Political Science in the Shadow of the State: Research, Relevance, Deference 3030759172, 9783030759179

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Political Science in the Shadow of the State Research, Relevance, Deference Edited by Rainer Eisfeld · Matthew Flinders

Political Science in the Shadow of the State “This compelling volume literally spans the globe, from North America to Europe and on to the Middle East, as it apprehends how agenda-setting and research support by public authorities can redirect and limit the contours and content of political science. Sharply argued, the essays raise many points of concern for scholarship oriented by curiosity and a critical imagination.” —Ira I. Katznelson, Ruggles Professor of Political Science and History, Columbia University “Superbly evocative… A distinguished dissection of a prevalent pattern in contemporary state-scholar relationships, revealed as disquieting in terms of its costs to intellectual freedom and social capital. Also a compassionate appeal in favor of expanding political scientists’ topic-driven international cooperation.” —Irmina Matonyte, Former President, Lithuanian Political Science Association, Military Academy of Lithuania (Vilnius) “Political science should be relevant but this book makes a convincing argument that the state alone should not be left to define what is relevant. A discipline focused on power and how to control it would do well to reflect and act on the warnings embodied in this work.” —Gerry Stoker, Professor of Governance, University of Southampton

Rainer Eisfeld · Matthew Flinders Editors

Political Science in the Shadow of the State Research, Relevance, Deference

Editors Rainer Eisfeld Fachbereich 1 Universität Osnabrück Osnabrück, Germany

Matthew Flinders University of Sheffield Sheffield, UK

ISBN 978-3-030-75917-9 ISBN 978-3-030-75918-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75918-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021, corrected publication 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover image: © decisiveimages/iStock/Getty Image Plus This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgments

From the moment when she first expressed an interest in our project, our editor at Palgrave Macmillan, Ambra Finotello, provided constant support and encouragement. She has been wonderful to work with, and we owe her a huge and heartfelt debt of thanks. During the final stages of the book’s preparation, we were fortunate to have Palgrave’s Hemapriya Eswanth as Project Coordinator. She has consistently been helpful and kind. Our thanks are also due to two anonymous reviewers for their inspiring comments and suggestions. This book would have been impossible, of course, without the engagement of our colleagues who wrote the country chapters. During a year when the Covid-19 global pandemic was creating huge challenges within higher education it is testament to the commitment and professionalism of our authors that they collectively delivered such an impressive and important volume. Even if possibly breaking the unwritten rules of editorial etiquette, we would like to offer one author a special note of thanks Tatsiana Chulitskaya. Although Tatsiana lives and works in Lithuania, she originates from Belarus. In fact, she currently lives in exile. Even while her family was safe, a lot of her friends and colleagues faced brutal violence from dictator Lukashenka’s “security” forces during protests against the falsified 2020 presidential elections. Some of them were detained. At one point in the development of this book, Tatsiana wrote to us as the editors to explain v

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

that recent events—watching, as she was, from afar—had left her emotionally exhausted and traumatized. We deeply empathized with her and offered her what support we could, but the fact that Tatsiana delivered her chapter might actually be seen not just as a personal and professional victory for her, but also as a small but no less insignificant victory for political science and beyond that for democratic politics. By expressing, outlining and defending the role of political science in terms of promoting and defending democratic politics, her chapter captures the essence of what this book is really about. As many of the chapters in this volume each in their own ways underline: Political science must amount to far more than a methodologycentered, functionalist discipline focused on the specialized audiences of its own profession. Superficially, this book is about universities and academic research. However, its editors and authors are convinced that citizens’ preparation for civic involvement is not helped by the ways governments are presently attempting to steer both research and entire universities by imposing outside authority over the production of knowledge. As the following chapters demonstrate, political constraints on science may result in accommodation, and accommodation may give birth to deference. Deference in a democracy is not always a good thing if it blunts critical minds. Political science once emerged not as a science of deference, but as a science of democracy. With the United Kingdom having recently left the European Union, Matthew Flinders (Sheffield) and Rainer Eisfeld (Osnabrück) are proud to present this result of rewarding British-European collaboration, enriched by American and Australian contributions. Only time will tell if the UK prospers in the “post-Brexit” world, but as an episode that was defined by falsehoods, fairy tales and fig-leaves few events can more dramatically underline the need for a community of engaged political scientists as a bulwark against populist promises.

Contents

1

Understanding Scholarly Shifts—A Matter of Relevance Matthew Flinders and Rainer Eisfeld

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Part I Foundations and Concepts 2

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Incentives for Impact: Relevance Regimes Through a Cross-National Perspective Justyna Bandola-Gill, Matthew Flinders, and Marleen Brans Towards a Tyranny of Politically Selected Relevance? Co-option Through State-Directed Research Funding Rainer Eisfeld

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Part II Country Case Studies 4

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Research in a Racially Structured State: The Role of the US National Science Foundation Dianne M. Pinderhughes and Andrea Peña-Vasquez Australia’s Politics of Research Funding: Depoliticization and the Crisis of the Regulatory State Kanishka Jayasuriya and Greg McCarthy

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CONTENTS

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The Unplanned and Underfunded Co-option of Political Science in France Raul Magni-Berton and Pierre Squevin

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Political and Social Forces Shaping Political Science Research and Knowledge Transfer in the Netherlands Arco Timmermans, Valérie Pattyn, and Barend van der Meulen When Illiberalism Meets Neoliberalism: State and the Social Sciences in Present Hungary Zsolt Boda and Zoltán Gábor Szúcs Undermining the Role of Political Science: State-Directed Research Funding in the Visegrad States Aneta Világi

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Political Science or Science in the Service of Politics: Internal and External Co-option in Belarus Tatsiana Chulitskaya

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Social Sciences as an Instrument of National Development? The Case of Qatar Leslie A. Pal

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Part III 12

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Analysis and Implications

From Deference and the Politicization of Research Funding to a New Politics of Political Science Rainer Eisfeld and Matthew Flinders

Correction to: From Deference and the Politicization of Research Funding to a New Politics of Political Science Rainer Eisfeld and Matthew Flinders Index

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Notes on Contributors

Justyna Bandola-Gill Research Fellow in Social Policy at the University of Edinburgh’s (where she also obtained her Ph.D.) School of Social and Political Science, and an Associate Director of SKAPE, that university’s Centre for Science, Knowledge and Policy. Exploring interactions between research and policy, she works at the intersection of science and technology studies and public policy. Bandola-Gill is currently involved in an ERC-funded project, where she focuses on the production and governance of global poverty indicators by international organisations. Zsolt Boda Research Professor and Director General of the Centre for Social Sciences—Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre of Excellence; part-time Professor of Political Science at Budapest’s ELTE University. Ph.D. in political science, M.A. in economics. His research focuses on issues of governance, public policy, and institutional trust (social roots and consequences for policy effectiveness). He is currently the principal investigator of DEMOS—Democratic Efficacy and the Varieties of Populism in Europe, a consortial H2020 project. Marleen Brans Professor of Public Policy at the KU Leuven Public Governance Institute (Belgium), holds a Ph.D. from the European University Institute, Florence. She was founding Vice-President and is current Treasurer of the International Public Policy Association Her research focuses on policy work, the production and use of policy advice,

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and ministerial advisers. She has published in Public Administration, WestEuropean Politics, Governance, Halduskultuur, Policy and Society, and the Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis. Co-edited books include Policy Analysis in Belgium (Bristol University Press) and the Routledge Handbook of Comparative Policy Analysis. Tatsiana Chulitskaya Senior Researcher, Faculty of Political Science and Diplomacy, Vytautas Magnus University (Lithuania), and Academic Director, think tank—and informal public administration school— SYMPA/BIPART (Belarus). She obtained her Ph.D. at Vilnius University. Her research and publications focus on the theory and methodology of political science, public policy analysis, welfare state, civil society in non-democratic regimes, reforms in post-Soviet countries, and Belarusian studies. Rainer Eisfeld born in Berlin 1941. Economics Degree, University of Saarbrücken 1965; Ph.D. University of Frankfurt 1971. Professor of Political Science, University of Osnabrück, 1974–2006. Visiting Professor, UCLA, 2002. Faculty Dissertation Award, 1971. Volkswagen Foundation Research Grant, 1989. Chair, IPSA Research Committee (RC) on Socio-Political Pluralism, 2000–2006. Member, IPSA Executive Committee (RC Representative), 2006–2012. Member, Board of Trustees, Concentration Camp Memorials Buchenwald/Mittelbau-Dora, 1994–2017. Recent books: Political Science in Central-East Europe: Diversity and Convergence (ed., with Leslie A. Pal—‘Selected by IPSA’), Opladen/ Toronto: Barbara Budrich 2010; Radical Approaches to Political Science, Opladen/Toronto: Barbara Budrich 2012; Empowering Citizens, Engaging the Public. Political Science for the 21st Century. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan 2019. Matthew Flinders born in London 1972. Degree in Modern European Studies, Loughborough University 1994; Ph.D. University of Sheffield 1999. Professor of Politics, University of Sheffield, 2000-present. Chair, PSA 2014–2017, Board of the Economic and Social Research Council 2016–2020, Higher Education Policy Committee of the British Academy, 2020-. Harrison Prize, 2002; Richard Rose Prize, 2004; Leverhulme Research Fellow, 2005–2006; WJM Mackenzie Prize, 2009; Visiting Fellow, University of Sydney, 2010; Elected Academician, Academy of Social Sciences, 2011; Sam Aaronovitch Prize, 2012; Visiting Professor, Utrecht University, 2014; Visiting Distinguished Professor, Murdoch

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University, Australia, 2014–2016; National ‘ESRC Impact Champion’ Prize, 2018; House of Commons Professorial Research Fellow, 2016– 2019; ESRC Professorial Leadership Fellow, 2018–2020. Author/editor: 14 books, over 200 peer-reviewed research articles and chapters. Kanishka Jayasuriya Professor of Political Science at Murdoch University, Western Australia, is also a Fellow of the Australian Social Science Academy. He obtained his Ph.D. from the Australian National University (ANU). Jayasuriya writes on international and comparative political economy, including the politics of higher education. His teaching and research experience includes appointments at the University of Sidney, the National University of Singapore, and the City University of Hong Kong. Raul Magni-Berton born in Lima (Peru) 1973. Professor of political science at the University Grenoble-Alpes (Sciences Po Grenoble, PACTE). He also taught at the Universities of Montréal, Geneva, Stuttgart, Turin, Bordeaux, and Paris. Magni-Berton mainly works on democracy, its institutions and norms. Research projects on the political and ethical opinions of French academics led to two books and several articles. Greg McCarthy Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Western Australia, was the BHP Chair of Australian Studies (2016– 2018) at Peking University. He has published widely on both China and Australia relations and higher education, including Governing Asian International Mobility in Australia, with Xianlin Song (2019); ‘Indigenising Australian Studies in China’, Journal of Australian Studies, forthcoming; ‘The Regulatory State and the Labour Process’, with Kanishka Jayasuriya and Xianlin Song, in G. Capano and D. Jarvis, Convergence and Diversity in the Governance of Higher Education, Cambridge (2020); ‘The Proletarianization of Academic Labour in Australia’, with Xianlin Song & K. Jayasuriya, Higher Education Research & Development (2017). Leslie A. Pal Founding Dean of the College of Public Policy at Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Doha (Qatar), and Chancellor’s Professor Emeritus of Public Policy and Administration at Ottawa’s Carleton University. A Vice President of the International Public Policy Association, he is the author/co-author/editor of over 30 books. Global Governance and Muslim Organizations (2019) and Beyond Policy Analysis: Public Issue Management in Turbulent Times (6th ed. 2020) are the most recent. Pal has also published over 90 articles and book chapters in a wide variety

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of areas of public policy and administration and international public management reform. Valérie Pattyn Assistant Professor in Public Policy at the Institute of Public Administration of Leiden University, Netherlands, and partially affiliated to the KU Leuven Public Governance Institute, Belgium. She is involved in projects about policy advice production and use within and outside the civil service (including parliaments, think tanks, and consultants). Her research also examines conditions and constraints of evidence-informed policy-making and the politics of policy evaluation. Co-founder and co-chair of the EGPA Permanent Study Group Policy Design and Evaluation, Pattyn is a Management Committee member of the COST network on the Professionalization and Social Impact of European Political Science (ProSEPS). Andrea Peña-Vasquez Ph.D. Candidate (Department of Political Science) and Dissertation Fellow (Nanovic Institute for European Studies), University of Notre Dame. B.A. University of Florida (summacum laude, 2015), M.A. University of Notre Dame (2017). Her research interests lie at the intersection of migration, governance, and citizenship; her dissertation explores the impact of local policymaking on the regularization of African immigrants in Spain. Her work has been funded by the J. William Fulbright Foundation and published in Politics, Groups, and Identities (PGI) as well as The Washington Post’s Monkey Cage. Dianne M. Pinderhughes Professor at the University of Notre Dame in the Department of Political Science and the Department of Africana Studies. Her publications focus on racial, ethnic and gender politics in the Americas, US civil society institutions and voting rights policies. Recent work includes Uneven Roads, An Introduction to US Racial and Ethnic Politics with Louis DeSipio, Todd Shaw, and Toni Travis (2018) and Contested Transformation: Race, Gender, and Political Leadership in 21st Century America (2016), with Carol Hardy-Fanta, Pei-te Lien, and Christine Sierra. Pinderhughes has been President of the American Political Science Association and Vice President of the International Political Science Association. Pierre Squevin holds a master’s degree from IEP de Grenoble and is a Ph.D. candidate at the Catholic University of Louvain (UCLouvain). His research focuses on policy formulation, policy advice and advisers

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to cabinet members, policy learning and its measurement. He presently participates in the COST ProSEPS project on the Professionalization and Social Impact of European Political Science. Zoltán Gábor Szúcs born in Budapest 1979. Research fellow, Centre for Social Sciences. He holds a Ph.D. from Eötvös University and has published books and articles about early modern political thought, postcommunist Hungarian politics and normative political theory. His current research concerns political ethics in non-democratic regimes (e. g. political failures, political obligations, regime theory); related articles appeared in the European Journal of Political Theory, Res Publica, The European Legacy. Arco Timmermans Professor of Public Affairs at the Institute of Public Administration, University of Leiden. Previously he was research director of the Montesquieu Institute in The Hague. He did his Ph.D. at the European University Institute and worked at different universities in the Netherlands. His research and educational activities are on lobbying and advocacy and political agenda-setting. He has published widely and frequently acts as a news interpreter for the media. His activities as chair on public affairs include the promotion of dialogue between research and practice and the professionalization of public affairs as an emerging field. Barend van der Meulen Professor for Institutional Aspects of Higher Education and Director of the Center for Higher Education Policy Studies (CHEPS) at Twente University, Enschede. His research is on higher education, science and innovation policy and the dynamics of science and technology. Current interests include evidence-based policy making and the digitalisation of higher education. He was research director of the Rathenau Instituut, The Hague, and acted as expert advisor to Parliament on issues of science policy, higher education and innovation policy. Aneta Világi Assistant Professor of Political Science, Faculty of Arts, Comenius University in Bratislava, Slovakia; Ph.D. 2006. Research focus on Slovak politics in the context of European integration. Research stays at IUP (USA) and the University of Oslo. Current work on Euroscepticism and anti-democratic politics draws on qualitative fieldwork and public opinion surveys. Világi has written on a range of topics, including Slovak elections to national & European parliaments and ethnic minorities in Slovakia.

Abbreviations

ALESCO ANES APSA BISR BISS BMBF BRFFR CASBS CBASSE CCES CEU CMPS COMSTECH COSSA CSO DDRIG DFG EHU ELKH FIFA FIRBSU HBKU HEFCE IDEA

Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization American National Election Studies American Political Science Association Belarusian Institute for Strategic Research Belarusian Institute of Strategic Studies Federal Ministry of Education and Research Belarusian Republican Foundation for Fundamental Research Center for the Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences Commission on Behavioral and Social Science and Education Congressional Cooperative Election Study Central European University Collaborative Multi-Racial Post-Election Study Ministerial Standing Committee on Scientific and Technological Cooperation Consortium of Social Science Associations Civil Society Organizations Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Association) European Humanities University Eötvös Loránd Research Network, Hungary International Federation of Football Association Faculty of International Relations, Belarusian State University Hamad Bin Khalifa University Higher Education Funding Council for England International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance xv

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ABBREVIATIONS

IPSA ISESCO KAF KPI LNS MFA MOSTA MTA NAAS NAN NARD NBES NDS-2 NIMH NPM NPR NSB NSF OIC OSRD PPM PSA PSR QBRI QCRI QEERI QNRF QNS RAE RBSI REF RSF SBES SCST SESRIC SPSR SRC SSR SSRC STEM UKRI UNS V-DEM

International Political Science Association Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Konrad Adenauer Foundation Key Performance Indicators Latino National Survey Ministry of Foreign Affairs Research and Higher Education Monitoring and Analysis Centre, Lithuania Hungarian Academy of Sciences National Asian American Survey National Academy of Sciences National Agency of Research and Development, Moldova National Black Election Studies Second National Development Strategy, Qatar National Institute of Mental Health, United States New Public Management New Public Research National Science Board, United States National Science Foundation, United States Organisation of Islamic Cooperation Office of Scientific Research and Development, United States Paths Towards Precision Medicine Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom Politically-Selected Research Qatar Biomedical Research Institute Qatar Computing Research Institute Qatar Environment and Energy Research Institute Qatar National Research Fund Qatar National Strategy Research Assessment Exercise Ralph Bunche Summer Institute Research Excellence Framework Russell Sage Foundation Social, Behavioral and Economic Sciences State Committee on Science and Technology Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training Centre for Islamic Countries State Program of Scientific Research Survey Research Center, University of Michigan Scholar-Selected Research Social Science Research Council, United States Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics United Kingdom Research and Innovation Unified National System, Australia Varieties of Democracy Project

List of Figures

Diagram 2.1 Diagram 4.1

Fig. 2.1 Fig. 9.1

Varieties of relevance regime Trends in the National Science Foundation budget, 1998–2014 (Source Business & Management INK, 2014, Social Science Space) Spread and depth of scholarly impact assessment regimes, 2019 Expenditure on R&D in Visegrad Countries (Source of data Eurostat)

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53 243

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List of Tables

Table Table Table Table Table Table Table

1.1 1.2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 6.1

Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table 8.1

Table 8.2 Table 8.3 Table 8.4 Table 9.1 Table 9.2 Table 9.3

Modes of determining research relevance Levels and tools of state control and intervention Methodological steps Different definitions of impact Forms of assessment of impact Incentives for impact Participatory and direct democracy in peer-reviewed journal articles (France) National research council-funded projects in political science (Netherlands) Roles of political scientists in the Netherlands Number of European research grants (social sciences and humanities) per country, 2010–2018 (Central/East Europe) Web of science publications across Central and Eastern Europe in social sciences disciplines (2015–2020) Number and share of government-funded studentship in Hungarian higher education (% of total studentships) Public spending on higher education, % of GDP (Hungary) Number of political science students: Czech Republic and Hungary Number of political science students: Poland and Slovakia R&D expenditure 2017 (V4 countries)

7 10 44 46 47 55 172 188 196

214 215 221 221 235 235 244

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Table 9.4 Table Table Table Table

9.5 9.6 9.7 9.8

Table 9.9 Table 10.1 Table 11.1 Table Table Table Table

11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5

R&D expenditure by sector of performance 2017, V4 countries (in % of total R&D expenditure) Participation in Horizon 2020 Funding agencies in V4 countries Slovakia: Projects in political science (2008–2020) Czech Republic: Projects in political science (1994–2020) Poland: Projects in political science (2010–2020) Number of universities with political science programs in Belarus Qatar Second National Development Strategy, 2018–2022 main outcomes QNRF research programs: Summary QNRF research grants: Political science [Active] QNRF research grants: Economics and business [Active] QNRF economics and business,and political science, research grants: classified

244 246 246 248 248 249 265 297 304 308 310 314

List of Boxes

Box 2.1 Box 9.1

The Evolution of Incentives for Impact in the United Kingdom, 1993–2021 Snapshots of the Political Discourse in the V4

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CHAPTER 1

Understanding Scholarly Shifts—A Matter of Relevance Matthew Flinders and Rainer Eisfeld

What does being ‘relevant’ actually mean? Why should the issue of relevance matter to anyone interested in the future of universities, let alone in the future of democracy? Who has the power to define where the boundary between ‘relevant’ and ‘irrelevant’ knowledge should be, let alone the subtle differences between cognate concepts such as ‘impact’, ‘public good’ or ‘social value’? How have the processes and relationships through which such questions are resolved altered in recent years, and how does this in itself flow through into broader questions concerning public (dis)trust, (de)politicization, new forms of governance and the emergence of anti-political sentiment? All of these questions revolve around the issue of relevance for the simple reason that for anyone with an interest in democratic governance,

M. Flinders (B) University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK e-mail: [email protected] R. Eisfeld Fachbereich 1, Universität Osnabrück, Osnabrück, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Eisfeld and M. Flinders (eds.), Political Science in the Shadow of the State, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75918-6_1

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in general, or for scholars working within the social and political sciences, more specifically, issues of relevance increasingly matter. Whether couched in antagonistic and oppositional terms as ‘the tyranny of relevance’ or within more measured discussions regarding the ‘social value’ or ‘public good’ of publicly funded research what is arguably clear is that the relationship between academe and the state has shifted significantly in recent years. Traditional understandings of academic autonomy, intellectual independence and professional selfgovernance have been challenged by politicians and policymakers who have sought to utilize universities as a core component of policy-analysis, industrial strategy and economic planning. A rich seam of scholarship and discussion—such as Elizabeth Berman’s Creating the Market University (2012), Frank Furedi’s What’s Happened to the University? (2017) and Richard Watermeyer’s Competitive Accountability in Academic Life (2020)—have all offered detailed and generally critical analyses of this shift, and its main components are generally well-known. They include the imposition of neoliberal logic and market-based relationships; new regulatory and audit frameworks; an emphasis on demonstrable outputs and impacts; an increased role for performance metrics, league tables and international rankings; and an emphasis on customer-focussed relationships which has arguably transformed higher education from a public good to a private gain, and from a generally collegial endeavor into a markedly more competitive professional terrain. In this context, the notion of an academic career has arguably been transformed from a relatively clear and stable ‘public service bargain’ (a job for life, clear promotion prospects, attractive terms and conditions, etc.) to a far more precarious and uncertain endeavor in which the chances of securing tenure are increasingly tenuous. Put very simply, the ‘metagovernance’ of higher education has changed with ‘the shadow of the state’ playing a far more active and directive role vis-à-vis the aims and ambitions of the academe. From an academic perspective this recalibration of traditional relationships has generally been interpreted in narratives of ‘crisis’ (Scott, 2020), ‘tyranny’ (Muller, 2019), and ‘betrayal’ (Craig & Openshaw, 2018). The interpretation from beyond academe also tends to recognize ‘the decline of donnish dominion’—to paraphrase the title of A. H. Halsey’s 1992 book on the nature of academe in the twentieth century—and tends to respond through a focus on the existence of a ‘university challenge’

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(Byrne & Clarke, 2020) or accounts of the changing nature and value of ‘a university education’ (Willetts, 2017). Yet what tends to be missing from nearly all of the existing accounts is an awareness of the link between universities and academe, on the one hand, and democratic politics, on the other. It is exactly this relationship between scholarship and democracy that the present book seeks to expose and explore but it does so through a highly distinctive and original pivot point: the changing governance of public research funding. Although at first glance this might seem a rather arcane, administrative and unattractive topic—when public research funding is defined in terms of the oxygen or lifeblood of open academic inquiry, then its relationship with broader power structures and democratic scrutiny starts to become apparent. If political elites act to reduce or delimit the resources or discretion that scholars have traditionally enjoyed in terms of selecting how and where they might shine the light of academic scrutiny, then it is democracy itself and not just academe that will suffer. It is by mapping the changing topography of research funding that it is possible to identify and interrogate broader shifts in the relationship between democracy and the state, and therefore between politicians and academics. As such, at the heart of this book lies the core contention that universities are not only educational establishments but also democratic institutions, they inform and underpin the broader architecture of democracy as much as they do the broader architecture of knowledge. This is reflected in the manner in which open, confident, questioning and transparent structures (i.e. democratic regimes) facilitate the mobility of people, ideas and talent which is needed to nurture a truly dynamic research environment. At the same time, a healthy research environment contributes and sustains a healthy civic culture and democratic polity in at least two ways: firstly, scientific progress and the fruits of research provide new ways of addressing or managing collective societal challenges; and (secondly) an environment which combines criticality and questioning with an openness to new ideas and ways of thinking provides a natural bulwark against authoritarian thinking. The role of academics in terms of ‘speaking truth to power’ is well-established, or as Noam Chomsky (2017) states, ‘It is the responsibility of intellectuals to speak the truth and to expose lies’. It may therefore be no coincidence that the apparent demise of the university seems to overlap with a related seam of scholarship on the ‘crisis’ (Przeworski, 2019), ‘end’ (Runciman, 2019), and

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‘death’ (Zammit-Lucia & Boyle, 2016) of democracy, even the beginning of ‘a new despotism’ (Keane, 2020). By engaging with debates about democratic backsliding and the role of academe—specifically of political science—in “speaking truth to power”, a second feature of the book’s distinctive approach lies in offering the first in-depth reflections on how the undemocratic trappings of the new research funding regimes have made them attractive not just for neoliberal democratic, but also for authoritarian policymakers. Our hypothesis is that the amalgam of state-directed priorities, efficiency-focussed rhetoric and coercive accountability rules merge all too easily into the presently increasing porousness of once-solid boundaries between democracies and autocracies. This volume’s chapters will demonstrate how policymakers in hybrid regimes such as Hungary or other Visegrad states have used neoliberal tools in their efforts to create a deferential community of academic researchers. Not for one moment are we arguing that the global ‘crisis of democracy’ is due to a shift in the balance of power between the state and academe, even less so to shifts in the contours of the research funding landscape. But what we are suggesting is that the health of democracy rests upon the vitality and vigour of a number of institutional relationships, such as an independent judiciary, a free media and broadcasters, a strong public service ethos among the bureaucracy, etc. The checks and balances provided by each of these institutions and the relationships they sustain form an important and interwoven element, like strands in a strong rope, of a mature and strong democracy. The ‘bigger picture’ within which this book seeks to make a contribution is one concerning the changing nature of democracy—possibly even the ‘life and death of democracy’ to paraphrase John Keane—and the role of academics and universities within it. Our concern is that without open debate and scrutiny shifts that are taking place in the research funding landscape may well hollow-out the capacity of the academe to full its wider democratic responsivities to society. The increasing shadow of the state upon academe may well dull the glow of criticality and questioning that scholars are supposed to cast upon political institutions, political processes and politicians. We are therefore concerned with how what appear to be fairly clear and consistent international shifts in the nature and distribution of research funding, shifts that have occurred through stealth rather than as a result of open debate, might form a key component of a much broader sense

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of democratic drift. The paradox is that the rationale offered by policymakers and politicians to explain the need for this shift is itself generally based upon democratic arguments concerning public value, social impact and making academic research more relevant. In many ways the core argument of this book is that what politicians and their advisers and officials define as ‘relevant’ to their interests, or what they perceive to be as key issues of relevance for the public, may well be very different to the views held by scholars. The perspective of the former is likely to be defined, for understandable reasons, by a relatively short-term emphasis on retaining power and generating wealth; the perspective of the latter, by contrast, is more likely to focus on more long-term horizons while also seeking to expose the causes, motivations and often hidden intentions behind political decisions. This grating tension between politicians and scholars represents a key element of a healthy, open and flourishing democracy. As such the balance between what might be termed ‘scholar-selected’ and ‘state-directed’ notions of what is deemed to be a ‘useful’ or ‘relevant’ area or issue to study is a far more political topic than is often recognized. The aim of this book is to foster a greater recognition of this argument and to stimulate further research in the area. Anyone interested in understanding what might be termed ‘the politics of relevance’, as it exists within broader contemporary debates concerning scholarship and democracy, is therefore faced with an immediate challenge concerning contested representations of relevance. Put slightly differently, different actors come to the debate from different angles, with different perspectives and with very different normative priorities. Untangling this congested terrain is made even harder by the simple fact that: (i) the existing knowledge base on research funding frameworks is relatively small; (ii) there is a lack of analytical or theoretical structure that can be easily adopted and applied to this tangled terrain and (iii) political science has generally focussed its attention on matters beyond ‘research on research’ which has to some extent allowed the democratic implications of changes to the governance of higher education to receive less attention than they might arguably have deserved. In this context and stripped right back to its basic structure this book adopts a multi-levelled approach in order to help fill this knowledge gap and to some extent to politicize the topic of research funding. The macro-political or ‘mega-constitutional’ level is concerned with the relationship between democratic governance, on the one hand, and

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academic governance, on the other hand. At the meso-level or midstream, this book is focussed on the institutional structures and processes through which public research funding is distributed to academics and the conditions or expectations that are placed on that transfer of resources. At the micro-political level this book focuses on the field of political science as arguably the vanguard discipline when it comes to promoting and protecting not only democratic values but also in terms of challenging and scrutinizing the behaviour of politicians. Not only does this three-level approach provide an effective balance between breadth and depth but it also allows us to capture and explore the relationships between different levels as they have evolved in different countries and over time. As later chapters will illustrate, although the disciplinary focus is on political science the implications and issues that emerge from this intellectual reference point ahow what might bere of great relevance, in different ways and forms, across the full scientific spectrum. In order to start exploring and unpicking the relationships between relevance, deference and democracy this opening chapter provides what might be seen as a number of essential building blocks. The first block and the opening section focus on research funding and seek to set down a set of basic reference points that seek to distinguish between ‘scholarselected’ and ‘state-directed’ interpretations of relevance. The second building block adopts a more historical perspective and seeks to provide ‘the long view’ on debates concerning ‘useful’ and ‘useless’ knowledge and the role of the state in terms of shaping or directing academic life. This forms the nucleus of the second section and flows through into a focus, in the third section, on political science and why it provides a ‘critical case’ in terms of understanding the relationship between scholarship and democracy. The third (disciplinary) building block is therefore concerned with ‘that noble science of politics’ and its broader role in sustaining democratic values and a civic culture. With these three building blocks in place, the fourth section provides an account of the structure of this book in a section that teases out the arguments and insights of each chapter. The fifth and final block (and section) provides a brief review of debates, disagreements and dimensions that combine to shed fresh light on the relationship between scholarship and democracy, or more specifically between research relevance and deference in a democratic context.

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A Starting Point---Two Types of Research Relevance Those who wish to explore the complex relationship between scholarship and democracy are faced with an immediate and obvious question: ‘Where do I start?’ This book commences with a step that is as short as it is simple and which revolves around the identification of two modes or types of research funding (see Table 1.1, below). The adoption of such an apparently Procrustean framework may at first glance appear unable to capture the broad array of funding opportunities and it is necessary from the outset to underline that we are not suggesting that there are only two types of research funding. What the identification of two broad types of funding—types that hinge on the degree of political control or oversight that come, like strings, attached to it—is intended to achieve is an initial starting point or heuristic that facilitates theoretical, historical and comparative analysis, while at the same time being itself open to analytical change and refinement. To put the same point slightly differently, although we begin with a ‘two types’ model we expect to end in Chapter 12 with something quite different in terms of gradations, perspectives and insight. Table 1.1 Modes of determining research relevance

Intellectual scope Role of politicians Common Emphasis Research governance Selection Potential for political veto Country Funding Examples United Kingdom

Germany

‘Type I’ Scholar-Selected

‘Type II’ State-Directed

Open None/Limited Pure knowledge/ problem-orientated Arm’s-length/Independent Peer Review No

Limited Potentially Significant Applied knowledge/ solution-focussed Hypothecated/politicized Political Oversight Yes

UKRI Responsive Mode Funding

Global Challenges Funding, Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund Mission-orientated (Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF); other federal and state ministries)

DFG (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, German Research Association)

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The ‘two types’ model is therefore offered as an initial ‘first step’ along a path to understand how and why the issue of research funding fits within broader debates about the relationship between scholarship and democracy. As already noted, this is not a path that has been taken by many scholarly explorers before us and therefore the terrain is largely unmapped and not well-trodden. Table 1.1 provides an initial attempt to sketchout the most obvious reference points—the highest mountains and the deepest valleys—from a distance in hope that subsequent surveyors and pioneers will fill in the fine detail and through this chart the topography of this scholarly terra incognita. The great benefit of this initial and very simple mapping is that already before the intellectual journey has really started it facilitates the discussion of a number of points that while being framed as weaknesses in the dichotomy actual serve to underline its simple value in terms of sparking reflection, discussion and debate. With this in mind it is useful to very briefly discuss four potential ‘problem points’ with Table 1.1. These can be summarized as follows and serve to structure the rest of this section: (i) the use of a broad net and the size of the mesh; (ii) politicization is not ‘black’ or ‘white’ but generally comes in shades of grey; (iii) the need to avoid zero-sum assumptions and (iv) and the need to question normative assumptions. The first point takes us back to the tension between designing an analytical perspective that is broad, simple and flexible enough to be cast, like a net, over a wide range of cases without being so broad that its findings lack value. This is a common challenge in any research design and there is no doubt that the research funding landscape is as complex as it is multi-levelled with businesses, industry, charities, philanthropic trust and non-governmental organizations all funding research in different sectors and with very different aims and ambitions. But the focus of this book is more specific: publicly funded research as distributed by the state, generally through arm’s-length funding bodies which exist at the intersection or within the hinterland between academe and politicians and their officials. As later chapters will illustrate in some detail, semi-independent or ‘arm’slength’ funding bodies very often play a critical role not just in terms of distributing resources but also as acting as an institutional buffer between competing interests and competing expectations. As governments around the world move towards an emphasis on supporting research investments that have been co-designed and are co-delivered through collaborative projects with potential research users (i.e. businesses, charities, healthcare

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providers, etc.), the meaning of ‘state-funded’ may well become increasingly blurred as co-funded research, often through large and complex consortia, becomes the rule rather than the exception. This flows into a second potential challenge that Table 1.1 encourages us to be aware of in the sense of what might be termed levels of politicization. Put slightly differently, the critical reader might suggest that to some extent all publicly funded research is state-directed for the simple reason that it will be through politicians and the tentacles of the state that decisions about the amount of funding and how it is to be allocated are made. To this extent all public research funding exists in the shadow of the state. This, in turn, leads to a discussion about due process and methods of allocation which again highlights a range of ways in which even after the overall budget-lines have been agreed politicians or their officials may attempt to exert some subsequent control over that resource. Put differently, political influence or intervention may take many forms, and in order to capture this variety it is necessary to understand that the shadow of the state (by which we mean forms of politicization) is rarely ‘black’ or ‘white’ and—like all shadows—exists in a variety of shades of grey. The challenge, as with the net-problem mentioned above, becomes one of disaggregating levels and gradations while also being aware of both formal and informal interference. The distinction between principles, programmes and projects is offered, again as an early building block, as a way of teasing-apart the controloptions and political pressure-points that could in theory exist. Once an overall research funding budget is allocated it would be possible for a government or politician to make a high-level decision with regard to whether they actually want to retain some element of control over that funding. If not, then the funding could be distributed to funders and allocated through scholarly selected open competitions with peer review forming the main mechanism for assessing quality and relevance (i.e. ‘Type I’ in Table 1.1). If, however, politicians are not content to distribute without at least some influence, framing or control then their options cascade down from broad principles to highly specific interventions (see Table 1.2, below). Level 1 in this multi-levelled approach to state control would focus on principled statements of value and, through this, potentially to the demarcation of some disciplines as being ineligible for funding. This is the rawest form of state control with the research capacity of those selected disciplines becoming less ‘state-directed’ and more ‘state-rejected’. Level

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Table 1.2 Levels and tools of state control and intervention Level

Essence

Example

1. Principle

The barring of certain disciplines or topics from receiving public research funding

2. Programme

The formal dedication of research funding to specific politically selected topics

3. Project

The existence of an ‘executive veto’ over specific projects that have been recommended for funding

During the period between the 2013 Continuing Appropriations Act and the 2014 Omnibus Appropriations Act, political science funding in the United States by the National Science Foundation was restricted to projects promoting either national security or US economic interests In the United Kingdom the government’s commitment to major increases in research and development funding is tied to a productivity-focussed industrial strategy In 2017 the Australian Education Minister vetoed eleven grants in the arts and humanities on the basis that they were focussed on ‘entirely the wrong priorities’

2 might shift the control level away from disciplines and towards topics by tying funding to specific thematic and politically selected priorities. This would be the ‘Type II’ funding in Table 1.1 and in theory could be interpreted as a compromise position in the sense that academics from any discipline retain their intellectual freedom and professional autonomy in terms of how to study a specific topic but what t o study is essentially decided by politicians. In reality, however, it could also be argued that state control at the programmatic level serves to reduce or undermine the critical capacity of those academics who may want to work beyond those politically mandated topics; or even where scholars do work within mandated topics where funding is available they may feel uncomfortable with the normative values or ambitions that the government is trying to achieve, and fearful of being essentially co-opted as servants of the state. Moreover, the realities of the pressures to publish and secure external research income are so intense that many academics, especially those in precarious employment positions, may well feel they have little choice but

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to limit their perceived capacity to criticize in order to secure funding. Hence our focus on the interplay between research, relevance and deference; and on how the subtle co-option (Level 2) or more brutal exclusion (Level 3) of academics may have major implications for the health of democracy. In terms of understanding these implications it is necessary to chart the various pressure-points that politicians might utilize and specifically the final project-based option whereby all research grants that have been selected for funding, or possibly just grants on specific topics, have to be approved by politicians. Level 3 is therefore concerned with the ‘executive veto’. Although politicians may well be reluctant to veto specific projects and use these powers sparingly (or informally/unofficially as occurred in the Australian example mentioned in Table 1.2) it is important to understand that the potential for veto is likely to will cast a long shadow of the state over the broader scholarly community in terms of a negative ‘anticipatory effect’ (i.e. ‘there’s no point applying for a research grant on this topic as the minister would probably veto it’.) Table 1.2 provides a summary and example of these levels of political control but, as in the case with the ‘Two Types’ dichotomy set out in Table 1.1, we would expect our understanding of the range of control methods to expand and deepen as this book evolves through the rich variety of country profiles. In many ways the options and tools highlighted in Table 1.2 provide an initial attempt to begin refining and untangling the potential interplay between the ‘two types’ of research set out in Table 1.1. With this in mind a third potential ‘problem point’ might be that it is too obvious, or possibly too easy, to assume the existence of zero-sum relationships where an increase in relation to one factor or variable automatically results in a reduction to some other element. Just as it is possible for the statecraft of a politician to utilize more than one or all of the levels of state control and intervention at the same time it is also possible that an increase in ‘Type II’ research funding does not necessarily mean that ‘Type I’ funding has been reduced. The creation of United Kingdom Research and Innovation (UKRI) in 2018, for example, occurred through the amalgamation of the seven independent research councils (e.g. Economic and Social Research Council, Arts and Humanities Research Council, etc.) that had operated to support designated areas of science for several decades and in the case of the Medical Research Council for over a century. During its first two years in existence the UKRI has delivered a major increase in the availability

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of ‘Type II’ programmatic funding (totaling many billions of pounds) while at the same time maintaining levels of ‘Type I’ open responsive mode funding. The increase in ‘Type II’ funding has not, as yet at least, not occurred at the cost of ‘Type I’ funding but whether the same is true in other countries or whether this balance will be sustained in the UK in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis given the economic and social challenges it has created remains to be seen. Of course, and taking the need to challenge zero-sum assumptions one step further, there is also the chance that notions of state-directed relevance will at times overlap and align with scholar-selected issues in ways that facilitate exactly the sort of open criticality and questioning that democracy demands. The need to acknowledge such possibilities, however, must somehow be combined with a need to avoid political naiveté and what might be termed ‘co-option through good intent’. This flows into recent concerns about the ‘Covid-crowbar’ and how research funding systems around the world have very rapidly been refocused to respond to the crisis resonate with this book’s broader focus on the role of academics, the value of intellectual independence and the future of democracy. Indeed, COVID-19 and particularly the way in which certain governments around the world have responded to the crisis has created widespread concern about ‘autocratization’ (see V-Dem, 2020) which came upon pre-existing concerns about ‘democratic backsliding’ and the emergence of populism (see IDEA, 2019). The existence of far-reaching democratic anxieties was captured in the conclusion of Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2020 report, Democracy and pluralism are under assault. Dictators are toiling to stamp out domestic dissent [and] … many freely elected leaders are increasingly willing to break down in-institutional safeguards and disregard the rights of critics and minorities as they pursue their populist agendas.

Not only does this broader concern raise academic anxieties due to the manner in which populism often brings with it a virulent strand of ‘antiexpert’ or ‘anti-science’ sentiment but it also brings the discussion back to fundamental debates concerning the nature of democracy and the role of academe within it, as opposed to being in some way external or separate to it. With this in mind a potential problem with the ‘two types’ approach is that it brings with it a temptation to view scholarly selected relevance as in some ways ‘good’, ‘superior’, ‘pure’ and ultimately ‘democratic’;

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and state-directed relevance as in some ways a corrupted or contaminated endeavor, ‘bad’, ‘inferior’, ‘tainted’ and for some reason undemocratic due to its more direct linkage to the dirty business of politics. The point being made is that such normative temptations must be resisted in favour of a more balanced and broad-ranging appreciation of what might be termed the essence of public funding. As a number of recent scholars and social commentators have underlined, whether viewed in terms of the higher education sector, some broader scholarly sphere or some simply in terms of ‘the academe’, it is possible to identify the emergence of a new socio-political context or paradigm with which academics are expected to operate. The shifting research funding landscape is in many ways both a symptom and symptomatic of that broader shift and particularly in manner in which a number of societal shifts (i.e. higher educational levels, declining social deference, a more questioning public, rising public expectations, etc.) have combined to shift the traditional relationship between the academy and the public, and therefore between academe and the state. Cardinal Newman’s mid-nineteenth century arguments about The Idea of a University with its emphasis on civic virtue, good character and professional independence; plus his warnings against ‘mechanical’ approaches to measuring value or crude pressures to focus on ‘utility’ or ‘useful’ knowledge may provide the ‘deep story’ that continues to define and inspire a rather nostalgic and romanticized view of academic life. But it is not an ‘idea’ that appears quite as attractive or credible to those who exist beyond academe and who possess more egalitarian attitudes (Newman was essentially constructing a defense of an Oxbridge college) and in a climate in which levels of social and economic inequality are increasing rather than declining. The simple point being made—although possibly heretical to many academics—is that it is possible to construct a democratic argument for state-directed relevance on the basis that it is the public’s money that is being distributed and some sense of social benefit or public impact might therefore be appropriate. It is at this point that Richard Watermeyer’s Competitive Accountability in Academic Life (2019) provides a useful foil due to the manner in which it reiterates many of this book’s concerns about ‘Type-II’ research leading to stealthlike forms of co-option whereby academics relinquish their capacity to serve as ‘the intellectual as lookout’ and through this—as Watermeyer warns—become ‘just too close, too involved, too active, too enmeshed and too invested (with too much to lose) as players within a power elite’ (p. 12). He proceeds to note (p. 13),

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The question becomes in the risk-averse Academy the extent to which competitive accounta-bility dissuades and/or disables academics from invoking their political agency, where such forms of public enactment may be disadvantageous, and potentially damaging to their insti-tution’s branding and therefore their own careers.

The politicization of academe is the central concern that drives this book but the weakness of Watermeyer’s position, and many other academics writing on this topic, is that they tend to simply dismiss rather than engage with the democratic arguments that politicians and their officials make about the need to account for public money. Verbose and arguably pompous narratives that define changes to the research funding and assessment landscape in terms of their stimulation of ‘performancebased anxieties that are corruptive to academics’ self-concept as active contributors to the public sphere—and therefore debilitating to their effectiveness as ‘public intellectuals’—which in turn engenders inflated or otherwise counterfeit rationalizations of the public value of academic research’ (Watermeyer, 2019: 4) are unlikely to cultivate support for ‘Type I’ funding and, if anything, are likely to provide further evidence for those who seek to increase levels of state-directed relevance. If academe has an argument to make about its role in nurturing and sustaining democratic politics, and therefore also in terms of resisting authoritarianism, then it is a case that needs to be made in far simpler and direct terms. To highlight the need for simplicity and directness brings this section full-circle and back to its original core focus on the rationale for offering a ‘two types’ model as the starting point for analysis. The value of this contrast between scholar-selected and state-directed relevance, as this section has shown, is that it stimulates a set of questions and raises a host of issues which each in their own ways serve to tease-apart and reveal the changing relationship between scholarship and democracy. The core concern being that an increased emphasis on state-directed relevance may lead (either by accident or design) to a new form of ‘deferential don’ who feels unable to unwilling to speak truth unto power. It would, however, be wrong to see debates concerning relevance and the appropriate relationship between academe and the state as particularly new or novel issues which is why the next section provides a brief account of relevant historical matters.

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A Matter of Relevance and Historical Matters In recent years and for the reasons discussed in the chapters of this book the topic of relevance has emerged as a key issue in the governance of higher education around the world. Should support by public funding prioritize the scientific analysis of topics deemed in some ways obviously ‘useful’ above those that might too easily be dismissed as ‘useless’? This point about utility or value brings the discussion back to the opening questions about who should have the power to define where the boundary between ‘relevant’ and ‘irrelevant’ or ‘useful’ and ‘useless’ knowledge should be. The core tension or schism can be seen as existing between two arguments: The Democratic Argument goes something like this: ‘In a democracy it might justifiably be argued that it is for politicians, as the elected representatives of the public, to define such matters of value as it is they, through the ballot box and other forms of scrutiny, will have to provide an account for those decisions. Academics are not accountable and are, in fact, little little more than a social elite’.

[but] The Scholarly Safety-Net Argument goes something like this: Even in a democracy, not to mention authoritarian regimes, politicians have their own interests which may not align with those of the public, allowing scholars to conduct research—to explore, question and critique free from political direction—is therefore a democratic backstop, safeguard or safety-net’.

Both arguments can be seen as offering oversimplified narratives designed to bolster the position of one professional group vis-à-vis the other. Following the advice in the previous section, it is therefore important not to unquestionably accept the normative positions that underpin each of the arguments. As Christopher Achen’s and Larry Bartels’ Democracy for Realists (2016) underlines, the transmission-rod theory of democratic politics from ‘the people’ to ‘the politicians’ through to ‘the policies’ and back down the chain from ‘the governors’ to ‘the governed’ may well provide a neat and clear theory of how democratic politics works but it is some way off the messy reality of political life and

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decision-making. The democratic argument that sees politicians potentially punished at the ballot box for their decisions about the research funding landscape is therefore a pretty tenuous position to adopt. And yet arguments concerning the potential role of the ‘scholarly safety-net’ are also arguably equally problematic due to a relative absence, particularly in recent decades, of academic activism in the service of democracy. To put the same point slightly differently, if the scholarly safety-net was working well and ‘speaking truth to power’ then there would have been little need for David Ricci to write about the ‘tragedy of political science’ (1984), for Michael Burawoy to launch ‘the public sociology wars’ (2011) or for Rainer Eisfeld (2019) to emphasize the role of academics in terms of ‘empowering citizens, engaging the public’. If a conundrum seems to raise its ugly head here, it may help to contextualize contemporary discussions by raising awareness of the fact that they are by no means new. Debates concerning research, relevance and deference date back at least to the beginnings of the modern university. This history of academe and of the emergence of the modern university has evolved into a highly specialized sub-field and if works such as Sheldon Rothblatt’s Revolution of the Dons (1968) and the collection of essays published by Lawrence Stone on The University in Society (1974) represent early contributions to this ‘field’—as Janet Howarth (1997) suggests—then Powicke and Emden’s 1936 revision of Hasting Rashdall’s The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages [orig. pub 1895], and the four volume (1992, 1996, 2004, 2011) A History of the University in Europe that was edited by Hilde de Ridder-Symoens and later by Walter Rüegg provide its foundational pillars. What the ‘long view’ provided by these magisterial texts reveals is the manner in which the history of universities and of scholarship has to all intents and purposes always been defined by its relationship with the powerful external actors, usually the state or the church. Any understanding of academic origins and evolution must therefore recognize the existence of a constant tension between a desire for intellectual autonomy and self-governance, on the one hand, and external expectations of practical value and usefulness, on the other. It is exactly this tension that brings us back to a narrative that has already been mentioned and to the lectures that Cardinal Henry Newman wrote while serving as the first rector of the Catholic University of Ireland between 1854 and 1858, or what is today University College, Dublin. These lectures were eventually published as The Idea of a University and sought to set down a very clear marker against any expectation

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that the role of the university was to either educate students for specific employment or to produce applied research. For Newman the definition of a university demanded free-thinking and the opportunity for intellectual meandering—‘to range through a library at random, taking down books as they meet him, and pursuing the trains of thought which his mother wit suggests!’—so that students and scholars could understand and appreciate different arguments or insights through a sense of perspective and a willingness to step-back from specialization in order to appreciate the bigger picture. Newman’s idea was simply this: a liberal education was relevant and to be valued above what might be termed a professional or applied education because it provided the intellectual breadth through which an individual could critique and contest a wide variety of arguments and perspectives: ‘Not to know the relative disposition of things is the state of slaves and children’. Universities and academia was therefore concerned more with developing good character and with ‘training good members of society’. With Newman’s rhetorical flair and passion, the benefits of a liberal education range from ‘raising the intellectual tone of society’ to ‘purifying the national taste’ and from preparing students to ‘fill any post with credit and to master any subject with facility’ through to knowing ‘when to be serious and when to trifle’. To be free to nourish one’s soul with learning on any topic is by definition to nourish and benefit society more broadly, and it is this argument which arguably continues to offer purchase in relation to contemporary debates concerning relevance. In many ways Newman provides a defense of the scholarly safety-net argument in the sense that the role of the university is to nurture critical citizens and therefore part of this thesis revolves around pushing back against those who would promote utility above ideals: Now this is what some great men are very slow to allow; they insist that Education should be confined to some particular and narrow end, and should issue in some definite work, which can be weighed and measured. They argue as if everything, as well as every person, had its price; and that where there has been a great outlay, they have a right to expect a return in kind. This they call making Education and Instruction ‘useful’ and ‘Utility’ becomes their watch-word. With a fundamental principle of this nature, they very naturally go on to ask, what there is to show for the expense of a University; what is the real worth in the market of the article called ‘a Liberal Education’, on the supposition that it does not teach us definitely how to ad-vance our manufactures, or to improve our lands, or

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to better our civil economy; or again, if it does not at once make this man a lawyer, that an engineer, and that a surgeon; or at least if it does not lead to discoveries in chemistry, astronomy, geology, magnetism and science of every kind.

Critical citizens with the ability to challenge and counter dominant ideas were unlikely to fostered through an educational system whereby students were enrolled into specific disciplines or against specified accreditation processes. Such ‘mechanical’ learning would create machine thinkers and would not ‘form or cultivate the intellect’. This was the critical point and the link between scholarship and democracy: the role of a university was to educate ‘the intellect to reason well in all matters, to reach out towards truth, and to grasp it’. Frank Turner’s 1996 edition of Newman’s work, complete with a set of new interpretive essays penned by a set of genuine world-class scholars, affirms, ‘No work in the English language has had more influence on public ideals of higher education’; whereas Jaroslav Pelikan (himself the author of The Idea of the University: A Reexamination, 1992) describes it as ‘the most important treatise on the idea of the university ever written in any language’. ‘A token of the prophetic, timeless and universal nature of Newman’s vision’, John Cornwell writes in Newman’s Unquiet Grave (2011), ‘is its adoption by writers and thinkers generations on, and far removed, from the circumstances of nineteenth-century tertiary education in Catholic Ireland’. The argument here is simply that in delivering his lectures Newman was attempting to forge an ideal that was intended to frustrate the demands of those social actors who sought to impose what would today be called a demand that scholarship is ‘relevant’. For Newman scholarship was highly relevant but simply in a less direct and instrumental way than politicians and policymakers would often demand. As Stephen Ferruolo’s (1985) The Origins of the University and Thomas Bender’s The University and the City (1988) illustrate, the earliest universities were formed with a far heavier focus on moral and mechanical production that Newman seems willing to concede. From their formative stages and ecclesiastic roots, they were also beholden to powerful social actors and recruitment was generally defined by wealth and patronage. The development of the medieval university was therefore inter-twined with a need to train future functionaries of state and church and by the fourteenth century the creation and role of universities was often closely bound within broader national and regional projects which

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involved increasing control by local royal and municipal authorities. What even the most cursory historical review therefore reveals is the existence of a long-standing tension within the basic idea of a university. The rationale for being granted university status was to secure a degree of institutional autonomy and operational independence from the state (theological or feudal) and yet once established universities remained dependent on the patronage of elites. This ‘long view’ is relevant but the modern university is essentially a nineteenth century creation with the creation of the University of Berlin in 1810 by the then Prussian minister for education, Wilhelm von Humboldt, conventionally regarded as a critical moment. This began a transitional period whereby universities were no longer associated with satisfying the state or church’s need for functionaries and instead focussed upon professionalized ‘higher learning’ with a focus on research as the core defining purpose. Not only was this the period when the university syllabus expanded but it was also when a more formalized framework of academic levels or professional grades emerged. As such the formal education of future generations of scholars became central to the role of the modern university and linked with a focus on higher degrees and doctorates. The German ideal, embodied in the Humboldtian model, was hugely influential in many parts of the world as several domestic systems, notably in the United Kingdom and United States, attempted to cultivate a level of research intensity alongside pre-existing traditions of teaching and scholarship. And yet this model also encapsulated the tension that this book is attempting to expose and address in the sense that it was at one-and-the-same-time based on the notion of intellectual freedom while being inextricably inter-twined with the state. The Humboldtian model sought to combine professional autonomy with some level of state control and to that extent resembled a hybrid constellation of scholars and state officials. This created a higher-level tension whereby the university was expected to fulfil a range of what would today be termed ‘impact-related’ functions while at the same time being somehow withdrawn from society in order to foster reflective capacities and a certain independence of mind. This emphasizes the manner in which the ideal of the university implicitly assumed a certain criticality that would take shape as a site of resistance to the dominant values and practices of that society; while the institutional reality was tied to relevance-related expectations, claims and demands

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from the ‘host’ community (i.e. city, region, nation, etc.), which also very often served as a key funder of the university. If the conflict between what is defined as ‘useless’ as opposed to ‘useful’ knowledge does not encompass ‘a uniquely contemporary set of concerns’ and is in fact a perennial feature of state-scholar tensions, as Collini (2012: 39) suggests, then what exactly are the claims to originality, significance or even (dare we suggest) relevance offered within the pages of this book? First and foremost, we suggest that a significant shift or change in the nature of this perennial tension has and is occurring towards a far stronger and more explicit emphasis on a state-directed definition of research relevance. Secondly, we hold that the scope of the shift raises fundamental questions about political power and democratic control. One of the key reference points for understanding the democratic significance of academe is Noam Chomsky’s The Responsibility of Intellectual s (1967 [2017, ed.]) and his argument that (pp. 16–17): Intellectuals are in a position to expose the lies of governments, to analyze actions according to their causes and motives and often hidden intentions. In the Western world, at least, they have the power that comes from political liberty, from access to information and freedom of expression. For a privileged minority, Western democracy provides the leisure, the facilities, and the training to seek the truth lying hidden behind the veil of distortion and misrepresent-tation, ideology and class interest, through which the events of current history are presented to us. The responsibilities of intellectuals, then, are much deeper than what Macdonald calls the ‘responsibility of people’, given the unique privileges that intellectuals enjoy.

Over fifty years later, many academics might question whether a university career still provides quite the leisure and freedom that Chomsky suggests but at root ‘It is the responsibility of intellectuals to speak the truth and to expose lies’ (p. 17). And yet in making this argument and exploring the evolution of academe and the changing expectations of politicians and policymakers vis-à-vis the academy Chomsky offers an important distinction between two types of intellectual. The first group were the value-orientated intellectuals who were concerned with the realm of ideas, challenging dominant ideological frameworks and who placed contemporary issues in a historical context. These were the ‘wild men in the wings’ that were often dismissed or denigrated by those in power as over-emotional, destructive and lacking in

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loyalty. It was this latter group of intellectuals that the Trilateral Commission of 1975 blamed for the ‘crisis of democracy’ because they had delegitimized a once stable model of elite rule by encouraging those who were previously marginalized to protest and demand to be heard. These were the mischief makers and dangerous creatures with the honesty to “tell it was, is, and might be” on the basis that their professional position provided them with tenure and security to rile and ruffle political elites. The second group were the technocratic and policy-orientated intellectuals that focussed their energies on refining and tinkering with the actually existing system and could therefore be trusted as ‘responsible men’. These were the academic experts that fell into place, passively adopting the conventions instituted by the structures of authority carrying out ‘faithfully the instructions of those who hold the reins of power, to be loyal and faithful servants, not after reflective judgement but by reflexive conformism’. This distinction re-introduces the notion of levels and more specifically Peter Hall’s (1993) influential analysis of levels of policy change which essentially distinguished between three levels: first-order changes revolve around relatively minor adjustments in existing policy instruments at the micro-political level, such as changing the level of a specific benefit or tax threshold; second-order changes involve the introduction of completely new tools or policies to achieve a stated ambition, such as privatizing public utilities; third-order change, however, is more fundamental and involves a shift in the dominant policy paradigm or the fundamental ideas or values that define and underpin a governing approach. When viewed through Hall’s lens, Chomsky’s technocratic and policyorientated intellectuals focus their energies on first and second-order challenges but from within the dominant policy or political paradigm; whereas value-orientated intellectuals are less concerned with tinkering with the actually existing machine and more concerned with highlighting embedded inequalities, questioning cultural templates and exposing lies and distortions. Although the concept of ‘intellectuals’ is clearly contested Chomsky’s writing on the responsibility of intellectuals, both in the context of the Vietnam war and subsequently (see Allott et al., 2019), is primarily focussed on the position and role of academics in society. It therefore resonates very strongly with this book’s focus on the relationship(s) and interplay between research, relevance and deference in a number of ways. Most significantly, Chomsky highlights what he sees as a worrying trend

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towards the academic operating as a technocratic and policy-orientated intellectual rather than as a more critical or free-floating value-orientated intellectual . The casualization of academic life combined with the emergence of market-like pressures and an emphasis on short-term high-impact research, combined with the introduction of continual performance management processes, has been highlighted by a large number of scholars as leading to a decline in academic freedom (see, for example, Oancea, 2008). To be ‘policy relevant’ in contemporary terms is to work in close collaboration with potential research users in order to increase efficiencies largely within the existing policy paradigm which provides us with a link back to Newman’s ‘idea’ of a university for the simple reason that in attempting to outline the benefits of a liberal education and the need to possess a sense of intellectual range he was in essence seeking to nurture the value-orientated intellectual with the character and capacity to question, prod and poke those in power. His arguments against disciplinary specialization and professional pathways reflected not only his personal predilections for an elite Oxbridge model but also a wider concern about the democratic implications of an education system that produced narrow technocratic and policy-orientated intellectuals instead of broader and more questioning (less ‘mechanical’ to use Newman’s term) ways of thinking. But this in itself brings us to a third point and a tension that exists that the heart of the notion of ‘responsibility’ when applied to intellectuals (including academics). Returning to the warning about questioning normative assumptions it is possible to identify two valid perspectives. One might argue that it is completely right and legitimate for scholars to work to support and refine the actually existing model of democracy and equally naïve to expect them to adopt some externalized role that sees them constantly heckling from the side-lines but rarely actually playing some role in changing society. Taking small steps and exploiting existing cracks and wedges might from this perspective be seen as a far more beneficial and politically rational approach that waiting for the crisis that may (or may not) allow a great leap forward. From this perspective the technocratic and policyorientated intellectuals may well possess their own hidden agendas that Chomsky too easily overlooks. Added to this is the more basic point that by identifying two types Chomsky risks imposing an over-simplistic zerosum assumption that fails to recognize the fluidity of academic life and how, in theory at least, academics can operate as both technocratic and

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policy-orientated intellectuals through positive engagement with potential research users around contemporary policy and politics while at the same time being value-orientated intellectuals and therefore critical of the broader ideological framework in which they operate. A scholarly definition of relevance in political science—to which the next section will turn in more detail—might arguably be that its academics’ efforts matter most when, by research and by diverse forms of extramural communication, they address ways of better attaining the discipline’s core values. These in turn may be described for the twenty-first century as liberty, political equality, democratic participation, government accountability, cultural multiplicity and ecological sustainability. To do relevant, stimulating, important work, political scientists might, in this view, first and foremost provide citizens and policymakers—definitely not merely the latter—with empirical knowledge and normative counsel for (inter alia). • reducing glaring disparities in political resources to advance democratic participation; • exposing false, illegal or unethical claims and operations (attempts at “liars’ rule”) by politicians, thereby promoting governmental accountability; • proposing and monitoring “integration pacts” between national, regional and local agencies to combat xenophobic prejudice and foster cultural multiplicity; • participating in and monitoring programmes for multi-level climate politics to attain ecological sustainability. If it may safely be maintained that such determined focus is too rarely brought to bear by political science in its present highly fragmented state as a “federation of loosely linked specialties” (the memorable words were those of American Political Science Review editor Lee Sigelman in 2006), the list does demonstrate that Chomsky’s two positions are not by definition mutually exclusive. But what has changed is that the professional permanence and protections once afforded to academics that allowed them to voice more strident fundamental concerns has been eroded; while at the same time the incentives and opportunity structures have been altered to promote a very specific form of ‘policy relevance’ (i.e. one

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linked to a dominant economic model). This is the shift in the metagovernance of higher education that has already been highlighted and which forms the focus of this book. However, one interesting reflection that emerges from Chomsky’s distinction between two types of intellectuals and his concerns is that when it comes to powerful value-orientated critiques and debates about the increasing connection between research funding and demonstrable relevance the academic community has arguably been incredibly deferential. Whilst numerous special editions, book and chapters have been written about the ‘tyranny of impact’ and its political implications for the discretion and (ir)relevance of different sections of the academic community this has not in itself evolved into any form of concerted political action or rebellion. It in exactly this vein that Watermeyer highlights ‘a shortfall of resistance’: ‘The academic rank and file or those who might be considered the academic proletariat are a silent or silenced majority and/or those who have reconciled themselves to higher education’s new corporate world (p. 45) [emphasis added].’ Alis Oancea highlights that manner in which powerful and highly bureaucratic forms of internalized ‘performative accountability’ have now existed within academe in some countries for several decades and this may have implicitly shaped the intellectual identity of many academics away from any recognition of possessing any broad societal value-orientated role and towards the automatic adoption of a more individualized technocratic and policy-orientated role. What is interesting here is that Russell Jacoby’s The Last Intellectuals (1987) makes a similar argument but from a very different direction. Jacoby’s focus is on the broader concept of public intellectuals and how many of the writers, artists, musicians and poets who would have performed exactly the disruptive, questioning, value-orientated and emotionally charged democratic role—the agitators of creative conflict that Chomsky lamented the loss of—had in the late twentieth century, in essence, accepted a Faustian bargain by trading an element of their capacity for criticality and dissent for the stability and remuneration of a university position. The implication of this notion of a ‘bargain’ or ‘deal’ is an understanding that it may come at a very high (democratic) price; or to put the same point slightly differently, it is not enough for academics to blame and decry the system of which they are a part. Academics as individuals have agency (some, admittedly, more than others) and must therefore share some of the responsibility for the shift between the academy and the state that has to a large extent been allowed to occur. It is at this point

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tempting to explore the excoriations contained within Frank Furedi’s Where have all the intellectuals gone? (2004) with its biting attack on ‘the evident banalization of university life’ (p. 2), but such temptations must be resisted for a fifth and final point that flows out of our recent focus on the responsibility of academics and into a discussion of whether political scientists, due to the manner in which democracy and deference, and policy and power provide the foci of their discipline, should bear a greater responsibility than most in terms of both interrogating and seeking to address the shift from scholar-selected to state-directed notions of research relevance with which this book is concerned. This forms the focus of the next section.

The Relevance of Political Science If there is a disciplinary enemy or academic philistine lurking within the pages and between the lines of Chomsky’s views on the responsibility of intellectuals, then it is a fairly easy one to recognize in the form of political science. It is these students of ‘the noble science’ who have, one might assume from a reading of Chomsky’s work, moved furthest not just in terms of adopting the role of technocratic and policy-orientated intellectuals but while also denigrating and dismissing the claims and role of the value-orientated intellectuals who seek to engage with the public in order to challenge basic ideas and assumptions, and through this highlight (third-order) alternatives. Whether Chomsky is correct to label political science, as opposed to a specific variant of American political science, as any more or less culpable than any other social science is debatable but what is potentially more significant is the discipline’s historical emphasis on not just studying political phenomena but on promoting democracy. Put slightly differently, the relevance of political science to debates about the relevance of research stem from its historical association with the nexus or intersection between academe and the state. As Matthew Flinders and Leslie Pal (2020) have shown, a commitment to ‘speaking truth to power’ and promoting active citizenship and political engagement has provided the ethical and moral foundations of political science since its inception. This explains the emphasis on political science ‘in the shadow of the state’ in this book and supports the argument that as an inevitably political discipline it offers significant potential in terms of developing a sophisticated grasp of the interplay between research, relevance and deference. It is, however, neither possible nor necessary to

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provide an exhaustive history of political science (but see, for example, Almond, 1990; Collini et al., 1983; Farr et al., 1995; Ricci, 1984), as the aim of this section is simply to make and substantiate three inter-connected arguments: 1. Political science as a discipline has traditionally evolved alongside a commitment to pro- moting democratic principles and values. 2. In recent years a high level of disciplinary anxiety has emerged in relation to whether do- minant notions of professionalization have undermined the public relevance of the discipline. 3. The existence of this historical role and contemporary anxiety should combine to place the discipline at the forefront of debates concerning the relationship between scholar-select-ed and statedirected relevance. ‘Political science cannot hope to immunize citizens against folly nor, for that matter, against anger or even hate’ Rainer Eisfeld argues (2019: xix) ‘But it can attempt considerably more than it is doing at present to spread historically informed analytical thinking and careful, normatively inspired reasoning among the public. And it needs to sound the alarm, challenging mendocracy—liars’ rule—towards which once venerable democracies, as evidenced by the Brexit and Trump campaigns, are presently sliding’. In these simple sentences Eisfeld captures what might be termed the ‘soul’ of political science. Having surveyed the available evidence on the strengths and weaknesses of the discipline, John Trent (2011: 197) suggested that the basic impression ‘[was] one of a discipline in search of its soul and out of touch with the real world of politics’. Eisfeld’s plea therefore represents the latest, albeit arguably the most eloquent and extended, contribution to a long tradition of demands that political science be a more publicly engaged and publicly relevant discipline. The tradition can be traced back to texts including Crick’s (1959) The American Science of Politics right through to Elinor Ostrom’s 1997 American Political Science Association (APSA) presidential address at the end of the twentieth century, in which she claimed that political science ‘suffers from a neglect of the citizen’ (1998: 16). She argued that our research should ‘help sustain democratic polities in the twenty-first century’ and that ‘We owe an obligation to the next generation to carry forward the best of our knowledge about how individuals solve the multiplicity of

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social dilemmas—large and small—that they face’ (1998: 18). Robert Putnam, in his 2003 APSA presidential address, argued that political science ‘must have a greater public presence’ and that one of our key responsibilities is ‘our contribution to public understanding and to the vitality of democracy’ (2003: 249). Matthew Flinders, Peter John and colleagues debated the future of political science in a 2013 special issue of Political Studies Review, but the debate was not about whether political science should be more engaged but about how. In their concluding, joint essay, Flinders and John (2013: 22) urged the discipline to ‘engage more visibly and coherently in political and public debate’. Most sweepingly, the American Political Science Association (APSA) (2011) Report of the Task Force on Political Science in the 21st Century closed with the conviction that political science has a ‘rich potential... to provide ways to better attain peace, economic opportunity, human rights, participatory democracy, and, ultimately, individual fulfilment’ (APSA, 2011: 59). What was missing, however, was any clarity about how to deliver on this potential, which is a strain of disciplinary agonizing that defines the 2014 APSA Task Force on how to improve public perceptions of political science’s value and the 2015 APSA Task Force on how to better communicate political science’s public value. Taken together what this reflects is a discipline that: (i) has traditionally evolved with a very strong and explicit commitment to promoting democratic principles and values; (ii) became increasingly concerned in the decades spanning the millennium about increasing evidence of democratic decline and disenchantment among the public and (iii) included many scholars who felt that the vaunted evolution or professionalization of their discipline towards an increasingly (hyper-)specialized, highly esoteric, selfreferential and extremely fragmented field had undermined its practical capacity to engage with society and promote democratic understanding more broadly. In many ways the ‘Perestroika’ movement within political science (see Monroe, 2005) was a threatened revolution without an external enemy that focussed around internal frustrations that sit almost perfectly within Chomsky’s distinction between technocratic and policy-orientated intellectuals on the one hand, and value-orientated intellectuals , on the other. The concern was that the discipline had evolved towards recruiting, incentivizing and rewarding scholars who adopted generally quantitative, methodologically complex and supposedly value-free approaches that generally failed to engage with or having anything to say about the most

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pressing social issues. Although working in broad strokes across a wide canvas, it is possible to suggest that under the influence of the behavioural movement political science had become a somewhat dull and detached, largely depoliticized and highly technical intellectual endeavor, and if it offered any relevance at all it would be to policy-making elites operating within a defined paradigm. The Perestroikan rebels might, through this interpretation, be seen as the ‘wild men and women in the wings’ who were frustrated with feeling dismissed and disparaged for promoting explicit normative positions and for being willing to dirty their hands in the messy business of politics. These were the value-orientated intellectuals who were seeking to push-back against mainstream interpretations of science in academe and to carve-out some space for pluralism (in relation to methods, approaches, definitions of value, ideological approaches, etc.). Anyone wishing to explore the emergence of this tension might compare Bernard Crick’s ‘A Footnote to Rally the Academic Professors of Politics’ (published as an appendix to the 1964s edition of his classic book In Defence of Politics ) with more recent contributions such as Sanford Schram and Brian Caterino’s Making Political Science Matter (2006) and Gerry Stoker, B. Guy Peters and Jon Pierre’s The Relevance of Political Science (2015), or even the May 2019 Carnegie Council debate on ‘Political Science is Lapsing into Irrelevance’, in order to gain a sense of the emergence of a gap between political science and the public. This notion of the emergence of a gap takes us back (once again) to Newman’s arguments concerning ‘the idea of a university’ and also to the contrast between ‘the democratic argument’ (i.e. academics spend public money and it is therefore legitimate for the public, through their elected representatives, to impose some strings and expect something in return) and ‘the scholarly safety-net argument’ which casts a degree of healthy suspicion over the decisions and intentions of politicians and places the academy as a democratic backstop or safeguard (mentioned above). Back in the mid-nineteenth-century Cardinal Newman was basically arguing that in order for academe to be able to fulfil its democratic and social functions some element of distance, autonomy and independence was necessary in order to prevent co-option and to facilitate the development of a sense of perspective. And yet it is also possible to suggest that too much distance can also be as problematic as too little distance if it is allowed to breed a sense of insularity and almost total separation from what might be termed ‘the real world’. To read a lot of the literature

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already mentioned in this section is to gain a strong sense of a discipline that had lost touch with reality and had taken a number of what are frequently termed ‘roads to irrelevance’. Even when some element of public influence is claimed it is not always in the positive sense. Colin Hay (2009: 587), for example, reflected upon the dominance of rational choice theory within elements of the discipline (schools, sects or tribes that generally ate in the same restaurant but refused to sit at the same tables to paraphrase Gabriel Almond’s, 1988 article) and suggests that ‘political scientists have contributed significantly to the demonization of politics…[T]hey trained us, in effect, to be cynical. And in that respect at least, we have been excellent students’. The emergence of a gap—or even just the perception that a gap exists—between political science and the public matters in terms of understanding how what might be termed ‘the politics of relevance’ relates to what might also be labelled ‘the politics of political science’ because there are few other disciplines where politicians and their advisers are as likely to try and exploit the emergence of a gap or vacuum to legitimate the imposition of greater control mechanisms. This, in turn, underlines the simple point that what might be ‘very good’ for the health of democracy in terms of academics exposing lies, speaking the truth and revealing the hidden reasons for specific decisions might actually be ‘very bad’ for the health of an incumbent politician or government. That is exactly why the international V-DEM database reveals such a strong correlation between political structures and academic freedom, with the global concern about the emergence of illiberal democracies and ‘democratic backsliding’ reflected in the imposition of strict governmental controls over academic research. The relevance of political science to the debate about the relevance of research therefore stems from both its historical role in terms of promoting democratic politics (broadly defined), supporting active citizenship and highlighting the existence and effects of different inequalities; combined contemporary disciplinary anxieties about its ability and willingness to fulfil this broader public role. Put very bluntly, it is also possible to suggest that due to the very nature of the discipline it is political science who should be most aware and attentive to the shift that concerns this book from scholar-selected to state-directed forms of relevance. The hidden politics forged through the introduction of new forms of researchrelated ‘performance management’ or ‘quality assessment’ in terms of imposing a specific form of potentially self-disciplining governmentality is a topic with major democratic implications that the discipline should be

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exploring and challenging with energy and passion. What political science brings to the topic is depth and detachment; qualities that the emergence of an over-emphasis on state-directed relevance risks losing with implications that are likely to be felt far beyond the lecture hall and seminar room.

References Achen, C., & Bartels, L. (2016). Democracy for realists. Princeton University Press. Allott, N. et al. (Eds.). (2019). The responsibility of intellectuals. UCL Press. Almond, G. (1988). Separate tables: Schools and sects in political science. PS: Political Science & Politics, 21(4), 828–842. Almond, G. (1990). A discipline divided. Sage. American Political Science Association (APSA). (2011). Political science in the 21st century: Report of the task force on political science in the 21st century. American Political Science Association. Boyer, E. (1990). Scholarship reconsidered. The Carnegie Foundation. Burawoy, M. (2011). The public sociology wars. In V. Jeffries (Ed.), Handbook of public sociology (pp. 449–473). Rowman & Littlefield. Byrne, E., & Clarke, C. (2020). The University Challenge. Pearson. Chomsky, N. (2017). The responsibility of intellectuals. The New Press. Collini, S. (2012). What are universities for? Penguin. Collini, S., Winch, D., & Burrow, J. (1983). That noble science of politics. Cambridge University Press. Craig, D., & Openshaw, H. (2018). The great university con. Original. Crick, B. (1959). The American science of politics: Its origins and conditions. University of California Press. Eisfeld, R. (2019). Empowering citizens, engaging the public. Political science for the 21st century. Springer. Farr, J., Dryzek, J., & Leonard, S. (1995). Political science in history. Cambridge University Press. Flinders, M., & John, P. (2013). The future of political science. Political Studies Review, 11(2), 222–227. Flinders, M., & Pal, L. A. (2020). The moral foundations of public engagement: Does political science, as a discipline, have an ethics? Political Studies Review, 18(2), 263–276. Freedom House. (2020). Freedom in the world 2020. Hall, P. (1993). Policy paradigms, social learning and the state: The case of economic policymaking in Britain. Comparative Politics, 25(3), 275–296.

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Hay, C. (2009). Academic political science: Understanding politics differently. Political Quarterly, 80(4), 587. Howarth, J. (1997). Introduction: Writing university history. Oxford Review of Education, 23(2), 147–150. Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. (2019). The global state of democracy, 2019: Addressing the Ills, reviving the promise. IDEA. Jacoby, R. (1987). The last intellectuals. Basic Books. Keane, J. (2020). The new despotism. Harvard University Press. Le Goff, J. (1993). Intellectuals in the middle ages. Blackwell. Lindblom, C. E. (1997). Political science in the 1940 and 1950s. Daedalus, 126(1), 225–252. Monroe, K. (2005). Perestroika! The raucous rebellion in political science. Yale University Press. Muller, J. (2019). The tyranny of metrics. Princeton University Press. Oancea, A. (2008). Performative accountability and the UK Research Assessment Exercise: Critical perspectives on communication. Cultural & Policy Studies, 27 (1/2): 153–173. Ostrom, E. (1998). A behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of collective action: Presidential address, American political science association, 1997. American Political Science Review, 92(1), 1–22. Przeworski, A. (2019). Crises of democracy. Cambridge University Press. Putnam, R. D. (2003). APSA presidential address: The public role of political science. Perspectives on Politics, 1(2), 249–255. Ricci, D. (1984). The tragedy of political science. Yale University Press. Runciman, D. (2019). How democracy ends. Profile. Scott, P. (2020). The crisis of the university. Routledge. Trent, J. (2011). Should political science by more relevant? European Political Science, 10, 191–209. Varieties of Democracy. (2020). Democracy report 2020. Watermeyer, R. (2019). Competitive accountability in academic life. Edward Elgar. Willetts, D. (2017). A university education. Oxford University Press. Zammit-Lucia, J., & Boyle, D. (2016). The death of liberal democracy. Radix.

PART I

Foundations and Concepts

CHAPTER 2

Incentives for Impact: Relevance Regimes Through a Cross-National Perspective Justyna Bandola-Gill, Matthew Flinders, and Marleen Brans

As a number of scholars have highlighted (Martin, 2011; Nowotny, 2015; Smith & Stewart, 2017), the dominant science policy paradigm appears to have shifted in recent years towards an increasing emphasis on demonstrating the ‘public value’, ‘relevance’ or ‘impact’ of scholarship. Assessments of research quality—and therefore decisions regarding research funding, appointments, promotions, prizes, fellowships, institutional investments, etc.—are therefore increasingly likely to include (implicitly or explicitly) some assessment of the non-academic societal

J. Bandola-Gill (B) University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK e-mail: [email protected] M. Flinders University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK M. Brans KU Leuven Public Governance Institute, Leuven, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Eisfeld and M. Flinders (eds.), Political Science in the Shadow of the State, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75918-6_2

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value of that research. It is, however, possible to suggest that the emergence of this impact-related shift has not received the scholarly attention it deserves given the potential ‘perils’ of this paradigm (Flinders, 2013). This is not to suggest that cognate pools of scholarship do not exist, for example in studies of innovation (e.g. Ergül & Co¸sar, 2017; Etzkowitz, 2003) or research evaluation (de Jong & Muhonen, 2018; Gunn & Mintrom, 2016; Williams & Grant, 2018). Yet, the systematic crosscountry comparison of institutionalized strategies aimed at incentivising and evaluating research impact, as well as its theoretical framing of such changes is lacking. As such, there could be a gap identified in exploring the research impact agenda development and potential pathologies in terms of research impact agenda as an international phenomenon in the governance of science. It is in exactly this context that this chapter engages with four inter-related questions. RQ1:

RQ2:

RQ3:

RQ4:

Theory—How can the evolution of the impact-agenda be theorised in a manner that facilitates both comparative research while offering linkages to other policy domains? [The focus of Part I] Methods—How can the scientific analysis of the emergent ‘impact agenda’ be most efficiently and credibly undertaken? [The focus of Part II] Empirics—To what extent do research assessment processes in different countries actually include an emphasis on ‘impact’, ‘relevance’ or ‘public value’? [The focus of Part III] Consequences—What are the implications of this shift in terms of professionalization, autonomy and scholarship? [The focus of Part IV]

The research presented in this chapter engages with these questions by: (1) utilizing New Public Management-theoretic studies to develop the concept of ‘New Public Research’ (in response to RQ1); (2) through the design and implementation of a multi-step and multi-method research model (RQ2); (3) through the comparative analysis of impact-regimes in 33 countries and European Research Council (RQ3); and finally (4) through a review of the qualitative data collected on the unintended consequences of ‘incentives for impact’ during two focus groups with

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country specialists (RQ4). Possibly the most significant finding of this research relates to the extent and pace of the unfolding impact agenda within higher education, or at least in relation to the analysis of political science, with 31 of the 33 cases analysed now having some form of impact-related research assessments, the vast majority of which were introduced within the last five years. As with other New Public Management (NPM) related reform agendas, the UK is recognized a ‘leader’ in the field but the research from British scholars also highlights what might be termed the ‘hidden politics of impact’ or the unintended consequences of this agenda (e.g. Chubb & Reed, 2018; Meagher & Martin, 2017; Smith & Stewart, 2017). In order to substantiate these arguments and to present the original data collected in the study this chapter is divided into four parts that mirror the core research questions outlined above. Covering such a broad scholarly agenda within the contours of a single research chapter has clearly demanded that we use a fairly broad brush as we work across a wide intellectual canvas. However, it is hoped that by exploring the emergence of the impact agenda within academe, particularly in relation to charting country profiles, this chapter will stimulate more scholarly interest on this topic, thereby filling-in the detail and achieving a more fine-grained understanding of ‘new public research’.

Theory The chapter is focussed upon mapping and understanding the emergence of ‘incentives for impact’ within higher education, in general, and as it relates to political science, in particular. The existing research base on this topic is relatively limited and particularly in relation to theorizing the emergence of the impact agenda within academe (i.e. RQ1, above). The central argument of this section is that the extensive literature on New Public Management (NPM), in terms of its (i) underpinning rationalities, (ii) institutional effects, and (iii) unintended consequences offers a valuable analytical framework through which to contextualize and understand the emergence of the impact agenda. The introduction of explicit assessments of ‘impact’, ‘relevance’ or ‘public value’ can be interpreted as representing the latest phase or fashion in NPM-theoretic reform initiatives as they relate to higher education. (How to study this phenomenon is the focus of Sect. “Methods”, evidence of its international spread and variations in

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implementation form the focus of Sect. “Empirics”, and indications of unintended consequences form the focus of Sect. “Consequences”.) And yet, even though the link between marketization of the higher education sector has been linked to impact agenda (Chubb & Watermeyer, 2016), the systematic exploration of the theoretical underpinnings of the moves towards impact was lacking. Hence, the main aim of this section is to demonstrate the linkage between impact and NPM and explain why it matters. Indeed, we would suggest that NPM has fueled the contemporary emphasis upon impact and relevance—as well as the broader marketization of universities and an increasing emphasis on the utilization of publicly funded research to support economic growth and productivity—to the extent that the term ‘New Public Research’ now captures many elements of the emergent new science paradigm. Although there is an extensive literature on the history, implementation and evolution of NPM in different countries and different policy areas there is very little literature on the history, evolution or roll-out of the impact agenda within higher education despite its clear links and synergies with managerialism. One way of illustrating this linkage is to reflect upon the core essence of NPM and then to identify its core themes or governing principles. Stripped-down to its core essence, NPM is concerned with a reform agenda based upon the utilization of private-sector tools, processes and institutions with the aim of increasing efficiency, effectiveness and value for money. Whether NPM ‘works’ is a contested issue (see Hood & Dixon, 2015; Sorin & Pollitt, 2015) but what is critical for the focus of this chapter is the manner in which it seeks to drive the ‘logic of the market’ into the public sphere. This ‘logic’, however, is applied not just through the introduction of specific reforms and ‘tools of governance’ but also through a process of ideational and discursive institutionalism whereby the political discourse surrounding a specific part of the state becomes recalibrated and, through this, redefined and redirected towards a quite different set of goals. Or, more commonly, political debates emerge due to the emergence of what Matthew Flinders (2010) has termed a ‘splintered logic’ due to the layering of new and potentially incompatible goals, values and expectations upon a set of pre-existing norms, assumptions and ambitions. Our argument here is that NPM provides a broader theoretical and analytical canvas through which it is possible to both locate and understand what might be termed ‘the politics of impact’ as it relates to higher education and the value of scholarship. We see the impact agenda very

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much as the latest wave of a broader NPM-derived reform agenda which has been unfolding for several decades. Therefore, the impact agenda could be viewed as an ‘offspring’ (Talib, 2003) as it entails focus on performance measurement, transparency, focus on return on investment and customer choice; and, as a result, tensions are likely to emerge (see Christopher & Leung, 2015) as traditional academic and disciplinary cultures either grate towards a slow alignment with corporate culture and the demands of managerialism or seek to broker a co-existence that allows the new external demands for evidence of ‘relevance’ to be satisfied while preserving a sense of intellectual autonomy and professional distance from the state. We therefore seek to capture the existence of this ‘splintered logic’ and the introduction of impact-related performance assessments on universities in the concept of ‘New Public Research’. (The ‘New’ in this sense is designed to reflect the need to demonstrate the non-academic ‘Public’ value or relevance of Research.) Identifying the emergence of NPR as a constituent element of a broader NPM agenda is valuable for at least three reasons that range from macro-political debates concerning power, control and democracy; through to micro-level elements of the audit regime. Without careful analysis and reflection these reasons appear almost meaningless but actually reflect a more subtle shift in control, point of emphasis or mode of political signaling. At the macro-political level, it is important to acknowledge the implicit political values that drive NPM. Couched within a lexicon that appears almost synonymous with neutral, rational, ‘common sense’ reforms—who could be against ‘increasing efficiency’?—there exists a highly political project that revolves around the vaunted superiority of the private sector and market-based relationships (see Hood, 1991). The introduction of new frameworks of ‘meta-governance’—or simply specific new tools of governance–need not simply be associated with a desire to increase economic efficiency. It may also be driven by a political desire to exert greater control over a professional constituency who are deemed for one reason or another to be either under-performing, over-protected or professionally threatening (or a combination of all three factors). This may involve doctors, teachers, civil servants or—as in this case—university professors. NPM is therefore associated with (re)asserting control

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by emphasizing ‘the shadow of hierarchy’ (Scharpf, 1997) in a democratic polity where a degree of accountability and control is deemed a legitimate expectation to place those in receipt of public money. The emergence of NPR—with ‘incentives for impact’ at the core—is therefore inevitably bound-up in debates about the appropriate relationship between the academy and the state and how this relationship is mediated through governance structures that are open to both amendment and contestation. If the macro-political debates introduce themes such as control, power, resource-dependency and co-option then the mid-range or meso-level issues add tone and texture to these issues through a return to the notion of ‘splintered logics’ and the potential tension between ideals, assumptions and expectations. As already mentioned, NPM injects ‘the logic of the market’ into the public sector and in relation to higher education. As the work of leading scholars such as Andrew McGettigan (2013), Rob Watts (2017) and Stefan Collini (2017) has illustrated, this creates tensions as established cultures and pre-existing relationships are expected to move into alignment. When it comes to demonstrating ‘impact’, ‘social relevance’ or ‘public value’ it is also possible to suggest that certain areas of scientific inquiry are more amenable to demonstrating a causal relationship between scholarly research and demonstrable impact than others. This is particularly true of STEM disciplines (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) where attachment to the ‘linear model’ still has a stronghold in both the funding schemes (Pielke, 2012) and scientists’ frames of reference (Roll-Hansen, 2017), despite being proved to be empirically inaccurate (Edgerton, 2004). The linear model assumes the development of innovation as a set of consecutive stages from basic research, through applied research, product development and diffusion (Hessels et al., 2009). Most of the social sciences, arts and humanities operate in a very different intellectual space in which making causal claims to demonstrable social impact is far more difficult and contestable (Davies et al., 2008; Weiss, 1977). How this tension or example of splintered logic (i.e. the assumption of linearity and direct causation set against the fuzzy reality of the social sciences’ relationship with society) can be accommodated will be examined in later sections. This points to the issue of commodification of knowledge, as NPR introduces (similarly to NPM—Pollitt and Talbott, 2004; Hooghe and Marks, 2003) division of scholarship into separate components which

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then become measured and governed. This division of research practice has important consequences for the economic valuation of research, research funding and income coming from the student fees. The critical point is that the introduction of ‘incentives for impact’ risks creating ‘disincentives-for-research-deemed-non-impactful’ irrespective of the innate scholarly value of that work (Chubb & Reed, 2018). Overall, we theorize the impact agenda as an introduction of NPM logic as applied to the socio-economic value of research. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the UK and Australia emerge as the leaders in this approach to research assessment and two countries in which research funding became explicitly linked to the value of research outside of academia (see Smith & Bandola-Gill, 2020; Williams & Grant, 2018). Box 2.1: The Evolution of Incentives for Impact in the United Kingdom, 1993–2021 (Source Bandola-Gill et al., 2021) In the UK, the first step towards the research impact agenda was taken in 1993 with the publication of the White Paper Realizing Our Potential. A Strategy for Science, Engineering and Technology. This outlined two main goals for British Science: (i) the value of science was to be made explicit; and (ii) the application of science was to be more explicitly pursued. This initial stage of making the benefits of science known to a wider field of potential ‘research users’ was followed by moves towards the formal assessment of impact-related achievements (e.g. goals, indicators, etc.). The Lambert Review of Business-University Collaboration of 2003 and the subsequent Science and Innovation Investment Framework (2004– 2014) established ‘knowledge transfer’ as one of the key areas governed by explicit targets. In response, the research councils that distributed funding through a semi-independent delivery structure published revised delivery plans and strategic documents to reflect this change in top-down governmental emphasis. A variety of impact-oriented funding initiatives and incentive projects were also launched. The third stage of the development of the research impact agenda in the UK entailed moving the responsibility for research impact directly onto the research councils, prompting them to introduce a more formalised and systematic approach to impact support. Increasing the economic impact of Research Councils (2007–generally known as the Warry Report), for example, recommended integrating ex ante impact assessments within the process for assessing grants applications. This led to the requirement to submit ‘Pathways to Impact’ statements alongside your scientific research statement, but in 2014 the ‘incentives for

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impact’ changed more substantially when the national five-year assessment of research quality (through which universities are ranked) was amended to include an explicit (ex post) impact component that would constitute 20% of the overall score for each unit. This component was assessed through the submission of ‘Impact Case Studies’, and in a further sign of the government’s commitment in this area the impact element was subsequently increased to 25% for the forthcoming Research Excellence Framework 2021.

As Sect. “Empirics” will illustrate, the shift towards what we term ‘NPR’ is rarely, if ever, associated with a singular research policy. More commonly, it finds its expression in a set of evolving, increasingly comprehensive guidelines, the gradual expansion of an initial set of measures that are subsequently expanded, like the positioning of wedges into cracks, to gradually impose an ever-greater and more explicit set of expectations. This can be demonstrated through a stage-based account of the content of Box 2.1: Stage 1 was high-level and revolved around the setting and elaboration of governmental priorities; Stage 2 saw these statements translated into specific targets with funding available to incentivize capacity building; Stage 3 shifted (ex ante) responsibility for impact-related targets down the policy chain to funding organizations and grant recipients; Stage 4 introduced an ex post impact assessment as part of the national review of research quality. Soft signaling in the early stages is therefore translated into hard regulatory governance requirements in the later stages. Even though we do not expect all of the countries to follow this four-stage process directly, the UK case study provides an example of a trajectory that may be of analytical value from a comparative perspective. This raises the question of how such a comparative analysis could be undertaken in order to not only descriptively map the cross-national emergence of ‘incentives for impact’ but also to explore the existence of any tensions, challenges of potential pathologies arising from this trend. This forms the focus of the next section.

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Methods The argument of the previous section was that in terms of theoretical frameworks the emergence of the impact agenda can be located within the existing body of scholarship on NPM. The concept of ‘New Public Research’ was therefore offered as a useful shorthand phrase through which to encapsulate the drivers and expectations that are embedded within the impact agenda. The aim of this chapter is to map the broad topography of this new paradigm in terms of the spread of the ‘impact agenda’ (Part III) and to drill down into this agenda through a disciplinary focus on political science in order to explore potential or emergent concerns regarding this agenda (Part IV). To achieve these aims, a six-step mixed-methods framework was adopted (see Table 2.1) with the support of European Cooperation in Science and Technology (COST) funding. We offer this framework as an efficient, rigorous, tested and replicable methodology through which to analyze the emergent ‘impact agenda’ (i.e. RQ2, above). The initial country survey was designed through a planning session that brought network members from partner countries together at the Katholieke University of Leuven in September 2017. The survey was designed around RQ3 and RQ4 (above) and subsequently distributed to scholars in each of the 38 within our COST network. Detailed responses were received from 33 countries. These were then developed and supplemented through country-specific desk research that analysed a range of websites, resources and documents (e.g. guidelines for applicants, assessment protocols, science policy documents, etc.). Taken together, the survey data plus the desk research facilitated the creation of country profiles, which then provided the units of analysis for subsequent comparative study. The collected documents (over 100 in total) and survey responses were thematically coded which facilitated the creation of a thematic matrix. What Steps 1 and 2 revealed was that: (i) the recent introduction of an ‘impact agenda’ could be identified in the vast majority of countries; (ii) the agenda seemed to be gaining policy momentum; and (iii) but it was possible to identify clear country specific variations in terms of depth, focus and pace. In order to look beyond and beneath these headline findings two focus groups consisting of the country representatives were convened in March and September 2018 (i.e. Steps 3 and 4, Table 2.1). Not only did this allow for the refinement of specific country

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Table 2.1 Methodological steps STEP

METHOD

WHEN

DETAIL

1

Desk Research

June 2017–March 2018

2

Country Survey+

September. 2017–March 2018

3

Focus Group I

March-18

4

Focus Group II

September-18

5

Expert Feedback

January 2019

Collection and analysis of over a 100 documents, including funding and peer-review guidelines, research funders’ strategies, websites Initially discussed and designed at network meeting held in Sept. 2017 at the Katholieke University, Leuven 38 European countries were surveyed Convened in Lisbon 14 Country specialists brought together to discuss survey results and implications. Qualitative data collected and coded Convened in Sarajevo 60 Country specialists brought together to discuss draft analysis paper. Qualitative data collected and coded Distribution of draft analysis followed by review and reflection phase

profiles but it also facilitated a broad discussion about the emergent and potential concerns or implications of this agenda for political science, in particular, and higher education, more broadly. The final step involved the circulation of a draft final report in January 2019 to all participating country specialists in order to: (i) confirm factual accuracy and capture any recent developments; (ii) outline the key concerns or emergent issues in order to (iii) assess those topics that may need further research or may even have been overlooked. The next section reviews the emergent data produced by this methodology in order to chart the emergence of the impact agenda from an international perspective (i.e. RQ3). The final section will then offer an initial discussion of some of the key issues that are being raised about this agenda (i.e. RQ4).

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Empirics The aim of this section is to provide an overview of the ‘impact agenda’ from a comparative perspective. The core findings can be summarized under the themes of spread, pace and genesis: 1. Spread: Expectations relating to the non-academic ‘impact’ of publicly funded research seems to be growing across European research funding systems. Out of 33 countries, 31 cases demonstrated the existence of at least some form of ‘incentive for impact’. 2. Pace: The findings also seem to point to an acceleration of the impact agenda in the last few years with new assessment processes either being implemented (e.g. Italy, Norway), planned (e.g. Sweden, Serbia) or existing processes augmented (e.g. the UK). 3. Genesis: The United Kingdom’s decision to introduce an explicit ‘impact’ component within their national assessment regime for the 2014 Research Excellence Framework appears to have had significant spill-over effects upon other countries (e.g. Norway, European Research Council). The overall finding of this study is that an increasing number of scholars are expected to provide formal accounts of the demonstrable nonacademic impact of their research. The impact agenda has emerged across higher education as a powerful new legitimating narrative with potentially far-reaching implications for scholarship but with relatively little external debate. The spread and depth of the impact agenda is illustrated in Table 2.2. Table 2.2 provides a very broad overview of the contemporary situation and therefore veils the existence of significant variations in relation to a number of variables. Therefore, in order to unpack the overview provided by Table 2.2 it is useful to utilize the data generated by this project to explore five sub-questions: SQ1. How is ‘impact’ defined? SQ2. What role does ‘impact’ play in relation to research grant applications? SQ3. What role does ‘impact’ play in relation to national assessments of research quality? SQ4. How is ‘impact’ weighted?

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Table 2.2 Different definitions of impact COUNTRY

DEFINITION

United Kingdom

In 2014—‘An effect on, change or benefit to the economy, society, culture, public policy or services, health, the environment or quality of life, beyond academia’ ‘Knowledge utilization is the process of making scientific knowledge suitable and available for use outside of the academic world and/or use within other scientific disciplines’ ‘An effect on, change or benefit to the economy, society, culture, public policy, or services, health, the environment or quality of life beyond academia’ ‘Openness to the socio-economic context through the exploitation and transfer of knowledge’ ‘Any effect or benefit to the economy, society, culture, public policy or services’ ‘Impact is generally defined as effects of the funding measures on the target groups i.e. the grantees themselves and their hosts. Four categories of impact are assessed: scientific impact; training impact; socio-economic impact; and personal impact’

The Netherlands

Norway

Italy European Research Council Luxembourg

Source Bandola-Gill, Flinders and Anderson, European Political Science, 2021

SQ5. What incentives and sanctions are attached to the ‘impact agenda’? SQ1. How is ‘impact’ defined? Impact—just as other concepts in science policy (Calvert, 2006; Pielke, 2012)—is a flexible concept, interpreted differently by diverse communities. It is represented by a set of principles, rather than a core definition (Bandola-Gill et al., 2021). Nevertheless, at a broad comparative level a significant amount of confusion and vagueness of the definition of impact reflects the lack of clarity regarding what ‘impact agenda’ is trying to achieve and how it can be assessed. Indeed, the setting of the definitional boundaries—and therefore how the quality of ‘impact’ is assessed—has itself proved the focus of wide-ranging debates as disciplines seek to ensure that dominant interpretations are broad and flexible enough to include a wide range of activities. These issues around defining impact

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unveiled the meanings inherently embedded in this form of assessing and incentivizing work towards social and economic benefits of science. One key finding that stands out in this context is the fact that the vast majority of countries reported that there was no singular, official definition of impact in their research funding systems, or reported a broadly accepted, yet not formally codified definition. Only eight cases reported a formally codified definition of impact, either in terms of definitions (examples presented in Table 2.3) or by specifying the effects of research in funding regulations (as was a case in Lithuania and Moldova). As we have argued elsewhere (Bandola-Gill et al., 2021) has been used interchangeably with ‘valorization’ (Belgium, France), ‘third mission of the universities’ (Italy, Belgium), ‘practicality’ (Latvia), ‘relevance of science’ (Serbia, Luxembourg), ‘knowledge exchange’ (Hungary) or ‘knowledge utilization’ (in the Netherlands), as a relationships with the ‘socio-economic environment’ (France), in terms of ‘engagement or partnerships’ with non-academic audiences (Poland, the Netherlands), or ‘outreach’ (Portugal). The definitional debates surrounding the non-academic ‘impact’ of publicly funded research demand further research and analysis. The analysis of the collected data points to the key quality which differentiates the impact agenda from other science policy initiatives. Even though there is no definitional unity across different approaches to impact, this approach to research assessment reflects a set of similar principles. Firstly, the existing definitions and their interpretations by academics point to the direct effects of academic research on socio-economic environment. This reflects the evolving understanding of the public role of science, which Table 2.3 Forms of assessment of impact HARD [Formalised and weighted]

SOFT [Discretionary use]

Spain, Turkey, The UK, Norway, Moldova, Ireland, Lithuania, The Netherlands (across some tools)

Finland, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Latvia, Germany, Denmark, Iceland, Poland, Luxembourg, Serbia, Macedonia, Belgium, France, Hungary, Greece, Croatia, Romania, Sweden, Portugal, Estonia, Slovakia, Italy, The Netherlands (across some tools)

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Elizabeth Popp Berman (2012) described as an evolution from framing science as a resource to seeing it as an engine of economic development. In the case of impact agenda, this transformation is clearly embedded in the existing systems of incentives to increase the responsiveness and availability of academic research to policymakers (see also Bandola-Gill et al., 2021). For example, it is reflected in the conceptualization of impact with reference to ‘benefit’ or change to different social realms (such as the economy, society or culture). This conceptualization has been adopted for example in the UK, Norway, Lithuania and the European Research Council. Secondly, these definitions are implicitly based on the assumption of increased ‘relevance’ of research which is to be achieved in collaboration with research users. This points to a key assumption regarding research impact (see in the UK context: Smith & Stewart, 2017)—that the implications of impact are positive. Strikingly, none of the existing formal or informal definitions of impact reported by the academics in this study accounted for the possibility of negative implications of research for policy and politics. Moreover, academics often have their own ideas about the legitimate role and boundaries of the impact agenda that may not be in complete alignment with the framework being imposed by funders, regulators or the government. This flows into a second argument concerning the risk of ‘conceptual stretching’—as opposed to ‘conceptual travelling’ (see Sartori, 1970)—if ‘impact’ becomes too broadly defined in order to capture each and every possible form of non-academic influence or interaction then it risks becoming almost meaningless. One response to this agenda—that explicitly builds upon Sartori’s responses to Gallie’s puzzle—has been to offer a demarcation between ‘impact’, ‘relevance’ and ‘engagement’ in order to demonstrate a degree of taxonomical breadth that can accommodate the potential role and strengths of different disciplines (see Flinders, 2013). This flows into a final definitional point that relates to evolution and drift. What the analysis of the UK reveals as a ‘critical’ or ‘extreme’ case of the evolution and ‘hardening’ of the impact agenda is the gradual broadening of the formal definition of impact away from a fairly tight, narrow, linear and STEM-inspired characterization towards a far broader understanding that could accommodate the more complex ways in which social science feeds into and influences the broader social milieu. More specifically, the definition of ‘impact’ in the UK initially entailed dominantly ‘economic impacts’, as emphasized in the Warry Report, but gradually

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broadened to include social, cultural, health and environmental impacts. This broadening was also reflected in assessment processes, which transformed from quantifiable indicators towards more descriptive formats such as case studies in REF. With these points in mind, it is necessary to look at how impact is being introduced within the governance of academe. SQ2. What role does ‘impact’ play in relation to research grant applications? In terms of how the impact agenda has come to influence the publicly funded research landscape, it is useful to distinguish between the specific and the systemic. The former relating to applications for project funding such as research grants or fellowships (let us call this Type I), the latter to national assessments of research quality at the institutional level (labelled for the purposes of this chapter as Type II), and often feeding into various rankings and league tables—the focus of the next sub-section. The most common strategy for incentivizing impact activities from a comparative perspective is through Type I mechanisms whereby the assessment criteria for funding grants and fellowships now includes some explicit statement of expected non-academic impacts. This format of projectbased Type I incentives was identified in 13 participating countries (and within European Research Council funding). The country profiles suggest that there are two main forms of Type I funding. There are what can be termed ‘integrated’ systems where major funding applications generally include some question about the expected non-academic social benefits of the proposed research or fellowship (e.g. UK, Norway, France, ERC’s Horizon 2020); and there are examples of ‘separated’ pathways where funders offer some opportunities solely on the basis of scientific excellence as well as separate resourcing options for the dissemination or application of scientific knowledge (e.g. Poland, Belgium, Ireland). If there was a general pattern or direction of drift to be identified out of this research, it would be the increasingly role of ‘impact’ related considerations within Type I funding decisions. Two insights flow out of this: first, the expectations placed on academics and even the definition of ‘scientific excellence’ appears to be broadening to place emphasis beyond a traditional knowledge-creation role (i.e. ‘scientific discovery’) and to incorporate an emphasis on the role of the scholar in knowledge brokerage, knowledge mobilization and knowledge translation. This

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flows into a second dimension of the impact agenda that is often referred to as ‘co-production’ (see Flinders et al., 2016), entailing engagement of potential non-academic research users in the initial research design and conception phase and then throughout the whole research process. This may also involve non-academic assessors within the research grant or fellowship assessment process that can also be the case in relation to broader Type II national evaluations of research quality. This is the focus of our next sub-section. SQ3. What role does ‘impact’ play in relation to national assessments of research quality? A second way that this research suggests that ‘impact’ is increasingly influencing academe is at a broader institutional level through its inclusion within national research audit and assessment frameworks. In Type II processes the ‘impact agenda’ has basically been ‘up-scaled’ and although the evolution of these processes is less developed than in relation to Type I processes it is still possible to identify a general drift or direction of travel towards the introduction of ‘incentives for impact’. These incentives can be direct in the form of financial rewards and penalties for performance or indirect in terms of providing a basis for claim-making and a proxy for research excellence that in a period of financial austerity can be incredibly valuable vis-à-vis attracting future students or underpinning persuasive research grant applications. The Type II processes therefore take the form of ex post evaluations of the ways in which publicly funded research has enjoyed some form of social impact beyond academe (i.e. ‘impact’, ‘relevance’, ‘knowledge exchange’). Impact has been introduced as an assessment criterion for broad Type II institutional funding in 12 countries. However, the emphasis placed upon this assessment of impact varies considerably. In Italy, for example, although impact is part of the audit regime it is not thought to actually be most decisive element of evaluations; in France the situation was thought to be only slightly different with ‘impact’ perceived to play a fairly minor element of evaluations. In the Netherlands the relevance of research and ‘productive interactions’ is an element of the Standard Evaluation Protocol that is conducted every six years. The results of the evaluation are not binding, but are meant to promote selfreflection. In Romania, a similar triennial evaluation requires academics

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to report on (inter alia) collaborations with other non-academic institutions, media engagement, etc. In other countries, by contrast, assessments of ‘impact’ play a larger and more formalized role in evaluations of research quality with potential implications in terms of finances, prestige, etc. The UK’s REF process represents the acme of this approach with Norway also adopting this model. Similarly, in Lithuania, the Research and Higher Education Monitoring and Analysis Centre (MOSTA) and the Lithuanian Research Council are two state institutions, which conduct the national research assessment exercises, including the performance in research impact. In Moldova, economic and social benefits of the research are an element of institutional reports to National Agency of Research and Development (NARD). Furthermore, a specialized institution of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Research of Republic of Moldova—the National Agency on the Assuring the Quality in Education and Research is assessing the scientific and non-academic impact of the research institutions on society. SQ4. How is ‘impact’ weighted? What the analysis of Type I and Type II impact assessments revealed was the existence of what might be termed ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ evaluative processes. In the former, some appraisal of non-academic impact is made but not necessarily tied to any explicit scoring or grading assessment— reviewers enjoy high levels of discretion in relation to whether to consider impact. In the latter, an explicit proportion of the marking criteria is formally assigned to an assessment of non-academic impact—reviewers are obliged to build an assessment of impact into their assessment of scientific quality. What this comparative project has revealed is a clear but relatively immature and embryonic international impact agenda within higher education with a small number of reform ‘leaders’ at the forefront followed by a large number of ‘followers’ (Table 2.2, above). What is interesting about the data arising from this project is that although the ‘impact agenda’ appears to have emerged in the vast majority of countries it is generally associated with ‘soft’ appraisal methods. Out of 33 cases examined in this project, eight cases reported a definite or ‘hard’ weighting of the impact element in funding or career development frameworks (summarized in Table 2.3). In the largest number of countries impact was raised as an issue but was perceived by academics to be a relatively minor element of assessment

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systems (with research income and publications, alongside teaching evaluations continuing to dominate). Moreover—and confirming a certain sense of opacity surrounding the impact agenda—the role that impact could play within Type I and Type II processes was often unclear with assessors given a significant amount of discretion. This approach was most explicitly stated in the Finnish guide for peer-reviews: When reviewing an application, the peer review panel may opt to comment on the application’s potential in terms of impact beyond academia. Impact beyond academia will not, however, be rated as a separate item. Impact beyond academia is one of the science policy objectives adopted by the Academy. The bodies responsible for making the funding decisions (e.g. the Academy’s research councils) may use the review panels’ remarks on impact in making the decision. (Academy of Finland, 2016)

But in many ways such an evolutionary process from initial soft-signaling through to the gradual elaboration and introduction of ‘hard’ audit or assessment methods would fit with the staged approach to policy design and implementation outlined in Fig. 2.1. Put slightly differently, an initial ‘rhetoric-reality gap’ is almost to be expected as politicians and policymakers seek to recalibrate the broader ideational and discursive context to the point at which the implementation of more direct control mechanisms can be framed as legitimate expectations. This is particularly true in a policy sector where practitioners (i.e. academics) have traditionally enjoyed high levels of professional autonomy from the state. This is an issue we will return to but pulling the initial findings from the four secondary questions that have been examined in this section together, it is possible to think in terms of a grid-group framework (Diagram 2.1). This would combine the Type I and Type II dimension with the distinction between discretionary and non-discretionary (i.e. ‘hard’ and ‘soft’) assessments in order to create a two-dimensional conceptual map based upon the impact-regimes discovered by this project. The consideration of four types of ‘impact agenda’ (i.e. HI, HII, SI, SII) type combined with the consideration of the progressive development of the various stages of impact agenda (the centrifugal logic indicated in Fig. 2.1) further highlights the directional emphasis or expected policy pathway towards a hardening or formalization of impact agendas. This is reflected in Table 2.2 in the case of Sweden and Serbia. In Sweden, currently using mostly discretionary forms of assessment

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Fig. 2.1 Spread and depth of scholarly impact assessment regimes, 2019

of the broader relevance of research, is planning to implement a new research assessment strategy accounting for social and economic benefits of science (Swedish Research Council, 2015). Similarly, Serbia plans a research funding system reform (Jari´c Dauenhauer & Tatalovi´c, 2019). Furthermore, as indicated in Fig. 2.1, not even one country reported a reverse direction—one that would entail minimizing the formality of impact measurements and incentives within the national funding systems.

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TYPE OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT

SCALE OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT Type I Type II [Project/Fellowship Funding] [National Assessments of Research Quality]

Hard [Formal element of assessment dedicated to impact score]

HI Spain, Turkey, Ireland, ERC

HII UK Norway, Moldova, Lithuania

Soft [Discretionary consideration]

SI Finland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal, Poland, Macedonia, Estonia, Belgium

SII The Netherlands (across some tools), Italy, Latvia, Hungary, Romania, Iceland, Slovakia, Greece, France

Diagram 2.1 Varieties of relevance regime

Indeed, what this comparative analysis has revealed is not just the emergence of ‘incentives for impact’ but the gradual formalization of a new set of professional expectations. The direction of policy travel is therefore downwards when viewed through the lens of Table 2.2 that reflects a progressive hardening of formerly discretionary rules and a movement of the impact agenda from the periphery of higher education policy very much towards the core (as originally occurred in relation to the REF in the UK). This leads us to a focus on the final theme of this section and the issue of incentives and sanctions. SQ5. What incentives and sanctions are attached to the ‘impact agenda’? Universities are generally large bureaucratic organizations that take time to respond to external stimuli and move into alignment with new expectations. One of the interesting elements of this research was therefore how universities in different countries—either individually or collectively— were beginning to respond to the creation of clear ‘incentives for impact’. The notion of impact has been institutionalized within the universities, for example in their missions (Germany, Norway, the UK), internal funding schemes (Romania, Belgium) or career promotion systems (see Table

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2.4). The clearest example here is Iceland where academics can receive financial incentives for impact and public engagement work. One point that could be made based on these data is that assessment of and incentives for impact across different countries were both ex ante (for project Table 2.4 Incentives for impact Individual (1)

Type II (2)

Type I (integrated assessment) (3)

Type I (Separate Impact Grants) (4)

x

x x

x x

x x

x

x

x

x

x x

x x

x

x x

Country Examples

UK Norway, Romania The Netherlands, Lithuania Latvia, Moldova, Iceland x Belgium Bulgaria, Montenegro, Croatia, Sweden, Serbia Italy, Slovakia, Greece Finland, Luxembourg, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkey, Portugal, Germany, France, Estonia, Hungary Spain x ERC, Ireland x Poland, Macedonia for example in terms of career benefits for

(1) Incentives on individual level, individual researchers (2) Impact as an element of national research evaluations/assessments, for example UK REF or Norway’s SAMEVAL (3) Assessment of grants include a specific impact or relevance element. Examples would include UK Pathways to Impact (4) Grants that are awarded specifically for impact related activities and not for primary research. Examples would include funding under the ‘Impact Acceleration Accounts’ in the UK or the more specific ESRC Knowledge Exchange Fellowships

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funding) and/or ex post (for block funding). The incentives for impact could be categorized into four groups: (i) appointment and promotion structures; (ii) Type II–style national-level evaluations; (iii) Type I-style grant applications requiring a ‘pathways to impact’ statement of some kind or (iv) impact-oriented knowledge utilization projects. The overview of these approaches is presented in Table 2.4. Although Table 2.4 provides a formal review of the current ‘incentives for impact’ it is interesting to note that the focus groups identified a strong ‘anticipatory effect’ among scholars in the sense that there was a general acceptance that: (i) the ‘impact agenda’ was very likely to intensify rather than to wane in the near future; (ii) this fearfulness about ‘the tyranny of relevance’ was a source of concern among most focus group participants irrespective of the specific ‘impact agenda’ in the represented country; and (iii) at the core of this concern was the fear that an incentive system might be created that possibly over-rewarded those scholars whose research was particularly amenable to impact claims (e.g. public policy, governance, public administration, etc.) while overpenalizing those whose sub-fields made ‘playing the impact game’ far harder (political theory, cultural studies, etc.). This brings the discussion to a brief review of some of the consequences of the ‘impact agenda’.

Consequences The main aim of this chapter has been to examine the degree to which the emergence of a potentially far-reaching ‘impact agenda’ within higher education—or what we term the emergence of ‘New Public Research’—is a particularly British phenomenon or part of a far broader international pattern. This has been achieved through a focus on political science and the results have been striking in the sense that it is possible to identify the emergence of an impact agenda in all but two of the thirty-three countries or scientific domains analyzed in this study. In some countries the analysis and measurement of impact has become formalized and linked to funding decisions; in other countries it remains little more than a rhetorical steer towards thinking about the social benefits of scholarship. But the general international pattern is clear: an increasing expectation that academics are able to account for the non-academic ‘value’ or ‘social benefit’ of their publicly funded research. The aim of this final section is to explore this core finding in terms of its implications for professionalization, autonomy and scholarship (i.e. RQ4) and in doing so it draws

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largely upon arguments and concerns expressed in the two focus groups of country specialists. Two issues deserve brief discussion. The first was a general consensus that the nature of academe was changing and that a new scientific paradigm seemed to be emerging with an emphasis on ‘relevance’ or ‘impact’ at its core. Three sub-debates add tone and texture to this realization. The first was a conceptual debate that sought to distinguish between these terms: ‘impact’ was deemed to be problematic as it brought with it an assumption of having a direct effect; ‘relevance’, by contrast, was seen more positively as being associated with contributing to policy discussions and public debates without having to over-claim. ‘Impact in combination with incentives for impact’ one participant noted ‘is actually something that we would consider really dangerous and threatening to political science’. Most political scientists were content with the assumption that their research should in some way be ‘relevant’ but not that it should necessarily have a direct ‘impact’. (Other country representatives made exactly the same point by suggesting that they favoured knowledge mobilization and knowledge transfer activities but could not be held responsible for ‘knowledge utilization’ or ‘knowledge take-up’—see also Bandola-Gill et al., 2021.) Interestingly, and a second sub-theme, is that several scholars noted that the ‘tyranny of relevance’ might actually serve as a corrective to dominant disciplinary assumptions about standards of scholarship. As one German political scientist noted: I come from an institution where we have a tradition of applied research and some of my colleagues say that they welcome the impact agenda…because there is still this idea that you have ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ research…there are the cowboys who do applied research versus the ‘real’ academics who stay away from it.

This flows into a third and final sub-theme about the emergence of a new paradigm: irrespective of the country in question most academics were generally, uncertain about the specific parameters of the impact agenda in terms of what was now required of them or whether their professional training had given them the necessary skills to fulfil the new agenda. One focus group member summed-up the general view by concluding: ‘To be honest, this is all something we have not learned, we’ve had no training whatsoever and we’re just muddling through’. If this raised some of the practical issues raised by the introduction of an ‘impact agenda’ then our

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second main issue of concern was more political and takes us back to the issue of New Public Management (Sect. “Theory”, above). Just as ‘new public management’ is generally interpreted as a neoliberal approach to the management of the state that is articulated within a language that is almost seeped in allusions of common sense and neutrality then so too was the notion of ‘new public research’ generally accepted as a useful shorthand phrase for interrogating what might be termed ‘the politics of impact’. ‘New public research’ might, from this perspective, be viewed as a neoliberal approach to the management of academe through the incentivisation of specific modes of behaviour. As one participant suggested, I think it’s a lot about [the question of] how do you control and manage the university sector? So in a way I would say that part of it is actually part of new management ideas. And that what happens more often now is that I think universities are seen as just one other government agency that have to be managed and evaluated.

A constant theme within the focus group discussions related to the potential narrowing of intellectual horizons as academics were, implicitly or explicitly, steered towards research projects that were deemed to have the highest chances of producing demonstrable ‘impact’. The creation of ‘disincentives-for-research-deemed-non-impactful’ was therefore adjudged as not only being real but existing to some extent even in those countries where the impact agenda was still relatively young and high levels of academic discretion still existed. This led to an open discussion about power and control within academe and who retained final decision-making powers. One participant, for example, placed great emphasis on the manner in which academics could in effect shield those sub-fields where impact might be thought to be more problematic. We all have to fill out the box, but the grant applications are judged within the disciplines, and the juries are all made up of scholars in your discipline. And we all know that this is a kind of theatre situation… if I were a political theorist going into the archives of an 18th century thinker, I would have to fill the box out, and I would probably make up something about the impact…[but] I know that it’s going to be judged by other political theorists in the jury who also know that they have to play the game to satisfy [the system]. So, there’s this kind of overlay and crustacean of performance that cascades down throughout, from the government to the

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funding agencies, down right into the application and the little box you have to fill up. But in practice it doesn’t end really forcing people to jump through too many hoops, except to fill the box.

And yet, as other participants pointed out, in many cases funding decisions are no longer being made by an applicant’s peers working within a specialist microcosm as it is increasingly common for academic assessment panels to be not only multi-disciplinary but also in some cases to include non-academic members to assess the ‘impact potential’ or ‘user need’ of applications. Panel members who were less invested in sub-field loyalties were thought unlikely to accept the ‘crustacean of performance’. Moreover, the emerging research from the consequences of the REF regime in the UK do suggest that individual academics and universities are altering their behaviour in terms of both publishing and recruitment (respectively) towards a new impact agenda (Bandola-Gill, 2019; Chubb & Reed, 2018; De Rijcke et al., 2016; HEFCE, 2016; Greenhalgh et al., 2015; Meagher & Martin, 2017; Smith & Stewart, 2017; Watermeyer, 2012). The argument is not that traditional scholarship is no longer possible but simply that there is a certain ‘squeezing of intellectual spaces’ (Smith, 2010) taking place as higher education attempts to respond to a potentially transformative set of external demands concerning the nature of publicly funded scholarship. This brings us to possibly the most striking and unexpected finding of this research: surprise among political scientists at how passive higher education, in general, and political science, in particular, had generally been to the emergence of an ‘impact agenda’ that was so obviously steeped in neoliberal values to the extent that it was increasingly interwoven with ambitions related to delivering increased efficiency and economic growth. There was almost a sense of frustration among focus group participants about the perceived failure of academe to recognize the risks of state co-option and control via the impact agenda. As a Swedish political scientist put it: I think we were surprised to see how many of our colleagues just don’t seem to realize what’s going on. From our point of view it has a lot to do with the academic freedom kind of idea, where we do think that academia in general, and political science specifically, needs to keep its freedom from being engineered by politicians and outsiders. So there is a debate going on. We’ve tried to encourage it even more but I’m kind of surprised how passive political scientists are about what’s happening with their own community.

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‘I think we have maybe a similar problem’ a Norwegian focus group participant suggested ‘In general people are passive. Now “new public management” has been on the agenda for thirty years or so…. So the generation that was really up in-arms against it…they’re now leaving. And the people who are left know nothing else than public management’. Even in the UK where the impact agenda is arguably most advanced within higher education the lack of any major debate or professional resistance is stark. That is not to say that scholars have not criticized the impact agenda or that pressure groups have not been formed—such as the Council for the Defence of British Universities—but in reality the gradual growth in the impact agenda has not been the focus of sustained, intense or collective critique. This passivity is arguably the most relevant finding of this study.

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CHAPTER 3

Towards a Tyranny of Politically Selected Relevance? Co-option Through State-Directed Research Funding Rainer Eisfeld

I At the very moment in political science’s post-WWII history, when calls for more publicly relevant research, informed by widely held citizens’ concerns, are on the increase within the discipline, governments and bureaucratic players have started exercising outside authority over the production of knowledge: By tying research funding to issues whose relevance is defined politically, policymakers and funding agencies have been introducing a coercive element. Through the ensuing co-option of academic researchers, the democratic process in one more policy area is being eroded—an awareness insufficiently driven home in the past. Scholarly selected relevance (SSR) in the above meaning of empowering citizens by connecting with the larger public may as yet matter to a mere minority among political scientists. (How to make SSR in that sense

R. Eisfeld (B) Cultural and Social Sciences, University of Osnabrück, Osnabrück, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Eisfeld and M. Flinders (eds.), Political Science in the Shadow of the State, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75918-6_3

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happen more broadly is a question to which I have devoted considerable space elsewhere; see Eisfeld, 2019.) Currently, existing SSR-informed efforts for reshuffling the discipline, however, run the very real risk of being constrained, if not displaced by politically selected relevance (PSR), effected through the funding-based co-option of academics. As a “measure” of PSR, the notion of impact has gained wide acceptance. The interfering trend in the governance of research programmes is, of course, affecting every discipline. But its effect may be considered particularly pronounced in the case of a research agenda as it is presently debated in political science. The following chapter will expand on this short summary.

II During the past two decades, political scientists have begun scrutinizing both their discipline’s condition and the state of democracy in their countries. This process has most visibly been evidenced by the reports of task forces appointed at the behest of successive APSA presidents— Robert Putnam, Theda Skocpol, Dianne Pinderhughes, Rodney Hero, John H. Aldrich, Margaret Levi. Those teams have submitted evidence and assessments on topics including • American Democracy in an Age of Rising Inequality, • Graduate Education (warning of “unduly parochial research”), • Political Science in the twenty-first Century (emphasizing present limits of the discipline’s relevance “to broader social and political discourse”), • Politics of Racial and Class Inequalities, • Communicating Political Science’s Public Value (concluding that the discipline had a great, but largely “untapped” potential to “improve lives”), finally • Political Violence and Terrorism. In their presidential addresses, consecutive APSA chairs—Elinor Ostrom, Robert Putnam again, Ira Katznelson—reproached the discipline for neglecting to inform citizens “of the actions they need to know and can undertake”. They challenged political scientists to reverse the discipline’s shift, emphasizing active involvement over passive analysis, urging them

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not to stay aloft but to help find the way “to a more decent politics and society under dangerous and difficult conditions” (details in: Eisfeld, 2019). Escalating income and wealth disparities translating into ever more grossly unequal political resources, racist prejudice polarizing societies, counter-terrorism strategies subverting civil liberties emerged from these messages as areas where severe democratic erosion is occurring. The activities of vested interests constraining climate change policies; the absence of robust regulatory policies for capitalism; the salience of gender-based violence should be added to the list (again, see Eisfeld, 2019). A political science community striving to address such “large” issues ahead of other topics and to offer normatively inspired—i.e. solutionoriented—public narratives requires an academically defined agenda of these, and possibly other, “large” themes. That such an agenda as a result of intramural authority over the production of knowledge would also need to involve efforts at reshuffling present research priorities and at redirecting financial resources at least deserves mention. The relevance, or SSR, of those topics should be understood as primarily structural, basic and long-term. That classification is not meant to imply that no valuable short-term (“rapid response”) research is or can be conducted under the SSR label. The categorization is rather used • firstly, to mark a significant contrast to PSR-inspired activities, particularly concerning those “large” themes which make up the agenda set forth above, • and secondly, to emphasize that research into issues of structural and abiding relevance calls for increased levels of what has been called protected space—a “shield” or “bulwark” defined in terms of time and resources controlled by academics for the pursuit of problems, without suffering career setbacks (Whitley et al., 2018: 112). It bears repeating that the final justification for such focused research by political scientists is provided by both the discipline’s and the society’s need to engage major issue areas of continuing democratic erosion. How could the discipline’s accountability to citizens for funding claims on the public purse be more impressively demonstrated than by according priority to SSR-grounded, peer-reviewed projects dealing with those pressing challenges to human rights, participatory democracy, economic

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opportunities and, in the last instance, individual fulfilment identified by APSA Task Forces and a host of other scholars? As British Academy President Sir Adam Roberts has summed up the issue: “I do not know of a single major problem that we face which does not require attention both from the physical sciences and from the social sciences and the humanities…The British Academy does need to establish itself better in the public mind as a body that can speak relevantly in a way that the public, not just the government, can understand” (Roberts, 2014: 66). However, transformation into entrepreneurial universities by neoliberal New Public Management (NPM) strategies in countries such as Australia, Canada, Germany, the UK and the US has implied both an increase in competition for resources and a decrease in academic self -governance, with governments and external stake-holders, such as industry, acquiring a stronger role. The term “entrepreneurial university” is not just a label devised for analytical purposes. In a 1999 policy statement, which will be taken up again below, Australia’s government demanded an “entrepreneurial approach” from the country’s universities, a “culture” even “of entrepreneurship” (Knowledge and Innovation, 1999: 5). In another instance, the Social Democratic government of Lower Saxony decreed three years later, when it proposed a new Universities Bill to that German state’s legislative assembly, that college executives should be obliged to steer their universities’ further development “by entrepreneurial action” (Niedersächsischer Landtag, 2001: 29). University research and knowledge production came to be viewed by political and business elites as strategic assets both nationally (industrial development strategies) and internationally (global competitiveness)— assets which “can and should be managed for policy purposes” (Demeritt, 2000: 314; Whitley, 2007: 3). In their search for legitimacy while pursuing these programmes and practices, policymakers—as unequivocally put by Michael Power—regularly “claim” to speak for citizens: Taxpayers and consumers are serving as NMP’s “mythical reference points” (Power, 1997: 44; emphasis added). The list of favoured fields under NPM-shaped approaches includes national defence (see, e.g. Vavakova, 1998: 220, Table II), public security, industrial and agricultural production, public health and public education. The relevance, or PSR, of these topics should be understood as

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predominantly agency-related, immediate and short-to-mid-term.1 With regard to both vindications and issue areas, the contrast to SSR-grounded programmes is stark and obvious (Demeritt, 2000: 312/313): The principal concern of recent science policy has been, not with broader questions of public legitimacy, but with increasing the…economic returns from scientific research… The precise nature of the public needs served by the new social contract is often unspecified or left so vague as to be unimpeachable…As a result, the campaign to make academic research more socially relevant and more publicly accountable risks becoming of a Trojan Horse for a set of unexamined political and economic commitments.

Resulting changes in funding arrangements have been judged nothing less than “dramatic” (Gläser & Velarde, 2018: 2). State co-option is sought by “testing” university funding applications for presumable benefits to politically identified fields. To quantify “performance” and “impact”, a regime of metrics has been introduced, with questionable results. As might be expected, there have been scholarly studies either “neutral” or supportive with regard to changed research (and funding) governance. The most conspicuous example, with fourteen editions published between 1994 and 2010, may well be The New Production of Knowledge (Gibbons et al., 2010): Critical issues of power, profit, authority and legitimacy were made to disappear in an assertive depiction of “Mode 2”—as contrasted with traditional “Mode 1”—knowledge production (ibid.: 2 7, 8, 15/16, 82) • emphasizing social accountability, “reflected in the setting of research priorities”, and with “sensitivity to the impact of the research built in from the start”; • stating that quality control unavoidably “reflects the broadening social composition of the review system” which has started to incorporate “social, economic or political” interests;

1 For instance, the British Academy found in 2008 that “a high proportion, often as

high as 60%, of departmental research budgets is being allocated to short-term projects to meet current political and administrative demands”. Departmental Chief Scientific Advisers in the UK Government interviewed on behalf of the Academy said that they spent 40– 60% of their research capacity on short-term and up to a further 20% on medium-term research (British Academy, 2008: X, 26, 32).

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• claiming new “challenges” for government policies vis-à-vis academic institutions, “particularly for the integration of education, science and technology and competition policy into a comprehensive innovation policy”; • favourably referring to the universities’ move “closer to a corporate system of management” with a “much tighter organizational framework” at the centre, whose “managerial energy” competes with the “academic energy” of departments and research groups. An early critical comment on the study predicted that the “amalgam” of academe, politics and business portrayed there offered itself “readily” to the imposition of “direction and details… by an authoritarian political force” (Shinn, 2002: 608). That is precisely what has been happening worldwide: The shadow of the state has increased in length and intensity, as will be demonstrated in the second part of this book. Entrepreneurial universities obligingly adapted in other ways. In the calculations of administrators, corporate executives and policymakers, formerly prestigious faculty were reduced to the status of “informational workers”—as profound a transformation as may be imagined (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997: 60). Faculty recruitment and tenure committees commenced to weigh “grant capture” as a marker of quality, hence a career prerequisite, even if significant research might have been done without recourse to public funds. And websites for academics started providing grant application-writing advice and dispensing counsel about how to deal with impact requirements such as a purported “national interest” (Yates, 2019).

III This section will trace the emergence of the conceptual pentagon that has come to prevail in the governance of academe, funding and research, identifying its five linchpins as (1) “marketized” entrepreneurial universities, (2) accountability, (3) impact, (4) politically selected relevance and (5) political control of funding eligibility. If this brief section were a separate study, “encroachment of the profit motive” into academe (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997: 9) would serve as a suitable title. The arrival of the entrepreneurial university, whose practices and rhetoric owe their rationale “mostly to the world of business administration, management schools and consultancies”, was classified by German

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sociologists Maasen and Weingart as nothing less than a cultural shift, “the end of the post-war ‘social contract’ between science and society”: Cognitive capture (a term used by Joseph Stiglitz to good effect) by the concepts of efficient managerial regimes and flexible managerial procedures took the place of trust in the competence of the academe’s “institutionalized self-regulating mechanisms” (Weingart & Maasen, 2007: 75/76). The emerging ‘new social contract’—provided one desires to call it that—is much narrower. Defined in terms of “customer–contractor relations”, it focuses on the generation of “immediate commercial and economic benefits”, values means over ends, displaces “substantive judgments”, and favours “powerful” (i.e. corporate) rather than broad political and economic interests (Demeritt, 2000: 309, 321, 324). The above observation that a “culture of mistrust” has evolved between governments and higher education institutions—corroborated for Germany by Schimank (2005: 369–372), the United States by Schmidtlein (2004: 268), for Australia by Robson (2008) and Vidovich and Currie (2011: 49, passim)—should be considered highly problematical from a political science point of view. The decline in trust and the ensuing establishment of external authority over the production of knowledge involve the disappearance of no small part of the universities’ role to generate social capital in the sense of civic engagement experiences and norms. Such disappearance chips away at the promotion of social confidence and social, if not political, participatory capabilities. Policymakers’ distrust in autonomous university governance, including research, may also heighten public suspicions about the integrity and proficiency of academics, directly counteracting political scientists’ attempts to act “as an aid, refiner, extender” of citizens’ inquiries (Lindblom, 1990: 257/258). Or has the tried and tested warhorse “trust” perhaps irrevocably bolted? And what might be the consequences for democratic attitudes and comportment? The advent of the entrepreneurial university coincided with a new political emphasis on assessing the performance of universities, with governments adopting evaluative techniques and, by applying financial pressure, making employment of these procedures mandatory: University research became “accountability driven” (Alexander, 2000: 413; Kelly, 2019). Accountability as a prerequisite for performance-based funding is, as must be understood, of the “coercive type” (Weingart & Maasen, 2007: 97): By linking the release of fiscal resources to the attainment of

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pre-established objectives, the political aim consists in “ensur[ing] compliance” (Power, 1997: 42)—in plain English, forcing academic institutions to become “more productive” in the desired sense, or pay the price of “financial penalties” (Alexander, 2000: 413, 419, 423; Vidovich & Currie, 2011: 48). As briefly indicated above, these practices have been informed by the strategies of regimes which have been mutating into “competition states” (Philip Cerny), perceiving themselves as players in a global marketplace and, consequently, rating university research as “a foundational component of economic growth” (Alexander, 2000: 427). But the procedures of “autocratic accountability” (Weingart & Maasen, 2007: 97) may even more fundamentally be grounded in what was diagnosed—most influentially by LSE’s Michael Power—as an “audit society”—averse to risk, averse to trust, bent on arrangements providing “visions of control and transparency which satisfy the self-image of managers, regulators and politicians” (Power, 1997: 143). Power’s social diagnosis has both been contradicted (see, e.g. Maltby, 2008) and adopted when discussing the evolution of research evaluation systems (see, e.g. Weingart & Maasen, 2007: 94–97). More research may come up with further empirical support (Power, 2000). Accountability, perceived as measuring performance in the sense of attaining set goals, increasingly came to be equated with a “fixation” on metrics, on rankings and ratings—a reliance on standardized quantitative over qualitative indicators. As social scientist and historian Jerry Muller reminded his readers when he wrote about the “tyranny” of metrics: Once such measurements are linked to offering rewards and administering penalties, “interests of power, money, and status” come into play. Monetary considerations are ranked paramount, resources diverted away from research and teaching towards data “management” and assessments “administration”—more often than not to the detriment of professional ethos, of responsibility vis-a-vis students and colleagues, of commitment to long-time projects. Articles in peer-reviewed journals, more typical of the natural sciences, are valued over wider- (and frequently deeper-) ranging book-length studies more representative of the humanities and social sciences (Muller, 2018: 3/4, 8/9, 78, 80, 86; for the observation regarding differing disciplinary “publication cultures”, cf. already Wilsdon et al., 2015: 51/52). Twice, there were collective responses to increasingly perceived deficiencies of the “metric tide” (Wilsdon et al., 2015). Editors and publishers

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of scholarly journals drew up the 2012 San Francisco Declaration on Research Assessment, inviting support from further signatories across the disciplines (by mid-2015, 12,300 individuals and over 570 institutions had responded; see Wilsdon et al., 2015: VIII). A group of academics led by Diana Hicks (USA) and Paul Wouters (Netherlands) followed three years later with the Leiden Manifesto for Research Metrics. Both statements coincided • in the urgency of their tone (“pressing need” for improving evaluations of research output—San Francisco; use of metric tools “not always well informed, often ill applied… without knowledge of good practice and interpretation”—Leiden), and • in their emphasis on recommending a combination of qualitative indicators, such as peer-assessed quality of content and scientific value, with supposedly “robust” quantitative data, regularly scrutinized and updated. The authors acknowledged once again that, due to “variations by discipline in publication practices” (keyword: books) and in the national or regional focus of research engagements, the social sciences and humanities may experience discrimination from the application of metrics built on English-language journals as “gatekeepers of high impact” (Leiden Manifesto, 2015: 430). Impact: The United Kingdom’s 2014 Research Excellence Framework (REF, 2014), initially undertaken by the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE), elevated the term to the rank of a new buzzword. Esteem by one’s peers, professional reputation won through research published in journals and books, presented at conferences, reviewed, cited or even awarded had long figured among major criteria of funding eligibility. Such esteem now morphed into “internal” impact. The new concern, however, was about “external” impact or, as LSE political scientist Patrick Dunleavy somewhat scathingly remarked, about constructing “fairytales of influence” showing that a particular researcher’s or department’s voice “somehow rose above the din to be uniquely or distinctively efficacious” (Dunleavy, 2012: 3). The Impact element included in REF 2014 asked for submissions that would be assessed according to (1) “reach” and (2) “significance” of any presumed effect (change or benefit) on “the economy, society, culture,

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public policy, public services, health, environment, or quality of life”. Twenty per cent of government research funding to universities were henceforth to be allocated on the basis of impact achievements (REF 2021 raised the amount to 25%). Unsuccessfully, 17,570 academics— some 3000 of them professors, including several Nobel laureates—had, by 2013, signed a petition to withdraw the funding conditionality, as it risked “undermining support for basic research across all disciplines” (UCU, 2013). In a valiant effort to arrive at a more sophisticated measurement of research impact in the humanities and social sciences (HSS), Canada’s federation for those disciplines—comprising universities, colleges and scholarly associations—issued a 50-page working paper during the year when the United Kingdom’s REF 2014 introduced impact assessments as a funding prerequisite. In advocating “multi-pronged evaluation frameworks” (Impacts, 2014: 10), the authors at first glance did not seem to have advanced substantially beyond the combination of qualitative and quantitative indicators recommended by the San Francisco Declaration two years earlier. But appearances can be deceptive. The Canadian study commenced (Impacts, 2014: 9) by introducing for HSS the same fundamental distinction made with regard to political science at this paper’s outset—presenting the relevant disciplines as capable of conducting, on the one hand, • “narrowly focused, intellectually inclined, and discipline-specific” research of doubtful relevance for ‘lay’ audiences, and on the other hand • “socially engaged, problem-focused, and cross-disciplinary” research, conscious of the needs of non-academic communities. From stressing that such wider public are increasingly calling for HSS disciplines to help resolve their difficulties, the document proceeded to list and discuss “baskets” of indicators that might be used to measure not just possible impacts on the economy and public policy, but services to society and culture, such as: a. the number and quality of cooperation arrangements with community groups that provide advice, support and mentoring for solving urban issues, (re-) introducing social capital: goodwill, reciprocity, trust;

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b. engagements with different audiences at public events, involving knowledge transfer, a raising of awareness for “large” issues affecting citizens; c. and the development of research-based public web resources, again offering manifold opportunities for collaboration, but also for review and feedback. Such an agenda would be highly compatible with the programme for a more publicly engaged political science, aimed at empowering citizens, which this chapter proposed earlier. Yet when the study’s authors tried to discover examples of existing indicators for “society and culture” impacts, results read mostly: “None yet found”. Suggested measurement tools for the fields of “economy” and “public policy” were much more tangible—such as commercialized research outputs (e.g. patents), consulting contracts, commissioned reports, invitations on expert committees. And while noting that techniques for evaluating external research impact required considerable further exploration and experimentation, the Canadian authors did not fail to identify “the ability to substantiate” such presumed impact as “key”—not “a” key, but “key”—to “preserving, protecting and increasing HSS research funding” (Impacts, 2014: 10). When, during 2008/2009, the United Kingdom’s Higher Education Funding Council (HEFCE) began discussing which criteria should be built into the aforementioned REF 2014, a “major” contribution by research “to economic prosperity [and] national wellbeing” had been put at the top of the list, after HM Treasury—the United Kingdom’s economic and finance ministry—had voiced its concern over achieving “greater rewards for user-focused research”. In reviewing developments which had led to introducing impact assessment in the REF, British social scientists Kate Williams and Jonathan Grant concluded (Williams & Grant, 2018: 13, 16) • that advocates as well as opponents recognized that the purpose was the “explicit steering of researchers, research units and universities”, • that this amounted to “re-defining what is meant by ‘research excellence’, which has vast implications for universities and researchers”, • and that in the run-up to the final REF 2014 version, “the political nature” of the mew approach had been “explicitly recognized”.

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As “public relevance” became “synonymous” with policymakers’ requirements at a specific moment —or, in the terms of this chapter’s preceding section, became agency-related and short-term—, supposed public needs were equated with the “demands of paying customers”, and accountability with “cost-effectiveness” (Demeritt, 2000: 313). An independent review of REF 2014 commissioned by the UK Minister for Science and the Universities acknowledged at least part of the narrowing down which had taken place. Its report recommended that impacts should not solely refer to issues of economy and governmental policy, but also include “public engagement and understanding”, cultural life, and teaching. The suggestion was, if not rejected, clearly played down by HEFCE in the run-up to REF 2021, when the agency justified the increase of financial support henceforth to be allocated on the basis of impact achievements from 20 to 25% by “the importance of REF-driven funding in supporting the industrial strategy” (Williams & Grant, 2018: 28, 30). British historical geographer David Demeritt concluded that the pressures exerted by such a funding environment would, particularly in the humanities and social sciences, tend to encourage “safe” (i.e. systemsupporting) at the expense of more critical research “that challenges the status quo or pushes the boundaries of conventional wisdom” (Demeritt, 2000: 320, 322). The thesis was corroborated for Australia by a series of interviews with academics and university managers, whose result read (Gläser & Laudel, 2007: 135, 147) As a result of [forced] adaptation, research [by most of the interviewed academics] is becoming less diverse, less fundamental, and less reliable. We did not observe moves towards ‘better’ research by addressing more fundamental problems and providing surprising solutions.

In Australia, performance-based research funding systems had first been targeted in the late 1990s, but discarded again due to a change in government. When those plans were drawn up, they had been informed by a political agenda which included (Knowledge and Innovation, 1999: 4/5): • making “more effective and visible” the impact of research on “national economic competitiveness… through closer links with industry” • developing an “entrepreneurial culture” of university research

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• introducing changes to the ways of funding research, including “greater participation of users in determining priorities for funding and performing research”. Pursued with renewed vigour, these policies were not merely translated into the 2018 Engagement and Impact (EI) Assessment, introduced with a view to creating “incentives for greater collaboration between universities and industry, as well as other research end-users”. Along with EI, a mandatory National Interest Test (NIT) was announced that would apply to future research grant applications. According to the Australian Research Council (ARC), applicants would need to explain, “in 100 to 150 words”, the extent to which their research would contribute “to Australia’s national interest through its potential to have economic, commercial, environmental, social or cultural benefits”. Only those applications “that meet the NIT definition and score highly in the competitive grants process” would be recommended for funding. In addition, academic peer reviewers assessing grant applications were explicitly advised by the ARC that it was not their role to determine “whether the application satisfies the National Interest Test” (ARC, 2018, 2020). Australia’s education minister announced the NIT only days after it had emerged that his predecessor had rejected (without public knowledge, let alone explanation) 11 peer-reviewed grant applications—all of them in the arts and humanities—submitted by the ARC. When a wave of criticism erupted, the current minister tried to allay widespread academic disapproval by ridiculing a particular application, whose title he misquoted, affirming that “most Australian taxpayers preferred their funding to be used for research other than… projects like ‘Post orientalist arts of the Strait of Gibraltar’.” The project proposer, Roger Benjamin, Professor of Art History at the University of Sydney, thereupon went public, stating in part (Benjamin, 2018): • The project title was actually: “Double Crossings: Post-Orientalist Arts at the Strait of Gibraltar” • ‘Double crossings’ referred to the back-and-forth movements of painters and photographers between Europe/Africa and Muslim/Christian cultures • The bulk of the grant money would have gone to young academics as substitute lecturers during teaching relief for the project director

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• It was, concluded Benjamin, “galling to have a minister strike down a recommendation made by half a dozen disciplinary experts and a full assessment committee. The peer review process is rigorous and should be defended absolutely”. Ian Donaldson, former English & Literature professor at the universities of Edinburgh, Cambridge and Australia’s National University (ANU) in Canberra, blasted the minister much more severely (“ARC Controversy”, 2018): To withhold an explanation – more astonishingly, to suppress all public knowledge of the veto—is to act not as an animator and inspirer of national research, but as a faceless bureaucrat might act in the service of a totalitarian state.

The affair was portrayed in some detail, as it touches at the heart of the issue discussed in these pages: Should political fiat have precedence over scholarly established relevance? Unsuccessfully, the Senate—the Australian Federal Parliament’s upper house—called on the government to remove the NIT, noting that “narrow political agendas should not be allowed to determine long-term research priorities ” (Parliament, 2018: 4406)—a distinction not unlike that drawn at the outset of this chapter. Viewed against that background, adoption of the NIT which made Australia’s principal research funding agency a “political censor”, as also alleged in the Senate (Ross, 2019), could not but sow increased distrust between government and academe. This became manifest when a Nobel Laureate in Medicine and Physiology, Peter Doherty, scathingly asked (Belot, 2018): Research has to be in the National Interest? What does that mean? If it’s not in the interest of the coal & gas industry, it’s not in the National Interest?

The spreading “culture of distrust” is, however, far from the only knotty issue raised by politically selected relevance (PSR) and political control of research funding eligibility. As I have written elsewhere (Eisfeld, 2019: 187–188), regime hybridization in Central-East European countries may indeed provide the extreme case of democratic backsliding. However, Western democracies have also been compromised by strong touches

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of liars’ rule poisoning informed political participation and eroding government accountability; by starkly rising disparities in economic and political resources; by deficiencies in public education identified as major determinants not just of inequality, but also of xenophobic prejudice. In other words, due to the negative impact of these trends, boundaries are becoming porous between democratic and hybrid, “competitive authoritarian” (Levitsky & Way, 2010: 4/5) regimes. Not least because of the coercive element involved in outside authority over knowledge production, policies of state-directed research funding are emerging as another addition to the catalogue of issue areas where such porousness is becoming manifest. The case of Hungary serves to illustrate the statement. Not only have constant repetitions by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s government (and by the ruling party Fidesz which Orbán also leads) of alleged national victimization by international players been fomenting a siege mentality and advancing a friend–enemy scenario. They have coincided with large-scale purposeful media buyouts, a determined political capture of justice, and a stigmatization of non-governmental organizations. Subsequently, the regime turned to tighten control over science. In 2017, Budapest’s Central European University (CEU), established by billionaire financier and “Open Society” philanthropist George Soros in 1991, became the obvious target of an amended Higher Education Act restricting the operation of foreign universities. To escape the imposition of state control or closure, CEU moved to Vienna two years later. In May 2018, a new Ministry for Innovation and Technology was set up and allocated, for research funding purposes, two-thirds of the EUR 130 mio. annual budget which had previously gone to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA). The next step followed a year later (see Hungarian Government, 2019; Index Website, 2019). In August 2019, the MTA was stripped of its fifteen research institutes, which were placed under the control of a new agency named ELKH (Eötvös Loránd Research Network). The assets of these institutes were transferred by the MTA without compensation. The Academy’s budget for 2020 was drastically reduced by over two thirds as against 2019, with the redistribution of finance benefitting the newly-established ELKH. Of the new agency’s 13-member governing board, six members will be nominated by MTA and six by the ministry, with the president “jointly” proposed by Academy and ministry. The board, which is then appointed by the prime minister, and on which research institutes are not represented, may—after evaluation—by simple majority decision close or

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reorganize existing institutes and create new ones. A National Science Policy Council, composed of “representatives from science and business”, will in future develop the general lines of Hungary’s research and development and innovation strategy. The government’s familiar arguments were “improved efficiency and effectiveness”, plus the sort of future research “that tangibly serves the Hungarian economy” and “Hungary’s competitiveness”. Fields of science “relating to the Hungarian people”—such as “music, literature, language and history”—would, according to the Minister for Innovation and Technology, have “a place” in the new institutional network. However, there might be “a need for optimization”. Sociology and political science were not mentioned. But in a 2018 interview, the Minister had accused MTA of, “in some cases”, moving “towards being politically active, and this is not their task.” Mathematician and MTA President Lászlo Lovácz had countered that social science research may generate “criticism concerning certain policies… This is different from politics” (Walker, 2019). The Minister was also not above maintaining that the reorganization was “reinforcing the freedom and independence of research.” That assertion was flatly contradicted (see Science Organizations in Germany, 2019) by Germany’s Alliance of Science Organizations, including—among others—the Leopoldina National Academy of the Sciences, the Council of Science and Humanities, and the German Research Association (DFG): The [Hungarian] academy’s autonomy does no longer include structural and budgetary sovereignty. Such constraints are not in keeping… with the principle of freedom in research and teaching.

The British Academy and the United Kingdom’s Royal Society, the Czech Academy of Sciences, the Polish Academy of Sciences, the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts, and a number of other institutions added their voices. The International Science Council, an NGO bringing together the natural and the social sciences issued a particularly dire warning (ICS, 2019): Not only do these [developments in the Hungarian science system] represent a threat to science freedom. They would also hamper scientific progress, innovation, and Hungary’s standing in the global scientific community. Scientific capability and human capital take many years to accumulate, but can be lost very quickly, and be difficult to replace.

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Unsurprisingly, this was to no avail. No discernible political pressure ensued. Quite the contrary: When protesting the government bill eviscerating the Academy, MTA President Lovácz with good reason referred to the danger that other governments, including those of European Union member states, might emulate the Hungarian example (MTA, 2019). Orbán and his cohorts had indeed been planning their steps carefully. Is not the ELKH Board largely made up of academics? Are not scholars represented on the National Science Policy Council? Has not the demand for incorporating policymakers and business elites “into the selection and monitoring processes of research funding agencies” (Whitley, 2007: 4) become increasingly widespread? Have not NPM slogans such as “improving performance”, “increasing efficiency”, “benefiting economic competitiveness” reverberated throughout Western research funding policies—not to mention Australia’s NIT? To some not so small degree, Western coercive accountability and impact strategies had preceded Hungary’s practices.

IV What follows is a more systematic reflection, based on the example of what is referred to in the United Kingdom as the Haldane Principle, • on the fundamental tension between academic research-funding autonomy (“Haldane”) and government-pushed investment in a “science-fueled” growth agenda, and • on ways that tension is being circumvented by the kind of government intervention that pretends not to do what it does in fact. When Sir Adam Roberts, President of the British Academy from 2009 to 2013, was asked about the case for the public funding of the social sciences and the humanities, he responded by singling out environmental politics. He stated that actions would, in some measure, be required from individuals and governments “that are not obviously in their short-term interests.” As there had to be “some notion of looking to the long-term and to the broader public interest”, Roberts added, the social science aspects of environmental issues were “the most challenging and difficult.” He added: “We need to be looking at them very hard” (Roberts, 2014: 66; emphasis added).

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The case for what in these pages has for short been labelled SSR, scholarly selected relevance, and against PSR, politically selected relevance, could hardly have been made more succinctly. Already in a 2008 report, the Academy had taken pains to emphasize that, on the one hand, policymakers were in dire need of “far-sighted” research from the social sciences and humanities, which meant “committing sufficient funding to long-term knowledge development”, while on the other hand short-term interests often worked against such an approach. Consequently, policymakers needed to be made aware that “increasing pressure” on academics and funding agencies to demonstrate the economic benefits of research projects might well result in “simplistic indicators” which, in turn, would “damage” the quality of research. The danger of such distortion was all the greater because studies had shown that policymakers also “want[ed] research findings that support existing ideologies and are uncontentious” (British Academy, 2008: XVII, X, XIII, 3, 27, 37). The context of the Academy’s message consisted in growing political support for the promotion of research in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics—the STEM subjects. In a report entitled “Putting Science and Engineering at the Heart of Government Policy”, the House of Commons Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee • refrained from applying an inclusive concept of “science” that would have covered both the natural and the social sciences, instead using an interpretation narrowed down to the former. Cultural, ethical, political issues raised by scientific advance were not mentioned. Moreover, • pronouncing the Haldane research funding principle, in the Committee Chair’s words, “dead and out of date”, the Committee recommended its abandonment. A different framework should henceforth support (a) regional development policies, (b) “mission driven” research designed to attain specific public policy goals, and (c) the “rationalization of detailed and strategic funding decisions” (Committee, 2009: 3, 48, 55; Newman, 2009). The House of Commons Committee’s chief argument was that the government, while paying lip service to the Haldane Principle, had in fact pursued a policy of “strategic[ally] influencing research funding streams”,

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situated “somewhere between… dictating detailed decisions” and setting an “over-arching strategy”: By providing that Research Councils were to “refocu[s] spending on new research priorities”, a concentration of funding had been achieved “into specific research areas”, which had been “known in advance by Government”. In an example of what these pages earlier termed the increasing porousness of boundaries between democratic and hybrid regimes, the UK government flatly refused to provide the Committee—not even on a confidential basis—with the budget allocation letters sent to every Research Council. The refusal was justifiably censured by the Committee as executive “contempt for Parliamentary scrutiny” (Committee, 2009: 43/44, 45/46). Finding itself unable to determine the extent of outside control— of, possibly, “inappropriate influence” —exerted over the Councils, the Committee opted for throwing the baby out with the bathwater—recommending, as it did, a shift from a principle which, in effect, was misused by the government as a smokescreen, to a different framework that would, supposedly, be “transparent and rigorous”. Both researchers and t he public, the Committee members insisted, had “a right to know” on what basis funding decisions were made (Committee, 2009: 46, 48). True enough—but how should a “transparent and rigorous” course be judged that, in the end, might throw scientific autonomy to the winds? The retreat from the Haldane Principle became more conspicuous by the publication of an article in which British science historian David Edgerton contended (Edgerton, 2009: 3–4, 5–6) • that Lord Haldane had, in his 1918 Report on the Machinery of Government, proposed something quite different from the “principle” latter attributed to him; • that the term “Haldane Principle” had rather been invented in 1964 by the Conservative Lord Hailsham for an arrangement where responsibility for research and development would be exercised neither by the government nor by autonomous investigators, but through “an independent council of industrialists, scientists and other eminent persons”; • and that, consequently, the Haldane Principle tended to “limit discussion to particular parts of a much more complex whole… governed by many institutions, and many policies.”

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Edgerton’s narrative was picked up by the House of Commons Committee, and Edgerton in turn declared himself “delighted” that the “myth of the Haldane Principle” had been challenged, which prevented— as he chose his words two years later—a “grown-up approach” to the setting of research policy (Jump, 2011; Newman, 2009). Allegedly “growing up” by playing down ‘Haldane’ seemed to serve as no more than a catchword for the kind of “reforms” whose commodification features have come to belie the term’s traditional progressive connotation. Because whatever the Haldane Principle’s precise origins, its significance for attempts “to beat off” government initiatives at prioritizing or even “micromanaging” research budgets (Mandler, 2011) had been evident. In an attempt to assuage critics and to stifle controversy, a revised version of the Haldane Principle was enshrined in law when 2017 legislation brought together Research Councils and HEFCE funding functions into a new agency labelled UK Research and Innovation (UKRI). The act in no uncertain terms spelled out the Secretary of State’s power to give the agency “directions about the allocation” of research grants. Even if decisions on individual research proposals—and here reference to a specific view of ‘Haldane’ was brought explicitly in—were “best” taken following an evaluation “such as a peer review process”, that assessment had to consider both “quality and likely impact ” (emphasis added). Introducing “Pathways to Impact” and an “Impact Summary” as mandatory components of grant applications, UKRI minced no words about “the robust strategy for maximizing the likelihood of impact opportunities” expected from researchers no less than “their own capacity” for taking advantage of these (UKRI, 2020): Applicants should actively consider how these [potential scientific, societal and economic] impacts can be maximized and developed in their proposal, and this will form part of the peer review and application process… Careful consideration of impact…is a condition of funding.

In early 2020, UKRI announced the removal of the requirement to submit an “Impact Summary” and a “Pathways to Impact” Plan as separate sections within grant applications, for impact by now had advanced to the rank of a “vital”, indeed a “core” consideration “throughout the grant application process”. New, more streamlined procedures would be worked out over the next year, reflecting—and here the narrative comes

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full circle—reflecting the “cultural change” wrought not least by the previous requirements. When the sociological diagnosis—presented at the preceding part’s outset—and the affirmation put forward by a major player coincide, the profound significance of the process in question may be considered proven: We are indeed facing a cultural shift.

V In its concluding part, this chapter will return to the proposed SSRbased political science agenda set forth in the first paragraphs of Sect. II, contrasting it with PSR on three counts. The first is competition for resources. More often than not, long-term relevance will imply long-term projects, at odds with policymakers’ shortterm return expectations. Earlier in the present chapter, the notion of “protected space” was introduced, relating to both duration and resources available for research project and depending not least on authority relations governing the grant funding system. In a situation of political authority over funding decisions, there is a strong likelihood that projects may be put at an a priori disadvantage which involve “major commitments of time and other resources” without contributing “directly to socio-economic objectives” (Whitley et al., 2018: 113). Even if funding is, of course, not the only relevant factor in this context, a comparative study has judged the “narrowing” of research goals and approaches “probable” to the extent that dependency on external state grants has been growing— making it “especially” difficult for researchers to pursue projects that “challenge mainstream beliefs and assessment criteria” (ibid.: 129). It would do well at this point to recall the preference of policymakers for uncontentious research findings, as well as equally observable moves by academics towards “less diverse” and “less fundamental” research, both referred to earlier in these pages. This leads to a second crucial issue. The SSR-based political science agenda focuses on citizens’, rather than on policymakers’, concerns. That focus may entail critique of—rather than hobnobbing with—political and business elites and distance from, rather than commitment to, prevailing politics. Such friction will be the more likely when it comes to research on, for example,

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• the political ramifications of escalating economic inequality (involving reduction of stark income, wealth and education disparities by tax reforms and other policy changes), • the morally absolutely unjustifiable burden placed on ordinary citizens by large-scale individual and corporate tax evasion via tax havens and extralegal enclaves (involving the enactment of policies constraining, rather than encouraging—as, for instance, British, Dutch, Swiss, several US states’ laws presently do—the offshore movement of corporate assets and earnings), or • the subversion of democratic values and institutions in the name of anti-terrorist security measures through intrusive blanket surveillance and broad police powers (involving substantial comparative research work into “soft power” approaches to combating terrorism, including efforts at de-radicalization), or even • the disastrous implications for democracies which human suffering due to aggravating environmental disruption may entail (involving a much greater presence of political science research in the fields of climate change adaptation and mitigation). Grant applications for pursuing research projects of that kind may not always sit well with policymakers able to use financial levers. Once again, an aversion to challenging the status quo may come into play. The third count is that culture of trust , or rather mistrust, which surfaced repeatedly in the present chapter. Any academically pursued “window of relevance” would be predicated on a measure of trust both among academics and between academics and the public. It would be in stark contrast to a “tyranny” of policy-ordained relevance feeding on policymakers’ lack of trust in academic autonomy, which may subsequently spread to the public, or which may “translate into deference” (Vidovich & Currie, 2011: 45) of researchers towards university managers, government and other bureaucratic players. The latter point deserves particular attention, implying as it does a dislike of risks, due to an awareness of political dependency, that fits in with the attitudes depicted above. And is deference not the final purpose of co-option by the state?

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• The ridicule poured by an Australian minister on a peer-approved arts project whose funding his predecessor had rejected without explanation, • and the accusation of a Hungarian minister, before stripping the Hungarian Academy of its research institutes, that the social sciences, in voicing criticism of government policies, had moved towards being “politically active”, which was “not their task”—these pronouncements testify to a difference of degree, not to a difference in kind. Rather than treating the cultural shift towards state-directed research funding with benign neglect, as has largely been the case, political science should finally start responding forcefully to the authoritarian implications of politically defined relevance criteria.

References Alexander, F. K. (2000). The changing face of accountability: Monitoring and assessing institutional performance in higher education. Journal of Higher Education, 71, 411–431. ARC [Australian Research Council]. (2018, November 27). Funding worldleading research. Media Release, https://www.arc.goc.au/new-publicati ons/media/media-releases/funding-world-leading-research. Accessed 31 Mar 2020. ARC [Australian Research Council]. (2020). Letter sent to assessors of grant applications. ARC Controversy, The. (2018, December). Australian Book Review, 407 . https://www.australianbookreview.com.au/abr-online/archive/2018/233december-2018-no-407/5217-the-arc-controversy. Accessed 1 Feb 2020. Belot, H. (2018, October 31). Nobel Prize Winner Peter Doherty criticizes national interest test on research funding. ABC News. https://www.abc. net.au/news/2018-10-31/nobel-prize-winner-criticises-research-funding-ove rhaul/10450504. Accessed 23 Jan 2020. Benjamin, R. (2018, October 31). I kicked a winning goal only to have the minister disallow it. Sydney Morning Herald. https://www.smh.com.au/ national/i-kicked-a-winning-goal-only-to-have-the-minister-disallow-it-201 81030-p50cw2.html. Accessed 2 Apr 2020. British Academy. (2008). Punching our weight: The humanities and social sciences in public policy making. The British Academy. https://www.thebritishac ademy.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Punching-our-weight-Wilson.pdf. Accessed 27 Jan 2020.

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Cerny, P. G. (1999). Globalization and the erosion of democracy. European Journal of Political Research, 36, 1–26. Committee. (2009, July 8). House of Commons Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee. Putting Science and Engineering at the Heart of Government Policy. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cms elect/cmdius/168/168i.pdf. Accessed 27 Jan 2020. Demeritt, D. (2000). The new social contract for science: Accountability, relevance and value in US and UK science and research policy. Antipode, 32, 308–329. Dunleavy, P. (2012, October 22). REF advice note 1: Understanding Hefce’s definition of impact. LSE Blogs. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/72502/1/blogs.lse. ac.uk-REF%20Advice%20Note%201%20Understanding%20Hefces%20definit ion%20of%20Impact.pdf. Accessed 22 Mar 2020. Edgerton, D. (2009, July). The ‘Haldane Principle’ and other invented traditions in science policy. History and Policy. http://www.historyandpolicy.org/ policy-papers/papers/the-haldane-principle-and-other-invented-traditions-inscience-policy. Accessed 26 Jan 2020. Eisfeld, R. (2019). Empowering citizens, engaging the public: Political science for the 21st century. Palgrave Macmillan. Gibbons, M., Limoges, C., & Nowotny, H., et al. (2010 [1994]). The new production of knowledge. Sage. Gläser, J., & Laudel, G. (2007). Evaluation without evaluators: The impact of funding formulae on Australian University Research. In R. Whitley & J. Gläser (Eds.), The changing governance of the sciences: The advent of research evaluation systems (pp. 127–151). Springer. Gläser, J., & Velarde, K. S. (2018). Changing funding arrangements and the production of scientific knowledge. Minerva, 56, 1–10. Hungarian Government. (2019). Ministry for Innovation and Technology: “The Reorganization of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences is Reinforcing the Freedom of Research”. https://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-for-innovationand-technology/news/the-reorganisation-of-the-hungarian-academy-of-sci ences-is-reinforcing-the-freedom-of-research. Accessed 12 Apr 2020. ICS. (2019, June 12). ICS president issues statement on academic freedom in Hungary. https://council.science/current/news/isc-president-issues-sta tement-on-academic-freedom-in-hungary/. Accessed 12 Apr 2020. Impacts. (2014, October). (Canadian) Federation for Humanities and Social Sciences. The Impacts of Humanities and Social Science Research (Working Paper). https://www.ideas-idees.ca/sites/default/files/2014-10-03-impactproject-draft-report-english-version-final2.pdf. Accessed 21 Mar 2020. Index Website. (2019). Hungarian academy of sciences stripped of its research network. https://index.hu/english/2019/07/02/hungarian_academy_of_s ciences_research_network_taken_away_academic_freedom_ministry_of_innova tion_and_technology/. Accessed 12 Apr 2020.

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Jump, P. (2011, June 23). Haldane myth prevents a ‘grown-up approach’ to setting of research policy. Times Higher Education. https://www.timeshigh ereducation.com/news/haldane-myth-prevents-a-grown-up-approach-to-set ting-of-research-policy/416585.ar-ticle. Accessed 26 Jan 2020. Kelly, W. (2019). The emerging impact landscape. The Research Whisperer. https://researchwhisperer.org/2019/05/21/the-emerging-impact-lan dscape/. Accessed 1 Feb 2020. Knowledge and Innovation. A Policy Statement on Research and Research Training by the Australian Minister for Education. (1999). https://web. archive.org/web/20070221195656/, http://www.dest.gov.au/archive/hig hered/whitepaper/report.pdf. Accessed 31 Mar 2020. Leiden Manifesto for Research Metrics. (2015, April 23). Nature, 520, 429–431. https://www.nature.com/news/polopoly_fs/1.17351!/menu/main/topCol umns/topLeftColumn/pdf/520429a.pdf. Accessed 21 Mar 2020. Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2010). Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the cold war. Cambridge University Press. Lindblom, C. E. (1990). Inquiry and change: The troubled attempt to understand and shape society. Yale University Press. Maltby, J. (2008). There is no such thing as audit society. Ephemera, 8, 388–398. Mandler, P. (2011, April 7). Wherefore Art Thou, Haldane? Times Higher Education. https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/wherefore-art-thou-hal dane-state-plans-for-humanities-research/415750.article. Accessed 26 Jan 2020. MTA. (2019, June 12). International press conference at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. https://mta.hu./english/international-press-conference. Accessed 19 June 2019. Muller, J. Z. (2018). The tyranny of metrics. Princeton University Press. Newman, M. (2009, July 23). Abandon ‘out-of-date’ Haldane principle on research priorities. Times Higher Education. https://www.timeshighereduc ation.com/news/abandon-out-of-date-haldane-principle-on-research-priori ties/407520.article. Accessed 27 Jan 2020. Niedersächsischer Landtag. (2001). 14. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 14/2541. https://www.nilas.niedersachsen.de/starweb/NILAS/servlet.starweb?path= NILAS/lisshfl.web&id=NILASWEBFASTLINK&search=(NEDF,HEDF=% 22HOCHSCHULGESETZ%22+AND+WP=14)+AND+NOT+%281SPER% 2CSPER%3D%3F%2A%29&format=WEBVORGLFL. Accessed 1 Feb 2020. Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia. (2018, December 4). Journals of the Senate, 135. https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/chamber/ journals/24074a8f-3220-46da-b8b1-d5f01831a8ff/toc_pdf/sen-jn.pdf;fil eType=application/pdf. Accessed 1 Feb 2020. Power, M. (1997). The audit society: Rituals of verification. Oxford University Press.

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Power, M. (2000). The audit society—Second thoughts. International Journal of Auditing, 4, 111–119. Research Excellence Framework (REF) - Key Facts. (2014). https://www.ref. ac.uk/2014/media/ref/content/pub/REF%20Brief%20Guide%202014.pdf. Accessed 22 Mar 2020. Roberts, A. (2014). Interview. British Academy Review, 23, 62–66. https://www. thebritishacademy.ac.uk/sites/default/files/BAR23-12-Roberts.pdf. Accessed 26 Jan 2020. Robson, A. (2008). G08 on removal of national governance protocols. https:// go8.edu.au/?option=com_content&task=view&id=176, quoted in Vidovich & Currie, op. cit., p. 50. Ross, J. (2019, March 4). New test makes Australian research boss a ‘political censor’. Times Higher Education. https://www.timeshighereducation.com/ cn/news/new-test-makes-australian-research-boss-political-censor. Accessed 1 Feb 2020. San Francisco Declaration on Research Assessment. (2012). https://sfdora.org/ read/. Accessed 9 Mar 2020. Schimank, U. (2005). ‘New public management’ and the academic profession: Reflections on the German situation. Minerva, 43, 361–376. Schmidtlein, F. A. (2004). Assumptions commonly underlying government assessment practices. Tertiary Education and Management, 10, 263–285. Science Organizations in Germany. (2019, February 19). Open letter to minister for innovation and technology László Palkovics. https://www.leopoldina.org/ uploads/tx_leopubli-cation/2019_02_19_Brief_an_ungarische_Regierung_ Leibniz_01.pdf. Accessed 12 Apr 2020. Shinn, T. (2002). The triple helix and the new production of knowledge: Prepackaged thinking on science and technology. Social Studies of Science, 32, 599–614. Slaughter, S., & Leslie, L. L. (1997). Academic capitalism: Politics, policies, and the entrepreneurial university. John Hopkins University Press. Stiglitz, J. E. (2012). The price of inequality. W. W. Norton. UCU [University and College Union, UK]. (2013). Statement opposing REF proposals. https://www.ucu.org.uk/REF/#statement. Accessed 28 Mar 2020. UKRI. (2020). Impact, innovation, and interdisciplinary expectations. https:// esrc.ukri.org/funding/guidance-for-applicants/impact-innovation-and-interd isciplinarity/. Accessed 6 May 2020. Vavakova, B. (1998). The new social contract between governments, universities and society: Has the old one failed? Minerva, 36, 209–228. Vidovich, L., & Currie, J. (2011). Governance and trust in higher education. Studies in Higher Education, 36, 43–56. Walker, S. (2019, June 13). Hungary eyes science research as latest target for state control. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2019/jun/13/hungary-eyes-science-research-as-latest-target-for-state-con trol. Accessed 3 July 2019.

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Weingart, P., & Maasen, S. (2007). Elite through rankings—The emergence of the enterprising university. In R. Whitley & J. Gläser (Eds.), The changing governance of the sciences: The advent of research evaluation systems (pp. 75– 99). Springer. Whitley, R. (2007). Changing governance of the public sciences. In R. Whitley & J. Gläser (Eds.), The changing governance of the sciences: The advent of research evaluation systems (pp. 3–27). Springer. Whitley, R., Gläser, J., & Laudel, G. (2018). The impact of changing funding and authority relationships on scientific innovations. Minerva, 56, 109–134. Williams, K., & Grant, J. (2018). A comparative review of how the policy and procedures to assess research impact evolved in Australia and the UK. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1810/273745/ Kate%20Williams%20-%20Research%20Evaluation.pdf?sequence=3. Accessed 26 Mar 2020. Wilsdon, J., et al. (2015). The metric tide: Report of the independent review of the role of metrics in research assessment and management. https://apo.org.au/ sites/default/files/resource-files/2015-07/apo-nid56066.pdf. Accessed 26 Mar 2020. Yates, L. (2019, July 18). Surf the tensions between your audiences. In L. Kamerlin & L. Yates et al. (Eds.), How to win a research grant. Times Higher Education. https://www.timeshighereducation.com/features/ how-win-research-grant. Accessed 1 Feb 2020.

PART II

Country Case Studies

CHAPTER 4

Research in a Racially Structured State: The Role of the US National Science Foundation Dianne M. Pinderhughes and Andrea Peña-Vasquez

Our exploration of this subject matter has led us to the understanding that the National Science Foundation’s Political Science research funding involves a complicated history. The volume’s editors’ interest in the health of democracy projects a strong and independent community of academic researchers. As Eisfeld and Flinders state in their opening chapters (Eisfeld & Flinders, Chapters 1 and 3), without open debate and scrutiny, shifts that are taking place in the research funding landscape may well hollow-out the capacity of the academe to fill its wider democratic responsivities to society. The increasing shadow of the state upon academe may well dull the glow of criticality and questioning that scholars are supposed to cast upon political institutions, political processes and politicians.

D. M. Pinderhughes (B) · A. Peña-Vasquez University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, USA e-mail: [email protected] A. Peña-Vasquez e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Eisfeld and M. Flinders (eds.), Political Science in the Shadow of the State, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75918-6_4

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The National Science Foundation is the most important source of funding for the social sciences within which political science is located. However, within that framework in the NSF, political science represents a relatively small proportion of the whole. This is not new information in the American context, and this chapter discusses the history of political science research funding within NSF. The chapter presents a brief history in the American context, which suggests that the challenges faced in European national academic funding regimes are somewhat distinct from those in the American environment. The editors seek a specific focus within the volume, and this chapter seeks to sustain that effort: Publicly funded research as distributed by the state, generally through arm’s-length funding bodies which exist at the intersection or within the hinterland between academe and politicians and their officials.

The chapter comprises two major sections. The first focuses on the issue of public control versus scientific governance, a tension that has existed since the NSF was established seventy years ago, and on the difficult life political science has experienced within the Foundation (including a brief institutional history of political science funding by the NSF). The second section places the creation of the NSF in the context of contemporary race and ethnic politics and subsequently discusses emerging support for a number of political science research projects on racial issues.

I NSF, the “Shadow of the State”, and Political Science Establishment of the NSF in the Post-World War II Context World War II largely created the conditions for the establishment of the National Science Foundation (Kevles, 1977). The wartime Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) had been set up in 1941 as a federal agency to coordinate scientific research for military use. At the time of its dissolution in 1947, there was no peacetime programme for the federal government to support scientific endeavours. The exact origins of the idea for a National Science Foundation have been attributed to Waldemar Kaempffeert, the science editor of The New York Times, Democratic Senator Harley M. Kilgore of West Virginia, and Vannevar Bush, the Director of the OSRD (Kevles, 1977; NSF, 1994).

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Kaempffeert griped about how science and technology were largely not meeting public needs, instead only fuelling advances in physics and chemistry incentivized by profits and military advantage. “OSRD exemplified how science could be properly mobilized for the purposes of war; why not do the same for the purposes of peace?” (Kevles, 1977: 7). Senator Kilgore shared his sentiments and in 1943 introduced the Science Mobilization Act that would establish an Office of Scientific and Technological Mobilization (OSTM) as a permanent independent federal agency (ibid.: 10). Concerned that scientific advancement would become subject to political control, various scientific organizations opposed the bill as did Vannevar Bush. Although Bush agreed with the need for government support of science, he and other scientific leaders felt that Kilgore’s planned agency would “shackle science to the state and stifle freedom in scientific research” (Wang, 1999: 27). In order to preserve “freedom of inquiry,” Bush proposed for academic and scientific institutions to maintain “internal control of policy, personnel, and … research” (Solovey, 2004: 395). He also objected to Kilgore’s proposed administration by a board that not only represented scientists, but other interest groups, including industry, labour, small business, and agriculture, as well as his plan for a geographic distribution of research funds (NSF, 1994). Bush believed that as a means to keep science free from political control, only scientists should lead the agency and that funding should be determined only by the scientific merit of the research proposals (NSF, 1994; Wang, 1999). President Franklin D. Roosevelt commissioned Bush’s influential report, Science: The Endless Frontier, in a letter sent on November 17, 1944 formally asking for his recommendations on how to continue the OSRD’s scientific achievements in peacetime. After Roosevelt’s death on April 12, 1945, the responsibility for framing the Foundation resided with his successor Harry S. Truman. On July 5, 1945, Bush delivered his report to President Truman in which he proposed the establishment of a “National Science Foundation” with five divisions: Medical Research, Natural Sciences, National Defense, Scientific Personnel and Education, and Publications and Scientific Collaboration (Bush, 1945). One of his main concerns was the adequate support of basic (or what is often termed “pure” or “discovery”) science, which according to him would falter if left to industry. According to Bush (1945), “industry is generally inhibited by preconceived goals, by its own clearly defined standards, and by the constant pressure of commercial

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necessity” (ibid.: 14). In contrast, “basic research is performed without the thought of practical ends” but is necessary for progress as it “provides the means of answering a large number of important practical problems” (ibid.: 13). There are two specific mentions of the social sciences in his report and one is to explain their lack of attention in the report. He explicitly stated, It is clear from President Roosevelt’s letter that in speaking of science that he had in mind the natural sciences, including biology and medicines, and I have so interpreted his questions. Progress in other fields, such as the social sciences and the humanities, is likewise important; but the program for science presented in my report warrants immediate attention.

The only other reference to the social sciences in Bush’s report is the following: It would be folly to set up a program under which research in the natural sciences and medicine was expanded at the cost of the social sciences, humanities, and other studies so essential to national well-being.

Nevertheless, the social sciences were not included as an integral part of the Foundation in either Bush’s proposed divisions or in the subsequent bill introduced by Senator Warren Magnuson. Instead, the bill included “a clause referring to the ‘other sciences’ [which] indicated that the new agency could support them” (Solovey, 2004: 393); in other words, support for the social sciences was permitted but not required. And thus, the initial conceptualization of the Foundation was one in which the social sciences, and political science, resided in the organizational background. Bush arranged with Senator Magnuson to introduce a bill that incorporated his ideas on the same day the report was released by the White House (NSF, 1994). In response, Kilgore introduced his own bill proposing an alternative organizational structure and functioning for the prospective National Science Foundation. Wang (1999) describes three basic differences between the Kilgore and Magnuson bills that illustrate the divergent views on the proper involvement of the government in science policy. She claims that these distinctions “spelled out the fundamental differences between Kilgore’s inclination to create a governmental system for science amenable to democratic access and Bush’s desire to insulate science from political influence” (ibid.: 28–29):

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1. Kilgore sought to ensure public access to science policy by having representatives from the federal agencies as well as members of the public sit on the board while Bush preferred to only include scientists, chosen “solely on the basis of their demonstrated interest in, and capacity to promote, the purposes of the Foundation.” 2. Kilgore’s bill provided great detail on the ways in which the NSF could coordinate federal research and assist government agencies in their research and development. On the other hand, Magnuson’s bill would allow the Foundation to largely formulate its own scientific priorities and policy. 3. The Kilgore bill included provisions on patents, namely government ownership and licensing of patents derived from federally funded research while the Magnuson bill made no mention of patents or patent reform. One other key difference between the bills relates to the inclusion of social science. Kilgore’s amended bill later included a division for the social sciences within the NSF while the Magnuson bill did not. The Magnuson bill had been designed in close consultation with Bush, who had been opposed to centralizing tendencies of the New Deal and “found the extensive involvement of social scientists in a wide array of New Deal agencies and programs troubling” (Solovey, 2019: 25). Although the social sciences had been primarily funded by private foundations, the Great Depression demonstrated that these could not always be expected to shoulder a majority of the funding (Solovey, 2004). As a result, the federal government and its proposed science agency were viewed as a necessary source of financial support for the social sciences (ibid.). During legislative hearings held in 1945, a day was set aside for social science representatives to state their case (Solovey, 2004). The Social Science Research Council (SSRC), organized testimonies from leading figures in economics, sociology, psychology and political science, all of whom stressed the scientific nature of their disciplines in an effort to effectively “ride the coattails” of natural scientists into the National Science Foundation (Solovey, 2004). In the summer of 1947, after numerous debates, a compromise bill was finally drafted and passed through both chambers of Congress but immediately vetoed by the President (Bronk, 1975). Truman vetoed the bill because it didn’t allow the President to appoint the Director of the agency (NSF, 1994). He argued that there would be no mechanism for

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public accountability if the Director could not be held responsible by the President for proper administration (Bronk, 1975). Congress and the President were finally able to come to an agreement in March 1950, passing and signing Public Law 81-507, which established the National Science Foundation with a Board of 24 presidential appointees and a Director appointed by the President after consultation with the Board (ibid.: 2840). Thus, the issues of the “shadow of the state” were decisively incorporated into the organizational framework and governance of the National Science Foundation. The legislation specified that the National Science Board (NSB) was composed as follows: “NSB Members are drawn from industry and universities and represent a variety of science and engineering disciplines and geographic areas”. The inaugural Board of the NSF was selected exclusively from the scientific community but with political, geographical, religious and racial diversity in mind (ibid.: 2841). Especially notable for its time, the Board included two white women, Dr. Sophie B. Aberle and Dr. Gerty T. Cori, as well as two African American men, Dr. John W. Davis and Dr. Robert P. Barnes.1 This unusual pattern has continued in the Foundation’s leadership with African Americans John Slaughter (1980–1982), Walter Massey (1991–1993), both physicists, serving as Directors and Cora Marrett (2010, 2013–2014), a sociologist, as Acting Director. In addition to Marrett, two other women directed the Foundation. Rita Colwell, a microbiologist, and France Cordova, an astrophysicist, directed the Foundation from 1998–2008 and 2014–2020, respectively. Although the inclusion of the social sciences had also been a contentious topic of debate, it was ultimately not resolved in the final bill. Research in the social sciences could be included under the umbrella of “other sciences”. However, as NSF historian George T. Mazuzan noted in The National Science Foundation: A Brief History, this term “gave them second-rate status compared to the mathematical, physical, biological, medical, and engineering sciences that were specifically mentioned in the statute” (NSF, 1994: 3). NSF’s Social Science Research Program was established in 1957 with the task of providing support to anthropology, economics, sociology, and history and philosophy of science. Political science began to receive support from the NSF in 1965, several years after

1 http://www.nsf/gov/about/history/nsf50/nsf8816.jsp.

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the social sciences had been strengthened institutionally with the creation of the Division of Social Sciences.2 Despite providing the social sciences with only tenuous institutional support, federal funds available to social scientists increased sevenfold, from 40m to approximately 300m in the decade from 1958 to 1968 alone (Riecken, 1971). As of 2020–2021, the NSF boasts an annual budget of $8.3 billion and grants approximately 12,000 new awards each year. However, although the NSF comprises 62% of the total federal support for academic basic research in the social, behavioural, and economic sciences, only about 4% of the NSF budget ($250.69 million) was allocated towards the Directorate for Social, Behavioral, and Economic Sciences (SBES) in 2018, incorporating programmes funding political science projects. About $10 million has been budgeted for Political Science in recent years (Matthews, 2014). In contrast, almost a quarter of the total NSF budget—23.5% or $1.5 billion—was assigned to the Directorate for Mathematical and Physical Sciences (see Diagram 4.1). From the outset, the social sciences have been structurally disadvantaged, constrained and financially subordinated in terms of institutional positioning and funding. American Political Science Before the National Science Foundation Prior to the establishment of the NSF in 1950 and its eventual inclusion in 1965, political science in the United States had developed primarily with the financial support of universities, public and private, and also private foundations. The Social Science Research Council (SSRC), founded in 1924, was extremely influential in its development and professionalization, primarily using funds from private foundations such as the Rockefeller philanthropies (Solovey, 2004). Other sources of support included the Center for the Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences

2 Other federal sources of support for SBE type research include the Department of Justice, the Department of Education, and the Department of Health and Human Services, however the NSF provides a clear majority of the funding despite only allocating 4% of its budget to the SBE. The SBE is the 3rd least funded of the NSF directorates and offices, the first being the U.S. Artic Research Commission (1.43 million) and the second is the Office of International Science and Engineering (48.98 million). https://www.soc ialsciencespace.com/2016/01/timeline-of-us-government-and-socialbehavioral-science/.

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Diagram 4.1 Trends in the National Science Foundation budget, 1998–2014 (Source Business & Management INK, 2014, Social Science Space)

(CASBS), the Commission on Behavioral and Social Science and Education (CBASSE), the Ford Foundation, and the Russell Sage Foundation (RSF) (Alpert, 1954). The American Political Science Association (APSA) has also historically played a major role in the development of the discipline in the United States. Originally established in 1903, the association now boasts of more than 11,000 members in more than 100 countries. At the time of its first meeting, political science had not yet completely distinguished itself from the disciplines of history and economics; for some years they met simultaneously. Adcock (2003) discusses the gradual demarcation between the fields, which were greatly influenced by the German historical school. At APSA’s first meeting, President Frank J. Goodnow defined the field of political science as “the science which treats of the organization known as the State” (37). He further elaborated: “The State, as an object of scientific study, will be considered from the point of view of the various operations necessary to the realization of the State will” (Goodnow, 1903: 37). This emphasis on the scientific nature of the discipline would later be echoed in the efforts of social scientists allying themselves with physical scientists in seeking federal funding (Solovey,

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2004). As a consequence, positivistic political science research has tended to receive more favourable attention while theory has been largely sidelined in the discipline (Gunnell, 1993). Incidentally, the NSF’s founding coincided with the “behavioral revolution that came to dominate American political science during the 1950s” (Riecken, 1971) and remains a powerful force today. Adcock’s (2007: 187) examination of this era argues that: Behavioralism inherited its topical focus on subjects that are not formally part of the government structure - such as political parties, public opinion, and interest groups - and it sought to extend attention to such topics within comparative studies, where it was less developed than in the study of American politics. (Adcock 2007: 187)

But since the NSF was not elevating social science either in its organizational or in its funding priorities, it was not a driver of significant changes in methodological or intellectual focus within political science. Instead, the private sector played a key role in supporting innovation. Not least in 1949 when it underpinned the establishment of the Committee on Political Behavior within the Social Science Research Council, supporting funding for the pioneering Election Studies begun at the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan (Burns, 2006: 9). These ‘new’ topics introduced within behaviouralism, specifically political, allowed for guaranteed careful review and criticism of such work from elected political representatives. The connections between the likely study of such subjects and the reactions of politicians to these projects generated continuing sensitivity within the Foundation about its ability to protect and stabilize its budgetary interests. Although the NSF finally became amenable to funding research in the social sciences, it was subject to strict political controls and therefore discouraged politically controversial topics of study. In a 1958 report to the National Science Board, NSF Social Science Program Director Harry Alpert stated (as quoted in Larsen, 1985): The Foundation has demonstrated clearly its success in defining its social program so as to omit such controversial areas … We have identified such regions as sex, religion, race and politics as fields which might be more appropriately supported by private foundations or by governmental agencies with applied social science missions. It would be the intention of the NSF not to support research in sensitive, controversial fields no matter how significant such research may be.

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In the same vein, NSF Director Leland J. Haworth acknowledged in a statement published in the American Political Science Review regarding NSF support for the field that “some research topics that may interest social scientists are not given research support by the National Science Foundation” (Haworth, 1964: 1087). In fact, political scientists were warned that research evaluating “the merits of competing ideologies, political parties, interest groups, and other organizations [were] inappropriate for submission to the Foundation” (ibid.). According to Riecken (1971), “this reluctance was motivated by a sense that government agencies risked their impartiality in supporting such research” (108). Regardless of the reason, this reluctance was apparent in both the strict guidelines that undoubtedly limited the number of applications from political science as well as the “critically small amount of support” political science received in 1967 and continues to receive in comparison to the other social sciences half a century later (Harris, 1967, Kopko et al., 2016). This legacy remains consequential as evidenced by Garcia’s (2017) meta-analysis of social science surveys regarding race. His analysis included 257 studies published between 1960 and 2012 and he found that the NSF had funded only 5.5% of the studies. The Establishment of the Social, Behavioural and Economic Directorate (SBES) and Political Science Funding Within the discipline, the average political scientist was often the tutor of large numbers of students who become lawyers and public officials and therefore understandably assumed the discipline to be of considerable importance in general, and to the nation specifically. That view is not shared within Congress or the domains of federal research funding. While significant funds are available for competition for individual grants, the character and size of funds available is not at all comparable to those available for the mathematical, physical, biological, medical and engineering sciences specified in the original legislation. As has already been described, the social sciences in general and political science even more specifically were permitted but not required, or even held “second-rate status”, as defined within NSF’s timeline. Tracking political science within NSF is somewhat difficult because it’s been located out of sight for much of the Foundation’s history, partly because of lack of legislative support, and also because of the ambivalent views many legislators have for the work of social and especially political scientists.

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The founding of NSF in 1950 was followed in 1955 by placing “the sociophysical sciences, including “mathematical social science, human geography, economic engineering, statistical design, and the history, philosophy and sociology of science in the mathematical, physical and engineering sciences division” (Social Science Space, 2016). In 1957 the NSF created the Social Science Research Program, with the components of anthropology, economics, sociology, history and philosophy of science. In 1958 the Foundation created the Division of Social Sciences, with a budget of $750,000, and “more than half of that slated for anthropology” (Social Science Space, 2016). It was not until 1962 that political science achieved explicit incorporation within NSF. Anthropology and Psychology became the Division of Behavioral Sciences with economics, political science and sociology included, although political science research budget support only began in 1965. Senators Fred Harris and Walter Mondale proposed the creation of a separate National Foundation for the Social Sciences, but the effort failed; and there was considerable opposition from a variety of sources, including famed political scientist/economist/cognitive psychologist (later Nobel Laureate) Herbert Simon and representatives from a number of fields that were excluded in the initial proposal.3 Most participants assumed the creation of a separate Social Science Foundation would seriously weaken both bodies. In 1975, the NSF was reorganized into seven directorates. “Social and behavioral science [was] lumped into a Directorate of Biological, Behavioral and Social Science” (Social Science Space, 2016). After years of effort and discussion, with a task force created in 1989 to consider dividing biology and behaviour, the task force’s 1991 report created “two new directorates, one for biology and one for social, economic and psychological sciences” (ibid.). This became the Directorate of Social, Behavioral and Economic Sciences (SBES), within which political science programmes were located. The SBES, and political science, in particular, have been subject to a number of attacks both from politicians and from scholars in the natural and physical sciences who question their scientific credibility and relevance. Solovey (2019) describes the generalized distrust of social science as taking two forms, which rested on two different sources of doubt:

3 Howard Silver, Interview, December 14, 2020.

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epistemological distrust and social distrust. The former “stemmed from doubts about the scientific status of the social sciences” while the latter “involved worries about the social relevance and policy uses of the social sciences” (209). In the early days of legislative hearings leading to the NSF’s creation, Republican senator, Thomas C. Hart declared: “No agreement has been reached with reference to what social science really means. It may include philosophy, anthropology, all the racial questions, all kinds of economics, including political economics, literature, perhaps religion, and various kinds of ideology” (Solovey, 2004: 408). This sentiment was also shared by natural and physical scientists, many of whom viewed “the social part of social inquiry as less than scientific” (Solovey, 2004). The greater inaccessibility of the natural and physical sciences made them a more difficult target for political attacks from “budget hawks” than the social sciences. According to Miller (2002), “everyone, whether within or outside the political system, felt qualified to evaluate the work of social scientists. In the 1970s, a number of congressmen began to include examples of unnecessary or unwise government expenditures in their budget speeches. Increasingly, these examples involved governmentsponsored research in the social sciences” (4). As Miller (2002: 4) further explains, Denouncing a NSF grant for the study of religion among the Sherpas of the Himalayas, for instance, provided an effective means of attacking the budget of a science agency without having to display one’s ignorance about physics or chemistry. It was also an attack that stimulated no retaliation. There was no political price to be paid in belittling social science research, and there were clear political benefits to be gained from constituents who enjoyed hearing about government mismanagement. These constituents, however, were uneasy or uninterested in any discussion involving attacks on research in the physical sciences, considering the difficult, often inaccessible nature of the material.

Consequently, congressional attacks on the funding of social science research increased during the 1970s and were sustained by the Reagan administration in the following decade. This resulted in greater efforts by social scientists to defend their disciplines from their political attackers.

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The Consortium of Social Science Associations (COSSA) began in the late 1960s as an informal group of social science associations that met to exchange information and discuss common problems. In 1981, the disciplinary associations, responding to disproportionately large budget cuts to the social and behavioral sciences at the National Science Foundation (NSF) proposed by the Reagan Administration, used the informal COSSA collaboration to establish a Washington-based advocacy effort.

Later, Congressional Republicans including Senators John Kasich of Ohio in 1995 and Kay Bailey Hutchison of Texas in 2006 began to push increasingly stronger critiques of the social sciences. Senator Tom Coburn of Oklahoma attempted but failed to prohibit NSF from funding political science research in 2009, later joined by Rep. Jeff Flake of Arizona. Coburn stated that the “field has little, if anything, to do with science” (Social Science Space, 2016). Coburn even had little regard for the most technical and quantitative aspects of the discipline, diminishing the field of public opinion: Americans who have an interest in electoral politics can turn to CNN, FOX News, MSNBC, the print media, and a seemingly endless number of political commentators on the internet who pour [sic] over this data and provide a myriad of viewpoints to answer the same questions. There is no shortage of data or analysis in this field that would require the government to provide funding for additional analysis.

In the most serious challenge to political science funding, Senator Coburn in 2013 successfully proposed a legislative amendment to NSF political science projects, requiring them to “promote the national security or the economic interests of the United States” (Uscinski & Klofstad, 2013: 558). This led to the cancellation of one grant cycle in political science only a month before the typical fall 2013 deadline for proposals. In response to this move, Michael Brintnall, the American Political Science Association’s executive director, hired a lobbyist, and worked with the Consortium of Social Science Associations, led by executive director Howard Silver, to push back on the funding limitations. When Congress passed the 2014 Omnibus Appropriations Act, the restricting amendment was omitted. More recently the Social, Economic and Behavioral Sciences Directorate, led by political scientist and former PI of the ANES

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at the University of Michigan, Arthur (Skip) Lupia, restructured the Political Science Programs at NSF into two new programmes “Security and Preparedness” and “Accountable Institutions and Behaviors.” The APSA reported on this in a news story on its website Political Science Now 4 : The Directorate’s officers have assured us that both of the new programs will be headed by political scientists and will support a wide variety of political science research projects. It is our understanding that these new programs will likely be broadly inclusive of the varied types of political science work. The NSF officers also express optimism that total NSF funding for political science research will increase after these program modifications are made. They also indicate that the NSF will continue to fund Political Science Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grants.

APSA clearly stated its opposition to these changes, but the reforms remain in place. Given the political attention legislators often used to ridicule agencies including NSF, the foundation has used a variety of strategies to reduce the vulnerability of its programme awards.5

II NSF, Race, and Political Science Research The Establishment of the NSF Considered in a Racially Structured Context The Foundation was created during the Truman Presidency at the time shortly after he had issued Executive Order 9981 in 1948 and ordered the integration of the US military after WWII. Moreover, he had also issued Executive Order 9808, establishing the President’s Committee on Civil Rights on December 5, 1946:

4 “Announcement Concerning Changes in the Political Science Program at the National Science Foundation”, Political Science Now, August 23, 2019. 5 Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin created the “Golden Fleece Awards” to highlight alleged waste or abuse of taxpayers’ money, which he gave to a number of agencies from 1975 to 1987. The Wisconsin Historical Society lists them in detail: https://con tent/wisconsinhistory.otg/digital/collection/proxmire/id/443. Kellina Craig Henderson, Interview, December 9, 2020.

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The Committee is authorized on behalf of the President to inquire into and to determine whether and in what respect current law-enforcement measures and the authority and means possessed by Federal, State, and local governments may be strengthened and improved to safeguard the civil rights of the people.

The Report was completed in September 1947. The President’s Committee on Civil Rights Report was a radical one, with a significant number of major proposals. While President Truman took on some of his Committee’s recommendations, a number of others were enacted over the following two decades in the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Housing Act of 1968. Others might still be considered innovative today. Even an abbreviated summary of the Committee’s recommendations in 1947 to the President suggests their boldness: the reorganization of the Civil Rights Section of the Department of Justice, the creation of a permanent Commission on Civil Rights, a proposed joint Standing Committee on Civil Rights in Congress, antilynching legislation, an end to discrimination and segregation in all branches of the Armed Services, a Fair Employment Practice Act, an end to restrictive covenants, the guarantee of access to public accommodation regardless of race, colour, creed and national origin. Some of the recommendations such as the increased professionalization of state and local police forces would generate strong controversy even today. Truman took on the task of integrating the armed forces, in 1948, one of the Committee’s recommendations to the President. During this time Truman was also negotiating with Congress over the structure and organization of the National Science Foundation. One might have expected the President would have incorporated some of these types of policies within the creation of this new agency which had no past history to address. Yet this was a task beyond the political constraints within which the NSF was created. While the Truman and Eisenhower administrations crafted policies that liberalized important aspects of national public life, NSF was not one of them. With the social sciences placed originally at the back of the organizational framework, there was no place for direct research on race and racial discrimination. Political science was especially problematic in the congressional oversight and budgetary process; as we saw, many legislators did not consider it a science.

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NSF and Political Science Project Funding The scepticism regarding the scientific credentials of the social sciences resulted in a ‘scientistic’ strategy with a “preference for certain methodologies associated with scientific rigour and involving, for example, quantitative analysis, hypothesis testing and experimentation” (Solovey, 2019: 212). Consequently, NSF support to the discipline as a whole has primarily taken the form of funding major surveys that explore the American electorate’s political attitudes. However, another notable area includes support for student training of future political scientists, the professionalization of the discipline, and institutional/disciplinary goals identified by APSA Presidents early in the twenty-first century. One of the major contributions of the NSF to American political science has been the support of the American National Election Studies (ANES) and its accompanying pilot studies. It was formally established as a national research resource in 1977. Originally financed by the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), the ANES had its origins at the Survey Research Center (SRC) at the University of Michigan in the post-war years, specifically in 1948. Ironically, its lack of federal funding in the early days largely shaped one of the ANES’ most valuable assets. The funding available through private foundations meant that there was little opportunity to implement changes during the first several iterations. The result was a time-series dataset, which allows researchers to track and compare political attitudes among the American electorate from the 1950s to the present day and is the longest-running political time-series in the world.6 According to Warren E. Miller, founder of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) at the University of Michigan and one of the central figures of the ANES, the onset of NSF funding was vital to its expansion. In an institutional history of the programme, he wrote (Miller, 1994: 261): National Science Foundation funding for the election studies not only put their execution on a somewhat more permanent basis, but it provided the capacity to be more effective in planning for new content for studies, and in elaborating study design through expanding the data collecting capacity.

6 Ibid.

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Although the ANES is a staple of the U.S. social science landscape and of the NSF Political Science Program, the funding it receives from the federal government is not renewed automatically. The PIs are responsible for applying for continuing grants from the programme and for justifying its funding with every iteration. In 2017, it was announced that the Political Science Program would make two awards for the 2020 Presidential election cycle, one for the traditional face-to-face survey and the other for a web-based survey. These would extend from 2018 to 2021 fiscal years and provide approximately $11.5 million over that time period. Although the COVID-19 pandemic meant it would not be possible to conduct face-to-face interviews in 2020, the study was completed using live Zoom interviews, online questionnaires, and phone interviews, thereby ensuring the continuity of the ANES. In recent decades, the NSF has made some inroads in funding political science research on race and ethnicity. One of its earliest contributions was the 1996 National Black Election Studies (NBES), followed by the Congressional Cooperative Election Study (CCES) in 2010, and more recently it provided support to the 2020 Collaborative Multi-Racial PostElection Study (CMPS). The National Black Election Studies (NBES) began in 1984 with funding from the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Carnegie Corporation. Prior to the first study, there had been no large, targeted survey of African Americans and their political attitudes. Instead, the ANES usually included a nationally representative sample across a variety of racial and ethnic groups. This usually produced a very small number of Blacks, Latino/as, Asians, too small to be of use for scholars of racial and ethnic politics. Therefore, the 1984 and 1988 NBES surveys were designed as longitudinal studies in order to capture change in attitudes among African American voters between elections. Prompted by Rev. Jesse L. Jackson’s campaigns for the Democratic Presidential nomination, these were the first major national studies of African American public opinion (Gurin et al., 1989). The 1996 NBES, which was then funded by both the Political Science and Economic programmes of the NSF, further extended the panel by one more year but also included new questions about topics neglected in the earlier studies. The NBES began a series of racially and/or ethnically specific surveys; the NBES were followed by the Latino National Survey (LNS) in 2006, and the National Asian American Survey (NAAS) in 2008.

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The Congressional Cooperative Election Study (CCES) is a large-scale and cooperative academic survey that consists of a nationally stratified sample of more than 50,000 respondents and covers congressional, state, and presidential elections. Faculty and graduate students across the United States are invited to participate in teams to design their own subset surveys that are then administered to 1000 respondents. According to the website, the CCES included participation from over 200 faculty and approximately 75 graduate students across 60 teams in 2018. The Collaborative Multi-Racial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) is notable for its large and generalizable samples of racial and ethnic groups in the United States as well as its multilingual availability, including Spanish, Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese and Arabic.7 Although its first iteration was in 2008, it greatly expanded in 2016 when it became entirely user content-driven and funded by academic researchers through their purchase of questions. The NSF funding it received for the 2020 iteration allowed the CMPS to broaden its sample beyond the Black, White, Asian and Latinx respondents of the 2016 wave to also include Native American, Native Hawaiian, Black immigrant, Afro-Caribbean, Muslim and LGBTQ respondents. Support for Graduate Training and Innovations in Political Science In line with the NSF’s mission to support the next generation of scientists, the Political Science Program also provides funding for the APSA Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant (DDRIG) programme as well as the Ralph Bunche Summer Institute (RBSI). The DDRIG was previously administered by the NSF Political Science Program itself but is now administered by APSA. The APSA programme awards up to twenty grants each year of between $10,000 and $15,000, a substantial decrease from the estimated number of awards (30–40) in the 2015 competition. The RBSI was initiated by the American Political Science Association in 1986 under the leadership of Jewel Prestage and later by Lois Moreland. It has been supported by the NSF since 1997, along with the APSA and Duke University, its institutional home since 2000. It was originally named the APSA Summer Institute for Blacks in Political Science and later renamed after Ralph Bunche, the Nobel

7 http://www.nsf/gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1918510.

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Peace Prize laureate, diplomat, and the first African American to gain a Ph.D. in political science from an American university. He was also the first African American President of APSA, 1953–1954. The Institute is designed as a summer programme for undergraduate students from underrepresented backgrounds to spend the summer of their junior year in a five-week intensive programme that prepares them for graduate education in political science. Students are exposed to graduate-level coursework and introduced to research methodology and statistics, which they then utilize to develop original research to present at APSA. The NSF has also started providing grants for efforts to improve the discipline such as APSA Presidential Task Forces, and most recently, the ADVANCE Partnership project for #MeTooPolisci. APSA Task Forces, begun by Theda Skocpol during her presidency (2002–2003), produce reports and recommendations regarding topics of interest to the broader public outside the political science discipline. One such example was the APSA Task Force on Political Science for the 21st Century report published in 2011. The Task Force, charged by APSA President Dianne Pinderhughes (2008–2009), noted that while “the pace and magnitude of demographic change in the United States is well known…it is rare for academic disciplines to take stock of the practice of their profession to determine if they are realizing their full potential as effective contributors to society” (APSA, 2011: 6–7). In contrast to previous Task Forces, which had been primarily concerned with increasing the perceived relevance and public presence of political science, this Task Force was instead charged to look within the profession (ibid.). As such, its members researched and provided recommendations for how to best address questions of diversity and inclusion in political science at the undergraduate, graduate, and faculty levels through research and teaching. Some of the recommendations included the expansion of graduate training with a greater emphasis on race, gender and inequality, the incorporation of innovative teaching practices such as service-learning, and the creation of a research department within the national office of the APSA to study the issues of mentoring and professional development, especially for the recruitment and retention of women and historically underrepresented groups in the discipline (ibid.). Finally, the Organizational Change for Gender Equity in STEM Academic Professions (ADVANCE) Program was formed in 2001 as a Foundation effort to “increase the representation and advancement in academic science and engineering careers, thereby contributing to the

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development of a more diverse science and engineering workforce”. Over the past two decades, the NSF has provided more than $270 million in funding for these programmes, partnering with universities and other not-for-profit organizations to address these issues. The #MeTooPoliSci Collective was launched in 2018 after two female political scientists publicly disclosed that they had been sexually harassed and assaulted. One of its members, Nadia Brown, wrote in The Washington Post’s Monkey Cage blog: The #MeTooPoliSci Collective has worked to move beyond reacting to colleagues who’ve suffered harassment and bias — and to try to change the political science culture that permits sexual harassment.

They have employed strategies such as hosting a pre-conference workshop at the 2018 APSA meeting, publishing work on #MeToo in an openaccess special edition of the Journal of Women, Politics, and Policy, and administering a survey of experiences of women in the discipline. With a $1 million grant from the NSF’s ADVANCE programme, four members of the collective, Nadia Brown, Rebecca Gill, Stella Rouse, and Elizabeth Sharrow, partnered with APSA to develop and adapt research-driven interventions such as “department climate studies, upstanding bystander training, department-level facilitated dialogues, and policy changes that support an improved climate.”8 Their ultimate goal is to use the partnership with APSA to reach across the entire discipline and foster gender equity in political science.

Conclusion Our exploration of the creation of public research funding in NSF shows very clearly that the shadow of the American state dominated from the first years of the foundation’s existence. The political process shaped the character of the research fields that were funded, and even more decisively limited the definition of what types of research were acceptable. Construction of scientific innovations in the post-war atomic era, in mathematics, chemical sciences and physics, mechanical and aerospace engineering, physical sciences and in fields related to military competition and supremacy had priority. 8 https://connect.apsanet.org/centennialcenter/2019/08/23/metoopolisci/.

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Even in areas specifically focused on STEM, who should be eligible for participation in summer institutes raised volatile policy questions about teacher training. Rather than challenge the South’s opposition to integration, whether in elementary, secondary or higher education, the NSF frequently adapted its policy criteria to maintain its flexibility to work within the racial status quo, that is to sustain a segregated one, rather than risk congressional hostility. While the social sciences threatened to bring into the political arena all the destabilizing problematic areas such as race and class, it was much simpler to severely limit the social sciences, the more as the Social Science Research Council had advised the social sciences that they emphasize “technical, nonpartisan, and value-neutral professional expertise” in their search for funding (Solovey, 2004: 416). In other words, the Eisfeld-Flinders hypothesis about research relevance, as defined by democratic universities, open debate, and academic independence, has not characterized the American intellectual environment as has played out in the creation and ongoing development of the National Science Foundation over the last seventy years. Research relevance has also proven difficult because of the critiques by natural scientists of the social sciences. The chapter has reviewed the strategies NSF social and political science programme officers have employed over many decades to manage these difficulties: if at all possible, research strategies should be convergent with the ‘natural sciences’; they should be scientistic, and projects should use technical, nonpartisan and rigorous methodological research strategies. Political Science is also seen as the most likely to bring politically controversial issues into the policymaking environment, of which public officials have been and remain critical since the NSF’s founding. The most striking description of this from a 1963 American Behavioral Scientist editorial, is reported by Solovey (2019: 223) on the ability of the social sciences to navigate within the NSF environment: only if a scholar wore ‘the proper scientific garb’, avoided ‘political science and all controversial topics’, and was ‘properly respectful and grateful’ might that scholar receive an invitation to an NSF cocktail party’. Despite the recent upgrades noted in the previous section, the author observed that the social sciences continued ‘to resemble the “official Negroes” of NSF grants policy’. (emphasis added)

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Finally, this research has shown that US Political Science has encountered significant barriers to public sector funding. Its value to governmental institutions was seen as having the capacity to upend national stability, and that even to fund political science research would introduce threatening questions onto the national policy agenda. Questions such as ‘What is democracy’, ‘what is the political good’, issues of political philosophy and ethics were often ridiculed as unscientific, therefore irrelevant, and a waste of public funds. Topics such as race and ethnicity, or gender were far too dangerous; many of the early NSF programme planners “had determined that the discipline’s subject matter, politics, was off limits, along with race, religion and sex” (Solovey, 2019: 222). The social sciences in general were threatening, but political science, in particular, was, as we have shown, the least well incorporated into the Foundation. Psychology, anthropology and sociology were well represented as early as the 1960s, while political science was not formally incorporated until 1991. If anything, the administrative leadership judged the discipline to be a threat to NSF’s long term organizational and financial stability. A ‘negative Congressional reaction is minimized by holding to a stringent definition of eligibility in terms of basic nature and scientific (rather than policy) orientation’ (Solovey, 2019: 223). The Foundation’s norms and values were well established in its earliest years, and they remain a strategy still in operation today. Ironically, political science, as we have demonstrated, has fared poorly in the NSF. The Foundation’s current budget sits at around $8 billion in comparison to the $250 million budget for the Social, Behavioral and Economic Sciences directorate. Yet the expectations for the Foundation were quite different in the post-war year when the plans were first developed. Though the early legislative proposals had envisioned an agency that would be the centerpiece of the post-war U.S. federal science system, the new agency was, in fact, rather small and suffered from paltry funding. This made the question of whether to allocate any funds to the social sciences even more dicey. Last but not least, the conservative political culture during the McCarthy era inflamed worries about social science involvement with such things as socialism, world government, economic planning, social engineering and racial integration. (Solovey, 2019: 218)

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The American academic and public sector is far from free, far from democratic, and far from open. Political science has only been relevant to the extent that it was under control and raised no sensitive issues that might lead to challenges to the national status quo.

References Adcock, R. (2003). The emergence of political science as a discipline: History and the study of politics, 1875–1910. History of Political Thought, 24(3), 459–486. Adcock, R. (2007). Interpreting behavioralism. In R. Adcock et al. (Eds.), Modern political science: Anglo-American exchanges Since 1880 (pp. 180–208). Princeton University Press. Alpert, H. (1954). The National Science Foundation and social science research. American Sociological Review, 19(2), 208–211. American Political Science Association. (2011). Political science in the 21st century. Report of the task force on political science in the 21st century. American Political Science Association. Bronk, D. W. (1975). National science foundation: Origins, hopes, and aspirations. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 72(8), 2839. Burns, N. (2006). The Michigan, then national, then American national election studies. Bush, V. (1945). Science the endless frontier: A report to the president. Business & Management INK. (2014). How much NSF funding goes to social science? Social Science Space. https://www.socialsciencespace.com/2014/03/ how-much-nsf-funding-goes-to-social-science/. Congress, U. (1950). National science foundation act of 1950. Public Law, 507 . Garcia, J. A. (2017). The race project. Journal of Ethnicity and Politics 2(2), 1–47. Goodnow, F. J. (1903). The work of the American political science association. Presidential Address. Proceedings of the American Political Science Association, 1, 35–46. Gunnell, J. (1993). The descent of political theory. University of Chicago Press. Gurin, P., Hatchett, S., & Jackson, J. (1989). Hope and independence: Blacks’ response to electoral and party politics. Russell Sage Foundation. Harris, F. L. (1967). Political science and the proposal for a national social science foundation. APSR 61(4), 1088–1095. Haworth, L. J. (1964). Support of political science by the national science foundation. APSR, 58(4), 1086–1088. Kevles, D. J. (1977). The national science foundation and the debate over postwar research policy, 1942–1945: A political interpretation of science—the endless frontier. Isis, 68(1), 5–26.

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Kopko, K. C, Ashley, E., Erin, K., & Vincent, J. M. (2016). Assessing outcomes of national science foundation grants in the social sciences. Council on Undergraduate Research Quarterly, 36(3). Larsen, O. N. (1985). Social science out of the closet. Society, 22(2), 11–15. Matthews, D. (2014). Why congressional republicans want to cut social science research funding. Vox. https://www.vox.com/2014/11/12/7201487/con gress-social-science-nsf-funding. Mazuzan, G. T. (1988). The National Science Foundation: A brief history. National Science Foundation. Miller, W. E. (1994). An organizational history of the intellectual origins of the American national election studies. European Journal of Political Research, 25(3), 247–265. Riecken, H. W. (1971). The federal government and social science policy. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 394(1), 100– 113. Miller, R. B. (2002). Crisis and responses: The politics of the social sciences in the United States (1980–1982). Revue pour l’histoire du CNRS, 1, 1–10. Social Science Space. (2016). Timeline of US government and social/behavioral science. Social Science Space. https://www.socialsciencespace.com/2016/01/ timeline-of-us-government-and-socialbehavioral-science/. Solovey, M. (2004). Riding natural scientists’ coattails onto the endless frontier: The SSRC and the quest for scientific legitimacy. Journal of the history of the behavioral sciences, 40(4), 393–422. Solovey, M. (2019). The impossible dream: Scientism as strategy against distrust of social science at the US national science foundation, 1945–1980. International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity, 7 . Uscinski, J. E., & Casey A. K. (2013). Determinants of representatives’ votes on the flake amendment to end national science foundation funding of political science research. PS: Political Science & Politics, 46(3), 557–61. Walgren, D. (1982). Problems of the behavioral and social sciences in national science foundation budget debates. American Psychologist, 37 (8), 927. Wang, J. (1999). American science in an age of anxiety: Scientists, antiCommunism, and the Cold War. University of North Carolina Press.

Interviews Howard Silver. Former Executive Director, Consortium of Social Science Associations. December 14, 2020. Kellina Craig-Henderson. Deputy Assistant Director, Social, Behavioral and Economic Sciences, National Science Foundation. December 9, 2020. Michael Brintnall. Former Executive Director, American Political Science Association. December 3, 2020.

CHAPTER 5

Australia’s Politics of Research Funding: Depoliticization and the Crisis of the Regulatory State Kanishka Jayasuriya and Greg McCarthy

The Regulation of Research and Its Challenges Politics has been central to research funding in Australia. However, we argue that the nature of this politics, the forms through which it takes shape and the actors engaged with it has changed over the post-war era. In particular, following the 1989 university unification period and with it the shift from an elite to a mass education system, the regulatory governance of research funding came to the fore and with it a depoliticization of research funding. This is part and parcel of the broader emergence of

K. Jayasuriya (B) Murdoch University, Perth, Australia e-mail: [email protected] G. McCarthy University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Eisfeld and M. Flinders (eds.), Political Science in the Shadow of the State, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75918-6_5

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the higher education regulatory state that through an ensemble of policies and practices guides research towards market objectives (Jayasuriya, 2015). The depoliticized strategy of regulatory governance contained a set of research priorities—or what is termed as state directed funding in the Introduction to the volume. Our approach builds on the book’s framework of the tension between research autonomy for public good and governmental claims that research serves its cultural and economic views. The chapter analyses the shift towards what we term a regulatory governance of research through which the state directs research funding working with and against a dependence on peer review. In the move to regulatory governance, academic disciplines, including political science and public policy, were governed to a technocratic rationality (Botterill, 2015; Flinders, 2013). Under the post-war university model, university research funding was reserved for a limited number of Australian universities, principally the old eight foundation universities and then to the newer universities, mainly in the outer suburbs. However, this was changed in 1989 by the Hawke government when the existing State-based colleges and institutes were combined into a new unified system, where research funding was now available to all 39 institutions—the so-called Unified National System (UNS)—but with research based on quantity outputs and grant applications where the older universities held sway (O’Brien, 2013). Under the 1989 UNS, the research funding model was founded on the articulation of rules for competitive grants, with new strategic priorities added that were couched in regulatory terms, and increasingly complex rules on performance-based funding. An important dimension of Minister Dawkins’ policy and governance reform was to regularize and increase competitive research grants, to regulate block research funding to universities on performance criteria and locate research priorities within the regulatory system (Aitkin, 1997). As this model consolidated over the next decades, the regulatory apparatus was expanded into the area of impact and specific linkage grant funds for ties with industry and public bodies. Research funding was underpinned by an arms-length system of regulatory governance that was intended to create a more competitive and strategic—in economic terms—system of research funding. We suggest that this move in turn has led to tension between instrumental objectives and the depoliticized governance strategies on which regulatory

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governance rests. The contradiction between this depoliticization and instrumentalism has fuelled increasing direct political intervention into the research funding process. There is tension between legitimizing research quality assessed through peer review, and governmental intervention on political correctness agendas or in using directives to oblige university researchers to serve the immediate interests of the industry. Such intervention is to be found in direct—often ministerial—intervention to veto or change particular kinds of grants, especially humanities and social sciences grants that were perceived to be a challenge to or not seen as within the government’s ideological predilections. Herein resided the paradox, the model established—in the unified system as it was a form of governance at a distance (Foucault, 1991)—via regulatory frames, and yet such a depoliticized system is not immune to larger ideological battles, to forms of what Hall (1988) called ‘authoritarian populism’. Recent policy changes as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic signal a significant shift towards a more overt and coercive state-directed strategy that is increasingly authoritarian and designed to deepen the neoliberalization of the research funding process. It is this coercive market populist agenda (Jayasuriya, 2020) that is challenging the depoliticized regulatory governance of higher education, leading to increasing marginalization of basic sciences and critical social science research. This market and authoritarian populist challenge to research funding has created a crisis for the system of depoliticized research funding. We have seen more direct interventions and a directive regulatory system to favour certain kinds of research outcomes over others. The current COVID-19 crisis has intensified these challenges and—at the time of writing—set the stage for a more overt political direction of research funding. The Minister has established an advisory committee to outline what he terms a ‘sustainable research funding model’ and promised to respond to the research effect caused by the loss of income from the decline in international students (Tehan, 2020). The decline in international student income, which is predicted to be $3.2 billion loss from the research pool in 2020 (Marshman & Larkins, 2020), will see a significant challenge to the depoliticized model that has shaped the governance of research funding over the last three decades. Nevertheless, such authoritarian control has its limitations. Overt politicization of research has ramification in that it can delegitimize national research standing in an era where global rankings are based on research integrity.

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Governing Research Funding: The Emergence and Crisis of Regulatory Governance The research funding system in the post-war period was focused on supporting national research priorities—particularly in agriculture— through the Commonwealth Scientific Industrial Organisation (CSIRO) and science at the Australian National University, but has morphed into a depoliticized and yet politically contested arena. During the formative post-war period, research was focused on priorities centred on promoting national development with a broad politically bipartisan consensus. In the post-war period, research in Australia was concentrated on sandstone institutes (modelled on Oxford and Cambridge), alongside the Australian National University, that were funded as national research priorities, linked to national projects. The predominant funding mechanism for the university sector was through block grants. In contrast, competitive grants—while increasing in importance from the late 70s were a relatively small proportion of research funding. Outside the ANU—which has special funding—research was concentrated in the older metropolitan institutions that later formed the Group of Eight institutions (Larkins, 2011). Yet, the lack of such formal specification should not indicate that there were no other mechanisms to establish research priorities. In this regime, research preferences and funding decisions were often organized around ‘club government’ that grew out of the elite university model. Moran (2003) describes club government as a system of informal groups of key gatekeepers who formed a network to steer and monitor research funding. Much of the governance of research and higher education prior to the reforms of the 1980s fit this model of ‘club governance’. For example, Bazeley (1998) in his survey of ARC grants found that the academic status of the applicant was a strong predictor of grant success, confirming the “Matthew effect”—the theory of ‘accumulative advantage’ where past success is a strong predictor of continued success. In this system, the governance of research funding rested on informal networks of key decision-makers. For instance, Forsyth (2014) notes the overriding importance of key scientists like Mark Oliphant and Philip Baxter who almost single-handedly developed the Lucas height reactor. Baxter, as Vice-Chancellor of the University of New South Wales and as Chairman of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission, was energetic in forging his own personal vision of military-industrial network. A similar pattern

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of ‘club governance’ could be identified within the social sciences where the research institutes at the Australian National Institutes played a key role in developing large social science research projects (Macintyre, 2010). Of course, politics mattered, but it was a politics that was played out within a system of ‘club governance’. Politics was based on the control of key informal scientific and research networks and through key organizations such as Commonwealth Scientific Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) based on strong public and private industry networks. In this club governance, political science became a fully-fledged discipline under the tutelage of Henry Mayer, who founded the Australasian Political Studies Association (AusPSA), and from 1971 to 1976 he edited Politics (from 1990 the Australian Journal of Political Science). With Richard Spann, Mayer was essential in training a new generation of scholars in what is identified as critical pluralism and interest group theory. In the 1970s, Mayer ensured the journal opened up to debates on feminism and Indigenous issues. The British-inspired value-based character of political science was built around key individuals such as Alan Davies, Sol Encel, Henry Mayer and Percy Partridge, who formed a political science elite network (Goot, 1986), but by the 1980s this was about to change with a new regulatory system. The club model of research governance system was starting to unravel before the Dawkins reform as expressed in the Green Paper on Higher Education reform (Dawkins, 1987a) The rise of the new universities and the expansion of research funded by universities through their grants were challenging the contours of ‘club governance’. The introduction of newly formed universities enabled them to become more research-oriented, and there was a demand that they be accommodated within the research funding system. The new actors—who were outside the club of older metropolitan universities—wanted a formalized system of research funding (Larkins & Croucher, 2013). The system of ‘club governance’ no longer suited the interests of these players within the newly constituted unified national system. Moreover, while there was informal prioritization of strategic research within the system of club governance, this was no longer seen to be adequate or robust enough. With the shift towards what has been described as a system of higher education relevant to economic objectives it was argued that a market responsive research funding system was needed (Jayasuriya, 2015). After the 1989 Dawkins reforms a unified national system was established, opening grants to old and new universities and along with

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it a higher education regulatory state that governed universities at a distance (Jayasuriya, 2014). In essence, there was a regulated system of funding through councils of experts, such as the Australian Research Council (ARC) and the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC). These were meant to be matched by government research block grants (RBG) the latter based on the universities grant success combined with higher degree research training funds. The emerging higher education regulatory state aimed to give effect to this programme of marketization. And, to a system of governance that Marginson terms ‘steering from a distance’ (1997: 77) writing that the advance of university autonomy can complement rather than contradict the advance of central control, and that the character of autonomy – whether individual or institutional – is determined by the larger set of relations in which that autonomy is embedded.

Similarly, King (2006: 8) argues that the introduction of market reform into higher education went hand in hand with a ‘higher education regulatory state’. In Australia, the regulatory reforms were embedded in regulatory rules, which had the effect, at one and the same time, of distancing the government from the direct allocation of research funds via statutory authorities, while still ensuring, through the existence of powerful levers in the form of regulatory frameworks and funding decisions, to steer the universities in the desired political direction (see Jayasuriya, 2014, 2015; O’Brien, 2013). These reforms had important implications for the governance of research funding through regulatory means. The marketization process was mirrored in the growing visibility of governmental policy, the language of research priorities and investment in shaping the objectives of research governance that flowed into university decision-making. On one hand, there was priority given to research funding as a way of promoting economic competitiveness but on the other hand, this funding was to be disciplined and justified through its allocation based on research priorities. The emerging regulatory research funding system gave effect to increasing research investment and at the same time prioritizing the allocation of these funds. These objectives were interrelated but often stood in tension with each other, and it is this stress that fuelled political conflict within and outside the system of regulatory governance. The imperative here was to give more explicit and formal recognition to strategic priorities of the

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government within the new research funding system. The Green Paper noted that research investment ‘should be in fields that have potential to improve the nation’s competitive position’ (Dawkins, 1987b: 65). These discussions were influenced by what was perceived as Australia’s failure to develop a coherent and coordinated strategic policy for research that was more directed at enhancing competitive industries—seen as an important objective in period of relative economic decline (Johnson, 2007). Whereas the system of ‘club governance’ relied on the informal consultation to determined research priorities, the assumption in the emerging research funding system was that a formalized system of research priorities was essential in steering research funding towards strategic investments. The language of research priorities became increasingly important in policy discussions. As Aitkin—a member of Dawkins’ kitchen cabinet— perceptively observes, the priority of the new Australian Research Council was to set the research agenda. He goes on to note that (Aitkin, 1997: 187). two major perspectives were apparently in conflict: that researchers had a kind of right to determine their own agenda and be funded for it, and that the spending of public money in a democracy can only be justified if there is a clear and defendable public benefit. Those of us who were charged with managing the expenditure of that money had to find a way of reconciling these two perspectives.

The solution to this apparent conflict was to be found in locating ‘research priorities’ within a new regulatory regime. In this way, there was a more depoliticized and formalized recognition of research priorities within the emerging regulatory governance of research funding. However, the contradiction identified by Aitkin (1997) is ever-present, as it was not fully accommodated within the regulatory system. Periodic ministerial interventions and criticism by various interests—business and conservative forces—of failure to implement what they deemed ‘research priorities’ became the focus of disenchantment and political attacks on the regulatory governance of the research funding. The depoliticized strategy of regulatory governance is an expression of the dominance of various interests—the new universities, governments and business stakeholders in a more market-driven system, and the desire of older sandstone universities to maintain their dominant position with respect to research funding. The emerging system of governance

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attempted to accommodate these diverse interests. However, there was mixed success in accommodating the competing concerns. The question of ‘research priorities’ was—as Aitkin (1997) observes—central to this as it brought instrumental and commercial objectives to the fore and at the same time left key actors dissatisfied with the capacity of the governance to meet research priorities. Over the ensuing decades, this dissatisfaction was particularly evident in the conservative attacks on ‘humanities and social science research’, linked to the ongoing cultural wars (Busbridge et al., 2020; McKnight, 2005) and the use of Ministerial prerogative to overrule the decisions of research councils. It is at the core of the conservative attacks on the depoliticized system of research funding governance. In a curious sense, the paradox here is that the depoliticized implementation of research priorities contributed to the growing political attacks on research funding as not serving the government of the day. Finally, the regulatory governance of research funding reached all the way down into the management of research within the institutions. The regulatory system transformed politics of research funding within individual institutions. This is not the focus of our chapter, but it is useful to understand that politics was transformed both within institutions as well as outside. The increase in the quantum of research funds—particularly those flowing to highly research-intensive universities made the governance and allocation of these funds greatly important to the government. In this respect, a key aim of the research funding changes introduced by Dawkins was to allow university management to have a greater capacity to steer research funds (Larkins & Croucher, 2013; Marginson, 1997). This disciplining of research funding at the institutional level was accomplished by empowering key regulatory intermediaries within the university who would be responsible for regulatory compliance as well as overall research performance within the institution (Derrick & Nickson, 2014; Kirkland, 2008). In effect, over the last three decades, this has been reflected in the development of a formidable research governance infrastructure within various institutions. The rise of research offices, grant compliance offices, and above all, the institutions of the Deputy Vice Chancellor (Research) has created centres of regulatory authority within individual universities. Further additions to this regulatory governance through new performance measures such as the introduction of the Excellence in Research for Australia (ERA) have enhanced the power of regulatory intermediaries within individual universities (Brennan, 2015; Wood & Meek, 2002; Young et al., 2011).

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As the research system developed over the last two decades, there were two research funding streams. The first was governmental via competitive grants, won by researchers from the Australian Research Council (ARC) and National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC), plus the accompanying Research Block Grants (RBG) accrued to the universities. Secondly, over fifty per cent of research revenue in researchintensive universities came from discretionary funds, as cross-subsidies from teaching fees to research (AG Productivity Commission, 2017). In both streams, a distinct form of depoliticization was in evidence, as the research councils allocated the funds through a techno rationality (Dean, 2002) and universities made their own decisions over their discretionary funds. In general, the government regulated the ARC, NHMRC and RBG funds via financial restraints, notably budget cuts directly or disguised as efficiency dividends. Over time there was also a funding shift away from pure to applied research, and from humanities to medicine and the sciences. For example, by 2018 medical and health research, constitutes 28 per cent of higher education research funds and combined with stem research add up to 44 per cent of all research expenditure, with humanities only at 13 per cent of research spending (Norton et al., 2018: 146). Most critically, for universities, the pressing issue became that the rate of growth in competitive grants was not matched by a rise in RBG. For example, between 2000 and 2013 RBG grew around 19 per cent (from $1.6 to $1.9 billion), whereas Category 1 competitive grants grew by over 110 per cent, from $736.7 million to $1.56 billion (NTEU, 2018). The mismatch between competitive grants and RBG left universities with a shortfall of $1 billion (Norton et al., 2018). While universities avoided direct political interference from government by funding around fifty per cent of their research costs from discretionary funds, this intensified the market risk for each university, especially the GO8 research-intensive universities as their rankings attract a higher proportion of international students. Compounding the risk was that as over 30 per cent of these overseas students came from China this evoked political attacks from the security and conservative think tanks (see Babones, 2019; Joske, 2020), and within the national parliament, where a cohort of anti-China hawks regarded universities as susceptible to Chinese influence. Consequently, the current Morrison government has begun to politically intervene in this research funding model, firstly by not responding with any urgency to revive the overseas student market, even though Marshman and Larkins (2020: 2) calculate that the effect of the

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COVID-19 travel ban on international students will have a potential loss of 4600 research staff across the sector, Secondly, in regard to domestic students, Minister Tehan has used a Deloitte (2019) report on teaching costs to try and break the cross subsidization from teaching to research. Lastly, the government has established a joint security committee with the universities to examine joint research projects, principally targeted at China. These developments had significant effects on the political science discipline. First, the move towards depoliticized research has at the same time led to increased use of instruments such as journal ranking to evaluate research quality. The impact of these instruments has been to shape research agendas in a way that narrows the type of issues and topics that are considered appropriate for research funding (Sawer & Curtin, 2016). We are not suggesting that there is a direct causal link but rather a generalized set of pressures on researchers to conduct research according to journal ranking and to play politically safe with research grant applications. Flinders (2013) argues under this pressure Australian political science turned away from value-based public politics to a technocratic model. Likewise, Botterill (2015) contends that the move to technical over value-driven research was institutionalized within universities in the search for political science ranking recognition. Second, the move towards a more industry-driven research funding model threatens to robustly shape both the quantity and nature of research in political science and international relations. The effect is to diminish the capacity for critical research. Finally, we note how changes in the regulation of research have shaped the profession through internalization of the expected governmental practices. i. We examine these effects through the debate over journal rankings within the Australian Political Studies Association (AusPSA).

Politicization of Research and Culture Wars The first instance of the use of Ministerial power to override the normal process of research governmentality occurred in 2005, when Education Minister Nelson in two consecutive years vetoed three and then seven humanities and social science grants that had been peer-assessed by the ARC. Concomitantly, Nelson controversy appointed three nonacademics, a judge, a journalist and a prominent conservative figure Padraic McGuinness, to a committee scrutinizing the grants to attest as to

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whether they passed the ‘national benefits test’. The pressure on Nelson to act came from outspoken media critiques of humanities, who claimed to be the voice of ‘the people’ against ‘neo-Marxist fancies’ allegedly dominating the fields of gender, race, and cultural studies. As well, rightwing factional leaders in the Howard Government placed pressure on Minister Nelson to show he was on their side in the culture wars (Haigh, 2006). In Australia, the culture wars refer to the increasing politicization of issues such as migration, gender and indigenous issues in terms of a clash of cultural values between the ‘elite and the people’. It reflects a populist attempt to make political issues a question of values. The appointment of McGuinness, editor of the neo-conservative publication Quadrant, was praised by Prime Minister Howard. McGuinness said that in his approach to vetoing ARC grants he looked for those applications with ‘feminist assumptions’ (Haigh, 2006). The second case where politicization intervened in the ARC research funding process was in 2017–2018 with the Minister of Education and Trade Birmingham secretly vetoing eleven humanities grants in 2017– 2018 worth over $4 million (Piccini & Moses, 2018). Like Nelson, Birmingham was seen as a Liberal moderate and became Minister under Turnbull. At that time, there was a concerted effort by the conservative ex-Liberal prime ministers Abbott and Howard to upping-the-ante on the culture wars by establishing a pro-Western Centre of Western Civilization at the Australian National University. Birmingham supported that proposal and criticized ANU when the university rejected it as being counter to ANU’s academic autonomy (Abbott, 2018). In this period of a heightened culture war over the superiority of Western civilization, Minister Birmingham vetoed eleven ARC grants, unannounced to the researchers or the public. The veto only came to light when the ARC appeared before a Senate Select Committee and under questioning by Opposition education spokesman Carr listed the grants that had been disallowed by Minister Birmingham. Senator Carr pointedly said, “This is political correctness gone mad by an out of touch government, which is pandering to its knuckle-dragging and right-wing philistines’ (Carr, 2018a, b) Birmingham doubled down on his decisions, saying that the eleven grants did not pass the taxpayer ‘pub test’ of what research is in Australia’s national interest, commenting that ‘I’m pretty sure most Australian taxpayers preferred their funding to be used for

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research other than spending $223,000 on projects like Post orientalist arts of the Strait of Gibraltar’ (Birmingham cited in Norton, 2018). The politicization of the humanities and creative arts research conformed to an attack by the conservative think tank’s cultural writer, d’Abrera, supported Birmingham’s decision as necessary because, in ‘the humanities, the leitmotifs of class, race and gender have replaced the essential core subjects which explain the political, intellectual, social and material basis of the history of Western Civilisation’ (d’Abrera, 2019). The third instance of attempts at politicizing research came when Tehan replaced Birmingham as Education and Training Minister in 2018. While restoring three of the vetoed grants, he reiterated that it is the right of the minister to apply a ‘national interest-pub test’ to grants whether they provide ‘economic, commercial, environmental, social or cultural benefits to the Australian community’ (Bankovsky, 2018). In announcing the new rules Tehan (2018) appealed to parliamentary democratic ministerial rights but in a populist form, saying that ‘a National Interest Test will give the Minister of the day the confidence to look the Australian voter in the eye and say, “your money is being spent wisely”’, adding that (Tehan, 2018). under the new National Interest Test, only those applications that meet the NIT definition and score highly in the competitive grants process will be recommended to the Minister for funding…Applicants will be asked to explain ‘the extent to which the research contributes to Australia’s national interest through its potential to have economic, commercial, environmental, social or cultural benefits to the Australian community.

Ivison (2018) argues that the governments notion of a ‘pub test’ is ‘crass populism’, which ignored the ARC expert evaluation. Johnson (2019) draws a larger bow and places the Morrison government’s policy approach as ‘authoritarian populism’ where the claim of ‘elites ripping off’ taxpayers is a constant theme’. Here the attacks on the social science and humanities research reinforce this authoritarian populist message that divided the ‘cosmopolitan elite’ versus ‘the people’. This populism thread is woven through the three instances of the politicization of ARC grants examined here. These interventions, in turn, threatened the depoliticized character of peer-based research decisions (Nogrady, 2018).

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The shift towards a more instrumental direction of research funds will have a significant impact on the types of research undertaken within political science. First, it will preclude the often critical and theoretical work in favour of applied or policy-oriented work aligned with shifting policy and political agendas. As Sawer and Curtin (2016: 447) point out, it will have gendered effect because women’s contribution to the discipline is often regarded as ‘soft’ knowledge – of how political realities and policy problems are discursively framed and reframe how collective meanings and identities are generated; and how the gendered logic of appropriateness within political institutions includes some and excludes others.

Second, social scientists have been—quite rightly—critical of this politicization of the research funding process. Therefore, the response of the social science community—including those in political science—is to accommodate these pressures as a way of minimizing political pressures in political science. The tension between depoliticization and instrumentalization plays out within the discipline. In this way we observe a clear preference for depoliticized research funding but in order to support these strategies, political science has to accommodate strategic research priorities. This could entail framing research proposal so that they fall in line with various ideologically charged notions of national interest or national security.

The Politics of Assessing Quality: The Excellence in Research Australia (ERA) Initiative The ERA—Australia’s research performance assessment system—also exemplifies our argument in relation to the tension between depoliticization and the promotion of instrumental objectives covered in democratic trappings. The ERA was seen as regulatory instrument to measure and audit research quality. It is a disciplining instrument to ensure the global quality of research outputs while claiming to prove to the public the value of government funding of academic research (Martin-Sardesai et al., 2017). Traditionally government’s allocated research funds on quantity outputs, however, in 2005 following the UK lead, the Howard government introduced a new research evaluation scheme to firstly measure the quality of research outputs and secondly, an impact measure to

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test whether academic research furthered private sector productivity. However, when the Rudd Labor government was elected in 2007 it abandoned the impact measure as too cumbersome and implemented a research quality audit scheme, called the Excellence in Research Australia (ERA). In preparation for the first ERA, the decision was to use science indices to measure citations and in a unique and controversial approach requested peak bodies to rank journals in their field. The data was accumulated by universities and evaluated by Research Evaluation Committees (REC) under eight multidisciplinary clusters using two- and four-digit Fields of Research codes to create four-and two-digit Units of Evaluations, which aimed to match disciplinary fields. The REC’s rated each unit/discipline in the range of above world standard at 5 and 1 as below world standard. The outcomes but not the evidence was reported publicly, by institution and by discipline (ARC, 2010). ERA was trialled in 2009 and evaluations occurred in 2010, 2012, 2015 and 2018. After considerable disquiet over the veracity of the rankings, the journal ranking scheme was officially abandoned in 2012 but remained somewhat of a proxy for journal quality (Vanclay, 2011; Young et al., 2011). Politically, the problem for governments was that the ERA gave proof that universities can accurately measure and validate their research quality at arms-length from the government. It was also a validation of the global quality of Australian university research. For example, the science, technology, engineering, health and medical fields improved from 1.15 times the world average in 2003 to 1.46 for the period 2014–2018 (Learner Reader, Campus Review, 2019). That indicator was founded on over 470,000 outputs, providing proof that Australian university research on average is performing above world standard (ERA level 4 and 5). Further validation was apparent in the rise of Australian research-intensive universities in global ranking with seven out of eight GO8 universities in the top one hundred of the ARWU scales in 2020 and eight more universities ranked in the top 300 world universities (ARWU, 2020). Whilst the ERA process kept politics at bay from outside the universities, it did lead to an intensification of managerialism and performance management within the universities. As noted earlier, the capacity of universities to boost research quality has changed the internal research culture (McCarthy et al., 2017) reinforcing the trend of new public sector management exemplified by numerical cross-university quantifications and control by research management over how and what is to be

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assessed (Broadbent, 2016; Gable, 2013; Martin-Sardesai et al., 2017; Young et al., 2011). Further, the pressure on research quality and output has intensified precarious work and the employment of research-only staff, which has tripled between 2000 and 2018 with many on grantdependent money, concomitantly, the practice of ‘poaching’ researchers from other universities has intensified (Kwok, 2013; Norton, 2020; Song & McCarthy, 2020). By managing the ERA, universities have kept respective governments at arms-length over research assessments. However, there are persistent efforts by governments to shift the measurement of academic research towards national impact, especially for its impact on industry. For example, in 2011, under government pressure, there was a pilot trial in 2012 Excellence in Innovation for Australia. Likewise, in 2015 the Watt Report stressed that research funding should lead to industry innovation. In 2015 the Turnbull government commissioned the National Innovation and Science Agenda Report, which noted the low rate of collaborations between academic researchers and industry. Prime Minister Turnbull, following the report said, ‘publish or perish will be replaced by collaborate or crumble’ (NTEU, 2016). Education Minister Pyne claimed that the government is ‘going to abolish publications as the chief reason why you attract research grants’ and went on to say that ‘we are going to change that into research impact’, adding that in university research there would be a “massive cultural change” where government funding would be dependent on showing ‘that your idea is going to be able to be commercialised’ (cited in NTEU, 2016). The government then set aside funds for the development of a nationwide assessment on the impact of academic research on industry and productivity. In 2016 the Engagement and Impact Steering Committee, established pilots seeking ‘to develop a process that uses clear and transparent measures of non-academic impact and end-user engagement, to assess our nation’s university research performance and inform future funding structures’ (Birmingham, 2016 cited in NTEU). In the discipline of political science, one key area in which the politics of research funding has impacted the disciplines is in the area of journal rankings for the ERA. In 2016, after considerable debate within the association, the AusPSA decided to implement a journal ranking system. The ranking system listed journals in various tiers—A*, A, B and C—that were meant to be an indicator of quality. The debate itself is interesting in that it exemplifies some of the effects of regulatory governance on the

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choice and selection of journal. By using these indicators, the Association in effect valorized certain journal and methods over others. One of the arguments made by opponents of the journal ranking system is that it disqualified certain methods and sub-disciplines. Sawer and Curtin (2016) have argued that in Australia the political science tradition has been dominated by qualitative tradition and this may not be well reflected in the journal ranking systems—particularly the A* journals—that favour quantitative methods. This is a criticism that is amplified by Vromen (2016). In short, it is clear that the shift to competitive grants and the growing importance of measurement of research quality has had an impact on the selection of research topics and the extent to which these topics might enable one to be published in high ranking journals. As Vromen (2016) points out, the rankings have achieved what she calls discursive significance—that is by ‘discursive significance I mean that the classifications A* and A articles started to appear in promotion, job and grant applications, with little reflection on what they meant or were indeed measuring. There have also been anecdotal evidence shared by some that they were being told to only publish in A* or A ranked journals (para 7, lines 5–8). This is an important point and shows how the journal ranking system—itself a response to the research regulatory state—shapes the selection of journals and the type of topics. The effect of this is to diminish the potential for critical and more adventurous research within the discipline. The debate within the association itself reflected the way in which the regulatory system shapes disciplinary practices. One of the co-authors of this chapter—Kanishka Jayasuriya—was present at the meeting at which the journal rankings were debated. It was striking that one of the arguments for the journal ranking systems was that it gave a degree of professional control over the ranking to the association and therefore prevented a more robust metric-based system of journal rankings to be determined by university research offices. This may well have an appropriate pragmatic response but it does indicate the extent to which the professional practices are shaped by broader regulatory systems. It also needs to be pointed out that the journal rankings system seems to be broadly supported by the discipline (McDonnell & Morgenbesser, 2019). In 2018 along with the ERA there was the national rollout of the EI assessment on firstly, the engagement between researchers and end-users, secondly, a test on the impact of research on the economy, society, environment, or culture beyond the academia. The late addition of ‘culture’

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indicated the difficulty for the ARC committee of measuring impact across widely different fields of research. The decision by the review committee was to relate impact to engagement and university’s approaches to impact, with engagement based on the research-income data collected through the ERA. However, this was deemed only a partial picture so a narrative exercise was introduced built on the 2-digit field of research, where one case study was (somehow) deemed to represent the whole diverse disciplinary field. Impact was to be ranked with a rating scheme of low, medium and high, and the exercise placed pressure on the university’s research branch’s ability to present convincing impact vignettes to prove the broad field’s socio-economic impact. The ARC released the findings of its engagement and impact assessment exercise in March 2019, where 626 case studies were assessed, 85 per cent were rated as having a high or medium level of engagement, while 88 per cent of the 637 submitted impact case studies were assessed as having a medium or high level of impact. Seventy-six per cent were assessed as having a medium or high rating for approach to impact (ARC, 2019). Tehan said the results show that ‘University research is improving the lives of every Australian’ (Tehan, 2019). However, as Sawczak (2020) argues the Engagement and Impact (EIA) exercise is unlikely to satisfy the government’s desire to dig deep into academic research to prove it serves national interest. She argues that the process was deeply flawed with the vignettes an ill-fitting device to prove that research benefited society in general and industry in particular (Sawczak, 2020). Equally, the EIA failed to placate the long-standing resistance of academe to engage with industry as it ran counter to their public value ethos. Rather, the EIA has had limited utility, if for no other reason than the 2-code narratives for academics was read as a form of manufacturing consent to the government’s agenda and it stretched academic credibility to cover all their disciplinary fields in a 2-digit code narrative. The EIA assessment confirms the ongoing tension between peer review as non-political and governmental interest in making academic research conform to the politics and ideology of the government of the day.

Markets, Ideology and Research Funding One of the key elements of the tension between depoliticized research funding and instrumental objectives is the push towards a more ‘market friendly’ research agenda. It seeks to reshape the research funding in a way

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that is much more overtly designed to deliver outcomes that are viewed as commercially useful. Here, the explicit instrumentalization of research in terms of its commercial utility cuts against the depoliticized nature of the research funding system. As we have seen, research priorities—particularly to the extent that they serve to expand the knowledge economy—were a central element of the reforms of the late 80s. However, recent shifts particularly by the Liberal National Party has led to a greater overt assertion of market interests, and more crucially these new research funding rules seek to give a more direct role to commerce or industry actors in access to research funds. Once again evident here is the tension between the depoliticization of research funding and instrumental objectives, The notion of innovation was a central element of the former Prime Minister Turnbull’s political agenda. One of the key driving motivations behind this agenda was that the emphasis on inputs, principally publications—detracted from the pursuit of commercial innovations. This reflects the inherent tensions between the imperatives of the depoliticized research funding system and the more overt market friendly research regime demanded by the government’s innovation programme. The innovation agenda states that (Commonwealth of Australia, Watt, 2015: 2). We will change funding incentives so that more university funding is allocated to research that is done in partnership with industry; and invest over the long term in critical, world-leading research infrastructure to ensure our researchers have access to the infrastructure they need.

The thrust of the current Morrison government elected in 2019 deepens these efforts to move the research funding system towards a more explicitly market-oriented direction. In this sense, the crucial political question to ask is whose interests and benefits are supported through this new research agenda. The architecture of the emerging market-oriented systems gives a more explicit sway to private interests in the allocation of research funding, and at the same, it leads to the overt privatization of the public research infrastructure. The Watt Report (2015) on research produced for the Turnbull government, when Morrison was Treasurer, provided a blueprint for changing the allocation of academic research funding to support industry. It recommends using the impact measures, as adopted in the ERA to give

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precedent to industrial collaborations, as the prime instruments to allocate research funding. The intent of the Watt Report recommended was to make government block grants lead to bolstering impact measures, as calculated by income generated via collaboration with industry and as a key driver of research funding. The government aims to change block research grants to favour outputs—that is industry collaborations and income—to inputs—that is research publications. These remodellings are certain to be reinforced in the foreshadowed changes to research funding under Minister Tehan. There is a strong ideological core to the Watt report based on the assumption that the public research sector is wasteful and requires the discipline of the more innovative private sector. This is despite the evidence that Australian business spending on research is below and trails that the OECD average (Jayasuriya & Johnson, 2016). Moreover, the political impact of the agenda is to marginalize research that does not have direct industry or commercial imperatives including basic scientific research and social science research. The research funding changes will prove to be particularly deleterious for the social sciences and humanities where commercial or industry collaborations are low. As Jayasuriya and Johnson (2016) point out, the Watt Report contains an ideologically charged ‘narrow understanding of ‘industry’ that does not reflect the broad conception of the diverse industries that make up a successful twenty-first-century economy. For example, issues around the broad service industries sector, including aged care, cultural industries and development are increasingly important components of the emerging post-industrial capitalist economy but are displaced by industries that have captured the government’s policy agenda. This market agenda dovetails with the right-wing populist attacks on the social sciences and humanities and the culture wars examined earlier. It is the mixture of markets and populism that is driving the crisis of the depoliticized regulatory research agenda. The politics of this shift towards a market-based research system will shape the contours of the emerging research funding framework. In this context, one key element of this new agenda will be the move away from competitive funding to a block grant system. It would be premature to suggest that this might signal a return to an earlier model of research governance. The emerging system of block grants will be highly targeted towards industry-based funding and at the level of local institutions it will privilege corporate interests, In short, such

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a model will once again reshape the politics of research funding towards the market. The Watt report and the more industry-based research funding model will have a significant impact on the political science discipline. The effects will be felt in three key areas: first, a renewed emphasis on industrybased funding is likely to have an impact on the ability of members of the profession to access research funding. This is likely to reduce research capacity in the political science discipline. Second, the type of research projects that will be funded will be determined by industrybased sources. Even those with third sector funding will be pushed to undertake more applied research that can be shown to be policy relevant. Research that is critical and more theoretical focused will be significantly affected by these market-based decisions. Finally, promotions within the discipline will be based on the capacity to attract research funding rather than well-regarded publications—exemplifying the tension between instrumentalism and depoliticization that is detailed in this chapter.

Conclusion The core argument of this chapter is that the regulation of research funding has been shaped by the tension between two twin interrelated objectives: depoliticization and the instrumentalization of research in the service of commercial objectives. It is the growing contradiction between these objectives that has led governments to pursue a more overt statedirected strategy for the allocation of research funding. The last decade and a half has been dominated by conservative governments that have sought to pursue both a populist and a market-based agenda to shape the research funding system. Research funding—especially in the social sciences and humanities—has been the subject of numerous political attacks by conservatives for pursuing what they perceive as a cosmopolitan political agenda that is not in the purview of what they define as the national interest. The recent introduction of the national interest tests exemplified how these instrumentalist and populist elements have come together in way that has undermined the regulatory research funding regime under the ‘pub test’ guise of defending political interference in research as the voice of the people. At the same time, these forces have combined with a more market-oriented strategy which is aimed at a

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greater coercive push to make research more directly attended to commercial interests. It is this right-wing market populist agenda that is now posing challenges to the strategy of depoliticization of research funding and moving towards a more authoritarian strategy to coerce research funding in a commercial and instrumental direction. These changes in the politics of research funding have had a major impact on the political science discipline. The organization and norms of the discipline have been shaped by the growing emphasis on ‘quality audits’. This has led, for example, to robust debate within the profession on journal rankings and the pressure for academics to publish in quality journals. The profession has sought to accommodate a wide range of views on journal ranking but the effect has been that choice of journals increasingly shape the nature of research. Political science departments are increasingly dependent on internal research funds for their performance in research quality audits and these, in turn, shape the choice of research agendas. At the same time, the emphasis on industry-based funding has placed pressure on academics to align their research agendas with the interests of funding agencies. For example, the growth in defence and security-related funding has put pressure on academics to focus on research areas of interest to defence and security agencies. The upshot of these developments in the allocation of research funding is to diminish the sources of funding for critical political science research. This together with conservative-led attacks on social science and humanities research means that the capacity for political science to contribute to robust debate and research on key problems and challenges in political life is significantly threatened.

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CHAPTER 6

The Unplanned and Underfunded Co-option of Political Science in France Raul Magni-Berton and Pierre Squevin

Classic models of state–academe relationships proceed on the assumption that states need academia, and academia needs states. That interdependence raises a fundamental issue: Who manages to control the scientific agenda? As regards France, the model is partly inadequate, especially in the case of political science. On the one hand, the French state cares little about the academic world—especially the social sciences—in part because expertise is sufficiently generated in-house and rarely outsourced. While France has the largest fundamental science agency—the CNRS (National Centre for Scientific Research; in French Centre national de la recherche scientifique)—former CNRS president Alain Fuchs declared in 2015 that “the knowledge produced by social sciences has not found an audience in

R. Magni-Berton (B) Université Grenoble Alpes, Grenoble, France e-mail: [email protected] P. Squevin Catholic University of Louvain, Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Eisfeld and M. Flinders (eds.), Political Science in the Shadow of the State, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75918-6_6

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political action”. On the other hand, political science is highly dependent on the state because it suffers from a lack of visibility in the public sphere and in international disciplinary debates. This asymmetry causes political scientists to be relatively free from political direction. Yet, they often freely choose to serve, in some way, political or bureaucratic interests rather than those of the public. The present chapter illustrates that mechanism with the help of two case studies about external political shocks that might have provided political science with high visibility. First, since January 2015 France has suffered several bloody terrorist attacks. Second, since November 2018, a large protest movement—the yellow vests—has notably been demanding the introduction of direct democracy. The first case illustrates how the government may need to legitimize its actions by co-opting political scientists in order to avoid possible challenges by academics. The second case focuses on a social crisis that called into question an established cooperation between political science and the state with a joint focus on participatory democracy. Surprisingly, political scientists did not specifically react to the yellow vests’ popular demand, became barely visible and remained trapped by their past approach. In both cases, political science failed to offer an alternative agenda to that of the state. Both events did not increase the number of scientific works that dealt with terrorism or democracy in an alternative way, compared to that adopted by the state. The argument defended in this chapter is that French political science is scientifically and politically marginalized. On the one hand, from the state’s point of view political scientists are neither powerful allies nor dangerous opponents. They do not manage to significantly influence policies, and, at best, can only infrequently legitimize them. On the other hand, they are unable to produce a visible, viable alternative political diagnosis of social problems, but merely a criticism of what the state does. This marginality is the consequence of two historical processes. First, the existence of special schools (Grandes écoles ), inherited from the monarchy and reorganized during the French Revolution, subsequently under the Napoleonic reign. More prestigious than universities, they are charged with providing highly skilled, committed and trained civil servants who devote themselves from the start of their careers to serving the State (Thuillier, 1983). Once professionally active, their students play a key role in the provision of expertise to the state, thereby substituting academics. Second, partly due to that organization, the divide became particularly salient during the Cold War, since universities turned

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into places of contestation (as in 1968). While the latter, at that time, played a major role in civic debates and social movements, the progressive divorce between academics and civil society has pushed French universities towards a relative marginalization, sometimes scarcely visible to the public, seldom consulted by public authorities. Beyond the specific context of France, this chapter sheds light on ways in which the relationship between the state and political science finds expression. The case of France demonstrates that the existence of a ‘protected space’—defined in terms of time and resources controlled by academics to deal with problems, without suffering career setbacks (Whitley et al., 2018: 112)—is not enough to guarantee academic independence. In France, academic careers are indeed protected. Young academics are tenured after merely one year following their recruitment. The systems of research funding and career advancement are largely selfmanaged by academics. French academia enjoys probably one of the best protected academic spaces in the world. It belongs not, however, among the most independent. The paradox is therefore that this distance from the state does not work as a buffer allowing for academic autonomy and intellectual independence. The case of France exemplifies two other conditions for guaranteeing academic independence. First, the state should, to some extent, depend on academic research to satisfy its need for expertise. There is a strong inclination towards building in-house expertise. A lack of intellectual competition or challenge coming from academe which might reduce internal experts’ authority effectively means that the state is able to shield itself from criticism and undesired evidence. If the state succeeds in making itself independent or quasi-independent from academic research, the capacity of the latter to impose its agenda considerably decreases. Especially in the social sciences, alternative agendas may then become equivalent to mere political opinions hostile to the government’s line. Second, public research should not depend too largely on the state. An ability to attract funds from different levels of government—European, national and local—and from civil society—which includes associations, firms, and organizations—is likely to better protect its independence. When the state has a funding monopoly, its temptation to influence research content is high. Added to this is the fact that the independence of public research requires an audience if it is to take effect. When such audience is absent, the state’s capacity to step in and provide an audience could considerably affect the dynamics at work within the academe.

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In-House Generated Expertise vs. Academically Produced Knowledge: State Actors’ General Disregard for Political Science In order to enter the French civil service as high, middle rank, but also as lower rank administrators, specific steps and ways of access need to be followed. First, citizens who feel a vocation to invest in an administrative career at any level in one of the three branches of the civil service (state, territorial and hospital services), regularly study in specifically designed higher education institutions that are in fact ‘civil service schools’ (grandes écoles de services publics ), but not in universities, which is a French peculiarity (Biland & Gally, 2018; Musselin, 2017). Those institutions of higher learning, destined to train future public professionals, are either engineering and technical or administrative schools, the best-known and illustrious administrative school being the ENA (Ecole Nationale d’Administration). Access to those schools is granted to students who have succeeded in passing competitive exams (written and oral), ordinarily after previous bachelor and master’s degrees. Installed in Napoleonic times at the beginning of the nineteenth century, this pervasive logic based on concours to allocate positions has survived till today (Taine, 2011: 1350–1380). It automatically provides a lot of credit and legitimacy to candidates who succeed at the toughest and most competitive concours. Positive achievements at entry exams, but also derived from the aforementioned institution of higher learning, such as the ‘grandes écoles ’, at the same time help to secure or enhance social status through merit-acquisition and the attribution of lifelong distinctions and titles (Suleiman, 1974: 72–98). This is why, for instance, each year, to enter ENA, hundreds upon hundreds of contenders prepare the concours, hoping to do well, aiming to take one of the 80–90 available places at the end of the selection procedure. The ENA is still viewed as one of the main ways to access the regime’s most senior administrative posts. The French state is characterized by the existence of major administrative corps (Conseil d’État, Inspection des finances, Cour des comptes, …)1 and technical corps (engineers of the Mines and of the Ponts et Chaussées ) 1 To be more exhaustive, the corps préfectoral and the diplomatic corps, the corps of inspectors such as Inspection Générale de l’administration, Inspection Générale des Affaires Sociales, the corps of INSEE statisticians, can also be added to this list.

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at its heart. Those are groups of high-placed career civil servants, which are often being referred to as the ‘grand corps ’. Joining a corps does not happen overnight; very high educational requirements need to be satisfied first. Sitting on the bench of one of the grandes écoles such as ENA, or the école Polytechnique, is absolutely necessary. Subsequent to a ranking, those schools’ best-performing students earn the right to choose their future ‘corps ’ of belonging. They then spend years of training within the institutions, picking up much valued competences and gaining respectability. In the past century, they were called grands commis de l’Etat, indicating the honour of serving the State and complete dedication to the public cause and the general interest. The grands corps still are very well implanted across ministries and sectors, holding a firm grip over the administrative life of the Republic. Professional training in a small number of schools and the following grooming phase within public institutions tend to produce somewhat homogeneous élites. They also push for “inbreeding” in the production of knowledge, as it is considerably easier, even encouraged, to rely on methods and contents stemming from trusted sources inside the state apparatus rather than from outside actors such as academics, with whom high civil servants share little and who are located at a distance. It has even been argued that it was practically the administrative profession itself that defined and reconstructed the organization of the knowledge-production structure (Fourcade, 2009). As an outcome, a strong, internal, in-house state expertise is generated, continuously reproduced and retained by specific groups. Those groups, among which the ‘grand corps de l’Etat’ belong, and which play a role in various organizations and bodies internal or peripheral to the State, consequently hold an explicit “monopoly over the production of knowledge and expertise on and for policies” (Biland & Gally, 2018). Several organizations dominate the production of state expertise. France stratégie, a part of the prime minister’s services, has emerged as one of the main expertise-providers in the institutional landscape. It coordinates a network of eight (high) councils, such as the Economic Analyses Council, the High Council for Employment, or the High Council of the Climate. Many other consultative organs, advisory bodies and commissions have sprung up and operate across policy sectors and domains, widening and deepening state expertise when needed. Looking at the composition of those numerous advisory bodies and consultative organs once again confirms the sweeping presence of high civil servants and the

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grand corps, who act as gatekeepers and coopt each other in distributing positions. High civil servants tend to colonize think tanks and foundations too. A major idea behind this ‘expert’, some might say ‘technocratic’, career pattern is that the central administration ensures the continuity of the state through changes of government, when most heads of ministries, cabinet members and ministerial advisers will be replaced, or even more disruptive political transformations. Senior civil servants therefore represent a solid and permanent reference point for elected officials in terms of expertise, policy-relevant information, and practical experience. Additionally, careers in senior civil service remain highly attractive when it comes to material benefits and rewards. Indeed, salaries of French academics (teachers/researchers) in general or political science and other social science researchers in particular, although substantial, could be qualified as not particularly gratifying when compared to those of high civil servants. At the outset of her or his career, a university professor will receive just over 3000 euros per month. Towards the end of that career and with seniority, the same university professor’s income might roughly amount to 5000–6000 euros. It goes without saying that lecturers earn relatively less. CNRS researchers have salary grids that do not differ very much from those of their colleagues that are teachers/researchers. As for senior civil servants, some of them are even better paid than elected politicians or even the French President. For the 1% best-paid public agents (approximately 20,000 individuals working in public service), salaries amount to at least 6370 euros, while average incomes are higher. Therefore, a teacher/researcher or CNRS political science researcher, even in later career stages, will always be less well-off in terms of salary than high civil servants, adding to the prestige of the latter over the former. This prestige differential is amplified considering that teachers/researchers have themselves a status of state civil servants à part entière. Among OECD countries, France is the purest example of the careerbased system described before, in which employees are recruited at lower levels and move up to higher positions throughout their civil service career. Almost no recruitment for top managers and special experts is open to external applicants. In comparing department heads and cabinet members at the ministries of economy in France and the United States, Brookes (2018) documents that in France, 61.4% have completed one of the elite Parisian schools, while only 33.4% in the United States have graduated from an Ivy League university. As a consequence, a mere 7%

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hold a Ph.D. in France (versus 14.4% in the US), and 11.4% have experience in academic research (versus 24.5% in the US). Similar data may be found regarding ministerial offices in general, composed of individuals who are politically appointed to serve as the closest aides to ministers. In those key organizations at the core of the executive, only a minority (less than 10%) of ministerial advisers had previous professional occupations in higher education and research institutions before working in ministerial cabinets, and their passage in ministerial entourages was of comparatively shorter duration (Bellon et al., 2018; Mathiot & Sawicki, 1999). Even among elected officials who have won a mandate as members of the French Parliament (with the National Assembly as its lower house and the Senate as its upper house), profiles do not differ a great deal. National MPs happen to be mostly civil servants or professional career politicians, and their experience outside politics is limited (Rozenberg & Surel, 2018: 143). That includes the private sector and academia (although MPs are entitled to continue teaching as professors). Consequently, it looks as if the political terrain in France is not particularly open to contenders with academic and researcher profiles. That, in turn, might push political scientists further away from the sphere of politics, as they have very few peers in the executive or legislative branches of government who might sponsor drawing on the discipline. Unsurprisingly, such division of labour has relevant consequences for relations between academic researchers in political science and policymakers. When preparing, making and applying decisions on public policies, representatives of the state are not known to attach great weight to what political scientists have to offer. Indeed, state actors and researchers follow their own career paths and generally go on separate ways; examples of bridges being built between the two separate worlds are few. In a flash of wit, Jean Leca, a political scientist who has been involved in the Conseil scientifique de l’évaluation des politiques publiques (CSE, Scientific Council for Evaluating Public Policies, established in 1990) and has witnessed those difficulties, referred to the paradox of evaluation: “When something is feasible for the decision-maker, it happens to be useless. When it is useful for the decision-maker, it is impossible to carry out” (1993). Independence of the French state from academia is not restricted to political science. Other social sciences, particularly law and economics, have undergone processes of incorporation into the state apparatus

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(Fourcade, 2009). Political science, however, has remained singularly under-considered as a potential candidate for such incorporation. Although included in teaching programmes with courses on political sociology or policy studies, traditionally political science is neither ideally nor firmly established in the aforementioned public-service schools,2 and a specialization in one of its fields carries little weight for career progress and future promotions. Economics, public finance and accounting, public management, public and administrative law, among others, are more prized subject matters, in which students may obtain a wellrecognized, but also a very practicable skill set and toolkit for later stages in their public careers. Another characteristic of those schools is that students are very often trained by professionals, not by academics. As a result, political and administrative elites, once out of school and arrived in responsible positions, have no real notion of what political science is about, whether and how it could be useful and relevant. From the outset, that makes state representatives quite impervious to any analyses based on political research. In the eyes of public authorities, political science remains particularly small and invisible. The responsible ministry labelled it a ‘rare discipline’ in December 2014, due to the limited number of political scientists in higher education and research institutions across the nation. Social and political sciences are only exceptionally mentioned in public by state actors and politicians, and not always in positive terms, which partially suggests the value attributed to those research communities. In fact, politicians sometimes send undisguised signals of distrust and contempt, blaming universities and the social sciences for their allegedly questionable role. The picture drawn is not one of trustworthy and reliable experts, but of socially or politically engaged bearers of suspect ideas and opinions, and from there, potential troublemakers and disturbers. In summer 2020, in a period marked by demonstrations and the ‘Black Lives Matter’ movement, even President Emmanuel Macron declared: “The universities’ world has been guilty. It promoted the ethnicization of the social question, thinking that they had hit the motherlode. The prospect

2 Even ‘technical’ schools, like the école des ponts et chausées, or AgroParisTec, include political science chairs, but in very small numbers.

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can only be ‘sécessionniste’. This comes down to breaking the Republic in two”.3 These words were perceived as an attack by many social and political scientists, who were left wondering about the extent of their academic freedom to touch upon contentious issues such as discrimination, applying concepts that apparently were being denounced as problematic. It occasionally seems that politicians not restricted to the populist camp would prefer if social and political scientists would stay quiet in academia, lowering their tone, continue doing their job and trying not to make too many waves and to trespass their classical roles as teachers and researchers. What is true nationally is also true locally, and politicians might not like that academics take positions and stand in support of specific projects, programmes and parties. Lack of understanding or negative reactions by political actors might easily ensue.

A Neglected Discipline’s Dilemma: No Political Steering, No Public Relevance, Ending-Up with State Co-option by Choice Faced with the state’s lack of interest in the expertise of social scientists, political scientists find themselves in a particularly awkward situation, because, compared to other social sciences, political science does not spark the interest of other public players, be it international academic organizations or French NGOs (Déloye & Mayer, 2008). The present section offers four reasons for that situation: absence of a strong tradition and of influential figures; a political science community relatively turned inwards, with a weak interest for such communities elsewhere, which in turn might divert attention away from French conditions; the discipline’s lack of unity in the national arena; finally, its small size. Unlike other social sciences such as economics, law or sociology, political science is short of a well-established tradition in France. Political scientists are poorly known beyond their own domestic turf. For example, the Encyclopedia Britannica provides a list of famous political scientists 3 «Le monde universitaire a été coupable», «Il a encouragé l’ethnicisation de la question sociale en pensant que c’était un bon filon», a poursuivi le président. «Or, le débouché ne peut être que sécessionniste. Cela revient à casser la République en deux». Le Monde, June 30, 2020.

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which includes three French names: Jean Jacques Rousseau, Alexis de Tocqueville and Raymond Aron. All of them are long dead, and only the latter lived in the twentieth century. Conversely, French political science figures best known internationally like Maurice Duverger are not very famous nor well-recognized on French soil. That lack of recent authoritative figures is also apparent within French academia itself: In a recent survey of academics, political science was the only discipline whose members, when questioned about the author who influenced them most, mainly chose two scholars who were not political scientists: sociologists Max Weber and Pierre Bourdieu (François & Magni-Berton, 2015). This has caused political scientists to often refer to themselves as political sociologists, electoral sociologists, policy sociologists etc., suggesting that they are unwilling to fully accept the label ‘political science’. Overall, no structured and influential research has yet been developed in French political science, which surely does not help to bring about a well-defined and outstanding disciplinary identity, an achievement that could attract the public gaze together and stimulate a demand for insights and expert judgements. Another sign indicative of the discipline’s difficulties to be acknowledged by the public is that vast portions of the French population, when asked about political science, think primarily of ‘Sciences Po’, a famous elite school in Paris, rather than of an academic discipline. This is even more detrimental since neighbouring disciplines such as economics or sociology have recurrently produced influential figures. Recently, some such as Pierre Bourdieu in sociology, Thomas Piketty in economics or Dan Sperber in cognitive science have even ventured into fields that would normally be considered the classic terrain of political science, like democracy and political representation, or political campaign finance. Along with the lack in intellectual tradition, maybe because of it, current research in political science remains weakly disseminated and visible internationally4 (Déloye & Mayer, 2008). Based on the publications of French political scientists during four years (2003–2006), Jobard (2010) concludes that a mere twelve per cent of full-time political science

4 Regarding the involvement of French political scientists in international political science associations, both Jacques Chapsal and Jean Leca were IPSA presidents. There were three French IPSA general secretaries as well (the last in the 1960s). However, it is very clear that those individuals belong to other development periods of French political science and another generation than those of today.

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researchers have published in peer-reviewed journals listed by the Social Sciences Citation Index, and none in the top 10 most-cited journals. In a survey designed to determine French academics’ publication strategies, Grossman (2010) explains this lack of international visibility by an excessive concentration on French-language journals that are not listed in international databases. The seven most mentioned academic journals to which French political scientist preferably submit articles are national outlets entirely published in French. Moreover, four of these are not classified as political science journals. Among the fourteen journals most chosen, only two published articles in another language (International Organization and West European Politics ). Finally, between 2013 and 2017, less than 6% of the discipline’s junior scientists had obtained their Ph.Ds. abroad (Smith, 2020). That massive strategy consisting of first seeking to acquire domestic visibility reduces the capacity of French political scientists to attract international attention. It not only diminishes their impact on cross-national research programmes or in obtaining international grants but also might work to the discipline’s disadvantage when it comes to influencing the overall nation-wide scientific agenda. Indeed, an international research agenda tends to strongly legitimize a national focus on specific issues. In contrast, when national scholarly debates are dissociated from international discussions, the former runs the risk of losing part of their domestic legitimacy. Third, the lack of influential figures and a relative isolation from international developments in political science could have been compensated by a discipline with a strong profile. In other words, French political science might have evolved into a well-defined whole with distinct core themes and boundaries. That did not happen at all. The level of disciplinary homogeneity may be assessed by comparing the congruence of the rankings of French academic journals. For reasons previously pointed out in this chapter, in France no international index is used to classify or rank academic journals. Therefore, two French public agencies have produced their own classification, based on information provided by French academics. Interestingly, Briatte (2008) demonstrates that there is no robust correlation between the indices published by these two agencies. This reveals the difficulty of arriving at a consensual way to identify professionally relevant knowledge and explains why a large majority of French political scientists oppose any ranking of journals in their discipline (Grossman, 2010). Internal disparateness is also revealed by the fact

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that, among French academics from all disciplines, political scientists— along with anthropology and linguistics—display the most heterogeneous opinions about what “science” means (François & Magni-Berton, 2015). In sum, French political science remains a field of inquiry fraught with controversies and divisions, unable to speak with a single voice. This lack of homogeneity is particularly prejudicial as French political science is a small size discipline. In total, it accounts for only 0.7% of French academics and is among the smallest social sciences (Déloye & Mayer, 2019). With roughly five hundred scholars either in tenured positions as teacher-researchers in higher education institutions (around 130 professors and 240 lecturers), or working as full-time researchers, e.g. for the CNRS (which has a research staff of around 120), the discipline exists in an increasingly crowded environment.5 In three higher education disciplines, a competitive national examination called “agrégation” is the main way for academics to become full professors: law, where some 25 full professors are nominated each year; economics and management with, before the reform, about 50 full professors recruited per year; and political science, with about 3 such positions filled each year. That comparatively small number favours inertia and might be viewed as a hindrance to internal renewal. The difference in size also means that political science is subject to encroachments from larger disciplines such as law, sociology and economics. Moreover, discrepancies between social sciences have not diminished: During the last few years, political science has even experienced a reduction in new positions and an increase of budgetary cuts (Déloye & Mayer, 2019). This overview highlights how vulnerable French political science actually is. A young, small, divided, and inward-looking discipline, it suffers from lack of visibility in the national public space and in international debates. While the state does not exert particular pressure on French political science, the discipline cannot survive without state aid. Under these conditions, the Chomskyan dilemma—either evolving into a technocratic and policy-oriented intellectual or into a critical value-oriented intellectual—should be considered in a new light. The first strategy is tricky. Given that governmental demand for political knowledge is low, political scientists have to convincingly demonstrate their capacity to 5 This number of five hundred individuals comes from an attempt to count members of the discipline in the framework of the COST project ‘ProSEPS’, supported by the French association of political science (AFSP).

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provide helpful contributions. Such a persuasive approach requires either high competence or great deference, since contradicting government agendas may result in being ignored. On the other hand, the second strategy is difficult to implement on the basis of a marginalized discipline, contributing to a certain professional resignation and isolation. Behaving as a critical value-oriented intellectual requires acknowledgement of the views and concepts of activists (including intellectuals) from civil society. Lack of professional visibility may allow them to become, at best, critical value-oriented citizens among many others similarly engaged. This dilemma easily leads some political scientists to anticipate the desires of the state so as to garner attention. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, policymakers without much effort and quite unexpectedly would end up benefiting from the consent, if not from resigned acceptance, of their own agenda and priorities by a part of the political science community.

National Funding and the Government Agenda Despite the emergence of additional EU and sub-national (in the case of France, through regional tiers of governance) instruments of funding, nationally allocated research means continue to provide a major financial resource for French political science. Starting to grow during the 1960s—an increase particularly sustained over the last two decades—that allocation corresponded to the model of project-based funding, as distinguished from pure performance-based or input-based models which have also been applied to French higher education and research institutions (Musselin, 2019: 51–72). The main research funder in France is the National Research Agency, Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR). Created in 2005, the ANR became the national key player in charge of project-based research funding, for “basic” as well as for applied or “targeted” research. National research institutions like the well-known CNRS, but also ministries (e.g. the Ministry for Higher Education and Research) which had previously handled research funding, lost that capacity to the ANR, which came to centralize funding management—back then a change not warmly welcomed by research institutions, as they were dispossessed from what used to serve as their own budgets (Musselin, 2014: 60). The ANR is structured around three core processes: first, the programming of research, second, the selection of research projects, and third,

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research monitoring, evaluation and follow-up. Researchers who respond to ANR calls and submit project proposals inevitably compete with each another for finite resources. Assessment of research projects and decisions on grants are mainly the task of seven selection committees and are based on peer-review, as the committees are composed of scientists. Since the ANR’s creation, its budget of intervention has been fluctuating. At its historic maximum in 2009, it shrank until 2015, followed by a progressive uptick until 2019 (Dupin & Quirion, 2019). Closely connected to variations in the budget of intervention is the selection rate. As ANR budgets decreased, that rate also fell, reaching all-time low levels around 10% in 2014–2015, significantly less than in other European countries—much lower, for instance, than selection rates of the German Research Foundation (40%) or the Swiss National Fund (35%). Merely guessing specific rates of political science projects is particularly tricky, as the information is widely dispersed across higher education and research institutions which may have data about how many projects have been submitted, by whom, and how many have finally been selected. As budgets of intervention recently started to rise again and are projected to continue their upward trend, overall selection rates might become higher and more research projects be supported. Much as other disciplines, political science has no choice but to complete the selection process, trying to maximize its chances of success. Based on reports and a variety of other documents, Andy Smith (2020) found that, in a twelve-year period (2005–2017), the ANR funded as many as 59 research projects, among which political science was strongly represented. He also calculated that the latter represented 15% of the total (380) officially stated to have been funded in the social sciences and humanities, which he interprets as more than a decent performance against the backdrop of the discipline’s size and weight. Of course, political science is also involved in projects where its role may be less central or even marginal, for instance in multidisciplinary ventures. One imperfect way to provide a non-exhaustive estimate of the number of ANR-funded projects where political science is mentioned and therefore potentially involved is to use a search engine for projectfinding called ‘ScanR’ that has been developed by the French Ministry for Research and Higher Education. Using the terms ‘science politique’, ‘sociologie politique’, ‘political science’, “relations internationales ” to tap into project descriptions and/or project participants’ names (for example, foundation nationale des sciences politiques, FNSP), the engine detects

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173 projects that were funded by the ANR from 2005 to 2020, more than twice the core number identified by Andy Smith for a shorter period (2005–2017). Everything considered, those 173 projects represent about 0.8% of all ANR-funded projects (total: 20,252) for the period and across the range of disciplines. Apart from the ANR, other institutions and organizations such as individual ministries or public agencies at times offer (financial) support to research projects, networks and groups. Members of the political science community strategically navigate between the various available funding sources and employ different strategies to arrive at their target. They have also access to resources and funds that may be more or less tied to specific societal or economic challenges, or even to issues that happen to resonate well with those figuring on the government agenda. For that reason, risks of co-option of parts of political science by the state, through research funding, do exist in the French case, and the discipline is not completely immune from external interference. First, apart from individual projects, state authorities are always prepared to promote and fund what has been branded scientific excellence. In France, since 2011, that has taken the form of LABEX, which are ‘excellent research labs’ in all disciplines, including the social sciences and the humanities. Funding those scientific units is seen as a state investment in the future (programmes d’investissement d’avenir de l’Etat: PIA) and as a way to foster innovation. It has joined forces with another initiative called IDEX (initiative d’excellence) whose purpose is to encourage the building of multidisciplinary alliances on what are to become excellent university ‘sites’. Both instruments were inspired by the German Excellence initiative (Sursock, 2015: 24). Requests for LABEX proposals are usually published once or twice per year. Once collected, projects are assessed and ranked by an international jury of experts, on which a couple of political scientists might sit. From 2011 onwards, 171 LABEX projects have been selected in two sequences. Decisions to prolong a LABEX grant can be taken after an evaluation process also carried out by an international jury of experts. Within LABEX, teams might adopt a pronounced multidisciplinary and multi-topic character, involving the cooperation of research organizations and individuals cutting across different traditions and fields. In 2018, the human and social sciences accounted for 26% of LABEX projects, the biggest proportion of any discipline. Along with other social science and humanities disciplines, political science has been participating in

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two LABEX biddings: LIEPP and TEPSIS, both located in the Parisian region. If, therefore, only a minority of political scientists are involved with LABEX, the initiative nonetheless gave political research a chance to gain weight by working in teams with sometimes well-recognized researchers in economics, sociology, history, etc. and be pushed to the fore. It has been empirically shown that LABEX may reduce inequalities within selected communities and enhance co-authorship (Carayol & Henry, 2020). Political science may have benefited from this, also to some degree increasing its visibility, both nationally and internationally. Conversely, it could be argued that taking part in LABEX might cause political science to be swallowed up by larger and more popular disciplines like economics. Signals of scientific excellence in certain domains might attract stakeholders, policymakers and state actors, who might think of LABEX as a potential source for generating and supplying expertise. Research valorization and dissemination, which are part of the LABEX raison d’être, could drive state policymakers to take an interest in the analyses produced and communicated via those platforms,6 possibly establishing points of contact between the academic and governmental spheres, where policy-relevant knowledge and information are exchanged. The fact that researchers active within some LABEX units try to safeguard their own autonomy through deontology charters laying down rules of professional conduct says something about potential conflicts that may arise from academics being perceived as serving outside interests. Second, national leaders would also like to see France evolve into a scientific powerhouse in the world. To achieve that goal, instruments have been evolved to promote the internationalization of French research. Here again, the ANR has at its disposal specifically designed tools to fund projects based on international partnership between countries; for example, between Québec and France or between Germany and France. A few political scientists have proved able to win such grants, which demand existing cross-Channel, cross-Atlantic or intra-European networks. The discipline’s low internationalization worked probably as an impediment in that pursuit. It seems that comparatists were better placed to succeed. Third, another important strategy that may be used by political scientists is to target non-thematic, blue-sky research funds. Looking at what 6 Members of the LIEPP teams (Laboratory for Interdisciplinary Evaluation of Public Policies) notably draft policy briefs and notes readable and usable by policymakers.

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kind of political science projects have been selected in the past, a large number evidently received funding through that kind of instruments, often called white programmes (programmes blancs ), assessment criteria for which notably emphasized scientific ambition and originality. Funding for young researchers (JCJC), for database and corpus creation also pertains to that category of non-thematic, more basic research funding. The future of this sort of research funding is uncertain, as it appears that a theme-based variety of ANR funding has crept in over the last decade. The fragile equilibrium between funding basic and theme-related research might be upset, partly due to the fact that decision-makers and politicians may not always perceive the added value of fundamental research. Because non-thematic, blue-sky research is by its very nature least prone to suffer from government interference, the discipline’s autonomy could suffer if it were forced to turn to more theme-based support. Lastly, in this context, to aim at obtaining such theme-related funding would be an important option left to members of the political science community. Recently, ANR so-called generic funds were included in previously specified research axes, part of seven scientific domains, such as life sciences, environmental sciences, or social sciences and humanities. Traversal themes cutting across scientific domains were also defined. As has been stressed, the share of social sciences and humanities in ANR theme-based funding was very small; from 2005 and 2013, for instance, it did not amount to more than 4–5%, while non-thematic funding was almost doubled. In sum, roughly 900 social sciences and humanities projects were annually submitted. Subsequently, during a second period starting in 2014, the number of such projects submitted to the ANR significantly dropped from 500 to 400, which should be attributed to the disappearance of nontheme-related “white” programmes. Political scientists have thus been increasingly dependent on a range of topics that may or may not appeal to them. Nonetheless, a number of themes have surfaced to which political scientists are typically attracted. Dating back to 2008, the theme ‘to govern and to administer’ (gouverner et administrer) provided considerable research funding for the discipline. Later in 2014, ‘Law, democracy, governance and new frames of reference’ was another thematic orientation that offered funding opportunities due to its proximity with political scientists’ research interests. Programmes like ‘Les Suds’ I & II, ‘conflicts, war(s) and violence’, themes about governance, globalization, but also

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environment, citizen security, fight against crime and terrorism provided more irregular sources of financial support since 2007. Themes such as these are singled out in programme-planning processes, to which ANR steering committees appoint individual and institutional representatives of scientific disciplines, but where civil servants from ministries and other stakeholders (like the CNRS, actors of private-sector research…) also play a key role. Themes decided in the programme phase and updated on a regular basis should normally conform to the National Research Strategy and to state strategic priorities. Issues on the government agenda may therefore always make their way into final research programmes. This also holds true for more specialized thematic tools, such as the extraordinary funds called ‘flash’ which the ANR provides. Calls for flash funds are launched in case of major calamities and external shocks such as earthquakes, diseases, etc., creating a need for scientific knowledge, in order to tackle serious issues in a firefighting manner. Political science might be involved in those projects, as it was in the flash ‘Asylum’ in 2016, or in 2020 in the flash ‘Covid’. Overall, arbitration between research and state strategic priorities remains unclear. It would be erroneous to believe that programming is simply a top-down process, leading to the smooth, direct and unaltered translation of government agendas into research goals and projects. There are bottom-up elements in the identification of research themes, with disciplines, including social sciences and humanities, sometimes solicited by ministries like the Ministry for Research and Higher Education to proactively suggest strategic priorities and themes, convinced that they might come up with relevant answers to some of the problems governments have to deal with. Regarding political science, the state-research relationship is illustrated by the development of the ATHENA alliance (Alliance thématique nationale des sciences humaines et sociales ) since 2010. This alliance—represented by the president of the CNRS—aims to provide strategic policies for the ANR and to specifically monitor and develop strategic orientations for research infrastructures in the humanities and social sciences. ATHENA works therefore as an intermediary between state and research. The result of its coordinated efforts consisted, in 2016, in embracing a set of research priorities for scholars, including radicalization and violence, the Near and Middle East, participatory sciences. These topics, in fact, subsequently evolved into important themes of ANR projects.

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Beyond the ANR, ministries, public agencies, and political science scholars sometimes sustain relationships, and interdependencies are thus generated. ADEME, the agency for ecological transition, funds approximately fifty Ph.D. studentships per year on specific themes linked to sustainability, the environment, agriculture, etc., including proposals from political science. The Ministry of Defense also finances social science research (doctoral and post-doctoral). The Ministry of the Interior is much interested in studies about radicalization and terrorism, and in close collaboration with a scientific committee has launched since 2016 annual requests for proposals on Islam, religion and society; an involvement of political scientists was envisaged. The same ministry is concerned with security and violence and participates—notably through its Center of Advanced Studies (centre des hautes études du ministère de l’intérieur: CHEMI)—in the funding of targeted research via calls for strategic and foresight studies. The Ministry of Justice is also active in financing research on the same topics. Adjunct to the prime minister’s services, the National Institute of Advanced Studies in Security and Justice (INHESJ, Institut national des hautes études de la sécurité et de la justice) is an important establishment that builds on a network of players, academe included, to perform research on, e.g. policing, radicalization processes, crisis management, which may create interfaces with political science. All in all, there are multiple ways in which the French State and its agencies can retain some degree of interest in political science, even outside the main channels of the number one national research funding agency. The latter, however, remains by far the main public funding organization. As regards the discipline’s relationship with the state, two case studies are offered below. In both, major social events provided a salient topic typically studied by political scientists: terrorism in 2015, direct democracy in 2018. The dilemma of either remaining marginal or seeking to follow the State’s agenda stands out in both cases. They offer, however, two different dynamics of this dilemma.

A Political Science Agenda Emerging from Political Shocks: The 2015 Islamist Terror Attacks Beginning in January 2015, the moment in which two brothers opened fire at the headquarters of the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo, a wave of Islamist deadly attacks ensued, by which more than 250 people were

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killed in five years, many more than all the victims of terrorism in the previous 45 years. Among the bloodiest and most spectacular attacks were the Bataclan attack in Paris in November 2015, the attacks on the Promenade des Anglais in Nice in July 2016, the assassination of a catholic priest that same month, plus the attacks in Carcassonne (2018) and Lyon (2019). Terrorism and political violence suddenly demanded attention, created a demand for expertise, and sparked debates, including within academia. However, two weeks after the November 2015 attacks, Prime Minister Manuel Valls surprisingly declared at the Senate: “I am tired of those who are always looking for excuses or cultural or sociological explanations for what happened”. This Prime Minister’s refusal to accept attempts at understanding why attacks are so prominent in France could be interpreted as a simple blunder, but it was not. He repeated the same position two months later, in a tribute to the victims of the ‘Hyper Cacher’ attack: “There can be no valid explanation. Because explaining almost means justifying”. Actually, after what we spelled out above, this reaction is arguably understandable. The government needs unity against Islamism and expects everybody to rally around the flag. It already disposes of its own expertise, information and intelligence on the topic. So, academic research may potentially involve criticism and objections to the government’s strategy, or refute views prevailing in French society. Did political scientists comply with the government’s “call to order”? Clearly not. Since 2015, 180 French journal articles displayed the term “terrorism” in their title, an increase of 107% over the previous five-year period. Many of these contributions (46%) were published in specialized political science journals. In these, the increase in the number of articles on terrorism amounted to 156%. Terrorist attacks have thus inspired political scientists despite the prime minister’s admonition. The fact alone, however, did not yet demonstrate the scholars’ autonomy from government steering. Contrasting with the Prime Minister’s public statements, the government initiated in November 2015 cooperation with the ATHENA alliance, which was, probably for the first time, considered the voice of French social science research. In a mission letter handed to the President of the Alliance by the Secretary of State in charge of Higher Education and Research, concrete proposals and a plan for action on the problem of terrorism were solicited. Noting that public research was insufficiently disseminated among decision-makers, the letter framed

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the research assignment as follows: “The mobilization of the scientific community is more than ever a crucial issue. Its values - lucidity, critical spirit, rigor and high standards - are the best bulwarks against dogmatism and obscurantism” (Fuchs, 2016: 72). Exactly as in the United States right after 9/11 terrorist attacks, the French government had followed up the 2015 attacks with an explanation that has guided its policies: terrorism is the result of a process of ideological radicalization (to be associated with the notions of dogmatism and obscurantism mentioned above). From that perspective, preventing terrorism essentially means de-radicalizing individuals. To accomplish this mission, the president of ATHENA (and of the CNRS) , Alain Fuchs, signed in March 2016 a report entitled: “Research on radicalization, the resulting forms of violence that result, and how societies may prevent and protect themselves from it”. This focus on radicalization is understandable in the light of the government members’ political interest. In the literature on terrorism (see Goodwin, 2019), two main explanations have been advanced. According to the first, international terrorism is above all a strategy of retaliation. In particular, Islamist transnational terrorism primarily targets countries particularly involved in a war against a Muslim country. That interpretation was dominant in Spain after the 2004 terrorist attack in Madrid. It caused both the incumbent, conservative prime minister Aznar, to be defeated in the March 2004 elections, and his challenger, the future socialist prime minister Zapatero, after the latter came to power, to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq. Since France is strongly involved in different wars against Muslim groups (especially in Iraq and Syria, Libya, Mali and the Central African Republic), such an explanation, beyond its merits, might prompt reconsidering the legitimacy of the government’s foreign policy. According to the second explanation, Islamist terrorism should be mainly associated with domestic causes, such as discrimination and the political exclusion of Muslims. These living conditions produce individual grievances that, in some rare cases, end up transforming individuals who have specific predispositions (such as psychological troubles or criminal records) into terrorists. This interpretation is less dangerous for governments, but leads nevertheless to criticism of the ways in which the government treats the country’s minorities. The interpretation has been politically endorsed in the Netherlands, where efforts at preventing

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terrorism are predominantly based on the protection of minorities, particularly Muslims (Fadil et al., 2019). However, this approach remains rather rare and, in the case of France, the Muslim community being quite large, the government might figure that it is too costly. In fact, it might be argued that Prime Minister Valls referred to this explanation when he declared that “explaining almost means justifying”. Contrary to these explanations, focusing on ideological radicalization presents several political advantages. First, it does not entail any blame for the government: Some Muslims radicalize due to international propaganda of radical Islamist groups, such as al Qaida or the Islamic State. For that process, the government bears no responsibility. On the contrary, it may be viewed by the citizens as their protector, uniting them in the common purpose to prevent further outrages. Second, radicalization is a sufficiently fuzzy concept to be considered as a necessary component to turn terrorist. Since all terrorists are radicalized, radicals can be preventively targeted by government action without many legal constraints. The interpretation’s political ramifications provide clear clues for explaining why governments, especially in countries targeted by terrorism such as France, largely promote the radicalization thesis. In France, that political posture has been implemented by enlarging the “interdepartmental fund for the prevention of delinquency” created in 2007. In 2016, it became the “interdepartmental fund for the prevention of delinquency and radicalization” and started to finance several pertinent initiatives including the first de-radicalization centre in September 2016. Since 2020, the programme explicitly involves the “fight against Islamism and communitarian isolation”, dedicating Euros 15.6 million to that fight over three years. Under these funding rules, many requests for proposals by social scientists have been launched at national and regional levels since 2016 (Samaan & Jacobs, 2020). France is not the only country that follows this line, but certainly it was among those whose government stressed the most the “ideological radicalization” thesis. To assess the extent to which those public choices may have impacted political science, we have determined the thematic orientation of publications on terrorism in French academic journals. With regard to the first explanation, we identified the number of articles whose abstracts included the words “terrorism” along with “foreign policy” or “military intervention”. Concerning the second explanation,

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we associated “terrorism” with “discrimination” or “exclusion”. Finally, a third group of articles combined, in their abstracts, “terrorism” and “radicalization”. During the period 2015–2020, the last group comprised 30 articles, amounting to 77% of the publications included in our research. The first group amounted to a mere 3 (8%), the second to 6 articles (15%). The pre-eminence of ideological radicalization may also be observed in the international literature (Goodwin, 2019). Still, the same research, if not restricted to French-language entries on the Web of Science, found 796 (64%) articles in the third group, 227 in the first group and 222 in the second group (around 18% in each case). This result indicates that the impact of the anti-terrorist policy based on the radicalization hypothesis has influenced French research to a greater extent than international research. This is not to say that French academics fully agree with their government. In some cases, the articles criticize the ideological radicalization approach. In other cases, they just describe government actions, rather than delving into and exploring the causes of terrorism. However, this does mean that the French government managed to effectively shape the research agenda to a larger extent than the average of English-publishing countries. Let us turn now to French political science outlets. 64% of the selected articles on terrorism were published in political science journals. The proportion of articles in each group is similar to that mentioned above for the entire sample. To assess the impact of specific incentives set by the government, we compared the scholarly output before and after 2015. Specifically, we focused on publications in French political science journals during 2005–2014 (9 years) and 2015–2020 (6 years). The number of articles included in the first (3) and in the second group (4) was identical in both periods, so that no increase in scholarly writing was found. It should be noted that the second period is shorter. Therefore, we may consider that the annual increase is after all similar and reflects the higher interest on this issue because of the terrorist events. In contrast, we found 10 articles on “terrorism and radicalization” during the first period and 19 during the second, which adds up to an increase of 90%. In this sample, we counted six articles adopting a critical approach. Interestingly, however, three of them are signed by foreign researchers originating from Denmark, the Netherlands and Kenya.

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During this period, many researchers—especially in political science— were picked to sit on advisory bodies. Subsequent to recommendations by ATHENA, the Scientific Council on Radicalization Processes (COSPRAD) was established in 2017 and attached to the Prime Minister’s Office.7 Five Ph.Ds. on the topic of radicalization were planned to be funded each year by the Council. In 2019, the inter-ministerial Committee for the Prevention of Criminality and Radicalism (CIPDR) also financed several Ph.D. theses. Approximately a hundred theses on radicalization were written during 2018–2019, a major part in political science. Researchers focusing on possible links between foreign policy and terrorism or between discrimination and terrorism were progressively marginalized. This caused the president of the Foundation “House of Human Sciences” (Maison des sciences de l’homme)—a specialist on political violence—to resign in July 2020 and to publicly declare that “le pouvoir has created the ATHENA alliance”. Several months later, in November 2020, over one hundred public personalities, among them seven political scientists, published an op-ed in which they highlighted the impact of France foreign wars on terrorism and denounced a situation in which “attacks committed by fanatical terrorists merit no other explanation than this tautology: they are committed by fanatical terrorists”. In view of this (barely visible) debate, the Minister of Public Education, Jean-Michel Blanquer, publicly maintained in October 2020: “I am thinking of the intellectual complicity of terrorism. Our society has been too permeable to currents of thought, (…), to an ‘Islamo-leftism’ which wreaks havoc in universities”.8 Like Valls five years earlier, a representative of the state insinuated that a part of the universities was sympathizing with terrorists. The above comparison between three different explanations of terrorism illustrates two different mechanisms at work in the relationships between policymakers and political scientists. The first mechanism is a direct consequence of the independence of political power from academia. Following the first murderous attacks, social sciences and humanities were initially suspected by the government to be more of a hindrance than a help. That did not discourage political scientists from expanding the

7 In that scientific council, almost half of 13 experts may be considered as coming from the political science community. 8 Interview on Radio Europe 1, October 22, 2020.

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number of publications about terrorism. Subsequently, the government developed a sweeping programme based on the idea that terrorism is mainly due to “ideological radicalization”. That agenda came to largely dominate debates in political science journals, even though in many cases it did not escape criticism. However, criticism hardly acquired visibility on the national level. In sum, despite relative autonomy from political power, parts of political science may follow the government agenda, when it offers funding—and possibly career—opportunities.

Political Science Non-research into Political Shocks: The 2018 “Yellow Vest” Protest Movement In 2017, a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center revealed that in every European country, direct democracy was desired by a majority of the population. That result scored particularly high in southern European countries, including France with 74% of respondents supporting it. In November 2018, an unprecedented social movement, the “yellow vests”, emerged in France, protesting against rising fuel prices and high living costs. After two weeks, the movement switched towards a very clear priority: the introduction of direct democracy in the form of citizeninitiated referenda, inspired by the Swiss model (Egger & Magni-Berton, 2020). During approximately eight months, every Saturday the yellow vests met across the country on traffic circles of rural and suburban areas, or launching huge demonstrations in cities (Chamorel, 2019). In opinion polls, a vast majority of the French public have backed the movement and its demand for citizen-initiated referenda (Egger & Magni-Berton, 2020). The increasing saliency of this form of direct democracy flung open an unexpected opportunity window for political scientists to influence and shape public debates. However, the popular demand surprised both government and academics. On the one hand, the movement developed in rural areas, far from urban centres and their universities. On the other hand, since some two decades, political and bureaucratic actors and political scientists had developed a close collaboration on participatory—in contrast to direct—democracy programmes, so as to fight citizens’ increasing disaffection with political parties, elections and political institutions (Blatrix,

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2012). In 2007, the Socialist presidential candidate Ségolène Royal highlighted the need for “participatory democracy”, conceived as a chance for as many people as possible to enter into debates and express an opinion.9 Numerous associations and institutions had emerged, some of them with ministries as sponsors and partners, but not always directly receiving research funding. Since 2009, for instance, a large “scientific interest group” (GIS) focusing on democracy and participation had organized annual meetings and supplied advice about participatory tools and instruments (participatory budgets at local level, public debates, community organizing, and so forth). The group did and does not finance research, but just brings together actors interested in participatory experiments, trying to merge resources that would otherwise be scattered across many teams. It nonetheless has ties with ministries such as the Ministry of Ecological Transition and receives support for t implementing of specific programmes. Think tanks sometimes sprang up on the initiative of ministries, like Décider Ensemble. Ministries launched calls for research programmes such as ‘Concertation, Decision and Environment’, ending in 2013, and including notable inputs from political scientists. Finally, in 2015, the ATHENA Alliance went public with a “participatory sciences” project, one of the main themes to develop in the future (Laugier et al., 2015). Interestingly, however, citizen-initiated referenda had never come up in these programmes and were largely understudied in France. The request emerged among the yellow vests independently of academic or political debates, and no significant input can be traced back to political science research. Facing this movement, the French government quite categorically rejected the yellow vests’ claim. President Macron declared that “the citizen-initiated referendum impresses me as undermining representative democracy”, while Prime Minister Edouard Philippe publicly said, “The citizen-initiated referendum makes my skin crawl”. However, the government did initiate forms of citizens’ dialogue, including a “great national debate” and, later, a “citizens’ convention for climate”. In line with the tradition of attempts at arriving at a more participatory democracy, these initiatives aimed at allowing as many people as possible to express an

9 Marc Abélès, «Le royalisme, nouveau langage», Le Monde, 18 octobre 2006.

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opinion, without directly affecting decisions. However, only one political scientist (Pascal Perrineau) was included among the five guarantors of the ‘great national debate’ and none among the three guarantors of the “citizens’ convention for climate”. In fact, the agenda of the French government was two-pronged: First, understanding who the yellow vests were, determining their social profile; and, second, rejecting their demands of ‘direct democracy’, instead resorting to “soft” forms of participatory democracy. On the opposite side, the yellow vests highlighted the merits of direct democracy and refused participatory approaches. Contesting and challenging the “national debate” set up by the French president, they organized a “true debate” from which the citizen-initiated referendum (labelled “RIC”) emerged as their top priority. The claim was largely covered in national media, and everywhere in France the yellow vest groups press conferences. In this dispute over a fundamental institutional issue, how did French political scientists position themselves? Did the discipline provide space for facts and discussion on the yellow vest claim (direct democracy), or on the government’s response (participatory democracy)? In other words, was political science more interested in establishing the yellow vests’ profile, or in RIC, their main demand? Determining the extent of scholarly attention devoted to the issue of direct vs. participatory democracy may serve as a start. Disregarding English-language journals, the Web of Science for a period ranging from 2018 to 2020 found 148 peer-reviewed articles in whose titles “direct democracy” or “participatory democracy” were explicitly mentioned. Among them, 91 (or 61%) referred to “direct democracy”. Because of the yellow vest crisis, one would expect that attention paid to these topics should be on the rise in French-language journals. Yet, according to CAIRN (the main database for academic pieces published in French), only 9 articles can be found in political science journals during this period, hardly dissimilar from the 8 publications during the period prior to the yellow vest crisis (2015–2017). Moreover, among these nine articles, a sizeable proportion strongly favoured participatory democracy; merely a single article’s title mentioned “direct democracy”. In addition, that article was not authored by a political scientist, did not refer to the yellow vest crisis and, in all likelihood, had been published just before its outbreak (Fauré, 2018).

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Over the previous three years, direct democracy had never been mentioned in any French-language article. No major academic interest in these institutional matters may be observed. A debate centring on what might be considered a typical “political science” issue did not really impact the French discipline. Direct democracy evoked no interest; interest in participatory democracy remained limited. Moreover, one of the five major guarantors of the ‘great national debate’ cited earlier and set in motion by the government, was a well-known and popular political scientist, chosen by the French senate, but a specialist neither in the field of participatory nor of direct democracy (Table 6.1). Such a general lack of response seemed to have left government propositions unopposed, tending to legitimize them. However, the surprising result might be explained by the fact that “direct democracy” is not precisely the label developed by the yellow vests. Their demand read “RIC” (referendum d’initiative citoyenne). Using that keyword, and comparing the result with the attention devoted to the movement, we found 35 articles explicitly referring to the yellow vests in their title. While that number includes the totality of social sciences, at least ten were authored by political scientists. In stark contrast, only two discussed the citizen-initiated referendum—the first a translation of an article by three American political scientists (Knobloch et al., 2019), the second coming from a French retired public law professor (Denquin, 2019). Again, French political science provided no expertise on the yellow vests’ demand, while contributing to identifying their sociological profile in competition with sociologists and historians. Scattered political science research on participatory democracy drew some attention from the government, regional and local actors, as well as private firms. A few political scientists—members of GIS—produced a report for a think tank associated with the Socialist Party, advocating Table 6.1 Participatory and direct democracy in peer-reviewed journal articles (France)

Cairn (France) Web of science

N articles (2018–2020)

Direct (vs. participatory) democracy (%)

N articles (2015–2017)

9 148

11 61

8 158

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implementation of a citizen-initiated referendum that would “combine as closely as possible direct and participatory democracy”. Rather in line with the government position, the report insisted on the “numerous and daunting” issues of such referenda and emphasized their limits. In the end, that somewhat ambiguous report was disregarded by both government and yellow vests.

Conclusion Political research in France has had to exist in the shadow of a strong, centralized state. Looking at the 5th Republic from the 1960s to the late 1990s and the turn of the century, past studies had already explored interdependencies between that state and social science research (Bezes et al., 2005). The present study investigated more recent developments in relationships between political science and the state. From the start, the chapter emphasized that French political science has been placed in a dilemma—rather neglected by policymakers, scarcely visible to the public in the national sphere, quite withdrawn where it comes to international involvement. In that situation, what seems to be left to political scientists is a choice between staying marginalized or trying to escape that fate by responding to state agendas and priorities, possibly putting their autonomy and independence in jeopardy. Focusing on national research funding provides one way for appraising that tension. While the ANR has centralized funding, its instruments of intervention have been modified over time, especially via state investment in excellent research labs, where political science is present, and a growing focus on project-based research funding. This has impacted the discipline, which had to find strategies to adapt to this changing context. Although to a lesser extent, research resources are also channelled through sectoral ministries and public agencies, and the chapter has offered evidence that interfaces between the state and political science continue to exist at that level, outside the ANR. With the help of two cases studies, the chapter sought to illuminate how the discipline’s dilemma plays out in detail, and how political science attempts to respond and to develop its own agenda vis-à-vis that of the state, not always uncritically. The case studies also reveal that the central state is strong enough to take, to a considerable part, an entire discipline in tow, managing to frame debates and research on issues such as the

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radicalization thesis. Representatives of scientific communities and intermediary bodies or organizations (like the ATHENA alliance) might at times reinforce those dynamics by proposing lines of cooperation and partnership fitting well with state actors’ needs. There are nevertheless various ways out of the dilemma. First, political science might try to regain an audience and greater visibility in the public sphere. Political scientists already participate in both general and specialized media, on TV and radio programmes, but this apparently is still insufficient to make it nationally visible and recognizable. Further initiatives, like talks and conferences engaging the general public and aimed at empowering citizens might be decisive in building thicker ties with civil society, which are lacking to this day. Second, counter-intuitively, political scientists might challenge the dominance of in-house state expertise by trying to get advice to policymakers outsourced to a greater extent. With experts from within contested by academic experts from outside, that strategy might result in conflicts. Building trust between decision-makers and academics would take years, including failures along the way. But once achieved, political science might gradually emerge from its marginalized status. Third, re-establishing more links with other national political science communities and grow more outward looking, especially through the implementation of international comparative projects, might help political scientists to question the government agenda, put it into better perspective, and develop alternatives. Cultivating theoretical, conceptual and methodological pluralism within the community might have the same positive effect. Decentralizing and multiplying research funding opportunities, not only in the hands of state actors, but also of supranational players (e.g. the EU), of local and regional authorities, or even of civil society organizations, might work in the same direction. The preservation of blue-sky research opportunities and non-thematic funding should equally be salutary for political science. In any case, multiple efforts on many fronts will be necessary to achieve greater dissociation between state interests and political science, for the latter to emerge as an independent and strong interlocutor.

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CHAPTER 7

Political and Social Forces Shaping Political Science Research and Knowledge Transfer in the Netherlands Arco Timmermans, Valérie Pattyn, and Barend van der Meulen

The development and autonomy of universities and academic disciplines within them is not a simple linear process but displays cycles that reflect predominant views in politics and society on the role of science and academic institutions. In these cycles, episodes of strengthening autonomy and democratization of universities are alternated by

A. Timmermans (B) · V. Pattyn Institute of Public Administration, University of Leiden, Leiden, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] V. Pattyn e-mail: [email protected] B. van der Meulen Center for Higher Education Policy Studies (CHEPS), Twente University, Enschede, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Eisfeld and M. Flinders (eds.), Political Science in the Shadow of the State, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75918-6_7

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times of increasing government control, emphasis on relevance and efficiency, fitting in with strategic topics on the national policy agenda that appear imminent or urgent and calls for ideas on policy problems and solutions for the future. In this way, the relationship between academic institutions and government resembles the cultural dynamics in other domains such as the economy, social policy and immigration (Namenwirth & Weber, 1987). Research funding and programming in the Netherlands, for example, shows stability for periods of 5–8 years, interrupted by changes in emphasis and priority. Changes in the national research agenda of Dutch governments thus can be considerable, though budget changes typically are more incremental. Compared to other domains of public policy, academic research and education are not strong topics in the competition for political attention and spending (Breeman & Timmermans, 2014). While autonomy as a concept implies a degree of institutional selfprotection and resistance to external forces, universities typically appear to have permeable boundaries with their environment. From a government perspective, they are considered strategic institutions for innovation, creating a highly skilled labour force and promoting economic development. Universities are an object of politics, and university managers as well as many scholars working in academic departments must span the boundaries between the internal and the external sphere. In the Netherlands, academic institutions were established and acquired autonomy from the late sixteenth century onwards, with a time span of just over 400 years between the oldest (Leiden, 1575) and the youngest university (Open University, 1984). In the mid-eighteenth century, the first Academy of Sciences was created, and after some realignments, the—now—Royal Academy of Sciences is the main contemporary and prestigious scholarly institution nationwide. In the 1950s, funding and coordination organizations were established, such as the Dutch Research Council (1950) and the National Association of Universities (1956, under a different name, current name taken in 1985). As in most countries in Europe, political science, along with other social sciences, emerged and became embedded in the national academic system after the natural sciences and other disciplines had established themselves. The chapter considers the relationship between governments and universities in the Netherlands, with a special focus on political science and the way in which scholars within this academic domain deal with forces from their political and social environment. While Dutch science

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policy and fundamental research is dominated by some main actors and coalitions formed by them, individual scholars also may experience effects of externalization and increasing political and public debate on the position and relevance of scientific knowledge. For political science, government policy, control and trends in knowledge use and impact are particularly pertinent, as government and its democratic functions and performance itself are the central object of study. In this sense, political science may analyse any forms of co-option of academe by governments as much as it is subjected to them. We begin with a macro perspective, presenting the discipline of political science and its institutionalization, followed by a discussion of the main features of research programming and funding in general, and the domestic policy advisory system as two important contexts in which political scientists find their place and become active in any kind of role. Then we move on to a more microscopic view of the orientation and activities of political scientists in the Netherlands, the roles they assume at the boundary of their academic basis and the political and social environment. How do scholars in this field interpret and act, given the regulatory regime of higher education, funding programmes and evolving impact requirements? We suggest that, in the Dutch case, in between a scholarselected relevance of science and a state-directed relevance of science there is also a society-induced relevance of scholarly work as a third type. This type, to which we will refer as entrepreneurial relevance, and on whose characteristics we will enlarge below, may evolve due to experiences with limited state funding or apparent market (public sector or private sector)demand, to which the motto and location of the authors’ universities may testify: Twente is labelled an ‘entrepreneurial university’, Leiden University expanded a ‘Hague mission’ sort of collaboration with government institutions of the Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs, centred on The Hague. This third form may also be a typical venue for applied research, and it also may better take into account the country’s pragmatic and consensus-building political and social culture (Van der Meulen, 1998). Another reason for considering this third form is that research across different disciplines shows that scholars find it hard to interpret and deal with the impact policies of government and intermediary research organizations, but in their behaviour they actually do engage with many and diverse external parties to deliver their knowledge (de Jong et al., 2016: 112). This last point also is a main finding in a recent study of advisory roles of political scientists in the Netherlands (Pattyn & Timmermans, forthcoming).

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Political Science as an Institutionalized Discipline in the Netherlands The discipline of political science in the Netherlands relies on a long tradition and is firmly institutionalized. The first pioneering professor of ‘politices’, Daniel Heinsius, was appointed as early as 1613, at the time with a selective and small student population. As in many other Western countries, the major rise of political science occurred in the post-war years of the twentieth century, when behaviouralism gained prominence in the social sciences and in economics. The first three chairs in political science were established between 1948 and 1953. In 1963, the first full professor of political science actually trained in the discipline was appointed, and in 1967, political science was officially included in the Academic Statute regulating education at universities (Reinalda, 2007). During that period, the research agenda of political science also came to be actively debated, a discussion which actually contributed to the separation of public administration from political science. This segmentation may be considered characteristic for the Dutch profile of the discipline. For instance, unlike other countries, Dutch public administration scholars have their own association (Vereniging voor Bestuurskunde), which functions independently from the Dutch Political Science Association (Nederlandse Kring voor de Wetenschap der Politiek). In addition, in the majority of universities, political science and public administration are co-existing in separate institutes and with different programmes, sometimes even at different faculties. Hence, when considering the discipline of political science in the Netherlands, this hybrid profile should be borne in mind. At present, the political science academic community is large in proportion to population size, with about 460 scholars with a Ph.D. in political science/public administration working at one of the fourteen departments in the field (Pattyn & Timmermans, forthcoming). A somewhat lower number of junior scholars engaged in Ph.D. research and in fulltime junior teaching positions may be added. Political science in the country not only expanded, it also always had an international orientation, indicated by the fact that the first Dutch political science chair, Jan Barents, was a member of the IPSA Executive Committee in the early 1950s. At present, almost 55% of the scholars in the field have worked abroad, or had a foreign country (and university) as departure point in

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their career development. Participation in projects, conferences and publications at the international level is also high (PROSEPS Work Group 2, April 2019). Data from the Dutch Association of Universities on enrollment numbers indicate a strong rise in the student population in political science since 2010, as compared to the previous decade and earlier years. In bachelor programmes, during the period 2010–2018 the number of students doing political science or a programme with a strong political science component doubled, as compared to the decade before (over 60,000 for the total nine-year period), and in master programmes it even tripled (over 30,000). These numbers not only indicate the firm basis of political science in higher education; the trend has additional significance for reasons of contingency: While student numbers increased, the direct government budget did not evolve on a par with that rise. Instead, governments increased student fees and forced the universities to increase teaching loads. At many universities, the student-staff ratio went up and led to higher teaching work pressure and inversely to declining time for research, in particular for major research projects. Job advertisements for university staff mentioning a teaching load of 70% of total employment time are no exception. Even when such figures are not mentioned, the same percentage often applies in practice. To an important extent, substantial research time for staff depends on external funding of project proposals, which in the Netherlands is highly competitive. Since the early 2000s, universities minimized internal budgets for creating Ph.D. positions. Such positions are now mostly available only with external funding either by the National Research Council, or by public or private organizations via contract research projects. Further general characteristics of national research programming and budgeting will be discussed in the next section.

The Institutional Context of Academic Research: Policies for Research Excellence and Relevance To understand policy pressures on the current portfolio of research in any discipline in the Netherlands, it is useful to start in the early 1990s. At that time, the government started to structure its science policy along two main lines. The first line attempted to stimulate excellent science by creating a restricted number of graduate schools in a few disciplines in which the Netherlands would internationally excel. That attempt failed,

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as universities organized all Ph.D. training in graduate schools, and excellent research could be identified in many disciplines, with the result that science organizations coined the low countries an academic highland. In 1998, the focus shifted to stimulating careers of excellent scientists, which was strongly supported by the science organizations and became a real policy success. The core of this policy is the Veni, Vidi and Vici grants, which NWO, the National Research Council, provides to young postdocs, early career scientists and mid-career scientists to develop innovative projects and research lines. The programme grew in a few years to almost 200 million Euro. In 2006 the programme was copied by the new European Research Council, in which researchers from Dutch universities were relatively successful. By 2013, the budget for these grants had doubled to almost 400 M e (Van Arensbergen et al., 2013). The second line in science policy since 1990 has been characterized by pressures to improve the relevance of public science funding for the Dutch industry. This policy has not been stable and remains an ongoing topic of interdepartmental contestation between the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sciences and the Ministry of Economic Affairs. In the early 1990s, analogous to the above-discussed experience, governments tried to create a few technological top institutes in fields where the Netherlands could be economically competitive. Around 2000, that policy was replaced by large innovation programmes funded by the public gas revenues that the government had set aside for investments in economic restructuring. In 2010, these funds were reduced, and the government implemented a new policy which focused on nine Economic Top Sectors. The approach gave the Minister of Economic Affairs a stronger role in science policy and forced the National Research Council (NWO) and public research institutes to allocate a considerable part of their budget to industry-led research programmes. For the Social Science Board of NWO, this implied that 20% of their budget had to be allocated to industryrelated research (Koier et al., 2016). Science policy, in this way, came to involve a substantive element of state-directed relevance. In its science policy papers, the government also mentioned the social relevance of scientific research. Until 1990 the minister of Education, Culture and Sciences had separate budgets for joint research programmes with other ministries, but in 1990 this task was delegated to NWO. Other ministries, however, were not eager to work with NWO, and subsequently cut down their research budgets. The policy line got some impetus in 2015, when the Minister of Education, Culture and Sciences together

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with the science organizations launched the National Science Agenda. While in the policy paper that announced the initiative, that Agenda served multiple goals, the most remarkable element was that it would be based on questions that citizens could send in. In the document, that participatory element was justified by referring to the interest and trust of the public in science, as well as on the grounds that the public is highly educated and in many ways a stakeholder in the impacts of science. Inspiration did also come from the Responsible Research and Innovation initiatives in the Horizon2020 programme of the European Commission, which was well received in the Netherlands. Politically, though, this was a two-faced initiative, as citizens’ participation also served to counterbalance the heavy emphasis on the economic value of science and regain some control over the allocation of the NWO budget. For good reasons it was expected that the public would be more interested in ‘blue sky research’ than the Minister of Economic Affairs and the captains of industry. The National Science Agenda was created out of 12,000 questions citizens had sent in, which were structured around 25 themes. Currently the agenda is used for an NWO funding programme for consortia of multidisciplinary researchers from universities and applied research organizations. Selection of proposals in the first two rounds was done by panels of up to fifteen members covering all fields of research, and having considerable experience with the impacts of science. Projects ranged from quantum microscopy to the histories of hunger in Europe, and from health care to sustainable economies. In every project, researchers need to show how citizens and civil society organizations are involved and in what ways their questions are addressed. Compared to the Top Sector Approach, neither the state nor industry was, or is, in control of what is being researched. Instead, the state facilitates what are considered “productive interactions” between science and society. Thus the initiative may serve as a model for other countries to accommodate the tension which science organizations may feel between the need for autonomy and the political pressure to assume responsibility for the impacts of science. Funding Science policies usually come with funding, though in the Netherlands scientists often feel that new policies are financed from existing or even decreasing budgets. For the Economic Top Sector policy this is true, even

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if the national science budget still shows a steady though small annual growth. Three developments in the allocation of funding help to understand the feeling of scarce resources. First, as mentioned above, student numbers increased and concomitantly the teaching load for academic staff. Second, scarcity may be caused by rises in the budget for medical science. While this never was announced in any policy document, between 1990 and 2010 public funding for medical science grew fast from 200 million euro to nearly 1 billion euro per year (Horlings & Van der Meulen, 2010). Third, the relative proportion of competitive funding to direct funding for university research grew, in particular due to the career grants scheme as well as to EU funding. Because these competitive grants usually cover only part of the full costs of research projects, universities need to match these grants. As a result, internal university allocation of research funds came to be steered strongly by competitive public funding allocation. This effect was reinforced by universities making academic careers more dependent on the results of such competition. The consequence was that NWO obtained and still obtains many more applications than it can absorb, and actual success rates for some schemes fell to below 10%. Effects on Research The effects of these different policies in terms of pressures on research agendas, funding opportunities and (perceived) autonomy are not uniform across disciplines, fields, research groups or universities. Investigation of effects at departmental level has shown that differences between research groups of the same disciplines are as large as differences between disciplines. Some research groups have been able to create a very stable influx of competitive funding (Koier et al., 2016). Studies of the impact of excellence funding schemes show that some of this funding accumulates around clusters of researchers, who are able to acquire such funding themselves, win prizes and thereby attract young researchers who in turn obtain this type of funding. The result is a self-perpetuating dynamic of scientific excellence which provides research with a strong autonomous position towards funding bodies and their own organization (Hessels et al., 2016). Other groups are depending on a variety of funding sources. While that creates more uncertainty, some researchers again prove very successful up to a level that makes them really autonomous in their research strategy. Groups within faculties with large bachelor and master programmes may

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acquire such autonomy through research funding attached to these education programmes, depending on their universities’ allocation models and opportunities to organize teaching at relatively low costs. But just as there are winners in the new game, there are losers as well, who are less fortuitous and depend on contract research for industry or government bodies, or even lack that opportunity and have to focus on teaching, management or leave the academic world. Effects in Political Science To understand the effects of these different factors in the field of political science, it is useful to review the current portfolio of projects funded by NWO, the National Research Council, which places political science and governance studies in one category. In January 2021, the NWO database included 141 research projects in political science and governance studies, after removing double counts, projects for supporting the management of research programmes, and projects whose description did not match with the database labels. These 141 projects were funded through 42 different programmes, which in itself demonstrates how government policies for excellence and relevance have created a myriad of different impulses. As compared to other social science disciplines, the total number of political science projects is in the same range as that in management sciences and in pedagogy. With only one third of that figure, cultural anthropology is much smaller. Sociology and economics each contribute an additional 20%. In the case of economics, that is remarkable, as its numbers of researchers and students considerably surpass that of political science. Psychology and educational sciences outnumber the other fields, each obtaining almost 25% of the project total. For educational sciences, this may be explained by the existence of a separate NOW funding section that supports mainly applied science projects. For psychology, the high score probably reflects its positioning between the social and the life sciences and its reliance on experimental approaches. We analysed the policy aims of the 141 political science programmes and structured them into four categories, according to their main aim. Three of these reflect the main lines in Dutch science policy, i.e. international excellence, economic top sector-related programmes and societal relevance and policy-oriented research. The fourth set of programmes consists of smaller programmes aimed at research at universities of applied

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science—often of rather limited size. Table 7.1 presents the results of this project. Most projects are funded through programmes aiming to stimulate excellent research. Of these projects more than 50% were funded by Veni and Vidi grants, each with a research budget of some 250,000 and 800,000 e, respectively. These grants are meant to facilitate career development of young and early career scholars. No prestigious Vici grant (some 1.5 M e research budget for setting up a new research group) was obtained by a political scientist thus far. The 42 career grants include also two grants for scholars with a political refugee status. Most of the seventeen international collaboration projects are funded through two Table 7.1 National research council-funded projects in political science (Netherlands)

Policy aim

Program aims

Excellence

Scientific career International collaboration Open competition Scientific infrastructure

Relevance and policy

Local governance Corona studies Policy support Transitions Pensions

Top sector

Transitions Innovation Infrastructure

UoA oriented

Collaboration Local governance Capacity

Total

No. programmes

No. projects

3

42

5

17

3

16

1

1

12 2

76 8

1 4 4 1 12 4 2 1 7 3

5 5 5 1 24 7 4 3 14 11

3

9

5 11 42

7 27 141

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thematic NORFACE programmes, a collaboration between social science research councils in Europe. One programme is on dynamics of social inequality, the other on democratic governance. Furthermore, we find projects funded for science diplomacy reasons, strengthening international relations through joint research projects. Of the sixteen projects funded in the Open Competition programmes most are meant for Ph.D. projects of teaching staff at secondary schools. The Infrastructural project is a large venture to develop a mobile lab for field studies in the social sciences. If we look at the topics of these excellence-oriented research projects, about half of the career grant projects focus on typical political science issues such as the dynamics of party politics, voting behaviour, political polarization, civil participation in politics, interests and lobby groups and the impact of digital media. The other part is more governance-oriented topics. In the international collaboration programmes, again about half are from political science, mainly because of the NORFACE programme on democratic governance. Table 7.1 also shows that political science and governance studies are effectively steered towards research projects which are socially relevant, policy-oriented or industry-related. Most, if not all focus on governance and management. Two main topics stand out: transition towards sustainability and local governance. There are a few projects that aim to support policymaking, as well as some addressing political and governance issues related to the corona pandemic. One project is financed by the National Science Agenda fund and analyses the democratic governance of pension funds. The results suggest that for political science the main function of the National Research Council is to fund researcher-driven project ideas and support the scientific autonomy of the field. The role of the career funds for young academics reflects the change in science policy in the 1990s towards promoting academic career development. The emphasis here however is on early career, not mid or later career political scientists. Pressures for industrial, social and political relevance seem to have a limited influence on the fundamental research programme applications. Traditional areas of policymaking also are not very present in the projects allocated; more visible are contributions to innovation-led transitions and local governance, both specialized research topics. Moreover, as regards these topics, an increasing emphasis on data-driven research puts more theoretical and normative approaches at a funding disadvantage.

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A final and different factor indirectly relating to budgets and the substance and orientation of research is the recent claim that social scientists, and political scientists among them, have a leftist tendency and that there is ‘too much consensus pressure and too little diversity in viewpoints and topics of study’. That claim which may exemplify the wider tendency of politicization of science (Weingart, 1999) was made in the Chamber of Representatives which adopted a parliamentary motion in February 2017, following debates on the position of social science scholars in other countries such as the United States and some countries moving towards authoritarianism, such as Hungary and Turkey. A brief inquiry done by the Royal Academy of Sciences in March 2018 however did not confirm such political tendencies within the scholarly community (KNAW, 2018). As a consequence of these developments in research agenda-setting, NOW funding provides a rather narrow window for maneuvering and financial support for political scientists on topics that are fundamentally domain-specific.

Knowledge Transfer and the Policy Advisory System Research funding by universities and intermediary organizations such as NWO are one type of channel, but to understand the reality of academic research and knowledge transfer, it is important to also consider the structures and practices of the domestic policy advisory system. The policy advisory system contains different spheres of interaction between producers of (scientific) knowledge and policymakers who demand, receive and may use this knowledge. With Halligan (1995), we conceive a policy advisory system as the interlocking set of actors and organizations in a particular jurisdiction providing recommendations for action to policymakers. For the purposes of this book chapter, a policy advisory system may be approached from two directions. From a demand-side perspective, the system indicates the landscape of actors whom policymakers can rely on for evidence-based input addressing state-selected relevant topics. Scientific advice may in fact also be requested and delivered outside the sphere of formal policymaking institutions, such as by and to corporations, interest organizations, civil society groups and, perhaps less strictly packed as advice, also the media. Importantly, universities are part of the policy advisory system, but they exist next to a plethora of other actors

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also equipped to provide evidence-based information. Advisory councils and think tanks are examples. From a supply-oriented perspective, a policy advisory system reveals which routes scientists themselves may use for the proverbial speaking truth to policymakers, or for voicing concerns. In this section, we highlight some key features of the Dutch policy advisory landscape, which influence the ‘size of the shadow’ which the state casts on political scientists. Particularly in comparative terms, the Dutch landscape of policy advisory actors is strongly institutionalized, densely populated and diverse in nature. Scholarly work on the issue typically attributes this ‘richness’ and strong institutionalization to the consensus-oriented nature of the country (Van Nispen & Scholten, 2015). Consensus-style knowledge regimes, such as the Netherlands, commonly value scientific expertise for providing the non-partisan source on which political agreements can be constructed (Pattyn et al., 2019). Also in empirical survey data on trust, scientists commonly rank on top. Compared to other institutions such as government, parliament, the judiciary, large corporations, trade unions and the media, science enjoys the highest degree of public trust in the country (Rathenau, 2018). It is this important role for scientific expertise and its potential to depoliticize debates which has given rise to the establishment of many independent institutions charged with policy analysis and providing pertinent knowledge for policymakers. Sufficiently relevant to name, and unique worldwide, are the Planning Bureaus (including the Netherlands Institute for Social Research, the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis and the Central Bureau of Statistics, the Environmental Assessment Agency) and the high-level Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR). The planning bureaus’ mission centrally includes evidence-based advising (Halffman, 2009), and the WRR in addition is an important and powerful source for policy ideas delivered directly and independently to the government (Van Nispen & Scholten, 2015). Other than this, the Dutch policy advisory landscape includes a range of bodies advising the government in an evidence-based way on general strategic and more specific technical issues. Examples in the domain of political science are the Council for Public Administration (Raad voor het Openbaar Bestuur), advising on the structure and working of the government itself; the Electoral Council (Kiesraad), focusing on electoral processes and system issues or the Advisory Council on International Affairs (Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken). Unlike some other

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countries, advisory councils in the Netherlands often have academics appointed, usually on a rotation basis. In the councils mentioned above, political scientists provide even the most important staff by temporary appointment. Although the number of advisory councils and bodies was reduced significantly since the 1990s, they still constitute a cornerstone of the Dutch advisory system (Scholten & Van Nispen, 2015). They are a prominent legacy of the corporatist-style ‘poldermodel’ characterizing Dutch policymaking. Where formal institutional advisory arrangements do not exist for involving academics in policy analysis, it is also common practice to appoint them in advisory committees of applied research, such as policy evaluations. Unique for the country as well is the large number of endowed professorships, for which the funding of chairs is supported by external parties (such as foundations, private actors, but also ministries). Examples are, e.g. a chair in policy evaluation, funded by the Ministry of Economics and a chair in public affairs funded by the Association of Public Affairs. All these provisions have contributed to relatively permeable boundaries between the sphere of academia and institutions involved in the policy process. At the same time, the Dutch policy advisory system also experiences trends of pluralization and externalization that occur in many other OECD countries (Craft & Howlett, 2013). New actors entered the arena, and some took a prominent place in the policy advisory landscape, with an impact on the ‘market share’ of academics. Comparatively, the Netherlands has a high density of consultants in policy advising (Van den Berg, 2017). In addition, more and more think tanks were established over the years, which also aim to supply scientific advice to policymakers. In fact, quite a lot of academics in the Netherlands combine their university affiliation with a position in a consultancy firm or a think tank, although specific numbers of colleagues holding double affiliations are not available (to our knowledge). Considering these different institutional provisions together, it may be clear that entrepreneurial Dutch scholars have multiple formal and informal routes to dialogue with policymakers, speak truth to power and express concerns on issues in their field. At the receiving end, Dutch policymakers can use several arrangements for collecting input from advisory actors other than scholars based at universities. Such a rich and diversified boundary system may provide opportunities for scholars, but on the

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other hand makes policymakers less dependent on academics for obtaining scientific input on issues relevant to them. Given this general context, the question is what this implies for political scientists, whose object of study is governance and state-society interactions. Are they themselves motivated or perhaps feel obliged to engage with policymakers through existing institutional arrangements, and by conducting mission-orientated research projects? Or does the pluralistic nature of the Dutch advisory system leave political scientists the possibility to focus mainly on scholarly selected topics, while other, non-academic actors provide scientific evidence to policymakers? A third possibility is that political scientists are active in advisory work, and seek such engagement, because the aforementioned competitive and selective research programming and funding arrangements force them to look for alternative financial resources, relevance and recognition. In the next section we consider these three types of relationships between political science scholars and their environment in which incentives for academic professional work ensue.

The Impact Factor: Interaction Between Political Scientists, Policymakers and the Public The Rise of Impact Criteria Given the institutional properties of research funding and programming and the general nexus between research and policy making, Dutch academia as in other countries encountered a shift towards emphasis on the non-academic value and relevance of research to society. While reinforced, this emphasis is not novel. Societal impact already was explicitly mentioned as a core task of universities since the reform of the Higher Education and Research Act (WHW) in 1992. The Act conceptualizes societal impact generally as ‘knowledge transfer for the benefit of society’ (article 1.3). This clause initially may have had a mere symbolic meaning, but in 2004 the Minister of Science made societal impact one of the main priorities in formal science policy. The publication of a policy document in 2004 carried the introduction of the notion of valorization, which is still the most commonly used term when referring to added value and relevance of academic research in the Netherlands (de Jong et al., 2016). The concept first was meant to indicate the importance of universities collaborating with private organizations, but later the meaning of valorization

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was broadened to societal impact and dissemination—not just economic value. Following negotiations between the government, representatives of the Dutch science and higher education system and knowledge users, the standing government definition of valorization is ‘the process of creating value from knowledge by making knowledge suitable and/or available for economic and/or societal use and translating that knowledge into competitive products, services, processes and entrepreneurial activity’ (Nederland Ondernemend Innovatieland, 2009: 8, also cited in de Jong et al., 2016). Following this formal introduction of the concept in science policy, the Dutch Research Council in 2009 formulated a ‘knowledge utilization paragraph’ and included it standard in almost all funding schemes (de Jong et al., 2016). In this context, knowledge utilization is conceived as an iterative process towards societal impact. Emphasis is put on the interaction and coordination of researchers and knowledge users during the entire research process, as a means to increase the chance of knowledge utilization, and as such the chance of social impact (NWO, 2021). The knowledge utilization paragraph has been made mandatory as of 2014, and counts for 20% of the score for grant applications. Subsequently, universities, too, increasingly integrated valorization in their policies. The Dutch Association of Universities VSNU explicitly refers to valorization in the framework that details academic job descriptions from junior to full professorships. This also implies that valorization is translated in promotion policies of individual institutions (de Jong et al., 2016). In practice, there is variation in the extent to which university departments put emphasis on valorization criteria when making decisions on career advancement, but overall it has become a relevant factor. In a comparative study of approaches to impact assessment across European countries, Bandola-Gill et al. (2019) categorized the Netherlands as a country where impact assessment is used explicitly in academic decisionmaking. These authors found that this is not the case in many other countries, but in the Netherlands, impact assessment (valorization) plays an increasingly significant role in making career steps. Thus, next to grant proposal requirements, there are additional incentives for paying attention to impact. Having sketched the broader impact agenda dominating Dutch science policy, the question is how academics experience the politics of research assessment and respond to valorization policies. A qualitative empirical study by de Jong et al. (2016) concludes that valorization is perceived

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as a struggle and challenge by most academics. Differences were found across academic ranks with junior scientists struggling mostly with how to reconcile valorization in a way that does not hinder their academic career. Senior academics seem to struggle more with the justification of valorization in bureaucratic procedures. While this study targets all disciplines, the general conclusions also apply to political science. For a more specific view on this field, we next present empirical findings on the Netherlands from a survey on the professionalization and social impact of political science in Europe (Brans et al., 2019). Political Scientists as Boundary Workers The opening chapter of this book presented a fundamental distinction between, on the one hand, technocratic and policy-oriented intellectuals in line with conventional policies and paradigms, and on the other hand more critically inclined value-oriented intellectuals. A shift in institutional logic and policy regime in higher education and academic research was seen to reduce the protected space for true autonomous academic thinking and work and induce work with more direct policy relevance. These two main orientations implying fundamentally different functions and outcomes may be related to a typology of roles assumed by universitybased scholars in a comparative study of advisory activities of political scientists in Europe (Brans & Timmermans, forthcoming 2021). In this typology, pure academics who refrain from any engagement with policymakers or a wider audience are distinguished from experts who bring mostly facts as input to the policy process and provide occasional news interpretations, opinionating scholars who typically voice more normative viewpoints and concerns, and public intellectuals who have a broad repertoire of evidence-based but often also eloquent contributions to policymaking and public debate. The comparative analysis in this study of advisory work shows wide variations across European countries as well as between age groups, gender and employment status of scholars. The findings on the Netherlands reveal a relatively high level of activity in advising. Dutch political scientists are significantly less often pure academics than in the European average (Pattyn & Timmermans, forthcoming). This is shown in Table 7.2. Also, in accordance with this finding, Dutch political scientists consider themselves visible and capable of achieving social and political impact.

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Table 7.2 Roles of political scientists in the Netherlands Advisory role

Pure academic Expert Opinionating scholar Public intellectual

Proportion of respondents Dutch respondents ( N = 84) (%)

All European respondents ( N = 2354) (%)

9.5 28.6 57.1 4.8

19.6 28.2 47.9 4.3

Source Pattyn and Timmermans (forthcoming)

Visibility and impact estimations do not automatically correspond, but in the Netherlands a majority of political scientists thinks their disciplinary knowledge has a real impact on society and policymaking. The most important topics are, naturally, the form and functions of government and administration, international affairs and the EU, but political scientists also deliver knowledge in policy domains such as social welfare, immigration, civil rights including gender issues, and the environment. Attention to these topics indicates that problems often are complex and require an understanding of political processes and governance and not just of technical content. Furthermore, a vast majority of respondents considers providing advice a contribution to society, and a somewhat smaller group thinks it is part of their professional duty. At the same time, engagement is not strongly driven directly by motivations of career advancement, rather more by a search for opportunities of research funding and arranging for knowledge delivery. This is consistent with the earlier finding that scholars struggle with ‘valorization’ criteria as they are stated in programme calls of the formal research funding organizations. The data from the study on roles of political scientists in the Netherlands also reveal that the least engaged in advising are younger scholars. The average age of pure academics is 38.1 years, against 47.8 years for opinionating scholars (and 42.7 years for experts) (Pattyn & Timmermans, forthcoming). This is a significant difference that may indicate how incentives for academic career advancement come with agenda-setting and criteria defined by the formal research funding organizations, such as the National Research Council. For those more settled (and with a permanent contract), entrepreneurship becomes more visible. While this may

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indicate a focus on scholar-selected relevance for political scientists further advanced in their careers, an additional element is the need to push for financial resources, given the high competitiveness of fundamental research funding programmes. In contrast, NWO’s scientific excellence programmes appear more important for young political scientists intent on developing their careers and on obtaining more research time, as compared to teaching. We note here that another background variable used in the advisory roles project hits the eyes: as compared to the European average, female political science scholars are much more pure academics and much less experts or opinionating scholars (Pattyn & Timmermans, forthcoming).1 And age and gender are interacting: most female pure academics are young scholars. Conversely, entrepreneurial academics are much more often advanced career male scholars. These findings correspond to the more general points made in this chapter’s previous sections. It also may indicate that next to the two types of intellectuals guided by either technocratic or critical considerations there is a third type possible, which is the pragmatic scholar seeking alternative windows for research funding, knowledge delivery, relevance and recognition. This third type may be called ‘entrepreneurial relevance’. Academics after all are not only involved in a nexus with government and formal science funding organizations but, with the growing emphasis on impact and ‘valorization’ in the Netherlands, also with all those public and private actors providing impact “arenas”. More empirical evidence for this point emerges from an analysis of the recipients of advice by political scientists in the aforementioned survey study. Civil servants were the most frequently mentioned recipients of political science knowledge (two thirds of the respondents had experience with them), but civil society groups, advisory bodies and think tanks were also recognized as relevant targets by a majority of political scientists. While less prominent, international organizations and private interest organizations were additionally mentioned by one quarter to one third of those participating in the survey. These findings become more pronounced when taking into account that these types of recipients of advice emerge more frequently than on average for all European countries. This not only illustrates the density of the policy advisory system, 1 An observation by one of the authors is that in a core course of the Ph.D. programme of the Netherlands Institute of Government, a collaboration of most relevant departments in the country, participants are by a large majority female.

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but testifies to the orientation of political scientists in the Netherlands towards advising and outreaching. The expert and opinionating roles are also recognizable from the topics on which political scientists engage in advising. We already saw that the main topics of advising are the general structures, operations and possible reforms of government, plus international or European matters. These appear particularly prominent for opinionating political scientists, and are less exclusively the focal points for experts and for (the few) public intellectuals, who focus specifically on immigration, civil rights as well as education. Experts and opinion makers attend also to some other policy topics. For experts, the environment, agriculture and food, and some specific social policy and labour-related topics are matters of advice, while more or less active opinionating scholars move into the fields of social welfare, civil rights, immigration and, occasionally, defense and public works. While experts seem to specialize, opinionating political scientists together display the broadest scope. This points to differences in kind of impact. The finding that opinionating is a more frequently visible activity of political scientists in the Netherlands than in the European average, and that pure academic work is much less prominent than in the European average also may indicate an orientation on other, alternative venues for knowledge delivery and search for impact. These other venues are not captured entirely with the concepts of scholar-selected relevance for academic autonomy and state-directed relevance for a more technocratic approach to research agenda-setting and funding. Again, we note that with this finding and interpretation comes a strong correlation with age and gender. Given the low frequency of pure academics but the comparatively high proportion of females among them, and the high frequency of opinionators and the comparatively low proportion of females, ‘entrepreneurial relevance’ in Dutch political science seems to be still mostly ‘a man’s world’.

Conclusion In the Netherlands, since long, political science is a strongly institutionalized and internationalized discipline that particularly in recent years attracted an increasing number of students in university programmes. One consequence of this is a rise in teaching load and declining formal space for research activities for most academics working in departments

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of political science (and public administration). At the same time, the government and the main intermediary for project grants, the National Research Council NWO, have acquired higher primacy in setting the research agenda conditioning funding opportunities. We observe an increase in the number of research projects obtained by political scientists within the general excellence programmes (Veni and Vidi) of the National Research Council relative to other programmes that are more topic-driven. This may indicate that especially younger scholars seek such funding in order to create time for fundamental research directly contributing to career advancement. To a proportion of the scholarly community, it offers a limited space for scholar-selected relevance. While political scientists also participate in projects of state-directed relevance (with topics pre-set on the research agenda and connected to funding), that variety figures less prominently. The space not used (or available) for that formal and centralized fundamental research funding is to a large part compensated by access to additional venues for research agenda-setting and funding. Political science in the Netherlands is visible and increasingly prominent in the domestic policy advisory system. This is (even if not exclusively) the domain of experienced—and comparatively much more often male— political scientists. In the activities of these scholars, valorization is given more substantive meaning, including also a financial component, mostly in ad hoc arrangements where they interact with recipients and users of their knowledge and skills. Developments in the policy advisory system itself contribute to this, as the advisory landscape has become more diverse. The Dutch advisory system displays increasing overlaps and interactions between government, academia and the public sphere. These developments have ensured that political scientists may choose from a range of formal and informal windows for policy advice, either reactively on demand or more proactively on their own initiative. Thus the scholarly political science community is intertwined strongly with government and other organizations involved in the policy process, interest representation and the public arena through an extensive advisory network, which enables political science to have an impact in all areas of policy making. The national excellence programmes for fundamental research are mostly pursued by young, early career political scientists, while senior scholars appear much more in boundary work relationships than in such programmes. There is, thus far, no political science project

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in the Vici programme, the most advanced of the excellence programmes for which finding proposals can be submitted. The role taken by political scientists in the policy advisory system, both in formal and in informal arrangements, structural as well as ad hoc, provides a reason for identifying ‘entrepreneurial relevance’ as a third type of relationship between academics and funding organizations and recipients (paying or not paying) of scientific knowledge. This mode of relevance also gives a more substantive meaning to impact criteria and what in the Netherlands is called ‘valorization’. Strong interactions between political scientists and government organizations and civil society—also their main object of study—thus offer an evolved substitute (but not a secondary choice) for reported difficulties that senior scholars have with the justification of ‘valorization’ in bureaucratic procedures linked to programmes of the National Research Council (de Jong et al., 2016). Though academic political scientists in the Netherlands in their choices of topic and content display more diversity than sceptics of the social sciences want to believe when making allegations of ideological (’leftist’) drift, there is still considerable gender and age bias in the entrepreneurial chorus of this research community. A key question to be addressed in Dutch political science is whether this bias in academic entrepreneurship is driven by factors over which political scientists themselves have control, or is the result of national science policy in the Netherlands.

References Bandola-Gill, J., Brans, M., & Flinders, M. (2019). Incentives for impact: A new paradigm for political science? (PROSEPS Short Term Mission Report 412). Brans, M., et al. (2019). The Advisory Role of Political Scientists in Europe. WG 4 Report, September. COSTProject, ProSEPS Annual Meeting. Breeman, G., & Timmermans, A. (2014). The policy agenda in multiparty government: Coalition agreements and legislative activity in The Netherlands. In C. Green-Pedersen & S. Walgrave (Eds.), Agenda setting, policies, and political systems: A comparative approach (pp. 87–104). Chicago University Press. Craft, J., & Howlett, M. (2013). The dual dynamics of policy advisory systems: The impact of externalization and politicization on policy advice. Policy and Society, 32(3), 187–197.

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de Jong, S. P. L., Smit, J., & van Drooge, L. (2016). Scientists’ response to societal impact policies: A policy paradox. Science and Public Policy, 43(1), 102–114. https://doi.org/10.1093/scipol/scv023. Halffman, W. (2009). Measuring the staks: The Dutch planning bureaus. In J. Lentsch & P. Weingart (Eds.), Scientific advice to policy making: International comparison. Verlag Barbara Budrich. Halligan. (1995). Policy advice and the public sector. In B. Guy Peters, D. T. Savoie (Eds.), Governance in a changing environment (pp. 138–172). McGillQueen’s University Press. Hessels, L., Scholten, W., Franssen, T., & De Rijcke, S. (2016). Excellent geld - De rol van excellentiesubsidies bij vier toponderzoeksgroepen in Nederland. Den Haag, Rathenau Instituut. www.rathenau.nl/sites/default/files/Excell ent%20Geld-Rathenau%20Instituut.pdf. Horlings, E., & Van der Meulen, B. (2010). Financiering en specialisering in medisch onderzoek. Den Haag: Rathenau Instituut. www.rathenau.nl/sites/def ault/files/Financiering_van_en_specialisering_in_medisch_onderzoek_def.pdf. Koier, E., Van der Meulen, B., Horlings, E., & Belder, R. (2016). Spinning plates—Funding streams and priorities in Dutch university research. Den Haag: Rathenau Instituut. www.rathenau.nl/sites/default/files/2018-03/Spi nning%20plates.pdf. Namenwirth, J. Y., & Weber, A. P. (1987). Dynamics of culture. London: Allan & Unwin. NWO. (2021). Knowledge utilisation. Available: https://www.nwo.nl/en/kno wledge-utilisation. Pattyn, V., Blum, S., Fobé, E., Pekar-Milicevic, M., & Brans, M. (2019). Academic policy advice in consensus-seeking countries: The cases of Belgium and Germany. International Review of Administrative Sciences. https://doi. org/10.1177/0020852319878780. Pattyn, V., & Timmermans, A. (forthcoming). Polder politics under pressure: The advisory roles of a segmented political science community. PROSEPS Report Work Group 2. (2019, April). Rathenau. (2018, January 4). Public trust in science Factsheet. Available: https:// www.rathenau.nl/en/science-figures/impact/public-trust-science. Reinalda, B. (2007). The current state of political science in the Netherlands. In D. Klingemann (Ed.), The state of political science in Western Europe. Barbara Budrich Publishers. Scholten, P., & van Nispen, F. (2015). Advisory board and planning bureaus. In F. van Nispen & P. Scholten (Eds.), Policy analysis in the Netherlands (pp. 139–154). The Policy Press. Van Arensbergen, P., Hessels, L., & Van der Meulen, B. (2013). Talent centraal. Ontwikkeling en selectie van wetenschappers in Nederland, Den

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Haag: Rathenau Instituut. www.rathenau.nl/sites/default/files/Rapport_T alent_Centraal_2013.pdf. Van den Berg, C. F. (2017). Dynamics in the Dutch policy advisory system: Externalization, politicization and the legacy of pillarization. Policy Sciences, 50(1), 63–84. Van der Meulen, B. (1998). Science policies as principal-agent games: Institutionalization and path dependency in the relation between government and science. Research Policy, 27 (4), 397–414. Van Nispen, F. K. M., & Scholten, P. W. A. (2015). Policy analysis and the migration crisis: Introduction. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis Research and Practice, 17 (1), 1–9. Weingart, P. (1999). Scientific expertise and political accountability: Paradoxes of science in politics. Science and Public Policy, 26(3), 151–161.

CHAPTER 8

When Illiberalism Meets Neoliberalism: State and the Social Sciences in Present Hungary Zsolt Boda and Zoltán Gábor Szúcs

The focus of this chapter will be on the radical transformation of funding, the changing institutional context and political control of the social and political sciences in Hungary after 2010 and the beginning of the increasingly illiberal Orbán regime. There are English-language summaries of political science research in Hungary that deal with the pre-2010 period (Arató & Tóth, 2010; Balázs, 2014; Boda & Szúcs, 2015). In contrast, our chapter seeks to make sense of the changes initiated by democratic backsliding and the emergence of an illiberal political regime in Hungary after that date. The essence of this transformation was that a pluralistic ideological landscape

Z. Boda (B) Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre of Excellence, Budapest, Hungary e-mail: [email protected] Z. G. Szúcs Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre of Excellence, Budapest, Hungary e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Eisfeld and M. Flinders (eds.), Political Science in the Shadow of the State, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75918-6_8

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was replaced by a predominantly neoliberal vision of academia which served as a Trojan horse for gradually expanding political control over previously autonomous academic institutions and universities, following the logic of illiberalism. Some of the elements of this transformation, like the ousting of Central European University or the nationalization of the research infrastructure of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, captured the attention of the international media. We will show that recent developments in political science fit into a larger pattern of developments in the social sciences, and that political science may not even be the discipline that is most dramatically affected by them. The chapter will be structured as follows: Its first section provides an overview of Hungarian politics since the post-communist democratic transition of the early 1990s. Here we will argue that 2010 should be seen as a major turning point which radically changed the political context for the social sciences in Hungary. We will further argue that a minor turning point may be identified in the mid-1990s when the democratic transition had resulted in more or less consolidated democratic politics unfolding through the competition of two larger party-blocs, a stable system of constitutional checks and balances and so on. For the social sciences, the date marks an important historical point, as intellectuals—social scientists included—had been widely involved in the democratization process. The mid-1990s witnessed a shift towards professionalization and a growing gap between academics and politicians. The regime change after 2010 put an end to the era of flourishing institutional autonomy and pluralism within the social sciences and started a new, far darker, chapter in the relationship between academia and politics. The second section will summarize major trends in the development of the social sciences in Hungary, including important data on funding, education and research. The third section will then be dedicated to the competing models of social scientific research and education in Hungary before 2010. Here we will argue that until 2010 four major ideological outlooks (for which we will show numerous examples) characterized the relationship between social sciences and politics: First, widespread suspicion among conservative and right-wing politicians about the presumed leftist and liberal bias of social scientists; second, a technocratic vision claiming that politics should listen more to the advice of experts; third, a neoliberal vision that stressed the importance of international success, competitive, project-based funding and the importance of the applied

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sciences; fourth, a co-optional outlook that sought to find technical support and political resources for research and education. The fourth and fifth sections of this chapter will focus on two aspects of transformations in the relationship between politics and the social sciences, which have led to an interesting mixture of neoliberal and illiberal policies vis-à-vis these disciplines in Hungary: the breakthrough of the neoliberal vision of social science funding (of which the two most important examples are the first reform of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 2011 and the current privatization of Hungarian universities since 2018), and the expanding direct political control over the social sciences through a series of attacks on the institutional autonomy of social science education and research and the extensive use of co-option to bring these disciplines under the scope of political influence.

The Political Context: 1989–2020 In this section, we will briefly survey the broader political context for social science research in Hungary. Four distinct periods will be briefly discussed: the state-socialist regime (–1990); post-communist democratization in a broader sense (1990–1995); the consolidated democratic period (1995–2010) and the Orbán regime (2010–2020). In an obvious sense, post-communist democratization—a peaceful transition of power via roundtable talks between the communist party and the small opposition movements in 1989, and the first democratic elections in 1990—marked a radical disruption in the dynamic history of relationships between politics and the academic sphere. Until 1990, Hungary belonged to the Eastern Bloc and was dominated by the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (called the Hungarian Working People’s Party before 1956). The country was permanently occupied by the Soviet Armed Forces that helped Hungarian communists to suppress the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and virtually appointed János Kádár, namesake of the succeeding thirty-three-year long period of communist rule in Hungary, as the communist party’s new leader. During these thirty-three years, the stability of the rule of János Kádár or the hegemony of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party were hardly ever questioned, and people began to accustom themselves to the idea of never-ending Soviet dominance. The Kádár regime was maintained not just by sheer force, but also by the legitimating power of comparative economic prosperity that brought improvements in health care, education and living

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standards. Even Kádár’s fall was orchestrated by a younger generation of communist apparatchiks in 1988, when he and many of his closest and oldest allies were replaced at a party conference with the consent of Moscow. The deepening economic crisis and the weakening of the Soviet Union, however, quickly undermined the stability of the regime as well. When Kádár’s former party tried to reform itself and changed its name to Hungarian Socialist Party in October 1989, its membership fell from around 800,000 to only 35,000, and it won a mere 8% of seats in the newly elected parliament in 1990. By then, the communist constitution was totally rewritten, a considerable portion of the economy was privatized or on its way towards privatization and direct political control over the press, the academia, the churches and the civil sphere was over for good. In another and no less obvious sense, however, the heritage of the state-socialist era left its lasting impact on academic life in Hungary. Many of the senior researchers had been socialized in that regime’s much more confined academic world. Social sciences and humanities were in a particularly delicate position before 1990 because they were treated with deep suspicion by the Party as potential ideological rivals to the official ideology of ‘scientific socialism’. Consequently, they received much closer attention on the part of the regime and were less able to engage in international scientific networks than the ideologically less suspicious STEM disciplines. Also, the major academic institutions were mostly formed during or later reformed in response to the academic world of the Kádár regime. The long shadow of the state socialism was cast on academic life by the obstinate financing problems that were partly due to the vast transformation crisis around 1990 when inflation skyrocketed, the GDP dropped and academic financial resources became permanently scarce. The next major turning point occurred after 2010 when Viktor Orbán and his party won a landslide victory in the parliamentary election, gaining a two-thirds majority of seats in Hungarian parliament. That majority enabled them to unilaterally and radically reshape the foundations of the Hungarian political system. Since then, they won two further parliamentary elections, again gaining a two-thirds majority in both cases. These electoral victories completed their hegemony in Hungary that had started to unfold earlier. The Fidesz party won every local government election between 2006 and 2019 (although in 2019 their victory was somewhat mitigated by the opposition’s unexpected successes in Budapest and other metropolitan areas), and it also won every election to the European

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Parliament since Hungary’s accession to the European Union. As these results show, the 2010 boundary should be considered not so much the beginning, but rather the tipping point for a longer-term process that started around the mid-1990s when the Hungarian democracy became consolidated and a two-party-bloc system was formed: a right-wing bloc dominated by Fidesz and a left-liberal bloc with the Hungarian Socialist Party as the senior and the Alliance of Free Democrats as the junior partner. In some sense, the regime change taking place since 2010 represented a culmination of parallel developments, of which the slow erosion till 2010 and then sudden collapse of the two-party-bloc system in 2010 was one of the most obvious, but definitely not the only contributing factor. The system had been fatally weakened by a number of reasons. First, the eight-year long rule of the left-liberal parties (2002–2010) was accompanied by a series of corruption and political scandals, the fall of two prime ministers (Péter Medgyessy and Ferenc Gyurcsány; neither of them was replaced due to electoral defeats), unprecedented riots in Budapest in autumn 2006, a double economic crisis (one preceding the great global economic crisis and induced by economic policy failures between 2004 and 2006 misadministration, the second part of the Great Recession after 2008) and the dissolution of the political coalition between socialists and liberals in 2008. Another important factor was that a new generation of political parties entered Hungarian politics after 2006, whose main objective was to offer an alternative to the “entire corrupt two-party-system”: The far-right ‘Movement for a Better Hungary’ and the green ‘Politics Can Be Different’ introduced new dividing lines in Hungarian politics and succeeded in gaining seats in the Hungarian parliament in 2010, making the landslide victory of Fidesz even larger than it would have been in the absence of any electable alternative to the left-liberal parties. The liberal Alliance was not returned and soon dissolved, but a new party, the Democratic Coalition, founded by former premier Ferenc Gyurcsány, came into existence in 2011 to challenge the hegemony of Fidesz. The new parties and new cleavages transformed the Hungarian political landscape into what Fidesz politicians liked to call a ‘central space of power’ by which they simply meant that Fidesz was in winning position as long as the opposition remained divided, so that its votes would not add up. A third important factor was a systematic dismantling of the democratic machinery and the foundations of the rule of law by

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Viktor Orbán and Fidesz after 2010. They wrote an entirely new constitution, packed the Constitutional Court and curtailed its powers, filled essential positions at Hungary’s State Audit Office, Prosecutor General, Supreme Court, National Media Authority, etc. with political appointees. Vast amounts of EU financial resources were channeled to governmentaligned entrepreneurs and corporations. A series of hostile takeovers of independent media outlets and an expansion of government-oriented media companies was launched. There are many labels for the changes that Hungary underwent during the last decades: hybridization, mafia state, externally constrained competitive authoritarian regime, plebiscitary leader democracy, Ceasarianism and populism (Bozóki & Heged˝ us, 2018; Körösényi et al., 2020; Sata & Karolewski, 2020; Szelényi & Csillag, 2015, etc.). Undoubtedly, the most popular label associated with the new regime is ‘illiberalism’, mostly due to the fact that it was used by the prime minister in a public speech and thus it seems to fit nicely Fidesz’ openly declared antiliberal character. Various authors seem to disagree on the extent of the Orbán regime’s deviance from the established standards of constitutional democracy and on the speed of de-democratization. Some (especially constitutional lawyers) argued already in 2011 that Hungary was turning into an authoritarian regime. There is also a disciplinary difference with respect to the perceived central element of the regime change: Some argue that it may best be understood as a dismantling of the constitutional order, while others focus on corruption, state capture or the mixture of authoritarianism and a certain version of capitalism. But by now there is widespread agreement on the fact that Hungary is not a democracy anymore (as reflected in the conclusions of V-Dem, Freedom House and a range of global democracy barometers). That is why it is so important to see that certain changes in the Hungarian political context could have come about without democratic backsliding, and certain phenomena of backsliding have parallels in the region and can be interpreted on a global level, but some are the results of the specific mixture of various strands of Hungarian politics during the past fifteen years since the first cracks on the two-party-bloc system. Compared to this major turning point, the other, minor one that may be detected during the mid-1990s has had a much less dramatic effect on Hungarian politics. The consolidation of Hungary’s democracy slowed the influx of academic professionals into the new political elite and established a more robust boundary between the academic and the

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political spheres. While a large portion of the democratic opposition to the state-socialist regime and the new democratic parties were recruited from the academic sphere during the post-communist transition, many such persons lost their interest in politics. Those who remained within the academic sphere spent much of their time building barriers against political influence. This was not unique to the academic sphere, and it was a process that was a direct response to the experience of constant political and ideological control over academic life during the state-socialist period. More importantly, however, it consolidated the major autonomous institutions and set the rules of academic life in post-communist Hungary. That did not occur without controversies, and as will be seen, it did not go unchallenged both by political players or outsiders who criticized the rules and practices of the academic sphere from time to time. It was obviously not a utopian age of free and politically unengaged scientific inquiries. But still it was a period that significantly differed from the Orbán regime with respect to its predominant views about the relationship between politics and the academe. To sum up, the last half century of Hungarian politics offered four distinct kinds of political context for academic life: state socialism with tight political control over the academic sphere (–1990); the transitional period with an influx of academics into democratic politics (1990–1995); the period of consolidated democracy and an autonomous academic sphere (1995–2010) and the illiberal regime with expanding political control over academic matters (2010–2020).

Trends in Hungary’s Social Sciences In this section we survey some main developments in Hungarian social sciences. We will focus on political science and sociology in a broad sense (including public administration and gender studies). Without wishing to open our historical lens too far, it is worth noting that Hungary, although a semi-peripheral country compared to Western Europe, has a considerable history in social science research and education. For instance, in the eighteenth century a new department for politico-cameral studies was established, and a professor for the new discipline was appointed at the Faculty of Law, University of Buda (formerly: University of Nagyszombat [Trnava, Slovakia], currently known as Eötvös University, Budapest). The curriculum was built on the German works of Joseph Sonnenfels, a leading Enlightenment intellectual and influential

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minister of the Habsburg Empire. These were abbreviated and translated into Latin, the Hungarian Kingdom’s official language. Sonnenfelsian Polizeywissenschaft dominated the education in political science until 1848. Even after the curriculum had repeatedly been revised, the status of the subject remained more or less the same: it was part of the training of future lawyers throughout the nineteenth century. Sociology has a shorter history, but several important Hungarian public intellectuals of the nineteenth century, such as István Szécheny, the “Greatest Hungarian”, pursued an essentially sociological approach in their analyses of the slowly modernizing Hungarian society. In the early twentieth century, several internationally renowned social science figures started their studies in Hungary, including Karl Mannheim, Karl Polanyi and Arnold Hauser. Two features of the early Hungarian social sciences deserve attention. First, they emerged from legal studies. As shown above, political science was predominantly about public administration and played a role in the training of future lawyers. The first important academic figures of sociology also came from the domain of law, like Bódog Somló or Oszkár Jászi. That tradition weighed on the social sciences, especially on political science during its renaissance after the regime change of 1989. Second, while sociology was largely viewed as a leftist, potentially subversive discipline, very soon a fundamentally right-wing, nationalistic branch grew out of it. The former observation is hardly surprising, but the latter is more interesting. Indeed, before World War II a strong intellectual movement emerged at the borderline of sociology and literature: its sociographic depiction of the poverty of peasantry was coupled with the idealization of the countryside as well as anti-semitic and anti-urban messages. Actually, it had a lasting impact on Hungarian political thought by creating a dividing line between urban and populist intellectuals, and it remained relevant even after the post-communist transition and shaped debates about the social sciences during the last thirty years. During the decades of the communist regime, “scientific socialism” replaced the social sciences in university curricula, and scientific socialism departments were founded all over the country. Their main function was to implant the ideology of the regime in the future intelligentsia. Ideological control of the social sciences thus has a long-standing tradition in Hungary. However, these disciplines re-emerged during the soft Communist autocracy of János Kádár. Sociology played an important role in the 70s

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in providing a language and an interpretive frame for talking about society and social problems. Kuczi and Becskeházi (1992) argue that in the 1970s sociology offered a discursive space for expressing reflective and even critical ideas about society under Communist rule as an academic discipline. Similarly, the renaissance of political science in the 1980s was linked to political changes and even social-political activism, as it was orchestrated by a number of reform-minded communist intellectuals who wrote memorable proposals for political reforms (e.g. Bihari, 1987) and took some part in the reform movements of the late 1980s. It may be said that social scientists and researchers played an important political role in the regime change. From 1990, the situation normalized to some extent: the new democratic regime provided a supportive background to the development of the social sciences. Their evolution may roughly be divided into three periods (see Boda & Szúcs, 2015). The first period from the 1970s to the early 1990s saw the establishment of the foundations. This is when the first handbooks were published; the first research-driven sociology and political science research programmes were launched, and the first university departments were founded. The second period (roughly the 1990s and the early 2000s) was characterized by large-scale expansion of the social sciences. As the number of students grew and the demand for degrees in the disciplines increased, new departments were founded at universities both in Budapest and outside the capital in the towns of Miskolc, Pécs, Szeged, etc. A faculty of social sciences was established at Eötvös Loránd University (Budapest) as well as Corvinus University of Budapest. Other universities established faculties of the humanities and social sciences (University of Szeged, Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Chruch in Hungary, University of Pannonia), or of economics and social sciences (Politechnical University of Budapest, University István Széchenyi, University Károly Eszterházy). At some universities social science programmes have been offered in the faculty of humanities (University of Miskolc, University of Pécs). Doctoral schools in political science, sociology and other social sciences have also been established at several universities. According to data of the Hungarian Doctoral Council, by 2020 there were six in political science, seven in sociology, one in communication studies and several others in law, economics, public administration, etc.

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A very important development was the establishment of the Central European University (CEU) in 1991 by George Soros, the HungarianAmerican billionaire who provided a generous endowment to finance the university. CEU is accredited in both the United States and Hungary (and from now on, in Austria), and offers English-language master’s and doctoral programmes—in Austria, also bachelor’s programmes—in the social sciences, the humanities, law, management and public policy. CEU operates with a partly Hungarian, partly international staff and has been recognized for both teaching and research excellence. A reference point for social science education and research in Hungary, CEU was and is respected and envied in equal measure by scholars otherwise predominantly reliant on state funding. Yet even substantial philanthropic support proved unable to push back the shadow of the state: After several years of government attacks and obfuscation, the CEU decided to relocate from Budapest to Vienna. Along with universities, the research network of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) deserves attention. The HAS is a publicly funded research society; until 2019, before their reorganization into a new body, the Eötvös Loránd Research Network (ELRN), 15 research centres with some 3500 researchers also belonged to it. The centres’ activity is limited to research, although many researchers teach at universities either part-time or as external fellows. One of the centres is the Centre of Social Sciences (CSS) with some 150 researchers in the fields of legal studies, political science and sociology. During the second period, research associations such as the Association of Political Science and the Association of Sociology were founded; Hungarian-language academic journals were established; new textbooks were written, and a number of classics and foreign textbooks were translated into Hungarian. As the number of social science graduates grew, the disciplines’ professionalization also increased. A group of think tanks emerged, specialized in survey techniques and social analysis (TÁRKI, Medián, etc.) as well as in policy analysis and political consultancy (e.g. Vision Politics Budapest, Policy Solutions, Századvég, Political Capital, etc.). As political parties recognized the significance of these organizations, a new generation of think tanks emerged that were more closely associated with political parties (e.g. Demos Magyarország, Néz˝ opont, Republikon, etc.). However, a number of independent institutes survived (e.g. Méltányosság, Progresszív Intézet). Overall these organizations

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represented the demand side of the social science job market and offered attractive positions to the new graduates. The third period, the opening decades of the new century, were characterized by a gradual movement towards diversification in terms of research topics and approaches; sophistication in terms of research methodology and internationalization of research with increasing Hungarian presence at international conferences and publication fora. In terms of diversification it may be safely stated that many intellectual currents are present, including conservative social theory (András Lánczi, Attila Károly Molnár), critical sociology (Iván Szelényi, Gábor Scheiring), political realism (Zoltán Gábor Sz˝ ucs) and normative social theory (István Balogh). With regard to methodological sophistication, the last two decades have brought about a breakthrough, especially in political science. With its longer history and stronger methodological foundations, sociology had long been using a wide array of both quantitative and qualitative research methodologies, which during the 1990s gained ground in political science. In the 2000s, empirical studies and database-building endeavours won prominence, and new methodologies, including text mining and big data analyses, appeared in the toolkits of researchers. As regards the third above-mentioned trend, Hungary is Central/East-European leader in terms of internationalization of research. For instance, Hungarian social researchers won 5 ERC grants in the period of 2010–2018, which is higher than any other country’s performance in the region, including Poland (with a four-times higher population than that of Hungary). However, as Table 8.1 demonstrates, the entire region is lagging behind the performance of Austria. Similarly, as Table 8.2 illustrates, Hungary also leads the region in terms of international social science publications: Several Hungarian social scientists received prestigious international awards. For instance, in 2003 the ECPR’s Rudolf Wildenmann Prize was awarded to Zsolt Enyedi (Central European University), and in 2013 the ECPR’s Stein Rokkan Prize was awarded to Dorothee Bohle and Béla Greskovits (both again located at the Central European University) in recognition of their book Capitalist Diversity on Europe’s Periphery.

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Table 8.1 Number of European research grants (social humanities) per country, 2010–2018 (Central/East Europe)

sciences

and

50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Austria

Bulgaria

Czechia

Hungary

Poland

Romania

Slovenia

Source www.europa.eu

Competing Models of Social Science Research and Education In this section, four distinct models of social scientific research and education will be discussed. These models may be familiar from other cases, but for the specific purposes of this chapter their main function is to show how interactions between academic and political sphere have been shaped by more or less coherent normative visions of social science research and education. These models or normative visions can be best described as a set of assumptions about how academic and political spheres should be connected to each other and which should be the dominating side in their interactions. The models are as follows: the politicized vision focusing on perceived biases behind seemingly apolitical social science research; the technocratic vision that highlights the crucial importance of experts and academics in policymaking; the neoliberal vision that underlines the competitive nature of scientific work and wishes to reshape academic work to maximize competitivity and, finally, the co-optional vision in which the role of academics is subordinated to politics.

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Table 8.2 Web of science publications across Central and Eastern Europe in social sciences disciplines (2015–2020)

Those four models were present in Hungarian politics throughout the last three decades, but it is clear that they played a changing role during various periods of these thirty years. In a sense, we may describe these years as a transformation of the relationship between the academic and political spheres from domination of the first two visions to supremacy of the latter two. This is hardly surprising, given that since the post-communist democratic transition Hungary’s academic sphere first provided a recruiting pool for the political elite and then developed strong autonomous institutions against the sort of direct political control experienced during the state-socialist regime. Under such circumstances, suspicions about hidden political bias were calculable reactions to the academe’s claims of autonomy and independence, while technocratic ideas could be reasonably interpreted as a kind of overreach on the part of academics. Neoliberal academia and co-optation may be also viewed as reactions to the status quo in the relationship between the academic and the political spheres before 2010: Both seek to undercut the former’s autonomy

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in the name of transparency, accountability and academic excellence visa-vis those who finance university research in the case of the normative vision of neoliberal academia while, in the case of co-option politics seek to retrieve direct control over academic work. In this sense, the illiberal regime change in Hungary can be best described as a double breakthrough of neoliberal academia and co-option. It is essential to see, however, that neither neoliberal academia nor co-option as normative visions are unique to the Orbán regime. The first model assumed that social scientific research should be or is claimed to be politically unbiased. Max Weber’s ideas were often cited— especially in the early 1990s—to legitimize a vision of academic work according to which the social sciences should explore the empirical world, while value-driven efforts to change the social environment should be left to extra-scientific discussions. This quasi-Weberian dichotomy was perceived as sharply contrasting with the ideologically loaded and politically controlled relationship between the state-socialist regime and its academic sphere. And it happened against this quasi-Weberian background that social scientists were often accused of leftist or liberal bias. In an infamous bon mot, István Csurka, a former dramatist and founding member of the right-wing Hungarian Democratic Forum (the party that won the 1990 parliamentary elections), later the founder of the far-right Party of Hungarian Justice and Justice, expressed this suspicion when claiming that ‘expertise is a bolshevik trick’. When criticizing government, sociologists, economists and political scientists were recurrently charged with pursuing a hidden political agenda and supporting the current opposition. That was especially conspicuous during the first period of democratization, when political parties freely recruited academics for political careers, making such allegations plausible enough. The contention became topical again after 2010, when the Orbán regime began to question the autonomy of academic institutions: Allegedly playing a political role became a recurrent charge against economists, political scientists, sociologists and legal scholars criticizing government policies. The assertion surfaced in a particularly absurd form in the case of gender studies whose financing was abruptly ended by the Hungarian government in 2018: Gender studies were charged with spreading ‘genderism’ or a ‘gender ideology’. The second model was also often legitimized by the above-mentioned quasi-Weberian dichotomy between empirical social sciences and valueladen political discussions. But in contrast to the politicized vision, which

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desired to confine the authority of scholarly knowledge to the academic sphere, now it became politics’ turn to be constrained by academic authority. The basic idea was that the proper field of politics is the democratic competition for governing power, while policymaking should be grounded in expert knowledge, derived from scientific knowledge. ‘Independent’ institutions not supposed to be controlled by party politics were initially widely popular (the independence of the National Bank was established on these grounds in the early 1990s, and the autonomy of academic institutions was also legitimized by reference to the privileged epistemic status of persons with expertise in a specific field). Against this background, the technocratic vision provided exceptional opportunities for academics to contribute to meddling in politics without explicitly transgressing the boundaries between academic and political spheres. Perhaps adoption of the 1993 Act on the Hungarian Academy of Sciences provided the most interesting example: the bill had been drafted at the Academy. The third model was based on two crucial assumptions. First, it was contended that as academic research is publicly financed, it must be held accountable for its spending. Second, it was further assumed that there are two fundamentally different, but equally legitimate ways of providing accountability. One may be followed if research outcomes can be directly utilized for economic purposes. In such cases, public spending provides a direct economic return, but it also opens the gate for political control through project-based financing where policymakers establish priorities for allocating research resources. Another way can be pursued when no such direct economic benefits exist. Public spending can then be justified by procedures for assessing scientific excellence and especially by scientometric references. This latter way differs from the former in that the latter rests on the supposedly discrete standards of an autonomous academic sphere, while the former highlights the dependence of academic work on the demands of the economy (and politics). In the case of social science research, the former way understandably played a lesser role. One exception may be noted: In the never-ending Hungarian debate on the public financing of higher education in the social sciences and humanities, these disciplines were frequently charged with producing graduates who had no reasonable chance on the labour market. Although a popular joke about a graduate serving burgers in a McDonald’s restaurant targeted the humanities, social science courses were also accused of generating increasing unemployment, even if these

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allegations do not seem to have any empirical support. And, unfortunately, Hungarian policies based on the normative vision of neoliberal academia served the purposes of austerity rather than increased competitiveness. Finally, the fourth model may be considered a counterpart of the technocratic vision. Both assume that expertise must contribute to policymaking, but they offer very different justifications. While the technocratic vision seeks to legitimize the privileged epistemic status of experts at the expanse of politicians, the co-optional model puts politics into the driver’s seat. Autonomous academic institutions are considered unnecessary, even harmful, because academic work should serve political purposes. Accordingly, the academic sphere should be administered by political appointees. That does not imply that the specific prestige and privileged epistemic status of academics are utterly irrelevant, but their proper use is to serve as political resources. In this view, academics should voice their opinion on policy matters only when explicitly consulted by politicians. If required by other factors, the opinion may be conveniently overlooked. In exchange for such selective and on-demand contribution to policy making, academics may hope for various rewards. In the case of the social sciences, the establishment of new schools or research institutes and think tanks as well as the grant of additional financial resources may be considered as typical rewards. In light of this argument, the next section explores the origins of this twofold breakthrough of neoliberal academia and co-optation.

The Breakthrough of Neoliberal Academia The neoliberal vision of the academia is of course far from a Hungarian peculiarity. Even the EU’s Lisbon Strategy builds on a fundamentally neoliberal concept when urging for more private R&D expenditures (see Fekete & Boda, 2010). As put by the Presidency Conclusions of the Barcelona European Council on 15 and 16 March 2002 (Paragraph 47), [i]n order to close the gap between the EU and its major competitors, there must be a significant boost of the overall R&D and innovation effort in the Union, with a particular emphasis on frontier technologies. The European Council therefore […] agrees that overall spending on R&D and innovation in the Union should be increased with the aim of approaching 3% of GDP by 2010. Two-thirds of this new investment should come from the private sector.

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That approach is in line with Ziman’s (1996) idea on ‘post-academic science’, as contrasted to classic academia. According to classic academic notions, knowledge is a public resource, and the main goal of research consists in contributing to the accumulation of well-founded (‘true’) knowledge on the world. The institutionalized norms of that concept, as described by Robert Merton, seek to scrutinize research activities in order to promote commonality, universality, objectivity, originality and skepticism (see Ziman, 1996). Classic academia is financed either by the state (the continental model), or by generous private donors and their endowments. Research is pursued by researchers who view their position more in terms of a vocation than of a profession, and is mainly considered as pure science, independent from commercial utilization. However, in post-academic science utility and even profitability rule over purely scientific considerations. Knowledge production is not a disinterested process anymore with the aim of promoting the public good. On the contrary, it is a process driven by interests in solving practical problems and making money. Of course, post-academic science in a Zimanian sense is more than the neoliberal vision of academia. But the concept is largely compatible with the neoliberal approach; and it is important to see that such a market-oriented operation of the academia may have a far-reaching impact on the very essence of research activities. There is evidence that neoliberal academia does not function according to model assumptions, viz. that private investments in R&D fall short of expectations (e.g. Fekete & Boda, 2010). Even in the United States, the state plays an important role in financing not just basic research, but development activities (see Mazzucato, 2015). Debates on the roles of the state and the market in research and higher education cannot be summarized here. Suffice it to underscore that neoliberal ideas on academia are very much on the table not just in the United States, but in Europe as well, and that they may have serious consequences for the social sciences and humanities—as illustrated by the 2012 EU debate on whether funding of social sciences and humanities projects should be terminated. Hungarian academia, including HAS and university research institutes, have largely been operating along classic principles, at least in the sense that academic activities have not been subject to strict performance requirements; they have been largely seen as a vocation with comparatively low salaries; they have been predominantly financed by the government;

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their political and business independence has not been questioned and they have been considered as public services accessible to the wider public. As a legacy from the previous Communist autocracy, higher education was practically free of charge, and the HAS research network employed almost 10,000 researchers. This state-centred model came under attack several times, but remained in place with a few reforms and modifications till recently. Since the austerity measures of 1995, tuition fees at universities have become a highly politicized issue. The first Orbán government (1998– 2002) basically abolished them, but the Socialists brought them back in 2006. Despite their low amount, they drew criticism from the opposition, along with the (also largely symbolical) co-payment for doctor’s visits. In 2008, a referendum was initiated for abolishing them, and a large majority voted against the fees. In 2012, Fidesz started re-focusing on higher education policy. Four years after the referendum that the party had itself organized against tuition fees, 16 study programmes were put on a self-financed basis, with very limited scholarship opportunities. A student loan was provided, but it only covers the tuition fee, not student subsistence. The sixteen programmes (both at BA and MA levels) rank among the most popular courses, mostly related to business and economics. However, legal studies, media studies and international relations are also included among selffunded programmes. Table 8.3 shows the number and share of students whose higher education studies have been financed by the government. There is a sharp drop in the period 2000–2005, largely due to the expansion of higher education and growing student numbers. After 2012, although the share of students with public funding stabilized around 58%, the absolute number of enrollments declined dramatically. This was largely due to the intimidating effect of self-financing requirements. As a consequence, public spending on higher education has also decreased (see Table 8.4). It is well known in Hungary that the introduction of tuition fees for some study programmes and the decline of higher education spending was not merely driven by efforts at economizing. Under the influence of László Parragh, president of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Viktor Orbán declared repeatedly that the country needs less university degrees and more industrial workers for the government’s re-industrialization programme (on whose political economy and social consequences see Scheiring, 2020).

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Table 8.3 Number and share of government-funded studentship in Hungarian higher education (% of total studentships) 250,000

60.00% 58.00%

200,000

56.00% 54.00%

150,000

52.00% 100,000

50.00% 48.00%

50,000

46.00% 44.00%

No

2017/2018

2016/2017

2015/2016

2014/2015

2013/2014

2012/2013

2011/2012

2010/2011

2009/2010

2008/2009

2007/2008

2006/2007

2005/2006

2004/2005

2003/2004

2002/2003

2001/2002

2000/2001

0

%

Source Hungarian Education Office, https://www.oktatas.hu

Table 8.4 Public spending on higher education, % of GDP (Hungary) 1.2

1

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Source Central Statistical Office of Hungary, http://ksh.hu

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Finally, in 2018 the government started privatizing public universities. First Budapest’s Corvinus University (Hungary’s most important business, economics and social sciences university) was reorganized into a foundation, which the government provided with a generous endowment in the form of shares of the national oil company (Mol ) and other Hungarian corporations. In 2020 the privatization of six other universities commenced: the Széchenyi University of Gy˝ or, the Moholy-Nagy Art School, the University of János Neumann, the University of Miskolc, the University of Veterinary Medicine and the University of Sopron. At the time of writing, the operational model of privatized universities is not completely clear. They are being transformed into private foundations, but unlike the case of the Corvinus University, the government provides no more endowments. Thus, at the end of the day, the state will have to continue financing them, although the contributions of students are also expected to rise. Even if promises for scholarship schemes have been made, privatization has, once again, unsettled potential students: enrollments at Corvinus University dropped significantly in 2020. The rationale for the privatization of universities is expected efficiency and rising quality. The government apparently believes that once professors are no longer public servants, they will work better, while their salaries will—magically—increase. Among further expectations are increasing cooperation between universities and corporations; faster and better R&D and market-led university programming. While the authors are, of course, not in a position to guess the outcome of this process, the lack of white papers suggests that the reform is far from being well-prepared. Expected outcomes may therefore not materialize. As regards the fate of the research network of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, HAS shed about half of its researchers and underwent some reorganization after the 1989 regime change. Still, in 2006, during left-liberal governance, criticisms concerning its poor performance and costly operation were raised. In 2011, already under the Fidesz government, József Pálinkás, at the time president of the HAS, started a major reform—rumors said it was the price paid for the government not touching the academy. The reform aimed at raising quality standards and making research more efficient. It consisted of merging the previously fragmented research institutes into fifteen larger centres. The Center of Social Sciences integrated the Institutes for Political Science, of Sociology, of Legal Studies and of Minority Studies. That process was supposed to

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increase synergies between researchers working on similar domains—an argument that has proven valid, at least for the Center for Social Sciences. Following the 2018 elections, the entire research network underwent a drastic change anyway. The objective was to reorganize the research centres under a new organization, independent from the Academy. The arguments put forward by the government referred to the alleged failure of the research network to produce adequate outputs and, more specifically, to effectively contribute to the innovation process of the Hungarian economy. Both HAS and the researchers protested against the plans, but in vain: In 2019, the network was stripped from the Academy and put under a new institutional structure, the Loránd Eötvös Research Network (LERN). At the time of writing, LERN has not provided any meaningful new initiatives to achieve the government’s declared goals in terms of promoting innovation, but at least the freedom of research has not been jeopardized either. In 2020 the government decided to double the public funding of LERN. On one hand, this was badly needed, as researchers’ salaries have been lagging behind not only internationally, but by Hungarian standards as well: According to the Innovation Scoreboards of the European Commission one of the major weaknesses of the Hungarian R&D system is the low level of public funding. But pouring money into the research network contradicts the neoliberal logic which has characterized the government’s approach to academia. To sum up: Over the past thirty years, but especially during the past decade, Hungarian academia gradually moved away from a predominantly state-centred, public service-type approach towards a more market-based, neoliberal approach. Public expenditures on both higher education and research have been low and decreasing. Higher education is increasingly financed by the students, while academic research has been compelled to look for external funding in order to balance low salaries and the lack of public financing. The relative success of Hungarian scholars under European research programmes should be interpreted in this light.

Expanding Political Control This section aims at shedding light on several cases where the model of cooption clearly shaped the Orbán regime’s attitudes and policies towards social science research. The first example describes one of the regime’s pet projects: the expensive new National University of Public Service. The second example consists in a series of sustained efforts on the part

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of the National Bank’s leadership to promote its somewhat ‘unorthodox views’ about economics via higher education and by financing academic publishing. The third example is the ousting of the CEU, which not just contradicted the neoliberal logic, but whose political motives were quite evident. The last example relates to the current privatization of universities. Actually, it includes two contrasting cases: Corvinus University and the University of Theatre and Film Arts. These examples demonstrate that the Orbán regime is interested in co-opting certain academic figures for political purposes, and is ready to provide rewards within the academic sphere in exchange for political services. Arguments from other models have been widely marshalled for support, but remained subordinated to the purposes of political co-option. Before turning to these cases, it should be emphasized that, since 2010, the co-optional model has been much more widely applied in Hungary than these isolated examples might suggest. And in several of these instances, the social sciences and particularly political science were targeted. We may distinguish between three distinct fields where the co-optional model was put to use: targeting specific institutions or organization; targeting specific individuals; and, at a general level, targeting the whole of the whole Hungarian academia. First, a network of think tanks and research institutes were either created, or specific previously existing institutions received generous support from the government (e.g. Veritas, Terror Háza Múzeum, Néz˝ opont, Századvég, National University of Public Administration). Of this list, both Néz˝ opont and Századvég are political think tanks, led and operated by political scientists like Ágoston Mráz, András Lánczi or Gábor G. Fodor who are (or in case of Fodor: were) part of the Hungarian academe. These think tanks have a contractual relation with the government, providing policy analyses and conducting surveys. Their contracts have not been won in open bidding, and payment is very generous. Some of those political scientists, e.g. Mráz, also perform in public debates, unfailingly defending the government’s position, acting as a sort of informal spokespersons. Second, politically favoured individuals were appointed or helped to be elected by autonomous bodies even if that required a change of laws (as when Lajos Mocsáry, a famous handball coach, became professor, rector and chair of the national conference of university rectors). And third, the autonomy of academic institutions in general—most obviously

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universities—were considerably limited by legislative changes, placement of political appointees and pressure by media directly controlled by the regime. Below we provide some examples on how the co-optional model works. The first example relates to the creation of a new university based on previous military, public administration and law enforcement higher education institutions in 2012. From the perspective of our chapter, the case is of special importance, for it concerns a higher education institution with a high profile of law, public policy and political science courses. And it illustrates how easily the Orbán regime was able to establish an entire university for itself on the grounds of the co-optional model. The new university has been named National University of Public Service and has been running under the auspice of the government ever since its creation. This was a pet project of the then Minister of Justice and Public Administration, Tibor Navracsics. Subsequently, it came to be supervised by Gergely Gulyás, Minister of the Prime Minister’s Office. The current rector, András Koltay served as a member of the Media Council between 2011 and 2019 (established by the regime as the top authority in media regulation and policymaking), while his predecessor András Patyi is among the Orbàn regime’s top legal advisors: He served as chair of the National Election Committee between 2013 and 2018, and as president of the State Reform Committee from 2014 to 2018. His name has been associated with very controversial decisions of the National Election Committee, the national authority in electoral legal issues. The new university was allowed to build a modern new campus and has been provided with extra funds permitting to increase the otherwise shamefully low salary of university professors. The university immediately began lobbying for a new ‘state studies’ program, which originally was referred to as “political science” in English translation; however, the Hungarian term ‘államtudomány’ has a long prehistory as the Hungarian equivalent of the German term ‘Staatswissenschaft ’. It was widely suspected that this was intended to replace political science programmes nationwide. Now the university has a monopoly in ‘statestudies’, the only diploma that directly enables graduates to hold a senior position in public administration. The university also runs a ‘Good Governance’ project, where a specific concept for measuring the quality of governance was developed. However, because of its flawed methodology this has been basically

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ignored by Hungarian political scientists. The project’s annual reports invariably argue that the governance of Hungary is of high quality in every respect. As this brief summary attests, the National University of Public Service was, from the very beginning, an institution differing fundamentally from those Hungarian universities which had an autonomous status. In fact, it was openly subordinated to the government, administered by political appointees and represented a somewhat militaristic ethos of discipline and public service inherited mostly from the military academic precursor institutions. Its close links to politics, as well as the political functions it fulfills, have been generously rewarded by the government, which makes it a prime instance of the co-optional model. The second example revolves around the promotion of ‘unorthodox views’ in economics. György Matolcsy, former economics minister in Viktor Orbán’s government, was appointed president of the National Bank whose authority was subsequently considerably expanded. Matolcsy has long been famous for his pretty unconventional economic opinions. When he became president of the National Bank, he began to behave not so much as the head of an independent institution, but as a powerful member of the government. Since he had realized that his views were controversial, he made it a priority of the National Bank to promote his views within higher education by very generous scholarships, doctoral courses, peaking with founding another new university in Kecskemét, and by financing academic publishing through several newly established foundations of the Bank. His case was not isolated in the Orbán regime. What gives it particular importance is its scale and its explicit departure from the academic standards of the Hungarian economists’ community. The third example brings the discussion back to the ousting of the CEU in 2018. This was particularly intriguing due to the manner in which it not only explicitly contradicted the goal of spreading the ideals of neoliberal academia by seriously harming an internationally recognized university, but it was also politically risky for the government, because it threatened to damage relations with the United States by harassing an American-owned private university. Nevertheless, the Hungarian government decided to pass a new law that obviously targeted the Central European University as being virtually the only non-EU private higher education institution in Hungary that issued diplomas without conducting education in its homeland.

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The regime’s rhetoric was deliberately chaotic. Some politicians denied that the measure was aimed at CEU at all, while others accused CEU with being a fraud. Government-controlled media added the charge that CEU was instrumental to George Soros’s conspiracy to undermine the stability of Hungary and its government. The disarray of these messages made it extremely difficult to respond to the charges. Even while tens of thousands of people and a number of Hungarian—and international— academic institutions expressed their solidarity with CEU, the university chose to comply with the new law. However, in vain it established a campus in New York state and confirmed its New York state accreditation for its courses. The Hungarian government intentionally delayed formally probing into the CEU case so long that the university lost its right to run US-based courses in Hungary. It was then that the university had to look for other options to survive, and eventually decided to relocate its courses and most of its infrastructure to Vienna. A final example encourages us to compare the parallel processes of privatizing the Corvinus University and the University of Theatre and Film Arts, cases which display several important similarities and dissimilarities. An essential similarity is that both measures were executed by political allies of the Orbán regime. In the former case, the flagship project of university privatization was prepared by András Lánczi, the Corvinus University’s rector and a conservative political philosopher who has long been an ardent supporter and advisor of the prime minister, and it was financed by MOL (Magyar Olaj- és Gázipari Részvénytársaság ), an oil and gas corporation and one of the biggest companies in Hungary, with close connections to the Orbán regime. In the case of the University of Theatre and Film Arts, a famous theatre director, Attila Vidnyánszky, a well known supporter of the regime and fierce critic of those in his profession whom he considers too ‘liberal’ and ‘not Christian’, was appointed president of the newly established Board of Trustees. Another important similarity was that in both cases privatization was combined with a political attack on the alleged bulwark of the Orbán regime’s perceived opponents: ‘liberal’ artists and ‘leftist’ sociologists and economists. But there was also one important difference: While Corvinus University came to be privatized in 2019 without too much defiance by students or teachers, students and staff of the University of Theatre and Film Arts decided to actively resist. They occupied the university building, organized rallies and began to launch a campaign for evoking solidarity in Hungary and abroad. A possible explanation for that difference might be

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that in the case of Corvinus University privatization may have met with the neoliberal worldview shared by many faculty and the students alike. In the case of the University of Theatre and Film Arts, privatization appeared as a politically driven attack on an autonomous professional community. What these examples reveal is that co-option may take many forms under the Orbán regime, and it may or may not conflict with other norms of the relationship between academic and political spheres. What also emerges from these examples is that the political context of illiberalism makes co-option particularly dangerous in the Hungarian case.

Conclusion This chapter sought to provide an overview of Hungarian social science research and education with respect to the relationship between academic and political spheres. First, its narrative focused on the wider political context of modern social science research in Hungary between 1989 and 2020. Four periods were distinguished: the end of the state-socialist regime and of tight political control over academia (–1990); the democratic transition and an influx of academics into politics (1990–1995); a consolidated democracy and autonomous institutions of the academic sphere (1995–2010); democratic backsliding and the undermining of the autonomy of academia (2010–). We argued that relationships between the social sciences and politics have been deeply impacted by the political context, which has also been the most important factor behind the dominance of specific visions about social sciences. Four such visions were distinguished: the politicized, the technocratic, the neoliberal and the co-optional. The politicized vision was obviously a dominant paradigm before the democratic regime change of 1989, but it did not utterly disappear in the subsequent years and made an especially strong comeback after 2010. The Orbán government has been pursuing a “ culture war” in terms of arts, culture, the humanities and the social sciences, where any performance or person or even discipline (such as gender studies) is being classified as either ideological foe or friend. The technocratic vision was strong during the years of democratic transition where social scientists, especially political scientists, provided the necessary knowledge to build the new democracy’s structures. With some variations, that vision remained influential till 2010, as governments relied on economists, sociologists and legal experts in working out different

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reforms programmes in education, health, etc. However, as recent studies suggest, the role of expertise has declined since 2010 (Bartha et al., 2020). The neoliberal vision emerged in the 2000s under socialist-liberal governments and their neoliberal social reforms (including the privatization of public services and a New Public Management reform). However, the neoliberal paradigm did not effectively affect academia and its institutions until recently, when the right-wing Orbán government(s) started to privatize universities. We also argued that post-2010 developments represent a somewhat strange alliance between neoliberal, market-led solutions and a statist intervention with tightening political control in the spirit of ‘illiberal’ governance. They marked the advent of the co-optional vision as well. Although Hungary—just as the entire Central-East European Region—has a long tradition of politically committed intellectuals joining parties to participate in ideological wars, the extent to which the Orbán governments have managed to co-opt, ‘domesticate’, control or, conversely, hunt both individuals and academic institutions is unparalleled in the history of democratic Hungary. The main lesson that we may draw is that the political context of academic life makes a huge difference with respect to the ability of political science to play a part in sustaining democracy as a way of life. In the particular case of Hungary, a central but often neglected element of democratic backsliding since 2010 has been the arguably brutal and direct destruction of academic autonomy.

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Piotr Borowiec (Eds.), Political science in Europe at the beginning of the 21st century (pp. 165–187). Jagellonian University Press. Bozóki, A. (2019). Gördül˝o rendszerváltás. L’Harmattan. Bozóki, A., & Heged˝ us, D. (2018). An externally constrained hybrid regime: Hungary in the European Union. Democratization, 25(7), 1173–1189. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2018.1455664. Fekete, L., & Boda, Z. (2010). The fabrics of knowledge: The role of large companies in knowledge production and dissemination. In P. H. Dembinski & B. Fryzel (Eds.), The role of large enterprises in democracy and society (pp. 214– 246). Palgrave Macmillan. Körösényi, A., Illés, G., & Gyulai, A. (2020). The Orbán regime: Plebiscitary leader democracy in the making. Routledge. Kuczi, T., & Becskeházi, A. (1992). Szociológia, Ideológia, Közbeszéd. Budapest: Scientia Humana Társulás. Mazzucato, M. (2015). The entrepreneurial state: Debunking public vs. private sector myths (Rev. ed.). Public Affairs. Sata, R., & Karolewski, I. P. (2020). Caesarean politics in Hungary and Poland. East European Politics, 36(2), 206–225. Scheiring, G. (2020). The retreat of liberal democracy: Authoritarian capitalism and the accumulative state in Hungary. Palgrave Macmillan. Szelényi, I., & Csillag, T. (2015). Drifting from liberal democracy: Neoconservative ideology of managed illiberal democratic capitalism in postcommunist Europe. Intersections: East European Journal of Society and Politics. https://doi.org/10.17356/ieejsp.v1i1.28. Ziman, J. (1996). “Post-academic science”: Constructing knowledge with networks and norms. Science & Technology Studies, 9(1), 67–80.

CHAPTER 9

Undermining the Role of Political Science: State-Directed Research Funding in the Visegrad States Aneta Világi

There are many similarities in the development of political science and political regimes in Central East Europe (CEE). Consequently, political scientists in the region face similar challenges and constraints in expanding the discipline. On the other hand, there are also differences that make it worth examining and comparing some of the challenges that political science in the Visegrad countries (V4, or Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) has faced during the last three decades. Recent political developments in countries once perceived as winners of democratic transition have caused serious concerns and evoked criticism by the European Union (EU). Hungary and Poland were brought to the EU Court of Justice for violating democratic principles.

A. Világi (B) Comenius University in Bratislava, Bratislava, Slovakia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Eisfeld and M. Flinders (eds.), Political Science in the Shadow of the State, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75918-6_9

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The introduction of “illiberal democracy” in the case of Orbán’s regime and the promotion of “majoritarian democracy” by Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s PiS (‘Law and Justice Party’), followed by the rise of populist and anti-democratic forces in Czech Republic and Slovakia, were also criticized by many political scientists in the region. Trained by profession to assess democratic principles and criticize the violation of such principles, academe and political scientists in particular play significant roles in democracy. However, with its public put-down of anti-democratic endeavours, the discipline became an annoying disturbance to evolving illiberal regimes and politicians. This chapter discusses how deficient democratic governments attack political science as a discipline with a vested interest in liberal democracy. Is there a systematic attempt to erode the legitimacy and stability of the discipline? More precisely, how do these governments use the distribution of research funding to control academic freedom to silence the capacity of value-oriented intellectuals to voice criticism? The chapter argues that illiberal and populist policymakers in the Visegrad countries, though largely abstaining from direct institutional attacks (Hungary is rather the exception), use political discourse, verbal attacks, to undermine the legitimacy of the social sciences and political science in particular. The ensuing deterioration of the discipline’s popular perception has a twofold impact on the stability of political science. First, it reduces the discipline’s attractiveness and, consequently, the number of students who choose political science as their subject. As the quantity of students is an essential factor in higher education financing, the impact on overall funding is substantial. Secondly, the political discourse promotes a vision of competitiveness, efficiency and productivity-related science that favours the natural and technical disciplines (STEM) to the detriment of the social and political sciences. State-based research funding mirrors that approach. As there is a lack of private investment in academic research, especially in the social sciences and humanities, state funding policies may serve as the basis for “a new politics of political science”, sacrificing independent research and shifting towards politically defined and state-directed relevance criteria. The chapter is based on empirical evidence provided by statistical data from national research agencies, statistical databases and experts’ assessments collected within the COST project Action CA 15,207

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PROSEPS—Professionalization and Social Impact of European Political Science.1

Financing Political Science: The Institutional Component Political science as an academic and scientific discipline was established (in the case of Slovakia and the Czech Republic) and re-established (in the case of Poland and Hungary) shortly after the fall of the communist regimes. During the 1990s, the discipline gradually won autonomy from other disciplines, developing an institutional structure including chairs of political science, research institutes, professional organizations and journals. The most important strongholds of political science, as regards research, stability and reproduction of the discipline, became higher education (HE) institutions. After democratic regimes were introduced in the V4 countries, academic institutions acquired autonomy from the state. However, through funding policies and evaluation (accreditation) requirements, governments could still exert influence on the discipline. As the focus of this chapter is on financial constraints, the problems of evaluation criteria will be left aside. In all four countries, financial sources for political science come mainly from the state budget in the forms of institutional or statutory funding and more specific project funding. The former is allocated by the ministries of education. Governmental allowances support academic institutions as well as national research academies in all four countries. Institutional financing depends on the criteria set up by each state. Substantive criteria might vary in nuances, but two characteristics prevail throughout: • the importance of student enrolment • and more recently, a push for market-oriented prioritization of study programmes and a profit-seeking approach to issues of education and research.

1 I would like to thank authors of the PROSEPS national reports: Eva Bobková and Vladimíra Dvoˇráková (Czech Republic) and Gabriella Ilonszki and Gábor Molnár (Hungary) for their valuable information and insights.

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In general, institutional financing of HE establishments covers the implementation of accredited study programmes, research activities, organizational development and commitments specified by the ministry (such as scholarships, or student social allowances). In each country, the model of public funding seems to favour education over research even if there are tendencies to increase the balance. Since the late 1990s until around 2012, the number of students used to be the most important criterion in determining subsidies for the implementation of study programmes. This had significant consequences for higher education in the region, as it led to a proliferation of the student body. Some of the HE institutions adopted profit-seeking strategies and promoted study programmes, including political science, as a “fancy” and “easy” way to obtain a university diploma. Not only did the number of institutions offering courses in political science mushroom, but the overall number of accepted students on these courses also increased significantly. Only after regulatory changes following the advancement of HE quality criteria convergence within the European Education Area were adopted, did research performance begin to play a role in allocating public funding to universities. Therefore, after 2012, financial incentives supporting study programmes with large numbers of students began losing their attractiveness, and universities were forced to diversify their strategies with regard to funding.

Political Science as a Discipline Also Followed This Path In the Czech Republic, the initial rise was evident, based on enrolment numbers in political science programmes2 which quadrupled in 2009, as compared to 2000. In Hungary, enrolment numbers in political science also increased up to the end of the new millennium’s first decade (Table 9.2). In Poland, political science emerged as the 8th most popular study programme in the academic year 2003/4 (Szulc, 2004), reaching a

2 The entire political science student body consists of students studying any of the following specializations: politology, international relations, public policy and administration. In every V4 country, these study programmes are accredited as “political science”.

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Table 9.1 Number of political science students: Czech Republic and Hungary

235

Country

2000

2009

2018

Czech Republic Hungary

828 1473a

3567 2593

3058 1516

a In the database, the first data are available only since 2006 and

only for bachelor level of the study as the new three-cycle degree system was introduced in academic year 2006/7 Source PROSEPS National Report on the State of Political Science in Czech Republic; Hungarian-Educational (2020)

Table 9.2 Number of political science students: Poland and Slovakia

Country

2000

2005

2018

Poland Slovakia

41,122 906

55,674 1159

17,579 597

Source Unpublished data from the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak Republic; GUS (2019), KrauzMozer et al. (2015), Szulc (2004)

peak of student numbers the following year (Table 9.1). The country kept the total number of political science students within a range of 40–50 thousand (compare to 8713 in 1993/4) for almost a decade (KrauzMozer et al., 2015). The rise was also obvious in Slovakia, where the number of political science students increased and even more than tripled (total of 3049 political science students) in the academic year 2009/10, as compared to 2000. However, the number of political science students underwent dramatic changes in the following years. The most visible decline happened in the cases of Poland and Slovakia, where the number of those students shrank to 17,579 and 597 (respectively) in 2018. In the Czech Republic and Hungary, the decline in enrolment numbers is less dramatic but still present (Table 9.2 above). Attempts at explaining these tendencies might point to factors such as demographic decline (EACEA, 2018: 25–26; Krauz-Mozer et al., 2015; Santa, 2018), or the advancing development of the European Education Area that allows students from the Visegrad region to study more easily

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in other EU countries. However, the ratio of political science students to the overall body of HE students3 in the V4 countries indicates a decline in the attraction of political science as a discipline. One of the factors that may be expected to have contributed to that loss of political science attractiveness is the political discourse on higher education in the V4 countries. Over the last decade, a discursive strategy has developed challenging the relevance of several subjects including political science. Governmental policies focusing on market-driven demands with the overall aim to supply a workforce for industry seriously eroded the former perception of university education. Academe´s primary duty used to consist in providing an education which permitted intellectual inquisitiveness as the means of advancing knowledge (Kogan & Teichler, 2007). For many years, academics were considered to be intellectuals. The recent focus on employability and future earnings of graduates shifted the perception towards the effectivity of academic disciplines to produce a competitive workforce. An emphasis on the necessity for labour-market-oriented education with a preference for technical disciplines (needed in industry) and, in some cases, also deliberate misrepresentation targeted at political science are in the forefront of present political strategies in the HE sector. With the advance of digitalization and the increase of direct political communication, politicians strategically use the political discourse as an opportunity structure for promoting “policy relevance” or the allegedly required “usefulness” of education. The subsequent snapshots of political narratives relating to study programmes illustrate some of those efforts.

3 The exception is the Czech Republic where the ratio has not decreased. In Hungary, the share of political science students dropped from 3% in 2000 to 0.76% in 2018, in Slovakia from 0.7% in 2000 to 0.4% in 2018, in Poland from 3 to 1.3% (Author’s calculation based on statistical data presented above).

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Box 9.1: Snapshots of the Political Discourse in the V4 Czech Republic Czech right-wing populist Karel Fiedler (MP for Úsvit—Národní koalice4 ) explained his opinion on the humanities: “Certainly we do not need so many historians, sociologists, political scientists…I think there are many people of such profession and have troubles to find a job…What we need are the fields that have added value and bring finances to the economy. These are disciplines that produce something, they bring added value” (Hajduˇcková, 2017). Hungary “The education system needs to develop in a way that it can respond to the demands of the market and address a worsening skills shortage, László Palkovics [State Secretary for Education] told a meeting at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences…There is a growing demand for graduates in technical fields, natural sciences and information technology, and the education system has failed to match this in the past 15 years” (Hungary Today, 16.06.2016). Poland “Asked about what studies to choose, the Deputy Prime Minister noted that Poland needs 100,000 computer specialists. ‘It is not a question of how quickly you will find a job after graduating in computer science from individual universities anymore - but of what the salary range is, because it turns out that in some cases it is several times different’ - he pointed out” (NAWA, 2020). Slovakia Slovak prime minister Robert Fico (2006–2010, 2012–2018) repeatedly presented political science as an educational field with unemployed graduates. According to him, the Slovak education system produces “an enormous amount of political scientists, lawyers and social workers who are unemployable at the job market” (TASR, 2014). Therefore, he considers it “a mistake if somebody is eager to study political science or international relations. We have thousands of such people. Who would need an organiser of spare time with university diploma?!” (TASR, 2018).

Unlike political scientists, politicians are held accountable at the ballot box. Their actions and policies therefore have to take into account economic and societal prosperity. Within the context of globalization and of challenges to restructure national economies, governmental efforts 4 The party was dissolved in 2018.

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to streamline education to better suit middle- and long-term market demands are plausible. However, denigrating political science to increase chances for STEM disciplines to attract more students is not. First, prospective students considering political science might, following their professional orientation, opt for another social science or humanities discipline. Second, job market changes do not necessarily call for technicians or physicists by training. Rather, such changes may demand the development of soft skills, which may be acquired in quite different study areas. Contemporary job market trends require (inter alia) a flexible workforce that can adapt to organizational change, different cultures, different clients, new technologies, while also responding to changing circumstances and expectations (for more details see e.g. García-Aracil & Van der Velden, 2008; Lin, 2018; Pulakos et al., 2006). The demands of a knowledge-based and globalized economy do not necessarily exclude the social sciences, and political science in particular, as an educational option. Discursive strategies like those set out above (Box 9.1) may, however, have spread distrust towards the discipline and contributed to a decline of political science attraction in the eyes of the public. The more so, as that discourse was reinforced by political action in the education and research sector. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, for example, governments introduced a prioritization of study programmes. The annual calculation of funding to be allotted to specific HE institutions thus takes into account strategic state aims for higher education transformed into budgetary terms, including financial support for students of prioritized disciplines. At the same time, the emphasis on STEM disciplines has been translated into a ministerial financial allowance calculus increasing rates for such study programmes as well as the amount of additional students’ allowances (e.g. social and merit stipends) in these fields. Thus, in practice, Slovakian HE institutions providing for training in applied mechanics receive one and a half times more financial support per student than for a political science student at the same educational level. In the Czech Republic, mathematical engineering has a financial demand coefficient of 2.25, while political science has a coefficient of 1.00. Multiplied by these coefficients, state allowances for the implementation of accredited study programmes are correspondingly higher in the former case, creating financial incentives for HE institutions to promote specific studies. Hand in

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glove with the political discourse on useful/useless disciplines, that practice makes the environment for political science (and other social sciences) less favourable. A system of funding HE institutions based on components among which criteria related to student numbers dominate (highest weight in determining allotments) is also present in Poland.5 Additionally, according to the latest reform (2018–2019), HE institutions are encouraged to establish relationships with business companies, pursuing a programme of market-oriented education. The ministry also introduced a scheme of business-related doctoral and postdoctoral qualifications, promoting Ph.D. and research projects carried out jointly with business partners. Declining numbers of political science students have an impact on the funding of HE institutions and their ability to conduct socalled “in-house” research financed by universities themselves. Particular institutes/chairs or even whole faculties teaching political science and conducting research might be forced to reduce staff levels or even close down entirely. While state budget allowances increasingly take HE establishments’ research performance into account, student-related allocations in three of V4 countries still account for a significant part of the HE budget. In Slovakia, for example, only an approximate 12% of annual funding by the ministry of education are based on universities’ involvement in research. In the Czech Republic, about 53% of such funding are based on implementation of study-programme component. A different approach to promoting disciplines that are considered “useful” and to eliminating or at least weakening those which are not was adopted in Hungary. In a 2011 reform, the government fundamentally changed the structure of higher education on various points, including financing. Since then, government subsidies have been based on tuition fees—determined by the state for students participating in university-financed course programmes—which, multiplied by the number of students participating in state-subsidized programmes, produce the amount of state subsidy for each institution.6 Therefore,

5 https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-policies/eurydice/content/higher-education-fun ding-56_en, accessed 6 October 2020. 6 https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-policies/eurydice/content/higher-education-fun ding-35_en, accessed 6 October 2020.

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tuition fees and the ability to attract students have become vital for HE institutions in Hungary. Recent government initiatives to privatize public universities aroused even more concern. Since 2019, six formerly public universities have in essence been turned into “private universities”, albeit with limited autonomy. The Hungarian state handed over operating rights to newly established foundations, whose board members are appointed by the Innovation and Technology Ministry. Under the new model, the state no longer subsidizes those universities whose students pay tuition fees; instead, foundations provide for scholarships. “Privatized” universities now run by foundations continue to receive funding from the state, but financial allocations within the limits of globally endowed funds are the responsibility of board members. The list of the latter features mainly ministers from Orban’s government, Fidesz-KDNP parliamentary representatives or party-affiliated mayors. Their composition efficiently ensures government (party) influence on financing. A significant number of academics are worried that the Prime Minister’s vision of “automatic and self-sufficient higher education” will, in the long run, entirely reshape the present university system, turning universities into business ventures that either flourish or fail according to market forces. Any institutions that might disrupt Orban’s vision of his mission to save Hungary’s and Europe’s “Christian culture”7 by offering alternative values are considered potentially harmful to the regime. The Central European University (CEU) with its mission to promote “open society” norms was hounded out of Budapest despite massive protests from academia and civil society in Hungary and abroad. A government amendment of the country’s Education Law preventing CEU to continue its work in Hungary was criticised by many academic and research institutions, including the International Political Science Association (IPSA), APSA, the International Social Science Council and the International Association of Universities. In its formal statement, IPSA commented that the

7 Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s speech at the 30th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp, 27 July 2019, Tusnádfürd˝ o. Accessed at: http://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/prime-minister-viktor-orbans-speechat-the-30th-balvanyos-summer-open-university-and-student-camp/, 6 December 2020.

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proposal of the Hungarian government constitutes an attempt to silence an institution that is committed to the preservation of academic freedoms, an institution where politi-cal science is studied and taught in a manner which is commended by colleagues from around the world. We consider the proposal to be in violation the academic freedom of our colleagues working at the CEU, and therefore strongly object to its adoption.

An example of using a “marketizing education and research” as both rhetoric and rationale for political purposes was when the Hungarian government seized control over the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA), including the Institute for Political Science. In 2019, parliament approved transformation of the research institutes network run by the MTA into a new institution—the Eötvös Loránd Research Network (ELKH). A new governing body comprising six members nominated by the Ministry of Innovation and Technology, six by the Academy, and a jointly nominated president, all appointed by the Prime Minister, will allocate future research funding. The government had denounced the MTA as an inefficient relic of communism and justified the takeover by needs to boost the Hungarian performance in international innovation rankings and reap more economic profit from science. However, opponents of Orban’s regime accused the government of wanting to exert influence over researchers, rather than boost innovation in R&D. Their main concern is that the research network will be more and more reliant on project-based funding available for government priorities, so that longterm research agendas or any research beyond government priorities will be increasingly difficult to pursue. The consequences of these changes for political science in Hungary have taken a number of forms; possibly the starkest has been the decline in student numbers (Table 9.2 above). An indication of the government’s explicit willingness to define what are seen to be “legitimate” academic topics is provided by the example of Corvinus University. Prime Minister Orbán had persistently criticized gender studies as something to be excluded from academic curricula, as it allegedly ran counter to the Hungarian society’s traditional values by promoting an anti-family ideology. As a form of response, the government decided to set up a Center of Family Business—focusing on the demographics and operations of Hungarian family-owned business ventures—and a Family Policy master’s programme at Corvinus University along the lines of the ruling government’s conservative ideology. Through promoting and funding

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an entire research agenda the government was in essence attempting to utilize academe as a bulwark not of democratic freedom and choice but of authoritarian restraint.

Financing Political Science: The Research Component In addition to institutional funding, institutions undertaking more project-based political science research may seek financial support from the state within the framework of competitive project-oriented research agendas in all four Visegrad countries. Such agendas form part of overall state support for the R&D sector which over the last two decades has become more and more important. Research and development is mentioned as a salient component of economic development in strategic documents of international organizations (UN, EU, OECD, World Bank) as well as in national growth projections of the V4 countries.8 One of seventeen targets of the United Nations 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda is to scale up investments in R&D. In its Europe 2020 strategy, the European Union also included indicators for research, development and innovation, setting the aim of increasing combined public and private investment in R&D at 3% of GDP by 2020. Despite the fact that the R&D strategies of each country may vary in nuances, there are (at least) two common characteristics: The R&D sector tends to be underfinanced, and—therefore—state-funded research is critical. Financing the R&D Sector Excepting Poland, Visegrad countries are relatively small economies, characterized by limited material, financial and human resources. All of them rank among those developed countries which spend a relatively small proportion of their GDP on research. The V4 countries’ investment in

8 For example: National Policy on Research, Development and Innovations in the Czech Republic 2016–2020; Hungarian National Research and Development and Innovation Strategy (2013–2020); Poland’s National Reform Programme Europe 2020; Strategy of Research and Innovations for Intelligent Specialisation of Slovakia.

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R&D is far from the Europe 2020 target, despite a constant but moderate increase during the last two decades (Fig. 9.1). Among Visegrad countries, only the Czech Republic with a 2018 share of 1.93% of GDP invested into R&D is closing the gap vis-à-vis the EU average (2.18%). The least advanced state in this regard is Slovakia, the only V4 country whose share of R&D expenditure in 2018 (0.83%) did not even reach the 1996 level (0.89%), placing Slovakia at the 6th lowest rank among EU members. Investment in R&D in Poland has been constantly growing, reaching a peak (1.21%) in 2018, and has also been on the increase in the case of Hungary, reaching 1.56% of GDP in 2018—even if irregularities interrupted the trend in 2004 (a drop from 0.98 to 0.86) and in 2016 (another drop from 1.35 to 1.2). In 2017, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia countries spent four times less than the EU average on R&D (Table 9.3). All V4 countries rank among the ten with the lowest spending ratio in the EU. Again, the Czech Republic with an expenditure of 325 euro per capita is lagging less behind the EU average of 622 euro. However, that still placed the country at position 15 among EU members.

Research & Development Expenditure (% of GDP) 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Czechia

Hungary

Poland

Slovakia

EU

Fig. 9.1 Expenditure on R&D in Visegrad Countries (Source of data Eurostat)

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Table 9.3 R&D expenditure 2017 (V4 countries) Expenditure (mio. of Euro)

Expenditure per capita (Euro)

3433 1673 4834 749 318,108

325 171 127 138 622

Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia EU 28

Rank in R&D expenditure per capita among EU countries 15th 20th 23rd 21st –

Source Data from Eurostat

Table 9.4 R&D expenditure by sector of performance 2017, V4 countries (in % of total R&D expenditure)

Czechia Hungary Poland Slovakia EU

Business enterprise sector

Government sector

HE sector

Private non-profit sector

62.9 73.1 64.5 54.1 66.2

17.2 12.6 2.3 20.1 11.1

19.6 13.3 32.9 24.7 22

0.29 – 0.35 0.41 0.76

Source Eurostat

Sectoral distribution (business/government/higher education/private non-profit) of R&D expenditure provides another key indicator. All four countries follow the EU trend, with the business enterprise sector dominating. Social sciences, political science among them, hardly benefit from the trend. In the Visegrad region, private companies conducting R&D are mainly concentrating on automotive, machinery, pharmaceutic industries and information and communication technologies. As Table 9.4 illustrates, the share of R&D investments in the higher education and the government sector, where political science may compete for research projects, is much smaller. Additionally, as will be shown below, even in those two sectors the success of political science research projects in obtaining public funding is limited as compared to other disciplines.

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National Research Funding Programmes Funding shortage, constraining the development capability of political science in the V4 countries, has been a huge problem since the very beginning of the discipline’s (re)establishment in the region. During the 1990s, the lack of state support for research was partially compensated by funding from foreign agencies. As Eisfeld and Pal pointed out, Western foundations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) sponsored research “with the professed mission of contributing to the evolution of civil society and the consolidation of democracy” (2010: 230). Political science as a discipline studying processes of democratic transformation and Europeanisation significantly benefited (Malová & Miháliková, 2002). The British Council, the Fulbright Institute of International Education, the Open Society Institute, the Friedrich Ebert and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, the World Bank and the OECD exerted an important influence in the CEE region. After democratic stabilization was followed by EU accession of the region’s countries (in 2004), international donors and partners shifted their focus further eastwards. The burden to finance research was left almost exclusively to the national states. Despite the fact that EU membership opened up access to major funding programmes for Visegrad researchers, this source has remained underused. Many researchers play important roles in EU-funded projects, but usually as persons or institutions invited to co-operate and serve as national experts. Rarely are political scientists from the Visegrad countries found among consortium initiators or leading researchers in these projects. (Arató & Tóth, 2010; Gebethner & Markowski, 2002; KrauzMozer et al., 2015; Malová & Miháliková, 2002) As Table 9.5 illustrates, Visegrad countries’ ratio of approved proposals to the total number of eligible proposals received under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program is between 12 and 14%. In terms of budget shares they rank 15th and lower among the 28 EU members. As political scientists from the region lack the ability to draw on EU funds, and private funding of political science research remains limited, the state was and according to expectations still is the largest donor. Therefore, domestic state resources and state policies of institutional/statutory funding—discussed in the preceding section—remain crucial for project funding.

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Table 9.5 Participation in Horizon 2020 Country

Average success rate (%)

Czechia Hungary Poland Slovakia Total

12.2 12.26 12.84 13.78 –

Budget share rank (out of Number of projects 28 EU) estimated 16th 17th 15th 24th –

1101 916 1536 370 29,729

Source of data EC (2020)

Table 9.6 Funding agencies in V4 countries

Basic research Applied research

Czechia

Hungary

Poland

Slovakia

Czech Science Foundation ˇ (GACR) Technology Agency of the Czech Republic ˇ (TACR)

National Research, Development and Innovation Fund (NKFIH)

Poland National Science Center (NCN) National Center for Research and Development (NCBR)

Scientific Grant Agency (VEGA) Slovak Research and Development Agency (APVV)

While institutional funding is totally in the hands of ministries, project funding for the last several years has been gradually transferred to intermediary institutions. Grants are offered through open calls by agencies (with the most important listed in Table 9.6) subordinate to the ministries of education and/or science. In the aftermath of the European Council’s 2000 adoption of the socalled Lisbon Strategy to promote “a competitive and dynamic knowledgebased economy” (followed by Europe 2020/Horizon 2020), national governments started to formulate their approach to this overarching goal. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia that led to the establishment of new ˇ in 2009, Slovak APVV in 2005) focusing research agencies (Czech TACR mainly on applied research. These agencies have been gaining more power

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and autonomy from the state. Their evaluation of projects is based on a peer review system where individual expert reviews are collected through an online electronic proposal review system. The proposals are then further evaluated and ranked by a two-level system of review panels and boards made up of experts in the field. A similar system also exists for basic research programmes. Government influence may be exerted mainly through allocating budget and programme priorities. In the case of Hungary, overall development ran in the opposite direction, as the Hungarian government has been systematically concentrating powers. The country’s formerly independent research funding agency was restructured in 2015, then totally absorbed by the Ministry of Innovation and Technology in 2018. Currently, the evolving reality is that the ministry decides on funding programmes. In addition to priority being accorded to R&D considered “useful” in terms of economic gain, further political considerations also matter: There are research topics not in line with alleged “national interests” that have no chance of being funded. As already pointed out earlier, gender research for example, as a part of “gender craziness” (Prime Minister Orbán), clearly goes against Fidesz’s desire to fight liberal values. Project-oriented support in the Visegrad countries is based on various funding programmes that are organized on the basis of competition, but money is very scarce. Projects are either submitted within the limits of pre-defined themes commanding priority, or in a bottom-up approach without thematic restrictions. Competition is very intense, and the performance of political science in gaining research grants has been moderate. Tables 9.7, 9.8 and 9.9 indicate the success rate of political science projects in specific V4 countries financed via the most important research agencies or programmes. Their share does not exceed 2% in any V4 country. Admittedly, such a ratio is not unusual for other social sciences, too. On the other hand, some technical disciplines have obtained better results. For comparative purposes, materials engineering, a technical discipline related to the automotive sector—an important part of V4 countries’ industry—has been included. That discipline’s share in approved projects financed by national research agencies is higher (at least double) in all cases. However, the divide was less in international projects funded by the European Commission’s 7th

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Table 9.7 Slovakia: Projects in political science (2008–2020) VEGA No. Political Science projects Materials engineering Total

APPV Share (%)

No.

Share (%)

7th Framework Program

Horizon 2020

No.

No.

Share (%)

Share (%)

82

0.9

10

0.4

4

2.2

4

1.1

327

3.7

67

2.9

3

1.7

4

1.1

8920

2318

181

370

Source Project Register—SK CRIS, https://www.skcris.sk/

Table 9.8 Czech Republic: Projects in political science (1994–2020) ˇ GACR

Political Science projects Materials engineering Total

ˇ TACR

Horizon 2020

No.

Share (%)

No.

Share (%)

No.

Share (%)

37 81 18,941

0.2 0.4

58 87 3290

1.8 2.6

149 – 1101

1.3 –

Source Central register of projects, https://www.rvvi.cz/cep and EC (2020) 9 The number is only estimated, based on the Horizon projects database, https:// h2020viz.vinnova.se. The search engine allows selection per country; however there is no reference with regard to discipline. Therefore I calculated the number of political science projects based on project titles. Such approach has its weaknesses, as it is not always discernible which discipline dominates. In the case of “Developing SUstainable PERmanent Grassland systems and policies”, for instance, I also checked the “objective description” column for better assessment of the project’s disciplinary domain. As it was “Food security, sustainable agriculture and forestry, marine and maritime and inland water research and the bio-economy”, I ruled out the project from consideration as political science.

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Table 9.9 Poland: Projects in political science (2010–2020) NCN

Political Science projects Materials engineering Total

7th Framework Program

Horizon 2020

No.

Share (%)

No.

Share (%)

No.

Share (%)

342 862 18,997

1.8 4.5

13 66 1017

1.3 6.5

20 27 1536

1.3 1.8

Source POL-on, the Integrated System of Information on Science and HE, https://polon.nauka.gov. pl

Framework Program and Horizon 2020 in those cases where data were available (Slovakia, Poland). In the case of Hungary, available data from the newly formed NKFIH agency does not allow a comparison with the other three Visegrad countries. However, we may use data from the OTKA (Hungarian Scientific Research Fund) database, now run under the NKFIH umbrella, to illustrate the state of political science research in Hungary. That index which has collected data since 2005, currently lists 8 442 projects of which 972 are social science projects. One hundred of them are political science projects which counts for a 1.2% share of all OTKA-funded projects.10 Data on political science projects in applied research are lacking, but the share of such projects under Horizon 2020 (25 out of 916–2.7%) is approximately double as compared to national programmes.11 Different ratios in EU and national funding results do not necessarily indicate a bias of the former against political science. Rather, they originate from governmental prioritization of STEM sciences. For ˇ State Agency example, in the case of the Czech Republic, the TACR for Applied Research operates eighteen research programmes. At least seven are specifically targeted to support research in STEM disciplines. One programme (ÉTA) aims to support innovation in the social sciences, humanities and arts, and another (BÉTA 2) aids applied research for

10 Data available at: http://nyilvanos.otka-palyazat.hu/. 11 The number is only estimated based on Horizon projects database, https://h2020viz.

vinnova.se.

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state administration purposes. Until 2018, the agency ran a funding programme labelled OMEGA which was also targeted at the social sciences and humanities. However, financial allocations for social science ˇ budget research projects reached a mere share of 2.2% of the entire TACR in 2016 and 2017, increasing to 7.8% in 2018, the last year of OMEGA’s ˇ et al., 2019). ˇ da operation (Dur With populist politicians coming into office, expanding government powers and spreading polarizing discourses, more than statistical data on financing will be necessary to assess the impact on political science research in coming years. Verbal attacks of politicians on political science and state-driven undermining of social research may reflect a traditionally antagonistic relationship between political scientists and the political elite. Political science as a vested discipline informed by democratic ideals (Ágh, 1991; Eisfeld & Pal, 2010) played an important role in explaining processes of democratic transition in the Visegrad countries during the 1990s. However, the discipline´s traditional commitment to assessing and revealing democratic deficiencies of political elites makes it particulary vulnerable to politically driven strategies impacting research and/or higher education. Government policies and financial constrains may effectively mute academic criticism or at least force the discipline to struggle for its freedom to voice fundamental (frequently value-based) concerns. Recent democratic backsliding in the Visegrad region has offered ample reason for such criticism. Political scientists have accordingly acted as value-oriented intellectuals, blaming governments for democratic deficiencies and shaming populist politicians. In the case of the Czech Republic, criticism by political scientists castigated inclusion of the populist party ANO 201112 in the government, calling it the end of “the era of the Czech Republic’s exceptionalism in Central Europe in terms of its resistance to populist illiberal challenges” (Havlík, 2019: 369). Polish scientist Radoslaw Markowski accused the PiS government of choosing “a course of political action that violates both the abstract principles of liberal democracy and concrete, binding provisions of Poland’s 1997 Constitution”, labelling its rule “authoritarian clientelism” (2019: 111). As regards Hungary, András Körösényi, 12 In Czech, ANO means “yes”, but has also served as an abbreviation for „Akce nespokojených obˇcanu“, ˚ Action of Dissatisfied Citizens. The party’s founder, multimillionaire entrepreneur Andrj Babiš, is the current Czech Prime Minister.

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a political scientist at the Hungarian Academy of Science, referred to Prime Minister Orbán as a “plebiscitary dictator” who has created a political regime that is democratic in form, while authoritarian in content (Körösényi, 2019). Slovak political scientist Tomáš Koziak accused longterm Prime Minister Róbert Fico of establishing a system analogous to “updated Meciarism”13 —in other words, a modern version of former Prime Minister Meˇciar’s semi-authoritarian regime (Gosling, 2020). However, any chance of political scientists appearing publicly and voicing criticism in an attempt to influence public opinion depends on the toughness of the regime in a given Visegrad country. In Slovakia, media freedom from political meddling is still relatively intact,14 whereas Hungary’s Fidesz party has effectively abolished media independence (Polyák, 2019). Thus, access to the most important public media and largest newspapers in the country is open to political scientists who give the impression of allowing themselves to be co-opted by the government. During Orbán´s campaign against immigrants in 2015– 2016, security analyst György Nógrádi was critizised by researchers Vera Messing and Gabór Bernáth for his appearances as an expert on immigration backing government positions on the issue (Bernáth & Messing, 2015). Also, many outputs of the formally independent Századvég Foundation deal with policy-relevant topics along governmental agenda-setting lines, promoting Fidesz viewpoints. The foundation may serve as an illustration of how state-directed relevance of research (transformed into financial incentives), combined with self-induced censorship (selection of a particular angle to tackle a research problem), may shift the position of intellectuals in society towards applying politically defined relevance criteria. State-directed funding may then provide motivation to convert critical value-oriented into conventional technocratic and policy-oriented intellectuals (Chomsky, 2017). In Hungary and Poland, a political discourse cultivating “correct” values, nationalist historical interpretations and one-sided perceptions of

13 Meciarism is a distinct period in Slovak modern history (especially during 1994– 1998) when Vladimír Meˇciar, three times Prime Minister, ruled by autocratic style, trampling rights of the opposition and of minorities. For more details see e.g. Baer, Josette (2001): “Boxing and politics in Slovakia: meˇciarism—roots, theory and practice”. Democratisation, 8(2): 97–116. 14 For example, in 2020 Slovakia ranks 33rd in the World Press Freedom Index, while the Czech Republic ranks 40th, Poland 62nd and Hungary 89th.

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national identity has been introduced by Fidesz and PiS, respectively. There are indications of similar tendencies in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The consequences for political science might be similar as, e.g., for the arts or other social disciplines that contribute to knowledge production and popular perceptions. A fear of losing vital funding provided by the state might fuel self-censorship by researchers and hamper the free selection of research topics which scholars consider relevant. Therefore, qualitative “research on research”—inquiry into subject matters whose in-depth exploration is financed by public funding—may be of vital interest to evaluate the future impact of state-directed research in the Visegrad countries.

Conclusion When criticism by political scientists appears inconvenient to politicians in power, governments may harm the legitimacy and downplay the relevance or credibility of the discipline via discursive strategies, educational and research policies, financial incentives or constraints. A combination of such endeavours might seriously affect the existence of study programmes, research agendas, student numbers and the size of the political science community. State-directed relevance of academic disciplines and research topics may also be put in the service of streamlining purposes, pushing academics towards conventional paradigms advanced by political elites. The present illiberal and populist turn in the Visegrad countries embodies considerable risks for political science. As most populist politicians in the region are sufficiently prudent to steer clear of open censorship, the adoption of state-strategies endangering research freedom could impress them as a more promising venue. The recent restructuring of research institutions and universities in Hungary, which has effectively curtailed their autonomy, may serve as example of such strategies. The predominance of state funding for political science research makes the discipline particularly vulnerable to state-induced conditions and priorities. The risks of eroding academic freedoms and of polarizing the political science community are acute, as strategies to support scientists more in line with governmental paradigms—or at least not contradicting them—are being put into place.

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CHAPTER 10

Political Science or Science in the Service of Politics: Internal and External Co-option in Belarus Tatsiana Chulitskaya

Although political science has been viewed as a “science of democracy,” from a broader perspective we may observe that it often develops in a non-democratic political environment (Latin America in the 1970s, former Soviet countries in the 1990s till present). Belarus, a postSoviet country that for a long time has been referred to as “Europe’s last dictatorship,” represents a captivating case: consolidation of the authoritarian regime caused a twofold institutional reaction—a splintering effect—within the professional community that resulted in the appearance of “official” (state-directed) and “alternative” (independent) political science(s) (Naumova, 2010: 64). That division is based first and foremost on the position—autonomous or not—and loyalty of political science communities vis-à-vis state authorities. The difference between the two communities has also been reflected

T. Chulitskaya (B) Faculty of Political Science and Diplomacy, Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Eisfeld and M. Flinders (eds.), Political Science in the Shadow of the State, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75918-6_10

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in the funding opportunities for research and other professional activities. While official political science enjoys limited but stable internal public funding, the alternative mostly depends on external support, with limited (or even non-existent) opportunities for domestic financing. Belarusian official political science is located at state-run institutions that are institutionally and politically subordinated to and co-opted by the authorities. Universities are major recipients of national public funds for education and have access to research funding as well. Another type of institution that also forms part of official political science in Belarus are government research institutions and think tanks. Oppositional or alternative political science in Belarus was institutionalized in the form of think tanks, expert groups and initiatives financed mainly from abroad as a part of Western democracy promotion programs. For the professional Belarusian political science community, think tanks (especially in the 1990s) became an opportunity for faster— as compared to state universities—careers and better salaries. During the early period of political science institutionalization, positions at a stateowned university and an independent think tank could be combined (Bigday & Kryzhanouski, 2015). With the consolidation of the nondemocratic regime, the divide between official and alternative political sciences deepened. From the 2000s, it was hardly possible to belong to both communities at the same time. An intellectual, institutional and professional splintering occurred. Nevertheless, in recent years, the division between the two types of political science has become less marked. Due to internal and external political changes—including relations with national authorities and external donors’ support policies—, the “alternative” camp has also been reshaping. Many think tanks created in the 1990s have ceased to exist, and new institutions have emerged. The institutional forms and relationships of today’s “alternative” political science with Belarusian authorities vary. We may observe a new type of research institution that has appeared: those in-between officials and alternative political science poles. Meanwhile, when it comes to sources of funding, we still believe that external funding is the main source of support to all think tanks in Belarus. This chapter analyzes internal and external co-option caused by the political science split and the resulting issues, challenges and opportunities. The following questions are raised: What is the situation regarding research funding for political scientists in the country? Does (and if yes,

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how) belonging to official or alternative political science affect funding opportunities? What are the sources and arrangements via which research money is made available to state-owned universities and alternative think tanks? How do internal and external political co-option influence and possibly transform political science research and its funding? While the topic of political science institutionalization in Belarus has received at least some attention from international scholars (Bigday, 2020; Naumova, 2010) and Belarusian academics (Antanovich & Kozlova, 2014; Bobrovich, 2003; Bondar, 2006; Panchenko, 2018; Reshetnikov et al., 2009)—although in the latter case, possibly with a descriptive or even political bias—, the topic of research funding has been neglected. There have been some recent policy papers (Chulitskaya et al., 2017; Kazakevich & Goroshko, 2019; Toshkov et al., 2019) on science and research policies and international research cooperation. However, the topic of political science funding itself has remained largely unexplored. Analyzing political science research funding in Belarus must cope with several significant constraints. As regards official political science, the limited nature of information on public spending in Belarus is problematic. While annual budget laws, government science and education programs and other major finance regulations are publicly accessible documents, they do not provide any comprehensive information on the funding of academic disciplines. Also, it is almost impossible to find relevant or reliable information in other open sources. Moreover, the budgets of political science departments are not officially published. Information about the finances of state-run research centres and think tanks is limited. When it comes to the issue of external funding of political science think tanks and research organizations, the situation is also opaque. Budgets of external donors’ democracy promotion programs and other international support to Belarusian civil society organizations (CSOs) are usually either classified or just not published. As these circumstances make a comprehensive quantitative analysis of funding impossible, a mixed methods approach was used for exploring the topic. In addition to intensive desk research on funding information available in open sources, eleven semi-structured interviews about political science as an academic discipline in Belarus, institutional development, research directions, research funding and challenges for the discipline were conducted. The respondents were representatives of Belarusian think tanks (six interviewees) and universities (four interviewees), plus one independent expert. Interviews were conducted between summer 2019

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and summer 2020. Due to the sensitivity of the subject, the majority of respondents preferred to stay anonymous, even if some agreed to be named in the text. Unfortunately, despite formal and informal requests, the author did not succeed in interviewing representatives of the biggest and, probably, most influential governmental think tank—the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Research (BISR). Experts from this institution ignored all requests, which is itself indicative of a closed organizational culture. The chapter’s first part briefly analyzes the discipline’s institutionalization process in Belarus. From there, the chapter proceeds to describing and evaluating the main funding sources—the state budget and different democracy promotion programs. Subsequently, the changing terms and conditions of research funding are examined and compared for official and oppositional/alternative political science. In concluding, the chapter discusses the prospective development of funding opportunities for political science research in Belarus.

Institutionalization of Political Science and Political Research in Belarus: Opening Remarks Unlike other social disciplines, no institutional basis for political science research, such as departments or academic courses, existed in Belarus during the late 1980s/early 1990s before and shortly after the USSR’s collapse (Reshetnikov, 2009). The discipline’s formative process was shaped by external and internal challenges. In the early 1990s, the external influence of Western countries and their democracy promotion programs constituted important elements in the country’s societal development generally and the formation of political science particularly. Some Belarusian authors even describe the latter process as the ‘re-export of the Western patterns of democratization’ (Reshetnikov, 2009). Others (Bobrovich, 2003) argue that the most important task in creating the discipline consisted in overcoming the heritage of the Soviet past and specifically of “scientific communism”. Indeed, at the outset political science merely formally replaced that ideologically biassed Soviet discipline (and several other social science disciplines), while the majority of teaching staff and even some course content remained the same.

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The very process of the discipline’s institutionalization in Belarus was uneven and fluctuating. From the late perestroika in the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, political science and political research were developing intensively. In the late 1990s, the growth of non-democratic tendencies in the country split the political science community. Since that period, two national political science and research communities of different size and quality co-existed. However, while in the late 1990s to the mid-2000s the divide between the two communities was sharp and independent think tanks could claim to be pro-democratic, mostly pro-Western and opposed to the political regime, over time the situation began to change. From 2010 onwards, but especially from 2014, the gap between the two camps has been fading and is not so obvious anymore. Some independent Belarusian think tanks have commenced closer cooperation with Belarusian authorities, while preserving good relations and getting financial support from Western donors at the same time. One such example is the “Minsk Dialogue” think tank launched in 2015. Its main target audiences are the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Ministry of Defence and other governmental bodies and officials, but also foreign diplomats, embassies, foundations and organizations. While the official PS community continues developing its own research organizations and think tanks, e.g. the National Academy of Sciences (NAN) and the Faculty of International Relations (FIR) at Belarusian State University (BSU), these organizations have a double identity: on the one hand, they depend on state-run institutions or closely cooperate with them; on the other, when it comes to funding, their main sources are external. Content-wise, an important characteristic of political science in Belarus is a strict division between different fields within the discipline. Political science, public administration, international relations and policy analysis exist as separate academic disciplines and research directions. From an institutional point of view, these disciplines (branches) are separated from each other, and their representatives (with an exception of a narrow group of “pure” political scientists) do not identify themselves and their activities as “political research.” Such division can be explained by a number of factors including a lack of institutional traditions, relatively late (in comparison with other social science disciplines) formation of political science in the country, and a non-democratic domestic political environment. In addition, the National Academy of Science (NAS), recognized as

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the official centre of science and research, does not include a specialized political science institute. Such institutional separation between political science and related disciplines exists in both official and oppositional/alternative political science. The official variety’s traditional centre is the Political Science Department of the Law Faculty at BSU. A corresponding IR Faculty at the same university serves as the Centre for International Relations, and public administration belongs to the Academy of Public Governance under the aegis of the President. Metaphorically, political science is like an unloved child nobody wants to take care of. There are no political science faculties in Belarusian universities, but only departments. Official political/policyrelated research is mostly conducted by state-supported research centres belonging to different public institutions, ministries in particular. In the oppositional/alternative PS camp, the same division may be observed, with just a few centres identifying themselves as political research centres (the Institute of Political Studies “Political Sphere” is one of the few examples), the rest focussing on analyses of economic matters (IPM Research Center, BEROC Economic Research Center), public opinion (Belarusian Analytical Workshop), public administration (School of Young Managers in Public Administration [SYMPA]), international relations (“Minsk Dialogue”) etc. However, for the purposes of this research, this division will not be taken into account, but all institutions will be united under the labels of “political science” and “political research.”

Official Political Science’s Institutionalization and Development The Perestroika period and subsequent political developments in the Soviet republics created a unique situation for the institutionalization of political science. On the one hand, there was a window of opportunities for the discipline’s development. On the other hand, the newly established discipline had to deal with all kinds of challenges from arriving at a definition of its own identity to coping with the economic, social and political difficulties of the times. The late 1980s—mid-1990s were the discipline’s formative period. Political developments in Belarus created a certain demand for specialized

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political knowledge. Already by 1991, the first political science department was established at BSU, later transferred from the PhilosophicalEconomic to the Law Faculty, where the chair has since been located. The department also initiated a council for doctorates (kandidat nauk) and habilitations (doktor nauk) (Antanovich, 2004; Naumova, 2010). Later, in the 1990s and 2000s, political science departments (either specialized or combined with other social science disciplines) were created in every state-run Belarusian university. The teaching staff were recruited mostly from the “older generation”, majority of which had specialized in scientific communism, history and philosophy under the old regime. It took some time for Belarusian universities to engage staff with a more modern political science specialization (Antanovich, 2004; Naumova, 2010). The BSU’s political science course program was an adopted variant of the Moscow State University (MSU) curriculum, although Western authors were recognized and their writings included in the program (Naumova, 2010: 62). It provided the general guidelines for every other such program in Belarus. Content-wise, political science was included during the mid-1990s by the Ministry of Education as a compulsory core curriculum for all B.A. programs in Belarusian Higher Education institutions (HEIs) (Antanovich & Kozlova, 2014; Naumova, 2010). Analogous to developments at state-run universities, the discipline was included in the curricula of private HEIs. In particular, a FrancoBelarusian Faculty of Political and Administrative Science supported by the French Embassy in Minsk was created in 1993 at the private European Humanities University (EHU). By the beginning of the 2000s, political science departments were established in many other private HEIs as well (Naumova, 2010). However, private universities did not succeed in creating a viable alternative to the state-run establishments. EHU is probably the exemption here. Supported by Western donors, the university provided education different from that offered by state universities. The political science department had a strong professional reputation in Belarus and abroad. In 2004, the entire EHU was closed for political reasons by the authorities (its later reopening in exile in Lithuania de facto was a process of creating a different institution, without political science as a leading discipline). Other than EHU, private universities have never been competitors of the state-run universities. The discipline’s further institutional development was determined by the political changes in the country. In 1996, President Lukashenka

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conducted an internationally unrecognized referendum, followed by an intensification of non-democratic tendencies in the country (Silitski, 2005). Born as a result of these changes, official political science developed as a part of the heavily centralized national policy in the field of higher education. Another event important for the further development of political science took place in 2003, when Lukashenka decreed the introduction of an ideological education. Political scientists from BSU and other staterun universities developed the curriculum, and a course on state ideology for B.A. students appeared in all Belarusian HEIs. By 2008, the process of establishing PS as a university discipline had been completed. A standardized PS curriculum was approved by the Ministry of Education (see Ministry of Education, 2008). As already mentioned, Belarusian academic political science exists within a heavily centralized higher education system. That centralization, however, has not only had negative but also some positive ramifications for the discipline. In the mid-1990s, political science was included as a compulsory subject in the socio-humanitarian core curriculum of all B.A. programs. The step provided political scientists with relatively stable positions, including a guaranteed workload. At the same time, according to the logic of the heavily centralized political system, such positive achievements could be easily and quickly destroyed. In 2012, after President Lukashenka had publicly criticized education in the social sciences and humanities at national HEIs,1 the Ministry of Education developed a concept of “Optimizing the content, structure and volume of social science and humanities disciplines in HEIs” (Ministry of Education, 2012). As a result of the introduced innovations, the number of hours in political science decreased, and the discipline itself became part of an integrated module along with the course on “Introduction to the ideology of the Belarusian state.” These changes had an impact on the official political science community, who lost both parts of their workload and their relatively stable positions in the educational system. As of this writing (summer 2020), there are further plans to reform education in the social sciences and humanities, which might lead to the exclusion of PS from the list of obligatory courses for all B.A. programs. 1 The transcript of the Belarusian President’s speech is available at http://president. gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/stenogramma-vystuplenija-prezidenta-respubliki-belarus-agluka shenko-na-soveschanii-pedagogicheskogo-aktiva-5808/ (accessed July 8, 2020).

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Table 10.1 Number of universities with political science programs in Belarus

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Level

B.A. level

M.A. level

Period

2000–2009/ 2010–2020 8 6

2000–2009/ 2010–2020 4 4

Political Science exclusive or dominant

Source Author’s aggregation of information available from university websites

Despite the fact that Belarus has been conditionally accepted (since 2015) into the European High Education Area (EHEA), any real changes concerning the quality of education and research and the institutional autonomy of the HEIs failed to materialize (Dounaev et al., 2018). Direct political interference by the President and the government led to the described changes in educational programs and further split the national academic community. If we analyze political development from a purely quantitative perspective, during 2000–2018 the number of B.A. and M.A. political science programs dropped from eight to six (see Table 10.1) Today, there are six universities teaching the discipline as a major at B.A. level, among which three are state-run and three are private. There is no data on the exact numbers of students’ enrolment in the programs. An approximate annual number of political science B.A. students at BSU is 30. The numbers of B.A. and M.A. students and programs at state-run universities may vary from four to fifteen. In summary, political science departments produce a small number of graduates who, from a professional perspectives point of view, demonstrate limited interest towards this specialization. The equally limited number of programs and students and intentions to reduce PS teaching hours within the core curriculum create additional challenges for official political science teachers and researchers highly dependent on teaching workload. Similar to other former Soviet republics, the involvement of Belarusian universities in R&D activities is relatively low, while government institutions and enterprises play an important role (Chulitskaya et al., 2017). Research activities have a rather formal nature, and departments, faculties or even universities in general seldom—if ever—conduct full-scale research (Kazakevich & Goroshko, 2019; Lavruhin, 2020). Like staterun universities, official political science is more focussed on the staff’s

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administrative and teaching activities than on publications, projects, or conferences. That model was inherited from Soviet times, when research took the form of activities during the “second [teaching-free] part of the day” (Lavruhin, 2020). One of the respondents mentioned that an average associate professor’s workload amounts to 800 h per year, half of which are so-called “contact hours” spent by teaching students. Another 400 h are divided between administrative, research and other activities. Lower positions in the academic hierarchy mean even more (than 400) contact hours, while persons with administrative positions have a lower teaching workload. As a rule, academics try to take on more teaching hours, because they provide higher salaries. Formally, conducting research belongs among the academic staff’s obligations. According to one of the respondents, research topics are defined by the academics themselves, based on both their own interests and the research priorities of academic units (chairs, departments). Such formalistic approach results in a lack of internationally recognized publications. International databases list practically no publications by Belarusian authors in the social sciences and humanities. Belarusian academic journals are not included in these bases (Kazakevich & Goroshko, 2019). Only 22 of 51 universities have profiles in Scopus and the Web of Science; two thirds of all publications belong to the Belarusian State University (BSU) (35%) and the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) (34%). The 2020 Hirsh Index of Belarusian social sciences was 15 points (134th position in the world) (Lavruhin, 2020). At the same time, state-run universities perform ideological or informational functions, providing support to Belarusian authorities via written papers, particularly in international relations and foreign policy, where Eurasian integration is one of the most popular topics (Kazakevich interview). Generally, teaching far outweighs research at Belarusian HEIs. According to evaluation (Lavruhin, 2020), among 51 universities in the country merely one (BSU) can be regarded as a research institution, although social science faculties and departments (with, probably, a single exception—the Faculty of International Relations) conduct practically no research. Regarding research obligations and guidelines for political scientists and other academics, the situation has been changing recently. However, it still seems possible to work at a university without engaging in any research activities (Lavruhin, 2020, Kazakevich interview).

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Meanwhile, state-run universities might and often do have research institutes or even think tanks specializing in political issues. Thus, the BSU Faculty of the International Relations has at least three research centres (for International Studies, for Eurasian and European Studies, and a Center of US International Politics Studies), focussing on different regions and aspects of regional integration, employing predominantly academic staff from the same faculty. However, the centres are not necessarily active. Some of them do not have official webpages or other publicly available sources of information about their activities. At the same time, the centres might be active in conducting and organizing internal discussions, workshops and other events, to which they invite experts and officials, particularly from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Some other BSU faculties and other universities also establish and support research centres, e.g. the BSU Centre for Social and Political Studies that specializes in surveys of different types and has been participating in international research projects. However, this and other university research centres are not widely known and have a very limited academic and social impact. One explanation why universities create and support research centres at all is that such institutes create a space for a greater level of autonomy and an opportunity to attract additional external resources, i.e. funding from international foundations and organizations. Another group of official political science institutions are different pro-governmental research centres, e.g. the Labour Research Institute under the Ministry of Labour and Social Security. Although the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) has several social science research institutions, it does not have—as already mentioned—a dedicated political science section. Some of these have established research centres with a focus on geopolitical issues (Belarus—Russia and Belarus—EU relations in particular). One example is the Centre for History and Geopolitics founded in 2014 as part of the NAS Institute of History. The Center’s official website provides very limited information about members and research topics and no data on events or current research. Finally, a limited number of state-run think tanks count among official political science institutions. One of the most important is the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Research (BISR), created in February 2019 as a result of reorganizing the main governmental research centre (the Information and Analytical Center, directly responsible to the President). BISR conducts political and policy research and analysis, but its main goal is “to provide information and analytical support to government agencies and officials in strategic areas of domestic and foreign policy”

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(BISR, 2020). The papers of the Institute may rarely be publicly obtained, and those that are available are in some cases ideologically biassed. Typically for a closed decision-making system, even the state-run BISR admits that Belarusian officials do not follow the principles of evidence-based decision-making, as they do not perceive that analytics would improve the quality of decisions (Ryabava, 2020). We may conclude that the official political science’s level of institutionalization, autonomy and research capacity is highly problematic, especially in terms of promoting democracy. Although political science departments exist in almost every Belarusian university, they suffer from diverse internal and external institutional challenges, ideological pressure from the authorities and self-censorship. Political science chairs in staterun universities do not have any decision-making autonomy regarding studies and research programs. Official political science still exists in a very Soviet-like format, and the gap between Belarusian and European political science concerning notions of research, quality of education and internationalization is growing. The activities of the state-run centres are not publicly known, and the centres themselves function as closed institutions implementing tasks formulated by the government, rather than research establishments as such.

Alternative Political Science and Research: Think Tanks in a Non-Democratic Environment Having sprung up in the country as new institutions in the late 1980s and early 1990s, think tanks are defined here as “institutions claiming autonomy whose main aim is to influence policymaking based on the social analyses they produce” and “to bridge the gap between knowledge (academia) and power (politicians and policy makers)” (Jezierska & Giusti, 2020: 1–2). Theorists of democracy promotion believe that think tanks contribute to an intensification of political participation and might potentially lead to democracy (Carothers, 2002; Struyk, 2000). However, in a heavily centralized and stable non-democratic system, the very role and functions of these institutions are transformed, and they need to search for a mode of operation in a hostile environment. In addition, as Struyk (2000) shows, all think tanks in the post-Soviet bloc face stark challenges of sustainability. According to Belarusian experts’ (Ryabava, 2020), there are approximately 40 independent think tanks in Belarus today. However, 2019

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international ratings (in particular, the University of Pennsylvania’s Global Go To Think Tank Index) contain data on just 22 such organizations (McGann, 2019). As Ryabava (2020) emphasizes, it is unclear which centres and why are included in the rating, but none of them rank among the top-90 of Central-/East European centres, or are present in the thematic sub-ratings. Belarusian think tanks have a diverse field of expertise: starting from “pure” political issues to international relations, economics, social issues, civil society and others. A separate group of institutions identifies themselves as think tanks, but in reality are media or expert platforms publishing opinions of different experts (e.g., the web portal “Our Opinion”). For the purpose of this analysis, all organizations that focus on different types of political research and/or identify themselves as independent think tanks are included into the category. They produce around 60 research reports annually, although the overwhelming majority are published by just two economic think tanks (IPM and BEROC) (Ryabava, 2020). When these institutes first appeared in Belarus, they destroyed the state monopoly in research. They reproduced practices of Western think tanks, adapting their institutional design and public performance to the Western experience. Their emergence created an institutional basis for independent analysis outside post-Soviet academia, which was still quite rigid (Bigday & Kryzhanousky, 2015). The entire project of establishing independent research centres was interpreted by analysts as an act of criticism of the Soviet system and de-Sovietization. From an intellectual perspective, think tanks claimed to have brought, and to a certain extent indeed brought, to Belarus a new analytical perspective and policy analysis approach, different from traditions at state-run universities (Bigday, 2020). The institutionalization of think tanks was a gradual process. In the beginning, when they had merely a vague idea about their mission and scope of activities, they engaged in a lot of different activities, including media projects and organizing public events (Bigday interview). Their goal was twofold: offering research and consulting to the new national elites and political institutions. They also created a space for cooperation between different social groups, including political and economic elites and civil society representatives (Bigday, 2020). The institutionalization process was interconnected with domestic and external political developments, foremost with the evolution of the non-democratic regime and changes in international donors’ support

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policies towards Belarus. According to existing literature (Bigday, 2020; Naumova, 2010), the first phase of institutionalizing think tanks happened from 1990–1996. During that period, non-academic political research was developing intensively, coinciding with a high level of political competition and relative political pluralism in the country. There was a demand for independent political research from domestic and external political players, and the new think tanks were close to the political arena. Among the most prominent centres were the Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS) established in 1992, and the East–West National Centre of Strategic Initiatives, established in 1993 and later transformed into the Analytical Centre “Strategy” (Naumova, 2010: 63). However, the golden age of independent think tanks in Belarus remained short, and after the constitutional referendum of 1996 which enormously enlarged presidential powers, the favourable environment declined. The domestic policy of the newly elected populist President Aleksander Lukashenka focussed on increasing the overall role of the state. Belarusian international relations took a sharp turn with a new focus on Russia and a generally anti-Western agenda. The years 1996– 2001 comprised the second period of institutionalization, marked by the politicization of independent think tanks. That development happened logically when political elites at different levels were replaced by President Lukashenka with his loyal supporters (Bigday interview). These changes resulted in a break between official political elites and independent think tanks. The latter de facto lost space and tools for policy advice. Authorities now preferred not to cooperate with them, and “a vast ideological campaign was launched [by authorities] to stigmatize the leading think tanks”2 (Bigday & Kryzhanousky, 2015). Financial assistance from the West (as the main source of think tanks’ funding) became a target for harsh criticism of them as presumed proof of their dependence on external players, unfriendly to Belarusian authorities. Politicians who had previously collaborated with think tanks found themselves in opposition. They continued cooperation, and the research centres were for all practical purposes co-opted by the political opposition.

2 For example, in 1995 IISEPS was accused of relying on foreign secret services. The East–West Centre was accused in having prepared several oppositional rallies together with “Western agents” (Bigday & Kryzhanousky, 2015: 77).

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The third period (years 2001–2008) was shaped by the political crisis which followed the 2001 presidential election, resulting in further consolidation of the authoritarian regime, including repressions against civil society–think tanks in particular. They led to a decreased demand for independent political analysis. In addition, democracy promotion programs related to Belarus changed priorities during that period, leaving think tanks without sufficient resources for their activities. Not surprisingly, the majority vanished, while the rest were ghettoized within existing research fields (Bigday interview). According to Bigday, among 24 institutes, existing from 1990 till 2006, only five survived the regime’s deterioration, preserving their legal status, while nine were—mainly between 2004 and 2006—totally prohibited (Bigday & Kryzhanousky, 2015). Moreover, from 1999 till 2006 no new centres were officially registered. As a result, the first generation centres which had not ceased to exist started looking for new ways of institutionally adapting to their marginalized status (Bigday interview). From the mid-2000s, acting in a mostly hostile environment, some think tanks obtained their registration abroad. Others changed activities and became mere discussion platforms. Meanwhile, a new generation of think tanks lacking experience of relations with authorities has appeared on the scene (e.g., “Political Sphere”). From 2008 till approximately 2016, a new period of think tank activation took place, caused mainly by the liberalization process in Belarus-West relations during 2008–2010. Although the 2010 Presidential election was judged by the international community as unfree and unfair, and international sanctions were imposed on the country, the liberalization of Belarusian foreign policy occurred just two years later. Democracy promotion programs were relaunched by international donors. The resulting need for research led to the intensification of activities of existing think tanks and the appearance of new ones. However, from 2016 up to the present (2020), external support of civil society in general and of think tanks in particular again deteriorated. According to Kazakevich, democracy promotion programs–especially those operated by US organizations and foundations–changed priorities. They started to focus more on social issues, including regional development, urbanism, etc. and less on political research. Moreover, all international donors’ programs became focussed on project aid rather than institutional support. In many cases, international donors preferred to support state-run institutions and organizations, rather than civil society organizations. Consequently, support for Belarusian think tanks

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has substantially decreased (Kazakevich interview). The very sphere of independent think tanks in Belarus has been reduced to a state of stagnation. According to respondents, research takes up only around 20–30% of think tanks’ activities. The rest is absorbed by the organization of various types of events, such as popularizing conducted research, conferences, workshops, summer schools. In general, the development of the think tank sector and alternative political research in Belarus may be seen as a complicated and fluctuating process with numerous ups and downs. Uneven development, non-regularity of research activities and institutional “youth” of the organizations (the average age of think tanks in Belarus is about 6 years) are among key factors affecting alternative political research today (Kazakevich, 2015). From the point of view of cross-sectoral cooperation, think tanks in a non-democratic environment have very limited opportunities for cooperation with authorities and public institutions. This creates a specific situation where the main target audiences of think tanks are international organizations, civil society, media or the general public rather than political institutions. With very few exceptions, independent researchers are excluded from every stage of the public policy cycle. They are neither engaged in policy design and nor implementation and, as a result, are viewed by officials as aliens who try to interfere with their activities. According to the interviews, think tanks do try to influence government, but that government is not particularly responsive to their attempts. Communication between government and think tanks varies depending on the field of expertise: outcomes of analysis in economics might be interesting for officials, while issues of human rights, public administration, or environment are not (Ryabava, 2020). For instance, all respondents agreed that the leading economic think tanks (IPM and BEROC) have relatively successful records of cooperating with ministries. Another partly successful example is international relations, where the “Minsk Dialogue” actively cooperates with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Even in the somewhat more successful cases, there can be no question of cooperation playing out between partners. Rather, think tanks provide governmental with expertise, which the latter may use or not according to its own internal logic. The window of opportunity for cooperation exists only in cases when positively minded high-rank officials are ready to listen to independent researchers. As well put by one respondent, think tanks

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resemble Belarusian enterprises, which produce a lot but lack markets for their products. In general, contacts between think tanks and the government have the form of person-to-person communication or consultation and communication during public events (Kazakevich, 2015). When it comes to research, the think tank sector is the main producer of knowledge and data in the field of political institutions, media, or civil society (Kazakevich, 2015). Other important research topics are foreign policy, economy, public opinion and diverse sectors of domestic policy. However, the activities of independent research centres do not interfere with those of the state-run universities, and the two spheres exist in two parallel realities without even partial intersection(s).

Funds for Official Political Science: Limited Opportunities for Limited Means The official public R&D sector and all research activities in Belarus are characterized by a high level of dependence on the state, which may be observed in different contexts, including legislative regulation, institutional and funding hierarchies. At the same time, Belarusian authorities demand that research should be profitable, i.e. generate additional income. With only minor contributions from the private sector, Belarusian research is mainly supported via the state budget (Chulitskaya et al., 2017). According to the National Statistics Committee (Belstat), the GDP share allocated for research was 0.59% in 2019, a bit less than the 0.6% allocation in the previous year. That share has been decreasing since 2010, when it amounted to 0.67% GDP (Belstat, 2020). Kazakevich and Goroshko (2019) claim that “starting from 2008 Belarus is living through its ‘black’ decade in the field of research and development”, with decreasing funding. The biggest share of R&D goes to research in the hard (STEM) sciences. Their primacy may also be observed in the thematic priorities of research proclaimed by the Belarusian government for the period 2016–2020 (approved by Presidential Decree N 166, 22 April 2015). Humanities and social sciences are not mentioned as targets at all (Chulitskaya et al., 2017). According to expert estimates, social and economic sciences and humanities in 2017 received only 4.5% of all R&D spending (Kazakevich & Goroshko, 2019). In absolute numbers, average annual budget spending on social and political research amounts to $15.9

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million. The share of public spending on social research is 4.21% and on research in humanities 1.24% (Kazakevich, 2015). State dependence is also obvious at the institutional level, as the research budget is prepared by the State Committee on Science and Technology (SCST)—identical with the Ministry of Science and Technology—in cooperation with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and several other ministries, then to be approved by the President. The same committee (SCST) controls the budget’s implementation (Chulitskaya et al., 2017). There are two major ways of budget support for science and research in Belarus: via funding particular institutions (institutional support), and via state programs (Kazakevich & Goroshko, 2019). In the case of institutional support, universities further distribute receipts according to their priorities, with research not necessarily at the forefront of institutional priorities. The guiding document in the sphere of national science is the State Program of Scientific Research (SPSR). Programs are approved by the Government for a period of five years. The latest list was adopted in 2015 and contains 12 programs (Council of Ministers, 2015), among which only one (the 12th) is devoted to social sciences and humanities. The program is entitled “Economic and Humanitarian Development of the Belarusian Society.” It is divided into six subprograms, but none of them includes political science.3 The program mentions goals that might be considered as relevant for political research, although they are formulated very broadly—for instance, “developing theories of Belarusian stateness and nation-building” or “preservation and empowerment of the national identity in globalization processes” (Council of Ministers, 2016). The total budget of the 5 years-program is 598.312 million Belarusian rubles (approx. $260 m). Seven state-run institutions are listed among program implementers, including three NAS research centres, the Ministry of Education, but only one university (BSU) (Council of Ministers, 2016). Open sources do not contain any information on the budget distribution among these agencies. Redistribution procedures, while formally

3 Description of subprograms of the State Program: “Economics and Humanitarian Development of the Belarusian Society”. Available at: http://research.bsu.by/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/Struktura-GPNI-na-2016-2020.pdf (accessed September 18, 2020).

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competitive, actually benefit the same state-run institutions, who formulate priorities and also implement them. De facto, support via state programs means institutional support of state-run research institutions (Kazakevich & Goroshko, 2019). One organization, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), dominates in the field of science and research and in the implementation of the State Programs on Scientific Research. NAS responsibilities include the redistribution of public funds for research through the Belarusian Republican Foundation for Fundamental Research (BRFFR). The Foundation redistributes these resources usually for a two-year period according to officially approved national research priorities (Council of Ministers, 2015). From an institutional perspective, NAS representatives dominate the BRFFR governing structures (Kazakevich & Goroshko, 2019). Twenty-six out of thirty-nine members of the Scientific Council and four out of ten members of the Supervisory Council are from NAS (BRFFR official website). The Foundation distributes funds of some $3–$5 million per year via open calls, which is, according to experts, almost the entire budget allocated for research. Meanwhile, NAS representatives belong among the main grant recipients (Kazakevich & Goroshko, 2019). In general, BRFFR activities are not transparent, and there is no information on the grant amounts or recipients. According to the information on the BRFFR official website (respondents from state-run universities agree), competition for the Foundation grants is high, with state-run research centres and universities as the main competitors. Information about open calls is, in principle, published. However, as one of the respondents mentioned, one should know where to look for it and to whom to address questions about the calls. The Academy of Sciences as the main institution in the field of science and research may thus be viewed both as monopolist in the distribution of budget funds and as the main recipient of these funds. The conflict of interest is obvious and creates unequal conditions in the competition for funding (Chulitskaya et al., 2017; Kazakevich & Goroshko, 2019). As regards funding the main institutions of official political science, all state-run universities receive institutional support money from the national budget. They in turn display a centralized budgeting structure. Faculties receive money from, but also contribute money to the

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university budget, should they receive any additional funding for education and research. Financially, faculties heavily depend on university administrations, which set the rules of the game. Although Belarus took the lowest positions among Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries regarding international academic cooperation (Chulitskaya et al., 2017), the very opportunity of such cooperation—not least as an additional source of funding—might be evaluated differently by faculty members and university administrations. While in some HEIs academicians are encouraged by the latter to apply for such programs, in others, they are either discouraged or not permitted to apply. There are political (or perceived political) limitations for participating in international projects, because of which some academics from state-run universities prefer either to refrain from participating or to take additional precautions, such as involving themselves on a personal rather than institutional level or participating informally. In general, because of the perceived or real political risks, state-run universities display a fear of international cooperation. Projects might be interpreted as promoting pro-Western concepts or ideas perceived as “alien” by the Belarusian authorities. Talking about international cooperation, one respondent from a state-run university stressed that any initiative to participate in an international research project would not be welcomed until there was an official invitation, followed by a positive evaluation on the part of the university administration which would weigh the “political pros and cons.” In addition, respondents mentioned lack of interest or even mild sabotage of applications for international research programs by the Ministry of Education, which might be requested to provide official confirmation and support. In rare cases, when state-run universities receive international project funding, the process of project management is very complicated. As a rule, the university administration is not too supportive, and there are all sorts of bureaucratic hurdles and challenges. Project initiators are held personally responsible for all project-related issues, including management and reporting, which are considered as unnecessary additional workloads by the staff, demotivating from participation in externally financed projects altogether. At university level, there may be specialized programs for funding the teaching staff’s international mobility. However, respondents mentioned that the volume of funding is usually moderate (one visit to another country per year), and that faculties compete intensely for the scarce

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means. Mobility funding is generally a big problem. Theoretically, mobility-related expenses (participation in conferences, seminars, workshops and such) could be reimbursed by the universities. But respondents emphasized that in practice it is almost impossible to obtain such support, and expenses must be borne either by participants or by the host party. Faculties might potentially apply for research funding by business enterprises, and university administrations could encourage such attempts. However, where political science research is concerned, this opportunity does not seem realistic. At the level of political science departments, issues of funding are not included in the competences of department heads who—as one respondent mentioned—may not even know their department’s budget. Departments merely receive orders from above (faculty or university administration) and have no tools to influence or even to get access to the faculty or university budget. One of the respondents described the situation in the following way: “The rules [of budget distribution] are known to the sub-departments of the Rector’s office, which are competent in every sphere.” However, at the department level, opportunities for individually supporting teaching staff from a special fund may exist. For instance, at some universities, staff who publish in high-ranked journals might get some financial help from the department, although the amount is minimal (less than 20 Euro monthly). Research funding in the one state-run think tank, the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Research, also follows the rules of centralized institutional funding. BISR as an institution receives annual funding from the national budget, whose amount is not publicly revealed. However, according to its official website, BISR employs at least 15 researchers and three management members. According to Presidential Decree No. 49 of 12 February 2019 establishing the Institute, its staff holds positions of civil servants (although the Institute may also hire other staff without this status). According to the decree, government and Presidential Administration are responsible for materially and financially supporting BISR work. In the case of research institutions affiliated to ministries, the same approach towards budget support may be observed: It is institutional, but not performance-based in character, and thus may be inefficient. In summary, every official political science-related institution (stateowned universities, think tanks and research centers affiliated with public institutions) receives centralized institutional support from the national budget, and is thus controlled and co-opted by the state. Faculty and

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department budgets consist predominantly of these funds, with some share from additional sources—first of all, students’ tuition fees. International projects might provide additional funding, but in reality, international political science projects are scarce, due to the general lack of research internationalization in Belarus and to numerous political obstacles. In general, the funding situation of political science research at state-run universities may be described as limited opportunities for limited means. In contrast, the financial situation of the one state-run think tank (BISR) is stable by reason of granted budget support.

Funding of Alternative Political Science and Research In general, Belarusian independent think tanks face the same problems as other Belarusian civil society organizations (CSOs), including a hostile political environment, repression and diverse internal problems (CSO Meter, 2019). Another important component of that political context are extremely unfavourable conditions for foreign funding (and any other donor support in general). In a situation where practically no mechanisms of domestic (state) funding exist, and private support is neither institutionalized nor very common, foreign funding is the main source of CSO support. The key problem there is the rigid approval-based registration requirement either at the Department for Humanitarian Activities of the President’s Property Management Directorate (foreign grants) or at the Ministry of Economy (international technical support). Organizations face an array of difficulties, including a lengthy review process (up to 12 or even 24 months), the impossibility to provide complete paperwork, and frequent cases of denial either without explanation or for far-fetched reasons (Chulitskaya et al., 2020). As a result, Belarusian organizations and think tanks often opt for a different type of legal entity (institution).4 While an institution is easier to register (it merely must be declared), this type of legal entity imposes certain restrictions on the organization’s activities (Chulitskaya et al., 2020). Some think tanks therefore register abroad and direct funding to foreign bank accounts.

4 Institution—uchrejdenija (yqpedeni) in Russian.

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As far as financing is concerned, only the first period of think tank development in Belarus was successful. In the early 1990s, these institutes—partly due to their pro-Western image—received different types of support from Belarusian political and business players “who challenged the old Soviet system” (Bigday & Kryzhanousky, 2015). Domestic businessmen provided think tanks with material help (computers and other office equipment, reimbursement of business trips and rental expenses). Political elites gave administrative and, in some cases, material support as well (for renting offices). However, after the political situation deteriorated, domestic support became impossible. External influence was a second defining characteristic of think tank institutionalization in Belarus, whose presence may still be observed today. Democracy promotion policies and programs provided emerging Belarusian CSOs, including think tanks, with a financial, political and ideological basis (Bigday & Kryzhanousky, 2015). Financial support came first and foremost from US-based foundations (the George Soros Open Society Foundation, Eurasia Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, the National Democratic Institute [NDI] and the International Republican Institute [IRI]), different German Foundations and other international and national Western donors (Bigday & Kryzhanousky, 2015). The main changes in US donor support occurred after the Soros Foundation’s official expulsion from Belarus in 1997, when other foundations reduced the volume or reshaped conditions of their Belarusian programs. External support remains today the primary and, in reality, the only source of funding for independent think tanks and research in Belarus. According to experts’ rough estimates, the 2015 volume of support for all independent research organizations may have amounted to between $1.5 and $2.5 million. That number includes organizational expenses of all kinds. A functioning Belarusian think tank generally has an annual budget of around just $80,000–$100,000 (Kazakevich, 2015, interviews). It should be mentioned that support for research has since been considerably reduced. As a rule, data on financial support for the independent research centres are classified and not included in any publicly accessible databases. External help comes in different ways: 1. through research projects (for instance, European framework Programs for Research and Technical Development); 2. as infrastructural/and institutional support; or

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3. as support of advocacy and/or informational campaigns. In addition, various international organizations provide targeted support for research or related activities. For instance, German foundations (the Konrad Adenauer Foundation [KAS], the Friedrich Ebert Foundation [FES]) actively support different kinds of research and popularizing events (particularly for the “Minsk Dialogue” Initiative). From an institutional perspective, the international donor support programs in some cases directly influenced the development of the Belarusian research centres’ sector. Thus, PACT, a US-headquartered non-profit international development organization, from 2012 till approximately 2016 had a program focussing on Belarus which prompted a qualitative and quantitative growth in the think tank sector due to a strong agenda about how think tanks should operate. At the same time, as respondents felt, the think tanks’ own initiatives, intentions and ideas were also valued in the program. The PACT program mainly focussed on institutional growth and capacity building. PACT managers assisted in developing and implementing policies regarding missions of organizations, quality standards, formats of product presentation etc. According to respondents, PACT’s approach was often perceived as quite interfering and in some cases even paternalistic. However, retrospective assessments are more positive, as PACT engagement improved think tanks’ institutional capacities. External involvement was seen as administrative rather than substantive, while issues related to agenda setting and research priorities were settled by the think tanks themselves. As part of its program, PACT created a think tank umbrella organization, the Belarus Research Council (BRC). Formally, BRC was established in 2012 as a network of “Belarusian think tanks, analytical centers and individual researchers that regularly meets to discuss achievements, share research findings and coordinate research plans” (PACT website). BRC also initiated and conducted at least three annual ratings of Belarusian think tanks. It created a specialized online platform www.thinktank s.by, which is the only currently active component of PACT’s program, publishing information related to independent think tanks and research. BRC itself de facto suspended its activities after 2016. While this attempt to unite the Belarusian research CSOs was positively assessed by some respondents, absence of external support made the umbrella Council expire.

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A serious challenge to the financial (and organizational) sustainability of Belarusian think tanks in recent years arose due to a shift in the approach of donors’. One respondent mentioned that, in his opinion, previously a shared vision had existed among international donors that the sector of the independent research needed a general institutional support program, and donors’ programs were designed accordingly. However, after the 2014 events in Ukraine inaugurated a new round of liberalization and warming of Belarus–West relations, donors started to focus on projects which involved Belarusian official institutions and organizations, while financial and institutional support for civil society decreased in volume and changed in form (CET, Lawtrend, 2018). Another respondent mentioned that big international donors focus on supporting those independent think tanks whose activities thematically coincide with their own missions. The EU Delegation to Belarus, for instance, supports a “green” economy, and organizations that work in this field benefit. Today, support is mostly provided through short- or mid-term projects (up to three years), and research is not supported separately, but merely as a part of such projects. In addition, targeted support of research activities has become rare. According to one respondent, while previously research would be the main focus in supporting think tanks, the situation has now changed dramatically, and research only counts as one element among think tanks’ donor-funded activities such as advocacy, education and staging of events. As a result, the general institutional sustainability of think tanks is decreasing. Despite their dependence on external funding sources, representatives of Belarusian think tanks maintain that they are free in setting their research agenda. They choose and formulate research topics according to their own interests and competences. At the same time, respondents also admitted that due to insufficient funding or unstable financial conditions, there are situations when they have to apply for support under any calls for proposals, regardless of their own specialization or interests. Due to the decrease in external support, some previously active institutions (e.g., the Belarusian Institute of Strategic Studies—BISS) have practically disappeared or substantially reduced their activities. The most successful trajectories up to now have been of those think tanks and centres that. (a) received institutional and not just project support, which allowed them to pursue a diverse array of projects;

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(b) possessed their own well-established and recognized sphere(s) of expertise; (c) had a very clear target audience and a stable demand for research results from national or international institutions. According to some respondents, in recent years, Belarusian think tanks have been attempting to offer their analyses for sale. However, these are more exceptions rather than a common trend, and no success stories are available. Compared to official political science, independent think tanks are organizationally and financially less sustainable. The business sector is just not interested in independent political expertise or research. As a result, alternative political research organizations are left with no choice but to seek support from external sources. That makes them especially vulnerable to any changes in democracy promotion programs, and to domestic political developments. However, all representatives of think tanks claim that they are free in formulating their research agenda within the framework of projects supported by the international donors.

Institutional and Financial Intersections Between Official and Oppositional Political Science and Research: Hybrid Think Tanks Previously, several important dividing lines separated the two types of political science and research in Belarus. Most essential was a political division, with official political science practically co-opted by the authorities and thus supporting the non-democratic political regime. In turn, alternative think tanks, being dependent on international donors, were promoting democracy. Funding-wise, this has been reflected in domestic financial support for official and external support for alternative political science. However, from 2014 (or even earlier) an erosion of the political division may be observed. Independent think tanks began to cooperate with public institutions, and their positions and activities cannot be identified anymore as politically oppositional or purely pro-democratic. One of the most interesting examples here is the “Minsk Dialogue”. Another case of such transformation occurs when state-run institutions (such as NAS and BSU) support think tanks that identify themselves as independent, e.g.

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via the Centre for History and Geopolitics (affiliated to the Institute of History of NAS), or the Foreign Policy and Security Research Centre, formally not affiliated but de facto supported by BSU. These think tanks might not necessarily focus on a pro-democratic agenda, but on issues of Eurasian integration or Belarus-Russian relations which are part of the official Belarusian foreign policy agenda. “Minsk Dialogue” posits itself as “a space for international dialogue and regional cooperation” (“Minsk Dialogue”, official website). Among the expert community, it has a dubious reputation: On the one hand, the initiative is internationally recognized and has good professional relations with well-known pro-Western political experts who participate in events organized by the “Minsk Dialogue”. On the other hand, together with the economic policy think tanks IPM and BEROC, it has well-established connections with the government, closely cooperating and allegedly even affiliated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Published research findings are often in line with MFA positions. President Lukashenka attends the “Minsk Dialogue” annual conferences. This makes the initiative vulnerable to criticism and generates lack of trust in the expert community and the Belarusian political opposition. Erosion of the division between official and alternative think tanks and the appearance of think tanks of a new (hybrid) type may have been caused by the changes in international donor support policies towards Belarusian civil society. In 2014 and later, an increase in support to state-run projects and institutions coincided with a certain decrease in support to the independent sphere (CET, Lawtrend, 2018). Western foundations, for instance, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS) which had predominantly supported conservative oppositional parties, intensified cooperation with state-run universities and institutions (BSU and NAS) and also with think tanks that closely cooperate with Belarusian official institutions. Despite some government support (e.g., provision of offices or some other minor material help), the hybrid think tanks still largely depend on external funding. A look at events organized by the “Minsk Dialogue” yields a predominance of international donors (confirmed by respondents).

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Conclusion It can be argued that a non-democratic political system and its institutional configuration directly influence political science and its development in Belarus. A sharp division between authorities and political opposition caused the division of political science into official and oppositional/alternative disciplines. Hierarchical and non-inclusive high education and R&D policies make official political science institutions highly dependent on the authorities. Oppositional/alternative political science think tanks are de facto excluded from public policy processes, with their participation limited to consultations and provision of information. Meanwhile, in recent years, a new (hybrid) type of research institutions, intending to bridge the official/oppositional division, has emerged in Belarus. When it comes to funding, Belarus represents a case of different practices for official and oppositional/alternative political science. Staterun universities, including the discipline’s official variant, are provided with limited but sustainable centralized funding from the state budget. However, this way of funding leads to the universities’ profound dependence on the authorities and lack (if not a total absence) of academic self-governance, which result in co-option of academia into the state. In line with the former Soviet approach, research—as compared to teaching–is of secondary importance for state-run universities. Funding opportunities provided to the state-run universities through governmentcontrolled institutions (BRFFR, in particular) focus, first of all, on institutional support. The topics of state research programs, which provide the operational basis for official political science researchers, are formulated solely on the basis of the authorities’ vision of the “usefulness” of research for the state, while longer-term interests of the public are not considered. In the case of another type of official political science institution—state-run think tanks— the authorities approach research from a top-down perspective which is based on own short-term interests without any consideration of societal relevance. Official political science in Belarus follows a technocratic and policyoriented logic where academic staff and researchers act predominantly in line with conventional policies and paradigms. The official discipline’s design leaves practically no space for value-oriented intellectuals within academia or state-run think tanks. Those intellectuals who try to escape this paradigm are forced to create their own practices of balancing

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between teaching and attempting to conduct value-based research. The only alternative for them is to leave their universities and either find a new place within alternative think tanks or go abroad (although the latter is not a very popular solution). If none of those options are possible, the researchers have no choice but to change careers. Oppositional political science is mostly governed by the short-term political logic of external donors who support think tanks. Domestic funding is practically non-existent. We observe that changes in the international support programs for civil society in Belarus (and think tanks in particular) affect the entire sphere of alternative research. While Belarusian researchers in think tanks intend to pursue a value-oriented agenda and to formulate their own research aims, their total dependence on the international funding makes them susceptible to co-option by external actors. Without foreign funding think tanks either disappear altogether or limit their research to organizing events or implementing other donorsupported activities. However, we may also argue that think tanks have been and still remain a space of at least relative research freedom for Belarusian intellectuals. While trying to overcome existing political divisions, hybrid think tanks still depend on external funding as their main and ultimate source of support. This again puts them at risk of external co-option. At the same time, they also have to follow the policy-oriented research logic of Belarusian authorities, and the risk of their co-option by the state is increasing. It is at present quite unclear to which extent intellectuals in such hybrid think tanks may be able to observe or to protect their value-oriented standards.

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CHAPTER 11

Social Sciences as an Instrument of National Development? The Case of Qatar Leslie A. Pal

Most states fund basic scientific research, including in the social sciences, to support economic development (Barros de Barros et al., 2015; Meyers & Kearnes, 2013). Qatar is no exception, but it has some distinguishing features which influence its funding priorities and strategies. First, it is a relatively new nation-state, achieving independence (it was a socalled “trucial state” of the United Kingdom) only in 1971. Second, it is small, both in area (11,571 km2 ) and population (2.8 million), but with the highest GDP per capita in the world, generated almost entirely through exports of natural gas. Third, of this small population, Qatari nationals account for only 15%. The 85% ex-pat population is primarily engaged in natural gas and resource development, construction and services, but includes personnel in educational and research establishments in the country. Fourth, despite its small national population, Qatar is an Arab and Muslim country, and so its research activity is inevitably connected to networks in the Arab and Muslim world,

L. A. Pal (B) College of Public Policy, Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Doha, Qatar e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Eisfeld and M. Flinders (eds.), Political Science in the Shadow of the State, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75918-6_11

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such as Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (ALESCO) and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and its subsidiary organizations—the Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training Centre for Islamic Countries (SESRIC) in Ankara; the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO) in Rabat; and the OIC Ministerial Standing Committee on Scientific and Technological Cooperation (COMSTECH) (Currie-Alder, 2019). Fifth, Qatar is commonly understood to be a “rentier state” (Beblawi & Luciani, 1987; Luciani, 1987), though possibly a “late” one (Gray, 2011) that has escaped the worst pathologies of that condition (Davidson, 2012; Kamrava, 2013, 2014). Nonetheless, it is an Islamic monarchy, ruled by the Al-Thani family, and most key institutions are in the hands of a small group of leading tribes. This profile poses some interesting twists to the book’s theme of “co-optation through funding” and a “tyranny of relevance” that might distract political science from its role as critic on large and pressing issues such as democratic erosion, wealth disparities, weak regulatory policies for capitalism, racism, populism and climate change. In the European or the wider OECD context, the distraction comes through the enticements of government funding for research on national priorities on economic growth and national security, and for “entrepreneurial” rather than humanistic universities. The book’s theme reflects the worry that this subtle or overt financial seduction will draw political scientists away from being critics, from developing discipline-driven research agendas and serving the wider public interest (Eisfeld, 2019; Flinders & John, 2013; Flinders & Pal, 2019). The implication is that with more sources of independent funding —or at least a more diverse blend of state and non-state sponsors—the social and political sciences would endogenously generate research agendas that would serve as catalysts of social change in response to pressing issues. State-directed funding, from this perspective, saps critical energy and drains those impulses that might otherwise contribute to far-reaching social and political changes. Put slightly differently, a research dependency relationship with the state risks turning the social and political sciences into handmaidens of more restrictive agendas. There is no question in the Qatari case that post-secondary education (PSE) and its institutional infrastructure of universities and research institutes are instruments of national development. There was no PSE sector before 1971, and Qatar University was established only in 1977 (it now has approximately 16,000 students, taught almost exclusively in Arabic).

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Like some other Gulf states, the UAE most prominently, Qatar decided to invest heavily in western university branch campuses after 1995, located in Education City in Doha (Baghdady, 2016). The campuses include Weill-Cornell Medical School, Carnegie Mellon, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, Northwestern University, Texas A&M University (engineering) and Virginia Commonwealth University (graphic arts and design). This is both entirely consistent with efforts in the last 50 years in the Arab world to use education, and particularly post-secondary education, for nation-building and citizenship purposes (Herrera, 2007; Zahlan, 2012). The strategy of attracting western branch campuses, however, is significantly different than building national universities (which, for example, typically teach in Arabic, and often maintain separate facilities and classes for men and women) (Donn, 2010, 2013). Education City, the Qatar Foundation (which oversees the branch campuses), as well as the most recent new university, Hamad Bin Khalifa University (HBKU, founded in 2010 for graduate teaching and research, in English), are explicitly designed to modernize the country, help shift it away from reliance on natural resources, support the educational development of the population and engage (inevitably) in world-class research. The objective is unambiguously to be relevant, entrepreneurial, modernizing and global. There is no hidden agenda—it’s perfectly obvious and deliberate. And the social sciences are expected to be part of the national project of modernization, economic as well as cultural and social. There is a double curiosity in the Qatari case. The first is the reverse polarity of the situation as posed in this book’s core theme. In the western context, the worry is that the social sciences get co-opted and weakened in terms of critical capacity, as they are seduced towards “relevance” as defined by governments. In Qatar, the strategy behind the research institutions mentioned above is unambiguously that they be catalysts for change, and in some respects, disruptive change in a still quite conservative country. The leadership is well aware of the importance of retaining the country’s character and culture, its history and its Islamic roots. But it is also a leadership that has been pushing the boundaries in some sectors, for example, in women’s participation in society and economy. State-driven research agendas in the west have, as other chapters in this volume illustrate, been framed largely as an amalgam of restrictive and constraining forces, deflecting social sciences (and especially political science) from the ethical obligation of social criticism. In the Qatari case,

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state-driven research agendas are intended to modernize and propel social and economic change, to some careful extent. That, at least, is the conclusion that springs from casual observation. The analysis below will explore this. The second curiosity is that Qatar is usually classified as a “rentier state.” Put crudely, elites in rentier states generate sufficient revenues from natural resource rents (which come easily, without much need for economic or technological development) that they can buy off their populations, keep them passive and political docile, and so stay in power almost endlessly, thereby neutralizing Huntington’s famous “King’s Dilemma” (Huntington, 1968: 177–191). In rentier states like Qatar, an overly educated population can become a demanding population, and so the logic of rentierism would suggest only moderate development of postsecondary education and relatively little investment in western-style research, particularly in the social sciences. In fact, the opposite appears to be the case—by one estimate, Qatar spends over $400 million per year just on the western branch campuses in Education City (Havergal, 2016), which does not include HBKU and its research institutes in biomedicine, computing and environment and energy. There is something unusual in the logic of national development in Qatar, and even perhaps in funding priorities by the national granting agencies, that requires fresh thinking about national development strategies of rentier states. Again, we explore this below. This chapter proceeds in three stages. First, it reviews Qatar’s Second National Development Strategy, 2018–2022 (the previous one was for the period 2011–2016; see Mitchell & Pal, 2016), with special focus on PSE and scientific research. Second, it examines the priorities of the major (almost sole) funding agency in the country, the Qatar National Research Fund (QNRF), with particular reference to the social sciences. Third, the chapter concludes with some reflections on the paradoxes of the “tyranny of relevance” in a country like Qatar, and some implications for rentier state theory.

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Qatar Second National Development Strategy, 2018–2020, and Qatar National Vision 20301 The Second National Development Strategy, 2018–2022 flows from the Qatar National Vision of 2008, and together the two documents set broad national priorities which cascade down to the research and funding sectors. With the goal of “transforming Qatar into an advanced country by 2030” (Planning and Statistics Authority (Qatar), 2008: 2), the National Vision identifies five challenges facing Qatar: 1. Modernization and preservation of traditions. 2. The needs of this generation and the needs of coming generations. 3. Managed growth and uncontrolled expansion. 4. The size and the quality of the expatriate labour force and the selected path of development. 5. Economic growth, social development and environmental management (Planning and Statistics Authority (Qatar), 2008: 2–4). There are four pillars to the Vision: human development, social development, economic development and environmental development. The key points of each pillar (stripped of rhetorical flourishes) are listed below. Human Development The QNV acknowledges that hydrocarbon resources will eventually run out, and that economic success will depend on the ability of Qataris to compete in the global knowledge economy. It proposes to build a “modern world-class educational system,” as well as an integrated, accessible health care system. It wants to increase the “effective labor force participation” of citizens, but acknowledges that for the foreseeable future, Qatar will have to rely on expatriate workers with the right mix of skills. Specific initiatives include: • Curricula with a “solid grounding in Qatari moral and ethical values.”

1 This section draws on Mitchell and Pal (2016).

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• Well-developed, independent, self-managing and accountable educational institutions. • System of scientific research funding. • Increased opportunities and vocational support for Qatari women. • Targeting the right mix of expatriate labour, and retaining the best among them. Social Development The social development pillar is an amalgam of commitments to family and to regional and international cooperation. It emphasizes “preserving a strong and coherent family” but promises that women “will assume a significant role in all spheres of life, especially through participating in economic and political decision-making” (Planning and Statistics Authority (Qatar), 2008: 19). Key elements of the social development agenda include: • Building an effective social protection system that “ensures an adequate income to maintain a healthy and dignified life”, as well as putting in place • Strong and active civil society organizations that, among other things, preserve “Qatar’s national heritage and enhance Arab and Islamic values and identity” and “enhance women’s capacities and empower them to participate fully in the political and economic spheres, especially in decision-making roles.” Economic Development This pillar assumes that Qatar’s resources are finite, that the path forward is diversification, and that the challenges are in fostering entrepreneurs and innovation in the face of inflationary risks. The specific initiatives under this pillar are the typical nostrums of low inflation and sound budgetary management, mixed with pledges to carefully and sustainably nurture the hydrocarbon sector to generate “advanced technological innovations” while ultimately moving to diversify towards a “knowledgebased economy.” Key elements include:

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• Enabling the private sector through training and support for entrepreneurs, and financial and other means “to help incubate and grow small and medium-scale enterprises”, alongside • sustainable economic diversification towards a knowledge-based economy. Environmental Development This pillar was the thinnest of the four. In part, this was because the oil and gas sector in Qatar was at that time, and to a certain degree still is, an enclave within the state. Qatar Petroleum was and is the engine of the economy. The preamble to this section does refer to the impact of diminishing hydrocarbon and water resources, and global warming. All of the initiatives associated with this pillar are relatively minor, though from the perspective of 2007, did represent some moderately significant attempts to deal with environmental degradation and sustainability. Second National Development Strategy, 2018–2022 The Second National Development Strategy (hereinafter referred to as NDS-2) draws its inspiration from the QNS, but has three important background features. First, it was preceded by an NDS for 2011–2016 period, and so was framed in part as a “lessons learned” exercise, with some direct comments on problems of coordination and implementation from the first round. Second, the planning was conducted during a period of declining oil prices, which was affecting government revenues and slowing GDP growth (the hydrocarbon sector accounts for nearly 49% of GDP and 94% of government revenues). Third, as of 2017 Qatar was hit unexpectedly by the blockade (resolved in January 2021) from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt and UAE (Krieg, 2019; Ulrichsen, 2020). Finally, the 2022 FIFA World Cup preparations were to be a major component in the development process, with the completion of infrastructure projects such as stadiums and public transport. The NDS-2 is lengthy, and as a national planning document, is heavily technocratic, with strong emphasis (as one would expect) on economic development. Moreover, one of the key lessons from NDS-1 was the emphasis it produced on capacity-building and effective coordination for effective implementation in order to facilitate successful policy implementation: NDS-2 bristles with Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and

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delivery mechanisms. Part I (Toward the Year 2022) of the document has chapters on: lessons learned; economic performance; and institutional development/fiscal management. Part II (Institutional Development, Service Delivery and Fiscal Management) has one chapter by the same title. Part III (Sustainable Economic Prosperity) has chapters on: economic infrastructure; diversification and private sector development; and natural resource management. Part IV (Promoting Human Development) has chapters on: the healthcare system; education and training quality; and efficient and committed workforce. Part V (Sound Social Development) has chapters on: social protection; security and public safety; and cultural enrichment and sports excellence; and global partnerships for development (international cooperation). Part VI (Sustainable Development to Preserve the Environment) has one chapter by the same title. Finally, Part VII (Managing the Performance of the Second National Development Strategy 2018–2022) has one chapter by the same title. Table 11.1 presents the high-level outcomes or objectives in the NDS2, which then cascade down into intermediate outcomes (too numerous to list here), and KPIs. Since these are high-level outcomes, they are by their nature quite broad, but nonetheless do provide clarity about government priorities, particularly when parsed in terms of the Qatari context. Each of these high-level outcomes contains some surprises as well as nuance when viewed through that context: 1. Modern public-sector institutions and excellent services: There is a challenge in building capacity for a government that has had to modernize so rapidly and has only a small domestic population. As well, the expectation—given the wealth and resources of the country—is that public services will be at the highest standards. 2. Infrastructure and smart technologies: Linked to the first outcome, there is no sense in building and borrowing from international standards unless one borrows the highest technological standards as well. 3. Diversification of the economy: Despite natural resource wealth, the long-term prosperity depends on diversification and less government-driven development. Fostering a private sector, entrepreneurship, and moving away from LNG dependence are major priorities.

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Table 11.1 Qatar Second National Development Strategy, 2018–2022 main outcomes 1. Modern public-sector institutions that provide excellent services and achieve financial sustainability 2. Develop a sustainable and high-quality infrastructure that supports the national economy and is capable of keeping abreast of the latest smart technologies 3. A more competitive, productive and diversified economy and a more dynamic private sector with greater contribution to the national economy 4. Optimal exploitation and sustainability of natural resources for the people of Qatar 5. Improved health for Qatar’s population, meeting the needs of existing and future generations through an integrated health system that aims to achieve better health, better care and better value for all 6. A world-class education system that offers equitable access to high-quality education and training, equips all learners with the necessary skills and competencies to realize their potential in line with their ambitions and abilities to contribute to society, strengthens Qatar’s values and heritage, and calls for tolerance and respect for other cultures 7. A competitive labour market that enables Qatar’s population to participate in development, build a prosperous society and meet the needs of the current generation without compromising those of future generations through effective participation in the labour force, achieving high productivity, attracting and maintaining highly skilled labour and a modern and transparent information system that provides data on both the supply and demand sides of recruitment and training 8. An integrated, effective and sustainable social protection system 9. Achieving security, stability and maintaining public safety 10. An active and creative cultural, sports and youth system that supports society advancement while preserving its constants and values 11. Effective, orderly and sustainable international cooperation 12. Sustaining the environment for future generations

4. Sustainability: A surprise perhaps, for one of the world’s largest LNG exporters, but policymakers are well aware of air, water, climate issues in the context of a tiny country with its geographic location and vulnerabilities. 5. Health care: The twist here is providing a health care system (again, at the highest international standards) for a population of which 85% are ex-pats, or effectively, immigrants. 6. Education: How to balance respect for Islamic values and educational traditions, with educational competence (as measured in international standardized tests) and openness to other cultures (again, a key feature of country’s demographics).

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7. Labour force: With FIFA 2022, Qatar’s treatment of migrant labour, particularly in the building and construction trades, has come under intense international scrutiny. 8. Social protection: In addition to expected issues around pensions, drawing vulnerable populations into rewarding employment, and services for the elderly, there was a strong emphasis on youth, family support, domestic abuse and encouraging the development of civil society organizations. 9. Public safety: Almost the entire chapter on this subject was focussed on traffic safety, a major consideration in Doha. 10. Culture and sports: Qatar has tried to position itself as a major hub for international sporting events, but more than that, to try to stimulate a “sporting” culture in society through healthy exercise. It may be the only country in the world with a National Sports Day holiday. 11. International cooperation: The key point here is Qatar’s necessary strategy of soft power, given its size and geopolitical situation, combined with the complexities of the blockade. 12. Sustainable development: Qatar’s constitution Article 33 calls on the state to “protect the environment and its natural balance to achieve comprehensive and sustainable development for all generations.” This section of the NDS-2 recognizes the intense environmental pressures of rapid economic and social development in the last twenty-five years, and has specific targets on pollution abatement, and marine environment. Of course, any government will have objectives of this sort—“motherhood and apple pie” statements about achieving only the best for their population. However, when combined with intermediate goals and KPIs, these become much more tangible and measurable. As an example, the main outcome for education could be a cut-and-paste from any OECD country, with the obvious difference of a reference to Qatar’s values and heritage: “A world-class education system that offers equitable access to high-quality education and training, equips all learners with the necessary skills and competencies to realize their potential in line with their ambitions and abilities to contribute to society, strengthens Qatar’s values and heritage, and calls for tolerance and respect for other cultures.” However, this high-level outcome is supplemented by 15 intermediate outcomes, and further by specific targets (sometimes multiple

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targets) for each outcome. There are four intermediate outcomes for primary education, each with numerical targets. These are followed by five intermediate targets for primary to secondary education, four on post-secondary education and two on governance. Of the four PSE intermediate outcomes, none mention research directions or priorities explicitly. The NDS-2 was therefore analyzed (through a word search on “research”) for any other indications of state-driven research agendas. The search yielded 54 mentions, most of which were innocuous. The ones that were important were linked to the country’s overall objective of economic diversification away from hydrocarbon resources. In Chapter 2, for example, the report notes that the efforts at capital formation during the first National Development Program had fallen short: “The progress toward achieving the targets of increasing the capacities and skills of discovery and innovations was uneven and varied. The slow pace indicates to more [sic] efforts need to be made to foster invention and innovation to facilitate the transition of Qatar to a knowledge-based economy” (Planning and Statistics (Qatar), 2018: 96). There is a clear objective of linking innovation and research to private sector development and business, and the Qatar Science and Technology Park (under the authority of the Qatar Foundation) is tasked with supporting efforts at technology transfer to businesses. The main outcome for “sustainable economic prosperity” is “A more competitive, productive and diversified economy and a more dynamic private sector with greater contribution to the national economy” and one of the intermediate outcomes is linked to research—“Strengthen positioning of Qatar as a regional hub for priority sectors.” The KPIs for this intermediate outcome are: 6.1. Establish state of the art infrastructure that enables Qatar to become a focal point for select economic and research activities over the period 2018–2019 6.2. Focus and coordinate national efforts to achieve excellence in research during the period 2018–2022 6.3. Build international recognition and strengthen partnerships relevant to Qatar’s research and priority sectors over the period 2018–2022 (Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics (Qatar), 2018: 111–112).

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The projects associated with the KPIs are all operational—building informational infrastructure, and databases, coordinating among the different post-secondary education entities in Qatar, collaborating with key international research consortia to host global research conferences. The most interesting one from the point of view of the possible skewing of social science research priorities is to develop “strategic partnerships and alliances that strengthen Qatar’s value proposition and competitiveness across priority sectors over the period 2019–2022” (Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics (Qatar), 2018: 112). One of the projects in this chapter (linked to the intermediate outcome of economic diversification) is to implement “research programmes in priority sectors and key areas and develop research incentives and funding mechanisms to build a competitive advantage and increase productivity over 2018– 2022” (Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics (Qatar), 2018: 105). Those priorities are not identified as such, though one could draw reasonable inferences from the chapter and the rest of the document. The implementation of this particular project is delegated to the Qatar Foundation. The NDS-2 mentions research in four other connections. The first, briefly, is agriculture. This is connected to food security as well as climate change, in finding climate-resilient crops (counter-intuitively, there is agricultural production in Qatar, which has expanded considerably since the blockade to encourage more self-sufficiency). Indeed, the centrality of agriculture makes this clearly an issue in which the government is determined to steer research to support diversification and sustainable agriculture and aquaculture. The second area, and a large one in terms of financial commitments, is health research. A Qatar National Ethics Committee was established, and procedures for an Institutional Review Board for bio-medical research were implemented. Given the precarious demographic situation of the native Qatari population, research on women and reproductive health is encouraged. Indeed, a range of healthrelated targets were all coupled to research: occupational health and safety, mental health, chronic diseases, as well as service delivery and governance in the health sector. The third area was social development. We have already discussed educational policy and related research efforts. More broadly, social development in the NDS-2 includes the cultural sector, social values, heritage and identity and sports. To this could be added the

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references to education for “global citizenship” mentioned in the education chapter. The final sector targeted for research is sustainability, noting previous efforts under NDS-1 centred around research: Moreover, there are numerous centres concerned with preserving the environment, such as Qatar University’s Environmental Science Center, Qatar Environment and Energy Research Institute—opened in 2011 at Hamad bin Khalifa University—the Environmental Studies Center at the Ministry of Municipality and Environment (MME), and the Friends of the Environment Center. Legislation has also been enacted to preserve the environment, such as the Environment Protection Law No. 30 of 2002 (Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics (Qatar), 2018: 284). It is quite clear from this review that research—natural and health sciences as well as social sciences—is considered by state planners as both a key policy tool for achieving results, and a cluster of results themselves, linked to knowledge production and commercialization, and a transition away from reliance on hydrocarbons to a new economy. We now turn to examine how these national priorities have been reflected in the policies of the key national granting agency, the Qatar National Research Fund. Qatar National Research Fund The Qatar National Research Fund (QNRF) was established in 2006, and is part of the Qatar Foundation for Education, Science, and Community Development (QF), which itself was established in 1995 by Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani and Sheikha Mozza bint Nasser. Currently, QF is the umbrella for some fifty organizations, including universities, research institutes, libraries, orchestras, and even a Qatar Nanny Training Institute. In terms of research, it is responsible for Education City, which is the collection of international branch campuses of leading universities (mentioned above), HBKU and several research institutes (under HBKU)—Qatar Biomedical Research Institute (QBRI), Qatar Computing Research Institute (QCRI) and Qatar Environment and Energy Research Institute (QEERI). QNRF receives research grant applications from these entities as well as other research institutions in the country. The mission and vision of QNRF are unabashedly harnessed to national priorities and national development. As Currie-Alder et al. point out, “as

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Qatar embraced national priorities and societal challenges as the cornerstone of its funding programs, it sent a strong signal to researchers to redesign their proposals to align with these priorities” (Currie-Alder et al., 2018: 80). The QNRF mission statement makes this clear: In response to the national needs of the State of Qatar, Qatar Foundation has set forth. an ambitious vision of research and its benefits. Qatar Foundation envisions research. as a catalyst for expanding and diversifying the country’s economy, enhancing the edu-cation of its citizens and the training of its workforce, and fostering improvements in. the health, well-being, environment, and security of its own people and those of the region. In striving toward this vision, Qatar will distinguish itself within the region and world. as a cosmopolitan nation that embraces scholarly excellence, innovation, creativity, inclusiveness and merit. The mission of Qatar National Research Fund (QNRF) directly supports this vision:QNRF advances knowledge and education by providing funding opportunities for original competitively selected research and development at all levels and across all disciplenes with emphasis on the four pillars of the Qatar National Research Strategy.

The four pillars referred to above represent substantive research areas: (1) energy and environment (oil and gas; renewable energy; energy efficiency; understanding and protecting Qatar’s natural environment; environmental sustainability; addressing global climate change; and cross-cutting basic research and applications), (2) computer sciences and information technology (infrastructure; computing and data analytics; Arabic language technologies and social computing; systems, applications and robotics; cross-cutting enabling research), (3) health (addressing national health priorities; building enabling health research platforms); and (4) social sciences, arts and humanities (society through the support of economic, social, and human development; culture; public and economic life, including developing knowledge bases on international affairs, public policy, governance and regulation; capabilities, coordination and crosscutting) (Qatar National Research Fund, 2012). QNRF has three broad research pillars: research programs, capacitybuilding and development programs and special programs. We will focus the discussion on the research programs area. That area, it should be noted, is supported by a grant selection and support infrastructure (e. g., ethics, independent and international peer review committees, arduous and exacting requirements for submissions that are common around the

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world), and so while harnessed to national priorities, is still arm’s length and relatively autonomous. Table 11.2 provides a summary of each of the seven programs within the research programs area. Social sciences (and political science in particular) could be funded in all the areas, except possibly for Paths Towards Precision Medicine (PPM), but even PPM might attract work on ethics and health data privacy issues. QNRF has a searchable database of all grants (pending, awarded, active, and terminated) across all research areas (https://mis.qgrants. org/Public/AwardSearch.aspx). Under the heading of “social sciences” there are 491 entries, but this can be further divided by discipline/field (these categorizations are hostage to QNRF definitions, but we will accept them for the purposes of this discussion): (1) economics and business, 101 grants; (2) psychology, 27 grants; (3) educational sciences, 72 grants; (4) sociology, 45 grants; (5) law, 48 grants; (6) social and economic geography, 33 grants; (7) media and communications, 28 grants; and (8) other social sciences, 103 grants. The political science category had 34 grants in total. Of those 34, some are terminated/closed, and some were to support individuals in their graduate work. When we remove those from the list, there are eight active grants remaining, listed in Table 11.3. Of the eight active QNRF grants in the political science category, five are held in the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, two with Qatar University, and one with the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies. The bulk of the topics seem to be in foreign policy and international relations (not surprising, with the weight of Georgetown). It might be, however, that this list underestimates the more applied, policyoriented projects that might be encouraged and supported by the QNRF. Since there is no “policy” disciplinary category, we conducted a search on the “economics and business” category, which has a total of 101 grants (awarded, active, completed, closed). Table 11.4 has the list of only awarded and active grants, of which there are 23. In this list, Qatar University and HBKU are the leading institutional recipients of grants. The range seems to be quite eclectic, with a concentration, however, in entrepreneurship, environment and energy efficiency, and economic transition (to knowledge economy; tourism; sports). Two projects (numbered 28 and 53) focus on the economic role of women. But this list is barely a quarter of the entire list, and previous listing of active political science projects was only eight out of 34. In order to try to get a richer picture of the distribution as well as clustering of grants, the

Summary Described as the “the primary means by which QNRF seeks to support research that addresses Qatar’s needs.” There are two categories of grants, the NPRP Standard (NPRP-S) and NPRP Cluster (NPRP-C) NPRP-S: The NPRP-S aims to focus on meritorious research projects that demonstrate a potential impact on the development of Qatar’s society and economy with an emphasis on: • tackling needs and challenges that local research end-users face; • supporting projects with tangible impacts; • focussing on subjects that are highly promising in terms of commercial and technological potential; • promoting a public–private partnership culture in Qatar; • encouraging a more cross-cutting/interdisciplinary approach to projects; • stimulating scientific excellence and the advancement of knowledge in Qatar NPRP-C: The main objective of the National Priorities Research Program—Cluster (NPRP-C) is to address pressing and strategic challenges for Qatar and produce tangible societal and economic impact. This program aims at supporting multi-institutional and inter/multi-disciplinary research to solve significant and complex problems in a holistic way that are resistant to conventional approaches

Program

National Priorities Research Program (NPRP)

Table 11.2 QNRF research programs: Summary

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(continued)

Themes and challenges are selected, and engaged with multi-stakeholder groups. Outcome focussed. It varies year-by-year. In 2020, the theme was food security, with call for proposals on • Local Food Production • Community Initiative • Policy and Legislation • Strengthening resilience among people and Agrifood systems • Supply Chain The aim of the call is to intensify cooperation between Turkish and Qatari participants in science and industry by means of Academia and Industry Cooperation. The theme of the third cycle is ‘Smart Cities’ “Academia-Industry Cooperation Projects” are R&D projects, which require the participation of at least one Turkish research institution/university/training and research hospitals and one Qatari research institution/university as well as at least one Turkish commercial company and one Qatari commercial company or research end-user The research priority areas of this call are • Smart Energy • Smart Environment • Smart Healthcare • Smart Logistics • Smart Security • Smart Sports • Smart Transportation

Thematic and Grand Challenges

TUBITAK—QNRF Joint Funding Program

Summary

Program

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The Doha International Family Institute (DIFI) and the Qatar National Research Fund (QNRF) have launched the OSRA research grant which is an annual research grant on Arab families and family policy-related issues. The goal of this call is to encourage research on Behavioural Issues Research, Family cohesion, Family Well being and Protection and Marriage and Divorce, Parenthood and Parenting research related to families that contributes to the development of evidence-based policies and programs to promote the well-being of families The Belmont Forum is a group of major funders of climate change research, encouraging international partnerships in interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary projects. The QRNF highlighted topics are: • Capacity building in disaster risk management • Cascade effects and disruption of critical infrastructure • Gulf water pollution • Identification, understanding and assessment of disaster risks in hot and arid environments • Infrastructure resilience • Low frequency and high impact natural hazards: vulnerability, exposure, prediction & mitigation • Multi-hazard early warning systems and risk information for large events • Pre-disaster recovery planning and risk communication frameworks • Risk assessment and modelling of natural and technological disasters • Trans-epidemic diseases

Osra

Belmont Forum

Summary

Program

Table 11.2 (continued)

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The objective of the Path towards Precision Medicine (PPM) call is to support and advance research that aims to guide healthcare decisions towards the most effective prevention of disease or treatment for a given patient based on their genetic profile. This call will continue to support genomic research in Qatar by utilizing the samples and data collected and generated by QBB and QGP, with more focus on innovative projects aiming at translating basic research into clinical implementation A separate listing of the Thematic Challenge above—Food Security. MME refers to the Ministry of Municipality and Environment

Path Towards Precision Medicine (PPM)

Source Qatar National Research Fund, Funding, https://www.qnrf.org/en-us/

QNRF-MME Joint Funding

Summary

Program

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Table 11.3 QNRF research grants: Political science [Active] #

Project number

Project title

Lead investigator

Project status

1

CWSP11-C-101916029

Dr. Harry Verhoeven

Award Active

2

CWSP2-W-0414-14046

The Liberal State and its Alternatives in the Indian Ocean World (I) Overcoming Sectarian Fault Lines After the Arab Revolutions

14 NPRP12S-0210-190067 Managing National Security Risk during and after the Blockade: Strategic Challenges and Opportunities for Qatar’s Energy Sector 15 NPRP9-261-5-029 Developing the Arab Barometer in the Arab Gulf States 16 NPRP9-309-5-041 ‘Transitions of Islam and Democracy’: Engendering Democratic Learning and Civic Identities

Prof. Mark Farha

Prof. Rory Miller

Submitting institution

Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar Awarded Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar Award Georgetown Active University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Dr. Darwish Alemadi

Award Active

Qatar University

Prof. Larbi Sadiki

Award Active

Qatar University

(continued)

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Table 11.3 (continued) #

Project number

17 OSRA2-0208-17018

33 UREP24-210-5-039

34 UREP24-215-5-041

Project title

Lead investigator

Project status

Submitting institution

Unfamiliar Families: Syrian Refugees’ Transnational Solidarity and Kinship Networks Understanding Royalist, Nationalist and Tribal Affiliations in the Post Blockade States of the Gulf Humanizing Resources: Analyzing Employment Opportunities for the Disabled in Qatar

Dr. Sophie RichterDevroe

Award Active

Doha Institute for Graduate Studies

Prof. Amira Sonbol

Award Active

Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Dr. Sonia Alonso

Award Active

Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Source Qatar National Research Fund, https://mis.qgrants.org/Public/AwardSearch.aspx

full list (including active as well as the various classes of non-active) grants for both political science and economics and business were consulted, totalling 135 (that full, combined table is not reproduced here for reasons of space). We then classified these 135 grants into subject areas, using an inductive approach. Table 11.5 summarizes the results. Before jumping to any conclusions on the distribution of these grants, it should be noted again that this is simply a list drawn from the Economics & Business, and Political Science QNRF categories of grants. In addition to the 491 grants under the “Social Sciences”, there are 621 under Natural Sciences; 1206 under Engineering and Technology; 731 under Medical and Health Sciences; 40 under Agricultural Sciences; and 109 under Humanities. The total for all categories is 3433, of which Social Sciences comprise (in number, not in proportion of funding) 14%.

Project number

CWSP10-C-0309-16001

CWSP10-C-0405-16013

CWSP12-W-0306-17008

CWSP13-W-0911-17001

CWSP14-W-0211-18004

CWSP2-W-0410-14040

CWSP7-W-0611-15004

CWSP8-Q-0922-15029

GSRA6-2-0525-19041

#

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

GSRA6 Project of Reem Mohamed

Public Policy, Entrepreneurship and Education Nexus: Promoting Qatar National Vision 2030 & Beyond The Knowledge-Based Economy Shariah Scholars Roundtable Green Economy, Business and Entrepreneurship in Qatar (GEBEQ) Awqaf throughout the Muslim world: case studies and analysis of management, performance and trust l Skill Development in the Construction Industry of Qatar Islamic Finance Roundtable: Shariah Issues Entrepreneurship 2020

Project title

The Honourable Wolfgang Amann

Prof. Syed Ali

Dr. Nader Kabbani

Prof. Syed Ali

Dr. Evren Tok

Prof. Laoucine Kerbache Prof. Syed Ali

Dr. Evren Tok

Lead investigator

Table 11.4 QNRF research grants: Economics and business [Active]

Award Active

Awarded

Awarded

Awarded

Award Active

Award Active

Award Active

Awarded

Awarded

Project status

Hamad Bin Khalifa University HEC Paris in Qatar

Silatech

Hamad Bin Khalifa University

Hamad Bin Khalifa University Hamad Bin Khalifa University

HEC Paris in Qatar

Hamad Bin Khalifa University

Submitting institution

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Project number

NPRP10-0129-170276

NPRP10-0131-170300

NPRP10-0212-170447

NPRP10-1203-160007

NPRP11C-1229-170007

NPRP12S-0214-190086

#

28

29

30

31

32

33

A Platform to Promote Entrepreneurship for Women in Qatar Through International Collaboration and Co-Innovation Improving Qatar water use/reuse efficiency through a behavioural lens Modelling and Assessing the Transition to Low Carbon/Smart Economy in Gulf Countries Localizing Entrepreneurship Education in Qatar: QNV 2030 and Beyond A Secure End-to-End Blockchain-Based Solution to Finance Trade: The Legal, Technological and Economic Framework Positioning Qatar as a Preferred International Tourism Destination Unbridled by the Blockade, and Strategies for Economic Diversification via Tourism

Project title

Project status

SOCIAL SCIENCES AS AN INSTRUMENT …

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Qatar University

Award Active

Dr. Ali Salman Saleh

Hamad Bin Khalifa University

Qatar University

Qatar University

Qatar University

Award Active

Award Active

Award Active

Qatar University

Submitting institution

Dr. Mazen El-Masri Award Active

Dr. Evren Tok

Dr. AHMED BADRAN

Dr. Ahmed Khalifa

Prof. Nitham Hindi Award Active

Lead investigator

11

311

Project number

NPRP12S-0311-190314

NPRP9-172-5-021

NPRP9-232-5-026

QRLP9-G-3330040

TDF1-0209-170032

UREP24-027-5-003

UREP24-059-5-011

#

34

40

41

53

54

98

99

Table 11.4 (continued)

The implementation of Qatarization strategy: The status quo, challenges and remedies A Comparison of Sport Event Participation Outcomes across Qatar and Australia Promoting energy efficiency in Qatar: field experimental evidence SOCIAL, BUSINESS and PROFESSIONAL EMPOWERMENT of WOMEN THROUGH ENTREPRENEURSHIP AGPs: Automatic Generation of Personas from Social Media Data Entrepreneurial Finance in Qatar: New and traditional Sources of Financing for Start-up and Entrepreneurship Businesses Assessing the Impact of Introducing Value Added Tax on Price Levels and Consumers’ Behaviour in Qatar

Project title

Award Active

Award Active

Dr. Mohammed Elgammal

Dr. Mahmoud Abdellatif Khalil

Award Active

Award Active

Award Active

Award Active

Award Active

Project status

Dr. Bernard Jansen

Ms. muneera Al-Qahtani

Dr. Ahmed Khalifa

Dr. Rana Sobh

Prof. Said Elbanna

Lead investigator

Qatar University

Qatar University

Hamad Bin Khalifa University

Qatar National Research Fund (QNRF)

Qatar University

Qatar University

Qatar University

Submitting institution

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UREP24-152-5-027

100

Utilizing social media influencers in marketing communications: Examining the effects on collaborating brands and consumer well-being

Project title Dr. Tamer Elsharnouby

Lead investigator

Source Qatar National Research Fund, https://mis.qgrants.org/Public/AwardSearch.aspx

Project number

# Award Active

Project status Qatar University

Submitting institution

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Table 11.5 QNRF economics and business, and political science, research grants: classified

Economic transition Arab society Finance Retail markets International relations Environment/energy Labour markets Entrepreneurship Islam Women Health Sports Food security Unclassified

Econ & business

Political science

Total

18 4 12 12 0 10 6 8 5 4 2 2 1

0 12 0 0 11 1 1 0 1 2 0 0 0

18 16 12 12 11 11 7 8 6 6 2 2 1 5

Note The 18 individual grants made to graduate students are not included. The total is more than 135 because some grants fell into more than one category

The proportion of funding is likely to be significantly smaller (financial data were not available at time of writing). That said, there is a rough alignment between the distribution of grants and the QNRF priorities described earlier. There is a heavy weighting towards topics on the economic transition (including finance, labour markets, entrepreneurship, and retail markets), international relations and Arab society. In a sense, this is a trinity of concerns dear to the heart of any government: the economy, geo-politics and the characteristics and trends of the society it governs (Arab society, Islam, and women).

Conclusion This conclusion briefly addresses the issues raised at the beginning of the chapter, as well as questions posed in this book’s Chapter 1 with respect to the macro-, meso- and micro-level trends in state funding of research and potential co-optation of universities and reduction in their autonomy. The Qatari state’s ambition is to harness education, post-secondary education and research to national development. In this respect, Qatar is no different than the European Union and its Horizon Europe

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project, which supports innovation through research to secure Europe’s global competitiveness. The Qatari case, however, has some important features. First, it should be remembered that the modernization of the country only began in earnest in 1995, and especially as revenues from LNG flowed in after 2001. Second, this has simultaneously been a “catching up” modernization of basic infrastructure and public services, and a “transformational” modernization in trying to encourage an eventual (maybe impending) transition to a knowledge- and service-based economy. Third, given the small national population and virtually nonexistent post-secondary sector twenty-five years ago, rapid development on these fronts required “buying off the shelf” in terms of importing both PSE institutions (the branch campuses) and ex-pat researchers. The state by definition had to be highly interventionist and directive, though QNRF operates according the international standards of arms-length relation of funding agencies to government. We mentioned two curiosities about the Qatari case: first, the reverse polarity whereby these investments in PSE and research might be supporting “progressive” social change, and second, that these investments seem odd for a rentier state that should be trying to keep its populace passive, not educated (and hence, possibly, agitated). On the first point, and mirroring Chapter 1, we can use a macro-, meso- and micro-approach. At the macro-level, the establishment of QF, Education City, partner institutions, are all part of a clear strategy to modernize the country, adopt western standards of education and research, and to participate in the global community. The educational and research sector is a huge tectonic plate that has been inserted into the social topography of the country, a country that is still Arabic, Islamic and traditional in many ways. The strategy fully respects the need to preserve the society’s culture and religion, but research in the Qatari context is intended to have a catalytic effect. The role of women is perhaps the most obvious illustration, and is reflected in the QNRF grants around women’s issues, entrepreneurship, and the role of the family. The second curiosity is the rentier state investing so heavily in education. As Kamrava points out: “There is a direct link between higher levels of education and the likelihood of taking part in opposition activities and calling for political change, especially in adverse economic circumstances” (Kamrava, 2014: 39). Why invest so heavily in research and education, and make post-secondary education a cultural expectation by Qataris themselves (especially women, who outnumber men in terms of higher

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education qualifications)? Structurally, this may be due to a combination of factors: (1) the tiny size of the Qatari population and concentration in one city (Doha) makes it possible to use traditional consultative mechanisms such as majlis to manage dissent; (2) the robustness of the “bargain” in terms of services, financial benefits, and jobs and (3) lack of significant social, class and tribal cleavages in Qatari society. Added to this would be the astute and measured leadership of the Father Emir and the current Emir, Tamim (in comparison, for example with Saudi Arabia). Finally, though this is more recent, the 2017 blockade generated a strong sense of solidarity (among both Qataris and many ex-pats). With these combinations of circumstances, the leadership can take a long view that its survival and that of the society as whole will depend on modernization through a highly educated population, balanced with a commitment to certain core principles of Islam and Arabism (Freer, 2018). It is clear that academic and scientific research in Qatar is unambiguously seen as an instrument of national development as defined through the QNS and the NDS-2, and consequently structuring the granting priorities of the QNRF. In this sense, Qatar is definitely part of the international trend that this volume’s Chapter 2 captures in the notion of an “impact agenda”. In terms of effects on academic autonomy and intellectual freedom, again there is no doubt that the institutions (and hence the faculty members and researchers) understand that their work is embedded in this national agenda. If they want in-country funding, they have to turn to QNRF, and the evidence clearly shows that research has been skewed to align with QNRF priorities, which align with national priorities. That said, researchers do not have to apply for funds, or alternatively they can apply for external funding. Moreover, while QNRF has set funding priorities, for example, entrepreneurship, researchers inclined in that direction still have ample scope to define the specifics of the research they would like to conduct. The “degrees of freedom” have been reduced, but not narrowed completely. The question of “intellectual freedom” is somewhat more complicated. There are clear boundaries. The Qatari Constitution states that the Emir’s person is “inviolable and he must be respected by all.” On January 19, 2020, the Official Gazette published a new law authorizing the detention of “anyone who broadcasts, publishes, or republishes false or biassed rumours, statements, or news, or inflammatory propaganda, domestically or abroad, with the intent to harm national interests, stir up public opinion, or infringe on the social system or the public

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system of the state” (“Qatar’s ‘repressive’ press law sparks international outcry,” January 22, 2020). Both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International condemned the legislation. As well, Islam is the official state religion of Qatar, and a full-blown, frontal attack on Islam as an expression of “intellectual freedom” by an academic or researcher in the country would attract sanctions, either informal, formal, or possibly legal. According to Amnesty International, Qatar does not currently have any political prisoners, though there was the notorious case of Mohammed Al-Ajami, a Qatari poet who was imprisoned from 2011 to 2016 for a poem that allegedly insulted the Emir (then Hamad) and his son (the current Emir). He was released by royal pardon in 2016. Before leaving the macro-level, it is worth briefly reflecting on a trend that has been noted in several earlier chapters: an undermining of public trust in academics as part of a larger populist attack on ‘elites’, ‘experts’ and ‘the establishment’ by politicians in a number of countries. This has not been a prominent feature of the Qatari context, beside possibly some scepticism of consulting firms (linked to some early mistakes by RAND) and possibly of unhealthy “westernization”. Anecdotally, there might be several reasons for this. One is that because researchers are agents of national development plans, they are respected for their contributions to modernizing the country. QF is led by the royal family, and so all the research activities within Education City bask in the glow of royal patronage, and moreover, the patronage of a royal family (Al-Thanis) that enjoys broad support and legitimacy, especially since the blockade. As well, some of the populist critique of the experts in the west hinges on their elite status, substantial incomes and apparent privileged lifestyles (like jetting off to international conferences to analyze populism). In Qatar, the research “class” has no evident material advantages over Qatari nationals. Finally, there seems a legacy of Arabic cultural respect for education and learning, a well that might run dry in the future, but retains some depth at the moment. Chapter 1 encouraged two other levels of analysis: (1) meso-level, or possible co-optation of academe by the state, where research is “framed less in intellectual or scholarly terms and more in terms of global competitiveness and productivity challenges”, and (2) micro-level, where political science in particular might less audibly “speak truth to power.” With respect to the first, in light of the discussion above, there can be no doubt of co-optation in the sense of “harnessing” and trying to shape research agendas. It’s undisguised, unapologetic and intentional. Whether

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that translates into the suppression of certain research avenues scholars might want to pursue, is another question. On the micro-level, there are limits on speaking to power in the Qatari context, whether what is spoken is “true” or not. The truth that the editors fear is being muffled is analysis that would support strong public action on major challenges facing humanity, such as climate change and now, possibly, the pandemic, but also a range of fundamental issues related to justice and equality (Eisfeld, 2019). As in most other states, Qatar has similar pressures driving researchers away from deep questions to more mission-oriented, state-directed priorities. With respect to political science as a discipline, it is not as concentrated in Qatari higher education institutions as it is in Europe and North America, and political scientists themselves tend to be scattered throughout cognate entities, departments and think tanks, often focusing on global geo-politics, public policy and management. They are no less in demand for that, and often the demand comes from political authorities seeking advice on the issues of the day, or even from the higher political authorities who see opportunities for Qatari influence on key global issues (e.g., the annual Doha Forum). This is indeed a form of co-optation, but a distinct co-optation, within the context of modernization and state attempts to position the country as a “positive” influence on global issues.

References Baghdady, A. (2016). Transforming Qatar’s PSE: Achievements and concessions. In M. E. Tok, L. Alkhater, & L. A. Pal (Eds.), Policy-making in a transformative state: The case of Qatar (pp. 131–153). Palgrave Macmillan. Barros de Barros, F., Geodegebuure, L., Lyn Meek, V., & Pettigrew, A. (2015). Institutional governance, leadership and management of research for innovation and development. In J. Huisman, H. de Boer, D. D. Dill, & M. Souto-Otero (Eds.), Palgrave international handbook of higher education policy and governance (pp. 261–280). Palgrave Macmillan. Beblawi, H., & Luciani, G. (Eds.). (1987). The rentier state: Nation, state, and the integration of the Arab world. Croom Helm. Currie-Alder, B. (2019). Scaling up research governance: From exceptionalism to fragmentation. In L. A. Pal & M. E. Tok (Eds.), Global governance and Muslim organizations (pp. 229–249). Plagrave Macmillan. Currie-Alder, B., Arvanitis, R., & Hanafi, S. (2018). Research in Arabicspeaking countries: Funding competitions, international collaboration, and career incentives. Science and Public Policy, 45(1), 74–82.

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Davidson, C. M. (2012). After the Sheikhs: The coming collapse of the Gulf monarchies. Hurst and Company. Donn, G. A.-M. Y. (2010). Globalization and higher education in the Arab Gulf States. Symposium Books. Donn, G. A.-M. Y. (2013). Education in the broader Middle East: Borrowing a Baroque Arsenal. Symposium Books. Eisfeld, R. (2019). Empowering citizens, engaging the public: political science for the 21st century. Palgrave Macmillan. Flinders, M., & John, P. (2013). The future of political science. Political Studies Review, 11(2), 222–227. https://doi.org/10.1111/1478-9302.12012 Flinders, M., & Pal, L. A. (2019). The moral foundations of public engagement: Does political science, as a discipline, have an ethics? Political Studies Review. https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929919881332 Freer, C. (2018). Rentier Islam: The Influence of the Muslim brotherhood in Gulf monarchies. Oxford University Press. Gray, M. (2011). A theory of “Late Rentierism” in the Arab states of the Gulf . Doha, Qatar: Occasional Paper No. 7. Center for International and Regional Studies. Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar. Havergal, C. (2016). Hosting US branch campuses costs Qatar £280 million annually. THE World University Rankings. https://www.timeshighereduc ation.com/news/hosting-us-branch-campuses-costs-qatar-ps280-million-ann ually#survey-answer. Herrera, L. (2007). Higher education in the Arab world. In J. J. F. Forest & P. G. Altbach (Eds.), International handbook of higher education. Springer. Huntington, S. P. (1968). Political order in changing societies. Yale University Press. Kamrava, M. (2013). Qatar: Small state, big politics. Cornell University Press. Kamrava, M. (2014). The rise and fall of ruling bargains in the Middle East. In M. Kamrava (Ed.), Beyond the Arab Spring: The evolving ruling bargain in the Middle East (pp. 17–45). Hurst and Company and Centre for International and Regional Studies, School of Foreign Service in Qatar, Georgetown University. Krieg, A. (Ed.). (2019). Divided Gulf: The anatomy of a crisis. Palgrave Macmillan. Luciani, G. (1987). Allocation vs. production states: A theoretical framework. In H. Beblawi & G. Luciani (Eds.), The Rentier State (Vol. 2, pp. 63–82). Croom Helm. Meyers, M., & Kearnes, M. (2013). Introduction to special section: Intermediaries between science, policy and the market. Science and Public Policy, 40, 423–429. https://doi.org/10.1093/scipol/sct051

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Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics (Qatar). (2018). Qatar Second National Development Strategy, 2018–2022. https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/kno wledge/DocumentsNDS2Final.pdf. Mitchell, J. S., & Pal, L. A. (2016). Policy-making in Qatar: The macro-policy framework. In M. E. Tok, L. Alkhater, & L. A. Pal (Eds.), Policy-making in a transformative state: The case of Qatar (pp. 65–96). Palgrave Macmillan. Planning and Statistics Authority (Qatar). (2008). Qatar National Vision 2030. Doha, Qatar: Planning and Statistics Authority. Available at: https://www. psa.gov.qa/en/qnv1/pages/default.aspx. Qatar National Research Fund. (2012). Qatar National Research Strategy (QNRS) 2012 and a Strategic Plan for Implementation: Summary Version. QNRF. Qatar’s ‘repressive’ press law sparks international outcry. (2020, January 22). The Arab Weekly. https://thearabweekly.com/qatars-repressive-press-law-spa rks-international-outcry. Ulrichsen, K. (2020). Qatar and the Gulf crisis. Hurst and Company. Zahlan, A. B. (2012). Science, development, and sovereignty in the Arab world. Palgrave Macmillan.

PART III

Analysis and Implications

CHAPTER 12

From Deference and the Politicization of Research Funding to a New Politics of Political Science Rainer Eisfeld and Matthew Flinders

The main aim of this chapter is to further substantiate that argument while also focusing on its potential consequences for the future of both academe and democracy. We achieve this aim by looking across the country-specific profiles that have been offered in this book and returning to the concept of the pentagon (see Chapter 3 above), in order to explain a prevailing pattern in state-scholar relationships. Our argument is not

The correction to this chapter is available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3030-75918-6_13 R. Eisfeld (B) Fachbereich 1, Universität Osnabrück, Osnabrück, Germany e-mail: [email protected] M. Flinders University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021, corrected publication 2021 R. Eisfeld and M. Flinders (eds.), Political Science in the Shadow of the State, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75918-6_12

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that any simple or straightforward “reform” agenda has been applied across each and every country. National cultures, histories and institutional frameworks have each in their own ways shaped the nature of change. The shift has therefore been more subtle, hidden and context specific—often conducted through gradual attrition—but we argue that at a broader level it is possible to identify a global shift in the metagovernance of higher education that needs to be the focus of discussion and debate. As the third chapter illustrated, the pentagon’s five core elements are. • • • • •

entrepreneurial universities, accountability, impact, politically selected relevance, and political control of funding eligibility.

Starting with the first element, it is critical to remember that although the term “entrepreneurial university” evokes the image of a largely unregulated market player devoid of intervention by government agencies or other “outside” actors, it is in fact a product of the state and an actor of the state. State legislation created the entrepreneurial university, changing the tools of control and the degree of intrusiveness in the process. Political rhetoric promoted the idea of the entrepreneurial university as a driver of innovation, agility and change. Even allowing for continuing national divergences, it is essential to highlight (Whitley, 2007: 4). the incorporation of public policy goals and evaluation standards into the selection and monitoring processes of research funding.

Put slightly differently, for all the talk of freedom and independence in the marketplace of ideas the entrepreneurial university still exists very much in the shadow of the state.

Marketization and Politicization: Gateways to Ideological University Capture As alternative sources of financial support have declined both in number and in scope, state funding and assessment agencies increasingly decide

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on the “visible stratification” not just of academic research teams or departments, but of entire universities, whose driving force and essential profile component remains research (ibid.: 8, 10). Global rankings of research excellence and reputational prowess have become increasingly central tools of governance and a core component of an “audit explosion” that very often limits the basic flexibility, freedom and therefore “entrepreneurial” capacity of universities (another paradox). Nevertheless, with these foundations in place, university presidents and staff were increasingly expected to act like corporate executives than leaders of an intellectual community. Performance-management frameworks redefined academic departments as “business units” or “cost centers”, and market-based logic redefined the relationships between university, staff and students. With “task offices” proliferating across universities, the ratio of academic staff to professional managers shifted in favor of the latter (Weingart & Maasen, 2007: 76, 77). Traditional notions of collegial internal university governance were replaced by more autocratic forms of top-down management. Coercive outside authority and diminished internal self-governance combine like the two blades of a pair of scissors cutting into democratic rules and procedures. The results, as this book’s chapters show, include deference and co-option, while no sustained collective—and effective—critique is offered. There has been, Richard Watermeyer (2019) has argued, “a shortfall of resistance” to the imposition of an incredibly narrow model of competitive accountability on academic life. Kanishka Jayasuriya and Greg McCarthy developed a related argument in their chapter on Australia: [I]t is the mixture of markets and populism that is… shap[ing]the contours of the emerging research funding framework… Social scientists have been – quite rightly - critical of this politicization of the research funding process. Therefore, the res-ponse of the social science community – including those in political science – is toaccommodate these pressures as a way of minimizing political constraints.

Jasuryia and McCarthy proceed to note that this could entail framing research proposals so that they fall in line with various ideologically charged notions of national interest or national security.

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Successive chapters of this book have demonstrated how the protected space of available resources and peer-defined career criteria shielding academics in the pursuit of self-selected or peer-selected research issues has been weakened, sometimes fundamentally, by the marriage of market and politics, as incarnated in the entrepreneurial university. Once that destruction has been wrought, the amalgam that is the marketized university offers itself to the imposition, by outside (funding/monitoring) authority, of political values that may be more or less liberal—or il liberal. As argued by the authors of the chapter on France, even safeguarding protected space may not suffice, should governments manage to generate enough in-house expertise to make themselves independent from academic research. Magni-Berton and Squevin: “Especially in the social sciences, alternative agendas may then become equivalent to mere political opinions hostile to the government’s line.” This argument warrants further research. In Western states, the imposition of governmental control capacity tends to occur via intermediary institutions and is therefore generally less visible to the public (hence our emphasis on “hollowing-out by stealth” rather than direct attack). The Australian “model” offers a case in point. At the first stage, the academic peer review process is kept intact: The Australian Research Council (ARC) assesses grant applications. At the second stage, the mandatory National Interest Test (NIT) intervenes as a separate hurdle: Academic reviewers may not determine whether an application satisfies NIT requirements. At the third stage, the education minister’s rights include vetoing any proposals that may not meet the politician’s notion of what benefits Australia’s national interest. The United Kingdom provides another example (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997: 67–70): Between 1988 and 2017, relevant legislation and government directives. • abolished academic tenure, reducing the autonomy of faculty; • abolished block grants to universities, instituting the principle of competition for research funds; • put research contributions to economic prosperity at the top of funding criteria, practically redefining research excellence; and • authorized the Secretary of State to give “directions about the allocation” of research grants, allowing for the principle that individual research grants are “best” decided following an evaluation “such as a peer review process”.

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The cultural shift referred to in these pages therefore should be conceptualized more broadly than has tended to occur in the past, for the entrepreneurial university with whose emergence it has been identified, displays at least three defining features: (a) the marketized university, chiefly modeled on corporate management rules and procedures, (b) the public policy-impacted university, its researchers and research units substantially steered by policymakers’ funding constraints and requirements; and (c) in a more provocative vein, arguably something of a cowed victimmentality whereby the need to display increasingly aggressive and competitive behaviors in a global education marketplace actually veils a deeper lack of confidence about the role and contribution of universities in the twenty-first century. Such a mix is in line with the overall rationale of the “competition state” which Philip Cerny (1999: 264) found emerging during the 1990s: Deregulation must not be seen just as the lifting of old regulations, but also as the for-mulation of new regulatory structures… designed to enforce market-rational economic political behavior on… private sector actors as well as on state actors and agencies… The state becomes the spearhead of structural transformation to market norms.

The cowed and confused trajectory of universities is, we suggest, a symptom of the fact that most academics do not want to abide by market norms, to work in business units or see their work commodified into “impact case studies” that drive industrial productivity. This resistance, weak and unchanneled as it has generally been, should not be interpreted as a lack of faith in the social role or capacity or research to help inform society, but points to a more diverse definition of scholarly relevance, impact and public value. Taking this further, “what counts” in the entrepreneurial university are forms of economic impact, but many disciplines, especially when it comes to the humanities, sociology or political science, possess a far richer and wider definition of value or capital. This explains the attack on the traditional role of universities due to their emphasis on the ‘good character’ of students and their belief that all knowledge has an innate social value. The politicization of such values

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and the intellectual freedom of academics contributed to the current “culture wars” over societal values and claims regarding the (mis)use of research for political purposes—such as presently in Australia and the United States, or in Poland and Hungary. Political players may attempt to defame terms such as “migration” or “gender”, and resort to disqualifying academic research projects in those fields. For evidence, we refer you to the chapter on Australia. Seen from this perspective, research grant assessment processes may no longer be considered as neutral channels for the allocation of funding, but may be turned into politicized tools for suppressing unwanted topics, critical approaches, or even entire disciplinary fields. One potential remedy to such state control and manipulation would be to ensure a healthy ecosystem of research funding opportunities—a pluralization of public funding sources, such as that offered by the Netherlands’ highly developed and diversified policy advisory landscape. Arguing that “in their behavior, scholars actually do engage with many external parties to deliver their knowledge”, Chapter 7 proposes entrepreneurial relevance as a third, intermediary category in between the scholarly selected and state-directed varieties. As the three authors are the first to acknowledge, their suggestion is bound to considerably stimulate the current debate and depends on at least four factors: • on widely sought scholarly expertise in a pragmatic and consensusoriented political and social culture, • on academic access to many and varied—if largely public—venues for research agenda-setting and funding, offering at least limited space for the scholarly selection of topics judged relevant, • on a pragmatic, “entrepreneurial” breed of scholars, including political scientists, actively seeking alternative windows for knowledge production funding, knowledge delivery, relevance and recognition, • finally, on the existence of largely permeable boundaries between civil society, organizations involved in interest representation/policy formulation, and the government. What Arco Timmermans and his colleagues are essentially describing, however, is a very different interpretation of “entrepreneurship” in the academic context which is far broader and more creative than narrow market-based definitions. Indeed, the “entrepreneurial scholar” that they

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seek to identify is not bound to economic productivity and profit, but is free to range and trespass across conventional organizational and professional boundaries. The facilitation of such mobility rarely happens by accident and is more commonly designed and incentivized by more enlightened and progressive political instincts. With this in mind, it should be noted that, to offset a previously introduced heavy emphasis on the economic impact of science, and thereby to regain some control over the allocation of research funds, the Dutch Education and Science Minister, in collaboration with the science organization, in 2015 launched an initiative for a National Science Agenda to be based on inputs submitted by citizens (some 12,000 were sent in). The agenda is currently used for funding multidisciplinary groups of academic researchers. The concept, not unlikely several other features of the Dutch approach, offers some fascinating elements of a counterreaction to prevailing trends and provides another case that warrants further in-depth research, including—even if limited—applicability to other cultures and countries. At present, however, as evidenced by what has been said about the United Kingdom and Australia, and by this book’s subsequent chapters on higher education and research policies in Hungary and the (other) Visegrad States, the Netherlands seem to provide a rather unique case. Particularly in the Orban regime’s sustained attempts at establishing a “democracy” downright labeled “illiberal”, there have been no attempts at fostering a pragmatic and consensus-building political culture. On the contrary, “migration” and “gender” have served as bêtes noires, ratcheting-up a public discourse which. • promotes one-sided perceptions of “correct” values underlying a supposed “national identity”, and which • feeds on suspicion and fear about differing “modernist” values and international players allegedly bent on victimizing the Hungarian nation. Again, according to the judgment of Zsolt Boda and Zoltán Gábor Szúcs, a “culture war” is pursued in that process which is committed to impressing an ideological “friend-or-foe” scenario upon higher education to which researchers are expected to adapt in the face of pressure and

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critique. Following a sequence of privatizing previously public universities, a neoliberal rhetoric of benefiting economic competitiveness by improving performance has been used in Hungary “as a Trojan horse” for expanding political control over academic and cultural institutions. Not content with employing intermediary, “arm’s-length”, agencies to transmit alleged public needs, the Orbán regime resorted to direct political governance. The manner in which the Hungarian Academy of Sciences’ fifteen research institutes were placed under the control of a new government-appointed supervisory body provides a case in point. Details can be found in several previous chapters, so there is no need to reiterate those here. While Hungary may presently be considered the most flagrant case of such efforts at establishing scholarly co-option by incentives and enforcing academic deference by subordination, the “Western” and the “Central-East European” research funding regimes testify to differences in degree, not in kind. In Western states, too, led by Australia and the UK, initial measures have been—as noted by Flinders et al. in their chapter—gradually expanded, eventually resulting in hard regulatory governance requirements. Contrary to traditional assumptions and idealized expectations, the neoliberal entrepreneurial university offers a form of ideological control and institutional capture: Internally antiparticipatory, market performance and crude notions of productivity have trumped academic autonomy and professional collegiality; externally anti-intellectual, because a machine-like focus on “what works” and the assessment of disciplinary value through the lens of potential salary scales risks injecting a populist dynamic into the democracy of knowledge. This dependency relationship provides political players with the capacity not just to shape research priorities, but also to question the credibility of specific disciplines. In the United States, that fatal constellation—as shown by Pinderhughes and Pena-Vasquez in their chapter—has operated to the detriment of political science even from the post-World War II establishment of the National Science Foundation as a research funding institution. “Epistemological distrust”—policymaker’s doubts about the scientific status of the social sciences—and “social distrust”—legislators’ fears about potential policy uses of these disciplines—led to continuing self-censorship by the NSF concerning the scope of its research support: “Controversial” fields such as politics, race, gender were systematically omitted from Foundation programs.

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According to the authors, parts of that strategy remain in operation today, having worked toward making political science in the United States—and that is a highly discomforting conclusion for a professed liberal democracy—“only relevant to the extent that it was under control and raised no sensitive issues that might lead to challenges to the national status quo”. What could more starkly confirm our assessment in the introduction to this volume that any over-emphasis on state-directed relevance is fraught with implications likely to be felt far beyond the lecture hall and seminar room?

Between Metrics and Metaphorical “Pub Tests”: Accountability as a Sliding Scale The conceptual pentagon’s second and third linchpin, accountability and impact, lend themselves to joint discussion. The preceding chapters have documented that again we are dealing with political categories, whose substance—whether in Western or Central-East European states— is defined by the governments of the day. The broad range of such definitions becomes apparent—when, on the one hand, and as reported by Jayasuriya and McCarthy in this book, successive Australian education ministers were clearly resorting to “playing with populism”. This is reflected in assertions about applying a metaphorical “pub test” to grant applications, which suggests that academics should really be accountable to the “sound” judgment and “common sense” of “ordinary” taxpaying citizens, in whose place the ministers seek to stand;—and on the other hand, a veritable tide of quantitative metrics (rankings and ratings) has been emanating from countries such as the United Kingdom that aimed to “measure” the degree of having attained pre-established goals. Use of standardized metric indicators threw open the gate to the “politics of impact” explored and assessed in this book’s second chapter: Epitomizing the commodification of knowledge, these politics have come to rate predicted “impact achievement” as a major funding application component. As we noted, a 2013 petition, joined by over 15,000 British academics, to withdraw the “external impact” conditionality, remained unsuccessful, and a sustained international critique of statedirected research funding regimes has failed to materialize. The 2012 San Francisco Declaration on Research Assessment and the 2015 Leiden Manifesto for Research Metrics at least responded, as we saw, to perceived gross flaws of the expanding fixation on metrics. Although resonance was

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substantial, resistance was actually limited and results in terms of changing the system or rejecting “drift” were therefore modest. To explain this quandary, it would be well to recall the extent (as described in the second chapter) to which neoliberal political, business and intellectual players committed to imposing the private sector’s allegedly superior values upon the public sphere were successful in redirecting and redefining the political discourse: New public management and new public research agendas, as the work of Christopher Hood has illustrated, were explicitly based on the promise of increasing accountability, efficiency and transparency, became almost hegemonic frames of reference and, to a considerable extent, continue to operate as such. Changes in the tools of control arrived on the heels of a pervasive rhetoric of “modernization” and “reform” to which conservative, liberal and social democratic parties largely surrendered. The commodification features of the catchword “reform” belied the term’s traditional progressive connotation. Costs in terms of bottom-up engagement, intellectual freedom, social capital, collegiality were downplayed, denied or neglected. In Central-East European states, particularly Poland and Hungary, the neoliberal economic discourse has been combined with a “traditionalistnativist” political narrative. For the hybrid regimes of both countries, which have secured considerable media hegemony, the desire to increase economic efficiency and the desire to exert political control—to quote from this book’s second chapter—became intertwined on a much broader scale in comparison to Western states. For the project’s ideological foundation, these regimes promoted an ideology that constructed a “defensive” national identity—a “martyrologic vision” even of recent national history—which claimed a need for protection from an intrusive “other”, defined as the West’s “universalist” (liberal, secular) visions of political order (Agh, 2016: 32–33; Sliwa, 2012: 13–14, 21). As set forth in Chapters 8 and 9, once both regimes had started promoting “a political discourse cultivating ‘correct’ values and one-sided perceptions of national identity” (Aneta Vilagi in her chapter on the Visegrad states), the social sciences and political science in particular were targeted. Criticizing democratic deficiencies or specific government policies was denounced as—in the words of Hungary’s innovation minister— “being politically active, which is not their task.” By combining institutional reshuffling with “discursive strategies, educational and research policies, financial incentives or constraints” (Vilagi), the discipline’s critical capacity was systematically undermined. Belarus—in contrast to the

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four Visegrad states an out-and-out dictatorship through Presidential fiat —had by 2003 introduced an official state ideology, the main components of which included the need for a strong leader, a socially oriented economy and Orthodox Catholic tenets (Bekus, 2008: 273). This split the country’s political science community. In her chapter, Tatsiana Chulitskaya explains how “official” (state-directed) political science education was reduced and its research capacity cut, whereas “alternative” political science sought to forge an intellectually independent space beyond the reach of the state. Although this latter strand of the discipline emphasized its criticality and independence, it was at the same time highly dependent on funding by Western foundations and organizations. In both cases, the ‘official’ and ‘alternative’ camps of political science, researchers remain highly dependent on state structures and therefore innately politicized. Indeed, this volume’s analyses forcefully demonstrate that accountability structures can be placed on a sliding-scale of politicization that ranges from high levels of intellectual autonomy and discovery-focused research through to intermediary positions where scholars operate in the shadow of the state but enjoy an arm’s-length relationship, to situations in which state-directed funding restricts critical thinking and the contestation of ideas. To borrow a term from Boda’s and Szúcs’ chapter on Hungary, accountability for public research funding can in some situations perform the role of a “Trojan horse” whose coercive component demands academic compliance.

Policymakers and Political Scientists: The Race Towards Public Relevance The past two decades have seen what might be termed a “race toward public relevance” between political scientists on the one and policymakers on the other hand, symbolized by two 2014 quotes. The first by British Academy President Adam Roberts emphasized the need to “speak relevantly in a way that the public, not just the government, can understand” (Roberts, 2014). The second, from the United Kingdom’s Research Excellence Framework, undertaken by the Higher Education Funding Council for England, focused on “social and economic benefits arising from public engagement activity” (REF, 2014). The way things developed reminds the observer of the fabled race between the hare and the hedgehog, with governments in the role of the hedgehog, always

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calling out: “I’m already here”, while political scientists find themselves playing the part of the hare, continuing to run for tangible results in debates about the “if’s”, “but’s” and “how’s” of lessening the discipline’s disconnect with the larger public. The result has been, as we have attempted to illustrate in several countries, a clear drift towards a particularly narrow form of politically defined relevance that has, in turn, led to a gradual shortening of the ‘arm’ in traditional ‘arm’s-length research funding relationships’. As this volume’s chapters reveal, the selection and eligibility rationale is overwhelmingly economic. From the United Kingdom to Australia and from Hungary to Qatar, the increasing shadow state is the common thread that binds the contributions in this volume together. If anything, Qatar represents the end of the line when it comes to disciplines, including the social sciences, fulfilling relevance criteria for research that have been politically set. As Leslie Pal notes in his chapter: The objective is unambiguously to be relevant, entrepreneurial, modernizing, and global. There is no hidden agenda – it’s perfectly obvious and deliberate. And the social sciences are expected to be part of the national project of modernization, economic as well as cultural and social.

Pal adds that such modernization is propelled “to some careful extent”. After all, Qatar qualifies as an authoritarian regime on the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 2019, scoring a mere 3.19 out of 10 possible points, occupying position 128 among 167 countries. Due to exclusive political control over academic knowledge production as an instrument for achieving competitive economic advantages, Qatar should be considered a prime example of those “competition states” (Cerny) which were referred to above. “Modernization” policies have not opened up any additional spaces for democracy—quite the contrary: In early 2019, the Doha Center for Media Freedom (opened in 2008) was arbitrarily closed without prior notice after a history of conflicts with Qatari authorities. The first (French) director resigned after six months of being appointed, and his (Dutch) successor was dismissed after two-anda-half years. Paulo Coelho and Lilli Gruber had, among others, served on the Center’s Board of governors, Graça Machel and Daniel Barenboim on its Advisory Council. The Gulf Center for Human Rights, financed by the philanthropic Swedish-British Sigrid Rausen Trust, commented that even before the Doha Center’s enforced closure the emirate had worked to

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turn it “into a state propaganda tool” (GHCR, 2019). On the legislative side, membership of the only chamber remotely resembling a parliament, the Consultative Assembly, remained limited to delegates appointed by the emir, although the 2003 constitution stipulates that two thirds of the 45 seats should be filled through elections every four years. For two decades, the emir has consistently postponed these elections (Freedom House, 2020). Pal’s analysis in his chapter on Qatar concludes with the assessment that there can be no doubt of co-optation in the sense of ‘harnessing’ and trying to shape research agendas. It’s undisguised, unapologetic, and intentional. Whether that trans-lates into the suppression of certain research avenues scholars might want to pursue, is another question.

Should such politically selected relevance and politically controlled funding eligibility be expected to promote research excellence? A series of interviews with 32 Australian academics from five disciplines (biochemistry, geology, history, mathematics, political science) and 21 university managers, whose results were reported in the third chapter, sounds a note of caution. The pressure emanating from the country’s grant funding system was perceived as “strong” and, moreover, “the most significant influence” forcing academics to adapt research strategies. “As a result of this adaptation”, Gläser and Laudel (2007: 134–135, 147) argued, "“their research is becoming less diverse, less fundamental and less reliable.” The British historical geographer David Demeritt, also quoted in the above chapter, arrived at a rather similar conclusion for the United Kingdom. In other words, only rarely may excellence spring from deference.

On the Way to Launching a New Politics of Political Science? Such “evaluation of evaluations” takes us back to what we earlier compared to the fable of the race between the hare (political scientists) and the hedgehog (policymakers)—the “race toward public relevance” which the former so far have been losing against the latter. As highlighted above, mere critiques of prevailing relevance regimes had no

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lasting results. This volume’s chapters also showed that prospects for humanities and social sciences are decidedly gloomier than for STEM disciplines. We have reached a point where it should be apparent that a new politics of political science is urgently required. As a start, a procedure needs to be developed for globally agreeing on a well-reasoned catalog of highly relevant large issues—issues, that is, which should move to the fore of the discipline, in order not only to prove that what political scientists do does matter but also to help the discipline play a more visible and ambitious role, taking control of and proactively shaping the impact agenda. A focused and concerted effort to address a limited number of global challenges might foster new initiatives for international cooperation and collegiality. The approach might also facilitate fresh in-depth empirical research, followed by new broadly accessible narratives and ways of public engagement. In our introduction to this book, we referred to recent examples of political scientists arguing in favor of a more publicly engaged and publicly relevant venture. We additionally listed examples of major issues which such a discipline might wish to tackle through combining empirical rigor with normative counsel. How to advance from there to the next stage, from individual appeals to a more collective endeavor? The effort evidently involves both substance and process. No less evidently, it needs to be publicly visible. Regarding process, we suggest a concerted two-year drive, led by the International Political Science Association. In substance, the drive would involve bottom-up inputs, invited by national political science associations, aimed at establishing a priority catalog of those pressing issue areas judged overridingly relevant to local, national and global publics. Scheduling the operation to happen between two IPSA World Congresses, the IPSA Council might elect a Special Committee of between ten and fifteen men and women from North and South, East and West (quoting IPSA’s Mission Statement). Every candidate would need to be supported by three of IPSA’s national member associations from at least two continents. The Committee would issue an invitation to each of IPSA’s sixty member associations, providing them with a selection of relevant materials consisting of APSA Task Force Reports and similar studies. Moreover, the Committee might prepare an inaugural World Congress Special Session, scheduling a number of lectures addressing the issues involved. To

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proceed from process to substance, every participating association would, during a maximum period of—say—nine months, canvass its members’ assessments by flexible methods depending on the size of country and association, including research sections/sub-groups which it may have generated. Subsequently, a catalog of well-reasoned results would be drawn up. From these reports, IPSA’s Special Committee would prepare and publicize a combined two-part synopsis and recommendation for a resolution. The first part would summarize the national associations’ submissions, identifying particular issues favored by majorities, prevalent substantiations, possible problems discussed. From the synopsis, the second part would distil a proposal for a resolution by the IPSA Executive Committee, whose final text would henceforth serve as IPSA’s and the participating national associations’ “Relevance Statement”. It would be globally distributed by the organizations to their members, to ministries, foundations and other funding agencies, to university managers, political science departments and professional journals. And it might provide the Main Theme for the subsequent IPSA World Congress. The Relevance Statement would—and could—of course, as already made clear, not transcend the character of a top-priority recommendation. Yet it would hold the authority of a duly substantiated list of issues originating in a worldwide process of scholarly engagement—a list selected for its weight in terms of scientific substance, societal impact and accountability to citizens. Two caveats are in order. First: There is no special international meeting involved as part of the process. The international sessions would be included in World Congresses. Yet, the project requires funding, particularly on national levels. And the COVID-19 pandemic has certainly strained the financial resources of many associations. So realizing the proposal may not be feasible in the immediate future. But substantial planning would be required anyhow, and COVID-19 should be no excuse for not getting started. Second: Even the Relevance Statement’s problem-oriented agenda would not “automatically” include, let alone “solve”, issues of normative judgments and public engagement. Gerry Stoker, for one, suggested what he labeled a “design approach” as implying a step beyond problemorientation: A solution-seeking political science with “designing politics as its intellectual focus” would need to merge normative considerations

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with empirical arguments (Stoker, 2013: 174, 176–177, 178). Further debates, further disputes within and beyond the discipline will be necessary if such avenues of evaluation and communication are to be explored in earnest. Nevertheless, a Relevance Statement, identifying scholarly selected core themes around which a major part of the discipline’s research should henceforth crystallize, would signify a first step of vast importance—not least for the arduous task of confronting government relevance regimes and agendas of impact. It would, in fact, signal a limit to compliance and deference. The tragedy of political science—to paraphrase David Ricci (1984)—has always been that processes of professionalization have too often come at the cost of public engagement. A new Relevance Statement, underpinned with cutting-edge but accessible scholarship, could help turn tragedy into triumph. This is an opportunity for the discipline, and it is worth remembering that political science owed the very establishment of its international professional association to the initiative and support of UNESCO in 1949. If that discipline almost exactly seventy years later has not matured to the point when it is capable of mounting a major worldwide initiative to define a new politics of political science through determining its own research priorities vis-à-vis citizens, societies and, indeed, governments as part of a wider commitment to mending democracy—that would really be a final tragedy.

References Agh, A. (2016). Cultural war and reinventing the past in Poland and Hungary. Polish Political Science Yearbook, 45, 32–44. Australian Government—Ministerial Research Policy Statement. (1999). Knowledge and innovation. https://vital.voced.edu.au/vital/access/services/Dow nload/ngv:41605/SOURCE3?view=true. Accessed November 26, 2020. Bekus, N. (2008). European Belarus vs. state ideology: Construction of the nation in the Belarusian political discourses. Polish Sociological Review, 163, 263–283. Cerny, P. G. (1999). Globalization and the erosion of democracy. European Journal of Political Research, 36, 1–26. Freedom House. (2020). Freedom in the world 2020: Qatar. https://freedomho use.org/country/qatar/freedom-world/2020. Accessed November 27, 2020.

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GCHR (Gulf Centre for Human Rights, 2019). Qatar: Authorities arbitrarily close Doha centre for media freedom. https://www.gc4hr.org/news/view/ 2127. Accessed November 27, 2020. Gläser, J., & Laudel, G. (2007). Evaluation without evaluators: The impact of funding formulae on Australian university research. In R. Whitley & J. Gläser (Eds.), The changing governance of the sciences: The advent of research evaluation systems (pp. 127–151). Springer. Halsey, A. H. (1992). Decline of Donnish dominion: The British academic professions in the twentieth century. Oxford University Press. Higher Education White Paper. (1987). Higher education: Meeting the challenge, Cm 114 (April). Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. Hungary Today. (2019). Summary: What is the restructuring of the academy all about? https://hungarytoday.hu/academy-sciences-restructuring/. Accessed November 26, 2020. Qatar. (2018). Qatar second national development strategy 2018–2022. https:// www.psa.gov.qa/en/knowledge/Documents/NDS2Final.pdf. Accessed November 27, 2020. REF. (2014). Research excellence framework impact pilot exercise. https:// www.ref.ac.uk/2014/pubs/refimpactpilotexercisefindingsoftheexpertpanels/. Accessed November 27, 2020. Ricci, D. (1984). The tragedy of Political science. Yale University Press. Roberts, A. (2014). Interview. British Academy Review, 23, 62–66. https://the britishacademy.ac.uk/sites/default/files/BAR23--12-Roberts.pdf. Accessed January 26, 2020. Slaughter, S., & Leslie, L. L. (1997). Academic capitalism: Politics, policies and the entrepreneurial university. John Hopkins University Press. Sliwa, M. (2012). The horizons of Polish political thought. Polish Political Science Yearbook, 41, 9–21. Stoker, G. (2013). Designing politics: A neglected justification for political science. Political Studies Review, 11, 174–181. Watermeyer, R. (2019). Competitive accountability in academic life. Edward Elgar. Weingart, P., & Maasen, S. (2007). Elite through rankings—The emergence of the enterprising university. In R. Whitley & J. Gläser (Eds.), The changing governance of the sciences (pp. 75–99). Springer. Whitley, R. (2007). Changing governance of the public sciences. In R. Whitley & J. Gläser (Eds.), The changing governance of the sciences (pp. 3–27). Springer.

Correction to: From Deference and the Politicization of Research Funding to a New Politics of Political Science Rainer Eisfeld and Matthew Flinders

Correction to: Chapter 12 in: R. Eisfeld and M. Flinders (eds.), Political Science in the Shadow of the State, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75918-6_12 The original version of this chapter was inadvertently published with a missing paragraph and the same has been included below: When we started to envisage the present project by building an international team of authors and drafting our introductory texts, little did we foresee the extent to which a volume on university research and authority over academic knowledge production would evolve into a study of democratic erosion in the early twenty-first century. Under the guise of modernization and the vaunted promotion of efficiency, the artful hand of the state has grasped for the governance of publicly funded research agendas, the lifeblood of universities and in so doing has increasingly restricted or redefined the scope of intellectual autonomy. Intellectual

The original version of this chapter can be found at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75918-6_12

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021, corrected publication 2021 R. Eisfeld and M. Flinders (eds.), Political Science in the Shadow of the State, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75918-6_13

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freedom and the capacity without restraint (except the constraints of logic and falsification) in the sphere of ideas and through this to “speak truth unto power” is not just the lifeblood of universities, but also of democracies. The paradox we have attempted to bring to the fore is therefore the manner in which neoliberalism has furthered il liberalism. The result is a dangerous fraying at the borderline between democracy and authoritarianism.

Index

A Accountability, 4, 23, 40, 67, 69–72, 76, 79, 81, 100, 216, 217, 324, 325, 331–333, 337 Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR), 157–163, 173 Ágh, Attila, 250 Alpert, Harry, 102, 103 American National Election Studies (ANES), 107, 110, 111 American Political Science Association (APSA), 26, 27, 66, 68, 102, 108, 110, 112–114, 240, 336 Aron, Raymond, 154 Australian Research Council (ARC), 77, 122, 124, 125, 127–130, 135, 326 B Barents, Jan, 182 Behavioralism, 103, 182 Birmingham, Simon John, 129, 130, 133 Bourdieu, Pierre, 154

Brintnall, Michael, 107, 118 Bunche, Ralph, 112 Bush, Vannevar, 96–99

C Central European University (CEU), 79, 212, 224, 226, 227, 240, 241 Cerny, Philip G., 72, 327, 334 Chapsal, Jacques, 154 Chomsky, Noam, 3, 20–25, 27 Coburn, Tom, 107 COVID-19, 12, 111, 121, 128, 337 Crick, Bernard, 26, 28 Culture war, 129, 137, 228, 328, 329

D Dawkins, John, 120, 123, 125, 126 Deference, 6, 11, 13, 16, 21, 25, 86, 157, 325, 330, 335, 338 Direct democracy, 146, 163, 169, 171, 172 Doha Center for Media Freedom, 334

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Eisfeld and M. Flinders (eds.), Political Science in the Shadow of the State, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75918-6

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342

INDEX

Duverger, Maurice, 154

E Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA), 148, 149 Edgerton, David, 40, 83, 84 Excellence in Research Australia (ERA), 126, 131–136

F Fuchs, Alain, 145, 165

G Goodnow, Frank J., 102 Grands corps , 149

H Haldane Principle, 81–84 Hart, Thomas C., 106 Haworth, Leland J., 104 Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE), 73, 75, 76, 84, 333 Howard, John, 129, 131 Humboldt, Wilhelm von, 19 Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS), 79, 204, 205, 212, 217, 219, 220, 222, 223, 237, 241, 330 Hybrid regimes, 4, 83, 332

I Illiberalism, 29, 203–205, 208, 216, 228, 229, 232, 252, 326, 329 Impact, 1, 24, 35–38, 40–42, 45–51, 54, 56–58, 133 Intellectuals policy-orientated, 21–23, 25, 27

value-orientated, 20–23, 25, 27, 28 International Political Science Association (IPSA), 240, 336, 337

J Jackson, Jesse L., 111

K Kaczynski, ´ Jarosław, 232 Kaempffeert, Waldemar, 96, 97 Kilgore, Harley M., 96–99 Körösényi, András, 208, 250, 251

L Leca, Jean, 151, 154 Lindblom, Charles E., 71 Lukashenka, Alexander, 263, 264, 270, 283

M Macron, Emmanuel, 152, 170 Magnuson, Warren G., 98, 99 Marketization, 38, 324 Mayer, Henry, 123, 153, 154, 156 McCarthyism, 116, 325, 331 McGuinness, Padraic, 128, 129 #MeTooPoliSci Collective, 113, 114 Metrics, 2, 69, 72, 73, 331 Miller, Warren E., 106, 110 Minsk Dialogue, 261, 262, 272, 280, 282, 283 Morrison, Scott, 127, 130, 136

N National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS), France, 145, 150, 156, 157, 162, 165

INDEX

National Interest Test (NIT), Australia, 77, 78, 81, 130, 326 National Research Council (NWO), Netherlands, 183–187, 189, 190, 196, 197, 199, 200 National Science Agenda (Netherlands), 185, 189, 329 Nelson, Brendan, 128, 129 Neo-liberalism, 2, 4, 58, 59 Newman, Henry (Cardinal), 13, 16–18, 22, 28 New Public Research (NPR), 36–40, 42, 43, 56, 58, 332

O Orbán, Viktor, 79, 81, 203, 205, 206, 208, 209, 216, 220, 223–229, 232, 241, 251, 330 Ostrom, Elinor, 26, 66

P “Perestroika” Initiative, 27, 28, 261, 262 Perrineau, Pascal, 171 Philippe, Edouard, 170 Piketty, Thomas, 154 Proxmire, William, 108 “Pub test” (Australia), 129, 130, 138, 331 Putnam, Robert, 27, 66 Pyne, Christopher, 133

R Relevance entrepreneurial, 181, 197, 198, 200, 328 politically selected, 70, 78, 324, 335 scholarly selected, 82

343

state-directed, 6, 7, 12–14, 20, 25, 26, 29, 30, 181, 184, 198, 199, 232, 251, 252, 331 Relevance Statement, 337, 338 Research Excellence Framework (REF), UK, 45, 49, 51, 54, 59, 73–76, 333 Roberts, Adam, 68, 81, 333 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 97, 98 Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 154 Royal, Ségolène, 170 Rudd, Kevin, 132 S Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics (STEM), 40, 48, 82, 115, 206, 232, 238, 249, 273, 336 Social Science Research Council (SSRC), U.S., 99, 101, 103, 110, 115 Soros, George, 79, 212, 227 Sperber, Dan, 154 Stoker, Gerry, 28, 337, 338 T Tehan, Dan, 121, 128, 130, 135, 137 Terrorism, 66, 86, 146, 162–169 Think tanks, 127, 150, 170, 191, 192, 197, 212, 218, 224, 258, 259, 261, 267–273, 278–285, 318 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 154 Truman, Harry S., 97, 99, 109 Trust, 8, 71, 72, 74, 86, 174, 185, 191, 283, 317 Turnbull, Malcolm, 129, 133, 136 U United Kingdom Research and Innovation (UKRI), 11, 84

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INDEX

V Valls, Manuel, 164, 166, 168 Valorization, 47, 160, 193–197, 199, 200

WRR Scientific Council for Government Policy, Netherlands, 191

W Weber, Max, 154, 180, 216

Y Yellow vests, 146, 169–173