Political Manipulation And Weapons Of Mass Destruction: Terrorism, Influence and Persuasion 9781350987524, 9781786732644

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Ben Cole is Honorary Research Fellow in the Department of Psychological Sciences, University of Liverpool. He specialises in the process by which individuals become radicalised into violent extremism; terrorist decision-making with regard to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism; and real-time monitoring and analysis of conflicts and terrorist movements using online media. He worked on the development of the PVE tool and guidance, and lectures regularly on CBRN terrorism. He is the author of The Changing Face of Terrorism (I.B.Tauris, 2011), co-author of Martyrdom: Radicalisation and Terrorist Violence Among British Muslims and editor of Conflict, Terrorism and the Media in Asia.

‘Ben Cole has written a carefully researched and illuminating analysis of a key issue in al Qaeda strategy, one that has been the subject of much political manipulation in Western circles. It is a welcome contribution to a subject that badly needs this kind of examination rather than the ill-informed speculation and rhetoric that is so common.’ Paul Rogers, Emeritus Professor of Peace Studies, Bradford University and author of Irregular War: The New Threat from the Margins (I.B.Tauris, 2017)

POLITICAL MANIPULATION AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Terrorism, Influence and Persuasion

BEN COLE

I.B. TAURIS Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA BLOOMSBURY, I.B. TAURIS and the I.B. Tauris logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published 2018 Paperback edition first published 2020 Copyright © Ben Cole, 2018 Ben Cole has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: HB: 978-1-7845-3885-9 PB: 978-0-7556-0093-9 ePDF: 978-1-7867-3264-4 eBook: 978-1-7867-2264-5 Series: Library of Modern Middle East Studies, 198 Typeset in Garamond Three by OKS Prepress Services, Chennai, India To find out more about our authors and books visit www.bloomsbury.com and sign up for our newsletters.

CONTENTS

Abbreviations

ix

Introduction

1

1. Opportunism, 1994–6 Opportunities to Acquire CBRN Weapons Al Qaeda and Sudan’s Chemical Weapon Programme Al Qaeda Attempts to Connect with Iran and Iraq Al Qaeda Leaves Sudan

5 7 13 14 18

2. The US and the Politics of CBRN Terrorism, 1996– 8 CBRN Terrorism in Security Debates The Politicisation of the Threat Intelligence Assessments of the Threat

19 20 25 31

3. Antecedents: Afghanistan, 1996– 8 The Development of Al Qaeda’s Strategy and Tactics The Attacks on the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania The Decision to Start a CBRN Programme

34 37 38 43

4. Project Al Zabadi and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons Chemical Weapons Biological Weapons Nuclear and Radiological Weapons Al Qaeda Implements CBRN Training Breakthrough? – Al Wafa and Ummah Tameer-e-Nau

47 47 52 55 59 60

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5. Al Qaeda’s Strategy Begins to Emerge, 1988– 2001 The Returnees from Albania US and UK Intelligence Assessments of Al Qaeda’s CBRN Capabilities Bin Laden Begins to Articulate a Strategy of Deterrence Exploiting the Politics of CBRN Terrorism

65 69

6. Opting for Deterrence, 1999–2001 Chechnya and the Politics of CBRN Terrorism Stepping Up Attacks on the US

82 86 95

70 75 78

7. The End of Project Al Zabadi The War on Terror Investigating Project Al Zabadi Re-Assessing the Threat Renewed Politicisation of the Threat from CBRN Weapons

99 101 103 107 110

8. Re-Establishing a CBRN Weapon Capability, 2002– 3 Re-Establishing the CBRN Weapon-Development Programme The Publication of Online Training Materials The Al Qaeda Leadership Refuses to Approve Further CBRN Attacks Warning Signs of Al Qaeda Losing Control of the Threat

115

9. Al Qaeda Announces its Strategy, 2002– 3 The Theological Legitimacy of Using CBRN Weapons A CBRN Fatwa Confusing the Message Evidence of Developing CBRN Plots in Europe

127 132 135 137 139

117 119 121 125

10. Constraining the Threat, 2002– 3 AQSA Attempts to Buy Nuclear Weapons Europe and the ‘Chechen Network’ The Capture of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed Intelligence Assessments of the Threat

143 146 148 155 157

11. The Politics of CBRN Terrorism and the Invasion of Iraq The Iraq Link Confirmed? The Build-Up to the Invasion of Iraq

161 163 167

CONTENTS

The Debate in the UK The Invasion of Iraq and its Aftermath

vii

171 175

12. Western Uncertainty About the Threat, 2004–7 False Alarms The Threat Moves to Europe Publicising the Threat and the Debate on Enhanced Interrogation

178 180 182 188

13. Losing Control of the Threat, 2004– 8 The War in Iraq Online Training Materials Sporadic Global Incidents

195 198 206 208

14. Breakdown in Control, 2007– 9 The War in Afghanistan, 2004– 6 The Theological Challenge to Al Qaeda Strategic Thought, 2007– 8

211 219 221

15. Influencing the New President, 2008–10 Increasing Jihadi Online Chatter on Nuclear Weapons Emerging Opportunities in Pakistan Assessing the Risks and Increasing Political Concerns President Obama’s National Security Strategy and the Drone Programme

227 230 234 238

16. A New Threat Emerges, 2010– 15 Decentralised Incidents Al Qaeda Attempts to Impose Control over CBRN Plots New Opportunities – the Arab Spring The Emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

242 243 245 250 253

Conclusion Al Qaeda’s Intentions Regarding the Use of CBRN Weapons The Political Value of CBRN Weapon Threats to Nation States Al Qaeda’s Legacy with Respect to CBRN Weapons

259 260 264 265

Notes Bibliography Index

267 345 389

240

ABBREVIATIONS

AQAP AQI AQIM AQISA BND BW CBRN CBW CIA CSG CW DCI DFP DIA DIS DMSO DST EIJ FBI FSB GIA GSPC HEU IEDs

al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula al Qaeda in Iraq al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia Bundesnachrichtendienst (German intelligence service) biological weapons chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear chemical and biological weapons Central Intelligence Agency (US) Counter Terrorism Security Group (US) chemical weapons Director of Central Intelligence (US) diisopropyl fluorophosphate Defense Intelligence Agency (US) Defence Intelligence Staff (UK) dimethyl sulphoxide Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (French intelligence service) Egyptian Islamic Jihad Federal Bureau of Investigation (US) Russian Federal Security Service Armed Islamic Group Group for Preaching and Combat highly enriched uranium improvised explosive devices

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POLITICAL MANIPULATION AND WMD

ISG ISI ISIL JI JIC JN JSOC KSM Kt MIC NATO NRC NSA NSC SSRC TNSM UAE UNSCOM USAMRIID UTN WMD WTC

Iraq Survey Group Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan intelligence agency) Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Jemaah Islamiyah Joint Intelligence Committee (UK) Jabhat al-Nusra Joint Special Operations Command (US) Khaled Sheikh Mohammed kiloton Sudanese Military Industrial Corporation North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US) National Security Agency (US) National Security Council (US) Scientific Studies and Research Centre (Syria) Tehrek-i-Nehfaz Shariat-i-Mohammedi United Arab Emirates United Nations Special Commission on Iraq US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases Ummah Tameer-e-Nau weapons of mass destruction World Trade Center

INTRODUCTION

Since 9/11, al Qaeda has been a dominant feature in the national security debates of Western states. Nothing has symbolised that threat more than reports of its efforts to acquire and use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. When I first started work on this book I was firmly of the opinion that al Qaeda intended to acquire CBRN weapons of mass destruction in order to use them for indiscriminate mass-casualty attacks against the West. George Tenet, the former director of the CIA, even states in his memoirs that the CIA has established ‘beyond any doubt’ that al Qaeda wanted CBRN weapons not for deterrence, but to use for mass-casualty attacks.1 Given al Qaeda’s track record of perpetrating indiscriminate mass-casualty attacks, and its propaganda statements since 9/11 in which it has threatened to continue escalating its attacks against the West, this assessment seemed self-evident. This narrative about al Qaeda and CBRN weapons is consistent with the broader reaction of governments, politicians and the media, to the generic threat of CBRN terrorism since the 1990s. Fears about CBRN terrorism have been around since the 1970s, but they only reached a peak in the mid-1990s, following the unexpected rash of chemical weapon attacks by the Aum Shinrikyo religious cult in Japan, and an increased interest in the biological toxin ricin amongst extreme right-wing groups in the US. The Aum attacks prompted a significant political reaction in the West, where many politicians, parts of the media and policy-makers took the view that terrorist attacks involving CBRN weapons had become an imminent threat. From that time onwards, CBRN terrorism became an intensely political issue at both national and international level.

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On a number of occasions since the late 1990s, al Qaeda has demonstrated its ability to mount complex and innovative attacks that have caused significant loss of life and economic damage. Concerns about CBRN weapons have therefore featured prominently in both political debates and media reporting about the ongoing threat from al Qaeda since 9/11. Much of this debate has been apocalyptic in tone, with fears being expressed of al Qaeda causing many thousands of casualties. As a result, successive US administrations have taken a consistently riskaverse approach to the threat. The Bush Administration took the view that if there is just a 1 per cent chance of the threat being real, then the US had to deal with it. The American journalist Ron Suskind labelled this approach ‘the 1 per cent doctrine’.2 This extremely risk averse approach to the threat is completely understandable amongst governments and officials with responsibility for national security and public safety. When the costs of being wrong could potentially be enormous, a tendency to err on the side of caution is only natural. Tenet noted in his memoirs that this was an issue the CIA simply could not afford to be wrong about.3 It can reasonably be argued that it would be dangerously naı¨ve to base planning on any other assumption. However, this dominant narrative about al Qaeda and CBRN weapons has obscured a more surprising reality, which is that the al Qaeda leadership’s decision-making with regards to using CBRN weapons has actually been extremely cautious. Despite constant warnings of an al Qaeda CBRN attack on the West being only a matter of when, not if, there is no publicly available evidence that the al Qaeda leadership has ever actually planned such an attack against the West. Al Qaeda has possessed a crude CBRN weapon capability since 1999, and has also trained its operatives to use that capability and disseminated CBRN training manuals online. There have been a number of CBRN incidents in western Europe involving operational al Qaeda cells, which are cited as evidence of al Qaeda’s intent, but none of these cells was even close to executing a CBRN attack at the time they were arrested. It would be easy to explain away the absence of an attack as being due to effective intelligence and law enforcement. It is certainly true that Western intelligence and law enforcement agencies have arrested a number of cells that were discussing the use of CBRN weapons, but several of those cells already had everything they needed to either manufacture the biological toxin

INTRODUCTION

3

ricin or conduct a crude chemical attack at the time they were arrested. This begs the question, why don’t they act? To understand al Qaeda’s intentions with regard to using CBRN weapons it is necessary to focus on the actions of its top leadership. Throughout the period 1994–2014, al Qaeda encouraged its operational cells to develop ideas for attacks, but all plans needed to be considered by the leadership in order for them to be approved and funded. The key issue is therefore not whether operational al Qaeda cells were talking about or planning CBRN attacks, but whether the al Qaeda leadership had actually ordered or approved CBRN attacks. Increasing amounts of information about the al Qaeda leadership’s intentions with regard to using CBRN weapons has now become available. This material indicates a different, more surprising reason for the lack of an al Qaeda CBRN attack in the West. It indicates that the al Qaeda leadership’s approach to using CBRN weapons has primarily been shaped and constrained by political factors. Its position has been to use these weapons for political purposes, for deterrence and propaganda, rather than as first strike weapons. Whenever the al Qaeda leadership was presented with plans to actually use CBRN weapons by its operational cells, the available evidence indicates that it rejected those plans. The information to support these findings comes from a range of sources, including public statements by al Qaeda leaders, captured al Qaeda documents, information from detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, testimony of former al Qaeda members, and evidence from the arrest of a number of al Qaeda cells in Europe that considered conducting CBRN attacks. Individually, each of these sources would need to be treated with a significant degree of caution but, combined, they form a consistent and powerful narrative covering a nearly 20-year period. Some of this material has been available for some time but it has received little or no serious attention in the public debates on the issue, and has had no impact on shaping the dominant narrative on al Qaeda and CBRN weapons. This can partly be explained away by the justifiable sense of risk aversion amongst Western intelligence agencies and policy-makers, but the existence of the al Qaeda CBRN bogey-man has also been politically expedient for some governments. As a result of the heightened political sensitivities surrounding terrorist CBRN threats, some nation states have attempted to use the al Qaeda

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CBRN threat for wider political purposes, to help justify controversial policy decisions. The central narrative in this book is a chronological account of al Qaeda’s efforts to acquire a CBRN weapon capability, and the evolution of the al Qaeda leadership’s approach to actually using CBRN weapons. This is set within the context of the politicisation of the threat of CBRN terrorism in US security debates since the mid-1990s. This book will explore how the inherently political nature of terrorist CBRN threats has helped to shape al Qaeda’s approach to CBRN weapons, and will discuss how the heightened political sensitivities surrounding the threat have enabled some governments to manipulate it in order to generate domestic and international support for controversial policies, particularly the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It will then assess the relative success of the al Qaeda leadership’s political approach to CBRN weapons, together with the relative success of the efforts of the US, UK and Russian governments, to exploit the al Qaeda CBRN threat for their wider political purposes.

CHAPTER 1 OPPORTUNISM, 1994—6

Al Qaeda’s decades-long hunt for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons began with a number of random opportunities that presented themselves during the early years of its existence. In 1992, it had moved its base of operations from Afghanistan to Sudan. This brought it physically closer to the Middle East, giving it a better opportunity to influence events in the region,1 and also brought it closer to the radical Sudanese regime of President Hassan al-Turabi.2 Initially at least, al Qaeda displayed no interest in CBRN weapons. It was still a small and relatively new organisation, and was little more than a marginal player in the wider jihadi movement. Bin Laden was ambitious though, and set about building a network with the other jihadi and terrorist groups that were operating in Sudan at that time. The precise nature of these contacts varied from group to group, but that did not matter to bin Laden because he was not trying to build a monolithic organisation. Instead, he set up al Qaeda as a facilitator, providing funding and support for other jihadi groups. Among the groups with which it established a particularly strong working relationship was Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ).3 The foundations of al Qaeda’s interest in CBRN weapons were set in the ideological and strategic debates that took place in the al Qaeda shura (leadership council), in the mid-1990s. During those early years in Sudan there were fundamental differences of opinion within the shura over whether to focus on overthrowing what they defined as ‘un-Islamic’ and despotic regimes in Muslim states (i.e., the ‘near enemy’), or attacking the US (i.e., the ‘far enemy’).

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One faction, led by the leader of EIJ Ayman al-Zawahiri, wanted to focus on the ‘near enemy’. Its primary goal was to overthrow the Mubarak regime in Egypt and replace it with an Islamist regime. In contrast, bin Laden was beginning to set his sights on the ‘far enemy’. He had initially conceived of jihad in the traditional sense of liberating Muslim lands from foreign occupation. But the continued presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia following the 1991 Gulf War had led him to believe that the focus of the jihad should be on the ‘far enemy’. He viewed regional Muslim leaders as being pawns of the US, reliant on US political and military support to remain in power. Bin Laden therefore believed that removing US influence from the Muslim world was the only way of bringing about the establishment of true Islamist regimes in the Middle East and the creation of a transnational Muslim umma.4 In 1992 al Qaeda’s attention was drawn to the neighbouring country of Somalia, where UN forces under US command were attempting to safeguard the delivery of humanitarian aid to the famine and conflict stricken country. To bin Laden, the presence of US troops in Somalia confirmed his belief that the US had a secret grand strategy to conquer Muslim lands.5 Following discussions with senior EIJ leaders, al Qaeda operatives became actively involved in Somalia, and were reputed to have been involved in the infamous ‘Black Hawk down’ incident in Mogadishu in 1993, in which 18 US servicemen were killed, which proved to be one of the catalysts to the US withdrawal from Somalia in 1994.6 The US withdrawal from Somalia marked the beginning of a shift in al Qaeda’s ideological focus on the ‘far enemy’. But whilst al Qaeda leaders were debating ideology, they made little effort to think strategically and tactically. Their models for action were the guerrilla war against the Soviet army in Afghanistan between 1980 and 1988, the 1983 Beirut truck bombings and latterly the urban guerrilla war on US forces on Somalia. Each of these models had proved to be successful against more powerful enemies, so there was no real incentive to think about acquiring powerful new capabilities such as CBRN weapons. Whilst al Qaeda was making its first tentative steps in its fight against the US in Somalia, other elements in the wider jihadi networks were preparing to take the jihad right into the heart of the ‘far enemy’. In 1993, an Islamist terrorist cell led by Ramzi Youssef, and directed by his uncle, Khaled Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), was operating in New York.

OPPORTUNISM, 1994 –6

7

The pair were not members of any formal group but rather freelancers who would come together with other jihadi groups and operatives to conduct specific operations. The cell’s spiritual mentor was the blind Egyptian cleric, Omar Abdel Rahman, who had had been the spiritual guide to the Egyptian Islamic Group during the 1980s, and was at that time working as an Imam in a New York mosque.7 Youssef believed that the US had only managed to bring World War II to an end by dropping atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing 250,000 civilians. This led him to the conclusion that it was necessary to inflict a similar level of casualties on the US, in order to achieve his objectives.8 The cell developed a plan to destroy the World Trade Center in New York by detonating a massive truck bomb in the basement of one of the towers. Youssef considered augmenting the explosion with chemical agents, and even acquired a small quantity of cyanide,9 but did not have enough money to procure the larger quantities of cyanide that he would need.10 Instead, he hoped that the explosion would topple one of the towers into the other, bringing both down. The cell succeeded in detonating a massive truck bomb in the basement of the north tower, but it failed to collapse, and casualties were minimal. Immediately afterwards, the cell sent a letter to the New York Times threatening that if their demands were not met, there would be more attacks, including strikes on ‘some potential nuclear targets’.11 However, they were given no chance to follow through on this threat as most members of the cell were quickly rounded up by the police, and Youssef fled to Pakistan. The 1993 World Trade Center bombing presented al Qaeda with a different strategic model – an act of mass destruction on the land of the ‘far enemy’. But the attack had been a failure, the traditional truck bomb had proved ineffective for executing this particular strategy. For the jihadis, the main lesson of the bombing was that new weapons and tactics would be required.

Opportunities to Acquire CBRN Weapons This recognition that new weapons and tactics were required coincided with a period of unparalleled opportunity for terrorist groups to acquire CBRN weapons, particularly nuclear weapons. The break-up of the Soviet Union into a number of fledgling successor states in 1991 had

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created significant new opportunities for terrorist groups to acquire CBRN materials, expertise or even complete weapons. This was most apparent in respect of nuclear and radiological weapons. Developing nuclear weapons is an extremely difficult proposition, even for states. The single most difficult element is acquiring the necessary nuclear material, otherwise known as fissile material, to form its explosive core. The optimum materials are either plutonium-239 (Pu-239), or uranium that has been enriched so that it comprises at least 94 per cent uranium-235, otherwise known as highly enriched uranium (HEU), although plutonium-240 (Pu-240) and uranium of lower enrichment levels can also potentially be used. The amounts required for a basic 20-kiloton (Kt) bomb are somewhere in the order of about 6 kg of Pu-239, or 25 kg of HEU, as a minimum.12 More sophisticated designs would require less fissile material but would probably be beyond the limited technical capabilities of terrorist groups such as al Qaeda.13 It is extremely difficult to manufacture fissile material because it needs significant industrial facilities and technical expertise. Therefore, the most realistic way for terrorists to acquire the necessary material is to either steal it or buy it on the black market. From 1991, both of these options suddenly became much more realistic as the Soviet successor states experienced a major economic crisis and the Soviet-era system of state controls began to erode. Between January 1993 and August 1994 some 300 employees of the Russian nuclear industry were reportedly arrested for illegally possessing, stealing or transporting radioactive waste. From the mid-1990s, police forces in a number of European states began seizing small quantities of fissile material from smugglers.14 This included a case in 1992, when 3.7 lb of HEU were stolen from a scientific institute, and another case in 1993 when 10 lb of HEU was stolen from the Murmansk naval base.15 There were only ever a few such seizures and the amounts of material involved were significantly less than would be required to build a nuclear weapon, but given that the extent and magnitude of the trafficking remained unknown16 it posed serious questions about whether other larger quantities might also be available for sale. It was not just fissile material that posed a risk: there was a much greater number of smuggling incidents involving other radioactive materials, such as Casesium-137 and Strontium-90, which are suitable for use in radiological weapons. These are considerably easier to build

OPPORTUNISM, 1994 –6

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than nuclear weapons and work by spreading radioactive contamination rather than causing casualties through blast effects. There are several ways of dispersing radioactive material as a contaminant, the crudest of which is to pack the material around a conventional explosive and let the explosion disperse it. Constructing such a device requires no specialist skills apart from knowledge of how to protect oneself from the radioactivity whilst building it. Other, more sophisticated dispersal methods, which require a higher level of technical skill, could involve radioactive isotopes that can be dissolved, sprayed, vapourised or burned.17 These isotopes could potentially be introduced into the ventilation systems of buildings, or dispersed through spraying devices, or else simply dumped into the water supplies of buildings.18 But it was not just from the states of the former Soviet Union that terrorists could potentially acquire these materials. Radiological isotopes are used throughout the world, in a wide range of civil commercial applications, such as X-ray machines and industrial measuring devices. It was equally possible for terrorists to either steal or clandestinely purchase such equipment, in order to remove the radiological isotopes for use in a weapon. With illicit markets, the majority of the traffic remains hidden from the authorities. If the same was true in respect of the trafficking in nuclear materials, there could have been even greater quantities of material available than was evident from the limited seizures that were made. For al Qaeda, the challenge was how to access this chaotic and shadowy market.

Opportunistic Attempts to Acquire Nuclear Material From its earliest days, al Qaeda operated as a facilitator, inviting individual jihadis and cells to present their plans to the senior members of the organisation for approval and funding. The leadership would then decide whether or not to support a particular plan. This approach promoted innovation within the organisation, and would naturally generate a diverse range of proposals for consideration. It was only natural that plans involving CBRN weapons would eventually feature among the proposals that were put forward for approval. In 1993, al Qaeda business associates received word through intermediaries that a quantity of smuggled HEU was available for sale. If the offer was genuine, it presented a golden opportunity to overcome the single most significant problem in nuclear weapon development.

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Al Qaeda did not have any nuclear physicists or engineers within its ranks at that time, but this was still too good an opportunity to pass up. The subject was discussed among the leadership, one of whom commented that ‘it’s easy to kill more people with uranium’.19 The most influential figure in the discussion was Mohammed Atef, a member of EIJ and al Qaeda’s Deputy Military Commander. Perhaps influenced by the failure of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, Atef believed that al Qaeda needed to acquire new capabilities, including CBRN weapons.20 His arguments won the day, and it was agreed to instruct Abu Rida al-Suri, another founder member of al Qaeda and one of its key strategists, to oversee the purchase of the material. Al-Suri ordered Abu Fadhl al Makkee, a member of the al Qaeda Finance Committee and shura, to evaluate the offer. In turn, al Makkee telephoned Jamal al-Fadl, a Sudanese member of al Qaeda, instructing him to make contact with the intermediary. When al-Fadl met the intermediary, Abu Abd Allah al-Yemeni (who was also known as Abu Dijana), he was given the name of yet another contact. That person was Moqadem Salah Abd al-Mobruk, a Sudanese army officer and former Cabinet minister in the government that al-Turabi had overthrown in 1989. After conferring with associates, al-Fadl met al-Mobruk, who referred him to yet another man called Basheer. When the two met at an office on Jambouria Street in Khartoum, al-Fadl told Basheer that al Qaeda was primarily concerned about the quality of the material and its country of origin, and they agreed a price of $1.5 million plus additional commissions for Basheer and al-Mobruk. At that point, the main issue was how to test the uranium to determine whether it was genuine. Al-Fadl knew nothing about nuclear materials, but nor was there anyone else in al Qaeda with the necessary technical knowledge. Al-Fadl reported back to al-Makkee and al-Suri, who told him that they had an ‘electric machine’ that was capable of testing uranium. Al-Fadl then arranged another meeting with Basheer for himself and al-Suri. In a small house in the town of Bait al-Mal, north of Khartoum, al-Fadl and al-Suri were shown a cylinder and given a note which had the words ‘South Africa’ and a serial number written on it. However, they clearly must have had some lingering doubts because they were still not prepared to commit to buying the cylinder at that meeting. It was only after further consideration that al-Fadl and al-Suri met with Basheer

OPPORTUNISM, 1994 –6

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again and agreed to buy the cylinder. Al-Suri then negotiated directly with al-Mobruk, and arranged for the cylinder to be tested at a location in the Hilat Koko district of Khartoum. It passed the test, and al-Suri handed over $1.5 million. Subsequent analysis, however, showed that the cylinder contained low-grade reactor fuel, comprising uranium enriched to about 20 per cent uranium-235, which could not be used to make a nuclear weapon.21 This incident highlights the inherent problems faced by al Qaeda in trying to buy nuclear material on the black market when it did not have anyone among its ranks who knew anything about nuclear materials. But despite this setback, Atef did not give up. Together with another founder member of the shura, an Egyptian called Abu Obeida Albanshiri, they also acquired a manual, written in English, about how to produce a radiological ‘dirty bomb’, and continued to try and obtain nuclear materials.22 Another potential opportunity to acquire nuclear materials presented itself in 1995, when Muhammad Shah, a Pakistan-based facilitator with links to al Qaeda and other jihadi groups, was approached by individuals offering to sell a quantity of uranium and red mercury. Shah reportedly approached Atef, as well as a jihadi group called the Khalifa Group in Pakistan, and representatives of the Iraqi government, to ascertain whether any of them wanted to purchase the material.23 Atef refused the offer because he had doubts about whether the material was genuine. References to red mercury had first begun to appear in the Russian and Western media in the early 1990s. These reports claimed that the substance was an important component of Soviet nuclear weapons. From the early 1990s it was being peddled throughout Europe and the Middle East by Russian businessmen, and it became the subject of dozens of cases of illicit trafficking, which peaked in 1992.24 Yet no-one knew what red mercury actually was. As early as 1992, US and Russian officials, as well as prominent independent commentators, repeatedly denied that any material matching the properties of red mercury existed or that any such material was used in the construction of nuclear weapons. Eventually, it became widely recognised that red mercury was a fictitious substance, and that the people who were trying to sell it were con men.25 The fact that red mercury was a scam therefore raised significant question marks over whether the uranium that Shah was offering was genuine.26

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Despite experiencing another scam, al Qaeda persisted with its efforts to acquire nuclear material, but its efforts suffered a serious setback in 1996, when Albanshiri drowned in a boat accident on Lake Victoria. Albanshiri was reportedly in East Africa trading Tanzanite and gold, at the same time as setting up al Qaeda cells and infrastructure, but a former al Qaeda source reports that he was also exploring opportunities for acquiring nuclear materials.27 However, East Africa is an unlikely region in which to acquire nuclear materials, given that the main smuggling routes for nuclear materials originating from the soviet successor states were westwards into the Balkans and Europe and south through central Asia. Following Albanshiri’s death, Atef was promoted to the role of military commander, which put a key advocate of CBRN weapons in a powerful position within the al Qaeda hierarchy. But even if al Qaeda had succeeded in acquiring fissile material through these opportunistic contacts, it would still have been a long way away from developing a viable nuclear weapon. To design and develop even a crude nuclear weapon would require a significant commitment in terms of time and resources, as well as the recruitment of a team of people with a range of different skills and knowledge.28 Al Qaeda did not have the necessary expertise within its ranks, or any of the other technology and production equipment that would be needed. Its whole approach was naive and displayed little grasp of what was actually needed to develop a viable weapon. This was also reflected in a lack of strategic direction within al Qaeda regarding nuclear weapons. There had been no internal debate about nuclear weapons, no consideration had been given to manpower and resource issues, or even what role nuclear weapons might play in al Qaeda’s future operations. Instead, the decision to procure fissile material seems to have been taken simply in the belief that it would be useful to have these weapons. As a result, there was a lack of coherence in al Qaeda’s early approach to nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, its efforts to exploit these initial opportunities grew into a longer-term interest in acquiring CBRN weapons, which was reflected in the fact that it set up a Nuclear Subcommittee, under its Military Committee, led by Ali Sayyid Muhammad Mustafa al-Bakri (also known as Abdul Aziz al-Masri).29

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Al Qaeda and Sudan’s Chemical Weapon Programme In contrast to al Qaeda’s opportunistic and chaotic efforts to acquire nuclear materials, the Sudanese government had a structured programme in place to develop chemical weapons (CW). The programme was based at a site in the Hilat Koko neighbourhood in northern Khartoum, and was focused on the development of mustard gas, with the aim of producing weapons that could be used in the war against separatist rebels in the south of the country. By the early 1990s, however, it had run into difficulties in acquiring the necessary raw materials and technology. In an effort to resolve these problems, it turned to al Qaeda for help. Following its arrival in Sudan, al Qaeda had developed a close relationship with the Sudanese government, funding several major infrastructure projects and making financial contributions to the Sudanese Military Industrial Corporation. It also developed an extensive infrastructure of its own, including a sprawling international business empire that included dozens of trading companies.30 Besides generating funds for al Qaeda, this business empire provided cover for procuring and shipping material for terrorist purposes. Following a meeting between bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Hasan al-Turabi in either 1993 or 1994, it was agreed that al Qaeda would provide assistance to the Sudanese CW programme.31 Its involvement was led by Mamdouh Mahmud Salim (who was also known as Abu Hajer al Iraqi). Salim was an electrical engineer by training and had a number of responsibilities in al Qaeda, ranging from lecturing recruits on the doctrinal basis for killing civilians in jihad to managing the group’s finances. He was supported by Abu Rida al-Suri, Amin Abdel Marouf and Jamal al-Fadl.32 Salim and his team used al Qaeda’s business empire to acquire restricted technologies and materials for the Sudanese CW programme. They also financed the development of new manufacturing methods and weaponisation technologies and helped test the experimental products.33 The Sudanese CW programme was seemingly successful, because from 1995 members of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the Sudanese National Democratic Alliance, together with Ugandan security officials, repeatedly alleged that Sudan had used mustard gas in battles with rebels and against civilian targets.34 However, none of these allegations

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was ever corroborated, so the precise impact that al Qaeda’s involvement had on the Sudanese CW programme remains unclear. Despite its involvement in the Sudanese CW programme, al Qaeda displayed no apparent interest in setting up its own CW development and production capability. In contrast, other elements within the wider jihadi networks had grasped the potential of CW, even though they lacked the technical capacity to develop them. Ramzi Youssef, who had been on the run in Pakistan since the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, had started thinking beyond the use of conventional explosives, and was turning his attention to CW. He thought about attacking the World Trade Center again, this time with a smaller bomb that would disperse hydrogen cyanide inside one of the towers.35 As the Pakistani security forces closed in on Youssef in February 1995, they raided a hotel room in Islamabad. Inside they recovered two letters written by Youssef, threatening to use CW in the Philippines unless the authorities there released one of his accomplices who had recently been arrested. One letter threatened to kill the Philippine president and stated that the group could ‘manufacture different kinds of chemical substances that are deadly and poisonous gases and assemble them from very basic materials that are available to any chemist’, and claimed that they would use these weapons ‘in big cities and big and vital establishments and drinking water sources’. The other letter repeated the same points.36 Youssef was eventually detained later that same year, and handed over to the US. He told FBI investigators that he had also planned to assassinate President Clinton, possibly by attacking the Presidential limousine with phosgene gas.37 There is no evidence that Youssef actually possessed any chemical agents or even had access to accomplices with the relevant technical skills. Therefore his ideas were at that stage nothing more than just bluster and threats. However, they show that elements within the wider jihadi network were at least beginning to think about how they might be able to make use of CBRN weapons. This thinking had the potential to find its way back through the networks to al Qaeda.

Al Qaeda Attempts to Connect with Iran and Iraq Al Qaeda’s relationship with Sudan had provided it with a safe haven from which to operate, as well as material and political support.

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Recognising the significant benefits that additional state sponsorship might give the network, bin Laden also sought to forge links with Iran and Iraq, both of which were active sponsors of international terrorist groups at that time. Both had also been heavily engaged in developing CBRN weapons. Iran had an active CBRN weapon development programme and held stockpiles of CW. In contrast, the Iraqi CBRN weapon programme was in the process of being dismantled by the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), although Iraqi scientists and engineers possessed considerable expertise in CBRN weapon development. This meant that both the Iraqi and Iranian regimes were in a position to provide invaluable assistance to al Qaeda with respect to CBRN weapons, if they wanted to. Between 1991 and 1992 al Qaeda had established contact with Iranian government officials and was able to secure cooperation in providing explosives training, including in how to make and use truck bombs.38 However, Iran is a Shia state and al Qaeda is a Sunni organisation. While Iran might have recognised some potential benefits in providing limited forms of assistance to al Qaeda there were fundamental theocratic and ideological differences between the two. As a consequence there were limits to Iran’s willingness to provide al Qaeda with material support, and there are no reports that Iran ever discussed CBRN weapons with al Qaeda. Then, in early 1995, al Qaeda asked the Government of Sudan to facilitate contacts with Iraq. This approach proved successful and a meeting was arranged between bin Laden and a senior Iraqi Intelligence Service (Mukhabarrat) officer called Faruq Hijazi, in Khartoum. Hijazi took his orders directly from President Saddam Hussain, who did not trust radical Islamist groups and was wary of cooperating with them. Saddam instructed Hijazi to listen to bin Laden but not to negotiate or promise anything explicit. During the meeting, bin Laden asked permission for al Qaeda to open an office inside Iraq, for Iraq to provide al Qaeda with Chinese made sea mines and military training and that Iraq broadcast the speeches of the radical anti-Saudi cleric Shaykh Salman al-Awdah.39 Hijazi, however, was unimpressed by bin Laden. In his report to Saddam he criticised bin Laden for his hostility and insistence on the Islamisation of Iraq. He also expressed concern that working with al Qaeda risked damaging Iraqi relations with other Arab regimes.

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This assessment confirmed Saddam’s personal suspicions, and he refused all of bin Laden’s requests. He later mandated in a presidential order that Iraq should not deal with al Qaeda, although the Mukhabarrat retained a ‘weak’ connection with al Qaeda for the purposes of gathering intelligence. Hijazi was ordered to sever all contact with bin Laden.40 It seems that al Qaeda did not seek to acquire CBRN weapons or expertise from either Iran or Iraq at this time. Instead, it focused on trying to develop higher-level strategic relationships with both states. But while neither Iran nor Iraq transferred CBRN weapons, materials or expertise to al Qaeda, the risk was that if al Qaeda’s relationship with either state deepened, one of them might do so at some stage in the future.

US Intelligence Monitors the Threat During the early 1990s al Qaeda was just one among many jihadi groups, and did not really feature on the radar of the US intelligence agencies. In 1995 however, US intelligence began to receive reports that the Sudanese regime had given bin Laden tentative approval for al Qaeda to develop CW, and that bin Laden had asked Sudan for assistance to develop CW that could be used against US troops in Saudi Arabia.41 Other reports indicated that al Qaeda, with Sudanese assistance, had tested nerve agents that could be dispersed by bombs or shells,42 and that Mamdouh Salim had negotiated a joint weapons-production agreement between al Qaeda, Sudan and the Iranian government.43 These reports were partially corroborated in 1996, when Jamal al Fadl defected to the US.44 He divulged details of the failed attempt to procure uranium, as well as al Qaeda’s involvement in the Sudanese CW programme. Al Fadl claimed that Mamdouh Mahmud Salim was involved in arranging weapons production in the Sudan as part of a joint effort between al Qaeda, Iran and the Sudan, that he had obtained dual-use chemicals for bin Laden’s Sudanese tannery that could be used to produce CW, and that at various times he had made efforts to obtain nuclear weapon components.45 Significantly, however, he did not corroborate the reports that al Qaeda had started its own CW development programme. In the summer of 1997 an informant reported that two sites in Khartoum might be involved in CW production. The informant also mentioned a third site, the Shifa pharmaceutical plant just outside

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Khartoum, on which he had less information, but which was suspicious because it was surrounded by high fences and protected by heavy security.46 Based on this information, the US intelligence agencies began targeting the Shifa plant and intercepted telephone communications from inside the plant that seemed to suggest that the plant was linked with the Sudanese CW programme.47 Shifa was Sudan’s largest pharmaceutical plant, producing some 50– 60 per cent of Sudan’s pharmaceutical needs, including painkillers, antibiotics, anti-malarial drugs and treatments for tuberculosis, as well as veterinary products. But the US intelligence agencies also identified it as being part of Sudan’s Military Industrial Corporation, and reported that it was a closed, secretive facility, guarded by Sudanese troops. They also discovered that bin Laden had invested in the plant, and several sources reported that the plant’s owner was a frontman for al Qaeda, whilst the manager of the plant lived in a house that had formerly been occupied by bin Laden. This evidence was far from being conclusive, but it was nevertheless consistent with what al Fadl was saying about al Qaeda and Sudanese cooperation on the development of CW.48 The US intelligence agencies also picked up hints about potential Iraqi involvement in CW development in Sudan. They received information that suggested that a Sudanese army officer, Colonel Abd al-Basit Hamza, who had previously worked with bin Laden’s al-Hijra construction company, managed a group of companies that were working on CW production. The programme was reportedly based in Khartoum and staffed by a team of 60 Iraqi scientists and technicians, led by a Dr Khalil Ibrahim Muharuhah.49 The US intelligence agencies clearly had doubts about the veracity of this report, because in 1998 a White House official stated that the US had no credible evidence that Iraq had exported WMD (weapons of mass destruction) technology to other countries.50 But even if this report was true, it did not prove a connection between Iraq and al Qaeda on CW, only that both were working on the Sudanese government’s CW programme. These reports indicate that the US was aware that al Qaeda was involved in CBRN weapon development activities from at last 1996, even though some of the details of those activities were unclear or uncorroborated. At the same time, the evolution of al Qaeda’s ideology to strike at the ‘far enemy’, its involvement in attacks on US forces in Somalia, the reports of possible linkages between Iraq and al Qaeda and

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the 1993 WTC bombing were all indicators of a major potential threat to US interests. Taken together, these developments represented the first indicators that al Qaeda might one day pose a significant CBRN threat to the US.

Al Qaeda Leaves Sudan By 1996, al Qaeda had reached a critical juncture in its development. It had finally settled on an ideology of attacking the ‘far enemy’, but it was on borrowed time in Sudan. The Sudanese regime had been resisting international pressure to stop its support for terrorist groups for some time, but by the mid-1990s that was beginning to change. The regime’s brand of Islamism was different from the international jihadism of al Qaeda, and it gradually came to view the presence of the international jihadis as a threat to what it wanted to achieve in Sudan. This made it more responsive to the political and economic pressure being applied by the US and the regional states that were being targeted by the terrorist groups that Sudan supported.51 From February 1996 representatives of the regime began secret discussions with the US about normalising relations. Recognising that al Qaeda’s position in Sudan was becoming increasingly untenable, bin Laden moved back to Afghanistan in mid 1996, leaving the Sudanese government to seize everything that he owned there.52 Among those who returned to Afghanistan with him were the key players in al Qaeda’s early efforts to acquire nuclear materials and CW: Mohammed Atef; Abu Rida al-Suri; and Mamdouh Salim. Yet al Qaeda was still a long way away from ever posing a significant CBRN threat to the US. Its efforts to acquire weapons and materials were opportunistic, it lacked skilled technicians and it had no weapon-development infrastructure. Equally, its strategic relationships with Sudan, Iran and Iraq had either broken down or were unlikely to yield access to CBRN weapons, technology or expertise.

CHAPTER 2 THE US AND THE POLITICS OF CBRN TERRORISM, 1996—8

Al Qaeda’s return to Afghanistan brought its initial CBRN activities to an end. To understand its next steps with regard to CBRN weapons, it is first necessary to examine the international political context in which it was operating in the mid- to late 1990s, and the political debates on the proliferation of WMD and CBRN terrorism that were taking place in the US. This political context was instrumental in shaping al Qaeda’s decision-making in respect of CBRN weapons and the response by successive US administrations to the al Qaeda threat. As al Qaeda was establishing itself in Sudan, the international security environment was still in the middle of a period of profound transformation following the end of the Cold War. In the new international security environment, emerging forces such as Militant Islamism were playing an increasingly significant role, and it was feared that regional conflicts would increase, as powerful regional states would gain more freedom to operate. In this new environment, the opportunities available for the proliferation of WMD were growing, including to states that were alleged to sponsor terrorism. The exposure of Iraq’s extensive WMD programme following the 1991 Gulf War provided conclusive evidence that the clandestine production of WMD was possible, despite the existence of international arms control treaties and export controls on sensitive technologies. Among the emerging risks at that time were a breakdown in the physical accounting and security measures protecting CBRN weapons and materials in successor states of

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the Soviet Union, the erosion of export controls on sensitive materials and technologies in those states and unemployed former Soviet WMD scientists who might hire out their services to the highest bidder. At the same time it was believed that the development of CBRN weapons was becoming increasingly easy for terrorist groups, due to rapid advances in technology and the increasing availability of dual-use technology and scientific expertise. In March 1995 these concerns were brought into sharp relief by the sarin attack on the Tokyo subway by the Aum Shinrikyo religious cult. Subsequent investigations showed that the cult had actually been responsible for at least 17 attacks using chemical and biological weapons (CBW), between 1990 and 1995. These incidents confirmed that sophisticated modern terrorist groups were increasingly capable of developing CBRN weapons. But whilst Aum Shinrikyo was the first non-state group ever, to possess both the capability to develop a WMD and the intent to use them, its campaign of CBW terrorism was a failure. Only two of its sarin attacks succeeded, but they only resulted in the deaths of 19 people, and it failed to acquire pathogenic strains of anthrax and botulinum, which meant that its biological weapons (BW) were ineffective.1 However, the Tokyo subway attack was spectacularly successful in one respect – generating propaganda.

CBRN Terrorism in Security Debates The risk of CBRN terrorism had been widely recognised in policy circles since the 1970s, but as news of the Tokyo subway attack reverberated around the world, it had an immediate impact in galvanising a public debate on the issue. In the US, it gave the threat a heightened political prominence, transforming what had previously been considered to be a potential threat into a clear and present danger. The key feature of this debate was how quickly the threat was blown completely out of proportion. The debate was dominated by alarmist and worst-case analysis, with the debate in the US in particular being dominated by apocalyptic visions of terrorist WMD attacks killing tens to hundreds of thousands of people. This spawned a whole new terminology of ‘super terrorism’, ‘catastrophic terrorism’, ‘ultimate terrorism’ and ‘ultraterrorism’.2 As analysts considered the potential risks, the starting point for many was a debate over whether there is a psychological distinction between

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using conventional weapons and using CBRN weapons. Some commentators suggested that, for terrorists willing to conduct indiscriminate attacks that caused large numbers of casualties, using CBRN weapons would only be a small escalatory step. In contrast, others suggested that within some societies, the use of CBRN weapons is psychologically different from the use of conventional weapons, for a number of closely interrelated reasons. CBRN weapons were considered to be different to other weapons because of their potentially higher destructive capacity. This is closely linked to the uniquely horrifying nature of the consequences of CBRN weapons, not only in terms of casualty levels but also because of the very nature of the deaths, injuries and contamination that they can cause. Whilst conventional weapons are capable of causing a large number of deaths and appalling injuries, the type of injuries and number of deaths that can potentially be caused by CBRN weapons of mass destruction (WMD) can far exceed the consequences of any conventional weapon. These two factors were considered by many to underpin a third factor: a deep-rooted societal taboo against the use of CBRN weapons within some cultures. This taboo is derived from a mixture of moral, religious, political and strategic considerations. These weapons are considered to be morally reprehensible, because societal values and moral norms dictate that even when violence is justified, it should to be proportionate. It was considered that the use of CBRN WMD would be a totally disproportionate response to virtually all acts of violence. In addition, the use of poison is often seen as unworthy of decent or heroic people, and is rather seen as the weapon of the weak and deceitful, something that is unnecessarily vicious and morally unacceptable.3 Terrorists generally seek to portray themselves as heroes of the people, and claim to hold the moral high ground against oppressive opponents, which suggests that they might avoid the use of CBRN weapons for those reasons. Yet societal taboos have always been challenged and broken. One of the reasons that the Tokyo subway attack was considered to be so important was because it was perceived to undermine this taboo.4 However, this notion of a societal taboo against the use of CBRN weapons was highly speculative and based on Western Christian moral and social values. Little consideration was given to whether it would be a factor for other groups from different cultural and religious backgrounds, such as al Qaeda.

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Following the Tokyo subway attack, the predominant view among commentators on security matters was that moral qualms would not prevent terrorists from using CBRN weapons. This fed into a wider analysis about the intentions of contemporary terrorist groups, which suggested that the increasing number of groups with religious-based ideologies were operating under fewer constraints than groups with secular ideologies. Because groups with religious-based ideologies consider themselves to be operating under divine sanction, they were generally considered to be uninterested in seeking support from either wider society or nation states, and to operate under no incentives to compromise.5 As a result, it was widely believed that they would be much more likely to use CBRN weapons. Alongside these assessments were developments in technology that made it potentially easier for terrorist groups to develop CBRN weapons. Increasing numbers of people across the world were being educated and trained in the basic scientific skills that could be used to develop CBRN weapons. Some of the necessary raw materials were also becoming increasingly easy to obtain. For example, a number of World War I-era chemical weapon (CW) agents, such as chlorine, cyanide and phosgene, had become standard industrial products. In addition, as technology progressed, new ways of developing some types of CBRN weapons were emerging, some of which were easier to master than the traditional ways.6 There was even debate about whether terrorist groups would even need to develop their own CBRN weapons. A number of proliferator states, including Sudan, Iraq, Iran and Libya, were known to be sponsors of terrorism, and there was considerable speculation about whether they might give CBRN weapons to the terrorist groups that they supported. None had ever done so before, but no-one could be certain that that would continue to be the case. Most of the states of concern were authoritarian regimes, and it was argued that it could not be guaranteed that irrational or hard-line regimes would continue to refrain from giving CBRN weapons to terrorist groups. Also, if those regimes were faced with being overthrown, they might be more likely to either use CBRN weapons themselves or give them to terrorist groups. However, a number of disincentives for states to give CBRN weapons to terrorist groups were also identified. These included fear of the inevitable military backlash from any state that the terrorists targeted, concerns

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about the international political repercussions and a desire to avoid those very same weapons being used against themselves one day. During the 1990s the disincentives to state-sponsored CBRN terrorism outweighed the motivations, but what could not be assessed was what factors might lead that situation to change.7 Between 1995 and 2001 it was widely accepted that it was not a matter of whether there would be a CBRN attack, but when.8 The prevailing attitude was summed up by former Director of the CIA John Deutch in 1996, when he declared that the ‘proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their potential use by states or terrorists is the most urgent challenge facing the national security, and therefore the intelligence community in the post-Cold War world’.9 Little mention was made of the technical, political, strategic, tactical and theological constrains under which terrorist groups have to operate, and which might inhibit them from escalating their violence to using CBRN weapons. In the 1970s the main focus had been on nuclear terrorism, which culminated in the convening of the International Task Force on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism in 1985.10 Chemical and biological terrorism was a much lower concern, despite the fact that CW are easier to develop than nuclear weapons. The threat of biological terrorism was downplayed because the use of BW was considered to be so morally repugnant that no-one would consider using them; the technology was too difficult for all but the most sophisticated laboratories to master; and the potential destructiveness of these weapons was simply too great for terrorists to consider using them.11 Concern about nuclear terrorism increased in the early 1990s when it became apparent that there was a haemorrhage of nuclear materials from insecure facilities in the successor states of the Soviet Union. However, al Qaeda’s experience in Sudan had demonstrated that acquiring genuine nuclear material from the black market was not as easy as people thought. In addition, the threat of CBW terrorism was also considered to have significantly increased. The huge growth of the biotechnology industry, coupled with the potential casualty levels that BW can cause, served to push BW terrorism to the forefront of concerns in the US. Writing in the respected journal Foreign Affairs in 1998, Richard Betts argued that ‘Biological Weapons should now be the most serious concern, with nuclear weapons second and chemicals a distant third’.12

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The key conclusions that emerged from the debate in the 1990s were that: groups with religious-based ideologies were more likely to use CBRN weapons than those with secular ideologies; developing CBRN WMD was becoming increasingly easy for terrorist groups; and these weapons could kill very large numbers of people. Three main types of terrorist group were considered to pose the greatest risk: religious cults, right-wing groups and Islamist groups. Analysis also tended to emphasise the increasing vulnerability of technologically dependent states to terrorist violence, overlooking the fact that states have always been vulnerable to terrorism. This new sense of vulnerability in the US was heightened by the fact that the traditional means of dealing with WMD threats through deterrence, arms control and political engagement were ineffective for dealing with these new threats. This fuelled some thoughtless and extravagant rhetoric, including from senior officials in the US Administration. During one interview with ABC news regarding the Iraq WMD programme in November 1997, Secretary of Defense William Cohen displayed a 5-lb bag of sugar and claimed that if it contained Bacillus anthracis spores and was spread over Washington, DC, half the population of the city would be killed.13 Others hypothesised about the likely wider political and societal consequences. In evidence to a Congressional subcommittee in 1988, one academic described a terrorist CBRN WMD incident as a transforming event that would have catastrophic effects on American society. He argued that aside from the actual physical effects and human suffering, the psychological impact would be enormous, shaking the nation’s trust and confidence in its government to its core.14 The nature of the rhetoric was so dramatic that CBRN terrorism became a feature in popular culture. Hollywood made a number of highprofile films on the subject, including The Peacemaker starring George Clooney and Nicole Kidman, and The Patriot starring Steven Seagal. It also provided good material for thriller writers, including Richard Preston, whose book The Cobra Event was about a BW attack on the US involving a genetically engineered virus. The narratives that were propagated in these films and novels only served to strengthen public perceptions about US vulnerability to terrorist CBRN attacks. This was reflected in a public opinion poll in 1997, which found that 33 per cent of respondents considered that terrorists posed the greatest nuclear

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threat to the US (compared to 9 per cent thinking it was Iran and 12 per cent thinking it was Iraq).15 But whilst the threat of CBRN terrorism was playing an increasingly high-profile role in US national security debates, al Qaeda was not publicly identified as a specific threat, because at that time it was still only a small and largely unknown group. However, it clearly fitted into the generic description of the type of group that was considered most likely to use CBRN weapons.

The Politicisation of the Threat As a result of the heightened public prominence of the debate, it inevitably became politicised. The threat was seized upon by both Republican and Democrat legislators, including Senator Richard Lugar, a former Chair of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Sam Nunn and Congressman Curt Weldon, Chair of the Research and Development subcommittee of the Committee on National Security. All three shared similar views, based on a worst-case analysis of the threat. In a statement to the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in 1996, Nunn declared: The scenario of a terrorist group either obtaining or manufacturing and using a weapon of mass destruction is no longer the stuff of science fiction or even adventure movies. It is a reality which has come to pass and one which, if we do not take appropriate measures, will increasingly threaten us in the future.16 Similarly in 1997, Weldon proclaimed that the mere possibility that terrorists or rogue states may have acquired Russian nuclear weapons should be a matter of the gravest concern to the governments of the West.17 Lugar made perhaps the most alarmist claim when he argued that ‘from the tragedies of Oklahoma City and the World Trade Centre to the first act of nuclear terrorism requires but one small step’.18 Lugar was wrong, because it would actually require a huge technological leap to perpetrate an act of nuclear terrorism, a leap that no terrorist group at that time was capable of making. Nevertheless, there was increasingly strong political pressure for action to address the perceived threat. In 1997 Nunn declared that:

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the threat of terrorist attack on American cities involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons has reached a point where a bold and vigorous effort is required. This is a clear and present danger to the American people that requires a timely response.19 In 1999 Lugar even invested a considerable amount of money in a series of four TV commercials warning of the threat from nuclear terrorism, as part of his campaign to secure the Republican presidential nomination.20 The fact that he felt that this was an electoral issue is indicative of the level to which the threat had permeated political debates and the US public consciousness. This alarmist view of the threat led to CBRN defence becoming one of the cornerstones of both the Congress’ and the Clinton Administration’s national security agendas. When William Cohen was nominated to be Secretary of Defense in 1995, he declared that WMD terrorism would present the main strategic threat for the US in the twenty-first century.21 This led to a strong policy response from the Clinton Administration. In June 1995, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), ‘US policy on counterterrorism’, which stated that: The development of effective capabilities for preventing and managing the consequences of terrorist use of nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) materials or weapons is the highest priority. Terrorist acquisition of weapons of mass destruction is not acceptable and there is no higher priority than preventing the acquisition of such materials/weapons or removing this capability from terrorist groups.22 PDD-39 set the tone for a continued focus by the Administration on CBRN terrorism. At the G7 summit in Lyons in 1996, the US joined the other members of the G7 in issuing a communique on terrorism that reiterated the shared conviction of the G7 states that terrorism was a major challenge to all societies and states. The communique´ confirmed that the G7 considered the fight against terrorism to be an absolute priority, and noted that special attention needed to be paid to the threat of the utilisation of nuclear, biological and chemical materials, as well as

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toxic substances, for terrorist purposes.23 This was reflected in the much more significant role in international politics played by the threat. In terms of bilateral relationships, the US continued to engage with the successor states of the Soviet Union in programmes to secure CBRN weapons and materials. It also became an increasing feature in multinational diplomacy, through its interconnections with nonproliferation and broader security debates. It was not until 1998 that the Clinton Administration introduced a range of new countermeasures at national level. One of the catalysts for this renewed action was a 1997 Department of Defense report, in which Cohen argued that ‘a lone madman or nest of fanatics with a bottle of chemicals, a batch of plague-inducing bacteria, or a crude nuclear bomb can threaten or kill tens of thousands of people in a single act of malevolence’.24 Another, more surprising, catalyst was Richard Preston’s novel The Cobra Event. President Clinton read the book, and was so alarmed by what he had read that he ordered an intelligence analysis of it.25 As part of that work, officials tested US preparedness to deal with an incident similar to that described in the book. In March 1998, officials conducted an exercise based on a scenario in which terrorists dispersed a genetically modified BW that was resistant to known vaccines along the Mexico–US border. It was hardly surprising that as the exercise unfolded, state and local officials were quickly overwhelmed by the sheer number of casualties, and huge gaps were discovered in logistics and the availability of medical care.26 No terrorist group has ever displayed the technological capability to develop such a BW, yet the validity of using such an extreme scenario was not questioned. The findings from the exercise helped to inform the development of two further Presidential Decision Directives. In May 1998, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 62 (PDD-62), ‘Protection against unconventional threats to the homeland and Americans overseas’ and Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63), ‘Critical infrastructure protection’. PDD 62 stated that ‘[i]t is increasingly likely that terrorist groups, or individuals with criminal intent, may use unconventional methods to disrupt the Nation’s critical infrastructure or use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against our citizens’, whilst PDD-63 provided for the appointment of a National Coordinator responsible for critical

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infrastructure, foreign terrorism and threats of domestic mass destruction (including BW).27 These themes were re-iterated in the Administration’s 1998 National Security Strategy for a New Century, which stated that: weapons of mass destruction pose the greatest potential threat to global stability and security. Proliferation of advanced weapons and technologies threatens to provide rogue states, terrorists and international crime organizations the means to inflict terrible damage on the United States, its allies and US citizens and troops abroad.28 Among the policies that emerged from these directives and the strategy was an increase in spending on bio-defence measures.29 President Clinton later went even further by issuing a secret Presidential Decision Directive authorising the US Army’s Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) to operate on US soil in counter terror operations and to confront WMD threats, circumventing the Posse Comitatus Act, which explicitly prohibits the US military from conducting law enforcement activities inside the US.30 In the late 1990s plans were also developed for JSOC to deploy anywhere in the world to recover sensitive CBRN materials in the hands of terrorist groups, and to infiltrate rogue countries to obtain evidence of secret WMD programmes and to detect, disarm, disable or seize WMD.31 But despite its evident concern about the threat, the Administration did not attempt to exploit it for wider political purposes. This was particularly apparent in its policy towards Iraq between 1997 and 1998, when Saddam Hussein expelled UN weapon inspectors who were monitoring Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions requiring it to dismantle its CBRN weapons programme. A protracted game of brinkmanship over the weapons inspections reached its peak in October 1988, when the US and UK threatened to use airstrikes to bring Iraq back into compliance. The public debate on CBRN terrorism in the mid-1990s had highlighted state sponsorship of CBRN terrorism as a potential risk. Iraq was a known sponsor of terrorism, so it would have been a relatively easy step for the US and UK to use the risk that Iraq might help terrorist groups acquire CBRN terrorism as part of the case they were making for airstrikes, but neither did so. Instead, they built

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the case for airstrikes squarely on Iraq’s threat to regional stability and its breach of UN Resolutions, and on that basis the two countries launched a limited series of airstrikes against Iraq.32 CBRN terrorism was an issue which transcended political boundaries in the US, making it one of the few policy areas on which President Clinton received support from Congress, which was dominated by Republicans at that time. In turn, activist legislators ensured that the Administration was subjected to continued political pressure to address the threat, including through high-profile publicity stunts. One such stunt, sponsored by Curt Weldon, involved the US Marine Corps’ CBRN incident response force conducting an exercise on Capitol Hill, with the avowed aim of influencing Congress to approve funding for more equipment for firefighters and the Marine Corps.33 Legislators readily agreed to the budgetary demands to strengthen CBRN terrorism countermeasures. This was partly because they did not want to be held responsible for inadequate response capabilities should an attack actually occur, but also because the allocation of hundreds of millions of dollars to CBRN terrorism-related programmes made it the latest ‘pork barrel’ issue in US politics. By 2001, the US was spending billions of dollars on measures to protect against CBW terrorism, ranging from assistance to local governments in planning for an attack, to disease-surveillance systems.34 Some critics argued that funding decisions were being made based on fear and perceived vulnerability, rather than a rational assessment of the threat. They pointed out that the sudden investment of significant additional resources, before an adequate foundation plan had been established, merely led to duplication and waste.35 But they had little influence over the dominant narrative that there was an imminent threat and that countermeasures urgently needed to be put in place. The debate soon become self-sustaining, fuelled in part by further government studies and exercises to test and develop response capabilities. A 1997 US Department of Defense, Defense Science Board report concluded that there was evidence that the transnational terrorist threat would escalate into the greater use of WMD. It stated that CBW are relatively easy to obtain (compared to nuclear weapons), potential users do not need access to large and expensive facilities to achieve potent capabilities, they can be developed and produced in laboratory or small-scale industrial facilities, their lethality means that

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small quantities can be very effective and they can be delivered by a variety of means. It went on to add that ‘[a] few kilograms of a biological agent could threaten an entire city’. These assumptions were reminiscent of some of the alarmist thinking that permeated academic and media analysis of the threat at that time. In particular, it grossly underplayed the difficulties of developing CBW, and what the reference to threatening an entire city actually meant was unclear.36 US governmental emergency planning also proceeded on the basis of worst-case scenarios, yet no-one seriously questioned the efficacy of the assumptions underpinning those scenarios. Unsurprisingly, exercises showed significant shortcoming in the US’s capabilities to prevent and manage terrorist CBRN incidents. The resultant negative publicity only served to heighten public concern, giving legislators additional levers for putting political pressure on the Administration. This tendency to work on worst-case assumptions persisted into the twenty-first century. The Dark Winter exercise in 2001 used a scenario involving aerosolised smallpox, in which the person-to-person transmission rate was 10, over three times the historic average of three. Similarly, the 2005 Atlantic Storm exercise made gross assumptions about the ease of producing and disseminating a dry powder smallpox preparation. Given that neither the US nor the Soviet BW programmes ever succeeded in manufacturing such a preparation, it was highly unlikely that a terrorist group could.37 The high profile accorded to the potential threat and the emphasis on worst-case scenarios was also a consequence of the dynamics that operated within the US bureaucracy at that time. With the budgets of many of the agencies concerned with national security issues being cut in the post-Cold War world, they sought new ways to maintain their funding base. In particular, the nuclear weapons laboratories needed to secure their future following reductions in nuclear arsenals and other post-Cold War arms control agreements that had greatly reduced their traditional areas of work. Establishing a role for themselves in programmes to combat the threat of CBRN terrorism became the latest issue over which various departments, agencies and other bodies could compete for funding.38 As a result of the large number of agencies attempting to enhance their role in this field, there was a significant amount of duplication as bureaucratic turf battles were fought to determine areas of responsibility in order to seize bigger slices of the funding cake. One consequence was

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that Hazardous Materials Response Teams were established by the National Guard, the FBI, the army, the US Marine Corps and scores of local police and fire departments.39 Similarly, the FBI sought to build a multimillion-dollar biolab, despite the fact that the US army and the Centers for Disease Control already had more than a dozen such facilities.40 As the different agencies competed for resources by highlighting inadequacies in their capabilities for dealing with the threat, they simply exacerbated concerns about the threat. The same was also true of commercial companies, which quickly identified a lucrative market for their products. In one instance, two members of a scientific panel who endorsed a plan to stockpile BW vaccines stood to gain financially from its implementation. Whilst Admiral William Crowe, the former Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who was a strong advocate for establishing effective counter-terrorism programmes, was linked to Michigan Biologic Products, which was the sole US manufacturer of an anthrax vaccine. As a result, there was a range of influential actors with a vested interest in emphasising the worst-case analysis of the threat.41 As one cynical observer put it at the time: ‘The rising din about bioterrorism in the US is dominated by one faction – people who say the problem exists, and they should be trusted to deal with it.’42 The influence of these actors invariably increased the difficulty of reaching a reasoned analysis of the potential threat and how to respond to it. As a result, the dominant narrative within US politics was that CBRN terrorism had become inevitable. In January 1999, President Clinton stated that the US would be subject to a terrorist attack involving chemical or biological weapons within the next few years,43 whilst Secretary of Defense William Cohen stated that ‘the question is no longer if this will happen, but when’.44 But at the domestic level, this politicisation of the issue was largely a US phenomenon. In other states it had a significantly lower political profile. Governments in countries such as the UK deliberately tried to avoid discussing the threat, in order to keep it out of domestic politics, whilst countries like Israel faced more immediate terrorism concerns, such as suicide bombers.45

Intelligence Assessments of the Threat Following the Aum attacks, the collection of intelligence on the spread of WMD to subnational groups became a high priority for US and

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Western intelligence agencies. However, the CIA was unable to provide categorical assurances that it knew everything that was going on in the field of CBRN terrorism. Even ascertaining the intentions of small terrorist cells and groups proved to be extremely difficult, let alone identifying whether any of them were actively engaged in trying to acquire CBRN weapons.46 Nevertheless, during the 1990s both the US and UK intelligence agencies did proffer some broad assessments of the generic threat. Assessments of the threat by the UK intelligence agencies were noticeably sanguine. A constant feature of assessments by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in this period was that conventional weapons were better suited than CBRN weapons for most terrorist purposes. In 1992, in its first assessment of the generic threat, the JIC emphasised the disincentives to using CBRN weapons. It assessed that terrorists might be deterred from using CBRN weapons by a number of factors. These included the danger to their own members of handling toxic materials, the risk of alienating their own supporters and wider public opinion, or even concerns that using CBRN weapons might lead to an international backlash against their group. In contrast, it noted that conventional weapons are cheaper, easier to procure and offer equal or greater effectiveness against traditional targets.47 In a further assessment in 1994, the JIC assessed that despite the availability of nuclear materials from the successor states of the Soviet Union, terrorists would still not be able to acquire a nuclear weapon, and that an attack using a radiological weapon was possible but unlikely. Attacks involving chemical or biological agents were also assessed to be unlikely, but the use of toxic chemical substances remained a possibility. In 1995, the JIC provided an assessment of the threat posed by Islamist extremists but considered it almost exclusively in terms of suicide attacks.48 The broad conclusions by the JIC remained unchanged throughout 1996, although it did note that the Aum attacks would have heightened terrorist interest in CBRN weapons.49 In contrast, intelligence assessments in the US were significantly more risk averse. In 1996, the CIA assessed that there was potential for nuclear terrorism from a range of non-state actors, such as separatist and terrorist groups, criminal organisations and individual thieves, who might choose to further their cause by using nuclear materials. It identified a particular threat in a new breed of multinational terrorists,

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exemplified by the cell that carried out the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, who were part of a loose association of Islamist militants, apparently motivated by revenge, religious fervour and a general hatred of the West.50 Overall, it viewed the CW threat as being the most likely, followed by BW, with nuclear the least likely threat to emerge.51 By 1998, the CIA had revised that assessment slightly. In testimony to the House National Security committee, the Director of the CIA, R. James Woolsey, argued that WMD terrorism was the number one threat to US national security, and that BW were the most troubling threat because they are more easily constructed than nuclear weapons and the raw materials for some of the most dangerous types, such as anthrax, were readily available. Coupled with these capabilities, he also highlighted the fact that many contemporary terrorist groups were not interested in negotiations, which created a radically new threat.52 These assessments were used to inform the implementation of counterterrorism measures at potential target sites. In 2001 the Director of the World Trade Center reported that ‘[w]hat the security people and others were telling us was that the threat was chem-bio . . . We felt this was the coming wave’. He responded by purchasing protective suits and training programmes for his security personnel.53 By 1998 neither the US nor the UK intelligence agencies had specifically identified al Qaeda as a threat in respect of CBRN terrorism, although it fitted the CIA’s generic description of the type of group most likely to engage in CBRN terrorism. This was reflected in the political debate, which largely focused on the generic threat of CBRN terrorism. For al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, the politicisation of CBRN terrorism illustrated two things: firstly, that this was a threat that the US feared; and secondly, that CBRN weapons and threats had a political value that could potentially be exploited. Bin Laden and his senior associates were acutely aware of the political dimension of their jihad, and that it had been political factors that had led to the Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan and the US withdrawals from Beirut in 1983 and Somalia in 1994. For al Qaeda, these factors would have a significant influence in shaping its future decision-making with regard to CBRN weapons, whilst for successive US administrations, the politicisation of the threat made decision-making on dealing with it extremely risk averse.

CHAPTER 3 ANTECEDENTS: AFGHANISTAN, 1996—8

When bin Laden and his associates arrived back in Afghanistan in 1996, the Taliban allowed them the freedom to build up al Qaeda’s recruitment, training and logistics infrastructure inside the country. They set about establishing a network of about a dozen camps, at least four of which were used for terrorist training.1 One of these camps was located at Darunta, approximately 15 miles outside of the city of Jelalabad. Darunta was a former Soviet military base situated beside a dam on the banks of the Kabul river, just metres away from the main road from Pakistan to Kabul. Another major camp was located at Turnak Farms, a sprawling former military site adjacent to Kandahar airport. It was al Qaeda’s principal training and military base in southern Afghanistan, comprising about 80 concrete or mud brick buildings, surrounded by a 10 ft-high wall. At the height of its operations, Turnak Farms was capable of housing 1,800 fighters. As he had done in Sudan, bin Laden also set up a series of businesses to generate income and provide cover for the procurement of explosives, weapons and chemicals.2 Al Qaeda publicly announced its new strategy of attacking the ‘far enemy’, in its 1996 fatwa, ‘A declaration of war against the Americans occupying the land of the two holy places’, which set out the network’s objectives and methodology. It stated that ‘[i]t is a duty on every tribe in the Arab peninsula to fight jihad and cleanse the land from these occupiers’. While bin Laden’s short-term objectives were focused on Saudi Arabia, his broader aim was to bring an end to what he saw as the

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repression of the Islamic world by the hypocritical governments of the ‘Crusader-Zionist alliance’, which was supporting and manipulating Muslim regimes across the Middle East. He argued that the reason for the problems and humiliation currently being experienced by the Muslim world was that they had allowed the holy places (including the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem) to be occupied, contrary to the will of Allah.3 The fatwa also outlined the means by which al Qaeda would achieve these objectives. It acknowledged the imbalance of military force between al Qaeda and its enemies, but stated that this would be redressed by using ‘fast moving light forces that work under complete secrecy’. These forces would ‘hit the aggressor with an iron fist . . . re-establish the normal course and give the people their rights’.4 He called for a vanguard of Muslims who would be prepared to martyr themselves to come forward to form these forces.5 But whilst identifying the US and Israel as targets, the declaration says little about the specific tactics or weapons that the vanguard would employ. There was no indication of whether they would attack US civilians or the US mainland, let alone conduct indiscriminate mass-casualty attacks, and it made no reference whatsoever to CBRN weapons. Setting weapons and tactics aside, al Qaeda’s first problem was how it could mobilise the vanguard from its remote headquarters in Afghanistan. The international media provided a vehicle through which it could disseminate its ideology and propaganda, but words had to be backed up by deeds in order to achieve widespread coverage. Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) had previously demonstrated the power that a single powerful strike against the right target could have, with the assassination of President Sadat of Egypt. Such a strike would generate enormous publicity, bring in more recruits and inspire further attacks. Bin Laden recognised this when he stated in 1996 that: If we wanted small actions, the matter would have easily been carried out immediately after the [August 1996] statement. [But] the nature of the battle calls for operations of a specific type that will make an impact on the enemy, and this calls for excellent preparations.6 The politicisation of CBRN terrorism in the US during the mid-1990s meant that CBRN weapons were exactly the sort of weapon that might

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deliver the impact that bin Laden sought. Therefore bin Laden’s strategic vision could potentially have strengthened the position of those elements among the al Qaeda leadership who favoured the acquisition of CBRN weapons, but at that stage the al Qaeda leadership did not seem to have recognised the role that CBRN weapons were playing in US national security debates. In February 1998 al Qaeda issued a further statement, announcing the creation of the World Islamic Front. The statement contained a fatwa that declared that: the killing of Americans and their civilian and military allies is a religious duty for each and every Muslim to be carried out in whichever country they are until Al Aqsa mosque has been liberated from their grasp and until their armies have left Muslim lands.7 This was the first explicit reference to the killing of civilians being part of al Qaeda’s strategy, although it did not explicitly call for indiscriminate mass-casualty attacks. The following month, in an interview with the Pakistani newspaper Islamabad Al-Akhbar, he went even further by announcing that ‘[t]he United States is the biggest terrorist and rogue and it is the duty of every Muslim to struggle for its annihilation’.8 During an interview with ABC News several months later, bin Laden clarified the principles underpinning al Qaeda’s strategy. He re-iterated that civilians were legitimate targets, but also declared that: The Americans started it and retaliation and punishment should be carried out following the principle of reciprocity . . . America has no religion that can deter her from exterminating whole peoples . . . Nothing could stop you except perhaps retaliation in kind.9 This statement shows that bin Laden believed that al Qaeda possessed the right to retaliate against the US, but it also suggests that he believed in the concept of deterrence. CBRN weapons were not mentioned in either the 1996 or 1998 fatwas, nor did bin Laden mention them during the ABC interview, but the reference to needing a capability to exterminate a whole people in order to deter US aggression can be seen to establish an imperative for al Qaeda to acquire CBRN WMD.

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At the same time, al Qaeda was anxious to develop links with potentially helpful governments, and attempted to resurrect its contacts with Iraq. In early 1998 bin Laden sent Abu Hafs al-Mauritani, the head of al Qaeda’s sharia committee, to Baghdad to ask President Saddam Hussein if he would provide $10 million to fund al Qaeda attacks against the West. But Saddam flatly refused to meet him. He was more interested in re-establishing ties with Saudi Arabia and other Middle East regimes than in building relationships with al Qaeda, and remained distrustful of bin Laden, because he had referred to Saddam as an unbeliever.10 This denied al Qaeda its most likely source of state support should it ever try to develop CBRN weapons.

The Development of Al Qaeda’s Strategy and Tactics Bin Laden believed that the US would only be able to withstand two or three powerful attacks before caving in to al Qaeda’s demands. This view was shared by some of his Saudi followers who had previously visited the US. Other members of the leadership, though, were not so sure. As evidence, bin Laden cited the bombing of two hotels in Yemen during 1992, which had forced the US to change its plans for using Yemen as a supply base for ‘Operation Restore Hope’ in Somalia.11 The question for al Qaeda was where, and how, to deliver those attacks. At that time, jihadis in Afghanistan were formulating strategies and tactics, and codifying them in training manuals. One training manual, titled ‘Military studies in the jihad against the tyrants’, lists bloodshed and mass murder as ideal characteristics for warriors, and states that an Islamic state cannot be created except by war. It identifies a number of specific tactics for Islamist terror cells including: kidnapping and assassinating enemy personnel and foreign tourists; freeing captured fighters; destroying places of amusement, immorality and sin; destroying embassies and vital economic centres; and destroying bridges leading into and out of cities.12 In a similar vein, the manual of Afghan Jihad states that: There must be plans in place for hitting buildings with high human intensity like skyscrapers, ports, airports, nuclear power plants and places where large numbers of people gather such as football grounds . . . The choice of targets should be as follows . . .

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like the statue of Liberty in New York, Big Ben tower . . . in other words, hitting museums and monuments which have sentimental value. It also identifies Jews as targets: ‘In every country we should hit their organizations, institutions, clubs and hospitals . . . the targets must be identified, carefully chosen and include their largest gatherings so that any strike should cause thousands of deaths.’ A chapter on external pressure states that ‘[t]he strikes must be strong and have a wide impact on that nation . . . Four targets must be simultaneously hit. In any of those nations so that the government knows that we are serious.’13 These manuals indicated that whilst economic, military and political targets featured prominently in al Qaeda’s target set, it also sought to target civilians. The rationale for this was summarised by Ayman al-Zawahiri: The mujahid Islamic movement must escalate its methods of strikes and tools of resisting the enemies to keep up with the tremendous increase in the number of its enemies, the quality of their weapons, their destructive powers, their disregard for all taboos, and disrespect for the customs of wars and conflicts. In this regard we concentrate on the following: the need to inflict maximum casualties against the opponent, for this is the language understood by the West.14 Numerous targets were of interest to al Qaeda; the question that its operational planners needed to decide was what weapons were best suited, or most appropriate, for attacking those targets. CBRN weapons can potentially be used to attack a variety of different types of target, and were also capable of delivering the big attacks that bin Laden believed were necessary to defeat the US. But given that it did not have CBRN weapons, for its first major attack against a US target it reverted to a tried and trusted method – the truck bomb.

The Attacks on the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania On 7 August 1998 al Qaeda suicide bombers driving truck bombs attacked the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The attack in

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Nairobi killed 213 people, mostly Kenyan civilians, and injured 4,500. The attack was timed to coincide with the bombing of the US embassy in Dar es Salaam, which killed 11. The attacks had been meticulously planned and professionally executed, demonstrating that al Qaeda was capable of mounting sophisticated transnational operations. The embassies were political targets; however, the large number of civilian casualties indicated that al Qaeda was prepared to accept high levels of indiscriminate civilian casualties in attacking their intended targets. In an interview after the bombings, bin Laden insisted that the need to attack the US excused the killing of innocent civilians, be they Muslim or non-Muslim.15 Since Kenya was a US ally, the casualties were in any event justifiable according to the terms of al Qaeda’s February 1998 fatwa. The bombings propelled al Qaeda into the centre of the political debate in the US about CBRN terrorism. The bombings were seen as one of four seminal attacks (alongside the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo attacks and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing), which were interpreted by many commentators as evidence that terrorists were prepared to use CBRN weapons for indiscriminate mass-casualty attacks. The bombings, coupled with bin Laden’s rhetoric about annihilating the US and civilians being legitimate targets, were also taken by many commentators to support the dominant narrative in the political debate on CBRN terrorism, that terrorists with religiousbased ideologies were focused on perpetrating indiscriminate masscasualty attacks. The bombings therefore created a widespread perception in the West that al Qaeda was intent on perpetrating further mass-casualty attacks and would use CBRN WMD in a first strike attack against the US, if it could acquire them. The consensus view was that al Qaeda was not inhibited by some of the moral constraints that other terrorist groups operated under because it justified its actions theologically. Nor was it concerned about the risk of losing the support of state sponsors, because it had none. Similarly, it was unconcerned about alienating popular opinion in the Muslim world, because it justified its actions theologically. Nor did it fear the risks associated with escalating the level of violence it employed, because it already believed that it was in an all-out war with the West. To many commentators CBRN weapons offered al Qaeda significant advantages in terms of their potential

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destructive power and terror effects, and fitted with its modus operandi of high-profile, high-casualty attacks. But in reaching these judgements, commentators and politicians tended to overlook the fact that the embassies were political targets, that the bombings had political objectives and that the large number of African civilian casualties was unintended. In addition, the attacks had demonstrated that al Qaeda was able to achieve its objectives by using conventional weapons, so there was no incentive arising from the attacks themselves for it to escalate to using CBRN weapons. To the US government the attacks on the embassies were a turning point. No other terrorist group had previously shown the kind of skills that were evident in the coordinated destruction of two embassies hundreds of miles apart. It deepened the sense among government officials that the practice of terrorism had changed in important ways. Al Qaeda moved straight to the top of the list of terrorist threats to America. As result, the Clinton Administration decided that it was imperative to disrupt al Qaeda’s operations and preempt future attacks.16 This shift in policy was given added urgency by intelligence reports that indicated al Qaeda was seeking to acquire CBRN weapons. The testimony of Jamal al Fadl and other sources had provided the US intelligence agencies with information about al Qaeda’s efforts to develop CBRN weapons whilst it was based in Sudan, and some sources even provided indications that it might still be linked to CBRN activities in Sudan. In August 1998 a CIA report stated that al Qaeda had obtained chemical or nuclear material and ‘might be ready’ to conduct a CW attack.17 That same month a small group of advisers met President Clinton and presented him with evidence that al Qaeda was actively seeking to acquire CBW to use against US installations.18 Significantly, these reports suggested that al Qaeda would use CBRN weapons in a first strike against US targets. In the immediate aftermath of the embassy bombings, and lacking any information to the contrary, it was a logical conclusion to draw. As a consequence of the embassy bombings and additional reports that al Qaeda was planning more attacks, the Administration ordered preparations for a cruise missile strike against al Qaeda.19 The primary target was the al Qaeda leadership, particularly bin Laden, and the secondary target was al Qaeda’s infrastructure. In preparation for the

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attacks the US intelligence services provided details of everything they knew about a large number of suspect sites in both Afghanistan and Sudan. This information was reviewed by military planners and senior decision-makers to select potential targets. As they hurriedly worked up a target list, US intelligence agencies reviewed the information that they had obtained about al Qaeda’s CBRN activities in Sudan. During this process their attention was drawn to the Shifa pharmaceutical plant. In March 1998, the plant had been bought by Salah Idris, an advisor to the largest bank in Saudi Arabia. The US intelligence agencies obtained new, but not fully evaluated, evidence of financial links between bin Laden and Idris, and they also obtained evidence linking bin Laden to Osman Suleiman, the manager of the plant. This information was tenuous, but grew stronger over time. There was also evidence of links between Idris and Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and evidence that Idris had financial holdings in a company that was 40 per cent owned by the Sudanese Military Industrial Corporation, which controlled Sudan’s CW development programme. The belief among US intelligence analysts that Shifa was involved in a CW programme intensified in 1998, when an agent working for the CIA collected soil samples from a number of suspicious sites in Sudan, including Shifa. The samples were tested at a commercial laboratory, and a sample from Shifa was found to contain traces of O-ethyl methylphosphonothioic acid, or Empta. This chemical has a small number of potential commercial applications but can also be used in the production of VX nerve agent. The CIA concluded that there was no other reason for the chemical to be present in the quantity demonstrated in the soil sample except in connection with the production of VX. However, the intelligence did not show what role, if any, Shifa might have played in the purported VX programme. In addition, it neither pointed to any specific plans by al Qaeda to use CW nor did it refute the fact that the plant manufactured pharmaceuticals. Nevertheless, it did suggest that Shifa was involved in some capacity, in a CW programme. Experience had shown that CW programmes in other countries, such as Iraq, often made use of dual-use facilities, so the fact that Shifa manufactured pharmaceuticals was not in itself sufficient evidence to refute the allegations that it was involved in a VX programme. One possible explanation was that at some time or another a quantity of Empta had been either produced or stored at Shifa, or else transported through it.

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By 1998 some elements of the US intelligence community firmly believed that al Qaeda had acquired CW, and the discovery of Empta at Shifa was the smoking gun that enabled them to firm up their assessments. The potential linkage between Shifa and VX also correlated with intelligence on al Qaeda’s links to Iraq. The US intelligence agencies had received anecdotal reports of the tentative contacts between al Qaeda and Iraq during al Qaeda’s time in Sudan. Their initial assessment of those contacts had been broadly accurate, but the findings at Shifa suggested that there might be a much deeper link. VX is difficult to develop, and probably beyond the limited technological and industrial capabilities of Sudan. The discovery of Empta therefore raised suspicions that a more technologically advanced state was involved in the Sudanese CW programme. US officials noted that Iraq was the only country known to have produced VX using Empta, and the US intelligence agencies were able to monitor contacts between officials from Shifa and Dr Emad al-Ani, who has been identified as ‘the father of Iraq’s VX programme’. This was consistent with the finding from a 1998 Congressional task force report that concluded that Iraq had relocated its WMD assets to the Sudan, Yemen, Libya and Algeria, although Shifa was not among the facilities identified in the report. Whilst these reports did not explicitly link Iraq with al Qaeda, they nevertheless made an implicit link. However, there were profound differences of opinion within the US intelligence community about the involvement of Shifa in a CW programme. Two days before the planned missile strikes, staff of the Counter Terrorism Security Group in the National Security Council (NSC), wrote that al Qaeda ‘has invested in and almost certainly has access to VX produced at a plant in Sudan’.20 However, Mary McCarthy, the senior NSC Director responsible for intelligence programmes, counselled caution, arguing that much better intelligence was needed before acting and that the link between bin Laden and Shifa was uncertain. But President Clinton’s National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger, was more concerned about the risk of what might happen if the US did not attack Shifa and nerve gas was subsequently used to attack the New York subway. This debate illustrates the high degree of risk aversion among senior decision-makers when it came to matters of CBRN terrorism. Berger in particular, reportedly felt no sense of constraint over the use of force against al Qaeda.21

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As planning for the cruise missile strikes proceeded, some of those within the small circle of officials who knew of the plans began to have doubts about the wisdom of targeting Shifa. The intelligence was far from being conclusive, but the perception that al Qaeda posed a clear and present danger was sufficient to override these concerns. The President’s closest advisers unanimously recommended that Shifa should be attacked. Based on their advice, President Clinton authorised Operation Infinite Reach, to take place on 20 August 1998. The targets of the cruise missile strikes were Shifa and four militant training camps in Afghanistan. One of the express objectives of the attacks was to kill bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders, after intelligence was received that he would be attending a meeting at the Zhawar Kili al-Badr training camp. In the event, the meeting at the Zhawar Kili al-Badr camp had been cancelled following the arrest of a senior al Qaeda member, so no senior al Qaeda figures were present when the camp was attacked, but the Shifa factory was successfully destroyed. The basic nature of the al Qaeda training camps meant that they could be rebuilt relatively easily. The missile strikes therefore caused no lasting damage to al Qaeda’s infrastructure in Afghanistan. This left the destruction of Shifa as the single most successful element of the operation.

The Decision to Start a CBRN Programme For al Qaeda, the attack on Shifa was probably the most surprising aspect of Operation Infinite Reach. That the US had singled out the plant for attack indicated just how seriously it took the threat of CBRN terrorism. Mohammed Atef and Ayman al-Zawahiri had already recognised the prominent role that CBRN terrorism played in Western security debates. They noted the repeated concerns that were being expressed about the threat, as well as the arguments being made at that time about how easily CBRN weapons could be manufactured and the ability of these weapons to kill large numbers of people.22 Among the media reports that came to their attention was US Secretary of Defense William Cohen’s TV appearance in November 1997 in which he brandished a 5-lb bag of sugar and claimed that if it contained spores of Bacillus anthracis and was spread over Washington, DC, half the population of the city would be killed.23

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During a series of meetings at Tora Bora in the late 1990s, the al Qaeda shura discussed the acquisition and use of CBRN weapons. During these discussions there was a consensus on the gravity and sensitivity of the issue, but divisions soon emerged between hardliners, such as Mohammed Atef, and others who favoured a more moderate approach.24 The hardliners argued that the US was a dishonest and ruthless adversary, which would show no compassion and would only retreat if faced by a strong opponent. They believed that al Qaeda needed to acquire WMD in order to counterbalance US military power, and that they should be used on the territory of the US and its allies. They acknowledged that this would inevitably cause civilian casualties, but argued that civilian casualties had become an inevitable feature of modern warfare. They noted that most of the victims of World War II had been civilians who were deliberately targeted by the warring armies, and that the nuclear weapons that the US dropped on Japan were dropped on cities rather than military targets. These views were challenged by the more moderate elements, who argued that every battle should be placed in its particular geographical domain. For instance, the battle for Palestine should be fought in Palestine and the battle for Afghanistan should be fought in Afghanistan. They argued that confining a battle to its particular geographical domain would help al Qaeda gain international support. They also feared that using WMD inside the US would make the US Administration much more inclined to take strong military action in retaliation. The hardliners rejected these views, arguing that the US and its allies were already implacably opposed to Islam, and that the US, Israel and the West were already perpetrating genocide against Muslims. The moderates noted that the mujahideen were only capable of producing primitive CBRN weapons that could not match US WMD, and feared that the US might use WMD against civilians in retaliation if al Qaeda used or threatened to use CBRN weapons. But the hardliners responded that that was already happening. They singled out Iraq, where they claimed that over 2 million Iraqi civilians had been killed by the US and UK. They noted that this exceeded the casualties that could have been caused by four of the nuclear weapons that had been dropped on Hiroshima in 1945, and the area of land in Iraq that had contaminated with radioactivity (from depleted uranium shells) was double that of

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Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They believed that nuclear weapons were so powerful that the US wanted to generate a belief among Muslims that their use was so sensitive that they would be self-deterred from seeking to acquire and use them. Despite the inherently political nature of CBRN threats, the debate within the shura was framed almost entirely in terms of whether al Qaeda should use CBRN weapons operationally, and there was little appreciation of their potential use for deterrence. This was consistent with the views of the Western commentators who believed that al Qaeda would seek to acquire CBRN weapons for first strike, masscasualty attacks. However, the moderate elements in the debate highlighted the potential political costs of using CBRN weapons against the US. This was a position that Western commentators had not anticipated. Significantly, these political concerns would remain prevalent in al Qaeda thinking regarding CBRN weapons over the following two decades. Bin Laden himself disagreed with the use of CBRN weapons, but did not declare his views in the shura, probably because of a desire to avoid creating irrevocable rifts, particularly with Atef. He therefore fudged the issue, claiming that he was unsure about the strategy for using CBRN weapons and that a decision should be postponed until al Qaeda had actually acquired CBRN weapons. The exact reasons for his reticence remain unknown, but his position reflected that of the moderates, therefore he might also have been concerned about the political costs of using CBRN weapons. Despite the lack of agreement on a strategy for using CBRN weapons, the shura agreed to start a CBRN weapon development programme. In early 1999 Zawahiri and Atef began discussing the practicalities of setting it up. Zawahiri recorded their discussions in a memo to Atef on 15 April 1999. He noted that: the destructive power of CBW is equivalent to that of nuclear weapons; a BW attack is often only detected days after it has occurred, which increases the number of casualties; and defending against a BW attack is difficult. He also noted that obtaining the services of a specialist would be the fastest, safest and cheapest way to proceed.25 In subsequent exchanges, the pair agreed that developing a CW would be the most feasible option, and also agreed to create a charitable foundation to serve as a front for the operation.26 But despite their enthusiasm the shura only earmarked an extremely modest

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$2,000 to $4,000 for the start-up costs. They codenamed the project al Zabadi, which means curdled milk or yoghurt in Arabic. The first thing they needed to do was to find someone to lead the project. They agreed on the need to appoint a specialist to lead the project, but then chose to look no further than the ranks of EIJ. They appointed an Egyptian chemist called Medhat Mursi al-Sayed, who used the nom de guerre Abu Khabab.27 He had graduated from Alexandria University as a chemical engineer in 1975 and was among the dozens of Islamists who had been arrested in the 1980s for involvement in the conspiracy to kill former President Anwar Sadat. In 1987 he left Egypt for Saudi Arabia, and then travelled to Afghanistan to join the jihad against the Soviet Union28 By the late 1990s he was in charge of a bombmaking laboratory at the Darunta training camp. Reports suggest that Khabab had been slow to join al Qaeda and was not a close personal ally of Zawahiri, because he felt that EIJ should be focusing its efforts on establishing an Islamist state in Egypt rather than attacking the US. However, he agreed to lead project al Zabadi in part because he needed money and al Qaeda was willing to pay for his services.29 Following his appointment, Khabab took over the chairmanship of the WMD sub-committee of the al Qaeda Military Committee, which also included Assadalah Abdul Rahman, a son of the Egyptian cleric Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, who was convicted of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and Abu Bashir al-Yemeni, who worked in the Afghan training camps.30 Khabab was an interesting choice to lead the project because whilst he was one of al Qaeda’s leading bomb makers and had a degree in chemistry, he had no specialist training or previous experience in developing CBW.31 He also reportedly had an oversized ego and an argumentative disposition.32 Perhaps there was no better qualified person available, but it is also probable that Zawahiri and Atef wanted a fellow member of EIJ to be in charge of such an important project. As a consequence of Khabab’s appointment, project al Zabadi would be starting from first principles.

CHAPTER 4 PROJECT AL ZABADI AND THE PURSUIT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

When the al Qaeda leadership took the decision to initiate project al Zabadi, the organisation lacked any of the scientific and industrial infrastructure required to develop CBRN weapons. It would inevitably take time to get this into place, but al Qaeda had a key advantage in that Afghanistan provided a safe haven in which it would have both the time and freedom it needed. Project al Zabadi would have two elements: a CW element and a BW element, with different teams working on each at different locations. At the same time, al Qaeda took the opportunity to revive its previous interest in acquiring nuclear weapons.

Chemical Weapons Khabab began his work in a room lit by a single light bulb, behind the mud-brick walls of a compound in the Darunta camp. Among his first challenges were to recruit assistants with the necessary technical knowledge and skills, gather together whatever relevant scientific information was available from open sources, procure the necessary raw materials and production equipment and set up a laboratory. He was assisted in the first task by bin Laden’s personal doctor, Dr Amer Aziz, who was based in Lahore. Aziz recruited a network of doctors and scientists in Pakistan to provide medical services for al Qaeda and to support its CBRN weapon programme.1 Khabab’s team included

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Assadalah Rahman who was in charge of procuring material for the programme,2 Abu Bashir al-Yemeni3 and Abu Baraa al-Masri.4 Together, they set about gathering whatever scientific information they could from open sources.5 Academic journals contain a wealth of relevant generic information, and it is also possible to find detailed technical information on developing CBRN weapons online, including formulas for making some types of CBW.6 However, whilst some of the technical information available on the internet is accurate, much of it is either erroneous or incomplete. Therefore this literature search would not have provided Khabab with all of the information that he needed. Among the information that the team managed to obtain were formulas for developing sarin, VX, ricin and mustard gas as well as documents listing lethal doses for poisons according to body weight.7 However, possession of the formulas and other related technical information is not in itself sufficient to ensure success. Developing effective CW is a complex process and not every detail of the process for making an agent is formally written down. There are certain ‘tricks of the trade’ to manufacturing CW, which Khabab and his team would need to learn through experimentation.8 This was illustrated by the fact that it took Aum Shinrikyo about two years to develop sarin, even though it had access to the formula for sarin and all of the necessary chemicals and production equipment. Consequently, even if Khabab managed to acquire the necessary theoretical knowledge, materials and production equipment, there was still a technological barrier that he would have to cross. This would have the effect of possibly making some weapons too difficult to develop, or else extending the time that it took to develop CW. Khabab and his team also faced some significant practical challenges in setting up their laboratory. The equipment and safety requirements for developing CW will vary according to the agent that is being produced, the synthesis path chosen and the purity of the agent being developed.9 Some crude CW can potentially be manufactured in a wellventilated room, using commonly available laboratory glassware and equipment, but the more dangerous agents require more sophisticated facilities and equipment.10 Even if they were successful, laboratoryscale production would only yield relatively small quantities of an agent. To produce significant quantities of CW, they would face additional technical issues in improving the yield of the production

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process and scaling up the process to produce large quantities of the agent.11 They were helped by the fact that al Qaeda controlled an extensive global business network, which was already providing cover for the procurement of explosives, weapons and chemicals.12 This network was now tasked with acquiring the raw materials and production facilities needed for project al Zabadi. Among the businessmen who were linked into this network was a wealthy US-based Pakistani citizen called Saifullah Paracha, who owned a US-based import business. He met with senior al Qaeda leaders and operational planners in Pakistan, including Khaled Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), and offered to assist the project by procuring chemicals from China.13 However, Khabab acquired most of the materials and equipment for his work from Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The UAE was one of the few states to recognise the Taliban regime, and in 1999 bin Laden met senior UAE officials who were staying at a hunting camp in Afghanistan.14 Exactly what they discussed remains unknown, but from 1999 CBRN-related cargoes were being flown from the UAE directly into Kabul by the Afghan national airline, Ariana,15 whilst other cargoes were brought overland from Pakistan. Even though CW are among the easiest types of CBRN weapons to produce, it still requires a high level of skill and knowledge to develop the more sophisticated nerve agents such as sarin and VX. Khabab attempted to minimise these challenges by putting an incremental development programme in place, starting with the most basic agents and associated delivery technology, with a medium-term aim to develop mustard gas and the longer-term of aim of developing nerve agents such as sarin. This sort of incremental development programme would enable his team to learn lessons from one phase to apply to the next. The downside, though, was that it would inevitably take time to achieve the ultimate objective of developing nerve agents. They began by experimenting with commercially available chemicals and pesticides, including hydrogen cyanide, chlorine and phosgene.16 The latter three chemicals had all been used as CW in World War I but are now standard industrial products. They are not as lethal as nerve agents, but they would still have provided al Qaeda with a CW capability, if only Khabab could work out how to weaponise them effectively. To achieve that, he would need to develop a dispersal device

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that could convert the liquid agents into gas, and then disperse the gas through an aerosol mechanism. The main focus of Khabab’s early work was on hydrogen cyanide. There are a number of forms of cyanide, which could potentially be used as weapons, and it is relatively easy to produce hydrogen cyanide gas by mixing cyanide with sulphuric acid. Cyanide poisons cells in the body by preventing them from utilising oxygen carried in the blood. It is a colourless, highly volatile liquid and has a faint odour, similar to peach kernels or bitter almonds. When it is turned into gas and inhaled just 250 mg can be lethal.17 But despite its lethality, it is difficult to use it as a weapon capable of killing a large number of people because it evaporates very quickly in the open air. Using it as a contaminant to kill large numbers of people is equally difficult. It has been estimated that to pollute a 5 million-litre reservoir, would require 10 tonnes of potassium cyanide to kill a single person drinking 100 ml of untreated water.18 For these reasons, cyanide compounds are only really effective in restricted types of attack, such as in the confined spaces of buildings. Khabab was soon experimenting on live animals. This included placing dogs in a glass box along with a quantity of cyanide and then pouring in sulphuric acid. The resultant fumes killed the dogs in about four minutes.19 These experiments were filmed for use in training courses. He also set about trying to work out how to disseminate cyanide through the ventilation systems of buildings, and started development of a stand-alone dispersal device that could disseminate the gas.20 Khabab also started work on three other agents. The first was a toxic pesticide solution that included a chemical to increase absorption of the solution through the skin, which was tested on rabbits and dogs. The intention was that the substance could be smeared on door handles.21 The second agent was mustard gas. This is a blister agent, or vessicant, that causes burns and tissue damage to the skin, the inside of the lungs and other body tissues. This is another World War I-era CW, and whilst making it is not an easy process, it is nevertheless easier to develop than the more lethal nerve agents. The third agent was the biological toxin ricin.22 Ricin can be extracted relatively easily from castor beans, so it was always likely that al Qaeda would consider it. But whilst it is a highly toxic substance, it is unsuited for use as a weapon of mass destruction. At least half-a-dozen countries, including the US, have previously

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attempted to weaponise ricin and failed. The problem is that ricin molecules are large and heavy, and tend to clump together, making it extremely difficult to disperse as an aerosol. US bioweapon scientists found that they needed tons of ricin to deliver lethal doses to a battlefield.23 Since the 1990s, a number of terrorist groups and individuals have explored the possibility of using ricin either to contaminate foodstuffs or as a contact poison. There is no evidence to indicate that ricin can penetrate intact skin, and its low thermal stability limits its effectiveness as a contaminant in cooked foods.24 However, it would remain stable in unheated foods, and leaves few indicators because it does not have a strong taste and is off-white in colour. But whilst swallowing ricin can kill, it is 1,000 times less effective that injecting it directly into the body.25 In May 1999 Zawahiri visited Khabab at Darunta, to be briefed on progress. He was pleased with what he heard, reporting back to the shura that Khabab had some ‘very useful ideas’, which just needed further experimentation in order to develop their practical application. He was particularly encouraged by the concept of using a commercial pesticide as a contact poison.26 However, Zawahiri was clearly not a student of the past history of CBRN terrorism. Various terrorist groups in the US have attempted to disseminate chemical or biological agents by spreading them on doorknobs, without success.27 By the end of May 1999 Zawahiri informed the shura that Khabab had made ‘significant progress’.28 However, Zawahiri was covering up some serious shortcomings in the project. A progress report in June 1999 noted that a lack of skilled engineers had resulted in a waste of effort and money, and recommended the recruitment of experts as the fastest, safest and cheapest route to achieving success. To address the problem, Zawahiri suggested that students should be recruited to infiltrate educational institutions, in order to gain access to the necessary expertise.29 They also used Saud Memon, a Pakistani businessman from Karachi, to identify Pakistani scientists for possible recruitment.30 But despite these problems, Zawahiri must have remained confident of success, because he instructed Atef to build a new laboratory.31 However, there were clearly lingering doubts about whether Khabab would succeed, because a second CW laboratory was set up at the Turnak Farms, where experiments were conducted into poisons, choking agents

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and blister agents.32 This laboratory was operated by a team of Syrians under the overall direction of Abd al-Aziz al-Masri, who also led al Qaeda’s nuclear and radiological work in the Kandahar area, which is discussed later in this chapter.33

Biological Weapons Al Qaeda’s biological weapons programme also began with the collection of relevant scientific information from open sources. Zawahiri studied the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) anthrax programme to try and glean useful lessons. There are a number of books available online, such as Silent Death, The Poisoner’s Handbook and The Anarchist’s Cookbook, that provide instructions on how to make some crude biological toxins such as ricin and botulinum, and Khabab downloaded some of this material from the websites of US right-wing extremist groups.34 They also acquired a number of books and papers from scientific journals dealing with pathogens or BW. Many of the books dealt with either historical or general aspects of BW and were of little operational utility. But at least some of the journal papers and medical handbooks that dealt with anthrax, botulinum toxin, Yersinia pestis (plague), hepatitis A and hepatitis C would have been useful to a BW programme.35 This literature provided some information to help them understand the requirements for culturing biological agents, but it did not cover everything they needed to know. The fundamental problem for al Qaeda was obtaining pathogenic strains of toxins. This is not an easy task because there are numerous strains of many toxins, only some of which are pathogenic. For instance, there are seven serotypes of Clostridium botulinum, each containing around 100 strains. Many of these strains produce no toxin at all. It took the pre-1969 US BW programme many years of work just to identify a reliable toxin-producing strain. It is a measure of al Qaeda’s limitations that it relied on a crude protocol for producing botulinum toxin, or ‘rotten meat poison’, from The Poisoner’s Handbook, for which there is little evidence that it will produce a pathogenic strain of the toxin.36 Al Qaeda’s primary interest was in anthrax, which has the potential to kill large numbers of people. But developing an anthrax weapon poses a number of formidable technological problems. Basic microbiology skills that a university undergraduate would learn should be sufficient to

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isolate Bacillus anthracis, and then culture it into a crude slurry, containing billions of spores. The key challenge is processing the crude slurry into a form that is suitable for dispersal through an aerosol dispersal mechanism. This requires drying the slurry, adjusting the particle size to between 1 –5 micrometres (mm), and developing an effective dispersal device. Milling the powder into particles of the required size is perhaps the most demanding part of the whole process. A project of this complexity would require a range of different skills and years of systematic effort.37 In early 1999 Zawahiri recruited a mid-level microbiologist, Rauf Ahmed, from Pakistan’s Council of Scientific and Industrial Research to lead the anthrax programme. Ahmed was not the ideal candidate because he specialised in food production, but he was the only option available. He probably possessed an understanding of the basic procedures and methods required to culture biological agents, but he lacked specific knowledge and training concerning anthrax and other BW agents, as well as the techniques relevant to weaponisation. He might have proved capable of learning much of this knowledge and acquiring the necessary skills as he went along, but it would have slowed his progress considerably.38 Ahmed’s first challenge was obtaining a pathogenic strain of anthrax. He took a 12-month sabbatical from his job and travelled throughout Europe to obtain both anthrax spores and the equipment he needed. He used his membership of the Society for Applied Microbiology (a UKbased international professional body), to make contacts and arrange visits, and attended a number of conferences on anthrax and dangerous pathogens. Through these contacts he was able to consult with other scientists on some of the key technical problems associated with weaponising anthrax.39 Ahmed reported back directly to Zawahiri in a series of progress reports. In one early report he admitted to having experienced several setbacks. He had found a supplier who could provide samples of Bacillus anthracis, but it turned out to be a harmless strain. In another he described an attempt to acquire a lethal strain from a different laboratory. Finally, he reported that he had visited a BioLevel-3 facility with a special confidential room where thousands of pathogenic cultures were kept. He went on to state that he had successfully achieved his targets, and that the paperwork relating to the export of the pathogens

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was pending. He sketched out the layout of a laboratory and identified the equipment that would be required. He also identified a number of other requirements including training for whoever was going to work in the laboratory, respirators and vaccines to protect the workers from accidental exposure.40 Ahmed returned to Afghanistan and set up a laboratory in a tunnel complex beneath the al Qaeda training camp at Turnak Farms, but shortly afterwards returned to his job in Pakistan.41 In August 2001 Zawahiri and Hambali inspected the laboratory42 but Atef was dissatisfied with the pace of progress. With Ahmed gone, someone else was needed to lead the project. Zawahiri turned to Hambali, the leader of al Qaeda in Southeast Asia, for help.43 On a visit to Kandahar in 2001, Hambali introduced Zawahiri to a Malaysian member of the Indonesian terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Yazid Sufaat. Sufaat had studied at Malaysia’s prestigious Royal Military College before completing further studies at California State University, where he was awarded a degree in biological sciences with a ‘clinical laboratory concentration’ in 1987.44 He then served in the Malaysian army as a medical technician, reaching the rank of captain. In 1993 he set up a pathology laboratory called Green Laboratory Medicine, which tested blood and urine samples of foreign workers and state employees for drug use.45 Zawahiri used his meeting with Sufaat to assess his general knowledge of biology and his laboratory skills. Despite the fact that Sufaat was not a professional scientist, both Zawahir and Atef endorsed him to head up the programme.46 In late 2001 Sufaat started work in a blood testing laboratory next to the Omar hospital in Kandahar.47 His four immediate tasks were researching the project, obtaining suitable seed stock of anthrax, recruiting assistants and acquiring the necessary equipment. To help him achieve these tasks, Sufaat was supported by KSM, who helped to arrange for equipment to be shipped from Pakistan. KSM’s assistant, Amar al-Baluchi,48 also sought the advice of a Pakistani neuroscientist called Aafia Siddiqui.49 She had been awarded a BSc in Biology from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology before studying neuroscience at Brandeis University in Massachusetts, although she had not taken any advanced biology or chemistry courses during the course of the studies.50 Baluchi asked her opinion about Pakistan’s BW lab in

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Karachi, as well as the potential cost and length of time it might take to develop BW.51 Siddiqui offered to work on the project, but Baluchi refused her offer.52 Instead, he sought her opinion on whether a jihadi called Samer Halmi Abdel Latif al-Barq (who used the nom de guerre Abu Bakr al-Filistini), who belonged to a largely Jordanian group called al Tawhid wal Jihad, would be suitable. Al-Barq had left Jordan in 1996 to study microbiology in Pakistan and had been awarded a Masters degree. In 1998 he travelled to Afghanistan and received military training, including CW training. He then began talking to friends about the possibility of attacking the West, and using CBRN weapons against Israel. In 2001, he was introduced to Zawahiri, who told him that he could teach him how to produce anthrax, and they discussed the possibility of conducting a suicide attack involving the release of anthrax into a major urban centre.53 Siddiqui evidently approved of al-Barq, because Sufaat recruited him along with a Sudanese militant called al-Hud al-Sudani.54

Nuclear and Radiological Weapons At the same time as al Qaeda was establishing project al Zabadi, other members of the network were attempting to establish a more structured nuclear and radiological weapon-development programme. This work was led by Abdel Aziz al-Masri (aka Ali Sayyid al-Bakri),55 a former member of EIJ and a close associate of Zawahiri, who would eventually became a member of the al Qaeda shura. He was a chemical engineer by training, and served as an explosives and CW instructor in the Afghan training camps. At the same time, he educated himself about nuclear matters. To support this work al Qaeda also tried to recruit nuclear scientists from Kabul University, but they refused to cooperate unless it was sanctioned by the Taliban. That approval was never forthcoming, denying al-Masri the support of perhaps the only Afghans with relevant technical knowledge.56 Al Qaeda operatives gathered together hundreds of documents on nuclear weapon-related issues, many of which came from the internet.57 This included a blueprint for a ‘Nagasaki-type bomb’, which turned out to be an internet hoax.58 Al Masri and his associates used this information to compile a ‘superbomb’ manual, which discussed the

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advanced physics of nuclear weapons. They also prepared notes on how to detonate explosives to compress plutonium.59 Overall, they made significant progress in working through some of the theoretical aspects of nuclear weapon design, but there were still significant gaps in their knowledge. They also collected information pertinent to the development of radiological weapons, including papers on the use of radioactive materials in agriculture and medicine.60 In the years leading up to 2001 al-Masri reportedly conducted a number of nuclear weapon-related explosive experiments in the Afghan desert near Kunar.61 But before he could build an actual nuclear weapon, he needed to acquire the necessary fissile material. For this, he had to rely on the black market in nuclear material, which al Qaeda’s experience in Sudan had shown to be fraught with risks. By the late 1990s the opportunities seemed to be improving as the smuggling networks became more professional. Yet the smugglers were still finding it very difficult to obtain supplies of fissile material. All of the known instances of smuggling involving fissile materials were of quantities that were several orders of magnitude less than was required to manufacture a nuclear weapon.62 As was the case with nuclear weapons, the main stumbling block in developing a radiological weapon also proved to be obtaining the necessary nuclear materials. Whilst there was no fissile material in Afghanistan, there were nuclear materials located in hospitals and at Kabul University that could potentially have been used to build a radiological weapon. However, the nuclear scientists at Kabul University prevented al Qaeda from getting its hands on the materials held there by hiding them all.63 As a result, al Qaeda was forced to rely on the black market for these materials as well. Unlike fissile material, however, significant amounts of nuclear materials that could be used in a radiological weapon were finding their way onto the black market. In the late 1990s some of this material was being trafficked from the successor states of the Soviet Union down into Afghanistan. The Taliban controlled the nuclear materials market in Afghanistan, but they preferred to deal with the Pakistani government regarding this material rather than al Qaeda. As a result, most of this material found its way to Pakistan. But as the movement of nuclear materials into Afghanistan dried up, the Taliban began to cooperate with the jihadis in trying to obtain it for themselves.64

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With only limited opportunities to obtain nuclear material in Afghanistan, al Qaeda turned its attention to Europe, where its efforts to acquire nuclear material were primarily coordinated through a number of front companies. In 1996, Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, who had been involved in the failed plan to buy uranium in Sudan, had established a travel agency and import-export business in Istanbul, called Maram, which was suspected of being involved in efforts to obtain components for nuclear weapons. Shares in the company were later transferred to Mohammed Loay Bayazid, another senior figure involved in the Sudan uranium deal. At this time, Salim travelled extensively in Russia, Romania and Bulgaria, possibly searching for nuclear material.65 However Salim failed to obtain any nuclear material from Eastern Europe. In 1998 this forced him to take the high-risk decision to travel to Western Europe in pursuit of an offer of highly enriched uranium. But as happened in Sudan, he was being scammed and the material on offer was simply low-grade nuclear fuel. Even worse for him, he was being tracked by Western security agencies and was arrested in Germany later that year.66 Following his arrest, the offices of Maram were hurriedly shut down and cleared out. Salim was subsequently extradited to the US, where he was convicted of involvement in the 1998 Kenya embassy bombing. Salim’s activities were not al Qaeda’s only efforts to acquire nuclear material. In 1998, Russian intelligence officials claim to have prevented an attempt to sell an unspecified amount of weapons-grade uranium to a Pakistani company controlled by bin Laden.67 Al Qaeda envoys were also sent to Eastern Europe in 2000 to purchase enriched uranium but were also unsuccessful.68 Al Qaeda finally seemed to have succeeded when they were offered a quantity of nuclear material by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which was acting as a middleman for smugglers. The Taliban and al Qaeda purchased three containers, which the smugglers claimed contained nuclear material. But a simple visual inspection should have rung alarm bells, because the canisters were extremely crude. They were neither made of lead nor lead-lined, and were not imprinted with the standard yellow radiation warning labels. One simply had a skull and crossbones painted on it by hand. Despite this, they purchased the containers, only to discover later that they did not contain radiological material. It seems that the smugglers might simply have dipped the containers in medical radiological waste in order to fool a Geiger counter.69

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This incident indicates that al Qaeda still did not have any members with the necessary technical knowledge to correctly identify nuclear materials. To get around this problem it tried to use more trustworthy smuggling networks. Among the contacts of Pakistani businessman Saifullah Paracha was A.Q. Khan, who had formerly led the Pakistani nuclear weapon programme. Khan was running a clandestine nuclear supply network, providing proliferator states with nuclear weapon designs and related technology.70 In 1998 Al Qaeda made at least three attempts to solicit assistance from the Khan network, but their approaches were all rebuffed for reasons that remain unknown.71 The failure to obtain support from the Khan network forced al Qaeda to go back to more unreliable smugglers. Yet despite the fact that nuclear materials continued to be trafficked into Pakistan, al Qaeda remained unable to make the necessary connections with genuine smugglers.72 In 2001, for example, an al Qaeda facilitator called Abu Munthir instructed another Pakistani based facilitator, Salahuddin Amin, to contact a man identified as Abu Annis about a ‘radioisotope bomb’. Amin did so via the internet, and Abu Annis told him that he had made contact with the Russian mafia in Belgium and was trying to buy the bomb from them. But like so many other nuclear incidents that al Qaeda was involved in, it was a scam and came to nothing.73 In April 2001 it tried a different approach, of using a front company to buy nuclear material legitimately. Al Qaeda operatives used a middleman to approach a Bulgarian businessman and former intelligence officer Ivan Ivanov, who had long-standing ties to a Middle Eastern contracting firm. The middleman and Ivanov discussed the possibility of setting up an environmental company to buy nuclear waste. Ivanov was invited to Pakistan, and taken to see bin Laden, who was speaking at a religious festival on the outskirts of Peshawar. A day later he was taken on a bus ride along Pakistan’s remote mountainous border with China to a location on the other side of the border, where he was introduced to bin Laden. Ivanov then travelled with his new business associates to a large villa in Rawalpindi, where he was approached by a Pakistani chemical engineer who was interested in obtaining spent nuclear fuel rods from the Kozlodui nuclear reactor in Bulgaria. He offered Ivanov $200,000 to set up an environmental firm to buy waste from the reactor, and asked if Ivanov would run the company, but he declined.74

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By 2001, al Qaeda’s nuclear weapon programme was progressing at a snail’s pace, and was nowhere near to producing a workable device. Al-Masri and his colleagues had still not resolved all of the theoretical issues associated with nuclear weapon development and were still no closer to obtaining the necessary fissile material. However, they seem to have made greater progress with radiological weapons, with some sources within al Qaeda reporting that they had tested a radiological weapon in Kunar province in 2000.75

Al Qaeda Implements CBRN Training With project al Zabadi under way, al Qaeda began to train its operatives in how to make and use the CBRN capabilities it had developed. This training was mainstreamed into al Qaeda training programmes at a number of sites in Afghanistan. The most prominent of these was Darunta, where the training programme focused on chemicals and biological toxins,76 with one of the two-week courses focusing exclusively on poisoning food and drink.77 As part of the programme, recruits received copies of CBW instruction manuals that had been downloaded from the internet.78 CBW courses were also run at Turnak Farms, where the basic explosives course included sections on poisons and gases, including botulinum toxin.79 Similar training also took place at the al Faruq camp, which was also near Kandahar airport. Besides the main training camps, CW training also occurred at a number of other smaller al Qaeda facilities. At the Hassan guesthouse on the outskirts of Kandahar, which was used by graduates from al Faruq, and those awaiting more advanced training at Turnak Farms, jihadis learnt how to use poisons mixed with perfume.80 At Camp 9, just north of Kabul, which was mainly used for advanced training with heavy weapons, rocket-propelled grenades and shoulder-launched missiles,81 Khabab also provided training with poisons that could be inhaled, ingested or absorbed through the skin. The training involved testing the poisons on rabbits, and recruits were shown the video of dogs being gassed at Darunta.82 Camp Sadeeq, located outside of Khost, also contained laboratories, some of which were used for developing poisons and gasses,83 whilst the Ghulam Bacha Guesthouse, in the Karte Parwan district of Kabul, contained facilities that were used by the Taliban to create poisons for assassinations.84

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To complement this training, information on manufacturing CBW was included in a number of training manuals which were either developed or used by al Qaeda, including the Mujahideen Poisons Handbook, Military Studies in the Jihad against the Tyrants, the Encyclopedia of Jihad and Necessary Precautions to be Taken before and after Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Warfare. These manuals include instructions for manufacturing CBW that are similar to those contained in internet publications such as the Poisoners Handbook and were being distributed to operational cells from as early as 2000.85 Khabab also provided training to other jihadi groups and networks,86 the most significant of which was al Tawhid wal Jihad (Monotheism and Holy War), which was focused on establishing an Islamist state in Jordan, and was led by a then-little-known terrorist called Ahmed Fadheel al-Khalayleh, who used the nom de guerre Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. This group had strong links to al Qaeda, but Zarqawi never swore loyalty to bin Laden and acted autonomously.87 With al Qaeda’s assistance, Zarqawi had set up a training camp near Herat, catering mainly for exiled Jordanians, Palestinians and Syrians. As the group became more firmly established it began to welcome militants from across Europe, and Zarqawi abandoned his exclusive focus on Jordan to include attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets in Europe. Amongst the training on offer at the Herat camp was instruction in the use of CBW.88 Another independent jihadi camp in Afghanistan offering CBRN training was the al Ghuraba camp, run by Mustafa bin Abd al-Qadir Sitt Maryam Nasar, who used the nom de guerre Abu Musab al Suri. In the late 1980s Nasar had been a member of bin Laden’s inner circle, but after falling out with bin Laden in 1998 he pledged allegiance to the Taliban.89 In 1999 he began lecturing his recruits about the necessity for obtaining CBRN weapons, and instructed operatives to work with contacts in Pakistan to learn how to use ‘the charges from a traditional nuclear reactor for military ends’.90

Breakthrough? – Al Wafa and Ummah Tameer-e-Nau In 2001 al Qaeda suddenly gained access to significant additional technical expertise and material support through two nongovernmental organisations called al Wafa and Ummah Tameer-e-Nau (UTN). With the support of these two organisations, there was a very real prospect that

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al Qaeda might be able to overcome some of the technical problems that had stymied its progress on developing CBRN weapons. Al Wafa had been established with financial backing from a Saudi cleric between mid-2000 and early 2001, to provide material support to a range of different extremist groups in Afghanistan. It eventually established a network of offices throughout Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran that organised the transport of fighters to Afghanistan as well as purchasing arms and other supplies. In late 2000, bin Laden met its founder and director, Abdullah Aiza al Matrafi, to discuss the opening of al Wafa offices in Afghanistan. Through this meeting, al Matarfi secured access to senior al Qaeda figures and facilities in Afghanistan, and acted as an emissary between bin Laden and Saudi clerics who supported al Qaeda.91 Besides funnelling money to al Qaeda for training and purchasing weapons, al Wafa also became involved in al Qaeda’s attempts to develop CBRN weapons. As 2001 wore on, however, the relationship between Matarfi and bin Laden broke down, due to a disagreement over the issue of martyrdom. Matarfi felt that martyrdom was attained by fighting to the last breath, whereas bin Laden was an advocate of suicide missions. Bin Laden was so angry that he threatened to kill Matarfi, and ordered him never to come near any al Qaeda guesthouses again, and to never talk again the mujahideen about martyrdom.92 Despite the threats, Matarfi met bin Laden for the second and last time in July 2001, and they resolved their differences.93 Following the meeting, Matarfi agreed to help al Qaeda obtain the equipment needed for its BW programme. Sufaat was instructed to contact a Yemeni al Wafa official, Ayman Saeed Abdullah Batarfi, to make the necessary arrangements. Batarfi had fought in the jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, after which he became a surgeon in Pakistan. He was recruited by Dr Amer Aziz, and subsequently appointed as al Wafa’s medical advisor. In this role he worked closely with a UAE-based al Wafa facilitator and financier, Umran al-Awais, to purchase medical supplies. In this capacity he imported a quantity of cyanide, which was ostensibly destined for a dental hospital in Kabul.94 In August 2001, Sufaat met Batarfi at al Qaeda’s Hajji Habash Guesthouse in Kandahar, from where the pair went to al Wafa’s Kandahar office to meet Matarfi. At that meeting, Sufaat was instructed to go to al Wafa’s Karachi office, and speak to a Yemeni microbiology

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student there, called Jamil Qasim,95 who had been studying and researching at Karachi University since 1993. Batarfi instructed Qasim to make $4,000 to $5,000 available to assist Sufaat.96 In total, Sufaat made four trips to Karachi with Hambali to purchase materials and equipment, with other lower-ranking al Qaeda members also making similar trips.97 Whilst he was in Karachi, Sufaat practised his laboratory techniques in Qasim’s laboratory at Karachi University. Qasim was unimpressed with Sufaat’s skills,98 which seemingly confirms Sufaat’s lack of scientific expertise, and raises doubts about whether he would ever have succeeded in developing BW. Al Qaeda eventually obtained the equipment and information required to develop a wide variety of chemical and biological agents to use against people, plants and animals, including the limited production of anthrax.99 This included a centrifuge for separating liquids and an oven in which slurried biological agents could be dried. Eventually, the laboratory would have been capable of being used to culture anthrax, plague and cholera, as well as a variety of rusts and blights that attack plants, and foot and mouth disease to use against animals with cloven hooves.100 Sufaat continued searching for equipment, materials and other scientists,101 but he had enough to get started. He began trying to culture anthrax102 but was unable to obtain a strain that was suitable for use as a weapon.103 Anthrax is endemic in Afghanistan but he never succeeded in obtaining samples from the environment, and the animal vaccination programme in the country used the commercially available, non pathogenic, Sterne strain.104 UTN was a Pakistan-based relief organisation that from 1988 had been working with the Taliban to upgrade roads, build flour mills and carry out other infrastructure projects inside Afghanistan. But it was also linked to the Pakistani jihad groups, Jaish e Muhammad (the Army of the Prophet Mohammad) and Lashkar-e-Toiba.105 It was just one of many organisations performing similar humanitarian work in Afghanistan, but what made it different from the others was its overtly ideological agenda and the people who worked for it. UTN had been founded and chaired by Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, a former director general of the nuclear power division of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. He was a close confidante of A.Q. Khan and one of Pakistan’s foremost experts on plutonium production. UTN also employed Chaudry Abdul Majeed, a former

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director of Pakistan’s uranium-enrichment laboratories. Significantly, neither man had previously been involved in nuclear weapon design or development. They had both been forced out of their jobs in 1999 for advocating equipping Muslim nations with fissile material to build nuclear weapons.106 A number of other nuclear scientists as well as financiers and military men featured amongst its employees, including the former head of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence Directorate, General Hamid Gul. Among members of al Qeada, UTN was reputed to have been set up ‘to assist in spreading the modern achievements of science and technology among Muslims’.107 UTN set up base in an unremarkable two-storey cinderblock house in Wasi Akbar Khan, the wealthy diplomatic quarter of Kabul. The organisation occupied offices on the upstairs floors of the building while downstairs was reserved for family living quarters. In the summer of 2001 Mahmood met Matarfi,108 raising the possibility that the two organisations might collaborate. He also met Taliban leader Mullah Omar on a number of occasions during a long visit to Kandahar in August 2001. During one of those meetings Omar introduced him to bin Laden.109 Mahmood and Majid then had several meetings with bin Laden, Zawahiri and two other members of al Qaeda at a compound in Kabul. They spoke extensively about CBRN weapons, and bin Laden sought their assistance in building nuclear and radiological weapons.110 Bin Laden told them about the nuclear material that al Qaeda had obtained through the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Mahmood then outlined how to build a nuclear device, drawing a rough sketch and describing a simple firing mechanism using commercially available materials. However, he told bin Laden that the cache of nuclear material was insufficient for a use as a weapon,111 and that it would be too difficult for al Qaeda to make its own fissile material. Bin Laden responded by asking: ‘What if I already have them?’ An unidentified senior al Qaeda leader who was also present at the campfire then showed the visitors a canister that may or may not have contained nuclear material.112 Whilst Mahmood and Majid might not have had any direct experience of developing nuclear weapons, they nevertheless possessed relevant technical knowledge and skills, and had considerable experience of supervising large and complex projects. They also had contacts within the Pakistani nuclear community that they might have been able to tap

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into. As a result, they were potentially in a position to make a significant contribution to al Qaeda’s nuclear and radiological weapons work.113 UTN was soon working on a number of projects to assist al Qaeda. One project was the development of artillery shells and mortar rounds filled with ground-up, highly irradiated metal, which they planned to obtain from Pakistan.114 Another project involved the development of a CBW dispersal device. Al Qaeda had initially focused on the idea of using commercial crop dusters,115 but UTN began working on a concept involving weather balloons to disperse chemical or biological agents over a wide area. To support this work, UTN members obtained a large amount of information about anthrax from US military sources, some of which was from original documents and some of which came from websites. This included including information about the history of anthrax, detailed descriptions of how it can be used as a weapon and spread through artillery shells, aeroplanes and trucks, details of the Pentagon’s programme to immunise all members of the US military against anthrax attacks and information about the dose of anthrax that would be required to kill someone who had been immunised.116 By late 2001 al Qaeda possessed a very crude CBW capability, based on ricin and poorly weaponised commercially available chemicals. It also arguably had a radiological weapon capability. But, significantly, it had failed to cross a number of key technological barriers to developing more sophisticated CBW and nuclear weapons. The key limiting factors on its programme were a lack of people with the necessary technical skills and its inability to acquire critical materials, particularly fissile material, pathogenic biological agents and key precursor chemicals. Al Wafa and UTN might have been in a position to partially address the first problem, but it remained to be seen to what extent they would be able to obtain the critical materials that al Qaeda needed.

CHAPTER 5 AL QAEDA'S STRATEGY BEGINS TO EMERGE, 1988—2001

With al Qaeda actively trying to develop CBRN weapons, the key issues for the US and Western intelligence agencies were determining exactly how far it had got and ascertaining how it intended to use them. However, intelligence information can often be incomplete and liable to conflicting interpretations. This was particularly true of the intelligence relating to al Qaeda’s CBRN weapon programme. A complicating factor was that US efforts to clarify al Qaeda’s CBRN weapon capabilities and intentions were taking place within a highly politicised public and political debate on the issue. These issues were played out in the public spotlight, in the immediate aftermath of Operation Infinite Reach. Initially, the decision to attack al Qaeda’s Afghan training camps and the Shifa pharmaceutical plant was readily accepted by much of the US media and public opinion. But journalists soon began to question whether the attack on the Shifa pharmaceutical plant was justified. It was discovered that, contrary to early US intelligence reports, Shifa was not a closed facility and was not guarded by the Sudanese army. Numerous foreign contactors had previously worked there and had full access to all areas of the site. It had also regularly hosted visitors, including at one time the British ambassador to Khartoum. Those foreign contractors were unanimous in affirming that Shifa was exactly what it purported to be – a pharmaceutical plant. The only caveat around these assertions was that none of those contractors were CW experts, and so might not necessarily have been able to recognise

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CW-related activities. So it remained a possibility that a small section of the plant might have been used for the production or storage of CW precursor chemicals.1 Having been put on the back foot by these revelations the US Administration attempted to stifle the criticism by releasing more details about the intelligence material that it had gathered about Shifa. But this only served to make matters worse. In disclosing only some of the imformation at its disposal, the Administration expected journalists to make the necessary connections between the various pieces of evidence and draw appropriate conclusions. Instead, reporters reviewed each piece of information in isolation and questioned its validity.2 One of the first aspects of the Administration’s case to be criticised was Shifa’s alleged links to bin Laden. There was a tangential link in that Shifa was part of the Sudanese Military Industrial Corporation (MIC), and bin Laden had a financial interest in the MIC. But that in itself proved nothing. Saleh Idris, the officially listed owner of the plant, had contacts with the National Islamic Front and also invested in the MIC, but that is not necessarily surprising for a prominent businessman operating in Sudan. He also had close links with the Saudi Royal Family, but had no known links with al Qaeda or any other militant group. In the absence of a deed of ownership in bin Laden’s name, reporters argued that the connection had not been shown convincingly.3 US officials argued that they did have additional information about al Qaeda’s links to the plant but that they were not prepared to reveal it because it would have compromised the US intelligence agencies ongoing intelligence-gathering operations. But this was simply not accepted by the media, which continued to argue that the US had hit the wrong target. A month after the attack, US officials were forced to concede that they had no direct evidence of a link between bin Laden and the plant.4 However, Shifa did not need to be owned by bin Laden for it to be part of a clandestine CW production programme. There was also the issue of the intercepted signals intelligence from inside the plant that had raised the initial concerns. This intelligence needed to be corroborated, but there were serious shortcomings in the way that this was done. Intelligence officers searched commercial databases and Sudanese websites, including Shifa’s, but could not find a list of medicines produced by the plant for sale. As a result, they came to the astonishing conclusion that the plant did not produce pharmaceuticals.5

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The most damning piece of evidence against Shifa had been the soil sample contaminated with Empta that had purportedly been collected from the site. US officials claimed that Empta had no commercial applications but they were wrong, because it can be used in the manufacture of some fungicides, pesticides and anti-microbial agents. For that reason it is not banned under the Chemical Weapons Convention, but rather is listed in schedule 2B of chemicals that have legitimate commercial uses. Even so, US officials could find no evidence that it had been used commercially in any of these applications.6 Serious questions should have been asked about the credibility of the Empta finding because of the way it had been obtained and then tested. It is possible that the sample actually came from another location, that it had been mishandled or even that it had been deliberately contaminated. Some commentators argued that the sample’s chain of custody was improper, others contended that analysing the soil sample at only one laboratory was scientifically unacceptable. Yet others suggested that the contamination could hypothetically have been a derivative of pesticide production. All of these arguments were sufficient to cast reasonable doubt on the veracity of the Empta finding.7 These doubts were further exacerbated by serious question marks over the credibility of the agent who had collected the sample. After the US had withdrawn all diplomatic and intelligence personnel from Sudan in 1996 it had been forced to rely on informants of questionable reliability. In one case, the US was forced to retract over 100 intelligence reports, including some that linked the Sudanese government to terrorist attacks, because it concluded that the source who provided the information had fabricated it. Concerns over the reliability of US intelligence sources in Sudan were so great that some US officials suggested that dubious intelligence had driven US policy on Sudan since 1995. This cast significant doubt over the credibility of the agent in the Shifa case and therefore any evidence that he or she gathered.8 As a result of all these factors, the media became increasingly critical of the decision to bomb the Shifa plant. The most telling example of the coverage was provided by the New York Times headline on 21 September 1998, which read: ‘Decision to strike factory in Sudan Based on surmise inferred from evidence.’ The report claimed that senior officials had said that the case for attacking Shifa relied on inference and shards of evidence gleaned from telephone intercepts, spies and scientific analysis.

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Administration insiders tried to claim that the evidence was much stronger than was being suggested by the report, but their protestations were given little credence.9 The media also chose to ignore some key facts, particularly the CIA’s analysis showing that Empta was not being used commercially anywhere in the world, and the reports that Iraqi weapons engineers had been linked to Shifa, which had been independently confirmed by UN weapons inspectors.10 The UK government also attempted to support the Administration by claiming that it had its own ‘convincing case’, that al Qaeda had been trying to acquire CBW and that CW were being developed at Shifa,11 but its intervention failed to influence the debate in the US. Another interesting feature of the aftermath of the attack on Shifa was the lack of support that the Administration received on Capitol Hill. Given the highly politicised nature of CBRN terrorism and the fact that it was one of the few policy areas on which the Clinton Administration received cross-party Congressional support, it might have expected strong support within Congress, even if the evidence regarding Shifa was weak. Instead, Congress was noticeably reticent about supporting the attack. This lack of support for the Administration can partly be explained by the fact that some legislators might have feared being vilified by a media that had become extremely critical of the attack. In addition, many of the most vocal legislators on CBRN terrorism were Republicans and may actually have welcomed the criticism of the missile strikes because it undermined the Administration.12 Despite everything, the US State Department continued to believe that al Qaeda had sought to develop CW, both on its own and in cooperation with Sudan.13 However, the whole Shifa incident highlighted the formidable difficulties in obtaining accurate and unequivocal intelligence on al Qaeda’s CBRN weapon activities and the challenges that this posed for decision-makers who had to deal with the threat. In terms of the wider political debate on CBRN terrorism, it should also have taught politicians and the media to always apply critical judgement to the information that was being presented to them, even if came from intelligence sources. For al Qaeda, there were confusing political messages from Operation Infinite Reach and the subsequent political fall-out in the US. On the one hand it showed that the US would respond militarily to significant

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attacks on its interests, but at the same time bin Laden believed that the attacks were ineffective and proved that the US lacked the political courage to use ground troops to attack al Qaeda.14 Yet despite bin Laden’s confidence, the fact was that Shifa had been completely destroyed, and if bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders had been present at the Zhawar Kili al-Badr camp, they could have been killed.

The Returnees from Albania The smoke and mirrors regarding al Qaeda’s CBRN weapons programme increased even more in 1999, following revelations made during the trial of 43 members of Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) in Egypt, which became known as the Returnees from Albania trial. The trial was the culmination of a covert CIA programme to kidnap Egyptian extremists from Albania, Azerbaijan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Yemen during 1998, and then subject them to extraordinary rendition back to Egypt to face trial for a number of major terrorist incidents. During the trial, the prosecution leaned heavily on the testimony of defendant Ahmad Ibrahim al-Sayyid al-Naggar. Among other things, he claimed that EIJ cells based in Albania and Azerbaijan had acquired samples of E-coli and salmonella from facilities in Eastern Europe, and had also agreed deals with a facility in Southeast Asia to supply samples of anthrax and ‘toxic gases’, and with a laboratory in the Czech Republic to provide samples of botulinum toxin. This information was partially corroborated by evidence from another of the detainees, Ahmed Salama Mabruk, the former leader of the cell in Azerbaijan, who stated that EIJ had acquired CW over the previous two years.15 To reinforce these claims, one of the defendants’ lawyers, Muntasir alZayyat, announced that al Qaeda had CBW and would likely use them against the US, given the extradition pressure being faced by senior al Qaeda leaders.16 Al-Zayyat’s comment represents the earliest available public statement about al Qaeda’s likely intentions with regard to using CBRN weapons. He indicates that al Qaeda would use CBW in response to a specific threat, implying that if the threat were removed, al Qaeda would not use CBW. However, al-Zayyat was not an al Qeada leader, so it remains unknown whether his comments were a true reflection of the intentions of the leadership. But what it does indicate is that at least some elements who were linked with al Qaeda and jihadi networks

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had recognised the inherent political value of CBRN weapons, and were beginning to think in terms of how they might exploit that political value. The claims made by al-Naggar and Mabruk caused significant concern in the West, but project al Zabadi was not initiated until 1999, so their claims could not have been related to any al Qaeda activity. The reason for the claims soon became apparent when it was reported that they had been tortured. Information obtained under torture clearly has to be treated with caution, given the possibility that the person being tortured will say whatever they think the torturer wants to hear, in order to make the torture stop. This issue of false testimony given by al Qaeda detainees and testimony given under duress would return to haunt assessments of the al Qaeda CBRN capabilities in future years. Despite these claims lacking credibility, they were widely reported and fuelled the debate on CBRN terrorism in the West. They seemed to highlight the apparent ease with which al Qaeda might be able to obtain biological agents, which helped establish a sense of a serious and imminent threat among observers in the West. The revelations were followed by a number of other media reports that also lacked credibility and have subsequently been shown to be false. One report suggested that al Qaeda had purchased three CBW production facilities in the former Yugoslavia, whilst other allegations suggested that it had hired a number of Ukrainian chemists and biologists to train its members.17

US and UK Intelligence Assessments of Al Qaeda’s CBRN Capabilities The political fall-out from the Shifa incident and the revelations made during the Returnees from Albania trial raised fundamental questions about the accuracy of Western intelligence assessments of al Qaeda’s CBRN capabilities. Western intelligence agencies typically rely on information from a range of different sources, including human sources, electronic sources such as intercepted phone calls or internet communications and the intelligence services of other countries. However, the US intelligence agencies did not have any agents inside al Qaeda, which forced them to rely primarily on technical intelligencegathering. But this type of intelligence gathering often has great difficulty in tracking WMD programmes, as had been illustrated by

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the information gathered about Shifa. The main problem for intelligence analysts was in assessing the credibility of the information that came through these sources. In intelligence circles, credible information is considered to be information that has either been independently confirmed by a number of different sources or has come from a source that has previously proved to be accurate. Whether any particular piece of information is credible is therefore often open to interpretation.18 The problems faced by the US intelligence agencies in gathering and analysing intelligence concerning al Qaeda’s CBRN activities were further compounded by significant internal institutional problems. Analysis of the threat needed to bridge three different analytic disciplines within the US Intelligence Community – traditional regional analysis, state-focused WMD technical analysis and terrorism analysis. Yet analysts in these disciplines often did not work together. Organisational structures, information handling barriers and cultural disconnects blocked effective collaboration. For example, the analysts who possessed most of the Intelligence Community’s CBRN technology expertise focused mostly on state WMD programmes. Whilst the regional analysts who worked on Afghanistan tended to focus more on political, economic, opium-production and military issues.19 These divisions between different types of analyst were reflected in competing assessments of al Qaeda’s CBRN weapons capabilities. Analysts who worked on WMD proliferation by states felt that terrorism analysts were overestimating the potential threat, because terrorist groups are technologically limited and Afghanistan lacked the necessary resources and infrastructure to sustain a sophisticated CBRN weapon development programme.20 This lack of cooperation across the disciplines was only one of a number of analytical shortcomings, which meant that the Intelligence Community’s analysts did not do enough to optimise the reliability of their predictive assessments. For instance, the analysts working on al Qaeda’s CBRN programme did not adequately state the basis or the underlying assumptions for their most critical judgements.21 Some assessments of al Qaeda’s CBRN weapon capabilities offered highly speculative judgements without citing any evidentiary anchors whatsoever, while others used single sources only, and in some cases dated information. As a result of these poor analytic practices, it proved

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impossible in retrospect to determine what information analysts were working with or how they weighted that information in formulating their judgements.22 Yet despite these problems, the assessments of the threat by both the US and the UK intelligence agencies between 1988 and 2001 were broadly correct, albeit incomplete. In the late 1990s, reports that al Qaeda was trying to procure complete CBRN weapons from the black market had given way to new reports of it setting up its own CBRN weapon-development infrastructure in Afghanistan. Reports indicated that al Qaeda had constructed crude CBW labs at bases in Khost and Darunta,23 and was shopping around for nuclear materials and components for CBW.24 In April 1999, the US intelligence agencies received reports of possible attempts to acquire nuclear material at Herat.25 These reports show that the US intelligence agencies had identified the existence of project al Zabadi, and were also aware of al Qaeda’s active interest in nuclear and radiological weapons. A classified Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report from 1999 stated that: ‘Terrorist use [of CBRN weapons] should also be anticipated primarily in improvised devices, probably in association with an explosive.’26 This report contained two significant judgements: that al Qaeda’s capabilities were relatively crude, and that al Qaeda was intending to use these weapons operationally in a first strike role. Later that year, the US intelligence agencies assessed that al Qaeda might already have acquired CW.27 They had obtained information which indicated that al Qaeda: had small quantities of toxic chemicals and pesticides, and had produced small amounts of World War I-era agents such as hydrogen cyanide, chlorine, and phosgene . . . Training manuals . . . indicated that group members were familiar with the production and deployment of common chemical agents. and that unconfirmed reports ‘indicated that al Qaeda operatives had sought to acquire more modern and sophisticated chemical agents’.28 It was also assessed that al Qaeda had the technical capability to develop a crude nuclear device if only it could obtain the necessary fissile material.29 The trend in this reporting was of a steadily worsening threat, which by 2001 was possibly on the verge of becoming operational.

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These US assessments of al Qaeda’s CBRN capabilities were broadly shared by the UK intelligence agencies. In the late 1990s, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) assessed that most al Qaeda attacks would involve conventional weapons, but it was also tracking a gradual improvement in al Qaeda’s CBRN capabilities. In November 1998 it noted al Qaeda’s long-standing interest in CBRN materials, and that it might already have obtained some chemicals and biological materials. It assessed that al Qaeda lacked the expertise or facilities to produce a nuclear weapon but that it might seek to make a radiological weapon. In respect of al Qaeda’s intentions with regard to using CBRN weapons, the report noted that bin Laden’s ideas were maturing and being developed in more detail.30 In 1999, the JIC reported claims that had reputedly been made by bin Laden that al Qaeda was setting up a nuclear weapon laboratory in Afghanistan.31 In an effort to test those claims, the British intelligence services paid agents to enter an al Qaeda training camp in Herat. They reported back that al Qaeda had set up a laboratory in the camp to manufacture a radiological weapon, using medical isotopes provided by the Taliban. They had no physical evidence that a device had been constructed but British government scientists concluded that al Qaeda had succeeded in constructing a radiological weapon.32 UK assessments also highlighted the activities of Abu Khabab, including his CW training courses. In February 1999 the JIC reported that an al Qaeda fighter had claimed that the organisation intended to attack US and UK targets in India, Indonesia and the US by using means that even the US could not counter. This was interpreted as implying the use of either chemical or biological weapons. The JIC also had evidence that Abu Khabab was working with biological agents, but the information lacked detail.33 In June 1999, the JIC reviewed its previous assessments of al Qaeda’s CBRN capabilities and concluded that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that al Qaeda had acquired either radiological or nuclear material, but that it did have access to unspecified chemical or biological materials, and that some al Qaeda operatives had received basic training in using them against individuals and in confined spaces.34 The following month, the JIC provided its most detailed assessment to date of al Qaeda’s intentions with regard to using CBRN weapons. The JIC revised one of the major assumptions underpinning its previous assessments of the generic CBRN threat by assuming that some terrorists were no

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longer reluctant to cause mass casualties. As a result of this revision, it assessed that the generic risk of a CBRN terrorist attack had risen and that groups that were motivated by an extremist Islamist ideology or ethnic hatred were less constrained by considerations such as the need to maintain public support, causing casualties among innocent bystanders, or the prospect of retaliation.35 Al Qaeda clearly fitted that description, yet the JIC stuck to its previous assessment that the network remained more likely to employ conventional weapons than chemical or biological materials, because they are easier to use, more reliable, safer and more controllable than CBRN materials.36 These comments were therefore not a categorical assertion of the circumstances under which al Qaeda might use CBRN weapons, but they suggest that, like the US intelligence agencies, the JIC was also coming round to the view that al Qaeda would use CBRN weapons for first-strike purposes rather than for deterrence or retaliation. Between 2000 and 2001 the JIC re-iterated its previous assessments that: al Qaeda retained a strong interest in acquiring CBRN materials and expertise; it had established a CW lab in Afghanistan and had experts working there; it possessed chemical or biological materials; it had an understanding of their utility as terrorist weapons; and there was still no hard intelligence that it possessed genuine nuclear material. Among all of the terrorist groups with an interest in non-conventional weapons, the JIC assessed that al Qaeda posed the most significant threat.37 The US and UK intelligence services could not know for certain how accurate the information that they were receiving about al Qaeda’s CBRN capabilities was, but they had at least identified the existence of project al Zabadi as well as al Qaeda’s nuclear and radiological weapon work. In retrospect, it can be seen that US intelligence assessments of certain aspects of al Qaeda’s CBRN weapons capabilities prior to 9/11 were broadly correct, particularly in respect of its CW capabilities and the judgement that it did not possess a nuclear weapon.38 But there were serious shortcomings in the assessments of other aspects of al Qaeda’s CBRN capabilities. The judgement that al Qaeda had the technical capability to develop a crude nuclear device was incorrect, given that it had not managed to work out all of the key principles of nuclear weapon design. Assessments also failed to adequately determine the size and scope of al Qaeda’s anthrax programme. This meant that, by 2001, the US and UK intelligence agencies’ knowledge of al Qaeda’s CBRN weapon programme was partial at best.

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The report of the 9/11 Commission found that whilst the US intelligence agencies were devoting significant resources to tracking al Qaeda’s activities following the 1998 embassy bombings, they were still not seeing the bigger picture. There was a failure to fully understand both the character of al Qaeda and its aspirations, as well as its transformation from an obscure group of extremists into one of the most dangerous terrorist networks in the world. Most significantly, its plans to launch attacks inside the US and the extent of its operations inside the US were unknown. US officials recognised that al Qaeda represented a serious threat but there was uncertainty among senior officials about whether it was just a variation of the standard terrorism, or something radically new that posed a threat beyond what had previously been experienced.39 Because of this, insufficient resources were focused on al Qaeda as a target.40 This failure to recognise the true nature of the threat was reflected in the field of CBRN weapons. The CIA knew that al Qaeda was experimenting with CBRN materials but it was assessed that men in caves would not be able to make WMD. Consequently, the CIA assessed that al Qaeda was not trying to develop strategic WMD.41 Consequently, the US reaction to the al Qaeda CBRN threat was limited. After receiving intelligence about the activities of UTN, the US persuaded the Pakistani authorities to arrest the senior members of the organisation. The Pakistani authorities allowed US officials to observe the interrogations, and as a result they managed to reassure the US that its members did not know how to manufacture nuclear weapons. This may well have understated UTN’s significance to al Qaeda, but the organisation had at least been removed from al Qaeda’s CBRN weapons programmes before it could make a significant contribution.42 Sandy Berger and other senior Administration officials also considered the option of conducting further missile strikes against al Qaeda camps and CBRN infrastructure in Afghanistan, but rejected the idea. They decided that missile strikes would have only have a slight impact, and ran the risk of causing collateral casualties and generating significant political fall-out.43

Bin Laden Begins to Articulate a Strategy of Deterrence Bin Laden first began to provide some clues about his attitude towards nuclear weapons in a number of references during media interviews in 1998 and 1999 to the dropping of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and

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Nagasaki during World War II. In 1998 he cited the bombings as evidence that the US ‘does not even refrain from destroying the human race in its own interests’.44 When he was asked during an interview with Esquire magazine in early 1999 to justify the targeting of US civilians, he responded by arguing that: American history does not distinguish between civilians and military, not even women and children. They are the ones who used bombs against Nagasaki. Can these bombs distinguish between infants and military? America does not have a religion that will prevent it from destroying all people.45 The view in the US was that these references to Hiroshima and Nagasaki were intended literally, to justify al Qaeda’s use of CBRN weapons against the US in a first-strike role.46 This was seemingly confirmed in 1998, when the CIA intercepted a telephone conversation between two al Qaeda operatives, during which one of them stated that bin Laden was planning a ‘Hiroshima-type event’ against the US, causing 10,000 casualties. This sparked an immediate but unsuccessful search for evidence that a major attack on the US was being planned.47 However, the key themes in bin Laden’s references to Hiroshima and Nagasaki were concerns about US intentions, and criticism of the circumstances surrounding the bombing of the two cities. He did not say that the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki justified al Qaeda using a nuclear weapon against the US. The very fact that the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not targeted against Muslims meant that it would be extremely difficult for al Qaeda to use them to justify its own use of nuclear weapons against the US. Indeed, by criticising the bombing of the two cities, bin Laden seems to be suggesting that he would not use nuclear weapons in similar circumstances. Having expressed these concerns about the willingness of the US to indiscriminately kill large numbers of people, al Qaeda needed to publicly demonstrate that it was able to defend the Muslim world from this threat. In a number of further interviews following Operation Infinite Reach, bin Laden attempted to do this by beginning to articulate al Qaeda’s strategy with regard to nuclear weapons. He repeatedly made the case that it was both a right and a duty for al Qaeda to possess these weapons. In an interview with al Jazeera in

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June 1999 he responded to a question about possessing nuclear weapons by stating: We believe that the right to self-defense is to be enjoyed by all people. Israel is stockpiling hundreds of nuclear warheads and bombs. The Christian West is largely in possession of such weapons. Hence, we do not regard this as a charge, but rather as a right.48 In this statement, bin Laden was not explicitly calling for nuclear weapons to be used against the US or the West in response to current or past events. Instead, he was saying that al Qaeda would use them for defence, in the same way as the West and Israel does. In other words, al Qaeda would use them to deter aggressive actions, or use them for retaliation if deterrence failed. This position is even more apparent in a series of comments that he made regarding Pakistan and nuclear weapons, in 1998. Following the Indian nuclear weapon tests in early 1998, he argued that the Muslim nation in general, and Pakistan in particular, should prepare for jihad and to terrorise the enemy, including with a nuclear force.49 In another interview with a Pakistani journalist he argued that the Indian tests had made it important for Pakistan to strengthen its own nuclear weapons capability and to demonstrate its power by testing its own nuclear weapons. He stated: ‘It is the responsibility of the brotherly Islamic country of Pakistan to examine the situation and give a stern reply to India one way or the other . . . it must show its power to India at any cost.’50 Significantly, he was not advocating the pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons against India, but rather stressing the overriding imperative for Pakistan to show that it was as powerful as India. The main purpose in demonstrating one’s strength to a powerful opponent would be to deter that opponent from any aggressive actions. Following Pakistan’s own nuclear weapons tests in June 1998, bin Laden praised Pakistan’s efforts to defend itself with WMD and encouraged other Muslims to do the same.51 Pakistan was committed to a posture of nuclear deterrence with India, so this statement can be seen as an explicit endorsement of that approach. It was not until after Operation Infinite Reach in August 1998 that bin Laden made his first explicit statements about al Qaeda and CBRN weapons. When he was asked about CBRN weapons during an interview

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with the ABC news network in December 1998, he confirmed that al Qaeda possessed CBRN weapons, and stated that ‘how we use them is up to us’.52 These comments were deliberately opaque, and he subsequently sought to clarify them in an interview with Time magazine in January 1999. When asked how he would use chemical or nuclear weapons, he replied: Acquiring weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty. If I have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to do so. And if I seek to acquire these weapons, I am carrying out a duty. It would be a sin for Muslims not to try to possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting harm on Muslims.53 When bin Laden referred to CBRN weapons preventing infidels from harming Muslims, he could have been referring to using them either for deterrence or in a first strike role. However, there is reason to believe that he may at least have begun to think in terms of their utility as a deterrent. He had previously acknowledged the concept of deterrence in his interview with ABC News in May 1998, even if he had not specifically mentioned CBRN weapons at that time. Similarly, the timing of the Time interview, so soon after Operation Infinite Reach, suggests that the cruise missile strikes might have persuaded bin Laden that al Qaeda needed a strategic deterrent to prevent future US attacks against its bases in Afghanistan. The Time interview was a less-than-emphatic declaration of al Qaeda’s intentions with regard to using CBRN weapons, but it also reflects an attempt to use CBRN threats for wider political purposes, by positioning al Qaeda as the protector of Muslims worldwide. This would tap into widespread disquiet among Muslims about US foreign policy in the Muslim world. Projecting an image of military strength through public statements about CBRN weapons was an attempt to add credibility to that position.

Exploiting the Politics of CBRN Terrorism During the late 1990s the academic debate on the generic threat of CBRN WMD terrorism was becoming much more balanced. Whereas

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in the mid-1990s academics had tended to focus on the factors that made a CBRN WMD terrorist attack more likely, by the turn of the century a larger number of analysts were focusing on the factors which would inhibit the threat, particularly the immense technical difficulties of developing workable WMD. The predominant view was best summed up by Richard Falkenrath, who defined CBRN WMD terrorism as ‘a low-probability, high-consequence threat’.54 In contrast, political analysis continued to reflect some of the worstcase analysis of the threat that had dominated the debate in the mid1990s. In 1999, the US Commission on National Security, which had been commissioned by President Clinton to study homeland security, concluded that ‘states, terrorists, and other disaffected groups will acquire weapons of mass destruction and mass disruption, and some will use them’, and that the ‘most serious threat to our security may consist of unannounced attacks on American cities by sub-national groups using genetically engineered pathogens’.55 Reports such as this helped to shape the wider political narrative about al Qaeda and CBRN weapons. Partly in order to justify Operation Infinite Reach and partly to fulfil its reporting requirements to Congress, the US Administration began to release increasing amounts of information about al Qaeda’s CBRN activities into the public domain in the late 1990s. In August 1998, John Gannon, chairman of the National Intelligence Council, revealed that the CIA had discovered that al Qaeda had attempted to acquire an unspecified CW for use against US troops stationed in the Persian Gulf.56 In February 1999 Sandy Berger informed a press conference that ‘we know bin Laden was seeking chemical weapons’, and ‘we know that he had worked with the Sudanese government to acquire chemical weapons’. CIA Director George Tenet repeated a similar message to the Senate Intelligence Committee in February 2000, telling them that: Although terrorists we’ve pre-empted still appear to be relying on conventional weapons, we know that a number of these groups are seeking chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear agents. We are aware of several instances in which terrorists have contemplated using these materials . . . Among them is bin Laden, who has shown a strong interest in chemical weapons. His operatives have trained to conduct attacks with toxic chemicals or biological toxins.57

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Contrary to bin Laden’s statement to Time magazine, which suggested that al Qaeda might adopt a strategy of deterrence, the statements by Gannon and Tenet indicate that the US intelligence agencies believed that al Qaeda planned to use CBRN weapons for first-strike purposes. However, their statements are not detailed enough to determine whether that was indeed the case. In particular, they did not indicate whether the al Qaeda leadership had either planned or approved any CBRN attacks, or whether the purported plans or plots that they were referring to had been developed by lower-level operational cells and still needed the approval of the central leadership. Nor was there any information about the politico-strategic context in which they claimed al Qaeda was contemplating using these weapons, so it is impossible to judge whether the purported plans were for first-strike or retaliatory purposes. One thing that is clear, though, is that the public record does not report any actual al Qaeda CBRN attacks either being put into operation or being disrupted in the period leading up to January 2000. The messaging in these statements was enhanced by alarmist and misleading media reports about al Qaeda obtaining CBRN weapons. In one example, in 2000 the Arab newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat claimed that the intelligence services of an unnamed European country had intercepted a shipment of approximately 20 nuclear warheads originating from Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan and Ukraine that were intended for al Qaeda and the Taliban.58 The report was untrue, but nevertheless fed into a wider narrative in the US, of a significant an imminent threat. Similarly, the Arab newspaper Al-Watan al-Arabi claimed in February 2001 that the US had aborted a planned air strike in Afghanistan for fear of a retaliatory CW attack by al Qaeda, after receiving warnings from an Arab embassy in Pakistan.59 The US had indeed planned several military operations to either kill or capture bin Laden in the late 1990s, all of which were cancelled. The precise reasons for the cancellation of these operations varied, but generally included inadequate intelligence of his whereabouts and the risk of collateral casualties. There is no evidence that US policy-makers had been deterred from acting by CW threats, even though they knew that al Qaeda was developing such weapons. Nevertheless, this report contributed to a perception in the Muslim world of al Qaeda’s growing military strength, enabling it to continue playing the role of self-proclaimed protector of the ummah.

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As a result of the increasing amounts of information that were becoming available about al Qaeda’s efforts to acquire CBRN weapons, and the high casualty levels in the Kenya and Tanzania embassy bombings, most US politicians and commentators believed that al Qaeda would use CBRN weapons as first-strike weapons for indiscriminate masscasualty attacks. It can be argued that this was a reasonable observation to draw from those facts, but bin Laden’s public statements about nuclear weapons were seemingly suggesting something quite different. The tendency to surmise al Qaeda’s intentions from its previous actions and its potential CBRN capabilities rather than its public statements would continue to dominate assessments of the CBRN threat posed by al Qaeda in future years. But given al Qaeda’s previous history of terrorist attacks, it would have been naive for the US intelligence agencies to base their assessments of al Qaeda’s intentions with regard to CBRN weapons solely on bin Laden’s brief and ambiguous public statements about nuclear weapons. This was especially true given that intentions can change suddenly, and with no warning. But the result was that the US risked misunderstanding al Qaeda’s intentions with regard to using CBRN weapons. For US policy-makers this raised the fundamental question of what to do about the al Qaeda CBRN weapon programme. By the time that President Clinton left office in January 2001 project al Zabadi and the al Qaeda nuclear programme were continuing to progress. Leaving them to continue, and possibly succeed in, developing CBRN WMD was clearly not a sustainable position in the long term, given the assessments of al Qaeda’s intentions.

CHAPTER 6 OPTING FOR DETERRENCE, 1999—2001

By 2001, the most experienced and committed al Qaeda operatives were receiving CBW training. It is not known how many jihadis might have received this training, but it could have been hundreds. After their training, some of them stayed on in Afghanistan, others returned to their countries of origin in North America and Europe as sleeper agents, whilst others travelled to fight in jihads across the world, particularly Chechnya. Routinely training al Qaeda operatives to use CBRN weapons would seem to suggest that al Qaeda was considering their use as firststrike weapons. However, the al Qaeda leadership retained direct control over all operations at that time, therefore any plans by individual cells to use CBW would have needed their approval. Nevertheless, the dissemination of CBRN knowledge throughout the wider network of jihadi training camps in Afghanistan posed a risk that the al Qaeda leadership might one day lose control of the CBRN threat. With the al Qaeda leadership finally having agreed to focus attacks on the US, it began to turn its attention towards operational matters. The most daring proposal for attacking the US did not come from within al Qaeda, but from the independent jihadi, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), who had masterminded the 1993 bomb attack on the World Trade Center (WTC). That attack had taught KSM that bombs and explosives could be problematic for big attacks, and that more novel forms of attack were needed. He therefore developed an audacious idea to hijack ten aircraft simultaneously and fly them into targets on the east and west

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coasts of the US. Among the potential targets he identified were nuclear power stations.1 He presented the idea to the al Qaeda leadership, and it became the first documented instance of the al Qaeda leadership considering a plot that involved an element of CBRN terrorism. KSM’s plan was initially rejected because of profound disagreements amongst the leadership over both its advisability and religious permissibility.2 These disagreements were not about the details of the operation but rather the very principle of an attack on US territory. One group believed that the plot was both ill-advised and theologically unjustified. The leading figure in this group was Abu Hafs al-Mauritani, who, as head of al Qaeda’s Shari’a committee, was responsible for determining the religious legitimacy of al Qaeda’s actions. He objected to the very principle of indiscriminate violence on religious grounds,3 and presented bin Laden with a brief, backed by Qur’anic citations, arguing that the plan would violate Islamic law.4 Others, such as Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, who used the nom de guerre Shaykh Sa’id alMasri, objected to the plan because they were worried about the likely retaliation by the US.5 However, the dissenting group was overruled, and in late 1999 bin Laden gave KSM the go-ahead for what became known as the airplanes plot.6 Over the course of a series of meetings in the spring of 1999, KSM, bin Laden and Mohammed Atef developed an operational plan. During these meetings, the west coast element of the plot was dropped, along with the targeting of nuclear power stations.7 Instead, the focus was placed on political, military and economic targets in Washington and New York. Even though the airplanes plot was an al Qaeda plot, KSM did not swear loyalty to bin Laden at this time, in order to leave himself free to continue the attack if bin Laden pulled out.8 The decision not to attack nuclear power stations is the first recorded instance of the al Qaeda leadership considering a CBRN attack and not approving it. The reason was because of fears that ‘it would go out of control’.9 This somewhat cryptic comment could conceivably have been a reference to the uncontrollable spread of radiation that would result, but it is more likely to have been a reference to the concerns expressed by al-Yazid about US retaliation. The decision was also consistent with bin Laden’s statement to Time magazine in 1999 that al Qaeda would use CBRN attacks for deterrence and retaliation, rather than for firststrike purposes.

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As planning for the operation developed, Mohammed Atta, the leader of the operational cell in the US, also pondered the option of attacking a nuclear power station that he had seen on his training flights around New York. However, the idea was rejected by other members of the cell because the airspace around nuclear power stations is restricted, which meant that they might get shot down. Atta accepted the views of his colleagues and never put the idea to KSM.10 This incident showed that just because an operational cell might discuss a CBRN idea, it does not necessarily mean that it will follow through on it. With planning for the attack well underway, bin Laden convened a conference of jihadis in Kandahar during the summer of 2000, to try to persuade other militant groups to join al Qaeda’s global jihad against the US. But many of those present criticised al Qaeda’s focus on attacking the US, because the inevitable retaliation would damage the work of those groups trying to overthrow secular dictatorships in the Arab world. But bin Laden refused to compromise his objectives. Surprisingly, at least some of those at the conference were told that al Qaeda was planning a major attack on the US, and became party to discussions about how to protect the Taliban regime and Afghan regime from US retaliation.11 Bin Laden did not believe that the US would ever try to invade Afghanistan, predicting instead that it might fire about 200 cruise missiles at Afghanistan. The al Qaeda leadership knew that they could evade the worst consequences of such an attack by simply dispersing, but they were extremely concerned about the risk that the US would target the Taliban as punishment for allowing al Qaeda to carry out the attack from Afghanistan. Mohammed Atef was given the task of determining how to mitigate the potential US response. He headed a group of al Qaeda leaders who believed that it was imperative to acquire a deterrent weapon before carrying out the attack, and the view of the key leaders was that only CBRN WMD would deter the US. These deliberations provide further evidence that bin Laden’s statements about nuclear weapons in 1999 were intended to mean that al Qaeda would use CBRN weapons for deterrence.12 However, bin Laden and Atef did not believe that project al Zabadi would ever deliver credible deterrent weapons within the timeframe of the airplanes plot. In desperation, Atef sent an emissary to Iraq to try and secure some assistance with developing CBRN weapons,13 but the Iraqi regime rejected these overtures. This left al Qaeda with the problem of

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how to use the crude CBRN capability that it had at its disposal as a deterrent. With KSM fully engaged on the airplanes plot, his assistant Amar al-Baluchi took the lead with trying to resolve this issue.14 He focused on identifying how to pre-position CBRN weapons or materials in the US. By having the capability already deployed in the US, it would strengthen the credibility of any al Qaeda CBRN threat, and if necessary allow for a demonstration of that capability. Among those he consulted was the Pakistani businessman Saifullah Paracha, who was involved in procuring materials for project al Zabadi.15 Paracha’s value lay in his extensive experience of importing goods into the US and his willingness to help al Qaeda do ‘something big’ against the US.16 Paracha described how any contraband could potentially be smuggled into a country by hiding it amongst similar, but legitimate, cargoes. He also tried to interest Baluchi in using nuclear weapons and attacks against nuclear power plants, arguing that nuclear weapons should be used against US troops, although he warned that the presence of radiation detectors at US ports would make it difficult to smuggle nuclear material into the US. But despite his enthusiasm, he failed to convince Baluchi, who did not believe that any of Paracha’s nuclear ideas were practical.17 KSM and Baluchi also tasked two al Qaeda operatives in Canada, Zacarias Moussaoui and Abderraouf Yousef Jdey, with conducting additional CBRN-related research. Moussaoui had met Sufaat in 2000, and Sufaat’s company had both sponsored his entry into the US and provided him with money.18 In the summer of 2001, Moussaoui and Jdey travelled down to the US together, where Moussaoui enrolled in a flight training course. But he also began researching how to operate crop duster aircraft,19 which al Qaeda considered to be a potential means to disseminate CBW. Moussaoui and Jdey were arrested in August 2001 after Moussaoui’s flight instructors became suspicious because he did not want to obtain a pilot’s licence. Jdey was found to have biology textbooks in his possession, although there was no evidence that he was engaged in any BW-related work. Crucially, they were both detained on immigration charges rather than terrorism charges, which meant that the FBI did not have the authority to search Moussaoui’s computer. As a result, they remained unaware of his interest in crop dusters. Jdey was released soon afterwards and disappeared, but Moussaoui continued to be held.20

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Even though KSM and Baluchi were researching ideas for using CBRN weapons, they did not develop any operational plans, and there is no evidence that the al Qaeda leadership had either ordered or approved a CBRN attack. Their activities did not therefore represent an imminent or emerging threat. But at the same time as al Qaeda was holding back from planning CBRN attacks, the politics of CBRN terrorism were being exploited to maximum effect in the Russian province of Chechnya.

Chechnya and the Politics of CBRN Terrorism Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Chechen separatist insurgents, led by General Jokhar Dudaev, had declared independence from Russia. The insurgents were primarily a nationalist movement but also included jihadis who were networked with al Qaeda. The most prominent of these jihadis was a Saudi called Ibn Khattab. At the time, the Russian government was too weak to challenge the separatists, but over the following years it increasingly began to try to reassert its authority over the breakaway province. From the outset, both the Russian government and the Chechen leadership conducted an information war in which deception and misinformation were routinely employed in an effort to influence both domestic and international politics. Insurgent CBRN threats would come to play a small but nevertheless significant role in this information war. If there was one theatre of conflict that had the potential for acts of CBRN terrorism it was Chechnya. The insurgents were ideally placed to obtain any unsecured CBRN weapons and materials from the states of the former Soviet Union, or even assistance from unemployed former Soviet WMD scientists. There were also a number of industrial facilities in Chechnya that housed toxic chemicals, such as the Grozny Chemical Factory and the Red October Factory, as well as 21 facilities housing radiological sources, especially the Radon radioactive waste-disposal facility at Tolstoy Yurt, north of Grozny.21 There were also individuals living in Chechnya who were experienced in handling these materials who could potentially work with insurgent bomb-makers to make crude chemical and radiological improvised explosive devices (IEDs). During 1993, Russian-backed Chechen opposition groups made a number of attempts to overthrow Dudaev, all of which failed. As tensions began to increase, Dudaev approached the US government

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claiming that his forces possessed nuclear weapons.22 It is not clear whether Dudaev made this claim in order to draw the US into the conflict or to deter Russia from attacking Chechnya, but whatever his intention, it failed. In the summer of 1994 the Russian government intensified the political pressure on the Chechen government by claiming that it was corrupt and involved in international criminal activities. At the same time, Russia was funding and arming several Chechen opposition groups that were attempting to overthrow Dudaev. These groups launched a major offensive in November 1994 with the covert support of ‘volunteers’ from elite Russian regular army units. In response, Dudayev requested that the UN deploy troops to Chechnya to protect WMD from attack by Russian special forces units. Dudaev’s request was generally regarded as an attempt to scare Russian decision-makers into thinking that he had nuclear weapons,23 but it may also have been designed to draw the UN into the conflict. After this effort to overthrow Dudaev failed, the Russian armed forces launched a major offensive to recapture Chechnya in December 1994. The offensive quickly exposed Dudaev’s claims to have nuclear weapons as a bluff. The Chechen capital city of Groznyy and other population centers were destroyed during a long and bloody campaign. But despite the firepower at its disposal, the Russian army experienced a series of setbacks, and Chechen forces continued to hold swaths of territory in the republic throughout 1995 and into 1996. As the war dragged on Russia increasingly found itself losing the information war. Western politicians and media largely viewed the conflict as a war of national self-determination, and the violence meted out by the Russian military against civilians was widely condemned. These views were reflected in the position of Western governments, particularly the US Administration, which refused to recognise the independence of Chechnya but still publicly criticised Russia’s use of military force. But much more significantly, Russian public opinion did not believe in the war. During 1995 and 1996 the insurgents increased their efforts to use CBRN threats for political purposes. They removed a significant amount of radioactive waste from the radon facility, including quantities of caesium-137 and strontium-90, and buried it in a suburb of Grozny where an explosives workshop was located.24 Shamyl Basayev, one of the

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most prominent insurgent commanders, then made a series of threats to detonate containers of radioactive material in Russian cities, to attack nuclear facilities in Russia, and even to detonate a nuclear device inside Russia. He boldly declared that he would turn Moscow into an ‘eternal desert’ with radioactive waste.25 To demonstrate the credibility of his threats, he called a press conference at which he displayed containers which he claimed contained radioactive materials, and told a Russian television network where to find a container of caesium-137 buried in Moscow’s Izmailovskiy Park.26 If Basayev had intended these threats to act as a deterrent, they failed because there was no change in Russia’s conduct of the war. But even with his bluff called Basayev did not attempt to make good on his threats. One potential explanation for this is that he recognised the likely negative political consequences of using a radiological weapon against a civilian target in Russia, both in terms of losing international political support as well as provoking an extreme backlash from Russia. But it can also be argued that he had no need to follow through on his threats because the success of the insurgent army on the battlefield was already fatally weakening Russian resolve. With no possibility of military victory in sight and domestic public opinion having turned against the war, the Russian government agreed to a ceasefire in 1996, leaving the insurgents in control of Chechnya. Following the ceasefire, the Russian military recognised that it had lost the information war to the insurgents, and that it if there was ever to be a renewal of hostilities it would need to reshape the public attitude towards the insurgents.27 In the subsequent years therefore, the Russian government continued the information war. A prominent element in this stage of the war was attempts to scare both domestic and international opinion into believing that the insurgents had acquired CBRN weapons. In late 1995 and 1996 the Russian media published a number of reports claiming that the Chechen insurgents had acquired a number of small person-portable nuclear weapons from the arsenal of the former Soviet Union. From then on, these devices were commonly referred to in the media as ‘suitcase nukes’. One of these reports described the purchase of two 30-kg nuclear devices in Lithuania in 1992. These reports chimed with concerns voiced in Western debates on CBRN terrorism, that inadequate accountancy and physical security measures on the Russian

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nuclear arsenal might enable terrorists to acquire nuclear weapons. However, the majority of Russian news organisations are linked with the government, and these particular reports appeared in the ultranationalist newspaper Zavtra and the pro-Kremlin tabloid Komsomolskaya Pravda,28 which cast significant doubt on their credibility. Despite doubts about the credibility of the reports, the Russian government set up a commission to investigate them, under the chairmanship of General Alexander Lebed. In 1997 Lebed publicly announced that an unknown number of suitcase nukes could not be accounted for. According to Lebed, the commission had only been able to locate 48 of the estimated 132 devices that existed. This suggested that as many as 84 might have been lost. But Lebed would not confirm exactly how many had been in the Soviet arsenal to begin with, and regularly changed his story about how many were missing. He eventually declared that the number missing was somewhere between 100 and 500. But one thing that Lebed was categorical about was that the allegations concerning Chechen insurgents acquiring some of these devices were false.29 However, Lebed had spoken before the Commission completed its work, and as a result the facts of the situation remained mired in confusion. He also neglected to mention that these devices required regular maintenance, without which their explosive yield would be significantly diminished and they might even become inoperable.30 But irrespective of the credibility of Lebed’s claims, the official status of the inquiry meant that its findings influenced international debates about nuclear proliferation and terrorism and fed into the ongoing information war against the Chechen insurgents and al Qaeda. The suitcase nukes drama reached its peak in 1997 and 1998. In May 1997, Lebed ensured that it fed back into US political debates when he met a US congressional delegation led by Senator Curt Weldon, and briefed them that 84 suitcase nukes were missing. In a subsequent US television interview, aired on 7 September 1997, Lebed went on to state that he believed that more than 100 were missing.31 Other sources then chipped in to add fuel to the fire. In August 1998, a leaked intelligence report by Aman, the Israeli Directorate of Military Intelligence, stated that bin Laden had allegedly paid over £2 million to a middleman in Kazakhstan for a suitcase nuke.32 There was no conclusive proof that any terrorist group had actually acquired any of these weapons, but

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legislators and the media continued to emphasise the risk. In one particularly melodramatic gesture during a congressional hearing on Russian espionage in January 2000, Weldon produced a mock-up of a suitcase nuke in an attache´ case. It would not be until 2004 that the issue was finally closed, when Russia announced that it had accounted for every single device.33 The final closure of the story strongly suggests that it had been concocted for political purposes. The exact reasons are unclear, but the story formed part of the backdrop to the second Chechen war. Following the 1996 ceasefire, the insurgents underwent an everincreasing process of radical Islamisation and internationalisation, and their objective became the creation of an Islamic state in Chechnya.34 This was reflected in growing connections between the insurgents and al Qaeda. One aspect of these growing connections was that some Afghan Arabs travelled to Chechnya, whilst several hundred Chechens made the opposite trek to Afghanistan for training.35 Any of the Chechens who underwent al Qaeda’s advanced training courses would have received the basic CBRN training described earlier in this chapter. Another significant result of these connections was a growing dialogue between Khattab and the al Qaeda leadership about CBRN weapons. Senior al Qaeda leaders warned Khattab that previous experience had shown that whenever the Russians were defeated, they would quickly re-organise and strike back. They warned that if the Russians were victorious, the Chechen population would face a genocide similar to that experienced by the Bosnian Muslims. They recommended that the only way to prevent this happening was to obtain CBRN WMD.36 This line of reasoning was consistent with the arguments made by Atef during the Kandahar conference in 2000 about the need to acquire a CBRN deterrent to deter US attacks on Afghanistan. By 1999, tensions in the Caucasus were beginning to rise again. As a renewal of hostilities became increasingly likely, the Russian government increased the tempo of its information war. The key theme in its approach was to portray the Chechens as criminals and terrorists, and allegations of CBRN terrorism continued to play a part in that narrative. The most prominent example of this was an article in late 1998 in the Arab newspaper Al-Watan al-’Arabi, which was partly based on information provided by the Russian intelligence service, the FSB. The article recounted an incredible story that drew on all of the major

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concerns that had permeated debates on WMD proliferation since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The article claimed that the US had received reports that al Qaeda and the Taliban had bought more than 20 nuclear weapons of various sizes and explosive power from the Chechen mafia. Bin Laden was reported to be particularly interested in nuclear weapons that could be carried in small suitcases. The weapons were reported to have originated in several countries, including Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Russia, and reputedly cost $30 million in cash and two tons of heroin. Al Qaeda was also reported to have recruited five Muslim Turkmen nuclear experts, who were establishing a nuclear weapon laboratory in an al Qaeda camp near Khost, where the nuclear warheads were stored in underground tunnels. Some security agencies reportedly did not rule out the possibility that other former scientists from the Soviet nuclear weapons programme had joined the team. The US intelligence agencies reportedly feared that this laboratory would specialise in converting the nuclear weapons into smaller bombs for use in US cities.37 Nothing in this report was actually true, and the sourcing of information from the FSB strongly suggests that it was Russian misinformation. In particular, the reference to bin Laden’s interest in suitcase nukes was a fairly obvious attempt to capitalise on the political furore generated by Lebed’s claims. It was just one of a number of reports within a broader narrative being developed by the Russian government at that time, linking the Chechen insurgents to both al Qaeda and CBRN terrorism, two issues at the top of Western security debates. In December 1998, the Chechen Security Service announced that it had discovered a container filled with radioactive materials attached to a landmine, hidden near a railway line near Argun, 10 miles from Grozny. And from 1999 there was a steady increase in the number of reports coming out of Russia of Chechens carrying out surveillance on sensitive Russian facilities.38 The Russian narrative was further strengthened by a number of politically naive threats made by the Chechen government. They began with President Maskhadov’s government condemning Operation Infinite Reach, which was followed by the Chechen Deputy Prime Minister Vaha Arsanov declaring war against the US.39 The Chechen leadership then went on to make a number of explicit threats to use CBRN weapons. In February 1999, the Chechen warlord Salman

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Raduyev warned that Chechen forces would attack Russian biological facilities unless two Chechen prisoners were released. Several months later, the insurgents threatened to attack a nuclear power plant and other nuclear facilities in Russia. Perhaps emboldened by the fact that its propaganda narrative was beginning to resonate in the West, the Russian government took an even harder public line every time the Chechens made a CBRN threat.40 In August 1999, Chechen insurgents launched an attack on the neighbouring province of Dagestan, and a bombing campaign in Moscow that destroyed a number of apartment blocks, killing hundreds of people. The Russian government used these incidents as the justification to launch a new military offensive in Chechnya. Just as the war began, the Russian government alleged that the insurgents were planning to attack nuclear targets, but this was strongly denied by Raduyev on the grounds that ‘the consequences of this cannot be predicted’.41 Raduyev did not articulate exactly what he meant, although he could have been referring either to the uncontrollable spread of radiation that would result or the political consequences of such an attack. But his denial had little impact on the course of the information war. The Russians continued to aggressively propagate their narrative, and in October 1999 yet another report about a ‘Chechen bomb’ appeared in the Russian media.42 The al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan had been correct in its assessment of the likely Russian reaction to its defeat in the first Chechen war. The Russian army had taken the intervening time to re-organise and prepare, and was soon advancing on Grozny. Mindful of the advice of the al Qaeda leadership, Basayev and Khattab sent representatives to Kandahar to ask al Qaeda for support. One of the things they explicitly asked for was CBRN weapons. Bin Laden readily agreed to provide fighters, equipment and money, but he had no strategic CBRN weapons to offer them.43 Unable to obtain strategic CBRN weapons from al Qaeda, Brigadier General Rizvan Chitigov, one of Khattab’s most trusted lieutenants, laced the likely avenues of approach to Grozny with crude locally made chlorine and ammonia IEDs.44 In an attempt to deter an assault on the city, a Chechen spokesman then publicly threatened to detonate these IEDs if the Russian army advanced.45 Russian army reconnaissance units observed the preparation of these defences, and the army ensured that the Chechens use of CW received widespread coverage in the media. ORT, the Russian Public Television

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Station, and Novosti, the Russian Information Agency, also reported that the insurgents were planning to use mustard gas. And the Russian army also briefed the media that ‘foreign extremist groups’ could have delivered CW supplies to the insurgents, and that there were about 160 tons of ammonia and 60 tons of chlorine located in 11 plants throughout Chechnya.46 The Chechens responded with their own propaganda that the Russians were using CW. The pro-insurgent Kavkaz-Tsentr website reported that Russian strikes against nuclear waste dumps, chemical installations and other sites could lead to an environmental catastrophe in the entire Caucasus-Caspian-Black Sea region. In early December 1999, witnesses reported seeing ‘a strange yellow smog’ following an explosion in Grozny, which the insurgents claimed was the result of the Russian army using CW shells. The Russian army countered by accusing the insurgents themselves of blowing up oil products or chemicals in Grozny to coincide with the Helsinki Summit, in order to accuse the Russian army of using CW.47 The final assault on Grozny began in mid-December, but rather than simply advancing into pre-prepared kill zones as it had done during the first Battle of Grozny, the Russian army cautiously probed for insurgent positions before calling in air and artillery support to eliminate them. In an attempt to pre-empt the CW threat, Russian forces seized or destroyed much of the chlorine stocks in Grozny, and bombed the Grozny Chemical Factory,48 but the assault was still hampered by fierce defensive fire and IEDs, both conventional and chemical.49 During the course of the battle for the city, there was continued claim and counter-claim by both sides about the other using CW. The Chechens claimed that Russian army CW units were concentrating on the outskirts of the city and that a large quantity of CW had recently been deployed. Whether this was a legitimate report or the establishment of plausible deniability for detonating their own chemical IEDs is unknown. They also claimed that the Russians had already used CW in the Dzhokhar district, killing more than 60 civilians and wounding around 200 more.50 Similarly, Russia reported a number of chemical IED and mortar attacks against its forces, but no cases of poisoning were reported.51 Despite official Russian protestations that it was not using CW, the insurgent propaganda was widely reported in the Western media, and was followed by threats of European Union sanctions and the withdrawal

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of Council of Europe status.52 But ultimately these allegations caused no significant political damage to Russia. On the battlefield, Grozny fell in early 2001, giving the Russian authorities the opportunity to recover most of the nuclear materials that had been removed from the radon facility,53 as well as the remaining chlorine and ammonia stockpiles in the city, roughly one-third of which were found to have been rigged with explosives.54 Alongside its military success, the Russian government’s political conduct of the war was also markedly more successful than during the first Chechen war. Throughout the offensive, Russia kept up a steady stream of propaganda about the insurgents and CBRN weapons. Pravda published a further report about the Chechens possessing nuclear weapons, which had reportedly been stolen from stockpiles in the FSU before they could be transferred to Russia, whilst official Russian sources continued to make a steady stream of claims about insurgent plans to use CBRN weapons.55 This time around the Russian narrative found resonance with both domestic public opinion and the US Administration, which acknowledged that the current outbreak of violence had been sparked by the Chechen attacks on Dagestan and Moscow. In testimony before Congress, a senior Administration official asserted that the insurgents were receiving help from radical groups in other countries, including al Qaeda and others who had attacked or threatened the US or its interests.56 So whilst the Administration remained highly critical of Russia’s excessive use of military forces in Chechnya, it still acknowledged Russia’s responsibility to defend its territorial integrity and to combat terrorism and lawlessness.57 The Administration did not publicly refer to the allegations about Chechen links with CBRN terrorism, but they nevertheless added to the case that this was a war against international terrorism. The use of CW by the Chechens illustrates that terrorists will not necessarily use CBRN weapons for indiscriminate mass-casualty attacks. The insurgents had been involved in a number of terrorist attacks in Russia that had caused large numbers of civilian casualties, yet they restricted the use of CW to attacks against the Russian army. Outside of the immediate battlefield, they focused instead on trying to use CBRN threats for political purposes, particularly to threaten and deter the Russian government, and to influence Russian and international public opinion. For al Qaeda and other observers of the conflict, it was evident

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that Chechen use of CW had failed to alter the course of the battle for Grozny and their CBRN threats failed to secure any significant political benefits for the rebels. In contrast, Russia had successfully managed to use Chechen CBRN threats to both politically damage the insurgents and justify its own military actions.

Stepping Up Attacks on the US Between 1988 and September 2001 the al Qaeda leadership was primarily focused on planning and executing large-scale conventional attacks against US targets. Within the lower levels of the network, however, there was discussion about how they might be able to use the crude chemical and biological agents that al Qaeda had at its disposal.58 This included discussions about using mustard gas and cyanide against Jews in Iran, or forcing Russian scientists to fire a nuclear-armed missile at the US, and using air-conditioning systems to pump poisonous gas into buildings.59 Preliminary planning for a plot to poison a river in the US was also undertaken,60 as well as research into US nuclear power stations.61 A Portugese member of al Qaeda, Paulo Jose de Almedia Santos, also discussed an idea to use mercury to poison water and cereals in Israel and tried to develop a contact poison, but failed.62 However, none of these ideas was ever formulated into an operational plot, leaving Khabab to bemoan the fact that none of his former students had tried to use their CBRN training in an operational attack.63 This chatter and research about CBRN weapons is indicative that some al Qaeda operatives were at least beginning to think about CBRN weapons, but there is no evidence that their interest in using CBRN weapons was shared by the leadership. This difference in views was apparent in the Millennium Plot of December 2000. This plan involved simultaneously bombing Los Angeles airport in the US and a number of locations in Jordan, where there would be hundreds of US and Israeli tourists, on the eve of the millennium. The plot was to be executed by cells based in Canada and Jordan, and was coordinated by Abu Zubayda, an influential Pakistan-based fixer for militant ideologues who was linked to al Qaeda. The key player in the Canada cell was an Algerian called Ahmed Ressam, who had received CW training at Darunta.64 Al Qaeda therefore had an operative in place if it wanted to execute a CW attack on the US, but it chose instead to use a conventional bomb.

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The cell in Jordan was led by a US citizen named Raed Hijazi, also known as Abu Ahmed the American. He was an experienced jihadi who had been trained in bomb-making in al Qaeda’s Afghan camps. Other members of the cell came from al Qaeda and al Tawhid wal Jihad. The plan was to bomb four sites – the Radisson hotel in the Capital City Amman, the border between Jordan and Israel, Mount Nebo (a Christian holy site) and a site on the River Jordan where John the Baptist is said to have baptised Jesus.65 However, the cell had been compromised. In late 1998, the Jordanian intelligence services first started to receive information about a terrorist operation called Bethlehem 2000, and later heard that Abu Ahmed the American was boasting that there would not be enough body bags in Jordan to hold all the corpses.66 In late 1999, realising that an attack was imminent, the Jordanian police conducted a number of raids, arresting 16 men. But Abu Ahmed the American was not among them. Some of the suspects provided details of a safe house in a refugee camp on the outskirts of Amman, where police discovered 70 canisters of highly toxic chemicals. Altogether, they found 5,000 lb of nitric and sulphuric acid, which is enough to produce a bomb capable of blowing up the entire neighbourhood around the Radisson hotel.67 Information received by the FBI indicated that the plot might have included plans to use cyanide bombs.68 This allegation probably arose from the cell discussing the option of using cyanide with its bombs, but there is no evidence that they ever attempted to do so. The Jordanian authorities eventually put 28 suspects on trial. Twenty-two of them would be found guilty. Among those sentenced in absentia were Zarqawi and Abu Zubayda.69 A member of the Amman cell revealed the existence of the Canada cell, which consisted of members of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). In early December 1999 the Canadian authorities began monitoring the cell, but did not realise that it was planning to bomb Los Angeles International airport. The Canadian police failed to notice when Ressam slipped quietly out of his apartment building and drove west, with 100 lb of bomb-making equipment in the boot of his car. On 14 December 1999, he reached Victoria, a coastal town in British Columbia, from where he took a ferry to Port Angeles in Washington State in the US. Ressam was just one checkpoint away from disappearing into the US when he was detained by US immigration officers.70

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Under interrogation Ressam gave up details of the millennium attack, as well as the training he had received in Afghanistan. He provided investigators with details of Khabab’s CBW work at Darunta, including the use of cyanide on dogs, and the oily form of cyanide that was being developed. He claimed that he had been taught how to disseminate cyanide through the ventilation systems of buildings. A Qaeda’s thinking was that it could potentially be used in US government buildings to kill as many people as possible.71 He also stated that al Qaeda was interested in using low-flying aircraft to disperse toxic materials.72 His testimony was partially verified by satellite imagery showing the bodies of dead dogs strewn around a training camp near Tora Bora.73 Ressam’s testimony confirmed US intelligence assessments that al Qaeda already possessed a crude CW capability, and that al Qaeda had begun to train operatives to use CBW.74 The failure of the Millennium Plot was swiftly followed by another failure in Yemen, when a group of al Qaeda operatives and other jihadis attempted to use a boat laden with explosives to attack a US warship docked in Aden harbour in January 2000. The boat sank before reaching the warship, but the jihads still believed that the concept would work. In October the same year another cell used the same tactic to attack the USS Cole in Aden harbour. This time, the attack was successful and 17 US sailors were killed. Whilst al Qaeda’s senior leadership were focused on conventional attacks, there was an operational cell in Europe that was actively developing plans to use CBW. In the late 1990s, al Qaeda’s most important base in Europe was reported to be the Islamic Cultural Institute in Milan, which organised the movement of weapons, men and money around the world. Linked to the Institute was a cell of five operatives from the Salafist Group for Faith and Combat, an offshoot of the Armed Islamic Group. The cell was led by a Tunisian called Essid Sami Ben Khemais, and was linked to al Qaeda planners in Afghanistan through a Libyan called Ben Hani Mohamed Lased, who was an expert in explosives and had also received CBW training in Afghanistan. In March 2001 the cell was discussing the possibility of using ‘tins of tomatoes’ to transport ‘a liquid that suffocates people’, and a crude ‘gas bomb’, which had recently been developed by Lased.75 They had informed al Qaeda contacts in Pakistan of their plans and were becoming impatient to receive further instructions. Khemais urged Lased to:

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Talk to the Sheikh [believed to be bin Laden]. I need two people who I have already got in mind, the Libyan and the Kurd from London. What I need is not an army but two people who have got a brain, training, and nothing to lose or to gain. They spread the gas and say goodbye. I only need a barrel of 10 litres and a few documents. God is with us. But approval for the attack was never forthcoming. Instead, on the evening of 9 March Lased confided to the other members of the cell, ‘believe me, the Sheikh is planning something. He has an objective and he wants to realise it, just like he has achieved all his desires. It’s not a little thing.’76 The meaning of this comment eventually became apparent with the coordinated attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. That proved to be their last discussion of the matter before Khemais was arrested in Milan in April 2001 and Lased was arrested in Munich in October 2001. No chemicals or any other potential weapons were recovered but Khemais still received a five-year prison sentence for trafficking in arms, explosives and chemicals. Precisely what their plan was remains unclear. One theory is that they were planning to spread cyanide gas through an American government building in London or Rome. It was speculated that the tins could have been used to transport cyanide crystals that would then be dissolved in acid, and the resultant gas would then be dispersed through the ventilation ducts of an appropriate building.77 This is the second known instance of the al Qaeda leadership refusing to approve a CBRN attack. Lased’s veiled reference to the airplanes plot suggests that the al Qaeda leadership had refused to approve the plot because it did not want to draw attention to al Qaeda in the lead-up to 9/11, but the leadership had been willing to sanction the attack on Los Angeles airport, which would have had exactly the same effect. A more likely explanation is that the plan did not fit with al Qaeda’s intention to use CBRN weapons for deterrence. After the attacks on 11 September 2001, the key issue for the al Qaeda leadership was to what extent the attack had changed the politico-strategic environment in which it was operating, and whether circumstances continued to support the use of CBRN weapons for deterrence.

CHAPTER 7 THE END OF PROJECT AL ZABADI

The events of 9/11 proved again that al Qaeda was willing to perpetrate mass-casualty attacks on the US, reinforcing the widely held perception that it would use CBRN weapons for first-strike purposes if it could only acquire them. Prior to 9/11, the consensus within the CIA was that al Qaeda would be unable to develop effective CBRN WMD. Following the attacks, the CIA reviewed all of the available intelligence regarding al Qaeda and CBRN weapons, but this time came back with a radically different assessment. George Tenet, the former director of the CIA, noted in his memoirs that the results ‘stunned us all’ – the threat was real.1 It was therefore unsurprising that as the US security establishment scrambled to identify and prevent any possible follow-up attacks, their attention focused on CBRN weapons. Within days of 9/11, former Secretary of Defense William Cohen predicted that al Qaeda’s next attack would involve BW.2 The Pentagon itself warned that the next major attack would not involve aircraft ‘they’ve been there and done that . . . the real fear now is chemical’.3 R. James Woolsey, a former director of the CIA, also chipped in by reminding the American public that ‘bin Laden has been trying to get his hands on enriched uranium for seven or eight years’.4 These fears were seemingly confirmed when the FBI re-assessed Zaccarias Moussaoui. They searched his computer and discovered a manual on crop-spraying from aircraft, which in light of Ahmed Ressam’s testimony was taken as evidence of a plan to spread chemical, biological or radioactive material over a US city.5 In response, all crop dusters in the US

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were grounded, and the FBI approached every crop duster company in the country, searching for links to terrorism. No evidence of links between the 9/11 hijackers and crop dusters was discovered, but members of a crop dusters’ group were asked to report any suspicious purchases of dangerous chemicals. The restrictions were lifted soon afterwards, but crop dusters were still banned from taking off or landing around major cities.6 The FBI also discovered that several individuals, including some who may have had links to the 9/11 hijackers, had fraudulently obtained or attempted to obtain hazardous material transportation licences. The FBI investigated the possibility that terrorists might attach bombs to chemical tankers to convert them into crude chemical weapons, but no evidence of a plot was discovered.7 In response to concerns about the possible contamination of food and water supplies, federal and local agencies stepped up safety checks,8 and the FBI issued a warning to all US law-enforcement agencies, instructing them to be vigilant around public utilities, nuclear power plants and water facilities.9 Intelligence was also received that a small nuclear weapon had been smuggled into New York, prompting the Department of Energy to send radiation detection equipment to the city, but nothing was found.10 In the UK, sensationalist media reporting was also placing a renewed focus on CBRN attacks. Just five days after 9/11, there were reports that al Qaeda was plotting to attack the European Parliament with sarin.11 A group of six men was arrested by the police but later released. Even at the time, the report lacked credibility, given that there was no evidence that al Qaeda had ever produced sarin. But even though that specific report lacked credibility, the UK security services issued a warning about the potential risk of a CBRN attack, particularly through contamination of the water supply,12 and contingency plans to deal with CBRN threats were hurriedly updated.13 Fears about al Qaeda using BW were seemingly realised just a few weeks after 9/11, when four letters containing anthrax were sent to US TV stations and politicians. Those letters cross-contaminated a large volume of other post as they passed through the postal system, as well as the buildings in which they were processed or opened. A total of 22 people contracted anthrax during the course of the incident, of whom five died. For a short time, the Capitol and Supreme Court buildings, among others, were closed for decontamination. The casualties and damage arising from the letters were minimal, but they had the effect of

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repoliticising the issue of CBRN terrorism, with both legislators and the media criticising the Administration’s handling of the incident and demanding the introduction of improved defences against BW attack. In the early days of the investigation into the letters, White House officials repeatedly pressed FBI Director Robert Mueller to prove that they were a second-wave assault by al Qaeda, even though investigators had quickly ruled it out. After a photojournalist died of anthrax on 5 October 2001, Mueller was ‘beaten up’ during President Bush’s morning intelligence briefings for not producing proof that al Qaeda was responsible. He recalled that ‘[t]hey really wanted to blame somebody in the Middle East’. Yet the FBI had been informed by experts at Fort Detrick, the US government’s biodefence centre, that the anthrax was a military strain that was ‘not something some guy in a cave could come up with’. Nevertheless, on 15 October 2001 President Bush publicly declared that ‘[t]here may be some possible link’ to bin Laden, whilst Vice President Dick Cheney claimed that bin Laden’s henchmen were trained in ‘how to deploy and use these kinds of substances, so you start to piece it all together’.14 This disconnect between the Administration’s statements and the assessments that it was receiving from its specialist advisers can potentially be interpreted as the Administration deliberately issuing misinformation to suit its political agenda. Yet the Administration was under enormous political pressure at the time for its failure to contain the threat and identify the perpetrators. Bush’s and Cheney’s carefully worded statements may simply have been an attempt to stave off that criticism. The longer the investigation continued, the more a consensus developed that the culprit was actually someone from inside the US BW defence community. But it was not until 2008 that the FBI officially closed the case following the suicide of Dr Bruce Ivins, a former microbiologist at Fort Detrick.15 Ivins was not linked to any known terrorist organisation, but did suffer from mental health problems. The letters were not therefore an al Qaeda BW attack, but they served as a warning of what al Qaeda might be able to achieve, which perhaps was their intended purpose.

The War on Terror Prior to 9/11, successive US administrations had avoided the issue of dealing with al Qaeda’s CBRN weapon infrastructure in Afghanistan, but

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after 9/11 that position was no longer politically tenable. Within hours of 9/11, President Bush had decided that the US would respond militarily,16 which provided the perfect opportunity to destroy al Qaeda’s CBRN weapon infrastructure. On 20 September 2001 President Bush officially announced that the US was declaring a ‘war on terror’. The first significant action of the war was to invade Afghanistan, in collaboration with the UK and the forces of the Afghan Northern Alliance. As part of its communications strategy in the lead-up to the invasion of Afghanistan, the UK government published a dossier titled ‘Responsibility for the terrorist atrocities in the US’, which was intended to summarise the evidence of al Qaeda’s culpability for 9/11. There was actually very little information about 9/11 in the dossier, with the bulk of it being about al Qaeda’s past record of terrorist activity. But it did include a number of unattributed references to Jamal al Fadl’s testimony about al Qaeda’s efforts to acquire nuclear and chemical weapons.17 These references were among the first steps by the US and UK governments to establish a narrative in the public discourse on the war on terror that linked 9/11 with al Qaeda and its attempts to acquire CBRN weapons. This reflected the significance of CBRN terrorism, both as a driver of US and UK policy-making in the war on terror and as a core component of the communication strategies that were designed to justify US and UK actions. As they planned the invasion, US military planners faced a dilemma. They had good intelligence about a number of al Qaeda CBRN weapondevelopment sites, but there were also a number of other sites that were suspected of being involved in CBRN activities but were not part of al Qaeda camps. High on this list of suspect sites was a nitrogen fertiliser plant in the northern town of Mazar-i-Sharif that was being run by both al Qaeda and the Taliban, which contained equipment that could have been used to make CBW.18 The plant was near an al Qaeda compound, and there had been reports of suspicious activity at the plant for some time.19 Another suspect site, at Badam Begh in Kabul, manufactured anthrax vaccine for livestock, using non-pathogenic strains of anthrax that had been acquired from India, Iran and Turkey. The facility concerned US intelligence analysts because of the equipment that it contained.20 US BW experts advised that it would be difficult to use the plant to produce anthrax weapons, but some US officials still claimed that it was important to deny al Qaeda access to such a facility.21

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On 8 October 2001, the US and UK air forces began to systematically bomb Taliban and al Qaeda facilities in Afghanistan. Among the early targets were the Turnak Farms, Darunta and Sufaat’s laboratory at Kandahar hospital. Sufaat’s laboratory was destroyed, but Khabab’s laboratory at Darunta and the underground facilities at Turnak Farms remained unscathed. Neither the fertiliser plant in Mazar-I-Sharif nor the anthrax vaccine facility at Badam Begh were bombed.22 The decision not to bomb those two facilities illustrates the extent to which political considerations were influencing US decision-making on dealing with CBRN weapon threats. Mindful of the political damage caused by the destruction of the Shifa pharmaceutical plant, the Administration was worried about being accused of destroying the public health and agricultural infrastructure of Afghanistan.23 Hindsight proved that it was the right decision, since neither site was part of al Qaeda’s CBW programme. After several weeks of airstrikes, the US and Northern Alliance forces launched a major ground offensive in northern Afghanistan, which was coordinated with an uprising among Pashtun opposition groups in the south. Al Qaeda abandoned most of its bases as it pulled back to the Tora Bora cave system to make a final stand, where it was defeated after a protracted battle. A few hundred fighters also tried to make a stand in the bombed-out remains of the Turnak Farms, but they were quickly overwhelmed by the Northern Alliance. After the battle, the entrance of an underground tunnel that led to a vast workshop containing a number of containers filled with suspicious materials was discovered.24 By 10 December 2001 Taliban rule in Afghanistan officially came to an end, leaving the US in control of all al Qaeda facilities in Afghanistan.

Investigating Project Al Zabadi Having taken control of the al Qaeda infrastructure in Afghanistan, the US intelligence agencies began to systematically search for evidence of its CBRN activities. What they discovered was a CBRN weapondevelopment programme that was still in its early stages but was much more extensive than they had originally assessed. It became apparent that Khabab and Sufaat had managed to gather a significant amount of relevant scientific information to support their CBW work. US troops recovered hundreds of documents from various

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locations, written in a variety of languages, including Arabic, Urdu, Persian, Mandarin, Russian and English. Among them were documents that detailed Rauf Ahmed’s efforts to acquire equipment and anthrax samples from Europe.25 The documents outlined crude plans for developing CBW, and included protocols for manufacturing botulinum toxin, ricin and cyanide,26 as well as documentary evidence of al Qaeda’s interest in sarin, mustard gas and VX.27 One textbook contained details of methods for contaminating air-conditioning systems, and evidence was discovered of experiments with a device to disperse cyanide gas. Analysis of this material showed that it did not come from a single source but rather from people from several nationalities with different educational backgrounds,28 and included a considerable amount of material that had been downloaded from the websites of extreme rightwing American groups.29 At Darunta, Khabab’s cluttered laboratory was discovered intact. In one corner, a long metal box lined with wood shavings held 18 containers of toxic liquids. On a shelf in another corner were several smaller plastic containers, one of which was marked ‘cyanide’ in Arabic. There were also a number of boxes of basic laboratory equipment, gas masks and a packet of gas detector papers scattered around the room. Stuffed onto another shelf was a thick pile of English-language instruction manuals on chemicals, bomb-making and guerrilla warfare, which had been downloaded from the internet.30 Most of the equipment in the room came from the UAE, and the chemicals came from China.31 In the tunnel complex below the Turnak Farms a CBW laboratory, together with quantities of cyanide and hundreds of containers full of powders and liquids, were discovered, alongside documents relating to the development of CBRN weapons.32 It was assessed that al Qaeda might have acquired the necessary production facilities to support ‘a very limited production of biological and chemical agents’, although the equipment had not yet been used and no live biological agents were discovered there.33 Over 100 typed and handwritten pages of documents that shed light on al Qaeda’s early anthrax planning were recovered, but it remained unclear whether or not it had acquired a pathogenic strain of anthrax.34 There were a number of reports that al Qaeda got as far as isolating cultures of anthrax,35 but given that Sufaat’s laboratory had been destroyed, this could not be corroborated. The discoveries at Turnak Farms were particularly alarming because US intelligence

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officials had been aware of the laboratory’s existence. This intensified concerns about al Qaeda’s CBRN capabilities and the degree to which the US and its allies could accurately monitor efforts by terrorist groups to develop CBRN weapons. Ayman al-Zawahiri’s house in Kabul was raided by Northern Alliance troops on 13 November. Like Khabab’s laboratory, it resembled the lair of a mad scientist. It contained hand grenades, blasting caps, electronic components and various solid and liquid substances, including white crystals and fine silvery powders in jars and plastic bags, and mysterious liquids in shampoo bottles labelled ‘special medicine’. American intelligence agents collected samples and conducted chemical and biological tests, one of which turned up a ‘positive indicator’ for anthrax.36 That result would later turn out to be a false positive. In another safe house in Kabul that was used by two Arab doctors, plans for producing ricin were discovered.37 In the offices of UTN, the plans for the helium balloon device for dispersing CBW, as well as materials that could be used for building a prototype, were discovered. However, subsequent analysis of the plans suggested that the device was unlikely to have been effective because pinpoint release of the agents over a specific target would have been difficult, and CW agents released outdoors would be so widely dispersed as to be useless in many circumstances.38 Among the other documents recovered was a considerable amount of literature relating to BW,39 large amounts of data on the construction and maintenance of nuclear weapons from the Kahuta research laboratories in Pakistan, plans to explore the mining of uranium in Afghanistan and letters exchanged between UTN and Pakistani militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-eMohammed.40 Documents relating to al Qaeda’s nuclear and radiological weapons activities were also recovered from a number of locations. The CIA recovered a design for a radiological device as well as rudimentary diagrams of nuclear weapons,41 and documents marked with the location of nuclear power plants in the US were also recovered.42 In a house in the Wazir Akbar quarter of Kabul, where Abu Khabab and other senior al Qaeda figures lived, a bag on a rubbish pile was found to contain a number of documents related to nuclear weapon development,43 the most significant of which was a 25-page handwritten manual titled ‘Superbombs’.44

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The superbomb manual was missing its cover and first pages, so its author remains unknown. It contains nuclear weapon designs, explanations of the physics of nuclear explosions, the properties of the nuclear materials needed to make them and the effects of nuclear weapons. It covers some subjects in depth, but others are covered only superficially or incorrectly. Some of the information in the document indicates that the author possessed an understanding of various shortcuts to making crude nuclear explosives, but many of the critical steps are missing. Critically, the nuclear weapon designs contained in the document were assessed to be unviable.45 The manual also makes some implausible suggestions for obtaining fissile material, such as setting up a plant for enriching uranium and using laser enrichment, which it claims to be ‘simple’. In reality, enriching uranium is extremely difficult to master, and laser enrichment is incredibly complex to master. Overall, the sections of the document dealing with plutonium and uranium are relatively detailed compared to the sections discussing nuclear weapons, indicating that the author was more comfortable writing about the nuclear fuel cycle than nuclear weapons.46 Despite the fact that the manual was flawed and incomplete, evidence was discovered in student notebooks that it was being used to instruct recruits being trained in conventional bomb-making.47 At another house in the Karta Parwan district of Kabul a cache of partly burnt documents was recovered. They included a rough design for a nuclear weapon, descriptions of how to use explosives to compress plutonium to create a nuclear explosion and preliminary research on the development of a thermonuclear device, as well as a partial periodic table (in Russian), which showed only radioactive elements. Other documents included advanced physics and chemistry manuals, and there were also telephone numbers for chemical suppliers.48 Documents relating to the use of radioactive isotopes in agriculture and medicine were also found, alongside notebooks on conventional explosives at other locations in Kabul, which was indicative of research into radiological weapons.49 Tom Ridge, the US Homeland Security Director, later confirmed that much of the information found in these documents was already in the public domain and could have been downloaded from the internet.50 The shortcomings of relying on the internet for information were evident from the fact that one of the recovered documents was a

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well-known spoof article on how to build a nuclear weapon that had first been printed in the 1970s.51 Analysis of the documents proved that al Qaeda was working on a nuclear weapon programme but that the quality of its research was mixed, and contained significant technological gaps. They indicated that al Qaeda was still in the process of thinking through the various process involved, and that its thinking had not advanced very far.52 However, other documents may have been either destroyed or removed by al Qaeda before the fall of the Taliban, creating a significant degree of uncertainty about exactly how far al Qaeda had got. In total, searches were conducted at about 60 locations inside Afghanistan that were suspected of being linked to the production of CBRN weapons, and another 50 or so that were described as ‘sensitive sites’. Roughly 370 samples were taken from these sites, but only five showed any indication of the presence of biological agents, and these were in tiny or trace amounts, some of which were subsequently found to be false positives. Despite everything that US troops found, they did not find any CBRN weapons or nuclear materials.53 Nor was there any evidence to indicate that al Qaeda had succeeded in obtaining bacterial cultures or growth media in which to grow bacteria, or even evidence that any work on manufacturing BW had actually begun.54 What the evidence recovered from Afghanistan showed was that whilst al Qaeda was making a determined effort to develop CBRN weapons, its technical capabilities were extremely limited, and the CBRN threat it posed was extremely crude. The invasion of Afghanistan stopped project al Zabadi and the nuclear weapon research dead in its tracks, but there were disconcerting reports that materials or technologies had been either hidden or previously removed to Pakistan.55 One report even suggested that an al Qaeda member had left Afghanistan earlier in the year with a container containing nuclear material.56

Re-Assessing the Threat The evidence recovered in Afghanistan showed that the US intelligence community’s pre-9/11 assessments of al Qaeda’s CBRN weapon development activities had only been partially accurate. Of most concern was the fact that they had been largely unaware of the true extent of al Qaeda’s research and development activities, particularly its

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BW programme.57 And despite the volume of evidence that was recovered from Afghanistan, there were still critical gaps in their knowledge of all aspects of al Qaeda’s CBRN programme. In particular, it was not clear how far al Qaeda had got with developing a blister agent or with developing delivery technologies for CBW agents.58 But while the information recovered from Afghanistan enabled the US intelligence agencies to identify mistakes or gaps in its pre-9/11 assessments, they failed to identify the causes of those mistakes, which meant that they continued to make some of the same mistakes in formulating their assessments. In particular, they continued to offer some highly speculative judgements without citing any evidentiary anchors, or used single sources and in some cases dated information. To an extent they were forced to do this because of substantial gaps in their knowledge, but the net result was that significant differences of opinion persisted between different agencies within the US intelligence community.59 Some of the most speculative judgements concerned al Qaeda’s nuclear activities. Analysts were extremely concerned about the trafficking of nuclear materials but could not reach a definitive conclusion about whether al Qaeda had actually acquired any radiological material.60 One assessment suggested that al Qaeda might possess enough caesium-137, strontium-90, or cobalt-60 to build a radiological weapon.61 Similarly, the CIA’s Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center and the Director of Central Intelligence’s (DCI) Counterterrorist Center produced an assessment of al Qaeda’s nuclear options that concluded that al Qaeda probably had access to nuclear expertise and facilities, and that there was a real possibility of the group developing a crude nuclear device.62 At least some US intelligence officials also believed that al Qaeda might have a Soviet-era tactical nuclear weapon or enough weapon-grade material to fashion a crude atomic bomb, and briefed the Washington Post to that effect.63 Despite the lack of a high level of confidence in assessments of al Qaeda’s nuclear capabilities, these assessments formed the basis for a number of significant policy responses from the US Administration. In late October 2001, CIA director George Tenet met with President Bush to discuss the intelligence that had come out of Afghanistan about al Qaeda’s nuclear threat. President Bush was so alarmed by the discussion that he immediately ordered defence against nuclear terrorism to be made

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a top priority.64 In March 2002, Tenet briefed Bush again about al Qaeda’s nuclear ambitions, and Bush reiterated his decision to give nuclear terrorism priority over every other threat to the US.65 In response, radiation sensors were issued to New York police officers and fitted to cranes at sea ports, and the federal government placed sophisticated neutron flux detectors and gamma ray sensors at transportation ‘choke points’ in Washington, DC and New York.66 There were also discussions about creating a national network of radiation monitoring. Additional funding was also allocated to border security, particularly to prevent CBRN weapons being smuggled into the country.67 Speculation that the fourth hijacked plane on 9/11, which had crashed in a field outside of Pittsburg, might have been heading for a nuclear power station, coupled with the information about US nuclear power stations that had been recovered from Afghanistan, led to a renewed focus on the security of nuclear power stations. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) had been assessing the security of nuclear power stations for years, but training for defending power stations against ground assaults had been quietly dropped in the late 1990s.68 The NRC started performing analysis of what would happen if an aeroplane were to crash into a nuclear power station, and considered re-instating training for defence against ground assaults. In early 2002 the NRC implemented a policy of distributing potassium iodide tablets within the ten-mile emergency planning zone of each nuclear power plant, and shipped supplies to any US state that requested them.69 The events of 9/11, coupled with the assessments of al Qaeda’s CBRN capabilities, were also instrumental in shaping intelligence assessments of al Qaeda’s intentions with regard to using CBRN weapons. There was a fundamental shift in the calculus of threat within the UK intelligence community. Prior to 9/11 it had been believed that alienating public opinion or its own supporters would deter al Qaeda from perpetrating mass-casualty attacks, but after 9/11 it was assessed that al Qaeda considered mass casualties and destruction to be an end in themselves, rather than just a means to an end. The Joint Intelligence Committee assessed that this would lead to a corresponding shift in al Qaeda’s decision-making about the attractiveness of using CBRN weapons.70 The US intelligence community had been suggesting that al Qaeda would use CBRN weapons for a first strike against the US since the late 1990s. It now took an even stronger line, assessing that al Qaeda’s

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intentions were to incrementally escalate its level of violence in search of a truly strategic blow against the US, and that it believed that CBRN WMD were a way of achieving that objective.71 This assessment was seemingly corroborated by information provided by the American Taliban John Walker Lindh, who had been detained in Afghanistan after 9/11. He stated that one of his former training-camp instructors had declared that a second attack on the US would involve attacking nuclear facilities, oil and gas pipe lines, or some kind of biological attack.72

Renewed Politicisation of the Threat from CBRN Weapons The 9/11 attacks confirmed the core narrative in Western security debates, that al Qaeda was committed to conducting mass-casualty attacks against civilian targets. Almost inevitably, this emphasis on mass civilian casualties was linked with al Qaeda’s plans to acquire CBRN weapons. This ensured that the al Qaeda CBRN threat continued to hold a high political profile. During a debate on the attacks in the US Senate on 12 September a number of speakers spoke about the risk of a terrorist CBRN incident, especially an attack involving a nuclear weapon. Senator Dorgan summed up the mood by stating that: yesterday it was a commercial airliner full of jet fuel. In the future it could be a vial of deadly biological agents that can kill a million people. Or it could be a suitcase nuclear device in the trunk of a rusty car parked on a dock in one of America’s largest cities.73 In the months after 9/11, a number of US politicians continued to express similar views. During a speech in January 2002, Senator Lugar declared that: September 11th forced Americans to recognize that the United States is exposed to an existential threat from terrorism and the possible use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists. Meeting that threat is the premier security challenge of our time. There is a clear and present danger that terrorists will gain the capability to carry out catastrophic attacks on Europe and the United States using nuclear, biological or chemical weapons.74

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This mood was reflected in the UK, where Prime Minister Tony Blair’s official spokesman claimed that ‘bin Laden would have killed 600,000 people on September 11 if he could have done. This simply underlines again why he has to be stopped’.75 A few days after 9/11, Prime Minister Blair himself declared to the House of Commons: Let us make this reflection too. A week ago, anyone suggesting that terrorists would kill thousands of innocent people in downtown New York would have been dismissed as alarmist, yet it happened. We know that these groups are fanatics, capable of killing without discrimination. The limits on the numbers that they kill and their methods of killing are not governed by any sense of morality. The limits are only practical and technical. We know, that they would, if they could, go further and use chemical, biological, or even nuclear weapons of mass destruction.76 Significantly, he then went on to say that ‘[w]e know, also, that there are groups of people, occasionally states, who will trade the technology and capability of such weapons’.77 This reference to unnamed states marked the beginning of a narrative in official statements made by the US Administration and UK government, linking the threat of CBRN terrorism with the activities of proliferator states. The prevailing mood among Western politicians was fuelled by a flurry of media reporting in late 2001, much of which was based on al Qaeda documents that reporters had been able to obtain in Afghanistan and statements from unnamed intelligence sources. Despite the apparent credibility of these sources, the reporting itself was often contradictory and contained a significant amount of speculation, uncorroborated information and error. In November 2001, the London Times reported intelligence sources who claimed that al Qaeda had acquired nuclear materials illegally from Pakistan,78 whilst and the Daily Telegraph reported that a cache of uranium-235 had been discovered at Turnak Farms.79 One BBC report included footage of the spoof instructions for developing a nuclear weapon.80 Newsweek reported unnamed intelligence sources who indicated that al Qaeda had established a stockpile of anthrax, with the assistance of one or more Russian scientists, which may or may not have been destroyed in bombing raids.81 Most serious were

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the numerous reports regarding the traces of anthrax being discovered at various locations in Afghanistan. Even when these findings were subsequently reported to be false positives, it still left the impression that al Qaeda possessed anthrax. There was little or no discussion of the factors that made the development of effective CBRN weapons difficult. There were also further media reports about al Qaeda’s continued CBRN activities and residual capabilities. One report claimed that al Qaeda had obtained seven enriched uranium rods from mafia connections in Eastern Europe.82 Another, citing sources in Pakistan, suggested that al Qaeda had acquired a suitcase nuke from Central Asian sources. The device was reported to weigh 8 kg and to possess at least 2 kg of fissionable uranium and plutonium. It was said to have the serial number 9999 and a manufacturing date of October 1998, and to be capable of being set off by a mobile phone signal.83 This was an impressive degree of detail, but it actually cast doubt on the credibility of the story because the date of manufacture was well after Soviet nuclear weapons had been withdrawn from Central Asia.84 Journalists also obtained a copy of the film of Abu Khabab gassing dogs at Darunta. The video had originally been intended for training purposes, but it actually turned into useful propaganda for al Qaeda when it was aired by CNN in late 2001. CNN invited pundits to speculate about what the gas might have been. Their opinions included cyanide and sarin, whilst another claimed it was neither.85 None of them knew for certain what the substance was, but the speculation was sufficient to increase concerns about al Qaeda’s technological capabilities. The media’s continued interest in alarmist reports about al Qaeda and CBRN weapons created the conditions that enabled the US Administration to use the threat to help justify its actions in the war on terror. In his 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush pointed to the discoveries in Afghanistan to highlight the dangers posed by al Qaeda: The depth of their hatred is equalled by the madness of the destruction they design . . . We have found diagrams of American nuclear power plants and public water facilities, detailed instructions for making chemical weapons, surveillance maps of American cities, and thorough descriptions of landmarks in America and throughout the world.86

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In reality, no diagrams of US nuclear power stations had been found in Afghanistan, but it became just one more inaccuracy that was reported in the media.87 In a similar vein, US Undersecretary of State John Bolton also publicly declared in January 2002 that: I don’t have any doubt that al Qaeda was pursuing nuclear, biological and chemical warfare capabilities. It’s not our judgment at the moment that they were that far along, but I have no doubt that they were seeking to do so . . . It underlines just how serious the threat of the use of these weapons of mass destruction could be, and why it’s such an important part of the global campaign against terrorism.88 These warnings, which came shortly after the anthrax letters, fuelled the already political nature of the debate on CBRN terrorism in the US. The shortcomings in the US’s ability to respond to a BW attack which had been exposed by the anthrax letters led to US politicians taking an even stronger approach to CBRN defence, with calls for increased funding for homeland security, including specific counter-CBRN terrorism measures. In October 2001, a group of senators introduced a Bill calling for additional spending of $1.4 billion to improve preparedness for a BW attack, and the US military took the decision to vaccinate every member of the armed forces against anthrax.89 Responding to these concerns, President Bush announced a 14 per cent increase in the defence budget, and doubled spending on homeland security to $38 billion, in early 2002. This money was divided between bioterrrorism defence, the fire service, the police service, including airport and border security, and intelligence.90 This heightened political focus on the threat was also shared in the UK, where the government abandoned its previous reluctance to talk about the issue. Prime Minister Blair openly warned of the threat of WMD terrorism, and Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon ordered contingency plans to deal with CBRN threats to be updated.91 In retrospect, the political reaction seems alarmist, but it reflected both the broader mood at the time and the views of the US and UK intelligence communities. However, the fact that these concerns were being persistently aired in public illustrates how both the US

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Administration and the UK government were beginning to use the al Qaeda CBRN threat as part of their broader communications strategies to help maintain public support for their policies in the war on terror. Public opinion in both countries was already largely in favour of actions to hunt down al Qaeda, including the invasion of Afghanistan. The acid test of how effective this approach would be would come when the war on terror started to grow beyond those initial objectives. By 2002, the core narrative that al Qaeda would use CBRN weapons for a first strike was firmly established in both US and UK intelligence assessments, as well as political and policy debates in the US and the UK. The key issue for the future was how that narrative would influence policy-making. In November 2001, George Tenet briefed Vice President Dick Cheney and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice about the meetings between bin Laden, Zawahiri and UTN. Cheney felt that this new type of threat, which he referred to as a ‘low-probability, highimpact event’, needed to be handled in a new way. He argued that ‘[i]f there’s a 1 per cent chance that they do (possess a nuclear weapon), you have to pursue it as if it were true’.92 US journalist Ron Suskind dubbed this approach the ‘1 per cent doctrine’.93 This doctrine would frame US policy-making in the war on terror over the coming years, and took the politicisation of the al Qaeda CBRN threat to its most extreme. Given the circumstances of the time and the potential gravity of the threat, such a precautionary approach is understandable, but it ran the risk that information that was inconsistent with the dominant narrative on al Qaeda’s CBRN capabilities and intentions would either be overlooked or misinterpreted.

CHAPTER 8 RE-ESTABLISHING A CBRN WEAPON CAPABILITY, 2002—3

During the war in Afghanistan, Mohammed Atef, one of the leading advocates of acquiring CBRN weapons, was killed in an airstrike. However, the majority of the al Qaeda leadership managed to escape. The faction that had advocated the 9/11 attacks, including bin Laden, Zawahiri and KSM, fled to Pakistan. The faction that had opposed 9/11, led by Sayf al-’Adl, Abu Hafs al-Mauritani and Abu’l-Walid al-Masri, relocated from either Afghanistan or Pakistan to Iran. Al-Mauritani had been so incensed by the decision to go ahead with 9/11 and how he had been ignored that he submitted his resignation to bin Laden several weeks prior to 9/11. After reaching Iran they were placed under house arrest by the Iranian authorities.1 Critically, most of the important figures in al Qaeda’s CBRN weapon programmes, including Khabab, Sufaat and the other members of their teams, fled to Pakistan. As a result, al Qaeda was well-placed to restart its CBRN activities in Pakistan, once it was able to replace the equipment and materials lost in Afghanistan. In contrast, Abdel Aziz al-Masri, who had led al Qaeda’s nuclear activities, and those responsible for al Tawhid wal Jihad’s CBW activities fled to Iran. Al-Masri would remain in Iran, but the al Tawhid wal Jihad fighters quickly moved on to other countries. However, many of the important individuals in the support networks for al Qaeda’s CBRN weapon programmes were captured. The senior members of al Wafa were quickly rounded up in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Batarfi was arrested after being injured at Tora Bora,

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Jamil Qasim was arrested in Pakistan in October 20012 and al Matrafi was detained at Lahore international airport as he attempted to board a flight to Saudi Arabia in December 2001. Qasim and Matarfi were handed over to the US3 but where Pakistani citizens were concerned the Pakistani government were less forthcoming. In late 2001 a team of US law enforcement and intelligence officials led by CIA Director George Tenet travelled to Pakistan to raise concerns about the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal and to ask that the leaders of UTN be interrogated again.4 Although President Musharraf did not believe that terrorists could develop WMD he nevertheless agreed to Tenet’s requests.5 But these interrogations yielded little new information, and it was impossible to prove whether UTN and al Qaeda had ever got beyond the stage of an agreement in principle to work on CBRN weapons.6 The US intelligence agencies had also uncovered links between al Qaeda and two other Pakistani nuclear scientists, Suleiman Asad and Muhammed Ali Mukhtar, who worked at the Kahora Research Laboratories. Their alleged involvement was hugely significant, because they reportedly had considerable experience of working at two of Pakistan’s most secret nuclear weapons-related installations. The sensitivities surrounding the pair were so great that the Pakistani government refused to grant US investigators any sort of access to them. To get them out of the way, they were then sent them to Myanmar on an unspecified ‘research project’.7 The microbiologist Rauf Ahmed was detained in late 2001, and a joint US –Pakistani investigation into his activities started off very successfully. Ahmed agreed to be questioned and provided some useful information8 but problems soon arose when the US sought to expand the investigation with the goal of pursuing criminal charges, including prosecution in the US. In 2003, the Pakistani authorities denied US investigators any further access to Ahmed, and subsequently released him from custody on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he had succeeded in providing al Qaeda with BW.9 The loss of the al Wafa and UTN networks was a severe blow to al Qaeda, but the most significant individual to be arrested was Yazid Sufaat. It had originally been planned for Sufaat to re-establish an anthrax programme in Pakistan,10 but when he and Hambali reached Pakistan in October 2001 they decided to restart the programme in Indonesia instead.11 Hambali suggested to Sufaat that he should relocate

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to Bogor in Indonesia and approach one of his relatives who worked at the microbiology division of an Indonesian institute. The relative refused to cooperate12 but Sufaat still decided to travel to Southeast Asia, and was arrested as he tried to enter Malaysia in December 2001.13 At that time, though, neither the US nor the Malaysian intelligence services knew about Sufaat’s role in al Qaeda’s anthrax programme.

Re-Establishing the CBRN Weapon-Development Programme It is indicative of the importance that the al Qaeda leadership placed on CBRN weapons that it attempted to restart a CBRN weapondevelopment programme in Pakistan, under the leadership of KSM. The success of 9/11 had demonstrated that KSM was an excellent organiser and planner and was therefore a good choice for managing a complex CBRN weapon-development programme. He set himself up in the home of a microbiologist called Abdul Qadoos Khan in the Pakistani city of Rawalpindi, and was supported by Hambali, who based himself in Thailand.14 The main focus of the new programme was on cyanide, anthrax and radiological weapons, but work was also carried out on botulinum and salmonella. They set about identifying the production steps for these agents and the equipment that would be required, and also discussed the recruitment of scientists.15 From these discussions they identified the Muslim states of the former Soviet Union as a potential source of the materials and scientific expertise they needed. In June 2002 bin Laden wrote to Mullah Omar stating that: It is a fact that the Islamic Republics region [of the former Soviet Union] is rich with significant scientific experiences in conventional and non-conventional military industries, which have a great role in the future jihad against the enemies of Islam.16 As a result there were continued reports of al Qaeda attempting to acquire nuclear material from the states of the former Soviet Union. In 2002, for instance, the Russian intelligence services reported that they had thwarted an attempt by al Qaeda to acquire 11 lb of radioactive thallium from instruments in decommissioned Russian submarines.17

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Besides the new al Qaeda programme, the al Tawhid wal Jihad fighters who had fled to Iran before dispersing further throughout the Middle East and Central Asia also attempted to re-establish CBRN weapon-development facilities at locations in Iraq and Georgia. Scores of Arab fighters made their way to the Kurdish-controlled region in Northern Iraq, where they were invited to join the camp of a little known Islamist terrorist group called Ansar al-Islam at Sargat, near the village of Kermal. Their welcome was facilitated by a high-ranking member of Ansar called Abu Wal, who had formerly been a member of the Iraqi Military Intelligence Service before becoming a fanatical jihadist.18 Among those who reached the Ansar camp was Zarqawi, as well as other elements of al Tawhid wal Jihad. They set up a crude CBW laboratory in the camp, where they conducted experiments with cyanide and ricin, including the development of a cyanide cream for use as a contact poison.19 The most controversial issue associated with al Tawhid wal Jihad’s presence in Iraq, was the group’s connection to the Iraqi regime. A senior Jordanian intelligence service officer reported that ‘Zarqawi is using Saddam Hussein’s secret service structures today . . . He knows them from the past’.20 US intelligence sources also learnt about the role played by Abu Wal, that Zarqawi had travelled to Baghdad in May 2002 for medical treatment and that al Tawhid wal Jihad had established a base of operations in Baghdad to coordinate the movement of people, money and supplies into and throughout Iraq.21 But whilst it is clear that the network was operating inside Iraq, no concrete evidence of the regime actively supporting its activities has been reported. Other elements of al Qaeda and al Tawhid wal Jihad moved on to the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia, where they linked up with Chechen rebels who were using the gorge as a safe haven. Up to 100 al Qaeda-linked fighters gathered there, under the leadership of Saif al-Islam al-Masri, a member of al Qaeda’s military committee. Zarqawi dispatched Abu Atiya to the gorge, where he worked closely with al Qaeda fighters to plan attacks on Western targets. Atiya established a CBW laboratory in the gorge, where he experimented with ricin and cyanide, including the development of a contact poison. He also started providing CBRN training to Chechen rebels.22 However, unlike the situation in northern Iraq, they did not have complete freedom to operate in Georgia. The Georgian security forces

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began arresting Arab militants in early 2002, and in April that year they stopped a car carrying four members of al Qaeda. One of the occupants of the car was killed and the other three were detained. One of the detainees, Omar al Rammah, was identified by the Georgian security forces as a ‘poisoner’. All three were handed over to the US and detained in Guantanamo Bay.23 From the interrogation of these detainees, the US intelligence agencies began to build up a picture of al Qaeda and al Tawhid wal Jihad CBRN activities in Georgia.

The Publication of Online Training Materials Prior to 9/11, al Qaeda’s principal modus operandi had been infrequent, centrally directed spectacular attacks that required long and careful planning, by well-trained operators. That pattern of activity continued after 9/11, but the other way it had operated was to provide support to other groups or cells within the wider networks of Islamists operating throughout the world. These groups were not necessarily part of al Qaeda but shared similar ideologies and objectives. As al Qaeda’s ability to centrally direct large-scale terrorist attacks across the world became increasingly degraded by the killing or capture of key operatives, it began to put much greater emphasis on this latter aspect of its operations. One of the ways it tried to do this was through the internet, by establishing a large number of websites and chatrooms.24 This created a ‘virtual caliphate’ in which militants could interact with each other and share ideas. Initially it was mainly used for general debate and the dissemination of its ideology, and one of the products of this new virtual caliphate was the emergence of a robust vision and desire for the apocalypse. This vision, which was based on early Islamic sources, was in part derived from the desperate desire among militant Islamists for radical change.25 To facilitate this change, al Qaeda increasingly began to post operational training material online, with the intention of encouraging action by independent cells and individuals. Amongst this online material were CBRN related training manuals such as the Mujahideen Poisons Handbook and the Encyclopaedia of Jihad, although this material only ever comprised a fraction of the total material that al Qaeda has published online over the years. The easy availability of these manuals generated significant concern among Western intelligence agencies, but analysis quickly showed that much of

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it was of limited use. It typically contains technical flaws, and does not contain much information about the weaponisation and delivery of chemical and biological agents.26 Some of the suggested deployment instructions are extremely crude. One online posting instructed the reader to mix cyanide with a hand cream and then smear the mixture onto the door handles of cars owned by Americans. Other instructions suggest using a hypodermic needle to spray the concoction into the airconditioning systems of cars or houses. Another suggestion was to use a hypodermic needle either to squirt chemicals onto unpackaged fruit and vegetables being bought by Americans in supermarkets or else inject them directly into fruit or vegetables. One manual also contained a chapter titled ‘Poisonous Letter’, presumably taking inspiration from the 2001 anthrax letters in the US.27 These delivery methods are extremely low-tech and well within the capabilities of individuals or cells with limited technical capabilities. However, there have been no reported instances of such attacks, and there are serious doubts about whether they would succeed. Even if hand cream were capable of improving the absorption of toxic chemicals into the body, anybody who found the toxic cream on their hands would presumably wipe it straight off. Similarly, fruit and vegetables are normally washed, peeled and cooked before eating, so it is unclear how much of a toxic chemical that had been squirted onto their surface would remain. Overall, these instructions have a note of desperation about them, born from a recognition that their readership is incapable of conducting more sophisticated CBRN attacks. However, some material did contain a reasonable degree of technical sophistication. One 28-page manual, called ‘Preparation of botulinum toxin’, appears to be composed of linked sections of several papers that have been published in scientific journals. But even so, it does not explain how to obtain a pathogenic strain of clostridium botulinum, other than suggesting trial and error from environmental sources. It also specifies the use of some advanced equipment and materials, such as a walk-in cold room, a refrigerated vacuum centrifuge and highly specific reagents. It is extremely unlikely that this sort of advanced equipment would be available to the type of small terrorist cells operating in the West.28 And as explained in Chapter 4, written formulas are not necessarily enough to guarantee the successful development of a CBRN weapon. Anyone attempting to use this information for the first time

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would still need to go through a process of experimentation to learn the tricks of the trade. The publication of these materials raised important questions about al Qaeda’s intentions. It seemed to be a direct encouragement to independent groups and cells to develop and use CBRN weapons. Yet hitherto the al Qaeda leadership had been extremely cautious about using these weapons, refusing to approve any of the CBRN plots that had been put to it for consideration. However, many of the Islamist terror cells operating in western Europe at that time were still connected with al Qaeda’s central leadership in Pakistan. The leadership could therefore have reasonably expected to be able to exert control over the CBRN threat posed by these groups and cells. But if that was their intention they were playing a risky game in assuming that they could maintain such strong control in the future, and that the West would not blame al Qaeda for any CBRN attacks conducted by independent jihadi groups and cells.

The Al Qaeda Leadership Refuses to Approve Further CBRN Attacks In late 2001 the Pakistani authorities arrested Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, al Qaeda’s global operations chief, and he was replaced by KSM. This meant that for the first time a single senior figure was responsible for both CBRN weapon development and operational planning. His overriding priority was to attack the US mainland, but he realised that further attacks would be difficult because of the increased levels of security. As a result, most of his planned attacks at this time were opportunistic and significantly more limited than the 9/11 attack. This included plots to crash an airliner into the tallest building on the west coast of the US, as well as bomb attacks on petrol stations, water treatment plants and high-rise buildings, and a plot to hijack aircraft and crash them into Heathrow airport.29 He was also interested in developing plans for using CBRN weapons, and often spoke about crude CBRN attacks on the US, including poisoning US reservoirs and attacking nuclear power stations. To help develop these ideas, he instructed some US-based operatives to undertake some basic research.30 Prior to 9/11, he had despatched Ali al Marri, a dual Saudi-Qatari national, to the US as a sleeper agent. Al Marri was an

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experienced al Qaeda operative who had trained in al Qaeda camps between 1998 and 2001. He entered the US on 10 September 2001 on a student visa, and whilst studying he also carried out research into poisons and the location of US dams, waterways and tunnels.31 However, he was arrested in December 2001, before he had got very far.32 Following the arrest of al Marri, KSM instructed another operative called Majid Khan, who had previously been tasked with a plot to bomb multiple petrol stations in the US, to continue the research into poisoning US reservoirs.33 However, his priority was the petrol station plot, so he did not do any serious research on the reservoir concept.34 Khan was eventually arrested in Karachi on 5 March 2003, effectively ending the petrol station plot and drawing a line under further work on the reservoir concept. Despite the fact that KSM was interested in developing options for using CBRN materials, his intentions with regard to actually using CBRN weapons remain unclear. The tasking of Khan clearly shows that he was prioritising small-scale conventional attacks on the US mainland over CBRN plots. But his original intention to include nuclear power stations among the targets to 9/11 indicates that he was prepared to conduct first-strike CBRN attacks. His interest in the reservoir concept therefore suggests that he might have perceived of CBRN attacks as an option for escalating attacks in the US over the medium term. But whether the rest of the leadership would have ever approved this plan is unknown, given that he did not develop an operational plan. Whilst KSM’s focus was on attacking the US, other elements of al Qaeda were focused on attacking the US-led coalition and Afghan forces in Afghanistan. During 2001 and 2002 a number of cells based in Pakistan and Afghanistan discussed ideas for using CBRN weapons, most of which involved contaminating the food and water supplies of coalition forces in Afghanistan.35 This was a credible concept given that the insurgents probably had access to ricin as well as commercially available chemicals, including an incapacitating chemical agent that was readily available in the bazaars near Peshawar in Pakistan.36 However, none of these ideas was ever developed into an operational plot, and al Qaeda cells relied instead on increasing the tempo of gun and IED attacks on Coalition and Afghan forces. Al Qaeda also retained a significant network of cells in Italy, where the Lased cell had been developing a CBRN plan in 2001. Prior to his

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arrest, Lased had been in contact with a cell of four Moroccans based in Rome, who were also linked with a Libyan called Farj Hassan al-Saadi, who used the nom de guerre Abu Hamza al-Libi, and who was a member of both the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and al Qaeda operative.37 The cell developed a plan to attack the US embassy and other buildings in the commercial area of Rome by poisoning the mains water supply. They obtained maps marking the city’s water supply network, and purchased 4 kilos of potassium ferrocyanide, which is primarily used in gardening and for producing inks and dyes. This substance is harmless unless it is mixed with a strong acid to produce hydrogen cyanide gas. The fact that the cell were planning to introduce it into the water supply indicates that they did not understand the properties of the material that they were working with. However, the cell was being monitored by the Italian security services and was arrested in February 2002, before the plot could be executed. Al Saadi fled to London, where he was detained. After being released, he was killed in a motorcycle accident in 2010.38 A CBRN attack seemed to have been prevented only by the timely arrest of those involved. But the cell already had everything it needed for the attack at the time it was arrested, so why didn’t they act before they were arrested? One potential explanation is that they were not actually intending to go through with the attack. It is possible that, like the Lased cell’s plan in 2001, the al Qaeda leadership had not approved the plan. This explanation is supported by evidence from al Qaeda’s consideration of another plan for an attack on the US involving a radiological weapon. In January 2002, Abu Zubaydah was discussing potential plans with a group of al Qaeda operatives in a safe house in Lahore. Among those present were a US citizen called Jose´ Padilla.39 Padilla and a colleague had downloaded spoof instructions for building a hydrogen bomb (H-bomb) from the internet. They discussed the possibility of making the weapon with Zubaydah, and assured him that they could make it work. They also suggested a plan to disseminate cyanide gas throughout the air conditioning system of a nightclub. Zubaydah arranged for the plans to be reviewed by Abu Khabab in Karachi.40 Zubaydah recognised that the idea of making an H-bomb was absurd, but he felt that developing a radiological weapon was a much more realistic proposition.41 He discussed the idea with Amar al Baluchi, who was so enthusiastic about it that he wrote a letter of introduction for

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KSM endorsing the idea. Zubaydah gave Baluchi’s letter to Padilla, and instructed the pair to report to KSM and Sayf al-Adil and await KSM’s instructions. When the pair met KSM and al-Adil in March 2002 they were told that the idea was too complex, and that al Qaeda was looking for short-term operations to put pressure on the US government to curtail military operations in Afghanistan and release the prisoners from Guantanamo Bay. KSM instructed the pair to plan an attack on apartment buildings in the US using conventional bombs, effectively putting an end to Padilla’s nuclear ambitions.42 Shortly afterwards, US and Pakistani forces captured Abu Zubaydah, following a gunfight in the city of Faisalabad. The US intelligence agencies wrongly believed that he was number three in al Qaeda’s chain of command, a major recruiter, operational planner and member of bin Laden’s inner circle. He was subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques, including being waterboarded 83 times over a five-year period. He very quickly told his interrogators about Padilla, claiming that al Qaeda knew how to construct a dirty bomb and that there might already be such a device in the US.43 He also divulged that al Qaeda had considered attacking a major US subway system with CW, which was seemingly corroborated by other information obtained from Afghanistan.44 In March 2002 the Pakistan police also recovered an article on constructing an H-bomb from a computer that was seized during a raid on an al Qaeda safe house in Lahore.45 At the time some US officials argued that Zubayda’s claims should be treated with caution. Nevertheless, they were leaked to the media and caused a sensation. Padilla was subsequently arrested in Chicago in May 2002, leading to a further spate of lurid media headlines about a plot to detonate a ‘dirty bomb’ in the US. As a result, the US stock market fell, and the media was full of stories about how easy it is to build dirty bombs. In response, US officials were forced to actively downplay the risks by claiming that the initial threat assessment of Padilla had been alarmist. Prosecutors subsequently dropped the charge of conspiracy to use a radiological weapon, and in August 2007 he was found guilty of conspiring to kill people in an overseas jihad and funding and supporting overseas terrorism.46 Despite the fact that Padilla was not actually planning to use a radiological weapon, the incident illustrates the sort of a psychological impact the mere threat of using CBRN weapons can have.

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The other aspect of the Padilla case that raised concerns was that the US intelligence agencies only become aware of it following the use of enhanced interrogation techniques on some of those involved. The false information about CBRN weapons that had been gleaned under torture from the Returnees from Albania in 1998 and 1999 indicated that these reports also needed to be treated with a degree of caution. Nevertheless, the fact that all those involved confirmed that a plan involving a radiological weapon was discussed, provides reasonable grounds for suggesting that Padilla’s plan represents the third known case in which the al Qaeda leadership refused to approve a CBRN plot. KSM and al-Adil may have harboured doubts about whether Padilla would be able both to obtain the necessary nuclear material and construct a weapon, but they did not express them. Instead, the reason they gave was that use of a radiological weapon did not fit with al Qaeda’s preferred tactics for striking at the US. Whether that was the only, or the real, reason remains unknown, but the decision was also consistent with the al Qaeda leadership’s intention to use CBRN weapons for deterrence rather than as first-strike weapons.

Warning Signs of Al Qaeda Losing Control of the Threat Whilst the al Qaeda leadership continued refusing to approve plans to use CBRN weapons, there were tentative signs that other groups might not so reticent, notably the Taliban and the Chechen insurgents. In early 2002, Muhammad Rahim al Afghani, a Talib with links to al Qaeda, and Abdul Zaher, a former assistant, facilitator and translator for the senior al Qaeda commander Abdul al-Hadi al-Iraqi, began working on a plan to poison US troops based in Afghanistan. They obtained chemicals and recruited cooks who worked at US bases. But before the attack could be executed, Zaher was arrested. Afghani remained at large and went on to become one of bin Laden’s most trusted facilitators and translators, before being detained by the Pakistani security forces in July 2007.47 US intelligence also received information that Mohammed Zahir, a high-ranking member of the Taliban Intelligence Directorate and arms dealer, possessed a quantity of uranium. In July 2003, US forces arrested Zahir, and recovered a small sealed can labelled in Russian, ‘Heavy Water – U235 150 Grams’. Documents found in his possession included a memorandum from himself to the Internal Affairs Ministry

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Department of Intelligence that reported an inventory of weapons and materials which included ‘two or three cans of Uranium’, intended for the production of a nuclear weapon.48 But despite Zahir believing that he possessed a quantity of uranium, the container contained nothing of concern. In Russia there were indications that rogue elements among the Chechen insurgents, acting outside the control of the Chechen leadership, might try to conduct CBRN attacks. In Denmark, Akhmed Zakayev, an aide to separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov, warned that rogue elements might raid a Russian nuclear facility. That same day in the city of Tver, 100 miles north of Moscow, a captain of the guards at the Kalinin Nuclear Power Plant was arrested. In his possession he had detailed plans of the station and coded telephone numbers belonging to Chechens. The commander of Russia’s nuclear arsenal, Colonel General Igor Valynkin, also reported two efforts by armed groups to probe the defences at nuclear weapons storage sites. It is unclear whether these events were related, or whether there were even any actual plans to attack Russian nuclear facilities, but they were sufficient to raise concerns.49 Events between 2002 and 2003 showed that al Qaeda remained committed to developing CBRN weapons. But whilst this was matched by an increase in planning to use CBRN weapons by operational cells, there is no evidence that the al Qaeda leadership had actually approved any of the plans that were being developed. Indeed, the only hard evidence concerning the intentions of the al Qaeda leadership with regard to using CBRN weapons was its refusal to approve Padilla’s plan to use a radiological weapon. Therefore, despite the increase in CBRN activity within the al Qaeda network, there is nothing to suggest that al Qaeda leadership was planning to actually use these weapons. However, there were some very tentative indications that the CBRN threat might grow beyond the control of the al Qaeda leadership.

CHAPTER 9 AL QAEDA ANNOUNCES ITS STRATEGY, 2002—3

At the same time as KSM was working to re-establish a CBRN weapon-development capability, the al Qaeda leadership was focusing on developing its strategy for using CBRN weapons. During the Kandahar conference in the summer of 2000 they had agreed on the need to acquire a CBRN deterrent against the US. After being defeated in Afghanistan, its positon remained the same, but for deterrent threats to have any chance of being effective they need to be credible. Consequently, al Qaeda focused increasing effort on publicly articulating its deterrent posture, and working to enhance its credibility. Following 9/11 bin Laden released a series of video and audio statements justifying the attacks and making further threats against the US and the West. The majority of these statements focused on general themes, such as justifying attacks on the US by reference to its past and present actions, stating that reciprocal treatment is integral to the concept of justice, identifying all US citizens as potential targets1 and promising further attacks unless the US changed its foreign policy in the Middle East.2 Another significant feature of these statements was bin Laden’s repeated references to the US use of nuclear weapons against Japan during World War II. Following on from his pre-9/11 comments on the subject, he explicitly described the bombings as a crime.3 In September 2001 he argued:

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American history does not distinguish between civilians and military, and not even women and children. They are the ones who used the bombs against Nagasaki . . . Therefore, you do not have the right to object to like treatment. At the same time, our primary targets are military.4 Exactly what he meant by this statement is unclear. Did he mean that the US had no right to complain about the targeting of US civilians? Or that it had no right to complain about the use of nuclear weapons? Or both? To analysts in the West, this all added weight to the assessment that al Qaeda would use nuclear weapons for first strike purposes. Bin Laden made his strongest reference to Hiroshima and Nagasaki in October 2002, when he stated: The most unique thing about you, is your use of weapons and power everywhere – not for defensive purposes, but for destructive ones. It is you who dropped a nuclear bomb on Japan, even though Japan was ready to negotiate an end to the war. So what is left on the list of the most heinous, evil and unjust acts that you have not done?5 It has been argued that bin Laden was citing the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in order to justify al Qaeda’s own use of CBRN weapons. However, as in his pre-9/11 comments on the subject, he was consistently critical of the circumstances surrounding the US use of nuclear weapons against Japan. This suggests that he was actually saying that he would not use nuclear weapons in similar circumstances. Interspersed amongst these general messages there were also a few that did directly address the issue of al Qaeda and CBRN weapons. The first was an unaddressed letter that was recovered by US forces in Afghanistan. Written by Abu Abdullah al Kuwaiti, it stated that: ‘If the American people are ready to die as we are ready to die, then our combat groups along with our military, nuclear and biological equipment will kill hundreds of thousands of people we don’t wish to fight.’6 In this crude statement al Kuwaiti was arguing that al Qaeda had no desire to arbitrarily kill US civilians, but was prepared to use CBRN weapons to do so in retaliation for US actions. This implied that if the US met al Qaeda’s demands then it would not use CBRN weapons against the

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US, which can be interpreted as a crude deterrent threat. Al Kuwaiti’s position in the al Qaeda hierarchy is unknown, but the individual that the US intelligence agencies believed to be al Kuwaiti is reported to have mixed with the top leadership and to have helped train some of the 9/11 cell,7 and so can be considered to have held a relatively senior position. Bin Laden himself explicitly confirmed al Qaeda’s deterrent strategy in November 2001, during an interview with the Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir, who worked for the Dawn newspaper. The Englishlanguage version of Dawn reported bin Laden as saying: ‘I wish to declare that, if America used chemical or nuclear weapons against us, then we may retort with chemical and nuclear weapons. We have the weapons as deterrent.’ But when Mir asked bin Laden where al Qaeda had got its chemical and nuclear weapons from, he declined to answer.8 Bin Laden’s refusal to provide evidence of al Qaeda’s CBRN weapon capability severely damaged the credibility of the deterrent threat that he had just made. Zawahiri, who was also present at the interview, recognised this, and afterwards told Mir: If you have $30 million, go to the black market in central Asia, contact any disgruntled Soviet scientist, and a lot of dozens of smart briefcase bombs are available. They have contacted us, we sent our people to Moscow, to Tashkent, to other central Asian states, and they negotiated and we purchased some suitcase bombs.9 This matched reports of al Qaeda buying newspapers that appeared in a number of Arab newspapers between 1998 and 2000 (see Chapters 5 and 6). The credibility of al Qaeda deterrent threats was also dependent on whether the use of CBRN weapons could be justified according to Islamic teachings. To address that credibility gap, bin Laden went on to claim that the killing of innocent people could be justified. He argued that, because the US and its allies were massacring Muslims in Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir and Iraq, Muslims had the right to attack the US. If an enemy occupies a Muslim territory and uses common people as a human shield, he argued, it is legitimate for Muslims to attack that enemy, even if innocent civilians get hurt. Using this argument, he not only justified the deaths of civilians on 9/11 because the targets were

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economic and military in nature, but also held the whole of America responsible for the actions of the government it elects.10 These comments were not explicitly about CBRN weapons, but they were general principles that al Qaeda could draw on to justify their use. However, bin Laden was quoted in the Urdu version of Dawn as saying: ‘The US is using chemical weapons against us and it has also decided to use nuclear weapons. But our war will continue.’11 These are two quite different statements, and it is difficult to see how this could have arisen as a result of a mistranslation. However, it illustrates how CBRN propaganda is tailored to fit particular audiences. To the enemy audience there is a deterrent threat whereas to the audience of potential supporters al Qaeda is presented as the victim. This is an important theme, which would be picked up and developed by other jihadi ideologues in the coming years. To further strengthen his claims that al Qaeda was theologically justified in using CBRN weapons to respond to US aggression, bin Laden claimed in another interview at around the same time that US forces might already have used CW during the invasion of Afghanistan, because the bodies of a group of mujahideen found at a site in Kabul after a US attack had ‘all turned black’.12 These comments were supported by other propaganda circulating around jihadi networks at that time. One document, called ‘The biologic warfare: an imminent danger’, is a fourpage diatribe that accuses the US of planning to conduct biological warfare against Muslims, using anthrax. The document claims that the vaccination of US troops and the expansion of US vaccine production were preparations for an anthrax attack. Hundreds of copies of this document were found in the UTN offices in Kabul in 2001.13 Doctors at a Kandahar hospital in 2001 also claimed that Taliban soldiers fighting against the Northern Alliance had been exposed to CBW that had been supplied by the US.14 The principle of only being able to meet force with an equal level of force is an important principle an Islamic jurisprudence,15 so these claims theoretically cleared the way for al Qaeda to use CBRN against the US for retaliatory purposes at some stage in future. Bin Laden’s statement about deterrence was repeated the following month by Abu Hafs al-Mauritani, during an interview with al Jazeera. The interviewer asked al-Mauritani whether al Qaeda possessed chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. Al-Mauritani replied:

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First, we are in a war with the mightiest nation on Earth: America. This enemy has established many criminal precedents in the use of weapons of mass destruction against many nations. So many criminal records of this nature have been established. When we say we declare war on America, we put this precedence into consideration. When the US goes to war against al Qaeda and the Mujahideen anywhere in the world, it has to realize that they will exert their utmost, and exhaust all their energies and use any weapons in their hands. If al-Qaeda had such a weapon, it is for deterrence, and not to initiate attacks with it. The Americans should expect all evils when they use non-traditional weapons.16 Al-Mauritani’s statement indicates that bin Laden’s comments to Mir were not just an off-the-cuff response to an unexpected question, but rather a fully worked-out and agreed position of the al Qaeda leadership. His comments are also interesting because they indicate that al Qaeda did not consider previous (alleged) US use of CBRN weapons as having already justified future al Qaeda’s use of CBRN weapons. Rather, al Qaeda’s deterrent and any future CBRN retaliation, would be triggered by future US actions. Al Qaeda’s decision not to attack nuclear power plants on 9/11 was publicly confirmed by KSM and Ramzi bin al-Shibh in an interview with al Jazeera in 2002. They revealed that al Qaeda had decided against attacking US nuclear power plants for the time being ‘for fear it would go out of control’.17 The reference to the decision only being for ‘the time being’ was a veiled threat that the position might change in future. Their statement is significant because they were publicly announcing that al Qaeda had specifically chosen not to execute a CBRN attack in a first-strike role, and the veiled reference to the possible targeting of nuclear power stations in future can be interpreted as a crude deterrent threat against future unspecified US actions. The statement can therefore be seen as being part of the al Qaeda leadership’s efforts to enhance the credibility of its deterrent posture. Their comments were also similar to the statement made by Chechen commander Salman Raduyev in 1999 that he was not planning attacks on Russian nuclear facilities, because ‘[t]he consequences of this cannot be predicted’.18 The consistency between the positions of the two organisations, and the history of contacts between them, hints that

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al Qaeda may have influenced the Chechen leadership not to attack nuclear facilities, for fear of the political and military consequences.

The Theological Legitimacy of Using CBRN Weapons As an organisation that claimed to be founded on and to operate according to Islamic principles, al Qaeda’s deterrent threats would lack credibility unless it could theologically justify the use of these weapons. Al Qaeda’s previous lack of focus on the theological dimension of its violence had been badly exposed following 9/11, when it was criticised in the Muslim world for failing to obtain significant religious authorisations before committing such a highly destructive attack. It was also criticised for not following the Islamic tradition of warning one’s enemy and offering them the opportunity to convert before attacking. While Islamists may disagree about whether killing innocents is sanctioned by the laws of jihad, they do agree that notice must be given.19 This criticism had stung, and fed into the wider criticism of 9/11 within the Muslim world. Unless al Qaeda could justify its actions theologically, it risked losing public support within the Muslim world. It therefore needed a theological underpinning for its strategy with regard to CBRN weapons, but the clerics, scholars or Islamist intellectuals who supplied the ideological and doctrinal support for the culture of Global Jihad very rarely mentioned CBRN weapons.20 A key theme that had permeated the debates on CBRN terrorism in the West during the 1990s was that the use of CBRN weapons is somehow morally different from the use of other weapons, and that would deter terrorist groups from using them. But on this point the debate had failed to understand the nature of al Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist groups. To these groups, CBRN weapons are no different from any other kind of weapon. The key moral or ethical issue is whether the use of any weapon for a particular purpose, or in a particular way, is either halal (permitted) or haram (forbidden). Their primary guides in determining this are the Qur’an and the Hadiths, but there were obviously no CBRN weapons at the time these texts were written. The key question was therefore how religious texts that are many hundreds of years old can be interpreted to justify use of the most modern of weapons.

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There are verses in the Qu’ran and Hadiths which explicitly prohibit the killing of women, children and Muslims, as well as the poisoning of the land or the destruction of land, property and crops. In addition, killing must be proportional and done in way that avoids undue suffering. But the key injunction in respect of the use of violence is the principle of proportionality. The Qur’an states: ‘Whoso commits aggression against you, do you commit aggression against him like as he has committed against you’, and ‘if you chastise, chastise even as you have been chastised’.21 Besides the Qur’an and the Hadiths, the writings of some prominent Islamic scholars are also relevant to the use of violence. Several have written about the issue of proportionality and killing. Abu Dawud argued that in matters of retribution, someone who murders must be killed by the same means by which they murdered, although Ibn al-Majishun also said that someone who murders using fire or poison should not killed by the same means, because the prophet had said that ‘[n]o one except God chastises with fire’. This would seem to rule out both the use of nuclear weapons and certain CW because poison is considered to be intestinal fire. Al-Nawawi pronounced that if vengeance is exacted by means of something else, the person taking vengeance has gone beyond what is his right, since he has both killed and tortured. The fundamental principle is that vengeance must be based on equivalence.22 Given the indiscriminate nature of CBRN weapons, the lingering deaths they can cause and the contamination they can leave in the environment, these are powerful theological arguments against using CBRN weapons. But despite that, there are also parts of the Qur’an and the Hadiths that al Qaeda ideologues have used to justify their use. In July 2002, al Qaeda spokesman and bin Laden’s son-in-law Sulayman Abu Ghayth al-Libi,23 who was being held under house arrest in Iran, published a document online called ‘In the shadow of the lances’, in which he attempted to set out the theological case for using CBRN weapons. Ghayth focused his arguments on the verses from the Qur’an that could be argued to support the use of CBRN weapons. These strongly supported the case for using them for retaliation: ‘Allah said, “He who attacked you, attack him as he attacked you”, and also, “The reward of evil is a similar evil”, and also, “When you are punished, punish as you have been punished”’.24

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He went on to argue that ‘America knows only the language of force. This is the only way to stop it and make it take its hands off the Muslims and their affairs.’ Citing works by noted Islamic scholars such as Ibn Taimiyya, Ibn Al-Qayim, Al-Qurtubi and Al-Shukani, he stated that: Anyone who peruses these sources reaches a single conclusion: The sages have agreed that the reciprocal punishment to which the verses referred is not limited to a specific instance. It is a valid rule for punishments for infidels, for the licentious Muslims, and for the oppressors. He estimated that by adding up the casualties from conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Somalia, Bosnia and those killed in other countries by regimes backed by the US: We have the right to kill four million Americans – 2 million of them children – and to exile twice as many and wound and cripple hundreds of thousands. Furthermore, it is our right to fight them with chemical and biological weapons, so as to afflict them with the fatal maladies that have afflicted the Muslims because of the [Americans’] chemical and biological weapons.25 In the context of the statements made by bin Laden and al-Mauritani that al Qaeda would use CBRN weapons for deterrence, Abu Ghayth’s statement can be interpreted as an attempt to strengthen the credibility of al Qaeda’s deterrent threats by removing any theological constraints on the use of these weapons. Yet in saying that the US had already used CBRN weapons and killed millions of Muslims, Abu Ghayth seemed to be saying that the conditions for al Qaeda to use CBRN weapons had already been met, which was to all intents and purposes a first-strike posture. However, al-Mauritani had also made reference to past atrocities that he alleged had been committed by the US, but had still stated that al Qaeda would use CBRN weapons for deterrence or retaliation in respect of future US actions. Whatever Ghayth actually intended is unclear, and his statement only served to cloud western understanding of al Qaeda’s intentions with regard to using CBRN weapons.

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A CBRN Fatwa Abu Ghayth was the first al Qaeda spokesman to try to develop an explicit theological justification for using CBRN weapons, but he lacked strong religious credentials. What al Qaeda needed was a fully qualified alim (scholar or expert), untainted by connections to a state, who could provide an authoritative, independent theological opinion. Bin Laden recognised this shortcoming, and wrote to the well-known Saudi scholar Shaykh Nasir bin Hamid al-Fahd asking him to draft a fatwa on the issue. Al-Fahd was among the leading clerics of the Saudi Islamist opposition that supported the culture of Global Jihad.26 In May 2003 al-Fahd published ‘A treatise on the legal status of using weapons of mass destruction against infidels’. Al-Fahd used similar arguments to Ghayth, but in a much more indepth and sophisticated fashion. The key theme in the fatwa was reciprocity, with a whole section being devoted to the principle of meeting aggression with similar aggression. He supported his argument with a number of verses from the Qur’an that state: ‘And if you chastise, chastise even as you have been chastised’; ‘Whoso commits aggression against you, do you commit aggression against him like as he has committed against you’; ‘And the recompense of evil is evil the like of it.’ Al Fahd argued that these verses in themselves permit the use of WMD against the US, on the grounds that US aggression against Muslims and their lands over the previous decades had killed nearly ten million people and destroyed an unquantifiable amount of land. So on the grounds of simply ‘repaying in kind’, he concluded that it would be permissible to drop a bomb on the US that killed ten million people and destroyed as much US land as Muslim land had been destroyed. Al-Fahd developed his case further with a series of secondary arguments. He cited theological texts proving the permissibility of attacking polytheists at night, even if their children are injured, to argue that the prohibition on killing women and children only relates to killing them intentionally, and that it was permissible to kill women and children as collateral damage. He also cited verses from the Qur’an and the Hadiths that permit the cutting down of trees and the burning of land, to justify the destruction of the enemy’s land and crops. Perhaps most importantly, he cites Hadiths that record how the followers of the Prophet Mohammed used catapults against a number

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of towns and cities, in order to justify the use of weapons which kill indiscriminately. Unlike Abu Ghayth, al-Fahd also addressed the theological rulings that did not support the use of CBRN weapons. He acknowledged the validity of these rulings but concluded that ‘there is no obligation when there is inability’. In other words, if the conditions of the jihad are such that the jihadis need to use WMD then the prohibitions on killing women, children and Muslims or the contamination of land and killing of livestock do not necessarily apply. Based on these arguments, al-Fahd concluded that if infidels can only be repelled by using such weapons, and those in authority over the jihad decide to use them, it is permissible to use CBRN weapons. This reference to the leaders of the jihad needing to authorise the use of CBRN weapons is an important detail in the treatise, because it meant that independent jihadi groups and cells would not be theologically justified in using CBRN weapons unless it was sanctioned by a higher authority. Bin Laden clearly saw himself and the al Qaeda leadership as having legitimate authority over the jihad, so this conclusion should have strengthened the leadership’s control over the wider jihadi CBRN threat. On an issue of this magnitude several other prominent and respected scholars would usually also have to concur in order to establish a consensus within the community, and in this instance another radical Saudi cleric, Ali al-Khudair, endorsed al-Fahd’s treatise.27 In the summer of 2003, both al-Fahd and al-Khudair were arrested, as part of a wider campaign against al Qaeda by the Saudi security forces, and imprisoned without trial. Al-Fahd was later forced to publicly renounce several of his rulings against the Saudi government, and both of them recanted their respective WMD fatwas on Saudi television in December 2003. However, speaking from prison in January 2005, al-Fahd rescinded his former renunciation through messages communicated by his supporters over Islamist internet forums.28 Al-Fahd’s treatise provided the authoritative theological opinion that al Qaeda needed to give its CBRN threats credibility. Equally, however, for individual Islamist groups and cells that might not recognise al Qaeda as being in authority over the jihad, it also provided a theological justification for using CBRN weapons in a first-strike role. There was therefore the potential that the treatise might incentivise some groups and cells to conduct CBRN attacks. For the al Qaeda

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leadership, this placed an even greater emphasis on maintaining strong central control of CBRN plans being developed by its wider network.

Confusing the Message Once al Qaeda had received al-Fahd’s treatise, the most significant weakness in the credibility of its CBRN threats was its capabilities. At that time its CBRN capabilities were so crude that they were of little use for making deterrent threats. In an effort to improve the credibility of its threats, al Qaeda continued to inform the media that it possessed more effective CBRN weapons than it actually did. In doing so, however, its messaging on CBRN weapons became confused, and fed into the dominant narrative in the West that al Qaeda was intent on using CBRN weapons in a first-strike role. One of the main conduits through which al Qaeda informed the word of its CBRN capabilities was the journalist Hamid Mir. He had numerous contacts inside al Qaeda and the Taliban, including at senior levels. A number of these contacts informed him that even before 9/11 al Qaeda had smuggled nuclear weapons, along with many kilos of enriched uranium for making radiological weapons, into the US via Mexico. At least two al Qaeda operatives told Mir that three suitcase nukes had been smuggled into the US, whilst another source told him that Chechen members of al Qaeda wanted to smuggle one nuclear weapon into London, one into Paris and one into California. He was also told that al Qaeda could manufacture anthrax but that it did not have advanced BW.29 There was a certain lack of credibility to these claims, but they nevertheless served to generate uncertainty about al Qaeda’s CBRN capabilities. Perhaps influenced by these claims and previous reports of al Qaeda possessing nuclear weapons, some of the more exuberant individuals within the wider jihadi network misunderstood the leadership’s intentions with regard to CBRN weapons, and began making threats that were inconsistent with al Qaeda’s declared strategy of deterrence. On 26 December 2002 Abu Shihab al-Kandahari, the then-moderator of the Islamist internet forum al-mojahedoon.net, issued a warning of an impending nuclear attack on the US, under the title ‘Nuclear war is the solution for the destruction of the United States’. Al-Kandahari argued that nuclear weapons were the only way to kill the maximum number of

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Americans, and that al Qaeda had radiological and biological weapons that could be used against US cities. He warned that in the coming days al Qaeda would turn the US into a lake of lethal radiation. He justified the use of nuclear weapons by arguing that the US was using the most violent and modern weapons to bomb civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan, and had attacked Iraq using weapons that contaminated the land and water with radiation. This article marked the first time that such a threat had been publicly issued by supporters of al Qaeda, or at least by a figure known to have been close to the propaganda apparatus of Global Jihad.30 Similar threats were made by other individuals who were apparently members of al Qaeda. In 2003, al-Majallah, a leading Arab current affairs magazine, published details of correspondence between one of its journalists and Abu Muhammad al-Ablaj, who identified himself as the supervising commander of the Mujahedeen training centre of the al Qaeda and Taliban organisations. Little is known about al-Ablaj, or his position within al Qaeda, but it is believed that he was an official spokesman for the network.31 In the correspondence al-Ablaj refused to rule out al Qaeda’s use of new tactics and weapons, such as sarin or poisoning drinking water in US cities or in other Western nations.32 He declared that: as to the use of Sarin gas and nuclear [weapons], we will talk about them then and the infidels will know what harms them. They spared no effort in their war on us in Afghanistan and left no weapon unused. They should not therefore rule out the possibility that we will present them with our capabilities.33 In a further article in al-Majallah later that same year, al-Ablaj provided further explanation that a chemical, biological or nuclear weapon is a strategic weapon that has ‘reactions commensurate with its size . . . it must therefore be used at a time that makes the crusader enemy beg on his knee that he does not want more strikes’.34 It is impossible to fully understand al-Ablaj’s comments without seeing the original correspondence. In particular, it is not known whether he was responding to a specific question regarding CBRN weapons or whether he raised the subject himself.35 So whilst his comments represented clear CBRN threats, they lacked clarity about the precise circumstances in which al Qaeda would use CBRN weapons.

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This lack of clarity may have been a deliberate attempt to enhance the credibility of al Qaeda’s CBRN threats by engendering uncertainty in the minds of the US about the circumstances in which they would be used. Alternatively, al-Ablaj’s comments could have been intended to enable al Qaeda to explain that it had not yet used the CBRN weapons it claimed to have because the circumstances were not right. Whatever his purpose, his comments only served to cloud Western understanding of al Qaeda’s intentions. The statements by al-Kandahari and al-Ablaj provided Western intelligence agencies with confusing messages about al Qaeda’s intentions with regard to using CBRN weapons. As a consequence, they continued with the risk-averse assessment that al Qaeda intended to use CBRN weapons for first-strike purposes. At the same time, they were also struggling to develop an accurate assessment of al Qaeda’s CBRN capabilities. They did not know how far al Qaeda had got with developing certain weapons; whether it had any completed CBRN weapons at its disposal; how many al Qaeda fighters had received CBRN weapon training; or what their level of training was.

Evidence of Developing CBRN Plots in Europe For Western intelligence agencies, the assessment that al Qaeda intended to use CBRN weapons in a first-strike role was further confirmed by information that started to become available from mid 2002 suggesting that a Qaeda was planning to launch CBW attacks in Europe. In July 2002, the CIA received reports from Iraqi Kurdish sources that a man with a limp had sent a courier with a tube of cyanide cream to a contact in Turkey called ‘Musab’. British intelligence received similar reports that the limping man had taken a quantity of ricin to Algerian contacts in Turkey. The substance was described as a cream that could be absorbed through the skin, which was to be used in a terrorist attack against either US or Russian interests within the next 20 days.36 The identity of the limping man was uncertain. Some analysts believed that it was Zarqawi whilst others identified him as Abu Atiya, who had lost a leg whilst fighting in Chechnya. This suggests that the group involved was al Tawhid wal Jihad, but at that time Western intelligence agencies considered it to be part of the al Qaeda network, so the putative plot was labelled as being an al Qaeda operation. The CIA

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passed the warning on to the Turkish authorities, who issued an urgent warning, ordering that extraordinary security measures be taken in shopping centres, hotels, sport centres, stadiums, places of ceremony, bus stations, airports and at US and Russian establishments. They also put out an alert to apprehend a man called Abu Tasiir.37 This warning seems credible, but no attack was ever carried out, so it remains unclear whether there ever was an attack being planned. By August 2002, Western intelligence agencies were starting to receive reports from Kurdish sources in Northern Iraq about the CBW experiments being carried out in the Ansar al-Islam camp at Sargat. This included reports of experiments on animals using aerosolised ricin, and experiments with cyanide, including the development of a cyanide cream that killed on contact with the skin.38 However, no country has ever managed to develop an effective method for mass dispersal of ricin. If it was beyond the capabilities of states to effectively weaponise ricin, it should have been a reasonable assumption that terrorist groups working in basic laboratories would also be unlikely to succeed. However, the reports of experiments with a cyanide cream were consistent with Abu Khabab’s work in Afghanistan prior to 9/11, and were credible. Whilst the US intelligence agencies believed that the CBW laboratory in the Ansar camp was set up by Arabs who arrived there in late 2001, another possibility began to emerge from Iraqi defectors who claimed that Ansar was being supported by the Saddam regime.39 This was seemingly corroborated by captured members of Ansar, who claimed that the regime had supplied the group with CW.40 In conjunction with the information that had previously been received about the role of Abu Wal, as well as al Tawhid wal Jjihad’s wider activities in Iraq and Zarqawi’s treatment in a Baghdad hospital, this led some analysts to claim that there was a link between the Saddam regime and Ansar’s CRBN activities. On the face of it, it was difficult to see why the Saddam regime would provide any sort of support to Ansar, given their ideological differences, but they did have a common enemy in the autonomous Kurdish Administration in northern Iraq. However, the sources of these reports needed to be treated with caution, given that defectors often have personal agendas and there is a possibility that captives might say anything, particularly if they are tortured. Nevertheless, these reports were seen by some as evidence of Iraqi state sponsorship of CBRN terrorism by al Qaeda.

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Meanwhile, Western intelligence agencies were picking up increasing signs of al Qaeda and al Tawhid wal Jihad activity in the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia. Initially, Western intelligence agencies had identified the Pankisi Gorge as the site of a ‘terrorist academy’, where terrorists were being trained in the production of toxic chemicals, and Abu Atiya as the man conducting experiments with cyanide and ricin to produce a contact poison.41 More alarmingly, French intelligence sources claimed that Atiya was working on anthrax, ricin and botulinum toxin, as well as the development of some kind of weaponised pathogen or chemical armament, using small bio-safety containment boxes.42 From September 2002, the US intelligence agencies began tracking al Tawhid wal Jihad associates infiltrating into Turkey, the UK, Spain, Italy, France, Sweden, Germany and other countries. US analysts came to the view that the network consisted of dozens of extremists in about 30 countries.43 However, there was a considerable amount of uncertainty about what was going on, and other governments were less certain about the command structure of this purported network.44 The US could do little about Ansar because the Iraqi regime would not act against it. In contrast, the US was in a position to act against the al Qaeda and al Tawhid wal Jihad elements based in the Pankisi Gorge, because Georgia was an ally in the war on terror. The US provided a significant amount of military aid to Georgia to strengthen its counterterrorism capabilities, and by October 2002 the Georgian government was ready to act decisively. The Georgian army conducted a sweep of the gorge, but by that time most of the militants had been aware of what was about to happen and had already left, although Saif al-Islam al-Masri and 14 other suspects were arrested and handed over to the US.45 Atiya escaped but was subsequently detained, and ended up in Jordanian custody. The sweep yielded only ambiguous information that did little to shed any light on al Qaeda’s CBRN activities in the gorge. Georgian Security Ministry operatives claimed to have discovered components for manufacturing ricin in the gorge,46 but Deputy Security Minister Irakli Alasania reported that no ricin production laboratories had been discovered.47 The Georgian government concluded that no material evidence had been found to suggest that ricin or any other lethal substances had ever been manufactured in the gorge.48 But rather than quelling speculation about al Qaeda and CBRN weapons, attention

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switched back to Iraq, partly because of reports that Zarqawi had been located there. By 2003, al Qaeda’s declared intentions with regard to CBRN weapons were becoming increasingly clear, although they remained partly obscured by some of the unclear messaging coming from al Qaeda spokesmen. Its intentions were also clouded by the lack of understanding among Western intelligence agencies at that time about the relationship between al Tawhid wal Jihad and the al Qaeda network. As a result, al Tawhid’s reported activities were interpreted as being indicators of al Qaeda’s intentions. Western intelligence agencies were correct in identifying a potential increase in the CBRN threat from al Tawhid wal Jihad, but they did not recognise that this was actually due to the threat growing beyond the control of the al Qaeda leadership.

CHAPTER 10 CONSTRAINING THE THREAT, 2002—3

The US and international reaction to 9/11 proved that bin Laden had been wrong in believing that the US could only withstand three strong blows. It also showed that the fears of those elements within the al Qaeda leadership, who had warned about the repercussions of a major attack on the US mainland, had been well-founded. For the al Qaeda leadership, this posed a major strategic dilemma – whether to persist with largescale attacks against the US mainland or whether to focus attacks on US allies, assets and interests in other countries. This dilemma was brought into sharp relief in 2003, when al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia (AQSA) sought approval for an operational plan to attack the New York subway with cyanide weapons. The al Qaeda leadership’s consideration of this proposal would also test whether it remained committed to the declared policy of using CBRN weapons for deterrence, at a time when al Qaeda was being put under increasing military and political pressure. In the summer of 2002, the leader of AQSA, Yusef al-Ayeri (who used the nom de guerre ‘Swift Sword’) and his second in command, Ali al-Faqasi al-Ghamdi (who used the nom de guerre Abu Bakr al-Azdi), began planning attacks against the Saudi royal family and oil assets in the kingdom.1 AQSA publications produced at that time also began to include references to using CBRN weapons. Al-Ayeri himself, published a book called Crusaders’ War, in which he outlined a tactical model for fighting US forces in Iraq, which included assassination and poisoning the enemy’s food and drink.2

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Over the following months the US intelligence agencies began to pick up references to nuclear and biological weapons in intercepted communications between AQSA operatives, including reports that AQSA was negotiating to buy three Russian nuclear weapons.3 This information was matched by other reports that Chechen rebels were becoming increasingly active in investigating opportunities for acquiring nuclear weapons. In 2002 and 2003 the Russian security forces reportedly thwarted two attempts by Chechens to gain access to warehouses containing nuclear warheads in the Saratov region, and Chechen rebels were also believed to have identified special armoured trains that transport nuclear warheads across Russia, as potential targets.4 Between March and May 2003 US officials grew so concerned by these reports that the intelligence was shared with Saudi officials,5 who responded by ordering a security clamp down. In January 2003, a joint Saudi–US security team recovered a laptop computer from the apartment of an al Qaeda suspect. They were startled to find that the laptop contained details of a crude portable device for dispersing cyanide, called the al-Mubtakkar.6 The device contained quantities of sodium cyanide and hydrochloric acid that when mixed together create hydrogen cyanide gas.7 FBI technicians declared that the device was viable, although unlikely to be capable of causing mass casualties. They made a copy of the device to show President Bush, who declared: ‘[The] thing’s a nightmare.’ Other non-government observers were a little more sanguine, estimating that the device was unlikely to produce much hydrogen cyanide gas, although in the worst-case scenario it might produce enough gas to kill people in a confined space.8 But irrespective of these assessments over the effectiveness of the device, the key fact was that the al Qaeda leadership believed that the device worked, and could kill a lot of people.9 The concern was so great that in February 2003 the US State Department issued a ‘Worldwide Caution’ advisory to Americans, warning of a growing threat of terrorists using nonconventional weapons, including chemical or biological agents. In New York, hospital officials were warned to be prepared to deal with a possible cyanide attack and to build up stocks of CBW treatments, including sodium thiosulfate, the antidote to cyanide poisoning. After intercepting two e-mails, the FBI issued a similar bulletin in March 2003, warning law enforcement agencies across the US about the threat of attacks using

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improvised CW produced from easily available items such as canisters and paint cans and using agents such as hydrogen cyanide or chlorine.10 These warnings were fuelled by further intelligence reports that al Qaeda was planning a CBRN attack on the US. This included a report that 15 al Qaeda operatives in the US were planning to contaminate swimming pools with sodium cyanide and had also brought a nuclear bomb, and a chemical called ‘blue mercury’ into the country.11 By midMarch, however, the CIA investigation had reached a dead-end. To break the impasse, they approached British intelligence, who had a highly placed source inside al Qaeda, for assistance. The source identified ‘Swift Sword’ as al-Ayeri, and then dropped a bombshell by reporting that AQSA had been planning to use the al-Mubtakkar to attack the New York subway. A cell of Saudi militants had travelled to New York in the fall of 2002, with the intention of planting several remotely activated al-Mubtakkar devices in subway cars and at other strategic locations in the city. The cell had reconnoitred their targets, and by January 2003 was reportedly just 45 days away from launching the attack.12 At that point al-Ayeri visited Zawahiri in Pakistan to brief him about the plot. But Zawahiri was so concerned about the potential backlash from the US that he instructed al-Ayeri to call off the attack.13 Al-Ayeri complied, and the attack was never carried out. This is the fourth reported instance of the al Qaeda leadership refusing to approve a CBRN attack. Zawahiri’s reasoning was consistent with the views of those elements within the al Qaeda leadership who had opposed 9/11 on the grounds that it might provoke severe retaliation, and for the reasons given by KSM and Ramzi bin al-Shibh for not attacking nuclear power stations on 9/11. It also sheds new light on the factors that might have influenced the decision to not approve Padilla’s improbable radiological bomb plot in 2002. It confirms that political factors were central to al Qaeda’s decision-making with regard to using CBRN weapons, and adds further weight to the case that the leadership really was reserving these weapons for deterrence. However, the US was sceptical about the reasons why Zawahiri had called off the attack. These doubts were seemingly confirmed when the National Security Agency (NSA) intercepted a message from Zawahiri in which he stated that the plot had been dropped for ‘something better’.14 What that something better was became a matter of endless speculation within the US Administration.15 President Bush and Vice President

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Cheney took the view that it meant that an even bigger attack was in the offing.16 This conclusion seemed to be consistent with the reports that AQSA was negotiating to buy three Russian nuclear weapons.

AQSA Attempts to Buy Nuclear Weapons In its on-going attempts to neutralise the threat from AQSA, the Saudi security forces made a coordinated series of raids in May 2003, during which a quantity of cyanide was found in an al Qaeda safe house in Riyadh. But the biggest success was the death of al-Ayeri and a number of other members of his cell in a shoot-out with the Saudi police on 31 May.17 Al-Ayeri was replaced by the scholar Fares Ahmad al-Shuwayl al-Zahrani, who was more famous by his nom de guerre, Abu Jandal al-Azdi. He was an exponent of the concept of asymmetric warfare and envisioned the use of new weapons and technologies as a key component of such conflicts. In March 2004 he published an article titled ‘The al-Qaeda organization and the asymmetric war’, which cites at length a report on asymmetric warfare by General Henry Shelton of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, that states: ‘Asymmetry means the use by the enemy of psychological war and its implications, in order to take the lead and enjoy freedom of activity and will. It does it by using innovated means, untraditional tactics, and weapons and technologies.’18 These references suggested that al-Azdi might potentially have been an advocate of using CBRN weapons, but in November 2004, before he could see his ideas put into action, he was arrested and imprisoned by the Saudi authorities. At about the same time as the CIA began to receive reports that AQSA was negotiating to buy three former Soviet nuclear weapons reports also emerged that Chechen insurgents had managed to acquire three nuclear weapons from the arsenal of the former Soviet Union. These reports suggested that in November 1991 Russia’s former defence minister, Pavel Grachev, had ‘sold’ the Russian military arsenal in Grozny to the former Chechen president, Dzhokhar Dudaev, among which was a nuclear-tipped air-to-surface missile. The insurgents are also reported to have found two more nuclear warheads in an abandoned ballistic missile silo in the village of Bamut. The missiles in the silo had been destroyed by a fire in the mid-1970s, leaving two warheads lying at the bottom of the shafts.19 Like previous reports of terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons, these claims seemed unbelievable. If the Chechens had

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nuclear weapons they would presumably have tried to use them during the defence of Grozny in 1999, but they did not. Still, in accordance with the 1 per cent doctrine, the allegations needed to be investigated. The CIA sent officers to Chechnya, but they were unable to prove whether the reports were true.20 There was every reason to believe that the report was just another baseless rumour, but the fact that multiple sources were talking about three nuclear warheads being for sale seemed to suggest that al Qaeda believed the offer to be genuine. Between March and May 2003 al-Ghamdi consulted with senior al Qaeda leaders based in Iran, including its chief of operations Saif al-Adel, regarding the offer. Bin Laden himself approved the deal to buy the weapons, subject to them being inspected and tested by a Pakistani nuclear specialist.21 Reports suggested that his plan was to detonate the nuclear bombs simultaneously in several US cities, and he selected Adnan al-Shukrijumah a Guyanese citizen with US residency who also possessed a Canadian passport, to lead the plot.22 The US intelligence agencies picked up details of these communications and considered the information to be of such concern that it was passed to the governments of Saudi Arabia, Russia and Iran for possible action.23 The Saudi security forces were already aggressively pursuing AQSA, and as a result of the pressure he was under, al-Ghamdi surrendered to the Saudi authorities on 26 June 2003.24 In all, dozens of AQSA members were arrested or killed by the Saudi security forces in early 2003. Afterwards, terrorist chatter about buying nuclear weapons abruptly stopped, leaving US officials uncertain about whether the plan had been brought to an end or simply pushed deeper underground.25 What was clear though was that al-Ghamdi had not managed to buy any nuclear weapons, and the Russian authorities have never reported the recovery of three nuclear warheads from the Chechen rebels. It was therefore more likely than not that the planned deal to buy the three warheads was just another scam. Despite its failure to acquire any nuclear weapons, AQSA propaganda continued to include references to CBRN weapons. In January 2004, a publication posted by members of al Qaeda on the internet included an article by ’Abd al-’Aziz al-Muqrin (Abu Hajir), a leading AQSA fugitive in Saudi Arabia, which called for supporters to use nuclear and biological weapons in attacks against the Saudi government.26 But with the Saudi

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security forces gaining the upper hand against AQSA, this statement was little more than bluster.

Europe and the ‘Chechen Network’ Whilst US attention was focused on Saudi Arabia, intelligence traffic on terrorist plots in Europe was building up to levels similar to those witnessed shortly before 9/11. The first indications of a potential CBW attack in Europe had came from the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, who claimed that al Tawhid wal Jihad was planning to carry out poison attacks in the UK.27 Before he left the Pankisi Gorge, Abu Atiya had sent a group of operatives to the UK to scout out targets for attacks using CW and conventional weapons. The British intelligence agencies learned of Atiya’s plans when a member of al Tawhid wal Jihad called Rashi Zuhayr was arrested as he tried to cross an international border using forged identity papers. Zubayr admitted that Atiya had ordered him to reconnoitre targets in the UK for attacks involving poison and conventional weapons.28 This was a period of intense anxiety for the UK authorities, who did not have a clear picture of what was going on but feared that a major attack was being planned. These fears were partly influenced by reports from the surveillance of an al Qaeda cell based in London, which indicated that the cell was planning to smuggle materials for a CW into the country.29 The government was so alarmed that on 7 November 2002 it issued a warning about a likely CBRN attack, which stated that ‘[m]aybe they will try to develop a so-called dirty bomb or some kind of poison gas; maybe they will try to use boats or trains rather than planes. The bottom line is that we simply cannot be sure’.30 The warning caused a media storm, prompting reports that a CW attack was being planned on the London Underground. The government then quickly withdrew it, and replaced it with a less alarmist assessment. Just two days later the cell was arrested, but they had no bomb-making materials in their possession and were never even questioned about CW. The police later explained that, rather than preventing an imminent attack, the arrests were intended to disrupt the cell in the early stages of its existence,31 and the government was forced to publicly rebut the claims that a CW attack on the London Underground had been planned.32 This media response to the incident was symptomatic of the febrile atmosphere at that time and the generally poor quality of media

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reporting on the issue of CBRN terrorism. But British politicians did little to ease the atmosphere. Home Secretary David Blunkett warned that ‘whatever damage they [al Qaeda] are able to inflict they would do so’,33 whilst Prime Minister Tony Blair declared in a speech just two days after the arrests that: These dangers can strike at any time. At the moment barely a day goes by without some new piece of intelligence coming via our security services about a threat to UK interests. Today’s breed of terrorist knows no bounds – of geography, of humanity, of scale. They are looking for evermore dramatic and devastating outrages to inflict on the people they claim to be their enemy.34 Blair’s concerns were seemingly founded on additional reports that Western intelligence agencies were receiving from in late 2002 that suggested that cells belonging to the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which was linked with al Tawhid wal Jihad and al Qaeda, were planning chemical or biological attacks in Europe. The German intelligence service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), identified Zarqawi as the key figure in the plot.35 It was reported that shortly before Abu Atiya left the Pankisi Gorge he had ordered a number of cells to conduct poison and bomb attacks in several western European states.36 As evidence of a plot grew, the Spanish, British and French intelligence services worked closely together to try and prevent it. In the autumn of 2002 the French intelligence service, the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST), began to receive intelligence that al Qaeda leaders in the Caucasus were planning a widespread terror campaign using ricin and cyanide in western Europe.37 The DST labelled it the ‘Chechen network’.38 The part of this network that was based in France was centred around the Benchellali family, and was based in the cities of Paris and Lyons. It comprised former members of the GIA and others who had been recruited in the Paris and Lyons suburbs. It was led by Menad Benchellali, who had received CBW training at Darunta and was known as ‘the chemist’ among the other members of the network. Three members of the network, Benchellali, Merouane Benahmed and Noureddine Merabet, had fought in Chechnya and had received CBW training in the Pankisi Gorge.39 Benachalli had set up a crude laboratory in a spare room in the

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family apartment in Lyons, using a coffee pot to blend the ingredients.40 Among the ideas that the cell discussed were a cyanide attack on the Paris Metro and the use of ricin on the Eiffel tower, the Russian embassy and other tourist attractions.41 However, the French police initially believed that they were dealing with a group planning bomb attacks on Russian interests, and possibly providing support to the Chechen rebels.42 The DST had a lucky break when the cell was betrayed by a detainee being held in US custody. In December 2002 police raided two apartments in the northern Paris suburbs of La Courneuve and Romainville. Benchellali and three others were arrested and the police recovered gas canisters, fuses, chemical formulae, chemicals and a chemical protection suit. Further investigations led the police to a storage locker at Paris Gare de Lyon train station, in March 2003. The locker contained two vials containing a powder and three bottles filled with liquids. They also found evidence that suggested that the cell was communicating with other cells in the UK and Spain.43 Following the discovery at the Gare de Lyon, the Interior Ministry initially announced that the contents of the two smaller bottles were ‘traces of ricin in a mixture which has proven to be a very toxic poison’. But the very next day, the Ministry revised its statement, saying that the traces of ricin were too minute to be lethal. The following month it finally announced that laboratory tests had identified the substances as wheat germ and barley, which had certain chemical similarities to ricin. It seems that no ricin whatsoever had been found.44 Nevertheless, the discovery heightened concerns about a new threat from CBW terrorism, and it was quickly blown out of proportion. Even the French examining magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguiere declared that ‘the Chechens are experts in chemical warfare. And Chechnya is closer to Europe than Afghanistan’.45 It was not until January 2004 that the other members of the network were arrested in Venissuex, near Lyons.46 The arrests provided a goldmine of further unexpected evidence, including quantities of chemicals and samples of ricin as well as statements from those arrested that Menad Benchellali had hoped to make botulinum toxin and ricin. This led the French police to believe that the cell was actually trying to manufacture CBW for attacks around Europe, although they found no evidence that their plans had proceeded beyond a vague planning stage.47

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But the Chechen network was not the only CBRN threat facing France at that time. Members of the Moroccan Salafia Jihadia group, were training for a mission to attack the Cap de la Hague nuclear power station in France.48 Salafia Jihadia is made up of many small, local and autonomous cells, some of which are alleged to have received operational support from the GSPC and strategic guidance from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.49 However, details of the plot were discovered following the arrest of a number of Salafia Jihadia members in Morocco, and the key figure in the plot was arrested as he tried to enter Europe via the Spanish port of Algeciras.50 The alleged connection between Salafia Jihadia and al-Zarqawi hints that this incident may have been part of al Tawhid wal Jihad’s wider intention to attack France, but the fact that Salafia Jihadia consists of autonomous cells suggests it might equally have been an independent initiative by a local cell. Following the arrest of Benchellali, attention switched to the UK, when the UK intelligence agencies received information from their Algerian counterparts about a BW attack that was reportedly being planned in London. The suspect was identified as a GIA operative called Kemal Bourgass, who had entered the UK illegally in 2000, and was based in an apartment in the Wood Green area of North London. He had reportedly received CBW training from al Qaeda in Afghanistan during the late 1990s and, along with an accomplice called Mohamed Meguerba, had been instructed to set up a sleeper cell in the UK and await instructions.51 Bourgass possessed photocopies of protocols for making a range of poisons, and also acquired the castor beans and other rudimentary equipment required to make ricin. The pair also discussed the idea of smearing the ricin on door handles of the toilets of the Heathrow Express train service, and possibly also contaminating toothbrushes.52 Significantly, however, there have been no reports that the al Qaeda leadership had actually instructed them to carry out a BW attack. Meguerba was then arrested on suspicion of immigration offences, and after being released on bail he fled to Morocco, where he was arrested in December 2002 and handed over to the Algerian security forces. Under interrogation, Meguerba revealed details of their planning, as well as information about a number of other UK-based al Qaeda cells and scores of other individuals who appeared to be engaged in terrorist activities.53 His most alarming admission was that Bourgass had already made two small jars of ricin.54

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In January 2003 the Algerian security services passed this information on to their British counterparts,55 which led to a police raid on Bourgass’s apartment. No-one was at home, but the police discovered photocopied protocols for manufacturing ricin, cyanide, botulinum toxin and nicotine poison, as well as 22 castor beans, apple pips and cherry stones, which can be used to make cyanide. They also recovered a coffee grinder, a mortar and pestle, a bottle of acetone, a funnel, thermometers and scales, all of which could be used in the manufacture of ricin. The protocol for manufacturing ricin, which had been downloaded from a US-based website and transcribed into Arabic, was a derivative of a protocol published in The Poisoner’s Handbook.56 Subsequent experiments at the government’s bio-defence centre at Porton Down showed that using the protocol with five grams of castor beans could create one lethal dose of ricin, if it was injected into a person. If eaten, it would most likely only cause symptoms such as nausea, vomiting and abdominal pain. The protocol specified mixing the ricin with either DMSO (dimethyl sulphoxide) or lemon juice to produce a mixture that could be absorbed through unbroken human skin. However, there is no evidence that this concoction would have constituted a contact hazard.57 During subsequent police raids across London eight men were arrested, but Bourgass was not among them. He had already fled London, but was arrested in Manchester on 14 January, stabbing a police officer to death in the process. The British authorities reported that a least one of the other suspects had trained in al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, while the others may have received training in the Pankisi Gorge.58 Initial testing in the kitchen of the flat, using highly sensitive field detectors, detected the presence of ricin.59 However, subsequent laboratory tests carried out at Porton Down determined that there was no ricin present in the flat. But for reasons that remain unclear, the public liaison office at Porton Down incorrectly informed both the media and the police, that ‘traces of ricin’ had been found.60 Meanwhile in France the investigation had broadened out further when the DST discovered communications between the Paris cell and individuals in Spain. The examining magistrate, Jean-Louis Bruguiere, requested that the Spanish authorities arrest a number of Algerians and Moroccans, on the grounds that four of the Algerians arrested by French

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police in December 2002 had visited Spain and been in contact with the suspects. On 24 January 2003, Spanish police arrested 16 suspected members of a GSPC cell in pre-dawn raids on 12 apartments in Barcelona, Girona and nearby towns in northeastern Spain. They found large quantities of chemicals and explosive material – including time switches, remote control detonators and barrels of suspicious resin. They were also reported to have found manuals on chemical warfare and electronic circuits. The Spanish authorities felt confident enough to announce that a major terrorist attack had been thwarted. Jose´ Marı´a Aznar, the Spanish Prime Minister, claimed that: ‘The network we have dismantled had connections with terrorists recently arrested in France and the United Kingdom. They were preparing attacks with explosives and with chemical material.’ The Spanish operation followed similar raids by Italian police near Venice in which explosives and maps of NATO bases and the London Underground were discovered. The Spanish authorities claimed that the suspects detained in Spain were believed to have passed through al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan or Chechnya.61 The national and international media was equally upbeat. El Pais announced: ‘Police operation in Catalonia against al-Qaeda’s European network’. The New York Times was equally excited: ‘Prime Minister Jose´ Marı´a Aznar said today that Spanish police officials had arrested 16 militants suspected of links to al-Qaeda, breaking up two cells and confiscating electronic material and containers of unidentified chemicals.’ In the British media, the chemicals were quickly identified as ricin, but subsequent reports referred only to ‘unconfirmed reports of ricin’ when it was realised that the Spanish Interior Ministry press release actually referred to ‘resina’, which is Spanish for resin.62 This series of arrests in the UK, Spain and France appeared to have rolled up an entire al Qaeda sub-network. The putative plots were consistent with al Qaeda’s modus operandi of conducting multiple synchronised attacks. The CIA confidently asserted that the London cell was networked with the Paris and Spain cells, and indicated that the arrests ‘point[ed] toward nearly ready al Qaeda-sponsored [CBW] attacks’.63 US concerns were stoked up even further by the Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov, who declared in a speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy on 8 February 2003 that the Pankisi Gorge was a well-known destination for the training and instruction of

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international ‘chemical terrorists’ and that it housed makeshift ricin laboratories. He then went on to claim that the terrorist cells that had been arrested in Britain and France had been trained in the gorge.64 But all was not as it seemed. The first threads began to unravel in Spain, when the examining magistrate in charge of the case released the suspects, citing a lack of evidence. The chemicals that had been recovered by the police were found to be harmless. When the magistrate asked to see the French court’s evidence, he was met with bureaucratic delay before being told that France would not be asking for the extradition of any of the Spanish suspects. When the magistrate decided to go to Paris for himself, Bruguiere said he was too busy to see him and would remain too busy for months.65 British anti-terrorist sources began to suspect that the Spanish cell was actually involved in organised crime rather than terrorism,66 although it was later made public that the cell, supported by other cells based in France and the UK, might have been planning a chemical attack against a naval base in Rota (Spain) that was used jointly by Spain and the US navy.67 In the UK, the eight suspects were put on trial in 2005 but, as in Spain, the case began to unravel. The fact that no ricin had been discovered at the Wood Green flat was presented to the court, and evidence from Meguerba was withheld from the jury after the prosecution successfully argued that he was an unreliable witness because he had been tortured.68 Bourgass was eventually convicted of murdering the police officer and ‘conspiring to cause a public nuisance’ by plotting to use poisons and explosives to cause ‘disruption, fear and injury’, but the jury could not decide on the more serious charge of conspiracy to murder using poisons.69 The other defendants were all acquitted or had the charges against them dropped. In France, 25 members of the Paris and Lyon network were convicted of plotting terrorist attacks, but the prosecution also failed to produce any evidence that a CW attack was being planned.70 The incidents in France and the UK showed that the individuals who had received CBRN training in the Afghan camps had poor technical skills and the CBRN threat they posed was extremely crude. But they at least showed that individual cells and sub-networks within al Qaeda and other jihadi networks were continuing to think about how they might use CBW and making the relevant preparations. However, Bourgass and the network in France had the training, materials, equipment and time

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needed to manufacture and use ricin at the time they were arrested, but they had done neither. The most obvious explanation for Bourgass’s failure to push his plan through to completion is that it had not been approved by his handlers in Pakistan, which would have been consistent with the al Qaeda leadership’s refusal to approve the four other CBRN plots that had previously been brought to it for consideration. The network in France was more of a concern because its chain of command seemed to have been to Abu Atiya and al-Zarqawi, rather than to the al Qaeda leadership. In this instance, the network may simply have been at an early stage in its planning when it was arrested. What was unclear was whether the Chechen network was the precursor to a more aggressive, decentralised CBRN threat, operating outside of the political constraints imposed on using CBRN weapons by the al Qaeda leadership.

The Capture of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed At the same time as the drama of the Chechen network was unfolding, the US and Pakistani security forces were closing in on KSM and his associates. In February 2003, Pakistani intelligence sources identified an al Qaeda safe house in the city of Quetta, where KSM was believed to be hiding. The house was raided but KSM was not there, although the police did arrest Assadalah Rahman, who had been a member of the WMD sub-committee of the al Qaeda Military Committee prior to 9/11.71 KSM had narrowly avoided capture on that occasion, but satellite tracking of al Qaeda communications, together with an e-mail from Rahman, then led the US intelligence agencies to a new address in the city of Rawalpindi.72 ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) and US agents quickly raided the house, and this time KSM was there. As well as getting their man, they also seized a wealth of information from handwritten notes and computer hard drives. These materials showed that KSM had obtained the materials required to manufacture botulinum and salmonella and was also close to developing a feasible production plan for anthrax. However, it was not clear whether the materials referred to were the pathogen cultures themselves, the media in which the bacteria would be grown, the equipment that would be needed, or all of these items.73 Among the items found was a direction to purchase Bacillus anthracis,

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but there were no indications that KSM had gained access to a pathogenic strain of anthrax or to any advanced processing equipment or delivery methods.74 This material showed that the al Qaeda programme had still not progressed beyond the stage of gathering the necessary technical information, materials and equipment by the time KSM was arrested. The CIA quickly transferred KSM to a secret prison in Poland and subjected him to enhanced interrogation techniques, before eventually transferring him to Guantanamo Bay. During the course of his interrogation he was waterboarded over 180 times. Under considerable duress, he confirmed details of al Qaeda’s nuclear and biological weapons programmes, and threatened that there was a plot to cause a ‘nuclear hellstorm’ in the US. He also provided information about Sufaat’s role in project al Zabadi, together with information that led to the arrest of Sufaat’s assistants, Samer al Barq and al Hud al-Sudani, in 2003.75 Up until that point, Western intelligence agencies had been unaware of Sufaat’s role.76 KSM would later recant some of his testimony, but the information regarding Sufaat and his assistants was true. In contrast, the threatened ‘nuclear hellstorm’ proved to be untrue, and may have been a reference to Padilla’s would-be plot that he had refused to approve. The arrest of KSM was followed by the arrest of a number of other individuals associated with project al Zabadi. Amar al Baluchi was arrested in April 2003 in Pakistan. Among the items in his possession was a perfume bottle containing cyanide, which was a technique taught at camp 9 prior to 9/11. Saifullah Paracha was arrested in Thailand in July 2003 and handed over the US. Among the items in his possession was a digital diary that, besides his business contacts, also contained references to CW agents and their effects on humans, including VX, tabun, soman, sarin and cyclosarin.77 The diary also contained information for a contact in New York City who owned several pharmacies. Paracha had lived in the same Pakistani village as the pharmacist decades previously, and identified his old friend as a member of a pro-Taliban group operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The pharmacist’s name also appeared in a document found at an al Qaeda safe house in Pakistan, juxtaposed with a reference to an anthrax vaccine. Information linking the pharmacist to anthrax and biological weapons was also found on a calendar belonging to yet another suspected terrorist.78

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Crucially, KSM’s main collaborator on CBRN weapons, Hambali, was arrested in the Thai city of Ayuttayah a month after Paracha had been arrested.79 The presence of two individuals with links to al Qaeda’s BW programme in the same country might have been a co-incidence, but that seems unlikely. Paracha had allegedly been meeting business contacts as part of his legitimate commercial activities, but it is also conceivable that he met Hambali on the same trip. This series of arrests brought al Qaeda’s new CBW development programme to a halt, but the information that was obtained as a result played a crucial role shaping US intelligence assessments between 2002 and 2003.

Intelligence Assessments of the Threat Prior to these arrests the information obtained from the interrogation of captured militants had proved to be of dubious reliability. Some of what was said about al Qaeda’s CBRN capabilities was clearly implausible. Matarfi, for instance, claimed that he had attempted to purchase a computerised laser-guided missile system with a range of 1,500 km that would be armed with chemical warheads and have a destruction radius of 1,500 m2. The US intelligence agencies actually believed that Matarfi was involved with UTN in attempting to procure a nuclear weapon for al Qaeda, but he denied the accusation.80 Similarly, British citizen Moazzem Begg reported a plan to use an unmanned aircraft to spray anthrax over the House of Commons,81 yet al Qaeda did not have anthrax. Other reports amounted to little more than hearsay. A Yemeni operative called Salman Yehah Kasa Hassan claimed that an associate of his brother’s had been apprehended by the Yemeni authorities whilst attempting to sell a quantity of uranium for $500,000. After the Yemeni authorities confiscated the uranium it was rumoured to have disappeared in a transaction with bin Laden.82 Another detainee claimed that al Qaeda had purchased a ship that was intended to transport weapons, explosives and possibly uranium purchased from countries along the Red Sea and the Mediterranean.83 Yet another detainee claimed that one of bin Laden’s former bodyguards, Sanad al Kizimi, had told him that al Qaeda had hidden CBRN weapons in Tajikistan, Chechnya and Afghanistan, and was receiving assistance in chemical and nuclear research and delivery methods, from China. He also reportedly claimed

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that al Qaeda and the Taliban would respond with CW if the US attacked them with CW.84 However, some reports were corroborated by other sources. One of the most significant detainees was Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, who claimed that several small containers of nuclear material had been smuggled into New York City by a Russian organised crime group.85 This report was consistent with some of the information that Hamid Mir was receiving from his al Qaeda contacts. Similarly, only the report concerning Sanad al Kizimi revealed any details of al Qaeda’s intentions with regard to CBRN weapons. He had been close enough to bin Laden to have known what his approach to CBRN weapons was, and his evidence was consistent with bin Laden’s statements in 2001 about using CBRN weapons for deterrence or retaliation. Overall, the information regarding al Qaeda’s CBRN capabilities that came out of Guantanamo Bay was of limited use. Tellingly, at least some of this information had been obtained as a result of using enhanced interrogation techniques. It therefore seems likely that many of the detainees were either repeating rumours or simply making things up in order to receive better treatment. Perhaps unsurprisingly, information obtained from the detainees at Guantanamo Bay did not inform the public statements about al Qaeda’s CBRN capabilities that were made by US intelligence officials at that time. In January 2002, the CIA published a report which stated that the threat from WMD terrorism had increased since 9/11. It assessed that extremist groups appeared to be most interested in chemicals like cyanide salts to contaminate food and water supplies, but that they appeared to be increasing their search for weapons that could destroy large populations using CBRN agents.86 This assessment implied that al Qaeda did not possess effective CBRN weapons, which was supported by further statements that were made during February 2002. On 25 February 2002, General Tommy Franks, the commander of US military forces in Afghanistan, reported that following the examination of over 110 al Qaeda sites in Afghanistan no evidence had been found proving that al Qaeda had the capability to make CBW.87 However, the intelligence agencies continued to stress al Qaeda’s intention to acquire a sophisticated CBRN weapon capability. CIA Director George Tenet reiterated to the Senate Armed Services Committee that evidence recovered from Afghanistan showed that al Qaeda had been working to

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acquire dangerous chemical agents and toxins and was pursuing a sophisticated biological weapons research programme.88 In July 2002 the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency was more specific when he publicly stated that al Qaeda’s interest in BW was primarily focused on anthrax.89 The language of these statements was noticeably moderate, but there was a marked hardening of the tone in further statements that were made in 2003, following the arrest of KSM. The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency reiterated to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on 11 February 2003 that ‘al Qaeda and other terrorist groups are seeking to acquire chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) capabilities’.90 The same month, Tenet informed the Senate Committee on Armed Services: I told you last year . . . that bin Laden has a sophisticated biological weapons capability . . . In Afghanistan, al-Qaeda succeeded in acquiring both the expertise and equipment needed to grow biological agents, including a dedicated laboratory in an isolated compound in Kandahar.91 He also emphasised that it was within al Qaeda capabilities to make a radiological weapon, and that it was actively trying to acquire such weapons.92 Tenet’s language in 2003 was substantially stronger than he had used in his 2002 statement. In particular, his claim that Sufaat and his team had the expertise to grow biological cultures was new.93 But significantly, the US intelligence agencies did not revise their assessments of al Qaeda’s intentions with regard to using CBRN, despite the emergence of significant new evidence. The New York subway plot, AQSA’s abortive attempt to buy nuclear weapons, the activities of the Chechen network and information obtained from a Taliban source who reported that bin Laden had been planning an ‘unbelievable’ biological attack that had suffered a setback with the arrest of KSM,94 were all interpreted as evidence that al Qaeda would use CBRN weapons in a first-strike role against the US and western Europe. These assessments were reflected in a US report to a UN Security Council Committee monitoring the implementation of sanctions against al Qaeda, which stated that there was a

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‘high probability’ that al Qaeda would attempt an attack with a WMD within the next two years.95 Fuelled by these intelligence assessments, the political approach to combatting the threat continued to reflect the 1 per cent doctrine. The often alarmist media attention given to the arrests of the Chechen network and KSM also meant that the al Qaeda CBRN threat continued to have a high political profile in both the US and the UK. Crucially, these events were unfolding at a critical juncture in international politics, as the US and UK were engaged in last-minute diplomatic efforts to pave the way for the invasion of Iraq. Since the beginning of the war on terror, linking al Qaeda with CBRN threats and so-called rogue nations had been an important narrative in the information war being waged by the US and UK. That narrative would became even more prominent in the build-up to the war in Iraq.

CHAPTER 11 THE POLITICS OF CBRN TERRORISM AND THE INVASION OF IRAQ

Shortly after 9/11 the US made the state sponsorship of CBRN terrorism a major theme in the narrative of the war on terror. In January 2002 President Bush told the UN that ‘rogue States [are] the most likely sources of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons for terrorists . . . I will not wait on events while dangers gather’.1 Later that month, in his State of the Union address, he described an axis of evil comprising Iran, Iraq and North Korea, which was threatening global security. He explicitly linked the threats of CBRN WMD proliferation and terrorism, and pledged to prevent regimes that sponsor terrorism from threatening the US and its allies with CBRN weapons. Denying state sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists then became one of the cornerstones of the 2003 US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.2 The labelling of these states as ‘rogue’ nations implied that they operated outside of internationally accepted standards of behaviour, yet there was no evidence of the complicity of a state in the 9/11 attacks, and no evidence was found in Afghanistan that the al Qaeda CBRN weapon programme had ever been supported by a state. Events would later suggest that this theme was given heightened prominence in the US narrative of the war on terror in order to help provide justification for wider US foreign policy objectives. At the time, the inclusion of these references to terrorists and ‘rogue’ nations was reportedly driven by concerns that had first been articulated

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during the debates on CBRN terrorism in the mid-1990s, that such an alliance would be a logical one for terrorists.3 But the big unanswered question was whether it would be a logical one for proliferator states. The US intelligence agencies were unable to make a definitive assessment issue with the information that they had available to them. They knew about the links between al Qaeda and the Sudanese CW programme, but were unable to determine whether that relationship would ever have resulted in the transfer of CW, or CW-related, technology and expertise, to al Qaeda. They had also received some indications of potential Iraqi involvement in the Sudanese CW programme, which raised the spectre of al Qaeda linking up with Iraqi CW experts, but again there was nothing definitive. And whilst no evidence of state involvement in al Qaeda’s CBRN activities had been discovered in Afghanistan, the US intelligence agencies were aware that it had been continuing to try to build a strategic relationship with Iraq. Even before al Qaeda had been defeated in Afghanistan the US Administration was beginning to formulate a policy of ousting the Saddam regime in Iraq. The primary drivers of this policy were the Administration’s ideological agenda to spread democracy throughout the Middle East, and the widely held perception that Iraq posed a genuine threat to stability there. But there were also deep-seated, albeit unproven, concerns in some quarters that al Qaeda might obtain CBRN training from Iraq. Those concerns had surfaced during the 2001 anthrax letter campaign. The technical sophistication of the anthrax had raised questions about whether a state had been involved, and many US commentators and political figures had been quick to point the finger at Iraq. These accusations were quickly disproved since previous Iraqi attempts to weaponise anthrax had been significantly cruder than the anthrax contained in the letters. By the end of 2001 US intelligence and law enforcement agencies had virtually ruled out either al Qaeda or Iraqi complicity. But that did not stop the rumours of Iraqi complicity and, with Administration policy on CBRN terrorism being extremely riskaverse, it was only natural that removing the threat that Iraq might transfer CBRN weapons or expertise to terrorists should be a driver of US policy on Iraq. To generate popular support for its policy to oust the Saddam regime the US conducted an information war against Iraq, and CBRN terrorism was one of the key themes in that campaign. The US intelligence

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agencies could not establish a solid connection between al Qaeda and Iraq, but they had been receiving an increasing number of reports of potential links between the two, including on CBW. This information was of poor quality, but despite that the Administration began to release increasing amounts of intelligence material concerning Saddam regime’s support for al Qaeda to the media. Reports linking al Qaeda and Iraq had been circulating in the public domain since the late 1990s. Bin Laden was reported to have had numerous contacts with Iraqi agents during his years in Sudan, including with members of Iraq’s special security organisation, which was responsible for protecting Iraq’s WMD programme.4 Elements within US intelligence also continued to believe that Iraq had been involved in CW-related activities at the Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan. As described in Chapter 1, there had been contacts between Iraqi officials and al Qaeda but these reports tended to make more of those links than was actually the case. Following 9/11 the US Administration released further information about Iraqi links with al Qaeda to the media. In September 2001 the media was informed that in 1998 bin Laden had met with the Iraqi ambassador to Turkey, who was believed in some quarters to have been an agent of the Mukhabarrat, and that he had also visited Baghdad, just before the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.5 Iraq was also reported to have arranged for al Qaeda terrorists to receive the identities of people who had been killed in Kuwait during the 1991 Iraqi invasion.6 The following month reports began to circulate that Mohammed Atta, the leader of the 9/11 attacks, had met a Mukhabbarat agent in Prague earlier in the year. Some reports even suggested that he was given a vial of anthrax or had purchased a sample of anthrax from a Czech laboratory. The Czech interior minister, Stanislav Gross, confirmed that Atta had visited Prague in April and met Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani, an Iraqi diplomat who was later expelled for being a spy, but he denied that al Qaeda had bought anthrax spores from a Czech laboratory.7

The Iraq Link Confirmed? Following the capture of the senior al Qaeda operational commander, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, in November 2001 the Administration finally

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believed that it had found the smoking gun linking Iraq to al Qaeda and CBRN weapons. Al-Libi was senior enough in the al Qaeda hierarchy to have had knowledge of the network’s links with Iraq as well as its CBRN activities. He told his interrogators that bin Laden and Muhammad Atef had sent an emissary to Iraq in late 2000 to obtain CBRN weapons, and that the regime had provided unspecified CBW training to two al Qaeda associates in December 2000.8 However, there were significant doubts within the US intelligence community about the credibility of al-Libi’s claims. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was particularly concerned by al-Libi’s lack of knowledge about the details and outcome of the training that the al Qaeda operatives had received. The fact that al-Libi had been subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques should also have raised doubts about whether he was being entirely candid. As a result, on 28 February 2002 a DIA special analysis concluded that ‘all source intelligence has not confirmed Iraq’s involvement. Iraq is unlikely to have provided bin Laden with any useful CB knowledge or assistance’.9 These doubts were shared by the CIA, which, in September 2002, cautioned that the claims that Iraq had provided ‘training in poisons and gases’ to al Qaeda members had come from ‘sources of varying reliability’.10 The CIA and DIA both agreed that the extent of any potential cooperation between Iraq and al Qaeda was likely to have been limited. The DIA assessed that the secular nature of the Saddam regime would make it wary of Islamic revolutionary movements, making it unlikely to provide assistance to a group it could not control.11 Similarly, the CIA noted in 2003 that Saddam and al Qaeda are ‘far from being natural partners’. It lacked specific intelligence of Saddam’s personal attitude towards al Qaeda, but concluded that ‘his record suggests that any ties would be rooted in deep suspicion’.12 These assessments were an accurate description of what had transpired during the contacts between al Qaeda and Iraq prior to 9/11 and strongly suggested that Iraq would not cooperate with al Qaeda on CBRN weapons. Despite the doubts about the credibility of al-Libi’s testimony, elements of it were seemingly corroborated by other sources. An Iraqi defector claimed that members of al Qaeda were being trained by instructors from Iraqi military intelligence to use CBW in secret camps near Baghdad13 and an Israeli source claimed that Iraqi military instructors had trained up to 250 al Qaeda fighters in northern Iraq in

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the use of CBW and possibly nuclear weapons.14 There were also reports that Saddam planned to arm Palestinian terrorists with BW to attack Israeli and American targets. These reports fitted with US and UK intelligence estimates, which suggested that Iraq was developing a simple BW that could be used by terrorist groups.15 There were inconsistencies between the details of these reports, as well as doubts about the credibility of at least some of the sources, but the fact that a number of diverse sources were reporting the same basic story lent the reports a degree of credibility. Details of these reports were then leaked to the media, which helped build the narrative linking Iraq with al Qaeda and CBRN terrorism. The intelligence reports of Iraqi cooperation with al Qaeda on CBW were incredibly helpful to the Administration in developing its information war against Iraq, but the doubts about the credibility of the reports significantly weakened their value. Yet when this information was presented to Congress, the doubts about the credibility of the sources were not mentioned. When CIA Director, George Tenet, gave testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on 17 September 2002 he stated unequivocally that ‘Iraq provided training to al Qaeda members in Iraq – of most concern, in the area of chemical and biological agents’. By early 2003, the CIA had concluded that the general pattern that emerged from the available reporting was that al Qaeda had an enduring interest in acquiring CBW expertise from Iraq. This was reflected in Tenet’s repeated assertion on 11 February 2003 that ‘Iraq has also provided training in poisons and gases to al Qaeda associates. One of these associates characterised the relationship he forged with Iraqi officials as successful’.16 The internal CIA and DIA assessments were similar to those of the UK intelligence agencies, which had received reports suggesting that Iraqi chemical experts may have been in Afghanistan during 2000. They gave some credence to those reports, but they had no hard evidence of any practical cooperation between Iraq and al Qaeda. In November 2001 they concluded that practical cooperation between Iraq and al Qaeda was unlikely because of their mutual mistrust.17 US doubts about the veracity of al-Libi’s evidence were eased somewhat when the US intelligence agencies started receiving information from Iraqi Kurdish sources about links between the Saddam regime, Ansar al-Islam and Zarqawi. The US intelligence

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agencies had labelled Zarqawi as a key al Qaeda lieutenant so al Tawhid wal Jjihad’s CBRN activities in northern Iraq were also labelled as al Qaeda activities. Much of this new information came from Ansar defectors and prisoners being held by Kurdish Peshmerga forces in northern Iraq. But as was the case with the previous reports of Iraqi cooperation with al Qaeda, there were significant doubts about the credibility of the sources. Ansar had recently defeated the Peshmerga in a number of skirmishes, and the Kurdish government was anxious to obtain US support. In 2002, Kurdish officials suggested that Islamist militants were smuggling CW provided by the Iraqi security services to al Qaeda. However, a US official who interviewed prisoners in Iraq, felt that the claim lacked credibility. Nevertheless, the Kurdish authorities persisted, and induced their captives and some defectors to reveal that Ansar had begun producing CW, including a cyanide cream, in northern Iraq.18 This information about potential links between Iraq, Ansar and al Tawhid wal Jihad was ambiguous and contradictory, but a major issue which was considered to link the three parties was their common interest in CBRN weapons. Somewhat surprisingly, the US made no attempt whatsoever to bomb the Ansar camp near Kermal. Following 9/11, President Bush had publicly stated that he would not allow threats to gather and was prepared to order pre-emptive military action to prevent them emerging. So if the CIA had this evidence of an emerging CBW threat, why didn’t he order the camp to be bombed? In June 2002, the Pentagon drafted a plan to attack the camp with cruise missiles and airstrikes, but it was rejected by the National Security Council (NSC). Four months later, after receiving intelligence reports that Zarqawi planned to use ricin in terrorist attacks in Europe, the Pentagon drew up a second strike plan. But again, the NSC rejected it. Following the January 2003 ricin incident in London, the Pentagon drew up yet another attack plan, and for a third time the NSC rejected it. Administration officials let it be known that the facility was too small and crude to be worth risking American lives over and it would not be worth the outcry that might follow a US military operation.19 But it was also a politically expedient decision, which soon became apparent when the Administration began to make Zarqawi’s activities at the camp an integral part of in its information war in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq.

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The Build-Up to the Invasion of Iraq Having made the decision to go to war in Iraq, the Administration needed to shape the domestic and international political and media debates on the issue. The main narrative in its information war to achieve this was built on intelligence reports that Iraq possessed WMD and the theoretical risk it posed to regional and global security, but a significant subtext within that narrative was the purported links between Iraq, al Qaeda and CBRN weapons. In many respects this subtext was vitally important, because it enabled the Administration to legitimise war in Iraq as an integral part of the war on terror. One of the Administration’s main approaches to developing this subtext was to emphasise the role of Zarqawi. From early 2002 the Administration had begun to publicly describe Zarqawi as a key al Qaeda lieutenant as well as a CW expert, and to publicise the reports of his presence in Iraq.20 During a speech in October 2002 President Bush stated that all that might be required to launch a CBW attack was a small container and a single terrorist to deliver it. He then went on to reiterate that Zarqawi had been planning CBW attacks, and that Iraq had trained al Qaeda operatives in how to make poisons and gases. He concluded with the apocalyptic warning that Iraq might decide at any time to give CBW to terrorists.21 In early 2003 President Bush again described Zarqawi as a ‘very senior al Qaeda leader who received medical treatment in Baghdad this year, and who has been associated with planning for chemical and biological attacks’.22 However, these assertions greatly exaggerated the significance of the intelligence material that the Administration had at its disposal. In particular, al Tawhid wal Jihad was not formally a part of al Qaeda, there is no basis for describing Zarqawi as a CW expert given that he had received no formal education or training in chemical or biological sciences and there were significant doubts over the credibility of the sources reporting that Iraq had given al Qaeda operatives CBRN training. The Administration was aided and abetted by the media in disseminating this information. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 the media was much less challenging on national security issues, for fear of being seen to be unpatriotic. It often failed adequately to analyse the information that either the Administration or its unidentified ‘intelligence sources’ were putting out. To a great extent this was due

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to self-censorship. It was a time of heightened patriotic sentiment in the US, which created a hostile climate for reporters who sought to challenge the Administration’s policy. Reports that did not fit the Administration’s narrative usually triggered hate mail questioning the journalist’s patriotism.23 One of the most prominent examples of the media not being sufficiently critical of the information it was being given was a front page report in the Washington Post in December 2002, under the alarmist headline ‘Al Qaeda got nerve agent from Iraqis’. The report was based on information from unnamed US intelligence sources who claimed that intelligence had been received that indicated that jihadis affiliated with al Qaeda had been given a CW in Iraq. Analysts suspected that the transaction involved VX and that a courier had managed to smuggle it overland through Turkey. The body of the report was carefully worded to say that the CW had been obtained ‘in’ Iraq rather than ‘from’ Iraq, which seemingly contradicted the headline, which stated that it had been obtained ‘from Iraqis’. Given the political backdrop against which the report was published, the casual reader was very likely to interpret the report as implying that the Iraqi regime had given CW to al Qaeda. The sources claimed that the way the information had been gleaned made them feel confident that it was accurate. But the report then went on to say that the information was not backed up by definitive evidence, and even an official Administration spokesman admitted that the source of the report was uncorroborated. Given the alarmist nature of the headline and the significant doubts that existed about the credibility of the report, serious questions needed to be asked about whether the report should ever have been published.24 The media did publish some reports that challenged the Administration’s narrative. These included reports that the Czech president, Vaclav Havel, had informed the US that the Czech Republic had found no evidence of the purported meeting in Prague between Mohmmed Atta and the Iraqi intelligence official,25 and the Washington Post’s front-page report on 10 September 2002 argued that the CIA had not yet found any convincing evidence linking Iraq and al Qaeda.26 But these were isolated reports amongst the broader tide of reporting that there was a link and that Iraq possessed WMD. In the final months before the invasion of Iraq, the US Administration continued to ratchet up the rhetoric on CBRN terrorism in an effort to bolster its case for war. A key element of this was

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exploiting a number of CBRN incidents that occurred in early 2003. Firstly, there were the ricin incidents in the UK and France, even though it would subsequently be discovered that neither cell had actually made any ricin. Then, US military intelligence uncovered a plot to poison US troops stationed in Afghanistan. At about the same time, the Kuwaiti security services arrested a Kuwaiti National Guard soldier on suspicion of working for the Mukhabbarat. Among his other espionage activities, the soldier had been collecting information about companies provisioning US troops in Kuwait. Department of Defense analysis of this and other reports concluded that Iraqi operatives were assessing the possibility of poisoning the food supplies of US troops.27 Media reporting of these incidents was shoehorned into the Administration’s narrative, linking Iraq with al Qaeda and CBRN terrorism. For example, the New York Daily News published details of the Kuwait incident in the same report as details of the purported plot to poison US troops in Afghanistan. The report then erroneously claimed that the arrest of the London ricin cell and the unrelated arrest of the Kuwaiti soldier had helped to unravel a plot by al Qaeda and Iraqi agents to contaminate food and water supplies at Afghan and Kuwaiti bases.28 Other media reporting attempted to establish an Iraqi link by suggesting that Ansar al-Islam was involved.29 However, there was no such grand plot and no evidence of Iraqi involvement in any purported al Qaeda CBRN plots. The single most controversial aspect of the Administration’s information war was the presentation made by US Secretary of State Colin Powell to the UN on 5 February 2003.30 With war imminent, the UN remained hopelessly divided. Amongst those most strongly opposed to military action were two of the permanent members of the Security Council, France and Russia. A number of other western European states were equally sceptical, particularly after European intelligence sources reported that they had found no evidence of links between Zarqawi and the Iraqi government.31 In an attempt to build a stronger support base within the UN, Powell’s presentation laid out the latest US intelligence reports about Iraq’s WMD programme and the putative links between Iraq, al Qaeda and CBRN terrorism. In an effort to address the strong opposition from some western European nations, Powell explicitly linked Iraq to the ricin incidents in London and Paris. He stated that the Iraqi regime had strong links with

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both Zarqawi and Ansar al-Islam, and that Saddam had agreed to Zarqawi relocating to Iraq after fleeing Afghanistan in 2001. He then re-iterated the assessment that poisons were one of Zarqawi’s specialities, and that al Tawhid wal Jihad had established a poison training centre in the Ansar camp at Kermal. He rounded off his case by outlining details of how al Tawhid wal Jihad had sent operatives to western Europe in 2002 to conduct CBW and bomb attacks, and claimed that the cells which had been arrested in the UK, France, Spain and Italy in late 2002 and early 2003 all belonged to al Tawhid wal Jihad. He also made an attempt to appeal to Russian concerns by arguing that: we know Zarqawi’s colleagues have been active in the Pankisi Gorge, Georgia and in Chechnya, Russia. The plotting to which they are linked is not mere chatter. Members of Zarqawi’s network say their goal was to kill Russians with toxins. Powell dismissed the argument that the contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda had been inconsequential, arguing that the ambition and hatred of both parties were sufficient to encourage the two to work together and that al Qaeda could turn to Iraq for help in acquiring expertise with regard to developing CBRN weapons. To support his argument he cited details of the information that had been obtained from Ibn al-Shaykh al Libi. Key elements in this part of the presentation were factually correct, but Powell was guilty of some gross exaggerations and a failure to communicate the significant caveats that should have been attached to much of this information. Most surprisingly, Powell’s assessment about the likelihood of Iraq and al Qaeda working together was a direct contradiction of CIA and DIA assessments. Informed media commentators should have easily been able to pick up on some of these shortcomings, but the US media continued its tendency not to challenge official statements. This was evident from the Washington Post’s front-page report of the presentation, on 6 February 2003. The report re-iterated the substance of the presentation at length, and only in the ninth paragraph did it note that a number of European officials and US terrorism experts believed that Powell’s description of an Iraqi link to al Qaeda ‘appeared to have been carefully drawn to imply more than it actually said’.32 This indicates that the journalist was aware that there was

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a fundamental disagreement about the existence and nature of any links between Iraq and al Qaeda, and he could have written a different type of report, one that explored those differences of opinion. That he chose not to symbolises the unwillingness of media at large to challenge intelligence information being presented by the Administration. In his final speech before the invasion Bush returned again and again to the issue of Iraq, al Qaeda and CBRN terrorism, trying to cement those linkages in the public consciousness. At one point he declared: The regime has a history of reckless aggression in the Middle East. It has a deep hatred of America and our friends. And it has aided, trained and harbored terrorists, including operatives of al-Qaida. The danger is clear: using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons, obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfil their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country, or any other.33 Despite the significance of these arguments in the Administration’s narrative on Iraq, they were never seriously challenged by either US politicians or the media. Instead, the public debate in the US largely focused on the narrow issue of whether Iraq actually possessed WMD, whether it was in breach of UN resolutions and whether a breach provided the legal basis for going to war. This illustrates the extent to which the narrative that: al Qaeda would use CBRN weapons if it could acquire them; Iraq supported al Qaeda; and Iraq might one day pass CBRN weapons to al Qaeda or other terrorists groups, had become accepted wisdom. In some respects this was understandable, given that there was a potential risk that Iraq might give CBRN weapons to terrorists. Where the media and public debate fell short was in failing to quantify that risk. There was a strong argument to be made that the risk was actually extremely low but that it could increase if the geopolitical situation of the Saddam regime changed for the worse.

The Debate in the UK The narrative on Iraq being propagated by the UK government was very similar to that of the US Administration. Prime Minister Blair was a strong believer in liberal interventionism, and the successful use of

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British military power in Sierra Leone and Kosovo had convinced him that intervention could be used to bring peace and democracy to global trouble spots. The UK government built its case for invading Iraq on the threat posed by the regime to regional and global security, its possession of WMD and its non-compliance with UN resolutions to dismantle its WMD programme. But, unlike in the US, the UK media robustly challenged the government’s narrative for war and public opinion remained firmly opposed to intervention. As part of its information war to persuade public opinion and sceptical politicians of the case for war, the UK government initially considered mirroring the narrative of the US Administration of linking al Qaeda with CBRN terrorism. The UK had no intelligence suggesting that Iraq was planning to do this, but Prime Minister Blair’s view was that the threat of CBRN terrorism was increasing because the threat from proliferator states was increasing. The UK government correctly considered the Saddam regime and al Qaeda to be two separate entities, but Prime Minister Blair believed that repressive or failed proliferator states (like Iraq) might at some point forge alliances with other states or groups with whom they might not be natural bedfellows. As evidence, he pointed towards Zarqawi’s reported presence in Iraq. The UK media had widely reported that Zarqawi was a senior al Qaeda leader; therefore references to Zarqawi were widely accepted as references to al Qaeda. Blair believed that it was no longer possible to take any sort of risk with the potential threat, because the stakes had become so high.34 As a consequence, Blair believed that it was necessary to invade Iraq, remove the Saddam regime and dismantle its WMD programme. To help explain the case for war, the British government prepared a report for public release that outlined the available information on Iraq and WMD. Prior to publication, US and UK officials briefed the media that a draft version of the report had set out details of two al Qaeda operatives who had been trained in Iraq and still maintained links to the regime. One of these men, Abu Zubair, who was a member of Ansar al-Islam, was also a former Iraqi intelligence officer.35 They also made the startling allegation that the regime had sent Ansar al-Islam into northern Iraq to assassinate leading Kurds and to build CW facilities.36 But when the report was published in September 2002 those references were not included.

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By early 2003, however, the government had still not managed to sway British public opinion. As part of its continued efforts to do so, it began to highlight increasingly the associations between Iraq, al Qaeda and CBRN terrorism, and the potential risk that Iraq might give CBRN weapons to al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. The government first laid the groundwork by re-iterating al Qaeda’s interest in CBRN weapons. One of its first steps was to brief the media on the intelligence that had been obtained from Afghanistan in 2001, that al Qaeda was committed to acquiring CBRN weapons and had already built a radiological bomb. It also included details of how that information had been obtained. The release of intelligence material to the media, complete with details of how it was obtained, is almost unprecedented in the UK. There was no apparent reason for the government to sanction the release of the information at that particular time, other than to support its narrative on Iraq. The government also exploited the political value of the January 2003 London ricin incident, and its rhetoric about the incident was noticeably exaggerated. Prime Minister Blair initially claimed that the arrests showed that the terrorist WMD threat was ‘present and real and with us now and its potential is huge’,37 Similarly, in a statement to the House of Commons on 3 February 2003 he linked the arrests in the UK, France, Spain and Italy, with al Qaeda’s CBRN activities in Afghanistan, declaring that ‘many of these arrests show the terrorist groups actively seeking to use chemical or biological means to cause as much death and injury and suffering as they can’.38 Unsurprisingly, the British tabloid media had a field day, with the Sun newspaper in particular using the headline ‘Factory of death found’.39 In reality, there was no evidence that the al Qaeda leadership had ordered a ricin attack. Bourgass had not actually made any ricin, and even if he had managed to do so, using the protocol, materials and equipment at his disposal he would not have been able to kill many people with it. The government’s exaggeration of the incident was later explained away by the fact that Porton Down did not tell the police the results of the laboratory tests that showed that no traces of ricin had been found until March 2003. However, other reports suggested that Porton Down actually informed the police of the results within days of the tests being completed.40 The exact details remain mired in uncertainty, but the result was that the media lacked significant pieces of information it

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needed effectively to challenge a critical aspect of the government’s rhetoric about the incident. Even after March 2003 the government did nothing to correct the public record. It was not until the trial in 2005 that it was publicly acknowledged that no traces of ricin had been found.41 There were also allegations that the government was not being completely open about other intelligence that was available to it. In February 2003 the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, publicly stated that intelligence reports had identified links between al Qaeda and ‘various people’ in Iraq, and warned that the Iraqi regime was allowing al Qaeda significant latitude in which to operate. He did not specifically mention Iraq giving CBRN weapons to al Qaeda, but his comments nevertheless fed into the government’s wider narrative about the risks of Iraq giving CBRN weapons to terrorist groups. He also neglected to mention a significant assessment by the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS), which had concluded that the potential relationship between Saddam and bin Laden had foundered due to ideological differences. The report acknowledged that there had been contacts between al Qaeda and Iraq in the past and that al Qaeda personnel might have received training in Iraq, but concluded that relations between the two had broken down.42 Prime Minister Blair brought the issues of al Qaeda’s CBRN activities and the risk of state sponsored CBRN terrorism together in a statement to the House of Commons on 3 February 2003. He linked the January 2003 ricin incidents with al Qaeda’s wider CBRN activities and 9/11 to argue that unless the West took a decisive stand, it would only be a matter of time before a proliferator state gave CBRN weapons to a terrorist group.43 In a further speech to the House of Commons the day before the invasion of Iraq, he made repeated references to the threat of CBRN terrorism.44 He then returned to the same theme in his statement to the nation on the day of the invasion, arguing: ‘Should terrorists obtain these weapons [i.e., CBRN weapons] now being manufactured and traded around the world, the carnage they could inflict to our economies, our security, to world peace would be beyond our most vivid imagination.’45 Prime Minister Blair was possibly justified in identifying Iraqi sponsorship of CBRN terrorism as a potential risk, but he made no effort to either quantify the risk or explain the reasons why he thought Iraq

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might give CBRN weapons to terrorists. He relied instead on arguing that Saddam was either mad or bad, and that the regime’s previous use of CW during the Iran – Iraq war and against Kurdish civilians in 1988 made it more likely that it would give CBRN weapons to terrorist groups. Yet it had not done so previously, so why would it do so in the future? A more balanced analysis of the potential risk would have highlighted a number of potential reasons why Iraq would not give CBRN weapons to terrorists. In particular, Saddam’s overriding political objective was the survival of his regime, and his previous use of CW had been in response to direct threats to his regime. Any state sponsored CBRN attack would run the risk of the most severe repercussions, which again would have threatened the future of the regime. Therefore there were good reasons why Saddam would not have given al Qaeda CBRN weapons. In fact, the most plausible scenario in which Iraq might have considered giving CBRN weapons to terrorists was if the regime was threatened with being overthrown. So ironically, the very course of action that the US and the UK were pursuing in 2003 threatened to create the very scenario that it was trying to prevent. However, like the US Administration, the UK government believed that the stakes were so high that the UK could not afford to take the risk that Iraq would continue to refrain from giving CBRN weapons to terrorist groups.

The Invasion of Iraq and its Aftermath On 19 March 2003 the US, the UK and their coalition partners invaded Iraq. Among the first operations of the war US forces launched a major attack on the Ansar al-Islam positions in northern Iraq. Under cover of intensive airstrikes and heavy artillery bombardment, 100 US Special Forces soldiers led thousands of Kurdish Peshmerga fighters against the Ansar defences. In fierce fighting, the Peshmerga gradually pushed the Ansar fighters out of the villages they controlled. Many Ansar fighters were killed, but hundreds more escaped, and after several days of hard fighting the area around the Kermal camp was secured.46 In his presentation to the UN, Colin Powell had painted a picture of the Kermal camp as a terrorist nerve centre with a functioning poison facility, but what US forces found could not have been more different.

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It turned out to be an extremely basic camp that did not even have running water. The poison facility turned out to be a crude and makeshift laboratory. A US intelligence team recovered a three-volume manual on how to conduct CBW experiments as well as quantities of cyanide, and found evidence that it had been tested on animals.47 Initial on-site tests on a number of items found at the camp by the MSNBC news agency showed positive traces of ricin and botulinum, but subsequent laboratory testing showed the results to be false positives.48 Nor was any evidence found that Ansar had ever used these agents.49 The discoveries at Kermal partially corroborated Powell’s description of the CBRN activities at the camp but showed that he had been guilty of some gross exaggerations. However, this was barely mentioned by the media, which was focusing on the much bigger story of the Iraqi state’s WMD programme. After the Saddam regime was overthrown it gradually became apparent that Iraq did not have an active CBRN weapon-development programme. This finally proved that the reports of the regime supplying CBRN weapons to al Qaeda were baseless. But it was not just that Iraq did not have any CBRN weapons; Western intelligence agencies also failed to find any significant evidence to support the allegations of Iraqi collusion with al Qaeda. Documents recovered from the headquarters of the Mukhabarrat in Baghdad revealed that Abu Hafs al Mauritani had been invited to Baghdad in 1988, but there was no evidence of a meeting between bin Laden and Iraqi officials or of any subsequent meetings.50 A former senior regime official also claimed that al Mauritani had also travelled to Baghdad in 2002, but that as soon as Saddam learned of his presence he ordered that al Mauritani should leave the country, fearing that it might cause political problems for Iraq.51 To underscore the point, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi recanted his evidence about al Qaeda links to Iraq, claiming that he had fabricated it in order to receive better treatment. Postwar reviews showed that, as with previous assessments of al Qaeda’s CBRN capabilities, there had been significant errors in the process of assessing intelligence within the US intelligence community. The way that some information was presented to Congress and the media also suggested that the use of intelligence material on Iraq and al Qaeda had become politicised in order to justify the Administration’s decision to invade Iraq. The failure to find an active

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CBRN weapon-development programme in Iraq, coupled with the growing realisation that both the US Administration and the UK government had significantly exaggerated the information that they had presented to the public, raised questions about whether the media and public opinion would be quite so trusting about future warnings regarding the threat of al Qaeda and CBRN weapons.

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During 2002 the US Administration began switching its attention to Iraq, but even as it was doing so al Qaeda was re-establishing training camps in the tribal areas of North and South Waziristan in Pakistan. These new camps were smaller than those that had previously operated in Afghanistan but the number of militants passing through them was beginning to increase steadily.1 It also began to rebuild its command and control systems, to enable it to plan and execute attacks against the West. The arrest of KSM had deprived it of one of its most accomplished planners. He was replaced by Abu Faraj al-Libi, who was assisted by Hamza Rabia and Abu Bakr al Suri, who took over the role of external operations planner. Al-Libi primarily focused his attention on Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan but was also anxious to launch another big attack against the US or one of its allies. Long-term planning for an attack in the US or Europe was carried out by a core group of experienced al Qaeda commanders. They set about recruiting operatives who could travel to the US or Europe, while Rabia started planning to attack shipping in the Straits of Hormuz.2 The CIA also continued to assess al Qaeda’s end goal to be use of CBRN weapons for mass-casualty attacks against the US.3 Despite the killing or capture of many of those involved in project al Zabadi three significant figures remained at large. Abd al-Aziz al-Masri had escaped to Iran, whilst Abu Khabab and Aafia Siddiqui had escaped to the tribal areas of Pakistan. Khabab initially focused on

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training al Qaeda operatives in conventional bomb-making,4 but as al Qaeda became more firmly established in the tribal areas he again tried to re-establish a CBRN weapon development capability. Supported by a handful of aides, he set up rudimentary laboratories in which he conducted experiments with chemicals and other compounds. This work largely focused on cyanide, chlorine and other commercially available chemicals, but there were also reports that a number of al Qaeda operatives had been immunised against some biological agents.5 Siddiqui’s exact role in al Qaeda and its CBRN programme remained shrouded in mystery, but she remained connected with a number of individuals who were plotting attacks on the US at that time,6 and her scientific background remained an additional source of concern. Al Qaeda’s presence in the tribal areas, and its renewed interest in CBRN weapons, had not gone unnoticed. From the spring of 2002 the US intelligence agencies had begun to report the presence of large numbers of foreign fighters in the region. This intelligence was used by US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and the Pakistani security forces to kill or capture a number of al Qaeda operatives. Early successes in Pakistan had included the arrest a number of senior figures, including KSM, Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi bin al-Shibh. However, the Pakistani security forces had only limited control over the tribal areas, which hindered its ability to track down al Qaeda fugitives. In 2002 the US military had proposed that its special operations forces be allowed to establish bases in the region, but the Pakistani government flatly refused. Instead, it allowed a small number of JSOC units to accompany Pakistani forces on raids, but these were halted in 2003 after public and political protests in Pakistan.7 With a critical need to strike hard to reach al Qaeda targets in this lawless area, the US turned to the use of missile-armed pilotless drones. Beginning in 2004, this was an intelligence-led operation that relied on identifying and then tracking targets to a point where they could be attacked.8 The ability of the drones to attack targets throughout the tribal areas meant that they posed a significant threat to the new al Qaeda training camps, as well as its fixed-site CBRN development facilities. Khabab’s continued CBRN activities meant that he remained high on the US kill-or-capture list. In January 2006 the US thought they had got their man when Pakistani officials claimed that Khabab and several other al Qaeda leaders had been killed in a drone strike. But it proved to be a

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false alarm. The impact of the failure to kill or capture Khabab was rammed home by an intelligence assessment that he had restored al Qaeda’s CBRN programme to the point where it had been prior to 2001,9 and reports that he had integrated CBRN training into the courses at the new training camps.10 By 2008 some estimates suggested that there were as many as 2,000 militants in al Qaeda’s Pakistani camps,11 and reports indicated that Western recruits were being specifically chosen for CBRN training, in preparation for possible attacks in Europe and the US.12 In September 2007, al Qaeda also issued a new propaganda video in which bin Laden threatened to escalate the level of fighting and killing against the US as a means of ending the war in Iraq.13 Bin Laden did not specifically mention CBRN weapons in the video, but the reference to escalation was considered to support the dominant narrative in US security debates that al Qaeda intended to use CBRN weapons in a first strike. This assessment was seemingly confirmed as chatter on radical Islamic websites about using nuclear weapons to attack the US began to increase.14

False Alarms This increased chatter was matched by a number of false alarms about potential al Qaeda CBRN attacks inside the US. In late 2003 the FBI received information from an informant that four al Qaeda terrorists had been seen in Hamilton, Canada, the previous year. They were named as Adnan al Shukrijumah, Anas al-Libi (one of the FBI’s most wanted terrorists), Jaber Elbaneh and Amer el-Maati. Shukrijumah had reportedly enrolled as a student at McMaster University, with the intention of stealing a quantity of nuclear material from the university’s small nuclear reactor in order to build a radiological bomb. The story was leaked to the media and caused a sensation, with wild claims that a quantity of radioactive waste was missing from the university.15 The report was untrue but seemed to correlate with chatter within the jihadi networks being monitored by the US intelligence agencies, about an anticipated ‘mega attack’ over the 2003/4 Christmas and New Year period.16 By December 2003, the level of chatter was sufficient for the national security alert level to be raised to ‘orange’, the second-highest level, which warned of a ‘high risk of terrorist attacks’. Dozens of scientists with radiation detection equipment hidden in briefcases and

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golf bags were secretly deployed to a number of cities, including Washington, New York, Las Vegas, Los Angeles and Baltimore.17 But after they failed to find any terrorist weapons, the search was called off as unobtrusively as it had been conducted. Despite the US authorities giving the all-clear, reports that al Qaeda was developing radiological weapons continued to appear in the media throughout 2004, including reports that Abu Khabab was constructing a radiological bomb,18 and that bin Laden had been encouraged to purchase radiological material through contacts in Chechnya.19 At the same time, there were a number of reported unconfirmed sightings of Shukrijumah in Latin America.20 Whether Shukrijumah was ever actually in Latin America remains unclear, but these reports were given added credence by information obtained from the interrogation of Sharif al-Masri, a senior al Qaeda operative with close links to Zawahiri, who was arrested in Pakistan in August 2004. Al-Masri told his interrogators that al Qaeda wanted to move nuclear materials from Europe to either the US or Mexico. This was corroborated by several other al Qaeda detainees, who had indicated the potential use of Mexico as a staging area ‘to acquire end-stage chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear material’, from where it would be transported across the border into the US.21 Al-Masri claimed that Abu al-Libi had told him that al Qaeda possessed a nuclear weapon but was having difficulty moving it out of Europe. Al-Masri claimed that al Qaeda had no operatives in the US, but that the operators of the nuclear device would be Europeans of Arab or Asian descent. He then provided an insight into al Qaeda’s intentions with regard to the operational use of CBRN weapons, by stating that al Qaeda planned to use the bomb if bin Laden was either captured or killed, and that al-Libi was one of those who was able to give the order to use it. Al-Masri’s claim that al Qaeda intended to use CBRN weapons for retaliatory purposes was consistent with the claims reportedly made by bin Laden’s former bodyguard Sanad al Kazimi, as well as bin Laden’s public statements about CBRN weapons in 1999 and 2001. It was also seemingly corroborated by an unnamed top al Qaeda leader who informed the Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir that al Qaeda had not previously used nuclear weapons because they were waiting for the right moment, particularly for the US to be involved in a mass killing of Muslims, and had also discussed the possibility of giving Muslims living in the US a deadline by which to leave the country before using the bomb.22

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The US took this information about a nuclear weapon being smuggled into the US from Mexico so seriously that intelligence officials conferred with their Mexican counterparts about it, and Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge met with Mexican officials to discuss border security and smuggling rings. Following these discussions, US officials began monitoring all heavy trucks crossing the border, while Mexican officials kept a close watch on flight schools and aviation facilities.23 Whether this additional security had any impact is unclear, but there have been no reports since of either al Qaeda operatives of CBRN materials coming across the Mexico border illegally.

The Threat Moves to Europe With the US becoming an increasingly difficult target to attack, al Qaeda turned its attention to western Europe, where extensive Islamist militant networks remained in place. One of al Qaeda’s main strategic objectives at that time was to force the US and its allies to withdraw from Iraq. Its strategy for achieving this was based on the premise that more large-scale 9/11-type attacks on the US would be ineffective, and it would be more productive to attack its European coalition allies in order to force them to withdraw their forces from Iraq. If al Qaeda could achieve this, the economic and military burden of the war would increasingly fall on the US, which in turn would increase the pressure on it to withdraw. Spain, the UK and Poland were identified as the main targets, with Spain as the priority target because of its upcoming parliamentary elections in 2004 and the fact that Spanish public opinion was already opposed to the war in Iraq.24 In Spain, a jihadi cell that was influenced by al Qaeda began plotting a major attack on the rail system around Madrid. On 11 March 2004, just three days before the elections, the cell struck, planting ten conventional bombs on four different commuter trains during the morning rush hour. The bombs were devastating, killing 191 people and injuring 1,841. The election went ahead, and was won by the opposition Socialist Party, which subsequently withdrew Spanish troops from Iraq. The impact of the bombings on the election result is unclear because the Socialist Party was already ahead in the polls, but that did not prevent al Qaeda from heralding the bombings as major success. This attack was the same concept as the 2003 New York subway plot, with the exception

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that conventional bombs were used instead of the al-Mubtakkar device, and demonstrated that al Qaeda did not necessarily need to use CW to achieve its immediate objectives. Hamza Rabia was particularly impressed by the attack and planned to replicate it by attacking trains in the US or the UK. While Rabia set about planning further attacks that replicated the Madrid bombings, a number of UK-based cells were independently discussing and planning potential CBRN attacks. In 2003 and 2004 one cell was researching how to manufacture a CW using conventional explosives to disperse a commercially available chemical called osmium tetroxide, and discussed using the weapon to attack Gatwick airport, the public transport system and shopping centres. Osmium tetroxide is a highly toxic chemical that can damage the respiratory system, burn the skin and cause blindness. But despite being highly toxic, it is also extremely volatile, so large quantities would be required to kill lots of people if it was released as an aerosol in the open air. It is also expensive and usually only sold in small quantities, so buying a significant quantity would probably have drawn attention to the cell.25 The choice of osmium tetroxide, which had never previously been used as a CW, suggested that at least one of the cells had some familiarity with undergraduate-level chemistry, and also demonstrated a degree of innovation. However, the concept of the weapon was deeply flawed, because when the liquid osmium tetroxide was heated up by the explosion it would have rapidly decomposed into a rock-like form, nullifying the inhalation hazard. This indicates that while the cell had some technical knowledge, it lacked the skills to develop an aerosol dispersal device as well as a detailed understanding of the substance they were dealing with.26 Whether the cell would ever have executed an attack remains unknown because its members were arrested while they were still discussing the idea and before they had actually procured any osmium tetroxide.27 They had already discussed the plan with contacts in Pakistan, but it is not known whether the al Qaeda leadership ever approved it.28 Like the 2003 Bourgass ricin incident, this looks as if it might have been another case of a terrorist cell discussing plans to use CBW but not actually developing those ideas into an operational plot because the al Qaeda leadership had not approved them. This potential explanation is consistent with the development of an operational plot by another cell that was being monitored by the UK

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security services in the town of Crawley, south of London. This cell was under the direct command of Abdul Hadi al Iraqi, a member of the al Qaeda military committee. It was led by Omar Khyam and also included Salahuddin Amin, who in 2001 had been involved in the aborted attempt to obtain nuclear material from the Russian mafia in Belgium. As part of their training in Pakistan, both Khyam and Amin had been taught how to make ricin. After returning to the UK in 2003, the members of the cell discussed a range of options for attacks in the UK. During one of those discussions, a member of the cell suggested that they could get jobs as beer vendors at a football stadium and inject poison into cans of beer with a syringe, or else obtain mobile vending carts and sell poisoned burgers.29 It is unclear whether the ricin idea was ever discussed with Abdul Hadi but the cell eventually agreed on a plan involving a large conventional bomb made from ammonium nitrate. The plan was approved by Abdul Hadi and the cell proceeded to buy the materials required to build the bomb. Ultimately, their decision to use an ammonium nitrate bomb proved to be their downfall, because a worker at the storage unit where they stored it informed the police, leading to their arrest in March 2004. The reasons for the cell’s decision to use an ammonium nitrate bomb rather than ricin are unknown. One potential explanation is that an ammonium nitrate bomb was a simple, low-tech option that offered a high chance of success and would result in a dramatic incident with lots of powerful media images. However, the decision not to use ricin was also consistent with al Qaeda’s previous refusal to approve CBRN attacks. Over the same period that the UK security services were monitoring the osmium tetroxide and Crawley cells, their Pakistani counterparts informed them about another UK-based al Qaeda operative called Dhiren Barot, who was planning to detonate a radiological weapon in London. Prior to 9/11 Barot had received advanced training, including in the use of CBRN weapons, in al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. By 2003, he was one of al Qaeda’s leading operatives in the UK and had recruited a cell of seven others to carry out attacks.30 Following extensive research, the cell developed a number of plans. Its main plan, which was called the ‘Gas Limos Project’, involved packing three limousines with gas cylinders and explosives and detonating them in underground car parks. Among their other plans was one called the ‘Radiation

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(Dirty Bomb) Project’. Their intention was that the Radiation Project would be synchronised with the main Gas Limos Project to cause ‘collateral’ objectives such as ‘injury, fear, terror and chaos’.31 Through online research Barot discovered that radioactivity can potentially be dispersed by either the hot air generated by a fire or by an explosive blast, but that dispersal by means of a fire would achieve the optimum level of dispersal. He developed a plan that involved setting fire to a large number of domestic smoke detectors, which contain a very small quantity of radioactive americium-147. Barot noted that radioactive standards agencies claimed that it would take a million or more smoke detectors to make an effective radiological weapon, but he dismissed this as deliberate misinformation. His research suggested to him that even the use of 1,000 smoke detectors could have serious consequences.32 Barot drew up a project proposal for the attacks to pitch to his al Qaeda handlers in Pakistan. In the proposal he described how he had initially thought of using radioactive isotopes as an add-on to the main gas limos plan, but had soon realised that radioactive isotopes were powerful enough to be a plot in their own right. Besides smoke detectors, he had identified other potential sources of radioactive isotopes in hospitals and food preparation facilities, but had been forced to reject those options because the cell did not have access to such sources. Instead, he proposed buying 10,000 smoke alarms and setting them alight in the City of London. He anticipated that the resultant contamination could affect up to 500 people. The plan was extremely crude, but nevertheless showed how a terrorist cell with no specialist skills can potentially conduct a low-level radiological weapon attack.33 In March 2004 Barot attended a meeting convened by Abu Faraj al-Libi in Waziristan, where he presented his plans for approval and funding.34 The outcome of the summit is unknown, but there is no evidence that al-Libi approved the Radiation Project. This conclusion is supported by the fact that after Barot returned to the UK, the cell received no funding from the al Qaeda leadership, and when they were arrested six months later the police found no evidence that they had started procuring the large number of smoke alarms they would need.35 Even as the security services were monitoring Barot’s cell, yet another UK-based cell was carrying out research and video-recorded reconnaissance missions to support a CBRN attack in London.

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They discussed options for attacking the financial district of the City of London, the London Underground and the Houses of Parliament with chemicals, a dirty bomb and sarin.36 In 2005, details of the plans were discovered in coded emails on computers seized from suspects in Britain and Pakistan, enabling British police to disrupt the plot. Very few details of this incident are publicly known, but it again looks very much like an operational cell brainstorming ideas for attacks. As was the case with the osmium tetroxide cell, this particular cell was never brought to trial for planning a CBRN attack. The number of CBRN plots being discussed or planned by UK-based cells in between 2003 and 2004 was unprecedented, and illustrates how CBRN planning was being independently driven by cells at the grass roots of the al Qaeda network. However, the al Qaeda leadership still sought to maintain top-down control of all attacks and no evidence has ever been made public that it approved any of these plans. But all the while the al Qaeda leadership was being continually degraded by aggressive counter-terrorism operations and US drone strikes. One of the big issues with regard to the al Qaeda CBRN threat over the entire period between 1998 and 2015 was how leadership changes might impact on al Qaeda’s declared position with regard to the operational use of CBRN weapons. During the course of 2005 Abu al-Libi was arrested by Pakistani troops in the city of Mardan and Hamza Rabia was killed in a drone strike. This forced al Qaeda’s key players to go into even deeper cover. Under interrogation, Abu al-Libi did not corroborate Sharif al-Masri’s claims about al Qaeda possessing a nuclear weapon in Europe, although he did recount a discussion with Hamza Rabia in 2003 about a cache of uranium buried in Kandahar.37 Al-Libi was replaced by a triumvirate of Shukrijumah, Saleh al-Somali and British terrorist Rashid Rauf, who were put in charge of developing plans to attack Western nations. The connection between Shukrijumah and the radiological weapon scares in the US between late 2003 and early 2004 raised concerns in some quarters that his promotion might lead to al Qaeda placing an increased emphasis on using CBRN weapons. This was seemingly confirmed by continued reports that Shukrijumah was trying to obtain nuclear materials to smuggle into the US.38 The initial focus of the triumvirate was on Hamza Rabia’s plan to conduct Madrid-style attacks in the UK. Rauf identified a pair of

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potential suicide bombers and introduced them to Abu Obeida al-Masri, a member of al Qaeda’s external operations unit. This would have been a perfect opportunity to resurrect the concept of the 2003 New York subway plot, using the al-Mubtakkar device. But there is no indication that al-Masri and his colleagues gave any consideration whatsoever to using the device for this attack. Instead, the two would-be suicide bombers and a third British terrorist were trained in Pakistan to make conventional bombs using hydrogen peroxide. The al Qaeda leadership then approved a plot to attack the London transport system with two waves of suicide bombings during 2005. The first wave of four bombs was executed successfully on 7 July, but the second wave of four bombs on 21 July failed because the explosive had not been made properly. There were strong operational reasons why al Qaeda might have chosen to use conventional bombs for these attacks rather that the al-Mubtakkar device. In particular, the Madrid attack had proved to be devastatingly successful using conventional bombs, and hydrogen peroxide explosive is also relatively easy to make from everyday materials. This meant that the al Qaeda leadership could maintain its position on reserving CBRN weapons for deterrence. With the al Qaeda leadership continuing to focus on plots using conventional bombs, al Qaeda-linked CBRN plans remained bottom-up affairs. Besides the UK, there were also a number of CBRN incidents in other western European countries. In Germany the intelligence services had been monitoring an al Qaeda facilitator called Ibrahim Mohammed Khalil and an associate called Yasser Abou Shaweesh since 2003. Khalil had trained in the Afghan camps and had fought in Afghanistan following 9/11. After escaping to Germany, his primary roles were finance, logistics and recruiting suicide attackers for the war in Iraq. In 2004 the German intelligence agencies monitored him discussing a plan to purchase 48 g of uranium from a source in Luxembourg. Khalil hoped to use the uranium to make a ‘dirty bomb’ to use against an American target.39 When the pair were finally arrested in January 2005 they had not purchased any nuclear material and, as was the case with the various UK-based plots between 2003 and 2004, there is no indication that he had either sought or obtained the approval of the al Qaeda leadership for their idea. In July 2007 the Italian police raided a mosque in the city of Perugia that was being used as a militant training school linked to al Qaeda.

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During this and subsequent raids more than 20 suspects were arrested. Some of those arrested had links with two members of the Moroccan Islamic Combat Group, who were believed to have ties to al Qaeda and who had been arrested two years previously in Belgium. Between daily prayers the imam of the mosque held terrorism training courses, showed propaganda videos and made fiery sermons inciting his disciples to join a Holy War. Chemicals, including acids and cyanide, were found in the cellar, as well as equipment for remote detonation of explosives and instructions on flying a Boeing 747.40 However, the group had not developed any plans to actually use the cyanide. These incidents across Europe highlighted a continued interest among operational cells within the al Qaeda network in using CBRN weapons, despite the fact that their capabilities were crude. In contrast, the al Qaeda leadership’s intentions with regard to using CBRN weapons for deterrence remained consistent, as illustrated by the absence of evidence that it had approved any of these plans. However, this begged the question of what might happen in future if the al Qaeda leadership’s control of its wider network began to break down.

Publicising the Threat and the Debate on Enhanced Interrogation The reports of al Qaeda attempting to smuggle nuclear weapons into the US via Mexico and the CBRN incidents in the UK were unfolding at a significant political juncture, with US presidential elections due in November 2004. Not surprisingly, national security was a major issue in the election. The CBRN incidents during 2004, coupled with continued reporting of the threat by intelligence officials to Congress, ensured that CBRN terrorism featured strongly as an issue in the build up to the election. In February 2004, CIA Director George Tenet, the Defense Intelligence Agency Director, Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby and the FBI Director Robert Mueller gave their annual assessment of terrorist and proliferation threats to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Jacoby informed the committee that al Qaeda (and other terrorist groups) remained interested in acquiring CBRN weapons, and that al Qaeda’s stated intention to conduct an attack exceeding the destruction of 9/11 raised the possibility that it might use ‘unconventional weapons’.

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He also highlighted ongoing concerns about rogue scientists, and the potential for states to provide either technological assistance or CBRN weapons to terrorist groups, although he admitted that there was no intelligence available that suggested that a state might provide al Qaeda with a CBRN weapon.41 In his testimony Tenet began with an overview of the terrorist threat. He confirmed that al Qaeda’s leadership had been significantly damaged, resulting in local cells being forced to act increasingly independently, but also warned that al Qaeda continued to remain a threat. Significantly, he highlighted a growing threat posed by smaller and more regional terrorist groups that were influenced by al Qaeda’s ideology and had access to its destructive expertise. He then testified at length about the terrorist CBRN threat, confirming that the CIA was tracking more than two-dozen terrorist groups that were trying to acquire CBRN materials: We particularly see a heightened risk of poison attacks. Contemplated delivery methods to date have been simple but this may change as non- al-Qaida groups share information on more sophisticated methods and tactics. Over the last year, we’ve also seen an increase in the threat of more sophisticated CBRN. For this reason we take very seriously the threat of a CBRN attack. Extremists have widely disseminated assembly instructions for an improvised chemical weapon using common materials that could cause a large numbers of casualties in a crowded, enclosed area. Although gaps in our understanding remain, we see al-Qaeda’s program to produce anthrax as one of the most immediate terrorist CBRN threats we are likely to face. Al Qaeda continues to pursue its strategic goal of obtaining a nuclear capability. It remains interested in dirty bombs. Terrorist documents contain accurate views of how such weapons would be used.42 Tenet’s testimony was supported by the contents of a report sent by the Department of Defense to Congress in mid-2004. The report disclosed for the first time that al Qaeda had a sophisticated biological weapons research and development effort under way, although its work was still inhibited by technological obstacles. It also painted an alarming picture of the potential implications of al Qaeda’s known connections with

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members within the defence establishments of several countries. It suggested that these connections would enable al Qaeda to overcome the main inhibiting factors on its BW programme, including the acquisition of a pathogenic pathogen and the process of weaponisation.43 But despite Tenet and the Pentagon report highlighting a significant worsening of the al Qaeda BW threat, the US political debate on the terrorist CBRN threat remained very much on nuclear weapons. During the first of the three presidential election debates in 2004 both President Bush and his challenger John Kerry stated that they regarded nuclear proliferation as the most serious threat to US interests in the near future, and both said they feared that terrorists might acquire nuclear technology from unsecured sources across the world and use it to threaten US security.44 The issue featured heavily as part of President Bush’s efforts to justify the invasion of Iraq, which was the most significant national security issue of the election. President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney mounted a vigorous defence of their actions by continuing to claim that there were links between al Qaeda, CBRN weapons and Iraq. They repeatedly portrayed Zarqawi as the clearest link between al Qaeda and the Saddam regime, and that his links to al Qaeda and his presence in Iraq before the war justified the invasion. During a speech in Ohio Bush argued: ‘Zarqawi is the best evidence of connection to al Qaeda affiliates and al Qaeda. He’s the person who is still killing.’ Later in the campaign, Cheney introduced the CBRN issue, by arguing: ‘He [Zarqawi] set up shop in Baghdad, where he oversaw the poisons facility up at Kermal, where the terrorists were developing ricin and other deadly substances to use.’45 Yet this statement was made long after the US government knew that ricin had not been found in the camp. Despite the weakness of their argument, the issue of Iraq barely damaged President Bush, who was reelected in November 2004. Following the election the US intelligence agencies assessments of al Qaeda’s CBRN capabilities were mixed. In 2005 it was assessed that acquiring BW remained an important goal for al Qaeda, but there were no reliable reports that it had an active BW development programme. US intelligence was aware of the CW-related training that was taking place in the Pakistan camps but also had no evidence that al Qaeda had established a centrally controlled CW development programme.46 Major General Eric Olson, the second-in-command of US forces in Afghanistan,

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stated that he had seen no evidence that al Qaeda was attempting to obtain nuclear or biological weapons,47 whilst assessments in 2006 concluded that al Qaeda’s ‘key obstacle’ in developing a nuclear device remained acquiring sufficient fissile material.48 In contrast to these more downbeat assessments, there was still a belief in some quarters that a significant threat existed. In February 2005 US Department of State Anti-Terrorism Coordinator William Pope stated that ‘Europe should expect biological, chemical, and radiological terrorist attacks at any time’.49 The following month Vice Admiral Jacoby told the Senate Armed Services Committee that: Al Qaeda’s stated intention to conduct an attack exceeding the destruction of 9/11 raises the possibility that planned attacks may involve unconventional weapons. There is little doubt it has contemplated using radiological or nuclear material. The question is whether al-Qaida has the capability. Because they are easier to employ, we believe terrorists are more likely to use biological agents such as ricin or botulinum toxin, or toxic industrial chemicals to cause casualties and attack the psyche of the targeted populations.50 Significantly, these statements did not fully explore al Qaeda’s intentions with regard to using CBRN weapons, despite the growing body of evidence that was becoming available. Pope categorically stated that al Qaeda would use CBRN weapons for a first strike, whilst Jacoby was a bit more guarded in suggesting that they might do so. It is entirely natural that officials with responsibility for public safety should err on the side of caution in their assessments, but the lack of any detailed public discussion of al Qaeda’s intentions with regard to using CBRN weapons is still somewhat surprising. As a result of these briefings, the terrorist CBRN threat remained firmly on the political agenda after the election and continued to hold a high media profile. This created the conditions that enabled the Administration to continue using the threat of CBRN terrorism to help to justify controversial aspects of its conduct of the war on terror. The years following the re-election of President Bush proved to be significant ones in the war on terror, with the Administration being put under increasing political pressure as the war in Iraq escalated, and significant

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questions began to be asked about the conduct of the war against al Qaeda. Between 2005 and 2006 one of the most high-profile political debates on the Administration’s handling of the war on terror was over the use of enhanced interrogation techniques. In 2005 the Department of Defense sought to update the US Army Field Manual on interrogation, to spell out more clearly which interrogation techniques were prohibited and which were not. As a result of an amendment to a military spending bill submitted by Senator John McCain, the Detainee Treatment Act was passed an entered into force in 2006. The act explicitly prevents all US government interrogators from using interrogation techniques that were not authorised in the US Army Field Manual on Interrogation, and prohibits the ‘cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment’ of persons under the detention.51 After approving the act, President Bush issued a signing statement in which he laid out his interpretation of the law. This emphasised not only his obligation to follow the law but also his obligation as Commander in Chief to defend and protect the country. The Administration felt that in any given case it would need to square those two responsibilities. What was not explicitly laid out in the statement was what the Administration would do in cases where it believed that the two responsibilities clashed.52 During 2006 the Department of Defense continued to work on revising the manual, and during that time the Administration drew on CBRN threats to help justify the continued need to use enhanced interrogation techniques. In previous debates over the use of enhanced interrogation the CIA had claimed that use of these techniques had prevented a radiological attack on the US homeland by Jose´ Padilla.53 Yet Padilla had not been intending to conduct a radiological attack, and astute observers recognised that fact. The problem for the Administration was that the information it had released into the public domain about the threat of CBRN terrorism during 2004–5 was generalised. It was neatly summarised in a statement made in January 2006 by Henry Crumpton, the head of counter-terrorism at the US State Department, that an al Qaeda CBRN attack was merely ‘a question of time’.54 The emphasis was on risks and threats but not actual CBRN plots against the US. In the absence of an immediate threat to help crystallise the threat, elements within the Administration leaked details of the 2003

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New York subway plot and the 2004 nuclear weapon purchase, to the American journalist Ron Suskind. In June 2006, at a critical juncture in the debate, Time magazine published Suskind’s report. The political nature of the leak is evident from the fact that whoever leaked the information indicated that the Administration was unaware of why Zawahiri had called off the attack, and that it believed that his message that the plot had been dropped for ‘something better’ meant that an even bigger attack was being planned, which was assumed might be a nuclear weapon plot.55 Suskind’s report indicated that al Qaeda was seeking to acquire CBRN weapons as a first strike capability against the US, but made no reference to the growing body of evidence that the al Qaeda leadership was thinking more in terms of using them for deterrence and retaliation. This deliberate exaggeration of the threat at that specific point in time seems to have been designed to raise public concerns about the threat in order to help the Administration justify the need to use enhanced interrogation techniques on captured al Qaeda operatives. In September 2006 the US Army published the revised Field Manual, which prohibited many of the controversial enhanced interrogation techniques, including waterboarding.56 Later that month President Bush himself waded into the debate with a forceful speech justifying the need for their continued use. He listed a number of plots that had been prevented by the use of enhanced interrogation. Amongst them, Bush announced that waterboarding KSM had provided critical details of al Qaeda’s BW programme, and claimed that without that information the US might not have been able to stop Sufaat and his assistants from developing anthrax for attacks against the US.57 This was a reference to KSM identifying Sufaat as the leader of al Qaeda’s anthrax programme and providing the names of his two assistants, which had led to their arrest. Some observers viewed Bush’s signing statement to the Detainee Treatment Act as putting down a marker that if the situation arose, the Administration might need to put the safety of the nation first. In that context, the comments in President’s Bush’s speech can be seen as providing the justification for taking that position. But whilst Bush was implying that the use of enhanced interrogation might be necessary to prevent future CBRN threats, the fact was that al Qaeda’s CBRN capabilities remained extremely crude. US intelligence assessments reported that Abu Khabab had only been able to get the al Qaeda CW programme back to the point where it had been in

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September 2001 and was operating basic facilities for experiments with chemicals and other materials, including cyanide or chlorine.58 There was also a continued lack of understanding about al Qaeda’s intentions. The various CBRN incidents between 2002 and 2007 were widely interpreted as evidence that al Qaeda intended to use CBRN weapons in a first strike role, but none of these incidents represented an imminent threat, and no evidence has been made public that the al Qaeda leadership ever approved any of these plans. The biggest concern in respect of CBRN attacks should actually have been the risk that the al Qaeda leadership might lose operational control over its network.

CHAPTER 13 LOSING CONTROL OF THE THREAT, 2004—8

With al Qaeda becoming even more of a loose collection of regional networks operating with a considerable degree of autonomy,1 the jihadi CBRN threat became increasingly decentralised, threatening to weaken the strong centralised control that the al Qaeda leadership had previously exercised over CBRN plots. This fragmentation of the threat posed increasing challenges for the Western intelligence agencies, which already faced enormous difficulties in assessing al Qaeda’s capabilities and intentions with regard to CBRN weapons. It also posed significant challenges for the al Qaeda leadership in terms of maintaining its control over jihadi CBRN plots. This decentralised CBRN threat was partly driven by the writings of influential jihadis who were not part of al Qaeda. The most prominent of these individuals was Mustafa bin Abd al-Qadir Sitt Maryam Nasar, who had been involved with CW development in the Afghan camps prior to 9/11. During that time he had begun developing ideas for the evolution of the jihad that were based on the concept of ‘leaderless resistance’. He envisioned individual cells within the wider jihadi network conducting autonomous operations without leadership from, or reference to, a central command structure.2 He was also an outspoken advocate of acquiring CBRN, but prior to 9/11 does not seem to have decided how best to use them. In 1999, he had stated, ‘one has to threaten them [with CBRN weapons] and deter the enemy exactly like they [the enemy] have been doing’.3 But in another

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lecture that year he stated that guerrilla warfare should be based on causing larges number of casualties – ‘we have to start thinking about the use of WMD in terrorism in their countries (ie the west) . . . We have to use WMD in terrorism’ – in order to achieve a strategic balance.4 In November 2004 the US named Nasar a ‘Most Wanted Terrorist’ for his involvement in 9/11 and the Madrid train bombings. In response, Nasar wrote an open letter to the US State Department in which he stated that the only way Muslims could achieve military parity with the US was to acquire and use WMD. He said that if he had been consulted during the planning of 9/11, he would have recommended putting WMD on the planes. He accepted that attacking the US with WMD was not easy, but argued that it was vital.5 He went on to encourage North Korea and Iran to continue their nuclear weapon projects, apparently in the belief that it might be necessary for the jihadis to cooperate with these regimes in order to defeat the ‘bigger devil’. To justify the use of nuclear weapons, he cited the example of President Harry Truman, who had argued that the use of nuclear weapons had shortened World War II and was also fitting retaliation for the behaviour of the Japanese during the war. Nasar did not see much benefit from the guerrilla warfare being waged by al Qaeda in Iraq. Hence: the ultimate choice is the destruction of the United States by operations of strategic symmetry through weapons of mass destruction, namely nuclear, chemical, or biological means, if the mujahideen can achieve it with the help of those who possess them or through buying them. One other option, he claimed, was by ‘the production of basic nuclear bombs, known as “dirty bombs”’.6 In January 2005 he published an online book called The International Islamic Resistance Cell, in which he returned to the original jihadi doctrines of Abdallah Azzam and challenged some of the strategies that had been adopted by the new generation of jihadis, arguing that they preferred to jump straight into holy war without first completing the long stage of ideological indoctrination.7 He also re-iterated many of the same ideas with regard to CBRN weapons that he had expressed in his letter to the State Department, and reflected the conclusions of Sheikh Nasir al-Fahd’s ‘Treatise on the legal status of using WMD against

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infidels’ by writing ‘if those engaged in jihad establish that the evil of the infidels can be repelled only by attacking them with weapons of mass destruction, they may be used even if they annihilate all the infidels’. One of his main recommendations was to divide the mujahideen into four different kinds of groups: squads of popular resistance with limited training; military squads with limited training in light weapons; squads of quality resistance well-trained for both terrorist operations and guerrilla warfare; and squads for strategic operations. These strategic operations squads should be commanded by individuals who understood the strategic goals of the resistance and had good knowledge of using WMD for ‘when there is a need to counter attack or to achieve strategic symmetry with the United States’.8 Nasar re-iterated these points in a further statement published on a jihadi website that stated: I feel sorry that there were no WMD in the planes that attacked New York and Washington on 9/11. We might have been relieved of the biggest number possible of voters who elected Bush for a second term. The last option remains the destruction of America by strategic operations through nuclear, chemcial and germ weapons of mass destruction, if the mujahideen were able to get them in co-operation with those who possess them, or through purchasing them, or through manufacturing and using primitive atomic bombs, called ‘dirty bombs’.9 Nasar was eventually arrested in the Pakistani city of Quetta in 2005, but he remains extremely influential within jihadi networks. His writings were widely disseminated across the internet and served as a catalyst to the development of the wider Islamist discourse on the issue of using CBRN weapons.10 Significantly, his writings primarily focus on using CBRN weapons as first-strike weapons rather than for deterrence or retaliation, and there is no indication in his work that he thought that political considerations should constrain their use. Nasar’s writings were only a part of the broader jihadi discourse on CBRN weapons that was taking place in online at that time. In 2007, one posting to an online jihadi forum by Shaykh Husayn ibn Mahmud, which is believed to be the pseudonym of an al Qaeda leader, argued that al Qaeda’s enemies had used nuclear and chemical weapons and killed

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women and children as well as destroying homes and burning crops, and that as a result al Qaeda was allowed to respond in kind. This reasoning was contradicted by a subsequent posting by Abu Zabadi, who argued that a first-strike nuclear attack would result in indiscriminate killing that would violate Allah’s commandment to preserve the life of the innocent, and that because the US had not used nuclear weapons it would be illegitimate for Muslims to do so. Another posting, by ‘Abd al Sham, argued that the destructive power of the 1-tonne bombs dropped on Afghanistan by the US was greater than that of the nuclear weapons dropped on Hiroshima, so the Islamic principle of retributionin-kind applied.11 It is unclear whether any of these individuals were speaking with the authority of the al Qaeda leadership, but these debates undoubtedly served as an encouragement to the wider jihad networks to consider using CBRN weapons.

The War in Iraq From 2003 the biggest opportunity for independent jihadi activity lay in Iraq, where the chaos in the aftermath of the ousting of the Saddam regime had created the perfect conditions for al Qaeda and other jhadi groups to operate. As the insurgency grew in strength, large numbers of foreign jihadis began to travel to Iraq.12 Among the many jihadi groups that established a presence in Iraq was al Tawhid wal Jihad. Zarqawi himself was already in Iraq and took command of the group’s operations there. One of the immediate tasks for the occupying forces in Iraq was to secure the Iraqi regime’s suspected stockpiles of CBRN weapons. Preventing these weapons falling into the hands of terrorists was, after all, one of the purported reasons why the war had been fought. Almost immediately, concerns were raised when looters ransacked a site that housed a bunker that had contained CW. It was unknown whether any usable CW had still been present at the site, and whether anything of importance had been taken,13 but the incident highlighted the risks. The US Army’s Iraq Survey Group (ISG) gradually established that Iraq did not have an active CBRN weapon programme, but there were persistent fears about old Iraqi army CW munitions that might have lain forgotten and unaccounted for. In one incident in May 2004 a US army convoy discovered an improvised explosive device (IED) consisting of a

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155-mm artillery shell containing sarin. The IED exploded before it could be made safe, but subsequent analysis showed that the shell had probably been manufactured in the 1980s and it was more than likely that the fighters who made the bomb did not know what it contained.14 Over time, as former Iraqi military sites were secured, these incidents petered out, only to be replaced by a new threat from the capabilities of the insurgents themselves. In late 2003 the security situation began to rapidly deteriorate as insurgents began to attack high-profile foreign targets and critical economic infrastructure.15 One of the epicentres of this violence was the city of Fallujah, which is located within an area known to US forces as the Sunni Triangle. One insurgent group based in Fallujah, Jaish Al Mohammed (Mohammed’s Army), which was largely made up of former Iraqi military and intelligence personnel, created the Al-Abud Network to develop CW. It recruited an inexperienced Baghdad chemist to develop tabun, mustard gas and other non-traditional CW agents. The chemist had no links to the former Iraqi CW programme but did have access to chemicals in Baghdad’s chemical souk district. The network had little difficulty in acquiring chemicals, including malathion pesticide and nitrogen mustard precursors, but was unable to acquire all of the necessary precursor chemicals required to make tabun, either because of a lack of supply or their own inexperience with developing CW.16 The chemist first attempted to produce tabun in December 2003, using malathion, which has a similar chemical structure. He knew that it is impossible to make tabun from malathion but nevertheles continued with his experiments. He eventually developed a concoction that was toxic enough to use as a weapon, which was used to fill nine mortar rounds. Having reached the limits of what he could achieve with that approach he abandoned his tabun experiments.17 In March 2004 the chemist considered trying again to develop tabun, but the network was still unable to obtain all of the necessary precursor chemicals. Instead, it focused on acquiring the chemicals required to produce nitrogen mustard gas. This time, the network managed to obtain the necessary chemicals but the chemist was still unsuccessful because he used incorrect amounts of the precursors and inadequate processes.18 This prompted the network to hire a younger chemist who owned a laboratory in Baghdad. Like his predecessor, he too did not have

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any prior CW experience and also failed to produce nitrogen mustard gas. However, he did manage to produce small quantities of ricin cake, which can easily be converted into ricin.19 The ISG stumbled across the network in March 2004, after US troops raided the laboratory of the younger chemist and detained him. Following his arrest, the network shifted its focus to the production of binary mustard gas. The network was able to obtain the necessary precursors but their remaining chemist again struggled to master the process. In the meantime the ISG had created a dedicated team to investigate and disrupt the network’s activities. By June 2004 the network’s chemical suppliers and chemists had been identified and neutralised. However, the leaders and financers of the network remained at large, and the nine chemical mortar rounds remained unaccounted for. The activities of the Al-Abud network caused alarm within the US-led coalition because of how quickly and effectively it had been able to mobilise resources and access relevant expertise. If the chemists had been able to fine-tune their production techniques and better understand the principles behind effectively dispersing CW, then the consequences could have been much more serious.20 The Al-Abud network was not the only insurgent group operating in Iraq that was attempting to produce CBW agents, but these other groups lacked the business and political connections that had been the key to the Al-Abud network’s ability to obtain the chemicals it needed.21 Initially, therefore, the CW threat from these other insurgent groups was primarily from IEDs utilising commercially available chemicals such as chlorine and cyanide. But unlike the Al-Abud network, these groups were very soon able to mount an operational CBRN threat. This first became apparent in the city of Fallujah, which had fallen under the complete control of insurgents in early 2004. In April 2004 the US Marine Corps launched Operation Vigilant Resolve in an attempt to regain control of the city, but the operation quickly became bogged down. After failing to make any significant gains, the marines withdrew, leaving the city in the hands of the insurgents. In November 2004 US and Iraqi forces launched a new, more powerful, assault on the city. As they advanced deep into the city they discovered a number of crude laboratories containing chemicals and manuals for producing poisons, including anthrax.22

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As US forces surrounded the city, references to CW began to appear in insurgent propaganda. Internet postings claimed that the US had used CW in the city because its conventional weapons had proved ineffective against the well-entrenched defenders.23 These allegations were repeated in a documentary distributed by the Italian news network Rai News 24 in November 2004, entitled ‘The hidden massacre’.24 The insurgents also claimed to have added cyanide to their munitions, and a group of former Iraqi military officers, including CW experts, were rumoured to have helped organise the defence of the city.25 However, cyanide is of limited use in an open-air environment, and there were no reports of CW actually being used in the battle. After some of the bloodiest and most intense fighting of the war, Fallujah was finally retaken, leaving thousands dead and much of the city in ruins. These reports, together with similar stories that the US had used CW in Afghanistan, permeated through Islamist networks and Muslim communities, but were never substantiated. Nevertheless, they circulated on the internet, and might have been the source of jihadi strategists and propagandists using allegations that the US had used gas to justify attacking the US in a similar manner. They were also repeated in official al Qaeda propaganda. Mohammed Siddique Khan, the leader of the cell that attacked the London Underground on 7 July 2005, declared in his death video, that: ‘Until we feel secure you will be our targets. Until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture . . . we will not stop this fight.’26 Amidst the increasing levels of violence in Iraq, Zarqawi rapidly gained a reputation as possibly the most violent of the insurgent leaders, following a wave of indiscriminate attacks against Shi’a civilians. But despite Western intelligence agencies identifying Zarqawi as a master poisoner, all of al Tawhid wal Jihad’s early attacks inside Iraq were conventional in nature. However, there were two incidents during 2004 that indicated his intent to use CBRN weapons. The first was the discovery of 3 kg of cyanide at a house in Baghdad, which al Tawhid wal Jihad had been planning to place inside construction bricks and then use to attack US troops.27 The second incident actually occurred in Jordan, where the security forces arrested an al Tawhid wal Jihad cell and reportedly seized the materials required to make a chemical bomb capable of causing up to 20,000 deaths, as well as plans to use CW against the US embassy, the

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prime minister’s office and other public buildings. Under interrogation, the suspects confessed to plotting to attack the HQ of the Jordanian Intelligence Services in Amman with a chemical bomb. The leader of the cell, Azmi Jayyousi, stated: ‘I took explosives courses, poisons high level, then I pledged allegiance to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, to obey him without any questioning.’28 The Jordanian authorities claimed that the attack would have mixed a combination of 71 lethal chemicals, including blistering agents to cause third-degree burns, nerve gas and choking agents. A Jordanian government scientist said the plot had been carefully worked out, with just the right amount of explosives to produce a toxic cloud without burning up the chemicals. However, US intelligence officials expressed caution about whether the chemicals were actually intended to create a CW. The apparent reason for these differing assessments of the plot was the presence of a large quantity of sulphuric acid among the tons of chemicals seized. Sulphuric acid can be used as a blister agent but can also be used to increase the size of conventional explosions.29 Zarqawi himself denied that the plot involved CW. He declared that al Tawhid wal Jihad did not have a WMD, ‘but if we had such a bomb – and we ask God that we have such a bomb soon – we would not hesitate for a moment to strike Israeli towns such as Eilat, Tel Aviv and others’.30 This statement suggests that Zarqawi was sensitive to the potential political costs of using CBRN weapons inside Jordan, where he was trying to build popular support to overthrow the Jordanian monarchy. In contrast, it is possible to identify a number of potential political benefits from attacking Israel, particularly the propaganda value and the potential to draw Israel into the war in Iraq. But given that Zarqawi did not have any CBRN weapons under his control, it remained to be seen whether his statement was anything more than just rhetoric. In October 2004 Zarqawi swore an oath of allegiance to al Qaeda and bin Laden, and al Tawhid wal Jihad was renamed al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). But even then it continued to act autonomously. Al Qaeda’s lack of control over Zarqawi was vividly illustrated by AQI’s indiscriminate violence against Shi’a civilians. Ayman al-Zawahiri quickly recognised that the violence was so extreme that it was alienating mainstream Sunni Muslims around the world. In 2005 he wrote to the insurgents, telling them to stop indiscriminately targeting Muslim civilians and Shi’a

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mosques in order not to alienate popular opinion,31 but his pleas went unheeded. The majority of these attacks involved conventional weapons, but from 2005 US intelligence sources began to receive reports warning that the insurgents were plotting to use poison to attack Iraqi security forces, government officials, coalition troops and Shi’a civilians taking part in pilgrimages to religious sites.32 Between 2005 and 2006 there were several outbreaks of food poisoning at Iraqi security force bases, but it was never entirely clear whether these were accidental or a result of insurgent activity.33 In one instance, though, the insurgents did manage to recruit a local cook working at a US base, and gave him a quantity of poison to contaminate the food supply, only for him to betray the plot to the security forces.34 In Ramadi, insurgents were also reported to have given the local population a contact poison to put on the gates of their homes in the hope of poisoning coalition soldiers. This was a credible report given al Qaeda’s previous development of contact poisons, but there is no evidence that such a substance was ever used in Iraq.35 The CW incidents in Iraq at this time were extremely crude in nature, but in 2005 the insurgents succeeded in recruiting an Iraqi called Salih Jasim Mohammed Falah al-Sabawi, also known as Abu Malik, who had previously worked in one of Saddam’s CW production plants. Based on his training and experience, the US military assessed that he was capable of manufacturing lethal chemical agents,36 and he was targeted for killing or capture. In August 2005 US troops raided a warehouse in the northern city of Mosul that housed his laboratory. It was found to contain 1,500 gallons of chemicals that, when combined, would produce an agent capable of causing ‘lingering hazards’ to those exposed to it.37 However, Abu Malik himself escaped. Exactly what position Abu Malik once held in Saddam’s CW programme is unknown, but he does not seem to have had much knowledge of developing CW because he did not improve AQI’s CW capability. The insurgents continued to rely on using commercially available chemicals as either contaminants or as additives to conventional IEDs. Between 2005 and 2006 there were 40 incidents in Iraq involving toxic substances. Of these, only nine were actual attacks; there were ten seizures of toxic substances or materials in insurgent arms caches and 21 intelligence reports of planned attacks that did not materialise. It is not clear which particular insurgent group was responsible for each of the

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actual attacks, but in 2006 US army intelligence reports were increasingly reporting that AQI was plotting attacks with both chlorine and poison. The main tactic for plots involving toxic chemicals was to poison either food or water, with the total number of such reports roughly doubling over those two years. But despite the higher number of reports, the number of actual poisoning attacks declined from two to one in these years. The other principal tactic was to use either static or vehicleborne IEDs.38 The most commonly used chemical agent was chlorine, which was implicated in a total of seven incidents over those two years, five of which were actual attacks.39 Chlorine is widely used in Iraq as a cleaner and water purifier. It reacts with water in moist tissue, such as eyes and the respiratory tract, to create acid, which burns tissue. A few breaths of air containing chlorine at 1,000 parts per million can be lethal. Exposures at lower concentrations cause coughing, shortness of breath, chest pain, burning in the throat, nose and eyes, nausea and swelling of the lungs. If the exposure is limited, people generally survive without suffering any lasting injury. However, explosive dispersal of chlorine in the open air is an extremely crude method of delivery, because it is heavier than air and so will rapidly sink to ground level, some of it will be destroyed in the explosion and some of it will simply dissipate into the atmosphere.40 The insurgents were able to obtain large quantities of chlorine by either raiding water treatment plants or hijacking tankers that were importing it from Jordan and Syria. They improvised chlorine IEDs by either attaching explosive devices directly to the tankers or mounting tanks of chlorine in trucks with explosives packed around them.41 These chlorine IEDs were primarily used against Iraqi security force and US military targets, but the chlorine caused no fatalities. To some extent the security forces in Iraq were able to contain the threat by seizing caches of chemicals and arresting or killing the individuals involved in reported plots. In January 2006, for instance, there were reports that ten unidentified men from Syria had arrived in Iraq to support the CW operations of Hizballah Islami, an Iranian group linked with AQI. They were described as being foreign CW experts. They met a Hizabllah Islami contact in Sammara before being taken to Is’Hagey, where Hizballah Islami’s CW, which had reportedly been acquired in Syria, were stored.42 A number of them were subsequently

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detained in the city of Balad.43 Similarly, in June 2006 an AQI facilitator called Tahir Muhammad Mustafa Khalil Al-Bayati, who was leading a plot to put diisopropyl fluorophosphate (DFP) into reservoirs located in Baghdad, was detained in the city of Mosul.44 The security forces also experienced a certain amount of luck in containing the threat. In October 2006, the insurgents attacked the compound of a tribal sheikh using a chlorine IED consisting of about 12 120-mm mortar rounds and two tanks of chlorine, mounted on an SUV. The truck was stopped at a police checkpoint guarding access to the compound, forcing the militants to detonate the device prematurely. Only one of the chlorine tanks exploded and the other was blown clear by the explosion. There was no damage to either the checkpoint or the sheikh’s house, although three policemen and one civilian were wounded.45 Whilst these plots and attacks were crude in nature, some intelligence reports suggested that the insurgents might be acquiring or developing more sophisticated capabilities. One report in January 2006 suggested that neuroparalytic agents (with effects like snake venom) were being brought into Iraq from Iran.46 Others spoke of CW being brought into Iraq from Saudi Arabia or Syria and several reports suggested that the insurgents had obtained old Iraqi CW munitions.47 Possibly the most serious report emerged in late February 2006, when US intelligence received reports that a group of 200 militants led by Uday Adhab Dhiban Al-Duluyami, one of Zarqawi’s assistants, was planning to attack an army base in Al Mahmudiyah, with sarin-filled 82-mm shells. They were reportedly assisted by an al Qaeda CW expert from Saudi Arabia called Abu Mu’Ath Al-Saud.48 But while there were a number of reports that suggested a worsening of the threat, none of the attacks ever materialised. This suggests that many of the intelligence reports regarding CW in Iraq were untrue, but there was nevertheless a small core of genuine CW incidents. Data from the US army war logs show an upward trend in the number of CW reports, from 14 reported incidents in 2005 to 26 reported incidents in 2006, although the number of actual attacks only rose from four in 2005 to five in 2006.49 Overall, the low number of actual attacks, the crude nature of the attacks and the lack of fatalities all suggested that the threat was manageable and of much less concern than the almost daily gun battles and IED attacks taking place in Iraq at that

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time. But the critical issues for the future were whether the insurgents could improve the effectiveness of their chlorine IEDs and increase the frequency of attacks. AQI propaganda indicated that it was anxious to acquire more sophisticated CBRN capabilities, but also betrayed its lack of knowledge about the subject. An eight-page document on the history of BW, which indirectly advocated their use against the US, was posted on an official AQI website. The document described BW as being effective and affordable weapons that were relatively easy to make and could give the mujahideen military parity with the US. It stated: The American people are living in fear due to the anthrax phobias. This justified fear among ordinary citizens is due to some casualties from the infected letters . . . What many Americans do not know is that these microbes are the fruit of the endless greed of their culture. The author concluded by stating that ‘with $50,000 a group of amateurs can possess a BW sufficient to threaten a superpower. It is for this reason that BW are called the poor man’s atomic weapon’.50 The document contains a number of errors regarding the ease with which BW can be made, but it reflects the views expressed by Nasar in ‘The international Islamic resistance call’ that WMD are an ‘equaliser’ of US military power. The spate of CW incidents in Iraq appears to have been locally driven, with no guidance or instruction from the al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan. In fact, AQI was to all intents and purposes an autonomous organisation. This provided the first real indication that the al Qaeda leadership’s control over jihadi CBRN threats might be breaking down, and that the threat was already beginning to grow beyond its control.

Online Training Materials Al Qaeda did not help itself in trying to maintain control of the threat because it continued to post increasing amounts of CBRN related instruction and training manuals in online jihadi forums. These forums also provided spaces in which individual terrorists and cells could potentially connect with others, in order to acquire additional technical

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expertise. Some of these training manuals provided an overview of which commercially available nuclear materials were best suited for use in a radiological bomb. In October 2005 the al-Firdaws and al-Farouq jihadi websites published the ‘Nuclear Preparation Encyclopedia’, which contains detailed instructions in Arabic on how to make nuclear, radiological and biological weapons,51 whilst on another prominent jihadi website a posting entitled ‘Instances of radiation pollution from 1945 – 87’ encouraged the use of radiological weapons in large commercial areas in order to cause economic damage.52 The most significant posting in 2005 was a manual for the construction and deployment of the al-Mubtakkar device that is nearly identical to the device intended for use in the 2003 New York subway attack. The eightpage manual in Arabic, entitled Al-Mubtakkar al-Farid: Li Irsaal al-Safah al-Athiri Ila al-Kafir al-’Anid (The Unique Invention: To Deliver the Gaseous Killer to the Stubborn Infidel), contains 34 diagrams that illustrate the materials and components needed and instructs readers on assembly and the precautionary steps that need to be taken. The design combines hydrochloric acid with potassium cyanide in a device consisting of four glass bottles in a metal container. It differs from the New York subway device only in the number of glass containers it uses and the substitution of potassium cyanide for sodium cyanide (which would work equally well for the purpose of producing hydrogen cyanide). The manual recommends using the device against civilian targets, including theatres, brothels, shopping malls, bars and government offices. It states: ‘The most effective way to disperse this gas is in closed quarters by using the central air conditioning and ventilation systems within a building or by using multiple devices if available.’ It adds: ‘When placing these devices inside buildings it should specifically be placed by the entrances and the emergency exits.’ Surprisingly, it also states that it is possible to use the device in open spaces, but advises against using it in airports because of the high levels of security.53 It is unclear when the manual was first posted online, but it was available on the al-Firdaws and al-Farouq websites from October 2005 to early 2006. Since then, it has been disseminated on other websites, including the pro al Qaeda al-Nusra. The exact number of people who might have downloaded it is difficult to ascertain. However, the ‘Nuclear Preparation Encyclopedia’ attracted more than 57,000 hits, which hints at the potential numbers that might have viewed it.

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Despite the facts that these plans have been disseminated online, that it only requires commercially available chemicals and materials and that thousands of people have accessed them, the al-Mubtakkar device has never been used operationally. Al Qaeda’s reticence to do so can be seen in the reasons for the cancellation of the 2003 New York subway plot, but that does not explain the reticence of cells that do not fall under the command of al Qaeda. It may have been because procuring cyanide is difficult and risks drawing attention to oneself. Alternatively, some terrorist cells may be uncomfortable working with an unfamiliar substance. Jihadi cells operating in the West have tended to plot attacks with specific weapons and tactics that they have been trained to use. Cells that have not been trained to make and use the device may therefore be reluctant to try and use it. Instead, manufacturing explosives from more everyday items such as ammonium nitrate offers a higher chance of success and possibly higher casualties. It is equally possible that some independent cells have been unable to make a functioning device from the instructions. As noted in Chapter 4, written information is not in itself necessarily enough to guarantee the successful development of a CBRN weapon. Overall, the instructions in these manuals largely focus on crude CW and biological toxins such as ricin and botulinum, and do not require specialist technical skills. The crude nature of these weapons means that they are unlikely to kill many people, although the CIA assessed that at least some of the improvised CW that were described in them could potentially cause a large numbers of casualties if used in crowded, enclosed areas.54 Evidence of the extent to which this information was disseminating through militant networks is evident from the number of counter-terrorism raids in which computer files containing material relating to CBRN weapons were recovered. These materials therefore seemed to have significantly increased the potential risk of CBRN terrorism. The question was whether independent terrorist cells would be both willing and able to seize the opportunities that this afforded.

Sporadic Global Incidents Despite numerous individuals and cells downloading these CBRN materials, there were no CBRN attacks by independent cells and groups operating in Europe or the US at that time. However, there were a

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number of incidents that suggested a real threat existed. In Australia in 2004 a cell of 18 militants led by Faheem Khalid Lodhi, the leader of Lashkar-e-Toiba in Australia, began plotting bomb attacks. They discussed a range of possible targets, including the US –Australian electronic intelligence surveillance station at Pine Gap, military bases and a nuclear power station at Lucas Heights, 40 km from the city of Sydney. In December 2004, three members of the cell were arrested in the vicinity of Lucas Heights, but subsequently released.55 However, like other cells that discussed possible CBRN attacks, they did not have an actual plan to attack Lucas Heights when they were arrested in November 2005. Similarly, in 2005, during searches in Casablanca, the Moroccan security forces discovered documents that included diagrams and instructions for making the al-Mubtakkar device,56 but there was no evidence of an operational plot. In Indonesia in 2005, Sheikh Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, the spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiya, declared that Muslims must embrace the use of nuclear weapons because ‘in places like London and New York there must be other calculations [than conventional attacks]. In battle it is best to cause as many casualties as possible’.57 But in an interview later the same year, Ba’aysir stated that whilst the use of nuclear weapons is justifiable, chapter 60, verse 8 of the Qur’an states that Muslims should equip themselves with weapons of power but preferably to deter rather than kill the enemy.58 These statements make it difficult to ascertain what Jamaah Islamiya’s intentions with regard to using CBRN weapons actually were, but the fact that the Indonesian security forces did not find evidence of any active CBRN plots at that time suggested that Ba’asyir’s statements were meant for propaganda purposes. In Europe, the Russian authorities continued to report CW plots being planned by Chechen insurgents linked to al Qaeda. In early 2005 insurgents belonging to a Wahabbi group called Amanat Jamaat were reported to be planning attacks using a cyanide-based substance in the capitals of the North Caucasus region and several large regional centres elsewhere in Russia. The plot was supposedly led by led by a Jordanian known as Abu Mudjaid, whom the Russian authorities described as being an al Qaeda emissary. However, before the purported plot could be carried out the Russian security forces managed to seize the substance during combat operations along the border between Chechnya and the Province of Ingushetia.59

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Also in 2005, ‘Abd al-Qadir Fall Mamur, an Imam with links to al Qaeda, warned that the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades were planning a nerve gas attack on Italy’s symbolic sites.60 The reference to nerve gas strongly suggests that there was no actual plot and the statement was made purely for propaganda purposes. However, this was just the latest in a string of CBRN incidents in Italy since 2000, which raised the possibility that eventually one such incident would actually result in an attack. These incidents fed into a wider trend in the period between 2004 and 2007 that suggested that the CBRN threat was beginning to grow beyond al Qaeda into the wider networks of Islamist militant groups. This wider threat was primarily from larger networks and groups rather than independent autonomous individuals and cells. And unlike the al Qaeda leadership, these networks and groups were proving much more willing to use CBRN weapons operationally. However, the increasing availability of online CBRN materials appears to have had little effect on increasing the number of attacks. There are a number of potential reasons for this. Some groups and sub-networks may not have had access to anyone with the necessary technical skills to make the online instructions work in practice. They would also have had to deal with the problem of acquiring the necessary raw materials and equipment to manufacture the agents, which in some cases might have increased the risk of detection. Some cells may also have been influenced by tactical considerations, given that the low tech methods described in many of the online manuals would have restricted the type of operation that they could conduct. But for whatever reason, the decentralised threat from autonomous individuals and cells failed to emerge in this period.

CHAPTER 14 BREAKDOWN IN CONTROL, 2007—9

By 2007 CBRN weapons had become fully integrated into the strategic thought of the wider jihadi movement, with jihadi groups and networks in Iraq and Afghanistan beginning increasingly to use CBW operationally. For the al Qaeda leadership, the big questions this posed were whether it would be able to re-establish its control over the CBRN threat posed by the wider network and, if it failed, what the consequences of the increased use of CBRN weapons might be. Answers to both of these questions were initially played out in Iraq, where there was a significant increase in CW attacks from 2007. Zarqawi was killed by a US airstrike in June 2006, but his death had little impact on either the insurgency in Iraq, or the al Qaeda leadership’s control over AQI. This was reflected in the fact that the new AQI leaders began to consider more widespread use of CBW. AQI signalled its intent on 28 September 2006, when its new leader, Abu Hamza Al-Muhajr,1 posted a speech online saying, amongst other things: And my last message is to the people of distinctive competencies, and highly experienced scientists in all fields and disciplines, chemistry, physics, management and electronics, information . . . and in particular nuclear scientists and explosives specialists. We say to you, we are in dire need for your experience. The battlefields of Jihad will satisfy your ambitions . . . American bases serve as the best test fields for your non-traditional bombs . . . such as germ warfare and the so called dirty-bombs.2

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By the end of 2006 the tide of the war was turning against the insurgents. An increasing number of Sunni tribes had grown disillusioned with the sectarianism and violence of the jihadis and were forming ‘Awakening Councils’ to fight alongside government forces. As the Awakening Council movement grew in strength, it threatened to isolate the jihadis from their support base within the Sunni community. At the same time, the US was preparing to deploy 20,000 more troops to Iraq. ‘The surge’, as it became known, was scheduled to begin in January 2007. Recognising the strategic significance of the surge, the insurgents tried to seize the initiative before it began by launching a major series of attacks against the security forces and the tribes that had joined the Awakening Councils. As part of this upsurge in violence they made widespread use of CW. Before the insurgents could deploy CW operationally, they first had to develop effective weapons. However, they were hampered by the technical limitations of their bomb-makers. Lacking the ability to either manufacture or otherwise acquire sophisticated CW, they were forced to rely on whatever commercial chemicals were available to them, particularly chlorine and cyanide. However, the limited effectiveness of cyanide in the open-air environment meant that for practical purposes the only real option available to them was chlorine. AQI had access to a number of different types of weapons systems, including short-range rockets and mortars, which could potentially be adapted to deliver chlorine payloads. However, their engineers lacked the technical skills to adapt rockets. Drilling out rocket warheads to add chemical fills would likely impair their flight trajectory performance, and unless an appropriate burster tube and fuse was incorporated to enable these munitions to be airburst it was likely that the explosive blast of the warhead would consume the chlorine.3 As a result, AQI was forced to rely on using crude chlorine IEDs. The first indication of AQI’s change in tactics became apparent in Anbar Province to the west of Baghdad in late January 2007. A suicide bomber drove a dump truck carrying explosives and a tank of chlorine into a courtyard adjacent to the compound of a police emergency response unit near the city of Ramadi. The bomber then rammed the truck through the adjoining wall and detonated the device, killing 16 and wounding 55. Some of the injured Iraqi policemen reported a burning sensation in their throats, watering eyes and difficulty breathing, which are all symptoms

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consistent with the inhalation of chlorine.4 However, none of the victims were killed by the effects of chlorine. AQI’s system of command-and-control was not hierarchical, and because decision-making was decentralised, individual unit leaders communicated laterally across the organisation without waiting for instructions from senior commanders before acting. This meant that AQI tactics would change almost simultaneously in different cities, as information about weapons and tactics flowed laterally across its networks.5 As a result, chlorine attacks quickly spread to other areas of Anbar Province over the following months. The January attack was quickly followed by three more in February 2007. In the first attack, a truck laden with explosives and chlorine tanks killed 12 people and caused distinctive burns and breathing problems to some of the injured.6 Later that month, another truck-borne chlorine IED was detonated north of Baghdad, killing at least five people and emitting fumes that injured more than 150 others. A few days later a pick-up truck carrying chlorine tanks and explosives was detonated in southwest Baghdad, killing two civilians and wounding many others.7 This sequence of attacks indicated to the coalition forces that they were now dealing with a systematic campaign of chlorine IEDs, rather than the sporadic incidents that had been experienced over the previous two years. The CIA and US military responded by targeting the bomb-makers and planners behind the campaign, and choking off the supply of chlorine.8 Intelligence sources identified Muhammed Abdullah Abbas al-Issawi, a security emir for AQI in western Anbar Province, as a key planner in the campaign, and he was targeted for killing or capture. The increased number of US troops available as a result of the surge also enabled the security forces to conduct more security sweeps, which led to many more weapons caches being discovered. That year a total of 40 caches of chlorine were seized, two chlorine IED factories were discovered in Karma and Fallujah in February9 and the following month more were discovered near Fallujah and in Baghdad. However, this did not immediately stop the attacks.10 The problem was that chlorine was so widely available in Iraq, and the IEDs were so low-tech, that they could be manufactured in any rudimentary workshop. Nor did the bomb makers need any specialist knowledge of handling toxic chemicals, since the chlorine did not need to be removed from its sealed containers in order to be incorporated into an IED.

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As a result, the number of incidents rose significantly to nine in March 2007. The main method of using chlorine was in suicide vehicleborne IEDs, and the targets were a mix of civilians, tribal leaders who had joined the Awakening Councils, the US military and Iraqi security forces. The initial attacks consisted of isolated IEDs that, despite being successfully detonated, had little lasting impact. As a result, the insurgents adapted their tactics to launch a coordinated series of three attacks on 16 March. Whilst only eight people were killed in these three incidents, one of them injured 100 people and another injured 250.11 Again, it was apparent that none of the fatalities had been caused by the chlorine. A key feature of these attacks was the low number of deaths compared to the relatively high number of injuries they caused. The insurgents recognised that this offered the capability to potentially incapacitate a large number of defenders at fixed sites, and again adapted their tactics to try and exploit that fact. They implemented this new tactic in a major attack on the Fallujah Government Centre on 28 March 2007. After an initial bombardment by mortars, suicide vehicle-borne IEDs were driven simultaneously into the northwestern and southern entrances of the base. The vehicle at the northwest gate contained chlorine and successfully passed an initial police blocking station. The bomber drove into the base and detonated the device in front of a barracks housing US and Iraqi troops. The explosion destroyed an entire wall of the barracks, creating a cloud of chlorine vapour. US Navy SEAL Eric Greitens, who was in the barracks at the time, recalls almost immediately experienced the effects of the chlorine. He describes the effects as feeling like flames scorching his throat and lungs. His eyes burned and he had to fight to keep them open. Suffering from blurred vision, Greitens and other members of his unit stumbled outside. Geitens recalled: ‘On my hands and knees, I began hacking up chlorine gas and spraying spittle. My stomach spasmed in an effort to vomit, but nothing came.’ The burning sensation settled in Geitens’s lungs, causing him to gag whenever he inhaled. He recalled: ‘My breathing was still shallow, and I felt as if someone had tightened a belt around my lungs and was pulling hard to kill me.’ Yet despite the effects of the chlorine, he and two others were still able to climb onto the roof of the barracks to defend the compound.12 Meanwhile, the guards at the southern entrance spotted the suicide bomber and opened fire as he approached, forcing him to detonate his

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device prematurely. A fierce gun battle then ensued before US reinforcements arrived and drove the attackers off. No coalition troops were killed in the attack, but 72 were injured, of whom 63 suffered varying degrees of chlorine inhalation.13 The attack was a failure, but the insurgents had at least identified the right tactics to exploit the advantages of chlorine IEDs. They simply needed to identify a smaller, more isolated target that could not be reinforced quite so easily. Yet the insurgents failed to pursue these tactics, and reverted instead to isolated IED attacks. As the number of chlorine attacks increased, they were increasingly reported on Iraqi TV, which emphasised the high levels of civilian casualties that they were causing. Whether as a result of this negative media coverage or not, the al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan grew increasingly concerned about AQI’s use of chlorine and attempted to assert its control. On 28 March 2007 an unidentified al Qaeda leader of Egyptian origin wrote about the issue to a militant legal scholar called Hafiz Sultan. The author of the letter noted that the al Qaeda leadership was aware of a plan to use chlorine against Kurdish forces in northern Iraq, and that those involved had previously been informed that using CW required central coordination and permission from the senior leadership. The leadership feared that because chlorine was be difficult to control and might harm civilians, an attack could tarnish al Qaeda’s image and alienate popular support. Those involved had agreed put the plan on hold, and in the meantime the author directed Hafiz Sultan to provide guidance on the use of chlorine.14 This represents the fifth known case of the al Qaeda leadership not approving a CBRN attack. In response, AQI issued a denial that it was using chlorine to attack Sunni civilians. It stated that: The group calls accusations of their involvement in the attack part of an information campaign aimed at tarnishing the jihad of the Islamic State, and more broadly, the image of the blessed global jihad . . . The group asks how any ‘sane’ person can believe that the Islamic State is targeting its own people as so many move to join their military ranks. Instead, it argued that it was targeting the security forces and Awakening Council fighters.15 This denial indicates that AQI was

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sensitive to the political costs of using CW, and suggested that it might adapt its tactics to ensure that the chlorine IEDs only killed or injured what it considered to be legitimate targets. Yet despite paying lip service to the political costs of using chlorine, the pace of the attacks continued, with a further seven in April before tailing off to two in May. This suggests that AQI considered the potential political costs of using chlorine to be outweighed by the military need to use them. The IEDs in April and May included the two most lethal incidents. In early April, an IED comprising chlorine and high explosive killed 35 people in Ramadi, west of Baghdad. The other incidents that occurred in April were modest by comparison, with few fatalities or injuries.16 As the number of incidents declined in May, the attacks spread to Diyala Province to the north and east of Baghdad, which has a mixed Shia and Sunni population. In one incident in Diyala Province that month a chlorine IED attack on an open-air market in the village of Abu Sayda killed at least 32 people and injured 50 more.17 Whilst some chlorine IED attacks resulted in significant numbers of casualties, in others the effectiveness of the IEDs was undermined by either their crude construction or factors related to their deployment. In some cases the chlorine tanks were blown clear by the blast without rupturing.18 Counter-terrorism measures also played a significant role in reducing the effectiveness of the overall campaign. The most significant success for the security forces was the killing of Muhammed Abdullah Abbas al-Issawi during a firefight in April 2007,19 which was complemented by a number of other successes. There was an increased number of incidents in which suicide bombers were forced to detonate their chlorine IEDs before reaching their intended targets due to the intervention of either US or Iraqi forces. Seizures of weapons caches that contained chlorine also continued at a steady rate, and six chlorine IEDs that had been deployed were located and destroyed in controlled explosions. One of the results of the targeting of the chlorine bomb makers and planners was that it reduced the insurgents’ ability to learn from experience and improve their IED designs and tactics. As a result of all these factors the insurgents were only able to detonate a further five chlorine IEDs in the latter half of 2007.20 The failure of the insurgents to learn from their mistakes was evident from an attack on US forward operating base Warhorse in Diyala Province on 3 June 2007. In contrast to the attack on the Fallujah

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Government Centre in March, this time the target was a smaller, more isolated base. As with the attack on the Fallujah Government Centre, the attack began with a brief mortar bombardment, before a suicide truck bomb comprising two tanks of chlorine and 1,000 lb of explosive was detonated approximately 200 m upwind of the entrance to the base. The toxic cloud from the IED blew over the base, making 65 troops ill. But the insurgents did not follow this up with a substantial ground assault. Most of the injured US soldiers returned to duty the following day, and no lasting damage was caused.21 These incidents, coupled with AQI’s statements of intent to acquire more sophisticated CBRN weapons, underpinned President Bush’s comments in a speech on 19 March 2008 marking the fifth anniversary of the invasion, warning that the early withdrawal of US forces from Iraq could indirectly help al Qaeda acquire WMD. He stated that ‘an emboldened al Qaeda with access to Iraq’s oil resources could pursue its ambitions to acquire weapons of mass destruction to attack America and other free nations’.22 By the time that Bush made this speech the Awakening Council movement and the surge had turned the tide of the war in favour of the US and the Iraqi government. US and Iraqi troops had either killed or detained many of the insurgents who had been building the chlorine IEDs,23 whilst improved security had made it increasingly difficult for the insurgents to obtain large amounts of chlorine. As a result, there was not a single reported chlorine attack in 2008, and the US army seized a total of 28 arms caches that contained tanks of chlorine. This was a reflection of the impact of the higher troop numbers in Iraq, and also possibly better intelligence from the local population. The fact that the insurgents still possessed quantities of chlorine but had not deployed it also suggests that they had to some extent lost faith in using chlorine IEDs. Similarly, there were no further chlorine IED explosions in 2009, although the US army did manage to locate two that had been deployed and make them safe before they could be detonated.24 These incidents proved to be among the last acts of a disappearing threat. In total, the US army’s war logs reported 34 chlorine IED attacks between 2006 and 2009. Estimates of the casualties caused by these IEDs are difficult to gauge, but the war logs and media reports suggest it was something in the order of 110 killed and 850 injured. The IEDs were a deliberate attempt by the insurgents to escalate the level of terror

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in its bombings, but in that respect they were a singular failure because the casualties they caused were no worse than those caused by many of the conventional IED attacks in Iraq at that time. Significantly, US officials estimate that all of the fatalities were caused by the bomb blasts25 rather than the chlorine. The fact that many of the victims of the chlorine IEDs were civilians, contrary to Zawahiri’s warnings in 2005 about the political damage caused by attacking civilians, illustrates just how much the threat of using CBRN weapons had grown beyond the control of the al Qaeda leadership. With the insurgents increasingly focusing on chlorine IEDs, the number of reports concerning planned or actual poisoning incidents in Iraq fell to less than ten a year between 2007 and 2009 and included just three relatively minor attacks in that three year period.26 Overall, the insurgents’ use of CW was a strategic failure, because their weapons and tactics had been too crude. But AQI had not been completely eliminated from Iraq. It formally re-branded itself as the Islamic State of Iraq, and retained a belief that CBRN weapons could change the course of the war. In April 2009, Islamist websites posted an audio interview with al-Muhajir in which he said that the mujahideen were ‘in great need’ of chemical and biological warfare agents. He again emphasised the need for acquiring biological, chemical and nuclear weapons in order to compensate for the US superiority in conventional weapons. He argued that Muslim scientists should do all they could in order to develop WMD, to be used as a deterrent by the mujahideen.27 Al-Mujahir’s reference to deterrence represents a significant change in ISI’s strategy with regard to CBRN weapons, bringing it into line with the declared position of al Qaeda. One potential explanation for this declared change in strategy was that al-Mujahir had belatedly recognised the political damage that had been done to its cause by the use of the chlorine IEDs, and recognised that the political value of CBRN weapon as a deterrent was possibly greater than the military benefits arising from their operational use. In 2010 there were worrying signs that the use of CBRN weapons might spill over into neighbouring countries when the Israeli security forces detained Yazid Sufaat’s former assistant, Samer al-Barq, as he attempted to enter Israel. Al-Barq had been released from custody in 2008 and then expelled from Jordan for planning to attack Jewish tourists in Jordan and to train other terrorists to produce toxins for an attack inside Israel.28 But whilst the Israeli security services considered

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al-Barq to be an extremely dangerous terrorist, there is little evidence that he had the necessary technical skills to mount a credible large-scale CBRN attack.

The War in Afghanistan, 2004 –6 With al Qaeda’s ability to mount complex international attacks being continually degraded by aggressive counter-terrorism operations and US drone strikes, it was forced to change the way that it conducted operations to decentralised operations, using small but well-organised regional groups inside Pakistan and Afghanistan.29 Its cross-border operations into Afghanistan were controlled by Abu Layth al-Libi, who primarily focused on conventional attacks. From 2002 US forces in Afghanistan began receiving intermittent intelligence reports that insurgents were planning to use CBW. But unlike the situation in Iraq, there was no discernable upward trend in the number of reports. The US Army’s Afghan war logs record a solitary report in 2004, followed by 11 in 2005 and then four in 2006.30 Significantly, not one of these reports resulted in an actual attack, which raises doubts about how many of them were actually true. Only two of these reports identified al Qaeda. One involved the use of a chemical IED against Afghan and coalition forces, which was a credible threat. The other was a plan to attack the town of Mazar-e-Sharif with an unknown CW with the intention of ‘blinding’ the local population and coalition forces.31 All of the other reports related to Taliban activities, which were primarily focused on using CW to attack coalition and Afghan forces, although an important secondary target was the Government of Afghanistan and the 2005 Afghan elections. There were a total of three reports of the Taliban planning to target civilians with chemical substances during the elections32 and one of attempting to poison Afghan government officials.33 The Taliban’s favoured idea for attacking coalition or Afghan forces was to try to poison their food and water supplies,34 although there was also a report in 2005 that the Taliban had distributed a contact poison to subordinate commanders for use against the Afghan government and coalition forces.35 Between 2007 and 2009 the number of intelligence reports concerning potential CW incidents fluctuated, with the US Army’s Afghan war logs recording 14 reports in 2007, 20 in 2008 and 11 in 2009.36 US forces

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never received any intelligence of what chemical substances were involved in these reports, but they are most likely to have been commercially available chemicals from Pakistan. Of all of these reports, only one was linked with al Qaeda, and concerned a purported plot to plant an unspecified CW device near an international military base in Kandahar. But as with the previous reports, the attack was never carried out so it remains unknown whether the plot was genuine or not.37 In contrast, the war logs report that the Taliban carried out a total of four CW attacks in Afghanistan between those years.38 The first attack was one of a spate of reports concerning plots to attack girls’ schools and resulted in 30 girls being poisoned by contaminated water.39 The second attack resulted in the poisoning of a group of Afghan national police by a Taliban agent.40 The third involved the use of rocket propelled grenades fitted with chemical warheads during an attack on an Afghan National Border Police post in 2008. The chemical was described as ‘a poison which blocked oxygen’ and would burn on contact with the skin, which might possibly have been cyanide.41 In the fourth attack, water tankers were found to be contaminated with cyanide but the contamination was discovered before it caused any casualties.42 These attacks were crude in nature and there are no reports that anyone was killed by the chemicals, but they nevertheless indicated an apparently growing intent by the Taliban to use CW. From 2007 there were also signs of a greater degree of technical sophistication in some intelligence reports. In mid-2007 insurgents were reported to have deployed a new type of landmine that contained up to 12 additional minelets containing toxic substances, which were released when the mine detonated. The mines were reportedly being used in Khost, Logar and Paktia Provinces.43 This may have accounted for an incident in February 2009, when US special forces soldiers who were working to clear an area of IEDs were caught in a bomb blast that reportedly released ‘a yellow cloud’ that made them feel nauseous. Eight soldiers reported symptoms, but an initial medical examination did not find any trace of chemical poisoning, and the incident was never confirmed as a CW attack.44 The development of rocket propelled grenades fitted with chemical warheads also represented a significant technological development, but the Taliban were dissatisfied with these weapons because they had to be fired from too close a range in order to be effective. To address this, they tried to fill mortar rounds with chemical substances, but failed.45 There were also

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intermittent uncorroborated reports that the insurgents had acquired anthrax.46 These included reports in the autumn of 2003 that ‘extremely virulent’ anthrax had been found in a house in Kandahar.47 Similarly, in 2007, Gul Aghar Sherzai, the Governor of Nangarhar Province near the Pakistan border, claimed that packets of anthrax had been recovered during the arrest of a Taliban spokesman called Mohammed Hanif. However, police and intelligence officials refused to confirm Sherzai’s statement.48 In the event, no anthrax was ever recovered in Afghanistan. In 2008 there were also a report that the Taliban were interested in acquiring uranium from an unspecified factory in Lahore to build a radiological weapon.49 But there were no follow-up reports to indicate whether the Taliban had actually gone through with it. There were also worrying reports that the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence Directorate had provided Taliban fighters with CW. One of the reports concerned a contact poison, another concerned a lethal liquid poison that was produced by the ISI which could be used to contaminate water supplies and a third report suggested that the ISI was cooperating with the Taliban to poison alcoholic drinks.50 If these reports were true, they would be the first reported instances of a state sponsoring CBRN terrorist attacks, but they were never corroborated. The overall impression given by intelligence reports in Afghanistan was that there was a threat of CBRN attacks, but it had not yet fully emerged in the way that it had in Iraq. The fact that the Taliban were behind the majority of the reported plots as well as all four of the actual CW attacks in Afghanistan, again indicates that the jihadi CBRN threat was growing beyond the control of the al Qaeda leadership. But whilst these incidents show that the Taliban maintained an interest in using CBW, their capabilities were extremely crude, and they were not a significant feature of Taliban tactics. However, their ability to access external assistance to develop more sophisticated CW hinted that their capabilities might potentially improve over time.

The Theological Challenge to Al Qaeda Strategic Thought, 2007– 8 A potential explanation for the Islamic State of Iraq’s change of strategy with regard to CBRN weapons can be found in the changes that were occurring in the wider political and ideological context within which

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global jihadism was operating between 2007 and 2008. From 2006, the mainstream media in the Middle East had begun increasingly to challenge al Qaeda. Al-Jazeera still tended to lead with the latest messages from bin Laden, Zawahiri and Zarqawi, but a number of other Arab broadcasters did not broadcast this material at all, and TV stations in Iraq ignored them almost completely. More significantly, a number of newspapers and commentators across the Arab world began criticising al Qaeda statements, with several newspapers reporting criticisms of al Qaeda being made by the more traditional Islamist organisations that were using peaceful political means to reach their goals.51 Some journalists even wrote damning personal criticisms of al Qaeda leaders. The columnist Nahid Hattar wrote in the Jordanian paper al-Arab al-Yawm: American imperialism in Iraq is certainly on the verge of defeat . . . But the credit for that goes to the sacrifice of the Iraqi people . . . It will never go to al Qaeda under the leadership of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, who appeared in his televised message to be thirsty, like a leech, for the blood of Iraqis, as well as haughty, stupid and lacking any connection to reality, just like George Bush junior.52 The same criticism was levelled at Zawahiri by the columnist Munir al-Khatib, writing in the Lebanese newspaper Sada al-Balad: From inside a cave belonging to some unknown age, al-Zawahiri is using his stone-age language to brag about a battle, the price of which the sons of Iraq are paying . . . It is as if Saddam’s evil deeds were not enough. The problem is that no-one is willing to argue with al-Qaeda’s number two. In Egypt, a commentary in the al-Akhbar newspaper stated that the continued threats by ‘al-Zawahiri and the other leaders of terrorism is in the end providing an acceptable justification’ for the Americans to ‘occupy Iraq, Afghanistan and other places’. Little if any of this criticism was directed at the insurgency in Iraq itself, but was instead aimed at al Qaeda for trying to take credit for it.53

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This negative media reporting was undoubtedly damaging to al Qaeda’s image in the Muslim world, but was not nearly as damaging as a wave of similar criticism that began to emerge from key figures within the wider jihadi movement. By 2008 there was a growing belief among some militant Islamists that violence against civilians, in both the Middle East and the West, had proved to be counter-productive for mobilising the ummah.54 Among those who denounced al Qaeda’s use of indiscriminate violence were a number of prominent militant Islamist ideologues. Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (otherwise known as Dr Fadl), the ideological godfather of al Qaeda, withdrew his support from the network in 2007 when he published a book titled Rationalizing Jihadist Action in Egypt and the World. In this book he argued that the killing of innocent civilians, whether Muslim or not, is un-Islamic, and that the use of any weapon that indiscriminately destroys is forbidden. Al-Sharif argued that al Qaeda’s bombings in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere were illegitimate and that targeting civilians in Western countries was also wrong. He pronounced that jihad had been blemished by what he described as these grave sharia violations.55 Likewise, Sheikh Salman al-Oudah, a Saudi religious scholar who was one of bin Laden’s erstwhile heroes, went on MBC, a widely watched Middle Eastern TV network, to ask: My Brother Osama, how much blood has been spilt? How many innocent people, children, elderly, and women have been killed . . . in the name of al-Qaeda. Will you be happy to meet God almighty carrying the burden of these hundreds of thousands or millions [of victims] on your back?56 These attacks came at a critical strategic juncture for al Qaeda, with the US gaining the upper hand in Iraq and al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia facing defeat at the hands of the Saudi security forces. In 2009 and 2010 similar criticisms even began to be heard from the former members of the al Qaeda leadership who had settled in Iran. One particularly damaging intervention was a book by Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, with an introduction by Abu Hafs al-Mauritani, entitled Twenty Counsels on the Path of Jihad, which was published in an online jihadi forum. Al-Mauritani’s introduction argued that the jihad movement had lost its way and was gravely in need of further:

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educational essays to correct the path, direct the activity, treat the illnesses, apply balm to the wounds, refine the hearts, and provide the field [of jihad] and its members what they need in terms of guidance to remind and assist them and to raise them to a level that befits them. In the body of the book itself Ghayth wrote: ‘it is not permissible for one man to use the blood of others to experiment in what seems to him to be rightousness’. This was an implicit reference to bin Laden, and reflected the criticisms that had previously been made by al Oudeh.57 For al Qaeda, the criticisms made by al-Sharif, al-Oudeh and former members of its own leadership cadre posed a grave threat in terms of both alienating popular support within the Muslim world and creating divisions with other militant groups. These individuals were widely respected within militant circles and their statements would have been extremely influential. This criticism was not specifically about the use of CBRN weapons, but it nevertheless highlighted the political damage caused to al Qaeda by the leadership’s inability to control AQI’s use of chlorine, and indicated that they would also criticise any use of CBRN weapons against US or Western civilians. Given the al Qaeda leadership’s sensitivity to these criticisms, this was a powerful incentive for it to continue with its declared policy of deterrence in respect of CBRN weapons.

The Exoneration In response to the criticisms of al-Sharif, Zawahiri published a book called The Exoneration: A Treatise Exonerating the Community of the Pen and the Sword from the Debilitating Accusation of Fatigue and Weakness.58 It is a wide-ranging and rambling book which draws heavily on both previously published al Qaeda material and the arguments presented in Shaykh Nasir bin Hamid al-Fahd’s 2003 fatwa, ‘A treatise on the legal status of using weapons of mass destruction against infidels’. It seeks to counter the criticisms made in al-Sharif’s book by justifying the strategy and tactics then being employed by al Qaeda. The key chapters are about: shooting at non-believers if Muslims or ‘persons who may not be killed’ are mixed in with them; fighting by means that cause ‘general destruction’; and ‘repaying like for like’. It is not specifically about CBRN weapons, although it contains a few direct references to them.

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One of al Sharif’s major criticisms of al Qaeda concerned the killing of innocent civilians, including non-Muslims. Zawahiri responded to that criticism by reverting to the arguments that bin Laden made in his interview with Dawn in November 2001. He argued that countries that attack Muslims are a single juridical entity, and so their people constitute a single juridical entity. By accepting democratic systems of government, the peoples of the West accept governance by the majority. As a result, the actions of the US president are executed with the approval of the majority of the population and the consent of the minority. Because of that, Zawahiri argued that it is permissible to kill US civilians. The chapter that justifies fighting by means that cause general destruction does not specifically mention CBRN weapons, although the arguments Zawahiri makes could potentially be applicable to the use of CBRN weapons. Similarly, in the chapter about ‘chastising like for like’ Zawahiri also does not explicitly endorse the use of CBRN weapons and several of the Qur’anic verses that he cites explicitly state that the Mujahid have to use exactly the same weapons as the adversary uses against them. If Zawahiri had wanted to use The Exoneration to explicitly endorse the use of CBRN weapons in a first strike role, he would presumably have made reference to the allegations that the US had used CBRN weapons against Muslims, yet he only cites the previous use of conventional weapons by the US. However, he does quote directly from the al-Fahd fatwa, citing the estimate that ten million Muslims had been killed by US action, together with an unquantifiable amount of land destroyed (or ‘burned’ in al-Fahd’s terminology). Like al-Fahd, Zawahiri could have used that to justify the use of CBRN weapons, but it is noticeable that he does not. Significantly, Zawahiri’s only explicit comments about CBRN weapons refer to their value as a deterrent. He argues that it is the possession of nuclear weapons that prevents India attacking Pakistan and prevented the US from attacking the Soviet Union during the Cold War. He also argues that the Arab states’ lack of nuclear weapons renders them impotent against Israel, and that the US forbids CBRN weapons to others so that the world remains under US nuclear threat. He does also claim that al-Fahd’s 2003 fatwa is still extant, because al-Fahd had withdrawn his public renunciation of it, on the grounds that he had been coerced while he was being held in captivity. As discussed in Chapter 9,

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this can be interpreted as either an endorsement of using CBRN weapons in a first-strike role or else as an attempt to strengthen the credibility of al Qaeda’s deterrent threats.59 So given that The Exoneration says so little about CBRN weapons directly, what does it actually mean in respect of the al Qaeda CBRN threat? One school of thought, reflecting the view of the US intelligence community and successive US administrations, is that it endorses a firststrike CBRN attack against the US.60 However, a strict reading of The Exoneration suggests that Zahawiri might actually have been endorsing the use of CBRN weapons for deterrence. This would be consistent with the declared position of the al Qaeda leadership since 1999. Events over the following years would test which of these interpretations was the correct one.

CHAPTER 15 INFLUENCING THE NEW PRESIDENT, 2008—10

2008 was a year of significant political change in the war on terror, as President Bush reached the end of his second term of office. This change was occurring at the same time as the CW threat in Iraq was receding but concerns about al Qaeda acquiring nuclear weapons from Pakistan were increasing. To the US intelligence agencies, it was apparent that al Qaeda retained a strong commitment to obtaining a CBRN capability and using it in a first-strike weapon. These continued concerns about the future threat meant that the politics of CBRN would play a role in both the presidential election campaign, and the counter-terrorism policies of the new Administration. The election of President Obama in November 2008 raised a number of uncertainties about the future direction of US national security policy. As a senator, Obama had been a vocal opponent of the Iraq War, and during the election campaign he pledged to implement a phased withdrawal from Iraq. This raised concerns in some quarters that al Qaeda might be able to exploit a US withdrawal to re-establish a foothold in Iraq. On CBRN issues however, his views were closer to those of the Bush Administration. As a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Obama had forged a strong working relationship with Republican senator Richard Lugar, and the two shared similar views on the threat posed by WMD. In August 2005 he and Lugar had travelled to Russia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan to discuss strategies to control the proliferation of conventional weapons and WMD, as a defence against potential terrorist

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attacks. The following spring, Lugar and Obama authored a Senate bill that authorised the President to provide assistance to foreign countries to prevent the proliferation of WMD.1 However, the election campaign had highlighted seeming inconsistencies in Obama’s position on CBRN terrorism and the war on terror. He had dissociated himself from President Bush’s approach to the war on terrorism, and made an explicit commitment to close the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. Yet he also made clear statements of his intention to address the threat of CBRN terrorism. In a television election advertisement in July 2008 Obama identified nuclear terrorism as the single most important national security threat, and charged the Bush Administration with failing to confront the threat adequately.2 Whilst these statements indicated that Obama shared some of the same concerns as the Bush Administration, the big question was his approach with regard to risk, and therefore whether his counter-policies would be tough enough to address the CBRN threat. It was at this juncture, before Obama was inaugurated, that the bipartisan Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism published its report. The report warned that unless the world community acted urgently and decisively, it was more likely than not that a WMD would be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013. But contrary to the post-9/11 focus on nuclear terrorism within the US political establishment, the Commission found that terrorists were more likely to obtain and use a BW than a nuclear weapon, although it also endorsed evidence from former Senator Sam Nunn that the risk of a nuclear weapon being used was growing rather than receding. The report concluded that the US government needed to act more aggressively to limit the proliferation of biological weapons and reduce the prospect of a bioterror attack.3 The timing of the report’s publication, in the period between President Obama’s election and inauguration, seemed like a deliberate attempt to put pressure on the incoming Administration. The finding that there would be a WMD attack somewhere in the world by 2013 seems alarmist now, but it was consistent with the riskaverse attitude towards the threat among the US intelligence community and law enforcement agencies that prevailed at the time. Earlier in the year the FBI had issued a warning to law enforcement agencies across the US to be on the alert for CBRN attacks, after it was

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discovered that al Qaeda was preparing to publish an online statement regarding CBRN. The FBI had not even seen the content of the message but still took it seriously enough to issue this warning.4 The Commission’s gloomy prognosis was seemingly justified when, in early 2009, the Sun newspaper in the UK reported that an outbreak of bubonic plague in an al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) training camp in the mountains of Tizi Ouzou province in eastern Algeria had killed at least 40 AQIM fighters. The day before President Obama’s inauguration, the Washington Times reported the same story, but with a new spin. Citing unnamed intelligence officials, it reported that AQIM had been trying to develop bubonic plague as a weapon, and Western intelligence agencies had intercepted an urgent communication between AQIM and the al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan indicating that an area that had been sealed to prevent the leakage of either a biological or chemical substance had been breached, causing the deaths of the fighters.5 However, there were significant doubts about the accuracy of the Washington Times report. AQIM had never previously (nor since) displayed any credible CBW development capability, so its sudden development of such a potent chemical or biological agent would be a major surprise. Whilst it seems that there had been an incident of some sort, it was most likely to have been a naturally occurring outbreak of disease. Given the poor sanitation in remote rural training camps, and the presence of endemic disease in north Africa, an outbreak of infectious disease is always a possibility.6 The leaking of this report to the media the day before President Obama’s inauguration, despite the question marks over its credibility, strongly suggests that it was being used to try and influence the incoming Administration’s counterterrorism policies. The concerns of those who favoured a continuation of the Bush Administration’s counter-terrorism policies were seemingly confirmed by President Obama just two days after his inauguration, when he signed presidential orders banning enhanced interrogation techniques and ordering the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay to be closed within a year.7 However, he also declared that the ‘core goal’ of the US should be to ‘disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan’.8 So despite concerns about President Obama’s approach to counter-terrorism, it soon became apparent that his Administration

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would continue with many of the Bush era counter-terrorism policies, particularly the kill-or-capture programme.

Increasing Jihadi Online Chatter on Nuclear Weapons Even before the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism had published its report, its main finding was seemingly contradicted by a series of intense debates that were taking place on al Qaeda and jihadi internet forums. The primary focus of these debates was on how jihadis should use nuclear weapons, with many contributors claiming that al Qaeda already possessed them. The first significant post was titled ‘Al-Qaeda and the Nuclear weapon’, which appeared on password-protected al Qaeda-affiliated forums in April 2008. This posting strongly advocated a nuclear strike within the US in order to position al Qaeda as the military equal of the US, and argued that al Qaeda’s nuclear weapons would then deter the US from responding with a nuclear counter-strike against Muslim countries.9 That posting was followed at the end of May 2008 by a video called ‘Nuclear jihad, the ultimate terror’, which was posted on the Al Ekhlaas jihadi forum. This posting was much less clear about whether nuclear weapons should be used for a first strike or deterrence. The video opens with two verses of the Qur’an that emphasise ‘an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth’, and then states: ‘Fight them until there is no more persecution and Allah is the only object of worship. If they desist, there will be no hostility, except against those who are dishonest. Attack those who attack you . . . .’ After that, it moves on to show images from the Italian RAI News documentary from November 2004 about allegations that US soldiers used CW during the battle for Fallujah in Iraq. It then cites the words of Islamic scholars justifying the use of WMD, and states that the Muslim nation must develop similar weapons in order to force a de´tente, similar to that which existed between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It then goes on to declare: the idea of killing lots of people, this idea is available to us, and it must be used under the idea of treating others the same, so I say that terror in their countries must involve human losses and these human losses must be with WMD.10

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The video was posted by a user named ‘p2l0a0g8u9e’, which represents an amalgamation of the word ‘plague’ and the years 2008 and 2009. It was the first and only posting under that username, and did not carry the logos of al Qaeda’s media wing al Sahab, as is usually the case with its official releases. This suggests that it was produced by a supporter rather than a member of a jihadi group. The thread in which the video was posted was quickly elevated to a ‘sticky’ thread, indicating that the forum administrators approved of the video. In order to ensure that members saw the video, the administrators posted a banner headline promoting the video at the top of the forum interface, which stated: ‘Pray, pray, Allah is great. America is destroyed by a fatal jihadist nuclear strike.’11 The video sparked a wave of discussion among forum members. One discussion thread, titled ‘How would you feel if America or Britain were hit with a nuclear weapon?’, solicited responses largely in favour of a nuclear strike. In a similar thread, a prominent member of the Ekhlaas forum posted a message titled, ‘Question and answer about the next attack in the heart of the infidel America’, claiming that news of a forthcoming nuclear jihadist strike had come to him in a dream.12 Similarly, on the al-Hesbah forum in May 2008, a member called Al-Fata al-Jurani discussed the potential ramifications of using nuclear weapons in a thread titled ‘The Mujahideen to use weapons of mass destruction from permissibility to its application’. He suggested that before deploying WMD against the West, jihadists should first weigh up the costs and benefits, and if the costs exceed the benefits their use should be forbidden. Al-Jurani concluded by arguing that using WMD against the West would harm Muslims because the West would retaliate with its superior firepower.13 Other members of the al-Hesbah forum vigorously disputed al-Jurani’s conclusion, writing that if the Mujahideen had WMD, they should use them immediately, because it would make the US fearful of them. One member, using the name Barayev74, argued that: ‘I believe Allah knows better, and we have to stop them by using nuclear and the biological weapons. We will make them fearful. I know that Allah will bring the Muslims victory, even if only one of us survives.’14 A major theme in the postings of the main players in this discourse was the language of de´tente and the Cold War, which indicated that they viewed al Qaeda’s acquisition of nuclear weapons as being important for

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gaining international legitimacy and as a means of balancing out the military power of the US.15 In contrast, it seems to be the more minor figures in these debates who favoured a nuclear strike against the US in order to establish a balance of terror. This reflected the situation that had pertained since 1999, of operational al Qaeda cells wanting to use CBRN weapons but the leadership feeling constrained from doing so by political reasons. For the al Qaeda leadership, this debate must have raised concerns that the discourse on CBRN weapons was shifting away from its declared position of deterrence. It was a measure of the significance of this online debate that a few days after the publication of the film, one of al Qaeda’s most prominent speakers, who calls himself ‘Asad Al-Jihad 2’ (the Jihad Lion 2),16 published an article on jihadi online forums, entitled ‘The following September events’, in which he stated that: The news that Al-Qaeda may have nuclear bombs has already been spread!!! And I say – and ‘Asad Al-Jihad 2’ knows what he is saying – we indeed have them. I already said so in an article published last year. Furthermore, when Sheikh Osama bin Laden was asked before the beginning of the Crusade War against Afghanistan, if America will strike us with nuclear weapons what will we do? He answered: If they strike us with nuclear weapons, we shall strike them in the same currency . . . and when we say Al-Qaeda holds nuclear or atomic weapons, only its leaders will decide when to use them and where. Al-Qaeda does not rush and does not use all its might in its blows.17 This official al Qaeda message was consistent with its previous messaging with regard to nuclear weapons, and appears to have been a direct attempt to shape the online debate about CBRN weapons. To some extent it appears to have been successful, because his messaging was mirrored by a member of the ‘Al-Ansar’ jihadi forum, who posted a message stating that: Some of the brothers held a long debate regarding the veracity of the existence of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of the Al-Qaeda organization and regarding its ability to use them in

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order to deter the enemies of Islam and the Muslims. This in case the organization’s leadership believes that this step can contribute to the Islamic nation and specifically help the Mujahideen. Some believe that obtaining weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, is a difficult task these days for the Mujahideen, but not an impossible one . . . others say it is impossible . . . The question to be asked is whether there is something preventing the Al-Qaeda organization from obtaining weapons of mass destruction as a deterring tool against the enemies, to make them fear the organization and help the Islamic nation from the claws of the enemies, or is it a far fetched dream? And if we assume that the Al-Qaeda organization has obtained such a weapon, can it use it against all its enemies? Knowing such a weapon will bring on the mass destruction of humankind???18 Similarly, Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, President of the Global Union of Muslim Religious Scholars, preached in his Friday sermon on 20 February 2009 that Islam was in favour of peace that comes from a position of power and not a position of weakness, and that the Muslims were allowed to hold nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction for purposes of deterrence.19 However, al Qaeda’s attempts to shape this discourse were not wholly successful, and postings on several jihadi online forums continued to call for CBRN attacks.20 One of the most well-publicised of these messages was issued in June 2009 by the Kuwaiti dissident and alleged al Qaeda recruiter Abdullah al-Nafisi. He published a video promoting an anthrax attack on the US, claiming that al Qaeda had the scientists necessary to manufacture anthrax and the ability to smuggle it into the US through tunnels from Mexico. He suggested that 4 lb of anthrax was guaranteed to kill 330,000 Americans within an hour if it was properly disseminated.21 It is not known whether any of the individuals contributing to these debates were actively involved in terrorist violence. However, this online discourse was consistent with the broader trend within the wider jihadi movement to use CBRN weapons operationally. These debates therefore suggested that the political inhibitions on using CBRN weapons, at least among those on the periphery of terrorist violence, were diminishing. The al Qaeda leadership’s inability to shape this discourse

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reflected its wider inability to influence the use of CBRN weapons by other jihadi groups within the wider jihadi movement.

Emerging Opportunities in Pakistan These online debates were taking place at a time of potentially unprecedented opportunity for al Qaeda to obtain CBRN weapons and materials in Pakistan. As the insurgency in Afghanistan escalated in the years following the ousting of the Taliban regime, it also led to a rapid deterioration of the security situation inside Pakistan, as militant groups sought to assert their control over the tribal areas in the northwest of the country. Gradually, the fighting between the militants and the Pakistani security forces escalated to such an extent that militants began attacking targets right across Pakistan. At times the country seemed to be on the brink of civil war as it was rocked by waves of terrorist attacks. In 2007 the militant group Tehrek-i-Nehfaz Shariat-i-Mohammedi (TNSM) seized control of the Swat Valley, which is just 90 miles from the capital city, Islamabad. By early 2009 it had gained de facto control of the entire Malakand Division in the northwest of the country.22 In the West it was feared that al Qaeda, or the Taliban, would be able to take advantage of this instability to either seize Pakistani CBRN weapons or otherwise acquire one from a corrupt or militant official. Initially, the Pakistani Taliban had shown little interest in seizing CBRN weapons. They conducted a number of attacks on or near to nuclear weapon-related facilities, but did not attempt to seize a nuclear weapon. And even if they had wanted to, their ability to seize a nuclear weapon was severely restricted by the strength of the procedural and physical security measures protecting the Pakistani nuclear weapon infrastructure. However, the escalating levels of violence began to raise profound questions about the robustness of the Pakistani state itself, and increased concerns that the instability might enable corrupt or militant individuals within the Pakistani nuclear weapons establishment to help al Qaeda or other militant groups acquire CBRN weapons. By 2008 the militants were becoming so confident that there were discussions within militant networks about seizing control of Pakistan and taking control of its nuclear weapons by force. Faqir Mohammed, one of the few Pakistani Taliban leaders to address the issue of nuclear weapons directly, told an interviewer in May 2008 that if ‘we get hold of

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nuclear weapons, which we hope to get very soon, then we will safeguard them until Allah Almighty guides us when and against whom to use them’.23 This statement betrayed a lack of thought, both about trying to acquire nuclear weapons and also how they might use any that they did acquire, but it nevertheless marked the beginning of a discourse within the Pakistan-based militant networks. In March 2009 the al-Fajr Media Center released a 29-page book entitled Sharpening the Blades in the Battle against the Government and Army of Pakistan, written by the senior al Qaeda leader Abu Yahya al-Libi. The book was intended to incite jihad against the Pakistani government. Following its publication, jihadi internet forums were filled with discussion about the Taliban seizing control of Pakistan and the opportunities that would present. One forum member, using the pseudonym ‘Mohami alDawla’, noted that the US would be helpless against Taliban control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, and suggested that counter measures against US plans to prevent the Taliban seizing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons should be prepared. If the government fell, al-Dawla noted that the Taliban would also obtain copies of the secret Pakistan–India agreements that were designed to prevent the two parties targeting each other’s nuclear facilities, including highly sensitive maps and intelligence on India nuclear facilities. However, al Dawla also acknowledged that the mujahideen would need to build up their military and intelligence capabilities to enable them to effectively manage a nuclear arsenal, which would necessitate recruiting experienced individuals from the Pakistani government. Other forum members described the importance of winning over Pakistani nuclear scientists such as A.Q. Khan, and suggested that the mujahideen must protect such scientists from assassination if the Taliban succeeded in taking control of Pakistan.24 In the same forum, a group of members launched a project to research nuclear installations around the world entitled ‘Nuclear targets and facilities to be attacked’. The project began by mapping the 17 nuclear facilities and installations in Pakistan. Part two of the project was to map the location of Israel’s nuclear arsenal. This section discussed Israeli nuclear and other military facilities in detail, and concluded by inciting Jordanian jihadis to attack the Negev Nuclear Research Centre near Dimona, where Israeli nuclear weapons were believed to be manufactured. Other countries examined by the members of the forum included the US, Russia, France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Holland,

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Turkey, South Africa and the UK. Several maps showing the locations of nuclear facilities and strategic naval bases in the countries were posted on the forum. The group concluded by expressing their belief that suicide attacks against nuclear facilities would bring the enemies of Islam to their knees, and urged Salafi-Jihadis everywhere to conduct more detailed research on the nuclear weapons facilities of the aforementioned countries.25 As part of these debates figures associated with al Qaeda began publicly asking Pakistani nuclear engineers to provide Pakistan’s nuclear secrets.26 Whilst the jihadi community was getting very excited about the prospect of getting their hands on Pakistani nuclear weapons, al Qaeda’s ability to exploit the supposed opportunities to do so was severely constrained by the US kill-or-capture programme. In 2008, it lost significant parts of its central command structure in a succession of attacks by US and Pakistani forces. Among those killed were Khalid Habib, its military chief and number four in its chain of command, Abu Layth al-Libi, Rashid Rauf and Usama al-Kini. The loss of these commanders, and others, in quick succession meant that al Qaeda sometimes had to promote more junior figures who were less skilled and less respected than the individuals they replaced.27 In addition, its aspirations to develop a CBW capability were dealt two significant blows in 2008 with the arrest of Aafia Siddiqui and the killing of Abu Khabab. When Siddiqui was arrested by the Afghan police, she had in her possession instructions for making CBW and radiological weapons, as well as a litre of cyanide.28 There was no evidence that she was involved in an operational CBRN plot, but she would have been an asset to any such plot. Khabab, on the other hand, was killed by a US drone strike in Pakistan.29 Whilst his death provided a welcome headline for the US, it probably had little impact on al Qaeda’s CBW activities, since there was no evidence that he had developed their capabilities beyond what he had achieved prior to 9/11. Politically, however, it was important for Western governments to continue to emphasise that the al Qaeda CBRN threat still existed. The month after Abu Khabab was killed, unnamed intelligence sources leaked details of a purported plot to attack London with radiological weapon to a British newspaper. The incident was said to have occurred in 2004 but very few details were made available, including critical details about whether al Qaeda had actually obtained any nuclear material, who

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was involved in the plot and how the attack had been prevented. In the context of events in Pakistan, the apparent intention behind the leak seems to have been to perpetuate concerns about al Qaeda’s potential ability to acquire CBRN weapons.30 By early 2009, however, it was becoming increasingly apparent that the tide of the war was turning in favour of the Pakistani government. In April 2009, the Pakistani army launched a counter offensive, recapturing the Swat Valley and other parts of Malakand Division. Buoyed by these successes, it launched a further offensive in October 2009 against the Taliban and al Qaeda heartlands of South Waziristan. The Taliban put up stiff resistance, but in December 2009 the Pakistani army claimed victory in South Waziristan and declared that the militants had been neutralised as a viable threat in Pakistan.31 However, the Taliban had not been defeated, it had simply relocated to North Waziristan and it retaliated with a wave of suicide bombings and other attacks across the country.32 But whilst fighting continued in a number of areas, the militant threat to overthrow the government had been neutralised, and with it the risk of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of the Taliban or al Qaeda receded. Besides nuclear weapons, there were also a number of facilities across the country that held radioactive sources for civil purposes. The Taliban or al Qaeda could potentially have attacked these facilities in order to seize materials to build a radiological weapon, but despite occasional reports of civil radioactive isotopes either being stolen or going missing in Pakistan there were no indications that either the Taliban or al Qaeda were responsible.33 The unrest also created conditions that potentially made it easier to acquire black market nuclear materials, which continued to be trafficked between the states of the former Soviet Union bordering Pakistan. Yet establishing connections to traffickers who possessed genuine nuclear material remained difficult for al Qaeda, and there were no public reports of it obtaining nuclear materials from that source either. The instability in Pakistan also created potential opportunities for al Qaeda or the Taliban to obtain chemical or biological materials from non-military sources such as chemical or pesticide factories. But again, there are no public reports that they ever tried to do this. In 2010, Mullah Daoud, a Taliban regional commander in Afghanistan, claimed in an interview with a Western TV crew at Tora Bora that the Taliban

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was working on an anthrax weapon. He stated: ‘we use anthrax so when a bomb explodes it produces a toxic cloud.’34 But this was nothing more than a propaganda statement, and did not indicate that the Taliban had obtained anthrax from Pakistani sources. Whilst these events were unfolding, the al Qaeda leadership remained reticent about its CBRN ambitions. Some clues about its intentions were evident from an interview given to al Jazeera in 2009 by Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, head of al Qaeda operations in Afghanistan and spokesman of the al Qaeda ‘General Command’. When asked about reported US plans to prevent Pakistan’s nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of militants, he replied that al Qaeda would use Pakistan’s nuclear weapons to strike the US if it had the chance to do so: ‘God willing, the nuclear weapons will not fall into the hands of the Americans and the mujahideen would take them and use them against the Americans.’35 This statement contradicted the al Qaeda leadership’s declared position of using CBRN weapons for deterrence, and is even more confusing given his opposition to 9/11 because of concerns about the potential repercussions. Whether this marked a change in al Qaeda’s declared strategy with regarding CBRN remained unclear, and al-Yazid never got the opportunity to clarify his comments because he was killed by a drone strike in May of 2010.36 By 2010 it was apparent that any supposed new opportunities for al Qaeda to obtain CBRN weapons or materials in Pakistan were actually very difficult for it to exploit, and had rapidly receded once the Pakistani security forces began to re-assert control. As the security situation in Pakistan settled down, al Qaeda was again left to its own capabilities to develop CBRN weapons.

Assessing the Risks and Increasing Political Concerns The developments in Pakistan were being closely monitored by Western intelligence agencies, which continued to receive reports that al Qaeda was actively trying to acquire CBRN weapons. By the beginning of 2009 the US intelligence agencies believed that whilst al Qaeda was most likely to use conventional explosives for attacks, any CBRN capability that it could acquire would probably be used against the US, and probably against the US mainland. The death of Abu Khabab was judged likely to cause al Qaeda only a temporary setback, because of its

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ability to shift responsibilities to other senior leaders and its existing cadre of trained personnel.37 At a NATO meeting in January 2009 the participants noted that al Qaeda had retained its intent to acquire CBRN weapons. It was reported to be considering developing radiological weapons, and there were continued credible reports of attempts to recruit people with the necessary technical expertise, as well as reports of attempts to infiltrate Pakistani CBRN-related laboratories. However, al Qaeda was assessed to have only a limited capability to develop WMD.38 Later the same year, the Russian government reported that terrorist organisations operating within the FSU were actively trying to build a radiological weapon but had not managed to acquire any radioactive material.39 If the report was true, the fact that terrorists had failed to acquire nuclear materials inside the FSU, which was possibly the easiest place in the world to obtain them, illustrates just how difficult it is for terrorists to acquire this material. In light of these continuing reports and the online jihadi debates about using nuclear weapons, Western governments continued to highlight the threat publicly. It featured particularly heavily in the UK government’s updated National Security Strategy, published in 2009. The strategy emphasised the continued interest of al Qaeda and other terrorist groups in acquiring CBRN weapons, as well as the increasing amount of information available on the internet. Regarding al Qaeda’s intentions with regard to using CBRN weapons, it stated that al Qaeda aspired to conduct mass casualty attacks with no warning, and was also prepared to use CBRN weapons.40 As a result, the issue of nuclear terrorism became a key feature of the International Nuclear Safety Summit, which was hosted by the US in 2010. Prior to the opening of the summit, President Obama’s top counterterrorism adviser John Brennan warmed the media up by reminding them of al Qaeda’s previous efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, and informing them that criminal gangs were aware that al Qaeda wanted nuclear materials and were actively trying to meet that demand.41 At the summit itself President Obama re-iterated the same themes, declaring that: The single biggest threat to US security, both short-term, mediumterm and long-term, would be the possibility of a terrorist organization obtaining a nuclear weapon . . . This is something that could change the security landscape of this country and around the

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world for years to come . . . We know that organizations like al-Qaeda are in the process of trying to secure a nuclear weapon – a weapon of mass destruction that they have no compunction at using.42 This indicates that, like the UK government, the US continued to believe that al Qaeda would use nuclear weapons in a first-strike role. Later in the year FBI Director Robert Mueller informed the House Appropriations subcommittee that ‘Al-Qaeda remains committed to its goal of conducting attacks inside the United States . . . Further, al Qaeda’s continued efforts to access chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material pose a serious threat to the United States.’ Mueller also cited a 2008 National Intelligence Estimate that had concluded that some terrorist groups remained intent on using WMD against the US, both at home and abroad. He also referred to the conclusion of the 2008 Report by the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism that ‘the risks are growing faster than our multilayered defenses.’43 These assessments displayed a significant degree of consistency with previous assessments. In terms of capabilities, they focused on al Qaeda’s desire to acquire a CBRN weapon capability but did not show any significant development beyond what it had achieved prior to 9/11. Similarly, the continued assessment that al Qaeda intended to use CBRN weapons in a first-strike role against the US remained at odds with the bulk of the available information regarding the intentions of the al Qaeda leadership. This illustrates a continued high level of risk aversion within the US intelligence community, stemming in part from gaps in its knowledge of al Qaeda’s capabilities and caution over relying on the al Qaeda leadership’s public statements about deterrence. As a result, the terrorist CBRN threat continued to have a high profile in the US Administration’s national security policy.

President Obama’s National Security Strategy and the Drone Programme In May 2010 the Obama Administration published its National Security Strategy,44 which described WMD as the ‘gravest danger’ to both US and global security. In an apparent acknowledgement of events in

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Pakistan and the focus on nuclear weapons in online jihadi debates, the strategy turned the findings of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism on their head by identifying nuclear terrorism as the greatest and most urgent danger faced by the American people. The strategy considered BW to be a lower risk, despite acknowledging that effective BW in the hands of terrorists would endanger the lives of hundreds of thousands of people and have unprecedented economic, societal and political consequences. The strategy identified a range of measures to help manage the threats of nuclear and biological terrorism, including expanding the US capability to prevent, attribute and apprehend those who might carry out terrorist attacks. But in reality, this was simply making public a decision that President Obama had already taken, to significantly expand the kill-or-capture programme. President Obama ordered drone strikes to be extended to include the Pakistani Taliban, leading to a massive increase in the number of drone strikes inside Pakistan. President Bush only ever approved nine drone strikes inside Pakistan between 2004 and 2009. In contrast, President Obama authorised 111 in his first year in office alone.45 Among those killed by a drone strike in 2009 was Saleh al-Somali. His death left Adnan el-Shukrijumah as the de facto director of al Qaeda’s overseas operations. Despite the successes of the drone campaign it proved to be a doubleedged sword, because it is considered to have led to increased levels of violence and public support for the Taliban inside Afghanistan and Pakistan.46 Nevertheless, drone strikes were successful in keeping al Qaeda on the back foot, and can be argued to have had a major impact on its ability to develop CBRN weapons. At a time when al Qaeda leaders and planners were preoccupied with personal survival, it would have been a huge risk to try to establish a major fixed-site CBRN weapon-development programme. But measured against that success, the kill or capture programme threatened to have another unintended consequence with regard to the CBRN threat. Events in Iraq had demonstrated that the al Qaeda leadership was losing authority and control over the wider jihadi movement, which had led to the widespread use of CW in Iraq. The kill-or-capture programme therefore threatened to accelerate that process and remove the residual political constraints with regard to using CBRN weapons that the al Qaeda leadership was placing on the wider jihadi movement.

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The Obama Administration’s hard line on CBRN terrorism was seemingly at odds with the apparently declining threat posed by al Qaeda. Between 2008 and 2010, sustained military pressure on al Qaeda in the tribal areas of northwest Pakistan had degraded its organisational cohesion and hence its ability to mount major international operations. The newly promoted commanders who replaced those who had been either killed or captured were largely untested in the planning and execution of attacks, and it was a source of significant concern to bin Laden that he did not know them personally.1 But the continued degradation of the al Qaeda leadership’s ability to control the wider network also threatened to further weaken its control over the CBRN threat posed its wider network. Elements within al Qaeda continued to encourage the operational use of CBRN weapons by publishing online training materials. After Abu Khabab was killed, his role was taken on by his assistant Abu Baraa al Masri, working closely with a colleague known as Abu Safia. The pair were active members of several Arabic language jihadi internet forums, which provided information about weapons and explosives.2 In May 2009 a posting on the jihadi military internet forum M3ark, entitled ‘Soon, a big surprise in the military preparation field, in response to the call of the (Islamic State of Iraq’s) War Minister, Abu Hamza al Muhajir’, promised that Abu Baraa al Masri and Abu Safia would soon be publishing a WMD manual.3

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The fact that members of al Qaeda were responding to calls issued by the ISI illustrates the high level of interconnectedness between the various organisations within the wider jihadi networks, and also the al Qaeda leadership’s lack of control over its own members. The following month a large collection of manuals and books relating to CBRN weapons was posted on a number of jihadi forums. Most of the books were in English and contained only general information about the nature and effects of CBRN weapons,4 but among the manuals was the Encyclopedia for Weapons of Mass Destruction.5 Written in English, it contains protocols for manufacturing CBRN weapons, together with explanations of their components and instructions on how the materials should be handled.6 Besides the continued dissemination of CBRN manuals, there were also ongoing strategic and theological debates about the use of WMD within online jihadi forums. While many of the contributors to these debates may not actually have been members of al Qaeda or other militant groups, these debates were nevertheless important because they disseminated ideas and encouragement to independent cells and individuals. After being unable to control the campaign of CW use by AQI in Iraq, these developments threatened to weaken the al Qaeda leadership’s control over the use of CBRN weapons further. A spate of incidents in different regions of the world soon suggested that these fears were being realised.

Decentralised Incidents In Indonesia, militant networks had been drifting away from al Qaeda for a number of years, and by 2011 the terrorist threat facing Indonesia was mainly from small, independent groups and cells, which were increasingly focusing on local, targeted killings, particularly of police officers and religious minorities.7 In early 2011, a cell in Jakarta was arrested for plotting to murder policemen with cyanide and guns fashioned to look like pens.8 This was a credible, albeit crude, idea, but the plan was never executed. However, this remains an isolated incident in Indonesia, which suggests that CBRN weapons were not a significant feature in the plans of Indonesian militant groups. In Europe, by contrast, numerous individuals and cells continued to download CBRN instructions from the internet. In January 2011, for

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example, when British police, investigating a domestic burglary in the city of Bolton, reviewed a USB memory stick containing footage from security cameras, they discovered thousands of pages of terrorist related information that had been downloaded from the internet. Amongst the material were instructions for producing ricin that had been reproduced from the Anarchist’s Cookbook. The material had been downloaded by the homeowner’s son, Asam Kausar.9 He was not a member of a terrorist group, but was a would-be jihadi. This case illustrates both the advantages and limitations of the decentralised threat. Kausar was just the sort of lone operator who might make the concept of ‘leaderless jihad’ a reality, and he had been able to acquire instructions for producing ricin. But as with many other independent jihadis and small militant cells previously, he had not moved beyond the stage of collecting terrorist literature, so it remains unknown whether he would ever have actually carried out an attack. There were also continued reports from Russia, where the authorities claimed in 2013 to have foiled a plot to bomb the Maradykovsky CW storage and disposal facility. This facility is located in the Kirov region, about 1,000 km northeast of Moscow, and held stockpiles of soman, pending their destruction.10 As with all reports from Russia regarding the CBRN activities of Chechen rebels, this report may have been a fabrication as part of the Russian government’s information war against the Chechen rebels, but it is nevertheless a credible incident. In Iraq, the Islamic State of Iraq had not given up on CBRN weapons either. In 2013, the Iraqi security forces announced that they had foiled a plot to develop CW and smuggle them into Europe and North America. Three workshops for manufacturing CW, including sarin and mustard gas, were raided and five men were arrested. Among the items recovered were remote-controlled toy planes, which the cell was apparently planning to use for releasing the chemical agents over their targets.11 This particular plan lacked credibility, given AQI’s previous inability to develop effective CW agents, but it nevertheless indicated ISI’s continued interest in acquiring and using CBRN weapons. This series of incidents developed outside the control of the al Qaeda leadership, but it had not lost total control over the actions of its affiliates. There were still a number of jihadi cells operating in the UK that were linked with al Qaeda elements in Pakistan. One particular cell

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in the city of Birmingham had received training in bomb-making and CW in Pakistan during 2010.12 After returning to the UK, they discussed a number of potential plots, including a Mumbai-style gun attack, a multiple suicide bomb attack and a CBW attack. However, their discussions on how they might use CBW betrayed their lack of knowledge. Their idea was to manufacture a contact poison using a hand cream or petroleum jelly and then smear it on the door handles of cars. They felt that anybody who came into contact with the concoction would start dying within five minutes and that about 1,000 people could be killed in this way.13 But they never followed through on this idea, focusing instead on planning suicide bombings and a Mumbai-style attack. They were eventually arrested in 2011, before they had got very far. The reasons for their decision not to use CBW are unknown, but it is a telling observation that none of the UK-based cells that had discussed using CBRN weapons since 9/11 and that were controlled by al Qaeda in Pakistan went through with their ideas. A potential explanation for this can be discerned from the al Qaeda leadership’s response to a BW plot proposed by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

Al Qaeda Attempts to Impose Control over CBRN Plots Between 2003 and 2004 al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia (AQISA) had been badly damaged by the Saudi security forces. In response, jihadis on the Arabian Peninsula shifted their focus to building a network in Yemen, which had always been a fertile recruiting ground for al Qaeda. Their task was made easier by the chronic weakness of the Yemeni government, which needed tribal support in order to exercise control over a number of provinces, and was having to confront a number of secessionist movements. With so many problems to contend with, the Yemeni government took a tolerant attitude towards al Qaeda. As a result, a fully functioning affiliated group was established in Yemen, which in January 2009 formally merged with the remaining elements of AQSA, to become AQAP. It started to actively recruit specialists in bomb-making and other skills, and soon became a magnet for terrorists fleeing the increasing pressure from drone strikes in Pakistan.14 In 2010, AQAP publicly announced its long-term strategy as being to attack the US with smaller, more frequent attacks.15 In pursuing this

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strategy it quickly established a reputation for using innovative weapons and tactics, prompting US counter-terrorism and intelligence officials to describe it as ‘the fastest-learning enemy we have’.16 This was largely due to the skill of its chief bomb-maker, Ibrahim Hassan Tali al-Asiri, who had been among the AQSA operatives who had fled to Yemen. He had studied chemistry at King Saud University in Riyadh but had dropped out before completing his studies. Among the plots he was involved in were an attempt to assassinate the Saudi Deputy Interior Minister with a bomb hidden in the rectum of an AQAP operative in August 2009, an attempt to bring down a US airliner with a bomb hidden in the underpants of an AQAP operative in December 2009 and an attempt to bring down freight aircraft over the US using bombs hidden in printer cartridges in 2010. Al-Asiri is also credited with being competent in the development of poisons and toxins.17 As a result, the CIA began to view AQAP as a more serious threat to US national security than al Qaeda’s core leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan.18 From 2009 CBRN weapons began to feature in AQAP propaganda and planning. On 26 January 2009, Al-Jazeera published an interview with the AQAP leader Nasir Abd Al-Karim Al-Wahishi in which he hinted that al Qaeda possessed WMD. At the end of the interview he was asked: ‘If al-Qaeda possesses nuclear weapons or deterrence weapons, why didn’t it use it in the September 11th attacks?’ He replied cryptically: ‘This was the first message, and they should know that there are many more messages.’19 Among the AQAP leaders promoting the use of CBRN weapons was its spiritual leader, the US-born cleric Anwar al Awlaki, whom the US Administration would later allege was in charge of its external operations. In 2009 he was actively discussing ideas for launching attacks against the West, including using poison in shopping centres20 and using botulinum toxin to poison US food and water supplies.21 By 2010 the AQAP leadership had decided to develop an operational plan22 and had begun to acquire large quantities of castor beans, which it transported to a site in Shabwa Province. There, it experimented with developing ricin IEDs by packing ricin around small explosives charges, which might be used to attack enclosed spaces like shopping centres, airports or subway stations. It also attempted to use the toxin to contaminate bottles of perfume, particularly a popular local fragrance made of the resin of agarwood, with the intention of sending it as gifts to government and security force officials in the Middle East.23

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However, al-Asiri faced the same technical problems in weaponising ricin as Abu Khabab had previously. The low thermal stability of ricin meant that dispersing it by means of an IED explosion would be ineffective.24 Probably as a result of a failure to weaponise ricin effectively, AQAP settled instead on a plot to use ricin and cyanide to poison food in salad bars and buffets in the US. The plan was to target a number of restaurants and hotels over the course of a single weekend.25 In preparation for the attack AQAP published a series of articles in Inspire magazine, which served as its official mouthpiece. In one article, restaurants, particularly those frequented by government employees, were identified as potential targets for gun attacks. Another article, entitled ‘Tips for our brothers in the United Snakes of America’, stated that a skilled microbiologist could produce botulinum toxin, which could result in ‘hundreds if not thousands of casualties . . . Brothers with less experience in the fields of microbiology or chemistry, as long as they possess basic scientific knowledge, would be able to develop other poisons such as ricin or cyanide’. The article promised that the subject of using WMD against the US would be discussed in upcoming issues of the magazine.26 The actual plot was not trailed in the magazine, but the individual components of it were clearly identifiable from these articles. However, the US intelligence agencies discovered details of the plot, and security personnel from the hotel and restaurant sectors were briefed about the threat. In late 2010 the Homeland Security Department publicly announced that it was aware of the plot,27 and also issued general warnings about the al-Mubtakkar device and terrorists’ continued interest in using toxins and poisons to contaminate food or water supplies or as contact poisons.28 From his hideout in the Pakistani city of Abottabad, bin Laden was maintaining communications with AQAP through written instructions saved on computer thumb drives, that were delivered by couriers to ’Atiyya ’Abdul Rahman (Sheikh Mahmud), a senior al Qaeda leader who acted as the interface between al Qaeda and network affiliates. AQAP informed al Qaeda’s central leadership of the planned ricin attack, but Bin Laden had significant doubts about it. In a letter to Rahman dated 26 April 2011 he failed to endorse the plan, writing instead: Regarding the operations that the brothers in Yemen are intending to conduct using poisons, please be careful of doing it

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without enough study of all aspects, including political and media reaction against the mujahideen and their image in the eyes of the public, so please pay attention to the matter.29 This represents the sixth known case of the al Qaeda leadership refusing to approve a CBRN plot. Bin Laden’s reaction is consistent with the al Qaeda leadership’s reaction to ISI’s CW attacks against civilians in Iraq, and shows just how sensitive he had become to the potential political costs of using CW to attack civilian targets. Possibly in response to bin Laden’s letter, al Awlaki drafted a further article for Inspire, entitled ‘Targeting the populations of countries at war with Muslims’. In this article he argued that Muslims were allowed to target the civilian population of countries that are at war with them with attacks that inevitably lead to the deaths of non-combatants, and that ‘the use of poisons of chemical and biological weapons against population centers is allowed and strongly recommended due to the effect on the enemy’.30 But if the article was indeed prompted by bin Laden’s letter, al Awlaki was missing the point. Bin Laden was talking about the political consequences of the attacks not their theological legitimacy. In response to the growing threat from AQAP, the Obama Administration significantly expanded CIA and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) operations in Yemen.31 One of the most high-profile successes of this campaign was the killing of al Awlaki by a drone strike in September 2011. The following year al Awlaki’s CBRN article was published posthumously in Inspire, but the food poisoning plot was never carried out. The exact reasons why AQAP cancelled the plot may never be known. It might perhaps have been because the US authorities had publicly announced that they were aware of it, or perhaps because al Awlaki had been killed. But it is most likely that bin Laden’s unwillingness to approve the plot was the decisive factor. The death of al Awlaki was a significant loss to AQAP, but it had little impact on its CBRN capabilities because al-Asiri remained at large. But as with so many other putative jihadi CBRN weapon-makers, al-Asiri’s skills were overstated. Despite displaying considerable technical innovation in developing conventional bombs, he displayed little skill with CBRN weapons. The concepts he experimented with were the same as those developed by Abu Khabab in Afghanistan prior

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to 9/11, and which were published in online training manuals. So even though AQAP posed a CBRN threat, the nature of that threat was extremely low-tech. Bin Laden’s reaction to the plan illustrates a significant change in the al Qaeda leadership’s reasons for not approving CBRN attacks. In the lead-up to 9/11 and the 2003 New York subway plot concerns about US retaliation had been the primary factor, whereas in 2011 it was apprehension about the political consequences arising from causing civilian casualties that were the primary concern. This suggests that the criticisms of al Qaeda that had been made by Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, Sheikh Salman al-Oudah and the former al Qaeda leaders based in Iran between 2007 and 2010 were a major factor in shaping bin Laden’s views on the use of CW. But even as bin Laden strove to maintain control over the threat posed by the wider jihadi network, time was running out for him. The US intelligence agencies had tracked him down to Abottabad, and in 2011 he was killed during a JSOC raid on his compound. In 2004 Sharif al-Masri had claimed that al Qaeda possessed a nuclear device and would use it if bin Laden was killed. If al Qaeda really did have a nuclear weapon, this would be the most likely moment for it to be used. Yet there was no nuclear retaliation. This provided the final unequivocal proof that al-Masri’s claim, like so many others made by al Qaeda detainees regarding al Qaeda’s CBRN capabilities, was untrue. Nevertheless, some militant leaders did consider responding with CW to the killing of bin Laden. Ilyas Kashmiri, the leader of the 313 Brigade, called a meeting of Pakistani Taliban commanders, including Asmatullah Maavia, Amjad Farooqui and Badar Mansoor, to discuss retaliation. Among the ideas they discussed was the poisoning of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) food supplies en route to Afghanistan through Pakistan. However, on 3 June 2011 Kashmiri was killed in a drone attack in Waziristan.32 Like so many similar purported plots before it, the discussion never seems to have reached the operational planning stage. Later the same year Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, who had recently taken over as al Qaeda’s top operational planner, was killed by a drone strike in Pakistan. The continued killing or capture of al Qaeda top leaders caused even more damage to its organisational cohesion, and its operations became even more decentralised. As a result, the leadership became even

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less able to control it wider network, just at a time when significant new opportunities to acquire CBRN weapons were emerging.

New Opportunities – the Arab Spring The CBRN incidents in 2010 and 2011 had shown that the most likely threat of an actual CBRN attack lay with groups and networks within the wider jihadi movement, rather than groups and networks directly controlled by al Qaeda. In 2011, the civil wars in Libya and Syria gave these groups major new opportunities to acquire either ready-made CBRN weapons or else relevant CBRN materials. Libya was supposed to have dismantled its WMD programme by 2007 as the price of its political rapprochement with the West. By 2011, however, it had still not completed the task, and continued to hold significant stocks of mustard gas. As the Arab Spring took root in neighbouring Tunisia in early 2011, it soon spread to Libya, where it escalated into a full-scale civil war. As the insurgents grew in strength, the conflict attracted international fighters, including international jihadis. During the course of 2011 the regime steadily crumbled, creating opportunities for jihadis to seize quantities of mustard gas from the Libyan army. The Ghaddafi regime was finally overthrown in October 2011 and replaced by a Transitional National Authority. During the course of the war, the insurgents had been able to seize large quantities of weapons from the regime, but the Transitional National Authority was able to secure the remaining stocks of mustard gas before they could be looted. The Transitional National Authority then continued with the internationally agreed destruction programme, to remove the threat completely. The events in Libya were a significant reprieve for the international community, but they highlighted the risks posed when proliferator regimes collapse. Just as the civil war in Libya drew to a close, the Arab Spring in Syria was also in the process of evolving into a full-scale civil war. Unlike Libya, Syria had an active CBW programme and held large stockpiles of CBW, including ricin, mustard gas, sarin and VX. In the past it had also tried to develop a nuclear weapon programme, and also had nuclear materials in civil use. Syria’s CBW programme was controlled by the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC), based in the foothills of

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Qasioun Mountain in the northern Barzeh district of Damascus. It was believed to have operated at least four CW manufacturing plants at Dumayr, Khan Abou, Shamat and Furklus, as well as CBW storage sites in about 50 different towns and cities dispersed across the country.33 Some of these sites only stored component chemicals but others held canisters of battle-ready nerve agents.34 It also managed BW-related activities at a number of legitimate and clandestine laboratories, institutes and facilities scattered across the country.35 As occurred in Libya, what started as a civil war, soon attracted international jihadi groups. By 2013, Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), which had pledged allegiance to al Qaeda, had become the single most effective fighting force amongst the insurgents. The fragmented nature of the conflict, with fighting raging throughout the country, meant that a number of Syria’s CBW facilities or storage facilities became vulnerable to attack. The risks were further increased when the Syrian military forward deployed quantities of CW with its combat units in 2013 and 2014. In 2013 the UK parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee declared the risk of jihadis obtaining CW from Syria to be ‘the most worrying emerging terrorist threat’.36 In 2013 insurgents seized the Sheikh Suleiman army base, west of Aleppo. There were no CW stored at the base, but the fact that the insurgents had seized a major army base indicated that they had the capability to seize CBW-related facilities. These concerns were tested in February 2013, when the insurgents launched a major attack on the city of al-Safira, east of Aleppo. The city, which sits in a strategic location on the Damascus to Aleppo road, is also the site of a major Syrian army base that contained an industrial facility for producing CW. On 6 February 2013 heavy fighting broke out as JN and other insurgent groups launched an offensive to the south of the city. Despite massive shelling by the Syrian army, the insurgents seized most of the city and surrounded the army base.37 The battle for the base continued for the best part of year, until November 2013, when a Syrian army offensive recaptured al-Safira, relieving the pressure on the base.38 At the same time as the Syrian army was fighting to protect the base at al-Safira, fighting was also raging near other CW sites. In Damascus, insurgents had established a strong presence in the Barzeh district although the SSRC, which was situated in a large tract of land protected by anti-aircraft and artillery batteries, remained firmly in the hands of

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the regime. Despite heavy fighting the insurgents were never able to mount a serious assault on the centre. Eventually, in April 2013 the Syrian army was able to take full control of Barzeh, relieving any immediate threat to the SSRC.39 The war also left parts of the Syrian biopharmaceutical infrastructure vulnerable to rebel groups. In 2013 at least one pharmaceutical laboratory near Aleppo, which was identified as a possible BW production site, was reported to have been looted.40 However, this was most likely in order to sell the equipment in Turkey to raise funds. There were no reports of insurgent groups taking over and continuing to operate bioweapon facilities, and no evidence that the insurgents had the technical expertise to develop, weaponise and deploy biological agents. As the risks of jihadis seizing Syrian CBW seemed to be increasing in 2013, there was speculation that the Western powers might try to neutralise the threat with airstrikes. However, the Syrian CBW infrastructure was spread across so many installations that it was considered to be impossible to destroy all of it with pre-emptive airstrikes. Nevertheless, in late January 2013 the Israel airforce conducted airstrikes against several sites, including an unidentified CW facility near Damascus and an arms convoy believed to be heading to Lebanon.41 The international community’s dilemma about how to neutralise the Syrian regime’s CBW stockpiles was finally resolved when the Syrian army made a major political miscalculation by using sarin to attack the eastern Ghouta suburb of Damascus in 2013. The attack killed almost 2,000 people, prompting strong international condemnation. Under threat of international airstrikes, the regime agreed to give up its CW stocks and dismantle its CW infrastructure. As a result, the threat of the regime’s CW falling into the hands of rebel groups was significantly reduced, although concerns persisted around the possibility that there might be some stray munitions that were unaccounted for and the international community’s inability to verify that some sites had been completely dismantled, due to their proximity to the fighting. With the possibility of obtaining CW from Syrian army stockpile diminishing, insurgent groups were forced to rely on their own capabilities if they wanted to acquire CW. Significantly however, JN, which remained loyal to the leadership of Aymen al-Zawahiri throughout the conflict, did not attempt to set up a CBRN weapon-development programme.

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The Emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant In 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) established itself as the dominant jihadi group in Syria and Iraq. Like its predecessor AQI, it was more extreme than al Qaeda and operated under fewer political and theological constraints. The extensive use of CW by AQI in Iraq between 2004– 9 indicated that if ISI could acquire CBRN weapons, it was extremely unlikely to be constrained from using them by political considerations. As ISIL swept through northern Iraq and northern Syria in 2014, seizing a number of major cities, it took control of laboratories at the University of Mosul as well as facilities at a number of other sites that could potentially be used for a CBRN waepon-development programme. These conquests also gave the group access to some relevant equipment and materials, including 40 kg of uranium compounds and 0.125 kg of thorium held at Mosul University,42 as well as chlorine from water treatment plants. The nuclear materials held at Mosul University were not ideal for use in a radiological bomb, but ISIL almost certainly also gained access to quantities of caesium-137 from hospital X-ray machines, and possibly also industrial equipment containing radioactive sources, which would have been much more suitable for making a radiological weapon. ISIL propagandists made the most of these reports, claiming that the group manufactured a radiological weapon from the material seized from Mosul University and smuggled it into Europe.43 ISIL’s success meant that it attracted significant numbers of new recruits and supporters. Among them was Yazid Sufaat, who was arrested in 2013 as he attempted to enter Syria,44 and Shaykh Nasir bin Hamid al-Fahd, who had drafted the CBRN weapon fatwa for al Qaeda in 2003; al-Fahd issued a message of support from his prison cell.45 ISIL also recruited a number of other people who had been educated in chemical and biological sciences. This included a Tunisian called ‘Muhammed S’, who had studied chemistry and physics at universities in Tunisia. He possessed a copy of al-Fahd’s CBRN fatwa, and in early 2014 was thinking through how to develop BW. The main focus of his research was on weaponising the bubonic plague virus, which he though could be obtained from infected animals. His concept was to load the virus into ‘small grenades’ that could be thrown into enclosed areas and next to the air-conditioning systems of buildings.46 Muhammed’s laptop, which

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contained details of his work, was recovered during a raid by the Free Syrian Army in late 2014. Nothing more was heard of Muhammed, and his fate remains unknown, but there is no evidence that he ever tried to put his plans into action. Instead, ISIL took the more practical approach of focusing on developing and using CW. AQI had previously resorted to using CW in Iraq, when it was put on the defensive by the Awakening Council movement and the US surge between 2006 and 2007. Similarly, it was not until ISIL began to suffer its first significant defeats that it attempted to use CW in tactical battlefield roles. The first evidence of this change in tactics occurred at the Kurdish town of Kobane on the Syria – Turkey border in late 2014. ISIL had swept through northeastern Syria that summer, but the intervention of US airpower at Kobane brought its offensive to an abrupt halt. In a battle lasting several months, ISIL threw considerable resources into the battle, but was repeatedly repulsed by the Kurdish defenders supported by US airstrikes. It was at that moment, with its offensive stalling, that IS turned to CW, by firing a small number of rockets armed with chlorine warheads into the town.47 However, these weapons did nothing to affect the course of the battle and ISIL was ultimately forced to retreat from Kobane. At about the same time, the Kurdish Peshmerga in northern Iraq, supported by US airpower, were also pushing back against ISIL. Faced by this first significant counter-offensive in Iraq, ISIL responded by deploying a number of chlorine IEDs and using mortars, rockets and shells fitted with chlorine warheads. These incidents were sporadic and limited, and did nothing to alter the course of the conflict in northern Iraq.48 By mid-2015 ISIL was being put under increasing military pressure in both Iraq and Syria, and was beginning to lose significant amounts of territory. In its attempts to reverse the situation, it continued to deploy small numbers of chlorine IEDs against Kurdish forces, but they continued to have no impact on the course of the battles. Recognising the limitations of its CW, ISIL invested additional resources in improving its CW capabilities. It set up a small group set to develop new CW agents, and hired scientists from the former Iraqi state CW programme and elsewhere.49 The group managed to develop a powdered form of mustard gas and loaded it into artillery shells and rockets, although it is unclear whether they had also mastered the fusing technology that would be required to airburst these munitions for

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maximum effectiveness.50 These developments meant that ISIL became the first terrorist group ever to have developed sulphur mustard gas. This showed that in terms of both capability and intent, the jihadi CBRN threat had grown beyond the control of the al Qaeda leadership. Concerns about ISIL’s interest in BW were also renewed during 2014, when it was reported that a number of ISIL fighters in the Iraqi city of Mosul had died of Ebola.51 If the reports were true, ISIL would have access to the Ebola virus. This prompted a wave of speculation in the Western media and online that ISIL might try to use the virus as a weapon. The New York Post even ran a story claiming that: ‘Like peanut butter and jelly, ISIS and Ebola would be good together.’52 It was suggested that the group might deliberately infect a group of fighters, who would then fly to the US or Europe, where they would go about infecting as many people as they could. As if to corroborate the threat, ISIL websites began calling for an Ebola strike on the US.53 Given that there was no laboratory in ISIL-held territory that was capable of diagnosing Ebola, there were strong doubts from the outset about the veracity of the reports. FBI Director James Corney later reported that there was no concrete evidence that ISIL was about to attack the US with Ebola.54 Speculation about an attack quickly subsided following subsequent reporting suggested that the fighters had probably not been infected with Ebola. During August 2014 ISIL forces deployed sulphur mustard during a number of battles. In mid-August, it fired a barrage of mortar shells filled with the gas during an attack on Iraqi Peshmerga forces near the town of Makhmour, not far from the city of Irbil. However, the barrage was noticeably unsuccessful, injuring just a handful of Peshmerga, and the attack still failed. A few days later ISIL forces in Syria fired a barrage of mustard gas-filled mortar shells on the rebel stronghold of Mare’a, north of Aleppo city. But the use of sulphur mustard is reported to have only killed one child and had no impact whatsoever on the battle. For unknown reasons, ISIL had stopped using it very suddenly by the end of the month.55 Alongside its interest in CW, ISIL was also seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. On 24 May 2015, an article in the ISIL magazine Dabiq claimed that it was ‘infinitely closer’ to buying a nuclear weapon from Pakistan and smuggling it into the US than it had been a year previously.56 This claim was reminiscent of previous reports of al Qaeda’s

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plans for obtaining and deploying nuclear weapons in the US. But given that the Pakistani nuclear weapon arsenal was secure, it was nothing more than a propaganda threat. It was nevertheless a signal of ISIL’s intent. Criminal gangs in Eastern Europe also tried to make connections to ISIL in order to sell them nuclear materials. The authorities in Moldova managed to stop gangs from selling radioactive material to terrorist organisations in the Middle East four times between 2011 and 2015. In February 2015, one gang attempted to sell a quantity caesium to a contact that they believed was linked to ISIL.57 ISIL would doubtless have been interested in any offers of fissile material but it probably did not need access to other types of nuclear materials, given its likely access to nuclear isotopes in commercial use in both Syria and Iraq. ISIL’s efforts to acquire and use CBRN weapons was widely reported in the Western media, but this reporting was very much overshadowed by the sheer volume of reporting on ISIL’s other atrocities. In the US, the ISIL CBRN threat was also covered in Congressional testimony from Administration and military officials. In March 2015 for instance, General John Kelly, commander of US Southern Command, in testimony before Congress, harked back to previous reports about al Qaeda smuggling nuclear weapons into the US from Mexico, when he stated: Clearly, criminal networks can move just about anything on these smuggling pipelines. Terrorist organisations could seek to leverage those same smuggling routes to move operatives with intent to cause grave harm to our citizens, or even quite easily bring weapons of mass destruction into the United States.58 This reporting potentially made the threat ripe for exploitation for political purposes, yet in contrast to the way that the Bush Administration and the UK government had used the al Qaeda CBRN threat to help justify the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the ISIL CBRN threat has been markedly less politicised. The Obama Administration made little effort to use the threat to legitimise its policies with regard to ISIL. In 2013, a war weary US public had been firmly opposed to US airstrikes against the Assad regime in Syria in response to the use of sarin in east Ghouta. By 2014, however, a broad

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political consensus backed by public opinion had developed in support of the Administration’s limited policy of airstrikes against ISIL, but remained firmly opposed to any deeper military involvement. The key event in the building of that consensus was the beheading of two US journalists by ISIL.59 For the Administration, there was simply no need for it to either highlight or exaggerate the ISIL CBRN threat in order to build support for its policy. During the US mid-term elections in 2014, ISIL and Ebola were the two biggest issues in US national security debates. Republican candidates charged the Administration with failing to deal with both issues adequately but did not necessarily need the two issues to be linked in order to make those accusations. Nevertheless, some Republicans, including Ron Johnson, Robert Pittenger and Mike Kelly, attempted to make political capital out of the reported links between ISIL and Ebola. Ron Johnson went as far as to describe the threat as a ‘real and present danger’.60 Similarly, Marc Thiessen, a former speechwriter for the Bush Administration, wrote an oft-cited op-ed in the Washington Post highlighting the threat.61 The reasons why the Republicans did not make more of the issue can be partly explained by the fact that the issue did not receive the sort of widespread hysterical media coverage that characterised some of the previous media reporting about the al Qaeda CBRN threat, and quickly subsided once doubts about whether there had actually been any cases of Ebola in Mosul began to be aired. In the UK, there were some tentative indications that the government might go down the route of using the ISIL CBRN threat to justify a change in policy to enable airstrikes by the Royal Air Force against ISIL targets in Syria. In late 2014 the Home Secretary Theresa May tested the appetite for intervention by stating in a speech that: If ISIL succeed in firmly consolidating their grip on the land they occupy in Syria and Iraq, we will see the world’s first truly terrorist state established within a few hours flying time of our country. We will see terrorists given the space to plot attacks against us, train their men and women, and devise new methods to kill indiscriminately. We will see the risk, often prophesied but thank God not yet fulfilled, that with the capability of a state behind them, the terrorists will acquire chemical, biological or even nuclear weapons to attack us.62

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It was not until late 2015 that the government eventually tried to seek a political mandate for this change in policy from Parliament. During a day-long debate it was noticeable that, when Prime Minister David Cameron set out the government’s case for airstrikes in Syria, he did not once refer to the ISIL CBRN threat. The political approach of the Obama Administration and the British government to the ISIL CBRN threat stands in marked contrast to the way that the Bush Administration and the government of Prime Minister Blair used the al Qaeda CBRN threat to help justify the invasion of Iraq. This may well be because the circumstances with regard to ISIL are completely different; its extremely violent propaganda and the limited nature of the Western response has meant that there has simply been no need for the US Administration and the British government to conjure up apocalyptic visions of an ISIL CBRN threat to justify their policies. Indeed, conjuring up such visions would be counter-productive given that both the US and UK wish to avoid escalating their intervention. However, the recognition and criticism of the way that the al Qaeda CBRN threat was used in the lead up to the invasion of Iraq may also have made US and UK politicians much more wary of trying to trying to exploit CBRN threats for political purposes. But whilst the ISIL CBRN threat has been markedly less politicised than the al Qaeda CBRN threat, it still retains the potential to be used for political purposes, should politicians choose to try and exploit it.

CONCLUSION

The fact that al Qaeda did not respond to the death of bin Laden with CBRN weapons provided the final proof that it did not possess strategic CBRN weapons. It failed to acquire that capability because making effective CBRN weapons is much more difficult than is commonly imagined. Whilst al Qaeda had a range of opportunities to help it either acquire or develop CBRN weapons in the 20-year period from 1994 to 2014, it also faced formidable technical constraints, and at the end of the day those constraints greatly outweighed the opportunities that were available to it. Technical constraints affected all aspects of al Qaeda’s efforts to develop CBRN weapons. It was never able to recruit sufficient people with the relevant scientific and technical skills, and even when it could, it discovered that they lacked the specific expertise required to develop CBRN weapons. As well as experiencing a skills shortage, it also faced difficulties obtaining the necessary raw materials it needed. In particular, it never had a realistic opportunity to purchase fissile material on the nuclear black market, and failed to obtain pathogenic strains of anthrax and botulinum toxin. It did have access to a range of commercially available chemicals that could have been used as weapons, but its engineers failed to develop an effective aerosol dispersal technology; that same problem would have faced its BW programme if it had ever succeeded in culturing pathogenic strains of anthrax or botulinum. The final significant constraint was that the war on terror denied it the time and space it needed to master the technology. Given time, Abu Khabab and Sufaat might have been able to achieve more, but not only

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was its CBRN infrastructure in Afghanistan destroyed in 2001, but every time it tried to re-start a CBRN programme, key planners and engineers were either killed or captured. As a result, al Qaeda’s technological development stalled, and it has never managed to get beyond the rudimentary level it had reached by 2001. Nevertheless, from 1999 it did have a crude chemical, biological and (arguably) radiological weapon capability that it could potentially have used to attack the US and the West.

Al Qaeda’s Intentions Regarding the Use of CBRN Weapons In the early period between 1998 and 2000 the evidence regarding al Qaeda’s intentions with regard to using CBRN weapons is confusing. This is partly because the al Qaeda leadership itself was still working through how it might use these weapons. There has also been a tendency in the West to infer al Qaeda’s likely intentions with regard to using CBRN weapons from its public statements about wanting to annihilate the US, and identifying civilians as legitimate targets. Bin Laden’s public statements about CBRN weapons in 1999 suggest that al Qaeda was considering both deterrence and first-strike as options. That strategic dilemma was only conclusively resolved in 2000, when the leadership decided to opt for deterrence. Although it was not until 2002 that bin Laden and al Mauritani publicly announced that al Qaeda had settled on a strategy of deterrence. This was re-affirmed by ‘Asad Al-Jihad 2’ during the online nuclear weapon debates during 2008, and at no time has the al Qaeda leadership announced any change to that position. However, the position regarding al Qaeda’s CBRN intentions since 9/11 is not totally clear. This is partly because the limited number of statements it has made about CBRN weapons have been interspersed amongst the much more numerous messages of its broader propaganda campaign, which consistently threatened further attacks on the US, identified US civilians as being legitimate targets and threatened to escalate the level of violence against the US. Even the wording of some al Qaeda statements on CBRN weapons by spokesmen such as Abu Muhammad al-Ablaj and Abu Shihab al-Kandahari between 2002 and 2003 is ambiguous. Similarly, Shaykh Nasir bin Hamid al-Fahd’s 2003 fatwa, ‘A treatise on the legal status of using weapons of mass destruction against infidels’, provides a theological justification for using

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CBRN weapons in a first-strike role. The former senior al Qaeda commander Abu Walid al-Masri has also confirmed that bin Laden believed that ‘America would not be able to sustain more than two or three of his painful blows’.1 If bin Laden was right, a CBRN WMD attack would constitute a second painful blow following 9/11, that might win the war for al Qaeda. There was therefore a powerful incentive for al Qaeda to use CBRN weapons in a first-strike role. This line of reasoning is supported by the reported interest of a number of operational cells in conducting CBRN attacks against western European targets. But whilst al Qaeda messaging on CBRN weapons as a whole, was not always entirely clear, the messaging from its leading figures, including bin Laden, al-Mauritani and ‘Asad Al-Jihad 2’ was explicit, and did not change. The statements by other, more junior spokesmen, which were inconsistent with that message, can potentially be explained as either poor communication or the expression of dissenting views. For an organisation that proved willing to sanction the deaths of thousands of civilians on 9/11 its reticence about using CBRN weapons in a first strike role seems odd. However, in his references to Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1999, bin Laden had expressed grave concerns about the readiness of the US to use nuclear weapons to indiscriminately kill large numbers of people. This suggests that he saw an imperative in not provoking the US into pursuing the same course of action against the Muslim world. This explanation is supported by the reasons nuclear power stations were dropped from the target list of the 9/11 plot. The US reaction to 9/11 then served to reinforce that decision, which is evident from the reason Ayman al-Zawahiri refused to approve the 2003 New York subway plot. The strategic logic of this position was articulated by the jihadi theoretician Mustafa bin Abd al-Qadir Sitt Maryam Nasar in 1999, when he stated: ‘As was the case with the nuclear balance between Russia and America. I have nuclear arms and you have nuclear arms, so we keep the fight within the category of conventional arms.’2 During the debate on WMD terrorism in the West during the 1990s there was considerable speculation about how the use of CBRN weapons was somehow morally different from using conventional weapons. It seems that bin Laden also believed that there was something different about CBRN. He recognised that there were significant political costs associated with using nuclear weapons, which is why criticism of the US

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bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 consistently featured in his propaganda messages.3 Condemning the US for using nuclear weapons in 1945 made it difficult for al Qaeda to then use CBRN weapons itself in similar circumstances. Once bin Laden had received al-Fahd’s fatwa in 2003 he would have been less concerned about the theological legitimacy of using CBRN weapons, but the evidence is that he still perceived CBRN weapons to be different from conventional weapons for political reasons, both in terms of the political reaction in the US and within the Muslim world. This was confirmed by the reaction within the Muslim world to AQI’s use of chlorine IEDs in Iraq. Accepting the word of a terrorist organisation that has proved itself willing to kill thousands of civilians at face value is inherently problematic. However, hard evidence of the al Qaeda leadership’s intention to reserve these weapons for deterrence can be found in the absence of a single al Qaeda CBRN attack in the West over this period. There are six recorded cases between 2000 and 2011 in which the al Qaeda leadership refused to approve plans by operational cells to conduct CBRN attacks in the US or western Europe. In two of those cases there is even documentary proof that the al Qaeda leadership refused to approve CW attacks for political reasons. Similarly, there were a further eight incidents between 2002 and 2005 in which operational cells in western Europe discussed CBRN attacks and in some cases even acquired the necessary raw materials and equipment, but never tried to go through with an attack. In these incidents it is important to differentiate between the plans and intentions of operational cells and the intentions of the al Qaeda leadership. These incidents, coupled with the online debates about using CBRN weapons that took place in online jihadi forums, indicate that there was widespread interest within the al Qaeda network in using CBRN weapons in a first-strike role. But it is apparent that these views were not shared by the leadership, which neither ordered nor approved the use of CBRN weapons in any operational attacks. It seems that as long as the leadership exercised control over its wider network, the intentions of its operational cells to use CBRN weapons could be kept in check. When the body of al Qaeda’s public declarations about CBRN weapons is considered in conjunction with the evidence of former jihadis about the WMD debates in the al Qaeda shura in the late 1990s and the

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Kandahar Conference in 2000, the evidence from al Qaeda detainees and the documentary evidence that was recovered from bin Laden’s compound in Abottabad, together with the available evidence concerning the CBRN incidents in the US and Europe, it establishes a strong and consistent narrative that the al Qaeda leadership did indeed intend to reserve the use of CBRN weapons for deterrence. Whilst political factors constrained al Qaeda’s use of CBRN weapons, bin Laden also recognised that CBRN weapons had political value and that he might be able to achieve his objectives without needing to use them, through making coercive and deterrent threats. In the years before al Qaeda had a strategic CBRN capability, this was the only approach available to it. However, even after it had developed the Mubtakkar device, the al Qaeda leadership still took the same approach. The al Qaeda leadership was partially successful in exploiting the political value of these weapons, because CBRN threats have proved to have propaganda value. Reports of al Qaeda acquiring, or attempting to acquire, CBRN weapons were widely reported in the Western and Middle Eastern media, generating significant propaganda for the network, which in turn made it a significant political issue in the US. But whilst CBRN threats made good propaganda for al Qaeda, that propaganda did not translate into positive benefits for the network. Bin Laden and Zawahiri had correctly identified that CBRN terrorism was an issue that US politicians and public opinion was extremely concerned about, but they completely overestimated the extent to which the US could be coerced by crude CBRN threats. The US was not intimidated by al Qaeda’s CBRN rhetoric, and legislators simply demanded that the threat should be robustly dealt with. This reaction may in part have been shaped by the fact that the US knew that al Qaeda did not have strategic CBRN weapons. Deterrence is predicated on being able to demonstrate an assured capability to strike at one’s opponent with sufficiently powerful weapons. During the Cold War, Russia and the US both relied on threatening each other with ‘mutually assured destruction’, using nuclear armed ballistic missiles. In contrast, al Qaeda’s capabilities were extremely crude and could to some extent be defended against. It therefore lacked an effective capability to strike back hard against the US with CBRN weapons. The final irony was also that after 9/11, al Qaeda was actually self-deterred from using the crude capability that

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it did have, to the extent that it did not even try to respond to the killing of bin Laden with CBRN weapons. Ultimately therefore, al Qaeda’s inability to demonstrate that it possessed an effective CBRN weapon capability meant that its propaganda had little effect, although it did force the US to expend considerable resources on countering the threat, which added to the goal of increasing the political and economic pressure on the US. Even though there is strong and consistent evidence from a range of different sources over a 15-year period that the al Qaeda leadership intended to use CBRN weapons for deterrence, it is impossible to have a high degree of confidence that it would always act in accordance with its declared intentions. Intentions can change very suddenly and unexpectedly, with no warning. It was publicly articulating this deterrent posture at a time when it did not have strategic CBRN weapons. If it did acquire a CBRN WMD it would always be faced with the temptation to use it, particularly if it was liable to be destroyed or seized by pre-emptive US military action. Noman Benotman, the former leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, who provided details of the Kandahar Conference in 2000, believed that despite Mohammed Atef claiming to want a deterrent capability, al Qaeda would have used CBRN WMD to kill indiscriminately.4 We can never know for certain, but as George Tenet stated, it is something that the West could not afford to be wrong about.5

The Political Value of CBRN Weapon Threats to Nation States In contrast to the failure of al Qaeda’s efforts to exploit the political value of CBRN threats to achieve any significant material benefits, corresponding attempts by nation states to exploit the political value of the al Qaeda CBRN threat have been significantly more successful. Exploiting the threat was an important aspect of the US Administration’s successful efforts to make the case for war in Iraq to its domestic public opinion between 2002–3, as well as being an integral part of Russia’s information war against the Chechen insurgents between 1995–2001. The US Administration and the UK government were, however, markedly less successful in using the threat to influence public opinion in western Europe about the necessity for the war in Iraq.

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However, one of the legacies of the invasion of Iraq has been that the political capital to be gained from trying to use the al Qaeda CBRN threats for wider political purposes has significantly declined. Politicians, the media and the public are no longer so trusting about claims linking proliferator regimes with al Qaeda’s CBRN ambitions. Since 2003, the issue of a Qaeda and CBRN weapons has become markedly less political, and Western governments have become more sanguine about CBRN weapon threats, reflecting a general lessening of the nature of the threat. This became evident when the US Administration and the UK government did not make any serious efforts to try and exploit the ISIL CBRN threat when it attempted to build public and political support for the policy of airstrikes in Iraq and Syria.

Al Qaeda’s Legacy with Respect to CBRN Weapons The lasting legacy of al Qaeda’s efforts to acquire CBRN weapons has been the way that its pursuit of CBRN weapons has also driven interest in CBRN weapons within the wider jihadi networks. But this has proved to be politically disastrous for the al Qaeda leadership, which had originally thought that it could control, or influence, groups within the wide jihadi networks. As time has gone by, its influence has waned and it has been increasingly unable to apply the political restraint to CBRN threats that it believed was necessary. As a result, the likelihood of CBRN attacks from the wider jihadi networks has grown since 9/11, with the biggest threat coming from groups that al Qaeda has exercised little control over and which do not share the same political constraints as the al Qaeda leadership, such as Jihadia Salafia, the Chechen insurgents, AQI, ISIL and al Tawhid wal Jihad. But whilst the threat of CBRN weapons being used by jihadi groups is now higher than it has ever been, it is unclear whether the technological level of that threat has also increased. ISIL has become the first non-state actor to have ever manufactured mustard gas, but that remains an outlier. In general terms, the technological level of the threat has remained relatively low. However, opportunities to develop or acquire CBRN weapons can come and go unexpectedly. Much will depend on the ability of jihadi groups to recruit suitably qualified people and acquire the necessary raw materials and production equipment.

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But even if they can acquire the necessary personnel and infrastructure, they would still need time and space to develop effective CBW. The rise of ISIL and its readiness to use CBRN weapons operationally has highlighted the ultimate failure of al Qaeda’s approach to CBRN weapons. The al Qaeda leadership has continued to be self-deterred from using CBRN weapons for fear of the political consequences, but has also failed to reap any political benefits from its CBRN propaganda. At the same time, its political control over the wider jihadi CBRN threat has now largely broken down. In contrast to al Qaeda, ISIL is entirely driven by ideology and has displayed no evidence that it will moderate its actions to take account of wider political considerations. It has demonstrated itself to be both willing and able to use CW, irrespective of the political costs, and the extreme nature of its ideology suggests that if it can obtain a nuclear weapon and smuggle it into the US, it will use it. These developments provide the final indication that al Qaeda’s pursuit of CBRN weapons has now evolved into a different, much more dangerous, type of threat.

NOTES

Introduction 1. George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (London: HarperCollins/Harper Press, 2007), p. 260. 2. Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine (London: Simon and Schuster, 2007). 3. Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, p. 259.

Chapter 1 Opportunism, 1994 –6 1. Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), p. 39. 2. Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban and Richard Lobban, ‘The Sudan since 1989: National Islamic Front rule’, Arab Studies Quarterly 23/2 (Spring 2001), pp. 1 – 9. Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/41858370?seq¼1#page_ scan_tab_contents (accessed 6 June 2007). 3. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, pp. 40– 1; Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (London: I.B.Tauris, 2003), p. 133. 4. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, p. 18. 5. Ibid., p. 40. 6. ‘The UK’s Bin Laden dossier in full’, BBC News Online, 4 October 2001. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/1579043.stm (accessed 4 October 2001); Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission), pp. 56 – 60. Available at http:// www.9-11commission.gov/report/ (accessed 22 July 2013); Burke, Al-Qaeda, pp. 134 –5. 7. John V. Parachini, ‘The World Trade Center bombers (1993)’, in Jonathan Tucker (ed.), Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological

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13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

22.

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Weapons (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), pp. 187– 90; Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, p. 42. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History Of The CIA, Afghanistan, And Bin Laden, From The Soviet Invasion To September 10, 2001 (Penguin: London, 2004), pp. 249 –50. Federal Bureau of Investigations, ‘First strike: global terror in America’, 26 February 2008. Available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/ february/tradebom_022608 (accessed 6 September 2011). ‘Direct examination of Brian Parr, United States of America v. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and Eyad Ismoil, S1293CR.180 (KTD)’, 22 October 1997, pp. 4734 –5. Parachini, ‘The World Trade Center bombers (1993)’. J. Carson Mark, Theodore Taylor, Eugene Eyster, William Marman and Jacob Wechsler, ‘Can terrorists build nuclear weapons?’, in Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander (eds), Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: The Report and Papers of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), p. 58. Leonard S. Spector, Mark G. McDonough and Evan Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995), p. 10. Summary listing of incidents involving illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and other radioactive sources (4th quarter 1996)’, attached to IAEA’s letter of 29 January 1997, Reference N4.11.42. Bruce Hoffman and David Claridge, Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Materials, Conflict Studies 314/315 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1999), p. 12. National Intelligence Council, ‘Annual report to Congress on the safety and security of Russian nuclear facilities and military forces’ (February 2002), pp. 2, 6. Peter D. Zimmerman and Cheryl Loeb, ‘‘Dirty bombs: the threat revealed’, Defense Horizons 38 (12 January 2004), p. 5. Available at http://www.hps.org/ documents/RDD_report.pdf (accessed 22 February 2015). Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists, p. 56. Report of the 9/11 Commission, p. 60. ‘The Afghan-Arabs Part One’, Asharq Al-Awsat, 29 June 2005. Available at http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section¼3&id ¼ 627 (accessed 16 March 2011; link no longer working). Douglas Waller, ‘Inside the hunt for Osama: the Feds have tailed the Saudi and his secret network for years. So why didn’t they stop the Africa bombings?’, Time, 21 December 1998. Available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/fnews/1116220/posts (accessed 4 February 2015); Stefan Leader, ‘Osama Bin Laden and the terrorist search for WMD’, Janes Intelligence Review (June 1999), pp. 34 – 7. ‘The Afghan-Arabs Part One’.

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23. ‘JTF-GTMO detainee assessment, Adil Hadi al-Jaza’iri bin Hamlili’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 8 July 2008. Available at https://www. wikileaks.org/gitmo/name.html (accessed 4 April 2014). 24. Kenley Butler and Akaki Dvali, ‘Nuclear trafficking hoaxes: a short history of scams involving red mercury and osmium-187’, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 1 April 2004. Available at http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/nucleartrafficking-hoaxes/ (accessed 22 January 2013). 25. Ibid. 26. ‘JTF-GTMO detainee assessment, Adil Hadi al-Jaza’iri bin Hamlili’. 27. ‘The Afghan-Arabs Part One’. 28. Ben Cole, The Changing Face of Terrorism: How Real is the Threat from Biological, Chemical and Nuclear Weapons? (London: I.B.Tauris, 2011), p. 37. 29. Rene´ Pita and Rohan Gunaratna, ‘Revisiting Al-Qa’ida’s anthrax program’, CTC Sentinel 2/5 (May 2009). Available at http://carnegieendowment.org/ files/CTCSentinel-Vol2Iss5.pdf (accessed 7 April 2013); Harmony Document AFGP-2002-000078, The Military Committee (undated). Available at https://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/AFGP-2002000078-Trans.pdf (accessed 7 September 2015). 30. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, pp. 57 – 8; Burke, Al-Qaeda, p. 145. 31. Jihad Salim, ‘Report on Bin Ladin, Zawahiri, “Afghans”’, Al-Watan al-Arabi, 16 February 2001. 32. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, ‘Failure of intelligence?’, New York Times, 20 December 2001. Available at http://csis.org/press/csis-in-the-news/failureintelligence (accessed 17 November 2012). 33. Ibid. 34. Michael Barletta, ‘Chemical Weapons In The Sudan: Allegations And Evidence’, The Nonproliferation Review (Fall 1998), p. 127. 35. Parachini, ‘The World Trade Center bombers (1993)’, p. 201. 36. Ibid., pp. 201 – 2. 37. Ron Purver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism, New Threat to Public Safety, Conflict Studies 295 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1997), p 16. 38. The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 61. 39. Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, on postwar findings about Iraq’s WMD programs and links to terrorism and how they compare with prewar assessments, 8 September 2006. Available at https://fas.org/irp/ congress/2006_rpt/srpt109-331.pdf (accessed 23 February 2013). 40. Ibid. 41. Tim Weiner and James Risen, ‘Decision to strike factory in Sudan based on surmise inferred from evidence’, New York Times, 21 September 1998. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/21/world/decision-to-strikefactory-in-sudan-based-on-surmise-inferred-from-evidence.html (accessed 7 February 2014); James Risen, ‘To bomb Sudan plant, or not: a year later, debates rankle’, New York Times, 27 October 1999. Available at

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42. 43. 44.

45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

50. 51. 52.

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http://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/africa/102799us-sudan.html (accessed 7 February 2014). Waller, ‘Inside the hunt for Osama’. Leader, ‘Osama Bin Laden and the terrorist search for WMD’. Al Fadl resented receiving a salary of only $500 a month for his role as a business agent for al Qaeda while some of the Egyptians in al Qaeda were given $1,200 a month. Al-Fadl fled Sudan in 1996 after bin Laden discovered that he had been pocketing commissions on the sales of goods imported by one of his businesses. He approached a number of countries with information about bin Laden and Sudan, before walking into an American embassy and announcing that he had information about impending terrorist attacks. United States of America v. Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, sealed complaint, United States District Court, Southern District of New York, 14 September 1998, pp. 2 – 5. Risen, ‘To bomb Sudan plant, or not’. Barletta, ‘Chemical weapons in the Sudan’, p. 121. Ibid., pp. 116 – 18. Michael Scheuer, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2008), pp. 124– 5 and 186– 93; ‘Foiled: plot to devastate capital with a radioactive “dirty bomb”’, Evening Standard, 2 February 2011. Available at http://www.standard.co.uk/news/foiled-plot-to-devastate-capital-witha-radioactive-dirty-bomb-6562588.html?origin¼ internalSearch (accessed 3 February 2011). Barletta, ‘Chemical weapons in the Sudan’, p. 130. Burke, Al-Qaeda, p. 141. The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 62 and 65.

Chapter 2 The US and the Politics of CBRN Terrorism, 1996 –8 1. Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 64; Evelyn le Chene, ‘Chemical and biological weapons proliferation, and the problem of special interest groups’, Intersec 7/6 (June 1997); W. Seth Carus, ‘Bioterrorism and biocrimes, the illicit use of biological agents in the twentieth century’, Working Paper, Centre for Counterproliferation Research, National Defence University (August 1998), pp. 63 – 6; Kyle Olsen (testifying at hearings conducted by the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations October 1995), ‘Hearings on global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: a case study of Aum Shinrikyo’, Senate Hearings 104– 422, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Part 1, Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee of Governmental Affairs, US Senate, 104th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, DC, US GPO (31 October 1995),

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3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

9.

10. 11. 12. 13.

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20 –24

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pp. 87 – 8; David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World: The Incredible Story of the Aum (New York: Crown Publishers, 1996), pp. 190 – 8; ‘Chronology of Aum Shinrikyo’s CBW activities’, James Martin Center for Non Proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies (undated). Available at www.cns.miis.edu/research/terror.htm (accessed 2 March 2004; link no longer working). Ehud Sprinzak, ‘The great superterrorism scare’, Foreign Policy (Fall 1998), pp. 110– 24; Ashton Carter, John Deutch and Philip Zelikow, ‘Catastrophic terrorism: tackling the new danger’, Foreign Affairs 77/6 (November – December 1998), pp. 80 – 94; David W. Brackett, Holy Terror: Armageddon in Tokyo (New York: Weatherhill, 1996), p. 45. Stern, The Ultimate Terrorist, pp. 37 – 9. Brad Roberts, ‘Has the taboo been broken?’, in Brad Roberts (ed.), Terrorism with Chemical and Biological Weapons (Alexandria, VA: Chemical and Biological Control Institute, 1997), pp. 121 –40, p. 130. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (London: Indigo, 1998) p. 94. ‘New routes to old poisons’, Guardian (4 November 1998). Ben Cole, The Changing Face of Terrorism: How Real is the Threat from Biological, Chemical and Nuclear Weapons? (London: I.B.Tauris, 2011), pp. 159 –76. Milton Leitenberg, ‘Assessing the biological weapons and bioterrorism threat’, Strategic Studies Institute Monographs (December 2005), p. 43. Available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID¼ 639 (accessed 22 August 2008); Robert Taylor, ‘All fall down’, New Scientist, 11 May 1996, p. 32. John M. Deutch, speech to Harvard-Los Alamos Conference on Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons Proliferation and Terrorism, Washington, DC, 23 May 1996. Available at speeches/archives/1996/dci_speech_052396. html (accessed 20 March 1998). Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: The Report and Papers of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987). D.A. Henderson, ‘Bioterrorism as a public health threat’, Journal of Emerging Diseases 4/3 (June– September 1998), p. 48. Available at http://wwwnc.cdc. gov/eid/article/4/3/pdfs/98-0340.pdf (accessed 5 May 1999). Richard Betts, ‘The new threat of mass destruction’, Foreign Affairs 77/1 (January – February 1998), pp. 26 –41, p. 27. William S. Cohen, ‘This week with Sam Donaldson and Cokie Roberts, the Iraq situation’, ABC News, 16 November 1997. Available at http://homepage. ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/abc-cohen-19971116.html (accessed 20 June 1998; link no longer working). ‘Weapons of mass destruction terrorism and US preparedness’, statement of Frank J. Cilluffo, Deputy Director, Global Organized Crime Project CoDirector, Terrorism Task Force, Center for Strategic and International Studies

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22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

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to the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice US House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 2 October 1998. Available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1998_hr/ 981002-fc.htm (accessed 27 October 2014). ‘Voters’ Attitudes To Nuclear Weapons’, The Mellman Group, 6 November 1997. Available at http://www.stimson.org/policy/pollmemo.htm (accessed 9 May 1999). Senator Sam Nunn, ‘Cooperative threat reduction’, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 13 March 1996. Available at http://fas.org/ spp/starwars/congress/1996_h/s960313a.htm (accessed 14 September 2013). Weldon, Curt, ‘Opening statement’, Military Research and Development Subcommittee Hearings on Nuclear Terrorism and Countermeasures, 1 October 1997. Available at http://ftp.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1997_h/ h971001w.htm (accessed 14 September 2013). Gururaj Mutalik, Frank Barnaby, Peter Taylor and David Sumner, Crude Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and the Terrorist Threat: IPPNW Global Health Watch Report 1 (Cambridge, MA: International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, 1996), p. 42. Sam Nunn, ‘Terrorism meets proliferation: a post-cold war convergence of threats’, The Monitor 3/2 (Spring 1997), p. 4. ‘Lugar unveils ads on nuclear terrorism’, USA Today, 4 November 1999. Ely Karmon, ‘Are we nearer to a major CBRN terrorism threat?’, International Institute for Counter Terrorism, 21 February 2012. Available at http://www.ict. org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/1034/currentpage/1/Default.aspx (accessed 2 February 2013). Ron Purver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism, New Threat to Public Safety, Conflict Studies 295 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1997), p. 20. ‘Declaration on terrorism’, communique´ from the G7 Summit, Lyons, 27 June 1996. Available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/1996/ terro.html (accessed 5 September 2014). Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, November 1997), p. iii. Karmon, ‘Are we nearer to a major CBRN terrorism threat?’. ‘War games show up germ defences’, Guardian, 28 April 1998. ‘Combating terrorism’, Presidential Decision Directive 62, Fact Sheet, The White House, 22 May 1998. Available at http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd-62. htm (accessed 2 June 2015). ‘A national security strategy for a new century’, May 1997. Available at http:// clinton2.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/Strategy/ (accessed 2 June 2015). Karmon, ‘Are we nearer to a major CBRN terrorism threat?’. Jeremy Scahill, Dirty Wars: The World is a Battlefield (London: Serpent’s Tail, 2013), p. 52. Ibid., p. 417.

NOTES

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32. Anthony Cordesman, ‘The Iraq crisis: a chronology of the “war of sanctions”’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2 December 1998. Available at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/981202_iraqahcchron.pdf (accessed 4 June 2015); ‘Timeline of the Iraqi crisis’, BBC News Online, 21 December 1998. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/events/crisis_in_the_gulf/ road_to_the_brink/216264.stm (accessed 4 June 2015); ‘Clinton announces Iraq strikes: full text’, BBC News Online (17 December 1998). Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/events/crisis_in_the_gulf/texts_and_transcripts/ 236858.stm (accessed 4 June 2015); James Bennet, ‘Standoff with Iraq: the overview; Clinton sets out to revive support for stand on Iraq’, New York Times, 20 February 1998. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/20/world/ standoff-with-iraq-overview-clinton-sets-revive-support-for-stand-iraq.html (accessed 4 June 2015). 33. ‘Fake Nerve Gas Attack Wednesday in Rayburn’, Roll Call, 28 April 1997. 34. Sharon Begley, ‘Unmasking bioterror’, Newsweek, 8 October 2001. Available at http://europe.newsweek.com/unmasking-bioterror-154159?rm¼ eu (accessed 20 December 2001). 35. ‘Agencies may be getting fat off bioterrorism fear’, Salt Lake Tribune, 31 October 1999. 36. Leitenberg, ‘Assessing the biological weapons and bioterrorism’; Defense Science Board Washington, DC, ‘The Defense Science Board 1997 Summer Study Task Force on DoD Responses to Transnational Threats; Vol. I, Final Report’ (October 1997). Available at http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb¼getRecord& metadataPrefix¼html&identifier¼ADA333273 (accessed 7 August 2011). 37. Ben Bain and Joseph Cirincione, ‘Exaggerating the threat of bioterrorism’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 16 March 2006. Available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2006/03/16/exaggerating-threat-of-bioterrorism/ (accessed 7 August 2011). 38. In one example, the Department of Health and Human Services received an additional $144 million, compared to its existing US$14 million, to cope with the bioterrorism preparedness. ‘Bioterrorism panic rises, but is it truly justified?’, The World’s Nuclear News Agency, 26 March 1999. 39. ‘Agencies may be getting fat off bioterrorism fear’. 40. James H. Anderson, ‘Microbes and mass casualties: defending america against bioterrorism’, The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, 26 May 1998. 41. Sprinzak, ‘The great superterrorism scare’, p. 117. 42. ‘Bioterrorism panic rises, but is it truly justified?’. 43. Bill Clinton, ‘Russians help to make chemical arms’, The Times, 25 January 1999. 44. Sprinzak, ‘The great superterrorism scare’, p. 111. 45. Nadine Gurr and Ben Cole, The New Face of Terrorism: Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction (London: I.B.Tauris, 2000), pp. 13 – 19. 46. Testimony of John Deutch, Director of the CIA, ‘Full text of “Global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”’, hearings before the Permanent

274

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48. 49. 50.

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Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 104th Congress, 1st Session, and 2nd Session, part 2 (13, 20 and 22 March 1996). Available at http://www.archive.org/stream/ globalproliferat02unit/globalproliferat02unit_djvu.txt (accessed 7 June 2013). Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors, CM 6492, House of Commons, 14 July 2004. Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment_data/file/61171/wmdreview.pdf (accessed 20 July 2005). Ibid. Ibid. Director of Central Intelligence, ‘The threat of nuclear diversion’, statement for the record, John Deutch, Director of Central Intelligence to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Affairs, United States Senate, 104th Congress, 2nd Session, part 2 (20 March 1996). ‘Full text of ‘Global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction’. ‘Testimony of R. James Woolsey’, US House of Representatives, Committee on National Security, 12 February 1998. Available at http://www.fas.org/irp/ congress/1998_hr/h980212w.htm (accessed 7 June 2011). Leitenberg, ‘Assessing the biological weapons and bioterrorism threat’.

Chapter 3 Antecedents: Afghanistan, 1996– 8 1. ‘The UK’s Bin Laden dossier in full’, BBC News Online, 4 October 2001. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/1579043.stm (accessed 4 October 2001). 2. Ibid. However the British government did not say what those chemicals were or what they would be used for. The inference was that they would be used for CW. 3. ‘Bin Laden’s fatwa’, PBS, 23 August 1996. Available at http://www.pbs.org/ newshour/updates/military-july-dec96-fatwa_1996/ (accessed 4 June 2013). 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. Jason Burke, Al- Qaeda: Casting A Shadow Of Terror (London: I.B.Tauris, 2003), p. 161. 7. ‘The UK’s Bin Laden dossier in full’. 8. ‘Compilation of Usama Bin Laden statements, 1994 – January 2004’, FBIS Reports (January 2004). Available at http://fas.org/irp/world/para/ubl-fbis.pdf (accessed 22 October 2014). 9. ‘Interview with Osama Bin Laden’, ABC News (May 1998). Available at http:// www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/interview.html (accessed 8 July 2014).

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275

10. Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, on postwar findings about Iraq’s WMD programs and links to terrorism and how they compare with prewar assessments, 8 September 2006. Available at https://fas.org/irp/ congress/2006_rpt/srpt109-331.pdf (accessed 23 February 2013). 11. ‘The Afghan-Arabs Part One’, Asharq Al-Awsat, 29 June 2005. Available at http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section¼3&id¼627 (accessed 16 March 2011; link no longer working). 12. ‘Follow these steps to commit mass murder’, Metro, 14 September 2001. 13. ‘Al-Qaeda terror manual orders attack on Big Ben’, Sunday Telegraph, 3 February 2002. 14. Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), p. 23. 15. ‘The UK’s Bin Laden dossier in full’. 16. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, ‘Failure of intelligence?’, New York Times, 20 December 2001. Available at http://csis.org/press/csis-in-the-news/failureintelligence (accessed 17 September 2012). 17. James Risen, ‘To bomb Sudan plant, or not: a year later, debates rankle’, New York Times, 27 October 1999. Available at http://partners.nytimes.com/ library/world/africa/102799us-sudan.html (accessed 7 February 2014). 18. ‘Dubious decisions on Sudan’, New York Times, 23 September 1998. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/23/opinion/dubious-decisions-on-thesudan.html (accessed 6 June 2015). 19. The following text is drawn from Michael Barletta, ‘Chemical weapons in the Sudan: allegations and evidence’, The Nonproliferation Review (Fall 1998), pp. 115 – 36. 20. Richard Clarke chaired a mid level interagency committee called the Counter Terrorism Security Group (CSG), which was part of the NSC infrastructure. In 1998 he was appointed national coordinator for security, infrastructure protection and counterterrorism. 21. Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 Commission). Available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/ report/ (accessed 22 July 2013). 22. Alan Cullison, ‘Inside Al-Qaeda’s hard drive, budget squabbles, baby pictures, office rivalries – and the path to 9/11’, The Atlantic, 1 September 2004. Available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/09/inside-alqaeda-s-hard-drive/303428/ (accessed 22 August 2013); Gary Ackerman and Jeremy Tamsett (eds), Jihadists and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Boca Raton, FL: Auerbach and London: CRC Press, 2009), p. 452. 23. William S. Cohen, ‘This week with Sam Donaldson and Cokie Roberts, the Iraq situation’, ABC News, 16 November 1997. Available at http://homepage. ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/abc-cohen-19971116.html (accessed 20 June 1998; link no longer working). 24. ‘The Afghan-Arabs Part One’. 25. ‘Inside Al-Qaeda’s hard drive’.

276

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45 – 48

26. Ibid. 27. Alan Cullison and Andrew Higgins, ‘Computer in Kabul holds chilling memos: PC apparently used by al-Qaida leaders reveals details of four years of terrorism’, Wall Street Journal, 31 December 2001. Available at http:// www.culteducation.com/group/812-al-qaeda/157-computer-in-kabul-holdschilling-memos.html (accessed 31 December 2001). 28. Dan Darling, ‘Abu Khabab and Project al-Zabadi’, Long War Journal, 19 September 2005. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/ 2005/09/abu_khabab_and_1.php (accessed 25 September 2007). 29. Craig Whitlock and Munir Ladaa, ‘Al Qaeda’s new leadership, Midhat Mursi al-Sayid Umar, weapons expert and trainer, nationality: Egyptian’, Washington Post, 2006. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/specials/ terror/omar.html (accessed 14 August 2012). 30. Harmony Document AFGP-2002-000078, The Military Committee (undated). Available at https://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 2010/08/AFGP-2002-000078-Trans.pdf (accessed 7 September 2015); Douglas Frantz, ‘Experts fear “dirty bomb” attack in US, Europe: it’s not a matter of if but when, one official says’, Los Angeles Times, 9 May 2004. Available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-05-09/news/0405090374_1_nuclearweapons-dirty-bomb-al-qaeda (accessed 2 January 2010); Ed Blanche, ‘The al Qaeda weapons race continues: Osama bin Laden’s infamous “sorcerer”, Midhat Mursi Al Sayyid Umar, comes back from the dead and rekindles new fears that jihadists are pursuing chemical, biological and radiological weapons’, The Middle East, 1 May 2008. Available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/ Theþ AlþQaedaþweaponsþraceþcontinues%3aþOsamaþBinþLaden% 27sþinfamous. . .-a0178991396 (accessed 14 March 2012). 31. Some sources suggest that Khabab had formerly been employed in the Egyptian government’s CW programme, but there is no authoritative corroborating evidence for this. 32. Blanche, ‘The Al Qaeda weapons race continues’.

Chapter 4 Project Al Zabadi and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons 1. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Jihad Ahmed Diyab’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 21 April 2008. Available at https://www.wikileaks.org/ gitmo/name.html (accessed 2 June 2013). 2. Ed Blanche, ‘The al Qaeda weapons race continues: Osama bin Laden’s infamous “sorcerer”, Midhat Mursi Al Sayyid Umar, comes back from the dead and rekindles new fears that jihadists are pursuing chemical, biological and radiological weapons’, The Middle East, 1 May 2008. Available at http://www.thefreelibrary. com/Theþ AlþQaedaþweaponsþraceþcontinues%3aþOsamaþBinþ Laden%27s þ infamous. . .-a0178991396 (accessed 14 March 2012).

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3. Dan Darling, ‘Al Qaeda’s mad scientist: the significance of Abu Khabab’s death’, The Weekly Standard, 19 January 2006. Available at http://www. weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/602zqghe.asp? page¼ 2 (accessed 4 May 2014). 4. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Murtada al-Sa-id Makram’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 4 February 2007. Available at https://www.wikileaks. org/gitmo/name.html (accessed 2 June 2013). 5. Glenn Zorpette, ‘Patent blunder’, Scientific American, November 1998, p. 25. 6. Ibid. 7. Nic Robertson, ‘Disturbing scenes of death show capability with chemical gas’, CNN, 19 August 2002. Available at http://edition.cnn.com/2002/US/ 08/19/terror.tape.chemical/ (accessed 19 August 2002); Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Terrorist CBRN: materials and effects’, May 2003. Available at https:// www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/terrorist_cbrn/terrorist_CBRN. htm (accessed 22 May 2009). 8. Benjamin Cole, The Changing Face of Terrorism: How Real is the Threat from Biological, Chemical and Nuclear Weapons? (London: I.B.Tauris, 2011), p. 35. 9. Richard Falkenrath, Robert. D. Newman and Bradley Thayer, America’s Achilles Heel: Nuclear Biological and Chemical Terrorism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), p. 107. 10. Richard Falkenrath, ‘Confronting nuclear, biological and chemical terrorism’, Survival 40/3 (Autumn 1998), p. 48. 11. Interview, name withheld by request, 23 March 1999. 12. ‘The UK’s Bin Laden dossier in full’, BBC News Online, 4 October 2001. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/1579043.stm (accessed 4 October 2001). 13. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Saifullah Paracha’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 1 December 2008. Available at https://www.wikileaks.org/gitmo/ name.html (accessed 2 June 2013). 14. Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 Commission). Available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/ report/ (accessed 22 July 2013). 15. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Hamidallah’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 20 August 2004. Available at https://www.wikileaks.org/gitmo/ name.html (accessed 2 June 2013). 16. James Risen and Judith Miller, ‘A nation challenged: chemical weapons; Al Qaeda sites point to tests of chemicals’, New York Times, 11 November 2001. Available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/health/article-printpage.html? res¼9906E4D61538F932A25752C1A9679C8B63 (accessed 11 November 2001). 17. Global Security Newswire, ‘Report: terrorists seek to poison food at US restaurants, hotels’, 21 December 2010. Available at http://npsglobal.org/eng/ news/29-non-state-actors/901-terrorists-posion-food-us.html (accessed 22 January 2011).

278

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18. Ron Purver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism, New Threat to Public Safety, Conflict Studies 295 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1997), p. 2. 19. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Khaled Sheikh Mohammed’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 8 December 2006. Available at https://www.wikileaks. org/gitmo/name.html (accessed 2 June 2013). 20. ‘Inside Bin Laden’s academies of terror’, Sunday Times, 7 October 2001; Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Terrorist CBRN’; ‘Bin Laden’s biological threat’, BBC News Online, 28 October 2001. Available at http://news.bbc. co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/1612647.stm (accessed 28 October 2001); Alan Cullison and Andrew Higgins, ‘Computer in Kabul holds chilling memos: PC apparently used by al-Qaida leaders reveals details of four years of terrorism’, Wall Street Journal, 31 December 2001. Available at http://www.culteducation.com/group/812-al-qaeda/157computer-in-kabul-holds-chilling-memos.html (accessed 31 December 2001). 21. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United States, 31 March 2005, pp. 269 – 70. Available at https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/wmd_ report.pdf (accessed 14 February 2012). 22. Joby Warrick, ‘An Al Qaeda “chemist” and the quest for ricin’, Washington Post, 5 May 2004. Available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/ doc/409640378.html?FMT¼ABS&FMTS ¼ABS:FT&date¼Mayþ5% 2Cþ2004&author ¼Warrick%2CþJoby&desc¼AnþAlþQaedaþ%27 Chemist%27 þ and þ the þ Quest þ for þ Ricin (accessed 5 May 2004). 23. Ibid. 24. C.J. Chivers and David Rohde, ‘A nation challenged: Qaeda’s grocery lists and manuals of killing’, New York Times, 17 March 2002. Available at http://www. nytimes.com/2002/03/17/world/a-nation-challenged-qaeda-s-grocery-listsand-manuals-of-killing.html?pagewanted¼ all (accessed 17 March 2002); C.J. Chivers and David Rohde, ‘Turning out guerrillas and terrorists to wage a holy war’, New York Times, 18 March 2002. Available at http://www.nytimes. com/2002/03/18/world/turning-out-guerrillas-and-terrorists-to-wage-a-holywar.html (accessed 18 March 2002). 25. Severin Carrell and Raymond Whitaker, ‘Ricin: the plot that never was’, Independent, 4 July 2013. Available at http://www.independent.co.uk/ news/uk/crime/ricin-the-plot-that-never-was-2053.html (accessed 4 July 2013). 26. Cullison and Higgins, ‘Computer in Kabul holds chilling memos’. 27. W. Seth Carus, ‘A case study in biological terrorism: the Rajneesh In Oregon, 1984’, paper prepared for the Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, 29 July 1997, pp. 5 – 6; Conrad deFiebre, ‘Two convicted of possessing deadly poison’, Star Tribune, 1 March 1995, p. 1B.

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279

28. Dan Darling, ‘Abu Khabab and Project al-Zabadi’, Long War Journal, 19 September 2005. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/ 2005/09/abu_khabab_and_1.php (accessed 25 September 2007). 29. Cullison and Higgins, ‘Computer in Kabul holds chilling memos’. 30. Rene´ Pita and Rohan Gunaratna, ‘Revisiting Al-Qa’ida’s anthrax program’, CTC Sentinel 2/5 (May 2009). Available at http://carnegieendowment.org/ files/CTCSentinel-Vol2Iss5.pdf (accessed 7 April 2013). 31. Cullison and Higgins, ‘Computer in Kabul holds chilling memos’. 32. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Abdullah Abdallah Ibrahim al Sharakah’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 26 July 2007. Available at https://www. wikileaks.org/gitmo/name.html (accessed 2 June 2013). 33. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Tariq Ahmad’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 30 September 2008. Available at https://www.wikileaks.org/ gitmo/name.html (accessed 2 June 2013). 34. Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (London: I.B.Tauris, 2003), p. 187. 35. Milton Leitenberg, ‘Assessing the biological weapons and bioterrorism threat’, Strategic Studies Institute Monographs (December 2005), p. 30. Available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID¼ 639 (accessed 22 August 2008). 36. Ibid., pp. 28 and 60. 37. Robert Taylor, ‘All fall down’, New Scientist, 11 May 1996, p. 34. 38. Joby Warrick, ‘Suspect and a setback in Al-Qaeda anthrax case’, Washington Post, 31 October 2006. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/article/2006/10/30/AR2006103001250.html (accessed 31 October 2006); Global Security Newswire, ‘US frustrated in Al-Qaeda anthrax case’, 31 October 2006. Available at http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-frustrated-inal-qaeda-anthrax-case/ (accessed 2 November 2006; link no longer working). 39. Ross E. Getman, ‘Anthrax mystery: evidence points to al-Qaida’, Newsmax, 7 June 2007. Available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1859073/ posts (accessed 14 July 2007). 40. Leitenberg, ‘Assessing the biological weapons and bioterrorism threat’. 41. Warrick, ‘Suspect and a setback in Al-Qaeda anthrax case’. 42. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, ‘Al Qaeda weapons of mass destruction threat: hype or reality?’, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, January 2010, p. 15. Available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/ 19852/al_qaeda_weapons_of_mass_destruction_threat.html (accessed 22 July 2011). 43. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Hambali’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 30 October 2008. Available at https://www.wikileaks.org/gitmo/ name.html (accessed 2 June 2013). 44. Some sources state that he obtained a degree in biochemistry. 45. Leitenberg, ‘Assessing the biological weapons and bioterrorism threat’, p. 33; Mark Hosenball, ‘Terror watch: a germ warfare guru goes free’, Newsweek,

280

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47. 48. 49.

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51. 52. 53.

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NOTES TO PAGES 54 –56 17 December 2008. Available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/ 2008/12/16/a-germ-warfare-guru-goes-free.html (accessed 30 November 2012). Marc A. Thiessen, ‘Documented: the WikiLeaks that show enhanced interrogation worked’, World Affairs Journal (November/December 2011). Available at http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/documented-wikileaksshow-enhanced-interrogation-worked (accessed 2 January 2012). ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Ayman Batarfi’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 29 April 2008. Available at https://www.wikileaks.org/gitmo/ name.html (accessed 2 June 2013). Baluchi is KSM’s nephew and a cousin of Ramzi Youssef, the 1993 World Trade Center bomber. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Ammar al-Baluchi’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 8 December 2006, Available at https://www.wikileaks.org/ gitmo/name.html (accessed 2 June 2013); and ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Saifullah Paracha’. ‘Wanted women: Pakistani neuroscientist was on US “kill or capture” list’, NBC News, 17 January 2012. Available at http://investigations.nbcnews. com/_news/2012/01/17/10167616-wanted-women-pakistani-neuroscientistwas-on-us-kill-or-capture-list (accessed 4 July 2014). ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Saifullah Paracha’. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Ammar al- Baluchi’. ‘Israel secretly detained al-Qaeda suspect Baraq’, BBC News Online, 18 November 2013. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middleeast-24984373 (accessed 18 November 2013); ‘High court upholds Israel’s 3-year detention of Al-Qaida weapons expert’, Haaretz, 9 November 2013. Available at http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.558976 (accessed 18 November 2013). Thiessen, ‘Documented’. Real name, Ali Sayyid Muhamed Mustafa al-Bakri. ‘Al Qaeda sought nuclear scientists’, Washington Times, 11 April 2002. Available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2002/apr/11/20020411041846-3668r/ (accessed 2 May 2013). Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, pp. 272– 3. ‘Nuke plans found: Brit paper discovers details of weapons in Kabul safe house’, Toronto Sun, 15 November 2001; Hugh Dougherty, ‘Afghan nuclear weapons papers may be internet spoofs’, Press Association, 19 November 2001; ‘Osama Bin Laden’s bid to acquire weapons of mass destruction represents the greatest threat that Western civilization has faced’, Mail On Sunday, 23 June 2002. ‘Al-Qaeda nuclear plans confirmed’, BBC News Online, 16 November 2001. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/south_asia/newsid_ 1657000/1657901.stm (accessed 16 November 2001).

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60. David Albright, ‘Al Qaeda’s nuclear program: through the window of seized documents’, Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 6 November 2002. Available at http://nautilus.org/napsnet/special-policy-forum-911/ al-qaedas-nuclear-program-through-the-window-of-seized-documents/ (accessed 2 June 2015). 61. George Tenet, At The Center Of The Storm: My Years at the CIA (London: HarperCollins/Harper Press, 2007), p. 275. 62. Summary listing of incidents involving illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and other radioactive sources (4th quarter 1996)’, attached to IAEA’s letter of 29 January 1997, Reference N4.11.42. 63. ‘Al Qaeda sought nuclear scientists’. 64. ‘The Afghan-Arabs Part Two’, Asharq Al-Awsat, 1 July 2005. Available at http://english.aawsat.com/2005/07/article55270953/the-afghan-arabs-parttwo (accessed 16 March 2011). 65. Douglas Frantz, ‘Threats and responses: Qaeda’s bankrolls: front companies said to keep financing terrorists’, New York Times, 19 September 2002. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/19/world/threats-responsesqaeda-s-bankrolls-front-companies-said-keep-financing.html?pagewanted ¼ all&src¼pm (accessed 19 September 2002). 66. Benjamin Weiser, ‘US says Bin Laden aide tried to get nuclear weapons’, New York Times, 26 September 1998. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 1998/09/26/world/us-says-bin-laden-aide-tried-to-get-nuclear-material.html (accessed 8 August 2014). 67. Earl Lane and Knut Royce, ‘America’s ordeal/nuclear aspirations? Sources: Bin Laden tried to obtain enriched uranium’, Newsday, 18 September 2001. Available at http://www.newsday.com/news/america-s-ordeal-nuclear-aspirationssources-bin-laden-tried-to-obtain-enriched-uranium-1.788969 (accessed 2 February 2012). 68. ‘Arab security sources speak of a new scenario for Afghanistan: secret roaming networks that exchange nuclear weapons for drugs’, Asharq al-Awsat, 24 December 2000; Uthman Tizghart, ‘Does Bin Laden really possess weapons of mass destruction? Tale of Russian Mafia boss Simion Mogilevich who supplied with Bin Laden with the nuclear dirty bomb’, Al-Majallah, 25 November 2001. 69. Thom Shanker, ‘A nation challenged: bin Laden; US analysts find no sign bin Laden had nuclear arms’, New York Times, 26 February 2002. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/26/world/nation-challenged-bin-laden-usanalysts-find-no-sign-bin-laden-had-nuclear-arms.html?scp¼ 5&sq¼Lab% 20Suggests%20Qaeda%20Planned%20to%20Build%20Arms,%20Officials %20Say,&st¼cse&pagewanted¼2 (accessed 2 February 2013). 70. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Saifullah Parcha’. 71. Tenet, At the Center Of The Storm, p. 261; David Albright, Peddling Peril: How The Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies (New York: Free Press, 2010), p. 169.

282

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72. Jason Pate, Gary Ackerman and Kimberly McCloud, ‘2000 WMD terrorism chronology: incidents involving sub-national actors and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials’, Nonproliferation Review 7/2 (Summer 2000), pp. 157 – 74. 73. ‘Terrorist sought dirty bomb, say British prosecutors’, Global Security Newswire, 23 March 2006. Available at http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/ terrorist-sought-dirty-bomb-say-british-prosecutors/ (accessed 16 June 2011; link no longer working); ‘Terror gang tried to buy nuclear bomb’, Daily Mail, 22 March 2006. Available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article380725/Terror-gang-tried-buy-nuclear-bomb.html#ixzz2IbnmKqyd (accessed 22 March 2006). 74. Adam Nathan and David Leppard, ‘Bin Laden’s nuclear plot: Al-Qaeda’s men held secret meetings to build “dirty bomb”’, Sunday Times, 14 October 2001. 75. Ryan Mauro, ‘Al-Qaeda’s hidden arsenal and sponsors: interview with Hamid Mir’, Canada Free Press, 25 May 2006. Available at http://canadafreepress. com/2006/mauro052506.htm (accessed 2 March 2015). 76. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Abdul Abis Ougry’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 22 June 2007. Available at https://www.wikileaks.org/ gitmo/name.html (accessed 2 June 2013). 77. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Fahd Umr al-Majid al-Sharif’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 1 September 2006. Available at https://www.wikileaks. org/gitmo/name.html (accessed 2 June 2013). 78. Burke, Al Qaeda, p. 187. 79. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Abd al Aziz Abduh Abdallah Ali alSuwaydi’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 9 June 2008. Available at https://www.wikileaks.org/gitmo/name.html (accessed 2 June 2013); ‘JTFGTMO Detainee Assessment, Fayiz Ahmad Yahia Sulyman’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 14 April 2008. Available at https://www.wikileaks.org/ gitmo/name.html (accessed 2 June 2013). Botulinum was known to al Qaeda as rotten-meat poison because of the production method it used. 80. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Mohammed al-Hattabi’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 12 May 2008. Available at https://www.wikileaks.org/ gitmo/name.html (accessed 2 June 2013). 81. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Jaralah al-Mari’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 6 September 2007. Available at https://www.wikileaks.org/gitmo/ name.html (accessed 2 June 2013); ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Muhammad Abdullah Muhammad al-Hamiri’. 82. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Umar Bin Hamza Abdallahyiv’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 27 February 2008. Available at https:// www.wikileaks.org/gitmo/name.html (accessed 2 June 2013); ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Min Gazov Arivil’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 14 March 2008. Available at https://www.wikileaks.org/gitmo/name.html (accessed 2 June 2013).

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83. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Salah Dhab’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 3 September 2004. Available at https://www.wikileaks.org/gitmo/ name.html (accessed 2 June 2013). 84. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Ismaiil Saiid Ali Bin Nasr’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 21 August 2008. Available at https://www.wikileaks. org/gitmo/name.html (accessed 2 June 2013). 85. Stephen Ulph, ‘Al-Qaeda’s weapons specialist killed in Pakistani airstrike’, Terrorism Focus 3/3 (27 January 2006). Available at http://www.jamestown. org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D¼ 635&tx_ttnews% 5BbackPid%5D ¼ 239&no_cache ¼ 1 (accessed 4 March 2012); Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States, pp. 269– 70; ‘JTFGTMO Detainee Assessment, Mohammedou Ould Salahi’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 3 March 2008. Available at https://www.wikileaks.org/ gitmo/name.html (accessed 2 June 2013); Warrick, ‘An Al Qaeda “chemist”’; Rene´ Pita, ‘Al-Qa’ida and the chemical threat’, The ASA Newsletter 108 (2005), p. A01. Available at http://www.asanltr.com/newsletter/05-3/articles/053a. htm (accessed 16 June 2011); Leitenberg, ‘Assessing the biological weapons and bioterrorism threat’, p. 28. 86. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Alisheer Hamidullah’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 2 August 2005. Available at https://www.wikileaks.org/ gitmo/name.html (accessed 2 June 2013). 87. Gary Gambill, ‘Abu Musab al-Zarqawi: a biographical sketch’, Terrorism Monitor II/24 (16 December 2004). Available at http://www.jamestown.org/ single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]¼27304 (accessed 22 April 2012); Mowatt-Larssen, ‘Al Qaeda weapons of mass destruction threat’. 88. ‘Profile of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’, Homeland Security, 1 November 2006. Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/abu_musab_ al-zarqawi.htm (accessed 5 August 2011). 89. Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al Qaeda Strategist Abu Musab al-Suri (London: Hurst and Company, 2007), pp. 240 and 253; Malise Ruthven, ‘The rise of the Muslim terrorists’, New York Review of Books (29 May 2008), pp. 33 – 6, 34. Available at http://www.nybooks.com/ articles/2008/05/29/the-rise-of-the-muslim-terrorists/ (accessed 16 September 2012). 90. Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, pp. 307– 11; Paul Cruickshank and Mohanad Hage Ali, ‘Web of terror’, Seattle Times, 25 June 2006. Available at http:// seattletimes.com/html/opinion/2003081872_sundayjihad25.html (accessed 18 November 2014). 91. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Abdullah Alamatrafi’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 25 October 2007. Available at https://www.wikileaks.org/ gitmo/name.html (accessed 2 June 2015). 92. Ibid. 93. Ibid. 94. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Ayman Batarfi’.

284

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62 –63

95. Thomas Joscelyn gives his name as Jamil Ahmed Said Nassir. Thomas Joscelyn, ‘Al Qaeda’s anthrax scientist’, 12 December 2008. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/12/al_qaedas_anthrax_sc. php#ixzz1g7oj5s4b (accessed 14 August 2014). 96. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Ayman Batarfi’. 97. Leitenberg, ‘Assessing the biological weapons and bioterrorism threat’, p. 34; ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Hambali’; ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Khaled Sheikh Mohammed’. 98. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Jamal Mari’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 5 May 2008. Available at https://www.wikileaks.org/gitmo/name. html (accessed 2 June 2015). 99. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 269. 100. Judith Miller, ‘Terrorist weapons: lab suggests Qaeda planned to build arms, officials say’, New York Times, 14 September 2002. Available at http:// www.nytimes.com/2002/09/14/international/asia/14LAB.html?scp¼ 1& sq¼Lab%20Suggests%20Qaeda%20Planned%20to%20Build%20Arms,% 20Officials%20Say,&st¼cse (accessed 15 September 2002). 101. Ibid. 102. Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, p. 151. 103. Maria Ressa, ‘Reports: Al Qaeda operative sought anthrax’, CNN, 10 October 2003. Available at http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/10/ 10/alqaeda.anthrax/ (accessed 16 November 2014); Lauren Johnston, ‘Is alQaeda making anthrax’, CBS News, 9 October 2003. Available at http://www. cbsnews.com/news/is-al-qaeda-making-anthrax/ (accessed 22 December 2011); Bill Sanderson, ‘Qaeda man discloses anthrax plan’, New York Post, 10 October 2003. Available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/nypost/doc/334128226.html? FMT¼ABS&FMTS ¼ ABS:FT&type ¼ current&date¼Oct þ 10%2C þ 2003&author¼Sanderson%2C þ Bill&pub¼New þ York þ Post&edition¼ &startpage¼025&desc¼QAEDAþMANþDISCLOSESþ%27THRAXþ PLAN (accessed 14 June 2011); Lincoln Wright, ‘Hambali’s taunt: we’ll kill again’, Herald Sun, 12 October 2003. 104. Leitenberg, ‘Assessing the biological weapons and bioterrorism threat’, pp. 34, 37. 105. David Albright and Holly Higgins, ‘A bomb for the Ummah’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59/2 (March/April 2003), pp. 49 – 55. Available at http:// thebulletin.org/2003/march/bomb-ummah (accessed 8 May 2010). 106. Toby Harnden, ‘Rogue scientists gave Bin Laden nuclear secrets’, Daily Telegraph, 13 December 2001. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ education/3291886/Rogue-scientists-gave-bin-Laden-nuclear-secrets.html (accessed 13 December 2001). 107. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Abdullah Alamatrafi’. 108. Ibid.

NOTES

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285

109. Mahmood’s son claims that bin Laden approached Mahmood directly, several months before 11 September 2001, about making nuclear weapons. Albright and Higgins, ‘A bomb for the Ummah’. 110. Albright, Peddling Peril, p. 179. 111. Barbie Dutter and Michael Smith, ‘Inside Bin Laden’s “nuclear arsenal”’, Daily Telegraph, 23 December 2001. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/1366219/Inside-bin-Ladens-nucleararsenal.html (accessed 23 December 2001). 112. Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, p. 268; Robert Windrem, ‘Pakistan’s nuclear history worries insiders’, NBC News, 11 June 2007. Available at http://www. nbcnews.com/id/21660667/#.VlVUhr9g6Fo (accessed 4 May 2012); Kaushik Kapisthalam, ‘Pakistan’s forgotten al-Qaeda nuclear link’, Asia Times, 4 June 2004. Available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FF04Df05. html (accessed 14 September 2013); Dutter and Smith, ‘Inside Bin Laden’s “nuclear arsenal”’. 113. Albright and Higgins, ‘A bomb for the Ummah’. 114. Nick Fielding, Joe Laurier and Gareth Walsh, ‘Bin Laden “Almost had uranium bomb”’, Sunday Times, 3 March 2002. 115. ‘Bin Laden’s biological threat’. 116. Douglas Frantz with David Rohde, ‘A nation challenged: biological terror; 2 Pakistanis linked to papers on anthrax weapons’, New York Times (28 November 2001). Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/28/world/ nation-challenged-biological-terror-2-pakistanis-linked-papers-anthraxweapons.html?pagewanted¼all (accessed 18 March 2011); ‘Sketches of anthrax bomb found in Pakistani scientist’s office’, Rediff.com, 28 November 2001. Available at http://www.rediff.com/us/2001/nov/28ny5.htm (accessed 2 June 2013).

Chapter 5 Al Qaeda’s Strategy Begins to Emerge, 1988– 2001 1. Michael Barletta, ‘Chemical weapons in the Sudan: allegations and evidence’, The Nonproliferation Review (Fall 1998), pp. 118– 19. 2. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, ‘Failure of intelligence?’, New York Times, 20 December 2001. Available at http://csis.org/press/csis-in-the-news/failureintelligence (accessed 17 September 2012). 3. Barletta, ‘Chemical weapons in the Sudan’, pp. 121– 2. 4. Ibid., p. 120. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid., p. 124. 7. Ibid., pp. 124 – 5. 8. Ibid., pp. 123 – 6. 9. Benjamin and Simon, ‘Failure of intelligence?’.

286

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68 –72

10. Ibid. 11. ‘UK says “embassies bomber” wants chemical weapons’, BBC News Online, 23 August 1998. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/157080.stm (accessed 23 August 1998). 12. Benjamin and Simon, ‘Failure of intelligence?’. 13. ‘US claims more evidence linking Sudanese plant to chemical weapons’, CNN, 1 September 1998. Available at http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/africa/9809/ 01/sudan.plant (accessed 16 August 2012). 14. ‘Wrath of God’, Time, 11 January 1999. Available at http://www. time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2054517,00.html (accessed 8 September 2011). 15. Muhammad Salah, ‘Bin Ladin front reportedly bought CBW from E. Europe’, Al-Hayah, 20 April 1999 and ‘US said interrogating jihadist over CBW’, Al-Hayah, 21 April 1999. 16. ‘Islamist lawyer on Bin Laden groups’, Asharq al-Awsat, 12 July 1999. 17. Guido Olimpio, ‘Islamic group said preparing chemical warfare on the West’, Corriere della Sera, 8 July 1998; Yossef Bodansky, Bin Laden: The Man who Declared War on America (Roseville, CA: Prima, 2001), p. 326. 18. David Johnston, ‘The nation; what is (un)known about Al Qaeda in America’, New York Times, 30 May 2004. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/ 05/30/weekinreview/the-nation-what-is-un-known-about-al-qaeda-in-america. html (accessed 2 March 2013). 19. The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United States, 31 March 2005, pp. 269 – 70. Available at https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ wmd_report.pdf (accessed 16 August 2012). 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. Ibid. 23. ‘Afghan alliance – UBL trying to make chemical weapons’, Parwan Payam-eMojahed, 23 December 1999; ‘Bin Laden set to strike again,’ ABC News, 16 June 1999. 24. Earl Lane and Knut Royce, ‘America’s ordeal/nuclear aspirations? Sources: Bin Laden tried to obtain enriched uranium’, Newsday, 18 September 2001. Available at http://www.newsday.com/news/america-s-ordeal-nuclearaspirations-sources-bin-laden-tried-to-obtain-enriched-uranium-1.788969 (accessed 2 February 2012). 25. Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 Commission). Available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/ report/ (accessed 22 July 2013). 26. Rowan Scarborough, Rumsfeld’s War: The Untold Story of America’s Anti-Terrorist Commander (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2003), pp. 196 – 7. 27. James Risen, ‘To bomb Sudan plant, or not: a year later, debates rankle’, New York Times, 27 October 1999. Available at http://web.archive.org/

NOTES

28.

29. 30.

31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

43. 44.

45. 46. 47.

TO PAGES

72 –76

287

web/20060909050523/http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/ sudbous.htm (accessed 7 February 2014). Dan Darling, ‘Al Qaeda’s mad scientist: the significance of Abu Khabab’s death’, The Weekly Standard, 19 January 2006. Available at http://www. weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/602zqghe.asp? page¼ 2 (accessed 4 May 2014). The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States. Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors, CM 6492, House of Commons, 14 July 2004, p. 35. Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment_data/file/61171/wmdreview.pdf (accessed 20 July 2005). Ibid. Frank Gardner, ‘Al-Qaeda “was making dirty bomb”’, BBC News Online, 31 January 2003. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2711645.stm (accessed 31 January 2003). Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, pp. 35– 6. Ibid., p. 32. Ibid. Ibid., p. 33. Ibid. The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States, pp. 275 –6. The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 343. The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States, pp. 272 –3. George Tenet, At The Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (London: HarperCollins/Harper Press, 2007), pp. 259 –60. Ibid., pp. 264 and 268; Rajesh Kumar Mishra, ‘Nuclear safety and security in Pakistan: under the shades of terrorism’, South Asia Analysis Group Paper No. 520, 20 September 2002. Available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/ %5Cpapers6%5Cpaper520.html (accessed 4 July 2011; link no longer working). The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 141. ‘May 1998 interview with Bin Ladin reported Islamabad Pakistan’, 20 February 1999, in ‘Compilation of Usama bin Ladin statements 1994– January 2002’, FBIS report (January 2004), p. 114. Available at http://fas.org/ irp/world/para/ubl-fbis.pdf (accessed 2 September 2013). ‘Esquire Interview With Bin Ladin’ (February 1999), ibid., p. 99. Steve Coll, ‘What Bin Laden sees in Hiroshima’, Washington Post, 6 February 2005. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A3652005Feb5.html (accessed 4 March 2010). ‘The man who knew’, PBS, 3 October 2002. Available at http://www.pbs.org/ wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/knew/etc/script.html (accessed 8 January 2012); The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 137 – 8.

288

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77 –83

48. Compilation of Usama Bin Ladin Statements. 49. Peter Bergen, The Osama Bin Laden I Know (New York: Free Press, 2006), p. 339. 50. ‘Abu Shiraz, interview with Bin Ladin reported’ (May 1998), in Compilation of Usama Bin Ladin Statements, pp. 112– 13. 51. Ibid. 52. ‘Osama Bin Laden vs the US. Statements and edicts’, PBS Online, 24 December 1998. Available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ shows/binladen/who/edicts.html (accessed 22 January 2011). 53. ‘Wrath of God’. 54. Richard Falkenrath, ‘Confronting nuclear, biological and chemical terrorism’, Survival 40/3 (Autumn 1998), p. 44. 55. ‘New world coming: American security in the 21st century’, Phase 1 Report of the US Commission on National Security (15 September 1999). Available at http://fas.org/man/docs/nwc/nwc.htm (accessed 8 July 2013). 56. Barry Schweid, ‘US suggests Iraq got weapons from Sudan’, Record (New Jersey), 27 August 1998. 57. Pamela Hess, ‘Al Qaida may have chemical weapons’, UPI, 19 August 2002. Available at http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2002/08/ 19/Al-Qaida-may-have-chemical-weapons/UPI-85291029788719/ (accessed 16 November 2014). 58. ‘Arab security sources speak of a new scenario for Afghanistan: secret roaming networks that exchange nuclear weapons for drugs’, Asharq al-Awsat, 24 December 2000. 59. Sa’id al-Qaysi, ‘US said aborted planned attack on Bin Ladin for fear of “chemical strike”’, Al-Watan al-Arabi, 16 February 2001.

Chapter 6 Opting for Deterrence, 1999 –2001 1. Julian O’Halloran, ‘US nuclear plants exposed to attacks’, BBC News Online, 5 September 2002. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ americas/2238891.stm (accessed 5 September 2002); Bill Gertz, ‘Nuclear plants targeted’, Washington Times, 31 January 2002. Available at http:// www.ohiocitizen.org/campaigns/electric/pre2003/plants_targeted.htm (accessed 14 May 2013); John J. Lumpkin, ‘Diagrams show interest in nuke plants’, Associated Press, 30 January 2002. 2. ‘Abu Ghaith and al Qa’ida’s dissident faction in Iran’, Jihadica, 11 March 2013. Available at http://www.jihadica.com/abu-ghaith-andal-qaidas-dissident-faction-in-iran/ (accessed 2 June 2014; link no longer working). 3. ‘Al-Jazeera interviews bin Laden deputee Abu Hafs al-Mauritani’, 11 December 2001. Available at https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/soc.culture.usa/ b4XqGY82ZtU (accessed 14 September 2013).

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4. ‘Abu Ghaith and al Qa’ida’s dissident faction in Iran’. 5. Ibid. 6. Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 Commission). Available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/ report/ (accessed 22 July 2013); ‘Khalid Shaykh Mohammed, pre-eminent source on al Qaeda’, Central Intelligence Agency, 13 July 2004. Available at http://www.ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/files/CIA%20KSM%20 Preeminent%20Source.pdf (accessed 14 August 2013). 7. The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 153. 8. ‘Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’. 9. Kaushik Kapisthalam, ‘Pakistan’s forgotten al-Qaeda nuclear link’, Asia Times, 4 June 2004. Available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ FF04Df05.html (accessed 18 June 2011). 10. The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 153. 11. Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, ‘The unraveling’, New Republic, 11 June 2008. Available at https://newrepublic.com/article/64819/the-unraveling (accessed 4 May 2014). 12. Rajeh Said, ‘Al-Qaeda sought to acquire weapons of mass destruction, jihadist says’, CentralAsiaOnline.com, 29 September 2010. Available at http://camilletawil.blogspot.co.uk/2010/10/al-qaeda-sought-to-acquireweapons-of.html (accessed 8 January 2015); Camille Tawil, ‘The other face of Al-Qaeda’, trans Maryam El-Hajbi and Mustafa Abulhima, November 2010, pp. 7–12. Available at http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/ uploads/publications/free/the-other-face-of-al-qaeda.pdf (accessed 8 January 2015). 13. Tenet, George, At the Center Of The Storm: My Years At The CIA (London: HarperCollins/Harper Press, 2007) pp. 353– 4; ‘Rice: Iraq trained al Qaeda in chemical weapons’, CNN, 26 September 2002. Available at http://edition. cnn.com/2002/US/09/25/us.iraq.alqaeda/ (accessed 4 June 2010); Douglas Jehl, ‘High Qaeda aide retracted claim of link with Iraq’, New York Times, 31 July 2004. Available at http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article 6587.htm (accessed 4 June 2010). 14. Baluchi is KSM’s nephew and a cousin of Ramzi Youssef, the 1993 WTC bomber. 15. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Ammar al-Baluchi’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks 8 December 2006. Available at https://www.wikileaks.org/ gitmo/name.html (accessed 2 June 2013); JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Saifullah Paracha, WikiLeaks, 1 December 2008. Available at https://www. wikileaks.org/gitmo/name.html (accessed 2 June 2013). 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. Sam Stanton, ‘Two CSUS grads implicated in al-Qaida plot in Malaysia’, The Sacremento Bee, 20 April 2002. Available at http://www.sacbee.com/ content/news/projects/attacks/story/2276641p-2690988c.html (accessed 8 August 2010; link no longer working).

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19. Maria Ressa, ‘Reports: Al Qaeda operative sought anthrax’, CNN, 10 October 2003. Available at http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/ 10/10/alqaeda.anthrax/ (accessed 16 November 2014). 20. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, ‘Al Qaeda weapons of mass destruction threat: hype or reality?’, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, January 2010. Available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19852/al_qaeda_ weapons_of_mass_destruction_threat.html (accessed 22 July 2011); United States Department of State; ‘Wanted: Abderraouf Ben Habib Jdey’, Rewards For Justice. Available at http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/index.cfm? page¼abderraouf (accessed 14 June 2010); Massimo Calabresi and Sally Donnelly, ‘Cropduster manual discovered’, Time, 22 September 2001. Available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,175951,00.html (accessed 4 March 2011). 21. David Filipov, ‘New fears Chechens may seek nukes, suspicious events concern Russians’, Boston Globe, 2 December 2002. Available at http://nuclearno.com/ text.asp?4526 (accessed 18 May 2009); ‘Radiation alert at Chechen plant’, BBC News Online, 16 December 2005. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/ hi/world/europe/4535452.stm (accessed 16 December 2005); ‘Russian nuclear material stolen during war in Chechnya’, Sunday Times, 10 November 1996. 22. Nikolai Sokov and William C. Potter, ‘Suitcase nukes: a reassessment’, Research Stories, Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, 23 September 2002. Available at http://cns.miis.edu/stories/020923.htm (accessed 14 February 2010; link no longer working). 23. ‘Chechnya special weapons’, Federation of American Scientists (undated). Available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/chechnya/ (accessed 7 June 2013). 24. Filipov, ‘New fears Chechens may seek nukes’; ‘Russian nuclear material stolen during war in Chechnya’. 25. ‘Full text of “Global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”’, hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 104th Congress, 1st Session, and 2nd Session, part 2 (13, 20 and 22 March 1996). Available at http://www. archive.org/stream/globalproliferat02unit/globalproliferat02unit_djvu.txt (accessed 7 June 2013). 26. ‘Chechnya special weapons’. 27. Emil Pain, ‘The second Chechen war: the information component’, Military Review (July – August 2000). Available at http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/ documents/secchech/secchech.htm (accessed 9 September 2014). 28. ‘Eto moglo sluchitsya tolko zdes’, Komsomolskaya Pravda, 1 December 1996, p. 5; ‘Yadernaya bomba dlya Chechni’, Komsomolskaya Pravda, 23 August 1996; ‘The press in Russia’, BBC News Online, 16 May 2008. Available at http:// news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4315129.stm (accessed 16 May 2008). 29. Sokov and Potter, ‘Suitcase nukes: a reassessment’. 30. Ibid.

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31. Curt Weldon, ‘Opening statement’, Military Research and Development Subcommittee Hearings on Nuclear Terrorism and Countermeasures, 1 October 1997. Available at http://ftp.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1997_h/ h971001w.htm (accessed 14 September 2013). 32. Marie Colvin, ‘Holy war with US in his sights’, The Times, 16 August 1998. In September 2001 an unnamed French counter-terrorism expert also claimed that bin Laden had bought 48 suitcase nuclear weapons from the Russian mafia; ‘Al-Majallah obtains serious information on al-Qa’ida’s attempt to acquire nuclear arms’, Al-Majallah, 8 September 2002. 33. ‘Analysts, officials discount claims that Al Qaeda has stolen Russian “suitcase nuke”’, Nuclear Threat Initiative Analysis, 11 February 2004. Available at http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/analysts-officials-discount-claims-alqueda-has-stolen-russian-suitcase-nuke/ (accessed 4 October 2011). 34. Jeffrey Bale, ‘The Chechen resistance and radiological terrorism’, Nuclear Threat Initiative Analysis, 1 April 2004. Available at http://www.nti.org/analysis/ articles/chechen-resistance-radiological-terror/ (accessed 6 October 2011). 35. Lorenzo Vidino, ‘How Chechnya became a breeding ground for terror’, Middle East Quarterly (Summer 2005), pp. 57– 66. Available at http://www.meforum. org/744/how-chechnya-became-a-breeding-ground-for-terror (accessed 6 October 2011). 36. Nick Fielding, ‘Bin Laden’s dirty bomb quest exposed’, The Times, 19 December 2004. 37. ‘Report links Bin Ladin, nuclear weapons’, Al-Watan Al-’Arabi, 13 November 1998; Emil Torabi, ‘Bin Laden’s nuclear weapons’, Muslim Magazine (Winter 1998), pp. 20 – 1. 38. Bruce G. Blair, ‘What if terrorists go nuclear’, Terrorism Project, Centre for Defense Information, 1 October 2001. Available at http://www.cdi.org/ terrorism/nuclear.cfm (accessed 8 May 2011). 39. ‘Chechnya declares war on USA’, PTI, 23 August 1998. Available at http:// www.tribuneindia.com/1998/98aug24/world.htm#2 (accessed 22 June 2013). 40. Bale, ‘The Chechen resistance and radiological terrorism’. 41. Brian Whitmore, ‘Could the Chechnya war take a nuclear turn?’, Moscow Times, 15 October 1999. Available at http://www.themoscowtimes.com/ news/article/tmt/271303.html (accessed 8 January 2013). 42. Yusef Bodanski, ‘U terrorista No 1 yest atomnaya bomba’, Komsomolskaya Pravda, 5 October 1999. 43. ‘The Afghan-Arabs Part Two’, Asharq Al-Awsat, 1 July 2005. Available at http://english.aawsat.com/2005/07/article55270953/the-afghan-arabs-parttwo (accessed 16 March 2011); Vidino, ‘How Chechnya became a breeding ground for terror’. 44. Adam Geibel, ‘Poisoned clouds over deadly streets: Grozny, December 1999– January 2000’, Military Review 82/1 (January – February 2002). 45. ‘Radiation alert at Chechen plant’. 46. Geibel, ‘Poisoned clouds over deadly streets’.

292 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55.

56.

57.

58.

59.

60.

61. 62. 63.

NOTES

TO PAGES

93 – 95

Ibid. ‘Radiation alert at Chechen plant’. Geibel, ‘Poisoned clouds over deadly streets’. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Filipov, ‘New fears Chechens may seek nukes’. Geibel, ‘Poisoned clouds over deadly streets’. Gavin Cameron, Jason Pate, Diana McCauley and Lindsay DeFazio, ‘1999 WMD terrorism chronology: incidents involving sub-national actors and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials’, Nonproliferation Review 7/2 (Summer 2000), pp. 157–74. Available at https://www.researchgate. net/publication/254334616_1999_WMD_terrorism_chronology_Incidents_ involving_sub-national_actors_and_chemical_biological_radiological_and_ nuclear_materials (accessed 18 September 2013); Jason Pate, Gary Ackerman and Kimberly McCloud, ‘2000 WMD terrorism chronology: incidents involving sub-national actors and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials’, Nonproliferation Review 7/2 (Summer 2000), pp. 157–74. ‘Text: Sestanovich statement on Chechnya to Senate Committee’, Global Security, 4 November 1999. Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/library/news/1999/11/991104-chechen-usia1.htm (accessed 8 May 2013). ‘Text: US response to Human Rights Commission Resolution on Chechnya’, statement issued by Harold Hongju Koh and Nancy Rubin in Geneva, 26 April 2000. Available at http://www.usembassy-israel.org.il/ publish/press/state/archive/2000/april/sd50427.htm (accessed 8 May 2013). Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, ‘Al Qaeda’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction: the authoritative timeline’, Foreign Policy, 25 January 2010. Available at http:// foreignpolicy.com/2010/01/25/al-qaedas-pursuit-of-weapons-of-massdestruction/ (accessed 14 June 2011). ‘Al-Qaeda operatives discussed WMD attacks while training prior to 9/11, report says’, Global Security Newswire, 16 June 2004. Available at http:// www.nti.org/gsn/article/al-qaeda-operatives-discussed-wmd-attacks-whiletraining-prior-to-911-report-says/ (accessed 2 December 2013). ‘JTF GTMO-CG, Memorandum for Commander, United States Southern Command, 351 1 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL33172. SUBJECT: recommendation to a retain under DoD Control (DoD) for Guantanamo Detainee, Detainee, ISN: US9EG-000661DP Mamdouh Salim’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 6 August 2004. Available at https://www.wikileaks.org/ gitmo/name.html (accessed 2 June 2013). ‘Diagrams show interest in nuke plants’, Associated Press, 30 January 2002. Peter Bergen, The Osama Bin Laden I Know (New York: Free Press, 2006), pp. 337 –8. Mowatt-Larssen, ‘Al Qaeda’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction’.

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64. ‘60 Minutes II: The Millennium Plot’, CBS News, 11 February 2009. Available at http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-500164_162-313398.html (accessed 8 January 2011). 65. Ibid. 66. Ibid. 67. Ibid. 68. Cameron et al., ‘1999 WMD terrorism chronology’; ‘US suspects al Qaeda got nerve agent from Iraqis’, Washington Post, 12 December 2002. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/12/ AR2006061200701_3.html (accessed 19 October 2011). 69. ‘Profile: Abu Zubaydah’, BBC News Online, 2 April 2002. Available at http:// news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1907462.stm (accessed 2 April 2002). 70. ‘60 Minutes II’. 71. ‘Inside Bin Laden’s academies of terror’, Sunday Times, 7 October 2001; Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Terrorist CBRN: materials and effects’, May 2003. Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/ terrorist_cbrn/terrorist_CBRN.htm (accessed 22 May 2009); ‘Bin Laden’s biological threat’, BBC News Online, 28 October 2001. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/1612647.stm (accessed 28 October 2001); Alan Cullison and Andrew Higgins, ‘Computer in Kabul holds chilling memos’, Wall Street Journal, 31 December 2001. Available at http://www.culteducation.com/group/812-al-qaeda/157-com puter-in-kabul-holds-chilling-memos.html (accessed 31 December 2001). 72. Sharon Begley, ‘Unmasking bioterror’, Newsweek, 8 October 2001. Available at http://europe.newsweek.com/unmasking-bioterror-154159?rm¼ eu (accessed 20 December 2001). 73. Lawrence Wright, ‘The man behind Bin Laden’, New Yorker, 16 September 2002. Available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2002/09/16/020916fa_ fact2#ixzz1sIyjHDUpAl.e (accessed 8 June 2010). 74. Begley, ‘Unmasking bioterror’. 75. Jeff Israely, ‘The second time around’, Time, 25 February 2002. Available at http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,212739,00.html (accessed 20 August 2013); ‘Raids yield clues to Europe-wide terrorist network’, The Times, 25 January 2003; Bruce Johnston, Ben Fenton and Sean O’Neill, ‘Cyanide plot to poison Rome water’, Daily Telegraph, 21 February 2002. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/ 1385585/Cyanide-plot-to-poison-Rome-water.html (accessed 21 February 2002). 76. John Follain and Nicholas Rufford, ‘Cyanide threat: tapes reveal poison plan’, 14 October 2001. Available at http://www.papillonsartpalace.com/cyanide. htm (accessed 29 July 2011; link no longer working). 77. Israely, ‘The second time around’; ‘Raids yield clues to Europe-wide terrorist network’; Johnston et al., ‘Cyanide plot to poison Rome water’.

294

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Chapter 7

TO PAGES

99 –100

The End of Project Al Zabadi

1. George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (London: HarperCollins/Harper Press, 2007), p. 259. 2. Milton Leitenburg, ‘Assessing the biological weapons and bioterrorism threat’, Strategic Studies Institute Monographs (December 2005), p. 45. Available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm? pubID¼639 (accessed 22 August 2008). 3. James Clark, Tony Allen-Mills and Stephen Grey, ‘SAS troops clash with Taliban unit deep inside Afghanistan’, Sunday Times, 23 September 2001. 4. Earl Lane and Knut Royce, ‘America’s ordeal/nuclear aspirations? Sources: Bin Laden tried to obtain enriched uranium’, Newsday, 18 September 2001. Available at http://www.newsday.com/news/america-s-ordeal-nuclearaspirations-sources-bin-laden-tried-to-obtain-enriched-uranium-1.788969 (accessed 2 February 2012). 5. ‘Moussaoui “slipped through net”’, BBC News Online, 12 December, 2001. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1706326.stm (accessed 12 December 2001); Maria Ressa, ‘Reports: Al Qaeda operative sought anthrax’, CNN, 10 October 2003. Available at http://edition.cnn.com/ 2003/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/10/10/alqaeda.anthrax/ (accessed 16 November 2014). 6. Massimo Calabresi and Sally Donnelly, ‘Cropduster manual discovered’, Time, 22 September 2001. Available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/ article/0,8599,175951,00.html (accessed 8 March 2014); Ben Fenton, ‘US airport staff face security screening’, Daily Telegraph, 24 September 2001. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/ 1341595/US-airport-staff-face-security-screening.html (accessed 24 September 2001). 7. Gary Fields and Daniel Machalaba, ‘FBI steps up checks on trucks carrying hazardous materials’, Wall Street Journal, 28 September 2001. Available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1001635418140140480 (accessed 28 May 2014); ‘Possible plans for chemical attacks feared’, ABC News (undated). Available at http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id¼ 92428&page¼1 (accessed 1 June 2015). 8. Sharon Begley, ‘Unmasking bioterror’, Newsweek, 8 October 2001. Available at http://europe.newsweek.com/unmasking-bioterror-154159?rm¼ eu (accessed 22 February 2011). 9. John J. Lumpkin, ‘Diagrams show interest in nuke plants’ Associated Press, 30 January 2002. 10. Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, p. 268. 11. David Bamber, Chris Hastings and Rajeev Syal, ‘Bin Laden British cell planned gas attack on European Parliament’, Sunday Telegraph, 16 September 2001. 12. Clark, Allen-Mills and Grey, ‘SAS troops clash with Taliban unit’.

NOTES

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13. ‘New threat of chemical war’, Metro, 19 September 2001. 14. James Gordon Meek, ‘FBI was told to blame anthrax scare on Al Qaeda by White House officials’, New York Daily News, 2 August 2008. Available at http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/fbi-told-blame-anthrax-scare-alqaeda-white-house-officials-article-1.312733#ixzz1g7oBzC8Y (accessed 18 March 2014); Anthony Loyd, ‘Bin Laden’s nuclear secrets found’, The Times, 15 November 2001. 15. Catherine Elsworth, ‘Suicide scientist “was sole anthrax terrorist”’, Daily Telegraph, 6 August 2008. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ worldnews/northamerica/usa/2513189/Suicide-scientist-was-sole-anthraxterrorist.html (accessed 6 August 2008). 16. William Langley, ‘Revealed: what really went on during the Bush missing hours’, Daily Telegraph, 16 December 2001. Available at http://www. telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1365455/Revealed-whatreally-went-on-during-Bushs-missing-hours.html (accessed 16 December 2001). 17. ‘The UK’s Bin Laden dossier in full’, BBC News Online, 4 October 2001. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/1579043.stm (accessed 4 October 2001). 18. Rory McCarthy, ‘Bin Laden denies anthrax attacks in Islamabad’, Guardian, 12 November 2001. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/nov/ 12/afghanistan.anthrax?INTCMP¼ILCNETTXT3487 (accessed 12 November 2001). 19. James Risen and Judith Miller, ‘A nation challenged: chemical weapons; Al Qaeda sites point to tests of chemicals’, New York Times, 11 November 2001. Available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/health/article-printpage.html? res¼9906E4D61538F932A25752C1A9679C8B63 (accessed 11 November 2011). 20. McCarthy, ‘Bin Laden denies anthrax attacks in Islamabad’. 21. Risen and Miller, ‘A nation challenged’. 22. McCarthy, ‘Bin Laden denies anthrax attacks in Islamabad’. 23. Risen and Miller, ‘A nation challenged’. 24. Barbie Dutter and Michael Smith, ‘Uranium and cyanide found in drums at bin Laden base’, Daily Telegraph, 23 December 2001. Available at http://www. telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/1366221/Uranium-andcyanide-found-in-drums-at-bin-Laden-base.html (accessed 23 December 2001). 25. Ross E. Getman, ‘Anthrax mystery: evidence points to al-Qaida’, Newsmax, 7 June 2007. Available at http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2007/ 6/6/163931.shtml (accessed 14 July 2007). 26. Anthony Loyd, ‘Scientists confirm bin Laden weapon tests’, The Times, 29 December 2001. 27. ‘Terrorist CBRN: materials and effects’, Central Intelligence Agency, May 2003. Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/ terrorist_cbrn/terrorist_CBRN.htm (accessed 22 May 2009).

296

NOTES

TO PAGES

104 –105

28. Sam Coates, ‘Schools of terror that taught how to kill’, The Times, 29 December 2001. 29. Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (London: I.B.Tauris, 2003), p. 187. 30. Rory McCarthy, ‘Inside bin Laden’s chemical bunker’, Guardian, 17 November 2001. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/nov/17/afghanistan. terrorism9 (accessed 17 November 2001); Nick Fielding, ‘Secrets of Al-Qaeda: network studied Oklahoma style bomb’, Sunday Times, 18 November 2001; Toby Harnden, ‘Rogue scientists gave bin Laden nuclear secrets’, Daily Telegraph, 13 December 2001. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/educati on/3291277/Rogue-scientists-gave-bin-Laden-nuclear-secrets.html (accessed 13 December 2001). 31. Fielding, ‘Secrets of Al-Qaeda’; Harnden, ‘Rogue scientists gave bin Laden nuclear secrets’. 32. Dutter and Smith, ‘Uranium and cyanide found in drums at bin Laden base’; ‘Marines called in after discovery of germ war plant’, The Times, 23 March 2002. 33. Judith Miller, ‘Terrorist weapons: lab suggests Qaeda planned to build arms, officials say’, The New York Times, 14 September 2002. Available at http://www. nytimes.com/2002/09/14/international/asia/14LAB.html?scp¼ 1&sq¼Lab% 20Suggests%20Qaeda%20Planned%20to%20Build%20Arms,%20Officials% 20Say,&st ¼ cse (accessed 15 September 2002). 34. Loyd, ‘Bin Laden’s nuclear secrets found’. 35. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United States, 31 March 2005, p. 269. Available at https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/wmd_report. pdf (accessed 14 February 2012). 36. Jeffrey Bartholet, ‘Terrorist sleeper cells: a US-based Al Qaeda “sleeper cell” was poised to launch a post-Sept. 11 attack on a major Washington Target; would-be terrorists went underground or fled US. Evidence indicates Al Qaeda had Russian help developing anthrax; Al-Zawahiri believed involved in bin Laden’s biological weapons program’, Newsweek, 9 December 2001. Available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/a-us-based-al-qaeda-sleepercell-was-poised-to-launch-a-post-sept-11-attack-on-a-major-washingtontarget-would-be-terrorists-went-underground-or-fled-us-74535997.html (accessed 19 November 2013). 37. Fielding, ‘Secrets of Al-Qaeda’. 38. Risen and Miller, ‘A nation challenged’; ‘Sketches of anthrax bomb found in Pakistani scientist’s office’, Rediff.com, 28 November 2001. Available at http://www.rediff.com/us/2001/nov/28ny5.htm (accessed 2 June 2013). 39. ‘Prize prisoners betray Al-Qaeda secrets’, Sunday Telegraph, 2 December 2001; Harnden, ‘Rogue scientists gave bin Laden nuclear secrets’; Bartholet, ‘Terrorist sleeper cells’.

NOTES

TO PAGES

105 –107

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40. ‘Did he meet Osama?’, Times of India, 10 April 2005. Available at http://arti cles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2005-04-10/rest-of-world/27866112_1_ osama-khan-bulletin-of-atomic-scientists (accessed 11 April 2005). 41. David Albright, ‘Al Qaeda’s nuclear program: through the window of seized documents’, Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 6 November 2002. Available at http://nautilus.org/napsnet/special-policy-forum-911/alqaedas-nuclear-program-through-the-window-of-seized-documents/ (accessed 2 June 2015). 42. Bill Gertz, ‘Nuclear plants targeted’, Washington Times, 31 January 2002. Available at http://www.ohiocitizen.org/campaigns/electric/pre2003/plants _targeted.htm (accessed 14 May 2013); Lumpkin, ‘Diagrams show interest in nuke plants’; Eric Pianin and Walter Pincus, ‘US warns nuclear plants of terrorist threat, officials say they cannot verify Al Qaeda member’s description of plan to crash airplane’, Washington Post, 1 February 2002. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5656-2002Jan31.html (accessed 2 February 2002). 43. ‘Christiane Amanpour: mysterious, ominous documents’, CNN, 16 November 2001. Available at http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/11/16/ ret. . ./ (accessed 18 March 2012; link no longer working); David Albright, Peddling Peril: How The Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies (New York: Free Press, 2010), p. 175. 44. Mike Boettcher and Ingrid Arnesen, ‘Al Qaeda documents outline serious weapons program’, CNN, 24 January 2002. Available at http://edition.cnn. com/2002/US/01/24/inv.al.qaeda.documents/ (accessed 22 May 2014). 45. Albright, ‘Al Qaeda’s nuclear program’. 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid. 48. Loyd, ‘Bin Laden’s nuclear secrets found’. 49. Albright, ‘Al Qaeda’s nuclear program’. 50. ‘Ridge says Al Qaeda A-bomb information probably taken off net’, Reuters, 16 November 2001. Available at http://www.rense.com/general16/BOMB. HTM (accessed 16 November 2001). 51. Roger Highfield, ‘Al-Qa’eda’s atom plans were spoof science’, Daily Telegraph, 20 November 2001. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/1362926/Al-Qaedas-atom-plans-were-spoofscience.html (accessed 20 November 2001). 52. Thomas Frank, ‘The potential for other threats/radiological attack a serious possibility, nuclear less likely’, Newsday, 25 December 2001. Available at http:// www.newsday.com/news/the-potential-for-other-threats-radiological-attack-aserious-possibility-nuclear-less-likely-1.745476 (accessed 22 October 2013). 53. Sammy Salama and Lydia Hansell, ‘Does intent equal capability? al-Qaeda and weapons of mass destruction’, Nonproliferation Review 12/3 (November 2005), p. 618; ‘Al-Qaeda: anthrax found in al-Qaeda home’, Global Security Newswire, 10 December 2001; Miller, ‘Terrorist weapons: lab suggests Qaeda

298

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66. 67. 68. 69. 70.

71.

72.

NOTES

TO PAGES

107 –110

planned to build arms, officials say’; Thom Shanker, ‘A nation challenged: bin Laden; US analysts find no sign bin Laden had nuclear arms’, New York Times, 26 February 2002. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/26/ international/asia/26NUKE.html (accessed 2 February 2013). Leitenburg, ‘Assessing the biological weapons and bioterrorism threat’, p. 31. Boettcher and Arnesen, ‘Al Qaeda documents outline serious weapons program’. Fred Cohen, ‘Nuclear safety of world is at stake, Blair tells troops’, The Times, 27 October 2001. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States, p. 273. Ibid., pp. 269 – 70. Ibid., pp. 272 – 3. Ibid., pp. 270 – 1. Albright, ‘Al Qaeda’s nuclear program’. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States, pp. 270 – 1. Albright, ‘Al Qaeda’s nuclear program’. Ryan Mauro, ‘American Hiroshima: al Qaeda’s nuclear threat’, abovetopsecret, 31 August 2005. Available at http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread 166431/pg1 (accessed 19 May 2015). Barton Gellman, ‘Fears prompt US to beef up nuclear terror detection’, Washington Post, 3 March 2002. Available at http://www.washingtonpost. com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/12/AR2006061200868.html (accessed 3 March 2002). ‘New York on guard for dirty bomb’, The Times, 6 July 2002. ‘The Trojan box’, The Economist, 9 February 2002. ‘US studying truck-bomb defenses at reactors’, New York Times, Special Edition – Terrorism, 23 April 1993. ‘Frequently asked questions about NRC’s response to the 9/11 events’, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (undated). Available at http://www.nrc.gov/security/ faq-911.html (accessed 14 May 2011). Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors, CM 6492, House of Commons, 14 July 2004, p. 34. Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ uploads/attachment_data/file/61171/wmdreview.pdf (accessed 20 July 2005). Michael Scheuer, ‘New York subway plot and al-Qaeda’s WMD strategy’, Terrorism Focus 3/24 (20 June 2006). Available at http://www.jamestown.org/ programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]¼ 814&no_cache ¼ 1#.VpAGV 1Jg6Fo (accessed 8 May 2006); Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, ‘Al Qaeda’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction: the authoritative timeline’, Foreign Policy, 25 January 2010. Available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/01/25/al-qaedaspursuit-of-weapons-of-mass-destruction/ (accessed 14 June 2011). Henry Schuster, ‘Walker Lindh: Al Qaeda spoke of more attacks, FBI report: “He swore allegiance to jihad”’, CNN, 4 October 2002. Available at http://

NOTES

73. 74. 75. 76.

77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89.

TO PAGES

110 –113

299

edition.cnn.com/2002/LAW/10/03/walker.lindh.documents/index.html (accessed 4 October 2002). Congressional Record Senate, ‘Terrorist attacks against the United States’, 12 September 2001, p. S9284. Available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/ senate_proc_091201.asp (accessed 30 September 2010). Richard G. Lugar, ‘NATO’S role in the war on terrorism’, speech given in Brussels, Belgium, 18 January 2002. Available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ sept11/lugar_001.asp (accessed 30 September 2010). Loyd, ‘Bin Laden’s nuclear secrets found’. Statement by Prime Minister Tony Blair, ‘International terrorism and attacks in the USA’, Hansard, 14 September 2001, Column 604. Available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo010914/ debtext/10914-01.htm#10914-01_head1 (accessed 30 September 2010). Ibid. Loyd, ‘Bin Laden’s nuclear secrets found’. Dutter and Smith, Uranium and cyanide found in drums at bin Laden base’; ‘Marines called in after discovery of germ war plant’. David Cassel, ‘Phoney bomb humor fools Taliban?’ AlterNet, 18 November 2001. Available at http://www.alternet.org/story/11935 (accessed 30 September 2010). Bartholet, ‘Terrorist sleeper cells’. Uthman Tizghart, ‘Does Bin Laden really possess weapons of mass destruction? Tale of Russian Mafia boss Simion Mogilevich who supplied with Bin Laden with the nuclear dirty bomb’, Al-Majallah, 25 November 2001. ‘N-weapons may be in US already’, Daily Telegraph (Sydney, Australia), 14 November 2001. ‘Al-Majallah obtains serious information on al-Qa’ida’s attempt to acquire nuclear arms’, Al-Majallah, 8 September 2002; ‘N-weapons may be in US already’. Nic Robertson, ‘Disturbing scenes of death show capability with chemical gas’, CNN, 19 August 2002. Available at http://edition.cnn.com/2002/US/ 08/19/terror.tape.chemical/index.html (accessed 19 August 2002). ‘Full text: State of the Union address’, BBC News Online, 30 January 2002. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1790537.stm (accessed 30 January 2002). ‘US official concedes that Bush erred in claiming nuclear plant threat’, New York Times, 10 February 2004. Boettcher and Arnesen, ‘Al Qaeda documents outline serious weapons program’. Stephen Kinzer, ‘The biological threat; military’s sole supplier of anthrax vaccine still can’t make it’, New York Times, 6 October 2001. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/06/us/nation-challenged-biologicalthreat-military-s-sole-supplier-anthrax-vaccine.html?scp¼ 15&sq¼U.S.%20 Has%20New%20Concerns%20About%20Anthrax%20Readiness&st¼cse& pagewanted¼1 (accessed 6 October 2001).

300

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TO PAGES

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90. ‘Unfurl the fuzzy maths: George Bush’s budget’, The Economist, 9 February 2002, p. 45. 91. ‘New threat of chemical war’. 92. Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, pp. 263– 4. 93. Ron Suskind, ‘The untold story of al-Qaeda’s plot to attack the subway’, Time, 19 June 2006. Available at http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/ 0,9171,1205478,00.html (accessed 18 May 2010).

Chapter 8 Re-Establishing a CBRN Weapon Capability, 2002 –3 1. ‘Abu Ghaith and al Qa’ida’s dissident faction in Iran’, Jihadica, 11 March 2013. Available at http://www.jihadica.com/abu-ghaith-and-al-qaidas-dissidentfaction-in-iran/ (accessed 2 June 2014; link no longer working). 2. Uli Schmetzer, ‘Pakistan’s scientists under scrutiny’, Chicago Tribune, 1 November 2001. Available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2001-1101/news/0111010253_1_senior-pakistani-officials-pakistani-intelligencejamil-qasim-saeed-mohammed (accessed 5 August 2015). 3. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Abdullah Alamatrafi’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 25 October 2007. Available at https://www.wikileaks.org/ gitmo/name.html. 4. C.J. Chivers, and David Rohde, ‘A nation challenged: Qaeda’s grocery lists and manuals of killing’, New York Times, 17 March 2002. Available at http:// www.nytimes.com/2002/03/17/world/a-nation-challenged-qaeda-s-grocerylists-and-manuals-of-killing.html?pagewanted¼ all (accessed 10 June 2002). 5. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, ‘Al Qaeda’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction: the authoritative timeline’, Foreign Policy, 25 January 2010. Available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/01/25/al-qaedas-pursuit-of-weapons-of-massdestruction/ (accessed 14 June 2011); George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (London: HarperCollins/Harper Press, 2007), p. 266. 6. David Albright, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies (New York: Free Press, 2010), p. 179. 7. Rajesh Kumar Mishra, ‘Nuclear safety and security in Pakistan: under the shades of terrorism’, South Asia Analysis Group Paper No. 520, 20 September 2002. Available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers6%5Cpaper 520.html (4 July 2011, link no longer working). 8. Joby Warrick, ‘Suspect and a setback in Al-Qaeda anthrax case’, Washington Post, 31 October 2006. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/article/2006/10/30/AR2006103001250.html (accessed 31 October 2006). 9. Ibid.

NOTES

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116 –118

301

10. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Khaled Sheikh Mohammed’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 8 December 2006. Available at https://www.wikileaks. org/gitmo/name.html. 11. Lauren Johnston, ‘Is Al Qaeda making anthrax?’, CBS News, 11 February 2003. Available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/10/09/eveningnews/ main577395.shtml (accessed 22 December 2011). 12. Rene´ Pita, Rohan Gunaratna, ‘Revisiting Al-Qa’ida’s anthrax program’, CTC Sentinel 2/5 (May 2009). Available at http://carnegieendowment.org/ files/CTCSentinel-Vol2Iss5.pdf (accessed 7 April 2013). This fitted with information obtained from two militants captured in Malaysia during 2001, who indicated that Jemmah Islamiyah was attempting to procure and weaponise biological agents. Maria Ressa, ‘Reports: Al Qaeda operative sought anthrax’, CNN, 10 October 2003. Available at http://edition.cnn. com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/10/10/alqaeda.anthrax/ (accessed 16 November 2014); Judith Miller, ‘US has new concerns about anthrax readiness’, New York Times, 28 December 2003. Available at http://www. nytimes.com/2003/12/28/national/28ANTH.html (accessed 29 December 2003). 13. Ressa, ‘Reports: Al Qaeda operative sought anthrax’. 14. Ross E. Getman, ‘Anthrax mystery: evidence points to al-Qaida’, Newsmax, 7 June 2007. Available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/ 1859073/posts (accessed 14 July 2007); Miller, ‘US has new concerns about anthrax readiness’; ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Mohd Farik al Amin’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 23 September 2008. Available at https:// www.wikileaks.org/gitmo/name.html. 15. Milton Leitenberg, ‘Assessing the biological weapons and bioterrorism threat’, Strategic Studies Institute Monographs (December 2005), p. 33. Available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID¼ 639 (accessed 7 July 2013). 16. Letter from Osama bin Laden to Mullah Omar, 5 June 2002, Document #AFGP-2002-600321. Available at http://www.theblackvault.com/documents/ capturediraq/mullah.pdf (accessed 22 August 2013). 17. ‘Chart: Al-Qa’ida’s WMD activities’, Terrorism Research Program, James Martin Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, 13 May 2005. 18. Dan Darling, ‘The Cicero articles’, Long War Journal, 30 October 2005. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2005/10/the_cicero_arti. php (accessed 22 June 2008); ‘Full text of Colin Powell’s speech’, Guardian, 5 February 2003. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/05/ iraq.usa (accessed 5 February 2003); Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting A Shadow Of Terror (London: I.B.Tauris, 2003), p. 277. 19. Don van Natta Jr, ‘Heart of darkness: who is Abu Musab al-Zarqawi?’, New York Times, 10 October 2004. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 2004/10/10/weekinreview/10vann.html?pagewanted¼ 3&_r ¼ 0 (accessed 11 October 2004); William Safire, ‘Clear ties of terror’, New York Times,

302

20. 21. 22.

23. 24. 25.

26. 27. 28. 29.

30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

NOTES

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118 –122

27 January 2003. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/27/opinion/ clear-ties-of-terror.html (accessed 28 January 2003); ‘“Terror manual” found at northern Iraqi camp’, AFP, 9 April 2003. Available at http://www.iol.co.za/ news/world/terror-manual-found-at-northern-iraqi-camp-1.104093 (accessed 10 April 2003). Darling, ‘The Cicero articles’. ‘Full text of Colin Powell’s speech’. David Leppard and Nicholas Rufford, ‘Poison terror suspects linked to Al Qaeda training camp’, Daily Times, 13 January 2003. Available at http:// archives.dailytimes.com.pk/foreign/13-Jan-2003/poison-terror-suspects-linkedto-al-qaeda-training-camp (accessed 14 January 2003); Darling, ‘The Cicero articles’. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Omar al Rammah’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 21 April 2008. Available at https://www.wikileaks.org/ gitmo/name.html. Kevin Anderson, ‘Militants weave web of terror’, BBC News Online, 14 July, 2004. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/3889841.stm (accessed 15 July 2004). Reuven Paz, ‘The first Islamist nuclear threat against the United States’, International Institute For Counter-Terrorism, 10 January 2003. Available at http://www.ict.org.il/Article/87/The-First-Islamist-nuclear-threa-againstthe-United-States (accessed 6 June 2013). Sammy Salama and Lydia Hansell, ‘Does intent equal capability? al-Qaeda and weapons of mass destruction’, Nonproliferation Review 12/3 (November 2005), pp. 632 –7. Ibid., p. 637. Leitenberg, ‘Assessing the biological weapons and bioterrorism threat’. ‘Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: pre-eminent source on al Qaida’, Central Intelligence Agency, 13 July 2004. Available at http://www.ccrjustice.org/ sites/default/files/assets/files/CIA%20KSM%20Preeminent%20Source.pdf (accessed 14 August 2013). ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Majid Khan’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 13 June 2008. Available at https://www.wikileaks.org/gitmo/name. html. ‘US jails al-Qaeda sleeper agent’, BBC News Online, 29 October 2009. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/8333133.stm (accessed 30 October 2009). Ron Purver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism, New Threat to Public Safety, Conflict Studies 295 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1997), p. 2. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Majid Khan’. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Ammar al Baluchi’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 8 December 2006. Available at https://www.wikileaks.org/ gitmo/name.html.

NOTES

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122 –124

303

35. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Adil Hadi al-Jaz’iri bin Hamlili’, 8 July 2008 and ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Mohammed Nabi’, 23 January 2008, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks. Available at https://www.wikileaks. org/gitmo/name.html;WikiLeaks; Jonathan Karl, ‘CIA: we got Bin Laden’s translator’, ABC News, 14 March 2008. Available at http://abcnews.go.com/ Blotter/story?id¼4453407&page¼1 (accessed 15 March 2008). 36. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Akhtiar Mohammed’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 10 September 2005. Available at https://www.wikileaks. org/gitmo/name.html. 37. Kim Sengupta, Portia Walker, Jane Merrick and Brian Brady, ‘Gadafi, Britain and US: a secret, special and very cosy relationship’, Independent, 3 September 2011. Available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/ gaddafi-britain-and-us-a-secret-special-and-very-cosy-relationship-2349039. html (accessed 3 September 2012); ‘Al-Qaeda plotted cyanide attack on Rome’s water’, The Times, 21 February 2002; ‘Terror suspects on trial in Italy’, BBC News Online, 5 February 2002. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ world/europe/1802859.stm (accessed 6 February 2002). 38. ‘Al-Qaeda plotted cyanide attack on Rome’s water’; ‘“Cyanide plotters” face terror charges’, BBC News Online, 21 February 2002. Available at http:// news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1833646.stm (accessed 22 February 2002); ‘Italians puzzle over “cyanide plot”’, BBC News Online, 21 February 2002. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1834573.stm (accessed 22 February 2002). ‘Cyanide attack foiled in Italy’, BBC News Online, 20 February 2002. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/ 1831511.stm (accessed 21 February 2002). 39. Also known as Abdullah al-Muhajir or Muhajir Abdullah. 40. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Muhammad Binyam’, 26 December 2008, WikiLeaks and ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Abu Zubaydah’, 11 November 2008, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks. Available at https:// www.wikileaks.org/gitmo/name.html. 41. ‘Khalid Shaykh Muhammad’. 42. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Muhammad Binyam’. 43. Jamie McIntyre, ‘Zubaydah: al-Qaeda had “dirty bomb” know how’, CNN, 22 April 2002. Available at http://edition.cnn.com/2002/US/04/22/zubaydah. dirty.bomb/index.html (accessed 23 April 2003); Marc A. Thiessen, ‘Documented: the WikiLeaks that show enhanced interrogation worked’, World Affairs Journal (November/December 2011). Available at http://www. worldaffairsjournal.org/article/documented-wikileaks-show-enhancedinterrogation-worked (accessed 2 January 2012). 44. Jonathan S. Landay, ‘US subways might be targeted for a nerve-gas attack, FBI says’, Philadelphia Inquirer, 12 June 2002. Available at http://articles.philly. com/2002-06-12/news/25350039_1_al-qaeda-nerve-gas-attack-nerve-gas (accessed 6 June 2015). 45. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Muhammad Binyam’.

304

NOTES

TO PAGES

124 –129

46. David Wastell, Philip Sherwel and Massoud Ansari, ‘Dirty bomber – and dirty tricks’, Daily Telegraph, 16 June 2002. Available at http://www. telegraph.co.uk/news/1397473/Dirty-bomber-and-dirty-tricks.html (accessed 17 June 2002). 47. Bill Roggio, ‘US captures senior al Qaeda leader Mohammad Rahim’, Long War Journal, 14 March 2008. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/ archives/2008/03/us_captures_senior_a.php (accessed 7 July 2009); James Gordon, ‘Feds find poison plot vs Gulf troops’, New York Daily News, 10 February 2003. Available at http://articles.nydailynews.com/2003-02-10/ news/18233913_1_al-qaeda-gulf-troops-coalition-forces (accessed 11 February 2003; link no longer working); Mike Toner, ‘Humble bean produces a deadly toxin’, Fox News Service, 20 March 2003. 48. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Mohammed Zahir’, 25 February 2008, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, https://www.wikileaks.org/gitmo/name. html. 49. David Filipov, ‘New fears Chechens may seek nukes, suspicious events concern Russians’, Boston Globe, 2 December 2002. Available at http://nuclearno.com/ text.asp?4526 (accessed 18 May 2009).

Chapter 9

Al Qaeda Announces its Strategy, 2002 – 3

1. ‘Bin Laden’s warning: full text’, BBC News Online, 7 October 2001. Available at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1585636.stm (accessed 7 October 2001); ‘Full text: “bin Laden’s message”’, BBC News Online, 12 November 2002. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/ 2455845.stm (accessed 12 November 2002). 2. See, for example, ‘Bin Laden’s warning: full text’. 3. ‘Al-Jazirah carries bin Ladin’s address on US strikes’, al Jazeera, 7 October 2001 and ‘Islamist site publishes bin Ladin’s ‘Letter to the American people’, Waaqiah, 26 October 2002, in ‘Compilation of Usama bin Ladin statements 1994–January 2002’, FBIS report (January 2004), pp. 183, 219. Available at http://fas.org/irp/world/para/ubl-fbis.pdf (accessed 2 September 2013). 4. ‘Daily News carries bin Ladin remarks’, Daily News, 21 September 2001, ibid, p. 111. 5. ‘Islamist site publishes bin Ladin’s “Letter to the American people”’. 6. ‘Abu ‘Abdullah al-Kuwaiti, letter of threat to Americans’ (undated), Combating Terrorism Center, West Point. Available at http://www.ctc.usma. edu/posts/letter-of-threat-to-americans-english-translation-2 (accessed 18 May 2013). 7. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Salman Fouad al-Rabai’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 12 May 2008. Available at https://www.wikileaks.org/ gitmo/name.html.

NOTES

TO PAGES

129 –133

305

8. Hamid Mir, ‘Osama claims he has nukes: if US uses n-arms it will get same response’, Dawn, 10 November 2001. Available at http://www.dawn.com/ news/5647/osama-claims-he-has-nukes-if-us-uses-n-arms-it-will-get-sameresponse (accessed 11 November 2001). 9. Hamid Mir, ‘Interview on “Enough Rope”’, Australian Broadcasting Company, 22 March 2004. Available at http://www.abc.net.au/tv/enoughrope/transcripts/ s1071804.htm (accessed 22 April 2014). 10. Mir, ‘Osama claims he has nukes’. 11. ‘Bin Laden “has nuclear weapons”’, BBC News Online, 10 November 2001. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1648572.stm (accessed 10 November 2001). 12. Rory McCarthy, ‘Bin Laden denies anthrax attacks in Islamabad’, Guardian, 12 November 2001. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/nov/ 12/afghanistan.anthrax?INTCMP¼ILCNETTXT3487 (accessed 12 November 2001). 13. David Albright and Holly Higgins, ‘A bomb for the Ummah’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59/2 (March/April 2003). Available at http://thebulletin.org/ 2003/march/bomb-ummah (accessed 8 May 2010). 14. ‘Pakistani scientist says no anthrax plant in Afghanistan, discusses prevention: US provides chemical weapons to Northern Alliance – Dr Sultan’, Islamabad Khabrain, 6 October 2001, in Urdu (available in English from Foreign Broadcast Information Service, document number FBIS-NES-2001–1006). 15. Nasir bin Hamd al-Fahd, ‘A treatise on the legal status of using weapons of mass destruction against infidels’ (May 2003). Available at https:// ahlussunnahpublicaties.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/42288104-nasir-alfahd-the-ruling-on-using-weapons-of-mass-destruction-against-the-infidels. pdf (accessed 24 November 2012). 16. ‘Al-Jazeera interviews bin Laden deputee Abu Hafs al-Mauritani’, 11 December 2001. Available at https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/soc.culture.usa/ b4XqGY82ZtU (accessed 14 September 2013). 17. Kaushik Kapisthalam, ‘Pakistan’s forgotten al-Qaeda nuclear link’, Asia Times, 4 June 2004. Available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ FF04Df05.html (accessed 14 September 2013). 18. Brian Whitmore, ‘Could the Chechnya war take a nuclear turn?’, Moscow Times, 15 October 1999. Available at http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/ tmt/271303.html (accessed 8 January 2013). 19. Ross E. Getman, ‘Anthrax mystery: evidence points to al-Qaida’, Newsmax, 7 June 2007. Available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1859073/ posts (accessed 14 July 2007). 20. Reuven Paz, ‘Global jihad and WMD: between martyrdom and mass destruction’, in Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqani and Eric Brown (eds), Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 2 (Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, 2005), p. 78. 21. al-Fahd, ‘Treatise’.

306

NOTES

TO PAGES

133 –139

22. Shaykh Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri, Exoneration: A Treatise on the Exoneration of the Nation of the Pen and Sword of the Denigrating Charge of being Irresolute and Weak (undated), no page numbers. Available at http://triceratops. brynmawr.edu:8080/dspace/handle/10066/14382 (accessed 28 October 2014). 23. Some spell it as Suleiman Abu Gheith. 24. ‘“Why we fight America” the entire earth must be subjected to Islam’, The Middle East Media Research Institute, 19 June 2002. Available at http://www. freerepublic.com/focus/news/702860/posts (accessed 8 June 2013). 25. Ibid. 26. Paz, ‘Global jihad and WMD’, p. 78. 27. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, ‘Al Qaeda weapons of mass destruction threat: hype or reality?’, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, January 2010. Available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/ 19852/al_qaeda_weapons_of_mass_destruction_threat.html (accessed 22 July 2011). 28. Paz, ‘Global jihad and WMD’, p. 78. 29. Mauro Ryan, ‘Al-Qaeda’s hidden arsenal and sponsors: interview with Hamid Mir’, Canada Free Press, 25 May 2006. Available at http://canadafreepress. com/2006/mauro052506.htm (accessed 2 March 2015). 30. Reuven Paz, ‘The first Islamist nuclear threat against the United States’, International Institute For Counter-Terrorism, 10 January 2003. Available at http://www.ict.org.il/Article/87/The-First-Islamist-nuclear-threa-againstthe-United-States (accessed 6 June 2013). 31. ‘Al-Qaeda plans attacks in the Gulf, Al-Majalla, Arab News’, Al Jazeera, May 2003. Available at http://www.aljazeerah.info/News%20archives/2003%20 News%20archives/May%202003%20News/14-b%20n/Al-Qaeda%20Plans %20Attacks%20in%20the%20Gulf.htm (accessed 24 February 2014; link no longer working). 32. ‘FBI again warns of chemical attacks’, ABC News, 28 May 2003. Available at http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id¼ 90605&page¼1 (accessed 24 February 2014). 33. Ben Venzke, ‘Al Qaeda/al Ablaj threat assessment’, IntelCenter, 30 May 2003. Available at http://www.intelcenter.com/ATA-PUB-v1-0.pdf (accessed 24 February 2014). 34. Ibid. 35. Ibid. 36. Andrew McGregor, ‘Ricin fever: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in the Pankisi Gorge’, Terrorism Monitor 2/24 (15 December 2004). Available at http://www. jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]¼27308#.VmcW-L9g6Fo (accessed 16 June 2009); ‘CIA warns Turkey about possible biological or chemical attack’, Albawaba, 11 July 2002. Available at http://www.albawaba.com/ news/cia-warns-turkey-about-possible-biological-or-chemical-attack (accessed 14 March 2013); ‘Terrorist threat in Turkey’, Hurriyet Daily News,

NOTES

37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

43. 44. 45.

46. 47. 48.

TO PAGES

139 –141

307

7 December 2002. Available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default. aspx?pageid¼ 438&n¼terrorist-threat-in-turkey-2002-07-12 (accessed 14 March 2013). McGregor, ‘Ricin fever; ‘CIA warns Turkey about possible biological or chemical attack’; ‘Terrorist threat in Turkey’. William Safire, ‘Saddam and terror’, New York Times, 22 August 2002. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/22/opinion/saddam-andterror.html (accessed 22 August 2002). Paul Reynolds, ‘Analysis: Iraq and al-Qaeda’, BBC News Online, 28 October 2002. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/2284123.stm (accessed 28 October 2002). ‘How poison trail spread to Britain’, Sunday Times, 19 January 2002. Dan Darling, ‘The Cicero articles’, Long War Journal, 30 October 2005. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2005/10/the_cicero_arti. php (accessed 22 June 2008). Jill Bellamy van Aalst and Olivier Guitta, ‘Media brief: Al Qaeda’s biological weapons programme’, Henry Jackson Society, October 2013. Available at http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Henry-JacksonSociety-Brief-Al-Qaedas-Biological-Weapons-14.11.2013.pdf (accessed 20 November 2013). Mowatt-Larssen, ‘Al Qaeda weapons of mass destruction threat’; George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (London: HarperCollins/Harper Press, 2007), p. 277. Darling, ‘The Cicero articles’. Reports of Zarqawi in this period are mixed. Some say he was actually present in the gorge and was among those who reportedly escaped the round-up. He was reported to have been one of al Qaeda’s top 25 terrorists and its commander in Europe, and was alleged to have been trained in the use of chemical, toxin and biological weapons. Some reports say that Zarqawi used London as his base until bin Laden ordered him to move to Afghanistan to run a training camp. David Leppard and Nicholas Rufford, ‘Poison terror suspects linked to al Qaeda training camp’, The Daily Times, 13 January 2003. Available at http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/foreign/ 13-Jan-2003/poison-terror-suspects-linked-to-al-qaeda-training-camp (accessed 13 January 2003). ‘Gruziya nachala davat priznatelnyye pokazaniya’, Gosudarstva SNG v zerkale Rossiyskoy pressy, 17 January 2003, in Integrum Techno. Available at http:// www.integrum.ru (accessed 18 August 2013). ‘Ministr Oborony RF – podderzhka boyevikov osushchestvlyayetsya v osnovnom iz gruzii i Azerbaidzhana’, Praym-Nyus, 8 February 2003, ibid. Akaki Dvali, ‘Instability in Georgia: a new proliferation threat?’, Nuclear Threat Initiative, Analysis, 1 August 2003. Available at http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/instability-georgia/ (accessed 18 August 2013).

308

NOTES

Chapter 10

TO PAGES

143 –145

Constraining the Threat, 2002 –3

1. Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), pp. 146 – 7; Elaine Shannon, ‘Read more: al-Qaeda commander turns canary’, Time, 31 July 2003. Available at http://www.time.com/time/world/ article/0,8599,472346,00.html#ixzz2Imr2L46m (accessed 22 March 2013). 2. Ron Suskind, ‘The story of al-Qaeda’s plot to attack the subway’, Time, 19 June 2006. Available at http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171, 1205478,00.html (accessed 18 May 2010). 3. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, ‘Al Qaeda weapons of mass destruction threat: hype or reality?’, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, January 2010. Available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19852/ al_qaeda_weapons_of_mass_destruction_threat.html (accessed 22 July 2011); George Tenet, At The Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (London: HarperCollins/Harper Press, 2007), p. 272. 4. ‘Chechen militants have tried to steal nuclear weapons twice, says Russian security chief’, Independent, 24 June 2005. Available at http://www. independent.co.uk/environment/chechen-militants-have-tried-to-stealnuclear-weapons-twice-says-russian-security-chief-294371.html (accessed 24 June 2005). 5. Gerald F. Seib, ‘Nuclear security’s new agenda’, Wall Street Journal, 13 April 2010. Available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304506 904575179822311523794.html (accessed 18 August 2013). 6. Mubtakkar means invention in Arabic or ‘the initiative’ in Farsi. 7. Sammy Salama, ‘Special report: manual for producing chemical weapon to be used in New York subway plot available on al-Qaeda websites since late 2005’, Outside Publications by CNS Staff, 20 July 2006. Available at http:// catalogue.sipri.org/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber¼ 70568 (accessed 22 November 2010). 8. Ibid.; ‘Cyanide gas plot not much of a threat, experts say’, Global Security Newswire, 26 June 2006. Available at http://www.nti.org/gsn/ article/cyanide-gas-plot-not-much-of-a-threat-experts-say/ (accessed 19 August 2010). 9. ‘The spy who came in from al-Qaeda: interview with Aimen Deen’, BBC News Online, 3 March 2015. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine31700894 (accessed 3 March 2015). 10. ‘FBI again warns of chemical attacks’, ABC News, 28 May 2003. Available at http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id¼ 90605&page ¼ 1 (accessed 24 February 2014. 11. ‘Al-Qaeda fascination with cyanide called “scary”’, Global Security Newswire, 20 June 2006. Available at http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/al-qaeda-fascinationwith-cyanide-called-scary/ (accessed 3 February 2013). 12. Suskind, ‘The story of al-Qaeda’s plot to attack the subway’.

NOTES TO PAGES 145 –149

309

13. ‘The spy who came in from al-Qaeda’. 14. Joby Warrick, ‘Report says al-Qaeda still aims to use weapons of mass destruction against US’, Washington Post, 26 January 2010. Available at http:// www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/25/AR2010012 502598.html (accessed 13 March 2012). 15. Tenet, At The Center of the Storm, p. 274. 16. Suskind, ‘The story of al-Qaeda’s plot to attack the subway’. 17. Ibid. 18. Reuven Paz, ‘Global jihad and WMD: between martyrdom and mass destruction’, in Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqani and Eric Brown (eds), Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 2 (Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, 2005), pp. 76–7. 19. David Filipov, ‘New fears Chechens may seek nukes, suspicious events concern Russians’, Boston Globe, 2 December 2002. Available at http://nuclearno.com/ text.asp?4526 (accessed 18 May 2009). 20. Ibid. 21. Mowatt-Larssen, ‘Al Qaeda weapons of mass destruction threat’, p. 26. 22. ‘Feds hoped to snag bin Laden nuke expert in JFK bomb plot’, Fox News.com, 4 June 2007. Available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,277614,00. html (accessed 9 September 2012). 23. Tenet, At The Center of the Storm, p. 272. 24. Shannon, ‘Read more’. 25. Warrick, ‘Report says al-Qaeda still aims to use weapons of mass destruction against US’. 26. ‘Al-Qa’ida manifesto entitled “The Base of the Vanguard” posted on the internet’, Middle East Newsline Morning Report 6/23 (19 January 2004). 27. Dan Darling, ‘The Cicero articles’, Long War Journal, 30 October 2005. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2005/10/the_cicero_arti. php (accessed 22 May 2010). 28. Ibid. 29. Thair Shaikh and Francis Elliott, ‘Three charged over plot to attack London Underground’, Daily Telegraph, 17 November 2002. Available at http://www. telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1413438/Three-charged-over-plot-to-attackLondon-Underground.html (accessed 17 November 2002). 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Jamie Wilson and Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Charges over “plot to attack Tube”’, Guardian, 18 November 2002. Available at http://www.theguardian. com/uk/2002/nov/18/september11.transport (accessed 19 November 2002). 33. Sean O’Neill and Philip Johnston, ‘Al-Qaeda “likely to be planning suicide bomb”’, Daily Telegraph, 18 November 2002). Available at http://www. telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1413534/Al-Qaeda-likely-to-be-planningsuicide-bomb.html (accessed 18 November 2002). 34. Shaikh and Elliott, ‘Three charged over plot to attack London Underground’.

310

NOTES

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149 –150

35. David Leppard and Nicholas Rufford ‘Poison terror suspects linked to al Qaeda training camp’, The Daily Times, 13 January 2003. Available at http://archives. dailytimes.com.pk/foreign/13-Jan-2003/poison-terror-suspects-linked-to-alqaeda-training-camp (accessed 13 January 2003) 36. Darling, ‘The Cicero articles’. 37. Kim Willsher, ‘Chechen terror group linked to Paris ricin’, Daily Telegraph, 23 March 2003. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ worldnews/europe/france/1425416/Chechen-terror-group-linked-to-Parisricin.html (accessed 23 March 2003). 38. ‘France jails Islamists for Eiffel Tower terror plot’, Independent, 15 June 2006. Available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/france-jailsislamists-for-eiffel-tower-terror-plot-404081.html (accessed 15 June 2006; link no longer working). 39. Joby Warrick, ‘An Al Qaeda “chemist” and the quest for ricin’, Washington Post, 5 May 2004. Available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/ doc/409640378.html?FMT¼ABS&FMTS ¼ ABS:FT&date ¼ May þ 5% 2C þ 2004&author ¼ Warrick%2C þ Joby&desc¼AnþAlþQaedaþ% 27Chemist%27þandþtheþQuestþforþRicin; Lorenzo Vidino, ‘How Chechnya became a breeding ground for terror’, Middle East Quarterly (Summer 2005), pp. 57–66. Available at http://www.meforum.org/744/how-chechnyabecame-a-breeding-ground-for-terror (accessed 5 May 2004). 40. Mark Easton, ‘Trials give terror battle insight’, BBC News Online, 13 April 2005. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4441763.stm (accessed 13 April 2005). 41. ‘France jails Islamists for Eiffel Tower terror plot’; ‘Ricin found in Paris’, BBC News Online, 21 March, 2003. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ europe/2870567.stm (accessed 21 March 2003); Willsher, ‘Chechen terror group linked to Paris ricin’. 42. Jon Henley, ‘Al-Qaida terror plot foiled, say French police’, Guardian, 12 January 2004. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/jan/12/ alqaida.france (accessed 12 January 2004). 43. ‘France jails Islamists for Eiffel Tower terror plot’; ‘Ricin found in Paris’; Willsher, ‘Chechen terror group linked to Paris ricin’. 44. ‘Ricin scare in Paris is false alarm’, Associated Press, 11 April 2003. Available at http://www.historycommons.org/timeline.jsp?complete_911_ timeline_war_on_terrorism__outside_iraq¼ &startpos¼500&timeline¼ complete_911_timeline (accessed 14 July 2012). 45. Andrew McGregor, ‘Ricin Fever: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in the Pankisi Gorge’, Terrorism Monitor 2/24 (5 May 2005). Available at http://www.james town.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]¼330#.VmsRer9g6Fo (accessed 16 June 2009). 46. ‘France jails Islamists for Eiffel Tower terror plot’. 47. Henley, ‘Al-Qaida terror plot foiled’.

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48. Martin Arostegui, ‘Terrorism in Morocco deeper than imagined’, United Press International, 7 June 2003; ‘Frenchman on trial in Morocco over suicide bombings’, Agence France Presse, 25 August 2003. 49. ‘Terrorist organization profile: Salafia Jihadia’, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (undated). Available at http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id¼ 4257 (accessed 16 July 2012). 50. Arostegui, ‘Terrorism in Morocco deeper than imagined’; Martin Arostegui and Kim Willsher, ‘Middle-class Islamic convert “masterminded suicide attacks”’, Daily Telegraph, 20 July 2003. Available at http://www.telegraph. co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/morocco/1436630/Middleclass-Islamic-convert-masterminded-suicide-attacks.html (accessed 2 July 2003). 51. ‘Hero killer’s links to cleric’s mosque’, BBC News Online, 8 February 2006. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4433709.stm (accessed 8 February 2006); Easton, ‘Trials give terror battle insight’; Chris Summers, ‘Questions over ricin conspiracy’, BBC News Online, 13 April 2005. Available at http:// news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4433499.stm (accessed 13 April 2005); ‘Mystery still surrounds killer’, BBC News Online, 13 April 2005. Available at http://news. bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4440953.stm (accessed 13 April 2005). 52. Duncan Campbell, ‘The ricin ring that never was’, Guardian, 14 April 2005. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/apr/14/alqaida. terrorism (accessed 14 April 2005); ‘Ricin plot triggers UK asylum row’, CNN, 14 April 2005. Available at http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/ europe/04/14/ricin.fallout/ (accessed 23 June 2012). 53. Jason Burke, ‘Revealed: how secret papers led to ricin raid’, Observer, 17 April 2005. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/apr/17/terrorism. world (accessed 17 April 2005). 54. ‘Hero killer’s links to cleric’s mosque’; Easton, ‘Trials give terror battle insight’; Summers, ‘Questions over ricin conspiracy’; ‘Mystery still surrounds killer’. 55. There was a suggestion in the media that the Paris arrests in December 2002 uncovered evidence that led to the London cell. However, the information actually came from Meguerba. This therefore seems like deliberate misinformation to establish a link between Paris and London and prove the contention that there was a Europe-wide plot. But while the London cell leads back to Afghanistan rather than the Pankisi Gorge, it is conceivable that both Meguerba and Bourgass were trained in Zarqawi’s camp at Herat. 56. Leppard and Rufford, ‘Poison terror suspects linked to al Qaeda training camp’; David Leppard, Gareth Walsh and Jon Swain, ‘Focus: Terror on the doorstep’, Sunday Times, 12 January 2003. Available at http:// www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/article215028.ece (accessed 12 January 2003); ‘How poison trail spread to Britain’, Sunday Times, 19 January 2003.

312

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57. George Smith, ‘More UK terror trial: evil foiled or more mendacity?’, Special National Security Notes, GlobalSecurity.Org, 13 April 2005. Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/nsn/nsn-050413.htm (accessed 26 June 2012). 58. Jeffrey Bale, Anjali Bhattecharjee, Eric Croddy and Richard Pilch, ‘Ricin found in London: an al Qaeda connection?’, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 23 January 2003. Available at http://cns.miis.edu/reports/ricin.htm (accessed 26 June 2012; link no longer working); Richard Norton-Taylor, Nick Hopkins and Jon Henley, ‘Poison suspect trained in al Qaeda camp’, Guardian, 10 January 2003. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/uk/ 2003/jan/10/september11.terrorism (accessed 10 January 2003); Vasiliy Sergeyev, ‘London poisoners came from Chechnya’, Gazeta (Moscow), 10 January 2003; ‘France, UK security follow trail of new terrorist structures with Chechen cell’, Itar-Tass News Agency, 13 January 2003; ‘Domestic minister says ricin laboratories found in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge’, Moscow Interfax (in Russian), 8 February 2003. 59. Campbell, ‘Ricin ring that never was’. 60. Ibid.; ‘ricin plot triggers UK asylum row’. 61. ‘Terror raids foil “major attack on Europe”’, Independent, 25 January 2003. Available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/terror-raidsfoil-major-attack-on-europe-602877.html (accessed 25 January 2003; link no longer working). 62. Justin Webster, ‘The strange case of the dangerous detergent’, New Statesman, 14 April 2003. Available at http://www.newstatesman.com/node/194707 (accessed 28 January 2013). 63. ‘Feds find poison plot vs. Gulf troops’, New York Daily News, 10 February 2003. Available at http://articles.nydailynews.com/2003-02-10/news/ 18233913_1_al-qaeda-gulf-troops-coalition-forces (accessed 22 October 2013; link no longer working). 64. ‘Hero killer’s links to cleric’s mosque’; Easton, ‘Trials give terror battle insight’; Summers, ‘Questions over ricin conspiracy’; ‘mystery still surrounds killer’; Jean-Christophe Peuch, ‘Russia: Moscow levels fresh terrorism-related charges against Georgia’, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, 11 February 2003. Available at http://www.terrorisme.net/p/article_14.shtml (accessed 14 August 2013) (text version). 65. Webster, ‘The strange case of the dangerous detergent’. 66. ‘Terror raids foil “major attack on Europe”’. 67. Rene´ Pita, ‘Al-Qa’ida and the chemical threat’, ASA Newsletter 05-3/108 (undated). Available at http://www.asanltr.com/newsletter/05-3/articles/053a. htm (accessed 22 September 2011). 68. Burke ‘Revealed: how secret papers led to ricin raid’. 69. Smith, ‘More UK terror trial’. 70. ‘France jails Islamists for Eiffel Tower terror plot’.

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71. Ed Blanche, ‘The Al Qaeda weapons race continues: Osama bin Laden’s infamous “sorcerer”, Midhat Mursi Al Sayyid Umar, comes back from the dead and rekindles new fears that jihadists are pursuing chemical, biological and radiological weapons’, The Middle East, 1 May 2008. Available at http:// www.thefreelibrary.com/Theþ AlþQaedaþweaponsþraceþcontinues% 3aþOsamaþBinþLaden%27sþinfamous...-a0178991396 (accessed 14 March 2012). 72. ‘How al-Qaeda “chief” was caught’, BBC News Online, 4 March 2003. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2818245.stm (accessed 4 March 203). 73. Barton Gellman, ‘’Al-Qaida near biological, chemical arms production’, Washington Post, 23 March 2003. Available at http://www.washingtonpost. com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/09/AR2006060900918.html (accessed 22 June 2012). 74. Milton Leitenberg, ‘Assessing the biological weapons and bioterrorism threat’, Strategic Studies Institute Monographs (December 2005). Available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID¼ 639 (accessed 22 August 2008). 75. ‘Khalid Shaykh Mohammed: pre-eminent source on al Qaeda’, Central Intelligence Agency, 13 July 2004. Available at http://www.ccrjustice.org/ sites/default/files/assets/files/CIA%20KSM%20Preeminent%20Source.pdf (accessed 14 August 2013). 76. Ibid.; Thomas Joscelyn, ‘Al Qaeda’s anthrax program was a threat too’, The Weekly Standard, 12 September 2009. Available at http://www.weekly standard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/2009/09/_al_qaedas_anthrax_program_was. asp (accessed 4 March 2012). 77. ‘Al-Qaida nukes bid alleged’, The Miami Herald, 11 February 2005. Available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2002177203_terror11. html (accessed 14 February 2012; link no longer working). 78. David Corn, ‘Does an Al Qaeda “anthrax operative” own New York pharmacies?’, MotherJones.com, 9 May 2011. Available at http://motherjones.com/politics/ 2011/04/al-qaeda-anthrax-operative-new-york-pharmacies (accessed 6 June 2012). 79. Judith Miller, ‘US has new concerns about anthrax readiness’, New York Times, 28 December 2003. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/28/national/ 28ANTH.html (accessed 29 December 2003). 80. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Abdullah Alamatrafi’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 25 October 2007. Available at https://www.wikileaks.org/ gitmo/name.html. 81. ‘US-held Briton admits to planning anthrax attack on British parliament’, Global Security Newswire, 2 December 2003. Available at http://www.nti. org/gsn/article/us-held-briton-admits-to-planning-anthrax-attack-on-britishparliament/ (accessed 6 June 2012).

314

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82. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Salman Yehah Kasa Hassan’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 29 February 2008. Available at https://www.wikileaks. org/gitmo/name.html. 83. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Hassan bin Attash’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 25 June 2008. Available at https://www.wikileaks.org/ gitmo/name.html. 84. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Sanad Yislam al-Kazimi’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 8 July 2008. Available at https://www.wikileaks.org/ gitmo/name.html. 85. Mowatt-Larssen, ‘Al Qaeda weapons of mass destruction threat’, p. 17. 86. ‘CIA: threat of weapons of mass destruction up’, Reuters, 30 January 2002. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/news/news-attack-cia.html (accessed 30 January 2002; link no longer working). 87. Thom Shanker, ‘A nation challenged: bin Laden; US analysts find no sign bin Laden had nuclear arms’, New York Times, 26 February 2002. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/26/world/nation-challenged-binladen-us-analysts-find-no-sign-bin-laden-had-nuclear-arms.html?scp¼ 5&sq ¼ Lab%20Suggests%20Qaeda%20Planned%20to%20Build%20 Arms,%20Officials%20Say,&st ¼ cse&pagewanted ¼ 2 (accessed 14 February 2012). 88. George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, ‘Worldwide Threat – Converging Dangers in a Post 9/11 World’, Testimony to the U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, The Worldwide Threat to United States Interest, 107th Congress, 2nd Session (19 March 2002) p. 10. 89. ‘Al Qaeda Weapons Worries’, CBS News, 18 July 2002. Available at http:// www.cbsnews.com/news/al-qaeda-weapons-worries/ (accessed 15 February 2012). 90. Muhammad Jawad Hashmi, Al Qaeda In Pursuit Of Nuclear Weapons/ Radiological Material – Analysis’, Eurasia Review (29 January 2012. Available at http://www.eurasiareview.com/29012012-al-qaeda-in-pursuitof-nuclear-weaponsradiological-material-analysis/ (accessed 15 February 2012). 91. George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, Testimony, US Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing: Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the United States, 108th Congress, 1st Session, 12 February 2003, pp. 13, 7. 92. Paul Kerr, ‘Intelligence chiefs paint grim picture of proliferation’, Arms Control Today, March 2003. Available at https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_03/ prolfieration_mar03.sp (accessed 30 March 2003). 93. Leitenberg, ‘Assessing the biological weapons and bioterrorism threat’, pp. 33–7. 94. Anthony Loyd, ‘Bin Laden’s nuclear secrets’, The Times, 15 November 2001. 95. Mowatt-Larssen, ‘Al Qaeda weapons of mass destruction threat’, p. 9.

NOTES

Chapter 11

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315

The Politics of CBRN Terrorism and the Invasion of Iraq

1. ‘Know thine enemy’, The Economist, 31 January 2002. Available at http://www. economist.com/node/965595 (accessed 31 January 2002). 2. ‘National Strategy for Combating Terrorism’, The White House, February 2003. Available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/60172.pdf (accessed 7 October 2003). 3. C.J. Chivers, and David Rohde, ‘A nation challenged: Qaeda’s grocery lists and manuals of killing’, New York Times, 17 March 2002. Available at http://www. nytimes.com/2002/03/17/world/a-nation-challenged-qaeda-s-grocery-listsand-manuals-of-killing.html?pagewanted¼ all (accessed 14 February 2011). 4. Stefan Leader, ‘Osama Bin Laden and the terrorist search for WMD’, Janes Intelligence Review (June 1999), pp. 34 – 7. 5. ‘Hotel clue points to an Iraqi connection’, Sunday Times, 30 September 2001. 6. Daniel McgGrory, ‘Terrorists murderous trade in stolen identities’, The Times, 22 September 2001. 7. Peter Green and Ben Fenton, ‘Prague confirms hijack leader met Iraqi agent’, Daily Telegraph, 27 October 2001. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/worldnews/1360690/Prague-confirms-hijack-leader-met-Iraqi-agent.html (accessed 27 October 2001); James Risen, ‘Prague discounts an Iraqi meeting’, New York Times, 21 October 2001. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/ 10/21/international/21PRAG.html (accessed 7 July 2011); Martin Walker, ‘Czechs retract Iraqi terror link’, UPI, 20 October 2001. Available at http:// www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2002/10/20/UPI-exclusiveCzechs-retract-terror-link/81851035124015/ (accessed 7 July 2011). 8. George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (London: HarperCollins/Harper Press, 2007) pp. 353– 4; ‘Rice: Iraq trained al Qaeda in chemical weapons’, CNN, 26 September 2002. Available at http://edition. cnn.com/2002/US/09/25/us.iraq.alqaeda/ (accessed 4 June 2010); Douglas Jehl, ‘High Qaeda aide retracted claim of link with Iraq’, New York Times, 31 July 2004. Available at http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article 6587.htm (accessed 4 June 2010). 9. Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, on postwar findings about Iraq’s WMD programs and links to terrorism and how they compare with prewar assessments, 8 September 2006, p. 77. Available at https://fas.org/irp/ congress/2006_rpt/srpt109-331.pdf (accessed 23 February 2013). 10. ‘High Qaeda aide retracted claim of link with Iraq’. 11. Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, p. 77. 12. Ibid. 13. Gwynne Roberts, ‘Militia defector claims Baghdad trained al-Qaeda fighters in chemical warfare’, Sunday Times, 14 July 2002.

316

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14. ‘No honor among thieves: Abu Nidal’s nemesis’, DEBKA File, 20 August 2002. Available at http://www.cuttingedge.org/na/na366.htm (accessed 6 May 2005). 15. Michael Evans, ‘Whitehall dossier says Saddam plans biological weapons for Palestinians’, The Times, 3 August 2002; David Bamber and Francis Elliott, ‘Blair’s Iraq dossier will show how Saddam trained al-Qaeda fighters’, Sunday Telegraph, 15 September 2002. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ worldnews/northamerica/usa/1407284/Blairs-Iraq-dossier-will-show-howSaddam-trained-al-Qaeda-fighters.html (accessed 15 September 2002); Roberts, ‘Militia defector claims Baghdad trained al-Qaeda fighters’. 16. Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence. 17. Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors, CM 6492, House of Commons, 14 July 2004, p. 119. Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ uploads/attachment_data/file/61171/wmdreview.pdf (accessed 20 July 2005). 18. William Safire, ‘Clear ties of terror’, New York Times, 27 January 2003. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/27/opinion/clear-ties-ofterror.html (accessed 28 January 2003). 19. ‘US knew of bioterror tests in Iraq’, BBC News Online, 20 August, 2002. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/2204321.stm# (accessed 20 August 2002). 20. Sheila MacVicar and Henry Schuster, ‘European terror suspects got al Qaeda training, sources say’, CNN, 6 February 2003. Available at http://edition.cnn. com/2003/US/02/06/sprj.irq.alqaeda.links/ (accessed 18 March 2011). 21. ‘Full text: Transcript: George Bush’s speech on Iraq’, Guardian, 7 October 2002). Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/oct/07/usa.iraq (accessed 7 October 2002). 22. MacVicar and Schuster, ‘European terror suspects got al Qaeda training’. 23. Howard Kurtz, ‘The Post on WMDs: an inside story, prewar articles questioning threat often didn’t make front page’, Washington Post, 12 August 2004. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/A581272004Aug11 (accessed 14 July 2011). 24. ‘US suspects al Qaeda got nerve agent from Iraqis’, Washington Post, 12 December 2002. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 2006/06/12/AR2006061200701_3.html (accessed 19 October 2011). 25. David Rennie, ‘Havel rebuts report linking Iraq to Sept 11’, Daily Telegraph, 21 February 2012. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ europe/czechrepublic/1410950/Havel-rebuts-report-linking-Iraq-to-Sept-11. html (accessed 21 February 2012). 26. Kurtz, ‘The Post on WMDs’. 27. ‘Feds find poison plot vs. Gulf troops’, New York Daily News, 10 February 2003. Available at http://articles.nydailynews.com/2003-02-10/news/ 18233913_1_al-qaeda-gulf-troops-coalition-forces (accessed 22 October 2013; link no longer working). 28. Ibid.

NOTES

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317

29. Ibid.; Mike Toner, ‘Humble bean produces a deadly toxin’, Fox News Service, 20 March 2003. 30. ‘Full text of Colin Powell’s speech’, Guardian, 5 February 2003. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/05/iraq.usa (accessed 5 February 2003). 31. MacVicar and Schuster, ‘European terror suspects got al Qaeda training’. 32. Kurtz, ‘The Post on WMDs’, p. A01. 33. ‘Text of President Bush’s Iraq speech’, NewsMax Wires, 18 March 2003. Available at http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/3/17/215133. shtml (accessed 19 August 2011). 34. ‘Evidence of the Rt Hon Tony Blair to the Chilcott Inquiry’, 29 January 2010. Available at http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/transcripts/oralevidence-bydate. aspx (accessed 27 October 2013). 35. Other sources cited in Chapter 10 claim that there was a former Iraqi intelligence officer in Ansar al-Islam called Abu Wal. It is likely that this is the same individual. 36. Bamber and Elliott, ‘Blair’s Iraq dossier will show how Saddam trained al-Qa’eda fighters’. 37. ‘Blair warning over terror threat’, BBC News Online, 7 January 2003. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/2635807.stm (accessed 7 January 2003). 38. Statement by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Hansard, 3 February 2003, Column 23. Available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/ vo030203/debtext/30203-05.htm (accessed 27 October 2013). 39. Mike Sullivan, ‘Factory of death found’, Sun, 8 January 2003. Available at http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/154059/Factory-of-deathfound.html (accessed 26 October 2013). 40. ‘The ricin ring that never was’, Guardian, 14 April 2005. Available at http:// www.theguardian.com/world/2005/apr/14/alqaida.terrorism (accessed 14 April 2005). 41. Ibid. 42. Andrew Buncombe and Cahal Milmo, ‘Iraq crisis: Terrorism links: Powell claims European terror network is run by al-Qa’ida team based in Iraq’, Independent, 6 February 2003. Available at http://www.independent.co.uk/ news/world/politics/powell-claims-european-terror-network-is-run-byalqaida-team-based-in-iraq-596815.html (accessed 6 February 2003; link no longer working). 43. Statement by the Rt Hon Tony Blair. 44. ‘Full text: Tony Blair’s speech’, Guardian, 18 March 2003. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/mar/18/foreignpolicy.iraq1 (accessed 18 March 2003). 45. ‘Full transcript of Blair’s speech’, BBC News Online, 20 March, 2003. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/2870581.stm (accessed 20 March 2003).

318

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46. Jason Burke, ‘US Special Forces take fight to fundamentalist terror group’, Observer, 30 March 2003. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/ mar/30/iraq10 (accessed 30 March 2003). 47. William Safire, ‘Tying Saddam to terrorist organisations’, New York Times, 25 August 2002; ‘UK knew of bioterror tests in Iraq’, BBC News Online, 20 August 2002. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/ 2204321.stm (accessed 20 August 2002); ‘US suspects al Qaeda got nerve agent from Iraqis’; ‘Ansar al Islam’, Federation of American Scientists, 30 April 2004. Available at http://fas.org/irp/world/para/ansar.htm (accessed 7 September 2011); Jonathan Schanzer, Al-Qa’eda’s Armies: Middle East Affiliate Groups and the Next Generation of Terror (New York: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2005), citing Isma’il Zayir, ‘Ansar al-Islam group accuses Talabani of spreading rumours about its co-operation with al-Qa’ida’, Al-Hayat, 22 August 2002. 48. Milton Leitenberg, ‘Assessing the biological weapons and bioterrorism threat’, Strategic Studies Institute Monographs (December 2005). Available at http:// www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID¼ 639 (accessed 22 August 2008). 49. Robin Denselow, ‘Kurds’ leader backs US-led war on Iraq’, Sunday Telegraph, 16 February 2003. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ middleeast/iraq/1422258/Kurds-leader-backs-US-led-war-on-Iraq.html (accessed 16 February 2003); Eliza Griswold, ‘Makeshift ricin labs linked to Bin Laden’s men’, Sunday Times, 6 April 2003. Available at http://www.thesunday times.co.uk/sto/news/world_news/article46251.ece (accessed 6 April 2003). 50. Inigo Gilmore, ‘The proof that Saddam worked with Bin Laden’, Sunday Telegraph, 27 April 2003. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ worldnews/middleeast/iraq/1428503/The-proof-that-Saddam-worked-withbin-Laden.html (accessed 27 April 2003). 51. Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence.

Chapter 12

Western Uncertainty About the Threat, 2004–7

1. Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 142– 5. 2. Douglas Frantz, ‘Experts fear “dirty bomb” attack in US, Europe: it’s not a matter of if but when, one official says’, Los Angeles Times, 9 May 2004. Available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-05-09/news/0405090374_ 1_nuclear-weapons-dirty-bomb-al-qaeda (accessed 2 January 2010). 3. Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Terrorist CBRN: materials and effects’, May 2003. Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/ terrorist_cbrn/terrorist_CBRN.htm (accessed 22 May 2009). 4. ‘Expert’s death rolls back al-Qaeda WMD capability’, Global Security Newswire, 11 August 2008. Available at http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/GSN_20080811_ 6994303A.php (accessed 8 May 2012).

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179 –181

319

5. Josh Meyer, ‘Qaeda said to focus on acquiring WMDs’, Los Angeles Times, 4 February 2008. Available at http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/ articles/2008/02/04/qaeda_said_to_focus_on_acquiring_wmds/ (accessed 12 April 2013). 6. ‘Wanted women: Pakistani neuroscientist was on US “kill or capture” list’, NBC News, 17 January 2012. Available at http://investigations.nbcnews. com/_news/2012/01/17/10167616-wanted-women-pakistani-neuroscientistwas-on-us-kill-or-capture-list (accessed 4 July 2014). 7. Con Coughlin, ‘Terror groups developing “dirty bomb”, say security chiefs’, Daily Telegraph, 7 September 2008. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/newstopics/politics/lawandorder/2700195/Terror-groups-developingdirty-bomb-say-security-chiefs.html (accessed 7 September 2008). 8. ‘Mapping US drone and Islamic militant attacks in Pakistan’, BBC News Online, 22 July 2010. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-southasia-10648909 (accessed 22 July 2010). 9. Ed Blanche, ‘The al Qaeda weapons race continues: Osama bin Laden’s infamous “sorcerer”, Midhat Mursi Al Sayyid Umar, comes back from the dead and rekindles new fears that jihadists are pursuing chemical, biological and radiological weapons’, The Middle East, 1 May 2008. Available at http:// www.thefreelibrary.com/Theþ AlþQaedaþweaponsþraceþcontinues% 3aþOsama þ Bin þ Laden%27s þ infamous...-a0178991396 (accessed 14 March 2012). 10. Michael Powell, ‘US recruit reveals how Qaeda trains foreigners’, New York Times, 23 July 2009. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/24/ nyregion/24terror.html (accessed 4 August 2013). 11. Coughlin, ‘Terror groups developing “dirty bomb”’. 12. Meyer, ‘Qaeda said to focus on acquiring WMDs’. 13. ‘New Usama Bin Laden video urges Americans to convert to Islam’, Fox News, 7 September 2007. Available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/09/ 07/new-usama-bin-laden-video-urges-americans-to-convert-to-islam.html (accessed 4 August 2013). 14. Frantz, ‘Experts fear “dirty bomb” attack in US, Europe’. 15. Paul L. Williams, ‘The search for Adnan El Shukrijumah’, Canada Free Press, 6 February 2008. Available at http://www.adjunct.diodon349.com/Attack_on_ USA/search_for_adnan_el_shukrijukiijumah.htm (accessed 17 October 2013). 16. Reuven Paz, ‘Global jihad and WMD: between martyrdom and mass destruction’, in Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqani and Eric Brown (eds), Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 2 (Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, 2005), p. 81. 17. ‘Fresh US fears of “dirty bomb”’, BBC News Online, 7 January 2004. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3376201.stm (accessed 7 January 2004). 18. Muhammad Wajdi Qandyl, ‘Searching for weapons of mass destruction and al-Qaeda’, Al-Akhbar, 18 January 2004; Stephen Ulph, ‘Al-Qaeda’s weapons

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specialist killed in Pakistani airstrike’, Terrorism Focus 3/3 (27 January 2006). Available at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews% 5Btt_news%5D¼ 635&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D¼239&no_cache¼1 (accessed 4 March 2012). Nick Fielding, ‘Bin Laden’s dirty bomb quest exposed’, The Times, 19 December 2004. Michelle Malkin, ‘Where is Adnan Shukrijumah?’, 18 August 2004. Available at http://michellemalkin.com/2004/08/18/where-is-adnan-shukrijumah/ (accessed 19 October 2013). Adam Zagorin, ‘Bordering on nukes?’, Time, 14 November 2004. Available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,782068,00.html#ixzz 2Ev3KXVdX (accessed 20 October 2013). Ryan Mauro, ‘Al-Qaeda’s hidden arsenal and sponsors: interview with Hamid Mir’, Canada Free Press, 25 May 2006. Available at http://canadafreepress. com/2006/mauro052506.htm (accessed 2 March 2015). Zagorin, ‘Bordering on nukes?’. Robert Pape, Dying to Win: Why Suicide Bombers Do It (New York: Random House, 2005), pp. 254– 5. Michelle Baker and Margaret E. Kosal, ‘Osmium tetroxide – a new chemical terrorism weapon?’, CNS Research Story, 13 April 2004. Available at http:// cns.miis.edu/stories/040413.htm (accessed 22 September 2013; link no longer working). Ibid. John Steele and Roger Highfield, ‘Rare poison linked to terrorists plan to attack Britain’, Daily Telegraph, 6 April 2004. Available at http://www. telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml¼ /news/2004/04/07nterr107.xml (accessed 6 April 2004). Ibid.; ‘Chemical “bomb plot” in UK foiled’, BBC News Online, 6 April 2004. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3603961.stm (accessed 6 April 2004); Duncan Gardham, ‘Muslim was planning dirty bomb attack on the UK’, Daily Telegraph, 14 October 2006. Available at http://www. telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1531326/Muslim-was-planning-dirty-bombattack-in-UK.html (accessed 14 October 2006); Duncan Gardham and Bonnie Malkin, ‘Fertiliser bombers jailed for at least 95 years’, Daily Telegraph, 1 May 2007. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/ 1550112/Fertiliser-bombers-jailed-for-at-least-95-years.html (accessed 1 May 2007). ‘Accused “talked of poison plot”’, BBC News Online, 24 March 2006. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4841314.stm (accessed 24 March 2006). ‘Muslim convert who plotted terror’, BBC News Online, 7 November 2006. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6121084.stm (accessed 7 November 2006). Gardham, ‘Muslim was planning dirty bomb attack on the UK’.

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32. ‘Rough presentation for Gas Limos Project’ (undated). Available at http://fas. org/irp/threat/barot1.pdf (accessed 9 October 2013). 33. Ibid. 34. Some reports suggest that Barot pitched his plans to his al Qaeda handlers in January or February 2004. Given that the Waziristan summit was just a month later it seems more probable that he pitched his proposals to al-Libi at that meeting. 35. ‘Man admits UK-US terror bomb’, BBC News Online, 12 October 2006. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6044938.stm (accessed 12 October 2006). 36. ‘UK police foil gas attack on parliament’, Dawn, 22 August 2005. Available at http://archives.dawn.com/2005/08/22/top12.htm (accessed 22 August 2005). 37. ‘JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment, Abu al Libi’, Guantanamo Bay Files, WikiLeaks, 10 September 2008. Available at https://www.wikileaks.org/ gitmo/name.html. 38. ‘Al Qaeda leader tried to smuggle dirty bomb: US’, Dawn, 6 October 2004. Available at http://archives.dawn.com/2004/10/06/top13.htm (accessed 7 October 2004). 39. Craig Whitlock, ‘Germany arrests 2 al-Qaeda suspects’, Washington Post, 24 January 2005. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/ A31078-2005Jan23.html (accessed 9 September 2013); Faye Bowers, ‘Eavesdropping on terror talk in Germany’, The Christian Science Monitor, 28 January 2005. Available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0128/p02s01-woeu.html (accessed 9 September 2013). 40. ‘Italy police raid “terror school”’, BBC News Online, 21 July 2007. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6909961.stm (accessed 21 July 2007). 41. Milton Leitenberg, ‘Assessing the biological weapons and bioterrorism threat’, Strategic Studies Institute Monographs (December 2005), p. 32. Available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID¼ 639 (accessed 22 August 2008). 42. Central Intelligence Agency, ‘DCI Testimony: The Worldwide Threat 2004’, testimony of Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 24 February 2004. Available at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2004/dci_ speech_02142004.html (accessed 6 August 2012). 43. Jill Bellamy van Aalst and Olivier Guitta, ‘Media brief: Al Qaeda’s biological weapons programme’, Henry Jackson Society, October 2013. Available at http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Henry-JacksonSociety-Brief-Al-Qaedas-Biological-Weapons-14.11.2013.pdf (accessed 2 November 2013). 44. ‘Al Qaeda leader tried to smuggle dirty bomb: US’. 45. Don van Natta Jr, ‘Heart of darkness: who is Abu Musab al-Zarqawi?’, New York Times, 10 October 2004. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/

322

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51.

52.

53.

54. 55. 56. 57. 58.

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2004/10/10/weekinreview/10vann.html?pagewanted¼ 3&_r ¼ 0 (accessed 11 October 2004). Peter Crail, ‘Bush says Iraq oil may fuel Al Qaeda WMD’, Arms Control Today (April 2008). Available at http://legacy.armscontrol.org/act/2008_04/IraqOil (accessed 30 April 2008). MLeitenberg, ‘Assessing the biological weapons and bioterrorism threat’, p. 39. Crail, ‘Bush says Iraq oil may fuel Al Qaeda WMD’. William P. Pope, Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism, US Department of State, quoted in Thomas Orszag-Land, ‘G-7 to establish germ warfare crisis centre’, Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, 15 February 2005. Prepared statement of Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, in ‘Current and projected national security threats to the United States’, pp. 45–54. US Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Future Threats to US National Security, 16 February 2005. Available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/ sites/default/files/hearings/threats.pdf (accessed 25 August 2013). Michael John Garcia, ‘Interrogation of detainees: requirements of the Detainee Treatment Act’, Congressional Research Service, 26 August 2009. Available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33655.pdf (accessed 26 August 2013). ‘Detainee Treatment Act’, History Commons (undated). Available at http://www. historycommons.org/timeline.jsp?timeline¼ civilliberties&civilliberties_ prisoner_rights¼civilliberties_detainee_treatment_act (accessed 17 October 2014); Madeleine M. Plasencia and Elizabeth M. Iglesias, ‘Righting the wrongs of others: signing statements, superheroes and the spectacle of the Detainee Treatment Act in critical perspective’, University of Miami Law Review 62/2 (January 2008). Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs tract_id¼1019294 (accessed 17 October 2014). Adam Taylor, ‘The CIA claimed its interrogation policy foiled a “dirty bomb” plot. but it was too stupid to work’, Washington Post, 9 December 2014. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/ 12/09/the-cia-claimed-its-interrogation-policy-foiled-a-dirty-bomb-plotbut-it-was-too-stupid-to-work/ (accessed 10 December 2014). Ulph, ‘Al-Qaeda’s weapons specialist killed’. Ron Suskind, ‘The untold story of al-Qaeda’s plot to attack the subway’, Time, 19 June 2006. Available at http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/ 0,9171,1205478,00.html (accessed 18 May 2010). Taylor, ‘The CIA claimed its interrogation policy foiled a “dirty bomb” plot’. ‘President Bush’s speech on terrorism’, New York Times, 6 September 2006. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/06/washington/06bush_trans cript.html?pagewanted¼all (accessed 9 October 2013). ‘Al-Qaeda renews WMD development, US officials say’, Global Security Newswire, 4 February 2008. Available at http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/ al-qaeda-renews-wmd-development-us-officials-say/ (accessed 1 October 2013).

NOTES

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323

Chapter 13 Losing Control of the Threat, 2004 –8 1. Central Intelligence Agency, ‘DCI Testimony: the worldwide threat 2004’, testimony of Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 24 February 2004. Available at https:// www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2004/dci_speech_ 02142004.html (accessed 6 August 2012). 2. Paul Cruickshank and Mohanad Hage Ali, ‘Web of terror’, Seattle Times, 25 June 2006. Available at http://seattletimes.com/html/opinion/2003081872_ sundayjihad25.html (accessed 18 November 2013); Lawrence Wright, ‘The master plan’, New Yorker, 11 September 2006. Available at http://www. newyorker.com/magazine/2006/09/11/the-master-plan (accessed 23 September 2010). 3. Gary Ackerman and Jeremy Tamsett (eds), Jihadists and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Boca Raton, FL: Auerbach and London: CRC Press, 2009), p. 454. 4. Ibid., p. 35; Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al Qaeda Strategist Abu Musab al-Suri (London: Hurst and Company, 2007), p. 310. 5. Reuven Paz, ‘Global jihad and WMD: between martyrdom and mass destruction’, in Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqani and Eric Brown (eds), Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 2 (Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, 2005), p. 82. 6. Ibid., p. 83. 7. Ibid., p. 82. 8. Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, p. 306; Paz, ‘Global jihad and WMD’, p. 82. 9. Abu Musab al Suri, statement issued from the offices of Sheikh Omar Abdel Haleem: see Peter Bergen, The Osama Bin Laden I Know (New York: Free Press, 2006), p. 347. 10. Dan Darling, ‘Al Qaeda’s mad scientist: the significance of Abu Khabab’s death’, The Weekly Standard, 19 January 2006. Available at http://www. weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/602zqghe.asp? page¼ 2 (accessed 4 May 2014). 11. Ackerman and Tamsett, Jihadists and Weapons of Mass Destruction, pp. 468 – 70. 12. Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq (London: Hurst and Company, 2006), p. 125. 13. ‘Iraqi insurgents threaten chemical attacks against US forces’, Global Security Newswire, 1 November 2004. Available at http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/ iraqi-insurgents-threaten-chemical-attacks-against-us-forces/ (accessed 19 March 2010). 14. ‘“Nerve gas bomb” explodes in Iraq’, BBC News Online, 17 May, 2004. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3722255.stm (accessed 17 May 2004). 15. Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, pp. 32 – 4.

324

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16. Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Volume III, 30 September 2004, Annex E, ‘Al-Abud network’, pp. 93– 5. Available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-DUELFERREPORT/pdf/ GPO-DUELFERREPORT-3.pdf (accessed 3 February 2010). 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Iraq Survey Group Final Report, Iraq’s Chemical Warfare Program, Annex E, ‘The Al-Abud network’. Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/ library/report/2004/isg-final-report/isg-final-report_vol3_cw-anx-e.htm (accessed 22 February 2010). 22. ‘Iraqi troops discover chemical laboratory, official says’, Global Security Newswire, 29 November 2004. Available at http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/ iraqi-troops-discover-chemical-laboratory-official-says/ (accessed 22 February 2010); ‘Iraq war logs cite continued WMD concerns’, Global Security Newswire, 25 October 2010. Available at http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/iraqwar-logs-cite-continued-wmd-concerns/ (accessed 16 November 2010). 23. Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, p. 168. 24. Pamela Geller, ‘Islam attacks: al-Qaeda video calls for nuclear strike’, 27 May 2008. Available at http://pamelageller.com/2008/05/rop-al-qaeda-vi.html/ (accessed 1 March 2010). 25. ‘Iraqi insurgents threaten chemical attacks against US forces’. 26. Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7 July 2005, HC 1087, 11 May 2006, p. 19. Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/ system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228837/1087.pdf (accessed 11 May 2006). 27. John J. Lumpkin, ‘US forces in Iraq find some cyanide’, Associated Press, 7 February 2004. Available at http://www.mail-archive.com/sam11@erols. com/msg00240.html (accessed 4 March 2010); Douglas Jehl, ‘US aids report evidence tying al-Qaeda to attacks’, New York Times, 10 February 2004. 28. ‘Jordan “was chemical bomb target”’, BBC News Online, 17 April 2004. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3635381.stm (accessed 17 April 2004). 29. ‘Jordan says major al Qaeda plot disrupted, authorities: chemical cloud would have been released in Amman’, CNN, 26 April 2004. Available at http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/04/26/jordan.terror/ (accessed 17 May 2004). 30. ‘Al-Qaeda denies Jordan WMD plot’, BBC News Online, 30 April 2004. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3672891.stm (accessed 30 April 2004). 31. Francis Harris and Anton La Guardia, ‘Al-Qaeda rift over murder of Muslims’, Daily Telegraph, 8 October 2005. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1500196/Al-Qaeda-in-rift-over-murderof-Muslims.html (accessed 8 October 2005).

NOTES

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325

32. ‘Other rep by NSA IVO Al Musaiyib: 0 INJ/DAM, 2006-08-31 04:45:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks, 31 August 2008. Available at https://wardiaries. wikileaks.org/id/63BCB629-D582-92BC-9FE89E561B9F5A85/ (accessed 9 June 2012); ‘Ther rep by IVO (Route Karbala): 0 INJ/DAM, 2006-09-06 08:10:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks. org/id/82D240CE-0275-8953-71CFD88AA463CA09/ (accessed 9 June 2012); ‘(12th Imam) AIF detained by Karbala IP in Hadi Ibrahim (Zone 427); 3 DET, 0 CF, 2006-09-09 06:16:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/5B0A576D-84B7-43239A11-C21844D4CE64/ (accessed 9 June 2012); ‘Ther rep by IVO Baghdad (Zone 28) (Route Al Dayash): 0 INJ/DAM, 2006-09-13 07:30:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/ A683C29D-0B04-89E2-0ED2FA851AEB0EF6/ (accessed 9 June 2012). 33. ‘Mass food poisoning reported at IA base in An Numaniyah: 40 IA NBI, 0 CF INJ/DA, 2006-10-08 15:00:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https:// wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/13EC5369-F0B9-4736-9960-C09FF930BE03/ (accessed 9 June 2012); ‘Poison attk on 1/3/2 IA IVO TULULAN NASIR: 1 DET, 3 IA WIA, 0 CF INJ/Damage, 2005-05-31 15:50:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at http://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/2B2EF705-89AD4000-A9FA-3C6D4A4240DA/ (accessed 9 June 2012); ‘Food sabotage in Basrah: 1 CIV killed, 9 CIV inj, 0 CF inj/damage, 2005-07-18 07:01:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/ DB10D387-CADA-4514-B6D3-4C462A6AD54A/ (accessed 9 June 2012). 34. ‘Raid By 2-116 IVO Kirkuk: 1 DET, 0 INJ/Damage, 2005-05-02 18:00:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at http://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/ BBAA92D4-9299-4979-AD0B-DDCF6E92232A/ (accessed 9 June 2012). 35. ‘Reference DIIR MNFW THT631 0106 06, DOI: 20060420’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/F219C253-5E0D4BFE-AFA1-7A66960D8319/ (accessed 9 June 2012). 36. ‘Air Strike Kills Isil “Chemical Weapons Expert”’, Daily Telegraph, 31 January 2015. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamicstate/11381343/Air-strike-kills-Isil-chemical-weapons-expert.html (accessed 31 January 2015). 37. ‘Iraqi Chemical Stash Uncovered’, Washington Post, 14 August 2005. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/13/ AR2005081300530.html (accessed 16 September 2010). 38. ‘Threat Warning: Poison Of CF IVO Ma’Laab Dist, Ramadi LTIOV: 16 MAY 06, 2006-05-13 15:58:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https:// wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/F219C253-5E0D-4BFE-AFA1-7A66960D8319/ (accessed 9 June 2012). 39. ‘IDF Attk Rptd By BDE Mitt In Adhamiyah (Zone18): 12xIA WIA, 0 CF Inj/ Damage, 2006-07-01 13:10:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https:// wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/63E251E4-9594-4595-A5A0-6C3A47516D01/ (accessed 9 June 2012); ‘SVBIED Attk On IP N Of Camp Ramdi: 1 AIF KIA,

326

40. 41.

42.

43. 44.

45.

46.

47.

NOTES

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204 –205

1 CIV Inj, 3 IP WIA, 0 CF Inj/Dam, 2006-10-21 08:12:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/A88A94CEB2A6-42C0-A2D2-A83415FE6FA7/ (9 June 2012); ‘IED Found/ Cleared Attk On Not Provided IVO Shihab Ahmad (Zone 98) (Route Unknown): 0 Inj/Dam, 2006-11-16 06:30:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/A04E8623-8D91-47CDBFC7-2DB065141D17/ (accessed 9 June 2012); ‘IED Attk On Patrl At Industrial Site IVO Baghdad (Zone 59): 4 CF WIA, 32 Detaine, 2005-02-04 01:40:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks. org/id/B717BC43-1616-45D4-AFC2-F037FE702103/ (accessed 9 June 2012); ‘IED Attk On 1/623 In Baghdad (Zone 54): 1 CIV INJ, 2 CF WIA/ M1114 Damagedm, 2005-03-25 15:40:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/5B8330A8-6206-48E885BA-5E3EA7F400A5/ (accessed 9 June 2012). ‘Iraqi Militants Use Chlorine In 3 Bombings’, New York Times, 21 February 2007. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/21/world/middleeast/ 21cnd-baghdad.html?pagewanted¼2&_r¼0¼ (accessed 18 May 2010). ‘Chlorine Gas Attack By Truck Bomber Kills Up To 30 In Iraq’, New York Times, 7 April 2007. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/07/ world/middleeast/07iraq.html (accessed 10 April 2007); ‘Seven US Soldiers Killed In Iraq’, BBC News Online, 20 May 2007. Available at http://news. bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/6674319.stm (accessed 20 May 2007). ‘Threat Report: CW Spec Center IRQ (LTIOV: UNK) 2006-01-28 17:34:00, Reference DIIR-4ID-32-320-06-023’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/B313E3B3-E427-4443-BD1B-73557606 9926/ (accessed 9 June 2012). ‘Iraq War Logs Cite Continued WMD Concerns’, Global Security Newswire, 25 October 2010. Available at http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/iraq-war-logscite-continued-wmd-concerns/ (accessed 4 May 2011). ‘Threat Report: AQIZ Plan Poison Baghdad Water Supply (LTIOV: 22 JUN 06) 2006-06-20 11:58:00, Reference IIR 6 067 2183 06, DOI: 20060617’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks. org/id/A515C786-A6A9-4E81-AE9D-5073D46FFD8A/ (accessed 9 June 2012). ‘SVBIED Attk on IP N of Camp Ramadi: 1 AIF KIA, 1 CIV INJ, 3 IP WIA, 0 CF INJ/DAM 2006-10-21 08:12:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/A88A94CE-B2A6-42C0-A2D2-A83415 FE6FA7/ (accessed 9 June 2012). ‘Threat Report: Sale of Neuro-Paralitical Projectiles, 82MM (LTIOV: UNK) 2006-01-17 16:03:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries. wikileaks.org/id/D3127776-BF22-4583-81BD-4DB8CD7F9357/ (accessed 9 June 2012). ‘Threat Report IED Threat Rpt Mosa Khail, 2006-02-27 06:27:00 Reference TD-314/13911-06, DTG: 26 1911Z FEB 06, Possible Plans to Attack MNF-I

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49.

50. 51. 52.

53.

TO PAGES

205 –207

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Compound in Al Mahmudiyah, Iraq, With Sarin-Filled 82-Millimetre Shells’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/ id/055D599B-E662-49D7-8D2E-DD3C9AE26A4F/ (accessed 9 June 2012); ‘Attack Threat Rep by AQI: 0 INJ/DAM, 2006-12-29 08:37:00, REF:TD314/91926-06, DOI:28 DEC 06; Title: Possible Plans by Two Alleged AQI Groups to Conduct Separate Attacks in Southern Iraq and the Persian Gulf on or After 15 January 2007’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries. wikileaks.org/id/CE0DB3FA-E98C-1321-CCC354BCC97C80FB/ (accessed 9 June 2012). ‘Reference TD-314/13911-06, DTG: 26 1911Z Feb 06, Possible Plans to Attack MNF-I Compound in Al Mahmudiyah, Iraq, With Sarin Filled 82Millimetre Shell, 2006-02-27 06:27:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/055D599B-E662-49D7-8D2E-DD3C9 AE26A4F/ (accessed 9 June 2012). ‘Poison Attk on 1/3/2 IA IVO Tululan Nasir: 1 Det, 3 IA WIA, 0 CF Inj/ Damage, 2005-05-31’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at http://wardiaries. wikileaks.org/id/2B2EF705-89AD-4000-A9FA-3C6D4A4240DA/.; ‘Raid by 2-116 IVO Kirkuk: 1 Det, 0 Inj/Damage, 2005-05-02’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at http://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/BBAA92D4-92994979-AD0B-DDCF6E92232A/ (accessed 9 June 2012); ‘Food Sabotage in Basrah: 1 Civ Killed, 9 Civ Inj, 0 CF Inj/Damage, 2005-07-18 07:01:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/ DB10D387-CADA-4514-B6D3-4C462A6AD54A/ (accessed 9 June 2012); ‘Threat report: AQIZ planning to poison water supply in Mosul (LTIOV: 15 dec 05) 2005-12-07’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries. wikileaks.org/id/54741BC0-3079-4914-92F3-C63B08F441A4/ (accessed 9 June 2012); ‘Sabotage threat rep by IVO (Route Baghdad): 0 INJ/DAM, 2006-08-01’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks. org/id/C99D914F-F940-8CE9-B5346C49E17DCD0D/ (accessed 9 June 2012). Sammy Salama and Lydia Hansell, ‘Does intent equal capability? al-Qaeda and weapons of mass destruction’, Nonproliferation Review 12/3 (November 2005), p. 631. Uzi Mahnaimi and Tom Walker, ‘Al-Qaeda woos recruits with nuclear bomb website’, Sunday Times, 6 November 2005. Available at http://www.thesunday times.co.uk/sto/news/world_news/article155023.ece (accessed 28 April 2016). Sammy Salama and David Wheeler, ‘From the horse’s mouth: unravelling al-Qaeda’s target selection calculus’, James Martin Center for Non Proliferation Studies, 17 April 2007. Available at http://cns.edu/pubs/week/ 070417.htm (accessed 18 August 2013; link no longer working). Sammy Salama, ‘Special report: manual for producing chemical weapon to be used in New York subway plot available on al-Qaeda websites since late 2005’, Outside Publications by CNS Staff, 20 July 2006. Available at http:// catalogue.sipri.org/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber¼ 70568 (accessed 22 November 2010).

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54. Central Intelligence Agency, ‘DCI Testimony: the worldwide threat 2004’. 55. ‘“Australia terror plotter” jailed a French national suspected of plotting terror attacks in Australia has been found guilty of links to terror groups’, BBC News Online, 15 March 2007. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ europe/6454373.stm (accessed 15 March 2007); Phil Mercer, ‘Australia’s terror fears’, BBC News Online, 23 April, 2004. Available at http://news.bbc. co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3653109.stm (accessed 25 April 2004). 56. ‘Moroccan authorities foil terrorist cell pursuing chemical weapons’, WMD Insights, 2 (February 2006). Available at http://cns.miis.edu/wmd_insights/ WMDInsights_2006_02.pdf (accessed 19 August 2013; link no longer working). 57. Samantha Maiden, ‘Embrace N-weapons: Bashir’, The Australian, 4 October 2005. Available at http://www.oocities.org/haroekoe/australian051005.htm (accessed 29 May 2012). 58. Scott Atran, ‘The Emir, an interview with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, alleged leader of the South East Asian Jemaah Islamiyah organisation’, Spotlight on Terror 3/9 (16 December 2005). Available at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/ single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]¼ 562&cHash¼f0e77f13a0#.Vqn4rVJg6YM (accessed 29 May 2012). 59. ‘Russian authorities foil poison attack plan’, Global Security Newswire, 6 May 2005. Available at http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/russian-authorities-foilpoison-attack-plan/ (accessed 29 May 2012). 60. ‘Former Imam threatens chemical attack in Italy “within 6 months”’, Libero (Milan), 13 July 2005.

Chapter 14 Breakdown in Control, 2007 –9 1. Abu Hamza Al-Muhajer was born in Egypt in 1975. He was First Deputy to the President of the Islamic State of Iraq, Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi, and Minister of Oil, Defense and War, before becoming leader of al Qaeda in Iraq. 2. ‘Al-Qaeda and weapons of mass destruction as seen on jihadi online forums’, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (June 2009). Available at http:// www.ict.org.il/Portals/0/Internet%20Monitoring%20Group/JWMG_AlQaeda_WMD.pdf (accessed 4 August 2010; link no longer working). 3. ‘Threat warning: JAM claims chem rkts IVO Sadr City (LTIOV: 12 Aug 06) 2006-08-09 15:54:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries. wikileaks.org/id/A28436BF-835A-4D51-A19D-A842F0906406/ (accessed 6 June 2013). 4. ‘IED explosions (SVBIED) attk on ERU-1 BNIVO AR Ramadi (Route Mobile): 55 ISF WIA 16 ISF KIA 1 AIF KIA, 2007-01-28’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/67AA8E67-50569023-583071344C803A03/ (accessed 6 June 2013).

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5. Jeremy Scahill, Dirty Wars: The World is a Battlefield (London: Serpents Tail, 2013), pp. 143– 4. 6. Alissa J. Rubin, ‘Chlorine gas attack by truck bomber kills up to 30 in Iraq’, New York Times, 7 April 2007. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/ 07/world/middleeast/07iraq.html (accessed 19 September 2012). 7. ‘Concern over Iraqi chemical bombs’, BBC News Online, 22 February 2007. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/6385033.stm (accessed 22 February 2007); ‘Iraqis killed by chlorine bombs’, BBC News Online, 17 March 2007. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ middle_east/6461757.stm (accessed 17 March 2007). 8. Peter Bergen, ‘Reevaluating al-Qa’ida’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities’, CTC Sentinel, 1 September 2010. Available at https://www.ctc. usma.edu/posts/reevaluating-al-qaida%E2%80%99s-weapons-of-massdestruction-capabilities (accessed 1 February 2011). 9. Bill Roggio, ‘Al Qaeda’s chlorine war continues in Ramadi’, Long War Journal, 24 March 2007. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/ 03/al_qaedas_chlorine_w.php#ixzz3J4xNbwNa (accessed 24 March 2007). 10. Rubin, ‘Chlorine gas attack by truck bomber’. 11. ‘Iraqis killed by chlorine bombs’; Rubin, ‘Chlorine gas attack by truck bomber’; ‘Ramadi suicide bombing “kills 35”’, BBC News Online, 6 April 2007. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/6532271. stm (accessed 6 April 2007); Kirk Semple and Jon Elsen, ‘Chlorine attack in Iraq kills 20’, New York Times, 7 April 2007. Available at http://www.nytim es.com/2007/04/06/world/middleeast/06cnd-iraq.html?pagewanted¼ all& _r¼0&gwh¼DE034731B804126DC59A702E0146002F (accessed 6 June 2013). 12. Corey Adwar, ‘Troops give brutal account of getting hit by a chlorine truck bomb in Iraq’, Business Insider, 9 May 2014. Available at http://www.business insider.com/heres-what-a-chlorine-truck-bomb-feels-like-2014-5#ixzz3GQL0 r5rI (accessed 12 June 2015). 13. ‘(Explosive hazard) IED explosion RPT (vehicle-borne IED (VBIED)) 1 IA DIV: 14 CF WIA 57 ISF WIA 1 CIV WIA 5 UE KIA, 2007-03-28 00:33:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/ 97C7ACC5-5056-9023-582170D477D6CA65/ (accessed 6 June 2013). 14. SOCOM, 2012-00000011, letter from unknown person of Egyptian origin to Sultan Hafiz, 28 March 2007. Available at https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/ letter-from-hafiz-sultan-original-language-2 (accessed 9 June 2013). 15. Roggio, ‘Al Qaeda’s chlorine war continues in Ramadi’; ‘Al-Qaeda group denies chlorine usage’, Asharq al Awsat, 23 March 2007. Available at http:// www.aawsat.net/2007/03/article55263277 (accessed 22 May 2010). 16. ‘(Explosive hazard) unknown explosion RPT (chemical) 1-12: 3 CIV WIA, 2007-04-09 06:45:00,3-1 04:274, 38SMC 57000 11800’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/D8D6E0A0-50569023-58312FDBDA426106/ (accessed 6 June 2013).

330

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17. ‘“Chlorine bomb” hits Iraq village’, BBC News Online, 16 May 2007. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/6660585.stm (accessed 6 June 2013). 18. ‘IED explosion (VBIED) attk on local nationals IVO at TAJI (ZONE 52) (Route IVO MSR TAMPA): 113 CIV WIA 1 CIV KIA,2007-02-20 01:07:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries. wikileaks.org/id/DD1061D9-9BF7-4681-013F0A6CE2CF68B0/ (accessed 6 June 2013); ‘IED explosion (SVBIED) attk on A/5-7 CAV IVO (Route MSR MOBILE): 1 CF WIA 1 CIV WIA 1 AIF KIA 2007-03-16 11:11:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks. org/id/5D33DFAC-5056-9023-5877599BD13B35A6/ (accessed 6 June 2013). 19. ‘US says killed senior al Qaeda in Iraq figure’, Reuters, 25 April 2007. Available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2007-04/25/content_ 860089.htm (accessed 25 April 2007). 20. ‘IED explosion (IED, chemical) attk on not provided IVO (Route AL Abarra District): 2 ISF WIA, 2007-07-13 18:15:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/CD289436-D42A-7457AD2CCD3AB9CAA74B/ (accessed 6 June 2013); ‘(Enemy action) direct fire RPT (small arms) C/2-1 CAV: 1 AIF WIA, 2007-11-21 04:55:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/ 61A7CFE0-0150-DFF2-E6A80D15A15A256D/ (accessed 6 June 2013); ‘Indirect fire (other) on 2/2ID IVO (Zone 30): 0 INJ/DAM, 2007-07-14 22:45:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks. org/id/C88F4596-ECB3-9AC1-22F2A151EE2BC8B5/ (accessed 6 June 2013); ‘(Explosive hazard) IED explosion RPT (vehicle-borne IED (VBIED)) 3-1 CAV IVO (Route PURPLE): 65 CF WIA 1 UE KIA, 2007-06-03 07:50:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks. org/id/F214085A-5056-9023-589223FD8AB67E81/ (accessed 6 June 2013); ‘IED explosion (IED) atk on B/2-12 IN (4 ID) IVO Baghdad (Zone 25): 10 CF WIA 1 CIV WIA, 2007-06-18 16:44:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/40EC8C31-DEC6-A23223C93184B82873C6/ (accessed 6 June 2013). 21. Jim Garamone, ‘Terrorists using chlorine car bombs to intimidate Iraqis’, Department of Defense, 6 June 2007. Available at http://archive.defense.gov/ news/newsarticle.aspx?id¼46311 (accessed 8 June 2010); Alexandra Zavis and Garrett Therolf, ‘US military reports 14 deaths in 3 days chlorine bomb cloud sickens 62 soldiers’, Boston Globe, 4 June 2007. Available at http://www.boston.com/news/world/articles/2007/06/04/us_military_reports _14_deaths_in_3_days/ (accessed 8 June 2010). 22. ‘Transcript: Bush remarks on Iraq war and terrorism’, Washington Post, 19 March 2008. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/article/2008/03/19/AR2008031901083.html (accessed 19 March 2008).

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23. ‘Iraq uncovers al-Qaeda “chemical weapons plot”’, BBC News Online, 1 June 2013. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22742201 (accessed 1 June 2013). 24. ‘(Explosive hazard) IED found/cleared RPT (VOIED): 0 INJ/DAM, 2009-0923 04:14:00, WikiLeaks’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https:// wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/79AB3C19-1517-911C-C5467F9F91EEDBB8/ (accessed 6 June 2013); ‘(Explosive hazard) IED found/cleared RPT (Improvised Explosive Device (IED)) Diyala Operation Centre: 0 INJ/DAM, 2009-12-06 11:00:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries. wikileaks.org/id/6634CF10-AF94-CC87-524259BFD12B1FAC/ (accessed 6 June 2013). 25. Officials in Baghdad could not tell from their records whether anyone died from chlorine inhalation. A Multinational Force Iraq spokesman said there are anecdotal reports that that an old man and some babies may have been killed by the gas, but this could not be corroborated. Garamone, ‘Terrorists using chlorine car bombs to intimidate Iraqis’. There was one uncorroborated report of a female civilian being killed by chlorine. 26. ‘Other event rep by 1/6 IA HQ IVO Baghdad, 2007-01-05 07:00:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/ F3645EFD-0BD5-3D2B-428196005AA5127E/ (accessed 6 June 2013); ‘(Criminal event) other RPT SOI, 2008-07-08’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/076EFA33-B008-A06C138C3EE0A540571A/ (accessed 6 June 2013); ‘(Suspicious incident) other RPT Muqdadiya IP JCC: 1 UE KIA 7 UE WIA, 2009-06-09 11:35:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/C6A5550102FD-F703-F3B2D5B4DA97133D/ (accessed 6 June 2013). 27. ‘Leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq stresses need for WMD Jihad’, CBS News, 21 April 2009. Available at http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2009/04/21/monitor/ entry4959370.shtml (accessed 17 July 2013); ‘Islamic State of Iraq War Minister: “The mujahideen today are in great need of chemical, biological and . . . even nuclear weapons . . . to defend what they have achieved and what they will achieve”’, Middle East Media Research Institute, 21 April 2009. Available at www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page¼ archives&Area ¼ sd& ID ¼ SP232009 (accessed 19 July 2013). 28. ‘State: Al Qaeda terrorist we’re holding still a major threat’, Israel National News, 18 November 2013. Available at http://www.israelnationalnews.com/ News/News.aspx/174171 (accessed 18 November 2013). 29. Unclassified written evidence by Director Blair to Senate Intelligence Committee, 12 February 2009. Available at https://fas.org/irp/congress/ 2009_hr/threat-qfr.pdf (accessed 22 Aril 2012). 30. These data were obtained by searching the Afghan War Diaries on WikiLeaks. Available at https://wikileaks.org/afg/ (accessed 6 June 2013). 31. ‘(Threat report) other RPT Balkh, 2005-03-19, Al Qaida plans chemical attack’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/

332

32.

33.

34.

35.

36. 37. 38.

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id/77975385-2219-0B3F-9F2EA982FB29C118/ (accessed 6 June 2013); ‘(Threat report) other RPT Kabul, 2006-04-18, AQ prepare to carry out chemical IED’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries. wikileaks.org/id/76F84D02-2219-0B3F-9F945C70378A243C/ (accessed 6 June 2013); ‘012030Z NPCC IRoA daily report, 2008-02-01 14:30:00, NPCC daily log, 1 February 2008’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/7BCE8A92-2219-0B3F-9F3D9DE3054 CEB1E/ (accessed 6 June 2013); ‘(Threat report) other RPT Kandahar, 200804-08 18:00:00, AQ poison attack planned in Kandahar’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/7BFFD5F5-22190B3F-9F277FC87A40AD62/ (accessed 6 June 2013). ‘(Threat report) attack threat RPT Meymana, 2005-05-10 18:00:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at http://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/ 778B58BF-2219-0B3F-9F46C5A21790E5F4/ (accessed 6 June 2013); ‘(Threat report) other RPT Gomal, 2005-08-27 18:00:00, TBs plan to use poisonous powders’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries. wikileaks.org/id/77BD20D3-2219-0B3F-9FA36BA5F7309BD0/ (accessed 6 June 2013); ‘(Threat report) attack threat RPT Kandahar, 2005-09-12 18:00:00, possible chemical agent’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/77B67ED4-2219-0B3F-9FCB0065EB501 EC1/ (accessed 6 June 2013). ‘(Threat report) other RPT Kabul, 2005-02-18 18:00:00, TB planning to poison GOA officials’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at http://wardiaries. wikileaks.org/id/77910FD2-2219-0B3F-9F9B6418F28AE3C5/ (accessed 6 June 2013); ‘(Threat report) other RPT unknown, 2006-01-15 18:00:00, PK officers train ACM to use AA rocket’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/77AE5FF8-2219-0B3F-9FA5D07627C 06792/ (accessed 6 June 2013). ‘(Threat report) attack threat RPT Khowst, 2005-02-26 18:00:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at http://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/7790 9FB3-2219-0B3F-9F1B9012136ADDC9/ (accessed 6 June 2013); ‘(Threat report) attack threat RPT Farah, 2005-03-26 18:00:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at http://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/77948968-22190B3F-9FF3E02A687F43FA/ (accessed 6 June 2013). ‘(Threat report) other RPT Kabul, 2005-03-01 18:00:00, Taliban to use contact poison’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at http://wardiaries. wikileaks.org/id/77879D1E-2219-0B3F-9F516056087C1054/ (accessed 6 June 2013). These data were obtained by searching the WarDiaries on WikiLeaks. Available at https://wikileaks.org/afg/ (accessed 6 June 2013). ‘012030Z NPCC IRoA daily report’; ‘(Threat report) other RPT Kandahar, 2008-04-08’. These figures were collated by searching the Afghan War Diaries on WikiLeaks. Available at https://wikileaks.org/afg/ (accessed 6 June 2013).

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39. ‘302359Z IROA NPCC daily report, 2007-05-30 17:59:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/D7D39A1668F4-4366-9E94-AB727C377FA7/ (accessed 6 June 2013). 40. ‘162046Z Sharana PRT SAF AT Yaya Khel District Center, 2007-06-16 14:46:00’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks. org/id/9EB29C86-7B17-499D-BB13-4D4FE821EA29/ (accessed 6 June 2013). 41. ‘(Threat report) attack threat RPT unknown, 2008-06-26 18:00:00, attempt to use chem wpns against CF, organization(s) involved: Afghan Border Police, Taliban East, 07 Jul 2008, TF Castle INTSUM 4127, NSIG’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/782B6B53-22190B3F-9FD18FC0FF6B6251/ (accessed 6 June 2013). 42. ‘(Criminal event) sabotage RPTTF Chosin: 0 INJ/DAM, 2009-10-28 02:33:47’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks. org/id/0x080e00000124969fe14d16d86817b972/ (accessed 6 June 2013). 43. ‘2007-07-02 18:00:00, new mines employed by INS, organization(s) involved: opposing militant forces, 12 Jul 2007, RCW, INTSUM 192-07, NSI, New mines employed by INS (SEWOC D-4)’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/7BBDE8E1-2219-0B3F9F7A5166576B8281/ (accessed 6 June 2013). 44. ‘Leaked documents suggest Taliban chemical strike on US soldiers’, Intelligence Quarterly, 27 July 2010. Available at http://www.intelligencequarterly.com/ 2010/07/leaked-documents-suggest-taliban-chemical-strike-on-u-s-soldiers/ (accessed 17 April 2013). 45. ‘(Threat report) attack threat RPT unknown, 2008-06-26 18:00:00’. 46. ‘New mines employed by INS, 12 July 2007’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/7BBDE8E1-2219-0B3F9F7A5166576B8281/ (accessed 6 June 2013); ‘EF may have chemical mines, 12 July 2007’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries. wikileaks.org/id/7BFEC0EB-2219-0B3F-9F6E4304EAEAA799/ (accessed 6 June 2013); ‘Insurgents hope to employ anthrax in AF, 4 July 2007’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/ 7C1587F9-2219-0B3F-9FC6C520D72FA101/ (accessed 6 June 2013); ‘NPCC daily log, 1 February 2008’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/E8414105-0A15-45CC-887A-C5A9A F08F33B/ (accessed 6 June 2013), ‘Threat IVO spin Boldak Kandahar, 1 Mar 2008’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/ id/7BCE8A92-2219-0B3F-9F3D9DE3054CEB1E/ (accessed 6 June 2013); ‘Biological letter attack threat – Kabul, 21 April 2009’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/7A99F8FB-22190B3F-9F2BE3536B922995/ (accessed 6 June 2013). 47. Ross E Getman, ‘The faithful spy: Amerithrax spoiler alert’, Scoop, 23 April 2007. Available at http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0704/S00371.htm (accessed 19 April 2013).

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48. ‘Taliban official said found with anthrax’, Global Security Newswire, 17 January 2007. Available at http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/taliban-officialsaid-found-with-anthrax/ (accessed 19 April 2013). 49. ‘(Threat report) attack threat RPT Kabul, 2008-07-22 18:00:00’. 50. ‘(Threat report) other RPT Kabul, 2005-02-18 18:00:00’; ‘(Threat report) other RPT unknown, 2006-01-15 18:00:00’; ‘(Threat report) other RPT Hirat, 2007-02-25 14:15:00, plot to poison alcoholic drinks Herat’, WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org/id/ 770E2C21-2219-0B3F-9F9BDDFCD4998DB7/ (accessed 6 June 2013). 51. Sebastian Usher, ‘Arab media shun al-Qaeda message’, BBC News Online, 19 January 2006. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/ 4628028.stm (accessed 19 January 2006). 52. Ibid. 53. Ibid. 54. ‘My brother Osama. How many innocent people have you killed in the name of Al-Qaeda’, Independent On Sunday, 22 June 2008. 55. Ibid. 56. Ibid. 57. ‘Abu Ghaith and al Qa’ida’s dissident faction in Iran’, Jihadica, 11 March 2013. Available at http://www.jihadica.com/abu-ghaith-and-al-qaidasdissident-faction-in-iran/ (accessed 2 June 2014; link no longer working). 58. Shaykh Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri, Exoneration: A Treatise on the Exoneration of the Nation of the Pen and Sword of the Denigrating Charge of being Irresolute and Weak (undated) no page numbers. Available at http:// triceratops.brynmawr.edu:8080/dspace/handle/10066/14382 (accessed 28 October 2014). 59. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, ‘Al Qaeda’s nuclear ambitions’, Foreign Policy, 16 November 2010. Available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/11/16/alqaedas-nuclear-ambitions/ (accessed 14 December 2010). 60. Ibid.

Chapter 15

Influencing the New President, 2008 – 10

1. Angie Drobnic Holan, ‘Obama-Lugar measure included weapons of mass destruction’, Politifact, 15 July 2008. Available at http://www.politifact.com/ truth-o-meter/statements/2008/jul/15/barack-obama/obama-lugar-measureincluded-weapons-of-mass-destr/ (accessed 17 August 2014). 2. Ibid.; Walter Laqueur, ‘The time to act on WMD terror is now’, Standpoint Magazine (March 2010). Available at http://www.standpointmag.co.uk/node/ 2716/full (accessed 17 August 2014). 3. Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism World at Risk: The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism (New York: Vintage Books, 2008), p. xv.

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4. ‘FBI warns: new al-Qaida WMD threat’, Newsmax, 27 May 2008. Available at http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/new-al-qaida-threat/2008/05/27/id/ 323813 (accessed 9 July 2014). 5. Chris Ames, ‘Black Death and al-Qaeda: anatomy of a scare story’, The Week, 4 February 2009. Available at http://www.theweek.co.uk/24583/black-deathand-al-qaeda-anatomy-scare-story (accessed 9 July 2014). 6. Rene´ Pita, Rohan Gunaratna and Philip Henika, ‘Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the alleged production of the etiological agent of plague’, The ASA Newsletter 131 (30 April 2009), pp. 1, 21 – 2. 7. Laqueur, ‘The time to act on WMD terror is now’. 8. White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group’s Report on US Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, The White House (undated). Available at http:// www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/afghanistan_pakistan_white_paper_ final.pdf (accessed 1 April 2014). 9. ‘Nuclear jihad: inspiration or intent’, SITE Intelligence Group (2008). Available at http://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/about-us/21jihad/26-nukes (accessed 2 February 2014). 10. Robert Hendin and Hoda Osman, ‘Nuclear jihad web threat called bogus’, CBS News, 28 May 2008. Available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/nuclear-jihadweb-threat-called-bogus/; ‘Al-Qaeda and weapons of mass destruction as seen on jihadi online forums’, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (June 2009). Available at http://www.ict.org.il/Portals/0/Internet%20Monitoring%20Group/ JWMG_Al-Qaeda_WMD.pdf (accessed 4 August 2010; link no longer working); ‘Nuclear jihad: inspiration or intent’, SITE Intelligence Group; Pamela Geller, ‘Islam attacks: al-Qaeda video calls for nuclear strike’, 27 May 2008. Available at http://pamelageller.com/2008/05/rop-al-qaeda-vi.html/ (accessed 1 March 2010). 11. Hendin and Osman, ‘Nuclear jihad web threat called bogus’; ‘Al-Qaeda and weapons of mass destruction as seen on jihadi online forums’; ‘Nuclear jihad: inspiration or intent’. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Some observers believe that ‘Asad Al-Jihad 2’ is the Egyptian, Muhammad Khalil Al-Hukaymah, who was active in the Egyptian Jihad Organization and is considered to be in charge of al Qaeda propaganda. 17. ‘Al-Qaeda and weapons of mass destruction as seen on jihadi online forums’. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. ‘Video suggests Al-Qaeda seeks to breach US border with biological weapon’, Global Security Newswire, 3 June 2009. Available at http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/ nw_20090603_6977.php (accessed 2 February 2014).

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22. Charles P. Blair, ‘Anatomizing non-state threats to Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure: the Pakistani neo-Taliban’, Federation of American Scientists, Terrorism Analysis Report No. 1 (June 2011), pp. 8 – 9, http://fas.org/pubs/ _docs/Terrorism_Analysis_Report_1-lowres.pdf (accessed 2 February 2014). 23. Carol Grisanti, ‘Face-to-face with a Taliban commander’, NBC News, 6 May 2008. Available at http://worldblog.nbcnews.com/_news/2008/05/06/ 4376082-face-to-face-with-a-taliban-commander (accessed 4 February 2014). 24. Abdul Hameed Bakier, ‘Jihadis discuss plans to seize Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal’, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor 7/14 (26 May 2009). Available at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]¼ 35031&cHash¼7bd86d44c1#.VnmEmVJg6Fo (accessed 4 February 2014). 25. Ibid. 26. David Albright, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies (New York: Free Press, 2010), p. 182. 27. Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Dennis Blair, Director of National Intelligence, 25 February 2009. Available at http://fas.org/irp///// congress/2009_hr/022509blair.pdf (accessed 18 February 2014). 28. ‘(Friendly action) detained RPTTF RED CURRAHEE: 1 UE DET, 2008-0718’, Afghan WarDiaries, WikiLeaks. Available at https://wardiaries.wikileaks. org/id/389D588F-AC1C-7149-9F8D2AE15A722142/ (accessed 6 June 2013); ‘Alleged Al-Qaeda operative indicted in US’, Global Security Newswire, 3 September 2008. Available at http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/ alleged-al-qaeda-operative-indicted-in-us/ (accessed 6 June 2013); ‘Suspected Al-Qaeda member convicted in shooting attempt’, Global Security Newswire, 4 February 2010. Available at http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20100204_4160. php (accessed 6 June 2013); Declan Walsh, ‘The mystery of Dr Aafia Siddiqui’, Guardian, 24 November 2009. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2009/nov/24/aafia-siddiqui-al-qaida (accessed 24 November 2009). 29. Dan Darling, ‘Al Qaeda’s mad scientist: the significance of Abu Khabab’s death’, The Weekly Standard, 19 January 2006. Available at http://www. weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/602zqghe.asp? page¼ 2 (accessed 4 May 2014). 30. Con Coughlin, ‘Terror groups developing “dirty bomb”, say security chiefs’, Daily Telegraph, 7 September 2008. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/newstopics/politics/lawandorder/2700195/Terror-groups-developingdirty-bomb-say-security-chiefs.html (accessed 7 September 2008). 31. ‘What have Pakistan offensives achieved?’, BBC News Online, 27 April 2010. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8647210.stm (accessed 27 April 2010). 32. Ibid. 33. ‘2010 NIS nuclear trafficking’, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 24 April 2012. Available at http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/2010-nis-nuclear-trafficking/ (accessed 12 August 2014).

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34. ‘Militant claims work on anthrax bomb in Afghanistan’, Global Security Newswire, 16 March 2010. Available at http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/ militant-claims-work-on-anthrax-bomb-in-afghanistan/ (accessed 9 February 2014). 35. ‘Al-Qaeda would use Pakistani nuclear weapons to attack US’, Global Security Newswire, 22 June 2009. Available at http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20090622_ 6127.php (accessed 9 February 2014); Inal Ersan, ‘Al Qaeda says would use Pakistani nuclear weapons’, Reuters, 22 June 2009. Available at http://in. reuters.com/article/idINIndia-40495320090621?sp¼true (accessed 22 June 2009). 36. ‘Abu Ghaith and al Qa’ida’s dissident faction in Iran’, Jihadica, 11 March 2013. Available at http://www.jihadica.com/abu-ghaith-and-al-qaidas-dissidentfaction-in-iran/ (accessed 2 June 2014; link no longer working). 37. Unclassified written evidence by Director Blair to Senate Intelligence Committee, 12 February 2009. Available at https://fas.org/irp/congress/2009_hr/ threat-qfr.pdf (accessed 22 April 2012). 38. ‘Readout North Atlantic Council Meeting, 28 January 2009, 1 February 2011, 09USNATO30, 29 January 2009’, Telegraph. Available at http:// www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/nuclear-wikileaks/8297099/ READOUT-NORTH-ATLANTIC-COUNCIL-MEETING-JANUARY-282009..html (accessed 6 June 2014). 39. ‘Terrorists in former Soviet states want “dirty bombs”, official says’, Global Security Newswire, 29 October 2009. Available at http://www.nti.org/gsn/ article/terrorists-in-former-soviet-states-want-dirty-bombs-official-says/ (accessed 12 April 2014). 40. The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: update 2009 (June 2009), pp. 19, 42, 75. Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/ system/uploads/attachment_data/file/229001/7590.pdf (accessed 9 February 2014). 41. Pam Benson, ‘Official: terrorists seek nuclear material, but lack ability to use it’, CNN, 13 April 2010. Available at http://edition.cnn.com/2010/US/ 04/13/nuclear.terrorists/index.html (accessed 12 April 2014). 42. ‘Al-Qaeda wants nuclear strike on US, Obama warns’, Global Security Newswire 12 April 2010. Available at http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20100412_9292. php (accessed 12 April 2014); Gerald F. Seib, ‘Nuclear security’s new agenda’, Wall Street Journal, 13 April 2010. Available at http://online.wsj. com/article/SB10001424052702304506904575179822311523794.html (accessed 18 August 2013). 43. ‘Al-Qaeda still pursuing WMD, FBI chief says’, Global Security Newswire, 18 March 2010. Available at http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20100318_5942.php (accessed 12 April 2014). 44. White House, National Security Strategy (May 2010). Available at https:// www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy. pdf (accessed 1 June 2011).

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45. Daniel Klaidman, Kill or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the Obama Presidency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012), p. 117. 46. ‘Mapping US drone and Islamic militant attacks in Pakistan’, BBC News Online, 22 July 2010. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-southasia-10648909 (accessed 22 July 2010).

Chapter 16 A New Threat Emerges, 2010 –15 1. ‘Annual threat assessment of the intelligence community for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence’, Dennis Blair, Director of National Intelligence, 25 February 2009. Available at https://fas.org/irp/ congress/2009_hr/022509blair.pdf (accessed 18 February 2014). 2. ‘Internet jihadis promise to publish major “WMD Work”’, CBS News, 20 May 2009. Available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/internet-jihadispromise-to-publish-major-wmd-work/ (accessed 9 January 2015). 3. Ibid. 4. ‘WMD manuals posted online’, CBS News, 8 June 2009. Available at http:// www.cbsnews.com/news/wmd-manuals-posted-online/ (accessed 9 January 2015). 5. ‘Al-Qaeda and weapons of mass destruction as seen on jihadi online forums’, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (June 2009). Available at http:// www.ict.org.il/Portals/0/Internet%20Monitoring%20Group/JWMG_AlQaeda_WMD.pdf (accessed 4 August 2010; link no longer working). 6. ‘Internet jihadis promise to publish major “WMD Work”’. 7. ‘Al Qaeda “lost its foothold” in Asia’, The Jakarta Globe, 4 May 2011. Available at http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/al-qaeda-lost-its-foothold-in-asia/ 439014#Scene_1 (accessed 19 April 2015; link no longer working). 8. ‘Indonesia arrests over police “cyanide plot”’, BBC News Online, 13 June 2011. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13754667 (accessed 13 June 2011). 9. ‘UK man sentenced to prison for possession of ricin, explosives info’, Global Security Newswire, 30 January 2012. Available at http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/ uk-man-sentenced-prison-possession-ricin-recipe/ (accessed 6 August 2014). 10. Alissa de Carbonnel and Steve Gutterman, ‘Russia says foils plot to attack chemical arms facility’, Reuters, 15 October 2013. Available at http://uk.reuters. com/article/2013/10/15/uk-russia-chemical-plot-idUKBRE99E06120131015 (accessed 15 October 2015). 11. ‘Iraq uncovers al-Qaeda “chemical weapons plot”’, BBC News Online, 1 June 2013. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22742201 (accessed 1 June 2013). 12. ‘Men “planned mass suicide attack”’, BBC News Online, 22 October 2012. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-20007532 (accessed 22 October 2012).

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13. ‘British “terror gang planned to buy five AK47 guns”’, Telegraph, 26 October 2012. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-inthe-uk/9635182/British-terror-gang-planned-to-buy-five-AK47-guns.html (accessed 26 October 2012). 14. Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, ‘Qaeda trying to harness toxin for bombs, US officials fear’, International New York Times, 12 August 2011. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/13/world/middleeast/13terror.html? pagewanted¼all&_r¼0 (accessed 9 July 2013). 15. ‘Factbox: Qaeda unveils “strategy of a thousands cuts”’, Reuters, 21 November 2010. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/21/us-yemen-qaedaplot-idUSTRE6AK2CU20101121 (accessed 21 November 2010). 16. Schmitt and Shanker, ‘Qaeda trying to harness toxin for bombs’. 17. Bill Roggio, ‘US adds AQAP bomb maker to terrorist list’, Long War Journal (24 March 2011). Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/ 03/us_adds_aqap_bomb_ma.php (accessed 26 March 2011). 18. Schmitt and Shanker, ‘Qaeda trying to harness toxin for bombs’; Jeremy Scahill, Dirty Wars: The World is a Battlefield (London: Serpents Tail, 2013), p. 378. 19. ‘Al-Qaeda and weapons of mass destruction as seen on jihadi online forums’. 20. Duncan Gardham, ‘Morten Storm: a radical life’, Telegraph, 3 December 2012. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorismin-the-uk/9699790/Morten-Storm-A-radical-life.html (accessed 3 December 2012). 21. Scahill, Dirty Wars, p. 372. 22. ‘Report: terrorists seek to poison food at US restaurants, hotels’, Global Security Newswire, 21 December 2010. Available at http://npsglobal.org/eng/ news/29-non-state-actors/901-terrorists-posion-food-us.html (accessed 19 August 2014). 23. Schmitt and Shanker, ‘Qaeda trying to harness toxin for bombs’. 24. David Rohde and C.J. Chivers, ‘A nation challenged: Qaeda’s grocery lists and manuals of killing’, International New York Times, 17 March 2002. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/17/world/a-nation-challenged-qaeda-sgrocery-lists-and-manuals-of-killing.html (accessed 14 September 2014); David Rohde and C.J. Chivers, ‘Turning out guerrillas and terrorists to wage a Holy War’, New York Times, 18 March 2002. Available at http://www.nytimes. com/2002/03/18/world/turning-out-guerrillas-and-terrorists-to-wage-a-holywar.html (accessed 14 September 2014). 25. ‘Report: terrorists seek to poison food at US restaurants, hotels’, Global Security Newswire, 21 December 2010. Available at http://npsglobal.org/eng/ news/29-non-state-actors/901-terrorists-posion-food-us.html (accessed 22 January 2011). 26. Schmitt and Shanker, ‘Qaeda trying to harness toxin for bombs’. 27. ‘Report: terrorists seek to poison food at US restaurants, hotels’.

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28. ‘Terrorist use of toxins and poisons: information for healthcare providers’, Department of Homeland Security, 9 November 2010. Available at http:// www.readbag.com/aha-content-11-110831-toxins-poisons-hc (accessed 4 February 2012); ‘(U//FOUO) DHS Mubtakar improvised cyanide gas device’, Department of Homeland Security, 10 November 2010. Available at https://publicintelligence.net/ufouo-dhs-mubtakar-improvised-cyanidegas-device-warning/ (accessed 9 May 2015). 29. Letter from UBL to ’Atiyatullah al-Libi 2 (original language), 26 April 2011, Combatting Terrorism Centre. Available at https://www.ctc.usma.edu/ posts/letter-from-ubl-to-atiyatullah-al-libi-2-original-language-2 (accessed 19 October 2013). 30. ‘“Unleash hell”: new al Qaeda Magazine describes in detail how to start huge forest fires across the US with instructions on how to make “ember bombs”’, Daily Mail, 3 May 2012. Available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/ article-2138758/Unleash-Hell-New-Al-Qaeda-magazine-describes-starthuge-forest-fires-U-S-instructions-make-ember-bombs.html#ixzz2KxLUU I7W (accessed 3 May 2012). 31. Scahill, Dirty Wars, pp. 261 –3, 387. 32. Ben Farmer, ‘Al Qaeda leader Ilyas Kashmiri planned new death squad to avenge bin Laden’, Daily Telegraph, 7 June 2011. Available at http:// www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/8562623/Al-Qaeda-leaderplanned-death-squad-to-avenge-bin-Laden.html (accessed 7 June 2011). 33. ‘Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile’, BBC News Online, 30 January 2014. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22307705 (accessed 30 January 2014). 34. Colin Freeman, ‘Syria: al-Qaeda’s battle for control of Assad’s chemical weapons plant’, Daily Telegraph, 27 April 2013. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10022753/Syria-Al-Qaedas-battle-forcontrol-of-Assads-chemical-weapons-plant.html (accessed 27 April 2013). 35. Jill Bellamy van Aalst and Olivier Guitta, ‘Media brief: Al Qaeda’s biological weapons programme’, Henry Jackson Society, October 2013. Available at http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Henry-JacksonSociety-Brief-Al-Qaedas-Biological-Weapons-14.11.2013.pdf (accessed 20 November 2013). 36. ‘Syria chemical weapons “most worrying terror threat to UK”’, BBC News Online, 10 July 2013. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-23258792 (accessed 10 July 2013). 37. Freeman, ‘Syria’. 38. ‘Syrian forces capture town near chemical weapons site: group’, Reuters, 1 November 2013. Available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-syria-crisissafira-idUKBRE9A00LH20131101 (accessed 1 November 2013); Dominic Evans, ‘Assad forces take Aleppo village, reopening supply line’, Reuters, 1 March 2013. Available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/03/01/uk-syriacrisis-idUKBRE92013C20130301 (accessed 1 March 2013); ‘Rebels kill

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world/2014/oct/24/kurds-fear-isis-chemical-weapon-kobani (accessed 24 October 2014); Paul Alster, ‘Gruesome photos may show ISIS using chemical weapons on Kurds, report says’, Fox News, 13 October 2014. Available at http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/10/13/gruesome-photosmay-show-isis-using-chemical-weapons-on-kurds-says-report.html (accessed 2 December 2014). Charles Hoskinson, ‘Report: Islamic State used chlorine gas against Iraqi police’, Washington Examiner, 14 November 2014. Available at http://www.washi ngtonexaminer.com/report-islamic-state-used-chlorine-gas-against-iraqi-police/ article/2555220 (accessed 2 December 2014); Omar al-Jaffal, ‘Islamic State accused of using chlorine gas on Iraqi soldiers’, Al Monitor, 5 October 2014. Available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/09/islamic-stateuse-chlorine-gas-soldiers-anbar.html##ixzz3J4rGZmhB (accessed 5 October 2014); Alex Thomson, ‘Syria chemical weapons: finger pointed at jihadists’, Daily Telegraph, 14 November 2014. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9950036/Syria-chemical-weapons-fingerpointed-at-jihadists.html (accessed 14 November 2014). Brian Fairchild, ‘Islamic State can launch an undetected WMD attack on the US’, The Counter-Jihad Report, 27 November 2015. Available at http:// counterjihadreport.com/2015/11/27/islamic-state-can-launch-an-undetectedwmd-attack-on-the-us/ (accessed 14 December 2015). Blake, ‘US official: “IS making and using chemical weapons in Iraq and Syria”’. Max Evans, ‘Fears Islamic State could launch Ebola attack on Britain after fighters “contract virus”’, Daily Express, 3 January 2015. Available at http:// www.express.co.uk/news/world/549845/Fears-Islamic-State-Ebola-attackBritain-fighters-contract-virus (accessed 3 January 2015). Beckie Strum, ‘WHO “probing” whether ISIS fighters got Ebola’, New York Post, 2 January 2015. Available at http://nypost.com/2015/01/02/isis-fightersmay-have-come-down-with-ebola-report/ (accessed 1 February 2015). Michelle Bentley, ‘Fears of Islamic State using Ebola in the US are an absurd and cynical distraction’, The Conversation, 23 October 2014. Available at http://theconversation.com/fears-of-islamic-state-using-ebola-in-the-us-arean-absurd-and-cynical-distraction-33322 (accessed 4 April 2015). Ibid. Hannah Parry, ‘ISIS suspected of using deadly mustard gas in attack on Kurdish town in Iraq injuring 60 fighters’, Daily Mail, 14 August 2015. Available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3197520/IS-suspectedusing-deadly-mustard-gas-near-Kurdish-town-Iraq-leaving-60-fighterssuffering-injuries.html#ixzz3imYOCym9 (accessed 14 August 2015); ‘Tests prove ISIS using mustard gas against Kurds’, Rudaw, 14 August 2014. Available at http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/140820151 (accessed 14 August 2014); ‘ISIS attacked Kurds with “a class one chemical agent” US official says’, Rudaw, 21 August 2015. Available at http://rudaw.net/english/ world/210820151 (accessed 21 August 2015); ‘Syria conflict: “mustard

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gas used” in Marea attack’, BBC News Online, 6 November 2015. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34743311 (accessed 6 November 2015). Jenny Stanton, ‘ISIS claims it is “infinitely” closer to buying a nuclear weapon from Pakistan and smuggling it into the US’, Daily Mail, 22 May 2015. Available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3093244/ISIS-claimsinfinitely-closer-buying-nuclear-weapon-Pakistan-smuggling-US.html# ixzz3azG7EpC6 (accessed 22 May 2015). Roland Oliphant, ‘Russian gangs trying to sell radioactive material to ISIL terrorists in Moldova’, Daily Telegraph, 7 October 2015. Available at http:// www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11916040/Criminalgangs-attempting-to-sell-nuclear-material-to-Islamic-State.html (accessed 7 October 2015). Fairchild, ‘Islamic State can launch an undetected WMD attack on the US’. ‘Consensus, but for what?’, The Economist, 23 September 2014. Available at http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/09/air-strikesagainst-islamic-state (accessed 23 September 2014). Kelly Cohen, ‘Ron Johnson: “real and present danger” of Islamic state bringing Ebola to US’, Washington Examiner, 16 October 2014. Available at http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/ron-johnson-real-and-present-dangerof-islamic-state-bringing-ebola-to-u.s./article/2554900 (accessed 2 December 2014). Louis Jacobson, ‘Could terrorists use Ebola to attack the United States?’ Politifact, 23 October 2014. Available at http://www.politifact.com/truth-ometer/article/2014/oct/23/could-terrorists-use-ebola-attack-united-states/ (accessed 8 January 2015); Bentley, ‘Fears of Islamic State using Ebola in the US are an absurd and cynical distraction’; Marc A. Thiessen, ‘A “dark winter” of Ebola terrorism?’, Washington Post, 20 October 2014. Available at https:// www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/marc-thiessen-a-dark-winter-of-ebolaterrorism/2014/10/20/4ebfb1d8-5865-11e4-8264-deed989ae9a2_story.html (accessed 2 December 2014). ‘Theresa May’s comments on IS and WMDs “embellish the threat”’, Channel 4 News, 2 October 2014. Available at http://www.channel4.com/news/ theresa-may-weapons-of-mass-destruction-is-isis-isil-tory-speech (accessed 7 April 2015).

Conclusion 1. ‘The Afghan-Arabs Part One’, Asharq al Aswat (29 June 2005) http://www. asharq-e.com/news.asp?section¼3&id¼627 (accessed 16 March 2011). 2. Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al Qaeda Strategist Abu Musab al-Suri (London: Hurst and Company, 2007), p. 308. 3. ‘Islamist site publishes Bin Ladin’s “Letter to the American people”’, al Jazeera, 26 October 2002; ‘Al-Jazirah carries Bin Ladin’s address on US

344

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strikes’, al Jazeera, 7 October 2001; ‘Al-Jazirah TV broadcasts Usama Bin Ladin’s 1998 interview’, al Jazeera, 20 September 2001; all reprinted in ‘Compilation of Usama bin Ladin statements 1994 – January 2002’, FBIS report (January 2004). Available at http://fas.org/irp/world/para/ubl-fbis. pdf (accessed 2 September 2013). 4. Gary Ackerman and Jeremy Tamsett (eds), Jihadists and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Boca Raton, FL: Auerbach and London: CRC Press, 2009), p. 471. 5. George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (London: HarperCollins/Harper Press, 2007), p. 259.

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Weldon, Curt, ‘Opening statement’, Military Research and Development Subcommittee Hearings on Nuclear Terrorism and Countermeasures, 1 October 1997. Available at http://ftp.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1997_h/h971001w. htm (accessed 14 September 2013).

Other Reports and Online Resources Butler, Kenley and Akaki Dvali, ‘Nuclear trafficking hoaxes: a short history of scams involving red mercury and osmium-187’, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 1 April 2004. Available at http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/nuclear-traffickinghoaxes/ (accessed 22 January 2013). ‘Chronology of Aum Shinrikyo’s CBW activities’, James Martin Center for NonProliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies (undated). Available at www.cns.miis.edu/research/terror.htm (accessed 2 March 2004; no longer available). ‘Compilation of Usama Bin Laden statements, 1994– January 2004’, FBIS Reports, January 2004. Available at http://fas.org/irp/world/para/ubl-fbis.pdf (accessed 22 October 2014). Federal Bureau of Investigations, ‘First strike: global terror in America’, 26 February 2008. Available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/february/tradebom_ 022608 (accessed 6 September 2011). ‘Timeline of the Iraqi crisis’, BBC News Online, 21 December 1998. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/events/crisis_in_the_gulf/road_to_the_brink/ 216264.stm (accessed 16 June 2015).

INDEX

1% Doctrine, 2, 147 9/11, 1, 2, 99 – 100, 102, 109– 10, 115, 119, 122, 129, 131, 132, 143, 145, 158, 161, 163, 164, 167, 174, 182, 188, 191, 196, 197, 238, 249, 260, 261, 263, 265 planning for, 82 – 4 report of the 9/11 Commission, 75 al-Ablaj, Abu Muhammad, 138– 9, 260 Abu Abdullah al Kuwaiti, 128– 9 Abu Atiya, 118, 139, 141, 148– 9 Abu Faraj al Libi, 178, 185 Abu Ghayth, Sulayman, 133– 5 Abu Hamza Al-Muhajr, 211 Abu Khabab, 46 –52, 59, 60, 73, 95, 97, 103, 104, 105, 115, 123, 178, 179– 80, 181, 193, 236, 238, 259 Abu Muhammad al-Ablaj, 138 – 9, 260

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 60, 96, 118, 139, 140, 142, 149, 151, 155, 165– 6, 167– 70, 172, 190, 198, 201– 2, 205, 211, 222 Abu Zubayda, 95, 96, 123–4, 148, 179 al-Adil, Sayf, 124, 125 Ahmed, Rauf, 53, 104, 116 al Qaeda in Iraq, 196, 202 al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, 143– 148, 223, 245 al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, 245– 50 Al-Abud network, 199– 200 Albanshiri, Abu Obeida, 11–12 Amman plot, 2004, 201–2 al-Ani, Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir, 163 Ansar al-Islam, 118, 140–1, 165– 6, 169–71, 175–6 anthrax, 20, 69, 102, 103, 105, 130, 137, 141, 162– 3, 189, 193, 200, 206, 221, 233, 238

390

POLITICAL MANIPULATION AND WMD

Al Qaeda programme, 52–5, 62, 64, 104, 116– 17, 155–7, 159, 259 anthrax letters 2001, 100–1, 120, 162– 3 CIA assessments, 33, 74, 111–13 Atef, Mohammed, 11, 12, 18, 43, 45, 46, 51, 54, 83, 84, 90, 115, 164, 264 Aum Shinrikyo, 1, 20, 31, 32, 39, 48 al-Awlaki, Anwar, 246 ‘axis of evil’ speech, 161 al-Ayeri, Yusef, 143–6 Aziz, Amer, 47, 61 al-Bakri, Ali Sayyid Muhammad Mustafa, 12, 55 al-Baluchi, Amar, 54, 85, 123, 156 Barot, Dhiren, 184– 5 al-Barq, Samer Halmi Abdel Latif, 55 Basayev, Shamyl, 87, 88, 92 Batarfi, Ayman Saeed Abdullah, 61 –2, 115 Berger, Sandy, 42, 79 bin Laden, Osama, 5, 6, 13, 15 –18, 33 – 43, 45, 49, 57, 58, 60, 61, 63, 66, 69, 73, 89, 91, 92, 98, 99, 101, 111, 114, 115, 117, 124, 125, 133– 6, 143, 147, 157, 158, 159, 163, 164, 181, 202, 222– 5, 232, 242, 247–9, 259– 64 statements on deterrence, 36– 7, 75– 86, 127–31

Blair, Tony, 111, 113, 149, 171– 4, 258 botulinum toxin, 20, 52, 59, 69, 104, 117, 208, 246, 247, 259 Bourgass, Kemal, 151– 2, 154–5, 173 Bush, George, 2, 101– 2, 108, 161, 166– 7, 171, 190, 191– 3, 197, 217, 222, 227– 30, 241, 257–8 CBRN defences, 126, 101, 126 Chechnya, 82, 86– 95, 129, 139, 147, 149, 150, 153, 157, 170, 181, 209 Chechen network, 148– 55, 159, 160 (see also Paris ricin plot) Chemical Weapon Convention, 67 Cheney, Dick, 101, 114, 146, 190 Chitigov, Rizvan, 92 chlorine, 22, 49, 72, 92–4, 145, 179, 194, 200, 224, 253, 254, 262 chlorine IEDs during war in Iraq 2003–10, 204– 6, 212– 19 CIA, 1, 2, 23, 32– 33, 40, 41, 68, 69, 75, 76, 79, 99, 105, 108, 116, 139, 145, 146, 147, 153, 156, 164– 6, 168, 170, 178, 188, 189, 192, 208, 213, 246, 248 Clinton, Bill, 14, 26– 8, 31, 40, 42, 43, 68, 79, 81 Cobra Event, The, 24, 27

INDEX

Cohen, William, 24, 26, 27, 31, 43, 99 Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, 228, 240, 241 crop dusters, 64, 85, 99–100 cruise missile attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan, 40 – 3 cyanide, 7, 14, 22, 61, 72, 112, 117 – 18, 120, 143, 146, 156, 158, 188, 207, 208, 236 experiments in Afghanistan, 49– 50, 97, 104, 194 experiments in Georgia, 141 experiments in Iraq, 139– 40, 166, 176 experiments in Pakistan, 179 plots to use cyanide, 95, 98, 123, 144– 5, 149–50, 152, 209, 243, 247 use in Afghanistan, 220 use in Iraq, 200– 1, 212 Darunta, 34, 46, 47, 51, 59, 72, 95, 97, 103, 104, 112 Defense Intelligence Agency, 72, 164, 188 Department of Defense, 27, 29, 169, 189, 192 Department of Homeland Security, 247 deterrence, 1, 3, 24, 36, 45, 74 – 8, 80, 82 – 86, 98, 125, 127 – 31, 134, 137, 143, 145, 158, 187, 188, 193,

391

197, 218, 224, 226, 232, 233, 238, 240, 246, 260, 262, 263, 264 Deutch, John, 23 ‘Dr Fadl’, 223 drone strikes, 179, 186, 219, 236, 238, 240 – 1, 245, 248, 249 Dudaev, Djokhar, 86 –7, 146 Ebola, 255, 257 Egyptian Islamic Jihad, 5 –6, 10, 35, 46, 55, 69 enhanced interrogation, 124 – 5, 156, 158, 164, 188 – 94, 229 European Parliament plot, 100 Exoneration, The, 224– 6 al-Fadl, Jamal, 10, 13 al-Fahd, Shaykh Nasir bin Hamid, 135– 7, 196, 224, 225– 6, 253, 260, 262 fatwa 1996, 34 – 6 1998, 36, 39 WMD, 2003, 135– 6, 224– 6, 253, 260, 262 FBI, 14, 31, 85, 96, 100– 1, 144, 180, 188, 228– 9, 240, 255 Georgia, 118– 19, 141, 170 al-Ghamdi, Ali al-Faqasi, 143, 147 Groupe Islamique Armee (GIA), 96, 149, 151 Guantanamo Bay, 3, 119, 124, 156, 158, 228, 229

392

POLITICAL MANIPULATION AND WMD

Hambali, 54, 62, 116, 118, 157 Hiroshima, 7, 44, 75, 76, 128, 198, 261, 262 Hussein, Saddam, 15–16, 28, 37, 118, 140, 162–3, 164–5, 170, 171, 172, 174–6, 190, 198, 203, 222 Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, 121, 158, 163, 170, 176 International Task Force on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, 23 Iran, 14 –16, 18, 22, 25, 61, 95, 102, 115, 118, 133, 147, 161, 175, 178, 196, 205, 223, 249 Indonesia, 73, 116– 17, 209, 243 Inspire magazine, 247, 248 Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), 155, 218, 221 Iraq, 24, 25, 28–9, 41, 44, 129, 134, 138, 142, 178, 182, 187, 190, 227, 241, 243, 248, 253–8, 264–5 allegations of links to al Qaeda, 4, 11, 22, 37, 42, 84, 118–19, 139, 140–2 allegations of links to Sudanese CW programme, 14 –18 invasion of, 160– 77 war, 2004– 10, 180, 191, 198–205, 211– 19, 221– 4, 230, 262 Islamic State of Iraq/ISIL, 196, 211–19, 221–4, 242, 244, 253–8

Italy, 97, 98, 122, 141, 170, 173, 210, 235 Jdey, Abderraouf Yousef, 85 Jemaah Islamiyah, 54, 209 Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), 32, 73– 4 Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), 28, 179 Kandahar conference, 84 al-Kandahari, Abu Shihab, 137, 260 al-Kazimi, Sanad, 157, 181 Kenya and Tanzania embassy bombings, 38 – 41, 163 Kermal, 118, 166, 170, 175, 176, 190 Khaled Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), 6, 49, 54, 82 – 5, 85– 6, 115, 117, 121– 2, 124, 125, 127, 131, 145, 155– 7, 159–60, 178, 179, 193 Khalifa Group, 11 Khalil, Ibrahim Mohammed, 187 Khalil, Ibrahim Muharuhah, 17 Khan, Abdul Qadeer, 58, 62, 235 Khan, Abdul Qadoos, 117 Khan, Majid, 122 Libya, 22, 42, 250 London radiological weapon plot, 2005, 185 London ricin plot, 2003, 151– 2 Lugar, Richard, 25–6, 110, 227– 8

INDEX

Madrid train bombings, 182– 3 Mahmood, Sultan Bashiruddin, 62 Majeed, Chaudry Abdul, 263 al-Marri, Ali, 121–2 al-Masri, Abdul Aziz, see al-Bakri, Ali Sayyid Muhammad Mustafa al-Masri, Al Baraa, 48, 142 al-Masri, Sharif, 181 al-Matrafi, Abdullah Aiza, 61, 116 al-Mauritani, abu Hafs, 37, 83, 115, 130–1, 134, 176, 223– 4, 260, 261 McMaster University, 180 Medhat Mursi al-Sayed, see Abu Khabab media criticism of al Qaeda, 221– 4 Mexico, 137, 181, 182, 188, 256 Millennium Plot, 95– 7 Mir, Hamid, 129, 181 Moussaoui, Zacarias, 85, 99 al-Mubtakkar device, 144– 5, 183, 187, 207–8, 209, 247, 263 Mueller, Robert, 101, 188, 240 Mukhabarrat, 15, 16, 163, 176 mustard gas, 13, 48, 49, 50, 93, 95, 104, 199, 250, 254– 5, 265 Nasar, Mustafa Abd al-Qadir Sitt Maryam, 60, 195–7, 206, 261 National Islamic Front, 66 National Security Council, 42

393

National Security Strategy, 28, 239, 240 New York subway plot, 143– 6, 249 nuclear power stations, 84, 109, 113, 122, 131, 145, 151, 209, 261 nuclear smuggling, 8, 12, 56, 58, 182, 255, 256 nuclear weapons, 11 – 12, 16, 23, 25, 26, 44 – 5, 63, 64, 81, 84, 85, 100, 110 – 12, 114, 126, 133, 161, 165, 171, 181 – 2, 186, 188, 190, 193, 196, 198, 209, 218, 225, 227, 228, 246, 249, 250, 260, 261, 262, 266 al Qaeda experiments in Afghanistan, 55–9, 105–8 al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia attempt to purchase, 144 – 8 allegations of al Qaeda purchasing nuclear weapons, 80, 91 bin Laden statements, 127– 30 Chechens and nuclear weapons, 87 – 9, 94 debates in online chatrooms, 137– 8, 180, 230– 41 ISIL, 255– 6 Joint Intelligence Committee assessments, 32, 73– 4 Obama statements, 239– 40 Pakistani nuclear weapons, 77, 116, 234–8 technology, 8– 9 Nunn, Sam, 25, 228

394

POLITICAL MANIPULATION AND WMD

Obama, Barack, 227– 30, 239– 41, 242, 248, 256, 258 online CBRN debates, 197, 223– 4, 230– 4, 260, 262 online training materials, 2, 48, 52, 119–21, 206– 8, 210, 242, 249 osmium tetroxide, 183–4 Padilla, Jose, 123– 5, 126, 145, 156, 192 Pakistan, 11, 14, 34, 36, 47, 49, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 75, 80, 97, 105, 107, 111, 112, 115 – 17, 121, 122, 124, 125, 145, 155, 156, 178 – 9, 180, 181, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 190, 197, 206, 215, 219, 220, 221, 225, 227, 229, 241, 242, 244 – 5, 246, 247, 249, 255 – 6 nuclear weapons, 77, 116, 234–8 Pankisi Gorge, 141, 148, 149, 152, 153, 170 Paracha, Saifullah, 49, 58, 85,156 Paris ricin plot, 2003– 4, 149– 50 phosgene, 14, 22, 49, 72 plague, 27, 52, 62, 229 plutonium, 8, 56, 62, 106, 112 poisoning food, 51, 143, 158, 169, 203, 204, 219, 246, 247, 248, 249 Powell, Colin, 169– 70, 175, 176 Presidential Decision Directives, 26 –7

Rabia, Hamza, 178, 183, 186 radiological weapons, 26, 55 – 9, 63– 4, 72 – 4, 79, 86, 88, 105, 106, 108, 117, 123– 5, 126, 137, 138, 145, 159, 173, 180– 3, 185, 186, 191, 192, 207, 221, 236– 7, 239, 240, 253, 260 Rahman, Assadalah, 46, 48, 155 red mercury, 11 Ressam, Ahmed, 95–7 returnees from Albania trial, 69– 70, 125 ricin, 1, 3, 48, 50–2, 64, 104, 105, 118, 122, 139–41, 149, 150–5, 166, 159, 173–4, 176, 183–4, 190, 191, 200, 208, 244, 246–7, 250 Ridge, Tom, 106 Rome plot 2002, 98, 123 al-Sabawi, Salih Jasim Mohammed Falah, 203 Salim, Mamdouh Mahmud, 13, 16, 18, 57 salmonella, 69, 117, 155 sarin, 20, 48, 49, 100, 104, 112, 138, 156, 186, 199, 205, 244, 250, 252, 256 Shah, Muhammad, 11 al-Sharq al-Awsat, 80 al-Shibh, Ramzi bin, 131, 145, 179 Shifa pharmaceutical plant, 16– 17, 41– 3, 65– 9, 70, 103, 163 al-Shukrijumah, Adnan, 147, 180– 1, 186, 241

INDEX

shura, 5, 10, 11, 44– 5, 51, 55, 262 Siddiqui, Aafia, 54 – 5, 178– 9, 236 Somalia, 6, 17 – 18, 33, 37 soman, 156, 244 Straw, Jack, 174 Sudan, 5 –18, 19, 22, 23, 34, 40 –2, 55, 56– 7, 65– 9, 79, 162, 163 al-Sudani, al-Hud, 55, 156 Sufaat, Yazid, 54 –5, 61 –2, 85, 193, 218, 253, 259 suitcase nuclear weapons, 88–91, 110, 112, 129, 137 sulphur mustard, 255 al-Suri, Abu Musab, see Nasar, Mustafa bin Abd al-Qadir Sitt Maryam al-Suri, Abu Rida, 10, 13, 18 Syria, 204, 205, 250– 8 Tabun, 156, 199 Taliban, 34, 49, 55– 6, 57, 59, 60, 62, 63, 73, 80, 84, 91, 102– 3, 107, 110, 125, 130, 137, 138, 156, 158, 159, 219–21, 234–8, 241, 249 al-Tawhid wal Jihad, 55, 60, 96, 115, 118, 139–42, 148– 9, 151, 166, 167, 170, 198, 201– 2, 206 Time magazine interviews, 78, 80, 83, 193 Tora Bora, 44, 103, 115, 237 training manuals, 2, 37, 60, 206– 7, 249

395

‘Treatise on the legal status of using weapons of mass destruction against infidels’, 135– 7, 196 Turkey, 102, 139, 141, 163, 168, 236, 252, 254 Turnak Farms, 34, 51, 54, 59, 104, 111 United Arab Emirates, 49, 61, 104 uranium, 8, 10 –11, 16, 44, 57, 63, 253 UTN (Ummah Tameer-e-Nau), 60– 4, 75, 105, 114, 116, 130, 157 VX (nerve agent), 41– 2, 48, 49, 104, 156, 168, 250 al-Wafa, 60– 2, 64, 115, 116 Waziristan summit, 185 Weldon, Curt, 25, 29, 90 WMD sub-committee of the al Qaeda shura, 46, 155 Woolsey, James, 33, 99 World Trade Center Bombing (1993), 6 –7 al-Yemeni, Abu Bashir, 46, 48 Youssef, Ramzi, 6– 7, 14 al-Zawahiri, Ayman, 6, 13, 38, 45– 6, 51 – 5, 63, 105, 114, 115, 129, 145, 181, 193, 202, 218, 222, 224– 6, 252, 261, 263