Political Regimes and Neopatrimonialism in Central Asia: A Sociology of Power Perspective (The Steppe and Beyond: Studies on Central Asia) 9811590923, 9789811590924

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THE STEPPE AND BEYOND: STUDIES ON CENTRAL ASIA

Political Regimes and Neopatrimonialism in Central Asia A Sociology of Power Perspective Edited by Ferran Izquierdo-Brichs · Francesc Serra-Massansalvador

The Steppe and Beyond: Studies on Central Asia

Series Editor Jean-François Caron Department of Political Science and International Relations Nazarbayev University Astana, Kazakhstan

Surrounded between Europe and Asia, Central Asia has been neglected by many experts for a very long time. Many reasons may explain this situation, such as the language barrier and the fact that the region remained inaccessible for the most part of the 20th Century. However, this situation is clearly about to change in light of the growing interest of the academic interest for this region and the purpose of this series is to enhance the understanding of this region which is has always been at the crossroad of various civilizations. From a multidisciplinary perspective, this series examines the history of the region, its past struggles with colonialism and communism as well as the political and sociological challenges Central Asian countries are currently facing with the emergence of the new Silk Road and the strategic power shift in the region. It also proposes to render accessible to English-speaking readers the important oral literary tradition of Central Asia, which is one of the largest in the world.

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/16223

Ferran Izquierdo-Brichs · Francesc Serra-Massansalvador Editors

Political Regimes and Neopatrimonialism in Central Asia A Sociology of Power Perspective

Editors Ferran Izquierdo-Brichs Faculty of Political Science and Sociology (International Relations) Autonomous University of Barcelona Barcelona, Spain

Francesc Serra-Massansalvador Faculty of Political Science and Sociology (International Relations) Autonomous University of Barcelona Barcelona, Spain

ISSN 2524-8359 ISSN 2524-8367 (electronic) The Steppe and Beyond: Studies on Central Asia ISBN 978-981-15-9092-4 ISBN 978-981-15-9093-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9093-1 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021, corrected publication 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

The original version of the book frontmatter was revised: An acknowledgments section has been added. The correction to the book frontmatter is available at https://doi.org/ 10.1007/978-981-15-9093-1_9

Acknowledgments

This publication has been compiled within the framework of the research projects led by Dr. Laura Feliu-Martínez and Dr. Ferran IzquierdoBrichs: ‘Popular Revolts from the Mediterranean to Central Asia: Historical Genealogy, Power Cleavages and Identity Factors’, funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitivity (HAR2012–34053); and ‘Transnational Dynamics and Actors in the MENA Region: A Historical Genealogy of Elites and Social Movements in between the Local and Global Level’, funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitivity, Agencia Estatal de Investigación and European Regional Development Fund (HAR2016–77876-P).

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Praise for Political Regimes and Neopatrimonialism in Central Asia

“This book provides a thorough and well needed analysis of the dynamics of power in Central Asian republics. By focusing on the role played by neopatrimonialism, these contributions are able to shed light on the fundamental features of governance in the ‘Stans’: clientelism, corruption, crony capitalism, concentration of power in the hands of a closed circle of ruling elites and the absence of democracy. A must read for any scholars studying this part of the world.” —Jean-François Caron, Associate professor in Political Science and International Relations at Nazarbayev University “As the 21st century world order evolves, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have become the cross-roads of an emergent Eurasia. Supranational strategies like the Belt and Road Initiative or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization frame their multidimensional and diverse approaches to state building, power regimes and the distribution of resources. This study by various authors offers a nuanced and well-informed analysis of how the post-USSR national elites navigate neo-patrimonial paths to system transformation between statism and the neoliberal policies imposed by global elites.” —Sean Golden, Full Professor (Retired) and Former Director of the East Asia Studies & Research Centre of the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB), Senior Associate Researcher of the CIDOB Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, and Associate Professor of the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals (IBEI) ix

Contents

Neopatrimonialism, Power and Regimes in Central Asia: A Sociology of Power Analysis Ferran Izquierdo-Brichs 1 The Sociology of Power 1.1 The Elites 1.2 The Population and Social Movements 2 Power Resources 2.1 The State as Resource 2.2 Neopatrimonialism 3 Power Regimes 4 The Structure of the System References Russia’s Role in the Consolidation of the Central Asian Elites Francesc Serra-Massansalvador 1 Introduction 2 A Question of Identity? 3 Geostrategic Interests 4 Regional Rivalries 5 The Role of Energy 6 Security 7 Local Elites and External Influence

1 7 9 13 16 20 22 28 31 36

41 41 43 48 51 55 59 63 xi

xii

CONTENTS

8 Conclusions References China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Implications for Central Asia Alejandra Peña 1 China’s Engagement with Central Asia: A Three-Dimensional Approach 1.1 Diplomacy 1.2 Trade 1.3 Security 2 Unpacking the Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia: Background, Framework, and Rationale 2.1 The Rationale Behind the Initiative 2.2 Central Asia at the Core of the Silk Road Economic Belt 3 The BRI and Central Asian Elites: Reinforcing the Mechanisms of Capital Accumulation and the Quest for Regime Preservation References Uzbekistan’s Neopatrimonial State and Authoritarian Regime: From Karimov to Mirziyoyev Rubén Ruiz-Ramas and Javier Morales Hernández 1 Introduction 2 State-Building in Central Asia: An Incomplete Process 3 The Central Asian Model of the Neopatrimonial State 4 Uzbekistan as an Authoritarian Regime and Neopatrimonial State 4.1 Karimov’s Rise to Power 4.2 Consolidation of the Political System After Independence 5 Territorial Power and Informal Agreements Between Central and Regional Elites 6 The so-called Clans as Informal Networks in Uzbekistan 6.1 The Transformation of the Concept of “Clan”

66 68

71

73 75 80 85 88 94 100

105 109

115 115 117 120 123 124 126 128 132 133

CONTENTS

Main Elite Informal Networks in Uzbekistan Under Karimov 6.3 Informal Networks and Inter-Elite Conflicts 7 Mirziyoyev’s Reforms and the Modernization of Uzbek Authoritarianism 8 Neopatrimonial Consolidation in Mirziyoyev’s Presidency 9 Conclusions Bibliography

xiii

6.2

Turkmenistan: Stability Through Regime Mobilisation Slavomír Horák 1 The Internal Elites and Control of Resources 1.1 From Traditional to Post-Soviet Elites 1.2 Niyazov and the System of Control Over Resources 1.3 Primary Elite of the Second President. Building Berdimuhamedov’s Family Corporation 1.4 Secondary Elite Transformation 2 Mobilisation Potential 2.1 Alternative Mobilisation Groups 2.2 Tribal Rivalries Under the Surface 2.3 Economic Hardships as a Push Factor of Mobilisation? 2.4 What Kinds of Mobilisation Could We Expect in Turkmenistan? 3 Foreign Actors in Turkmenistan. Competition or Shared Interests? 3.1 Russia: Maintaining Influence in Another Way 3.2 Chinese Strategic Partnership 3.3 Turkey and Turkmenistan: An Empire of Selected Businessmen 3.4 Other Actors Struggling for Influence in the Country 4 Conclusions References Tajikistan: From Reconciliation to Post-Reconciliation Edward Lemon and Flora Roberts 1 Elites Under Communism 2 Civil War and the End of Leninobodi Dominance

135 137 142 145 148 149 159 161 161 162 164 168 171 172 175 178 180 182 182 184 187 189 192 194 199 204 211

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CONTENTS

3 4 5 6 7 8 9

A Government of Warlords 1997–2006: The War on the Warlords 2008–2012: Reasserting Control over the Periphery Factional Networks in Contemporary Tajikistan Foreign Patrons State Repression: Marginalizing Opposition Voices An Emergent State Ideology: Valorisation of “Peace” and “National Reconciliation” 10 Conclusion References

215 219 222 225 231 233

Kazakhstan 2.0: Change and Continuity? Sofia Tipaldou 1 Introduction 2 Elites and Control of Resources in Nazarbayev’s Neopatrimonial System 3 Opposition to Nazarbayev’s Rule 4 Domestic Elites and Their Relations to External Elites 5 Popular Claims and Mobilization in Kazakhstan 6 Actors that Can Mobilize the Population 7 Strategy of the Elites to Stay in Power 8 Conclusion References

249

Kyrgyzstan and Intermingling of Elites: From a State of Enlightenment to a Shadow State Viktoria Akchurina 1 Introduction 2 Price of Multiculturalism in the Age of Nationalism: An Enlightened President and the Legendary Parliament 3 A Revolutionary “Southern” Elite Without the South 4 Sites of Intermingling 4.1 Site 1: Bazaars and National Resources 4.2 Site 2: Camp 31 and the Parliament 5 Institutions: A Legitimation Tool for the Monopoly Over Military and Economic Resources

237 241 242

249 253 261 265 269 272 277 286 288

295 295 298 305 306 306 309 312

CONTENTS

All-Representant: A Ragtag Parliament as a Move Toward a Shadow State 7 Conclusion 8 Personal Interviews References

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Correction to: Political Regimes and Neopatrimonialism in Central Asia Ferran Izquierdo-Brichs and Francesc Serra-Massansalvador Index

316 320 321 321

C1

323

List of Contributors

Viktoria Akchurina Senior Lecturer at the OSCE Academy, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan Slavomír Horák Institute of International Studies, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic Ferran Izquierdo-Brichs Faculty of Political Science and Sociology (International Relations), Autonomous University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain Edward Lemon Texas A&M University, Washington, DC, USA Javier Morales Hernández Universidad Madrid, Spain

Complutense

de

Madrid,

Alejandra Peña Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain; University of the Andes, Mérida, Venezuela Flora Roberts Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK Rubén Ruiz-Ramas UNED, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, Madrid, Spain Francesc Serra-Massansalvador Faculty of Political Science and Sociology (International Relations), Autonomous University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain Sofia Tipaldou University of Manchester, Manchester, UK xvii

Neopatrimonialism, Power and Regimes in Central Asia: A Sociology of Power Analysis Ferran Izquierdo-Brichs

The Soviet Union, probably the state that most clearly dictated the ideological, political and strategic course of the world during the twentieth century, dissolved within the space of a few months in 1991. Although much has been written about the collapse, one basic fact continues to draw attention: in a state that grew out of a broad social movement with a large popular base and constant rhetoric about society’s participation in the country’s politics and fate, its dissolution occurred with hardly any social pressure. Unquestionably, there was growing discontent throughout the USSR in the late 1980s over the deep-rooted corruption, increasing disillusionment with the values represented by the October Revolution and an undeniable disaffection towards an inefficient administration unable to adapt and change. Moreover, while there were some very localized popular mobilizations in the Baltic states, parts of the Caucasus and Ukraine, they were intensely nationalistic

F. Izquierdo-Brichs (B) Faculty of Political Science and Sociology (International Relations), Autonomous University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. Izquierdo-Brichs and F. Serra-Massansalvador (eds.), Political Regimes and Neopatrimonialism in Central Asia, The Steppe and Beyond: Studies on Central Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9093-1_1

1

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and often involved confrontations between communities, without any common project to renew the state or, where relevant, negotiate an agreement to dissolve it. To a large extent, the Soviet Union disintegrated because the common project that benefitted both the elites in the central administration and the elites governing the peripheral administrations disappeared. Stalinism and the Cold War had consolidated a political class at the top of the hierarchy whose permanence depended on the continuity of the system. In the early 1980s, the nomenklatura represented an immobility that allowed for no real social—let alone economic—evolution in the country. The USSR was tangled up in a complex network of personal interests that mixed a socialist rhetorical discourse incapable of renewal, an inefficient distribution of social services, an industrial projection that concentrated on heavy industry and arms manufacturing and a political structure immobilized by the personal interests of a gerontocratic social sector stagnating in power. Despite the increasingly obvious need to reform the Soviet economic and political system, this elite, which had accumulated almost all the power resources, held firmly on to the top state structures, using the excuse of safeguarding the revolutionary legacy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and, therefore, the USSR. Leonid Brezhnev’s long term (1963–1982) consolidated this social class, which became inevitably interconnected with the levers of power, and perpetuated a corrupt patrimonial system in the USSR economy. Upon Brezhnev’s death, the reformist sectors of the CPSU tried to compel the new leader, Yuri Andropov, to undertake the much-needed reforms, but his premature death after only one year provoked a reaction amongst the nomenklatura, who imposed their own candidate, Konstantin Chernenko, as his successor. When Chernenko also died one year later, in 1985, the reformists had already taken up positions around the new leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, with the old Soviet elite revealing the internal fissures that would distinguish them when they relinquished power. From the time that Gorbachev came to power, his attempts at reform repeatedly clashed with an archaic system that required more changes than anticipated, a social and economic reality that was much more serious than revealed by the opaque news media and, above all, a ruling class that was highly reluctant to abandon the power structures that it controlled. For that reason, more than altering the state’s internal structures, the perestroika programme was aimed at modifying the financial, political and social means that enabled perpetuation in the power of the ruling

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oligarchies. Thus, the aim of prioritizing the consumer goods industry was to satisfy public opinion, but more than that, to eliminate the privilege granted to heavy industry; glasnost reflected a commitment to provide the people with truthful information, but also to disclose the abuses that had been and continued to be committed by those who sought to hold on to power; and the goal of opening the Communist Party to free participation was not only to close the gap between the political power and society, but also to encourage that same society to replace the elites by taking away their main source of power, the party. Amongst its many particularities, the Soviet political system was characterized by a peculiar symbiosis between the administration and the Communist Party throughout its entire extensive and complex power network, both sector-based and territorial. At the highest level of power, the pinnacle of the state, there was no position equivalent to head of state. The closest analogy was the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, which in theory guaranteed greater democracy and plurality. It was not until the end of Gorbachev’s term that the position of President of the USSR was instituted for the first time since the revolution. By contrast, the CPSU had a General Secretary, selected in an increasingly opaque way from amongst the highest-ranking party officials, who held their positions of power virtually for life. The rank-and-file members of the party (whose selective membership was closely scrutinized) had no real opportunities to influence the command structure. As a general rule, the General Secretary of the CPSU also served as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, which avoided both overlapping and cumbersome fragmentation. However, this structure was slightly different on the periphery of the USSR. In not only the different federated republics, but also the autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts, national okrugs, krais and the like, the local Supreme Soviet had a chairman, usually a member of the local nationality—loading the position with autochthonous symbolic content—while the generally more discreet, but more powerful position of local CP General Secretary was filled by a Russian. In republics with a large Russian population, like Kazakhstan and Latvia, the result was a well-justified balance, but in places like Tajikistan and Armenia, where the Russian population was minimal, this created a somewhat colonial situation. In any case, the structure reflected a division of political influences in which economic resources and local client patronage adjusted to the centralized upper structure, which benefitted from the conformism of the native elites politically and financially at the federative level.

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The importance of this unwritten law about the distribution of power was reflected in the first disturbances that Gorbachev had to deal with, as early as 1985, when demonstrators in Kazakhstan protested the appointment of a politician attached to perestroika as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet. What the conservatives wanted to present as a reaction against the reformists, and what reached the West—in a distorted form—as a nationalist revolt, were really protests in response to the fact that the traditional balance had been broken by the attempt to place Russians in the two principle positions in the republic, that of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and Secretary General of the CP. After this effort, Gorbachev opted for another tactic, that of respecting the local elites in the periphery while simultaneously and discreetly replacing the members of the nomenklatura in key positions in Moscow until he was surrounded by like-minded politicians. One of the clear consequences of this policy was the coexistence of a reformist centre with peripheral elites who were engrossed in maintaining their privileges. The final process that led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union is well known. After the failed coup d’état in August 1991, the CPSU was outlawed. As a result, the peripheral elites, who were perhaps not as directly committed to the coup attempt, but were attached to the interests that protected the party, forged ahead. The reaffirmation of the independence of the Baltic countries, which was to a large extent legitimated by a genuinely popular movement, was followed by the proclamation of independence by Ukraine in August 1991, overwhelmingly confirmed by referendum a few months later. Ukraine witnessed a sudden conversion to nationalism by the local Soviet political class, led in this case by a classic apparatchik, President Leonid Kravchuk. After the Ukrainian secession, the other Soviet republics followed suit, including the Central Asian republics, until Gorbachev resigned in December of that same year, and the Soviet Union came to an end. However, although the USSR disappeared, the elites who had benefitted from its final phase paradoxically remained in power in most of the new republics; despite the emergence of new states, there was no replacement of elites. The independence of the Central Asian republics did not occur as a consequence of any nationalist mobilization or popular demand. It can even be said that the separation went against the wishes of the majority of the people. In 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev proposed a New Union Treaty to reorganize the USSR into a confederated Union of Sovereign States. The New Treaty, which was never implemented due to the August 1991 coup

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d’état and the dissolution of the USSR four months later, was put to a referendum. The voting results made it possible to identify the republics that were most open to breaking away, like the Baltic states, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia, all of which boycotted the referendum, and in which more or less only the Russian population and those who supported the new union voted. The Central Asian republics, on the other hand, clearly supported the union by more than 90% across the board (Collins 2006, 158). The economies of the Central Asian republics in the USSR depended completely on the role decided and planned for them within the centralized Soviet economy. Their main function was to supply raw materials and cotton. When the republics became independent, this created an economic crisis and threatened their productive and fiscal models. In the words of a 2002 report issued by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank: Independence meant the loss to most of these countries of significant fiscal and quasi-fiscal subsidies. Apart from Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, all of these countries are relatively poor in natural resources, in particular energy, so the adjustment to world prices has been estimated to be equivalent to terms-of-trade shocks of up to 15 percent of GDP (IMF & WB 2002, 5).

Real GDP growth Real GDP growth (annual percentage change) Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan World

1992 No No No No

data data data data −11.1 2.3

1993

1994

1995

−9.2 −13 −11.1 −10 −2.3 2.1

−12.6 −19.8 −21.4 −17.3 −5.2 3.3

−8.2 −5.4 −12.5 −7.2 −0.9 3.3

Source (IMF 2018)

The dissolution of the Soviet Union also entailed closing the central mechanisms to distribute goods and services to the population, as well as basic subsidized products (Geiss 2012, 193). Clearly, this impacted the population quite severely. Budget transfer from the Union as per cent of total republic revenue estimate (1991)

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Soviet Republic

Budget transfer from the Union as per cent of total republic revenue estimate (1991)

Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

23.1% 35.6% 46.6% 21.7% 42.9%

Source (Collins 2006, 157)

However, at the same time that changes in the model provoked an unprecedented crisis in the economy, the end of centralized planning allowed the elites in the republics to take control of the resources. This occurred both in terms of controlling decisions related to public resource management and in appropriating resources via privatization. Transitions to democratic systems only begin and develop successfully when popular pressure drives them, since elites will never cede part of their power or privileges in the name of democracy. In Central Asia, these mobilizations did not occur, and the processes of accumulating power in the hands of a few elites were very potent, the power regimes constructed were very concentrated,1 and the political systems acquired a neopatrimonial authoritarian character based on the very few men who had successfully become strong. Processes behind independence and the creation of new states always involve an intense power struggle, both for control of the power resources and for the design of the new structure: state, ideology, even history and identity. In the Central Asian republics, this process occurred in extraordinary conditions, since there had been no real secessionist conflict or influential social movements or parties with this objective. The independencies in Central Asia did not happen as a consequence of a nationalist struggle, but because the USSR imploded. Thus, instead of the elites being replaced, the same Soviet elites who had competed for power in the previous system continued to do so in the new one, which they had to build, adapting themselves and the system to their needs (Djalili and Kellner 2003, 39–40). Nonetheless, the competition for power and control of the new structures was no less intense. 1 We begin from the assumption that the analysis of power relations in a society from a macro-perspective should not only focus on the political system, but should encompass its power regime (Izquierdo Brichs 2009), taking all the power resources into account.

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Additionally, unlike in the immense majority of the independent states that emerged from decolonization, the social movements and capacity to mobilize the people were very weak in the new Central Asian states. For this reason, the configuration of the new systems was the product of a competition for power between a very small number of elites who did not have to answer to the people and their demands.2 This gave the elites great freedom of action that had the objective of maximum accumulation (as will be further discussed in the section on the theoretical bases of the sociology of power). Thus, the new power regimes acquired a strong neopatrimonial component, and the processes of privatization and transition to capitalist economies were, above all, characterized by appropriation, corruption and the patronage of the elites close to power (crony capitalism).

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The Sociology of Power

As discussed in other texts, the sociology of power is intended to be a useful tool to systematize the analysis of the power structures that govern a society.3 Over the course of history, most societies have produced hierarchized organization models in their political, social and economic relations. A hierarchized society is a social system consisting of actors who establish power relations on the basis of their capacity to have certain resources available to them. To analyse a society, then, it is necessary to categorize these actors and their importance, the dynamics that govern their relationships, the power resources at their disposal and their relative importance in the system, in addition to the structural elements. The creation of hierarchies inevitably entails the division of members of society into the elites and the rest. The elites’ interests must be defined in terms of power, since their very existence as elites, their identity and their capacities depend on their power. Their priority objective will always 2 For a comparison with new states whose creation was accompanied by social mobilization, see the case of Morocco in (Feliu et al. 2018) and the Arab world in general in (Izquierdo Brichs 2013). 3 See Izquierdo-Brichs and Etherington (2017), Farrés Fernández (2012), Izquierdo

Brichs (2007b, 2008), Izquierdo-Brichs and Lampridi-Kemou (2013), and (Kemou 2007). A presentation of the different concepts used by the sociology of power, including a comparative analysis with the dominant theoretical perspectives, can be found in (Lampridi-Kemou 2012). This section uses some of the considerations from the earlier texts.

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be to maintain and improve their position in the hierarchy, competing with the other elites to accumulate more power than their competitors.4 For this reason, the formation of elites inevitably involves competition for control of power resources, whether political, economic, informational, coercive, ideological or any other type.5 The general population lies at the base of the social pyramid and is generally subject to the decisions of the elites, except at isolated moments when the people are able to consciously identify their needs, fight for their well-being and become an agent as a social movement. The fundamental principle of the sociology of power resides in the competition between elites for the differential accumulation of power.6 As such, every actor’s ability to survive as an elite depends on their ability to accumulate more power than the other actors. The specific power of each actor is always measured in comparison with other elites, meaning that the relationships established between them construct a system in which competition never stops and feeds on itself, for which reason the term ‘circular power relations’ is used. At the same time, the logic of the competition becomes fiercer as the power controlled by the elites becomes greater. This competitive dynamic is characteristic of hierarchical systems, and individuals who find themselves in an elite position must compete or lose their power. The position of the members of the elite depends on their resources, abilities and alliances in competition with the others. This dynamic of constant competition, and the alliances within it, extends

4 For a development of this question, see Izquierdo-Brichs and Etherington (2017) and Izquierdo Brichs (2008). 5 In his classic text, The Power Elite, C. Wright Mills primarily focuses on the elites who control the state, corporations and the armed forces (Wright Mills 2000 [1956]). However, the sociology of power needs to analyse the competition for control of all the power resources since, depending on the context, resources like ideology, information or the population itself can be even more decisive. Corresponding to this analysis, our conception of power is connected to the competitive process itself, and the definition of power, whether as resource or relationship, is based on how useful it is in terms of accumulating more power. 6 Michal Kalecki introduced this perspective in his analysis of the role of the ‘military-

imperialist’ complex in competition with large corporate capital in the US economy (Kalecki 1972, 90–94, 109–112). Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, following Kalecki and analysing the competition for capital, present the concept of differential accumulation and the idea that capital is one of the forms that power adopts (Nitzan & Bichler 2002, 36–38).

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to all the power resources and to all times and spaces where hierarchical organizations have existed. Moreover, throughout history, circular power relations have been drivers of conservatism, as the maintenance and accumulation of power resources become the dominant dynamic. In the analysis of the power structure of a society, it is also important to bear in mind the multi-dimensionality of power, the multiplicity of actors and the fact that in this competition, all the actors/elites are involved and influence each other. As multi-dimensional power resources subject to the control of multiple competing actors, each actor is also subject to the influence of the others. Likewise, the same actors often completely or partially overlap in their control of various resources. Additionally, since power is not an abstraction, the actors involved in power relations cannot be abstract entities like a nation or state, but must be individuals or social groups, understood as an alliance between individuals, and any analysis must focus on them. Any reference to the state, corporations, the church, the party or other institutions is really a reference to the elites who control these institutions. 1.1

The Elites

Theoretical approaches to the concept of ‘elite’ have come from different points of view. This study distances itself from concepts of class and privilege7 to focus on the idea of competition for the differential accumulation of power, always involving a limited number of people. As Niccolo Machiavelli observed, ‘in all republics, whatever the form of their government, barely forty or fifty citizens have any place in the direction of affairs’ (Machiavelli 1513–1517, cap. XVI). Elites, then, are those individuals who find themselves in a higher hierarchical position in social institutions, whose survival in this position depends on their capacity to compete for the accumulation of power. The limits for action for each elite depend on the power structure in each society. In more democratic societies, there is higher specialization of elites, since they are more closely connected to specific power resources, while in more autocratic societies, the elites concentrate control over a 7 Here we distance ourselves from Veblen, who focused his study of the elites on the distinction between the ‘leisure class’ and the rest of the population. From our point of view, the driving force in the system is competition between elites, and not their distinction from the lower orders (Veblen 1971 [1899]).

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larger variety of resources. The degree of concentration of power is also important when analysing the system. A system structured around a few primary elites will tend towards oligarchy, towards autocracy in its political dimension and towards monopoly or oligopoly in its economic dimension. The more elites that participate in the competition, the tougher it will be, and the population will have more opportunities to defend its own interests. As Karl Mannheim observed, the more elites in a society, the more each individual elite tends to lose their role and influence as a leader, since they offset each other. In a mass democratic society, especially if there is significant social mobilization, no group is able to profoundly influence the entire society (Mannheim 1940). As this study shows, in most Central Asian countries, a very small group of people controls the primary power resources and, especially, maintains an autocratic relationship with the state. As will be discussed below, this allows them access to other resources, building enormously concentrated power regimes. The analysis of the elites and their competition for the differential accumulation of power must also consider factors like their background (social sector, region, clan, profession, education, corporative connections, state administration, etc.) and their access mechanisms to control the power resources (inheritance, nepotism, clientelism, conquest, revolution, etc.). In post-Soviet Central Asia, a background in the previous political apparatus (Communist Party and administration) was essential, although geographic origin first and then, as neopatrimonial mechanisms became established, direct family ties or contact with primary elites later gained importance. The background of the elites strongly influences the homogeneity of the ruling group. Cohesion and the ability to create alliances amongst the elites can be facilitated or made more difficult by their degree of homogeneity. Anthony Giddens distinguishes between moral integration and social integration. The former refers to the ideas and values that elites may share and the degree of awareness regarding ties of common solidarity. The latter, social integration, refers to the frequency and nature of contacts and relationships between elites (Giddens 1974, 5). In neopatrimonial systems like those of Central Asia, it is clear that the two types of integration exist and that access to the elite class is consequently increasingly closed off. However, homogeneity does not impede competition, and it is possible to find repeated examples of conflicts between

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allied elites who form part of the same networks, or even between family members. The differences in the integration—both moral and social—of the elites are reflected in their ability to create alliances. Homogeneity helps to generate similar interests and perceptions of society, which in turn facilitates alliances (Whitley 1974, 65). It is likely, therefore, that within a homogeneous elite, alliances against third parties will be easier to form and more long-lasting, and that competition for power will evolve in a more gradual and less conflictive way. On the contrary, heterogeneity amongst elites can lead to instability and even have bloody consequences. This situation occurs above all during transition periods with extreme cases like the civil war in Tajikistan, but also with repeated examples of fighting and even killings, exile and imprisonment in most of the Central Asian countries. As noted above, when a sector of the elite manages to take root and establish a stable regime, control of the power resources allows this group to relegate the other elites to a secondary (dependent) position or even eliminate them from the competition. On the other hand, the extent to which access to the elite is open or blocked to other actors is also important. A closed elite is usually more homogeneous and, therefore, accompanied by less conflictive competition. However, the very fact that it is closed means that access from external competitors, if it happens, may involve more traumatic methods and bring about important changes in the structure of the system. On the contrary, the effective democratization of the political system can open orderly access to state control for new elites, reducing the prospect of instability and violence. However, this would clearly weaken the current rulers, who could lose power, meaning that the dominant elites will do their utmost to block access to other competitors. 1.1.1 Primary and Secondary Elites The analysis of elites reveals that although all of them participate in competition for the differential accumulation of power, they have varying degrees of influence in the system. Primary elites, for example, have the ability to compete for control of the resources that allows for greater accumulation at any given moment while also being able to work together in alliance and in competition, determining the power balances that structure the entire system. For their part, while the secondary elites also participate in the competition, they move within the structure created by

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the primary elites, filling subaltern positions in the hierarchy. As a result, their access to resources depends on their alliances with the primary elites. At times, one individual or group may have an important power resource at their disposal, but if they are in a dependent position, they will continue to be secondary. Another way of identifying the position of elites in the system is by analysing whether they are easily replaceable when it comes to forming alliances without any subsequent important decrease in power for their elite ally. A primary actor can easily replace their alliance with a secondary actor without it affecting their accumulation capacity, while a secondary actor depends on their alliance with the primary elite. In some of the Central Asian cases analysed below, the centrality of the state as a power resource often means that the elites who control it have obtained a primary role, and even large business owners and capitalists depend on these political elites and are their clients, despite their wealth. If one of these secondary elites falls into disgrace, it can mean their exile, ruin or even prison or death. On the contrary, changes in alliances between primary actors form part of the ‘great game’ and have direct repercussions for the power balances in the system and, therefore, its very structure. The ability to be an actor therefore directly depends on the power that they manage to accumulate. For this reason, an actor must be analysed in the context of the subsystem over which they have influence. Different spaces create different systems with different structures. In this respect, in the global system, only those actors with the capacity to use ‘global’ resources matter, including power states, large transnational corporations, global ideologies and hegemonies (like the major religions, neoliberalism, socialism and communism, but not nationalist ideologies, which are only useful as power resources at national level), the capacity for international coercion, global informative capacity, international institutions and regulations, etc. However, this may also include regional, state, local or even institutional systems (a church, party, corporation, etc.). Thus, actors who appear to be primary in the analysis of a lower system may be secondary in a higher system. For this reason, it is important to situate the analysed system in its context, with its dependencies and foreign relations. In the Central Asian context, Russia and China are the two countries where relations are decisive.

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13

The Population and Social Movements

Despite or as a consequence of the above, the history of the twentieth century is also one of resistances and transformations achieved by social mobilization. In every society at some point in history, circular relations coexist with power relations that the people establish when they act as a social movement to improve their living conditions. Here, the definition of well-being and living conditions is broad and encompasses both material, cultural, identity and gender factors as well as those related to rights and freedoms. Just as the hierarchical, unequal structure of a system forces the elites to compete, so does it generate the need for resistance and transformation amongst the population. However, although some small social vanguard groups may constantly struggle, the mobilization of the people is always contextual and limited in time. In hierarchized societies, it is not easy for individuals to become aware of their interests in terms of improving their quality of life. When they do so, they find it difficult to mobilize to fight for this goal, since this almost always involves confronting the elites. When the population does manage to mobilize, it results in power relations that are quite different to competition amongst the elites. In this case, the people’s objectives are specific and, therefore, when they achieve the desired balance of power, they stop. The linear nature of this process is due to the fact that it is possible to identify a beginning—the moment when awareness evolves into collective action—and an end—when the mobilization is successful and its demands met or, on the contrary, when it is defeated and abandons action. When a social movement establishes linear power relations to reach its own goals, it becomes a transformative actor with the capacity to change society. The proposed definition of social mobilization bears in mind the distinction between circular and linear power relations. This means that the social mobilizations of interest here must seek to improve living conditions and that the population must be a subject and not an object, in other words an agent with its own objectives and autonomy and not a resource manipulated by the elites. As Adam Przeworski has observed, what really threatens authoritarian regimes is not the loss of legitimacy, but the organization of a counter-hegemony: the existence of a collective project for an alternative future (Przeworski 1991, 54). However, often the mobilization of the masses also corresponds to the ability of some elites to manipulate them for the elites’ own benefit. In this respect,

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Ronald Inglehart distinguishes between elite-directed participation and elite-challenging participation. The former refers to a broad mass of citizens, usually politically underprepared and guided by a small number of leaders most commonly through parties, trade unions, churches or other institutions. In the latter case, the action is more oriented towards specific, tangible objectives and based more on ad hoc groups than a bureaucratized organization. This type of participation requires a higher level of political experience on the part of the people (Inglehart 1977, 299–300). One essential factor in mobilizing the population, then, is the capacity for collective action. Since the same mobilization can mix the objectives of the elite—the differential accumulation of power—and the objectives of the people—improving living conditions—the analysis must differentiate some elements from others, as they have different causes, generate diverse dynamics and lead to opposing social changes. In Central Asia today, there are very few cases of social mobilization involving linear relations, and when they do occur, they are often sporadic and local. The social movements’ incapacity to mobilize the population gives the elite great freedom of action in their competition, facilitating the concentration of power. Most of the countries that achieved independence or saw political regime changes in the twentieth century did so in a context of intense social mobilization. One of the consequences of the people’s capacity to act was that the new governments and regimes initially had to respond to their demands or else the new revolutions, coups d’état and new political changes would bring competing elites to power. Thus, in most cases, the independences and new political regimes were accompanied by economic, social and labour policies that corresponded to the demands of the population in the early stage.8 Independence in Central Asia was different. Since the independences occurred not as a result of social mobilization but rather the implosion of the USSR, a demobilized people continued to be in the hands of the elites. Consequently, the social, economic and political transformations did not take into account the demands and needs of the people, but quite the contrary: they took place to further facilitate the processes that allowed the elites who were able to manage the changes to accumulate power and wealth. This dynamic was compounded by the financial crisis

8 For a comparison with the Arab world, see Izquierdo Brichs (2009, 2013).

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and the instructions that the governments received from international financial institutions that imposed dogmatic and extremely strict restructurings to privatize and lead the economies to capitalism. The result was a sharp increase in poverty and inequality in the first years of the transition and a sharp decline in social spending (IMF & WB 2002, 9–10, 17). For various reasons, from Soviet inertia to harsh repression, the mobilization of the population in Central Asia was generally very weak, sporadic and localized. As Ruiz and Morales have observed, this was also reflected in the hard working conditions in the private, semi-public and public sectors, which accentuated the processes of accumulation amongst the elites and inequality even further (Ruiz Ramas and Morales 2018). Thus, except in very specific and often local cases with little impact on the system, social movements have been very weak with little capacity to influence the construction and stabilization of the regimes. As the following chapters explore, even in cases like the Zheltoksan (Kazakh for ‘December’) uprising in Kazakhstan in 1986, the Tulip Revolution in 2005 and civil unrest of 2010 in Kyrgyzstan, and the civil war in Tajikistan, the mobilizations were the product of discontent amongst the people, but more than a popular revolution led by social movements, they were resources used by sectors of the elites in their competition for power. In the few cases where grassroots mobilization occurs, it is usually reactive, poorly organized and with short-lived results. Even as in the case of Kazakhstan in 2019 when the mobilization had consequences such as the resignation of President Nazarbayev, there was no real transfer of power and the regime was preserved with more cosmetic than substantive changes, despite the continuing power struggle within the regime, especially at times of succession. However, unlike the analysis of the elites, who are much more predictable, it is impossible to make categorical assertions in the analysis of social mobilization. One need only recall that shortly before the socalled Arab Spring in 2011, for example, very few analysts were predicting an outbreak of popular protests. The reasons for the protests were clear, but their transformation into a wave of mobilizations was unpredictable, even for the very social movements leading them. In Central Asia, the same occurred; while the possible causes, like corruption, authoritarianism, nepotism, inequality and the like are known, it is very difficult to envision a popular outbreak at this time, in part because harsh repression has kept opposition forces either in jail or in exile, when they have not been eliminated outright.

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Regional, rural-urban and ethnic inequalities can also become pronounced, creating tensions that have broken out in protests on more than one occasion. These cleavages can become not only the source of the emergence of social movements, but also be used by some elites in the competition for power. Some of the protests that have occurred are connected more to these dynamics than to any real attempts at regime change or system transformation.

2

Power Resources

The resources that the elites can use in their competition for the accumulation of power constitute another determining factor in the structure of the system. The importance of different resources is linked to circumstances, and the processes of accumulation evolve historically.9 Control over one or more resources results in different and often contradictory policies and interests. Although this chapter focuses on capital and, above all, on the state and neopatrimonialism, other power resources can also be important, such as control of information, ideology and the population itself as well as, clearly, coercion. Although the resources and mechanisms to carry out the processes involved in the accumulation of power evolve, they are limited and are an essential part of any analysis of the power structure of a society. This structure takes on a specific form (power regime) and is closely related, forms part of, or is subdivided into other possible power structures at different levels (global, regional, national, local) and even spheres (structures specific to certain fields of action). Identifying and understanding these structures is basic because of their influence over the constitution of the elites (primary and secondary, with their subdivisions), the resources within their reach (also configured at different levels) and social mobilization.

9 For instance, the major structural changes that shaped the current power regimes primarily centre around the appearance of capital and the state as central resources in the processes of the accumulation of power, and how these resources and the elites competing for control over them influence the configuration of modern societies. Increasingly, in a system that can only be analysed in global terms at this point, resources like large corporations and international financial institutions, both public and private, and agents like the global elites who control them also become key to the analysis (Izquierdo-Brichs and Etherington 2017).

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One central resource in a capitalist system is, obviously, capital. Without going into a debate about the definition of capital, it is important that this resource not be confused with wealth or benefits. In this respect, the conclusion presented by Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler from the perspective of political economy—which also introduces the idea of differential accumulation—is particularly apt: […] the accumulation of capital represents neither material wealth, nor a productive amalgamate of “dead labour”, but rather the commodification of power. Capitalists accumulate not things carried over from the past, but vendible power titles projected into the future. In this sense, their capitalised profit represents a claim not for a share of the output, but for a share of control over the social process. Now, whereas capitalist power is exerted over society, it is measured relative to the power of other owners. […] In short, the real issue is not absolute accumulation, but differential accumulation. […] The connection between differential accumulation and power should now become clearer. To accumulate differentially is to increase your share of total profit and capitalisation. And to increase your distributive share of these magnitudes is to increase your relative power to shape the process of social change. The source of such power is the ability of owners to strategically limit, or “sabotage” the process of social reproduction. (Nitzan and Bichler 2002, 36–38)

This ability to ‘sabotage’, which can be highly advantageous in competition, is often overlooked in analyses, but it is pivotal. This is particularly true in systems where what has been called crony capitalism is particularly active, since power is so closely tied to the capacity to confer advantages on some actors as well as the opposite: to impede the activity of others. In Central Asia, this is expressed in different ways, from practices like the direct appropriation of resources by the elites close to power to the misrepresentation of the competition in business transactions in which the state can intervene, to demanding bribes and commissions from other business owners or the direct theft of companies, forcing their owners to sell them at a price far below their value. In many cases, these regimes can be classified as kleptocracies. From this definition, ‘capital’ is understood to be whatever serves to accumulate more ‘commodified power’. For this reason, it is necessary to differentiate, for example, capital from foreign rent, whether it is the product of oil exports, aid received or debt contracted. The function of this rent in most countries is not to generate more accumulation in the

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form of capital, but in the form of state control, clientelism and legitimacy in the eyes of the people, or direct wealth in the hands of whoever can steal it. The union of clientelism and gas or oil (mainly in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) has also favoured rentier policies in the countries with access to these resources. However—especially with regard to the population’s lower capacity to demand—because of the lesser importance of production (and therefore rent), the greater presence of the private sector and the corrupt appropriation of resources by the elites,10 rentism is not as developed in Central Asia as in the Arab countries that produce oil and gas.11 In this context, the fact that capital and corporation are not synonymous is significant. It is necessary to differentiate between the accumulation of capital and the accumulation of corporative power. Giddens distinguishes between elites who own organizations and elites who control them. The modern corporation has evolved from being controlled by owners to being controlled by directors, and these two sectors can have different interests (Giddens 1974, 9). John Kenneth Galbraith also warned about the power of corporate bureaucracy (Galbraith 2004) and of corporate dominance over the capitalist economy, the erroneously dubbed ‘market economy’ (Galbraith 1973).12 The processes of accumulating capital in a patrimonialist regime differ from the processes of accumulation in systems where capital does not depend on the state. The consequences of this type of regime can be seen in Gilbert Achcar’s analysis of the Arab world, which correlates quite well with Central Asia: The development of ideal-typical productive capitalism, Weber insists, presupposes an adequate legal and administrative framework: “Modern rational business capitalism requires both calculable technical tools as well as calculable law and administration conducted according to formal rules, without which no rational private economic business with standing capital 10 In its 2016 index, Transparency International ranked Kazakhstan at 131, Kyrgyzstan at 136, Tajikistan at 151, Turkmenistan at 154 and Uzbekistan at 156 (out of 176 states, with some having the same points). Transparency International (2017) Corruption Perception Index 2016, https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perc eptions_index_2016#table 11 On rentism, see Beblawi and Luciani (1987), Mañé and De la Cámara (2005), and Izquierdo Brichs (2007a). 12 See Izquierdo-Brichs and Etherington (2017).

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and reliable calculation is possible, although adventure capitalism and speculative trading capitalism and all kinds of politically determined capitalism may be perfectly possible”. […] speculative or commercial capitalism motivated by the pursuit of short-term profit thrives under such conditions. Such capitalism coexists and, often, combines with the state bourgeoisie’s “politically determined capitalism”. By Weber’s definition, the “political orientation” of capitalism of the latter type is a function of 1) “opportunities for predatory profit from political organizations or persons connected with politics”, 2) “profit opportunities in continuous business activity which arise by virtue of domination by force or of a position of power guaranteed by the political authority”, and 3) “profit opportunities in unusual transactions with political bodies”. (Achcar 2013, 62–63)

Ideology is more of a threat for Central Asian regimes than a resource. As noted above, the independent states and regimes in Central Asia arose out of the disintegration of the USSR, without any large nationalist movement involved. The elites took power without the support of the population, never mind responding to their demands. As a result they lacked legitimacy, both ideologically and with regard to the construction of a popular social, economic and political project. For this reason, the regimes in the region see Islamist groups as the primary threat to the system, since they may have a higher capacity for ideological mobilization. Moreover, the Islamists are considered an outside threat to the regime, as they can compete with different resources and the objective of regime change, not only of replacing the elites in power. To deal with this Islamist threat, some leaders have chosen to ensure the continuance of the secular state model, such as Turkey before Recep Erdogan, to give a non-Soviet example. Other leaders have introduced symbolic religious elements or a national historical legitimacy to enhance and associate their image with the country’s mythology, such as Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan, who opened mosques and presented himself as ‘one of the faithful’ and disseminated the image of Tamerlane throughout the country. The main threat for elites in power is a coup from within the regime carried out by another elite that has gained the ability to do so. This threat is most tangible during times of transition. However, competition between elites can displace one elite, but without transforming the system and as a result, the power game can continue with the same rules and resources. In the case of Islamist groups (or a popular revolt), the system would change and not from within, for which reason the elites

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fear losing their capacity to compete. Indeed, the grand alliances between elites are formed to preserve this capacity, although the rivalries between them clearly continue. 2.1

The State as Resource

The institutionalization of the control of the population represents one of the primary mechanisms for the extraction of power and the creation of elites. The state is a structure that organizes other social and economic relations and, above all, a system to channel resources, in terms of both their concentration and their distribution. By passing laws and regulations, this process makes it possible to establish collective goals that are accepted by the majority, and concentrate power in the hands of hierarchies, such that social stratification becomes, in turn, a societal institution. The genesis of the state is directly connected to the subordination of the population to one group and the consequent appropriation of its resources, usually in the absence of a general social agreement. As Georges Balandier argued, the traditional state allows a minority to exert long-term domination, and power struggles inside this elite do not weaken it, but rather reinforce its superior position. Power and authority are so personalized that it is difficult to distinguish the public interest from the private interests of those who take them on (Balandier 1999, 176–177). The state is thus a power resource for which a broad range of actors competes. In the view of Hannah Arendt, power is based on the group and is never the property of one individual. The individual only receives ‘powers’ from a certain number of people, and when the group disappears, this power does, as well (Arendt 2005 [1970]). If Max Weber’s definition of the state as a ‘a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ (Weber 1985, 19) is added to Arendt’s idea, the clear conclusion is that one of the most valuable aspects of the state as a power resource for the elites who control it is this legitimacy in the exercise of governance and the use of violence. Weber himself, in his analysis of the different mechanisms that legitimate domination (traditional, charismatic and legal), referred to the capacity of some elites to use state control to legitimate their domination (Weber 1985, 11–12). However, when this legitimacy weakens or does not exist, violence becomes the basic resource in the hands of the elites who control the state. Consequently, it is important for the primary elites to have a monopoly over violence, which requires

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controlling the state. In Central Asia, in fact, the capacity to repress, coerce or directly eliminate actors is a commonly used resource. It is necessary to differentiate between state, government and regime. The state is a power resource, but it is also a structure. It is an institution that, in turn, encompasses other institutions in which the monopoly over and legitimacy of both the ultimate exercise of public power and violence coalesce. Government is the action of using the state resource as well as the concept used to define the actors who have the capacity to carry out this action at a given point in time. The regime, however, is more than the government; it is the structure adopted by power resources in the domination over the state resource. The term also identifies the elites who have the capacity to shape this structure. The form of the state, government and regime vary according to the historical moment in each society. Finally, there is the power regime, a separate structural configuration that distributes power within a system, bearing in mind all the primary elites and all the resources they use in their process of accumulating power. The modern Central Asian states emerged in a special context, the ‘retreat of the state’ (Strange 1996), in a framework of globalization and the imposition of neoliberal policies and dogma. Because of this, the construction of the new states had to correspond to the demands of global elites to dismantle some institutions. However, unlike in other countries, the starting point was the Soviet state structure, giving the state particular importance in terms of political, social and economic organization. The retreat of the state required political, institutional and geographic reorganization (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Zemni and Bogaert 2009; Izquierdo-Brichs and Etherington 2017). The history of the twentieth century is also the history of the evolution of the modern state, from its construction as certain national elites acquired sovereignty (always as part of a capitalist world system in which they must fulfil the function of control and production) to their transformation, as the limited sovereignty that they won weakened due to the insertion of the interests of foreign actors and the transfer of the control over public resources to foreign and national private hands. As in the rest of the world, the globalization of the system was accompanied by the invisibilization of national sovereignty, which became limited, above all, to the symbolic level and the administration of decisions taken outside state institutional frameworks. This complicated the interrelationship between fields of action and systems of power at their different levels and dimensions. In the case of Central Asia, an evolution that occurred over the course of decades in

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other countries took place to the rhythm of the creation of new institutions and the consolidation of the elites and regimes that won the competition for power. However, the state is still a central resource in the processes of accumulating power in Central Asia. In fact, the example of Tajikistan reveals how control over armed groups was an important component of controlling parts of the state, while the case of Kyrgyzstan even shows delinquents competing to control state institutions, although the actor who ended up with the most power was the one who successfully used the state apparatus against the others. The other countries, albeit using different mechanisms, displayed similar dynamics; here, too the state was an essential part of the elite competition, even with regard to getting rid of opponents, whether physically or politically. The state also serves as the gateway to other resources like foreign rent, capital or wealth acquired directly using corruption (neopatrimonialism and crony capitalism), coercion, information, foreign allies and so forth. The construction of the new states took place parallel to the transition from the Soviet economy to capitalism. This added new tensions to the political changes and also affects any analysis, since the process of economic privatization could magnify the perception of the private sector beyond reality. Without a doubt, privatization processes have had an enormous impact on the constitution of elites and the formation of power resources, particularly with regard to capital, whether more or less clean or criminal. However, crony capitalism and delinquency should not obscure the permanence of clientelist, rentier and neopatrimonial mechanisms based on controlling the state apparatus and public resources.13 2.2

Neopatrimonialism

The clash between statism and the neoliberal policies imposed by global elites made it necessary to adopt policies for system transformation. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan opted for the ‘shock therapy’ advocated by the International Monetary Fund, while Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan chose more gradual therapies. In Tajikistan, the civil war impeded reform (Djalili and Kellner 2003, 43). As noted above, the weakness of the population and social movements gave the elites significant room to manoeuvre, 13 Without entering the terminological debate, we prefer to use these concepts, which are much more widespread than Henry Hale’s ‘patronalism’ (Hale 2015).

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and the first victims were Soviet redistributive and social policies. The percentage of the population living in poverty increased and although economic growth began to recover a few years later, anti-poverty, social and redistributive policies were enacted much more slowly. However, the state continued to be the essential resource, even in the economy, since it played a decisive role in the privatizations that formed part of the economic transition processes, serving as the gateway to the appropriation of economic resources. The elites began to compete for the direct appropriation of the resources that they took from state control. In addition to controlling the state apparatus and bureaucracy, then, the primary elites were able to control the ‘market’ mechanisms with which to accumulate capital. This enabled them to oblige the secondary elites to accept their power and give them part of the accumulation of capital and wealth they had won. Thus, without eliminating the patrimonial or neopatrimonial state, neoliberal capitalism gave rise to capitalist processes of accumulation based on control of the state, corruption and nepotism (crony capitalism). Neopatrimonialism is a mixture of two, partly interwoven, types of domination that co-exist: namely, patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination. Under patrimonialism, all power relations between ruler and ruled, political as well as administrative relations, are personal relations; there is no differentiation between the private and the public realm. However, under neopatrimonialism the distinction between the private and the public, at least formally, exists and is accepted, and public reference can be made to this distinction (it is a different matter whether this is observed or not). […] Naturally these spheres are not isolated from each other; quite to the contrary, they permeate each other; or more precisely, the patrimonial penetrates the legal-rational system and twists its logic, functions, and effects. That is, informal politics invade formal institutions. Informality and formality are intimately linked to each other in various ways and by varying degrees; and this particular mix becomes institutionalised […] Thus neopatrimonialism is a type of political domination which is characterised by insecurity about the behaviour and role of state institutions (and agents). This insecurity structures the reproduction of the system: - Actions of state institutions or by state agents are not calculable – probably apart for the head of the state. All actors strive to overcome their insecurity, but they do so by operating on both the formal as well as the informal logic of neopatrimonialism. Ultimately, the inherent insecurity is reproduced in a systematic way. The relationship between the two logics

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of neopatrimonialism, the formal and the informal, can thus be conceptualised as a mutually reinforcing one, as a mutually constitutive cycle of reproduction. - Within such a pattern of social and political relations, formal state institutions cannot fulfil their universalistic purpose of public welfare. Formal public institutions and the politics ascribed to them cannot, therefore, gain sufficient legitimacy. Instead, politics and policies are determined by particularistic interests and orientations. - Political informality has gained such a dimension that one can even speak of institutionalised informality […]. (Erdmann and Engel 2006, 18– 19)

One characteristic of these types of neo-patrimonial relations is that they require control of the state, making the state a central resource in the competition for power. In the post-Soviet context, in which the new system was rooted in the statism that penetrated all political and economic relations, the centrality of the state was still more evident, even if only to be dismantled as far as it was convenient for the elites. The maintenance or construction of a legal-rational bureaucratic apparatus did not cancel out the concentration of control of power resources or arbitrariness; on the contrary, it was constructed in a way that facilitated the accumulation of power in very few hands. At times, it even approached sultanism, as defined by Juan J Linz, Alfred Stepan and Houchang Chehabi (Linz and Stepan 1996; Chehabi and Linz 1998). Since most of the leaders did not emerge from mass movements, but from manoeuvring against other elites, they lacked charisma and fit the description provided by Chehabi and Linz: ‘Sultanistic leaders crave charisma and surround themselves with the trappings of charismatic leadership precisely because they know they lack it. They invent new titles for themselves […]’ (Chehabi and Linz 1998, 13). Examples include Turkmenistan, where Saparmurat Niyazov declared himself Türkmenba¸sy (Leader of all the Turkmen) and Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov took the title of Arkadag (Protector). Nursultan Nazarbayev became ‘Leader of the Nation’, the same epithet bestowed upon Emomali Rahmon in Tajikistan. In most cases, there was also a strong trend towards oneman governance, trust placed only in the family and its closest circles, the promotion of family-based succession mechanisms, and ideologies connected to cults of personality. Moreover, this was all in the context of the absence of the rule of law, arbitrary laws and repressive apparatuses that turned fear into an omnipresent power resource and, evidently,

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corruption and crony capitalism, all of which combined to produce a kleptocracy. However, the situation was disguised with ‘constitutional’, electoral and plebiscitary facades that facilitated foreign relations and control of the pseudo-opposition that accepted a secondary position in the system (Chehabi and Linz 1998, 10–26). Thus, the dominant elites in this type of regime can clearly not be considered a bourgeoisie that accumulates power in the form of capital. Rather, they form a rentier aristocracy, since their position in the process of accumulation depends on their capacity to control the state. This rentier aristocracy, in turn, depends directly on the international bourgeoisie and support from the global elites. Parallel to the consolidation of the state leadership, a bourgeoisie with direct ties to the regime’s power also formed. At times this occurred because the state provided some individuals with the means to invest in institutional form. In other situations, well-positioned state civil servants diverted resources to the private sector to their own benefit, while some business owners took advantage of rents and demand to invest in profit-making sectors. In general, the bourgeoisie in the third group felt displaced and abused by the regime, viewing the first two groups as unfair competition and possessed of advantages that they did not enjoy (Vieille 1984, 17). Of course, the post-Soviet transitions occurred in a context of low oil and gas prices and a major economic crisis. When energy prices began to rise in the late 1990s, the spoils in the producing countries increased in size. In Central Asia, this rise in prices was accompanied by growing demand and interest from China, which allowed the countries to diversify their channels of foreign rent, enhancing its significance. Neopatrimonialism is accompanied by clientelism to ensure that the elites—mainly the primary, but also the secondary elites—have a support base in the competition against other elites. Both under Stalin and later, the Soviet regime was a breeding ground for the creation of clientelist networks. Some authors even speak of ‘patrimonial communism’ to refer to a system that ‘relies on vertical chains of personal dependence between leaders in the state and party apparatus and their entourage, buttressed by extensive patronage and clientelist networks’ (Kitschelt et al. 1999, 23). For this reason, both Stalin and the central nomenklatura after his death had to ensure that none of these clientelist networks became strong enough to become a threat. In the case of the Central Asian republics,

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where a tradition of regional or clan networks persisted, this was achieved using different mechanisms: Moscow’s appointment policy was based on a careful selection of leading cadres which attempted to entrust top republican positions to cadres of different regional origin. On comparing the regional affiliation of first party secretaries, it can be observed that their regional affiliation changed regularly. In this way Moscow tried to ensure that none of the regional factions could become too powerful. In addition other major offices, for example, those of the prime minister and the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, were given to party leaders from other regions in order to check the influence of the home region of the first secretary who usually was in charge of cadre affairs. Moscow retreated from this policy of balancing factionalism in Central Asia in two respects: In the Brezhnev era Central Asian First Secretaries were appointed for twenty years and more, which led to the so-called patrimonial era. During this period political clientelism became more unchecked, leading Gorbachev to try to curb it later on with his policy of cadre exchange. Secondly, there was the case of Tajikistan, where Moscow relied heavily on cadres from Leninabad and appointed all first secretaries from this more industrialized area of the Tajik Fergana valley. These appointments were balanced by recruiting primarily people from Badakhshan into the security apparatus. This regional bias of state institutions fuelled the outbreak of the civil war in Tajikistan in 1992. […] Political competition between regional factions was also constrained by European deputies, who were – being Moscow’s watchdogs – more difficult to integrate in clientele networks. In addition, political clientelism could not operate openly, as regional committees and Politburos formally made collective decisions, supported by all members of the committees. Finally, numerous Soviet institutions like the army, the KGB and the military-industrial complex were directly administered by Moscow and had different recruitment policies. (Geiss 2012, 192–193)

However, despite Moscow’s efforts, the networks existed. The transition from the Soviet system to the new states, created without nationalist demands, occurred in a context of neoliberal globalization in societies that still maintained social structures tied to clan-based segmentarism and, especially, to informal clientelist networks in some places. The strong Soviet statist system provided the basis for the construction of the new systems, with the state being central in the configuration of the different competition processes for the accumulation of power resources in their

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varied forms, including capital and wealth. At the same time, particularly during the transition period, when competition between different elites to control the system was tougher than ever, networks and alliances formed one of the bases from which to win positions. Accordingly, some authors focused their attention on the clans. In Kathleen Collins’s definition: A clan is an informal organization comprising a network of individuals linked by kin and fictive kin identities. These affective ties comprise the identity and bonds of its organization. Kinship ties are rooted in the extensive family organization that characterizes society in this region and in historically tribal societies. “Fictive kinship” ties go beyond blood ties and incorporate individuals into the network through marriage, family alliances, school ties, localism (mestnichestvo), and neighbourhood (mahalla) and village (qishloq). (Collins 2006, 17)

However, as Ruiz and Morales observe in their chapter, this definition of clan is much debated (Ruiz Ramas and Morales 2018; Ruiz Ramas 2010). In this case, the interpretation that Collins makes of the concept is, on the one hand, quite broad and, on the other, does not cover the range of clientelist and network relations that can be found in Central Asia and the Arab world today. Historically, the concept of clan had a much narrower meaning related to ties based on solidarity, identity, authority and clientelism—the Asabiyyah of Ibn Khaldun—that go far beyond alliances based on interest (Ibn Jaldún 1987 [1382]). In Central Asia, as in the Arab world, these ties were weakened by state institutions, migrations and urbanization processes, the modern economy, ideologies like Soviet so-called socialism, liberalism, nationalism and so forth, new identities and communities of interests, social movements and even religious institutions whose mechanisms of authority were detached from traditional social organization. Above all, they were weakened because the authority (the power) transferred to other elites and other resources, with the more clientelist dimension gaining increasing importance. […] the Soviet modernization project began to erode kinship ties and transformed them into clientele networks which – in the following decades – could also be established on the basis of comradeship and acquaintance in school, military service, at work or at university. When such informal patronage and clientele networks strive for control over economic and administrative resources within a region or a district, a regional power

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network emerges. The leaders of such a network might eventually challenge the influence of the central government on their territory or attempt to take control of central governmental institutions. (Geiss 2012, 187)

Thus, in most cases, clan elites and ties as a resource were given secondary status in the system, as they depended on their relationships with the primary elites and their capacity to access control of the power resources that went beyond clan relations. For this reason, it is better to speak of networks and alliances which—although they may at times preserve a clan base—are generally constructed on the basis of circumstantial overlapping interests and clientelism. They may even have different bases, related to region, profession, studies, business or even the experience of being in the same prison, like Camp 31 in Kyrgyzstan.14 These networks, including the clans, are especially important in times of transition, before a power regime and the elites who control it consolidate. During these periods, when a diversity of primary elites is in competition with each other, but none of them have managed to establish themselves above the others, networks and alliances have an important impact on the outcome of the competition and rivalry and, especially, the structuring of power. If these networks are regional, it can make it harder for the state primary elites to achieve stability. Moreover, the permanence of regional primary elites can even become consolidated in a system based on overlords (often from the war) who control entire areas that do not depend on the state presidency with whom the central elite has to negotiate. In Central Asia, however, the elites who have managed to gain control of the state have generally become strong enough to control regional elites and other networks during each moment of change, placing them in a secondary position or eliminating them directly. Thus, if an elite or group of elites secures a dominant position in a system, the other elites and their networks become secondary. Analytically speaking, in macrosocial terms they lose their clout, although they may be useful for a sociological and anthropological mesolevel analysis.

3

Power Regimes

The analysis of power regimes requires an identification of the different types of regimes. In their chapter, Ruiz and Morales concentrate on the 14 See Akchurina and Polese (2018).

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political system, the elites and the territorial fragmentation of power. We prefer to focus on the power system, on elites and resources, covering more than the political level. There are three ideal types of power regimes, bearing in mind that analysis never encounters pure models: a power regime with both diversified elites and resources; a regime with concentrated elites, but diversified resources; and a regime with both concentrated elites and resources. Central Asia is home to power regimes that have transitioned from one form to another or are still in that process, generally in the direction of increased concentration of power. In the power regime with both diversified elites and resources, a diversity of primary elites compete to control resources and for varied resources. This is the regime most similar to modern Western capitalist democracies, in which different elites compete to accumulate capital and control the state, the large corporations, information, ideology and influence over the population. This type of power regime is also very stable, since if one elite is displaced, it is immediately replaced by another, and the system remains. However, the position of the actors/elites may be more insecure than in other types of regimes, since competition can cause them to fall from the power hierarchy without the system being affected. The elites become accustomed to making alliances to preserve the mechanisms of accumulation, and even if one of the power accumulation processes changes (e.g. because of transformations in the political system, like the transition from Franco-era Spain to democracy), the others continue to function. The main danger for this type of power regime is that outside elites end up displacing the decision-making processes to a higher, global level, as is occurring now. Despite the fact that the regimes that are most representative of this model are capitalist Western democracies, they can also develop with different resources and political forms, as in some cases in Central Asia. During the transition period in Central Asia, some countries came close to this model, such as Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, although in a moderate and, above all, transitory way, because from the very beginning, the state played a larger role as a resource than the other resources. The elites who controlled the state found themselves in a very advantageous position and in more than one case were able to eliminate the competition and concentrate power through repression and coercion, as seen in the paradigmatic cases of Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan (Tipaldou 2018) and Rahmon in Tajikistan (Lemon and Roberts 2018). In Nazarbayev‘s case, even after resigning and handing over the

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presidency to Tokayev in 2019, he remains at the centre of power. Moreover, since the political system was in a process of construction, there were very few structural brakes on the processes of power accumulation and concentration, allowing the elites who had the capacity to define the characteristics of the system to situate themselves in an advantageous position with respect to the others. These power regimes were quite unlike those in Western democracies, and thanks to authoritarian control of the state apparatus, the primary elites could be placed in quite favourable situations. In Uzbekistan, for instance, despite the intense authoritarianism, different, largely regional clans or informal networks diversified the elites and their control over the resources somewhat in the beginning. Ruiz and Morales highlight the central Karimov clan and the clans from Samarkand, Tashkent and Fergana, in addition to some corporate and criminal elites. In Kyrgyzstan, the elites threatened by the growing concentration of power in the hands of, first, Askar Akayev and then, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, were able to take advantage of the changes brought about by the uprisings of 2005 and 2010 to once again redistribute power. Even greater democratization did not impede the clientelist, corrupt and kleptocratic mechanisms. However, in almost all the cases, the primary elite controlling the state gained strength little by little, eliminating the other elites or making them secondary, except in Kyrgyzstan, where the power continued to have a greater degree of diversification, and in Turkmenistan, where both elites and resources have been more concentrated. As a result, the regimes that started out more diversified have transitioned to the model of concentrated elites with diversified resources, but with state primacy. In this type of power regime, the primary elite is a very small, closed circle, although the resources they control are diverse. Historically, many authoritarian postcolonial states without an economy based on extracting oil or gas have approximated this model. It is possible to find examples of power regimes in which the elites who won the competition have been able to control the state in addition to capital, information, ideology, coercion and so forth. In many cases, this process occurred through control of the state that gave the elites access to the other resources (one clear example is Morocco [Feliu and Izquierdo Brichs 2016]), but other forms also exist, like the large Latin American landholders who successfully controlled the state, the media and the army and diversified the processes to accumulate capital. This type of regime is very stable, since the elites have significant

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room to manoeuvre, both with competing elites and with social movements, as they can make concessions in the control of a particular power resource while maintaining control of the other resources. They also have a high capacity to repress, which they do if they feel threatened. This allows them to maintain their primary position. Power regimes with concentrated elites and resources are also based on a very small, closed circle of primary elites, but in this case, their power is based on their control over very few resources. Historically, this model has applied to dictatorial or authoritarian postcolonial states with economies that are dependent on the production of oil or gas, since they are rentier, patrimonial or neopatrimonial regimes. Once this type of regime stabilizes, it is very strong, since a few people control large power resources. This means that they have a high capacity for coercion and repression, both against competing elites and against social movements. However, in the face of significant threats, they have little capacity to negotiate, since they cannot make partial concessions that are sufficient to weaken the mobilization and deactivate the competing elites or social movements because of the concentration of their power resources. Theirs is a game of all or nothing and it is existential in the face of competition or social mobilization; thus their repression always brutal. In Central Asia, the case that most closely fits this model is, without a doubt, Turkmenistan. The president and his family control the state apparatus, allowing them to concentrate wealth, coercion and information, control the ideology and, above all, control the rent from exporting raw materials (Horák 2018).

4

The Structure of the System

One of the key questions in the social sciences today continues to be the ‘agent-structure debate’. The perspective that sees the structure as the basis believes that the interests and behaviour of agents are defined by the framework in which they move. Those who uphold the primacy of agents, on the other hand, argue that structures are the result of the action of a few individuals with maximizing goals. In other words, structures are seen as either constraints or as the product of individual decisions. We believe that agents continuously produce and reproduce the characteristic elements of a society, but also that their activity does not always unfold in conditions chosen by them. The decisions made by agents are not completely determined by the structure, but neither

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are they always taken within a framework that they control completely.15 Following Roy Bhaskar and Anthony Giddens, we argue that structure is dual (Bhaskar 1979; Giddens 1984). Giddens asserts that structure is at once the medium and the outcome of the practices that constitute social systems (Giddens 1981, 27). Therefore, agents and structures are not opposing concepts; rather, each implies the existence of the other. In daily competition, agents do not have the capacity to directly influence the factors that define structure. This possibility only occurs in times of revolutionary change, which are usually accompanied by a linear mobilization on the part of the population. For this reason, one of the characteristics that makes it possible to distinguish when a factor is structural or circumstantial is, indeed, whether it is difficult for agents to directly influence it. Structure, of course, establishes both constraints for agents and opportunities (Giddens 1976, 161). Thus, in the competitive game, what acts as a constraint for one agent is an advantage for another. An agent who must play against certain structural constraints has only limited room to manoeuvre, while one who can take advantage of the opportunities will have more capacity to accumulate. Colin Wight goes even further, presenting two theoretical traditions in the structure analysis. In the first, structure is considered the environment in which agents move and it determines their constraints and opportunities, while the second adds the collective representations of social facts (Wight 2006, 126). Thus, different types of constraints or possibilities exist, which can come from: (a) pressures from the population or groups that are capable of generating linear relations that oblige elites to perform certain actions or prohibit others; (b) pressures from other elites, which forge the power balances in the system; (c) pressures from institutions and rules, such as the state, constitutional laws, customs and so forth16 ; (d) pressures from values and ideologies, especially those

15 From the perspective of the sociology of power, however, it is important not to confuse the systemic game with the structure. The system is based on circular and linear power relations. Elite decisions cannot escape the competition for the differential accumulation of power, since if they abandon the priority of maximizing power, they lose their position as elites. However, this competition plays out within a structure that is different in each system. 16 One extreme, but very graphic example of these pressures is the acceptance of war as a legal institution when carried out by states, but not when other organizations are involved.

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defined as the Foucauldian and Gramscian levels (regime of truth and cultural hegemony); and ( e) pressures from outside agents. Changes in the system structure result from changes in either the agents, resources, power relations or ideology. In the first case, changes occur when there is an increase or decrease in the power of some primary actors capable of generating new balances. In Central Asia, in fact, the capacity of some elites to achieve a dominant position in the power balance has been decisive. This has largely been due to the structural weakness of the system, which produces few constraints, especially regarding the values and demands of the population. Only outside actors at the time of transition, mainly global financial and economic elites, are able to impose a structurally significant neoliberal framework. However, for the new elites, this produces more opportunities than constraints, since neoliberalism facilitates the resource appropriation processes that develop in neopatrimonial systems. Regarding resources, the transformative factor for the system structure is related to changes in the usefulness of the resources to accumulate power. The importance of a power resource is not an intrinsic property, but depends on the competitive circumstances. Resources that are valid at one time may be useless at another and, therefore, the elites who have them are displaced by others able to use the new resources. In postSoviet Central Asia, the state continued to be an essential resource, the key that gave the elites an advantage in the competition for other power resources like capital, foreign rent, coercion, information and, in the some cases, ideology. Thus, paradoxically, in a neopatrimonial transition to capitalism based on neoliberalism, the state is essential if state elites are also to become capitalist elites and appropriate the wealth. Evidently, this is much more difficult in a democratic system, and, consequently, the political systems have tended towards authoritarianism, if not outright dictatorship. Most Central Asian states have a centralized model of primary elites who depend, above all, on control over the state, but who little by little— and thanks precisely to that control over the state—are diversifying the resources on which they depend. In the third case, that of power relations, the factor that can modify the system structure is the arrival of linear power relations on the scene. When the population mobilizes, it can weaken some elites, but it can also strengthen those who have the capacity to take advantage of the popular movement’s momentum. Moreover, linear relations can have revolutionary consequences, and even go so far as to modify the rules

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of the game, eliminate some elites and create new ones, or bring once useless power resources with regard to competition to the fore. This phenomenon depends on the capacity to raise awareness and mobilize the population or large groups. Theda Skocpol argued that the presence of two dynamics differentiates social revolutions from other transformative processes: a structural change in society with class agitation, and social and political transformations (Skocpol 1979, 4). In Central Asia, the inability of social movements to engender extensive mobilizations in the population (in the sense of linear relations to improve living conditions) was and continues to be enormously important. As a consequence, the competing elites have faced very few constraints and their decisions have not had to respond much to popular demands. Thus, they have been able to focus almost completely on processes of accumulation and competition for power. In the fourth case, regarding the collective representation of social facts, there are two levels: Foucauldian and Gramscian. According to Foucault, ‘Each society has its regime of truth, its “general politics” of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true’ (Foucault 1999, 53). This ‘regime of truth’ is only modified with the passage of time and the evolution of social relations and cannot be manipulated by the elites as they please. For the same reason, they cannot establish defined programmes of opposition and resistance to the regime of truth. However, this does not mean that some elites cannot take advantage of the regime to improve their position in the competition for power. On the level defined by Gramsci as ‘cultural hegemony’, a system of universal beliefs is established in which the interests of a specific sector are accepted as beneficial to all of society. Because of their ability to gain acceptance for their own interests as universal, the elites set the agenda and the priorities for the society. The hegemony is established from a large coalition of an important sector of society, practically a class, making it impossible to manipulate, at least in the short term. Gramsci’s concept is better defined than Foucault’s ‘regime of truth’ and leaves room for open battles to weaken the regime or establish counter-hegemonies. The Central Asian regimes have benefitted from the force of authoritarianism on the ideological plane of Foucault’s regime of truth. The

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Stalinist and Soviet inheritance has helped to sustain an acceptance of authoritarianism that forms part of the cultural heritage interiorized by generations of Soviet citizens. In this dominant ‘truth’, the authoritarian elites find broad support to justify their form of government as well as undercut the voices demanding democratization. Changes to this regime of truth are extremely slow, and the structure here acts a very powerful factor of continuity and paralysis on the side of the regimes. On the other hand, the inability of the elites to create cultural hegemonies in the Gramscian sense and the weakness of their legitimacy are factors of instability in the structure. In Central Asia, the weakness of these structural factors leaves the stability of the system in the hands of circumstantial power balances, and if the strength of one elite or another changes, this can lead to changes in the system hierarchy. While these changes do not transform the system, they can produce conflicts and insecurities, especially at times of transition between leaders. In another dimension of the analysis, the structure of a system is also connected to higher systems and the changes that occur in them. Thus, competitive subsystems may exist within systems and the alliances between elites from one subsystem with elites from a higher system are, in turn, a common power resource. For example, the competition for power in one region or clan will be determined in part by the capacity of certain elites to make alliances with the elites who control the state. On the contrary, at times of intense competition for state control, some key elites will need to ally with regional or clan elites or with networks of influence. On a higher level, the alliances made by elites from the world periphery with global elites constitute a power resource to ensure the position of the former. In Central Asia at this time, the ability to make alliances with Russian and Chinese elites plays an essential role. In this introductory chapter, the sociology of power has provided a general perspective with which to view power regimes in Central Asia. However, clearly, differences exist in addition to similarities, and at times they are pronounced. The following chapters analyse each of the regimes in the countries of Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan), highlighting their similarities and contrasts. Two other chapters on Russian and Chinese relations with the region situate these regimes in the context of regional and international dynamics.

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Russia’s Role in the Consolidation of the Central Asian Elites Francesc Serra-Massansalvador

1

Introduction

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the republics that emerged from that union have generated great interest among specialists in their evolution both internally and in the international strategic game. Once one of the main actors of the international system disappeared during the Cold War, a complex map remained to be defined in a context where there had been no clear design for the future. In this context, we can clearly distinguish between large geographical areas: in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, Russia would fight fiercely to maintain its influence through clientelist regimes and, often, through controlled conflicts that would make its presence essential, both militarily and politically (Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria…). In recent years, particularly in Ukraine and Georgia, this role of Russia has led to clear and often violent competition with the influence of other

F. Serra-Massansalvador (B) Faculty of Political Science and Sociology (International Relations), Autonomous University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. Izquierdo-Brichs and F. Serra-Massansalvador (eds.), Political Regimes and Neopatrimonialism in Central Asia, The Steppe and Beyond: Studies on Central Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9093-1_2

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powers. In the Baltic, Russia has resigned itself to external pressure on strategic issues and to a role as a distant defender of its related minorities, after giving up de facto control of the region. The case of Central Asia, however, presents its peculiarities and its own paradigms. This particularisation of the Central Asian case is due to three, perhaps four, basic reasons: firstly, a lack of real competition between powers for regional influence in the area; secondly, a continuum in power structures; and thirdly, a slow process of distancing from the former Soviet-Russian metropolis through a hesitant process of national (re)construction that involves consolidating the identities of the new states to the detriment of identification with Russia. To these three elements, a fourth should be added which, while not in itself exclusive to the region, does help to explain Russia’s role in Central Asia: the strong rivalry and competition between the countries of the region. So, first of all, we see that there is no great interest in other powers to strengthen their influence in Central Asia. However, this statement should be qualified. When these nations first gained their independence, at the beginning of the 1990s, we can detect the presence of interests of neighbouring middle powers (such as Turkey, Iran and even Pakistan and Saudi Arabia) to influence the area, either through economic investments or through soft power activities. However, there is a certain international consensus in granting Russia a privileged role in the ex-Soviet space, despite the weakness of the Russian state at the time, largely to avoid an excessive sense of grievance on the part of the Kremlin. Therefore, as soon as Russia can recover its international role, we see it rescuing its influence in Central Asia without greater international opposition and, although unevenly, without great opposition from the countries in the area. Geostrategic interests linked to energy, however, deserve separate mention. Here we do find, on the part of both China and, above all, Western Europe, interference that leads, especially in the case of Turkmenistan, to a certain distance from Russia, although this does not fundamentally deteriorate the regional balance of alliances. The second point we indicated, the continuity in the power structures, is essential to understand the political functioning of the region. This is for two reasons: on the one hand, it provides stability in power, although it also encourages authoritarian attitudes. Secondly, these structures come from the previous Soviet political context and, therefore, have largely inherited both the main actors involved in the relations between the new nations and the old metropolis, and the clientelist networks woven in the region, particularly during the last period of existence of the USSR,

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which was extremely immersed in corruption and direct personal interests. There is no revolutionary relay in the region’s elites in the early years of independence, and often not at all, and therefore, the basic, personal and collective political interests prior to independence are maintained. The Central Asian nations had never been independent, in the form of modern, stable and national states, before 1991. In fact, their national structures were obtained precisely because of their fit with the Soviet state. Thus, the consolidation of national attributes has been a slow, pusillanimous operation, largely done ad hoc (Ganev 2005). Although in other areas of the world the process of nation-building has been forged to the detriment of identity ties with the former metropolis, the lack of planning and concreteness in the Central Asian model has led to the maintenance of a great Russian influence in the region, to the satisfaction of Russian interests in the area. Finally, we must not forget the continuing tension in the region due to regional rivalries, territorial claims, border conflicts, personal incompatibilities between leaders and protection of minorities in neighbouring states. This rarefied climate in the region makes it difficult to achieve common objectives if not for the presence and activity of a guardian power that maintains a discreet mediation and a certain coordination of interests without putting the interests of one or another state first. Russia, to a large extent for the reasons mentioned above, stands out as a regional power with the general, although often irregular, compliance of the countries involved. Balancing this influence with countries’ independence of action, however, requires diplomatic skill that is not always guaranteed and may be difficult to maintain in future. Russia has for the time being guaranteed influence in Central Asia, and this influence is recognised by the regimes in the region as well as by other powers. However, this balance presents many uncertainties, in a politically fragile and unstable area. Throughout the chapter, we will see the effects and scenarios, present and future, of the consolidation of this influence and what this implies for the power structures in the Central Asian states.

2

A Question of Identity?

Russia’s role in Central Asian countries has often been overlooked or neglected. Unlike Eastern Europe, Russia has not fostered and prolonged conflicts in the area. And, unlike the Caucasus and other regions, we do not find self-proclaimed republics protected by the Kremlin. And yet,

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Moscow’s interests and ultimate interference in the area are more than evident and reflect one fundamental objective in Russia’s policy towards the so-called Near Abroad. Issues such as the protection of Russian minorities, soft power in the region, security and strategic problems or energy supplies lead us to conclude that Moscow has placed Central Asia at the heart of its foreign policy in order to strengthen its influence in the former Soviet space, no doubt in a more discreet way than in other regions, but precisely because of this, in a more effective way. This has, of course, led to a close relationship between Russian policy in the region and the formation, support, replacement or maintenance of indigenous political elites. Russia, with almost two centuries of experience in the region, during which it has shaped local power structures to its liking, continues to exert an influence in the area that, although uneven, is presented as an indispensable element for understanding the balances of power in Central Asia. For Russia’s high politics, the countries of Central Asia are part of its priority area of interest, in coherence with the historical tradition that has linked the region with Russia since the mid-nineteenth century. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought about a rupture that was poorly digested both by Russian society as a whole and by the Kremlin’s policies, which were not prepared for an unpredictable reality in which entities that had formed part of the national collective unconscious and that continued to form an indisputable identity continuity for Russia had to be treated as sovereign actors (Morozov 2015, 134–135). Two more important elements must be taken into account to understand Russia’s identification with Central Asia. Firstly, there is no real willingness to break up in Central Asia during the process that would lead to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Unlike in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and, above all, the Baltic republics, there is no demand for independence in the Central Asian region. However, there is no real demand to change the power structures, much less a change of structures such as the independence of the republics. This is due, in part, to the lack of cohesion of national identities in the area; let us not forget that these identities are, in this region, the product of the very ideological machinery of the Soviet Revolution, as we will see later. Secondly, and largely related to the previous point, during and after the break-up of the Soviet Union, there is no real replacement of the elites in power in Central Asia. The same structures and the same protagonists that already directed the Soviet republics are maintained, with changes

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only in the ideological rhetoric that denies in a very short time the references to the Revolution, to Marxism or to the brotherhood among the peoples of the USSR and embraces messages of national, identity and historical renewal. We only find a gradual replacement of intermediate Russian positions by native ones, a phenomenon derived both from the pressure of the new political discourses and from a first exodus of the Russian population after independence (Ubiria 2016). The first element mentioned, the paradoxical absence of national claims in the process that would lead to the independence of the Central Asian nations, does not obey a fully satisfactory relationship of the interethnic relations; in fact, during the Soviet era, a certain discrimination is perceived in the distribution of administrative positions between an autochthonous population, to which it is generally assimilated with clan alliances and atavistic family complicities, and some Russian social sectors, urban, qualified, linked to industrialisation and administration and of relatively recent roots. The Russians and other Europeans controlled the bureaucratic springs of the Central Asian Soviet republics, as well as the links that united it with the rest of the Soviet Union (party, unions, government of the big cities, intellectual world, management of companies) while the indigenous populations maintained an important and often highly symbolic presence (the presidencies of the republics, for example).1 The changes produced from 1991 onwards were initially cosmetic; as I have pointed out, they are not genuine revolutions, in the sense of replacing the elites in power, but in reality, the adaptation of these elites to a new political situation. The ideological erosion of the USSR and the independence achieved volens nolens lead to a significant change of discourse, from deep Marxist-Leninist roots to the exaltation of national and cultural identity. But in this transformation practically all the old administration participates, including the ethnic Russians and, it goes without saying, those responsible for the old communist apparatus. Only in the years that followed did we find a strengthening of the national character of the new administration. This is due to several factors: 1. The administrations of the new states, freed from their dependencies and allegiances to Moscow, consolidate their power with people they

1 The process of national identification of countries emerging from communism is discussed in depth in Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong (2002).

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trust, using personal, family and clan ties that often leave people with no deep-rooted ties to the country on the sidelines; 2. For the sake of consistency with the new nationalist discourse, Russian elements of power become less numerous and, in any case, less visible. In several of the new republics, an identification of the administration with the national ‘sovereign’ component is required, which may include everything from a public demonstration of loyalty to the new state (or to the leader, which is the same in these circumstances) to a display of mastery of the national language or local customs, which in fact becomes a sieve for those involved in the leadership of these new countries; 3. There is an exodus of the ‘exogenous’ population for various reasons: from the willingness of part of this population to ‘repatriate’ to the new Russia with which they identify, to the economic crisis that forces the closure of many old industries, the same ones that had attracted Russian immigration decades ago. The new nationalist discourse, on the other hand, brings the sensation, and often the fact, that the new state privileges national cadres, with which a gradual substitution of European elements by Asian ones is produced at all levels of power; 4. In addition to the net emigration of the European population, a phenomenon that is typical of the years following independence, the proportion of the Russian population is falling considerably due to another demographic phenomenon that has its roots in the 1970s: the growth of Asian groups, which reached 3–4% per year in the 1990s, expelled the European populations, whose negative growth was consolidated at the end of the twentieth century and which could not bring about generational renewal. Therefore, the members recruited by the new administration, and therefore the new elites, will tend to be less Russian/European and more local/Asian. Table 1 shows the evolution of the national composition of the Central Asian countries since their independence, according to the different censuses of each state. We can see that the proportion of the population that identifies itself as Russian is steadily decreasing, while the population is increasingly reflected in the ‘nominal’ national community of each state. Although the demographic factors, as I have pointed out above, are important, it should be noted that there is a growing ‘voluntary’ identification of the population with the majority ethnic group regardless of

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Table 1 Proportion of the majority nationality of each state and of the Russian population in the Central Asian republics, 1970–2018 (in bold, the proportion of the state’s titular population; in italics, the proportion of the Russian population)a

Kazakhstan Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan

1970

1989

1995–2000

2009–2010

2012–2014

2017–2018

32.4 42.8 64.7 12.5 43.8 29.2 56.2 11.9 65.6 14.5

39.7 37.8 71.4 8.4 52.4 21.5 62.3 7.6 72 9.5

53.5 29.9 80 5.5 64.9 12.5 79.9 1.1 76.7 6.7

63.1 23.7 nd

65.5 21.5 nd

nd

71 7.8 84.3 0.5 nd

72.3 6.6 nd 85.6 5.1

83.7 2.3 73.3 5.6 nd nd

a This was prepared based on the 1970 and 1989 Soviet nationality censuses and national censuses in

the various states. In the case of Uzbekistan, there has been no official census since independence; the data provided in the third and last columns are official estimates

the cultural origin of each person, whether it is for personal promotion or for authentic patriotic identification. Of course, the census manipulations, not unusual in this type of official document, should not be dismissed. The decline of the Russian population in Central Asia has been accompanied by a process of relativisation of Russian soft power in the region, which has been arguably successful. At present, only Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan maintain Russian as a co-official language, and there has even been a movement to reject the Cyrillic alphabet, but the truth is that the Russian language and culture continue to be the significant reference for the educated population in all these countries. Similarly, Central Asian societies remain linked to Russia through television, social networks, the Internet and by the maintenance of a diffuse transnational cultural community to which efforts to recover national cultures are insufficient and often simply not encouraged. In short, we can conclude that Russia has been able to maintain a cultural presence and even a certain identity identification in the societies of Central Asia, despite the consolidation of the nation-building processes and the clear decrease of the Russian human component in the region, especially in the administrations. This has favoured the maintenance of a social influence that has its clear consequences in the political and strategic spheres.

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3

Geostrategic Interests

If the persistence of Russian influence in Central Asia from the cultural and even identity point of view is undeniable, Russia’s political presence in the region presents several more questionable facts. One of the unknowns left by the disappearance of the USSR was the continuity of Russia as a regional power in the post-Soviet space. The creation and consolidation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in the same year did not meet Russian expectations of a direct continuity or replacement of the Soviet Union, among other reasons because of the same process of consolidation of the new states and the political and economic crisis that accompanied Russia throughout the 1990s. In the face of a clear lack of leadership, the ghost of a competition to exercise the role of regional power in areas that were previously part of the USSR soon appeared, but the disorientation typical of this era in the international system prevented the consolidation of a real alternative to Russian pretensions (except for the Baltic countries, of course). In the specific case of Central Asia, the Russian influence has not had to face great competition, given the isolation of the region and the absence of a clear interest by any of the neighbouring powers in extending their presence there. In the face of international uncertainty and Russia’s inaction, some powers began a timid, or not so timid, rapprochement with the region. Turkey wanted to recover the traditional influence it had had by acting as a cultural and even ideological reference, with a superficially democratic political model and as secular as a post-communist Muslim society could absorb, at the same time as its companies landed in the new states. Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia offered different versions suitable for societies recently returned to Islam, while Japan and South Korea deployed ambitious investment and regional development projects. Perhaps Russian influence, among so many suitors and in the midst of national reconstruction, could have been blurred at this critical time, but it did not. There were two reasons for this: firstly, and in spite of everything, there remained a strong feeling of belonging to the Russian-Soviet cultural and political space, both among the Central Asian societies and among the elites, trained in strict Soviet education and love for Russian culture (Deyermond 2008). Secondly, there was an implicit consensus among the international powers: it was not convenient to humiliate Russia more than necessary, since it was already seen as defeated, impoverished and disintegrated. Just as Russia’s role as a world power was respected

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by keeping it on the UN Security Council or inviting it to join the G-7, for example, and by helping it economically in the turbulent 1990s, there was a feeling that depriving it of an area of regional influence would have been an excessive affront. So, again except for the Baltics, there was a consensus at an early stage to recognise Russia’s interests and rights over the former Soviet space. This non-explicit decision watered down some of the first Europeanist vocations in Ukraine and other republics, while at the same time repelling the initial intentions to interfere in Central Asia, especially on the part of the powers that maintained close dependence on the West. This climate also isolated Georgia and forced it into the arms of the Russian giant despite the armed interference that the Kremlin was developing over the country prior to the Sochi agreements in 1992. Central Asia has thus remained under the direct influence of Russia, which has made it its client area, especially by maintaining good relations with the elites in power. This ruling class, which is becoming increasingly ‘national’ and less Russian, has preserved the commercial interests that were almost necessarily passing through Russia, which has changed guaranteeing them security and stability with hardly any demands in their internal policies; not even towards the Russians of the region, who have become national minorities that have lost their privileged status. The Commonwealth of Independent States has been a de facto failure; not only has it failed to guarantee Russia’s intentions to remain an area of expression of Moscow’s hegemony, but it has suffered from defections: in 2009, Georgia left the Commonwealth, and in subsequent years, Turkmenistan and Ukraine adopted an ambiguous position that places them, at most, in the category of CIS partner states. However, Russia has tried other institutional instruments to preserve the unity of the region and, above all, its own leadership in the region. Very significantly, the most demanding organizations, and at the same time those that have performed best in the area, are those related to security. Specifically, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) or Tashkent Treaty (1994) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (1996), which we will discuss in greater detail later. In both cases, the security of Central Asia is one of the main objectives of both organisations. But the most recent, and certainly the most ambitious, organisation is the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). In force since 2015 when it replaced its predecessor, the Eurasian Economic Community (2000– 2014), the EAEU brings together, for the time being, five countries (Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) and, although

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only two of them belong to the Central Asian region, the organisation soon expects to expand to include at least Tajikistan and perhaps Uzbekistan. Russia’s intention with the EAEU was to consolidate a strong regional area of influence, largely dependent on Moscow, which in future will create a free trade area, a monetary union and even a space of common political and defence activity, following the model of the European Union. However, Russian attempts to expand and unify their influence are often viewed with suspicion. The final negotiations for the creation of the EAEU coincided with the crisis in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, which led to strong suspicion on the part of the other members.2 In fact, even solid Russian allies such as Belarus and Kazakhstan wanted to lower expectations of political union in the face of Russia’s perceived threat, especially after the outbreak of the Donbass War in 2014. Russia continues to advertise the Eurasian Economic Union as its big project, but the actual functioning of this new project remains to be seen, especially given the rivalries in the area and the mistrust that has often been generated by Russian tutelage, even in Central Asia (Glenn 1991). Moreover, attitudes towards this Russian geostrategic presence vary greatly from time to time and from country to country. Without a doubt, the most faithful ally in the region is Russia in Kazakhstan. This is largely due to the persistence of the same leader, Nursultan Nazarbayev, since before independence. In fact, he was the only president of a Soviet socialist republic, apart from Yeltsin, who did not proclaim his country’s independence in 1991. Nazarbayev, on the other hand, has embraced the Eurasian cause; it was he who proposed the idea of an Eurasian Union, in 1994, has maintained Russian as the co-official language of his country and has maintained a certain respect towards both Russian culture in Kazakhstan and the large Russian population of this republic; despite his own nationalist turn, Nazarbayev has known how to surround himself with an environment of technicians and bureaucrats of Russian origin. Both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have remained in the orbit of Russian influence, but this has often depended on the political situation in these countries. The so-called Tulip Revolution in 2005 drove Kyrgyz 2 In fact, the creation of the EAEU is not unconnected with the crisis in Ukraine; let us remember that the Maidan revolt, in Kiev and other Ukrainian cities, arose when President Yanukovych announced his intention to incorporate Ukraine into the EAEU instead of signing the Treaty of Partnership and Cooperation with the EU.

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President Akayev from power and he took refuge in Russia. The new president, Bakiyev, maintained a certain distance from Russia between 2005 and 2010, and his violent removal from office is for many observers attributable to the Kremlin’s undercover action. Apart from the Bakiyev period, Kyrgyzstan has always leaned towards Russian influence. In Tajikistan, President Emomail Rakhmon has been kept in power in a controversial and turbulent manner by Russia’s unconditional support, especially during the country’s bloody civil war from 1992 to 1997.3 Both Uzbekistan and, above all, Turkmenistan have significantly distanced themselves from the Russian leadership. Uzbekistan has traditionally wanted to play the regional leadership card and sees Russia’s neighbours as strategic rivals. Turkmenistan, on its own, aspires to the maximum possible sovereignty to manage its huge gas reserves, for which it claims the largest possible share of national sovereignty. Neither country is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union or the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, and although Uzbekistan is a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (Turkmenistan belongs to neither of them), it has always been critically active within these organisations. There remains an implicit international recognition of Russia’s right to exercise its influence over Central Asia, unlike in Ukraine and the Caucasus. This is reflected, among other things, in the cohesion of local elites in an accommodation of this leadership. In spite of this, we can see, also with the favour of local elites, a certain presence of other international powers in areas such as security and, above all, energy, aspects that we will find again later on. It is worth highlighting, however, the contrast with which Russian hegemony is perceived according to the different countries. This is due to the consolidation of different regimes that generally profess a deep distrust of each other (Djalili and Kellner 2005).

4

Regional Rivalries

Despite being an area of limited size and where interests are largely shared, Central Asian regimes have shown a strong tendency to controversy and confrontation. Often these confrontations have been due to the rivalry for exercising regional hegemony, on other occasions ethnic 3 For an analysis of the case of possible ‘colourful’ change or revolution in Kyrgyzstan, it is worth looking at Hale (2006).

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or border conflicts have played a greater role, but in all cases two essential characteristics can be observed: weakness as a consequence of these rivalries and the imposition of an external hegemony, mainly Russian, to overcome regional problems. Here again, the complex national and identity fabric should be mentioned in order to understand these frictions between neighbouring countries somewhat better. The great paradox is that the national groups in the region owe their existence in practical terms, or at least their cohesion, to the scientific and codification efforts of the Soviet Union. After the stabilisation of the USSR, one of the efforts of the new revolutionary homeland was to ensure, at least on paper, equality among all the peoples of the union, and to this end, it engaged in a considerable effort to identify those peoples. This represented an enormous task in several areas of the USSR where the European concept of nationhood was not clearly defined, especially in Central Asia, where multiple identities, loyalties, solidarities and affinities coexisted in a disorderly manner and without much territorial, linguistic or historical coherence. Turkish peoples were divided into multiple nations, tribes, languages, dialects, clans and ‘hordes’ without clear distinction between them, and Persianspeaking peoples were often dispersed among the former with equally variable identities. Soviet censors and bureaucrats, not without effort, delimited who belonged to which group, in principle according to the language they spoke, called those who spoke Persian or Dari ‘Tajiks’ and divided the other peoples, of Turkish languages, into four large groups. Each of these five groups, not without effort, was given a territory and an administration, thus configuring the Central Asian republics that acquired their independence in 1991. However, neither the boundaries between the two groups were firmly established nor were the territories under the new administrations homogeneous or even consistent. The most emblematic case is the Fergana valley, the great interior delta of the Sir Daria where nearly 14 million people live. In this region, the capriciously overlapping borders between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan create foreign areas, territories and enclaves, apparently to satisfy the need for each national group to be administered by the republic of which that group is the owner. The result, however, is complex and in no way satisfies this objective; on the contrary, it leaves numerous communities as minorities in a republic of which their national group is not the holder; instead, communication is

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made extremely difficult not only between areas populated by the same group, but also between areas belonging to the same administration. On the other hand, the 1991 independencies added a new problem. The Soviet administrations, wrongly or rightly, guaranteed the same rights for all national groups, whether they were in their nominal republic or outside it. Perhaps it can be added that Russians formed a privileged group throughout Central Asia, but for the rest of the population, there was not much difference between living on one side or the other of the internal borders, and an Uzbek in Tajikistan enjoyed almost the same cultural and representational rights as an Uzbek in Uzbekistan; both, moreover, lived in their own country, the Soviet Union, and had little reason to feel foreign or uncomfortable in this condition. With independence, a large part of the population became members of national minorities and subject to assimilation or marginalisation. In 1989, about 23.5% of the inhabitants of Tajikistan declared themselves to be Uzbeks, as did 13% of the inhabitants of Kyrgyzstan and 9% of those of Turkmenistan, while almost 5% of the inhabitants of Uzbekistan declared themselves to be Tajiks, concentrated mainly in the Fergana Valley. The existence of ‘islands’ of people who do not culturally identify with the titular nationality of the republic that represents it is a recurrent source of border tensions. The best-known and most spectacular case has traditionally been that of the Uzbek minority in Kyrgyzstan. In 2010, during the violent clashes that toppled Bekayev, hundreds of people were killed in the Osh and JalalAbad regions; following these killings, between 100,000 and 300,000 people, mostly members of the Uzbek community, crossed the border into Uzbekistan. Osh, the second largest city in Kyrgyzstan, has a 44% Uzbek population. Tension between the two countries, mainly for ethnic reasons, has led to the closure of Kyrgyzstan’s borders with all its Central Asian neighbours on several occasions. The fragile balance in the region reflects not only the countries’ policies towards their ethnic minorities, but also the tensions between the different countries over the responsibility they have assumed to protect their communities beyond their own borders. But, in addition, there are numerous conflicts over transport, ecological problems, water supply or even basic urban services such as electricity networks or water collection, all of which are hampered by the morass of incomprehensible borderlines and the lack of political agreements.

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Added to these functional difficulties is an even greater drawback to understanding among the nations of the region: leadership capacity. Traditionally, two countries in the area, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, have sought to play a greater role in the region and to lead the same ideological line and regional soft power. In practice, this has translated into mutual animosity and greater lack of communication. Kazakhstan represents a model close to Russia, oligarchic but open to foreign investment, with a model of cultural coexistence between the country’s nationalities, despite its authoritarianism. Uzbekistan reflects a ‘national’ model with an Asian projection, with greater independence in the use of its own resources with respect to external interference. Both models, however, have much in common: personalised despotism, corruption and strong persecution of the opposition, especially the Islamist movements. The rest of the countries are too small to claim regional influence and, in some cases, such as Turkmenistan, project their international activity outside the region. In this context of mistrust between nations that share the same space and many common needs, where there are transnational interests but no transnational elites, it is worth asking about the role played by external powers, especially Russia. A priori we detect a division between some more ‘Russophile’ republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan) and others less prone to collaborate with the old metropolis (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan), with Tajikistan somewhere in between. This division also affects the attitude of the local elites: the Nazarbayev and Atambayev environments, Russian-speaking and educated in Russia, maintain attitudes of closeness to Russia as: • They are prone to join their countries to international organisations led by Moscow; • They sign contracts with Russian companies and accept massive investments from that country, even on unclear terms; • They generally support Russian foreign policy; • They willingly accept the participation of Russian sectors of their population in the administration of the state; • They recognise Russian as an official language of their respective states. However, it would be an illusion to say that ‘less Russian-speaking’ countries escape Moscow’s influence. Despite diplomatic and even

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economic flirtations with other powers, the truth is that Russia maintains a certain control over its Central Asian backyard. It is true that the elites of Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have almost completely dispensed with the previously omnipresent Russian technicians (the Russian population has also practically disappeared from these countries), but Russian companies continue to maintain a strong presence in these countries, the media exercise strong soft power over these societies and these states have not taken any decisive steps to break away from the Russian area of influence (Djalili and Kellner 2003). So what are the reasons for, and benefits of, regional rivalries in Central Asia? According to several observers, division is a strategy that has served Russia in other areas, such as the Caucasus, and that serves it well in Central Asia. A region in permanent struggle to find a leader among its members will never get one, which favours the action of an external leader. And a Central Asia without a clear political, cultural or ideological model will remain a weakened region, which in the end favours Russian tutelage. Whether this tutelage is direct or indirect is, as we have seen, the least of our worries. Russia, on the other hand, brings much-needed stability to the region. It is a familiar power that reminds many people of the reviled Soviet Union, but it brought with it ideological coherence, values and respect for minorities that nation states cannot always provide in a satisfactory way for all members of their societies, let alone for the myriad of states that emerged from the Soviet collapse that, let us remember, practically nobody in the region desired.

5

The Role of Energy

Oil and gas extraction has traditionally been, and still is, the region’s main economic resource. Turkmenistan is the tenth largest gas producer in the world, Uzbekistan the fourteenth and Kazakhstan the thirtieth. If we add up the production of these three countries in 2015, it would give us a quantity—160 billion cubic metres—equivalent to that of Qatar, the fourth largest producer in the world. Given the low level of industrialisation in Central Asia, logically most of this production is for export: Turkmenistan is the eighth largest gas exporter in the world, Uzbekistan is the sixteenth and Kazakhstan the nineteenth. Between the three countries, they exported almost 70 billion cubic metres in 2015 as well. The Galkynysh gas field in Turkmenistan is considered the second largest in the world after South Pars in the Persian Gulf, making the country’s

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potential to become an energy power enormous. Although less important than natural gas, oil also has a strong presence in the area: Kazakhstan is the sixteenth producer and tenth exporter of so-called black gold. Turkmenistan, slightly behind, is the 35th country in oil production and the 44th in exports. These simple data already give us a first division between two classes of countries in Central Asia: the hydrocarbon exporters, with what this entails of external influences, power games and elite consolidation, and two countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, impoverished and without these energy resources. These two countries, moreover, are the most geographically isolated and, surely not by chance, the most unstable, given that they are the only ones that have experienced armed conflict recently. The enormous potential of these two countries in the supply of hydraulic energy certainly does not compensate for the lack of protagonism in the field of hydrocarbons. Energy interests have conditioned the political life of Central Asian regimes and no doubt international interests in the area as well (Parvizi Amineh 2008). After the dissolution of the USSR, the new republics wanted to exploit the natural resources to guarantee their economic sovereignty, but at first there was no great interest in investing in the area from the main potential recipient countries, in Western Europe. This lack of interest is due, according to Voloshin (2006, 163), to the uncertainty about the future of fuel extractions, the lack of a favourable economic environment and the opacity in the choice of strategic partners. In this climate of doubt and mistrust, it cannot surprise us that it was the Russian energy companies, knowledgeable about the business and political mentality in the area and easily able to penetrate the tangled system of local elites, that took advantage of the opportunities in the region. On the other hand, the operating structures designed and built to meet the needs of the Soviet Union favoured the Russian position. Initially, the only gas exploitation and export structure in the region was the Central Asia-Centre (CAC) gas pipeline, built between 1967 and 1972, at the height of the Soviet industrial boom. This gas pipeline, with an official transit capacity of 67 billion cubic metres (bcm) per year, crosses Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Russia. In 2003, the Russian company Gazprom took over the ACC, which had deteriorated considerably after decades of use and poor care, and invested an estimated $4 billion to restore the pipelines, extend them to the European market and increase their capacity to 90 bcm. With this project, Russia

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took effective control of Central Asia’s gas exports and, in practice, political dominance of the region. Initially relatively modest, the oil operations were left mainly in the hands of Lukoil, another Russian company, which built pipelines in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. However, as the West became aware of the need for a more reliable energy supply than that of the ever-unstable Middle East, Central Asia grew as an alternative possibility. Already in the 1990s, the American company Unocal planned to export Turkmen oil through Afghanistan (Afghanistan Oil Pipeline), but the project was eventually rejected because of the instability of the area. In 2006, the construction of the BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) pipeline was completed, linking the Caspian with Western markets thanks to strong Western investment, especially from the British BP. This pipeline largely shaped the regional strategy, leaving Azerbaijan definitively on the Western side while Russia lost the ability to control Caspian oil to the West. In the face of the new situation, with Western companies openly interested in energy supply in areas of traditional Russian monopoly and with supply routes close to the region, Russia’s position weakened considerably. Since 2006, the construction of a gas pipeline between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan has been proposed on numerous occasions. The Transcaspian gas pipeline is still in the project phase and has raised strong protests from Russia and Iran, but it has never been abandoned by the European Union, the main investor and potential beneficiary, or by Turkmenistan. The project has lost momentum following the abandonment of the planned Nabucco pipeline, which was to link Turkey to Southern and Central Europe. This project was withdrawn in 2013 following the preference expressed by the After Shaz Deniz consortium for the trans-Adriatic route. However, Western interests in Turkmen gas remain valid and active and, most importantly, Turkmenistan maintains its goals of energy export free from Russian tutelage. In March 2009, following a crisis in Turkmen-Russian relations over gas exports, the Ashgabat government decided to break off its commitment to Gazprom for the construction of the East-West pipeline, which was to carry gas from the interior of the country to the Caspian Sea. At that time, Turkmenistan launched an international offer, in which more than 70 companies were interested, but it was finally announced that the country would build and finance the pipeline from its own resources. The construction of this gas pipeline, which was completed in 2015,

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meant a major fracture in relations between the Central Asian country and Moscow. Of equal or greater strategic importance have been the region’s gas export projects to its Asian neighbours. Turkmenistan has signed several contracts with Iran and has built the Korpeje-Kordkuy (1997, 8 bcm per year) and Dauletabad-Sarakhs-Khangiran (2010, 12 bcm per year) gas pipelines. But the main gas pipeline in the area, beyond the Russian investments, has been the Central Asia-China pipeline (2009, 55 bcm per year). This pipeline, in which the national companies of China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan participate, but without a Russian presence, is a real challenge for Russian companies and for the Kremlin itself, which is losing its monopoly on hydrocarbon exports from the region. Thus, Turkmenistan, 70% of whose oil was marketed until 2009 by Russian companies, has seen this dependence drop to 50% following the construction of this gas pipeline. The economies of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have also considerably eased their dependence on Russia. Also, in 2009, the Kazakhstan-China pipeline was inaugurated, which, although it has not yet developed its full potential, represents a challenge to Russia’s presence in the area. Central Asia has often been described as a theatre for Russian action. The clientelism of its companies, the social and cultural affinity, and the political stability based on autocracies which are focused on business and international contacts‚ are all fertile ground for the Kremlin’s action in the area. The field of energy, the main economic activity in Central Asia, is a privileged area for the development and deepening of these interests. We can see the evolution of this influence in the creation and development of the national energy companies: Turkmenistan created in 1997 a gas company (Türkmengaz) and an oil company (Türkmennebit ), both state owned and strongly controlled by the government. Uzbekistan created Uzbekneftegaz for both sectors in 1992, also under government control in spite of constituting a holding company. KazMunayGaz, in Kazakhstan, is the result of the merger between Kazakh national oil and gas companies in 2002. In all these cases, the public companies have been consolidated with a strong presence not only of Russian technicians and bureaucrats (both national and from Russia), but also of Russian companies in the sector, especially Gazprom and Lukoil. These companies, which are formally private, have strong links with the Moscow government, especially since Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000. However, over time all these companies have been doing without both technical and

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economic or administrative involvement that would link them to Russia. The most radical case has been that of the Turkmen companies, which even expelled their Russian technicians. KazMunayGaz, on the other hand, maintains strong investments and joint projects with Lukoil and other Russian companies. The economic, strategic and political interests of gas exports have defined and continue to define the position of the elites in Central Asia. To the clientelism and neo-patrimonialism characteristic of the region are added external influences that have an impact on the creation of sectors of power that stabilise the groups in charge of the regimes. As I pointed out above, it is no coincidence that the hydrocarbon exporting countries are the most stable in the region. This is due, as has often been stressed (Balmaceda 2008) in the first place, to the iron grip of the state on the production and export of energy, which turns these states into iron-fisted dictatorships almost inevitably. Secondly, international energy interests result in external powers, in this case Russia, feeding and sustaining these regimes, which in turn see international actors becoming a key part of their own power structure.

6

Security

I have noted above the importance of security for international organizations in the former Soviet space. For the geostrategic interests of Russia, Central Asia is an indispensable element and part of its own essence not only in terms of power or regional hegemony, but even of its imaginary identity. The link between Russian society and the historical space of imperial Russia and the Soviet Union leads to the development of a policy of proximity, or rather of not renouncing to what has come to be called ‘the near abroad’ (blinee zarubee), that is, those countries that no longer belong to the Russian political space but that form part of a common past, a common social and cultural essence and even a common project. And Central Asia fits perfectly into this half-solidarity, half-paternalistic concept by which Russia feels responsible for the political evolution of its environment. Unlike other areas of the former USSR such as the Caucasus or Moldova, Russia has not practised the policy of coercive diplomacy, i.e. of fuelling conflicts to ensure the instability of the area or offering itself as a necessary mediator in existing conflicts. On the contrary, Moscow has

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limited itself to protecting and strengthening clientelist regimes, often supporting the war efforts or repression of like-minded governments. Apart from Turkmenistan’s distancing, the only time we can find a government in the region that is lukewarmly critical of Russian influence (or, more appropriately, of Russian-protected elites) is Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s Kyrgyzstan, between 2005 and 2010. Still, Bakiyev, like the rest of the political elites in Central Asia, had been trained in Russia and served in the Russian Army; moreover, he is married to a Russian woman and upon being deposed went into exile in Belarus. During that period, there is some rapprochement with China, but we did not find a major confrontation between the Kyrgyzstan of 2005–2010 and Russia until March of that last year, when the Russian press (and to a large extent the Kyrgyz press, controlled by Russian investors) began a campaign against the president of Kyrgyzstan. On April 1, Russia imposed tight restrictions on energy exports to the country, which led to immediate price hikes, violent demonstrations and, three weeks later, the fall of Bakiyev. There is no agreement among observers about Moscow’s interests in regime change, but it is clear that before and after Bakiyev the Kyrgyz governments are composed of politicians sympathetic to Russia and largely assisted by Russia. The other country that has experienced strong instability in the region has been Tajikistan, where a bloody civil war caused between 20,000 and 60,000 deaths, in addition to 1.2 million displaced persons, between 1992 and 1997. The conflict had serious geostrategic connotations, as Russia and Uzbekistan supported Tajik President Rahmonov (later Rahmon) with up to 15,000 troops, while the rebels, largely ideologically inspired by Islamic fundamentalism, were assisted by the Taliban in Afghanistan. In this conflict, Russia played a leading role not only because of its support for the government in place and its military support for the fight against the rebels; on this occasion, and in an unprecedented event in the space of the former USSR, Russia effectively contributed to achieving a stable peace treaty satisfactory to all parties involved. The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yevgueni Primakov, met with representatives of several neighbouring countries in order to consolidate a peace that, in fact, has kept Rahmonov in power until today. Although the methods have been different to those used by Russia in other conflicts, supporting an established government instead of peripheral rebellions, the result has been highly positive for the Kremlin, achieving a like-minded and grateful stabilised government and at the same time presenting itself

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as a peacemaker and essential for regional stability. Today’s Tajikistan is a country that has had to make some concessions to the opposition to secure peace treaties, but it is unquestionably a faithful and strategically useful ally for Russia’s purposes (McGlinchey 2011). The conflicts in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan serve to put Central Asia on the map and prove the importance of this region to Russia. The Tajik Civil War was the biggest expansion attempt of the Afghan Taliban regime, and it came at a critical time of expansion of Islamism. It is therefore not surprising that Russia’s involvement in the war was not widely criticised internationally, as other alleged Kremlin interferences have been. When, from 2001 onwards, the United States decided to intervene directly in the region to attack Afghanistan, both Russia and the Central Asian regimes admitted this intervention and facilitated it as much as possible. Kyrgyzstan allowed the US Army to use the Manas base as a transport centre for 13 years, until the country stopped renewing the contract with the US forces in 2014. The Manas base, for which the US Army paid $60 million in rent annually, transported 5.3 million security personnel from 26 countries. Between 2001 and 2005, US aviation also used the KarshiKhanabad base in Uzbekistan. The closure of both bases was decided by the respective governments, although it should be noted that in the case of the Kyrgyz base in Manas there was great pressure from Russia, especially after Bakiyev left power. At present, Russia maintains a discreet military presence in Central Asia. Tajikistan is home to the 201st motorised division, which has been acting as a border guard since the civil war of the 1990s. In 2003, Kyrgyzstan handed over the Kant airbase near Bishkek to the Russian Army. It was at that time the first military base that Russia opened abroad since 1991. In 2012, the two countries signed a 15-year renewable base rental agreement. The Russian Army also maintains an important seismological equipment and the 338th naval communication centre in Kyrgyzstan. But it is perhaps in Kazakhstan that Russia has its most strategically important military presence, with a radar station near Lake Balkhash, an anti-ballistic test base at Sary Shagan and the Baikonur space launch station, from where Russia, deprived of near-tropical space, conducts most of its military and civilian space activities. Uzbekistan, after the closure of the US base in 2005, began a Russianled approach to security and gave up the use of military bases to the Russian Army, but in 2012 the country left the Collective Security Treaty Organization and rescinded agreements with the Kremlin for the use of

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its bases. Uzbekistan, therefore, which has recently hosted both Russian and US troops, currently has no foreign troops on its territory, nor does Turkmenistan. Both countries maintain a distance from the Kremlin’s strategic projects that has made them renounce joining organizations such as the CSTO or the EAEU and, in the case of Turkmenistan, also the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and even the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In this sense, we see a clear division between countries aligned with Russia and countries with neutral intentions.4 Among Moscow’s allies, we can highlight that they are the two poorest countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the only ones that have experienced recent conflicts on their territory and that owe their stability to Russian support; plus Kazakhstan, an unconditional ally of Russia due to its geographical situation, investments in the country and the very composition of its society, with more than a fifth of its population of Russian origin (Allison 2008). Also linked to security and Russian interests in the area, the presence of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia should be noted. These are extremely secularised societies and practically all elements of religion are controlled by the state, from prayer and sermons in the mosques, the choice of imams and mullahs and clothing to the timing and celebration of religious festivals. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ensuing ideological turmoil and the social and economic crises following independence have provided an ideal breeding ground for the emergence of extreme religious trends. These tendencies are harshly repressed by the authorities, with the undisguised support of Russia, in all the countries of the area, and have ended up proving to be the only real opposition to the regimes of Central Asia. In the 1990s, these movements had their political expression in the Hizb ut-Tahrir movement, which was particularly active in Uzbekistan, and in the armed movements in Tajikistan, but both were harshly repressed and never showed any real influence on society, much less on the elites, except in isolated cases in the areas controlled by Tajik rebels. From 2012 onwards, we find a new social phenomenon due to the presence of numerous (perhaps thousands) volunteer fighters from Central Asia in the Islamic State of Syria and Iraq. Interestingly, in many cases, these militants have become radicalised after living in Russia, where 4 On the overlap of regional influences in the region and the role of different international organisations, see Adler and Gereve (2009).

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they have probably reacted to strong discrimination. In any case, the expansion of Islamic radicalism in Central Asian societies has been the new strategic challenge in the region, leading to a tightening of government control over its own population, while at the same time encouraging cooperation between these states and external security services, particularly from Russia. Islamic fundamentalism is probably the only serious threat facing Central Asian regimes today, and so these regimes and their protectors have reacted with extreme alarm and harshness.

7

Local Elites and External Influence

When we speak of elites and power in Central Asia, we usually refer to a tangled web of patrimonial networks, local traditional leaderships and clientelism composed largely of family, clan and ethnic alliances (Collins 2006). However, to this indisputable structure, and which the other chapters of this work analyse in detail country by country, we must add the presence of Russia as a factor that is both cohesive and disruptive. It is cohesive because Russia’s regional influence brings stability to the regimes through support for the ruling classes, and because it brings a common element, although in varying degrees, to all the countries in the region. Yet it is disruptive because it interferes with the indigenous system of loyalties and patronage, and also because its presence does not eliminate, but rather stimulates, rivalries and tensions between the different states (Cooley 2012). On the periphery of the Soviet Union, there was a power-sharing system with a strong rhetorical and symbolic component. This rhetoric was not only ideological (extolling Marxist-Leninist thought and communist values in a way that was increasingly disconnected from the reality of society), but pointed to an equality between nationalities that was one of the foundations of the USSR, but which did not exactly correspond to reality. In an unwritten but long-respected tradition, the indigenous elites were granted control of the rural areas, especially the sovkhoz and kolkhoz, as well as certain positions of a symbolic nature (in a very significant way, the presidencies of the federated republics). However, it was the members of the Russian communities in each republic, even in places where this was numerically insignificant, such as Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, who held technical and bureaucratic positions with strong political recognition and better social positioning. This was mainly due to the better contact of these sectors, basically urban and with personal links to other centres of

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the Soviet Union, their good command of the Russian language, their greater empathy with the values and functioning of the Soviet political system and their facility to escape from the complex and dangerous links of ethnic, religious or clan-based fidelity, so traditionally rooted among the indigenous populations (Akçali 2003). Although there was no discriminatory intent in these power-sharing practices, their practice led to a contradictory and effectively segregationist reality contrary in principle to Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, as several authors denounce. Of course, there is a tendency, especially after the Second World War, to include indigenous elements in this power structure, but in the long term this results in the emergence of elites distanced from the cultural values of their own societies (such as clan solidarity) and assimilated to a national and political culture seen as alien by much of the local societies. These elites, often academically and militarily trained in other areas of the Soviet Union, generally end up acculturating, adopting Russian as their own, familiar language and forced to publicly renounce much of the original cultural heritage, such as religion or clan allegiances. These are sectors, especially visible in urban centres such as Tashkent and Alma Ata, which end up forming a solidarity group in itself, using the educational or social resources intended for the Soviet elites and often relating much more to the Russian sectors of their republics than to the more humble and culturally cohesive segments of their own national communities. These are elements assimilated to that elite social class generally known as the Nomenklatura, linked to the Communist Party, the high administration and strategic industries such as the military, which held de facto power in the last phase of the Soviet Union. From the identity point of view, especially in the periphery, this Nomenklatura assumes the transnational ideological component of the Soviet rhetoric, identifying itself with what has come to be called homo sovieticus, an identity in principle beyond the traditional cultural fidelities but that in reality projects the Russian influence in the whole of the union (Roeder 1997; Møller and Skaaning 2010). The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, of course, radically transformed this scheme. The local elites, until that moment of regional character and subordinated to an external power system, become sovereign and their links and loyalties are replanted on new political bases. Although economic and clientelist ties are maintained with the old centre, the new political reality and the need to unite new autonomous centres of power mean that in a short time the ties of dependence on Russia are suppressed

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and replaced by indigenous power structures. Although in no case has there been an immediate or massive replacement of the sectors in power, at least in Central Asia, the improvisation and the economic and political chaos that followed the dissolution of the USSR meant a restructuring of the sectors in power. On the one hand, there was an exodus of the Russian population from the region: if at the time of independence there were almost ten million Russians in Central Asia, today there are less than six million, two-thirds of them concentrated in Kazakhstan. Ninety per cent of Russians left Tajikistan during the civil war, and Kyrgyzstan has seen 60% of the Russian population leave. On the other hand, the absence of dependence on Moscow or the Communist Party has meant that the new elites in power have been free to include all the beneficiaries of the neo-patrimonial networks in their environment, often with the excuse of ‘nationalising’ the levers of power, which has gradually consolidated indigenous environments under the authority of the new leaders, who have now become sovereigns of a markedly authoritarian nature (Wohlforth 2004; Laruelle 2012). The decline in the Russian population, both in the societies of the new states and in the groups that hold power there, and the strengthening of the personal circles of trust of the leaders may suggest that the way has been opened for the disappearance of Russian influence in Central Asia (Ruiz Ramas 2010). Some facts may corroborate this, such as the disappearance of Russian as a co-official language in the region (it is only maintained in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) or an increasingly strong visibility of indigenous cultural elements, but this point should be qualified. As I have pointed out, the elites in power in the region are the same ones that already held power during the last phase of the Soviet Union, and these are strongly Russified social sectors. Russia continues to exercise strong soft power in the area and deeply influences the social and political life of Central Asia. The new elites in the region have fewer Russians and fewer direct links with Russia compared to the situation before independence, no doubt; but these same elites identify with an intellectual and political culture that is closely related to Russia.5 The leaders of the new Central Asian republics have even experienced a personal shift in their attitudes to power. They have returned to habits of clannish loyalty and neopatrimonialism based on identity and 5 For the concept of neopatrimonialism applied to the region, see Von Soest (2010), Guliyev (2011) or Erdmann (2012).

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culture, even embracing traditions that they disowned while holding the card of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Schatz 2004). But the appearance of modernity and democracy forces them to maintain Europeanised formalities, even with ideological foundations such as secularism or respect for minorities, which lead them to reduce the weight of more direct clientelism. This attitude, which is linked to the habits of power during the Soviet phase, poorly conceals the authentic relationships of clientelist dependence, but generates a formal egalitarian and democratic discourse that coexists with realities of nepotism, corruption and clientelism (Cummings 2012). In conclusion, the current power structures in Central Asia are based on direct relations between leaders, obeying patterns of re-nationalisation of administrations and neopatrimonial fidelity (Izquierdo Brichs 2013). The Russians, as a visible element of these structures, have been decreasing significantly, but Russia still has a strong influence on the axes of power of the states, both because of Moscow’s direct influence on the region and because of the attraction and seduction that Russia continues to exercise, in spite of everything, on the elites of Central Asia.

8

Conclusions

As I have pointed out above, the presence of Russia significantly modifies the classic scheme of power structure in the regimes of Central Asia and moves them away from the model we find in other areas, such as in the Arab world (Left 2013). This modification is explained on the one hand by the necessary adaptation of Russia to strictly local structures of personal loyalty or with traditional ties, but at the same time conditioning these power structures to a political and economic relationship that is beneficial for the regional power. Moscow allows for sovereign policies at the local level that consolidate and strengthen the patrimonial networks that sustain power, and in turn, these leaders show a satisfactory or at least prudent attitude towards Moscow’s interests in the region. While it is true that the receptivity of Central Asian regimes varies considerably, from unconditional strategic allies (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) to more distant ones (Turkmenistan), we can find a number of characteristics that determine Moscow’s strong influence in the region’s spheres of power:

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1. Strategic alignment (membership of CSTO, SCO, EAEU) or, if there is one, neutrality towards other powers that does not question Russian hegemony. In fact, although Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan do not form part of most of the alliances led by Russia, neither of the two harbours troops from other powers nor has it openly opted to align itself with another regional hegemon; 2. Economic dependence on Russia, which results on the one hand in maintaining a preferential attitude towards investments and imports from Russia, and on the other hand in preferential treatment towards Russian energy companies and towards Russia as a preferential destination or transit for Central Asian hydrocarbons. For years, there has been a certain diversification in terms of hydrocarbon exports, especially from Turkmenistan (Iran, China, gas pipeline projects to Europe…), but even here Russia remains the main destination country for exports, and Russian companies continue to maintain a privileged presence in the country; 3. Maintenance of a soft power and cultural link with Russia, often manifested by the presence of a national Russian-language press, television and educational networks, as well as a ruling class deeply adapted to the Russian social and political context (Lewis 2008). It can be argued that these three points of Central Asia’s dependence on Russia actually represent a much lower position than previous situations, and that there is a tendency to promote centrifugal policies towards Russia. There have been some tensions with Russia for reasons of sovereign cohesion, the settlement of sectors in power and the exploitation of hydrocarbons (in all three cases, Turkmenistan has been the extreme country), but this has not called into question an obvious fact: throughout the region, the elites in power have been consolidated to a large extent thanks to the external support of the Kremlin, and they provide essential support for Russia’s strategic needs in the region. On the European periphery of Russia and in the Caucasus, we find new ruling classes that have directly confronted Russian interests and have even insisted on incorporating their countries into areas of regional hegemony of other powers, particularly the European Union and NATO. In these countries, there has also been greater political alternation, and, with the exception of Belarus and Azerbaijan, we rarely find a president or a power group clinging to command for decades. The political stability of Central Asia is due to an iron grip on power resources by the elites, but this would

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rarely be possible without external support to ensure it. Russia’s support obeys the reasons that I have already enumerated in this chapter: satisfaction of an important collective identity for the Russian society, as it is the no relinquishment of its historical space; control of the energy resources and their export, monopoly of the region in the scope of security; and permanence of the cultural influence and values (soft power) linked to Russia and to a diffuse Soviet past that continues being a reference for the local populations (Jones Luong 2002). The clientelism that implies the acceptance of these Russian interests by local elites guarantees the stability of their own power and the perpetuation of Russia’s role in the region (Stewart et al. 2012). Can change the scenario in future? It is a perspective that’s unimaginable today. Any structural change, as has long been analysed by Snyder (1992) and others, should be accompanied by serious political turbulence, given the rigid control regimes have over power structures. The regimes in the region, without reaching the dynastic cases of North Korea, Syria or, closer to the area, Azerbaijan, do tend, instead, to hold life positions: Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan, Rahmon in Tajikistan and Karimov in Uzbekistan served a quarter of a century in their respective presidencies, and Nyazov in Turkmenistan served twenty years. Succession mechanisms have always guaranteed the continuity of regimes, their interest groups and the Russian presence in the area, and in the only case where there has been an alternation of groups in power, in Kyrgyzstan, Russia has been present in any relevant political change (Radnitz 2010). The opposition in these countries is tightly controlled and marginalised, often even internationally because of its ties to religious fundamentalism, with hardly any democratic or open-minded dissidents present. Any structural change should be supported, directly or indirectly, from Russia, which seems unlikely at the moment, or by a change in Russia’s own foreign policy, which at present seems even less likely. The conjunction of interests between local elites and Russian interests seems to indicate a strong stability and prolongation of the situation in Central Asia, in the absence of real alternatives.

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Laruelle, M. (2012). Discussing Neopatrimonialism and Patronal Presidentialism in the Central Asian Context. Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, 20(4), 301–324. Lewis, D. (2008). The Temptations of Tyranny in Central Asia. New York: Columbia University Press. McGlinchey, E. (2011). Chaos, Violence, Dynasty: Politics and Islam in Central Asia. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Møller, J., & Skaaning, S. (2010). Post-Communist Regime Types: Hierarchies across Attributes and Space. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 43(1), 51–71. Morozov, V. (2015). Russia’s Postcolonial Identity: A Subaltern Empire in a Eurocentric World. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Parvizi Amineh, M. (2008). Eurasia central en el marco energético y geopolítico global. In A. González & C. Claudín, Asia Central y la seguridad energética global (pp. 57–91). Barcelona: CIDOB. Radnitz, S. (2010). Weapons of the Wealthy: Predatory Regimes and Elite-Led Protests in Central Asia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Roeder, P. (1997). From Hierarchy to Hegemony: Patterns of Security Among the Soviet Successor States. In D. A. Lake & P. M. Morgan (Eds.), Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (pp. 219–244). University Park: Penn State University Press. Ruiz Ramas, R. (2010). Los regímenes neopatrimonialistas y el clan en Asia Central, 1991–2010: un análisis conceptual. In S. Stavridis & C. De Prado (Eds.), Panorámica de Actores y Factores en Asia Central (pp. 9–28). Zaragoza: Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza. Schatz, E. (2004). Modern Clan Politics: The Power of ‘Blood’ in Kazakhstan and Beyond. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Snyder, R. (1992). Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships. Comparative Politics, 24(4), 379–400. Stewart, S., Klein, M., Schmitz, A., & Schröder, H.-H. (Eds.). (2012). Presidents, Oligarchs and Bureaucrats: Forms of Rule in the Post-Soviet Space. London: Ashgate. Ubiria, G. (2016). Soviet Nation-Building in Central Asia: The Making of the Kazakh and Uzbek Nations. London: Routledge. Voloshin, V. (2006). La posición de Rusia. In A. González & C. Claudín, Asia Central y la seguridad energética global (pp. 153–177). Barcelona: CIDOB. Von Soest, C. (2010). What Neopatrimonialism Is—Six Questions to the Concept. Hamburg: GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies. Wohlforth, W. (2004). Revisiting Balance of Power Theory in Central Eurasia. In T. V. Paul, J. Wirtz, & M. Fortmann (Eds.), Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century (pp. 214–238). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Implications for Central Asia Alejandra Peña

Launched in 2013 by President Xi Jinping, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) constitutes so far, the most complex, controversial, and far-reaching project put forth by a major power in the contemporary era. The project of the century—as Xi has come to label it—comprises two distinct, yet intertwined routes aiming at building an intercontinental network of trade and infrastructure that connects China to Central Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and Africa. On the one hand, the land-based “Silk Road Economic Belt” (SREB), announced by the Chinese President in September 2013 during his visit to Kazakhstan; on the other hand, the sea-based “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” (MSR), also announced by President Xi at the Indonesian parliament in October of the same year. In his speech at Kazakhstan’s Nazarbayev University, Xi referred to the BRI as a new model of innovative cooperation between China and Central Asia, while stressed the centuries of interaction between China

A. Peña (B) Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain e-mail: [email protected] University of the Andes, Mérida, Venezuela © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. Izquierdo-Brichs and F. Serra-Massansalvador (eds.), Political Regimes and Neopatrimonialism in Central Asia, The Steppe and Beyond: Studies on Central Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9093-1_3

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and Central Asian countries under the Ancient Silk Road, and envisioned the present time as a golden opportunity for Sino-Central Asian relations.1 Six years after its inception, the BRI’s scope and magnitude of investments have escalated. As of the end of July 2019, 132 countries and 30 international organizations have signed 194 cooperation agreements under the BRI umbrella, including new participants in Africa, Latin America, and the South Pacific (Li and Barbosa 2020). According to official sources, China’s investment in the BRI countries has surpassed the US$ 100 billion, while BRI construction contracts worth US$ 614 billion have been signed by China.2 The total Chinese investment over the course of the initiative is expected to reach US$ 4 trillion.3 Scholarly contributions on the BRI in Central Asia predominantly address the impact of the initiative in geopolitical terms, and stress the standoff between Russia, China, and the U.S. as securitizing agents of the New Great Game in the region (Clarke 2016; Indeo 2017). Another strand of the literature focuses on the challenges that the initiative will face in terms of their interaction with local political agendas, networks, and cleavages that characterize the region (Cooley 2016), and also the societal aspects that affect the endorsement or rejection of the BRI within Central Asian societies (Peyrouse 2016). These strands of work, while insightful, tend to generate partial or focalized studies or insights about the implications of the BRI in Central Asia. While it is indeed important to address the implications of the BRI from a geopolitical perspective, it is equally important to understand the actors, power relations, and agendas that both from China and Central Asia drives the implementation of BRI. After all, power is not an abstraction and any allusion to the state, to the Parties or corporations, refers to the actors/elites who 1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2013): “Promote Friendship Between Our People and Work Together to Build a Bright Future”: http:// www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1078088.shtml. Accessed on 22 July 2017. 2 The State Council Information Office (2019): “Press Conference on Pursuing Higherquality Opening-up and High-quality Commerce Development”: http://english.scio.gov. cn/pressroom/2019-09/30/content_75283943_0.htm. Accessed on 12 October 2019. Moody’s Analytics (2019): “The Belt and Road Initiative—Six Years On”: https:// www.moodysanalytics.com/-/media/article/2019/belt-and-road-initiative.pdf. Accessed on 12 October 2019. 3 The Economist (2016): “Our Bulldozers, Our Rules”: https://www.economist.com/ china/2016/07/02/our-bulldozers-our-rules. Accessed on 31 October 2018.

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run such entities (Izquierdo-Brichs and Etherington 2017). Against this backdrop, this chapter attempts to shed light on the implications of the Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia by establishing a bridge between both perspectives and achieving their complementarity. Accordingly, the central argument of this chapter is twofold: firstly, that there is an economic, security and political rationale driving the BRI in Central Asia, denoting that the BRI serves to the Chinese leadership as an instrument for achieving Beijing’s strategic goals, as well as a vehicle to cope with domestic issues concerning China’s overaccumulation crisis, security threats, the regime preservation, and the CCP’s leadership. Secondly, the BRI is linked to the agenda of Central Asian elites while reinforcing the existing mechanisms of capital accumulation. The BRI also brings forth an inflow of resources that can be instrumentalized by Central Asian elites to pursue their power consolidation and maintain the regime’s political stability. The chapter is structured in three parts. The first part presents an overview of the diplomatic, trade, and security dimensions of Chinese engagement with Central Asia, which signals how the BRI consolidates China’s existing economic investments and infrastructure projects in the region, while providing a new framework for Central Asian elites to enhance the connections with Chinese companies. The second part analyzes the implementation of the BRI in Central Asia by exploring its background, framework, and rationale. This section highlights the major BRI projects in the region and the involved actors. The third and final part addresses the implications of the BRI for Central Asian elites in terms of their competition over power resources, capital accumulation mechanisms, and political stability.

1 China’s Engagement with Central Asia: A Three-Dimensional Approach Ties between China and Central Asia date back to the Han Dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), when the great Emperor Wu carried out the conquest of the Confederation of the Hsiung-un nomadic tribes, scattered all around the region. Later on, the establishment of the ancient Silk Road (130 BCE–1453 CE) created a bridge between China and the Roman Empire through these newly conquered lands. However, this long-standing interaction was sharply affected in the twentieth century due to a turn taken by the Sino-Soviet relations at the beginning of the 1970s. The gradual

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closing of the four trade border areas in Khorgos, Turugart, Jimnay, and Baktu—established under the China-USSR Agreement in 1949— resulted in the total cessation of the border trade between China and the region. This interruption lasted until 1982 when business ties resumed. Still, it was not until 1986 that China formally acknowledged them in the context of its reform and “opening-up” (Gaige kaifang 改革开 放). During the 1990s, the upcoming scenario turned out to be quite different. On the one hand, the collapse of the USSR and the birth of the post-Soviet states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan put an end to the border barrier that the USSR had built in relation to Eurasia. On the other hand, in October 1992, China adopted the “socialist market economy” (shehui zhuyi shichang jingji 社会主义市 场经济) system through a reform program with which it sought, among other things, to deepen the “opening- up” of China to the rest of the world in order to ensure a greater integration with the global economy. In light of this, China decided to open trade all along its Western borders. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, China has made great efforts in order to build and strengthen its ties with Central Asia. The motivations which have sustained theses ties can be structured in three phases. In the first phase, which lasted until the mid-1990s, China’s main motivation was the delimitation and demilitarization of its borders and the simultaneous prevention of separatism from Uyghur in the Xinjiang region. In the second phase, which spanned from the second half of the 1990s to the early 2000s, China’s aim was to build an institutional platform that allowed a collective security framework through the foundation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).4 As a consequence of the country’s economic rise, the third phase, in the first half of the 2000s, was characterized by the addition of China’s regional trade interests to its prior security. As a result, China established itself in the Central Asian market, mainly in the fossil fuels industry and that of building infrastructure and communications services (Peyrouse 2016, 14). Currently, one may witness the emergence of another phase since China’s rapprochement to Central Asia has been intensified through the launching of the BRI in

4 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was created in the year 2001 as a regional initiative led by Russia and China with the objective to improve the cooperation in Central Asia in order to guarantee security and stability in the region through the joined effort against the called “three evils”: terrorism, separatism, and extremism.

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2013, which signals Beijing’s unequivocal efforts to increase China’s influence within the Eurasian continent as a top priority of the new Chinese leadership. China’s engagement with Central Asia has been traditionally focused on security and trade dimensions along with the use of diplomatic efforts to strengthen China’s influence in the region. Nonetheless, China’s economic rise and the consequent need of raw materials, energy resources, and new markets for the Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have put the trade dimension in a preeminent position. Upon these dimensions, connections among political and economic elites from both China and Central Asia were built upon bilateral agreements and foreign policy instruments. Against this backdrop, the BRI not only consolidates China’s existing economic investments and infrastructure projects in Central Asia but also provides a framework for local elites to enhance said connections and reinforce the mechanisms of capital accumulation by adjusting their agendas to Chinese companies. 1.1

Diplomacy

The diplomatic dimension comprises both China’s bilateral ties and the establishment of “strategic partnerships” (zhanlue huoban guanxi 战略伙 伴关系) within the region and its participation in regional and multilateral organizations. The territorial proximity between China and Central Asia means that they are considered interdependent neighbors. In geopolitical terms, to Central Asia, China represents access to the sea. In the same manner, to China, Central Asia represents a bridge to Europe and a continental access to Western Asia. Furthermore, China and Central Asia have ancestral ties. Their connection through the Silk Route brought centuries of trading and cultural exchange that, after a period of stalled relations, were later resumed as a corollary to the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of the Central Asian republics. In this regard, Moscow’s debilitating power in the region and the birth of the new republics in the Chinese periphery (zhoubian 周边) presented China with an opportunity to strengthen its position in the region while the same time allowing for the resolution of domestic issues such as border disputes, trade expansion, and the possibility of mitigating the influence of Islamic fundamentalism and separatist movements in Muslin regions in China. In light of this, and following Deng Xiaoping’s key principle of foreign policy—“keeping a low profile” (tao guang yang hui 韬光

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养晦)—China did not look for confrontation with other powers outside the region (Russia and the U.S.) which in a certain way contributed to achieving China’s interests, considering that the US presence restricted the influence of Iran, Russia and Turkey. China opted to wait for the new republics to determine their priorities in political and economic matters, and allowing them to emerge. Against this backdrop, China was one of the first countries to acknowledge and establish diplomatic ties with the new republics. On December 20, 1991, China recognized the independence of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan via a telegraph sent by the then Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Qian Qichen. Under the current non-interference principle in the internal affairs of other countries, negotiations for the establishment of diplomatic relations quickly took place.5 During a visit to Central Asia by the Chinese government delegation, which included the Minister of Foreign Trade and the Minister of Foreign affairs, a draft of the Communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations was written, and the outline of certain bilateral economic and trading agreements was discussed. In early January 1992 this communiqué was signed and with it, the diplomatic ties between China and the five republics of Central Asia were formally established. An important aspect of these negotiations was the declaration from the Central Asian leaders to respect the “One-China Principle” (Yige zhongguo yuanze一个中国原则), and with it, acknowledging the People’s Republic of China and its government as the only legitimate one, with Taiwan as an inalienable part of its territory. The Chinese leadership had decided to fully support the existing authorities of the newly constituted republics, understanding that in spite of the change in political structures as a result of the collapse of the USSR, power still remained in the reformist factions of the old communist parties. Additionally, this support would come in exchange for aid directed at containing the influence of the Islamic fundamentalists and pan-Turkic activists in the Muslim regions in China and with it, satisfying the need to maintain stability in these regions and the rest of China (Syroezhkin 2002, 177–178).

5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2014): “China Entered into Diplomatic Relations with Independent Former Soviet Republics”: http:// www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18019.shtml. Accessed on 22 July 2017.

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In order to develop these objectives, during the 1990s, several official visits6 took place to sign cooperation agreements on economic, commercial, scientific, technological, and border matters. A significant visit by the Chinese Premier Li Peng to Uzbekistan in April 1994 marked the principles within which China-Central Asia relations would be framed. Along the same lines as the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”7 (Heping Gongchu Wu Xiang Yuanze 和平共处五项原) the Chinese Premier would add the following, specifically regarding relations with Central Asia: 1) unswerving commitment to good- neighbor relations and peaceful coexistence; 2) development of mutually beneficial cooperation and promotion of common prosperity; 3) respect for the choice of the people of each country and nonintervention in the internal affairs of the other party; and 4) respect for the sovereignty of each state and the promotion of regional stability. (Syroezhkin 2002, 179)

Through these principles, a positioning strategy from China was established in the region and it was composed of three aspects. (1) Territorial: based on the search for a solution to the border disputes that were still unresolved; (2) Security: focused on containing the separatist movements and the extremist activities that took place mainly in the Xinjiang region; and (3) Commercial: aimed at establishing trade links with Central Asia. Regarding the first aspect, an important moment was the signing of the Sino-Kazakh agreement between Kazakhstan and China on March 20, 1994. It resolved territorial disputes in nine of the eleven disputed areas.

6 Among the most important visits, there was the one by the President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov in March 1992, which was considered the first one ever made by a leader of the recently constituted Central Asian republics. Later on, it was the turn of the Presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan in May and November 1992. In March 1993, the President of Tajikistan would be received, and in October 1993, Nursultan Nazarbayev paid his first visit to China. President Jiang Zemin visited Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan in July in 1996, 1998, and 1999, as well as the visits paid in June 2000 to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. 7 (1) Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, (2) mutual non-aggression,

(3) non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence. These principles were set for the first time by the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai during the negotiations between China and India which led to the signing of the Sino-Indian Treaty in 1954. A year later, they would be made known to the international community during the Bandung Conference.

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This agreement has been considered historical for being the first celebrated between a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and China. The status of the two remaining contested territories was resolved shortly after through the signing of different agreements between September 1997 and July 1998. Multilateral relations began in the year 1996 with the constitution of the Shanghai Five group comprised of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. This multilateral block aimed to discuss the second of the aspects, governing security, and more specifically, the separatism and extremism issue in Xinjiang. In 1997, the leaders of this group met in Moscow and signed an agreement that contemplated the reduction of armed forces in border areas. Nevertheless, it was in the third meeting celebrated in July 1998 in Kazakhstan where separatism and extremism issues were directly addressed. Members committed, through a joint agreement to “…not allow their territories to be used for the activities undermining the national sovereignty, security, and social order of any of the five countries.”8 Through these agreements, the necessity to promote regional security issues was emphasized and was discussed from a multilateral perspective, as well as to satisfying China’s objective to keep its Western border protected and to counteract the American influence in the region. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the separatist movements in Xinjiang during the following years forced both China and Russia to take the initiative to persuade the Central Asia states that they should perceive the threats as shared security matters and therefore, to try and find a regional response of the same nature (Clarke 2010, 127). Thus, during the following Shanghai Five group meeting in July 2000, the first attended by the President of Uzbekistan, the Taliban regime was condemned for its support of terrorists, and collective efforts were demanded in order to combat the soon to be named “three evils”: separatism, terrorism, and extremism. The Shanghai Five group became an official international organization in June 2001.

8 CIS Legislation (1998): “The Joint Statement of Participants of the Almaty Meeting - the Republic of Kazakhstan, People’s Republic of China, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan”: http://cis-legislation.com/document. fwx?rgn=3881. Accessed on 9 September 2017.

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The diplomatic dimension is also composed of the establishment of “strategic partnerships” between China and the countries of the region. At the end of the 1990s, the term “partnership” (huoban guanxi 伙 伴关系) became a keyword in China’s foreign policy. In fact, this was conceived as a new model in the relationships between states, based on the “five principles of pacific coexistence,” and would serve as an instrument of Chinese diplomacy to promote its particular vision of a peaceful development in the world and its consequent way of relating with other great powers.9 Although the partnership may vary in its type and importance depending on the country China holds relations with, it can be asserted that the “strategic partnership” is indeed an instrument of the Chinese diplomacy which constitutes a new type of relationship, as inferred from the following three aspects: (1) It is a long-term model of stable cooperation that transcends possible differences that may arise between the parts regarding its ideology and the nature of its political system and model of society; (2) the relation between the parts is built on the principles of equal conditions, respect, and mutual benefit; and (3) the content and purpose of the relationship should be multidimensional and multilevel, which implies economic, political, technological, and cultural cooperation, both at the bilateral and at the multilateral level. In 2005, for the first time China established a “strategic partnership” with a Central Asian country. The chosen country to be the first was Kazakhstan. Even though the model of “strategic partnership” comprises multidimensional cooperation, the driving force behind China–Kazakhstan strategic partnership is economic cooperation, especially in the energy field. Due to its economic growth, China has become the secondlargest oil consumer in the world, with an oil demand roughly 12 million barrels a day. Given its growing energy demand and its current supply conditions, a vital objective for China is to ensure a constant and secure supply that satisfies its demand. Beijing is constantly searching for energy resources abroad and developing its internal capacities. Kazakhstan turns out to be a strategic ally since it possesses 30 thousand million barrels of oil reserves—the biggest of the region—and 1.0 trillion cubic meters of natural gas reserves (British Petroleum 2019). The construction of the Sino-Kazakh pipeline in 1997 was crucial to the adoption of the strategic partnership between the two countries. This 9 During the 1990s, China established its first strategic partnerships with Brazil in 1993, Russia in 1996, and the U.S. in 1997.

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oil pipeline is the first of its kind and it directly transports the oil it imports to China from Central Asia. Stretching from the Atyrau region in Kazakhstan to Xinjiang in China, this oil pipeline crosses an extension of 2,800 kilometers and since the year 2006, it has transported around 100 million tons of oil.10 Additionally, in 2011 and as a result of the visit of the President of China Hu Jintao to Astana, China and Kazakhstan enhanced their “strategic partnership” to “comprehensive strategic partnership” status, which included committing to increase the volume of its bilateral commerce. Subsequently, through the signing of a joint statement in 2015,11 “new connotations” were established for the bilateral relations. China and Kazakhstan went one step further in the deepening their relationship by including in the new agreement the intention of presenting China’s BRI, and Kazakhstan’s “Bright Road” initiative (Nurly Zhol ) as complementary projects. Through merging these initiatives, both countries sought to deepen and strengthen their cooperation in infrastructure, energy, trade, and investment areas. Moreover, during the visit of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to China in September 2019, a bilateral agreement to develop a “permanent comprehensive strategic partnership” was signed. In 2016, the “strategic partnership” between China and Uzbekistan was promoted to “comprehensive strategic partnership” status. The same happened to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in 2016 and 2018, respectively. Not so for Turkmenistan, that has remained with the “strategic partnership” model since 2013. This step taken by China in the quest to deepen its relations with some of the countries of the region is due to the launching and continued deepening of the BRI in the region. 1.2

Trade

The trade dimension includes the economic ties that have been forged between China and Central Asia through bilateral trade and Chinese investment. Central Asia is well known for being a region of abundance, boasting a variety of mineral resources such as oil, natural gas, silver, coal, 10 Xinhuanet (2017): “Oil Imports Through Sino-Kazakh Pipeline hit 100 mln Tonnes”: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-03/29/c_136168316.htm. Accessed on 12 August 2017. 11 Joint Declaration on New Stage of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Kazakhstan.

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gold, aluminum, and uranium. Nevertheless, a fall in oil prices and the sanctions applied by the West to Russia—a highly important business partner—is slowing down the region’s economic growth. For China, this scenario not only offers the possibility of accessing energy resources which are vital to meet its energy demands, but also the possibility of entering a wider market with countless investment opportunities and, above all, gaining ground in a region that in the framework of the BRI connects Western Asia to Europe. China has quickly positioned itself as Central Asia’s largest trading partner in the region. The total trade volume between both parts grew from US$1.5 billion in 2001 to US$50 billion in 2013. Consequently, China became the main lender and investor in Central Asia, replacing Russia, whose commercial volume then amounted to US$32 billion. Even though these figures started to decrease in 2014 due to a slowing down of the Chinese economic growth, the scenario could change thanks to the BRI, since an investment in infrastructure of US$45 billion is expected to take place, in tandem with the resources provided by the initiative’s financial arms: the AIIB with an asset of US$ 100 billion and the Silk Road Fund with an additional US$40 billion. Currently, Kazakhstan is China’s first trade partner in the region. In 2013, both countries reached a commercial volume of US$28 billion, which meant an increase of 11.3% over the previous year.12 Kazakhstan is followed by Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan with a total trade volume that in 2016 reached approximately US$25 million. In this same year, the total volume of China’s exports regarding to Central Asia reached US$17 billion. Most of the imported goods are various manufactured products that range from footwear, furniture, and auto parts to electrical appliances. For its part, 67% of China’s imports correspond to mineral fuels, lubricants, and natural gas (Královiˇcová and Žatko 2016). Kazakhstan represents an emblematic case regarding its commercial relations with China. From the beginning of the 1990s, the bilateral trade between both countries experienced an exponential growth that went from US$512 million in 1993 to US$25 billion in 2010. One of 12 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2014): “Ministry of Foreign Affairs Holds Briefing for Chinese and Foreign Media on Premier Li Keqiang’s Visit to Kazakhstan and Holding of Second Regular Meeting with Prime Minister of Kazakhstan”: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1219578.shtml. Accessed on 18 August 2017.

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the reasons that explain this spectacular growth is the complementary of the two economies. During the 1990s, the majority of Kazakhstan’s exports to China consisted of oil and their derivatives and metals. China, on the other hand, exported mostly light manufactured goods to. At the beginning of the 2000s, about 80% of the Chinese exports coming into Kazakhstan were finished consumer items such as textiles, footwear, and electrical appliances; meanwhile, 85% of the exports from Kazakhstan to China was composed of raw materials and minerals (Clarke 2014, 153). Since 2014, China’s direct investment in Kazakhstan totals the US$20 billion (Rapoza July 18, 2017). This investment was principally focused on the oil and gas sector, the infrastructure construction related to it, and the financing of infrastructure projects such as ports and railroads, which improve transport links between China and Central Asia and are a substantial objective for the BRI. Among all China’s investments in the energy sector in Kazakhstan, the acquisition of PetroKazakhstan in 2005 for US$ 4.18 billion by the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) stands out. This purchase soon proved to be China’s largest overseas acquisition to date and was a significant transaction given the oil production levels of this company, estimated at seven million tons per year and given its ownership of the second-largest volume of oil reserves in Kazakhstan (Huirong and Hongwei 2012, 179; Petelin 2011, 37). In 2008, the CNPC and KazMunaiGaz (KMG)—Kazakhstan’s National Oil and Gas Company—signed a cooperation agreement in which they committed to the construction of a gas pipeline whose main objective would be to transport gas from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China. With this, China would be ensured an annual supply of 5 million cubic meters of natural gas.13 Another important agreement of this kind was put in place by both countries in September 2017. KazTransGas and PetroChina International Company signed an agreement in which Kazakhstan committed to exporting 5000 million of cubic meters of gas to China in exchange for benefits of around one billion dollars.14 China will receive this gas inflow through the city of Khorgos, which constitutes the biggest terrestrial port between China and Kazakhstan. 13 KazMunaiGas (2017): “Gas Transportation Projects. Kazakhstan-China Gas Pipeline”: http://www.kmg.kz/eng/deyatelnost/project/ptg/. Accessed on 22 September 2017. 14 Azernews (2017): “Kazakhstan Launches Gas Supplies to China”: https://www.aze rnews.az/region/120603.html. Accessed on 25 September 2017.

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It is noteworthy that one of the factors that has allowed China’s successful foray in the Kazakh energy sector has been its acceptance of the investment conditions imposed by the Kazakh government, along with China’s foreign economic policy and the implementation of the “loansfor-oil” scheme. A clear example is the joint purchase of the Kazakhstani MangistauMunaiGas (MMG) oil company in April 2009 by the CNPC and the KMG, as part of a five-million-dollar loan that China granted to Kazakhstan that same month.15 The CNPC would become the owner of 49% of this company’s stocks, whereas KMG would obtain the remaining 51%; with this, China complies with the Kazakh government’s decision to involve the KMG in all operations that China carries out in the energy sector in Kazakhstan. In the framework of its loan policy, different Chinese financial entities such as the China Exim Bank and China Development Bank have loaned Kazakhstan more than US$ 50 billion16 through the Kazakhstan Development Bank. According to Clarke, “China’s strategy of overpaying for Kazakh assets and the provision of other financial inducements (e.g., loans) has succeeded in gaining it a significant stake in Kazakhstan’s oil and gas sector to such a degree that Chinese state-owned companies by some estimates now control some 25% of all Kazakh oil production” (Clarke 2014, 155). Another energy resource which is important for China is uranium. Currently, Kazakhstan owns 12% of the world’s uranium reserves, is responsible for 41% of its worldwide production, and is the first uranium-exporting country in the world. In 2014, 55% of the total production of uranium in Kazakhstan was exported to China.17 Moreover, in 2009, Kazakhstan’s National Atomic Company, Kazatomprom, and the China General Nuclear Power Corporation signed an agreement establishing a company which was specialized in the construction of nuclear plants in China, and which would reduce Kazakhstan’s dependence on Russia in this regard.

15 China Daily (2009): “CNPC Buys Kazakh Oil Company”: http://www.chinadaily. com.cn/business/200904/28/content_7722725.htm. Accessed on 22 September 2017. 16 China Daily (2017): “Full Text of Chinese President’s Signed Article in Kazakh Newspaper”: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2017xivisitskazakhstan/201706/07/content_29656868.htm. Accessed on 24 September 2017. 17 World Nuclear Association (2020): “Uranium and Nuclear Power in Kazakhstan”: https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countriesg-n/kazakhstan.aspx. Accessed on 24 March 2020.

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Meanwhile, Turkmenistan has become China’s second-largest business partner in the region. Its 19.5 trillion of cubic meters in natural gas reserves has made it into an important business partner for China in Central Asia. In 2015, the trade volume between both countries reached US$ 15 billion, which meant a considerable increase compared to the trade volume reached in 2010 with US$ 10 billion. Currently, Turkmenistan produces 61.5 billion of cubic meters of natural gas and it is ranked as the fourth exporting country of the resource worldwide (Královiˇcová and Žatko 2016; British Petroleum 2019). In April 2006, China and Turkmenistan signed an agreement that anticipated long-term natural gas supply and the construction of a 1830-km gas pipeline going from Turkmenistan, crossing Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and reaching the Khorgas port in Xinjiang. The first section of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline or Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline was completed in 2009. The second and the third sections were completed in 2010 and 2015, respectively, and in July of same year, the construction of the fourth and last sections was begun. It is expected that at the end of 2020, the gas pipeline will be finished and reaching the capacity of 55 billion of cubic meters per year.18 In the case of Kyrgyzstan, Chinese investment has been mainly focused on building infrastructure. This is principally because of a geopolitical criterion: the fact that this country borders with China and is considered the entry point for oil coming from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Within the BRI framework, the construction of the China-KyrgyzstanUzbekistan railway, the building of a hydroelectric power station located in the north of Kyrgyzstan, and the reconstruction of the Bishkek-Torugat highway are listed as the main infrastructure projects. In Uzbekistan, Chinese investment has been focused on the telecommunications, energy, and transport sectors. According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, the trade volume between these two countries in 2018 reached US $ 6.4 billion. Additionally, important projects have been initiated. Among them, we could mention the construction of the Uzbek-Chinese Industrial Park of High Technologies in 2011, which in 2013 was established as the “Jizzakh” free industrial zone. The plan is to invest more than US$ 200 million in twenty projects to enhance the 18 China National Petroleum Corporation (2017): “Flow of Natural Gas from Central Asia”: http://www.cnpc.com.cn/en/FlowofnaturalgasfromCentralAsia/Flowofnaturalgasfr omCentralAsia2.shtml. Accessed on 14 September 2017.

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industrial zone in which Chinese participation is expected. In this regard, 540 joint ventures have been constituted in the country; 80 of them rely 100% on Chinese capital. Furthermore, China has also implemented its loan policy in Uzbekistan for US$ 6.5 billion.19 Tajikistan on the other hand—with whom China has the lowest commercial volume of the five Central Asian republics (US$ 1.8 billion)— has also been a Chinese investment target. Chinese direct investment there in 2015 reached US$ 273 million, which represents 53% of the overall total while Russia’s direct investment dropped to US$ 35 million the same year. Finally, Tajikistan has a strategic importance for China given their shared border in the Xinjiang region. Several construction projects for roads, power lines, and plants have been signed between the two countries. Moreover, China and Tajikistan signed an agreement governing preferential loans for around US$ 26 million in 2011.20 1.3

Security

The security dimension comprehends both bilateral and multilateral cooperation between China and Central Asian countries in order to maintain regional security and stability. Sharing a 3700-km border creates similar security concerns, and thus gives rise to the need for a common security strategy. According to Su, the latter includes “practicing defensive policies; subordinating the enhancement of national defense to economic development; defending world peace and opposing aggression and the arms race; supporting the peaceful settlement of disputes, arms control, and disarmament” (Sun 2007, 53). As a consequence of the “keeping a low profile” China foreign policy approach, including the emphasis placed on China’s domestic matters and the risk of being perceived negatively on the international scene, throughout 1990s, this security strategy did not imply, at least directly, China’s military engagement with the region (Swanström March 18, 2015, 2). However, this situation has changed 19 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan (2017): “Cooperation of the Republic of Uzbekistan with the Countries of the Asia and The Pacific”: https://mfa. uz/en/cooperation/countries/374/. Accessed on 14 September 2017. UzDaily (2017): “Uzbekistan, China Discuss Development of Trade-economic Relations”: https://www.uzdaily.com/articles-id-38819.htm. Accessed on 14 September 2017. 20 Tajikistan Asia-Plus (2017): “China Leads in Direct Investment in Tajikistan’s Economy”: https://news.tj/en/news/tajikistan/economic/20170203/236278. Accessed on 13 September 2017.

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recently due to the adjustment of China’s foreign policy (“striving for achievement” (fenfa youwei – 奋发有为)) under Xi Jinping’s mandate. A wider security strategy that involves the implementation of greater cooperation mechanisms, military presence through counter-terrorism exercises and military aid, seems to have come to the fore. When formulating its security strategy, Beijing has considered some security concerns that affect regional security and stability. At an internal level, the question of Afghanistan stands out. The formal cessation of the combat operations of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) on December 2014 by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the possible departure of U.S. from Afghanistan could generate profound security concerns for China in regard to the growth of extremist organizations and the consequent radicalization of Tajikistan and Pakistan. Moreover, it is claimed by the Chinese government that a considerable number of Uighur separatists had not only been trained in Afghanistan by Al-Qaeda, but also provided funding and weapons there (McMillen 2009). Other threats which are just as important are the escalation of international drugs and weapons smuggling, the rise of nationalism and ethnic problems, and the spread of radical organizations related to terrorist activities both in Central Asia and inside China. For instance, the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) are pursuing the establishment of an Islamic State of East Turkestan in the region of Xinjiang (Botobekov August 17, 2016). Although the nature of this security concerns is mainly political, its consequences put China’s investments in the region at risk. In order to counter the mentioned threats, China has chosen to strengthen a multilateral security cooperation framework through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). As we stated before, the creation of this organization in 2001 reflects China’s wish to erect an institutional platform that would allow the construction of a collective security framework in the region. Through this organization, China has managed to strengthen its relations with Central Asia while maintaining stability in the areas adjacent to the region of Xinjiang. In addition, the SCO was by the time of its foundation the only organization at the multilateral level propelled by China that demonstrated a will to discuss military and security topics, which traditionally the Chinese government had never opened to discussion or faced under multilateral terms (Clarke 2010, 122). The SCO established an intergovernmental space to discuss issues that affect all its members and comprise security threats, principally

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terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Nowadays, however, the organization goes further; its main goals include not only security matters, but also the promotion of cooperation in politics, trade, economy, technology, culture, energy, and environmental protection as well as “… moving towards the establishment of a democratic, fair and rational new international political and economic order.”21 In 2001, members states signed The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism in which these three issues were defined as “a threat to international peace and security” and “to the territorial integrity and security of the Parties as well as their political, economic and social stability.” This document clearly exposes the consensus reached between China, Russia, and Central Asian countries regarding the need to respond and act as a regional bloc against the threat imposed by radical and extremist organizations in the region. The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, and the declaration of war in Afghanistan tested the strength of this recently established organization and the counterweight it would exert vis à vis the presence of the U.S. in the region. Between 2001 and 2002 the Central Asian republics, with exception of Turkmenistan, received economic aid through military cooperation and base access agreements with the U.S. As a reaction, the SCO established its operational framework with the creation of “… initial law enforcement agency meetings in Almaty, Kazakhstan, to coordinate responses to border security issues, illegal migration, and drug trafficking and the official adoption of the SCO charter, establishment of the SCO secretariat in Beijing, and the conclusion of an agreement to open the ‘Regional Anti-Terrorism’ center in Bishkek” (Clarke 2010, 129). China’s military cooperation within the SCO has been focused on the execution of counter-terrorism exercises. In 2002 the first bilateral exercise was held with Kyrgyzstan, followed by the first multilateral exercises conducted in Kazakhstan and China, where all SCO members participated with the exception of Uzbekistan. These exercises simulate terrorist attacks and are performed almost every year. Since to 2002, roughly 22 exercises have been carried out by the SCO members. For China, these trainings contribute to strengthening China’s ties with the SCO members while enabling China to test and improves its military capabilities (ICG February 27, 2013, 20). Another instrument of Beijing’s 21 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Portal (2017): “About SCO”: http://eng.sec tsco.org/about_sco/. Accessed on 14 September 2017.

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military cooperation mechanisms with Central Asia is the military assistance it offers, which includes technical support and aid from China. The principal recipient is Kazakhstan, benefitting from free transfers of retired military assets while the Chinese army is modernized. Furthermore, the two countries have signed agreements for Kazakhstan to receive technical equipment, communications, and transportation valued in more than US$ 5.5 million. Next, Turkmenistan was the creditor of a US$ 3 million loan to obtain equipment and uniforms for its army. In the case of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, in 2002 China offered technical military assistance worth US$ 1.2 million to Kyrgyzstan and to Tajikistan for US$ 1.5 million in 2009. Finally, Uzbekistan signed an agreement with Beijing in 2009 worth in US$ 3.7 for purchasing equipment for its borders (Peyrouse 2010, 11–12). China has set up a wider security strategy in Central Asia that not only implies the fight against the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism and extremism, but also countering organized crime with instruments such as the Agreement on Joint Fight Against Crimes. It is, however, noteworthy that the driver of China’s security engagement with Central Asia is mainly linked to Beijing’s domestic concerns such as the security threats in the region of Xinjiang and fostering economic development in its western region. With regard to these security threats, the instability in neighboring Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan stands out as a consequence of the existence of extremist and radical organizations along with their own separatist movements. Furthermore, the geopolitical position of Xinjiang is essential to consolidate China’s rise as regional power. As Clarke has claimed “the integration of Xinjiang grants China significant security, economic, and strategic benefits that serve two purposes — the consolidation of China’s control of Xinjiang and the expansion of Chinese power in Central Asia — which contribute to Beijing’s quest for a ‘peaceful rise’ to great power status” (Clarke 2011, 7).

2 Unpacking the Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia: Background, Framework, and Rationale It was in September 2013 during his speech at Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan, when President Xi Jinping launched the BRI as a trade and infrastructural developmental initiative for establishing a connectivity and

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cooperation framework across Central Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and Africa. In his speech in Astana, Xi Jinping asserted that: Both China and Central Asian countries are at a crucial stage of development with unprecedented opportunities and challenges. We have all set medium- to long-term development goals based on our national conditions (…) to forge closer economic ties, deepen cooperation and expand development space in the Eurasian region; we should take an innovative approach and jointly build an “economic belt along the Silk Road”. This will be a great undertaking benefitting the people of all countries along the route. To turn this into a reality, we may start with work in individual areas and link them up over time to cover the whole region.22

To this end, the BRI has been structured as a project that combines the following elements: (1) the investment in international infrastructure building projects; (2) the establishment and strengthening of partnerships among the participating countries under new cooperation frameworks; and (3) the commissioning of new financial institutional platforms such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Silk Road Fund. The first policy basis of the BRI can be found in two official documents. Firstly, on the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform, issued in November 2013. In this document the BRI was adopted by the Party Leadership as a pivotal policy to foster the opening-up of the inland and border areas of the country, by building infrastructure connections and new transportation routes between China and its neighboring regions. Secondly, the Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road jointly released by different governmental entities23 in March 2015. This document has been considered as the BRI blueprint since it outlines a comprehensive plan of the project regarding its aims, framework, policy

22 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2013): “Promote Friendship Between Our People and Work Together to Build a Bright Future”: http:// www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1078088.shtml. Accessed on 22 July 2017. 23 National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, with State Council authorization.

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priorities, and cooperation mechanisms that underpin the initiative. As far as the overarching aim of the initiative is concerned, the BRI aims: (…) to promote the connectivity of Asian, European and African continents and their adjacent seas, establish and strengthen partnerships among the countries along the Belt and Road, set up all-dimensional, multitiered and composite connectivity networks, and to realize diversified, independent, balanced and sustainable development in these countries.24

Accordingly, the SREB links the western and central regions of China and western Europe via Central Asia, West Asia, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe through six economic corridors: the new Eurasia Land Bridge, the China–Mongolia–Russia, China–Central Asia–West Asia, China-Indochina Peninsula, China-Pakistan and, Bangladesh-ChinaIndia-Myanmar. While the MSR was originally designed to go from the Chinese coast to Europe through the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Suez Canal, and the Mediterranean Sea, in 2015 the south line of the MSR was extended to the South Pacific. Therefore, the BRI attempts to build an interconnected network of maritime and land-based economic routes, running from the western Pacific to the Baltic Sea by putting forward “hard” and “soft” infrastructure projects. Hard infrastructure projects have been focused on the sectors of transportation (railroads, ports, highways, air transport); energy (oil and gas pipelines, power plants); and IT and communication (crossborder optical cables, spatial satellites). As far as “soft” infrastructure projects are concerned, the adoption of free trade cooperation agreements, the establishment of special economic zones and the reduction of tariffs, has been set up (Rolland 2019). In order to implement those projects, an estimated budget of US$ 1 trillion has been disposed, and China is willing to lend about US$8 trillion for improving infrastructure in the involved countries (Chin and He May 2016; Bruce-Lockhart June 26, 2017). Furthermore, the BRI’s Action Plan points out that the SREB is focused on connecting China, Central Asia, Russia, and Europe

24 National Development and Reform Commission (2015): “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st – Century Maritime Silk Road”: http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html. Accessed on 13 June 2017.

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through Central Asia, and West Asia, and linking China with Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, the MSR is planned to go from the coast of China to Europe through the South China Sea to the Pacific. On the one hand, the belt will rely on the main cities alongside the route to serve as economic trade zones in order to create the New Eurasian Land Bridge and the other economic corridors: China–Mongolia–Russia, China–Central Asia–West Asia, China-Indochina Peninsula, China-Pakistan and, Bangladesh-ChinaIndia-Myanmar. On the other hand, the road will rely on the main ports to build new routes of maritime transportation. The geographic area covered by the BRI has been changing since their launching. In 2016, the initiative involved 68 countries comprising an area that contains 62.3% of the world’s population, 30% of the world GDP, 55% of the world GNP, and 75% of known energy reserves. Nonetheless, as of July 2019, around 125 countries and 29 international organizations have signed cooperation agreements under the initiative’s framework.25 Although there is no official list of the projects and their interlinked parts, some data found on the BRI’s portal shows that at least 80 Chinese state-owned enterprises are part of the initiative and about 50 of them have financed around 1700 projects within the BRI since 2013. Approximately US$ 500 billion worth of projects, mergers and acquisitions were announced through seven infrastructure sectors (Huang 2017). Although AIIB is often considered as the main source of financing, most of the financing comes from the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (CHEXIM). In 2015, the CHEXIM and the CDB had, respectively, financed 2057 projects in 49 nations and 400 projects in 48 countries (Aoyama 2016). The BRI’s Action Plan has also outlined that the initiative must be considered as an open platform for all parties who wish to contribute to worldwide connectivity. “The initiative is open for cooperation. It covers, but it is not limited to, the area of the ancient Silk Road, it is open to all countries, and international and regional organizations for engagement, so that the results of the concerted efforts will benefit wider areas.”26 In this respect, the AIIB has become one of the main platforms of the 25 China Daily (2019): “BRI Helps to Improve Infrastructure”: http://www.chinadaily. com.cn/global/2019-05/10/content_37467396.htm. Accessed on 12 September 2019. 26 National Development and Reform Commission (2015): “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st – Century Maritime Silk Road”:

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initiative to gain support and attract the interest of other countries apart from the 68 directly participating in the BRI. Chin and He (2016) has identified 48 countries that are already signed up to be part of the Bank or have shown their interest in the initiative. Key countries in Central Asia are Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan; other countries involved include France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium, UK, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, South Africa, Somalia, Sudan, Australia, Argentina, Brazil, and Peru. The great powers not involved ate the U.S. and Japan. The Initiative follows four guiding principles: (1) openness and cooperation; (2) harmony and inclusiveness; (3) market-based operation; and (4) mutual benefit. We already mentioned the first principle, which refers to any interested country and international or regional organizations to participate in the initiative. The second one underlines the tolerance among civilizations and the respect for the development strategies of each participant and support for dialogue. The third, the market-based operation, is particularly important because it establishes the commercial sense of the initiative, differing from other forms of cooperation previously proposed by China that imply international aid. Notwithstanding, the most important characteristic that differentiates the BRI from other international forms of cooperation is the central role played by infrastructure development and investment. In China’s experience, investment in infrastructure has contributed to the country’s rapid economic growth during the reform period. It is clear that many of the countries involved in the initiative have vast market potential, but their lack of advanced infrastructure and funding capacity have restricted their economic development. In this context, the BRI emerges as a viable funding source intended to reduce the region’s funding gap. Moreover, the BRI has a multidimensional cooperation structure that is made up the following areas: (1) Policy coordination: This aims to promote intergovernmental cooperation through multilevel intergovernmental macro-policy exchanges and communication mechanisms, based on shared interests, mutual political trust, and consensus; (2) Consolidating connectivity: This refers to the improvement of the infrastructure across all the BRI countries, through the construction of aviation, port and energy infrastructures, as well as cross-border optical cable networks and spatial information passageways to expand information exchanges; http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html. Accessed on 13 June 2017.

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(3) Unimpeded trade27 : This seeks to promote investment and trade by eliminating investment barriers and creating a free trade zone among the countries involved in the initiative. It also implies the mutual recognition of regulations and mutual assistance in law enforcement; (4) Financial integration: Financial support constitutes a key pillar of the initiative. It aims to deepen financial cooperation by building a currency stability system, including currency convertibility and settlement and launching new financial institutions such as the AIIB and the Silk Road Fund and lastly, (5) People-to-people exchanges: encouraging mechanisms for cultural exchange among students and strengthening cooperation in science and technology. Therefore, the BRI constitutes a comprehensive strategy not only because of its scope and magnitude in terms of geographical size, participating countries, population involved, considerable financial resources, and its orientation to multidimensional cooperation, but also because it is an initiative that has a global impact with regard to the configuration of international trade and world politics. The emphasis placed on infrastructure building will cause a major impact on the trade volume among the participating countries. An increase in the influx of goods (imports and exports) between China and these countries is expected, thanks to the reduction of transportation costs brought about the improvement of the international trade routes and modes of transportation. By 2016, 59% of China’s trade traveled by sea, 22% by air, 18% by road and 0% by rail, given the high cost of the latter. Transportation costs will be considerably reduced through infrastructure improvements in land routes instead of the current sea-lines. Also, the infrastructure investment will increase the maritime connectivity between China and the countries along the new Silk Road. This is particularly important as 80% of the volume of goods traded in the world travels by this mean of transportation (Amighini 2017, 129–133). As Amighini states: Trade creation along the Belt and Road will occur through two major channels: on the one hand, through the expansion of trade ties between pairs of countries that are already important trade partners, facilitated by the decrease of transport costs and trade barriers; on the other hand,

27 As it appears in the official document “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st – Century Maritime Silk Road” (National Developmental and Reform Commission, 2015).

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through new trade routes that will un- lock potential trade ties among hitherto mutually isolated trading partners. (Amighini 2017, 134)

Certainly, China’s diplomacy of strategic partnerships with the BRI’s financial institutions support will provide those countries involved in the initiative with the necessary financial capacity to carry out specific infrastructure projects which they might otherwise not be able to develop. 2.1

The Rationale Behind the Initiative

Although the BRI has been presented as a massive trade and infrastructure development project, it has at its core economic, security, and geopolitical issues needed to be addressed. In this respect, one may understand that there is an economic, security, and political rationale driving the BRI. China is trying to open up new economic routes abroad aimed at developing the western parts of China, searching for alternative investment opportunities abroad for state-owned enterprises, and sustaining the second wave of economic reforms in order to internationalize and boost its economy. The “opening-up” reform ushered in the adoption of an export-oriented development model that stressed the comparative advantages of China’s eastern provinces in terms of population and industrialization. A notorious consequence has been the economic imbalance and disparities between the coastal region and the western area. In 2014, the per capita income in the Western provinces (i.e., Guizhou, Qinghai, Gansu) was slightly less than half of that of the eastern provinces of Zhejiang, Guangdong, and Fujian, and barely one-third of that of Shanghai and Beijing. Furthermore, in 2016 gross domestic product by region in the Western provinces was only a third of the GDP of the previously mentioned eastern provinces.28 To redress this unbalanced development, Jiang Zemin’s administration launched the “Great Western Development ” (xibu da kaifa 西部大开发) policy in 2001. This program covers the provinces of Guizhou, Qinghai, Gansu, Shaanxi, Sichuan and Yunnan, and the autonomous regions of

28 National Bureau of Statistics of China (2016): “China Statistical Yearbook 2015”: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2015/indexeh.htm. Accessed on 7 February 2018. Statista (2016): “Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of China in 2016, by region (in billion yuan)”: https://www.statista.com/statistics/278557/gdp-of-china-by-region/. Accessed on 5 February 2018

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Guangxi, Ningxia, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang, aiming to reduce regional inequality and the interior region’s discontents, to stimulate domestic demand, to improve the performance of SOEs, and to ensure national security and unity (Lai 2002). Under this policy, the launch of infrastructure projects such as the Xinjiang-Shanghai pipeline and the establishment of urban hubs have enabled interconnectivity and trade between China and Central Asian countries. It is now expected that thanks to the formidable resources, institutions, and inclusive narratives that it presents, the BRI will be able to strengthen the goals pursued by the Great Western Development policy as well as to further reduce these inequalities between the eastern and western regions. For instance, the per capita income in Xinjiang has increased by 18% between 2013—the year in which the BRI was launched—and 2016.29 The search for alternative investment opportunities abroad for Chinese companies, especially for SOEs,30 is also part of the economic rationale behind the BRI. Since the reform and the establishment of the socialist market economy system, the SOEs have played a significant role in the growth of the Chinese economy. During the early 1990s, China’s economy experienced a transition to a hybrid economic model, which gradually gave way to private property, but the consideration of public ownership as the base of the national economy prevailed (Peña 2013). Consequently, China’s productive apparatus was mainly in the hands of state-owned enterprises, most of them operating with losses. Because of this, in 1996 the government initiated a process of gradual transformation and restructuration of the SOEs, by which the central government kept control of the largest, most important SOEs in the country while allowed local governments to handle the restructuration of the small SOEs by selling, merging, or closing many of them. China has over 150,000 SOEs, of which 33% are controlled by the central government and the rest by local governments. Of this 33%,

29 National Bureau of Statistics of China (2017): “China Statistical Yearbook 2016”: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indexeh.htm. Accessed on 7 February 2018. 30 According to the Chinese government the SOEs are defined as “non-corporation economic units where the entire assets are owned by the state and which have registered in accordance with the Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on the Management of Registration of Corporate Enterprises” (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2002). SOEs are owned either by central or local governments.

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around 115 enterprises are controlled by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC).31 This central SOEs are in strategic sectors of the Chinese economy such as defense, electricity, oil and petrochemicals, construction, shipping, telecommunications, and civil aviation (Fan and Hope 2013, 8). Chinese SOEs account for 40% of China’s GDP and represent the 60% of China’s 500 largest companies and about 10% of Fortune Global List’s companies. It should be noted that the China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation or Sinopec Limited, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNCP), and the State Grid Corporation of China (SGC)—which are all companies carrying out projects under the BRI—are ranked second, fourth and fifth on the list.32 There is some controversy about SOEs obtaining preferential treatment in terms of access to bank capital, especially ones from state-owned commercial banks, which additionally provide SOEs with low-interest loans and debt relief. SOEs also enjoy favorable tax treatment, considerable injections of capital from the government when needed, and can also take advantage of specific policies designed to improve their competitiveness, involving licensing and allocation of contracts in the Chinese market (Szamosszegi and Kyle 2011). That said, it is important to highlight that Chinese SOEs are rooted in the state-controlled network beyond the shareholding ties. Indeed, there is an inherent tie between the SOEs and the party-state system in terms of governance, which often translates into the supervisory officials of these companies being nominated by the government and the establishment of other institutional bridges between the administration and the SOEs. As Lin states: An additional institutional bridge between the large SOEs and the government is the practice of reserving a number of positions in several elite (if functionally obscure) government and party bodies for leaders of the national groups […] For example, the Party Committee of SASAC nominated 52 top managers as representatives of the current (18th) National Congress of the Party […] As noted, the Party also plays a major role in personnel appointments in the national business groups. One-third of

31 SASAC is a commission of the State Council that manages the state-owned assets and holds the shares of the central SOEs on behalf of the state. 32 Fortune (2019): “Global 500”: https://fortune.com/global500/. Accessed on 17 April 2020.

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the employees in the national SOEs are members of the Party, and Party organizations exist within each level of the business group hierarchy. (Lin 2017, 590–591)

Under President Xi’s administration, this situation has intensified. In his speech at the Working Conference on the Construction of the Stateowned Enterprises held in Beijing in October 2017, he pointed out that: “party leadership and building the role of the party are the root and soul for state-owned enterprises […] We must unswervingly uphold the party’s leadership over state-owned enterprises, give full play to the leading and political core roles of the party organizations in the enterprises, ensure that the party’s and state policies are implemented in state-owned enterprises.”33 Such a statement suggests that maintaining control over Chinese SOEs is still an imperative for China’s leadership despite the ongoing reform of the SOEs. SOEs are just as central to the performance of the Chinese economy as they were at the beginning of the reform era, and they are of course instrumental to guaranteeing the party’s leadership. On the one hand, SOEs serve as an instrument to China’s leadership insofar as they contribute to the achievement of vital economic and social policies. For example, as well as constituting the flagship of China at the international markets, SOEs help maintain social stability by creating jobs and offering social assistance. On the other hand, SOEs represent a space for the party to continue to exert control over key sectors of the Chinese economy and to reaffirm Party’s rule. According to Xiao Yaqing, the director of the SASAC, “Communist Party Members at state enterprises form the ‘most solid and reliable class foundation’ for the communist party to rule the country.”34 About 80% of the executive directors of the central SOEs are Party members. Selecting the senior executives of these companies

33 Xinhuanet (2016): “Xi Jinping zai quanguo guoyou qiye dang de jianshe gongzuo huiyi shang qiangdiao jianchi dang dui guoqi de lingdao bu dongyao” [Xi Jinping Stressed at the Working Conference on the Construction of State-owned Enterprises: Upholding Party’s Leadership over State-owned Enterprises]: http://www.xinhuanet.com/2016-10/ 11/c_1119697415.htm. Accessed on 12 February 2017. 34 South China Morning Post (2017): “How the Communist Party controls China’s state-owned Industrial Titans”: http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/ 2098755/how-communist-party-controls-chinas-state-owned-industrial-titans. Accessed on 14 February 2018.

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from different government bodies (National Peoples’ Congress, Political Consultative Conference, and the National Congress of the CCP) is an institutionalized practice exerted by the Chinese government as is contemplated within the SASAC’s guidelines that regulate the SOEs. Xiao Yaqing has also stressed the importance of the central SOEs as a driving force for the implementation of the BRI: “SOEs are the market backbones. They have their own plans and strategies for the Belt and Road drive, in addition to the country’s overall blueprint for the initiative.”35 Near the celebration of the first Belt and Road Forum in May 2017, a report published by Caixin Global stated that over the past three years around 50 SOEs have participated in 1,700 BRI projects. As of the end of 2018, the number of projects carried by the central SOEs increased to 3,116.36 This illustrates that the BRI has enabled SOEs to find new investment markets abroad while laying the foundations for the internationalization of the Chinese economy and the transnationalization of the SOEs and the elites who run them.37 Both aims have been included in China’s “going out” (Zou chuqu 走出去) policy launched in 1999 introducing the Chinese government’s encouragement to Chinese enterprises to “go out” and set global prospects. One key step on this path of transnationalization will be the internationalization of the Renminbi. Until 2015, the People’s Bank of China had signed over 30 swap agreements with foreign central banks, for a total value of US$ 468 billion (Landry and Tang September 16, 2017). With the BRI, this trend will continue to the extent that swap agreements are included in broader agreements of their terms. A survey conducted in 2017 states that swap agreements between China and the countries along the Belt and Road would increase bilateral trades values between China and such countries by more than 30% (Zhang et al. 2017).

35 Nan, Zhong (May 9, 2017): “SOEs to Take the Lead Role Along the Belt and Road”, China Daily. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-05/09/content_2 9258516.htm. Accessed 23 April 2020. 36 Caixin (2017): “SOEs Lead Infrastructure Push in 1,700 ‘Belt and Road´Projects”: https://www.caixinglobal.com/2017-05-10/soes-lead-infrastructure-push-in-1700-beltand-road-projects-101088332.html. People’s Daily (2018): “China’s Central SOEs Running Over 3,000 Projects Under BRI”: http://en.people.cn/n3/2018/1114/c90000-9518167.html. 37 For a better understanding of the emergence of a transnational class in China made of CPC’s officials, see Sklair (2002) and Izquierdo-Brichs and Etherington (2017).

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Boosting the Chinese economy and dealing with its overcapacity problem is another domestic imperative linked to BRI. It is known that after a long period of double-digit economic growth, China is now experiencing a period of economic deceleration known as the “New Normal” (xin changtai 新常态). This idea lies at the core of the understanding that is essential for the country to improve sustainable growth, even if that implies an economic slowdown. Against this backdrop, China’s BRI “… aims to boost China’s slowing economy by developing new markets and generating demand for the country’s over- capacity in aluminium, steel, construction and other industries” (ICG July 27, 2017, 3). The lack of infrastructure in Central Asia countries is a perfect match for Beijing’s needs for investment in construction and infrastructure projects abroad. Moreover, this infrastructure development not only helps open up new markets in Central Asia and boost foreign demand for Chinese products, but also presents Chinese state-owned companies with new opportunities to invest abroad. Although the BRI’s narrative has stressed its core goal of developing Eurasian connectivity and providing the means to foster its economy and infrastructure, the BRI’s security rationale is structured around some domestic imperatives linked to tackling security threats, ensuring access to energy resources, and reinforcing China’s peripheral diplomacy. In terms of security threats, the integration of Xinjiang into China and the consolidation of its territorial, political, economic, and cultural control over the region have been a long-standing goal of the Chinese government, ever since the establishment of the PRC. To achieve this objective China has developed “a ‘double-opening-approach’ to simultaneously integrate Xinjiang with Central Asia and China proper in economic terms and to stablish security and cooperation with China’s Central Asian neighbors” (Clarke 2016, 304). In light of this, the BRI is not only driven by this imperative but also represents the platform from which it could be attained. The BRI gives Central Asia a role as a strategic region while appearing to be an extension of China’s periphery policy. Through this policy, China has been nurturing its political and economic relationships by implementing bilateral trade agreements and the concession of loans to support diverse infrastructure projects. Apart from that, there are broader security and strategic considerations also driving the initiative: principally to counter the influence of the U.S. in China’s periphery. The rebalancing of the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy by

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the Obama administration in 2011 encouraged China to respond strategically with respect to its positioning in Asia. To this effect, in the “March West” (Xijin 西进) strategy formulated in 2012, it is proposed the revival of the Silk Road as an important bridge for communications and commerce between Eastern and Western civilizations and supported the strengthening of the Great Western Development program to establish an overall strategy to achieve: (a) the opening of supply channels of oil and gas through the construction of a new silk road; (b) increasing cooperation with Western countries through establishing economic assistance and a cooperative development fund; (c) counteracting the threats to stability and harmony in Xinjiang and Tibet brought about by implementing a strategic barrier; and (d) fostering investment in foreign countries as well as strengthening social and cultural exchanges.38 In light of this, the BRI should not be conceived as an isolated project but should instead be understood as a comprehensive strategy, one that among other aspects will counteract the weight of US hegemony in the Chinese periphery. Finally, the BRI is also driven by the imperative of strengthening Xi Jinping and CCP’s leadership. For the fifth generation of Chinese leadership, the issue of regime preservation and CCP’s legitimacy has gained increasing relevance. It is known that since 2012, the country’s annual GDP growth has dropped, which has evidenced the exhaustion of the Chinese economic development model. This, in turn, jeopardizes the fulfillment of one of Xi Jinping’s aims—achieving the “two centenary goals” and the national rejuvenation of China. The risks of a possible decline of the Chinese economy and the consequent non-fulfillment of expectations that China’s rise has brought to Chinese people have driven Xi Jinping to double down on nationalist narratives and to project a more proactive and leading international profile by posing the BRI as a vehicle to do so. 2.2

Central Asia at the Core of the Silk Road Economic Belt

The analysis of the diplomatic, trade, and security dimensions that comprises China’s engagement with Central Asia—addressed in the first section of this chapter—suggests that China’s political strategy in this 38 Global Times (2012): “Wang Jisi: ‘Xijin’, zhongguo diyuan zhanlue de zai pingheng ” [Wang Jisi: ‘March West’, China’s geopolitical re-balance]: http://opinion.huanqiu.com/ opinion_world/2012-10/3193760.html. Accessed on 14 October 2017.

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region has pursued the following goals. Firstly, to maintain regional security and stability as long as this falls in line with maintaining national security and stability. For instance, the success of separatist movements and the creation of independent states along China’s Western border could set a precedent for the Uighur population in the region of Xinjiang, which might lead to their secession from China. Secondly, to keep Central Asia as a secure and constant supplier of raw materials and energy resources such as oil, gas, and uranium. China’s growing energy demand of twelve millions of barrels per day and its position as a net oil importer since 1993 make Central Asia a strategic region in order to sustain economic growth in China. Thirdly, to strengthen political and economic ties with Central Asian countries because due to the appeal of Central Asia as a large market for Chinese goods. Until now, this goal has been successfully achieved through the establishment of the “strategic partnerships,” China’s “loans-for-oil” framework, and the complementary nature of the Chinese and the Central Asian economies. However, with the BRI, China seeks to strengthen these goals and further those linked to its domestic imperatives and global aspirations. In this respect, Central Asia holds special meaning for China as: (1) a contiguous area to demonstrate its strengths as a great power in a region historically considered as an area of influence of Russia and the U.S.; (2) a bridge to Europe and the Middle East as well a continental access to Western Asia; (3) a prominent source and supplier of raw materials and energy resources; (4) a new market for Chinese products; (5) a territory for Chinese state-owned enterprises with endless investment opportunities; but also, (6) an area where to further control a latent threat to China’s national security due to the separatist movements, rising nationalisms and the growth of extremist organizations in the Chinese periphery. For the Central Asian countries, China’s BRI seems to be an extremely attractive opportunity for the following reasons. First, both a lack of infrastructure and the absence of economic means put the success of Central Asian countries’ development plans at risk. In this respect, the BRI’s funding capacity helps their objective. The BRI has made the capital of its two financial institutions available for the participating countries: the AIIB with assets of US$ 100 billion, and the Silk Road Fund with an additional US$ 40 billion. According to Qian Keming—Chinese ViceMinister of Commerce—within the BRI framework, China has invested around US$ 100 billion in the countries along the Belt and Road and

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signed for new construction projects of US$ 720 billion worth, while the BRI countries have invested in China around US$ 48 billion.39 Meanwhile, AIIB’s president—Jin Liqun—has declared that in 2016 the bank aimed to lend US$ 1.2 billion; however, this amount was surpassed by the US$ 1.7 billion that the bank actually lent (Hsu January 14, 2017). It is important to mention, that a US$ 27.5 million loan was granted to the Dushanbe-Uzbekistan Border Road Improvement Project in Tajikistan. Besides, during the first Belt and Road Forum it was announced that the Silk Road Fund will benefit from an additional capital of CNY¥ 100 billion.40 Secondly, China represents an alternative partner to Central Asian countries, potentially reducing their economic dependence on Russia. As we stated earlier, the fall of oil prices and the sanctions applied to Russia have affected the Central Asian economies; this, in turn, has driven countries’ focus toward China as a political and commercial partner. Even at the multilateral level this shift was evident in the performance of Central Asian countries at the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). As Indeo has argued the BRI “… appears more attractive for Central Asia republics than the EAEU, mainly because the Chinese initiative does not impose a membership and it is not an organization but a program of investments tailored to promoting the development of infrastructures, which could help land-locked Central Asian Countries connect with the global economy” (Indeo 2017, 39). Among the six economic corridors proposed by the BRI to improve cooperation and connectivity, two of them go through Central Asia. First, the New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic Corridor, which connects China and Europe through Central Asia, and it is expected to complement the existing Russian-built road and the rail infrastructure of the first Eurasian Land Bridge. This new bridge joins the Chinese cities of Lianyungang and Rizhao to the cities of Rotterdam in Holland and 39 The State Council Information Office (2019): “Press Conference on Pursuing Higher-quality Opening-up and High-quality Commerce Development”: http://english. scio.gov.cn/pressroom/2019-09/30/content_75283943_0.htm. 40 China.org.cn (2017): “SCIO Briefing on Trade and Economic Cooperation Under

B&R Initiative”: http://www.china.org.cn/china/2017-05/11/content_40790733.htm. Accessed on 30 June 2017. Xinhuanet (2017): “Full Text: List of Deliverables of Belt and Road Forum”: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/15/c_136286376.htm. Accessed on 30 June 2017.

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Antwerp in Belgium. It is 10,800 km long and runs through Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, and Germany. Second, the China-Central AsiaWest Asia Economic Corridor which connects China and the Arabian Peninsula, starting from the region of Xinjiang, crossing all five Central Asian republics and seventeen countries and regions in Western Asia.41 A report published by the International Crisis Group a Non-Governmental Organization points out that: Within this route, a northern spur is most developed, building railways from a new trade terminal at Khorgos on the Chinese-Kazakh frontier across to the Kazakh port of Aktau on the Caspian. From Aktau, shipping offers transport across the Caspian to Azerbaijan and Georgia, and a link to the new Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway. Heading south from Aktau, a new railway has opened between Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran. The first trains between China and Iran began operations in February 2016. (ICG July 27, 2017, 7)

Since Kazakhstan is China’s largest trading partner in the region, its support for and implication to the BRI will be greater than of other countries in the region. Indeed, Kazakhstan shares with China what could be considered the most remarkable Central Asia transportation project within the BRI. This is the construction of the Khorgos Eastern Gate Special Economic Zone and dry port in the city of Khorgos. This was officially announced in July 2014 by the former Kazakh president, Nursultan Nazarbayev. It was in accordance with the “100 Concrete Steps Program” the national platform set up to achieve the Kazakhstan objective of being included into the top 30 developed countries by 2050 (Idrissov July 25, 2015). The Khorgos Gateway is a container port that links China and Kazakhstan by rail along its border zone. It is located on the KazakhChinese border; it reached a yearly capacity of 200,000 containers by 2019 and expecting to reach the 500,000 in 2023. In May 2017, two Chinese companies—China Cosco Shipping Corporation Limited and Lianyungang Port Holding Group Limited—jointly purchased 49% of the shares in the port on the Kazakh side by signing an investment agreement at the First Belt and Road Forum (Rapoza July

41 Xinhuanet (2017): “Keywords of China’s Major-country Diplomacy: Six Major Economic Corridors and AIIB”: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-09/18/c_1 36618958.htm. Accessed on 12 October 2017.

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18, 2017). Another important Kazakh infrastructure project within the BRI is the construction of the Western Europe—Western China road. With its 8,207 kilometers of highway, it aims to link Central Asia with Europe, and hopes to further the economic and industrial development of its adjacent areas. As of 2016, the Silk Road Fund, along with the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the Islamic Development Bank have provided funding of around US$7 billion (Djankov March 2016, 32). Other infrastructure projects are also being carried out in Uzbekistan. One emblematic scheme is the construction of Central Asia’s longest railway tunnel: The Kamchiq tunnel links the Fergana Valley to the Uzbekistan capital Tashkent. It is 19.2 km long and is part of the projected China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway line. Funding of US$ 350 million was covered by China Exim Bank.42 During the first Belt and Road Forum, various agreements between the Central Asian republics and China were signed. Among them, the agreement on international transportation and strategy coordination with the government of Uzbekistan; the cooperation agreement between the Silk Road Fund and the National Bank for Foreign Economic Activity of Uzbekistan; the financing cooperation agreements on chemical, metallurgical, and petrochemical industries between the China Development Bank and Kazakhstan; the participation of Chinese companies in “Digital Kazakhstan 2020” cooperation program; and the Memorandum of Understanding on Promoting the Major Projects under Industrial Capacity and Cooperation with the Ministry of Economy in Kyrgyzstan.43 These agreements demonstrate the long-term projection that the BRI will have in Central Asian countries with regard to their deeper engagement with China. However, for a project that foresees about thirty years longer to be completed, it is too early to conclude how it will be developed and whether it will overcome all the challenges involved in its execution.

42 Xinhuanet (2016): “Chinese, Uzbek Leaders Hail Inauguration of Central Asia’s Longest Railway Tunnel”: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-06/23/c_1 35458470_2.htm. Accessed on 13 October 2017. 43 Xinhuanet (2017): “Full Text: List of Deliverables of Belt and Road Forum”: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/15/c_136286376.htm. Accessed on 30 June 2017.

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The BRI and Central Asian Elites: Reinforcing the Mechanisms of Capital Accumulation and the Quest for Regime Preservation

Consistent with the second part of our approach, it is important to understand how the implementation of the BRI, is linked, on the one hand, to the interests of local actors, while reinforcing their mechanisms of capital accumulation, and on the other hand, whether the initiative contributes to consolidate the power of the Central Asian regimes, or on the contrary, whether it has the potential to exacerbate political instability. As Heathershaw, Owen, and Cooley argue, apart from the geopolitical perspective that addresses the issue in Central Asia as the New Great Game, in which powerful states exert their dominance upon the small states of Central Asia, the primary players are non-state actors, such as the capital-owning elites and foreign companies that when converges with local elites, set the terms under which “the game” over the region takes place. In this sense, power should not be understood as a linear relationship between the dominant and the subordinate actor, rather “as produced relationally in specific situations through the practices of ongoing interactions between locally situated actors” (Heathershaw et al. 2019, 2). Thus, as addressed in chapter “Neopatrimonialism, Power and Regimes in Central Asia: A Sociology of Power Analysis” by Izquierdo-Brichs & Serra, when it comes to the elite’s competition over power resources, power is structured in a multidimensional way, in terms of the multiplicity of elites involved and influencing each other on the competition for the differential accumulation of power (Izquierdo-Brichs and Serra Massansalvador 2018). Against this backdrop, the BRI can be seen as the field where this competition takes place, and the network between local and foreign elites; between public and private interests is interwoven. Accordingly, the BRI as a foreign policy initiative denotes how foreign policy is instrumentalized by elites to maintain and accumulate power resources, and in turn, ensure the regime preservation. Given the neopatrimonial and authoritarian character of the political systems in Central Asia, the foreign policy choices made by Central Asian elites not only prioritize regime preservation but also “…their own private enrichment, and must reward their domestic political clients with access to adequate resources and rents” (Cooley 2014, 242). In light of this, Central Asian regimes have agency

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in the implementation of the BRI, therefore, they should not be considered as mere recipients of the initiative since both their execution and success largely depend on the dynamics resulting from the convergence between actors, and on the capacity of Central Asian regimes to direct the Initiative to their owns agendas (e.g., Kazakhstan’s “Bright Road” Initiative as complementary of the BRI). As we can draw from the analysis of the three dimensions of the Chinese engagement with Central Asia, the BRI consolidates China’s existing economic investments and infrastructure projects in Central Asia, while providing a new framework for Central Asian elites to enhance the connections with Chinese companies. As Cooley and Heathershaw state the BRI is “partly an umbrella framework for accommodating the regional agendas of a number of Chinese companies, regions and local actors, many of which lack effective oversight from Beijing and/or pursue their own narrow interests” (Cooley and Heathershaw 2017, 355). Accordingly, Central Asian elites provide external actors with the means to operate within the region under negotiation schemes that, although celebrated within the framework of development and state cooperation, favor private interests. There are some emblematic cases that point in this direction: on the one hand, the acquisition by the CNPC in 2003 of the 25% stake of Kazakhstan’s energy company Aktobe MunaiGas. The Chinese company bought it for US$ 150 million although the value of such shares was announced at US$300 million the day before the deal was signed. Moreover, for this purchase, the CNPC used one of their subsidiaries CNPC International Caspian Limited (CICL), which subsequently sold 49% of its shares to Darley Investment Services, a company owned by Arvind Tiku, an Indian businessman known to be the business partner of Timur Askaruly Kulibayev, the son-in-law of former Kazakh President Nazarbayev.44 On the other hand, some other cases have implied the selection of companies without competitive tenders. For example, the loan granted by the China Exim Bank to the Kyrgyz government in 2013 which was used to refurbish the Bishkek power plant by the Chinese company Tebian Electricity Apparatus (TBEA), and the US$ 300 million granted to the refurbishment of the Dushanbe-Chanak highway in Tajikistan by 44 Chazan, Guy (March 26, 2010) “Kazakh Spat Casts Light on China Deals”, The Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870358090457513161 1702788550. Accessed 22 May 2020).

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the China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) (ICG July 27, 2017, 13). These cases prove how Central Asian elites “create layers of hidden networks and informal arrangements that may actually obscure the exact contracting parties [while] their intermediaries and subcontractors elaborate schemes for allowing external actors to build infrastructure and manage logistics across the region” (Cooley and Heathershaw 2017, 355–360). Furthermore, the BRI allows to reinforce the existing mechanisms of capital accumulation by local actors. Since Central Asian countries possess vast natural resources, specially oil and gas resources, rent-seeking has become a primary and long-standing mechanism for capital accumulation. As Rutland has stated regarding Central Asia: The oil and gas industry had been built up under central planning, with decades of costly investment. The Soviet collapse shattered the planning system which channeled resources into the sector, but left the infrastructure intact- and left a small number of managerial and political elites with the opportunity to divert the proceeds from oil and gas exports without having to worry about ensuring the renewal of the production infrastructure. (Rutland 2000, 167)

In Central Asia countries rent-seeking is anchored to the state control of the energy resources and related industries. From the SoP perspective, the state constitutes itself as a resource of power of the elites in their competition for the differential accumulation of power (IzquierdoBrichs and Etherington 2017). As stated in Chapter “Neopatrimonialism, Power and Regimes in Central Asia: A Sociology of Power Analysis” by Izquierdo-Brichs & Serra rent it is not exclusively linked to the purpose of generating greater accumulation in the form of capital (material wealth) but in the form of state control, as the state is a resource that serves to accumulate more “commodified power.” Against this backdrop, the BRI has the potential to become a new source of rent for Central Asian elites since the initiative represents an unprecedented influx of funding for the countries in the region (Toktomushev 2018). Indeed, a US$ 4 trillion of Chinese investment is planned to be disbursed over the course of the Initiative. Moreover, it is expected that by 2020, the bilateral trade volume between China and the Central Asian countries would increase more than 11% due to the Chinese Official Development Flows (ODF) from the BRI (Lee 2018). Additionally,

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Chinese loans have been growing as a share of external debt in Central Asia. For example, in Tajikistan, Chinese loans constituted in 2016, 88% of the country’s bilateral debt portfolio, and roughly 50% of the country’s total external debt. In Kyrgyzstan, Chinese loans constituted 67.1% of the country’s bilateral debt portfolio and about 40% of the country’s total external debt (Jaborov 2018; Hurley et al. 2018). Although the BRI allows for greater flexibility to benefit from the initiative’s funding, this may, in turn, generate long-term complications in the case of insufficient liquidity of the recipients and taking them to the risk of being in debt distress. The vast influx of money orientated to the execution of BRI projects and the influx coming from different sources of Chinese investment plus the lack of effective accountability mechanisms of both the BRI and Central Asian governments provide the breeding ground for rent-seeking legal and illegal activities such as corruption and bribes. According to Cooley: In states such as Central Asia that are vulnerable to state predation and chronic rent-seeking, the introduction of large-scale infrastructure projects without accompanying oversight, conditions, and the liberalization of transit services may further fuel additional rent-seeking on behalf of predatory elites. In other words, local elites may well use externally financed infrastructure and development projects for their own parochial purposes and in a fashion unintended by the patron. (Cooley 2016, 11)

It is in this context, where the assimilated practices of corruption and bribery within the region find new ground in the BRI and exacerbate the competition over resources between the elites. In light of this, the BRI may lead to divisions among the different Central Asian political clans, promote inter-clan rivalries regarding the access to the BRI’s projects, and in turn, exacerbate political instability (Toktomushev 2018, 80). Moreover, the government opponents usually instrumentalized the relationship and deals celebrated with China against the ruling authorities.45 This, coupled with the discontent among the population due to growing corruption and how Chinese companies operates within the region, has fostered anti-Chinese sentiments among the population and therefore toward local regimes. Consequently, there is a growing lack of 45 See Laruelle and Peyrouse (2009).

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support for Chinese endeavors at the social level in recipient countries due to the nature of Sino-Central Asian relations, which are state-tostate as opposed to people-to-people. It means that while the political elites of the Central Asian countries welcome the capital funding directed through the initiative, Chinese investors are faced with what Peyrouse has come to label “Sinophobia” (Peyrouse 2016). One of the sources of this anti-Chinese sentiment stems from the high flexibility regarding the recruitment of Chinese workers instead of national workers for the projects carried out in Central Asia. Anti-Chinese sentiment was present at several protests and attacks on Chinese companies’ premises in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 2016 and 2019. More recently, in February 2020, a US$ 280 million project in Kyrgyzstan was pulled out after the continuous protest of locals.46 Notwithstanding this, the inflow of BRI resources along with all forms of Chinese investment in the region can be instrumentalized by Central Asian elites to pursue their consolidation of power and maintain the political stability of Central Asian regimes. On the one hand, the BRI serves as a flexible funding source to reduce the region’s funding gap for infrastructure development. Accordingly, the execution of the BRI projects in correspondence with local needs may lead to a supportive stance from the population toward the project, and with it, the social tensions that put the stability of the regime at risk would be alleviated. On the other hand, if the synergy of the BRI with local plans and projects success, it may contribute to keeping the Central Asian regimes in power while their elites’ interests and Beijing’s goals are met.

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Uzbekistan’s Neopatrimonial State and Authoritarian Regime: From Karimov to Mirziyoyev Rubén Ruiz-Ramas and Javier Morales Hernández

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Introduction

After the death in 2016 of the first president of independent Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov—formerly head of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic before the collapse of the USSR—the authoritarian system created and led by him for more than two decades entered an uncertain path. With the election of Shavkat Mirziyoyev, prime minister since 2003, as successor to Karimov, the regime’s continuity seemed guaranteed. A peaceful transfer of power was carried out, proving that previous concerns about possible destabilization due to the succession were unfounded. However, discussions on the future of the Uzbek political regime and the stability of its neopatrimonial state remain open after Mirziyoyev’s first years in office.

R. Ruiz-Ramas (B) UNED, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, Madrid, Spain e-mail: [email protected] J. Morales Hernández Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. Izquierdo-Brichs and F. Serra-Massansalvador (eds.), Political Regimes and Neopatrimonialism in Central Asia, The Steppe and Beyond: Studies on Central Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9093-1_4

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On the one hand, there has been a frantic approval of reforms of apparent political openness, which aim not at a real transition, but rather at the modernization of the previous authoritarianism. On the other, the current president’s consolidation as head of a neopatrimonial state has been carried out through a deep reorganization of informal elite networks in the state apparatus. The dismissal of Rustam Inoyatov as director of the National Security Service (SNB),1 allegedly a key figure in Mirziyoyev’s rise to power, as well as the undisguised expansion of the president’s own network in the state apparatus, verifies the survival of the norms and conflict dynamics of a neopatrimonial state. Although the most prominent feature in any analysis of Uzbek politics and society is the authoritarian character of its government, an understanding exclusively based on the absence of a democratic system would be incomplete and deterministic, assuming a static distribution of power preserved by existing legal norms and political institutions. Both the “transition paradigm” and the authoritarianism–liberal democracy continuum are insufficient to explain the transformations that have been taking place in Central Asia (Carothers 2002; Jones Luong 2002; Kubicek 2010; Cummings 2012; Stewart et al. 2012; Ambrosio 2014). Hence, in recent years there has been a theoretical restructuring, delving into the different subtypes of authoritarianism (Møller and Skaaning 2010; Stykow 2019) and emphasizing the relevance of informal institutions in states classified as neopatrimonial (Hale 2006, 2015, 2018; Ilkhamov 2007; Collins 2006, 2009; Isaacs 2009; Guliyev 2011; Ruiz-Ramas 2013; Cooley and Heathershaw 2017). Consequently, when analysing the heterogeneity of the trajectories of Central Asian regimes—of which only Kyrgyzstan has reached a status of hybrid regime, advancing from authoritarianism—the focus must be on elite competition for the establishment and distribution of state authority; as well as the challenges from the regions to the central government, which continue to be intense. In Central Asia, where state-building has not yet been completed, each country presents its own dynamics and contests in the competition for establishing authority, that is, for the actual exercise of power beyond the policy-making process. The challenge is to understand how, de facto and not only de jure, internal political structures are created and sustained over time through social practices, for which a necessary condition is the distribution of resources 1 Sluzhba Natsionalnoy Bezopasnosti in Russian, while the official Uzbek name is Milliy Xavfsizlik Xizmati (MXX ).

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among different social groups. In order to examine the formation of state authority—especially in a centralized state like Uzbekistan—it is not only necessary to study the functioning of central decision-making structures, but also the implementation of their rules at the local and regional levels of government. By highlighting the importance of informal institutions, this chapter also supports a theoretical shift from the classical paradigms of political regimes and transitions to the less explored framework of state-building (Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong 2002; Ganev 2005; Cummings 2012), focusing on the sources of the heterogeneity of neopatrimonial states. This chapter is focused on analysing the processes and elements that have shaped the particular neopatrimonial and authoritarian nature of the Uzbek state, from its origins and early consolidation under Karimov to the transformations during Mirziyoyev’s presidency. These factors have predominantly developed in the domestic sphere, due to the high degree of autonomy from outside influence of Uzbek authorities and elite networks, compared to other Central Asian cases, such as Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan or Turkmenistan. This tendency may vary in the future, if the development strategy of “openness” started by President Mirziyoyev is finally consolidated.

2 State-Building in Central Asia: An Incomplete Process The first generation of academic studies on post-Soviet Central Asian countries identified five main features in their state-building processes after independence (Cummings 2000; Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong 2002; Ganev 2005; Fritz 2007; Kavalski 2010); although later developments partially questioned some of them. First, a clearly present element is the rulers’ strategy of linking nation-building to statehood itself in order to legitimize their authority. According to Cummings (2012: 111), the leaders of these republics have used five main legitimation techniques to do this: a revision of historiography, visual symbolism, language, the indigenization of power—although ethnicization would be more precise—as well as other forms of association between indigenization and territory. Second, in the first decade of their independence, Central Asian presidents carried out a remarkable concentration of power in their hands: either through constitutional reforms, or by exceeding their own constitutionally defined powers (Hale 2006, 2018; Stykow 2019). As Hale

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(2006: 307–308) has highlighted, the specificity of the post-Soviet institutional framework led to the consolidation of “patrimonial presidencies”, where privatization policies—maintaining a balance between the elites for access to economic resources through the state—and centre-periphery relations—the capacity to exercise authority at the local and regional levels—shaped the nature of these patronage policies. Third, when analysing Central Asian “state capture” we see a weak institutional core which legitimizes itself through the private appropriation of the public sphere, serving “the interests of a few ‘captors’, rather than society as a whole” (Fritz 2007). At the same time, the state lacks the socially embedded autonomy that it needs for its development and institutional efficiency (Evans 1995; Evans and Heller 2013). Furthermore, Ganev (2005) explains that the post-Soviet process has been the reverse of Charles Tilly’s classic explanation of the formation of the modern state: it extracts resources from society, and only in return—somewhat involuntarily—provides services and infrastructure. According to this view, what happened after 1991 in the Central Asian regimes—and other countries of the former USSR, although to a lesser extent—was not so much the construction of a new state, but its exploitation by extractive, predatory elites (Radnitz 2010; Markowitz 2011, 2014, 2017; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). This process was only possible within the framework of a specific institutional context: the sudden disintegration of the central planning system, which allowed the elites of each of the republics that became independent to assume control over their own economic resources. Previously, they had just been administrators on behalf of a higher, central power. This project of the predatory elites initially benefited from very limited social resistance, since resources were drawn from the state itself and not from other groups. However, that changed once the system’s initial transformation was completed. In addition to legal tax collection, businesspeople have been subjected to various corrupt practices by the authorities: from demanding bribes to more aggressive actions, such as raiderstvo 2 or forced and unlawful appropriation of private property (Junisbai 2010). As for workers, there is a profound imbalance between their harsh working conditions and the profit they generate for their 2 Raidertsvo occurs, for example, when people close to government agents receive help from law enforcement agencies to force business owners to sell their assets and property at a price well below market value.

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employers, which not only occurs in the private sector, but also—and this is significant—in state-owned or partially state-owned companies. It is true that there has been increasing social contestation of this predatory behaviour by government officials, a behaviour that is responsible for the existing insecurity in the business world and the deterioration in living conditions. In the Uzbek case, the latter were a key factor in the rise of protests like Andijan in 20053 ; their repression was justified by Karimov himself, equating the riots to “colour revolutions” in neighbouring countries (McGlinchey 2011: 122), such as that in Kyrgyzstan that same year (Radnitz 2010; Ruiz-Ramas 2013; De Andrés and Ruiz-Ramas 2016). Fourth, the competition for policy-making authority in Central Asia has involved not only conflict between different elite groups, but also between the central and regional levels of government, without the participation of non-state actors (Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong 2002; Ganev 2005). However, today this competition has become more plural by incorporating new, non-state actors: an autonomous business elite, the result of liberalizing economic measures, and several criminal networks that control illegal trafficking, whose political influence has also been increasing. Final, the decline of the state’s “infrastructural power” (Mann 1986)4 after independence affected not only functional competencies, but also the capacity of the central authority to prevent “authority migration” to regional entities (Libman 2012). For all these reasons, approaches such as that of Migdal et al. (1994) fit perfectly into the Central Asian

3 After the imprisonment of 23 businessmen, for whom a significant part of the local population worked, hundreds of protesters—who attempted an armed assault of the prison—were violently dispersed by the security forces; which ended with 187 dead, according to the authorities. However, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE-ODIHR 2005‚ 2006) raised the number of deaths to between 300 and 500, while the International Crisis Group (2005) placed it at 750. According to other sources, the figure may be even higher. A deserter from the Uzbek SNB, Ikrom Yakubov, stated it was 1,500 (Donovan 2008). Anonymous police officers assured the Institute for War and Peace Reporting that, counting the repression of the following days, the figure could be as high as 4,500 (Uzmanova 2005). 4 State-building is the process by which “the authority to create a structural framework

of rules through which collectively binding decisions are made and enforced” is established (Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong 2002: 531). This definition, which emphasizes state authority and the ability to enforce laws, updates Mann’s (1986) influential work, in which the state’s despotic power, based on controlling decision-making, is distinguished from its infrastructural power, based on its power of implementation.

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context, where the state is not a unitary actor and therefore needs to be disaggregated (Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong 2002).

3 The Central Asian Model of the Neopatrimonial State The governance model of the Central Asian republics during the Soviet period has been described as “patrimonial communism” (Kitschelt et al. 1999: 39): a form of rule based on personal networks of loyalties and mutual exchange, as well as patronage, corruption and nepotism in the selection of elites. After the end of the USSR, the concept of neopatrimonialism—designed to study developing countries where authoritarian systems have been consolidated after decolonization—helps us understand the evolution of the five now independent Central Asian republics; and in the case at hand, how the regime created by Karimov has managed to survive for almost three decades. A neopatrimonial state is one where formal-bureaucratic and informalpatrimonial logics coexist and interact with each other. The concept, which originates from Weber’s distinction of different types of authority— traditional, charismatic, and bureaucratic or legal-rational—was developed in its current form by researchers examining the newly independent African states (Eisenstadt 1978; Snyder 1992; Médard 1982; Bratton and Van de Walle 1997; Erdmann and Engel 2007; Erdmann 2012). When speaking of neopatrimonialism, we do not refer to a specific type of political regime, but to a set of institutionalized practices among state agents and institutions, which cannot be easily eliminated or challenged by new actors since they are historically rooted (Von Soest 2010: 5–7). These practices can be related to political factors—strong governments with highly concentrated decision-making, clientelism, patronage, institutional uncertainty, nepotistic recruitment, loyalty to superiors—as well as economic ones—corruption, illegal appropriation of private or state assets and rent-seeking—developed both in government and other state agencies. There are four primary informal institutions of a neopatrimonial state: a personalist regime with an informal concentration of power, private appropriation of the public arena, systemic clientelism and the use of state resources for the political legitimation of individuals (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997: 63–68). However, there are other fundamental features. First, the persistence of neopatrimonialism in a specific state depends on

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a constant interaction between formal and informal political institutions that can only be achieved through institutional uncertainty, which allows formal institutions to be shaped—for example, the regulation and supervision of electoral processes or the market economy—to serve the interests of the authorities or specific individuals (Ruiz-Ramas 2013). This uncertainty also contributes to reinforcing clientelist ties with the ruling elite, since economic and social actors understand that they need the authorities’ patronage to provide certain predictability to activities under state regulation (Timm 2010: 2). In a neopatrimonial state, political power is concentrated in a small group; there is a “cult of personality” around the leader and there are no formal mechanisms that prevent politicians from transferring their positions to those whom they choose (Ruiz-Ramas 2010: 16–18). However, unlike classical patrimonialism, the regime is not only legitimized through personalistic leadership derived from patriarchal values, where positions are inherited rather than attained through institutional mechanisms. Informal and traditional legitimation is combined with rational mechanisms that provide stability in the exercise of power: especially, established patronage relationships, in which the patron buys the political loyalty of his clients, protecting their private interests in the framework of a market economy. However, the high degree of intervention in all areas of leaders such as Karimov makes informal legitimation always more important than legal-rational legitimation: both formal institutions and the legal system and those “business” exchanges between patron and client are subject to arbitrary decisions by the president (Ilkhamov 2007: 66, 2010). Secondly, the neopatrimonial state is vulnerable to informal fragmentation of political power, and seldom—despite personalism being one of its central characteristics—functions as a cohesive vertical system. On the contrary, the central government needs the loyalty and collaboration of local power brokers, with conflicts, demands, negotiations and compromises occurring in the shadows marking their everyday relations. As a result, regional implementation of policies approved by the national government is frequently beyond centralized control. In fact, “the central challenge for neopatrimonial authority is to prevent an uncontrolled decentralisation of power structures” (Timm 2010: 6). Thirdly, politics in these countries is a flexible arena, where programmatic elements of cleavages are easily replaceable, and today’s irreconcilable enemies may tomorrow share coalitions in power. This situation is

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favoured by the key role of informal networks as a vehicle for collective action, as important as political parties—or more so. Finally, variation in informal institutions is not the only way to assess the heterogeneity of neopatrimonial trajectories. Most typologies combine the structure of state authority—from legal-bureaucratic rationality to patrimonial domination—with the regime’s degree of political competition (Fisun 2007; Guliyev 2011).5 Some authors, such as Erdmann and Engel (2007: 113) and Von Soest (2010), differentiate within the axis of political domination—from rational/legal to patrimonial—between government structures and administrative or bureaucratic ones, maintaining the authoritarian–liberal democracy continuum. Thus, while the first axis basically discriminates between competitive, semicompetitive and non-competitive regimes,6 the second axis represents a step forward in the elaboration of a typology of neopatrimonialism by adding concentration of power in government and degree of separation of the rulers from legal means of government (Fisun 2007). Any ruler who aspires to stability tries to balance the interests of the most influential actors, whether they are allies or not: every process of concentration of power also involves a distribution of power. This task, linked to the concentration of power, can be carried out in at least two possible dimensions, on the one hand, in the degree of inclusivity of central government institutions in relation to the accommodation of the interests of informal networks or other political actors (Ilkhamov 2007; Ruiz-Ramas 2013). Von Soest (2010) and Fisun (2007) place the possible cases of this trait into two categories: a personalist or an oligarchic regime. On the other hand, we must distinguish between a dispersed clientelism— prebendalism or “decentralized patrimonial regime” (Lewis 1996)—and a more centralized type (Guliyev 2011: 586).

5 Fisun (2007) relies on the theory of sultanism by Chehabi and Linz (1998) to distinguish between sultanistic, oligarchic and bureaucratic neopatrimonialism. However, Guliyev (2011) proposes a typology of structures of state authority—personalist regime, institutional patronage and legal-bureaucratic regime—that is terminologically more flexible. Furthermore, it is especially appropriate when analysing Central Asian states that, like the case of Kyrgyzstan, are difficult to label as sultanistic or oligarchic, but nevertheless fit into the category of institutional patronage. 6 Most political scientists consider that neopatrimonialism can exist under authoritarian or hybrid regimes, but not in liberal democracies. However, there are some exceptions, such as Pitcher et al. (2009).

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Therefore, we identify two variables—concentration of power in the ruler and centralization of patronage—that are very useful as a starting point for studying the distribution of power in a neopatrimonial state like Uzbekistan. However, these variables belong to broader units of analysis—such as the creation of state authority and the territorial distribution of power—that need to be complemented by other concepts related to state-building and institutionalization. In order to explain the distribution of power in Central Asia, part of the analysis must examine those impasses in the application of central authority that cause an informal “migration of authority” to local agents and institutions.

4 Uzbekistan as an Authoritarian Regime and Neopatrimonial State The Uzbek political regime had—and still does under Mirziyoyev— the second-highest level of authoritarianism in post-Soviet Central Asia, along with Tajikistan in recent years; with Turkmenistan being the most authoritarian of all five Central Asian states (Economist Intelligence Unit 2020). Its leaders have implemented harsh measures to neutralize the Western strategy of “democracy promotion”, as well as to maintain their autonomy in the face of Russia-led regional integration projects (Gallo 2020). However, although the government’s central authority has not been challenged by an opposition movement with the capacity to take power in the whole territory, Uzbekistan is a state with deep regional fractures, both in political terms, with a significant presence of political Islam in the Fergana Valley, and, above all, due to the importance of regional patronage networks. The Uzbek state is thus characterized by two contradictory elements. On the one hand, it has a highly centralized executive branch and strong security forces, which have already fought challenges to the state monopoly on violence and attempts to consolidate territorial fragmentation: for example, Namangan in 1991–1992, the actions of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), or the Andijan revolt in 2005. But on the other, it also has a weak infrastructural power, which has favoured a gradual informal devolution to local actors in certain regions.

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4.1

Karimov’s Rise to Power

The political system, both formally and informally, revolved around the person of Islam Karimov from independence in 1991 until his death in 2016. A personalist regime was built throughout his tenure, in which power relations were strongly consolidated, giving rise to full authoritarianism. To understand the place that the presidency occupies as a political institution, strongly conditioned by Karimov’s legacy, we will now briefly explain his rise to power in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, a trajectory that exemplifies the culture of competition and negotiation between informal elite networks, predominant in Uzbekistan to this day (Melvin 2000; Aydın 2004; Tunçer-Kilavuz 2014; Ambrosio 2015; Hale 2018). Karimov was a typical apparatchik who started his political career thanks to a combination of professional merit, luck and contacts. After studying engineering and economics, he worked in a sovkhoz or collective farm, and later in an airplane factory. Once he was admitted as a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), he joined the State Planning Committee (Gosplan), the organization in charge of the fiveyear plans, where he would become one of the highest-ranking officials. In 1983, the suicide of Sharof Rashidov—first secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan (CPU), the CPSU branch in the republic—upon the discovery that he had been providing false cotton production figures to Moscow, led to a purge among Uzbek Communist leaders. Karimov was one of the political survivors of that crisis, and thanks to his good relations with the new first secretary, Inomjon Usmonxo‘jayev, he would be successively appointed minister of Finance, deputy prime minister and president of the republic’s Gosplan. Furthermore, he would become a member of the CPSU Central Committee (Aydın 2004). When Usmonxo‘jayev was replaced by Rafiq Nishonov, his career appeared to have ended: Karimov fell out of favour and was sent as the Party’s regional secretary to Kashkadaria province. But when Nishonov was himself fired for failing to control interethnic tensions in the Fergana Valley in 1989, Karimov unexpectedly became the CPU first secretary. The reason for this was neither his personal ability nor his influence in Tashkent, but rather a favourable combination of circumstances. Firstly, other candidates had been ruled out by Moscow for being too close to the previous leader. Secondly, various regional elites ended up supporting Karimov’s appointment, thinking that he could be easily manipulated, which would later be proven wrong. On the whole, they saw Karimov

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as a technocrat lacking the support of a strong patronage network, and therefore unable to concentrate excessive power, as well as an Uzbek— not Russian—apparatchik who would protect the interests of Uzbek networks against Moscow’s interventionism (Collins 2006, 2009; Hamm 2007; Ilkhamov 2007). During this stage, Karimov answered to regional elite networks as they expected, knowing that his Samarkand clan was too weak to face the challenge of other clans joining forces against it. After taking office, he divided power more evenly between Samarkand, Tashkent and Fergana to reflect that he had obtained his position as a result of consensus between their respective elites. Karimov balanced their interests by bargaining and co-optation, not resorting to repression until he had begun to consolidate his power in 1992 (Tunçer-Kilavuz 2014: 58, 98). In that process, two individuals played a central role: Ismail Dzhurabekov, Minister of Water Management and leader of the “clan” or informal elite network of Samarkand, and Shukrullo Mirsaidov, mayor of the capital, Tashkent, and leader of the “clan” in his region. They both thought they could guide—when not directly control—Karimov’s actions once he was elevated to the post of first secretary. Initially, the new leader rewarded Dzhurabekov and Mirsaidov by appointing them deputy prime minister and prime minister, respectively. However, when Karimov understood their real expectations, he acted quickly to guarantee his future autonomy, liquidating their direct formal influence7 and initiating the building of a neopatrimonial system, supported by a personalist central government rather than a mere regional balance. Karimov became a member of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR, as well as of the Politburo. After a failed coup in August 1991, although he seemed to sympathize with the move, his reaction was also determined by the power struggle in Tashkent: one of his rivals had taken advantage of Karimov’s absence—on an official visit to India—to declare a state of emergency in support of the rebels, a measure that they probably hoped to use against Karimov himself. However, he managed to return to Tashkent and declared his opposition to the coup, which would end up reinforcing his position after the failure of the attempt. Finally, anticipating the imminent collapse of the Soviet system, Karimov left the Communist Party and declared the independence of the new Republic of 7 Dzhurabekov, however, held a position as an adviser to Karimov until 2004, when he was dismissed on charges of membership in a criminal organization.

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Uzbekistan, which would later join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) established by Russia, Ukraine and Belarus (Ortiz de Zárate 2016). 4.2

Consolidation of the Political System After Independence

The process of power centralization led by Karimov after the breakup of the USSR was based, first of all, on strengthening the position of the presidency in the hierarchy of neopatrimonialism by centralizing decisionmaking power and access to economic resources in sectors vulnerable to income extraction. In addition, centralization also involved the strengthening and direct control of the security organs, in order to suppress any potential challenge to presidential authority (Ilkhamov 2007: 75–77; Markowitz 2013, 2014). Karimov also maintained the structure of the CPU as its power base, simply changing its name to the People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (PDPU); the bulk of local and regional leaders remained in their positions, now as PDPU members. In 1996, Karimov himself ceased to be a member of the PDPU, arguing that as head of state he should remain neutral. This allowed, in some cases, for an “alternative” candidate from the PDPU to stand for election as Karimov’s only competitor. This was the case in the 2000 presidential elections, in which Karimov— formally without party affiliation—was re-elected with 91.9% of the votes, compared to 4.1% for the PDPU candidate, Abdulaziz Dzhalalov, who then declared publicly that he had voted for Karimov (Melvin 2000: 33; Djalili and Kellner 2005: 49). The new regime adopted a secular model similar to Turkey to counter any Islamist-oriented political opposition, whether peaceful or not. However, some religious elements—referred to as “our Islam” and in opposition to radical ideas supposedly imported from abroad—were incorporated into the official “Ideology of National Independence”. For example, Karimov encouraged the construction of mosques, reestablished Islamic holidays and displayed his beliefs as a Muslim by performing the hajj or pilgrimage to Mecca, in addition to swearing his position on the Koran alongside of the Constitution. Historical leaders such as Timur (Tamerlane), statues of whom have proliferated throughout the country—replacing in some cases others of communist leaders—have become cult figures to legitimize the regime and provide continuity with

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the past, as founding myths of the Uzbek nation (Melvin 2000: 45–46; Aydın 2004; Olcott 2012). In accordance with the 1992 Constitution, in force until today, the president is both head of state and head of government; he presides over the Council of Ministers and appoints the prime minister and other members of the cabinet. The principle of separation of powers was undermined by allowing presidential decrees to replace parliamentary legislation, as well as by giving the Presidential Administration the power to designate the main executive positions, both centrally and regionally. However, despite the fact that this centralization was implemented during the 1990s, the Supreme Assembly (Oliy Majlis) has kept certain exclusive powers. Regional elites also disputed Karimov’s plans for deterritorialization and control of the distribution of seats in parliament. In 1993, the new electoral law gave local legislatures the power to designate nominees for the Oliy Majlis, then a unicameral parliament. In many cases, the hokims —regional or local governors—were proposed as candidates, forming a block of hokims that won a majority of seats, 167 out of 250, in the first parliamentary elections in 1994. Together, the hokims —who were directly linked to the PDPU—came to hold 94% of the seats. Karimov then attempted to curb the regional elites’ and the PDPU’s own autonomy by promoting the creation of several progovernment parties: the Adolat or Social Democratic Party, the Milliy Tiklanish or Democratic Party and the Fidokorlar or National Democratic Party. The latter was Karimov’s main project to consolidate an absolutely loyal “party of power”, thereby abolishing regional control of the Oliy Majlis. However, in the 1999 parliamentary elections, Fidokorlar only won 34 seats, while the block of hokims won 110; together with the PDPU, this represented 63% of the seats (Ilkhamov 2004: 170–171). After the failure of the Fidokorlar project, Karimov proposed the creation of a bicameral Oliy Majlis, with a 120-member Legislative Chamber or lower house—150 after a new reform in 2008—composed of representatives of political parties and independent candidates, and an upper chamber, the Supreme Council (Oliy Kengash), with 100 members—now called the Senate (Senat)—with 84 of its members elected among municipal, district and regional deputies, and 16 by presidential appointment. This seemingly power-sharing reform helped stabilize Karimov’s position while ensuring representation of regional elites in the national Parliament, ensuring their loyalty and reducing the risk of impeachment (Ilkhamov 2004: 181).

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In the following parliamentary elections, pro-government parties occupied all the seats, since the opposition groups or candidates were prevented from taking part. None of the five parties represented today in the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis question the authoritarian regime: in fact, during the campaign for the last presidential elections disputed by Karimov, the other candidates declared that the president was more suitable than them (OSCE-ODIHR 2015). The existence of these organizations is merely a strategy by the authorities to try to resemble a parliamentary democracy. As part of this fictitious pluralism, the PDPU—on which Karimov initially relied after independence—has become the third party by number of seats. First place in the last elections with Karimov was occupied by the O’zlidep or Movement of Entrepreneurs and Businesspeople—the Liberal Democratic Party of Uzbekistan, a new ruling party launched in 2003, which Karimov used to stand for election in 2007 and 2015. The other legally accepted political parties are the Milliy Tiklanish or Democratic Party of Uzbekistan—National Renaissance, the Adolat or Social Democratic Party of Uzbekistan—Justice, and the Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan, all of which also have deputies in the Legislative Chamber (Saidazimova 2007; OSCE-ODIHR 2015). However, as we have stressed, the parliament has little power in political decision-making and resource allocation. Therefore, the main informal elite networks in the central institutions are in the Presidential Administration and ministerial departments.

5

Territorial Power and Informal Agreements Between Central and Regional Elites

In the Karimov era, the formal centralization of the Soviet period was maintained and even reinforced (Djalili and Kellner 2005: 38). A verticality was established at all levels: from traditional local institutions, such as the mahalla or neighbourhoods, to the twelve viloyat or regions in which the country is divided, whose governors (hokim) are appointed by the president. The regime has worked to prevent the emergence of opposition groups defined by ethnic or religious identities: for example, the Tajik minority in the Samarkand or Bukhara regions, or the Islamic movements in the Fergana valley. The Uzbek state exercises a monopoly on violence throughout the territory, although its coercive capacity has been tested several times since independence. In particular, two events

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should be mentioned: the riots in Namangan, a city in the Fergana region, from November 1991 to March 1992 (McGlinchey 2011: 119–121), and the mentioned Andijan uprising in May 2005 (Markowitz 2017). Two of the leaders of the Muslim secessionist movement in Namangan—known as Yuma Namangani—Tohir Yo’ldosh and Jumaboi Khodjiyev, left the country after being subject to retaliation, later returning as IMU leaders. IMU activities include the deadly attacks in Tashkent in 1999 and 2004, and clashes with border guards and Uzbek and Kyrgyz soldiers in the summers of 1999 and 2000. The debate over whether the radicalization of Islamic militants can be understood as a response to Karimov’s continuing repression of any Islamic movement still continues. In any case, IMU actions have been used by Uzbek authorities to justify repression against Muslim social leaders, which has led to a dramatic increase in the number of militants across the country. Regarding formal decentralization, within the Uzbek state there is the Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan, which is formally a sovereign republic: the Constitution recognizes their right to secession, and they can exercise a veto power over decisions by the central government that concern them. In reality, this wide but sparsely populated region is so poor and dependent on the state budget that such autonomy cannot be fully implemented. In the medium term, Karakalpakstan’s estimated hydrocarbon reserves, among the largest in the country, may be a source of conflict with central authorities if they do not fairly share the profit with the autonomous republic. However, this formal authority has been limited by the inability of government structures to implement the decisions of the central power, which has allowed an informal decentralization of power towards local actors in the regions. To secure the loyalty of regional elites, Karimov had to establish informal agreements that provided them with the necessary autonomy to create lasting patronage networks. Thus, the neopatrimonial state consolidated under his rule combined a strong concentration of political and economic power in the president’s family with multiple scenarios of competition for authority, in which regional elites ended up strengthening their own position. Examples of this have been competition over the composition of parliament (Ilkhamov 2004) and over appointments of regional executives (Markowitz 2012). For some time, Karimov fought regional challenges by carrying out a recentralization process in which he tried to weaken the regional governors: rotating them from their posts every few years—which prevented them from developing their own

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support base—using newly arrived leaders to launch “anti-corruption” campaigns against local officials, or concentrating export products, such as cotton, in the hands of the national government rather than the regions (Ilkhamov 2007, 76–77; Markowitz 2014). Despite these efforts, informal decentralization has established itself as an institutional feature in Uzbekistan. On the one hand, it reveals the limited capacity of the state to implement the decisions of the centre and carry out the most basic state functions in the regions. This gives rise to the emergence of local actors that replace the state as providers of solutions to conflicts and basic social services, and who ultimately strive to position themselves as sources of authority (McGlinchey 2011; Markowitz 2011, 2014). On the other hand, three scenarios must be highlighted where a battle for authority has taken place between the central government and local and regional political elites. First, in the regionalization of the central institutions that we have already addressed: the power to designate and distribute positions in the Presidential Administration, the cabinet of ministers and legislative institutions. Second, in the competition over the appointments of local and regional executives, who in turn control the access points to income in a state subject to systemic clientelism—licences, contracts, sale of public positions—permitting them to create their own patronage networks. The president has absolute control over territorial executive appointments; during the Karimov era, tactics such as the constant replacement of regional and district hokims, as well as the purging of regional hokims, were used in order to prevent the strengthening of local patronage networks (Ilkhamov 2004; Radnitz 2010). However, other studies (Markowitz 2012: 391–399) reveal examples with a solid empirical base of resistance to the centre’s attempts to eliminate the regionalization of the cadres; that is, the centre has been forced to recognize the authority of informal regional networks. After a decade of struggles over the designations of the regional elite—which revealed the limits of presidential power—Karimov chose to return to a more conventional neopatrimonialism: granting greater autonomy to regional elites in their respective decision-making areas, in exchange for their loyalty. Lastly, the third arena of competition between the central executive and regional elites has been over jurisdiction and control of income from cotton and other types of agriculture, especially export-oriented production. The regime’s decision to centralize control of land distribution and cotton harvesting—as well as other products that generate

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export revenues—has had three important consequences. First, being a rural economy, the formal centralization of how rents are channelled and distributed has constrained political elite defection to openly challenge the presidency (Markowitz 2016: 519). However, dissatisfaction has manifested in resistance from regional elites, who have sought alternative sources of income. Among other practices, they have channelled production towards the black market, something that already happened in the Soviet period. Regional elites have also benefited from the use of land for other sectors oriented towards the domestic market: livestock and the production of fruits and vegetables. Initially, the response of the central government was to impose periodic punishments and purges of cadres (Ilkhamov 2004: 167–170). However, in the last decade, this conflictive relationship has been softened, mutual recognition of the “spheres of enrichment” between central and regional elites having been achieved. Finally, the central authorities have tried to use the prosecution service, police and security services—particularly the SNB—to subdue regional administrations. According to Markowitz (2013), a complex intersection of corruption and coercion braces Uzbekistan’s state infrastructure. His explanation connects unlootable resources and rent-seeking with unruly elites. During the 1990s, Uzbekistan’s state security apparatus, with a growing dominant role of the SNB, centralized its personnel system and extended its reach into municipalities and regions. Security and law enforcement agencies were entrusted with promoting social order and economic development, goals that allowed them to link coercion and rent-seeking activities. As local elites commanded economies defined by immobile capital—such as cotton—that cannot be delivered to the market without state patronage and involvement, they tried to find political patrons. Over the years, there were two unintended consequences for the centre, and particularly for Karimov’s presidency. On the one hand, territorial elites enjoyed a stronger coercive apparatus as well as access to new rent-seeking forms, growing their autonomous power. On the other hand, “the center became increasingly dependent upon the state’s coercive apparatus—ultimately fusing coercion and rent-seeking by empowering state security organs that were already enmeshed in rent-seeking relationships with local and regional elites” (Markowitz 2014: 71).

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6

The so-called Clans as Informal Networks in Uzbekistan

As we have pointed out when analysing the characteristics of a neopatrimonial regime, informal networks function as de facto substitutes for democratic institutions, such as parliamentarism and multiparty systems, which formally exist but are deprived of any relevant role. The “clans” act in an oligopolistic market for the exchange of resources and services as true “extractive elites” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012), within an organized system to exploit the state and national economy for private benefit. Power relations within elite networks are “circular”, in a continuous cycle of insecurity, and in a search for influence and “differential accumulation of power” through which to guarantee their security against other groups. When central authority is weakened—for example, in a context of succession to the presidency—the clans may use this opportunity to increase their influence against other actors, intensifying their differential accumulation of power (Izquierdo Brichs and Lampridi-Kemou 2013: 8; Izquierdo Brichs and Etherington 2017). In the case of Uzbekistan, the existing clans were initially defined by a shared regional origin, something that traditionally influenced the distribution of government posts, with officials trying to recruit people from their own region. The most influential networks in this regard are those of Samarkand and Tashkent, and to a lesser degree that of Fergana (TunçerKılavuz 2009: 327–328). As we have seen, membership in a particular clan was a relevant factor in Karimov’s appointment as leader of the Uzbek branch of the CPSU. The former first secretary, Rashidov, belonged to the Samarkand clan; after his death, the new clan leader, Dzhurabekov, had to find a successor to take over the leadership of the party, since Moscow was suspicious of him because they considered him excessively powerful. Thus, Karimov—a native of Samarkand, but without excessive influence—was also accepted by the groups from Tashkent and Fergana, who did not perceive him as a threat. Today, the clans are no longer fixed categories: geographical origin does not structure cooperation networks, and an official’s behaviour cannot be predicted solely on the regional factor. On the contrary, there may be different clans in the same region or even in the same city, understanding them as broad groups of influential people who compete with each other. Karimov himself—as Nursultan Nazarbayev would also do in

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Kazakhstan—tried to eliminate regional identification as the main feature of elite coordination and recruitment at the central level of institutions. 6.1

The Transformation of the Concept of “Clan”

The concept of “clan” in Central Asia has been the subject of intense debate. Although it can be affirmed that the current consensus among specialists reflects a clear evolution of its meaning, this change is not always present in published analyses of the region. Four concepts stand out in Central Asian area studies: the tribal clan as a subnational identity (Schatz 2004; Collins 2006, 2009; Vaisman 1995); the informal network as a regional elite association (Jones Luong 2002; Ilkhamov 2007); the informal network as a personal and local entity, not a regional one, in countries like Kyrgyzstan (Radnitz 2005, 2006, 2010; Sjöberg 2011; Ruiz-Ramas 2013); and finally, for cases such as Russia, Ukraine or Kazakhstan, the financial-industrial groups (finansovo-promyshlennye gruppy, FPG): global elite economic networks that control financial, industrial and energy corporations, in addition to significant political power (Cummings 2005; Balmaceda 2008; Ostrowski 2009; Junisbai 2010; Kononenko and Moshes 2011). In the context of Central Asia, the characteristics of the predominant networks vary from one country to another, as there are different economic, political and social conditions. However, the most recent studies reject that the traditional tribal clans still maintain their influence in the political sphere. Thus, belonging to the same ethnic group and/or a common regional origin are no longer necessary to determine membership in them (Ruiz-Ramas 2010, 2013). In those Central Asian countries that were previously nomadic societies—such as Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan or Kazakhstan—one can still speak of a conception of a clan structure beyond the family nucleus. In contrast, in a sedentary society like Uzbekistan, only a few tribes still maintain that type of identity; while the majority of the population does not have—nor does it remember having had in the past—any tribal affiliation. With regard to members of “political” clans, it is very rare that they openly associate with such tribal groups, or even acknowledge their existence (Tunçer-Kılavuz 2009: 324; Ilkhamov 2007: 68–70). In choosing who to cooperate with, political and economic interests are now more decisive in societies like Uzbekistan than traditional ties. Clans with relevance in the highest echelons of power may include

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both politicians from the old Soviet nomenklatura and the new class of entrepreneurs, who inevitably need a network of contacts in the state bureaucracy to succeed in their businesses. Access to these groups is more flexible and informal than other types of groups determined by birth, to which one belongs for life. Therefore, we must conceptualize the clan as a type of collective identity based on personal relationships with a common purpose, sustained over time by a desire for long-term cooperation for mutual benefit, although there may also be relationships of kinship or regional origin that further strengthen these ties. We must thus question the orientalist conception sometimes applied to Central Asia and other post-Soviet regimes that characterizes them as quasi-premodern societies, in which factors such as ethnicity or “traditional customs”, supposedly incompatible with liberal democracy, would explain the persistence of authoritarianism. It is not ethnic factors, but economic rationality and competition for political influence—combined with the weakness of formal institutions and the use of direct political repression—that explain the survival of these networks in a neopatrimonial state. The Uzbek clans are now clientelistic cliques fed more by money and the exchange of favours than by ancestral blood ties, although there are still analyses that erroneously try to fit the entire Uzbek society into a strict division by tribal clans. They are structured by personal and professional connections, rather than by kinship or regional identity; in addition, they tend to be flexible in composition, of temporary duration, and do not constitute corporate groups (Ilkhamov 2007, 2010; Tunçer-Kılavuz 2011, 2014; Radnitz 2010; Cummings 2012; Laruelle 2012; Ruiz-Ramas 2013). Organized in a strict hierarchy, these clans compete for limited resources, but are able to coordinate collective actions in temporary coalitions. In fact, networks of different nature can coexist and collaborate in the same country, such as elite cliques that operate only in the highest echelons of political power, together with local or regional networks, capable of mobilizing districts and acting as power brokers in favour of an influential option at the central level. As for relations with foreign elites, unlike the Kyrgyz, Tajik or Turkmen cases, the Uzbek elite networks have been able to maintain a high degree of autonomy. The Karimov regime’s strategy for relations with Russia or other powers contributed to this, regardless of whether it led to their own isolation, an approach, however, that as discussed later is being reviewed by Mirziyoyev.

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Main Elite Informal Networks in Uzbekistan Under Karimov

6.2.1 Karimov’s Megaclan In Karimov’s era, the so-called megaclan emerged: the president’s own family network, in which his eldest daughter, Gulnara Karimova, played a leading role in the accumulation of assets for years, as well as in the connection of Uzbek domestic monopolies with global markets, in sectors such as telecommunications or mining for precious metals. Karimova was one of the most prominent figures in the Uzbek political and economic elite, controlling some of the country’s leading companies, which caused the resentment of those who were displaced from the ruling oligarchy. Cooley and Sharman (2015) have identified the Karimov family as the main transnational corruption network in the country, having made a fortune on a range of government-related businesses. In 2010 in Der Spiegel, they estimated Karimova’s personal fortune alone at 570 million US dollars. However, a scandal regarding payments to her by the Swedish telecom company TeliaSonera provoked her fall from grace in 2014. She herself announced on Twitter that she was under house arrest, blaming the security services for it. At the same time, two people close to her— one of them allegedly her romantic partner—were sentenced to prison for counterfeiting and money laundering (RFE/RL 2006, 2014c). The megaclan, and especially Karimova, had close business relations with certain corporations, for example, those owned by Mirabror Usmanov—influential Senate member, president of the National Olympic Committee of Uzbekistan, and from 1994 to 2005, Deputy Prime Minister, who oversaw consumer goods, restaurants and trade activities, including international trade—Gafur Rakhimov, important entrepreneur in sectors such as transport, textiles and, according to the US Treasury Department, drug trafficking,8 and lastly, Salim Abduvaliyev, specialized

8 According to the US Treasury Department, Rakhimov acts on behalf of the Bratski Krug (Circle of Brothers), the largest criminal and drug trafficking organization in Eurasia; he is especially associated with heroin trafficking. Apart from other legal business activities, he also chairs the Asian Boxing Confederation and was president of the International Boxing Association (AIBA) until his resignation in 2019, forced by pressure from the International Olympic Committee. He declared that he has “never been involved in transnational criminal organisations or whatever has been said about me”, and argues that he was framed by his political enemies in Uzbekistan, who “provided all the false allegations about me to the US Department of the Treasury” (US Department of Treasury 2012; Iveson 2020; France 24 2018).

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in international trade in metals, as well as illegal trafficking.9 Together with Rakhimov and the Aziz brothers, he is considered an avtoritet, that is, one of the people with the most informal influence in the country (Lewis 2008: 30; Ilkhamov 2007: 75–78; Libman 2009). In addition, Deputy Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov was dismissed in 2012 when the General Prosecutor accused him of colluding with Gulnara Karimova in her telecommunication’s dark businesses. He was rehabilitated by Mirziyoyev in 2016 when he was confirmed as new prime minister. 6.2.2 Samarkand Clan The faction of the Uzbek elites that takes its name from the city of Samarkand has counted among its members the two successive presidents of the country, although Karimov stopped identifying with this group a few years after independence. Its former leader was former minister Ismail Dzhurabekov, who played a decisive role in Karimov’s coming to power. Aside from former Prime Minister and current President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, other members have included the Minister of Economy from 2011 to 2017, Galina Saidova, and former Interior Ministers, Zokir Almatov10 and Bakhodir Matlyubov. This clan has been primarily associated with the Ministry of the Interior and with control of the cotton industry. 6.2.3 Tashkent Clan This group, identified with the country’s capital, has had Rustam Inoyatov, director of the SNB—the security service that replaced the KGB in Uzbek territory—and Rustam Azimov, First Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister, as its most relevant leaders. Other people related to them have been Karimov’s youngest daughter and current Uzbekistan representative to UNESCO, Lola Karimova, as well as Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov, Defense Minister Kabul Berdiev, and Justice Minister—later, President of the Senate—Nigmatilla Yuldashev. Within the state administration, the SNB has been its main centre of influence. 9 In a telegram published by Wikileaks (2011), originally from 2006, the former US ambassador in Uzbekistan, Jon Purnell described Abduvaliyev as one of the “heads of the criminal world” in the country, so close to the ruling elite that he could trade with the appointments of senior officials, and even decide on some ministerial posts. 10 After the 2005 Andijan events, Almatov was dismissed from his post. In December 2016, he became the Chairman of the State Anti-Corruption Commission of Uzbekistan. On 27 February 2018, he was appointed as special adviser to the Interior Minister of Uzbekistan (TsentrAzia 2018).

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Inoyatov, who has headed the SNB since 1995, has been accused of being responsible for the arrest of Gulnara Karimova, as well as persecuting businesspeople connected to her, some of whom have had to leave the country. The perception in the last stage of Karimov’s life was that Inoyatov had accumulated too much power, weakening the authority of the president himself and confronting other clans. Karimov reacted with a purge of the SNB in which forty of its officers were dismissed (RFE/RL 2014b). Despite this, many pundits listed Inoyatov as the most likely kingmaker after Karimov’s death (Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service 2015). 6.2.4 Fergana Clan The group associated with the Fergana region has had businessmen like Gafur Rakhimov or Salim Abduvaliyev as leaders, both of whom fled abroad at different times, after being harassed by the other two main clans. It has also included relatives of the two consecutive presidents of the country, such as the sister of Karimov’s wife, her son, and Mirziyoyev’s son-in-law. As we have pointed out, although Karimova does not belong to the Fergana clan, she has maintained business relationships with them. In addition, it was her only possible support, since she was a rival to the Samarkand clan and especially to the Tashkent clan, with which her sister and mother were linked. The arrest of Karimova by the SNB may have been part of a broader campaign against the Fergana clan launched by the security services, which were trying to consolidate their power by taking advantage of the weakness of the regime due to the proximity of Karimov’s death. However, other analysts considered it a manoeuvrer by the president himself in preparation for the succession, in which he intended to obtain support for the new president at the cost of punishing his own daughter, one of the most hated figures in the country (Sadykov 2013). 6.3

Informal Networks and Inter-Elite Conflicts

During his presidency, Karimov used competition between the other informal networks for his own purposes, using a divide-and-conquer strategy to prevent the rise of any competitor who might challenge his power. An example of this tactic was the reinforcement of the SNB— controlled by the Tashkent clan—as a counterbalance to the Interior

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Ministry, led by Karimov’s rivals in the Samarkand clan, to which the president had belonged early in his career. However, the dominance of the Karimov-led megaclan did not prevent the rivalry between the other groups from turning into an open confrontation for the control of the main ministries and state agencies. The main clash took place in 2005 and was instigated by the Samarkand clan, led by Interior Minister Zokir Almatov, and the Tashkent clan, controlled by SNB director Rustam Inoyatov. Both groups not only had coercive power, but also informal authority over various economic activities such as foreign trade, internal trade or restaurants; also in this case, some authors connect them to drug trafficking (Ilkhamov 2007: 77, 2010). In the following years, a hard confrontation took place between both clans, in which they accused each other of collaborating with radical Islamists in the organization of terrorist attacks. The influence of the Tashkent clan grew as the SNB gained power in the context of the “fight against terrorism”: for example, taking over the Border Guard and creating its own spetsnaz special operations units. Ultimately, this conflict resulted in the fall of Almatov, who was replaced by Bakhodir Matlyubov, also from Samarkand but without Almatov’s influence.11 Shortly thereafter, however, Karimov weakened the Tashkent network with the dismissal of Defence Minister Kadyr Gulamov in November 2005, and the firing of another tashkentski, Timur Alimov, from his post as presidential adviser. Others have interpreted the Andijan massacre in 2005 as a result of these power struggles between informal networks: specifically, between those linked to Samarkand or Tashkent and the local elites of Fergana (McGlinchey 2011). The region’s governor, Kobiljon Obidov, had been in office for eleven years until his dismissal in 2004. The new governor wanted to purge Obidov’s local allies both within the administration and among the economic elites, which led to the arrest of 23 businesspeople with strong roots and social relevance (Ilkhamov 2004: 169; Sharipov 2004; Radnitz 2010). However, after a popular uprising in which hundreds of civilians were killed in clashes with government troops,

11 Years later, in 2013, he would be replaced by former Deputy Interior Minister Adham Ahmedbaev, who had also worked at the SNB and was part of the Tashkent clan. His appointment was interpreted as a sign of Inoyatov’s influence Snow (2016).

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Karimov blamed “Islamic terrorists” and seized the opportunity to dismiss the Interior Minister, in addition to disbanding the ministry’s troops. The SNB and its director Inoyatov appeared to have emerged victorious from this restructuring. In later years, however, a rapprochement between the Samarkand and Fergana clans occurred, especially after the marriage of a niece of Mirziyoyev with the nephew of Fergana’s oligarch Alisher Usmanov. The weakened Tashkent clan continued to use the SNB to hunt down and arrest several members of the Fergana clan (Burnashev and Chernykh 2007; Markowitz 2014). A second wave of conflict between the elites erupted in 2009, when a number of top-ranking oligarchs apparently became an obstacle to the economic activities of the president’s network, which led to their arrest. This campaign, spearheaded by then-Prime Minister Mirziyoyev, began with the arrest of Dmitri Lim—one of the richest people in the country and director of one of Tashkent’s most important markets, the Bazaar Karavan—who would subsequently leave the country in early 2010. The purge continued with the arrests of Batyr Rakhimov and his brother Bakhtiyor,12 Alik Nuritdinov, the director of the Bekabad Cement industrial complex, and Zahid Hakimov, head of the state company Uzbektourism. At the same time, the owner of the Alp Jamol Bank, Muhiddin Asomiddinov, and its executive director, Fazliddin Abdurahidov, left the country. The assets of the Kapitol and Alp Jamol banks were liquidated by the National Bank of Uzbekistan (Uznews 2010b). Asomiddinov was only allowed to return to Uzbekistan in 2019 after agreeing to return assets and cooperate in the investigation with the new authorities (Kun.uz 2019). In the same context, but with different consequences, there was the bankruptcy of Zeromax GmbH: a conglomerate involved in oil and gas, sports and construction sectors and registered in Switzerland, and whose control by Gulnara Karimova was an open secret. Zeromax’s operations were halted and its assets frozen in May 2010, but neither Karimova nor the company’s management were then arrested, although the former was later removed from all public responsibility, by order of her father. As Karimov’s succession was perceived to be closer due to his advanced age, internal strife between Prime Minister Mirziyoyev and Finance 12 Batyr Rakhimov was the owner of a tungsten deposit in Jizzaj and a cooking oil factory in Namangan, as well as a co-owner of Kapitol Bank, along with his brother Bakhtiyor. He was arrested on charges of illegal business and tax evasion, and was released on bail, which allegedly ranged from 100,000 to one million US dollars (Uznews 2010a).

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Minister Rustam Azimov was rekindled. The former, connected to the Samarkand group, was associated with more conservative ideas regarding political change; while the latter was a candidate from Tashkent, with a more liberal profile, and even open to the West. For a time, Karimova also remained in the race for succession, but was left with no options after the Zeromax and TeliaSonera scandals (Ismoilov 2013). Karimov repeatedly showed his concern about potential internal conflict after his own death and proposed a reform of Article 96 of the Constitution, which deals with presidential succession. In 2011, three constitutional amendments were approved in order to allow for a peaceful succession. The first permitted the appointment of the president of the Oliy Majlis as interim president for three months, in the event that the head of state was unable to carry out his duties. The second strengthened the Oliy Majlis, in order to make it capable, in terms of competencies, to serve as a niche for an effective distribution of power (Uznews 2013); this reform allowed the majority party in the parliament to nominate the prime minister, as well as mandated the candidacy of a prime minister to be approved by a vote of more than half of the delegates in the Legislative Chamber. Lastly, the third reform reduced the presidential term from seven to five years. The explicit justification for these reforms was to ensure a transition absent of “misunderstandings, disagreements, tribalism, and regionalism” (Ambrosio 2015: 58). They were complemented by other amendments to the Constitution—Articles 32, 78, 93, 98, 103, 117—in March 2014; the main change was a partial transfer of presidential power and duties to the prime minister (Hashimova 2014). This latest package of reforms was interpreted as a Karimov manoeuvrer to favour then-Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev, a member of the Samarkand clan, in the face of a foreseeable near presidential succession, and, at the same time, to counteract the growing influence of the Tashkent clan (EurasiaNet 2011; RFE/RL 2014a). In addition to the aforementioned informal elite networks, has any economic lobby appeared in Uzbekistan that can be described as truly autonomous from the authorities, and with a desire for political involvement? Some authors (Ilkhamov 2012; Libman 2006) argue that a private business elite capable of challenging government authority has not emerged. In contrast, McGlinchey (2011: 121–134) argues that there is a new generation of influential entrepreneurs, with a strong desire for social involvement—derived from their faith in Islam—and independent from

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the state. Their emergence as social leaders places them in a competitive relationship with the authorities, as in certain regions they have attempted to take on those functions the state has failed to carry out successfully, which provides them with recognition in their communities as a new informal authority. Thus, the tragic events in Andijan were a consequence of this conflictive relationship between the central government and certain local businessmen, who were leaders of Muslim social organizations. After all, it was the imprisonment of twenty-three of these businessmen—who employed a significant part of the population—that triggered the protests, violently repressed by the regime. However, the presence of these independent businessmen has not been exclusive to Andijan, as shown by the repressive reaction of the central authorities, who have imprisoned leaders of this type of organization in different regions (McGlinchey 2011: 6). To understand the role of this new business class, a distinction must be made between a business elite that is capable of consolidating itself as an alternative source of authority to the state and one that seeks to use its privileged position to challenge the current ruling elite, replacing it in political institutions. For example, Radnitz (2010: 172–176) argues that the Uzbek business elite cannot be considered politically autonomous, in the sense that this happens in Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan, because in Uzbekistan they do not use their wealth to compete for political power. Thus, contrary to McGlinchey (2011), the Uzbek business elite lacks vertical ties typical of a patron–client relationship in their communities, as well as horizontal alliances with business elites or networks in other regions. The Andijan uprising also served to prove that “rent seeking concentrates rents under the national executive and brings to elite defection the problem of indivisible rents: that defecting from the regime entails enormous risk because access to rents is tightly linked to control over the presidency” (Markowitz 2017: 117). Apart from the competition for authority involving only a small part of the business elite, the Uzbek authorities have had to face few social challenges. The most obvious has been that of the IMU’s terrorist activities, which, however, has been effectively neutralized by the security forces. Among other less-known types of dissent, we can highlight the protests in November 2004 against the government’s imposition of a new sales tax in the bazaars. But in any case, the most likely sources of competition for authority and of political instability in the near future—apart from the internal struggles within the ruling elite—are religious associations with social functions and their leaders.

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For its part, the state has manoeuvred to neutralize the risk of greater social conflict, increasing control over the neighbourhoods or mahallas. Thus, the law on the self-government of the communities made the mahallas the first administrative level of surveillance, by placing the posbons or neighbourhood guards in charge of maintaining order, gathering information from residents and communicating it to police authorities (Radnitz 2012: 69). A similar control occurs in the official mosques, which prevents autonomous political associations from emerging. In this sense, Hizb ut-Tahrir deserves special attention. The Uzbek government’s hard-line campaign against this Islamic group intensified after 1999 and has continued until the present, including recent nationwide arrests of Hizb ut-Tahrir members (Eurasianet 2020).

7

Mirziyoyev’s Reforms and the Modernization of Uzbek Authoritarianism

When Karimov died, the president of the Oliy Majlis was supposed to become acting president for three months, before the election of a new president. Nevertheless, it was Mirziyoyev who organized Karimov’s funeral, which since Soviet times had been considered as a signal that he was the chosen successor. As a result, the Senate’s president, Nigmatilla Yuldashev, remained acting president for only six days. On December 4, Mirziyoyev won the presidential election with 88.6% of votes; just as Karimov, he was the candidate of the Movement of Entrepreneurs and Businesspeople—Liberal Democratic Party of Uzbekistan. No other candidate attained 3.5% of the vote (the Central Election Commission of Uzbekistan 2016). Three years later, a two-round parliamentary election was held in December and January. As in Karimov’s years, the five parties standing in the poll were pro-government—as we know, the Uzbek multiparty system does not include an opposition—and all of them were awarded seats in a rubber-stamp parliament. The Liberal Democratic Party won the largest number of seats, 53, and the turnout was at 67.8%. Despite Mirziyoyev’s statement that “all foreign observers openly and unanimously acknowledged that the elections were conducted in the atmosphere of sound competition and struggle among political parties” (Maerz 2019: 14), both elections were assessed as neither free nor fair by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE 2017, 2020). By 7 February 2017, the Presidential Administration had announced an Action Strategy for 2017–2021. A presidential decree

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established the following priorities: improvement of the state administration and public services, increasing the role of the parliament and political parties in democratic reforms, consolidation of the rule of law by reinforcing the legal system and separation of powers, a development strategy focused on agriculture and infrastructure modernization, and economic liberalization reforms oriented to achieve macroeconomic stability while maintaining economic growth (Mirziyoyev 2017). Without any doubt, reforms in the last two dimensions have been the most convincingly implemented. Although it is still too early to talk about a transition towards a deep market-oriented economy, Mirziyoyev’s administration has begun several ambitious reforms in line with that goal. The most critical reform in this period has been the currency liberalization introduced in September 2017, which neutralized incentives for the black market. Other meaningful economic reforms have included the removal of certain capital controls, tax reforms, the setting up of free economic zones and industrial zones and the liberalization of import and export activities by ending state monopolies, such as in the processing and exporting of cotton. The authorities expect the improvement of the business environment to translate into higher levels of foreign investment in a few years. Uzbek officials acknowledge that the regime’s international reputation for human rights abuse, characterized by its repression and restriction of political and civil liberties, complicates the resetting of relations with the European Union, the United States and other Western-led international organizations. First results are emerging since the World Bank provided robust support to the government’s reform agenda, improving its chances to benefit from multilateral funding. Hence, political reforms in Mirziyoyev’s Uzbekistan have resulted from the need for accommodation in the international political environment and consolidation at home as leader during a new developmental phase of the country, a phase which involves the new opening of Uzbekistan to its Central Asian neighbours through the softening of border policy and the enhancement of transit routes. This regional policy will benefit border communities, particularly Uzbek communities in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The most meaningful political changes initiated by Mirziyoyev affect four areas: restructuring of the security forces—which is discussed in the following section—fundamental rights of prisoners of conscience, the media and social media, as well as civil society organizations and international human rights organizations. Regarding fundamental rights, new

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legislation has banned the practice of obtaining evidence for court cases by using falsification and torture, which have become crimes punishable with a prison sentence. Individual pardon was introduced at the president’s initiative, which enabled the release of a significant number of political prisoners13 and hundreds of independent Muslims, those who practise Islam outside state controls (Marszewski 2018). However, according to Human Rights Watch (2020), “thousands of others, most of them peaceful religious believers are jailed on extremism and other political charges”. Moreover, authorities have reported that they ceased to apply Article 221 of the Criminal Code regarding violation of prison rules, which has been employed to extend sentences of political prisoners. In addition, over 20,000 citizens have been removed from the security services’ blacklist used to restrict internal and international mobility. The authorities’ attitude towards the press has also improved, even though this applies more to digital and social media. Eleven digital media that were blocked for over a decade are now accessible, including regional broadcasters such as Eurasianet and Fergana, as well as foreign media such as the BBC’s Uzbek service and Voice of America (Amerika Ovozi), whose correspondents have received accreditation. The local diversity of online news sources has also increased in recent years with the launching of Kun.uz and Daryo.uz, among others, also contributing to widening media coverage of sensitive issues (Economist Intelligence Unit 2019). Advances in the civil society arena have moved at a slower pace, despite announcement in 2018 and 2019 by the Justice Ministry of new regulations to relax registration procedures and government control over NGOs. On 9 March 2020, the Justice Ministry registered Hukuki Tayanch (Legal Support), the first human rights organization legalized since 2003, when Ezgulik (Compassion) was registered (Fergana 2020). Obstacles to NGO registration impact international organizations as well. A good example is Human Rights Watch, which has been able to do research in the country since August 2017, although, its registration remains banned by a 2011 Supreme Court decision (Human Rights Watch 2020).

13 More than 50 people that were in prison on politically motivated charges, including human rights activists, journalists and peaceful opposition activists, have been released. Among them, journalists Yusuf Ruzimuradov and Muhammad Bekjanov, jailed for 19 and 18 years, respectively, also, the political dissident and first vice chairman of Parliament after independence, Samandar Kukanov, imprisoned for 23 years.

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Despite the above-mentioned signs of progress, political reforms have not produced a meaningful alteration in Uzbek authoritarian governance and how citizens can dispute political power. Political institutions remain as closed to them as before. Nevertheless, in recent years, pundits and scholars have debated the path already travelled by Mirziyoyev, also trying to infer the political and developmental legacies we can expect from his presidency. His initiatives have led quite a few authors to believe, perhaps optimistically, that his reformist spirit is genuine (Lemon 2019; Marszewski 2018); some of them are even enthusiastic about the country’s political future (Starr and Cornell 2018; Bowyer 2018; Biryukov 2019; Zanca 2018). However, as Anceschi (2018, 2019) has convincingly argued, Mirziyoyev’s reformist agenda can be better understood as a project of authoritarian modernization (Gel’man and Starodubtsev 2016) rather than liberalization. Same as with Soviet governance, Mirziyoyev locates “modernization” at the core of his policy-making, in line with “Central Asia’s fundamental rule of policy reform: economy first, politics never” (Anceschi 2018).

8

Neopatrimonial Consolidation in Mirziyoyev’s Presidency

Before Karimov’s death, there were three people meant to play a critical role in the succession context. Whereas Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Finance Minister Rustam Azimov were the primary presidential candidates, the SNB Director, Rustam Inoyatov, was regarded more as a “kingmaker”. In comparison with Mirziyoyev, Azimov’s profile suggested greater reliability as a reformist, and he was the preferred candidate of Western governments and international financial institutions. According to several sources, Inoyatov—along with Russian President Vladimir Putin—backed Mirziyoyev ahead of time, overconfident that he would maintain the conservative and security approaches of Karimov’s regime (Ilkhamov 2019; Geschwindt 2018). This support neutralized Azimov’s candidacy and enabled an informal power-sharing deal among Mirziyoyev, Azimov and Inoyatov that guaranteed a peaceful transfer of power (Ilkhamov 2019). Mirziyoyev moved slightly faster than Karimov in the consolidation of his personal power once he reached the presidency. A day after his presidential inauguration in January 2017, Mirziyoyev demoted Azimov from finance minister to deputy prime minister, and eventually fired him

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in June of that year. Mirziyoyev blamed Azimov for serious wrongdoings committed by bankers, “do-nothing financiers” and bribe-takers, prior to reassigning him as the head of Uzbekinvest, a “national export-import insurance company” (Putz 2017). Six months after Azimov’s removal, in January 2018, Mirziyoyev managed to dismiss Inoyatov, justifying the move by appointing him security adviser to the President and Oliy Majlis member. As Anceschi (2019: 110) reminds us, the authorities neither implemented an elite “lustration” nor provided a public apology for the repression in Karimov’s period. Notwithstanding these facts, the reshufflings were not only aimed at displacing potential political patrons capable of leading elite networks against Mirziyoyev’s rule; they affected thousands of cadres and involved most of the state apparatus, including the banishment of the SNB as a pillar of the Uzbek regime. Regarding this agency, even Karimov had criticized extrajudicial killings; as Mirziyoyev also did, accusing it of “exceeding its authority” (Geschwindt 2018). Apart from diverging political approaches and conflicting power interests, the clash between Mirziyoyev and the SNB also had an economic dimension. Having penetrated many formal and informal sectors, as well as controlling rent-seeking activities at central and local levels, the agency emerged as a significant obstacle to trade and monetary reforms. As a consequence of the weakening of the SNB, Mirziyoyev favoured the economic control of regional hokims, therefore attracting their support (Ilkhamov 2019). In a year and a half, Mirziyoyev carried out a mass reshuffling not only within the SNB but also in other state agencies penetrated by SNB officials, including the public prosecutor’s office and the foreign and finance ministries. Only in the Ministry of Finance, more than five hundred employees were fired; and the trial of Prosecutor General Rashid Kadyrov led to the arrest of 25 influential state officials. Moreover, according to Marszewski (2018: 4), “almost all of the heads of the peripheral government authorities were dismissed (along with the heads of the peripheral militia, public prosecutors’ offices and tax offices) as were dozens of heads of district authorities”. The new administration conducted this massive cleansing by launching both a campaign of arrests and dismissals employing allegations of treason, corruption and illicit trafficking. Parallel to this process, SNB powers were reduced: control over the Interior Troops was returned to the Ministry of Interior, and the National Guard and Presidential Security Service were reinforced. And if that was not

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enough, Mirziyoyev demolished the SNB Tashkent prison, moved its headquarters to the suburbs and finally renamed the agency State Security Service14 (Marszewski 2018; Ilkhamov 2019). Elite infighting continued in the SGB at the highest level in the following two years. Ihtiyer Abdullayev, formerly Prosecutor General, and new head of the agency was suspended and criminal charges filed against him, along with several of his subordinates. According to Ilkhamov (2019), the most popular version linked the case to Abdullayev’s instructions to conduct surveillance of the presidential family. In the meantime, Mirziyoyev called prosecutors “the biggest thieves” in the “old rotten system” (Radio Ozodlik 2017). In February 2020, the Supreme Court announced Abdullayev’s sentence of 18 years in prison “for organising a criminal group, bribe-taking, abuse of office, extortion, the theft of private property, violating customs regulations, and other crimes”. Eight other public officials, including another former Prosecutor General, Otabek Murodov, were given prison sentences between 5 and 17 years (RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service 2020). The SNB staff earthquake was not unique. Mirziyoyev’s massive replacement of personnel reached every single state agency. According to Lemon’s calculation (2019: 7), “of 66 ministers, first deputy ministers, chairpersons of state committees and CEOs of state companies, only foreign minister Abdulaziz Kamilov, has retained his position from Karimov’s time”. The rationale underlying all these new appointments was to procure an elite loyal to Mirziyoyev. For that purpose, the president’s new recruitment strategy attracted four main profiles: former associates, including those who had fallen out of favour under Karimov,15

14 In Uzbek, Davlat Xavfsizlik Xizmati; in Russian, Sluzhba Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti, often romanized as SGB. 15 Both the current prime minister Abdulla Aripov and first deputy prime minister Achilbay Ramatov worked under Mirziyoyev when he was premier. As was mentioned above, Aripov was fired in 2012 after the Procuracy accusation of colluding with Gulnara Karimova in a corruption case. Another example is former Tashkent mayor Kozim Tulaganov, sentenced to 20 years in 2006 for economic crimes, who became deputy chairman of the Committee for Architecture and Construction. It is also worth mentioning the head of the presidential administration, Zainilobiddin Nizomiddinov, who was under Mirziyoyev’s orders before 2016.

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businessmen and tycoons,16 young and Western-educated technocrats,17 and relatives or personnel from Samarkand and Andijan regions.18 This was combined with the cadre rotation of officials from the Karimov era19 and an anti-corruption campaign.20

9

Conclusions

The case of Uzbekistan is a clear example of neopatrimonial authoritarianism, in which elites compete with each other in a continuous accumulation of political and economic resources, with a weak connection to the real needs of the majority of the population. The so-called clans around which this competition is structured are not defined today by kinship, ethnicity or place of origin, but are much more flexible client networks. By providing an informal system for the distribution of resources and influence, they are able to attract the loyalty of much broader social sectors than the ruling elites, which contributes to preserving the regime, by hindering the emergence of viable alternatives capable of obtaining

16 Two people can be highlighted in this category: the tycoon Jahongir Ortiqxo´jayev, who was appointed acting mayor of Tashkent in 2018, directly by Mirziyoyev; and the Russian oligarch of Uzbek descent, Alisher Usmanov, also associated with local tycoon Pattokh Shodiyev. 17 Senior officials that fit into that profile: Ruslandek Davletov, minister of Justice; Jamshid Kuchkarov, minister of Finance; Sherzod Shermatov, acting minister for Development of Information Technologies and Communications; Sardor Umurzakov, minister for Investment and Foreign Trade. 18 Mirziyoyev appointed two sons-in-law: Otabek Umarov—deputy head of the Presidential Security Service—and Oybek Tursunov, deputy head of the Presidential Administration. The latter’s father, Batyr Tursunov, holds a senior position in the National Guard. Mirziyoyev’s daughter and Umarov’s wife, Shahnoza Mirziyoyeva, is also deputy head of the Department for Preschool Educational Institutions at the Ministry of Education. Mirziyoyev’s other daughter, Saida, is deputy director of the Agency for Information and Mass Communications. 19 Mirziyoyev relocated critical potential political rivals such as Inoyatov and Azimov, but also other senior officials like the former minister of Emergency Situations, Tursinkhan Khudaibergenov—today, adviser on law enforcement; Zilemkhan Khaidarov, who moved from one position to other within the presidential administration; and Khayridden Sultanov, who still is presidential speech-writer but not State Councilor for Culture, Press and Creative Organizations (Lemon 2019). 20 Mirziyoyev introduced a law fighting corruption which resulted in court proceedings against 1,566 officials only in the first six months of 2017 (Lemon 2019: 6).

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sufficient support. These networks, together with the personalist leadership, the process of nation-building using historical references, and open political repression, allowed the regime created by Karimov after the dissolution of the USSR to continue until his death. This informal neopatrimonial system of governance is both a result of and a substitute for the absence of democratic institutions that could handle the selection of leaders in a more stable and predictable way. Conflict is a permanent feature of this system precisely because of the absence of the rule of law, which makes confrontations between factions arise whenever the central authority weakens. However, the Uzbek authoritarian regime has managed to survive its founder, firstly, by softening its repressive face and launching an ambitious strategy of modernization and, secondly, by countering both the challenges of rival factions within the elites and the possibility of a cohesive opposition emerging from civil society.

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Turkmenistan: Stability Through Regime Mobilisation Slavomír Horák

Turkmenistan belongs to the countries where the democratisation (Huntington 1991) and transition have led to the conservation of a Soviet system (McFaul 2002). The case of Turkmenistan showed that the discourse of transitology (popular in the 1990s and 2000s) could move in the reverse direction, i.e. towards a more authoritarian government (Carothers 2002). Some scholars, analysts and especially journalists usually refer to a kind of bizarre, exotic regime or “despotic oriental rule” Kurtov (2006) and Stronski (2017). At the same time, the system in Turkmenistan cannot be described as a fully totalitarian society (Linz 2000) or a sultanistic regime (Chehabi and Linz 1998; Kunysz 2012; Denison 2006). However, the political regime in Turkmenistan follows a relatively logical path, based on what Jackson and Rosberg or van den Bosch term as a personal regime based on the African experience (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 1984; Van den Bosch 2015), eventually Henry Hale determines as a patronage system (Hale 2015).

S. Horák (B) Institute of International Studies, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. Izquierdo-Brichs and F. Serra-Massansalvador (eds.), Political Regimes and Neopatrimonialism in Central Asia, The Steppe and Beyond: Studies on Central Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9093-1_5

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The political system in the country has acquired several features of concepts as mentioned above, particularly its high level of centralisation and personalisation. The ruler enables just a small (and over time, increasingly narrow) elite to participate in the distribution of wealth. The small size of the highest elites made them relatively easy to control; moreover, members of the elite often inform on other members for their benefit. This has allowed the president to accumulate power and, armed with the necessary information, to punish any unnecessary member of the elite. The division of political power between the ruler and the population, and the people’s involvement in power, is almost non-existent in this system. The top elite level does not depend on any internal or outside forces and feels unchallengeable for any exploitation from above, while kickbacks flow bottom-up. Such centralisation of the power, reproduction of the elites from within the current system further consolidates its conservatism and rigidity. Absence of alternative political sources prevents any potential changes from inside even following a change of ruler. The chapter focuses primarily on the transformation of the political system in Turkmenistan from the regime of the first President, Saparmurat Niyazov, to the political system of the current President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov. Based on openly available information as well as some information from insiders, I attempt to analyse the distribution of power in Turkmenistan between the country’s primary and the secondary elite (Izquierdo-Brichs and Serra-Massansalvador 2020; Izquierdo-Brichs and Etherington 2017) also tracing changes in these elites following the death of the first president, to outline the redistribution of crucial domestic and foreign assets, and to evaluate the potential for any change in the country. Besides internal affairs, both Presidents have to deal with the interests of the outside forces. The examples of the three leading foreign powers (China, Russia and Turkey), plus a short overview of other external actors, will demonstrate the limits and options of external interference in the internal affairs of Turkmenistan. I argue that currently, there is no political force that can challenge the regime both from inside and outside. Although the recent economic crisis in the country showed the possibilities of some internal mass opposition and dissatisfaction, its mobilisation potentials remain limited. At the same time, external powers are not interested in any kind of change. The current regime is satisfactory to them, and this makes interference in the regime and challenge of the political elites almost improbable. Thus, the internal implosion of the regime (with uncertain consequences) is the only real alternative to continuous support for the existing regime.

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The Internal Elites and Control of Resources 1.1

From Traditional to Post-Soviet Elites

The territory of today’s Turkmenistan was inhabited by different Turkmen tribes and tribal associations, together with some local elites in a few larger settlements, up to the nineteenth century. These tribes were called Turkmens by their neighbours, but they used different dialects, had different customs and internal political settlement. They also lived under different states and maintained different geopolitical orientation. The eastern parts of today’s Turkmenistan, where the Salor and Ersary tribes were dominant, was subordinated to the Bukhara Emirate with its principal regional city Chardzhou (inhabited, however, mostly by Uzbek settlers). The Mary oasis was under the influence of the Khiva Khanate, though the local Mary Teke and (to some extent) Saryk tribes had a high degree of autonomy. The northern Turkmens (mostly Yomuts) in Khorezm were under the direct control of the Khiva Khanate and played a significant role in Khivan politics. Western Turkmenistan, with the western Yomuts and the Göklen tribe, were oriented towards trade with Russia and Persia at least from the eighteenth century. The most remote area, which remained outside the control of external forces, was the centre of today’s Turkmenistan, inhabited by the Akhal Teke tribe. We mentioned only the essential tribes; there were also many smaller ones (Abu al-Ghazi Bahadur Khan 1897). This overview demonstrates the fragmented identity and differences in the internal organisation of the Turkmen tribes, as well as their diverse external contacts. Within each tribe or tribal confederation, the system of hierarchies was based mostly on the egalitarian consensus of the particular community. The Council of Elders traditionally decided on the most significant issues in the tribe or tribal confederation, including the election of the tribal chief or the settlement of disputes. After the partial unification of several Turkmen tribes in the 1870s, the rudiments of a more structured administration were formed; however, this development was interrupted after the Russian advance into the Turkmen lands (Saray 1989). Besides, authority (which did not equal power in all cases) rested in the hands of educated people (mullahs) or the descendants of holy men, ovlyads (Demidov 1976). The establishment of Soviet Turkmenistan was not only the first attempt to create a state unit; it was also the first attempt to bring the

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Turkmen nation together as a single entity. For the first time, the codification of one Turkmen language and one Turkmen script was established (Clement 2018). The Turkmen SSR was the first modern state of the de facto newly created Turkmen nation (for a detailed history of the period see [Edgar 2006]). The Soviet cadre system was based mostly on loyalties towards the higher level of power. In the first years of the Turkmen SSR and throughout the Stalin period, the central control over the Soviet republics was more direct. Local elites served in the secondary positions, while the Second Secretary of the Party (appointed by Moscow) became a key decision-maker—despite the presence of some strong personalities within the Turkmen leadership, such as Gaygysyz Atabayev or Nedirbai Aitakov (Kadyrov 2003). From the 1950s onwards, the First Secretaries recruited from the local elites became the real leaders in Turkmenistan. The selection of the leader was still under central control, so the Communist Party Central Committee sought out those who would be loyal to Moscow. In the Turkmen SSR, the local leader between 1950s and 1980s was usually selected from outside the Ashgabat area (inhabited by mostly Akhal Teke tribes). The system of traditional local tribes was partly incorporated into the Soviet system of power; once elected, the particular First Secretary preferred to surround himself with loyal people from his region of origin, relatives, classmates or followers. Due to this process, the Akhal Teke elite, despite being concentrated in and around Ashgabat, became downgraded into secondary positions, although the capital city of the republic would otherwise have put the Akhal Teke in a primary position for leadership. As a result, the internal affairs in Turkmen SSR became mostly a matter of the Party leader and his loyalties. 1.2

Niyazov and the System of Control Over Resources

In the 1980s, the newly elected All-Union Communist Party leader Mikhail Gorbachev made personnel changes among the First Secretaries of local Communist Party organisations. Saparmurat Niyazov, then the First Secretary of the Ashkhabad Party Regional Branch, was installed as the new Turkmen SSR Communist Party leader. He is sometimes considered to be the founder of the Akhal Teke hegemony in Turkmenistan (Sasaki 2008, 133–134). Indeed, during his rule, families from the Akhal Teke region gained more power than in previous times Kadyrov (2003,

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2009). At the same time, Niyazov did not see the Akhal Teke as the principal members of his circle. Moreover, the Akhal Teke elite did not consider him to be a member of the highest elite; his Turkmen (Akhal Teke) origin was challenged and called into question. He grew up as an orphan after losing part of his family during the 1948 earthquake. His father allegedly died in the Second World War, although this has not been confirmed by relevant sources. Moreover, there were constant rumours about the origin of his mother. She was claimed as having Kurdish, Persian or another origin, but not Akhal Teke.1 Therefore, his legitimacy was rooted in Moscow rather than inside the local elites in Ashgabat. President Niyazov understood that the base of his internal power was relatively weak. When support from Moscow diminished, Niyazov’s absence of a power base turned him to establish personal control over the entire political system as his principal survival strategy (Polese et al. 2017). This approach went against the increasing role of the Akhal Teke elites—some of whom were exiled, jailed or otherwise silenced. In this situation, Niyazov himself became the principal source of the decision-making process and elite transformation in the country. He gradually surrounded himself with a circle of supporters, mostly originating outside the elite structures of Ashgabat. Niyazov’s innermost circle and the most influential persons around him also consisted of non-Turkmen figures, such as the triumvirate Viktor Khramov, Vladimir Umnov and Aleksandr Zhadan at the presidential administration. According to some reports, Viktor Khramov became the most influential person in Niyazov’s inner circle as he managed who would have access to the president. However, We are not entirely sure about the exact role played by Khramov and his influence on Niyazov. Besides his ideological activities supporting the growing personality cult of Niyazov, Khramov also quickly became an owner of many business assets in Turkmenistan, including telecommunications or companies exporting oil and gas to Russia.2 The first president also trusted some other foreign businessmen rather than Turkmen people around him (for more details see the section on Russia and Turkey).

1 Erkin.net. 2006. “Pamiatnik idiotizma.” Accessed August 3. http://www.dogryol. com/print.php?article=1546. 2 Dubnov, Arkady. 2009. “Vozvrashcheniie ‘Itery.’” Vremia Novostei, April 3. http:// www.vremya.ru/2009/36/8/224268.html.

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Niyazov established a highly centralised political culture, with one person able to influence any process and any decision in the country. Other figures of Turkmen origin in lower positions served merely as the executors of orders emanating from the “Turkmen No. 1” and his administration. He was also able to dismiss any person below him with almost immediate effect, and thus an atmosphere of fear and servility became the most distinctive aspect of Turkmenistan’s political culture. At the end of Niyazov’s rule, his Turkmen entourage consisted mostly of people from outside the Akhal Teke group, the majority of them concentrated in the presidential administration and the Presidential Guard led by Akmurat Rejepov (again of non-Akhal Teke origin). As for the Akhal Teke elite, only a few of them—with almost no real influence—remained relatively close to Niyazov (for a more detailed account see Horák (2010, 2012). Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov belonged to the latter category, as he was regarded as the person who procured and had control over Niyazov’s medicine.3 Under Niyazov, especially in the last stages of his rule, the country’s elite became relatively homogenous, and—due to its centralisation—also non-conflictual. The primary elite (President Niyazov and his closest circle, including non-Turkmen advisors and business people) became almost entirely separated from the secondary elites. The rise of the secondary elites was hardly possible without the consent of the ruler. In this context, the creation of a system of alliances within the narrow primary elite (and the only slightly more numerous secondary elite), as well as the penetration of secondary figures into the primary elite, was highly improbable. This elite circle (the so-called group of December 22 [2006]) was the group that had the most decisive influence over the appointment of the new leader after Niyazov’s death (December 21, 2006). 1.3

Primary Elite of the Second President. Building Berdimuhamedov’s Family Corporation

The sudden death of Niyazov (shrouded in speculations about a palace murder) left Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov as the highest-positioned

3 Author’s interview with a former person from Niyazov’s entourage, today in exile, 2016.

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figure from the Akhal Teke in the innermost presidential circle. Moreover, Berdimuhamedov (together with Rashid Meredov) was also the longest-serving minister around Niyazov, despite his marginalised role in the eyes of the first president. There is no clear evidence on whether or not Berdimuhamedov played a part in the decision-making process on the new leader. The role of outside players (Russian, Turkish and others) in the selection of the new leader is also questionable.4 However, being established in the office the newly (s)elected leader (the selection was confirmed by a formal election process in February 2007) started almost immediately the redistribution of power and business into the hand of his broad family and country-fellows. In this way, the key management (and especially ownership) of property in Turkmenistan has shifted to the control of Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov’s family and his cronies in the 13 years of his rule. Unlike his orphaned predecessor, he held a strong power base in the Western Akhal region (today Gök Tepe district). As such, he was obliged by local traditions to provide material support for his native region and relatives. Therefore, the recruitment of decisive part of cadres was focused on this region—the home of Berdimuhamedov’s fellow countrymen, relatives, and classmates. Logically, within years of his rule Berdimuhamedov and his family were able to capture the most lucrative parts of the Turkmen economy— including the distribution of oil and gas incomes, although the further details are still not entirely clear (Horák and Šír 2009, 22–32). In particular, his sisters and their family members became the most influential personalities in the Turkmen business sphere, while his direct family is considered has groomed into the dynastic rule. Serdar Berdimuhamedov, the president’s son, was already moved to the different state structures. His career started in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was also involved in the recently dissolved State Agency for the Control and Use of Natural Resources, which controlled the distribution of oil and gas sector incomes. He had a role in the Ministry of Agriculture (the Turkmengalla company) and, according to some information, Serdar also took over the hotel business from Murat Niyazov,

4 For more details on the transition in Turkmenistan see Kadyrov ( 2007), Blank (2007), and Sullivan (2016); ICG, “Turkmenistan After Niyazov.” Europe and Central Asia Briefing, 60. February 12, 2007. https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/ central-asia/turkmenistan/turkmenistan-after-niyazov. Accessed July 21 2017.

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the son of the first president.5 In 2016 he became a Deputy of Mejlis (the Parliament), although he was not elected, despite some expectations, as its head that would enable him to take the presidential post in case of Berdimuhamedov’s stepping down for some reason. Recently, he was named as the hakim (the governor) of Akhal welaýat (region), and in 2020 he was appointed as a Minister of Industry. It is apparent that apart of his business, he was designed as his father’s successor and, as such, he rotates in several positions to become accepted and respected by the secondary elite.6 The president also often promotes on the public his grandson Kerimguly, who is often seen with the president at various official or informal occasions.7 He is also considered by several sources a potential successor of the president.8 The indirect successors of Berdimuhamedov are involved in the business creating a mutually supportive system of political and economic power. Therefore, his oldest sister Gulnabat (together with her family) is involved mainly in the construction industry.9 Her company is responsible for new construction projects all over the country, and it serves as a subcontractor in the case of large-scale projects built by foreign companies (Awaza Caspian Sea resort, the Olympic City in Ashgabat and others). Gulnabat’s family also controls the import of alcohol, tobacco, medicines, clothes and other textile industry products, particularly from the UAE, with most of the items bypassing customs clearance. The family supports its clients (often Gulnabat’s former classmates) who control the markets in Turkmenabad (Chardzhou) and especially Mary, under the rule of M. Abdurahmanov (known as “Mukha Magnat”)—the deputy of the local 5 Orazmuhammedov, Aimuhammed. 2012. “Kogda semeinyi biznes vyshe interesov gosudarstva.” Gundogar.org, April 20. http://gundogar.org/?024705123820000000000 00013000000. 6 Ferghananews.com. 2017. “Turkmenistan: syn prezidenta Serdar Berdymukhamedov vozglavil parlamentskii komitet,” March 21. http://www.fergananews.com/news/26166. 7 Blois, Antoine, and Klevtsova, Anna. 2013. “Vnuk diktatora Turkmenistana v tsentre vnimaniia pressy.” Radio Azattyk, July 7. http://rus.azattyq.org/a/vnuk-berdymukhame dova/25036110.html. Gostev, Aleksandr. 2015. “Diktator i ego vnuk.” Radio Svoboda, June 5. http://www. svoboda.org/a/26996493.html. 8 CA-News. 2016. “Prezident gotovit sebe v preemniki vnuka,” September 14. http:// ca-news.org/news:1329606. 9 Amanmyratov, Gochkuli. 2014. “Rvachi, mukhi i dhuty iz semeiki Turkmenbashi.” Arba.ru. January 18. http://www.arba.ru/forum/7014.

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hakim (city chief) responsible for construction, and one of Gulnabat’s closest friends.10 Gulnabat’s family also controls the tourism industry, particularly Awaza resort vacations. As a consequence, a substantial proportion of state employees are obliged to take their vacations in the family’s hotels in Avaza and some other resorts, paying monopolistic prices.11 Gulnabat is also involved (through her clients) in mobile telecommunications and some industrial production (the slate factories in Ashgabat and Mary). She maintains excellent business contacts with the Azerbaijani ruling elite through her control of the Turkmenbashi seaport and the Turkmen fleet of cargo ships.12 Younger sister Durdynabat together with her husband Annanazar Rejepov control different construction industries (Nusay yollary company), transport (Ak Hazyna), food industry (Daýhan sarpasy) as well as the network of supermarkets Kamil and Ak market. Their sons Hajimurat and S, ahmurat are one of the most assertive tycoons in Turkmenistan business as owners of the trade and export-import companies as well as they own monopolist network of pharmacies in Turkmenistan. Another of Berdimuhamedov’s sisters, Mähri, controls the rare metals and jewellery business in Turkmenistan, including imports, distribution and jewellery shops.13 She has probably become the owner of several markets in Ashgabat, and according to some unconfirmed rumours she was involved in the closure and takeover of Yimpash, the most popular supermarket in Ashgabat.14

10 Agabaev, Halnazar. 2012. “Turkmenistan kak chastnyi ogorod’ dliia prezidentskoi semeiki.” Centrasia.ru, July 21. http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1342854060. 11 “Mezhdunarodnaia turisticheskaia zona Avaza: krizis konceptsii.” 2014. Netherlands:

demokraticheskii grazhdanskii soiuz Turkmenistana. https://app.box.com/s/00lhungni sy2sy9fvpcm. The Chronicle of Turkmenistan. 2016. “Obiazatel’nyie putevki v Avazu,” December 21. http://www.chrono-tm.org/2016/12/obyazatelnyie-putevki-v-avazu/ 12 Meredova, Garagyz. 2015. “Prezident Turkmenistana - garant protsvetaniia semeinogo biznesa.” Azat Turkmenistan, June 11. http://www.azatturkmenistan.org/ analytics/prezident-turkmenistana-garant-procvetaniya-semejnogo-biznesa.html. 13 Kuliyev, Durdy. 2012. “Prezidentskii klan delit stranu.” Gundogar.org, November 23. http://www.gundogar.org/?0130513090000000000000013000000. 14 Radio Azattyk. 2017. “TC ‘Yimpash’ perekhodit pod kontrol’ vliiatelnykh liudei i vskore mozhet otkryt’sia pod novym nazvaniiem,” January 30. http://rus.azathabar.com/ a/28267604.html.

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The family of the president’s daughter Jahon (together with her husband Ilasgeldy Amanov) were responsible for the oil and gas business. Their company Trade & Invest LLC also controlled the export of cotton production. The family lives mostly in Western Europe (London and Paris) and takes advantage of diplomatic immunity.15 The most prominent members of the family are untouchable for local police authorities, and they can make many things happen without fear of consequences. Turkmenistan has essentially turned into the large corporation under the control of one family, embracing almost all spheres of income in the country. The secondary elite is created by the people close to the presidential circles as business partners, service centres (ministries, state organisations and enterprises). Access to the ruling family, and personal loyalty to the president, have become the essential prerequisite for access to power and economic resources. Because the first President Niyazov managed to cleanse the political and economic scene and removed most of his influential challengers, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov and his family do not have any opponents who would be capable of threatening their position from inside the country.16 1.4

Secondary Elite Transformation

Starting from his (s)election in 2007, the president started to reshuffle the cadres in Turkmenistan within the first months of his rule in order to cleanse the political elites from his most influential challengers and clear the path to take over their business interests and transfer them to the control of his own family. The figures considered the most prominent during Niyazov’s period were dismissed, exiled, forced to retire (in better cases) or jailed. Only 8 out of 29 persons mentioned as members of the “group of December 22” remained on the political scene.17 These eight persons are in low-ranking positions, or they have no real aspirations to any role within the newly established Berdimuhamedov clan. 15 Charyyardurdyyev, Myratgeldy. 2013. “Kto grabit Turkmenistan.” Centrasia.ru, June.

http://www.centrasia.ru/news.php?st=1371469920. 16 Durdydzhan, Maksat. 2018. „Antikoruptsionnaia pokazukha Arkadaga“. Gundogar.org, February 11. http://www.gundogar.org/?013051819100000000000 0011000000. 17 Mamedov, Aslan. 2010. “8 Iz 29.” Gundogar.org, November 6. http://www.gun dogar.org/?0247049595000000000000013000000.

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More than a decade of the second president’s rule, the secondary elite was to much extent rearranged with several types of approach. Several people were downgraded, although they maintain influential positions and seem to be essential for the president for different reasons. Viktor Khramov, the advisor to the president, remains an essential figure for Berdimuhamedov in constructing the ideological image of the president. Aleksandr Zhadan might still probably control economic flows of the president and promotes Russian interests in the country (and maintain contact with Russia), although his real fate and role in the president’s team and his relations to the family of the president are not clear. These people probably maintained their positions, access to the president, and a part of their business interests. President Berdimuhamedov considers them (at least in case of Khramov) a supportive figure serving the interests of his family empire (Minchenko et al. 2011, 19–20). As for the Turkmen elites outside the newly established Berdimuhamedov’s circle, several indispensable heavyweights serve at secondary positions. Rashid Meredov, the Foreign Minister of Turkmenistan, remains a competent and crucial figure in foreign policy together with his deputy Wepa Hajiyev who polish the critics towards Turkmenistan. However, their chances to challenge Berdimuhamedov’s position are negligible. Meredov himself cannot be accepted as Akhal Teke (due to his family’s origins in Mary) or even as a pure Turkmen. Other resilient personalities on the Turkmen political scene are figures of the secondary elite who are fully loyal to the regime, and who eventually receive a small share of business in Turkmenistan for themselves or the member of their families. Akja Nurberdyyeva, the long-term Head of the Parliament, used to serve as the face of the regime performing some ceremonial functions, but without any ambition to oppose the interests of the ruling family. She did not pass to the Mejlis (Parliament) after the elections in 2018, and she was replaced at the position by Guls, at Mammedova as another symbol of women in Turkmenistan leadership. Former long-term Minister of Interior Iskender Mulikov served as another example, how Berdimuhamedov deals with the secondary elite. The minister provided the technical support for the president collecting necessary discrediting dossiers to other elite members and punished already unwanted personalities from the secondary elites. Mulikov transformed his ministry into an all-embracing repressive organ using all means to maintain the necessary security order for the leader. Despite

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his cautious and loyal approach, he was dismissed in fall 2019 probably due to his connections to Turkmen business people who lost Berdimuhamedov’s trust and were jailed (Charymuhammat Kulov, one of the wealthiest people in the country with formerly excellent connections to the ruling family).18 Mulikov’s example represents the repressive approach to those losing the confidence of the ruling class or being involved in some business that threatens the interests of the family. He tends to be uncompromising and cruel in such cases. The substantial part of the business community was until recently under the control of Alexander Dadaev, one of the wealthiest entrepreneurs in Turkmenistan and the former chairman of the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Turkmenistan. He had two established political parties under his control (the Entrepreneur Party and the Agrarian Party), and Berdimuhamedov channelled some of the assets of his own family through Dadaev and received dividends from Dadaev’s agricultural empire.19 Nevertheless, even Dadaev, despite his wealth and degree of influence, is still merely a secondary member of Berdimuhamedov’s empire. His career terminated in April 2020 when he left his post (official for retirement) and replaced by Dowran Khudayberdyev, one undistinguished personality from the Union. It seems that these and other changes further weakened the competition in the country, and the Berdimuhamedov’s family took control over redistribution of entrepreneurs profit to the hands of the president’s circle. The secondary elite under the Berdimuhamedov’s rule that includes the ministers, business persons not belonging directly to the family or other supportive and servant positions has become transformed to serve the ruling empire of the family. Capturing the business opportunities in the country, it seems that Berdimuhamedov’s family get rid of several Turkmen business tycoons in order to take over their assets (or at least better control them). The example of Charymuhammat Kulov who probably expressed some political ambitions shows that any threat to the family business (political and economic) will be unmercifully eliminated.

18 Sacked After Ten Years at the Top—What Brought Down Turkmenistan’s Interior Minister? Turkmen.news, October 4, 2019. https://en.turkmen.news/opinion/what-bro ught-down-turkmenistan-s-interior-minister/. 19 Aman, Esen. 2017. “Tycoon—President’s Friend.” The Chronicle of Turkmenistan. March 29. http://en.chrono-tm.org/2012/04/tycoon-presidents-friend/.

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The secondary elite members in Turkmen politics are even more unsecured in their positions. Any minor and unconscious offence that might hurt Berdimuhamedov can turn to be fatal for them. As these people are usually involved in unlawful schemes, they might be easily removed from the office and usually severely punished.

2

Mobilisation Potential

Turkmenistan’s closed society, characterised by harsh authoritarianism with almost total control over the population, does not enable the emergence of any significant mood of protest inside the country. Moreover, long-term ideological education and propaganda have created a generation that is unable to imagine another regime, even if the current regime is not capable of bringing prosperity or any potential improvements in the future (Horák 2013). Although the attitude towards the regime among (at least some parts of) the population is not necessarily positive, the repressive measures imposed by the authorities—and the notion of stability as well as security challenges in neighbouring regions—enable the authorities to contain any open display of dissatisfaction. The absence of protest moods is explicitly voiced in a typical toast proclaimed in Turkmenistan—“Parahatçylyk bolsun” (Let there be peace). The mobilisation of the local population is carried out through the regime’s rituals demonstrating the loyalty of the population to the regime (and to the leader personally). Mass festivities (called “chare”) organised by the state—including visits by the president to the regions, state visits, state holidays and others—are mandatory for substantial parts of the population.20 State employees, students and also business people are the most affected groups, although the level of their involvement working for the regime may differ. Entrepreneurs are usually forced to contribute a sometimes substantial share of their income to social programmes, architectural projects and other foundations often connected with the

20 Bairamova, Gul’nabat. 2015. “Veselaia zhizn’ turkmenskoi molodozhi.” Azat Turk-

menistan, October 11. http://www.azatturkmenistan.org/analytics/veselaya-zhizn-turkme nskoj-molodezhi.html. Alternativnyie Novosti Turkmenistana. 2014. “Monitoring ispol’zovaniia prinuditel‘nogo truda v Turkmenistane (Chast’ II),” May 11. https://habartm.org/archives/ 1620.

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president’s assets. However, as the regulations and the system of donations in the business sphere are very vaguely defined, the collection of the fees is sometimes perceived as a form of state racketeering21 (Horák 2016a). Due to the high level of control, the expression of alternative opinions is not allowed, and any such expressions are suppressed by law enforcement bodies. The number of regulations (especially for young people), and their forced participation in official celebrations, does not offer the most active part of the Turkmen populace much space for independent thinking and resistance to the all-pervasive propaganda. 2.1

Alternative Mobilisation Groups

The groups proclaiming an alternative to Niyazov went into decline following the country’s independence in 1991. They kept functioning for a while mostly by inertia from the late Soviet period. However, they remained relatively small in number, and their influence usually did not exceed a limited number of followers based around some idea (ecology, human rights, etc.) or they did not extend beyond some particular region (Horák 2016b). Moreover, as President Niyazov hated any expression of even potential disloyalty towards him personally, he ordered the silencing of all opposition movements and groups as soon as he felt powerful enough to do so in 1992. Opposition members were forced into exile, or their activities were made illegal, so they lived under the constant threat of being accused and jailed (Hinnemo 2005, 62–63; Kuliyev 2006). The opposition-in-exile was able to mobilise mostly international human rights organisations or some Western governments, but it had almost no direct impact inside Turkmenistan itself. At the same time, the internal opposition was unable to mobilise, as the authorities’ control over the population (and particularly over the small group of dissidents) had been tightened since the 1990s, continuing throughout the Niyazov’s entire presidency. There were only several genuine attempts to organise demonstrations, real or alleged plot against the ruler. The first protests appeared in 1995 when several hundreds of demonstrators went to the street to protest 21 Alternativnyie Novosti Turkmenistana. 2017. “Shapka po krugu. Gosorgany prizyvaiut pozhertvovat’ na Aziadu,” December 3. https://habartm.org/archives/6561.

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against increasing economic hardships. These were quickly suppressed by the power services, and the most active people were detained and later jailed with exemplary punishments (Mitrokhin and Ponomarev 1999, 34– 40). In 1998, an isolated group of soldiers left their place of deployment in the town of Kazandzhik (250 km west of Ashgabat) and set out to reach Ashgabat, with unclear intentions.22 In the same year, Avdy Kuliyev, then a leading opposition figure based in Moscow, came to Ashgabat in order to support alleged protests, but he was detained as soon as he arrived at the airport in Ashgabat and expelled to Russia after a few days (Kuliyev 2006, 66–95). A more serious attempt to challenge the regime was organised by Boris Shikhmuradov, the Foreign Minister until 2000, who escaped into exile in 2001. He illegally crossed the border to Turkmenistan in autumn 2002 and tried to organise an unsuccessful coup against Niyazov in November 2002 (Decaux 2003). However, the plot was discovered and November 25, 2002 became a symbol of the last potential resistance to Niyazov’s regime. The regime responded with show trials of the alleged conspirators, including Shikhmuradov himself, who was jailed and probably died in prison.23 After this attempt and the removal of the last strong personalities within the Turkmenistan government by 2005, there was no significant opposition movement (either inside Turkmenistan or outside it) capable of initiating a change of the regime. This inability became evident during the transfer of power, which followed Niyazov’s death in December 2006. Although foreign-based opposition parties tried to express appropriate reactions to the event and undertake necessary actions, the regime simply denied these opposition leaders all access to the country. It was the internal elites who decided on the power transfer; the opposition was excluded from the process, and it was not allowed to participate in elections or any other forms of political life in Turkmenistan (Horák and Šír 2009, 17–18). After this, the opposition-in-exile gradually dispersed in Western Europe and the USA. Only a few groups remained active, focusing mostly on the 22 Ponomarev, Vitaliy. 2001. “V kazandzhikskom tankovom polku.” Memorial. September 15. http://www.memo.ru/hr/politpr/asia/2004/svid-tu/kazand.htm. 23 The Chronicle of Turkmenistan. 2017. “Boris Shikhmuradov byl ubit vo vremia pravleniia Niiazova,” December 3. http://www.chrono-tm.org/2017/03/boris-shihmu radov-byil-ubit-vo-vremya-pravleniya-niyazova/ (including subsequent discussion).

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gathering of information about and from inside Turkmenistan. Chronicles of Turkmenistan 24 (run by Farid and Ruslan Tuhbatulins) and Gundogar 25 (run by Bairam Shikhmuradov, the son of Boris Shikhmuradov) are among the most serious and constant providers of insider information. Later, in the 2010s, several other projects (such as Alternative News of Turkmenistan/Turkmen News, Azat Turkmenistan or the Turkmen Yurt TV YouTube channel) joined the trickle of alternative information flow from the country. However, none of them has political ambitions—with the probable exception of campaigning at international organisations or seeking to uncover the fate of Boris Shikhmuradov and other figures involved in the alleged coup against Niyazov in November 2002 (the “Prove They Are Alive” campaign). Therefore, political opposition does not exist both inside and outside the country. There are also no preconditions for a new political opposition to emerge. Social mobilisation inside Turkmenistan is likewise scarce. However, several protests have broken out in recent years all around the country with several typical features. Firstly, they are locally based, not spreading beyond the affected quarter, town or (the maximum extent) district. It is extremely improbable that such protests will spread throughout the country. Secondly, the protests are mostly directed against some economic restrictions and hardships or specific local social problems. The former type of protest broke out at the Farab bazaar in 2012,26 while the latter case happened in Ashgabat (against the opening of a road). Thirdly, keeping the two characteristics mentioned above in mind (the strong local character and economic/social reasons for protests), the regime can (at least partly) satisfy the demands of protesters.27 However, in case of a more serious threat to the regime, the protests are easily dispersed by police forces. Finally, even if protests were to become more widespread,

24 https://en.hronikatm.com/. 25 http://www.gundogar.org/. 26 Volkov, Vitaliy. 2012. “Protiv chego protestuiut v Turkmenii.” Deutsche Welle, December 11. http://p.dw.com/p/16gAA. The Chronicle of Turkmenistan. 2012. “Na vostoke Turkmenistana vzbuntovalis’ torgovtsy,” January 11. http://www.chrono-tm.org/2012/11/vzbuntovalis-torgovtsyi/. 27 Volkov, Vitaliy. 2014. “Zakonomernosti stikhiinogo protesta.” Deutsche Welle, March 2. http://www.chrono-tm.org/2014/02/turkmeniya-zakonomernosti-stihiynogoprotesta/.

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the political culture and traditions established in the last 25 years would prevent protesters from voicing political demands. All in all, the potential for linear ad hoc protests existed in the country. However, any attempt at a more widespread expression of dissatisfaction is uncompromisingly suppressed (even by force). Moreover, the protest moods are channelled based on economic reasons rather than regime changes. At the same time, people are not willing to take to the streets, as the repressive organs are omnipresent and the long-term atmosphere of fear does not offer fertile ground for serious protests or real political opposition capable of challenging the regime. 2.2

Tribal Rivalries Under the Surface

Both Presidents have striven for control over the regions of Turkmenistan, expelling and repressing local elites and appointing their cronies to the main regional posts. Regional and tribal gaps have tended to be marginalised since independence. At the same time, this regional tribal identity maintains its position in society. It is still considered desirable to marry a member of the same tribe, while inter-tribal marriages are usually not welcomed (Blackwell 2013, 65). The students in Ashgabat, as well as Turkmen students abroad, group themselves according to their respective region/tribe. These fault-lines occasionally become evident in daily life, e.g. in a clarification of interpersonal relations or street fights. The current regime, based on Akhal Teke dominance and (regarding the personal attitude of Berdimuhamedov) even Akhal Teke chauvinism, can suppress other regional groups and keep control over the regions through a system of loyalties (either Akhal Teke or personal loyalty) and repressive organs. The open “Akhalisation” of the leading political and economic positions under Berdimuhamedov has prepared the ground for antiAkhal sentiments which could potentially challenge the existing regime in the case of any power-related or economic crisis (Khan November 23, 2010). Berdimuhamedov facing this potential threat turned the regional governors (hakims ) under extreme pressure for calming down the protest potential and for demonstrating economic progress of their regions (welaýat ). Traditionally, Mary Teke constituted the most significant rival regional group to Akhal Teke within Turkmenistan. The rivalry goes back at least into the nineteenth century when Merv was a vital trade oasis in the Turkmen lands. Furthermore, while the incorporation of Akhal

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Teke into the Russian Empire was achieved violently following the battle of Gök Depe in 1881, Mary Teke representatives accepted Russian domination “voluntarily”. Mary Teke’s insufficient support for Akhal Teke’s fight against the Russian army in 1881 still resonates among the Akhal Teke. Mary Teke (as well as some other tribal confederations in southern Turkmenistan) sit on the country’s key gas fields (Yolotan and Dovletabad, today merged into a single Galkynysh complex). The proximity to the Afghan border may have a synergic effect in the event of a security or economic crisis in the country. The unconfirmed but probably factual information about the weapon and drug smuggling into the Mary welaýat confirms the existence of a potential challenge to Berdimuhamedov. Therefore, the Mary region—which is crucial for any regime in Ashgabat—is under the direct surveillance of the state security organs and remains economically under the control of the family or reliable cronies. The Balkan welaýat in the western part of the country—traditionally inhabited by Yomuts—contains oil reserves and other mineral resources. Until recently, many specialists in the oil and gas industries were recruited from this region. Tachberdy Tagiyev, a leading specialist and former CEO of the Turkmennebit and Turkmengas companies and the Turkmenbashi oil processing complex, was among the most visible. He did not belong to the most powerful elite, but he was respected as an oil and gas expert. Yomuts consider themselves more educated than Teke and highlight their rich cultural and historical legacy, including several respected Turkmen poets and intellectuals (Ghezel January 29, 2017). Currently, Balkan Yomut elites are not strong enough to challenge Ashgabat, though the potential for protest exists. Despite the marginalisation of the tribal question in Turkmen politics, it remains an essential factor that could potentially emerge to challenge the Ashgabat regime. The tensions that have been contained over a long period could turn out to be one of the main fault-lines in the internal policy of Turkmenistan. However, it currently seems that the regime can prevent any mobilisation among tribal and other regional elites. Moreover, no individual in the region would be capable of leading mass opposition against the regime based on regional or tribal affiliations. The dependency of hakims on Ashgabat still prevails over the local or regional interests. Saparmurat Niyazov established a system of control that was mostly based on zero-tolerance against any alternative thinking in the country.

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He set up strict control over the media and adopted repressive measures in order to control the only permissible image of himself. He and those around him initiated a growing personality cult based on the infallibility and inviolability of the president Horák (2005) and Polese and Horák (2015). Niyazov thus became the Prophet of Turkmens, a position which no mortal creature could challenge.28 As he did not trust even Akhal Teke Turkmens (considering them too ambitious and too powerful) he tried to get rid of most high-ranking Akhal Tekes by means of several trials held in the 2000s. His innermost circle consisted of non-Akhal Tekes, and longterm positions (including advisors) were occupied by non-Turkmens. Those chosen and promoted to the elite were not interested in any transformation or modification of the regime; on the contrary, they supported Niyazov’s cult, including the selfish and repressive measures against those at lower levels of power in the country. Constant changes of cadres at this level of power kept the elites in a state of continual tension. The system of corruption that penetrated through all spheres of life did not allow the ministers and other state authorities to remain outside this system. Therefore, Niyazov always had at his disposal compromising information on each member of the elite. By applying a policy of “sticks and carrots”, he bought the population’s silence by providing some welfare incentives (free gas, water, electricity, cheap petrol and essential foods). However, these free supplies led to the obsolescence of infrastructure networks and, in many cases, cut off supplies all around the country. Berdimuhamedov has continued the repressive policies and political culture established by Niyazov, as he has found these practices convenient for maintaining his power. As a pragmatic step, he removed a significant part of the elites who could potentially have challenged his power, leaving in place those figures he considered loyal for him and converting them into servants of the system. As mentioned in Sect. 1, the principal difference between the two leaders is in the number of their family members. The family’s control over the majority of the Turkmen economy as well as over law enforcement and tax inspection authorities has allowed the family to create and maintain a monopoly in critical sectors of the Turkmen economy. Own family and his country-fellow promotion underline Akhal Teke nationalism the fellow of which the current president remains. In order to strengthen his position of Turkmen no. 1, Berdimuhamedov 28 Ballyev, Kakamurat, and Osman Odeev. 2001. “Slovo Proroka.” Neitral’nyi Turkmenistan, May 21.

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has also continued Niyazov’s system of ideological control over the country. He is portrayed as an excellent sportsman, a horse rider, a cyclist, an architect and a representative of many other professions. He even further developed the ceremonies confirming his status as a leader and his legitimacy showing his supremacy in all spheres of life over his subordinates. While Niyazov rarely travelled around the country and abroad, Berdimuhamedov is very active in this regard. This element of power has created a situation of permanent mobilisation among the population, expressing their praise for the president (“Arkadaga Shohrat”) at the street festivities (“chare”). These “beautiful rides” also hamper the rising of the tribal unrest and keep the hakims in the constant threat of being dismissed. 2.3

Economic Hardships as a Push Factor of Mobilisation?

Turkmenistan’s praised economic stability has been affected in recent years as the country’s economy (like that of other countries exporting hydrocarbon resources) has faced the impact of a slump in oil and gas prices and, in the latest months, a decline caused by COVID pandemic. The Turkmen economy receives about 80% of its export incomes from exports of raw materials. It creates an economy entirely dependent on resources rather than labour.29 Compared with a labour-based economy, this economic system allows incomes to be more easily centralised in a small number of hands, regardless of the problems experienced by the country’s population. The fall in prices has been exacerbated by the closure of two out of three gas export routes, Russia and Iran, in 2016 and 2017, respectively. While Russian direction supplies were resumed on a limited scale in 2019, Iran oriented pipelines dried up. Despite a sharp decline in income, Turkmenistan continued to announce high GDP growings.30 Several sectors and actors continue to drain available funds and government assets to the

29 Etkind, Aleksandr. 2016. “Vlast‘chuzhda vsem“. Forbes.ru, March 29. http://www. forbes.ru/sobytiya/ekonomika/316685-aleksandr-etkind-vlast-chuzhda-vsem. 30 Bhutia, Sam. 2019. “Why Turkmenistan’s Rosy Economic Reports Are Unreliable.” Eurasianet.org, October 23. https://eurasianet.org/why-turkmenistans-rosy-economic-rep orts-are-unreliable.

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ruling family.31 As mentioned before, the ruling family remains among the most important actors in this respect. The regime also tries not to endanger investments (often overpriced) in several megalomaniacs and propagandist projects such as the Awaza tourist resort on the Caspian Sea and (mainly) the construction of an Olympic City for the Asian Indoor and Martial Arts Games (Aziada) in 201732 (Horák 2016a). The lack of funds and delays in payments to the building companies were compensated with often involuntary direct and indirect contributions by the population (cuts in state employees’ salaries and transfers by entrepreneurs). The shortage of foreign currency forced the regime to introduce restrictions on currency exchanges and imports of consumer goods. Limitations were imposed on transfers of money from Turkmenistan (including support for tens of thousands of Turkmen students abroad) and payments from Turkmenistan banks to accounts outside the country. These measures resulted in the emergence of a black market in the country in 2016, and (after several years of stable currency rates) the real devaluation of the Turkmen manat, with an increasing discrepancy between the official exchange rate and rates available on the black market.33 This measure enabled the ruling family to carry out “silent” privatisation of the remnants of foreign trade using their access to cheaper foreign currency.34 The imported products are mostly purchased through companies controlled by the family members of the president or their clients, who have access to more favourable currency conversion rates. The shortfalls in the state budget forced the government and Berdimuhamedov to abolish privileges such as the provision of free gas, 31 “Turkmenistan: Gosregulirovanie importa produktov i ikh tsen privodit k defitsitu i

ocherediam.” Turkmen News, May 27, 2019. https://turkmen.news/news/ocheredi-zaproduktami-turkmenistan/. 32 Kramer, Kira. 2017. “90 dnei dliia Aziady. Kogda prestizh vazhnee blagopoluchiia naroda.” Khronika Turkmenistana, June 19. http://www.chrono-tm.org/2017/06/90dney-do-aziadyi-kogda-prestizh-vazhnee-blagopoluchiya-naroda/. 33 The Chronicle of Turkmenistan. 2016. “V Turkmenistane ogranichili denezhnyie perevody cherez Western Union,” January 25. http://www.chrono-tm.org/2016/01/ western-union/; “Krizis ne obozdet turkmenskuzu ekonomiku” 2019. Gundogar.org, December 19. http://gundogar.org/?0130519056000000000000011000000. 34 Turkmenistan Loses Out as Prime State Assets Privatized for Peanuts (2019). Turkmen News, March 22. https://en.turkmen.news/news/turkmenistan-loses-out-asprime-assets-privatized-for-peanuts/.

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water and electricity—i.e. the most essential ideological achievement of the regime.35 However, the recent economic crisis in Turkmenistan has even caused a decline in the ruling family’s incomes, and the government has had to implement some economic restrictions. As a result, the prices of the primary food products (mostly imported and better quality ones) increased significantly, while the incomes of the population decreased, partly also because of the exchange rate.36 The supply chains in the country deteriorated up to the lack of low-quality products in state shops (with state subsidies) and inaccessibility of the products on bazaars and supermarkets (due to high prices) for substantial parts of the population. 2.4

What Kinds of Mobilisation Could We Expect in Turkmenistan?

The exhausting and long-last economic crisis in Turkmenistan probably represents the most significant threat to the existing regime.37 There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, Berdimuhamedov’s family and cronies face a continuing decline in their incomes and the profits generated by economic activity and foreign trade—and this may give rise to dissatisfaction among the members of the ruling class. Secondly, unstable economic conditions create the fundament for protests to give vent to widespread discontent with the regime. The protests already locally outbroke starting from the news in Dashoguz where parents rallied against the significant increase of fees for pre-school attendance. In the following months and years, the deteriorating economic conditions became the reason for several other spontaneous protests.38 However, the most visible rallies 35 Imamkulieva, Irina (2017): Torzhestvo narodnoy demokratii. Neitral|nyi Turk-

menistan No. 274–275 (October 10), p. 8. 36 Turkmenistan: gosregulirovaniie importa produktov i ikh tsen pˇrivodit k defitsitu i ocherediam (2019). Turkmens News, May 27. https://turkmen.news/news/ocheredi-zaproduktami-turkmenistan/. 37 Haknepesov, Selim (2020). Dashoguz: ekonoimcheskiie problemy i ogranicheniia uslozhniaiut zhizn’ naseleniia. Turkmen News, January 20, https://turkmen.news/spo tlight/zhizn-turkmenistan-dashoguz/; Turkmenistan: Lish by nebylo voiny. Itogi 2019 goda. Turkmen News, December 19. https://turkmen.news/opinion/turkmenistan-lishby-ne-bylo-vojny-itogi-2019-goda-v-filme-turkmen-news/. 38 Pannier, Bruce. 2020. A Troubled Government and Rare Protests in Turkmenistan. RFE/RL. May 19. https://www.rferl.org/a/analysis-turkmenistan-s-ineffectivegovernment-brings-people-into-the-streets-for-rare-protests/30620560.html.

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erupted against the non-activity of local authorities after the hurricane and floods in Lebap region (eastern Turkmenistan) in April and May 2020. The protests in Turkmenistan were characterised by several typical attributes. Primarily, all of them were rooted in local affairs and did not challenge the ruling elites and the fundaments of the regime. Secondly, the protests are still not massive, systematic or long-term. It means that the mobilisation potential remains low and involves those who directly take part in such spontaneous actions. This limited character of the protests creates an easy target for still powerful security forces. Additionally, the regionally based protests allow Berdimuhamedov to move the responsibility to local hakims and eventually rotate them for their mismanagement. The hakims seem to use the politics of appeasement to calm down the protest mood and use the repressions mostly for selected people.39 As the queues for the food and other products are usually the matter of women, they (often with their children) are more successful in their demands as security organs tend to appease them rather than use as wide repressive measures as against the male protesters.40 Despite the local manifestations, the regime still can rely on the fact that there is no local or nationwide force capable of organising protests or revolts in the country that would challenge the regime. The pervasive omnipresence of the militsia and security services can monitor the population for any suspicious activities. The security forces can still be considered one of the main pillars of the regime. The Ministry of National Security maintains control over the population through an extensive network of informants. A hierarchical system of loyalties (based on nepotism and sycophancy from one side and intimidation from the other) penetrates the entire system of state authorities from top to bottom and ensures that any displays of disagreement with the regime remain limited. Any small “recommendation” emanating from the president is transferred as a command down to local-level decisions, leading to abuses at the lower levels of the state system. In contrast, expressions of loyalty (organised state events, 39 “Hakim ispugalsiia, prislav vmesto sebia zamestitelia. Podrobnosti protesta v Turkmenabade (2020). Turkmen News, May 14. https://turkmen.news/news/protest-turkme nabat/. 40 Turkmenistan – mezhdu koronavirusom i uraganom (2020). Obzor situatsii s pravami cheloveka v strane. Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights, May 14. https://www.hronik atm.com/2020/05/tihr-report/.

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visits by state officials) are directed from the lower ranks towards the higher ranks of the state hierarchy. The security services act as the controlling mechanism of these top-down and bottom-up processes, ensuring that the system remains enacted. Notably, the Presidential Bodyguard Service plays a significant role in ensuring the implementation of presidential commands and recommendations. A particular group within the Bodyguard Service monitors the use of the internet inside the country as well as monitoring international news reporting about Turkmenistan.41

3

Foreign Actors in Turkmenistan. Competition or Shared Interests?

Turkmenistan could be presented as the cradle of the geopolitical struggle for natural resources in Central Asia (Marketos 2009). Starting from 2009, Turkmenistan became able to export in three main directions (Russia, China and Iran), and it was also interested in building export capacities into Pakistan and India (the TAPI pipeline) and Turkey-Europe (through the system of Transcaspian and Transcaucasian pipelines). In fact, as of 2020, China and Russia are the only countries importing gas from Turkmenistan, while the future of other export routes is doubtful. Moreover, the geopolitical competition for Turkmenistan does not only involve oil and gas supplies. Security and military co-operation are other spheres of potential geopolitical rivalry in Central Asia (Labban 2009). Until recently, Turkmenistan stood aside from the main military and security rivalries in the region, but in recent times the interest of the outside world has increasingly focused on the Turkmen market, due to the Turkmen leadership’s growing security concerns with the situation in Afghanistan (Visingr 2017). However, the companies and the states involved in Turkmenistan are interested mostly in business contacts, rather than political interference in the internal issues of the country. 3.1

Russia: Maintaining Influence in Another Way

Although Russia used to be the leading political and economic partner during Niyazov’s rule, his pro-Russian orientation was mostly a legacy 41 Alternativnyie Novosti Turkmenistana. 2016. “V Turkmenistane deistvuiet spetsgruppa po kontroliu za internetom.” October 14, 2016. https://habartm.org/archives/ 5850.

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of the Soviet era. Niyazov understood the Soviet political culture (and the new Russian political culture) due to his long career in Soviet Party organs. He did not expect any support from Russia if Turkmenistan were to be affected by internal turmoil. Consequently, the lack of external (Russian) support, combined with insecure internal support, led Niyazov to establish a centralised, personified regime. Despite several announcements about the diversification of his external political vectors (Šír 2006) and the construction of a short pipeline to Iran, Russia remained up to 2009 the only viable gas export route and Turkmenistan’s leading economic partner. In addition to the official relations and personal contacts between the first President Niyazov and Russia, several business figures also mediated contacts with Russian counterparts on Niyazov’s behalf. Specifically, the Itera company—led by Niyazov’s companions and former members of the Turkmen SSR Communist Party leadership (Igor Makarov and later Valeriy Otchertsov)—subcontracted gas supplies for Gazprom until the 2000s, when Putin made changes in the Gazprom leadership (Kadyrov 2007, 42). The partners on the Turkmen side were the advisors of the president—particularly Viktor Khramov. However, the leaders of the Itera company (today renamed Areti) lack influential access to Vladimir Putin, which also blocks their path to Berdimuhamedov. After coming to power, Berdimuhamedov began to shift Turkmenistan’s foreign policy away from its previous focus on Russia. In 2009, due to an alleged explosion on the Turkmenistan-Russia pipeline, northward supplies were cut. Although supplies were resumed later (though in much lower quantities), Russia lost its dominant economic position in the country at the expense of China. Gazprom cut all imports from Turkmenistan several times in the past decade due to the disagreements over the prices. In the situation of the economic crisis, the gas supplies revival became desperately needed for Turkmenistan, while Gazprom agreed on gas import mostly due to the political reasons. The Turkmen compromise followed in a days after concluding the contract as the long-term locked question of Russian-Turkmen dual citizens was solved, and these people were able to ask for the Turkmen passports; the issue that was closed for Turkmen authorities for several years.42

42 Turkmenistan nachal priem dokumentov na vydachu passportov bipatridam. Radio Azatlyk, July 5, 2019. https://rus.azathabar.com/a/30038501.html.

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Security issues, however, quickly replaced oil and gas as the most serious pillar of Russian-Turkmen mutual relations.43 In 2014–2015, Russian state media launched a massive campaign warning about the situation on the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan border. Russia then offered military and security assistance to Berdimuhamedov during the visit of the Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov in January 2016, followed by the first-ever visit of the Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu to Ashgabat in June 2016.44 According to several non-official sources, Turkmenistan expressed its willingness to accept Russian military assistance on the Afghan border.45 Although not comparable to the Chinese export volumes, Russia successfully sells its products on Turkmenistan market. Russia supplies Turkmen president with its Kamaz trucks for the needs of the economy, although parts of these supplies are subsequently without its utilisation and are sold in the other markets.46 It shows that some contracts are probably concluded for Berdimuhamedovs’ family profit or in order to satisfy Russian demands. The shift from gas to security and economy demonstrates another attempt to keep Turkmenistan within the Russian orbit. Despite this manifestation of Russian influence in the country, it is clear that Russia is not willing to implement any changes in the internal affairs of Turkmenistan. Despite the agreement about strategic partnership ratified in 2018, the role of Russia as an essential partner shifted to China. Nevertheless, as the case of dual-citizens issue shows, Russia is still capable of creating pressure in Turkmenistan internal affairs; however, the complete replacement of the established regime is not in its interests. 3.2

Chinese Strategic Partnership

China emerged as an essential partner for Turkmenistan at the end of Niyazov’s presidency. However, Niyazov understood that Russia’s interest 43 Dubnov, Arkady. 2009. “Vozvrashcheniie ‘Itery.’” Vremia Novostei, April 3. http:// www.vremya.ru/2009/36/8/224268.html. 44 Pannier, Bruce. 2016. “Russia Flexes Its Muscles In Turkmenistan.” RFE Qishloq Ovozi, December 6. http://www.rferl.org/a/russia-flexes-muscles-turkmenistan-gas-exp orts/27793499.html. 45 Interview with a Moscow analyst, June 2016. 46 The parts of Russian Kamaz trucks supplies are sold in Georgian market. Observation

of the author in 2018–2019.

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in natural gas imports from Turkmenistan was declining in the later stages of his rule. The notion of gas exports to the south and West became increasingly chimeric. In this situation, the only possible solution during the late phase of the Niyazov regime was to turn eastwards. Chinese companies were equipped to make technological progress in the exploitation of new gas fields, and Chinese banks were willing (with the approval of the Chinese leadership) to open up credit lines (Horák and Šír 2009). Niyazov was received warmly in China in 2006 (his last foreign visit), including a grandiose presentation of the second volume of his sacred book the Ruhnama in Chinese language.47 His successor, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, continued to develop this policy. While Niyazov had been able to count on multiple vectors of gas supplies (including Iran and Russia), Berdimuhamedov soon interrupted gas supplies to Russia in 2009 (the circumstances of the so-called explosion on the Turkmenistan-Russia pipeline are still unclear), the same year as China opened the first part of the world’s most extended system of gas pipelines from eastern Turkmenistan. Moreover, Chinese companies were the first to obtain concessions for gas exploitation. It means that China took control over the entire process—beginning with geological surveys and continuing through the construction of infrastructure up to the exploitation itself, leaving only a small role for Turkmenistan. Moreover, China also provided several billion USD in credit to Turkmenistan, the repayment of which is possible only from the incomes generated by gas exports to China. Becoming Turkmenistan’s most significant partner, China was able to establish preferential arrangements and prices for gas.48 Such dominance is at odds with Turkmenistan’s original aims—the diversification of gas supplies and an increase in income due to competition among buyers. Moreover, in 2015–2016 Turkmenistan lost other alternatives for 47 Neitral’nyi Turkmenistan. 2006. “Gosudarstvennyi vizit Prezidenta Turkmenistana Saparmurata Turkmenbashi v Kitaiskuiu Narodnuiu Respubliku,” April 4. Ruhnama (The Book of the Soul), apparently written by Saparmurat Niyazov, combines an autobiography of the President, a revisionist account of Turkmen history and a recommended moral codex for Turkmens. It became an essential part of Turkmen daily life, studied in the manner of a holy text at schools and universities. Knowledge of the Ruhnama penetrated into all aspects of daily life in Turkmenistan—including driving tests or competitions in the recital of texts from the Ruhnama. 48 Khummedov, Yazmurad. 2010. “Kitai Pokupaet Turkmenistan.” Vremia Vostoka, May 7. http://www.easttime.ru/analitic/1/2/817.html.

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exports. After the cessation of gas supplies to Russia mentioned above, Turkmenistan also cut off supplies to Iran at the end of 2016.49 As a consequence, Turkmenistan’s only source of income from gas exports comes from its trade with China, a substantial part of which returns to China in the form of credit repayments. Although Russia directed gas flow has been resumed since 2019, its volume is far from sufficient for Turkmenistan budget and the family. The lack of income has seriously impacted the economy with several restrictions and regulations having to be imposed, leading to supply shortage, lack of foreign currency and real devaluation of Turkmen manat (Jakub and Marszewski 2018). Consequently, the decreasing income of the ruling elites forced them to put even more pressure on an already deteriorated economy. Moreover, the fall of gas prices and the decline of the Chinese vector of gas export due to the COVID pandemic in spring 2020 further decrease Turkmenistan’s incomes for both the state and the family (it is still not clear where precisely these incomes end up) and made the economic crisis even more profound.50 Despite massive involvement of China in the Turkmen economy, the Chinese government has demonstrated its unwillingness to interfere in the internal affairs of partner countries provided that they remain loyal in their mutual relations with China and do not substantially harm Chinese interests. It is questionable whether this corporate, business-based approach to clients will be enough to defend Chinese interests in the region in the future, as any event affecting Chinese interests could force China to become involved in the internal politics of some Central Asian states. However, given the current implausibility of an internal struggle inside Turkmenistan and the improbability of any significant anti-Chinese turn in Turkmenistan’s foreign policy, any change of ruler in a country loyal to Chinese business and politics is not in China’s interests.

49 Pannier, Bruce. 2017. “Turkmenistan And The Neutrality Trap.” RFE Qishloq Ovozi, November 1. http://www.rferl.org/a/turkmenistan-neutrality-iran-gas-dispute/ 28226071.html. Eurasianet.org. 2017. “Turkmenistan, Iran Gas Dispute Serves as Ill Omen for New Year,” February 1. http://www.eurasianet.org/node/81821. 50 Garibov, Azad (2020). Central Asia Caught in Economic Perfect Storm Amid Oil Price Collapse and COVID-19 Pandemic. The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, May 12. http://cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13617-central-asiacaught-in-economic-perfect-storm-amid-oil-price-collapse-and-covid-19-pandemic.html.

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187

Turkey and Turkmenistan: An Empire of Selected Businessmen

Turkish leaders, and some Turkish analysts and scholars, often rank Turkmenistan among Turkey’s most important strategic partners during bilateral meetings and summits (Kasım 2014). At the same time, political relations and geopolitics have usually been less significant than the educational and business links that have become the most important components in Turkmenistan-Turkish relations since the 1990s. Numerous Turkish schools (including a Turkmen-Turkish university) have been opened in Turkmenistan, and the number of Turkmen students at Turkish universities was the highest out of all Turkic-speaking countries (Türk 2009, 43). Turkish schools, mostly funded by Fethullah Gülen foundations, provided high-quality education, and they quickly became one of the most popular alternatives to Turkmenistan’s corrupt and deteriorating school system Clement (2007, 2014). However, the schools did not supply new members of the elite in Turkmenistan, and Berdimuhamedov’s suspicious attitude towards Gülen’s schools in the country resulted in their eventual closure by 2014, due to fears of the penetration of radical Islam among Turkmen students.51 The TurkmenTurkish university opened in 1994 was closed following the events in Turkey in July 2016, after which Turkey put pressure on Turkmenistan to remove institutions with apparent or alleged pro-Gülen orientation from its education system. This act terminated educational co-operation as an important pillar of mutual relations and adoption of Turkish “soft-power” in the country. The raids against Gülen’s followers (real or supposed) and business people connected with him demonstrated the attitude of the Turkmenistan leadership towards Turkey. In addition to the university, almost all businesses connected somehow with Gülen were closed down,52 including the Yimpash market.53 After the collapse of co-operation in the educational sector, business relations remained the most preferred 51 The Chronicle of Turkmenistan. 2014. “Turkmeno-turetskiie razborki iz-za shkoly v Ashkhabade,” August 20. http://www.chrono-tm.org/2014/08/turkmeno-turetskie-raz borki-iz-za-shkolyi-v-ashhabade/. 52 Radio Azattyk. 2016. “Turkmenistan: aresty za sviaz’ s Gulenom prodolzhaiutsia,” November 21. http://rus.azathabar.com/a/28130701.html. 53 Radio Azattyk. 2017. “TC ‘Yimpash’ perekhodit pod kontrol’ vliiatelnykh liudei i vskore mozhet otkryt’sia pod novym nazvaniiem,” January 30. http://rus.azathabar.com/ a/28267604.html.

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field of co-operation. Around 600 Turkish companies are operating in Turkmenistan, and they are most active in the textile, chemical and construction industries (Türk 2009). However, only a few Turkish businessmen have managed to come close to the president’s inner circle and influence the decision-making process inside Turkmenistan. Ahmet Çalık, the holder of the Çalık holding (one of the biggest business empires in Turkey), became a citizen of Turkmenistan, and for several years he held the position of the Deputy Minister for the Textile Industry. Another Turkish businessman, Erol Tabanca (with his Polimeks holding), also became one of the most prominent figures in the Turkmenistan business sphere (especially construction). The access of other Turkish people in business to the country’s leadership, and their influence on decisionmaking processes, is far less regular and cordial. However, companies and holdings such as Norsel, Cotam, Linkway, Engin Group and others operate on the Turkmenistan market, probably with less attention and fewer scandals than in case of the Polimeks and Çalık holdings (Korkmaz 2018, 244–246). In the first years of President Berdimuhamedov, it seems that he relied more on the Polimeks holding.54 His acquaintance with Erol Tabanca dates at least from the construction of the new building for the Ministry of Health (controlled by Berdimuhamedov during Niyazov’s presidency). According to some insider information, Tabanca “protected” Berdimuhamedov in front of Niyazov when Berdimuhamedov was accused of receiving kickbacks for contracts with Polimeks.55 Recently the Polimeks holding was awarded two of the most important strategic contracts in Turkmenistan during recent years—the Olympic City and the new airport in the capital, both for the Asian Indoor and Martial Arts Games in 2017, at the cost of around 5 billion USD (Horák 2016a). Even against the background of the economic crisis and increasing debts owed by the state to contractors in several projects, Polimeks always receives its payments. At the same time, “Çalık holding” regained its position in

54 Atabaev, Deria. 2012. “Berdimukhamedov i tureckaia kompaniia ‘Polimeks’: vzlet v 2007 g.” Radio Azattyk, October 4. http://rus.azattyq.org/a/polimex_turkey_guli_berd ymukhamedov_business/24542594.html. 55 Informal interview with a former state official in Turkmenistan, 2013.

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the country and it continues to get the governmental contracts, particularly in building, textile and electro energy industry.56 All in all, Turkish companies have constructed more than 1000 buildings in Turkmenistan since 1992, with total expenditures of 50 billion USD.57 In general, Turkmenistan has become more of a territory for the extraction or laundering of money by several influential Turkish businesspeople rather than a real strategic partner for Turkey. Although Turkish magnates could feasibly change politics in Turkmenistan via their influence and funds, no one has a serious interest in challenging a regime which is willing to cooperate with Turkish investors (who receive lucrative kickbacks). Even though the seizure of control over Turkish businesses is a sign of Berdimuhamedov’s (and his family’s) determination to capture the most lucrative businesses in the country, the process also shows the ability of Erdogan’s leadership to influence the internal affairs of Turkmenistan. However, as in the case of Russia or China, Turkey is hardly willing to change the leadership of a country which manifests its loyalty to Erdogan’s regime in case of necessity. 3.4

Other Actors Struggling for Influence in the Country

Other state and non-state actors active in Turkmenistan mostly include those that are interested in making deals with the country. The Petronas Corporation (Malaysia), Gazprom and Lukoil, etc. (Russia), European energy companies like ENI, Shell or British Petroleum, Siemens (Germany) or Huawei (China) in the sphere of communications, and Bouygues (France) in the construction industry, rank among the most prominent. Some minor companies from Ukraine, Belarus, Iran or other countries may be somewhat less satisfied with their contracts in Turkmenistan, as the current economic crisis means that these companies do not receive their payments on time. However, these companies cannot pose any threat to the existing regime.

56 Khronika Turkmenistana. 2020. “Konsortsium ‘Chalyk‘postroit kol’tsevuiu energosistemu Turkmenistana,” February 1. https://www.hronikatm.com/2020/02/electro-cha lyk/. 57 Durdyzhan, Maksat. 2018. Ch’i interesy zashchishchaet Arkadag. Gundogar.org, January, 26, 2018. http://gundogar.org/?02470518149000000000000011000000.

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EU impact in Turkmenistan is minimal, and the perception of the EU is somewhat ambiguous in the country. Neither the EU as one unit nor a single EU member state is perceived as a potential stimulator of changes. Business opportunities take priority in Turkmenistan, including still theoretical Transcaspian gas pipeline linking Turkmenistan with the European market (Lee 2019). At the same time, EU programmes do not apply to the country (Peyrouse 2014, 11–12). As in the case of the most important partner states, prominent corporations (and the states standing behind them) are interested mostly in the stability of Turkmenistan and leadership willing to conclude the mutually attractive deal at the expense of the state budget. Contractors which enjoy a close enough relationship to the president and are entrusted with the most strategic projects also receive their payments on time, at the expense of smaller and less established companies and also the local population, which is not considered a threat in the eyes of Berdimuhamedov and his family. Unlike some more open countries, Turkmenistan lacks the presence of a vast range of various NGOs focused on the training and democratisation processes. Except for the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (whose impact, in any case, appears to be limited due to pressure from the Turkmen authorities), other potential non-state actors and international organisations have been expelled from the country or have found conditions for the development of civil society unfavourable as a result of official pressure. The remnants of civil society consist mostly of so-called GONGOs (government-organised non-governmental organisation) non-governmental organisations that are in fact under the control of the government and the authorities, which can provide some humanitarian, development or (until recently) educational aid under the control of the authorities (Dailey and Silova 2005, 211–230). Any proselytism, democratisation, civil society or human rights-related activities are strictly forbidden and suppressed. Organisations such as the Soros Initiative, Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, the National Democratic Institute and others are regarded (not without reason) as agents of the West, and (after the “colour revolutions” in the former Soviet space in 2003– 2005) as instigators of revolution (Ó’Beacháin and Polese 2010, 229). Russia, China and also Turkey (as the principal partners of Turkmenistan) are also far from being supporters of the development of civil society in the country—much less of NGOs supported by the West.

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So-called Islamic proselytism is strictly suppressed in Turkmenistan. For this reason, the Gülen elementary and secondary schools were closed even before the anti-Gülen campaigns in Turkey, and existing Islamic schools are run by people who are loyal to the regime. Turkmenistan’s security services intensified their activities inside the country and on the border after numerous claims and reports about the presence of Taliban and Islamic State (IS) fighters on the Turkmen-Afghan border (though still on the Afghan side) and proclamations about Turkmens fighting in Syria and Iraq on the side of the IS forces.58 Generally, Turkmenistan does not offer fertile ground for long-term NGO activities leading to the cultivation of democratic, liberal values— but neither is the country conducive to radical Islamic values. A “colour revolution” such as occurred in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan or Ukraine remains inconceivable under the current regime, as such developments need at least a degree of long-term freedom of expression and some space for NGO civil society activities. Liberalisation, freedom of the press and education in Turkmenistan—as recommended by several Western and other analysts, scholars and activists59 —are not acceptable in Turkmenistan, and there is no way to disseminate these values among the population. Turkmenistan’s system is not ready to open itself up and allow any kind of organisations or civil society actors which could (as the authorities would interpret it) infiltrate Turkmen society and is still more open and democratic values among at least a part of the population. The political culture established in Turkmenistan is not ready for such a development, and the regime feels threatened by words such as democracy, freedom or Islamic education. Moreover, the closest foreign partners of Turkmenistan share the same attitude towards the spread of democratic values and Islamic radicalism.

58 Cortbus, Colin. 2015. “Is The Islamic State Threat Making Turkmenistan Vulnerable To Russian Military Influence?” The Interpreter, March 9. http://www.interpretermag. com/is-the-islamic-state-threat-making-turkmenistan-vulnerable-to-russian-military-influe nce/. 59 “General Saad Muhammad: ‘Rvom granitsa Ne Okhranaetsia’.” 2014. Alternativnyie Novosti Turkmenistana, September. https://habartm.org/archives/1470.

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4

Conclusions

After its independence, Turkmenistan passed through a period of consolidation under its first President Saparmurat Niyazov. He was able to create a unified Turkmenistan through intense centralisation of the regime, an almost total lack of alternative forces, and the establishment of personal rule via a cult that is sometimes considered a form of eccentric totalitarianism. Thanks to his unique starting position (with his legitimacy rooted in his appointment by Moscow) and his status as an orphan (which meant that he had only a weak connection with local structures), Niyazov had a rare opportunity to concentrate unchallengeable power in his own hands. His style of rule created a specific kind of political culture based on the central role of an adored leader. The second President, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, inherited this political culture and maintained the most relevant parts of it when creating his regime. Unlike Niyazov, Berdimuhamedov lacks external legitimacy, distant from regional structures and charisma. Although he retained Niyazov’s legacy of centralised rule and personality cult, his social roots and origin have not allowed him to play the same exclusive role as his predecessor. He brought Turkmenistan under the rule of his family and clan, with the position of president as Turkmen No. 1 and Akhal Teke No. 1 in terms of both formal and informal rule. As Malashenko has noted, the regime changed from almost totalitarian towards a typical hard authoritarian system (Malashenko 2012, 3). The long-term inertia of the established political culture dominated by the “Turkmen No. 1”, the revival of clan structures and the general isolation of Turkmenistan (despite some easing of the situation after 2007) have all functioned as internal prerequisites for the stable survival of the regime in its present form. Popular revolts originating inside the country are improbable, as the population is highly intimidated. With the intensification of economic hardships in Turkmenistan, isolated protests and demonstrations could occur, although they are currently not strong enough to challenge the system and the regime as such. It appears that at present, there is no viable alternative to the authoritarian regime in Turkmenistan. The population is not ready to participate in the political and economic life of the country, as the harsh political, security, economic and ideological control exerted by the regime does not allow the emergence of any alternative groups. The most capable cadres have already left the country. The deterioration of the education

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system—combined with the clannish nature of the political system and the role of personal connections and funds in gaining promotion, even at the lower levels of the system—does not permit the emergence of new cadres that would be capable of leading the country along another path than authoritarianism. However, it is precisely this system of clans, connections and corruption, together with tight control over the population, that constitutes the authoritarian regime. Of course, some correction of the regime—or even its sudden implosion for whatever reason—cannot be excluded; however, such a situation would quite possibly propel the country into a struggle for the redistribution of power (among regions or clan structures, or several high-ranking figures) with unpredictable results. Moreover, even in such a case (the overthrow of the current leader), we can expect a continuity of political culture, with authoritarian rule and the exclusive role of the president continuing once a particular group has seized power. Rapid change within the country would cause the situation to deteriorate rather than ushering in the process of liberalisation. Currently, even the threats mentioned above are mostly hypothetical, and whether or not they become a reality depends on the regime’s ability to maintain control over its repressive bodies. The alternative to authoritarian rule is much less viable when compared to other potentially similar cases (such as Syria, Tunisia or Egypt before the 2011 Arab Spring). Unlike Syria, in which demands for change among a substantial part of the population were supported from outside, Turkmenistan’s key partners (Russia, China and Turkey) and other outside actors are mostly interested in maintaining stability within the country. Although the two countries exist in different cultural, historical as well as political and geopolitical contexts, Turkmenistan’s durability and stabilising factors make it more similar to North Korea than to Syria or other countries that have faced the challenge of regime change in recent years. The outside voices promoting the liberalisation or even democratisation of the country usually ignore Turkmenistan’s experience of stability in the last 25 years compared with the instability that has beset surrounding regions (Afghanistan, Tajikistan, the Middle East) and the interest of a majority of the population in maintaining these achievements, albeit under harsh authoritarian rule. Unlike the countries affected by the Arab Spring (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya) or the “colour revolutions” in the post-Soviet space (Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan), Turkmenistan’s population receives only minimal information from abroad (as well as from inside the country). The regime can at present control the country’s

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relatively small population (compounded by the brain-drain caused by emigration). The Islamic extremist threat to Turkmenistan is not unrealistic, but the interest of international jihad in the country is somewhat limited as the population is mostly indifferent towards the radical forms of Islam and proselytism is suppressed. Although Berdimuhamedov considers the turmoil in Afghanistan (and especially in the territories adjacent to Turkmenistan’s borders) to be a significant threat, it is unlikely that Afghanistan will be the source of events which endanger the regime’s survival. Locally rooted terrorism could occasionally occur in the country, but the security system is currently able to deal with this threat. Even more severe threats—such as acts of sabotage on the Amudarya river or raids on Turkmenistan’s territory in order to take control of (for example) gas infrastructure—will hardly be able to undermine the regime as such. All in all, Turkmenistan (like many other similar systems) successfully challenges the thesis about the inevitable internal or external collapse of an authoritarian regime and its possible turn towards a more open and liberal system or, on the contrary, religious extremism; this is especially true in a situation when key external partners do not support either of these paths.

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Tajikistan: From Reconciliation to Post-Reconciliation Edward Lemon and Flora Roberts

Like the other former Soviet countries profiled in this edited volume, Tajikistan experienced the challenges of state-building following an independence that was thrust upon the region’s leaders in 1991. Rather

Edward Lemon is Research Assistant Professor at The Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, Washington D.C. teaching site. He has previously held positions at the Wilson Center and Columbia University. His research focuses on authoritarianism and security issues in Central Asia. He is the editor of Critical Approaches to Security in Central Asia (Routledge 2018). Flora Roberts is the Lecturer in Environmental History at Cardiff University. Her research focuses on Soviet Central Asia, but she has also directed research on contemporary security issues in Central Asian border regions funded by the OSCE and worked for international development agencies in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan, managing microfinance and emergency response projects, among others. Her research has been published in Central Asian Survey and Ab Imperio.

E. Lemon Texas A&M University, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected] F. Roberts (B) Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. Izquierdo-Brichs and F. Serra-Massansalvador (eds.), Political Regimes and Neopatrimonialism in Central Asia, The Steppe and Beyond: Studies on Central Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9093-1_6

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than transitioning towards democracy as Kyrgyzstan did, Tajikistan, like the other states in the region, has become increasingly authoritarian, with informal, factional politics remaining central to the endurance of authoritarian rule. But Tajikistan stands apart from the other states in a number of ways. It was the only country to experience protracted civil conflict, which left over 20,000 dead.1 Fear of the resumption of conflict continues to shape the way most citizens acquiesce to the authoritarian regime. Tajikistan remains the poorest state in the former Soviet Union, lacking the mineral and natural resource wealth of its neighbours Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. As the only ex-Soviet majority-Persian-speaking country, Tajikistan has the potential to benefit from much closer commercial and cultural ties with Iran, but despite significant levels of humanitarian assistance from Iran since the mid-1990s, the relationship hitherto has been clouded by fears of Shiite Iran’s real agenda for the predominantly Sunni country.2 Over the years, as President Emomali Rahmon has consolidated his position, Tajikistan has increasingly conformed to the type of regime Juan Linz and Houchang Chehabi call a “sultanistic regime” (Chehabi and Linz 1998). The boundaries between the state and the elite are blurred. Governance in Tajikistan is kleptocratic, with members of the elite capturing large parts of the state and dominating the economy for personal gain. Although laws exist, justice is meted out selectively, with the regime using accusations of corruption and extremism to remove rivals. By means of plebiscites, rigged elections and constitutional amendments, Rahmon has ruled since 1992. The president has fostered a cult of personality, framing himself as the nation’s founder and saviour. Tajikistan is increasingly dynastic, with power seemingly being transferred to

1 The only study conducted to determine the number of deaths in the civil war in Tajikistan put the number at 23,500, with 20,000 of these deaths occurring in 1992. See: Mukomel’, Demograficheskie Posledstviia etnicheskikh i religional’nikh konfliktov v SNG, Naselenie & Obshchestvo, No. 27 (April 1997), Table 1; Mukomel’, Vooruzhennie mezhnatsional’nie i regional’nie konflikti: lyudskie poteri, ekonomicheskii ushcherb i sotsial’nye posledstviia, in Identichnost’ i konflikt v postsovetskikh gosudarstvakh. 2 Tajikistan was also outraged by Iran’s decision to host Muhiddin Kabiri, exiled leader of the IRPT branded a terrorist by Rahmon’s government, for a conference on Islamic Unity in December 2015. See Catherine Putz, Tajikistan’s Islamic Disunity on Display at Islamic Unity Conference, The Diplomat, 31 December 2015. http://thediplomat.com/ 2015/12/tajikistans-islamic-disunity-on-display-at-islamic-unity-conference/.

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Rahmon’s son Rustam, in a process which has taken shape since 2017, when Rustam became mayor of the capital Dushanbe. In this chapter, we seek to define the elite in contemporary Tajikistan, explain how the contemporary ruling class in Tajikistan came to acquire its favoured position, map the factional networks surrounding long-time President Emomali Rahmon and shed light on its contacts with global capitalism and international institutions. Our goal is to highlight both the sources of resilience and the areas of vulnerability of today’s elite in Tajikistan. To understand the dynamics of authoritarian governance in Tajikistan, the experience of seventy years of Soviet rule needs to be taken into account. As Georgi Derluguian has argued for the Caucasus, in Tajikistan the transitions from the communist period are still ongoing, and therefore a long durée approach to the formation of the Tajik elite over the course of the twentieth century is crucial to understanding the present configuration (Derluguian 2016, 8). Analysts often frame Tajikistan as in danger of “Afghanicisation,” arguing that “the Rahmon regime could, theoretically speaking, collapse at any moment” (ICG February 12, 2009, 15).3 Others have pointed to the way that the state has become fused with networks of organised crime (De Danieli 2011; Engvall 2006; Marat 2006). Given this apparent state weakness, analysts have pointed to the limits of the regime’s power. Writing in 2012, Lawrence Markowitz argued that Tajikistan conformed to a “soft authoritarianism,” whereby the president’s power was diminished to the extent that he had to distribute rents among a number of clients, and fragmented security institutions lacked repressive powers (Markowitz 2012). Since Markowitz made this argument, much has changed in Tajikistan. The last of the warlords incorporated into the government following the civil war have been purged, the president has promoted members of his family to senior positions in government, the country’s leading opposition movement—the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan—has been outlawed, and President Rahmon has become “Leader of the Nation,” allowing him to rule indefinitely. While the power of the regime has its limits, the government has consolidated its

3 On “Afghanicization,” see Hill (2002).

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position. The regime is neither “weak” nor “strong.” Instead, it is hybrid and polyvalent, strong in certain aspects and weak in others.4 This chapter examines what Oisin Tansey calls “authoritarian practices,” or “the non-democratic strategies that autocrats use to secure their rule, and once in power, to fend off challenges and ensure regime survival” (Tansey 2016, 55). Authoritarian rule, according to Johannes Gerschewski, is based on three “pillars”: co-opting members of the elite, strategies of legitimation, and repressing threatening behaviour (Gerschewski 2013). This chapter places emphasis on the role of factional networks in governing Tajikistan. Observers have long noted the importance of informal kinship relations in Central Asian politics, adopting a range of terms and approaches to these relations.5 Kathleen Collins uses the term “clan“ to refer to the “informal organisations comprising a network of individuals linked by kin and fictive kin identities,” in Central Asian politics (Collins 2006, 17).6 Pauline Jones Luong favours the term “regionalism” to describe the importance of relations based on local background (Jones Luong 2002). In his work on Kyrgyzstan, Scott Radnitz uses the term “networks” (Radnitz 2005). Radnitz’s approach favours neither place of origin or kinship ties. Like Radnitz, Henry Hale’s concept of “patronal politics,” or more specifically “patronal presidentialism,” focuses on these networks. According to Hale, “patronal politics refers to politics in societies where individuals organize their political and economic pursuits primarily around the personalised exchange of concrete rewards and punishments through chains of actual acquaintance” (Hale 2015). Networks of patronage based on kinship, regional or other ties form the centre of politics in Tajikistan. In other words, “power involves not only formal but immense informal authority based on pervasive patronclient relationships and machine politics” (Hale 2005, 36). Like in other post-Soviet states, Tajikistan is a “single pyramid” system with President Rahmon sitting atop. Yet, to understand authoritarian governance in Tajikistan we need to look beyond these elite networks. As Gerschewski argues, “today’s autocracies cannot rely (at least in the long term) entirely on their

4 On hybrid forms of statehood, see Migdal (1994). For a discussion of statehood in Tajikistan, see Heathershaw (2014). 5 For a discussion of these terms, see Gullette (2007). 6 See also Schatz (2004).

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abuse of power in a strictly, hierarchical, pyramid-shaped political order” (Gerschewski 2013, 18). Rahmon has used repression to consolidate his power. In doing so, he has targeted three types of threat: citizens, organised political opposition and rival members of the elite.7 But authoritarian governance in Tajikistan has not rested on repression alone. The government has legitimated its rule in the negative by sparking fears of instability should citizens challenge the status quo. At the same time, through education and the state media, the regime has developed a national ideology that attempts to unite citizens through a commitment to peace and secularised expressions of Islam. This chapter unfolds as follows: in the first section, we survey the changing make-up of the Tajik elite from the Tsarist to the Communist period. We chart the rise of an elite cadre from Leninobod (modernday Khujand) who came to dominate republican politics during the post-war Soviet decades. This perceived favouritism towards the Leninobodis contributed in part to societal tensions that erupted in civil war in 1992. Having discussed the civil war, we discuss how President Rahmon, following his rise to power in November 1992 was forced to broker deals with a series of warlords from the country’s south. Having relied on these warlords, and the support of external patrons Russia and Uzbekistan, to re-establish order and sign a Peace Accord with the opposition in 1997, Rahmon moved against the warlords. Gradually, the warlords lost their positions, were killed or imprisoned. In the second half of the chapter, we discuss the rise of a new elite centred on President Rahmon, his family and allies, predominantly from in and around Kulob. We map the way that the elite maintain their control over politics and the economy through opaque, offshore companies. Not only does the elite rely on these transnational connections, it also draws support in the form of investment and security assistance from external patrons, most notably Russia, China, and, to a lesser extent, the United States. Having discussed these patrons, in the final two sections we draw attention to the way Rahmon’s regime has consolidated its position through repression. We focus on the country’s leading opposition party, the Islamic Renaissance Party, which was banned in 2015. In the final section, we discuss the emergence of a state ideology which valorises “peace” and “national reconciliation,” stirring up fears of a return to violence should the authoritarian order be challenged.

7 This tripartite distinction is outlined in Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009).

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1

Elites Under Communism

Like the other nation states of post-Soviet Central Asia, Tajikistan came into being as a territorially demarcated republic during the Stalin era (1927–1953). Before the Bolshevik revolution, the territories that comprise the contemporary republic were split between the GeneralGovernornate of Turkestan, a colony of the Russian Empire under direct military rule, and the Emirate of Bukhara, which by 1873 had become a much-diminished Russian protectorate. The final territories of modern-day Tajikistan came under Russian control in 1895 with the signing of the Anglo-Russian border agreement and the establishment of a permanent Russian garrison in Khorog. Before the revolution, the elites in the region were landowners, Islamic clerics, scholars, judges, and state functionaries (whether employed by the Russian colonisers or at the court of the Emir). These categories very often overlapped: many large landholdings enjoyed tax-exempt status as Islamic charitable endowments (waqf ), whose administration was hereditary, and these endowments funded the madrasa system, which was the primary mechanism for forming, maintaining and perpetuating the socioeconomic and cultural elite (Khalid 1998).8 Literacy and a traditional Islamic education were both the preserve of the elite and a crucial marker of status. Genealogically-defined elite status groups were also a significant feature of the local landscape: prominent families held family trees (shajarat ) documenting their descent from the Prophet Muhammad’s early caliphs, eminent Sufi leaders, the Chinggissid royal family or a combination of the above. Although nobody was formally excluded from attending a madrasa, illiteracy was widespread, social mobility was low, and each marker of elite status—land, wealth, genealogy, erudition and a reputation for piety—tended to reinforce the others, or facilitate their acquisition. The first half of the twentieth century brought successive waves of violent upheaval and profound social change to the whole region, but the pre-revolutionary elites proved remarkably nimble and strikingly tenacious. Even before the reverberations of the two revolutions of 1917 reached Central Asia, much of the region was convulsed by the violent uprisings against the draft in 1916, in response to the Tsar’s illconsidered decision to enlist local men for non-combat roles in the First World War (Brower 2010; Buttino 2003). The civil war, which followed 8 On waqf , see McChseney (2014).

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closely on the Bolshevik seizure of power, caused widespread famine in Central Asia, and the death of up to one-quarter of the total population (Buttino 1993). After a few short years of relative stability in the countryside during the 1920s, Stalin launched a large-scale collectivisation campaign, expropriating landowners, confiscating grain and cotton crops and forcing peasants into collective farms (kolkhozes ). The 1920s also saw concerted campaigns against religion and “servants of a cult,” or the Islamic clergy, whose property was confiscated, while they themselves were arrested or exiled. These dangers led many elite families to flee beyond Soviet borders, often to Afghanistan, but others who stayed became adept at concealing their “class origin,” masquerading as landless peasants and learning to “speak Bolshevik” (Kotkin 1995). Of these, some were genuinely drawn to the ideals of the Party and served the cause of socialism loyally for decades, while for others it was an adaptation strategy to avoid arrest or execution. The process of national delimitation began in the 1920s, when the fledgling Bolshevik regime inherited the colonial region of the TurkestanGovernorate General from the Tsarist Empire. Then, with help from the Red Army, the Emir of Bukhara was driven into exile in Afghanistan in 1920, and the People’s Soviet Republic of Bukhara briefly became a Soviet protectorate, until losing its independence and coming under full Bolshevik control. When the Soviet Union was established in 1922, the Central Asian territories were divided between the three union republics of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, and several subordinate Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSR), including the Tajik, the Kara-Kirghiz and Kara-Kalpak. The long drawn out process to assign territories to ethno-linguistic groups, and determine which of these groups merited full republic status, as opposed to an autonomous territory within another republic, included protracted negotiations between fiercely invested local stakeholders, and was by no means as case of “divide et impera,” as some local and Western scholars and journalists continue to assert (Bustanov 2014).9

9 See, for instance Shishkin (2014), and the robust rebuttal to the old canard of Stalin’s malevolent role in the national delimitation process offered by Alexander Morrison in “Stalin’s Giant Pencil: Debunking a Myth About Central Asia’s Borders,” published by EurasiaNet on 13 February 2017. Accessed 10 May 2017 at http://www.eurasianet.org/ node/82376.

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By the mid-1920s, a number of Central Asians (who assigned themselves a range of ethno-national labels, sometimes depending on the circumstance), mostly but not exclusively hailing from the prerevolutionary elite, had joined the Communist Party and were in a position to play leading roles in the fraught process of assigning a national label to each town, village and waterway. At the same time, the Central Asian Bureau, which acted as an intermediary between Moscow and the region, was headed by an outsider to the region throughout its existence, and the First Secretaries of each of the Central Asian republics who ultimately emerged from the process were also largely outsiders until the post-war period.10 Ethno-linguistic homogeneity within a territorial unit, which in any case would not have been possible without massive population transfers, was far from being the overriding principle of territorial delimitation, as economic, administrative and logistical criteria often took precedence.11 Each full republic also had to have an external border, and contain a large enough population. As a result of this process, the Uzbek republic included a significant Persian-speaking minority, including important urban centres of Persianate culture such as Samarkand and Bukhara, while the Tajik autonomous region, centred on the territories of the former Emirate of Bukhara, included a sizeable number of Turkic speakers, both sedentary and nomadic.12 The exclusion of Samarkand and Bukhara, seat of the Samanid ruler Ismoil Somoni, later claimed as the putative proto-founder of the Tajik nation, from Tajik territory, would come to rankle with the Persianspeaking intellectuals who made of Tajikistan their home. Irredentist claims regarding the status of Samarkand and Bukhara have never ceased, as Tajik nationalists intermittently restate the claim that the exclusion of these two cities was to their republic a mortal blow.13 This has been

10 On the role of the Central Asian Bureau, see Keller (2003). 11 Indeed, in 1923 the commission responsible for re-designing administrative subdi-

visions within Turkestan explicitly set aside national criteria “because the population is too mixed.” D.P. Krasnovskii, ed., Materialy po raionirovaniiu Turkestana, vyp.2, Proekt administrativno-khoziaistvennogo deleniia TSSR (Tashkent, 1924), quoted in Khalid (2015, 271). 12 On the process of national delimitation, see Hirsch (2005). 13 For an example of Tajik nationalist historiography advancing irredentist claims on

Samarkand and Bukhara, see Rahim Masov, Istoriia topornogo razdeleniia (Dushanbe: Irfon, 1991).

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one among several causes of friction between the two now independent republics, which has also caused problems for ethnic Uzbeks in Tajikistan, and ethnic Tajiks in Uzbekistan. Relations between the two nations have, however, improved since Shavkat Mirziyoyev became president of Uzbekistan, following the death of Islam Karimov in 2016. The subordinate status of Tajikistan compared to Uzbekistan was inscribed, in practice as in theory, from the first day, when the little runt state of Tajikistan was carved out of the rocky east of Uzbekistan, like the Biblical Eve from the superfluous rib of Adam. Paul Bergne reviews the formal reasons why Tajikistan was eventually able to qualify as a full republic: the territory had an external border, with Afghanistan, and could not technically remain a mere autonomous region given that it itself contained an autonomous region (Badakhshan), whose population was distinct in terms of both religious affiliation (Ismaili) and languages (Pamiri). The Pamiri languages belong to the Eastern Iranian group of languages, unlike the Persian (later labelled Tajiki) spoken in the lowlands of the future Tajik nation state (Bergne 2007). Once Tajikistan was granted full republic status in 1929, official Soviet policy favoured the formation of a national intelligentsia, to serve in Party and State organs, and lead the rest of their countrymen towards a bright socialist future. To this end, a strong emphasis was placed on literacy campaigns and primary education, and a set of measures amounting to ethnicity-based affirmative action were adopted to promote locals of the titular nationality, where possible, at the expense of Russians or other Europeans (Martin 2001). The policy of korenizatsiia, as it was known, unwittingly favoured the social elite from urban areas, as it provided a mechanism for allowing ascribed national identity to take precedence over ascribed class identity. Memoirs and archival sources concur in documenting a process whereby representatives of local elites were promoted to positions previously held by Russians or members of other national groups to the north and west (including Muslim Tatars).14 During the 14 See, for instance, Ibrohim Rahmatovich Jabborov (2014), Vklad akademika S.A. Radzhabova v razvitie vysshego obrazovaniiai nauki Tajikistana (Unpublished doctoral dissertation), Tajik National University, Dushanbe: 34–36. The role of korenizatsia is tacitly or openly acknowledged in the accounts of career trajectories given in several memoirs including: Zarif Radzhabov (Rajabov) (1986), Stranitsy proshlogo: iz vospominanii veteran kul’turnogo stroitel’stvo v Tadzhikskoi SSR [Pages from the past: from the memoirs of a veteran of cultural construction in the Tajik SSR], Dushanbe, n.p.; Saidkarim Valizoda (1975), Yode az guzashta [Memories of the past], Dushanbe, Irfon.

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heyday of korenizatsiia in the 1920s, when swelling the cadres of national elites was seen as the top priority, the “class vigilance” that had been urgently stressed until recently was suffered to lapse. When the emphasis temporarily shifted from class to ethnic/national status, logically the local elites were poised to reap the benefits. The positions which were vacated for them required a degree of functional literacy and level of comfort with the material culture and social conventions of Russophone society that was beyond the reach of all but a handful of “working class” Central Asians—sharecroppers, field workers hired by the day and artisans’ apprentices. Those most equipped to take on white-collar positions in the Soviet administration were graduates of reformed Islamic schools, and of the Russian-native schools established by the Tsarist government precisely to train native functionaries and foster rapprochement to Russian culture (Khalid 1998; Khalid 2015; Morrison 2008). Within the newly formed Tajik national intelligentsia, young scions of scholarly and clerical families from Bukhara and Samarkand predominated initially, attracted by the investment in Persophone culture in Dushanbe beginning in 1930. As in other Soviet republics, and throughout the Soviet period, the intelligentsia constituted one of the main categories of the “new” elite: writers, artists and other culture workers enjoyed relatively comfortable lifestyles, privileged access to goods and services even in times of great shortage, and wielded significant moral authority, as did their Russian counterparts. Sadriddin Aini, novelist Jalol Ikromi, academician Mohammad Osimi and poet Mirzo Tursunzade were among the most eminent of the Soviet-era cultural elite. The first cohort, the Samarkandis and Bukharans who populated the cultural as well as the political elite in the first Soviet decade, was radically thinned out by the senseless violence of the Stalinist Purges of 1933–1938.15 This hecatomb set the stage for the ascendancy of a new

15 Approximately 70% of the party membership in Tajikistan—nearly 10,000 people at all levels of the organization—was expelled between 1933 and 1935. Accurate numbers for purge victims are notoriously hard to pin down, but it has been established that 7,883 Tajik citizens were subsequently rehabilitated, about half posthumously, see Nourzhanov and Bleuer (2013, 111–112). Prominent victims of the purges included several who had taken active part in the national delimitation process: Abdurahim Hojiboev (chairman of Tajik SovNarKom until 1933), Nusratullo Mahsum (chair of the Central Executive Committee of the Tajik SSR), Shirinsho Shotemur (acting first secretary of the Communist Party of the Tajik ASSR from 1929 to 1930) and Abdullo Rahimboev (chair of Tajik SovNarKom until 1937). The Russian non-governmental organisation Memorial has

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group, the Leninobodis.16 Leninobod, as Khujand had been renamed in 1936, was the Tajik republic’s largest town at the time of its formation, a relatively prosperous settlement on the banks of the Syr Darya River. The most fertile land available in the predominantly mountainous republic was to be found in the Fergana Valley around Khujand, and it was here that the most successful collective cotton farms—the “millionaire” kolkhozes —were set up.17 The links between the chairmen of these unusually successful cotton farms and the republic’s political elite grew very close in the post-war period.18 After the Second World War, between 1946 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, each of the five successive First Secretaries of the Tajik Communist Party—at the top of the republican chain of command—was native Leninobodis. The second most powerful position, that of Chair of SovNarKom (Council of People’s Commissars), was held by a Leninobodi between 1946 and 1986, with the single exception of the Pamiri Dodkhudoev, whose tenure as SovMin Chairman overlapped exactly with that of his close friend Uljaboev as First Secretary (1956–1961). This small male clique shared many biographical details, including long careers in government, technical educations, close ties to the region’s most successful cotton growers; several of them had connections to a single school, the Behbudi internat (boarding school), founded in Khujand/Leninobod in the immediate aftermath of the Bolshevik revolution (Iskhaki and Iskhaki 2002). To a portion of the political elite, as well as to the cultural elite, education remained an important marker of status until the collapse of the

compiled a list of one hundred purge victims executed in the Tajik SSR in 1938 (not all of them ethnic Tajiks), which does not include Tajiks executed elsewhere in the USSR, available at https://www.memo.ru. 16 This narrative has been challenged by Isaac Scarborough, who argues that the idea that “Tajik Soviet politics was dominated by a unified “Leninabad” clan, […] is not entirely supported by available evidence. Archival records show that ministerial and Party roles were filled by cadres from around Tajikistan, and political networks often had as much to do with shared work experience as with geographic belonging.” See Scarborough (2018, 55). 17 On the phenomenon of millionaire kolkhozes in general, see Fitzpatrick (1996, 262ff). For more on the millionaire kolkhozes surrounding Leninobod and their links to the political elite, see Roberts (2016). 18 The current President, Emomali Rahmon, also began his career in cotton farming, although he is from the south of the country, not the north where Khujand/Leninobod is located.

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Soviet Union, and cultural capital continued to accumulate within certain lineages, particularly in the north of the country. The lines between the political and cultural elites were blurred: Bobojon Ghafurov, the first ethnic Tajik First Secretary and a strong champion of native cadres, left politics for academia and is today mostly eulogised as the author of one of Tajik nationalism’s foundational texts, The Tajiks (Tojikon 1973). Given that education, including higher education, was one of the first professions to be colonised by the old elite after the revolution, it was all but inevitable that Soviet teachers and academics would—consciously or otherwise—favour those students whose values and habits of mind most resembled their own. The long-serving head of the Tajik Academy of Sciences, Mohammad Osimi (1920–1996), was in a position to advance or stall the careers of many aspiring academics and, according to some, even control access to the capital’s most prestigious universities. His assassination in 1996 during the civil war was interpreted as a settling of scores, and a warning to other Leninobodis. It is hard to overstate the symbolic as well as economic value of the cotton harvest in Soviet Tajikistan. Collective farm chairmen who exceeded their set targets were showered with honours and lavish rewards, including prizes they were able to distribute to their clients and dependents. In 1961, a scandal broke over inflated procurement figures for cotton grown in the republic, which implicated the Tajik leadership from the kolkhoz level upwards, and led to the sacking of Tursunboi Uljaboev, First Secretary of the Tajik Communist Party between 1956 and 1961. Inflating the figures for the cotton harvest was a predictable, and even rational, response to the constantly climbing quotas set for cotton production in Tajikistan, and to the mechanisms whereby funding for other sectors was conditional on meeting cotton quotas. The scandal broke and was mopped up, however, without seriously affecting the standing of the Leninobodi elite, which was broad enough to be able to offer plausible alternatives to those too damaged by the scandal to be able to keep hold of their positions. The Tajik cotton affair of 1961 strikingly prefigured the Uzbek cotton scandal which broke in the 1980s, but the latter had rather more damaging effects on the Uzbek nomenklatura (Starr 2011, 141). In her study of Soviet Tajikistan’s political elite in the 1970s, Rakowska-Harmstone identifies the governing elite of Tajikistan very simply with the membership of the Central Committee of the Tajik Communist Party, which, while not incorrect, elides the significance

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of informal patronage networks and mutual obligation binding the economic, political and cultural elites (Rakowska-Harmstone 1970, 146); see also Nourzhanov and Bleuer (2013, 119–143). After the shake-up in the early 1960s, Brezhnev’s policy of fostering the “stability of cadres” meant that incumbents were allowed to remain in the same position, often in their home region, for a decade or longer, which allowed for informal networks between elite groups in Tajikistan to solidify, while the uncertainties created by the command economy made of patronage systems an important adaptation strategy. Jabbor Rasulov is a good example of the pattern promoted by Brezhnev: he served as First Secretary of the Tajik SSR between 1961 until his death in 1982. Rasulov was replaced by another Leninobodi with strong connection to the cotton-producing network, Rahmon Nabiev, who was, however, dismissed shortly after Gorbachev’s election and the start of perestroika in 1985 (Epkenhans 2016, 32). In Tim Epkenhans’ account of the origins of the civil war, based on autobiographies of participants and observers, the tenure of Nabiev’s successor Mahkamov was marked by deepening cleavages in Tajik society. As the economy faltered, competition within the elite for resources and positions to distribute to their patronage networks intensified. Mahkamov’s background—an orphanage upbringing, and management of a coal mine—differed from that of his predecessors, and he appears to have been less successful at balancing and propitiating the rival elite networks.

2 Civil War and the End of Leninobodi Dominance Alone among the former Soviet republics, Tajikistan descended into a devastating civil war shortly after the Union’s collapse, when supporters of the incumbent government were pitted against a loose coalition of forces that came to be known as the United Tajik Opposition. The 16th Session of the Supreme Soviet in November 1992 eventually established a new dominant elite and political economy in Tajikistan centred on elites from Kulob, but several rounds of peace talks between Rahmon’s government and the United Tajik Opposition failed to broker a definitive peace accord until 1997, following significant external pressure by Iran, Russia and the United States. What were the factors that caused Tajikistan to spiral into civil war, a fate avoided by the neighbouring Central Asian republics? In explaining

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the outbreak of the conflict, scholars have placed importance on the role of regional identities (mahalgeroi), solidified by Soviet internal migration policies.19 The pattern of massive forced resettlement from the mountainous areas of Gharm, the Pamirs, Maschoh, to the cotton-growing regions of Kulob and Qurgonteppa, which began in the 1930s and intensified in the post-war period, was not unique to Tajikistan. But the policy of placing newly-settled families in separate collective farms seems to have created particularly acute social tensions in the south of the republic. Resettlement and the experience of exile “strengthened the imagined or real bonds with what was considered and imagined ‘home’ – and with each other, sometimes to the detriment of relations with other communities settled in the area” (Epkenhans 2016, 6). Years of perceived favouritism towards the Leninobodis at the republican level also bred resentment. When Tajikistan fragmented in 1992, it did so primarily along these regional lines. The opposition, an alliance of democratic nationalists and Islamists calling for the gradual Islamisation of society, mostly hailed from the east of the country, from the Pamir, the mountains around Gharm, and the Gharmi villages in the south of the country. Pitted against them were forces dedicated to maintaining the status quo. The pro-government Popular Front (Sitodi Milli) was supported by those from Leninobod (renamed Khujand in 1991), who had dominated republican politics during the Soviet Union, those from Kulob, who dominated the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and ethnic Uzbeks from Hissor, with external support provided by Russia and Uzbekistan. But regional divisions were not the only factor driving the conflict. Others have characterised the conflict as a battle over resources in a “weak” state and a competition between elites vying for power in a weakened institutional environment (Lynch 1999; Rubin 1998). As Epkenhans writes “the enormous challenge of the Soviet Union’s disintegration, compounded by inner-elite conflicts, ideological disputes and state failure triggered a downward spiral to one of the worst violent conflicts in the post-Soviet space” (Epkenhans 2016). As Idil Tuncer-Kilavuz has argued, the Tajik Civil War did not simply pit richer regions of the country against poorer; this can be seen in the fact that pro-Communist Kulob, then among the poorest areas of the country, allied with Leninobod, which was the wealthiest. Many alliances 19 On the role of regionalism in the outbreak of violence, see Roy (2000, 85–89), Ferrando (2011, 39–52), and Akiner (2001).

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cut across (sub-)ethnic lines. Although both regional and kinship-based identities and loyalties are important to the elites of Tajikistan, as they are to ordinary citizens, the dynamic networks of patron-client relationships have better explanatory power than do primordialist “clans.” Such solidarity networks draw on ties not only of blood, but also of friendship and commonality of interests, work, education and patron-client relationships. Such networks “are neither purely regional nor purely clan-based. […] People from the same region can be rivals, while people from different regions can be allies” (Tuncer-Kilavuz 2011, 265, 267). But focusing on regionalism alone is not sufficient to understand the Tajik Civil War. As Tim Epkenhans argues, regionalism was “an ordering device…and not causative for the conflict” (Epkenhans 2016, 8). John Heathershaw has called the conflict a “complex crisis of decolonization” (Heathershaw 2009a, 25). It emerged from specific economic and political conditions that emerged in the late Soviet and post-independence periods (Scarborough 2018; Nourzhanov and Bleuer 2013; Epkenhans 2016). Scholars have paid attention to Tajikistan’s experience of perestroika and glasnost. Isaac Scarborough documents how marketisation under perestroika forced firms to lower production, avoid unprofitable contracts and cut workers. This resulted in rising unemployment, inflation and shortages of consumer goods. The entire republican economy went into recession in 1989 (Scarborough 2018). From 1987 on, Gorbachev began to call for glasnost (openness). In Tajikistan, this new atmosphere of openness allowed for the formation of new political parties and movements. In late 1990, the first political party to challenge the monopoly of the local Communist Party was officially registered: the Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT) (Epkenhans 2016, 51). Other parties that emerged during this period included Rastokhez (formed in 1989), which called for a revival of the Tajik language, the Islamic Renaissance Party (formed in 1990), which pushed for Islam to play a greater role in public life, and La’li Badakhshon (formed in 1991), which called for greater autonomy for the Pamir region. In February 1989, a large group gathered in front of the Tajik Supreme Soviet, the first protest of its kind. They held banners declaring “We demand the resurrection of the ancient Tajik culture!” The protest, organised by Rastokhez, was the first of a number organised in the Gorbachev period. In February 1990, the tension and anger produced by glasnost/perestroika was laid bare in three days of largely undirected anti-government riots which left 26 dead.

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Tajikistan’s leadership reluctantly declared independence from the Soviet Union on 9 September 1991. The [Tajik] Communist Party dissolved itself in the weeks following independence, but nonetheless retained its grip on power. On 24 November 1991, elections were held in which Nabiev, who had been First Secretary of the Communist Party between 1982 and 1985, was reported to have obtained 57% of the votes cast. The runner up, filmmaker Davlat Khudonazarov, had received 30% of the votes cast (Ahmed 1994, 87–89). The opposition decided not to challenge the results, and the early months of Nabiev’s presidency saw a lull in intra-elite struggles. But this soon ended as Nabiev and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Safarali Kenjaev sought to purge disloyal elements within the old Communist Party apparatus, and opened legal proceedings against members of the DPT, Rastokhez and the IRPT. Attacks focused on Minister of Interior Mamadayoz Navjuvonov, an ethnic Pamiri. In March 1992, protesting the move to marginalise Navjuvonov, hundreds of supporters of La’li Badakhshon began protesting on Shahidon square in central Dushanbe. Soon they were joined by members of the DPT and IRPT. On March 27, 1992, the opposition leaders put forward their demands: the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet, the holding of multiparty elections and the resignation of Kenjaev. Within a week, protesters supporting the government set up camp in the nearby Ozodi square, and a stand-off ensued. After tense talks between the government and the opposition, in May 1992 an agreement was reached to form a coalition government of national reconciliation. In return, the coalition promised to call off the blockade erected by supporters in the capital city and disarm their militias, but these arrangements never got off the ground. In May 1992, proCommunist militias in Kulob launched an attack on the collective farms of Qurgonteppa, an area which was a stronghold of the IRPT. On the last day of August, students from the pro-opposition Dushanbe Youth Movement captured the parliament building and took several hostages there. The Prime Minister, Akbar Mirzoev, resigned at once (Ahmed 1994). On September 7, 1992, Nabiev went to Dushanbe airport and attempted to board a flight to Khujand, but was prevented from doing so by a large, angry crowd who forced him to resign. Although a Leninobodi, Nabiev did not hail from the social elite; for this reason, or some other, he had failed to secure the unequivocal support of the Leninobodi elite. On April 11, 1993, Nabiev died in his own home in Khujand at the age of 62— possibly of natural causes stemming from his alcoholism, but perhaps by

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his own hand, or perhaps, as some of his relatives have claimed, he was murdered. Within a year of gaining independence, the Tajik state had collapsed. The violence was triggered by individual decisions made by elites (Rubin 1998, 139–142; Akiner 2001, 21). Some, like Nabiev, failed to act to quell the tensions. For others, like Kenjaev, “violence presented an opportunity to remake the structures of power” in their own favour (Scarborough 2018, 254). They found willing supporters who formed around regional solidarity groups. With the economy in a state of total collapse by the Spring of 1992, “Tajikistan’s citizens were willing to turn to extremes and even violence if this would improve their lives” (Scarborough 2018, 232). Regardless of what caused the conflict, it wrought devastation on the country. Between 1992 and 1997, between twenty and fifty thousand lives were lost in the country, and almost seven hundred thousand people were displaced (Scarborough 2018, 263).

3

A Government of Warlords

The fact is that 24 years ago, on November 16, 1992, in the Kasri Arbob palace in Khujand, at the 16th session of the Supreme Council of Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmon was elected chairman of Supreme Council (head of state). It was on this very day that constitutional order was resurrected and that an end was put to anarchy and to divisions within authority—Saidali Siddik, director of Khovar20

In November 1992, the Supreme Council voted for Emomali Rahmon to be its chair, and effective head of state. With Kulobis heading the most powerful militias and contributing three-quarters of the pro-government fighters, the Leninobodis opted to elect a new chairman from Kulob. They hoped that by appointing a relatively weak candidate, they could eventually marginalise him and appoint their chosen candidate, Abdulmalik Abdullojonov, as head of state.21

20 Saidali Siddiq, Den’ presidenta (President’s Day), Khovar, 16 November 2016. http://khovar.tj/rus/2016/11/den-prezidenta/. 21 Abdullojonov became the Minister of Grain Products in the Tajik SSR in 1987. An ally of Nabiev, he served as Prime Minister from September 21, 1992 to December 18, 1993. Members of Abdullojonov’s family dominated politics in the north of the country.

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Little-known Emomali Rahmon, who had just turned 40, was chosen as the compromise candidate. Rahmon was a relative newcomer to republican politics, having only been elected to the Supreme Soviet in 1990. Born into a relatively undistinguished family in the south of Tajikistan, he had worked as an electrician, gained a degree in economics and then worked for his local trade union. Slowly he rose through the party ranks, becoming director of the Lenin sovkhoz (state farm) in his hometown of Danghara in 1988. He became Chairman of the Kulob Executive Committee in 1992, enjoying the support of powerful warlord Sangak Safarov. Nonetheless, Rahmon was in a position of relative weakness in 1992. He commanded no militia of his own and did not have his own independent power base. At the time of his election to chair the Supreme Soviet, the government controlled just 40% of the country’s territory and did not have full control over the capital city. Given this weakness, Rahmon was forced to broker a series of deals with warlords who had backed the government during the civil war, and to rely on the support of external patrons, most notably Russia. It was, as Barnett Rubin summarises, a shift from “those who held the factories and party personnel committees” to “those who held the guns” (Rubin 1998, 129). The warlords offered the nomenklatura security and access to transit networks for both licit and illicit trade in the former-Soviet Union. Rahmon’s rise signified a transfer of power from Leninobod to Kulob.22 When Rahmon formed his government in 1992, the warlords were well-represented. The most powerful Popular Front commander, former barman and convicted murderer from Kulob, Sangak Safarov, led the newly named People’s Army.23 Another commander and ex-criminal, Yaqub Salimov, was appointed Minister of the Interior.24 Suhrob Qosymov, a one-time schoolteacher and karate instructor, commanded the Special Forces of Dushanbe Police from his base in Varzob from

His brother became mayor of Khujand in the early 1990s and his brother in law Abdujalil Homidov was governor of Leninobod viloyat (region) from 1990 to 1992. 22 For a thorough analysis of these pacts with warlords, see Driscoll (2015). 23 In a stroke of luck, Rahmon avoided having to deal with his most powerful patron

Safarov who was killed by another commander Faizali Saidov on March 30, 1993. 24 A career criminal, Salimov was jailed for being a leader of the riots that shook Dushanbe in February 1990. Salimov was allegedly henchman of Rauf Saliev, a boxer and prominent leader of Dushanbe’s underworld.

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1993.25 Sulton Quvvatov, headed the Ministry of the Interior’s Unit of Combatting Economic Crimes, and headed the Tax Committee from 1995.26 Ghaffor Mirzoev became head of the Presidential Guard in 1995.27 Rahmon also relied on the support of the governments of Russia and Uzbekistan. Following independence, Russia maintained an army base, the 201st Motorised Rifle Division (MRD), in the country. When the war began in May 1992, the troops were ordered to remain neutral, backing the establishment of a Government of National Reconciliation in which one-third of posts were given to the opposition.28 But soon the Russian army started transferring arms to the pro-government militias. In 1993, the Commonwealth of Independent States deployed 25,000 peacekeeping forces to reinforce the 201st MRD. Challenging the concept of impartial, third-party peacekeeping, Russian-led “peace making” (mirotvorchestvo) focused on “the notions of ‘authority’ and ‘stability’” (Heathershaw 2007, 220). Ultimately, Russia intervened in Tajikistan to maintain its hegemony in the near abroad (Heathershaw 2007). Concerned by the instability over its border, the government of Uzbekistan trained and supplied pro-government forces, particularly those controlled by Safarali Kenjaev (Hiro 1995, 213–218). The Uzbek air force also attacked United Tajik Opposition bases in Afghanistan (Horsman 1999). In a sign of Uzbekistan’s role in bringing about the recapture of Dushanbe in December 1992, Alexander Shishlyannikov, a representative of the armed services of Uzbekistan, was made Minister of Defense in January 1993. After Rahmon won the 1994 presidential election, the process of “Kulobisation,” whereby ministries were filled with civil servants from Kulob, continued apace (Akiner 2001). By mid-1995, Kulobis represented 43% of top government positions (the Cabinet, the Presidential Administration and leadership of the national legislature), three times 25 A physical trainer at schools in Dushanbe, Qosymov joined the Popular Front as a commander in 1992. 26 Quvvatov worked in the economic crime department at the Minister of Interior in Kulob and later Dushanbe. 27 Before joining the Popular Front, Mirzoev worked as a teacher, in a factory and as a driver in an avtobaza in Kulob. 28 For a more comprehensive history of the Russian–Tajik relations in the Yeltsin period, see Jonson (2006).

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higher than when Rahmon took over (Nourzhanov 2005, 120). Almost every Leninobodi was pushed from the presidential inner circle and the security forces. Sixteen of the 23 cabinet positions were filled by officials from Kulob (Collins 2006, 285). Having begun to consolidate and strengthen state institutions, with the strong encouragement of Moscow, Rahmon’s government started to negotiate with the opposition. On June 27, 1997, Rahmon and the head of the United Tajik Opposition, Said Abdullo Nuri, officially concluded a “General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord,” formally ending five years of civil war. The Accord created a twenty-six-member Council on National Reconciliation, composed of thirteen opposition and thirteen government representatives. The peace deal was built on the formal incorporation of opposition elites into the government. In return for disarming their militias, elites from Gharm and Badakhshan were offered 30% of government positions.29 Influential cleric Hoji Akbar Turajonzoda became first deputy prime minister in 1999.30 The UTO military commander Mirzo Ziyoev was appointed to head the newly-created Ministry of Emergency Situations (MCHS) in 1998 and allowed to command a small battalion of troops. Commander from the Rasht valley Mirzokhuja Nizomov headed the Customs Committee and later held a senior position on the Border Protection Committee. Salamsho Muhhabatshoev from Vanj was appointed Chairman of the Committee on Oil and Gas in 1997. Democratic Party of Tajikistan leader Mahmadruzi Iskandarov headed state energy company Tojikgaz from 2001. Former commander Hakim Kalandarov became Deputy Chairman of the State Committee of Border Protection. A number of commanders from the Rasht valley were given positions in local government, allowing them to maintain their dominance over the region. Mirzokhuja Ahmadov headed the local office of the anti-organised crime directorate (UBOP) of the interior ministry (MVD) in Gharm. Another commander, Nemat

29 By July 1999, 5,377 UTO fighters had been incorporated into Tajikistan’s army, police force and border guard units. 30 Born in 1954 into a prominent religious family, Turajonzoda studied Islam in Bukhara and Jordan, becoming qazi kalon, or supreme religious leader in Tajikistan between 1988 and 1993. He joined the UTO and supported the opposition during the civil war. He held the position of first deputy prime minister until 2005 and remains a member of the Supreme Assembly, Tajikistan’s upper house.

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Azizov, headed the Tavildara division of the Ministry of Emergency Situations. These commanders retained substantial private armies, maintaining extensive patronage networks and support in their home districts. Rahmon relied on the warlords to assert his authority, and extend his control over territory in the years following his appointment. As Kirill Nourzhanov argues, “these warlords have been instrumental in restoring the collapsed state in Tajikistan; on many occasions they worked on its behalf propping up centralised government at the national level” (Nourzhanov 2005, 111). But as well as helping the central government, the warlords used their positions to amass personal fortunes and further develop their own power bases. Others contented themselves with living from the spoils their positions offered. Religious leader Hoji Akbar Turajonzoda controlled a cotton-processing plant and shopping centre in Vahdat. Suhrob Qosymov owned a string of dachas in the picturesque valley of Varzob, where officials and western aid workers went to relax at the weekend. Ghaffor Mirzoev owned over 30 apartments in Dushanbe and the bank Olimp. In short, the warlords’ alliance with the government was a marriage of convenience, suiting both parties in the short term. But as Rahmon consolidated his position, the warlords became potential rivals. Gradually, he outmanoeuvred and removed them.

4

1997–2006: The War on the Warlords

From the very beginning Rahmonov planned to be Kulob’s chairman as a person capable of carrying out orders of the then united PFT without questioning them. None could foresee then that behind this young obedient leader lurks a treacherous and ungrateful dictator. Nobody from his close circle could have thought that one might fall victim to his political intrigues.31

By 2002, when the former Popular Front commanders penned this open letter, Rahmon’s purge (chistka) of the warlords was well underway. As Rahmon’s own power base grew, he relied on these strongmen less and less. The campaign against the former commanders took two distinct

31 A 2002 open letter of the old Popular Front commanders to President Rahmon commanders, quoted in Nourzhanov (2005, 125).

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avenues. First, the regime moved against “spoilers,” former commanders who believed that the peace deal threatened their power and refused to fully accept it.32 This included those who had never been incorporated into the government, and those who had been, but had never fully accepted the terms of the Accord. Two such commanders, Mahmud Khudoiberdiyev and Ibodullo Boimatov, continued to threaten instability, using this to increase their bargaining power. Khudoiberdiyev ruled Qurgonteppa as an independent city state, refusing to pay taxes to the central government. Ethnic Uzbek Ibodullo Boimatov, a warlord from Hissor, became mayor of Tursunzoda, supported by a private army paid for by his control of the TadAz aluminium smelter, the country’s largest industrial enterprise.33 When Boimatov was replaced as mayor of Tursunzoda, he led a rebellion, saying he was fighting against the “Kulobisation” of the state. In February 1996, Khudoiberdiyev and Boimatov seized Dushanbe airport, cutting off supplies to the city. Instead of being punished for their actions, the two commanders were promoted by Rahmon’s weakened administration. Boimatov was appointed to the position of special trade envoy for cotton and aluminium, while Khudoiberdiyev became the First Deputy of the Presidential Guard. The Prime Minister, his first deputy and the Head of the Presidential Administration, all of whom were Kulobis, had to step down. Despite having been given official positions, erstwhile allies Boimatov and Khudoiberdiyev continued to spoil the peace process. Having become Tajikistan’s cotton trade representative in Uzbekistan in early 1996, Boimatov died in an attempt to invade Tajikistan on October 28, 1997. Mahmud Khudoiberdiyev repeatedly tried to disrupt the peace process, launching a military operation against the central government in August 1997, before retreating to Uzbekistan. In November 1998, he launched another attack, this time against Khujand. A counter-offensive by the government regained control of the region a few days later. Khudoberdiev fled to Uzbekistan.34 While Khudoiberdiyev’s attempted coups constituted the largest threat to Rahmon’s government, other commanders were responsible for 32 On the concept of ‘spoilers’ in peace negotiations, see Stedman (1997). 33 Renamed TALCO in 2007, the aluminium smelter consumes 40% of the country’s

electricity and accounts for one-third of exports. 34 His exact fate is unknown, with some reporting that he died in 2001. See, for example, Engvall (2014, 234).

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localised outbreaks of violence. Rizvon Sodirov had fought with the UTO, only to switch sides in 1995, and then take 17 people hostage in Obigarm in February 1997. After a number of attempts, government forces killed Sodirov and 40 of his militants in December 1997. Mullo Abdullo, whose real name was Abdullo Rahimov, an opposition commander based in Nurobod in the Rasht valley, also rejected the peace deal. The government only felt in a position to remove him when he killed the head of the Gharm raion (district) in June 2000. In September of that year the army moved against Abdullo’s group, killing 28 of them.35 Abdullo fled to Afghanistan, where he joined the Taliban. Finally, Rahmon Sanginov, another UTO commander, controlled the eastern approach to Dushanbe from 1995 onwards. In 2001, after murdering the Minister of Interior, his group was wiped out by the government. Having dealt with those who had openly rebelled against the state, Rahmon turned his attention to those who, publically at least, remained loyal to him. Using allegations of corruption and extremism, Rahmon gradually removed these former commanders from his government. Some were fired, others compelled to retire. Some were arrested, others murdered. Yaqub Salimov was dismissed as Interior Minister and sent into effective exile as ambassador to Turkey. In 1997 he was accused of a coup attempt, and kidnapped in Moscow in 2003 to face jail back in Tajikistan. Sulton Quvvatov, who had been head of the Tax Committee since 1995, was dismissed in 1998, stripped of his Parliament seat in 2002 and arrested for “inciting ethnic hatred” in 2002. Strongman from Hissor, Safarali Kenjaev, the former Transport Prosecutor and ex-Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan, was shot in 1999. Kenjaev was reportedly planning a presidential bid in the elections that year.36 Chairman of the State Oil and Gas Committee Salamsho Muhhabatshoev left the government in 2001. Qurbon Cholov, an alleged drug trafficker who held a senior position in the Border Guards, and Saidshoh Shamolov, head of the 5th Brigade of Border Guards were both dismissed in 2002. Ghaffor Mirzoev was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment

35 For details on the operation, see ICG (December 24, 2001, 17). 36 Kenjaev was one of the most powerful men in the country following indepen-

dence. As Speaker of the Supreme Soviet between 1991 and 1992, he stoked tensions by publically accusing ethnic Pamiri Minister of Internal Affairs Mamadayaz Navjavanov of sympathizing with opposition protesters in March 1992.

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in 2004. Suhrob Qosymov was dismissed in 2005 and quickly disappeared from politics, becoming head of the country’s football federation. Mirzokhuja Nizomov, head of the State Customs Committee, retired in 2006. With almost all the warlords removed from central government, Rahmon continued to place members of his extended family and those with ties to his home region in top government positions.

5 2008–2012: Reasserting Control over the Periphery Even after the removal of many former commanders from their posts, some areas of the country, most notably the Rasht valley, remained beyond the control of the central government.37 Tavildara district remained under the control of the former Minister of Emergency Situations, Mirzo Ziyoev. Gharm was dominated by Mirzokhuja Ahmadov. In February 2008, the head of the paramilitary police (OMON), Colonel Oleg Zakharchenko, was killed in an attempt to eliminate Ahmadov. Zakharchenko’s murder initiated a showdown between the Rasht warlords and the central government. Although Rahmon visited the region and reportedly pardoned Ahmadov, offering land and money to him in exchange for retreating from politics, the law enforcement agencies did not lose their desire for revenge.38 The rumoured return in 2009 of Mullo Abdullo, the commander who had escaped to Afghanistan in 2000, gave the central authorities an opportunity to re-assert control in the Rasht valley. In May 2009, the regime used the kidnapping of three soldiers in Darvoz by an armed group led by another former commander, Nemat Azizov, as an opportunity to move against Mirzo Ziyoev. The government accused Azizov and Ziyoev of being involved in drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Kyrgyzstan via Tavildara.39 Under the cover of an anti-narcotics sweep, 37 For more contexts on this conflict, see Lemon (2014), Lemon and Hamrin (2015), and Heathershaw and Roche (2011). 38 “M.Akhmadov: My Dostanem ikh i v Pravitselstve” [M. Ahmadov: ‘We Will Get Them, Even in the Government’], Asia-Plus, 12 January 2011, http://news.tj/ru/new spaper/article/m-ahmadov-my-dostanem-ikh-i-v-pravitelstve. 39 On August 5, Safina TV, a channel owned by Rahmon’s daughter, aired police footage of the interrogation of two of Azizov’s brothers, arrested on August 3. They both cited Mirzo Ziyoev as their group’s leader.

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the government launched a campaign against the Tavildara leaders on May 15, 2009. On July 8, an armed group tried to take control of Tavildara itself; the Ministry of Internal Affairs alleged that Azizov and Ziyoev were involved in the violence.40 Police repelled the group and shot four of its members dead. On July 11, Ziyoev was arrested and then killed in mysterious circumstances. According to the official account, released in a joint statement by the MVD and State Committee on National Security (GKNB), Ziyoev had agreed to reveal the militants’ hidden arms caches and to negotiate their surrender, after which Azizov’s group accused him of betrayal and shot him.41 On August 4, the government declared the operation a success. Eleven militants were dead, including Azizov, and twenty were detained. On August 20, 2010, forty-six of those arrested in Tavildara in 2009 were sentenced to between ten years and life in prison on charges of terrorism, illegal arms possession and murder. Within three days, twentyfive prisoners, most of whom had just been sentenced, escaped from a maximum-security prison in Dushanbe. Among them were Nemat Azizov’s brothers, Ziyoev’s sons and the brother of Ghaffor Mirzoev, the former head of the Presidential Guard. Rahmon ordered a nationwide security operation, putting the border guards on high alert and setting up police checkpoints around the country. On September 19, a military convoy came under attack in Kamarob gorge, north of Gharm, with the loss of thirty-five servicemen.42 The defence ministry blamed Ahmadov, Mullo Abdullo and Alovuddin Davlatov (known as Ali Bedaki), for the attack. With the Zakharchenko murder case reopened earlier in the year, and the new charge, Ahmadov became fair game, despite his informal pardon in 2008. On September 23, two thousand troops entered the Rasht valley. The previous day, Ahmadov narrowly escaped when a helicopter gunship destroyed his house, killing five people. On 40 Saodat Muhbatsho, Tajikistan: Mysterious Death Raises Concerns About Militant Returns, EurasiaNet, 13 July 2009, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/ articles/eav071409.shtml. 41 Analysts have noted numerous inconsistencies in the government’s account of events. Sodiqov notes that whereas the Tajik authorities reported that Ziyoev was killed on July 11, www.centrasia.ru broke the news of his death on July 10 (Sodiqov August 19, 2009). 42 The government suffered another setback on October 6 when an Mi-8 helicopter carrying the GKNB’s elite Alpha division crash-landed, killing twenty-eight soldiers. Although the defence ministry claimed the helicopter “crashed due to technical reasons,” locals reported seeing RPG fire (ICG May 24, 2011).

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October 14, he accepted a government offer of amnesty and laid down his arms with thirty of his supporters. Eventually, the government managed to enforce relative stability in the region. Ali Bedaki was captured near Gharm on January 4, 2011, and extrajudicially executed.43 A more significant and symbolic victory came three months later, when government forces killed Mullo Abdullo in the village of Samsolik in Nurobod district. In November, the final prison escapee, a brother of Mirzo Ziyoev, was recaptured. Having brought the Rasht valley more firmly under central government control, the regime next turned to the Pamir.44 A number of former UTO field commanders, who had been incorporated into the government only to be purged, still retained more influence locally than the centrally-appointed head of the provincial government. These commanders also controlled drug trafficking and smuggling networks with nearby Afghanistan. Following the murder of Major-General Abdullo Nazarov, the head of the regional branch of the State Committee on National Security, on July 22, 2012, government troops intervened in the region’s capital Khorog.45 They targeted four former opposition commanders, Tolib Ayombekov, Imomnazar Imomnazarov, Muhamadboqir Muhamadboqirov and Yodgor Shomusallomov, whom they accused of murdering Nazarov and of smuggling across the nearby border with Afghanistan. After a month of sporadic fighting, in which 20 civilians were killed, both sides agreed upon a ceasefire. None of the commanders was arrested, although Imomnazarov was murdered in late August. Ayombekov was placed under house arrest. As in the Rasht valley, the military operation in the Pamirs put further pressure on the political opposition, and provided cover for the government to eliminate potential threats. Local IRPT leader Sabzali Mahmadrizoev disappeared from his home in Khorog on July 24, 2012, one day after speaking at a protest rally against the military intervention. Three days later his body was found

43 Officials originally said Bedaki was killed in a gun battle. A month later, footage emerged online showing Bedaki being interrogated. See Sodiqov and Foroughi (January 11, 2011). 44 The Pamir, or Gorno-Badakhshan Avtomnii Oblast’ (GBAO), represents 45% of the territory of Tajikistan but only 3% of its population. It is home to 250,000 Ismaili Shiites who speak Pamiri languages of the Eastern Iranian language family. 45 Nazarov was allegedly running his own smuggling operation, as well as asking for a cut of Ayombekov’s profits. See Tadjbakhsh (2012).

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near an army base nearby. The head of the IRPT office in Khorog, Sherik Karamkhudoev, also disappeared, turning up two weeks later in detention at the GKNB facility in Dushanbe. While the central government reasserted control over the periphery, Rahmon also continued to foster factional networks centred on his family and allies.

6

Factional Networks in Contemporary Tajikistan

Governance in Tajikistan remains deeply nepotistic; officials abuse their offices to enhance their personal power and wealth. Rahmon has appointed many members of his extended family and those from his home region to senior government posts. Over half of the ministerial and cabinet positions in Tajikistan are currently occupied by individuals from in and around Kulob.46 Four are from the president’s home district of Danghara.47 But ultimately, members of the presidential family wield more influence than ministers and the chairmen of state committees. Rahmon remains at the centre of these networks. As Alexander Cooley and John Heathershaw argue, in Tajikistan, “associates and even family members rise or fall and gain or lose pieces of the pie, according to their ability to please the president and act according to his preferences” (Cooley and Heathershaw 2017, 97). This dominance extends to the economy. In 2015, the top three exports of Tajikistan by value were raw aluminium (257 million USD), gold (140 million USD) and raw cotton (83 million USD)—for comparison, Tajikistan is obliged to import 184 million USD of wheat each year, a legacy of Soviet-era economic specialisation.48 As should by now be clear, the bulk of the profits from each of these three commodities flow directly to a small circle of people who have proven their loyalty to 46 This is based on a list of 31 ministers, heads of state committees, speakers of parliament and senior members of the prime minister’s team compiled by the authors. Seventeen of these officials are from districts within the Soviet region (viloyat ) of Kulob, which was merged with Qurgonteppa viloyat in November 1992 to form Khatlon. 47 These are Minister of Agriculture, Amonullo Salimzoda, Deputy Prime Minister, Davlatshokh Gulmakhmadzoda, Minister for Industry Zarobiddin Fayzullozoda, Minister of Health Jamoliddin Abdullozoda. Other key individuals include Head of the State Customs Committee Abdufattoh Ghoib and Head of the Border Forces, Rahmonali Rajbali. Danghara accounts for just 1% of the Tajik population. 48 Observatory of Economic Complexity, Tajikistan Country Profile, http://atlas.media. mit.edu/en/profile/country/tjk/.

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Rahmon, not least the members of his large immediate family. Any independent entrepreneurs who accrue too much wealth are liable to have their businesses seized by members of the presidential family. One businessman, who complained after his contract for issuing license plates was transferred to the president’s son in law, was sentenced to over two years in jail.49 Far from being isolated from the effects of globalisation, the elite in Tajikistan has embedded itself in transnational capital flows. To facilitate this control over the economy, members of the elite have established shell companies, registered in offshore tax havens such as the British Virgin Islands. Registering offshore not only allows the elite to avoid tax, but syphon off profits from supposedly state-owned enterprises without transparency.50 This capture of large parts of the state and economy has allowed the elite to accrue vast fortunes from their control of state assets without any accountability. Rather than being a sign of state weakness, as John Heathershaw has convincingly argued, this sort of state capture is rather part of a process of “state transformation” in which the elite form links with “partners who have interests in its survival and continued denationalization” (Heathershaw 2011, 161). Emomali Rahmon dominates political and economic affairs in Tajikistan. A December 2015 law made Rahmon “Leader of the Nation and Founder of Peace and National Reconciliation,” rendering him immune from prosecution.51 In a May 2016 referendum, 96.6% of voters cast their ballots in favour of 41 amendments to the constitution. The changes to the constitution abolished term limits for the president and lowered the age a citizen could run for president to 30 years old, making Rahmon’s eldest son Rustam eligible to run in the 2020 presidential elections. Rahmon has skilfully outmanoeuvred potential challengers to his rule, regularly rotating local and ministerial appointees to prevent any of them from developing significant power bases. Allegations of corruption have been levelled at middle and low-level officials to remove them from power. To achieve security in this unstable environment, some officials 49 Tajikistan: Government Critic Facing Prison, Human Rights Watch, 4 August 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/08/04/tajikistan-government-critic-facing-prison. 50 For a thorough analysis of these offshore linkages, see Cooley and Heathershaw (2017). 51 Bruce Pannier, Why Does Tajikistan Need a Referendum? RFE/RL, 20 May 2016, https://www.rferl.org/a/qishloq-ovozi-tajikistan-referendum-rahmon/27747496.html.

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have elevated their positions by marrying into the first family. Eldest daughter Firuza married into the Sohibov family, which has interests in cement and energy.52 Another daughter, Parvina, is married to the son of the former Minister of Energy, Sherali Gul. Sixth daughter, TV presenter Zarina, is married to Sievush Zuhurov, the son of the head of the communications service.53 Other relatives hold senior positions in the tax service, diplomatic service, and local government. Through kinship and other ties, members of the elite have developed their own power bases that exist semi-independently of the president. Influential daughter Tahmina, for example, owns nationwide channel TV Safina, and is believed to control a large bank, real estate and several shops and restaurants in Dushanbe.54 Beyond the president himself, four major power bases appear to have emerged, all centred on members of his family; brother-in-law Hassan Asadullozoda, daughter Ozoda Emomali, two sons-in-law from the Sohibov family and son Rustam Emomali. Asadullozoda, who is married to Rahmon’s sister Azizamoh, controls Tajikistan’s largest private bank, with assets worth $47 million, and owns the country’s largest private airline, Somon Air (Heathershaw 2012, 617). Most significantly, Asadullozoda is reported to control the firm that supplies bauxite for TALCO, the country’s state-owned aluminium company. A second power base has emerged around Rahmon’s daughter Ozoda Emomali. In September 2009, Rahmon appointed then 30-year-old Ozoda deputy minister of foreign affairs, elevating her to first deputy minister in 2014.55 In January 2016, she became head of the presidential administration.56 Ozoda’s husband, Jamoliddin Nuraliev, was appointed first deputy finance minister in 2008, and in 2015 became a deputy to the chairman of the National 52 Tamiris Esfiandar, Tajikistan: President’s Family Expands Grip with Key Positions, EurasiaNet, 27 May 2014, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/68408. 53 SMI: Mladshaya Doch’ Rahmona Vishla Zamuzh za Dal’nego Rodstvennika [Media: Youngest Daughter of Rahmon Married a Distant Relative], Rosbalt, 10 June 2013, http://www.rosbalt.ru/world/2013/06/10/1139413.html. 54 Central Asia’s 10 Most Influential (And Connected) Women, RFE/RL, 2 August 2011, https://www.rferl.org/a/central_asia_most_influential_connected_women/ 24284829.html. 55 Tamiris Esfiandar, Tajikistan: President’s Family Expands Grip with Key Positions, Eurasia.Net, 27 May 2014, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/68408. 56 Tajik President Appoints Daughter Chief of Staff, Seen as Move to Consolidate Power, RFE/RL, 27 January 2016, http://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-rahmon-daughterchief-of-staff-consolidate-power/27514819.html.

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Bank.57 A third power base centres on the Sohibov family. Mahmadzoir Sohibov is married to Rahmon’s eldest daughter Firuza, and his brother Shamsullo is married to another daughter Rukhshona. The family has amassed a business empire centred on the holding company Faroz ranging from gold mines to driving schools, pharmaceuticals, banking and a ski resort.58 Finally, Rahmon appears to be preparing his elder son, Rustam Emomali, to succeed him. Known to many in Dushanbe as a playboy and keen footballer, Rustam has slowly been promoted through the ranks of the government. In February 2011, Rahmon appointed his son to head the anti-smuggling department of the Customs Service, promoting him to head the entire service in November 2013. Rustam became head of the State Committee for Financial Control and the Fight Against Corruption in March 2015. Thanks to the constitutional amendments passed in May 2016, Rustam, born in 1987, is eligible to run the next presidential election scheduled for 2020. In January 2017, he appointed him mayor of Dushanbe, replacing Mahmadsaid Ubaidulloyev, who had held the position since 1996. Once considered by many observers to be one of most powerful men in the country, Ubaidulloyev has lost much of his influence. In April 2017, a number of Ubaidulloyev’s associates were charged with corruption and embezzlement relating to construction projects in the capital. Meanwhile, Rustam has slowly extended his influence over the country’s State Committee on National Security (SCNS), and reportedly holds “veto” power over appointments in the security services. In April 2020, he was appointed Chairman of the Majilisi Milli, the upper chamber of parliament, once more replacing Ubaidulloyev, making him second in line to the presidency. Rustam has appeared more frequently with his father, attending events and greeting foreign leaders. Stability in Tajikistan will depend on relations between these elite factions, who continue to compete. Relations between Hassan Asadullozoda and Rustam Emomali have been strained. Rumours circulated in May 2008 that Rustam had shot his uncle as a result of a business dispute (Heathershaw 2012, 617–619). It was later rumoured that Asadullozoda had lost part of his business interests to other members of 57 Tajik President Appoints New Chairman of National Bank, Trend.az, 4 May 2015, http://en.trend.az/casia/tajikistan/2391106.html. 58 Tajikistan: Money by Marriage, OCCRP, 5 June 2018, https://www.occrp.org/en/ moneybymarriage/.

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the family, particularly the daughter Ozoda and her husband Jamoliddin Nuraliev. Two years after Asadullozoda’s rumoured shooting, the US State Department found that the contract for the first toll system in Tajikistan, proposed to repay the debt owed to the Chinese company who rebuilt the road between Dushanbe and Khujand, was awarded without a public call for tenders to a previously unknown company. The company, Innovative Road Solutions (IRS Ltd), is registered in the British Virgin Islands and owned by persons unknown.59 It is exempt from all taxes in Tajikistan, other than the social tax docked from employees’ wages.60 Deutsche Welle reported in 2010 that IRS Ltd was registered in the British Virgin Islands to one Jamoliddin Nuraliev,61 which is also the name of the deputy Finance Minister and President’s son in law, but the latter has denied any involvement with the company.62 Strikingly, given the repressive atmosphere of intimidation, the head of Tajikistan’s Antimonopoly Committee, Amonullo Ashur, openly criticised the uncompetitive tender that had secured IRS this contract in 2010: he also denounced the tolls charged as too high, and demanded that IRS submit to a tax inspection. Ashur, reportedly acting at the behest of Asadullozoda,63 was sacked by order of the president in January 2011.64 Nowhere are these struggles within the elite more prominent than in the case of TALCO, the country’s largest producer of aluminium. Tajikistan experienced an estimated capital flight of over 60% of its GDP in 2011, according to the IMF (Cooley and Heathershaw 2017, 11), much of it related to TALCO. According to a leaked US Embassy cable from 2008, TALCO “generates 33% of the country’s GDP, 48% of its 59 Sofia Wickberg, Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Tajikistan, Transparency International, 2013. https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/answer/overview_ of_corruption_in_tajikistan. 60 Tajik Official Accuses Innovative Road Solutions Ltd of Violating Country’s Laws, Asia Plus, 4 May 2010, https://news.tj/en/news/tajik-official-accuses-innovative-roadsolutions-ltd-violating-country-s-laws. 61 Platnye Dorogi v Tajikistane Sdelali Gosurdarstennoi Tainoi [Toll Roads in Tajikistan Made a State Secret], Deutsche Welle, 5 July 2010, http://bit.ly/2qBERku 62 Tajik President’s Son-In-Law Denies Ties to Company, RFE/RL, 12 July 2010, https://www.rferl.org/a/Tajik_Presidents_SonInLaw_Denies_Ties_To_Company/ 2097815.html. 63 Author Interview with Tajik expert, November 2016. 64 Tajik President Sacks Official Who Criticized Toll Road, RFE/RL, 24 January 2011,

https://www.rferl.org/a/tajik_ashur_sacking_toll_road/2285206.html.

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export revenues, and 75% of its foreign currency reserves,” further noting that TALCO has been under the “direct control of President Rahmon since 2004” (Putz October 28, 2016). As an officially state-owned enterprise, TALCO benefits from open-handed electricity subsidies, and large unpaid electricity bills have routinely been written off. Soviet economic planning assigned Tajikistan this relatively large and advanced aluminium processing plant in the 1980s, but Tajikistan does not produce bauxite, from which alumina is derived—this was a prestige project that struggled to recoup costs even in the early years (Epkenhans 2016, 7). Alumina thus has to be imported, and under Rahmon this has happened through the process of tolling, whereby the value of the imported alumina is paid back in the form of processed aluminium. Since the civil war, TALCO has been the subject of ownership struggles. In the two decades between 1993 and 2013, the primary trading partner for Tajikistan’s import of alumina and export of aluminium, was Norsk Hydro, a company in which the Norwegian government is the biggest shareholder (34.3%).65 Norsk Hydro did not deal directly with TALCO, however, but rather with Talco Management Ltd. (TML), a shell company registered in the British Virgin Islands which conducts all trade on behalf of Talco (Putz March 10, 2016). Talco Management Ltd. appears to be entirely controlled by Rahmon and his close circle. Avaz Nazarov, who had controlled TALCO until 2004, and the government of Tajikistan went to the London High Court in 2004 in a dispute over ownership of the plant. The government accused Nazarov of embezzling $500 million through Ansol, a company based in Guernsey (Heathershaw 2011). After four years, and an estimated $85 million in legal fees, the court case ended without either party winning.66 Another long legal battle between TALCO and Rusal, the world’s largest producer of aluminium which partnered with TALCO in 2007, yielded insights into how the president and his family have invested profits from aluminium. Revenues of almost 100 million were used to purchase two Boeing 737s used to start a private airline, Somon Air, run by the president’s brother in law, Hassan Asadullozoda. Somon Air subsequently began to squeeze 65 Reuters, Norsk Hydro denies wrongdoing in Tajikistan, 7 March 2016, http://af. reuters.com/article/metalsNews/idAFL5N16F0OS. 66 Tajikistan Case Set to Test Record Fees, Financial Times, 1 May 2008, http:// www.ft.com/cms/s/0/24f3b976-1717-11dd-bbfc-0000779fd2ac.html?ft_site=falcon&des ktop=true#axzz4ghstbgKK.

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out the state carrier, Tajik Air.67 TALCO apparently remains under the president’s control. Although Asadullozoda still benefits from his links to TALCO, his position is in no way assured, with Rustam and Nuraliev rumoured to have their eyes on the plant. In September 2016, the Ministry of Finance, where Nuraliev was first deputy minister until 2015, accused TALCO’s management of embezzling $1.1 billion in profits since 2010. The public nature of these allegations led John Heathershaw to speculate that this was an attempt to marginalise Asadullozoda and establish new schemes to benefit other members of the family.68 This struggle remains unresolved at the time of writing.

7

Foreign Patrons

As well as benefiting from a series of informal transnational connections with offshore companies, lobbyists, banks and foreign law firms based in Europe and North America, the government of Tajikistan has relied on external patrons to provide economic support, security assistance and to lend legitimacy to the regime. Russia, China, and to a lesser extent the United States, form the most important partners for the Tajik regime, which relies on external patrons to help provide security and bolster the economy. Tajikistan’s main external partner is Russia, which considers Tajikistan part of its “near abroad.” Russia is Tajikistan’s largest trade partner and owns half of Tajikistan’s foreign debt. Officially, just under one million Tajikistani citizens worked in Russia in 2016.69 Before Russia’s 2014 economic crisis, remittances reached $4 billion, equivalent to 52% of Tajik GDP.70 In 2015 remittances fell by 67%, with a 7% fall in the number of 67 David Trilling, Russian Aluminum Giant Pries Open Books at Tajikistan’s Largest Factory, EurasiaNet, 9 June 2014, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/68466. 68 John Heathershaw, Is There A Rahmon Family Feud Over Tajikistan’s Aluminium Company and its Offshore Schemes? EXCAS, 31 October 2016, https://blogs.exeter.ac. uk/excas/2016/10/31/talco-rahmon/. 69 According to the latest figures from the Federal Migration Service from July 2016, there are 870,000 Tajik citizens residing in Russia. See Tajik Official Says Migration to Russia Down, RFE/RL, 22 July 2016, https://www.rferl.org/a/tajik-official-says-migrat ion-to-russia-down/27873757.html. 70 David Trilling, Tajikistan: Migrant Remittances Now Exceed Half of GDP, EurasiaNet, 15 August 2014, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/68272.

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labour migrants.71 This number rebounded to $2.7 billion in 2019, onethird of the economy, but is expected to plummet again as a result of COVID-19.72 In spite of the recent crisis, Russia has used this economic dependency to secure its interests in Tajikistan. Not only has the Russian government supported the Tajik economy, it has also provided military assistance. Having supported the government during the civil war, the signing of the Peace Accord in 1997 did not signal an end to Russia’s military presence in Tajikistan. Russian troops protected the country’s border with Afghanistan until 2004, and Tajikistan still hosts the 201st Motorised Rifle Division, with 7,000 Russian soldiers, and a space surveillance station in Nurek. In recent years, China has become a key partner for the Tajik regime. Economic ties have grown since the opening of a road linking Khorog with Kashgar in 2004. China is now Tajikistan’s second-largest trade partner. In 2015, investment from China accounted for 58% of Tajikistan’s total investments, mostly in infrastructure (Shahbazov November 23, 2016). Since 2009, China has evolved as Tajikistan’s major bilateral lender, investing in large-scale transport infrastructure projects. Security ties have also grown in recent years, with the Chinese government funding the construction of five border posts and a new barracks in Dushanbe. In October 2016, 10,000 military personnel from Tajikistan and China participated in the country’s first bilateral military exercises on the border with Afghanistan.73 The same year China opened its first foreign military facility in the region near the Afghan-Tajik border. Tajikistan is a major recipient of foreign aid. Foreign donors give $500 million per year,74 equivalent to 7% of the state budget. Concerned by the possibility of conflict in Afghanistan spilling over the border, US engagement with Tajikistan has been primarily driven by security. Since independence, the US government has provided $262 million to support

71 Tajikistan: Annual Remittance Data Confirm Worst Fears, EurasiaNet, 24 March 2016, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/77921. 72 Farangis Najibullah, Tajik Workers Face Dire Future as Russia Closes Borders over

Coronavirus, RFE/RL, 18 March 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/tajik-workers-face-direfuture-as-russia-closes-borders-over-coronavirus/30495815.html. 73 Joshua Kucera, China Holds Anti-Terror Exercises on Afghanistan-Tajikistan Border, EurasiaNet, 24 October 2016, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/80986. 74 This is based on figures given by the World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indica tor/DT.ODA.ODAT.CD.

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border security, counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics in Tajikistan.75 Between 2016 and 2017, the US Department of Defence plans to spend a further $50 million countering terrorism in Central Asia, with the majority of funds going to “key partner nation in the region” Tajikistan.76 Much of this security assistance has strengthened the regime’s capacity to repress its own population.

8 State Repression: Marginalizing Opposition Voices At the time of writing, Tajikistan was in the throes of what Human Rights Watch has called the country’s “most intense human rights crackdown in twenty years.”77 Political activism is so tightly restricted within the country, that even a grassroots effort to honour the war dead from the Second World War with a procession—which was given the go ahead in neighbouring Uzbekistan—was banned in 2017.78 The legacy of the civil war means that suspicion and fear of public demonstrations is widespread even among the general population. Peaceful protests against the Tajik government are more likely to occur beyond the country’s borders, but even so, reprisals are virtually guaranteed. Between 2015 and 2017, peaceful protests, timed to coincide with Tajik official visits to foreign capitals or international conferences, were swiftly followed by the harassment, intimidation and arrest of the dissidents’ family members still living in Tajikistan, while others have simply disappeared without trace.79 Such reprisals targeted the families of those who protested President Rahmon’s December 2016 visit to Prague, and an Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe conference in Warsaw in September 2016.

75 U.S. and Tajik Security Forces Conduct Crisis Response Exercise, US Embassy in Dushanbe, 20 March 2017, https://tj.usembassy.gov/u-s-tajik-security-forces-conduct-cri sis-response-exercise/. 76 Joshua Kucera, Pentagon Proposes $50 Million Program to Help Tajikistan Fight Terrorists, EurasiaNet, 16 February 2016, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/77366. 77 Tajikistan: Abuse of Dissidents’ Families, Human Rights Watch, 20 December 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/20/tajikistan-abuse-dissidents-families. 78 See, for instance, Komu zhe meshaet “Bessmertnyi polk”? Mnenia Zhitelei Dushanbe, Fergana News, 5 May 2017, http://www.fergananews.com/articles/9400. 79 Tajikistan: Abuse of Dissidents’ Families, Human Rights Watch, 20 December 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/20/tajikistan-abuse-dissidents-families.

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Over time, the government has marginalised the country’s leading opposition party, the Islamic Renaissance Party. After signing the Peace Accord in 1997, the IRPT was legalised as an opposition party. It won two seats in the Supreme Assembly in the 2000 parliamentary elections, re-winning these seats in 2005 and 2010. At its height in 2007, the party claimed to have 50,000 members. But the regime of Emomali Rahmon gradually marginalised the party. A 2011 decree titled “Protocol 32-20” laid out the government’s plans to do so. It called on agencies to compile a list of current members of the party and find to ways to “create incentives for them to leave the party.”80 Although the decree emphasised the role of local entrepreneurs in offering members financial incentives to leave the party, in practice law enforcement has also used intimidation. Party spokesman Hikmatullo Saifullozoda and First Deputy Chairman Mahmadali Hait were both beaten by unknown assailants in Dushanbe in 2011 and 2013 respectively. The state media discredited the party, repeatedly linking it to terrorism and radical Islam. “As the events in Syria and Iraq have shown, the first to join the ranks of the Islamic State were people with connections to Islamic movements (harakoti Islomi),” one journalist argued.81 The government has consistently accused the IRPT of radicalising young people, making them more likely to join the estimated 1,900 citizens who travelled to Syria and Iraq to fight for armed groups. Half of the Tajiks who joined the Islamic State were members of the IRPT, according to one state media report.82 As well as labelling the party immoral and linking it to Islamic extremism, the government took measures to undermine the party’s activities. Law enforcement officials actively encouraged members to abandon the party. Others reported that their families had been harassed as a result of their membership of the party.83 Lastly, the government used allegations of corruption, tax evasion 80 Protokol 32-20 [Protocol 32-20], TajInfo, March 2012, https://tajinfo.org/pivt/ page/635787048302941224. 81 Kamol, V. HNIT. Oyo Metavon Onro Chun Paziruft? IRPT: Are they the “Party of the Victims”?], Jumhuriyat, 3 July 2015, http://www.jumhuriyat.tj/ index.php?art_id=19813. 82 A. Murodov HNIT az Bayoniya to Bayoniya [IRPT from Statement to Statement], Faraj, 2 August 2014, http://faraj.tj/security/5928-1202nit-az-baeniya-to-baeniya.html. 83 End of a Peace Process? Pressure on Islamist Party Undermines Tajik Post-civil War Consensus, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 9 September 2013, https://www.afghanistananalysts.org/end-of-a-peace-process-pressure-on-islamist-party-undermines-tajik-post-civilwar-consensus/.

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and administrative irregularities to disrupt party activities. In April 2014, the government confiscated a family-owned market belonging to IRPT leader Muhiddin Kabiri, accusing him of having obtained it illegally in 1999. Later the government used allegations of fraud to jail Buzurgmehr Yorov, a human rights lawyer who had defended a number of political prisoners, to 25 years in prison.84 The campaign against the IRPT reached its climax in 2015. Like all previous elections, the parliamentary election in May 2015 was rigged in favour of the ruling People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT). Election monitors from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) concluded the vote “took place in a restricted political space and failed to provide a level playing field for candidates.”85 The IRPT lost its two seats in parliament, after failing to clear the 5% threshold needed to win a seat. Officially, the party secured just 1.6% of the vote. Communist Party leader Shodi Shabdolov wryly concluded that “the campaign that happened in our country on March 1 was not an election; it was decree (ta inot ).”86 Following the elections, the party’s downfall was swift. Over the summer of 2015, party officials began “voluntarily” resigning, many under pressure from the security services. Some of the deputies vowed to join the ruling PDPT. On August 14, city authorities closed the party’s publishing house, Muattar, allegedly for “violating sanitary and medical” guidelines.87 Two weeks later, the Prosecutor General ordered that the party’s central office be closed due to an “unresolved dispute about the

84 Jailed Tajik Human Rights Lawyer’s Sentence Extended to 25 Years, RFE/RL, 17 March 2017, http://gandhara.rferl.org/a/jailed-tajik-human-rights-lawyer-sentenceextended/28374887.html. 85 Although Tajikistan’s Parliamentary Elections Provided Some Political Alternatives, Campaign Space Was Restricted and a Fair Count Could Not Be Guaranteed, International Observers Say, OSCE, 2 March 2015, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/tajikistan/ 143311. 86 Natijahon Intihobot Muholifinro Dar Kholi Shok Andokht [Election Results Push the Opposition Out], Radio Ozodi, 2 March 2015, http://www.ozodi.org/content/rea ction-for-parliament-election-in-tajikistan/26876990.html. 87 Mehrangez Tursunzoda, “The Authorities Have Closed the Publishing House of the IRPT” for “Failure to Provide Medical Treatment,” Asia Plus, 14 August 2015, http://news.tj/en/news/authorities-have-closed-publishing-house-irpt-fai lure-provide-medical-treatme.

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legality of the building’s acquisition.”88 In an August 28 statement, the Ministry of Justice declared that the “Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan is no longer a republican party.” The explanation offered was that since the IRPT has closed offices in 58 districts in 2015, it no longer represented the people. According to the statement, the IRPT was in violation of Article 3 of the “Law on Political Parties,” which states that parties need to have operations in “most regions, cities and districts” of the country.89 The IRPT was given ten days to shut its operations. The latest wave of harsh state repression was galvanised by events of September 2015, when a coup allegedly orchestrated by the deputy minister of Defence, Abduhalim Nazarzoda, was swiftly foiled.90 According to the Tajik authorities, General Nazarzoda, who had only been promoted to deputy minister of Defence the year before, led a predawn attack on the police precinct in Vahdat, a few miles east of Dushanbe, on September 4. Seventeen people were reported dead that day, including eight police officers and ten alleged assailants, including the general himself.91 Nazarzoda was a commander with the UTO during the civil war, although he had secured his position in the Tajik security forces independently of the Peace Accord, which granted 30% of government posts to the opposition. Following the violence, the government blamed the IRPT for organising the “coup,” and arrested over 200 senior members over the following weeks. The Supreme Court classified the party a “terrorist” organisation on September 28. Until the party was banned in August 2015, the existence of the IRPT remained an integral part of the “virtual politics of peace” in Tajikistan: a symbol of nascent democratisation and multiparty politics, despite the absence of both (Heathershaw 2009b). The party had served as a junior partner in the peace process, and had

88 Asia-Plus, Tajik Prosecutor General’s Office Has Sealed the IRP Office in Dushanbe, 25 August 2015, http://news.tj/en/news/tajik-prosecutor-generals-office-has-sealed-irpoffice-dushanbe. 89 Tajikistan Bans Islamic Opposition Party, EurasiaNet, 28 August 2015, http://www.

eurasianet.org/node/74856. 90 Thomas Grove, Tajikistan Kills Ousted Deputy Defense Minister in Shootout, Wall Street Journal, September 16, 2015, accessed 17 May 2017 at https://www.wsj.com/art icles/tajikistan-kills-ousted-deputy-defense-minister-in-shootout-1442423682. 91 RFE/RL, Tajik Police Say 17 Killed in ‘Terrorist’ Attacks, 4 September 2015, https://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-attacks-airport-deaths/27226045.html.

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been afforded some space to criticise the government, despite limits placed on its participation in republican politics. By banning the IRPT, Tajikistan moved from an (albeit symbolic) reconciliation period to a period of post-reconciliation, where the government no longer pays lip service to the peace process. State ideology, centred on concepts of “peace” and “national reconciliation,” has played a central role in this shift.

9

An Emergent State Ideology: Valorisation of “Peace” and “National Reconciliation”

I appeal to you, dear young people, to defend this great historic achievement (dastovardi buzurgi ta’rikhi), national unity (vahdati milli), with respect, care and prudence. Lift high the banner of unity, be faithful to our beloved homeland (vatan) and every piece of our ancestor’s land.92

The above quote, from Rahmon’s speech on the 18th anniversary of the Peace Accord, illustrates the Rahmon government’s chief ideology: the concept of “national unity” (vahdati milli). This ideology aims to create docile citizens who value peace and authoritarian order, thus accepting the status quo. But this ideology also seems to rest heavily on the promotion of certain cultural and historical symbols as a way of reminding (or perhaps persuading) Tajiks that they share a common national identity (Hall 2002). Prominent among these national symbols is the figure of Ismoil Somoni, a ninth-century emir who ruled Transoxiana and Khorasan from his court in Bukhara, where his mausoleum can be seen to this day. Aspects of Ismoil Somoni that appeal to twenty-first century Tajik nationalists include his Sunni Muslim faith, his patronage of culture, and, perhaps most tellingly, his military prowess and armed incursions against Turkic neighbours which allowed him to extend Samanid control beyond the Syr Darya river. Ismoil Somoni was adopted officially as the father of the Tajik nation and celebrated in several gargantuan statues prominently displayed in Dushanbe and Khujand. This remote ruler is honoured in the 92 Suhanronii Emomali Rahmon, Presidenti Jumhurii Tojikiston, ba Munosibati 18Solagii Ruzi Vahdati Milli [Speech of Emomali Rahmon, President of the Republic of Tajikistan, on the 18th Anniversary of National Reconciliation], Jumhuriyat, 26 June 2015, http://jumhuriyat.tj/index.php?art_id=19789.

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Tajik national currency, the country’s largest banknote, and the country’s tallest mountain, formerly Peak Communism and now Ismoili Somoni peak. Tajikistan’s complex and inconsistent attitude towards Islam can also, in part, be explained by the stifling emphasis on “peace” and “national reconciliation” in state ideology. Many of the ways in which Muslim beliefs and practices common to the majority of the population are policed and restricted are a legacy of Soviet rule: Friday is a working day (with a Christian pattern Saturday-Sunday weekend), the number and location of mosques and madrasahs is strictly controlled, and imams are government appointees. Rahmon’s government has also introduced more recent legislation designed to limit the influence of Islam on public life: minors under the age of 18, and all women, are prevented from attending sermons or participating in communal prayer in mosques. Women who veil are not permitted to attend school or university, and there have been numerous reports of bearded men being forcibly shaved (and of one bearded man dying in custody following arrest), despite the apparent lack of legislation to support such action.93 Despite these manifestations of a somewhat hostile official attitude towards Islam, Islamic beliefs are also used to justify state policies, and the president has at times sought to bolster his legitimacy by appealing to his citizens’ piety. Thus, banning women from mosques was justified by recourse to the Hanafi school of Islamic Law, and a grassroots memorial of the dead from the Second World War in 2017 was forbidden in view of Muslim injunctions against visual representations of the dead. Over the course of a decade, in his ethnographic fieldwork in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, Morgan Liu developed the concept of a “khan-centred imaginary” (Liu 2012). In his interactions with Uzbeks in Osh, Liu noticed that many spoke highly of Uzbek President Islam Karimov. Like the imagined khans of the pre-Tsarist period, they believed Karimov to be farsighted, intelligent and benevolent. Sitting above society, the “khan” has the authority to discipline his people for the benefit of society as a whole. In his ethnography of the Pamir, Till Mostowlansky observed similar attitudes towards Rahmon (Mostowlansky 2017, 136–141). Indeed, the regime itself has cultivated the image of Rahmon as “father of the nation”

93 U.S. Department of State, Tajikistan 2015 International Report on Religious Freedom, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/256531.pdf.

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(padari millat ). By using such imagery, the government narrative represents the family unit as interdependent with the state, a “nucleus that represents the state in miniature” (p. 137). As Mostowlansky argues, “this hierarchy went from the family to elders to the local government and the governor of the province, and at the top of the hierarchy stood the president and head of the nation (millat ), representing the highest figure defending his people’s best interests” (p. 138). This narrative is gendered and patriarchal. Where the leader is masculine, the motherland (vatan) is feminine. It is hierarchical: the leader is superior, all-powerful and removed from the population by virtue of this status. The status of women in Tajikistan has been eroded significantly since the end of the Soviet Union, in part as a result of state policy. The decision to change the celebration on March 8 from International Women’s Day to the Day of the Mother is emblematic of the reduced role of women in public life, which persists despite the striking gender imbalance created by predominantly male labour out migration. As well as restricting access to religious education, and banning children from praying in mosques, the 2011 Law on Parental Responsibility sought to tie the family to the state, and frame “motherhood as the center of the Tajik nation” (Roche 2016, 215). It gave parents, and mothers in particular, the responsibility to raise their children in the spirit of “patriotism” and “national values.” In other words, mothers became responsible for creating docile, apolitical citizens who respect the status quo. A cult of personality built around President Rahmon increased in intensity in tandem with the crackdown on human rights and the political opposition described above. On 16 November 2016, Tajikistan celebrated “President’s Day” for the first time. Celebrated on the anniversary of Rahmon’s election as chairman of the Supreme Soviet in 1992, some news articles framed it as a celebration of the current president’s specific qualities, rather than one honouring the office in general terms, as the similarly named public holiday does in the US. This was not even the first holiday invented to massage the presidential ego, as September 29 had only recently been declared Tajik Diplomat Day, commemoration of Rahmon’s first address to the United Nations General Assembly.94 In December 2015, parliament conferred upon the president the formal title 94 V Tajikistane Poyavilsya Novy Prazdnichny Den’ [In Tajikistan A New Holiday Has Appeared], Sputnik, 22 June 2016, http://ru.sputnik-tj.com/country/20160622/ 1019957671.html.

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of “Founder of Peace and National Unity of Tajikistan.” This verbose formulation was henceforth to be used, in full, every time the president was alluded to by newsreaders or officials speaking in public. The president’s title reflects a version of the Tajik Civil War currently undergoing canonisation, whereby Rahmon personally and conclusively brought peace to the nation when he assumed power (as opposed to half a decade later).95 Gradually, the role played by external patrons, most notably Russia and Uzbekistan, and by the Popular Front warlords who brought Rahmon to power, has been redacted from the narrative.96 The hegemonic narrative on the civil war performs three functions. It serves to elevate Rahmon to the status of hero, who single-handedly brought peace to the country. By framing the war as a conflict between Islamic disorder and secular order, it serves as a warning of what happens when religion and politics mix.97 Most importantly, memories of the civil war remind Tajiks what happens when the public attempt to challenge the status quo. Repeated reminders of this serve to transmit these memories to a new generation of Tajiks who have grown up since the civil war. Speaking in September 2015, for example, President Rahmon reminded the audience: The people of Tajikistan have not forgotten the tragedies (oghozi) of the 1990s and therefore value peace (sulkh) and security (aminyat ). We must remind young people to be thankful for nationhood (sohibvatan) and statehood (sohibdavlati), and peace, stability and national reconciliation (sulhu subot va vahdati milli).98

95 Tajikistan Celebrated a New Holiday This Year—President’s Day, EurasiaNet, 21 November 2016, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/81376. 96 For an analysis of the valorisation of Popular Front commanders during and after the war, and their marginalization, see Nourzhanov (2017). 97 Officials frequently blame Islamic extremists for the violence that broke out in 1992.

For Saidmurod Fattohzoda, first deputy chairman of the ruling People’s Democratic Party, for example, the civil war was “a war between two ideologies (jangi du ideologia): Communism and Islam.” See Mo Muqobili Islomi Radikali va Ateizm Jangovar Hastem [We Are Against Radical Islam and Militant Atheism], Harakat.tj, 10 November 2015, http://harakat.tj/52-mo-muobili-islomiradikal-va-ateizmi-angovar-astem.html. 98 Suhanronii Emomali Rahmon, Prezidenti Jumhurii Tojikiston, Bakhshida ba Ruzi

Donish va 70-solagii Ta’sisi Donishgohi Davlati Kulob ba Nomi Abduabdullohi Rudaki [Speech of Emomali Rahmon, President of the Republic of Tajikistan, Dedicated to Knowledge Day and the 70th Anniversary of Kulob State University Named After Abduabdullohi Rudaki], Jumhuriyat, 1 September 2015, http://jumhuriyat.tj/index.php?art_ id=20642.

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To understand citizens’ acquiescence to the modes of authoritarian governance, clientelism, and state repression outlined in this chapter, an understanding of the continued social importance of the civil war is crucial.

10

Conclusion

During its first three decades of independence, Tajikistan has transformed from failed state in 1992 to consolidated authoritarian regime. President Rahmon has skilfully outmanoeuvred his rivals: exiling, jailing and killing them. He has fostered an elite populated by family members and loyalists, who dominate economic and political life in the country. Portraying himself as the saviour who lifted the country out of civil war, and playing on popular fears of a return to violence, he has managed the ensure the population’s acquiescence. By 2015, Rahmon was secure enough to dispense with the symbolic remnants of the 1997 Peace Accord. With the classification of the Islamic Renaissance Party as a “terrorist” group in September 2015, Tajikistan moved from an era of reconciliation to postreconciliation. This post-reconciliation order is based on crony capitalism, nepotism and repressive rule. President Rahmon, who became “Leader of the Nation” and can now rule indefinitely, sits atop of this system. Rahmon, who turned 68 in October 2020, is reportedly in good health. The “Leader of the Nation” could rule the country for many years to come. At the same time, there are indications that he is planning for transition and grooming his son, Rustam, to take over the familyrun state. As Tajikistan grappled with COVID-19, Rustam assumed a more public role. State media frequently praise him for his leadership and management. Rustam, however, lacks the legitimacy that his father enjoys. He did not end the civil war and bring peace to the country. He did not oversee the establishment of a functioning state and shape the Constitution. Evidence from other Central Asian authoritarian states indicates that the transition will remain peaceful should elites broker power-sharing deals, or successfully marginalise one another within Rahmon’s lifetime. When Saparmurat Niyazov died in 2006, deputy prime minister Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov quietly took over from him. Following the death of Islam Karimov in September 2016, prime minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev became president. When Rahmon finally departs the scene, we can expect all conflicts over his succession to have been resolved.

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Rahmon appears to be adopting the approach by Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbayev, who retired in March 2019. Following the constitution, the position of head of state was transferred to Chairman of the Senate Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Yet Nazarbayev continues to exercise power by remaining head of the ruling Nur Otan party, chairman of the country’s Security Council for life and has since 2010 been known as elbasy, or Leader of the Nation. By making himself “Leader of the Nation,” Rahmon could relinquish the presidency while retaining influence over the politics of the country. But the Kazakh model has not worked out perfectly for Nazarbayev. Nazarbayev’s legacy has been tainted by widespread protests since 2019 and in May 2020, Nazarbayev’s daughter was removed from her position as Chair of the Senate and second in line to the presidency. Rahmon’s position may be more secure as he seems to be opting for hereditary succession, limiting the prospects of his successor challenging him. Although Ozoda and Nuraliev may be more educated and have greater administrative experience than Rustam, he now wields large amounts of informal and institutional power, and appears to be the chosen successor. Regardless of how things develop, we can expect a Rahmon, or a member of his family, to remain in power for the foreseeable future.

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Kazakhstan 2.0: Change and Continuity? Sofia Tipaldou

1

Introduction

On March 19, 2019, Kazakhstan’s president Nursultan Nazarbayev surprised the world by voluntarily stepping down after almost thirty years in power to leave space for “a new generation of leaders.”1 He has been the longest-serving leader in Central Asia since the death of Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov in September 2016. Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who was serving as chairman of the Senate at the time of Nazarbayev’s resignation and was second in line for the presidency, was first appointed and then elected as the country’s new president with 70% of the vote. The first elections that would appoint a different person to the presidency, took 1 Rittmann, M. (2019, June 5), “The Kazakhstan Elections and the Transition That Wasn’t”, Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/05/kazakhstanelections-and-transition-wasnt (accessed 13 June 2020).

S. Tipaldou (B) University of Manchester, Manchester, UK e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. Izquierdo-Brichs and F. Serra-Massansalvador (eds.), Political Regimes and Neopatrimonialism in Central Asia, The Steppe and Beyond: Studies on Central Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9093-1_7

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place in a climate of social unrest and heavy repression against protesters, who took to the streets to denounce fraud in the electoral process.2 Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the imposition of new rulers from above, Kazakhstan has evolved into a neopatrimonial system, a system that reflects the relationship between traditional politics, patrimonial communism, and new constitutional-liberal institutions. Nursultan Nazarbayev is at the center of this system. His power relies on informal relations and the establishment of a dominant, virtual party, as well as the co-optation of the opposition. The party system is dominated by personalist and clientelist parties that are facilitating the consolidation of Nazarbayev’s neopatrimonial system (Isaacs 2011, 22–25). Some prodemocratic civil society actors emerged, however, the political system has remained loyal to the one-party system and has shown no intention of regime change (Laruelle 2012, 311). Nazarbayev—like the Uzbek and Tajik presidents—had increasingly strengthened his powers by all possible means; he is controlling primary economic resources while preserving the myth he had created of himself as the nation’s founding father through daily practices of personality cult (Laruelle 2012, 311). One of the characteristics of Kazakhstan, as well as of the other four Central Asian states, is the high levels of simultaneous concentration of political, economic, and symbolic power (Hale 2015; Laruelle 2012, 311; Gabdrafikov and Hale 2006). Nazarbayev won all five presidential elections celebrated from 1991 to 2019 with almost 100% of the vote. Nazarbayev had shown signs of democratic tolerance in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, when he also allowed the development of free media and independent political organizations.3 However, he soon began to increase control over politics in order to consolidate his power (McFaul 2002, 232–233). The liberal democratic opposition in Kazakhstan has since then been delegitimized and a paternalistic state with weak institutions and no independent 2 Niyazbekov, Nurseit (2020, March 3), “Democracy, the Tokayev Way”, The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/democracy-the-tokayev-way/ (accessed 13 June 2020). 3 In 1993, Nazarbayev adopted the first Constitution of independent Kazakhstan and

formed the Central Electoral Commission to guarantee a democratic transition (Imashev, Berik [2016, December 13], “Cvobodnye vybory – osnovopolagayushchii printsip” [Free Elections Are a Fundamental Principle], Kazachstanskaya Pravda.) https://www.ele ction.gov.kz/rus/news/releases/index.php?ID=3509&sphrase_id=9271 (accessed 27 July 2017).

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judicial system has emerged. By 2016, Freedom House had given Kazakhstan a democracy score of 23 out of 100 (with 100 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 0 the lowest).4 Those who were hoping that Nazarbayev’s resignation would set off Kazakhstan’s transition to democracy were disappointed to find out that “Nazarbayev’s portraits remain hanging on the walls in all the offices of government officials” (Ibadildin and Pisareva 2020). Nazarbayev also became senator for life and head of the government’s Security Council. Furthermore, a presidential decree of October 2019 gave him the right to veto the appointment of ministers and regional governors.5 He also remains the Chairman of the ruling party Nur Otan. Additionally, Nazarbayev still remains in charge of key state issues and he meets with ministers, local governors, and international official visitors, while Tokayev reports to him regularly (Ibadildin and Pisareva 2020; Nixey 2019). At the same time, Nazarbayev still holds the title of “Leader of the Nation” (Elbasy), which was granted to him by parliamentary decree in 2010. It is worth stating here that Nazarbayev has been considered the source of Kazakhstan’s economic prosperity, political stability, and ethnic balance and has been enjoying a high level of popularity throughout his rule (Peyrouse 2012, 347; Isaacs 2010). Tokayev, in turn, is a career diplomat loyal to Nazarbayev. He served from 1994 to 1999 as Kazakhstan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, from 1999 to 2002 as Prime Minister, and from 2002 to 2007 as Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2011, he was appointed Director General of the United Nations office in Geneva. Tokayev’s experience in governmental positions inside Kazakhstan and his international network made him the perfect candidate for succeeding Nazarbayev.6 In a move that allows no doubt of how important Nazarbayev still is in this new phase, the new president proposed the renaming of the capital from Astana to Nur-Sultan in Nazarbayev’s honor. The renaming of the capital

4 “Freedom in the world 2020: Kazakhstan”, Freedom House, https://freedomhouse. org/country/kazakhstan/freedom-world/2020 (accessed 13 June 2020). 5 “Kazakhstan’s Nazarbaev to Confirm Ministers, Governors: Decree”, U.S. News, October 21, 2019, https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2019-10-21/kazakh stans-nazarbayev-to-confirm-ministers-governors-decree (accessed 13 June 2020). 6 “Secretary-General Appoints Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan as DirectorGeneral, United Nations Office at Geneva”, United Nations, https://www.un.org/press/ en/2011/sga1281.doc.htm (accessed 13 June 2020).

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and the prospects of the country’s liberalization, however, was received by the public with mixed feelings (Ibadildin and Pisareva 2020). Despite the fact that Tokayev finds himself in a secondary role in Kazakhstan’s political system, he has taken some steps toward changing his image and has shown some controversial signs of liberalization. After large pro-democratic protests in the country’s two biggest cities, Tokayev removed the energy minister and “political heavyweight” ambassador to Russia, Imangali Tasmagambetov replaced the head of a newly established financial supervision agency, and sacked his deputy chief of staff, Darkhan Kaletayev.7 Additionally, Tokayev has been giving very liberal interviews to the West, has created a National Council of Public Trust to assist the government in dealing with current sociopolitical issues, has announced that protest policing would decrease, and has seemingly been controlling the internet less than before (Ibadildin and Pisareva 2020).8 These signs, however, are contradictory. Police response, for instance, had been fierce during the protests against Tokayev’s election. There are many areas that need improvement, such as restrictions on peaceful assembly and freedom of speech and the media, criminal charges used to target government critics,9 the imprisonment of human rights defenders (e.g., Maks Bokaev),10 and the crackdown on Kazakhstan’s independent trade union movement (Ibadildin and Pisareva 2020). This chapter presents the turbulent relationship between political elites and the opposition in Kazakhstan following Izquierdo-Brichs’ and SerraMassansalvador’s analytical model of the Sociology of power (IzquierdoBrichs and Serra-Massansalvador 2018, 2020; Izquierdo-Brichs and Etherington 2017). It first discusses the role of “clan politics” in Kazakhstan’s actual power balance and then presents the elites that control 7 “Kazakh President Reshuffles Gov’t After Pro-Democracy Protests”, Aljazeera, December 19, 2019 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/kazakh-president-reshuf fles-govt-pro-democracy-protests-191218205345799.html (accessed 13 June 2020). 8 Niyazbekov, Nurseit (2020, March 3), “Democracy, the Tokayev Way”, The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/democracy-the-tokayev-way/ (accessed 13 June 2020). 9 “Kazakhstan: Proposal for a Human Rights Reset”, Human Rights Watch, https:// www.hrw.org/news/2019/08/06/kazakhstan-proposal-human-rights-reset (accessed 13 June 2020). 10 Rittmann, Mihra (2019, July 19), “Union Leader Jailed in Kazakhstan”, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/19/union-leader-jailed-kazakhstan (accessed 13 June 2020).

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Kazakhstan and which are grouped around the president and his family as well as the opposition to them. Part three describes the competition that Kazakh elites face from abroad and part four is dedicated to the relations of the Kazakh elites with external elites. Part five and six identify the main demands around which popular discontent is expressed and the most significant groups and leaders that can mobilize the population. Part seven focuses on the strategies of the elites to maintain power over the four periods that characterize Kazakhstan’s party formation. The conclusion discusses the prospects of Kazakhstan’s transition.

2 Elites and Control of Resources in Nazarbayev’s Neopatrimonial System Central Asian regimes follow a particular path of patronage, which scholars have defined as “clan politics.” A clan is “an informal organization comprising a network of individuals linked by kin and fictive kin identities” (Collins 2006, 17). A clan can be related to a person’s genealogy and can therefore be used for reasons of identity (clan identity), or as a network of people and can therefore be used for political aims (clan patronage). Clan identity and clan patronage are often fused in the literature, despite the fact that they are not similar. For instance, the genealogical clan has to do with parentage, while the political clan is not guaranteed and may disappear. Its value varies according to external factors that depend, for example, on the form of government (national or local) and the branch in question (executive or legislative) (Laruelle 2012, 315–316). Most Kazakhs were nomadic peoples of the steppe or mountains organized in clan and tribal structures until the 1920s. However, the same clan divisions that dominated the social organization of the steppe entered post-Soviet political life, not because of the regime’s inability to control remote regions, but because of the Soviet regime’s heavy-handed modernization effort (Schatz 2005, 238). Clan ties are either vertical or horizontal and lines between classes are generally crossed, including both elite and non-elite members (Collins 2006, 19). Before Soviet rule, the center of identity was the local clan based on ancestry and a resonant category was the subethnic horde or zhuz. The Small or Younger Horde (kishi zhuz) inhabited the West and Northwest of Kazakhstan, the Middle Horde (orta zhuz) the Northern and Central regions, and the

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Great or Elder Horde (uly zhuz) the East and Southeast (Schatz 2005, 239; Soucek 2000). The Middle Horde was the first to feel the consequences of Russian colonialism, since they migrated to today’s Northern and Eastern zones. The nobility had privileges and educated their sons in Russian schools. These children later became the first Kazakh nationalists (Olcott 1997, 224). The sons of the Great Horde, in contrast, were not attracted to the nationalist movement and some of them even joined the socialists. It was also the Great Horde that was residing in the territory of Almaty. This offers an explanation for their domination of Kazakh politics under Soviet rule (Olcott 1997, 225). For some scholars, the importance of clans has increased considerably since the collapse of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan (CPK) and its patronage networks. At the center and in the regions, the economy and politics are every time more dependent on clan and zhus membership. This fact makes ethnic Russians feel excluded from Kazakhstan’s political and economic advantages. It also creates rivalry between the Great Horde and the Small and Middle Hordes, as the Great Horde, which is the only one based in the South far from the Russian border, would be the only one to remain intact should the Russian-dominated part of Kazakhstan secede (Olcott 1997, 225). More recent scholarship, however, disagrees with the impact of clan identities on Kazakhstan’s political evolution. Peyrouse challenges the supposedly central role of this “supple system of tribal confederations assembled on the basis of a territorial principle” in the country’s political life (Peyrouse 2012, 346). The idea that the three hordes, or zhuz, determined Kazakhstan’s politics, Peyrouse argues, originates from Soviet intellectuals, and was later reproduced by Western scholars studying the area. The control of the Great Horde over the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, of the Small Horde (based in Western Kazakhstan) over oil, and the Middle Horde (the most Russian of the three, based in NorthCentral Kazakhstan) over intellectual life and administration is disputed. According to this later scholarship, clans can influence traditional aspects of social life, such as marriage and exchange of services, but they cannot influence the functioning of Kazakhstan’s political system. It is patronal practices that link political elites with business interests (Peyrouse 2012, 349). Clan belonging is not as important a prerequisite for promotion as loyalty to one’s superior, especially in higher positions. The result is a

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system that is both fragile and flexible; the system could keep on functioning without the president, but it is the president who keeps it in equilibrium (Peyrouse 2012, 348). At the top level, influence is dependent on corporate mentalities, private interests, and individual loyalties to the president. At the local government level, elites are more closely related to their constituencies and communicate through intermediate figures, who function as “power brokers” (e.g., company directors, leaders of neighborhood communities, councils of elders, religious figures, and the former Soviet middle class who have specialized technical knowledge) (Laruelle 2012, 319). Nazarbayev entered politics under the auspices of Dinmukhamed Kunaev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan for almost a quarter of a century (1960–1986, with an interruption from 1962 to 1964). Kunaev, an ethnic Kazakh, appointed several Kazakhs to his administration, including Nazarbayev who served as chairman of the Kazakh republic’s Council of Ministers since 1984 (Olcott 1997, 205–206). Nazarbayev came to the forefront when the Supreme Soviet under Gorbachev’s leadership replaced, Kunaev with the Russian Gennadi Kolbin. The reason behind this move was that Kunaev was opposing Gorbachev’s liberalization policies. Kolbin, however, had no ties to Kazhakstan and his appointment triggered a massive protest on 17 December 1986 that became a landmark of disproportionate repression by the authorities: the Zheltoksan [December] uprising. The most accepted estimates raise the number of deaths to more than two hundred; however, the exact number remains unknown and a judicial investigation has never taken place (Olcott 1997, 205–206). After Zheltoksan, Nazarbayev, who had served as chairman of the Council of Ministers since 1984, prevailed over Kolbin and was appointed first secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan in June 1989. The privatization process that allowed new individuals and groups to enter the political arena divided the Kazakh elite in their corporate interests. When the legislature began to show signals of independence from presidential control, Nazarbayev suspended it. The old nomenklatura was split between supporters and opponents of the transition (Olcott 1997, 205–206, 2010, 91–93). Nazarbayev chose an opportunistic stance regarding the major issues that his country and the Soviet Union as a whole were facing at the time and made compromises with all political groups. He maintained an ambiguous stance toward the Soviet Union, firmly supporting

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Gorbachev’s reforms, while at the same time refusing to be under Russian influence when the central government was collapsing. He also collaborated with Gorbachev for the creation of a Union of Sovereign States together with Belorussia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan (McAdam et al. 2004, 257–258). Nazarbayev’s policy can be summed up as an effort to search for ways for integrating his country with Russia, while at the same time keeping Kazakhstan’s independence (Olcott 1997, 202). Another major concern was the peaceful coexistence between the country’s equal number of ethnic Kazakh and Russian populations (Olcott 1997, 201). Taking advantage of his Kazakh origins, Nazarbayev played the nationalist card to consolidate power, while simultaneously initiating the economic reforms dictated by the Kremlin. He passed a series of pro-Kazakh laws, such as the introduction of Kazakh as the language of both the state and public business, and gave the Russian language formal legal status. Furthermore, he made efforts to tame both pro-Russian and pro-Kazakh radical nationalist organizations, while blocking dual citizenship (McAdam et al. 2004, 257–258; Olcott 1997, 202). Nazarbayev has created a patronal system centered around him and his intimates (“the family”) that is held together by loyalty (Peyrouse 2012, 348). The president’s power base is Otan [Fatherland], a party that was formed in 1999 and was led by Bakhytzan Zhumagalov. The party was created by merging the pro-presidential People’s Union of Kazakhstan, the Liberal Movement of Kazakhstan, and the For Kazakhstan 2030 Movement. Prior to this, Nazarbayev was the leader of the Partiya Narodnoye Edinstvo Kazakstana (PUP) [People’s Unity Party of Kazakhstan] (Olcott 1997, 212). Otan merged with the party of Dariga Nazarbayeva, Nazarbayev’s oldest daughter, Asar [All Together] into the super-party Nur Otan [Ray of Light of the Fatherland] in 2006. Moving from the center of Nazarbayev’s patronal system to its periphery, we find the oligarchs; the technocratic elite; the heads of the presidential administration; the regional elite; small and medium-sized businessmen; and the local administration (Peyrouse 2012, 348).

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Patronage, as well as corruption, bribery, and nepotism are characteristics of “rentier states”11 (Sandbakken 2006, 138). Kazakhstan figures as an archetypical case of a rentier state in the literature, where political legitimacy and the level of living standards depend on the revenues from natural resources and mining (Franke et al. 2009). As such, the state’s main source of income is natural resources sold on foreign markets, instead of taxes, and consequently, control over the natural resources industry leads to control over politics (Satpayev and Umbetaliyeva 2015, 123). Furthermore, the government forms patron-client networks that increase its stability by giving it greater legitimacy (Franke et al. 2009, 112). Nazarbayev, has managed to take control of political and economic resources and to build his power upon “symbolic and financial assets” since the beginning of Kazakhstan’s transition (Peyrouse 2012, 349). Following Yeltsin’s model in Russia, Nazarbayev introduced shock therapy for a rapid transition to the market economy and in April 1994, began a large-scale privatization program with a voucher model similar to the Czech Republic’s. The liberalization process brought more than three-quarters of the privatization vouchers into the hands of one-quarter of the holding companies. This way, most of the nation’s new wealth ended up in the hands of a small group of the Kazakh elite, that was made up by the same people who ran the state (Olcott 1997, 217–218; Murphy 2006, 550). Former state-owned industries suffering total collapse—especially in the mining sector—were bought by a few businessmen, who formed a new social group, the oligarchs. After their acquisition, many owners engaged in illegal trafficking practices, especially to China, to make their companies prosper. At the same time, many foreign investors (e.g., Chevron, ExxonMobil) have taken control over the hydrocarbon sector (Esanov et al. 2001, 43; Peyrouse 2012, 349–350). During the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, the state regained control over the oil sector and Kazakhstan’s dependence on oil and gas increased considerably compared to the beginning of the reforms. The mining industry, however, remained privatized (Esanov et al. 2001, 3; Peyrouse 2012, 358). By the end of the 2000s, Kazakhstan’s economy was characterized by being “fairly close to market capitalism, albeit with 11 On the rentier economy see (Beblawi and Luciani 1987), on the rentier mentality see (Yates 1996) and on a sociology of power perspective see Izquierdo-Brichs and LampridiKemou (2013).

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serious limitations” (Junisbai 2010, 264). Nazarbayev and the people around him began to take over a significant proportion of the national wealth—particularly in the hydrocarbon and construction sectors—by impeding democratic progress (Peyrouse 2012, 350, 358). The elite members of the president’s inner circle, also called the “Nazarbayev clan,” were given exclusive access to the country’s lucrative energy and metal industries.12 In 2011, the government introduced a “people’s IPO” (Initial Public Offerings) program that would allow Kazakh citizens to buy shares in the country’s ten major enterprises, but only KazTransOil (Kazakhstan’s oil transportation company) and KEGOC (Kazakhstan’s electricity company) have actually conducted IPOs. By 2016, the state owned a large part of the economy and played a crucial role in the country’s economic life. In particular, 60% of the country’s GDP was produced by state-owned or state-controlled entities. The Comprehensive Privatization Plan of 2015 aimed to decrease this share to 15% of GDP by 2020 through the privatization of representative entities from almost all major sectors of the economy, including the national railway company Temir Zholy, KazMunayGas, KazAtomProm, Samruk-Energy, Kazpost, and Air Astana (Brod and Shyngyssov, April 2017). A part of the natural resources (and also of the media, the food industry, security, and taxes) has passed over the years into the hands of Nazarbayev’s family. His wife and three daughters are the most influential women in Kazakhstan. Nazarbayev’s son-in-law, Timur Kulibayev, has significant control over the oil sector and has held senior positions in the oil monopoly Kazmunaigaz, in KazEnergy, in the “oil group” of Nazarbayev’s inner circle, which is the most influential, in the Kazakhstani Wealth Fund Samruk Kazyna, and in Gazprom13 (Franke et al. 2009, 114–115). Nazarbayev’s younger daughter, Aliya Nazarbayeva, controls large parts of the water and gas industry (Franke et al. 2009, 115). Relations between the oligarchs and Nazarbayev’s family are considered a key element in the functioning of Kazakhstan’s neopatrimonial 12 For a list of the most commonly cited financial-industrial groups, see Junisbai (2010, 243). 13 Radlovsky, Yaroslav (2011), “Timur Kulibayev to Head Samruk Kazyna”, Tengri News, https://en.tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/Timur-Kulibayev-to-head-Samruk-Kaz yna--825/; Forbes (2017), “Timur Kulibaev”, available at: https://www.forbes.com/pro file/timur-Kulibaev/.

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regime. The oligarchs compete with each other and form groups that mostly work together with the presidential family, but there are also a few groups that confront it. Parallel to political reforms, Nazarbayev’s family has increased its power with greater economic participation in the hydrocarbon and construction sector—especially after the transfer of the capital to Astana in 1997—and through a “marriage strategy” of Nazarbayev’s daughters with oligarchs and persons of influence (Peyrouse 2012, 350–366). Nazarbayev’s older daughter, Dariga, has entered the political scene in the early 2000s through the use of her stranglehold on the media (Laruelle 2012, 311). In 2003, Nazarbayeva formed the Asar party that later merged with Nur Otan. She was an MP withNur Otan and deputy speaker of the lower house. Nazarbayev appointed Dariga as deputy prime minister in 2015, further empowering his family’s role in the executive, and proudly confirming his personalized regime (Freedom House 2017). Dariga’s ex-husband, Rakhat Aliyev, was a surgeon who created a business empire after his marriage to Nazarbayev’s daughter. In 2007, Aliyev was suspected of the disappearance of two former Nurbank executives and, while under investigation, was appointed Kazakhstan’s new Ambassador to Austria and Permanent Representative to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Vienna. From Austria, Aliyev criticized Nazarbayev for the constitutional amendments that would allow him to become president for life. He subsequently fell out of the president’s favor, was dismissed from his posts on charges of seeking to oust the government and his wife eventually filed for divorce. In Kazakhstan, he was charged with the murder of Kazakh opposition leader Altynbek Sarsenbayev and two cases of kidnapping. Austria did not extradite Aliyev and he was prosecuted in absentia. In 2009, Aliyev published his book Godfather-in-law, in which he exposed Nazarbayev’s public and private life and the way he had become an “autocrat.” The book was banned and another criminal case was opened against Aliyev. When Austria launched a criminal investigation against Aliyev in July 2011 regarding the abduction and murder cases, Aliyev fled to Malta. In June 2014, Aliyev voluntarily turned himself into Austrian authorities and one year later, he was found dead in his cell (Lavrov and Velska 4 April 2016). 14 14 BBC (2015, February 25), “Austria Post-Mortem Finds Kazakh Death Was Suicide”, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31602113 (accessed 16 June 2017); Khegai, Dmitry, Dinara Urazova, and Tatyana Kuzmina (2014), “Rakhat Aliyev’s

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Aliyev’s and Nazarbayeva’s son, Nurali Aliyev, is a businessman active in the fields of finance, agriculture, media, and telecommunications. Forbes magazine featured him in 2012, when Nurali Aliyev was 27 years old, as Kazakhstan’s “youngest multimillionaire.” In 2019, he became deputy mayor of Astana, a position that he held until 2016 (Lavrov and Velska 4 April 2016). Nazarbayev’s second daughter, Dinara, is married to Timur Kulibayev, one of the most famous oligarchs. His father was regional secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan in Atyrau in the 1980s and governor of Atyrau in the 1990s. Timur Kulibayev was president of the AltynAlma Bank, chair of the Supervisory Board of Almaty Trade and Industry Bank, and head of the Directorate for Project Assessment and Negotiating under the Investment Committee of Kazakhstan that brought him in contact with foreign investors. Indicatively, since 2002, he has been serving as vice president and then chairman of the board of directors of the national oil and gas company KazMunaiGaz, since 2005 as chairman of the Kazakhstan Association of Oil, Gas and Energy Sector Organizations, since 2011 as member of the Gazprom Board of Directors, and as “part-time adviser to the President of the Republic”.15 Kulibayev has reportedly received such good treatment from his father in law, because he serves as a counterweight to Dariga and her husband.16 Finally, Nazarbayev’s youngest daughter, Aliya, after briefly being married to the son of the Kyrgyz president, she married Kazakh oligarch Daniar Khasenov (Peyrouse 2012, 351). Many oligarchs allied with Nazarbayev, such as Vladimir Kim from Kazakhmys, Adilzhan Ibragimov and Alexander Mashkevich from the Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation. Mashkevich, together with Patokh Sodiev and Alidzhon Ibragimov are heading the “Eurasian group,” a group of non-ethnic Kazakhs with holdings in the metal Arrest Confirmed by Vienna Prosecutors”, Tengri, https://en.tengrinews.kz/crime/Rak hat-Aliyevs-arrest-confirmed-by-Vienna-Prosecutors-254013/ (accessed 20 June 2017); Najibullah, Farangis (2009 May 22), “Former Kazakh Presidential Son-in-Law Publishes Tell-All Book”, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, https://www.rferl.org/a/Former_ Kazakh_Presidential_SoninLaw_Publishes_TellAll_Book/1737423.html (accessed 20 June 2017). 15 Gazprom (2017), “Timur Kulibayev”, http://www.gazprom.com/about/manage ment/directors/ , (accessed 12 August 2017). 16 RFE/RL (2006, August 9), “Kazakhstan: Battle of the Clans Continues”, https:// www.rferl.org/a/1070426.html (accessed 11 August 2017).

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industry. Other influence groups see the Eurasian group as “foreign,” whereas Nazarbayev uses it to counterbalance family-related influence groups.17 Some oligarchs tried to compete with Nazarbayev, but they switched sides later on, such as Nurzhan Subkhanberdin, chair of the largest private financial institution, Kazkommertsbank. Subkhanberdin allied with Timur Kulibayev in the 1990s and with the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DVK) in the early 2000s. However, Nazarbayev succeeded in making Subkhanberdin step back from politics through economic means, such as taking control of several companies from Kazkommertsbank, or political means, such as repressing the leadership of the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (Peyrouse 2012, 360–364). Nazarbayev’s opponents in oligarchic circles are not many. One of them is Mukhtar Abliyazov, founder of the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan, who ended up seeking political exile in the United Kingdom after being accused of mishandling and money laundering by the BTA bank (see below); and Zamanbek Nurkadilov, who was found dead after threatening to reveal high-level corruption information that connected foreign oil companies to Nazarbayev (Peyrouse 2012, 359–362). The old power elite has been surrounded by young Western-educated Kazakhs, who have returned to their homeland in the last decade. These competent individuals have brought knowledge and liberal values, such as meritocracy, corporate culture, and respect for intellectual property and liberal democracy back to their country. They do not have enough power yet, to push for liberal reforms in government and business, but some analysts consider that this is a matter of time. In this case, they could form a “new governing elite” that could contribute to the “maturing” of Kazakhstan’s political culture (Sholk 5 May 2015).

3

Opposition to Nazarbayev’s Rule

Until the 2000s, opposition to Nazarbayev’s rule was coming from outside the elite, e.g., Islamic nationalists, Russians, and pro-Western liberals. The election of political parties, at least until the mid-1990s, was conditioned by personal appeal or by program interests. In the late 2000s, however, the focus shifted toward leaders and their conflicts rather than 17 Kimmage, Daniel (2006, March 3), “Kazakhstan: A Shaken System”, RFE/RL, https://www.rferl.org/a/1066325.html (accessed 13 August 2017).

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their ideas. This is arguably the case of Nazarbayev and his Nur Otan party (Bowyer April 2008, 11). Nazarbayev’s most serious contender in the 1990s was former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin (1994–1997), leader of the Republican People’s Party of Kazakhstan (RNPK). During the elections, he faced prosecution on charges of tax evasion and abuse of office. He left the country and continued to lead the RNPK from abroad. The RNPK’s other prominent founding members were Sergei Duvanov and Amirzhan Qosanovk, and political scientist Nurbulat Masanov (HRW 7 April 2004, 8–9). Another elite figure is Olzhas Suleimenov, leader of the environmental movement Nevada-Semipalatinsk. Suleimenov was “the enfant terrible of the Kunayev-era Communist Party […] an establishment figure of the late Gorbachev period, an active Communist Party member who enjoyed Gorbachev’s favor, and had the privileges usually accorded to a Central Committee member” (Olcott 2010, 90). Suleimenov was promoted as a leader of grassroots movements, and as such served Gorbachev’s and Nazarbayev’s interests well. Suleimenov used the argument that Kazakhstan should stop being the Soviet Union’s nuclear stockpile in order to become famous, despite the fact that he was a supporter of Mikhail Gorbachev and then Boris Yeltsin during the 1991 coup d’état. After serving as the leader of the opposition for years, he was appointed Kazakhstan’s first ambassador to Italy (Olcott 1997, 21; 2010, 91, 128; Bowyer April 2008, 41). In the 1999 parliamentary elections, the “hard” opposition to Nazarbayev and the dominant pro-presidential party Otan were the RNPK and the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, the successor to the ruling party of the Soviet era that had made a turn toward social democracy. These two parties formed the “Republican Bloc” coalition together with the organizations Orley, the Officers’ Union, and the Association of Russian and Slavic Organizations. The RNPK, however, withdrew from the electoral list, because its leader had been denied registration and had reportedly been intimidated by local authorities (Sholk 5 May 2015). Furthermore, the reformists or “constructive” opposition were represented by Azamat , a party led by a troika of former government members that represented the Kazakh intelligentsia. Smaller opposition parties were the People’s Congress of Kazakhstan, a long-standing, policy-oriented party that had only recently joined the opposition; the Republican Party of Labor, a party based on the Republican Engineering

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Academy; and the nationalist party Alash. The remaining three parties, the Civil Party, the Agrarian Party, and the Kazakhstan Renaissance Party were all pro-presidential (OSCE-ODIHR 20 January 2000, 9–10, 26). Toward the end of 2001, part of the elite, concerned about Nazarbayev’s growing influence, created the party Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DVK). The DVK was composed of members of the government, elected leaders, and businessmen and was led by high-ranking or former members of the government, e.g., Galymzhan Zhakyanov, governor of Pavlodar, Uraz Dzhandosov, Vice-Prime Minister, and Mukhtar Abliyazov, former Minister of Industry and Commerce and founder of Astana Holding (Peyrouse 2012, 352–353). According to its program, the DVK aimed to broaden the powers of Parliament, establish direct elections of regional political leaders, reform the electoral system and the judiciary, and expand media freedoms. At the end of 2003, it had an estimated 32,000 members (HRW 7 April 2004, 13). Abliyazov, together with Kazhegeldin, supported opposition media outlets, such as SolDat and Vremia Po, which published allegations of the “Kazakhgate” oil scandal that implicated Nazarbayev and close associates in the illicit enrichment of the country’s oil business (HRW 7 April 2004, 8). According to independent news publications, high-ranking officials, including Nazarbayev, were receiving bribes from foreign oil companies, such as the Mobil Oil Corporation. The amount was estimated at $1.4 billion and was deposited in a Swiss bank account controlled by Nazarbayev and his close associates (HRW 7 April 2004, 10–11). Abliyazov’s political insolence toward Nazarbayev cost him his freedom (he was sentenced to six years in prison in 2002), his physical integrity (he was probably tortured in prison), his country (he first moved to Moscow and then went into exile in the United Kingdom), and his political career (he renounced his post) (Peyrouse 2012, 359). Other opposition parties in the early 2000s were the bloc CPK/DVK, formed by the coalition of the DVK and the Oppositional People’s Union of Communists, Ak Zhol , known as the “business party,” and For A Just Kazakhstan, whose leader Zharmakhan Tuyakbai came second in the 2005 presidential elections with 6% (OSCE-ODIHR 15 December 2004, 24; Sholk 5 May 2015). In the following year, Tuyakbai founded the party Obshchenatsional’naya Sotsial-Demokraticheskaya Partiya (OSDP) [All National Social Democratic Party]. The OSDP was an effort to bring

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together all the remaining opposition parties in the country. It brought together Nagiz Ak Zhol , Alga, and KPK18 (Isaacs 2011). Bolat Abilov, one of the country’s most successful businessmen, together with Oraz Zhandosov, Altynbek Sarsenbayev, and Tulegen Zhukeev split from Ak Zhol in 2005, because they opposed closer collaboration with the government. Abilov then founded the party Nagiz Ak Zhol [True Bright Path] and Ak Zhol became pro-presidential. Although many members of Nagiz Ak Zhol had close ties to the president and the government, the party was still considered a dissident party (Isaacs 2011). Nagiz Ak Zhol was dissolved in 2008 and Bolat Abilov founded Azat [Freedom] with Zhukeev as secretary. Azat managed to become registered, despite its critical posture toward the government. In 2009, Azat and the OSDP merged together into the OSDP-Azat. In 2011, the OSDP voted for Abilov as its presidential candidate, but later announced it would boycott the elections. In January 2012, three Azat leaders, Bolat Abilov, Amirzhan Kosanov, and Amirbek Togusov were arrested during a peaceful rally in Almaty to protest the democratic shortcomings of the elections and were sentenced to 15 days of administrative arrest (OSCE-ODIHR 3 April 2012, 14). In 2013, the two parties split and Abilov announced that he was leaving politics. Although he gave no reason for this decision, the numerous charges and convictions that he faced, the assassination of his close associate, Altynbek Sarsenbaev, and the Zhanaozen events have most likely had an impact on his decision to leave politics.19 Loyalist opposition parties, on the contrary, can pass the seven percent threshold and enter Parliament, such as the late Ak Zhol and the Communist People’s Party of Kazakhstan (CPPK) that split from the Communist Party of Kazakhstan in 2004 and is led by Vladislav Kosarev (Isaacs

18 RFE/RL (2006, July 19), “Kazakh Opposition Leader Calls for New Party”, https:// www.rferl.org/a/1069955.html (accessed 9 August 2017). 19 Lillis, Joanna (2011, December 16), “Kazakhstan: A Look Back at the Zheltoksan Protest a Quarter-Century Ago”, Eurasianet.org, http://www.eurasianet.org/ node/64721 (accessed 23 July 2017); Lillis, Joanna (2013, September 19), “Kazakhstan: Is Opposition Politics Officially Dead?”, Inside the Cocoon: Central Asia Today, http:// www.eurasianet.org/node/67522 (accessed 9 August 2017); RFE/RL (2013, September 19), “Prominent Kazakh Opposition Figure Leaves Politics”, https://www.rferl.org/a/kaz akhstan-politician-retires-opposition-abilov/25111662.html, (accessed 9 August 2017).

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2011).20 Dissident parties, however, were left out of Parliament. In 2010, the parties that constituted Kazakhstan’s “true” opposition, were the People’s Democratic Patriotic Party Auyl , the Democratic Party of Kazakhstan Azat , Birlik, and the Nationwide Social Democratic Party (NSDP) (OSCE-ODIHR 27 June 2016, 4). By 2017, none were left. In April 2002, a new party was registered, Gennadiy Belyakov’s Russian Party of Kazakhstan (RPK), with the aim of uniting the numerous regional and republican Russian, Cossack, and Slavic organizations. Its objective is the defense of the rights of Russians and Russian speakers, the recognition of the Russian people living in Kazakhstan as a stateforming nation, and the recognition of Russian as the second state language (Babak 2005, 86). The Russian party—later renamed the Compatriot Party—also advocates Kazakhstan’s integration with Russia. Observers suspect that the only reason that the party has overcome Nazarbayev’s restrictions was that it served Moscow’s interests. This comes as no surprise, given Nazarbayev’s proclaimed loyalty to Vladimir Putin. However, this move possibly reflects the Kremlin’s approach to regional politics in the Putin era21 (HRW 7 April 2004, 24).

4 Domestic Elites and Their Relations to External Elites Kazakhstan is a country tremendously rich in natural resources, specifically in gas, oil, and minerals and its riches have attracted Western, Russian, and Chinese energy companies since the early 1990s. Nazarbayev’s regime holds power through the seizure of resources and control over the most prominent economic sectors, which consist mainly of hydrocarbons (oil and gas), mineral extraction (uranium), the construction sector, and the financial and banking sectors (Laruelle 2012, 312). In the “New Great Game” in Central Asia, the United States, Russia, and China compete for power and influence (Cooley 2012, 4). The interaction of the great powers intensified in the 2000s and resulted in the strengthening of the position of the Central Asian rulers, especially of 20 Ak Zhol won 8 seats and CPPK won 7 seats at the 2012 parliamentary elections (OSCE-ODIHR 27 June 2016, 4). 21 Alibekov, Ibragim (2002), “Russian Party of Kazakhstan May Reflect Moscow’s Influence”, Eurasianet.org, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav 042402a.shtml (accessed 10 August 2017).

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Nazarbayev, who was the most successful in manipulating competition among foreign powers (Cooley 2012, 11). Kazakhstan’s foreign policy has been multidirectional and can be summed up in the slogan: “happiness is multiple pipelines.” Although the Kazakh elite was eager to build an international reputation, it was also easier for it to “purchase loyalty” and to have democratic shortcomings excused by its international partners (Schatz 2005, 205; Cooley 2012, 10, 22). Furthermore, the stability and openness to macroeconomic reforms of Nazarbayev’s regime have made the country the success story of the Central Asian region (Olcott 2010, 126). Russia was relatively week during the Yeltsin years, but was still the most powerful actor in the region and reached various agreements on key Soviet-era defense assets (Cooley 2012, 22, 23). From the 2000s onwards, it once again started to play a dominant role in Central Asia and to push forward new economic and security organizations. In 2000, Russia established the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Its security equivalent, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), was signed in 2002 by Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan with the aim of integrating the military forces of member countries (Cooley 2012, 60). In 2010, the EurAsEC Customs Union Commission was formed to prepare the implementation of the “Customs Union” between Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. In 2012, the group introduced the single economic space for trade, investment, and labor and aspired to proceed with the integration of further sectors and currencies (Cooley 2012; Kudaibergenova 2016). The Kazakh population widely perceived the Customs Union as an economic proposal of the oligarchs that was motivated by oil and gas and which was accepted by Nazarbayev because it would protect his regime under the Russian umbrella (Laruelle and Peyrouse 2012, 45). The United States were mostly interested in security issues in the region and Kazakhstan’s energy sector in the 1990s (Cooley 2012, 23). Washington offered economic incentives to attain NATO expansion and security cooperation. The deterioration of relations between the United States and Russia from 2003 to 2008 has increased the geopolitical competition in the region. The Obama administration’s rapid rapprochement with Russia in 2009 has dampened this competition (Cooley 2012, 80). Kazakhstan was the only Central Asian country, with which the

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United States have established a Strategic Partnership Dialogue Commission. The two countries also agreed to cooperate in the field of military security and signed a five-year plan in 2013. Furthermore, they held talks on nuclear nonproliferation. Most US foreign direct investment has gone to the mining industry, real estate, business services, and the financial sector (Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan). Finally, NATO has developed its own association strategies with the Partnership for Peace program, including an Individual Partnership Action Plan for Kazakhstan (Peyrouse et al. 2012, 15). China primarily aims to prevent Uighur nationalism and stabilize the western province of Xinjian, to avoid destabilization of Central Asia, to control part of the hydrocarbons and raw materials, and to integrate Central Asia into the Chinese market (Peyrouse et al. 2012, 12). China has, therefore, started to use diplomatic means to conclude border demarcation talks in the Chinese-promoted body for regional engagement, the Shanghai Five Forum that in 2001 became the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Through the SCO, China has also promoted regional and economic development to ensure future political stability. Parallel to these efforts, it has secured oil and gas agreements in Kazakhstan and has constructed new regional pipelines for its transportation. By the end of the 2000s, China’s total trade volume with Central Asia exceeded that of Russia. Beijing is offering aid and investment packages in the area and plans to construct new regional road and railway corridors that bypass Russia. This has caused considerable alarm in Russia and has probably motivated it to proceed with the Eurasian Union (Cooley 2012, 6–7, 22, 79). Collusion scandals, however, between international investors and Kazakhstan’s elite have left a black mark on the country’s success story. A US consultant was allegedly arranging hundreds of millions of dollars in bribes from US energy companies to the ruling elite in what became known as “the Giffen affair,” while Chinese energy companies were accused of corruption scandals related to the oil sector (Cooley 2012, 31). The European Union’s (EU) key interests in Central Asia are the stabilization of the region, access to hydrocarbons, the promotion of human rights and democratic values, and the development of the area according to international criteria (Peyrouse et al. 2012, 15). Only in 2007 did the EU prepare a concrete strategy toward Central Asia, called “Strategy for a New Partnership with Central Asia,” however it is nowhere near

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the Eastern Partnership that has been developed for six East European and South Caucasus neighbors. Kazakhstan’s accession has been discussed informally during its 2010 chairmanship of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The EU has become Kazakhstan’s first trade partner in the world and its first foreign investor. In 2014, the government of Kazakhstan signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU that promotes energy cooperation and expands people-topeople contacts, enhancing thus the economic and strategic relationship between Kazakhstan and the EU.22 In 2006, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline was opened, despite Russia’s efforts to prevent it. It is the first major oil pipeline in the postSoviet era that bypasses Russian territory. Europe and the US have been actively supporting the BTC project since it promises them involvement in the energy and security sectors of the area and a chance to link Europe to Central Asia via the Caucasus. The US has backed, promoted, financed, and supported it over three different administrations (Cornell et al. 2006, 17, 30). The Kazakh government managed to court successfully various international investors to renegotiate contracts signed in the 1990s and to pursue different export routes, such as the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline completed in 2009, while at the same time it convinced Russia to accept its policies (Cooley 2012, 71–72). In sum, Russia has forged a new set of regional institutions that could provide it with the legal framework to reassert regional primacy. Kazakhstan, however, following a diversified foreign policy has managed to become the first country that maintains a cordial and balanced strategic partnership with China, Russia, and the United States. Through a diversified foreign policy strategy that quickly adapts to international economic conditions, such as China’s intense economic growth and the subsequent need for hydrocarbons, and a good use of its own assets, mainly its energy resources, Kazakhstan ensured that it remained open to the rest of the world: In 2010, Kazakhstan obtained the chairmanship of the 2010 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In 2014, it signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU and in

22 Mukasheva, Aisha (11 October, 2014), “Kazakhstan, EU Conclude Talks on Enhanced Partnership, Proving International Relations Aren’t “Zero Sum Game”, Astana Times, http://astanatimes.com/2014/10/kazakhstan-eu-conclude-talks-enhanced-partne rship-proving-international-relations-arent-zero-sum-game/ (accessed 13 August 2017).

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2015, it became a member of the World Trade Organization (Cooley 2012, 25).

5 Popular Claims and Mobilization in Kazakhstan In Kazakhstan, popular claims focus on four major issues: ethnic privileges, freedom, working conditions, and living conditions. The first issue refers mostly to Kazakhstan’s two titular groups—often defined in the literature as “ethnic Russians” and “ethnic Kazakhs”—that confront each other to acquire more political and economic privileges. The first political organizations in Kazakhstan during the disintegration of the Soviet Union were formed along the lines of ethnicity (Babak 2005, 82). Kazakhs, however, accounted only for 46% of the total population in 1995, making them a part and not a majority in their own country. The non-titular group was made up by a variety of nationalities, like Ukrainians, Tatars, Belarussians, the vast majority of which were linguistically russified and often thoroughly sovietized (Kolstø 1998, 52). This fact allows their inclusion in the category of “ethnic Russians” for analytical purposes. The foundation of Kazakh nationalism is the movement Alash Orda that emerged after the Russian Revolution during the 1917 civil war. Alash Orda, named after a founder of the Kazakh people, was a movement of secular nationalists. Its formation coincided with the parallel emergence of a young intellectual elite that was promoting Kazakh national identity and the autonomy of Imperial Russia. Alash Orda presided over the governance of the Middle, Small and Great Hordes of the Kazakh Khanates and of the local clans, especially in Northern Kazakhstan. Alash Orda offered a democratic model that took into consideration the council-of-elders and tried to find solutions to problems such as the future of land expropriated by the tsarist government. For the less than two years that it lasted, it offered the Kazakh elite for the first time the possibility to create a state governed by ethnic Kazakhs. It ended with the formation of the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and its annexation to the Soviet Union in 1936 (Bowyer April 2008, 9–10, 39; Olcott 1997, 204). The ethnic dispute over the party leadership in the late 1980s had parallels with the years of Alash Orda’s government. The Zheltoksan massacre evoked “a sense of Kazakh nationalism” which, as noted above, led to the rise of ethnic Kazakh Nazarbayev and to the creation of the

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Kazakh nationalist movement Nevada-Semipalatinsk, the ethnic Kazakh parties Alash, Azat [Freedom], and Zheltoksan, and the pro-Russian movements Edinstvo [Unity] and Vozrozhdyenie (Bowyer April 2008, 42). Nazarbayev understood even before the breakup of the Soviet Union that he had to reinforce the Kazakh element—language, culture, and history—in order to make Kazakhstan the homeland of the Kazakhs, without alienating the Russian and European populations. The laws he adopted, however, have granted Kazakhs a privileged position. He also initiated a campaign that promised to replace Russians and Russian speakers at top administrative positions with ethnic Kazakhs, which caused many Russians to emigrate or set up political organizations of their own (Olcott 1997, 210; Babak 2005, 82). The official patriotic discourse that is not based on ethnic exclusiveness hides, however, an unofficial process of “Kazakhistation” that refers to the gradual dominance of ethnic Kazakhs in the public sphere at the expense of Russian speakers and Russian nationalist organizations (Caron 2019, 182–183). The second category, which I refer to as mobilization for freedom, includes all political movements and parties that strive for political and human rights. It includes the opposition parties and leaders, and other initiatives of a smaller scale that openly oppose Nazarbayev’s regime. Given the authoritarian nature of the Kazakh political environment, groups that can mobilize the population—and therefore pose a threat to the regime—are usually those persecuted by the regime. Pro-presidential elites, on the contrary, are promoted in public life, or at least are not hindered, unless they switch sides. Another example that falls into this category is LGBT activists living in a climate of permanent persecution, especially since 2015, when Parliament passed a draft legislation against “propaganda of non-traditional sexual orientation” (HRW 23 July 2015). The third category includes mainly trade unions and other organizations that promote workers’ rights. In 2014, the government adopted a law on trade unions that restricts the right of workers to join trade unions of their choice and to freely determine their functioning. The law also limits the worker’s right to strike and introduces criminal penalties for calling on workers to continue a strike that had previously been declared illegal by the courts. As a result, independent unions denounced it for deviating from international human and labor rights standards. The Confederation of Free Trade Unions of Kazakhstan was unable to register under the new law. By 2015, workers could only join co-opted unions

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that promote the interests of big business, given the close links they have with the authorities. In November 2015, Nazarbayev promoted a new labor code that facilitates employers to hire, transfer, and dismiss workers, further weakening workers’ rights (HRW 2015, 2016; Freedom House 2016). Finally, the activism that seeks to improve living conditions consists of environmental movements and protests related to housing. During its years in the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan suffered irreversible environmental damage from the Virgin Lands project on the Aral Sea and the health effects of the nuclear testing program at Semipalatinsk (Bowyer April 2008, 41). Other protests connected to living conditions include those against the country’s 2016 Land Code that allowed foreigners to rent agricultural land in Kazakhstan for 25 years and allowed land to be sold or leased at auctions.23 The environmental movement Nevada-Semipalatinsk, led by longtime member of the central committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan and head of the Writer’s Union, Olzhas Suleimenov, was the largest movement in the days of Soviet dominance that challenged Moscow’s instructions. It became “an influential interest group with international recognition and renown” (Bowyer April 2008, 41). NevadaSemipalatinsk persuaded more than one million people from both Russia and Kazakhstan to sign petitions. Despite the fact that it was quasigovernmental, it had a strong appeal across the majority of Kazakhstan’s ethnic communities (Olcott 1997, 21; 2010, 90). Grassroots mobilization is extremely restricted in Kazakhstan. Every attempt to publicly express discontent or disobedience is immediately suppressed by the security apparatuses. Prosecutors inform participants of public events that they are violating legislation by holding an unauthorized assembly, whereas the same amount of policemen as participants is awaiting close to the event and usually detains them. Assemblies, pickets, or simply meetings of activists are harshly dealt with, despite constitutional guarantees. Even if assemblies on social and economic issues are tolerated, the freedom of citizens to assemble peacefully and express their opinions is at stake. Only those organizers that are politically loyal to the government can get away with staging public meetings (Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights 2010, 18–20). NGOs 23 BBC (2016, April 28), “Kazakhstan’s Land Reform Protests Explained”, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-36163103 (accessed 13 August 2017).

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face government harassment when dealing with sensitive political issues. In 2015, Nazarbayev enacted amendments to legislation that imposed “burdensome reporting obligations” and government control over their funding sources. The ability of individuals to hold public gatherings has been limited and foreigners have been prohibited from funding public associations (they can only become members) (HRW 2016, 2017; Freedom House 2016).

6

Actors that Can Mobilize the Population

The nationalist movements have mostly been led by elites. When Nazarbayev passed the 1989 bill that aimed to make Kazakh the language of the republic, the descendants of the earliest Russian settlers especially in the North formed the movements “Organization for the Autonomy of Eastern Kazakhstan” and Edinstvo. These movements aimed to the protection of the political and social rights of citizens and the prevention of violence by separatists, chauvinists, and nationalists. Other organizations that were founded to protect non-titular groups from ethnic and linguistic discrimination were the Slavic Movement of Kazakhstan and the Russian Community. The first one was a political movement that aimed at protecting the Slav’s civil and social rights and culture. The Russian Community was similar to Edinstvo and later became the public association Russian Alliance (Olcott 1997, 210; Babak 2005, 82). Kazakhstan’s largest Slavic movement was Lad [Harmony], with more than 8000 members by 1994 in 16 regions. Founded in 1993, Lad opposed the official nationalities policy and demanded a degree of local autonomy for areas with ethnically uniform Russian settlements in the north and east that would eventually lead to their secession. According to its Charter, Lad wanted the preservation of ethnic originality, culture, and Slavic languages, democratic development, spiritual rebirth of nations; protection of political, economic, social, cultural rights and personal freedoms, and the establishment of “brotherly relations” between Kazakhstan’s nations. Lad also promoted cultural and educational activities and was lobbying for sending its candidates to Parliament (Babak 2005, 82; Sayabayev 2016, 96). The large number of Cossacks residing in Kazakhstan was also organized politically and founded the associations Ural Municipal Cossack Historical and Cultural Society, the Society for Lending Assistance to the Semirichye Cossacks, the Siberian Association of Cossacks, and the Upper

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Irtysh Old Belief Cossack Society. The aim of these associations was the cultural, spiritual, and historical learning and promotion of the Cossack tradition, but they also promoted the creation of special Cossack structures on the basis of self-government and the transfer of Cossack lands to Russia (Sayabayev 2016, 96; Babak 2005, 91–92). In the camp of pro-Kazakh nationalism, the repressed participants of Zheltoksan formed a committee in 1987, which served as the basis for the Zheltoksan National Democratic Party in 1990. Its main objectives were the separation from the USSR and the creation of an independent multi-party constitutional state that would function under democratic procedures. It also demanded amnesty and rehabilitation for the participants of the uprising. The Zheltoksan Party was able to organize major protests, such as the 1992 gathering of 5000 people in front of Parliament to demand the resignation of the Communist leaders. It also organized hunger strikes, and building takeovers (Furman 2005, 250; Olcott 1997, 210–211; Sayabayev 2016, 96). Its leader, Khasen Kozhakhmetov, who later changed his name to Kozh-Akhment, wanted to run for president in the country’s first presidential elections of 1991, because he wanted “to give voters an alternative and to make himself better known.” He failed to gather the 100,000 signatures required and could not participate (Furman 2005, 204). The radical nationalist party Alash (National Freedom Party) was based on Islamist and Pan-Turkish ideology. Its name made reference to both the heroic Kazakh founder Alash and the Alash Orda of the early twentieth century. Alash’s main objectives, according to its program, were the achievement of real independence of Kazakhstan, Turkic unity and the creation of the Great Turkestan state with Kazakhstan at its core, the improvement of life of Kazakh people and other nations of the republic, and the prevention of colonial expansion of world powers. In October 1991, Alash, which had a paramilitary structure with a strict hierarchy, threatened to start a jihad and, two months later, stormed a mosque in Almaty and attacked Kazakhstan’s chief mufti, Ratbek Nysanbaev. After this, its senior leaders were arrested, but Alash did not withdraw from public life. It merged with the Republican Party in 1992 and managed to receive public support for a brief period, but was later marginalized (Olcott 1997, 211; HRW 7 April 2004, 21; Furman 2005, 250; Sayabayev 2016, 96). Toward the end of the 1990s, Alash became more moderate. Its new objective was to revive the Kazakh nation and unify “the national-patriotic

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forces in order to create a democratic society and an independent state.” However, it only wanted to collaborate with the parties that supported the ethnic Kazakh population. It officially registered in 1999, but its registration was then refused because it violated Article 7 of the law on political parties that prohibits ethnic, religious, or gender-based parties. Its reregistration was blocked six consecutive times until 2003 (Olcott 1997, 211; HRW 7 April, 2004, 21; Furman 2005, 250). Another organization denying multi-ethnicity that formed in the same period with Zheltoksan and Alash, was Azat [Freedom], the Civil Movement of Kazakhstan (Azat from now on). The Azat movement should not be confused with the Azat party (former Nagkyz Ak-Zhol) of Bolat Abilov, Oraz Jandosov, and Altynbek Sarsenbayev. The Azat civil movement was formed in the 1990s and lobbied for independence from the Soviet Union. Its goals were the achievement of full state sovereignty of the democratic Kazakh Republic, the establishment of the rule of law, and the recovery of its national wealth. After the constitution of the republic, it demanded a mono-ethnic homeland for Kazakh people, after the example of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (Olcott 1997, 214; Bowyer April 2008, 27, 43; Sayabayev 2016, 96). Activism related to political freedom and the protection of human rights, workers’ rights, and living conditions is mostly undertaken by individuals and social movements with different organizational characteristics, which they are forced to adopt in an authoritarian and strongly repressive environment. A famous case is that of Ermek Narymbaev, leader of the Arman association, who has openly denounced Nazarbayev on various occasions, such as in 2010, when he called for his impeachment. He was imprisoned twice in 2015 on charges of holding unsanctioned protests in Almaty (Freedom House 2016). In 2016, he and Serikhzan Mambetalin were sentenced to two and three years in prison respectively for “inciting national discord,” through their Facebook posts about Murat Telibekov, an activist under criminal investigation on the same charges (HRW 2016, 2017). The Communist Party of Kazakhstan also holds meetings, such as Lenin’s 140th anniversary, which was only allowed in an industrial estate far from the city center. Finally, activists of the organization “For Free Internet” have been organizing various events, such as the picket line in front of the central office of Kazakhtelecom in 2010 (Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights 2010). The most serious violent clashes in post-communist Kazakshtan took place in December 2011 in the western city of Zhanaozen. Since May

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2011, thousands of workers in the oil and gas sector have gone on separate labor strikes in various cities to denounce unpaid hazardous work and to claim higher wages and better working conditions.24 Zhanaozen’s strike has been going on for months at the OzenMunaiGaz Company and resulted in violent clashes on December 16. Local police fired indiscriminately at the crowd, killing at least 13 people and injuring more than 100. The authorities imposed a state of emergency. In the following months, authorities persecuted outspoken oil workers and government critics, such as trade union leader Amin Yleusinov (sentenced to two years), Nurbek Kushakbaev (sentenced to two and a half years), Larisa Kharkova, the editor-in-chief of the independent Vzglyad newspaper, and Alga!’s leader, Vladimir Kozlov on charges of inciting social discord25 (OSCE-ODIHR 1 February 2012; OSCE-ODIHR 3 April 2012, 2; HRW 2010; HRW 23 November 2016; HRW 13 June 2017; HRW 16 May 2017; Satpayev and Umbetaliyeva 2015). The 2016 land reform protest was the first major mobilization after the Zhanaozen violence. The protest started in Atyrau, western Kazakhstan, with spillover effects in the northern city of Aktobe and the eastern city of Semey.26 More than two dozen people were jailed and hundreds were detained during the countrywide protests against land reforms, including more than 50 journalists. Activists Maks Bokaev and Talgat Ayan were sentenced to 15 days detention for administrative offenses and were subsequently prosecuted on charges of “violating the public assembly law, for inciting national discord, and disseminating false information.” Journalist Guzyal Baidalinova was found guilty of “disseminating false information” for an article she wrote about a Kazakh bank. She was sentenced to 18 months in prison, but after two months she was released on parole. Father and son, Seitkazy and Aset Mataev, both critical of pro-government journalists, were sentenced to five years in prison for 24 For a calender of the strikes of oil workers see Osavoliyk, Andriy (2012, March 2), “The Calendar of the Strikes of Oil Workers and Political Persecution in Kazakhstan”, Open Dialog, http://en.odfoundation.eu/a/522,the-calendar-of-the-strikes-ofoil-workers-and-of-political-persecution-in-kazakhstan-february-2012 (accessed 13 August 2017). 25 Daisy Sindelar, Daisy and Sania Toiken (2012, December 16), “A Year After Deadly Riots, Zhanaozen Is Quiet But Angry”, RFE/RL, https://www.rferl.org/a/zhanaozen-ayear-after-the-riots/24798726.html (accessed 13 August 2017). 26 BBC (2016, April 28), “Kazakhstan’s Land Reform Protests Explained”, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-36163103 (accessed 13 August 2017).

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embezzlement, in a case criticized for its lack of integrity (HRW 2017). Surprisingly, the protest prompted Nazarbayev to halt the proposal for five years.27 The residents of Berezovka, who have been asking the government to relocate them since 2003, have also mobilized protests. Berezovka is a village near the Karachaganak gas condensate field, where several school children and teachers fell severely ill from high emissions in 2014. Similar incidents continued to occur, despite government statements that they had nothing to do with extractive practices (Freedom House 2016). Finally, the group Antigeptil has been protesting against the firing of rockets in Baikonur. Its activists‚ Saken Baikenov and Bolatbek Blyalov‚ were arrested in 2015 for “inciting ethnic discord” and “social discord” respectively. Bolatbek Blyalov was sentenced to three years of restricted movement and association for “inciting social discord” for his online videos on Kazakh nationalism (HRW 2016, 2017). In February 2019, the death of five siblings caused by a fire in their home while their parents were both working night shifts, started a series of peaceful mass protests, unprecedented in their scale and nature of demands. After the call of the opposition movement DVK, more than thousand people rallied in Astana to demand reforms and the resignation of Nazarbayev. More than 200 people were detained. Since then, hundreds of mothers of many children have held long-term protests in Astana, Almaty, Atkobe, Karaganda, Shymkent, Uralks, Kyzylorda, and Taldykorgan to ask for improvements in social security and social policies. At the same time, Zhanaozen has seen protests from residents who demanded permanent jobs.28 In the aftermath of Nazarbayev’s resignation, a series of protests shook the whole country. The 2019 protests have been larger and more sustained than most observers expected (Nixey 2019, 2). The snap elections of June that followed Nazarbayev’s resignation incited protests by followers of the moderate opposition, represented by Amirzhan Kosanov, 27 Reuters (2016, August 18), “In Rare Climbdown, Kazakh Leader Delays Land Reforms for 5 Years”, Voanews, https://www.voanews.com/a/rare-climbdown-kasakh-lea der-delays-land-reforms-five-years/3471001.html (accessed 13 August 2017). 28 Savchenko, Igor (2019, July 3), “A Turbulent February in Kazakhstan: Hundreds of Detained and Persecuted Participants of Peaceful Assemblies”, Open Dialogue, https://en.odfoundation.eu/a/9129,a-turbulent-february-in-kazakhstanhundreds-of-detained-and-persecuted-participants-of-peaceful-assemblies/ (accessed 3 June 2020).

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the DVK, nationalists, and the movement Oyan, Kazakhstan (Wake up, Kazakhstan) that wanted to denounce rigged elections.29 Nearly 4000 people were detained, 305 fined and 677 more were handed short jail sentences over five days. More protests followed, the most significant of which was the rally organized by DVK in September, where 100 people were arrested. The government proceeded to a ban of Internet freedoms in order to control protests; in this vein, the government disrupted mobile internet connections, throttled access to social media, temporarily blocked independent news websites, and detained activists, journalists, and ordinary internet users. In December more protests took place, after which president Tokayev announced that he would undertake liberal reforms that would ease restrictions on assembly.30 In February, the government released a draft of the much-awaited reform of Kazakhstan’s protest legislation that included many problematic points. For example, organizers should be present at the rally and should not have been convicted of any offense related to the organization of rallies in the past (i.e., for participating in mass riots or for organizing unsanctioned rallies). DVK and the Democratic Party responded with the organization of more unsanctioned rallies that resulted in the arrest of 200 participants (Putz 2020).31

7

Strategy of the Elites to Stay in Power

This part presents the strategies followed by Nazarbayev to maintain his power during the four periods of the country’s party development (Sabayev 2016). The first one is the late Soviet period, from the second half of the 1980s until the 1994 parliamentary elections, when political organizations flourished for the first time on the basis of political and ethnic cleavages (Sayabayev 2016, 98). At this time, Nazarbayev 29 Niyazbekov, Nurseit (2020, March 3), “Democracy, the Tokayev Way”, The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/democracy-the-tokayev-way/ (accessed 13 June 2020). 30 Freedom House (2020), “Freedom in the World 2020. Kazakhstan”, https:// freedomhouse.org/country/kazakhstan/freedom-world/2020; Freedom House (2020), “Freedom on the Net 2019. Kazakhstan”, https://freedomhouse.org/country/kazakh stan/freedom-net/2019. 31 Putz, Catherine (2020, February 25), “Arrests at Rallies as Kazakhstan Contemplates New Protest Law”, The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/arrests-at-ralliesas-kazakhstan-contemplates-new-protest-law/.

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began to increase his control over the administrative infrastructure of the Republic of Kazakhstan, preparing the country to become more autonomous than ever before (Olcott 1997, 209). Nazarbayev’s popularity was diminishing due to the economic decline in the first half of the 1990s and the general disenchantment with Kazakhstan’s transition. This brought a parallel increase in competitors, as vibrant opposition and civil society were forming in the new state. The new Parliament turned out to be sufficiently strong and independent to constrain Nazarbayev’s decisions and impede the privatization process, despite the fact that the new Parliament was to “provide a compliant, unsophisticated accomplice to Nazarbayev’s vision of political and economic transformation” (Olcott 1997, 226, 230). The second period begins with the adoption of the current Constitution (1995) and ends with the first parliamentary elections that took place under the mixed scheme (1999). This was an exploratory period for the search of the best political model that would fit the country’s needs, during which the first mechanisms that would regulate political processes were established. Despite these efforts‚ institutionalization continued to be largely incomplete (Sayabayev 2016, 98). Nazarbayev, who had not yet secured his place in post-communist Kazakhstan, started to increasingly use authoritarian strategies to consolidate his power: in March 1995 he dissolved Parliament, ruled by decree for nine months, and assembled an unconstitutional “advisory committee” that adopted a resolution for Nazarbayev to remain president. In August 1995, he amended the Constitution by referendum, under which he was allowed to prolong his mandate until 2000. The second Constitution of 1995 restricted political liberties, dismantled political parties, created the present bicameral legislature, restricted the powers of Parliament, and strengthened presidential powers while weakening elected institutions (Olcott 2010, 87; Peyrouse 2012, 350). In 1998, the Constitution was amended once again, changing the president’s term of office from five to seven years and providing further clauses that facilitated Nazarbayev’s re-election (i.e., the abolition of the age limit, the requirement of a 50% turnout for a valid election, as well as the establishment of succession in case the president was unable to perform his duties). It also introduced the disqualification of potential presidential candidates from registration if they had received a minor administrative sanction for a so-called intentional offense. In addition, under the new Constitution, the president could appoint government

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and regional leaders, the majority of deputies in the Upper House and the prime minister, suspend central and regional government decrees, and dissolve Parliament if it rejects the president’s nominee for prime minister twice or if it passes a vote of no-confidence in the government (OSCE-ODIHR 5 February, 1999; Olcott 2010, 88). On 6 May 1999, the Kazakh authorities enacted a new Constitutional Law on presidential elections, parliamentary elections for both the Majilis (Lower House) and the Senate (Upper House), and local elections. This new law established the appointment of With this new law, 15 of the Senate’s 47 members by the president and a 7% threshold for parties to enter the Majilis (OSCE-ODIHR 20 January 2000, 4–5; OSCE-ODIHR 3 April 2012, 5). At the same time, competitors for power have been excluded by either being allowed to go to exile or by being appointed to positions with high symbolic value (e.g., ambassadors, professors), but with little political weight. For example, Olzhas Suleimenov was sent as ambassador to Italy and has since pursued a diplomatic career. And Kuanysh Sultanov, deputy prime minister at a time when Nazarbayev was dismantling Parliament, confronted the president’s authority and was appointed ambassador to China from 1994 to 1995 (Dumoulin 2012, 28; Laruelle 2012, 320). The 1999 parliamentary elections—the first ones according to the mixed scheme—marked the beginning of the third period of Kazakhstan’s party development. Nazarbayev formed the Otan party by co-opting smaller political forces and won the elections with an absolute majority. At the same time‚ he took control over the largest opposition parties (e.g., the second-largest political force became the pro-presidential Civil Party). Otan’s challengers were the repressed Communist Party of Kazakhstan and the Republican People’s Party of Kazakhstan (RNPK). The RNPK withdrew from the election, because its leader had been denied registration and reportedly been intimidated by local authorities. OSCE observers reported widespread violations, the collapse of transparency and accountability mechanisms envisioned by the Central Election Commission and the interference of executive authorities in the electoral process in the 1999 parliamentary elections (OSCE-ODIHR 20 January 2000, 2–10). Akezhan Kazhegeldin, RNPK’s leader, was banned from running for office in the 1999 parliamentary elections, because of an “administrative offense,” a term used for politically motivated misdemeanors. Kazhegeldin and his associates were assaulted by unknown assailants, harassed by law enforcement officials, given arbitrary

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misdemeanor charges‚ while his book Kazakhstan: Meeting the Challenges Ahead was confiscated and burned (Olcott 2010, 120). Another competitor was Murat Auezov, former ambassador to China and son of Kazakhstan’s most celebrated writer during the Soviet period, Muhtar Auezov. Murat Auezov was co-chairman of the Azamat movement, together with Petr Svoik and Galym Abilseitov. While Svoik and his wife were beaten and Abilseitov was sentenced to 15 years in prison for organizing a demonstration without prior authorization, Murat Auezov enjoyed a certain degree of immunity, apparently because of his father’s fame. However, after announcing that he would oppose Nazarbayev in the 1999 presidential elections, he withdrew (Olcott 2010, 120; Junisbai 2010, 252). The year 2001 saw the rise of another opposition party: the Democratic Choice Party of Kazakhstan (DVK) (see above). Two days after the formation of the DVK, on November 20, 2001, Zhakyanov was removed from office as governor of Pavlodar and other members who were governmental officials were dismissed. The following year, both Abliyazov and Zhakyanov were sentenced on charges of abuse of office to six and sevenyear prison terms respectively (Peyrouse 2012, 352–353; HRW 7 April 2004, 15). International pressure led to their eventual release. However, they were forced to apologize publicly and their credibility to lead the opposition afterward was most likely destroyed (Peyrouse 2012, 353). In 2005, DVK was banned because of its harsh criticism of the government and Zhakyanov was imprisoned. The fourth period is the crystallization of the present system (2002 to today). During this period, the patronage and co-optation strategies have reached their peak. Small parties were excluded from the elections, through bureaucratic obstacles for party registration, through the creation of pseudo-opposition parties, and through the formation of Nur Otan [Ray of Light of the Fatherland], a super-party that would dominate the political scene. The first attempt to construct a liberal pseudo-opposition was the formation of the Asar party, lead by Dariga Nazarbayeva. Her party, however, failed to achieve its goal of bringing together young members of the elite, and in June 2006 Asar joined her father’s party Otan.32

32 BBC (2015, September 11), “Kazakhstan Profile- Leaders”, http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-asia-pacific-15479889 (accessed 15 June 2017).

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In November 2006, Otan merged with two other parties, Qazaqstan Azamattlyk Partiyasi [Civic Party of Kazakhstan] and Qazaqstan Agrarlyk Partiyasi [Agrarian Party of Kazakhstan] and came under Nazarbayev’s leadership. The coalition managed to control almost 90% of the seats in the 2007 parliamentary elections (OSCE-ODIHR 30 October 2007). In 2008, Nur Otan founded its youth branch, Zhas Otan [Youth of the Fatherland], and a party school to train party members. From 2007 to 2012, Nur Otan was the only party represented in Parliament. In 2012, following a legislative reform aiming to protect the country against criticism from the West, two pseudo-opposition parties entered Parliament (Peyrouse 2012, 353). Through the formation of Nur Otan, Nazarbayev fulfilled his goal of having fewer but stronger political parties, as most out of the ten parties registered in 2006 were supporting him (OSCE-ODIHR 30 October 2007).33 This massive super-party epitomizes Nazarbayev’s attempts to legitimize his authority and promote him as a charismatic leader (Isaacs 2011). According to Bakhytzhan Zhumagulov, acting deputy chairman of Otan: “This name symbolizes the nationwide character of our party, its democratic ideology, its orientation to the future, and the party’s recognition of Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev as the leader of the whole nation.”34 A decisive step that Nazarbayev took toward dismantling pluralism in his country was the restrictive Law on Political Parties of July 2002. The law raised the minimum number of members who must sign in for a party to stand for public office from 3,000 to 50,000. The law restricted party access to the ballot and struck a severe blow against Kazakhstan’s political pluralism (HRW 7 April 2004, 20). In December 2004, Parliament passed the “law on the procedure for organizing and conducting peaceful assemblies, meetings, marches, pickets and demonstrations in the Republic of Kazakhstan,” according to which even one-person demonstrations must be registered 10 days in advance. Organizers and participants of gatherings without permission may now be 33 RFE/RL (2006, November 10), “Pro-Nazarbaev Party Merges With President’s Power Base”, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, https://www.rferl.org/a/1072644.html (accessed 25 July 2017). 34 Pannier, Bruce (2006, December 22), “Kazakhstan: Ruling Party Gets Even Bigger”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, https://www.rferl.org/a/1073642.html (accessed 25 July 2017).

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charged with up to 15 days detention or even one-year imprisonment (HRW 1 December 2008). The regime tried to maintain the image of some degree of meritocracy and freedom, and in 2007 it proceeded to new constitutional amendments that extended the power of the legislative branch (Kanapyanov and Kaliyev 2015, 337).35 The amendments introduced the system of proportional representation and the election of 30 additional deputies to the Majilis, bringing the number of deputies to 107. The Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, chaired by Nazarbayev, elects 9 of these 107. The number of members of the Senate who can be appointed by Nazarbayev also increased from 7 to 15. The amendments reduced the length of the presidential mandate from seven to five years, but also removed its two-term limit, allowing the president to remain in office for an unlimited number of terms (OSCE-ODIHR 30 October 2007, 4–9, 34; Kanapyanov and Kaliyev 2015, 337). In 2010, Parliament unanimously adopted a constitutional law “A Leader of the Nation,” which granted Nazarbayev greater privileges and protection, and a subsequent law, in December of the same year, which extended the term of the first president to an indefinite period (Kanapyanov and Kaliyev 2015, 339). By 2015, Nazarbayev had achieved the authority to appoint and dismiss the prime minister, the attorney general, judges at all levels and all heads of local executive authorities, enact legislation, veto laws passed by Parliament and decisions of the Constitutional Council, dissolve Parliament, and call early elections at all times. Nazarbayev had also amended the Constitution to give him special legal status and protection and can now remain in the presidency without limits as the country’s “first president” (OSCE-ODIHR 29 July 2015, 5). In 2017, however, a constitutional amendment introduced prodemocratic reforms. The president’s role was formally diminished through a more rigid and precise separation of powers and in the process, Parliament was empowered to choose cabinet members, including the prime minister. Furthermore, the president’s power to issue legal decrees or override parliamentary votes was limited. In 2018, the Security Council received the status of constitutional organ and became an alternative to the presidency. Nazarbayev was also awarded lifelong chairmanship of the

35 On 21 May 2007, the Parliament adopted the “Law on Amendments and Addenda to the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan” (Sarsembayev 2008, 122).

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Security Council. Experts saw these changes as Nazarbayev’s preparation for his departure from the presidency (Mallinson 2019, 12–13). Opposition parties have been either closed or co-opted by the authorities, or divided or abandoned because their leaders and activists have been intimidated. All members of the opposition risk not only arbitrary dismissal from their workplace, but also surveillance by law enforcement agents (HRW 7 April 2004, 39, 48). The practice of putting all kinds of possible obstacles to political opponents has intensified over the years. DVK candidates, for example, reported that they faced difficulties or were excluded from registration on the basis of administrative offenses or failure to pass the psychiatric tests required of all candidates under the Law on Elections (HRW 7 April 2004, 18–19). Indicative is the fact that no new party has been registered since 2007 (OSCE-ODIHR 29 July 2015, 4). Opposition parties Alga! and AtaMeken were excluded from the 2007 elections because the authorities delayed acceptance of their registration application (OSCE-ODIHR 30 October 2007, 4–9, 34). In 2009, Alga! submitted another registration application, which was not answered (OSCE-ODIHR 16 June 2011). Similarly, in 2012, the parties Alga!, Khalyk Rukh, and Ata Meken were denied registration in parliamentary elections because of problems with their member lists. Alga!’s leader, Vladimir Kozlov, was sentenced to seven and a half years in prison in 2012 for “inciting social discord” during the Zhanaozen events and his party was banned (OSCE-ODIHR 1 February 2012; HRW 2010). Furthermore, the merger of OSDP-Azat was rejected by the Ministry of Justice and Azat members had to formally join the All National Social Democratic Party (OSDP) to run for these elections. After the arrest of three Azat leaders in January 2012, party leader Abilov resigned and OSDP-Azat decided not to present a candidate for the presidential elections (OSCE-ODIHR 3 April 2012, 14; OSCE-ODIHR 29 July 2015). The Communist Party of Kazakhstan was suspended by the court in 2011 and was unable to stand for election. It was finally suspended in 2015 by the Almaty Economic Court due to several technicalities (OSCE-ODIHR 3 April 2012, 5, 11; OSCE-ODIHR 27 June 2012, 4). Finally, the unregistered opposition movement Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DVK)

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was banned in March 2019 on the basis of engaging in “extremist” activities. The authorities also increased repression toward both alleged patrons and supporters of the DVK.36 Opposition leaders were banned from running for office, such as Galymzhan Zhakianov of the DVK, who was banned from the 2004 parliamentary elections due to a corruption conviction, and Bolat Abilov was banned from the 2004 parliamentary election due to a defamation conviction and in the 2007 parliamentary elections due to his past conviction (OSCE-ODIHR 30 October 2007, 4–9, 34). Popular opposition leaders are also indirectly dismissed through a Kazakh language test, such as Azat member Ualikhan Kaisarov, who failed the test, and Vladimir Kozlov from Alga! who has withdrawn because he did not have enough time to prepare for the early presidential elections of 2012 (Brauer 2011). 15 of the 27 nominees for the 2015 presidential elections failed the test (OSCE-ODIHR 29 July 2015, 10–11). Another strategy the government has used to eliminate dissidents is the pardon process. The president pardons political prisoners if they abandon politics altogether. This strategy was used on several occasions, such as in the case of Abliyazov. Abliyazov, following international pressure, was released under presidential pardon in 2003. However, he has resigned from the DVK and has not returned to politics since. The same happened to Galymzhan Zhakianov, who was unable to run for elections, because he served the above-mentioned sentence for “abuse of office and exceeding official authority” and was released on parole only after the elections (OSCE-ODIHR 21 February 2006, 14–16). Finally, a series of targeted political assassinations dominated Kazakshtan’s political life in the 2000s (Laruelle 2012, 319). During the pre-election campaign for the 2005 presidential elections, Zamanbek Nurkadilov, a member of the movement For A Just Kazakhstan and former minister, was found dead in his house with two bullet wounds to the chest and one to the head. The investigation came to the controversial conclusion that he had committed suicide, a claim disputed by many, starting with his wife.37 Three months later, another prominent opposition figure, Altynbek Sarsenbayev of Ak Zhol and founder of the Naghyz 36 HRW, “Kazakhstan. Events of 2018”. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/ country-chapters/kazakhstan (accessed 13 June 2020). 37 RFE/RL (2005, November 30), “Lawyer Disputes Claim of Kazakh Oppositionist’s Suicide”, RFE/RL, https://www.rferl.org/a/1063385.html (accessed 11 August 2017).

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Ak Zhol, and two of his employees were found dead in the outskirts of Almaty. His assistant said that his hands were tied behind his back and he was shot in the front and in the back of his head.38 In the aftermath of Sarsenbayev’s killing, Nartai Dutbaev, head of the Kyrgyz National Security Committee, resigned and the speaker of the Senate Nurtai Abykaev and boss of one of the two accused murderers received a severe blow to his authority. The list of suspected political assassinations includes also journalist Batyrkham Darimbet (traffic accident in 2015), Erzhan Tatishev, head of the country’s biggest bank (hunting accident in 2004), journalist Ashkat Sharipzhan (hit-and-run accident in 2004), journalist Nuri Muftakh (traffic accident in 2002), and human rights activist Aleksei Pugaev (hit-and-run accident in 2002).39 At the same time, independent journalists and critics of the regime are threatened and harassed. Libel is a severely punished criminal offense. A high-profile case was the 2002 attack on Sergei Duvanov, a well-known journalist who covered the Kazakhgate. In 2002, after receiving an official invitation to speak about human rights abuses in Kazakhstan at the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe meeting on Human Dimension Implementation in Warsaw, Duvanov was attacked in front of his home. The assault resulted in head injuries and knife wounds. A few months later, he was arrested on charges of raping a minor and sentenced to three and a half years in prison (HRW 7 April 2004, 37; OMCT 2002). Through this strategy, the government not only silences disturbing voices that may uncover incidents, especially related to corruption‚ but also sends a clear message to the country’s journalists, who live in an atmosphere of anxiety and self-censorship (HRW 1 December 2008).40

38 RFE/RL (2006, February 13), “Kazakhstan: Opposition Figure Found Shot Dead Near Almaty”, https://www.rferl.org/a/1065719.html (accessed 11 August 2017). 39 RFE/RL (9 August, 2006) op. cit. 40 There is a very long list of journalists who have received similar treatment in retal-

iation to their work. Some very striking cases, according to Western standards, for their line of accusation are the sentence of Ramazan Yesergepov, editor of newspaper Alma-Ata Info, in 2010 on a three-year imprisonment for disclosing state secrets (HRW 2010) and the placement of government critic Natalya Ulasik in forced psychiatric detention in 2016, on accusations of defamation of her ex-partner (HRW 2017).

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8

Conclusion

Kazakhstan has become the success story of post-communist development in the region. Investors as well as domestic and foreign elites have been praising the stability of Nazarbayev’s neopatrimonial regime. Nazarbayev, however, is the first Central Asian leader who chose to step down from the presidency. He preferred to do a political tandem, similar to the one that Putin undertook with Medvedev in 2008. Will Kazakhstan be able to maintain its stability? Given previous experience from other Central Asian states, we would expect that Tokayev is more likely to break with Nazarbayev’s legacy once he gathers enough power around him. However, Nazarbayev’s heritage creates serious constraints to his supposed challenger. Nazarbayev’s manifest cult of personality is sincere; he is genuinely popular among his people, the majority of which consider him the architect of the Kazakh development model. Nazarbayev has also proven to be very skillful in dominating the political sphere. Seizing the opportunity opened up by the brutal repression of the Zheltoksan’s uprising, he prevailed over his main rival, ethnic Russian Kolbin. After Kolbin’s defeat, Nazarbayev’s opportunistic moves have kept him in power. This included in particular, Nazarbayev’s support for both Gorbachev’s reforms and the independence of the Kazakh political class from Russian influence. Nazarbaev also played the nationalist card to consolidate his power by taking advantage of his Kazakh origin and passed a series of pro-Kazakh laws, while attempting to tame both Kazakh and Russian nationalism. At the same time, Nazarbayev pursued oppressive policies against all dissenting voices. The first decades of Kazakhstan’s independence from the USSR saw the formation of many opposition parties, such as the Kazhegeldin’s RNPK, the Suleimenov’s Nevada-Semipalatinsk, the DVK of Zhakyanov, the Dzhandosov and Abliyazov, the Tuyakbai’s OSDP, the Abilov’s Nagiz Ak Zhol and later, his party Azat (co- founded with Kosanov and Amirbek). Nonetheless, all these efforts to oppose Nazarbayev’s omnipotence in the country’s political life were persecuted and dismantled as Nazarbayev’s power increased. Opposition to Nazarbayev could only come from the grassroots. Activists organized around the major issues of ethnic privileges, freedom, working conditions, and living conditions. Nationalist organizations were formed to promote the rights of Kazakhs, Russians, Cossacks,

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and advocates of Pan-Turkism, i.e., Alash, Zheltoksan, Azat , NevadaSemipalatinsk, Edinstvo, Vozrozhdyenie. Other types of grassroots organizations, such as civil rights movements, trade unions, and environmental organizations, also tried to push their demands. All attempts to publicly criticize the regime, however, were met with repression and arrests. Opposition leaders were banned from running for office with convictions for different types of offenses (from administrative to more serious ones). Other obstacles, such as the Kazakh language test, the pardon process for convicted politicians provided they abandon politics, political assassinations, and the silencing of the press made opposition a dangerous endeavor. The message that Nazarbayev has sent to both his people and his opponents is that he will not tolerate criticism. Nazarbayev also learned from the experiences of other Central Asian leaders. Uzbekistan’s president Islam Karimov, for instance, died in office and his legacy was in part discarded by the political transition. Not long after this event, Nazarbayev introduced constitutional amendments that formally diminished the president’s role and increased the powers of the legislative branch. The Parliament has more say on cabinet members, including the prime minister, and the president can no longer issue legal decrees or override parliamentary votes of no-confidence by cabinet members. All these amendments suggest that Nazarbayev was seeking to limit the authority of any successor (Mallinson 2019, 13). Additionally, Tokayev has issued a decree in October 2019 that grants Nazarbayev lifetime chairmanship in the National Security Council and extends his decisionmaking power over the country’s political personnel. Nazarbayev’s oldest daughter, Dariga, replaced Tokayev as chair of the upper house of Parliament. This meant that if Tokayev leaved office, Nazarbayeva would become president.41 But in May 2020 she was removed from the Senate, in what seems to be a sign of Tokayev consolidation. According to experts, the new president, is using his formal office to develop his own “brand Tokayev“ and team (Mallinson 2019, 13). Tokayev also wants to be seen as the initiator of Kazakhstan’s liberalization. At the moment, however, there are no signs or prospects of a transfer of power. There is no genuine, high-profile opposition figure that could 41 Lillis, Joanna (2019, March 20) “Kazakhstan: A President Called Tokayev: A Future Called Nursultan”, eurasianet, https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-a-president-called-tok ayev-a-future-called-nursultan (accessed 13, June 2020).

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challenge the status quo and civil society is “largely a sham” (Nixey 2019, 5). Whether Tokayev will dare to compete with Nazarbayev and create instability will probably depend on how efficient Nazarbayev has been during nearly three decades in power to create resilient patronal relations. If Nazarbayev’s system proves resilient, the power centers that he has armed with his most trusted people, i.e., the Security Council and the executive council of Nur Otan, and the security agencies will probably defend him when Tokayev will have gathered enough power to challenge his system. Another factor that may play a role in Kazakhstan’s transition is the group of young, Western-educated liberals surrounding the old power elite. Young liberals have been gaining group consciousness and are advancing democratic change. One thing is for sure; the postNazarbayev era will most certainly become a laboratory for the study of regimes through the lens of the Sociology of Power.

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Kyrgyzstan and Intermingling of Elites: From a State of Enlightenment to a Shadow State Viktoria Akchurina

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Introduction

The term elite became one of the most general – and, therefore, one of the most meaningless – terms in social sciences. (Scott 2008, 27)

Since independence, the ruling elite in Kyrgyzstan changed abruptly and almost violently three times: in the early 1990s, in 2005, and in 2010.1 These events correspond to three changes of political power in the country, that is the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the coup d’état in 2005 that displaced President Askar Akayev, and the coup d’état in 2010 resulting in the displacement of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev. While elite change can happen democratically and under influence of 1 While today’s President of Kyrgyzstan, Sooronbai Jeenbekov was elected peacefully after the end of the term of President Atambayev, who was the first one to give up his power democratically, this article focuses on the regime change by violent action, i.e., revolution, coup d’etat, state disintegration, etc., as these changes had a tremendous impact on the state and society relations and the transformation of the state as such.

V. Akchurina (B) Senior Lecturer at the OSCE Academy, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. Izquierdo-Brichs and F. Serra-Massansalvador (eds.), Political Regimes and Neopatrimonialism in Central Asia, The Steppe and Beyond: Studies on Central Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9093-1_8

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external forces, this chapter focuses specifically on the episodes of abrupt regime change and its domestic sources of power, patterns, and processes, which may (dis)empower a specific set of elites in Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, the choice of episodes is guided by the goal to better understand the transformation of the state in Kyrgyzstan and how it went from the initially “enlightened democracy” formally represented by the democratic government in 1991 to a “shadow state” technically embodied in a parliamentarian rule in the post-2010 period. Starting from the construction of the political life of Kyrgyzstan, and the political loci where this seems to happen more regularly, this chapter documents the dynamics of political changes in the country from an angle that has been underestimated. This chapter suggests that, throughout the brief but intense post-1991 history of the country, all three ruling elites emerging after each of the above changes have adopted an intermingling strategy. Drawing from the sociology of elites, we define intermingling here as a pragmatic approach to politics, where elites gather on an ad hoc basis to address the interests of a certain elite group and then reshuffle themselves for another ad hoc goal; the goals may vary from business through to personal ones.2 We unfold this claim by following three key political changes in Kyrgyzstan as they reshuffled elite maps, such as President Akayev’s era, President Bakiyev’s era, and post-presidential era, when politics has lost its center. At each of these steps, we address the relationship between ruling and local elites (or strongmen), and focus on power resources that these groups have been competing for, as well as on sites where power used to be negotiated, including bazaars and prisons. Some precision on the use of the term “elite” is necessary here. Classically, a power elite is defined as a group of individuals with the ability to affect change and transform environments. In Central Asia, elites are neither “custodians of the state,” i.e., the products of a specific type of socialization that provides them with symbolic power and other relevant resources (Eymeri 2001), nor are they political professionals, treating politics as a “vocation and profession” as Weber describes. Rather, they represent a “dominant class” or circle, which possesses logistics for domination of national decision-making. This circle cannot strictly be called a “class” in the Marxist sense of the term, as many of these people 2 For this definition, the author is grateful to Ikbol Mirsaitov who, in his interview, provided an idea that is at the basis of the definition developed in this chapter.

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come from extremely diverse socioeconomic backgrounds; nor can they be seen through the lens of the Bourdieu’s concepts of “habitus” or “symbolic capital,” for the majority of them have either faked their symbolic capital (such as education) or acquired their economic resources in a dubious way, during the time of perestroika, when a strategically important economic asset could be obtained for a dollar and higher education diplomas could be bought. However, under certain conditions, these groups can still mobilize parts of societies for mass social protests. For these reasons, the approach closest to describing the elites in Kyrgyzstan is that of Raymond Aron, whose “categories dirigeantes” provide an analytical lens to understand political developments in their contexts, rather than as a whole (Aron 1965). This approach implies attention being given to the social basis of the elites, not in Marxist terms, but rather in any terms relevant for a particular social context, as long as they reflect the functions of the dominant circles, the organization of power, and the relationship between power and society (Aron 1950a, b). This chapter is a story of ad hoc elites, social resistance without resisting, and intermingling of formal and informal sources of power. It challenges the conventional framework of elite studies, which focuses on power vs. resistance or assumes a distinction between formal and informal processes. Drawing on the modern history of elite formation in Kyrgyzstan since 1991, this chapter claims that it is the sites of intermingling that need to be addressed, in order to better understand power resources of modern elites and social forces behind them. Specifically, the focus is on the relations between different sites of power contestation, in order to show how channeling of informal processes may itself become a source of political power. We have chosen three examples, such as bazaars, prisons, and state institutions, specifically Karasuu market, as an illustrative example of intermingling of formal and informal trade, as well as formal and informal influence; Camp 31 as a prison with specific relations with ruling elites; and state institutions themselves, as tools for formalizing and “laundering” informal sources of power. The chapter is organized as follows. The first section addresses the period between 1991 and 2005, when main competition was between two branches of power: the executive and the legislative, or between the presidential vector of political development and the parliament. The chapter does not map the elites based on the South-North divide, as Southern elites were largely underrepresented in politics back at that time. Rather,

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the focus is only on institutions which provided most sources of power. The second section addresses political change brought about by the revolution of 2005, which started President Bakiyev’s era, who used to be perceived as a representative of southern local elites. This period was illustrative of intermingling of elites, when the divide between the state and the local elites has become blurred, and when formal and informal sources of power have been used along with the state institutions. We show it by discussing three sites of power contestation, bazaars, prisons, and state institutions. Section three focuses on the parliament, as the form of governance that emerged out of the power contestation. It briefly touches upon the rule of Roza Otunbayeva, an intermediate President, who ruled between 2010 and 2011 and the start of President Atambayev’s rule in order to show how the country ended up as a parliamentarian republic and what it means for the state, taking into account the sources of power that parliamentarians possess. Eventually, the conclusion draws the elite formation patterns in Kyrgyzstani case and their following forms. The division between the legal and the illegal power brokers blurred, and the criminals-in-law, defined as individuals commonly known for having conducted fraud, illicit trafficking, or murder, but who had managed to launder their assets or become useful for the elites in terms of access to these illicit revenues, can significantly influence politics; mass social protests were manipulated to put pressure on a particular President; places like prisons, squares, and bazaars have become as important in shaping politics as the parliament and the government; courts retained little independence; and the parliamentarianism per se has become a tool for formalization or “laundering” otherwise informal sources of political power for ruling elites.

2

Price of Multiculturalism in the Age of Nationalism: An Enlightened President and the Legendary Parliament

Patriotism is slavery. A patriot lives against Reason and Consciousness. Instead of following his free will and free spirit, he serves the rulers power-seeking, corrupt, and self-interested. He does so, regardless of the direct link between patriotism and war. It is unreasonable to build the modern states on patriotism. (Lev Tolstoj, Patriotism and Government, 1900)

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At the outset of independence, the map of the Kyrgyzstani elites was comprised of the political professionals from the Soviet era, who continued their political paths as the members of the so-called legendary parliament3 (the Jorogku Kenesh or the Highest Council). The parliament consisted of 350 members who were elected through direct elections and lasted from 1990 until 1994. Legendary it is for it had to deal with creation of the legal and political order of a newly arranged state, draft the Constitution and the norms to live up to. The most prominent members of the parliament included Tekebayev, Madumarov, Bakir-uulu, whose political parties4 had a great impact on the Kyrgyzstani politics to date, though in different ways (Nogoibaeva 2007, 102). Whether the legendary parliament could be said to have included local elites is arguable. These were also political professionals, albeit mostly representing the interests of the Northern region of the country. The key point of contention was the balance between the three branches of power on the one hand and the powers of the President on the other. The parliamentarians claimed that the power of the executive branch was stronger than that of the legislature, whereas the judiciary was quite dependent on the President. The legendary parliament was relatively representative and therefore chaotic. Another issue was that the parliament, or Highest Council (Jogorku Kenesh), was, at the beginning, a continuation of the communist regime in Kyrgyzstan. Despite the democratic movements and the establishment of independence in the early 1990s, the political influence de facto still remained in the hands of the communists and the first secretary of the Communist Party, Absamat Masaliyev. This is why President Akayev tried to consolidate political power mostly within the executive branch. The rationale was that this would also allow direct accountability of this branch to the President, as well as provide the President more bargaining powers vis-à-vis the parliament (ICG August 11, 2004). The formalization of these powers was achieved through several referendums that were held in the 1990s. The social organization of the democratic movement which brought Askar Akayev to power included various interest groups gathered in parliament, all of whom sought to change the old communist elites. Askar 3 The reason for this name is that the parliament secured the transition from the Soviet to the democratic rule and has adopted the main laws and declarations of the sovereign state. 4 “Ata-Meken”, “Butun Kyrgyzstan”, “Erkin Kyrgyzstan”, respectively.

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Akayev, the then President of the National Academy of Science, had neither belonged to the political elite, nor was a member of the Communist Party, which made him an attractive neutral figure for the presidential office. The Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan, which comprised all opposition movements and groups which emerged between 1988 and 1990, supported Akayev’s candidacy. The social organization of this movement comprised students and youth in general, as well as informal societies of workers, academics, and artistic intelligentsia from the major cities5 of Kyrgyzstan. The parliament’s neocommunist or nationalist rationale concerning new societal development was balanced by the President’s program on cultural diversity. The program included ideas aiming at societal consolidation of multi-ethnic Kyrgyzstani society, such as the ideas of “Kyrgyzstan—our common home,” “Kyrgyzstan—the country of national diversity,” and “Kyrgyzstan—an island of democracy.” The context against which these ideas were tested included the inter-ethnic conflict between Uzbek and Kyrgyz in Osh and Jalal-Abad in 1991, the sporadic conflicts in Bishkek aiming at expropriation of lands around the capital city, and (re)appropriation of natural resources. These events took place before the first presidential elections in 1991. This violence was not so much about any kind of inter-ethnic hatred, but rather recognition that the momentum of change provided an opportunity to redistribute property, lands, water, and access to small trade in the bazaars. Since the latter was mostly dominated by the Uzbek communities, and in Kyrgyz small entrepreneurs had little access to trading at the bazaars without paying tributes to local strongmen, this was seen as a chance to restore justice. Furthermore, in both the North and South of the country, there was a popular desire for land on which to build housing. The proclamations relating to privatization and de-collectivization of lands made people think that the time for land expropriation had come. Since kolkhozes were proclaimed as closed, a mass movement toward urbanization started. In Osh, the Uzbek movement Adolat and the Kyrgyz Osh Aimagy were organized (McGlinchey 2011, 76). On both sides, there was fear of losing their land. For the Uzbeks, it was land they historically had been working. For the Kyrgyz moving from the rural to the urban areas, it was the chance to finally

5 Bishkek, Karakol (North) and Osh (South).

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regain the right to land from which they felt being deprived. But in the urban areas, the land was claimed mainly for purposes of housing construction. This laid the ground for the ongoing “Uzbek problem,” presented essentially as a risk of separation of the Fergana Valley, since the Adolat movement sought autonomous status for the province of Osh within the Kyrgyz Republic, which at that time included also Jalal-Abad (McGlinchey 2011). In Bishkek, similar land claims were organized into the Ashar movement, under the leadership of Zheksheev Zhypar, who tried to pursue similar goals. However, this movement allegedly sought land expropriation for “social housing” rather than individual purposes.6 These are just snapshots of the complexity of the social organization of the opposition Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan, which supported the candidacy of Askar Akayev, having seen his program as most inclusive. Once in office in 1991, President Akayev had to face the parliament, which was considered to be truly representative of the people (Nogoibaeva 2007). However, the first parliament of the new republic was filled with groups pursuing goals that would violate the rights of other groups within a multicultural society, which Kyrgyzstan was at that time. Strengthening the parliament would mean making those social issues more acute and result in politics being organized around those issues. The specter of civil war, such as in neighboring Tajikistan, was also a strong factor behind the political choices of the ruling elite. Thus, contrary to the prevalent view of blaming a “dictator,” the consolidation of political power under the executive branch was in practice a shifting of political priorities from the matters of land expropriation to more civil issues of the rule of law, education, and the creation of the civil rather than ethnicity-based culture. These disagreements reached their peak after the referendum, which approved the presidential version of the new Constitution on May 5, 1993, and in 1994, the parliament dissolved. The Constitution strengthened the accountability of local governments to the executive branch. It was the prerogative of the President and the Prime Minister to appoint governors, albeit with the consent or at the request of the parliament. However, the last word remained with the President. The method of consolidation of political power by the executive pursued by President Akayev had structural consequences for the 6 Fergananews. Oshskaya Reznya 1990 Goda. Hronologia Tragedii [Osh Bloodshed of the 1990. Events Chronology]. Fergana News (2010). http://www.fergananews.com/art icles/6601 (accessed June 8, 2015).

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economy, institutional setting, and society. At the later stages, the strengthening of ruling elite role in the economy was recreated through the arrests of leading businessmen and expropriation of their businesses (e.g., Daniyar Usenov) (ICG August 11, 2004, 28). The institutions of the state, at both the national and local levels, were under the President’s control through the direct appointments of officials to almost all positions of influence, “from regional governor to the university rector” (ICG August 11, 2004, 28). The security sector at that time was not well developed. However, it was a useful tool for pursuing the infamous “war of compromising evidence,” a favorite tool of the Kyrgyzstani politicians. Furthermore, the police themselves were perceived not as a part of the state, but as a part of the criminal world (ICG August 11, 2004, 29). The Western-sponsored NGO sector was countervailed by the pro-government association of NGOs, led by Toktaiym Umetalieva, created, reportedly, as a “government spoiler in relation to civil society” (ICG August 11, 2004, 31). The media sector and the Central Election Committee have also been reported as “dependent” on the President (ICG August 11, 2004, 29). Reportedly, all political appointees were chosen from the Northern elite, which traditionally dominated political affairs in the country, for these were mostly industrial and highly educated elites. In the South, elites were mostly those related to trade and agriculture. For this reason, a participatory framework has been missing (ICG August 11, 2004). As evidence for this take on the situation, analysts point to the protests in Aksy (part of Jalal-Abad Province), which stemmed from the sentencing of a supposedly popular representative of the southern elite, Azimbek Beknazarov, and the closing of a few opposition newspapers in January 2002.7 The Aksy events resulted in shots being fired, with people falling victim to gunshot wounds and romanticizing the participants of the protest as well as deputy Beknazarov. However, there is little reference within international analyses to the fact that he was one of the few nationalists who did not abstain from publicly proclaimed hatred toward the large minorities living in the south. His constituency

7 Gulbanu Abenova, Novaya Vlast’ Pozvolila Peresmotret’ Delo O Rasstrele V Aksy [The New Authorities Reconsider the Case of Mass Shooting in Aksy]. Radio Azattyk (2011). http://rus.azattyq.org/content/court_aksy_kyrgyzstan_/2288628.htm (accessed January 28, 2015). Description of the protest dynamics (st. from Kerben and shooting) (ICG August 11, 2004, 3).

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would be elements of the Kyrgyz majority, predominantly from the rural areas, who felt unfairly “deprived of their native lands” by the Uzbeks. This propaganda was based on the widespread view that “the Uzbeks are better off” and that they “abused the hospitality of the Kyrgyz land” by monopolizing trade and agriculture, a myth proven wrong statistically (Esenaliev and Steiner 2011).8 What started from perestroika was used by Beknazarov and his followers for their electoral campaigns. It was during his time in the prosecutor’s office that corruption in the judiciary reached its peak (ICG August 20, 2002). Since perestroika, there was an accompanying process of internal migration from the mountainous areas to the urban areas. This resulted in land seizures fueled by rhetoric of hate toward the “colonizers and monopolizers.” President Akayev faced the difficult choice of whether to prioritize a more centralized power system within which he could set the agenda, or let the situation flow with the new societal demands, which were often expressions of nationalist hatred. While the nationalist rhetoric9 was advanced under the guise of patriotism, Akayev based his politics on ideas such as multiculturalism, democratic security, societally, and multi-vector10 policy internationally. However, these ideas did not seem to be ingrained within the multiple realities of Kyrgyzstani society, part of which was highly educated, and part of which was poor but aspirational, moving from the remote mountainous regions to the cities and towns for better access to education and jobs. The “heroism” of Azimbek Beknazarov and the deaths of several protesters resonated within the media and human rights NGOs, and radicalized the opposition (ICG August 20, 2002). As a result, President Akayev dismissed his then Prime Minister, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, and the Minister of Interior, who were accused of escalating the violence in the Aksy protests, which led to the resignation of the whole government. Azimbek Beknazarov, a popular deputy, was arrested (ICG August 20, 2002). A political crisis ensued. Bakiyev joined the opposition as a leader of the People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan. President Akayev was forced 8 As for the second large minority, the Russians: those should merely “go to Russia”. 9 Since, during the Soviet period, the composition of the ruling circles disproportionately

disfavored the native Kyrgyz, which is why in the post-Soviet period nationalist rhetoric of some of the local elites became popular. 10 Multi-vector foreign policy implied developing foreign affairs with both along the NATO-vector and the CIS/Russia vector, as well as the Muslim world.

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into a new coalition government which would also include opposition members. On the one hand, President Akayev was harshly criticized for not allowing representatives of the southern elite to be in the government (even though the Prime Minister was a southerner). On the other hand, the same critics leveled the accusation that, in most cases, political parties were “vehicles of individual political figures,” representing their personal interests, rather than those of their regions or societal groups (ICG August 20, 2002, 14; Nogoibaeva 2007). As a compromise, the new post-Aksy strategy devised in 2002 was based on the idea of human rights. A new slogan was devised: “Kyrgyzstan is a country of human rights.” Four new laws submitted to the parliament by the President aimed to promote human rights and freedoms (ICG August 20, 2002, 22). These laws comprised the new Democratic Code requiring the establishment of a Council of Democratic Security, on a par with the Security Council, the office of ombudsman, the Law on the Fight against Extremism, and the Law on Amnesty of the People Involved in the Aksy Event (ICG August 20, 2002). In the meantime, the years between 1998 and 2000 were marked by the formation of the HuT movement and the IMU invasion of Kyrgyzstan, the restructuring of law enforcement, and border discussions between Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, sharing the Fergana Valley. In this light, the leaked information on secret border agreements with China (in 1996–1999), in which 10,000 hectares of land were transferred to China, contributed to public discontent. The sensitivity of the border issue was also reflected in the fact that in 2001 the parliament voted down a memorandum signed between the Uzbek and Kyrgyz prime ministers on the exchange of lands (ICG August 28, 2001, iv). In the final stages of his presidency, President Akayev issued several laws which would decentralize governance by favoring communities and citizens’ associations.11 At the same time, there was an attempt to subject the legislative branch to the state elite.12 Once the parliamentary elections

11 The Law on Jamoats, which allowed people to create free associations on the cause of their choice, as well as compromises with the opposition and parliament, exemplifies this tendency. 12 This was achieved by conducting a referendum which changed the election system from majoritarian to proportional with a high registration threshold. In this way, only parties with significant number of members have more chances to gain places in the parliament. This new system allowed the pro-presidential party “Alga, Kyrgyzstan!” to

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resulted in the victory of the pro-presidential party Alga, Kyrgyzstan, the popular uprisings swept the country, from one province to the next. On March 24, all these groups, each supporting their own parliamentarians, joined together on Ala-Too square in Bishkek and deposed President Akayev. Kurmanbek Bakiyev was elected as the new President in July 2005 (ICG May 4, 2005). This sequence of misunderstandings turned the tables: The southern elite became the ruling elite. Most of the Northern elites, especially intelligentsia, chose to either form an opposition or leave the country.

3

A Revolutionary “Southern” Elite Without the South

The new ruling elite, as well as the new government, was comprised of the members of the People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan. Kurmanbek Bakiyev was elected President, Felix Kulov acted as the Prime Minister, Boljurova and Madumarov as deputy prime ministers, Roza Otunbayeva as foreign minister, Pronenko as minister of labor and social security, and Beknazarov as prosecutor general (ICG May 4, 2005, 10). Since the Northern intelligentsia was largely in exile, it is difficult to map who, at that point, made up the local elite with the exception of those businessmen and criminals who used this opportunity to legalize their status and shift to mass politics, as will be seen. Interestingly, the sites of competition locally again turned out to be bazaars, natural resources, and unused land, which had not completely undergone the de-collectivization process. A new power structure emerged from the cooperation agreement between the two significant parties in parliament, the People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan, headed by Bakiyev, and the Ata-Jurt Party, established in 2004 by Roza Otunbayeva together with deputies Dooronbek Sadyrbayev, Adahan Madumarov, and Omurbek Tekebayev (ICG May 4, 2005, 2). The political agendas of the two groups remained different. In practice, democratic change manifested itself in the form of property expropriation. Besides the Cabinet, the new ruling elite comprised both politicians and those who aspired to the political stage, for example, win the elections in 2005. Since the daughter of the president, Bermet Akayeva, acted as a consultant to the party, this situation was presented as Akayev’s way to spread influence within parliament. Whether these were fraudulent elections (ICG May 4, 2005) or simply a matter of gerrymandering is arguable.

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the criminals-in-law. Being aware of this intermingling and the fact that parliament was the gate for these aspirational criminals to enter mass politics, President Akayev sought to keep state decision-making more or less unitary by keeping power within the executive. Bakiyev took the risky step of bringing this intermingling to state institutions. His presidency, which lasted until 2010, followed two main patterns: the (re)establishment of property expropriation as justice and further centralization of power through redesigning state institutions. The former involved the redistribution of ownership of bazaars, natural resources, and land seizure; the latter involved the strengthening presidential apparatus and its direct control over all revenue collection and the government at all levels. The integration of both legal and illegal power brokers into state politics guaranteed neither social support, nor the resolution of the structural problems that hindered Akayev’s rule, and this continues to undermine government even now. Rather, his rule redistributed wealth between the elites and then tried to restructure the state’s institutions to maintain this wealth distribution, at the expense of basic social needs. This is when the South was lost, and that is why President Bakiyev did not find much social support in the South once he moved there after the coup d’état and tried to mobilize society for a “counter-revolution.”

4 4.1

Sites of Intermingling Site 1: Bazaars and National Resources

The property which was addressed was mainly that of President Akayev’s family. The then prosecutor general, Azimbek Beknazarov, was responsible for the “return to the people” of property acquired illegally. A commission formed to investigate those cases, chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov, identified over 100 enterprises of which Akayev’s family had some control. Reportedly, this was the way in which the new ruling elite attempted to dismantle the old patronage structures (ICG May 4, 2005, 4). “Righting past wrongs,” paradoxically, did not address the structural issues of privatization. However, the property cases that were addressed first included that of the Karasuu bazaar, the Karakeche Coal Mines, and land seizure in the Bishkek suburbs. At first glance, the first case was related to the traders in the Fergana Valley and so had a potential to improve their lives as trade constituted people’s survival strategies. The case of the Karakeche Coal Mines had the potential to

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simplify the distribution of coal in nearby communities that depended on that resource.13 Instead of doing so, the new owner, Nurlan Motuev, redistributed coal in such a way that provoked inter-communal conflict with the neighboring communities. Finally, the redistribution of land was presented as an attempt to right the wrongs of de-collectivization. However, this turned into a land grab, often of private property belonging to people living in the suburbs of Bishkek. Hence, the practice somehow always reversed the logic of poetics legitimizing the manifestations of fairness. The businesses in the country run by former President Akayev’s family or friends simply shifted to Maksim Bakiyev.14 The Karasuu market is one of the biggest wholesale markets in the Fergana Valley, one of the main redistribution hubs of the Chinese goods by the shuttle traders, which became the target of redistribution between the criminals-in-law. Its meaning at the national level has to do with the re-export chain, within which Kyrgyzstan is a key link. The issue of reexport has become one of the arguments against the Eurasian Union initiative. If the Eurasian Union succeeds, Kyrgyzstan will lose its competitive advantage for the re-exporting of Chinese goods. The consequences for those who “cover” the market would be very serious. The struggle for influence over the management of the market in September 2005 involved Azimbek Beknazarov, allegedly a supporter of Bayaman Erkinbayev, a businessman and parliamentarian from Jalal-Abad. He is also alleged to be a prominent drug baron and criminal-in-law (ICG May 4, 2005, 5). The conflict as such was between Erkinbayev and a rival businessman, Abdalim Junusov, who challenged Erkinbayev’s control of the Karasuu bazaar with the support of popular protests by the traders.15 They complained about the high rents and poor management of the

13 Bearing in mind that the problem with the supplies of the Uzbek gas has been unresolved, coal remained almost the only way for people to warm their houses in the winter, in the southern Kyrgyzstan. 14 The favored son of President Bakiyev. 15 9 June, 200–300 traders were protesting against the high rents and demanding

Erkinbayev to give up control of the market. This situation resulted in violence between the traders, the supporters of Junusov, and the supporters of Erkinbayev on June 13. In July, another part of traders organized support for Erkinbayev and asked the self-dismissal of Junusov instead. On 5 September, before the courts hearings of this matter, Junusov was shot dead at his home in Karasuu (ICG May 4, 2005).

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market by Erkinbayev.16 Tensions between the two groups resulted in the assassination of Junusov. For obvious reasons, suspicions fell on Erkinbayev, and the same protesters demanded the resignation of Beknazarov for his negligent handling of the situation and failure to bring criminal charges against Erkinbayev (ICG May 4, 2005, 5). Shortly after, on 21 September, Bayaman Erkinbayev was also shot and killed. This was one of a series of parliamentary assassinations.17 Fearing assassination, parliamentarians passed a law allowing MPs to carry arms. They also initiated the establishment of a commission, headed by Felix Kulov, to fight organized crime.18 The state seems to have become the platform for resolution of disputes between organized criminals, as the latter comprised part of the local elites. Organized crime gained a degree of access to the parliament through such figures. The third means by which the injustices of Akayev’s regime were to be addressed was the expropriation of the Karakeche Coal Mines,19 which provides over half of the all coal mined in Kyrgyzstan. After the revolution of 2005, the largest mine (Beshsary)20 was expropriated by Nurlan Motuev, a journalist, human rights activist, and a strong supporter of the revolution. Reportedly, after expropriating the Beshsary mine, Motuev proclaimed himself a director, gained control over the access roads to all five mines, and soon after requested that all five mines be organized 16 Bayaman Erkinbayev acquired control over the bazaars through the Kyrgyz Trade Association (Kyrgyz sooda birimdigi), which his sister was a director of. The Kyrgyz Trade Association bought the shares of the bazaar from the Consumer Union of Osh Province. The Consumer Unions (potrebsuyuz) are holdovers from the Soviet time, serving as “intermediary organization between the production and sale of the consumer goods”(ICG May 4, 2005, 5). In the end, the state “nationalized” the Bayaman’s share in the Karasuu market (the rest of the shares has remained private). 17 Even though it is fashionable to blame President Bakiyev for the assassination of parliamentarians, the complex relations between the local elites themselves, a part of which are criminals-in-law/parliamentarians, might provide compelling evidence to doubt the allegations. 18 The commission has then never taken place. Considering the past imprisonment of Felix Kulov and the interconnections of the prison’s world with the world of politics in Kyrgyzstan, such body may have become an instrument of vengeance in the hands of an influential and respected figure in the criminal world. 19 Four of five mines are privately owned, and one Akulak is largely owned by the state-run Kyrgyzkomur company. 20 Formerly owned by a businessman and an MP (reportedly Akayev’s ally) Kamchybek Joldyshbaev.

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under one company under his control. Unsurprisingly, he started favoring Jumgal Province (of which he is a native) with a better quality coal for free, while selling low quality coal to the neighboring community of Kochkor for high prices. None of the government’s attempts to normalize the situation in Kara-Keche have been successful: The efforts of both Prime Minister Kulov and an old friend of Motuev, Tursunbek Akun, the Head of the Presidential Commission on Human Rights, have failed (ICG May 4, 2005, 7.8). 4.2

Site 2: Camp 31 and the Parliament

Finally, the biggest site of intermingling of elite is the prison system, which has strong links to the parliament. It has become a common knowledge in Kyrgyzstan that incarceration does not mean deprivation of political influence. On the contrary, prison networks may be an effective means to increase one’s political influence. A vivid example of this is the connection revealed by the situation in the Camp 3121 between the five following figures: a parliamentarian and the chair of the Committee of Defence, Security, Law Enforcement and Information Policy, Tynychbek Akmatbayev; his brother, a criminal-in-law Rysbek Akmatbayev; the prosecutor general Azimbek Beknazarov; Prime Minister Felix Kulov; and the Chechen22 criminal figure Aziz Batukayev, a rival of Rysbek Akmatbayev. The March Revolution allowed all the “oppressed and humiliated” to speak up. Prisoners took the opportunity to do so. The so-called prison crisis led to a number of prison uprisings, during which a parliamentarian, Tynychbek Akmatbayev, was murdered during his negotiations with the rebellious prisoners in Camp 31 on 20 October. This prison was notable for hosting the infamous Aziz Batukayev (ICG December 16, 2005, 13). Whether it was caused by “deteriorating prisons’ conditions,” as was reported, or was an orchestrated act to help the new state elites to remove figures who were too influential and unpredictable from its sphere of influence is arguable. However, what is known is that Mr. Tynychbek Akmatbayev, Mr. Rysbek’s proxy in parliament, was eliminated. In the end, the uprising was settled after negotiations between the prisoners and 21 A prison in the Moldovanovka village, famous for its prominent inmates, situated 20 km from Bishkek. 22 When the police officers discuss the figure of Rysbek, they express respect for that he did not allow the Chechen, Russian, and Kazakh mafias to take over the country.

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Prime Minister Kulov at the request of Aziz Batukayev(ICG December 16, 2005).23 Prior to this event, Rysbek Akmatbayev24 was temporarily pardoned to meet the prosecutor general, Beknazarov.25 Inspired by this possible amnesty, Rysbek used the time to “improve his image and cultivate links with the new elite” by organizing a festival of traditional games at the Issyk-Kul lake (ICG December 16, 2005, 13). The event was attended by President Bakiyev, some of his ministers, including Deputy Prime Minister Madumarov and a few parliamentarians. Since the events at Camp 31 happened just as Rysbek was seeking to be pardoned, he took the murder of his brother as a personal offense, orchestrated by Kulov himself. This resulted in another protest in Ala-Too square on October 22, in support of Rysbek, demanding the resignation of the Prime Minister. To oppose Rysbek, a protest in support of Kulov was organized and the parliament, which was asked to consider Kulov’s resignation, did not gather a quorum on the appointed dates, October 23–24. Parliament did not find enough political will to face the problem. Reactions from the parliamentarians and ministers were sympathetic to Rysbek, as he had just lost his brother. The police kept a low profile. President Bakiyev maintained a silence on the issue. On the other hand, the NGO sector and US ambassador asked the President to support the Prime Minister to prevent organized crime imposing their will upon the state (ICG December 16, 2005, 14). Ala-Too Square again became the place of politics, uniting protesters with various, often private, agendas. The protests were joined by groups from the provinces, organized by Nurlan Motuev, the hero of Karakeche Coal Mines, and Topchubek Turgunaliyev, a relative of Akmatbayev and human rights activist calling for the disbanding of parliament. Other voices, unrelated to the Camp 31 issue, used the chance to protest, such as the nationalists calling for the development of the Kyrgyz language organized by Marat Imanaliev and March revolutionaries demanding land as a reward (ICG December 16, 2005, 15). The NGO sector attempted to

23 The prison was surrounded by the security forces to prevent the escapes, as the regular personnel went on a strike and refused entering the prison. 24 Who had been on the run as the lead suspect in a triple murder. 25 Rysbek was under a trial schedule for 20 October, which the prosecutor general

could not undertake due to his dismissal in September for his alleged support to the criminal-in-law, Erkinbayev, during the uprisings at the Karasuu bazaar, described above.

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persuade the President to take action against organized crime. The President established a parliamentary commission investigating the murder of Tynychbek Akmatbayev, led by an influential Osh parliamentarian, Alisher Sobirov. The commission found that the murder was due to a private tension between Rysbek and Aziz Batukayev. Tensions slowly dissipated. Rysbek restated his belief in that the murder was arranged between the Prime Minister and Batukayev. He gave up the public protest, but promised to exercise vengeance (ICG December 16, 2005). Prime Minister Kulov, in his speech to parliament, noted that the underlying problem was that the law enforcement agencies were intertwined with the criminals. Felix Kulov resigned from the office of Prime Minister in 2006. In light of the events described above, the disadvantaged parliamentarians started forming new opposition movements and arrangements. Former enemies allied against the growing power of President Bakiyev. In the meantime, Rysbek was murdered shortly after, as he exited a mosque after the prayer (ICG December 16, 2005). The criminal element of the competition for places within the new ruling elite shifted back into the shadows. Until the presidential elections in 2009, President Bakiyev chose to keep a low profile. He engaged in several struggles with parliament over the powers of the various branches of state. He organized peoples’ Kurultai, an analogy of the Greek Agora, being considered today a traditional democratic mechanism that gathers both the formal and informal local leaders. The struggles with parliament included three changes of the Constitution and ongoing arguments over constitutional and judicial reform. However, most politics happened behind the scenes. The true centralization of power by President Bakiyev can be defined as a submission of the key state institutions to the presidential clique. While parliament and other bodies apparently maintained their powers, the plan was that in practice the gatekeepers would be figures loyal to the President. The security services were controlled by the brother of the President. However, the controversial and ambitious figure of Maxim Bakiyev, the son of the President, disunited both the family and the country. Despite this, Maxim was the ideological driver of all the subsequent institutional changes, leading to a specific mode of centralization of power, i.e., extreme and direct control of most sectors of the state.

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5

Institutions: A Legitimation Tool for the Monopoly Over Military and Economic Resources There were two main pillars to Bakiyev’s elite logic. First, he who owns economy owns the state. Second, the presidency should be protected by the military, in order to avoid Akayev’s mistake of not being able to disperse the crowd in 2005 (ICG April 27, 2010). With his accession to power, President Bakiyev focused on economic reforms, which in practice turned into the appropriation of the main national economic assets by the ruling elite. The scheme was crafted by Maxim Bakiyev, the President’s son, whom he considered an entrepreneurial genius. The scheme was simple: total control of all business projects in the country, by covering them or appropriation through the setting up of a puppet owner, who would formally head a company, while it would de facto belong to Maxim. The apogee of this privatization of economic assets was in 2010, after the presidential elections. Puppet companies controlled by Maxim have taken control of the privatized and most profitable part of the energy distribution system, Severelektro (which serves Bishkek and most parts of Northern Kyrgyzstan) and Kyrgyz-telecom (ICG April 27, 2010). Severelektro was officially bought by a small company called Chakan, run by Alexei Shirshov, who was also Chairman of the Board of Dastan, a torpedo plant in Northern Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz-telecom was privatized through the MNG Group, discussed below. Having privatized the areas of communication and electricity supply, the ruling elite then increased tariffs for electricity and cell phones, resulting in the mass reaction we witnessed in April 2010. In terms of military power, Bakiyev’s regime sought to monopolize this sector, too. It was achieved in two steps: appointing figures loyal to the President in key positions and restructuring the military forces. For instance, the State Security Service (SNB) was headed by Janysh Bakiyev, one of the President’s brothers, and the Ministry of Interior was headed by Moldomusa Kongantiyev, a representative of the Southern elite, loyal to the President. The restructuring process started with two key bodies. First, the National Guard, “Kyrgyzstan’s elite military force has been

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merged with Janysh’s State Security Service to form a new and significantly larger presidential guard known as Arstan ‘The Tiger’.”26 Special force Alfa, usually conducting counter-terrorism and other extreme operations, also reported to the SNB. Finally, one of the most important bodies for drug control, which possessed a high degree of integrity and independence, the Drug Control Agency, was abolished. The result was that “drug interdiction was handed to the Ministry of Interior” (ICG April 27, 2010, 8). Reportedly, this decision followed some serious drug seizures [i.e., DCA was getting too close to the ruling elite’s sources of income]. In other words, the case of Kyrgyzstan under Bakiyev’s regime represents an attempt to monopolize all power resources in the hand of the ruling elite. To legitimate the total control of the key sources of income and influence in the country, Maxim Bakiyev suggested new institutional reforms, which resulted in the connection of the ruling elite to the class of global financial intermediaries. In other words, while the public was busy demanding constitutional reforms, a much more significant (re)institutionalization happened informally at the heart of the presidential apparatus. The institutional reform was meant to turn Kyrgyzstan into a so-called consultative democracy. In general, it resulted in the direct subordination of all state institutions to the presidential administration. Parliament would remain separate, with a status of a consultative body. This idea began to be implemented after the presidential elections in 2009, which put President Bakiyev into office for his second term. In essence, the idea was to consolidate money, politics, and military force within the presidential cliques. The implementation of this idea comprised three major steps. First, it restructured the presidential administration and made the ministers themselves dependent on the will of an obscure clique comprised of a Secretariat and a new Central Agency for Development, Investment, and Innovation (TsARII).27 The former was responsible for the elaboration of political strategy and monitoring

26 RFE/RL. Kyrgyz President’s Brother Creates Elite Military Unit. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (2010). http://www.rferl.org/content/Kyrgyz_Presidents_Brother_ Creates_Elite_Military_Unit/1962177.html (accessed February 18, 2015). 27 In Russian, TsARII is co-sounded with the word “Tsari” as plural form of the word “Tsar’” (i.e., the monarch).

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the implementation of presidential decisions at all levels. The latter was responsible for managing all major financial flows, including aid. The public perception was that this step was intended to prepare the ground for Maxim as a successor to his father. As for “the social organization” of the aforementioned institutions, the key figures are figures loyal to the President’s son, Maxim Bakiyev, who himself was appointed a director of TsARII in November 2009. The TsARII monopolized access to privatized industries and foreign investment projects. The Secretariat gained the power to be involved, at least as observer, in all decision-making processes, including the appointments of officials of all branches power at different levels. State bodies had to submit reports to the head of the Secretariat, an organ which had no professional staff to deal with these reports. The head of the Secretariat was Oksana Malevannaya.28 Considering her limited professional qualifications, her immense influence over decision-making concerning the re-institutionalization of the executive branch has been almost inexplicable.29 The Secretariat and TsARII worked on a par. Staff for the Secretariat were selected by Malevannaya herself, from people loyal to her, former colleagues, and employees from the journalistic field (Lojnikov, 5th Channel Editor-in-Chief, interview 2014).30 The key figure behind Maxim was his consultant, Evgeny Gurevich, a US citizen. Gurevich acted as a management consultant for a number of international financial institutions. He was a suspect in one of the biggest frauds in Italian national history, related to money laundering with several Italian companies involved, such as Fastweb and Telecom Italia (Knyazev 2010). Reportedly, Gurevich established and managed several companies in different countries throughout the world, including such companies as Planetarium Srl and Global Phone Network Srl, through which he was successful in helping a number of Western firms to launder money. 28 A journalist not worthy of mention, except for her infamous love story with Medet Sadyrkulov, who by popular perception was one of the country’s strongest strategist, and whose written drafts, plans, and ideas she inherited. 29 Rumor has it that she had access to all strategies of her partner written for Kyrgyzstan for many years ahead, which she later used in her career moves. President Bakiyev himself has never expressed much admiration toward Malevannaya, explaining his trust as “if my son trusts her, I can trust her too.” 30 Oksana Malevannaya used to work briefly as a director of the pro-presidential Fifth Channel by Maxim’s appointment. The mission of the Channel was creation of the positive image of the president.

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Among the banks involved in these schemes, there were Bank Austria Creditanstalt (currently, UniCredit Bank Austria), Raiffeisen Zentralbank, as well as Austrian division of the Anglo Irish Bank (Knyazev 2010).31 With Gurevich’s guidance, Maxim created a number of similar phantom companies in Kyrgyzstan. The biggest vehicle for Maxim’s personal ambitions was MGN Asset Management, which “in September 2009 had won tender to manage the government’s Development Fund” with Evgeny Gurevich at its head (ICG April 27, 2010, 7). Gurevich is a vivid representative of the so-called financial intermediary elite, often represented by investment brokers who maneuver among various formal power-holders, while not being part of the state system as such. He has even been permitted access by Oksana Malevannaya to those meetings within the presidential apparatus which are usually open to natives only after a security check by the SNB (Officials of the Administration of the President Bakiyev, interview 2009). This evidence suggests that TsARII may be just another machine for money laundering in Kyrgyzstan (Knyazev 2010). All these changes fostered mass discontent against the state elite. The trigger for the new uprising was the raising of household electricity, heating, and cell phone charges from January 1, 2010. According to the government Decree of November 12, 2009, the tariffs on electricity were to double, and those for heating were to increase 5 to 10 times starting from July 1, 2010. The cell phone charges were to significantly increase starting from February 1, 2010. As all cell phone companies were monopolized by Maxim, the peoples’ patience reached its limits. The raising of tariffs happened within the context of a wider energy and food crisis. The country experienced a very cold winter with electricity shortages32 and the consequent lack of heating. It was widely held that the energy crisis was caused by the fact that electricity from the Toktogul reservoir, the key water reservoir in the country, was sold for market prices above the export norm to its neighbors, which caused the water level in Toktogul

31 Among his other posts are: President of the Virage Consulting Ltd in the US between 2001 and 2007; Director of the “AsiaUniversalBank” (2006–2009), a commercial bank, located in the Kyrgyz Republic. Other managerial roles were: Vice President of the Investment Bank of Africa, Executive Director of New York’s “Gamma Square Partners,” and Director of the “GSN Tech LLC” (for details, see Knyazev [2010]). 32 Electricity was given to different districts in once in a row, according to a schedule.

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to fall below the norm. As such, popular dissatisfaction increased.33 In other words, this institutional “reform” marginalized not only the rival elites, but also the ruling elites themselves, who were beyond the close circle of Maxim Bakiyev. It aimed at creating a strong power-vertical, which is impossible to build by destroying the state’s main pillars. At the same time, it made the state revenues become part of the fraudulent global financial schemes. This illustrates how elements of revenue collection which are not linked to the state budget and state expenditures do not help to extend the infrastructural capacity of the state. The rude violation of the basic Weberian principles has demonstrated its effect. Two viable parts of the state’s infrastructural power have been destroyed: the state institutions and the elite structures that could connect the state with its societies. Opposition in the meantime created a Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the People’s Kurultai (assembly) to coordinate protests. The opposition members of CEC would later become the next ruling elite. The covert economic schemes of Maxim led to the situation where after 2010 it was difficult to redistribute those assets which were socalled Bakiyev’s assets, for the legal owners were various companies and entrepreneurs, most of whom maintained their assets and, allegedly, remained connected to Maxim. This situation suggests that the intermingling of elites continues, and that this includes those who were dismissed previously. At least, clarity on Bakiyev’s wealth redistribution is not yet before the general public.

6

All-Representant: A Ragtag Parliament as a Move Toward a Shadow State

A third period of state consolidation in Kyrgyzstan started on April 7, 2010, as a provisional government, with Roza Otunbayeva taking office as its head. President Bakiyev flew to his native south at this point. This

33 Additional factor was that Bakiyev tried to play the US and Russia against each other,

promising the Russians to close the US base in exchange for Russian aid. Meanwhile, securing Russian aid package was a way to manipulate the United States into more favorable leasing conditions for the Manas Airbase. Since the Russians “never formally linked the financial package with Manas’s closure”, the Kyrgyz neither returned the Russian money, nor closed the US base (for details, see ICG [April 27, 2010]).

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was the third period of chaos that politicians were faced with. A decisive factor in the direction of power consolidation was fear. Fearful that President Bakiyev could mobilize southern elites against the North and provoke civil war, the government had to come up with a new image of the “Other” that would unite the Kyrgyz nation (Mirsaitov, interview 2014). The usual scapegoat for this exercise was “the Uzbek question,” which the country had faced in 1991. Clashes between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz broke out between June 11 and 14, 2010. “Uzbeks,” as an image of threat, epitomized another threat developing in the country, such as the Islamist threat34 or separatism.35 However, the evidence collected by the International Inquiry Commission (KIC), headed by Kimu Kiljunen, suggests that the attacks on the Uzbek population during those events were well organized and planned. The military observed the violence and did not intervene if the victims were on the Uzbek side (KIC 2011). The violence stopped suspiciously quickly, in just three days, and only, surprisingly, through the actions of the local administration. When, in 1991, the south faced a similar situation, the central Soviet authorities had to intervene and remain there for six months. This evidence also suggests that the event was well orchestrated (KIC 2011). The International Inquiry Commission put the responsibility on the provisional government. As a result of this conclusion, Kimu Kiljunen was denounced as a persona non grata, as this finding contradicted the results of the parliamentary inquiry, which put the blame on the Uzbek communities, former President Bakiyev, and other unidentifiable “third forces” or the “fifth column” (ICG April 27, 2010). Besides the human losses, this situation seemed to put more pressure on former President Bakiyev to leave the country. Russian media sources started suggesting that Kyrgyzstan was on the verge of civil war and Kurmanbek Bakiyev would be to blame. Since the departure of the former President, the provisional government gained more freedom in pursuing its policies. Human rights and other activists started developing new projects for national consolidation, peace, and unity. Indeed, the perception of threat helped raise the level of national pride and shift attention from other political issues. The desire for stability overtook the desire 34 As allegedly, “all Islamists are Uzbeks”. 35 Even though Uzbeks never expressed the wish to be separated into an independent

state or join Uzbekistan. To the contrary, Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks underline the big difference between them and the Uzbeks in Uzbekistan.

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for justice. National consolidation, to a certain extent, and the provisional government were accepted. At the same time, the violence showed who is who and in which domain. The Mayor of Osh, Melis Myrzakmatov was hailed as a national hero for being capable of appeasing the population within three days. Talks with local Kyrgyz people showed that they were almost euphoric in their admiration of the mayor, who finally “showed these blunt Uzbeks their place” (Adaev, 5th Channel Editor-in-Chief, Southern division, interview 2012). Even the most dispassionate analysis of the events by the Kyrgyz people would go along the lines: “We admit that it was us who started the physical violence this time. However, we have been conditioned to do so, because these Uzbeks have grown too blunt in our own land. They took our jobs, monopolized trade and agriculture” (Adaev, interview 2012). The link between sovereignty and national identity was also visible in official narratives of sovereignty (Gullette and Heathershaw 2015). Mayor Myrzakmatov published a book where he made the case for Kyrgyz being “the state-forming national grouping” and that with the help of “patriotic youth,” Kyrgyzstan has a chance to survive (ICG March 29, 2012, 6). While the local southern elites were gaining support through nationalist sentiments, the provisional government was disunited and unable to influence the situation. The ICG found that the responsibility for the bloodshed was mostly due to the local leader, Melis Myrzakmatov (ICG March 29, 2012). To diminish his power, the provisional government tried to persuade the mayor to resign. This attempt, however, resulted in the street demonstrations in Osh, supporting the Mayor and demanding the resignation of the provisional government’s President, Roza Otunbayeva. The result was that the mayor remained in place. As has been shown in the other chapters, the Mayor of Osh is the key political link in the network of racketeers who evolved into the criminals-in-law, involved in cross-border trade and control of bazaars. These networks duly supported the Mayor, as did Kyrgyz from the Alay region, where they consider themselves the best warriors among all other Kyrgyz tribes. These Kyrgyz started coming down to the cities and demanding land and shelter. The violence against Uzbeks was a convenient pretext for the creation of internal displacement, shaking the traditional networks of influence in the bazaars and justifying the new urbanization project. As part of this, Uzbeks were to be displaced to remote areas in the suburbs of Osh or “compensated” for any damage by apartments in newly built

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blocks in Osh, which were Chinese direct investments. In the meantime, in Bishkek, the government conducted a referendum (June 27, 2010) and adopted a new Constitution which turned Kyrgyzstan into a parliamentarian democracy. Hence, Kyrgyzstan has witnessed a degree of state fragmentation, with strengthened local elites, both in their criminal and in semi-criminal manifestations. Under these conditions, the country turned into a parliamentary republic, with proportional representation. The symbol of past revolutions, the White House, was swapped with the building of the parliament (Jogorku Kenesh). As one can see, the struggle among competing elites was not so much about different visions of structuring the state, but simply about appropriation of economic resources. Attempts at restructuring the state, based on the Washington Consensus and implemented during the period of President Akayev, contributed to territorial fragmentation rather than the functional decentralization. The legal framework inspired by the Washington Consensus inspired the National Strategy on Decentralization approved by the Presidential Decree No. 381 of December 17, 2001 (INTRAC 2011). It included several laws such as the Law on Local Self-Government and Local State Administration (2002), the Law on Financial and Economic Basis of Local Self-Government (2003), the Law on Jamaats (2005), Law on Municipal Property (2002), and Law on Municipal Service (2004) (INTRAC 2011). This legislation sought to regulate relationships between the central government and local governments, even though local governments remained directly accountable to the President. President Bakiyev’s state restructuring abolished provincial governments, making the city governments report directly to the presidential administration (Maxim/Malevannaya tandem). Consequently, the functionality of the state, in this case, has been largely centralized, not to a fraction of society as represented by the ruling elite, but to a fraction of the presidential administration, responsible for revenue collection in a broader sense. At present, the 2010 Constitution restored the initial status quo, but subjected the local governments to the Prime Minister, to lessen the powers of the President. All the other changes promised in the post-2010 period were partly implemented but their results still have to be assessed.

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7

Conclusion

This chapter challenged conventional binaries of studying elites, such as power vs. resistance or formality vs. informality. The case of Kyrgyzstan illustrates that areas of intermingling between formal and informal dimensions can provide a different story about elite formation and its sources of power (Mann 1986). In Kyrgyzstan, elites focused mostly on the state as a power resource, specifically on the chair of the President. Business, criminal, rent-seeking, and other private interests made the elites cooperate and intermingle with these interests on an ad hoc basis until a goal of a given interest group is achieved, whereupon the tables turn. Kyrgyz politicians seem to be the greatest Weberians of Central Asia, as they put all their hope in the bureaucratic apparatus and tried to redesign the state institutions mainly to fit their own interests, rather than solving structural problems. Despite the fact that the Kyrgyz case initially exposed a much clear division into two main regions, the South and the North (that are also geographically divided by a mountain range), it has been shown that once an elite becomes the ruling elite, it abandons the interests of its social basis, even if that could have been its main link to the societies. Kyrgyzstani Presidents, once in power, tried to focus on the state as their main power-basis, rather than their regional roots. As our discussion of the sites of intermingling has shown, informal resources have been one of the sources of political power, with no clear boundary between power and resistance. However, the constant change of elites and their ad hoc character show that state institutions, even though remaining a tool to legalize the informal sources of power, lose their role to less structured forces, grassroots forces, and even civil society. Elite map in Kyrgyzstan is still dispersed and unclear. Elite groups have found it difficult to become dominant as they have failed to turn state institutions into a neutral force balancing various societal pressures. Instead, the elites have been often seeking out to control the state as a means to prop or cover up their illicit activity, such as drug trafficking, the re-export shuttle trade, selling national resources such as water, illegal distribution of foreign aid, and other sources of illicit revenue, for it provides quick money. This is similar to what Tilly described as the “State as organized crime” (Tilly 1985). Eventually, the process of intermingling of elites shows that an ad hoc purposeful approach to politics does not necessarily lead to consolidation

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of political authority over a given territory either. Kyrgyzstan went from strengthening the institutions of the state through a system of checks and balances, trying different types of social change such as elections, negotiations, and social protests. However, the elites, once swapped, have not pursued their agenda further to establish a general political authority.

8

Personal Interviews

Adaev, Nurlan, Editor-in-Chief of the 5th TV Channel, Southern division. Interviewed in Osh, spring 2012. High ranked officials of the Administration of President Bakiyev. Interviewed in 2009 and 2010. Lojnikov, Dmitry, Editor-in-Chief of the 5th TV Channel, Northern division. Interviewed in Bishkek, summer 2012. Mirsaitov, Ikbol, Professor, Senior Analyst of the NGO “Search for Common Ground”, interviewed in spring and summer in Bishkek, 2014.

References Aron, R. (1950a). Social Structure and the Ruling Class: Part 1. British Journal of Sociology, 1(1), 1–16. Aron, R. (1950b). Social Stucture and the Ruling Class: Part 2. British Journal of Sociology, 1(2), 126–143. Aron, R. (1965). Catégories dirigeante ou classe dirigeante? Revue Française de Science Politique, 15(1), 7–27. Esenaliev, D., & Steiner, S. (2011). Are Uzbeks Better Off? Economic Welfare and Ethnicity in Kyrgyzstan. Kiel und Hamburg: ZBW-Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Eymeri, J.-M. (2001). La fabrique des énarques. Paris: Economica. Gullette, D., & Heathershaw, J. (2015). The Affective Politics of Sovereignty: Reflecting on the 2010 Conflict in Kyrgyzstan. Nationalities Papers, 43(1), 122–139. ICG. (2001, August 28). Kyrgyzstan at Ten: Trouble in the “Island of Democracy” (Europe & Central Asia No. 22). ICG. (2002, August 20). Kyrgyzstan’s Political Crisis: An Exit Strategy (Europe & Central Asia No. 37). ICG (2004, August 11). Political Transition in Kyrgyzstan: Problems and Prospects (Europe & Central Asia No. 81). ICG. (2005, December 16). Kyrgyzstan: A Faltering State (Europe & Central Asia No. 109).

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ICG. (2005, May 4). Kyrgyzstan: After the Revolution (Europe & Central Asia No. 97). ICG. (2010, April 27). Kyrgyzstan: A Hollow Regime Collapses (Europe & Central Asia No. 102). ICG. (2012, March 29). Kyrgyzstan: Widening Ethnic Divisions in the South (Europe & Central Asia No. 222). INTRAC. (2011). Decentralisation in Kyrgyzstan. Bishkek: International NGO Training and Research Centre. KIC. (2011). Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry into the events in Southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010. Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission. Knyazev, A. (2010). Kirgizskij Zeitnot S Ital’yanskim Akcentom [The Kyrgyz Zeitnote with the Italian Accent]. knyazev.org. Mann, M. (1986). The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results. In J. A. Hall (Ed.), States in History (pp. 109–136). Oxford: Basil Blackwell Press. McGlinchey, E. (2011). Chaos, Violence, Dynasty: Politics and Islam in Central Asia. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Nogoibaeva, E. (2007). Kyrgyzstan: Formirovanie I Vzaimodeistvie Politicheskih Elit [Kyrgyzstan: Formation and Interaction of Political Elites]. Centralnaya Asia I Kavkaz, 49(1). Scott, J. (2008). Modes of Power and the Reconceptualization of Elites. The Sociological Review, 56(1), 25–43. Tilly, C. (1985). War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. In P. B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, & T. Skocpol (Eds.), Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Correction to: Political Regimes and Neopatrimonialism in Central Asia Ferran Izquierdo-Brichs and Francesc Serra-Massansalvador

Correction to: F. Izquierdo-Brichs and F. Serra-Massansalvador (eds.), Political Regimes and Neopatrimonialism in Central Asia, The Steppe and Beyond: Studies on Central Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9093-1 The original version of this book was inadvertently published without the acknowledgments section regarding funding, which has now been added. The book has been updated with the changes.

The updated version of the book can be found at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9093-1 © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. Izquierdo-Brichs and F. Serra-Massansalvador (eds.), Political Regimes and Neopatrimonialism in Central Asia, The Steppe and Beyond: Studies on Central Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9093-1_9

C1

Index

A Abdullayev, Ihtiyer, 147 Abdullojonov, Abdulmalik, 215 Abdullo, Mullo, 208, 218, 221–224 Abdurahidov, Fazliddin, 139 Abdurahmanov, M. (“Mukha Magnat”), 166 Abduvaliyev, Salim, 135–137 Abilov, Bolat, 264, 274, 283, 284, 286 Abilseitov, Galym, 280 Abliyazov, Mukhtar, 261, 263, 280, 284, 286 Abykaev, Nurtai, 285 Adolat (movement ), 300, 301 Adolat (Social Democratic Party), 127, 128 Agrarian Party, 170, 263, 281 Ahmadov, Mirzokhuja, 218, 222, 223 Aini, Sadriddin, 208

Aitakov, Nedirbai, 162 Akayeva, Bermet (Akayev’s daughter), 305 Akayev, Askar, 30, 51, 295, 296, 299–301, 303–308, 312, 319 Akhal Teke, 161–165, 169, 175, 177, 192 Akmatbayev, Rysbek, 309–311 Akmatbayev, Tynychbek, 309, 311 Aksy (protest), 302–304 Akun, Tursunbek, 309 Ak Zhol , 263–265, 284 Ak Zhol, 286 Alash, 263, 269, 273, 274, 287 Alga!, 275, 283, 284 Alga, Kyrgyzstan, 304, 305 Alimov, Timur, 138 Aliyev, Nurali (Nazarbayev’s grandson), 260 Aliyev, Rakhat, 259, 260

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 F. Izquierdo-Brichs and F. Serra-Massansalvador (eds.), Political Regimes and Neopatrimonialism in Central Asia, The Steppe and Beyond: Studies on Central Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9093-1

323

324

INDEX

Almatov, Zokir, 136, 138 Amanov, Ilasgeldy, 168 Andijan (revolt), 119, 123, 129, 136, 138, 141 Antigeptil , 276 Aripov, Abdulla, 136, 147 Arman, 274 Asadullozoda, Hassan, 227–231 Asar (All Together), 256, 259, 280 Ashar, 301 Ashur, Amonullo, 229 Asomiddinov, Muhiddin, 139 Association of Russian and Slavic Organizations, 262 Atabayev, Gaygysyz, 162 Atambayev, Almazbek, 295, 298 Ata-Meken, 283, 299 Auezov, Muhtar, 280 Auezov, Murat, 280 Ayan, Talgat, 275 Ayombekov, Tolib, 224 Azamat, 262, 280 Azat , 167, 171, 174, 264, 265, 270, 283, 284, 286, 287 Azimov, Rustam, 136, 140, 145, 146, 148 Azizamoh (Rahmon’s sister), 227 Aziz brothers, 136 Azizov, Nemat, 219, 222, 223

B Baidalinova, Guzyal, 275 Baikenov, Saken, 276 Bakir-uulu, Tursunbai, 299 Bakiyev, Janysh (Bakiyev’s brother), 312, 313 Bakiyev, Kurmanbek, 30, 51, 60, 61, 295, 296, 298, 303, 305–308, 310–317, 319, 321 Bakiyev, Maxim (Bakiyev’s son), 311–316, 319

Batukayev, Aziz, 309–311 Beknazarov, Azimbek, 302, 303, 305–310 Belyakov, Gennadiy, 265 Berdiev, Kabul, 136 Berdimuhamedov, Gurbanguly, 24, 160, 164–171, 175–181, 183–185, 187–190, 192, 194, 241 Berdimuhamedov, Serdar, 166 Birlik, 265 Blyalov, Bolatbek, 276 Boimatov, Ibodullo, 220 Bokaev, Maks, 252, 275 Brezhnev, Leonid, 2, 26, 211 Butun Kyrgyzstan, 299 C Çalık, Ahmet, 188 Camp 31, 28, 297, 309, 310 Chernenko, Konstantin, 2 Cholov, Qurbon, 221 Civil Movement of Kazakhstan (Azat movement), 274 Civil Party, 263, 279 Clan, 10, 26–28, 30, 35, 45, 46, 52, 63, 64, 108, 125, 132–134, 136–140, 148, 168, 192, 193, 202, 209, 213, 252–254, 258, 260, 269 Clientelism, 10, 18, 25–28, 58, 59, 63, 66, 68, 120, 122, 130, 241 Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) (Tashkent Treaty), 49, 61, 266 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 48, 49, 51, 62, 78, 126, 217 Communist Party of Kazakhstan, 255, 262, 264, 283 Communist People’s Party of Kazakhstan (CPPK), 264

INDEX

Compatriot Party, 265 D Dadaev, Alexander, 170 Darimbet, Batyrkham, 285 Davlatov, Alovuddin (“Ali Bedaki”), 223, 224 Davletov, Ruslandek, 148 Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan, 261, 263, 276, 277, 280, 283, 284, 286 Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan, 300, 301 Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT), 213, 214, 218 Dodkhudoev, Pamiri, 209 Durdynabat (Berdimuhamedov’s sister), 167 Dushanbe Youth Movement, 214 Dutbaev, Nartai, 285 Duvanov, Sergei, 262, 285 Dzhandosov, Uraz, 263, 286 Dzhurabekov, Ismail, 125, 132, 136 E East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), 86 Edinstvo, 256, 270, 272, 287 Elder (Great) Horde, 254 Emomali, Rustam (Rahmon’s eldest son), 116, 136, 138, 140, 145, 201, 226–228, 231, 241, 242 Entrepreneur Party and the Agrarian Party), 170 Erdogand, Recep, 19, 189 Erkinbayev, Bayaman, 307, 308, 310 Erkin Kyrgyzstan, 299 Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), 49, 266 Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), 49–51, 102

325

Eurasian Union, 50, 267, 307 Ezgulik (Compassion), 144

F Fidokorlar (National Democratic Party), 127 Firuza (Rahmon’s daughter), 227, 228 For A Just Kazakhstan, 263, 284 For Kazakhstan 2030 Movement, 256

G Ghafurov, Bobojon, 210 Glasnost, 3, 213 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 2–4, 26, 162, 211, 213, 255, 256, 262, 286 Gulamov, Kadyr, 138 Gülen, Fethullah, 187, 191 Gulnabat (Berdimuhamedov’s sister), 166, 167 Gul, Sherali, 171, 227 Gurevich, Evgeny, 314, 315

H Hait, Mahmadali, 234 Hajimurat (Berdimuhamedov’s nephew), 167 Hajiyev, Wepa, 169 Hakimov, Zahid, 139 Hizb ut-Tahrir, 62, 142 Homidov, Abdujalil, 216 Hu Jintao, 80 Hukuki Tayanch (Legal Support), 144 HuT movement, 304

I Ibragimov, Adilzhan, 260 Ibragimov, Alidzhon, 260 Ikromi, Jalol, 208

326

INDEX

Imanaliev, Marat, 310 Imomnazarov, Imomnazar, 224 Inoyatov, Rustam, 116, 136–139, 145, 146, 148 Iskandarov, Mahmadruzi, 218 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), 123, 129, 141, 304 Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), 200, 201, 203, 213, 214, 224, 225, 234–237, 241 Islamic State, 62, 86, 191, 234 J Jahon (Berdimuhamedov’s sister), 168 Jeenbekov, Sooronbai, 295 Jiang Zemin, 77, 94 Junusov, Abdalim, 307, 308 K Kabiri, Muhiddin, 200, 235 Kadyrov, Rashid, 146, 165 Kaisarov, Ualikhan, 284 Kalandarov, Hakim, 218 Kaletayev, Darkhan, 252 Kamilov, Abdulaziz, 136, 147 Karakeche Coal Mines, 306, 308, 310 Karamkhudoev, Sherik, 225 Karasuu market, 297, 306–308, 310 Karimova, Gulnara (Karimov’s eldest daughter), 135–137, 139, 140, 147 Karimova, Lola (Karimov’s youngest daughter), 136 Karimov, Islam, 19, 30, 68, 77, 115, 117, 119–121, 124–132, 134–140, 142, 145–149, 207, 238, 241, 249, 287 Kazakhstan Renaissance Party, 263 Kazhegeldin, Akezhan, 262, 263, 279, 286 Kenjaev, Safarali, 214, 215, 217, 221

Kerimguly (Berdimuhamedov’s grandson), 166 Khalyk Rukh, 283 Kharkova, Larisa, 275 Khasenov, Daniar, 260 Khodjiyev, Jumaboi, 129 Khramov, Viktor, 163, 169, 183 Khudayberdyev, Dowran, 170 Khudoiberdiyev, Mahmud, 220 Khudonazarov, Davlat, 214 Kiljunen, Kimu, 317 Kim, Valdimir, 260 Kolbin, Gennadi, 255, 286 kolkhoz, 63, 205, 209, 210, 300 Kongantiyev, Moldomusa, 312 Kosanov, Amirzhan, 264, 276, 286 Kosarev, Vladislav, 264 Kozhakhmetov, Khasen (Kozh Akhment), 273 Kozlov, Vladimir, 275, 283, 284 Kravchuk, Leonid, 4 Kuchkarov, Jamshid, 148 Kulibayev, Timur, 106, 258, 260, 261 Kuliyev, Avdy, 173 Kulov, Charymuhammat, 170 Kulov, Felix, 305, 308–311 Kunaev, Dinmukhamed, 255 Kushakbaev, Nurbek, 275 L Lad, 272 La’li Badakhshon, 213, 214 Lavrov, Sergei, 184 Liberal Movement of Kazakhstan, 256 Lim, Dmitri, 139 Li Peng, 77 M Madumarov, Adahan, 299, 305, 310 Mahkamov, Qahhor, 211 Mahmadrizoev, Sabzali, 224

INDEX

Mähri (Berdimuhamedov’s sister), 167 Makarov, Igor, 183 Malevannaya, Oksana, 314, 315, 319 Mambetalin, Serikhzan, 274 Mammedova, Guls, at, 169 Mary Teke, 161, 175 Masaliyev, Absamat, 299 Mashkevich, Alexander, 260 Mataev, Aset, 275 Mataev, Seitkazy, 275 Matlyubov, Bakhodir, 136, 138 Medvedev, Dmitry, 286 Meredov Rashid, 165, 169 Middle Horde, 253, 254 Milliy Tiklanish (Democratic Party), 127, 128 Mirsaidov, Shukrullo, 125 Mirziyoyeva, Saida (Mirziyoyev’s daughter), 148 Mirziyoyeva, Shahnoza (Mirziyoyev’s daughter), 148 Mirziyoyev, Shavkat, 115–117, 123, 134, 136, 137, 139, 140, 142, 143, 145–148, 207, 241 Mirzoev, Akbar, 214, 217 Mirzoev, Ghaffor, 217, 219, 221, 223 Motuev, Nurlan, 307–310 Muftakh, Nuri, 285 Muhamadboqirov, Muhamadboqir, 224 Muhhabatshoev, Salamsho, 218, 221 Mulikov, Iskender, 169, 170 Murodov, Otabek, 147, 234 Myrzakmatov, Melis, 318

N Nabiev, Rahmon, 211, 214, 215 Nagiz Ak Zhol , 264 Namangan (riots), 123, 129, 139 Narymbaev, Ermek, 274

327

National Security Service (SNB), 116, 119, 131, 136–139, 145–147, 312, 313, 315 Nationwide Social-Democratic Party (NSDP), 265 NATO, 67, 86, 266, 303 Navjavanov, Mamadayaz, 221 Navjuvonov, Mamadayoz, 214 Nazarbayeva, Aliya (Nazarbayev’s daughter), 258, 260 Nazarbayeva, Dariga (Nazarbayev’s daughter), 256, 259, 260, 280, 287 Nazarbayeva, Dinara (Nazarbayev’s daughter), 259, 260 Nazarbayev, Nursultan, 15, 24, 29, 50, 54, 68, 71, 77, 88, 103, 106, 132, 242, 249–251, 253, 255–263, 265, 266, 269–272, 274, 276–283, 286–288 Nazarov, Abdullo, 224 Nazarov, Avaz, 230 Nazarzoda, Abduhalim, 236 Neoliberalism, 12, 33 Neopatrimonial/Neopatrimonialism, 6, 7, 10, 16, 22–24, 31, 33, 65, 105, 115–117, 120–123, 125, 126, 129, 130, 132, 134, 148, 149, 250, 253, 258, 286 Nevada-Semipalatinsk, 262, 270, 271, 287 Nishonov, Rafiq, 124 Niyazov, Murat, 165 Niyazov, Saparmurat, 24, 160, 162– 165, 168, 172–174, 176–178, 182–185, 188, 192, 241 Nizomiddinov, Zainilobiddin, 147 Nizomov, Mirzokhuja, 218, 222 Nuraliev, Jamoliddin, 227, 229, 231, 242 Nurberdyyeva, Akja, 169 Nuri, Said Abdullo, 218

328

INDEX

Nuritdinov, Alik, 139 Nurkadilov, Zamanbek, 261, 284 Nur Otan, 242, 251, 256, 259, 262, 280, 281, 288 Nysanbaev, Ratbek, 273

O Obidov, Kobiljon, 138 Obshchenatsional’naya SotsialDemokraticheskaya Partiya (OSDP) (All National Social Democratic Party), 263, 264, 283, 286 Officers’ Union, 262 Oppositional People’s Union of Communists, 263 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 142, 190, 234, 235, 259, 268, 285 Organization for the Autonomy of Eastern Kazakhstan, 272 Orley, 262 Ortiqxo´jayev, Jahongir, 148 Osh Aimagy, 300 Osimi, Mohammad, 208, 210 Otan, 256, 259, 262, 279–281 Otchertsov, Valeriy, 183 Otunbayeva, Roza, 298, 305, 316, 318 Oyan, Kazakhstan, 277 O’zlidep (Liberal Democratic Party of Uzbekistan), 128, 142 Ozoda (Rahmon’s daughter), 227, 229, 242

P Partiya Narodnoye Edinstvo Kazakstana (People’s Unity Party of Kazakhstan), 256 Parvina (Rahmon’s daughter), 227

Patrimonial, 2, 23–26, 31, 63, 65, 66, 118, 120, 122, 250 Patrimonial communism, 25, 120, 250 Patrimonialism, 23, 59, 121 Patronage, 257 People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT), 235 People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (PDPU), 126–128 People’s Democratic Patriotic Party (Auyl), 265 People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan, 303, 305 People’s Union of Kazakhstan, 256 perestroika, 2, 4, 211, 213, 297, 303 Popular Front, 212, 216, 217, 219, 240 Primakov, Yevgueni, 60 Pugaev, Aleksei, 285 Purnell, Jon, 136 Putin, Vladimir, 58, 145, 183, 265, 286 Q Qian Qichen, 76 Qosanovk, Amirzhan, 262 Qosymov, Suhrob, 216, 217, 219, 222 Quvvatov, Sulton, 217, 221 R Rahmon, Emomali, 24, 29, 60, 68, 200–203, 209, 211, 215–223, 225–228, 230, 233, 234, 237–242 Rakhimov, Bakhtiyor, 139 Rakhimov, Batyr, 139 Rakhimov, Gafur, 135–137, 139 Ramatov, Achilbay, 147 Rashidov, Sharof, 124, 132

INDEX

Rastokhez, 213, 214 Rasulov, Jabbor, 211 Rejepov, Akmurat, 164 Rejepov, Annanazar, 167 Rentier, 18, 22, 25, 31, 257 Rentism, 18 Republican Party of Labor, 262 Republican People’s Party of Kazakhstan (RNPK), 262, 279, 286 Rukhshona (Rahmon’s daughter), 228 Russian Alliance, 272 Russian Community, 272 Russian Party of Kazakhstan (RPK), 265

S Sadyrkulov, Medet, 314 Safarov, Sangak, 216 S, ahmurat (Berdimuhamedov’s nephew), 167 Saidova, Galina, 136 Saidov, Faizali, 216 Saifullozoda, Hikmatullo, 234 Saliev, Rauf, 216 Salimov, Yaqub, 216, 221 Sanginov, Rahmon, 221 Sarsenbayev, Altynbek, 259, 264, 274, 284, 285 Serdar (Berdimuhamedov’s son), 165 Shabdolov, Shodi, 235 Shamolov, Saidshoh, 221 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 49, 51, 74, 86, 267 Sharipzhan, Ashkat, 285 Shermatov, Sherzod, 148 Shikhmuradov, Bairam, 174 Shikhmuradov, Boris, 173, 174 Shirshov, Alexei, 312 Shishlyannikov, Alexander, 217 Shoigu, Sergei, 184

329

Shomusallomov, Yodgor, 224 Siberian Association of Cossacks, 272 Slavic Movement of Kazakhstan, 272 Sobirov, Alisher, 311 Society for Lending Assistance to the Semirichye Cossacks, 272 Sodirov, Rizvon, 221 Sohibov family, 227 Sohibov, Mahmadzoir, 228 Sohibov, Shamsullo, 228 sovkhoz, 63, 124, 216 Stalin, 25, 162, 204, 205 State Committee on National Security (GKNB), 223, 225 Subkhanberdin, Nurzhan, 261 Suleimenov, Olzhas, 262, 271, 279, 286 Sultanism, 24, 122 Sultanov, Kuanysh, 148, 279 Svoik, Petr, 280

T Tabanca, Erol, 188 Tagiyev, Tachberdy, 176 Tahmina (Rahmon’s daughter), 227 Tamerlane, 19, 126 Tasmagambetov, Imangali, 252 Tatishev, Erzhan, 285 Tekebayev, Omurbek, 299, 305 Telibekov, Murat, 274 Tiku, Arvind, 106 Togusov, Amirbek, 264 Tokayev, Kassym-Jomart, 30, 80, 242, 249–252, 277, 286–288 Tuhbatulins, Farid and Ruslan, 174 Tulaganov, Kozim, 147 Tulip Revolution, 15, 50 Turajonzoda, Hoji Akbar, 218, 219 Turgunaliyev, Topchubek, 310 Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), 86 Tursunov, Batyr, 148

330

INDEX

Tursunov, Oybek, 148 Tursunzade, MIrzo, 208 Tuyakbai, Zhamarkhan, 263, 286 U Ubaidulloyev, Mahmadsaid, 228 Uljaboev, Tursunboi, 209, 210 Umarov, Otabek, 148 Umetalieva, Toktaiym, 302 Umnov, Vladimir, 163 United Tajik Opposition (UTO), 211, 217, 218, 221, 224, 236 Upper Irtysh Old Belief Cossack Society, 273 Ural Municipal Cossack Historical and Cultural Society, 272 Usenov, Daniyar, 302, 306 Usmanov, Mirabror, 135, 139, 148 Usmonxo‘jayev, Inomjon, 124 V Vozrozhdyenie, 270, 287 X Xi Jinping, 71, 86, 88, 89, 97, 100 Y Yeltsin, Boris, 50, 217, 257, 262, 266

Yleusinov, Amin, 275 Yo’ldosh, Tohir, 129 Yorov, Buzurgmehr, 235 Younger (Small) Horde, 253 Yuldashev, NIgmatilla, 136, 142 Yuma Namangani, 129

Z Zakharchenko, Oleg, 222, 223 Zarina (Rahmon’s daughter), 227 Zhadan, Aleksandr, 163, 169 Zhakianov, Galymzhan, 284 Zhakyanov, Galymzhan, 263, 280, 286 Zhanaozen (protests), 264, 274–276, 283 Zhandosov, Oraz, 264 Zhas Otan, 281 Zheltoksan, 15, 255, 264, 269, 273, 274, 286, 287 Zheltoksan National Democratic Party, 273 Zhou Enlai, 77 Zhukeev, Tulegen, 264 Zhumagalov, Bakhytzan, 256 Zhypar, Zheksheev, 301 Ziyoev, Mirzo, 218, 222–224 Zuhurov, Sievush, 227