Politics and Technology in the Post-Truth Era 9781787569843, 9781787569836, 9781787569850

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POLITICS AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE POST-TRUTH ERA

EMERALD STUDIES IN POLITICS AND TECHNOLOGY Series Editors: Anna Visvizi and Miltiadis D. Lytras This series focuses broadly on the intersection of politics and technology. Its objective is to identify and explore the critical junctions where politics and ICT intersect to showcase the opportunities, raise awareness, and pre-empt impending risks for our societies. The series has a broad scope and will include a variety of topics, including but not limited to: cyber intelligence; government analytics; user-generated data and its impact on human society; technology in health care and public services; quantitative measures in political discourse; public engagement with politics through technology – for example, blogs, social media, freedom of the internet; text mining; e-participation in politics and digital diplomacy; international trade on the ICT market; information security risks; political communication in online social networks; big data; e-government and e-democracy; digital activism; ICT in developing nations; digital media; smart cities; disruptive effects of technology in politics; internet governance; citizen journalism; the politics of migration and ICT; and the European Union and ICT. We are actively seeking proposals for this exciting new series – please contact the editors if you are interested in publishing in this Series. Interested in publishing in this series? Please contact the series’ editors, Drs Anna Visvizi and Miltiadis D. Lytras ([email protected] and [email protected]).

POLITICS AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE POST-TRUTH ERA

EDITED BY

ANNA VISVIZI Institute of East-Central Europe (IESW), Poland

MILTIADIS D. LYTRAS Effat University, Jeddah

United Kingdom – North America – Japan – India – Malaysia – China

Emerald Publishing Limited Howard House, Wagon Lane, Bingley BD16 1WA, UK First edition 2019 Selection and editorial matter © Anna Visvizi and Miltiadis D. Lytras. Published under exclusive licence. Individual chapters © respective Authors. Reprints and permissions service Contact: [email protected] No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without either the prior written permission of the publisher or a licence permitting restricted copying issued in the UK by The Copyright Licensing Agency and in the USA by The Copyright Clearance Center. Any opinions expressed in the chapters are those of the authors. Whilst Emerald makes every effort to ensure the quality and accuracy of its content, Emerald makes no representation implied or otherwise, as to the chapters’ suitability and application and disclaims any warranties, express or implied, to their use. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-78756-984-3 (Print) ISBN: 978-1-78756-983-6 (Online) ISBN: 978-1-78756-985-0 (Epub)

Contents

List of Figures

ix

List of Tables

xi

List of Contributors

xv

Chapter 1  Politics and ICT: Issues, Challenges, Developments Anna Visvizi and Miltiadis D. Lytras Chapter 2  From the Freedom of the Press to the Freedom of the Internet: A New Public Sphere in the Making? Cláudia Toriz Ramos Chapter 3  Diffusion Patterns of Political Content Over Social Networks Marçal Mora-Cantallops, Zhengqi Yan and Salvador Sánchez-Alonso Chapter 4  Contemporary Politics and Society: Social Media and Public Engagement in Belarus Victor Shadurski and Galina Malishevskaya Chapter 5  Modeling Public Mood and Emotion: Blog and News Sentiment and Politico-economic Phenomena Mu-Yen Chen, Min-Hsuan Fan, Ting-Hsuan Chen and Ren-Pao Hsieh Chapter 6  Political Campaigns, Social Media, and Analytics: The Case of the GDPR Nikolaos Dimisianos

1

9

23

43

57

73

vi   Contents

Chapter 7  Assessing Compliance of Open Data in Politics with European Data Protection Regulation Francesco Ciclosi, Paolo Ceravolo, Ernesto Damiani and Donato De Ieso Chapter 8  ICT, Politics, and Cyber Intelligence: Revisiting the Case of Snowden Emanuel Boussios Chapter 9  Government Surveillance, National Security, and the American Rights: Using Sentiment Analysis to Extract Citizen Opinions Lily Popova Zhuhadar and Mark Ciampa

89

115

129

Chapter 10  Information Security Risks in the Context of Russian Propaganda in the CEE Aleksandra Kuczyn´ska-Zonik and Agata Tatarenko

143

Chapter 11  The ICT and Its Uses: Fighting Corruption and Promoting Participatory Democracy – The Case of Romania Cristina Matiuta

159

Chapter 12  Virtual Currencies in Modern Societies: Challenges and Opportunities Higinio Mora, Francisco A. Pujol López, Julio César Mendoza Tello and Mario R. Morales Chapter 13  Digital Diplomacy in Practice: A Case Study of the Western Balkan Countries Gorazd Justinek, Sabina Carli and Ingrid Omahna Chapter 14  Social Media and the Brazilian Politics: A Close Look at the Different Perspectives and “The Brazil I Want” Initiative Cleber Pinelli Teixeira, Jônatas Castro dos Santos, Reisla D’Almeida Rodrigues, Sean Wolfgand Matsui Siqueira and Renata Araujo Chapter 15  Evaluation of the National Open Government Data (OGD) Portal of Saudi Arabia Stuti Saxena

171

187

203

221

Contents    vii

Chapter 16  E-Government Strategy and Its Impact on Economic and Social Development in Saudi Arabia Hussein Alhashimi Chapter 17  Romancing Top Management: The Politics of Top Management Support in Large Information System Projects Gloria H. W. Liu and Cecil E. H. Chua Chapter 18  Trade in ICT, International Economy, and Politics Katarzyna Z˙ukrowska

237

245 259

Chapter 19  Conclusion: Politics and ICT – Taking Stocks of the Debate Miltiadis D. Lytras and Anna Visvizi

283

Index

287

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List of Figures

Chapter 1 Fig. 1 Fig. 2

Politics and Technology Word Cloud. Politics and ICT: Key Issues and Areas Influence.

3 4

Chapter 3 Fig. 1 The Brexit Tweet Network. Fig. 2 In-degree CAR for Neutral, Positive, and Negative Stances within the Event Window. Fig. 3 Sentiment CAR for Neutral, Positive, and Negative Stances within the Event Window.

37 37 38

Chapter 5 Fig. 1 Fig. 2 Fig. 3 Fig. 4 Fig. 5

Research Framework. Financial News of Single Company and TAIEX Prediction. Financial News of TAIWAN 50 and TAIEX Prediction. Politics News and TAIEX Prediction. Financial and Political News and TAIEX Prediction.

65 67 68 68 69

Chapter 7 Fig. 1 Scheme Related to the Relationship between the Different Categories of Data. Fig. 2 The New Open Data Lifecycle by European Data Portal.

93 111

Chapter 9 Fig. 1 Q1 Topic Sentiment Versus Polarity. Fig. 2 Q2 Topic Sentiment Versus Polarity. Fig. 3 Q3 Topic Sentiment Versus Polarity. Fig. 4 Q4 Topic Sentiment Versus Polarity.

136 137 138 139

x    List of Figures

Chapter 12 Fig. 1 How Virtual Currency Works. Fig. 2 Autonomous Key Control. Fig. 3 Shared Key Control.

173 174 175

Chapter 14 Fig. 1 Overall Process of Data Gathering, Extraction, and Handling. Fig. 2 Sample of a Subtitle. Fig. 3 CNI X TBIW Data Occurrences Comparison.

210 211 214

Chapter 17 Fig. 1 A Two-stage Process for Selecting Influence Strategies to Obtain Top Management Support.

252

Chapter 18 Fig. 1 GVC Model of Cooperation. Fig. 2 Possible Development Path along the Software Value Chain.

275 279

Chapter 19 Fig. 1 ICT and Politics in the Post-truth Era.

284

List of Tables

Chapter 2 Table 1 ICT Development Index (2017). Table 2 Human Development Index (HDI) and Inequalityadjusted Human Development Index (IHDI) (2016). Table 3 Freedom on the Net and Freedom of the Press (2017).

17 17 18

Chapter 3 Table 1 Largest Communities in the Network before the Chinese Retaliation.32 Table 2 Largest Communities in the Network after the Chinese Retaliation. 33 Table 3 In-degree Changes Before and After the Event. 33 Table 4 Eigenvector Centrality Changes Before and After the Event in Liberal Media Accounts. 34 Table 5 In-degree and Eigenvector Centrality Variation before and after the Event for the Main Influencers. 35 Table 6 Communities in the Brexit Twitter Network. 36 Table 7 Top Five Users in the Three Main Communities. 36

Chapter 5 Table 1 Research Type for Sentiment Classification. Table 2 Literature Review for Sentiment Classification of Elections.

63 64

Chapter 7 Table 1 Summary of the Different Concepts of Personal Data. Table 2 Type of Circumstance from Which the Legal Status of the Data Controller Can Be Inferred. Table 3 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Techniques Considered. Table 4 Data Protection Techniques’ Common Mistakes and Risks.

92 94 97 99

xii    List of Tables

Chapter 9 Table 1 Issues Regarding How Private Data Are Gathered and Used.

132

Chapter 10 Table 1 Specifics of Russian Propaganda in CEE.

151

Chapter 11 Table 1 Digital Single Market, Inclusion, and Public Services.

161

Chapter 13 Table 1 Digital Diplomacy Review Ranking 2017 and 2016. Table 2 Population and Social Media Penetration. Table 3 Overview of the Facebook and Twitter Accounts (Foreign Ministry and Diplomatic Missions). Table 4 Digital Platforms Including Social Media by Country. Table 5 Frequency of Publishing on Social Media. Table 6 Levels of OGMM and Rankings of Observed Countries.

192 193 194 194 195 195

Chapter 14 Table 1 Sample of Keywords Equivalence TBIW x CNI. 211 Table 2 Sample of Salience Result of the Keyword Employment in TBIW. 211 Table 3 Count of Most Commented Keywords Grouped by Region and Ordered by Occurrence Rates in TBIW. 212 Table 4 Comparison between CNI Answers and TBIW Correspondence.213

Chapter 15 Table 1 Citizen Engagement Models Proposed by Sieber and Johnson (2015). Table 2 Model Proposed for Evaluating OGD Portals. Table 3 Major Facilitators and Hindrances in Re-using Datasets Via the National OGD Portal of Saudi Arabia.

225 226 230

Chapter 18 Table 1 ICT Goods Exports. Total, in Millions US$, 2000–2012. Table 2 Comparison of Five Continents’ Creative Industries and Their Share of GNP in 2015 (Billions US$ and Percentage) and of Jobs Created (Millions and %).

263 264

List of Tables    xiii Table 3 Value-added in the ICT Sector in Selected States in 2011 (Latest Data Available). 264 Table 4 ICT Employment as a Share of Total Employment (%) for 2011 (Latest Data Available). 265 Table 5 World Exports of Telecommunications and Computer and Information Services, 2014 and 2015. 266 Table 6 J. Williamson’s Consensus, with 10 Points Added by D. Rodrick. 267 Table 7 Trade Weighted Tariffs Applied (MFN) Average Tariffs Rates in Trade of EU and US. 269 Table 8 Perceived NTB Index by Business (Index between 0 and 100). 270 Table 9 Major Exporters and Importers of Telecommunications, Computer, and Information Services, 2014 and 2015 (Million US$ and %). 271 Table 10 Backward and Forward Participation in Regions and Countries in 2000 and 2011 (%). 276 Table 11 Share of Export-added Value in Developed and Developing Countries in Selected Industry Segments. 277 Table 12 Difficulties Suppliers Identify in Entering, Establishing, or Moving Up ICT Chains (% and Number of Suppliers). 279 Table 13 Level of Competition in Selected Telecommunications Markets.280

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List of Contributors

Hussein Alhashimi is a PhD Student and Demonstrator at Computer Science Department, School of Electronics and Computer Science- University of Southampton. Prior coming to the United Kingdom, he had worked as a lecturer at Software Engineering Department, King Saud University. His research interests focus on Software Engineering in particular software development life cycle, software architecture and agile methodologies. Renata Araujo is a Professor and Director of the Board of Education of the Brazilian Computer Society (2018–2019). Professor Araujo’s research interests include information systems, digital democracy, digital governance, business process management, and innovation management. Emanuel Boussios is a Visiting Research Scholar at New York University and Assistant Professor at SUNY-Nassau College. His research interests include analyzing American attitudes toward the War on Terrorism and domestic terrorism in the United States, as well as a study of national/international use of drones and on cyber intelligence. Sabina Carli is a Project Manager at the Centre for European Perspective (CEP), Slovenia. She was the United Nations Youth Delegate of Slovenia in 2017/2018. Her research focuses on EU–China relations, international relations in East Asia, language in foreign policy, and transformation of diplomacy. Jônatas Castro dos Santos is an M.Sc. Student at the Federal University of the State of Rio de Janeiro (UNIRIO). He works at Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). His main research interests include web of science, semantics and learning, social networks, and geographic information systems. Paolo Ceravolo is an Assistant Professor at the Dipartimento di Informatica, Università degli Studi di Milano. His research interests include data representation and integration, business process monitoring, and empirical software engineering. On these topics, he has published several scientific papers. As a data scientist, he was involved in several international research projects and in innovative startups. Mu-Yen Chen, is a Professor of Information Management at the National Taichung University of Science and Technology, Taiwan. His current research

xvi    List of Contributors interests include artificial intelligence, soft computing, bio-inspired computing, data mining, deep learning, context-awareness, machine learning, and financial engineering. Ting-Hsuan Chen is an Associate Professor in the Department of Finance at National Taichung University of Science and Technology, Taiwan. Her current research interests include financial institutions, corporate social responsibility, spatial analysis, and data/text mining. Cecil E. H. Chua is an Associate Professor in the Department of Information Systems and Operations Management, University of Auckland, New Zeeland. He is a Desk Editor for the Project Management Journal and an Associate Editor for Information & Management and the Information Systems Journal. Mark Ciampa is an Associate Professor in Information Systems, Gordon Ford College of Business, Western Kentucky University in Bowling Green, Kentucky. Dr Ciampa has worked in the IT industry as a Computer Consultant for businesses, government agencies, and educational institutions. Francesco Ciclosi is an Adjunct Professor at Macerata University. As an Analyst and Trainer, responsible for designing distributed systems services, his research interests include data protection, risk analysis, and information security management systems evolution. Ernesto Damiani is a Professor at Università degli Studi di Milano, Leader of the SESAR Research Lab, Leader of the Big Data Initiative at the EBTIC/Khalifa University in Abu Dhabi, UAE. He is the Principal Investigator of the H2020 TOREADOR project. He was a recipient of the Chester-Sall Award from the IEEE IES Society (2007). He was named ACM Distinguished Scientist (2008) and received the Stephen S. Yau Services Computing Award (2016). Donato De Ieso is the Founder of Dilium S.r.l. (2017) and InPolitix S.r.l. (2017), CEO at InPolitix. Donato De Ieso participated as an invited speaker to different business forums and conferences such as GLocal 2016 in Varese, Spaghetti Open-Data 2016 in Trento, Frontiers Conference 2017 and FutureLand 2017 in Milan. The areas of his expertise include virtual reality, augmented reality and artificial intelligence.. Nikolaos Dimisianos is a Management Information Systems graduate of Deree College – The American College of Greece. His research interests include innovation, digital transformation, business, and technology integration. Min-Hsuan Fan is an Associate Professor of Information Management at National Taichung University of Science and Technology, Taiwan. His current research interests include artificial intelligence and financial engineering. Ren-Pao Hsieh is a Graduate Student in Information Management at the National Taichung University of Science and Technology, Taiwan. His current research interests include artificial intelligence and financial engineering.

List of Contributors    xvii Gorazd Justinek is an Executive Director at the Centre for European Perspective (CEP), Slovenia. Dr. Justinek is a Diplomat and Assistant Professor of International Business at the Graduate School of Government and European Studies in Kranj, Slovenia. He is the Founder and the Editor-in-Chief of the International Journal of Diplomacy and Economy (UK). Aleksandra Kuczyn´ska-Zonik is an Assistant Professor at the Institute of Central Europe, before at Institute of East-Central Europe, Poland. Her expertise includes politics and security in East-Central Europe, Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet space, the Baltic states, Russian diaspora, and Soviet heritage. Gloria H. W. Liu is a Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in the Department of Operations Management & Information Systems, Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University. Her research interests include project control and coordination, knowledge management, and enterprise systems implementation/upgrade. Miltiadis D. Lytras, Ph.D., is a Research Professor at Deree College – The American College of Greece and Visiting Researcher at Effat University; as well as a Researcher, Editor, Lecturer, and Consultant. His expertise covers issues pertinent to the broad field defined by cognitive computing, information systems, technologyenabled innovation, social networks, computers in human behavior, and knowledge management. He focuses on bringing together advances in ICT and knowledge management to advance socio-economic sustainability and citizens’ wellbeing. Galina Malishevskaya is a Ph.D. Candidate, Deputy Director (Belapan Information Agency) and former Editor-in-Chief of the independent newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda in Belarus. As a Media Expert, Consultant, and Researcher, her expertise includes media trends analysis; political communications; new media development and monetization in digital environment, social media influence, and social activism; bilateral relations with neighboring countries and regional cooperation; Union State of Belarus and Russia. Cristina Matiuta is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Oradea, Romania. Author of several books and various articles in refereed journals. Her research interests cover the areas of active citizenship, governance, identity, and migration. Julio César Mendoza Tello is an Assistant Professor at the Central University of Ecuador. His research interests are payment systems, cryptocurrencies, and electronic commerce. Higinio Mora is an Associate Professor at the Computer Technology and Computation Department, and a Researcher of Specialized Processors Architecture Laboratory, University of Alicante, Spain. His areas of research interest include computer modeling, computer architectures, high performance computing, internet of things, and cloud computing paradigm.

xviii    List of Contributors Marçal Mora-Cantallops is an Industrial and Computer Engineer, Ph.D. in Communication, Information, and Technology in the Web Society by the University of Alcalá, Spain. He is currently interested in the fields of social network analysis, data science, and game studies. Mario R. Morales is an Assistant Professor in the Faculty of Engineering, Physical Sciences and Mathematics, Central University of Ecuador in Quito (Ecuador). The areas of his expertise include virtual currencies, new business models, sustainable development, and e-commerce. Ingrid Omahna is a Project Assistant at the Centre for European Perspective, focusing specifically on digital diplomacy projects. Her main research interests include transnational corporations and their influence on economic development of least developed countries. Cleber Pinelli Teixeira is a Ph.D. Candidate in Information Systems at the Federal University of the State of Rio de Janeiro (UNIRIO), Brazil. He is currently a member of Semantics and Learning research group; his main research interests include searching as learning, social search, collaborative learning, and web science. Francisco A. Pujol López is an Associate Professor in the Computer Technology, Department of the University of Alicante. He has several papers. His research interests focus on biometrics, pattern recognition, and computer parallel architectures. Reisla D’Almeida Rodrigues is an M.Sc. Student at the Federal University of the State of Rio de Janeiro (UNIRIO). Her research topics comprise information systems, collaboration, semantics, social networks, and social learning. Salvador Sánchez-Alonso, Associate Professor, is a Senior Member of the Information Engineering group, a research unit dependent of the Computer Science Department of the University of Alcalá, Spain. Author of a good number of publications in the last 10 years, his current research interests include social network analysis applications, data science, blockchain technologies, and ­technology-enhanced Learning. Stuti Saxena is a Ph.D. Candidate at the Central University of Haryana, India. Her research interests include open government data. Victor Shadurski is a Professor and Dean of the Faculty of International Relations of Belarusian State University. He coordinates (jointly with the Raoul Wallenberg Institute) several international projects in the field of human rights. His research interests include problems of the Belarusian foreign policy, bilateral relations of country, and regional integration on the example of the Baltic Sea Region.

List of Contributors    xix Sean W. M. Siqueira is an Associate Professor of the Federal University of the State of Rio de Janeiro (UNIRIO). He coordinates the Semantics and Learning Research Group at UNIRIO. His research areas include web science, information systems, and technology-enhanced learning. Agata Tatarenko, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor at the Institute of Central Europe, before at Institute of East-Central Europe, Poland. Areas of expertise include memory studies, including oral history and politics of memory in EastCentral Europe, and French foreign policy. Cláudia Toriz Ramos is an Assistant Professor at Universidade Fernando Pessoa, Porto, Portugal, and a Researcher at CEPESE (Porto). Her research interests cover European integration (theories of political integration, democratic procedures and legitimacy, party politics), and the theory and practice of democracy and democratization. Anna Visvizi, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor at Deree College – The American College of Greece, Greece and Visiting Researcher at Effat University; researcher, editor, policy advisor, and lecturer. Dr Visvizi’s expertise covers issues pertinent to the intersection of politics, economics, and ICT, which translates in her research and advisory role in such areas as international safety and security, international collaboration, international organizations (especially the OECD and the EU), smart cities and smart villages, politics and policy of migration, and innovation promotion. Zhengqi Yan is a Graduate Student in Business Data Analysis, University of Alcalá, Spain. His interests include international investment and international trade, and the trade between Spain and China in particular. Lily Popova Zhuhadar is an Associate Professor in the Computer Information Systems, Department of Western Kentucky University, USA. Her research interests include semantic web, smart cities, and sentiment analysis. Katarzyna Z˙ukrowska is a Professor and Director of the International Studies Institute, Warsaw School of Economics, Poland. An Economist and Political Scientist, her research interests focus on international economic relations, including economic security, international trade, FDI transfers and development.

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Chapter 1

Politics and ICT: Issues, Challenges, Developments Anna Visvizi and Miltiadis D. Lytras

Previous industrial revolutions liberated humankind from animal power, made mass production possible and brought digital capabilities to billions of people. This Fourth Industrial Revolution is, however, fundamentally different. It is characterized by a range of new technologies that are fusing the physical, digital and biological worlds, impacting all disciplines, economies and industries, and even challenging ideas about what it means to be human. (Schwab, 2017) Technological advances have been altering the dynamics of social interaction and societal processes ever since, with each subsequent industrial revolution bringing about new implications for our societies and economies, and thus for the political process and politics. The nature and scale of technological advances that influence socio-political and economic landscapes today make the correlation between technology and society seemingly more complex, more pervasive, and more challenging to comprehend (Visvizi et al., 2018; Ordóñez de Pablos & Lytras, 2018; Pérez-delHoyo, et al., 2018). Indeed, the context in which contemporary socio-political processes unfold defies easy categorizations. In many instances, the scale, the multivaried nature, and the pace of developments in world politics and economics make it challenging to identify the causal relationship behind them on the spot. Given the pace of information diffusion these days, in absence of imminent evidence-based explanations, room is created for perceptions and opinions to step in the debate and effectively crowd out objective facts. Touted as “post-truth”, this specific condition characterizing contemporary politics and society has been defined in a number of ways, sparkling a vivid debate in academia and elsewhere (D’Ancona, 2017; McIntire, 2018; Lewandowsky et al, 2017; Rochlin, 2017). In brief, it denotes the condition in which appearances are given priority over objectivity, and so interpretations, emotional and subjective assessments and evaluations cloud the essence of things and so the truth. What

Politics and Technology in the Post-Truth Era, 1–8 Copyright © 2019 Anna Visvizi and Miltiadis D. Lytras doi:10.1108/978-1-78756-983-620191001

2    Anna Visvizi and Miltiadis D. Lytras is particularly worrying are the implications of the prevalence of assumptions and unfounded interpretations for the social and political processes. A case can be made that by viewing the reality through the prism of frequently misjudged assumptions, rather than through the lens of objectivity, leads the members of our societies to a self-assuring oblivion, self-complacency and muted alertness to pressing needs and challenges that our societies face (Visvizi, 2018). Considering the dialectical relationship between technological advances and post-truth, and the impact they have exert on politics and society today, the objective of this volume is to offer an insight into “the what,” “the how,” and the “to what end” pertinent in the discussion on information and communication technologies (ICT) and politics at macro-, mezzo-, and micro-levels of politics and policy making. This edited volume brings together and discusses critically the well-established, emerging, and nascent concerns and questions related to the impact of ICT on our societies, especially on the field of politics. By embedding the discussion in a broad conceptual framework and reaching out to case studies, this volume offers a journey into technological advances and showcases how sophisticated technology impacts politics and the policy-making process around the world today. By integrating views and insights from several continents and by focusing on several issue areas, this edited volume serves as a primer on the emerging and contentious relationship between the promise and the potential ICT holds for politics. The chapters included in this volume take a multi- and inter-disciplinary take on the role of ICT in shaping diverse layers of politics in its local, regional, and global outreach. Drawing on their extensive experience in academia, politics, and the think-tank sector, the authors contributing to this volume elaborate on the intricacies of technologies and paradigms that shape the field of technological innovation today such as the big data paradigm, data mining, data analytics, social media mining methodologies and sentiment analysis, cognitive computing and artificial intelligence, virtual reality, augmented reality, and blockchain technologies. These are then applied to real-life events and/ or processes to demonstrate the inseparability of ICT and politics today. The authors contributing to this volume query the prospect and the potential related to open data, data analytics, and data mining for data-driven decision process in view of optimizing the performance of public administration and promoting a healthy relationship between the public and the private sector. The chapters included in this volume dwell also on a variety of issues bound to steer the debate on privacy in times of data mining. Moreover, drawing on the case of Snowden, questions of civic responsibility, safety, and national security are upheld. Fig. 1 mirrors the variety of topics and issues that the authors contributing to the volume have dealt with. The chapters included in this volume pertain to all spheres of human interaction, including private life, wellbeing, civic engagement, as well as democracy. Questions of safety and security have been also examined carefully both in connection to citizens’ privacy and freedom from unauthorized use of their personal data and to questions of cyber warfare. Equally important in the debate in the

Politics and ICT    3

Fig. 1:  Politics and Technology Word Cloud. volume have been questions of ethical dilemmas that the ICT and its use generate. The notion of the regulatory framework within which ICT and its impact on our societies unfolds has gained attention in the book too. Overall, the 19 chapters included in this volume have been grouped in three thematic parts covering democracy, security, and policy making. Fig. 2 offers an overview of the key topics and issues discussed in the volume. The chapters included in this volume introduce the reader into a great number of case studies. Together, they mirror several of the most topical processes and trends that define the fields of domestic and international politics these days. Specifically, the following country case studies have been included in this volume, alphabetically: Angola Belarus, Brazil, Egypt, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, China, Tunisia, the United States, and Zimbabwe. The authors upheld such topics as cyber warfare and propaganda, questions of surveillance in context of national security, issues pertaining to data collection and processing, also as seen from the regulatory perspective. The case of Snowden was discussed in detail, albeit from different perspectives in two chapters. E-government initiatives have been queried. The geographical focus of the discussion covered areas such as Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Western Balkans, the Arab World, Sub-Saharan Africa, North America, and Asia. Following this introduction, in Chapter 2 titled “From the Freedom of the Press to the Freedom of the Internet: A New Public Sphere in the Making?” Cláudia Toriz Ramos explores the synergies that emerge among ICT, democracy promotion, transparency, and the state-building process. By focusing on the cases of Tunisia, Egypt, Angola, and Zimbabwe, the author examines in which ways the internet, seen as a “public sphere” for processes of regime transition, may serve as a mean of promoting democracy and freedom of speech.

social media transparency fake news propaganda state-building process political mood prediction models

surveillance

open government

trusted infrastructures

e-government

privacy data protection cyber warfare cyber terrorism risk identification threat detection

POLICY MAKING

internet as virtual 'public space' (αγορά)

SECURITY

DYCARCOME

4    Anna Visvizi and Miltiadis D. Lytras

e-diplomacy political content diffusion social media, public discourse, political agenda elections data-driven policymaking

Fig. 2:  Politics and ICT: Key Issues and Areas Influence. In Chapter 3, Marçal Mora-Cantallops, Zhengqi Yan, and Salvador SánchezAlonso discuss the patterns of political content diffusion in social networks. As the authors argue, over the past few years, ICT and social media have become increasingly relevant to politicians and political parties alike, often used to issue statements or campaigning, among others. At the same time, citizens have become more involved in politics, partly due to the highly interactive and social environments that the social networking services provide. Political events flow through these networks, influencing their users; such events, however, often start offline (outside the online platform) and are, therefore, difficult to track. Event studies, a methodology often used in financial and economic studies, can be translated to social networks to help modeling the effect of external events in the network. Accordingly, the event study methodology is applied to two cases, including the tariff war between the United States and China, with multiple responses and retaliations from both sides, and to the Brexit referendum. In Chapter 4, titled “Contemporary Politics and Society: Social Media and Public Engagement in Belarus,” Victor Shadurski and Galina Malishevskaya employ the case of Belarus and the contradictions inherent in its socio-political model to showcase how the onset of the ICT and therefore the evolution of the means of spreading information amplifies these contradictions. To this end, the authors highlight the increased engagement of the state authorities in the online information domain. Interestingly, the authors elaborate as well how the remaining stakeholders, including opinion leaders, activists, and bloggers, can use the online information domain to make their cases. The chapter includes case studies detailing how exactly information technologies and online communication contribute to the formation of a new socio-political agenda in the country. The key examples relate to situations where, owing to extensive public engagement and support for online appeals, it became possible to use mechanisms of legitimate influence on government decision making and bring to account officials responsible for concealing information. The following Chapter 5 adds to the discussion on social media by offering a more nuanced view of methodologies enabling targeted and purposeful use of social media as a tool of policy making. Indeed, in the chapter, titled “Modeling

Politics and ICT    5 Public Mood and Emotion: Blog and News Sentiment and Politico-economic Phenomena,” Mu-Yen Chen, Min-Hsuan Fan, Ting-Hsuan Chen, and Ren-Pao Hsieh discuss the exploitation of advanced computational techniques, such as text mining and sentiment analysis in social media. By focusing on the value added of big data mining and analysis, the authors demonstrate how to use information otherwise contained to the spheres of political blogs and news articles to build a public mood prediction model. The authors focus specifically on the stock market and Taiwan. Clearly, selected insights from their research might well be employed in political analysis. Chapters 6 and 7 are devoted to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) introduced in the European Union (EU) on May 25, 2018. Nikolaos Dimisianos, in his chapter titled “Political Campaigns, Social Media and Analytics: The Case of the GDPR,” discusses the impact of sophisticated technologies on political campaigns’ design, management, execution, and impact. The author examines in which ways social media, social media analytics, and disruptive technologies are combined and leveraged in political campaigns to increase the probability of victory through micro-targeting, voter engagement, and public relations. More specifically, the importance of community detection, social influence, natural language processing and text analytics, machine learning, and predictive analytics are assessed and reviewed in relation to political campaigns. Data processing is examined through the lens of the GDPR and its provisions. The author concludes that while data processing during political campaigns does not violate the GDPR, electoral campaigns engage in surveillance, thereby violating Articles 12 and 19, in respect to private life, and freedom of expression accordingly, as stated in the 1948s Universal Declaration of Human Rights. From a slightly different angle, Chapter 7, titled “Assessing Compliance of Open Data in Politics with European Data Protection Regulation,” authored by Francesco Ciclosi, Paolo Ceravolo, Ernesto Damiani, and Donato De Ieso, examines the compliance of open data, as applied in politics, with the GDPR requirements. Particular attention in this context is paid to legal questions pertaining to the data processing procedures, including open data licenses and anonymization techniques. Chapters 8 and 9 uphold the big question of government surveillance in the United States following the case of Snowden. Specifically, in Chapter 8, titled “ICT, Politics and Cyber Intelligence: Revisiting the Case of Snowden,” Emanuel Boussios investigates how cyber intelligence and cyber terrorism impact national security, surveillance, and privacy. The author focuses on a critical issue in cyber intelligence in the United States that concerns the engagement of state-owned, or state-controlled, entities with overseeing citizens’ activity in cyberspace. The emphasis in the discussion is placed on the constitutionality of state actions and the shifting boundaries in which the state can act in the name of security to protect its people from the nation’s enemies. The case of Snowden, discussed in this chapter, reveals the US government’s abuses of this surveillance machinery prompting major debates around the topics of privacy, national security, and mass digital surveillance. In a similar manner, in Chapter 9, titled “Government Surveillance, National Security, and the American Rights: Using Sentiment Analysis to Extract

6    Anna Visvizi and Miltiadis D. Lytras Citizen Opinions,” Lily Popova Zhuhadar, and Mark Ciampa, discuss the case of Snowden to examine citizens’ opinions about privacy and security. Questions of national security and threat to national security born in cyberspace are the focus on the following chapter (Chapter 10). Aleksandra Kuczyn´ska-Zonik and Agata Tatarenko in their chapter titled “Information Security Risks in the Context of Russian Propaganda in the CEE” outline the problem of information security in Russia and CEE countries since the year 2000. The authors demonstrate the specifics of Russian propaganda in the CEE, which visibly poses a security threat to those countries. The authors present the evolution of Russian information policy, propaganda, its tools, and instruments, including traditional and social media. In Chapter 11, titled “The ICT and its Uses: Fighting Corruption and Promoting Participatory Democracy – The Case of Romania,” Cristina Matiuta examines ICT, online communication, institutional transparency, anticorruption, and participatory tools as an integral approach to engaged citizenship. As the author argues, the Internet and digital technologies have become part of our life, essential for several daily activities and new powerful means of communication as well, able to invigorate the traditional forms of interaction between citizens and public institutions. The chapter examines their spread across the EU, and particularly in Romania, and their potential to promote transparency and accountability within the public institutions, to fight against corruption, and to expand citizens’ social mobilization. Even if Romania has much to do to provide quality online public services, to increase the efficiency in public administration, and to improve the communication between citizens and institutions, the examples and best practices mentioned in the chapter highlight the potential of ICT both as anti-corruption and participatory tools. In Chapter 12, Higinio Mora, Francisco A. Pujol López, Julio César Mendoza Tello, and Mario R. Morales discuss the role of virtual currencies in modern societies, especially the challenges and opportunities they generate. As the authors argue, virtual currency is a digital representation of value that is neither issued by a central bank nor issued by a public authority. Its reliability is based on advanced cryptographic methods which provide privacy and confidence to citizens. Virtual currency and its underlying technologies such as blockchain or smart contracts trigger transformation in many areas of the society’s functioning. Cryptocurrencies in this view constitute a good example of how specific technology may lead to substantial transformation of the world. Still, virtual currencies could benefit from the versatility of collaborative communication of social media and Internet to promote and develop new commerce and business initiatives as well as new forms of financial flow managements. Chapter 13, titled “Digital Diplomacy in Practice: A Case Study of the Western Balkan Countries,” by Gorazd Justinek, Sabina Carli, and Ingrid Omahna, addresses the link between ICT and digital diplomacy. The focus of this chapter is directed at Western Balkans and efforts invested in the promotion of Open Government in the region. As the authors argue, global mass communications and advances in ICT present a new challenge to the traditional way of conducting international relations. While the mode of conducting diplomacy is changing, diplomats are forced to communicate with many new actors in the international stage through new means of communication. The chapter overviews the existing digital

Politics and ICT    7 diplomacy research reports. Against this backdrop, it presents the outcomes of a 2017–2018 study of communication strategies employed by six countries of the Western Balkans, including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. The role of ICT in enhancing citizens’ involvement in the day-to-day policy making is showcased in Chapters 14, 15, and 16. Both chapters offer detailed case studies, pertinent to Brazil and Saudi Arabia, respectively. The discussion in Chapter 14 revolves around social media and politics. The chapter titled “Social Media and the Brazilian Politics: A Close Look at the Different Perspectives and ‘The Brazil I Want’ Initiative,” by Cleber Pinelli Teixeira, Jônatas Castro dos Santos, Reisla D’Almeida Rodrigues, Sean Wolfgand Matsui Siqueira, and Renata Araujo, provides an excellent case study depicting how to use social media in a positive manner. In the context of Web 2.0., social media have established themselves as a part of citizen’s daily routine. Hence, social media have a direct impact on politics today. This chapter examines this phenomenon and its implications for politics by tracing and examining the recent initiative launched by Rede Globo aimed at collecting citizens’ views and visions on Brazil’s future. “The Brazil I Want” project sought to encourage citizens to publish videos featuring their visions and views of Brazil’s future. Thousands of citizens used this opportunity to express their concerns and hopes related to the future of their cities and their country. This chapter demonstrates to what extent and how social media can serve as source of information, to feed the policy-making process in view of boosting its efficiency and, thus, a society’s wellbeing. In Chapter 15, Stuti Saxena evaluates the national Open Government Data (OGD) portal of Saudi Arabia. As the author highlights, OGD, a philosophy and set of policies, gains on momentum today. Believed to promote transparency, accountability, and value creation by making government data available to all, OGD constitutes a yet another field in which the interlocking relation between technological advances and politics can be studied. Using the national OGD portal of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a case study, the author evaluates the portal to underline the significance of maintaining the quality of the datasets published online. The findings suggest that there are many drivers to re-use the datasets published via the portal. At the same time, however, there are barriers to re-use the datasets on account of the non-publication of updated datasets. Implicitly, quality of the datasets should be improved. More involvement of the government agencies is required for contributing toward the datasets. Also, user involvement should be promoted by encouraging them to contribute to the datasets and lending recommendations for the improvization of the datasets published via the portal. The case of Saudi Arabia is elaborated in further detail in Chapter 16. Hussein Alhashimi examines the features and implications of the e-government initiative, especially as applied in the field of financial transactions and their transparency. In Chapter 17, Gloria H. W. Liu and Cecil E.H. Chua examine the local politics behind large information systems projects to showcase how arduous a process it can be. As the authors explain, getting the top management support for projects of this kind is often difficult, because top management has multiple priorities. Political maneuvering is thus an integral and necessary part of the process of

8    Anna Visvizi and Miltiadis D. Lytras obtaining top management support. In Chapter 18 Katarzyna Z˙ukrowska examines the ICT market and the role of ICT in the global economy. As the author argues, the analysis of the relationship between ICT and politics would be incomplete if the direct and indirect influence ICT exerts on international economy was not considered. This chapter examines the features of the international trade in ICT seen as a complex reflection of the current stage of liberalization achieved at the forum of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and subsequent spillovers to other domains of economic and political collaboration worldwide. It is argued that ICT and its development not only result in the “shrinking of the distance” in the world economy but also stimulate economic liberalization, further reshuffling production from more- to less-advanced economies, and, finally, help to overcome trade imbalances on the global scale. In brief, a case is made that ICT creates the conditions conducive to the enhancement of international political and economic collaboration. The discussion in the volume concludes with a Chapter by Miltiadis D. Lytras and Anna Visvizi, titled “Conclusion: ICT and Politics – Taking Stocks of the Debate,” where the editors of the volume take stocks of the points and ideas presented in the volume to highlight both the new avenues of research pertinent to the fields and their potential application in socio-political life. By bringing together research reflecting on developments in Europe, the United States, Asia, and Africa, this edited volume serves as a primer on the emerging, sometimes contentious, but overall misunderstood, relationship between the promise and potential inherent in ICT and the world of politics. The editors are hopeful that the book will prove useful for students, researchers, and practitioners working in the fields of politics, international relations, and computer science.

References D’Ancone, M. (2017). Post truth. The new war on truth and how to fight back. London, UK: Ebury Press. Lewandowsky, S., Ecker, U. K. H., Cook, J. (2017). Beyond misinformation: Understanding and coping with the “Post-Truth” era, Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 6(4), 353–369. McIntire, L. (2018). The post-truth. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Ordóñez de Pablos, P., Lytras, M. (2018). Knowledge management, innovation and big data: Implications for sustainability, policy making and competitiveness. Sustainability,10, 2073. Pérez-delHoyo, R., Andújar-Montoya, M. D., Mora, H., Gilart-Iglesias, V. (2018). Unexpected consequences in the operation of urban environments, Kybernetes. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1108/K-02-2018-0096 Rochlin, N. (2017). Fake news: belief in post-truth. Library Hi Tech, 35(3), 386–392. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1108/LHT-03-2017-0062 Schwab, K. (2017). The fourth industrial revolution. Geneva: The World Economic Forum. Visvizi, A. (2018). Ambiguities of security, collaboration and policymaking in Central Europe. Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe (#YIESW), 16(4), 7–14. Visvizi, A., Lytras, M. D., Daniela, L. (2018). Education, innovation and the prospect of sustainable growth and development. In Visvizi, A., Lytras, M. D., Daniela, L. (Eds.), The future of innovation and technology in education: Policies and practices for teaching and learning excellence, Emerald Studies in Higher Education, Innovation and Technology (pp. 297–305), Bingley, UK: Emerald Publishing. ISBN: 9781787565562. doi:10.1108/ 978-1-78756-555-520181015.

Chapter 2

From the Freedom of the Press to the Freedom of the Internet: A New Public Sphere in the Making? Cláudia Toriz Ramos Abstract Democracy requires free speech, but the channels for free speech and communication vary across time and place. With reference to ongoing democratization processes, or to potential ruptures inside of authoritarian regimes, the role of mass communication, both by means of the conventional press and the internet, is an unavoidable topic of study. The chapter examines the specificities of the internet as a “public sphere” for processes of regime transition, notably its transnational character, its potential for informal communication, its interactive character, the networking capacity it creates, and its medium-term political socialization potential. It also covers new censorship strategies designed by states to limit the freedom of the internet. The role of the internet in fostering democratization in four African cases (Tunisia, Egypt, Angola, and Zimbabwe) is then studied, namely by considering material infrastructures, underlying socio-cultural conditions, and the efforts made by governments to curb its political effects. The conclusion discusses the potential of the internet for fostering the breakup of authoritarian regimes and subsequent democratization processes, with reference to the African cases studied. Keywords: Freedom of the internet; virtual public sphere; democratization; censorship; ICT; Africa

Politics and Technology in the Post-Truth Era, 9–22 Copyright © 2019 Cláudia Toriz Ramos doi:10.1108/978-1-78756-983-620191002

10    Cláudia Toriz Ramos

Introduction In recent years, information and communication technologies (ICT) have rapidly changed the patterns of information diffusion and communication across the world. The internet, in particular, has created a global network enabling massive information transactions, through the breadth, speed, and increasingly low price of the processes involved. At the same time, global relations have substantially incorporated the idea of “democracy” as a value to be promoted across the world, in tandem with development. Democratization processes, whether originating internally, externally or both need efficient communication for the spreading of ideas, mobilization of the people, and the creation of a democratic “public sphere” where common interest can be debated in public forums. A democratic culture in the making, from the electoral threshold to deeply rooted political participation, requires free speech and free and broad debates. The internet apparently provides the optimum locus for such debate and it is therefore relevant to ask how it impacts upon authoritarianism and if and how it fosters processes of democratization. The chapter thus begins with a discussion on the relations between ICT and democratization processes, seeking to characterize the main changes they have introduced. In its second part, the chapter analyzes cases. There has been substantial debate on the role of ICT and the internet in the recent “Arab Spring” attempts at democratization. In line with those discussions, and because Africa, after decolonization, is a major field for emerging democratization processes, the research draws on four African cases, two from North Africa (Tunisia and Egypt) and two from Southern Africa (Zimbabwe and Angola). It focuses on the spread of ICT in those countries, the reception conditions and the ways extant regimes deal with the freedom of the internet, notably in comparison with the freedom of the press. A new type of censorship is said to be emerging, either permanently or at critical junctures, particularly at the time of elections. Its role in political processes is therefore worthy of analysis. The case studies mainly rely on data from international indices and associated reports. This information normally originates from international organizations (governmental and non-governmental) or advocacy groups that conduct systematic documental and empirical research. However, some caution must be adopted in considering the data, because its field collection is often done in political environments that are hostile to the idea of democracy and to free speech. Besides, internal informers are also alive to the advocacy potential of watchdog organizations and the international publication of domestic data, and are therefore not neutral in the process. As a rule, those organizations publish the methodological and technical details of the studies they undertake. Furthermore, the choice of cases was conditioned by data availability, since coverage of the African continent is discontinuous.

ICT and Democratization Democracy requires free speech, but the channels for free speech and communication vary across time and place. The role of mass communication, both

From the Freedom of the Press to the Freedom of the Internet    11 conventional and on the internet, is an unavoidable topic in studying transition from authoritarianism and democratization. Free speech is a precondition for democracy (Dahl, 1989). The creation of a public sphere, by means of free mass communication and wide public debate, is part of the democratic culture and lays foundations for a consolidated democracy (Habermas, 1991). Yet democracies are not always, and not always from the beginning, bottom-up processes deeply rooted in mass adhesion and participation. Elite-guided processes or the trends of international influence have often acted upon political processes of transition, leaving mass mobilization for a subsequent phase (Welzel & Inglehart, 2008). Nevertheless, a rooted democracy requires a democratic political culture. Some democratization processes rely on mass mobilization and its pressure for the implementation of democracy, what Welzel (2009) calls “responsive democratization” (p. 87). In this case, the population must have been exposed to patterns of democracy and have internalized a positive attitude toward democratic values and practices. No wonder authoritarian governments are concerned with limiting the access of the populations over which they rule to sources of mass communication. Censorship has a long history of walking hand in hand with authoritarianism and has given rise to many typical ways of impeding access to information, among them hampering the existence of a free media. Moreover, transitional regimes are also not always on good terms with the freedom of information (Rose, 2009; Zakaria, 1997). From this point of view, the recent “revolution” in ICT has subverted the conventional paths of democratization (Best & Wade, 2009; Salgado, 2014). A global “media-saturated” environment has emerged, substantially relying on the new ICT and allowing countries to “leapfrog” more conventional steps of mass mobilization (Ferdinand, 2000; Voltmer & Rawnsley, 2009). ICT have introduced a major change in communication and information processes that defies conventional censorship. The capacity to “spread the word” and to mobilize citizens’ participation has been widely increased and follows patterns that escape the full control of the states, despite the many attempts to limit it. The new paradigm in mass communication has therefore changed the conditions for regime transition and even for the consolidation of democracy – a process that has already contributed to what has been termed by some democracy’s “fourth wave” (Howard & Hussain, 2013). What then are these new ICT and what is it that might make a difference in the public sphere? Howard and Hussain (2013) offer a definition of what they term “digital media” as encompassing three main dimensions: a new information infrastructure; a new type of content; and a new and broader type of users. The material infrastructure is neither even nor universal, but it is expanding (ITU, 2017a; UNDP, 2016b, pp. 39–41). Internet infrastructures, for instance, require material networks, providers, state authorizations, market conditions, financial resources, and knowledge. Mobile phones, however, have filled many a pocket with small, smart, and easy-to-use devices that democratize access to information and multiply users’ interaction and networking capabilities, making each individual a potential terminal nodal point in a network of regime subversion and democratization (UNDP, 2016b, p. 39–41).

12    Cláudia Toriz Ramos Contents are as diversified as the multiplicity of sources that the networks are able to connect, no longer depend upon conventional channels, and thus challenge usual censorship procedures. As for the users, the process does not equally reach all strata of a country’s population or all regions in the world. Men, but also younger, wealthier, and more educated people are more prone to be exposed to ICT, according to digital divide statistics (ITU, 2017a; UNDP, 2016a, 2016b). This chapter is particularly focused on the specificities of the internet as potential creator of a new “public sphere,” where public debate boosts processes of regime transition and democratization (cf. Best & Wade, 2009; Papacharissi, 2009). Firstly, it must be made clear that communication by means of the new digital media is transnational. This is not to say that previous processes of democratization were not – actually the word “wave” was often used to aggregate cognate cases of national democratization – but the transnational dimension of internet has fostered processes of political communication beyond borders, thus introducing a new meaning to the term. Nor can it be ignored that, in the dominant global order, democracy itself has become a “tool” of globalization, in that it is deliberately associated with processes of development and modernization, often promoted by international governmental and non-governmental organizations and dominant states. As Howard and Hussain (2013) put it, there is “a global conversation about the politics of freedom” (p. 55) going on. This also means that the people are now more exposed to “liberal cultural values” (Howard & Hussain, 2013, p. 63) than ever before, that is to say, to the cultural underpinnings of Western democracy. International media and international broadcasting had already raised a relevant debate on the “CNN effect” and the “Al Jazeera effect” (McNair, 2009; Voltmer & Rawnsley, 2009). Although they should not be overrated, it is undeniable that they provide cross-border information and exempla on political changes and political patterns that at the very least enable comparison. However, the core question is on the cultural reception of such information, since democracy should not be naively deemed universal. Furthermore, “glocal” adaptations of democratic frameworks may result in rather puzzling outcomes, as happened in Egypt, with the emergence of bottom-up movements of radical political Islamism (Lynch, 2017). Therefore, the debate is not so much on bottom-up national democratization as it is on globalization’s potential for the standardization of political values and practices. A second characteristic is the fact that mass communication does not run exclusively through the conventional channels of the mass media. On the contrary, it is highly informal, relying on private users and their equipment and thus decentralized and difficult to frame. Internet users can navigate it for information, but can also network through social networks or be users of virtual private networks (VPN) that circumvent control mechanisms. Blogging or microblogging as in twitter have become daily common practices for many people worldwide. Mobile phones are often the tools for these permanent virtual conversations and have provided the world with instant photos, sounds, videos, and texts on ongoing

From the Freedom of the Press to the Freedom of the Internet    13 affairs in the many parts of the world – a phenomenon that has been termed “citizens’ journalism” (Howard & Hussain, 2013; McNair, 2009). Campaigning for causes now uses a series of new tools, from messages broadcasted by watchdog organizations to new music styles identified with social and political protest, such as digital hip-hop, for example. The number and diversity of messages thus renders censure a herculean task (Deibert, 2009; Howard & Hussain, 2013). A third characteristic is that this communication is not a one-way process; it is bilateral and multilateral, that is, the infrastructures used foster the potential for truly interactive communication. Instant and low-cost communication enhances the possibilities for public debate. As a result, it might be argued that a “virtual public sphere” is in the making – it does not rely on physical spaces where people come together to dialogue, but the dialogue does go on in a virtual space where ideas can be shared and discussed, causes made known and advocated, initiatives set up, and even revolutions started. The potential for fostering political participation is therefore enormous, inviting the masses to step out of passivism into activism (McNair, 2009; Papacharissi, 2009; Thornton, 2001). The networking capacity it creates is a fourth and major characteristic. Conditions for citizens’ mobilization have thus changed (Voltmer & Rawnsley, 2009). Horizontal and decentralized peer-to-peer communication enables fast and difficult to trace social movements that can materialize in street action (well-known examples are the Arab Spring or the Occupy movement). Digital activism has become an unavoidable subject, and its internal and external networking capacities are remarkable. Mass mobilization and social movements hence have to be addressed in a new manner (Earl, Hunt, Garrett, & Dal, 2015). Finally, the potential for transnational political socialization stemming from these new means of communication is enormous and introduces a major breach in conventional authoritarian processes of domination. At the same time, because ICT foster “good governance,” transparency, accountability, and popular participation can be reinforced in recent democracies, thus paving the way for democratic consolidation (Ferdinand, 2000; Howard & Hussain, 2013). The response from authoritarian regimes is also relevant in that it is reshaping censorship procedures (Deibert, 2009; Nam, 2017). The Freedom House (2017b) “freedom on the net index” considers three basic dimensions upon which states willing to foster internet censorship act: obstacles to access; limits to contents; and violation of user rights. For the first, state authorities can decide on internet blackouts (for instance, disconnecting the national internet information infrastructure). However, permanent blackouts have proven to hinder not only citizens’ free communication, but also state-citizens internal communication and external communication of the commercial, financial, or even diplomatic interests of the government. They therefore tend to determine temporary national blackouts, namely at the time of elections, to hinder free communication but without turning it into permanent isolation. More selective information blocking tools, which require technical know-how on the side of the governments, may also be activated. The disabling of national mobile phones has at times been ordered (Freedom House, 2017b;

14    Cláudia Toriz Ramos Howard & Hussain, 2013). Nevertheless, the fact that conventional political territoriality does not strictly apply to the virtual space of ICT means that full success in blackout attempts cannot be guaranteed (Deibert, 2009). The second strategy is conventional content censorship, but its efficacy is highly challenged both by the technological sophistication of present-day communication and by the huge amount of content circulating. Governments sometimes remove contents. Another possibility is blocking and filtering contents. Both imply the capacity to trace “threatening” information, a process that also relies on sophisticated and systematic technological tools (such as deep packet inspection systems). Some states have rerouted internet cables through state-security servers, as in Saudi Arabia (Howard & Hussain, 2013, p. 71), so that they can filter contents before they reach the public. Blacklisting and blocking websites is also common. In order to counter technological resources for circumventing internet filtering, bans on VPN software and anonymization providers have also been applied. At times, states have also used counterinsurgency strategies, by sending false information via the internet, or even manipulating the contents of the mass media, and thus misleading and eventually entrapping protesters (Deibert, 2009; Freedom House, 2017b; Howard & Hussain, 2013). As a whole, it very much looks like a never-ending cat-and-mouse game, albeit a very risky one, at least for the weaker party in the process. The third is the violation of user rights. States may indeed resort to limiting free speech, by passing laws that establish limits to ICT. States can also resort to technological sophistication in order to identify, survey, and eventually prosecute users. Social mobilization on the internet can also be traced by the state authorities it is meant to oppose. Once identified, participants may be put under surveillance, and their movement undermined. Some governments have also made technical attacks, such as password phishing, or flooding and malware practices. Sheer intimidation and violence, prosecutions, and detentions complete the frame (Deibert, 2009; Freedom House, 2017b; Howard & Hussain, 2013). The debate on the freedom of the internet is also tricky, in terms of the principles, because not only dictatorial states breach it, democratic states also resort to some of the abovementioned techniques on claims of internal and external security. Where the boundaries are to be drawn is therefore a contested issue, not least because conventional legal frameworks fall short of this new territoriality and of the new social relations of the virtual space (Deibert, 2009). Finally, the connections between internet diffusion in developing countries and democratization processes are also relevant. It is pertinent to consider the action of states and major IGOs and NGOs in fostering development and promoting democracy or its archetype of human rights and rule of law. As stated in the Swedish International Development Cooperation framework: “ICT have the potential to contribute to economic development and democratization – including freedom of speech, the free flow of information and the promotion of human rights – and poverty reduction” (APC, 2009, p. 13). The objective of poverty reduction attached to development projects also has close ties with democratization. In other words, it is highly unlikely that democracy will settle in countries deeply torn by poverty, or, as Welzel (2009) puts it,

From the Freedom of the Press to the Freedom of the Internet    15 “In models explaining democratization, measures of income distribution are often used and have many times been found to significantly increase the chances of democracy to emerge and survive” (p. 79). Individual as well as collective wealth will thus have a major impact on widespread literacy and on internet affordability, for example, both major pre-conditions for ICT to promote democracy. In broad terms, this is about the connection between democratization and “human empowerment” as explained by Welzel and Inglehart (2008). Also, the United Nations in its 2015 Sustainable Development Goals, gives one of its targets under goal nine as: to “Significantly increase access to information and communications technology and strive to provide universal and affordable access to the Internet in least developed countries by 2020” (United Nations, 2018a). Furthermore, it commits to promoting “peace, stability, human rights and effective governance” under goal 16 and thus pledges to “ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements” (United Nations, 2018b).

The Internet and Democratization in Africa: Case Studies The cases chosen for illustrating the debate on the relations between democratization and the internet are African national cases, since Africa is a recurrent scenario of attempts to democratize, in the framework of state construction after colonialism. While some parts of the continent have already attained reasonable levels of democratic consolidation, others are still undergoing troubled processes of transition, if not living under downright authoritarianism. For the focus of this chapter, it seemed useful to choose cases representing remaining authoritarianism, or recent transition and its setbacks. A further major constraint for the choice is the lack of systematic information on internet freedom for all states of the African continent (cf. Freedom House, 2017b). Consequently four cases were selected, from two very different sub-regions: Tunisia and Egypt in North Africa, sometimes regionally identified as “Arab countries” (ITU, 2017a); and Angola and Zimbabwe, in Southern Africa. With reference to democratization, their history is diverse and its explanation requires some contextualization. Tunisia and Egypt are countries that underwent the “Arab Spring” in 2011, a wave of attempts at democratization that hinged on ICT technology for mass mobilization. However, the respective outcomes have been different (Lynch, 2017; Szmolka, 2015). Tunisia, independent since 1956, is at present a parliamentary republic, in accordance with its 2014 constitution, and a functioning democracy even if not a consolidated one – it is classified as a “flawed democracy” in the Democracy Index 2016 (EIU, 2017). Its main problems are of an economic nature (economic stagnation and high unemployment) leading to some social unrest, as recent demonstrations against austerity measures show (The Guardian, 2018). Furthermore, its geopolitical position, as part of the Arab and Islamic world (over 90% of the population is Sunni Muslim), makes the country a potential hotbed for the troubled security problems religious radicalism and terrorism have brought into the region (CIA, 2018c).

16    Cláudia Toriz Ramos Unlike Tunisia, Egypt (independent since 1952) has not encountered roots for a solid transition in the aftermath of the 2011 protests and Mubarak’s overthrow, having recurrently fallen into protests and violence. The political system of government is a presidential republic, according to the 2014 constitution, and both presidential and parliamentary elections were held in recent years. Nevertheless, international observers still register major concerns on Egypt’s transition to democracy – EIU depicts it as an “authoritarian regime” (EIU, 2017). Economic instability and high poverty levels among its large population, coupled with major security problems associated with terrorism and religious radicalism (the majority of the population is also Sunni Muslim), have made the path to democracy a rather stony one (CIA, 2018b). The two Southern African countries chosen were part of later waves of postcolonial self-determination. Zimbabwe’s unilateral independence dates back to 1965, when it was still Rhodesia, but fully recognized independence was only achieved in 1980, the country having lived from then until 2017 under President Mugabe’s dictatorial rule. Although according to the constitution a semi-presidential republic, the regime has been tagged as “authoritarian” (EIU, 2017) and several problems in the electoral processes have been identified by international observers. Furthermore, the troubled years of political fighting and regime definition caused serious instability and many displaced people. Highly dependent on agriculture and the extractive sector, the country has undergone a financial crisis in recent years that has put increased pressure on state authorities and the population. Poverty remains a key issue. In November 2017, Mugabe’s forced resignation finally put an end to his rule and the country is now heading to elections (CIA, 2018d). Angola became independent in 1975, but a brutal civil war followed and lasted until 2002, when pacification was made possible. Ever since 1975, MPLA (a military force and then major political party) has governed, winning the few elections that were held. In 2010, a new constitution was approved, which makes the election of the President of the Republic indirect, following parliamentary elections, although the political system of government is presented as a presidential republic. José Eduardo dos Santos was Angola’s president from 1979 to 2017. The regime has also been labeled “authoritarian” by international observers (EIU, 2017), but the 2017 elections have not raised concerns as to their free and fair character, a new president and leader of the MPLA having emerged. Angola’s society reflects the contradiction of a country where the revenue from the oil business engendered economic boom in recent decades remains concentrated in the hands of an elite akin to political power, living side by side with widespread poverty. The oil crisis, from 2014 onwards, has been a motive for social and political unrest (CIA, 2018a; Salgado, 2014). To assess the political potential of the internet it is necessary to consider ICT infrastructures. Furthermore, human development indicators (from levels of poverty to literacy) are also a pre-condition to be considered. The ICT development index considers both, by combining three sub-indices: ICT access, ICT use, and ICT skills (ITU, 2017a, p. 27). The results for the four African countries are presented in Table 1.

From the Freedom of the Press to the Freedom of the Internet    17 Table 1:  ICT Development Index (2017). Tunisia Egypt ICT accessa sub-index (40%) ICT useb sub-index (40%) ICT skillsc sub-index (20%) IDI index (–) 0–10 (+)

5.11 4.11 5.67 4.82

5.40 3.35 5.66 4.63

Arab Zimbabwe Angola Africa States 5.51 3.96 5.26 4.84

3.40 2.10 3.58 2.92

2.62 1.03 2.41 1.94

3.28 1.74 3.16 2.64

Source: ITU (2017a). a Indicators are: Fixed telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants; mobile cellular telephone subscription 100 inhabitants; international internet bandwidth (bit/s) per internet user; percentage of households with a computer; percentage of households with internet access. b Indicators are: Percentage of individuals using the internet; fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants; active mobile broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants. c Indicators are: Mean years of schooling; secondary gross enrolment ratio; tertiary gross enrolment ratio.

Some of the underlying information for the results shown is worthy of more detailed consideration. In Tunisia, the number of mobile cellular phones per 100 inhabitants in 2017 was 125.8, while internet penetration amounted to 49.6% of the total population. In Egypt, mobile penetration was 113.7% and internet penetration amounted to 39.2%. The reach of mobile phones is evident, but the digital divide between users and non-users of the internet is also considerable and reduces the number of those who can actually be part of a digital public sphere to less than half of the total population. Moreover, there are considerable urban– rural, class, gender, and age gaps (ITU, 2017b). In Southern Africa, these dividing lines are even more visible. In Zimbabwe, mobile cellular phone penetration stood at 83.2%, whereas the internet had only reached 22.1% of the population. In Angola, mobile penetration amounted to 55.3% and internet users made up only 22.1% of the population (ITU, 2017b). As for skills, beyond ITU indicators it is also relevant to point out basic data on adult literacy in the four countries. In Tunisia, it reached 81.8%; in Egypt, 75.2%; in Zimbabwe, 86.5%; and in Angola 71.1% (UNDP, 2016b). Underlying material and cultural conditions can also be inferred from the figures on human development indices in Table 2. Table 2:  Human Development Index (HDI) and Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI) (2016).

HDI IHDI Source: UNDP (2016b).

Tunisia

Egypt

Zimbabwe

Angola

0.725 0.562

0.691 0.491

0.516 0.368

0.533 0.336

18    Cláudia Toriz Ramos Table 3:  Freedom on the Net and Freedom of the Press (2017). Tunisia

Egypt

Zimbabwe

Angola

Freedom of the Internet Partly Free Not Free Partly Free Partly Free   Obstacle to access (+) 0–25 (–) 10 16 16 14   Limits to content (+) 0–35 (–) 8 18 15 7  Violation of user rights 20 34 25 19 (+) 0–40 (–) Freedom of the press Partly free Not free Not free Not free Source: Freedom House (2017a, 2017b).

Last, but certainly not least, it is useful to consider the levels of electrification in those countries (as a percentage of the population with access to electricity). In Tunisia it reached 100% and in Egypt 99.6%; but in Zimbabwe only 40% and in Angola 30% (CIA, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d). These figures also define boundaries to potential political participation through ICT. Beyond indirect indicators, it is not easy to measure how the use of ICT, in particular the internet, has impacted the political life of the four countries, or even regime change. For the Arab Spring countries, there is abundant literature, as abovementioned. In Tunisia, for example, the “publinets,” cyber cafés from which anonymous web access was available, although by then forbidden, became very popular in 2011 (Freedom House, 2017b). Governments’ strategies to block or ban the use of internet can therefore work as a reverse image, a mirror of the threat posed by the internet. Freedom House provides the results shown in Table 3, for the four African cases. In Tunisia, freedom of the internet has increased ever since 2011, when censorship was still entrenched. At present, not only is material access to ICT quite extensive but it is also being improved in terms of quality (broadband coverage) and price. The market is broad and reasonably competitive and there is no evidence of the state’s regulatory bodies interfering as censorial entities or introducing restrictions on connectivity (Freedom House, 2017b; ITU, 2017b). Limits to content, such as blocking, filtering, or content removal, have also not been identified, although they remain legal, given that the old legislation has not yet been repealed. On the contrary, internet communication has become quite vibrant in the country and digital activism is a regular practice. Nevertheless, selfcensorship may exist, since security reasons (such as terrorism) may be invoked to set some limits to free expression (Freedom House, 2017b). The panorama for Egypt is not the same and actually worsened from 2016 to 2017. With regard to obstacles to access, and despite a vibrant and competitive market, the prices are still relatively high and the coverage insufficient. Egypt is, nevertheless, a broad and enlarging market for ICT. Unlike in Tunisia, the state has applied restrictions on connectivity, such as VoIP restrictions and shutdowns of cell phone service, or temporary blockages. The government also keeps

From the Freedom of the Press to the Freedom of the Internet    19 centralized control of the fiber-optic infrastructure, which further enables control (Freedom House, 2017b; ITU, 2017b). In Egypt, contents on the internet have regularly been targeted. In 2017, many websites were blocked, or contents removed, on grounds of security concerns. Neither does the legal environment foster freedom. According to Freedom House, new laws were passed that threaten free expression, and there are cases of surveillance, prosecutions, and detentions, while privacy and anonymity on the internet are under attack. Digital activism is undermined by repression (Freedom House, 2017b). In Zimbabwe, the problems are slightly different. The country still registers low internet coverage, but its transnational connections are more complex, given the landlocked characteristic of the territory. Prices remain unstable and a major rural-urban divide is visible. The state intervention over access is patent, from restrictions on connectivity (e.g., on WhatsApp during antigovernment protests) to market distortions and attempts to centralize the control over the backbone of ICT. Regulatory bodies are said to act in a political manner (Freedom House, 2017b; ITU, 2017b). In recent years, major limits on contents were not reported, although there has been pressure leading to informal removal. Intimidation exists which, in turn, fosters self-censorship. New legislation on computer and cybercrime was passed in 2016 and a new ministry for cybersecurity, threat detection, and mitigation was announced in 2017. Together with the already existing legislation the legal framework may reinforce conditions for surveillance, prosecution, and detention. There are no reports of technical attacks (Freedom House, 2017b). In Angola, the infrastructure is also sparse and expensive, which makes state activism to control it less necessary than if it were more widespread. Major rural–urban, but also class and age divides apply. There are no reports of deliberate restrictions on connectivity, although the government has some level of control over the market and the regulatory agencies (Freedom House, 2017b; ITU, 2017b). In 2017, limits to content, such as blocking, filtering, or content removal were not identified, even though there are reports of cases of informal governmental pressure for content withdrawal. Contents lack diversity mostly because of the small dimension of the network. Digital activism has emerged, especially among young people (blogs and music are some of the outcomes), but self-censorship applies, given recent prosecutions and detentions over freedom of expression cases. New legislation on social communication was passed in 2017 that grants the state the powers to interfere with online communication. Surveillance on the internet is difficult to trace but, according to Freedom House, the Angolan government may well already have the means. Intimidation and violence are also mentioned. In past years, Freedom House has reported technical attacks (Freedom House, 2017b). The comparison between freedom of the internet and freedom of the press (Table 3) shows differences (except for Egypt). It appears that the press is more vulnerable to mechanisms of censorship and intimidation, and that professional journalists are easier to persecute than anonymous web users. In 2016, in Tunisia and Zimbabwe, the police interfered with or even arrested journalists reporting on

20    Cláudia Toriz Ramos protests; Angola has also prosecuted independent journalists (Freedom House, 2017a). In contrast, internet freedom, especially if its expansion is quicker than the capacity for dictatorial governments to frame its use, creates a major opportunity for political debate and mobilization.

Conclusion Does the internet impact upon authoritarianism? Does it foster transition and democratization procedures in general? It is difficult to say. Authoritarianism is grounded in the opposite of free speech, which the internet, on the contrary, seems to reinforce. The text has highlighted the transnational, informal, interactive characteristics of the communication it enables, the networking capacity it creates, and the medium-term political socialization effect of the ongoing “global conversation about the politics of freedom” (Howard & Hussain, 2013, p. 55). Nevertheless, the internet is a condition for, rather than a direct cause of democratization. If a large number of people are able to use it and if they identify with democratic values, mobilization is made easier and that may trigger regime change. At the same time, other underlying conditions have an impact upon internet expansion, from infrastructures to the material-cultural conditions to use it. Therefore, the internet and democratization bear a close connection with human development processes and poverty reduction. This is particularly obvious in the cases presented, most notably in the two Southern African countries. Authoritarian regimes apparently connect internet freedom with their ruin and make efforts to update censorship to the technological layer of the perceived threat. From the cases addressed, there is evidence that governments also seek out sophisticated technical tools to condition access, block contents, and trace users. Furthermore, they create new legal frameworks for censorship (often relying on the security argument), or resort to sheer intimidation and violence. Whether authoritarian governments can win the race is still an open question.

Acknowledgment Acknowledgment is due to Gustavo Lira’s technical advice on ICT.

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From the Freedom of the Press to the Freedom of the Internet    21 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). (2018b). The world factbook. Egypt. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). (2018c). The world factbook. Tunisia. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ts.html Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). (2018d). The world factbook. Zimbabwe. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/zi.html Dahl, R. A. (1989). Democracy and its critics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Deibert, R. J. (2009). The geopolitics of internet control: Censorship, sovereignty, and cyberspace. In A. Chadwick & P. N. Howard (Eds.), Routledge handbook of internet politics (pp. 323–336). London & New York, NY: Routledge. Earl, J., Hunt, J., Garrett, R. K., & Dal, A. (2015). New technologies and social movements. In D. Della Porta & M. Diani (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of social movements (pp. 355–366). Oxford: Oxford University Press. EIU-The Economist Intelligence Unit. (2017). Democracy Index 2017. Retrieved from https://pages.eiu.com/rs/753-RIQ-438/images/Democracy_Index_2017.pdf Ferdinand, P. (2000). The Internet, democracy and democratization. Democratization, 7(1), 1–17. Freedom House. (2017a). Freedom of the press 2017. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse. org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2017?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI6MOIrcf52A IVlDLTCh0cbwDsEAAYASAAEgLB0vD_BwE Freedom House. (2017b). Freedom on the net 2017. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse. org/report/freedom-net/freedom-net-2017?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI7OXqrJ352AIVk ArTCh06wQC-EAAYASAAEgLMBPD_BwE Habermas, J. (1991). The structural transformation of the public sphere. An inquiry into a category of Bourgeois society. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Howard, P. N., & Hussain, M. M. (2013). Democracy’s fourth wave? Digital media and the Arab spring. Oxford: Oxford University Press. International Telecommunication Union (ITU). (2017a). Measuring the information society report 2017 (Vol. 1). Geneva: ITU. International Telecommunication Union (ITU). (2017b). Measuring the information society report 2017. Volume 2. ICT country profiles. Geneva: ITU. Lynch, M. (2017). The new Arab wars: Uprisings and anarchy in the Middle East. New York, NY: Public Affairs. McNair, B. (2009). The internet and the changing global media environment. In A. Chadwick & P. N. Howard (Eds.), Routledge handbook of internet politics (pp. 217–229). London & New York, NY: Routledge. Nam, T. (2017). A tool for liberty or oppression? A cross-national study of the Internet’s influence on democracy. Telematics and Informatics, 34, 538–549. Papacharissi, Z. (2009). The virtual sphere 2.0: The internet, the public sphere, and beyond. In A. Chadwick & P. N. Howard (Eds.), Routledge handbook of internet politics (pp. 230–245). London & New York, NY: Routledge. Rose, R. (2009). Democratic and undemocratic states. In C. W. Haerpfer, P. Bernhagen, R. F. Inglehart, & C. Welzel (Eds.), Democratization (pp. 10–23). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Salgado, S. (2014). The internet and democracy building in Lusophone African countries. London: Routledge. Szmolka, I. (2015). Exclusionary and non-consensual transitions versus inclusive and consensual democratizations: The cases of Egypt and Tunisia. Arab Studies Quarterly, 37(1), 73–95. The Guardian. (2018, January 21). Anger that drove the Arab spring is flaring again. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/21/is-a-new-arab-spring-underway-tunisia-riots Thornton, A. L. (2001). Does the internet create democracy? Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies, 22(2), 126–147.

22    Cláudia Toriz Ramos United Nations. (2018a). Sustainable development goals. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/ sustainabledevelopment/infrastructure-industrialization/ United Nations. (2018b). Sustainable development goals. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/ sustainabledevelopment/peace-justice/ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2016a). Africa human development report 2016. Accelerating gender equality and women’s empowerment in Africa. New York, NY: UNDP, Regional Bureau for Africa. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2016b). Human development report 2016. New York, NY: UNDP. Voltmer, K., & Rawnsley, G. (2009). The media. In C. W. Haerpfer, P. Bernhagen, R. F. Inglehart, & C. Welzel (Eds.), Democratization (pp. 234–248). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Welzel, C. (2009). Theories of democratization. In C. W. Haerpfer, P. Bernhagen, R. F. Inglehart, & C. Welzel (Eds.), Democratization (pp. 74–90). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Welzel, C., & Inglehart, R. F. (2008). The role of ordinary people in democratization. Journal of Democracy, 19(1), 126–140. Zakaria, F. (1997). The rise of illiberal democracy. Foreign Affairs, 76(6), 22–43.

Chapter 3

Diffusion Patterns of Political Content Over Social Networks Marçal Mora-Cantallops, Zhengqi Yan and Salvador Sánchez-Alonso Abstract In the last few years, information and communication technologies (ICTs) and social media have become increasingly relevant to politicians and political parties alike, often used to issue statements or campaigning, among others. At the same time, many citizens have become more involved in politics, partly due to the highly interactive and social environments that the social networking services (SNS) provide. Political events flow through these networks, influencing their users; such events, however, often start offline (outside the online platform) and are, therefore, hard to track. Event studies, a methodology often used in financial and economic studies, can be translated to social networks to help modeling the effect of external events in the network. In the present case, the event study methodology is applied to two sample cases: the tariff war between the United States and China, with multiple responses and retaliations from both sides, and the Brexit referendum. In both cases, the Twitter social networks that arise from users who discuss the respective subjects are analyzed to examine how political events shape and modify the network. Results show how event studies, combined with the possibilities offered by the ICTs both in data retrieval and analysis, can be applied to understand the effect of external political events, allowing researchers to quantitatively track, observe, and analyze the spread of political information over social network platforms. This is a first step toward obtaining a better understanding on how political messages are diffused over social networks and their effects in the network structures and behaviors. Keywords: Information and communication technologies; social networks; event study; politics; Brexit; tariff war

Politics and Technology in the Post-Truth Era, 23–42 Copyright © 2019 Marçal Mora-Cantallops, Zhengqi Yan and Salvador Sánchez-Alonso doi:10.1108/978-1-78756-983-620191003

24    Marçal Mora-Cantallops et al.

1. Introduction Given the penetration of social media in our society, politics has become one of the main fields of interest, as, for both politicians and political parties, “it is important to actively participate in the political communication via social media, especially during election campaigns” (Stieglitz & Dang-Xuan, 2012). While political parties and politicians increasingly use the possibilities of the Internet to communicate interactively with citizens and vice versa, the highly interactive and personalized environments provided by social media also increase citizens’ political involvement (Kruikemeier, van Noort, Vliegenthart, & de Vreese, 2013). With the advent of Big Data, social network activity is easily recorded, generating data on an extremely large scale (Vespignani, 2009). The idea is that every online discussion, every interaction, and many other aspects of people’s daily routines can be recorded and analyzed to obtain valuable information, not only of behavioral patterns but also of political preferences and influences. One of the milestones and earlier examples of the successful use of social media in an election campaign is the one led by Barack Obama in 2008 (Wattal, Schuff, Mandviwalla, & Williams, 2010). Nowadays, Twitter and Facebook accumulate most of the related studies. Information (or user-generated content in the case of social networking services (SNS)) travels through the network affected by social influence. The messages or actions posted by individual users can induce their connections to further spread this information or to behave in a similar way, in a social phenomenon called imitation (Guille, Hacid, Favre, & Zighed, 2013). Information then spreads by identical actions from a sequence of individuals (herd behavior) and/or by making decisions from inferences based on earlier people’s actions (information cascade). There is also another option: inaction, which would stop information transmission. Furthermore, information transmission is not only affected by internal network influences but also by external ones: certain events can influence spreading patterns and change the social network (Liu, Zhan, Zhang, Sun, & Hui, 2015). Although both politics and information diffusion have been topics of interest from a social network perspective, few works (Barberá, Jost, Nagler, Tucker, & Bonneau, 2015; Halberstam & Knight, 2016; Romero, Meeder, & Kleinberg, 2011) joined both fields aiming to understand how political information spreads. Instead, most of these studies focus on structural network elements and homophily, which disregard external influences. However, we believe that if most (if not all) politically relevant events happen offline (i.e., outside the online social network), such external events must, therefore, be considered to understand how they shape and modify the social network. Blending big data, politics and social networks provide promising questions for research. How does political information flow through social networks? Is it possible to understand how internal and/ or external events shape social networks in politics? What are the sources of such events? As SNS are changing the political landscape and strategies to get the message to the voters, any advance in understanding how political information transmission works becomes crucial.

Diffusion Patterns of Political Content Over Social Networks    25 In the next section, we will go over the background and previous studies on information diffusion, their models and event studies. In Section 3, the methodology that will be followed to adapt event studies to social network analysis will be presented, together with two study cases. The results of both analyses can be found in Section 4. In conclusion, our work shows how event studies can be useful for social network research and provide a better understanding of how external events affect information diffusion and social network structures.

2. Background 2.1. Information Diffusion in Social Networks In social networks, information travels in the form of posts, messages, or others. Kaye, Levitt, and Nevins (2005) found that even “one-bit communication devices” were “seen by users as a valuable and rich resource for communicating intimacy.” The patterns followed by these messages are not random; they show regular temporal patterns and paths between sources and receivers, which suggests that the dissemination process is driven by homophily (Golder, Wilkinson, & Huberman, 2007). Kossinets, Kleinberg, and Watts (2008) noticed how information only spread on social networks “as a result of discrete communication events […] that are distributed non-uniformly over time.” They further argue about the existence of a “backbone of the network,” a subgraph that is essential to keep people upto-date, illustrating the relationship between network structure and information flow. In Facebook, for example, this backbone is mostly triggered by small events (such as birthday reminders) (Viswanath, Mislove, Cha, & Gummadi, 2009) and tie strength decreases quickly as the link ages. Due to scale and relevancy, SNS are also becoming very important for research on information diffusion. Several papers have studied the characteristics over various online social networks and with multiple empirical objectives. To cite a few, there are studies on Flickr (Cha, Mislove, Adams, & Gummadi 2008; Cha, Mislove, & Gummadi, 2009), Twitter (Mønsted, Sapieżyński, Ferrara, & Lehmann, 2017; Ye & Wu, 2010), and Facebook (Chiu & Hsu, 2017).

2.2. Models Human dynamics and social interactions are complex, and so it is to model how information spreads over online social networks. The vast scale and heterogeneity of SNS doesn’t help; despite the wide availability of data, identifying influence and information pathways remains a challenge. In social networks, actors tend to engage in similar behaviors as their peers, so it becomes difficult to determine from empirical observation whether the spread from one individual to another is due to homophily (similarity) or to influence (Aral, Muchnik, & Sundararajan, 2009). In general, by posting or sharing a message, the node takes an active part in its diffusion and, thus, it is considered activated. After the first activation, each

26    Marçal Mora-Cantallops et al. subsequent step can be seen as an ordered sequence of activations: a node can be either influenced or not by the neighbors’ status and decide to propagate the message (active) or not (inactive). This idea is analogous to that of epidemic spreads in a population; this is the reason why most of the models and works about information spread in social networks start from epidemic model studies. 2.2.1. Epidemic Models.  Infectious diseases are transmitted among the population when infected individuals propagate the disease to other individuals through their social connections, possibly generating a full-scale contagion. Information can pass from one individual to another in a very similar way, with the two classical models being the SIS (Bailey, 1975) and the SIR (Anderson & May, 1992). In these two models, the infected population grows exponentially until either the rate of infection is balanced with that of recovery, or the contagion dies as the recovery rate prevails. These models, however, do not consider the structure of the network. 2.2.2. Topological Models.  Models that focus on the topology of the network usually follow either a linear threshold (LT) (Kempe, Kleinberg, & Tardos, 2003) or an independent cascades (IC) (Goldenberg, Libai, & Muller, 2001) model. Both are based on directed graphs and on the idea that each node can be active or inactive, but active nodes cannot deactivate. The difference between both models is the activation function; the LT model uses an influence degree threshold for the edges and an (activation) influence threshold for each node, while the IC model requires a diffusion probability in each edge. Both models start iteratively from a set of initially activated nodes. In the LT model, all inactive nodes are influenced by their active neighbors with an intensity that equals the sum of the weights of the connecting edges; if this sum exceeds the influence threshold, the node becomes influenced and, thus, active for the next iteration, where it will influence further neighbors. In the IC case, newly activated nodes try once to influence their neighbors; whether the transmission succeeds depends on the probability defined for the edge that links both nodes. If it is successful, the receiving node becomes active for the next iteration, where it will further try to cascade such information. Process ends when there are no neighbors left to contact. In summary, LT is receiver-centric (influence depends on the listener) while IC is sender-centric (it depends on the source). 2.2.3. Temporal Models. The explosive dynamics of some online activities or content, which might suffer drastic increases or drops in popularity, require models that are able to capture the shift of the individual’s attention caused by external or exogenous factors. This requires models where time plays a pivotal role, so time-dependent diffusion probabilities between nodes of the network are included. Guille and Hacid (2012) proposed approach, for example, was able to predict the temporal dynamics of information diffusion in Twitter, although it failed to predict the volume of tweets generated by such diffusion. Ratkiewicz, Fortunato, Flammini, and Vespignani (2010) proposed “a minimal model combining the classic preferential popularity increase mechanism with the occurrence of random popularity shifts due to exogenous factors,” simulating attention shifting events using a probability function to randomly boost some topics. In sum, temporal models acknowledge both the need to understand the

Diffusion Patterns of Political Content Over Social Networks    27 exogenous factors that affect the network and the context where such influence takes place. 2.2.4. Virality. Content virality has attracted attention recently, as SNS is very sensible to this phenomenon. Although the spread of viral content, such as memes, challenges, clips, or fake news, can be considered a form of social contagion – individuals influence others to imitate – or disease spreading – the “virus” travels through social ties from one person to the next – some studies (Centola, 2010) show that there are some differences, as multiple exposures may significantly increase the chances of adoption. Furthermore, how fast and easily information is transmitted is also notably impacted by the attributes of the social ties between actors. Classic studies have shown how strong and homophile links are more effective for spreading messages (Brown & Reingen, 1987), while weak ties preferentially transfer novel information (Granovetter, 1973). Virality is crucially impacted by the structure of the underlying network (Christakis & Fowler, 2007). On top of these structural elements, communities are also believed to greatly impact the information flow, particularly constraining, slowing down or, even, stopping, the spread of the message (Weng, Menczer, & Ahn, 2014) when the community has a strong opposite belief and, thus, refuses to transmit the message.

2.3. Event Studies An event study is an empirical and statistical analysis method to assess the impact of an event on some objective; such objective is often an economic (as the value of a firm) or financial (such as stock prices), but it is not limited to these disciplines. Event studies are considered the “standard method of measuring security price reaction to some announcement or event” (Binder, 1998). Therefore, they can reveal important information about how a security is likely to react to a certain event, allowing to forecast how other similar securities are likely to react to the same kind of event. Event studies arguably started with Dolley (1933), who sampled 95 stock splits between 1921 and 1931, investigating the price effects of those stock splits and finding that the price increased in 57 of the cases and the price declined in only 26 instances. Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969) “introduced the methodology that is essentially the same as that which is in use today” (MacKinlay, 1997). Niederhoffer’s (1971) study used event studies to correlate the impact of World events (published in The New York Times) with stock prices. A significant relationship was found, mainly in the price decreases linked to negative news. More recently, some researchers started using event studies to analyze the futures market. Bina and Vo (2007) applied event-study methodology to attempt to investigate the possible influence of OPEC decisions on output upon the global oil spot and futures prices during the period of 1983–2005 and were able to conclude that the OPEC “is neither a cartel nor exhibits any sign of market domination, market control, or monopoly.”

28    Marçal Mora-Cantallops et al.

3. Methodology 3.1. Event Studies Adapted to Social Network Analysis Event studies can be easily applied to other fields. It is, in the end, a quantitative analysis method that relies on specific techniques to assess the impact of an event onto something else, comparing the status before and after the relevant event happened. We believe that politics is a good example. During an electoral campaign, many events of many different kinds happen, for example, a piece of news about a candidate, an important electoral debate, a tweet that went viral or a terrorist attack, among many others. Each of these events might affect the result of the elections, the polls, voter turnout, candidates’ discourse, etc. If all voters were strictly rational, the impact of any political event would be quickly reflected in the polls, so event studies would be a useful tool to understand how such events affect a social network. From the network perspective, event studies can also help to understand how it is shaped by events. Do different kinds of political events produce different changes? Although many studies analyzed political discourse or influence in online social networks (Bosch, 2017; Correa & Camargo, 2017; Howard, Bradshaw, Kollanyi, Desigaud, & Bolsover, 2017; Hwang, 2013; Ramos-Serrano, Fernández Gómez, & Pineda, 2018), no studies have been found that empirically link external events with changes in the network.

3.2. Context To study events in political social networks, two different cases will be explored. The first case concerns the USA–China trade war that started after the publication in March 2018 of the results of the Section 301 investigation by the US Trade Representative Office (USTR). The USTR announced a series of tariff increases on $250 billion worth of Chinese goods, magnified with statements from the White House and the US Government. The official confirmation of such tariffs was replicated by the Chinese Government with equivalently valued customs duties to US products. During July and August 2018, further announcements were made by the United States and responded accordingly by the Chinese authorities, notably impacting the financial and commercial markets. The second case found in this work concerns the Brexit referendum, held in the UK on June 23, 2016. Grčar, Cherepnalkoski, Mozetič, and Kralj Novak (2017) investigated Twitter activities from May 12 until the final vote; they collected around 4.5 million tweets from close to one million users geo-located in the UK and related to Brexit. Those tweets were labeled in three sets: positive (supporting the Brexit), neutral (uncommitted), and negative (supporting to remain in the EU) and made publicly available (Grčar, Cherepnalkoski, Mozetič, & Kralj Novak, 2016). Departing from the original data set, we added missing information using the Twitter Developer API and discarded almost half a million tweets to avoid tweets and users that have been deleted since then.

Diffusion Patterns of Political Content Over Social Networks    29 3.3. Event Characterization The political events considered relevant for our purposes have one or more of the following characteristics: (1) They have a clear political intention: they are events, messages or statements that are unequivocally linked to politics. In the case of Brexit, for example, one of such claims would be: “Stop sending £350 million to the EU every single week. Spend it on our priorities instead.” (2) They appeal to nationalism: many of the notable events leading to Brexit or the reasons behind Trump laws are driven by nationalism and protectionism. (3) They caught media’s attention and interest. (4) They have broad scope and long range. Trump’s tariffs on trade with China, for example, impact diverse products and derivates, from soy or fruits to steel or aluminum, cars, and alcohol. (5) They are promulgated from the highest ranks of authority and authenticity: news and announcements come from official communication channels such as governments, public media, or first-line politicians. (6) Their diffusion paths are wide and reach large audiences: these events spread to most of the network through people, media, and social networking systems, and their associated discussions are alive for days.

3.4. Identification of Relevant Events Identification and selection of relevant events is the first step toward an event study. With regard to the USA–China tariff war, the publication of the “Statement by U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer on Section 301 Action”1 with tariff increases in many Chinese imports and the countermeasures adopted one day later by the Chinese authorities2 on US products are chosen as the events to study. Both the event and the response have a clear political intention and are promulgated from the highest ranks of authority. In the case of Brexit, the widely covered by the media murder of Jo Cox – a British politician and anti-Brexit activist assassinated by a far-right extremist at 12.53 p.m. on the June 16, 2016 – is selected as the event to study. Cox’s death happened one week before the Brexit vote, and sparked national and international condemnation.

3.5. Network Construction 3.5.1. USA–China.  Using the Gephi Twitter Streaming Importer as the tool for extraction, two networks are obtained, aiming to examine the effects of the Chinese retaliation on them. 1

https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/august/statement-us-trade-representative 2 https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/03/china-reportedly-says-it-will-retaliate-with-tariffson-60-billion-in.html

30    Marçal Mora-Cantallops et al. (1) The first is extracted after the publication of the tariff increases by the USTR office on the night of the August 1 (extracted on the August 2, 9 a.m. Washington, DC, time), formed by 10,142 users in a three-hour streaming session. (2) The second is built after the Chinese retaliation (August 3), formed by 7,401 users in the same period as the previous network. 3.5.2. Brexit Twitter Network.  Upon extraction of 4,037,684 Brexit-labeled tweets from UK-based users and in order to rebuild the social network formed by them since the May 12, 2016, and until the June 23, 2016, the following steps are followed: (1) Tweets are grouped in one-hour time periods. (2) For each time period, the following operations are executed: (a) For every tweet, the user is added to the network (if not added yet). (b) If the tweet is a retweet, a directed link is established between the source user and the target user (the author of the retweeted tweet). (c) If the tweet is a reply to another user, a directed link is established between the source user and the user to whom he or she replies. (d) If the tweet is a quote of another tweet, a directed link is established between from the source user to the quoted user. (e) In all cases, if the target user node does not exist in the network a new node is created. (3) After processing all tweets in the same one-hour period, metrics are calculated and stored for a later analysis. (4) The resulting network is used as input for the following time period until all time periods are processed. The final Brexit network has 462,058 nodes (or unique users) and 1,326,803 edges between them.

3.6. Metrics The central process in event studies is to determine the abnormal returns (AR) produced by an event. This means, thus, that it is first mandatory to determine what would be the “normal” or “expected” returns of every point in time. To assess these variations, in the case of the USA–China tariff war a qualitative analysis supported on the network parameters will be followed. The anomalous activities that take place in the network during the study window will be analyzed using the extracted networks, their communities and users. To do so, the centrality of their nodes (degree, betweeness, and eigenvector) will be compared before and after the event, allowing to determine the influence of the event in each community. For the Brexit Twitter Network case, a statistical approach has been chosen. Many statistical models exist, but as our work aims to understand the volatility of the response, the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity

Diffusion Patterns of Political Content Over Social Networks    31 (GARCH) model is considered one of the standard tools. GARCH models are commonly used for modeling financial time series with time-varying volatility, with periods of swings alternating with periods of relative calm. Twitter activity suffers of such volatility in its level of activity, as the network is more active in some hours than in others (e.g., night and day, weekdays and weekends), so the GARCH model was found to be an appropriate choice. From a social network perspective, two main metrics will be tracked over time (for each one-hour period). First, the in-degree for some selected nodes, which will both give a measure of the interactions that a particular node has over time and will allow us to identify if the social activity around it becomes abnormal in the window of interest. Second, the hourly percentage of “leave,” “remain,” and “neutral” tweets are going to be recorded to illustrate how the social network sentiment or opinion is affected by the events in our study.

4. Results Once the relevant events and the relevant accounts or indicators have been identified, the event analysis can be performed.

4.1. The Chinese Retaliation to the Increase of Tariffs by the United States Nowadays, information flows are highly developed, and diffusion happens quickly. In a communication war, one actor generates an event and the counterpart counteracts in only a few hours or less. This shows in the USA–China trade war, where the US tariff increase is quickly answered a day later by the Chinese Government. These events can alter the network, as will be analyzed in the sections that follow. 4.1.1. Identification of Communities and Influencers. The initial network, extracted before the event and composed by 10,142 users, is analyzed using Gephi, a graph visualization and analysis tool. From its community detection algorithm (Blondel, Guillaume, Lambiotte, & Lefebvre, 2008), the following top communities and top users are obtained (Table 1). After the event, however, the situation changes notably. The same analysis is performed on the network extracted one day later, containing 7,401 users. The results can be found in Table 2. As could be expected, the main influencers in the USA–China trade war network are high level politicians (such as Donald Trump himself) and media venues, ranging from liberal (CNN, NYT) to conservative (Fox News), but also neutral news agencies and foreign sources, among others. Results show how, before the event, communities were scattered; many liberal and conservative groups were isolated from one another. After the Chinese retaliation, however, these communities became connected. After the event, a large user community (1) against Trump policies arises, countered by a supportive community (4). The effect of the event on the network, therefore, is one of cohesion of communities and, arguably, one of even more polarization than before.

32    Marçal Mora-Cantallops et al. Table 1:  Largest Communities in the Network before the Chinese Retaliation. Relative Size Community 1

Community 2

Community 3

Community 4

Community 5

Community 6

Top User (In-degree)

Comments

14.82% Donald Trump Mixed community with Trump (1965) supporters and detractors that have interacted with him. 10.50% Glenn Thrush Mostly formed by media (450) correspondents linked to The New York Times and CNN. Both are liberal and opposed to Trump’s politics. 10.20% Linda Rothwell A heterogenous and international (816) group of activists without political backgrounds but opposed to Trump. 6.09% Sarah Sanders The White House Press Secretary (252) and some of the most important American media (CNN, NPR). 5.22% Patty Murray Democrats such as Patty Murray (173) and a few business-related media (Bloomberg, Business Insider). All are clearly political, liberal, and opposed to Trump. 4.70% Kevin W (245) Mainly Trump anonymous supporters and linked to the #MAGA (Make America Great Again) hashtag.

Source: Own elaboration. Note: Results show scattered communities.

These results, however, are mostly based on the US side of the question. One of the most popular social media platforms in China is Weibo, a microblogging site that could potentially be used to understand the patterns of diffusion in the Chinese side. The restrictions imposed by the Chinese Government on its users, however, alter the results, as, although objections might be allowed, they are removed if considered detrimental. Thus, communities (or groups) against conventional media (such as CCTV or People’s Daily) cannot be formed. 4.1.2. Event Analysis.  The most relevant nodes in both networks are, as introduced in the previous section, politicians and media accounts. The liberal media accounts were mostly “silent” before the event, but after the Chinese authorities they became clearly more active (Table 3). The AP, Politico, and The Hill (together with the CNN) became the main sources of information for most of the users in the network. This is also displayed by the eigenvector centrality (a measure of importance in the network) which shows how many of these sources become much more prominent and prestigious

Diffusion Patterns of Political Content Over Social Networks    33 Table 2:  Largest Communities in the Network after the Chinese Retaliation. Relative Size Community 1

Community 2 Community 3

Community 4 Community 5

Top User (In-degree)

Comments

38.98% @teapainusa A heterogenous but large community (844) of users, press correspondents, and politicians against Trump. 11.66% CNN (262) Media accounts, mostly liberal but also a few “neutral” ones (such as Reuters). 11.17% AP (916) A community with The Associated Press (a news agency) at the center and the users which retweeted the breaking news (Chinese retaliation) from this source. 10.21% Donald A conservative community led by Trump Trump (464) and Fox News.  9.05% RT (137) Foreign media, mainly Russian (RT) and Chinese (People’s Daily China, CGTN) but also by a few financial sites (CNN Money).

Source: Own elaboration. Note: Communities are more cohesive than before.

Table 3:  In-degree Changes Before and After the Event. User

In-degree Before

After

Liberal Media CNN NBC The AP Politico The Hill The NYT Bloomberg

154   9   9  27  24  15  55

262 130 912 374 357  36  46

Conservative Media Fox News Fox Business The WSJ GOP

156  62 119  83

 34 297 437  33

Source: Own elaboration. Note: There is a notable increase in the attention to liberal media.

34    Marçal Mora-Cantallops et al. (in network terms) than before (see Table 4), with a few exceptions (such as The NYT and Bloomberg). A similar pattern is found across the users; as with the liberal media, Trump opposers were not particularly relevant neither in in-degree nor in eigenvector centrality before the event (Table 5). However, after China’s response, opposers and liberal media become more active, get more interactions (in-degree) and are promoted to highly central (or prestigious) positions in the network (increasing their eigenvector centrality). Although such users take control of the network (previously dominated by the conservative community), the Trump supporters are still relatively important in centrality terms and, even though they experiment an overall decrement in the number of interactions, there are a few nodes that receive more attention than they did previously. From the previous results, it is relevant to note how the conservative communities are still influential even when the network becomes controlled by the liberal media and users; highly influential users such as Donald Trump himself or the FOX News ecosystem are still able to efficiently bridge the information across the conservative users.

4.2. Jo Cox’s Murder 4.2.1. Identification of Communities and Influencers. To identify communities and main actors in the Brexit Twitter Network, two additional steps will be applied to the network. First, only the giant component (the maximal connected graph) will be selected. A second step consists on selecting the 50 core of the network, keeping the maximal subgraph were all nodes have at least 50 interactions with other nodes in the set. The reason for doing so is to filter out all the nodes that have only very few interactions during the study window. This is equivalent Table 4:  Eigenvector Centrality Changes Before and After the Event in Liberal Media Accounts. User

CNN NBC The AP POLITICO The Hill The New York Times Bloomberg Source: Own elaboration. Note: Again, an increase is observed.

Eigenvector Centrality Before

After

0.143 0.007 0.003 0.009 0.017 0.011 0.041

0.283 0.129 1.0 0.192 0.371 0.038 0.048

Diffusion Patterns of Political Content Over Social Networks    35 Table 5:  In-degree and Eigenvector Centrality Variation before and after the Event for the Main Influencers. User

Against Trump @teapainusa Brian Krassenstein Amy Siskind Richard Stengel Steven Greenhouse Soledad O’Brien Trump Supporters Donald J. Trump @POTUS Carlos V Payne Maria Bartiromo Laura Ingraham Sarah Sanders Kevin W

In-degree

Eigenvector Centrality

Before

After

Before

After

20 49 50 0 1 0

844 684 316 176 149 192

0.004 0.025 0.05 0 0.0001 0

0.935 0.752 0.342 0.200 0.167 0.215

1,965 230 6 0 2 252 245

464 53 281 238 230 21 2

1.0 0.115 0.0065 0 0.0025 0.119 0.249

0.228 0.027 0.107 0.063 0.258 0.017 0.002

Source: Own elaboration. Note: The “Against Trump” community sees the most increase.

as having, in average, at least one interaction – a tweet, a quote, a reply or a simple retweet – per day. The reduced network is also analyzed using Gephi. First, the degree of each node is calculated. Second, the communities of the graph are obtained using the Louvain algorithm (Blondel et al., 2008) as implemented in Gephi. The resulting communities are described in Table 6. The top five members (in number of interactions or indegree) of the three biggest communities can be found in Table 7. As seen, three main communities are found, each supporting a different stance on Brexit, as could be expected. The pro-leave community is formed around the @vote_leave hub, mainly composed of individuals with a positive attitude toward Brexit and UKIP members or followers. It is important to note how this community is thrice as big as the pro-remain one. In contrast, both the pro-remain and neutral communities are led by media accounts. The Independent and The Guardian were against Brexit while the BBC and SkyNews seemed to have a neutral stance. Only two high level politicians appear in the top members, with Jeremy Corbyn on the pro-remain community and David Cameron in the neutral one.

36    Marçal Mora-Cantallops et al. Table 6:  Communities in the Brexit Twitter Network. Community (Stance)

Relative Size (%)

Pro-Leave (Brexit positive) Pro-Remain (Brexit negative) Neutral (Brexit neutral) Scottish Politics (Brexit negative) Others

68.76 23.82  5.64  0.71  1.07

Source: Own elaboration. Note: Two are large (pro-Leave and pro-Remain) with one smaller in between (neutral).

Table 7:  Top Five Users in the Three Main Communities. Pro-Leave

pro-Remain

neutral

@vote_leave @theordinaryman2 @Vote_LeaveMedia @UKIP @PrisonPlanet

@Independent @guardian @jeremycorbyn @MirrorPolitics @politicshome

@BBCNews @SkyNews @BBCRealityCheck @TheEconomist @David_Cameron

Source: Own elaboration.

Last, a few other members are classified by the algorithm in a small but mixed community that seems to be placed between leavers and neutral media, with @RTUKNews as the most prominent user but loosely connected to any other communities. Both the communities and the most relevant users are represented in Fig. 1. 4.2.2. Interactions with Top Influencers.  To understand how events impact on the regular activity of the top influencers in the Brexit Tweet Network, they are grouped by community (either in the pro-leave, neutral, or pro-remain groups) and their returns are averaged. A 24-hour window is set around the event (ranging from 12 hours before the event to 12 hours after). Using a GARCH model, as described in the methodology, the forecast of the variation of the number of interactions (or, equivalently, the in-degree) for each actor is calculated at every period. With that forecast is then possible to assess the AR as the difference between the actual variation and the forecasted one. Additionally, the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) can be added over the time window. The CAR shows how the event has a different cumulative impact in each group (Fig. 2). In particular: ⦁⦁ Neutral (NEU) top users experiment variations in interactions that are lower

than expected.

Diffusion Patterns of Political Content Over Social Networks    37

Fig. 1:  The Brexit Tweet Network. Note: Three communities can be clearly defined, corresponding to “pro-Leave,” “neutral,” and “pro-Remain.” Source: Own Elaboration.

Fig. 2:  In-degree CAR for Neutral, Positive, and Negative Stances within the Event Window. Source: Own Elaboration. ⦁⦁ Positive (POS) top users are flat after the event (meaning they see no AR, there-

fore performing as expected by the forecast model).

⦁⦁ Negative (NEG) top users experience much more activity than expected in

“normal” circumstances after the event.

38    Marçal Mora-Cantallops et al.

Fig. 3:  Sentiment CAR for Neutral, Positive, and Negative Stances within the Event Window. Source: Own Elaboration. 4.2.3. Social Network Sentiment.  Another perspective to look at how social networks react to an event is the sentiment analysis of messages. In the Brexit case, the percentage of positive (pro-leave), negative (pro-remain) and neutral labeled tweets was recorded every hour. The results over the 24-hour window show an abnormal increase in the percentage of neutral tweets, with the corresponding abnormal decrease in both positive and negative messages. Although both see a reduction, it must be noted that the negative (pro-remain) decrease in share is much more pronounced than the positive ones. The AR derived from the event can be considered statistically significant for all three options, as when they bounce back to the expected levels (around +5/+6 hours after the event) they do so with AR associated to p-values below 0.05. The effects of the event in the overall sentiment of the network are represented graphically in Fig. 3. All three lines start at the event (time 0) with CAR close to zero, but in the following time periods there is an abnormal surge of neutral tweets that reduce the global polarization. This effect lasts for approximately five time periods and goes back to “normal” levels afterwards.

5. Conclusion Although information diffusion studies in social networking sites abound in many topics, very few look at the influence of external events. Such events are often difficult to analyze, but the event study methodology can be useful to address the problem. Event studies have been often linked and limited to financial and economic studies, but we have shown how they can also be applied to understand the effect of external political events in social networks. Event studies allow researchers to quantitatively track, observe, and analyze the spread of information (political, in this case) over social network platforms; they can be useful to obtain a better understanding on how such messages are

Diffusion Patterns of Political Content Over Social Networks    39 diffused over the network and to model some of the complex social dynamics behind social and political movements, campaigns, and statements, which would benefit from further investigation of their effects on the social network structures. Applying this methodology to two sample cases, we have shown how external events affect not only how information is diffused over the network but also user’s dissemination behavior and the shape of the social network itself. Some events transform the communities in the network by making them more cohesive, while others might change the role some nodes play, altering their centrality or prestige. Other events can change the overall message or sentiment in the network, while the sources with which the users interact might also be affected by the external events, altering their behavior and forming different diffusion patterns than before the event. A few limitations must be considered, however. First, the data for both presented cases was obtained from a sampling process, which hardly tells the whole story. Furthermore, online user behavior (or Twitter behavior) is not considered to be an exact reflection of the users in the real world, as messages and interactions on social networking platforms are often well curated and systematically managed (especially on high authority or official accounts). Both cases were limited to a snapshot of their respective systems, which limits their validity to their contexts and more work would be needed to understand whether they could be easily extrapolated to other places and times. Last, the USA–China case was also limited by the bias in the Chinese platforms, often censored, that hinders the chances to compare both sides of the story in equal conditions. As we have seen, the effect of information and communication technologies s on politics (and political communication, in particular) has two contradictory effects. On one hand, the magnitude, availability, and spread of SNS make data easily available and allow researchers to obtain information in an unprecedented scale. In another hand, such scale hinders the identification of influence and information pathways, once dominated by the television and media outlets and now distributed over the network with multiple smaller sources. It is, thus, increasingly relevant to examine the effects of such technologies on the social network structures to understand their impact on the political behaviors of their users.

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Chapter 4

Contemporary Politics and Society: Social Media and Public Engagement in Belarus Victor Shadurski and Galina Malishevskaya Abstract This chapter examines the peculiarities of the Belarusian socio-political model and its internal contradictions, which are becoming increasingly significant enhanced in the context of the new information and communication reality. The authors describe the information environment and the current political situation in Belarus. This chapter examines the factors behind the intensification of socio-political communications. The authors note the increased role of authorities in the online information domain. Particular focus is placed on the new role of social media, opinion leaders, activists, and bloggers. This chapter includes case studies detailing how exactly information technologies and online communication contribute to the formation of a new socio-political agenda in the country. Key examples relate to situations where, owing to extensive public engagement and support for online appeals, it became possible to use mechanisms of legitimate influence on government decision-making and bring to account officials responsible for concealing information. The authors emphasize the importance of information and communication technologies when it comes to external political challenges. Keywords: Social media; network society; civil initiatives; political engagement; e-petition; the public engagement; the media technologies

Introduction The role of online communication is growing every year. It is cyberspace that becomes the main platform where new forms of political discussions and

Politics and Technology in the Post-Truth Era, 43–56 Copyright © 2019 Victor Shadurski and Galina Malishevskaya doi:10.1108/978-1-78756-983-620191004

44    Victor Shadurski and Galina Malishevskaya disputes are taking shape, and where political consciousness and political culture are developing. The views of Habermas (2007) on social policy and the sphere of political communications are the conceptual basis for studying new social and political challenges. Works on media policy and political communications by Lumann (2005), McLuhan (2004), Bourdieu (2005), and Baudrillard (1983) allow us to consider the changes taking place in Belarus in the context of global information and communication transformations. We examine the role of new media and online communications (Castells, 2017) primarily with regard to their influence on the distribution of power within the country. The objective of this chapter is to examine the question of how information technology changes the nature of political communication in Belarus. It is argued that it leads to the new forms of civil activism, which involve different actors in to the social relations. The study traces how information technology changes the nature of political communications, which leads to the emergence of new forms of social relations. These changes allow making assumptions about the development of online social institutions in Belarus that change the form and content of communication between the government and the public. The cases that are presented in the study, in practice, confirm the words of Ramo (2017) that the requirement to maintain constant, instantaneous communication changes the alignment of political forces. The formation of networks creates new poorunderstood sources of power. Ramo speaks of the “seventh sense,” which is designed for the current era of total communications. It is not just about communication over the Internet, but about the world of networks, entangling and comprehensively determining our life as a whole (Ramo, 2017, p. 17). Similarly as Castells (2017), Ramo is confident that at present we need to develop our own forefeeling because everything that is not arranged in accordance with the era of networks – our politics, our economy, our national security, our education – will split into parts under the influence of communications. It is necessary to mention works by Reshetnikov (2011), Antanovich (2010), Slutskaya (2016) as Belarusian researchers’ contribution to studying this issue. To this end, this chapter examines the features of the socio-political model of Belarus and the five key contradictions inherent in this model are identified. In the following part, the discussion in this chapter focuses on cases of online communication and new media contribution to the formation of a new socio-political agenda in the country. Conclusions follow.

Peculiarities of Belarusian Social and Political Model The Belarusian socio-political model is well known in the world as an example of a rigid vertical system with the dominant role of the state in all spheres of social life. This model began to evolve from the mid-1990s as a response to the challenges and difficulties of post-Soviet transformation. National security maintaining controllability in the economy and progressive social development were officially declared as priorities. As Rubinov (2010), the then deputy chairman of the Council of the Republic (upper parliamentary house), noted in 2010, the main

Contemporary Politics and Society    45 feature of the Belarusian model is an evolutionary path of development, which he said implies a gradual transition from a super-centralized system of managing the economy and society to a democratic social system and market principles of economic management. To examine the existing socio-political model and its possible dynamics, it is expedient to examine the main contradictions in the political process, which in recent years have clearly manifested themselves in the conditions of the new information and communication reality.

First: The Sphere of State Interests Is All-embracing The Belarusian state is actively involved in all major spheres of human and social life: from health care and education to transportation and utilities. The private and social interests of people, social, and political communications are developed in close connection with the state. To put it more specifically: social life in Belarus is in fact not separated from the state. This close intertwining of the state and social spheres is largely due to the tradition of the Soviet social system and practice of regulated political communications. The constitutional foundations of the country contribute to the strengthening of this system. The constitution currently in force describes the head of state as a guarantor of citizens’ rights and liberties. So, under the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus, the president of the country is above the three branches of power, personifying the unity of the nation (The Constitution of the Republic of Belarus, 1994). Article 79 says: The President of the Republic of Belarus shall be the Head of the State, the guarantor of the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus, the rights and freedoms of man and of the citizen. The President shall personify the unity of the nation, guarantee the implementation of the main guidelines of the domestic and foreign policy …. The President shall take measures on protection of sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus, its national security and territorial integrity, ensure its political and economic stability, continuity and interaction of the bodies of state power, maintain the intermediation among the bodies of state power. The presidency is a central, system-forming element, and a channel of direct communication with the people. The president accumulates expectations and aspirations of the nation and is responsible for the balance of the three branches of power: legislative, executive, and judicial. Accordingly, the president plays a central role in political communications. It is possible to say that Belarus is characterized by paternalistic political culture, with a high degree of personalization. Socio-political discourse presupposes a personal social contract between the leader and the society. In his annual address to the Belarusian people and the National Assembly, Lukashenko (2017) noted that any government is interested in such a parliament as it wants to see it. He was required to

46    Victor Shadurski and Galina Malishevskaya create equal conditions for campaigning for candidates and good opportunities for voters: I did it, maybe not perfectly, but not worse, absolutely no worse than in other countries. And I think it is worthily for my people. And yet, I am absolutely not opposed – contrary to what some people say – to increasing the role of parties, but this should not be done artificially and lead to antagonism with the authorities.

Second: The System of Political Parties and NGOs is Underdeveloped in Belarus The current social situation in the country is characterized by authorities’ intention to prevent stratification and confrontation and preserve a homogeneous society. In practice, this leads to the government’s attempts to limit the levels of pay in the banking and other profitable sectors of the economy. An intention to prevent social discontent in the country, radical, nationalistic sentiments in society, and religious conflicts is cited as an argument in favor of this approach. Obviously, the reverse side of this policy is the government’s active intervention in social life. The party system remains undeveloped, and therefore the social and political interests of various groups are not clearly defined. Parties do not have serious support among the public and do not play a serious role in the life of the country. In Belarus, there are 15 registered political parties, and only six of them are represented in parliament. But out of the 110 members of the House of Representatives, only 16 (14.5%) are members of parties, including Anna Kanopatskaya, a member of the opposition United Civic Party. She is the first opposition MP in 20 years (Elected 2016, September, 2017, October 9). However, active discussions on reports provided by ministers and government officials’ practice of taking questions from journalists following the House’s plenary meetings has been a positive trend in recent years. In this regard, the parliament in any case becomes a channel for open communication between the executive branch with state and non-state media outlets accredited with the parliament. The modest role of parties in the country’s life is reflected in the findings of sociological surveys conducted by government-controlled organizations. Such surveys are regularly conducted by the Information and Analytical Center under the aegis of the Presidential Administration. According to the Center, the church had the highest confidence rate among the public of all social institutions at 78.5% (Republic of Belarus in the Mirror of Sociology, 2016). Data about the level of confidence in institutions such as the army and the police force are not given in the findings for 2015. However, in the following year (2016), it was the army that was on top of the confidence rankings with 79%. The level of confidence in the church was 73%, and that in the police was 67.5% (Republic of Belarus in the Mirror of Sociology, 2017). The level of confidence in the opposition parties was 9%. The level of confidence in the president according to the Center was 74.5% in 2015 (p. 23). It is this proportion of Belarusians that believe that the president’s activities are in their interests. In 2016, their share shrank to 61.5% (Republic of Belarus in the Mirror of Sociology, 2017, p. 15).

Contemporary Politics and Society    47 Third: Belarusians’ Unity and Homogeneous Society Are an Ideological Myth Rather Than Social Reality Four large groups (communities) in Belarusian society can be identified with fairly clear value differences. These differences in the evaluation of national and historic identity are correspondingly reflected in political views. As Professor Shadurski (2014) notes, in Belarus there are two diametrically opposed groups: “Belorussians” and “Euro-Belarusians.” Their visions of the country’s development path are directly linked to Russia or to the European Union. In fact, political integration with Russia is opposed against integration with the European Union. Between them there are two more groups of Belarusians, one of which (the “party of power”) is strongly oriented toward the Soviet past, and the other is oriented toward a national consensus on the basis on the common history and traditions of the Belarusian people. It is these two groups that today constitute the main social basis for strengthening the idea of national sovereignty and balancing between the global centers of power. The government has to take into account the views of all the four groups, although the existence of social discontent is not mentioned in public discourse. As an example, we can cite public discussions in Vitebsk, a regional capital in the eastern part of Belarus, in 2014 (Matveyeva, 2014). Social discontent among pro-Russian people was caused by the unveiling of a monument to Grand Duke Alhierd (Algirdas) of Lithuania who expanded the territory of the Grand Duchy in the fourteenth century by incorporating Muscovite lands. Most of the local population perceive Alhierd as a figure symbolizing European traditions. Government officials attended the unveiling of the monument, but neither the head of the regional government nor the head of the city government spoke at the ceremony. Another monument unveiled in the city in 2016 commemorates Alexander Nevsky, a legendary Russian military leader, canonized as a Russian Orthodox saint. The monument is designed to symbolize family values and the common historic roots of the peoples of Belarus and Russia (Belarus today, 2016, June 25). Thus, the authorities aimed to take into account and balance public sentiment in the city. A few years ago, the official position of the authorities was close to the Sovietera notion of national identity. The president once defined the Belarusians as “Russians, but of better quality.” In the past two years, “soft Belarusianization” has been taking place in the country. A new notion of national identity is taking shape on the basis of historic roots and culture. Unlike rhetoric based on the Soviet past, the new rhetoric is filled with ethnic content, although political and economic reality imposes other requirements. Social surveys show that most Belarusians (60%) associates an improvement in the social and economic situation in the country with the strengthening of the union with Russia (Republic of Belarus in the Mirror of Sociology, 2016). Slightly more than 22% associate an improvement in living standards with the development of relations with the European Union. About 20% believe that living standards will be improved through the creation of favorable conditions for small and medium-sized enterprises (Republic of Belarus in the Mirror of Sociology, 2016, p. 21).

48    Victor Shadurski and Galina Malishevskaya Answering the question: “Cooperation with which countries meets the interests of our country best?” 86% of those interviewed named Russia (Republic of Belarus in the Mirror of Sociology, 2017, p. 35). In 2011, Russia was named by 76.5% of respondents (Republic of Belarus in the Mirror of Sociology, 2012). The EU countries were named by one-third in both 2011 and 2016 (Republic of Belarus in the Mirror of Sociology, 2012, p. 6; 2017, p. 35). Economic integration with Russia is an unconditional priority for Belarus. The same is with the military and political alliance and close cultural ties with Russia. At the same time about 100,000 Belarusians are holders of the Pole’s Card, which means that they acknowledge their historic and cultural ties with Poland (Pawlik K. Poland’s ambassador to Belarus, 2017, August 17; Euroradio Pawlik, 2017, August 17). Pragmatic economic approaches are in conflict with the strengthening of the Western vector of the country’s foreign policy, although Belarusian researchers note that historically the role of a mediator between civilizations, a kind of bridge between two cultures, European and Eastern, is characteristic of the Belarusians. The Eurasian Economic Union and China can currently be viewed as bearers of Eastern culture.

Fourth: Political Activity and Forms of Public Engagement Are Poorly Regulated One of the features of Belarus’ social space is that it has poor political content. Public expression of political views, civil position, support for civil initiatives or participation in protests is not a generally accepted form of political involvement. In 2015, 79% of Belarusians viewed the socio-political situation in the country as calm. Only 9% were ready to take part in protests under exceptional circumstances (Republic of Belarus in the Mirror of Sociology, 2016). In 2016, the level of calmness ranged from 55% at the beginning of the year to 71.5% at the end (Republic of Belarus in the Mirror of Sociology. 2017, p. 14). Special mechanisms of socio-political communications are set up in the country. These include the traditions of a personal direct (written, oral or telephone) appeal to authorities across the entire range of social issues. This practice is enshrined in the Law on Appeals of Citizens and Legal Entities. All state, commercial, and non-profit organizations are required to maintain communication with people on all issues within their competence. Commercial and non-­commercial organizations, small business owners are required to take note of appeals and respond to them within 15 days in cases stipulated by the law. Under this law, all organizations and government agencies must cooperate with the media. Appeals are implemented in the form of statements, proposals or complaints and are aimed at “restoring violated rights of a person or groups of citizens in all matters of state and social life.” This communication channel has become basic discursive. 48% of Belarusians have a positive attitude toward this way of social interaction (Republic of Belarus in the Mirror of Sociology, 2016). Fifty-six percent of Belarusians prefer personal reception in the executive bodies, 32.5% prefer to use hotlines, which are run by all state and social institutions.

Contemporary Politics and Society    49 Only 10.5% of respondents choose to appeal to the media as a form of public communication. That is, the state has done its best to allow the person to resolve the problem or find support not in the social sphere, not within the framework of social interaction, but through a regulated two-way communication form. Is it possible for government agencies to bear such a burden? The answer is given on Facebook by the above-mentioned opposition MP Anna Kanopatskaya. The MP participated in a round-table conference on the practical implementation of the Appeals Law and posted the following information for public discussion: in the first nine months of 2017, the Presidential Administration received about 20,000 appeals. The Council of Ministers received 4,800 and the State Control Committee received 2,800. The House of Representatives received 2,200 appeals and the Council of the Republic (Belarus’ upper parliamentary house) received 500 appeals. The MP notes that these figures suggest that people mostly view the president as the main entity that can solve their problems (Kanopatskaya Facebook page, 2017, November 21).

Fifth: The Belarusian Information Space Is Characterized by Strong Peculiarities Belarus’ media space has never been purely national or isolated. For almost 20 years, there has been a serious Russian information presence in it. The Russian print media and television channels have been widely represented in Belarus. But in the last decade, the Belarusian information space has been becoming more national, especially in terms of social and political content. The state takes measures against uncontrolled flows of television content and rhetoric from neighboring countries. Nonetheless, such measures certainly cannot completely prevent external media influence on the Belarusian public. Such influence was especially noticeable during the acute phase of information confrontation between Russia and Ukraine in the 2014–2016 period. The protection of the country’s information space is understandable. It is clear that evening news broadcasts on TV have heightened viewership and have a tangible effect on public opinion. Technically, it is not difficult to limit information broadcasts from foreign countries. For instance, the Belarusian State Television of Radio Company, the main stateowned media organization, currently inserts local productions in the programming of Russian television channels retransmitted in Belarus, and the Belarusian channel ONT broadcasts newscasts and talk shows produced by Russia’s leading television channel, Channel One. Television viewers in Belarus are still offered Russian news broadcasts, Russian entertainment TV shows, and Russian television series. However, as a rule, Russian political talk shows are not transmitted at prime programming time, but later in the night. Occasionally, Russian channels’ programming includes shows severely critical of the Belarusian authorities, which is primarily caused by Belarus’ attempts at rapprochement with the West. Belarus’ participation in Eastern Partnership summits – the latest one was held in November 2017 – can serve as an example. In most cases, such information attacks do not go unnoticed in the Belarusian media. For example, accusations leveled against Belarus in the talk show “Mesto Vstrechi”

50    Victor Shadurski and Galina Malishevskaya on the Russian channel NTV was responded to with a retaliatory talk show on Belarusian TV, and Sovetskaya Belorussiya (Belarus Segodnya, Belarus’ largest newspaper controlled by the Presidential Administration, published a caricature mocking the anchors of the NTV show (BelTA, 2017b, December 1)). However, in recent years, conflicts between Belarus and Russia in the television sphere, which can be called exchanges of information attacks, have not been frequent and lengthy and have not led to conflicts at the highest government level.

New Information and Communication Challenges Major changes in the field of communication are, of course, related to new information and communication technologies. Owing to the rapid spread of digital technologies, popular access to high-speed Internet service, the situation in the information sphere is changing very rapidly. Consequently, the sphere of social relations is undergoing changes. First of all we should consider the development of the Internet and new media in Belarus.

Internet and New Media Actors in Belarus According to the findings of a survey titled, “The Media Sphere of Belarus: The Sociological Aspect,” which was conducted in 2009, 24.2% of respondents pointed to the Internet as the main source of information about developments in Belarus and abroad. In 2014, the Internet was named by 53% (Media Sector of Belarus, 2014). In 2017, Belarus’ Internet penetration rate for people aged 15 and over reached 70%. Mobile Internet traffic consumption is on the rise. According to the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology of the Republic of Belarus, more than five million people in the country are mobile Internet users. As for the frequency of use, 91% use the Internet every day (Smirnov, 2017). Thus, thanks to the Internet and new communications technologies, the information space has become open and global. The traditional mechanisms of government control over information distribution channels no longer work. The authorities have to accept the new reality. Today, the concealment of information by officials is not a guarantee against information leaks to the public. Information inconvenient or embarrassing to authorities can be confirmed by global sources and eyewitnesses armed with smartphones with video cameras. The speed of information dissemination makes the world compact, transparent, and closely interconnected. The social and political sphere is experiencing an explosion of communications, where the number of actors and connections between them increases many times. All these force the government and all political institutions to search for new ways of communicating with the public and winning public trust. Today, the political process cannot rely only on traditional forms of public engagement and methods of influencing public opinion through television. The government has to learn to openly and publicly respond to the initiatives of new actors. Moreover, many news websites carry out activities without being registered as a media outlet.

Contemporary Politics and Society    51 For example, tut.by, a leading news site, has an audience comparable to that of a national television channel. At the same time the site is beyond the scope of the Media Law. Unlike a print media outlet, the website cannot be issued an official warning. At the same time tut.by reporters cover all major political events in the country, have accreditation with the parliament, and its editor in chief receives invitations to meetings with the president. Indeed, today it is already impossible to ignore such media or control their news agenda. Apart from major media entities, information about social and political events is collected and distributed by bloggers. We should also note the role of social networking services. The social networking service Vkontakte is used by 2.9 million Belarusians and Facebook is used by 900,000 people. Users actively communicate and share information with each other. It is also impossible to stop their communication and build an online community by administrative methods. Online communities and groups emerge spontaneously and grow like a snowball rolling down a hill. For instance, photo reporter and civil society activist Anton Motolko gained an effective media influence in 2015–2017 by initiating public discussions about local social problems on social networking sites. He goes beyond usual online communication and openly criticizes authorities for their inaction and simultaneously actively communicates with them to solve problems. The influence of civil society activists such as Motolko is comparable to the influence of a major newspaper because his messages are distributed by ordinary users in a viral way through the Internet. His civil initiatives deal with a wide range of social matters, from the removal of trees the city to the enforcement of parking regulations in residential areas. People even use the hashtag #мотолькопомоги (Motolko, help us) on social networking sites (Motolko, 2017). Such initiatives do not have a direct political content, but they require a response from authorities because specific measures have to be taken to assuage mass social discontent. In the case of Belarus, this can be equated to the socio-political process. We can state that the developing civil society in Belarus for the first time has a space for self-organization, a space where authorities cannot perform an organizing function. This is a reality and the authorities have to accept it. Indeed, a new social environment has emerged, in which a new type of communication is taking shape. This is horizontal web communication in which civil society activists, bloggers, and opinion leaders become information and communication nodes (Castells, 2017, p. 65) and restructure the social space.

New Social Platforms and Civil Initiatives in Belarus in 2017 It is social networking websites and platforms that become a basis for the development of activism and the promotion of social initiatives. For example, the above-mentioned MP Anna Kanopatskaya posted the country’s 2018 budget estimates on her Facebook page in November 2017. That was done for the first time, and the move had public repercussions. Formerly, the public and journalists had had no opportunity to see state budget estimates before they were adopted by the parliament. In general, in the country there is no practice of putting state or city

52    Victor Shadurski and Galina Malishevskaya budget estimates for public discussion. Thus, the new information environment makes it possible for issues previously closed to the public to be available for public discussion. In the new information environment, even the efforts of one MP can be enough to have things change or improve. An important factor that caused the intensification of social life in the 2015– 2017 period was the possibility of raising funds through micro-donations from a large number of people. Thanks to the new possibility of paying with credit cards over the Internet, crowdfunding is becoming increasingly popular in Belarus. Crowdfunding is not only about raising donations for charity, it has also become a platform for supporting media and civil initiatives. Most of such initiatives are funded through the platform talaka.by. This platform is used to raise money for a prominent civil initiative known as Angel. A search and rescue team called Angel was established in 2012 to search for people who get lost in the woods. The Angel community on the most popular social networking site Vkontakte has more than 114,000 members (Angel, 2017). Angel volunteers have helped find more than 300 people in five years. It is fundamentally important that thanks to new media and social platforms, more people can learn about the practical opportunity to implement a civil initiative, and that any person or group can put forward a civil initiative regardless of its scale and publicly, with the help of the Internet community, try to change things for the better through the collection of signatures. By November 2017, more than 1,000 online petitions had been made on the platform and 733 replies had been received from government agencies (Petitions, 2017). It is important to note that platform administrators analyze the results of petitions. And users who signed petitions have the opportunity to examine the reply and conclude whether the problem has been solved, whether the reply is satisfactory, etc. Platform administrators use the replies to petitions to compile rankings of government agencies. Particularly strong public repercussions and serious consequences were caused by an incident that happened in a military unit in October 2017. A conscript soldier, Alexander Korzhich, was found hanged on the grounds of the unit. It turned out that it was the second death in the unit in a year. Many national and regional media outlets started their own journalistic investigations. Reports on this incident were spread on social media. Civil society activists launched an online petition demanding a probe into the circumstances of the death and the resignation of the defense minister. In just a few days, the petition, posted on the platform zvarot.by, was signed by more than 10,000 people (Zvarot, 2017). People’s online appeals were sent to the website of the defense ministry. And the official position of the authorities changed radically. To alleviate a surge of public discontent on social media, the president held a meeting with top-ranking military and law enforcement officials, which was followed by the institution of criminal proceedings and the dismissal of the commander of the military unit. The head of state also told the prosecutor general and the KGB chief to meet with the mother of the deceased soldier in person. The spokesperson for the president, Natalia Eismont, offered condolences to the family of the deceased on behalf of the president. The defense

Contemporary Politics and Society    53 minister held an extended briefing on them of bullying in the military (tut.by, 2017, October 18). The Investigative Committee launched a probe into on all suicides reported in the Armed Forces in the past five years. State television channels started to broadcast reports on measures taken to eradicate hazing from that particular military unit and the army as a whole. For example, TV channels highlighted the appointment of a new commanding officer for the military unit. While speaking to the newly appointed officer and the defense minister, President Lukashenko suggested considering the possibility of resuming the old practice of exempting young men from compulsory military service if they were the only sons in their families. Thus, thanks to new information means of communication, heightened public attention to an acute social issue resulted in a civil campaign. For the first time an online petition contained a political demand: the resignation of the defense minister. Although the petition failed to achieve the declared goal, it was a turning point for the entire nation. Both the public and the government were able to see the mobilization potential of new media platforms and their role in social and political communication. That was a serious challenge to the system of public administration with regard to response to the public’s discontent and concerns, and the practice of hushing up information. The new information environment has also caused some positive changes in the daily activities of government agencies. The year 2017 was marked by a new stage in the implementation of the government’s “policy of openness and good-neighborliness.” In January 2017, Lukashenko issued a presidential edict abolishing the requirement for citizens of 80 countries to have a visa if they arrive in Belarus through Minsk National Airport and stay in the country for up to five days. In the first few days after the edict was issued, the foreign ministry did a lot of work to publish the necessary information online. In particular, a list of the 80 countries was promptly posted on the official website of the ministry and its official pages on social networking sites. Literally the day after the edict was signed, the foreign ministry held a question-and-answer session for online social networks (Official Page of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Facebook, 2017). According to Dmitry Mironchik, spokesman for the foreign ministry, the audience reading reports on the new rules for entry into Belarus and receiving answers to questions about the matter exceeded one million people. Those included people living in different countries across the world. The ministry’s prompt response suggests that it had an adequate idea of the role of social media and took a serious approach. This was also evidence that the state tries to use new forms and methods of social and political interaction in the conditions of high-speed communication and open information space. In 2017, about 80,000 people used the opportunity to enter Belarus without a visa (Euroradio, 2018, January 11). It should be noted that the country’s foreign ministry is more open than other government agencies for informal communication on social networking sites. Belarusian embassies abroad have started their official pages on Twitter and Facebook and also actively work to expand their online communities. On their pages, they provide information about their activities and post-media reports on topical international issues. Their pages are rich in photographs and video content. This is in line with

54    Victor Shadurski and Galina Malishevskaya the growing presence of international organizations and embassies on social networking platforms. In fact, the foreign ministry is keeping pace with global trends in the sphere of social communication and may serve as an example for other government agencies and institutions. As an example of successful information cooperation, we can cite the story of a statue of Thaddeus Kosciusko, which the Association of Belarusians in Switzerland put up in 2017 in the Swiss city of Solothurn where one of the leaders of the 1794 anti-Russian national liberation revolt died in 1817. The association wanted the plate under the statue to read, “To the Prominent Son of Belarus from Grateful Compatriots,” but shortly before the monument was to be unveiled, Polish diplomats demanded that the reference to Belarus should be removed (BelTA, 2017a, October 12). The Polish side also did not want the inscription to be in the Belarusian language. The case received much coverage in the Belarusian media and prompted civil society activists to start raising funds on the crowdfunding platform talaka.org, for putting up a monument to Kosciusko at his birthplace in the Brest region. Thanks to the efforts of Belarusian diplomats, who met with the mayor of Solothurn, a compromise was negotiated. The statue was unveiled on October 21, with the plate under it reading in Belarusian and German: “Tadeusz Kosciusko, 1746–1817. From the Association of Belarusians in Switzerland.” This case clearly shows the importance of prompt information support, not only the need for diplomats and officials to properly perform their functions. This implies the need for the parties in a conflict to publicly clarify their positions, respect the position of the other party and be ready for a compromise. It is this style of openness and dialogue that helps avoid an escalation of tension and prevent a negative emotional reaction in the social space.

Conclusions So we can state that Belarus currently exists in the conditions of open global information space. The public and the state face new challenges in the field of information and communication. The clue objective of this chapter was to examine the question of how information technology changes the nature of political communication in Belarus. It is argued that it leads to the new forms of civil activism, which involve different actors in to the social relations. ICT and social media create new opportunities and challenges to the consolidation of statehood and real independence of Belarus. Authorities have a lot to do to transform the existing practices of communication with civil society in the country and to develop their own approaches to the use of online communications in international practice. The key point is to realize the need for a transition from the administrative regulation of social life to an open dialogue with civil society. After all, the social sphere of socio-political communication already exists and is developing autonomously. In this sphere, communication between the public and the state is built on a parity basis. And new media technologies are the key to maintaining free communication and an equal information exchange.

Contemporary Politics and Society    55

References Angel, A Search and Rescue Team. (2017). Group on the social networking site VKontakte. Retrieved from https://vk.com/angel_search Antanovich, N. (2010). Prospects of using the network approach. Sociology, 2, 10, 44–53. Retrieved from http://elib.bsu.by/handle/123456789/6325 Baudrillard, J. (1983). Ecstasy of communication. In H. Foster (Eds.), The anti-aesthetic. Essays on postmodern culture (p. 126–133). Port Townsend: Bay Press. Retrieved from http://gtmarket.ru/laboratory/expertize/3091 Belarus Today. (Newspaper). (2016, June 25). Retrieved from https://www.sb.by/articles/ v-vitebske-otkryli-pamyatnik-aleksandru-nevskomu.html BelTA. (2017a, October 12). The idea of a Kosciuszko monument in Switzerland should be implemented without serious interference in the activities of association. Retrieved from http://www.belta.by/politics/view/ideja-o-pamjatnike-kostjushko-v-shvejtsariidolzhna-byt-realizovana-bez-grubogo-vmeshatelstva-v-270982-2017 BelTA. (2017b, December 1). Yakubovich on NTV: The channel often does not get into information and political trends. Retrieved from http://www.belta.by/society/view/ jakubovich-ob-ntv-kanal-zachastuju-ne-popadaet-v-informatsionnye-i-politicheskietrendy-278645-2017 Bourdieu, P. (2005). Social space and the genesis of “Classes”. Sociology of social space. Digest of articles. Retrieved from http://gtmarket.ru/laboratory/expertize/3054 Castells, M. (2017). Communication power (pp. 18–190). Moscow: National Research University Higher School of Economics. Euroradio. (2018, January 11). Visa free entry introduced by edict. Retrieved from http://euroradio.by/byazviz-uvyali-dekretam-i-nyama-garantyi-shto-zautra-dekretam-yago-neadmenyac Habermas, J. (2007). Technology and science as “Ideology”. Moscow: Praxis. Kanopatskaya, A. (Member of the House of Representatives). (2017, October 9). The MP’s personal page on Facebook. Retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/anna. kanopatskaya Lukashenko, A. (President). (2017, April 21). Address to the Belarusian people and the national assembly. Retrieved from http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/ezhegodnoeposlanie-k-belorusskomu-narodu-i-natsionalnomu-sobraniju-16059 Lumann, N. (2005). Media communication. Moscow: Logos. Matveyeva T. (2014, June 27). At the opening of the monument to Prince Alhierd in Vitebsk, the authorities did not say a word. Tut.by. Retrieved from https://news.tut.by/society/404952.html McLuhan, M. (2004). Galaxy Internet: Reflections on the internet, business and society. Yekaterinburg: U-factoria. Media Sector of Belarus. (2014). The sociological aspect. Retrieved from http://iac.gov.by/ sbornik/Mediasfera_Belarusi.pdf Motolko, A. (2017). Twitter. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/hashtag/мотолько Official page of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Facebook. (2017). Retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/belarusmfa Pawlik, K. (Poland’s Ambassador to Belarus). (2017, August 17). Euroradio. [Video]. Retrieved from http://euroradio.by/belarusy-atrymali-kalya-100-tysyach-kart-palyaka-palovuz-vydadzenyh-pa-usim-svece Petitions.by. (Electronic petitions). (2017). We are against the demolition of houses in Osmolovka. Retrieved from ttps://petitions.by/petitions/744 Ramo, J. (2017). The seventh sense (pp. 11–330). Moscow: Eksmo. Republic of Belarus in the Mirror of Sociology. (2012). Collected materials of sociological research. Retrieved from http://iac.gov.by/sbornik/002.pdf

56    Victor Shadurski and Galina Malishevskaya Republic of Belarus in the Mirror of Sociology. (2016). Collected materials of sociological research. Retrieved from http://iac.gov.by/sbornik/010.pdf Republic of Belarus in the Mirror of Sociology. (2017). Collected materials of sociological research. Retrieved from http://iac.gov.by/sbornik/010.pdf Reshetnikov, S. (2011). Methodology of analysis of public policy in the Republic of Belarus: Political functionalism. Bulletin of Elarusian State University, 3(3), 60–62. Retrieved from http://elib.bsu.by/handle/123456789/26530 Rubinov, A. (2010). The Belarusian model. Some policy issues at the present stage. Belaruskaya Dumka, 3, 3–9. Retrieved from http://beldumka.belta.by/isfiles/000167_770398.pdf Shadurski, V. (2014). Historical policy in the Republic of Belarus: Stages of development and version of the interpretation of the past. Proceedings of the International Relations Department of Belarusian State University, 5 (5), 9–24. Slutskaya, L. (2016). Political communications as the basic technology of formation of political space. In Reports at the 7th international scientific and practical conference (pp. 174–177). Retrieved from http://elib.bsu.by/handle/123456789/157655 Smirnov, D. (2017, September 20). Google says what Belarusians do on the internet. tut.by. (Newsportal). Retrieved from https://42.tut.by/512804 The Constitution of the Republic of Belarus. (1994). Retrieved from http://pravo.by/ pravovaya-informatsiya/normativnye-dokumenty/konstitutsiya-respubliki-belarus tut.by. (2017, October 18). Commanders should be responsible for subordinates. Defense Minister Ravkov comments on the death of a soldier in Pechi. Retrieved from https://news.tut.by/society/565138.html Zvarot. (Online Petitions). (2017). Retrieved from http://zvarot.by/ru/ostanovi-proizvol-varmii-protestuj-protiv-dedovshhiny

Chapter 5

Modeling Public Mood and Emotion: Blog and News Sentiment and Politico-economic Phenomena Mu-Yen Chen, Min-Hsuan Fan, Ting-Hsuan Chen and Ren-Pao Hsieh Abstract Given the maturation of the internet and virtual communities, an important emerging issue in the humanities and social sciences is how to accurately analyze the vast quantity of documents on public and social network websites. Therefore, this chapter integrates political blogs and news articles to develop a public mood dynamic prediction model for the stock market, while referencing the behavioral finance perspective and online political community characteristics. The goal of this chapter is to apply a big data and opinion mining approach to a sentiment analysis for the relationship between political status and economic development in Taiwan. The proposed model is verified using experimental datasets collected from ChinaTimes.com, cnYES. com, Yahoo stock market news, and Google stock market news, covering the period from January 1, 2016 to June 30, 2017. The empirical results indicate the accuracy rate with which the proposed model forecasts stock prices. Keywords: Sentiment mining analysis; text mining; opinion mining; stock price; public mood and emotion; Politico-economic Phenomena

Introduction The information and communication technology (ICT) industry has accounted for a large share of Taiwan’s economy over the past decade. In 2006, the ICT industry accounted for 50% of Taiwan’s manufacturing GDP. Taiwan’s manufacturing employment accounted for about 29% of Taiwan’s ICT production concentration, making it the third largest ICT producer in the world after the United States and Politics and Technology in the Post-Truth Era, 57–71 Copyright © 2019 Mu-Yen Chen, Min-Hsuan Fan, Ting-Hsuan Chen and Ren-Pao Hsieh doi:10.1108/978-1-78756-983-620191005

58    Mu-Yen Chen et al. Japan, measured by total revenue of ICT enterprises in 2009. Taiwan, in particular, occupies almost the entire global market share (more than 90% in 2010) in mask read-only memory, laptops, and cables. The design and management of the Taiwan Science and Technology Park provide ideal conditions for high-tech businesses. The park also provides a good environment for the development of relevant syndicates, nearby industrial parks, and public research and development institutions. Taiwan ranked first in the “state of cluster development” index of the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2013–2014. Taiwan has a population of 23 million, and its well-educated and industrious people have a place in the global ICT industry. Many ICT companies in Taiwan are driving the global supply chain by setting up their own brands. Currently, Taiwanese companies account for three-quarters of global PC production and half the world’s LCDs. In addition, Taiwan makes up about a quarter of the world’s semiconductors, accounting for one-fifth of global handsets. The close proximity of Taiwan’s electronics companies has created an obvious cluster of cost and time-to-market advantages within the industry, including one-stop purchasing, design support, and rapid commercialization of Taiwan’s products. Many of Taiwan’s largest brands are now using the same local manufacturing expertise to provide consumers with innovative products and better value. In the past few years, with the availability of more data and better analysis, new findings have increased our understanding of the impact of ICT on society. ICT’s benefits to Taiwan can be divided into three main categories, as follows: Social: enabling new interactions between businesses and consumers via the internet or social media; promote cost-effective public and private services; and improve transport efficiency. Financial: facilitating the understanding of customer types and demands, facilitate financial transactions, help investors’ decision analysis, and implement inclusive finance. Political: increasing the coverage of political messages, for example, allowing for continued contact with overseas citizens and providing them with the opportunity to vote. According to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), there were more than 7 billion mobile phone users in the world in 2015, compared with less than 1 billion in 2000. Worldwide, a total of 3.2 billion people use the internet, of whom 2 billion are from developing countries. As the world moves faster and faster toward a digital society, ICT will play an even more important role in the post-2015 development agenda and the achievement of future sustainable development goals. We underscore Taiwan’s contribution to ensuring that everyone is connected at an affordable cost in the emerging information society. This chapter adopts the ICT perspective and investigates the impact of ICT on the finance, political, and social spheres. Therefore, we have collected political blogs and news articles to develop a public mood dynamic prediction model for the stock market. We also reference the behavioral finance perspective, as well as the characteristics of the online political community. The organization of this chapter is as follows. First, we survey related literature regarding ICT development on social media, the financial market, and politics. Second, we introduce

Modeling Public Mood and Emotion    59 and discuss the sentiment classification and analysis. Third, we describe the research methodologies and process. Fourth, we present the experimental design and the collection of the datasets. This is followed by the experimental results and a performance evaluation. Finally, we present the contributions of this research and make recommendations for future studies.

The Impact of ICT and Its Development on Social Media In 2018, Merriam-Webster defined social media as “Forms of electronic communication (such as websites for social networking and microblogging) through which people create online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, etc.” The term social media is usually used to describe social networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Pinterest, Snapchat, Instagram, and WeChat. Social media technologies take many different forms including blogs, business networks, enterprise social networks, forums, microblogs, photo sharing, products/services review, social bookmarking, social gaming, social networks, video sharing, and virtual worlds (Aichner & Jacob, 2015). Companies are increasing their use of social media monitoring tools to monitor, track, and analyze online conversations about their brand or products, or about related topics of interest. Social media “mining” is a type of data mining, a technique for analyzing data to detect patterns. Social media mining is a process of representing, analyzing, and extracting actionable patterns from data collected from people’s activities on social media. This kind of big data has aroused the interest of many scholars and industries. In recent years, text mining, webpage mining, and emotion mining have been the most popular methods for analyzing and using such online data. Sentiment mining is also known as opinion mining, sentiment analysis, or subjectivity analysis. It is based mainly on text mining search technology in which the computer automatically finds high frequency, meaningful words, and sentences. Since “sentiment” refers to people’s attitudes, opinions, and feelings about a particular time, place, and thing, sentiment mining is more effective than text mining in detecting, extracting, and analyzing metaphorical emotions or lexical documents. A 2016 Pew Research Center survey entitled the “News Use Across Social Media Platforms” found that a majority of US adults (62%) get their news via social media, and 18% do so often. Two-thirds of Facebook users (66%) get their news from Facebook, nearly three out of five Twitter users (59%) get their news from Twitter, and seven out of 10 Reddit users get news on that platform (Pew Research Center, 2016). As per the statistics revealed on Statista (2018), 71% of internet users are social network users, and this figure is expected to grow. In 2015, approximately 2 billion users used social networking sites and apps. With the increased use of mobile devices, this number is likely to cross the 2.6 billion mark by 2018, and exceed 3 billion by 2021 (Statista, 2018). Currently, the mainstream practical application of sentiment mining is text analysis of social networks. Data mining and machine learning are transforming this landscape by extracting signals from dizzying amounts of granular data on social media.

60    Mu-Yen Chen et al.

The Impact of ICT and Its Development on Financial Markets In a 2014 white paper entitled “Social Media in Financial Markets,” the worlds’ largest social data provider, Gnip, noted that sentiment analysis was first used to explore the impact of social networks on the stock market in 2010 (Gnip Whitepaper, 2014). The usage was limited to company analysis of customer satisfaction and the customer experience. In the future, sentiment analysis will be used for stock market prediction and applications in other fields. Although news most certainly influences stock market prices, public mood states or sentiment may play an equally important role. Research in the field of psychology has shown that, in addition to information, emotions play a significant role in human decision making (Dolan, 2002). It is therefore reasonable to assume that public mood and sentiment can drive stock market values as much as does news. This is supported by recent research by Gilbert and Karahalios (2010), who extracted an indicator of public anxiety from LiveJournal posts and investigated whether variations in that indicator could predict S&P500 values. Bollen, Mao, and Zeng (2011) used a large number of Twitter tweets to determine whether the emotions of the masses can be used to predict future trends in the stock market. The research targeted nearly 10 million Twitter articles and used two API tools: OpinionFinder and Google-Profile of Mood States. It compared the results of Granger causality analysis and a Self-Organizing Fuzzy Neural Network with analysis of the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index. The result showed that a change in “calm,” as analyzed by Google-Profile of Mood States (GPOMS), can predict the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index within the next 3–4 days with an accuracy rate as high as 86.7%. In 2012, the company Datasift used 95,019 tweets from 58,665 Twitter users to determine if there was any correlation to the stock price on the day of Facebook’s initial public offering and found that sentimental tendencies can be used as a leading indicator of stock price movements (Datasift, 2012). Moreover, in May 2012, London funding company Derwent Capital Markets launched the world’s first hedge fund based on public sentiment on Twitter and promised a 15–20% annual rate of return (Tweney, 2012). Li, Xie, Chen, Wang, and Deng (2014) used Harvard’s psychological dictionary and Loughran-McDonald’s financial sentiment dictionary to construct a sentiment space. Textual news articles were then quantitatively measured and projected onto the sentiment space. The results showed that models that incorporate sentiment analysis outperform the bag-of-words model. Nguyena, Shirai, and Velcin (2015) built a model to predict stock price movement using sentiment data from social media. They incorporated the sentiments regarding topics specific to the company into the stock prediction model. Comparing the accuracy average over 18 stocks in one year’s transactions, the method achieved 2.07% better performance than the model using historical prices only. Nayak, Pai, and Pai (2016) used supervised machine learning algorithms to develop two models: one for daily predictions and one for monthly predictions. As part of the daily prediction model, historical prices were combined with sentiments. The supervised machine learning algorithms used in the daily prediction model for the Indian stock market achieved accuracy rates of up to 70%.

Modeling Public Mood and Emotion    61 Chen and Chen (2017) used big data techniques to conduct sentiment analysis of emotions and reactions. They built a public mood dynamic prediction model for the Taiwanese stock market. The model was verified using experimental datasets from ChinaTimes.com, cnYES.com, Yahoo stock market news, and Google stock market news. The empirical results indicated that the proposed model can forecast “Hon Hai Precision Industry Company” stock prices and the Taiwan Capitalization Weighted Stock Index (TAIEX) with a high rate of accuracy.

The Impact of ICT and Its Development on Politics Combined with other online platforms, social media are capable of competing with traditional media, and in 2008 their influence extended to the US presidential election. Social media not only affected the election coverage of traditional media, but also led to a considerable degree of change in the voting itself (Metzgar & Maruggi, 2009). Some scholars believe that the 2008 US presidential election opened the era of the “Facebook election” (Johnson & Perlmutter, 2010). As social media became an important conduit for political campaign communication, an increasing amount of research began to explore the real impact of social media platforms on political communication. However, the use of social media such as Facebook, MySpace, and YouTube in the US presidential election in 2008 made it widely available to voters, thus providing an opportunity for researchers to explore the impact of individual social media on political communications. During that election, the Obama campaign also took great advantage of the political communication effect of social media. Not only was Obama highly successful at fundraising via online mechanisms, he was even more successful at mobilizing young voters. This marked the beginning of an era of online participation in politics (Macnamara & Kenning, 2011). During the 2008 US presidential election, 23% of Americans received information directly from candidates’ e-mails, 35% from online campaign films, 39% directly from original documents such as submissions, speeches, and materials (Smith & Rainie, 2008). Because social media has created a new channel by which information and opinions can spread among voters, it also gives voters the freedom to take control of the path of diffusion. As a result, the 2008 US presidential election made social media a new political communications hot spot on the world scene. Facebook data allow researchers to understand the electorate’s political messages produced on social media, analyze the content, and better understand the images that candidates have distributed via this new medium (Woolley, Limperos, & Oliver, 2010). An empirical study by Aparaschivei (2011) also confirmed that the recent rapid development of social media has enabled the internet to serve as an effective new channel for campaign message broadcasting and fundraising in other elections as well. Data from Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and personal blogs were analyzed to investigate the development of five candidates’ online activities during the 2009 Romanian presidential election. Traian Băsescu, the incumbent president, had the highest visibility on Twitter and was the most effective candidate using YouTube as a campaign tool. Băsescu uploaded a large number of videos and garnered more views than all other candidates combined. More than half of the

62    Mu-Yen Chen et al. Romanians who followed the election chose to subscribe to Băsescu’s videos as a source of information. Aparaschivei (2011) argued that Traian Băsescu’s effective operation of social media such as YouTube was one of the main reasons for the success of his presidential campaign. In the 2012 Taiwanese presidential election, social media were considered to be a new campaign weapon. During the election period, Taiwan’s internet population reached 17.53 million (Taiwan Network Information Center, 2012), accounting for 75% of the total population. Of the various internet platforms, social media was the main platform. In October 2012, 11.41 million non-repeat users visited community-type websites, accounting for 96.8% of the total number of network users in Taiwan. In particular, Facebook was the most popular social networking site, used by 80% of Taiwanese netizens (InsightXplore Consultant Company, 2012). These figures show that both President Ma Ying-Jeou and DPP nominee Tsai Ing-Wen were actively engaged in Facebook. Developed by Indian startup Genic.ai, MogIA’s artificial intelligence system successfully predicted Trump’s 2016 election to the US presidency after collecting more than 20 million data points from Google, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. Yaqub, Chun, Atluri, and Vaidya (2017) investigated the sentiment of tweets by the two main presidential candidates, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, along with almost 2.9 million tweets by Twitter users during the 2016 US presidential campaign. Also of significance was the finding that sentiment and topics expressed on Twitter can serve as a proxy for public opinion and important election-related events. Moreover, they found that Donald Trump offered a more optimistic and positive campaign message than did Hillary Clinton and enjoyed better sentiment when mentioned in messages by Twitter users. Kušen and Strembeck (2018) provide a sentiment analysis of the Twitter discussion on the 2016 Austrian presidential elections. They extracted and analyzed a dataset consisting of 343,645 Twitter messages related to this election. Among other things, they found that the winner of the election (Alexander Van der Bellen) predominantly sent tweets resulting in neutral sentiment scores, while his opponent (Norbert Hofer) preferred emotional messages (i.e., tweets resulting in positive or negative sentiment scores). It is noteworthy that the motivation for the use of social media has been attracting attention in research on new online media. However, no previous empirical studies related to political communication have considered how social media motivations affect the financial world.

Sentiment Classification and Analysis The sentiment classification of words has been receiving gradually increasing attention in recent years. This research field can be divided into four aspects for further exploration: subjectivity classification, word sentiment classification, document sentiment classification, and opinion extraction (Tang, Tan, & Cheng, 2009). This chapter focuses on a literature survey regarding these four aspects, the methodologies or processes (i.e., machine learning, feature selection, and feature weighting), as well as data collection from social media, as shown in Table 1. The goal of

Modeling Public Mood and Emotion    63 Table 1:  Research Type for Sentiment Classification. Research type Machining learning method

Feature selection method

Feature weighting method

Social media platform

Methodology comparison New method proposing Support vector machine (SVM) Decision tree (ID3, C4.5, random Forest) Naive Bayes (NB) Others (neural network, time-series) Document frequency (DF) Information gain Linear regularization Others (LASSO, N-gram, POS-based) TF TF–IDF TP Twitter Facebook

R1 R2 ML1 ML2 ML3 ML4 FS1 FS2 FS3 FS4 FW1 FW2 FW3 S1 S2

sentiment classification is to divide words and documents into positive, negative, or neutral opinions, based on their sentiment. Once this is completed, subjectivity classification and opinion extraction can be achieved easily. Recently, scholars have used sentiment classification and analysis to predict the outcomes of political issues and elections, as shown in Table 2. The matrix in Table 2 shows the themes of political communication-related studies on Twitter. Various types of research have identified or analyzed these issues by focusing on a novel method or comparing different methods. Some studies have used data from the social media platform to examine ways in which AI or machine learning methods can provide insight into stakeholders’ political preferences and inclinations toward certain media. Studies of feature selection methods have explored possible ways to reduce the dimension of feature space (as well as computing time and costs), remove noise, and improve classification performance (Polat & Gunes, 2002). Studies of feature weighting methods have explored the usefulness of various features in the retrieval process. There are many ways of calculating feature weights in the document classification field, including term frequency (TF), inverse document frequency (IDF), TF–IDF, and term presence (TP). Social media platform studies have explored the ways in which certain subject matter or methodologies are employed from the perspective of various data sources or collection channels. Finally, survey-based studies of electoral outcomes have sought to correlate Twitter activity with the election performance outcomes of political candidates or parties. Sentiment analysis has been the predominant approach for such studies, employing feature selection or feature weighting methods to examine the likelihood of a given election outcome. Researchers have also compared different machine learning methods in this regard.

Beauchamp (2017) Bermingham and Smeaton (2011) Bravo-Marquez, Mendoza, and Poblete (2014) Charalampakis, Spathis, Kouslis, and Kermanidis (2016) Gull, Shoaib, Rasheed, Abid, and Zahoor (2016) Jain, Kumar, and Fernandes (2017) Joyce and Deng (2017) Shi, Agarwal, Agrawal, Garg, and Spoelstra (2012) Tunggawan and Soelistio (2016) Wang, Can, Kazemzadeh, Bar, and Narayanan (2012)

Scholars

○ ○

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○ ○

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○

○ ○

○

○

○

Machine Learning

○

○ ○

ML1 ML2 ML3 ML4 FS1 ○ ○

R2

○ ○

R1

Research Type

Table 2:  Literature Review for Sentiment Classification of Elections.

○

FS2

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FS3

Feature Selection

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FS4 FW1 FW2 FW3

Feature Weighting

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○ ○

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○

○

○

○ ○

S1

S2

Social Media

64    Mu-Yen Chen et al.

Modeling Public Mood and Emotion    65

Research Methodology Vinodhini and Chandrasekaran (2012) noted that sentiment mining is the natural language processing technique for analyzing emotions and opinions expressed in articles. Sentiment mining involves expertise in a variety of research fields and professional knowledge: an understanding of the proper methods for collecting articles in a social network, the use of computational linguistics to analyze the grammatical structure of those articles, and the means by which to determine whether the emotional polarity of the vocabulary is positive or negative. This has driven our design of a comprehensive sentiment mining approach in order to solve the problems involved in analyzing a large quantity of short articles. To detect abbreviation slang, delete stop words, and detect the positive and negative emotions in the vocabulary, we referred to the Academia Sinica Bilingual Ontological Wordnet (BOW-WordNet), and the National Taiwan University Sentiment Dictionary (NTUSD). Thus, we provide a sentiment mining framework which can serve as a reference for subsequent researchers. The research framework is described in the following sections and is shown in Fig. 1. Details of the process used to achieve the research objectives are discussed below. (1) Data Collection The politics news were collected from Taiwan’s most popular news websites – Yahoo.com. In addition, financial news were collected from ChinaTimes.com, cnYES.com, Yahoo stock market news, and Google stock market news. All the datasets were collected on January 19, 2018, and covered the time period from

Data Collection

Data Preprocessing

Polarity Lexicon Usage

Sentiment Polarity Modeling

Stock Market Trend Prediction

Fig. 1:  Research Framework.

66    Mu-Yen Chen et al. January 1, 2016 to July 31, 2017. This study also collected stock price data for the same time period. (2) Data Preprocessing Once the raw data were collected from the main political and financial news community articles, we identified incomplete data, duplicate data, or missing values within the datasets. HTML tags, JavaScript, style, Cascading Style Sheets (CSS), and incomplete data were removed from each article to reduce unnecessary information and improve training efficiency. About 200,000 political news articles were collected, of which only about 140,000 remained after preprocessing. In contrast, the collected data included 760,000 articles related to financial news. Because of the varying levels of quality of the financial news published in different news forums, some articles have been removed by website administrators. In some cases, the external access required for data collection was blocked, and in other cases, articles were found to be duplicates. After preprocessing, only 130,000 financial news articles remained in the dataset. (3) Polarity Lexicon Usage For opinion word acquisition and extension, we used the NTUSD, which is a Chinese sentiment dictionary derived from the General Inquirer (GI), and the Chinese Network Sentiment Dictionary (CNSD) (Ku, Lo, & Chen, 2007). Ku et al. (2007) translated the GI and merged the result with the CNSD. They then used synonym relations to derive the NTUSD sentiment dictionary, which has 11,088 Chinese words: almost 2,800 positive and 8,200 negative words. Words that were also found in the NTUSD were assigned the same polarity given to them in the NTUSD. These tools and resources can serve as a basis for opinionrelated research tasks. (4) Sentiment Polarity Modeling The goal of this chapter is to apply the sentiment mining approach to real-time analysis of the emotional moment for online political and financial news articles. Sentiment polarity modeling was performed after the raw data were processed and the polarity lexicon was adopted. An article consists of many words, each of which is correlated with its appropriate polarity as assigned in the NTUSD lexicon. Words that appear in the lexicon with a positive polarity receive a POS tag, and words that the lexicon lists as having a negative polarity receive a NEG tag. If the number of POS tags is greater than the number of NEG tags, the article is viewed as a positive article. In contrast, when the number of POS tags is less than the number of NEG tags, the article is viewed as negative. (5) Stock Market Trend Prediction Based on the sentiment polarity modeling, we calculated each article from the time period t–6 to t–1 to determine the correlation to the “up” or “down” of the stock price. We also calculated the time of each article’s ups and downs to determine the correlation to the forecast time t ups and downs.

Modeling Public Mood and Emotion    67

Experimental Design and Results Financial News of Single Company and TAIEX Prediction To investigate prediction performance, this experiment chose articles about the following three companies: “Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company” (TSMC), “Hon Hai Precision Industry Company” (also known as Foxconn Technology Group), and “Nanya Technology Corporation” (NTC). We chose TSMC and Hon Hai because the TAIEX ranked these companies as the top two performers as of early June 2017. Thus, they have greater influence in the broader market. NTC is ranked 50th and was chosen because news discussions treat it differently from TSMC and Hon Hai. The empirical results were expected to indicate the accuracy rate with which a single company can forecast the TAIEX index. As shown in Fig. 2, the experimental results show that, when one company’s stock is used to predict the weighted index, TSMC and Hon Hai both outperformed NTC. Specifically, Lag-1 means that the forecast at time point t is based on article analysis at time point t–1. This explains the higher average rates from Lag-1 to Lag-4 for these three companies.

Taiwan 50 Financial News and TAIEX Price Prediction Using data from a single company to account for all listed stocks resulted in inaccuracies. Thus, we chose to collect financially related articles regarding Taiwan’s top 50 companies (Taiwan 50) and apply sentiment polarity modeling to enhance lexicon coverage. This was then used to forecast ups and downs in the TAIEX, the leading index for the Taiwanese stock market. Fig. 3 shows that financial news does not experience a lag effect in the stock market. In addition to the significant difference between different Lag periods, Lag-2 to Lag-6 are all quite stable in terms of precision rates. This result confirms that, when using the weighted index, the top 50 stocks are indeed more predictable, with a

Single Company 60%

58.21% 54.47%

55% 52.79%

51.68%

56.48%

52.51%

TSMC 49.72%

Lag-1

46.93%

49.31%

48.61%

46.53%

45.83% 40%

55.62% 53.60%

53.91%

50% 45%

55.91%

Lag-2

Lag-3

Lag-4

47.22%

Lag-5

47.92%

Foxconn NTC

Lag-6

Fig. 2:  Financial News of Single Company and TAIEX Prediction.

68    Mu-Yen Chen et al. TAIWAN 50 60.00% 55.00% 50.00%

54.57% 54.57%53.58% 53.33% 53.33% 50.62%

Financial

45.00% 40.00% Lag-1 Lag-2 Lag-3 Lag-4 Lag-5 Lag-6

Fig. 3:  Financial News of TAIWAN 50 and TAIEX Prediction.

60.00% 55.00% 50.00%

51.06% 50.64% 50.21% 48.51% 48.30% 48.30%

45.00%

Political

40.00% Lag-1 Lag-2 Lag-3 Lag-4 Lag-5 Lag-6

Fig. 4:  Politics News and TAIEX Prediction. steady forecast. The accuracy rate of Lag-1 to Lag-3 will rise, and Lag-4 to Lag-6 will not be able to maintain stable, as happened previously. In the previous experiment in which one company’s stock was used to predict the entire TAIEX index, the variance was larger and the risk of choosing the wrong Lag day was relatively higher.

Political News and TAIEX Price Prediction The stock markets in Taiwan may also be affected by political factors such as political turmoil or the changeover to a new administration with a different political party. Therefore, this experiment explores the influence of political news on TAIEX, with a lag of five days. Fig. 4 shows that Lag-1, Lag-3, and Lag-5 are more accurate than other lag periods. Lag-1 represents the TAIEX prediction at the time t using political news at the time t–1; Lag-2 represents the TAIEX prediction at the time t using political news at the time t–2, and so on. Lag-3 shows the highest accuracy rate, suggesting that the effects of political news are reflected in the stock market three days after the news is released. Fig. 5 plots a similar TAIEX prediction graph using both financial and political news. In both of these experiments, Lag-3 is the most precise. Although both types of news are cyclical, financial news is more precise and stable than political news.

Modeling Public Mood and Emotion    69 60.00% 53.33%

55.00%

54.57%

53.33%

54.57%

53.58%

50.62% 51.06%

50.21%

50.00%

48.30%

50.64% 48.51%

48.30% Political

45.00%

Financial 40.00% Lag-1

Lag-2

Lag-3

Lag-4

Lag-5

Lag-6

Fig. 5:  Financial and Political News and TAIEX Prediction.

Conclusions This chapter investigated the ICT’s benefits to Taiwan from the social, financial, and political perspectives. Our literature survey summarized the political communication-related studies on Twitter that employed sentiment classification and analysis. Hence, we proposed a public mood and emotion prediction model for the stock market based on political and financial news, and financial blogs. Our model also referenced the mood-driving variations in stock market activity, and the characteristics of the online political and financial communities. The proposed model was verified using different experimental designs using financial news of a single stock, the top 50 companies (TAIWAN 50), and political news as we investigated the impacts to the stock market. The empirical results of the first experiment indicated that the financial news of a single stock can forecast the trend for the TAIEX index. We also found that higher accuracy rates are obtained when the prediction of the future trend of the TAIEX index is based on the stocks of more popular companies. In the second experiment, we found that the TAIWAN 50 can be adopted to forecast the stock market, and that higher accuracy rates are obtained after related financial articles are collected. Finally, we claimed that both the political and financial news can forecast the stock market in Taiwan. This research contributes to academia and related industries by proposing an approach based on sentiment classification and analysis, specializing in political and financial news. This chapter also shows how big data analysis techniques can be used to analyze investors’ emotions and reactions to current stock news or related financial issues, thus allowing for the prediction of changes in the stock index in Taiwan. This chapter has some issues that could be addressed in future studies. First, this chapter used stock price datasets from TAIEX only. Future studies could collect datasets from other internationally famous stock markets such as the DJIA, S&P 500, FTSE 100, DAX, Nikkei225 or HSI, etc. Second, this chapter explores the future trend of the stock market using specific political and financial news websites. Future research might also consider collecting articles from other

70    Mu-Yen Chen et al. popular social network platforms or communities such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. Finally, the proposed model can be considered using other artificial intelligence or machine learning algorithms to build the prediction model, including deep learning, autoencoder, or attention-based networks.

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Chapter 6

Political Campaigns, Social Media, and Analytics: The Case of the GDPR Nikolaos Dimisianos Abstract This chapter examines the ways social media, analytics, and disruptive technologies are combined and leveraged by political campaigns to increase the probability of victory through micro-targeting, voter engagement, and public relations. More specifically, the importance of community detection, social influence, natural language processing and text analytics, machine learning, and predictive analytics is assessed and reviewed in relation to political campaigns. In this context, data processing is examined through the lens of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) effective as of May 25, 2018. It is concluded that while data processing during political campaigns does not violate the GDPR, electoral campaigns engage in surveillance, thereby violating Articles 12 and 19, in respect to private life, and freedom of expression accordingly, as stated in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Keywords: Social media analytics; political campaigns; community detection; social influence; machine learning; micro-targeting

1. Introduction Internet users are turning into social networks in order to connect and interact with each other, both in a personal and a professional context. These interactions produce digital footprints, which, if carefully analyzed, can measure and predict online and offline behaviors, thereby providing accurate insight “on one’s personal attributes including: sexual orientation, ethnicity, religious and political views” (Kosinski, Stillwell, & Graepel, 2013, p. 5802). In 2009, Karpf introduced the notion of “politics 2.0,” which refers to the processing of online information by political campaigns using data mining, artificial intelligence, and machine learning techniques. Privacy experts agree that “many of these practices are unethical, but probably not Politics and Technology in the Post-Truth Era, 73–88 Copyright © 2019 Nikolaos Dimisianos doi:10.1108/978-1-78756-983-620191006

74    Nikolaos Dimisianos against the law” (Howard & Kreiss, 2009, para. 16). While this constant monitoring and processing of social media by political campaigns is in accordance with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), some claim that “the analysis of digital data is primarily a means of surveillance and control” (Moss, Kennedy, Moshonas & Birchall, 2015, p. 287). The purpose of this chapter is to examine the use of social media by political campaigns as well as the tools, methods, and techniques by which data are analyzed. The argument in this chapter is structured as follows: During election periods, campaigns engage in social media and process social media data to increase the probability of victory. Even though this constitutes a means of surveillance, data processing by electoral campaigns does not constitute a violation of the GDPR. However, it can be seen as a violation of Articles 12 and 19, in respect to private life and freedom of expression as stated by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

2. Social Media and Political Campaigns Electoral campaigns have two major purposes: affect election outcomes and maximize the probability of victory. Political parties collect data about citizens in order to tailor their campaign strategies, develop their policies, and increase campaign communications efficiency; “data driven campaigning can have enough effect to make the difference between winning and losing” (Nickerson & Rogers, 2014, p. 53). Traditionally, data collection was a timely process requiring substantial financial resources. Survey polls, phone calls, and volunteers’ recruitment have thus been complemented by social media analytics which are cheaper, faster, and enable continuous real-time monitoring of the public opinion during the entire period of a campaign (Ceron, Curini, Iacus, & Porro, 2014). By using artificial intelligence techniques such as data mining, text analysis, machine learning, and sentiment analysis on big data, campaigns manage to better identify their supporters (Howard & Kreiss, 2009), perform micro-targeting, communicate interactively and engage the electorate (Kruikemeier, 2014), influence the public opinion, and forecast elections’ outcome. The two Obama’s electoral campaigns have been characterized as the most sophisticated electoral campaigns to make use of data analytics. Especially in the 2012 campaign, “the real winner was analytics” (Shen, 2013, para. 1). Analytics is a term that refers to the collection, organization, and analysis of large sets of data (Dalton, 2016, para. 9). Extending that, social media analytics refer to the process of mining social media data to understand how individuals communicate and behave, what they think and feel, and how they are related to one another. Campaigns need data to create predictive models and understand behavior, support, and responsiveness scores. Behavior scores are used to predict whether citizens are likely to engage in political activities either by donating money or by volunteering. Support Scores are used to predict political preferences of citizens while responsiveness scores measure the degree to which individuals will respond to direct communication and campaign outreach (Nickerson & Rogers, 2014, p. 54). For instance, Issenberg (2012) maintains that “Obama’s campaign began the election year confident it knew the name of every one of the 69,456,897 Americans whose votes had put him in the white house” (para. 17).

Political Campaigns, Social Media and Analytics    75 2.1. Micro-targeting Targeting decisions techniques initially borrowed by the marketing science are known as “micro-targeting.” The purpose of this technique is to segment citizens into clusters that share same characteristics and, therefore, according to the preferences of each group, address the most relevant message. While, for example, individuals with young children are more concerned about public schools, unemployed citizens tend to be more appealed by job opportunities (Brown, 2016, para. 6). Moreover, “if all micro-targetable voters disagree with the candidate on the issue in question, then clearly the campaign should not raise the issue” (Strauss, 2009, p. 4). However, micro-targeting does not only aim in targeting voters; donors and volunteers are integral parts of any electoral campaign and knowing which door to knock can save money and time.

2.2. Voter Engagement While social networks users increase, users engaging with campaigns through social media also increase. According to LaMarre and Suzuki-Lambrecht (2013): during the 2010 midterm election cycle, 53 percent of adults used the web to find political information, and 22 percent used social media to directly engage with candidates and campaigns. (p. 361) Sometimes issues do not make their way to the councils of states through formal channels. For instance, in the case of a referendum, it is crucial for political parties to understand what those that have not voted would have to say. This entails “moving from a top-down model of engagement to a more-participatory one, where the public is involved in co-designing policies” (Moss, Kennedy, Moshonas, & Birchall, 2015, p. 13).

2.3. Social Media as a Personal Relations Tool Kruikemeier (2014) examined the use of social networks and argued that Tweeter can be used as a public relations tool for candidates to communicate with their electorate. Specifically, by using Twitter, candidates can expose their personal and professional life and activities to the public, engage in open discussions, and use this tool for self-promotion; “Evidence shows that candidates who used Twitter during a campaign, received more preferential votes than those who did not” (Kruikemeier, 2014, p. 136). In other words, social media allow candidates to create and promote their own brand and maintain a certain profile which will follow them and make them recognizable during the elections’ period. Referring to the 2012 elections and the Obama campaign, Issenberg (2012) points out that the electorate could be seen “as a collection of individual citizens who could each be measured and assessed in their own terms” (para. 6) and where campaign leaders should consider and act accordingly.

76    Nikolaos Dimisianos

3. Technological Aspects of Social Media Analytics Social networks contain large sets of texts which are mostly related to what users post on their walls, formally known as user-generated content, and the interactive discussions and comments that derive from them. Because social media data contain both structured and un-structured data, and in huge sizes, they can often be referred to as big data. The process of extracting information from written resources to discover new information is known as text analytics, which is a subcategory of the natural language processing (NLP) field, one of the pillars of artificial intelligence.

3.1. Big Data, Data Mining, and Analytics 3.1.1. Big Data. Big data is defined as “high-volume, high-velocity and high-variety information assets that demand cost-effective, innovative forms of information processing for enhanced insight and decision making” (Gartner IT Glossary, 2016). These concepts of volume, velocity, and variety are often referred as the 3V’s of Big Data and denote the size; the structural heterogeneity and the speed data are being generated accordingly. Turning big data into useful information results from the combination of two sub-processes; data management and analytics. Data management “involves processes and supporting technologies to acquire and store data, and to prepare and retrieve it for analysis” (Gandomi & Haider, 2015, p. 140) while analytics refer to the techniques used to turn this data into useful insight. Before starting discussing about text analytics, perhaps it would be a good time to introduce data mining, upon which knowledge management theorem is based. 3.1.2. Data Mining.  Data mining has been defined as the “non-trivial process of identifying valid, novel, potentially useful, and ultimately understandable patterns in data” (Durairaj & Ranjani, 2013, p. 30) and can be seen either as a synonym of knowledge discovery from data (KDD), or “merely as an essential step in the knowledge discovery process” (Han, Pei, & Kamber, 2011, p. 6). For instance, by using data mining techniques in a set of data obtained by the American national election studies, Murray, Riley, and Scime (2009), managed to accurately identify likely voters based on a two-variable model. These variables included participants’ intention to vote and previous vote. 3.1.3. Social Media Analytics.  Social media analytics can be categorized into two broad categories; content-based analytics and structure-based analytics. Content-based analytics refer to user-generated content such as texts, images, videos, etc. Structured-based analytics deal with the relationships between different entities. Social networks are modeled through nodes and edges. Nodes represent the participants of the network while edges represent the relationships between those participants. Network graphs, the way social networks’ visualization occur, can be divided into social graphs, where edges between nodes represent the existence of a link, and activity graphs where the edges represent actual exchange of information. Two of the most important tasks of social media analytics are community detection and social influence analysis.

Political Campaigns, Social Media and Analytics    77 3.1.3.1. Community Detection.  Social networks can be huge in size, containing millions of nodes and edges. Understanding the existing relationships between the nodes is what allows us to “uncover existing behavioral patterns and predict emergent properties of the network” (Gandomi & Haider, 2015, p. 142). Communities refer to groups of people that share similar characteristics or interact with each other. Toward improving communication with citizens and voters, detecting social network communities allows campaigns to identify hot topics and trends, predict potential rising topics, or even manage the candidate’s reputation by proactively dealing with potential crises and scandals (Stieglitz & Dang-Xuan, 2013). In order to identify a correlation between news-sharing in social media and ideological perspectives around the 2015 UK general elections, Williams, Cioroianu, and Williams (2016) presented a study where they attempted to identify political communities based on the URL links users posted in their Tweeter walls. The idea behind this is that each link corresponds to a website where a specific political party is mostly represented. For instance, The Daily Mail and The Telegraph are right-leaning newspapers, whereas The independent and The Guardian are left-leaning. Similarly, The Financial Times and The Economist mostly occupy the political center-right. Having identified eight different communities, the writers used a number of keywords to find out whether the topics of discussion within the communities were indeed representative of the ideology of each community. Indeed, topics like “tax and spend” were mostly found in right-leaning communities whereas “housing and benefits,” indicating social welfare payments were mostly found in labor and left-leaning communities. Following the rationale described above on effective communications with online communities, it would be irrational for a candidate to promote a governmental funding for a new factory plant to the environmentalist Green party, considering the impact a factory plant has on the environment. However, it would be a great opportunity to enter in a dialogue about the eco-friendly technologies this plant will use and the renewable energy initiatives it can support. 3.1.3.2. Social Influence Analysis.  Social influence is defined as “the behavioral change of individuals affected by others in a network” (Sun & Tang, 2011, p. 177). Analyzing social influence refers to the techniques of “modeling and evaluating the influence of actors and connections in a social network” (Gandomi & Haider, 2015, p. 142). While individuals influence each other on a daily basis, some tend to be more influential than others. The strength of social influence depends on factors such as the strength of the relationship between nodes, the distance they have between them, and the characteristics of the individuals and the network (Sun & Tang, 2011, p. 177). For this purpose, statistical techniques such as degree, betweenness, and closeness centrality are used in order to measure the importance of each node or edge within a network. Degree centrality counts the number of connections a node has. An actor having many connections is said to be highly degree central. Betweenness centrality refers to the influence the node who controls the information and acts as a liaison between two other separate networks has. Consequently, highly betweenness central nodes are also known as “brokers.” Finally, closeness centrality measures the speed a node can reach other nodes.

78    Nikolaos Dimisianos Why is centrality and social influence, however, a matter of importance when it comes to political campaigns? According to Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2010), “a traditional view of power in politics is that it comes from the possession of important resources” (p. 2). Such resources include people and organizations, which, if correctly exploited during the elections period, can help a political party win. The degree of influence a user has is usually determined by the degree of interaction he creates, including the number of followers and friends, retweets, mentions, likes, and comments. By identifying those users, campaigns can engage in direct communication so as to further influence their opinions, especially when those are “ideologically or politically opposed to them” (Stieglitz & Dang-Xuan, 2013, p. 1286). However, research indicates that not all types of connection matter and certainly, not all connections constitute influential users. Celebrities and other public figures, even though they have high numbers of followers, they usually post their own updates instead of expressing their opinions about other matters (Lee, Ahn, Oh, & Ryu, 2015, p. 3). The writers therefore conclude that the occupation of nodes plays an important role when it comes to determining their strategic value. On the other hand, one cannot forget the huge support of celebrities during the two Obama electoral campaigns, or the massive degradation of Donald Trump in 2016.

3.2. NLP, Text Analytics, and Machine Learning 3.2.1. Natural Language Processing.  NLP is the pillar of artificial intelligence and the practical field of Computational Linguistics which is “devoted to make computers understand the statements of words written in human language” (Chopra, Prashar, & Sain, 2013, p. 131). Simply put, NLP is both a means and the study of human–computer interaction, where either of them is invited to ultimately perform a certain task in human language. The main components of NLP are natural language understanding, which refers to the understanding and reasoning through a natural language input and natural language generation, which refers to the process of creating meaningful sentences in natural language. Two of the most important components of NLP are discussed below. 3.2.1.1. Morphological and Lexical Analysis.  Morphological analysis focuses on morphemes, which are the smallest units of a word that assign a specific meaning when used to form that specific word. For example, the word “unforgettable” is consisted of three morphemes: the prefix -un which means “not,” the root of the word deriving from the word “to forget” and the suffix “able” which showcases ability. Morphological analysis is of paramount importance since whenever texts are processed, positive and negative scores are assigned differently depending on the meaning of each word. Lexical analysis does not only focus on morphemes but on the overall meanings of words and phrases and the relationships between them. 3.2.1.2. Syntactic Analysis – Parsing.  Syntactic analysis, also known as parsing, deals with grouping and sequencing elements within samples of language, examining the relationship of different parts of speech in a specific clause or sentence as well as decoding the function of those parts of speech in the specific context of a particular clause. For instance, in the sentence “Obama criticized

Political Campaigns, Social Media and Analytics    79 Romney,” “Obama” is the subject, “criticized” is the verb and “Romey” is the receiver of the action of the verb, meaning the object. Such triplets are known as Subject-Verb-Object (SVO) triplets. Sudhahar, Veltri, and Cristianini (2015) used parsing in the form of SVO triplets in a number of media articles related to the 2012 US elections in order to gain insight about the key actors and their relations so as to create a semantic graph to define the strategic positioning of actors around key political issues such as rights, economy, legislation, etc. The writers conclude that the 2012 elections was mostly preoccupied with the US economy and civil rights; Obama and the democratic party had a positive impact on the media, frequently and positively associated with objects such as “rights” and “law,” referring mostly to the legal recognition of same-sex marriage and the relative amendment to the marriage law, whereas Romney was mostly associated with objects such as “taxes,” “benefits,” and “cuts,” mostly because fighting recession was a top item in his agenda. 3.2.2. Text Analytics.  Text analytics refer to the sum of techniques that allow the extraction of information from written resources. Moreno and Redondo (2016) defined text analytics “as an extension of data mining, that tries to find textual patterns from large non-structured sources” (p. 57). While data-mining processes structured data from databases, text analytics can handle unstructured or semi-structured data such as files, blog posts, newspapers, and so forth. Analyzing texts is a complex process encompassing a series of different methods and techniques, with the most important being information extraction, summarization, and sentiment analysis. 3.2.2.1. Information Extraction.  Information extraction is the process of identifying key phrases and relationships within a written resource. This is done through pattern matching, the process of looking for predefined sequences in a text based on regular expressions. Information extraction is further broken into two other processes, namely entity recognition (ER) and relation extraction (RE). ER “seeks to locate and classify atomic elements in text into predefined categories” (Moreno & Redondo, 2016, p. 56). These categories mostly include pre-established ontologies such as names, locations, quantities, etc. RE deals with the semantics, meaning the relations between the different ontologies categorized in ER. 3.2.2.2. Summarization. Summarization refers to the process where one or multiple texts are summarized to provide the reader with the text’s most useful information. Falling under the umbrella of the previously described NLP, text summarization follows two different approaches: extractive and abstract summarization. Extractive summarization involves “determining the salient units of a text and stringing them together” where the level of importance is determined by the analysis of location (title, main body, conclusion) and the frequency of words in a text. Extractive summarization does not necessarily require an understanding of the text; “important sentences in articles are statistically weighted and ranked” (Moreno & Redondo, 2016, p. 58), thereby providing the reader with the most important sentences. In contrast, abstractive summarization deals with semantics, which means that a text is parsed and the summary that is generated may be totally different from the original text, however, with the same meaning.

80    Nikolaos Dimisianos 3.2.2.3. Sentiment Analysis.  Sentiment analysis techniques are important to understand human opinions and feelings that derive from texts. This allows for example to determine whether a user is expressing concerns, complaints, or positive feelings in different situations. Sentiment analysis techniques can be divided in three categories: document level, sentence level, and aspect-based. ⦁ Document-level techniques deal with the sentiments expressed within a whole

document toward some other entity. Sentiments can be positive, negative, or neutral. Others have further divided emotions to include joy, sadness, anger, fear, disgust, and surprise (Mohammad, Zhu, Kiritchenko, & Martin, 2015, p. 482). For instance, an article discussing about a certain political figure can be classified as expressing positive, negative, or neutral. ⦁ Sentence-level techniques are considered as more complex since they try to distinguish between subjective and objective sentences. ⦁ Aspect-based analysis deals with the entirety of aspects within a sentence. According to Wang and Liu (2015), “The typical sentiment analysis focuses on predicting the positive or negative polarity of a given sentence [assuming that] the given text has only one aspect and polarity” (p. 1). In contrast, aspectbased analysis deals with all the aspects of a sentence and all the sentiments that are associated with these aspects. For example, in the sentence food is decent but service is bad, we can identify two different aspects; food and service. While bad is negative we cannot classify the whole sentence as such, since another aspect, service, is decent (Wang & Liu, p. 1). NLP and text analytics can be used by campaigns to identify likely voters and markets of persuasion, detect ideological positions (Prabhakaran, Arora, & Rambow, 2014, p. 1481) or even forecast election outcomes. For instance, in order to predict the 2016 US Elections’ results, Agrawal and Hamling (2017) developed an algorithm where Tweets mentioning words such as “Trump,” “Hillary,” or “Clinton” were associated with a number of predefined sentiments, out of which, positive ones would take values from +0.0625 to +1.0, while negative values ranged from –0.0625 to –1.0. The algorithm did also recognize negation words, which once identified, would flip a positive score to negative. Each tweet would also be associated with a location and timestamp, thereby allowing the algorithm to segment tweets based on state. The writers concluded that their experiment proved to be “somewhat accurate” and explained that “if sentiment analysis techniques are improved and further developed, they could be used to predict election results in the future” (p. 41). Yet, emoticons, slang language, acronyms, and sarcasm still constitute a big challenge for sentiment analysis accuracy. 3.2.3. Machine Learning.  “There has never been a better time to be a politician, but it’s an even better time to be a machine learning engineering working for a politician” (Polonski, 2017). Previously described NLP algorithms and text analytics are mainly based on machine learning and statistical machine learning. Machine learning has been defined as a method by which “a computer identifies existing knowledge, acquires new knowledge, improves its function and achieves its perfection” (Keming & Jianguo, 2016, p. 2487). Simply put, machine learning

Political Campaigns, Social Media and Analytics    81 refers to the automated process of machines using their experience and acquiring new knowledge so as to accurately perform new tasks. When talking about machine learning and training datasets it is important to distinguish between supervised and unsupervised learning. 3.2.3.1. Supervised Learning.  Supervised learning occurs when the machine is fed up with input and output variables and the purpose is to associate these variables with each other. Supervised learning can further be divided into two categories: ⦁ Classification, where the output variable is a category (e.g., classifying whether

a voter is democratic or republican, or whether political posts on social media are positive or negative). ⦁ Regression, where the output variable is a value (e.g., the number of voters showing up in the elections). 3.2.3.2. Unsupervised Learning.  Unsupervised learning refers to the process where, in contrast to supervised learning, output data are not present, and categories or classes of input data are unknown, meaning that it is up to the algorithm to figure out the patterns and the way data are structured. Unsupervised learning can further be divided in two categories: ⦁ Clustering, where datasets present similar characteristics and are therefore

grouped together based on these characteristics (e.g., political posts vs. music posts). ⦁ Association, where the purpose is to find common rules that govern the datasets and associate them with each other (e.g., If a voter posts negative content about candidate X, he is most likely to vote for candidate Y). When it comes to communication and targeting purposes, supervised machine learning is more appropriate since identifying clusters of voters who are similar in a number of dimensions is perhaps a good first step, but does not help on its own. As I have already said, the aim of electoral campaigns is to maximize mobilization and persuasion so as to increase the probability of victory, always aiming in an efficient consumption of financial resources. Therefore, unless the identified clusters are also correlated with behaviors like voting, ideology, or propensity to donate, their value is ultimately insignificant (Nickerson & Rogers, 2014, p. 14). For instance, trying to convince a cluster that candidate X is more suitable than candidate Y, even if persuasive communication is successful, it still is inefficient if this particular cluster had no intention to vote in the first place. Therefore, this cluster should be treated in a different way so as to first increase its likelihood of voting. But then again, not the entire cluster should be mobilized to participate in the elections; opponent supporters should be excluded. Similarly, trying to convince a cluster with high supportive score for candidate X, to actually vote for candidate X, is like trying to sell a product to someone who had the intention to buy this specific product in the first place. It would be much more efficient to target specific individuals who either are undecided or show a big probability of turnout.

82    Nikolaos Dimisianos 3.3. Predictive Analytics Predictive analytics is a combination of statistical techniques, data mining, machine learning, and predictive modeling which seeks to identify relationships between explanatory and predicted variables from past occurrences and then use them to predict future outcomes. It is toward the end of prediction that most of what has been discussed in this chapter is interconnected and leveraged in complementary ways. Political campaigns monitor and engage in social media for a number of reasons including supporter identification purposes, communication purposes, electorate engagement, micro-targeting, public opinion influence, and election outcome forecast. However, the end of political campaigns is victory therefore those are just means to the end. Electoral campaigns want to win. To win they need votes and voters, both of which increase through positive influence. In order to influence, campaigns need to communicate and in order for communication to be effective, they need to be aware of dominant topics and prevailing sentiments. Obviously, knowing as a fact is usually impossible so it all comes down to creating predictions, stressing the importance of predictive analytics. Considering all the above, the following question arises: Could political opinion mining and predictive analytics potentially replace elections as we know them? From a technological perspective, as previously mentioned, predictions depend on algorithms and predictive models, which are created by machine learning experts and statisticians. Therefore, the accuracy of those models depends on the knowledge and experience of those people. Research indicates that most models have failed to predict an accurate outcome. Having discussed in the previous chapter about machines learning from their experience to improve their performance, one could further ask: Why don’t machines learn to create their own accurate algorithms, instead of depending on human experience? Perhaps there will be a time in the future where this will be possible; however, we are most probably not there yet. From a sociological perspective, elections have been the cornerstone of representative democracy since the seventeenth century. Through the process of election, citizens were given the power to select their own political representatives. Taking this away would mean taking away the power from citizens and giving it back to the few, leading to other, most likely non-democratic, governmental systems.

4. Political Parties, Data Protection Legislative Frameworks, and Human Rights 4.1. GDPR Framework Data protection legislation has first appeared in the EU with the provisions of the 1995 European Union Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC, 1995) and has recently been redefined in the GDPR which will take place as of May 28, 2018. According to the latter, “The protection of natural persons in relation to the processing of personal data is a fundamental right” (Regulation (EU) 2016/679). Furthermore, according to article 9(1):

Political Campaigns, Social Media and Analytics    83 Processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation shall be prohibited. (Regulation (EU) 2016/679) Up to this point, regulation is clear, indicating that individuals are protected when it comes to the processing of their personal data, and that their protection is their fundamental right. However, several exemptions apply. Two of them are discussed below. According to 9(2), Article 9.1 does not apply if: (a)  the data subject has given explicit consent to the processing of those personal data for one or more specified purposes. (Regulation (EU) 2016/679) (b)  processing is carried out in the course of its legitimate activities with appropriate safeguards by a foundation, association or any other not-for-profit body with a political, philosophical, religious or trade union aim and on condition that the processing relates solely to the members or to former members of the body or to persons who have regular contact with it in connection with its purposes and that the personal data are not disclosed outside that body without the consent of the data subjects. (Regulation (EU) 2016/679) As far as exemption 9(2)a is concerned, social media usage is restricted unless the user agrees to the specific terms provided by each social media platform, meaning that there is no real alternative for the user. Taking into consideration that most social media platforms are offering free memberships, the current situation makes one wonder who is the actual product; is it the social media platform one is using, or oneself ? A fair alternative would be to provide the user with the option of either allowing processing of his/her personal data or not, by still allowing the use of the service in both cases. Moving on to 9(2)d, a few questions arise. First, what are the “appropriate safeguards,” who is in charge of defining the level of appropriateness and who is in charge of controlling whether those levels are respected? Moving on, what do we mean by “members,” “former members,” and “regular contact”? Does following a campaign on Facebook or Twitter constitute regular contact? How is “regular” defined and how is “contact” defined? So far, one could say that the fundamental right of protection of processing of our personal data which was granted to us by 9(1) is debated. Yet, Recital 56 in reference to political parties comes to clarify that: Where in the course of electoral activities, the operation of the democratic system in a Member State requires that political parties compile personal data on people’s political opinions, the processing of such data may be permitted for reasons of public interest, provided that appropriate safeguards are established.

84    Nikolaos Dimisianos Even though, again, there is a number of unclarities (i.e., “operation of the democratic system,” “public interest”) what we see is how law loses its strength throughout the entire document. While the law starts by protecting us from the processing of our data, at the end we see that not only this processing is not restricted, but in contrast, is permitted and required. While, as it appears, legislation is far from being clear, and despite the different questions that arise, data processing by political parties is not legally restricted.

4.2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights Two of the articles stated in the UDHR that are immediately related to our discussion of data protection are Article 12 in respect to privacy, and Article 19 in respect to freedom of expression. According to Article 12: No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. (UN General Assembly, 1948) Similarly, according to Article 19: Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. (UN General Assembly, 1948) Going through the above, one could say that both articles are immediately linked based on the assumption that whenever one feels secure about his privacy not being violated, he is more likely to express himself in a more honest and spontaneous way. When users’ data are being processed, individuals’ privacy is subjected to “arbitrary interference.” According to the Human Rights committee, “any interference with privacy must be proportional to the end sought and be necessary in the circumstances of any given case.” In other words, if we are to accept that our privacy is violated, it should be for a higher purpose such as our protection or safety. For example, in the case of a terrorist attack prevention, interference with one’s privacy would be reasonable for the greater good. In the case of elections however, safety of individuals is threatened in no circumstance and in no case this interference with one’s privacy is either necessary, or proportional to the end sought, that end being the understanding of individuals’ political opinions and beliefs. By applying data-mining techniques in the data voluntarily shared by users in social media, political parties are engaged in surveillance, a practice defined by Lyon (2001) as “any collection and processing of personal data, whether identifiable or not, for the purposes of influencing or managing those whose data are garnered”(p. 1). As explained by Bennett (2015), surveillance and democracy are unlikely to be on the same side since surveillance “compromises those freedoms upon which democratic societies are founded, including privacy, and freedom of speech and

Political Campaigns, Social Media and Analytics    85 association […] and instead, inspires conformity, control and obedience” (p. 381) thereby violating Articles 12 and 19, in respect to private life, and freedom of expression accordingly, as stated in the 1948’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Following the above, one could ask: How can something be legal, but at the same time be a violation of human rights? The answer is simple; the universal declaration is not a treaty, meaning that it only has a suggestive force and is not legally binding. As a result, even though the monitoring and processing of personal data is violating human rights, no legal violation occurs. Law only draws from ethics; it is not defined by it, and of course, justice is served based on the legal interpretation of the judges.

5. Conclusion and Future Research In conclusion, this chapter discusses the ways social media and analytics are used by political campaigns to increase the probability of victory through micro-targeting, voter engagement, and public relations. By applying NLP, text analytics, and machine learning techniques in big data, campaigns manage to efficiently detect communities, analyze sentiments, and tailor their communication strategies to efficiently influence the electorate. In some cases, predictive analytics can even go as far as predicting elections’ outcome. Furthermore, this chapter examines data processing by electoral campaigns in respect to the GDPR. While legislation is far from being clear, political parties are regulated. Nevertheless, by processing social media data, electoral campaigns engage in surveillance, thereby violating Articles 12 and 19, in respect to private life, and freedom of expression accordingly, as stated in the 1948’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Rapid advancements in technology prove that we are far from having seen it all. Chatbots, digital avatars, and of course the Internet of Things are some of the existing technologies which are very likely to be leveraged very soon for electoral purposes, as they already did by businesses. We should not be surprised if in a couple of years from now, artificial intelligence chatbots or voice interfaces such as Apple’s Siri or Microsoft’s Cortana urge us to participate in the elections or engage with us in deep, one-to-one conversations about our opinions, ideologies, and beliefs. Nor if digital avatars found in the street interact with us about hyperpersonalized offerings in return for our vote. Even IoT-generated data will eventually be of value to electoral campaigns. From geolocation and distance travelled with our cars, to biometric data and heart rate during electoral debates airing in TV, all can help in building more accurate personalized profiles. It should be noted that internet communications are not private and that everything that is done, liked or wished through online channels takes the form of a digital footprint and it is just a matter of time until this information gets linked to citizens’ personal ID and becomes knowledge. Citizens therefore need to be aware both of the technological developments but also the relevant legislation that exists to regulate and protect. Technology is a tool and should be treated as such; it is the human element which should be put first and be respected accordingly.

86    Nikolaos Dimisianos Bennett’s observation that surveillance and democracy are unlikely to go together constitutes an interesting starting point; future research can further examine this debate through an in-depth study and analysis of the notions of surveillance, conformity, control, and privacy.

Acknowledgement This chapter is a version of my Honors Thesis which was supported by the Deree International Honors Program and was revised with the help provided by the editors of this book during the editorial process.

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88    Nikolaos Dimisianos Strauss, A. (2009). Microtargeting’s implications for campaign strategy and democracy. Different news for different views: Political news-sharing communities on social media through the UK General Election in 2015, 118-125. Retrieved from https:// www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/ICWSM/ICWSM16/paper/download/13232/12850 Sudhahar, S., Veltri, G. A., & Cristianini, N. (2015). Automated analysis of the US presidential elections using Big Data and network analysis. Big Data & Society, 2(1), 1–28. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951715572916 Sun J., & Tang J. (2011). A survey of models and algorithms for social influence analysis. In C. Aggarwal (Eds.), Social network data analytics (pp. 177–214). United States: Springer. Springer. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-8462-3_7 UN General Assembly. (1948). “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (217 [III] A). Paris. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ Wang, B., & Liu, M. (2015). Deep learning for aspect-based sentiment analysis. Stanford University report, 1–9. Retrieved from https://cs224d.stanford.edu/reports/WangBo. pdf. Williams, M. J., Cioroianu, I., & Williams, H. T. (2016). Different News for Different Views: Political News-Sharing Communities on Social Media Through the UK General Election in 2015.

Chapter 7

Assessing Compliance of Open Data in Politics with European Data Protection Regulation Francesco Ciclosi, Paolo Ceravolo, Ernesto Damiani and Donato De Ieso Abstract This chapter analyzes the compliance of some category of Open Data in Politics with EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) requirements. After clarifying the legal basis of this framework, with specific attention to the processing procedures that conform to the legitimate interests pursued by the data controller, including open data licenses or anonymization techniques, that can result in partial application of the GDPR, but there is no generic guarantee, and, as a consequence, an appropriate process of analysis and management of risks is required. Keywords: GDPR; anonymization; pseudonymization; data; open data; data protection; persona data; compliance; risk; data publishing

1. Introduction Privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM) has been proposed to allow processing data while preserving the privacy of individuals (Lindell & Pinkas, 2000) (Mendes & Vilela, 2017): in order to protect the owner’s exposure, they modify the original data by anonymization techniques, trying, at the same time, to maximize the utility of the data. This work examines to what extent open data licences and data anonymization techniques comply to the European General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR) and highlight that its application implies the execution of appropriate risk management procedures. The concept of personal data is a very broad concept that obtained a clear definition in the Directive 95/46/EC, about

Politics and Technology in the Post-Truth Era, 89–114 Copyright © 2019 Francesco Ciclosi, Paolo Ceravolo, Ernesto Damiani and Donato De Ieso doi:10.1108/978-1-78756-983-620191007

90    Francesco Ciclosi et al. 20 years before the Regulation (EU) 2016/679. In fact, the GDPR uses a definition of personal data that is identical to that already contained in the article 2 of the Directive 95/46/EC. So, a “personal data” could be “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person” (cf. art. 4(1)) (Regulation (EU), 2016/679), or rather a “data subject.” However, while in the Directive 95/46/EC (cf. art. 2(a)) this identification is “in particular by reference to an identification number” (Directive 95/46/EC, 1995), in Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (cf. art. 4(1)) it is “in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier” (Regulation (EU), 2016/679). Moreover, in the GDPR (cf. art. 4(1)) another way to identify a natural person “is by reference to […] one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person” (Regulation (EU), 2016/679). Therefore, the GDPR expands the scope of the protection offered by the legislation, as the concept of “identifier” is no longer limited to a number, but includes various elements related to online interaction, fully part of our reality in this hyperhistorical time (Floridi, 2016). According to this approach, we can classify as personal data: a person’s name, a mobile number, an e-mail address, credit card details, payment details, the history of the web browsing, images, videos, temperature, GPS coordinates, clinical analysis data (such as blood pressure, diabetes level), and so on. According to this approach, Recital 30 explicitly includes as a source of identification of natural persons the association with “online identifiers provided by their devices, applications, tools and protocols, such as internet protocol addresses, cookie identifiers or other identifiers such as radio frequency identification tags” (Regulation (EU), 2016/679). Moreover, always in the same recital, it is also highlighted as such identifiers may leave traces which, in particular when combined with unique identifiers and other information received by the servers, may be used to create profiles of the natural persons and identify them. (Regulation (EU), 2016/679). Furthermore, the Recital 26 specify both the notion of “means” of which the data controller or a third party can reasonably be used to identify a natural person, and the concept of pseudonymization, in addition to that of anonymization already present in the Directive 95/46/EC. Regarding the first aspect, the GDPR (cf. Recital 26) recommends, that in order: to ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used, […] account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time of the processing and technological developments. (Regulation (EU), 2016/679) Hence, the indication of the legislator is to consider every aspect and then carry out a punctual assessment on a case-by-case basis. With regard to the second aspect, the GDPR provides that anonymous data protection principles do not apply to anonymous information. Despite this (cf. Recital 26),

Assessing Compliance of Open Data in Politics    91 personal data which have undergone pseudonymisation, which could be attributed to a natural person by the use of additional information should be considered to be information on an identifiable natural person. (Regulation (EU), 2016/679) In fact, for the Regulation (cf. Recital 26) the anonymous information is information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. (Regulation (EU), 2016/679)

1.1. The Different Types of Personal Data The Regulation (EU) 2016/679 distinguishes between “personal data,” “special categories of personal data,” and “personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences.” In more detail, the GDPR extends the list of special categories of personal data, adding the types of genetic and biometric data. Therefore, to this category of data belong: personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation. (cf. art. 9(1)). (Regulation (EU), 2016/679) The GDPR provides further information on what, a genetic data or data concerning health, can be considered on a practical level. Recital 34 asserts that a genetic data is: personal data relating to the inherited or acquired genetic characteristics of a natural person which result from the analysis of a biological sample from the natural person in question, in particular chromosomal, deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) or ribonucleic acid (RNA) analysis, or from the analysis of another element enabling equivalent information to be obtained. (Regulation (EU), 2016/679) Furthermore, the Recital 35 says that: personal data concerning health should include all data pertaining to the health status of a data subject which reveal information relating to the past, current or future physical or mental health status of the data subject. (Regulation (EU), 2016/679) Among these are included, for example, any information on […] a disease, disability, disease risk, medical history, clinical treatment or the physiological or biomedical state of the data subject independent of its source, for example from a

92    Francesco Ciclosi et al. Table 1:  Summary of the Different Concepts of Personal Data. Categories Special categories of personal data [art. 9(1)]

Data concerning health [art. 4(15)]

Genetic data [art. 4(13)]

Biometric data [art. 4(14)]

Person. data relating to criminal convictions and offences [art. 10]

Explanation Personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union. membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose. of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation. Personal data related to the physical or mental health of a natural person, including the provision of healthcare services, which reveal information about his or her health status. Personal data relating to the inherited or acquired genetic characteristics of a natural person which give unique information about the physiology or the health of that natural person and which result, in particular, from an analysis of a biological sample from the natural person in question. Pers. data resulting from specific technical processing relating to the physical, physiological, or behavioral characteristics of a natural person, which allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural person, such as facial images or dactyloscopic data. Personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences or related security measures.

physician or other health professional, a hospital, a medical device or an in vitro diagnostic test. (Regulation (EU), 2016/679) In Table 1, the various classifications of types of personal data are summarized. Fig. 1 presents a graphical scheme related to the different relationship between the different categories of data expected by GDPR. The article 9(1) of the GDPR says that the processing of special categories of personal data “shall be prohibited” (Regulation (EU), 2016/679). Subsequently, in the second paragraph of the same article, it is specified that this general rule does not apply to the occurrence of specific cases. Beyond the personal data categories defined by the GDPR it is important to consider that the status of data (and therefore also of personal data) changes according to the transformative effect that derives from the particular operating context. An example of this scenario relates to Big Data analytics, in which the analysis itself could have the effect of disclosing sensitive information from data originally classified as nonpersonal (or not belonging to the special categories of personal data).

Assessing Compliance of Open Data in Politics    93

Fig. 1:  Scheme Related to the Relationship between the Different Categories of Data. The UK’s supervisory authority, namely the Information Commissioner’s Office, published a taxonomy, which illustrates precisely this modification of the original concept of “personal data.” So new types of data have emerged in a continuous increase in global complexity. The cited authority has identified the following different typology of personal data (Denham, 2017): ⦁⦁ Provided data, that is, those that are “consciously given by individuals.” ⦁⦁ Observed data, that is, those that are “recorded automatically.” ⦁⦁ Derived data, that is, those that are “produced from other data in a relatively

simple and straightforward fashion.”

⦁⦁ Inferred data, that is, those that are “produced by using a more complex

method of analytics to find correlations between datasets and using these to categorize or profile people.”

2. The Status of Data Controller The GDPR (cf. art. 4(7)) defines the data controller as “the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others,

94    Francesco Ciclosi et al. determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data” (Regulation (EU), 2016/679). Furthermore, the Article 29 Working Party (WP29) specifies that “the concept of controller is […] functional, in the sense that it is intended to allocate responsibilities where the factual influence is, and thus based on a factual rather than a formal analysis” (Kohnstamm, 2010). All this considered there are three important aspects: (1) the form or nature of the data controller is irrelevant; (2) it is the data controller who determines the purposes and means of processing personal data; and (3) in determining the purposes and means of processing personal data, the data controller may operate independently or jointly with other data controllers (joint controllers). WP 29 assert that is possible to consider a body as a data controller even if it is not formally appointed, in the case in which it could effectively be able “to determining respectively the «why» and the «how» of certain processing activities” (Kohnstamm, 2010). In other words, it is needed to analyze every processing in order to find an answer to the question about what body has started it and for why. WP29 identifies three circumstances in which it is possible to consider a body as data controller because it determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data (cf. Table 2). Therefore, in these cases, the legal status of the data controller can be inferred. Obviously, if the results of the analysis show that the examined body “has neither legal nor factual influence to determine how personal data are processed [it] cannot be considered as a controller” (Kohnstamm, 2010). Table 2:  Type of Circumstance from Which the Legal Status of the Data Controller Can Be Inferred. Description

Example Cases

Responsibility deriving from an explicit legal competence This is the case where the specific criteria Public authority entrusted with for the designation of the controller are carrying out certain public tasks established by Union law or by a that cannot be performed without Member State. collecting a series of personal data (e.g., road safety). Responsibility deriving from a clear implicit competence This is the case where the jurisdiction to The employer regarding the data of determine derives from common legal his employees. provisions or a consolidated legal practice in various sectors. Responsibility deriving from an effective influence This is the case in which the status of data An organization that is able to controller is attributed by evaluating the determine the processing of personal factual circumstances (also through an data, even if it is outside the scope assessment of the contractual conditions of a contractual relationship, or if between the parties). this case has been explicitly excluded from the contract.

Assessing Compliance of Open Data in Politics    95 Instead, the capacity to determine the “means” by which achieving the purpose of processing is related to both the technical and organizational scope; so, to know that a body can determine the means of processing is not a sufficient condition to decide that it acts as a data controller. In more detail, in the case, that the considered body is able to determine the means of processing only from a technical point of view it could be once again considered a data processor, otherwise, it will be a data controller.

3. The Profiling and the Automated Individual Decision Making The article 4(4) of the Regulation (EU) 2016/679 defines the profiling as “any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person” (Regulation (EU), 2016/679). Furthermore, the art. 22(1) states the data subjects’ general right of “not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her” (Regulation (EU), 2016/679). Anyway, this is not an absolute right and exists three cases where this does not apply. Namely (cf. art. 22(2)), when the decision “is based on the data subject’s explicit consent” (Regulation (EU), 2016/679), or “is necessary for […] a contract between the data subject and a data controller” (Regulation (EU), 2016/679), or else “is authorized by Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject” (Regulation (EU), 2016/679). In the first two cases (cf. art. 22(3)), “the data controller shall implement suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests” (Regulation (EU), 2016/679). These one must obligatory include at least the rights “to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point of view and to contest the decision” (Regulation (EU), 2016/679). In any case (cf. art. 22(4)), the decisions referred in previous paragraphs “shall not be based on special categories of personal data” (Regulation (EU), 2016/679) unless applies the data subject has given explicit consent to the processing of those personal data or the processing is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest. In other words, the controller must implement both appropriate mathematical or statistical procedures for the profiling, and technical and organizational measures adequate to ensure the correction of personal data inaccuracy and to minimize the risk of errors, as well as the potential risks concerning the interests and rights of the data subject.

4. The Legitimate Interests Pursued by the Controller The art. 6(1)(f) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 establishes the cases in which a Processing is lawful. One of this is when the “processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party” (Regulation (EU), 2016/679). However, there is an exception “where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject

96    Francesco Ciclosi et al. which require protection of personal data” (Regulation (EU), 2016/679). This is an important statement because it underlines the intention of the European legislator to express data protection in the form of a balancing of opposing interests between the parties involved (on the one hand the data controller and on the other the data subjects). Moreover, the use of the locution “is necessary” is substantial because it means that, without its execution, it is not possible to pursue the legitimate interest of the controller or third parties in any other way. Therefore, it is not enough that the considered processing “is simply useful” for the pursuit of legitimate interest. Regarding the balance of the interests of the parties, in González Fuster and Scherrer (2015) it is stated that even the need to process personal data carried out in the public interest “should, however, not be over-stretched so as to encompass any possible third-party interest” (González Fuster & Scherrer, 2015). Recital 47 states that “the legitimate interests of a controller […] may provide a legal basis for processing” (Regulation (EU), 2016/679), but only if is provided that the interests or the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject are not overriding, taking into consideration the reasonable expectations of data subjects based on their relationship with the controller. (Regulation (EU), 2016/679) Therefore, it is necessary to proceed in two directions. The first one has the purpose of investigating the type of relationship between the data subjects and the controller. While the second is aimed at assessing “whether a data subject can reasonably expect […] that processing for that purpose may take place” (Regulation (EU), 2016/679). In fact, in the case that “personal data are processed in circumstances where data subjects do not reasonably expect further processing” (Regulation (EU), 2016/679), the interest of the data controller is overriding the interests and fundamental rights of the data subject. Therefore, the processing activity is unlawful. This evaluation is more complex, hence, “it follows that relying on such ground requires a thorough assessment, which can be particularly difficult in a big data context” (Van Julien Debussche, César, & Asbroeck, 2017). Consequently, it is necessary to set up mechanisms to allow data subjects to apply a withdraw of consent. This is particularly critical in a Big Data analytics context, where the effects are hardly predictable at the beginning of processing activity. Accordingly, big data organization will have to have a framework of values against which to test the proposed processing, and a method of carrying out the assessment and keeping the processing under review. (Denham, 2017) Therefore, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS, 2015) assert that “individuals must be given clear information on what data is processed, including data observed or inferred about them.” In addition, data subjects must be “better informed on how and for what purposes their information is used, including the logic used in algorithms to determine assumptions and predictions about them” (EDPS, 2015).

Assessing Compliance of Open Data in Politics    97 To achieve the expected result (i.e., a fair and transparent processing), the controller must provide information to data subjects about their data that are being processed.

5. Anonymization and Pseudonymization Recital 26 defines the anonymous information as: information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. (Regulation (EU), 2016/679) In addition, this condition must persist ever, taking into account “all the means reasonably likely to be used […], either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly” (Regulation (EU), 2016/679). Moreover, in Directive 95/46/EC. (2014) the WP29 provides some interesting considerations on the concept of anonymization, namely, anonymization constitutes both a subsequent processing of personal data and the result of a processing activity aimed at irreversibly preventing identification of natural people. Finally, anonymous data are outside the scopes of EU’s data protection legislation. The WP29 (Directive 95/46/EC., 2014) has also analyzed the various techniques of data protection in order to check what is still possible to do on personal data after their application. This analysis was carried out in three directions. The first is the possibility of singling out a natural person, the second is that to link the data related to a natural person and the last is pertinent at the possibility to inference some data about a natural person. Table 3 summarizes the principal techniques of data protection with highlights the principal strengths and weaknesses. In addition, GDPR highlight four characteristics typical of anonymization techniques, namely: Table 3:  Strengths and Weaknesses of the Techniques Considered. Protection Technique

Permanence of the Risk of Singling Out

Linkability

Inference

Yes Yes Yes No No May not No

Yes May not Yes Yes Yes May not Yes

Yes May not May not Yes May not May not May not

Pseudonymization Noise addition Substitution Aggregation or k-anonymity l-diversity/t-closeness Differential privacy Hashing/Tokenization Source: document Directive 95/46/EC (2014)

98    Francesco Ciclosi et al. ⦁ anonymization can be the result of a data processing activity in order to irre-

versibly prevent identification or re-identification of a data subject;

⦁ there is no specific obligation on adoption of a particular technique, but is

required that this one is adequate to minimize the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects; ⦁ “a risk factor is inherent to anonymization” (Directive 95/46/EC., 2014), so the “severity and likelihood of this risk should be assessed” (Directive 95/46/EC., 2014); and ⦁ it is important to take the context into consideration, “having regard to all the means ‘likely reasonably’ to be used for identification” (Directive 95/46/EC., 2014) of a data subject.

6. Data Protection Techniques as a Means to Mitigate Risks According to the approach proposed in WP29 (Directive 95/46/EC., 2014), an anonymization technique is effective if it prevents anyone from singling out a respondent in a dataset, or linking two distinct records, or else inferring an information from a dataset. Above all, this technique’s effect must be irreversible and permanent, as well as the cancellation. GDPR states that the principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, namely […] to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. (Regulation (EU), 2016/679) Even if controller take advantage of all means are reasonably likely to be used. To understand if a data is effectively anonymous, it is essential to know whether the controller (or others) owns data that can be used to identify a natural person. If the controller keeps the original (identifiable) data and communicate the pseudonymized data to others, the new dataset would still have the status of personal data. In fact, in theory, it is possible to link this new dataset with data kept by controller in order to re-identify the respondents of the information. The case is different if data controller proceeds to the cancellation of original data (microdata), limiting yourself to keep, and to disclosure to third parties, only aggregated statistics (macro data). In fact, in this circumstance, the data processed (in the context of an anonymization process) are surely anonymous. In any case, if a dataset is pseudonymized, data contained in it is not anonymous. Indeed, “in many cases it can be as easy to identify an individual in a pseudonymized dataset as with the original data” (Directive 95/46/EC., 2014). Furthermore, in many cases, even the anonymization techniques are not enough to assert that a dataset is anonymous. In fact, “an anonymised dataset can still present residual risk to data subjects” (Directive 95/46/EC., 2014). Generally, “different anonymization practices and techniques exist with variable degrees of robustness” (Directive 95/46/EC., 2014) against tree different risks of re-identification, namely singling out, likability and inference. Therefore, “anonymisation techniques can provide privacy guarantees, but only if their application is engineered appropriately” (Directive 95/46/EC., 2014).

Assessing Compliance of Open Data in Politics    99 Summarizing, the WP29 states that the use of anonymization techniques could result in a partial application of the GDPR, but this is not always true and should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis using an appropriate process of analysis and management of risks. Despite the point of view of WP29 (Directive 95/46/ EC., 2014), in the opinion of some authors (Van Julien Debussche et al., 2017), anonymization can never be considered a definitive solution. According to this vision it is mandatory to adopt an approach based on risk assessment, in which controller should evaluate (according to the accountability principle) if the means necessary to re-identify a data, by linking it to a data subject, is excessive and, consequently, data can be considered de facto as anonymous data. In other words, the impact of an anonymization technique must be assessed by the application of risk management framework, such for instance the one prescribed by the standard ISO 31000:2018 (ISO, 2009), that provides principles and generic guidelines on risk management. This framework introduces a process for managing the risk organized in three main steps: the identification of a scope and a context, the risk assessment (which is divided into the risk identification, the risk analysis, and the risk evaluation phases), and finally the risk treatment. The WP29 (Directive 95/46/EC., 2014) has highlighted the main common mistakes that is possible to make when is carrying out an anonymization technique. Table 4 shows the possible re-identification risks related to these incorrect approaches. Table 4:  Data Protection Techniques’ Common Mistakes and Risks. Common Mistakes

Common Risks

Protection technique: Pseudonymization Assuming that If only the identifier is removed or replaced, it is pseudonymization is possible that an attacker identifies a respondent using enough both a quasi-identifier remaining in the dataset and the values of other attributes still capable to identify him. Incorrect use of If the secret key is stored with the pseudonymized pseudonymization data, in the case of a data breach, the attacker “may as a technique to be able to trivially link the pseudonymized data to reduce linkability their original attribute” (Directive 95/46/EC., 2014). Furthermore, if different keys are used for different users with a repeatable scheme, it is possible that an attacker recognizes it and uses it in order to facilitate likability of the entries corresponding to a given respondent. Finally, if the same key is used in different databases it is possible that an enemy uses this key to perform a likability attack. Protection technique: Noise addition Adding inconsistent If the added noise has not a semantic sense, is possible noise that an attacker is able to filter the noise, and even to regenerate the missing entries.

100    Francesco Ciclosi et al. Table 4:  (Continued) Common Mistakes

Common Risks

Assuming that noise addition is enough

The research results have shown that the noise addition is not a standalone solution for anonymization; so, it is possible to filter the noise and also to regenerate the missing entries. Protection technique: Substitution Selecting the wrong If the sensitive or risky attributes is not identified attribute correctly it is possible that the permutation activity is executed on the wrong one; so, the association between sensitive/risky attributes and the original attribute persists and an attacker could extract the sensitive information of a respondent. Permutating If the permutation action is performed randomly attribute randomly involving two attributes that are strongly correlated (e.g., job and income), this could be detected and even be reversed. Assuming that The research results have shown that the substitution permutation is enough is not a standalone solution for anonymization; so is possible that it could be detected and even be reversed. Protection technique: Aggregation or k-anonymity Not considering all The threshold k is a critical parameter which measures the quasi-identifier the privacy guaranteed, so if not all the quasi-identifiers are considered “some attributes can be used to single out an individual in a cluster of k” (Directive 95/46/EC., 2014). Then this respondent will be not protected by this technique. Choosing a small If the k-value chosen is too small, the inference attacks’ value of k success rate will increase; indeed, in this case, the respondent weight in cluster will be too significant. Not grouping respondents with the same weight

If the grouping of a set of individuals is not homogeneous is possible that some of these could represent a significant fraction of the entries in the cluster. Protection technique: l-diversity/t-closeness Mix the sensitive If the distribution of sensitive values in each cluster does attribute values not resemble the distribution of those value in the total with other sensitive population, or if it is not uniform throughout the cluster, attributes the dataset could be not protected against inference attacks.

Assessing Compliance of Open Data in Politics    101 Table 4:  (Continued) Common Mistakes

Common Risks

Protection technique: Differential privacy Not injecting enough If the quantity of noise added to the true answers in not noise minimal is possible that an attacker uses it for linking with his background knowledge about the respondent. Similarly, if noise added is to high could not preserved the responses usefulness. Treating each query independently

If a query history is not retained, is possible that “a combination of query results may allow disclosing information which was intended to be secret” (Directive 95/46/EC., 2014).

7. Data Protection Techniques as a Means to Compliance with the GDPR The anonymization and the pseudonymization techniques can be a mean to comply with Regulation (EU) 2016/679. In fact, Recital 28 asserts that the application of these techniques “to personal data can reduce the risks to the data subjects concerned and help controllers and processors to meet their data-protection obligations” (Regulation (EU), 2016/679). Moreover, the same Recital explains that the use of word “pseudonymisation” “is not intended to preclude any other measures of data protection” (Regulation (EU), 2016/679). Therefore, it is possible to use also more advanced techniques of anonymization such as k-anonymity (Ciriani, De Capitani di Vimercati, & Samarati, 2007; Samarati, 2001), I-diversity (Kifer, 2006), or t-closeness (Li, Li, & Venkatasubramanian, 2007). In particular, these techniques are useful for ensuring compliance with the purpose limitation, storage limitation, and accountability principles; as well as be helpful in the implementation of “appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk” (Regulation (EU), 2016/679) (c.f. art. 32(1)). About the compliance with the purpose limitation principle, the article 6(4) of GDPR states that “the controller shall, in order to ascertain whether processing for another purpose is compatible with the purpose for which the personal data are initially collected, take into account” (Regulation (EU), 2016/679) many elements. One of which is exactly “the existence of appropriate safeguards, which may include encryption or pseudonymisation” (Regulation (EU), 2016/679). Finally, the GDPR states that (c.f. art. 89(1)) the adoption of pseudonymization and anonymization techniques (if the first one is not sufficient) is one of the ways that permit the data controller to keep personal data for longer than it is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are processed. Along with this line, “anonymisation might constitute a compulsory

102    Francesco Ciclosi et al. processing activity that enables one to comply with its data protection obligations” (Van Julien Debussche et al., 2017).

8. Openness and Open Data Before analyzing the differences between data, open data and personal data, it is first necessary to define these individual concepts. Then, it will be possible to introduce the more general concept of openness that represents the scope of reference in which it makes sense to talk about open data. This is an important point, especially in a new data-driven economy in which all data is inherently valuable, and they can take on new meanings, if they are correlated to form new relationships. In fact, as underlined in Bowles, Hamilton, and Levy (2014), data can be treated to assess the conformity of an organism to the established criteria, as well as to ascribe it the responsibilities of its actions, verifying both its legitimacy and its legality. According to this vision same authors sustain that: transparency has often been a means to regulate companies’ actions, relying on the market rather than law to constrain them (for instance, companies have to publish accounts, and release data about their environmental impact). (Simperl, O‘Hara, & Gomer, 2016) Another argument normally used to sustain the need of opening data is that: data collected by the state is legitimized by citizens electing the government, and funded by taxpayers, and so […] that citizens/ taxpayers should have access to non-sensitive data and services built off the back of it, if they would find them valuable. (Simperl et al., 2016)

8.1. The Concept of Data As highlighted in Ciclosi (2012) the term “data” is used to indicate an elementary portion of an information that has particular characteristics. More concretely, these characteristics are as follows: to describe directly the facts, or be clearly connected to these; to belong to a system of knowledge or to a more extensive information; to increase the value, if contextualized and correlated with additional information; to be reproducible without ambiguity, if you notice the methods by which it was generated; ⦁⦁ filed in digital formats; and ⦁⦁ to be able to generate new knowledge, if elaborated with software applications. ⦁⦁ ⦁⦁ ⦁⦁ ⦁⦁

Therefore, it is undeniable that “not all data can reach the status of information, but only those that, elaborated, organized, structured and contextualized,

Assessing Compliance of Open Data in Politics    103 become effectively usable”1 (Ciclosi, 2012). In other words, to transform a data into an information, it is necessary to carry out a treatment.

8.2. The Concept of Open Data To understand what is classifiable with the term open data you can refer to two distinct definitions, the first contained in the Open Data Charter and the second contained in the Open Definition. Accordingly with the Open Data Charter, a “open data is digital data that is made available with the technical and legal characteristics necessary for it to be freely used, reused, and redistributed by anyone, anytime, anywhere” (International Open Data Charter, 2018). Instead, accordingly with the Open definition2 provided by the Open Knowledge Foundation, the “open data and content can by freely used, modified, and shared by anyone for any purpose” (Open Definition, 2018). Independently, from the modalities chosen to define the concept of open data, this is configured as a general category, within which is included a set of more specific data that takes the name of open government data. The public sector information (PSI) belongs to such set (Pagnanelli, 2016).

8.3. The Openness As highlighted in Ciclosi (2012), in the literature the concept of openness is “linked to both the technological and legal aspects.”3 In fact, as already underlined, we usually consider open those data that are online, machine-readable and released under an open license. This is coherent with the definition of Open Knowledge provided by the Open Knowledge Foundation. In fact, according with this vision a “knowledge is open if anyone is free to access, use, modify, and share it – subject, at most, to measures that preserve provenance and openness” (Open Definition, 2018). Therefore, this assertion implies that the object or the element of knowledge considered (i.e., the work) is open according to the relative mode of distribution, which must satisfy such specific requirements in its distribution (Ciclosi, 2012), namely: (1) open license or status; (2) access; (3) machine readability; and (4) open format.

1

Original translation from the Italian language text: Non tutti i dati possono pervenire allo status di informazione, bensì solo quelli che, elaborati, organizzati, strutturati e contestualizzati, diventano effettivamente utilizzabili. 2 The full Open Definition’s text version 2.1 is available at https://opendefinition.org/ od/2.1/en/. 3 Original translation from the Italian language text: Legato sia all’aspetto tecnologico che a quello legale.

104    Francesco Ciclosi et al. The first one is related to the need that the work is both “in the public domain or provided under an open license” (Open Definition, 2018) and without any additional terms that could contradict these conditions. The second one establishes that the work is “provided as a whole and at no more than a reasonable one-time reproduction cost, and should be downloadable via the Internet without charge” (Open Definition, 2018). Moreover the work must also be accompanied by “any additional information necessary for license compliance” (Open Definition, 2018). The third one is that the “work must be provided in a form readily processable by a computer and where the individual elements of the work can be easily accessed and modified” (Open Definition, 2018). Finally, the last one requires that “the work must be provided in an open format” (Open Definition, 2018), that is a format with no restrictions and processable “with at least one free/ libre/open-source software tool” (Open Definition, 2018). For example, in the Italian context, the art. 7 of Legislative Decree n. 33/2013 “dictates the rules for the reuse of data and establishes the mandatory publication in an open format”4 (Pagnanelli, 2016). This rule states that it is possible to re-use the data subject to mandatory publication as indicated in European legislation concerning the re-use of PSI and in Italian legislation concerning the digital administration. It also sets specific limits in compliance with the legislation on the protection of personal data and “in the obligation to cite the source and to respect its integrity”5 (Italian Republic, 2013). Another important element of consideration about the principle of openness is the deep and substantial difference between the principles of publicity and transparency. In fact, while “publicity would involve a mere know ability […], transparency is a real passage of knowledge” (De Leonardis, 2016). In short, transparency is not limited to passively granting the simple right of access to information, but it actively working for this information to be effectively usable by the public. So, in that case the information will be made understandable. However, these conditions imply many different effects. First, it is important to note both that “the open license will make it difficult to apply standard disclosure control methods, such as access or query controls” (Simperl et al., 2016), and that “the range of uses for which the data is released is not constrained” (Simperl et al., 2016). The second point is related to the difficult of to isolate the data about institution from data about people. In fact, if, for example, we consider the data published according to the Italian legislation about the transparency, is required that the data subject to mandatory publication are not simply published as they are, but they are first analyzed in order to verify the existence of the conditions for the obscuration. In other words, “it is necessary to select the personal data to be included in such documents and documents, verifying, case by case, if the

4

Original translation from the Italian language text: Detta le regole per il riutilizzo dei dati e ne stabilisce l’obbligatoria pubblicazione in formato di tipo aperto. 5 Original translation from the Italian language text: Dell’obbligo di citare la fonte e di rispettarne l’integrità.

Assessing Compliance of Open Data in Politics    105 conditions for the obscuring of certain information occur”6 (Garante per la protezione dei dati personali, 2014). For this reason, is obvious that there is a correlation between open data and privacy and is not possible to imagine of organized the first aspect without consider the second one. So, if in an open data is presented at least one information concerning a data subject,7 its privacy will be breached, on the basis of the sensitivity of the data. Another point of consideration is about the possibility that an information originally not present in a dataset is produced by inferring it as the output of a linking process of the dataset content with other content available for a third party. Accordingly with this vision, some authors (Calzolaio, 2016) have highlighted that “currently it is no longer necessary to process personal or sensitive data to process analytical information on individuals”8 (Calzolaio, 2016). Therefore, “it is sufficient to correctly interrogate big data and cross […] non-personal data to obtain personal, analytical, intimate and confidential information”9 (Calzolaio, 2016). Consequently is necessary to analyze the risks related to datasets before their release in the open. Moreover, as highlight by some authors (Ciclosi, 2012) “given the particular nature of public sector information […], there are justified cases where these cannot be available in a completely open manner”10 (Ciclosi, 2012), namely, for example, in cases where it is necessary to guarantee the protection of national security, of privacy, or of intellectual property rights.

9. Privacy and Open Data According to some authors, “privacy is an open philosophical question [and] […] not a legal concept (although there are regulations about it, and it is subject of much case law)” (Simperl et al., 2016). Moreover, the significance of privacy is of type culturally relative. Other studies have underlined its complex condition. For example, O’Hara asserts that “we can approach privacy at a number of levels, 6

Original translation from the Italian language text: È necessario selezionare i dati personali da inserire in tali atti e documenti, verificando, caso per caso, se ricorrono i presupposti per l’oscuramento di determinate informazioni. 7 Which is, according to art. 4(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, an identified or an identifiable natural person. 8 Original translation from the Italian language text: Attualmente per trattare informazioni analitiche su singole persone non è più necessario trattare dati personali o sensibili. 9 Original translation from the Italian language text: È sufficiente interrogare correttamente i big data e incrociare [...] dati non personali per ottenere informazioni personali analitiche, intime, riservate. 10 Original translation from the Italian language text: Data la particolarità delle informazioni del settore pubblico [...], esistono dei motivati casi in cui queste non possono essere disponibili in modalità completamente aperta.

106    Francesco Ciclosi et al. […] these levels conceal the roots of disputes and agreements, and veil the nature of privacy itself ” (OHara, 2016). More in detail, the same author highlights how “social norms are vital for the protection of privacy, and explain much of its cultural diversity. They allow people to pursue their preferences […] without needing to establish control” (OHara, 2016). The power of these social norms is effective as they go to outline a behaviorally expected and shared by all members of a certain community. Therefore, for example, it will be sufficient to delimit an area with a cord to expect that nobody pass through it, even if physical barriers are not actually present. In the open data world, the type of privacy is an informational privacy, defined as a state where information about a person is not in the possession of others (Simperl et al., 2016). Therefore, the concept of open data involves the loss of control by a natural person, regarding their data. In fact, when a dataset is released as open it is not more private, and the data subject loose the control over it, even in the case that no one had have access to the data itself. Even though “there is nothing inherently wrong or damaging in releasing information about people” (Simperl et al., 2016), it is possible that, in some situations, this contrasts with people’s preferences itself. Another important point is that a possible absence of an information in a dataset could disclose something about the information itself. In fact, if for example, in the release of a medical dataset related the people diseases, there are 99 records in which the disease is shown and only one, in which this information is omitted, an external observer could assert (rightly or wrongly) that this absence implies something about the respondent’s disease. Hence, the European Data Portal suggests (Simperl et al., 2016) an innovative approach in which are considered some key factors, for every privacy-relevant release of data. Namely, these factors are harms, sensitivity, norms, confidentiality, and the public interest. About harms, it is important to highlight that these could also be figurative, such as a breach of people’s rights. About sensitivity of information, it is important to note that because not all the types of information are equally sensitive, it “is linked to the harms that may be caused by a privacy breach, although it is not a direct function of them” (Simperl et al., 2016). Moreover, it is possible that a sensitive information could be inferred by the release of a non-sensitive information. As for the norms, it is good to consider that these vary considerably from State to State. Furthermore, norms are influenced by and regulate (even though they are not laws) the people’s social context. Therefore, all the publishers must take into account norms, when they are publishing open data. Confidentiality, it refers to a type of information that is not private per se, but that it cannot forbidden transmit to others that originally does not know it. Finally, there is a public interest when “the availability of data may outweigh the private interests of the subjects of the data in keeping it under wraps” (Simperl et al., 2016). However, this evaluation is very complex and touches some political aspects that could be established with difficulty by the controller, who does not have the authority to make such an assessment.

Assessing Compliance of Open Data in Politics    107

10. Data Protection and Open Data Data protection is a legal concept (in fact it is regulated by statute) but is not in itself a protection of privacy. In fact, data protection allow data subject to ensure both that data about them is accurate and appropriate to the purpose for which it was collected, and that the processing is fair and lawful. Therefore, it is designed to determine the right to control information of data controllers and data subjects. The data protection application and scope are clearer than those of privacy (in fact it is defined by law); moreover, it could be used by data subjects to protect their privacy to a limited degree. About the data protection, it needs to consider that because a personal data is a data related to a natural person identified or identifiable, the status of personal data is not absolute but always relative. In fact, it is concerning to a particular data controller. This is an important point because it follows that if the data controller change, also the status of personal data could change. The article 6(1) of the Regulation (EU) 2016/679 asserts that a processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that is verified at least one of the six conditions which constitute the legal ground of the processing itself. This means that the lawfulness of a processing cannot exist without a legal basis explicitly defined in the GDPR, without prejudice to that “member States may maintain or introduce more specific provisions to adapt the application of the rules”11 (Regulation (EU), 2016). In particular, the aforementioned legal bases are as follows: (1) the data subject has given consent to the processing for one or more specific purposes; (2) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract; (3) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; (4) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of somebody; (5) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest; and (6) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party. Obviously if the legal ground is based on the data subject consent, and the purposes of the processing changes, controller must obtain a new consent to the processing for the new purpose.

11. Considerations About the Open Data Publishing Because the definition of processing contained in the GDPR includes, among others, the “disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available”12 (Regulation (EU), 2016), it follows that “it is illegal to publish personal data as Open Data unless one of the six conditions holds” (Simperl et al., 2016). 11 12

Regulation (EU) 2016/679, art. 6(2). Regulation (EU) 2016/679, art. 4(2).

108    Francesco Ciclosi et al. To better clarify this concept it is possible to consider two examples. The first one concerning the Italian Open Data License, that is a special Italian license “which aims to allow users to freely share, modify, use and reuse the database, data and information released with it, while ensuring the same freedom for others”13 (Dati.gov.it., 2018). In the license’s text, is specifying that the use of the information must be in compliance with current legislation, and it is also expressly stated that the license does not constitute an authorization to violate the current legislation on the protection of personal data. Analogously in the similar UK’s Open Government License (OGL, 2018) expressly specified that “this licence does not cover personal data in the Information.” In addition, because the openness of the license, there is many freedom of action for bodies who act as consumers of open data. In fact, after the publication of personal data in the form of open data, these data could go anywhere, and could be used by anyone for anything. Another interesting point is pertinent to the consumer’s risks. Sure enough in the case that consumer is doing a reuse of the open data and republishing the open data obtained by the publisher, it could happen that this last publication takes place outside the legal ground of the processing, even if under the terms of the license of use. As we have analyzed in the previous paragraphs, if a personal data is fully anonymized, it is very likely that the data protection laws does not apply, because the processing is outside their material scope of application. Therefore, in these cases it is not required a legal ground to publish open data. However, in such cases is required and also desirable, to publish some dataset that contain personal data. This is the case with the aforementioned compulsory publications of open data on transparency.

11.1. The Technical Issue of Data Disclosure Before publishing a dataset as an open data, it is necessary to analyze whether or not it contains personal data. This analysis is reduced to verifying (and this verification is anything but trivial) if through the data contained in the dataset it is directly or indirectly possible to identify a natural person. Some authors (Duncan, Elliot, & Salazar-González, 2011) have highlighted how the possibility of identifying a natural person depends on multiple factors. Namely, how the data are governed, what auxiliary data are available, the presence of both access and query controls over the data, and finally the presence of firewalls between the dataset and auxiliary data. Other authors (Simperl et al., 2016) have highlighted that, in the case of open data publishing the access controls are not present or are very few; therefore, the true elements to take into account are the auxiliary data. However, the determination of which auxiliary data can facilitate the identification of a natural person is anything but simple. In fact, some data could determine

13

Original translation from the Italian language text: Che ha lo scopo di consentire agli utenti di condividere, modificare, usare e riusare liberamente la banca di dati, i dati e le informazioni con essa rilasciati, garantendo al contempo la stessa libertà per altri.

Assessing Compliance of Open Data in Politics    109 this identification exclusively in particular cases. For example, work activity of a person is not usually identifying, but if this is very rare in a certain group of individuals, then it could become so. In this regard, consider the profession of Pontiff or of Italian Republic’s President. In the paragraph named “Anonymization and pseudonymisation” there were been covered the aspects concerning the three forms through which data disclosure operates, namely, singling out, linkability and inference.

11.2. The Legal Issue of Data Disclosure Some authors (Dwork, 2006) have shown that “it will always be possible technically to reidentify people from anonymised data with sufficient auxiliary data” (Simperl et al., 2016). More in detail, this theoretical discovery allowed they to reject the thesis of Dalenius (1977), which asserted that “access to a statistical database should not enable one to learn anything about an individual that could not be learned without access” (Dalenius, 1977). In fact, in its work Dwork (2006) discovered that this is an unattainable type of privacy. Therefore, “the obstacle is in auxiliary information, that is, information available to the adversary other than from access to the statistical database” (Dwork, 2006). This is an important point from a legal perspective, because it becomes difficult to prove with certainty that the published data are actually anonymous, unless you want to completely eliminate their information content and, therefore, their usefulness. According to this vision, other authors (Rubinstein & Hartzog, 2016) acknowledge that the “perfect anonymization of datasets that contain personal information has failed.” Moreover, they assert that: the best way to move data release policy past the alleged failures of anonymization is to focus on the process of minimizing risk of reidentification and sensitive attribute disclosure, not preventing harm. This is an interesting point of view taking into account that all data exchanges entail some risk. All these elements highlight the need to have “a stewardship mentality on the part of data controllers” (Simperl et al., 2016), so it is not possible just analyzing the risk related to the data publishing and then forget about it. On the contrary, it is necessary that the adopted approach is cyclical, according to the Deming model. At this purpose, the UK Anonymization Network guidance (UKAN) provided us the Anonymization Decision-Making Framework. This is a structured guidance for anonymization decision making, which is composed by the following 10 components:   (1) describe your data situation;   (2) understand your legal responsibilities;   (3) know your data;   (4) understand the use case;

110    Francesco Ciclosi et al.   (5) meet your ethical obligations;   (6) identify the processes you will need to assess disclosure risk;  (7)  identify the disclosure control processes that are relevant to your data situation;   (8) identify who your stakeholders are and plan how you will communicate;   (9) plan what happens next once you have shared or released the data; and (10) plan what you will do if things go wrong (Elliot, Mackey, O’Hara, & Tudor, 2016). In general, this is an excellent choice, considering that the decision to use a single framework entails, as a benefit, a standardization of anonymization operations with a consequent reduction in the related risks. A further aspect to consider is that the publication operation is a processing and, therefore, it needs a legal ground for to be able to take place. For example, in the description the proposal of an Italian “System of Access to Administrative Transparency,” the author highlight the need for some regulatory changes [that] are necessary and inevitable in order to provide a legal ground for the processing of data of data subjects holding elective and/or directive positions in bodies, maintaining a fully compliance (Ciclosi, 2018) with the GDPR requirements. The last legal issue is related to the new role assumed by the consumer, when successfully deanonymizing the data. In fact, at this moment consumer could identifying the natural person to which the data are concerned. Therefore, the data processing by consumer became personal data, and the processing activity fall back into the material scope of the Regulation (EU) 2016/679.

12. The Open Data Lifecycle In the document “Analytical Report 3: Open Data and Privacy” published by the European Data Portal Simperl et al. (2016) proposed a new model for the open data lifecycle (Fig. 2), in which the authors attempted to reproduce the additional complexity introduce in publishing by the presence of personal data. The proposed model provides for three distinct actors, namely data subjects, data controllers, and data consumers. The first two are the same that are described in the GDPR, while the last one represent people who can download and use the data that was been published by the publishers. Analogously, in the same document Simperl et al. (2016) identified two approaches useful to manage the risks concerning the data publishing. The first one is the stakeholder dialogue, and the second one is the data subject consent. According to the first approach, data publishers must dialogues with stakeholders (that are data subject and customers, but not only) in order to identify and the managing the potential risk (O’Hara, 2011). This action will also

Assessing Compliance of Open Data in Politics    111

Fig. 2:  The New Open Data Lifecycle by European Data Portal. serve to identify any legal problems related to the use or reuse of the dataset by consumers. In this regard it would be useful to set up a forum for dialogue to which a plurality of subjects should take part, such as data publishers, data consumers, subjects’ representative, technical expert, and domain expert (O‘Hara, 2011). According to the second approach, the open data publishers acquire a data subjects consent as a ground for the processing (i.e., more in detail as a legal ground for data publishing). At this purpose is a good idea to acquire always “to rely on subject consent in order to publish open datasets that are not fully anonymised” (Simperl et al., 2016). In fact, this choice allows us to solve at least two problems. The first one is concerning the possibility to publishing open data even if a specific use case it has not previously identified. Finally, the second one is concerning the possibility to always allow the transfer outside the EU, and this is very useful because open data are available for Internet download by everywhere and from everybody. Finally, it must take into account that the Regulation (EU) 2016/679 excludes the possibility of providing a generalized consent to processing. Therefore, even if the publication of a dataset finds its legal ground in the consent of the data subjects, the same consent does not automatically allow the consumer to treat it. To solve the issue some authors (Kaye et al., 2014) proposed to use a consent management’ system in which is possible to grant and to revoke the consent in a dynamic modality. This dynamic consent is a specific project also finalized to “facilitates two-way communication to stimulate a more engaged, informed

112    Francesco Ciclosi et al. and scientifically literate participant population where individuals can tailor and manage their own consent preferences” (Kaye et al., 2014).

13. Conclusions In conclusion, it is possible to assert that the use of data protection techniques can be instrumental to comply with Regulation (EU) 2016/679, or even to mitigate its requirements. In fact, in case it is possible to obtain an irreversibly anonymized personal data, these can be processed without the need to comply with GDPR obligations; differently, in the case in which the data subjects could still be identified, the GDPR will remain applicable and data protection must be considered as an instrument in support to risk management procedures.

References Bowles, N., Hamilton, J., & Levy, D. A. L. (2014). Transparency in politics and the media: Accountability and open government. London: I.B. Tauris, in Association with the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, University of Oxford. Calzolaio, S. (2016). Digital (and privacy) by default. Constitutional identity of e-government. Journal of Constitutional History, 31 (Transparency and privacy. Conflicts and balances between history and theory), 185–203. Ciclosi, F. (2012). S.A.T.A.: Per la definizione architetturale di un Sistema di Accesso alla Trasparenza Amministrativa. Tolentino: Edizioni Montag. Ciclosi, F. (2018). The Italian ‘system of access to administrative transparency’ and the cultural revolution of the Open Data paradigm. International Journal of Scientific Research and Innovative Technolnology, 5(5), 45–56. Ciriani, V., S. De Capitani di Vimercati, S., & Samarati, P. (2007). k-Anonymity. Secure Data Management in Decentralized Systems (Advances in Information Security), 33(Part I), 323–353. Dalenius, T. (1977). Towards a methodology for statistical disclosure control. Statatistics Tidskrift, 15, 429–444. Dati.gov.it. (2018). Italian Open Data License v2.0 | Dati.gov.it. Retrieved from https:// www.dati.gov.it/content/italian-open-data-license-v20. Accessed on June 12, 2018. De Leonardis, F. (2016). Among transparency obligations and the right to privacy: Towards a functional transparency. Journal of Constitutional History, 31 (Transparency and privacy. Conflicts and balances between history and theory), 175–184. Denham E. (2017). Big data, artificial intelligence, machine learning and data protection. Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) (p. 34). Retrieved from https://ico.org.uk/ media/for-organisations/documents/2013559/big-data-ai-ml-and-data-protection. pdf. Accessed on June 13, 2018. Directive 95/46/EC. (1995). Directive 95/46/EC of the European parliament and of the council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. OPOCE. Directive 95/46/EC. (2014). Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament. Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques (April), 1–37. Duncan, G. T. Elliot, M., & Salazar-González, J.-J. (2011). Statistical confidentiality. Principles and practice. New York, NY: Springer. Dwork, C. (2006). Differential privacy (pp. 1–12). Berlin: Springer.

Assessing Compliance of Open Data in Politics    113 Elliot, M., Mackey, E., O’Hara, K., & Tudor, C. (2016). The anonymisation decision-making framework. Manchester: UKAN Publisher. European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS). (2015, November). Meeting the challenges of big data (pp. 1–21). Brussels: EDPS. European Union. (2016). Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 “on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation)”. Official Journal of the European Union, L 119/1, of 4 may 2016. Floridi, L. (2016). The fourth revolution. How the infosphere is reshaping human reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Garante per la protezione dei dati personali. (2014). “Linee guida in materia di trattamento di dati personali, contenuti anche in atti e documenti amministrativi, effettuato per finalità di pubblicità e trasparenza sul web da soggetti pubblici e da altri enti obbligati”. Gazzetta Ufficiale, 134(del 12), 1–47. González Fuster, G., & Scherrer, A. (2015). Big data and smart devices and their impact on privacy. Study for the LIBE Committee (pp. 1–42). European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affair. International Open Data Charter. (2018). “Principles – International Open Data Charter.” [Online]. Retrieved from https://opendatacharter.net/principles/. Accessed on June 12, 2018. ISO I. 31000:2009. (2009). Risk management—Principles and guidelines. Geneva: International Organization for Standardization. Italian Republic. (2013). Legislative Decree No. 33 of March 14, 2013. Italy (GU n. 80 del 5-4-2013). Kaye, J., Whitley, E. A., Lund, D., Morrison, M., Teare, H., & Melham, K. (2014). Dynamic consent: A patient interface for twenty-first century research networks. European Journal of Human Genetics, 23(May), 141. Kifer, D. (2006). l-diversity: Privacy beyond k -anonymity. In Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on data engineering (vol. 1, pp. 1–36). Kohnstamm, J. (2010). Article 29 data protection working party, opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of “controller” and “processor” (wp169). Brussels: Working Party Article 29. Li, N., Li, T., & Venkatasubramanian, S. (2007). t-Closeness: Privacy beyond k-anonymity and l-diversity. In IEEE 23rd international conference on data engineering (pp. 106–115). Lindell, Y., & Pinkas, B. (2000). Privacy preserving data mining. In Proceedings of the 20th annual international cryptology conference on advances in cryptology (pp. 36–54). Mendes, R., & Vilela, J. P. (2017). Privacy-preserving data mining: Methods, metrics, and applications. IEEE Access, 5, 10562–10582. OGL (2018), Open Government Licence (OGL). Retrieved from http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3/. Accessed on June 13, 2018. O’Hara, K. (2011) Transparent government, not transparent citizens: A report on privacy and transparency for the cabinet office (pp. 1–84). Retrieved from https://eprints.soton. ac.uk/272769/1/272769OHARA11.pdf. Accessed on June 13, 2018.. OHara, K. (2016). The seven veils of privacy. IEEE Internet Computing, 20(2), 86–91. Open Definition. (2018). “The Open Definition – Open Definition – Defining open in open data, open content and open knowledge.” Retrieved from https://opendefinition. org/. Accessed on June 12, 2018. Pagnanelli, V. (2016). Access, accessibility, open data. The Italian model of public open data in the European context. Journal of Constitutional History, 31 (Transparency and privacy. Conflicts and balances between history and theory), 205–218.

114    Francesco Ciclosi et al. Rubinstein, I. S., & Hartzog, W. (2016). Anonymization and risk. Washington Law Review, 91, 703–760. Samarati, P. (2001). Protecting respondents identities in microdata release. IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering., 13(6), 1010–1027. Simperl, E., O‘Hara, K., & Gomer, R. (2016). Analytical report 3: Open data and privacy. European Data Portal (p. 4). Retrieved from https://www.europeandataportal.eu/ sites/default/files/open_data_and_privacy_v1_final_clean.pdf. Accessed on June 13, 2018.

Chapter 8

ICT, Politics, and Cyber Intelligence: Revisiting the Case of Snowden Emanuel Boussios Abstract This chapter focuses on a critical issue in cyber intelligence in the United States (US) that concerns the engagement of state-owned or state-controlled entities with overseeing citizen’s activity in cyberspace. The emphasis in the discussion is placed on the constitutionality of state actions and the shifting boundaries in which the state can act in the name of security to protect its people from the nation’s enemies. A second piece of this discussion is which state actors and agencies can control the mechanisms by which this sensitive cyber information is collected, stored, and if needed, acted upon. The most salient case with regard to this debate is that of Edward Snowden. It reveals the US government’s abuses of this surveillance machinery prompting major debates around the topics of privacy, national security, and mass digital surveillance. When observing the response to Snowden’s disclosures one can ask what point of view is being ignored, or what questions are not being answered. By considering the silence as a part of our everyday language we can improve our understanding of mediated discourses. Recommendations on cyber-intelligence reforms in response to Snowden’s revelations – and whether these are in fact practical in modern, high-technology societies such as the US – follow. Keywords: Cyber intelligence; cyberterrorism; homeland security; surveillance; privacy; Snowden

Introduction Over the last several decades, Western societies have seen a tremendous advancement in technology, progressing far beyond the simplicity of closed circuit televisions (CCTVs), and a tremendous increase in the actual use of surveillance. With computerization, surveillance is becoming subtler and, at the same time Politics and Technology in the Post-Truth Era, 115–128 Copyright © 2019 Emanuel Boussios doi:10.1108/978-1-78756-983-620191008

116    Emanuel Boussios more intense, spreading from material space to cyberspace (Lytras, Raghavan, & Damiani, 2017). Scholars have argued (Lyon, 2001) that the real “superpanopticon” exists in electronic environments – in the “worldwide web of surveillance.” Most individuals in Western nations have accepted the fact that they are being observed in some capacity in public spaces but may be surprised with what is being done with information that is being collected in the public and the private realm. The discussion in this chapter discusses a crucial issue in the United States (US) stemming from the actions of government entities overseeing citizens’ activity in cyberspace in an effort to protect against terrorists, while at the same time, promising to protect their civil liberties.1 “Cyberattacks are increasingly exponentially in the United States and around the world with attacks in the United States averaging over 550,000 a week and over 25,000,000 a year” (Pelton & Singh, 2015). Cyber threats to military and commercial sectors are growing rapidly with criminals having exploited 75 percent of the US computers (Farwell, 2012). Targeted cyberattacks could pose a great threat to the public due to interconnectivity and reliance on public switch telecommunications. This could create an untenable situation for public safety officials and health providers and decimate public trust and social integrity (Visvizi, 2015). Of course, this political discourse lends itself to an important debate internationally (Boussios & Visvizi, 2017). In this chapter it will be more narrowly discussed in the context of the current debate being held in the US. In 2016, President Barack Obama signed into law the highly contentious Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2016 (CISA). The CISA, craftily placed within the 2016 spending bill, encourages businesses and the federal government to exchange cyber-threat information in the interests of national security. Privacy advocates, such as the ACLU, view the CISA’s inclusion within the 2016 spending bill as “sneaky backdoor politics,” since, by design, this minimizes debate on the Act’s very details. The principal discussion in this chapter is on the constitutionality of state actions2 and the shifting boundaries in which the state can act in the name of security in an effort to protect its people, and, hence, the state, from its enemies. A second part of 1

This chapter updates and extends an earlier discussion on this topic published in Boussios (2016). 2 In the United States, there are several Amendments that constitute an American citizen’s right to privacy. The First Amendment which is held upon privacy beliefs – “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” The Third Amendment which states privacy within the home – “No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.” Lastly, the Fourth Amendment which holds privacy of the citizen and their possession –“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

ICT, Politics, and Cyber Intelligence    117 this discussion is which state actors and agencies should be able to control the mechanisms by which this sensitive cyber information is collected, stored, and if needed, acted upon? Since the State is a major player in storing cyber information they also maintain tremendous influence over the narrative if abuses were to occur. A third piece of this debate references the case of Edward Snowden revealing the US government’s abuses of this surveillance machinery. Snowden claims the US government (and its Allies) acted criminally by aiding and abetting its own agents in collecting information on its populace in the absence of lawful means (i.e., proper warrants). More specifically, these actions infringe upon the privacy of its citizens, business, and even politicians by the use of deep packet inspection, and smartphone location tracking. This case is far from its legal conclusion; Snowden, as of this writing, is still in asylum in Russia. Nevertheless, it has raised brought a range of legal and ethical questions concerning democratic states’ cyber-intelligence gathering (Toriz Ramos, 2011). Edward Snowden’s revelations in June 2013 prompted major debates around the topics of privacy, national security, and mass digital surveillance. This chapter concludes by discussing cyber-intelligence reforms put forth by Edward Snowden.

Literature Review The debate of states’ use of surveillance in the name of security is not unique to US society. For example, the use of spies by government agents to counteract insurgencies has been the norm, a tactic used by leaders of the earliest nation states. For many the history of surveillance can be traced back to antiquity (Sennet, 1990). For example, in medieval Europe a feudal lord could keep watch over his domain from the top of his watchtower, while for others an emphasis on the visual represents the very essence of modernity (Heidegger, 1977). According to Fussey (2008) “while the development of administrative surveillance has been viewed not simply as a mere feature of modernity, but as an enabling mechanism that has facilitated its development.” Despite its long history in civilized society, the very existence of surveillance has been viewed by many as a social problem due its ease of abuse by government and its agents. Several scholars (Fussey, 2008; Sennet, 1990) have suggested that one way of explaining this is that while surveillance has always been present, it has not always been a mechanism of control. According to Griffin (2016, p. 38), “Alas, America has become a surveillance state.” Public opinion in both the US and UK has indicated that an overwhelming majority of the citizenry consider government surveillance of the public’s internet communications and telephone, to be an important issue (Madden, 2015). In the EU the general public thinks some surveillance technologies are effective and should be used in combating national security threats, and should be used, but acceptability varies according to whether the surveillance is of communications or bodies, blanket or targeted. It is common practice for government security agents to use all of these surveillance technologies. Surveillance of physical bodies (smart CCTV) and targeted surveillance of digital communications (smartphone location tracking) are more accepted by the public than blanket surveillance of digital communications (deep packet inspection) (Bakir, Cable, Dencik, Hintz, & McStay, 2015). There are three general security-oriented technologies, each with

118    Emanuel Boussios its own mechanism of surveillance: smart-CCTV, deep packet inspection, and smartphone location tracking (Bakir et al., 2015). CCTVs feature digital cameras which are linked together in a system that has the potential to recognize people’s faces, analyze their behavior and detect objects (Wu, Chen, Wu, & Lytras, 2018). Deep packet inspection detects and shapes how messages travel on a network, opening and analyzing messages as they travel, and identifying those that may pose particular risks. Smartphone location tracking analyses location data from a mobile phone, to glean information about the location and movements of the phone user over a period of time. Recent controversial Supreme Court rulings have reset the boundaries of the government’s power with regard to deep packet inspection and smartphone location tracking (Hunton & Williams, 2014). According to Hunton and Williams (2014) surveillance practices “pervades all societal sectors that stretch ‘well beyond the state’; surveillance is a fact of modern life and not intrinsically anti-social or repressive.” According to Lyon (2001), surveillance societies are defined by their double-edged character; surveillance technologies can be used to provide benefits, empower consumers and workers, and enable the promotion of citizenship rights. Lyon’s point here is that surveillance can also be less concerned with “care” and more with “control.” Surveillance plays a coordinating role in aiding an individual’s passage through the shopping mall, customs or the workplace. This coordination process is more and more being defined by a risk calculus, which is increasingly taking on an amoral character – less concerned with inclusiveness and questions of justice. Traditionally, privacy has been used as a counterpoint to resisting and challenging surveillance but others argue a post-privacy challenge to surveillance exists that addresses the latter as a social question to do with power (Lyon, 2001). Power and surveillance have a complex social relationship; not always to be characterized in oppressive terms in that “few people feel constrained, let alone controlled, by surveillance regimes” (See Lyon, 2001, p. 7). However, surveillance effects “life chances and social destinies” in forming a kind of “super-panopticon” (cf. Lyon, 2001, p. 151) whereby surveillance societies can only be understood in recognizing how ideologies and beliefs “underpin” the work of organizations and, therefore how they use surveillance technologies. Yet, cyber insecurity affects all, and raises collection, storage, and release questions … when one writes, edits, drafts, and emails stuff, the pile has to be stored somewhere. Surrendering information to a trusted third party erases privacy. (Griffin, 2016, p. 39)

Cyber-Surveillance Legislation This examination of cyber surveillance seeks to go beyond the standard discussion of the dichotomy of “liberty vs. security” (Fussey, 2008) to discuss how open the US government should be about its cyber-intelligence capabilities and how these apparatuses are possibly infringing upon its citizens’ freedoms. This debate is hardly new; however, the freshness of the controversy stems from legislation introduced in response to 9/11; Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002

ICT, Politics, and Cyber Intelligence    119 and Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). Cyber policy is highly contentious — the contest of security versus privacy, the public good versus corporate profits, interagency power struggles, budget fights, and the “simple” matter of setting daily priorities in a 24-hour day — all enter into and complicate issues that appear cut-and-dry at first glance. As of this writing, the discourse surrounding cyber-intelligence gathering includes the controversial CISA and the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act. Other controversies, on intelligence gathering, can be seen in the discourse regarding ID cards (specifically so for illegal immigrants) and even public camera surveillance. Both laws would similarly provide for the sharing of select cyber-threat intelligence and information (i.e., Internet traffic information) between technology and manufacturing companies and the US government. Each piece of legislation further exacerbates three conditions in the US: reduced privacy; increased government secrecy; strengthened government protection of special interests (Talanian, 2008). The CISA was packaged within the $1.1 trillion spending package that Congress passed in late 2015. The CISA will significantly reshape the relationship between the consumer, company, and government and how such data are collected and stored. These are some of the more significant changes with the passing of CISA (Hoffman, Linsky, & Segalis, 2016): sharing of cyber-threat information by the federal government cybersecurity best practices guidance, immunity; sharing of cyber-threat information by businesses; and privacy protections. The “immunity” provision both raised the concerns of privacy advocates and was viewed as essential to enabling the sharing of cyber-threat information with the government by businesses. Privacy advocates have expressed alarm with the CISA in allowing businesses to monitor their information systems and all information stored on, processed by, or transiting the information system, as long as the monitoring is for the “purpose” of protecting the information or information systems. Since liability protections were of significant concern to businesses, the law is protective by granting businesses full immunity from government and private lawsuits and other claims that may arise out of CISA-compliant monitoring in which businesses may engage. Much of the criticism of this Act (i.e., the ACLU) has been has been that privacy has been compromised given the NSA’s expanded powers, while others, including The Obama White House, felt it was a well-struck balance between the nation’s need for cyber intelligence and defines, and privacy.

Narrative and Silence: The Debate Over the Public’s Interest The media frenzy following Snowden’s revelation generated multiple narratives surrounding the US government’s cyber-intelligence apparatus with a particular focus on the PRISM program. The PRISM program is a massive surveillance program in operation by the US National Security Agency that utilizes extensive data mining efforts to collect information and analyze that data for patterns of terrorist or other potential criminal activity. Several scholars (Mehraj, Mehraj, & Akhtar, 2014) have argued that the role of the media helps a democracy function effectively by informing the public about government policies and programs and how these programs can be useful to them. Therefore, the argument is this

120    Emanuel Boussios helps the people voice their feelings and helps the government to make necessary changes in their policies or programs. Absent in the production of these various discourses, there were also narratives that failed to emerge, that remained silent. One of these narratives was one of the need for transparency in how the government uses in cyber-intelligence capabilities on its people. The loss of particular narratives is hardly innocent oversights, but a consequence of presenting controlled narratives. The lack of coverage of certain views can be explained through a framework recognizing the constitutive role of silence in our everyday lives. “Silence” is the power to control what information is made public and what is not. In particular, a focus on silence can teach us to ask what is not said, for instance, why was the PRISM program classified in the first place? Foucault (1981) argues that discourse is constituted by the things we say, but it is also constructed by what we elect not to say. Foucault is alluding to the power of silence in our everyday lives. The power to prevent certain speech presupposes of the primacy of power in social relations and it is the capacity to exercise power that provides some with the ability to silence others. The Executive Branch has considerable power to control silence through its power to classify documents as top secret. In 2011, over 76 million documents were classified “secret” in the US by over 4 million government employees (Schaefer, 2013). The power of the Executive Branch to control what is said and not said to the general public has brought criticism from former government employees (Schaefer, 2013). Thomas Keane, who chaired the 9/11 Commission, reported to Congress that “three quarters of classified information he reviewed for the Commission should not have been classified in the first place.” Further, J. William Leanord, former Government classification czar, filed a formal complaint against Justice Department regarding their abuse of classification power. The power to control what is made public and what is not made public provides considerable power to silence narratives, and since our thinking is organized through discourse then silence is never outside of discourse but is part of its constitution. As Foucault (1981) observes silence is constitutive of discourse and is thus is a precondition for its existence, thereby “the make-up discourse has to be pieced together with things both said and unsaid, with required and forbidden speech.” Within this discourse of silence, we can understand the messages that are not told, or the questions that are not asked, implicating silence as an important part of our language. Discourse authorizes who can speak, what can be spoken about, how it is spoken about and what should be taken seriously; while simultaneously marginalizing and disqualifying other voices whose speech remains forbidden or derided (Hunt & Wickham, 1994). Hallsworth and Young (2008) expand the conception of silence by arguing “that all persons are confronted with silence in our day-to-day lives and we play a role in the construction of silence.” Hallsworth and Young (2008) expand on the role of silence when discussing the link between crime and the media suggesting that “there are four key players when examining crime: perpetrator, victim, witness, and control agent (i.e., law enforcement).” In every mediated communication there is the perpetrator, in this case state actors, who has a vested interest (“national security”) in discussing a particular point of view on a subject. The media conglomerates that fail to present a critical discourse represent the

ICT, Politics, and Cyber Intelligence    121 status quo, the status quo being in support of state actors in protecting national security, and this in this instance the assumption that the American people do not need to know certain information related to such matters. As consumers of knowledge, people become the victim, witness, and control agent (Hallsworth & Young, 2008). The consumer is the witness through viewing the news, the victim through the exposure to myopic discourses, and the control agent because of the potentiality to call for greater coverage (Schaefer, 2013). The work of Foucault and Hallsworth and Young show the value of silence in deconstructing the messages told through the media (Schaefer, 2013). As argued in this research, the media’s coverage of the National Security Agency’s PRISM program does not address the necessity for transparency (yet pays some attention of the need for accountability). It is through a framework that the public can recognize the critical nature of what is not said. State actors evoke “national security” clauses, which render them exempt from a duty of disclosure (Hallsworth & Young, 2008). Therefore, one can see the reaction of the state in response to Snowden’s disclosures, Snowden the “traitor,” the “dissident” is one in which the media hardly conflicted with. This recourse to silence on the part of the State is often invoked in a state of exception where normal legal safeguards are suspended in the very name of the law being upheld (Hallsworth & Young, 2008). Interestingly, there were no such safeguards in place protecting whistleblowers. A popular method deployed to silence state employees involved the production of legislation designed to prevent the disclosures of state secrets. These, in turn, are supported by the threat of sanctions such as imprisonment, or “gagging clauses” for those who elect to disclose (Hallsworth & Young, 2008). When observing the response to Snowden’s disclosures one can ask what point of view is being ignored, or what questions are not being answered. By considering the silence as a part of our everyday language we can improve our understanding of mediated discourses.

Snowden and the Debate Over US Cyber Intelligence In one of the most significant cybersecurity events in recent history, former NSA contractor Edward Snowden shared thousands of classified NSA documents with journalists Glenn Greenwald, Laura Poitras, and Ewen MacAskill (Mass, 2013). This ongoing disclosure of leaked documents has intensified the debates over mass surveillance, government secrecy, and the balance between national security and information privacy. Previously unknown details have been revealed of a global surveillance apparatus run by the US’ NSA in close cooperation with Australia (ASD), the United Kingdom (GCHQ), and Canada (CSEC). In response to these disclosures, Snowden has been called a hero, a patriot, a whistleblower, a dissident, and a traitor. Snowden revealed the surveillance techniques and a depth of information gathering by Western governments on its citizens, which was indeed staggering (Jewkes, 2015). What we have come to know about these disclosures is that the NSA, working closely with the private sector, has been monitoring citizens’ web activity and has collected massive quantities of data on email and phone contacts (Scheuerman, 2014). The National Security Agency acquired its name officially on November

122    Emanuel Boussios 4, 1952, and since that time this organization has endured much controversy protecting American communication systems, primarily those of the US armed forces. One such controversy was over the offshoot of the warrantless domestic spying program created by the Bush administration after 9/11. These NSA’s initiatives were made public in a New York Times article published on December 16, 2005 (Risen and Lichtblau, 2005). In spite of this revelation, Congress responded by indemnifying the big telecommunications firms that had cooperated with the NSA, effectively giving the agency a green light to continue with secret surveillance (Scheuerman, 2014), leaving the public to wonder what type of “agreements” were made outside of the public eye. It was the later efforts, such as the PRISM data mining program, that Snowden revealed in 2013. By involving parties in the press and the government, Snowden said he hoped to serve the public interest: bringing attention to privacy issues while also mitigating security risks. His personal motivations3 for leaking the NSA documents, Snowden said, was motivated more by “self-interest” than altruism, as he felt that he would improve societal wellbeing by revealing and ultimately dismantling the NSA’s metadata collection programs (Xu, 2015). Several scholars agree that “In the name of privacy or, put more succinctly, a deeper concern for the turf allotted to privacy, government should dump its bulk telephone meta-data about us” (Griffin, 2016, p. 40). Snowden added that he feels there are moral obligations to act when the law no longer reflects the morality of the society it governs. Snowden put forth two major policy changes: ending mass surveillance and better protecting whistle-blowers (Jewkes, 2015). On the first point, Snowden cited the “ineffective” nature of surveillance projects and the ineffectuality of the NSA’s data collection in producing any improvements in security. On the second point, he argued for the creation of independent agencies staffed by civil liberties advocates to handle cases like his (Jewkes, 2015). Snowden’s demand for ending mass surveillance is not practical especially in modern high-tech societies. An analogous situation may be occurring with the use of CCTV surveillance in towns, cities, and municipalities. According to Jewkes (2015) “some studies examined whether visual surveillance technologies such as CCTV were effective in cutting crime or whether they simply displace it to surrounding areas.” The net result is that ending mass surveillance could increase cybercrime in these societies (displacement), which could then increase public fears about personal safety. 3

In an interview with Edward Snowden, Perry and Taylor asked whether Snowden was reluctant to “break the law,” here is an excerpt of Snowden’s responses: “When legality and morality begin to separate, we all have a moral obligation to do something about that,” he said. “When I saw that the work I was doing and all my colleagues were doing [was] being subversive not only to our intentions but contrary to the public’s intent, I felt an obligation to act.” Snowden spoke at length about the institutional failures in the US government that allowed for the NSA activities in question to occur. “The courts were frozen out, the majority of Congress was frozen out, the populace was frozen out,” he said. He added that he attempted to reintroduce this system of checks and balances – which failed in the case of the NSA – in his own methodology for releasing the documents.

ICT, Politics, and Cyber Intelligence    123 In this current Internet age, ending mass surveillance could also leave a nation open to massive cyberattacks, devastating its infrastructure and thereby undermining the nation’s security. Eliminating mass surveillance, as suggested by Snowden. may actually achieve little net benefit since cybercrime will “shift” into these ­communities/nations from other regions that utilise mass surveillance techniques.

Snowden and the Debate Over US Cyber Intelligence Advocates of stronger cybersecurity warn that the public is at risk of a “digital Pearl Harbor” (Farrell, 2014b) in which the US power system, financial system, and other parts of “critical infrastructure” could be attacked and seriously damaged by foreign hackers. In one such occurrence, a cyberattack on the Office of Personnel Management resulted in 21.5 million federal-worker personnel records being stolen by hackers (Riponadvance, 2015). Some within the US government think that deterrence [strategy against cyberattacks] is feasible, and face a dilemma (Farrell, 2014a). The US government would like to get everyone to believe that it has strength and depth in cyber offense, so that it can deter others from attacking it (Farrell, 2014a). This means that the most that the US can do to deter attackers is to deny them any benefits from attacking (what deterrence theorists call “deterrence through denial”), creating strong defenses that minimize the likelihood of successful attacks and hence slightly discourage attackers from trying to breach systems in the first place (Farrell, 2014a). Yet, the US does not want to provide any detail about its capabilities, that is, be more transparent in its cyber-intelligence activities. If you have some idea of what a country’s cyber weapons look like, you can defend yourself much better against them. Because the US can only talk in vague generalities about its capabilities, the US is actually engaging in a form of ‘game theory’ strategy, other states might think that it is deliberately inflating them for show. The US is obviously technically sophisticated and spends a great deal of money on cybersecurity. The President’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 Budget seeks to invest over USD 19 billion for cybersecurity and represents a more than 35 percent increase from FY 2016 in overall Federal resources for cybersecurity (Fact Sheet: Cybersecurity, 2016). Even so, adversaries may underestimate these capabilities. On the same point, the US is mute on its offensive capacities in cyber warfare. This is not an accident; and most US senior officials have been only slightly more forthcoming. Other scholars disagree on the effectiveness of deterrence, and the need for this type of strategy. According to Farrell (2014a), it [current operations] reflects the US belief that traditional deterrence does not work in cybersecurity, and if it did, then the US would gain benefits by publicizing how effective their weapons were and hence making it clear that the US had a strong retaliatory capacity. Since US officials believe that deterrence does not work, they are restrained in describing their attack capabilities. Explicit description could have many downsides (encouraging other states, e.g., to arm up in cyberspace too), and few obvious

124    Emanuel Boussios upsides. While the US does have strong offensive capacities, it sees no good reason to publicize them. Additionally, although this is understood and viewed as necessary by the general public for very brief time periods during war, this fails to gain the confidence among the American public that abuse is not being taken place during times of peace.

Accountability and Reforms Perhaps it is not necessary to end mass surveillance, or even to be more transparent on its cyber-intelligence operations, but it is essential to have greater accountability over these operations. This is attainable in a functioning democracy and would go to great lengths in better protecting the American public from illegal government overreach and do better in gaining the public’s trust. Accountability is critical in gaining the confidence of the public and “checking” against abuse (i.e., checks and balances). In governance, accountability has expanded beyond the basic definition of “being called to account for one’s actions” (Mulgan, 2000). […] It is frequently described as an account-giving relationship between individuals, e.g. A is accountable to B when A is obliged to inform B about A’s (past or future) actions and decisions, to justify them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual misconduct. (Schedler, 1999) Accountability cannot exist without proper accounting practices; in other words, an absence of accounting means an absence of accountability. It is important to note that given the range of cyber threats, this could have necessitated the current US cybersecurity arrangement. The main actors of this arrangement include the Department of Homeland Security (a civilian government role), the National Security Agency and Cyber Command (a military role), and the FBI (Gardiner & Mallicoat, 2014). Just as the culture and turf wars between these different organizations are difficult to manage, as one could imagine a comprehensive oversight arrangement is indeed difficult to arrange. Yet the status quo allows for a mostly ineffective systems of checks and balances (within branches of government as well) to remain in place and the chance of continuous government overreach remains an immediate threat. There is no doubt that some of the concern is because of the secrecy surrounding the government’s cyber-security initiatives. More specifically, a case occurred with the Bush Administration and the Department of Homeland Security releasing limited information about the cyber-security measures they were taking — including its well-known use of Einstein 3 (Chi, 2014) which was considered an excessive and illegal use of deep packet inspection by these agencies. In addition, problems exist here today whereby most of the details of the initiatives remain classified, generating continuing Congressional and public concern about overreaching (Chi, 2014). Without explicit accountability laws in place, what are the constraints placed on the executive branch in carrying out its cyber protection responsibilities? Regular reviews of cyber-security programs could help alleviate concerns about privacy and overreach.

ICT, Politics, and Cyber Intelligence    125 One such proposal recommends that cyber-security programs be subject to regular congressional reviews and also be required to publish regular reports, in unclassified form, about the status and recent actions under the deep packet inspection programs (Chi, 2014) such as Einstein 3. These cyber-security programs could also undergo periodic legal review by independent experts with appropriate clearances to ensure that constitutional and statutory constraints are being followed much like the Federal Trade Commissions’ authority to regulate corporate cybersecurity (Stempel, 2015). Similar to these suggestions is the report put forth by the Sans Institute (Chi, 2014) recommending is that if significant discrepancies are found, these reviewers would have the authority to temporarily stop the programs in question, or at the minimum, convene meetings with the officials overseeing these programs. These reforms would better enable these critical bi-partisan committees on intelligence, the House and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, enhanced access to certain information. Improving such access would arm these committee members, for instance, with the ability to comb through covert action and activities information which the executive branch can currently restrict “as needed.”

Conclusions Edward Snowden revealed a wide range of concrete evidence showing the scope and the scale of cyber-surveillance in the West. Although the US arguably is the most technologically advanced society in the world and people living in less hightech prone places may expect that the eye of the Big Brother to be less digitized, the debate centers on the magnitude of activity of the state-owned or state-­controlled entities overseeing our activity in the World Wide Web. “Open” internet advocates are highly skeptical of the likelihood of crippling cyberattacks, rather they see the real risk as coming from a US security establishment that wants limitless powers to gather information and restrict individual freedoms. In contrast, security advocates see open Internet advocates as dangerously naïve in a world in which the risk of a digital Pearl Harbor is imminent. The media’s coverage of the National Security Agency’s PRISM program does not address the necessity for transparency, that is, establishing a framework by which the public can recognize the critical nature of what is not said. What has been absent in the production of these various discourses, narratives that have failed to emerge and that have remained silent, has been the need for transparency in how the government uses in cyber-intelligence capabilities on its people. Yet, doubling down on transparency and ending mass surveillance could open Americans to blunt and constant cyberattacks; however, shunning the moral and legal responsibility of checks and balances would give the appearance of totalitarian governing practices. There was heated debate in Congress over the CISA of 2015. This act strongly encourages business and the federal government to share cyber-threat information in the interests of national security. Although the heated exchanges over this legislation was welcomed, what was troubling to many (including the ACLU) was this bills’ inclusion into the 2015 Capitol Hill spending bill, perhaps as an effort to

126    Emanuel Boussios bypass any additional dialogue over the bills’ privacy protections. In consolation to some, the CISA required the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security to jointly submit to Congress interim CISA policies and procedures (by February 16, 2016), and publish final policies and procedures (by June 15, 2016). Since these policies and procedures are subject to Congressional reviews, this allows for needed dialogue over the necessities of such policies and whether they are excessive. Perhaps Capitol Hill’s political wrangling over the CISA and the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act is suggestive of a passionate argument about governments’ responsibility to be the moral authority in cyberspace, while at the same time making branches of government more involved in holding state security agents accountable for their actions. The debate does not end here however. There are amendments needed on current laws regarding corporate cyber laws over the ownership of consumers’ data. The months-long legal tug-of-war between Apple Inc. and the US government is one example of the need for such legislation. The conflict began with the FBI’s attempt to use legal motions and public pressure to force Apple to write new software allowing this agency to access the iPhone used by one of the shooters in the December 2015 mass murder in San Bernardino. The debate over who owns the data of individuals US citizens — corporations or the government — is still very much in its infancy.

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ICT, Politics, and Cyber Intelligence    127 Fussey, P. (2008). Beyond liberty, beyond security: The politics of public surveillance. British Politics, 3(1), 120–135. Gardiner, C., & Mallicoat, S. (2014). Criminal justice policy (pp. 67–83). New York, NY: Sage Publications. Griffin, R. C. (2016). Spying. In D. A. Frenkel (Ed.), Selected issues in modern jurisprudence (pp. 35–54). Athens: Athens Institute for Education and Research (ATINER). Hallsworth, S., & Young, T. (2008). Crime and silence: ‘Death and life are in the power of the tongue (Proverbs 18: 21)’. Theoretical Criminology, 12, 131–152. Heidegger, M. (1977). The question concerning technology. In The Question concerning technology and other essays (pp. 3–35). New York, NY: Harper and Row. Hoffman, A., Linsky, K., & Segalis, B. (2016, January 3). Federal cybersecurity information sharing act signed into law. Retrieved from http://www.dataprotectionreport. com/2016/01/federal-cybersecurity-information-sharing-act-signed-into-law/ Hunt, A., & Wickham, G. (1994). Foucault and law: Towards a sociology of law as governance. London & Boulder, CO: Pluto. Hunton, H., & Williams, M. (2014). Privacy and information security law blog: Global privacy and cybersecurity law updates and analysis. Retrieved from https://www. huntonprivacyblog.com/tag/supreme-court/ Jewkes, Y. (2015). Media and crime (pp. 222–242). New York, NY: Sage Publications. Lyon, D. (2001). Surveillance society: Monitoring everyday life. Buckingham: Open University Press. Lytras, M. D., Raghavan, V., & Damiani, E. (2017). Big data and data analytics research: From metaphors to value space for collective wisdom in human decision making and smart machines. International Journal on Semantic Web and Information Systems (IJSWIS), 13(1), 1–10. doi:10.4018/IJSWIS.2017010101 Madden, M. (2015). Americans’ attitudes about privacy, security, and surveillance. Retrieved from http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/05/20/americans-attitudes-about-privacysecurity-and-surveillance/ Mass, P. (2013, August 3). How Laura Poitras helped Snowden spill his secrets. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/magazine/laura-poitras-snowden. html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 Mehraj, H. K., Mehraj, M. R., & Akhtar, B. N. (2014). Impacts of media on society: A sociological perspective. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention, 3(6), 56–64. Mulgan, R. (2000). Accountability: An ever-expanding concept? Public Administration, 78(3), 555–573. Pelton, J., & Singh, I. B. (2015). Digital defense: A cybersecurity primer. New York, NY: Springer. Ramos, C. (2011). Ideas of Europe in National Political Discourse. Bologna: SocietaEditrice Il Mulino. Riponadvance. (2015, August 11). Hatch, Carper introduce Federal Computer Security Act. Retrieved from https://riponadvance.com/stories/510632623-hatch-carper-introducefederal-computer-security-act/ Risen, J. & Lichtblau, E. (2005, December 16). Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/bush-lets-us-spyon-callers-without-courts.html Schaefer, B. (2013). Classification and the NSA: The power of silence. Sociology Lens. Retrieved from http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Silence_Means_Security_-_ NARA_-_515419.tif Schedler, A. (1999). Conceptualizing accountability. In A. Schedler, L. Diamond, & M. Plattner (Eds.), The self-restraining state: Power and accountability in New De contacts (pp. 13–28). London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

128    Emanuel Boussios Scheuerman, W. (2014, May 21). Snowden and the ethics of whistleblowing. Retrieved from http://bostonreview.net/books-ideas/scheuerman-snowden-greenwald-hardingsagar Sennet, R. (1990). The conscience of the eye: The design and social life of cities. New York, NY: W.W. Norton. Stempel, J. (2015, August 24). US court declares FTC has authority to regulate cybersecurity. Retrieved from http://venturebeat.com/2015/08/24/u-s-court-declares-ftc-hasauthority-to-regulate-cybersecurity/ Talanian, N. (2008). The ‘War on Terror’ and the constitution. Retrieved from http://www. constitutioncampaign.org/toolkit/war_on_terror.pdf Toriz Ramos, C. (201*). Trope, R., & Humes, S. (2013). By executive order: Delivery of cyber intelligence imparts cyber responsibilities. IEEE Security & Privacy, 11(2), 63–67. Visvizi, A. (2015). Safety, risk, governance and the Eurozone crisis: Rethinking the conceptual merits of ‘global safety governance. In P. Kłosińska-Dąbrowska (Ed.), Essays on global safety governance: Challenges and solutions (pp. 21–39). Warsaw: Centre for Europe, University of Warsaw, ASPRA-JR. ISBN: 83-89547-24-4 Wu, S. M., Chen, T.-C., Wu, Y. J., & Lytras, M. (2018). Smart cities in Taiwan: A perspective on big data applications. Sustainability, 10, 106. Retrieved from https:// doi.org/10.3390/su10010106 Xu, V. (2015, May 15). Edward Snowden talks ethics of whistleblowing. Retrieved from http://www.stanforddaily.com/2015/05/18/edward-snowden-talks-ethics-ofwhistleblowing/

Chapter 9

Government Surveillance, National Security, and the American Rights: Using Sentiment Analysis to Extract Citizen Opinions Lily Popova Zhuhadar and Mark Ciampa Abstract After the ex-National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden1 disclosures of the National Security Agency surveillance of Americans’ online and phone communications, the Pew Research Center2 administrated a panel survey to collect data concerning Americans’ opinions about privacy and security. This survey has mixed types of qualitative questions (closed and openended). In this context, to our knowledge, until today, no research has been applied on the open-ended part of these data. In this chapter, first the authors present their findings from applying sentiment analysis and topic extraction methods; second, the authors demonstrate their analysis to sentiments polarities; and finally, the authors interpret the semantic relationships between topics and their associated negativity, positivity, and neutral sentiments. Keywords: Privacy; government; surveillance; sentiment analysis; text mining; open-ended responses

Introduction Innovations in information and communications technology (ICT) have been shifting the dynamics of human interaction with societal processes (Visvizi,

1

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Snowden Pew Research Center is a non-partisan fact tank that informs the public about the issues, attitudes, and trends shaping America and the world. It does not take policy positions. It conducts public opinion polling, demographic research, media content analysis, and other empirical social science research: http://www.pewresearch.org. 2

Politics and Technology in the Post-Truth Era, 129–141 Copyright © 2019 Lily Popova Zhuhadar and Mark Ciampa doi:10.1108/978-1-78756-983-620191009

130    Lily Popova Zhuhadar and Mark Ciampa Mazzucelli, & Lytras, 2017). For instance, in 2016, the advancement of ICT has played an omnipresent role in uncovering a massive trove of enormous corrupted networks of over 11.5 million financial and legal records – the Panama Papers (Zhuhadar & Ciampa, 2017). In this chapter, we study the impact of ICT shift on the Americans’ people. More specifically, how the development of communication technologies negatively exposed their privacy. This dramatic change of Americans’ perception of technology triggered by the Edward Snowden revelations of the National Security Agency surveillance of Americans’ online and phone communications. This chapter starts with the literature on the most recent topics pertaining to privacy and security: followed by, examining a case study of sentiment analysis; and finally concludes with some interesting findings.

Literature Review What is Privacy? Privacy is defined as the state or condition of being free from public attention to the degree that you determine. That is, privacy is freedom from attention, observation, or interference, based on your decision. Privacy is the right to be left alone to the level that you choose. Prior to the current age of technology, almost all individuals (with the exception of media celebrities and politicians) were generally able to choose the level of privacy they desired. For those who wanted to have very open and public lives where anyone and everyone knew everything about them, they were able to freely provide that information about themselves to others. Those who wanted to live a very quiet or even unknown life could limit what information was disseminated. In short, both those wanting a public life and those wanting a private life could choose to do so by controlling information about themselves. However, today that is no longer possible. Data are collected on almost all actions and transactions that individuals perform. This includes data collected through web surfing, purchases (online and in stores), user surveys and questionnaires, and through a wide array of other sources. It also is collected on benign activities such as the choice of movies streamed through the internet, the location signals emitted by a cell phone, and even the path of walking as recorded by a surveillance camera. These data are then aggregated by data brokers. One data broker holds an average of 1,500 pieces of information on more than 500 million consumers around the world.3 These brokers then sell the data to interested third parties such as marketers or even governments: Unlike consumer reporting agencies, which are required by federal law to give consumers free copies of their credit reports and allow them to correct errors, data brokers are not required to show consumers information that has been collected about them or provide a means of correcting it. 3

Tucker (2013).

Government Surveillance, National Security, and the American Rights    131 Risks Associated with Private Data The risks associated with the use of private data fall into three categories: ⦁⦁ Individual inconveniences and identity theft. Data that have been collected on

individuals are frequently used to direct ad marketing campaigns toward the person. These campaigns, which include email, direct mail marketing promotions, and telephone calls, generally are considered annoying and unwanted. In addition, personal data may be used as the basis for identity theft, which involves stealing another person’s information (such as Social Security number) and then using the information to impersonate the victim for financial gain. Usually identity theft starts with personal data theft. ⦁⦁ Associations with groups. Another use of personal data is to place what appear to be similar individuals together into groups. One data broker has 70 distinct segments (clusters) within 21 consumer and demographic characteristic groups (life stages). These groups range from Boomer Barons (baby boomer-aged households with high education and income), Hard Changers (well-educated and professionally successful singles), and True Blues (working parents who hold blue-collar jobs with teenage children about to heave home). Once a person is placed in a group, the characteristics of that group are applied, such as whether a person is a potential inheritor, an adult with senior parent, or whether a household has a diabetic focus or senior needs. However, these assumptions may not always be accurate for the individual that has been placed within that group. Individuals might be offered fewer or the wrong types of services based on their association with a group. ⦁⦁ Statistical inferences. Statistic inferences are often made that go beyond groupings. For example, researchers have demonstrated that by examining only four data points of credit card purchases (such as the dates and times of purchases) by 1.1 million people, they were able to correctly identify 90 percent of them.4 In another study, the Likes indicated by Facebook users can statistically reveal their sexual orientation, drug use, and political beliefs. The issues raised regarding how private data is gathered and used are listed in Table 1. The inaccuracy of data is of particular concern. A study of consumer financial data used by consumer reporting agencies found that 20 percent of consumers discovered an error on at least one of their three credit reports that had impacted their credit score. After the information was corrected, over 10 percent of consumers saw their credit score increase, while one in 20 consumers had a score change of over 25 points. And one in 250 consumers who corrected their data had a maximum score change of over 100 points.5 The risks associated with private data have led to concern by individuals regarding how their private data are being used. According to a recent survey, 91% agree or strongly agree that consumers have lost control over how personal 4 5

Hardesty (2015). Dixson and Gellman (2014).

132    Lily Popova Zhuhadar and Mark Ciampa Table 1:  Issues Regarding How Private Data Are Gathered and Used. Issue The data are gathered and kept in secret. The accuracy of the data cannot be verified.

Identity theft can impact the accuracy of data. Unknown factors can impact overall ratings.

Informed consent is usually missing or is misunderstood.

Data are being used for increasingly important decisions.

Explanation Users have no formal rights to find out what private information is being gathered, who gathers it, or how it is being used. Because users do not have the right to correct or control what personal information is gathered, its accuracy may be suspect. In some cases, inaccurate or incomplete data may lead to erroneous decisions made about individuals without any verification. Victims of identity theft will often have information added to their profile that was the result of actions by the identity thieves, and even this vulnerable group has no right to see or correct the information. Ratings are often created from combining thousands of individual factors or data streams, including race, religion, age, gender, household income, zip code, presence of medical conditions, transactional purchase information from retailers, and hundreds more data points about individual consumers. How these different factors impact a person’s overall rating is unknown. Statements in a privacy policy such as “We may share your information for marketing purposes with third parties” is not clearly informed consent to freely allow the use of personal data. Often users are not even asked for permission to gather their information. Private data are being used on an ever-increasing basis to determine eligibility in significant life opportunities, such as jobs, consumer credit, insurance, and identity verification.

information is collected and used by companies; 80% of those who use social networking sites say they are concerned about third parties like advertisers or businesses accessing the data they share on these sites; and 70% of social networking site users say that they are at least somewhat concerned about the government accessing some of the information they share on social networking sites without their knowledge.6

6

Madden (2014).

Government Surveillance, National Security, and the American Rights    133 Encrypting Mobile Devices With previous generation mobile devices, neither Apple iOS nor Google Android provided native encryption, so third-party apps had to be installed to encrypt data. However, later versions of both iOS (iOS Version 8 in 2014) and Android (Android 6.0 Marshmallow in 2015) encrypted all data on their mobile devices (full disk encryption) by default: Beginning with Android 7.0 Google provided an encryption option called file-based encryption, which is considered more secure than full disk encryption. File-based encryption encrypts different files with different keys so that files can be unlocked independently without requiring an entire partition to be decrypted at once. This allows the device to decrypt and use files needed to boot the system and process critical notifications while not decrypting personal apps and data. Although data on a mobile device – local data at-rest – is encrypted so that unauthorized users cannot access it, there are significant loopholes in which mobile device data can be accessed through data in-transmit and remote data at-rest.

Data Transit Mobile devices that transmit information using cellular telephony are subject to the 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) that requires telecommunications (telecom) carriers to build surveillance capabilities into their networks. This allows law enforcement agencies to collect data in-transit – like phone calls and SMS text messages – crossing through their networks in real time. This Act was later expanded in 2006 to cover “web traffic” and internet Voice over IP traffic. In 2015 one of the major US telecoms received 287,980 court orders for user information from all courts (federal, state, and local) covering criminal and civil cases.7 However, a relatively new category of mobile apps delivers what is called over-the-top (OTT) content, or the delivery of audio, video, and similar content over the internet without the telecoms being directly involved (other than their networks are being used for transmission). When OTT apps are used, the telecoms can see that the communications are taking place but cannot see the contents of the communication. Even though the courts can ask the app providers to surrender any data that they may have stored on their servers from users, there is no requirement about how long they must store the data. One popular OTT app does not store users’ messages after they have been delivered so that nothing can be handed over. 7

AT&T Transparency Report. Retrieved from https://images.apple.com/legal/ privacy/transparency/requests-2016-H1-en.pdfhttps://about.att.com/content/dam/csr/ Transparency%20Reports/ATT_Transparency%20Report_Jan%202016.pdf. Accessed on May 19, 2017.

134    Lily Popova Zhuhadar and Mark Ciampa Some governments do not like OTT. In 2016 the Brazilian federal police arrested the vice president of Facebook’s Latin American operations for not complying with police requests to access WhatsApp (an OTT app owned by Facebook) messages that have been linked to drug trafficking and organized crime cases. In late 2015 another Brazilian judge ordered the complete shutdown of WhatsApp across the entire country for 48 hours after Facebook did not comply with another court order, and in another case, Facebook was fined $250,000 for not complying with three other court requests for OTT data.

Remote Data At-Rest Data from mobile devices is routinely backed up to Apple’s iCloud or to a Google server. Despite the fact that data on these servers is encrypted, Apple and Google possess the decryption keys necessary to unlock the data on their servers. Since the data are encrypted on the user’s device and is inaccessible to outside parties, courts routinely serve orders to Apple and Google to provide this same data stored on their servers: In the first six months of 2016 Apple received 2,564 court orders for data stored on its iCloud servers. While some of the court orders only requested providing information about an account holder’s iTunes or iCloud account, such as a name and an address, other court orders demanded Apple to provide customers’ iCloud content, including stored photos, email, iOS device backups, documents, contacts, calendars, and bookmarks.8 Because Apple and Google hold the decryption keys to users’ data stored on their servers, they can provide the decryption keys to unlock the data to authorities. Those users who are concerned about maintaining the highest level of security on their data often turn off backups to iCloud or Google servers.

Research Study After the 2014 Edward Snowden leaks of the National Security Agency surveillance of Americans’ online and phone communications, the Pew Research Center conducted a yearlong panel survey – the Privacy Panel Survey. In 2015, this data collection was made available to researchers. Apparently, this is the most recent available data set about Americans’ opinions regarding privacy and security. This survey consists of mixed types of qualitative questions: closed-response (requiring respondents to select an answer from a set of choices) and openresponse (permitting respondents to answer in their own words). Various 8

“Report on Government Information Requests: January 1–June 30, 2016,” Report on Government Information Requests: January 1–June 30, 2016. https://images.apple.com/ legal/privacy/transparency/requests-2016-H1-en.pdf

Government Surveillance, National Security, and the American Rights    135 research studies examined the closed-response types of answers provided in this data set. To our knowledge, until today, there is no research study on this dataset pertaining to the answers those participants provided in the open-ended response type of questions. The information posted in the open-ended response is in a textual format. In general, this type of textual answers not only presents the participants opinions, but also reveals their sentiments. These sentiments can disclose information about those participants’ opinions and if they were expressed in a positive or negative matter, objectively or subjectively, and ironically or non-ironically. Although some open-response types of questions play prominent roles in survey research, they require the development of complex coding schemes. This type of research study falls under the text mining research domain, which involves topic extraction, text classification, text clustering, and/or sentiment analysis.

Research Methodology Sentiment Analysis On one hand, the Oxford English Dictionary9 defines sentiment analysis as: The process of computationally identifying and categorizing opinions expressed in a piece of text, especially in order to determine whether the writer’s attitude towards a particular topic, product, etc. is positive, negative, or neutral. On the other hand, computer science literature defines it as measuring the confidence level of a machine learning program that is capable of describing the polarity of textual data using text classifications, topic extraction, and text clustering by applying natural language processing (NLP) methods (Simov & Kiryakov, 2015). By conducting sentiment analysis on the textual data (open-ended responses), we were able to determine if they convey positive, negative, or neutral sentiment. Accordingly, the polarity of the different sentences in each response is identified and the relationship between them is evaluated.

Constructing Corpuses The Pew Survey data set has four open-ended response questions. To be able to construct meaningful data sets, we applied some data preparation and preprocessing such as the following: (1) extracting the corpus from each openended response, (2) removing stop words and high frequency words, followed by (3) applying Porter’s stemming algorithm (Lovins, 1968).

9

https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/sentiment_analysis

136    Lily Popova Zhuhadar and Mark Ciampa Modeling and Research Findings After preprocessing the data, the modeling stage took place by (i) using text clustering algorithms to construct the main ontology for each corpus separately (Zhuhadar, 2015; Zhuhadar & Kruk, 2010; Zhuhadar, Kruk, & Daday, 2015; Zhuhadar, Nasraoui, & Wyatt, 2010a, 2010b; Zhuhadar, Nasraoui, Wyatt, & Yang, 2011); (ii) performing sentiment analysis on each corpus; and finally (iii) identifying their polarities (Cambria, Das, Bandyopadhyay, & Feraco, 2017; Soleymani et al., 2017; Yadollahi, Shahraki, & Zaiane, 2017). In the succeeding paragraphs, we present our research findings by first introducing the specific open-ended question, followed by revealing the results obtained from applying sentiment analysis modeling techniques, and finally by interpreting these results. (Q1) Would you give us a few details about how you have changed your internet and cell phone use? Strikingly, 95% of the participants, in this survey, admitted that they have changed their use of Internet and/or cellphone. In addition, they provided some detailed information about the type of changes they made in the open-ended response section. After applying sentiment analysis to these open-ended responses and extracting the ontology of this specific corpus (collections of all text provided in these specific responses), we mapped the relationship between topics sentiment and the general polarity, as shown in Fig. 1.

Fig. 1:  Q1. Topic Sentiment Versus Polarity.

Government Surveillance, National Security, and the American Rights    137 We notice that the top hierarchical concepts (or topics) mentioned in this corpus include 11 topics (censorship, company, encryption, firewall, GPS, internet, mobile phone, online, privacy, security, and social media). It is not surprising that all of these topics are semantically related to the internet and to cell phones. We also observe that among these topics, only two captured positive or negative opinion, security and social media. We conclude that when changes of internet or phone usage were closely related to security, participants’ sentiment were positive (polarity = P). However, when the reasons were precisely related to social media, the sentiment polarity in most of the cases was negative, which obviously relates to their dissatisfaction with making these changes (e.g., deactivating their Facebook account). (Q2) Could you please tell us briefly why you think that people should have the ability to use the internet completely anonymously for certain kinds of online activities? Less than 50% of the participants think people should be able to use the internet anonymously and agreed to express the reasons behind this belief. After mapping the relationship between topics sentiment and the general polarity of Q2, as shown in Fig. 2, we noticed that these responses were included nine topics (big brother, browsing activity, company, constitutional right, family, government, health, personal information, and privacy). The analyzed sentiments extracted from these responses conveyed a wider range of sentiment polarity Q2: Topics Sentiment vs Polarity

P+ big brother

Polarity

P

browsing activity company constitutional right

NEU

family government

N

health personal information

N+ 0%

privacy 20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

% of Topic Sentiment

Fig. 2:  Q2. Topic Sentiment Versus Polarity.

138    Lily Popova Zhuhadar and Mark Ciampa compared to Q1. This range was extended from high negative polarity (N+) to high positive polarity (P+). By examining these topics, we notice that when the participants talked about their constitutional rights, they used positive terms (polarity = P+/P); however, when the focus of their arguments were related to privacy, health, or personal information, their vocabulary showed high negative polarity. By examining the original text associated with these specific high negative responses, we found some sentences were expressed with anger and some inappropriate language. This was especially true when these participants indicated their right to browse the internet privately or to search for information related to some health condition, medical information, and drugs. (Q3) Could you please tell us briefly why you think that people should not have the ability to use the internet completely anonymously? More than 88% of those participants think that people should not be able to use internet completely anonymously and offered their opinion behind this belief. Of note is that these responses were involved the following five topics: human trafficking, illegal activity, national security/terrorist/threat, predator/child pornography, and cyberbullying), as shown in Fig. 3. The analyzed sentiments extracted from these responses conveyed positive sentiments (P) when participants expressed concerns related to national security/terrorist/threat. In these types of arguments, they used positive terms; whereas, when the topic supporting their argument were related to predator/child pornography,

Fig. 3:  Q3. Topic Sentiment Versus Polarity.

Government Surveillance, National Security, and the American Rights    139 illegal activities, human trafficking, or cyberbullying, they used highly negative/ negative terms in their arguments. (Q4) Thinking about the topics related to privacy that were covered in this survey, do you have any additional comments you would like to share? All participants responded to this question. Predominantly, their responses were focused on four topics: drug dealer, government, legislation, and national security. These data are shown in Fig. 4. On one hand, when they discussed privacy in relation to national security, most of the time their sentiments were highly positive; on the other hand, they expressed negative sentiments when they talked about drug dealer, government, and legislation.

Conclusions Various research studies have examined the 2015 Pew Research Center Privacy Panel Survey quantitative data: closed-response (requiring respondents to select an answer from a set of choices). This survey also consisted of qualitative questions: open-response (permitting respondents to answer in their own words). In this study, we examined the textual part of this dataset. By using sentiment analysis and topic extraction approaches, we were able to get a deeper understanding about participants’ sentiment and polarity when they express their concerns about privacy and security. In our opinion, although tremendous improvement has been made in the field of NLP, the current state of sentiment analysis is still far from reaching human-like abilities to detect sentiments with high accuracy. In addition, the current available sentiment analysis applications, such as

Fig. 4:  Q4. Topic Sentiment Versus Polarity.

140    Lily Popova Zhuhadar and Mark Ciampa IBM SPSS Modeler, SAS Text Miner, SAS Contextual Analysis, and MeaningCloud, are all semi-automated. Therefore, the sentiment topics initially generated by such type of applications require a domain expert to manually restructure, reorganize, and rearrange the results, so the extracted topics can be interpreted correctly and their polarities are can be properly understood.

References Cambria, E., Das, D., Bandyopadhyay, S., & Feraco, A. (2017). A practical guide to sentiment analysis (Vol. 5). Berlin: Springer. Dixson, P., & Gellman, R. (April 2, 2014). The scoring of America: How secret consumer scores threaten your privacy and your future. Retrieved from http://www.worldprivacyforum. org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/WPF_Scoring_of_America_April2014_fs.pdf. Accessed on September 12, 2015. Hardesty, L. (2015, January 29). Privacy challenges. MIT News. Retrieved from http:// news.mit.edu/2015/identify-from-credit-card-metadata-0129. Accessed on September 12, 2015. Lovins, J. B. (1968). Development of a stemming algorithm. Mechanical Translation and Computational Linguistics, 11, 22–31. Madden, M. (2014, November 12). Public perceptions of privacy and security in the postSnowden era. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from http://www.pewinternet. org/2014/11/12/public-privacy-perceptions. Accessed on September 12, 2015. Simov, K., & Kiryakov, A. (2015). Accessing linked open data via a common ontology. Paper presented at the Second Workshop on Natural Language Processing and Linked Open Data (NLP&LOD2), Hissar, Bulgaria. Soleymani, M., Garcia, D., Jou, B., Schuller, B., Chang, S.-F., & Pantic, M. (2017). A survey of multimodal sentiment analysis. Image and Vision Computing, 65, 3–14. Tucker, P. (2013). Has big data made anonymity impossible? MIT Technical Review, May 7. Retrieved from http://www.technologyreview.com/news/514351/has-big-data-madeanonymity-impossible. Accessed on September 12, 2015. Visvizi, A., Mazzucelli, C., & Lytras, M. (2017). Irregular migratory flows: Towards an ICTs’ enabled integrated framework for resilient urban systems. Journal of Science and Technology Policy Management, 8(2), 227–242. Yadollahi, A., Shahraki, A. G., & Zaiane, O. R. (2017). Current state of text sentiment analysis from opinion to emotion mining. ACM Computing Surveys, 50(2), 25. Zhuhadar, L. (2015). A synergistic strategy for combining thesaurus-based and corpusbased approaches in building ontology for multilingual search engines. Computers in Human Behavior, 51, 1107–1115. Zhuhadar, L., & Ciampa, M. (2017). Leveraging learning innovations in cognitive computing with massive data sets: Using the offshore Panama papers leak to discover patterns. Computers in Human Behavior. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2017.12.013 Zhuhadar, L., & Kruk, S. R. (2010). Intelligent Social Semantic Collaborative Filtering Tools in an E-learning Contexts. Paper presented at the IC-AI. Retrieved from http://dblp.unitrier.de/db/conf/icai/icai2010.html#ZhuhadarK10 Zhuhadar, L., Kruk, S. R., & Daday, J. (2015). Semantically enriched massive open online courses (MOOCs) platform. Computers in Human Behavior, 51, 578–593.

Government Surveillance, National Security, and the American Rights    141 Zhuhadar, L., Nasraoui, O., & Wyatt. (2010a). Multi-language ontology-based search engine. In Conference: ACHI 2010, the third international conference on advances in computer–human interactions, Saint Maarten, Netherlands, Antilles (pp. 13–18). Zhuhadar, L., Nasraoui, O., & Wyatt, R. (2010b). Semantically enriched recommender engine: A novel collaborative filtering approach using “User-to-User Fast Xor Bit Operation”. Los Alamitos, CA: IEEE Computer Society. Zhuhadar, L., Nasraoui, O., Wyatt, R., & Yang, R. (2011). Visual knowledge representation of conceptual semantic networks. Journal of Social Network Analysis and Mining 1(3), 219–229).

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Chapter 10

Information Security Risks in the Context of Russian Propaganda in the CEE Aleksandra Kuczyńska-Zonik and Agata Tatarenko Abstract The objective of this chapter is to outline the problem of information security in Russia and Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries since 2000. It demonstrates the specifics of Russian propaganda in the CEE, which visibly poses a security threat to those countries. To address this issue, the authors present the evolution of Russian information policy, propaganda, its tools and instruments (traditional and social media), and examine the mechanisms of exerting social influence used in practice in the CEE countries. The authors discuss the implications of Russia’s information war with the West and for the CEE states’ domestic problems, which provide vast opportunities for Russian activity in the region. Changes in information policy and information management are bound to a revision of Russian foreign policy. The authors assumed that the information war in the CEE is not directed toward the countries of this region but rather aims to weaken the West, especially the European Union. Moreover, there is a need to speak out about the rise of populism and extremist movements exploited through Russian media influence to undermine regional stability and weaken state authorities. Additionally, it is suggested more attention should be paid to education and public awareness. The lack of new media literacy skills, together with the combination of populism and pro-Russia business links in the CEE states, will increase their vulnerabilities to more risks than information security. Keywords: Russian propaganda; information war; information security; Central and Eastern Europe; Russia’s Information Security Doctrine; traditional and social media

Politics and Technology in the Post-Truth Era, 143–157 Copyright © 2019 Aleksandra Kuczyńska-Zonik and Agata Tatarenko doi:10.1108/978-1-78756-983-620191010

144    Aleksandra Kuczyńska-Zonik and Agata Tatarenko In 2005, during an interview for German television, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that: those who do not regret the collapse of the Soviet Union have no heart, and those that do regret it have no brain. We do not regret this […]. We understand where we should move. (Putin, 2005) These words expressed the nostalgia for Soviet times as well as Russia’s aspirations to encapsulate the international position of the state, to restore its role as a superpower in world and in the region as the Soviet Union had in the past. Putin repeated versions of this conviction on many other occasions. His words were also cited in Central and Eastern European media (Materski, 2017). This quote from Putin’s speech illustrates something significant about the information space in Russia. The country uses a wide range of informational methods and instruments to strengthen its own position, destabilize the internal and regional environment, weaken EU cohesion and state authorities, influence the general public, confuse CEE citizens, and shift public opinion against the West and Western institutions. Traditional media, as well as social media, are important instruments of Russian internal and foreign policy. Recently, we have witnessed several crucial changes within the Russian information landscape, such as complete political control over traditional media and expansion of political propaganda in social media, both in Russia and abroad. As we will argue in this chapter, the debate over Russian foreign policy has become closely tied to the subject of “information war,” “hybrid threats,” and “information security,” as information has become a key strategic resource and crucial method of influence. The contemporary Russian information space, which will be identified in this chapter, consists of many, often contradictory, elements. However, propaganda is the most characteristic one. The Russian propaganda1 approach is broad and complex, exploiting history, culture, and language. Its methods and techniques include spreading information that benefits Russia but with no clear allegiance to the Kremlin, strong anti-Western and anti-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) narratives, conspiracy theories that combine facts and half-truths, blackand-white thinking, simplification, emotional language, and a lack of (organizational and financial) transparency. The chapter identifies the main problems of information security, indicating specifics of Russian propaganda in the CEE states, including the information space of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Our point of departure is that visible Russian disinformation campaigns pose a security threat

1

The most common definition of propaganda used in political science was proposed by Laswell (1927): “it is the management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols.” Nowadays, the concept is also defined as “the intentional manipulation and shaping of what people think, see and believe in an effort to get the targeted audience to respond in ways that satisfy the interests and goals of the propagandist” (Brunello, 2014).

Information Security Risks    145 to the CEE states. To address this issue, the argument in this chapter is structured as follows. First, the evolution of propaganda and restriction of media freedom in Russia are defined. The second part is dedicated to the specifics of Russian propaganda and the information war in the CEE, intensified with the rapid growth of the digital environment. The discussion then shifts to the risks to state security in the military, political, social, and cyber spheres. Afterward, conclusions and counter-propaganda recommendations for CEEs are presented. This study demonstrates the specifics of Russian propaganda in the CEE countries to pay attention to the implication of Russia’s information war as used toward the West and to the CEE states’ internal problems that provide vast opportunities for Russian activity in the region. Our main argument is that the changes in information policy were bound accordingly to Russian internal and foreign policy, setting up the stage in the post-Cold War era in relations between Russia and the Western world. It is assumed that information warfare in the CEE is not directed toward the countries there but rather aims at weakening the Western world, especially the EU. In specifying Russian propaganda in the CEE, we claim that the basic tools of its influence are enriched by the technological advances of the Digital Era by adjusting disinformation directly to target groups (Hornik, 2016). New technologies give power to access, publish, and disseminate information globally, but at the same time, they represent a new and intensively growing area of concern as states become more vulnerable to cyberattack. Moreover, in the case of the CEE states, there is the need to speak out about the rise of populism and extremist movements exploited by Russian media influence to undermine regional stability and weaken state authorities. Various CEE states’ problems serve as conduits for Russian propaganda. It is suggested more attention should be paid to education and public awareness. Unless the development of news literacy skills is more a priority in the national educational system, the CEE states will be more vulnerable to security risks.

Evolution of the Information War Concept and Propaganda in Russia When taking power in 2000, Vladimir Putin expressed his ambitions very clearly. In the political manifesto “Russia at the Turn of the Millennium” (Putin, 2000), he presented his strategy for the development of the state and for legitimizing its right to the position of a world power due to its “historical potential.” Thus, in the first months after he took control, the focus settled on building political technology. Great importance was given to the sphere of information policy, with the first steps taken to modernize this area already in 2000 (Materski, 2017). On September 9, 2000, President Putin approved the Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2000). This document established that the information environment was of a military nature – information space was considered an equivalent field of military operations to the traditional operational space. The document introduced most of the concepts used nowadays on the grunt of Russian

146    Aleksandra Kuczyńska-Zonik and Agata Tatarenko information issues, emphasizing its military nature, such as “information war,”2 “information weapon,” or “masking of information counteraction.” It also outlined the main external threats to Russian information security, among which the activities of foreign – implicitly Western – structures were named (Darczewska, 2015). The doctrine itself was therefore propaganda. It created an ambience of anxiety, indirectly referring to threats from the Cold War era. In 2010 and 2014, several changes were introduced into the Russian Information Security Doctrine. They aimed at eliminating the threat of some countries to try to “dominate and violate Russia’s interests in the global information space and its alienation from information markets” (Hajduk & Stępniewski, 2015, p. 138). In reality, they served to further and gradually take control of the information space into the power of the state. The role of the All-Russia State Television and Radio Company (established in the 1990s by Boris Yeltsin) grew progressively. At the same time, media institutions appeared in Russia that served exclusively the interests of the state, such as the multilingual television network Russia Today (since 2008, just “RT”). In November 2014, another multilingual media platform, the Sputnik news agency, was launched. Both RT and Sputnik can be perceived as Russian information weaponry and important propaganda tools in Western and CEE countries. They silence unwanted information and “reshape narratives” and “push them in the right direction” (Reichardt, 2016, p. 21). Limitations in Russia did not bypass internet usage. After the wave of protests in 2011–2013, numerous regulations were gradually introduced. The first changes in the law occurred in 2012 and were designed to block websites promoting child pornography, illegal drugs or advocating suicide (Duma, 2012). In 2013, a law on blocking extremist sites was established, which allows the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor), under the instruction of the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation, to immediately block websites that disseminate information during mass riots and other information considered useful to extremists without earlier court decisions (Duma, 2013). These changes resulted in rapid growth of a Russian blacklist, officially called the “Common register of domain names, internet website page locators, and network addresses that allow identifying internet websites which contain information that is prohibited for distribution in the Russian Federation.” Even a quick glance at the list revealed it had websites such as Alexei Navalny’s LiveJournal blog and in 2014, the Ukrainian news site Glavnoe.ua (Common register). The System of Operational-Investigatory Measures has since 1995 required telecommunications operators to install FSB-provided hardware allowing the agency to monitor users’ communications metadata and content (phone calls, e-mail traffic, web activity). Since 2012, it has been applied to social networking sites (Maréchal, 2017).

2

Russian authors understand the term “information war” quite different than Western ones, as “an impact on mass consciousness in the interstate competition of a civilization system in the information space, using special ways of control over information resources, and used as an information weapon” (Darczewska, 2014, p. 12).

Information Security Risks    147 Around 2011, the activity of the Russian authorities on the internet went beyond negative control. Under the influence of events such as the Arab Spring, the authorities in Russia recognized the proactive role of social media and started to use them to disseminate propaganda, plant false information, mobilize government supporters, and shape and promote official narratives. As the Russian newspaper Gazeta3 reported in 2012, the “Kremlin-sponsored youth group Nashi has spent hundreds of thousands of dollars to pay bloggers, journalists, and commenters to post pro-regime messages on websites and social media outlets” (Gunitsky, 2015, p. 45). In 2014, during Maidan in Kyiv, Russia’s information war intensified, effectively with both Russian and Ukrainian traditional and social media favorable to Russia. To protect Russia’s interests in Ukraine, it emphasized, on one hand, that Russians and Ukrainians are one nation, and on the other, demonized revolutionary groups were and planted false information about the methods and goals of the protesters (Shutow, 2015, p. 14). Russian propaganda manipulated commonly known symbols, attributing them to “fascists” to evoke negative associations with the participants of the demonstrations (Darczewska, 2014). It can be assumed that changes introduced to the doctrine in 2014 were related to the Western response to the Russia– Ukraine conflict. The new edition referred to the western theory of non-lethal warfare. The West indirectly was presented as an aggressor in the information war, including the one in Ukraine, against which Russia was only defending itself. Also in 2014, a new law was introduced that limited the share of foreign capital in a media company to 20 percent. Companies that did not comply with this requirement by 2017 were to be closed. These restrictions were intended to protect Russia “from the influence of Western media,” especially those that “led to the events in Ukraine.” In November 2017, Putin signed another law requiring foreign media of various legal forms – “legal entities registered in the territory of a foreign state” and “foreign structures without the form of a legal person” – as “foreign agents” (Kremlin Press, 2017). In practice, this meant that media in Russia has become a channel for government propaganda and have no competition. It is worth adding that this came in response to US actions that required RT America – Russian RT’s US channel – to register under its foreign agents act (Kremlin Press, 2017). Russia’s Information Security Doctrine was replaced with a new document in 2016. It was probably not a coincidence that it was published several days after a European Parliament resolution warned against “anti-EU propaganda from Russia and Islamist terrorist groups” (European Parliament, 2016). The 2000 and 2016 doctrines differ only slightly. Both documents present issues related to information policy as an ideological fight carried out by various methods: explicit and implicit, traditional as sabotage or psychological impact, and using new cybernetic technologies. They are also joined by the assumption that information policy serves to solve political and military tasks. In Russia, information is treated as a very handy weapon – it is cheap, universal, easily accessible, and has unlimited range (Darczewska, 2015).

3

Gazeta.ru.

148    Aleksandra Kuczyńska-Zonik and Agata Tatarenko Legal solutions regarding the information space in Russia are specified by concrete legal regulations, but the 2016 doctrine also had a propaganda character. The document uses the basic tools of Russian propaganda: manipulation, disinformation, and distortion of facts. For example, the new document reverses the roles in the information war between Russia and the West. According to it, the threat first comes from the West, where Russian media are very often discriminated against. Attention is drawn to the growing technological rivalry in the digital space, with a simultaneous lack of cooperation between states to counteract computer crimes, implicitly the fault of the West. The propaganda used by contemporary Russian media is similar to that in the Cold War. Analogous symbols (e.g., “fascists”) and mechanisms (e.g., manipulation of collective memory) are used. This can be seen in the statements included in each of the information doctrines. Each new version indirectly suggested growing tension between the West and Russia. The Russian government and Russian media are presented as victims of Western activities, and their actions as in defense of their own interest. The technological rivalry indicated in the doctrines arouses anxiety through associations with the arms race of the Cold War. This has led to conclusions that Russia’s current information policy is similar to the one from Soviet times. The state’s power over information management is undivided. One of the main differences between the Soviet era and the situation today is the adaptation of propaganda methods to modern information technology. Social media, for example, VKontakte, the Russian versions of Facebook and Twitter, popular blogs, and the activity of social media influencers are powerful instruments for Russian propaganda. They are effective tools in information warfare and can be used for attacks, defense, and to camouflage.

Specifics of Russian Information War and Propaganda in the CEE The documents mentioned above did not directly indicate CEE countries. At the same time, allusions were made to the harmful activities of “certain States” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016), as can be deduced, the Western ones. Each document omitted both internal and external threats as well as the limits of Russia’s interests, leaving the field open to interpretation. However, the changes introduced to the documents and to its new edition were stimulated by an external situation: the Russia–Ukraine conflict and the reaction to it by the Western world, especially the EU and NATO. It can be assumed that the information war in the CEE is not directed specifically at weakening countries in the region but rather at the Western world, especially the EU. The EU has been the primary target of Russia since the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine. The EU was blamed for orchestrating what was said to be a coup d’état in Ukraine after failing to impose an unfavorable Association Agreement (Šuplata & Nič, 2016, p. 5). The second target has been NATO, with Putin openly stating as much in 2007 in his Munich speech.

Information Security Risks    149 Thus, the CEE countries play a secondary role in this information war. Nonetheless, this does not mean that activities related to them are less intensified, in fact, quite the opposite. From the perspective of Russia, these states constitute a convenient area for activities related to the information war, especially propaganda, because of the states’ historical and cultural background, and the current socio-political situation. None of the examined countries display a numerous Russian-speaking audience, thus Russian propaganda in the CEE is facilitated by local pro-Russian media, which portray themselves as constituting “a true and real alternative to mainstream media that fail to provide unbiased political views on current events in the world” (AE News, 2017). Most of them have been active only since 2014. They claim no allegiance to the Kremlin and it is difficult to prove a link between the propaganda outlets and Russia-based entities. They are characterized by subtle promotion of anti-liberal establishment and traditional conservative values rather than openly pro-Russian agendas. They offer an ideological and moral alternative the audience wants to hear. The basic instrument of Russian media influence in CEE countries remains propaganda, referring to the Soviet era type, adapted to contemporary realities and employed with modern technologies such as social media. The internet and social media make it easier to create and share unverified information. Any person who reads posts on Twitter, Facebook or blogs containing pro-Russian comments cannot be sure of the author of the message (Zaliznyak, 2016). Several Russian agents have been working as trolls and controlling bots in CEE cyberspace from Moscow or St. Petersburg. So far, several of these newer Russian propaganda techniques have been identified, including the use of fake interviews, false or unverified facts, and conspiracy theories. But the most significant feature is a simple linear story playing on strong emotions. For example, lots of pictures and videos are used to prove the way of thinking instead of providing fair and honest information. Russian propaganda in the CEE does not follow an overall strategy but rather has adopted a multidimensional approach that uses the particularities of its recipients (Smoleňová & Chrzová, 2017). While CEE countries share many political similarities, such as anti-immigration and EU skepticism, the messages of pro-Russian disinformation differ from country to country, as may the tools and channels for spreading it. In Poland, Slovakia, and Czech Republic, Russian propaganda is present in niche and alternative media. In contrast, Hungarian mainstream media are involved in spreading pro-Russian disinformation, as well. Moreover, in Slovakia and Czech Republic, the openness to Russia is much more significant and Russia’s cultural soft power influence much more effective. In contrast, Russian media play a relatively minor role in Poland. Apart from anti-establishment slogans, such media share anti-American, anti-Ukrainian, and anti-Lithuanian sentiments to inspire division within Polish society. For example, the Facebook fan page “The People’s Republic of Vilnius” exemplifies revisionist moods supported by the Polish minority in Lithuania. It is characteristic of Russian propaganda in Poland to focus mostly on undermining the relations between this country and its neighbors while a similar narrative is lacking in other CEE states. Interestingly, there

150    Aleksandra Kuczyńska-Zonik and Agata Tatarenko are revisionist sentiments among a few extreme far-right movements in Hungary; however, the attempt to inflame society around ethnic issues has not appeared in Russian propaganda in Hungary. Poland represents a distinct case among the CEE states as it expresses a high level of anti-communist and anti-Russian sentiment. Furthermore, Polish society is homogeneous so the scope of Russian propaganda is rather limited. According to the GLOBSEC Policy Institute’s Vulnerability Index (Milo & Klingová, 2017), Poland is the least vulnerable country in the region to subversive Russian influence. Thus, the main aim of Russian propaganda is to strengthen social division as well as to deteriorate bilateral relations between Poland and its neighbors. In contrast, some media content in Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia pass along EU and NATO skepticism and anti-migration messages as well as promote Russia’s business involvement in the countries. The particularities concerning Russian propaganda in each of the CEE states are presented in Table 1. The main principles of Russian propaganda used in the information space in CEE countries (Darczewska, 2014, p. 25) are: ⦁⦁ the principle of mass and long-term action (Poland as Russophobic); ⦁⦁ the principle of desirable information (West as a rival and aggressor); ⦁⦁ the principle of emotional stimulation (bringing the recipients to such a state

that they would act without much thought, indeed irrationally, e.g., migrants as terrorist); ⦁⦁ the principle of intelligibility (simplified message, black-and-white thinking, using keywords, generally understood); and ⦁⦁ the principle of alleged obviousness (invoking the association of propaganda thesis with created political myths, such as immigrant–Muslim–terrorist). These features of Russian propaganda confirm earlier theses about similar ways of exerting social influence in the Soviet era. However, there is not a simple continuity between the Soviet and post-Soviet propaganda in Russia, or in the CEE countries. The main difference between these two periods is the approach to “truth” – during the Soviet times, it was important to provide one concept of “truth” (Pomerantsev & Weiss, 2014, p. 9). Currently, Russian propaganda is multilevel and multinarrative, and these individual narratives are often contradictory. The purpose of this mechanism is to confuse the recipients and make them more susceptible to manipulation.

Risks to CEE State Security It is argued that Russian propaganda narratives relating to NATO and the EU may lead to risks to the military, political, social, or cyber security of their members. In the case of both NATO and the EU, Russia primarily aims to show a lack of internal cohesion, a division between NATO and the EU, to weaken European security and stability. In the case of NATO, Russia casts the United States in the leading role and then points to divisions within the Alliance structure. As leader of the alliance,

Divide EU.

Weaken European security and stability. Discredit national elites and divide EU.

Deterioration of bilateral relations between neighbors. Discrediting of EU policy.

Support for Russia’s alternative world order.

Polarization within the society.

Discredit national elites.

NATO skepticism

Relations with the United States

Relations with neighburs Anti-immigration

War in Ukraine

Anti-establishment

Memory policy

Aims

Euroskepticism in CEE

Narratives

Table 1:  Specifics of Russian Propaganda in CEE.

Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland Poland, Slovakia

States Involved

CEE servility toward the US; blame for deterioration in bilateral relations with Russia. Anti-Ukrainian, sentiments; revisionist Poland movement against Lithuania and Ukraine. Migrants as terrorists. Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia Legitimacy of separatist state in eastern Hungary Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Stirring up political conflicts. Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia Accusation of the illegal demolition of Poland Soviet monuments (Soviet monuments as historical heritage) Hysteric Russophobes. Poland

Anti-NATO protests.

Promotion of “Polexit” and “Hungexit.”

Methods

Information Security Risks    151

152    Aleksandra Kuczyńska-Zonik and Agata Tatarenko the United States is presented in pro-Russia media as an aggressive actor that seeks to dominate Europe. These media accuse the United States of provocative military maneuvers that increase international tension and undermine stability in the region. It is claimed that it is in the US interest to launch a war in Europe because it allows the United States to maintain a dominant position in the world. In this arrangement, Germany is most often presented as a counterweight to the United States (in the context of NATO). The position of the CEE countries is not consistent. Poland – strongly inscribed in the structure of the Alliance due to its location – is presented as a “Russophobe and extremist in their defence and military policies and as bad examples to other CEE countries” (Šuplata & Nič, p. 6). At the same time, Poland, as well as Slovakia, is considered strongly subordinated to the United States. A similar mechanism can also be observed in the case of narratives concerning the EU, with an effective narrative about liberalism and a supposed decline in values. Its aim is to undermine political integrity based on common values. A message of a liberal decadence in the West places Russia in the role of a worldwide protector of conservative values. The situation is aggravated by the existence of several CEE statesmen (except from Poland), known for their ultranationalist, anti-Western, and pro-Russian sentiments, who advocate for strengthening bilateral relations with Russia and promote a positive attitude toward Putin policy. At the same time, Russian propaganda also has managed to identify these calls as a threat, showing a divided EU, which in a longer perspective can lead to Euroskepticism in CEE. It turns attention to populist and extremist tendencies within states. Media outlets spread information about increases in xenophobic, nationalist, and populistic rhetoric in Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, and Slovakia, which undermines EU integrity and puts European unity at risk of collapse. An important topic here is the problem of terrorism combined with Muslim immigrants, who are made to represent all possible manner of threats, including violent crimes (often with a sexual background), as well as loss of jobs or social costs of accepting immigrants. This narrative fits the rhetoric of CEE governments, which officially criticize EU immigration policy and refugee quotas. It is worth noting that this narrative indicates divisions not only within the western and eastern parts of the union but also among the CEE countries, which suggests even these states lack cohesion. The CEE countries have become more vulnerable to Russian media influence because of internal challenges. Among others, there are cases of political corruption, scandals involving politicians, the interconnectedness of political and economic power, and the “oligarchization” of democracy. The CEE seems to be more vulnerable to Russian disinformation than Western European states because of an ineffective educational system and lack of well-developed critical thinking and ability to verify sources of information (Čižik, 2017). Another significant phenomenon is the growing importance of social media as a primary source of information. Social media are powerful instruments for mobilization among young people, many of whom have become accustomed to alternative sources of information and distrust traditional media. Online, they are exposed to controversial and

Information Security Risks    153 populist messages that may encourage them to move in unexpected radical directions (Furedi, 2014). The latest research has revealed an alarming rise of radicalism among young people in Slovakia. The social-economic and education factors no longer apply, as this radicalization affects even economically independent people with higher degrees (Gyárfášová, 2017). This phenomenon poses a greater threat to democracy and may be applied as a tool of Russian propaganda with the main aim to manipulate a person’s mind and change people’s perception and attitudes toward the democratic system (Čižik, 2017). Finally, Russian propaganda exploits Twitter and Facebook to distribute disinformation during election campaigns in the CEE states. Social media trolling in Russian propaganda directly acts to stir conflict and intervene and influence the democratic process in states on a large scale (Way & Casey, 2018). Automated bots and fake profiles, extremely active during election periods, share controversial messages and blame opposition candidates. Moreover, at least one Russian troll factory is said to pay political activists to influence specific candidates during an election. For a few years now, Russia has been accused of meddling in elections in the United States, the Netherlands, France, Germany, and several other countries, although the Russian authorities have repeatedly denied such allegations. Additionally, new technologies extend the spectrum of hostile attacks in cyberspace. An attack on information systems may take many forms, from stealing personal data and ICT logins to systems, to denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. While it is difficult to attribute concrete cyber-related acts to a state or non-state actor (Pawlak, 2015, p. 208), numerous state-sponsored cyberespionage campaigns such as phishing, spear-phishing, and malware have occurred in the Czech Republic, and Russia was accused of being behind the attacks (Jiráček, 2016). Other hostile acts were carried out against the Polish foreign ministry and believed to be inspired by Russia. Cyberattacks inspired by Russia, combined with its impact on democratic institutions in CEE states, represent non-military security risks, aimed to inflame tensions and increase instability and chaos within states and societies. Modern technology also empowers Russia to attack and weaken a state’s capacities and destroy its resources without the wide scope of the traditional armed forces. The examples above remind of the importance of multidimensional security policies in today’s increasingly Digital Era.

Conclusions and Recommendations for CEE States Russia has adopted a multidimensional approach to propaganda in the CEE countries using a variety of tools and methods. It has created sophisticated technology to discredit national elites and undermine democratic institutions in the CEE. It exemplifies what Nimmo (2015) calls Russia’s 4D approach, characterizing Russia’s rhetoric concerning the states of the CEE: dismiss, distort, distract, dismay. First, Russia attempts to deny allegations that it did something illegal or was involved in it. For example, the United States and EU claim that Russia fuels the rebellion in eastern Ukraine with military supplies and troops; Russia constantly denies all the allegations, explaining its presence as only an intervention to protect its compatriots abroad. Second, Russia distorts information to serve and

154    Aleksandra Kuczyńska-Zonik and Agata Tatarenko complement its narratives. Additionally, Russia seeks to turn attention away from its activities by launching criticism elsewhere. It seems an adaptation of Edward Lucas’s whataboutism (2008), which denotes Russia’s broader public diplomacy strategy of trying to counter criticism of its increasingly authoritarian political system by deflecting attention to allegedly undemocratic practices within the EU (Kuczyńska-Zonik, 2016). Eventually, Russia spreads consternation and distress to warn of disastrous consequences of NATO and US policies in Europe. Its effect is to discredit the West and shift the blame for the Ukraine crisis onto the West. While Russian propaganda in the post-Soviet space is much more effective because of the numerous Russian-speaking audience, in the CEE its ability to influence a great number of people is rather limited. To increase its effectiveness, the media message is accompanied by virtual supporters. The message and the medium are mutually reinforcing: “parties, NGOs, media, and Church read the script, and the script makes more sense for being embodied” (Wilson, 2015). There are proven diplomatic, economic, organizational and financial links between the institutions, business, and politicians in Russia and the CEE countries. Russia invests in the Czech and Hungarian nuclear energy or banking sectors, which make the states more vulnerable to Russia’s unpredictable policy in the CEE region. Several far-right and extremist parties, such as the Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz), the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik), and Change (Zmiana) in Poland have been extending pro-Russian and anti-Western narratives that polarize their respective societies (Mesežnikov, Gyárfášová, & Smilov, 2008). While they claim to be defenders of national interests, in fact they act more like defenders of Russian politics. In Slovakia, the various paramilitary organizations seem to be the most significant tools of Russian influence. Moreover, pro-Russian NGOs and GOs have been effectively utilized by Russia’s government for sharing ideology and Russia’s point of view. The core is to promote conservatism, traditionalism, and religious values. It is what Pomerantsev and Weiss (2014, pp. 18–21) call the “weaponization of culture and ideas” as a fluid approach to promote multiple voices and to build a “counter-culture” in the CEE where several various political and social organizations and actors play in favor of Russia’s interests (Krekó, Győri, & Dunajeva, 2016). An open, pluralistic information environment is crucial for the CEE countries, even though it makes them more vulnerable to Russian disinformation. CEE authorities have only recently started to recognize the disinformation operations from Russia and consider them a major threat at the national and international levels. In 2016, the president of Slovakia stated that “we are facing a new wave of political propaganda and an information war, an effective, intensive one, that is managing to manipulate the atmosphere in our societies” (ČTK, 2016). Similarly, in 2017, the Czech government’s state secretary for European affairs confirmed that the information war “is the biggest threat Europe has been facing since the 1930s” (Tasch, 2017). The states have launched several counter-propaganda programs and specialist agendas to prevent the spread of fake news and propaganda in their countries. The Czech Centre against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats tackles asymmetric or hybrid threats, including disinformation campaigns related to internal security. Moreover, the Slovak Foreign Policy Association (SFPA) kicked

Information Security Risks    155 off a project devoted to countering pro-Kremlin disinformation in the CEE, focusing on monitoring online media and searching for common patterns and key subjects undergoing manipulation. Poland as a member of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (StratCom) contributes to finding challenges in the information environment and improving strategic communication between the states. Furthermore, the strategic communication and partnership between CEE governments increased from 2017 with the launch of the joint Visegrad TV project. To reinforce state activities against disinformation and manipulation, several attempts to deal with the problem of propaganda have been taken in the nongovernmental sector, both on national and regional levels. In the fight against propaganda, independent think tanks, NGOs, and civil society activists support national government legal remedies. For example, when the official Press Agency of the Slovak Republic (TASR) signed a contract with Sputnik, civil society and media opposed it and eventually the contract was cancelled (RFE/RL, 2017). Other activities in the non-governmental sector include workshops, roundtables, and meetings devoted to asymmetrical threats from Russia organized by actors operating on information security topics. Several sessions have been arranged to increase cooperation in training and education. Additionally, to counter the information risks, researchers and experts analyze and then identify and expose the Russian propaganda methods and who is behind websites or messages spreading pro-Kremlin disinformation. So far, the CEE states have failed to come up with an effective narrative to counter the Russian propaganda. In our view, the wider social and political environment also needs to be analyzed. It is suggested to pay more attention to education and public awareness, because the present-day education is still based more on memorizing facts than on the ability to think critically and in context. A strategic approach should include not just the skills but the inclination to detect and discard disinformation (Hornik, 2016). Moreover, it is argued that more regular workshops, meetings, and conferences be organized for journalists, civil servants, and teachers to acquaint them with the variety of propaganda methods and tactics. The lack of critical thinking, together with a combination of socio-political populism and pro-Russia business links in the CEE states, increases their vulnerabilities to risks in more areas than just information security.

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Chapter 11

The ICT and Its Uses: Fighting Corruption and Promoting Participatory Democracy – The Case of Romania Cristina Matiuta Abstract The Internet and digital technologies have become part of our life, essential for a lot of daily activities and new powerful means of communication as well, able to invigorate the traditional forms of interaction between citizens and public institutions. The chapter examines their spread across the European Union, and particularly in Romania, and their potential to promote transparency and accountability within the public institutions, to fight against corruption and to expand citizens’ social mobilization. Even if Romania has much to do to provide quality online public services, to increase the efficiency in public administration, and to improve the communication between citizens and institutions, the examples and best practices mentioned in the chapter highlight the potential of ICT both as anticorruption and participatory tools. Keywords: Information and communication technologies; online communication; digital inclusion; institutional transparency; anticorruption tools; participatory tools

The Spread of Digitization Across the European Union The information and communication technologies (ICT) transformed our world in a “global village.” The Internet and digital technologies (e.g., portable devices, like smartphones or tablet computers) became so ingrained in our day-to-day life

Politics and Technology in the Post-Truth Era, 159–169 Copyright © 2019 Cristina Matiuta doi:10.1108/978-1-78756-983-620191011

160    Cristina Matiuta that it is seen as natural. They became part of our work, leisure and social life, essential for a lot of our daily activities, from shopping online and reservation of plane tickets, to enrollment in the school and payment of taxes. More than that, with the development of Web 2.0, which is based on a dynamic paradigm that allows users not just to receive information, but also easily to interact, the possibilities for individuals to communicate and to share every kind of content and data have spectacularly increased (Orofino, 2015). Interaction has become a “two way process” which, if we refer to the political field, could be more able to influence political agenda and the behavior of both political representatives and citizens. Recognizing its significant role, the United Nations Report from 2011 stresses the access to Internet as one of the fundamental rights of human beings. Disconnecting people from the Internet constitutes a human rights violation. The Internet is revolutionary, said the Report, unlike other communication medium such as radio, television, or printed publications, which are based on “the oneway transmission of information,” the Internet is an “interactive medium,” which makes people “no longer passive recipients, but also active publishers of information.” Thus, the Internet can be a tool of empowerment, one of the most powerful instruments of the 21st Century for increasing transparency in the conduct of the powerful, access to information and for facilitating active citizen participation in building democratic societies. (UN, 2011, p. 4) At the European Union’s (EU’s) level, promoting the development and dissemination of the new ICT is a priority, given their potential to foster economic growth, innovation and progress. As one of the flagship initiatives of the Europe 2020 Strategy, the Digital Agenda for Europe seeks to optimize the benefits of digital technologies. In order to have a dimension of their spreading across the EU, the European Commission publishes every year the digital scoreboard measuring the performance of the EU as a whole and of each Member State in the areas of digitization. Table 1 shows the percentages of digital inclusion, digitalization of single market and public services in all EU’s countries in 2014, and the progress made on each of these indicators by 2017, using data from Digital Agenda for Europe, 2014 (European Commission, 2014), and the EU’s Digital Progress Report, published by the European Commission (2017a). We find that basic broadband is available to all in the EU and that 79% of European citizens regularly use the Internet (this means go online weekly, whereas 71% do so every day), while 14% of them have never used it (a 6% drop from 2014). People living with disabilities are still facing difficulties in enjoying the benefits of the new electronic services (63% of them regularly use the Internet, at the EU’s average). As concerns the digital single market (understood as one in which free movements of goods, services and capital is ensured and which is meant to tearing down regulatory walls and recovering from 28 national markets to a single one), data show that 66% of Europeans are buying online, a significant increase compared with 2014, but the cross-border e-commerce, although

The ICT and Its Uses    161 Table 1:  Digital Single Market, Inclusion, and Public Services. EU Average (2014)

EU’s Digital Progress Report (2017)

Broadband Basic broadband coverage for all

100%

100% (2016)

47% 12% 14%

66% (2016) 21% (2016) 17% (2016)

72% 57%

79% (2016) 63% (2016)

20%

14% (2016)

42%

52% (2016)

21%

34% (2016)

Digital single market Population buying online Cross-border e-commerce Small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) selling online Digital inclusion Regular Internet use Regular Internet use by disadvantaged people Population never having used the Internet Public services Citizens interacting online with public authorities Citizens returning filled-in forms to public authorities electronically Source: Data from European Commission (2014, 2017).

almost doubled, remains insufficiently developed (21%). Withal, ICT are about to become the heart of the government processes and are widely used in interaction between citizens and public authorities: more than half of Europeans (52%) have interacted online with public authorities in 2016. A deeper analysis into the EU’s evolution toward a digital society highlights disparities between the Member States regarding digital developments. The Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) for 2017 tracks the evolution of the EU Member States in digital performance, calculated as weighted average of five main indicators: (a) connectivity (meaning access to fast broadband-enabled services and their quality); (b) human capital (the skills needed to take advantage of the possibilities offered by a digital society, from basic user skills to advanced skills of workforce that enhance productivity and economic growth); (c) use of internet (refers to the variety of activities performed online, from consumption of videos, music, games to communication on social networks or online shopping and banking); (d) integration of digital technologies (measures the digitization of

162    Cristina Matiuta business and their exploitation on the online sales channels); and (e) digital public services (measures the digitization of public services and focuses in particular on e-government and e-health, in order to deliver better services for citizens). We can find out from this composite index (DESI, 2017) that digital developments are uneven across the EU and Romania ranks last, with an overall score of 0.33, less than half the score of the best performing country (Denmark – 0.71) and far below EU average (0.52). Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands are the highest performing countries, not only ahead in the EU, but also as world leaders in digital. In accordance to the index, Romania has the lowest percentage of regular Internet users in the EU (56%) and 28% of Romanians have never used the Internet (the EU average is 14%). Romanian Internet users are keen to engage in reading news online (63% of them), in communication via voice or video calls (45%) or through social networks (74%), but they are very reluctant to engage in any type of online transaction: only 8% of them use the online banking and 18% shop online, the lowest of all EU countries. Very few small and medium-sized enterprises in Romania sell online (7%) and those who do sell online make a very small share of their turnover from those sale (4.3%). At the same time, Romania’s offer for online public services is the least sophisticated in the EU: only 6% of the internet users have interacted with public authorities over the internet in 2016, sending filled forms or completing the documents available online. This kind of services needs to be improved, being that modern public services offered online in an efficient manner are a vehicle for reduction of public administration expenditure and for gaining in efficiency for both administration and citizens. We can see that Romania needs to do more progress on these chapters and, as the chapter seeks to emphasize further, ICT are useful tools in reducing corruption, by increasing transparency of public institutions activities, as well as in stimulating the involvement of citizens in community, in order to influence decisions that affect their lives.

ICT as Anticorruption Tools The citizens’ access to public information and the transparency in the public institutions’ activity, especially in the way the public resources are spent, are essential to open administration toward citizens, to make it more accountable and responsive to the needs of society, and to fight corruption. The most common definition of corruption (World Bank, Transparency International) is the misuse or the abuse of public office for private interests, resulting in a biased allocation of public resources. To control corruption means to have the capacity, as a society, to restrict authorities from distributing public goods and resources in their own interests, in other words, to have the capacity to constrain corrupt behavior in order to enforce the norm of individual integrity in public service and politics and to uphold a state which is free from the capture of particular interests and thus able to promote social welfare. (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2013, p. 5)

The ICT and Its Uses    163 The transparency in the activity of public officials, civil servants, board members, managers is thus the surest way of guarding against corruption and to increase the trust of citizens in public institutions. Unfortunately, enacting legislation meant to make more transparent the activity of public institution and to bring the decision-making process closer to citizens took more than a decade after the fall of communist regime in Romania and a culture of transparency is even more difficult to create. The first and most important laws that created the framework to fortify the control of civil society over the activity of public institutions were the Law of free access to information of public interest, adopted in 2001 and the Law reagarding the decisional transparency in public administration, adopted in 2003, both of them considered at that time as great victories of the civil society organizations in relationship with public authorities. These laws regulate the possibility and the limits of citizens’ involvement in in the activity of public administration institutions, making practically impossible to ignore them and increase the transparency of these institutions that compel them to publish information relating to or resulting from their activities. But their existence does not automatically bring with them a culture of participation and transparency. Many researches (Bucheru, 2014; Matiuţa et al., 2008) indicate citizens’ apathy, distrust, lack of interest, and ignorance of leverages by which they can influence decision making and access to information concerning the activity of public institutions. Often, even if they know their rights, they invoke the lack of time, the lack of skills to use these rights and especially the futility of a such approach. Many citizens believe that important decisions can not be influenced without knowing someone “within the system” that informal contacts are preferable to have success in an issue or to make your rights respected. On the other side, the representatives of public authorities consider that they respect the legal framework which allows citizens’ involvement, but their recommendations often lack of consistency and cannot be included in draft legislation and, frequently, citizens’ participation is not active, but reactive, as a post-factum reactions to authorities’ decisions. The reuslts of such research are confirmed by survey data, which show the acceptance by the general public to give money, or a gift or do a favor in return for something obtained from the public administration or public services. Pursuant to the Special Eurobarometer 470, published in December 2017, over two-thirds of European citizens (68%) think that corruption is widespread in their own country (80% of Romanian citizens believe that) and almost as many (66%) agree that bribery and the use of connections is the easiest way in obtaining some public services in their country. Almost a quarter of Europeans (23%) think that it is acceptable to do a favor in return for something that they want from the public administration or public services or to do a gift in return for something that they want (21%), while more than half of them believe that bribery and the abuse of positions of power for personal gain is widespread among political parties (56%) and politicians at national, regional, or local level (53%). Across the areas of public services, corruption is perceived to be more widespread among officials awarding public tenders (43%), those issuing building permits (42%), police/customs and healthcare system (each with 31%), tax authorities (25%), tribunals (23%), public

164    Cristina Matiuta prosecution service (21%), and social security and welfare authorities (19%). There are clear differences between new and old EU Member States (NMS 13 vs. EU 15) regarding both attitudes and levels of exposure to corruption: respondents in the NMS 13 countries are more likely to say that someone had asked or expected them to pay a bribe for their services (15% vs. 5%; and 18% in Romania) and to agree that corruption is part of their business culture. A divide could be also remarqued between the northern part of the continent, where the percentage of respondents that think corruption is widespread remains low and the Southern and SouthEastern Europe, where corruption is a problem directly experienced by a significant minority of those living in these countries. Not the least, there is a clear split in socio-demographic terms: those with lower levels of education, the unemployed and the economically more vulnerable are both likely to see themselves as having recently been victims of corruption and to see it as a more widespread phenomenon in general (European Commission, 2017b). In this context, the ICT have great potential to promote transparency, accountability and anti-corruption goals, to reduce bureaucracy and the costs for accessing and sharing government information, to strenghten relationships between citizens and institutions, and to expand their social mobilization (Bertot et al., 2010). The more the public information and services are available online, the more citizens are encouraged to participate and the more corruption and clientelism decrease. An analysis made by a Romanian think-tank in 2015 ascertains an obvious relationship between availability of online public services and control of corruption in the EU’s countries, indicating a strong correlation between low availability of online public services for citizens and low control of corruption (Romanian Academic Society, 2015a). According to it, Romania and Bulgaria, the most corrupted countries in the EU, are the less developed regarding transparency (from fiscal transparency, to transparency of assets for public officials and transparency of decision making) and online delivery of key public services (such as income taxes, job search services, social security benefits, personal documents, registration of a new company, health-related services, enrollment in higher education, car registration, application for building permits, social contribution for employees, announcement of moving, etc.). At the opposite site, the Nordic countries have both a very high level of corruption control and a high advancement in e-government. One of the main ways by which ICT could be useful tools for reducing corruption is the online availability of government’s revenues and expenditure, of state budget allocations and government contracts. Unfortunately, Romania has a rich experience of wasting public money, even when one cannot reproach the authorities for the lack of transparency or lack of access to information. An illustrative example in this regard is the management of public funds for infrastructure. A project developed by the same think tank (Romanian Academic Society, 2015b) about the public procurement in the construction sector reveals that, although large amounts of public funds were spent, public contracts were often awarded to companies based on corrupted practices or political connections, the focus being on redistributing public money and not achieving high-quality construction works. To prevent such practices, necessary improvements should be made to

The ICT and Its Uses    165 the electronic public procurement system, in order to have a functioning unitary database and more verification and selection filters. In other words, new online tools have the potential to reduce corrupt practices and to make more transparent the whole process of the budgetary allocation. We should notice that an encouraging step in this regard is an online platform, launched in 2016, called budgetary transparency (transparenta-bugetara. gov.ro), meant to bring more transparency in public administration and in the way the public money are spent. It seeks to improve the management of budgetary resources by introducing verification tools and budgetary control automatically. The platform provides information, in an aggregated manner, on how public funds are distributed on different budget lines, on how they are spent and which are the results. All public entities across the country (approximately 13,700), both at central and local levels of administration, must upload information regarding their revenues and expenses that can be accessed by any interested person. Any citizen can find out how funds are distributed and spent by a company in which the state is a shareholder, from enterprises to research institutes. As the government officials declared at its launch, the platform is expected to remove the risks of fraud or corruption and to track the implementation of public policies that require budgetary outlays (AGERPRES, 2016). Another avenue for transparency, anti-corruption, openness, and collaboration offered by ICT is the use of social networking sites (e.g., Facebook) and platforms in interaction between public institutions and citizens. Social media gives users a platform to speak; it is collaborative and participatory by its nature. Social networks like Facebook began to be used by public institutions in Romania. Sometimes, communication through these networks replaces the classic institutional dialogue, the president, and the prime minister choosing to communicate through their Official Fan Pages accounts instead of communication through the press departments of presidential administration and government. But overall, the use of social media by public institutions in Romania is in an early stage. A pilot study analyzing the communication through Facebook of county councils in Romania emphasizes that most county councils do not have an official account on this social network or, if they have, it is no longer active (no posts in the last six months). Those who have such account (the study stops on Cluj and Dolj county councils) send messages not adapted to this type of interaction. Communication paradigm remains overwhelmingly unidirectional: comments, even when present, are not part of a real dialogue and those responsible for content do not enter into conversation with commenters (Urs, 2015, p. 131). Therefore, the new technologies are not enough integrated as part of institutional communication and their potential for a real dialogue between public institutions and citizens remains to be proved, by establishing rules and procedures on how communication through these channels should be conducted. In the same purposes, of making government more open, accountable and responsive to citizens and involving them in decision-making process, other applications of social media have been developed both by government and non-­ governmental organizations. We stopped at four of them, whose analysis led us to consider them examples of good practice.

166    Cristina Matiuta

Several Best Practices in Using ICT as Participatory Tools in Romania Domnule Primar/Dear Mr. Mayor (domnuleprimar.ro) is an interactive platform meant to ensure an efficient communication system between mayors and citizens. Through the website, citizens have the possibility to communicate directly to the mayor of their place of residence their personal or community interest problems, filling out an online form explaining concisely the complaint/notification. The mayor will have to respond within maximum 30 days, according to Law 544/2001 regarding the free access to information of public interest. Both notification and mayor’s response are published on the website in order to ensure transparency and fast communication between citizens and mayors. The platform includes more than 88,000 complaints coming in the last years from citizens living in more than 250 towns across the country, a top of the complaints by counties, by region, as well as a top of the most active mayors in this kind of interaction with citizens. It has a valuable dimension also by familiarizing citizens with legislation on their rights and civic responsibilities, by publishing various analyses and studies on economic, social, administration, health, or educational issues, as well as daily news from Romania’s counties. Piata de spaga/The bribery market (piatadespaga.ro) is another interactive platform, developed by EPAS Association and Funky Citizens, NGOs whose assumed mission is to inspire and to educate citizens to act responsibly in the public space. The platform is an information tool that monitors the “right price” on market bribes, based on reports made by citizens across the country (whose privacy is ensured) regarding the bribe paid to certain public services, the amount, and who asked for it. The project speaks about the experience of people who have paid (or not), where, when, for what or how much was paid the most, how much was paid the least, and how satisfied were those who paid before you, convinced that the more we use this information tool, the more we have the chance to reduce prices bribes. We can find out there are places where problems are solved without bribe and we must be aware that corruption affects each of us primarily because we participate, we do not reject, we accept. Or that is the purpose of this platform, to educate us to reject, to denounce this scourge that affects our society. Prioritatile orasului tau/Priorities of your city (prioritatileorasuluitau.ro) is an online platform, conceived as a bridge between local authorities and citizens, based on concept of participatory budgeting. The platform aims to involve citizens in defining the development priorities for their community. It can be used both by local authorities in the public consultation process of local development strategies, as well as by the members of civil society. The platform does not intend to replace the decisions of local authorities, but to contribute in taking better and more informed decisions. The main objective is to facilitate a process of identifying a list of priority projects in the long list included in the local development strategy. The easiest and the most effective tool for prioritizing a list of projects is a clear operational budget for a clear implementation period. Therefore, the first step in this exercise of prioritization is the analysis of the local development strategy approved by the local council. A second step involves the identification, from

The ICT and Its Uses    167 the development strategy approved by the local council, of a package of priority projects/programs of which values is less or equal to the operational budget. A first proposal of the priority programs/projects will be made by those who assume the use of this platform in their communities, either local authorities or civil society representatives. This proposal will be available to the public, to collect opinions and suggestions. Those who access the package of priority projects for their city have more options available: they can agree with the first proposal; they can agree with a proposal made by another person; they can make budget reallocations from a project/program to another; they can add other project proposals in the same intervention area. Each option registered in the system will be stored in a database and the result of this process will be made available to local authorities to be taken into account in establishing the list of priority programs/projects. And once the list has been established, the users of the platform can monitor the implementation of the programs/projects. For now, this online tool is available for five Romanian cities (Cluj-Napoca, Bucuresti, Ploiesti, Alba Iulia, and Pitesti), in which citizens can contribute also in this way to influence the future of their community. Cine ce a promis/Who promised what (cineceapromis.ro) is an online platform built and supported by two NGOs, Ratiu Center for Democracy and Resource Center for Public Participation, that seeks to monitor the promises made during the electoral campaign and the extent to which they are, or can be, fulfilled. The platform centralizes the promises during the electoral campaign and the extent they are implemented after the candidates take the office. Users can create an account to receive news and updates and to add relevant information about the elected representatives. They can actively contribute by adding content related to the candidates’ promises and their achievements. The president, the Romanian representatives in the European Parliament, deputies, senators, and the presidents of the county councils are all monitored in an attempt to hold accountable elected servants, given that during the electoral campaign hundreds of promises are made, most of them unrealistic, exaggerated, or disconnected from the community.

Conclusions Such collaborative platforms are useful exercises to increase transparency, to control corruption, and to fill the gap between citizens and institutions. From our point of view, ICT have the potential to refresh the traditional forms of participation and interaction between citizens and their elected representatives and to fight against the lack of civic and political participation, which is undoubtedly one of the most relevant problems even in consolidated democracies. More than that, in countries undergoing democratization or experiencing different degrees of authoritarianism, the internet has the potential to create a new public sphere and to support the democratization process. As Claudia Toriz Ramos points out in this volume, with reference to the four African countries, ICT have introduced “a major change in communication and information processes that defies conventional censorship,” mobilizing citizens’ participation by following “patterns that escape the full control of the states, despite the many attempts to limit it” (Toriz Ramos, p. 2).

168    Cristina Matiuta This potential depends, of course, on ICT infrastructure and literacy. As shown by data used in this article, Romania ranks last in the EU in 2017 in terms of digital inclusion and literacy, digitization of business and public services, so that it should make steps forward to cutting red tape and transparent administration and to better exploit the benefits of new technologies. Efforts should be on all sides. Institutional firstly, by improving citizens’ access to online services more diversified and sophisticated, by encouraging participatory processes and dialogue with civil society and citizens, and not the least by embracing ICT-enabled transparency measures. There is a need for better integration of online communication in the public administration, by training officials assigned to this type of interaction with the public, by setting clear rules, procedures, and contents approved for online communication. Strengthening the administrative capacity of the state, including through a coherent legal framework (frequent change of legislation or the over-regulation are examples of bad practices) and transparent and fair use of information systems, together with the firm punishment of those guilty of law infringement could diminish the scourge of corruption. We should not forget that e-Government works well only in honesty, accountability, and competence of the public administration (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015). And because the anti-corruption efforts are most often a matter of collective action, they must also seek to develop the capacity of citizens to sanction corrupt practices. Citizens have the responsibility to not accept corrupt practices and to use the levers that allow them to get involved in decision making. By changing attitudes of acceptance of corruption, they can ultimately protect themselves from the corruption. Both school and civic organizations should play a more active role in learning civic attitudes and skills, in mobilizing people around issues of civic interest, incorporating new technologies in this process. Only through joint efforts and through a real partnership between public authorities, school, and civil society, we can talk about democratic governance.

References AGERPRES. (2016). ‘Ciolos: Contribuabilii pot vedea prin programul Transparenta bugetara cum cheltuie administratiile banul public’ [Online]. Retrieved from http://www. agerpres.ro/economie/2016/03/11/ciolos-contribuabilii-pot-vedea-prin-­programultransparenta-bugetara-cum-cheltuie-administratiile-banul-public-11-26-08. Accessed on February 11, 2018. Bertot, J. C., Jaeger, P. T., & Grimes, J. M. (2010). Using ICTs to create a culture of transparency: E-government and social-media as openness and anti-corruption tools for societies. Government Information Quarterly, 27, 264–271. Bucheru, A. (2014). Administraţia publică mai aproape de cetăţeni prin social media. Raport de cercetare [Public administration closer to citizens through social media. Research report.] [Online]. Retrieved from http://www.anfp.gov.ro/R/Doc/2015/Proiecte/Social%20 media/Raport%20cercetare%20social%20media.pdf. Accessed on January 14, 2018. European Commission. (2014). Digital Agenda for Europe: Rebooting Europe’s Economy. Directorate-General for Communication. [Online]. Retrieved from https://europa.eu/ european-union/topics/digital-economy-society_en. Accessed on February 17, 2018.

The ICT and Its Uses    169 European Commission. (2017a). Commission Staff Working Document, Europe’s Digital Progress Report. [Online]. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/ en/news/europes-digital-progress-report-2017. Accessed on February 18, 2018. European Commission. (2017b). Special Eurobarometer 470: Corruption. [Online]. Retrieved from http://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/S2176_88_2_470_ ENG. Accessed on February 20, 2018 Matiuţa, C., Tătar, M., Brihan, A., Apăteanu, D., Ritli, L., & Haragoş, O. (2008). Cetăţenie activă şi dezvoltare democratică în Nord-Vestul României. Rezultate de cercetare şi recomandări de politici [Active citizenship and democratic development in the NorthWest of Romania. Research results and policy recommendations.] Oradea: Editura Universităţii din Oradea (University of Oradea Publishing House). Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2013). The good, the bad and the ugly: Controlling corruption in the European Union. ERCAS Working Paper No. 35, [Online]. Retrieved from http://www.againstcorruption.eu/publications/the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-­ controlling-corruption-in-the-european-union/. Accessed on December 28, 2017. Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2015). The quest for good governance: How societies develop control of corruption. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Orofino, M. (2015). The Web 2.0 and its impact on relations between citizens and political representatives. In C. Matiuţa (Ed.), Democratic governance and active citizenship in the European Union (pp. 81–100). Saarbrucken: Lambert Academic Publishing. Romanian Academic Society. (2015a). Raport Anual de Analiză şi Prognoză – România 2015. 12 Recomandări de Bună Guvernare [Annual report on analysis and prognosis – Romania 2015. 12 good governance recommendations.] [Online]. Retrieved from http://www.romaniacurata.ro/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/RAPORT-SAR-2015_ FINAL.pdf. Accessed on January 14, 2018. Romanian Academic Society. (2015b). Romanian public procurement in the construction sector. Corruption risks and particularistic links. [Online]. Retrieved from http://www. againstcorruption.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/D8.1.5-Romania.pdf. Accessed on February 20, 2018. The Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI). (2017). [Online]. Retrieved from https:// ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/digital-economy-and-society-indexdesi-2017. Accessed on January 25, 2018. United Nations (UN). (2011). Report of the special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression [Online]. Retrieved from http:// www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf. Accessed on February 25, 2018. Urs, N. (2015). The use of social media in Romanian public sector institutions. A pilotstudy. Revista Transilvană de Ştiinţe Administrative [Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences], 1(36), 124–132.

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Chapter 12

Virtual Currencies in Modern Societies: Challenges and Opportunities Higinio Mora, Francisco A. Pujol López, Julio César Mendoza Tello and Mario R. Morales Abstract Virtual currency is a digital representation of value that is neither issued by a central bank or a public authority. Its reliability is based on advanced cryptographic methods which provide privacy and confidence to citizens. Virtual currency and its underlying technologies such as blockchain or smart contracts trigger transformation in many areas of the society’s functioning. The way in which social relations occur and economic transactions are managed are changing forever. As a result, cryptocurrencies constitute a good example of how specific technology may lead to substantial transformation of the world. Still, virtual currencies could benefit from the versatility of collaborative communication of social media and Internet to promote and develop new commerce and business initiatives as well as new forms of financial flow managements. The objective of this chapter is to examine the role played by virtual currencies in modern societies in order to describe potential uses and applications and their impact on politics and social behavior. As a result, recommendations are inferred to address the challenges and opportunities of these new technologies. Keywords: Information and communication technology; virtual currencies; Bitcoin; social media; eGovernment; social behavior analysis

1. Introduction Virtual currency is a digital representation of money that it is not issued by a central bank and whose value is not supported by a government entity. In this way,

Politics and Technology in the Post-Truth Era, 171–185 Copyright © 2019 Higinio Mora, Francisco A. Pujol López, Julio César Mendoza Tello and Mario R. Morales doi:10.1108/978-1-78756-983-620191012

172    Higinio Mora et al. virtual currency creates an unregulated monetary system based on trust among users (European Central Bank, 2015). The first and most popular virtual currency is Bitcoin (Nakamoto, 2008). This shown the potential of this new concept and gave the technological fundamentals for other virtual currencies that have come since (Egorova & Torzhevskiy, 2016). Virtual currencies have had a huge growth in recent years. Nowadays it is estimated that there are over 800 active virtual coins around the world (https://coinmarketcap.com/). The importance of a virtual currency is reflected in its impact on society and economy. It can be estimated based on different criteria (Ong, Teik Ming, Guo, & David, 2015): (1) Community support: It is a broad approach to the popularity of the currency in the society. It can be measured through activity in internet and social networks like Twitter, Facebook, etc. (2) Developer activity: Most of the virtual currencies are open-source and hosted publicly. It is the measurement of developing activity around the virtual currency and its future growth. (3) Trading volume: It measures the liquidity of the currency. (4) Market capitalization: Usually defined as price multiplied by available coin supply. Taking into account these variables, the current podium of virtual currencies is composed of Bitcoin, Ethereum, and EOS (https://www.coingecko.com/). But, what is the role that virtual currencies have come to play in modern societies? without doubt, this revolutionary technology is making a growing gap in the economic world and seems to have the potential to put traditional monetary systems in check. Traditionally, money, and currency transactions are covered by monetary authorities, governments, and financial institutions. However, the new possibilities that virtual currencies have could revolutionize the way in which it works today. Public administrations and politicians must know the possibilities and real potential of this innovation with disruptive effects in society to take advantage of its advantages and overcome the drawbacks. With this objective, this chapter reviews the important issues regarding the impact of virtual currencies in modern societies.

2. How Virtual Currency Works The combination of new developments in information and communication technology (ICT) has made it possible to create the virtual currencies concept. Among the enabling technologies that facilitate this new monetary system are communication technologies, cloud computing, mobile computing, and high-performance computing to process the cryptography methods. In fact, transactions made with virtual currencies are based on the reliability of cryptographic methods provided by network of participants (Mukhopadhyay et al., 2016). In this way, virtual currencies build trust between unknown entities, without the backing of governments or banking entities. In such a way, virtual currencies are also named cryptocurrencies. The elements that make up a virtual currency system are the following (Nakamoto, 2008): (1) a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network, (2) the blockchain, (3) the transaction method, and (4) the currency issuance method.

Virtual Currencies in Modern Societies    173 (1) The P2P network is composed of geographic distributed nodes to perform the operation of the system (Donet, Perez-Sola, & Herrera-Joancomart, 2014). It is used to propagate information such as transactions or blockchain updates. Each node collects transactions in a block that is associated with a difficult mathematical problem. Solving that problem is called mining, and nodes that mine coins are called miners (Shi, 2016). For example, currently there are 9,468 nodes for Bitcoin currency around the world (https://bitnodes.earn.com/). (2) Blockchain is a technology designed to record electronic transactions in a distributed and immutable way. This database is a shared public ledger that stores all transactional history that cannot be changed and can be verified by the entire community instead of using a centralized authority (Efanov & Roschin, 2018). (3) For making transactions and spending the money, the participants on this system need a cryptographic key based on asymmetric cryptography methods. This key is stored in a digital wallet. It holds the cryptographic keys that allow participants to access their Bitcoin address. In fact, it seems to be used to own and

Fig. 1:  How Virtual Currency Works.

174    Higinio Mora et al. store the money (Chen, Jiang, & Wang, 2017). These digital wallets can be stored on a computer, a mobile device or on a physical memory card. (4) The currency issuance method is usually based on the validation process of the transactions. That is, miners compete to calculate valid hashes and are rewarded with new virtual money (Valfells & Egilsson, 2016). However, Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies have a limited supply of money. It makes currencies more predictable than standard money and prevents any interference from central banks. In such a way, it works like other natural assets such as gold. The process to make a transaction with virtual currencies is shown in Fig. 1. In this scheme, there are depicted the tasks performed by users and by the nodes of the underlying P2P network. As shown, blockchain is the key technology for registering the currency transactions. It is distributed along the nodes of the P2P network and consequently, the information is available for all participants without the need of a central institution. In addition, since all nodes of the network have the same copy of the blockchain, all changes and transactions are irreversible (Peck, 2017). Management of cryptographic keys is another issue for this virtual currency system. There are two main scenarios to implement it: (1) autonomous key control and (2) shared key control. (1) The user holds his/her own cryptographic keys stored in a digital wallet and need a direct connection with the P2P network to carry out monetary transactions according to Fig. 1 scheme. In this case, the user has access to the whole blockchain that can be checked locally (Fig. 2). (2) A shared control of the cryptographic keys is performed by specialized cloud service providers (Beikverdi & Song, 2015). In this scenario, the user stores the wallet in a cloud provider which provides the connection with the P2P network. Now, a pair of keys is needed to perform the transactions by means of a multisigning procedure (Fig. 3). This scenario has given rise cloud services in virtual currencies transactions. These services simplify the work for users and facilitate the adoption of this technology by shops and citizens. In addition, the integration with e-commerce platforms increases the potential usefulness of cryptocurrencies.

Fig. 2:  Autonomous Key Control.

Virtual Currencies in Modern Societies    175

Fig. 3:  Shared Key Control.

3. Potential Applications There are many application fields of virtual currencies and their underlying technology, and something new is being discovered every day. Based on its known features, currently, virtual currencies have the capacity for: (1) decentralizing socio-economic structures and (2) promoting new business models, and in each of these areas new potential applications arise. Next, most common use cases are described. (1) Decentralization of socio-economic structures. Virtual currencies facilitate forms of freedom by decentralizing socio-economic structures (Baldwin, 2018). In this sense, they promote the principles of collaborative economy through the development of free markets for intermediation based on open-source blockchain projects that allow decentralized access and the reduction of costs of products and services (Acquier, Daudigeos, & Pinkse, 2017). Around this technology, users can share goods, services, and information directly. New applications can be developed to implement decentralized economy based on this this concept. For example, virtual currency lending is a new business model that has grown very popular in recent times. There are some virtual currencies lending platforms online, for example, Bitbond (https://www.bitbond.com/). Other platforms allow people to lend money to Bitcoin traders and obtain some interest. The terms are defined according the loan demands and offers, for example, Poloniex (https:// poloniex.com/). These new platforms make that no user can be excluded due to low economic capacity nor personal background. In a system of virtual currencies, the financial capacity is not approved or supervised by any bank or risk agency. In this way, virtual currencies provide a solution to financial exclusion and it is an opportunity to reduce the social inequality gap and to provide the same opportunities to all members of society. The economic implications of including millions of people who are now outside the global financial system cannot yet be measured and is undoubtedly one of the great advances in the Internet age. In addition, virtual currencies change the traditional way of undertaking certain business activities. There are two key aspects of virtual currencies that enable this evolution: elimination of intermediaries and high divisibility of money units. Removing intermediaries actually cut costs and decentralize the economy activity. A customer will only pay for the product and service directly required without paying commission to bank institutions nor financial institutions. Many traditional trusted third parties are no longer needed. The features of divisibility favor the execution of micropayments in conditions barely supported by traditional systems (Giaglis & Kypriotaki, 2014).

176    Higinio Mora et al. (2) Promoting new business models. Technology innovations underlying virtual currencies promote new business opportunities in many economic and social sectors (Attia, 2017; Rodrigues, Bocek, & Stiller, 2018). Blockchain technology is considered as the most significant invention after the Internet (Efanov & Roschin, 2018). In this sense, blockchain is an “application platform.” In fact, virtual currency can be considered as its first application. Other revolutionary blockchain-based application is the Smart Contract concept. A smart contract defines a protocol for negotiating the terms of a contract that automatically verifies content, and then executes the agreed terms. Currently, smart contract and blockchain innovations are enabling new commercial applications in many fields of society and economy (Duchenne, 2018; Efanov & Roschin, 2018). Through the use of a smart contract, the explicit participation of users is a guarantee of security, reliability and compliance with obligations (Kshetri, 2017). Next paragraphs describe some examples in financial, healthcare, and educational fields implemented through blockchain and smart contracts technology innovations which are not possible to realize through traditional methods. Last financial crisis has weakened the confidence of customers in their banks and financial institutions. At the same time, new financial technology companies are coming up to provide services to population (called Fintech). In general, they are focused on interpreting the psychology of clients and are able to connect with new demands of people, especially of digital users. In this context, virtual currencies and their underlying technologies are a cross-cutting concern that applies to all the functional areas of consumer and business banking to offer innovative financial products. They have the potential to reduce liquidity requirements, transaction latency, transaction rates, operational risk, and others (Eyal, 2017). Another example in this field comes from the smart contract concept. A smart contract optimizes the flow of information in the course of a negotiation between customer and company. In addition, it is recorded in a blockchain structure in accordance with the level of authorization established by the smart contract. In this way, all parties can track events. This versatility makes it possible to eliminate unwanted infiltrations and the risk of fraud because all events are recorded in an auditable and immutable transactional history (Magazzeni, McBurney, & Nash, 2017). In the healthcare field, a smart contract has the potential to perform a proper follow-up of a patient’s medical history. The clinical history of a patient is privileged and restricted by access conditions defined in a smart contract based on blockchain. The sequential registration of the medical activity allows the monitoring of patients in real time, as well as notification to the authorized parties (doctor and patient). In this way, the privacy of medical information is guaranteed, and the falsification of results is eliminated (Griggs et al., 2018). In the educational field, smarts contracts are applications that support some of the activities in the teaching–learning process. Firstly, the blockchain can record all the academic information about certificates and academic degrees, as well as experiences, skills of both the teachers and the students. In this way, the academic community can be transparent and validate the veracity of the academic certificates (Chen, Xu, Lu, & Chen, 2018). Secondly, teachers can define tasks by creating rules which are established within the smart contract.

Virtual Currencies in Modern Societies    177 The development of the aforementioned applications is clear evidence of the advantages provided by virtual currencies and smart contracts based on blockchain. Transparency is increased by allowing blockchain to perform the registration and audit of transactions without the need for third parties. Organizational efficiency is improved by allowing a smart contract to automate processes and workflows previously agreed upon. These management capabilities increase the authenticity and transparency of the documentation generated, eliminate intermediation costs, reduce transaction times, and increase operational confidentiality.

4. Risks and Threats of Virtual Currencies Indeed, the reach of technological tools has given an unusual power to transgress the digital borders of organizations and people. Moore’s law that allows the duplication of computational power also doubles the power of fraudsters and impostors. Advantages and potentialities of virtual currencies are unquestionable. However, this coin has another side in form of risks and threats for the economy and society. The most relevant of them are about (1) privacy of transactions, (2) lack of regulatory framework, (3) speculative investment, and (4) security. (1) Regarding privacy, it is clear that one key feature of virtual currencies is the transparency in operation supervision supported by blockchain technology (Reyna, Martín, Chen, Soler, & Diaz, 2018). Nevertheless, this transparency can compromise privacy, specifically when personal data are involved. In this way, a first risk comes from the invasion of privacy of the persons concerned in virtual money possession. At first glance, it seems like standard money transactions through bank accounts. However, in the current system, this supervision can only be made by financial institutions and public administrations (i.e., tax inspectors), while the blockchain can be supervised by anyone. That is, any company or person can know where and who had the money and what transactions were made with it. To face this issue, there are virtual currencies extensions to provide an anonymity layer, for example, Bitcoin extension such as Zerocash (http://zerocashproject.org/) or BitCoinFog (http://bitcoinfog.info/), and even new anonymous virtual currencies such as Dash or Monero (Bocetta, 2018). These virtual currencies hide the details of the transaction. In contrast, this enhanced privacy feature can be exploited by users doing illicit activities (De Balthasar & Hernandez-Castro, 2017; U.S. Government, 2014), for example, money laundering, sales of illegal goods, drugs, and weapons, cybercrime, black economy, etc. (2) Currently, there are a generalized lack of regulation laws on the trade of virtual currency and digital wallets in all countries around the world (Heredia, 2017). However, the online business and private trade of virtual currency have been increasing rapidly in recent time. This may cause vulnerability of legal rights of the consumers and the population in general. Some private currencies are produced by a company or corporation which determines the amount of the currency in circulation. This means that the virtual money can be produced as much as the company wants. It may cause devaluation and artificial loss of value (Liu, Wang, & Hu, 2012).

178    Higinio Mora et al. In addition, payments with virtual currency are irreversible transactions, that is, there is no possibility of refunds unless the receiver issues a new transaction to send money back. Unscrupulous users can exploit this situation to implement bad business practices, for example, selling counterfeit or pirated goods. In this case, the buyer cannot recover his/her money (Hurlburt & Bojanova, 2014). (3) Speculative investment in virtual currencies causes bubbles and high volatility in prices (change relation with other assets) (Balcilar, Bouri, Gupta, & Roubaud, 2017; Cheah & Fry, 2015). This volatility adversely affects the usefulness as a currency (Yermack, 2013). This phenomenon is further accentuated since virtual currencies have not an intrinsic value. (4) Among the security problems, some potential threats must be considered. Security of virtual currencies mainly lies on cryptographic algorithms. In this way, cryptographic well-known attacks such as Man in the Middle or Denial of Service can obstruct the network and cause an out of service of all monetary system (Reyna et al., 2018). In addition, there are specific attacks for virtual currencies, such as doublespend attack or 51% attack (Eyal & Sirer, 2014). The double-spend attack consists in spending the same money more than once by taking advantage of the delay in verifying the transaction by miners. The 51% attack is a potential risk on the virtual currency network when an entity is able to control the majority of the network mining power. In this case, if most of 51% of miners are controlled by a single organization, they could decide which transactions get approved or not. In reality, a 51% attack is feasible since there is not a monetary authority to stop them from doing so. A common problem of virtual currencies is the problem of coin loss, wallet theft or hacking (Shin, 2016; Vandezande, 2017). If the wallet key is forgotten, there is no mechanism to operate with these coins. Finally, revolutionary computing advancements could break the cryptographic security of algorithms in a near future (Aggarwal, Brennen, Lee, Santha, & Tomamichel, 2018). The impacts of quantum computing in this field can find a quantum algorithm to mine cryptocurrencies easily since they are particularly good with difficult problems like searching and code breaking (Tessler & Byrnes, 2017). With this in mind, making cryptocurrencies quantum safe is an issue that is already starting to be taken seriously today.

5. Impact of Virtual Currencies on Policy and Decision-Making Virtual currency and its underlying technology (blockchain) can be used in many areas of government administration (Ølnes, Ubacht, & Janssen, 2017). The immutability and distributed feature of blockchain allows to guarantee the irreversibility, authenticity, and auditability of administrative activity, and it becomes in a powerful tool for public administration. Politics might take notice of these possibilities in order to modernize and make more democratic their administrations. This section reviews some ideas in this area.

Virtual Currencies in Modern Societies    179 5.1. Economic Policy Economic policy is conducted by government legislation. The monetary value of money and its custody is delegated to the Central Banks, which are responsible for implementing monetary policy in accordance with the objectives of the financial system’s growth and price stability (Özlem & Caner, 2015). One of the monetary policies is the control over the capital movements outside the economic area. Capital flight is a government concern because it upsets the trade balance, reduces the tax base, and diverts resources which could have been destined to productive investment and reduces the economic growth. Virtual currencies have a great impact on all these issues. In first place, the money supply of an economy can be distorted by virtual currency money in circulation. This latest must be added to standard one. Public administrations cannot know how much money are in the economic area since virtual currency money supply is unknown. In addition, creation of money is also an uncontrolled variable for central banks. These limitations can have important effects on financial system and price stability as utilization of virtual currencies becomes increasingly used by population. In second place, jurisdictional and economic borders are transparent for virtual currencies. Users can make fund transfers outside the economic area without permission nor institutional supervision. For example, capital flights and foreign currency remittance made with virtual currencies are outside the control of authorities. In this situation, economic supervisory authorities are calling for legislation that enables them to supervise virtual currency flows in order to be able to do their work (European Central Bank, 2015). In addition, financial services dependent on virtual currencies should be also considered in new legislation to prevent investors from being exposed to high-risk operations and users with policies such as redeem ability or a deposit guaranty scheme (Dibrova, 2016). In this opinion, the European Banking Authority proposed that virtual currencies could be included under the scope of the European Union legal framework regarding anti-money laundering and proposes to include virtual currency exchange platforms and custodian wallet providers under European Directives in this matter (Vandezande, 2017).

5.2. Voting Systems and Electoral Processes In the first place, virtual currencies have attracted attention as a means of financing political and electoral processes since it preverbs anonymity of donors. In this situation, Federal Commission of Elections of the United States has to legislate on strengthening of fair play (Federal Election Commission, 2014). In this way, political committees could accept virtual currencies as a donation to the electoral campaign, but the donation limit in Bitcoins cannot exceed 100 USD. In addition, virtual currencies cannot be used to purchase goods and services. Before being used (by the political committee) it must be transformed in US dollars.

180    Higinio Mora et al. On the other hand, the underlying technology of virtual currencies (blockchain) also achieves interest in some government areas. The blockchain technology gives credibility to the voting system since reduce voter fraud and increase voter access. In addition, it has the potential to count votes without the need for intermediaries, which increases the credibility of the electoral event. The blockchain technology is immutable and the audit of the votes is guaranteed. The cryptographic principles of the technology guarantee the confidentiality of the vote of every one of the participants. In this line, there are some such voting systems around the world: Gyeonggido is a province of South Korea. The local government of this province promoted a community voting project based on blockchain. Through this platform and the use of smart contracts, 900 citizens were able to select more than 500 community projects. After that, the authorities of the province can grant budgets to finance the aforementioned projects, according to the preferences of the citizens of ­Gyeonggi-do (Keirns, 2017). Other recent example in Moscow offers a transparent e-voting system based on blockchain innovation (Kshetri & Voas, 2018). In this case, every vote will turn into a smart contract and it will be listed in a blockchain structure across the P2P network. This e-voting system provides a full guarantee of data cannot be removed or altered. In addition, the citizens will be able to verify the authenticity of the voting in real time.

5.3. Civil Society Management Blockchain provides a transparent distributed database where all types of transactions performed by users can be registered. In this way, this technology can store data on interactions between citizens and government agencies. The potential possibilities of the blockchain technology are enormous for civil society organizations. This technology innovation can encode a variety of data and not just economic transactions. Among other cases such as birth certificates, death, marriage records, public deeds, property titles, academic degrees, and much more (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016). Some of classical procedures of registration of social information can be revolutionized with this innovation. For example, in many cases, title information remains stored offline and at local level. This produces accessing problems for citizens and distorts buying–selling process. For example, the project developed for Cook County of Illinois (USA) aims to change this situation thanks to blockchain technology. When a citizen buys a property, he/she receive a traditional paper deed but also a digital token of it (hash). These tokens are registered in a blockchain structure creating a central title database for the entire country to securely store and instantly access historical title records. By using tokens to identify every real estate transaction and making them publicly available and searchable through a public blockchain structure, it is easy to know who is (and was) the legal owner of a property. In addition to previous reasons, this technology resolves the problem in countries where it is difficult to know who actually owns the land one lives, due to corruption and unethical interventions by government or corporations.

Virtual Currencies in Modern Societies    181 5.4. Sustainable Administration Other potential applications with great interest for the modern world are the contributions that can be generated by virtual currencies and their underlying technologies for achieving a sustainable administration. In this matter, virtual currencies promote integration with collaborative and sustainable economy through decentralization of social and economic structures, new forms of sustainable consumption, or financial inclusion to unbanked persons. Projects for the management of smart cities and a better use of their assets are addressed by collaborative platforms and blockchain technology (Pwc, 2018). One of the significant advantages in the near future will be a substantial reduction in office and intermediation costs. This technology improves supply chain operations providing with transparency, efficiency, and cost reduction (Banerjee, 2018). In this way, blockchain can help public administrations to achieve a significant shift in accountability and transparency for citizens. In addition, this is a powerful tool that can help to spearhead the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals proposed by the United Nations (https:// www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/). For example, increasingly consumers are choosing to purchase pre-owned or used products rather than only buying new goods. This choice extends the life of existing products and avoids the need for additional resources used in the production of new products (related to objectives 11 and 12). Also, the potential use of virtual currencies can stimulate the economy, promote sustainable projects without prejudice to the environment, and encourage innovation (related to objectives 8 and 9).

6. Conclusions Governmental organizations recognize the potential benefits of virtual currencies, and particularly the possibilities of the blockchain and smart contract technologies. This technology offers people a new way to create, register, and exchange assets on distributed platforms, and presents in many cases an innovative and efficient alternative to existing systems. However, a proper understanding of how they work, and their potentialities are necessary to promote their use. Based on the foregoing, in this section some guidelines for policymakers and legislators are proposed. In the first place, virtual currencies and their underlying technology are not a panacea to solve all problems. In some cases, they create more problems than they solve. Therefore, applications must be implemented properly. The formation of transdisciplinary groups is advisable for the analysis of the problems. In addition, an objective assessment of governance procedures and its current situation is required. Politician, lawyers, computer engineers, and others should work together to define the functional and non-functional requirements for future implementations. This technology has the power to transform governance models and the way they work. Therefore, a process reengineering should be addressed to fully take advantage of new possibilities of technology and provide efficient solutions. Currently, there are several initiatives underway to develop

182    Higinio Mora et al. blockchain-based applications for public administrations in order to implement the e-administration concept. By implementing these applications, governments can increase citizens’ engagement and enhance public trust and security. Secondly, it is also the responsibility of governments to contribute to a global cause by exploiting the advantages of this new disruptive technologies and its capability to overcome borders and regulations. These technologies in combination with the concept of circular economy provide the basis and tools for a new and sustainable macroeconomic system. The first step should be to work out whether and how they will help in achieving sustainability goals. Finally, the philosophy of disintermediation eliminates the traditional structural hierarchy defined in society. Virtual currencies promise P2P relationships and no one entity can subdue another. A true revolution promises greater social, financial, and participatory inclusion of all actors in society, without any discrimination. This technology destroys the monopoly of money controlled by government entities and central banks. However, this behavior can create significant risks for population and for economy in general. The main concerns are not the technology itself, but the reasons why people buy and use it. To face this challenge, it is necessary to move forward a unified regulation of the use of virtual currencies. This should maintain the main features of the technology while protecting users and preventing illicit activities. This is not an easy task, and therefore, international cooperation is necessary. In fact, the adoption of regulations is key to the inclusion of virtual currencies and other technologies as part of government infrastructures and to become them in a real useful tool for society. This adoption would speed up the interaction between citizens, governments, and companies (Reyna et al., 2018). Technology always develops more quickly than legislation; therefore, comprehensive regulatory action has yet to catch up with the current state of practice. It should hurry up to set it on the right track for the future.

Acknowledgments This work has been funded by the Conselleria de Educación, Investigación, Cultura y Deporte, of the Community of Valencia, Spain, within the program of support for research under project AICO/2017/134.

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Chapter 13

Digital Diplomacy in Practice: A Case Study of the Western Balkan Countries Gorazd Justinek, Sabina Carli and Ingrid Omahna Abstract Global mass communications and advances in new information and telecommunication technology present a new challenge to the traditional way of conducting international relations. While the mode of conducting diplomacy is changing, diplomats are forced to communicate with many new actors in the international stage through new means of communication. The chapter overviews the existing digital diplomacy research reports. Against this backdrop it presents the outcomes of a 2017–2018 study of communication strategies employed by six countries of the Western Balkans, including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. The findings of the study give a first-hand data from the practical point of view on how, which, and to which extent digital tools are utilized as a tool of digital tools are utilized as a tool of digital diplomacy by the official communicators of ministries of foreign affairs (MFA) in the researched region. Keywords: Information and telecommunication technology; digital diplomacy; Western Balkans; Open Government Maturity Model; International Relations, Ministries of Foreign Affairs

1. Introduction This day and age are very much defined by the prevalence of previously unimaginable technological developments. One area which is subject of rapid development is the social media phenomenon. It “took off ” just after the Millennium and so could be defined, through entrepreneurial glossary, as a “gazelle” among other media. Social media tools are therefore no longer used simply for leisure,

Politics and Technology in the Post-Truth Era, 187–202 Copyright © 2019 Gorazd Justinek, Sabina Carli and Ingrid Omahna doi:10.1108/978-1-78756-983-620191013

188    Gorazd Justinek et al. nor do they merely serve as a useful way of reaching customers and the rest of the public. They became an important method of communication in diplomacy (Sedej & Justinek, 2013, p. 84). In this regard we try to analyze the role of social media tools in everyday work of a diplomat. Our primary research question is thus: What is the maturity of digital diplomacy of the ministries of foreign affairs in the Western Balkans countries? The applied methodology in this research runs in two phases. The first phase represented collection of data. It will start with an overview of existing digital diplomacy reports, namely Digital Diplomacy review (Diplomacy Live, 2018), Twiplomacy (Burson-Marsteller, 2018) report, Austin Doehler’s United M ­ acedonian Diaspora report on Digital Diplomacy (Doehler, 2017), United Nations and IMF statistical outlooks, International Telecommunications Union (Internet Worldstats), CIA World Factbook, Global Web Index, GSMA ­Intelligence, and Statista (Digital Market Outlook). The research continued with a series of structured interviews with official communicators at the ministries of foreign affairs of the selected countries. All the interviews were carried out in November 2017 and were structured through three main topics: strategy, tools, and content.1 The second phase was represented in the application of the gathered data into the Open Government Maturity Model (OGMM), which was developed to assess and guide open government initiatives focusing on transparent, interactive, participatory, collaborative public engagement, proposed by Lee and Kwak (2012). In this regard the selected countries will be also ranked and some best practices will be further elaborated. The selected countries were Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. The group of these six countries is also defined as the Western Balkan countries. The group was selected since they are all (potential) candidates for the membership in the European Union and are thus undergoing important changes in all spheres of society and government reorganization. 1

Questions on the topic of strategy covered: Is there a government-wide communications strategy (and does it involve digital communications) in your country? Is there a communications/public relations strategy specific for the ministry of foreign affairs (and does it involve digital communications) in your country? What other frameworks, rules of procedure do you follow in your digital communications on the level of the ministry of foreign affairs? What is the authorization procedure for the messages? Questions regarding the tools covered: Which social media platforms/tools does your institution use to communicate with the audiences? How often do you use them? Which are the profiles that you use – institution (ministry), persons (minister)? In which languages do you post? Since when do you use digital tools and is there a person who is responsible specifically for the digital communications? Do you use analytical tools to monitor your reach? Questions regarding the content covered: Who is your target audience (name the target groups)? Which groups are the most responsive, where do you reach the best results? Which content do you communicate? Do you execute specific campaigns, on what topics? Do you use data mining in order to follow the public opinion trends on the foreign affairs-related issues? Do you use automation to create your content?

Digital Diplomacy in Practice    189 Diplomacy and cooperation among civil society in regard of foreign policy matters is of outmost importance. Social media tools have made it possible to engage this cooperation on one hand, while on the other, foreign policy actors – especially diplomats, need to adopt to all these new lines of work. If and how ­successful they are, this chapter will present.

2. Digital Diplomacy Before we start analyzing the data gathered among the Western Balkan communicators, we first need to define digital diplomacy. What does the term digital diplomacy stand for at all? Public diplomacy scholars have argued that the incorporation of social media into the practice of diplomacy may constitute a new form of diplomacy that enables nations to create, and leverage, long-term relationships with foreign populations. (Kampf, Manor, & Segev, 2015, p. 12) Hayden (2012, p. 3) on the other hand argues that with the emergence of social media in international politics, a consensus arises among public diplomacy scholars on the developing field of public diplomacy practice: The classical objectives of public diplomacy to inform, educate, and engage appear in new prescriptive writing to be reenergized by an ethic of collaboration, relation-building, and listening – where the “goal” of public diplomacy is transformed from the transmission of information to the building or leveraging of relations. Riordan (2016, p. 10) commonly understands digital diplomacy as another tool to help deliver broader strategic objectives and warns of the danger of digital diplomacy to be seen as an end in itself. Still, there is a lack of definitional precision when speaking of digital diplomacy, argue Hocking, Melissen, Riordan, and Sharp (2012, p. 5). The way that Bjola (2016a, p. 298) contributes to the definition of digital diplomacy is by: focusing on five key areas of interest: the shifting power balances in the international system induced by digital technology, the relationship between digital diplomacy and soft power, the “digital shift” in consular assistance to nationals abroad, the myths surrounding diplomatic crisis communication, and the pathways for maximizing the impact and effectiveness of digital diplomacy. An overview of scholarly research can be rounded up with an analysis of the way digital diplomacy is perceived by practitioners. According to Clarke (2014), digital servants in the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development,

190    Gorazd Justinek et al. Canada and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) UK describe digital diplomacy as a product of changing social and technological conditions where foreign ministries can no longer reach their political objectives without collaborating with the civil society through open web technologies. Manor (2016) in his article identifies four events that have contributed to the advent of digital diplomacy. First of them was the need for countering al-Qaeda’s ideology that was widely spread through websites, blogs and online videos. The Public Diplomacy 2.0 initiative was launched by the US Department of State in order to successfully counter the war of ideas by using the tools of digital diplomacy. The second were democratic protests, the drivers of the Arab Spring, that encouraged governments to adopt social media which can be used for understanding and predicting events. The rise of the citizen journalists is described as the third event. The proliferation of information and communication technology, especially smart phones, allows each individual to share and disseminate information to the global audience on the ground in real time. As the fourth event, he identifies new media ecology, which is marked by the fragmentation of audiences to setups of selective exposure. According to Hayden (in Manor 2016) foreign ministries are in need of a “new” public diplomacy that would cope with the challenges of the new media ecology. Regardless of the growing interest in digital diplomacy, there are few studies to date that have evaluated the extent to which foreign ministries have been able to realize their potential. Bjola (2016b) examined an issue of trying to maximize the impact and effectiveness of digital diplomacy by ministries of foreign affairs with conceptual reflection of what impact means in the digital context. Although “diplometrics” consider a lot of factors that can track and shape the impact of digital policies and campaigns in real time, they do not take long-term objectives into account. Kampf et al. (2015) have conducted a cross-national comparison of public engagement on Facebook and Twitter by eleven foreign ministries using Kent and Taylor’s framework for dialogic communication. Manor (2016) in his article stepped further by trying to explore the digital diplomacy model employed by four foreign ministries through interviews and questionnaires with practitioners. He argued that some other studies have neglected to understand the manner in which diplomats define digital diplomacy and envision its practice.

3. Digital Diplomacy in the Context of Ministries of Foreign Affairs Researchers of diplomacy have in the past devoted significant attention to the area of public diplomacy.2 And this has been for good reason. Nevertheless, new technologies tend to catch our attention since with the development of the Internet and, most recently, social media, the world is no longer what it was. Practically, anyone with a smartphone device and access to the Internet can launch global campaigns, global business, and global activities (unfortunately, also 2

The Hague Journal of Diplomacy. Special issue: The domestic dimension of public diplomacy. Volume 7. No.4 (Brill).

Digital Diplomacy in Practice    191 negative ones3 such as recruitment for terrorism). Therefore, practically anyone can engage in international relations which, only a few decades ago, had been an area reserved primarily for diplomats. An important feature of the twenty-first century is the transforming character of diplomacy, based on the advances of information technologies in modern communication (Klavins, 2012). The dynamics of diplomatic work are boosted by operativeness of information circulation and accessibility of data. Unlike traditional diplomacy, digital diplomacy allows anyone, everyone, anywhere, anytime to have a voice. Individuals are no longer just passive receivers of information but can correspond directly and horizontally. They actively respond, comment, influence, and form public opinion. Since one-way communication no longer exists, their support is crucial in gaining support for the successful shaping and implementation of policies. In order to achieve the credibility of the implemented policies, the broadest segments of the population must be involved in the decision-making process. The emergence of digital diplomacy as a concept of research coincides with the 2010 Arab Spring movements and 2011 Occupy movements that started, culminated, and agitated civil society through digital tools (Ünver, 2017). Defined as “solving foreign policy problem using the Internet” (FCO), digital diplomacy is not a substitute for traditional channels of communication but an extension to traditional diplomacy. The twenty-first century diplomat will have to ride Ambassador Fletcher’s “digital tiger.” The 2020 envoy will be a lobbyist, leader, communicator, pioneer, entrepreneur, activist, campaigner, and advocate. He/she will have to learn from the best in those fields and gain experience working in several of them. He/she will understand that diplomacy is not some kind of secret artistic form, concealed by jargon and titles, but is instead an amalgamation of disciplines. To be very plastic, a real twenty-first century diplomat does not see the embassy as a building, but rather as an idea. In sum, social media in diplomacy today are a fact and an everyday life reality (Fletcher, 2013). The time is right and it could indeed be said that we are already in an era of iDiplomacy. What does that mean? iDiplomacy is a new concept of diplomacy where new hi-tech tools are used in diplomatic practice on a daily basis, both in terms of communications with external audience, as well as internally among diplomats and other stakeholders. These new tools make it possible to work and live almost in a global virtual world. This is of outmost importance especially for diplomats, due to geographically dispersed line of work, which they carry out. However, no new tool can replace a person, a real diplomat, with the knowledge of real diplomatic expertise. Yet, the combination of diplomatic expertise with good knowledge in social media tools does represent a new kind of diplomat, who would be ready and fit for the future or as we see it, for the time of iDiplomacy (Justinek, 2018).

3

For example, take the so-called Islamic State, which uses exclusively social media to communicate with different international audiences. Al-Qaida also used to avail itself of these tools in the past.

192    Gorazd Justinek et al.

4. Digital Diplomacy in Practice: A Case Study of the Western Balkan Countries An original contribution of the book chapter to the evolving research field of digital diplomacy is its focus on the region of the Western Balkans. This part of the chapter provides an overview of the usage of digital tools in the researched countries and estimates the maturity of digital diplomacy. The purpose of the analysis is to measure digital diplomacy performance and capacity of the ministries of foreign affairs in the Western Balkan countries, identify top performers and low performers, offer a comparison and contribute to the increase of digital diplomacy awareness in the region and to map motivational forces and diagnose shortcomings. Digital Diplomacy Review (Diplomacy Live, 2018) is an online ranking platform that uses qualitative and quantitative data and analyzes public digital diplomacy assets such as websites, mobile apps, and social networks through 166 criteria in order to assess digital diplomacy performance, customization, up-todateness, strategy, influence, engagement, analytics, security, content, audience, transparency, and innovation. Their total score is measured on a 0–100 scale and an equivalent rating from AAA ++ to E − is assigned accordingly. While some countries of the Western Balkans ranked very high, others are at the bottom of the list. Albania was ranked 32nd in 2017 with a total score 46.3 and rating CCC−, gaining the points in comparison to 2016, when it was on the 43rd place. It is followed by Macedonia, which ranked 66th in 2017 (in contrast to 118th in 2016) with a score 35.23 and rating C++, and Kosovo on 69th place (gaining points from 2016 when it was on the 71th place) with 34.94 points and C++ rating. Rather low are the rankings of Serbia on 111th place in 2017 (94th in 2016) with DDD− rating, Bosnia and Herzegovina on 168th place (141st in 2016) with E++ rating, and Montenegro on 180th place (144th in 2016) with E+. Analysis in Table 1 shows that the ranking varies immensely across the Western Balkans region. While Albania is well above the other countries, Macedonia and Kosovo are following in year 2017. Serbia did not make it into the first half of the list, while B&H and Montenegro are lagging far behind. The comparison Table 1:  Digital Diplomacy Review Ranking 2017 and 2016. Country

2017 Ranking

2017 Score

2017 Rating

2016 2016 Ranking Score

Albania Macedonia Kosovo Serbia B&H Montenegro

32 66 69 111 168 180

46.30 35.23 34.94 23.19 6.76 4.99

CCC– 43 C++ 118 C++ 71 DDD− 94 E++ 141 E+ 144

33.83 12.82 26.31 22.16 6.80 6.60

2016 Rating C+ DD−− DDD++ DDD− E++ E++

Source: Digital Diplomacy Review Ranking 2017 and 2016 (Diplomacy Live, 2018).

Digital Diplomacy in Practice    193 Table 2:  Population and Social Media Penetration. Population in October 2017 (in Millions) Albania B&H Kosovo Macedonia Montenegro Serbia

2.876 3.845 1.867 2.076 0.623 7.06

Active Social Media Penetration in January 2017 (%) 52 45 n/a 53 56 39

Active Mobile Social Media Penetration in January 2017 (%) 45 37 46 44 46 31

Source: Active social media penetration in European countries in January 2017 (We Are Social and Hootsuite, 2017b); Active mobile social media penetration in European countries in January 2017 (We Are Social and Hootsuite, 2017a); and World Economic Outlook Database October 2017 (IMF, 2017).

between 2016 and 2017 shows that Albania further improved its position, but the biggest development was achieved in Macedonia. From DD– ranking and 118th place, they progressed to C++ ranking and 66th place, which calls for further analysis in this chapter. While the region faced enormous difficulties in the past two decades, security, stability, democracy, and European rapprochement are at the top of the priority list for the Western Balkans. Stabilization, democratization, and preparation for the EU membership are underway and democratic and economic reforms are also the EU priority in the region (European Commission, 2018). Transparency and inclusion of citizens, therefore, represent an important tool. Social media usage in the Western Balkan countries is increasing and social media can strengthen values of openness and cooperation between the citizens and governments. A short overview of the internet, social media and mobile social media penetration4 is given in Table 2, while a more detailed social media market analysis will follow under each country profile. In all researched countries except for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, social media penetration exceeds half of the population, while mobile social media penetration follows closely with over a third of population. On the other hand, states and the ministries of foreign affairs tend to stay rather reserved when it comes to social media usage, which will be analyzed further in this chapter (Table 5).

4

Market penetration is a parameter in Marketing showing the rate of circulation of a product in the market. Internet penetration corresponds to the percentage of the total population of a given country that uses the Internet. Social media penetration is the percentage of the total population of a given country that uses the social media. Mobile social media penetration is the percentage of the total population of a given country that uses social media via mobile devices.

194    Gorazd Justinek et al. Table 3:  Overview of the Facebook and Twitter Accounts (Foreign Ministry and Diplomatic Missions). Number of Diplomatic Missions Albania B&H Kosovo Macedonia Montenegro Serbia

Number of Official MFA Social Media Accounts

52 50 38 57 35 99

56 n/a 17 14  1  5

Source: Twiplomacy (Burson-Marsteller, 2018).

While Albania and Kosovo top the list of the offcial MFA social media (Facebook and Twitter) accounts, Montenegro and Serbia are lagging behind with a very small number of active Facebook and Twitter accounts (Table 3). Table 4 will show the diffusion of usage of specific digital tools, including social media, that is, website, Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Flickr, LinkedIn, RSS Feed, Google+, and Instagram. While all researched countries use website as their basis for communication, Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Flickr, and Google+ are widely used among digital platforms. LinkedIn (used by B&H MFA) and Instagram (used by Albanian MFA) are rather an exception. While number of social media accounts and their choice signalizes a diversification of the communication channels of each diplomacy, frequency of publishing should be taken into account in the research. United Macedonian Diaspora’s “State of Macedonian Digital Diplomacy Compared to the Rest of the Western Table 4:  Digital Platforms Including Social Media by Country. Digital Platform MFAs by Country Website Twitter Facebook YouTube Flickr LinkedIn RSS Feed Google + Instagram

6 (Albania, B&H, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia) 4 (Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Serbia) 3 (Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia) 4 (Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Serbia) 4 (Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Serbia) 1 (B&H) 4 (B&H, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia) 4 (Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Serbia) 1 (Albania)

Source: Digital Diplomacy Review 2017 (Diplomacy Live, 2018) and independent research.

Digital Diplomacy in Practice    195 Table 5:  Frequency of Publishing on Social Media.

Albania B&H Kosovo Macedonia Montenegro Serbia

Extremely Very Active Active Active (Number/ (Number/ (Number/ Share) Share) Share)

Not Very Active (Number/ Share)

Inactive (Number/ Share)

8/14.3% n/a 0 0 0 0

13/23.2% n/a 4/23.5% 3/20% 0 3/60%

3/5.4% n/a 1/5.8% 4/26.6% 0 1/20%

22/39.3% n/a 3/17.6% 3/20% 0 1/20%

10/17.9% n/a 9/52.9% 5/33.3% 1/100% 0

Source: “State of Macedonian Digital Diplomacy Compared to the Rest of the Western Balkans, Greece, Estonia, and the V-4” Report (Doehler, 2017) and independent research.

Table 6:  Levels of OGMM and Rankings of Observed Countries. Level 1 – initial conditions Level 2 – data transparency Level 3 – open participation Level 4 – open collaboration

Level 5 – ubiquitous engagement

Governments are present on websites, but they have no social media activity nor open data capabilities Governments become present on social media (to a limited extent) and start publishing and sharing government data online to the public Governments open themselves toward public ideas and knowledge Governments begin fostering open collaboration among government agencies, public and private sector in order to co-create value-added government services Government agencies establish transparent, participatory, and collaborative government. Public can easily participate through social media as well as in other digital governance structures and processes

Bosnia and Herzegovina Serbia

Montenegro Kosovo, Macedonia

Albania

Source: Lee and Kwak (2012) and independent research.

Balkans, Greece, Estonia, and the V-4” Report divides digital diplomacies in extremely active (content published every day or multiple times a day), very active (content published every 2–3 days, usually multiple times a day), active (content published at least several times a month), not very active (content published at least once every couple of months), and inactive (no content for at least three months) (United Macedonian Diaspora).

196    Gorazd Justinek et al. Analysis (Table 5) shows that Albania and Macedonia are the most frequent publishers on the social media, followed by Serbia and Kosovo. The share of inactive social media accounts exceeds one fifth in Serbia and Macedonia.

5. Country Profiles We will use the OGMM that was specifically developed to assess and guide open government initiatives which focus on transparent, interactive, participatory, collaborative public engagement that are largely enabled by emerging technologies such as social media. The levels of development according to the model are presented in Table 6.

Albania With a total population of 2.91 million people (CIA, 2018), Albania belongs to the medium countries of the Western Balkans in terms of population, the rate of urbanization is 59%. There are 1.84 million internet users, which represents 63% internet penetration. A total of 1.5 million people are active social media users with 52% social media penetration. With 4.75 million mobile subscriptions, there are 1.3 million active mobile social media users, which makes 45% mobile penetration (GSMA Intelligence, 2018; Internet Worldstats, 2017; ITU, 2017). In the last year (from January 2016 to January 2017), Albania faced 1% growth of internet users, 15% growth of active social media users, and 18% growth of active mobile social users. There are 1.5 million monthly active Facebook users in Albania and 87% of the Facebook users access it via mobile. The percentage of Facebook users active each day is 53% (Internet Worldstats, 2017). Albania ranks as 32th in the Digital Diplomacy Review and scores the CCC– rating, which is the best rating in the researched region. The country has 52 diplomatic missions and operates 56 official foreign ministry and diplomatic missions Facebook and Twitter accounts. Over half of them publishes content multiple times a week, while only 5% of the accounts are inactive, which ranks Albania as the most active social media user in the region. In addition to Facebook and Twitter, its diplomacy runs a website, YouTube, Flickr, Google+, and Instagram accounts. It has been a coordinated effort of the ministry and diplomatic missions, internal source confirmed, to establish personalized and specialized websites and social media of Albanian diplomatic missions abroad. With a goal to be in closer contact with the citizens and to boost live communication in the framework of the digital consular services, tools of direct engagement and communication have been developed. While Albanian MFA communicators see their audience both in domestic and foreign audiences, it is visible, that majority of the communications is directed toward the Albanian citizens, which can also be confirmed due to the use of Albanian language. An additional tool, mobile application E-Konsullata has been introduced in September 2017, in order to achieve greater mobile presence and offer Albanian citizens direct, timely and up-to-date official and confirmed information,

Digital Diplomacy in Practice    197 describes an internal source. The app (developed both for iOS and Android users) includes embassy contact details, emergency numbers, information about currency, vaccinations, and local customs. There is a plan to upgrade it with the consular components, including over 40 different consular services offered to both Albanian and foreign citizens. In the framework of our gathered data Albania reaches the highest Level 5 in the OGMM ranking – Ubiquitous Engagement, since the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established transparent, participatory, and collaborative system of online engagement, where public relatively easily participates online.

Bosnia and Herzegovina In terms of population, Bosnia and Herzegovina is the second largest state in the Western Balkans with 3.8 million inhabitants (CIA, 2018) and 40% urbanization rate. There are 2.63 million internet users in the country, which represents 69% penetration. A total of 1.7 million are active social media users, which makes 45% penetration rate. With 3.4 million mobile subscription, there are 1.4 million active mobile social media users (37% mobile social media penetration) (GSMA Intelligence, 2018; Internet Worldstats, 2017; ITU, 2017). While the number of internet users remained the same in the last year, active social media users grew by 6% and active mobile social media users grew by 17%. There are 1.7 million monthly active Facebook users in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 82% access Facebook via mobile. The percentage of Facebook users active each day is 71% (Internet Worldstats, 2017). Bosnia and Herzegovina ranks 168th on the Digital Diplomacy Review in 2017 and holds the E++ ranking. The country has 50 diplomatic missions. It is the only diplomacy among the researched countries that runs a LinkedIn account of the ministry of foreign affairs, which serves predominantly as a tool to publish human-resources-related content. According to internal sources, there is no digital communications strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina and it is not being developed. It can be assumed that the issue is rooted in the institutional setup established by the constitutional arrangements of the Dayton Peace Accords. The tripartite Presidency, consisting of the three presidency members of the constituent nations – Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian – is in charge of foreign, diplomatic, and military affairs. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s digital diplomacy is in a very early stage, where the MFA is present on the website, but there is no social media activity. In the framework of the OGMM, Bosnia and Herzegovina would scoring to our gathered data rank at Level 1 – Initial Conditions for open government and digital diplomacy.

Kosovo Kosovo is the second smallest country among the researched countries of the Western Balkans with 1.88 million inhabitants, and 39% live in urbanized areas (CIA, 2018). There are 1.52 million internet users, which represents 81% internet penetration and 0.96 active social media users, which represents 51% social media

198    Gorazd Justinek et al. penetration. With 1.76 million mobile subscriptions, there are 0.87 million active mobile social users (46% mobile social media penetration) (GSMA Intelligence, 2018; Internet Worldstats, 2017; ITU, 2017). While the number of internet users hasn’t changed in the recent year, the number of social media users grew by 68% and active mobile social media users by 78%. There are 960,000 monthly active Facebook users in Kosovo, 91% access Facebook via mobile. The percentage of Facebook users active daily is 70% (Internet Worldstats, 2017). Kosovo ranks as 69th in the Digital Diplomacy Review and scores the C++ rating, the third best in the region. It has improved its rating since 2016 when it was DDD++. The country has 38 diplomatic missions and runs 17 official Facebook and Twitter accounts. Besides, their digital diplomacy is supported by the website, YouTube, Flickr, and Google+. With a bit less than one-fifth of accounts active multiple times per week and half of them publishing several times per month, it is moderately active. Twiplomacy report announced the MFA Kosovo account as the 31st out of 50 “Best Connected World Leaders” accounts in terms of interconnections with other diplomacies on social media. As internal sources confirm, Kosovo attributes great attention and devotion to the digital diplomacy and is the only out of the researched countries with an online portal used as a tool of digital diplomacy. The so-called Digital Diplomacy Strategy is a moving force behind Digital Kosovo, an initiative to overcome the online barriers of unrecognized independent state. As the sources say, Kosovo is aspiring for inclusion in the global internet infrastructure, which is constrained by non-recognition on websites, digital platforms, e-commerce, so on. Digital Kosovo initiative serves as a tool to send request to websites and institutions using online templates, which makes it a public and user-oriented platform operating since 2014. Open Collaboration and Level 4 are our assessments for the state of the digital diplomacy in Kosovo, according to the OGMM. The MFA is fostering open collaboration and is reaching out to the public and private sector. With active use of digital tools and digital initiatives the MFA creates value-added services for the government and its openness.

Macedonia With 2.08 million inhabitants (CIA, 2018), Macedonia is home to 1.47 million active internet users (70% internet penetration). There are 1.1 million active social media users (53% social media penetration). With 2.36 million mobile subscriptions, there are 0.92 active mobile social media users, which makes 44% mobile social media penetration. Number of internet users grew for 4% in the last year, number of active social media users grew 10% and mobile social media users increased by 12% (GSMA Intelligence, 2018; Internet Worldstats, 2017; ITU, 2017). There are 1.1 million Facebook users per month in Macedonia, out of which 84% accesses this social media platform via mobile phone. The percentage of Facebook users active each day is 73% (Internet Worldstats, 2017). Macedonia ranks 66th on the Digital Diplomacy Review in 2017 and holds the CC+ ranking. While Macedonia has 57 diplomatic representations, there are

Digital Diplomacy in Practice    199 14 official Facebook and Twitter accounts in use. In addition, Macedonia utilizes website, YouTube, Flickr, RSS feed, and Google+. With a fifth of accounts publishing the content multiple times per week and some third multiple times per month, it is among the moderately active social media users. A quarter of the accounts is inactive, however. Macedonian digital communicators confirm that they have devoted a strong focus on digital diplomacy recently, which resulted in the improved digital diplomacy ranking. Their focuses are both international, foreign audience and the Macedonian citizens abroad, which is why they work in both English and Macedonian language. Internal sources emphasize the importance of so called “cheerleaders” of digital diplomacy, influential individuals who understand and push forward the digital agenda. In accordance with the innovation curve, the majority of the digital diplomacy practitioners follow when the lead cases are developed and initiated. Strong efforts in the field of digital diplomacy set Macedonia in Level 4 – Open Collaboration in the OGMM model. MFA is fostering collaboration with other agencies and devotes increased attention to the civil society and other sectors, which is visible in strengthened online presence and digital tools usage.

Montenegro Montenegro, the smallest researched country has 6,262 inhabitants, 64% live in urban areas (CIA, 2018). A total of 4,043,000 people use internet and the country has 65% internet penetration. A total of 350,000 inhabitants or 56% are active social media users. With 1.01 million mobile subscriptions, there are 290,000 mobile social media users, 46% of the population (GSMA Intelligence, 2018; Internet Worldstats, 2017; ITU, 2017). Number of internet users grew by 6% in the last year, number of active social media users grew by 9% and active mobile social users by 12%. There are 350,000 Facebook users, 83% access Facebook via mobile and 69% are active daily (Internet Worldstats, 2017). Montenegro ranks 180th on the Digital Diplomacy Review with a score E+. The country has 35 diplomatic missions. Montenegro uses website and RSS feed, while it lacks the presence on social media. According to the internal sources, the inactivity can be seen as a consequence of the recent split between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and newly established Ministry of European Affairs. The structure of digital diplomacy is therefore still under development. Montenegro’s split between the two ministries results in a lower digital diplomacy ranking. In the framework of OGMM the country’s performance equals Level 3 – Open Participation, where the MFA is open toward the public ideas and communicated with the wider audience online but has not yet developed specialized content and comprehensive digital tools.

Serbia The biggest researched country, Serbia, accounts for 8.79 million inhabitants, 56% live in urban areas (CIA, 2018). There are 5.74 million internet users or

200    Gorazd Justinek et al. 65% of the population. A total of 3.4 million are active social media users, which accounts for 39% of the population. There are 9.51 million mobile subscriptions and 2.7 million active mobile social users. Internet population grew by 22% in the last year, but number of active social media users decreased by 6%, while active mobile social users remained the same (GSMA Intelligence, 2018; Internet Worldstats, 2017; ITU, 2017). A total of 3.4 million of population are monthly active Facebook users, 79% access it via mobile device. The percentage of Facebook users active each day is 71% (Internet Worldstats, 2017). Serbia ranks 111st on the Digital Diplomacy Review and holds the DDD– ranking. While Serbia has 99 diplomatic representations, there are 5 official MFA social media accounts in use. In addition, is supported by a website, YouTube, Flickr, RSS feed, and Google+. Only one of the social media accounts is used very actively (multiple posts per week). Most of the published content by the Serbian diplomacy aims at the domestic audience. Serbia does not have an established digital diplomacy system but represents a case where there are some basic pillars established already. According to internal sources, an increasing attention and support is devoted to digital diplomacy, although there is no specific strategy developed yet and barely any active social media links established. This results to Level 2 in the OGMM – Data Transparency placement. Government is participating on social media to a limited extent and is starting to publish and share government data online but is reluctant to do so.

6. Conclusion The chapter presents an overview of the digital presence of the ministries of foreign affairs in the region of Western Balkans. The region was selected since it is often observed due to the future European Union integration processes, yet we lack first-hand data from the field. Our research carried out in the years 2017 and 2018 first elaborated existing databases and online information on the development of digital diplomacy for the selected countries. Additionally, it introduced first hand data extracted through structured interviews with official communicators at the ministries of foreign affairs in the selected countries. The data gathered were analyzed, grouped and countries were ranked according to the levels of ODMM. In this regard, our research provides a new contribution to science since it ranks the selected countries according to their digital country profiles and ODMM levels. Our findings show that the observed countries vary from Level 1, according to the ODMM, (Bosnia and Herzegovina) where MFA is present on the website but has no specific social media activity. Serbia according to our research is at Level 2 since the MFA is to a limited extent present on social media and shares data online to the public. Montenegro is at Level 3 since the MFA has opened itself toward public ideas and knowledge (open participation). Kosovo and Macedonia reached Level 4, where both MFAs are fostering open collaboration among governmental agencies and public and private sector. The most mature country would in accordance with our findings and the ODMM be thus Albania reaching

Digital Diplomacy in Practice    201 Level 5 with ubiquitous engagement. The MFA has established a transparent, participatory and collaborative environment, where public can relatively easily participate in debates online through social media. The provided data present a new approach toward analyzing digital diplomacy and provide value added to the observed topic. The data gathered among professional communicators at MFAs in the selected countries show a need for further research of the digital developments in diplomacy.

References Bjola, C. (2016a). Digital diplomacy – The state of the art. Global Affairs, 2(3), 297–299. Bjola, C. (2016b). Getting digital diplomacy right: What quantum theory can teach us about measuring impact. Global Affairs, 2(3), 345–353. Burson-Marsteller. (2018). Twiplomacy study 2017. Retrieved from http://twiplomacy.com/ CIA. (2018). CIA World Factbook – Population. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2212.html Clarke, A. (2014). Business as usual? An evaluation of British and Canadian digital diplomacy as institutional adaptation. In C. Bjola & M. Holmes (Eds.), Digital diplomacy: Theory and practice (pp. 111–26). London: Routledge. Diplomacy Live. (2018). Digital diplomacy review 2017. Retrieved from http://digital.diplomacy.live/digital-diplomacy-atlas-2017/ Doehler, A., & United Macedonian Diaspora. (2017). UMD Macedonian digital diplomacy report. Retrieved from https://drive.google.com/file/d/1WH1CHUt1iU4nCInAmn0sUT1bBt_ 9zpSF/view European Commission. (2018). Strategy for the Western Balkans. Retrieved from https:// ec.europa.eu/commission/news/strategy-western-balkans-2018-feb-06_en Fletcher, T. (2013), Ambassador 2020. Retrieved from http://blogs.fco.gov.uk/tomfletcher/2013/09/04/ambassador-2020/. Accessed on April 4, 2016. GSMA Intelligence. (2018). Global data. Retrieved from https://www.gsmaintelligence.com/ Hayden, C. (2012). Social media at state: Power, practice, and conceptual limits for US Public Diplomacy. Global Media Journal, 11(21), 1–15. Hocking, B., Melissen, J., Riordan, S., & Sharp, P. (2012). Futures for diplomacy: Integrative diplomacy in the 21st Century (No. 1). The Hague: Clingendael, Netherlands Institute of International Relations. Retrieved from https://www.clingendael.org/ sites/default/files/pdfs/20121030_research_melissen.pdf IMF. (2017). World economic outlook database October 2017. Retrieved from http://www. imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/02/weodata/index.aspx International Telecommunications Union (ITU). (2017). ICT facts and figures 2017. Retrieved from http://news.itu.int/itu-releases-2017-global-information-and-communicationtechnology-facts-and-figures/ Internet Worldstats. (2017). Internet, Facebook and population stats for Europe. Retrieved from https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats4.htm Justinek, G. (2018). (Economic) Diplomacy: In need of a new paradigm? Research handbook on economic diplomacy bilateral relations in a context of geopolitical change. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. Kampf, R., Manor, I., & Segev, E. (2015). Digital diplomacy 2.0? A cross-national comparison of public engagement in Facebook and Twitter. Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 10(4), 331–362.

202    Gorazd Justinek et al. Klavins, D. (2012). Transformation of diplomacy. Retrieved from https://www.sylff.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/df167deba2dda4fb19d23be1c62e2400.pdf Lee, G., & Kwak, Y. H. (2012). An open government maturity model for social mediabased public engagement. Government Information Quarterly, 29(4), 492–503. Manor, I. (2016). Are we there yet: Have MFAs realized the potential of digital diplomacy? Results from a cross-national comparison. Brill Research Perspectives in Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, 1(2), 1–110. Riordan, S. (2016). The strategic use of digital and public diplomacy in pursuit of national objective. Retrieved from http://focir.cat/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/FOCIR_ Pensament_1_Shaun-Riordan_Digital_Diplomacy1.pdf Sedej, T., & Justinek, G. (2013). Social media in internal communications: A view from senior management. In Bondarouk, T., Bondarouk , Olivas-Luján, M. R. (Eds.), Social media in human resources management. Advanced Series in Management (Volume 12, pp. 83–95). Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing. Ünver, H. A. (2017). Computational diplomacy. Retrieved from http://edam.org.tr/wp-­ content/uploads/2017/11/bilisimsel_diplomasi_EN.pdf We Are Social and Hootsuite. (2017a). Active mobile social media penetration in European countries in January 2017. Retrieved from https://www.statista.com/statistics/299492/ active-mobile-social-media-penetration-in-european-countries/ We Are Social and Hootsuite. (2017b). Active social media penetration in European countries in January 2017. Retrieved from https://www.statista.com/statistics/295660/ active-social-media-penetration-in-european-countries/

Chapter 14

Social Media and the Brazilian Politics: A Close Look at the Different Perspectives and “The Brazil I Want” Initiative Cleber Pinelli Teixeira, Jônatas Castro dos Santos, Reisla D’Almeida Rodrigues, Sean Wolfgand Matsui Siqueira and Renata Araujo Abstract As the Web 2.0 induces changes in human relationships, several implications across issues and domains of socio-economic life follow; politics is one of them. In the context of Web 2.0, social media have established themselves as a part of citizen’s daily routine. Hence, social media have a direct impact on politics today. This chapter examines this phenomenon and its implications for politics by tracing and examining the recent initiative launched by Rede Globo aimed at collecting citizens’ views and visions on Brazil’s future. “The Brazil I Want” project sought to encourage citizens to publish videos featuring their visions and views of Brazil’s future. Thousands of citizens used this opportunity to express their concerns and hopes related to the future of their cities and their country. This chapter seeks to make sense of it in two ways. First, it explores to what extent and how social media can serve as source of information. Here the concepts and tools of big data and data mining are employed. Second, it inquiries into what people currently think about their country. By bringing these two research perspectives together, this chapter argues that effective ways of resolving issues and concerns the citizens thus voiced exist to the benefit of the efficiency of the policymaking process and the society’s wellbeing. Keywords: Politics; Information and communication technologies; big data; data mining; social media; natural language processing

Politics and Technology in the Post-Truth Era, 203–219 Copyright © 2019 Cleber Pinelli Teixeira, Jônatas Castro dos Santos, Reisla D’Almeida Rodrigues, Sean Wolfgand Matsui Siqueira and Renata Araujo doi:10.1108/978-1-78756-983-620191014

204    Cleber Pinelli Teixeira et al.

Introduction Information and communication technologies (ICT) have been transforming the way how people think and act, contributing to human life, by optimizing their processes of solving problems. However, the evolution carries a balance of advantages and disadvantages, which means that along with solutions, new problems may arise. The growth of the Web represents a huge contribution to globalization, but on the other hand, it brings lots of issues such as privacy, ethics, and security. The Web 2.0 (O’Reilly, 2005) changed a boundary where anyone without technical knowledge or infrastructure could produce and publish data available on the web. It created this new era of high volume of information flowing through the Internet and specially in social media (Obar & Wildman, 2015), where users make a massive use of the web, publishing, sharing, and consuming resources. There are zettabytes of useful information of all kinds that needs to be processed and updated quickly. This huge amount of information helps unveil hidden patterns to make better and strategized decisions (Khanduja, Arora, & Garg, 2017). As data can be collected from various sources in an unstructured and disorganized way it builds what is called Big Data (Khan, Uddin, & Gupta, 2014), and its analysis can be applied to particular domains, such as politics. Nowadays, we live in a transition moment where technology acts both as facilitator and threat to democracy. In the particular context of the elections, the citizen’s opinions are a guide for discussions and proposals for politicians in their campaigns. From the citizens point of view, online mobilization, enabled by social media, has become a socio-political action channel that provides new ways to make claims about democracy and the reorganization of society (Ramos, 2019). However, there is a standoff between citizens’ ability to use technology (Lytras & Visvizi, 2018) and data availability and their use to address big companies and politicians’ interests. As social media become more influent, it is important to understand current democratic practices and challenges in order to design citizen-oriented alternatives that create more participatory, open, and transparent political organizations through the use of ICT (Federici, Braccini, & Sæbø, 2015). While society gets more involvement with the virtual world, group influence and manipulation based on social networks become a new area of study (Metaxas & Mustafaraji, 2012). The understanding of this new area allows the prediction of social behavior as never before, since the data from social media can be monitored or collected on demand and used as input for analysis, since Big Data mining tools are able to support on discovering knowledge (Khanduja et al., 2017). This chapter brings an overview of the main perspectives of politics and ICT, explaining some perspectives of how this nexus impacts the society, the effects on stakeholders and ICT resources. A recent initiative in Brazil called “The Brazil I Want” (TBIW) was traced and examined according to these perspectives. Thousands of citizens embraced this initiative, sending short videos to express their concerns and hopes related to the future of their cities and their country. Departing from this scenario, this chapter explores to what extent and how social media can serve as source of information, employing big data and data mining

Politics and ICT: Issues and Challenges    205 concepts and tools to discuss what Brazilian citizens currently think about their country. The study also compares the main subjects from the citizens’ videos to industry issues. Finally, this chapter argues that effective ways of resolving issues and concerns the citizens thus voiced exist to the benefit of the efficiency of the policymaking process and the society’s wellbeing.

Perspectives of Social Media Impact on Politics The Web 2.0 enables new places for participation and attracts new citizens to participate in democratic decisions, although researchers believe that Internet is not able to fundamentally cure the problem of participatory inequality (Jafarkarimi, Sim, Saadatdoost, & Hee, 2014). The main implications can be seen under some points of view, and some different perspectives. The perspectives, as detailed in the following subsections, represent an attempt of categorizing the impact of social media in politics, answering how this impact takes place (attitudes, behavior, and actions), who is impacted or may promote impact (stakeholders or actors), and what brings the impact (the new paradigm brought by Web 2.0 and its digital era transformation).

Attitude’s Perspective Two antagonistic approaches regarded to human behavior influence the way how ICT are used for: an optimistic approach indicates ways for common goodness and social growth, while a pessimistic approach indicates ways for the individual or corporate interest to overcome social regards and benefits. Optimistic Approach. Digital democracy can be defined as the pursuit and the practice of democracy in whatever view using digital media in online and offline political communication (Van Dijk, 2012). Since the social media is widespread in our daily life nowadays, the democracy may not be thought disconnected to it. As an optimistic perspective, digital democracy enhances participation in political decision-making by citizens. The technology used as a beneficial purpose is able to support the democracy by opening the communication between society and government. Transparency is a requirement for democracy, since government must report the achievements, the importance of decisions to society, and the obedience to law in order to guarantee ethical use of public resources. The first step to ensure the transparency is allowing open access to government data, which must be indexable, intelligible, and replicable (Eaves, 2018). In Brazil, open data is also discussed in the context of public institutions (Silva & Aquino Júnior, 2018) and toward an open data innovation ecosystem (Siqueira, Bittencourt, Isotani, & Nunes, 2017). The publication and integration of data on the web through reports and balances enable citizens to monitor the results of government actions giving the possibility for more complex analysis and bringing further solutions for the issues reported (Barbosa, Bittencourt, Siqueira, de Amorim Silva, & Calado, 2017; Breitman et al., 2012; Lytras, Raghavan, & ­Damiani, 2017).

206    Cleber Pinelli Teixeira et al. Ethical behavior is another requirement which aims to guarantee that the decisions made by government leaders are focused on the society as a whole instead of particular group’s interests. It can be defined as a guideline for actions and decisions, not only in government, but for all citizens in charge of guaranteeing the reliability and applicability of law and institutions. Technology must support transparency and accountability mechanisms to minimize such inadequate behavior (Bertot, Jaeger, & Grimes, 2012; Carothers & Brechenmacher, 2014). Inadequate behavior somehow means possibility for corruption. There are a number of ways in which social media can help reduce the cost of fighting corruption (Bertot, Jaeger, & Grimes, 2010; Jha & Sarangi, 2014; Sandoval-Almazan & Gil-Garcia, 2014; Shirky, 2011): a larger number of social media users would mean a larger audience for the victims of extortive corruption that wish to share a corruption related incident; social media provides cheap and speedy means of sharing information and reaching a larger audience to organize public protests against the corrupt activities of government officials and politicians; it can also impact corruption by enabling a free press (traditional print and broadcast media and online news portals) to reach out and disseminate information to a larger population; and finally, interaction in social media platforms is typically among friends and family and this personal touch to information may give it more credibility. Pessimistic Approach. Traditional media channels are still popular and reliable (in terms of exhibition of authentic facts), which means that it may have a strong influence over society. However, it does not mean that information is impartial and free of deliberateness (Esch & del Bianco, 2016; Semary & Khaja, 2013). Some inappropriate behaviour may be supported by technology and amplified by social media, such as fake news, which have been highlighted lately as a harmful behavior that supposedly resulted in a mass manipulation with serious consequences in the politics and future nations (Amarasingam, 2011; Lazer et al., 2018). While people are not aware of the maneuvers, some tricks are still effective for mass manipulation during elections by the creation of advertisements maintained by opponent candidates making it go viral; bots created and acting like humans, and perhaps there are some unrevealed approaches that may create some kind of influences. There are already some exposed incidents such as Trump’s election supported by fake news (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017), and possibly in other countries it might have happened although it is still undetected.

Stakeholder’s Perspective Subject’s perception is influenced by each group’s interests and how they are immersed into technologies. Political actors must redesign their actions based on the digital era. There is a categorization of actors for e-participation (Sæbø, Rose, & Skiftenes Flak, 2008), based on that, some of these actors are highlighted in the context of this work. Policymakers. They have the role of adapting the legislation, rules and governance compatible with Web 2.0 in order to establish boundaries to the ethical behavior proper to reach democracy. The wide availability of public data for

Politics and ICT: Issues and Challenges    207 re-use seems to be an important enabling factor for this context (Osimo, 2008). The publication of budgets, the laws on information access, and the monitoring of legislative activity could help controlling corruption and reducing the gap between citizen and representatives. Two dimensions should be considered in this perspective, the analysis of transparency in the process of law-making and citizen participation in policymaking (Welp, 2010). Researchers and Scholars. They have the task of understanding the different contexts of e-participation and developing better frameworks, procedures, methods, and software tools for varying contexts and objectives (Sæbø et al., 2008). As an interdisciplinary area, it encourages sociotechnical researchers to investigate the main impacts of social media in the politics, looking for ways to collect, treat, and analyze data. Information technology researchers must promote new platforms and tools to regulate actions in the digital world, develop innovative ways to handle huge amount of data and provide ways of accessing information with no technical skills required. Social researchers are encouraged to understand the impact on individuals, society, and economy. Citizens. Politics may have a negative connotation, especially when citizens are not able, well prepared, or even interested to actively participate into the decision process. Social media has changed the way people get informed about their communities, and national and global current events. Beyond that, community collaboration, and social protests have become a powerful tool of expression against governments or government policies. Social media has become a powerful tool for the society, as a platform of discussion, collaboration and publication of their ideas, opinions, and concerns. It has the potential to sensitize citizens to understand the intricacies of politics and their roles in electing their leaders (Udanor, Aneke, & Ogbuokiri, 2016). Furthermore, open data about candidates and political parties in an intelligible way would represent a useful service to support the society in making better choices (Breitman, 2012). Politicians and Political Parties. They are brought closer to their potential voters (Udanor et al., 2016). By getting more popular in the social platforms, the politician’s voice can be heard by more people and establish more direct contact with electorate (Osimo, 2008). They may use tools to analyze social media and understand the target audience in order to suitably prepare their speech and proposals, or even use strategies to go viral by understanding and applying the concepts of echo chambers (Garrett, 2009) and filter bubble (Pariser, 2011). Those who can effectively use these resources and become successful in social media may have some advantage over the opposition. Governmental Institutions. They should be aware of issues regarded to public safety or general quality of life. The information can be discovered, monitored, and mitigated by analyzing social media streams to detect meaningful patterns and trends (Kavanaugh et al., 2012). The large use of mobile devices enables a wide range of possibilities, such as real-time data analysis for crisis response. A feasible way to enhance the quality of online democratic activities is aiming at increasing the access of online systems by educating people, providing infrastructure, expanding e-government systems, and exploring cultural factors (Jafarkarimi et al., 2014).

208    Cleber Pinelli Teixeira et al. Organizations. As new platforms and applications are being created, useful information is available to citizens. Private organizations (business companies) may use social data for commercial interests, analyzing and perhaps selling it to political parties. Since we live in the digital era, information means represents business opportunities. Organizations may use the data for many purposes such as predicting behavior, extracting insights, and perhaps returning some benefits to society.

ICT’s Perspective There are many ways to store and handle data in political context. Even if there are many platforms holding big social data in a proprietary, unstructured and heterogeneous manner, the data still can be captured since there are technology facilities for that. From ICT perspective, the real world has been modeled into a collection of data, whether there is access to this data, it is possible to make analysis over it. Real-world Modeled into Data. Social media is increasing its relevance and time spent by people on it is increasing too. The use of mobile devices also contributes to social media production of data, enriched with geolocation encompassing data production in real time. Even when merely sharing mass media contents, people can easily add their own personal layer of meanings onto the previous content through, for instance, a brief statement (Gan, Lee, & Li, 2017). From Data to Insight. It used to be difficult to capture tremendous amount of unstructured data from heterogeneous sources and make meaning out of them at the speed they were being generated (Udanor et al., 2016). Currently, there are lots of techniques, tools and platforms for analyzing social media and how to use them (Batrinca & Treleaven, 2015). One example of approach is explained as follows, firstly a method to fetch the data is needed; then a regular expression used for convert data into intelligible information and other resources for cleaning up the data so that it can be handled; some resources of speech to text in case of handling heterogeneous data, such as audio and video; and finally, a natural language processing may be used to make automatic analysis over text in scenarios of big data volumes.

“TBIW”: A Close Look into Brazilian Issues From the beginning of 2018, the Rede Globo1 (the most important free-to-air commercial television network in Brazil) has been conducting a campaign with the purpose of collecting citizens’ main ideas, suggestions, criticisms, and demands by asking the following question: “Which Brazil do you want for the future?” (“Que Brasil que você quer para o futuro?”2). Citizens answer it by recording a short video of 15 seconds in a place representing a specific location of the country. The videos

1

https://www.globo.com/ http://g1.globo.com/o-brasil-que-eu-quero/

2

Politics and ICT: Issues and Challenges    209 are sent spontaneously by citizens and have been selected and published daily in the journalistic channels. Then, they are made available on the television network website. One particular aspect of the data collected by this initiative is that the channel is supposed to exhibit the videos that come from every city in the country, motivating the participation of the most diverse people ranging from small villages in countryside to big and crowded cities, creating a huge and complete database. These videos sent by citizens are curated by the television network before publishing and the criteria are not explicit. This fact raises questions for both politicians and citizens, regarded to the reliability of the opinions that ends up published as city representativeness. This collection of videos represents a rich source of citizens’ opinions and expectations. It may be used according to an optimistic or pessimistic approach (attitude’s perspective) by the different stakeholders (stakeholder’s perspective), assuming they have the adequate tools (ICT’s perspective). For instance, policymakers may adapt the laws to support the citizens’ demands on combating corruption. Researchers may use data to generate different analysis and prove theories on social participation. Citizens could use apps that combine data from different sources in order to track politicians’ actions according to their election campaigns. The politicians may use this information with the real concern of solving the main reported issues or just as a strategy to their campaigns by using “psychology tricks” whenever they say what people want to hear in their election proposals, only for getting votes. Non-profit organizations can use the data to compare with other research and extract consolidated results. Private organizations may implement or suggest services and products for municipalities based on the issues reported through the videos.

Case Scenario This scenario was prepared in order to analyze data from Rede Globo initiative. This data was compared to an established research, correlating with latest news of the country, and also considering geographic data. For each 5,570 municipalities in Brazil a video has been selected to be exhibited, while the television merges the speeches of about six cities in a single video to be published. From the already available videos 1,054 videos (19%) have subtitles, from which it was possible to extract 480 videos (8% of the total). The extraction process could not handle all the videos due to some limitations in the automatic way of splitting the text, where the regex3 algorithm could not get the text properly of some subtitles, since some of them were out of the pattern. The whole process is shown in Fig. 1. Briefly explaining the process (Fig. 1) of collecting and analyzing the information from the videos: the videos subtitles were collected and stored in a database (by Celery4 with Django); then a regex algorithm in python5 was used to clean up

3

https://docs.python.org/2/library/re.html http://www.celeryproject.org/ 5 https://www.python.org/ 4

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Fig. 1:  Overall Process of Data Gathering, Extraction, and Handling. the text splitting into Brazilian cities; and the most commented keywords were extracted. The keywords were identified by Google NLP.6 The issues raised by videos from “TBIW” were then compared with the results from a 2018 survey of the National Confederation of Industry (in portuguese: Confederação Nacional da Indústria – CNI7). CNI is an institution that launches yearly a survey that inquires opinions about the issues and priorities for the country. As shown in Fig. 2, the keywords are highlighted in bold. The extraction process was done over the Portuguese version of the speech. Although both CNI and TBIW collect opinions from citizens, there are some different aspects. While TBIW is close to crowdsourcing, opened and without taxonomic structure, the CNI are more intentional, closed and in a settled taxonomy. In TBIW database, the citizens answer a unique subjective open question. In the CNI, on the other hand, there are options of subjects to be checked (structured answers). Considering these aspects, the keywords from TBIW acquired from Google NLP were listed in a set that matches CNI items for comparison. In this manner, a semantic equivalence was defined as shown in the sample presented in Table 1. In Table 2, there is a sample of the semantic selection for unemployment. At the bottom of the table the number of occurrences and the summation of salience (metric that represents the centrality of the keyword in the sentence) (Erkan & Radev, 2004) are shown. This number of occurrences represents a relevant evidence of the keyword in the text. The number of keywords occurrences in the semantic group was divided by the number of extracted cities (480 municipalities), in order to calculate the percentage. For instance, the number of keywords occurrences related to unemployment was 21. This value divided by the number of extracted cities (480) is 4.38%, as it can be seen in Table 4. As in Brazil each region holds its particularities, the results are shown by region in Table 3. As a parameter of comparison, the CNI result was presented in the same table. The Midwest was grouped along with North just to match the CNI data structure. There are some differences in the results between CNI and TBIW. While CNI is focused on the issues regarded to unemployment that match industry concerns and corruption that may decrease industry advances, TBIW is focused on issues regarded to education and health, as it is reported by individuals,

6

https://cloud.google.com/natural-language/ http://www.portaldaindustria.com.br/cni/

7

Politics and ICT: Issues and Challenges    211

Fig. 2:  Sample of a Subtitle. Table 1:  Sample of Keywords Equivalence TBIW × CNI. CNI Answers Unemployment Corruption Health

TBIW Keywords Employment, unemployment, opportunity, and opportunities Corruption, corrupt, and money laundry Health and hospital

Table 2:  Sample of Salience Result of the Keyword Employment in TBIW. State

City

Keyword

AL AL BA BA BA CE CE CE CE ES MS MT MT PB PE PI PI PR SC SP SP

Dois Riachos Dois Riachos Bom Jesus da Lapa Buritirama Medeiros Neto Acarape Cariús Maranguape Tauá Boa Esperança Chapadão do Sul Várzea Grande Várzea Grande Nova Palmeira Tacaratu Cocal Murici dos Portelas Castro Fraiburgo Arco-Íris Itápolis

Employment Unemployment Employment Employment Employment Employment Employment Employment Employment Employment Employment Unemployment Employment More employment Employment Employment Employment Employment Employment Employment Employment 21

Salience 0.04915527 0.0481441 0.0762452 0.13443923 0.07559355 0.0843649 0.07669808 0.05200692 0.07300145 0.06696285 0.03424783 0.06815063 0.05463687 0.22362822 0.08578987 0.06595293 0.04367119 0.06123642 0.07491689 0.06629591 0.05754074 1.5726

212    Cleber Pinelli Teixeira et al. Table 3:  Count of Most Commented Keywords Grouped by Region and Ordered by Occurrence Rates in TBIW. Region/ Keywords

O P(O|NR) CNI (%) (%)

Midwest/North Education Health Public security Corruption Unemployment

O P(O|NR) CNI (%) (%)

Northeast 56 39 30 28 7

64 45 34 32 8

12 45 35 56 59

Southeast Corruption Education Health Public security Unemployment

Region/ Keywords

Education Health Corruption Public security Unemployment

101 76 56 39 34

61 46 34 23 20

13 46 47 44 56

24 22 19 11 4

28 26 22 13  5

13 63 47 36 51

South 47 35 26 10 4

38 28 21 8 3

57 14 49 35 57

Education Corruption Health Public security Unemployment

Notes: O, occurrences and P(O|NR), proportion of occurrences by region.

which are more concerned about essential needs. Since each video recorded just 15 seconds of speech, there is no much information available, but just getting the keywords is already an evidence of what people are concerned about. Table 4 shows three parameters. First the percentage of answers of CNI for the question: “Considering the presented topics, in your opinion, which of them does Brazil face more issues currently?” Second, the percentage of keyword occurrences in TBIW, since only a few topics are mentioned in the 15 seconds, the result is much lower than CNI. Third, the summation of salience of the set of keywords is generated by Google NLP. The table is ordered by the first parameter (CNI rates). From Table 4, the chart presented in Fig. 3 was generated. It connects results of CNI and TBIW. The goal of this comparison is to check the relevance of findings on TBIW that matches the expectations of relevance from the points of view from citizens and industry. Some incoherencies are highlighted when comparing the occurrence of the semantic groups with the CNI results, as there is no corresponding keyword identified by TBIW. It can be explained by the fact that CNI offers a close list of choices while TBIW is an open survey where citizens can talk about any subjects they want, limited to 15 seconds. The same idea works for the keywords unemployment and life cost. On the other hand, education is much more expressed in TBIW than CNI, as the videos emphasize not only the problems, but also solutions to build a better country (while CNI focuses on industry problems).

Politics and ICT: Issues and Challenges    213 Table 4:  Comparison between CNI Answers and TBIW Correspondence. CNI Subjects Unemployment Corruption Health Public security/violence Cost of living/prices/inflation control Education quality Drugs Poverty/hunger Homeless issues Low wage High taxes Impunity/unfairness Drought/lack of water Low-income country/low country development Lack of moral values High interests Basic sanitation

% CNI

% TBIW TBIW Salience

55.90 55.25 47.30 37.50 13.30 13.25 11.65 9.65 7.10 7.05 6.30 5.45 3.80 3.70

4.38 16.88 16.25 11.04 6.67 20.63 0.21 2.50 1.67 1.88 3.13 2.92 0.42 1.25

1.57 6.06 5.41 3.63 2.21 7.14 0.07 0.85 0.49 0.61 1.05 0.95 0.16 0.51

2.65 2.65 2.30

0.83 – 1.25

0.30 – 0.34

Discussions The issues that people are more concerned about in the videos uploaded by the Brazilian citizens were grouped by the most commented keywords at TBIW. There are some correlations with latest news that is briefly explored, which indicates citizens’ perceptions of the Brazilian issues. Education. Brazil has a lack of quality education. While public schools face issues regarded to lack of investments that usually affects the quality of services, private schools tend to be expensive, which contributes to social inequality. As can be noticed in Table 3, while people from Southeast are more concerned about corruption, in the other regions of Brazil the most commented keywords is education. Raiser (2018) discusses the inequality of investment within Brazil stating that the poorest parts of the North and Northeast are still missing basic infrastructure while in the richer South and Southeast regions, inefficiencies are glaring. Health. People who need more care and more complex procedures of treatment usually complain about the health system quality, since it is not compatible with high taxes paid by citizens, and as a repercussion of the unsuitable way how politicians have been inappropriately investing public resources.

214    Cleber Pinelli Teixeira et al.

Fig. 3:  CNI X TBIW Data Occurrences Comparison.

According to data from government (public expenditure – Datasus8 and private expenditure – Agência Nacional de Saúde Suplementar, 2018), there are big differences within Brazil. Beyond that, there are other issues regarded to health system in Brazil, like the More Doctors Program that was created to support the health problems in Brazil, since the distribution of physicians within the municipalities face the same issue (Pinto et al., 2017). Apart from the focus on health system issue itself, the role of the government in influencing population health is not limited within the health sector but also by various sectors outside the health systems. Contribution to health of a population also derives from social determinants of health like living conditions, nutrition, safe drinking water, sanitation, education, early child development and social security measures (Lakshminarayanan, 2011). Corruption. Studies on corruption mostly use corruption measures that capture the perceptions of corruption rather than the actual phenomenon. An important reason for this is the fact that actual corruption, being an illegal activity by definition, is difficult, if not impossible, to document and measure (Jha & Sarangi, 2014). Corruption perception index in Brazil is reported by Trading

8

http://tabnet.datasus.gov.br/cgi/idb2012/Serie_Grupo_E.xlsx

Politics and ICT: Issues and Challenges    215 Economics9 and shows that the corruption was in a crescent flow until the first scandals started. The Operation Car Wash is an example of scandal where many private and public figures have been investigated for corruption since 2014. Several people have been arrested so far, and the operation goes on (BBC News, 2018). Whether news platforms emerge, citizens may participate more actively in the election process by reporting and checking irregularity about politicians. The Detector de Ficha de Político10 (Politician’s Record Detector) is an example of a platform to support citizens while choosing their candidates during the elections and is available for mobile applications. It consolidates official data from politicians about corruption cases and represents a reason for politicians to be more concerned about their actions and reputation. Public Security. Brazil has been suffering a public security crisis caused by a number of reasons. Lately, some of the news are internationally exhibited, in special a Federal Military Intervention is taking place in Rio de Janeiro in order to take control of the security (Londoño & Darlington, 2018). Web-based collaborative systems are effective tools to track some issues that occur in Brazil, one of them applied for public security is the application Onde fui roubado11 (“Where I was robbed”). There are some other applications for this purpose, such as Onde Tem Tiroteio12 (“Where does shooting happens”) and Fogo Cruzado13 (“Crossed fire”). These applications are becoming popular in Brazil and it is an indication that public security is an issue. Unemployment. The unemployment rates have been increasing since 2014, as can be seen in Trading Economics.14 This scenario obligates people to accept lower salaries and it also contributes to the social inequality.

Conclusions and Recommendations Politics and public administration are being strongly impacted by ICT and specially by Web 2.0, as a result of changes in human behavior, deeply affected by social media, and by how the Big Data analysis are used for. There are some implications regarded to elections process and government establishment where stakeholders should be aware in order to get the benefits with ethics and conscious of the politics. In addition, education, health, and public security, among other issues are impacted by how people notice the problems and solutions. Thousands of videos were used to capture the Brazilian citizens’ concerns and hopes related to the future of their cities and their country. Although the process of handling data in the study scenario had some limitations, such as videos

9

https://tradingeconomics.com/brazil/corruption-index http://www.vigieaqui.com.br/detectordefichadepolitico 11 http://www.ondefuiroubado.com.br/ 12 https://www.ondetemtiroteio.com.br/ 13 https://fogocruzado.org.br/ 14 https://tradingeconomics.com/brazil/unemployment-rate 10

216    Cleber Pinelli Teixeira et al. without subtitle or with problems in the subtitles as well as NLP limitations for Portuguese language, good insights were taken from the data. It was possible to compare the videos data with a consolidated base from industry (CNI), and some analyses were made. The study shows the relevance of the collected data from TBIW initiative and reaffirms the issues that Brazil has faced lately at citizens’ point of view as they are aligned to the most relevant news today. Some of the issues raised on the videos reinforce indexes reported by agencies and institutes. For other issues there are applications and services that provide useful information to citizens and support the government to take actions for social or economic purposes. Innovative forms of information processing for enhanced insight and decisionmaking are welcome to fulfill society needs for public utility services and also are opening doors for new business opportunities, since the process of extracting information from data requires some expertise. As future perspectives, the social media tend to improve the interaction between politicians and citizens both for supporting election and also tracking government actions, resulting in better public administration. There are some challenges that can be investigated as future works, such as promoting improvements in the automatic data treatment and applying semantic and sentiment analysis, so that it encompasses more intelligible data to the base resulting in a more efficient data mining process. Furthermore, a cross-validation with data from social networks and other social media and news would provide a more reliable understanding of the politics scenario and how the different players interact. However, the biggest challenge is to manage trolling and opportunistic behavior in the digital era where each stakeholder has an important role to reinforce the transparency and ethics and to prevent self-centered behavior. Meanwhile, government and policymakers should implement processes to support a transparent and virtuous e-democracy ecosystem in order to be able to handle big data mining aiming at people’s wellbeing.

Acknowledgments This work was partially supported by CNPQ (project: 312039/2015-8) and CAPES (bursary).

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Chapter 15

Evaluation of the National Open Government Data (OGD) Portal of Saudi Arabia Stuti Saxena Abstract Increasingly, Open Government Data (OGD), a philosophy and set of policies, gains on momentum today. Believed to promote transparency, accountability and value creation by making government data available to all (OECD, 2018), OGD constitutes a yet another field in which the interlocking relation between technological advances and politics can be studied. Using the national OGD portal of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (http://www.data.gov. sa/en) as a case study, this evaluates the portal to underline the significance of maintaining the quality of the data sets published online. The usability framework (Machova, Hub, & Lnenicka 2018) constitutes the framework for evaluation of the OGD portal. The findings suggest that there are many drivers to re-use the data sets published via the portal. At the same time, however, there are barriers to re-use the data sets on account of the non-publication of updated data sets. Implicitly, quality of the data sets should be improved. More involvement of the government agencies is required for contributing toward the data sets. Also, user involvement should be promoted by encouraging them to contribute to the data sets and lending recommendations for the improvisation of the data sets published via the portal. Keywords: Open Government Data; open data; government; Saudi Arabia; quality; datasets

Introduction Conceived both as a philosophy as well as a set of policies, Open Government Data (OGD) relate to the data published by the government which is freely

Politics and Technology in the Post-Truth Era, 221–235 Copyright © 2019 Stuti Saxena doi:10.1108/978-1-78756-983-620191015

222    Stuti Saxena available for being re-used by different stakeholder groups (citizens, journalists, researchers, entrepreneurs, etc.) to derive value out of the same and improvise upon their services (Alexopoulos, Loukis, & Charalabidis, 2014; Attard, Orlandi, Scerri, & Auer, 2015; Kassen, 2013; OECD, 2018). Such data may relate to different socio-economic sectors like weather, agriculture, industry, energy, power, education, trade, etc. (Ubaldi, 2013). As one of the examples of integration of information technology (IT) and the domain of politics (see for instance, Justinek, Carli, & Omahna, 2019; Sicilia & Visvizi, 2018), OGD is an advanced format of e-government which promotes transparency, accountability, and citizen trust because the government publishes the hitherto-reserved data for wider usage (Mpinganjira, 2015). Apart from facilitating citizen engagement, OGD initiatives help in improvising upon public policies and contribute toward efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of the government. As such, Open Data may be defined as “machine-readable data (which is) discoverable, available, and downloadable through dedicated internet portals without cost to potential data users” (Dawes, Vidiasova, & Parkhimovich, 2016, p. 15). For earning benefits from the OGD initiative, it is important that the data sets are published in a timely manner and they should be complete in all aspects (for instance, metadata, data entries, legible formats, provision of visualization and analytical tools, etc.; Jaeger, Bertot, & Shilton, 2012). Open data initiatives spur innovation through co-creation activities of the government and the other stakeholders (Verhulst & Young, 2016). For instance, software developers and the government collaborate on the social coding platform GitHub to contribute toward the revamped version of the source code (Mergel, 2015). It has also been underlined that sustainable OGD initiatives help in the economic growth of the country (Charalabidis, Alexopoulos, & Loukis, 2016; Jung & Park, 2015; Saxena, 2017a; Wirtz & Birkmeyer, 2015). Implicitly, the OGD initiative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) has the potential of facilitating the economic diversification of the country and meeting the goals of the Vision 2030 espoused by the government. However, to assess the potential of the OGD initiative, it is important that the data sets published by the government online are qualitatively and quantitatively adequate. This would facilitate optimum re-use of the data sets for deriving social and economic value out of them. In line with the aforesaid, this chapter invokes the usability framework (Machova, Hub, & Lnenicka, 2018) to present a case study where we evaluate the national OGD portal of Saudi Arabia (http://www.data.gov.sa/en) in terms of the data quality and underline the drivers and barriers in re-using the data sets published via the portal. The key research question guiding the case study is: “What are the drivers and barriers in re-using the datasets published via the national OGD portal of Saudi Arabia?” Further, the findings from the case study emphasize the need for maintaining the quality of the data sets published therein. As the first detailed study to investigate the national OGD portal of the country, the case study is a significant contribution to the OGD literature. The chapter is structured as follows: after summarizing the literature on OGD, a brief shall be provided about the research methodology invoked in the chapter wherein the case study on Saudi Arabian national OGD portal shall be elaborated.

Evaluation of the National OGD Portal of Saudi Arabia    223 Thereafter, concluding remarks shall be provided to summarize the major inferences. The penultimate sections of the chapter shall detail the social and practical implications of the case study and leave pointers for further research.

Related Research OGD is an emerging phenomenon and academic interest in the field is increasing over a period of time. While most of the studies are conducted in the West where Open Data initiatives are being undertaken at an advanced level, studies in the developing countries are few and far between (Huijboom & Van den Broek, 2011; Janssen, Charalabidis, & Zuiderwijk, 2012; Saxena, 2017a; Saxena & Janssen, 2017; Zuiderwijk & Janssen, 2014). Implicitly, there is a need for conducting more research in the developing countries to underline the impediments in the implementation of the OGD initiative (Charalabidis et al., 2016) besides drawing lessons from the countries who been successful in the implementation of the Open Data initiatives (Nugroho, Zuiderwijk, Janssen, & de Jong, 2015). Such contextual studies, including the empirical ones, provide cases of the success or failure of OGD initiatives. For instance, Rothenberg (2012) followed a case study approach wherein the OGD frameworks of USA, UK, Canada, and New Zealand were compared. The purpose of selecting these four countries lay in the marked similarities of culture among them. Likewise, a study based in Africa aimed at understanding the extent of OGD implementation regarding the characteristics of an “ideal” OGD portal and the study was conducted in five (Ghana, Kenya, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Tanzania) out of the seven (Ghana, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Morocco, South Africa, Kenya, and Tanzania) OGD centers (Afful-Dadzie & Afful-Dadzie, 2017). In another study, the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology model was adapted in order to conduct an empirical investigation in the Netherlands and identify the factors which impact the usage and adoption of OGD (Zuiderwijk, Janssen, & Dwivedi, 2015). In an empirical investigation conducted on a sample of 210 citizens in Germany, the extended Technology Acceptance Model was deployed to underline the relationship between the constructs (ease of use, usefulness, transparency expectancy, participation expectancy, collaboration, intention to use OGD, and word-of-mouth intention concerning OGD) and it was found that all the five constructs were significant predictors of Intention to use OGD and to collaborate among each other using word-of-mouth (Wirtz, Weyerer, & Rosch, 2017). In another empirical investigation conducted in India with a sample of 244 respondents, OGD use and acceptance among different users was probed and it was concluded that OGD use has increased in the country and men are more likely to tap OGD than women (Saxena & Janssen, 2017). All these studies underlined the reasons as to why OGD initiatives are yet to realize their cherished aims in terms of promoting accountability in administration and furthering citizen participation in policymaking. Literature on OGD has provided an understanding that the demand-supply equation of any OGD initiative merits a careful consideration and this entails that the legal provisions regarding publication of data sets and the concern for

224    Stuti Saxena privacy of the individuals (Martin, 2014). For instance, data sets are “supplied” by the government agencies and data sets may also be “suggested” or “recommended” by the users. Likewise, data sets may be “demanded” by the stakeholders for their purposes. The “supply” side may be bolstered by ensuring that the entire OGD publication value-chain is qualitatively and quantitatively superior and the “demand” side may be strengthened by the user engagement and involvement in the OGD initiative. Many studies have provided frameworks for investigating OGD initiatives. For instance, Martin (2014) has provided a framework for underlining the social and technological aspects of OGD initiative. The framework includes five dimensions – digital technologies (configurations that include tangible artifacts, the skills of technologists and users, and the interfaces of artifacts with the wider technical infrastructure), user practices (manner in which data is being re-used by a large cross-section of stakeholders), public management practices (includes the processes of data and information and communication technology [ICT] management and established data-related policies), institutions (include the sets of rules that connect data users and government organizations, including data markets and regulatory frameworks for government data), and resources (the resources drawn upon by actors shaping the OGD data agenda as including: social capital (the networks that connect actors); cultural capital (cultural goods and services, such as skills and knowledge); economic capital (money and other assets that can be directly and immediately converted to money); and symbolic capital: the means available on the basis of (perceived) prestige or legitimacy. Another study provides a model which outlines the stages in the roll-out of any OGD initiative (Kalampokis, Tambouris, & Tarabanis, 2011a, 2011b). Kalampokis et al. (2011a) have classified OGD into “downloadable files” (data are available in simple formats), “linked data” (data are linked with another one and re-used), “direct data provision” (all data are available via a portal and synchronized with time) and “indirect data provision” (actual data are provided and the user is responsible for further aggregation and processing of the data). Therefore, a four-stage model (aggregation of government data, integration of government data, integration of government data with non-government data, and integration of government data with non-government formal and social data) is identified by Kalampokis et al. (2011a). However, the drawback of the study lay in being more technical in approach wherein the emphasis was laid down on the crude mechanistic dimensions of linked data. Saxena (2017b) provided a typology of countries on the basis of their OGD adherence (“laggard,” “caged,” “forerunner,” and “champ”) wherein the “laggard” countries are the ones where there are hindrances associated with OGD implementation and OGD usage; “caged” countries are those with less propensity to implement OGD initiative but increased potential of usage by different stakeholders; “forerunner” countries as those which hold high potential of rolling out an OGD initiative but low potential of usage by different stakeholders; and “champ” countries as those which ranked high in terms of implementation of an OGD program as well as usage by diverse set of stakeholders (p. 219).

Evaluation of the National OGD Portal of Saudi Arabia    225 In another study, another model expounds the degree of interaction among the stakeholders involved in the OGD initiatives directly or indirectly (Sieber & Johnson, 2015). Thus, Sieber and Johnson (2015) provide four models which deal with the “nature of (OGD) delivery (which) shapes the way the data is used” (Sieber & Johnson, 2015, p. 310). Table 1 summarizes the four models. While the aforementioned models are descriptive, the overall comprehensiveness in terms of quality assessment of the data sets is missing. Therefore, the present case study seeks to adopt the evaluation framework proposed by Machova et al. (2018). In their benchmarking framework derived from the reading of the literature on OGD, 3 dimensions (criteria) and 14 sub-criteria were defined which Table 1:  Citizen Engagement Models Proposed by Sieber and Johnson (2015). Model Data over the wall

Code exchange

Civic issue tracker

Participatory open data

Description This is the basic citizen engagement model wherein the government publishes data sets on the online portal directly. Basic features like downloading of data sets, visualization, mapping, or sorting are allowed. Data sets are available in formats like PDF, Excel, etc. Programmatic access may be permissible via software-to-software interface (i.e., application programming interface). Users are encouraged to report errors in the form of feedback Government encourages the re-use of data sets for innovating products and services. Therefore, the government publicizes and promotes the OGD initiative by holding events, conferences, workshops, or “app” contests. Software or application “app” developers, civic hackers, and social entrepreneurs are encouraged to participate in such promotional activities Citizens contribute to the existing data sets in many ways. For instance, citizens report of civic problems (e.g., fire, accidents, drainage problems, floods, potholes, etc.) which necessitate immediate action by the government authorities. By encouraging participation of citizens in the OGD initiative, the government is regularly informed about the civic issues and this facilitates in revising and updating the data sets (Alexopoulos et al., 2014; Dawes & Helbig, 2010) As an ideal model wherein citizens and governments enter into a dialogue via the OGD initiative, there is active engagement and participation of citizens in the policy-making and policyimplementation stages. Citizens are encouraged to freely contribute toward the existing data sets via the online portal. Furthermore, all grievances of the citizens pertaining to the quality of the data sets are rectified in the prescribed manner. Data sets are qualitatively superior in this model with metadata and permit statistical analysis, interpretation, visualization, and mapping

Table 2:  Model Proposed for Evaluating OGD Portals. Dimension (1) Open data set specifications

(2) Open data set feedback

(3) Open data set request

Criteria (a) Description of data set

Description

Portal provides data sets together with their description and how and for what purpose they were collected (b) Publisher of Portal provides information about data set organization that published data sets (c) Thematic Portal provides thematic categories of data categories and sets to address the main topics covered. It tags distinguishes categories (themes) from tags (keywords) (d) Release date Portal provides data sets associated with and up to date a specific time or period tag, that is, date published, date updated, and its frequency (e) Machine Portal provides data sets formats that are readable formats machine readable and allow for easy reuse (f) Open data Portal provides license information related license to the use of the published data sets (g) Visualization Portal provides visualization and analytics and analytics capabilities to gain information about tools a data set, for example, in charts or visualizations in maps (a) Documentation Portal provides high quality of and tutorials documentation and tutorials to help users in learning how to use the portal (b) Forum and Portal provides an opportunity to submit contact form feedback on a data set from the users to providers and forum to discuss and exchange ideas among the users (c) User rating Portal provides capabilities allowing the and comments collection of user ratings and comments on a data set (d) Social media Portal provides the integration with social and sharing media technologies to create a distribution channel for open data and sharing feedback (a) Request form Portal provides a form to request or suggest new type or format type of open data (b) List of Portal provides a list of requests that were requests received from users, including the current state of request processing (c) Involvement Portal provides capabilities allowing the in the process involvement in the active requests, that is, express interest in the same data set

Source: Machova et al. (2018).

Evaluation of the National OGD Portal of Saudi Arabia    227 were a function of data discoverability, data accessibility, and reusability. Table 2 reproduces the framework proposed by them.

Evaluation of the National OGD Portal: A Case Study of the Saudi Arabian OGD Initiative The KSA is pushing forth a progressive agenda to tackle the challenges posed by the hydrocarbon sector which has hitherto remained the chief plank of its economic growth. The government underlined its major ideals in the Vision 2030 which was released in 2015/2016. Resting on the thematic principles of “a vibrant society,” a thriving economy,” and “an ambitious nation,” the Vision document showcases the need for developing sustainable platforms for the country to grow and thrive. Under the aegis of the National Transformation Program, steps are being taken to ensure that the resuscitation of the Saudi economy is fructified into non-hydrocarbon sectors like tourism, energy, infrastructure, and the like. Saudi Arabia occupies 30th spot out of 137 countries in the Global Competitiveness Report (2017–2018). While the report underlines relative stability of the macroenvironment in Saudi Arabia, challenges of ensuring financial market efficiency still remain to be tackled. Given the prospects of OGD initiatives in furthering economic growth, we posit that the OGD initiative of the KSA has the potential of aiding the country in its economic diversification moves. Apart from furthering economic growth, the OGD initiative should facilitate citizen participation and collaboration in improvising public services and making them more efficient and effective. Data sets published under the aegis of the OGD initiative may be reused by a diverse set of stakeholders (academic community, scientists, researchers, public/private/non-profit professionals, journalists, software developers, etc.). By re-using the data sets, the stakeholders may derive social and economic value and spearhead innovation. However, to realize the benefits of re-using the data sets, it is important that the data sets published by the government are of good quality and the government is proactive in instituting a robust OGD initiative by contributing toward publishing data sets that are qualitatively and quantitatively superior. Data sets should be complete in themselves and they should be published in a regular manner. This would ensure a sustainable re-use of the data sets by the stakeholders. Therefore, we present an evaluation assessment of the national OGD portal of Saudi Arabia (http://www.data.gov.sa/en) as a case study in order to analyze the quality of the data sets published via the portal. Specifically, the case study addresses the question: “What are the drivers and barriers in re-using the datasets published via the national OGD portal of Saudi Arabia?” The portal stipulates: “We proactively disclose government information and make it available online for everyone to access, reuse and redistribute” and that “Data is not subject to any copyright, patent, trademark or trade secret regulation. Reasonable privacy, security and privilege restrictions may be applied.” The portal also states that the Open Data portal of Saudi Arabia is an important initiative for the country, as it aims to implement a public data hub and strategy to enable transparency, promote e-participation and inspire innovation.

228    Stuti Saxena The OGD portal has been considered as a “platform (that) enables the public to have central point of access to find, download and use datasets generated by the ministries and governmental entities in the country.” It is the aim of the OGD initiative of the country for forging ties between the government and the citizens. In this line, the portal mentions that: The public benefits from the data provided in different ways, such as acquiring a better understanding of how to government agencies work, opening up the opportunities for people to evaluate the performance of various administrative institutions, giving citizens the chance to make informed decisions about government policies. It also allows using the data for research, reports, providing feedback, and developing web and smartphone applications and solutions based on government open data. Finally, the OGD initiative of the country seeks to promote transparency and creativity of the users. Among the “Policies and Guidelines” are included three dimensions – data sharing principles, open data booklet/guideline, and data policy. Among the “data sharing principles” are included objectives like “data management is a joint responsibility” with the participation of all the departments. The second “data sharing” principle relates to equipping the government agencies and departments with the IT-skilled manpower for the maintenance of the portal and an emphasis on data sharing wherein government information. The third principle is linked with the classification of the information and data by the concerned entities in line with the e-government transaction program. The fourth principle of “data sharing” states that data duplication should be avoided. The fifth data sharing principle is of “data consistency” in order to ensure that the data are comprehensible and available for all applications and systems in the establishment. The sixth principle is “data protection” in order to “protect data and prevent data leakage.” Conducting evaluation studies by underlining the features of the national OGD portals has been common till now (see for instance, Kassen, 2013, 2017; Saxena, 2018). This case study adopts the usability evaluation framework proposed by Machova et al. (2018). We chose to refer this framework for the present study for three reasons – it is a recent contribution which is relevant for the evaluation of any OGD portal; it is comprehensive and all-encompassing; and it has been derived after a review of literature which shows that it is well-researched and may be subject to further reference for academic research. Table 3 summarizes the key observations for the national OGD portal of Saudi Arabia in line with the model (Machova et al., 2018). From the table, it is clear that the OGD portal provides opportunities to re-use data sets and the re-use of the data sets by a large cross-section of stakeholders might result in innovation and improvisation of goods and services thereby contributing to economic development of the country. At the same time, there are challenges in re-using the data sets because the data sets need to be updated on a regular basis and more proactive stance of

Evaluation of the National OGD Portal of Saudi Arabia    229 the government agencies is required to facilitate publishing and interoperability of the data sets.

Conclusion The case study sought to present an evaluation of the national OGD portal of the KSA. After a brief scan of the literature on OGD, the case study provided a brief regarding the drivers and barriers to re-use the data sets published via the OGD portal conceding that data re-use by a diverse group of stakeholders is one of the prime rationale for publishing them and making them available for all. The evaluation of the OGD portal was conducted using the recently proposed framework (Machova et al., 2018) which is comprehensive. It may be deduced from this evaluation of the OGD platform that while the OGD initiative of the KSA is a forthcoming measure of the government for promoting transparency in administration and forging ties with the citizens, the portal needs to be improvised in terms of the quality of the data sets. Data sets should be published on a timely basis and regular updates should be made whenever required. For ensuring increased participation and engagement of the users, incentives should be provided for data re-use. Users’ contribution to the data sets should be encouraged and interaction via the platform is also encouraged such that the users may interact among themselves and discuss about the improvisation of the goods and services through data re-use. Data sets lack visualization and mapping tools and this is a bottleneck in analyzing the data sets. Likewise, data sets are not amenable to statistical interpretation on account of the absence of compatible features which may facilitate the re-use of data sets in an optimum manner.

Social and Practical Implications The case study underlines that the success of any OGD initiative lies in its sustainability. For ensuring the sustainability of the OGD initiative, it is important that the data sets be re-used for creating value out of the same. For instance, data sets may be re-used by a cross-section of stakeholders (citizens, journalists, software experts, academia, entrepreneurs, etc.) for appreciating public administration and providing recommendations for policymaking and improvisation in public service delivery. At the same time, they may tap the data sets for improvisation and innovation of their services. On the other hand, the policy-makers may solicit views from the users regarding the portal and the quality of the data sets published via the same and this would help in improving upon the administrative services. In turn, this would lead to better relationship between the policy-makers and the citizens. It is also important for the government to ensure that a robust ICT infrastructure is in place for sustaining the OGD initiative. Thus, on the one hand, the public officials managing the OGD initiative should be trained with regard to the maintenance and monitoring of the OGD portal and data publishing process; and on the other hand, technological advancement should be upheld for providing real-time linked data sets in near future. This would further improvisation in public service delivery and facilitate citizen participation in the co-creation of services.

(c) Thematic categories and tags

(b) Publisher of data set

(a) Description of data set

Facilitators to Re-use Data Sets Via the National OGD Portal

Portal is accessed in two languages: Arabic and English. There is a provision to “search” data sets via the main page. Metadata in the form of data publication date, last revision done, identifiers, spatial/geographical coverage, authorship, public access level are provided. It is also mentioned that “access to real-time data is critical in the effective decision-making process” In all, 116 government agencies are involved in data publishing (for instance, General Authority for Statistics, Alahsa municipality, King Fahad National Library, Ministry of Commerce and Investment, etc.) Data sets are grouped into 17 categories like “Accounts Financial Monetary Affairs and Industry,” “Agriculture and Fishing,” “Arab Gulf Cooperation Council,” “Economy and Planning,” “Education and Planning,” “Energy and Water,” etc. Data sets may be filtered by “groups,” “tags,” “publisher,” and “format”

(1) Open data set specifications

Criteria

Not all listed publishers have contributed to the portal. For instance, while King Fahad Security College has been mentioned as one of the data publishers, no data set was found which was published by the agency Portal provides thematic categories of data sets to address the main topics covered. It distinguishes categories (themes) from tags (keywords)

Portal provides data sets together with their description and how and for what purpose they were collected. However, real-time data are not being provided via the portal as of now

Hindrances to Re-use Data Sets Via the National OGD Portal

Table 3:  Major Facilitators and Hindrances in Re-using Datasets Via the National OGD Portal of Saudi Arabia.

230    Stuti Saxena

In all, there are 484 data sets and total resources are 15,390 (as on July 23, 2018)

(a) Documentation and tutorials

Visualization and mapping tools are required for optimum re-use of the data sets

N/A

Some of the data sets are quite old. For instance, the data set on “Quran memorization statistics for males and females-2016” was published on August 24, 2017. Likewise, the data set on “Index of Industrial Production” published by the “General Authority of Statistics” is that of 2016 and was published on June 28, 2017, with a revision on January 9, 2017. Again, the data set on “Natural conditions” covers the climatic conditions of 2015 and nothing has been published on the weather statistics for the present times despite the fact that climatic phenomenon are daily observations and need to be recorded on a regular basis. It is important that the data sets be published on a regular basis and they should be complete in themselves User-friendly formats should be provided for analysis and statistical interpretation

The manual of “Open Data Policy” provides N/A information regarding the OGD initiative of the country and the utility of the same for the different stakeholders

(2) Open data set feedback

(e) Machine-readable Data sets are available in formats like XLS, XML, formats XLSX, PDF, JPG, XLB, XML, CSV, JPEG, and PDF (f) Open data license Data are regarded as a “natural resource” and should be available for all users (g) Visualization and Data sets may be arranged in an ascending or analytics tools descending order

(d) Release date and up to date

Evaluation of the National OGD Portal of Saudi Arabia    231

There is a “Contact” form where the users/portal visitors may provide feedback on the website or contribute or suggest data sets Data sets may be ranked (5-star rating)

Facilitators to Re-use Data Sets Via the National OGD Portal

(c) Involvement in the process

(b) List of requests

(a) Request form

A blog may be provided where the users may interact with each other and lend constructive views for the improvisation of the portal Users may provide “feedback” regarding the website via the “Contact” form However, social networking plug-ins are not provided where the data are published

Hindrances to Re-use Data Sets Via the National OGD Portal

Other stakeholders should be involved in the data publishing process The portal should provide information regarding the recommendations and contributions of the users to the data sets via the portal In the “Data policy” component of “Policies Events like contests for the stakeholders to improvise and Guidelines,” public participation has been upon the data sets should be organized. For instance, encouraged wherein “recommendations from software apps may be devised by the software individuals, groups and organizations regarding the professionals. Businessmen may showcase how they presentation of data, data types, and metadata” are harnessed data sets for improvising their services. invited for supporting the “Transparency and Open Implicitly, incentives should be provided for increased Government Initiative” of the country involvement of the stakeholder groups

Only the government agencies may place “requests” for publishing the data sets The provision of providing the list of requests made by the users is missing in the portal

(3) Open data set request

(c) User rating and comments (d). Social media and Social networking plugins are provided (Twitter, sharing Facebook, and YouTube) via the main page

(b) Forum and contact form

Criteria

Table 3:  (Continued)

232    Stuti Saxena

Evaluation of the National OGD Portal of Saudi Arabia    233

Further Research Directions The case study leaves pointers for further research. For instance, further research is merited to assess the manner in which the OGD initiative is being perceived by the different stakeholder groups. Empirical investigation is required to appreciate the utility of the data sets for different stakeholder groups. Future research may be conducted to analyze the perspectives of the government representatives regarding the factors that impact the data publishing processes. A comparative approach may be undertaken to analyze how lessons may be drawn from the successes of OGD initiatives elsewhere. Research cues may be derived from the significance of data mining and social networks in furthering OGD discussions by the stakeholders (Cheng, Zhao, Xiong, & Chui, 2017; Chui & Shen, in press). Likewise, it may be interesting to evaluate the significance of Big Data analytics in understanding the efficacy of OGD initiatives (Lytras, Raghavan, & Damiani, 2017; Saxena, 2016). Empirical investigation is called for to assess the extent of popular legitimacy in the process of OGD implementation (Ramos, 2009, 2019). Finally, further research is warranted to analyze the utility of the implementation of OGD initiatives at the regional and local levels of the country.

Acknowledgment All thanks are owed to Dr Abdullah Al-Kuwaiz, former Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to Bahrain, for his insights on the Saudi Arabian landscape which were immensely helpful in writing this chapter.

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Chapter 16

E-Government Strategy and Its Impact on Economic and Social Development in Saudi Arabia Hussein Alhashimi Abstract Electronic transactions play a substantial role in many automated transactions in government organizations. The introduction of e-government is key as among other benefits it will raise the quality and transparency, and reduce the corruption that may occur especially in money. Saudi Arabia is considered one of the G20 countries. These countries seek to maintain the international financial stability, where Saudi Arabia has an economic weight to influence the global economy. Through this chapter, we will understand the various benefits both socially and economically that the government of Saudi Arabia is reaping through the introduction of e-government. It is these impacts that have had a significant influence on the global market regarding economic impacts. To better understand this, we evaluate the various applications that have been included in the e-government to foster these establishments. Among them includes Yesser, Tadawul, Absher and the national contact center. From them, the government is enjoying various benefits that will raise them high the economic scale globally. Also, the author looks at the strategies that have been put in place by that particular government to ensure that e-government is established as planned. Keywords: Saudi Arabia, e-government, impact, economy, society, Yesser, Tadawul, Absher.

Introduction The e-government in Saudi Arabia has introduced more conventional ways of conducting business within the government through the utilization of all

Politics and Technology in the Post-Truth Era, 237–243 Copyright © 2019 Hussein Alhashimi doi:10.1108/978-1-78756-983-620191016

238    Hussein Alhashimi potential information communication technology. This has led to a significant change in the way the public sector operates in the country. The introduction of e-commerce has also led to improvements on how the government relates to its citizen and has resulted in several impacts on the overall functioning of the society. The e-commerce works by providing government services to the community using the online platform. The e-government has proved to have numerous impacts that positively impact the nation and hence has attracted the attention of many stakeholders putting pressure on the governmental institutions to ensure its implementation. The government of Saudi Arabia is putting in more effort to ensure the maximum utilization of the latest trends in the e-government system. This is because the system has shown evidence of its capability to improve the overall functioning of the government in its aim to deliver more specialized and improved services to its citizens. The e-government project in Saudi Arabia is quickly advancing, and there is a great potential for its future growth and expansion. The project has taken enough time to define its clear goals and objectives, and in comparison with other e-governments around the world, Saudi Arabia is way ahead. The Yesser project that was launched in Saudi Arabia has its strategies in place that are a clear indication that the e-government is almost close to achieving its objectives of becoming an e-kingdom of its own. The government is utilizing every opportunity to take advantage of every emerging technology for its benefit and that of its citizens (Al-Khalifa, Baazeem, & Alamer, 2017). The e-government has currently surpassed its previous expectations by meeting different needs of people at the place of their convenience regardless of their current circumstances by allowing them to access information in the various online platforms without putting into consideration the location and distance they operate from. Yesser, as mentioned earlier on, is the main project that the government is focusing on as it looks forward to being an e-government. The main aims and objectives of the project are directed towards speeding up the operations of the project in the country. Among the key objectives of the project include improving the overall level of productivity and efficiency to the services provided to the public sector. Also, the project is aimed at availing more simplified services that are easy to use to individual and business communities. The third objective is to increase the government revenue and lastly to ensure that there is quick access to information that is timely and accurate to those in need. Apart from the Yesser application, there are other technologies that have been put to use by the government on its way to the e-kingdom among them includes the following applications; Tadawul, National Contact Centre that is used for general inquiries and the Absher which is the primary tool used by the ministry of interior. In general, the government strategies of implementing the e-government can be summarized as follows. The e-government is seen as a new way to manage the government processes and services in various organizations. Secondly, the government aims at restricting the old techniques used in administration to be compatible with the new services being introduced. Developing new relationships with the citizens by providing a 24/7 service provider center that can attend to all quires and needs of

The Impact of E-government on Raising Revenue in Saudi Arabia    239 the public (Alsaif, 2014). The e-government is the primary tool that the government intends to use to deal with corruption among the members.

Economic Impacts of the Project Even though the e-government has had significant impacts on the on Saudi Arabia and the society in general, it is difficult to evaluate the exact benefits that come along with such implementations. However, one can identify the macro advantages that have been witnessed as its effects are apparently visible. The benefits are a way to show that more investments should be made in this sector. Just like any other government the Saudi Arabian government and its people have also had a taste of the impacts that are brought about by e-government. Here are some of the economic effects.

Reduction in Cost of the Services Provided and Saving on the Budget One of the significant economic impacts of any new technology is the reduction of the cost of operation. The e-government can achieve this through the condensation of the cost needed to carry out government administrative procedures and also offers an efficient way to control governmental expenditures. To a large extent, the new technologies reduce the cost of operation through the simplification of procedures that then requires a limited number of personnel to operate. Even though most studies have shown that the initial value for the installation and running the programs were high in Saudi Arabia, in the long run, the benefits regarding cost reduction outweigh the cost incurred at the commencing of the project. The paper less offices also go a long way in saving the government numerous loss that would have been committed in the daily running of activities in the offices. The e-government also helps in the controlling of the government budget through various ways. One is that it can manage all the financial issues in a manner that it flows and hence the easy control of all aspects of financial management. It is also through the reduced paperwork that financial report can be easily monitored and control to ensure that the central required limit of the initial amounts is kept (Nyakwende & Mazari, 2012).

Tax Revenues Tax collection is a massive burden to various countries as there are no effective ways to carry out the process and hence the total confusion and more some embezzlement of tax funds. In Saudi Arabia, the government has been able to experience an improved flow concerning revenue collection through the introduction of the e-government. Just like in Mexico where the e-government tax collection system has led to significant economic impacts among the people the e-government of Saudi is looking forward to reaping from the same after it has fully implemented the tax system in the e-government. It is currently the tax that is gained from the operating application where the citizens pay for the services they receive online that has so far been collected.

240    Hussein Alhashimi Improved Administrative Processes The implementation of the e-government has led to more efficient administrative processes that have led to significant economic impacts in Saudi Arabia. According to research there has been improved communication between the government and the people and this has resulted to better undertakings by the community in the quest to fulfill their daily activities. The better commutation is the critical factor behind improved business operations both locally and internationally that have hence implicated major economic growths in the country. It is due to this that the introduction of e-government has also been found to improve customer services. This improvement has, in turn, led to a major return on all investments undertaken by both government and the public as they result in more efficiency in operations. The e-government is also more transparent hence raising the level of trust among the members that then lead to more faith in the citizens. As a result, confidence in the governmental system is also responsible for more corporation in the general public leading to more income. Lastly, there is saving on the cost of administration that is usually spent on personnel as the e-government minimaxes on the number of staff that is needed to perform particular processes (Al-Fakhri, Cropf, Higgs, & Kelly, 2011).

Specific Impacts of the E-Government in Saudi Arabia Apart from this general implications, there are more particular impacts on the economy that Saudi Arabia has enjoyed due to the implementation of specific applications.

Tadawul One of the applications that have been implemented as part of the e-government is the Tadawul application. This app works to control the stock exchange market as earlier mentioned. This application has had significant impacts on the Saudi Arabia stock exchange market and among them includes the following. Through market capital, the application can control all activity taking place on the stock exchange and hence simplifying works for the managers in ensuring that all assignments are completed on time. Secondly, the application can allow for both the local and foreign traders to take place in the Saudi Arabian market and more efficiency in the services while widening the Saudi Arabian stock exchange market. The legalization of the online services in the stock exchange market has resulted to the creation of a conducive environment for the foreign investments and also world trade in general hence opening the Saudi Arabia market to the international arena.

Yesser It Yesser has given different peoples and business an easy way to adhere to the numerous government procedures and services. It provides a quick way to complete transactions that would have instead taken ages to be completed.

The Impact of E-government on Raising Revenue in Saudi Arabia    241 The application also reduces the need for traveling by the citizens who previously were required to be personally present before the transactions could occur. The application also ensures that services are available to a large percentage of the population that already would not have been able to access the services. Through both local and international foraging, the application ensures that there are maximum returns on any investments undertaken (Bhuian, Abdul-Muhmin, & Kim, 2010). National Contact Center. This is another form of application that has been implemented by the Saudi Arabian government, and its primary purpose is to answer all questions presented by the citizens of Saudi Arabia. Through this, the government can offer support to all individuals by providing a timely response to all their inquiries and thus improved functioning in the economy. Foreign investors also have an easy time in attending to the queries that they are asked and hence easy for them to invest.

Absher Implemented by the interior ministry this application offers services to both the citizens and visitors of Saudi Arabia. In doing this, the app has successfully managed to reduce the time needed for one to interact with the government and has also reduced the need for one-on-one meetings by the states representative. These are among the current applications that are being used by the e-­government of Saudi Arabia and there impacts on the economy (Yamin & Mattar, 2016).

Social Impacts of E-Government on Saudi Arabia Transparency and Reduction of Corruption The essential social impact of the e-government in Saudi Arabia is the improved relationship between the government and its citizen through established trust among the parties. Initially, most citizens did not understand the decision-­ making procedures undertaken by the government, but through the introduction of e-government, transparency has been established. It is through this that corruption that was rampant before the opening of this system has been eliminated. This has been accomplished through various means including the reduction of bribes and also a complete elimination of brokers. Secondly, public awareness has been conducted that educated the society of their rights and privileges and lastly there is more accountability and recognition on each of the activities that are held by the government. The improved transparency and accountability has attracted more loyalty among the citizens and also has led to more foreign aids being received by Saudi Arabia (Basahel & Yamin, 2017).

Improved Service Delivery Initially, the government if Saudi has been blamed for poor service delivery among the members of the public. This has been averted through the introduction of e-government that has led to speeding up of the rate at which different clients are attended to. The digital platform can serve a large number of people at a particular

242    Hussein Alhashimi time hence quicker in delivering services to the members of the public. The government still aims at implementing other measures that will serve to enhance even more the rate of service delivery. This is because service delivery helps a great deal in ensuring that all other sectors function efficiently as it is the backbone of national growth. To achieve this, the government is providing internet access almost in every place and the citizens are well acquainted with computer skills.

Development of Government Sectors With the introduction of e-government, multiple industries that were initially not functioning to the full capacity have gained momentum. The new technologies being implemented as the days go by are serving as a significant point for improvement in the type of services offered and also as a reference point for growth. The growing sectors have improved the general livelihood of individuals as they can meet every of their need at the required time. Also, the improvement of governmental sectors has in turn led to more foreign investors in the country that have been the focal point regarding the social development of the communities and other entities that are critical for the general running of affairs within the society (Khalil, 2012).

More Interactions There has been improved interaction with the government and also a one-onone interaction with other citizens. This is the first and foremost advantage of e-government as this interaction help in fostering of unity and oneness among the people. Interactions are what result to a sense of ownership of one’s country and hence the motivation to work hard to ensure that they achieve the unity and oneness that they need as Saudi Arabians. The e-government has also guaranteed that there is the availability of all services required by the people of Saudi Arabia.

Enhanced Learning The e-government has resulted in the enlightenment of the community id Saudi Arabia through various ways. First, there has been a need to improve computer skills as most of the governmental processes are conducted online. This enlightenment is a significant tool used to fight illiteracy among the community and hence resulted in an improved lifestyle. It is through the e-government that various individuals have become familiar with their different rights and responsibilities which in turn has led to the better functioning if the entire community. It is this through this that the government can establish confidence within the people that it serves. Also, there has been increased participation in public affairs as the people understand the distinct role that both the government and the citizens have to play (Franke, Kroenung, Born, & Eckhardt, 2015).

Conclusion In summary, the e-government has played a significant role in the Saudi Arabian community and continued to do so as more implementations take place. Among

The Impact of E-government on Raising Revenue in Saudi Arabia    243 the applications that are being employed in the establishment of this system include; Tadawul, Yesser, Absher and the national contact center. So far they have proved useful in bringing about the desired economic impacts in Saudi Arabia. It is this application, and others that are continuously being implemented that have resulted in significant social and economic effects in Saudi Arabia. Among the financial impacts being felt include the lowering of the cost used in running the different processes within the government. Secondly, there is improved administration by the government as the unit can offer better services at a lower cost. Most importantly revenue collection has been enhanced, and it has led to increasing collections with more accountability and transparency. Also, there is improved service delivery to the people, enhanced interactions and more so enhanced learning among the group of participants and many other benefits that are continuously being felt as the implementations continue. Even though there is evidence that the cost of implementation of e-government is initially high, we have seen that in the long run the cost is recovered and the system proves to be cost-effective. This is usually the primary aim of any particular system that is implanted. Evidence shows that the implementation of e-government will serve the high purpose of transforming Saudi Arabia both in the local and international market.

References Al-Fakhri, M. O., Cropf, R. A., Higgs, G., & Kelly, P. (2011). E-government in Saudi Arabia: Between promise and reality. Hershey, PA: IGI Global. Al-Khalifa, H., Baazeem, I., & Alamer, R. (2017). Revisiting the accessibility of Saudi Arabia government websites. Universal Access in the Information Society, 16(4), 1027–1039. doi:10.1007/s10209-016-0495-7 Alsaif, M. (2013). Factors affecting citizens’ adoption of e-government moderated by socio-cultural values in Saudi Arabia Proceedings of the European conference on egovernment, 578. Basahel, A., & Yamin, M. (2017). Measuring success of e-government of Saudi Arabia. International Journal of Information Technology, 9(3), 287. Bhuian, S. N., Abdul-Muhmin, A. G., & Kim, D. (2010). Business education and its influence on attitudes to business, consumerism, and government in Saudi Arabia. Journal of Education for Business, 76(4), 226. Franke, R., Kroenung, J., Born, F., & Eckhardt, A. (2015). Influential factors for E-government success in the Middle East: Case study evidence from Saudi Arabia. International Journal of Electronic Government Research, 11(1), 39–62. Khalil, I. (2012). Influence of Culture on e-Government Acceptance in Saudi Arabia. ArXiv Preprint ArXiv:1307.7141, (June), 68. Retrieved from http://arxiv.org/abs/1307.7141 Nyakwende, E., & Mazari, A. A. (2012). Factors affecting the development of e-­government in Saudi Arabia. Advancing Democracy, Government and Governance (pp. 19–28), Springer. Yamin, M. & Mattar, R. (2016). e-Government in Saudi Arabia – An empirical study. BVICAM’s International Journal of Information Technology, 8(1), 944.

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Chapter 17

Romancing Top Management: The Politics of Top Management Support in Large Information System Projects Gloria H. W. Liu and Cecil E. H. Chua Abstract Top management support is recognized as the most critical factor for the success of large information system (IS) projects. However, getting this support is often difficult, because top management has multiple priorities and one has to compete with others to obtain such support. Political maneuvering is thus an integral and necessary part of the process of obtaining top management support. In this chapter the authors review current research on this topic and organize and synthesize our findings into a framework. The authors then propose four specific strategies which can be used to obtain top management support, including the following: (1) social capital, (2) social engagement, (3) rational persuasion, and (4) exchange strategies. While the authors argue that all four strategies should be applied, the specific circumstances in which they should be applied vary. A two-stage process is proposed that identifies the appropriate criteria for determining the most appropriate strategy. The criteria are: (1) the type of top management support needed (i.e., durable vs immediate) and (2) the level of top management-project team trust (i.e., high vs low). Keywords: Information system project; organizational politics; top management support; political influence strategy; decision criteria; trust

Introduction Information systems (IS) have come to figure prominently in all aspects of human life. As a result, organizations in both the private and public sector are continually

Politics and Technology in the Post-Truth Era, 245–258 Copyright © 2019 Gloria H. W. Liu and Cecil E. H. Chua doi:10.1108/978-1-78756-983-620191017

246    Gloria H. W. Liu and Cecil E. H Chua looking to IS for a range of innovative solutions to face myriad challenges (e.g., smart manufacturing, online political campaigns, and global carbon emissions). To unlock the value of IS, strategic management of IS projects is required. Top managers can provide strategic guidance as well as material and symbolic support for an IS project. Past studies emphasize that the most critical factor for the success of an IS project is the support of top management (Iacovou & Nakatsu, 2008; Kappelman, McKeeman, & Zhang, 2006; Young & Jordan, 2008; Young, Poon, & Irandoost, 2011). It is argued that it is such support that enables other critical success factors (e.g., production of clear project goals and fostering project championship) (Akkermans & van Helden, 2002), and the removal of barriers of structural incompatibility within an IS project (Ngwenyama & Nielsen, 2014). Furthermore, the efforts of top management are critical for the allocation of scarce organizational resources to ensure project success (Elbanna, 2013). Although the support of top management is vital for IS project success, getting that support is difficult. Top management has multiple priorities, and others compete for that support. It has generally been argued in the literature that the best way to obtain stakeholders support for a project is by logical argument and the presentation of factual evidence (Liu, Zhang, Keil, & Chen, 2010; Nutt, 1989). However, top management is outside the control of the IS project team (Schmidt, Lyytinen, Keil, & Cule, 2001), has limited attention spans, or has difficulties comprehending the key logic and drivers of an IS project (Loch, Mähring, & Sommer, 2017). Substantial research has demonstrated that it is political factors that often influence top management decisions (Pang, 2016; Rocheleau, 2003). Political maneuvering to acquire top management attention and support is thus part and parcel of project work on the part of an IS project team. Indeed, the context of a large IS project offers many opportunities for politicking complicated by its weak, temporary organizational structure, complex problem-solving involving multiple stakeholders, and persistent time pressure. We thus argue that such political behaviors should not be regarded as dysfunctional and manipulative. Rather, politics can be a useful tool, a less formal way to exercise influence over the target (i.e., top management) to obtain the necessary commitments and resources to ensure project success (Pinto, 2000). This chapter synthesizes recent developments in this emerging stream of research and then proposes an integrative framework for selecting the appropriate strategies for exercising political influence to obtain top management support for an IS project (Elbanna, 2013; Enns & McDonagh, 2012; Liu, Wang, & Chua, 2012, 2015a, 2015b; Ngwenyama & Nielsen, 2014). Specifically, we describe four strategies, namely the social capital, social engagement, rational persuasion and exchange strategies, and present a framework for determining which strategy is appropriate to employ, contingent upon (1) the type of top management support desired (durable vs immediate) and (2) the level of top management-project team trust (high vs low).

Top Management Support Top management refers to those who make the strategic decisions which influence where an organization is heading and how it will get there (Carpenter,

Politics of Top Management Support in Large IS Projects    247 Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004). Given that a large IS project, for example the implementation of an enterprise resource planning (ERP) system, can create tremendous changes in work processes and practices within an organization, strategic guidance by top management is required. The support of top management has been found to be an important predictor of project success (Davenport, De Long, & Beers, 1998; Liang, Saraf, Hu, & Xue, 2007; Sharma & Yetton, 2003; Thong, Yap, & Raman, 1996). Indeed, prior studies rank this as the most critical factor for the success of large IS projects (Bingi, Sharma, & Godla, 1999; Iacovou & Nakatsu, 2008; Kappelman et al., 2006; Liu et al., 2010; Somers & Nelson, 2001; Young & Jordan, 2008). This is because top management can help coordinate efforts, as well as cause other constituents within an organization to act (Gosain, Lee, & Kim, 2005; Grint & Willcocks, 2007) and transform their attitudes and collective interests toward the project (Shamir, House, & Arthur, 1993). Top management support comprises three critical elements: (1) resource provision, (2) participation, and (3) involvement (Dong, 2008; Dong, Neufeld, & Higgins, 2009; Jarvenpaa & Ives, 1991). ⦁⦁ Resource provision: IS projects require resources in the form of money, per-

sonnel, and equipment. Top management is responsible for allocating funds, assigning personnel and equipment, and arranging the context to facilitate the flow of resources to a project. For example, it is top management which ensures the release of critical personnel from their functional departments by granting the project manager formal power to reward and punish personnel (Pinto, 2000). ⦁⦁ Participation: top management needs to be present and visible to demonstrate their support of an IS project. This may be done by giving extra attention to help set project goals (Nah, Zuckweiler, & Lau, 2003), finding solutions for management problems (Young & Jordan, 2008), repairing dysfunctional processes and structures (Sarker & Lee, 2003), and paying periodic visits to the project site (Dong, 2008). ⦁⦁ Involvement: finally, top management’s participation in an IS project needs to be sincere and effortful. That is, they need to be psychologically committed to the project, considering it to be important and relevant, and acting on the basis of a belief in the enduring correctness of the project goals (Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & Fredrickson, 1993). For example, they need to express public and explicit support for a project, set the project as a top priority (Nah, Islam, & Tan, 2007), be receptive to communication about the project (Liu et al., 2015b), and take personal responsibility for the project outcome (Liu et al., 2015a).

Politics and Political Influence in Large is Projects To obtain the support of top management, it is necessary to adopt the right political strategies to influence them (Chamorro-Premuzic, 2014). We identify four political influence strategies as particularly effective for obtaining top management support, namely the social capital, social engagement, rational persuasion,

248    Gloria H. W. Liu and Cecil E. H Chua and exchange strategies (Elbanna, 2013; Enns & McDonagh, 2012; Liu et al., 2012, 2015a, 2015b; Ngwenyama & Nielsen, 2014).

The Social Capital Strategy Social capital refers to “the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, available through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed by an individual or social unit” (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998, p. 243). The social capital strategy involves the efforts of IS project team members to take advantage of existing or create new social capital with top managers (i.e., direct social capital) and/or their confidants (i.e., indirect social capital) to induce top management’s positive evaluation of a project and to encourage cooperative behaviors (Liu et al., 2015a). Social capital emerges from a project team’s repeated interaction with top management and/or someone who can influence top management. The interaction can begin even before the project starts and during the information technology (IT) department’s delivery of mundane service, such as helpdesk or troubleshooting services. Over time, repeated interactions can be used to build and strengthen three types of ties between the IT department and top management: (1) structural ties (i.e., stable connectivity and network ties), (2) cognitive ties (i.e., shared narratives and understanding about the project), and (3) relational ties (i.e., trusting partnerships). Structural ties can be physical or virtual. For example, IT helpdesk services engage with top management over problems with their personal computers, or project team members can communicate with top management by computer or through electronic communication media. Cognitive ties are established by the team’s frequent sharing of information and discussion with top management ensuring, for example, that the chief information officer (CIO) shares and understands the chief executive officer’s strategic vision for the company, or the project manager understands the benefits which top management seeks from the project. Relational ties are developed over time through the interaction between the team and top management. For example, the trust can be built as a result of IT consistently delivering on its promises. Personal relationships and familiarity may also play a role, for example, if project team members attended the same university as members of top management, there may be greater trust. As the examples show, social capital emerges from the continuous and mundane interaction between the project team and IT department with top management over a long period of time. Social capital built between one or two people can also spill over to others embedded in the network, such as an IS project team (Coleman, 1988; Field, 2003; Putnam, 1993). For example, a positive relationship between top management and IT support can translate into top management’s confidence in the IT development team even though the people in both groups are separated. In effect, the aggregate perception of top management about the individuals in the IT department becomes top management’s social capital with the IT department. In other words, social capital is built by the entire IT department, not just the CIO. Project managers, project team members, and IT staff all play an equally important role in the building of social capital with top management

Politics of Top Management Support in Large IS Projects    249 (Liu et al., 2015a). Social capital facilitates strategic alignment between IS and organizational strategies because it enables the exchange and integration of IS and business knowledge (Karahanna & Preston, 2013).

The Social Engagement Strategy The strategy of social engagement is fostered by having the project team obtain a series of quick and low-risk favors from top management. These requests for favors are used to help the project team assert control over a (recalcitrant) top manager, by making the manager more susceptible to the influence of the project team. The social engagement strategy depends upon known psychological properties to arouse feelings (e.g., of discomfort or dissonance) that will prompt attitudinal positivity (or attitudinal changes) in top management (Festinger, 1957). Specifically, the incremental asking and receiving of favors creates the following psychological effects. ⦁⦁ The exposure effect is a demonstrated phenomenon where the individual comes

to like something the more one is exposed to it (Bornstein, 1989). The repeated exposure of top management to an IS project through favor requests thus will make them more favorably inclined to the project (Zajonc, 1968). ⦁⦁ The induced compliance effect occurs when one is asked to do someone else a favor related to a task. As a result of that favor, cognitive dissonance results, and the person performing the favor becomes more inclined to the task (Festinger, 1957). This occurs when doing small favors for the project creates cognitive dissonance and induces top management to like the project (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). ⦁⦁ The effort justification effect occurs when effortful favor-doing creates increased sunk cost. While the sunk cost should be ignored by a rational decision maker, studies have shown that an increased sunk cost causes people to more strongly commit to a course of action (Keil, 1995). Increased investment in an IS team that asks for favors acts to change the attitude of top management toward increased positivity toward the project to justify the cost (Cunha & Caldieraro, 2009).

The Rational Persuasion Strategy Rational persuasion describes the reliance on logical appeals and factual evidence to show top management that the project is feasible and superior to others. While on the surface, rational persuasion employs dispassionate, logical arguments, in fact, good rational persuasion has a strong psychological dimension. For example, how an IS project team frames their messages about a project can either positively or negatively influence top management (Smith & Petty, 1996). The following are some psychological effects of “logical arguments” that can influence top management. ⦁⦁ The simple cue effect occurs because positively framed messages are more per-

suasive for targets who are not motivated or are unable to process the messages carefully. This occurs because the positive framing evokes positive associations

250    Gloria H. W. Liu and Cecil E. H Chua with the issue (Maheswaran & Meyers-Levy, 1990). Thus, top management with no technical background who is exposed to positive messages about a complex IS project is more likely to be swayed by the positivity or appealing cues (e.g., visual layouts) which the messages evoke. ⦁⦁ The negativity bias effect arises as a result of the disproportionate influence of negatively framed messages, because of people’s preference for positive outcomes. It also arises because most people are more concerned with loss than potential gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Negatively framed messages arouse fear, anxiety, or worry. Negatively framed messages are thus more persuasive and can elicit different and asymmetric efforts than positively framed messages (Khoo, Chua, & Robey, 2011). For example, top management may be worried about the threats created by not upgrading a system regardless of the minimal business benefits the project can introduce. ⦁⦁ Both the simple cue effect and the negativity bias effect can encourage top management to form a positive impression about a project according to the messages/cues the project team uses to characterize the project (i.e., emphasis on project benefits vs potential risks/costs if the project fails). Traditionally, project teams rely on positive messages highlighting project benefits to sway top management in favor of a project (e.g., description of process improvement). However, there are some situations where positive messages are not possible (e.g., acting in compliance with governmental regulations) or the business benefits are trivial (e.g., for the renewal of IT infrastructure) (Ross & Beath, 2002). Under such circumstances, negative messages are more likely to impress and sway top management to support the project. ⦁⦁ The message processing effect occurs when information is framed in an unexpected way. Surprising information stimulates greater cognitive processing, is given greater weight (Smith & Petty, 1996), and becomes more personally relevant (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). For example, if top management is accustomed to seeing communication based on benefits gained, then a negatively framed message (e.g., the risks or costs of not engaging in a project) will motivate them more strongly. Project teams pursuing a rational persuasion strategy should remember that top management is not all powerful. Rather, they have to constantly balance the needs of multiple organizational stakeholders, both internal and external (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, Wicks, & Parmar, 2004). Furthermore, top management is not omniscient and omni-articulate. Thus, they often do not understand the impact of project concerns, and even if they do understand, they may not have the right vocabulary to explain them to others. A key element of the rational persuasion strategy is not just in convincing top management, but helping them to convince the stakeholders they are answerable to and to provide arguments which can be used to rebut stakeholder concerns (Petty, Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995). For example, in one software upgrade project, IT helped top management convince other stakeholders to participate in the software upgrade even though it was not for their benefit. IT helped top management explain that the vendor would no longer support the old version of the system and a failure in

Politics of Top Management Support in Large IS Projects    251 either the legacy system or in the upgrade would compromise operations which would ultimately lead to organization-wide job losses (Khoo et al., 2011).

The Exchange Strategy Exchange involves the project team offering something to top management in exchange for something the project team wants. Exchange need not occur instantaneously. A favor or promise can be reciprocated at a later time. The influence of the exchange thus mainly rests on the perceived value of the exchange offer. For example, an IS project team can offer to bolt on a new system function to enhance top management control over operational costs in exchange for their support (Liu et al., 2015b). Alternately, the CIO could offer to make a marketing project the next higher priority in exchange for support on a current project from the Head of Marketing. An exchange must be more than a simple transaction. A project team that engages in exchange should ensure that top management feels that it is a good deal. Such exchanges create the following psychological effects: ⦁⦁ The reinforcement effect, which occurs when a behavior is rewarded by positive

consequences valued by the individual. Being rewarded means that the individual is more likely to repeat the same behavior in similar situations, to the point where the reward is no longer needed (i.e., the utility of the same reward diminishes over time) (Cook & Rice, 2003; Homans, 1961). ⦁⦁ The distributive justice effect, which occurs when individuals perceive that the profits (i.e., rewards minus costs) are proportionate to their investment (Jasso, 1998; Zafirovski, 2005), as a result of which, they come to view the exchange as beneficial and accept the exchange offer. ⦁⦁ the perceived obligation to reciprocate which occurs when one feels socially indebted to the other. Perceived obligation to reciprocate creates a psychological duty to return a kindness (Blau, 1964). Reciprocal obligation is developed through continuous exchanges where the exchange terms are not explicitly specified or negotiated (Molm, Takahashi, & Peterson, 2000). For example, top management without a technical background may sometimes need technical advice or guidance in the workplace or in their private life. An IS project team can initiate this type of exchange by performing a beneficial act for top management (e.g., providing technical advice about the use of a new executive support system or even when buying a home audio system) without specifying the exchange terms in advance. This thus creates a sense of obligation, prompting top management compliance to offer support.

A Two-Stage Process: Choice of Political Influence Strategies To have the best chance of success, a project team can and should take advantage of all the political influence strategies described above to obtain the support of top management for their projects. However, different strategies may best be

252    Gloria H. W. Liu and Cecil E. H Chua applied in specific situations. In other words, one strategy or another is applied depending on (1) the type of top management support desired (i.e., immediate vs durable) and (2) the level of top management-project team trust (i.e., low vs high). We argue that the selection of the appropriate political influence strategy is a twostage process, as depicted in Fig. 1. In the first stage, the team must determine whether what they require is immediate or durable top management support. Both are needed for a successful project. However, both are needed at different times. Project crises are sometimes triggered due to the changing social context of an IS project (e.g., mergers or reorganization) or factors not obvious at project inception (e.g., complaints from project members or users). Immediate top management support allows IS project teams to address (potential) project crises and improve or turn around project outcomes. For example, the project team may want top management to resolve a dispute within the team (Chua, Lim, Soh, & Sia, 2012) or decide on a change in the business process or organizational structure (Elbanna, 2013). In contrast, durable top management support is aimed at providing sustained support or changes required for an IS project over the course of the project life (e.g., by fostering a culture of cooperation or providing project championship). Sarker and Lee (2003) demonstrate an example of how top management deliberately fostered a culture of cooperation for an IS project through a series of activities, including the dismissal of several vice presidents who harbored territorial attitudes, the appointment of suitable persons as middle management, and the use of institute programs to encourage cooperation across the organization. Dong et al. (2009) also describe that top management’s regular visits to the project site and attendance on committee meetings helped them to understand what problems the project team faced and to offer specific support. Top management support needed (immediate vs. durable)

Top managementproject team trust (high vs. low) 1. Social capital

2. Social engagement

3. Rational persuasion

4. Exchange

Fig. 1:  A Two-stage Process for Selecting Influence Strategies to Obtain Top Management Support.

Politics of Top Management Support in Large IS Projects    253 The second stage involves evaluating the extent to which top management already trusts the project team. Trust in project team reflects a belief on the part of top management that the project team cares about organizational goals and is competent enough to complete the project. It also reflects a belief that the project team is reliable and honest (Mayer & Davis, 1999). High levels of trust mean that top management views the intentions and actions of the project team as credible. Liu et al. (2015a) present a case where the chief financial officer (CFO) had come to trust the project team because of prior successful projects they had carried out, and thus willingly championed new plans regardless of his initially limited knowledge about the IS and uncertainties surrounding the project outcomes. In contrast, low trust means that top management is inclined to disbelieve and/or refute information from the project team. Low trust is often associated with the harboring of initial hostility to the project (e.g., because the project challenges the status quo) (Pornpitakpan, 2004; Sternthal, Phillips, & Dholakia, 1978). Liu et al. (2015a) present a contrasting case where top management mistrusted a project team because of prior failed projects, and voiced suspicion about project benefits and publicly disparaged limitations of the system design. Once the diagnosis is made as to the level of trust, the project team can select the political influence strategy that holds the highest probability of influencing top management given the circumstances. If it is durable support which is desired and the team already has the trust of top management (i.e., conditions D–H in Fig. 1), they should use social capital. This is because trust developed through past interaction with the team makes top management receptive to further engagement. Social capital develops, allowing the project team to mobilize resources embedded within their relationships. In one of their case studies, Liu et al. (2015a) describe a situation where the CFO championed an IS project from its initial introduction to completion. This was made possible because the project team repeatedly interacted with the CFO and his confidant to build a shared understanding about the project and a strategic partnership with the team. In short, top management appreciated the strategic value of the project, and jointly worked to complete the project to realize its strategic value. If durable top management support is needed but the project team lacks the trust of top management (i.e., conditions D–L in Fig. 1), social engagement is a more appropriate strategy. If top management does not trust the project team, traditional methods of building social capital will not work. Social relationships have to be built indirectly. Initially, rapport can be built by the project team requesting small, non-costly favors. Over time, the cost and difficulty of these favors should increase to strengthen the commitment of top management and change feelings of negativity toward the project (Festinger, 1957), which hopefully translates into increased trust. As the stake of top management in the project increases through repeated participation, so will their belief that the project ought to continue, because its cessation would cause a personal loss. In other words, top management thus continues to support a project to appear consistent with their prior actions. Liu et al. (2012) report on the change in a top manager from being resistant to supportive because of engagement in the project. Initially the manager had publicly criticized the project and refused to participate. However, the

254    Gloria H. W. Liu and Cecil E. H Chua project manager assigned a team member to engage the top manager in a working relationship over a prolonged period of time. The team member first asked the top manager for small favors (e.g., helping to circulate project information, attending meetings). The project member then asked for more frequent and arduous favors, such as regularly meeting the project member after office hours, jointly deciding on the problem scope, and the design of solutions. As the top manager’s level of engagement increased, he formed a positive impression of the project, to the extent that he believed the organization would have too much to lose if the project was killed. In situations where the project team desires immediate top management support and has top management trust (i.e., conditions I–H in Fig. 1), it is appropriate for the team to employ rational persuasion. Trust is important in rational persuasion, because without it, the recipient of an argument is likely to discount statements made (Pornpitakpan, 2004). Indeed, people like to confirm judgments which are congruent with their own beliefs and disconfirm those which are incongruent (Edwards & Smith, 1996; Nickerson, 1998). If top management trusts the project team, they are more likely to view the evidence presented as credible (i.e., confirmation bias); if not, the evidence will be subjected to extensive refutational analyses (i.e., disconfirmation bias). Rational persuasion provides top management with credible rhetoric (either positively or negatively framed) to justify their support for an IS project and to communicate with and influence their subordinates and other stakeholders. This is particularly true when project crises occur and there is limited time for the development of network ties to influence top management and/or their subordinates. Rational persuasion is thus the primary strategy for obtaining immediate top management support to tackle project crises. Elbanna (2013) describes a situation where the IS project team had established their initial credibility by a record of on-time task delivery in earlier project stages. Mid-project, the team came into conflict with another project team on the issue of business process changes, leading to substantial project delays. The team diagnosed the problem using color-coded graphs to highlight to top management how confusion and conflicts surrounding business process changes had led to bottlenecks and project delays. Top management then helped settle the changes and resolve the crisis. Finally, in cases where a project team desires immediate top management support but lacks trust (i.e., conditions I–L in Fig. 1), the team should apply the exchange strategy. Without credibility, project information presented by an IS project team is unlikely to sway top management to favor the project (Sternthal et al., 1978) so rational persuasion is unlikely to work. However, by focusing on satisfying top management needs and requirements, a project team can develop top management support. This is because the offer of exchange provides assurance that supporting the project will be directly beneficial (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). Indeed, an exchange offer reduces the uncertainties perceived by top management about an IS project and project team. For example, renewing an outdated IT infrastructure (e.g., an ERP) is usually about enabling the same business outcomes (Ross & Beath, 2002). In the absence of knowledge about the potential benefits and opportunities of a new infrastructure, top management

Politics of Top Management Support in Large IS Projects    255 may exchange their support for an unrelated offer. Prior studies have found that exchange is statistically associated with the provision of managerial support (Falbe & Yukl, 1992; Liu et al., 2015b; Yukl, Guinan, & Sottolano, 1995; Yukl & Tracey, 1992). However, top management may only be willing to offer support to an extent that is viewed as proportionate to the value of the team’s offer (i.e., immediate top management support). Otherwise, a feeling of unfairness or exploitation can be created (Molm et al., 2000).

Conclusion Top management, whether in the private or public sector, must play a critical role in helping to achieve the strategic vision of an IS project (e.g., the creation of a smart city). The objective of this article is to offer a brief review and synthesis of the sparse literature on top management support acquisition. We identify and describe four political influence strategies, social capital, social engagement, rational persuasion and exchange, and explain how and why those strategies work on top management. We also outline a two-stage process to guide the selection of which strategy to use. Our two-stage process suggests that a project team should select the strategy based on (1) the type of top management support desired (i.e., durable vs immediate) and (2) the level of top management-project team trust (i.e., high vs low). However, we do not claim the strategies described or the frameworks proposed are exhaustive, as this research stream is in its nascent stage. Scholars must substantiate and extend the existing knowledge.

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Chapter 18

Trade in ICT, International Economy, and Politics Katarzyna Żukrowska Abstract Considering the dynamic correlation between advances in information and communication technology (ICT) and contemporary politics, this chapter provides an economist insight into the role of ICT in the global economy. It is argued that the analysis of the relationship between ICT and politics would be incomplete if the direct and indirect influence ICT exerts on international economy was not considered. This chapter examines the features of the international trade in ICT seen as a complex reflection of the current stage of liberalization achieved at the forum of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and subsequent spillovers to other domains of economic and political collaboration worldwide. It is argued that ICT and its development not only result in the “shrinking of the distance” in the world economy but also stimulate economic liberalization, further reshuffling production from more- to less-advanced economies and, finally, help to overcome trade imbalances on the global scale. In brief, a case is made that ICT creates the conditions conducive to the enhancement of international political and economic collaboration. Keywords: International trade; ICT; politics; economy; economic liberalization; collaboration

1. Introduction Considering the dynamic correlation between advances in information and communication technology (ICT) and developments, trends, and dynamics of contemporary politics, this chapter provides an economist insight into the role of ICT in

Politics and Technology in the Post-Truth Era, 259–282 Copyright © 2019 Katarzyna Żukrowska doi:10.1108/978-1-78756-983-620191018

260   Katarzyna Żukrowska the global economy. It is argued that the analysis of the relationship between ICT and politics would be incomplete if the direct and indirect influence ICT exerts on international economy was not considered. It is argued that sequenced development on a global scale with the use of ICT accelerates the development of less-advanced economies, while in the most advanced economies it contributes to a reduction of the current account deficit (where occurring). In sum, ICT and its development not only result in the “shrinking of the distance” in the world economy but also stimulate liberalization, further reshuffling production from more- to less-advanced economies and, finally, help to overcome trade imbalances on the global scale. Notably, ICT is seen here as an important factor in a bigger range of stimuli. This chapter examines the features of the international market for ICT, whereby trade in ICT is seen here as a complex reflection of the current stage of liberalization achieved at the forum of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the international movement of capital, use of similar measures and indicators in the national policies of states on different continents, and in different stages of development. The discussion in the chapter points to ICT’s importance in the contemporary international trade market and its impact on changes in the trade balances of the most-developed economies. The increasing interdependence between different groups of markets as far as traditional goods and ICT products are concerned is showcased in this chapter too. It indicates how this interdependence influences directly and indirectly the process of the liberalization of international trade. This chapter provides arguments that show that the development of ICT on its own creates the conditions conducive to the development of closer international relations. At the same time, it helps to reduce tariff barriers (traditionally used in manufactured goods trade). The article shows the growing importance of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), which can be seen in the longer run as an instrument enforcing certain desired solutions in managing national economies within regulatory frameworks influenced by the work of International Labour Organization, World Health Organization, or Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The discussion in this chapter reviews the mutual dependence between the development of ICT and development, as represented by the inclusion of African states into global value chains (GVC). The discussion is structured as follows: First, the key features of the ICT market are presented; second, barriers to trade in ICT are outlined; the third part discusses ICT in GVCs; in the fourth and last part, the links between ICT and development are discussed. Conclusions follow.

2. ICT Definition, Role, and Size of Market Several approaches to the definition of ICT exist. The common definition of the notion can be used in both a broader or narrow sense. The broad approach defines ICT as part of the creative segment of the economy with its cultural industries. The sector is dominated by small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) which go beyond the national borders of the economy and participate in GVCs. Deep changes have taken place in the culture and creative industries concerning the appearance of a number of new enterprises that are tightly connected internationally (Hesmondhalgh, 2013). These enterprises work in different fields, often

Trade in ICT, International Economy, and Politics    261 cooperating with big transnational companies (TNC). This specific trend is also reflected by a change in the ownership structure, as almost all such enterprises are private and usually owned by one person, a family, or a small group of friends who have similar interests, skills, accept new ideas, etc. (Howkins, 2002). These SMEs require a new approach in the state’s policy toward industry, one customized and tailored to their specifics. In most cases, such policies are built on the experience of previously existing or designed businesses and needs, which means the policies are limited in how suitable they are for this emerging need. For the sake of the discussion in this chapter the definition of ICT trade introduced by the World Customs Organization Harmonized System (HS) is used. That definition is also used by other international organizations that deal with ICT trade, incl. the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), WTO, International Monetary Fund (IMF), etc. This definition includes ICT products as well as ICT goods. According to that definition: ICT goods must either be intended to fulfil the function of information processing and communication by electronic means including transmission and display, or use of electronic processing to detect, measure and/or record physical phenomena, or to control a physical process. This indicator is measured in millions of the US$ (OECD, 2018a). The ICT sector is diverse, covering both manufacturing and services enterprises. According to the OECD definition, ICT manufacturing embraces the manufacture of electronic components, computers, peripheral equipment, communications equipment, consumer electronics, and magnetic and optical media. In turn, ICT services include the following activities: telecommunications, computer programming, consultancy, software publishing, web portals, data services, and repair of computers and communication equipment (OECD/WTO, 2013). Today’s changes in economies have been fostered by two consecutive industrial revolutions: 3.0 and 4.0 (Rifkin, 2011). The former one is closely linked to the spread of the use of personal computers, which was followed by automation and wider internet usage, leading directly to revolution 4.0, which is connecting people (through the internet, mobile phone, communications platforms such as Skype and Facebook, cloud storage, artificial intelligence, etc.) but also enabling smart factories and cyber-based physical systems (Windpassinger, 2017). These revolutions do not have a specific start or end date: 3.0 took root at the turn of the 1960s–1970s, while 4.0 is happening now and is stimulated by deep internet usage, or more precisely the “industrial internet of things.” Both took place relatively quickly one after the other, with no sharp divide marking when one ends and the other takes off. Revolution 4.0 seems to be both a natural and smooth continuation of 3.0. Here, it is worth mentioning the first industrial revolution (1.0) took place in the 18th century (usually cited as 1765, with the invention of the steam engine), while 2.0 dates to the end of the 19th century (in 1870, with the expanded use of electricity, gas, and oil for lighting). This shows that past revolutions required much time to change

262   Katarzyna Żukrowska how the economy functioned. The first, mechanical revolution, was followed by the second, electrical one, after nearly a century. The electrical revolution enabled mass production. Again, though, a century passed before the next major change to computers and then to the internet, together automating industrial production. Several differences among the three previous revolutions and the current one exist. The first three revolutions empowered the factory and means of production. The period between the start of one revolution and the next one was very long. In contrast, the current revolution not only empowers people but also blurs the divide between physical and digital production processes. Moreover, 4.0 has impacted socio-economic conditions in relation to industry, from process organization and the international division of labor to the government involvement and even individuals (Bloem, van Doom, Duivestein, & van Ommeren, 2014). ICT is bringing revolutionary changes to economies and development policies (Bessant, 2017), including UN development goals, which were replaced in September 2015 by 17 sustainable development goals. This shows how important it is to know what conditions are needed for ICT to function in an economy. This knowledge is required to create advantageous conditions for ICT to thrive and enables the preparation of infrastructure and people to use the technology. It is also important to understand that ICT can be leveraged by importing needed technology from those who produce them before a country establishes its own potential to do it. Importing technology, however, does not solve the problem, since they require expertise to use and apply and – in the medium term – must be upgraded and replaced by more advanced ones. This means that work has to be done upgrading the human capital in most countries that aim to catch up to more advanced ones. People have to be able to work with the new technology as well as to change with it as time passes (Table 1). In general, the statistical data on ICT or wider creative industries is incomplete (some years are missing in chains of comparable data, some states are missing in international comparisons and data often is outdated, lagging by some 3–4 years). This offers the general conclusion that individual states do not consider this sector important, which often also can be proved by a lack of policies addressed to the sector and its enterprises. Indirectly, the importance of the market can be shown by its share of gross national product (GNP), as well as in the total valueadded created in the specific economy or its share in employment (Table 2). There is no doubt that the Asia-Pacific region leads as far as the share of the creative industry in GNP and in the share of jobs created in the specific market. Second is Europe and third is the USA. This information shows that the sector offers big opportunities for development but this cannot be achieved automatically and without meeting specific conditions. These conditions are reflected in the figures for broadband internet penetration among both the public and economic entities, internet penetration in general, the number of computers per 1,000 inhabitants, the number of mobile phones per 1,000 inhabitants, and the charges for internet and mobile calls/internet. All these indicators are higher in economies with developed infrastructure, nearly unlimited access to electricity, open markets with wages (individual incomes) that enable the use of the internet, mobile phones, especially smart phones, and range of computers, including desktop PCs, laptops, tablets, smart watches, etc.

2000

666.3 44.1 31.9 48.7 0.7 27.7 10.7 108.8 59.4 34.8 38.2 1.3 15.5 3.1 1.02 50.4 156.7

Source: OECD (2018b).

OECD China France Germany Indie Ireland Italy Japan South Korea Mexico Netherlands Poland Sweden Switzerland Turkey UK USA

Country

370.0 53.2 26.3 46.6 0.8 31.6 10.6 81.9 44.9 34.9 34.3 1.6 8.5 2.6 1.1 48.0 128.5

2001

547.0 78.2 23.6 48.6 0.8 27.5 9.2 82.9 53.5 33.3 28.6 2.0 9.2 2.0 1.6 46.7 111.5

2002 586.4 121.4 23.3 55.3 0.9 22.5 9.8 91.4 63.3 31.8 42.6 2.3 10.2 2.2 2.0 37.3 114.9

2003 688.4 177.7 26.9 72.4 1.1 23.5 11.5 104.3 84.6 37.0 53.6 2.8 13.6 2.7 3.0 37.4 124.1

2004 730.2 234.1 27.3 77.2 1.1 24.7 11.6 100.8 85.3 38.5 58.7 3.6 14.6 3.4 3.2 53.9 128.9

2005

Table 1:  ICT Goods Exports. Total, in Millions US$, 2000–2012.

808.5 297.7 31.6 82.8 1.3 24.1 11.4 103.1 86.2 46.9 62.3 5.5 15.1 3.0 3.2 84.8 140.3

2006 750.2 353.5 26.0 77.5 – 22.7 11.1 92.3 93.8 48.1 67.7 7.9 14.5 3.0 2.8 29.7 135.3

2007 760.5 390.8 25.2 62.9 – 19.9 10.5 91.2 89.4 56.9 62.9 11.9 19.9 3.3 2.4 27.3 137.1

2008 614.5 351.9 19.6 53.1 6.1 12.8 8.2 69.1 78.5 49.7 53.1 12.8 12.8 2.7 2.0 23.0 112.6

2009 710.7 455.0 22.5 61.0 4.4 8.8 9.6 81.5 98.4 60.0 61.0 15.1 8.8 3.1 2.1 23.7 133.9

2010 724.7 503.8 24.5 62.5 6.5 7.3 11.0 75.5 98.3 59.2 62.5 13.2 7.3 3.4 2.2 23.2 139.9

2011

680.7 549.5 22.6 55.8 5.7 6.8 9.3 72.8 93.3 62.4 55.8 12.6 6.8 3.2 2.7 20.1 138.6

2012

Trade in ICT, International Economy, and Politics    263

264   Katarzyna Żukrowska Table 2:  Comparison of Five Continents’ Creative Industries and Their Share of GNP in 2015 (Billions US$ and Percentage) and of Jobs Created (Millions and %). Continent

Share of GNP, bln US$

North America Europe Latin America Asia Pacific Africa Total

620 709 124 743 58 2,254

Share, %

Share of Job Creation, mln

28 31 6 32 3 100

4.7 7.7 1.9 12.7 2.4 29.4

Share, % 16 26 7 43 8 100

Source: Cultural Times (2015).

From this, we see 10 states are above the OECD average of 6.0% and these are economies that specialize in the production of ICT goods. Most of the states are below the average in terms of value-added as a share of ICT. These data show the clear divide into traditional and pioneering economies. Data concerning valueadded created in the sector finds support in statistics showing the share of ICT in employment in OECD markets, where the average is 3.7%. The highest share is noted in the Finnish economy, the lowest in Canada (Table 3). In some cases, the data reflect the relatively low productivity of a given state’s enterprises – when value-added is low and the share of employment relatively high, which seems to be the case in Germany (where the mismatch between added Table 3:  Value-added in the ICT Sector in Selected States in 2011 (Latest Data Available). State (market)

Share, State % (market)

Ireland Korea South Japan Switzerland UK Hungary USA Estonia Sweden Finland

11.9 9.6 8.1 7.4 7.4 7.3 7.1 6.9 6.8 6.4

Source: OECD (2018c).

OECD average Slovakia Czech Rep. Denmark Germany France Canada Netherlands Italy Greece

Share, %

State (market)

Share, %

6.0 5.9 5.7 5.2 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 4.9 4.9

Slovenia Spain Belgium Iceland Poland Portugal Norway Austria

4.7 4.6 4.5 4.3 4.1 4.1 3.9 3.8

Trade in ICT, International Economy, and Politics    265 value and employment is clear) or in South Korea (lacking data concerning employment, Table 4). Returning to international trade in ICT (telecommunications, computer, and information services) one can conclude that the rate of growth of turnover in this particular field is relatively high, with Europe the leader here, followed by Asia and North America. The highest growth can be observed in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), followed by Asia, the Middle East and then Europe. It is lowest in Africa and South and Central America, although the 2015 statistics show that South and Central America are catching up (Table 5). Attention should be turned here to the disparities both in value and dynamics. Reaching a certain level of saturation of a market causes a fall in turnover values and their dynamics (USA), while relatively low saturation results in the growth of turnover and high dynamics of the rate of growth (Europe, Asia, and the CIS). The ITC market is strongly diversified as far as the demand and supply of ICT technologies is concerned; nevertheless, the newer model of production of a chain of tightly connected enterprises spread over different continents and based on outsourcing and networking stimulates the diffusion of knowledge, technologies and skills accelerating the catch-up process.

3. Barriers to Trade The interconnected and interdependent ICT market comprising GVCs can be seen as one solution to help cover the gap in development between different continents and regions. Overcoming this development gap is not an automatic process and a country must fulfill certain conditions (institutional, legal, and economic) to fully profit from the international division of labor and make use of differentiated levels of development. In general, hints to this are given by J. Williamson in his Washington Consensus. One can criticize the Consensus with the argument that it was invented some time ago (more than three decades now). Others say Table 4:  ICT Employment as a Share of Total Employment (%) for 2011 (Latest Data Available). State (market)

Share, %

Finland Switzerland Ireland Hungary Japan Sweden Denmark Luxemburg Source: OECD (2018c).

6.4 5.4 5.2 4.9 4.7 4.5 4.4 4.4

State (market) Estonia UK Germany USA OECD Netherlands Slovenia Slovakia

Share, % 4.4 4.3 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.5 3.4 3.3

State (market) France Norway Czech Rep. Italy Austria Belgium Spain Canada

Share, % 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.1 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.6

266   Katarzyna Żukrowska Table 5:  World Exports of Telecommunications and Computer and Information Services, 2014 and 2015. Contents

World North America South and Central America Europe European Union (EU) (28) CIS Africa Middle East Asia

Value (USD millions)

Share

Annual Percentage Change

2014

2015

2010

2015

2010–2015 2014

2015

485 45 9

475 45 10

100.0 10.0 2.2

100.0 9.4 2.2

7 6 7

9 0 6

−2 0 12

297 280

280 262

61.3 56.3

58.8 55.0

6 7

11 12

−6 −6

9 6 15 105

8 6 15 112

1.3 1.4 3.0 20.7

1.8 1.2 3.1 23.6

13 3 8 10

12 5 8 8

−4 −12 −2 7

Source: ITU (2017a, 2017b); https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/publications/ misr2017/MISR2017_Volume1.pdf.

there are newer consensus frames, such as the Mumbai or Shanghai models. Still, others will recall the arguments of the neo-Keynesian school or the Asian Tiger model. Some might also mention the European model to reform the economy. In most of these cases, we can find a number of common elements that can be used effectively to reform an economy. In short, Williamson in his Consensus was turning the attention to several things in an economy that form a healthy background for its functioning. These are: the convertibility of currency, a competitive exchange rate, the elimination of the budget deficit, and restructuring state expenditures in such a way that they can lessen the financial obligations on the state in the future as well as increase state revenues without raising taxes. Williamson pointed to a specific tool in every economy, which he ascribed to competition. This tool enforces the allocation of production factors in an efficient manner, enforces lower costs on producers, which, in turn, reduces cost pressure on inflation (Table 6). Differentiated development levels create some natural conditions for international cooperation, which in general result in different levels of production costs, mainly labor costs, but also lower taxes. Those advantages are accompanied by some disadvantages: underdeveloped infrastructure, a lack of advanced technology, an uncompetitive market, and protection against imports. Catchingup means that economic policy should consider the need to reduce trade barriers. Strategies often applied by states that want to accelerate their development through anti-import or pro-export production have failed in Asia and Latin America. Those strategies were built upon protection of the domestic market,

Trade in ICT, International Economy, and Politics    267 Table 6:  J. Williamson’s Consensus, with 10 Points Added by D. Rodrick. Original 10 Points of J. Williamson’s Washington Consensus

10 Additional Points to the Washington Consensus by D. Rodrick

Low government borrowing. Avoidance of large fiscal deficits relative to gross domestic product (GDP) Redirection of public spending from subsidies (“especially indiscriminate subsidies”) toward broad-based provision of key pro-growth, propoor services such as primary education, primary healthcare, and infrastructure investment Tax reform, broadening the tax base, and adopting moderate marginal tax rates; Interest rates that are market determined and positive (but moderate) in real terms Competitive exchange rates

Corporation order

Trade liberalization: liberalization of imports, with particular emphasis on the elimination of quantitative restrictions (licensing, etc.); any trade protection to be provided by low and relatively uniform tariffs Liberalization of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) Privatization of state enterprises

Deregulation: abolition of regulations that impede market entry or restrict competition, except for those justified on safety, environmental and consumer protection grounds, and prudential oversight of financial institutions Legal security for property rights

Counteracting corruption

Flexible labor market Following the WTO discipline Following the international codes and financial standards “Cautious” opening of the current account to capital flows

Regimes of intermediate Exchange rate Independent central banks/control over inflation Systems of protection of social needs

Policy should address the reduction of poverty

Source: Rodrik (2010).

which was accompanied by the assumption that protection is a helpful solution to promote production and exports. In reality, in those cases protectionism was a tool that stimulated inflation and limited competition. Protectionism eliminated the natural stimuli to upgrade technology, to invent new solutions, to increase competitiveness.

268   Katarzyna Żukrowska Most developing economies have learned that protectionism is not a good tool to stimulate development. WTO tariff reductions and increasing membership has resulted in almost cutting by half the tariff barriers in developing economies since the end of the Uruguay Round of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Such moves had an impact on prices, supply in the market, structural changes in economies, and the inflow of capital and technology. Tariff protection is usually much higher in developing economies than in developed ones while non-tariff protection is much more sophisticated and well established in developed markets. This means that there is an asymmetry not limited to development but also reflected in the methods of market protection in the two general groups of economies. Protection of developing economies against imports is a tool that creates the conditions for specific revenues to state budgets from the stimulation of demand, but at the same time, it pushes up the prices of goods sold on that market, making its citizens poorer. This shows a type of vicious circle forms when states try to help their citizens, instead increasing their suffering and prolonging the period in which they have to suffer. The paradox here is that these governments declared a need to support their people. Tariff barriers on average in the case of the OECD states are low. Taking the USA and the EU, the scale of market-tariff protection is ca. 2%. There are specific areas, different for both markets, in which the level of protection is higher. There are also differences between the levels of tariff and NTB protection (Table 7). It is clear that some sectors are similarly protected: agriculture, forestry and fishery, or some other primary sector. In most of sectors, the level of protection is comparable: Metals and metal products, electrical machinery, other machinery, and wood and paper products. Nevertheless, there are two exceptions from that trend – motor vehicles and processed foods. The EU has applied much higher tariffs to these sectors than the USA. There are much greater disparities in the protection of the two markets applied by NTBs (Table 8). The presented data indicate that the NTB index is generally higher on goods than on services and this finding is true for both markets. The highest NTBs are applied in the aerospace and space industry. The service market is more protected by NTBs in the USA than in the EU. Developed economies more often use non-tariff tools of protection than tariff types. What are they and why have they gained importance? The reduction and elimination of tariffs in developed economies seems to be a natural phenomenon. NTBs – certificates, voluntary export restraints, quality requests, specifications concerning components and their manufacturing location, fair-trade statements, environment protection rules, etc. – can be seen as a method that reflects some quality demands, which pushes the prices of exports from developing economies higher. Developed economies often offer to least-developed countries (LDC) access to their markets without any additional barriers. This is done within specific regulations applied by the WTO in policies applied to LDCs. Developing states’ application of tariffs and reduction with hesitation can be seen as a sort of carryover from a time when these economies were largely export oriented. The idea was that infant industry needed protection against giant global TNCs. This stance has remained even as developed economies, earlier called industrialized markets, have passed through consecutive stages of development

Trade in ICT, International Economy, and Politics    269 Table 7:  Trade Weighted Tariffs Applied (MFNa) Average Tariffs Rates in Trade of EU and US. Sectors Agricultural, forestry, and fisheries Other primary sectors Processed foods Chemicals Electrical machinery Motor vehicles Other transport equipment Metals and metal products Wood and paper products Other manufactures Other machinery

EU Tariff

US Tariff

3.7 0.0 14.6 2.3 0.6 8.0 1.3 1.6 0.5 2.4 1.3

3.7 0.0 3.3 1.2 0.3 1.2 0.2 1.3 0.2 3.2 0.8

Source: WTO, CEPII, UNCTAD mapped to GTAP8 (2013). a Most favored nation clause.

to a post-industrial phase. In this type of market, export goods are not as sensitive to tariff protection. These countries import goods while applying non-tariff protections (NTP1). However, NTP instruments are being reduced in regional or bilateral deals that liberalize trade, such as the EU, the European Economic Area, the Canada–EU Trade Agreement, Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the South American trade bloc (Mercosur), Trans Pacific Partnership (not the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement [renamed in 2018 to Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership], etc. NTP are also being reduced globally through the WTO. This explanation shows that emerging markets, marked by high tariff protection, guard mainly the “uncompetitive” parts of their economies. In other words, despite their declarations of intent, these protections prolong the period of reform, which increases social costs and the more general costs of the reform by postponing imports of advanced technologies, including ICT. Thus, the applied policies have the opposite effect. Trying to prove the level of protection in developed and developing markets in area of analysis – ITC technologies – one can say that in most of the cases of emerging markets listed in the table, the picture is relatively complicated, which means in practice that in general, tariffs are relatively high but vary. On top of the tariffs, often a set of taxes is applied. In some cases, the value of the taxes and tariffs are computed while in others, the information seems to be imprecise, giving a wide range of discretion to those who decide them. This means that in cases like Brazil, manufactured goods not produced on the market can be imported with 1

NTP (non-tariff protection) is used here as a synonym of NTB.

270   Katarzyna Żukrowska Table 8:  Perceived NTB Index by Business (Index between 0 and 100). Sector Service sectors Travel Transport Financial services ICT Insurance Communications Construction Other business services Personal, cultural, and recreational services Goods sector Chemicals Pharmaceuticals Cosmetics Biotechnology Machinery Electronics Office, information and communications equipment Medical, measuring, and testing appliances Automotive industry Aerospace and space industry Food and beverages Iron, steel, and metal products Textiles, clothing, and footwear Wood and paper, paper products

EU Exports to USA USA Exports to EU 35.6 39.9 29.7 20.0 29.5 29.5 44.6 42.2 35.8

17.6 26.3 21.3 19.3 19.3 39.3 27.0 20.0 35.4

45.8 23.8 48.3 46.1 50.9 30.8 37.9

53.2 44.7 52.2 50.2 36.5 20.0 32.3

49.3

44.5

34.8 56.0 45.5 35.5 35.6 30.0

31.6 55.1 33.6 24.0 48.9 47.1

Source: Based on WTO, CEPII, UNCTAD mapped to GTAP8 (2013).

the application of low or even “0”-rate duties, while in others, such as India, the freedom to choose the solution to be applied seems relatively flexible. Let us look at some of the solutions applied in a number of states listed in Table 9 as importers and which represent emerging or developing markets. Brazil has been a member of WTO since January 1, 1995, and before that, a member of GATT since July 30, 1948. The country applies three taxes that

Table 9:  Major Exporters and Importers of Telecommunications, Computer, and Information Services, 2014 and 2015 (Million US$ and %). Value

2014

2015

2014

2010– 2014

84.3 28.8

10 10

9 10

12 10

−6 −4

12.8 8.2 4.6 2.9 2.2 2.0 1.1 1.0 0.8 100.0

8 9 18 12 21 1 8 14 12 −

8 8 5 8 4 −8 15 19 11 −

5 2 18 15 15 −9 1 8 4 −

4 3 22 9 −2 −15 −1 −12 0 −

62.9 28.1

6 9

11 15

4 15

−11 −10

33,156 13,803 11,311 11,409 7,935 5,520

12.7 5.3 4.4 4.1 3.1 2.6

4 8 26 27 23 15

3 15 12 39 27 18

−1 6 80 41 19 13

0 0 −1 6 −3 −10

5,092 4,794 4,318 3,782 3,670 3,340 262,855 242,680

1.9 1.6 1.4 100.0

2 5 −1

−14 8 10

1 15 −30

−6 −12 −9

Exporters EU (28) 279,647 261,919 Extra-EU (28) 125,209 120,769 exports India 55,666 57,661 USA 35,885 36,990 China 20,173 24,549 Switzerland 12,634 13,826 Israel 9,417 9,274 Canada 8,704 7,434 Singapore 4,896 4,829 Russian Federation 4,504 3,971 Philippines 3,472 3,461 Above 10 435,000 423,915 Importers EU (28) Extra-EU (28) imports USA Switzerland Japan China Singapore Russian Federation Canada India Brazil Above 10 Source: ITU (2017b).

Share of Annual Percentage Change the 10 Economies Compared (%)

165,342 147,626 73,776 66,566 33,314 13,854 11,457 10,748 8,205 6,854

2013 2014

2015

272   Katarzyna Żukrowska account for the bulk of import costs (tariff profiles, WTO 2108): Import Duty (II), Industrialized Product Tax (IPI), and Merchandised Product and Service Circulation Tax (ICMS). On top of these taxes, several smaller taxes and fees are applied to imports. Most of the applied taxes are calculated cumulatively. Brazil is a member of WTO and participates in Mercosur. Within that customs union, each member state maintains its own, separate list of items exempted from tariffs. In 1995, Brazil implemented Mercosur Common Nomenclature, consistent with the HS of tariff classification. The Brazilian government established a computerized system to monitor foreign trade (imports and exports). It facilitates customs clearance, known as Foreign Trade Integrated System. It aims to speed up and reduce the paperwork linked with foreign trade transactions. All Brazilian imports are registered in the Foreign Trade Secretariat’s Export and Import Register. The Brazilian system allows imports of specific goods without the need to pay import tariffs, called “ex tariff.” It allows imports of foreign manufactured goods (including American products) under specific conditions. Imports meeting such conditions can be transferred when there is no similar equipment produced by local enterprises. These “ex tariffs” consist of a temporary reduction of import duties on capital goods and IT and telecommunications products. This information is given in Mercosur’s common external tariff and can be applied in cases when such products are not manufactured domestically. IPI is levied on most domestic and imported manufactured products and ranges between 0% and 15% on the total value of CIF (cost, insurance, freight). ICMS is a type of state value-added tax (VAT) and is applied to imports and domestic products. It is calculated from the ad valorem CIF value of the goods with added-IPI. The ICMS rate varies between 7% and 18%. China has joined the WTO on December 11, 2001. It applies the MFN clause to all WTO members. China also applies in its trade policy conventional duty rates, which means that the rates in such cases are dependent on regional trade agreements in effect with China. In other cases, the country applies general duties within a tariff rate quota, which means that tariffs are lower until the quota is exceeded, then they are higher. In some cases, for example, wheat, the differences between the applied tariffs are huge. Within the quota, the quota is 1%, substantially lower than the MFN tariff of 65%, and general duty of 130% (the general duty is double the MFN rate). China, like Brazil, can apply lower rates to imports when there are good reasons. Such reduced tariffs are used temporarily for certain goods when a decision is made that the items are needed on the market. In 2016, China implemented temporary rates lower than the MFN rates on more than 787 imported goods. Since 2015, China has cut tariffs by 50% in 14 categories of duty rates. This relief covered key technical equipment. The import tax and duties payable are calculated on an ad valorem basis. This approach applies to both solutions of payable duty: the given limit on imports as well as to quantities beyond the limit. Duty payable = DPV × Tariff rate (within the limit) Duty payable = Quantity imported goods × amount above the limit Compound formula = DPV × Tariff rate + Quantity of imported goods × amount of duty per unit

Trade in ICT, International Economy, and Politics    273 India has been a member of WTO since January 1, 1995, and a GATT member since July 8, 1948. India’s customs tariff and fee structure is complex and characterized by a lack of transparency in determining net effective rates of customs tariffs, followed by excise duties and other applied taxes (WTO, 2018). The tariff structure generally applied is composed of a “basic customs duty,” a “special additional duty,” and an “education assessment” (“CESS”). The regime is characterized by pronounced disparities between bound (WTO) and MFN applied rates charged at the border. According to the latest WTO data, India applies an average tariff of 48.5%. At the same time, the simple MFN average applied tariff for 2015 was 13.4%. The average for agriculture imports was 113.5%. Imports from ASEAN states enjoy an average tariff of 5%. Philippines became a member of the WTO on January 1, 1995, and joined GATT on December 27, 1979. The country applies an MFN tariff of 7.1% (WTO, 2018). The average applied tariff is 23.5%. Applied tariffs on agricultural products are significantly higher. Within ASEAN trade, 99% of tariff barriers are lifted. Russia has been a member of the WTO since December 16, 2011, although formally its membership started after ratification of the membership agreement in 2012 (WTO, 2018). By 2017, Russia had slashed industrial and consumer goods tariffs from almost 10% to 7.8%. About one-third of the tariff lines received the final bound rate upon Russia’s accession to the WTO while another one-quarter will be cut within an approved transition period ranging between three to seven years, depending on the sensitivity of the products and markets. What is interesting here is that the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) agreed Unified Customs Tariff (of the EAEU/CU) has undergone periodic revision since 2011. This in practice means that EAEU member states also reduce their tariffs according to Russia within the conditions of its accession to the WTO. So, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan all apply the same tariffs as Russia even though they are not WTO members. Armenia, too, tracks the EAEU rates, being the next candidate to join that customs union and in preparation for its accession. For some products, import excise taxes on the Russian market range between 20% and 570%. VAT is applied to the sum of the total customs value, the customs duty, as well as the excise tax. Russian customs VAT is levied at the same rates as Russian sales VAT, generally reaching 18% for most goods, work, or services. Some selected categories are subject to the lower 10% VAT and a few even exempted from the tax. The sanctions on Russia by the USA and the EU (Ćwiek-Karpowicz & Secrieru, 2015) after its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine, play a specific role in these circumstances, with the reduced tariffs allowing the other members of the EAEU to serve as “middlemen” between the Western markets and Russia, which stimulates the development of these EEAU markets, this despite the continuing conflict over Crimea and the lack of the full implementation of the September 2014 Minsk agreement. Looking deeper into the details at the solutions applied in states that import ICT goods and services, one can see that in general, markets representing relatively lower engagement in development, world trade, and international cooperation of all kinds protect their markets with higher tariffs. In most cases, there are specific options to

274   Katarzyna Żukrowska lower the applied tariffs if needed. Such a solution can be seen as advantageous at first sight. The real consequence of the application of these solutions though leads to a number of abuses of the law. A legal system in which the amount of tariff to be applied depends on a clerk’s decision creates the perfect conditions for corruption.2 In most states the formulated and applied system postpones development, increases the costs of ICT, and makes less-developed economies dependent on more expensive solutions to overcome the infrastructure gap.

4. ICT and GVCs With globalization, regional integration, and the development of international economic cooperation, enterprises have started to seek profit by moving some production to other regions to pay less, which has an impact on unit costs of the final product and increased price competitiveness. At the same time, the move created jobs on the production market, which in turn boosted demand for goods produced by the same company, allowing it to expand abroad in different ways – through FDI, ordering abroad (imports), and selling abroad (exports). The process was stimulated in several ways: First, by the differences in development between the markets, which meant lower labor costs in the developing market; second, by differences in capital supply between the markets; third, by an acceleration of the establishment of production ties internationally, stimulated by globalization (tariff reduction on a global scale and increase in the number of states participating in that process) as well as regionalization; fourth, by the technical revolution, stimulating connections between regions, both transport (lower fees) and telephone and internet usage, which has expanded direct and indirect communication. Developments in these areas as a natural mechanism anytime an investor seeks opportunities to gain more from his invested capital, resulted in the creation of GVCs. They have developed in all parts of the world but this does not mean that all regions are engaged in the same way with GVCs or follow the same model of cooperation. The main differences can be found by applying specific criteria that help distinguish the main divides between national markets and regions in terms of GVCs. First, there is a distinction between backward and forward participation in GVCs. This concept is based on analysis by A. Hirschman (1958), who studied the links established between enterprises. Looking at such links, he distinguished relations in terms of buying goods, products, and supplies from different sectors, which he labeled “inputs” and referred to them as “backward.” He also observed relations in the opposite direction, when a company sells a product or supplies another 2

According to the Corruption Perception Index for 2016 the positions of selected states are following: Finland (3), Sweden (4), Singapore (7), Canada (9), UK (10), USA (18), UAE (24), Chile (24), Poland (29), Czech Rep. (47), Slovakia (54), Hungary (57), China (79), Brazil (79), Belarus (79), India (79), Azerbaijan (123), Mexico (123), Kazakhstan (131), Russia (131), Ukraine (131), Kyrgyzstan (136), and Uzbekistan (156). The total number of states which are covered by the evaluation of the corruption index is 176. Source: https://www.transparency.org/ne ws/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016#table (accessed 12.01.2018).

Trade in ICT, International Economy, and Politics    275 company, which he termed “outputs,” that is, goods made for other enterprises, and called “forward” transactions. Backward links exist when investments in an industry profit from inputs while forward links cover the o ­ pposite – investments in an industry profits from outputs. Second, a distinction can be made between global and regional GVCs, as enterprises spread their activity over a narrower or wider geographic territory. Third, markets in which enterprises function within GVCs can represent either a similar level of development of a differentiated level of development. The picture is mixed. In some cases, there is progress in both backward and forward transactions, and in several cases there is progress in one type of transaction only and a decrease in the other. Latin American economies as a group of six have increased their share of forward transactions and decreased backward ones. The data show China is similar. Korea has increased its backward ties and kept the forward ones in more or less the same position. The EU has increased slightly in both indicators. The US economy has a similar trend as the EU, although the scale of positive change is smaller (Table 10). Individual sectors varied as far as value-added was concerned in exports. In the primary sector, the share of value-added was lowest and reached 9.6%; in the secondary sector, it was the highest, reaching 29.4%; and in the tertiary sector, it reached 14.2% (UNCTAD 2013). The analysis of value-added in specific branches found it differed between developed and developing economies. The share of value-added in exports in developed economies is higher than in the developing countries in two segments: textiles and electronics (Table 11). This is interesting since the traditional segments in developed economies, intuitively assumed to be less important to their exports in comparison with emerging markets, have a higher value-added component than the remaining ones. The automotive industry in developing economies enjoys the highest value-added, followed by machinery exports (Fig. 1). The analysis leads to the straightforward conclusion that the protection of markets in developing economies is a barrier to accelerating catching-up and development. The restrictions can be seen in trade regulations (tariff and non-­tariff), FDI inflows, business ownership, and areas restricted to foreign penetration, labeled as strategic for development. In practice, the opposite, openness, seems to bring more opportunities and accelerates the advancement of an economy. This can be explained by the simple model of international cooperation within GVCs.

Fig. 1:  GVC Model of Cooperation.

276   Katarzyna Żukrowska Table 10:  Backward and Forward Participation in Regions and Countries in 2000 and 2011 (%). Region/Country

Year

Backward

Forward

LAC6

2000 2011 2000 2011 2000 2011 2000 2011 2000 2011 2000 2011 2000 2011 2000 2011 2000 2011 2000 2011 2000 2011 2000 2011 2000 2011 2000 2011

24.8 20.1 24.4 28.6 25.0 30.4 22.0 25.4 20.1 25.5 29.7 41.6 6.3 14.1 11.4 10.7 21.7 20.2 9.4 7.6 26.5 27.8 34.3 31.7 37.2 32.1 12.5 15.0

14.1 21.0 20.2 22.5 21.3 21.1 21.0 23.3 22.6 24.1 20.8 20.5 19.2 16.4 17.4 24.5 22.8 31.7 20.4 30.2 13.5 16.8 10.4 15.1 10.8 15.1 24.4 24.9

EU (27) Asia 61 countries Germany Korea Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Mexico China USA Source: OECD/WTO (2015).

The cause-effect model here shows that catching-up depends strongly on international cooperation. Interdependence in this area is much stronger than the traditional division of labor among segments (inter-segment division) is replaced by an intra-segment division. This means that the final product needs to be completed through a complicated process of cooperation. None of the markets in which GVCs engage produces the entire product on its own from first step in the

Trade in ICT, International Economy, and Politics    277 Table 11:  Share of Export-added Value in Developed and Developing Countries in Selected Industry Segments. Contents Textiles Electronics Machinery Chemicals Automotive Average

Developed 34 35 23 24 32 29.6

Developing 18 22 32 35 57 32.8

Source: UNCTAD (2013, p. 8).

production process (design and technology) through manufacturing, to completion (collecting all the elements and assembling them into the end product and ready for sale), let alone selling and servicing the product. In the different stages of production, different types of work are needed, resulting in differentiated levels of value-added embedded in the product. This requires organizational skills, technologies, raw materials, energy, design, packaging, marketing, storing, preparing spare parts and services to keep the product in operating conditions, etc. At the same time, the producer needs to be aware of the specific area of specialization of his competitors and tries to seek own solutions to create an innovative product that in the future will replace the current one. All this creates pressure for advanced ICT enterprises. GVCs may seem to make the production line more complicated but they keep the product competitive on a world-wide scale and stimulate development by dividing production among numerous producers while keeping sales affordable by increasing the number of final consumers.

5. ICT and Development Physical production lines are more visible than the work of ICT, which shows up in the policies of individual economies and their acceptance of ICT in the economy and active support of it. ICT products are often literally invisible and thus neglected actual policies. Although this perception also leads to a specific omission of support for intervention activities by the state in ICT development, the sector has its own requirements and is not able to develop unconditionally. These conditions concern specific developments in infrastructure, such as electricity, telephone lines, roads, airports, availability and range of internet, etc. Mostly, they also require the development of a banking system, laws, institutions, and a skilled labor force. It seems difficult to meet all these requirements without international cooperation offered by international organizations, then by states and non-governmental organizations. Moreover, the economy of a country that tries to cover the development gap has to meet certain conditions. There is vast literature on that aspect of development, so it simply is important to note here.

278   Katarzyna Żukrowska The largest ICT companies among the top 100 non-financial TNCs come from developing or transition markets. All have input of foreign capital of 20–80%. These enterprises are located in Hong Kong, China, Egypt, India, South Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Qatar, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, and Turkey (OECD/WTO, 2013). The length of the value-added chains differs by industry. In general, the share is higher in the manufacture of television and communications equipment, construction, paper, printing, and publishing, and relatively lower in real estate activities. There is also the need to distinguish between domestic and foreign value-added shares of a component. Here, the picture is reversed. The domestic share is higher in real estate activities and lower compared to the foreign share in communications equipment manufacturing (OECD/WTO, 2013). The difference in the prices of goods, services, taxes, and remaining production-cost categories determines the higher share of imports of OECD countries than exports. Upper middleincome countries (UMICSs) catch up quickly with value-added of exports of ITC, followed by imports. In the second category, the rate of growth is relatively lower in comparison to the first one; nevertheless, it indicates positive changes. In the case of low- and middle-income countries, both exports and imports of ICT grow, although the dynamics and value levels are lower compared to those of the UMICs. The smallest change and lowest dynamics of catching-up is noticed in LDCs. This is so although this group of economies enjoys free access to the majority of the developed markets. The problem here is that the policies applied in those markets are too weak to attract foreign capital on a scale that is able to stimulate the whole economy. The main policies addressing the development problems should consist of activities that address the elimination of existing barriers, which embraces also the elimination of monopolistic structures and allowing increased intensification of competition. On the other hand, activities that stimulate the economy also require support in specific areas. Fig. 2 presents support of development of an economy along a software value chain. It explains the role of the participation of GVCs in growth and shows what is needed to attract the participation of GVCs. The biggest problems with joining GVCs in developing markets are linked with access to the capital market and obtaining sufficient financial resources to start the business. The problems continue for foreigners who want to engage in such activities on a market, since they need to face the finance and customs procedures. Most of the customers who reveal the problems they have in developing markets indicate customs paperwork or delays in administration responses to their requests as the biggest difficulty. In most cases, the previously presented issues of import duties and export licensing are seen as less hindering obstacles. The 2017 Economic Freedom Index shows that investors face similar problems today as four years ago (Heritage Foundation, 2018). To overcome these problems – listed above – policymakers should be aware of that too many in one sector postpones not only the quality of change in an economy but slows the growth of the national economy, resulting in low incomes and poverty, with exclusion often following. A lack of competition or limited competition in a market results in high prices for services and poorer quality. This, in turn, impacts the costs of activities conducted on that market. The problem is much bigger in Arab and African markets, but also appears in a number of Asian countries. The weight of the problem is

Trade in ICT, International Economy, and Politics    279

Fig. 2:  Possible Development Path along the Software Value Chain. Source: UNCTAD (2012). much bigger than the costs of services but also strongly hampers the dynamics of development, as shown in the two models of development above (Table 12). How to overcome the existing and enumerated problems? In general, there are three ways in which solutions can be brought about. The first is widening market access for enterprises and introducing clearly addressed incentives that make participation in Table 12:  Difficulties Suppliers Identify in Entering, Establishing, or Moving Up ICT Chains (% and Number of Suppliers). Contents

%

Number of Suppliers

Access to trade finances Customs paperwork and delays Import duties Local content requirements in public procurement Requirements for commercial presence/joint ventures Restriction of FDIs Other border agency paperwork or delays Logistics and shipping costs and delays Restrictions on professional service providers Export or import licensing requirements

49 28 20 19 17 15 15 12 12 11

37 21 15 14 12 11 11  9  9  8

Source: OECD/WTO (2013).

Source: ITU Telecommunications ICT Regulatory Database. a Monopoly – service provided exclusively by one operator. b Partial competition – regulatory framework limits the number of licenses. c Full competition – any company can be licensed to provide the services.

Level of Competition: Fixed Wireless Broadband

Monopolya Partial Competitionb Full Competitionc N/A Level of Competition: IMT 3G, 4G, Monopolya etc. Partial Competitionb Full Competitionc N/A Level of Competition: International Monopolya Gateways Partial Competitionb Full Competitionc N/A Level of Competition: Mobile Monopolya Partial Competitionb Full Competitionc N/A

Contents

9 6 16 1 2 6 19 4 7 10 21 1 2 12 27 0

Africa

Table 13:  Level of Competition in Selected Telecommunications Markets.

2 7 4 2 2 6 4 4 6 6 5 1 5 10 5 0

Arab States 2 5 19 0 4 7 12 2 5 5 18 0 5 7 20 0

Asia & Pacific 0 1 7 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 5 0 0 3 8 0

CIS 2 4 27 3 2 11 25 2 1 4 24 5 2 12 27 1

Europe 1 2 26 0 1 0 25 0 2 1 19 2 2 4 28 0

16 25 99 6 11 30 87 14 23 26 92 9 16 48 115 1

The Total Americas

Number of Countries/Economies

280   Katarzyna Żukrowska

Trade in ICT, International Economy, and Politics    281 GVCs more attractive. Second, actions that support GVCs by building new infrastructure and expanding existing ones often seems to be insufficient. A country’s policy should also address the problem of improving the preparation of the labor force to meet the demands of GVCs in the ICT sectors. The last set of actions should address barriers to market entry: institutional, legal, as well as tariff duties and NTBs. GVCs, as indicated in the two presented models, make use of the differentiation of the development stages of individual markets. This means that not only is the supply of production factors important but also the difference in development makes the markets complementary. This finding, when properly supported by applied policies and advanced tools, can solve the existing problems in the field analyzed in this chapter and can serve as effective stimuli of development and catching-up.

6. Conclusions This chapter showcased in which ways ICT trade is important in the current stage of development characterized by industrial revolutions 3.0 and 4.0. ICT companies are found in the goods production sector as well as in services, which means that often their development does not require as huge investment as it is the case manufacturing industries. Nevertheless, there are problems that need to be resolved to facilitate development in general and to stimulate development of the ICT sector and the participation of enterprises in GVCs. Solutions in support of the sector must address the problem of a lack of competition on the market, linked to institutional and legal arrangements, followed by protection through duties and NTBs. The next issue crucial for the sector to flourish is the development of infrastructure. The third is linked to the supply of capital and access to capital resources. ICT GVCs, in particular, show high dynamics in the creation of value-added, which additionally is followed by high dynamics in supplying domestic and export markets. It is important to underline that the high share of value-added in a specific production sector is a helpful tool that fosters the catching up process and helps close the development gap. The higher the value-added in the GDP, the shorter time is needed to bridge the development gap. The ICT sector is not as visible as industrial production, which too often results in orphan-type treatment in support policies and state actions in terms of intervention activities in a particular market. This is the first of three reasons why the problem should be addressed. The second is that it is a sector that accelerates development and promotes catching-up. The third is linked to the fact that production and international division of labor have reached a new stage as far as advancement is concerned, and the scale of the division, followed by penetration of that division at a global scale, embraces the majority of regional markets.

References Bessant, J. (2017). Riding the innovation wave. Learning to create value from ideas. Bingley: Emerald Publishing.

282   Katarzyna Żukrowska Bloem, J., van Doom, M., Duivestein, S., & van Ommeren, R. (2014). The fourth industrial revolution. Things to tighten the link between IT and OT. Groaingen, The Netherlands: Sogeti VINT. Cultural Times. (2015). The first global map of cultural and creative industries, London: EY. Ćwiek-Karpowicz, J., & Secrieru, S. (2015). Sanctions and Russia. Warsaw, Poland: Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM). Hesmondhalgh, D. (2013). The cultural industries. London: Sage Publications. Hirschman, A. (1958). The strategy of economic development. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Howkins, J. (2002). The creative economy. How people make money from ideas? London: Penguin. ITU Telecommunications ICT Regulatory Database. ITU. (2017a). Measuring the information society report 2017. Volume 1. A44. Geneva, Switzerland: ITU. ITU. (2017b). Measuring the information society report 2017. Volume 1. A45. Geneva, Switzerland: ITU. OECD/WTO. (2013). Aid for trade and value chains in information and communication technology. New York, NY: OECD/WTO. OECD. (2018a). ICT goods exports (indicator). doi:10.1787/b4d99334-en OECD. (2018b). ICT goods exports. Retrieved from https://data.oecd.org/ict/ict-goodsexports.htm OECD. (2018c). ICT value added (indicator). Retrieved from https://data.oecd.org/ict/ ict-value-added.htm. Accessed on January 27, 2018. doi:10.1787/4bc7753c-en OECD (2015). Latin American Economic Outlook 2016: Towards a New Partnership with China. Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), DOI 10.1787/9789264246218 Rifkin, J. (2013). The third industrial revolution: How lateral power is transforming energy, the economy and the world. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Griffin. Rodrik, D. (2010). One economics, many recipes globalization, institutions, and economic growth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. UNCTAD. (2012). Information economy report 2012. The software industry and developing countries, Geneva United Nations. Geneva, Switzerland: UNCTAD. UNCTAD. (2013). Global value chains and development. Investment and value added trade in global economy. Geneva, Switzerland: UNCTAD. Windpassinger, N. (2017). Digitize or die. Transform your organization. Embrace the digital revolution. Rise above the competition. IoT Hub, ISBN 9791097580032. WTO, CEPII, UNCTAD mapped to GTAP8. (2013). Quoted after J. Francois, M. Manchin, H. Norberg, O. Pindyuk, P. Tomberger, Reducing Trans-Atlantic barriers to trade and investment, CEPR, Paper Prepared for the EC.

Websites Retrieved from https://www.heritage.org/index/ranking Retrieved from http://stat.wto.org/TariffProfiles/BR_e.htm Retrieved from http://stat.wto.org/TariffProfiles/PH_e.htm Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_ 2016#table Retrieved from http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/ Retrieved from https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s345_sum_e.pdf

Chapter 19

Conclusion: Politics and ICT – Taking Stocks of the Debate Miltiadis D. Lytras and Anna Visvizi

The exploration of the politics-ICT nexus has only begun. The scale and scope of the impact ICT exerts on all spheres of social interaction is beyond what research and our imagination can capture. Technology is part and parcel of social life. It conditions its development. At the same time, to a large extent, it is driven by demand that the socio-political process creates. It is a function of a logic underpinning the prevailing socio-­economic model, where innovation is encouraged, appreciated, and recognized. In a period touted as the post-truth era, characterized by a frequent confusion as to what is true and what is right, disenchantment with the reality, disillusion and betrayed ideals, and disbelief in the positive nature of human agency, advances in sophisticated ICT have only added to the perplexity of developments and corresponding perceptions of reality. Recognizing the challenge inherent in this way of viewing politics and technology, the objective of this volume was to offer a brief insight into emerging issues and developments that shape the contentious relationship between ICT and politics. The idea was to familiarize the reader with topics and areas, where politics and ICT meet to showcase in which ways and to what end the two can influence each other. Moreover, by including a variety of case studies the intention was to demonstrate that ICT and politics meet all over the world and that no exceptions exist. In the discussion on ICT and politics several technologies come to fore. These include big data, big data analytics, sentiment and emotions analysis, advanced data mining, cloud computing, social media and social networking sites, artificial intelligence (AI), virtual reality (VR), augmented reality (AR), and blockchain technology (Sicilia & Visvizi, 2018; Lytras et al., 2016). Throughout this volume, a case was made that each of these technologies has an impact on the sociopolitical process. As Fig. 1 depicts, all spheres of the socio-political process have been influenced by advances in ICT. As that influence amplifies, new synergies and overlaps emerge (Lytras et al., 2018).

Politics and Technology in the Post-Truth Era, 283–285 Copyright © 2019 Miltiadis D. Lytras and Anna Visvizi doi:10.1108/978-1-78756-983-620191019

284    Miltiadis D. Lytras and Anna Visvizi freedom, liberty policy-making

economy

legal and regulatory issues

safety and security civic engagement and participation public opinion

Fig. 1:  ICT and Politics in the Post-truth Era. Advances in ICT, including the big data paradigm, have redefined the boundaries of individual freedoms and liberties, thus prompting questions of the boundary between the private and the public in modern life. It is just the beginning of the big debate and only future will show what the outcome will be. From a slightly different angle, several implications for safety and security have been generated as a result of progress in the field of sophisticated ICT, including both, safety and security. Again, the tools and methods that modern technology enables, including monitoring, surveillance, data mining, analysis, and modeling, raise questions pertinent to the scope of our individual freedoms and liberties. Conversely, ICT enables greater civic engagement and participation, either by means of fostering open dialog, uninhibited by censorship, etc. or, simply, by enabling the otherwise disadvantaged individuals, for example, living in remote areas, to cast their vote. As Fig. 1 illustrates, the chain of connections is endless. The tacit argument that the chapters included in this volume endorsed was that the interplay between ICT and politics can be seen in a two-fold manner. That is, it can be seen as a challenge, if inadequately handled, and as an opportunity, if used sensibly (Visvizi et al., 2017; Mazzucelli & Visvizi, 2017). In both cases, technology remains a function of the individuals’ intention as to how to use it. The key message regarding politics and technology that this volume promotes is very positive. That is, advances in ICT have exponential value-added vis-á-vis the political process, including transparency, participation, and accountability. The chapters included in this volume attest to that. For instance, the internet may be seen as a virtual “public space” the emergence of which allows to bypass several of the ailments of the democratic political process, such as accessibility, participation, equality, anonymity, etc. This is well evidenced by arguments on how a smart use of ICT promotes broader participation in the ­policy-making process of those excluded, disinterested, disadvantaged on a variety of accounts. Clearly, as other contributions in this volume demonstrate, advances in sophisticated ICT have been broadly employed in modern warfare, be it in the traditional or new combat domains, incl. cyberspace. National security, privacy, and transparency form another layer of questions that advances in ICT provoke. The case of Snowden, discussed in detail in this volume, depicts it clearly. This volume

Conclusion    285 offered a cautionary approach to ICT arguing that at the heart of our thinking of technology should always be the human agency and the value-added ICT generates for our societies. This implies that in as much our society members ought to be ICT-literate, even more so they should be cognisant of the key values, principles, and ideals underpinning the functioning of our societies. Accordingly, as the inroad of ICT in politics continues, it is vital that questions of ethics, trust, and accountability related to their development and application are considered seriously. This volume sought to highlight it. These issues will form the thrust of the ensuing research agenda as the connection between politics and ICT will be employed as the lens to view and query cryptocurrencies, blockchain technology, data mining and sentiment analysis, and many more.

References Lytras, M. D., Damiani, E., & Mathkour, H. (2016). Virtual reality in learning, collaboration and behaviour: Content, systems, strategies, context designs. Behaviour and Information Technology, 35(11), 877–878. 10.1080/0144929X.2016.1235815 Lytras, M. D., Visvizi, A., Damiani, D., Mthkour, H. (2018).. The cognitive computing turn in education: prospects and application, Computers in Human Behavior, online 10 November 2018, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2018.11.011 Mazzucelli, C., Visvizi, A. (2017). Querying the Ethics of Data Collection as a Community of Research and Practice The Movement toward the “Liberalism of Fear” to Protect the Vulnerable, Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal: 11(1), 2-8, DOI:http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.1.149 Sicilia, M. A., Visvizi, A. (2018). Blockchain and OECD data repositories: opportunities and policymaking implications, Library Hi Tech, https://doi.org/10.1108/LHT-122017–0276. Visvizi, A., Mazzucelli, C.G., Lytras, M. (2017). Irregular migratory flows: Towards an ICTs’ enabled integrated framework for resilient urban systems, Journal of Science and Technology Policy Management, 8(2): 227–242, https://doi.org/10.1108/JSTPM05-2017-0020

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Index Note: Page numbers followed by “n” with numbers indicate foot notes. Abnormal returns (AR), 30 Absher, 237–238, 241, 243 Abstractive summarization, 79 Academia Sinica Bilingual Ontological Wordnet (BOW-WordNet), 65 Accountability, 124–125, 206 Administrative processes, 240 Advanced computational techniques, 4–5 Africa, internet and democratization in, 15–20 “Al Jazeera effect”, 12 Al-Qaida, 190, 191n3 Albania, digital diplomacy in, 195–197 Analytics, 74 Big Data, 92, 96 predictive, 82 text, 76, 79–80 Android 7.0 Google, 134 Angel community, 52 Angola, internet and democratization in, 16 Anonymization, 89–90, 97–98, 101 decision-making framework, 109 Anti-migration messages, 150 Anticorruption, 6, 165, 168 ICTs as anticorruption tools, 162–165 Appropriate mathematical procedure, 95 Arab Spring, 13, 15 Arab Spring movements (2010), 191 drivers of, 190 Article 29 Working Party (WP29), 93–94, 97 Artificial intelligence system, 62 Asia-Pacific region, 262

Aspect-based analysis, 80 Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 269 Associations with groups, 132 AT&T Transparency Report, 134n7 Autonomous Key Control, 174 Behavior scores, 74 Belarusian socio-political model, 44 Belarusian information space, 49–50 Belarusians’ unity and homogeneous society, 47–48 Constitution of the Republic of Belarus, 45 national security, 44–45 political activity and forms of public engagement, 48–49 political party system and NGOs, 46 sphere of state interests, 45–46 Big Data (see also Information and communication technologies (ICTs)), 24, 59, 76, 204 analytics, 92, 96 techniques, 61 Biometric data, 91–92 Bitcoin, 172, 179 BitCoinFog, 177 Blockchain, 173–174, 176 possibilities of, 180 Blogging, 12 Boomer Barons, 132 Bosnia, digital diplomacy in, 197 Brexit referendum, 28 Brexit Twitter network, 30–31, 37

288   Index Brokers, 77 data, 131 Budgetary transparency, 165 Bulgaria, corruption in, 164 “Caged” countries, 224 Capital flight, 179 Cascading Style Sheets (CSS), 66 Catching-up, 266, 275, 278 Cause-effect model, 275 CCC–rating, 192, 196 Censorship, 11 Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), 4, 6, 144 recommendations for CEE states, 153–155 risks to CEE state security, 150, 152–153 Russian information war and propaganda in, 148–150, 151 “Champ” countries, 224 Chief financial officer (CFO), 253 Chief information officer (CIO), 248 Chinese Network Sentiment Dictionary (CNSD), 66 Chinese retaliation to tariff increment, 31–34 Cine ce a promis/Who promised what, 167 Citizens, 207 engagement models, 225 journalism, 13 Civic issue tracker model, 225 Civil activism, 44 Civil initiatives in Belarus, 51–54 Civil society management, 180 Closed circuit televisions (CCTVs), 115–116, 118, 122 Closed-response types, 136 CNN effect, 12 Code exchange model, 225 Cognitive ties, 248 Color-coded graphs, 254 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 265

Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), 134–135 Community detection, 77 support, 172 Comprehensive sentiment mining approach, 65 Computational Linguistics, 78 Confederação Nacional da Indústria (CNI), 210 CNI X TBIW data occurrences comparison, 214 comparison between CNI answers and TBIW correspondence, 213 sample of keywords equivalence TBIW × CNI, 211 Confidentiality, 106 Consent management system, 111–112 Constitutional rights, 139 Contemporary politics and society internet and new media actors in Belarus, 50–51 new information and communication challenges, 50 new social platforms and civil initiatives in Belarus (2017), 51–54 online communication, 43–44 peculiarities of Belarusian social and political model, 44–50 Contemporary Russian information space, 144 Content lack diversity, 19 virality, 27 Control agent, 120–121 Conventional content censorship, 14 Conventional media, 32 Cook County of Illinois (USA), 180 Cookie identifiers, 90 Corpuses, 136 Corruption, 162, 164, 214–215 reduction of, 241 Cost reduction, 239

Index    289 “Counter-culture” in CEE, 154 Crime, 120–121 Cryptocurrencies, 6, 172, 174, 178 Cryptographic key management (see also Data protection), 174–175 Cultural capital, 224 Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), 36–38 Currency issuance method, 174 Cyber Command, 124 Cyber intelligence, 5 accountability and reforms, 124–125 CISA, 116 cyber-surveillance legislation, 118–119 literature review, 117–118 narrative and silence, 119–121 Snowden and debate over US cyber intelligence, 121–124 Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, 119 Cyber terrorism, 5 Cyber-surveillance legislation, 118–119 Cyberattacks (see also Data protection), 116, 153 Cyberbullying, 139 Cybersecurity, 121, 123 Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA), 116 Cyberspace, 116 Data brokers, 131 collection, 65 concept 102–103 consumers, 110 controllers, 93–95, 110 disclosure, 108–110 concerning health, 92 management, 76 mining, 76, 204 policy, 228 preprocessing, 66

publishers, 110–111 sets, 224 sharing principles, 228 subject, 89–90, 110 subject consent, 107, 110 technical issue of data disclosure, 108–109 transit, 134–135 over wall model, 225 Data protection, 107 to compliance with GDPR, 101–102 legislative frameworks, 82–85 to mitigate risks, 98–101 obligations, 101 Decision-making, 163, 165, 191, 205 virtual currency impact, 178–181 Degree centrality, 77 Democracy, 10–11 digital, 205 flawed, 15 oligarchization of, 152 Democratization in Africa, 15–20 Denial-of-service attacks (DDoS attacks), 153 Denmark, digital developments in, 162 Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), 91 Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, Canada, 189–190 Department of Homeland Security, 124 Detector de Ficha de Político (see Politician’s Record Detector) Diffusion patterns of political content, 24 Chinese retaliation to tariff increment by United States, 31–34 context, 28 event characterization, 29 event studies, 27–28 identification of relevant events, 29 information diffusion in social networks, 25 Jo Cox’s murder, 34–38 metrics, 30–31

290   Index models, 25–27 network construction, 29–30 results, 31 Digital activism, 13, 19 Digital Agenda for Europe, 160 Digital communications, 117–118 Digital democracy, 205 Digital diplomacy, 189–190 cheerleaders of, 199 in context of ministries of foreign affairs, 190–191 country profiles, 195–200 digital platforms, 194 frequency of publishing on social media, 195 population and social media penetration, 193 in practice, 192–195 reports, 188 Digital Diplomacy Review, 188, 192, 196–200 Digital Diplomacy Strategy, 198 Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI), 161–162 Digital Kosovo initiative, 198 Digital media, 11 Digital Pearl Harbor, 123 Digital platform, 241–242 Digital single market, 160–161 Digital technologies (see also Information and communication technologies (ICTs)), 159–160, 224 “Digital tiger”, 191 Diplometrics, 190 Dismiss, distort, distract, dismay approach (4D approach), 153–154 Distributive justice effect, 251 Document frequency (DF), 63 Document-level techniques, 80 Domnule Primar/Dear Mr. Mayor, 166 Double-spend attack, 178 Durable top management support, 252–253

E-commerce, 238 E-government, 4 economic impacts of project, 239–240 impacts in Saudi Arabia, 240–242 in Saudi Arabia, 237–238 tax collection system, 239 E-Konsullata (mobile application), 196–197 Economic Freedom Index (2017), 278 Economic/economy, 240–241, 262, 266 capital, 224 objective, 27 policy, 179 Education, 213 factor, 153 Effort justification effect, 249 Egypt, internet and democratization in, 15–16, 19 Emotions (see also Public mood and emotion modeling), 60 mining, 59 Encryption (see also Data protection), 101 mobile devices, 134 Enterprise resource planning system (ERP system), 247 Entity recognition (ER), 79 EOS, 172 Epidemic models, 26 Ethereum, 172 Ethical behavior, 206 Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), 273 European Banking Authority, 179 European Data Portal, 106 European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), 96 European Union (EU), 5 DESI, 161–162 digital single market, inclusion, and public services, 160–161 ICTs, 160–161 European Union Data Protection Directive (1995), 82

Index    291 Event studies, 27 32 adaptation to social network analysis, 28 event characterization, 29 Exchange strategies, 246, 251 Exposure effect, 249 Extended Technology Acceptance Model, 223 Extractive summarization, 79 Facebook, 24, 53, 59, 61–62, 83, 134, 165, 194, 198–199 Feature selection method, 63 Feature weighting method, 63 Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, 146 File-based encryption, 134 Financial markets, 58 impact of ICT and Development on, 60–61 Finland, digital developments in, 162 First Amendment, 116n2 51% attack, 178 Flickr, 25, 194, 196, 198–199, 200 Foreign affairs, digital diplomacy in context of ministries of, 190–191 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), 190 Foreign direct investment (FDI), 267 Foreign Trade Integrated System, 272 “Forerunner” countries, 224 “Forward” transactions, 275 Four-stage model, 224 Fourth Amendment, 116n2 Fourth Industrial Revolution, 1 Foxconn Technology Group (see Hon Hai Precision Industry Company) Free speech, 10–11, 24 Freedom of internet, 14 ICT and democratization, 10–15 internet and democratization in Africa, 15–20 Freedom of press, 19–20

Gagging clauses, 121 “Game theory” strategy, 123 Gazeta (Russian newspaper), 147 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 5, 74, 82–84, 89–90 data protection techniques as means to compliance with, 101–102 General Inquirer (GI), 66 Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH), 30–31, 36 Genetic data, 91–92 Gephi Twitter Streaming Importer, 29 Global Competitiveness Report, 227 Global value chains (GVC), 260 backward and forward participation, 276 ICT and, 274–277 model of cooperation, 277 share of export-added value, 277 Google, 62 Android 7.0 Google, 134 NLP, 210 server, 135 Google-Profile of Mood States, 60 Google+, 194 Governments, 131 institutions, 207 sector development, 242 Harmonized System (HS), 261 Herzegovina, digital diplomacy in, 197 Homeland Security Act (HSA), 118–119 Hon Hai Precision Industry Company, 67 HTML tags, 66 Human Development Index (HDI), 18 Human dynamics, 25 Human trafficking, 139 Hybrid threats, 144 iCloud (Apple), 135 Identity theft, 132

292   Index iDiplomacy, 191 Illegal activity, 139 Import Duty (II), 272 Independent cascades model (IC model), 26 Indirect data provision, 224 Induced compliance effect, 249 Industrialized markets, 268–269 Industrialized Product Tax (IPI), 272 Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI), 18 Information (see also Big Data) blocking tools, 13 diffusion in social networks, 25 extraction, 79 privacy, 106 security, 144 weapon, 146 Information and communication technologies (ICTs), 2, 10, 57–58, 130–131, 159–160, 172, 204, 259–260 as Anticorruption Tools, 162–165 best practices as participatory tools in Romania, 166–167 comparison of continents’ creative industries and share of GNP, 264 and democratization, 10–15 and development, 277–281 Development Index, 17 development path along software value chain, 279 difficulties suppliers, 279 employment as share of total employment, 265 in EU, 160–161 features of international market for, 260 goods, 261, 263 and GVCs, 274–277 impact and development, 59–62 level of competition, 280

perspective social media impact on politics, 208 politics and, 2–8 role, and size of market, 260–265 in Romania, 162 value-added in ICT sector, 264 world exports of telecommunications and computer and information services, 266 Information Security Doctrine (Russia), 147 Information security risks information war concept and propaganda in Russia, 145–148 recommendations for CEE states, 153–155 risks to CEE state security, 150, 152–153 Russian information war and propaganda in CEE, 148–150, 151 Information systems project (IS project), 245–246 politics and political influence in, 247–251 top management support, 246–247 two-stage process, 251–255 Information war, 144 and propaganda in Russia, 145–148 Instagram, 59, 70, 194, 196 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA), 119 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 260 International Labour Organization, 260 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 261 International Open Data Charter (2018), 103 International Telecommunication Union (ITU), 58 International trade, 260, 265

Index    293 Internet, 10, 24, 149, 159–160 in Africa, 15–20 in Belarus, 50–51 censorship, 13 freedom, 20 protocol addresses, 90 traffic information, 119 users, 73 Voice over IP traffic, 134–135 Inverse document frequency (IDF), 63 Islamic State, 191n3 Italian legislation, 104 Italian Open Data License, 108 JavaScript, 66 k-anonymity, 101 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), 222, 227 Knowledge discovery from data (KDD), 76 Kosovo, digital diplomacy in, 197–198 l-diversity, 100–101 Lag-1, 67 “Laggard” countries, 224 Learning, 242 machine, 63, 80–81 supervised, 60, 81 unsupervised, 81 Legislation, 163 cyber-surveillance, 118–119 Italian, 104 Legitimate interests pursued by controller, 95–97 Linear threshold model (LT model), 26 LinkedIn, 59, 194, 197 LiveJournal blog, 60, 146 Local data at-rest, 134 Macedonia, digital diplomacy in, 198–199 Machine learning, 63, 80–81 Market capitalization, 172 Market penetration, 193n4

Mass communication, 6, 10–12 Mass media, 146 Mass mobilization, 11, 13, 15 Media actors in Belarus, 50–51 Merchandised Product and Service Circulation Tax (ICMS), 272 Message processing effect, 250 Micro-targeting, 75 Microblogging, 12, 32, 59 Miners, 173–174 Mining, 173 emotion, 59 Mobile device, 134 Mobile internet, 50 Mobile phones, 11–12 Mobile social media penetration, 193n4 Modernity, 117 Montenegro, digital diplomacy in, 199 Moore’s law, 177 Morphemes, 78 Morphological analysis, 78 MPLA, 16 MySpace, 61 Naive Bayes (NB), 63 Nanya Technology Corporation (NTC), 67 National contact center, 237–238, 241, 243 National security, 120–121 clauses, 121 National Security Agency, 121–122, 124 PRISM program, 121 National security/terrorist/threat, 139 National Taiwan University Sentiment Dictionary (NTUSD), 65 National Transformation Program, 227 NATO scepticism, 150 Natural language processing (NLP), 76, 78, 80, 136 morphological and lexical analysis, 78 syntactic analysis, 78–79

294   Index Negativity bias effect, 250 Netherlands, digital developments in, 162 Network (see also Social network) capacity, 13 construction, 29–30 graphs, 76 peer-to-peer, 173 structural, 24 VPN, 12 Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 12, 14, 46, 155, 166–167, 277 Non-governmental sector, 155 Non-profit organizations, 209 Non-tariff barriers (NTBs), 260, 268, 270 Non-tariff protections (NTP), 269 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 144 Occupy movements (2011), 13, 191 Oil crisis (2018), 16 “Oligarchization” of democracy, 152 One-bit communication devices, 25 Online communication, 43–44, 51 identifiers, 90 mobilization, 204 petition, 52–53 OPEC, 27 Open data, 102–105 anonymization and pseudonymization, 97–98 booklet/guideline, 228 data protection and, 107 data protection techniques, 98–102 initiatives, 223 legal issue of data disclosure, 109–110 legitimate interests pursued by controller, 95–97 lifecycle, 110–112 openness and, 102–105 personal data types, 91–93 portal of Saudi Arabia, 227

privacy and, 105–106 profiling and automated individual decision making, 95 publishing, 107–110 set feedback, 226 set request, 226 set specifications, 226 status of data controller, 93–95 technical issue of data disclosure, 108–109 Open Definition (2018), 103 Open Government Data (OGD), 7, 221–222 adherence, 224 evaluation of national OGD portal, 227–229 facilitators and hindrances in re-using datasets, 230–232 initiatives, 222 portals, 226 related research, 223–227 research directions, 233 social and practical implications, 229 Open Government License (OGL), 108 Open Government Maturity Model (OGMM), 188, 195 levels and rankings of observed countries, 196 Open Knowledge Foundation, 103 Opinion mining (see Sentiment analysis) OpinionFinder tool, 60 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 261 Over-the-top content (OTT content), 134–135 Parsing (see Syntactic analysis) Participatory open data model, 225 Peer-to-peer network (P2P network), 173 Personal computers, 261 Personal data, 89–90, 107 different types of personal data, 91–93 relating to criminal convictions and offences, 92

Index    295 Personal information, 109, 138–139 Personal relationships, 248 Pew Research Center, 130n2 Pew Survey data, 136 Piata de spaga/The bribery market, 166 Pinterest, 59 Polarity, 138–139 lexicon usage, 66 Policy data, 228 economic, 179 social, 43 virtual currency impact, 178–181 Policymakers, 206–207 Political campaigns, 82 future research, 85–86 social media and, 74–75 Political/politics, 24, 260 activity, 48–49 attitude’s perspective, 205–206 behaviors, 246 choice of political influence strategies,, 251–255 events, 29 and ICT, 1–8 impact of ICT and development, 61–62 ICT’s perspective, 208 in IS project, 247–251 maneuvering, 8, 246 news and TAIEX price prediction, 68–69 parties, 46, 82–85, 207 perspectives of social media impact, 205 power in, 77 service, 58 stakeholder’s perspective, 206–208 “Politics 2.0”, 73–74 Post-Soviet space, 154 Poverty, 16 reduction, 14–15 Pragmatic economic approaches, 48 Predator/child pornography, 139 Predictive analytics, 82

Press Agency of Slovak Republic (TASR), 155 Prioritatile orasului tau/Priorities of your city, 166–167 PRISM program, 119–125, 125 Privacy, 131, 139 and open data, 105–106 Privacy Panel Survey, 135 Project crises, 252 managers, 248–249 team members, 248–249 Protectionism, 267 Pseudonymization, 90, 97–98, 101 “Psychology tricks”, 209 Public Diplomacy 2.0 initiative, 190 Public diplomacy scholars, 189 Public engagement, 48–49 in Belarus, 43–54 Public management practices, 224 Public mood and emotion modeling financial news of single company and TAIEX prediction, 67 ICT, 57–58 impact of ICT and development, 59–62 political news and TAIEX price prediction, 68–69 research methodology, 65–66 sentiment classification and analysis, 62–64 Taiwan 50 financial news and TAIEX price prediction, 67–68 Public mood dynamic prediction model, 61 Public sector information (PSI), 103 Public security, 215 Quality demands, 268 Radio frequency identification tags, 90 Rational persuasion strategy, 246, 249–251 Ratiu Center for Democracy, 167 Reciprocal obligation, 251

296   Index Rede Globo initiative, 209 Reforms of cyber intelligence, 124–125 Regex algorithm in python, 209–210 Reinforcement effect, 251 Relation extraction (RE), 79 Remote data at-rest, 134–135 Resource Center for Public Participation, 167 Resources, 224 provision, 247 “Responsive democratization”, 11 Revolution 4.0, 261–262 “Revolution” in ICT, 11 Ribonucleic acid (RNA), 91 Risk (see also Information security risks) assessment, 99 associated with private data, 132–133 calculus, 118 to CEE state security, 150, 152–153 identification, 99 in virtual currency, 177–178 Romania best practices in using ICTs as participatory tools in, 166–167 corruption in, 164–165 culture of transparency, 163 ICTs in, 162 RSS Feed, 194, 199–200 Russia Today (RT), 146 Russian information landscape, 144 war and propaganda in CEE, 148–150, 151 Russian Information Security Doctrine, 146 Russian propaganda, 144–145 information war concept and, 145–148 Saudi Arabia case study of Saudi Arabian OGD Initiative, 227–229

e-government in, 237–238 social impacts of E-government, 241–242 specific impacts of E-government, 240–241 Yesser project in, 238 Security (see also Information security risks), 118–119 national, 44–45 public, 215 security-oriented technologies, 117–118 Sentence-level techniques, 80 Sentiment analysis, 5, 59, 62–65, 80, 131 constructing corpuses, 136 data transit, 134–135 encrypting mobile devices, 134 literature review, 131 modeling and research findings, 137–140 privacy, 131 remote data at-rest, 135 research methodology, 136 research study, 135–136 risks associated with private data, 132–133 Sentiment mining (see Sentiment analysis) Sentiment polarity modeling, 66 Serbia, digital diplomacy in, 199–200 “Seventh sense”, 44 Shared Key Control, 174–175 Simple cue effect, 249–250 Slovak Foreign Policy Association (SFPA), 154–155 Small-and medium-size enterprises (SMEs), 260 Smartphone location tracking, 118 SMS text messages, 134–135 Snapchat, 59 Snowden, Edward, 117 and debate over US cyber intelligence, 121–124

Index    297 Social capital, 224, 246, 248–249 engagement strategy, 246, 249 event studies adaptation to social network analysis, 28 influence analysis, 77–78 interactions, 25 mobilization, 14 movements, 13 network sentiment, 38 policy, 43 security number, 132 social-economic factor, 153 Social media, 4, 7, 58, 61, 138, 149, 152–153, 207 in Belarus, 43–54 ICT impact and development, 59 impact on politics, 205–208 mining, 59 penetration, 193n4 platform, 63 and political campaigns, 74–75 as PR tool, 75 tools, 187–189 Social media analytics, 74, 76 big data, 76 community detection, 77 data mining, 76 machine learning, 80–81 natural language processing, 78–79 predictive analytics, 82 social influence analysis, 77–78 text analytics, 79–80 Social networking services (SNS), 24–25, 27, 51 Social networks, 76–77 information diffusion in, 25 sites, 59, 165 Social platforms in Belarus, 51–54 Society, 238–239, 241–242 Socio-economic structure decentralization, 175 Socio-political discourse, 45 Sovetskaya Belorussiya, 50 Speculative investment in virtual currencies, 178

Stakeholder dialogue, 110 perspective social media impact on politics, 206–208 State authorities, 13–14 Statistical inferences, 132 Statistical procedure, 95 Stock market trend prediction, 66 Stock price movement, 60 Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (StratCom), 155 Subjectivity analysis (see Sentiment analysis) Superpanopticon, 116, 118 Supervised learning, 81 Supervised machine learning algorithms, 60 Support Scores, 74 Support vector machine (SVM), 63 Surveillance, 115–116, 118, 134–135 Sustainable administration, 181 Sustainable Development Goals (2015), 15, 181 SVO triplets, 79 Sweden, digital developments in, 162 Swedish International Development Cooperation framework, 14 Symbolic capital, 224 Syntactic analysis, 78–79 t-closeness, 100–101 Tadawul, 237–238, 240, 243 Taiwan Capitalization Weighted Stock Index (TAIEX), 61 financial news of single company and, 67 political news and, 68–69 Taiwan 50 financial news and, 67–68 Taiwan Science and Technology Park, 58 Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), 67 Tariff protection, 268 Tariff war, USA–China, 23, 29–30

298   Index Taxonomy, 92–93 Technical and organizational measures, 95 Technical attacks, 14 Telecommunications, 134–135 Temporal models, 26–27 Term frequency–inverse document frequency (TF–IDF), 63 Term presence (TP), 63 Text analytics, 76, 79 information extraction, 79 sentiment analysis, 80 summarization, 79 Text mining, 5, 59 research domain, 136 “The Brazil I Want” initiative (TBIW initiative), 204 Brazilian issues, 208–215 comparison between CNI answers and TBIW correspondence, 213 count of most commented keywords, 212 data gathering, extraction, and handling process, 210 perspectives of social media impact on politics, 205–208 sample of keywords equivalence TBIW × CNI, 211 sample of salience result of keyword employment in, 211 sample of subtitle, 211 Third Amendment, 116n2 Topological models, 26 Trade barriers to, 265–274 international, 260, 265 trading volume, 172 weighted tariffs applied average tariffs rates in, 269 Traditional media, 144 channels, 206 Transnational companies (TNC), 261 Transparency, 104, 177, 205–206, 241

in activity of public officials, civil servants, board members, 163 in operation supervision, 177 True Blues, 132 Trust low, 253 in project team, 253 Tunisia, internet and democratization in, 15–16 Twitter, 23–24, 26, 31, 53, 59–62, 83, 194, 198–199 UK Anonymization Network guidance (UKAN), 109 UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 261 UN development goals, 262 Unemployment, 15, 210, 215 Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology model, 223 United States (US), 116 cybersecurity arrangement, 124 National Security Agency, 119–120 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 84–85 Uruguay Round of GATT, 268 US Trade Representative Office (USTR), 28 USA–China network construction, 29–30 User practices, 224 User-generated content, 76 Value-added tax (VAT), 272–273 Violation of user rights, 14 Viral content, 27 Virality, 27 Virtual currency, 6, 171–172 applications, 175–177 function, 172–175 impact on policy and decisionmaking, 178–181 risks and threats, 177–178

Index    299 Virtual private networks (VPN), 12 Virtual public sphere, 13 Volume, velocity, and variety (3V’s of Big Data), 76 Voter engagement, 75 Voting systems, 179 Vulnerability Index, 150 Vulnerability of legal rights, 177 “Weaponization of culture and ideas”, 154 Web 2.0, 160 Web traffic, 134–135 Web-based collaborative systems, 215 Webpage mining, 59 WeChat, 59

Western Balkan communicators, 189 Western Balkan Countries, 192–195 WhatsApp, 19, 134 World Customs Organization Harmonized System, 261 World Health Organization, 260 World Trade Organization (WTO), 8, 260 tariff reductions and increasing membership, 268 Yesser project, 237–238, 240–241, 243 YouTube, 61–62, 194, 196, 198–200 Zerocash, 177