Political Representation in Southern Europe and Latin America: Before and After the Great Recession and the Commodity Crisis 9780367022945, 9780429400414

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Political Representation in Southern Europe and Latin America

This collective volume – with contributions from experts on these regions – examines broader questions about the current crises (the Great Recession and the Commodity Crisis) and the associated changes in political representation in both regions. It provides a general overview of political representation studies in Southern Europe and Latin America and builds bridges between the two traditions of political representation studies, affording greater understanding of developments in each region and promoting future research collaboration between Southern Europe and Latin America. Finally, the book addresses questions of continuity and change in patterns of political representation after the onset of the two economic crises, specifically examining such issues as changes in citizens’ democratic support and trust in political representatives and institutions, in-descriptive representation (in the socio-demographic profile of MPs) and in-substantive representation (in the link between voters and MPs in terms of ideological congruence and/or policy/issue orientations). This book will be of key interest to scholars and students of political elites, political representation, European and Latin American politics/studies, and more broadly to comparative politics. André Freire is Full Professor at Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL), Lisboa, Portugal and researcher at Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL), Centro de Investigação e Estudos de Sociologia, Lisboa, Portugal. Mélany Barragán is Researcher at the University of Salamanca, Spain. Xavier Coller is Full Professor at Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED), Madrid, Spain. Marco Lisi is Associate Professor at Nova University Lisbon, FCSH-UNL, and Researcher at Portuguese Institute for International Relations (IPRI-NOVA), Portugal. Emmanouil Tsatsanis is Senior Researcher at Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL), Centro de Investigação e Estudos de Sociologia, Lisboa, Portugal, and Invited Assistant Professor at Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL), Lisboa, Portugal.

Routledge Research on Social and Political Elites Series Editors: Keith Dowding and Patrick Dumont, Australian National University, Australia.

Who are the elites that run the world? This series of books analyses who the elites are, how they rise and fall, the networks in which they operate and the effects they have on our lives. Government Formation and Minister Turnover in Presidential Cabinets Comparative Analysis in the Americas Edited by Marcelo Camerlo and Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo The Selection of Politicians in Times of Crisis Edited by Xavier Coller, Guillermo Cordero, and Antonio M. Jaime-Castillo National Political Elites, European Integration and the Eurozone Crisis Edited by Nicolò Conti, Borbála Göncz and José Real-Dato Semi-presidentialism, Parliamentarism and Presidents Presidential Politics in Central Europe Miloš Brunclík and Michal Kubát The Contested Status of Political Elites At the Crossroads Edited by Lars Vogel, Ronald Gebauer and Axel Salheiser The Technocratic Challenge to Democracy Edited by Eri Bertsou and Daniele Caramani Political Representation in Southern Europe and Latin America Before and After the Great Recession and the Commodity Crisis Edited by André Freire, Mélany Barragán, Xavier Coller, Marco Lisi and Emmanouil Tsatsanis For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge. com/Routledge-Research-on-Social-and-Political-Elites/book-series/RRSPE

Political Representation in Southern Europe and Latin America Before and After the Great Recession and the Commodity Crisis Edited by André Freire, Mélany Barragán, Xavier Coller, Marco Lisi and Emmanouil Tsatsanis

First published 2020 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 selection and editorial matter, André Freire, Mélany Barragán, Xavier Coller, Marco Lisi and Emmanouil Tsatsanis; individual chapters, the contributors The right of André Freire, Mélany Barragán, Xavier Coller, Marco Lisi and Emmanouil Tsatsanis to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-0-367-02294-5 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-40041-4 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Taylor & Francis Books

Contents

List of figures List of tables List of contributors Acknowledgements Introduction: The Impact of the Great Recession and the Commodity Crisis upon Political Representation in Southern Europe and Latin America

vii ix xi xvii

1

ANDRÉ FREIRE, MÉLANY BARRAGÁN, XAVIER COLLER, MARCO LISI AND EMMANOUIL TSATSANIS

PART I

Southern Europe 1 Southern Europe and the Eurozone Crisis: Political Representation, Party System Characteristics and the Impact of Austerity

15

17

MARCO LISI AND EMMANOUIL TSATSANIS

2 The Study of Political Representation in Greece: Towards New Patterns Following the Economic Crisis?

34

EFTICHIA TEPEROGLOU, IOANNIS ANDREADIS AND THEODORE CHADJIPADELIS

3 Representation in the Italian Parliament

50

FEDERICO RUSSO AND LUCA VERZICHELLI

4 Political Representation in Portugal Before and After the Great Recession: Legitimation and Ideological Linkages Between Voters and Their Representatives ANDRÉ FREIRE, MARCO LISI AND EMMANOUIL TSATSANIS

66

vi

Contents

5 It Is Not Just the Economy: How Spanish Established Political Elites Understand the (Political) Crisis and Its Effects

85

XAVIER COLLER, MANUEL JIMÉNEZ-SÁNCHEZ AND MANUEL PORTILLOPÉREZ

6 The Social Profile of Spanish Elites Following the Great Recession

102

MANUEL PORTILLO-PÉREZ AND PABLO DOMÍNGUEZ

7 Methodological Challenges in the Study of Political Elites: Some Reflections from Southern Europe

120

ANDRÉ FREIRE, XAVIER COLLER, IOANNIS ANDREADIS, ANTONIO M. JAIME, SOFIA SERRA-SILVA AND EVANGELIA KARTSOUNIDOU

PART II

Latin America 8 Latin American Politics Before and Beyond the Commodity Crisis: Representation, Institutional Design and Political Cycles

137 139

MÉLANY BARRAGÁN AND MANUEL ALCÁNTARA

9 Venezuela: Changes and Continuities in the Post-Chávez Era

165

JUAN MANUEL TRAK

10 Political Representation Studies in Ecuador: Links between Elites and Voters

186

CRISTINA RIVAS, JOSÉ MANUEL RIVAS AND ALEXANDRA JIMA-GONZÁLEZ

11 Political Representation in Chile: Electoral Institutions, Elites and Voters

207

PETER M. SIAVELIS

12 Latin American Parliamentary Elites: A Methodological Approach

226

MÉLANY BARRAGÁN, CRISTINA RIVAS AND JOSÉ MANUEL RIVAS

Conclusions

244

MARCO LISI, EMMANOUIL TSATSANIS, XAVIER COLLER, ANDRÉ FREIRE AND MÉLANY BARRAGÁN

Index

254

Figures

1.1 2.1 3.1 3.2 3.3 4.1 4.2

4.3

5.1 5.2 6.1 6.2 8.1

8.2 8.3 8.4 9.1 9.2

Macro-economic indicators, Southern Europe 2000–18 Trust in political institutions in Greece (1999–2016) Citizen trust in the Italian parliament (2000–18) Occupational background of the Italian MPs: Chamber of deputies (1992–2018) Switching between PPGs, 1983–2018 Portuguese voter political trust, engagement and satisfaction with democracy, 2000–16 Voters’ and MPs’ positions on the economic left–right index of value orientations by party, 2008 to 2016–17 (5 – economic right; 1 – economic left) Congruence between MPs and voters in economic left–right value orientations, taking into account the heterogeneity among voters (‘centrism’) in 2008, 2012 and 2016 Trust in national parliaments in European countries, before and after the Great Recession Explanations of the erosion of the representative link Experience (number of legislatures) and renewal rate by legislature (%) Percentage of women (bars), university graduates, natives and age (male and female average) by legislature Simultaneous legislative and executive elections in Latin America (%) and the ‘carry-over effect’ of simultaneous elections (1978–2018) Non-response in party’s ideological position by deputies and citizens (%) Electoral participation before and after crisis: 1978–2018 (average) GINI index Effective number of parliamentary parties and parliamentary volatility in Venezuela 1958–2015 Mean ideological position of parties in parliament in 1993, 2000 and 2015

24 37 55 57 59 72

77

78 86 98 105 106

142 145 150 155 171 176

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List of figures

9.3

Ideological self-placement of party members at the National Assembly and voters, 2000–15 Ideological congruence of party coalitions in the National Assembly 2000–15 GDP Growth (annual %) in Ecuador (1979–17) Inflation, consumer prices (% annual) in Ecuador (1979–17) Assembly representatives’ satisfaction with democracy (2007–17) Ecuadorian citizens’ satisfaction with democracy (2008–16) Assembly representatives’ trust in political institutions (2007–17) Ecuadorian citizens’ trust in political institutions (2008–16) Ideological proximity and centrism in Ecuador (2007–17) Programmatic proximity and centrism in Ecuador (2007–17) State vs. private ownership of major firms Programmatic proximity and centrism in Ecuador (2007–17) Role of the state in reducing inequalities Chileans’ confidence in institutions. Percentage expressing ‘some’ or ‘a lot’ of confidence Evolution of support for political parties in Chile. Percentage identifying with a particular party Ideological self-placement: MPs and citizens Factors influencing poverty for MPs and citizens Elites and masses on the state. Percentage in agreement Academic production by researchers from the project since 2010

9.4 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.8 10.9 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 12.1

178 180 189 189 192 192 193 193 197 199 200 211 212 216 218 219 238

Tables

1.1 1.2 1.3 2.1 3.1 3.2 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 6.1 6.2

6.3 6.4 7.1 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7

Electoral system: Legislative (lower house) Effective number of parliamentary parties and volatility in Southern Europe (1974–2019) Turnout in Southern Europe (1974–2019) Descriptive representation in Greece (2004–19) (%) Indicators of descriptive representation: Italian chamber of deputies (1992–2018) Mean left–right self-positioning of voters and MPs/candidates within major Italian parties before and after the crisis Portuguese MP and candidate surveys Evolution of the profile of MPs in Portugal, 2005–15 (%) Battery of issues named economic left–right values (economic left–right index), 2008 and 2012–13 Issues for economic left–right index (2016) Social profile of MPs of new Spanish parties in the 11th (2015) and 13th (2019) legislatures (in percentages, except for age) The social profile of MPs of traditional Spanish parties in the 9th (2008) and 13th (2019) legislatures (in percentages, except for age) Index of social disproportion in the 9th (2008) and 13th legislatures (2019) (except age, that is a difference of means) Index of Social Bias for professions in the 9th (2008) and 13th (2019) legislatures Pros and cons of different methods of surveying Electoral system: Legislative (lower house) Effective number of parliamentary parties (1978–2016) Political parties’ position and citizens’ self-positioning on the left–right axis Party system polarisation by country (1991–2016) Electoral volatility Recent political and economic cycles in Latin America (1980– 2018) Left turn in Latin America

21 26 29 42 57 61 67 70 75 76 108

110 112 113 128 141 144 147 149 151 156 158

x

List of tables

A8.1 Party acronyms and full names 9.1 Number and percentage of seat and parties in the National Assembly (1993–2015) 10.1 Poverty gap at $5.50 (%) and GINI Index in Ecuador (1987–2017) 10.2 Ideological proximity and centrism indicators 12.1 Percentage of interviews in each country 12.2 Central points of analysis and main variables 12.3 Example of modifications to question and/or answer categories to improve data validity and reliability

159 174 190 198 229 231 234

Contributors

André Freire Full Professor, Head of the Doctoral Programme in Political Science at Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL), Lisboa, Portugal, and senior researcher at Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL), Centro de Investigação e Estudos de Sociologia, Lisboa, Portugal. In terms of international research networks, he has been participating in several, both as researcher and as coordinator. And he has directed many research projects in Portugal, namely, about electoral behaviour, and political attitudes, political reforms and political representation. For more information: http://er.cies.iscte-iul.pt/ He has published several books, book chapters and articles about left– right ideology, electoral behaviour, political attitudes, political institutions, political elites and political representation. Freire has acted as external scientific expert for several Portuguese and European institutions. Mélany Barragán She holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Salamanca. She also serves as researcher on the Parliamentary Elites in Latin America Surveys project. She focuses her research on elites and political careers, comparative politics and methodology. She has conducted fieldwork in El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Uruguay. She has been Visiting Scholar at several universities in Latin America, Europe and the US. Currently, she is working on political careers in federal systems and Latin American former presidents. Contact: [email protected] Xavier Coller Professor of Political Science at the Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, PhD in Sociology (Yale University). He has taught in several universities in Europe and the US and has been visiting fellow at Warwick University (UK), University of California (Berkeley), Yale, Harvard, Princeton, Georgetown (Seventh Prince of Asturias Chair 2005–7), Université de Montpellier 1 and LUISS. He has written more than 100 works on social theories, research methods, collective identities, political elites and complex organizations. His latest books are Political Power in Spain, The Selection of Politicians in Times of Crisis and Democratizing Candidates Selection. For more information: https://upo.academia.edu/xavierColler

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List of contributors

Marco Lisi Associate Professor in the Department of Political Studies, Nova University Lisbon and researcher at the Portuguese Institute for International relations (IPRI-NOVA). His research interests focus on political parties, electoral behaviour, democratic theory, political representation and election campaigns. He has published several articles in national and international journals such as International Political Science Review, Comparative European Politics and Party Politics, among others. His latest books are Party Change, Recent Democracies and Portugal: Comparative Perspectives (Lexington, 2015) and Party System Change, the European Crisis and the State of Democracy (Routledge, 2019). Emmanouil Tsatsanis Researcher at Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTEIUL), Centro de Investigação e Estudos de Sociologia, Lisboa, Portugal. His research and teaching focus on topics in comparative politics, usually related to questions of electoral behaviour, public opinion, political representation and party systems and has published his work in edited volumes and peerreviewed journals such as West European Politics, Party Politics, International Political Science Review, South European Society and Politics, Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, among others. Together with André Freire and Marco Lisi, Emmanouil currently coordinates the research project ‘Crisis, Political Representation and Democratic Renewal: The Portuguese Case in the Southern European Context’ (2016–19) funded by the Portuguese Foundation for Research and Technology (FCT). Eftichia Teperoglou is Assistant Professor at the School of Political Sciences, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. She studied political sciences and history at Panteion University, Athens. Her main research interests are in the fields of political and electoral behaviour with a focus on European elections, comparative politics and public opinion. She is one of the founders of the Hellenic (Greek) National Election Study (ELNES). She has published in international scholarly journals and in edited volumes. Her main publications include the monograph The Other ‘National’ Elections. Analysis of the Euro Elections in Greece 1981–2014 (Papazisis, Athens, 2016) as well as editing (with Hermann Schmitt) the collective work The 2014 European Parliament Elections in Southern Europe: Still Second-Order or Critical Contests?, South European Society and Politics series (Routledge, London, 2018). Ioannis Andreadis Associate Professor at the School of Political Science, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. He is a collaborator of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Modules 3, 4 and 5 and a member of the steering committee of the Comparative Candidates Survey. He serves as co-leader of the ‘Parliamentary Elite Surveys’ in Team Populism. He is an expert on survey data cleaning using item response times and web-survey paradata. He has been Fulbright Scholar at the University of Michigan and Fellow of the Electoral Integrity Project (Harvard University and the University of Sydney).

List of contributors

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Theodore Chadjipadelis Professor of Applied Statistics at the School of Political Sciences, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki and Director of the Laboratory of Applied Political Research in the same school. His research interests cover the field of applied statistics and mainly refer to issues of experiment design, statistical research training, public opinion, political and electoral behaviour, electoral geography, election systems as well as urban and regional programming and development. He is one of the coordinators of the Greek Comparative Candidates Survey and one of the founders of the Hellenic (Greek) National Election Study (ELNES). He has published more than 100 scholarly studies about the abovementioned topics. Federico Russo Associate Professor at the Department of History, Society and Human Studies of the University of Salento. Previously he worked as postdoctoral fellow at the New University of Lisbon and at the University of Siena, where he earned a PhD in Comparative and European Politics. His main research interests concern parliaments, political representation and European integration. He is co-director of the Italian Team of the Comparative Agenda Project. Among its most recent publications are the book Gli Onorevoli (Il Mulino, 2013) and articles published in the Journal of European Integration, Parliamentary Affairs and the Journal of Legislative Studies. Luca Verzichelli Full Professor at the University of Siena ([email protected] ), Department of Social Political and Cognitive Sciences (CIRCaP), University of Siena. Rector’s Delegate for International Affairs. Projects: PROSEPS (http://proseps.sns.it/), Chair, WP 3 EUENGAGE (http://www.euengage.eu), Co-ordinator, WP 1 POLCrises@Europe (httip://www.polcrises.unimi.it/), Coordinator, Local Research Unit (University of Siena). Manuel Jiménez-Sánchez Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University Pablo de Olavide, Seville. His research interests focus on political participation and social movements. He has published the books El impacto político de los movimientos sociales. Un estudio de la protesta ambiental en España (2005, Madrid, CIS) and La normalización de la protesta: el caso de las manifestaciones en España (2011, Madrid, CIS). He has recently published articles in South European Society and Politics (2007, 2015), American Behavioral Scientist (2008), Revista Internacional de Sociología (2010, 2015), Journal of Civil Society (2016). Contact: [email protected] Manuel Portillo-Pérez PhD student in Social Sciences at the Universidad Pablo de Olavide (UPO), Seville, researching motivations of politicians in times of crisis. Master’s degree in Society, Administration and Politics, he specialises in political elites and their relations with society. During his career he has been awarded several scholarships, including a pre-doctoral ‘university staff training’ (FPU) scholarship for completing his PhD thesis. He is a member of the research group DASP (Grupo de Investigación

xiv List of contributors Democracia y Autonomías: Sociedad y Política (SEJ-499)) (UPO), within which he is working on several research projects, presenting the main findings in international congresses and publishing in academic journals and books. Contact: [email protected] Pablo Domínguez PhD student in the research project Ciudadanía y parlamentarios en tiempos de crisis y renovación: El caso comparado de España en el contexto del sur de Europa (CIUPARCRI). He studies the congruence and divergence between political elite and citizenship in the descriptive (how they are) and substantive (what they think and do) dimensions of political representation, for the Spanish case and a European comparative study. He has a double degree in Sociology and Political Science and Administration at the Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Seville, where he received the award for best academic record. He also holds the official title of ‘Master in Models and Areas of Research in Social Sciences’ at the University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU). Contact: [email protected] Antonio M. Jaime-Castillo Associate Professor of Sociology at the Universidad de Málaga. He has been Visiting Scholar at the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (University of Bergen), the Zentral Archiv (University of Cologne), and the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis (University of Indiana). His research interests include welfare attitudes, inequality, political sociology and quantitative methods of comparative research. His work has been published in such journals as the American Behavioral Scientist, European Sociological Review, Journal of European Social Policy, International Political Science Review, International Sociology, Social Indicators Research, Social Forces and Social Science Research, among others. Sofia Serra-Silva PhD student of Comparative Politics at Institute of Social Sciences (ICS – University of Lisbon), granted a Portuguese Foundation for Research and Technology (FCT) PhD fellowship. Before that she completed both a BA (2012) and MA (2014) in Political Science at Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL), Lisboa, Portugal. Since 2012 she has been working on several research projects in multiple research centres, such as the Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL), Centro de Investigação e Estudos de Sociologia, Lisboa, Portugal, the Observatory of the Quality of Democracy at ICS and also with such independent think thanks as the Institute of Public Policy, Lisbon, where she has been an Associate Researcher since 2016. Evangelia Kartsounidou PhD candidate at the School of Political Sciences at Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (AUTH), examining stances and attitudes of political elites using web-tools. In June 2011 she completed her undergraduate studies in the School of Political Science at AUTH, where two years later she also received her MA degree in Political Analysis. She participated in the 2015 Greek National Election Studies. She has attended several national and international conferences and workshops. Her

List of contributors

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research interests lie broadly in political behaviour, survey methodology, web-surveys and social media. Contact: [email protected] Manuel Alcántara Full Professor at the University of Salamanca and currently Director of La Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) Spain. His field research concerns ‘Parliamentary Elites in Latin America’, ‘Parliamentary Performance in Latin America’ and ‘Democracy and Elections in Latin America’. His most recent books include El oficio de político (Editorial Tecnos, 2012) and Sistemas políticos de América Latina (Tecnos, 2013, 4th edition) and, as editor, Procesos políticos y electorales en América Latina (2010–2013) (Eudeba, 2013) and Selección de candidatos y elaboración de programas en los partidos políticos latinoamericanos (Editorial Tirant lo Blanch, 2013). Juan Manuel Trak Currently an independent researcher, Juan Trak has been Research Coordinator in the Centre for Political Studies at the Catholic University Andrés Bello, Caracas, Venezuela. He is a sociologist at the Catholic University Andrés Bello, and has an MA in Political Science and a PhD in Contemporary Political Processes from the University of Salamanca (USAL). Faculty at the School of Social Sciences, School of Mass Media and School of Law at Universidade Católica Andrés Bello (UCAB). His research interests are political culture, elections and political representation, and democracy. Cristina Rivas She is a researcher at the Institute of Latin America, and has a PhD in Global Governance from the University of Salamanca and MA in Latin American Studies, University of Salamanca. She is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Latin American Studies Master’s programme at the University of Salamanca. Her research interests are parliamentary elites in Latin America, quality of democracy and ideological polarisation. She has participated in several international congresses, and published papers in scientific journals as well as book chapters. She has participated in the Parliamentary Elites in Latin America project (PELAUSAL) since 2000. José Manuel Rivas PhD in Global Governance and MA in Latin American Studies at the University of Salamanca and a Political Scientist and Jurist at the University of Granada. He has been a Researcher at the University of Salamanca and Professor at the National University of Colombia and the Pontifical Xavierian University, in Bogotá. Also, he was Visiting Scholar at Boston University. He has participated in several international congresses, and published papers in scientific journals as well as book chapters. He has participated in the Parliamentary Elites in Latin America project (PELA) since 2015. His research interests are political leadership, conflict resolution and political elites. His latest publication (with Adrián Tarín) is La clase trabajadora. ¿Sujeto de cambio en el siglo XXI? (Siglo XXI, 2018).

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Alexandra Jima-González PhD candidate in Global Governance at the University of Salamanca; MA in Public Administration (Social and Public Policy) from the London School of Economics and Political Science; and BA in International Relations from Tecnológico de Monterrey. Her research interests are collective action, social movements, international relations and public policy evaluation. She is a full-time researcher and lecturer at Yachay Tech University in Ecuador. Her last research publication (with Miguel Paradela-López) is ‘The indigenous movement in Ecuador: Resource access and Rafael Correa’s citizens revolution’, Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 44(1): 1–22 (2019). Peter M. Siavelis Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science International Affairs and Associate Director of the Latin American and Latino Studies Program at Wake Forest University, in Winston-Salem, NC, USA. Siavelis received his PhD in Government from Georgetown University in Washington, DC. Siavelis is an expert in electoral, legislative and presidential politics in Latin America (with a particular focus on Chile), and also specialises in Latino Immigration to the United States. Siavelis has been published widely, writing on topics including candidate selection, immigration and Latin American politics in numerous journal articles and book chapters including articles in Comparative Politics, Comparative Political Studies, Party Politics, Latin American Research Review and Latin American Politics and Society.

Acknowledgements

This book would not have been possible without the support of the Portuguese Science Foundation (FCT) Project, 2016–19, which André Freire is coordinating in Portugal (with Marco Lisi and Emmanouil Tsatsanis), titled ‘Crisis, Political Representation and Democratic Renewal: The Portuguese Case in the Southern European Context’, PTDC/IVC-CPO/3098/2014, also online at er.cies.iscte-iul.pt/. Part of Freire’s work for this book was completed during his sabbatical leave at the University of Salamanca, from April to May and September to October 2019, which was also funded by FCT under the grant reference SFRH/BSAB/143105/2018. Freire would also like to thank his many colleagues in Salamanca (Manuel Alcántara Sáez, Ángela Suarez Collado, Fátima Maria García Díez, Mélany Barragán Manjón, Kerman Calvo Borobia, Alberto Penadés, Maria Mercedes, Garcia Montero, Asbel Bohigues, Carolina Plaza Colodro, Cristina Rivas and Ajo Diz) for their warm hospitality and for the stimulating intellectual environment. We would also like to thank the Spanish research project in which all the editors of this book are involved, titled ‘Ciudadanía y Parlamentarios en Tiempos de Crisis y Renovación: El Caso Comparado de España en el Contexto del Sur de Europe’ (CSO2016–78016-R), coordinated by Xavier Coller, of the Universidad Pablo de Olavide and UNED – Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED) online at dasp.wwb.cc/es/project/ciudadania-y-parlamentarios-em-tiempos-de-crisis-y-renovacion-el-caso-comparado-de-espana-em-el-contexto-del-sur-de-europa/ We would also like to acknowledge the support of other institutions and individuals in the projects mentioned above and for their assistance with the production of this book. First, we would like to thank all the authors who collaborated with us in this book, and the others who helped us organise a number of international conferences (APCP – Lisbon, Portugal, 2016; IPSA – Poland, 2016; FLACSO – USAL – Salamanca, Spain, 2017; ECPR, Hamburg, Germany, 2018). We would also like to thank our research assistant Augusta Correia and, last but not least, to express our gratitude to our institutions for their support: André Freire and Emmanouil Tsatsanis would like to thank the University Institute of Lisbon (ISCTE-IUL) and its Centre for Sociological Studies and Research (CIES-IUL) and Marco Lisi would like to thank the

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Nova University Lisbon (NOVA FCSH) and its Portuguese Institute for International Relations (IPRI-NOVA). Xavier Coller and Mélany Barragán would also like to thank the support of their respective institutions: the Universidad Pablo de Olavide and Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED), Universidade de Salamanca (USAL). Additionally, we would like to thank Stewart-Lloyd Jones for formal editing of the whole book, and English language revision of several chapters: the introduction, Chapter 4, 7, 9, and the conclusions. Last but not least, for their support in moving this book forward right from the beginning, the authors would like to thank Keith Dowding and Patrick Dumont, editors of the book series Routledge Research on Social and Political Elites, as well as all the Routledge staff for helping us with this edition of the book, and the two anonymous reviewers for their useful comments and criticisms.

Introduction The Impact of the Great Recession and the Commodity Crisis upon Political Representation in Southern Europe and Latin America André Freire, Mélany Barragán, Xavier Coller, Marco Lisi and Emmanouil Tsatsanis Up until the 1990s, comparative studies of Latin American and Southern European politics were commonplace in the subfield of comparative politics (Higley and Gunther 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996). Various factors made (and continue to make) these two regions obvious targets for comparative analysis: late political development, several simultaneous (or almost simultaneous) transitions to democracy during the third wave of democratisation, a conceptualisation of a similar positioning in the semi-periphery of the global economic system coupled with comparable levels of political and socio-economic development and deeper cultural ties and affinities (the mainly Catholic Christian culture). However, studies of the two regions in the last couple of decades have taken separate paths on almost every research question. The consolidation of democracy and the increasing Europeanisation of Southern Europe have led many scholars to assume these regions follow different trajectories in most ways, so their joint study became less commonplace. Nevertheless, questions about the distinctiveness of Southern Europe in the European context have come to the fore once again in the wake of the global economic crisis of 2007–8 – the Great Recession – and the resulting political developments (Roberts 2012, 2017). As a result, comparisons with Latin American countries that had been largely abandoned are now being revisited (Roberts 2017). Although Latin America was not immediately affected by the global recession and initially experienced a period of growth and prosperity, the commodity crisis in 2014 triggered a new economic cycle that directly affected politics. This is at the root of a possible right-wing turn and a new political order in Latin America. Including both comparative chapters and several case studies (from both Southern Europe and Latin America) this volume analyses the impact of severe crisis (the Great Recession in Southern Europe and the commodity crisis in Latin America) on political representation (both descriptive and substantive representation for Southern Europe, and substantive representation for Latin America) and citizen support (for the political system).1 We aim to disentangle commonalities and differences in the impact of severe crisis

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Freire, Barragán, Coller et al.

upon political representation and democratic support across the two regions. Additionally, methodological issues in the study of political representation are also analysed for the two regions. Following the banking collapse in the United States (2007–8), European states decided to intervene heavily in their economies to minimise the impact of the economic recession and to sustain growth through public investment. Although some countries already had very large public debts (Italy, Belgium, Greece), in others the ratio of public debt to gross domestic product (GDP) was fairly close to (Portugal) or below (Spain) the pre-crisis EU average. As a consequence, it was this response to the crisis that exaggerated whatever imbalances existed in the public finances and that led to the emergence of the sovereign debt crisis in Southern Europe (Blyth 2013: 51–96). Thus, the international financial crisis that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 caused economic growth to plummet and reminded financial institutions of the need to be more careful when assessing lending risks. In the years 2009–11, many countries were labelled high-risk investments, while demands for government bonds fell and interest rates rocketed. As a result, Ireland, Greece and Portugal were obliged to request loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Commission (EC) and the European Central Bank (ECB), which were granted, but on very stringent conditions. Italy and Spain, on the other hand, were described as countries at risk of contagion, with a bank bailout imposed in Spain (2012) and some terms imposed on Italy (Sacchi 2015). While all five countries introduced unpopular and far-reaching austerity measures, these measures were particularly demanding in the countries that received bailouts (Bosco and Verney 2012, 2016; Bermeo and Bartels 2014; Zamora and Coller 2014; Roux 2013; Magalhães 2014a, 2014b; Blyth 2013; Monastiriotis et al. 2013; Sacchi 2015; Freire, Lisi, Andreadis and Viegas 2016; Freire and Lisi 2016; Coller and Ramírez de Luis 2019). In the so-called post-neoliberalism era, i.e. at the beginning of the 21st century, Latin America entered a period of change at both the political and the economic level: the so-called left turn at the political level, and the commodity boom at the economic level. Most of the literature contends that the left-wing cycle begun with the election of Hugo Chávez as president of Venezuela in 1998 and ended with the impeachment of Brazil’s president Dilma Rousseff in 2015–16 (Carneiro and Traversa 2019; Montero, Selios and Marenghi 2019; Terán and Traversa 2019; see also Chapter 8 below by Barragán and Alcántara). In 2008, 11 out of 18 countries in Latin America were run by left-wing presidents. This left-wing cycle had several causes (Carneiro and Traversa 2019), but among them, and with crucial importance, was the crisis of neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus, and its contestation by left-wing parties, social movements and unions. The so-called neoliberal era in Latin America, during the late 1980s and 1990s, was associated mainly with austerity policies, often run by right-wing parties and imposed through the external intervention of international financial institutions, such as the IMF. Overall, it was intended to deal with the debt crisis in Latin America (in the

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late 1980s), but had negative consequences in terms of rising inequalities, unemployment and poverty, which were behind the mass and elite opposition to neoliberalism in the late 1990s and 2000s (Roberts 2012). The commodity boom was not only concurrent with the left-wing turn that opposed neoliberalism during the so-called post-neoliberal era in Latin America; it also helped consolidate the position of left-wing presidents by providing the resources and the favourable economic context for redistribution (Terán and Traversa 2019). However, with the decline of the price of raw materials (from around 2014–15), i.e. the so-called commodity crisis, many Latin American countries entered a new period of political change, if not instability, including those in which leftist populist regimes had managed to assume power on the back of popular discontent with the status quo and demands for political change in the preceding decade. Political turnover, impeachments, corruption scandals and social mobilisation are evidence of this new period of change (Alcántara, Buquet and Tagina 2018). Given recent discussions about a crisis of political representation in both regions,2 particularly following the Great Recession in Southern Europe and the commodity crisis in Latin America, we believe a collective volume, with contributions from academic experts on these regions, about the impact of severe economic crisis upon political representation might be of interest to a wider audience that wants to know more about their political trajectories and be informed on broader questions about the current crisis and the future of political representation. There are several reasons that can be advanced to justify a comparison between Southern Europe and Latin America, in particular their late political and economic development, their more or less long 20th-century authoritarian heritage, their entry in the global third wave of democratisation (Linz and Stepan 1996) and the role of elites in democratic transition and consolidation (Higley and Gunther 1991). However, to study the impact of severe financial and economic crisis upon political representation, perhaps the contributions by Kenneth Roberts (2012, 2014, 2017) are most appropriate. Examining the experiences during the neoliberal era in Latin America, Roberts (2017) argues that there are lessons (in terms of the type of crisis and the ways the political elites dealt with them) to be learned (for Southern Europe) from the severe crisis in Latin America, with external interventions by international financial institutions (especially the IMF) and the domestic political parties being obliged to introduce externally imposed austerity and market-oriented policies that sometimes ran counter to their programmatic orientations, especially so with parties on the left. Thus, there are lessons to be learned for the political impact of the crisis in (Southern) Europe following the Great Recession and the debt crisis, where we also found severe economic and financial crises, external interventions by the troika (IMF, ECB and EC)’3 and the fact that local political parties were obliged to introduce some externally imposed austerity and market-oriented policies that were, again, often counter to their programmatic orientations, especially for parties on the left (Della Porta et al. 2017).

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Roberts divides the impact of severe economic and financial crisis upon electoral behaviour, party systems and political representation into two groups. On the one hand, there is the short-term impact: huge voting shifts against incumbents, electoral volatility, growth in party system fragmentation due to the entrance of new parties and voting shifts among existing political parties. On the other hand, there is the long-term impact on party systems and programmatic alignments in the linkage between voters and parties. Here, the impact might be different depending on who is imposing the austerity and market-oriented policies. If they are being imposed by right-wing or centreright parties while left-wing and/or centre-left parties are in opposition, then programmatic alignments in the linkage between voters and parties can be reinforced during and after the crisis. According to Roberts (2017), this is what happened in Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. But if the externally imposed austerity and market-oriented policies are being implemented by left-wing or centre-left parties, while right-wing and/or centre-right parties are in opposition, then a programmatic dealignment between voters and parties is likely to take place, because the left-wing and centre-left parties are being obliged to govern against their normal programmatic orientations. And in these later cases, because it was in government during the austerity period, the traditional left did not oppose neoliberalism, this opens the way for alternative and populist movements and parties seeking to represent people who are unhappy with austerity and market-oriented policies. This is what happened in Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, and there are some similarly disturbing elements on political representation in Greece and Spain, for example, even if the situation is not entirely equivalent in the case of Spain. In any case, Roberts’s framework for analysis of the impact of severe crisis upon political representation not only helps us justify comparisons between Southern Europe and Latin America and helps us frame the analyses that follow in this book. In terms of the impact of the above-mentioned severe crisis, we can also take into account the distinction between short- and long-term effects. Moreover, we must also stress that we do not consider these to be determinist outcomes (as the Portuguese case shows: see Chapter 4 in this volume, and also Freire et al. 2014, 2016; Freire and Lisi 2016); on the contrary, we believe the final result depends on the complex interaction of multiple factors (the institutional characteristics of the political system, the role of political leadership and the tradition of the mobilisation of civil societies). Both Southern Europe and Latin America have rapidly growing traditions of political representation studies. The former through the participation of its countries (mainly Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) in several comparative research networks on political elites and political representation, such as the Comparative Candidate Survey (CCS), PARENEL (Parliamentary Representation at the National and European Levels), INTUNE (Integrated and United – the Quest for Citizenship in an Ever Closer Europe) and PARTIREP (Party Representation) research networks. While several Latin American countries have been involved in the PELA (Parliamentary Elites in Latin

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America surveys) project. However, despite the strong historical, political and cultural links between the two regions, these two branches of political representation studies are not truly connected. The sets of chapters included in this book (some focusing on Southern Europe, others on Latin America) seek to build bridges between the traditions of political representation studies so that greater knowledge can be gleaned about what has happened in each region and with the goal of increasing the prospects of future research collaboration between students of Southern Europe and Latin America. This volume has three major goals, and each chapter in the case studies sections can focus on either one, two or all of them as a whole (depending on data availability). Apart from providing a very general and short overview of political representation studies in each country (which is completed in more detail in the methodological chapters, one for Southern Europe and one for Latin America), all the articles focus on three major topics in an attempt to balance parsimony and comparability with detailed knowledge of representation studies in each country. These three topics correspond to the three remaining goals of this book and they all concern attempts to address questions of continuity and change in patterns of political representation in the wake of the recent economic crisis in each region – above all the Great Recession and sovereign debt crisis in Southern Europe, and the commodity crisis in Latin America. As well as reviewing existing studies on the topic, where appropriate the authors use updated longitudinal data that take into account differences by region. In Southern Europe, the data go back to around a decade before the 2007–8 crisis (in some cases they might begin earlier) and include recent years (depending on the availability of data in each country). Data for Latin America go back at least to around a decade before the commodity crisis (in some cases it will begin in the more distant third-wave democratisation period), which started in 2014–15, and will also present more recent developments in each case (depending on the availability of data). The data will be used to supplement the authors’ reviews and address the three major research questions (and objectives) outlined below. Moreover, considering the book is being finished in early December 2019 and that there are some very important events taking place in some countries that could not be ignored in a book coming out in 2020, some chapters include short epilogues about the most recent developments: the recent turmoil in Ecuador in Chapter 10, and Chile in Chapter 11; the most recent elections in Spain (10 November 2019) in Chapter 6, in Portugal (6 October 2019) in Chapter 4, and in Chapter 2 the general election in Greece (7 July 2019) that has already been taken into account. The first research question concerns the link between voters and members of parliament (MPs); that is, the mediation established through the patterns of candidate selection and the type of electoral system in each country, and citizen evaluations of political representation in their respective countries: namely, trust in political representatives – either individuals (MPs, government officials, etc.) or organisations and institutions (parties, parliaments and governments) – and satisfaction with democracy. The main research question is ‘Are the current

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patterns, i.e. since the Great Recession (2008–9) in Southern Europe and since the commodity crisis (2014–15) in Latin America, fundamentally different from those before the outbreak of the crisis in terms of degree and/or quality, or do they just signal an acceleration of trends that existed before the crisis?’ The second major topic addressed in most of the country articles concerns the impact of the crisis upon descriptive representation and the levels of professionalisation of the political elites before and after the Great Recession in Southern Europe (unfortunately, due to data limitations, this issue was not analysed for Latin America, although other studies about this issue in Latin America are briefly reviewed in the conclusions). The literature describes two major elements of the crises (or the profound transformation) of democratic political representation: the collusion between the main parties on both the social and political characteristics of the party elite and party ideological orientations; and the increasing disconnect of the political system from the societies within which they are more or less embedded (Mair 2013; Crouch 2004; Rose 2014; Merkel 2015). The research question here is ‘Are the fundamental changes in the patterns of descriptive political representation we are witnessing due to short-term factors (the Great Recession (2008–9) in Southern Europe and the commodity crisis (2014–15) in Latin America) or long-term trends, perhaps only reinforced by the Great Recession and the commodity crisis? Alternatively, are the Great Recession and the commodity crisis changing previous trends, especially in the hardest-hit countries, through the emergence of new parties that challenge the status quo and bring new political personnel into the democratic political systems?’ Finally, the country chapters analyse the level of congruence between voters and representatives (elected or candidates) in terms of ideology, especially left– right ideology as measured by left–right self-placement and policy/issue orientations. The ideological and/or policy congruence between voters and the political elite are said to be a fundamental element of the quality of political representation because they increase the likelihood of citizen preferences being translated into policy-making and policy outputs (Powell 2000, 2004; Miller, Pierce and Thomassen 1999; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999; Wessels 2007, 2011; Lijphart 2012; Freire et al. 2014, 2016). However, according to Peter Mair (2011, 2013), multilevel governance and globalisation have increased the dilemma between the responsibility of national parliaments and governments towards international and supranational institutions and/or ‘international markets’ and responsiveness towards the electorate (Rose 2014; Merkel 2015). The Great Recession in Southern Europe and commodity crisis in Latin America have accentuated the tension between both sides of the dilemma, tipping the balance in favour of responsibility over responsiveness. This has created conditions for a significant decline in the level of ideological and/or policy congruence between voters and political elites, which in turn erodes the quality of political representation. The research question is therefore ‘Has the economic crisis produced a sharp change in patterns of ideological and/or policy orientation congruence or has it merely exacerbated already existing trends in our two regions of interest?’

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The book begins with the present introduction by the editors, who set out the rationale, the relevance of the topics, the selection of the regions and case studies and the research questions and objectives the book tries to address. The remainder of the book is divided into two parts. Part I is on Southern Europe and includes case studies on Greece (by Eftichia Teperoglou, Ioannis Andreadis and Theodore Chadjipadelis), Italy (by Federico Russo and Luca Verzichelli), Portugal (by André Freire, Marco Lisi and Emmanouil Tsatsanis) and Spain (Chapters 5 and 6, by Xavier Coller, Manuel Jiménez-Sánchez and Manuel Portillo, and Manuel Portillo-Pérez and Pablo Domínguez, respectively). Each of these countries is covered in a single chapter, except Spain, which is examined over two chapters on different topics. However, before the case studies in Southern Europe, there is a comparative framework set out by Marco Lisi and Emmanouil Tsatsanis in Chapter 1 concerning the characteristics of political and party systems in the countries of Southern Europe (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain). Part I ends with a methodological chapter (Chapter 7 by André Freire, Xavier Coller, Ioannis Andreadis, Antonio M. Jaime, Sofia Serra-Silva and Evangelia Kartsounidou) that reflects upon the several methodological challenges in studying political elites and political representation, and the most common strategies used in representation studies in Greece, Portugal and Spain to interview political elites (especially MPs and unsuccessful candidates). This chapter also includes a brief overview of the major and more widespread research network on the study of political representation in Europe (and elsewhere), the CCS, the countries included, the timespan, the topics uncovered by the questionnaires and the methodologies used for data collection. The first part of the book is not just a comparative case-oriented section, but includes a section dealing with methodological issues, the impact of the crisis (and austerity) on representation and then the cases of Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece. In the cases of Greece, Italy and Portugal, the three questions about the impact of the Great Recession upon political representation are analysed, with the authors scrutinising the impact of the crisis upon democratic support by citizens (RQ1: Research Question 1), descriptive representation (RQ2) and ideological and/or policy congruence (RQ3). Spain is treated in two very different chapters that add and multiply rather than repeat arguments. Spain is the only case in Southern Europe where two new parties emerged with an unusual electoral strength that channelled citizen discontent with the representative link (MPs, parties, institutions). Thus, two chapters tackle the representative crisis in a complementary way: Chapter 5 deals with MPs’ perceptions of the break-up of the representative link, while Chapter 6 deals with the role of the new parties in bridging the gap between MPs and society via an analysis of their social representativeness or congruence with society (RQ2). Moreover, in all the five country studies chapters in Part I, contextual information is provided about the politics and the political systems in each country from the earliest democratic transitions (in the mid-1970s) or since the 1990s (in the case of Italy).

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Chapter 5 deals with the voices of usually forgotten actors in explaining the impact of the crisis on representation: the representatives themselves. The idea is to show that for MPs the Great Recession is not the independent variable of the crisis of representation they observe (and feel). Rather, the authors turn their attention to deeper (and earlier) causes affecting Southern European countries equally: corruption scandals, citizen ignorance, performance of representatives and institutional failures. Insofar as in other countries (Greece and Italy, but not so much Portugal) the crisis of the representative link exists, paying attention to MPs’ voices will highlight previously unexplored issues that may also be applicable to other Southern European countries. The strength of the chapter rests on the originality of the evidence provided: MP perceptions and discourses about the crisis of the representative link. Chapter 6 deals with a different aspect. Of the four Southern European countries examined, Spain is where (like in Greece and Italy) the party system has been changed profoundly with the successful emergence and consolidation of new political parties – Podemos on the left and Ciudadanos on the centreright, and in 2019 (28 April and 10 November) with the emergence of the Vox as extreme-right. All three have channelled citizen discontent with MPs, institutions and parties and are challenging old or traditional politics to the point that in some regions, municipalities and, certainly, at the national level, governments are either in their hands or rely on their support to govern. The emergence of these three parties has changed the social profile of the 19 parliaments in Spain, i.e. the 18 regional parliaments and the national congress, raising questions about their ability to bridge the gap between citizens (who are suspicious of parties) and parties, between the represented and representatives. It is the same gap MPs detected, characterised and explained in the previous chapter. Thus, both chapters are interconnected in their attack on the crisis of representation and/or its transformation from complementary perspectives. Both deal with issues that are clearly integrated into the goal of the book. Rather than creating an imbalance in the section, by complementing the analysis and using evidence from quite different sources the two chapters on Spain enrich its aims. We believe both chapters are useful and fit well together in the book. Part II includes case studies on political representation in Venezuela (by Juan Manuel Trak), Ecuador (by Cristina Rivas, José Manuel Rivas and Alexandra Jima-González) and Chile (by Peter M. Siavelis). In the cases of Ecuador and Chile, two research questions about the impact of the commodity crisis upon political representation are analysed: the impact of the commodity crisis upon citizen support for democracy (RQ1) and ideological and policy congruence (RQ3); in the Venezuelan chapter only RQ3 is analysed. Moreover, in all three country study chapters in Part II, contextual information about politics and the political system in each country from the earliest democratic transitions is provided. As in Part I, the Latin American case studies are preceded by a comparative framing chapter by Mélany Barragán and Manuel Alcántara (Chapter 8), which examines the political and party system characteristics of the Latin American countries included in the

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case studies, as well as several others (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay), as well as the political and economic cycles in these regions since the 1980s until now. Part II also ends with a methodological chapter on the well-established research network into political representation in Latin America since 1994, the PELA survey, which focuses exclusively on MPs (by Mélany Barragán, Cristina Rivas and José Manuel Rivas). This chapter presents the countries included in PELA, the country surveys conducted between 1994 and 2017, the topics covered by the questionnaires and the methodologies used for data collection. The book ends with some conclusions by the editors in which they recall the research questions and objectives defined at the outset before summarising the main findings of the two parts and providing an overview of the current state of political representation in Southern Europe and Latin America. A final note about methodology, and more specifically about the use of the comparative method and the selection of the cases. This book has a clear comparative approach for several reasons (about the comparative method, see Przeworski and Teune 1970; Ragin 1989; Landman 2003; Geddes 2007). The first reason is because it comprises chapters with several case studies, four from Southern Europe and three from Latin America, all of which use a common theoretical framework and a common methodological approach for each case. Second, in addition to the seven country study chapters, the book has four broad comparative chapters, two for substantive topics (Chapters 1 and 8) and two on methodological topics (Chapters 7 and 12). Third, because of the small number of cases in comparative analyses, the selection of cases cannot follow the same criteria as that used in quantitative statistical analysis; because we are unable to choose the cases randomly, questions of representativeness can be dealt with by using similar but adapted criteria, through quantitative studies with a random selection of cases, as was shown by Seawright and Gerring (2008) (see also Neuman and Graeff 2015). In the case of this volume, questions of representativeness are fully taken into account for the case studies from Southern Europe: as well as including all cases except one (Cyprus) or two (Cyprus and Malta), we uncover the most important situations in the context of the Great Recession – namely, external interventions (the troika) and severe austerity policies (Greece and Portugal), partial external interventions (the bank bailout in Spain) or at least external conditionality (Italy) and severe austerity policies. It is more difficult to take into account questions of representativeness for the Latin American case studies because there are more countries in the region and because of the limited space and time available to produce this volume. Nevertheless, we include one case of a country badly affected by the commodity crisis (Venezuela), one not so seriously affected (Ecuador) and one that was barely touched by it (Chile) (see Trak 2018; Pachano 2018; Altaman and Castiglioni 2018, as

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well as Chapters 9, 10 and 11 in the present volume). Moreover, the full set of cases in each region is analysed in the comparative chapters for each region. So overall questions of representativeness are well catered for in both regions.

Notes 1 Making use of the relatively scarce theoretical literature on the political consequences of austerity policies and their politicisation (Boin et al. 2005; Boin, Hart and McConnell 2009; Hart and Tindall 2009), here we mean both economic and political crisis, concerning the different ways the political elites deal with the economic crisis. If we now consider the theoretical paradigm on the framework of the crisis and its explanations, the theory of public policies shows how crises (such as disasters, political scandals, economic crises) can be explored and framed (Boin, Hart and McConnell 2009; Hart and Tindall 2009). When faced with a crisis, political actors have different perceptions, interpretations and conceptions about understanding the crisis and how to deal with it. These perceptions, interpretations and analysis tables are informed by the values of the actors themselves. Given this, three responses are possible. In the first (type 1), the crisis is defined as a nonevent – that is, it is stated that events are nothing more than an unfortunate accident (Boin, Hart and McConnell 2009: 84). This is the ‘non-existent crisis model’, in which it is said there is no one to blame and that the political consequences of the crisis are small or negligible (‘life goes on’). The second (type 2) occurs when there is a recognition of the crisis, but it is understood as being a threat to the common good that the status quo represents, and therefore there is a determination to defend the agents (incumbent stakeholders) and adopted behaviours (organisational policies and practices) of the status quo against emerging criticisms (Boin, Hart and McConnell 2009: 84). Finally, the type 3 response is when the crisis is seen as a unique opportunity, usually by the opposition, and there is a tendency to focus the blame on agents supporting the status quo and the allegedly dysfunctional policies in an attempt to mobilise support for their removal and/or substantial alteration. 2 On the Great Recession and its political impact, see Bosco and Verney (2012, 2016), Roberts (2012, 2017), Verney and Bosco (2013), Magalhães (2014a, 2014b), Bermeo and Bartels (2014), Freire et al. (2014, 2016); Freire and Lisi (2016). On the commodity crisis and other political and economic cycles in Latin America, see Alcántara and Freidenberg (2006), Alcántara, Buquet and Tagina (2018), Barragán (2015), Dabène (2012), Hershberg and Rosen (2006), Kaplan (2013), Roberts (2012, 2014, 2017), Alcántara, Buquet and Tagina (2018) and Sánchez and Montero (2019). 3 Some might argue there is a major difference between Southern Europe and Latin America: European governance has (and had) a huge impact on macro-economic and social policies at the national level, which is not strictly comparable to the constraints placed on Latin American countries by the IMF.

References Alcántara, M., Buquet, M. and Tagina, M. L., eds. (2018). Elecciones y partidos en América Latina en el cambio de ciclo. Madrid: CIS. Alcántara, M. and Freidenberg, F. (2006). Desarrollo nacional, cambios de gobierno y procesos electorales: México, América Central y el Caribe. In: M. Alcántara, L. Paramio, F. Freidenberg and J. Déniz, eds. Historia contemporánea de América Latina: Reformas económicas y consolidación democrática, Vol. VI: 1980–2006, Madrid: Síntesis, pp. 309–434.

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Altaman, D. and Castiglioni, R. (2018). Chile: El fin de una época política. In: M. Alcántara, M. Buquet and M. L. Tagina, eds. Elecciones y partidos en América Latina en el cambio de ciclo, Madrid: CIS, pp. 105–128. Barragán, M. (2015). Consecución de mayorías legislativas en América Latina: Una revisión crítica. Revista de Derecho Electoral 19, 204–237. Bermeo, N. and Bartels, L. M., eds. (2014). Mass politics in tough times: Opinions, votes and protest in the Great Recession. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Blyth, M. (2013). Austerity: The history of a dangerous idea. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Boin, A., Hart, P. and McConnell, A. (2009). Crisis exploitation: Political and policy impacts of framing contests. Journal of European Public Policy 16(1), 81–106. Boin, A., Hart, P., Stern, E. and Sundelius, B., eds. (2005). The politics of crisis management: Public leadership under pressure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bosco, A. and Verney, S. (2012). From electoral epidemic to government epidemic: The next level of the crisis in Southern Europe, 2010–2011. South European Society and Politics 17(2), 129–154. Bosco, A. and Verney, S. (2016). Electoral epidemic: The political cost of economic crisis in Southern Europe, 2010–2011. South European Society and Politics 21(4), 383–407. Carneiro, C. O. and Traversa, F. (2019). Ciclos ideológicos recientes en América Latina (1990–2015): un análisis de sus determinantes políticos y económicos. In: F. Sánchez and M. G. Montero, eds. Los ciclos políticos y económicos de América Latina y el boom de las materias primas. Madrid: Tecnos, pp. 31–80. Coller, X. and Ramírez de Luis, F. (2019). Unstable preferences and policy changes. The case of Spain. In: L. Morlino and C. Sotilotta, eds. The politics of the Eurozone crisis in Southern Europe: A comparative reappraisal. London: Palgrave, pp. 133–171. Crouch, C. (2004). Post-democracy. Cambridge: Polity. Dabène, O. (2012). La gauche en Amérique Latine. Paris: Sciences Po. Della Porta, D., Romanos, E., O’Connor, F., Vogliatzoglou, M., Andretta, M. and Fernandes, T., eds. (2017). Late neoliberalism and its discontents in the economic crisis, London: Palgrave. Freire, A. and Lisi, M. (2016). Political parties, institutions and civil society: The economic crisis and the evolution of Southern Europe political systems. Portuguese Journal of Social Science 15(2), 153–171. Freire, A., Lisi, M., Andreadis, I. and Viegas, J. M. L. (2014). Political representation in times of bailout: Evidence from Portugal and Greece. South European Society and Politics 19(4), 413–559. Freire, A., Lisi, M., Andreadis, I. and Viegas, J. M. L., eds. (2016). Political representation in times of bailout: Evidence from Greece and Portugal. London: Routledge. Geddes, B. (2007). Paradigms and sand castles: Theory building and research design in comparative politics. Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan University Press. Hart, P. and Tindall, K., eds. (2009). Framing the global economic turndown: Crisis rhetoric and the politics of recessions, Canberra: Australian National University Press. Hershberg, E. and Rosen, F., eds. (2006). Latin America after neoliberalism: Turning the tide in the 21st century?New York: New Press/NACLA. Higley, J. and Gunther, R. (1991). Elites and democratic consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Kaplan, S. B. (2013). Globalization and austerity politics in Latin America, New York: Cambridge University Press. Landman, T. (2003). Issues and methods in comparative politics: An introduction. London: Routledge. Lijphart, A. (2012). Patterns of democracy: Government forms and performance in 36 countries. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Linz, J. J. and Stepan, A. (1996). Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Magalhães, P. C. (2014a). Financial crisis, austerity, and electoral politics. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 24(2), 125–133. Magalhães, P. C. (2014b). The elections of the Great Recession in Portugal: Performance voting under a blurred responsibility for the economy. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 24(2), 180–202. Mair, P. (2011). Bini Smaghi vs the parties: Representative government and institutional constraints. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and EU Democracy Observatory, EUI working paper 2011/22. Florence: European University Institute. Mair, P. (2013). Ruling the void: The hollowing of Western democracy. London: Verso. Merkel, W. (2015). Is capitalism compatible with democracy? Zeitshcrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft-Comparative Governance and Politics. Available at doi:10.1007/s12286-014-0199-4. Accessed on 1 January 2016. Miller, W., Pierce, T. and Thomassen, J., eds. (1999). Policy representation in Western democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Monastiriotis, V., Hardiman, N., Regan, A., Goretti, C., Landi, L., Conde-Ruiz, J. I., Marín, C. and Cabral, R. (2013). Austerity measures in crisis countries: Results and impact on mid-term development. Intereconomics. Review of European Economic Policy 48(1), 4–32. Montero, M. G., Selios, L. and Marenghi, P. (2019). El mito de las dos izquierdas? La agenda ideológica do posneoliberalismo. In: F. Sánchez and M. G. Montero, eds. Los ciclos políticos y económicos de América Latina y el boom de las materias primas. Madrid: Tecnos, pp. 215–258. Neuman, R. and Graeff, P. (2015). Quantitative approaches to comparative analysis: Data properties and their implications for theory, measurement and modelling. European Political Science 14, 385–393. Pachano, S. (2018). Ecuador: Fin de ciclo y elecciones. In: M. Alcántara, M. Buquet and M. L. Tagina, eds. Elecciones y partidos en América Latina en el cambio de ciclo. Madrid: CIS, pp. 187–202. Powell, G. B. Jr. (2000). Elections as instruments of democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Powell, G. B. Jr. (2004). Political representation in comparative politics. Annual Review of Political Science 7, 273–296. Przeworski, A. and Teune, H. (1970). The logic of comparative social inquiry. New York: Wiley-Interscience. Ragin, C. C. (1989). The comparative method: Moving beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Roberts, K. M. (2012). Market reform, programmatic (de)alignment, and party system stability in Latin America. Comparative Political Studies 46(11), 1422–1452. Roberts, K. M. (2014). Changing course in Latin America: Party systems in the neoliberal era. New York: Cambridge University Press.

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Roberts, K. M. (2017). State of the field: Party politics in hard times: Comparative perspectives on the European and Latin American economic crises. European Journal of Political Research 56(2), 218–233. Available at doi:10.1111/1475–6765.12191. Accessed on 1 January 2018. Rose, R. (2014). Responsible party government in a world of interdependence. West European Politics 37(2), 253–269. Roux, C. (2013). L’Europe du sud dans la crise. Pôle Sud-Revue de Science Politique 39(2), 5–9 (plus articles on Italy, Portugal and Spain in the following pages of the special issue). Sacchi, S. (2015). Conditionality by other means: EU involvement in Italy’s structural reforms in the sovereign debt crisis. Comparative European Politics 13(1), 77–92. Sánchez, F. and Montero, M. G., eds. (2019). Los ciclos políticos y económicos de América Latina y el boom de las materias primas. Madrid: Tecnos. Schmitt, H. and Thomassen, J., (1999). Political representation and legitimacy in the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Seawright, J. and Gerring, J. (2008). Case selection techniques in case study research: A menu of qualitative and quantitative options. Political Research Quarterly 61(2), 294–308. Terán, M. T. and Traversa, F. (2019). Giro a la izquierda en América Latina: Causas y legado. In: F. Sánchez and M. G. Montero, eds. Los ciclos políticos y económicos de América Latina y el boom de las materias primas. Madrid: Tecnos, pp. 195–214. Trak, J. M. (2018), Venezuela: Elecciones y sistema de partidos en la era Pos-Chavez. In: M. Alcántara, M. Buquet and M. L. Tagina, eds., Elecciones y partidos en América Latina en el cambio de ciclo, Madrid: CIS, pp. 453–480. Verney, S. and Bosco, A. (2013). Living parallel lives: Italy and Greece in an age of austerity. South European Society and Politics 18(4), 397–426. Wessels, B. (2007). Political representation and democracy, In: R. J. Dalton and H.-D. Klingemann, eds. The Oxford handbook of political behaviour. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 833–850. Wessels, B. (2011). Performance and deficits of present day representation. In: S. Alonso, J. Keane and W. Merkel, eds. The future of representative democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 96–123. Zamora, A. and Coller, X., eds. (2014). The economic crisis from within: Evidence from Southern Europe. American Behavioral Scientist 58(12), 1511–1682.

Part I

Southern Europe

1

Southern Europe and the Eurozone Crisis Political Representation, Party System Characteristics and the Impact of Austerity Marco Lisi and Emmanouil Tsatsanis

Introduction Southern European countries are considered successful cases of democratic consolidation, where political and civil liberties can not only be taken for granted, but set the standard for newer democracies. Yet this assessment is less positive when we look at the overall quality of democracy and recent trends. First, Southern European citizens express more negative opinions on the functioning of representative democracies than citizens living in other Western democracies (Ferrín and Kriesi 2016). Second, according to the democracy index elaborated by the Economic Intelligence Unit, the quality of democracy in several Southern European countries eroded during the euro crisis, and they were characterised as ‘flawed democracies’. This index shows a decline in the quality of democracy between 2006 and 2016, especially in Greece, where democratic governance has taken a step backwards due to the persistent economic and deep political crisis. Finally, there has been a significant decline in the Human Development Index in some countries (notably Greece and Spain) over the last decade. Since the emergence of the Eurozone crisis, Southern European countries have faced a number of challenges (see Bosco and Verney 2013, 2017; Freire and Lisi 2016; Freire, Lisi and Tsatsanis 2016; Morlino and Raniolo 2017). In addition to the negative economic outputs and a general disaffection, which have widened the gap between citizens and democratic institutions, new phenomena have contributed to the perfect storm experienced by Southern European countries: these include asymmetric austerity; the violation of electoral mandates; emphasis on responsibility over responsiveness; and the crisis at the European level (Mair 2013; Matthijs 2014; Muro and Vidal 2016; Sánchez-Cuenca 2014). These events clearly call for a new assessment of the state of democratic representation in Southern Europe. The main goal of this introduction is to evaluate the extent to which the crisis has ushered in a new phase in Southern European democracies and to identify both similarities and differences in the trajectories these political systems have experienced over the last decades. To what extent has the Great Recession affected the features and functioning of Southern European political

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systems? Have these polities displayed common trends over the last decades? These are our research questions. Although a relatively large number of analyses have examined political representation in Southern Europe (Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle 1995; Diamandouros and Gunther 2001; Freire and Lisi 2016), they do not focus on the recent period or the complex events that took place during the crisis. An update is therefore required that uses a common theoretical framework and indicators. This introduction provides the basic background for a systematic comparison of several dimensions of democratic representation. This chapter is divided into four sections. The following section analyses the institutional features of the main Southern European countries (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain). The second section focuses on macro-patterns of economic and political change in Southern Europe, before delving a little deeper into the political consequences of the economic crisis. The third section examines party system fragmentation, party system polarisation and ideological identities. The fourth addresses voter mobilisation, analysing both electoral turnout and volatility. In the conclusions, we discuss our main findings, the lessons learned from Southern Europe, as well as highlighting some avenues for future research.

Overview of Institutional Design: A Comparative Perspective While all South European political systems can be classified as multiparty democracies, four of them (Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece) share legacies of prolonged or intermittent right-wing authoritarian rule in the 20th century. Even though these four countries have adopted largely parliamentary forms of government, the constitutional set-up of executive–legislative relations, the role of heads of state and the vertical distribution of power are much more varied from a formal-legal standpoint. In addition, if we exclude the authoritarian presidential republic of Belarus, Southern Europe is home to the only (democratic) presidential system in Europe: Cyprus. In contrast, the remaining countries follow the normal European pattern of non-executive heads of state. The head of state in the constitutional monarchy of Spain is a hereditary position, whereas in Italy and Greece the head of state is elected by the legislature.1 In Portugal, the head of state is elected by popular vote as the young democracy initially adopted all the formal trappings of a semi-presidential form of government in the 1976 constitution. Despite the controversies surrounding Portuguese semi-presidentialism (Neto and Lobo 2009), it could be argued that even in some parliamentary republics (indirectly elected) presidents can acquire a more central role during periods of political instability, just as they have in Portugal. In Italy, this is known as the ‘presidential accordion’ thesis, according to which the expansion or contraction of the role of the president depends on the strength of the party system, as shown by the role Giorgio Napolitano played during the Monti government (Pasquino 2013). In terms of executive–legislative relations, the three new democracies of Portugal, Spain and Greece have adopted a more majoritarian style of governance,

Southern Europe and the Eurozone Crisis

19

which is characterised by the legislature’s dependence on the executive, with relatively weak checks and balances (Morlino 1998; Gallagher, Laver and Mair 2011). Given the presidential system of government, the executive powers of the Cypriot president tend to be among the strongest of all countries with presidential systems. This is even more paradoxical given that the 1960 constitution was drawn up with the goal of creating a consociational system of government that never really took off after the growing tensions between the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities during the 1960s and the de facto division of the island in the mid1970s. The absence of a counterbalance from the Turkish-Cypriot communities has left few institutional counterweights to presidential executive power. Although strong executives were the norm in the region even before the crisis (with the exception perhaps of Italy), there is little doubt the crisis has contributed to increasing executive dominance at the expense of parliaments, taking to extremes a trend that arguably extends beyond the confines of Southern Europe.2 Since their return to democracy, Spain and (notably) Greece have come closest to the pure Westminster parliamentary model (Bruneau et al. 2001: 20), at least until the further fragmentation of party systems observed during the economic crisis. Portugal moved further along this path after 1987 with the emergence of single-party majorities, although it should be said that the possibility of cohabitation in the Portuguese semipresidential system can somewhat mitigate majoritarian tendencies (Pasquino 1995: 274). Paradoxically, Spain has established a majoritarian style of government despite minority governments having been the rule thus far (eight out of 13).3 The stability and longevity of minority governments in Spain is due, in large measure, to the existence of a constructive vote of no confidence. At these times, the most important checks to majoritarian tendencies within the Spanish system are the regionalist parties in the Cortes, which typically provide support to either PP (Popular Party) or PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) minority governments. However, this institutionalised system is also being brought into question with the erosion of popular support for the two main governing parties. In addition, the crisis period has introduced an unprecedented level of uncertainty in the functioning of Spanish parliamentarism, compounded by the emergence of new actors and recent secessionist tendencies in Catalonia that render alliances between national and regionalist parties even more complicated. Italy, on the other hand, had a tradition of a more consensual style of government during the post-war period compared with those of other countries in the region. Fears associated with the potential emergence of a new tyrant tended to favour representation over the decision-making capabilities of strong and stable executives (Pasquino 1995: 282). During the so-called First Republic, government tenure was very short and there were intense conflicts among coalition parties, paving the way for a weak and unstable parliamentarism (see Newell 2010). The passage to the Second Republic was also facilitated by an attempt to prevent the cabinet instability that had marked Italian democracy before the collapse of the party system in the

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1990s, most notably through electoral system reform. Indeed, the design of electoral systems has been one of the main ways in which a majoritarian style of governance has been promoted in Southern Europe. Finally, Cyprus and Greece have traditionally been examples of stable and single-party government, and patterns of change have been quite easy to forecast. However, the Greek crisis has led to important changes in the type of government, with the development of technocratic solutions – a situation shared with Italy under the Monti government (2011–13) – and innovative coalitions (see the alliance between SYRIZA [Coalition of the Radical Left] and Independent Greeks). When assessing the functioning of political parties in governments, the key role played by institutional rules in mediating political representation should not be underestimated as they make it difficult to find a uniform pattern due to the inconsistent rationale for government formation, functioning and the termination of cabinets. Even though certain models and tendencies can be identified in individual cases, they can rarely be generalised. Moreover, countries with similar coalition types and format characteristics actually differ from each other in the representation of political parties in governments, or in the stability and durability of governmental formations. Electoral Systems Southern European countries have a range of proportional electoral systems with some built-in advantages for larger parties that facilitate the formation of single-party governments or pre-electoral coalition blocs. The electoral systems were designed to serve two-party or bipolar party systems in which major parties or coalitions of the centre-left and the centre-right jointly capture three-quarters or more of the vote. Political developments during the recent crisis, which we will examine in the following sections, have rendered existing electoral systems in most of these countries incongruous to the current dynamics of party system change. The first aspect worth mentioning is that the Cypriot, Portuguese and Spanish electoral systems have remained largely unchanged since the transition to democracy, while significant changes took place in Italy between 1992 and 2018. Greece is an intermediate case because different systems of reinforced proportionality have been used throughout the democratic period, with the exception of the three elections held between June 1989 and April 1990 when pure proportional representation was applied (see Table 1.1). Cyprus and the two Iberian countries use a system of proportional representation (PR) that is based on the d’Hondt formula, and show a lower level of disproportionality compared to Italy and Greece. The strong majoritarian bias of the Spanish electoral system is associated mainly with the small average district magnitude, while in the Portuguese case district magnitude presents greater variation. Although the electoral system favours larger parties and prevents the fragmentation of the party system in both cases, it is less punitive towards smaller parties in the Portuguese case.

Southern Europe and the Eurozone Crisis

21

Table 1.1 Electoral system: Legislative (lower house) Country

Elections

Seats

Average district magnitudea

Disproportionalityb

Electoral system type

List form

Portugal

1979–87 1991–2015

250 230

11.36 10.45

4.09 5.37

Proportional

Closed

Spain

1977–2019

350

6.73

6.99

Proportional

Closed

Italyc

1994–2001 2006–13

630

1 23.73

8.31 8.89

Mixed ‘Reinforced’ proportional (majority bonus)

Closed

4.0

Mixed

Closed

9.69

‘Reinforced’ proportional Proportional ‘Reinforced’ proportional ‘Reinforced’ proportional (majority bonus)

Opend

Proportional

Open

2018 Greece

1977–85

300

5.14

1989–90 1993–2004

4.09 7.79

2007 2009 2012–15

Cyprus

1985–2016

56

4.64 4.25 5.14

9.47

9.33

1.82

Source: Author elaboration. Notes: a b c d

Average district magnitude in first electoral tier. We use the calculations in the (updated) dataset Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World, 1946–2011 (Bormann and Golder 2013). Average Gallagher index for group of elections. We use the calculation of indices from Gallagher (2017). We only consider electoral systems in place since 2006. Closed list in 1985, June 2012, Sep. 2015.

Electoral systems in Greece and Italy are more complex due to the adoption of a multi-tier system of seat allocation in the former and the use of mixed systems in the latter. In the Greek case, other features of the electoral system (i.e. a very high threshold and the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota) have helped benefit larger parties. In addition, a majority bonus was used in both countries to enhance government stability. While a seat bonus was introduced in Greece in 2004, the new electoral law approved in Italy for the 2006

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elections substituted the mixed electoral system with a PR system with a majority bonus, which ensured the list (or list of coalitions) with a relative majority received extra seats to enable it to achieve an absolute majority in the lower chamber (340 seats out of 630). However, the majority bonus worked at the regional level for the election of the Senate, thus making it more difficult to ensure government formation and stability. The impact of the crisis on political representation is also shown by public debates on electoral system reform. Popular dissatisfaction with democratic governance and the inroads made by new parties (see below) have led national political elites to consider reforming electoral laws. While this was the path taken in Cyprus, where the electoral threshold was increased just before the 2016 elections, other Southern European countries are rethinking the need to adopt a new electoral system to ensure government stability and/ or reduce the distance between citizens and their representatives. The SYRIZA-led coalition government submitted a new electoral law to parliament in 2016, removing the majority bonus and reintroducing a purer proportional system. However, the law did not get the required two-thirds majority to put it into effect from the next election. In Italy, a new electoral system (Rosatellum) characterised by a combination of PR (61 per cent of the seats) and majoritarian representation (37 per cent of the seats) was approved for the 2018 legislative elections. On the other hand, political parties in both Portugal and Spain remain reluctant to abdicate their powers and give citizens more voice in the choice of party representation.4

Breaking the Cycle(s): The Eurozone Crisis and the Threat to Mainstream Politics The introduction to Latin American politics (see Barragán and Alcántara, Chapter 8, this volume) emphasises the interaction between economic and political cycles that transcend national boundaries and occur at the regional level. Economic change (typically connected to global economic trends, such as sharp increases in commodity prices) is linked to swings of the political pendulum that produce left or right turns in the region. The identification of a cyclical regional pattern implicitly circumscribes processes of political change within predictable and known parameters. However, in the case of Southern Europe, the shock produced by the euro crisis was so severe that political change went beyond mere swings of the political pendulum. Instead, since 2010 we have observed Southern Europeans abandoning traditional political alternatives en masse, either by switching their support to new and/or fringe political forces (which are usually labelled populist by non-supporters, but which typically prefer to label themselves as anti-establishment) or abstaining from electoral politics altogether. Of course, the countries of Southern Europe are no strangers to waves of political change. The occasionally shared timing of political shifts makes them seem to be driven by forces that operate, at least partially, at the regional rather than national level. During the mid-1970s, Greece, Portugal and Spain

Southern Europe and the Eurozone Crisis

23

experienced the near-simultaneous fall of right-wing authoritarian regimes. The fall of the dictatorships and the transitions to democracy were accomplished in vastly different ways and triggered by different events; however, it is probably no accident that the fall of the authoritarian regimes came soon after the oil shock in 1973 that severely compromised the ability of the regimes to rely on output legitimacy and purely coercive means for prolonging their survival. Soon after the transitions to democracy, a left turn seemed to take place in the region that extended beyond the new democracies (including France and, to some extent, Italy) and came in contrast to the right-turn that was taking place across much of the Western world in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Indeed, socialist parties were in office (alone or as part of a coalition) in the countries of Southern Europe and largely out of office in the Northern European democracies for most of the 1980s. However, Southern European socialists in government mainly pursued democratisation and modernisation projects (Puhle 2001: 324–8) instead of radically redistributive policies (like some left-wing populists in Latin America), and their experience in government contributed to a decrease in polarisation, the institutionalisation of party systems and the establishment of a more centripetal logic of party competition. On the other hand, Cypriot politics was dominated by the territorial division and the conflict with Turkey. While this idiosyncratic question attracted most citizens and media attention, the multiparty system was structured along the left–right continuum, with the two major parties, AKEL (Progressive Party of Working People) and DISY (Democratic Rally), alternating in government. Since the 1990s, Southern European politics has been marked by the normalisation of the party systems and patterns of party competition. There have been frequent alternations in power of the centre-left and centre-right majority, minority or coalition bloc governments, depending on the institutional context of each country. Meanwhile, the Europeanisation process and convergence with Europe’s core countries in political, societal and economic domains continued up until the beginning of the Eurozone crisis in 2010. As a result, arguments about Southern European exceptionalism were beginning to appear increasingly irrelevant. After 2008, and as the global economic crisis advanced, narratives of Southern European exceptionalism and laggardness began resurfacing. The derogatory PIGS acronym made a comeback, this time as PIIGS,5 when the banking crisis largely migrated to the area of public finances and was recast as a sovereign debt crisis. This stage of the crisis mainly affected the Eurozone’s southern peripheral economies (first Greece, then gradually the rest) but the real effects were felt as soon as governments in these countries were forced – mostly under external pressure and, primarily, by the loathed EC/ ECB/IMF troika – to impose draconian austerity measures, including cutting wages, public sector employment, public investment, pensions and welfare services, as well as pushing through other reforms, for example in industrial relations systems (Morlino and Raniolo 2017: 10). Apart from short-term fiscal objectives, the goal was to regain competitiveness through a strategy of

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Lisi and Tsatsanis

domestic devaluation, given that currency devaluation is no longer an option for governments within the Eurozone. The short-term consequence of the crisis was a change in the political colour of Southern European governments. While socialist parties were in government in all countries except Italy at the onset of the crisis, as it unfolded a shift to the right took place. Not unlike what had happened in Latin America, the financial crisis posed huge threats to the (once) stable party systems in the region (Roberts 2017). As can be seen in the indicators in Figure 1.1, the crisis had deep and lasting effects in terms of negative economic growth, rising unemployment and stubbornly high debt to GDP ratios, as well as to deficits, despite deep reductions in government spending (largely due to the decline in economic activity and falling government revenues caused, at least in part, by the policies of austerity). Of course, neither the effects of the crisis nor the scope and depth of the imposed austerity policies were uniform. In every regard, Greece

Unemployment Rate

20 00 20 01 20 02 20 03 20 04 20 05 20 06 20 07 20 08 20 09 20 10 20 11 20 12 20 13 20 14 20 15 20 16 20 17 20 18

GDP Growth 8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6 -8 -10

30 25 20 15 10 5 20 0 20 0 0 20 1 0 20 2 0 20 3 0 20 4 0 20 5 0 20 6 07 20 0 20 8 0 20 9 1 20 0 1 20 1 1 20 2 13 20 1 20 4 1 20 5 1 20 6 1 20 7 18

0

Italy

Greece

Spain

Portugal

Cyprus

Italy

Greece

Deficit

Spain

Portugal

Cyprus

20 00 20 01 20 02 20 03 20 04 20 05 20 06 20 07 20 08 20 09 20 10 20 11 20 12 20 13 20 14 20 15 20 16 20 17 20 18

Public Debt

5 0 -5 -10

20 0 20 0 0 20 1 0 20 2 0 20 3 0 20 4 0 20 5 0 20 6 0 20 7 0 20 8 0 20 9 1 20 0 11 20 1 20 2 1 20 3 1 20 4 1 20 5 16 20 17 20 18

-15

200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0

-20 Italy

Greece

Spain

Portugal

Cyprus

Italy

Greece

Gini Coefficient 40 38 36 34 32 30 28 26 24 22 20 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Italy

Greece

Spain

Portugal

Cyprus

Figure 1.1 Macro-economic indicators, Southern Europe 2000–18

Spain

Portugal

Cyprus

Southern Europe and the Eurozone Crisis

25

stands out as the country hardest hit by the crisis and the one that is still struggling to kick-start the recovery process after many years of negative growth, high unemployment, mounting public debt, falling public and private investment and the inability to privately refinance its debt obligations at reasonable rates. Whether the austerity policies imposed were necessary to regain market confidence in the troubled economies or whether they are to blame for needlessly deepening the crisis remains a hotly debated topic (Blyth 2013). The marked changes in aggregate macroeconomic indicators produced commensurate reactions in terms of political behaviour. The standard model of economic voting predicts incumbents will be punished during economic downturns; however, the recession was so severe in this case that the punishment of incumbents is only part of the story in Southern Europe. It seems voters wanted to punish both the governments in power and establishment parties generally: in other words, all mainstream political forces that had alternated in power during the years before the crisis. The perceived convergence of the mainstream left and right on policies of austerity and an adherence to the fiscal policy-making guidelines of the European Union (EU) produced a backlash by angry voters, many of whom turned to challenger parties offering clearer alternatives (Hobolt and Tilley 2016: 2). This centrifugal dynamic is obviously not exclusive to Southern Europe, but the process has been more radical in the region due to the intensity of the euro crisis, the limited room for manoeuvre of Southern European governments during the crisis and a political culture marked by high levels of dissatisfaction with and distrust of politics even before the crisis (see case studies in this volume). The main governing forces in Portugal and Cyprus have been the least affected in the region, while the greater impact can be seen in Greece, Italy and Spain.

Party System Format and Types of Government This section focuses on the evolution of the number of relevant parties and on the changes in the logic of party system functioning. The party systems in new Southern European countries have habitually fallen into the moderate pluralist category elaborated by Sartori (1976), with a majoritarian tendency during the consolidation phase (Bruneau et al. 2001; Freire and Lisi 2016). On the other hand, Italy is close to the extreme pluralism class, with a relatively high level of fragmentation (more than five parties) and large ideological distance. However, the economic crisis has had a strong impact on the party system format in the countries analysed, with a general increase in party system fragmentation. As Morlino and Raniolo (2017: 35–8) have noted, with the exception of the Portuguese case (and, partially, Cyprus),6 Southern European countries experienced a transition from bipolarisation to tri-polarisation during the crisis, mainly due to the success of new protest parties. The index of the number of effective parties (Laakso and Taagepera 1979) is the most frequently used instrument to evaluate both the number and size of political parties. This indicator provides information on the level of voter

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concentration and enables the systematic comparison of Southern European countries (Table 1.2). Cyprus is the only case that registered a steady increase in party system fragmentation over time, ranging from an average score of 3.1 to 4.1 in the last decade (2008–16). Traditionally, four parties have structured party competition: AKEL (Progressive Party of Working People), EDEK (Movement for Social Democracy), DIKO (Democratic Party) and DISY (Democratic Rally) (Katsourides 2016). After the introduction of pure proportional representation, the threshold for the emergence of new parties went down. Over the last decade, there has also been a decline in the concentration of votes in the two main parties. While in the previous period, AKEL and DISY always received more than 60 per cent of the vote, they were only able to obtain 56.4 per cent in the 2016 legislative elections. In addition, two new parties, SYPOL (Citizens’ Alliance) and Solidarity, obtained parliamentary representation for the first time. Despite the bipolarisation fostered by the presidential regime, the Cypriot party system has become more fragmented and unstable. The number of relevant parties in the Italian party system has varied significantly; a trend that was influenced by changes to the electoral laws (see Newell 2010). Nonetheless, Italy exhibits the highest average level of party system fragmentation of all the cases studied. It differs from other countries because the electoral system has intensified contradictory dynamics

Table 1.2 Effective number of parliamentary parties and volatility in Southern Europe (1974–2019) Cyprus Average (1974–85) Average (1986–96) Average (1996–2007) Average (2008–19) Average (1974–2019)

Greece

Italy

Portugal

Spain

ENEP

3.1

2.1

3.6

3.7

2.7

Volatility

8.95

16.35

7.70

11.79

28.35

ENEP

3.5

2.3

5.9

2.4

2.8

Volatility

6.0

6.18

19.11

17.83

9.96

ENEP

3.7

2.4

5.5

2.6

2.6

Volatility

5.35

6.15

13.62

8.32

8.47

ENEP

4.1

3.5

3.9

2.9

3.9

Volatility

3.95

24.3

24.89

11.45

15.0

ENEP

3.5

2.7

4.6

3.1

3.1

Volatility

5.95

15.35

14.6

11.4

14.2

Sources: 1) for ENEP: Döring and Manow (2016) (ParlGov dataset, 1976–2019); 2) for volatility: calculation of averages from data available in Emanuele (2016), updated until December 2019 (http://www.vincenzoemanuele.com/dataset-of-electoral-volatility.html). Note: The volatility averages include elections up to 2019.

Southern Europe and the Eurozone Crisis

27

at the electoral and parliamentary levels (Baldini 2011). While the formation of electoral alliances was facilitated, parliamentary groups tend to split once elected, influencing the stability of parliamentary majorities and government performance. The success of the M5S (Five Star Movement) in the 2013 elections marked a substantial change in the Italian party system, bringing the trend towards bipolarisation to an abrupt halt. Before the crisis, voter support in Greece concentrated around the two major parties, PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) and ND (New Democracy), with the presence of an anti-system pole represented by the Greek Communist Party (KKE). However, we can observe a slight upward trend in party system fragmentation in the long term, with the average score of the effective number of parliamentary parties rising from 2.1 (1974–85) to 2.4 (1996–2007). This trend intensified after the crisis, when there was a significant drop in voter support for PASOK. At the same time, SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left) was able to increase its vote share significantly and to replace PASOK as the main party of the left. The impact of austerity eroded party identification in the two main parties and affected their capacity to retain public support (Tsatsanis 2016). Therefore, a new party system characterised by a higher level of fragmentation and polarisation (see below) emerged after the ‘earthquake elections’ of 2012 and disrupted a steady pattern of single-party government formation by either PASOK or ND. After the first decade of the democratic regime, there was marked stability in the number of relevant parties in Portugal. Over the first four electoral cycles, the party system presented a higher level of fragmentation, fitting quite well with Sartori’s polarised pluralism class (Jalali 2007). The asymmetry of the coalition potential between the left and the right, with the PCP (Portuguese Communist Party) assuming the role of an antisystem party, contributed to this characterisation. The realignment of the 1985–7 elections was followed by a considerable decline in the number of relevant parties and the emergence of a majoritarian trend (Freire 2005), showing a pattern similar to that of the Greek and Spanish party systems. This means the two moderate parties, the PS (Socialist Party) and PSD (Social Democratic Party), were able to secure a majority (or quasi-majority) of seats in parliament. The BE (Left Bloc), a coalition of radical leftist forces, was the only new actor to successfully break the quadripartite configuration after 1999. The economic and political crisis prompted the formation of new political forces, but they failed to gain parliamentary representation (Lisi 2015). However, in the 2015 legislative elections the small PAN (People-Animals-Nature) was able to elect one MP, and neither of the two largest parties achieved a parliamentary majority. This paved the way for significant changes to the Portuguese party system, with the PS negotiating a new government solution with the BE, PCP and PEV (Partido Ecologista 'Os Verdes', the Greens), which agreed to provide parliamentary support to a minority PS government for the first time in the history of Portuguese democracy (Lisi 2016). The trend towards increasing fragmentation was confirmed in the 2019

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parliamentary elections with the success of PAN (which elected four MPs) and the parliamentary debut of three new political forces, including one extremeright populist party, Chega (Enough). The Spanish party system shows a low level of party system fragmentation and exhibits fairly significant stability (see Gunther and Montero 2009). However, there have been striking changes in the roles and positions of individual parties within the relatively stable format. Competition developed primarily between the PP and PSOE, while smaller parties – mainly regional or nationalist in character – played a marginal role at the national level.7 It was only in the elections of 2015 and 2016 that the ENEP/ENPP showed a marked increased and the winner of the election (PP) was unable to gain a majority of seats, while two new parties (Ciudadanos and Podemos) obtained parliamentary representation (Simón 2016). Here again we observe a shift during the crisis period from a two-party system to a fairly fragmented scenario. As noted by Medina (2016), the 2015 legislative elections represented a turning point, showing higher ENEP/ENPP figures than recorded during the first post-dictatorship elections in 1977. The trend was confirmed – and deepened – in the 2019 elections, which were marked by the historical election of an extreme-right party, Vox. Overall, we can conclude that after the uncertainties of the formative phase of party systems for new Southern European countries – as well as Italy in the 1990s – the party system format in the cases studied displays a relatively low level of fragmentation and general stability (see also Sanches 2017). Nonetheless, we can observe either an upward trend in the effective number of parliamentary and electoral parties (i.e. increasing ENPP and ENEP) or a development with no convincing tendency towards an increase or decrease in the number of relevant parties (see the case of Italy).

Participation and Electoral Volatility This section focuses on the relationship between political parties and citizens through an analysis of the electoral process, which is the fundamental link between the party system and voters. Electoral turnout is the first indicator to consider. The average voter turnout in European countries (including post-communist Europe) between 1945 and 2002 was about 75 per cent, compared with 82 per cent in the EU-15 countries. Voter turnout data reveal a perceptible downward trend in mobilisation in consolidated democracies. Southern European countries have gone through a similar process. None of the countries studied demonstrates a long-term increase in voter turnout (Table 1.3). Based on the average voter turnout in the individual cycles, we can claim – unequivocally – that there has been a continuous decrease in voter participation. The average turnout in the first democratic elections held in these countries was 81.2 per cent, falling to 74.4 per cent in the second election and then to 65 per cent of registered voters in the most recent elections (2015–19). In particular, the net change between the first and last elections registers a negative record in the Portuguese

Southern Europe and the Eurozone Crisis

29

Table 1.3 Turnout in Southern Europe (1974–2019)

Average (1974–2019) Average (1995–2008) Average (2009–19) Net change (1974–2019)

Cyprus

Greece

Italy

Portugal

Spain

87.5 91.2 72.7 -18.6

73.0 75.5 62.8 -21.7

83.6 80.4 74.1 -20.5

70.4 63.3 57.3 -37.2

73.0 73.9 70.9 -5.2

Source: Döring and Manow (2016).

case, where there was a fall of more than 37 percentage points. Spanish data show the smallest decline (down five percentage points), while the remaining countries register intermediate figures (around 20 per cent). However, the figures representing the average voter turnout vary significantly in individual countries and are also markedly different from the average value. The average voter turnout over the democratic period ranges from 87.5 in Cyprus to 70.4 per cent in Portugal. If we consider the most recent period (2009–19), Portugal falls into a group of countries with a voter turnout lower than 60 per cent: a figure close to those of the countries of Eastern Europe. On the other hand, Italy and Cyprus display higher turnout levels (above 70 per cent), while Greece and Spain are intermediate cases. In the case of Cyprus, it is thought the considerable decline in voter turnout is a sign of citizen alienation and an indicator of party system transformation (Katsourides 2016: 207). Electoral volatility is a key dimension to assess the stability of party competition models and the level of party system institutionalisation (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006). According to previous analyses, a relatively high level of electoral volatility is one feature of Southern European party systems that distinguishes them from Western Europe (Gunther and Montero 2001). Generally speaking, the average electoral volatility has been higher than that of established democracies; however, a clear trend may be identified in the phase of democratic consolidation, as total average volatility has fallen substantially in all countries over recent decades (Morlino 1998). This downward trend in total volatility is most perceptible in Greece and Spain (Table 1.2). If we disregard the first democratic elections, the level of total volatility fell significantly in subsequent elections. In other cases, there is no clear trend, although total volatilities declined steadily in Portugal and Italy during the 1990s and 2000s. Nevertheless, as a number of studies have noted (Bosco and Verney 2012; Morlino and Raniolo 2017), extreme deviations of total volatility were recorded in most Southern European countries following the onset of the economic crisis. More importantly, strong growth in electoral volatility has been driven by the entrance of new actors in the party system, as in Greece (SYRIZA), Italy (M5S) and Spain (Ciudadanos, Podemos and more recently Vox). This means we observe an increase in extra-system volatility in these cases (Powell and Tucker 2014): that is to say, we see huge transfers of voter support caused

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by the emergence of new political formations and the termination of some existing ones. This is a crucial indicator of the lack of party system stability, a high degree of innovation in the party system or the beginning of a process of deinstitutionalisation (Emanuele and Chiaramonte 2018). Overall, two groups of countries stand out. On the one hand, we have Portugal and Cyprus, in which changes to aggregate voter behaviour (electoral volatility) and electoral party format (party system fragmentation) since the Great Recession have been almost negligible. On the other hand, we have Greece, Italy and Spain, in which there have been dramatic changes in electoral volatility, party system fragmentation and government type/format since the Great Recession. The party systems in the latter countries have witnessed record levels of electoral change, the emergence of strong new political parties and, in some cases, a fundamental shift from the usual pattern of single-party government during the democratic period to coalition government.

Conclusions The aim of this chapter was to set the stage for the case studies of Southern European countries that follow by providing a general overview of the main economic, institutional and party system characteristics of each country, focusing in particular on the political impact of the Eurozone crisis. Our overview revealed many commonalities in the characteristics of political systems and trajectories of change across the five countries examined, but also subtle differences – both in terms of the institutional arrangements and patterns of representation and in the degree of change. Greece and Spain are undoubtedly the two countries that have changed the most, followed by Italy; however, Portugal and Cyprus are also witnessing transformations, namely, with declining voter participation or shifting dynamics in inter-party relations due to the political demands imposed by extreme austerity. The emergence of a new dimension of competition is one of the most significant transformations: it has led to the tri-polarisation of Southern European party systems (with the exception thus far of Portugal), which may have far-reaching and lasting repercussions and could prove to be the most important political legacy of the Eurozone crisis. The decline of mainstream centre-left and centre-right parties and the emergence of new challenger parties undermine the party system institutionalisation that had taken place during earlier decades and which was marked by patterns of centripetal party competition, majoritarian styles of governance and a relatively broad consensus on the goals of modernisation and Europeanisation in the peripheral democracies of Southern Europe. It remains to be seen whether this wave of change will breathe new life into the increasingly unresponsive South European democracies in the long term, or whether these democracies have entered a new permanent state of crisis. In the following chapters, we will take a closer look into the ways in which the economic crisis has impacted patterns of political representation in each country.

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Notes 1 In Italy, the president is elected by an electoral college that includes members of both houses of the legislature as well as special electors appointed by the Italian regions. 2 See, for example, Puntscher Riekmann and Wydra (2013). 3 See Field (2016). 4 For an overview of these debates see Lobo and Santana-Pereira (2015) and Montero and Riera (2016). 5 The acronym PIGS refers to the economies of Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain and was popularised in the 1990s to refer to the Southern European economies as laggards in the process of European integration and particularly in terms of the difficulties in meeting the Maastricht criteria for entry into the European Monetary Union. The new acronym, PIIGS, added Ireland, which was facing a severe banking crisis that later turned into a sovereign debt crisis. 6 Although AKEL (Progressive Party of Working People) and DISY (Democratic Rally) have traditionally alternated in government, DIKO (Democratic Party) has played an important role as a centrist party. This third pole gained strength in the 2018 presidential election. 7 With the partial exception of Convergence and Union (CiU – Convergència i Unió) and the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV – Partido Nacionalista Vasco), which supported several governments at the national level.

References Baldini, G. (2011). The different trajectories of Italian electoral reforms. West European Politics 34(3), 644–663. Blyth, M. (2013). Austerity: The history of a dangerous idea. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bormann, N.-C. and Golder, M. (2013). Democratic electoral systems around the world, 1946–2011. Electoral Studies 32, 360–369. Bosco, A. and Verney, S. (2012). Electoral epidemic: The political cost of economic crisis in Southern Europe, 2010–2011. South European Society and Politics 17(2), 129–154. Bosco, A. and Verney, S. (2013). Elections in hard times: Southern Europe 2010–11. London: Routledge. Bosco, A. and Verney, S. (2017). Crisis elections, new contenders and government formation: Breaking the mould in Southern Europe. London: Routledge. Bruneau, T., Diamandouros, N. P., Gunther, R., Lijphart, A., Morlino, L. and Brooks, R. A., (2001). Democracy, southern European style. In: R. Gunther and N. P. Diamandorous, eds. Parties, politics and democracy in the new Southern Europe. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 16–82. Diamandouros, N. P. and Gunther, R., eds. (2001). Parties, politics and democracy in the new Southern Europe. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Döring, H. and Manow, P. (2016). Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov): Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies. Development version available at www.parlgov.org. Accessed on 8 June 2017. Emanuele, V. (2016). Dataset of electoral volatility and its internal components in Western Europe (1945–2015). Available at doi:10.7802/1112. Accessed on 8 June 2017, Rome: Italian Centre for Electoral Studies.

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Emanuele, V. and Chiaramonte, A. (2018). A growing impact of new parties: Myth or reality? Party system innovation in Western Europe after 1945. Party Politics 24(5), 475–487. Eurostat (2000–18). Available at ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database. Accessed on 8 June 2017. Ferrín, M. and Kriesi, H., eds. (2016). How Europeans view and evaluate democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Field, B. N. (2016). Por qué funcionan los gobiernos minoritarios. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch. Freire, A. (2005). Party system change in Portugal, 1975–2005: The role of social, political and ideological factors. Portuguese Journal of Social Science 4(2), 81–100. Freire, A. and Lisi, M. (2016). Political parties, citizens and the economic crisis: The evolution of Southern European democracies. Portuguese Journal of Social Science 15(2), 153–171. Freire, A., Lisi, M. and Tsatsanis, E. (2016). Portuguese citizens survey 2016–2018: Research project at CIES-IUL and IPRI-NOVA, Crisis, political representation and democratic renewal: The Portuguese case in the Southern European context, FCT: PTDC/IVC-CPO/3098/2014, available at er.cies.iscte-iul.pt. Accessed on 8 June 2017. Gallagher, M. (2017). Election indices dataset. Available at www.tcd.ie/Political_Sci ence/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/index.php. Accessed on 26 September 2017. Gallagher, M., Laver, M. and Mair, P. (2011). Representative government in modern Europe. New York: McGraw-Hill. Gunther, R. and Montero, J. R. (2001). The anchors of partisanship. In: P. N. Diamandouros and R. Gunther, eds. Parties, politics and democracy in the new Southern Europe. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 83–152. Gunther, R. and Montero, J. R. (2009). The politics of Spain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gunther, R., Diamandouros, P. N. and Puhle, H. J., eds. (1995). The politics of democratic consolidation: Southern Europe in comparative perspective. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Hobolt, S. and Tilley, J. (2016). Fleeing the centre: The rise of challenger parties in the aftermath of the Euro crisis. West European Politics 39(6), 971–991. Jalali, C. (2007). Partidos e democracia em Portugal 1974–2005. Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais. Katsourides, Y. (2016). Delegitimization accelerated: Democracy, accountability and the troika experience in Cyprus. Portuguese Journal of Social Science 15(2), 195–216. Laakso, M. and Taagepera, R. (1979). The ‘effective’ number of parties: A measure with application to West Europe. Comparative Political Studies 12(1), 3–27. Lisi, M. (2015). As eleições legislativas no Portugal democrático, 1975–2015. Lisbon: Assembleia da República. Lisi, M. (2016). U-turn: The Portuguese radical left from marginality to government support. South European Society and Politics 21(4), 541–560. Lobo, M. C. and Santana-Pereira, J. (2015). Uma proposta para a reforma do sistema político, In: V. Soromenho-Marques and P. Trigo Pereiram, eds. Afirmar o futuro: políticas públicas para Portugal. Lisbon: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, pp. 38–66. Mainwaring, S. P. and Torcal, M. (2006). Party system institutionalization and party system theory after the third wave of democratization. In: R. S. Katz and W. J. Crotty, eds. Handbook of party politics. London: SAGE, pp. 204–227. Mair, P. (2013). Ruling the void: The hollowing of western democracy. London: Verso.

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Matthijs, M. (2014). Mediterranean blues: The crisis in Southern Europe. Journal of Democracy 25(1), 101–115. Medina, L. (2016). Crisis, changes and uncertainty: Spanish party system after the Great Recession. Portuguese Journal of Social Science 15(2), 237–254. Montero, J. R. and Riera, P. (2016). El sistema electoral español: entre la desproporcionalidad, la igualdad y la reforma. Cuadernos de Alzate 48–9, 253–276. Morlino, L. (1998). Democracy between consolidation and crisis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Morlino, L. and Raniolo, F. (2017). The impact of the economic crisis on South European democracies. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Muro, D. and Vidal, G. (2016). Political mistrust in Southern Europe since the Great Recession. Mediterranean Politics 22(2), 197–217. Newell, J. L. (2010). The politics of Italy: Governance in a normal country. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Neto, O. Amorim, and Lobo, M. Costa (2009). Portugal semi-presidentialism’s (re) considered: An assessment of the president role’s in the policy process, 1976–2006. European Journal of Political Research 48(2): 234–255. Pasquino, G. (1995). Executive-legislative relations in Southern Europe. In: R. Gunther, P. N. Diamandouros and H.-J. Puhle, eds. The politics of democratic consolidation: Southern Europe in comparative perspective. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 261–283. Pasquino, G. (2013). L’elasticita della presidenza della repubblica. Quaderni Costituzionali 33(1), 111–114. Powell, E. N. and Tucker, J. A. (2014). Revisiting electoral volatility in post-communist countries: New data, new results and new approaches. British Journal of Political Science 44(1), 123–147. Puhle, H.-J. (2001). Mobilizers and late modernizers: Socialist parties in the new Southern Europe. In: R. Gunther and N. P. Diamandorous, eds. Parties, politics and democracy in the New Southern Europe. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, pp. 268–328. Puntscher Riekman, S. and Wydra, D. (2013). Representation in the European state of emergency: Parliaments against governments? Journal of European Integration 35 (5), 565–582. Roberts, K. M. (2017). Party politics in hard times: Comparative perspectives on the European and Latin American economic crises. European Journal of Political Research 56(2), 218–233. Sanches, E. Rodrigues (2017). Os sistemas partidários em perspectiva comparada. In: T. Fernandes, ed. Variedades de democracia na Europa do Sul, 1968–2016. Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, pp. 127–163 Sánchez-Cuenca, I. (2014). La impotencia democratica. Madrid: La Catarata. Sartori, G. (1976). Parties and party systems: A framework for analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Simón, P. (2016). The challenges of the new Spanish multipartism: Government formation failure and the 2016 general election. South European Society and Politics 21(4), 493–517. Tsatsanis, E. (2016). Politics in the depressed republic: Transformation and continuity in Greece during the crisis. Portuguese Journal of Social Science 15(2), 255–274.

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The Study of Political Representation in Greece Towards New Patterns Following the Economic Crisis? Eftichia Teperoglou, Ioannis Andreadis and Theodore Chadjipadelis

Introduction The study of political representation in Greece flourished both theoretically and empirically in the late 2000s. There are some seminal works on the study of political elites during the 1960s, but all research initiatives came to an end with the collapse of the democratic regime in 1967 and the start of the sevenyear dictatorship. However, the study of political representation did not attract scholarly attention, even at the start of the post-authoritarian period: it is only since 2006 – a time when Greece has taken part in comparative projects related to this field – that interest has grown. With the onset of the economic crisis, studies emerged comparing the ideology and value orientations of the political elite with those of voters, as well as their opinions on the origins of the crisis and the bailout agreements. In Greece, the relationship between the elites and the population has been particularly threatened by the economic crisis. It is known that representation is a crucial element of liberal democracy, and within the media and among citizens and protest movements during the crisis period there was a widespread debate about the quality and character of policy representation in harsh economic times. In other words, the study of political representation has, to some extent, benefited as a consequence of the crisis. For example, new research directions have been developed focusing on the degree of congruence between voters and political elites. Following the major objectives of this edited volume, the aim of this chapter is to provide insights into the history of political representation studies in Greece. As in all chapters in this volume, we account for the distinction between descriptive and substantive political representation (see Pitkin 1967). This categorisation is a central element in the study of the mechanisms shaping the character of political representation in any representative democracy. In terms of substantive representation, the quality of political representation is possibly linked to high levels of congruence on different ideological and attitudinal positions held by representatives and citizens. Descriptive representation, on the other hand, implies the socio-demographic characteristics of

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elected representatives should mirror those of the citizens. Even though the composition of an elected executive body can never be ideal, there are different ways to achieve a high level of descriptive representation (e.g. using quotas for minority groups, for women, etc.). This chapter has two main objectives. The first is to explore the theoretical foundation of these studies. The history of this field is presented in such a way as to shed some light on the roots and evolution of the study of political representation in Greece. The second is to provide an overview of the most important findings on political representation in Greece by comparing the period before the crisis with its peak and the post-crisis period. Here we aim to show how the patterns of political representation have changed over this timeframe. The following section contains a description of the context that should be taken into account in any study of political representation in Greece, before going on to present the origins of this line of study and analyse new main research paths. We then set out the key findings in terms of descriptive and substantive political representation in an attempt to answer the main research questions set by this volume. It should be noted that the chapter focuses on a secondary analysis of the available publications and the selection of findings on substantive representation presented is therefore based exclusively on existing literature for the Greek case. The final section presents our conclusions and sets out future paths for researching political representation in Greece.

The Context of the Study of Political Representation in Greece Informal Channels of Political Representation in Greece Any attempt to study political representation in Greece must be placed in a specific context. The first and major characteristic of this context in Greece is the party penetration of state and social institutions. As Pappas (1999) notes, Greek political parties hold a predominant position and neither the Greek state nor Greek civic society can act autonomously – at least prior to the onset of the economic crisis (see also the discussion by Marangudakis and Chadjipadelis 2019). It could be argued that this pattern changed after the collapse of the two-party system in 2012 (see Teperoglou and Tsatsanis 2014; Verney 2014; Tsatsanis 2018), when civic society started playing a more active role and non-conventional forms of protest became more commonplace (Sotiropoulos 2014). The second main feature of this context is the dominance of various forms of clientelism (Featherstone 2005; Haralambis 1989). The steady alternation of power between the centre-left PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) and the centre-right ND (New Democracy) since the restoration of democracy in 1974 and the extreme majoritarianism allowed PASOK and ND to develop a modernised version of the patron–client system with party linkages and clientelistic ties (Teperoglou and Tsatsanis 2014: 224). It should also be noted that while some actors are more open to change

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(reformers), others are more resistant (traditionalists). This was particularly apparent during and after the transition to democracy and is also very marked among the Greek political elite. In other words, the modernisation project in the Greek context has economic, political and cultural aspects.1 Globalisation and Europeanisation have created new and reinforced existing domestic cleavages that are based on competing notions of reform, economic interest and identity. Change and continuity are juxtaposed as domestic fault lines across the domestic system (Featherstone and Kazamias 2000: 13). As shown below, the emergence of a pro-/anti-European cleavage in the Greek political landscape has challenged the European-ness of the Greek political elite (and of citizens) (Teperoglou, Freire, Andreadis and Viegas 2014). A Legitimacy Crisis after the Onset of the Economic Crisis? Satisfaction with democracy in Greece fell to historically low levels during the crisis, while levels of trust in national (and European) political actors were in single digits (Teperoglou and Tsatsanis 2014). After 2009, there were signs of a European Union (EU) legitimacy crisis among PASOK and ND candidates: in 2009, just 34 per cent of ND and PASOK candidates expressed satisfaction with EU democracy. In 2012–13, 72 per cent of Greek candidates declared their discontent, with the figure rising to 75 per cent in 2015.2 Moreover, in 2015 the Greek political elites attributed much of the blame for the economic crisis to the EU a total of 44 per cent answered ‘very or extremely responsible for the crisis’, see also Teperoglou, Freire, Andreadis and Viegas 2014. This raises the question of whether there is a straightforward trade-off between the level of support for democracy and a preference for authoritarian solutions. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no systematic and longitudinal study of satisfaction with the current regime and democracy in Greece before and after the economic crisis, and we therefore present some findings related to this topic below. A study of supporters of antigovernment protests (the Greek Indignants) found people disappointed with representative politics (fewer than one-quarter of the sample supported the idea that the best way to take decisions is through elected governments and representative democratic institutions) (Georgiadou, Kafe, Nezi and Pieridis 2019). In another study comparing Portugal and Greece, Teixeira, Tsatsanis and Belchior (2014) conclude the Greek case is a cause for greater concern regarding the levels of support for parliamentary democracy. Differences in the levels of diffuse support are observed in the indicators from 2008 to 2012, which can be attributed to voters from the Independent Greeks party (ANEL) and the neo-fascist Golden Dawn. Overall, during the depth of the economic recession, Golden Dawn enjoyed some electoral strength at a time when there was a dramatic decline in the level of trust in political parties, politicians, the Greek parliament and the Greek government (Teperoglou and Tsatsanis 2014). This was accompanied by serious waves of civil unrest alongside a rise in levels of radicalism, extremism and populism (Dinas, Georgiadou, Konstantinidis and Rori 2013).

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80% 70% 60%

Trust parties Trust government Trust parliament

50% 40%

Trust EU Commission

30% 20% 10% 0%

Figure 2.1 Trust in political institutions in Greece (1999–2016). Source: Eurobarometer data taken from the analysis by Tsatsanis (2018: 115–36).

Studying Political Representation in Greece The Beginnings The study of Greek political elites dates to the late 1960s. The first studies of political representation in the country focused exclusively on individuals and were purely theoretical, with the analyses based on biographical data on politicians. Motivated by theories of modernisation, the main aim of these studies was to provide an overview of the profile of political elites in accordance with socio-economic changes in Greek society rather than an analysis of political power relations in Greece. Keith Legg’s monograph covering the period 1843–1965 was among the first of these studies. He examined the educational background, occupation, family tradition in politics and regional origin of ministers. He also conducted a sample survey of 55 MPs in the 1964 parliament (Legg 1969). His work has been subjected to criticism for focusing on just one aspect of the Greek political system: the clientelist networks (for a discussion see Sotiropoulos and Bourikos 2003). Nevertheless, it is considered the starting point in the study of Greek political elites. A later study looks at the Greek ministerial elite from 1946 to 1976 and asked whether the renewal of the elites had kept pace with the modernisation of the Greek economy and society after the Second World War (Koutsoukis 1982). Its major conclusion is that the traditional characteristics of the ministerial elite profile remained unchanged despite the economic and socio-cultural changes that had taken place in Greek society. Other studies focus on biographical notes or profiles of prime ministers.3 Overall, the early studies of political elites were linked to the third wave of democratisation (Higley and Gunther 1992) and most focused on the profile and social background of the political elites and their skills and professional origins.4

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Moving from biographical to more in-depth analyses, we find the case study of 19th-century Greek politicians from the southern region of Achaia that examined the decline of old-style notables and the presence of family trees of politicians in that region (Lyrintzis 1992). As Sotiropoulos and Bourikos (2003) point out, no studies focus on ministerial elites in the immediate post-authoritarian period (1974–81). A small number address parliamentary elites, while others focus on ND (Pappas 1999) or PASOK MPs. Overall, the 1980s and 1990s are considered a period of stagnation with little academic research on political representation. The only available information on parliamentary elites are articles from newspapers usually published in the aftermath of a national election (Sotiropoulos and Bourikos 2003). Summing up, when the Greek party system entered into metapolitefsi (the period after the fall of the dictatorship in 1974), there were no systematic studies of political elites. In other words, the fragmentary and disjointed nature of the study of political elites during this important period during which Greek democracy was consolidated poses obstacles for any systematic and longitudinal study in this research field. However, as we will see below, this period of stagnation was followed by one in which the framework for the study of political representation in Greece fostered an empirical, more systematic and cross-national outlook. In this respect, the Greek case follows a research path that is comparable with other countries, as presented in this edited volume. From the Period of Stagnation towards the Evolution of the Field The study of political representation in Greece found a new and more empirical research direction thanks to participation in comparative projects analysing political elites. In 2005, Greece was represented in the comparative project ‘Integrated and United: A Quest for Citizenship in an Ever Closer Europe’ (IntUne project) by a research group from the University of Athens and, two years later, researchers from the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki joined the Comparative Candidates Survey (CCS) project. Since then, the study of political representation has not only become more systematic, but the more empirical orientation has raised various new research questions in terms of analysing substantive political representation for the first time. Moreover, it should be noted that developments in this research field were accompanied by the implementation of voter studies and the analysis of party manifestos.5 In other words, the activities and publications of scholars seeking to provide a comprehensive understanding of the operation of representative democracy and legitimacy in modern Greece as a whole were made possible by the study of political elites (both candidates running for national elections and elected MPs), analyses of the programmatic commitments (party manifestos) of relevant political parties to national (and European) elections and more in-depth studies of the demand-side political competition (voting behaviour and party choices) in Greece. During this period, the relevant literature also includes

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case studies analysing specific topics of descriptive political representation, which also made an important contribution to the evolution of this research in Greece. More specifically, Sotiropoulos and Bourikos (2003) provide a detailed analysis of the changes in ministerial elites over time (1843–2001), Pantelidou-Malouta (2006) analysed gender, while Patrikios and Chatzikonstantinou (2015) examined dynastic politics in Greece, focusing on family ties in the Greek parliament from 2000 to 2012. Overview of Projects on Political Representation ‘Integrated and United: A Quest for Citizenship in an Ever Closer Europe’ was the first comparative study of political elites in which Greece participated.6 The project was launched in 2005 with European citizenship as its main research topic (Conti, Cotta and Tavares de Almeida 2010). The Greek survey took place between February and June 2007 (Nezi, Sotiropoulos and Toka 2010).7 This chapter refers to the project’s findings on the attitudes of Greek political elites towards the EU. These attitudes are also analysed within the scope of the more recent project, ‘European National Elites and the Eurozone Crisis’ (ENEC–2014) (Tsirbas and Sotiropoulos 2015).8 Greece’s participation in the CCS in 2007 was another major step in the study of the country’s political representation. The main goal of this project is to collect data on candidates running for national parliamentary elections.9 The Greek candidate surveys were conducted by the Laboratory of Applied Political Research at the School of Political Sciences Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. The first Greek CCS survey was in 2007, with further surveys in 2009, 2012 and 2015. Though usually based on a mixedmode methodology, the first mode is always a web-survey (Andreadis 2016) with invitations and reminders sent to the email address of the candidates. The methodological details of these surveys are presented in another chapter of this volume (see Chapter 7). Overall, we can conclude that the selection of the target population of the Greek CCS was determined by various factors, including the limited funds available and the availability of contact details (e.g. candidates with no email address or inability to access information). Finally, it is essential to include the rich dataset on the ‘Study of the Profile of the Greek Parliamentary Elites (1996–2015)’ provided by the National Centre for Social Research in this short overview of the available studies.10 It constitutes a major contribution to the study of descriptive representation (Kakepaki 2016). It should be noted that the collection of this information for the Greek case is extremely difficult as the Hellenic (Greek) parliament provides very little information and parliament’s volumes with biographical details of MPs only cover up to 2007. In short, the in-depth and comprehensive study of political elites in Greece is hampered by both the lack of information and funding problems for research.

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The Evolution of Descriptive Representation in Greece: Comparing the Period Before and After the Economic Crisis This section strives to determine whether different trends of descriptive representation can be depicted for the periods before and after the economic crisis in Greece. The first observation is that the composition of the Greek parliament changed. Immediately before the general elections of May 2012, more than one-third of MPs in the Greek parliament broke away from their former parliamentary groups, with many forming or joining new political parties. Moreover, almost half of the members of parliament following the May 2012 election had been elected for the first time (Kakepaki 2016: 23). The extremely fluid and fragmented political landscape after the 2012 double earthquake elections is reflected in the composition of the Greek parliament. The predominant pattern until 2009 was of little parliamentary representation of communists or the radical left, but a majority group of either socialists or centreright MPs. This situation changed with the onset of the crisis. After the 2015 national elections in particular, the majority of MPs were from the radical left and parliament consisted of communists, socialists and centre-right representatives, as well as MPs from new parties (the centrist liberal party, Potami, the neo-fascist party of Golden Dawn and the radical right populist party of Independent Greeks). Moreover, there was an increasing number of independents in parliament. After the general elections of July 2019, the composition of the Greek parliament differed from the previous one in three aspects. Most MPs come from the centre-right party ND, with MPs representing SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left) forming the second-largest parliamentary group. Golden Dawn did not achieve the 3 per cent electoral threshold, so none of its candidates were elected. Two new parties entered parliament: the new populist party of the radical right, Greek Solution, and the radical left-wing European Realistic Disobedience Front (Mera25). The other MPs are from the communist and socialist parties. Overall, we can conclude that since the onset of the economic crisis, many new political forces have entered the Greek parliament and that the political landscape had still not stabilised during 2019. Are these changes also reflected in the socio-demographic profile of the MPs themselves? Or in other words, has the entrance of the new parties to parliament and the collapse of the old two-party system challenged the typical profile of the Greek political elites? The findings on women’s participation in the Greek parliament reveal that the most common patterns are of low participation, women do not occupy cabinet seats and that few are re-elected. The evidence highlights the problem of reconciling family duties with a career as an MP (Pantelidou-Malouta 2006; Kakepaki 2016). Using the Socioscope database (from the period between 1989 and 2019) we conclude that the parliamentary term during which SYRIZA was in power following the January 2015 general election was the one with the highest proportion of female MPs (23.2 per cent), while the parliament elected in June 1989 had the lowest

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proportion of female MPs (only 4 per cent). Overall, as Kakepaki, Kountouri. Verzichelli and Coller (2018: 185) note, during the crisis there was no swift change towards a more gender-balanced Greek parliament; nevertheless, more women have been elected since 2009 than during the previous period (see also Table 2.1). Based on the Socioscope data for the period 1989–2019 we can assume MPs have a traditional profile: middleaged men who have attended higher education and who come from traditional political professions, especially lawyers and doctors (Kakepaki 2016; Kakepaki and Karayiannis 2016). This notwithstanding, the traditionally high percentage of lawyers elected to parliament starts to decline in 1996 and registered a particularly sharp fall in 2012 (from 32.6 per cent in the 1996–2000 parliamentary term to 23 per cent in July 2019). We also see a rise in the number of university professors elected to parliament at the height of the crisis (8.3 per cent in 2012 and 8.9 per cent in 2015) compared to the post-crisis period (6.7 per cent in 2019). It became increasingly important for politicians to have a more technocratic background, perhaps due to the crisis. Table 2.1 summarises some of the socio-demographic data for MPs from the pre-crisis period (March 2004 election) to its peak (June 2012 election) and the post-crisis period (July 2019 election). It can be argued that the different ideological backgrounds of MPs after the June 2012 elections also reflect the differentiation in their professional occupation background. The age of MPs has also changed slightly, with MPs elected during the crisis period being younger than those in the other two parliamentary terms. In terms of occupational groups, university professors, doctors, engineers, lawyers and journalists are significantly over-represented, while skilled and unskilled service and manual workers (who make up the majority of the employed population) have virtually no representation in parliament – with the interesting exception of the national elections of June 2012 (see Table 2.1), perhaps because of the higher number of MPs representing SYRIZA. Moving to some other distinctive characteristics, the recruitment channels changed with the onset of the crisis; more specifically, party organisations are no longer the main source of recruitment. For example, the MPs in parliament after the January 2015 elections were also recruited on the basis of technical expertise (academics), their participation in civil society or due to previous involvement in social movements and trade unions. Previous experience in local authorities and/ or in positions in European institutions was scarce, especially among SYRIZA MPs when the party was in government between 2015 and 2019 (Karoulas 2015; Kountouri 2018). Another main finding is that education is a very important indicator for a parliamentary career and is strongly related to previous party experience. The percentage of MPs with a doctorate fell slightly after the onset of the crisis. In addition, there is a positive association between a high level of educational attainment and experience in cabinet or EU-level positions (Kountouri 2018). Finally, family ties among parliamentarians became less common in the 2012 elections than they were before the

Table 2.1 Descriptive representation in Greece (2004–19) (%) MPs 2004

MPs June 2012

MPs 2019

85.9 14.1 100.0 (300)

77.8 22.2 100.0 (300)

78.7 21.3 100.0 (300)

0.0 7.3 31.6 39.0 21.4 0.3 100.0 (300)

1.0 12.4 23.2 39.4 19.0 5.1 100.0 (300)

1.0 10.0 19.3 29.7 26.0 14.0 100.0 (300)

5.1 77.7

7.6 67.5

4.7 72.6

15.0 2.2 100.0 (300)

13.3 11.6 100.0 (300)

14.0 8.7 100.0 (300)

6.1 24.0 42.5

5.4 18.7 35.2

6.7 23.0 40.3

7.0 3.5 1.6 0.6 8.0

8.3 4.4 3.2 1.6 12.4

6.7 3.0 2.0 2.0 6.0

6.4 0.3 100.0 (300)

8.6 2.2 100.0 (300)

7.3 3.0 100.0 (300)

Gender Male Female Total Age 25–9 30–9 40–9 50–9 60+ (data not available) Total (N/n) Education Below university education University education (including postgraduate) PhD level Not mentioned/ data not available Total (N/n) Occupation Managers, entrepreneurs, owners Legal professions Other professions (doctor, engineer, journalist) University professors Teachers Artists/athletes Armed forces/law enforcement White-collar employees, service and manual workers, technicians, etc. Other (not specified) Data not available Total (N/n)

Source: Authors’ data elaborated from the Socioscope database (wwww.socioscope.gr).

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economic crisis. However, as Patrikios and Chatzikonstantinou (2015: 107) argue, this conclusion does not apply to notable political families.

Evidence of Substantive Representation in Greece Moving to the main findings on substantive representation in Greece, there are two research strands related to the main themes of this edited volume. The first is on the attitudes of the Greek political elites towards the EU (and in comparison with voters) and the impact of the economic crisis. The second set of findings addresses ideological and attitudinal congruence. The Greek Political Elite’s Attitudes to Europe vis-à-vis those of the Electorate The Greek political elite’s attitudes towards the (EU) European Union, European integration and the European identity before and after the onset of the economic crisis tend to be the research topics most frequently analysed. Evidence from previous studies of political elites in Southern Europe (Conti et al. 2010) usually confirm that before the Great Recession, Southern Europe was generally pro-European; so regional economic and political integration did not prove to be particularly divisive topics, despite the growing politicisation of grievances towards the EU, particularly from smaller parties on the left and right (Teperoglou and Tsatsanis 2011). Before the economic crisis, the Greek electorate and political elites (with the exception of the Communist Party, KKE) were overwhelmingly pro-European (Teperoglou, Chadjipadelis and Andreadis 2010). However, the bailout, austerity packages and EU solutions for the debt crisis clearly changed these attitudes. While most of the blame for the economic recession was attributed to national actors rather than to the EU or the banking system or the banking system (Teperoglou, Freire, Andreadis and Viegas 2014), some Greek citizens held the EU responsible for the deterioration of both their individual and the nation’s economic conditions (Freire, Lisi, Andreadis and Viegas 2014). Tsirbas and Sotiropoulos (2015) conclude that the crisis influenced MPs’ perceptions of representation in the EU. On the one hand, they found that, with the exception of Golden Dawn and Independent Greek MPs, European identity was stronger in 2014 than in 2007, even among SYRIZA MPs. On the other hand, in 2014 a vast majority (more than 80 per cent) of Greek MPs were of the opinion that Greek interests were not being taken into account in the EU’s decision-making centres (compared with fewer than 30 per cent of MPs in 2007). The findings of the IntUne survey show that the views of the Greek political elites in 2007 depended on political ideology and party affiliation. European identity was only supplementary and ethnocentrism was a main characteristic among MPs (Nezi, Sotiropoulos and Toka 2010). Finally, the study by Freire, Moury and Teperoglou (2014) shows that the radical-left and the radical-right elites in Greece are more supportive of the EU than their voters, and that the central (left and right) political elite are always much more supportive of the EU than their constituents.11Another

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interesting finding is that while there was a decline in voter support for the EU in 2012, the authors do not detect a similar trend among the political elite. In other words, there has been almost no change in the level of support from the political elite perspective. Moreover, leftist positions (extreme position on the left–right scale or pro-state intervention values) are associated with lower support for the EU. Finally, comparing attitudes towards the EU in association with the bailout agreements, the analysis in this paper shows that negative evaluations of the troika agreement are associated with lower support for the EU, both in instrumental (EU membership) and political (further EU unification, evaluation of the performance of EU democracy) terms. This is especially evident among Greek voters, although less to among candidates. Candidate–Voter Congruence on Ideological and Attitudinal Stances Turning to the study of congruence on different ideological and attitudinal stances, it is impossible to reach any generalised conclusions due to the lack of appropriate studies. Andreadis and Stavrakakis (2017) analysed congruence between voters and candidates on various matters (positions on the economic left–right index, positions on cultural issues, attitudes towards the austerity measures enforced during the economic crisis, etc.) and found high levels of congruence between PASOK voters and candidates on almost all items, and low levels of congruence between SYRIZA voters and candidates in most aspects. More specifically, SYRIZA candidates are farther to the left than voters in the left–right self-placement.12 In another study, Freire et al. (2018) compare data from 2007 and 2015 on the left–right self-placement of candidates and voters, and concluded that the overall level of ideological congruence was relatively low over this timeframe, despite the increase in party supply. Furthermore, candidates are located farther to the left than voters on economic policy, while candidates of the current incumbent party seem to adopt more positive stances towards immigrants than their electorate. Finally, voters give more conservative responses to the battery of questions on law and order than candidates (Andreadis and Stavrakakis 2017). The only dimensions in which there are high levels of congruence between SYRIZA candidates and voters are populist attitudes (calculated by the ‘populist index’, see Andreadis and Stavrakakis 2017) and anti-austerity measures. This confirms the extreme polarisation between those who saw the bailout and the Memorandum of Understanding (mnemonio) as a lifeline for the Greek economy (mnemoniakoi) during the crisis period and those who actually believed it was why the economic crisis was so severe and protracted (antimnemoniakoi) (Teperoglou, Tsatsanis and Nicolacopoulos 2015: 336). These anti-bailout stances were accompanied by populist rhetoric and gave the leader of SYRIZA, Alexis Tsipras, ample space for manoeuvre in the formation of governments (Andreadis and Stavrakakis 2017). The study by Teperoglou, Freire, Andreadis and Viegas (2014) compares the responses of Greek voters and candidates to various statements about the

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first bailout and finds most Greek voters evaluated the bailout negatively. Moreover, the results show that the bailout agreement is almost entirely rejected by the majority of candidates standing in the 2012 general election. Overall, we observe exceptionally high levels of congruence, possibly because the candidates for the 2012 elections expressed even more negative opinions about the decision to accept the bailout agreement than their voters. As for the issue of responsibility for the crisis, the candidates tended to blame their own government and bankers and attribute less blame to the EU. We conclude that the Greek elite were more ideologically consistent and had more coherent views on the economic crisis and bailout agreements during the economic crisis than the electorate. Furthermore, the fact SYRIZA candidates and voters share the same positions on the bailout, anti-austerity policies and populist attitudes and not on other ideological and attitudinal stances indicates the importance of attitudes towards the economic crisis in voter choice. Alternatively, this could also be an indicator of the low quality of representative democracy.

Concluding Remarks This chapter presents an overview of the studies on political representation in Greece – the country affected most severely by the economic and political fallout from the crisis. Both the political and institutional contexts have changed remarkably since the onset of the economic crisis. From 2010 to 2019, the country experienced five general elections, three bailout agreements and a referendum on the final rescue plan, while the old party system changed beyond recognition between 2009 and 2015. In this context, the study of political representation becomes particularly important. Nevertheless, this area of research has not been fully developed in Greece, in part due to the lack of funding available to gather representative data. As the internet has been one of the main methods for data collection in Greece, funding for internet-based research methods should be improved. Moreover, Greece does not have an established research repository or parliamentary observatory for the delivery and deposit of data on the parliamentary elites. Collaborations should be developed between research teams and the Greek parliament to establish a network for the profound study of political elites. Despite these difficulties, some important research work and outcomes have been presented here. The analysis of descriptive representation reveals evidence of some changes since the start of the crisis. The composition of the Greek parliament altered in the wake of the crisis, most notably in terms of MPs’ educational background, occupations, previous experience and recruitment channels; however, the changes we observe are not linked to short-term factors (the Great Recession) but rather we suspect reflect more long-term trends that may have been triggered by the crisis. Turning to the study of substantive representation, we begin by noting the lack of available studies. We discovered the crisis influenced how MPs

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perceived representation in the EU, the process of European integration and their evaluation of how EU institutions handled the crisis, but the electorate were not influenced to the same extent. In addition to indicators of a legitimacy crisis, we identified low levels of congruence, especially among SYRIZA voters and candidates, although this was not the case in respect of populist attitudes and opinions on the economic crisis. These indicators raise doubts about the quality of political representation and whether citizen preferences are translated into policy-making and policy outputs. However, these observations should be interpreted with caution as no systematic and longitudinal studies have been conducted in Greece. More systematic research is required to explore this critical case of Greece further in the evolving area of political representation.

Notes 1 2 3 4 5

6

7

8

9 10

See the analysis of the ‘underdog culture’ in Greece in Diamandouros (1994). Data elaborated from the Comparative Candidates Surveys. For an overview of these studies see Sotiropoulos and Bourikos (2003). See Almeida, Pinto and Bermeo (2003) for a comparative study of Southern Europe. Greece’s participation in the COST Action ‘the True European Voter’ coordinated by MZES (University of Mannheim) contributed significantly to the establishment of the Hellenic National Election Study (ELNES). For further details see www. elnes.gr. It was organised by 29 European institutions, coordinated by the University of Siena, Italy, and financed by the EU within the 6th Framework Programme. The Greek partner was the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Athens, under the supervision of Professor Sotiropoulos. A sample survey of Greek parliamentarians was conducted using the standard project questionnaire. In total 90 of the 300 MPs were interviewed, including 32 who had served at least once as minister or junior minister. They were selected through quota sampling. The ENEC-2014 is a research project to evaluate how the economic and political crisis affecting European countries (particularly those in the Eurozone) since 2008 has affected the attitudes of national political elites towards the EU (enec-2014. wix.com/enec-2014). The Greek research team interviewed 74 Greek MPs between February and October 2014. The project was coordinated by MZES, University of Mannheim, and the data management is now organised by FORS, Switzerland (www.comparativecandida tes.org), with further information in chapter 7 of this volume. Socioscope. Profile of the Greek Political Elites, www.socioscope.gr. The variables included in this database are: parliamentary term, sex and year of birth, occupation, field of education and highest level of educational attainment, year of first election, party of election, electoral district and magnitude of electoral district, relation with constituency of election, relation with other MP, service in the EU parliament, position in current government, participation in local government, party role, past governmental position, number of parliamentary terms, participation in trade unions, changes during parliamentary term. In this chapter we use data from this dataset, which is now updated and includes data from 1989 to 2019.

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11 Nevertheless, the data should be interpreted with some caution because the CCS data used herein do not include data for communist elites (KKE) and include only limited data for radical-right elites (LAOS, ANEL and Golden Dawn). 12 See also Freire et al. (2018) for similar conclusions.

References Almeida, P. T. de, Pinto, A. C. and Bermeo, N. (2003). Who governs Southern Europe? Regime change and ministerial recruitment, 1850–2000. London: Frank Cass. Andreadis, I. (2016). The Greek candidate study 2015. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. Available at doi:10.3886/ E62191V1. Accessed on 3 January 2016. Andreadis, I. and Stavrakakis, Y. (2017). European populist parties in government: How well are voters represented? Evidence from Greece. Swiss Political Science Review 23(4), 485–508. Conti, N. Cotta, M. and Tavares de Almeida, P. (2010). Southern Europe: A distinctive and more pro-European region in the EU? South European Society and Politics 15(1), 121–142. Diamandouros, N. (1994). Cultural dualism and political change in post-authoritarian Greece. Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, Working Paper 50. Madrid: Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones. Dinas, E., Georgiadou, V., Konstantinidis, I. and Rori, L. (2013). From dusk to dawn: Local party organization and party success of right-wing extremism. Party Politics 22(1), 80–92. Featherstone, K. (2005). Introduction: Modernization and the structural constraints of Greek politics. West European Politics 28(2), 223–241. Featherstone, K. and Kazamias, G. (2000) Introduction: Southern Europe and the process of ‘Europeanization’. South European Society and Politics 5(2), 1–24. Freire, A., Coller, X., Segatti, P., Pedrazzani, A. and Tsatsanis, E. (2018). Descriptive and substantive representation in Southern Europe: A general overview before and after the Great Recession. ECPR conference, 22–5 August, Hamburg. Freire, A., Lisi, M., Andreadis, I. and Viegas, J. M. L. (2014). Political representation in bailed-out Southern Europe: Greece and Portugal compared. South European Society and Politics 19(4), 1–21. Freire, A., Moury, C. and Teperoglou, E. (2014). The puzzle of attitudes towards European integration in Greece and Portugal under harsh economic times: Comparing elites’ and citizens’ attitudes before and after the bailout agreements. South European Society and Politics 19(4), 477–499. Georgiadou, V., Kafe, A., Nezi, S. and Pieridis, C. (2019). Plebiscitarian spirit in the square: Key characteristics of the Greek Indignants. International Journal of Politics Culture and Society 32(1), 43–59. Haralambis, D. (1989). Clientelistic relations and populism [Πελατειακές σχέσεις και λαϊκισμός] Athens: Exantas. Higley, J. and Gunther, R., eds. (1992). Elites and democratic consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kakepaki, M., ed. (2016). Political representation in contemporary Greece 1996–2015: characteristics of Greek MPs 1996–2015 [Η Πολιτική Αντιπροσώπευση στη σύγχρονη Ελλάδα: χαρακτηριστικά και φυσιογνωμία των μελών του ελληνικού Κοινοβουλίου 1996–2015]. Athens: EKKE-Papazissis.

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Kakepaki, M. and Karayiannis, Y. (2016). Professional politicians and political professions in the Greek parliament [Επαγγελματίες πολιτικοί και πολιτικά επαγγέλματα στο ελληνικό Κοινοβούλιο]. In: M. Kakepaki, ed. Political representation in contemporary Greece: Characteristics of Greek MPs 1996–2015 [Η Πολιτική Αντιπροσώπευση στη σύγχρονη Ελλάδα: χαρακτηριστικά και φυσιογνωμία των μελών του ελληνικού Κοινοβουλίου 1996–2015]. Athens: EKKE-Papazissis, pp. 85–108. Kakepaki, M., Kountouri, F., Verzichelli, L. and Coller, X. (2018). The sociopolitical profile of parliamentary representatives in Greece, Italy and Spain before and after the eurocrisis. A comparative empirical assessment. In: G. Cordero and X. Coller, eds. Democratizing candidate selection: New methods, old receipts? London: Palgrave, pp. 175–200. Karoulas, G. (2015). Greek political culture has changed beyond recognition since the crisis began. In: Evidence-based analysis and commentary on European politics. London School of Economics and Political Science. Available at blogs.lse.ac.uk/ europpblog/2015/03/25/greek-political-culture-has-changed-beyon d-recognition-since-the-crisis-began. Accessed on 25 March 2015. Kountouri, F. (2018) Patterns of renewal and continuity in parliamentary elites. The Greek MPs from 1996 to 2015. Journal of Legislative Studies 24(4), 568–586. Available at doi: doi:10.1080/13572334.2018.1547947 Koutsoukis, K. S. (1982). Political leadership in modern Greece: Cabinet elite circulation and systemic change, 1946–1976. Athens: Athena. Legg, K. (1969). Politics in modern Greece. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Lyrintzis, Chr. (1992). The end of the notables: Society and politics of the Achaia region in the 19th century [Το τέλος των τζακιών: κοινωνία και πολιτική στην Αχαΐα του 19ου αιώνα]. Athens: Themelio. Marangudakis, M. (with Chadjipadelis, T.) (2019) The Greek crisis and its cultural origins: A Study in the theory of multiple modernities. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan/Springer Nature. Nezi, R., Sotiropoulos, D. A. and Toka, P. (2010). Attitudes of Greek parliamentarians towards European and national identity, representation, and scope of governance. South European Society and Politics 15(1), 79–96. Pantelidou-Malouta, M. (2006). Half a century of women’s suffrage, half a century of women in the House [Μισός αιώνας γυναικείας ψήφου, μισός αιώνας γυναίκες στη Βουλή]. Athens: Hellenic Parliament Foundation. Pappas, T. S. (1999). Making party democracy in Greece. Houndmills: Palgrave. Patrikios, S. and Chatzikonstantinou, M. (2015). Dynastic politics: Family ties in the Greek parliament, 2000–2012. South European Society and Politics 20(1), 93–111. Pitkin, H. F. (1967). The concept of representation. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Sotiropoulos, D. A. (2014). Civil society in Greece in the wake of the economic crisis. ELIAMEP paper and KAS Foundation, Athens. Sotiropoulos, D. A. and Bourikos, D. (2003). Ministerial elites in Greece, 1843–2001: A synthesis of old sources and new data. In: P. T. de Almeida, A. C. Pinto and N. Bermeo, eds. Who governs Southern Europe? Regime change and ministerial recruitment, 1850–2000. London: Frank Cass, pp. 143–190. Teixeira C. P., Tsatsanis, E. and Belchior, A. (2014). Support for democracy in times of crisis: Diffuse and specific regime support in Portugal and Greece. South European Society and Politics 19(4), 501–518.

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Teperoglou, E., Chadjipadelis, T. and Andreadis, I. (2010). Cleavages of voters and candidates in the national and European dimension: Convergences and divergences. Science and Society-Journal of Political and Moral Theory 25, 37–63. Teperoglou E., Freire, A., Andreadis, I. and Viegas, J. M. L. (2014). Elites’ and voters’ attitudes towards austerity policies and their consequences in Greece and Portugal. South European Society and Politics 19(4), 457–476. Teperoglou, E. and Tsatsanis, E. (2014). Dealignment, de-legitimation and the implosion of the two-party system in Greece: The earthquake election of 6 May 2012. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 24(2), 222–242. Teperoglou, Ε., Tsatsanis, Ε. and Nicalokopoulos, E. (2015). Habituating to the new normal: The 2014 European Election in Greece in a post-earthquake party system. South European Society and Politics 20(3), 333–355. Teperoglou, E. and Tsatsanis, E. (2011). A new divide? The impact of globalization on national party systems. West European Politics 34(6), 1207–1228. Tsatsanis, E. (2018). The swift unravelling: Party system change and deinstitutionalization in Greece during the crisis. In: M. Lisi, ed. Party system change, the European crisis and the state of democracy. London: Routledge, pp. 115–136. Tsirbas, Y. and Sotiropoulos, D. A. (2015). What do Greek political elites think about Europe and the crisis? An exploratory analysis, GreeSE Paper No. 93 Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe, London School of Economics. Verney, S. (2014). Broken and can’t be fixed: The impact of the economic crisis on the Greek party system. The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs 49(1), 18–35.

3

Representation in the Italian Parliament Federico Russo and Luca Verzichelli

Within the framework of the comparative analysis of parliamentary representation in Southern Europe and Latin America, Italy represents the case of long-established parliamentary democracy that, however, has been often described as weak or difficult. The recent transformation of political representation in Italy will be at the core of this chapter. We live in an age in which representative democracy seems to have entered its ultimate crisis, when the disjuncture between elites and ordinary people has reached the point of no return (Tormey 2015). According to the consolidated literature, the traditional channels and institutions of representative democracy have been challenged by a number of social and political phenomena. Among them, the fading trust in political institutions, the decline of parties and the transformation of their functions – in particular, the functions of articulation of social interests and selection of political elites and the predominance of a leader-centred model of democracy that would have also seriously endangered relations between voters and their representatives. In the Italian case, these general phenomena affecting all advanced democracies have been magnified by two very different events. During the early 1990s, when the party system that characterised the first 50 years of the Republican era crumbled in the wake of a series of major corruption scandals, new political actors suddenly emerged to transform the traditional modes of political representation. More recently, the global financial crisis of 2007–8, and the inability of the parties to manage it, have reduced the credibility of all mainstream parties and paved the way towards a new restructuring of the Italian party system. The rather fluid political juncture opened in 2013 and reinforced in 2018 suggests we should be cautious about offering a consolidated interpretation on the current Italian political system. Rather, this chapter will try to systematise our empirical knowledge in an attempt to evaluate whether and to what extent the crisis has made the prevailing interpretation advanced by scholars on the state of political representation in Italy obsolete. The structure of the chapter is as follows. First, we review the literature on the evolution of the traditional modes of political representation from the emergence of the first party system of the Republican period to its crisis (1948–92). The empirical part of the chapter will focus on the impact of the

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recent economic crisis on the modes of representation that emerged at the beginning of the 1990s, to assess whether and to what extent this external shock affected a system that was slowly consolidating after almost two decades of turbulent adaptation. To begin with, we provide a diachronic exploration of the level of trust in political representatives, to understand how it has evolved recently and whether the crisis has altered or simply accelerated a trend that was already under way (third section). Then (fourth and fifth sections) we analyse the evolution of political recruitment and the changing patterns of descriptive representation within the Italian parliament, focusing on the paradox between the specific patterns of political recruitment shown by the different party lists and the growing tendency of elected representatives to act individually and to switch from one parliamentary party group (PPG) to another. We then discuss the level of ideological congruence between voters and parties to assess whether the economic crisis opened a gap between the positions of citizens and elites (section six). The final section offers the first interpretative assessment: should we really view what is currently taking place as a period of revolutionary change in the relationship between parliament and citizens?

Modes of Representation in Italy: From the Traditional Partycracy to the Crisis of the Early 1990s The Italian parliamentary scene during the period after the end of the Second World War has been described as a party-centred consociational arena in which highly institutionalised and disciplined parties played a major role at the parliamentary selection level and, more substantially, in determining the main modes of political representation. According to Maurizio Cotta (1991), the main explanation for such a high degree of party control lies in the basic features of the new regime, which emerged during the periods 1943–8 (instauration and constitutional setting) and 1948–53 (democratic consolidation, with the first Republican legislature). The failure of an attempt to force the system towards a majoritarian turn, with a significant amendment of the electoral system, introducing a majority bonus to be allocated to the electoral coalition able to reach the absolute majority of the votes, marks the end of this age, which was dominated by Alcide De Gasperi, the leader of DC (Christian Democracy). Following this symbolic watershed, the Italian parliament remained a strong and somehow transformative legislature (Polsby 1975) and continued to exhibit strong external party control over all parliamentary party groups – including that of a highly factionalised party like DC. Party conferences became the main instrument of coalition governance (Criscitiello 1996) while negotiations within the parliamentary bodies (within the permanent legislative committees in particular) were a frequent practice to include the left opposition in a sort of power-sharing model of legislative behaviour that lasted through different phases until the end of the First Republic.

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The modes of representation that emerged between 1953 and 1992 were therefore very much the consequences of these two characters of the strong party centrality and the constant involvement of the opposition in the policy-making. The process of parliamentary recruitment was, obviously, very much dominated by party establishments, although a fundamental distinction should be introduced here between the DC pattern, which was based on the personal consensus of a territorial leader and factions, and the wholly centralised processes of selection operated by all the other parties, and by the PCI (Italian Communist Party). An expression used by Douglas Wertman in his reconstruction (1988) of candidate selection procedures in Italy, ‘local involvement central control’, gives us some idea of the importance of the different factors determining the input side of representation: the strong parties of the First Republic could use their territorial organisational units to grow highly competitive (above all within the DC) aspirants to national political office, while the last say in all the political selection processes was left to the national and relatively self-restrained elite groups (particularly in the case of the PCI). The controlled rate of parliamentary turnover during this ‘golden age’ of Italian party government has been frequently used to describe the stability of the relationship between selectorates and representatives (Verzichelli 1998). At least three generations of politicians were recruited within the national political elite, and a partial transformation of the same party system was possible starting in the late 1970s, but this did not seem to endanger the link between the central party elite and the territorial ranks, where the process of selection took place. The peak of turnover recorded with the 1992 elections was almost entirely due to the sudden emergence of a new party – the PCI (Italian Communist Party) – promoting a totally new group of representatives whose peculiar feature was that of representing micro-territorial units. The LN was born out of the alliance of a number of regional and provincial parties and civic lists. The promoters of this colourful and noisy platoon of representatives supported a deep reform of the state, actually demanding the creation of a federal state, if not the secession from Italy of the rich northern regions. A discussion about the ability of traditional parties to maintain full control over the channel of political selection and political representation was therefore started; however, nobody could predict that the rate of newcomers in the 1992 elections was just the start of a long and dramatic phase of political turmoil. Indeed, during the ensuing 24 years, parliamentary turnover remained constantly higher than the average for the First Republic, reaching impressive new peaks with the electoral earthquakes of 2013 and 2018 (Tronconi and Verzichelli 2019). Let us turn now to the output side of representation – the overall effect of MP behaviour. We can argue this had also been very stable throughout the long season of party government between 1953 and 1992. Several indicators support just such an interpretation: the stable recourse to consensus-based legislative behaviour practices, especially within the legislative committees, the

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difficulties the government had in imposing its agenda on parliament and the high rate of parliamentary amendments to executive bills and decrees. We may, therefore, conclude that the period 1948–92 can be classified as a long phase dominated by party attachment and political stability within the parliament. When some specific issues transpired to be particularly divisive – especially within the DC, which was the main party of government – the instrument of the occasional rebellion during the legislative session could be considered to stress internal fragmentation. This has often been labelled the story of the Franchi tiratori (snipers). In short, some factions or small groups of MPs from the governmental majority decided to withdraw their support from a given executive proposal without an explicit discussion, but simply by using their secret vote to reduce the scale of available support and force the majority to reach a new point of legislative equilibrium. The repeated employment of this practice, especially during the phases of more evident consensual law-making, brought the government and parliament to change the budgetary process procedure, centralising the main financial decision within an annual financial law proposed by the executive. Moreover, the secret vote during the legislative sessions was abolished in 1988, which reduced the blackmail potential of each individual MP. The crisis of the early 1990s and the collapse of the first party system of the Republican period changed some of the practices of political representation at the national parliament level due to the contextual action of a number of drivers, of which we identify four: 1 2

3 4

The decline of party organisational density (Ignazi, Bardi and Massari 2010); The general decline of political participation: that is to say, not just the reduction in political activism but the broader phenomenon of bifurcation between politics and society (Morlino and Tarchi 1996); The emergence of new and peculiar personal parties or the more pronounced role for leaders within existing parties and factions (Calise 2006); The termination – to a large extent this can be considered a consequence of the end of the First Republic’s traditional party system – of a patent pattern of subordination of the main interest groups that used to depend upon the strategic and substantial preferences expressed by the main parties (Morlino 1991).

Obviously, the effects of this compound set of explanatory factors are numerous and confused. On the basis of the recent literature on Italian legislative politics, at least three macro-phenomena can be indicated to show such dynamics of change: a persistent deficit of trust in the parliamentary institution that has been subject to sensitive variation since the 1990s (Russo and Verzichelli 2012); a continuous transformation within the parliamentary elite, which has followed the missed consolidation of the party system that emerged during the mid-1990s (Tronconi and Verzichelli

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2014, 2019); the substantial resilience of the left–right ideological dimension that was the main axis of competition during the age of political alternation and represented an important cognitive shortcut for voters (Baldassarri 2013). The remainder of this chapter will further evaluate these trends and assess how they have been affected by the crisis.

Citizen Trust in the Italian Parliament In most advanced industrial democracies support for political institutions, and especially for parliaments, has been subject to a long-term trend of erosion (Newton and Norris 2000; Leston-Bandeira 2012). Notwithstanding this diachronic evolution, there is still much to be learned about the health of the representative democracy by looking at cross-country variations and longitudinal changes in the attitudes of citizens towards national parliaments. In a previous account (Russo and Verzichelli 2012) we spoke of a persistent gap between parliament and citizens, noting that in the 2000s fewer than one-third of the latter tended to trust parliament. Here, we present a more detailed analysis, covering a longer timespan and producing a comparison with other European countries of a similar size. This will allow us to disentangle Italian peculiarities from the more general trend. The major source of comparable data on this topic is the standard Eurobarometer,1 which since November 2000 has included a question measuring the level of trust in the national parliament. However, to compare the trend of the last 20 years with the preceding decades we rely on the European Values Study, which asked a very similar question in 1981, 1990 and 1999.2 According to that source, there were not many significant changes during the last two decades of the 20th century: about one-third of citizens expressed a great deal or quite a lot confidence in the Italian parliament (30 per cent in 1981, 30.6 per cent in 1990 and 34.6 per cent in 1999). While this means those trusting the national representative assembly were clearly outnumbered, the latest figure placed Italy not very far from other large EU (European Union) member states, such as the United Kingdom (36.2 per cent), Germany (37.2 per cent) and France (40.4 per cent). Eurobarometer data (Figure 3.1) show that the last 20 years can be divided into three periods: up to 2007, when the level of trust remained comparable with earlier decades because those who had confidence in the Italian parliament represented 30–40 per cent of all citizens; 2008–11, when confidence fell to below 30 per cent; and the period since late 2011, when the proportion expressing trust in the Italian parliament fell below 20 per cent. Comparison with Germany or the United Kingdom, where confidence in parliament has grown, does not support the idea that the decline experienced in Italy is simply a manifestation of a global trend. The causes of such a disappointing level of trust in the Italian parliament should therefore be sought within the Italian political system, and especially in the functioning of the legislative-executive subsystem. There are two reasons for choosing this interpretation. First, the general satisfaction with democracy (measured by a specific question of the

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55

0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1

Tend not to trust

11-18

02-18

08-16

05-17

11-15

02-15

08-13

05-14

11-12

02-12

08-10

05-11

11-09

02-09

08-07

05-08

02-06

Tend to trust

11-06

08-04

05-05

11-03

02-03

08-01

05-02

11-00

0

DK - Don't know

Figure 3.1 Citizen trust in the Italian parliament (2000–18) Source: Standard Eurobarometer (https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/ index.cfm).

standard Eurobarometer) has not declined nearly as much as confidence in the Italian parliament, suggesting we are observing a syndrome that particularly affects the national representative assembly. Second, the turning points of 2008 and 2011 are characterised by two turbulent political conjunctures: the early termination of the 15th legislature in 2008, after two years of conflicts that destabilised the centre-left coalition led by Romano Prodi and the fall of the fourth Berlusconi government in 2011 under the impact of the economic crisis. We believe these circumstances are not coincidences, but rather proof that during the last two decades Italian citizens have changed their traditionally relaxed attitude towards political instability. The introduction of electoral laws favouring a majoritarian dynamic raised new expectations on the role parliament should play in the political system. The enduring level of conflict within the parliamentary coalitions and the resulting instability seem to be the most important factors contributing towards falling levels of trust in parliament as an institution.

Descriptive Representation: What Changed After 1992? What is the extent of change expressed by the profiles of Italian MPs after the revolutionary events of the early 1990s? This question is at the core of a number of recent works dedicated to the changing processes of elite selection (Kakepaki, Kountouri, Verzichelli and Coller 2018) or the specific dynamics of the Italian political system (Tronconi and Verzichelli 2019). However, a comprehensive interpretation of the transformation of the process of representation has still to come, since this long political transition has not yet determined a new prevailing model of parliamentary selection.

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So, what do we know about the patterns of descriptive representation during the past two decades, and particularly after the new recent disruptive points of the 2013 and 2018 elections? Although unified by the leadership of Silvio Berlusconi and a (more or less) stable bipolar party system, the two decades between the elections of 1994 and 2013 did not offer a truly coherent framework: the fluidity of the party system, the weak institutionalisation of some parties and two reforms of the electoral systems did not help consolidate a coherent set of representative behaviour. However, the slow consolidation of the new ruling class seemed possible until 2008, when the two coalitions that once supported Berlusconi (centre-right) and Romano Prodi (centre-left) evolved into two majoritarian parties. The same Berlusconi won the elections at the head of the new PdL (People of Freedom) party a merger of FI (Forza Italia) and the AN (National Alliance), while Walter Veltroni became the leader of the opposition at the head of the PD (Democratic Party), which was a merger of the post-communist DS (Democratos of the Left) and the leftwing DL (Christian democrats of Democracy is Freedom – La Margherita). These two parties could get more than two-thirds of the vote, giving supporters of majoritarian democracy false hope. Indeed, the economic crisis and collapse of the fourth Berlusconi government brought a new phase of political turmoil and the formation of a technocratic government. The controversial result of the 2013 elections did not relieve parliament of that stalemate, although five years of PD governments followed. In December 2016, a referendum defeated the Renzi government proposal for broad constitutional reform, leading to the appearance of a new populist drift. The 2018 elections gave M5S a majority of seats (Chiaramonte, Emanuele, Maggini and Paparo 2018), which, after protracted negotiation, resulted in the formation of a parliamentary coalition with Matteo Salvini’s LN, which had emerged as the largest centre-right party in parliament (Marangoni and Verzichelli 2019). Of course, we should recall several of the dimensions and indicators that describe the transformation of the parliamentary selection processes and their implications for the profile of individual representatives at such a complicated period (Tronconi and Verzichelli 2014, 2019; Russo, Tronconi and Verzichelli 2014). For purposes of this chapter, we report just a few aggregate figures concerning the main indicators of descriptive representation during the past 25 years (Table 3.1). The proportion of gender representation, while still clearly lower than in many other European democracies, has gradually increased over the years. However, figures from 2013 and 2018 clearly stand out. This is also true for the indicator for the mean age of MPs, which increased during the Second Republic before collapsing dramatically in 2013. The appearance of an antiestablishment party (M5S), which has a peculiar system of parliamentary recruitment that is inspired by a ‘social mirroring’ principle, has been

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Table 3.1 Indicators of descriptive representation: Italian chamber of deputies (1992–2018)

% Female % Graduate Mean age Mean age newcomers % Leading party background % Local elective background

1992

1994

1996

2001

2006

2008

2013

2018

8.4 71.6 49.6 46.1 40.2

15.1 66.8 47.1 46.3 27.6

11.1 67.1 48.1 47.3 29.9

11.6 70.7 50.4 47.9 31.0

17.6 66.8 52.1 49.5 35.6

21.3 76.6 50.8 46.9 37.7

31.0 69.4 46.2 42.8 19.2

35.2 68.8 45.0 43.1 18.7

65.2

50.1

51.2

67.7

71.8

64.1

52.7

43.7

Source: CIRCaP Observatory on Political Elites and Institutions – University of Siena.

suggested as the main factor driving these sudden changes. However, disaggregate analyses (e.g. Tronconi and Verzichelli 2019) have also stressed other novelties: for instance, the tendency of newly organised parties like the LN to recruit very young politicians, and the more pronounced attitude of the left PPGs to represent the female population and the more educated strata of society. A quick look at the occupational origins of MPs (Figure 3.2) confirms that quite important changes have taken place in recent decades. These aggregate figures actually hide the traces of polarisation that emerged recently in the representative profiles of the opposing coalitions/parties (Verzichelli 1998). While the first generation of LN MPs (1992–2006) had a strong core of small 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1992

1994

1996

2001

2006

2008

2013

Full paid policians/trade Unionists

Unemployed/blue collar/ student

Trade, Business, Entrepreneurship

Free professionals

2018

Public Sector

Figure 3.2 Occupational background of the Italian MPs: Chamber of deputies (1992– 2018). Source: Author’s database.

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businessmen and women and farmers, and while Berlusconi’s FI tended to attract managers and liberal professionals, the centre-left PPGs traditionally appealed more to representatives with purely political or public sector backgrounds. This latter background, however, seems to have lost its traditional strength, with the 2013 and 2018 elections resulting in fewer civil servants and teachers being elected to parliament. This is another clear effect of the process of symbolic representation promoted by populist parties, and in particular by the M5S, where parliamentary recruitment is open to people from unprivileged backgrounds, including the unemployed, students, blue-collar workers and housewives.

From Snipers to Switchers: The Difficulties of Party Representation in Contemporary Italy A paradox should be highlighted here: the parties that seem to have more clearly marked the social profiles of their representatives tend to progressively lose control over the PPGs formed by the same MPs. Different indicators should be discussed to cover the different dimensions of such a phenomenon, including legislative rebellions. Before moving to the role perceptions of parliamentarians, we limit our analysis to a general measurement of the difficulties parties have in controlling their parliamentary elite, by using the simple indicator of party switching frequency (Heller and Mershon 2008). As Figure 3.3 shows, throughout the Second Republic period, both the indicator of the proportion of MPs who switch between PPGs and the monthly average of switches remain quite high – the only exception being the 2001–6 term, which was dominated by a strong majoritarian government led by Berlusconi. After the 2013 elections, the trend of parliamentary switching turned into a pattern of implosion, which was inflated during the formation and crisis phases of the Renzi government (from February 2014 to December 2016) as a consequence of the divisive nature of his leadership and the assertiveness of his policy proposals. This has resulted in a new record of mobility during the 17th legislature, when about 35 per cent of MPs changed their PPG at least once. This is a remarkable figure, even in a comparative scenario. How is it possible that such continuity could persist for years? Of course, the main reason is the failure of the party system to reconsolidate. Given such an uncertain scenario, and with the additional problem of frequent changes to the electoral system, the ability of the parties to keep their parliamentary ranks united has clearly diminished. Even the two most important PPGs to emerge in the wake of the critical elections of 2013 and 2018 have suffered from party switching. The PD led by Matteo Renzi was quite remarkably attractive during the first half of the 2013–18 legislature, when the new secretary was able to lead the party to victory in the 2014 European elections. After that, the PD PPG lost a large number of members, especially after the defeat of the 2016 referendum,

Representation in the Italian Parliament 40

59 12.0

35 10.0 30 8.0 25 20

6.0

15 4.0 10 2.0 5 0

0.0 1983-1987 1987-1992 1992-1994 1994-1996 1996-2001 2001-2006 2006-2008 2008-2013 2013-2018 IX leg.

X leg.

XI leg.

XII leg.

XIII leg.

XIV leg.

XV leg.

XVI leg.

XVII leg.

% MPs switching PPG Monthly rate of switches (right scale) Monthly average % MPs involved (Right scale)

Figure 3.3 Switching between PPGs, 1983–2018. Source: CIRCaP Observatory on Political Elites and Institutions.

when a new left-wing group, Art.1-MDP (Article 1-the Democratic and Progressive Movement was formed). On the other hand, the PPGs (lower chamber and senate) of the new M5S lost about 20 per cent of its original representation as a result of personal conflicts that led to voluntary departures or expulsions dictated by party leaders and confirmed in votes by activists. The difficult balance between the loyalty to the movement’s policies and the free expressions of individual MPs seems to be a problem within the M5S, even during the 18th legislature, which is marked by a significant number of expulsions from the broad PPG of this anti-establishment party. The destinations of those expelled MPs are often different, with some remaining in the residual mixed group (gruppo misto) while others find a new home in the parties of the left or right. This reintroduces the theme of individual or voluntary switches – i.e. those not connected to splits or mergers of entire groups of MPs – which was once more than 50 per cent of the changes between PPGs (Russo, Tronconi and Verzichelli 2014). On the basis of some recent parliamentary chronicles, it is possible to argue that the state of ambiguity in which many of the party actors find themselves keeps offering strong incentives for individualism. Indeed, there is a stable proportion of ‘individual hoppers’, although research on the relationship between the phenomenon of group switching and the diverse nature of parliamentary selection (centralised or ‘inclusive’, like party primaries to select parliamentary candidates) is presenting rather mixed results (Rombi and Seddone 2017).

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Ideological and Policy Congruence after the Crisis The study of congruence between voters and citizens has a venerable tradition in political science and can be traced back to the seminal work carried out by Miller and Stokes (1963). Measuring the distance between the preferences of citizens and their representatives has become the dominant empirical strategy for assessing the quality of the representative relationship (Miller et al. 1999), despite old and recent admonitions noting that democratic representation is a much more complex phenomenon that cannot be reduced to this (Eulau and Karps 1977; Sabl 2015). From an empirical point of view, to assess the level of congruence we first must define the subject and object of the representative relationship. With regard to subjects, in the European tradition, scholars tend to focus on parties and their voters rather than on individual parliamentarians and their constituents, subscribing to the doctrine of responsible party government (Ranney 1962). Moving on to the object of representation, congruence can be studied by looking at single issues or, more parsimoniously, at the positions held on the left–right ideological dimension. In the former we study issue congruence; in the latter we study ideological congruence (Pedrazzani and Segatti 2016). As the left–right dimension has long been the main organising principle for advanced Western industrial democracies, the study of ideological congruence has often provided a synthetic proxy for assessing the distance between citizens and their representatives. The few studies on ideological congruence carried out in Italy before the crisis revealed that the left–right dimension represented the alignment of both masses and elites quite well, because the many dimensions of conflict important in Italian politics (redistribution, clericalism, foreign policy) tended to be related closely in an overarching dimension. Indeed, at least with reference to the three main parties studied by Samuel Barnes (1971, 1977) – PCI, the PSI (Italian Socialist Party) and DC – the position on all these issues tended to be highly correlated. This study also revealed that 21 per cent of DC voters could not place themselves on the left–right axis – the highest proportion among voters who claimed to identify with a party. Moreover, the distribution of DC voters resembled that of the mass sample as a whole, with a tall central peak and two almost symmetrical tails on the left and right. Unfortunately, there are only partial studies of the Second Republic: data gathered in 1994 show us that the left–right dimension was still an important organising principle for both the masses and the elites, though elites tended to be significantly more centrist than their representatives (Belchior 2010). This contrasts with the trend usually found in the comparative literature. The same results can be obtained by analysing the mass and elites data gathered by the IntUne project (Basile, Isernia and Smets 2013), showing that voters of the PD and PdL tended to be more left-wing (2.9 vs. 3.7) and right wing (7.9 vs. 7.0), respectively, than their representatives (Table 3.2).

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Table 3.2 Mean left–right self-positioning of voters and MPs/candidates within major Italian parties before and after the crisis Year

Party

MPs (a)

Voters (b)

2009

PD – Partito Democratico

3.72

2.95

0.77

PdL – Popolo delle Libertà

7.07

7.93

-0.86

LN – Lega Nord

7.00

7.49

-0.49

PD – Partito Democratico

3.24

2.43

0.81

PdL – Popolo delle Libertà

6.92

7.71

-0.80

LN – Lega Nord

6.55

6.77

-0.22

M5S – Movimento 5 Stelle

4.18

3.91

0.28

2013

Difference (a–b)

N MPs 25 Voters 152 MPs 28 Voters 197 MPs 3 Voters 24 MPs 143 Voters 317 MPs 71 Voters 150 MPs 31 Voters 22 MPs 98 Voters 192

Sources: IntUne integrated dataset (2009) and the Italian Comparative Candidate Survey (2013).

Ideological congruence after the crisis has been studied in depth within the framework of the Comparative Candidate Survey (Pedrazzani and Segatti 2016). The 2013 election will probably be regarded as a watershed, marking the crisis of the coalitions that had dominated the electoral scene since the early 1990s. Mainstream parties, such as the PD and Berlusconi’s PdL, lost millions of votes to the recently formed M5S, which defined itself as a post-ideological party positioned beyond the left–right continuum. Nevertheless, the left–right dimension maintained its capacity to discriminate among different parties, and the level of congruence between parties and voters did not decline. However, the M5S has its own peculiarities, which distance it from the other parties: first, about one-fifth of its voters and candidates refuse to place themselves on the left–right scale (Pedrazzani and Segatti 2016: 215); second, the positions of the remainder of its voters and candidates are dispersed over a rather wide range. Paradoxically, these phenomena make the M5S very similar to the old DC from the end of the 1960s (Barnes 1971), grouping together citizens with a rather diverse set of ideological preferences.

Conclusion We can now summarise the implications emerging from our systematic review of recent studies on representative democracy in Italy, which is corroborated by the discussion of some fresh data. The main points we have unveiled so far are as follows:

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1

The traditional lack of popular trust in the Italian parliament has gradually worsened, especially in the aftermath of the economic crisis. The perceived inability of the Italian political class to cope with the stagnating economy and other salient issues (initially the migration emergency) has widened a confidence gap that was already worryingly wide. Since 2011, Italian citizens have become accustomed to the concept of ‘spread’: the difference between the yield of the ten-year bond issued respectively by the Italian and the German governments. However, the never-ending quarrels within parliament, the permanent conflict within parliamentary majorities and the perception of an opportunistic ruling class has widened the equally dangerous ‘confidence spread’ between Italy and some the better-performing representative systems in Europe. There is a sharp decline in party control over the entire representation process. This began in the 1990s and has grown gradually since then, before being magnified by the crisis. This can be connected to the wellknown dynamics of party organisational decline (van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke 2012) and other phenomena such as, for example, the personalisation of politics. However, given the scope of the transformation, it is worth stressing that the Italian case has suddenly evolved from a patent instance of pronounced party control to an example of endemic lack of control. This makes the current Italian parliament one of the most liquefied and unpredictable in Europe. The crisis has not dramatically altered the ideological congruence between parties and voters, but it has paved the way for the emergence of M5S, a political party that purposefully refuses to take a position on the traditional left–right axis. The presentation of ambiguous positions has proved successful in winning votes from different sides of the political spectrum, but it might prove a costly strategy in the long run. The European elections of May 2019, held one year after the formation of the yellow-green coalition between the far-right LN and the anti-establishment M5S, saw the former doubling its support, with the latter losing half.

2

3

Although the evidence we have discussed here about the recent repeated peaks of parliamentary turnover, the modes of descriptive representation and even of parliamentary behaviour stresses the magnitude of change that took place after the failure of the Second Republic’s bipolar system, we argue that the story we have told is not necessarily a revolutionary one: indeed, the 2013 and (especially) 2018 elections have to be viewed as critical elections that demonstrate a creeping sense of uncertainty, the final effects of which are unforeseeable. We certainly cannot underestimate the novelties in the parliamentary recruitment of post-ideological and populist actors like the LN and M5S; however, these look more like alternative than complementary patterns (Tronconi and Verzichelli 2019). On the other hand, strong and centralised party elites, like those that governed during the First Republic, seem to have

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definitely gone, leaving the scene open to troublesome phenomena like MP individualism and party hopping. Our picture is therefore grounded on a triple paradox: 1

2

3

A parliamentary elite that today seems increasingly pluralised and socially representative does not seem to gain reputation and looks quite fleeting due to the continuous electoral shifts. The rise of personalised parties and assertive leadership does not determine the end of the hectic behaviours of representatives, began when the decline of party obedience emerged during the mid-1990s. Similarly, the new and more direct linkages with the ordinary people do not improve the overall reputation of MPs. The introduction of new electoral rules and parliamentary selection procedures have not so far determined a clear redefinition of a system of alternative modes of parliamentary selection and representation.

The uncertainties summarised in these paradoxes explain why scholars dealing with the overall transformation of Italian parliamentary democracy have been very cautious in assessing recent changes (Russo 2013; Pedrazzani 2017). This implication can somehow be interpreted as a sign of the difficulties Southern European democracies seem to face during the post-crisis period in reconsolidating their representative institutions. Nevertheless, evident differences have been observed from one country to another (Kriesi and Pappas 2015; Morlino and Raniolo 2017) and, in particular, the Italian parliamentary scenario after the affirmation of two such different populist parties as the LN and M5S in 2018 looks rather peculiar (Tronconi and Verzichelli 2019). The failure of the constitutional reform proposed by the Renzi government in December 2016 can probably be described as another and decisive step towards making representative democracy much similar to the past (the end of the majoritarian drift?), but it has not cancelled the demands for procedural and moral adjustment that remain on the agenda of many political actors.

Notes 1 For a detailed illustration of the Eurobarometer surveys see the Gesis webpage describing the historical series and the study profiles. https://www.gesis.org/euroba rometer-data-service/home/ 2 ‘Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all?’

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Pedrazzani, A. and Segatti, P. (2016). La congruenza ideologica tra partiti ed elettori. In: A. di Virgilio and P. Segatti, eds. La rappresentanza politica in Italia: candidati ed elettori nelle elezioni politiche del 2013. Bologna: Il Mulino, pp. 207–234. Polsby, N. W. (1975). Legislatures. In: F. I. Greenstein and N. W. Polsby, eds. Handbook of political science. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, pp. 257–319. Ranney, A. (1962). The doctrine of responsible party government. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press. Rombi, S. and Seddone, A. (2017). Rebel rebel: Do primary elections affect legislators’ behaviour? Insights from Italy. Parliamentary Affairs 70(3), 569–588. Russo, F. (2013). Gli onorevoli: cosa fanno e come ci rappresentano i nostri parlamentari. Bologna: Il Mulino. Russo, F., Tronconi, F. and Verzichelli, L. (2014). Snipers and switchers: The difficulties of parliamentary representation in the Italian XVII legislature. Polis 28(1), 85–106. Russo, F. and Verzichelli, L. (2012). Parliament and citizens in Italy: An unfilled gap. Journal of Legislative Studies 18(3–4), 351–367. Sabl, A. (2015). The two cultures of democratic theory: Responsiveness, democratic quality, and the empirical-normative divide. Perspectives on Politics 13(2), 345–365. Tormey, S. (2015). The end of representative politics. Malden, MA: Polity. Tronconi, F. and Verzichelli, L. (2014). La nuova rivoluzione del ceto parlamentare: effetti congiunturali e interpretazioni diacroniche. In: A. Chiaramonte and L. de Sio, eds. Terremoto elettorale: le elezioni politiche del 2013. Bologna: Il Mulino, pp. 203–232. Tronconi, F. and Verzichelli, L. (2019). Il ceto parlamentare al tempo del populismo. In: A. Chiaramonte and L. de Sio, eds. Il voto del cambiamento. Bologna: Il Mulino, pp. 209–240. van Biezen, I., Mair, P. and Poguntke, T. (2012). Going, going… gone? The decline of party membership in contemporary Europe. European Journal of Political Research 51(1), 24–56. Verzichelli, L. (1998). The parliamentary elite in transition. European Journal of Political Research 34(1), 121–150. Wertman, D. A. (1988). Italy: Local involvement, central control. In: M. Gallagher and D. Marsh, eds. Candidate selection in comparative perspective: The secret garden of politics. London: SAGE, pp. 145–168.

4

Political Representation in Portugal Before and After the Great Recession Legitimation and Ideological Linkages Between Voters and Their Representatives André Freire, Marco Lisi and Emmanouil Tsatsanis

Introduction Empirical studies on political representation in Portugal have highlighted some of the pathologies affecting the quality of democracy (Pinto, Magalhães and Sousa 2013; Freire, Lisi and Viegas 2015, 2016). We also know the economic crisis and consequent austerity measures changed the discourse and practice of political agents and the channels and intensity of political participation by individuals in Portugal and elsewhere (Freire 2016; Freire and Lisi 2016). Moreover, the crisis was a catalyst driving the long-term decline of citizen dissatisfaction with national political institutions (Muro and Vidal 2016). Bearing upon political representation studies in Portugal and elsewhere (Belchior 2008, 2010, 2012; Belchior and Freire 2013; Freire and Belchior 2013; Freire, Lisi, Andreadis and Viegas 2014; Freire, Tsatsanis and Lima 2016; Teixeira, Tsatsanis and Belchior 2014a and 2014b; Belchior, Tsatsanis and Teixeira 2015; Tsatsanis, Freire and Tsirbas 2014), the focus of this chapter is twofold: it presents the major characteristics of empirical surveys employed to study political representation in Portugal;1 and addresses three major sets of questions: 1 To what extent has the profile of MPs changed over the last decade? 2 Has the crisis fostered a decline in mass (specific and diffuse) support for the democracy and is the Great Recession causing a major decline in political trust for political actors and institutions? 3 How and to what extent have the attitudes of MPs and their values in respect of the fundamental issue dimension of political competition in Portugal, i.e., the socio-economic or socio-economic left-right dimension, changed? 4 Are there similar changes apparent within the electorate?2 These are the main questions addressed in this study, which relies both on existing works and on original and recently collected data (see Table 4.1).3

Study

Timespan

Survey mode

2015 elections (fieldwork 2016–17)

MPs’ survey, 2007 (PhD research)

Belchior (2012)

Survey in 2007 (elections 2005; fieldwork 2007)

Portuguese Studies on MPs based on MP surveys

Freire, Lisi and Tsatsanis (2017b)

Candidate survey 2015 (CCS PT)

2011 elections (fieldwork 2012–13)

2009 elections (fieldwork 2009–10)

Freire and Viegas (2010a)

Freire, Viegas and Lisi (2013); Freire, Lisi and Viegas (2015 and 2016)

2002 elections

Teixeira (2009)

Candidate survey 2011 (CCS PT)

Candidate survey (not in the CCS network) Candidate survey 2009 (CCS PT)

Face-to-face

Mail survey (all elected candidates, MPs: face-to-face)

Mail survey (some elected candidates, MPs: face-to-face) Mail survey (some elected candidates, MPs: face-to-face)

Mail survey

Studies on prospective MPs (candidates) based on Candidate Surveys

Type of survey

Table 4.1 Portuguese MP and candidate surveys

79 respondents/230 MPs: 34.3%

N = 257/1150 (22.3% of the universe and 29.3% of the questionnaires sent) (for some variables only 190 respondents) N = 306/1150 (26.6% of the universe and 45.13% of sampling frame) (i.e. the listing of the accessible candidates from which it was possible to contact, personally (MPs) or by letter (non-elected candidates with registered address on the CNE))

N = 300/1150 (17.7% of the universe, 28.4% of the questionnaires sent)

N = 300/1150 (26%)

Response rate

(Continued)

Reasonable (low response rate and small number of questions)

Good (although low response rate)

Good (although low response rate)

Good (although low response rate) Good (although low response rate)

Data quality

Face-to-face

70.4%

respondents/230 MPs:

53.5% 162

respondents/230 MPs:

39.3% 123

respondents/331 MPs (islands included):

61.7% 130

respondents/230 MPs:

142

Response rate

Sources: authors’ own elaboration based upon the sources referred to in the cells and cited in the references.

Survey in 2016–17 (elections 2015; fieldwork 2016–17)

Face-to-face

Survey in 2012–13 (elections 2011; fieldwork 2012–13)

Freire, Viegas and Lisi (2013); Freire, Lisi and Viegas (2015, 2016) Freire, Lisi and Tsatsanis (2017b)

MPs’ survey, 2013 (PARENEL)

MPs’ survey, 2016 or 2017 (CCS)

Web-survey (email) (some face-to-face or email)

Survey 2009-10 (elections 2009, fieldwork 2009–10)

Freire and Viegas (2010b)

MPs’ survey, 2009 (PARTIREP Network)

Face-to-face

Survey in 2008 (elections 2005)

Freire and Viegas (2008b)

MPs’ survey, 2008 (PARENEL Network)

Survey mode

Timespan

Study

Type of survey

Table 4.1 (Cont.)

Good (good response rate)

Good (but low response rate)

Good (but low response rate)

Good

Data quality

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The following section contains a review of studies of political representation in Portugal. It is followed with an examination of the evolution of descriptive representation between 2005 and 2015, then a study of voter perceptions of political trust and legitimacy. The chapter then analyses how voter– MP congruence on the fundamental issue dimension of political competition, i.e. the economic left-right dimension (...) evolved before and after the crisis (2008 and 2012–13/2016–17, respectively). This will enable the identification of any significant changes in parliamentary descriptive representation, the legitimacy of the political system and ideological linkage functions between voters and their representatives after the Great Recession. The chapter ends with a summary of the major findings.

The Study of Political Representation in Portugal Before and After the Crisis Although some studies on the Portuguese parliament and MPs exist for some time now (based on MP biographies, representative recruitment patterns and legislator activities), there is a more recent branch of research on political representation studies since 2008 based on candidate surveys (MPs and candidates) and corresponding mass surveys with similar items (2008, 2012, 2016) (see Table 4.1). Those works are connected to international research networks.4 Similar questionnaires were fielded to MPs (and candidates) and voters, including questions on the crisis, regime support, political trust and issue dimensions of party competition and voter identification. While in Table 4.1 we present the elite studies only for the four data points (2008, 2009, 2012–13, 2016–17) we also fielded mass surveys (2008 and 2012) (Freire and Viegas 2008a; Freire, Viegas and Lisi 2012) and the first and second waves of a mass survey panel fielded (2016–18) via the internet with a sample weighted to ensure representativeness (Freire, Lisi and Tsatsanis 2018, 2017a). The crises experienced, especially in bailed-out countries in Europe, can be viewed as a ‘quasi-experiment’ for testing the effects of ‘earthquake crises’ on democratic political systems in general, and political representation in particular (Freire et al. 2014; Freire 2016; Freire and Lisi 2016). In the Portuguese case, after the debt crisis (post-2009) and the troika bailout (2011–14) major changes occurred with the October 2015 national elections (Freire and Santana-Pereira 2016). Unlike the other Southern European countries where the debt crisis and the devastating social and economic effects of the austerity policies were followed, politically, by remarkable levels of volatility and party system fragmentation (due to the success of new parties entering the political systems), in Portugal volatility and the party system format hardly changed. However, the crisis was one of the reasons behind the end of the 40-year schism among the left-wing parties in Portugal,5 which until then had never been able to govern together. The general election of 4 October 2015 eventually resulted in the appointment of a minority PS (Socialist Party) government with support from the PCP (Portuguese Communist Party), the BE (Left Bloc) and the PCP’s ally, the PEV (Greens). This government and the political alliance produced

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both left-wing policies and maintained compliance with EU (European Union) rules. Moreover, the government performed well both economically and politically, and was evaluated positively by the majority of left-wing and non-partisan voters (Freire and Santana-Pereira 2016). As a result of this political change we expect some inversion (2016–17) in the (declining) trends in political legitimacy and the (declining) levels of voter–MP policy preferences congruence during the period from 2008 to 2012/13.

The Evolution of Descriptive Representation Before and After the Crisis The literature on the evolution of party organisations suggests a general decline in their representative capacity. Parties have faced increasing difficulties recruiting members and mobilising young voters, with an increasing bias over time (Mair 2013; Ignazi 2017). Previous studies found that Portuguese MPs traditionally display an ‘elitist profile’ (they have above-average levels of education, with high socio-economic status (SES) and mostly have a partisan career) (Freire 2001). Moreover, the proportion of younger MPs (under the age of 35) has declined over time and representatives present low levels of social capital (membership in civic associations) compared to their peers in other Western democracies. Drawing on the biographies of MPs between 2005 and 2015, this section aims to examine the evolution of their background and socio-demographic profile. In terms of gender, there are no significant differences over time (Table 4.2). The percentage of women remains low (approximately 30 per cent), although a higher proportion of female representatives was elected in the 2015 legislative elections than before (Portugal introduced 30 per cent gender quotas in 2006). Their education level confirms previous findings, with a clear predominance of MPs with a very high level of education (often a Master’s or a doctorate). The percentage of younger MPs is below 20 per cent, a significant drop at the 2015 elections. This suggests the mobilisation during the Memorandum of Understanding period did not improve the Table 4.2 Evolution of the profile of MPs in Portugal, 2005–15 (%)

Gender (male) Age (18–35) Education (undergraduate) Social capital Interest groups Political capital Political experience

2005

2009

2011

2015

71.3 18.3 87.8 27.4 7.4 44.1 86.5

70.9 16.5 92.3 16.5 5.7 37.8 76.1

71.7 19.1 94.0 14.3 5.7 32.8 90.0

66.5 10.9 93.4 31.3 4.3 69.1 87.4

Sources: MP biographies collected in parliament and processed by the project team (Freire, Viegas and Seiceira 2009; Freire, Lisi and Viegas 2011; Freire, Lisi and Tsatsanis 2017b).

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inclusion and representation of young people. The proportion of MPs who are members of civic associations is rather low and has declined between 2005 and 2011; nevertheless, the proportion increased significantly from 14.3 per cent to 31.4 per cent in 2015. Finally, there has also been a gradual decline in membership in professional organizations. There are important differences across parties that are worthy of examination. The proportion of women has significantly increased in both the CDS-PP (Popular Party) and PCP. On the other hand, the former has experienced a remarkable decline in the number of young MPs (0 per cent aged 18–35 in the 2015 elections). The main change affecting all parties concerns social capital. With the partial exception of the BE – which has always had stronger links with civil society/new social movements – in post-crisis elections the remaining parties have registered a considerable increase in the number of MPs belonging to a civic organisation. This trend has been accompanied by a slight decline in interest group membership (trade unions, business and professional organisations). Another general trend is that partisan careers have become more important as a criteria for political recruitment. The crisis seems to have had no effect on the openness of new trajectories for citizens with no partisan background or experience.

The Relationship Between Voters and their Representatives: Trust, Legitimacy and Satisfaction One would expect the economic crisis to produce strong negative views of the political system among Portuguese citizens, and more specifically on its institutions and politicians. However, to answer that question appropriately, we need first to revisit some familiar concepts in democratic theory and political culture studies. Following Easton (1975, 1976), we distinguish between regime legitimacy or ‘diffuse’ political support, discontent and ‘specific’ political support, and political disaffection. The first is closely associated with the concept of regime legitimacy, which implies the governed believe a particular system of government is preferable to all others from a normative point of view (Teixeira, Tsatsanis and Belchior 2014b: 504). Specific support is contingent on perceptions and evaluations of performance and policy outputs and refers to negative evaluations of the performance of political institutions, of the authorities that occupy them or of the political outputs of governance, although not necessarily of the regime as a whole (Magalhães 2005: 977). It is thus better synchronised with the political ebb and flow and more prone to short-term fluctuations (Teixeira, Tsatsanis and Belchior 2014b: 503; Montero, Gunther and Torcal 1997). Finally, political disaffection implies low levels of political interest, efficacy, participation and civic engagement, coupled with widespread cynicism regarding the political process and low trust towards political institutions. One of the most consistent observations about Portuguese political culture concerns the high levels of political disaffection that had existed well before the onset of the crisis (see Figure 4.1). Political disaffection in Portugal (and

Trust in Political Parties 40

Start of crisis in Greece

35

PS in government

30 25 20 15 10 5 0

Portugal

Southern Europe

Northern Europe

Trust in Political Parliament 70

Start of crisis in Greece

PS in government

60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Portugal

Southern Europe

Northern Europe

Figure 4.1 Portuguese voter political trust, engagement and satisfaction with democracy, 2000–16. Note: Trust in government, parliament and political parties, as well as participation in a lawful demonostration values are percentages. Satisfaction with democracy and interest in political values are means of a 1 (not at all satisfied/not at all interested) – 4 (very satisfied/very interested) scale. Data: Eurobarometer (accessed via the Portal de Opinião Pública www.pordata.pt).

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Interest in politics 3.5 Start of crisis in Greece 3 2.5 2 1.5

Portugal

Southern Europe

Northern Europe

Participation in lawful demonstration 25

Start of crisis in Greece

20 15 10 5 0

Portugal

Southern Europe

Northern Europe

Figure 4.1b Continued

to a lesser extent in Greece and Spain) has been much closer to the levels observed in the newer democracies of Eastern Europe than in the older consolidated democracies of Western and Northern Europe. However, signs of a gradual decrease in the levels of political disaffection have been detected since the 1980s, largely due to the higher levels of educational attainment among younger Portuguese (Magalhães 2005: 985). As expected, political disaffection is decoupled from the broader legitimacy of the democratic regime in the country. As in other European polities and consolidated democracies in general (Norris 1999; Dalton 2004), support for democracy in Portugal (as a form of government preferred to non-democratic alternatives) has remained high – even after the economic crisis hit the country in 2011 (Teixeira, Tsatsanis and Belchior 2014a). However, a different picture emerges once we start descending the ladder of abstraction. Indicators associated with the concept of specific support (satisfaction with democracy, trust in government, trust in parliament, trust in political parties), which had traditionally been low in Portugal compared to other Western European

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countries, plunged even lower in the aftermath of the economic crisis. Using data from two national surveys before and after the onset of the economic crisis (2008 and 2012),6 Teixeira, Tsatsanis and Belchior (2014a, 2014b) found trust in the institutions largely declined, especially where trust was relatively high prior to the crisis, such as in the office of the president. These findings are consistent with the idea that specific support is sensitive to shortterm economic factors as well as citizen assessment of the government in office and its performance, particularly during periods of economic downturn. Many studies have confirmed this hypothesis at the comparative level (Norris 1999; Dalton 2004), and in the particular case of Portugal (Magalhães 2002). Perhaps of more concern, Teixeira, Tsatsanis and Belchior (2014a: 512) also found support for political parties had also fallen at higher levels of abstraction. This kind of diffuse support for political parties at the institutional level appeared to take a significant hit once the effects of the economic crisis were felt in 2012 (especially among the younger and better educated), indicating a rejection of conventional forms of representative democracy among the more dynamic strata of Portuguese society and a preference for more participatory and less intermediated forms. In terms of trust in parliament data before the onset of the crisis showed that the trust the Portuguese had in their parliament was generally close to that of other Southern European ‘third-wave’ democracies (Spain and Greece), lower than the average of Western European countries, very close to such countries as the United Kingdom and Italy (which has experienced decline since the 1980s) and on average greater than in Eastern European countries. Since the 1980s there has been a clear path of decline in trust in parliament, which is common to most consolidated democracies over recent decades (Teixeira and Freire 2010: 26). The decline of trust in parliament after the onset of the economic crisis as captured in the Teixeira, Tsatsanis and Belchior’s (2014a) study also follows the pattern of other indicators of specific support. Eurobarometer data tracking trust in political institutions before and after the onset of the economic crisis (2000–16) confirm this trend (Figure 4.1). Moreover, these fresh data confirm that these indicators capture more short-term dispositions towards those holding political power rather than any deep-seated attitude towards the political system. As steep as the decline in specific support has been in Portugal since the beginning of the crisis, it has been matched by an equally steep increase as the Portuguese economy stabilised and the country completed its return to the international markets and, more importantly, since the formation in 2015 of the minority PS government with the support of the PCP and BE, which has promised to reverse the austerity policies implemented by the previous PSD (Social Democratic Party) and CDS-PP coalition government. While other Southern European countries severely impacted by the crisis are also on an upward trajectory after several years of decline, the Portuguese trend is unmatched.

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Voter–MP Congruence in Issue Dimensions: Before and After the Great Recession Our third objective is to examine the congruence between the political preferences of MPs and citizens. The underlying assumption is that the greater the degree of congruence between the preferences of voters and MPs, the greater the probability voters will feel well represented and that MPs (and the government) will act in accordance with the people’s preferences – which is a basic axiom of any representative democracy (Manin, Stokes and Przeworski 1999). Voter and MP Positions on the Economic Left–Right Index There has been a long debate in political science concerning the content of the left/right divide; however, there has always been a correlation (at least at the voter level) between the left–right dimension and classical economic issues related to the class divide (Freire 2015). For a number of reasons (comparatively low education levels, political interest, political sophistication and, especially, low polarisation at the party level), this correlation has traditionally been weaker in Portugal (Freire and Belchior 2013: 7). Table 4.3 Battery of issues named economic left–right values (economic left–right index), 2008 and 2012–13 Voters (a)

MPs (b)

Income and wealth should be redistributed to ordinary people. Education should mainly be provided by the state. Health care should mainly be provided by the state. The present levels of social protection must be kept the same, even if that means increasing taxes. Greater efforts must be made to reduce income inequalities. Economic growth is more important than balancing the state budget.

Income and wealth should be redistributed to ordinary people. Education should mainly be provided by the state. Health care should mainly be provided by the state. The present levels of social protection must be kept the same, even if that means increasing taxes. Greater efforts must be made to reduce income inequalities. Economic growth is more important than balancing the state budget.

Sources: Data elaborated by the authors using the voter and MP surveys in Freire and Viegas (2008a, 2008b) and Freire, Viegas and Lisi (2012, 2013). Notes: 2008: a) Voters index - Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.681 (after removing the variable for the creation of the economic left-right index 2008: ‘The present levels of social protection must be kept the same, even if that means increasing taxes’ – Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.754) b) MPs index - Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.691 (after removing the variable for the creation of the economic left-right index 2008: ‘Greater efforts must to be made to reduce income inequalities’ – Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.714). 2012–13: a) Voters index - Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.443 (after removing the variable for the creation of the economic left-right index 2012: ‘Present levels of social protection must be kept the same even if that means increasing taxes – Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.528) b) MPs index - Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.850

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Table 4.4 Issues for economic left–right index (2016) Economic left–right values Voters (a) Providing a stable network of social security should be the prime goal of government. Public companies should not be privatised. The economic consequences of globalisation are eminently negative. The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.

MPs (b) Providing a stable network of social security should be the prime goal of government. Public companies should not be privatised. The economic consequences of globalisation are eminently negative. Income and wealth should be redistributed to ordinary people.

Sources: data elaborated from Freire, Lisi and Tsatsanis (2016, 2017a). Notes: a) Voters index – Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.637; b) MPs index – Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.684.

To build the economic left–right index in 2008, 2012–13 and 2016–17, we used a set of questions to voters and MPs that measure socio-economic issues.7 In Table 4.3, 2012–13 and Table 4.4, 2016–17, we present the specific issues asked (the issues asked in 2008 were similar to those asked in 2012–13, while the same can be said about the internal consistency of the index for voters and MPs). Although the questions within the 2016–17 index are not the same as those used in the 2012–13 index, they can all be said to refer to the same underlying concept: socio-economic issues. Moreover, the indices all show reasonable levels of internal consistency as measured by Cronbach’s Alpha. So, despite the differences in the questions, we can say the indices are comparable over time (2008 to 2016–17) and show good internal consistency. Moreover, all the questions were coded so that higher values always represent more pro-market positions. Comparing the positions of MPs and voters on the economic left–right index for the 2008 dataset, it is interesting to note the high degree of congruence between MPs and voters (Freire and Belchior 2013: 9). Yet, these findings do not hold true for the 2012–13 survey, when the masses remained pretty much left-wing (1.9 on a 1–5 scale) as MPs were more polarised (moved from a single mode at 1.9 to bimodal distribution, with one mode around 1.5 and another around 3.2).8 While the position of voters remained mostly unchanged, there was a marked move by MPs to more economically right-wing positions. This seems to confirm the proposition in this first dimension that there was increasing polarisation at the elite level but not at the mass level. In 2016–17, the voters remained aligned with pro-state intervention positions and unimodal distribution (around two – 56.7 per cent of voters; 32.5 per cent for value three), while MPs remained more polarised, although with a distribution that was now unimodal, at around value three (45 per cent of MPs), albeit with a high number that was also around two (34.4 per cent). Overall, therefore, MPs remained more polarised than voters in 2016–17, but they were now less polarised around economic issues than they were in 2012–13.

5

4

2008 2008 2012

3

2012 2016 2

2016

1 BE

CDU

PS

PPD-PSD

CDS/PP

Figure 4.2 Voters’ and MPs’ positions on the economic left–right index of value orientations by party, 2008 to 2016–17 (5 – economic right; 1 – economic left). ** Reject the null hypothesis (Ho: μ1 = μ2) T-tests for population means (variances unknown and unequal): a) Voters 2008-Voters 2012: BE: t(76)=1.77, p=0.081 CDS: t(30)=0.95, p=0.351 CDU: t(142)=1.32, p=0.189 PSD: t(228)=0.30, p=0.764 PS: t(467)=1.66, p=0.099 b) Deputies 2008-Deputies 2012: BE: t(12)=2.88, p=0.014** CDS: t(19)=-0.01, p=0.99 CDU: t(15)=2.51, p=0.024** PSD: t(39)=-3.56, p=0.001** PS: t(44)=3.42, p=0.001** c) Voters 2012-Deputies 2012: BE: t(12)=-4.19, p=0.001** CDS: t(28)=2.92, p=0.007** CDU: t(9)=-4.72, p=0.001** PSD: t(112)=8.49, p=0.000** PS: t(45)=-3.38, p=0.002** d) Voters 2012-Deputies 2012: BE: t(267)=–3.22, p=0.001** CDS: t(31.70)=9.948, p=0.00** CDU: t(157)=–2.59, p=0.011* PSD: t(450)=9.44, p=0.000** PS: t(451)=-2.99, p=0.003** e) Voters 2016 -Deputies 2016: BE: t(267)=-3.219, p=0.001** CDS: t(31.698)=9.948, p=0.000** CDU: t(157)=-2.585, p=0.011** PSD: t(450)=9.439, p=0.000** PS: t(451)=2.987, p=0.003** f) Voters 2012 -Voters 2016: BE: t(295)=1.534, p=0.126 CDS: t(107)=-1.329, p=0.187

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CDU: t(213)=-0.872, p=0.384 PSD: t(555)=-4.058, p=0.000** PS: t(602)=1.021, p=0.308 g) Deputies 2012 - Deputies 2016: BE: t(25)=-0.207, p=0.838 CDS: t(17.724)=-1.692, p=0.103 CDU: t(18)=-2.127, p=0.047 PSD: t(113)=-2.136, p=0.035** PS: t(84)=-4.413, p=0.000** Sources: Data elaborated by the authors using the voter and deputy surveys in Freire and Viegas (2008a, 2008b); Freire, Viegas and Lisi (2012, 2013); Freire, Lisi and Tsatsanis (2017a, 2017b).

Examining party movements across the economic left–right value dimension (Figure 4.1) it becomes clear the rightward move by MPs between 2008 and 2012– 13 can be attributed mostly to representatives of the PSD, which was the only parliamentary party to make a statistically significantly shift to the right (the only one important on the right). However, due to its size, the entire MP sample appears to have moved right in economic terms, confirming the view of voters who identified the PSD’s shift to the right. In other words, it would appear the PSD is responsible for a situation that approximates ‘disconnecting representation’. A sharp move to the right on economic issues by the major governing party that was followed neither by voters in general nor by PSD voters in particular. Between 2012–13 and 2016–17 MPs representing the PSD and the CDS-PP shifted to the

1.50 1.26 1.11 2008 Centrism

1.00

2012 0.66 0.64 0.53

0.50

0.52

0.42 0.28

0.23

0.20

0.73

2016

0.43 0.31 0.29 0.20

0.00 BE

CDU

PS

PPD/PSD

CDS/PP

Figure 4.3 Congruence between MPs and voters in economic left–right value orientations, taking into account the heterogeneity among voters (‘centrism’) in 2008, 2012 and 2016. Sources: Data elaborated by the authors using the voter and deputy surveys in Freire and Viegas (2008a, 2008b), Freire, Viegas and Lisi (2012, 2013) and Freire, Lisi and Tsatsanis (2017a, 2017b).

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right: more so in the latter than the former, where the shift was limited. However, on the right, only the PSD move is significant (see notes in Figure 4.2). A similar situation emerges within the parties on the left between 2008 and 2012–13, albeit in a different direction. While the position of voters for every party remains stable from 2008 to 2012, MPs representing the PS, BE and CDU (Unitary Democratic Coalition) made significant moves to the left.9 In other words, the idea that there was greater polarisation among MPs in 2012– 13 than in 2008 is confirmed in terms of the economic left/right value divide, although no such dynamic appears to exist at the level of public opinion. Between 2012–13 and 2016–17, MPs representing both the PCP and the PS moved slightly towards the centre, while BE MPs remained where they were. However, only the PS move is statistically significant. Again, MP shifts between 2012–13 and 2016–17 were not mirrored by the voters, who remained stable, with right-wing voters always much more pro-state intervention than right-wing MPs, and left-wing voters slightly more centrist (slightly pro-market) than left-wing MPs. In any case, all the differences between voters and MPs are statistically significant for all parties. The findings for each period and for all parties are confirmed, even when using relative measures of congruence (those taking into account the dispersion among the electorates) (see Figure 4.3).

Conclusion Political representation is a growing research field in Portugal, particularly in the period since the start of the economic crisis. The increasing availability of data provided an opportunity to fill some important gaps in Portugal compared with the international literature, improving our understanding of the peculiarities of the Portuguese case and our knowledge of some of the main challenges affecting the quality of democracy in Portugal from a comparative perspective. This chapter’s primary goal was to examine the evolution of descriptive representation in Portugal. It posed the following question: ‘did the crisis foster a renewal of political elites?’ And gave an essentially negative answer. Since the party system has demonstrated remarkable stability, the profile of MPs has also remained rather unaltered. This continuity is due both to the lack of new political forces with parliamentary representation and to the control the party leadership has exerted over candidate selection (Freire and Teixeira 2011). In terms of the relationship between Portuguese voters and their political system, studies conducted after the start of the economic crisis show that even as indicators of trust in political institutions and satisfaction with democracy showed steep downward movement following the crisis, this movement has been largely limited to indicators of (already relatively low) specific support, and has not produced any dramatic effects on the overall legitimacy of the Portuguese political system. Growing discontent towards both the executive and the legislative branch, as well as lower levels of satisfaction with democracy, do not appear to have any impact on a general preference for

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the democratic regime at large and, following conventional wisdom in the relevant literature, could very likely end up with a similarly steep upward trajectory should economic conditions improve and as the economic crisis fades into the past. At the ideological level, the economic crisis appears to have had a greater impact on MPs than it has had on voters, who appear to be demonstrating mass stability at exceptional times, both in terms of their ideological preferences and their underlying value orientations. However, the movement to the right on economic policy by MPs representing the main right-wing governing party threatens to reveal a significant representation mismatch on the right due to growing incongruence in policy preferences between right-wing MPs and their constituents on the economic left–right issue. This trend was exacerbated by the countermovement by opposition parties, which has contributed to a growing polarisation inside the Portuguese political elite that negates the image promoted during the early stages of the crisis of an elite political culture based on consensus and mutual accommodation. However, both before and after the crisis, left-wing MPs remained more closely aligned with their constituents on economic left–right issues than right-wing MPs did with their voters. Moreover, this (greater) mismatch on the right was significantly amplified due to the PSD’s significant move towards a more neoliberal position. In the cultural arena (authoritarian-libertarian issues) the crisis brought about very little change among voters or MPs. Thus, there was a political class on the right that was more aligned with right-wing than with left-wing voters, a situation that remained as true in 2016–17 as it was in 2008. Changes more generally took place on economic left–right issues, affected the elites more than they did voters and were to be found more on the right than on the left. Thus, on economic issues, the neoliberal drive that emerged with the crisis generated greater incongruence on the right.

Epilogue: The General Election of 6 October 2019 and the New Government in Portugal In terms of empirical data, the analyses of this chapter on political representation in Portugal before and after the Great Recession focused on the period 2008–16; that is to say that it covered the majority and minority PS governments of 2005–11, the right-wing governments during the 2011–14 troika period, plus another year of the parliamentary (and government) mandate (2015), and part of the PS’s new minority government that was supported by the radical left in parliament from 2015 to 2019, the so-called geringonça (which loosely translates as ‘contraption’). However, following the general election of 6 October 2019 we thought it appropriate to include a very general epilogue about these recent changes. The agreements between the four parties (PS, BE, PCP and PEV; the latter two are part of the pre-electoral coalition CDU: PCP-PEV ) signed in November 2015 were a requirement of the then president, and effectively functioned as an

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mainstay of the remarkable stability that characterised the 18th legislature. For matters included in the agreements, which covered issues of governance (motions of censure and trust), they also guaranteed political-ideological coherence by ensuring government that was aligned to the left. Of course, many matters were not included in the agreements (in particular those dealing with Europe and issues related to political-military alignments and, for example, labour laws and support for the financial sector). On these issues the PS minority government relied mainly on support from the right (or at least their abstention) to ensure the measures passed. Overall, the geringonça government had positive outputs in both the political and the socio-economic arenas, and it always complied with EU financial rules. The result of the elections of 6 October brought the geringonça government to an end. By winning with 36.7 per cent of the vote share and electing 108 MPs (46.9 per cent of the total), arithmetically speaking, the PS require only one of the two other parties that supported the geringonça (BE with 19 MPs or the PCP-PEV with 12 MPs) to secure a parliamentary majority. On the other hand, the PS could have established an ‘oversized alliance’ (one that would have given it a large parliamentary majority) that included all the parties that had formed the geringonça, and even expanded it to include other non-right-wing parties, such as Livre and PAN (People-Animals-Nature). However, this solution was made unfeasible by the unwillingness of both the PCP-PEV and PAN to enter into a written agreement, and by Livre insisting on a multilateral agreement with all parties of the left before it would enter into any alliance. The PS was left with the option of a written agreement with BE, which was willing to sign; however, the PS did not want an agreement with just one other party. This means that it is probable Portugal will end up with a minority PS government that seeks support from the left on some issues and from the right on others (in Portugal this is called ‘winking’, or piscando), although the PS says its preference is to negotiate with the parties on the left. What the consequences will be for political representation in Portugal, either as a result of the geringonça’s entire mandate (2015–19), or of the new government that emerged following the 2019 elections, are clearly issues for future research.

Notes 1 About these topics see also the chapter in this volume on the methodological issues involved when surveying political elites in Greece, Portugal and Spain (Chapter 7). 2 Due to limitations of space we focus on this issue dimension rather than the cultural one, although in the conclusions we will briefly mention some findings concerning the latter dimension before and after the crisis. 3 See the project Crisis, political representation and democratic renewal: The Portuguese case in the Southern European context (PTDC/IVC-CPO/3098/2014), coordinated by Freire, Lisi and Tsatsanis at both CIES-IUL and IPRI-FCSH-UNL, 2016–19.

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4 CCS (Comparative Candidates Survey), PARENEL (Parliamentary Representation at the National and European Levels), (IntUne – Integrated and United: A Quest for Citizenship in an Ever Closer Europe) and PARTIREP (Party Representation). 5 PS, PCP (and their permanent partner in CDU since 1987: the Greens, PEV) and BE. 6 These citizen surveys were fielded as part of two consecutive projects: see Freire and Viegas (2008a); Freire, Viegas and Lisi (2012), for details. 7 The only exception is the question about fighting inequalities (in 2016–17), which, while it can be said to refer to the same basic underlying concept (the fight against inequality), has a different formulation for MPs and voters. 8 We believe an overall F-test would tell us whether the differences between the different groups of party voters (or party MPs) are significant as a whole, but it would not allow us to detect differences within each party (e.g. comparing BE sympathisers in 2008 with BE sympathisers in 2012, or BE sympathisers in 2012 versus BE MPs in 2012). This is why we chose the independent samples t-tests instead of an overall F-test. 9 The CDU is a parliamentary coalition of the PCP and the PEV.

References Belchior, A. (2008). Party political representation in Portugal. South European Society and Politics 13(4), 457–476. Belchior, A. (2010). Ideological congruence among European political parties. Journal of Legislative Studies 16(1), 121–142. Belchior, A. (2012). Explaining left–right party congruence across European party systems. Comparative Political Studies 46(3), 352–386. Belchior, A. and Freire, A. (2013). Is party type relevant to an explanation of policy congruence? Catchall versus ideological parties in the Portuguese case. International Political Science Review 34(3), 273–288. Belchior, A., Tsatsanis, E. and Teixeira, C. (2015). Representation in times of crisis: Deputy-voter congruence on views of representation in Portugal. International Political Science Review 37(2), 277–293. Dalton, R. J. (2004). Democratic challenges, democratic choices. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Easton, D. (1975). A re-assessment of the concept of political support. British Journal of Political Science 5(4), 435–457. Easton, D. (1976). Theoretical approaches to political support. Canadian Journal of Political Science 9(3), 431–448. Freire, A. (2001). Recrutamento parlamentar. Lisbon: Stape. Freire, A. (2015). Left–right ideology as a dimension of identification and of competition. Journal of Political Ideologies 20(1), 43–68. Freire, A. (2016). The condition of Portuguese democracy during the troika’s intervention, 2011–2015. Portuguese Journal of Social Science 15(2), 173–193. Freire, A. and Belchior, A. (2013). Ideological representation in Portugal: MPs’-electors’ linkages in terms of left–right placement and substantive meaning. Journal of Legislative Studies 19(1), 1–21. Freire, A. and Lisi, M. (2016). Political parties, institutions and civil society. Portuguese Journal of Social Science 15(2), 153–171. Freire, A., Lisi, M., Andreadis, I. and Viegas, J. M. L. (2014). Political representation in bailed-out southern Europe: Greece and Portugal compared. South European Society and Politics 19(4), 413–433.

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Freire, A., Lisi, M. and Tsatsanis, E. (2017a). Portuguese voters survey – 2015 elections. Crisis, political representation and democratic renewal: The Portuguese case in the southern European context, CIES-IUL and IPRI-NOVA research project, FCT: PTDC/IVC-CPO/3098/2014. Available online at http://er.cies.iscte-iul.pt/ Freire, A., Lisi, M. and Tsatsanis, E. (2017b). Portuguese MPs survey – 2015 elections. Crisis, political representation and democratic renewal: The Portuguese case in the southern European context, CIES-IUL and IPRI-NOVA research project, FCT: PTDC/IVC-CPO/3098/2014. Available online at http://er.cies.iscte-iul.pt/ Freire, A., Lisi, M. and Tsatsanis, E. (2017c). Biographies of Portuguese MPs 2015 – database. Crisis, political representation and democratic renewal: The Portuguese case in the southern European context, CIES-IUL and IPRI-NOVA research project, FCT: PTDC/IVC-CPO/3098/2014. Available online at http://er.cies.iscte-iul.pt/ Freire, A., Lisi, M. and Tsatsanis, E. (2018). Portuguese citizens survey 2016–2018 first (2016) and second (2018) waves of a panel. Crisis, political representation and democratic renewal: The Portuguese case in the southern European context, CIESIUL and IPRI-NOVA research project, FCT: PTDC/IVC-CPO/3098/2014. Available online at http://er.cies.iscte-iul.pt/ Freire, A., Lisi, M. and Viegas, J. M. L. (2011). Biographies of Portuguese MPs 2011. Database. In: A. Freire, M. Lisi, and J. M. L. Viegas, eds. Elections, leadership and accountability, 2012–2015. FCT: PTDC/CPJ-CPO/119307/2010. Available at http:// er.cies.iscte-iul.pt/ Freire, A., Lisi, M. and Viegas, J. M. L. (2015). Crise económica, políticas de austeridade e representação política. Lisbon: Assembleia da República. Freire, A., Lisi, M. and Viegas, J. M. L. (2016). Representação e participação política na Europa em crise. Lisbon: Assembleia da República. Freire, A. and Santana-Pereira, J. (2016). The Portuguese national election of 2015: From austerity to the fall of the Portuguese ‘Berlin Wall’. Pôle Sud – Revue de Science Politique44(1), 142–147. Freire, A. and Teixeira, C. P. (2011). A escolha antes da escolha: a seleção dos candidatos a deputados, parte III – teoria e prática. Revista de Ciências Sociais e Políticas 2, 31–48. Freire, A., Tsatsanis, E. and Lima, I. (2016). Portugal in times of crisis: Value change and policy representation. In: M. Voicu, I. C. Mochmann and H. Dülmer, eds. Values, economic crisis and democracy. London: Routledge, pp. 240–276. Freire, A. and Viegas, J. M. L. (2008a). Portuguese voters survey 2008. Portuguese deputies in comparative perspective: Elections, leadership, and political representation, ISCTE-IUL and CIES-IUL research project, FCT: PTDC/CPO/64469/2006. Available online at http://er.cies.iscte-iul.pt/ Freire, A. and Viegas, J. M. L. (2008b). Portuguese MPs survey 2008. Portuguese deputies in comparative perspective: Elections, leadership, and political representation, ISCTE-IUL and CIES-IUL research project, FCT: PTDC/CPO/64469/2006. Available online at http://er.cies.iscte-iul.pt/ Freire, A. and Viegas, J. M. L. (2010a). Portuguese MPs survey 2009 (2009 national elections) (MPs and candidate survey within the CCS-PT). Portuguese deputies in comparative perspective: Elections, leadership, and political representation, ISCTEIUL and CIES-IUL research project, FCT: PTDC/CPO/64469/2006. Available online at http://er.cies.iscte-iul.pt/ Freire, A. and Viegas, J. M. L. (2010b). Portuguese MPs survey 2009 (2009 national elections) in both Portuguese mainland and the islands (MPs web survey within the

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PARTIREP, Party Representation, network, fieldwork 2009-2010). Portuguese deputies in comparative perspective: Elections, leadership, and political representation, ISCTE-IUL and CIES-IUL research project, FCT: PTDC/CPO/64469/2006. Available online at http://er.cies.iscte-iul.pt/ Freire, A., Viegas, J. M. L. and Lisi, M. (2012). Portuguese voters survey, 2012. Elections, leadership, and accountability: Political representation in Portugal in a longitudinal and comparative perspective, ISCTE-IUL and CIES-IUL research project, FCT: PTDC/CPJ-CPO/119307/2010. Available online at http://er.cies.iscte-iul.pt/ Freire, A., Viegas, J. M. L. and Lisi, M. (2013). Portuguese MPs survey, 2012–2013–2011 legislative election. Elections, leadership, and accountability: Political representation in Portugal in a longitudinal and comparative perspective, ISCTE-IUL and CIES-IUL research project, FCT: PTDC/CPJ-CPO/119307/2010. Available online at http://er.cies. iscte-iul.pt/ Freire, A., Viegas, J. M. L. and Seiceira, F. (2009). Representação política em Portugal: inquéritos e bases de dados. Lisbon: Sextante. Ignazi, P. (2017). Party and democracy: The uneven road to party legitimacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Magalhães, P. C. (2002). A imagem de assembleia da República na opinião pública Portuguesa. In: A. Freire, A. de Araújo, C. Leston-Bandeira, M. C. Lobo, eds. O parlamento português: uma reforma necessária. Lisbon: Instituto de Ciências Sociais, pp. 467–482. Magalhães, P. C. (2005). Disaffected democrats: Political attitudes and political action in Portugal. West European Politics 28(5), 973–991. Mair, P. (2013). Ruling the void: The hollowing of western democracy. London: Verso. Manin, B., Stokes, S. C. and Przeworski, A. (1999). Elections and representation. In: A. Przeworski, S. C. Stokes and B. Manin, eds. Democracy, accountability and representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 29–54. Montero, J. R., Gunther, R. and Torcal, M. (1997). Democracy in Spain: Legitimacy, discontent and disaffection. Estudio/Working Paper 100. Madrid: Institute Juan March. Muro, D. and Vidal, G. (2016). Political mistrust in southern Europe since the Great Recession. Mediterranean Politics 22(2), 197–217. Norris, P. (1999). The growth of critical citizens? In: P. Norris, ed. Critical citizens: Global support for democratic government. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–27. Pinto, A. C., Magalhães, P. and de Sousa, L., eds. (2013). A qualidade da democracia em Portugal. Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais. Teixeira, C. P. (2009). O povo semi-soberano. Coimbra: Almedina. Teixeira, C. P. and Freire, A. (2010). Decline, transformation and trust in parliaments: The Portuguese case in a longitudinal and comparative perspective. Revista IberoAmericana de Estudos Legislativos 1(1), 24–37. Teixeira, C. P., Tsatsanis, E. and Belchior, A. (2014a). A ‘necessary evil’ even during hard times? Public support for political parties in Portugal before and after the bailout (2008 and 2012). Party Politics 22(6), 661–678. Teixeira, C. P., Tsatsanis, E. and Belchior, A. M. (2014b). Support for democracy in times of crisis: Diffuse and specific regime support in Portugal and Greece. South European Society and Politics 19(4), 501–518. Tsatsanis, E., Freire, A. and Tsirbas, Y. (2014). The impact of the economic crisis on the ideological space in Portugal and Greece: A comparison of elites and voters. South European Society and Politics 19(4), 519–540.

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It Is Not Just the Economy How Spanish Established Political Elites Understand the (Political) Crisis and Its Effects Xavier Coller, Manuel Jiménez-Sánchez and Manuel Portillo-Pérez

Introduction Political representation is based on trust between agents (MPs) and principals (citizens).1 Trust in representatives and political institutions are key elements in democracies (Warren 2018) insofar as they touch on two of the four dimensions of democratic practice identified by Fishman (2019: 11–12): depth (social inclusion in the political process) and quality (possibilities for public deliberation).2 If the democratic deficit (Norris 2011) is to be addressed,3 the performance of governmental and representative institutions needs to meet mobilised critical citizens’ expectations. However, only certain levels of trust in political representatives and institutions may render this match efficient. Without trust, conversations and/or deliberations are impossible, and democratic political actions are reduced to either protest or accommodation. Specifically, the growing distance between MPs and citizens makes it difficult to build trust between agents and principals. The erosion of the representative link represents a major failure of the system that requires an investigation into how the leading actors make sense of it and explain and rationalise the gap. Agency theory highlights the fact that agent–principal relationships are often affected by contextual factors. An economic crisis is one of those factors. Spain, together with Greece, Italy, Portugal and Ireland, is one of the European countries that most suffered from the Great Recession.4 One of its effects has been growing political detachment, especially among millennials (Muro and Vidal 2017; Montero, Sanz and Navarrete 2016; FEPS 2017). Detachment can be identified in Spain in three scenarios. First, there is growing disaffection with politicians, although not so much towards democracy as the preferred political regime (Torcal 2014; Muro and Vidal 2017; Cordero and Simón 2016; Cordero and Montero 2015). Second, there is a progressive erosion of the image of politicians to the point that since mid2008 politicians, their parties and politics in general have become one of the main problems for Spaniards. Third, a large protest wave in 2011–15 reflected widespread discontent and rejection of parties and politicians: the 15-M,

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protests guided by the slogan ‘no nos representan’ (‘they do not represent us’), the anti-austerity sectoral ‘tides’ (education, health) and the siege of the Catalan parliament are some indicators of the growing distance between citizens and politicians (and their traditional parties). These scenarios all contributed towards plunging levels of trust in key institutions, such as parliaments. Figure 5.1 shows changes in citizen trust in European national parliaments before (2002) and after the Great Recession (2016). Average values (between four and seven) concentrate in the middle of the 0–10 scale. Countries in which trust has decreased during this period (placed below the diagonal line in the figure) tend to be those that have been most affected by the crisis. Spain, in particular, is the country in which trust has fallen the most, while it also shows the lowest values, together with countries such as Portugal. Despite early research suggesting the economy has little impact on politics (Putnam 1994; Norris 2011), some other works suggest that the evolution of the economy may be a key factor to understand citizen support for democracy (van der Meer 2018; Fernández-Albertos 2018). In the case of Spain, satisfaction with the functioning of democracy seems to be cyclical. It has paralleled the evolution of the economy except during the transition and its aftermath, when satisfaction was high despite the economic crisis (Christman and Torcal 2017; see also Montero, Sanz and Navarrete 2016; Royo 2014).

7 Nor

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Figure 5.1 Trust in national parliaments in European countries, before and after the Great Recession. Source: Our own elaboration from ESS data from various rounds (available at https:// www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/).

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When analysing the causes of disaffection or the democratic deficit, scholars usually focus on the principal (citizen attitudes) and rarely on the perspective of the agent (the representatives’ views). And yet the latter’s views are of the utmost importance, insofar as their political practice is closely related to both the causes of and the solutions to the representative gap; specifically, ‘democratic conversations’, which are a centrepiece of the distinctive functioning of democracy (Fishman 2004, 2019), largely depend on their ability and willingness to be responsive to the demands of critical citizens. However, little is known about how MPs make sense of the growing distance between citizens and politics: How do they explain the growing distrust in politicians? What meanings attach to the representation crisis? Do they develop discourses that focus on economic matters (the Great Recession in this case) or do they envisage causes of a different nature? This chapter addresses these questions through the analysis of a large series of interviews with regional MPs, and tries to throw some light on this quite often forgotten side of the representative equation. The economic crisis in Spain, in a context of high social contestation, was firmly shaped in public opinion as a political crisis to a greater extent than in other European countries (Zamponi and Bossi 2016). In this sense, and in line with previous inquiries (Jiménez-Sánchez, Coller and Portillo-Pérez 2018), it is expected that political representatives would logically connect the crisis and the representative gap, but we also expect variations in the nature of that connection and, above all, a diversity of other factors to be taken into account. The narrative of the chapter develops as follows. Among those who acknowledge there is an estrangement of citizens from politics, explanations constructed by MPs are clustered around three poles (see Figure 5.2. in the conclusions section for a summary). First, external factors such as the economic crisis (multiplied by corruption scandals and government mismanagement of the economy), citizen fatalism and accommodation with the situation, the evolution of political cycles, misinformation and ignorance and pejorative mass media images. Second, elements that may be labelled ‘institutional’, such as a lack of accountability and responsibility induced by an imperfect bipartisan system, and centralised and non-inclusive candidate selection mechanisms combined with a hierarchical functioning of parliamentary groups. Third, factors related to MPs’ political actions, such as corruption, professionalisation and its derivatives (isolation), lack of responsiveness and failure to deliver on election promises.

A Methodological Note: Interviewing Politicians Using a Qualitative Approach Empirical evidence was generated from a series of face-to-face interviews with a ‘motivated’ sample of 66 MPs from seven regional parliaments. To guarantee variability and meaningfulness, and minimise the sample bias effect, interviewees were selected according to size of the chamber, territory, type of autonomous community, party, experience (legislatures in parliament) and use of information and communication technologies (ICT).5 Once the sampling

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criteria were established, some degree of randomness was incorporated to select the MPs to be interviewed. Fieldwork was carried out between October 2014 and April 2015 by members of the research project team. Interviews lasted an average of 40 minutes and followed a semi-structured guide dealing with a number of issues related to the representative link. Interviews were recorded, transcribed and coded using NVivo® following an iterative inductive process consisting of identifying concepts used by the interviewees, grouping them in subthemes, checking for their consistency (and affinity) across interviews and establishing conceptual categories. Thus, we were able to map out emerging concepts and their relationships. For instance, for the explanation of the erosion of the representative link it became clear that some factors were commonly used (crisis, corruption) while others emerged after reviewing for consistency (e.g. blaming society, representative role). Once the ‘emerged concepts’ were established, we explored commonalities and differences between MP discourses, associating them with specific characteristics (sex, party, etc.) to reveal different patterns. However, without aiming at any statistical significance, it should be highlighted that we found more commonalities than differences. Quotes used in the chapter are both evidence and illustrations of the analysis and classification carried out. For this chapter, we have selected those that better illustrate the argument developed.6 Rather than articulating elaborated theoretical discussions, in this descriptive and exploratory chapter we account for MP discourses while trying to make sense of, understand, explain and address the growing gap between citizens and politics.

The Political Divide Contested Broadly, there are two discourses concerning the crisis of the representative link. While one denies the existence of such a gap, the second builds its explanation on a number of factors analysed in the next section. Those who deny the erosion of the representative link tend to be conservative and experienced MPs (especially from the PP, Popular Party). There are three types of arguments sustaining the denial: there is no distance because MPs are also part of society and parliaments mirror societies; ICT (social media) bridges the gap efficiently; and local politics allows citizens to be close to representatives, a position usually associated with MPs who are also local councillors: I think there is no such gap. I believe that representatives are people who are in the streets and are regular people … [They] listen to regular people and all have families, friends. We come from different sectors … from all kinds of social backgrounds, diverse territories (rural, urban), some are more prepared, some others less prepared, with more money, or less wealthy. So, I believe we are a part of a real society. We are not that far away as many people think. (ANPP64W) Before it was unthinkable that you would Tweet to a political leader and that they would answer you … I think there is less distance because

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politicians have been obliged to … go on TV, they have Twitter … there is less physical distance and more room for political debate. (CACS25W) I have little to do with national leaders of any party … I believe that local councillors are politicians as well and there is no distance. I believe there is distance with people who, because of their responsibilities, are managing large structures [of power]: ministers, secretaries of state, etc. … It is true that they do not have a lot of relations with citizens. Furthermore, people do not perceive us as close. (VAPS31M) Against the threefold denial argument, the hegemonic discourse clearly acknowledges that the link between MPs and citizens has been eroded as a consequence of a representation crisis based on declining levels of trust between agents and principals. This perception is shared across political parties, although the explanations given are not necessarily common. The next section provides an account of these explanations that complement those already identified by the literature.

Explanations of the Political Divide Contrary to Norris’s (2011, especially ch. 7) suggestion that economic development has no impact on the democratic deficit, using survey data from EU member states from 2000 to 2015, Muro and Vidal (2017) and Christman and Torcal (2017) have shown that the sources of political mistrust in the southern periphery were both political and economic. They argue that deteriorating economic conditions focus citizens’ attention on political institutions’ performance. Rising levels of unemployment, austerity measures and political corruption become key factors in understanding falling levels of political trust and, consequently, the growing distance perceived by MPs. MP discourses provide grounds to support this idea, although they complement it by highlighting exogenous factors (traditional disinterest in politics, citizen ignorance of MP work, the mass media’s focus on the most negative images, the economic crisis or the natural evolution of things), which partially exonerate politicians of any responsibility; or factors related to MPs’ actions – corruption scandals, party discipline, not delivering on election promises, or the professionalisation of MPs are seen as part of the negative side of the equation. Following structuration theory (Giddens 1984), political institutions are external to political actors, but MP actions also recreate and modulate institutions. Therefore, ‘institutional failure’ is a middle ground that explains the growing distance between citizens and MPs.

External Factors The external factors represent the foundations of those explanations seeking the causes of the political divide outside political action. These are the normalisation of the crisis of representation, the economic crisis, citizen accommodation to the situation (fatalism) and media criticism. MP discourses along these lines help make sense of citizen detachment from politics.

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a) Normalising the political crisis. A subset of MPs normalises the existence of a political representation crisis by emphasising either that it is a reflection of a crisis of values, or that it is the outcome of the natural evolution of democratic politics. The crisis of values is highlighted by MPs of the radical left who critically put forward the idea that the economic crisis has made more visible the distance between politicians and citizens although its roots can be found in Francoism and the Transition or even in the nature of Spanish society: This has always existed and has deep sociological roots in Francoism. I believe there is a demobilising element that makes politics seem like … something distant [alien]. Even if you assume they [politicians] are crooks … I mean that [the divide] has deep sociological roots, but now we talk more because there are more debates thanks to the economic crisis. (NANA36M1) While social conflict was not that evident, it looked like the gap was narrowing. Now that the crisis is here, the gap is more evident and has emerged during the recreation of the national narrative of this country. The gap has existed since the Transition, but when one is coming from a dictatorship, everything is better … but after 35–40 years the crisis comes and society realises the existing dysfunction between representatives and represented, especially institutionally, like when the political system treats people like subjects not citizens. It is part of the culture: there are rules and institutions maintaining the gap. (CACUP29M) Detachment from politics and politicians has also been explained by using the metaphor of the honeymoon between a society and its democratic political institutions: it is the natural consequence of the passing of time, when people get bored of seeing the same things over and over again. One experienced MP from Andalusia highlighting this factor put it in this way: The first 20 years of democracy in Spain … there was the interest of the newlywed. It has been a long honeymoon, fortunately … but the interest we generated in citizens is now different … partly because there are a lot of youngsters who were born in democracy and the battles you tell them will be history … We have to react and I understand that for politicians from younger generations it will be easier to contact these groups than for those who have had other experiences. (ANPS106W) According to this view, the emergence of new parties led by young generations will make it difficult for traditional parties to be responsive to citizens’ demands unless they adjust to the new environment. b) Economic crisis and political discontent. The Great Recession has reinforced the idea that politics is highly sensitive to economics, to the point that it is seen as the basis of (if not catalyst of) political dissatisfaction and discontent (Christman and Torcal 2017; Muro and Vidal 2017). MP discourses align with this idea – with the qualification that most of them introduce the multiplying effect of

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corruption or the management of the economy in the context of the Great Recession – while some others (mainly, but not exclusively, PP MPs) focus more on the economic crisis. For this minor subset, had the crisis not affected Spain for so long and so deeply, Spaniards would not have been concerned about corruption: The divide is enormous. I believe it has been generated … by the crisis, although we might believe that it has been created by corruption … If it was the corruption, how is it possible that citizens have never punished these parties for the cases of corruption that have lasted for so many years … ? While there was no crisis, there was no problem. When does corruption explode and become a problem for citizens? When it is parallel to the crisis. If there is no crisis, citizens do not care. (EXPP30W) I believe that the economic crisis has had serious effects … here is a relationship between GDP growth and political disaffection. Growing GDP decreases disaffection. At least, that is what the CIS series [surveys] indicate. Now, we are in a more structural problem because even though the economy is improving, it does not mean that there will be a recovery in the credibility of politics. (CAPP46M) Among those who combine different factors with the Great Recession there are two arguments. On the one hand, there are those who believe that the effects of the crisis on political dissatisfaction or on the judgements of the performance of democracy are multiplied by the combination of the economic crisis and, mainly, the government’s (mis)management of the economy (austerity policies). Usually, leftist MPs from Andalusia are found among this group: Recently, many governments have been ‘against people’s happiness’, they are making people suffer, favouring minorities with economic power and then they are not representing society but particular economic and financial interests. They are representing an ideology that has nothing to do with provision for the happiness of the majority. This is why we have this gap. (ANIU65M) There are people who see the rich getting richer, banks going well, plenty of corruption scandals, and their sons and daughters being unemployed or having to emigrate or they themselves having economic difficulties to get to the end of the month. Then, how are you not going to have a disastrous perception of all this? So they have it. (ANPS20W) On the other hand, there are discourses that explain citizen detachment from politics by combining the economic crisis argument with that of corruption, some argue, echoed by the mass media. This is a discourse that is found across parties in an example of commonality: This economic crisis has made many people lose their jobs, and the welfare that they might have enjoyed under different economic conditions. If

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Coller, Jiménez-Sánchez and Portillo-Pérez you add to this situation the fact that there are many cases of corruption in which politicians have betrayed citizens’ trust, then this is translated into a generalised distrust towards politicians. (CAPP118M) The duration of the crisis means that the administration and politics are seen in a very negative way because politicians have not been able to attack the problem [the economic crisis] more quickly. And this phenomenon gets complicated, with episodes linked to the misuse of public money, or straight corruption flourishing in different situations, in different regions and in different parties over time. (ASPS29M) For me, ‘do-nothing policy’ and corruption are important. Obviously, the economic crisis introduces tensions – there are risky difficult situations that can affect anybody … and thus people’s degree of tolerance … diminishes dramatically. (CACIU19W) The distance has been created by the attitude and the behaviour of a political class of one party in particular and some politicians. And then, [it has been created] by the use that mass media make [of these behaviours]. (BCBI24M)

The Great Recession and the multiplying effects of corruption scandals and mismanagement of the economy are the key causes of the democratic deficit and critical citizens insofar as they may generate the perception that political institutions are not performing adequately. However, despite the mobilisations that were taking place in Spain at the time of the fieldwork (2014–15), some MPs perceived that political apathy and detachment was caused in part by citizen inactivity and lack of involvement in politics. c) Blaming citizens. Far from being rare, blaming citizens emerges as one of the pillars of politician discourses, especially, but not exclusively, among those on the left, and the less-experienced. MPs identify three explanations: accommodation, lack of critical views and (induced) apathy. These quotes reflect the arguments: Perhaps it is not politically correct to say so, but citizens also have their share of responsibility because with their votes they have not been critical enough … It is true that the opposition and the mass media have failed, but citizens have also lacked a bit of a critical stand. (VAPS31M) Citizens are also responsible. They are at home, watching TV and their only concern is the next TV or car they are going to get. Then, when the savings of grandpa are stolen with the ‘preferred stock’, they have been fired or lack health coverage, only then you get upset. (VACOM38M) I believe we have not been educated … to be committed citizens. This affects politicians and citizens. We all come from the same educational system. (BCBI126M) Additionally, there is the perceived unfamiliarity of citizens with parliamentary work, for which some MPs blame themselves. The argument is that ordinary citizens ignore the hard work most MPs do and see them as idle or merely

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concerned with keeping their seats. This argument is found in all parties although it is mainly associated with the left and among inexperienced and female MPs: It is true there is a gap between citizens and politicians. I do not know the origin but one of the problems is that there is great ignorance about what politicians do and their dedication, their interest and how they understand this whole thing [politics]. (VAPP76M1) I believe the gap exists … because people do not know what we really do in politics. They know the defects of politics, the corruption in politics, but they do not know POLITICS, with capital letters. (NAPS74M) [There is] the low critical vision on the part of the citizenry, who believe these messages, interiorise them and repeat them like parrots without questioning them and without checking whether they are true or not. On many occasions I have met with people who are very distrustful of politicians, but when they work with you, when they realise that you understand the problem and you try to help them … then they exonerate you from distrust, but unfortunately, you are the only one they exonerate. (CAIU26W) Ignoring the nature of parliament’s work and its impact on society may lead to negative images or the belief that misconduct is widespread in the political arena. The mass media must take their share of the blame, argue MPs across parties, since they transmit a negative image of MPs’ actions that only focuses on corruption scandals in which all MPs are involved: There is growing estrangement because there is not enough information. The media does not help because they spice [the situation] up. There have been times in which I have heard talk-show guests saying that we have free dinners here [in parliament] or that we even have a hairdresser at our disposal. (CACIU46W) The mass media do not contribute to dignifying politicians’ tasks. Crooks are exceptional but it is made to look like they are very common: it looks like we all are a band of crooks when there is 0.5 per cent to 1 per cent of corrupt [politicians] – as you will also find … in football clubs, with TV anchors, actors, plumbers, lawyers. (VAPP76M1) These negative images aired by the mass media are assumed by the population, who, in the view of some MPs, are unable to distinguish between different types of politicians. However, this perception may change when direct contact takes place. (see CAIU26W above)

Institutional Factors In the above-mentioned survey, Jaime-Castillo, Bartolome and MartínezCousinou (2018: 166) found that among the eight reasons given to MPs to

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explain political disaffection, ‘lack of contact with the average citizen’s real problems’ ranked fourth with an average of 3.14 on a 1–5 scale. Similarly, Torcal (2014) associates citizen distrust with the lack of responsiveness of political institutions (plus corruption). It is common ground among some MPs to emphasise this idea – that politics in Spain has not been in any way responsive to citizen needs, or that institutional representative politics alienates citizens by generating a lack of interest. But beyond these perceptions that may be associated with the political practice of MPs, our interviewees identify what could be called institutional failures that have generated situations conducive to widening the gap between citizens and politicians. In the MPs’ views, these institutional failures are concentrated in two elements: lack of accountability (favoured by the electoral system) and irresponsibility (fostered by the lack of institutional control over misconduct). An MP of the by now almost extinct UPyD (Union, Progress and Democracy Party) summarised it in this way: [The origin of the distance lies] in an absolute lack of accountability and an absolute irresponsibility. We have for a long time been led by an irresponsible political class, irresponsible not only because it behaved with little responsibility, but also because it did not assume any responsibility. Things have happened here with corruption, in the economy … and nothing has happened to the political elite … There has been no renewal of the elite, and when there is irresponsibility and when citizens’ lives are affected by this irresponsibility, and see that nothing happens, then… (ASUPD24M) Since there is little induced accountability (beyond elections every four years), the politician does not feel the need to tell citizens what they have done, which contributes to isolation and estrangement. An imperfect two-party system, a centralised and non-inclusive mechanism for the selection of politicians, an electoral system based on party lists and the hierarchical way parliamentary groups usually work are elements (not addressed in this chapter) that contribute towards an explanation for the lack of accountability (Cordero and Coller 2015; Jiménez-Sánchez, Coller and Portillo-Pérez 2018) and for which our interviewee discourses provide support. Furthermore, while some MPs are angry about the inability to control corruption, the image of politicians (as a collective) has been damaged and citizen detachment has grown: Politicians offer ideas in the elections, citizens vote for them and then the ideas that have won, get implemented. Well, it is not like that … This has brought politicians a lack of credibility. (CAERC27W) In part this is because of corrupt politicians, and then … in the current system to represent people … the opinions of a large social majority are left out … so people do not see their demands reflected in parties and that … generates frustration. (ASIU20W)

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Factors Related to MPs There are a number of elements revealed by MP discourses that lead towards blaming political actions rather than pointing at citizens or the political system. Blaming MPs is not common in public discourses, partly because MPs are not usually interviewed to find out their views on political detachment and partly because their repertoire of political actions includes ‘blaming others rather than myself (or ourselves)’. Interviewing MPs has allowed us to detect five main arguments and their derivatives: corruption, lack of responsiveness, professionalisation, isolation and breaking electoral promises. a) Corruption. Corruption scandals erode trust in politicians and democratic institutions, increasing the chances for the democratic deficit to grow, since the performance of democracy may be perceived as failing. In this respect, there are two sources of evidence. First, various studies have highlighted the fact that corruption generates mistrust (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Seligson 2002; Uslaner 2011; van der Meer and Dekker 2011). In Spain, Sánchez-Cuenca and Barreiro (2000), Jiménez (2004), Villoria, van Ryzin and Lavena (2013) and Torcal (2014) found that political scandals (usually associated with corruption) have an impact on citizen trust in politics and politicians. Second, the results of a survey of MPs indicate that when MPs are asked about the causes of disaffection, corruption shows the highest average point (4.31) on a 1–5 scale followed by ‘the continuous tension in political life’ (3.97) and the ‘constant criticism by the media’ (3.86) (Jaime-Castillo, Bartolome and Martínez-Cousinou 2018: 166). Aligned with these findings, and rivalling the economic factor in its centrality in MP discourses, political corruption is the other element politicians across parties put forward to explain disaffection and estrangement from the population. In their discourses, corruption is combined with political wrongdoings as a ‘package of misconduct’ in politics. As three MPs from different ideological traditions summarised: Because of the corruption … There is nothing else … This makes me feel really angry and if I were not a politician I would not be able to stand any politician. (VAPP194W) [There have been b]ad political practices … and corruption does not help. If we cannot put an end to this, it will be very difficult to go back to build bridges. (CAERC27W) Corruption is widespread … and nobody has implemented adequate measures. Even those who should have intervened long ago to prevent it have done nothing … Yes, we are all shocked, but I believe that we are all a bit responsible, but then, we blame the politician. (VAPS31M) In MP discourses across ideological lines, citizens, it is argued, are fed up with the misbehaviour of some politicians, usually associated with the PP, and end up believing all politicians are the same. Consequently, they distance themselves from all parties and politicians no matter whether they are

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honest or not. Some experience the weight of these generalisations by developing negative feelings: ‘I feel ashamed about my involvement in politics when there are people who [are corrupt]’ (EXPS119M). But others underline the need to make a distinction by arguing that there are honest people everywhere. As a young new MP acknowledged: [I]t is true that some people consider that all politicians are the same, that all politicians are corrupt, and this is not the case … There are people in the Popular Party, in CiU (Convergence and Union, in the PSOE (Socialist Party who are very honest, valid and hard workers … I do not agree with these generalisations, but it is true that the way things work in Spain favour those who want to be corrupt, whoever wants to steal, whoever wants to benefit from the system, as it is very easy to do so. (CACS25W) b) Representative role. This group of explanations for the divide has a kaleidoscopic nature, although all are associated with the representative role of MPs in one way or the other. The belief in the impossibility of combining a seat in parliament with any other profession leads to the professionalisation of politics and, for some, this isolates politicians from society: No doubt, no doubt [the gap exists]. In this parliament we are talking now about the professionalisation of MPs: that is, the exclusive dedication to politics … I am against it because [working outside of politics] is the only way to stay tuned to the streets, to see what happens in the streets. (ASFA190M) ‘Isolation from society’ is a widely acknowledged issue among MPs: they are not doing a good job in explaining to citizens what they do in parliaments, thus fostering an informational gap that does not help in bridging the link between MPs and citizens: We have not been capable of transmitting to citizens the importance of politics in their everyday life … In that sense, I believe there is a very important divide (ASIU190W). I think we need … more pedagogy … so that we can understand what they [citizens] demand of us … so that our language does not become unintelligible jargon. (ANPS106W) Well, there are many reasons for this [the estrangement and discredit of politics]: one is the unfamiliarity of citizens with the tasks we perform in parliaments. But this is not to blame citizens, but ourselves for not explaining what we do or for not working better, since everything we do here has an impact [on society]. (CAERC27W)

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c) Lack of responsiveness and electoral promises. This informational gap affects citizen unfamiliarity with parliaments and MPs, which may predispose them to uncritically accept negative mass media images, as some MPs indicated earlier. Furthermore, the combination of isolation due to professionalisation and informational gaps may consolidate the distance perceived by citizens when 80 per cent of Spaniards claim MPs should take voters’ wishes and demands into account when making political decisions (Mota 2018: 147). Citizens demand to be taken into account and MP discourses are nurtured with the idea that they have not been responsive enough and this is one of the causes eroding the representative bond. ‘Why is this?’, asked an MP rhetorically, ‘well, basically because we have had a very significant number of politicians who have not been responsive to the needs of the people. Furthermore, they have been delinquents, and this has left a mark’ (ASIU20M). As was discussed above, institutional failures and apathy and disinterest (or lack of commitment) on the part of citizens are seen as problems in generating and/or strengthening conversations between MPs and citizens. Distrust is also seen as the outcome of politicians not fulfilling their electoral programmes and thus disappointing electors, as a conservative MP indicated: ‘There is some disgust because we have … gone to the elections with an electoral programme that then reality has prevented us from implementing’ (EXPP74M). Age differences between MPs and youngsters may be another factor, as indicated above. But the inability of some veteran MPs to connect with young citizens may also be the result of isolation, which is in part a derivative of the professionalisation of politics, as a veteran conservative MP indicated: This activity absorbs most of your time. If you do not make an effort to keep your own social and political activity, even a regular life outside here, you run the risk of being enclosed [encapsulated] in a bubble … inevitably [the gap] will always exist. The point is to what extent representatives turn their back on citizens; MPs are always exonerated. In the internal debates in my party there were moments in which people frequently said the ‘people are turning their backs on us’ and I always said to them ‘no, people feel that we have turned our backs on them, which is quite different’, and that has no easy solution but it is the responsibility of the MP to enable the mechanisms to shorten this distance. (CAPP24M)

Conclusions Taking MP discourses together leads to two major conclusions. First, although the perception of the erosion of the representative bond is contested by a minority of MPs who are in some ways linked to the municipal world, the common position across parties is that MPs acknowledge there is a growing distance between representatives and citizens. This distance is

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definitely identified by MPs whose parties are not in government, especially those on the left and those who are not new to representative politics. Second, the erosion of the representative bond is explained by a number of factors, among which the economic crisis is just one, usually highlighted by representatives of the two largest parties (PP and PSOE). MP discourses reveal such relevant elements as institutional failures associated with bipartisanship, unresponsiveness, lack of accountability and lack of responsibility, corruption, professionalisation of MPs and their consequent isolation from society, fatalism, citizen ignorance of MPs’ work and misinformation by the mass media (see Figure 5.2). Although these factors can be found in discourses across parties, MPs from leftist parties tend to blame representatives (professionalisation, isolation) and citizens (weak political culture) more often than conservative MPs, who tend to combine the economic crisis and corruption scandals. MPs argue for a number of measures to address this diagnosis: more transparency in general, but especially in the selection of candidates using more inclusive mechanisms (Jiménez-Sánchez, Coller and Portillo-Pérez 2018), more participation, reforms in the electoral system leading to open lists and more contact between MPs and electors, more pedagogy, greater use of ICT to foster contact between citizens and politics. These measures lead the original enquiry in a particular direction: transparency, participation and facilitation of closer contact between MPs and citizens, which are the landmarks for expanding what Fishman (2004: 61) calls ‘discursive horizons’: a crucial factor in the quality of democracy.

Internal factors

External factors

Economic crisis

EROSION OF REPRESENTATIVE LINK

Corruption

Dissatisfaction

Party discipline

Mass media

Professionalization

Natural evolution

Isolation

The political crisis has always been there

Institutional failures Lack of accountability

Irresponsibility

Blaming citizens - Lack of knowledge - Disenteres

Bipartisanship

Figure 5.2 Explanations of the erosion of the representative link.

No responsiveness

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In societies like those in the south of Europe, the Great Recession has revealed a crisis of rationality (where the state is unable to control the economy) and a crisis of legitimacy (where citizens distrust the political system) (Habermas 1975). The combination of these elements may lead to the political disaffection of citizens: while citizens may still trust the democratic system (democratic legitimacy) they feel dissatisfied with the management of public affairs (political discontent), and the combination of both factors can result in self-exclusion from the political institutions (political disaffection) that has manifested itself in Spain, as in many other countries, in growing electoral volatility and into votes for anti-systemic or populist alternatives.

Notes 1 This chapter is based on the results of two research projects sponsored by the Spanish Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad ‘Parliaments and society’ (CSO2012–3264) (we thank Amparo Novo, Guillermo Cordero, Edurne Bartolomé, Sandra Bermúdez and Ricardo Feliú for interviewing MPs) and ‘Citizens and parliamentarians in times of crisis and democratic renewal’ (CSO2016–78016-R). The first author thanks the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Formación Profesional for the Salvador de Madariaga grant, which allowed him to benefit from Princeton University Library to prepare this chapter, and the Universidad Pablo de Olavide for granting him a leave of absence to work on this chapter. 2 Fishman’s (2019) two other dimensions of democracy are: authenticity (whether a democratic regime fits the Schumpeterian definition) and consolidation (the probability that democracy will survive, which is associated with the acknowledgement and tolerance of political rivals). 3 The ‘democratic deficit’ is the imbalance between expectations for the functioning of democracy and the perception of the actual performance of democracy among citizens. This imbalance is the pillar of Norris’s notion of politically involved ‘critical citizens’. 4 A number of works deal with the consequences of the Great Recession. See Coller and Ramírez de Luis (2019), Morlino and Raniolo (2017), Bosco and Verney (2012, 2016) and Freire, Andreadis and Viegas (2016). 5 The chambers were those of Andalusia (AN), Asturias (AS), Catalonia (CA), Extremadura (EX), Navarra (NA), the Basque Country (BC) and Valencia (VA). We interviewed 11 per cent of the population of these parliaments. See www.upo.es/investiga/da sp/es/project/parlamentarios-y-sociedad/ for more information about the sample. 6 Each quote is presented with a key to guarantee anonymity: the first two letters refer to the regional chamber and the second two to the party. The numbers identify the MP’s level of experience and his/her use of ICT. The last letter captures the sex of the MP (M for man and W for woman).

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6

The Social Profile of Spanish Elites Following the Great Recession Manuel Portillo-Pérez and Pablo Domínguez

Introduction Spanish democracy is experiencing a period of convulsion. Although citizen discontent with their representatives can be considered structural (Montero, Gunther and Torcal 1999), coinciding with the economic and financial crisis a crisis of representation and political confidence has been established (Torcal 2014; Muro and Vidal 2017). During the 15 May demonstrations (15-M) thousands of citizens congregated in the squares of Spain’s largest cities shouting ‘they don’t represent us!’; surveys in 2019 showed that politicians and parties are considered by Spaniards to be the third-largest problem in the country, and confidence in their work has fallen dramatically. On the other hand, according to the CIS barometer, in 2008 22.6 per cent of Spaniards thought the political situation is ‘good’ or ‘very good’, whereas in April 2019 (the month the 13th legislature was elected) only 2.7 per cent felt that. As Subirats (2015: 449) points out, ‘the crisis of functionality of institutionalised politics has increased to such an extent that, today, a majority of citizens in southern Europe perceive politicians as part of the problem and not as part of the solution’. In this context, new state-level parties have emerged: Podemos1, Ciudadanos and, more recently, Vox, which have transformed the party system. Faced with this situation of change and generalised uncertainty, it is worth asking how the Great Recession has affected the social profile of political representatives. Do representatives in the new parties have social profiles that are different from the traditional ones? Are there differences between the new parties? Have the profiles of traditional parties changed? And, as a whole following the Great Recession, are Spanish parliamentary representatives more like their electors? These are the fundamental questions that guide this chapter. First, a brief introduction highlights some general effects of the Great Recession in the Spanish political system. Next, using Pitkin’s (1967) theory of descriptive representation, changes in the social profile of MPs are analysed. We study the social profile of members in the Congress of Deputies by comparing the ninth legislature (2008–11) with the 13th legislature elected on 28 April 2019. We focus on sex, age, place of birth, studies and profession,

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which are the variables for which complete information can be found.2 Finally, the evolution of the social distance between representatives and represented is measured using the Social Disproportion Index (SDI). The SDI was first employed by Coller (2008) in Spain and has since been updated in Coller Domínguez, Portillo and Escobar (2018). It is an adaptation of what Norris and Lovenduski (1995: 96) call the ‘electoral bias index’, after the works of Ross (1944). Data used in this chapter come from BAPOLCON©,3 a database containing 2,439 records of all the MPs who occupied a seat from the constituent legislature in 1977 to the 13th legislature elected in 2019.

The Effects of the Great Recession on the Spanish Political System The Great Recession has generated a new political scenario. The next section focuses on the changes produced in the party system, the selection of candidates and the renewal of elites – all of which are essential to obtaining an understanding the impact of the crisis on the Spanish political system. Changes in the Party System The Great Recession has led to transformations in the European political system (Bosco and Verney 2016; Freire, Lisi, Andreadis and Viegas 2016; Morlino and Raniolo 2017), resulting in changes in the social profile of the elite. These changes include an increase in the number of parties and the rate of renewal of the elites (Kakepaki, Kountouri, Verzichelli and Coller 2018: 176). In Spain, three new state-wide parties have emerged and consolidated themselves by obtaining a large number of seats in different chambers: Podemos (left-wing) and Ciudadanos (centre-right) in 2015, and Vox (radical-right or extreme-right) in 2019. The effective number of parliamentary parties, ENPP (Laakso and Taagepera 1979: 79–80),4 shows a high level of fragmentation: until 2011, the average ENPP was 2.6, having never reached 3, but the parliament that emerged from the elections on 28 April 2019, had the highest ENPP in Spanish democratic history – 4.8. Apart from greater fragmentation, the presence of new parties in Congress has led to greater ideological polarisation, as is the case across the rest of Europe (Pappas and Kriesi 2015; van Kessel 2013). Podemos (located in position 2.3 on the 1–10 left–right scale) and Vox (at position 9.3) have expanded the ideological spectrum and raised the Polarisation Index from 3.1 in 2008 to 4.9 in 2019.5 Hence, we can compare two different scenarios: one in 2008, at the beginning of the crisis, in which two major parties, PSOE (Socialist Workers' Party) and PP (Popular Party), obtained more than 90 per cent of the seats in Congress, and another in 2019, following the crisis, with five state-wide parties – the most fragmented and polarised Congress since 1979. These changes, plus the rise of demands for independence in Catalonia and the inexperience of new MPs, are historical milestones of great impact on political life and its governance. It is no

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coincidence that the 11th legislature (2015) was the first in which it was not possible to form a government, forcing the dissolution of Congress within six months of its constitution. In the 12th legislature (2016), the fragmentation of Congress allowed a change of majorities and government support, producing the first successful vote of no confidence in Spain (2018), replacing the PP (right) with PSOE (centre-left) in government. And since the April 2019 general elections, until mid-September, all attempts to date to agree a government have been unsuccessful. Selection of Candidates With the Great Recession and the emergence of new parties, new methods for selecting candidates have been implemented, which have had an impact on the social profile of parliamentary groups and chambers (Cordero and Coller 2018: 4, 18). New and old parties have sought to improve their electoral results and/or reduce the perception of distance between citizens and politicians (Coller, Cordero and Jaime-Castillo 2018). Podemos and Ciudadanos, for example, began by holding primaries as the backbone for candidate selection to electoral lists. Moreover, the PSOE, and more recently the PP (2018), have chosen to elect their leaders by primaries, but those elected have the power to configure the electoral lists. When the ‘non-official’ or ‘noncontinuation’ candidate wins in the primaries, the electoral lists might have a higher rate of renewal. In addition, this advance in internal party democracy has favoured social diversification and the presence of traditionally underrepresented profiles in the legislative bodies (Jiménez-Sánchez, Coller and Portillo-Pérez 2018; Kakepaki et al. 2018: 196). Renewal of the Elites Another characteristic of the political system to take into account is the renewal of elites. The continuity of deputies following elections is understood to be a sign of the institutionalisation of a system and helps to define the style of the institution itself and its political elite (Polsby 1968). Whether or not MPs have (shared) experiences as political representatives can influence the functioning of the chamber (Coller and Santana 2009). Figure 6.1 shows the composition of each legislature according to the experience of deputies in Congress (measured in numbers of legislatures) and the rate of renewal. The rate of renewal is understood to be the proportion of MPs who have not been re-elected since the previous legislature (but they could be present in past legislatures, or not), whereas the new MPs are those who have never been in parliament. It can be seen that the elections carried out during the crisis (except for the 12th legislature, which was the result of the failed 2015 term) yield results with high chamber renovation rates (the average renewal rate is 52 per cent). Specifically, the elections that gave birth to the 11th legislature in 2015 have the highest renewal rate in Spanish

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180 66.

135

49.

47.

90

19 53

43.

49.

23

19 12

56.

45.

56.

67.

64.

52.4

17.

10 13

16 20

16 34

26

45 47

40.

47.

26

13 20

16 21

65 43

38

45

36

24 45

16 14 18 52

22 11 28 39

19 13 17 51

13 7 18

62

19

12

16

22 6

51

60

15 13 23 49

15

0 1st 1978

2nd 1981

3rd 1985

4th 1988

New MPs

5th 1992

6th 1995

2 legs.

7th 1999 3 legs.

8th 2003

9th 2007

10th 2010

4 or more legs.

11th 2014

12th 2014

13th Average 2018

Renewal

Figure 6.1 Experience (number of legislatures) and renewal rate by legislature (%). Source: From the BAPOLCON® database. Further information in note 2.

democratic history (67 per cent). This was the first time Ciudadanos and Podemos participated in a general election, obtaining 40 and 65 seats, respectively, out of a possible 350. The 2019 elections have followed this trend and are third in terms of the highest renewal rate (64 per cent), well above the average for the period (52 per cent). None of Vox’s 24 deputies was in the previous legislature and the ‘new’ parties present high renewal rates (61 per cent Ciudadanos and 52 per cent Podemos). The PP has a renovation rate of 49 per cent, although it stands out in the percentage of deputies with political experience (29 per cent serving in four or more legislatures and 20 per cent in three). However, the most striking data is that of PSOE, with a renewal rate of 72 per cent (68 per cent are new MPs). This may be due to the internal electoral process in PP and PSOE, where several candidates compete internally and the winner does not usually incorporate those politicians who supported the rival candidacy when formulating the lists.6

The Impact of the Great Recession on the Social Profile of the Elite: Changes or Trends? Imagine a parliament in which all MPs were male, illiterate or the same age. This body would function differently from socially and ideologically diverse chambers. A new chamber composition, containing representatives with different characteristics from previous legislatures, can affect its functioning (Alcántara and Freidenberg 2009: 20–1). The emergence of new parties that fragment the party system and the high renewal rate have caused changes in the elite’s social profile. To analyse this, we first present an evolution of the historical profile, with special emphasis on the comparison between pre-crisis and crisis legislatures.7 Subsequently, the

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social profile of the new parties that emerged during the Great Recession is analysed in order to study its possible consequences on the profiles of traditional parties. 3.1 Historical Comparison The study of the social profile of MPs focuses on the analysis of five sociodemographic variables: age, sex, place of birth, studies and profession. First, we briefly review the main characteristics of the chamber for each of the legislatures. Figure 6.2 shows the historical evolution of these variables (except for profession). The existence of easily identifiable historical trends is striking, which suggests there have been no great variations related to the Great Recession. As Kakepaki et al. (2018) indicate, changes in the Spanish elite’s social profile after this period are limited to specific elements. Taking as a reference the 2011 legislature (new parties did not enter Congress until the 2015 elections), it can be observed that the average age of deputies has been practically constant, as well as the difference of approximately three years between men (older) and women (younger). With some variation, there has been a minimum average age of the chamber, reaching its maximum in the 10th legislature (2011) (51 years men, 47 women). In 2019, the average age is 48 years, a bit higher than other European parliaments, where the average age is between 40 and 45 years (Best 2007: 103). A very similar evolution can be seen in the proportion of MPs with university degrees: 92 per cent on average for the entire democratic period and above that average since 2011. These high levels of education mean a high 100

75

88

89

89

68

68

68

90

90

91

63

64

64

92

91

61

64

95

68

91 69

94 74

94

93

94

70

71

70

47

50

23

25

8 6

6

14

29

35

37

40

40

39

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6

0 Cons 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 13th 1977 1979 1982 1986 1989 1993 1996 2000 2004 2008 2011 2015 2016 2019 Women

U. Graduates

Native (prov.)

Av. Age W.

Av. Age M.

Figure 6.2 Percentage of women (bars), university graduates, natives and age (male and female average) by legislature. Source: From the BAPOLCON® database. Further information in note 2.

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level of institutionalised cultural capital (Bourdieu 2000: 146–8), which shows that education is a key factor to access the elite (Keller 1963: 121; Putnam 1976: 28). The most striking upward trend is the growing proportion of women in the chamber. From the 6 per cent of deputies in the first three legislatures, the incorporation of women has been a constant until stagnating around 40 per cent in recent legislatures.8 However, in the 13th legislature (2019) a historical record has been reached, with 47 per cent of MPs being women. We will have to wait to see its evolution in the following legislatures. However, occupation of the most powerful posts, depending on each party, has remained unequal (Jerez, Linz and Real-Dato 2013; Santana, Coller and Aguilar 2015). Finally, Figure 6.2 shows the evolution of the percentage of natives of the province (electoral district) in which they were elected. This trend has the highest degree of variation and we would argue may be most related to the Great Recession. With minor changes, the highest proportion of natives was reached after the 2011 elections (74 per cent) remaining above 70 per cent in subsequent legislatures. Unlike the case with regional chambers, Congress retains a higher proportion of internal immigrants among MPs, which shows that in relation to the regional parliaments, Congress remains more open to non-natives (Coller et al. 2018). Regarding professions, the tendency is towards greater diversity. However, as the sociologist Max Weber also observed in 1946, the predominance of law and education professions among Spanish MPs is remarkable (around 20 per cent each). Both professions require qualities in their development that promote skills that are part of the ‘profession of the politician’. Weber called this the ‘elective affinity’, although ‘dispensability’, another concept coined by Weber (1946), may also help explain the phenomenon. Unlike workers, entrepreneurs or some liberal professionals (including professions with elective affinity, such as journalists), legal professionals are ‘highly dispensable’, as are civil servants (and most teachers), since they can return to their previous role after serving in parliament (Coller et al. 2018: 3376). However, the proportion of teachers has fallen since 2011 (13 per cent in 2019), increasing the proportion of liberal professions and professional politicians. Thus, based on historical data, the predominant parliamentary profile would be a university-educated male aged between 45 and 50, who was born in the province they represent, and who is a legal professional or an educator. This snapshot of the Spanish parliament does not differ much from other studies (Coller 2008; Coller et al. 2018: 3365; Jerez, Linz and Real-Dato 2013; Serrano and Bermúdez 2016: 43). However, while there may not have been any significant variation in the general historical profile of Congress, during the Great Recession extreme values have coincided: it has been the period with the highest percentage of MPs with university credentials, natives, women, ‘senior’ MPs (except for the minimum rejuvenation of the 13th legislature) and in which professional diversity increased.

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New Parties One of the main consequences of the Great Recession has been the emergence of new parties, although much is still unknown about them. Do they populate their parliamentary groups with people who are different from those in traditional parties? Are all the profiles of new parties similar or are there differences between them? Table 6.1 compares the social profiles of new parties by illustrating their evolution since they appeared in 2015 (except Vox, which only appeared in 2019). We focus on the variables for which there is reliable and complete information. Regarding gender, Podemos has more women than men among its deputies, achieving the highest percentages in history among large parties (55 per cent). Ciudadanos, however, has had more difficulty incorporating women. In 2019, the percentage of Ciudadanos women increased (to 39 per cent), although it remained below the chamber average (47 per cent). Vox, despite not supporting the official gender quotas in the electoral lists, has entered the Congress of Deputies with 42 per cent of its MPs being of women – which might be below average, but it is better than Ciudadanos. As Linz (2001) noted during the transition, age variations among the elite can be an important indicator for identifying moments of institutional crisis or political change. When we look at the ages of MPs, we see that all new parties have representatives below the average of the chamber (48), showing that they chose young people who are not experienced in politics for their electoral lists. Podemos stands out, with an average age five years lower than that of the chamber in 2019 – although in 2015 they were seven years below

Table 6.1 Social profile of MPs of new Spanish parties in the 11th (2015) and 13th (2019) legislatures (in percentages, except for age)

Women Average age Natives University training Workers Managers Legal profession Teachers Liberal professions Not known Seats

Ciudadanos

Unidas Podemos

Vox

Total MPs

2015

2019

2015

2019

2019

2015

2019

20 46 65 93 3 18 28 5 15 8 40

39 46 60 96 0 16 32 7 19 2 57

51 41 54 86 5 2 12 14 20 9 69

55 43 69 86 7 2 19 19 17 10 42

42 47 70 100 4 13 33 8 13 13 24

40 48 68 93 2 9 24 17 13 11 350

47 48 68 94 3 8 20 17 13 13 350

Source: From the BAPOLCON® database. Further information in note 2.

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the average. Ciudadanos MPs are two years younger than the average, with their female deputies standing out at up to four years less, while Vox is one year below the average. It is expected that new parties will not be so young in the future, probably due to having expert (older) MPs in their seats. Being younger does not seem to be a strategy, but rather something circumstantial. Congress has presented traditionally higher rates of natives (MPs who were born in the same province in which they obtain their seat) than regional parliaments (Coller et al. 2018). In the case of new parties, with territorial structures still weak, we might expect this data to be lower than the average (68 per cent). However, the new parties present percentages of natives similar to the other parties (Vox 70 per cent; Podemos 69 per cent), except Ciudadanos (60 per cent). Podemos was 14 points below the average in 2015. Two European tendencies have been reinforced since the Great Recession: proportions of over 90 per cent of MPs with university credentials, and higher rates in right-wing parties than in left. Ciudadanos (96 per cent) and Vox (100 per cent), who are very sensitive about this issue, contribute to increasing those tendencies. Podemos, with 86 per cent in 2015 and 2019, has the lowest number of university graduates, mainly due to the low rate of male university graduates (79 per cent). Regarding MP professions, we find that the new parties have elements of historical continuity and others of rupture. Ciudadanos and Vox, like the rightwing parties, have a high presence of managers and businessmen, as well as of legal professionals. The same goes for Podemos, which has a higher percentage than the average number of employees and teachers, as has traditionally corresponded to leftist parties (Coller et al. 2018). However, as Table 6.1 shows, the new parties also have new professional characteristics. For example, Ciudadanos (19.4 per cent) and Podemos (16.7 per cent) have an above average (13.3 per cent) number of liberal professionals, while Vox (13 per cent) is closer to the average. Ciudadanos stands out for having only 2 per cent of parliamentarians without a known profession outside of politics, which is in line with its political discourse about what the profession of the politician should look like: professional and technical. There are remarkable differences among the new parties, except in the youth of their MPs. Their social composition is different, although the best explanatory variable is not that of newness but the ideological one: the position of the party on the left–right scale still matters more than the new versus traditional party dichotomy. Above all, Podemos, with a high percentage of women (who are younger), and a lower number of university deputies, seems to have a more differentiated social profile. The Possible Effects on Traditional Parties PP and PSOE have alternated in the government since 1982 and both have experienced a significant loss of seats since 2015, caused mainly by the appearance of the three new state-wide parties. But despite this, they remain

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the two parties with the largest parliamentary groups in 2019. How has the Great Recession affected their social profiles? Have the dynamics of the new parties translated into changes in traditional parties? Table 6.2 shows the comparison of PP and PSOE social profiles before and after the Great Recession (2008 and 2019). The PP have had what might be said to be a surprising evolution in the percentage of women, going from 31.8 per cent in 2008 to 53 per cent in 2019, which makes it the party with the most female representatives after Podemos. The PSOE, in third place, has maintained the general trend of growth in the number of women in the chamber. Unlike the new parties, the traditional formations have an average age of 49, which is a little above the overall average of 47. This is due to the relationship between age and the seniority of the party: the more parliamentary experience you have, the more likely you are to have a higher average age. Following the Great Recession, both of the leading traditional parties increased their percentages of university deputies by around five points. This shift is mainly due to the increase in women having attended university, which in the case of the PP rose from 90 per cent to 100 per cent and in the PSOE from 89 per cent to 97 per cent. The proportion of 92 per cent of MPs with university credentials in the PSOE, although very close to the average, confirms the European tendency of lower percentages of university graduates among the parties of the left (Kakepaki et al. 2018: 194). The Great Recession has contributed to professional diversification in the PP and the PSOE. It can be seen how the most common professions in both parties, legal professionals and teachers, decrease (except the number of teachers in the PSOE) (Coller 2008; Coller et al. 2018), along with managers and Table 6.2 The social profile of MPs of traditional Spanish parties in the 9th (2008) and 13th (2019) legislatures (in percentages, except for age) PP

Women Average age Natives University training Workers Managers Legal profession Teachers Liberal professions Not known Seats

PSOE

Congress

2008

2019

2008

2019

2008

2019

32 50 65 92 4 19 31 14 11 7 154

53 49 67 97 2 8 21 9 10 17 66

43 48 65 88 9 18 13 30 8 7 169

50 50 74 92 3 3 13 23 9 15 123

37 49 66 90 6 8 22 23 6 7 350

47 48 68 94 3 8 20 17 13 13 350

Source: From the BAPOLCON® database. Further information in note 2.

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businesspeople. On the opposite side, while the increases in these professions are widespread for the whole parliament, the PP and the PSOE are between three and five points above the average in deputies without a known profession. This fact differentiates them from new parties, possibly due to the ‘career politician’: traditional parties have a history and consolidated structures (e.g. youth groups) that allow people to be professionally dedicated to the party for years before they become deputies. In conclusion, the traditional parties, PP and PSOE, have been mildly influenced by the trends of the new parties (more women and professional diversification), despite their high rates of renewal, mainly due to changes in leadership. They have stronger structures and experienced MPs, which may provide us with an explanation for their resistance to change. Actually, it would be more correct to speak about a substitution rather than a renewal of the elites of the traditional parties.

Social Disproportion Index: The Congruence Between MPs and Citizens The changes that have taken place in the profile of the elite following the Great Recession in Spain have gone in two directions: one that brings the chamber closer to being a social mirror of society and another that opens the gap between representatives and represented. Are new parties more like society than traditional ones? Has the congruence increased or decreased? To answer these questions, the SDI has been applied. The SDI offers a numerical indicator of the distance between the profile of parliamentarians and that of the society they represent, allowing us to measure the depth of the social gap for each variable. Its calculation is simple:9 SDI ¼

% social group X in Congress % social group X in society

The results of the SDI vary around value one, which implies equality in the social profile of representatives and represented. Values below one imply the under-representation of a social group in parliament (e.g. women); values greater than one, over-representation (e.g. university graduates). If the value is far from one, the difference between proportions will be large. As in almost all societies, women make up half of the population, but they are usually under-represented in institutions. Following the Great Recession, the SDI confirms the trend towards proportional representation, increasing the average of the chamber by +0.2 points, to 0.9. In the elections of 2019, Podemos and the PP (1.03) exceed one in the SDI of gender. The other parties are still approaching this figure, although they have not arrived yet.

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Table 6.3 Index of social disproportion in the 9th (2008) and 13th legislatures (2019) (except age, that is a difference of means) Women

PP PSOE CS UP VOX TOTAL

Average age

Natives (com.)

University training

2008

2019

2008

2019

2008

2019

2008

2019

0.6 0.8 0.7

1 1 0.7 1.1 0.8 0.9

3 1 2

-0.9 -0.4 -4.2 -7.3 -3.1 -2.2

0.8 1.2 1.1

1 1.3 0.8 1.2 0.9 1.2

4.9 4.7 4.8

5.1 4.9 5.1 4.5 5.3 4.9

Source: From the BAPOLCON® database. Further information in note 2, and Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE): https://www.ine.es/censos2011_datos/cen11_datos_inicio.htm

Age has ‘taken a turn’. Before the crisis, parliamentarians were on average two years older than the population, while in 2019 it is the other way around. This has been driven by the ageing population and the influence of new parties, which include deputies who are four years younger than the average. By sex, the average age of men coincides with the population and Congress (48), while female deputies are slightly younger than the national average. The SDI of the natives, that is, those who have been chosen from the autonomous community of their birth, presents figures very close to one, which indicates a lot of parity between the population and the deputies. Only in Ciudadanos and Vox are there fewer natives than in society. The traditional parties increased their presence from 2008 to 2019. These small changes do not indicate a change in the general trend, characterising Spanish society with percentages of sedentary lifestyle traditionally similar to those of the elites (Serrano and Bermúdez 2016). For Genieys (1998: 20), the high educational level of the political elite is a consequence of Spanish social change during the seventies, reflected also in the increase of more than 10 percentage points in the rate of Spanish university students between 1981 and 2011 (INE 2011). However, this has not prevented university students from being very over-represented in the chamber (by almost five times more), without significant differences between parties or between ‘before’ and ‘after’ the Great Recession. Professions without qualifications or manual workers are the most common in the population, but these are the least among the MPs, who under-represent them with an SDI very close to zero. The two most frequent professions among parliamentarians, legal professionals and teachers, are logically over-represented. Among the ideological parties of the right (PP, Ciudadanos and Vox) there is a greater gap in the professions related with law, while among parties of the left (PSOE and Podemos), the

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Table 6.4 Index of Social Bias for professions in the 9th (2008) and 13th (2019) legislatures Workers

Managers

Legal profession

Teachers

Liberal professions(a)

2008

2019

2008

2019

2008

2019

2008

2019

2008

2019

PP PSOE CS UP VOX

0.1 0.1 -

0 0 0 0.1 0.1

1.8 1 -

1.2 0.5 2.6 0.4 2

44.2 19.9 -

30.3 19.1 45.1 27.1 47.6

3.1 6.9 -

2 4.9 1.5 4.1 1.8

5.2 3.6 -

5.4 6.1 13.9 11.9 8.9

TOTAL

0.1

0

1.4

1.2

32.2

28.1

5.2

3.6

5.1

9.5

Source: From the BAPOLCON ® database. Further information in note 2, and Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (INE) https://www.ine.es/censos2011_datos/cen11_datos_inicio.htm The category ‘other liberal professions’ refers to professions of a liberal and highly qualified nature, such as nurses, pharmacists, economists, journalists, archaeologists, computer scientists, chemists, veterinarians, psychologists, political scientists, sociologists, foremen, publicists and other professions that are similar to this criterion. The percentage of these professions individually is so low that it has been decided to group them in order to improve the analysis (a)

over-representation is more in the category of teachers. This division between the left and the right is also true for managers and entrepreneurs, who are over-represented in right-wing parties (SDI over one) and underrepresented in left-wing parties (SDI under one). Finally, the over-representation of liberal professionals, which appears almost 10 times more in the elite than in society, is associated with the new parties. Thus, there are no major effects of the Great Recession in the social profile of MPs segmented by ideological wings, related with professions, because the usual social alignments of left and right parties are still present.

Conclusions We have studied the impact of the Great Recession on the Spanish political system by analysing the changes in three fundamental aspects: the party system, changes in the social profile of MPs and the congruence between MPs and citizens. Following the Great Recession we have identified several specific changes in the Spanish political scene, but this has not seemed to significantly change the social profile of elites nor the congruence. The most significant change in the party system has been the entry of new parties: Podemos (left) and Ciudadanos (centre-right) in 2015, and Vox (radicalright) in 2019. In 2008, there were two major parties (PSOE and PP) which obtained more than 90 per cent of the seats in Congress, whereas in 2019 there are five state-wide parties. As a result, the new configuration of Congress is the most fragmented (ENPP = 4.8) and ideologically polarised (PI = 4.9) since the democratic transition, and it presents high levels of renewal (64 per cent) and

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inexperience (60 per cent), helped by the newly adopted measures of internal party democracy (also now used by the PSOE and more recently the PP), which favour social diversification (Kakepaki et al. 2018: 196). These new characteristics (fragmentation, polarisation, diversification and the inexperience inherent in renewal) plus the rise of an independence movement can affect the functioning of parliament and its ability to reach agreements (Coller and Santana 2009), promoting political instability. Has the profile of political elites changed following the Great Recession? The main conclusion is that there have been no sudden changes in the general profile of the chamber, but there are historical trends confirmed by the crisis. However, it cannot be ignored that after the Great Recession the variables studied have reached extreme values: it has been the period with the highest percentage of women, university graduates, native, older (except the minimal rejuvenation in the 13th legislature) and professional diversity. It seems that in times of crisis the parties opt for more socially legitimised profiles, such as university graduates or natives. Despite these changes, it seems inappropriate to speak about the renovation of the elite, but rather their high rate of substitution. New parties have played a significant role in the relative change of profile of the elite after the Great Recession. They barely have older or experienced MPs in their seats, so they contribute to the rejuvenation of the elite. In addition, new parties also contribute to the diversification of professions in the chamber. However, this does not suppose a radical change in the social profile of Congress because the classic left–right axis continues to work (Coller et al. 2018). Podemos stands out, especially in terms of youth, women, employees and teachers, which is more common historically in the parties of the left. Ciudadanos and Vox maintain the historical trend of conservative deputies with university education and they have more liberal professionals, more MPs related to business or legal professionals and fewer deputies without a ‘known profession’ in their seats. Despite the high level of renewal in their seats due to their changes of leadership after primaries in both parties, the traditional parties have not experienced so many changes. They remain close to the average in their percentages of university graduates and natives (which are both upward trends) and the experience of their deputies has slowed down the rejuvenation of the elite. The PP has moved from 32 per cent to 53 per cent in their proportion of women, which is following the general trend. There is more diversification in the professions, but some trends are growing, such as MPs without previous professions, due to parties with cadres encouraging in part the professionalisation of policy. Despite this, the social profiles of traditional parties have not experienced radical change following the Great Recession. The last aspect studied is congruence. Have these changes made politicians more like the society they represent? Are new or traditional parties more like society? The evidence is inconclusive. The SDI tells us that following the Great Recession the Congress of Deputies is more like society in some

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aspects, such as the number of women, and it is very close to proportional representation but not achieving it; while it is less so in others (the increase of natives in parliament makes them minimally over-represented, while university graduates remain largely over-represented) and is professionally more heterogeneous, reducing the distance with the classic professions (legal and teaching professionals) but increasing the already existing over-representation of liberal professions, which is one of the effects of the entry of new parties. The new parties are slightly more distant from society than the traditional ones in terms of gender and age (they are less equal and younger), although the right–left alignment is also manifested here: the SDI indicates that Podemos (left) differs from Ciudadanos and Vox (right) in some aspects, such as the over-representation of women and natives and the lower over-representation of university graduates and professionals of the law. It has been argued that elites are key actors when analysing socio-political relationships within a system (Rahman 2012: 483). Following this critical moment of transformation, it is increasingly necessary to continue measuring the evolution of their impact in the near future. Only in this way can we better understand the new characteristics and functioning of the Spanish political system.

Epilogue: The General Elections of 10 November 2019 in Spain After the elections of 28 April 2019, the representatives of the parties were unable to reach an agreement to form a government. Faced with this situation of political stalemate, on 24 September the Cortes were dissolved and general elections called for 10 November 2019. This is the second legislature that has failed due to lack of agreements in the formation of a government since the restoration of democracy in 1977, both after the Great Recession. Spaniards have faced four elections in the last four years. The repetition of the elections in November was seen as a strategic way out of a stalemate. Voting trends in April predicted a significant improvement in the results for PSOE (the party with the highest number of seats and with more options to govern), Ciudadanos and PP (both on the right), to the detriment of Unidas Podemos (left of the PSOE) and Vox (right of the PP). PSOE and Unidas Podemos were unable to reach an agreement, although they would have still needed the support of other minor parties (among them the Catalan pro-independence parties) and the parties on their right vetoed the PSOE candidate. Thus, elections were called. The election campaign was brief, marked by a generalised weariness, and, above all, influenced by two elements: first, the publication of the sentences of the leaders of the attempt at proclaiming the independence of Catalonia by organising an illegal referendum on 1 October 2017; second, the exhumation of the remains of the dictator Francisco Franco. Post-electoral analysis emphasises that while the former helped fuel votes for Vox, the second could not prevent part of leftist voters staying at home.

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Spaniards went to the polls and the outcome of the new elections resulted in an even more complex scenario for forming a stable government. PSOE was again the largest party with 120 seats (down three). Unidas Podemos won 35 (down seven) while, although its division Más País, a new nationwide party, won two. PP gained 89 seats (up 23) and Vox 52 seats (up 28), becoming the parties that grew the most (second and third political force). Ciudadanos returned just 10 MPs, down 47. From being a party that could have been a key player for unlocking the situation, it has been relegated to the margins, with fewer seats than the pro-independence ERC (Republican Left of Catalonia), which has 13. The leader of Ciudadanos, Albert Rivera, resigned after the results were announced. Although the distribution of seats in the left–right blocks is very similar to that of the previous legislature, this new configuration, with the significant increase in seats of the ultra-right party Vox, takes the Polarisation Index to its highest value in the history of democratic Spain (six), double the figure prior to the Great Recession (3.1 in 2008). It is also the second-most fragmented parliament in history with an ENPP of 4.6, only just behind the previous legislature (4.8). The proportion of women declined to 43.7 per cent, although it is only lower than in the previous legislature. But their distribution by parties did change: PSOE (50 per cent) and Unidas Podemos (51.4 per cent) on the left have more women proportionally, while the PP (42.7 per cent) almost reaches the average and Vox (26.9 per cent) is well below. In short, we are facing the most ideologically polarised parliament in history, split into two axes of tension (left–right, centre–periphery/independence), which may make it difficult to guarantee Spain’s governability. The increase for Vox, with more different and polarised profiles than the rest of the parties, the reorganisation of the right, the new role for Ciudadanos, the ability of the left to reach agreements and the relationship of the nationwide parties with the pro-independence parties (the agreement to govern is PSOEUnidas Podemos with an ERC abstention), will mark the success or failure of this new legislature. Studying the characteristics of the Congress of Deputies in such a complex situation becomes more necessary than ever.

Notes 1 Podemos also includes the confluences with other minor parties that share the electoral list and the parlamentary group. Thus, in 2015 Podemos included the sum of En Comú Podem (Catalonia), En Marea (Galicia) and Equo (green party). In 2016, Izquierda Unida (derived from the communist party) was added. All together constituted what it was called the Unidos Podemos coalition. In 2019 the coalition changed the name to Unidas Podemos. 2 The analysis of these variables has a more extensive justification in Coller, Santana and Jaime (2014). 3 BAPOLCON® has been built over the years as part of the research projects ‘Ciudadanía y parlamentarios en tiempos de crisis y renovación democrática: el caso comparado de España en el contexto del sur de Europa’ (CSO2016–78016-R) and ‘La elite política autonómica en la España democrática (1980–2005)’ (BSO2003–02596). It

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5

6

7 8

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has been developed and updated by Xavier Coller, Andrés Vázquez, Manuel Portillo, Pablo Domínguez, Andrés Benítez, Beatriz Carrasco, Ana María Gómez, José Luís Gómez, Álvaro Mariscal, Iván Pérez, Fernando Ramírez de Luis and Daniel Valdivia. The authors would like to thank Xavier Coller for allowing access to the database. For further information, contact the authors or visit www.upo.es/investiga/dasp/wp-con tent/uploads/2018/08/BAPOLCON®-database.pdf The effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) is calculated with the following formula: ENPP = 1 / Σni=1 pi², where n is the number of parties in parliament and pi is the proportion of seats of party i in parliament. In 2015 and 2016 the ENPP was 4.2 and 3.9, respectively, which already much greater than the historical average (which was around 2). The Polarisation Index measures the distribution of the parties according to their sizes on the traditional ideological scale, where one is extreme left and 10 extreme right. According to Taylor and Herman (1971) it is calculated as follows: IPP = Σ Vi / 100 * (xi - μ) ², Vi being the percentage of seats in each party; xi the position occupied by the party on the 1–10 scale; and μ the average of the positions of the parties on the scale. The position of each party on the ideological scale has been obtained from ‘citizen evaluation’ in the studies of the CIS 2750 (2008), 3242/0 (2019a) and 3245/0 (2019b). One of the consequences of the integration of primaries is that it can generate internal divisions. This happened in Podemos (Pablo Iglesias list versus Íñigo Errejón list) in 2017, in the PP (Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría versus Pablo Casado) in 2018 and in the PSOE with the striking case of Pedro Sánchez, who has won on the PSOE primaries twice without being declared the official candidate (against Eduardo Madina in 2014 and Susana Díaz and Patxi López in 2017). While there were general elections in 2008, the authors consider the 2011 elections as the first ones after the Great Recession due to the lack of diagnosis and crisis awareness in 2008. The equality law was passed during the 8th legislature in 2007. This law requires parties to present a gender quota of 40–60 per cent on their list in every group of five positions (e.g. in the first five positions, at least two should be women, etc.), but without establishing the order (i.e. there is no ‘zipper’ list). Gender and age data are taken from the 2008 and 2018 Cifras de Población of the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE 2008, 2018). The average age is calculated only for those over 18, the legal voting age in Spain when a person can stand for elected office. For the other variables (birthplace, educational level and professions) the Censo de Población is used (INE 2011). The percentage of professions is calculated as a proportion of total employed.

References Alcántara, M. and Freidenberg, F. (2009). Selección de candidatos, política partidista y rendimiento democrático: una introducción. In: M. Alcántara and F. Freidenberg, eds. Selección de candidatos, política partidista y rendimiento democrático. México DF: Tribunal Electoral del Distrito Federal, pp. 13–34. BAPOLCON® database. Base Política del Congreso. By: X. Coller, M. Portillo-Pérez and P. Domínguez. Best, H. (2007). New challenges, new elites? Changes in the recruitment and career patterns of European representative elites. Comparative Sociology 6(1–2), 85–113. Bosco, A. and Verney, S. (2016). Electoral epidemic: The political cost of economic crisis in Southern Europe, 2010–2011. South European Society and Politics 21(4), 383–407. Bourdieu, P. (2000). Poder, derecho y clases sociales. Bilbao: Desclée de Brouwer.

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CIS (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas) (2008). Estudio 2750: preelectoral elecciones generales y autonómicas de Andalucía 2008. Panel (1º Fase). Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas. CIS (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas) (2019a). Estudio 3242/0: Macrobarómetro de marzo 2019: preelectoral elecciones generales 2019. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas. CIS (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas) (2019b). Avance del Estudio 3245/0: Macrobarómetro de abril 2019. Preelectoral elecciones al Parlamento europeo, autonómicas y municipales 2019. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones sociológicas. Coller, X. (2008). El sesgo social de las élites políticas: el caso de la España de las autonomías (1980–2005). Revista de estudios políticos 141, 135–159. Coller, X., Cordero, G., and Jaime-Castillo, A. M. (2018). The selection of politicians in times of crisis. Abingdon: Routledge. Coller, X., Domínguez, P., Portillo, M. and Escobar, M. (2018). Elites políticas en España. ¿Convergencia o divergencia con la sociedad? In: B. Pendas, E. González and R. Rubio, eds. España constitucional (1978–2018): trayectorias y perspectivas. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales. Coller, X. and Santana, A. (2009). La homogeneidad social de la elite política: los parlamentarios de los PANE (1980–2005). Papers: Revista de Sociología 92, 29–50. Coller, X., Santana, A. and Jaime, A. (2014). Problemas y soluciones para la construcción de bases de datos de políticos. Revista Española de Ciencia Política y de la Administración 34, 169–198. Cordero, G. and Coller, X. (2018). Lights and shadows of democratizing candidate selection. In: G. Cordero and C. Xavier, eds. Democratizing candidates selection. New methods, old receipts?London: Palgrave, pp. 3–24. Freire, A., Lisi, M., Andreadis, I. and Viegas, J. M. L., eds. (2016). Political representation in times of bailout: Evidence from Greece and Portugal. London: Routledge. Genieys, W. (1998). Las élites periféricas españolas ante el cambio de régimen político. Revista de Estudios Políticos 102, 9–38. (INE) Instituto Nacional de Estadística (2008). Cifras de Población. Madrid: Instituto Nacional de Estadística. (INE) Instituto Nacional de Estadística (2011). Censo población y viviendas 2011. Madrid: Instituto Nacional de Estadística. (INE) Instituto Nacional de Estadística (2018). Cifras de Población. Madrid: Instituto Nacional de Estadística. Jerez, M., Linz, J. J. and Real-Dato, J. (2013). Los diputados en la nueva democracia española, 1977–2011: pautas de continuidad y de cambio. In: J. R. Montero and T. J. Miley, eds. Obras escogidas Juan J. Linz. Vol. 6: Partidos y élites políticas en España. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales. Jiménez-Sánchez, M., Coller, X. and Portillo-Pérez, M. (2018). MPs of traditional parties’ perceptions on candidate selection in times of political crisis and reform. In: G. Cordero and X. Coller, eds. Democratizing candidates selection. New methods, old receipts?London: Palgrave, pp: 147–171. Kakepaki, M., Kountouri, F., Verzichelli, L. and Coller, X. (2018). The sociopolitical profile of parliamentary representatives in Greece, Italy, and Spain before and after the eurocrisis. A comparative empirical assessment. In: G. Cordero and X. Coller, eds. Democratizing candidates selection. New methods, old receipts?London: Palgrave, pp. 175–200. Keller, S. (1963). Beyond the ruling class: Strategic elites in modern society. New York: Random House.

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Laakso, M. and Taagepera, R. (1979). ‘Effective’ number of parties: A measure with application to West Europe. Comparative Political Studies 12, 3–27. Linz, J. J. (2001). El liderazgo innovador en la transición a la democracia y en una nueva democracia. In: M. Alcántara and A. Martínez, eds. Política y gobierno en España. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, pp. 57–97. Montero, J. R., Gunther, R. and Torcal, M. (1999). Legitimidad, descontento y desafección: el caso español. Estudios Públicos 74, 107–149. Morlino, L. and Raniolo, F. (2017). The impact of the economic crisis on South European democracies. London: Palgrave. Muro, D. and Vidal, G. (2017). Political mistrust in Southern Europe since the Great Recession. Mediterranean Politics 22(2), 197–217. Norris, P. and Lovenduski, J. (1995). Political recruitment: Gender, race and class in the British parliament. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pappas, T. S. and Kriesi, H., eds. (2015). European populism in the shadow of the Great Recession. Colchester: ECPR. Pitkin, H. (1967). The concept of representation. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Polsby, N. (1968). The institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives. The American Political Science Review 62(1), 144–168. Putnam, R. D. (1976). The comparative study of political elites. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall: Rahman, S. (2012). Elite identities. Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 19(4), 477–484. Ross, J. F. S. (1944). Parliamentary representation. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Santana, A., Coller, X. and Aguilar, S. (2015). Las parlamentarias regionales en España: masa crítica, experiencia parlamentaria e influencia política. Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas 149, 111–130. Serrano, I. and Bermúdez, S. (2016). ¿Cómo son los parlamentarios? In: X. Coller, A. Jaime and F. Mota, eds. El poder político es España: parlamentarios y ciudadanía. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas Subirats, J. (2015). ¿Nueva política? Argumentos a favor y dudas razonables. In: CIS, ed. Informe España 2015. Madrid: Fundación Encuentro, pp. 445–464. Taylor, M. and Herman, V. M. (1971). Party systems and government stability. American Political Science Review 65(1), 28–37. Torcal, M. (2014). The decline of political trust in Spain and Portugal: Economic performance or political responsiveness. American Behavioral Scientist 58(12), 1542–1567. van Kessel, S. (2013). A matter of supply and demand: The electoral performance of populist parties in three European countries. Government and Opposition 48(2), 175–199. Weber, M. (1946). Politics as vocation. In: H. H. Gerth and C. H. Wright Mills, eds. From Max Weber: Essays in sociology. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 77–128.

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Methodological Challenges in the Study of Political Elites Some Reflections from Southern Europe André Freire, Xavier Coller, Ioannis Andreadis, Antonio M. Jaime, Sofia Serra-Silva and Evangelia Kartsounidou

Introduction Social scientists know a lot about political institutions, but much less about those that lead these institutions, their cognitive framework, beliefs, opinions and attitudes. And yet these are important matters insofar as politicians, understood in a broad sense (Higley and Burton 2006: 7), decide on matters crucial to the lives of citizens and the quality of democracies. Perhaps because of their centrality and the need to know the decision-makers better, there is a growing interest in political elites that is reflected in the number of publications devoted to the subject. However, researching political elites is not an easy task. Researchers face different challenges according to the methodological nature of their research. Elite research mobilises a vast range of qualitative and quantitative methodologies, especially now that the volume of available data sources has increased significantly over time (Genieys 2011). Elite research may be broadly classified into four substantive areas (Hoffmann-Lange 2007): Social background studies collect data on family background and sociodemographic data. These data allow us to compare elites and population, demonstrating the extent to which accessing power is a function of social, cultural and economic capital; they also facilitate comparisons, both temporary and international. Because of data availability, this type of study is the most common (Hoffmann-Lange 2001; Freire 2001; Coller, Ferreira do Vale and Meissner 2008; Teixeira 2009; Kakepaki 2016). Elite careers analyse the more or less structured patterns of professional advancement that eventually lead to elite positions (Alcántara 2012; Freire 2001; Coller, Ferreira do Vale and Meissner 2008; Teixeira 2009; Tziovaras and Chiotis 2004). Alternatively, it looks at the professionalisation of politics and how political elites develop a career in different representative or governmental institutions. The degree of professional specialisation is a fundamental variable allowing us to assess whether more emphasis is placed

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on specialised knowledge or on generalist qualifications acquired in different organisational contexts. Activities, beliefs, values, attitudes and patterns of conflict and consensus among different elite groups can be analysed thanks to the development of survey research (Jerez Mir, Real-Dato and Vázquez 2010; Alcántara 2012; Freire, Lisi and Viegas 2015, 2016; Freire, Lisi, Andreadis and Viegas 2016; Coller, Jaime and Mota 2018). Elite interactions and networks provide crucial information on the access of various elite and non‐elites groups to central political decision-makers. Broadly speaking, research in any of those areas involves facing two methodological choices that we nail down in three questions. First, who makes up part of the population being studied? This implies identifying the politicians to be analysed. There are three paths for identifying politicians for research purposes (Putnam 1976: 15–16). The first is based on reputation (Hunter 1959), the second relies on the analysis of decisions taken by or in institutions (Dahl 1961) and the third is based on the positions occupied by politicians (MPs, local councillors or members of government, etc.). Most recent studies of political elites use positional analysis. Second, who is being studied? Once the population has been identified, researchers face two choices – analysing the whole population or just a sample of it. Obviously, the choice will be determined by the nature of the research but, as we will see below, both options challenge researchers. Third, there also is the fundamental technical-methodological choice about the data collection method to employ when using surveys (mode of survey: face-to-face, mail/self-administered or web-survey) because it has crucial consequences – in the financial and logistic fields and also in terms of response rates and the data quality. Here, based on the experience of researchers in Greece, Portugal and Spain, we offer our experience conducting elite surveys (as well as parliamentary representation studied through the use of biographical information on MPs and candidates and qualitative interviews) in Southern Europe in order to illustrate the major challenges researchers face when studying political elites. We also offer some suggestions about how to improve the process of data collection and management in studies targeting the whole population or a sample of MPs and/or candidates. We exclude Italy from our analysis because it is a consolidated democracy (since 1945) and has a tradition (since the 1970s) of political representation studies that is very different from the experience in Greece, Portugal and Spain (more recent democracies with a much shorter tradition of political representation studies). Thus, by concentrating on these three countries we opt for the similar systems design.

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Analysing the Whole Political Elite Population Studying political elites using the positional method involves identifying a particular institution and territory. Members of the institutions will often be easily identified (potentially violating anonymity principles), and the information needed to conveniently position them is hard to get (many sources), so it is an avenue of research that is not easy to handle. This type of study is limited to the few variables for which researchers can find reliable information: sex, date of birth, place of birth, education, profession, party and time served. The main challenges in this type of research are the existence, availability and access to the information required, its quality or accurateness and future data management. Studies based on the biographical data for MPs have a major virtue – the information is easily accessible since parliaments normally include a short biography of MPs on their websites. However, data protection laws may make the process more restrictive. In Portugal, the biographies of parliamentary candidates and elected MPs are deposited with either the CNE (National Election Commission or the AHP (Historical Parliamentary Archive (data from 1975 to 1985) and parliament’s own website.1 These types of biographical data are the result of the candidates’ responses to the short questionnaire (asking them about their gender, age, education, profession, address, party) they are required to complete to finalise their candidacy or the MPs’ responses to the similar questionnaire they must complete when taking their seat in parliament. In Spain, while more chambers offer biographical information on their webpages, there is no accessible centralised information for researchers. Each chamber gathers biographical information and either does or does not publish it according to their own criteria.2 Since MPs volunteer their information, data on education, profession, age or place of birth can often be missing, rendering databases incomplete and leading researchers to seek out other information sources (a similar problem has been found in Portugal). In Greece there is no open-access database containing biographical information about MPs. This information can be found on the official website of the Greek parliament, which includes the biographical information only of the current MP.3 This means researchers must collect biographical information about former MPs in other ways, often relying on sites that allow visitors to view data about Greek MPs.4 The problem with official webpages is that the information can be incomplete, leaving researchers with a choice: they either complete the information by searching through other sources; or they leave it incomplete. However, as Coller, Santana and Jaime (2014) show, no matter how much effort the researcher makes, there will always be incomplete information on some variables, such as year of birth, education or profession (Freire 2001). It is better to perform the analysis with incomplete information (duly warning the reader and leaving the conclusions ‘provisional’) than to have no analysis at all. Accessing the information required does not guarantee reliability, since the social desirability bias may operate. Although no good solution can be applied

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and the frequency of social desirability may be low, it is good to double-check the information whenever possible. Analysis of a particular population of political elites is much easier if a database is built for data management and further statistical analysis (King, Keohane and Verba 2000; Coller, Santana and Jaime 2014). Parsimony means that while reality is quite complex, it can be presented in a simpler way. The researcher loses a bit of accuracy in favour of a much more reasonable analysis. For example, if you have a fragmented party system, and particularly if you want to carry out some comparative analysis, then instead of using the parties as separate categories in empirical data analysis, you can choose to classify them according to their ideological leanings and/or party families. Multicollinearity means two variables are highly related up to the extent that they may be almost identical. Operating with both at the same time is problematic and may distort the analysis. In order to avoid this, the researcher must at an early stage in the database building process pay special attention to the education and profession variables. For example, while there are some cases of MPs entering parliament without a degree and who, after a succession of terms, obtain one, such cases are fairly rare, so the researcher must construct the database by considering that, in most cases (the same MP across time with the same degree), the situation will not vary, although it may appear associated with formally (and only formally) different cases (the same MP across time). Thus, the database has to be constructed in such a way as to avoid such confusion. The same can also be said for the profession variable. Timespan is the period of time the database covers. Best and Cotta (2000) deal with MPs over a 150-year period; Linz, Gangas and Jerez (2000) examine ministers over a period of 125 years; Botella et al. (Botella, Teruel, Barberà and Barrio 2010) cover 31 years in Spain, 25 in France and nine in Britain when studying presidents of regional governments; while Santana, Aguilar and Coller (2016) cover 36 years in their study of women MPs. As far as Greek MPs are concerned, Kakepaki (2016) studied their main demographic characteristics since 1996. Tziovaras and Chiotis (2004) provide important biographical information about Greek MPs between 1974 and 2004. Finally, Pantelidou-Malouta (2006), focusing on gender representation, presents biographical information of all female Greek MPs and members of the European Parliament (MEPs) between 2007 and 1953 and 1981, respectively. In Portugal, studies about the socio-demographic characteristics and political careers of MPs have covered several years and decades: from the constituent assembly of 1975 to 1999–2002 (Freire 2001; Sousa 1984; Magone 2000). In any legislature there are MPs who, for a number of reasons, leave the chamber and who are then substituted. As with the databases of members of the executive (local, regional, national or European), MP databases need to pay attention to the timespan and respond to the following question: who is going to be in the database – the MP that begins the legislature or their substitute? As Coller, Jaime and Mota (2018: 3364) show, the response will lead to different methodological choices and may provide different results. It may

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be more accurate (meaning it is a better reflection of reality) to incorporate into the database those MPs who, the substituted or the substitute, have served more time during the legislature. To deal with this problem, in Portugal research teams usually focus on the MPs who exercise the mandate at a specific time during a legislature, when the data are collected, but sum up the number of MPs elected by each party (Freire 2001). A different challenge is party switching. How do researchers deal with MPs who belong to one party in one legislature and to a different one in the next? The only realistic solution is to be consistent throughout the database. While biographic analysis is limited, it offers a great deal of possibilities. For example, for the analysis of how the social structure develops in a certain polity is reflected at the parliamentary level (Best and Cotta 2000; Gaxie and Godmer 2007). Or for the analysis of descriptive representation, when similar data can be compiled for MPs (biographical or survey data) and the population (census data or other sources), then systematic comparisons may be carried out to determine whether the distances between populations and MPs (in toto) have widened or narrowed. Indices like the Systematic Index of Social Proportion (Coller, Jaime and Mota 2018) may be of great help. Additionally, assuming some degree of homogeneity in the national databases (with biographical data on MPs) across countries enables some systematic international comparisons that may highlight differences and similarities across countries (Kakepaki, Kountouri, Verzichelli and Coller 2018).

Analysing a Sample of Political Elites Studying a sample of political elites means facing a methodological challenge contingent upon the nature of the research – a researcher may want to study a representative sample or a motivated sample of politicians. The latter implies a selection of MPs related to the research topic that is wide enough to guarantee variability in the discourses generated. Jerez Mir, Real-Dato and Vázquez (2010) explore the different discourses about Europe that different political and economic elites have developed, which is why they interview mainly MEPs. In the Greek candidate survey, for example, they asked additional questions of candidates standing for both the national and the European parliament. They select a motivated sample and use a semi-structured questionnaire. Another variation of the motivated sample results from applying a snowball technique in which an interviewee names a number of possible further interviewees who, in turn, offer more names associated with the research topic. While qualitative interviews have been used frequently (they are cheaper and easier to manage in terms of accessing MPs, since there is a smaller number of them to interview), surveying samples of MPs (and of unsuccessful parliamentary candidates) has also become popular, especially with the emergence of internet surveys. Generally speaking, in Europe there are

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two major international initiatives worth mentioning: PARTIREP and the Comparative Candidates Survey.5 However, working with a representative sample involves the use of a mainly closed questionnaire and the creation of a random sample that takes into account such variables as gender, party and territory (or chamber) to guarantee the reliability and external validity of the results. A random sample means every individual in the population has the same chance of being selected for inclusion in the sample. Randomness is a crucial element in guaranteeing unbiased generalisations from the whole MP population. Non-random samples do not allow the precise measurement of empirical errors and, therefore, do not allow an estimation of the external validity level. Non-random samples are those in which all members of the population are invited to participate (all MPs in a country), with only a portion of them responding to the survey. This is quite common in internet surveys in particular, and in elite surveys in general. In Portugal, the MP and candidate surveys (from 2007/8 to 2016 and the present day), which have been carried out as part of the Comparative Candidates Survey, PARTIREP or other international research networks,6 usually try to reach as many MPs and unsuccessful candidates as possible: ideally all of them in each case. However, while the target is all MPs and unsuccessful candidates (of parties with parliamentary representation in the relevant legislature), we usually only reach a subset of cases, especially in the situation of unsuccessful candidates. What we do, therefore, is ensure all political parties are present in a statistically reasonable way in the samples (especially the smaller parties with a small number of MPs) and with a reasonable absolute number of MPs/candidates. We then weight the samples if needed.7 Most political elite surveys rely on new technologies and web-based tools. The development of new technologies and the massive use of the internet has resulted in ever more political elites using them as means of communication in their daily life, and especially as essential campaign tools that they use to inform, motivate, communicate and interact with the electorate. This may be the main reason behind the growing use of web-based surveys that target MPs. Currently, the largest initiative for surveying MPs and candidates (the CCS - Comparative Candidate Survey)8 is usually conducted with webbased surveys, although in some cases (e.g. Portugal) mixed-mode survey designs (web, face-to-face, mail, telephone) are preferred, since they combine the strengths of each individual mode while simultaneously compensating for their weaknesses at an affordable cost. A web-based survey for the whole population of MPs or candidates (which tends to be small: 1,813 in Spain; 230 MPs/1,150 candidates for the five parties with parliamentary representation in Portugal; 2,060 in Greece) targets the whole population. Two challenges arise from this – coverage errors and empirical errors. Coverage errors are among the most frequent problems observed in web-surveys and can undermine the sample’s representativeness. In web-surveys, sample representativeness is related directly to the percentage

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of respondents with access to the internet (Andreadis 2013). However, candidates and MPs are a specialised target population that differs considerably from a sample of the general population, since they are public figures who tend to use the internet in their daily lives to communicate and interact with the wider audience, namely, their voters. Consequently, coverage issues are less frequent in surveys of parliamentary candidates and MPs (Andreadis and Kartsounidou 2016). The experience in Portugal is that web-surveys (we conducted one in 2009–10 as part of PARTIREP) and mail questionnaires (which we usually use for unsuccessful candidates) receive lower response rates than face-to-face interviews (which we usually use for MPs), and that they are of a lower quality (e.g. there is no way of knowing if it was the candidate/MP that answered the survey). However, web-surveys and mail questionnaires are much cheaper and logistically easier to handle than face-to-face interviews.9 Since coverage issues are not very important in candidate or MP surveys, the main challenge is the empirical errors resulting from the non-response. Non-response refers both to those who did not participate in the survey and to those who failed to complete the questionnaire (dropouts or break-offs) (Key, Layton and Shakir 2002). For example, in Spain only 38 per cent of the 1,813 MPs (the target population) responded to the 2018–19 CCS survey (25 per cent completed the survey and 13 per cent did not). In Greece in 2015, with the cooperation of the party leaderships, we created a list of 1,476 email addresses, of which 1,384 were valid. From this we received 520 completed questionnaires. Following American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) standards we can estimate the response rate to be: 520/1,384 = 37.6 per cent (excluding unknown eligibility cases) or: 520/1,476 = 35.2 per cent (with all cases included) (Andreadis 2016). MPs (who are time poor) are slightly under-represented in the sample, but the gap is not very large (MPs in the sample and in the population represent 8.1 per cent and 12.5 per cent, respectively). As noted above, in Portugal face-to-face interviews had much higher response rates in MP surveys (60–70 per cent or more) than those that used web-surveys or mail questionnaires (20 per cent or less). In the Portuguese branch of the CCS in MP surveys we usually combine face-to-face interviews with mail questionnaires for unsuccessful candidates, with a resulting response rate of 26 per cent in 2016 (306 from 1,150). While web-based surveys have advantages over other survey methods, it should be noted that, as reported by Crawford, Couper and Lamias (2001), the privilege given to the respondents to record their own answers may also have negative effects that could include dropping out of the questionnaire before it is completed. The absence of an interviewer, the burden of long questionnaires, possible distractions or a questionnaire that is not optimised for all devices (Andreadis 2015) can all increase the chances of the respondent abandoning the questionnaire before completing it.

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Non-responses and lack of participation lead to self-selection bias, which threatens the survey’s representativeness and external validity. This can be addressed at two different points – before the survey, by paying attention to the questionnaire design, and after the survey, by applying weighting to ensure the final sample is similar to the internal population distribution as a means of gaining representativeness and eliminating self-selection bias. The questionnaire design is an important factor that can minimise measurement and non-response errors. The length of the questionnaire is an especially important element that influences the response rate (Andreadis and Kartsounidou 2020). Evidence from the 2015 Greek candidate survey shows a lower percentage of dropouts and more completed questionnaires when the questionnaire is short (20 questions) compared to one that is longer (85 questions). We can conclude, therefore, that when we are interested in a smaller subgroup of question within the entire survey questionnaire, it may be more useful or effective to split a long survey into smaller parts, placing the more important questions in the first part since there is a greater chance that respondents will answer them (Kartsounidou and Andreadis 2015). Another way to maximise sample size takes late dropouts into consideration. Evidence from the CCS in Spain suggests there are those who abandon the survey before the last block of questions, which deal with socio-demographics. Having detected these dropouts, the web questionnaire was modified to include some of the more important socio-demographic questions (gender, age, education level, profession) in the first blocks of questions, so that if a person abandoned the survey in the eighth block (out of ten) their answers could remain part of the sample. When the whole population of MPs (and/or candidates) is asked to participate in an online survey, but only a few actually do, then we run the risk of selfselection bias (we cannot be sure if something is motivating some to participate and preventing others from doing so). Calibration or weighting is a way of correcting this bias in completed surveys, by introducing weighting factors that are based upon some important auxiliary variable (Valliant and Dever 2018).

Maximising Answers When Interviewing Politicians Surveying politicians is not easy, which helps explain why there are fewer surveys of politicians than there are of citizens. In this section we consider MPs (and candidates), who are the most frequently surveyed of all politicians. The fact they are ‘special’ people whose answers tend to be key to understanding how institutions function leads researchers to think about some challenges that can maximise the information gathered through surveys (but also when using semi-structured questionnaires). MPs are highly mobile citizens who generally serve in one city (where the institution of representation is located) while living in another. This lifestyle reinforces the idea that MPs have a tight agenda. More importantly, MPs usually surround themselves with gatekeepers (secretaries, counsellors) who

Table 7.1 Pros and cons of different methods of surveying Type of interview

Pros

Cons

Face-to-face

Respondents are MPs or candidates More, richer and higher-quality data Solid results High response rate Difficult questions can be clarified by interviewer Less don’t know/no reply Low rate of errors completing the questionnaire More privacy and anonymity Less risk of sharing questionnaire among MPs Contextual data Anonymity guaranteed. Easier than face-to-face Respondents are MPs or candidates Needs to be short Low cost Interview can be done at different times Less effort to answer Useful, especially when there are missing or invalid email addresses. Low response rate Low cost (compared to face-to-face) Anonymity guaranteed

They can lie Higher costs than telephone survey or web-survey (money, effort, people, time) Social desirability bias Fieldwork takes more time Sometimes may not very effective (i.e. in Greece).

Telephone (landline, mobile, Facetime, Skype), not CATI

Email

Mail

Low cost Rich data (socio-demographic, attitudinal and contextual variables) The MP can research information Less social desirability Less risk of answering inconveniently or against the party line The respondent can answer at different times Less incoherence in answers Anonymity guaranteed

Higher costs (money, effort, people, time) than web- or email-surveys. Access costs Finding time to answer Needs to be short. Long questionnaires are difficult to answer over the phone Social desirability bias More distractions Light answers. No identity control. Who answers? Costs of pursuing MPs to answer Social desirability bias Risk of MPs sharing questionnaire and emulating answers Non-response error No identity control. Who answers? Low response rate Costs of pursuing MPs to answer Requires more efforts from respondents More don’t knows/no replies Risk of MPs sharing questionnaire and emulating answers from colleagues. Non-response error

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Type of interview

Pros

Cons

Online, web

Lower costs (than face-to-face and telephone survey) Rich data (socio-demographic, attitudinal and contextual variables) The MP can research information Less social desirability Less risk of answering inconveniently or against the party line The respondent can answer whenever they have time and at different times Less incoherence in answers Fast data collection process Self-administered: errors during data input can be avoided Ability to collect metadata Anonymity guaranteed.

Lower response rare than face-to-face Works better with shorter questionnaires Needs reinforcement for access No identity control. Who answers? Need to build an e-platform Risk of MPs sharing questionnaire and emulating answers Not always easy to find the email addresses of all target respondents (missing or invalid email addresses) Absence of an interviewer: higher possibility of dropouts Non-response error Needs to be adapted to different devices (computer, mobile phone, tablet).

Sources: Adaptation and extension of the contributions summarised in Rodriguez-Teruel and Daloz (2018, p. 103) based on the authors’ experience of interviewing politicians.

sometimes make access to them difficult. MPs are also often wary of talking to researchers out of a fear they may say something inconvenient, which goes against the party line or which could push electors away. There are a number of different ways to interview politicians: by mail, faceto-face, on the telephone (Skype, Facetime, mobile or landline) and through online surveys. All have their pros and cons that the researcher will have to evaluate according to their own criteria and resources (both economic and human). In Table 7.1 we offer a collection of these pros and cons based on our own experience. There are a few considerations to take into account both to ensure a good response rate and reduce the chances of a respondent dropping out. 1 2

3

Addresses – The first is access to the addresses at which to contact MPs and candidates. Access – MPs are usually busy, highly mobile (unless they live in the same city as the parliament) and subject to three pressures: parliamentary work; relationship with the public; and party political tasks. Gaining access to them may prove difficult. Contact – Being aware of these challenges, the research team may follow multiple lines of action.

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b c

d

4 5

The principal researcher will send introductory letters to the president of each parliament, leaders of parliamentary groups and to each MP; The letter may be followed by a number of phone calls to set up an interview or by an email sending the link to the survey webpage; In face-to-face interviews with a random sample, should the MP refuse to take part, a randomly selected replacement with the same characteristics (gender, party, territory) needs to be contacted. This is a way of maintaining a high response rate (Coller, Jaime and Mota 2018); In the case of online surveys (and mail questionnaires/surveys), reminders need to be sent (only) to those who have not responded to the survey. Reminders were sent out every two weeks in the Greek and Spanish CCS survey, which some respondents said were very useful. For the mail surveys in Portugal, we usually send four or five reminders to those who have yet to respond – one each consecutive month.

Questionnaire – A few issues need to be dealt with in relation to questionnaires: extension, wording and the type of questions. The role of small parties – Should the researcher interview MPs from small parties if they will probably end up in the ‘others’ category when analysing the data? Sometimes, the decision is made for the researcher since, for whatever reason, some small parties do not want to participate in surveys. This was the case of Golden Dawn in Greece and the CUP (Popular Unity Candidacy in Spain. At other times, although it may be time consuming, it is worth having the small parties included in the sample. Later, according to research needs and to ensure anonymity, these parties can be grouped together in such categories as ‘other regional parties’, ‘other nationalist parties’, ‘other centre-right or right parties’ or ‘other centre-left or left parties’ or indeed any classification that reflects an important political cleavage. In Portugal, where there are few political parties represented in parliament, we usually interview them all for the MP surveys and target all of their candidates in the relevant election for the unsuccessful candidate segment. Another fundamental issue here is to ensure a significant and reasonable absolute number (for sound statistical analyses) of MP respondents from the smaller parties.

Conclusions This chapter has dealt with some of the methodological and technical-methodological challenges academics face when researching political elites – especially MPs or parliamentary candidates. Once the target population has been identified, methodological challenges are contingent upon a basic dilemma – surveying the whole population or a sample of it. If the whole population is surveyed (generally

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as in biographical research), a database should be constructed that takes parsimony, timespan, future multicollinearity and accurateness into consideration. If a sample of politicians (e.g. MPs and candidates) is to be studied, then the challenges are different and involve such matters as whether or not the sample is random, bearing the goals of external validity and reliability in mind. Non-random samples involve the coverage error and self-selection bias leading to empirical errors. Questionnaire design is key to maximising the number of respondents who actually complete the questionnaire, while calibration is a tool used to maximise external validity with non-random samples that are affected by self-selection bias. There are a number of challenges to be faced when conducting interviews. There are several techniques (mail, email, telephone, web, face-to-face) and the pros and cons of each have been shown in Table 7.1. These will have a significant impact on both the response rates (although variable across countries and contexts) and the quality of responses. Finally, consideration about accessing, contacting, convincing and interviewing needs to be addressed in order to maximise responses and collect high-quality data. Below we summarise each of the three country experiences compared in the present chapter related to the several topics analysed. The 2015 Greek candidate survey was conducted entirely online. Although non-response is one of the main problems facing researchers, the recruitment process and contact strategy, which include the initial invitation and follow-up reminders, are important stages that can be used to increase the survey response. The response rate for the 2015 Greek candidate survey (37.6 per cent) and representativeness of the sample in terms of political parties, constituency and gender distribution allow us to conclude that using the web as the main mode to conduct a candidate survey can produce high-quality data that can be used to produce reliable estimates for the population being studied; however, it is worth noting that each country has its own peculiarities and traditions concerning surveys and that the success of one mode is largely connected to previous experience. For instance, the 2015 Greek candidate survey is the fourth consecutive study conducted in that country. The studies that followed the initial survey in 2007 have all improved gradually, reaching a peak in 2015 with the most mature, complete and successful Greek candidate study. Portuguese studies of political elites and political representation that rely on biographical data have been carried out for much longer and with much longer timespans than those relying on elite surveys. The former type has been conducted since the 1980s, with the latter emerging around 2007–8. In the case of elite surveys, these have normally been conducted under the aegis of international research networks – CCS (2009, 2011 and 2015 elections), PARTIREP (MP survey 2009–10), PARENEL, IntUne and ECS. Several data collection methods have been used; however, in recent years we have tended to use a mixed method (involving mail questionnaires for unsuccessful candidates, because we can only reach their physical addresses through the CNE; face-toface interviews for MPs) as the best way of reaching the political elites, to

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obtain the highest response rates possible, and to achieve the best possible quality of responses. To meet this requirement, partnerships with the Portuguese parliament, CNE, the parliamentary groups and MPs taken individually have all been of fundamental importance. Studies of political elites in Spain have tended to be carried out using such qualitative techniques as semi-structured interviews with a motivated sample of MPs or by using the available biographical data. Pioneering studies, such as those by Linz and de Miguel of MPs during the Second Republic and the Francoist state, multiplied once democracy and federalisation were implemented, with the 17 newly-created parliaments offering a perfect basis for studying the people representing the people. Studies based on biographical data mushroomed, although with some notable exceptions they were partial and focused on a single region. Surveying politicians in Spain has not been that common: apart from the 1997 CIS (Centre for Sociological Research) of MPs in Congress and then the Spanish section of the PARTIREP project in 2009, the first comprehensive survey of a representative randomised sample of MPs of the 19 chambers, the results of which were published in 2016 (Coller, Jaime and Mota 2018), with 581 MPs taking part in face-to-face interviews designed to gather information on a number of issues. This project was repeated in 2018 under the umbrella of the CCS. This time, 452 MPs were surveyed in a non-random sample, with all 1,813 representatives having been invited to participate. The results were later calibrated to gain external validity and avoid sample bias. In this project, a web-based questionnaire was employed, reinforced by mail, email and phone interviews.10 Contrary to CCS methodology and the experiences of Greece and Portugal, non-successful candidates were not included in the sample, since in Spain the law forbids the disclosure of personal data (such as email or postal addresses) required to contact candidates. We anticipate the use of webmail surveys will become increasingly common in Spain, particularly taking into account that, as in other countries, there is growing interest in the study of political elites.

Notes 1 At least from the 5th legislature to date. See: www.parlamento.pt/DeputadoGP/Pa ginas/default2.aspx 2 For instance, while the Spanish Congress offers some complete biographical information (depending on the MP), the parliaments of the Balearic and Canary islands offer no or very limited information. 3 See www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vouleftes/Viografika-Stoicheia 4 See www.socioscope.gr/?lang=en#datasets/deputies 5 See urbanstudies.brussels/research/political-participation-and-representation-partirep, www.comparativecandidates.org. See Deschouwer and Depaw (2014) for more on PARTIREP. 6 Some political representation (elite and mass) studies in Portugal (and Greece and Spain) (2008–9) were conducted as part of IntUne (Integrated and United: A Quest for Citizenship in an Ever Closer Europe), see www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/

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d7/de/datasets/integrated-and-united-a-quest-for-a-citizenship-in-an-evercloser-europe, while others for Portugal (2008–10) were carried out as part of PARENEL (Research Project Parliamentary Representation at the National and European Levels), see legipar.sciencespobordeaux.fr/PDF/PARENEL_EN.pdf. See also the website for most of these Portuguese representation and get a detailed overview of the different studies at er.cies.iscte-iul.pt/en For further details and references about political representation studies in Portugal, see Chapter 4 above. See comparativecandidates.org For further details on the elite surveys and the different modes of data collection used, as well as their advantages and shortcomings, see Lima and Serra-Silva (2015). Results can be seen here: www.upo.es/investiga/dasp/es/project/ciudadania-y-parlam entarios-en-tiempos-de-crisis-y-renovacion-el-caso-comparado-de-espana-en-el-conte xto-del-sur-de-europa/

References Alcántara, M. (2012). El oficio de político. Madrid: Tecnos. Aldridge, A. and Levine, K. (2001). Surveying the social world: Principles and practice in survey research. Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press. Andreadis, I. (2013). Who responds to website visitor satisfaction surveys? Paper presented at the 2013 General Online Research Conference (GOR), Mannheim, Germany, 13 March. Andreadis, I. (2015). Web surveys optimized for smartphones: Are there differences between computer and smartphone users? Methods, Data, Analysis 9(2), 213–228. Andreadis, I. (2016). The Greek candidate study 2015. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. Available at doi:10.3886/E62191V1. Accessed on 3 January 2018. Andreadis, I. and Kartsounidou, E. (2016). Conducting a candidate study as a web-survey: Advantages, challenges and best practices. Paper presented at the First BCES International Scientific Conference, Center for Monitoring and Research (CeMI),Podgorica, Montenegro, 1–12 July 2016. Andreadis, I. and Kartsounidou, E. (2020). The impact of splitting a long online questionnaire on data quality. Survey Research Methods, 14(1). Best, H. and Cotta, M. (2000). Parliamentary representatives in Europe 1848–2000: Legislative recruitments and careers in 11 European countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Botella, J., Teruel, J. R., Barberà, O. and Barrio, A. (2010). A new political elite in Western Europe? The political careers of regional prime ministers in newly decentralised countries. French Politics 8(1), 42–46. Coller, X., Jaime, A. and Mota, F., eds. (2018). Political power in Spain: The multiple divides between politicians and citizens. London: Palgrave. Coller, X., Santana, A. and Jaime, A. (2014). Problemas y soluciones para la construcción de bases de datos de políticos. Revista Española de Ciencia Política y de la Administración 34, 169–198. Coller, X., Ferreira do Vale, H. and Meissner, C. (2008). Les élites politiques régionales espagnoles (1980–2005). In: W. Genieys, ed. Penser la dynamique des régimes politiques: sur les pas de Juan Linz. Paris: L’Harmattan, pp. 113–139. Crawford, S. D., Couper, M. P. and Lamias, M. J. (2001). Web surveys: Perceptions of burden. Social Science Computer Review 19(2), 146–162.

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Dahl, R. (1961). Who governs? Democracy and power in an American city. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Deschouwer, K. and Depaw, S., eds. (2014). Representing the people: A survey among members of state-wide and sub-state parliaments. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Freire, A. (2001). Recrutamento parlamentar. Lisbon: Stape. Freire, A., Lisi, M., Andreadis, I. and Viegas, J. L. M., eds. (2016). Political representation in times of bailout: Evidence from Greece and Portugal. London: Routledge. Freire, A., Lisi, M. and Viegas, J. L. M. (2015). Crise económica, políticas de austeridade e representação política. Lisbon: Assembleia da República. Freire, A., Lisi, M. and Viegas, J. M. L. (2016). Representação e participação política na Europa em crise. Lisbon: Assembleia da República. Gaxie, D. and Godmer, L. (2007). Cultural capital and political selection: Educational background of parliamentarians. In: M. Cotta and H. Best, eds. Democratic representation in Europe: Diversity, change and convergence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp: 106–135. Genieys, W. (2011). Sociologie politique des élites. Paris: Armand Colin. Higley, J. and Burton, M. (2006). Elite foundations of liberal democracy. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Hoffmann-Lange, U. (2001). Elite research in Germany. International Review of Sociology 11(2), 201–216. Hoffmann-Lange, U. (2007). Methods of elite research. In: R. Dalton and H. Klingemann, eds. The Oxford handbook of political behaviour. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hunter, F. (1959). Top leadership. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. Jerez Mir, M., Real-Dato, J. and Vázquez, R. (2010). The perception of the European Union by political and economic elites in Spain. South European Society and Politics 15(1), 35–56. Kakepaki, M., ed. (2016). Political representation in contemporary Greece: Characteristics of Greek MPs 1996–2015. Athens: EKKE-Papazissis. Kakepaki, M., Kountouri, F., Verzichelli, L. and Coller, X. (2018). The sociopolitical profile of parliamentary representatives in Greece, Italy and Spain before and after the Eurocrisis: A comparative empirical assessment. In: G. Cordero and X. Coller, eds. Democratizing candidate selection: New methods, old receipts?, London: Palgrave, pp. 175–200. Kartsounidou, E. and Andreadis, I. (2015). Increasing the response rate of the Comparative Candidate Survey. Paper presented at the 10th South East European Doctoral Student Conference,17–18 September 2015, Thessaloniki. Key, C.Layton, D. and Shakir, S. A. (2002). Results of a postal survey of the reasons for non-response by doctors in a prescription event monitoring study of drug safety. Pharmacoepidemiol Drug Safety 11(2), 143–148. King, G., Keohane, O. and Verba, S. (2000). El diseño de la investigación social: La inferencia científica en los estudios cualitativos. Madrid: Alianza Editorial. Lima, I. and Serra-Silva, S. (2015). Procedimento de recolha e tratamento dos dados no estudo da representação política. In: A. Freire, M. Lisi and J. M. L. Viegas, eds. Participação e representação políticas na Europa em crise. Lisbon: Assembleia da República, pp. 49–76. Linz, J. J., Gangas, P. and Jerez, M. (2000). Spanish diputados: From the restoration to consolidated democracy. In: H. Best and M. Cotta, eds. Parliamentary representatives in Europe 1848–2000: Legislative recruitment and careers in eleven European countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 370–462.

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Magone, J. (2000). Political recruitment and elite transformation in modern Portugal 1870–1999: The late arrival of mass representation. In: H. Best and M. Cotta, eds. Parliamentary representatives in Europe, 1848–2000: Legislative recruitment and careers in eleven European countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 341–370. Pantelidou-Malouta, M. (2006). The gender of democracy: Citizenship and gendered subjectivity. New York: Routledge. Putnam, R. D. (1976). The comparative study of political elites. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Santana, A., Aguilar, S. and Coller, X. (2016). Who leads and who lags behind? Women MPs in the Spanish regional parliaments. Revista Internacional de Sociología 74(2), 1–14. Sousa, V. (1984). Caracterização da classe política portuguesa. Lisbon: Instituto Damião de Góis. Teixeira, M. P. (2009). Partidos políticos e recrutamento parlamentar: O povo semisoberano?Coimbra: Almedina. Tziovaras, G. and Chiotis, V. (2004). Ο πολιτικός χάρτης της μεταπολίτευσης 1974–2004 (The political map of the Metapolitefsi, 1974–2004). Athens: Livanis. Valliant, R. and Dever, J. A. (2018). Survey weights: A step-by-step guide to calculation. College Station, TX: Stata Press.

Part II

Latin America

8

Latin American Politics Before and Beyond the Commodity Crisis Representation, Institutional Design and Political Cycles Mélany Barragán and Manuel Alcántara

Introduction Latin America’s recent history has seen many recurring economic and institutional crises. Since the transitions to democracy, this region has experienced periods of expansion and recession, as well as multiple political phenomena: the rise of neoliberalism, populism, crises of representation and both right and left turns. Sometimes political changes have been closely linked with economic cycles; in other cases they have been the result of internal situations such as institutional crises or domestic tensions. Its heterogeneity makes Latin America an interesting region for study. Analysis of its evolution through recent decades until the present – drawing together its institutional designs, economic cycles and political dynamics – permits the construction of a complex map where ideology becomes a relevant and controversial variable. The meanings of ‘left’ and ‘right’ and, above all, their importance to the study of Latin American politics have often been questioned in the scholarly literature (Dix 1989; Ruiz-Rodríguez 2000; Torcal and Mainwaring 2003); left and right are seen as fuzzy categories that do not always permit easy or correct comparisons. However, there is empirical evidence to suggest that Latin American voters and politicians are ideologised to a relatively high degree, and rather consistently locatable on the left–right axis (Alcántara 2004; Colomer and Escatel 2005; Alcántara and Rivas 2007). Beyond particular nuances among countries, surveys of elites and public opinion show that both have integrated the concepts of left and right into their cognitive schemas. And, as a consequence, these categories are useful to understanding and classifying political cycles in terms of left and right turns. In this sense, the aim of this chapter is to describe Latin American politics before and beyond the so-called commodity crisis. In order to do so, this chapter begins by examining the particular institutional design of each country, focusing attention on electoral and party systems. After that general overview, the left and right dimensions are introduced, through a double approach: first, from a theoretical perspective, to reflect on the meaning of those concepts in Latin American politics; and second, through the provision of data on political polarisation. This information is then connected with economic cycles, with the purpose of studying

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the influence of the crisis in political cycles. Specifically, the effect on the left–right axis will be measured using data provided by the Parliamentary Elites in Latin America Surveys (PELA) project from the University of Salamanca.

Overview of Institutional Designs: A Comparative Perspective Understanding Latin American political cycles, the meaning of left and right in the region or the impact of economic crises on politics will require, first and foremost, recognition of the institutional systems in which these phenomena and dynamics occur. In that sense, it is worth underlining that the third wave of democratisation established the basis for a new order, and this required the design of new rules and institutions.1 Even as each country has followed its own path, and despite occasional backlashes (such as the 2009 coup in Honduras), a democratic culture has taken root throughout Latin America, suggesting the arrival of a certain measure of governmental stability (Biekart 2014). Thus, since the arrival of democracy, Latin America’s political development process has been steady, and political reforms have been undertaken in a more systematic way (Hagopian and Mainwaring 2005; Shixue 2010). The establishment of governmental institutions and electoral systems has proven conducive to the legitimation of the new democracies. A procedural democracy was instituted for guaranteeing free and clean elections and for impeding non-elected actors from imposing their will on an elected government. As a result, a complex system of institutions and rules has become well established. Among these institutions, electoral laws and party systems occupy a significant position in terms of representation and political articulation. Electoral Systems In spite of differences among countries in terms of the quality of democracy or political performance, the celebration of free and competitive elections has been constant in the region. While military governments and dictatorships were the norm in the 1960s and 1970s,2 today elected governments rule in every Latin American country except Cuba and Haiti. In country after country, effective competition has been guaranteed, even where electoral laws have been modified over time. Electoral systems are important because their design influences the configuration of party systems and political cycles. Moreover, electoral systems are closely linked to other aspects of constitutional design. For example, Shugart and Carey (1992) have looked at how the rules for electing a president and the timing of parliamentary and presidential elections interact with the choice of the electoral system to produce political consequences. A body of evidence has further been gathered in support of the notion that electoral systems reflect party calculations (Colomer 2016). In order to better consider all these possible effects, Table 8.1 lays out the main characteristics of the Latin American electoral systems.

Table 8.1 Electoral system: Legislative (lower house) Country

Coincidence

Chamber renewed by half

Seats

Size of electoral districta

Voting system

List form

Argentina (1983–93) Argentina (1995–2015) Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia (1982–2002) Colombia (2006–15) Costa Rica Dominican Republic Ecuador (1996) Ecuador (1998) Ecuador (2002–6) Ecuador (2009–15) El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela

Mixed

Yes

254

11

Proportional

Closed

Mixed

Yes

257

10.7

Proportional

Closed

No Yes No No

No No No No

130 513 120 166

1.59 19 2 4.9

Mixed Proportional Proportional Proportional

Closed Open Free Closed

No

No

166

4.74

Proportional

Multiple

Yes No

No No

57 183

7 10.76

Proportional Proportional

Closed Free

Yes

No

82

3.73

Proportional

Closed

Yes

No

121

5.5

Proportional

Open

No

No

100

4.55

Proportional

Open

Yes

No

124

5.64

Proportional

Open

No Yes Yes Mixed Yes Yes Yes No Yes No

No No No No No No No No No No

84 158 128 500 90 71 80 120 99 165

6 6.54 8 1.64 5 1.82 4.44 4.76 5.21 6.11

Proportional Proportional Proportional Mixed Proportional Mixed Proportional Proportional Proportional Mixed

Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Free Closed Free Closed Closed

Source: Barragán (2015). a

Median. Number of elected deputies per electoral district (average value).

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Figure 8.1 measures the percentage of legislative and executive elections that have been held simultaneously. Results show that for the majority of cases, citizens have voted for their representatives and executive authorities at the same time. Considering the ‘carry-over effect’, Figure 8.1 also shows a very interesting phenomenon: before a crisis, the greater percentage of simultaneous elections provided a majority for the president’s party in Congress; after a crisis, that tendency changed. Consequently, presidents elected after 2014 have had to govern with legislative chambers run by the opposition. Other important variables are the criteria for representation and the list form. Regarding the first, the majority of countries adopted proportional systems following their transitions to democracy.3 In that sense, Latin American electoral systems tend to favour proportionality over efficacy (Alcántara and Freidenberg 2006). As a result of this criterion for representation, if a president’s electoral support is not strong enough, legislatures may show high levels of fragmentation, which gives rise to instability and complicates effective decision making.

Party System Format Party Systems in Latin America The old stereotype that described the region’s party systems as excessively pragmatic, clientelistic, personalistic, volatile and weak has been overcome. However, parties and party systems have evolved by different degrees since 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% Before crisis (1978-2014) (N=156)

40%

After crisis (2015-present) (N=9)

30% 20% 10% 0% No Simultaneous Carry-over No carry-over simultaneous elections effect (N=80) effect (N=19) elections (N=9) (N=99)

Figure 8.1 Simultaneous legislative and executive elections in Latin America (%) and the ‘carry-over effect’ of simultaneous elections (1978–2018). Source: Own elaboration based upon data from the Latin American Electoral Courts.

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the transitions to democracy: at the advent, traditional parties dominated politics in most of the region, but over time established political parties began to lose staying power (Lupu 2016). On the one hand, the rise of personalism and populism have favoured the emergence of new parties and electoral platforms; on the other hand, successive political and economic crises have benefited from the arrival of new parties. In this way, with the exception of Bolivia and Ecuador, Latin American party systems have maintained or increased the effective number of parties since the arrival of democracy (Table 8.2). The increase of fragmentation can be attributed to various factors (Alcántara and Freidenberg 2006), including the emergence of different ideological trends inside of party systems. Also, new groups (guerrilla, indigenous, militia or social movements) have been incorporated into institutional systems. Finally, a pessimistic approach tries to explain the increase of fragmentation by way of personalism and internal struggles within parties. As a general tendency, the effective number of parliamentary parties increased until the period between 2000 and 2006. In spite of the permanence of some historical parties – for example, the Partido Aprista in Peru, or the Unión Cívica Radical in Argentina – after transitions to democracy, new parties were indeed incorporated into party systems – Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Nicaragua), Frente Faribundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (El Salvador), Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik (Ecuador) – and have remained viable over time. On the opposite side, other traditional parties have disappeared – Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca (Guatemala), Movimiento Popular Democrático (Ecuador), Partido Socialista (Bolivia) – while others had a relatively short life – Cambio Radical (Peru), Acción de Desarrollo Nacional (Guatemala), Clase Media Revolucionaria (Venezuela) and Movimiento Fuerza Ecuador (Ecuador). In some cases, these parties were only electoral platforms without any pretension of continuity, but, in others, electoral failure caused their extinction. However, the arrival of the four strongest leaders of the region – Hugo Chávez (Venezuela), Evo Morales (Bolivia), Rafael Correa (Ecuador) and Lula da Silva (Brazil) – reversed the situation and, for the first time since the transition to democracy, the number of parties decreased considerably. Only a few new parties have emerged in Latin American politics since the 2000–6 period, including the Movimiento Regeneración Nacional (Mexico) and the Partido Libertad y Refundación (Honduras). This suggests that a regional left turn transformed party systems, and that some presidential parties became quasi-hegemonic forces in a context of high polarisation and low fragmentation. The subsequent outbreak of economic crisis seems not to have changed that tendency: alternation of power has transpired with opposition candidates and new parties have not appeared. The only exception here is Venezuela, where opposition forces have indeed emerged, even achieving a majority in parliament.

4.3 2.8 1.9 2.3 -

6.9 2.6 3.0 2.1

2.3 -

4.0 2.2

2.5 2.6 2.7

Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Honduras

Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela Average

2.4

2.1 1.9 4.0 3.3 2.8 3.5

5.5 2.4 4.4 2.0

3.9 8.7 5.1 2.2 2.2 3.1

2.8

1987–90 2.8

2.2 4.3 2.5 2.9 3.3 4.7 3.6

6.2 3.0 3.1 2.0

3.7 8.2 5.0 2.8 2.3 2.4

3.2

1991–5

a

2.9

2.7 2.7 3.3 2.0 3.8 3.1 6.1 3.8

5.0 3.7 2.4 2.2

5.4 7.1 5.3 2.9 2.6 2.3

2.9

3.3

1996–2000

Argentina holds midterm elections. We calculate the effective number of parliamentary parties for each election.

Source: Own elaboration based upon data from the Latin American Electoral Courts.

2.3 2.3 2.9 2.4 3.2

2.2

-

1982–6

1978–81

Country

Argentinaa

Table 8.2 Effective number of parliamentary parties (1978–2016)

3.0 2.9 3.2 4.4 2.4 3.4 4.3

7.5 3.6 4.6 2.4

5.0 8.5 6.0 6.9 3.7 2.5

3.4

2001–5 3.5

3.5 3.1 3.7 3.9 3.8 2.7 2.0 4

4.8 3.0 4.9 2.3

2.1 9.5 5.6 7.6 3.3 2.7

3.5

2006–10

3.2 1.6 3.0 2.2 4.0 2.6 5.6 3.8

1.8 2.9 5.6

1.9 10.4 5.4 5.0 3.9 2.0

2011–16

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Party System Polarisation and Ideological Orientations In spite of oft-cited theories about ‘the end of the history’ (Fukuyama 1989) and ‘the end of ideologies’ (Bell 2000), new ideological forms have appeared to replace prior ones. And although left and right are heuristic shortcuts to simplify the conflict, the left–right division remains important in the identification of elite and voter policy positions and, as a consequence, to the explanation of political dynamics. However, the importance of the left–right dimension in Latin American countries has traditionally been dismissed by students of politics, who have supposed that political parties are not strongly ideologically oriented, but rather populist, personalistic and clientelistic (Colomer 2013). On the other hand, many studies have documented the continuing importance of the electors’ positions on the left–right axis in Latin America (Alcántara 2004; Colomer and Escatel 2005; Luna and Zechmeister 2010; Cannon and Kirby 2012). Moreover, when politicians and citizens are asked about their ideology, the majority recognise these categories and locate themselves on the left–right spectrum (Figure 8.2). This fact was reinforced after the latest crisis, with lower levels of non-response. But that is not all: left–right is also correlated with different issues that articulate political competition. Among other continuums, Alcántara (2008) has identified for Latin American countries: individual autonomy versus collectivism; clericalism versus laicism; and market versus the state. Following these principles, Altman et al. (Altman, Luna, Piñero and Toro 2009) distinguish three cleavages articulated and correlated with

10% 9% 8% 7% 6% 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 0%

Elites before crisis (1994-2014)

Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela

Elites after crisis (2015-present) Citizens before crisis (1994-2014) Citizens after crisis (2015present)

Figure 8.2 Non-response in party’s ideological position by deputies and citizens (%). Source: Own elaboration based upon data from the Parliamentary Elites in Latin America Surveys project, University of Salamanca (1994–2017) and the Latin American Public Opinion Project, University of Vanderbilt (1994–2014).

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the left–right division: a) the role of the state in terms of economics and welfare policies; b) the position towards nationalism and traditionalism; and c) the support to democracy or authoritarianism. However, several authors (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Zechmeister 2006; Kitschelt et al. 2010) have shown that the meaning of left and right varies among individuals and countries. This is especially meaningful in Latin America due to interruptions to democracy, phenomena like populism or the existence of local cleavages. In any case, political organisations have promoted party-to-citizen links by making ideological and class-based appeals (Roberts 1996; Luna and Zechmeister 2010). Furthermore, parties have made an effort to develop programmes and offer political alternatives in potentially ideological dimensions such as economics, social policies, religion, nationalism or foreign affairs (Freire and Kivisk 2013a, 2013b). In that regard, Table 8.3 shows different political parties’ positions on the left–right division in 18 Latin American countries from the last five legislatures. Data are provided by PELA and legislators were asked about political parties’ position on the left–right axis. Citizen self-positioning has also been also included in the table, with data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The results shown correspond to the average. Results are difficult to compare across countries, since they may reflect different elites’ evaluations of the 1–10 scale. In any case, on the one side, some parties are given far-left scores, including Movimiento al Socialismo in Bolivia, Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional in Nicaragua, Frente Amplio in Uruguay and Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional in El Salvador. On the far-right, high values are given to Unión Demócrata Independiente in Chile, Alianza Republicana Nacionalista in El Salvador, Partido Nacional in Honduras and Movimiento Liberal Republicano Nacionalista in Panama. Another fact to underline is the convergence of major parties within a country, especially the Partido de Avanzada Nacional and the Frente Republicano Guatemalteco in Guatemalan and Panamanian parties. Finally, some parties have relocated relative to the average position: the Unión Cívica Radical in Argentina has moved from a centre-left position to the right of the political spectrum, while the Liberal Party has jumped to the right of the Conservative Party, reflecting the extreme fractionalisation of the Liberals. Based on this data, Latin American parties are relatively highly ideological and rather consistently locatable on the left–right axis. Finally, in terms of citizen self-positioning, there is a clear predominance towards the centre, which confirms that elites are more polarised than the general population. Self-placement on the left–right axis by elites and parties allows for the measurement of party system polarisation (Table 8.4). Thus, polarisation permits the structuring of parties according to a programmatic criterion in which the announced positions of important competitors are very far apart. In general terms, the characteristic heterogeneity of Latin American societies

Table 8.3 Political parties’ position and citizens’ self-positioning on the left–right axis Country

Party

Position

Argentina

PJ

5.6

UCR

5.5

FREPASO PRO

4.4 8.0

PMDB

6.5

PP

8.3

PTB PSDB

7.6 7.0

PT

4.6

MNR

7.2

MIR

6.2

UCS

5.2

ADN MAS

9.1 2.7

UN

7.8

PDC

4.9

RN

7.3

UDI PPD

8.8 3.8

PS

2.5

Colombia

PL

5.3

Costa Rica

PC PUSC

7.7 6.8

PLN

6.5

PAC

4.1

ML RC

9.0 5.5

Brazil

Bolivia

Chile

Dominican Republic

El Salvador

FA

1.8

PRD

6.3

PLD PSRC

5.7 8.3

ARENA

9.0

FMLN

1.7

PCN

7.5

Citizens’ self-position

5.6

5.5

4.7

4.8

5.8

5.8

6.4

5.2 (Continued)

Table 8.3 (Cont.) Country

Party

Position

Ecuador

PSC

8.7

PRE

5.5

ID

4.7

MUPP-NP PRIAN

3.4 9.1

PAIS

3.4

PAN

7.3

FRG

7.3

Unionista UNE

6.3 4.7

Honduras

PLH

5.5

PNH PRI

8.1 5.9

6.2

Mexico

PRD PAN

3.0 8.3

5.8

Guatemala

Citizens’ self-position

4.9

5.0

Nicaragua

PL

7.7

Panama

FSLN PRD

2.2 5.4

PP(PA)

7.2

MOLIRENA CD

8.0 8.4

ANR

6.3

PLRA PAP

6.1 5.6

Peru

UPP

3.9

Uruguay

APRA FA-EP

6.4 3.2

PC

6.9

PN AD

7.1 5.1

5.0

MAS COPEI

4.0 6.4

6.1

Paraguay

Venezuela

5.3

5.2

6.3

5.5

Source: Own elaboration based upon data from the PELA project, University of Salamanca (1994–2017) project and the LAPOP, University of Vanderbilt (1994–2014).

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Table 8.4 Party system polarisation by country (1991–2016) Country

1991–5

1996–2000

2001–5

2006–10

2011–16

Argentina Bolivia Brazil

3.0 -

4.0 2.5 -

3.2 6.6 4.2

3.1 6.8 3.2

2.6 5.2

Chile Colombia Costa Rica Dominican Republic Ecuador

3.9 2.7 4.4 -

5.7 2.2 3.1 3.1 3.7

4.5 5.5 4.3 3.2 4.9

4.3 5.1 5.3 2.9 3.1

4.9 5.4 5.2 2.1

El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay

6.8 4.1 6.2 2.2 2.5 4.7

8.2 1.5 4.2 6.2 6.8 3.0 4.0 5.1

8.1 2.7 5.9 6.7 7.1 3.6 1.2 6.3 5.1

8.3 2.7 6.8 7.3 6.6 2.3 1.9 3.6 4.4

8.1 3.5 5.6 7.6 6,0 5.1

Venezuela Average

1.7 3.8

3.2 4.2

4.9

4.6

5.1

Source: Own elaboration based upon data from the PELA project.

has an effect on high levels of polarisation. However, different types of party systems may be distinguished. El Salvador, Nicaragua, Colombia and Mexico show the highest levels of polarisation. In the first two cases, polarisation can be explained by the inclusion of guerrillas into the party system. In Colombia, ideological differences respond to the existence of two political families: liberals and conservatives. In México, the high polarisation is a result of a legacy of political extremism (Alcántara 2004). Elsewhere, in countries such as Panama and Dominican Republic, there is a predominance of right-wing parties. Finally, Paraguay, Costa Rica, Argentina and Honduras are the least polarised party systems. Participation and Electoral Volatility The quality of the electoral processes in Latin America, in terms of freedom, ‘cleanness’ and competitiveness, has increased considerably since the beginning of the third wave of democratisation. Although the percentage of citizens who distrust elections is very high in Latin American countries, electoral

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participation is also relatively high, especially because voting is mandatory in a few countries (Pérez-Liñán 2001; Fornos, Power and Garand 2004; Carreras and Irepoglu 2013). In general, in countries where voting is mandatory and abstention is punished (Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay), there is evidence of a higher percentage of participation, while in countries without any kind of penalty (Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama and Paraguay) there are more oscillations (Figure 8.3). In that sense, voting behaviour reflects the relative youth of the region’s democracy and, quite often, the highest levels of participation are explained by socio-economic inequalities that favour an increase of phenomena like caudillism or populism (Huber and Stephens 2012). After the most recent crisis, however, the percentage of electoral participation has increased slightly as a consequence of a greater discontent with the ruling elites and demands for change (Figure 8.3). On the other hand, volatility reflects changes in the political cycles. As can be seen in Table 8.5, countries such as Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador increased their percentages of electoral volatility with the arrival to power of Chávez, Morales and Correa, respectively. But, beyond those specificities linked to political cycles, some generalities should be underlined. First, Honduras and Uruguay have the most stable systems, while at the other extreme, Peru, Bolivia and Guatemala are the most volatile. In general terms, electoral volatility in the Latin American context can be attributed to diverse causes. On the one hand, the number of voters has

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

Before crisis (1978-2014)

Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela

After crisis (2015-present)

Figure 8.3 Electoral participation before and after crisis: 1978–2018 (average). Source: Own elaboration based upon data from the Latin American Electoral Courts.

a

-

1978–81

5.9 14.1 18.5 13.2 41.5 4.2 52.7 15.8

1982–6 5.9

11 31.5 35.6 14.2 10.4 23.7 27.4 24.3 55.6 7.2 56.4 50.3 13.4 19.7

1987–90 5.2

5 39.3 18.0 17.4 22.6 12.0 26.3 20.2 22.9 54.2 9.6 19.5 17.1 33.9 69.0 17.0 35.2

1991–5

a

Argentina holds midterm elections. We calculate electoral volatility for each.

Source: Own elaboration based upon data from the Latin American Electoral Courts.

Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela

Country

Table 8.5 Electoral volatility

10

9.3 25.9 15.3 18.4 29.7 15.9 22.8 27.7 19.7 42.5 6.3 14.5 15.3 11.5 19.9 41.3 10.1 40.8

9.3

1996–2000 22 61.2 16.3 1.8 39.6 31.4 10.6 41.0 11.4 51.1 6.1 16.2 35.9 12.4 38.5 44.7 26.8 48.2

2001–5 14

22 40.7 11.1 18.2 51.3 27.1 25.3 42.2 4.3 46.6 15.1 23.7 14.3 16.3 44.5 7.8 36.9

29

2006–10

37 39.2 23.9 14.0 44.0 30.5 7.8 37.6 2.4 55.8 42.4 14.1 55.8 19.4 40.1 44.6 4.7 38.6

20

2011–18

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experienced an increase due to the spread of political rights, and volatility is therefore a result of oscillations in levels of political participation. On the other hand, countries like Peru and Guatemala have changed their party line-up frequently, which has had an impact on volatility (Alcántara and Freidenberg 2006). However, the decline in commodity prices has exposed problems in governance that had been nurtured for a number of years and impacted on electoral volatility. The unfavourable economic environment, with its overdependence on commodities and income inequalities, has led to the fall of one left-wing government after another. In that sense, a source of frustration has been the failure of governments to bolster the institutional framework and to combat corruption. In spite of all the progress experienced since the arrival of democracy, institutions remain weak in many countries and public opinion perceives that public institutions are corrupt. For example, protests to denounce corruption have erupted in many countries (Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Venezuela), and scandals have contributed to the ousting of leaders and parties in government. In Argentina, after 12 years of President Kirchner, Mauricio Macri (a former mayor of Buenos Aires) defeated Daniel Scioli (successor to outgoing president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner) with the campaign slogan Cambiemos (Let’s Change). One month later, in Venezuela, the Democratic Unity Roundtable won the majority of seats in the National Assembly, marking the first time in 17 years that the party in government did not hold legislative dominance. Moreover, chavismo began crashing and social mobilisation against the government started to become frequent. Finally, 2015 ended with the announcement by Ecuador’s president Rafael Correa that he would step aside at the end of his term. In 2016, Evo Morales (Bolivia) lost a referendum that would have allowed him to seek a fourth consecutive presidential term. Meanwhile, more than one million people took to the streets of cities across Brazil to oust leftist leaders, including President Dilma Rousseff, who the lower house of Congress voted to impeach. In August, Rousseff was removed from office by the Brazilian Senate. Furthermore, former President Lula da Silva was embroiled in a corruption scandal, and in 2018 the right-wing populist Jair Bolsonaro won the office. Behind these crises and the decline of left-wing parties are common threads, most of them closely linked with economic variables. When the left-wing governments came to power, extremely favourable conditions prevailed and endured thanks to the commodities boom and the abundance of international liquidity. This environment favoured social programmes and poverty reduction. However, the most recent crisis ushered in a period of impoverishment and scant resources, making difficult the development of social policies and putting left-wing leaders against the ropes. An ‘end stage’ is currently at play in Latin American politics: the hegemony of progressive regimes is falling in a context of economic crisis. In

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response to the new situation, the right has been revitalised, and conservative parties promise the replacement of interventionism with neoliberalism/the market, and authoritarianism with liberty (Arkonada 2015; Sader 2015). In spite of the triumph of Macri, the paralysis of Correa and the impeachment of Rousseff, several authors highlight the limitations of the conservative offensive (Arkonada 2015; Puga Álvarez 2016). They underline the weakness of that project, the transitory nature of its successes and the proximity of major social resistance. On the opposite side, other authors identify the end of the progressive cycle as a consequence of extractivism (Svampa 2014; Zibechi 2016). In any case, beyond differences of criteria, there is consensus that the region is not experiencing a shift back to the late 1980s and early 1990s. Conservative leaders vow to maintain several socio-economic policies introduced by left-wing governments, and right-wing governments will not return entirely to the principles associated with the Washington Consensus. Therefore, the swing back to the right could take a different form, maintaining targeted antipoverty campaigns, environmental protection and indigenous rights.

Political and Economic Cycles in Latin America Once the most important features of Latin American political systems have been explained, it is important to underline that political and economic cycles are jointly determined. On the one hand, economic shocks impact the tenure of leaders as incumbents are often replaced following negative economic turns. Political risk and the threat of turnover can also often push policymakers facing potential replacement to become short-sighted and to choose inefficient policies. Connections between economics and politics are especially obvious in periods of crisis. Governing becomes more difficult after financial and economic crises and political systems are notably affected. One of the main effects is that power tends to fragment: the party in government’s vote share drops, while the opposition’s share increases; parliaments become more fractionalised and the number of parties increases. Moreover, economic crises trigger political protests in the streets: strikes, violent riots and anti-government demonstrations (Mian and Sufi 2012). Latin America’s Economy: Structural Problems Latin American countries are not immune to economic cycles, and the region has experienced successive periods of expansion and recession. But beyond crises, structural problems underlie recessions. Despite Latin America’s efforts towards economic dynamism, innovation for social inclusion and for environmental sustainability, and the modernisation of its economic and institutional infrastructures, other issues must still be addressed.

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First, the region has problems regarding diversification of its drivers for growth, and in decreasing its dependence on natural resources. Second, from a competitiveness perspective, countries need to modernise their infrastructures and logistics. Another serious concern is the degree of inequality and the need to grow a middle class, including better and more efficient public services and higher-quality employment. Finally, public insecurity and drug trafficking remain significant challenges (Edwards 2007). After two and half decades of neoliberalism, the 2000s have seen the best economic performance in 40 years. This growth is closely linked with the increase of Latin America’s commodities exports and, by all accounts, with the ascension of China and additional fiscal resources, as well as a positive balance of payments in the current, trade and capital accounts (Petras and Veltemeyer 2016). Since the early 2000s, commodities have represented around 40–60 per cent of the region’s exports. Over the past decade, the region has benefited from high commodities prices and the expansion of volume, especially due to Chinese demand. Moreover, economic integration initiatives such as the Pacific Alliance have favoured more efficient flows of goods and services. However, for several countries, including Venezuela, Argentina and Ecuador, performance has been linked to the abandonment of Washington Consensus directives. In order to fight inequality and exclusion, these countries sought alternative strategies for development by applying active monetary, fiscal and wage policies. In that sense, beyond economic growth, the role of democratic government in shaping and redistributing resources is at the heart of politics and constitutes a relevant input into the political process (Hicks and Swank 1984; Huber and Stephens 2012). In Latin America this variable is even more important, due to the traditional disparities of the region, which remain the most unequal in the world. The reasons for this phenomenon are basically twofold: struggles over the definition and implementation of state policies; and institutional legacies responsible for the perpetuation of inequalities over time (Fritz and Lavinas 2016). Therefore, issues such as redistribution, clientelism, personalism and populism are overlooked in the public debate (Figure 8.4). Although there have been positive outcomes from programmes to alleviate poverty, which have allowed the emergence of a middle class, much progress still needs to be made in terms of equal opportunities and inclusive growth. In order to achieve this, immediate measures should be taken to invest in human capital, to improve the quality of education and public services and to generate more high-quality employment. However, the region manifests significant variations among countries in terms of inequality. On the one hand, countries such as Uruguay display considerable homogeneity and low levels of inequality; while on the other, countries such as Ecuador, Honduras and Guatemala are characterised by high levels of inequality associated with ethnic segregation. Due to such factors, the transitions to democracy did not manage to reduce levels of inequality. Quite the opposite: the neoliberalism adopted in the 1980s

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0.7 0.6

0.5 0.4 0.3

1995

0.2

2005

0.1

2014

0

Figure 8.4 GINI index. Source: Own elaboration based upon data from CEPAL (1995–2018).

and 1990s along with the costs of stabilisation policies increased the differences in terms of income (Fritz and Lavinas 2016). Despite this, by the late 1990s and into the 2000s, Latin America experienced a remarkable reduction in the general level of income inequality (Gasparini, Cruces and Tornarolli 2016). The average GINI coefficient in the region fell by 0.7 points per year between 2002 and 2010. However, the fall in inequality has substantially decelerated in the 2010s: the GINI has been falling at less than half the rate of the previous period. Only in Colombia, Ecuador and Uruguay has inequality fallen more intensively in the 2010s than in the previous decade. Finally, in Bolivia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay and Venezuela, inequality levels have become stagnant or have even increased. Economic Cycles and Their Impact on Latin America’s Politics At the end of the Cold War, with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, neoliberal economic policies appeared to reign triumphant. The demise of statist development models and the rise of the Washington Consensus caused US-capitalist-style democracy to become a model to follow (Levitsky and Roberts 2013). Moreover, while the debt and inflationary crises discredited state-led development models, neoliberalism was accepted as a way to enter into global trade and financial circuits. Reforms were instituted by technocrats who supported policies backed by the US government, the World Bank and the IMF (International Monetary Fund).

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At the same time, this new economic cycle was accompanied by a crisis of the representative system, where crises favoured the rise of populism. Presidents like Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil and Alberto Fujimori in Peru appealed to the poor against the old economic and political elite, easily characterised as a corrupt and exclusionary political class (Weyland 1999; Levitsky and Roberts 2013). In this sense, the resurgence of populism in Latin America owed much to the economic stagnation and financial crises that hit the region in the late 1990s. Even when neoliberalism was successful in controlling inflation and promoting a resumption of growth, by the late 1990s the model revealed its inability to solve some of the most important problems of the Latin American economies: anaemic growth, periodic financial crisis and social and economic inequalities. All these problems set the stage for social mobilisation and gave the opposition an opportunity to claim power. In countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, mass protest movements were channelled into the electoral arena by new leaders and parties who proposed a new model of development based on left-wing values: statist and redistributive projects that broke sharply with the Washington Consensus (Roberts 2008). Equality, social justice and mass political participation were the driving forces of a social transformation that crystallised in diverse agendas. In that sense, poverty, inequality and the failure of states under liberalised economies to respond to social needs allowed left forces to repoliticise inequality. However, even when all these parties and movements defended an equitable growth model, the left turn revealed itself in different ways: while Brazil, Chile and Uruguay maintained their constitutions (inherited from non-leftist predecessors) and most macro-economic policies, in Venezuela a populist outsider president used a plebiscite to rewrite the constitutional rules. Between these two poles, countries like Argentina, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Paraguay experienced a left turn that combined different types of policies.

Table 8.6 Recent political and economic cycles in Latin America (1980–2018) 1980–90 Political cycle Economic cycle

1990–2000

Crisis of representative system: neoliberalism, populism, political and institutional crises Economic Crisis (‘Lost recovery; Decade’) Growth with GDP poverty and Public Debt inequality Exports Hyperinflation GDP Public Debt Exportations Poverty

2000–10

2010–14

2015–18

Left turn

Right turn?

Growth and redistribution GDP Exportations (volume and prices)

Economic standstill and crisis GDP (slow growth, then standstill) Exports (prices) standstill

Source: Own elaboration based upon Alcántara (2014).

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Thus, the beginning of the 21st century witnessed an unprecedented wave of electoral victories by leftist presidential candidates in Latin America (Levitsky and Roberts 2013). While the rest of the world was affected by the economic fallout of the 2008 financial crisis, South America was going strong and leftist and centre-left leaders took office. The first evidence of that change came in 1999, when Hugo Chávez was elected president of Venezuela. After that, other leftist candidates followed suit: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil (2002), Nestor Kirchner in Argentina (2003), Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay (2004) and Evo Morales in Bolivia (2005) are just a few examples. By 2009, nearly twothirds of Latin Americans lived under left-wing governments (Table 8.7). Latin America has experienced commodity booms in the past and, invariably, the collapse of commodity prices led to serious economic crises. Commodity prices started to decline in 2015: after almost four years at around $100 per barrel, oil prices fell to $50. Soybeans (51 per cent of Argentina’s commodity exports), copper (94 per cent of Chile’s, 51.6 per cent of Peru’s) and iron ore (30.4 per cent of Brazil’s exports) have all fallen by 20–50 per cent. These declines are closely connected with the Chinese slowdown. The IMF indicates that a 1 per cent fall in China’s growth reduces the average export price for commodities from Latin America by 3–8 per cent. This means that growth fell from nearly 5 per cent in 2003–13 to well below 2 per cent in 2014– 18. It also means an increase in risk aversion, magnified by limited space for counter-cyclical policies (except fiscal policy in Peru and Chile) and by the significant negative impact it would have on household and business confidence, which was already at very low levels (Latam 2015). Distinguishing among countries, in 2017 Brazil was expected to remain stagnant for another year, while the economies of Argentina and Venezuela were projected to continue contracting. Furthermore, other energy-exporting economies, such as Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador, were expected to fall as the sharp drop in oil prices would affect investment and export receipts. However, a recovery in growth was projected for several economies, including Chile and Peru, which were set to benefit from lower oil prices, monetary policies and the removal of certain short-term brakes on growth (IMF 2017). Finally, it must be pointed out that countries’ savings rates can play a role in helping to mitigate the economic impact of the decline in commodity prices (LAC 2012). Countries that saved less during the boom tend to carry sovereign risk, making access to external financing more costly. By contrast, countries that saved at a higher rate tend to have easier access to external finance.

Conclusions This chapter has offered an overview of the Latin American political systems before and after the most recent economic crisis. The chapter’s main purpose has been to describe the region’s institutions – especially the electoral and party systems – as well as recent political dynamics. Additionally, these features have here

Economic and political crisis Social and political crisis

Social and political crisis Economic recovery, social and political crisis

Venezuela

Ecuador

Economic recession

No crisis

Economic crisis No crisis

Chile

Brazil

Nicaragua Costa Rica

Daniel Ortega (2007–present) Luis Guillermo Solís (2014–present)

Tabaré Vázquez (2005–10), (2015–present) José Mujica (2010–15) Michelle Bachelet (2014–present) Lula da Silva (2003–10) Dilma Rousseff (2010–16)

Nestor Kirchner (2003–7) Cristina Fernández (2007–15)

Rafael Correa (2007–present)

Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) Nicolás Maduro (2013–present) Evo Morales (2006–present)

President(s)

3.9 2.3 4.9

Enrique Bolaños Geyer (2002–7) Laura Chinchilla (2010–14)

Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002)

Sebastián Piñera (2010–14)

2.8 3.1 4.7

Jorge Batlle (2000–5)

Eduardo Duhalde (2002–3)

Carlos Mesa (2003–5) Eduardo Rodríguez Veltzé (2005–6) Alfredo Palacio (2005–7)

Rafael Caldera (1994–9)

Predecessor

4.3 4.1

4.9

3.2

2.3

Ideology (PELA)a

b

a

Ideology: position provided by legislators. No data available.

Source: Own elaboration based upon data from the Parliamentary Elites in Latin America Surveys project (1994–2017). Notes:

No crisis

Uruguay

Argentina

Bolivia

Juncture

Country

Table 8.7 Left turn in Latin America

8.4 8.1

-

7.3

7.3

6.5

-

-b -

6.5

Ideology (PELA)

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been closely linked with economic cycles, with the goal of understanding the reciprocal influence between economy and politics. In detail, this relation has been addressed with a focus on the role played by ideology. Due to the heterogeneity of the region and consequent differences between countries and political systems, this chapter has not presented a general model to explain the effects of the economic crisis on politics. Neither has it provided a methodology or statistical model to measure such impact. The main aim of this work has been to introduce Latin American politics to readers in a comparative perspective, in order to better understand the emergent scenario following the recent crisis. In that sense, economic crises have moved us towards an ‘end stage’: the hegemony of progressive regimes is disintegrating in a context of recession. The latest international crisis has brought an end of years of growth in the region, and that has had repercussions on the political cycle. Such circumstances are not entirely new, as the Latin American region has been known for economic volatility and has historically shown a capacity to remove governments. However, the latest crisis has put an end to a historical Left turn and highlighted the region’s high dependency on commodities.

Appendix Table A8.1 Party acronyms and full names Country

Party acronym

Full name

Argentina

Brazil

PJ UCR FREPASO PRO PMDB

Bolivia

PP PTB PSDB PT MNR

Partido Justicialista Unión Cívica Radical Frente País Solidario Propuesta Republicana Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro Partido Popular Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira Partido dos Trabalhadores Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria Unidad Cívica Solidaridad Acción Democrática Nacionalista Movimiento al Socialismo Frente de Unidad Nacional

MIR UCS ADN MAS UN

(Continued)

Table A8.1 (Cont.) Country

Party acronym

Full name

Chile

PDC RN UDI PPD PS PL PC PUSC PLN PAC ML RC FA PRD PLD PSRC ARENA FMLN

Partido Demócrata Cristiano Renovación Nacional Unión Demócrata Independiente Partido por la Democracia Partido Socialista Partido Liberal Partido Conservador Partido Unidad Social Cristiana Partido Liberación Nacional Partido Acción Ciudadana Movimiento Libertario Renovación Costarricense Frente Amplio Partido Revolucionario Dominicano Partido de la Liberación Dominicana Partido Reformista Social Cristiano Alianza Republicana Nacionalista Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional Partido de Concertación Nacional Partido Social Cristiano Partido Rodolsista Ecuatoriano Izquierda Democrática Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik Partido Renovador Institucional Acción Nacional Patria Altiva i Soberana Partido de Avanzada Nacional Frente Republicano Guatemalteco Partido Unionista Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza Partido Liberal de Honduras Partido Nacional de Honduras Partido Revolucionario Institucional Partido de la Revolución Democrática Partido Acción Nacional Partido Liberal Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional

Colombia Costa Rica

Dominican Republic

El Salvador

Ecuador

PCN PSC PRE ID MUPP PRIAN

Guatemala

Honduras Mexico

Nicaragua

PAIS PAN FRG Unionista UNE PLH PNH PRI PRD PAN PL FSLN

Latin American Politics Country

Party acronym

Full name

Panama

PRD PP(PA) MOLIRENA

Partido Revolucionario Democrático Partido Panameñista Movimiento Liberal Republicano Nacionalista Cambio Democrático

CD Paraguay

Peru

Uruguay

Venezuela

ANR PLRA PAP UPP APRA FA-EP PC PN AD MAS COPEI

161

Asociación Nacional Republicana Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico Partido Acción Popular Unión por el Perú Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana Frente Amplio-Encuentro Progresista Partido Colorado Partido Nacional Acción Democrática Movimiento al Socialismo Comité de Organización Político Electoral Independiente

Notes 1 Term used by Huntington (1991) to describe transitions to democracy in the late 20th century. 2 Only Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela avoided authoritarianism during those decades. 3 Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic and Uruguay have all adopted a proportional system since their transitions to democracy.

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Alcántara, M. and Rivas, C. (2007). Las dimensiones de la polarización partidista en América Latina. Política y Gobierno 14(2), 349–390. Altman, D., Luna, J. P., Piñero, R. and Toro, S. (2009). Partidos y sistemas de partidos en América Latina: aproximaciones desde la encuesta de expertos 2009. Revista de Ciencia Política 29(3), 775–798. Arkonada, K. (2015). Del entierro del alca al nacimiento del soft power chino en América y el Caribe. Revista Kavilando 7(2), 133–140. Barragán, M. (2015). Consecución de mayorías legislativas en América Latina: una revisión crítica. Revista de Derecho Electoral 19, 204–237. Bell, D. (2000). The end of ideology: On the exhaustion of political ideas in the fifties. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Biekart, K. (2014). Assessing the arrival of democracy in Central America. European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 96, 117–126. Cannon, B. and Kirby, P. (2012). Civil society and the state in left-led Latin America: Challenges and limitations to democratization. London: Zed Books. Carreras, M. and Irepoglu, Y. (2013). Trust in elections, vote buying and turnout in Latin America. Electoral Studies 32(4), 609–619. Colomer, J. (2013). Elected kings with the name of presidents. On the origins of presidentialism in the United States and Latin America. Revista Latinoamericana de Política Comparada 7, 79–97. Colomer, J. (2016). The handbook of electoral system choice. London: Palgrave. Colomer, J. and Escatel, L. (2005). La dimensión izquierda-derecha en América Latina. Desarrollo Económico, 177, 123–136. CEPAL (1995–2008). Bases de datos y publicaciones estadísticas. https://estadisticas. cepal.org/cepalstat/Portada.html Dix, R. (1989). Cleavage structures and party systems in Latin America. Comparative Politics 22(1), 23–37. Edwards, S. (2007). Crises and growth: A Latin American perspective. Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History 25(1), 19–51. Fornos, C., Power, T. and Garand, J. (2004). Explaining voter turnout in Latin America, 1980 to 2000. Comparative Political Studies 37(8), 909–940. Freire, A. and Kivisk, K. (2013a). Western and non-Western meaning of the left–right divide across four continents. Journal of Political Ideologies 18(2), 171–199. Freire, A. and Kivisk, K. (2013b). Mapping and explaining the use of the left–right divide. Brazilian Political Science Review 7(3), 61–89. Fritz, B. and Lavinas, L. (2016). A Moment of Equality for Latin America?: Challenges for Redistribution. New York: Routledge. Fukuyama, F. (1989). The end of the history? The National Interest 16, 3–18. Gasparini, L., Cruces, G. and Tornarolli, L. (2016). Chronicle of a deceleration foretold income inequality in Latin America in the 2010s. Revista de Economía Mundial 43, 25–46. Hagopian, F. and Mainwaring, S. (2005). The third wave of democratization in Latin America: Advances and setbacks. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hicks, A. and Swank, D. (1984). On the political economy of welfare expansion. A comparative analysis of 18 advanced capitalist democracies, 1960–1971. Comparative Political Studies 17(1), 81–119. Huber, E. and Stephens, J. (2012). Democracy and the left: Social policy and inequality in Latin America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Huntington, S. (1991). Democracy´s third wave. Journal of Democracy 2(2), 12–34.

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IMF (2017). IMF Annual Report 2017. International Monetary Fund. Inglehart, R. and Klingemann, H. (1976). Party identification, ideological preference and the left–right dimension among Western mass publics. In: I. Budge et al., eds. Party identification and beyond: Representations of voting and party competition. London: Wiley, pp. 243–273. Kitschelt, H., Hawkins, K. A., Luna, J. P., Rosas, G. and Zechmeister, E. J., eds. (2010). Latin American party systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. LAC (2012). Remesas a América Latina y el Caribe en 2012: comportamiento diferente entre subregiones. Latin America and Caribbean. Available at https://publica tions.iadb.org/es/publicacion/16716/las-remesas-america-latina-y-el-caribe-en-2012comportamiento-diferenciado-entre Latam (2015). What would be the impact on Latin America of a further slowdown in China? Economic Analysis. 28 December. Available at https://www.bbvaresearch. com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Watch-China-LatAm-ENG.pdf Levistky, S. and Roberts, K. (2013). Latin America’s ‘left turn’. A framework for analysis. In: S. Levitsky and K. Roberts, eds. The resurgence of the Latin American left. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Luna, J. P. and Zechmeister, E. (2010). Political representation in Latin America. In: H. Kitschelt, K. Hawkins, J. P. Luna, G. Rosas and E. Zechmeister, eds. Latin American party systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 119–144. Lupu, N. (2016). Party brands in crisis: Partisanship, brand dilution, and the breakdown of political parties in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mian, A. and Sufi, A. (2012). What explains high unemployment? The aggregate demand channel. National Bureau of Economic Research. Available at https://www. nber.org/papers/w17830 Pérez-Liñán A. (2001). Neoinstitutional accounts of voter turnout: Moving beyond industrial democracies. Electoral Studies 20(2), 281–297. Petras, J. and Veltemeyer, H. (2016). What’s left in Latin America?: Regime Change in New Times. New York: Routledge. Proyecto de Élites Parlamentarias de América Latina (1994–2018). University of Salamanca, americo.usal.es/oir/elites/ Puga Álvarez, V. (2016). De Correa al 2017: claves para entender el preludio electoral en Ecuador. Revista Política Latinoamericana 2. Roberts, K. (1996). Economic crisis and the demise of the legal left in Peru. Comparative Politics 29(1), 69–92. Roberts, K. (2008). The mobilization of opposition to economic liberalization. Annual Review of Political Science 11, 327–349. Ruiz-Rodriguez, L. (2000). Clivajes y competencia partidista en Chile (1990–1999). In: Nuevo Gobierno: desafíos de la reconciliación. Chile 1999–2000. Santiago: FLACSO-Chile, pp. 159–190. Sader, E. (2015). A nova toupeira: os caminhos da esquerda latino-americana. São Paulo: Boitempo Editorial. Shixue, J. (2010). Latin American politics after the ‘Third Wave’ of democratization and its future prospects. Procedia –Social and Behavioral Sciences 2(5), 6764–6771. Shugart, M. and Carey, J. M. (1992). Presidents and assemblies: Constitutional design and electoral dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Svampa, M. (2014). Revisting Argentina 2001–2013: From ‘¡Qué se vayan todos!’ to the Peronist Decade. In: Argentina since the 2001 Crisis. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 155–173.

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Torcal, M. and Mainwaring, S. (2003). The political recrafting of social bases of party competition: Chile, 1973–1995. British Journal of Political Science 33(1), 55–84. Weyland, K. (1999). Neoliberal populism in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Comparative Politics 31(4), 379–401. Zechmeister, E. (2006). What’s left and who’s right? A Q-method study of individual and contextual influences on the meaning of ideological labels. Political Behavior 28 (2), 151–173. Zibechi, R. (2016). Liberar el mundo nuevo que late en el corazón de los movimientos. Revista Kavilando 6(1) 7–14.

9

Venezuela Changes and Continuities in the PostChávez Era Juan Manuel Trak

Introduction The aim of this chapter is to address the changes and continuities in political representation in Venezuela since the commodity crisis in Latin America (2014–15) by using mass and elite survey data from the years 2000–15. The election of Hugo Chávez as president in December 1998 was a milestone in the Venezuelan political process. Since then, political institutions, the economy, civil society, state bureaucracy and the armed forces have been transformed. The conjunction of President Chávez’s charisma, the weakness of democratic institutions (Levine and Molina 2012) and the rise in the price of oil allowed him to implant a type of regime that used elections to legitimise power while undermining civil and political rights, co-opting institutional checks and balances and increasing state control over economic and social life. Hence, Venezuela took a path from electoral democracy to competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2010). This chapter shows how the ideological position of the government and its voters was radicalised between 2000 and 2015. The party in government and its supporters moved from a centrist position towards one on the extreme left of the ideological spectrum. Using congruence as a proxy of substantive representation, this chapter traces how, prior to the commodity crisis and Chávez’s death, the government was able to retain a majority of electorate, while after these two events radicalisation led to a loss of electoral support. The chapter is organised as follows. First, it briefly defines substantive political representation. Second, it describes the political and socio-economic context within which these changes occur. It also describes the political and institutional context framing political representation in Venezuela. Finally, the chapter analyses the ideological orientations of voters and MPs and the evolution of the ideological congruence of these orientations in the context of the aforementioned commodity crisis by comparing data on ideological congruence from two years: 2000 and 2015. We use data from the Latinobarometro and the University of Salamanca’s Parliamentary Elites in Latin America (PELA) project (Alcántara 1994).

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Defining Political Representation According to Hanna Pitkin, political representation can be defined as ‘acting in the interest of represented, in a manner responsive to them’ (Pitkin 1985: 233). This means representatives should be aware of a constituency’s policy preferences when making political decisions. Political representation is, thus, linked to the idea of responsiveness, which is ‘what occurs when the democratic process induces the government to form and implement policies that citizens want’ (Powell Jr. 2004a: 91). Nevertheless, political representation does not necessarily mean representatives are mere messengers for their constituents: representatives can use their judgement and make decisions they believe are good for their constituents even if the latter think otherwise (Manin 1998). Political representation is a complex phenomenon in which the distribution of preferences among citizens is not homogeneous. This approach to political representation is known as substantive political representation, and its aim is to study the quality of the representation by analysing whether representatives have preferences and policy positions that are responsive to their constituency (Powell Jr. 2004b). In this chapter, we use a dyadic approach to analyse substantive representation (Weissberg 1978). The dyadic approach analyses the preferences of Congress members individually (Achen 1977, 1978; Converse and Pierce 1986; Herrera, Herrera and Smith 1992; Hill and Hurley 1999; Miller and Stokes 1963), aggregated by political parties (Belchior 2010, 2011; Belchior and Freire 2013 Luna and Zechmeister 2005; Otero-Felipe and Rodríguez-Zepeda 2010) and the congruence in regard to the electoral districts they represent or voters of the parties they also represent. From an empirical point of view, Converse and Pierce (1986: 491) define representation as ‘the degree of congruence between constituency interest and representatives’ action’. Otero-Felipe and Rodríguez-Zepeda (2010) indicate that political representation is the degree of congruence between the preferences of constituencies and the actions and positions of MPs. However, these definitions assume these interests or preferences are equally distributed among constituencies. Also, as Eulau and Karps (1978) state, political representation is more complex than congruence, which is just one indicator of what they called policy responsiveness. They argue political representation has more dimensions, including representatives promoting laws that provide benefits to particular groups (service responsiveness), establishing clientelistic bonds by providing ‘pork-barrel’ exchanges (allocation responsiveness) or appealing to symbolic actions to build and maintain support and trust among the constituency (symbolic responsiveness). In any case, policy responsiveness, understood as ‘the presence of a meaningful connection between constituent policy preferences or demands and the representative’s official behaviour’ (Eulau and Karps 1978: 242), is at the heart of representative democracy, in which people elect representatives to govern on their behalf.

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In this chapter, substantive representation is studied considering MPs and voters grouped by the political parties that are at the centre of the political struggle in the Venezuelan parliament and which control the nomination process in the country’s mixed-member majoritarian system. The data used in this study are from surveys of members of Congress and national public opinion surveys, with the analysis being performed by aggregating them into political parties. The study of substantive representation assumes the content of parliamentary party preferences is important in their decision-making process, with the study of political representation having two approaches towards the content of the representation. The study of substantive representation follows Anthony Downs (1973) theory which contends the political struggle can be reduced to a single dimension: the left-right scale (Powell Jr. 2000). Because it allows a reduction in the cost of gathering political information, the left–right dimension is one of the most commonly used preference systems in this kind of study (Downs 1973). The left–right scale simplifies the voters’ election decision-making process and reduces the cost to political parties of communicating their proposals (Downs 1973; Powell Jr. 2000; Zechmeister and Corral 2011). The ‘left’ and ‘right’ labels allow people to predict the kind of policies that can be expected from political parties in relation to such important political issues as state–market relationships, public spending, church–state relations, abortion or minority rights (Rivas 2006; Alcántara 2004). There are also studies that focus on the substantive representation of a specific set of policies. Wlezien and Soroka (2007: 808) note there is diversity in preferences and that citizens may have different levels of congruence across various issues with respect to those of the elites. Thus, the aggregation of positions on the left–right dimension may disguise the plurality of preferences; but it can also hide the fact the electorate may have different motivations for voting for their representatives. That is, voters may choose a candidate or party that is closer to them on the problems affecting them directly, even when it is further away from their views on other more peripheral problems. This chapter analyses substantive representation using voter and MP self-placement on the left–right ideological scale because this is one of the most common methods for comparing the position of voters and MPs. Moreover, for practical reasons, it offers an ability to make comparisons across levels (MPs versus voters) and across time (2000, 2015) by considering the data available in both PELA and Latinobarometro.

Economic and Political Context When Chávez died in 2013 his vice-president Nicolás Maduro seized power. However, his lack of charisma and the deep economic crisis undermined his legitimacy, resulting in several waves of protests and ungovernability. Among the causes of the poor economic performance were the convergence of the commodity crisis, a state-controlled economy and the decay of the state oil

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company Petroleum of Venezuela (PDVSA). This crisis affected Venezuelan daily life, as food shortages, lack of medicines, malfunctioning public services and rampant criminality reduced popular support for Maduro and his government. The government’s response to the crisis was political and economic radicalisation, which resulted in deadlock between the government and the opposition. During 2014, Maduro’s government faced street protests led by students, the middle classes and some political parties. The government responded with harsh repression against protesters, leading to a massive violation of human rights and the imprisonment of political leaders (Amnesty International 2014). A parliamentary election took place on 6 December 2015. The government tried to use its control of the state to rig this election. According to national and international experts, the campaign was uneven, with the government using public resources to promote its candidates being one of a number of electoral malpractices (Universidad Católica Andrés Bello and IDEA Internacional 2015). Despite the interference, the opposition coalition won 56 per cent of the valid votes cast and 67 per cent of seats in parliament, while the government coalition obtained 40 per cent of the vote and 33 per cent of the seats. This defeat of the government was a turning point in the Venezuelan political process. This result led to the opposition taking control of more than two-thirds of parliament. This meant Maduro would have to negotiate the budget and international agreements on almost all economic matters, which is why on 30 December 2015, the Electoral Chamber of the Supreme Court annulled the election of four representatives on charges of electoral fraud: three of the MPs were members of the opposition, with the fourth a member of the government party. The opposition consequently lost the two-thirds majority it had won. During 2016, the Supreme Court passed at least 49 sentences against more than half of the faculties of parliament (Morales 2017). According to the members of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, the board of the legislative branch disobeyed the verdict suspending those four representatives and was therefore in contempt of court. As a result, parliament was prevented from exercising some of its powers. The Supreme Court had in effect annulled the most important parliamentary responsibility: to appoint members to the National Electoral Council (NEC, CNE in Spanish) and approve the national budget presented by the president. The Supreme Court also granted Maduro emergency powers, enabling him to rule by decree as well as to appoint and approve members to the CNE. A Supreme Court decision in March 2017 that annulled all of parliament’s powers trigged another wave of protest. The government once more resorted to repression through the use of force. New human rights violations were reported, and several political leaders persecuted (Amnesty International 2018). The conflict between the executive and legislative branches has resulted in deadlock. In May 2017, Maduro called for the election of a National Constituent Assembly (NCA) while avoiding the need to call a referendum asking the people whether or not they approved as required by the constitution. The

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basis of that Constituent Assembly appears to represent a setback for Venezuelan democracy, given Maduro’s proposals included sectorial vote. According to the official announcement, the NCA has 545 representatives, 69 per cent chosen via territorial representation with the remaining 31 per cent elected from eight different groups that Maduro himself defined: entrepreneurs, farmers and fishermen, the disabled, students, workers, indigenous people, communes and communal councils and pensioners. The 38 per cent of registered voters who do not belong to any of these groups can only chose regional representatives, while the other 62 per cent of voters were able to choose regional and sectorial representatives. Moreover, the NEC did not announce the method by which the list of voters in these groups were made (Centro de Estudios Políticos 2017a, 2017b). The result was a one-party NCA that works as a superpower restricting the functioning of the legislature elected in 2015 and which has assumed its powers while imposing its mandates on other political institutions, following Maduro’s orders. Furthermore, while by the end of 2017 and the beginning of 2018 the government and opposition were negotiating electoral conditions, the release of political prisoners and institutional normalisation in a dialogue hosted by the Dominican Republic and supported by the governments of Chile, Mexico, Bolivia and Nicaragua, the NCA instructed the CNE to put forward the date of the presidential election to May instead of December 2018. Most opposition parties boycotted the election, while those that did participate denounced several electoral irregularities. On 20 May 2018 Maduro was elected by 67 per cent of the vote on a 46 per cent turnout of registered voters. The election was not recognised by the opposition, several Latin American countries, the United States and some Western European democracies. In January 2019, the opposition in parliament challenged the Maduro’s government by refusing to recognise him as the elected president and instead appointing the president of parliament, Juan Guaidó, as interim president of the country. The political conflict has grown since then, with the deadlock continuing as the economic and social crisis deepens. In this context, parliament has become the centre of the political conflict in Venezuela. It is worth asking, therefore, whether the parties that won seats in 2000 and 2015 are representative of those who elected them, and about the impact of the commodity crisis on the pattern of substantive representation in Venezuela by tracing the evolution in substantive representation (i.e. the evolution of voter–MP ideological congruence in terms of left–right self-placement, always segmented by parties) between the period before and after the commodity crisis: 2000 and 2015. The Collapse of Venezuela’s Economy The collapse of Venezuela’s economic system is the consequence of a series of political decisions after which the government increased its control of the economy, although it was also clearly exacerbated by the commodity crisis

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caused by the sharp fall in oil prices. Venezuela became a petro-state in the early 20th century (Karl 1997), when oil revenues represented more than 10 per cent of the country’s GDP. When Chávez seized power in 1999, oil exports represented 80 per cent of total exports, and by 2015 oil exports made up about 96 per cent of GDP (Hidalgo and Puente 2016). Increasing oil prices during the first decade of the 21st century allowed Chávez’s government to increase its control over the economy. First, the government imposed foreign exchange control and price controls on food and services. Second, the government seized control of PDVSA, replacing most of its managers with politically loyal workers. The consequence was a decline in oil production. Finally, after winning the election for a third term in 2006, the government began to expropriate farmlands, food industries and ‘strategic’ companies (steel, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, electricity). Most of these companies are now closed or have lost almost all of their productive capacities. The commodity crisis in the context of a state-controlled economy resulted in the collapse of the economic system. According to the IMF (2019), in 2012 and 2013 Venezuela’s GDP grew by 5.6 per cent and 1.6 per cent, respectively; however, it fell 3.9 per cent in 2014, 6.2 per cent in 2015, 17 per cent in 2016 and 18 per cent in 2017. By 2014 48 per cent of households were in poverty, rising to 81.8 per cent by 2016 (UCV, USB and UCAB 2016). The economic collapse led to shortages of food and medicines, the collapse of public services, hyperinflation and massive emigration. The Collapse of Venezuela’s Party System The Venezuelan party system collapsed during the 1990s. According to Dietz and Myers, a party system collapses: when large numbers of voters desert the system-sustaining parties in a short period; the weakened system-sustaining parties cannot regain support or reconstruct the intra-systemic relationships that structured the party system before the collapse began, and new political parties emerge and a different configuration of interparty competition takes shape (2007: 61) Venezuela is a paradigmatic case: the years 1958–88 are regarded as the period in which the bipartisan system was institutionalised and consolidated (Molina 2004). During this period, the party system was stable, the main political parties retained their support among the electorate, people identified themselves with existing political parties and there was no radical polarisation between political actors (Rivas Leone 2006, 2008). Figure 9.1 shows the ENPP (effective number of parliamentary parties),1 which shows us the number of parties with an important proportion of seats within the legislature (Ruiz-Rodríguez and Otero Felipe 2013: 123). Figure 9.1 also shows the Aggregated Parliamentary Volatility Index,2

Venezuela 6.00

50% 3.44

2.81

2.69

40%

2.72 2.64

2.57

30%

2.42

2.05

0.00

38%

37%

50%

37%

44%

34%

10%

13%

10%

14%

1.00

29%

20%

31%

2.00

32%

ENPp

4.74

1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2000 2005 2010 2015

Volality Index

4.85 4.26

4.00 3.00

5.57 60%

5.52

5.00

171

0%

Year of the parliamentary elecon

Figure 9.1 Effective number of parliamentary parties and parliamentary volatility in Venezuela 1958–2015 Source: Authors with data from the CNE (www.cne.gob.ve).

which measures total changes in the percentage of seats between two elections (Ruiz-Rodríguez and Otero Felipe 2013: 143). Both indicators show that between 1973 and 1988 the party system became institutionalised, displaying relatively low levels volatility and an ENPP (Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties) that shows two and a half important parties. Figure 9.1 also shows that the turning point in the Venezuelan party system happened in 1993. While between 1973 and 1988 the party system had an average ENPP of 2.65, with volatility under 15 per cent, by in 1993 ENPP had soared to 4.74 with the aggregate volatility reaching 34 per cent. By 1998 ENPP had risen to 5.52 and electoral volatility reached a peak at 44 per cent. That is to say that in 1998 parliament was highly fragmented, with 44 per cent of seats changing hands between elections. In 2000 ENPp fell to 3.44, although volatility remained high. In this election, Chávez’s party, the MVR (Fifth Republic Movement), became the main political actor in the new parliament and formed a short-lived alliance with another centre-left party, the MAS (Socialist Movement), while the socialdemocratic DA (Democratic Action) and COPEI (Christian Democratic Independent Political Electoral Organisation Committee) became secondary political actors. In 2005, the opposition boycotted the parliamentary elections, which helps explains why parliamentary volatility reached its maximum and the ENPp fell to 2.05. Rivas Leone (2008) states that this change of political behaviour was a consequence of the loss of legitimacy by the traditional parties, AD and COPEI, a change in Venezuelan socio-political imaginary, a perception of widespread corruption and the rise of new leadership resulting from the process of decentralisation initiated in the 1980s. These are some of the reasons

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Chávez rose to power in the 1998 election. While some people changed their preferences towards an anti-system outsider, others decided not to participate in any election between 1993 and 2005, a period in which the old party system collapsed completely, traditional parties almost disappeared and Chávez became the only reference within the political system. The return of the opposition parties to the electoral arena in the presidential election of 2006 allowed them to take control of the opposition movement. In 2008, the foundation of the MUD (Democratic Unity Roundtable) was the only rational option for those who opposed Chávez and his party. MUD was created as an ideologically diverse multiparty alliance united in the purpose of defeating Chávez at the ballot box. The creation of MUD was a result of two mutually reinforcing elements: Chávez’s charismatic leadership that transformed every election into a plebiscite about him (Álvarez 2016), and an electoral system that generates incentives for political parties to join the alliance to challenge Chávez in a relative majority vote system or to compete against the PSUV (United Socialist Party of Venezuela) in a parliamentary election ruled by a mixed-member majoritarian system. Both the inability of the parties to individually challenge Chávez and the institutional design resulted in the formation of MUD (Álvarez 2016). Chávez also sought to unify his electoral coalition by founding PSUV, which was a merger of the MVR and some of his allies. However, as Álvarez (2016) points out, PSUV was not Chávez’s preferred option for unifying the parties supporting him into a single party. Left of centre organisations, such as the PCV (Venezuela Communist Party), PPT (Fatherland for All), PODEMOS (For Social Democracy) and the MEP (People’s Electoral Movement), among others, refused to dissolve to join the PSUV. The real changes in the party system began when the political parties presented their parliamentary candidates in the 2010 election. Parliamentary volatility remained high, at 37 per cent, due to the change of seats from the ruling party to the opposition. Likewise, the ENPP rose to 2.69. By 2015, the change of voter and coalition system preferences resulted in the opposition winning a majority of the seats, meaning volatility remained at 38 per cent, while the ENPP rose to 5.57. However, these data need to be interpreted carefully, because both opposition and government parties contested the election as coalitions in which they behaved as party blocs rather than as individual organisations. To understand this situation, we calculated the ENPp by considering coalitions as the unity of analysis in 2010 and 2015. In the first case, the ENPP was 1.97, with the PSUV and its allies in the GPP (Great Patriotic Pole) emerging as the largest coalition in parliament. Similarly, in 2015 the ENPP for the coalition was 1.79, but in this case the most important coalition was MUD.

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Beyond the changes in the numeric structure of party systems in Venezuela, this transformation can be observed in the parties that survived or emerged during the collapse of the party system. Table 9.1 shows the number and percentage of seats won by parties in the legislature between 1993 and 2015. As we can see, the collapse of the party system led to a significant change in the political system’s important actors. While, with the exception of the AD, the old parties almost disappeared in 2015, new organisations emerged within the legislative arena, some of which were ephemeral.3 The most important party at this time was the PSUV, which had been founded as the MVR in 1997 and which used its control of the state’s resources to finance its activities. It is worth noting that the 1999 constitution prohibited the public financing of political organisations, a reversal of the position contained in the 1961 constitution. Political parties were able to survive because they could take over national- and subnational-level offices, with the PSUV controlling more offices at that time. Finally, while some new parties appeared, we must wait to discover how ephemeral or durable they will be. The most important of these groupings are MPJ (Justice First Movement), UNT (A New Era) and P (Popular Will).

Elite Ideological Changes Sani and Sartori (1980) claim state fragmentation has a negative impact on democracy when there is a high degree of polarisation. In this sense, as stated above, when parties are moderate, then it is more likely the government and opposition will reach agreement. Similarly, when the positions are radical and extreme there is certain to be gridlock (Chasquetti 2008; Sani and Sartori 1980). More recently, Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013) have pointed out that radicalism or moderation in policy preferences has an impact on political regimes. By radical preferences, they mean ‘intense policy preferences located toward a pole of the policy spectrum’ (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013: 49). Consequently, if the main political actors hold radical views on policy preferences it is more likely they will not tolerate negotiation, which is a central feature of democracy. We use the data collected by the University of Salamanca’s PELA project to analyse ideological congruence (Alcántara 1994). PELA has been conducting surveys of members of the lower houses of parliament across Latin America since 1994, asking the MPs their position on a number of political subjects. In the Venezuelan case, there are three waves of surveys. The first of members of the lower house of Congress elected in 1993 (1993–8); the second of MPs elected to parliament in 2000 (2000–5); the third in 2016 of MPs elected to parliament on 6 December 2015 (2016–21). For this analysis, we use the left–right position of the MPs organised by political party, which is an indicator summarising their stance on policy issues. In the same vein, Sani and Sartori (1980) established that the left–right dimension made sense, both because it allows comparability between different

Movimiento Primero Justicia (MPJ) Acción Democrática (AD) Un Nuevo Tiempo (UNT) Voluntad Popular (VP) La Causa R (LCR) Movimiento Progresista de Venezuela (MPV) Independents

Opposition coalition by 2015

Movimiento Quinta República/ Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV) Partido Comunista de Venezuela (PCV) Vanguardia Republicana Por la Democracia Social (PODEMOS) Patria para Todos (PPT) Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo (MEP)

Government Coalition by 2015

Political Party

27.09 0.00 0.00 19.70 0.00 0.00

0

0.00 0.49

0 1

55 0 0 40 0

0.00 0.00

0 0

0.00

0.00

0

0

0.00

0

0

62 0 0 6 0

0

7 1

0 0

1

46

N

N

%

1998

1993

0.00

29.95 0.00 0.00 2.90 0.00

0.00

3.38 0.48

0.00 0.00

0.48

22.22

%

0

30 3 0 3 0

5

1 0

0 0

0

80

N

2000

0.00

18.18 1.82 0.00 1.82 0.00

3.03

0.61 0.00

0.00 0.00

0.00

48.48

%

0

0 0 0 0 0

0

11 11

0 15

8

114

N

2005

Table 9.1 Number and percentage of seat and parties in the National Assembly (1993–2015)

0.00

0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

0.00

6.59 6.59

0.00 8.98

4.79

68.26

%

6

16 17 1 3 0

6

2 0

0 4

1

97

N

2010

3.64

9.70 10.30 0.61 1.82 0.00

3.64

1.21 0.00

0.00 2.42

0.61

58.79

%

3

25 18 14 4 4

33

0 0

1 0

2

52

N

2015

1.80

14.97 10.78 8.38 2.40 2.40

19.76

0.00 0.00

0.60 0.00

1.20

31.14

%

11.82 0.00 1.97 100

24

0 4 203

0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.81 26.11

0 15 207

17

20 0 0 0 0 4 28

N

0 0 0 0 0 26 53

1998

N

%

1993

0.00 7.25 100

8.21

9.66 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.93 13.53

%

2000

0 2 165

21

7 0 0 1 0 4 8

N

b

0.00 1.21 100

12.73

4.24 0.00 0.00 0.61 0.00 2.42 4.85

%

0 8 167

0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

N

2005

0.00 4.79 100

0.00

0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

%

0 0 165

1

3 0 0 1 0 1 6

N

2010

0.00 0.00 100

0.61

1.82 0.00 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.61 3.64

%

2015

3 0 167

0

2 2 2 1 0 0 0

N

Indigenous representatives are elected in special electoral districts by their own parties, which belonged to the opposition coalition, MUD, in 2015.

Source: Authors’ calculations based upon data available in CNE. (www.cne.gob.ve).

Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS)a Indigenous Representativesb Otros Total

Others by 2015

Proyecto Venezuela (PRVZL) Cuentas Claras (CC) Avanzada Progresista (AP) Alianza Bravo Pueblo (ABP) Gente Emergente (GE) Convergencia Comite Político Electoral Independiente (COPEI)

Political Party

1.80 0.00 100

0.00

1.20 1.20 1.20 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00

%

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political systems and is capable of summarising the political debate within each country. Zechmeister (2006: 151) also notes that ideology has two purposes: to facilitate communication between parties and their voters; and the ideological labels serve as a parameter allowing citizens to assess political situations and make decisions. We use the average ideological self-placement of MPs by party to capture the mean ideological position of each party. The question was present in the three waves of surveys and is worded as follows: As you know, when we speak about politics the expressions left and right are often used. On this card, there is a series of boxes that goes from left to right. According to your political leanings, in which box do you place yourself ? (Alcántara 1994) Figure 9.2 shows the Venezuelan party system experienced deep transformations both in the number of political parties and in the parties that exist and their ideological position. By 1993, old and new parties shared positions near the centre of the ideological spectrum. LCR, (The R Cause) a party that represented trade unions, was the most left of centre party, with a mean position of 3.6. Closest to the centre, but still on the left, is President Caldera’s party, National Convergence with 4.11 and MAS with 4.53. AD also stood on the centre-left with 4.13. The only centre-right party was COPEI, with an ideological mean of 5.39. VP 5.3

UNT 4.7

Political Party

PRVZL

6.5

Other MVR/ PSUV MPJ

4.5

5.4

3.6

1.6

5.6

MAS 3.8

LCR

4.5

3.6

COPEI National Convergence AD

4.1

5.4 5.8 4.6 5.6

4.1 Left(1)

2

3

4

% of seats

Year

5 6 Ideological Scale 0.1

1993

0.2

2000

7

8

0.3

0.4

9

Right(10)

2015

Figure 9.2 Mean ideological position of parties in parliament in 1993, 2000 and 2015. Source: Author with data from PELA (oir.org.es/pela/).

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By 2000 the political offer changed dramatically. LCR and National Convergence lost most of their representatives in parliament, while MVR won an important share of seats. On the ideological spectrum, MVR appeared to be the most left of centre party, with its ideological mean position of 3.64. It was followed by its ally, MAS, with 3.83. AD moved from the centre-left to the centre-right with mean of 5.56, while COPEI maintained its position with an ideological average of 5.83. Finally, PRVZL (Venezuela Project) was farthest to the right in 2000, with a mean ideology position of 6.5. Unfortunately, there are no available data for the 2006–10 and 2011–15 legislatures, a lacuna that makes it difficult to tell which parties maintained or changed their ideological positions. In any case, by 2015 the political landscape had changed dramatically, and most of the parties with an important quota of representatives in parliament are new. The PSUV radicalised to the left and has an ideological position of 1.59. AD returned to the centre-left with a mean of 4.60, where it was joined by UNT with a mean of 4.71. In the centre-right, we find MPJ with 5.56 and VP with 5.30. The results in Figure 9.2 show that the party in government has radicalised its position since seizing power in 1998. This pattern of radicalisation can be observed when we calculate the polarisation between the most extreme parties. In 1993, polarisation between LCR and COPEI was 1.79, while in 2000 polarisation between MVR and PRVZL was 2.89 and by 2015 was 3.97 between the PSUV and MPJ. This radicalisation crystallised following Chávez’s victory in 2006 when he formally announced the construction of his 21st-century socialism and attempted to change the 1999 constitution to increase presidential powers and alter the principles of democracy towards a communal state.4 That was when the government embarked on its programme of the expropriation of private companies while increasing its control over the economy. This ideological radicalisation also signalled the beginning of a systematic attack on the media and the selective pursuit of opposition leaders. As noted above, during the Chávez years a weak democracy was transformed into electoral authoritarianism, with massive electoral support and high oil prices being the most important tools for ensuring legitimacy with voters; however, the lack of both resources has led President Maduro to close down the political system further than Chávez ever did.

Congruence Ideological positions are important both as a predictor of party policy decisions and as a measure of substantive representation. As stated above, congruence is a proxy variable of substantive representation that helps us understand the link between political parties and their voters. Here we measure congruence at two moments in time – 2000 and 2015 – the only two legislatures for which comparable data exist. We use data from both PELA and Latinobarometro surveys.5

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The PELA survey was conducted in Venezuela in 1994, 2000 and 2015. While its data make it possible to discriminate between parties, its only limitation is that representatives of small parties are categorised as others to guarantee their anonymity, which means it is not possible to assign them to any of the coalitions. In the case of the Latinobarometro survey, the party preferences of voters are determined from the question on voting intention. This research takes in the 1998 wave, which is the closest survey documenting voting intentions at the 2000 general election. It also takes in the 2015 survey, which was carried out before that year’s election. It is worth noting that in 2015, the opposition parties stood as a single group; the result of an agreement that allowed people to vote only for the MUD coalition rather than for the parties individually. The PSUV and its allies also presented an identical list of candidates, but not on a single ballot. Consequently, for this analysis we used the mean position of opposition parties (MPJ, VP, UNT, AD, Others), and compare it with the position of those Latinobarometro respondents who indicated they would vote for any of the parties in the MUD coalition. While for supporters of the government, we look at those respondents who indicated they would vote for any GPP party. Figure 9.3 shows that the ideological mean of the government’s MPs in parliament has radicalised since 2000. While in 2000, government MPs had an ideological score of 3.68, by 2015 this had fallen to 1.59. The same process

Opposition

7.23

8.45

Political Coalition

5.14 5.77

Government

1.59

Left(1)

2.83

2

3.68

3

Party 2000

6.02

4

5 6 Ideological Scale Party 2015

7

Voters 2000

8

9

Right(10)

Voters 2015

Figure 9.3 Ideological self-placement of party members at the National Assembly and voters, 2000–15. Source: Author with data from PELA (oir.org.es/pela/) and Latinobarometro (www.la tinobarometro.org).

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can be seen with their voters: in 1998 the ideological score of those backing the government was 6.02, while in 2015 this score had moved to the left and was sitting at an average of 2.83. For their part, opposition MPs stayed at the centre of the ideological spectrum. In 2000 opposition MPs had a score of 5.77, falling slightly to 5.14 in 2015. However, this electorate has been radicalising towards the right: in 1998 their voters placed themselves to the right of centre, with a score of 7.23, while in 2015 this average self-placement score had risen to 8.45. This means Maduro’s party and voters had radicalised and that the MPs are far more radical than their voters, while the opposition parties are generally centrist while their voters are more right-wing. To find out whether the differences between the parties and their voters are real, we used three measures proposed by Golder and Stramski (2010). The first, Absolute Median Congruence (AMC), is the absolute distance between the median of both groups. The second is Absolute Citizen Congruence (ACC), which takes the dispersion of voters from the average citizen into account. In both these measures, the greater the result the less the congruence between MPs and their voters. The third measure, Relative Citizen Congruence (RCC), takes the dispersion of both groups from their own group position into account and is measured on a scale from 0 to 1, with 0 meaning perfect congruence and 1 perfect incongruence. Figure 9.4 shows these measures for both political groups in each period. In all three measures, PSUV is shown to be the most congruent party each time. With the AMC measure, the result is 2.02 in 2000 and 1.83 in 2015, compared to 2.23 in 2000 and 3.45 in 2015 for MUD. In the ACC measure, PSUV scored 1.89 and 1.66, respectively, compared to MUD’s 2.28 in 2000 and 3.47 in 2015. For the RCC measure, PSUV scored 0.11 and 0.09, while MUD scored 0.17 and 0.54, both in 2000 and 2015, respectively. These results show how the radicalisation of the government’s policy position resulted in a higher degree of congruence with its electorate. While in 2000, the government was also congruent, since they represented a more centrist electorate, by 2015, the congruence was higher because the radicalisation implies the policy position is targeting a more homogeneous audience. Conversely, because it is a pluralistic coalition of parties that are not ideologically oriented, the opposition maintain a centrist position while their voters are moving to the right as a consequence of the polarisation process initiated by Hugo Chávez in 1998. Before the commodity crisis and Chávez’s death, the government was able to retain its electorate; however, after these two events radicalisation led to a loss of electoral support. Also, Maduro’s radicalisation undermined democracy. While under Chávez, the Venezuelan political system could be classed as one of electoral authoritarianism, following the parliamentary election under Maduro, the system rapidly turned into hegemonic authoritarianism (Alarcón, Álvarez and Hidalgo 2016; Trak 2018).

Opposition

Opposition

Government

AMC

Opposition

Government

ACC

0.0

0

0

0.1

0.11

1

1

2.28

0.2

0.17

2

1.89

2

2.02

2.23

0.3

3

3

3.47

3.45

0.4

4

4

0.5

5

5

0.54

0.6

6

6

0.7

7

7

0.8

8

8

Figure 9.4 Ideological congruence of party coalitions in the National Assembly 2000–15. Source: Author with data from PELA (oir.org.es/pela/) and Latinobarometro (www.latinobarometro.org).

Government

RCC

0.9

9

9

1.0

10

10

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Conclusions The transformation of the Venezuelan political system is an example of how the collapse of a party system leads a formerly stable electoral democracy towards competitive authoritarianism and, when it loses electoral support, towards autocratisation. The commodities crisis, economic mismanagement, colonisation of the institutions ensuring checks and balances and the radicalisation of the ruling elite laid the foundations for an authoritarian system. The collapse of the party system opened the door to a charismatic leader who could establish new relationships between the state, the ruling party and citizens, in which all institutions sought to serve the president. In this context, the deinstitutionalisation of political parties also played an important role in this process. The lack of an effective political opposition during Chávez’s first term allowed him to seize control of the republican institutions that were responsible for controlling the power of the executive. A parliament without opposition between 2006 and 2010 allowed Chávez to co-opt the institutions designed to ensure the checks and balances between the branches of government, enabling him to further concentrate power in his hands, while society enjoyed the wealth that resulted from high oil prices. When the opposition agreed on the foundation of MUD, the political institutions designed to protect democracy had already fallen under the control of the ruling party, allowing President Maduro to retain power despite the profound economic, political and social crises, and his financial and charismatic shortcomings. At this point, the political system stopped responding to citizen demands. While the ruling party is divorced from the general public, its control over the political system remains firm. Voters, therefore, are now unable to make Maduro’s government accountable to the people or the institutional checks and balances. The political situation prevents citizens from fully exercising their civil and political rights or from participating in open and fair elections. In fact, the presidential election of 2019 deepened the conflict between the executive and legislative branches, while repression and persecution have dramatically increased. The Venezuelan case helps us understand the hypothesis according to which the most important variable for explaining the breakdown of democracy is not the number of parties in parliament, but the polarisation between political organisations. This being the case, high levels of political fragmentation are not as great a problem as is the radicalisation of a ruling elite that wants to impose its policies and keep its grip on power without any real regard for the democratic process.

Notes 1 ENPp was calculated using the numbers of seats obtained by each party in the lower house of Congress during 1958–98, and in the unicameral National Assembly between 2000 and 2015. We use effective number of party index developed by

182

2

3 4

5

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Laakso and Taagepera and improved by Taagepera and Shugart (Ruiz-Rodríguez and Otero Felipe 2013). We use the Aggregate Volatility Index developed by Pedersen that measures the total changes between each pair of elections in the party system as a whole. In this case we use the changes in the proportion of seats between two elections (RuizRodríguez and Otero Felipe 2013: 143–7). E.g. PRVZL, LCR, National Convergence and PODEMOS. The communal state is the organisation of political power through intermediary structures such as: communal councils, workers’ councils, youth organisations, cooperatives and other structures linked to the socialist government. In the communal state, representation comes from belonging to these structures rather than parties. According to the Organic Law of the Communes, approved by the National Assembly dominated by the PSUV in 2010, the aim of the commune is to structure the communal state as an expression of popular power and support for the construction of socialist society (Lopez Maya 2018). According to Lopez Maya (2018), the notion of the popular power comes from the influence of Cuban socialism. In Latinobarometro the question about ideological self-positioning is: ‘In politics, people normally speak of “left” and “right”. On a scale where 0 is left and 10 is right, where would you place yourself ?’ In order to make the PELA and Latinobarometro scales comparable, the latter was transformed from an 11n-point scale. The formula to convert left–right 11 point scales (0–10) into left–right 10-point scales (1–10) was originally proposed by Oddbjørn Knutsen (1998) but in the present chapter we follow the adaptation of the formula by André Freire (2006: 183, note 29): VLR * 0.9 + 1 = VLRrc — VLR is the 0 to 10 left–right scale; and VLR. rc is the rescaled variable from 1 to 10. The VLR.rc variable is an 11-point scale, but ranges from 1 to 10 as in PELA.

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Luna, J. P. and Zechmeister, E. J. (2005). Political representation in Latin America: A study of elite-mass congruence in Nine countries. Comparative Political Studies 38 (4), 388–416. Mainwaring, S. and Pérez-Liñán, A. S. (2013). Democracies and dictatorships in Latin America: Emergence, survival, and fall. New York: Cambridge University Press. Manin, B. (1998). Los principios del gobierno representativo. Madrid: Alianza Editorial. Miller, W. E. and Stokes, D. E. (1963). Constituency influence in Congress. American Political Science Review 57(1), 45–56. Molina, J. E. (2004). The unraveling of Venezuela’s party system. In: D. J. Myers and J. McCoy, eds. The unraveling of representative democracy in Venezuela. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 153–178. Morales, M. (2017). El TSJ ha cercenado 55% de las facultades del parlamento. El Nacional, 12 February, p. 2. Otero-Felipe, P. and Rodriguez-Zepeda, J. A. (2010). Measuring representation in Latin America: A study of ideological congruence between parties and voters. APSA, American Political Science Association, 106th Annual Meeting, Washington, DC. 2–5 September. Pitkin, H. F. (1985). El concepto de representación. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales. Powell Jr., G. B. (2000). Elections as instruments of democracy: Majoritarian and proportional visions. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Powell Jr., G. B. (2004a). The chain of responsiveness. Journal of Democracy 15(4), 91–105. Powell Jr., G. B. (2004b). Political representation in comparative politics. Annual Review of Political Science 7(1), 273–296. Rivas, C. (2006). Las dimensiones de la polarización en los parlamentos latinomaericanos. In: M. Alcántara, ed. Políticos y política en América Latina. Madrid: Fundación Carolina, Siglo XXI de España, pp. 215–254. Rivas Leone, J. A. (2006). Crisis y desinstitucionalizacion de los partidos politicos en Venezuela. Stockholm Review of Latin American Studies 1, 48–57. Rivas Leone, J. A. (2008). Los desencuentros de la política venezolana: Nacimiento, consolidación y desinstitucionalización de los partidos políticos, 1958–2007. Caracas: Fundación para la Cultura Urbana. Ruiz-Rodríguez, L. M. and Otero Felipe, P. (2013). Indicadores de partidos y sistemas de partidos. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas. Sani, G. and Sartori, G. (1980). Polarización, fragmentación y competición en las democracias occidentales. Revista de derecho político 7, 7–37. Trak, J. M. (2018). Venezuela elecciones y sistema de partidos en la era post-Chávez. In: M. Alcántara Sáez, D. Buquet, M. L. Tagina, eds. Elecciones y partidos en América Latina en el cambio de ciclo. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, pp. 453–480. UCV, USB and UCAB (Universidad Central de Venezuela, Universidad Simón Bolívar and Universidad Católica Andrés Bello) (2016). Resultados de la encuesta nacional de condiciones de vida: Encovi 2016. Available at encovi.ucab.edu.ve/. Accessed on 5 May 2017. Universidad Católica Andrés Bello and IDEA Internacional (2015). Informe preliminar: Misión de estudio IDEA-UCAB sobre las condiciones del proceso electoral 2015. Caracas: Centro de Estudios Políticos.

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Weissberg, R. (1978). Collective versus dyadic representation in Congress. American Political Science Review sp 72 sp (2), 535–547. Wlezien, C. and Soroka, S. N. (2007). The relationship between public opinion and policy. In: R. J. Dalton and H.-D. Klingeman, eds. The Oxford handbook of political behavior. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 799–817. Zechmeister, E. J. (2006). What’s left and who’s right? A Q-method study of individual and contextual influences on the meaning of ideological labels. Political Behavior 28 (2), 151–173. Zechmeister, E. J. and Corral, M. (2011). Evaluando la representación por mandato en América Latina a través de las posiciones en la escala izquierda-derecha y de las preferencias económicas. In: M. Alcántara and M. García Montero, eds. Algo más que presidentes: El papel del poder legislativo en América Latina. Zaragoza: Fundación Manuel Jiménez Abad de Estudios Parlamentarios y del Estado Autonómico, pp. 132–154.

10 Political Representation Studies in Ecuador Links between Elites and Voters Cristina Rivas, José Manuel Rivas and Alexandra Jima-González Introduction Ecuador’s 2017 presidential election results showed the limitations of the ‘pink tide’ cycle,1 and Latin America’s preference for more conservative governments. This change started after the victory of Mauricio Macri in Argentina and Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment in Brazil (Montero and Collizzolli 2016). Under this scenario, the new government in Ecuador, headed by Lenin Moreno, faces three challenges: economic recovery, reconstruction of zones affected by the 2016 earthquake and the institutionalisation of Rafael Correa’s policies. Although there is a great deal of academic literature pertaining to the changes in political representation in Ecuador after the 1999 financial crisis (Lucero 2001; Parga 2009), there is a gap in the study of the economic reversal Ecuador has experienced since the fourth quarter of 2013 and its effects on the first quarter of 2016 – with a negative GDP growth rate (-1.7 per cent). Even although the economy started showing signs of slow recovery during the second (0.7 per cent) and third quarters (1.5 per cent) (Banco Central del Ecuador 2017), the narrow victory of Alianza PAIS in the 2017 presidential election mean we must test whether there are changes in the country’s political representation. With this in mind, the main purpose of this chapter is to analyse the changes in Ecuador’s political representation before and after the 2013 economic crisis. This chapter is organised into four sections. The first offers a literature review of empirical studies about political representation in Ecuador and the effects of the economic crisis. This is followed by an analysis of citizen and parliamentary elite perceptions, especially in relation to the levels of trust and political legitimacy since Rafael Correa’s first administration. The third section develops an analysis of the congruence (ideological and programmatic), through ‘proximity’ and ‘centrism’ indicators, between MPs and citizens using surveys from the Parliamentary Elites in Latin America (PELA-USAL) project and Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The concluding section suggests that satisfaction with democracy, trust in institutions and programmatic congruence have remained high while ideological congruence has decreased.

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Representation and Political Crisis in Ecuador Research on political representation is wide in scope. By liberal democracy we mean it is the representative’s responsibility to remain accountable to their voters; however, according to Pitkin (1985), representation may be descriptive, symbolic and substantive. Studies on representation generally focus on attitudes and beliefs (substantive representation) or the ideological congruence between representatives and their electorate (symbolic identification). The latter type of representation is stronger when representatives and voters share the same attitudes and beliefs (Pitkin 1985; Weber 2005; Došek and Freidenberg 2013; Rivas, Otero and Mateos 2014).2 Although economic and social discontent could lead to a representation crisis (Urquizu-Sancho 2014), this phenomenon emerges generally when citizens believe their political preferences are not linked to the decision-making processes within institutions (Norris 1997). The delegation of sovereignty towards supranational organisations such as the European Union, policies designed for budget adjustments and cuts (Norris 1997) or the invalidation of policies by supreme or constitutional courts (Ryden 1996) are some of the causes that could potentially explain citizen disaffection with representative institutions. In the 21st century, disaffection with democracy extended in Latin America, especially in the Andean region – which suffered a chronic representation crisis (Aragón 2016). The neoliberal reforms implemented from the late 1980s provoked serious social problems such as the increase in the levels of poverty and inequality. The latter, vis-à-vis the weakness of the state apparatus and corruption scandals, were the ideal breeding ground for social discontent and mistrust of democracy, political parties and representative institutions (Novaro 1994; Torre 2003; Mainwaring 2006). Another factor explaining dissatisfaction with democracy is the legacy of authoritarian regimes and the implementation of economic policies that broke the mediation process between states and societies (Hagopian 1993). The representation crisis in Latin America has also been studied through empirical approximations. Luna and Zechmeister (2010), using data from the public opinion and parliamentary elites, analyse six countries in the region and quantify the level of congruence between political parties and the political preferences of voters. According to these authors, the degree of institutionalisation of the party system and economic development are linked to higher levels of programmatic congruence. By the same logic, neoliberal reforms are associated with lower levels of representation; likewise, they found that leftist parties contribute towards representative structures through ideological and class demands. Similarly, Aragón (2016) argues that Andean countries show specific timeframes of high and low disaffection towards democracy, as well as high levels of trust towards institutions. This study also shows that a process of political representation, ‘perception recovery’, occurred in Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela.

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The Ecuadorian case has been widely studied through the literature pertaining to representation crisis. As noted by Parga (2009: 188–91), it is quite curious that the democratic transition in Ecuador happened in the same year – 1979 – in which the new development model based on financial capital was introduced. The political system opening took place through the instauration of an economic model that favoured wealth concentration and eschewed redistribution. This contradiction, which also occurred in other countries, reached its maximum momentum in the late 1990s. Even though the country experienced significant economic growth, the basic salary fell from $114 in 1980 to $16 in 1998, and poverty increased from 28.5 per cent in 1995 to 60.8 per cent in 2001. The decisive point of this development model occurred a year before the financial crisis, with the 1998 constitutional reform promoted by Fabián Alarcón, which gave the president broad powers over economic issues and diminished Congress’s oversight and control powers (Negretto 2009). The negative social reaction was evident. During the 1990s a well-supported series of protests took place. These mobilisations ended up overthrowing the vice-president, Alberto Dahik, and then three elected presidents – Abdala Bucaram, who was removed by Congress; Jamil Mahuad, who was removed by a military-civic coup d’état; and Lucio Gutiérrez, who was removed in the wake of the Forajidos Rebellion (Paltán 2005). Similarly, the indigenous protests against the interim government in 2001 made visible the problems faced by the Ecuadorian democracy (Lucero 2001). After this period of agitation, Rafael Correa’s victory in 2007 opened the door to a new political era in the country. Correa – an economist trained in Europe and the US – took part in the Forajidos Rebellion and did not belong to any mainstream political party. He served for three months as minister of economy in the administration of Alfredo Palacio. In fact, during that short period of time he became widely popular due to his economic management and his criticism of international lending bodies (Conaghan 2007). During his time as president, Correa summoned a constituent assembly, increased social spending and saw socio-economic indicators improve. The latter was achieved due to the high price of commodities, investment in productive sectors, low inflation and a more effective system of tax collection (Polga-Hecimovich 2013: 137).3 Although Ecuador’s GDP increased (Figure 10.1), it was uneven. Between 2007 and 2008 it increased from 2.2 per cent to 6.4 per cent, in 2009 it decreased to 0.6 per cent and grew again in 2011 to 7.9 per cent before gradually falling to 4 per cent in 2014. Despite the economic deterioration in recent years, inflation rates (Figure 10.2) have remained stable: in April 2017 inflation was 0.43 per cent (Banco Central del Ecuador 2017; World Bank 2017).4 Regarding other indicators, public debt was reduced between 2007 and 2014 to 24.6 per cent of GDP (in 2000 the public debt skyrocketed and reached a 116.1 per cent of GNP). Currently, Ecuador’s public debt stands at 20 per cent of GDP (Banco Central del Ecuador 2017). Similarly, there was a considerable improvement in social indicators: the poverty rate (Table 10.1)

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10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6

Figure 10.1 GDP Growth (annual %) in Ecuador (1979–17) Source: Created by the authors based using World Bank (2017) data. Available at data.worldbank.org/indicator

2017

2015

2013

2011

2009

2007

2005

2003

2001

1999

1997

1995

1993

1991

1989

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1985

1983

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100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Figure 10.2 Inflation, consumer prices (% annual) in Ecuador (1979–17) Source: Created by the authors using World Bank (2017) data. Available at data. worldbank.org/indicator

decreased from 7.3 per cent in 2007 to 2.6 per cent in 2014.5 Likewise, inequality levels (Table 10.1) were reduced from 53.3 per cent in 2007 to 45 per cent in 2014 (World Bank 2017).6 In light of these statistics, Ecuador became one of the three countries with the highest rates of poverty reduction and the leading country in inequality reduction (ECLAC 2015). According to a number of authors (Correa 2013; Aragón 2016), the positive macro-economic performance and the improvements in terms of social indicators decreased the discontent of Ecuadorians towards democracy, the political system and institutions, hence improving political representation indicators. The successive electoral victories of Correa and his political movement, Alianza PAIS – including Lenin Moreno’s narrow victory in May 2017 – seem to confirm these arguments.7

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1987 1994 1998 1999 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Poverty gap at $5.50

GINI Index

14.5 15.2 14.2 18.6 22.9 12.4 13.1 10.4 7.2 7.3 6.7 6.3 5.1 4.4 4.1 3.1 2.6 3.3 3.3 2.9

50.5 53.4 49.7 58.6 56.4 53.4 53.9 53.1 52.2 53.3 49.7 48.4 48.7 45.9 46.1 46.9 45.0 46.0 45.0 44.7

Source: Created by the authors based on World Bank (2017) data. Available at data.worldbank.org/indicator

Nevertheless, other authors are more critical of Correa’s government in terms of the improvements to political representation. According to BasabeSerrano (2009), the institutional design that emerged with the 2008 constitution displaced participative democracy institutions and decreased cooperation among institutions in general. Parga (2009: 202) argues that the caudillo democracy developed by Correa is characterised by a government heavily influenced by the executive, and has diminished the importance of political democratic institutions – the legislative power, the electoral system and the party system. Pachano (2010) argues that while Correa closed a period of political instability in Ecuador, negative elements from the past –the power of the president, the self-centred leadership promoted by Correa and his Manichaean and polarising speech– are clear obstacles to political representation.8 Finally, authors such as Freidenberg (2012) and Polga-Hecimovich (2013) recognise the social improvements made during the Correa’s government, but highlight some limitations: his confrontational style, the increase in the fiscal deficit due to China’s financing programmes, social protests against extractive

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9

policies, the deterioration of traditional parties, corruption scandals, the excessive pressure on journalists and the subordination and weakening of representative institutions. Overall, the representation crisis that Ecuador experienced was a consequence of its 1998 and 2013 economic and political changes. These changes not only affected the descriptive dimension of representation, but also its substantive and symbolic elements. Consequently, the following section explores democracy satisfaction, trust in representative institutions and ideological and programmatic congruence during Correa’s government in order to explore whether these indicators changed in light of Ecuador’s economic and political dynamics.

Satisfaction with Democracy and Trust in Representative Institutions This section examines the data on satisfaction with democracy and trust in representative institutions in Ecuador from 2007 to the present. This analysis shows the evolution of perception in order to compare and contrast the relations between political elites – MPs – and citizens. The analysis is based on PELAUSAL databases on Ecuadorian MPs from 2007 to 2017. Similarly, data on public opinion from LAPOP support citizen perception. The chapter analyses five variables in total: satisfaction with democracy, trust in elections, trust in the party system, trust in parliament and trust in the president. All these variables are related to MP and citizen attitudes to democracy and measure political discontent as there is a lack of indicators in both databases to measure other facets of attitudes towards democracy, i.e. democratic legitimacy (democracy is the best form of government) and political disaffection (lack of interest in politics, complexity of politics, lack of influence of citizens in politics, among others) (Montero et al 1998: 31–2). The main results show that both satisfaction and trust indicators have remained high throughout the period of study. Satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with democracy is an indicator that measures political discontent, one of the facets of attitudes towards democracy (Montero, Gunther, Torcal and Cuéllar 1998). Satisfaction with democracy among MPs and citizens shows a progressive increase, more evident with the former than the latter. MPs unsatisfied and very unsatisfied with democracy (Figure 10.3) changed from 44 per cent in the 2007–8 legislature and 51.3 per cent in the 2009–12 legislature to 14.1 per cent in the 2013–17 legislature. MPs who were either satisfied or very satisfied with democracy showed the following changes: from 56.1 per cent in the 2007–8 legislature and 48.3 per cent in the 2009–12 legislature to almost 86 per cent in the 2013–17 legislature. These changes can be explained as the 2013 election was the first time since the democratic transition in which the president’s party, Alianza PAIS, obtained a parliamentary majority. Nevertheless, the number of MPs unsatisfied or very unsatisfied increased in the 2017–21 legislature from 14.1 per cent to 37 per cent according to Alcántara (2017), probably because of the political and economic problems in the country as a consequence of oil price instability.

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100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2007-2008

2009-2012

2013-2017

2017-2021

Figure 10.3 Assembly representatives’ satisfaction with democracy (2007–17) Note: Satisfied (3) and Very Satisfied (4) values (1:4 scale). Source: Created by the authors based on Alcántara (2017) data. Available at oir.org. es/pela/

Citizen satisfaction with democracy (Figure 10.4) also increased during these years, especially between 2010 and 2012, when the number of satisfied or very satisfied citizens rose from 54.6 per cent to 64.8 per cent. The percentage of citizens who were very satisfied with democracy remained stable during these years, unlike the case with MPs, the number of whom were very satisfied quadrupled in the last legislature. However, in 2016, citizen satisfaction with democracy fell to 44.2 per cent, with dissatisfaction increasing to 48 per cent. Another indicator measuring political discontent is trust in the electoral process. There has been a notable increase in this figure among both MPs (Figure 10.5) and citizens (Figure 10.6). During the 2007–8 legislature, 56.1

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Figure 10.4 Ecuadorian citizens’ satisfaction with democracy (2008–16). Note: Satisfied (3) and Very Satisfied (4) values (1:4 scale). Source: Created by the authors based on LAPOP (2016) data. Available at datasets. americasbarometer.org/database/index.php

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100 80 60 40 20 0 2007-2008

2009-2012

Electoral processes

2013-2017

Political parties

Parliament

2017-2021 President

Figure 10.5 Assembly representatives’ trust in political institutions (2007–17) Note: Some (3) and A Lot (4) values (1:4 scale). Source: Created by the authors based on Alcántara (2017) data. Available at oir.org. es/pela/

100 80 60 40 20 0 2008 Electoral processes

2010

2012

Political parties

2014 National Assembly

2016 Executive

Figure 10.6 Ecuadorian citizens’ trust in political institutions (2008–16). Note: Some (4, 5) and A Lot (6, 7) values (1:7 scale). Source: Created by the authors based on LAPOP (2016) data. Available at datasets. americasbarometer.org/database/index.php

per cent of MPs had trust in the electoral process in which they participated. These percentages increased progressively, reaching a maximum of 91 per cent in the 2013–17 legislature, before falling to 79.2 per cent in the 2017–21 legislature. In spite of the economic crisis, trust in the electoral processes remained higher than during the pre-2013 legislatures. A similar phenomenon occurred with levels of citizen trust in elections (Figure 10.6). Citizens who trust the electoral processes – values 4, 5, 6, 7 – reached 58.1 per cent in 2008 and then increased to 76.3 per cent in 2014. However, as with satisfaction with democracy, levels of citizen trust in elections fell in 2016, although the percentage of Ecuadorians trusting elections

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(58.7 per cent) is still higher than the percentage that distrust the process (32.3 per cent according to LAPOP 2016). MP (Figure 10.5) and citizen trust in political parties (Figure 10.6) improved, while citizens’ mistrust of politicians fell. MPs that reported high levels of trust increased from 4.1 per cent in 2007–8 and 23.5 per cent in 2009–12 to 48 per cent in 2013–17 and 56.3 per cent in 2017–21. The increase reported in the 2009–12 legislature occurred due to the consolidation of new political parties after the 1999 economic crisis (Freidenberg 2012) and to the primary elections within Alianza PAIS. Accordingly, null or almost null levels of trust fell gradually during the three aforementioned legislatures: from 96 per cent in 2007–8 to 43.7 per cent in 2017–21 according to Alcántara (2017). In the last legislature none of the MPs said they had no trust in Ecuador’s political parties. Like MPs, citizen trust in political parties increased up to 2014 (Figure 10.6). In 2008, 77.3 per cent of Ecuadorian citizens reported having no or low levels of trust in political parties, in 2014 this percentage was 57 per cent, a significant reduction but still high (LAPOP 2016). Simultaneously, trust in political parties increased from 22.7 per cent in 2008 to 43.1 per cent in 2014. In 2016 trust in political parties fell slightly (40.2 per cent), while the percentage of citizens saying they had no or low levels of trust was 59.8 per cent according to LAPOP (2016). A very remarkable fact is that during these last ten years there was a gradual increase in the levels of trust in parliament (National Assembly) from both MPs and citizens (Figure 10.5 and Figure 10.6, respectively). The latter questions the arguments from authors claiming that during Correa’s administration there was a deterioration in perceptions of representative institutions and of the parliament in particular. Instead, there seems to have been a strengthening of representative political institutions (Luna and Zechmeister 2010; Aragón 2016). In 2007–8, 91.8 per cent of MPs had low or no trust in parliament,10 this percentage fell to 38.9 per cent in 2002–12 and 10.9 per cent in 2013–17 before increasing to 20.4 per cent in 2017–21 (Alcántara 2017), but it is still far from the percentages of the 2007–8 and 2002–12 legislatures. Similarly, MPs stating they had high levels of trust increased from 7.1 per cent in 2007–8 to 89.2 per cent in 2013–17 before falling to 79.5 per cent in the 2017–21 legislature (see Figure 10.5). The increase in the level of citizen trust (4, 5, 6 and 7 values) in National Assembly between 2008 and 2014 is evident (Figure 10.6). Trust increased from 68.2 per cent in 2008 to 84.2 per cent in 2014; while at the same time those who expressed no trust fell from 31.9 per cent to 16 per cent. However, in 2016 the percentage of trust fell to 63.7 per cent, and those expressing no trust increased to 36.2 per cent. Finally, trust in the president, which is an indicator of political discontent, expressed by MPs and citizens also improved during these years. The deterioration in trust in the president in 2007 was not as great as the deterioration of other institutions (elections, parliamentary parties). MPs expressing high

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levels of trust in the president (Figure 10.5) increased from 67.3 per cent in 2007–8 to 83.9 per cent in 2013–17, while in 2009–12 there was a considerable decline in levels of trust in the president (59.8). This could have been the consequence of the economic decline in 2009 and of the scandal surrounding Pedro Delgado, president of the Central Bank and Correa’s cousin. The change of president in 2017 affected MPs’ trust in this institution: MP trust in Lenin Moreno was 83.9 per cent, 5.4 points below the value for Rafael Correa. The main caveat on this data is that the interviews with MPs were carried out just a few months after the president took office, which means we expect the president’s popularity to decline. Citizen trust in the executive (Figure 10.6) during 2008–14 remained at medium-high levels and actually increased during the last years studied. Medium-high levels of trust values (4, 5, 6 and 7) increased from 68.2 per cent to 84.2 per cent. In fact, in 2013 President Correa became the best-rated leader in the region according to Consulta Mitofsky (EFE 2013) and, in 2015, Correa was named the world’s second best-rated political leader, with a 79 per cent approval according to the Political Communication Association (ACOP) (El Comercio 2015). Probably the economic crisis had an impact on the 2016 results, with the levels of trust falling 20.5 points to 63.7 per cent. The aforementioned data on the levels of trust in the elections, political parties and in the president-executive help us to better understand the improvement of governability standards within the country. Overall, indicators on satisfaction with democracy and trust in representative institutions show a similar trend over time. However, it should be noted that the variations in both satisfaction with democracy and trust in institutions are generally stronger among MPs than among citizens, with the obvious exception of trust in parliament. The graphical analysis performed provides some clues as to the findings demonstrated below, which analyses Ecuador’s ideological and programmatic congruence in order to assess MP and voter preferences.

Ideological and Programmatic Congruence This section aims to examine the congruence between political preferences of MPs and citizens. Ideological and programmatic congruence is studied through two indicators: proximity and centrism. The proximity indicator measures the distance between a given political party and every voter. Similarly, the centrism indicator estimates the degree of programmatic and ideological distance between any given political party and the average of voters. Generally speaking, the results suggest there is a great dispersion in both proximity and centrism indicators, showing high levels of programmatic congruence and a decrease in ideological congruence. The approximation towards political representation through congruence has been studied in a number of academic works. The classic study by Miller and Stokes (1963) consisted of an empirical analysis of the links between US

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representatives and citizens, confirming the hypothesis that when the level of congruence between the preferences and ideological positions of MPs and citizens is greater, there is a higher probability that citizens will feel well represented. Since this first approximation, several research works on political representation have been developed (Achen 1978; Weissber 1978; Dalton 1985). Likewise, there has been growing interest in studying the congruence between MPs and citizens (Thomassen and Schmitt 1999; Miller et al. 1999; Luna and Zechmeister 2005; Adams, Clark, Ezrow and Glasgow 2006; Golder and Stramski 2010; Freire and Belchior 2013; Teperoglou, Freire, Andreadis and Viegas 2014; Otero Felipe 2014; Tsatsanis, Freire and Tsirbas 2014; Pedrazzani 2016; Lupu, Selios and Warner 2017). Specialist literature has developed several methods for measuring congruence, highlighting an intense debate on how to construct valid indicators. This research work analyses the degree of congruence between MPs and citizens on the ideological and programmatic dimensions following the proposal developed by Achen (1978). For this purpose, data taken from PELA-USAL and LAPOP are used and the two calculated indicators capture different aspects of congruence: i.e. proximity and centrism for each party-group of voters. Through the proximity indicator, the distance between a given political party and every voter is estimated. Similarly, through the centrism indicator, the degree of programmatic and ideological distance between the political party and the media of voters is calculated (Otero Felipe 2014: 151). For the estimation of ideological congruence it was considered the representatives’ self-location on a scale ranging from ‘left’ (1) to ‘right’ (10) for each political party, and the self-location of voters on the same scale. In this way, a total of 13 dyads of party–voters in the three periods were calculated.11 Proximity was calculated using the following formula: "

X 2 ^¼ 1 R cij  rj n i

#

Where cij is the ideological location of voter (i) in party (j), rj is the ideological location of the party (j) and n is the number of voters.12 Consequently, congruence will be higher when proximity gets closer to zero. Additionally, centrism was calculated using the following formula: " # 2 1 X ^ ^ cij  cj C ¼R nj  1 i Where R is proximity, cj is the media of the ideological location of the voters of party (j), cjj is the ideological location of the voter in that same party and nj is the sample for that party. In this case, when this indicator is higher, there would be less congruence.13 With the aim of comparing both indicators, Figure 10.7 shows the results of the proximity and centrism indicators calculation for the party–voters dyads. The figure also shows the average for every period studied in order to

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13 Alianza PAIS 2017

Ideological Centrism

11 MPD 2010

9

Ecuador 2017

7 PSP2010

Alianza PAIS 2010

5

PRIAN 08

3

1

-1

PRIAN 2010 Alianza PAIS 2014

0

PSP 2008

Ecuador 2014 Ecuador 2010

PSC 2008 Alianza PAIS 2008 Ecuador 2008 CREO 2014 CREO 2017 PSC 2010 PSC 2014 PSC17 5 10 15 PSP 2014 Ideological Proximity

20

25

Figure 10.7 Ideological proximity and centrism in Ecuador (2007–17). Source: Created by the authors based on PELA-USAL and LAPOP data (2008–16). oir.org.es/pela/ and datasets.americasbarometer.org/database/index.php.

see to what extent party values differ from country values. In this way, when the value of these indicators is high, it would imply the congruence between MPs and citizens is low. Therefore, political parties located on the lower lefthand side of the figure, close to the axis origins, are the most congruent, with the less congruent parties located on the upper right-hand side. The results show a great dispersion on both indicators, with a medium value of 9 in proximity and 0.9 in centrism in 2008. These values increased in 2010, 2014 and 2017 to 11.8, 11.9 and 17.6, respectively (see Table 10.2). These results show that, on average, the ideological connection of Ecuadorian MPs with their voters has weakened significantly since 2008. The latter confirms that the ideological links between representatives and voters in Ecuador – and in Latin America more broadly – are lower compared to ideological links in Europe, where the average ideological proximity is 5.41 (Otero Felipe 2014). Another interesting result is the unequal distribution of the party–voters dyads. The proximity indicator varies from 1.8 for the Patriotic Society Party (PSP) in 2008 and 20.9 for Alianza PAIS in 2017. These parties were the closest and farthest, respectively, to their voters in ideological terms, from the entire sample studied. The PSP in 2008 and 2014, the Social Christian Party (PSC) in 2010, 2014 and 2017 and Creating Opportunities Movement (CREO) in 2014 are the parties closest to their voters, while the most distant parties are the Popular Democratic Movement

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PSP08 PSC17 PSC10 PSP14 CREO14 PSC08 PSC14 PRIAN08 Ecuador08 Alianza PAIS08 CREO17 PSP10 Ecuador10 Ecuador14 PRIAN10 Alianza PAIS10 Alianza PAIS14 MPD10 Ecuador17 Alianza PAIS17

Proximity

Centrism

1.8 6.1 6.3 7.3 7.4 7.9 8.4 8.7 9.0 9.4 9.6 9.7 11.8 11.9 12.7 13.0 13.3 14.0 17.6 20.9

-0.8 -0.5 0.6 -0.4 0.8 2.0 -0.1 3.1 0.9 2.1 0.8 5.9 3.6 4.2 6.8 5.1 6.0 9.4 8.9 12.2

Source: Created by the author based on PELA-USAL and LAPOP data, 2008–14. Available at oir.org.es/pela/ and datasets.americasbarometer.org/database/index.php

(MPD) in 2010, Alianza PAIS in 2010, 2014 and 2017 and Institutional Renewal Party of National Action (PRIAN) in 2010. Similarly, the results for the centrism indicator are quite dispersed. Values oscillate between the minimum value obtained by PSC in 2014 and 2017 (-0.1 and -0.5, respectively) and the PSP (-0.4) in 2014. Alianza PAIS (12.2) in 2017 and MPD (9.4) in 2010 are the parties located furthest away from their voters. Given this, it is possible to state that the links between the electorate and MPs in Ecuador have weakened significantly since 2008, especially for the Alianza PAIS (which has a very low level of ideological connection with its voters). The dynamics of Alianza PAIS are not rare, since it is a political coalition that incorporates a considerable number of social and political organisations; hence, even if Alianza PAIS is a leftist movement there is a lack of strong internal cohesion, ideologically speaking. This ideological distancing has been deepened in 2016–17 (when this research fieldwork was conducted), which indicates the challenges faced by the new government of Moreno without the charismatic personality of Rafael Correa. Another explanation for this distancing between the party in government and the electorate is the poor economic performance since the second semester of 2013.

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This economic reversal has brought an end to the public policy model championed by Rafael Correa. Correa’s tenure (2007–17) benefited from the high commodity prices, which created a source for financing his economic model. During those ten years, on average, Ecuador reported its highest economic income. Nevertheless, in the programmatic analysis between MPs and the electorate, the distance decreases considerably (Figure 10.8). According to Kitschelt et al. (2010) there is programmatic congruence when politicians defend the electorate’s preferred policies. More recent academic literature suggests MPs and voters have higher levels of congruence on social and decentralisation issues, and less congruence on topics such as civil liberties and perceptions of the ‘country’s main problems’ (Lupu and Werner 2017). In order to measure programmatic congruence, the study uses two variables that capture the opinions of both parliamentary elites and citizens regarding the role of the state in the last two legislatures. Contrary to the findings of the ideological links, the levels of programmatic congruence are higher and have only changed slightly since 2014 (mean proximity values of 4.3 since 2014, and 0.5 and 0.3 on the centrism indicator in 2014 and 2017, respectively). Representatives and voters show a high programmatic congruence regarding their level of agreement with the following statement: ‘The state rather than the private sector should own the most important enterprises in the country’.

PSP 2014

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Programmatic Centrism

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4

PSC 2014 Alianza PAIS 2017 CREO 2014 Ecuador 2014 PSC 2017 Alianza PAIS Ecuador 2017 2014 0 CREO 2017 0 2 4 6 2

8

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Programmatic Proximity

Figure 10.8 Programmatic proximity and centrism in Ecuador (2007–17). State vs. private ownership of major firms. Source: Created by the authors based on PELA-USAL and LAPOP data (2008–16). Available at oir.org.es/pela/ and datasets.americasbarometer.org/database/index.php

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Proximity data varies between 3.6 for CREO and 12.9 for PSP in 2014 – these two parties are located at the end of the spectrum in terms of programmatic congruence. The other political parties depict low levels of proximity as shown in Figure 10.8. Correa’s discourse defending public enterprises during the last ten years has been positively assessed. Ecuadorian living conditions have improved under a redistributive state; hence, it is understandable to note their agreement with their MPs’ opinions on the role of the state, including opposition voters. Regarding the degree of agreement with the following statement: ‘The state should implement firm politics in order to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor’ (Figure 10.9), the level of congruence decreases significantly. In fact, there is an increase in the distance between MPs and voters in 2017 (4.6) compared to 2014 (3.1). Contrary to the situation in the ideological sphere, Alianza PAIS MPs and voters are the most programmatically congruent, with mean proximity values of 2.9 in 2014 and 3.8 in 2017 (the distance under Moreno’s government has slightly increased). CREO and PSC depict the lowest proximity levels in 2017. There has been a notable distancing between voters and representatives in 2017 when compared to data from 2014. The anti-state position of PSC does not correspond with the voters’ views of the state: PSC voters approve the state model promoted by Correa during his tenure, which does not imply a change in the ideological identification of PSC voters. Similarly, the centrism indicator shows high levels of dispersion. More concretely, the values for this indicator oscillate between the minimum value (-0.1) for CREO in 2014 and the value for PSC in 2017 (4.0). PSC is the party that is least congruent with its voters. 5 4

PSC 2017

Programmatic Centrism

CREO 2017 3 PSC 2014 2 Alianza PAIS 2017 Ecuador 2017 1 0 0

Alianza PAIS 2014 Ecuador 2014 PSP 2014 1 2 3 4 5 CREO 2014

6

7

8

9

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-1 Programmatic Proximity

Figure 10.9 Programmatic proximity and centrism in Ecuador (2007–17). Role of the state in reducing inequalities. Source: Created by the authors based on PELA-USAL and LAPOP data, 2008–16. Available at oir.org.es/pela/ and datasets.americasbarometer.org/database/index.php

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The results above demonstrate differences at the level of ideological and programmatic congruence between voters and MPs in Ecuador. Regarding ideological congruence, Alianza PAIS and its voters show low levels of ideological congruence and higher programmatic congruence. A possible explanation lies in the use of the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’. Knutsen (1998) argues that while these concepts are functional and simplify party programmes and ideological positions, their application in Latin America is limited due to the region’s heterogeneity (Alcántara and Rivas 2007: 352). The left–right scale is closely related to a symbolic measurement component that is more in alignment with voters’ identity than policy issues. However, the high level of programmatic congruence between voters and MPs in Ecuador may have occurred because during the Alianza PAIS governments, voters believed pro-state policies helped achieve remarkable -macroeconomic results – at least before 2015.

Conclusions The main purpose of this chapter was to test the changes in Ecuador’s political representation in light of its 2013 economic crisis, the turn to the right experienced in the Latin American region and the beginning of a new presidential period under Moreno. The chapter analysed several variables to assess satisfaction with democracy and trust in representative institutions since 2007: 1) satisfaction with democracy; 2) trust in elections; 3) trust in the party system; 4) trust in parliament; and 5) trust in the president. All the indicators increased during the period of study, which suggests that despite the economic downturn, Ecuadorian citizens trust their institutions and – in general terms – believe in democracy. This could be partly explained by the maintenance of key social programmes and governmental subsidies that diminish the pervasive effects of the economic crisis. Furthermore, given the massive institutionalisation of the Ecuadorian state during Correa’s tenure, citizens were able to access key services (i.e. scholarships, social programmes and health services). Regarding ideological and programmatic congruence, the results show great dispersion on both proximity and centrism indicators. On average, the ideological connection of Ecuadorian MPs with their voters has weakened significantly since 2008, especially with the Alianza PAIS. Contrary to the findings on the ideological links, programmatic congruence was high, with Alianza PAIS MPs and voters the most programmatically congruent. These findings suggest the low levels of ideological congruence occur because the left–right spectrum is an identity factor that is not directly related to policy issues. Consequently, Alianza PAIS voters can agree on the government’s main programmes while feeling disconnected from the party’s left–right position. Overall, this chapter has shown empirically the changes in political representation in Ecuador. In general, satisfaction with democracy and trust in the institutions improved for both citizens and MPs during Rafael Correa’s tenure, and experienced a setback at the beginning of Moreno’s time in office.

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Similarly, ideological congruence has fallen since 2008 and programmatic congruence has remained high. Given the recent change in Ecuador’s government, it is important to test these indicators once a reasonable time has passed in order to better assess the main findings of this research.

Epilogue: Ecuador’s Current Situation, Summer and Autumn 2019 After Lenin Moreno won Ecuador’s presidential election in 2017, his government began a gradual confrontation with Rafael Correa, Ecuador’s former president. Although Moreno is a member of the Alianza PAIS party, which was formed by Correa, his policies soon began to diverge from Correa’s Socialismo del Siglo XXI (21st-Century Socialism) political project. In 2018, Correa left Alianza PAIS and founded a new party, the Revolución Ciudadana (Citizens’ Revolution). The close relationship Moreno and Correa once shared fell apart as a result of Moreno’s changes to economic policy, which included: a drastic reduction in public spending; the use of a referendum to prevent Correa’s re-election; the removal of Julian Assange’s political asylum; and his approach to CONAIE (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador) – the most important indigenous organisation in Ecuador, which has maintained a tense relation with Correa as a result of his mining and natural resource extraction policies. The confrontation deepened further in the wake of the Odebrecht scandal that resulted in the incarceration of several political figures, including Jorge Glas, the country’s vice-president and a close ally of Correa. Furthermore, Ecuador’s prosecutor’s office is currently investigating Rafael Correa in connection with several charges, including graft and corruption, influence peddling and hate crimes. Moreno has consistently accused Correa of putting Ecuador in debt. The country now has a foreign debt level at 36 per cent of GDP. Given this high fiscal deficit, Moreno has obtained loans from the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the World Bank, international institutions often portrayed by Correa as harmful for Ecuadorian society. In light of a new loan request with the IMF ($4 billion), Moreno agreed to impose policies that would cut Ecuador’s public spending and boost the economy: a 20 per cent cut to public sector wages; a reduction in the number of holidays for workers; and a reduction in tariffs for technology products and tax reductions for enterprises. Within these new economic policies, the most controversial decision was to end 40-year-old fuel subsidies, in a move that immediately affected the middle and lower classes as a consequence of the knock-on effect in transport costs. The indigenous movement and other social movements (including students, transportation unions and others) in return called for a national strike to reverse the decision taken by the president. The strike lasted 12 days and the Ecuadorian government declared a state of emergency to control social discontent. The national police and the military services were widely criticised for abusing the use of force, and protesters demanded the resignation of Moreno’s ministers of government and of defence.

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The protests led to the deaths of eight people and resulted in almost 2,000 arrests. After some sustained popular pressure, Moreno decided to retain the fuel subsidies and entered into discussions with the indigenous movement and other sectors – supported by the United Nations and the Ecuadorian Episcopal Conference – to develop alternative and less drastic measures designed to deal with Ecuador’s economic crisis. Currently, international human rights organisations are investigating alleged abuses by the military and the police during Ecuador’s most recent period of social unrest.

Notes 1 ‘Pink tide’ was a political cycle of more than 15 years in which the left took over most of the Latin American presidencies. 2 Descriptive representation has been widely studied (Pitkin 1985; Madrid and Rhodes-Purdy 2016). This type of representation focuses on women’s representation (del Campo 2004; Hughes 2011), indigenous communities and other ethnic group representation (Lucero 2006, 2008). 3 This improvement occurred because the SRI (Ecuador’s tax collection agency) increased its monthly collection from $400 million in 2007 to more than $900 million in 2013 (Polga-Hecimovich 2013: 139). 4 Except in 2008 (8.2 per cent) and 2009 (5.1 per cent) inflation rates have remained below 5 per cent. 5 Poverty rate based on $5.50 per day. 6 GINI Index. 7 On the 2013 National Assembly election, Correa’s Alianza PAIS obtained the first majority since 1979 (Polga-Hecimovich 2013: 136). 8 According to de la Torre (2015), there is a latent tension between Correa’s charismatic personality and the rational technocracy of his government, often referred to by him as ‘technopopulist’ government. Caramani (2017) argues that both the principles of populist representation and technocracy defy the very base of party democracy. 9 The most important scandal besides Odebrecht is that which affected the Central Bank and Pedro Delgado (Correa’s cousin), who used a false academic diploma to pursue a Master’s degree (Polga-Hecimovich 2013: 142). 10 After 2008, the National Congress was renamed the National Assembly following the approval of the 2008 constitution. 11 Parties with fewer than five parliamentary representatives were disregarded. 12 The value proposed by Achen (1978) on a country level oscillates between 0 and 1. In this case, the original scale from 1 to 10 was used as it is intuitive for interpretation. 13 Centrism values interpretation is in absolute terms. These values are often close to zero (which indicate greater ideological centrism).

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11 Political Representation in Chile Electoral Institutions, Elites and Voters Peter M. Siavelis

Introduction Like most of the countries in this volume, Chile has experienced profound transformations in its patterns of political representation in the last 10 years. While in Europe, these grew from the 2007–8 Great Recession, in Latin America these changes were due more to the end of the commodities boom. However, in comparison with its neighbours Chile pursued more judicious economic policies as the commodities boom waned and politics were relatively less affected. Thus, rather than experiencing the emergence of extremist or populist politics, as has occurred in other cases covered in this volume in response to deep economic crisis, Chile has been characterised by moderate politics and an alternation of power between governments that do not differ substantially when it comes to economic and social policy (Sehnbruch and Siavelis 2013). Nonetheless, the Chilean case represents an irony. For years defined as a ‘model’ in so many different ways, for its democratic transition, for its economic performance and for its dynamic of consensus politics, and even in its successful weathering of the end of the commodities boom, media coverage of Chile is now characterised by depictions of crisis. Seemingly unending student protests and tomas (forced occupations) of university faculties, social activism and repression of indigenous people, street mobilisation, escalating corruption, declining support for political parties and the two coalition model of politics that has characterised Chile since the end of the transition, all point to a new chapter in politics shaped by demands for new patterns of representation. Some underscore a deep crisis of politics, while others contend Chile has simply evolved from a political system in transition to one that is ‘normalised’ and facing the challenges that confront democracies around the world (Oppliger and Guzmán 2012; Joignant, Morales and Fuentes 2016; Castiliogni and Rovira 2016). What explains this irony? This chapter argues that at least part of the response lies in a dissatisfaction in Chile related to two of this book’s central focuses. First, it argues that the links between citizens and voters created by the legislative electoral system have provided inadequate channels of

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representation; and second, that this representational deficit is also reflected in a lack of congruence between citizens and elites in terms of their interpretation of what is wrong and right with contemporary democracy and economic and social policy. To make this argument, the chapter begins with a background discussion of the trajectory of Chilean democracy historically and since its democratic transition in 1989. The second section takes up the link between voters and members of parliament (MPs) with respect to representation mediated by the legislative election systems. The third section deals with the level of congruence between MPs and citizens with respect to support for democracy, ideology and opinions on the centrality of the state and market. Through this analysis, the chapter will conclude by discussing the transformed nature of political representation in the country, the central concern of this volume.

Democracy, Authoritarianism and Back Again Chile had a long experience with well-functioning republican institutions prior to its violent democratic breakdown in 1973 (Gil 1966; Valenzuela 1978). An enduring conventional wisdom regarding Chilean politics relates to the character and importance of its pre-authoritarian party system. Before and after the dictatorship, Chile’s party system stood out in Latin America as institutionalised, well embedded in society and characterised by parties that acted as the central interlocutors between political elites and the population. Many claimed that Chile’s political parties were more ‘European’ than their Latin American counterparts. Traditionally, the party system was characterised as a ‘three-thirds’ system, with about one-third of the electorate supporting forces representing the left, centre and right (Gil 1966; Valenzuela 1978). The contemporary party system is a moderate multiparty one, though during the first two decades of Chilean democracy, competition was structured between a multiparty alliance of the centre-left (known by various names, but most recently called NM, New Majority) and another of the right (also known by numerous names, but now Let’s Go Chile). However, levels of support and confidence in political parties in Chile went from being among the highest in Latin America in 1992 to the lowest according to contemporary surveys. In addition, some have claimed that the traditional three-thirds division has been displaced by one in which the authoritarian/democratic cleavage is more important. Much recent literature has also been devoted to the causes and significance of the decline of the party system as well as its connection to the growing dissatisfaction with representation in the country. Some of it is certainly due to the two central themes of this volume: the electoral connection between citizens and members of parliament, and an apparent lack of congruence between them (Huneeus 2014; Luna and Altman 2011; Morgenstern, Polga-Hecimovich and Siavelis 2014).

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Voter and Members of Congress: The Electoral Connection A central legacy of the dictatorship’s exercise in constitutional engineering was the imposition of a new legislative elective system aimed at transforming the party system and reducing the power and influence of the left. The military pointed to the highly ideological and fragmented system as one of the principal rationales for military intervention. However, military authorities faced a conundrum. They considered the adoption of a single-member district system, but knew that having received only about 40 per cent of the vote in the 1988 plebiscite (which was a referendum on whether to keep Pinochet or transition towards democracy) that the right would probably continue to poll at about that level with a return to democracy. If it did, the right risked exclusion from Congress with a single-member district system. On the other hand, with a larger magnitude proportional representation system, its goal of minimising the representation of parties of the left would be undermined, given its permissiveness in the representation of many parties. To resolve this, military reformers opted for a two-member district systems (or a binomial system). Electoral rules provided that each coalition could present two candidates in an open list system. Though voters chose a candidate, votes were pooled to determine whether lists won one or two seats. The highest polling coalition in a district could only win both seats if it more than doubled the vote total of the second-place list – providing effective thresholds of 33 per cent for a one-seat victory and 66 per cent for a two-seat victory. Rarely could a list reach the 66 per cent threshold, so effectively one seat went to each of the two coalitions during most of the post-authoritarian period (until the most recent electoral reform). Because the centre-left’s level of electoral support consistently hovered around 55 per cent and the centreright’s at around 40 per cent, in functional terms the coalitions simply divided seats in most districts, providing an electoral bonus for the right (winning 50 per cent of the seats with only 35–40 per cent of the vote). The system has also succeeded in marginalising non-aligned leftist parties or any small party that failed or refused to strike an electoral bargain with one of the two major coalitions (Navia 2005; Rahat and Sznajder 1998). Perhaps most importantly, the system provided a lock on power for the two major coalitions in the country (Valenzuela and Scully 1997). The outcome of elections was usually a foregone conclusion: except in a few cases one candidate of NM and one candidate of CV were likely to win in each district, because each of the major coalition lists almost invariably polled between 33 and 66 per cent. In addition, the election system required each of the coalitions’ constituent parties to negotiate two-seat slates (with the understanding that one candidate was likely to lose). The strategic complexity of this exercise shifted the power of candidate nomination into the hands of party elites, who were forced to make strategic calculations on candidate placement in the interests of coalition maintenance.

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Furthermore, the combination of elite candidate choice and the dynamics of the two-list system made unseating an incumbent difficult. Barring incompetence or extreme indiscipline, Chilean parties consider incumbents to have a right of renomination (Siavelis 2002). The election system in the context of two coalitions strongly limited the ability to unseat an incumbent. Rarely did one list contain two candidates from the same party, providing incumbents the luxury of not facing intra-party competition, at least in the electoral arena. More importantly, within the context of the binomial system, if a voter sought to unseat an incumbent there are two potential strategies. The voter could either completely abandon his or her ideological convictions and vote for an opposition list or cast a likely more ideologically sincere vote for the list partner of the incumbent. However, because votes were pooled in determining seat distributions, a vote for one candidate on a list was in many respects a vote for both. Therefore, voting for an incumbent’s list partner actually provided support for the incumbent the voter aimed to defeat. Further, as Navia notes, the system’s thresholds meant a candidate’s support could drop from 60 per cent to 35 per cent without losing the congressional seat. Accountability is central to democracy. The prevailing coalitional configuration combined with the binomial system’s properties did not provide voters the opportunity to hold their representatives accountable (Navia 2005). Finally, voters had little input into the selection of candidates. Each of Chile’s major parties had formalised rules for candidate selection. Each party belonged to a subpact that unified parties with common ideological orientations. Each coalition contained two subpacts (the centre and left in the NM and the centre-right and hard-right in CV), and each subpact also acted as a negotiating unit. The exigencies of negotiation among so many actors, and the give and take inherent in cobbling together two member lists from multiparty coalitions, meant that informal processes took over where formalised processes failed and, ultimately, informal agreements between the highestlevel party officials determined which candidate would run where and with which party partner. These problems provided disincentives to participation, with a growing perception in the Chilean electorate that voting did not matter, as electoral outcomes were predetermined by elite negotiations. This chapter has noted that the binomial system has been reformed, and has focused primarily on analysing the representational dynamic of a system that has been abandoned. This may seem to make the argument less relevant and important. However, attitudes, opinions and ways of doing politics do not change overnight. What is important to note is that the representational genie is already out of the bottle, in the sense that the system likely damaged the reputation of parties and political institutions in general – a troubling reality and part of the explanation for discussions concerning a crisis of representation in the country.

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This is reflected in citizen evaluations of democracy and democratic institutions in Chile. There are increasing levels of citizen dissatisfaction with the functioning and quality of democracy in the country. Only 48.2 per cent of Chileans are ‘mostly’ or ‘very satisfied’ with democracy. Further, after more than two and a half decades of democracy, only 54 per cent think in all cases democracy is the best regime, and the number who think so has actually decreased since peaking after the return of democracy. Indeed, 22.7 per cent contended that in some circumstances an authoritarian regime is preferable and 14.7 per cent said it really did not matter (UDP-IDRC 2014).1 Though Chile is lauded by academics and analysts as a high-quality democracy, on several key indicators of mass public opinion other Latin American countries rank significantly higher, and some of Chile’s indicators are disturbing. For example, long known for its high level of citizen identification with parties, Chile now ranks 25th out of 26 countries in levels of party identification, trailed only by Guatemala (LAPOP 2012; UDP-IDRC 2014). Figure 11.1 summarises confidence in the most important political institutions in the country and democracy in general. Because political parties are a major focus of this chapter, Figure 11.2 summarises Chileans’ identification with political parties. The results of the tables are impactful, but again, there are some complexities in the data’s takeaway messages. First, it is clear there is a general lack of support for any institution in society. Chileans are dissatisfied with their legislative chambers, their courts and their ministers. Indeed, even businesspeople – who are relatively highly rated in some industrial democracies like the United States – rank right down with the chambers of Congress and ministers in Chile.

Figure 11.1 Chileans’ confidence in institutions. Percentage expressing ‘some’ or ‘a lot’ of confidence. Source: CEP (2019).

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60 53 50 43 43 40

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Figure 11.2 Evolution of support for political parties in Chile. Percentage identifying with a particular party. Source: CEP (2019).

Second, while political parties are at the bottom of the barrel when it comes to the evaluation of institutions, other national-level institutions are equally poorly rated. However, one must again bear in mind both the history of the role of political parties in Chile and the speed and magnitude of citizens’ loss of confidence. Parties have been central actors in Chilean political life. The country was notorious historically for its wide ideological spectrum, high levels of party fractionalisation, and high levels of party identification. Even after the dictatorship, citizen identification with parties was high, with 88 per cent of citizens identifying with a political party. Figure 11.2 shows the downward evolution since 2006, with only 19 per cent of Chileans identifying with a political party. One must approach this data with some degree of caution. There is a worldwide trend of declining support for formal political institutions; however, what makes Chile remarkable is the extent and speed of this loss of confidence. Also, this chapter is not suggesting that the binomial system alone is producing this malaise in representation. Many arguments have been advanced to explain this dramatic loss (Sehnbruch and Siavelis 2013; Joignant, Morales and Fuentes 2016). One of the principal ones has been the lack of audacity in reforming institutions and public policies inherited from the Pinochet dictatorship. This is quite a convincing argument given that Chile’s economic performance has been comparatively good and the country weathered the crisis in the commodities boom relatively better than some of its regional neighbours. It is interesting to note, however, that much of the lack of audacity in reforms is tied to the limits on representation established by the Pinochet constitution and inherent in the legislative electoral system. An analysis of the congruence between elites and masses regarding the most important problems facing the country sheds additional light on this debate.

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Elite–Mass Congruence and Chilean Democracy There are many models of representation, not all of which suggest that the preferences of elites and masses must be in alignment (Pitkin 1967). However, there is reason to believe that a model of ‘mandate representation’ (where congruence exists between the policy preferences of the population and politicians) is more likely to facilitate the positive functioning of democracy (Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski and Tóka 1999). ‘Mandate representation’ may contribute to other dimensions of democracy, such as responsiveness and accountability, by creating the citizen–politician links that allow these processes to take place. What is more, such congruent relationships may better ensure the ability of marginalised citizens to pursue their interests and achieve distributive outcomes that are beneficial to them and which reinforce democracy (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992). With respect to new democracies, ‘there is strong reason to believe that the level of representation affects citizens’ support for a system and therefore contributes to its durability’ (Luna and Zechmeister 2005: 392). For all of these reasons, elite–mass congruence is significant to democracy. The relationship between elites and masses has played out differently in Chile than in the countries discussed in other chapters in this volume. One cannot understand this relationship without also understanding the context in which elite–mass relations have evolved since the end of the dictatorship, and how both elites and the masses were shaped by 17 years of military rule with respect to their basic ideas about government, private responsibility and the state. The military came to power with a clear project of transformation that was both political and economic. In political terms, and as noted, the regime sought a fundamental transformation in the way politics was done in the country and in the dynamic of partisan competition (Valenzuela 1978; Huneuus 2014). This was done through a combination of brutal repression, institutional engineering and the imposition of an authoritarian constitution (Siavelis 2000). On the economic front, the dictatorship had a similar project of transformation. Pinochet supporters (or apologists) see these reforms in terms of economic success at the hand of the much vaunted University of Chicago trained economists inspired by Milton Friedman, who, at Pinochet’s behest, transformed Chile’s economy into a free market success story. For the critics of the regime (and supporters of the Concertación/Nueva Mayoría governments that followed), the neoliberal experiment may have begun in a hamfisted way under Pinochet, but its taming and transformation into a successful economic policy occurred during the democratic governments that followed the dictatorship. Yet, as is often the case, closer examination reveals a much more complex economic story than either side tells. And neither story denies that existential reform to Pinochet’s legacy has only begun very recently. There is little doubt that Chile’s economic transformation has been significant, and that it has experienced remarkable growth since the end of the

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dictatorship, and even sustained growth during the waning of the commodities boom. However, Chile’s positive economic growth has been of little comfort to those at the lower end of Chile’s notoriously unequal socio-economic ladder: Chile remains one of the most unequal countries in the world. Indeed, Chile ranks 20th out of 175 countries worldwide in its level of inequality, with the highest level of inequality in the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) club of which it just became a member, and only slightly beaten by Brazil and Colombia in South America (World Bank 2019). Since then, 20 years of consistent economic growth have led to equally consistently declining absolute poverty rates, but they have also led to constantly increasing demands for the consumption of goods and services among the poor that have outpaced the growth of their incomes. In terms of social policy, while health care services that can compete with the best in the world cater to the rich, the poor largely remain excluded from these private clinics. Similarly, Chile’s privatised pension system replicates the inequalities generated by its labour market, with little redistribution between rich and poor. The education system is equally split between excellent standards for the rich and very low standards for the poor. Many Chileans sense a lack of social justice, which fails to provide greater equity in the overall distribution of the country’s wealth and access to opportunities. In essence, for the last 25 years there has been a constant tension between achieving social progress and the confines of an economy that still largely adheres to the principles laid out by a neoliberal dictatorship, which privatised social services as far as possible, reduced the size of the state and limited its tax base. Thus, while the Concertación/NM governments have been lauded for maintaining economic stability and growth, they are also continuously criticised for their lack of audacity in engaging in real reforms to the Pinochet model that could make Chile a more just and equitable society. In essence, despite real accomplishments, the delicacy of the democratic transition and ‘transitional enclaves’, combined with the institutional, constitutional and political constraints outlined here, have limited the scope of political change and deeper economic reforms.2 In this sense, there were real impediments to the reform of Pinochet era political and economic institutions. Interestingly, an analysis of elite–mass congruence provides potential clues to both the debilities of representation in the system, but also a partial explanation of the lack of reforms, which this chapter argues are at the core of dissatisfaction with democracy. It appears that elites and the public see things differently in some, but not all, important areas. Part of the challenge in measuring elite–mass congruence lies in the lack of parallel questions asked in public opinion surveys and elite questionnaires. One set of data produced by a joint project between Diego Portales University (UDP) and the International Development Research Centre of Canada (IDRC) provides what, until now, is the most useful tool, as they ask both citizens and MPs what amount to the same questions posed in the same way (UDP-IDRC 2014). These surveys are employed here to analyse the key questions on which elites and the citizens agree or disagree. Data suggest some interesting divergences and some interesting parallels.

Political Representation in Chile Support for Democracy

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3

One of the most essential elements underwriting the governability and success of a government is essential support for democracy as a regime. Given the violence and severity of the military regime and the recognised toll it took on Chilean society, one would expect widespread rejection of authoritarian politics. In addition, given the country’s iconic status as a model democracy in the region, and frequent news and scholarly allusions to the quality of Chilean democracy, one might think that support for a democratic regime would be high at the popular and elite level. On the other hand, several studies of post-transitional Chilean politics find that the democratic/authoritarian cleavage was a defining one that differentiated the right and the left, so it is possible that this might persist with more limited support for democracy as a regime (especially for parties of the right) (Mainwaring and Torcal 2003). Among all MPs, 98.7 per cent agreed with the statement: ‘democracy is preferable to any other form of government’. Support for democracy was actually higher among MPs on the right, at 100%. Granted, a minuscule 1.7 per cent of Concertación/NM MPs surveyed agreed with the statement that ‘in some circumstances an authoritarian government can be preferable’, yet still it is remarkable that among parties of the right, support for this statement approached 10 per cent in 2006 and yet today support for such a contention has completely evaporated. This suggests at the elite level support for democracy is firmly entrenched. It is less so at the level of the mass public, where data tentatively suggest that solid support for democracy as the only acceptable regime has actually decreased, with support going in the opposite direction from elites. From 2006 to 2008, the percentage of Chileans who agreed with the statement that an authoritarian regime ‘might be preferable to a democratic regime in certain circumstances’ increased from 12.6 to 18 per cent from 2006 to 2008 (LAPOP 2012; CEP 2011). The more contemporary and complete UDP-IDRC data show 22.7 per cent support for this statement. On the flip side among the citizenry, 54.9 per cent of the population agree that democracy is preferable to any other form of government, yet the remaining 37.4 per cent believe that authoritarianism is sometimes justified (22.7 per cent) or that it really does not matter whether a government is authoritarian or democratic (14.7 per cent). Between 2006 and 2008, support for democracy as a regime varied between 46 per cent and 56 per cent, and it continues to hold at that rate. At the most basic level of the governing regime, there is consensus and general congruence, with generalised acceptance of democracy. Nonetheless, there is a stark difference between elites and the masses regarding the acceptability of a military regime. However, this situation is also found in most other Latin American countries (LAPOP 2012).

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Ideological Self-position For many analysts, Chile was notorious for the extent of its polarisation of politics. Indeed, Chile was regularly cited by analysts as one of the most polarised countries in the world, and this polarisation is often cited as one of the drivers of democratic breakdown (Sartori 1976; Valenzuela 1978). Nonetheless, many of these discussions are really not satisfying because analysts fail to differentiate between the citizenry and the masses when measuring polarisation, or survey data simply asked citizens whether they identified with the centre, the right or the left. Indeed, even Valenzuela, as one of the most important analysts of party system polarisation in Chile, did note that while the elite was indeed polarised, voting behaviour at the local level was perhaps better characterised as being motivated by clientelism, and indeed that these local–national clientelistic connections actually helped moderate the polarisation of the party system (Valenzuela 1978). Despite this, the general consensus among scholars is that there is a much lower degree of polarisation of the party system and electorate compared to the pre-authoritarian period (Munck and Bosworth 1998; Scully and Valenzuela 1997). The UDP-IDRC data seem to back up this contention, though there are slight differences between ideological selfposition at the elite and voter level with different levels of dispersion and positioning. Figure 11.3 shows this data. First, it is striking that Chile has become overwhelmingly a centrist country at the voter level. A full 23.2 per cent of Chileans place themselves firmly in the centre with a value of five. This is roughly consistent with the status of self-identification during most of the post-authoritarian period. Data cited in Siavelis find that in polls conducted in 2008, 30 per cent of those surveyed placed themselves

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exactly at the centre, at a value of five, with none of the other deciles on the 10-point scale exceeding 7 per cent (Siavelis 2009). However, this only tells part of the story. What is not shown in Figure 11.3 is that a full 38.1 per cent (or almost four out of 10) claimed not to know or chose not to respond. This is a dramatic change since the return of democracy. Indeed, in 1990 only 13.1 per cent claimed not to identify with any ideological tendency (a figure that rose to 38.4 per cent in 2009) (CEP 1990, 2011). What is more remarkable is that the UDP-IDRC survey actually seems to under-measure this tendency. Indeed, in the most recent CEP survey, 57 per cent said they identified with no ideological tendency (CEP 2015). This is consistent with other surveys; however, this finding is interesting and even contradicts some of the literature on left–right divisions. While Freire and Kivistik find that the left–right divide tends to become more solidified in more mature democracies, Chile is a redemocratised country in which the left–right divide was stronger during the pre-authoritarian period than it is now (Freire and Kivistik 2013). The data for MPs roughly mirror that of the electorate, albeit without the high level of non-identifiers. As Figure 11.3 shows, while there is a pretty standard distribution of ideological self-identification by MPs, there are two key and important differences: first, the elite survey places the average MP further to the left than the average Chilean, with the modal score being a four instead of a five. The distribution is also different, and wider than the selfpositioning of the electorate. Chilean elites disburse themselves more widely across the scale, as evinced by a standard deviation of 7.7 for elites and 4.65 for the surveys of the electorate. In this sense, both MPs and the voters are broadly centrist, though the MPs are slightly to the left and more widely dispersed across the ideological spectrum, which is not uncommon cross-nationally. Poverty, Economic Success and the Role of the State It appears then that there is no really significant disagreement between voters and MPs in terms of the existential issues of politics. However, when it comes to issues of the sources of poverty, economic success and the role of the state, we see more of a gap in citizen/MP perceptions, which this chapter argues tells us something about the glaring levels of dissatisfaction with institutions and helps explains the discontent suggested by the almost constant waves of social protest experienced in recent years. One of the metanarratives of contemporary Chilean politics is that the country and its citizens have been transformed by the country’s experiment with neoliberalism. Data on the sources of poverty suggest this may indeed be the case. Most of the data cited in the UDP-IDRC report only summarise ‘first mentions’ of the causes of poverty. An analysis of second and third mentions shows an interesting divergence between elites and masses, and one that suggests some potential changes to Chileans’ perceptions of structural versus personal views of the sources of poverty.

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Once education is set aside, Chileans are much more likely to blame themselves for being poor than they are to blame the state or structural conditions, while MPs are more likely to focus on the latter rather than the former. As Figure 11.4, which presents the percentage of the citizenry and deputies that cited these reasons among their top three for being poor, shows after education the Chilean public finds that ‘personal laziness’ (16.36 per cent) and ‘alcohol/drug addiction’ (16.19 per cent) rank second and third. On the other hand, and again in a striking testament to the perhaps schizophrenic view of poverty and inequality, though public discourse repeatedly refers to social class, apellido (last name) and deep inequalities in education (all determined by where and to whom you are born), only 4.94 per cent of the first three mentions by citizens of the sources of poverty ‘came from a poor family’. On the other hand, elites recognised the generational sources of poverty, placing it as the third-most important explanation (15.04 per cent). It is equally interesting that the second and fourth reasons were structural or related to the state: ‘lack of jobs’ at 18.29 per cent and ‘government economic policies’ at 10.57 per cent. The Chilean public neither expects help from the state nor thinks much of the notion that state policies affect poverty. Again, a dearth of data from the pre-authoritarian period structured in the same way prevents the drawing of definitive conclusions concerning the potential transformation of Chileans into stubborn individualists. Still, the data are suggestive of an important divide between elites and the public, one mirrored later when each are asked about the role the state should play in social welfare institutions. These data seem to confirm that Chileans are indeed neoliberal children of the dictatorship.

Lack of Education

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Figure 11.4 Factors influencing poverty for MPs and citizens. Source: UDP-IDRC (2014).

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However, deeper analysis tells a different story of incongruence between elites and masses. Elite and mass views of the state are not that simple, and despite many years of dictatorship and market economics, Chileans – even though they tie success to individual variables – remain remarkably statist and, dare we say it, communitarian. In addition, the Chilean public and MPs differ widely in their perception of the role of the state in some key areas. Figure 11.5 demonstrates the many contradictions voters and MPs elites have in their ideas of the state, suggesting the public is considerably more statist than are MPs. Remarkably, and despite decades of neoliberal economics, more than 75 per cent of Chileans agree there should be state pharmacies, state banks, a single payer health plan (to replace the private ISAPRES (Institutional Health Providers) and a state pension plan (to replace the private AFP (Pension Fund Administrators). Well over 50 per cent of Chileans want to transfer responsibility for public transport and education to the state or state bodies. In addition, mirroring questions concerning who should control aspects of the economy and social provision, most Chileans do not want to see ISAPRES or AFPs remain in private hands. In all other areas the public is substantially more statist. Indeed, the most dramatic difference of opinions between the two groups concerns education. The public is much more inclined to support a role for the state in the provision of education. There are only two areas where the MPs are more statist than Chileans, and that is with the state copper company, National Copper Company (CODELCO), and the provision of public services. Fewer elites want to see CODELCO privatised and fewer still believe the state should not be in the business of providing public services. CODELCO should be privatized ISAPRES should continue to remain in private hands

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Figure 11.5 Elites and masses on the state. Percentage in agreement. Source: UDP-IDRC (2014).

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We should neither conclude that Chilean elites are now market champions and that the public are closet statists. When asked whether they would prefer to choose a society ‘in which all have the same rights guaranteed’ or one that ‘rewarded individual effort’, 66.4 per cent of MPs chose the former, while only 31.5 per cent chose the latter. As one might expect, there is a partisan divide on this question, with 61.3 per cent of those identifying with the Alianza/CV opting for individual effort and 89.5 per cent in the Concertación/ NM opting for guaranteed equality of rights. So, as in all areas, the data talk in many different ways and pull in many directions regarding the role of the state. Despite mountains of data demonstrating a complete lack of trust in many state institutions, and a perception that much of the explanation for wealth or poverty is tied to personal variables in people’s minds, Chileans have not completely lost faith in the state.

Conclusion Representative democracy is defined by the existence of mechanisms to channel public will into policy by way of a smaller number of elected representatives, mediated by intermediate-level groups and primarily political parties. For most of Chile’s democratic history, representation took place by way of mass-based ideological parties that sought to mobilise the citizenry (Gil 1966). Voter commitments to parties tended to be consistent with established cleavages in society and correspond to identifiable socio-economic or other types of social divisions. Parties relied on hierarchical structures that employed party organisations and party activists to carry out the functions scholars and citizens associated with political parties, including interest representation, interest articulation, political recruitment and political communication. This model of representation no longer exists in Chile. Studies of elite–mass congruence are prefaced on the long-held notion that where the preferences of elites are in alignment with those of the citizens, democracy will be efficacious and valued by the public. This chapter and others in the volume show that this relationship is much more complex and it is a complexity that has profound consequences for the future of Chilean democracy. This chapter has uncovered some surprising divisions between MPs and the public and some intriguing contradictions and realities that say a lot about the quality of democracy in Chile. First, while there is a great deal of congruence between the public and MPs regarding a general acceptance of democracy, ideological placement and the importance of inequality and education, there are some intriguing differences regarding the causes of inequality, the role of the state and the potential solutions to some of the dissatisfaction registered repeatedly by the Chilean public. It is also clear that Chileans are done with a number of things: they are done with politics, with political parties and with institutions (at least national ones). However, the data are revealing in many ways. Chileans do not seem to trust their government and institutions, but they trust their state more than

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MPs do. They want the state involved in things. Perhaps most intriguing are the differences in interpreting and explaining inequality and in the proper role of the state. At first glance it is puzzling that Chileans tie the sources of poverty to individual variables, but want the state more involved in addressing inequalities generated by a largely private structure of social provision. In addition, local institutions are nowhere near as negatively rated as national ones. These divergent views, as well as disgust with national institutions, certainly are related. It is telling that national-level institutions are the target of most of the ire of the Chilean population. Democracy is about process and content. In terms of process, at the national level, Chile’s transitional years were characterised by a politics of elite domination with little citizen input, and an ideology of stability – in many respects, and as this chapter has suggested, driven by an unrepresentative election system imposed by a dictatorship. While this pattern provided remarkable stability, it undermined other equally important aspects of democracy like representation, accountability and legitimacy (Sehnbruch and Siavelis 2013). Chileans are reacting against this form of politics and the institutions and parties that promoted it. With respect to content, while there were reforms to some aspects of the system of educational and social provision, the broad outlines of the Pinochet policies remained. Again, these were systems left over from the previous regime and were deemed untouchable by subsequent governments. In this sense, perhaps Chileans are not as statist as they seem from the data presented here, but rather they are just disgusted with what the market-oriented system has wrought and are casting about for reform. The obvious candidate to fix policies if they are to be wrested from the market is the state. Since 2011, major issues have not been put on the table by political parties, but rather through the vocal demands of social movements. While Concertación leaders often avoided controversial reforms or came to the table with incremental reforms, more substantial reform initiatives have been forced onto the agenda by more assertive social movements and protests. While this dynamic is most notable in the area of educational reforms, it has also been the case for gender-progressive legislation, divorce, birth control, abortion and gay marriage. This suggests that the pattern of democracy via inter-elite accommodation no longer satisfies the Chilean public, and neither do the resultant reforms that have emerged from this pattern of politics. Overall, the chapter argues that the impact of the commodities crisis on the patterns of political representation in Chile was rather limited. At best it only amplified previous trends, because the ongoing tendencies (at least at the mass level) in terms of limited support for political parties, the growing (albeit rather limited) tolerance for authoritarian rule and increasingly limited (albeit always majoritarian) support for democracy as the best regime were already there before the commodities crisis. Moreover, incongruence between citizens and elites is more pronounced with respect to policy (i.e. a citizenship that is more pro-state intervention than the elites, except for the copper industry and

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the provision of public services) than in terms of left–right ideological congruence. The chapter’s major argument is that the principal reason for the problems of representation in Chile has been the lack of audacity in reforming institutions and public policies inherited from the Pinochet dictatorship. This reality suggests that regardless of whether a crisis of representation exists, there are deep challenges to representation and Chileans are clearly seeking new forms of representation. What these new forms might look like is subject to disagreement. They might include popular mobilisation, social media, referenda or a rehabilitation of parties so they can return to reassume their past functions.

Epilogue: Chile’s Current Situation, Summer and Autumn 2019 On 20 October 2019 the most significant, violent and deadly protests since the end of the Augusto Pinochet dictatorship exploded in Chile. Simmering protests and social discontent have been the norm in that country in recent years; however, the most recent spate of protests, accompanied by looting, attacks on property and infrastructure and 23 deaths, represented a turning point. Widely billed in the press as a protest against increased transport fees, this social mobilisation really represents a much wider demand for a fundamental rewriting of Chile’s prevailing social contract. As the protests played out, grew in size and continued unabated for weeks, it became clear these they were different from those that had broken out in the past. In terms of representation, which is this book’s major focus, what is the source and long-term significance of these protests? Post-authoritarian governments of all ideological stripes made much of leaving the dictatorship’s legacy behind, with reforms to the tax code, social welfare and educational schemes, and the legislative electoral system. Nonetheless, politicians lacked the determination to fundamentally transform the dictatorship’s most important pillar: Chile’s extreme brand of neoliberalism. For decades Chileans have borne the brunt of Pinochet’s neoliberalism in the form of low salaries, inadequate pensions and high prices for privatised educational and social services. At the same time, the nation’s elite reaped the benefits of Chile’s economic boom, making the country among the least equal in the world. Corruption in the police force, price-setting collusion for basic staples and high utility and transport costs also contributed to a deep-seated sense of fundamental injustice. Transport price increases (and the tone-deaf attitude in implementing them-President Sebastián Piñera’s – economy minister, Juan Andrés Fontaine, suggested Chilean workers ‘get up earlier’ to avoid the rush hour rate) represented the final insult, tipping the scales towards what most Chileans believe is justified violence. The government’s initial response was equally inadequate. Calling protestors delinquents and terrorists, and contending the country was in a state of war with itself, conjured uncomfortable parallels with the dictatorship.

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Under constant public and elite pressure to respond to the crisis, Piñera announced a set of immediate reforms including increasing the minimum wage and pension payments, cutting the price of medicines, lowering public transport costs, slashing electricity costs, implementing higher taxes for the rich and reducing the salary of MPs, who are the highest paid in the region. For the longer term, and despite initial opposition, Piñera also agreed to a process that may potentially lead to the abolition of Chile’s 1980 constitution, which was written by the Pinochet dictatorship and which was also the target of protestors’ ire. In October 2020 a national plebiscite, delayed from April because of the coronavirus pandemic, will ask Chileans if they want a new constitution and, if so, how it is to be drafted. If agreed upon, a second plebiscite will be held for ratification of the constitution. While Piñera’s reforms are a step in the right direction, they are unlikely to quell protests and demands for more profound changes to Chile’s constitution and basic social contract. Chile is in for a long and painful struggle that few expected, many predicted and that the country’s economic and political elites should have foreseen.

Notes 1 Siavelis (2009) provides similar analysis for the earlier years of the transition. 2 Following Garretón (2003), Siavelis (2009) argues that just as the military regime left ‘authoritarian enclaves’ in the term first described by Garretón, democratic authorities also created certain ‘enclaves of the transition’ that have prevented more representative forms of politics. 3 Portions of this analysis are drawn from Siavelis (2016, 2017).

References Castiglioni, R. and Rovira, C. (2016). Political representation in contemporary Chile. Journal of Politics in Latin America 8(3), 3–24. CEP (Centro de Estudios Públicos) (1990). Estudio social y de opinión pública. Santiago, Chile. CEP (Centro de Estudios Públicos) (2011). Estudio nacional de opinión pública, junio– julio 2011. Available at www.cep.cl. Accessed on 9 September 2018. CEP (Centro de Estudios Públicos) (2015). Estudio nacional de opinión pública, junio– julio 2015. Available at www.cep.cl. Accessed on 9 September 2018. Freire, A. and Kivistik, K. (2013). Mapping and explaining the use of the left–right divide. Brazilian Political Science Review 7(3), 61–89. Garretón, M. A. (2003). Incomplete democracy. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. Gil, F. G. (1966). The political system of Chile. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. Huneeus, C. (2014). La democracia semisoberana: Chile después de Pinochet. Santiago: Taurus. Joignant, A., Morales M. and Fuentes, C. (2016). Malaise in representation in Latin American countries: Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Kitschelt, H., Mansfeldova, Z., Markowski, R. and Tóka, G. (1999). Post-communist party systems: Competition, representation, and inter-party cooperation. New York: Cambridge University Press. LAPOP (2012). Latin American political opinion project. Available at www.vander bilt.edu/lapop. Accessed on 9 September 2018. Luna, J. P. and Altman, D. (2011). Uprooted but stable: Chilean parties and the concept of party system institutionalisation. Latin American Politics and Society 53(2), 1–28. Luna, J. P. and Zechmeister, E. J. (2005). Political representation in Latin America: A study of elite–mass congruence in nine countries. Comparative Political Studies 38 (4), 388–416. Mainwaring, S. and Torcal, M. (2003). The political recrafting of social bases of party competition: Chile, 1973–1995. British Journal of Political Science 33(1), 55–84. Morgenstern, S., Polga-Hecimovich, J. and Siavelis, P. M. (2014). Ni chicha ni limoná: Party nationalisation in pre-and post-authoritarian Chile. Party Politics 20(5), 751–766. Munck, G. L. and Bosworth, J. A. (1998). Patterns of representation and competition: Parties and democracy in post-Pinochet Chile. Party Politics 4(4), 471–493. Navia, P. (2005). La transformación de votos en escaños: leyes electorales en Chile, 1833–2004. Política y Gobierno 12(2), 233–276. Oppliger, M. and Guzmán, E. (2012). El malestar de Chile: ¿Teoría o diagnóstico? Santiago: Ediciones RIL. Pitkin, H. (1967). The concept of representation. Berkeley: University of California Press. Rahat, G. and Sznajder, M. (1998). Electoral engineering in Chile: The electoral system and limited democracy. Electoral Studies 17(4), 429–442. Rueschemeyer, D., Stephens, E. H. and Stephens, J. D. (1992). Capitalist development and democracy. Cambridge: Polity. Sartori, G. (1976). Parties and party systems. New York: Cambridge. Scully, T. R. and Valenzuela, S. (1997). Electoral choices and the party system in Chile: Continuities and changes at the recovery of democracy. Comparative Politics 29(4), 511–527. Sehnbruch, K. and Siavelis P., eds. (2013). Democratic Chile: The politics and policies of an historic coalition, 1990–2010. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Siavelis, P. (2000). The president and Congress in post-authoritarian Chile: Institutional constraints to democratic consolidation. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. Siavelis, P. (2002). Exaggerated presidentialism and moderate presidents: Executive/ legislative relations in Chile. In: S. Morgenstern and B. Nacif, eds. Legislative politics in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 79–113. Siavelis, P. (2009). Elite–mass congruence, partidocracia and the quality of Chilean democracy. Journal of Politics in Latin America. 1(3), 3–32. Available at doi:10.1177/1866802X0900100301. Accessed on 11 December 2019. Siavelis, P. (2016). Crisis of representation in Chile? The institutional dimension. Journal of Politics in Latin America 8(3), 61–94. Available atdoi:10.1177/ 1866802X1600800303. Accessed 11 December 2019. Siavelis, P. (2017). Elite–mass congruence in Chile. In: A. Joignant, M. Morales and C. Fuentes, eds. Malaise in representation in Latin America. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 93–118. UDP-IDRC (2014). A crisis of legitimacy: Challenges to the political order in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. Santiago: UDP-IDRC.

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Valenzuela, A. (1978). The breakdown of democratic regimes: Chile. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Valenzuela, J., and Scully, T. (1997). Electoral choices and the party system in Chile: Continuities and changes at the recovery of democracy. Comparative Politics 29(4), 511–527. World Bank (2019). GINI index. Available at data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV. GINI/. Accessed on 19 April 2019.

12 Latin American Parliamentary Elites A Methodological Approach Mélany Barragán, Cristina Rivas and José Manuel Rivas

This chapter presents the Parliamentary Elites in Latin America (PELA) project, based at the University of Salamanca, and the methodology used in that project, to study elites from a comparative perspective. Set in the context of the field of political science, and focusing on members holding representative office, this analysis reflects on the importance of studying elites as well as the various possible ways of so doing, and the challenges inherent to each. After more than 20 years’ experience, the difficulties and challenges that have arisen during the PELA project are indicated here, along with its main inputs and, especially, the relevance of their use in academic activity and production. In this regard, questions are addressed related to both the methodological design and challenges encountered throughout the project’s research phases, including data compilation during fieldwork and data processing and their subsequent use for academic production. That is to say, we focus not only on the strict aspects of methodological design, but rather that we adopt a more global vision of the research process. The chapter’s aim is to rethink several issues (such as data mining) that arose during the research process, taking into account the wealth of available information (after two decades of development) and the particularities that parliamentary elites present as an object of study. The text is in three parts. The first considers the main issues inherent to the study of elites from a theoretical-methodological perspective. Second, the principles treated in the first section are related directly to the PELA project. Finally, there is a discussion of the main challenges and future agenda. All of this is supported by the specialised bibliography, as well as by data from the project itself.

How to Approach a Survey of Elites? Interest in the study of elites derives from the centrality of the figure of the professional politician in political science. Politicians are significant because without them we would have no politics; without representation, it would not be possible to speak of political life (Schmitt 1982: 208; Bourdieu 1990). In this sense, the political class is a fundamental component of the political

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system in every society, insofar as politicians can be a reflection of the sociopolitical context in which they act, the dynamics of power and the aggregate demands and interaction guidelines among political actors. But what does it mean to study elites? According to a holistic approach, it means consideration of their socio-demographic characteristics, their expectations and beliefs and their socialisation, previous expertise and performance. However, the scarcity of empirical research on political elites and their trajectories is somewhat surprising. This scarcity is even more evident in terms of the study of political elite values, beliefs and attitudes.1 Despite the impact of Putnam’s seminal work (1973) on the variables that determine the beliefs of political classes in the United Kingdom and Italy, few studies have approached this subject empirically and in depth. In any case, as García, Mateos and Rivas (2014) have noted, certain important contributions can be found that focus on distinct geographical areas. For Western Europe, we have the works of Best and Cotta (2000, 2007); for Eastern Europe, we have the contributions of Higley, Pakulski and Wesolowski (1998), Crowther and Matonyte (2007) and Semenova, Edinger and Best (2013). For the United States, one of the main contributions was made by Eztione-Harlevy (1993). Finally, for a comparative approach that goes beyond regional boundaries, the studies by Czudnoswki (1983) and Eldersveld (1989) deserve mention. For the case of Latin American, before the launch of the PELA project such contributions had been minimal, the work of Higley and Gunther (1992) notwithstanding. This scarcity of analysis on the Latin American sphere can be said to have two explanations: one theoretical; one pragmatic. Related to the former, Latin America during the 1980s was characterised by transition processes towards democracy, while during most of the 1990s studies tended to focus on analysis of the ‘third wave’ of democracy and on institutional strengthening. Related to the latter, the difficulty of accessing relevant material and human resources must be borne in mind. These difficulties can be even greater when applied to elites, given the complexity inherent in arranging interviews with legislators due to tight agendas and low availability or even mistrust towards research in general. In any case, the study of elite opinions and attitudes can be undertaken through both qualitative and quantitative techniques, as well as through mixes of the two. In the first group, tools include in-depth interviews, discussion groups and discourse analysis. With regard to quantitative tools, the survey remains the most common, and content analysis constitutes a good example of a mixed strategy. Qualitative tools focus principally on particular phenomena, seeking specificities. On the other hand, quantitative tools look for generalities, focusing on big data with a positivist approach. Faced with these two possible techniques, which are not exclusive and can be applied complementarily, researchers must first make a methodological decision to define the strategy. Adoption of one or the other approach, or a combination of the two, will depend both on the resources available and on the final objective of the study. Thus, if the context and the search for

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specificities are to be prioritised, then quantitative tools will be used; if generalisation from large samples is the objective, quantitative tools will be used. Together with this decision, other aspects to be taken into account include: the selection of concrete tools for development of the technique; consideration of research variables; the process for obtaining data; and treatment of data. In the next section, the main design characteristics developed in the PELA project will be examined from a critical perspective.

The Beginning of the Parliamentary Elites in Latin America Project from the University of Salamanca The PELA investigation began in 1994 with a project called ‘Political Reform and Parliamentarians’ Values in Four Latin America Nations’.2 This opened a strand of research based on the study of Latin American MPs’ attitudes, opinions and values, and it sought to fill the lacuna of opinion studies applied to elites. The aim that propelled the project and which has directed the investigation ever since is to understand who Latin American legislators are and how they behave. Thus we have paid attention to the socio-demographic as well as ideological characteristics of MPs from a comparative perspective. This has allowed, through data processing, the assessment of differences and similarities among the elites from the various countries studied, along with data on a series of factors such as MPs’ careers, their democratic and institutional points of view, their political party relations or their foreign policy positions, among other aspects. The research in its pilot scheme applied to a small number of countries: Argentina, Paraguay, Costa Rica and Venezuela. The purpose of this first stage was to identify the most important variables for study, along with relevant hypotheses in both theoretical and empirical terms. Following this approach, we chose an investigation strategy based on case studies (García, Mateos and Rivas 2014). Quantities of collected data and the need to study the elites in-depth prompted an increase in the number of countries observed, as can be seen in Table 12.1, and the first wave ended with 16 countries in the sample. The last case to be included was Brazil, which entered in the third wave. For the first time, the questionnaire was applied in a language other than Spanish, which allowed the Brazilian Academy to use the project’s databank. Moreover, the number of variables to be considered increased with the territorial extension of the project, as will be explained below. Methodological Design: Key Questions This field of investigation has been qualified as incipient due to the scarcity of prior studies based on the attitudes and public opinion features of parliamentary elites during the 1990s (Diamond 1999). This was especially clear in

96–98

95–00

73

933

51.7

73.7

34.0

98–02

00–05

00–05

1371

68

100

103

83

68.7

60.6

69.1

69.2

* There is no completely representative proof available.

Source: Authors’ elaboration, from García, Mateos and Rivas (2014).

N

Uruguay

69

01–06

05–10

02–06

06–11

62

94–98

93–98

Dom. Rep.

Venezuela*

72.5

87

95–00

81.3

Peru

65

02–06 99–04

98–03

75.3

01–05 00–03

03–08

58.8

70

55.5 25.2

00–04

02–06

00–03

93–98

47

71 126

78.8

92.6

69.0

Panama*

96–01

97–00

63

112

58

Paraguay

Nicaragua

52.3

24.6

97–01

67

123

94–97

94–97

Honduras

Mexico

98–02 95–00

87.8

97–00

Guatemala*

72

54.8

02–06

02–06

Ecuador

46

86.0

54.7

94–97

49

88

91.2

98–02

52

98–02

El Salvador

02–07

03–07

94–98

Colombia*

Costa Rica

74.2

75.4

49.8

01–05

89

77.5

98

97–01

93

97–02

128

93–97

56.9

97–01

Leg. P.

Chile

74

26.5

%

03–07

93–97

Bolivia

68

Nº interviews

3rd wave

Brazil

95–97

Argentina

Leg. P.

%

Leg. P.

Nº interviews

2nd wave

1st wave

Table 12.1 Percentage of interviews in each country

98.0

102

1500

86

118

96

56

64

60

124

86.8

78.7

73.4

70.0

90.1

65.2

24.8

79.7

69.9

98 79

76.2

89.5

57.2

73.3

26.1

61.5

40.9

%

64

51

95

88

134

80

105

Nº interviews

10–15

06–10

11–16

08–13

04–09

07–11

03–06

06–10

04–08

09–12

03–06

06–10

06–10

06–10

07–11

06–10

07–011

Leg. P.

4th wave

1577

79

94

93

72

68

69

124

91

121

95

80

57

107

90

129

98

110

Nº interviews

79.8

52.8

72.0

90.0

87.2

75.0

24.8

71.1

76.6

76.7

95.2

100.0

64.5

75.0

25.1

75.4

43.0

%

15–20

10–14

17–21

13–17

09–13

12–17

06–09

10–14

08–12

13–17

06–09

10–14

10–14

10–14

10–14

10–14

09–13

Leg. P.

5th wave

1395

69

78

73

55

64

52

128

91

97

94

72

56

91

86

122

97

70

Nº interviews

69.7

42.6

53.3

68.8

90.0

57.0

25.6

70.0

61.4

68.6

85.0

98.3

55.0

74.6

23.8

74.6

27.0

%

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Latin America, where the only important study was that of Higley and Gunther (1992). Thus PELA represented a challenge and an opportunity at the same time: it was a challenge due to the dearth of prior theoretical and methodological referents to guide the measurement of legislators’ attitudes and profiles; it was an opportunity by making the project a pioneer in the study of attitudes of Latin America parliamentary elites. Because a new line of investigation was being opened up, the project undertook two approaches: empirical-descriptive and empirical-explanatory (García and Mateos 2001). With this double goal, the project first described parliamentary elites in Latin America by remarking upon those features that identify this class collectively (socio-demographic, ideological or party-related). Later, the investigation delved more deeply into the explanatory dimension by studying the possible relationships between these features and MPs’ opinions on the consolidation of democracy. These variables were selected for the purpose of studying elites in some degree of complexity. That is, focus was brought to socio-demographic features and the trajectories of MPs, as well as to their opinions on the main common issues driving the national and international politics of any state. Considering the empirical-explanatory view of the investigation, it was important to ask MPs many questions about their perceptions, their institutions and economic systems, their positions on international politics and their attitudes, as well as to identify their personal ideologies. From these premises, and through use of the questionnaire and selected indicators, two general aims were established: 1) the methodical description and comparison of specific cases; and 2) evaluation of the reliability of indicators. As for the first aim, the questionnaire allowed for comparison as well as generalisation due to the systematic integration of several dimensions of analysis. Moreover, recourse to large numbers of cases allows greater use of statistical techniques to identify causal connections among different variables. As for the second aim, certain weaknesses in terms of reliability and validation in the questionnaire have been detected and addressed in successive revisions. New axes have also been incorporated, adapting to the political and academic requirements of each given moment (García, Mateos and Rivas 2014). At first, the more important indicators – measured in terms of their presence in design – were those that also permitted a description of the MPs’ profiles, both from a socio-demographic point of view and with regard to their attitudes towards the main elements of their political systems. With subsequent waves, the project’s aims have widened and inferences have been established between the opinions and attitudes of elites and the quality of a given democracy, along with analysis of the degree of suitability between representatives and citizens. As for the universe under study, it is composed of MPs in every country studied for the entirety of each term. This has enabled us to adopt a comparative analysis strategy of a mixed nature that examines both MPs and countries as a whole. Therefore, paraphrasing García and Mateos (2001: 178–9):

Table 12.2 Central points of analysis and main variables Central points

Main variables

Democracy, elections and form of government

- Stability of and satisfaction with democracy - Democratic quality - Factors associated with consolidation of democracy and regression risk - Design of the electoral system - Confidence in the electoral processes - Definition and ideal form of government - Party identity - Degree of continuity among political parties - Political party functions - Links between political parties and society - Confidence in political parties - Party whip - Internal democracy - Confidence in institutions - Independence of judiciary - Obstacles to independence of judiciary - Valuation of armed forces - Incentives used during electoral campaigns - Corruption perceptions in several institutions and groups - Evaluation of public policies and public expenditures - Degree of state intervention - Function of the state - Privatisations - Tax policy - Foreign policy priorities - Regional integrations - European Union assessment - Free Trade Agreement assessment - Socio-economic origin and family socialisation - Membership in political parties - Beginnings in politics - Political career motivations - Motivations for joining a political party - Offices of representation, appointment and within the political party - Why they were chosen - Political expectations - Representation priorities - Decision-making - Work in committees - Identify one’s ideology - Ideological distance between political parties - Ideological placement of national and international leaders

Political parties

Institutions

Patronage system and corruption Function of the state and public policies

Integration and foreign policy

Political career and parliamentary activity

Ideological axis (left–right politics)

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Central points

Main variables

Socio-demographic features

-

Gender Age Civil status Studies Job Religion and/or religious practice Level of income Opinions on abortion, drug legalization and same-sex marriage

Source: Authors’ elaboration using PELA.







Each country provides a case study in which features and causal relations within the country are gathered. In this way, the behaviour of MPs at a particular moment may be explained from a view that yields information on the changes and continuities during parliamentary terms. Each country represents an analysis unit within the region as a whole. As parliamentary elites are also considered globally, it is easy to infer regional conclusions and to establish both differences and similarities found in specific geographic areas (Central America, the Southern Cone, the Andean countries, etc.). Having access to studies from each parliamentary term since 1994 allows the establishment of comparisons between different historical moments, considering information from within each country as well as for purposes of regional comparison. Furthermore, such longitudinal research offers evidence of changes in attitudes and behaviours, while also allowing for tests of the utility of questions and answers.

With respect to the criteria for the selection of proofs, a proportional criterion is applied for each political party without consideration of gender, ethnic group or age. Thus, the specific selection of interviewees is random, in keeping with a methodological decision that grants importance to representation over personal terms or attitudinal characteristics. This enables us to draw conclusions about the differences and similarities MPs from different political forces may present (not excluding the possibility of independent candidates). Moreover, the high heterogeneity in the composition of Latin American parliaments, as measured in the personal characteristics of their members (by gender, age or ethnic group), makes it difficult to set the criteria that might apply homogeneously across all of the countries studied.

Evolution: Advances in the Project and Methodological Decisions Taken For more than two decades of activity, PELA has experienced a clear evolution in the quantity and nature of data collected. This has, of course, given

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rise to methodological discussions that sought to improve the validity and reliability of the data, as well as new information that might be able to enrich the study of parliamentary elites in the Latin American region. With the data collected from 1994 to 2016, there has been a substantial increase in the number of interviews: from 933 in the first wave to 1,580 in the third. From that point on, there has been a decrease in the number of interviews, for two main reasons. First, the fieldwork conducted in Venezuela from 2006 was terminated due to difficulties associated with obtaining a representative sample. Second, data from Brazil during the 2011–14 legislative term are still being processed and are therefore not included in these statistics. So, apart from Venezuela, the number of interviews has steadily increased from 1994 to the present. It should be noted that the interviews conducted during the sixth wave (2014–18) have not yet been included, as that round of fieldwork is still in progress. In conjunction with these data variations, the project has had to confront certain methodological challenges. In this chapter, we place those challenges into four categories: a) questionnaire design; b) unit of analysis; c) fieldwork; and d) data exploitation. Methodological Decisions in Questionnaire Design Despite the standardised goal to facilitate comparisons between waves and countries, certain adjustments have been introduced over the course of the project’s development designed to improve the validity and reliability of the data gathered. In this sense, as shown in Table 12.3, early emphasis should be placed on the modification of some question and answer categories that are meant to obtain information or to facilitate its understanding. Another methodological decision concerned the inclusion of new questions. In that sense, despite problems associated with inclusions that lengthen the questionnaire and consequently complicate fieldwork, it was decided to give priority to present-day subjects of interest to political science and the project itself. Particularly in the most recent waves, some questions related to two specific subfields of research: the study of professionalisation and quality in politics have been included as indicators to potentially measure variables such as political career and leadership;3 while some questions focused on the level of political congruence, the degree of coincidence and any superposition between the attitudes and preferences of citizens and of legislators. It should be noted that PELA has collaborated with the Barometer of the Americas team at Vanderbilt University in the United States. For nearly three decades this team has spearheaded the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP),4 a public opinion survey that shares several thematic areas with PELA. Because of this collaboration, changes were made to some questions in order to better fit the approach of the Vanderbilt project.5 Elsewhere, other questions were eliminated because those interviewed found them difficult to understand or because the information they produced did not

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Table 12.3 Example of modifications to question and/or answer categories to improve data validity and reliability Original question Currently, there is discussion around the role of the government. In this sense, can you please indicate to what extent you either agree or disagree with the following statements? - In a society as complex as this one, the government cannot solve citizens’ problems. - Intervention of the government in socio-economic life is the only way to reduce social inequalities. - The government should focus on a series of specific areas (health, education, justice, etc.) and leave the rest in the hands of individuals. - The government should intervene as little as possible in society and leave private initiative to deal with citizens’ needs. Revised question I am going to read some statements about the role of the national government. Please indicate to what extent you either agree or disagree with the following statements using a range where one means ‘strongly disagree’ and seven means ‘strongly agree’. - The government, instead of the private sector, should own the most essential enterprises and industries of the country. - The government, instead of individuals, should be the main agent responsible for the welfare of people. - The government, instead of the private sector, should be the main agent responsible for creating jobs. - The government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. - The government, instead of the private sector, should be the main agent responsible for providing retirement pensions. - The government, instead of the private sector, should be the main agent responsible for providing health services. - The government, instead of the private sector, should be the main agent responsible for providing university education. - The government should implement strong policies to reduce inequalities between men and women. - The government should implement strong policies to reduce inequalities between different cultural and ethnic groups. Source: authors’ elaboration using PELA.

correspond to that required by the project. Yet more were omitted due to changes in the regional context.6 Another methodological choice discussed over the two decades related to ranges of answers. As García, Mateos and Rivas (2014) argue, a debate is continuing in respect of the use of answer ranges, as in the choice of extension (e.g. 0–10, or 1–7 or the traditional range of 1–10). In the original questionnaire design, a 1–10 range was used, despite a bias effect in which the interviewee considers five to be a ‘medium’ response. The research team chose not to modify this range, so as not to lose comparability with data already gathered.

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Methodological Decisions Relating to the Unit of Analysis The different types of Latin American parliaments presented different levels of fragmentation, with some composed of a large number of parties holding few seats. This involves the challenge of guaranteeing the anonymity of MPs within minority groups (García, Mateos and Rivas 2014), and the challenge of avoiding a plenitude of categories that would make the use and presentation of data less parsimonious. As a solution, it was decided to create the joint category of ‘others’, in which parties with fewer than five MPs would be included. Another methodological challenge that needed addressing was related to defections by MPs. Changes in the composition of parties following elections often produced changes in the initial sample design. To deal with this situation, it was decided that each sample would be designed according to the composition of legislative bodies in the immediate aftermath of the election, and would ignore any subsequent defections. That is to say, the MPs interviewed are included in the parties to which they were initially attached. This has allowed us to adopt homogeneous criteria for every legislature and to take an initial snapshot of each newly elected parliament. The third challenge concerns comparisons between countries. Despite the fact that every legislature in every country is taken as an independent unit for analysis, comparative logic is given priority over case studies. In the same way, specific questions are not included for each particular country, in order to improve the comparability and homogeneity of questions and to obtain valid and reliable indicators. Finally, the time dimension also implies a challenge. During the more than two decades of research, countries in the region have experienced substantive changes in context that may have affected the profiles of MPs as well as their opinions and attitudes. However, as when drawing comparisons between countries, questions relating to specific situations have been avoided in order to facilitate comparisons and standardisation of the questionnaire. And yet another element – the guarantee of anonymity – prevents us from tracking the ideological evolution of a given MP over their career. It is not, therefore, possible to compare answers given by the same MP at different times. Research ethics towards anonymity are given priority, in order to ensure they contribute to the development of the project. Methodological Decisions Relating to Fieldwork Most discussions around this subject have been classified along four axes: a) the moment the questionnaire is applied; b) researchers personally in charge of carrying out the survey; c) questionnaire application by telematic means; and d) cases in which the sample could not be completed. With regard to when the questionnaire is applied, the research team decided the ideal moment would be at the beginning of the legislative mandate. In this

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way, we avoid distortions and biases provoked in MPs who are preparing for elections in the near future (especially if they are in mid-campaign), as well as, by contrast, changes in attitude that may be produced later as a consequence of an erosion in the exercise of their duties. In the second place, from the beginning of the project to the present day, the survey has generally been applied by members of the research team. This involves researchers travelling to the country in question, sometimes with the support of staff and institutions at the location. This presence in the field by members of the team responds to two rationales. The first relates to the need for the fieldwork to be coordinated and supervised by staff already deeply familiar with both the questionnaire and the methodology, in order to avoid doubts or contingencies. Second, this tactic responds to the logic of periodic revisions of the questionnaire to improve the validity and reliability of the indicators used. Application of the questionnaire by members of the team further allows the detection of weaknesses when measuring question and answer categories. As for telematic application, in recent years there has been an incremental growth of studies using online surveys. However, given the particularities of the sample and the object of study in the PELA project, the survey has so far been applied face-to-face by project researchers. Moreover, to control measurement errors of comprehension and to observe possible inconsistencies that are susceptible to revision, it was decided to not implement the self-administered survey option in order to avoid completion of the questionnaire by a member of the MP’s team, rather than by the MP. The final methodological decision related to fieldwork was the exclusion of Venezuela as a unit of analysis after the second wave. Despite it being one of the four initial countries included in the project, the fieldwork difficulties following the 2005 elections hindered the collection of a sufficiently representative sample, with no data available for the 2006–11 and 2011–16 periods. Nevertheless, following the 2015 legislative elections, it was possible to resume fieldwork in Venezuela and to obtain a representative sample. Methodological Decisions Relating to Analysis and Data Exploitation When exploiting data, the methodological debates have focused on three axes: a) left–right; b) elites–citizens; and c) quality of democracy. With regard to the first, the use of the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ in public life in a heterogeneous region such as Latin America has historically proven difficult and ineffective (Alcántara and Rivas 2007). Given this, and despite several authors having argued for the importance of these terms in characterising the behaviour of actors and parties in Western Europe and the United States (Inglehart and Kungemann 1976; Sartori 1976; Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990; Mair 1997), in the particular case of Latin American the impact of other variables (such as populism) should be taken into account in describing the political universe.

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However, despite the complexity the left–right axis may present for Latin America, the evolution of democracies in the region has allowed us to capture the characteristics of political and party life along a left–right continuum (Coppedge 1998). In this regard, a number of works have highlighted the notion that, despite differences that may exist, this dimension is observed by Latin American MPs themselves, both for ideological self-placement and for parties and leaders.7 This is associated with specific attitudes and opinions that facilitate and guarantee the validity of the indicator (Alcántara and Llamazares 2006). As for the second issue, the ongoing collaboration between the Barometer of the Americas team at Vanderbilt University and the University of Salamanca has allowed a deepening in the study of MPs and voters in terms of ideology and programme. In that sense, as García, Mateos and Rivas (2014) show, three objectives are at play: a) grasping the direct relationship between citizens and MPs; b) measuring coincident and divergent interests between them; and c) presenting a global view of coincidence and divergence between the positions of these groups. The study of congruence between elites and citizens gains special importance in the Latin American context, where a crisis of representation is seen to exist (Mainwaring, Bejarano and Pizarro 2006; Hagopian 1998). As Soroka and Wlezein (2011) argue, it is necessary to delineate the extent to which government action responds to citizen demands and to ask whether errors in the mechanisms of representation involve a source of disaffection and make the consolidation of democracy difficult. In view of this, researchers from PELA have concentrated their efforts on assessing the level of congruence of opinions and attitudes between MPs and voters from a political, social and economic perspective. Finally, the relationship between representation and the quality of democracy is a priority area for the research team. The opinions and attitudes of elites play an unquestionable role in the stability of democracy (Diamond 1999), given that they exert a major influence on decision processes compared to other civil society actors. Their professional dedication to politics and greater access to information produce in the governing elites a more elaborate system of beliefs than found among other actors (Dahl 1971). These systems of belief are in turn transferred to society and influence the political culture of the country. However, the concept of quality of democracy continues to present several methodological challenges due to a high level of abstraction, causing difficulties in operationalisation. In respect of this problem, a debate persists between two positions: one arguing that the level of the quality of democracy can be assessed by citizens; the other connecting it to institutional performance (O’Donnell 1999). Thus, the opinions and attitudes of elites on economic, political and social issues, as well as their positions on policy development, acquire great importance.

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Main Contributions and Academic Production Impact The fact that PELA has become a standard for reference in studies of the opinions and attitudes of Latin American legislators, together with the public nature of its funding, has moved the team to make the results of its different waves publicly available at oir.org.es/pela. In addition to the data collected during fieldwork, the project has generated a heterogeneous body of academic production that, from different approaches and methodologies, has followed the objective of collecting descriptive and/or explanatory studies on the profiles and behaviour of Latin American MPs. These publications can be classified into the following categories: 1) bulletins; 2) scientific articles; 3) books and chapters; 4) contributions to congresses; and 5) doctoral theses. Bulletins are brief informative reports in which certain variables are analysed in a comparative or case study approach. There are four bulletin collections: a) countries; b) issues; c) analysis; and d) United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The first contains studies classified by three different periods – the years 2005, 2008 and 2012 – in which data from every country are presented alongside comparative works. The issues collection, from 2006, consists of 12 bulletins that focus on specific points of research. The analysis collection consists of analyses by researchers from the political science discipline at the University of Salamanca between 2009 and 2013. Finally, the UNPD collection is the result of the collaboration between the University of Salamanca and the United Nations Development Programme’s Democratic Governance Office (UNDP-DGO). With regard to academic production by researchers involved in the project, data from the project were distributed at conferences and congresses, amounting to nearly 150 documents over the last eight-year period (Figure 12.1). In addition to this, during the period indicated, data from the project

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Figure 12.1 Academic production by researchers from the project since 2010. Source: Authors’ elaboration using information from reports for the Spanish government’s Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness.

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also appeared in books and chapters (33) and scientific articles (28). The relatively low number of theses employing data from PELA indicates the need for the promotion of the project among younger researchers engaged in the development of their doctoral theses. As for the content of the works employing project data, the scenario is mixed. With respect to published articles, some, such as those by Martínez Barahona (2000) and Martínez Barahona and del Campo (2000) take as their unit of analysis data on the left and right families of political parties. Others have focused on the process of political professionalisation (Alcántara and Cabezas 2011; Cabezas and Barragán 2014), on political parties (Alcántara 2011; Cabezas 2010), on party systems (Luna 2014), on the quality of representation (Rivas, Vicente and Sánchez 2010) and on issues relating to political economy (Luna 2014). Finally, some researchers have used PELA data to focus on the subjective dimension of politics, including ambition (Martínez Rosón 2011) or for research on neuropolitics developed by Alcántara (2014). Of the books and book chapters, most noteworthy is Elecciones y política en América Latina, 8 which draws on data about the ideological positions of parties and leaders, as well as variables related to institutional systems and the internal organisation of parties. El oficio del político (Alcántara 2011) employs comparative and longitudinal data to examine the attitudes professional politicians have towards their own political activity and careers. In the area of the contributions to academic and other congresses, as with published articles, the issues approached show wide diversity. Here it is worth mentioning certain congresses at which PELA data have been presented, rather than enumerating the many issues involved. Project data have been presented at such academic fora as the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), the International Political Science Association (IPSA), the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) and the Latin American Political Science Association (ALACIP). Moreover, members of the research team have presented PELA data at a number of Latin and North American universities.

Research and Methodological Challenges, and a Future Agenda Since it was launched in 1994, PELA’s priority goal has been to collect systematic and rigorous data that enable the analysis of attitudes and opinions of Latin American legislators. This has constituted an important methodological contribution in a field in which studies on elite opinions had been few and far between and has ensured a significant theoretical contribution by providing data that can be used to develop theoretical works about processes in Latin America as a whole and individual countries in the region. Likewise, this broad universe of study (every legislature from 18 countries, or almost all of Latin America) has served as a key element in carrying out comparative studies, both geographically and chronologically. All of this – the thoroughness and periodic upgrading of the quality of the data – has

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been managed in consideration of the need to incorporate new indicators on issues of current concern or academic interest, along with the revision of existing indicators. With respect to the fieldwork, the debate around the use of self-administered surveys continues. Despite the reasons mentioned above in favour of such an approach, this possibility has been rejected so far, and discussion currently revolves around a potential, mixed strategy that combines researchers on the ground with the use of new technologies that are capable of facilitating the development of fieldwork. The diffusion of data also constitutes an outstanding challenge. Despite the ample availability of this data and their frequent use by the research team, one of the team’s objectives is to increase its use by the Spanish, Latin American and North American academic communities, both in scientific articles and in master’s and doctoral’s theses. In this way, the aim is to contribute empirical data to the analysis of parliamentary elites in Latin America, as well as to improve methodologies for the analysis of opinions and attitudes held by MPs throughout the region.

Notes 1 For a detailed analysis about the study of elites, see Chapter 7. 2 The PELA project has always had public funding. Over its more than 20 years of activity, the following projects have been financed: SEC94/0284, SEC95/0845,SEC02/ 3484, SEJ 2005–08313, C/POL, CSO 2009–08971 Y CSO2012–39377-C02–02. 3 Examples of added questions: ‘In terms of your career, what would you like your next office to be?’; or ‘From the following characteristics here presented (education, political expertise, honesty, charisma or political leadership), which do you think is most important to winning an election? And to win second place?’ 4 www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/index.php 5 One example could be the question related to religion. The original question was ‘According to your religious beliefs, in what position would you place yourself in the following range, where one means “minimum religiosity” and 10 means “maximum religiosity”?’ The revised question is ‘How frequently do you attend religious services? More than once a week/once a week/once a month/once or twice a year/never or hardly ever/no answer/not applicable’. 6 A good example here would be the question related to the advantages and disadvantages of a democratic regime: ‘I am going to show you a list of possible advantages of democratic regimes, and I would like to know which, in your opinion, would represent the main advantage. And the second.’ At the beginning of the research, in 1994, these questions responded to the interest in democratic consolidation following transitions, and to the level of institutionalisation of the state when facing possible threats. However, more than two decades later, challenges have evolved beyond the consolidation of democracy. 7 See, among others, Coppedge (1998), Alcántara (2004), Ruiz-Rodríguez (2003), Freidenberg, García and Llamazares (2006) and Colomer and Escabel (2005). 8 See Alcántara and Díaz (2008), Alcántara and Tagina (2011) and Alcántara and Tagina (2013).

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References Alcántara, M. (2004). Quality of democracy or quality of politics? In: G. O’Donnell and J. V. Cullell, eds. The quality of democracy: Theory and applications. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 234–238. Alcántara, M. (2011). El oficio del político. Madrid: Tecnos. Alcántara, M. (2014). Neuropolítica: una aproximación a la micropolítica. Revista Española de Ciencia Política 35, 31–55. Alcántara, M. and Cabezas, L., eds. (2011). Selección de candidatos y elaboración de programas en los partidos políticos latinoamericanos. Mexico: Tirant lo Blanch. Alcántara, M. and Díaz, F. (2008). Elecciones y política en América Latina. Mexico: Instituto Electoral del Estado de México. Alcántara, M. and Llamazares, I. (2006). Los partidos de la derecha en los legislativos latinoamericanos. In: M. Alcántara, ed. Políticos y política en América Latina. Madrid: Siglo XXI. Alcántara, M. and Rivas, C. (2007). Las dimensiones de la polarización partidista en América Latina. Política y Gobierno 14(2), 349–390. Alcántara, M. and Tagina, M. (2011). América Latina: Política y elecciones del bicentenario (2009–10). Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales. Alcántara, M. and Tagina, M. (2013). Elecciones y política en América Latina (2009–11). Mexico: Instituto Federal Electoral. Best, H. and Cotta, M. (2000). Parliamentary representation in Europe 1848–2000: Legislative recruitment and careers in eleven European countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Best, H. and Cotta, M. (2007). Democratic representation in Europe: Diversity, change and convergence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bourdieu, P. (1990). Sociología y cultura. Mexico: Consejo Nacional para la Cultura de México. Cabezas, L. (2010). El éxito electoral de los partidos en la región andina. Consejo editorial 85, 85–117. Cabezas, L. and Barragán, M. (2014). Repensando la profesionalización de los políticos. Iberoamericana 14(54), 164–168. Colomer, J. and Escabel, L. (2005). The left–right dimension in Latin America. Working paper. Mexico: CIDE. Coppedge, M. (1998). The dynamic diversity of Latin American party systems. Party Politics 4(4), 547–568. Crowther, W. and Matonyte, I. (2007). Parliamentary elites as a democratic thermometer: Estonia, Lithuania and Moldova compared. Communist and Postcommunist Studies 40, 281–299. Czudnowski, M. (1983). Political elites and social change: Studies of elite roles and attitudes. DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press. Dahl, R. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and opposition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Diamond, L. (1999). Developing democracy toward consolidation. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Eldersveld, S. (1989). Political elites in modern societies. Ann Arbor, IL: University of Michigan Press. Eztione-Harlevy, E. (1993). The elite connection: Problems and potential of Western democracy. Cambridge: Polity.

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Freidenberg, F., García, F. and Llamazares, I. (2006). Instituciones políticas y cohesión ideológica: un análisis multinivel de la heterogeneidad ideológica en los partidos latinoamericanos. In: M. Alcántara, ed. Políticos y política en América Latina. Madrid: Siglo XXI, pp. 255–280. García, F. and Mateos, A. (2001). Elites parlamentarias en América Latina. Revista Española de Ciencia Política 5, 173–194. García, F.Mateos, A. and Rivas, C. (2014). Veinte años de élites parlamentarias en América Latina (1994–2014). Revista de las Cortes Generales 15, 135–174. Hagopian, F. (1998). Democracy and political representation in Latin America in the 1990s: Pause, reorganization or decline? In: F. Auyero and J. Stark, eds. Fault lines of democracy in post-transition Latin America. Coral Gables, FL: North-South Center Press, University of Miami, pp. 99–143. Higley, J. and Gunther, R. (1992). Elites and democratic consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press. Higley, J., Pakulski, J. and Wesolowski, W. (1998). Postcommunist elites and democracy in Eastern Europe. Houndmills: Macmillan. Inglehart, R. and Kungemann, H. (1976). Party identification, ideological preference and the left–right dimension among Western mass publics. In: I. Budge and D. Farlie, eds. Party identification and beyond: Representation, voting and party competition. Chichester: Wiley. Kitschelt, H. and Hellemans, S. (1990). The left–right semantics and the new politics cleavage. Comparative Political Studies 23, 210–238. Luna, J. (2014). Segmented representation party strategies in unequal democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mainwaring, S., Bejarano, A. and Pizarro, E. (2006). The crisis of democratic representation in the Andes: An overview. In: S. Mainwaring, ed. The crisis of democratic representation in the Andes. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 1–44. Mair, M. (1997). Party system change: Approaches and interpretations. Oxford: Clarendon. Martínez Barahona, E. (2000). La democracia interna en los partidos centroamericanos. Paper presented in the panel ‘Political Parties in Latin America’. London: Institute of Latin American Studies. Martínez Barahona, E. and del Campo, E. (2000). La derecha en Chile. Paper presented at the LASA Congress. Miami. Martínez Rosón, M. (2011). Ambición política y lealtad: influencia sobre el comportamiento político. Política y Gobierno 18(2), 231–264. O’Donnell, G. (1999). Horizontal accountability and new polyarchies. In: A. Schedler, L. J. Diamond and M. F. Plattner, eds. The self-restraining state: Power and accountability in new democracies. Boulder, NY: Lynne Rienner, pp. 29–52. Putnam, R. (1973). The beliefs of politicians: Ideology, conflict and democracy in Britain and Italy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Rivas, C.Vicente, P. and Sánchez, F. (2010). La educación como elemento de calidad de los políticos latinoamericanos. Política y Gobierno 17(2), 279–319. Ruiz-Rodriguez, L. (2003). La coherencia de los partidos políticos: estructuración interna de la élite parlamentaria latinoamericana. Doctoral thesis. University of Salamanca. Sartori, G. (1976). Parties and party system: A framework for analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schmitt, C. (1982). Teoría de la constitución. Madrid: Alianza Universidad.

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Semenova, E., Edinger, M. and Best, H. (2013). Parliamentary elites in Central and Eastern Europe: Recruitment and representation. New York: Routledge. Soroka, S. and Wlezein, C. (2011). Degrees of democracy: Politics, public opinion and policy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Conclusions Marco Lisi, Emmanouil Tsatsanis, Xavier Coller, André Freire and Mélany Barragán

It is commonly agreed that democratic representation depends on institutionalised links between voters and office-holders that make those in power accountable to the mass electorate. It is also well known that political representation in contemporary democracies has suffered a number of challenges and pressures. Multilevel governance and globalisation have defied the functioning of traditional representative institutions. New digital technologies have changed the way MPs communicate with voters. In addition, new parties have emerged that defend anti-establishment policies and radical institutional reforms. These are just some of the recent phenomena that have added new pressures to the constant change of societies, enhancing the severe strains in the circuit of political representation. This volume addresses one core feature of democratic political systems; namely, the transformations of political representation. Without seeking to resolve old dilemmas, to cover all aspects of political representation or to achieve unequivocal generalisations, the contributions to this volume fulfil a twofold task. On the one hand, they bring new evidence to this field of study by examining new and original data, thus updating and expanding existing research. On the other, all contributions focus on a crucial period, characterised by deep economic and political challenges, with significant transformations of democratic political systems. In particular, the analysis of specific dimensions of political representation before and after the Great Recession in Europe and the commodity crisis in Latin America allowed the contributors to test existing theories and approaches related to the empirical study of representation. This volume adopts a comparative research design based on a comparison of two distinct regions: Southern Europe and Latin America. In doing so, we aim to innovate on previous research based mostly on case studies or cross-country analyses within a specific region. This strategy may increase our knowledge on the topic and pave the way to more systematic collaboration in the future. Moreover, the comparison between the two regions seems particularly suited for examining how external shocks – economic and political crises – have impacted political representation and, more broadly, the overall performance of democratic polities.

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Political representation has been challenged by the crisis of party democracy. Representative democracies are based on the idea of party government that consists of an executive body responsible for policy-making and representing the top level within the polity (Katz 1987; Keman 2002a). Usually this concept is associated with two crucial dimensions that measure the ‘quality’ of governmental and parliamentary functioning: responsiveness and accountability. Representative institutions should be sufficiently responsive to societal and political issues, while accountability refers to the government’s capacity to effectively execute the policy choices put forward by political parties. To what extent have the economic crises that emerged in 2008 in Europe and the commodity crisis that hit Latin America in 2014 deepened the crisis of party democracy and, consequently, political representation? As noted by Katz and Mair (2018), political and economic crises are usually associated with the inability of party governments to respond to citizen demands. In some cases, the problem lies in the inefficacy or incompetence of elected officials who are unable to deal with the main problems facing society. In other cases, the problem results from the inconsistency of citizen demands. Finally, crises may reveal the incapacity or inability of party governments to meet expectations. This is especially true when parties need to take into account the opinion of experts and to manage the government and state ‘responsibly’ while at the same time striving to remain representatives of the people and to represent citizen demands. Starting from this premise, one of the overarching aims of this volume is to assess the effects of these external shocks on key aspects of political representation. In particular, we want to separate shortterm impacts from more long-term trends, highlighting cases (and causes) of deep and abrupt change and those characterised by more gradual transformations, if not outright continuity. The spectacular rise of populist forces in countries such Italy, Spain and Greece has been understood as evidence of the direct impact of imposed reforms. However, the failure of mainstream parties to fulfil representative functions and to maintain popular consent has not been limited to the countries most directly affected by the recent economic crises. Indeed, the analysis of Latin American countries suggests the need to look also at the long-term development of growing detachment from parties, the atomisation of society and the self-referential nature of political elite discourse. Generally speaking, these phenomena have endangered the traditional mechanisms underpinning democratic political representation, although no real alternative has as yet come to the fore. This concluding chapter aims to summarise the main findings of the volume and to provide a preliminary answer to the research questions presented in the introduction. Therefore, we start by looking at the evolution of key indicators of democratic legitimacy and satisfaction. The next section focuses on the degree of ideological congruence between citizens and their representatives, while the fourth section of the chapter examines the evolution of descriptive representation before and after economic crises in both

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Southern Europe and Latin America. In the conclusion, we explore some potentially fruitful avenues for future research.

Citizen Attitudes Towards the Political System: A Crisis of Representation? The question of the impact of the double economic crises on democratic legitimacy and trust in political institutions in the two regions is not an easy one to answer. To begin with, as David Easton pointed out (1976), specific and diffuse political support are not always connected. Therefore, sudden economic shocks can affect trust in particular institutions and, especially, in the specific actors that control them, without necessarily shattering citizen faith in the entire political regime. This seems to be particularly the case in consolidated democracies (Dalton 2004), where levels of diffuse support for the democratic regime (captured, for example, by an evaluation of democratic forms of government versus non-democratic forms) remain high and stable, while specific support (captured by such indicators as satisfaction with the way democracy works or by trust in particular political institutions and office-holders) can wax and wane in the short term, reacting to such contextual factors as perceived government performance, external shocks (e.g. a global economic recession that affects the national economy) or other recent political events of note (e.g. a political scandal). While the countries of Southern Europe and many in Latin America are third-wave democracies, levels of diffuse support for democracy in Southern Europe have been generally much closer to the highs of other advanced democracies in relation to Latin American countries. On the other hand, the crisis had a sharp negative impact on levels of specific support in Southern Europe, something that is captured in the case studies contained in the volume. Specific support, in the form of trust in representative political institutions such as parliament and political parties, took a big hit during the first half of the 2010s in Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece, even while diffuse support remained high, as is shown in other studies (Cordero and Simón 2016; Teixeira, Emmanouil and Belchior 2014). Therefore, growing political discontent in Southern Europe did not translate into a full-fledged regime legitimation crisis, but rather into a rejection of the old political guard. The anger and frustration of citizens with austerity and the deterioration of living standards were expressed at the ballot box, where large parts of Southern European electorates decided to punish traditional mainstream parties and to give a chance to fringe challengers and political upstarts. Portugal stands apart from this regional trend in two respects. First, political discontent did not really find electoral expression in the form of a new and successful challenger. Second, Portugal’s economic recovery coincided with the advent of a new government, under the tenure of which specific support has recovered almost as abruptly as it collapsed at the start of the crisis. Such a recovery of trust in political institutions and the government has

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not been observed in the other Southern European countries, despite an overall improvement in economic indicators after 2014–15 and the electoral successes of challenger parties. In the case of Portugal, a change in inter-party cooperation and competition patterns, namely via the formation of an innovative anti-austerity coalition on the left, was enough to restore trust in political institutions in the short run by reinforcing a sense that meaningful alternatives (in terms of programmatic responses to the crisis) are on offer within the pre-existing party system. Despite the significant cycle of protest across other Southern European countries at the beginning of the 2010s, and the continuing decline in electoral turnout in certain countries (especially Portugal), one can say that the political discontent unleashed by the economic crisis in Southern Europe was largely expressed within proper institutional channels and never amounted to a legitimacy crisis. However, the full and lasting legacy of the crisis is still being ascertained, and as long as old and new political parties struggle equally to offer convincing answers for the pressing questions posed by the economic crisis, immigration and globalisation, a crisis of representation will continue to be visible, if not appear imminent, on the Southern European political horizon. The chapters of this volume dealing with Latin America focus somewhat less on the question of citizen attitudes towards the political system. However, to the extent that they do, the chapters on Chile and Ecuador, for example, reveal the limited impact of the commodity crisis. Nevertheless, in many countries, such as Venezuela, the commodity crisis is difficult to separate from other developments (such as the regime’s authoritarian turn). As a result, even while trust in political institutions appears to be less affected by the commodity crisis in Latin America in comparison to the effect of the sovereign debt crisis in Southern Europe, comparative studies show that diffuse support for democracy is far more fragile in the Latin American region (Zechmeister and Lupu 2019) and that it is threatened by a combination of domestic and external factors, which, apart from fluctuations in the commodity market prices, include feeble political institutions, weakly entrenched democratic culture among elites and persistently high levels of economic inequality, among others.

The Congruence Between Voters and MPs: Trends and Comparative Perspectives The impact of the crises on substantive representation in Southern Europe and Latin America appears somewhat complex and without a clear overall pattern. Congruence between voters and MPs seems to follow different patterns on different aspects of policy. In Portugal, for example, the movement of the parties of the centre-right government (and especially the PSD [Social Democratic Party]) to the right on economic matters increased the incongruence of parties and voters, which had the unintended consequence of the pact between the PS (Socialist Party) and the two smaller parties of the radical left (CDU [Unitary Democratic Coalition], i.e. the PCP [Communists] and the PEV [Greens]; the BE [Left Bloc]). In other Southern European countries, the incongruence between

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mainstream governing parties and the electorate was addressed via the emergence of challenger parties such as SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left), Podemos and M5S (Five Star Movement), which appeared more congruent with the electorate on matters related to austerity and economic policy. Political discontent in Southern Europe was without doubt fuelled by a growing incongruence between mainstream ruling parties and their (former) voters on these issues. Substantive representation appears to have improved as a result of the electoral response to the crisis in these countries, at least in terms of the congruence of views and stated preferences between voters and their MPs. However, the real test remains the ability of new political actors to deliver policy outputs that are closer to the preferences of the electorate. Here, the record of parties such as SYRIZA and M5S appears to be less convincing. The case studies of Latin American countries show that an overall verdict concerning the direction of substantive representation in that region is perhaps even more difficult to deliver. For example, in Chile, images of steady congruence on some ideological or policy dimensions (e.g. left–right placement, identification of main social problems and acceptance of democracy) are contrasted with the growing divergence on the diagnoses and proposed solutions of social ills, differences in the role of the state and other things that reflect a growing distance between the public and political elites. The case of Venezuela also shows that congruence between political elites and the electorate within a heavily polarised society and political system does not necessarily and automatically translate into an improvement in the quality of political representation.

Economic Crises and Descriptive Representation: The Evolution of Representativeness Descriptive representation has been analysed in this book in the chapters covering the countries of Southern Europe. In all four of them the conclusion is clear: with the exception of Portugal, the crisis has transformed the party system and/or has opened avenues through which new political actors can enter parliament. Even in the case of Portugal (and to a limited extent in the case of traditional Spanish parties, Jaime-Castillo, Coller and Cordero 2018), parties have somehow incorporated social discontent by opening their electoral lists to civic leaders (Lisi 2018). This case of ‘environment absorption’ helps put Portugal on the same trend as the other Southern European countries, albeit with different intensity: parliaments seem to be more socially diverse after the crisis than before. Greece is a case in which the crisis had devastating effects with political derivations: the party system changed with the emergence of new parties and the growth and consolidation of new ones that entered parliament. The Greek parliament changed its social profile slightly, as has been shown elsewhere (Kakepaki 2018; Kakepaki, Kountouri, Verzichelli and Coller 2018). Compared to the period before the crisis, there are more women, the proportion of

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the older MPs has been reduced, there are proportionally fewer universitytrained MPs, while the structure of professions remains more or less the same. The authors report, however, that family ties are less common among MPs and that the proportion of new, inexperienced MPs grows. Italy is another example of party system transformation that took place long before the crisis. It opened the way for political entrepreneurs and new parties to channel the discontent of broad segments of the electorate, with new parties being well represented in parliament. The effect has been the addition of social diversity: more women in parliament, fewer university graduates (more variety in terms of educational levels), more young MPs – especially among the newcomers – and a modification of the professional structure of parliament, insofar as traditional professions like civil servants and teachers (especially among leftist parties) declined, which basically means other professionals entered parliament. In large part, the authors contend, supporting Seddone and Rombi’s (2018) findings, that the M5S is largely responsible for the introduction of this social diversity, although the Northern League (NL) and the parties of the left, respectively, are responsible for bringing younger MPs and more women to parliament. There has been no major change to the Portuguese party system, and the level of social diversity introduced to parliament seems to be lower than in other countries. The authors report that there are more women, the younger cohort (18–35) has fallen and the proportion of MPs with university degrees has grown. Overall, however, social diversity brings parliament slightly closer to Portuguese society, as is shown by the synthetic index of social disproportion (Freire and Coller 2019). Analysis by party indicates that the PCP (Portuguese Communist Party) and the CDS-PP (Popular Party) are partially responsible for these changes (Lisi 2018). However, Portugal is an exception in the context of Southern Europe. Spain is another case of party system transformation, although unlike Portugal and Ireland in the EU, it is a country in which a new extremely populist party of the far-right entered parliament in the 2019 elections. The authors of chapter 6 report the changes these new parties (Podemos, Ciudadanos and Vox) have incorporated into the social profile of parliament. Certainly, although more social diversity is a historical trend, comparing pre- and post-crises legislatures shows there is a renewal of MPs above the historical trend (average of 50 per cent), a slilght growth in the presence of women, younger MPs (except after the 2019 elections), more professional diversity to the detriment of the teaching and legal professionals, and stagnation in the number of university graduates and natives. All in all, it seems to confirm the findings of Coller, Domínguez, Portillo-Pérez and Escobar (2018), who concluded that more diversity means, overall, that parliaments tend to socially resemble societies that elect MPs, a claim that needs to be sustained empirically in other countries. Finally, although no data have been gathered for the Latin American part of the book, previous research concludes that while the dominant profile in

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parliaments has persisted lately (middle-age men with university qualifications), recent changes associated with the crisis and social protests ‘allow the entry into politics of traditionally marginalised groups, such as women and young people, and promote more social diversity’ (Barragán and Bohígues 2018: 182).

Looking Ahead The literature on political representation points to the importance of the political environment for providing citizens with effective information cues that enable them to make reasoned choices when selecting their preferred politicians and to form opinions about the performance of representative institutions. One of the lessons we can draw from our study, based on the comparison between Latin America and Southern Europe, is that the functioning of political representation is not only a matter of the institutionalisation of political or party systems. Economic crises, historical legacies and democratic trajectories are also key factors that help explain the differences across regions and countries. Apart from extending the geographical and temporal scope of studies on political representation, the research would probably be most fruitful were it pursued along several lines. The remaining part of the chapter is devoted to identifying ways that might improve the field of political representation studies. From a theoretical point of view, it is highly desirable to strengthen the link between political theory and empirical studies, trying to benefit from theoretical and philosophical insights to draw testable arguments and hypotheses. This is certainly a new avenue worth exploring if we want to be innovative in this field of study. For example, the transformation of the state or of identity politics are issues that may usefully foster dialogue across these distinct subfields. The contributions to this volume show there are important national variations in institutional configurations, both across and within each region. Although there are already some works that have systematically examined the impact of institutions on political representation (Keman 2002b; Ezrow 2010; Dalton, Farrell and McAllister 2011), there is yet more work to be done. The general assumption is that the formal institutional structures of representative democracies matter less than the characteristics of parties and party systems. Yet, the growing ease of scholars in connecting micro- and macro-levels of analysis holds significant promise for integrating the study of attitudinal and behavioural politics with the performance of representative institutions. This area of enquiry is particularly promising for integrating the study of established democracies with research on newer democratic regimes. Another important strand of research is to connect the literature on the personalisation of politics to the transformations of political representation. As a number of authors have noted (Poguntke and Webb 2005; Musella 2018; Rahat and Kenig 2018), we have entered an era in which collective actors

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have been increasingly replaced by the figure of individual politicians to fulfil traditional representational functions. This phenomenon has important implications for the links between political representatives, parties and citizens, thus affecting the overall quality and functioning of political representation. An example of this new research agenda is the volume edited by Colomer (2011a), which examines the link between electoral systems and ‘personal representation’, intended as the MPs’ ‘reliability and ability to fulfil electoral promises and respond to voter demands’ (Colomer 2011b: 7). Another topic that deserves more attention in the future, from both a theoretical and empirical point of view, is the importance of multilevel politics in understanding the multiple facets of political representation. The interaction between local politics and national MPs may provide new perspectives that will allow us to better evaluate both the input and output side of representative institutions. Sometimes the ties that link citizens to local and national politicians or political organisations point to different conclusions and do not always evolve in the same direction. Moreover, there can be a contagion effect from one arena to another. It is thus imperative to tackle political representation from multiple angles. In the European region, this also means incorporating into the analysis the way the European integration process has shaped the linkages between voters and their representatives. Finally, our research also highlights the need to advance, methodologically, the study of political representation. First, it would be useful to use panel data to disentangle the complex relationship between distinct phenomena and to identify causal links between relevant variables. Second, in some cases, data limitations in terms of the subjects to be surveyed or the years covered limit the scope of comparison, making generalisations more difficult to achieve. Expert surveys may complement mass or elite surveys, thus strengthening the empirical evidence and the robustness of the findings. These are just some strategies that can advance our knowledge of political representation, focusing not only on Southern Europe and Latin America but extending our examination to other regions of the world. Despite these unexplored aspects and the diversity presented by the two regions analysed here, we believe it is possible to reach a tentative conclusion, at least in a negative form. There is, as yet, no sign that other subjects are replacing political parties in their institutional functions. Mainstream parties have certainly become weaker in terms of their societal bonds, and they have been challenged by the rise of new political forces and actors of intermediation. However, political parties remain the key gatekeepers, at least as far as the selection of candidates is concerned, and they still perform a crucial function with respect to the elaboration of programmes and policy orientations. Finally, political parties also shape government efficacy and the ability to enact policy decisions. While parties may be in decline – at least in terms of their traditional societal functions – they remain an important side of the equation between the represented and representatives, and it is imperative that

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we examine how their role in the political system is changing and how they interact with other potential actors of representation.

References Barragán, M. and Bohígues, A. (2018). New political parties in Latin America: A new way of selection and new elite profiles? In: X. Coller, G. Cordero and A. M. Jaime-Castillo, eds. The selection of politicians in times of crisis. London: Routledge, pp. 165–188. Coller, X., Domínguez, P., Portillo-Pérez, M. and Escobar, M. (2018). Elites políticas en España: ¿Convergencia o divergencia con la sociedad? In: B. Pendas, E. González and R. Rubio, eds. España constitucional (1978–2018): trayectorias y perspectivas. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, pp. 3363–3385. Colomer, J. M. (2011a). Personal representation: The neglected dimension of electoral systems. Colchester: ECPR. Colomer, J. M. (2011b). Introduction: Personal and party representation. In: J. M. Colomer, ed. Personal representation: The neglected dimension of electoral systems. Colchester: ECPR, pp. 1–20. Cordero, G. and Simón, P. (2016). Economic crisis and support for democracy in Europe. West European Politics 39(2), 305–325. Dalton, R. J. (2004). Democratic challenges, democratic choices. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dalton, R. J., Farrell, D. and McAllister, I., eds. (2011). Political parties and democratic linkage. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Easton, D. (1976). Theoretical approaches to political support. Canadian Journal of Political Science 9(3), 431–448. Ezrow, L. (2010). Linking citizens and parties: How electoral systems matter for political representation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Freire, A. and Coller, X. (2019). Social distance and ideological congruence between MPs and citizens: Iberian legislatures before and after the Great Recession. In: J. M. Fernandes. and C. Leston-Bandeira, C., eds. The Iberian legislatures in comparative perspective. London: Routledge, pp. 91–110. Jaime-Castillo, A., Coller, X. and Cordero, G. (2018). New parties and new ways of candidate selection in Spain. In: X. Coller, G. Cordero and A. M. Jaime-Castillo, eds. The selection of politicians in times of crisis. London: Routledge, pp. 226–242. Kakepaki, M. (2018). New actors, old practices? Candidate selection and recruitment patterns in Greece. In: X. Coller, G. Cordero and A. M. Jaime-Castillo, eds. The selection of politicians in times of crisis. London: Routledge, pp. 98–114. Kakepaki, M., Kountouri, F., Verzichelli, L. and Coller, X. (2018). The sociopolitical profile of parliamentary representatives in Greece, Italy and Spain before and after the eurocrisis: A comparative empirical assessment. In: G. Cordero and X. Coller, eds. Democratizing candidate selection: New methods, old receipts? London: Palgrave, pp. 175–200. Katz, R. S., ed. (1987). Party governments: European and American experiences. Berlin: W. de Gruyter. Katz, R. S. and Mair, P. (2018). Democracy and the cartelization of political parties. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Keman, H. (2002a). Comparative democratic politics. London: SAGE.

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Keman, H. (2002b). Policy-making capacities of European party government. In: K. R. Luther and F. Mûller-Rommel, eds. Political parties in the New Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 207–243. Lisi, M. (2018). The limits of party change: Candidate selection in Portugal in the age of crisis. In: X. Coller, G. Cordero and A. M. Jaime-Castillo, eds. The selection of politicians in times of crisis. London: Routledge, pp. 206–225. Musella, F. (2018). Political leaders beyond party politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Poguntke, T. and Webb, P., eds. (2005). The presidentialization of politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rahat, G. and Kenig, O. (2018). From party politics to personalized politics?Oxford: Oxford University Press. Seddone, A. and Rombi, S. (2018). The hurricane in the Italian parliament: M5S and its MPs, selection procedures, profiles and legislative behavior. In: X. Coller, G. Cordero and A. M. Jaime-Castillo, eds. The selection of politicians in times of crisis. London: Routledge, pp. 149–164. Teixeira, C. P. Tsatsanis, E. and Belchior, A. M. (2014). Support for democracy in times of crisis: Diffuse and specific regime support in Portugal and Greece. South European Society and Politics 19(4), 501–518. Zechmeister, E. and Lupu, N., eds. (2019). LAPOP: The 2018/19 Americas Barometer. Topical Brief 36, Vanderbilt University. 15 October. Available at https://www.va nderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/ITB036en.pdf

Index

AD. See Venezuela, Democratic Action ADN. See Guatemala, National Development Action AFP. See Chile, Pension Fund Administrators agency theory 87 AHP. See Portugal, Historical Parliamentary Archive AKEL. See Cyprus, Progressive Party of Working People ALACIP. See Latin American Political Science Association AN. See Italy, National Alliance ANEL. See Greece, Independent Greeks Arena. See El Salvador, Nationalist Republican Alliance Argentina Kirchner, Cristina Fernandez de 156 Kirchner, Nestor 161 Macri, Mauricio 156–7, 191 Radical Civic Union (UCR) 145, 149 Scioli, Daniel 156 Art.1-MDP. See Italy, Article 1-the Democratic and Progressive Movement Assange, Julian 207 BE. See Portugal, Left Bloc Belarus 18 Bolivia Morales, Evo 145, 156, 161 Movement for Socialism (MAS) 149 Socialist Party (PRS) 145 Brazil Bolsonaro, Jair 156 Collor de Mello, Fernando 160 Lula da Silva, Luíz Inácio 145, 156, 161 Rousseff, Dilma 2, 191, 156–7

CCS. See Comparative Candidate Survey CDS. See Portugal, Popular Party CDS-PP. See Portugal, Popular Party CDU. See Portugal, Unitary Democratic Coalition challenger parties 253 Chega. See Portugal Chile 1980 constitution 228 1988 plebiscite 214 2020 plebiscite 228 commodities crisis 212, 226 Concertación 218–9, 226 congruence 213, 218–9, 225–7, 253 corruption 227 crisis of representation 215 democratic breakdown 213 democratic transition 212–3 economic performance 217–9 Fontaine, Juan Andrés 227 fragmentation 214 Independent Democratic Union (UDI) 149 inequality 219, 223–7 Institutional Health Providers 224 Let’s Go Chile (CV) 213–5, 225 National Copper Corporation (CODELCO) 224 New Majority (NM) 213–9, 225 party system 213 Pension Fund Administrators 224 Piñera, Sebastián 227–8 Pinochet, Augusto 227 polarisation 221 political dissatisfaction 212–7, 222, 225 political divergence 222 political parties 213, 216–7 political positioning 221–3 political protest 227

Index political reform 219, 226, 227 political representation 213, 227 political system, 213–7, 225 protests, October 2019, 227 reforms 228 satisfaction with democracy 216 selection of candidates 215 student protest 212 support for democracy 220, 225 survey 219 ‘three-thirds’ system 213 trust in politics 226 Ciudadanos. See Spain CMR. See Venezuela, Revolutionary Middle Class CNE. See Portugal, National Election Commission Coalition of the Radical Left. See Greece, SYRIZA CODELCO. See Chile, National Copper Corporation Comparative Candidate Survey (CCS) 4, 7, 40–1, 63, 126–30, 133–4 CONAIE. See Ecuador, Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador COPEI. See Venezuela, Christian Democratic Independent Political Electoral Organisation Committee CR. See Peru, Radical Change CREO. See Ecuador, Creating Opportunities (CREO) CUP. See Spain: Popuilar Unity Candidacy CV. See Chile, Let’s Go Chile Cyprus 7–9, 18, 20, 26–7 1960 constitution 19 2016 elections 22, 27 Citizens’ Alliance (SP) 27 conflict with Turkey 19, 23 Democratic Party (DIKO) 27 Democratic Rally (DISY) 23, 27 electoral reform 22 electoral volatility 32 form of government 20 Movement for Social Democracy (EDEK) 27 party system fragmentation 32 power of president 19 Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) 23, 27 Solidarity 27 sovereign debt crisis 26 voter turnout 31

255

DC. See Italy, Christian Democracy DCG. See Guatemala, Guatemalan Christian Democracy democratic legitimacy 251 democratisation third wave 1–5, 39, 76, 142, 153, 232–3, 251 descriptive representation 36–7 DIKO. See Cyprus, Democratic Party DISY. See Cyprus, Democratic Rally DL. See Italy, Democracy is Freedom-Daisy DS. See Italy, Democrats of the Left EC. See European Commission ECB. See European Central Bank ECPR. See European Consortium for Political Research Ecuador 1999 economic crisis 199 1999 financial crisis 191 2007 election 193 2008 constitution 195 2013 economic crisis 191 2016 earthquake 191 2017 election 191, 194, 207 21st-Century Socialism 207 Alianza PAIS 191–6, 199, 202–3, 205–7 Bucaram, Abdala 193 caudillo democracy 195 Citizens’ Revolution (LRC), 207 Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) 207 congruence 196, 200–7 Correa, Rafael 145, 156–7, 191–5, 200, 203–7 Creating Opportunities (CREO), 202, 205 Dahik, Alberto 193 Democratic Peoples’ Movement (MPD) 145, 202–3 democratic transition 193 economic downturn 206 economic reform 193 fiscal deficit 195, 207 Forajidos Rebellion 193 fuel subsidies 207 Fuerza Ecuador 145 Glas, Jorge 207 IMF 207 inequality 194

256

Index

Institutional Renewal Party of National Action (PRIAN) 202 loan request 207 Mahuad, Jamil 193 Moreno, Lenín 191, 194, 200, 205–7 national strike 207 Odebrecht scandal 207 Pachakutik Plurinational Unity Movement-New Country (PACHAKUTIK) 145 Palacio, Alfredo 193 Patriotic Society Party (PSP), 202–3, 205 Pedro Delgado scandal 2009, 200 political discontent 193 political representation 192–6 public debt 193 representation crisis 196 satisfaction with democracy 196–7, 200 Social Christian Party (PSC) 202–3, 205 state of emergency 207 substantive representation 192 trust in politics 196–200 World Bank 207 EDEK. See Cyprus, Movement for Social Democracy El Salvador Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) 145, 149 Nationalist Republican Alliance (Arena) 149 ENEC-2014 41 ERC. See Spain, Republican Left of Catalonia EU. See European Union European Central Bank (ECB), 2, 23 European Commission (EC) 2–3, 23 European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) 244 European National Elites and the Eurozone Crisis. See ENEC-2014 European Realistic Disobedience Front. See Greece, Mera25 European Union (EU) 2, 26, 30, 38, 45–8 Eurozone crisis 22–3 FA. See Uruguay, Broad Front FEM. See Ecuador, Fuerza Ecuador FI. See Italy, Forza Italia FMLN. See El Salvador, Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front France 23, 56 FRG. See Guatemala, Guatelmalan Republican Front

FSLN. See Nicaragua, Sandinista National Liberation Front Germany 56 GPP. See Venezuela, Great Patriotic Pole Greece 2–9, 17–8, 23, 41, 130, 251 2012 election 28, 42, 47 2015 election 42–3 2016 electoral law 22 2019 elections 42 anti-mnemoniakoi 46 attitude towards EU 45 austerity 46 banking system 45 candidate survey 126–9, 133–4 clientelism 37 Comparative Candidate Survey (CSS) 40–1 congruence 46–8 debt crisis 20, 25–6 descriptive representation 36, 42 earthquake elections 42 economic crisis 36–8, 42–5, 253 electoral system 21 electoral volatility 31, 32 European Union (EU) 38, 41, 45–8 form of government 19–20 globalisation 38 Golden Dawn 38, 42, 45, 130 Greek Communist Party (KKE), 28, 45 Hagenbach-Bischoff quota 21 Independent Greeks (ANEL) 20, 38, 42, 45 Indignants 38 legitimacy crisis 38 Memorandum of Understanding 46 Mera25, 42 metapolitefsi 40 ministerial elites 41 mnemoniakoi 46 modernisation 39 New Democracy (ND) 28, 37–8, 40, 42 Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) 28, 37–8, 40, 46 party system fragmentation 32 political change 20 political elites 39, 41, 43, 45 political representation 36–43, 47–8 Potami 42 satisfaction with democracy 38 sovereign debt crisis 26, 45–7 subjective representation 36 substantive representation 45, 48

Index SYRIZA 20, 22, 28, 42–3, 45–6, 48, 253 technocratic government 20 third-wave of democratisation 39–40 troika 46 trust in political parties 38 voter turnout 31 women in politics 42–3 Guatemala Guatemalan Christian Democracy (DCG) 145 Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG) 149 National Advancement Party (PAN) 149 National Development Action (ADN) 145 Hagenbach-Bischoff quota 21 Honduras 2009 coup 142 Liberty and Refoundation (Libre) 146 National Party of Honduras (PNH) 149 IMF. See International Monetary Funs Independent Greeks. See Greece Integrated and United A Quest for Citizenship in an Ever Closer Europe. See IntUne International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2–3, 23, 159–61, 207, 174 International Political Science Association (IPSA) 244 IntUne 4, 40–1, 45, 62, 133 IPSA. See International Political Science Association ISAPRES. See Chile, Institutional Health Providers Italy 2, 4, 7–9, 18, 251 “presidential accordion” 18 1992 election 54 2006 electoral law 21–2 2013 election 28, 54, 58, 60, 63–4 2016 referendum 58, 60–1, 65 2018 election 54, 58, 60, 64–5 2018 electoral law 22 Article 1-the Democratic and Progressive Movement (Art.1) 61 Bailout 2 Berlusconi, Silvio 57–8, 60, 63 candidate selection 54 Christian Democracy (DC) 53–5, 62–3 Comparative Candidate Survey (CCS) 63

257

congruence 62–4 consociationalism 53 De Gasperi, Alcide 53 Democracy is Freedom (The Daisy) 58 Democratic Party (PD) 58, 60, 62–3 Democrats of the Left (DS) 58 descriptive representation 58 economic crisis 57 electoral systems 21 electoral volatility 31–2 European election 60, 64 First Republic 19, 54 Five Star Movement (M5S) 28, 31, 58– 61, 63–5, 253 Forza Italia (FI) 58, 60 Franchi tiratori 55 Giorgio Napolitano 18 Italian Communist Party (PCI) 54, 62 Italian Socialist Party (PSI) 62 National Alliance (AN) 58 Northern League (LN) 54, 58–9, 64 parliamentary elite 54–5 party organisation 55 party representation 60 party system 26–7, 52–3, 58, 65 party system fragmentation 32 party system transformation 254 Partyocracy 53 People of Freedom (PdL) 58, 62–3 political fragmentation 27 political change 20, 52–3 political crisis 53 political organisation 55 political participation 55 political representation 52–3, 58, 60, 64–5 political system 54–5, 57, 64 populism 58, 63–4 Prodi, Romano 57–8 Renzi, Matteo 58, 60, 65 Salvini, Matteo 58 Second Republic 19 sovereign debt crisis 26 technocratic government 20, 58 trust in politics 52, 55–7, 64 Veltroni, Walter 58 voter turnout 31 KKE. See Greece, Greek Communist Party LAPOP. See Latin American Public Opinion Project

258

Index

LASA. See Latin American Studies Association Latin America commodity crisis 3, 5–6, 141, 156–7, 161, 250–2 comparative studies 240 congruence 242 debt crisis 2 decline of the left 156–7 democracy 142, 149 economic development 159–60 economic growth 158 electoral systems 142, 144 electoral volatility 153 fragmentation 240 ideology 149 institutional design 142 left turn 3, 160–1 modernisation 158 parliamentarism 145 party systems 144–9 polarisation 148, 150, 153 political competition 148 political elites 255 political fragmentation 145 political participation 154, 156 political parties 145, 149 political professionalisation 244 political representation 231 political systems 141 poverty alleviation programmes 158 representation crisis 192 research challenges 244 right turn 157 studying elites 231 studying elites 232–8, 240–1 substantive representation 253 volatility 154 Latin American Political Science Association (LAPSA) 244 Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 149, 191, 196, 199, 201, 216, 220, 238 Latin American Studies Association (LASA) 244 Libre. See Honduras, Liberty and Refoundation-Libre LN. See Italy, Northern League M5S. See Italy, Five Star Movement MAS. See Venezuela, Socialist Movement MEP. See Venezuela, People’s Electoral Movement Mexico

National Regeneration Movement (Morena) 145 Molirena. See Panama, Nationalist Republican Liberal Movement MPD. See Ecuador, Democratic Peoples’ Movement MS. See Bolivia, Socialist Movement MUD. See Venezuela, Democratic Unity Roundtable MVR. See Venezuela, Fifth Republican Movement NCA. See Venezuela, National Constitutent Assembly ND. See Greece, New Democracy Nicaragua Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) 145, 149 NM. See Chile, New Majority Oil shock 1973, 23 PAN. See Portugal, People-AnimalsNature Party, PAN. See Guatemala, National Advancement Party Panama Nationalist Republican Liberal Movement (Molirena) 149 PARENEL. See Parliamentary Representation at the National and European Levels Parliamentary Elites in Latin America (PELA) 4, 9, 142, 149, 169–71, 178, 182–3, 191, 196, 201, 231–8, 241–4 Party Representation (PARTIREP) 4, 126–8, 133–4 PASOK. See Greece, Panhellenic Socialist Movement PCI. See Italy, Italian Communist Party PCP. See Portugal, Portuguese Communist Party PCV. See Venezuela, Venezuela Communist Party PD. See Italy, Democratic Party PdL. See Italy, People of Freedom PDVSA. See Venezuela, Petroleum of Venezuela PELA. See Parliamentary Elites in Latin America Peru Aprista Party 145 Fujimori, Alberto 160 Radical Change 145

Index PEV. See Portugal, Green Party PJ. See Venezuela, Justice First PNH. See Honduras, National Party of Honduras Podemos. See Spain political discontent 251 Political elites 122–3, 126, 133 identification 123–7, 132 survey questionnaire design 123, 128–9 surveying politicians 127–33 political representation 249–50, 255 Portugal 2, 4, 5, 7–9, 18, 81–2, 88, 127, 130, 251 2015 election 28, 71–2 2019 election 30, 81, 82 candidate survey 127, 133, 134 Chega! 30 congruence 71, 77–80, 252 descriptive representation 68, 72, 80 diffuse support 73, 76 disconnecting representation 79 earthquake crises 71 economic crisis 68 economic recovery 251 electoral volatility 31–2, 71 European Union (EU) 71, 82 form of government 19 geringonca 76, 82 Green Party (PEV) 71, 82 Historical Parliamentary Archive (APH) 124 Left Bloc (BE) 28, 71–3, 76, 79, 82, 252 Livre 82 Memorandum of Understanding 72 National Election Commission (CNE) 124, 133 party system 32, 254 People-Animals-Nature Party (PAN) 28, 30, 82 polarisation 78, 79 political representatives 72 political disaffection 73, 75–6, 81 political elite 72, 79 political legitimacy 72 political representation 68, 71–3, 77–81 Popular Party (CDS-PP) 73, 76, 79 Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) 28, 71, 73, 76, 79, 82 satisfaction with democracy 81 semi-presidentialism 18 Social Democratic Party (PSD) 28, 76, 78–9, 81, 252 Socialist Party (PS) 28–9, 71, 76, 79, 81–2, 252

259

sovereign debt crisis 26, 71, 76, 81 specific support 73, 76 support for democracy 68 troika 71 trust in politics 73, 76, 251, 252 Unitary Democratic Coalition (CDU) 79, 82, 252 voter polarisation 77 voter surveys 127 voter turnout 31 PP. See Spain, Popular Party PPT. See Venezuela, Fatherland for All PRIAN. See Ecuador, Institutional Renewal Party of National Action PRVZL. See Venezuela, Venezuela Project PS. See Portugal, Socialist Party PSC. See Ecuador, Social Christian Party PSD. See Portugal, Social Democratic Party PSI. See Italy, Italian Socialist Party PSOE. See Spain, Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party PSP. See Ecuador, Patriotic Society Party PSUV. See Venezuela, United Socialist Party of Venezuela quality of democracy 242 questionnaire design 238–41 Social Disproportion Index 105, 113–7 Solidarity. See Cyprus Southern Europe and the EU 45 austerity 23, 25 banking crisis 23 congruence 253 convergence with northern Europe 23 descriptive representation 253 Economic Intelligence Unit 17 electoral systems 20 electoral volatility 31, 32 Europeanisation 23 Eurozone crisis 17, 22 institutional design 18 party system 23, 26 PIGS 23 PIIGS 23 political stability 30 proportional representation 20 right turn 25 sovereign debt crisis 2, 5, 23, 25 transitions to democracy 23 voter turnout 30, 31

260

Index

Spain 2, 4–5, 7–9, 17–8, 93–4, 97–8, 105, 117–8, 124, 130, 251 11th legislature 106 12th legislature 106 13th legislature 105, 109 15-M 87, 104 1977 election 30 2015 election 30, 106 2016 election 30, 106 2019 election (April) 104–7, 109, 117 2019 election (November) 117–8 bailout 2 candidate selection 106–7 candidate survey 128, 134 Catalonia 19, 88, 105, 117 Ciudadanos 8, 30–1, 104–7, 110–1, 114–8 Comparative Candidate Survey (CCS) 129 congruence 113–4, 116 corruption 97–8 democratic deficit 87, 94 descriptive representation 104 economic crisis 89, 93–4 electoral volatility 31–2 Franco, Francisco 117 party system 32, 116, 254 Podemos 8, 30–1, 104–7, 110–18, 253 polarisation 118 political detachment 87 political disaffection 89 political diversification 112 political divide 91 political fragmentation 105, 107, 115–6 political mistrust 91 political parties 110 political representation 87–9, 91, 95–100, 104–9, 110–1, 113–5, 117 political responsiveness 99–100 political system 105 political transformation 111–2, 115 Popular Party (PP) 19, 30, 91, 93, 98, 100, 105–7, 111–8 Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP) 130 populism 254 profile of MPs 108–9, 111, 115–6 representation crisis 91 Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) 118 social contestation 89 sovereign debt crisis 26, 104 Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) 19, 30, 98, 100, 105–7, 111–8

trust in politics 88, 92–7, 100, 104 Union, Progress and Democracy Party (UPYD) 96 vote of no confidence 2018, 106 voter surveys 127 voter turnout 31 Vox 8, 30–1, 104–5, 107, 110–1, 114–8 specific support 76 subjective representation 37 substantive representation 1, 36–7, 45, 170–3, 182, 252 support for democracy 251 SYPOL. See Cyprus, Citizens’ Alliance SYRIZA, See Greece, SYRIZA troika 3, 9, 23, 46, 71 trust in political institutions 251 UCR. See Argentina, Radical Civic Union UDI. See Chile, Independent Democratic Union UNDP-DGO. See United Nations Development Programme’s Democratic Governance Office United Nations Development Programme’s Democratic Governance Office 243 UNT. See Venezuela, A New Era UPyD. See Spain, Union, Progress and Democracy Party Uruguay 149 Vázquez, Tabaré 161 Venezuela 172 1961 constitution 178 1998 election 176 1999 constitution 178, 182 2000 election 182–3 2005 election 175 2010 election 176 2015 election 172, 183 2018 election 173 2019 election 186 21st-century socialism 182 A New Era (UNT) 178, 182–3 Caldera, Rafael 181 Chávez, Hugo 2, 145, 161, 169, 172, 174, 182, 184, 186 chavismo 156, 169, 176, 182, 184 Christian Democratic Independent Political Electoral Organisation Committee (COPEI) 175, 181–2 commodity crisis 169, 173–4, 184 congruence 169, 170, 173, 182, 184 Convergencia 181

Index corporatism 173 Democratic Action (AD) 175, 178, 183 Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD) 156, 176–7, 183–4, 186 economic collapse 173–4 electoral fraud 172 elite survey 169, 178, 181–2 Fatherland for All (PPT) 176 Fifth Republican Movement (MVR) 175–6, 178, 182 fragmentation 178 Great Patriotic Pole (GPP) 176, 183 Guaidó, Juan 173 Justice First 178, 183 Maduro, Nicolás 171, 182 madurismo 172, 184, 186 National Constituent Assembly 172–3 National Electoral Council (CNE) 172–3 nationalisation of oil 174 opposition to Maduro 173 party system 176, 178, 186 People’s Electoral Movement (MEP) 176

261

Petroleum of Venezuela (PDVSA) 172, 174 polarisation 178, 182, 184 political representation 169, 170, 176, 183–4, 186 political system 174–5, 186 Popular Will (VP) 178, 182–3 protests 172 radicalisation 169, 178, 182, 184 Revolutionary Middle Class (CMR) 145 Socialist Movement (MS) 175, 181–2 substantive representation 169–71 survey 182–4 United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) 176, 178, 182–4 Venezuela Communist Party (PCV) 176 Venezuela Project (PRVZL) 182 volatility 175 VP. See Venezuela, Popular Will Washington Consensus 2, 157–60 Weber, Max 109 World Bank 159, 207