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Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Political Leadership and its Significance in a Time of Troubles, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Political Leadership and its Significance in a Time of Troubles, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

POLITICAL LEADERS AND THEIR ASSESSMENT

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POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN A TIME OF TROUBLES

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POLITICAL LEADERS AND THEIR ASSESSMENT

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN A TIME OF TROUBLES

ANNA L. LARSEN

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

EDITOR

Nova Science Publishers, Inc. New York

Political Leadership and its Significance in a Time of Troubles, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2011 by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, electrostatic, magnetic, tape, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise without the written permission of the Publisher. For permission to use material from this book please contact us: Telephone 631-231-7269; Fax 631-231-8175 Web Site: http://www.novapublishers.com

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Independent verification should be sought for any data, advice or recommendations contained in this book. In addition, no responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property arising from any methods, products, instructions, ideas or otherwise contained in this publication. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information with regard to the subject matter covered herein. It is sold with the clear understanding that the Publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or any other professional services. If legal or any other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent person should be sought. FROM A DECLARATION OF PARTICIPANTS JOINTLY ADOPTED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND A COMMITTEE OF PUBLISHERS. Additional color graphics may be available in the e-book version of this book. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA Political leadership and its significance in a time of troubles / editor, Anna L. Larsen. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN:  (eBook) 1. Political leadership. I. Larsen, Anna L. JC330.3.P644 2010 303.3'4--dc22 2010015620

Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. † New York Political Leadership and its Significance in a Time of Troubles, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

CONTENTS Preface Chapter 1

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

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Chapter 4

vii Japanese Conservative Views on Foreign Policy: The Defensive Nature of Japan‘s Wars Hiroshi Kaihara

1

Lights and Shadows of Political Leadership: A Review of the Literature and a Research Agenda Beatriz Junquera and Esteban Fernández

23

If the Market is so Efficient, Why Do We Need Leadership? Reflections on Corporate Mismanagement Matt Vidal

47

Multi-Polar Leadership – Success in Nam Puoi Village Resettlement, Vietnam Pham Thi Bich Ngoc and Anders Hjort-af-Ornas

69

Chapter 5

Japan‘s Historic 2009 Elections: Implications for U.S. Interests Weston S. Konishi

87

Chapter 6

Iran‘s 2009 Presidential Elections Casey L. Addis

103

Chapter 7

Party Leaders in the House: Election, Duties and Responsibilities Valerie Heitshusen

117

Chapter 8

The Speaker of the House: House Officer, Party Leader, and Representative Valerie Heitshusen

121

Chapter 9

The Role of the House Minority Leader: An Overview Walter J. Oleszek

135

Chapter 10

The Role of the House Majority Leader: An Overview Walter J. Oleszek

149

Index

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163

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PREFACE Political leadership is defined as ―one that has been democratically elected and is a representative vulnerable to re-election, who works inside and is influenced by a legal and constitutional framework.‖ This book presents and discusses varied topics on global political leadership such as the Japanese conservative views of foreign policy; a look at the roles of the U.S. Speaker of the House, and the House Minority and Majority leaders; Iran's 2009 Presidential elections; corporate scandals and its relationship to political leadership; multipolar leadership in Vietnam, and a review of the most relevant academic literature on political leadership. Chapter 1 - Japanese conservatives are getting lauder and influential in politics. Newspapers and magazineshave been reporting their views sporadically. But it is rare to deal with their most distinctive view; that is, their views on the nature of Japan‘s wars before and during the Second World War. This issue of the interpretations of Japan‘s wars is not totally a matter of the past; it is related to a matter of the present. Conservatives firmly believe that China uses the so-called history issue to divide Japanese public opinions so that Japan cannot adopt more active foreign and defense policy. Their gut feeling seems to be supported by evidence. Peter Hays Greis and his co-authors has concluded in their latest article that the more Japanese students―recognized the negative impact of their past colonization of Manchuria and Korea, the less they perceived threat from China or South Korea and the less they advocated for tougher foreign policies‖ (2008, p. 263). Due to the negative interpretations of Japan‘s war, Japan still does not admit her state right of collective selfdefense. Without it she cannot participate in any military operations under the aegis of the United Nation or an international coalition such as the 2003 Iraqi War. And it is not clear that Japan can handle with China militarizing with a double digit increase of military budget every year and North Korea developing nuclear-weapon and missiles without it. Moreover, such a divided and immobilized Japan is an interest for America and Europe: they will lose a polar force which can counter China, Russia and North Korea in Far East. Then conservatives believe that Japan and the Japanese cannot revive unless they overcome the negative interpretations of Japan‘s wars. Chapter 2 - The aim of this chapter is to review the most relevant academic literature on political leadership. To this end, materials in which this issue appears explicitly in the centre of the debate will be used. There are many and very diverse issues analyzed on this matter. A first aspect on which the debate is supported is the following. Are the classical leadership models useful to analyze the political one? Based on this, it is necessary to go deeply into a

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viii

Anna L. Larsen

lot of other issues: What are the challenges of political leadership in times of changes and crisis? How can author measure its quality and effectiveness, and more specifically, when does political leadership lead to conflict and when to compromise? Is there a unique type of political leadership? What defines the charismatic leader? Must political leadership go hand in hand with ethical behaviours? What happens when this is not so and, more specifically, when political leadership induces behaviours that beyond opportunism, even generate a destructive aim? Would this be the exclusive responsibility of the leader or is this also responsibility of his context? What are the characteristics that define the political leader (speeches, gesture, personality traits, experience, etc)? Although there is no doubt about the leader‘s influence, what can affect him/her? That is, which factors (socio-demographic, ethnic-cultural, institutional and organizational contexts, national culture, voter characteristics, etc.) affect him/her? On the other hand, what is the utility of the models elaborated for the analysis of political leadership in the world of business? These are the issues that raise interest today with respect to political leadership and which will be discussed in this work. From the review of the literature relevant conclusions are drawn. First, political leadership has already achieved remarkable contributions from researchers. Moreover, this area of research is expanding clearly and that raises interest inside and outside the academic world. Nevertheless, there is still a lot of work to be done so that the literature on political leadership reaches its critical mass. After the review, this work finishes with the development of an agenda about those issues still hardly dealt with. Chapter 3 - As a result of two recent waves of corporate scandals – the Enron accounting scandals and the subprime mortgage crisis – millions of unwitting victims have lost their jobs, homes and/or retirement savings; hundreds of billions in taxpayer money has been spent on bailouts; and tens of trillions in paper wealth has evaporated. The prevailing analysis of these scandals is that there was a crisis in corporate leadership. Yet, the core aspects of the free market doctrine – most notably, the institutionalized worship of private enterprise and profit – have survived largely intact. The leadership analysis is correct that managerial discretion is of fundamental importance. But leadership is a construct that is ambiguous, symbolic, and romantic, one that individualizes the complex, organizationally and institutionally shaped process of management. Far more than a problem of individual ethics, the corporate scandals were driven by an institutional environment that not only celebrates the single-minded pursuit of self-interest, in general, but one that structurally encouraged mismanagement. The structural context included enormous pools of money for investment in a financialized economy, norms of obscene individual compensation, extreme pressures to perform, and specific pressures to adopt questionable practices due to competitive mimesis. Chapter 4 - The decentralization process in Vietnam stresses stakeholder participation. A new leadership style is then needed, one that replaces traditional top-down management. This study of a voluntary resettlement of Nam Puoi village in northern Vietnam puts the policy to a test. The process supporting villagers‘ request combined natural disaster relief and development with support from administrations trained in the Sida-financed Chia Se Poverty Alleviation Program. As expected, the involved administrations were trained in stakeholder interaction, bottom-up, and rights based approaches. Yet, put in action, the resettlement process revealed a range of complications that called for good leadership and new thinking for involved parties. This learning process involved interaction across stakeholder categories. Facilitation proved necessary at a point where this communication had come to a deadlock.

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Preface

ix

The result was success for the villagers to shape their new homes along with the experience for the administration to address issues that are frequent for resettlement projects in an empowerment style. The study concludes that multi-polar leadership and participatory interaction process were crucial factors for the success in Nam Puoi resettlement. This process has involved collective action linking local community, administrations, and local decision makers that moves its leadership gravity away from a highly centralized tradition into decentralization. The success in Nam Puoi was not automatic just because initiative came from the village, and the Chia Se program offered stakeholder participation. There have been a number of specific circumstances around even this small project. At the onset, interaction across stakeholder boundaries was absent. Tackling tension and security threats proved awkward and interaction even came to a stand-still until proper facilitation was introduced. The ways in which this obstacle was resolved has lessons of value for scaling-up into other resettlement. When going into the implementation of decentralization not only for routine administration management but also for problem-solving, all parties need to show flexibility and courage to improvise and delegate when confronted with specific concerns. The article addresses one case where a multi-polar leadership has been effective. Chapter 5 - In a historic landslide victory, on August 30, 2009, Japan‘s largest opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), ousted the main ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), in elections for control over Japan‘s Lower House of parliament. The LDP has had almost continuous control of the Japanese government since 1955 and has been a staunch supporter of the U.S.-Japan alliance throughout the postwar period. The DPJ, which includes a mixture of right- and left-leaning members and is led by Yukio Hatoyama, is now Japan‘s main ruling party. The Diet (Japan‘s parliament) is expected to elect Hatoyama as Japan‘s new prime minister in a special Diet session scheduled to begin on September 16. Since 2007, the DPJ has controlled the less powerful Upper House of the Diet, along with two smaller parties, a coalition that is expected to continue once the DPJ officially takes over the government. The DPJ policy platform advocates sweeping economic and administrative reforms and has called for a ―proactive‖ foreign policy with greater ―independence‖ from the United States through deeper engagement with Asia and a more United Nations-oriented diplomacy. In particular, the party has in the past criticized many issues related to the U.S.-Japan alliance, such as plans to realign U.S. forward deployed forces based in Okinawa, Japan‘s ―Host Nation Support‖ (HNS) payments (worth around $4 billion) that defray much of the costs of American troops and bases in Japan, and the bilateral Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). In 2007, the DPJ briefly blocked legislation allowing the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) to continue the refueling of U.S. and allied vessels engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. For the United States, the most significant of these issues would be the HNS and base realignment plans. During the campaign for the Lower House elections, the DPJ showed signs of a more pragmatic approach toward the U.S.-Japan alliance in order to deflect LDP criticism that it was not prepared to run the country. The DPJ dropped demands to end the current legislative authorization for the JMSDF refueling mission in the Indian Ocean, and took a slightly more ambiguous position regarding the SOFA and other bilateral alliance management issues. The party‘s call for a U.N. and Asia-oriented diplomacy also appears to fall short of a more strategic shift to replace the U.S.-Japan alliance with an alternative regional security

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arrangement. Other signs suggest that the party might indirectly support U.S. foreign policy interests over the long-term through enhanced Japanese contributions to U.N.-sanctioned activities, as well as engagement in regional trade institutions and multilateral fora. Nonetheless, the party remains deeply divided on many foreign policy-related issues and continues to send conflicting signals about its overall approach toward the United States. While a political changeover in Tokyo represents a watershed moment for Japan and potentially for U.S.-Japan relations, the extent to which there will be significant policy changes in Tokyo remains uncertain. It is not clear whether some of the DPJ‘s past criticism of the U.S.-Japan alliance and other LDP-backed policies was the result of opposition party politicking or more fundamental policy principles that will be implemented now that the party is coming to power. The DPJ faces daunting political and economic challenges at home that many see as a higher priority for the party than its proposals for adjusting the structure of the U.S.-Japan alliance. This report analyzes the DPJ‘s policy platform and reviews the implications for U.S. strategic and economic interests now that the party and its coalition allies are set to take control of the Japanese government in the wake of the August 30 parliamentary elections. Chapter 6 - On June 12, 2009, following a heated campaign between reformist candidate Mir Hussein Musavi and incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iranians turned out in record numbers to vote in the presidential election. Shortly after the polls closed, the Interior Minister announced that President Ahmadinejad had been reelected by a 62% margin. The announcement was followed by allegations of vote rigging and election fraud and prompted supporters of leading reformist candidate Mir Hussein Musavi and others to hold public demonstrations in several major cities of a size and intensity unprecedented since the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Despite a government ban on unauthorized public gatherings, protests reportedly have continued since the election. Restrictions on foreign and domestic journalists, reported disruptions of mobile phone networks, limited accessibility of some internet sites, mass arrests, and clashes between civilian protestors and Basij forces have garnered international attention and increased concerns about the Iranian government‘s apparent disregard for human rights and basic civil liberties. Regardless of the actual election results, the Supreme Leader Khamenei, along with the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij, appear determined to impose the election outcome by force. The government crackdown on protestors appears to be effective, even as smaller gatherings have continued in Tehran and other major cities. Attention has now focused on the potential long-term effects of the post-election unrest on Iranian government and society, and what the outcome might mean for U.S. efforts to resolve the issues of Iran‘s nuclear program, its support for terrorism, and other national security concerns. The Obama Administration‘s response has been cautious, but somewhat has hardened as reports of deaths, injuries, and mass arrests of Iranian citizens have increased. Many observers believe that President Obama is attempting to balance the need to condemn the violence against the protestors with the need to avoid the perception of U.S. interference, which some worry could prompt the Iranian government to clamp down further on freedom of expression or jeopardize U.S. efforts to engage Iran on the issue of its nuclear program. Chapter 7 - Each major party in the House has a leadership hierarchy. This report summarizesthe election, duties, and responsibilities of the Speaker of the House, the majority andminority leaders, and the whips and whip system. For a listing of all past occupants of

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Preface

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congressional party leadership positions, see CRS Report RL30567, Party Leaders in Congress, 1789-2009. Chapter 8 - The Speaker of the House of Representatives is widely viewed as symbolizing the power and authority of the House. The Speaker‘s most prominent role is that of presiding officer of the House. In this capacity, the Speaker is empowered by House rules to administer proceedings on the House floor, including the power to recognize Members on the floor to speak or make motions and the power to appoint Members to conference committees. The Speaker also oversees much of the non-legislative business of the House, such as general control over the Hall of the House and the House side of the Capitol and service as chair of the House Office BuildingCommission. The Speaker‘s role as ―elect of the elect‖ in the House also places him or her in a highly visible position with the public. The Speaker also serves not only as titular leader of the House but also as leader of the majority party conference. The Speaker is often responsible for airing and defending the majority party‘s legislative agenda in the House. The Speaker‘s third distinct role is that of an elected Member of the House. Although elected as an officer of the House, the Speaker continues to be a Member as well. As such the Speaker enjoys the same rights, responsibilities, and privileges of all Representatives. However, the Speaker has traditionally refrained from debating or voting in most circumstances, and does not sit on any standing committee of the House. Chapter 9 - The House minority leader is head of the ―loyal opposition.‖ The party‘s nominee for Speaker, the minority leader is elected every two years by secret ballot of his or her party caucus or conference. The minority leader‘s responsibilities involve an array of duties. Fundamentally, the primary goal of the minority leader is to recapture majority control of the House. In addition, the minority leader performs important institutional and party functions. From an institutional perspective, the rules of the House assign a number of specific responsibilities to the minority leader. For example, Rule XIII, clause 6, grants the minority leader (or his designee) the right to offer a motion to recommit with instructions; and Rule II, clause 6, states that the Inspector General shall be appointed by joint recommendation of the Speaker, majority leader, and minority leader. The minority leader also has other institutional duties, such as appointing individuals to certain federal or congressional entities. From a party perspective, the minority leader has a wide range of partisan assignments, all geared toward retaking majority control of the House. Five principal party activities direct the work of the minority leader. First, he or she provides campaign assistance to party incumbents and challengers. Second, the minority leader devises strategies, in consultation with other partisan colleagues, that advance party objectives. For example, by stalling action on the majority party‘s agenda, the minority leader may be able to launch a campaign against a ―do-nothing Congress.‖ Third, the minority leader works to promote and publicize the party‘s agenda. Fourth, the minority leader, if his or her party controls the White House, confers regularly with the President and his aides about issues before Congress, the Administration‘s agenda, and political events generally. Fifth, the minority leader strives to promote party harmony so as to maximize the chances for legislative and political success. Chapter 10 - The majority leader in the contemporary House is second-in-command behind the Speaker of the majority party. Typically, the majority leader functions as the Speaker‘s chief lieutenant or ―field commander‖ for day-to-day management of the floor. Although the majority leader‘s duties are not especially well-defined, they have evolved to

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the point where it is possible to spotlight two fundamental and often interlocking responsibilities that orient the majority leader‘s work: institutional and party. From an institutional perspective, the majority leader has a number of duties. Scheduling floor business is a prime responsibility of the majority leader. Although scheduling the House‘s business is a collective activity of the majority party, the majority leader has a large say in shaping the chamber‘s overall agenda and in determining when, whether, how, or in what order legislation is taken up. In addition, the majority leader is active in constructing winning coalitions for the party‘s legislative priorities; acting as a public spokesman— defending and explaining the party‘s program and agenda; serving as an emissary to the White House, especially when the President is of the same party; and facilitating the orderly conduct of the House‘s business. From a party perspective, three key activities undergird the majority leader‘s principal goal of trying to ensure that the party remains in control of the House. First, the majority leader assists in the reelection campaigns of party incumbents by, for example, raising campaign funds and traveling to scores of House districts to campaign either with incumbents or challengers of the party. Second, the majority leader promotes the party‘s agenda by developing themes and issues important to core supporters in the electorate. Third, the majority leader encourages party cohesion by, for instance, working to minimize internal factional disagreements that may undermine the majority party‘s ability to govern the House.

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Chapter 1

JAPANESE CONSERVATIVE VIEWS ON FOREIGN POLICY: THE DEFENSIVE NATURE OF JAPAN’S WARS Hiroshi Kaihara

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INTRODUCTION Japanese conservatives are getting lauder and influential in politics. Newspapers and magazineshave been reporting their views sporadically. But it is rare to deal with their most distinctive view; that is, their views on the nature of Japan‘s wars before and during the Second World War. This issue of the interpretations of Japan‘s wars is not totally a matter of the past; it is related to a matter of the present. Conservatives firmly believe that China uses the so-called history issue to divide Japanese public opinions so that Japan cannot adopt more active foreign and defense policy. Their gut feeling seems to be supported by evidence. Peter Hays Greis and his co-authors has concluded in their latest article that the more Japanese students―recognized the negative impact of their past colonization of Manchuria and Korea, the less they perceived threat from China or South Korea and the less they advocated for tougher foreign policies‖1 (2008, p. 263). Due to the negative interpretations of Japan‘s war, Japan still does not admit her state right of collective self-defense. Without it she cannot participate in any military operations under the aegis of the United Nation or an international coalition such as the 2003 Iraqi War. And it is not clear that Japan can handle with China militarizing with a double digit increase of military budget every year and North Korea developing nuclear-weapon and missiles without it. Moreover, such a divided and immobilized Japan is an interest for America and Europe: they will lose a polar force which can counter China, Russia and North Korea in Far East. Then conservatives believe that Japan and the Japanese cannot revive unless they overcome the negative interpretations of Japan‘s wars.

1

Peter Hays Gries, Qingmin Zhang, Yasuki Masui, and Yong Wook Lee, ―Historical Beliefs and the Perception of threat in Northeast Asia: colonialism, the tributary system, and China-Japan-Korea relations in the twenty-first century‖, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific (May 2008), pp. 245-65.

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Hiroshi Kaihara

Conservatives claim that Japan‘s wars were defensive and challenge a dominant view on the wars. The dominant view is that Japan‘s wars were aggressive, irrational and brutal. This is the view propagated by the Tokyo Trial, Japanese history textbooks, and Japanese leftist and non-Japanese media. There have been published articles which doubt this view. Sir George Sanson2 and Scott D. Sagan3 argue that Japan‘s decision to go war against America was not as irrational as it appeared, although they do not argue that Japan‘s wars were neither aggressive nor brutal. Noam Chomsky,4 Richard H. Minear,5 James B. Crowley6 and Helen Mears7 are very sympathetic to Japan, although they don‘t say that Japan was not brutal. Barry Buzan does argue that Japan‘s wars were not exceptionally brutal, although he says that Japan‘s wars were opportunistic and aggressive. 8Thus there is no article which is written in English and simultaneously argues that Japan‘s wars were not aggressive, irrational, nor brutal. This paper is intended to fill the lacunae. Japanese conservatives argue that Japan was forced to fight the wars to defend her independence and autonomy .And they argue that the wars‘ decisions were not irrational: they were made after intense discussions among major policymakers and supported by the pre-war Japanese people.Moreover, Japan‘s war conducts were not exceptionally brutal: many accusations and pictures which are alleged to prove her brutality are war propaganda. These conservative claims are unbelievable for non-Japanese and hard-line leftist Japanese. But conservatives are serious. Right now, the world seems to dismiss them as fringe.This paper is to take their claims seriously and to try to see whether there are any reasonable grounds for them. Specifically, the paper is to examine their assertions on war propaganda, the setting up of Manchu state, the war against China, and the war against America. Accusers of Japan have never mentioned this issue, while conservatives have conducted photographic examinations on woeful war-time pictures. Most people, whether Japanese and non-Japanese, believe these pictures and conclude from them that Japan was an aggressors. Thus how these pictures are produced or/and what exactly they prove are very important issue in this debate. Also the paper is to examine whether Japan had reasonable grounds for self-defense when she decided to set up the Manchu state, a war against China and a war against America. There are some conservatives who refute the brutality accusation but argue that Japan could have avoided the wars which were so destructive. Their argument is a major concern of this paper, and thus the paper is to assess whether Japan could have avoided the wars by using counterfactual analysis. 9Especially the paper is to consider whether Japan could have maintained her

2

George Sansom, Sir, ―Japan‘s Fatal Blunder,‖ in Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, ed. The Use of Force: International Politics and Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1971), pp. 203-15; 3 Scott D. Sagan, ―The Origins of the Pacific War,‖ Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18: 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 893-922. 4 Noam Chomsky, American Power and the New Mandarins (New York: Pantheon Books, 1967). 5 Richard H. Minear, Victor‟s Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Center for Japanese Studies, 2001). 6 James B. Crowley, Japan‟s Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930-1938 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966). 7 Helen Mears, Nobuji Ito, trans., America no Kagami: Nihon [Mirror for Americans: JAPAN] (Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten, 2005). 8 Buzan, Barry, ―Japan‘s Future: Old History versus New Roles‖, International Affair (autumn 1988), pp. 557-73. 9 Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, ed. Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

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Japanese Conservative Views on Foreign Policy

3

security and independence had she accepted America‘s diplomatic demands in November 1941.

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HISTORIC VIEWS OF THE TOKYO TRIAL Japan‘s wars before and during the Second World War were aggressive, irrational and brutal. These views are firmly crystallized in the minds of the Chinese, Koreans, Westerners and leftist Japanese. The Tokyo Trial concluded that in 1931 Japan ―launched a war of aggression against China and conquered Manchuria and Jehol. … From 1937 onwards they continued their aggressive war against China. … [O]n 7thDecember 1941 the conspiratorslaunched a war of aggression against the United States and the British Commonwealth.‖ 10And as Minear writes, ―Far from condemning the Soviet Union for its attack on Japan, the Tokyo majority found Japan guilty of aggression against the Soviet Union.‖ 11About sixty years later after the trial‘s judgment, former Japanese Prime Minister Jun‘ichiro Koizumi, who was criticized of playing up nationalism, still embraced this view. And the Japanese were irrational because they hit an enemy which was probably ten times stronger than them. 12The New York Times wrote ―sublime insanity‖ when Japan hit Pearl Harbor. The Los Angeles Time wrote ―the act of a mad dog.‖ The Philadelphia Inquirer wrote ―an insane adventure that for fatalistic abandon is unsurpassed in the history of the world.‖ 13About sixty years later after these utterances, Yukio Okamoto, a Japanese diplomat, still laments the folly of the pre-war Japanese leaders. 14He claims, without elaboration, that China and Japan would have already established a common economic body if Japan had not made a reckless decision to invade China. Finally, the Japanese were brutal. The Nanking Incident is a star evidence for the Japanese brutality during the war. According to the judgment of the Tokyo Trial, Japanese solders entered the city of Nanking on 13 December 1937 and committed murders, rapes, robbery and arsons. They were drunken, and indiscriminately killed men, women and children with no provocations. 15The trial estimates that in the first six weeks after the Japanese troops occupied the city, the total number of Chinese civilians and war prisoners who were killed by them in and around the city is more than 200,000. 16After having occupied, America inculcated the conclusion of the trial in Japanese minds. Its War Guilt Information Program was intended to implant the sense of guilt about the war in Japanese minds, and forced a Japanese radio station to broadcast radio programs called ―Shinso ha Koda [This is the Truth]‖ and ―Shinso Bako [Box of the Truth] from December 9, 1945 to December 4, 1946. 17These programs spread the trial‘s stories about the Naking Incident. 10

Richard H. Minear, Victor‟s Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Center for Japanese Studies, 2001), p. 195-6. 11 Ibid., p. 135. 12 Sanson, ―Japan‘s Fatal Blunder,‖ p. 203. 13 Quoted in Sagan, ―Origins of the Pacific War,‖ p. 893. 14 Yukio Okamoto and Akihiko Tanaka, ―Sekai ha Chugoku to Kyozondekiruka [Can the World Coexist with China?],‖ Chuo Koron (August 2008), pp. 26-37, at p. XX. 15 Quoted in Nobukatsu Fujiwara, Jiyu Shugi Shikan towa [What Is the Liberal History View?] (Tokyo: PHP Bunko, 1997), p. 252. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid., pp. 242-50.

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Hiroshi Kaihara

Sixty years after the trial, Japan‘s history textbooks still characterize this incident as a great massacre and tell the number of the dead as the trial concluded.Tokyo Shoseki‘s [Tokyo Books] junior high school history textbook tells the number of the dead in this incident is 70,000 to 80,000 for civilians including women and children.If soldiers who abandoned weapons are included, the number is said to amount to 200,000.Kyouiku Shuppan‘s [Education Publisher] textbook even speaks for the Chinese government which puts the death number at 300,000. The Japanese believed these views. That is why they quietly accept postwar Japanese leaders making apologies every time they went to Asian countries. That is why they quietly accept their leaders making apologies whenever Asians complain of the issues of history textbooks, the Yasukuni Shrine, and comfort women.Even those who think Asians‘ accusations are not based on facts accept their accusations, believing that the history issue will disappear as long as Japan continues to apologize. Alas, no matter how many times Japan has apologized (i.e., every year in the 1990s),18 the history issue has never disappeared.Indeed it is getting worse. Meanwhile, the Japanese seriously face history, examine it and are surprised to find a new history which is very different from the history which their teachers told them.

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WAR PROPAGANDA FOR JAPAN’S BRUTALITY Katsuichi Honda wrote a book about the Naking incident.19When I was a university student, I read it and believed it.Pictures which vividly showed burnt Chinese bodies convinced me that a massacre did happen. Iris Chan wrote a book about the incident.20Her book became a bestseller in America and greatly contributed to the propagation of the incident among Americans. Then I am surprised to read Shudo Higashinakano‘s book which examines these pictures.21He and his colleagues show that some pictures are faked and unnatural, photographically speaking. For example, two shadows in one picture run in different directions. A shadow of a soldier‘s foot, which must be long because the incident happened in winter, is short. People who were watching the Japanese soldiers burying Chinese dead bodies wore summer clothing. And Higashinakano went to the Nationalist Party‘s library in Taipei, Taiwan, and found the party‘s secret document which shows the party aimed at foreign presses, such as the New York Times and the Life,to spread war propaganda in Western countries. 22Books written by conservatives such as Nobukatsu

18

Prime Minister Tanaka apologized on September 25 and 29, 1972; Suzuki on September 26, 1982; Takeshita on August 25, 1988 and on April 12 and 13, 1989; Kaifu on August 11, 1991; Japanese Emperor on October 1992; Miyazawa on August 10, 1993; Hosokawa on March 20, 1994; Murayama on May 3, 1995; Hashimoto on November 24, 1996 and on September 4, 1997; Obuchi on November 26, 1998 and on July 8, 1999; Mori on October 13, 2000; Koizumi on October 8, 2001. Ma Lichen observes that the Chinese seem to think that the Japanese have never apologized despite Japan apologized 21 times. See his article ―Nashonarizumu no Chokoku ga Saidai no Kadaida [Transcending Nationalism is the Biggest Task],‖ Chuo Koron (August 2004), p. 127. 19 Katsuichi Honda, Nankin heno Michi [Road to Nanking] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1989). 20 Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II (New York: Basic Book, 1997). 21 Higashinakano Shudo, Kobayashi Susumu, and Fukunaga Shinjiro, Nankin Jiken: Shoko Shashin o Kensho suru (Analyzing “the Photographic Evidence” of Nanking Massacre) (Tokyo: Soshisha, 2005). 22 Higashinakano Shudo, Nankin Jiken: Kokuminto Gokuhi Bunsho kara Yomitoku (Nanking Incident: Reading Nationalist Party‟s Top Secret Documents) (Tokyo: Soshisha, 2006), p. 15.

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Fujioka,23 Naoki Komuro24 and Shouichi Watanabe25 forced me to reconsider my judgment on the incident. What exactly happened in December 1937 in the city of Naking? 26Are the accusations against Japanese brutality in the city true? One accusation made by the New York Times is not true. On December 9, 1937, Japanese Commander Matsui recommended a Chinese commander who was responsible for the defense of the city to surrender. The Japanese waited until 1:00 p.m. of the next day and received no response. Immediately the Japanese started a war. They fought heavy battles at a mountain and a plateau outside the city. Two days later, the Japanese surrounded the city. Although he pledged Chiang Kaishek to defend the city to death, the Chinese commander quickly fled.High-ranking Chinese soldiers also fled from the northern and northwestern gates of the city. And they closed the gates from outside so that Chinese citizens and remaining soldiers couldn‘t get out of the city. 27The number of boats floating at the YangtzuRiver was limited. Thus the high-ranking officers wanted to secure boats for themselves and their families.In the city, shootings happened among Chinese solders: one side was fleeting soldiers and the other side was soldiers who were ordered to prevent the escape. The result was a mount of dead bodies at the northwestern gate, reaching two meters high. But Tillman Durdin of the New York Time reported that it was the Japanese who killed all these Chinese soldiers. And he went on to claim that the Japanese left them as a warning. As Higashinakano shows, the Nationalist Party‘s secret document specifically named Durdin as a target. 28Durdin mistakenly reported this horror as a Japanese deed due to Nationalist war propaganda activities. Similarly many reports about the Japanese brutality in the incident are dubious. The Tokyo Trial found that the Japanese troops committed murders, rapes, robberies and arsons after they entered the city .One of examples is Xu Chuanyin, a Chinese civilian, who testified at the trial a story which he heard from a Chinese boatman. According to his testimony, two Japanese soldiers raped daughters in the boat. The family, which was composed of the daughters, their father, and a husband of one of the daughters, committed suicides by jumping in the sea after the rapes. But as Justice Radhabinod Paar wondered, why couldn‘t three brave and honorable Chinese men (i.e., the father, the husband and the boatman) who died to defend their family‘s honor fight against two Japanese? 29They could have hit the Japanese heads when the latter were raping their daughters Another example is John Magee, an American pastor, who testified more than hundred cases of Japanese atrocities. But when a defense lawyer asked him whether he directly witnessed the atrocities, he answered that he witnessed only one case. 30How did Magee collect these accusations? Tokuyasu Fukuda, a Japanese consul at Nanking at the time of the incident, remembered what was going on in an office of the International Committee which supervised the Safe Zone in the city of Nanking.Magee was working in the office, and one Chinese young after another came to him every day. The 23

Fujiwara, Jiyu Shugi Shikan. Naoki Komuro and Shouichi Watanabe, Fuin no Showashi [Sealed Showa History] (Tokyo: Tokuma Shoten, 1995). 25 Shouichi Watanabe, Showa History by Shouichi Watanabe (Tokyo: WAC, 2003). 26 The following accounts on the Naking incident rely on Fujioka, Jiyu Shugi Shikan, pp. 281-7: Ikuhiko Hata, Yugamerareru Nihon Gendaishi [Distorted Japanese Modern History] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyusho, 2006). 27 Fujioka, Jiyu Shugi Shikan, p. 285. 28 Higashinakano, Kokuminto, p. 45. 29 Fujioka, Jiyu Shugi Shikan, p. 236. 30 Ikuhiko Hata, NankinJiken [Nanking Incident], enlarged ed. (Tokyo: Chukou Shinsho, 2007), p. 35. 24

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Chinese told him, ―the Japanese soldiers are gang-raping a 15 to 16 year-old girl,‖ or ―a group of Japanese soldiers are robbing goods at the Pacific Street.‖ 31And Magee and others were typing these claims without questioning.Fukuda was surprised and protested Magee and others, ―Wait a minute!Don‘t type them without scrutiny.‖ And Fukuda took them to places where the Japanese crimes allegedly happened, and found that there were no civilians living or traces of crimes.72.7 % of the evidences of the trial were hearsay of this kind.32 The Japanese did kill the Chinese in the Naking City in December 1937. But the issue is the nature of the killing. They were accused of wanton killings of hundreds of thousands of Chinese.Did they really do that? An important point is that they were fighting a war in China.Killings which were necessary or inevitable for military goals must be distinguished from those which were not. The latter can be rightly condemned, but the former cannot. Most accusers of Japanese war conducts in China do not make this distinction. Take as an example a case of shootings at a place called Xiaguan between the Yangtze River and a northwestern gate of the city on December 13, 1937. Driven by the Japanesesoldiers, the Chinese soldiers abandoned their weapons, ride on boats on the Yangtze River and tried to flee.The Japanese were shooting at about 10,000 such Chinese.Yutaka Yoshida called the shootings as a massacre. 33But many wonder whether shooting at fleeing enemies is a common war practice in the world. 34Even if this shooting is illegal, the Allied Powers‘ soldiers did the same thing. In February 1943, their airplanes were shooting at Japanese sailors who were floating at the Sea of Bismarck. 35The Japanese are wondering why their war crimes are intensely criticized while the Allied Powers‘ not .Don‘t international humanitarian laws apply to both the winner and the loser of a war alike? The Chinese commander should have surrendered and opened the city for the Japanese troops. Instead he fled without giving any instruction to his soldiers.So they wore civilian clothes and intermingled among Chinese civilians in the Safe Zone in the city. John H.D. Rabe, a German and chairman of the International Committee, should have delivered them to the Japanese. Instead they hide them.So the Japanese started to hunt them among houses in the zone .But it was hard to distinguish soldiers and civilians. Thus the Japanese solders indiscriminately captured Chinese men of fighting age and executed them. The Seventh Regiment of Kanazawa proudly reported, ―6,670 defeated enemies stubbed to death.‖ 36 Among them were probably included Chinese male civilians who were mistaken to be 31

Fujioka, Jiyu Shugi Shikan, p. 237. Ibid., p. 232. 33 Quoted by Fujioka, Jiyu Shugi Shikan, p. 294. Yoshida also concluded that the shootings were at Chinese civilians as well as Chinese soldiers. See, his Tenno no Guntai to Nankin Jiken [Emperor‘s Military and Naking Incident], (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1985), p. 113. But how did he reach this conclusion? He was born in 1954 and did not witness the shootings. Thus he had to rely on other people who witnessed or heard about the shootings. He brought up in his 1985 book four people who directly witnessed the shootings and two people who heard about the shootings. The four witnesses wrote about the shootings in their diary. All of them used the words ―enemy soldiers,‖ ―troops,‖ or ―men looked as enemy soldiers‖ to describe the Chinese who were killed in the shootings; none of them suggested the Chinese civilians were killed in the shootings. The two Japanese who heard about the shootings from other people claimed that the Chinese civilians were killed in the shootings. Under this circumstance, objective historians should be very careful to conclude that civilians were intentionally killed in the shootings. But Yoshida, without showing a rationale, jumped to such a conclusion. 34 Fujioka, Jiyu Shugi Shikan, pp. 294-6. 35 Yutaka Yoshida, ―Kokusaiho no Kaishakude Jiken o Seitokadekiruka [Can We Justify the Incident by the Interpretation of International Law]‖ in Nanking Daigyakusatu Hiteiron: Ju-san no Uso [Deniers of the Nanking Massacre: Thirteen Lies] (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobo, 1999), p. 174. 36 Hata, Yugamerareta, p. 73. 32

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soldiers. Hata estimated about 40,000 of this kind of death in the incident.37The debate over the incident seems to be narrowed down to the assessment of these executions. On the one hand, some argue that there was nothing wrong about it because they did not meet conditions for war prisoner‘s privileges set by the Hague Convention.38On the other hand, some argue that these executions were illegal because a strict interpretation of international laws on war requires the setting up of military courts before execution. However, there is no clause requiring taking surrendering soldiers as war prisoners in the Hague Convention. The convention only prescribes the rights and privileges of war prisoners. It seems that it is up to field commanders to decide whether to take war prisoners or not. 39 Moreover, it is not clear whether a practice of mandatory taking as war prisoners was established in the 1930s-40s. There is an evidence to show that it was not. Charles A. Lindbergh, the great pilot, deplored that America did not take Japanese soldiers as war prisoners in his memoir. He writes, ―The general atmosphere was to kill every enemy and not to take them as war prisoners. When we took them as war prisoners, we let them to stand in a line, and asked them whether there was anyone who could speak English. Those who could speak English were taken away for interrogation, and others were not taken as war prisoners.‖ 40 Then what happened to those who were not taken as war prisoners? It is logical to assume that they were killed. No matter which side on the debate is right, the debate seems to miss a more important question. It is whether non-Japanese and leftist Japanese accuse the Japanese on this incident in a fair manner.Japanese Commander Matsui and Division Chief Tani got a death penalty for whatever war crimes which Japanese soldiers committed in the city. Thus Japan already took a responsibility. After that, is it fair to demand apology from the Japanese by unfairly accusing them?Is it fair to accuse the Japanese of killing children and women wantonly when the Japanese soldiers were killing unlawful combatants, male civilians mistaken as combatant, and fleeing soldiers? Is it fair to accuse them with faked and irrelevant pictures?Just presenting a picture which shows a dead body with a stick stabbed into a female genital does not prove that the Japanese soldiers did it .A picture which shows something happened in Shanghai cannot be used to prove the Naking Incident. And is it fair to focus only on the Japanese war crimes while war crimes committed by the Allied Powers are ignored? Accusing someone with fake pictures and unsubstantiated claims is unethical, and nobody is under moral obligation to accept unethical accusations. One may argue that the Nanking incident is not the only case for the Japanese brutality: there are the Bataan death march, man-nin ko [holes for 10,000 dead bodies], comfort women and others. But if the star case is seriously doubtful, how strong are other minor cases? First, how about the Bataan death march?General Jonathan M. Wainwright was a general who fought against the Japanese after General MacArthur leftthe Philippines.He made a speech in 37

Hato, Nankin Jiken, p. 214. The Hague Convention of 18 October 1907 sets four conditions as to be taken as war prisoners in Article 1. They are (1) there is a leader who can control subordinates; (2) ―a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance‖; (3) carrying ―arms openly‖; and (4) ―To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.‖ 39 Komuro and Watanabe, Fuin no Showashi, p. 60. The logic of war supports this conclusion. When you are strong, you kill enemies. But when you are losing, you surrender and enemies are obliged to take you as war prisoners. Wars do not work out in such a way. 40 Quoted in Shouichiro Watanabe, Showa History by Shouichi Watanabe (Tokyo: WAC, 2003), p. 292. I translate into English a Japanese translation of Lindbergh‘s sentences. Therefore, my English translation and his original sentences do not exactly match. 38

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Washington after the war.―We surrendered to the Japanese who we thought as honorablesoldiers. But they ignored the rules which prescribed how civilized nations should treat war prisoners, that is, rights and privileges war prisoners can demand as a matter of course.Many of our brave soldiers were tortured to death by senseless brutality and hunger.‖41But isn‘t it just that the Japanese did not have foods and trucks for the American soldiers who had already caught with malaria? Second, how about the man-nin ko?Katsuichi Honda wrote about it.42When I was a university student, I read it and believed it.Man-nin ko are holes where the Japanese buried Chinese workers who died of hard works in insanitary workplaces in coal mines in Manchu. According to his book, there were thirty holes in the Bujun43 Coal Mine, and 250,000 to 300,000 Chinese died during the forty years of Japanese management of the mine. 44But Toshio Tanabe interviewed 37 Japanese who worked at the mine, and found that nobody had ever seen or heard of the holes. 45Honda rebutted, saying Tanabe‘s samples are small. Then Tanabe talked to the Tokyo Bujun Kai, a group of Japanese who worked at the mine. The group sent inquiry to its members and collected 455 responses.94.7 % of the respondents say that they have never seen or heard about it.4612 respondents say that they have not seen but heard about it. One respondent say that he saw it. But what he saw is a place where about ten dead bodies were abandoned. Third, how about comfort women?North Korea accuses that the Japanese military authorities ordered to kidnap 200,000 Asian women, and that these women gang-raped in comfort stations and most of them were killed. The United Nations‘ human rights committee took her accusations at face value and reported them to the world. Seiji Yoshida came out to confess that he, as a military officer, went to the Cheju Island, Korea, kidnapped 1,000 Korean women, and bought them to comfort stations during the war. But Ikuhiko Hata doubted his claim and went to the island. After interviews he found that nobody in the island knew such kidnappings ever took place. 47 He also found that Yoshida lied about his status: he was never a military officer. Yoshida was the only Japanese witness to approve the direct government role in this issue.Here again, as the Nanking incident, the start witness turn out to be highly dubious. All in all, accusers of the Japanese war conducts make serious claims but support them with highly solid evidence.

WHY JAPAN SET UP THE MANCHU STATE Even if the Japanese did not wantonly kill the Chinese, it is undeniable that they killed them when waging wars.Japan waged aggressive wars and thus all killings done by her cannot be justified.One might argue this way.As seen above, the Tokyo Trial found that Japan 41

Daisetsu Suzuki, Toyotekina Mikata [The Eastern Way to View Things], new ed. (Tokyo: Iwanami Bunko, 1997, p. 294. 42 Katsuichi Honda, Chugoku no Tabi [Travel in China] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1981). 43 Its Chinese characters are 撫順. The Chinese and Japanese pronunciations of these Chinese characters are different. ―Bujun‖ is Japanese. 44 Ibid., p. 92. 45 Toshio Tanabe, ―Asahi Shimbun ni Oshitsukerareta Dairyo Gyakusatsu [A Great Massacre Propagated by the Asahi News],‖ in Masami Kataoka et al, ed. Machigaidarakeno Shimbun Hodo [Too Many Wrong News Reports] (Fukuoka: Kakubunsha, 1992), pp. 169-240, at p. 208. 46 Ibid., p. 224. 47 Ikuhiko Hata, Ianfu to Senjo no Sei [Comfort Women and Sex on Battlefields] (Shinchosha: Tokyo, 1999), pp. 232-3.

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was engaged in aggressive wars since 1931 .But did Japan really wage aggressive wars? Didn‘t she act to protect her subjects and secure her independence and autonomy? Let us see the case of setting up the Manchu state. After Japan wiped out Russia from Manchu and started to rule, security and economy improved in Manchu. The population increased by seventy percent between 1908 and 1930, reaching 29 million.Farm land and railroad expanded.Bean‘s production increased five times; coal production fourteen times; and trade six times.48However, attacks on Japanese settlers in Manchu had been an issue.Around 1930 there were 220,000 Japanese and one million Koreans, who were Japanese subjects at that time, in Manchu.Hundred cases of attacks against Koreans were reported every year.49No payment of debts, illegal taxations, violent acts by Chinese police, insulting acts against the Japanese, skirmishes between Chinese and Japanese troops were reported too. In June 1931 two Japanese solders, one Russian, and one Mongolian were killed by Chinese troops when they went on a tour of inspection in the northwestern part of Manchu. A Chinese warlord in Manchu, who maintained a precarious relationship with the Japanese Army in Manchu, did not seem to have capabilities or intent to address these Japanese grievances. It seemed to the Japanese that only solution to these subversive activities was that Japan should set up a state and provide security in the region. Also the Japanese took the threat of communism in Manchu seriously.In 1927 or 1928, a Chinese war lord forcibly searched the Soviet embassy in Beijing and found a document planning to put Manchu in communist control.50The Soviet Union was in turmoil immediately after the revolution of 1917, but was growing under Stalin‘s collectivist economic policies.It wasreasonable for the Japanese to think that the Soviet Union would have occupied Manchu if Japan had not occupied it and been ready to fight against them.The past behaviors of Russia amply support this speculation.In 1860 Russia opened a military port at Vladivostok. In 1861, Russia occupied Tsushima, a Japanese island between the Korean Peninsula and Japan. Russians killed one Japanese officer and kidnapped three island villagers. 51They left the island only with American and British diplomatic protests. Observing this incident, Sir John R. Alcock, British ambassador to Japan, said that ―it is for certain that Japan will be part of the Russian empire if other European powers retreat.‖52By 1900 Russia had military ports along Chinese coasts. And in 1900 Russia occupied Manchu, using the Boxer Incident as a pretext.And Russia forced Korea to open a port for her fleets. Only Japan‘s war against Russia in 1904 pushed back these Russian southern drives. This war not only cost about 100,000 Japanese lives53 but also put her independence and autonomy at stake (image what would have happened had she lost the war). Moreover, at the end of W. W. II, the Soviet Union ignored a neutral pact with Japan, and occupied four islands near Hokkaido.And she continues to do so to this day. These facts support Japanese fear of communism at that time. The Tokyo Trial‘s view that the Japanese act in Manchu was aggressive totally ignored the insecurity Japanese settlers felt in Manchu and the geopolitical threat posed by the Soviet Union to Japan.Justices of the trial could not understand this geopolitical threat, but General 48

All these numbers come from Ryuzo Sejima, Daitoa Senso no Jisso [The Truth about the Great East Asian War] (Tokyo: PHP Bunko, 2000), p. 69-70. 49 Ibid., p. 73-4. 50 Ibid., p. 67. 51 Nobukatsu Fujioka, ed. Kyokasho ga Oshienai Rekishi: Meiji, Taisho, Showa, Daijiken no Shinso [A History That Textbooks Do Not Teach: Meiji, Taisho, Showa, Truths of Big Events] (Tokyo: Fusosha Bunko, 1999), p. 19. 52 Ibid., p. 20-1. He meant ―retreat‖ from Japan. 53 Kiyoshi Hiraizumi, Monogatari Nihon Shi [Story Japanese History], vol. 3 (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2006), p. 194.

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MacArthur could. On 3 May 1952, he testified at the Senate that Japan‘s wars in Asia were defensive. He understood the defensive nature of Japan‘s wars only after he fought against communists in the Korean peninsula.54 Due to these two concerns, the Japanese Army in Manchu decided to act.On 18 September 1931, the Japanese troops exploded a railroad in southern Manchu. This was done without an order from the Army‘s Headquarters. Using this explosion as a pretext, they went on to wage a war against a Chinese warlord in Manchu. They quickly got rid of the warlord and set up a state of Manchu. People around the world thought that this was an act of aggression. Many current Japanese think that this is a beginning of the military‘s domination of Japanese politics. They always take an issue of the unauthorized nature of the act. However, they are not told the above two concerns that confronted Japan at that time. Nor are they told the fact that many pre-war Japanese praised the Army‘s act and donated 2.2 million yen to the Army. 55Although they emphasize that the military dominated Japan‘s politics at that time, didn‘t the military act on the wish of the people? The Japanese troops exploded the railroad and occupied a main city in Manchu. These acts were illegal under international law.And these illegal acts led to the setting up of the Manchu state. But how politically wrong was this entire process in terms of international practice in the age of imperialism? Compare with an American way to annex the Kingdom of Hawaii.56American citizens went to the kingdom and lived there. Taking advantage of a controversy over a constitution, they started a rebellion and let American marines to invade the kingdom.Queen Lili‘uokalani appealed to President Cleveland. But he did nothing to her plea.American insurgents declared independence and asked America to annex their state. The queen was jailed and forced to abdicate. The kingdom ended.It is obvious that Japan‘s statebuilding in Machu is praiseworthy compared with this.Japan asked the last Chinese Emperor Pu Yi to come to Manchu. And he voluntarily came to Manchu, although it is often claimed that he was kidnapped by the Japanese.57Although the Japanese occupied the higher echelon of the Manchu state, they did provide security and prosperity in Manchu. That was why the Chinese, who felt secured, flooded into Manchu: the population of Chinese there increased from 14 million around 1904 to 28 million in 1930.58Five peoples, i.e., the Chinese (comprising 95.9 % of Machu population around 1930), Japanese (0.8 %), Koreans (2.1%), Manchu (0.7%), and Mongolians (0.7 %), lived under the level of security and prosperity which China failed to provide.59It seems that accusers of Japan on this case of setting up the Manchu state miss a larger picture by exclusively focusing the explosion the railroad. They ignore the anti-Japanese commotions and communist threat in Manchu. And they never compare Japan‘s deed in Manchu with those of other imperial powers in Asia.

54

Fujioka, Jiyu Shugi Shikan, p. 191. Atarashii Rekishi Kyokasho [New History Textbook] (Tokyo: Fusosha, 2001), p. 267. 56 Kaname Saruya, Hawai Ocho Saigo no Jo‟o[Last Queen of Hawaii Kingdom] (Tokyo: Bunshun Shinsho, 2003). 57 Reginald F. Johnston, a British tutor to Pu Yi, wrote, ―The Chinese endeavoured to make out that the emperor had been kidnapped by the Japanese and carried off against his will. This statement was widely circulated among Europeans, many of whom believed it; but it was wholly untrue… He left Tientsin and went to Manchuria of his own free will.‖ See his Twilight in the Forbidden City (London: Gollancz, 1934, pp. 449-450). I take this citation from Shouichi Watanabe, Nani ga Nihon o Okashikushitaka [What Made Japan Wrong] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2000), p. 72. 58 Junnosuke Masumi, Nihon Seijishi[History of Japanese Politics], vol. 3 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1988), p. 202. 59 Ibid. 55

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WHY JAPAN FOUGHT AGAINST CHINA Next, let us see Japan‘s war against China.As seen above, the Tokyo Trial concluded that ―From 1937 onwards they continued their aggressive war against China.‖ Non-Japanese and leftist Japanese follow this view and focus on the ambition of the Japanese Army in North China. And many thoughtful Japanese lamented the handling of China-Japan relationship after the Manchu Incident.For example, Kanji Ishiwara, an architect of the incident, retrospectively opined that we should have had Chiang Kaishek to suppress anti-Japanese commotions, set up a common defense against communism with him, had him to recognize or tacitly accept the Manchukuo, and ended the aftermath of the incident.60But could Chiang have suppressed anti-Japanese commotions? A growing economic relation between Japan and Manchu increased an economic relation between these countries and China .For example, some types of minerals and coals had to come from North China. 61Also North China became important for Manchu as a buffer zone against the Soviet Union. But anti-Japanese commotions were increasing in North China. Could Japan have protected Japanese there from violent attacks without the show or use of force? Such a concern came true on July 7, 1937.Japanese troops were shot three times at the MarcoPoloBridge. They fought back and chased away Chinese Nationalist troops. It turns out that it was Ryu Shaoqi‘s communist soldiers who shot at that night. He wanted the Japanese and Chiang‘s troops to start a war.62It was clear that the Japanese did not want a war with China.Next day, the Japanese Army Headquarters ordered a field commander not to use forces and to prevent the skirmish from developing into a war.63But Chinese continued to shoot Japanese troops on July 24 and on July 26. It was obvious that Chiang had no capabilities or intention to prevent provocations against Japan. The Japanese Army had no choice but to punish Chiang. Then a horrendous incident happened to make the Japanese people support the military campaign .On July 29, Chinese troops killed Japanese and Korean civilians, including women and children, in the city of Tongzhou.It is said that 280 out of 380 Japanese who resided in the city at that time were killed.64However, this atrocity has been never taught in history textbooks, and therefore most current Japanese do not know this crucial incident at all.Although mentioning to the Nanking incident, Yoko Kato65 and Toshiya Iko66 do not mention to the Tongzhou incident when they wrote a book about the China-Japan war of 1937.Hideo Kobayashi mentions to the incident but does not explain what happened.67Kodansha‘s documentary called Showa: All Records of Twenty Thousand Days explains what happened but concludes that ―this incident was overly propagated to inflame anti-Chinese feeling in Japan.‖68It is hard to understand the meaning of ―overly propagated.‖ 60

Sejima, Daitoa Senso, p. 101. Ibid., pp. 114-5. 62 Sankei, September 8, 1994, Evening ed. 63 Sejima, Daitoa Senso, p. 119. 64 Fujioka, ed., Kyokasho ga Oshienai Rekishi, p. 61. 65 Yoko Kato, Manshu Jihen kara Nicchu Senso he [From the Manchu Incident to Japan-China War] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 2007). 66 Toshiya Iko, Manshu Jihen kara Nicchu Zenmen Senso he [From the Manchu Incident to Great Japan-China War] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2007). 67 Hideo Kobayashi, Nicchu Senso [Japan-China War] (Tokyo: Kodansha Gendai Shinsho, 2007). 68 Katsumasa Harada et al., ed., Showa: Ni-man Nichi no Zen Kiroku, vol. 4: Nicchu Senso heno Michi [Showa: All Records of Twenty Thousand Days, vol. 4: Road to the Japan-China War] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1989), p. 269. 61

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How can a massacre of 280 civilians be exaggerated? Doesn‘t a single sentence reporting the incident suffice to ignite anger among the Japanese? Most of the current Japanese do not know the existence of the incident, let alone its significance.Instead, they have been taught that the Japanese Army, imbued with contempt for the Chinese, ran a mock, and that is the cause of the war between China and Japan. Many argue that the very stationing of Japanese troops in China was wrong: if there had been no Japanese troops, there would have been no war between China and Japan. However, Japan was entitled to station her troops in China. For example, a truce agreement of 31 May 1933 between China and Japan made a part of Northern China a truce district where Chinese troops were prohibited from entering and provocative commotions were prohibited. And it gave the Japanese military an authority to monitor these agreements.69Also a treaty concluding the Boxer Incident of 1900 gave Japan as well as European nations an authority to station troops to maintain free transportation between the capital and harbors.Moreover, Japan sent her troops to China to protect Japanese subjects who were doing business in China.Even Americans supported such a dispatch.Chomsky writes that ―In 1928, American consuls supported the dispatch of Japanese troops: one reported that their arrival ‗has brought a feeling of relief…even among Chinese, especially those of the substantial class.‘‖70And he goes on to write, ―The business community remained relatively pro-Japanese even after Japanese actions in Manchuria and Shanghai in 1931-32; ‗in general, it was felt that the Japanese were fighting the battle of all foreigners against the Chinese who wished to destroy foreign rights and privileges.‘‖71 But how serious were Chinese threats to Japanese and other foreign businesspeople in China?The so-called Second Shanghai Incident of August 193772 might give us some ideas of the situation.73Once a war started between China and Japan in 1937, about 30,000 Japanese residents gathered in Shanghai for protection. There were only 4,000 Japanese navy troopers to protect them at the beginning of the incident.On the other hand, there were 60,000 Chinese soldiers advancing to the city. And they were trained by German military advisers and equipped by German weapons. The Japanese Army immediately dispatched reinforcements. The warfare ended in three months, but 42,000 Japanese soldiers were injured and killed.It is not preposterous to assume that there would have been another Tongzhou-type massacre of Japanese civilians in Shanghai had Japanese reinforcements been delayed .And it does not seem apparently wrong for the Japanese military to decide a military campaign against Nanking after the Shanghai incident.Nanking and Shanghai are very close.Unless Japan gave China a decisive military blow in Nanking, China would have repeated a military campaign against Shanghai.To sum up, the incident, the above opinions of foreign businesspeople, the above treaties and the attacks against the Japanese residents in China lead to a conclusion that Japan fought against China to protect her subjects and her treaty-based interests.And this conclusion seriously undermines Tokyo Trial‘s judgment that Japan waged an aggressive war against China since 1937. 69

Ibid., 104. Chomsky, American Power, p. 187. 71 Ibid. 72 The First Shanghai Incident took place in January 1932. 73 Ken‘ichi Ara, Nicchu Senso ha Doitsu ga Shikunda [It Was Germany Who Arrange the Japan-China War] (Tokyo: Shogakkan, 2008). 70

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WHY JAPAN FOUGHT AGAINST AMERICA Finally, let us see Japan‘s war against America. As we have seen, the Tokyo Trial found that on December 7, 1941, Japan ―launched a war of aggression against the United States and the British Commonwealth.‖ And President Roosevelt made a speech at Congress on December 15, 1941, and said that America was at peace with Japan when the latter hit Pearl Harbor.But this is clearly against a fact. As Justice Pal pointed out in the trial, since America was supporting Chiang who was fighting Japan, America was de facto in war against Japan.74And no Japanese thought that Japan was waging an aggressive war against America when their fighters attacked the military harbor. Instead, they felt relieved and great, like the sky with no cloud.75And they overwhelmingly supported the war. Why did they feel so?Because they were a war-like people? No, because they were very angry at America. Why were they angry at America? There were a couple of reasons, but the most important one is racist policies against the Japanese and Japanese-Americans in California.In 1906 Japanese students were expelled from public schools in San Francisco.In the same year, an earthquake hit this city, and the Japanese government made a donation, which was worth 0.1 percent of the national budget, to the city.76The government hoped that the donation would weaken the racist policy, but of no use.Next, in 1913 California prohibited the Japanese to own land.Japanese journalism criticized this policy and began mentioning to the possibility of war between the two countries.Third, in 1920 California closed a loophole of the 1913 law.In response to the 1913 law, the Japanese transferred the title of their land to their American-born children. The 1920 law closed this loophole and made the Japanese and Japanese-Americans effectively an outlaw in that state. Finally, in 1924 this California law was federalized, making the Japanese and Japanese-Americans an outlaw in America. This federalization shattered Eiichi Shibusawa‘s love for America. He was probably the most important businessman in Japan at that time.When Commodore Perry came to Japan, he was twelve and joined in anti-foreign movements. But as he knew that America was a county of justice and humanity, he felt shame for having anti-foreign sentiment and spent the rest of his life to build a friendship between the two countries. He did not believe that the Senate would pass this kind of law. But it did. At his seventy, his dream was shattered and wondered if he would have been better off had he continued the anti-foreign movements.77He was a kind of man that if you get him angry, you are wrong. The effects of the racist policies was such that.That is why the Japanese overwhelmingly supported the war.Shigeo Iwanami was an owner of the Iwanami Shoten, a publishing house which lined up all great books around the world.It is a Japanese version of the Penguin Classics.He was far from a war-like person. Even he supported the war.78But the current Japanese are never taught that the pre-war Japanese supported the war and why.Instead, they are taught that the military intimidated opponents of the war, dominated the politics and misled the nation into the war against America. This view fits well with the Tokyo Trial‘s history view. There were evidences for this view: the military used secret funds 74

Milear, Victor‟s Justice, p. 156-7. Shouichi Watanabe, Seigi no Jidai [Age of Justice] (Tokyo: PHP Bunko, 1992), p. 53. 76 Ibid., p. 71. 77 Ibid., pp. 83-5. 78 Ibid., p. 91. 75

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to influence journalists and sometimes intimidated professors. And radical young military officers stabbed politicians to death. These acts should have alienated the pre-war Japanese.And they knew that America was stronger than their country.But still they supported the war.Why?The history view of the trial cannot answer this question. The most plausible answer is that the pre-war Japanese were angry at America due to her racist policies against their country people. But didn‘t the Japanese military brainwash the people so that they support wars? This is a view which leftist Japanese never stop spreading.For example, Saburo Ienaga claims that ―there is no doubt that the emphasis on militarism in the curriculum, combined with the media‘s glorification of war and the government‘s suppression of pacifist and liberal views, was a major factor in socializing the great majority of Japanese to support aggression enthusiastically.‖79He elaborates that ethic textbooks in primary schools extolled militaristic values.Thus, according to this view, the pre-war Japanese supported the war due to militaristic education.But how effective such an education was?Fusao Hayashi has a very different view on pre-war education than Ienaga does. Hayashi said that he had received no education which inspired the respect for the Emperor in his soul when he was young.80Junior high school students were obliged to attend Shinto ceremonies, but burst into laughter when priests began uttering the words praising Japan‘s god. These words were totally foreign to these students.Hayashi wondered why schools didn‘t spend even one tenth of the time for English to study these words.Teachers scolded the laughing students. But most of them also had to kill their own laughter beneath their mustache.And the books which students read in extra curriculum were Ogai Mori, Soseki Natsume, Jun‘ichiro Tanizaki, Ryunosuke Akutagawa .All of them were exploring the denial of God, bestiality of human beings, rationalism, egoism and individualism; all of them would reach to the denial of godly Japan.One Burmese monk agrees with Kobayashi.He visited Japan in 1910, and thought that Japan was a beautiful country because the people had sensibility and respect for the imperial house.But when he revisited Japan in 1929, he predicted Japan would perish because their respect for the imperial house was completely destroyed.81With secular and materialistic cultures, it is not surprising to see in 1930s the emergence of new young people who were called ―Mobo [modern boy]‖ and ―Moga [modern girl]‖ in cities where consumer culture, such as movie, dance halls, departments, jazz, café, reached to the level similar to today.82Non-Japanese and leftist Japanese tend to think that the pre-war Japanese were conformist and jingoistic Emperor-worshipers.There is simply too much evidence to dispute such a view.Thus it is hard to sustain Ienaga‘s view that militaristic ethic textbooks in primary schools made the people jingoistic Emperor-worshipers and thus they supported the war. But the Japanese leaders knew that Japan could not win the war against America. If so, wasn‘t it their responsibility not to begin an unwinnable war?Why did they decide to go to war?Did the military overruled civilian oppositions?No.Foreign Minister Togo, Finance Minister Kaya, and President of the Privy Council Hara reluctantly approved the war.For them, the final version of American demands was simply not acceptable. Indeed, the final 79

Saburo Ienaga, ―The Glorification of War in Japanese Education,‖ International Security 18: 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 113-33, at 117. 80 Fusao Hayashi, ―Kinno no Kokoro [Heart for Loyality],‖ in Tetsutaro Kawakami et al, ed. Kindai no Chokoku [Transcending Modernity] (Tokyo: Fuzanbo, 1979), p. 85. 81 Hiraizumi, Monogatari Nihon Shi, pp. 204-5. 82 Manabu Arima, Teikoku no Showa[Imperial Showa] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2002), pp. 148-56

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version of November 1941 got tougher than the earlier version of April of the same year.83The earlier version proposed a merger of the Chiang government and the Wang government.84It also proposed a withdrawal of the Japanese troops from China according to a treaty that China and Japan would conclude.But the final version proposed a disapproval of the Wang government.85It also proposed the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from China with no condition.On the other hand, Japan made a concession after concession during the seven-month negations. She gave up special economic interests in China accruing from proximity and close relationship.86She also specified when the Japanese troops will withdraw from China.87It was clear for Japanese leaders that America had no interest in concluding the negotiations and avoiding war. When he saw the final version, Foreign Minister Togo was shocked and surprised at the harshness and uncompromising attitude of America. He said that the final version ―demands Japan a complete surrender. It completely ignores all sacrifices that Japan has made for many years. It demands Japan to abandon a status of power in Far East.That is a suicide for Japan.‖88 Moreover, Japanese leaders were not sure where American demands would end. As Sagan points out, Japanese leaders came to a view that ―Even if we should make concessions to the United States…for the sake of a temporary peace, the United States, its military position strengthened, is sure to demand more and more concessions on our part; and ultimately our empire will lie prostrate at the feet of the United States.‖89Their fear was substantiated by the toughening American demands during the negations.Japanese leaders had not considered that Manchu was included in China.But after the final version, Togo worried about the possibility that America might include Manchu in China and demand Japan to withdraw from Manchu.90He had America‘s changed attitude toward the Wang government at his mind.And as time passed by, Japan‘s oil reserves decreased while America‘s war preparation increased.Thus the choice for the Japanese leaders was ―fight now or surrender.‖ But since Japan could not win, shouldn‘t the Japanese leaders have started the war? If they had not done, millions of Japanese soldiers would have been saved. The current Japanese think this way. But it is not clear that the pre-war Japanese thought Japan had no chance to win the war or even draw. One fact which the current Japanese do not know is that Japan was very strong at the beginning of the war. There were only two countries on the planet at the time which had projection-capabilities (i.e., carriers and fighters); they were America and Japan.And immediately after the Pearl Harbor, there was no enemy for Japan in the Western Pacific.Britain was out of question: to Churchill‘s chagrin, the Japanese smashed her Asian fleet in one stroke of December 10, 1941.But in the long run America would build up massive 83

The final version of American demands was presented in the so-called Hull Note. The Hull Note was based on a draft which was written by Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr. And it is said that Morgenthau‘s draft was written by Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Harry Dexter White. The Venona File, which monitored communications between the Comintern and communist spies in America between 1940 and 1948, found that White was a communist agent. Yoshitaka Fukui, ―Tokyo Saiban o Tsuudasuru ‗Benona‘ no impakuto [The Impact of ‗Venona‘ Which Undermining the Tokyo Trial History View]‖, Seiron (May 2006), p. 88-99. It is not preposterous to assume that White as a communist spy wanted America to fight against Japan and therefore put uncompromising demands to Japan in Morgenthau‘s draft. 84 Sejima, Daitoa Senso, p. 205. 85 Sejima, Ibid., p. 261. 86 Ibid., p. 252. 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid., p. 264. 89 Quoted in Sagan, Origins of the Pacific War, p. 912. 90 Sejima, Daitoa Senso, pp. 262-3.

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battle ships and fighters.That is true .But what would have happened had Hitler fought longer and victoriously?America would have been occupied with Europe much longer.Meanwhile, Japan could have developed resources in Southeast Asia. As Sansom pointed out, securing resources in South Asia while America was occupied with Europe where Germany seemed to be victorious was ―as a reasonable and honourable alternative to submitting to sanctions.‖91Moreover, what would have happened if Japan had successfully helped India and Arab to get independence from British rules? The world would have been very different now.The current Japanese, who are raised under the history view of the Tokyo Trial, think the decision for the war is irrational.But the pre-war Japanese, who didn‘t know it, probably did not think so.Studies after studies endlessly point out that Japanese leaders made this mistake or that in the process executing the war. But such mistakes do not make the decision irrational. Thus three understandings seemed to dominate Japanese leaders‘ minds.One is that surrender was simply not a choice; two was that American demands were unacceptable; and three was that the outcome of the war was not clear. Under these conditions they thought it was time to fight.Their decision was similar to that on the war against Russia.At that time, most of the leaders did not know whether Japan could win or not. Elder statesman Hirobumi Ito was opposed to the war and made the last ditch effort to work out a diplomatic solution.But Nicholas II had no interest in peace with Japan and never thought that Russia would lose the war.Russian war-preparedness increased in Manchu day by day. Time was running against Japan. Then they decided this was time to fight.After the decision was made, Ito lamented a forty-year endeavor of building the Meiji state would be ruined, but made up his mind.He said that there was no time to discuss whether we could win or not and that we had no choice but to fight at the stake of nation‘s survival.92He said, ―if Russians defeat our Army in Manchu, defeat our Navy in the Channel of Tsushima, and pose to land my country, remembering my fighting against the Tokugawa government with Choshu samurais, I will take rifles and become a foot soldier, prevent Russian landing, and die in the battles.‖93Probably Japanese leaders felt the same way when they made the decision. Americans never thought they might lose the war and had no intention to avoid it unless Japanaccepts their demands. For the Japanese, American demands are tantamount to a demand that Japan commit a suicide. Although they did not want to fight the war which they knew they were likely to lose, they concluded that going to fight would be better than accepting eventual surrender.And their oil reserves were decreasing month by month. They refused to accept American demands, and the war began. This is hardly a mentality of the nation which is waging an aggressive war. Thus the Tokyo Trial‘s conclusion that Japan waged an aggressive war against is untenable.

COULD JAPAN AVOID WARS? Even though facts do not support the Tokyo Trial‘s history views, weren‘t the Japanese Army officers terrible?Ryotaro Shiba, one of the most famous history novelists in post-war

91

Sansom, Japan‟s Fatal Blunder, p. 209. Ryutaro Shiba, Sakano ueno Kumo [Cloud Above the Slope], vol. 2 (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 2004), p. 363. 93 Ibid. 92

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Japan, wants to scream against them, smashing an ashtray.94Tsuneo Watanabe, an owner of the most popular daily newspaper, cannot forgive them because he was forced to overwork when he was enlisted in the Army.95Masao Maruyama, one of the most famous post-war political science professors, cannot forgive themtoo because he was bullied when he was enlisted in the Army.96These most influential Japanese use their pen, newspaper and platform to spread the image that Army officers were irrational and evil. There are many evidences for their irrationality and evilness. They let soldiers to fight within thinly-armed tanks which were instantly destroyed when warfare began.97They suggested committing a suicide if they could not escape from captivity.98They always hit soldiers for trivial or no reason at all. But the issue is whether these evidences make Japan‘s wars aggressive? Or could Japan have avoided the wars without their irrationality and evilness? How could Japan have avoided the wars while maintaining her independence and autonomy? Nobukatsu Fujioka claims that Japan could have avoided the wars.He thinks that Japan could have avoided the wars if she had accepted Harriman‘s proposal. It was a proposal made by Edward H. Harriman that America and Japan co-develop the southern Manchu railroad.Prime Minister Taro Katsura and many other influential leaders agreed with Harriman because letting American capitals in Manchu would make it a buffer zone against Russia.Fujikoka approvingly quotes Hisahiko Okazaki‘s opinion that Japan might have avoided the miserable wars if this proposal had been realized.99It is not clear how letting American capitals in Manchu would have prevented anti-Japanese commotions in Manchu and North China, which was the main cause of the setting up of the Manchu state and the China-Japan war. And it is very easy to come up with historical ifs and say later, ―that was a mistake.‖ But who opposed the proposal? Foreign Minister Jutaro Komura was opposed to the proposal.Was Komura incompetent?No.He was a competent diplomat.Okazaki admires his analysis on the pros and cons for the Anglo-Japanese alliance.100The competent diplomat thought hard under imperfect information and opposed the proposal. The current Japanese think freely under perfect information and denounce his decision. Isn‘t it hindsight? Also Fujikoka seems to think that Japan could have avoided the wars if she had accepted Ishibashi‘s proposal. Tanzan Ishibashi, a journalist before W. W. II and Prime Minster after the war, proposed in 1913 that Japan abandon her colonies, i.e., Manchu, Korea, Taiwan and Karafuto. The reasons are two-fold.One is that colonies were costly. Revenues and expenditures of four colonies matched, amounting to 110 million yen. Out of the revenues of 110 million yen, however, 30 million yen came from Japan.Thus having colonies costJapan 30 million yen every year.Per capita expenditure in Japan and that in four colonies were close: 10.45 yen for the former and 9.46 yen for the latter. Compared with other colonists, 94

Fujioka, Jiyu Shugi Shikan, p. 134. Tsuneo Watanabe and Yoshibumi Wakamiya, ―Yasukuni o Kataru, Gaikou o Kataru [Talk about the Yasukuni, Talk about Diplomacy],‖ Ronza (February 2006), p. 28. 96 Tadashi Karube, Maruyama Masao (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 2006), p. 108. 97 Fujioka, Jiyu Shugi Shikan, p. 133. 98 Taketoshi Yamamoto, ―Taiheiyo Senso ka deno Nihonhei Horyo no Ishiki to Kodo [Consciousness and Behavior of Japanese War Prisoners during the Pacific War,‖ in Taketoshi Yamamoto, ed. Beigun ni yoru Nihonhei Horyo Shashinshu [Photos of Japanese War Prisoners by American Soldiers] (Tokyo: Seishi Shuppan, 2001), p. 140. 99 Fujioka, Jiyu Shugi Shikan, p. 153. 100 Ibid., pp. 146-7. 95

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Japan spent much more money for the colonized.Per capita expenditure in Japanese colonies was 9.46 yen, while that in British colonies was 4.66 yen. The number for French colonies was only 2.54 yen.101The other reason is that colonies were not necessary for migration from Japan.Japan‘s population increased from around 30 million in 1860 to around 65 million in 1930.102During the twenty years of colonial management (1894-1913), however, Japan sent only 400,000 people to these colonies.103 Ishibashi argument was substantiated by the data, but could Japan have maintained her independence and autonomy without colonies? After Ishibashi‘s article, in 1928 France‘s Colonial Custom Act closed Indo-China against Japan; in 1933 China increased import tariff from 33 % to 600 %; in the same year Dutch Crisis Import Ordinance closed her colonies against Japan; in 1934 Britain imposed an import quota system on her colonies; and in 1935 Japan was forced by the United States to limit the exports of cotton textiles to the Philippines.104With all Asian markets closed against Japan, was it realistic for Japan to abandon her colonies? And his argument misses the most important issue, i.e., security.What would have happened if Japan had abandoned Manchu and Korea? Surely the Soviets would have invaded these areas as just happened after America beat Japan.And probably it might be far worse than that. Without Americans stationing in the Korean peninsula, the Soviets might have invaded Japan. There were and are Asianist Japanese who dream of the union of Asia and Japan. These people always fault the Japanese for having a superior feeling toward Asian peoples, forgettingthat it was China and Korea who had such a feeling toward Japan historically. They wanted Japan to unite with Asia and fight together against the West.But could Japan have allied with Asia at that time? There were some Japanese who thought that the West was perilous even before the Opium War of 1841.105The war only confirmed their worry. After the war, Commodore Perry threatened the Tokugawa government to open the nation, and the British and French fleets bombarded Kagoshima and Choshu. A sense of crisis ran though the nation.Kaishu Katsu, an official of the Tokugawa government, thought that Japan should talk to heads of Asian countries, first Korea and next China, and persuade them to build up navy and develop science and technologies to prevent the West‘s invasions.106But China and Korea were not ready. When Japan began modernization, Westerners laughed, thinking that ―monkeys‖ were having a parliament, laws, and modern army and navy .Not only Westerners but neighbors did so.Chong Hyon-dok, a Korean governor, contemptuously declared that the Japanese became a ―lawless nation‖ by changing their dress and customs.107How could Japan have cooperated with such neighbors?It is reasonable that Yukichi Fukuzawa, a publicist, proposed to abandon Asian neighbors.China was no better than Korea.In 1876 Arinori Mori went to Beijing and proposed to Li Hung Chang cooperation among China, Japan and other Asian countries against the West.But Li didn‘t respond to the proposal positively .In a letter 101

Ibid., pp. 166-7. Ibid., p. 159. 103 Ibid., p. 168. 104 Ethel B. Dietrich, ―Closing Doors against Japan,‖ Far Eastern Survey 7: 16 (August, 10, 1938), pp. 181-6. 105 Koichiro Matsuda, Edo no Chishiki kara Meiji no Seiji he [From Edo Knowledge to Meiji Politics] (Tokyo: Perikansha, 2008), p. 196. 106 Ibid., p. 199. 107 Mark Ravina, The Last Samurai: The Life and Battles of Saigo Takamori (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2004, p. 183; Fujioka, Jiyu Shugi Shikan, p. 123. 102

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to Chinese Emperor, he wrote that ―even if China makes a concession, Japan will not help China to stop Russian southern drive.Thus it is better to make a concession to Russia and let Russia to suppress Japan. Russia is hundred-times stronger than Japan.‖108Japan had to rely on herself to fight against Russia.Asianist Japanese dream was indeed a dream. Many think a defect of the Meiji Constitution was the cause of Japan‘s war.109Under the constitution the Emperor was supposed to have all sovereign powers. But he had none of them in practice.Prime Ministers did not have any control over the military.They think that if the Emperor or Prime Ministers had had a constitutional power over the military, they might have avoided the wars.But as we have seen, all leaders, both military and civilian, agreed on the war against America. And the Japanese people supported the war and the setting up of the Manchu state. Some segments of a people always opposed any kind of war in any time. The military used power and money to influence or intimidate this kind of people, some journalists and some professors. But these facts alone do not make a case that the military dominated the politics and misled the nation into the wars.Moreover, there was a possibility that civilians could outwit the military under even this constitution. That was a proposal for a direct meeting between Prime Minister Konoe and President Roosevelt.According to this proposal, Konoe would meet Roosevelt, directly report a deadlock of the negotiation to the Emperor, and ask him what to do.This is the point. Usually the Emperor listened to what was already decided by ministers, and never overruled it. But he can make a decision when asked to do so. When asked whether to surrender near the end of the war, the Emperor decided to do so. Thus according to the proposal, Konoe would ask Emperor, the military would oppose, but the Emperor would persuade the military and decide to accept America‘s demands. This was the only possible chance for Japan to avoid the war under the Meiji Constitution.Alas, the State Secretary Hull torpedoed it on October 2, 1941. Like the War Secretary Stimson, he thought that ―The invitation to the President is merely a blind to try to keep us from taking definite action‖ and thus refused the proposal.110Hull‘s suspicion toward the Japanese was deep, and he couldn‘t see how desperate the Japanese were trying to avoid the war. His suspicion continued throughout the final diplomatic negotiation in the latter half of November of the same year. Hull confessed in his memoir that Japanese diplomat Kurusu was sly and trying to buy time to prepare for military attack .Although Kurusu was not informed of any things about military attack, Hull thought he knew it.Ryuzo Sejima, a staff of the Army, laments that ―It is a surprise to see that man like Hull committed this kind of prejudice and factual misunderstanding.That became the cause of the war.We should keep that in mind for Japan-U.S. relationship now on.‖111Institutions matter, but, as Byman and Pollack argue, sometimes great men matters more.112 But since the Emperor was ready to accept America‘s demands, why didn‘t Japanese leaders accept them? The current Japanese, who know the miserable outcomes of the war but do not have any sense of shame for relying on America for their security, think that the decision for the war is reckless and that Japan should have accepted American 108

Ibid., p. 148. Sejima, Daitoa Senso, pp. 284-87; J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances M. Rosenbluth, The Politics of Oligarchy: Institutional Choice in Imperial Japan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 11. 110 Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor (New York: Atheneum, 1962), p. 259. Joseph Grew, American ambassador to Japan, thought that the refusal was a sad error (Ibid., p. 274). 111 Sejima, Daitoa Senso, p. 259. 112 Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, ―Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In‖, International Security 25: 4 (Spring 2001), pp. 107-46. 109

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demands.Today the Japanese can live peacefully without having colonies .They think that American demands, such as the withdrawal from China and even from Manchu, are reasonable.But what would have happened had she accepted them?America could have continued to demand Japan to withdraw from Manchu. Even if America did not demand so, China and the Soviet Union could have driven Japan out of Manchu and divided Manchu between them. If Japan had been driven out of Manchu, China and the Soviet Union could have advanced into the Korean peninsula.Or the Soviet Union could have fanned communist subversions in Korea and forced Japan to withdraw from there.With all Asian markets closed against her, Japan would have had no markets to export and no resources to import.How could Japan have maintained and increased her military powers against China and the Soviet Union?America might come to rescue for Japan.But what if America didn‘t? It is not preposterous to think that the Soviet Union would have invaded Hokkaido.And the Soviets were directing a communist branch in Japan,113 and the leftist movement seemed to topple conservative governments in the first two decades after the war.114The depletion of resources, internal communist subversions and the external communist threats might have turned Japan into a communist state.If so, I might not have been able to write this paper now. Thus, my counterfactual analysis suggests that the decision for the war is understandable.115Of course, my analysis is only one of the possible scenarios which Japan might have followed had she had accepted America‘s demands. But mine is the worst scenario.Strategists cannot ignore the worst scenario.If so, it is reasonable that the pre-war Japanese chose to avoid it even if that meant the war against America.The pre-war Japanese did not know the exact outcomes of the war, but they had a sense for honor and were ready to sacrifice their life for the nation‘s independence and autonomy. For such a people, it was simply unthinkable to accept American demands. After the war against America ended, Hideo Kobayashi, a literature critic, opined that ―I coped with this war as a politically ignorant national.I did it quietly.Now I have no regret about that.When war ends, there will be arguments that if we had done differently, we would not have had the war or the war would not have been like this.It is men‘s revenge on what is called inevitability.It‘s a vain revenge.Did this great war happen because of the ignorance and ambition of some group of people? Did it not happen without them? I cannot have such a convenient history view. I think that the inevitability of history is much more dreadful.I am ignorant and thus do not reflect.Smart guys had better reflect a lot.‖ 116Some think his attitude fatalistic. But how could Japan have avoided the wars?Since when did Japan go wrong?Fujioka think that is at the end of the Russo-Japanese war. As we have seen, Harriman‘s proposal was rejected.This rejection raised a suspicion toward Japan among Americans.And another incident happened which hardened the relationship between two countries further.Japan couldn‘t get indemnity from Russia at the end of war.The people got 113

In April 1932, the Communist International gave the Japan Communist Party a document titled ―Theses on the Situation in Japan and the Missions of the Japan Communist Party.‖ See Eiichi Tanizaki, Akuma no Shiso [Thoughts of the Devil] (Tokyo: Crest, 1996), pp. 29-54. 114 The New York Times reported on October 9, 1994, ―C.I.A. Spent Millions to Support Japanese Right in 50‘s and 60‘s.‖ This report supports the view that the leftist movement was powerful. 115 Tetlock and Belkin worry that counterfactual analysis can lead to ―the full-scale politicization of counterfactual argument (as advocates claim carte blanche to write hypothetical histories that advance their favorite causes).‖ See their Counterfactual Thought Experiments, p. 38. I honestly did my best. It is up to my critics to prove that my analysis is such a politicization. 116 Hideo Kobayashi, Kindai Bungaku [Modern Literature] 1: 2 (1946), pp. 24-36, at 35.

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mad and set fire on buildings at Hibiya. During these commotions, a Christian pastor said that Russia was a Christian state and that was why God spared her indemnity.117Infuriated, a mob set fire on a dozen of Christian churches.118Fujioka says that this incident decisively turned American feeling against Japan and led to the racial discriminations against the Japanese and their children in California.119And as seen above, California‘s racist policy decisively turned Japanese feeling against America.This is what Kobayashi called the inevitability of history, isn‘t it? How could these historical sequences have been otherwise? Komura might act wrongly.The Christian pastor, the arsonists and Californians acted wrongly.But humans, carrying a bag of misperceptions, prejudices and misjudgments, have to walk through history under uncertainty.Is there anyone who can throw a stone onto them? Non-Japanese and leftist Japanese never stop writing books and articles which try to show all conceivable aspects of irrationality and brutality of Japanese Army officers.And they go on writing books and articles about all aspects of conformism and Emperor-worship of the Japanese people. But none of them tell any realistic alternative path in which Japan could have avoided the warsandmaintained her independence and autonomy.

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CONCLUSION This paper has taken seriously Japanese conservative views on Japan‘s wars before and during the Second World War.It examined the accusations of Japan‘s war conducts which were categorically characterized brutal, and concluded that war propaganda played a major role in spreading such a characterization and her conducts were not exceptionally brutal in comparison with other countries‘ war conducts. It also examined the accusations that Japan acted aggressively in Manchu, China and against America, and concluded that Japan acted defensively in all these cases. It went on to examine the arguments that Japan could have avoided the war, and concluded that Japan could not have done so as long as she had wanted to maintain her independence and autonomy.Although these conclusions may be unbelievable for non-Japanese and leftist Japanese, there seem to be reasonable grounds for conservative history views.Admittedly their views are hardly a mainstream view in Japan at this moment.Nor is it clear that their views will become as such soon.The history view of the Tokyo Trial still holds at the higher echelon of Japanese politics and in society.But conservative views are not likely to extinguish.It might be possible for their views to replace the Tokyo Trial‘s view. Battles over history interpretation might affect Japan‘s international relations.Some Japanese are afraid that history will become a major diplomatic issue in coming years.120There is no reason to think that history issue will disappear or wane.Buzan wrote in 1988 that Japan‘s ―reputation for aggressiveness and brutality in the half-century before 1945 continues to stunt its political life, both brutally and internationally.Old images of Japan still condition current perceptions of it.‖121Due to the old images, Japanese prime ministers have 117

Akira Yoshimura, Potsumasu no Hata [Flag of Portsmouth].(Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1983), p. 310. Fujioka, Jiyu Shugi Shikan, p. 149. 119 Ibid. 120 Kitaoka Shin‘ichi, ―‗Gaikou Kakumei‘ ni Nihon ha dou tachimukauka (How Will Japan Cope with the Revolution in Diplomacy),‖ Chuou Koron (2007 September), pp. 182-191. 121 Buzan, Japan‟s Future, p. 557. 118

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made apology to China and Korea ever time they go there.But the history issue, far from waning, has intensified.Twenty years later, his writing is still valid. China has no intention to let bygones be bygones.Chinese President Jiang Zemin‘s guidance for teachers has instructed them to ingrain the bitterness toward Japanese imperialism in the hearts of Chinese students.122Asian neighbors cannot stop putting the Japanese down by raising history issues whenever diplomatic issues, which are unrelated to history issues, arise between Japan and them.Moreover, on March 22, 2002, U. S. Congressman Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) introduced the Justice for United States Prisoners of War Act.This bill is aimed at allowing American prisoners of war to suit Japanese companies which used them as labor force.123Accusations against Japan are getting louder year after year. On the other hand, the Japanese are increasingly getting tired of these accusations against their country.Whatever responsibilities she may have regarding the war, Japan has already taken them.The Tokyo Trial and other related trials put 984 Japanese war leaders to death, jailed 475 for life and meted out a sentence of limited penal servitude to other 2,944 defendants.124And post-war peace treaties absolved Japan of all the legal responsibilities accruing from the war. Despite all this, non-Japanese and leftist Japanese continue to accuse the Japanese with faked pictures and highly dubious witnesses.The result of these campaigns is a divided and immobilized Japan which cannot admit even an ordinary state right of collective selfdefense.Without it, as mentioned at the beginning of this paper, Japan cannot use force together with other countries in any international military campaign.This is one of reasons why Japan and America cannot take concerted foreign and military policies against nucleararming North Korea and rapidly militarizing China.North Korea drove out IAEA inspectors in 1993 and now has missiles which can reach Hawaii and probably a nuclear bomb or two.Diplomacy would not work without the willingness to use force.America and Europe must not think that this immobilization affects only Far East.It has been already reported that North Korea seems to support Iran and Syria to develop nuclear power plants and missiles.125If the things remain the same in Far East for another decade or two, America and Europe may be driven out of Middle East.If that happens, they would be driven out of Far East, too, with China establishing a regional hegemony.Only a strong Japan can prevent this path from realizing.If so, every country which values secularism, liberty, democracy and capitalism should have a second-thought in putting Japan down on the history issue.

122

Isao Yamamoto, ―Shinrai Sodateru Rekishi Kyoiku Minaoshi [Look Again At History to Raise Trust],‖ Sankei, July 9, 2008, p. 1. 123 Jamil Jaffer, ―Congressional Control over Treat Interpretation,” University of Chicago Law Review 70 (Summer 2003). 124 Ma Lichen, Nihon ha Mo Chugoku ni Shazaishinakutemoii [Japan Need Not Apologize to China Any More] (Tokyo: Bungeishuju, 2004), p. 106. 125 Hiroyuki Noguchi, ―Kita Iran „Renzasei‟, Oubei no Taikita „Honkido‟ Ageyo [Connect North Korea and Iran, Get Europe and America Serious About North Korea]‖, Sankei, May 5, 2009, p. 5; Kunihiko Miyake, “‟Kita‟ Mondai, Bei no Honne ha Dokoni [Where is America‘s Real Goal in the North Korea Problem]‖, Sankei, April 23, 2009, p. 7.

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Chapter 2

LIGHTS AND SHADOWS OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND A RESEARCH AGENDA Beatriz Junquera and Esteban Fernández

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ABSTRACT The aim of this chapter is to review the most relevant academic literature on political leadership. To this end, materials in which this issue appears explicitly in the centre of the debate will be used. There are many and very diverse issues analyzed on this matter. A first aspect on which the debate is supported is the following. Are the classical leadership models useful to analyze the political one? Based on this, it is necessary to go deeply into a lot of other issues: What are the challenges of political leadership in times of changes and crisis? How can we measure its quality and effectiveness, and more specifically, when does political leadership lead to conflict and when to compromise? Is there a unique type of political leadership? What defines the charismatic leader? Must political leadership go hand in hand with ethical behaviours? What happens when this is not so and, more specifically, when political leadership induces behaviours that beyond opportunism, even generate a destructive aim? Would this be the exclusive responsibility of the leader or is this also responsibility of his context? What are the characteristics that define the political leader (speeches, gesture, personality traits, experience, etc)? Although there is no doubt about the leader‘s influence, what can affect him/her? That is, which factors (socio-demographic, ethnic-cultural, institutional and organizational contexts, national culture, voter characteristics, etc.) affect him/her? On the other hand, what is the utility of the models elaborated for the analysis of political leadership in the world of business? These are the issues that raise interest today with respect to political leadership and which will be discussed in this work. From the review of the literature relevant conclusions are drawn. First, political leadership has already achieved remarkable contributions from researchers. Moreover, this area of research is expanding clearly and that raises interest inside and outside the academic world. Nevertheless, there is still a lot of work to be done so that the literature on political leadership reaches its critical mass. After the review, this work finishes with the development of an agenda about those issues still hardly dealt with.

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1. INTRODUCTION Until very recently, despite its relevance, the literature that has addressed the issue of political leadership has been very scarce. Nevertheless, it plays a crucial role in current democratic societies, since political leadership is considered the missing link of the social leadership theory (Renshon, 2000). The leadership capital is in itself an important element of social capital and, like its counterpoint in public psychology, the civic capital, it is absolutely essential for democracies‘ wellbeing. Social capital is defined as the ‗glue‘ that allows people to work together either for their own reasons or due to pressure inside the group (Paldam, 2001). Renshon (2000) distinguishes, consequently, between civic capital and leadership capital, considering social capital a by-product of the relationships between both concepts. He defines civic capital as the relational and internal aspects of civic psychology, which reflects citizens, their connections with others, their institutions and their leaders. Meanwhile, leadership capital consists of the political leaders‘ character, abilities and performance, given their responsibility to lead and govern this and other societies. As a result, the concept of leadership capital rests on the idea that leadership is important. On the other hand, it is perhaps in times of crisis and changes when the consideration of effective leadership becomes more evident. In such periods it is not only necessary this leadership, but it is precisely at such times when the emergence of exceptional leaders becomes more prolix (Halverson, Holladay, Kazma y Quionnes, 2004). It has not been, nevertheless, until well into the present decade when research has begun to approach, beyond a few works of an anecdotic character, the issue of political leadership in times of crisis. In this context, the aim of the present chapter is, first, to carry out a review of the more relevant academic literature on political leadership. Next, a specific section will be devoted to the review of those works that have analyzed this phenomenon in contexts of crisis and/ or change. Finally, after the conclusions, we will propose a research agenda on the matter.

2. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP In the present section we will make an incursion into the contribution of the literature to political leadership. We will start with its definition. Next, we will refer to the character, demography, socio-family characteristics and skills that usually go hand in hand with the most effective political leaders. Finally, we will refer to the different types of political leader.

2.1. Definition of the Political Leader Schwartz (1993) has defined the political leader as the one that has been democratically elected and is a representative vulnerable to re-election, who works inside and influenced by a legal and constitutional framework.

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From these characteristics emanate some differences between political leaders and the leaders understood in the broadest sense of the word, which are conditioned, above all, by the contexts in which both groups perform their activity. The challenges both types of leaders must face are quite different. Specifically, the political leadership rests on the complexity and interdependence of the relationships between political leaders,stakeholder groups and the electorate (Morrell and Hartley, 2006), an issue at least not so obvious in the case of non political leaders. The relational character of political leadership implies that the actors and institutions share the responsibility in the results, so that a successful political leader‘s opportunities depend, to some extent, on other actors‘ reactions to his initiatives, regulations and strategies (Llanos and Margheritis, 2006). In this respect, Downey (2006) has defined a framework to understand how leaders face the strategic challenges of the undertaking of their task, which rests on the definition of a niche inside a constellation of political actors that share common goals, but face different models of opportunities and restrictions. Such circumstances cause differences, for example, in the roles political leaders assume (Stewart, 2003). Just to cite a case, their action as representatives calls for empathy, acceptation and listening skills, as well as service ethic. The elements that allow a better definition of a model political leader can also be deduced resorting to the analysis of the political leaders that have failed. This is what Kuhn (2005) did when he analyzed the first two years of the premier Raffarin (between May 2002 and July 2004). His conclusions describe the type of mistakes that led him to failure: a) his role as head of the government and parliamentary majority leader, b) his political coordination, c) his activity as communicator in the public sphere of the media and d) his position as leader in the re-election campaign. During his mandate, Raffarin made poor progress in the important issue of a coherent message transmission and public expectation management. When the government prepares the baggage to face the difficult issues of health security and education reform, Raffarin shows little authority or credibility inside his government, in the parliamentary party or with the electorate. His post as prime minister is in the hands of a president who may choose to continue with Raffarin until 2007, but only so that such decision can act as a solution to deal with the electoral discontent and deflect the President‘s criticism on himself/herself (Kuhn, 2005). Given the very diverse facets that allow describing a political leader, Morrell and Hartley (2006) considered essential and, consequently, designed a political leadership model that has brought forward several novelties to the research. First, it recognizes the diversity inherent in the domain of political leadership, extending its scope to situational explanations. For example, in their model‘s definition, Morrell and Hartley (2006) recognize, like Cheyne (2004) and Haus and Sweeting (2006), that the local government could be evaluated according to different dimensions (demography, community, technology, etc.), providing an evaluation for each of them, recognizing, moreover, the differences that are likely to emerge in relation to those that allow evaluating the national government. Similarly, Lowndes and Leach (2004), after interviewing six mayors, detected that, unlike what happens in national governments, it was not necessary in every case at this level in politics to encounter strong political leaders. In fact, among the six only three could be considered as such in terms of their behavior, while the other three opted for operating through a more consultative style, involving their office partners and the party groups in terms that go beyond what regulations stipulate.

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Likewise, Morrell and Hartley‘s (2006) model reveals that certain types of the political leader‘s behavior may be more adequate for some types of actions (for example, evaluation), while others, such as representative or executive leadership will require differentiated behaviors. An additional advantage of this model is that it illustrates how the context in which a local authority develops his activity will influence the interpretation of the generic roles‘ profiles and the type of behaviors considered effective.

2.1. The Effective Political Leader’ Characteristics

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We will refer below to the defining characteristics of the effective political leader as shown in the literature. In some cases, the works are unanimous, while in others the debate persists. We will classify such characteristics into four groups, some of which will subsequently show subdivisions. These four groups are: a) character, on which the political leader‘s personality is built; b) demographic characteristics, c) socio-family characteristics and d) skills.

2.1.1. Political leaders’ character Renshon (2000) points out that the leadership capital reflects the leader‘s character, his/her abilities and his/her performance. The character refers to the core elements of political leaders‘ inner psychology, the building block of their personality (although not synonymous with it) and the foundation upon which leadership abilities rest. Renshon (1998) has developed a formulation of character, which he uses in his analysis of leadership and which he considers that it is supported on three essential elements: ambition, character integrity and relationship. Other researchers have also embarked on the analysis of the factors linked to the politicians‘ character that are responsible for their leadership‘s effectiveness. Thus, Jones and Hudson (1996), with the aim of detecting the factors that determine the impact of the leadership‘s personal attributes on a political party‘s electoral support, have analyzed the case of John Mayor‘s leadership. Their main objective was to evaluate its quality, understanding as such the leadership perceptions in the eyes of the electors. A very relevant conclusion of their study is that the electorate does not regard all the personality‘s characteristics as significant (Jones and Hudson, 1996). We will then continue examining the relevant aspects of the political leader‘s character, starting from Renshon‘s (1998) classification. Ambition or effectiveness is the leadership capital‘s fuel, since it provides the motivation for political efforts (Jones and Hudson, 1996). Need for achievement and the necessary proactivity for its accomplishment are especially significant in the effective political leader, according to Pillai, Williams, Lowe and Jung‘s (2003) results. The integrity of character or adherence to principles reflects a person‘s loyalty to a consolidated group of ideals and values (Renshon, 1998). The integrity of character brings with it some support to ambition in a world of ambiguity and uncertainty and shows the link between the way the leader presents himself/herself and what he/she is really like, at the same time as it provides the public with a sense of reassessment that has brought legitimacy to the one who is honest enough to deserve it (Jones and Hudson, 1996). Despite what has been pointed out by the studies mentioned above, the link between political leadership and ethics

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does not seem to be so obvious. Dobel (1998) defends that leadership involves ethics due to the responsibilities leaders assume, although he admits that good intentions, moral conviction and even technical competence do not guarantee success in the administrative and political life. At this stage, it is indispensable to refer to Machiavellianism, as no analysis that discusses the role of ethics in political leadership can overlook its analysis. The political leader‘s Machiavellianism is a process of social influence that involves the use of politics, power and expressive behaviors (Christie and Geis, 1970). Leaders with a high level of Machiavellianism use a depersonalized approach with the others and are concerned first about controlling the situations (Christie and Geis, 1970). They use misleading interpersonal tactics (Shapiro, Lewicki and Devine, 1995) and build power coalitions to protect their interests (Jameson, 1945; Pfiffner, 1951; Martin and Sims, 1956). A leader with a high level of Machiavellianism will probably be more effective under stress situations, in unstructurated and face to face competitive situations, where his/her cold indifference, his/her impersonal character and his/her practically null personal involvement, together with his/her flexibility to improvise, all constitute relevant advantages for him/her (Christie and Geis, 1970). As a third dimension of Renshon‘s (1998) schema, the relationship refers to the basic position of a person towards the others. A sense of the country environment and the empathy with the voters‘ demands distinguish the positive political leadership from the negative one in terms of the support to the political party a leader represents (Jones and Hudson, 1996; Pillai, Williams, Lowe and Jung, 2003). Among the different aptitudes for relationship, these researchers highlight listening skills (Jones and Hudson, 1996). For their part, Judge and Bono (2000) have shown that extroversion is identified as a key element of effective political leadership. For Jones and Hudson (1996), ambition, relationship and integrity are essential so that a political leader is successful.

2.1.2. Demographic characteristics: career age versus chronological age Simonton (1998) carried out the first and most relevant empirical study that has compared directly the relative impact of the career age and chronological age on the political leaders‘ result achieved. The research suggests that the relationship between the political leader‘s age and effectiveness may be one of the most complex phenomena in the domain of creative achievements. Two questions induce such complexity. First, the processes that promote the achievement of the political leaders may differ according to the nature of the result criterion. On the other hand, some of these processes are likely to be related to the chronological age, while others may be related to the career age (Simonton, 1998). 2.1.3. Socio-family characteristics In this section we will refer to the predominance of first-born children among political leaders and the role of gender as a moderating variable in this relationship. It seems unlikely that the birth order in itself will cause a direct effect on whether a person becomes a political leader. However, it seems more probable that a specific position of birth order will cause a different group of experiences in childhood which will increase or decrease a child‘s ultimate political abilities and ambitions. Examples of these debates are shown in the works by Townsend (1997), Downey (2001), Rodgers (2001) and Zweigenhaft (2002). In fact, Somit, Arwine and Peterson (1994) found a significant overrepresentation of

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first-born children among British prime ministers in relation to the distribution of the order of births in the families to which such politicians belonged. In this regard, previously Miller and Maruyama (1976) had already pointed out that it was highly unlikely that such overrepresentation of the eldest in politics may be the result of the voters‘ discrimination against the youngest, as any effect is more likely to favor the latter, who tend to compensate their lack of power developing social skills and who tend to be perceived as the most popular ones. Some explanations of first-born children‘s overrepresentation centre on parents (Renshon, 1974; Schachter, 1959; Steinber, 2001). These are based on the argument that parents differentiate the first-born child and this predisposes first-born children to become political leaders. This idea is based on the so-called ‗resource dilution‘ model (Downey, 2001). Most of the parents‘ resources (time to enjoy their children, money to invest in their education, etc.) are not infinite and, if the family grows, each child will receive a smaller share. Moreover, the intellectual environment, in terms of language and culture, conditioned originally by the parents‘ intellectual level, deteriorates with the addition of each new birth, obviously intellectually immature (Zajonc and Markus, 1975; Zajonc, 2001). Even if parents act with justice, so that such dilution also affects the first-born child, this will have enjoyed a larger share of the parents‘ resources and a richer intellectual environment before the youngest is born, which will provide him/her with a permanent advantage. The quality of the parents‘ resources will also be affected by the growth of the family. For this reason, first-born children are more likely to be endowed to a greater extent with the intellectual and verbal skills necessary in any political career (Andeweg and Van Den Berg, 2003). On the other hand, first-born children are usually subject to parents‘ highest expectations, as well as to some anxious concern. This combination will lead them to seek power as a result of low selfesteem (Lasswell, 1948). An alternative or complementary explanation emphasizes the interaction among siblings (Stewart, 1977, 1992). The sibling perspective also predicts that the eldest will have more politically relevant abilities and will look for power as compensation. The development of the capacities derives from the fact that they assume a role of tutors of their younger brothers/sisters. The beneficial effects for the first-born child derived from the adoption of this role may be even stronger than the negative effect derived from the deterioration of the eldest‘s intellectual environment caused by the arrival of a new sibling (Zajonc and Markus, 1975; Zajonc, 2001). On the other hand, the rivalry among siblings provides a training field for posterior fights in life. The only difference between the first and the others is that the firstborn child receives a more complete formation on this matter. Within the family they are at the end of the reception of power on their parents, but they also exert power on the younger brothers/sisters. The youngest are excluded from any leadership experience in the family, so they are likely to feel uncomfortable in such roles in the future (Hudson, 1990, 1992), except as rebels (Sulloway, 1996). The dethronement, on the other hand, constitutes the type of deprivation that develops the need to seek power as compensation (Lasswell, 1948). Andeweg and Van Den Berg‘s (2003) study in Holland confirms most theoreticians‘ expectations on first-born children‘s overrepresentation (and on only children) in political posts. Since Holland is a patriarchal society, the results of this study are more robust for men. In this respect, however, differences are perceived among female leaders that reached power before and after 1990, so that in the first group the level of first-born girls was lower than in the second.

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2.1.4. Political leaders’ skills In this section we will refer, in the first place, to political leaders‘ communication skills: their messages and contents, the influence of the gestures they display and the emotional responses they provoke, highlighting the differences among cultures. In the second place, we will refer, given its relevance, to the role of the skills acquired in prison by some political leaders and their usefulness in the transition processes to democratic regimes. It is generally accepted that political speeches are a successful leader‘s key element. Power (2004) emphasized that three remarkable U.S. presidents (Kennedy, Reagan and Clinton), despite their differences, used rhetoric powerfully: their messages were simple, clear and plain. They were their main instruments to go beyond a mechanical and routine government management. In their approach to the analysis of messages, Shamir, Arthur and House (1994) have pointed out the characteristics of the political speech content more capable of producing charismatic effects on followers. Among them the references to collective history and identity, to the leader-follower identification, to the values and moral justifications or hope and trust, among others, must be stood out. Political leaders tend to resort to the use of metaphors to induce emotional meaning and make their message more vivid and, consequently, provoke emotional reactions (Katz, 1996). In fact, some of the memorable political speeches that have provoked a greater inspiring effect in the twentieth century like the one by Martin Luther King Jr. (‗I have a dream‘), were built upon metaphors designed to inspire followers. Mio, Riggio, Levin and Reese‘s (2005) paper is, in fact, the first study that has investigated the current use of metaphors in political leaders‘ speeches and that comes up with evidence of the role these metaphors play in the most inspiring speeches. Despite the relevance of the message and communication for the political leader‘s significance, these do not seem to be essential. Power (2004) presents cases of leaders who did not use rhetoric to hold a place in the history of their country. A good example was New Zealand Prime Minister Muldoon, whose main goal was to return his country to the good years of antiquity. Expert in hand to hand combat, thanks to his reflections, his unique style, his legacy continued being recognized after giving up power. Not only speech and its metaphors affect the electors‘ emotional reactions. In order to know how televised speeches influenced the electors‘ emotions, Masters and Sullivan (1989b) chose a passage on television of two political leaders that had polarized three groups of voters among which the study was carried out. Likewise, a second passage of each leader that had provoked responses of consensus among the three groups of voters was chosen. The study concluded that the facial displays associated with the polarizing passages were described by observers from the three groups as more aggressive than the clues used in fragments of consensus. Going deeply into the same question, Masters and Sullivan (1989a) studied how emotional responses penetrate in the process by which voters establish or modify their attitudes towards political leaders and candidates. It is an empirical study that explains American and French observers‘ emotional and cognitive responses to televised expressive displays of their respective political leaders. The great advantage of these types of studies is their usefulness to understand some mechanisms that influence citizens when they watch their current political leaders on television. Their most relevant contribution may be the research

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carried out into facial displays as communicative signals, considering them a central element to explain some key aspects in the political process. The study emphasizes the importance given in France for the observers‘ emotional response to the leader‘s expression of nonverbal displays considered culturally inappropriate. It refers to the moment Fabius lost his self-control in a personal attack apparently not provoked by his rival Chirac. This effect was perceived both by those considered critics and those considered in favor of Chirac and Fabius. Similarly, there was a marked increase in the percentage of U.S. voters who did not believe Reagan‘s refusal to exchange weapons for hostages in Lebanon after the November 1986 press conference, where he showed repeatedly unprovoked fear/evasion and anger/threat, generating an impression of loss of control and lack of honesty (Masters and Sullivan, 1989a). Nevertheless, current political leaders‘ job is difficult, since citizens, at the same time as they detest fakery or dishonesty, they long for political actions deserving to win an Oscar. Therefore, like actors, political leaders are often concerned about how they are perceived by their audiences, obsessed by controlling the political life scenario and, like actors, longing for applause and acceptation (Cronin, 2008). In any case, the interpretation given to these expressions differ among cultures. In France, controlled gestures of anger/threat are expected and welcome by observers and generate feelings of warmth (Sullivan and Masters, 1987), although it is less likely that they will arouse favorable feelings among North American people. Awareness of such differences allows improving the knowledge for cultural contacts in diplomatic and business relationships, as well as improving the analysis of political events (Masters and Sullivan, 1989a). Likewise, it is not only the electors‘ assessment of facial displays, but also other characteristics show differences among cultures with respect to the electors‘ assessment. Krogstad and Strovik (2007) have carried out a compared analysis of the ideal of political leadership in France and Norwegian. Their results show that the Norwegian ideal of political leadership is not a strong and heroic leader but one oriented to the community and antiauthoritarian, a model that, by the way, leaves little room for charisma in its most traditional version. In France charisma is linked to heroism and seduction, whose specific manifestations depend on class, physical appearance, previous excellence or merits and the representation of the leader within the party, giving rise to the war hero (De Gaulle), the aristocrat (d‘Estaing), the patriarch (Miterrand), the lout (Le Pen), the seducer (Chirac, Villepin o Sarkozy) or the solitary rider (Sarkozy). Krogstad and Strovik‘s (2007) study goes even further, defending the existence of different types of charisma according to gender. Charisma in France has been a traditionally masculine quality, because the model of the seductive hero is especially difficult to live up to for female politicians. This has led to experiment with other elements of the national and cultural repertoire to achieve charisma. An example has been Ségolène Royal, for whom the capacity of her role as mother and loving wife to generate charisma had not been confirmed at the moment Krogstad and Strovik‘s work was published1 (2007). Very different, and already proved, is the example of Simone Veil, sometimes described as charismatic leader, whose charisma is, nevertheless, ascetic.

1

We must not forget that, after her defeat against Sarkozy in the second round of the 2007 presidential elections, she separated from her partner since the late seventies, François Hollande.

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This ascetic dimension can also be found in Norwegian politics, although certainly more in the past than nowadays. Gerhardsen and Tranmael‘s ascetic lifestyles made them extraordinary in their time. Even nowadays, Norwegian female politicians try to avoid excessive consumption and prefer an ordinary way of life. This leadership model may be a good reason to explain why in Norwegian politics the female presence has been traditionally so high as compared to other European countries; the access to that particular form of Norwegian charisma, a very human charisma, made of flesh and blood may be easier for women. Nevertheless, it cannot be omitted that, since around the year 2000, Norwegian politicians themselves have become the main exponent of eroticism and glamour in Norwegian politics. In fact, many of them have posed with quite amazing garments, which has introduced humor and amusement in the solemn Norwegian politics. However, this does not seem to have strengthened their position among voters. Nonetheless, it has become a key element to encourage interesting debates about up to where politicians can go defying the cultural repertoires of political leadership (Krogstad and Strovik, 2007). Continuing with effective political leaders‘ skills, we will focus now on the contribution of a very particular experience, although present in the more recent democracies: political imprisonment. Buntman and Huang (2000) have analyzed the connections between prisoners‘ resistance, politicians in prison and the models after prison and democratic leadership and an elite formation, despite having been topics traditionally rejected and condemned by the literature in social sciences. Nevertheless, it is a relevant topic since a remarkable characteristic of democratic transitions is the prominent role of previous political prisoners in the government and the opposition. There is no doubt that political imprisonment grants a critical legitimizing letter of credence for future democratic political leaders, as it is an indicator of ‗loyalty to the cause‘. Imprisonment, in its turn, is used by political prisoners to obtain and develop substantive tools that facilitate their political activity after their release and the democratic involvement, that is, the mechanisms used to survive and face prison usually increase skills, knowledge and the experiences in the old prisons.Due to this, exprisoners political leaders can apply such lessons in the promotion of democracy outside prison. Finally, mainly in South Africa, political prisons became negotiation places and places for power relationships between the regime and its opponents. Nevertheless, Buntman and Huang (2000) also point out that these imprisonment contributions depend on the contexts. To support this statement they show the different results of their studies in South Africa, a country to which the conclusions shown previously about the role of imprisonment can be perfectly applied, and Taiwan, where the prison‘s and opposition forces‘ idiosyncrasy prevented such advantages from being taken of.

2.2. Types of Political Leaders The classification of political leaders can be based on Weber‘s (1947), who defends that, apart from the charismatic political leadership, there exist at least two other trajectories that allow the emergence of exceptional political leaders: the ideological one and the pragmatic one. Underlying these three trajectories are the differences in how they build, or think about, the situations that provide political leaders with the opportunity for the exceptional leadership (Drazin, Glynn and Kazanjain, 1999; Hunt, Boal and Dodge, 1999).

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Ideological political leaders build mental models around failure cases, although they do not necessarily must renounce to build a prescriptive mental model based on broad and shared goals (Strange and Mumford, 2005). The attractive of ideological leaders is for a group of followers that share these goals: close trusting followers. These followers are expected to act to modify the operative causes underlying the situation that shows the failure (Moghaddam, 2005). Ideological leaders, as a result of their prescriptive mental models, tend to emerge and work well in chaotic environments, where basic principles are in a constant process of change. Pragmatic leaders do not show goals or causes intertwined in a complex system in the formation of their prescriptive mental models (Mumford and Van Doom, 2001), but want to work in solutions to problems already settled, rather than in others that create a wider vision (Mumford, 2006). Consequently, pragmatic leaders tend to emerge, and produce effective results, in relatively stable environments, characterized by local descriptions and opportunities. On the other hand, the nature of the prescriptive mental models formulated by the pragmatic leaders gives rise to a leaders‘ tendency to resort to the support of the elites that understand the complexity of the matter at issue. Charismatic political leaders, for their part, reflect a vision oriented to the future (Conger and Kanungo, 1998). Thus, they effect a change in goals so that they can be implemented. Although charismatic leaders emphasize future goals, the causes of the goal achievement remain stable and under followers‘ control, who could act on them. Therefore, charismatic leaders perceive mass support action as very relevant to execute their agenda (Fiol, Harris and House, 1999). However, despite being the central element of their definition, several researchers have realized how little is known about how and why charismatic political leaders effect the social change (Fiol, Harris and House, 1999), as well as about the process by which leaders and followers develop a charismatic political leadership relationship (Meindl, 1993). Thus, charismatic leaders, especially when they are in a position of power, will show some influence capability trying to change followers‘ actions rather than trying to raise a basic knowledge of the situation (Bedell-Avers, Hunter and Mumford, 2008). Empirical findings have nevertheless shown that charismatic political leaders can exert extraordinary effects on their followers, their organizations and the social systems (Bass, 1985; House and Howell, 1992; Bass and Avolio, 1994; Yukl, 1998), as they are very skilful to interpret, express and model emotions in themselves and in others (Shamir, House and Arthur, 1993; House, 1995; Bass, 1997). Likewise, they hold profound convictions in the moral rectitude of their believes and visions, so that their followers are strongly motivated and involved to achieve the political leader‘s vision (House, 1977; Willner, 1984; Bass, 1985; Trice and Beyer, 1986; Conger and Kanungo, 1987). The charismatic political leader possesses a magnetic personality and gets involved in expressive behaviors in an attempt to create an image of competence and effectiveness (House, 1995, Gardner and Avolio, 1998). On the other hand, charismatic political leaders promise to crystallize fluent networks and act as their driving force (John, 2001). In this regard, recent empirical evidence shows that charismatic political leaders delegate to their followers ensuring that these increase their social identification (Conger, Kanungo and Menon, 2000; Kark, Shamir and Chen, 2003), that is, the very concept of the individual derived from his knowledge of his association with the social group, as well as the emotional meaning attached to such association (Tajfel, 1974).

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Similarly, previous research shows that charismatic political leaders‘ effectiveness to produce a social change also depends on their capacity to transform the group‘s shared values and identities into a new social identity, necessary to complete the leader‘s vision. Nevertheless, it is customary that for minority groups and more established high-status groups the social change causes social identity concerns (Tajfel, 1981). Seyranian and Bligh (2008) propose a three stage model (rupture of the frame, change and realignment of communication skills) by which charismatic political leaders may alter the group‘s identity applied to the U.S. presidents of the twentieth century. Not all are lights in relation to the charismatic political leadership. Deluga‘s (2001) work proved empirically that Machiavellianism emerged as positively connected with charismatic leaders. As such, findings support the idea that the charismatic leadership and Machiavellianism may have very similar characteristics. Charismatic political leaders project self-confidence, dedication, competence, charisma and other image-building behaviors to encourage followers‘ identification and the commitment to their objectives (Conger and Kanungo, 1987, 1988; House, 1995; Awamleh and Gardner, 1999). These leadership skills to impress appear particularly relevant to the relationships between distant charismatic leaders and their followers (Shamir, 1995). Machiavellian leaders are also skilled in showing selfconfidence even when it is uncertain (Bass, 1990) and charisma perceptions (House and Howell, 1992; Gardner and Avolio, 1995). For this and other reasons, psychological approaches recognize that the charismatic political leadership is not always advantageous (Harrison, 1987; O‘Connor, Mumford, Clifton, Gessner and Connelly, 1995; Bass, 1998; Conger and Kanungo, 1998; Yukl, 1998; Bass and Steidlmeier, 1999; Beyer, 1999; Maccoby, 2000), and may even show a dark side (Hogan, Raskin and Fazzini, 1990). Two types of charismatic leadership can be distinguished, which we will call socialized and individualized. The socialized charismatic leadership is based on non-exploitative collective interests and power is used to benefit others. It tends to be altruistic and works by means of recognized systems to achieve objectives. In contrast, personalized charismatic leaders exert few limitations in the use of power, because their leadership is based on their own exploitative interests. These leaders emphasize in personal identification the devotion to the demand of themselves and behave in an authoritarian way. Personalized charismatic leaders use power, first for self-server personal benefit. To this end, they promote their own vision, use one-way communication channels and resort to external moral standards that suit them personally (Deluga, 2001). Political leaders generally show simultaneously some aspects both of the socialized and the personalized charismatic leadership (House and Howell, 1992; Conger and Kanungo, 1998; Conger, 1999). It is also possible to differentiate between near and distant charismatic political leaders. In relation to near charismatic leaders, distant ones are described in terms of their ability to speak persuasively in public, articulate a clear vision and their courage to express controversial opinions (Shamir, 1995). Among U.S. presidents, the consistency of the neardistant charismatic leadership has changed in all probability in time. That is, the first presidents of the twentieth century could influence others, in the first place, through face to face contact, and indirectly, by means of reports on speeches. Today, however, leaders (presidents) can create results for the public that are not consistent with their behavior with their near subordinates (Beyer, 1999).

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3. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN TIMES OF CRISIS Crisis has been defined as ―a high impact and low probability event that threatens the organization‘s viability and that is characterized by ambiguity of cause, effect and means of solution, as well as by the belief that decisions must be taken quickly‖ (Pearson and Clair, 1998; 59). The emergence of exceptional political leaders, regardless of their trajectory (charismatic, ideological or pragmatic) seems to be linked to crisis and ambiguous events that involve a change in the existing social order (Bligh, Kohles and Meindl, 2004; Halverson, Holladay, Kazma and Quionnes, 2004). Mumford and Strange (2002) point out that the political leader‘s awareness is based on a mental model of the social system (Johnson-Laird, 1999; Goldstone and Sakamoto, 2003; Hmelo-Silver and Pfeffer, 2004). With the analysis of the causes and its reconfiguration in relation to the goals and results obtained, political leaders can create a prescriptive mental model that describes an ideal social system (Mumford and Strange, 2002; Strange and Mumford, 2002). This model allows awareness, and under certain restrictions, forming a viable vision, since one of the key characteristics of the exceptional political leader is to convey to his followers a prescriptive mental model. It is relevant to analyze the political leaders‘ characteristics that are especially responsible for their success in crisis times. Crises may generate opportunity periods in which the political environment is more likely to be modified more easily (Greenstein, 1968; Kingdon, 2003). In fact, it has been observed that in such periods some leaders behave like political entrepreneurs, but not all do so (Mintrom, 1997; Mintrom and Vergari, 1998; Balla, 2001). The waste of opportunities in crisis situations was examined by Llanos and Margheritis (2006) when analyzing de la Rúa‘s post management and removal from power. The leader assumed limitations, impoverishing his government‘s political strategy, as he despised the more active and creative duties of his post. Unlike the first president Alfonsín, who in the midst of a serious political and economic crisis negotiated with the elected Menem the terms of this anticipated power transfer, de la Rúa made no attempt to do so. Crises are more favorable for certain political leaders. McCann (1995) found out that charismatic leaders are more likely to be chosen in the United States in periods of crisis and threats and that the winners are also more likely to get wider margins of victory. Specifically, it was the tremendous ambiguity surrounding the economic crisis that brought so much success to Obama‘s slogan ‗the change we believe in‘ (Bligh and Kohles, 2009). The charismatic political leadership can also be seen as a mechanism by means of which anxious followers build their society and project qualities on a person to help allay their fears (Beyer, 1999). Obama‘s presidential campaign encouraged actively this mode of infection by means of strategies of on-line social networks and a wide network of volunteers, who helped arouse enthusiasm as followers and the basic tool to convey the others that spirit with their support (Bligh and Kholes, 2009). Not only the charismatic political leadership, but other characteristics contribute to success. With regard to character, a political leader that presents himself/herself as friendly, polite, relaxed, histrionic and dominant is usually perceived as more capable of being effective in future posts (Bligh and Kholes, 2009). Empathy is especially relevant in a political leader in crisis times, because it is precisely then, more than ever, when people need to know what happens, especially if this leader may go to voters

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asking for personal sacrifices for the collective wellbeing (Pillai, Williams, Lowe and Jung, 2003). With respect to communication skills, characteristics such as intonation, rhythm and gestures have been linked to the political messages‘ responsiveness from the audience (Heritage and Greatbatch, 1986), especially in crisis times, so that the way a political message is sent complements and strengthens it (Atkinson, 1984). Likewise, the previous research works‘ results have shown the relevance of messages and gestures, especially in the current era of predominance of the media, on the evaluation received by political leaders. Nevertheless, these studies have been conducted mainly in France and the United States alongside Masters and Sullivan‘s (1989a and 1989b) works. Communication skills are particularly relevant in crisis periods, because voters usually experience this situation as an episode of threat of uncertainty, which causes anxiety (Pescosolido, 2002). For this reason, the role of political leaders during these crisis periods becomes so relevant, because the citizens take their leaders, and especially their emotions, as a model to know how to react to the new situation (Kash and Darling, 1998). Hence the crisis is a window to opportunities (Boin and Hart, 2003). Among the best known examples of leaders that have made use of positive emotions to obtain support for their goals are the radio speeches of President Kennedy to the nation, when he declared his intention to put a man on the Moon (Chemers, 1997). A leader‘s most adequate emotion depends on the context (Madera and Smith, 2009). Although there is still no complete agreement with the previous literature, particularly in crisis moments, a leader expressing anger and sadness or only the latter is judged as more effective than just expressing anger. A leader that shows anger prompts more participants to a negative effect as compared to a leader showing sadness or both emotions. Anger may be considered too defensive and hostile, and hence it may have a negative effect on followers, while sadness provokes sympathy and concern (Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson and O‘Connor, 1987). With regard to another type of skill, some studies have examined the role of the leader‘s cognition in crisis episodes or change events (Mumford, Friedrich, Caughron and Byrne, 2007). It must be born in mind that such situations present some peculiarities: complexity, ambiguity, novelty and time pressure. It is these unique characteristics that force leaders to consider government management in a different way. In such contexts, intelligenceper se does not provide a sufficiently complete basis to understand the influence of cognition on leadership, but must also be considered, among others, creativity, wisdom, decision-making models, intuition, planning, schematic knowledge and tacit knowledge. Crises also predetermine the most adequate type of political leader. As they refer to illdefined new problems, awareness strategies implemented by the three types of political leaders may be expected to lead to differences in the leader‘s recognition of the problem and differences in the leader‘s success to solve these problems. For example, in very chaotic situations, ideological political leaders may appear especially effective due to their focus on the situation, while charismatic leaders will show themselves more effective in more organized situations, where causes are likely to be stable. These differences in performance may stem, to some extent, from underlying preferences for the implementation of a given style of awareness in problem solving (Bedell-Avers, Hunter and Mumford, 2008). Each crisis situation, given its peculiarities, will require a type of political leader. Thus, as the prescriptive mental model implemented by charismatic and ideological leaders show

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the others‘ importance, it can be expected that both will approach better than pragmatic ones the understanding of problems. In less structured domains, where there is greater uncertainty about causes and goals, ideological and charismatic leaders can be expected to achieve better results than pragmatic ones, who require a structured relationship, even if the structure is complex, between causes and goals in problem solving (Mumford and Van Doorn, 2001). Thus, in such situations, one might expect to find ideological and charismatic political leaders, who emerge and work well in more chaotic situations, while pragmatic leaders work better in more stable environments (Mumford, Antes, Caughron and Friedrich, 2008). Initiation structure problems, by contrast, require a balanced integration of causes and goals. In addition, the need to integrate both makes one expect that pragmatic political leaders will work better with respect to the solutions‘ quality and originality than the other two types of leaders. With respect to change management, charismatic leaders‘ current visions (Conger y Kanungo, 1998) would lead to expect that this type of leadership would obtain better results on such problems than the ideological ones that formulate mental models based on extensive shared goals. Nevertheless, it is also possible that the multiple complex considerations involved in the problems of change management may contribute to improve the result on the part of pragmatic political leaders (Mumford and Van Doorn, 2001). Participatory problems, on the contrary, involve agreeing to trust others based on shared goals. Ideological political leaders, due to their construction of prescriptive mental models around past failures (Strange y Mumford, 2002; Mumford, 2006), may work less effectively, producing less quality and less original solutions for participation problems than charismatic and pragmatic leaders. Previous research has shown that the analysis of political organizations allow shedding light on generic matters of organizational behavior (Hartley, 2004). This is especially relevant in crisis and change moments. The idea that leadership behaviors and the nature of their motivational antecedents may be found in organizations, although it requires a more thorough research level, rests on the following approach (Butcher and Clarke, 2006): in practice organizational policies, like their counterparts in the institutional scenario, are a logical and necessary process to solve conflicts between diverse interests (Held, 1987; Butcher and Clarke, 2001). This includes behaviors such as networks, lobbying and coalition formation (Dennis, Lamothe and Langley, 2001; Ammeter, Douglas, Gardner, Hochwater and Ferris, 2002). Hence, the study in depth of the analysis of the conclusion validity obtained by means of the political leaders‘ study will enrich substantially businesses management in crisis and change periods.

4. CONCLUSIONS AND A FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA The aim of this work has been to undertake a review of the literature into political leadership and, specifically, its challenges in crisis and change periods. From this review some conclusions can be drawn. In the first place, despite some similarities, political leadership shows key differences from leadership understood in a broad sense. This provides justification for its independent study.

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In the second place, some characteristics define the effective political leader: a) some character aspects, b) demographic characteristics, like his/her chronological age and his/her career age, c) socio-family characteristics, like birth order and d) communication and political management skills. What is less clear is whether ethical behavior is the political leader‘s characteristic, especially considering Machiavellianism‘s contributions to the literature. It is also possible to distinguish between ideological, pragmatic and charismatic leaders, the latter open to subcategories according to certain criteria. The crisis moments not only make leaders more relevant but they are also periods of outstanding leader emergence. This is the case of charismatic political leaders in particular. Nevertheless, crises make stand out, if possible, some of the characteristics mentioned above as characteristic of effective political leaders. Likewise, and as the nature of crises is really diverse, this will determine the type of most adequate political leader to face each problem. The review of the literature shows some ideas on the matter contributed by previously published works. These ideas, analyzed for the political setting, are considered very useful in the world of business, given the similarity of some of the most outstanding aspects of the challenges to be encountered in both environments, although in this respect a more comprehensive analysis is still necessary. Next, some of the issues which, as a result of the analysis of the literature, would be necessary to elaborate on are addressed. On the one hand, academicians should pay special attention to political leaders‘ reform attempts, mainly when these are prompted by crisis situations (Palazzolo and Moscardelli, 2006). Likewise, considering the current world globalization, future research must extend its scope to see leadership through the lenses of the global social thought and international management (Kellerman and Webster, 2001). Given the relevance of the voters‘ trust in the candidate in relation to the leader‘s success in the campaign, it will be necessary in the future to strengthen the research into those characteristics of personality and leadership behaviors that influence more critically the trust in the candidate. Specifically, and despite its relevance, few studies have examined the role of specific negative emotions in the evaluation of a leader in a crisis period. Madera and Smith (2009) have examined the impact of two negative emotions linked to crisis (anger and sadness) on leaders‘ evaluation. In any case, it is necessary to study the impact of other primary emotions (surprise, for example) or secondary ones like annoyance, envy or shame (Weiss and Cropanzano, 1996). Nevertheless, such analyses require replication in another type of crisis since Madera and Smith‘s (2009) work was conducted in the context of an internal crisis (a failed product), which could hardly have caused the emotions previously mentioned. Likewise, it is necessary to elaborate on the study of new personality characteristics that may affect the evaluation of the candidates and on the specific combination or combinations of several aspects of the personality that are more relevant to the electors‘ evaluation of leaders (Pillai, Williams, Lowe and Jung, 2003). With respect to other types of the effective leader‘s characteristics, the study into the effect of primogeniture on the likelihood of becoming political leaders must be widened in order to know whether the resource dilution explanation perspective or the interaction among siblings perspective prevail in the explanation of the current first-born children‘s overrepresentation in political leadership (Andeweg and Van Den Berg, 2003).

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With regard to communication skills and the use of metaphors to support political leaders‘ communication strategy, much remains to be investigated: what happens, for example, when metaphors are used excessively or how does the specific combination in each case of density/quality of metaphors influence their inspiring capacity? (Mio, Riggio, Lewis and Reese, 2005). However, before generalizing these results, it would be necessary to replicate the studies in places where, unlike the case of France and the United States, their cultural norms inhibit the public display of emotion by their powerful leaders. In fact, this research need was already suggested by Masters and Sullivan (1989b). Likewise, few works have been carried out on the role of other strategies of the political leader, like his cognition under crisis or change conditions (Fiedler and García, 1987; Weick, 1995; Mumford, Friedrich, Caughron and Byrne, 2007). Therefore, future studies must strengthen this type of analysis, which will allow revising the conclusions shown in such works as the research progresses. On the other hand, it is necessary to implement other studies that analyze the mechanisms used by leaders to come up with solutions in moments of organizational crisis or in change situations (Lord and Hall, 2005). In turn, the issue of the leader‘s cognition cannot be solved with an analysis exclusively from the individual perspective, but it is necessary to discover which social and organizational variables influence the leaders‘ thoughts about the crisis they face. Mumford, Friedrich, Caughron and Byrne (2007) suggest analyzing how leaders manage the organizations‘ socio-informative context to make their ideas clear to the public in crisis times. Apart from this question, future research should deal with the impact of other social and organizational variables on leaders‘ thoughts in crisis times. Likewise, other factors external to the candidate as an individual person (the role of the media coverage, the type of election the candidate submits to –local versus national- inflation and interest rates, real gross national product, the international presence of the country, etc.) may determine the position of the candidate in the elections, and therefore should be the subject of future research (Pillai, Williams, Lowe and Jung, 2003). A country‘s size may affect the type of characteristics that allow improving the electors‘ evaluations of a political leader. This could help explain some differences between the U.S. presidents that have left a deeper footprint in history and some of the New Zealand Prime Ministers whose legacy has endured more (Power, 2004). Nevertheless, this is only an idea that should be proved by future research. With regard to political leaders‘ classification, future studies must examine whether there are differences in the prevalence of the different outstanding leaders (charismatic, ideological and pragmatic) according to intercultural differences (Bedell-Avers, Hunter and Mumford, 2008). So far the research that has dealt with charismatic political leaders‘ characteristic behaviors (Gardner and Avolio, 1998; Sosik, 1998) or how they achieve impressive results (Fiol, Harris and House, 1999; Howell and Hall-Merenda, 1999) has been scarce. For this reason, it would be advisable for future research to focus on its study. Future research could also be based on recent findings (Popper, 2000) and could clarify the relationship between socialized political leadership and personalized political leadership. Moreover, the relationship between the psychological and sociological vision of charismatic leadership seems worthy of investigation, that is, to examine how the situation context (sociological approach) alters the impact of the leader‘s personal qualities and his behaviors (psychological approach). Similarly, the point where the bright side of Machiavellianism is

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dissolved and the Machiavellian manipulative and deceptive behavior begins to erode the group's goals requires special attention. Historiometric studies that allow understanding Machiavellianism and assessing its nature in the charismatic political leadership with organizational subordinate-supervisor relationships are necessary (Deluga, 2001). Likewise, and from a methodological perspective, although cross questionnaires are a useful tool in exploratory tests, it would be very useful to make use of longitudinal studies, which will allow delimiting the differential impact characteristics and behaviors exert on the predicted results (Pillai, Williams, Lowe and Jung, 2003). Specifically, political leadership processes include decisions on selection, development, evaluation and succession planning, decisions all of them that may improve the future political leaders‘ skills. Relying on longitudinal methodologies would facilitate the appraisal and understanding of these complex causal relationships (Yukl, 2008). Not only is it important that future research should focus on aspects not analyzed so far. In addition, analyses must be based on methodologies that make use of other sources (analysis of biographies‘ content, news and articles from magazines, among other sources of information) in order to obtain complementary data to those obtained in studies such as that by Pillai, Williams, Lowe and Jung (2003).

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Drazin, R., Glynn, M. A. & Kazanjain, R. K. (1999). ‗Multi-level theorizing about creativity in organizations: A sensemaking perspective‘, Academy of Management Review, 24, 2, 286-329. Fiedler, F. E. & García, J. E. (1987). New Approaches for Effective Leadership: Cognitive Resources and Organizational Performance, Oxford, England: John Wiley & Sons. Fiol, C. M., Harris, D. & House, R. (1999). ‗Charismatic leadership: Strategies for effecting social change‘, The Leadership Quarterly, 10, 3, 449-482. Gardner, W. L. & Avolio, B. J. (1995). Charismatic Leadership: The Role of Impression Management, paper presented at the meeting of the Academy of Management, Vancouver, BC. Gardner, W. L. & Avolio, B. J. (1998). ‗The charismatic leadership relationship: A dramaturgical perspective‘, Academy of Management Review, 23, 1, 32-58. Geis, F. L., Krupat, E. & Berger, D. (1970). ‗Taking over in group discussion‘, in R. Christie, & F. L. Geis, (eds.): Studies in Machiavellism, 392, New York: Academic Press. Goldstone, R. L. & Sakamoto, Y. (2003). ‗The transfer of abstract principles governing complex adaptative systems‘, Cognitive Psychology, 46, 4, 414-466. Greenstein, F. I. (1968). Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference, and Conceptualization, Chicago: Markham. Halverson, S. K., Holladay, C. L., Kazama, S. M. & Quiñones, M. A. (2004). ‗Radical and incremental self-sacrificial leadership: Effects on carisma, legitimacy, reciprocity, and impact‘, The Leadership Quarterly, 15, 2, 263-275. Harrison, R. (1987). ‗Harnessing personal energy: How companies can inspire employees‘, Organizational Dynamics, 16, 2, 5-20. Haus, M. & Sweeting, D. (2006). ‗Local democracy and political leadership: Drawing a map‘, Political Studies, 54, 2, 267-288. Held, D. (1987), Models of Democracy, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Heritage, J. & Greatbach, D. (1986). ‗Generating applause: A study of rethoric and response at party political conferences‘, American Sociological Review, 92, 1, 110-157. Hmelo-Silver, C. E. & Pfeffer, M. G. (2004). ‗Comparing expert and novice understanding of a complex system from the perspectiva of structures, behaviors and functions‘, Cognitive Science, 28, 127-138. Hogan, R., Raskin, R. & Fazzini, D. (1990). ‗The dark side of charisma‘, in Clark, K. E. and Clark, M. B. (eds.): Measures of Leadership, 343-354, West Orange, NJ: Leadership Library of America. House, R. J. (1977). ‗A 1976 theory of charismatic leadership‘, in J. G. Hunt, & L. L. Larson, (eds.), Leadership: The Cutting Edge, pp. 189-207, Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois Univ. Press. House, R. J. (1995). ‗Leadership in the twenty-first century: A speculative inquiry‘, in A. Howard, (eds.): The Changing Nature of Work, 411-450, San Francisco, CA: John Wiley & Sons. House, R. J. & Howell, J. M. (1992). ‗Personality and charismatic leadership‘, The Leadership Quarterly, 3, 2, 81-108. Howell, J. M. & Hall-Merenda, K. E. (1999). ‗The ties that bind: The impact of lider-member exchange, transformational and transactional leadership and distance on predicting follower performance‘, Journal of Applied Psychology, 84, 5, 680-694.

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In: Political Leadership and Its Significance in a Time… ISBN: 978-1-61668-396-2 Editor: Anna L. Larsen © 2011 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 3

IF THE MARKET IS SO EFFICIENT, WHY DO WE NEED LEADERSHIP? REFLECTIONS ON CORPORATE MISMANAGEMENT Matt Vidal

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ABSTRACT As a result of two recent waves of corporate scandals – the Enron accounting scandals and the subprime mortgage crisis – millions of unwitting victims have lost their jobs, homes and/or retirement savings; hundreds of billions in taxpayer money has been spent on bailouts; and tens of trillions in paper wealth has evaporated. The prevailing analysis of these scandals is that there was a crisis in corporate leadership. Yet, the core aspects of the free market doctrine – most notably, the institutionalized worship of private enterprise and profit – have survived largely intact. The leadership analysis is correct that managerial discretion is of fundamental importance. But leadership is a construct that is ambiguous, symbolic, and romantic, one that individualizes the complex, organizationally and institutionally shaped process of management. Far more than a problem of individual ethics, the corporate scandals were driven by an institutional environment that not only celebrates the single-minded pursuit of self-interest, in general, but one that structurally encouraged mismanagement. The structural context included enormous pools of money for investment in a financialized economy, norms of obscene individual compensation, extreme pressures to perform, and specific pressures to adopt questionable practices due to competitive mimesis.

Keywords: Collateralized debt obligations, competitive mimesis, corporate malfeasance, financialization, free market doctrine, inefficiency, mortgage-backed securities

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INTRODUCTION The last decade has witnessed two waves of corporate scandals, first,revelations of widespread, systematic accounting fraud – symbolized by Enron and WorldCom – around 2001/2, followed by the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007/8. In the wake of Enron and company, corporate writedowns have been estimated to hit $1 trillion, while hundreds of thousands of employees lost their jobs due to corporate failures resulting from the scandals. The subprime crisis has been estimated to have resulted in the elimination of up to $7.7 trillion in stock-market value, while the number of home foreclosures could hit 6 million American familiesafter the foreclosure crisis spread into the prime mortgage market. And these are just the two most recent waves of scandals. In the last three decades the US has also seen the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s (costing $153 billion, $124 of which was paid by the public), the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management in the late 1990s, Boeing‘s misleading of investors in the buildup to the merger with McDonnell Douglas in 1997, and the implosion of the dot-com bubble around the turn of the century.1 As a result of these corporate scandals, millions of unwitting victims have lost their jobs, homes and/or retirement savings; hundreds of billions in taxpayer money has been spent on bailouts; and tens of trillions in paper wealth has evaporated. Yet, core elements of the free market doctrine – which celebrates the unfettered pursuit of individual self-interest, eschews government intervention in the economy, and holds that markets are universally efficiencyenhancing and self-regulating – have survived largely intact. To be sure, the US government responded to the accounting scandals with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which focused on greater transparency and oversight of corporate accounting, and to the subprime crisis with the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill, which at time of press has passed both the House and Senate and is awaiting a signature by President Obama to become law. These reforms, however, have not fundamentally altered existing institutions of American capitalism. With the subprime crisis having set off a full-blown financial crisis many on the Left have increasingly predicted the death of neoliberalism and liberals have enjoyed more space to criticize laissez-faire policies and neoclassical/monetarist theories. Andit is true that faith in the free market doctrine has been shaken to the extent that Minksy‘s financial instability hypothesis is now being seriously discussed within certain factions of the macroeconomic mainstream and government regulation is again on the policy table. But academic and policy debates have largely failed to question a core aspect of the market fundamentalism: institutionalized worship of private enterprise and profit. Neither crisis has yet to produce any debate about the relationship between mismanagement and market inefficiency. At the organizational level of analysis, the central debate has focused almost exclusively on questions of leadership in corporations and ethics in MBA education. In particular, there has

1

On the writedowns due to the credit crisis, see Elisa Martinuzzi, ―Credit Crisis Cost Tops $1 Trillion With Morgan Stanley‘s Loss,‖ Bloomberg NewsDecember 17, 2008. On the stock-market value cost of the subprime crisis, see Robert J. Samuelson, ―The Real Price of the Slide: The market has dropped by a dizzying $7.7 trillion since its peak,‖ Newsweek July 29, 2002. On the cost of the savings and loan crisis, see Timothy Curry and Lynn Shibut, ―The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and Consequences,‖ FDIC Banking Review, no date. On the Boeing scandal, see Stanley Holmes and Mike France, ―Boeing‘s Secret,‖ BusinessWeek May 20, 2002.

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been some discussion of management as a profession, questioning of the shareholder value model of the corporation, calls for rethinking of business school curricula.2 This predictably-shallow exercise in reflection on existing institutions is unfortunate, for it is disproportional to the sheer magnitude of economic and social damage – including mammoth allocative inefficincies, but extending much farther and deeper into ruined livelihoods – generated by corporate malfeasance and mismanagement in the intoxicating age of American financialized capitalism. The prevailing analysis of the scandals, that there was a crisis in corporate leadership, focuses entirely on the characteristics of individual managers. Other than a lack of leadership (and insufficient oversight) the institutions of American financial capitalism are working fine, thank you. As Bill George, of Harvard Business School, has argued, many ―prudent‖ leaders of financial firms adequately prepared for the latest (subprime/credit) crisis ―by anticipating the impact of systemic risks and emphasizing the long-term health of their firms,‖ while the economy as a whole has been saved by the ―authentic leadership‖ of Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson.3 The central problem was poor leadership and unethical behavior by individual executives. The solution: improve ethics training in business schools, improve oversight and transparency, and, most of all, hire better leaders. But this immediately begs the question of how efficient is the ―market for corporate control‖ if it fails to weed out crooks and short-term schemers before they have inflicted billions of dollars in damage on the system? In terms of the broader managerial labor market, how could these major American corporations have been led by their executives – who have risen to the top of the market for managerial talent – into financial ruin on such an unprecedented scale? The leadership analysis of the scandals – which, to my knowledge, has been offered exclusively by management scholars trained outside of traditional economics departments – is strikingly inconsistent with mainstream economic theory and free market doctrine. Mainstream economic theory includes little role for leadership or, indeed, for managerial discretion. In its purest form, there is no role for management or leadership because of the assumption of profit maximization. The only problem, then, is one of getting the incentives right. Even if the assumption of profit maximization is relaxed, however, market discipline should (a) force managers to adopt efficiency-maximizing strategies (through incentives and information generated by competition), and (b) curb opportunism and malfeasance (through reputation effects and the market for corporate control).4 Best practice will quickly emerge in each industry, and inefficient firms will adopt it or perish. In this story there is little room for managerial discretion, and hence for leadership. While organizational economists, including transaction cost economists and agency theorists, have taken managerial choice more 2

See, for instance, Paul Adler, ―Corporate Scandals: It‘s Time for Reflection in Business Schools,‖ The Academy of Management Executive 16, pp. 148-149, 2002. 3 Bill George, ―Wall Street's Latest Crisis of Leadership,‖ BusinessWeek October 3, 2008. 4 I use the term market discipline to refer broadly to the disciplinary effects of markets on firm performance, including but not limited to product market competition. This differs from a more recent and specialist usage of the term by financial economists in the banking literature to refer to the use of private monitoring by investors (rather than public oversight) to limit bank risk. Bank creditors can withdraw funds or demand higher interest rates from riskier banks, while equity holders can influence bank behavior through changes in bank security prices. On the role of market forces in ensuring profit maximization, see Richard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Harvard (Cambridge), 1982; and on market forces ensuring maximization of technical efficiency, see Hal Varian, Intermediary Microeconomics, W.W. Norton & Company, 1993.

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seriously, they still view managerial decision making in extremely narrow terms, focusing on the choice between a small set of incentive alignment problems (e.g., incentive pay) or problems of optimizing organizational form. Both neoclassical and organizational economics assume away all or most of the problems of real-world management that preoccupy many scholars of work and organizations, such as managerial interpretation of complex environmental pressures and differential operationalization of abstract models in practice. But when mismanagement, malfeasance and inefficiency are observed in the real world, the notion of poor leadership provides a convenient scapegoat for outcomes largely inconsistent with the doctrine of free markets. The case of corporate scandals in the United States illustrates just how doctrinaire free market ideology has become. Mainstream economic theory holds that market forces discipline managerial behavior so effectively that the problems of management boil down to a few abstract incentive problems. In this chapter I will argue that the business of management is a messy, cultural and political process that belies the simple incentive problems of economic theory and the mechanical, ontologically-shallow notion of market discipline.5 Although management is of fundamental importance for organizational behavior, the leadership analysis obscures more than it reveals. Leadership is a construct that is ambiguous, symbolic, and romantic, one that individualizes the complex, organizationally and institutionally shaped process of management. Far more than a problem of individual ethics, the corporate scandals were driven by an institutional environment that not only celebrates the single-minded pursuit of self-interest, in general, but one that structurally encouraged mismanagement. The structural context included the institutionalized worship of private enterprise and profit, enormous pools of money for investment in a financialized economy, norms of obscene individual compensation, extreme pressures to perform, and specific pressures to adopt questionable practices due to competitive mimesis.

A DECADE OF CORPORATE SCANDALS, 2001 – 2009 Each year from 1996 through 2001, Enron Corporation was crowned as ―America‘s Most Innovative Company‖ by Fortune magazine. By the end of 2001, however, Wall Street‘s favorite darling would plunge to the depths, collapsing in an astonishing, fraud-driven failure that would set off a cascade of corporate scandal exposures. The uncovering of Enron‘s systematic fraud may be dated March 5, 2001, with an article published, somewhat ironically, in Fortune by Bethany McLean. It was entirely unclear to investors, McLean pointed out, where Enron‘s income actually came from. Enron‘s organizational structure was inordinately complex, and its financial statements ―nearly impenetrable.‖ Despite this opacity, Enron was trading at 55 times its earnings. By the end of 2001, Enron and 13 of its subsidiaries filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, becoming one of the largest bankruptcies in US history – an ominous bellwether for the decade, but a distinction that would be erased within a year with the bankruptcy of WorldCom. 5

The concept of market discipline posits a number of mechanisms that exert pressures on individuals and organizations. But this concept is part of an empiricist theory that is ontologically shallow because it assumes these mechanisms operate at the experiential level, automatically and unproblematically without interference from other underlying mechanisms or from other countervailing forces.

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The details of the Enron scandal have been widely reported and dissected in newspapers throughout the country. In the 10 months between the Fortune article and the declaration of bankruptcy, it was revealed that Enron had reported false profits and used a variety of deceptive accounting practices to mislead investors and portray strong growth. Ultimately, 16 of Enron‘s former executives pleaded guilty to fraud and conspiracy. The full economic costsof the Enron scandal are impossible to fully quantify, extending far beyond the lost jobs of its employees and the evaporated wealth of its investors to broader losses of confidence and market turbulence. The financial community assumed that the accounting fraud revealed at Enron was just the tip of the iceberg. Between 2000 and mid2002, stock prices of the country‘s largest companies fell by more than 33%, while technology stocks tanked by 70%.6 The assumption of the financial community was correct: by 2005, 1,010 companies had restated their earnings, effectively admitting they too had engaged in deceptive accounting.7 In Enron‘s wake were left not only a thousand companies restating their earnings but a scattering of breathtaking shipwrecks. The list is familiar to anyone who reads the business news: Adelphia, Arthur Andersen, Dynegy, Fannie Mae, Global Crossing, Halliburton, IMClone, KPMG, Merck, Merill Lynch, Peregrine Systems, Qwest Communications, Refco, Tyco International, WorldCom, and Xerox. Each of these companies experienced high-profile cases of corporate malfeasance, ranging from accounting fraud and outright theft by top executives to consumer fraud (Merck) and insider trading (IMClone). Some, like Adelphia, Arthur Andersen, Refco and WorldCom have declared bankruptcy and/or dissolved. The majority, however, have either been acquired or, more often, persisted through the scandals. The costs of the accounting scandals associated with these firms have been estimated to be over $200 billion in evaporated shareholder wealth, over one million lost jobs, and fully $176 million in lost 401(k) savings.8 The revelations of corporate fraud in this round of corporate scandals peaked in 2002, with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act being rapidly passed on the heels of the Enron, Arthur Andersen and WorldCom scandals. The Act created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, implemented new rules for internal auditing and financial disclosure to improve transparency, and increased penalties for fraud. It would be just a few years, however, before corporate America would be swept up in a another whirlwind of corporate scandal, this time as the banking sector fueled a housing bubble with a system-wide infusion of high-risk loans that were questionable at best, ratings agencies consulted on how to repackage these high-risk assets that would then be certified as nearly risk free, and banks used collateralized debt obligations to engage in regulatory arbitrage so they could increase leverage to unsustainable levels.9 Because many of these exotic new financial instruments greatly increased the interdependence of the financial system – in the process, increasing instability and uncertainty rather than reducing risk – what began as a crisis in the subprime lending market quickly spread, first into a meltdown of the entire mortgage market and then into a system-wide credit

6

"Enron Scandal," Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2009. Matiur Rahman, Daryl V. Burckel, and Muhammad Mustafa, ―Accounting Scandals and Stock Performance: Life After Enron,‖ Journal of Business & Economics Research 7,3: 13-22, 2009. 8 No More Enrons Coalition, ―The Cost of Corporate Recklessness,‖ American Family Voices, 2003. 9 On using CDOs for regulatory arbitrage, see Tony Lawson, ―The Current Economic Crisis: Its Nature and the Course of Academic Economics,‖ Cambridge Journal of Economics 33, pp. 759-777, 2009. 7

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crunch, ultimately brining the entire system to its knees in a full-blown, global financial crisis. The role of corporate executives in these twowaves of scandals differs in certain respects; whereas the accounting scandals resulted from outright fraud and illegal behavior, the more recent round was driven mostly by legal and ostensibly non-fraudulent activities. At root of the subprime crisis was the systematic enactment of extremely risky, speculative, manipulative and predatory behavior by bankers, and authorization of this behavior by a regulatory system, dominated by The Fed, that explicitly disdained regulation and maintained that the market could safeguard against risk (and, by omission, opportunism). At the height of the mania, bankers were proactively marketing no-income, no-asset (NINA) loans that were contrary to long-standing banking customs. Banks were also offering interest rates with low introductory levels that would quickly shoot to double digits and packaging loans with prepayment penalties. Countrywide Financial steered subprime borrowers into higher-cost loans – more profitable for Countrywide and more expensive than necessary for homebuyers – by using a computer system that excluded the cash reserves of borrowers.10 These types of behaviors fall under the category of mismanagement. The corporate malfeasance of the first wave of scandals is one type of mismanagement. A second type of mismanagement, which characterized lending behavior leading up to the subprime crisis, is manipulative and predatory behavior by banks (or other firms). A third type, exemplified by executive behavior in the subprime crisis, is an excessive focus on short-term performance (through high-risk transactions). Mismanagement may lead to corporate decline, including but not limited to bankruptcy and government bailouts, although most likely only if it becomes system wide, as it did in the subprime crisis. While much of the mismanagement leading to the subprime crisis was not illegal, there was also widespread fraud involved; having to get the NINA mortgages through often entailed fudging the numbers by smaller banks that were pushing the loans.11 Manipulative and predatory subprime loans were just the beginning. Dubious subprime loans and other home loans were sold to investment banks and repackaged to back securities sold to investors. The flood of high-risk mortgages and their securitization (which seemingly inoculated risk, thus increasing risky lending while simultaneously heightening the interdependence of the financial system) combined with extensive speculation in real estate, rubber stamping by credit rating agencies, and inaction by efficient-market gurus at regulatory agencies, to inflate the housing market to bursting point. When the bubble began to deflate – as predicted by economists from the Center for Economic and Policy Research‘s Dean Baker to Yale‘s Robert Shiller, but studiously ignored by most of the profession – and housing prices rapidly declined over 2006-07, mortgage delinquencies skyrocketed. The years 2006-07 were a prelude to the depths of the crisis, when the 158 year-old investment bank Lehman Brothers filed bankruptcy in Sept. 2008, setting another record for the biggest bankruptcy in US history. (WorldCom, which declared bankruptcy in July 2002 as a result of accounting fraud, was the largest bankruptcy in US history until Lehman took that title.) Lehman Brothers had a subprime lending unit, which it closed in 2007, and it 10

Gretchen Morgenson, ―Inside the Countrywide Lending Spree,‖ New York Times August 26, 2007. For a remarkably clear analysis of the subprime crisis with minimal jargon, including details on the subprime ―mortgage machine‖ and reports of widespread fraud, see ―The Giant Pool of Money,‖ a radio programreported by Alex Blumberg and Adam Davidson, produced and aired by NPRs This American Life.

11

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eventually lost enormous sums due to its own holdings of mortgage backed securities. When federal regulators let the bank collapse, it touched off a global financial crisis. The Reserve Primary Fund, the world‘s oldest money-market fund, had lent $785 to Lehman Brothers in commercial paper, which became worthless after Lehman went bankrupt.12 When Lehman collapsed, these lenders lost all their money, setting off widespread panic and freezing up the $2.2 trillion dollar US commercial paper market, hence the ―credit crunch.‖ Regulators quickly stepped in to save many of Lehman Brothers‘ competitors who were also on the verge of collapse. But the crisis spread far wider than mortgage lenders and investment banks. Soon after, Washington Mutual, the largest savings and loan bank in the US, collapsed and was taken over by the government, becoming the largest bank failure in US history.13 One of the worlds‘ largest insurers, AIG, was also brought to its knees due to liquidity crisis following its credit downgrading and its inability to honor its credit default swaps. In addition to being severely overleveraged on its credit default swaps, AIG also held extensive mortgage-backed securities in its portfolio. Due to failures in its credit default swap business and losses from its mortgage-backed securities, AIG reported a quarterly loss of $61.7 billion in March of 2009, the largest quarterly loss in history.14 As with the accounting scandals, it is impossible to estimate the overall costs of the market turbulence and losses of confidence generated by the corporate mismanagement leading to the subprime crisis. The current estimate of the net cost of the $700 billion bailout paid by the public, generated by US congressional budget analysts, is $356 billion.15 According to the IMF, mortgage-market losses due to falling home prices and rising delinquencies could reach $565 billion, with the total cost of the credit crisis approaching $1 trillion.16 At the one-year anniversary of the collapse of Lehman Brothers, newspapers and commentators noted the lack of change on Wall Street. A New York Times headline captured the prevailing sentiment: ―A Year After a Cataclysm, Little Change on Wall St.‖17 As the same article goes on to note, ―Backstopped by huge federal guarantees, the biggest banks have restructured only around the edges. … Pay is already returning to precrash levels, topped by the 30,000 employees of Goldman Sachs, who are on track to earn an average of $700,000 this year. … Executives at most big banks have kept their jobs.‖ The main organizational change has been that two investment banks, Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase, have emerged as more powerful banks vis-à-vis their newly humbled, still government-dependent competitors. As this chapter went to press, a major financial reform package, the Dodd-Frank bill, had passed both the House and the Senate in the US.18 President Obama said he would sign the bill within a week. Although the Dodd-Frank bill does not alter the size or power of Wall St. banks, it does contain provisions that will limit Wall St. profits – at least until the banks figure out how to work around the new rules and regulations – and provide some improved oversight, most 12

Jim Stack, ―Money Market Funds: How Safe Are They?‖ Forbes.com, October 10, 2008. Eric Dash and Andrew Ross Sorkin, ―Government Seizes WaMu and Sells Some Assets,‖ New York Times September 25, 2008. 14 ―AIG reports record $61.7bn loss,‖ BBC News, March 2, 2009. 15 ―Estimated U.S. taxpayer cost for bailout jumps,‖ Reuters April 6, 2009. 16 ―Credit crisis could cost nearly $1 trillion, IMF predicts,‖ New York Times April 8, 2008. 17 Alex Berenson, ―A Year Later, Little Change on Wall St.,‖ New York Times September 12, 2009. 18 My final revision of this chapter was submitted on July 20, 2010. The Senate passed the bill on July 15, 2010. 13

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notably a ban on large financial firms owning hedge funds and improved regulation of derivatives.19 Standardized derivatives are now to be traded on an exchange or swamp execution facility, although there will still be a large loophole for ―customized‖ derivatives. The bill also creates a new consumer financial protection bureau, although in a huge concession to the banking industry this is housed in the Fed rather than as an independent body. The bill does not include more far-reaching reforms that have been suggested by many commentators, including a tax on financial transactions, a firewall between commercial and investment banking, or limits on the size of banks. The reactions are of course mixed, but many well-informed observers who have been following closely argue that the new regulations and regulatory powers do not go far enough to address sources of financial instability or inoculate the economy from banking crises.20 The monetary losses due to these two waves of corporate scandals in the first decade of the 21st century are staggering. As noted above, estimates put the costs of the accounting scandals at over $200 billion in shareholder wealth and $176 million in retirement savings, and the costs of the subprime crisis at nearly $1 trillion. These costs do not begin to calculate the costs of direct job losses due to corporate failures, massive increases in personal debt for working families due to the mortgage meltdown, and the indirect costs associated with the deep recession that was triggered and greatly exacerbated by irresponsible lending and overleveraged, high risk transactions carried out with uncertain financial instruments.

THE RESPONSE TO THE SCANDALS

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As is perhaps appropriate for a capitalist system, one of the most prominent responses to the scandals has largely focused on individuals, that is, on the ―lack of leadership.‖ As Bill George writes: The heads of firms like Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, AIG, Countrywide Financial, and Washington Mutual all too often sacrificed their firms' futures in order to maximize short-term gains. This meant under-pricing of risk in exchange for immediate fees and taking on 21 inordinate levels of debt to invest in complex, highly uncertain instruments.

The solution is straightforward. ―We will never avoid these problems until boards of directors start selecting authentic leaders to run their firms known for character, substance, and integrity.‖22 There is a small contingent of commentators who have argued it is hard to blame bankers for single-mindedly pursing profits with intense determination – after all, this is deeply embedded in Wall St. culture. This is the position taken by many practitioners and occasionally by business ethicists, such as Karen Brenner of New York University, who 19

Eric Dash and Nelson D. Schwartz, ―As Reform Takes Shape, Some Relief on Wall St.,‖ New York Times May 23, 2010. Edward Wyatt and David M. Herszenhorn, ―In Deal, New Authority over Wall Street,‖ New York Times June 25, 2010. 20 See, for example, Gretchen Morgenson, ―3,000 Pages of Financial Reform, but Still Not Enough,‖ New York Times May 28, 2010. 21 Bill George, ―Wall Street‘s Latest Crisis of Leadership,‖ BusinessWeek October 3, 2008, 22 Ibid.

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notes, in response to Lehman Brothers, that ―It is very human and understandable to feel the pressure of the time and respond accordingly … These people were operating in a culture where this behavior was prized and rewarded. But I think it is too easy to say, ‗They made me do it; I don‘t have to examine what I did.‘ These people are professionals with duties and obligations to clients.‖23 This more systemic analysis has even been offered for the accounting scandals. As Harvey Green, a business ethicist from Tulane, explains, ―I don‘t think we‘re talking about a bad class of people. I think for the most part we‘re talking about people a lot like us, placed in situations of enormous expectations, and sometimes without much encouragement to do the right thing.‖24 But the primary response has been to focus squarely on corporate leadership. The main debate seems to be not whether the problem is individual or systemic – it is individual – but whether corporate leadership is the responsibility of business schools or not. On the one side are those who argue that business schools have failed in their obligations to produce wellrounded, ethical leaders. For instance, Judy Samuelson, head of the Aspen Institute's Initiative for Social Innovation Through Business, suggests that ―Business schools are good at producing skilled managers, but what we need are leaders … What are [business schools] in business to do, if it's not to create leaders for society?‖25 On the other side, however, are those who argue that ethics has no place in business schools. This tradition is a venerable one, having been adopted by Milton Friedman, who argued that ethics belongs to families and elementary education. This line of reasoning finds support among economists, who increasingly dominate business school faculty. Sociologist Amitai Etzioni recounts a story of faculty-wide vote at Harvard Business School in 1989 on a proposal to begin teaching ethics in the program: Reactions ranged from distrust to outright hostility. One economist argued that "we are here to teach science." Another faculty member wanted to know, "Whose ethics, what values, are we going to teach?" And a third pointed out that the students were adults who got their ethics education at home and at church. By meeting's end, the project had been sent back to 26 the drawing board.

This, of course, is an anecdote about one business school 20 years ago. But it is a telling anecdote. Economics as a profession does not generally discuss, let alone teach, ethics. In economics departments, economics is taught as a technical science. While there is a branch of ―normative‖ economics called welfare economics, this is generally marginal in undergraduate and graduate programs, being subordinated to ―positive‖ economics. Microeconomics textbooks do not deal with ―fairness,‖ and they typically have a discussion of welfare economics that may take up 4 pages in a 726 page textbook.27 In the Harvard Economics department, for example, there is no undergraduate specialization in normative or welfare 23

Quoted in Louise Story and Landon Thomas Jr., ―Tales From Lehman‘s Crypt,‖ New York Times September 12, 2009. 24 Quoted in Bruce Nolan, ―Ethicists: Most CEOs aren't villains,‖ Times-Picayune June 30, 2002. 25 Quoted in Greg Griffin, ―Ethics debate muscles way into business schools,‖ The Denver Post July 28, 2002. 26 Amitai Etzioni,‖ When It Comes to Ethics, B-Schools Get an F,‖ The Washington Post August 4, 2002. 27 This example comes from Robert S. Pindyck and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Microeconomics, Prentice Hall (New Jersey), 1998.

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economics, and welfare economics is only taught as a brief subsection in micro course and in a single course on normative economics. Likewise, the graduate program does not offer any specializations, seminars or workshops in normative or welfare economics.28 In any case, welfare economics purports to deal with comparison of different distributional states without endorsing any specific set of values. Efficiency is the sole criterion upon which the profession teaches that economic judgments are to be made. While philosophers like John Rawls and economists like Amartya Sen have pushed welfare economics to explicitly consider other forms of equality than utilitarian Pareto efficiency, these interventions, along with the broader subfield, are quite tangential to the business of mainstream economics. Accordingly, where ethics is taught in business schools, it is typically taught by philosophy professors and housed in philosophy departments. The business school professors that have invoked the leadership analysis and discussed the role of business schools share at least one thing in common: They were trained and/or currently specialize in management/organization studies and sociology, not in economics. Where economists have addressed corporate mismanagement in the scandals, they have focused on incentive and corporate governance issues or on improving accounting and/or reporting procedures, but without any discussion of market efficiency.29 These discussions about corporate governance, including those from law and economics scholars, tend to address the scandals within the framework of agency theory and an assumption of market efficiency. Thus, for example, William W. Bratton finds that the Enron ―case justifies no fundamental reform‖ of the ―self-regulatory system of corporate governance.‖30 By focusing on the analysis on abstract incentive issues and assuming market efficiency, organizational economics is actually quite divorced from the problems of real-world management – including the non-rational, non-incentive effects of institutions – and blind to the possibility of system-wide inefficiencies endemic to organizational life. The financial crisis has, if anything, further diverted attention from mismanagement within the economics discipline. The main debates here have concerned the assumptions of neoclassical economics and the merits of different approaches to financial regulation. Most notably, the financial crisis has exacerbated existing fractions between neoclassical/monetarists and Keynesians. There is an active debate within the profession, spearheaded by Paul Krugman, over neoclassical assumptions of perfect rationality and the efficiency and stability of markets.31 Remarkably, however, neoclassicals continue to push market fundamentalism. Harvard‘s Edward Glaeser offers a typical account, referring to the behavior of bankers with the euphemism ―shenanigans‖ – a term used with surprising frequency in the commentary on the scandals, both rounds of which have included extensive criminal behavior. As he explains in his New York Times blog, capitalism is working fine, it was just a problem of regulation. In a neat trick, Glaeser turns the financial crisis into a 28

See the Harvard Economics department undergraduate course overview at http://webdocs.registrar.fas. harvard.edu/courses/Economics.html, and the list of graduate seminars and workshops at http://www.economics. 29 For instance, see Baruch Lev, ―Earnings: Facts and Fiction,‖ The Journal of Economic Perspectives 17,2: 27-50, 2003; Mihir A. Desai, ―The Degradation of Reported Corporate Profits,‖ The Journal of Economic Perspectives 19,4: 171-192, 2005. 30 William W. Bratton, ―Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value,‖ Tulane Law Review 76, 2001-2002. 31 See, for instance, Paul Krugman, ―How Did Economists Get it So Wrong?‖ New York Times Magazine September 6, 2009.

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problem of government failure – rather than a market failure – that provides a lesson against too much regulation: ―it is foolish to react to a governmental failure and think that the right response is to vastly increase the scope of public activity. I do fear the hubris of moving to a wider public agenda, before the financial market basics are in place.‖32 Glaeser does not even mention the possibility of regulating derivatives. Apparently, the regulators need more resources but not new responsibilities or power. On the one hand, then, economists have effectively elided the problem of mismanagement. To the extent they discuss management, the focus is exclusively on incentive structures; real individuals – and, crucially, variation in individual capabilities, motives, goals, etc. – fade from view.33 On the other hand, the organizational-level analysis outside economics, which has focused largely on leadership, has remained conspicuously separate from any discussion of market efficiency or stability. There have been reforms that increased regulation, but these have focused on improving the efficiency and integrity of the capitalist system, without any type of reflection on whether these scandals have any basis in core capitalist market institutions. My goal here is to take the scandals as having potential lessons about capitalist institutions. I begin my analysis by examining the academic literature on leadership before presenting an institutional alternative to the leadership analysis.

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LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT According to the leadership analysis – which focuses the problem on professional development rather than regulation – the central question that follows from the crisis is, how can business schools do a better job of training managers to be well-rounded, ethical leaders? When posed directly, this question immediately reveals a remarkable fact about the popular response to the scandals: economists – both individually and as a discipline – have been relatively silent on these issues. It was the media and popular outrage that focused the analysis on individual corporate executives.34 The fact that many of the executives at the center of the scandals were MBAs put business schools in the hot seat. Many business school professors joined in to lament the lack of leadership in corporate America and the sorry state of ethics instruction in American business school curricula.35 Some, as discussed below, go even further to critique the narrowly-focused shareholder value model that dominates business school curricula. 32

Edward L. Glaeser, ―A Failure of Regulation, Not Capitalism,‖ New York Times Economix blog, June 9, 2009. For a detailed discussion of the failure of economists to take the problems of management seriously, with particular reference to the problem of organizational efficiency, see my ―Routine Inefficiency: Operational Satisficing in Real-World Markets,‖ pp. 89-117 in Nina Bandelj (Ed.) Economic Sociology of Work JAI Press (Bingly, UK), 2009. 34 Examples of limited responses focused on incentive problems and governance issues were cited in note 25. The only cases I know of where economists have actually taken the subprime crisis as indicating a need to fundamentally rethink economics are David Colander, Hans Föllmer, Armin Haas, Michael Goldberg, Katarina Juselius, Alan Kirman, Thomas Lux, and Brigitte Sloth, ―The Financial Crisis and the Systemic Failure of Academic Economics,‖ Kiel Working Paper No. 1489, February 2009; Paul Krugman, ―How Did Economists Get it So Wrong?‖; and Tony Lawson, ―The Current Economic Crisis.‖ 35 See, for instance, Diane L. Swanson and William C. Frederick, ―Are Business Schools Silent Partners in Corporate Crime?‖ Journal of Corporate Citizenship 9, pp. 24-27, 2003; Warren Bennis and James O‘Toole, ―How Business Schools Lost Their Way,‖ Harvard Business Review 83, pp. 96-104, 2005. 33

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A central assumption of my analysis is that management matters significantly for organizational performance. This should be an uncontroversial assumption. If it were otherwise, this would be news to most of the management professors in the thousands of management departments around the world (although not all management professors; paradigms like population ecology and resource dependence view management as highly constrained by environmental factors). The Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business lists 574 accredited business schools in the US. Of course management matters, the questions and debates concern how management matters, what are the central management issues, what works, and so on. In contrast to management as a general category of organizational life, the very significance and meaning of the notion of leadershiphas been widely questioned. As Rakesh Khurana explains, leadership ―remains without either a widely accepted theoretical framework or a cumulative empirical understanding leading to a usable body of knowledge.‖36 To be sure, there is a vast leadership literature, encompassing empirical research and serious theoretical analysis in leadership journals as well as hundreds of popular how-to airport books. But, as Khurana notes, there are no leadership departments in elite business schools equivalent to departments of strategy, organizational behavior, human resource management, finance and accounting.37 Although much of management theory and research emphasizes the constraints on management, this does not imply that management does not have a significant impact on organizational performance. Rather, it simply highlights the fact that management is complex and messy process, shaped by numerous factors including industrial structure, institutional environment, organizational culture and politics as well as managerial strategy and behavior. What is in question is the conventional notion of organizational leadership that views leadership as a purely individual phenomenon and sees individual leadership as central to organizational performance. Foundational studies on leadership have found that most of the variation in organizational performance is accounted for by environmental factors such as industry and firm characteristics rather than leadership.38 In a careful review of this research, Alan Berkeley Thomas argues persuasively that these studies do not actually provide evidence that leadership does not matter.39 While they do show that environmental factors account for most of the variation in organizational performance, the relevant basis of comparison, he argues, is how much management matters within the variation unexplained by environmental factors. Reexamining these studies in this light shows that leadership/management has a substantial impact on the variation in organizational 36

Rakesh Khurana, From Higher Aims to Hired Hands: The Social Transformation of American Business Schools and the Unfulfilled Promise of Management as a Profession, Princeton (New Jersey), 2007, p. 357. 37 This is by far a unanimous view. Jonathan Doh argues that ―Leadership has long occupied a prominent place in management and business research‖ and that it is a ―pervasive subject of management.‖ He notes a number of leadership centers and programs associated with business schools, as well as six specialist journals on leadership. See Jonathan P. Doh, ―Can Leadership be Taught? Perspectives from Management Educators,‖ Academy of Management Learning and Education 2, pp. 54-67, 2003. Despite these centers and programs, however, the status of leadership research and theory in the business school community is an open question. It is arguably held in relatively low status by non-leadership management scholars. 38 Stanley Lieberson and James F. O‘Connor, ―Leadership and Organizational Performance: A Study of Large Corporations,‖ American Sociological Review 37, pp. 117-130, 1972; Gerald R. Salancik and Jeffrey Pfeffer, ―Constraints on Administrator Discretion: The Limited Influence of Mayors on City Budgets,‖ Urban Affairs Quarterly 12, pp. 475-498, 1977. 39 Alan Berkeley Thomas, ―Does Leadership Make a Difference to Organizational Performance?‖ Administrative Science Quarterly 33, pp. 388-400, 1988.

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performance that is not accounted for by environmental factors. In his own study retailing firms in the UK, Thomas finds that leadership plays a substantial role in explaining variation in organizational performance that is not accounted for by environmental factors, a finding consistent with research subsequent to the early studies.40 It is also noteworthy that studies of the impacts of leadership on organizational performance generally focus on high level executives, either on CEOs, presidents or board chairs.41 This provides a rather restricted view of management. This is of course by design, because the research is attempting to get at the question of top-level leadership. But it is worthwhile making explicit the caveat that this research does not reflect on the significance of management more broadly, given that it excludes management at all other levels, from divisions to local operations. My own research on plant management in manufacturing, for instance, finds that managers approach even a well-established management system in quite different ways, and that such variation in managerial approach is crucial in determining organizational outcomes.42 Equally important, as Thomas argues, what the studies on executive leadership really show is that differences in firm performance account for so much of the variation that they swamp differences associated with leadership.43 Top management does matter significantly, but just not as much as firm-level differences, with the implication being that top management has a large effect on performance within firms over time. The foregoing indicates that contextual factors play a large role in determining organizational performance, but that management also plays a key role. Rather than seeing these factors as in competition, a more productive approach may be to see them in a dynamic, complementary relationship. This is the view advanced by the contingent opportunities approach, which sees management having a larger effect under particular circumstances than others.44 Opportunities for managerial discretion vary by organization and by industry. While differences in managerial impact may largely wash out in the aggregate, the opportunities for managerial discretion may be very large in particular firms, depending, among other things, on the overall managerial structure of the firm and the resources available to managers. If the research just reviewed indicates that management, although variably constrained by contextual factors, does matter for organizational performance, it does not address specific question of what leadership is. In fact, the concept of leadership has been heavily criticized for over three decades. In particular, the notion of leadership as a characteristic of highly influential and effective individuals has been criticized. Such theories of leadership may emphasize the traits of leaders (intelligence, capacity to motivate, confidence, and so on) or the behaviors of leaders (adopt particular roles, encourage cooperation, etc.).45 Criticism of 40

Ibid. Leiberson and O‘Connor focus on presidents or chairs, while Thomas focuses on CEOs. Also focusing on CEOs is Noam Wasserman, Nitin Nohria, and Bharat N. Anand, ―When Does Leadership Matter? The Contingent Opportunities View of CEO Leadership,‖ Strategy Unit Harvard University Working Paper No. 02-04, April 2001. 42 Matt Vidal, ―Manufacturing Empowerment? ‗Employee Involvement‘ in the Labour Process After Fordism,‖ Socio-Economic Review 5, pp. 197-232, 2007. 43 Thomas, ―Does Leadership Make a Difference.‖ 44 Wasserman, et al., ―When Does Leadership Matter?‖ This is an extension of the classic contingent leadership view proposed by Fred E. Fiedler, ―Engineer the Job to Fit the Manager,‖ Harvard Business Review 5, pp. 115-122,‖ 1965. 45 On the traits view for instance, John Gardner, On Leadership, Free Press (New York), 1990. On the behavioral view, see John Kotter, The Leadership Factor, Free Press (New York), 1988. 41

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these views has emphasized the fact that leadership is generally more symbolic than substantive, and that the effects of individuals are highly constrained by organizational and other contextual factors. In an early critique, Jeffrey Pfeffer argued that leadership is not a characteristic of individuals as much as an attribution by observers.46 Such attributions help provide observers with a simple causal framework for understanding organizational outcomes, with leaders effectively being symbols for scapegoating. Extending this attribution perspective, James Meindl and collaborators argue that the individualized notion of leadership helps people make sense of organizational outcomes, and that this individualized view easily becomes romanticized as leaders take on a heroic status to many observers.47 The causes of organizational outcomes are often ambiguous and indeterminate, a context which may create a bias toward the romanticization of leadership. Meindle et al. present evidence that individual emphasis on leadership is positively associated with both increased and decreased organizational performance; people tend to give individual leaders credit for positive outcomes and blame for negative outcomes. The attributional perspective sees leadership as a social construction of observers attempting to make sense organizational situations. But, as Keith Grint has argued, leadership may also be socially constructed by decision-makers as they attempt to legitimate their actions or intended actions.48 In this analysis, contexts are often opaque and open to interpretation. This suggests that contingency approaches to leadership –leadership is the ability to correctly analyze the situation and take appropriate action – are fundamentally flawed because of their essentialist notion of context. In this sense, contingency theories are distinct from the contingent opportunities view presented above; the latter focuses on environmental constraints and opportunities, while the former focuses on the ability of leader to correctly diagnose a complex situation. The social constructionist view does not imply that there are no elements of the context that can be taken as objective, but simply that many elements of context are socially constructed and open to interpretation. This view is consistent with research finding that the work environment is perceptually malleable and that workers selectively perceive their context.49 The social constructionist perspective just elaborated maintains that leadership is a construct that is ambiguous, symbolic, romantic, and rationalizing. What is more, with its individualist perspective, the notion of leadership tends to greatly simplify what are often complex situations. The more sociological analysis is that managers are often constrained by contextual factors that vary across organizations and industries. The social constructionist perspective also suggests that the venerable distinction between leadership and management is an oversimplification. It has been argued that managers focus on stability and existing

46

Jeffrey Pfeffer, ―The Ambiguity of Leadership,‖ The Academy of Management Review 2, pp. 104-112, 1977. James R. Meindl, Sanford B. Ehrlich, and Janet M. Dukerich, ―The Romance of Leadership,‖ Administrative Science Quarterly 30, pp. 78-102, 1985. 48 Keith Grint, ―Problems, Problems, Problems: The Social Construction of ‗Leadership,‘‖ Human Relations 58, pp. 1467-1494, 2005. 49 Gerald R. Salancik and Jeffrey Pfeffer, ―A Social Information Processing Approach to Job Attitudes and Task Design.‖ Administrative Science Quarterly 23, pp. 224–253, 1978; Matt Vidal, ―Lean Production, Worker Empowerment, and Job Satisfaction: A Qualitative Analysis and Critique,‖ Critical Sociology 33, pp. 247-278, 2007. 47

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procedures while leaders focus on creative solutions and thrive in chaotic situations.50 But this distinction, which is ultimately based on a distinction between known and unknown situations, as Grint argues, ―belies the complexity of the relationship between problem and response.‖51 Not only is the simple, essentialist view of the situation problematic, but the underlying notion that managers and leaders are distinguished by different personality types is equally questionable. Even if context were not often opaque and malleable, why couldn‘t the same individual excel or fail at both known and novel problems? It is hard to see the point of the distinction other than to romanticize leadership. What, then, can be done about corporate mismanagement and malfeasance? The leadership analysis places much of the blame on the lack of ethics in business schools. But the research on teaching ethics in business schools is not encouraging. A meta-review of 10 studies measuring the impact of ethics courses on business students found only six cases of positive impacts. Two studies found no impact, a third had mixed results, and a fourth study found an initial positive result that vanished after four years. This last study is particularly disturbing for advocates of ethics training: although students who took an ethics course did show more ethical behavior immediately after taking the course, after four years they were indistinguishable from a control group that did not take an ethics course.52 It has also been suggested that the effect of ethics courses may be context specific; outside of tests directly (and immediately) examining ethical judgment in relation to the content of an ethics course, will ethical judgment be improved? While there is thus some support that ethics courses can improve the ethical judgments of business students, the evidence is rather weak and inconsistent. This is not too surprising, as many ethics professors agree that transforming the ethical judgment of students is very hard to do. For instance, Jeffrey Seglin, ethics professor at Emerson College in Boston and New York Times ethics columnist, notes that teaching ethics is ―sort of like asking whether you can tell somebody to have the values you want them to have. …You can‘t.‖53 This is not to discourage the teaching of ethics in business schools. It certainly can‘t hurt, and will likely do some good, especially for those interested in ethics or inclined to high moral standards. At the same time, however, it is questionable how much a single ethics course, or a small ethical component to classes spread across a curriculum, can change the ethical stance of adult students, particularly those in MBA programs who already have a college experience under their belts. Further, ethics, like leadership more broadly, requires a personal commitment of those being taught.54 Assuming a distribution of ethical positions among MBA students, perhaps random and thus normally distributed, how likely is it that a single class in ethics can have much effect on amoral or immoral adults, which, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, are as likely to be represented among business school students as highly moral individuals.

50

Abraham Zaleznik, ―Managers and Leaders: Are They Different?‖ Harvard Business Review 55, pp. 67-80, 1977. Grint, ―Problems, Problems, Problems,‖ p. 1472. 52 James R. Glenn, Jr., ―Can a Business and Society Course Affect the Ethical Judgment of Future Managers?‖ Journal of Business Ethics 11, pp. 217-223, I992; The study that found an initial effect that vanished after four years is Peter Arlow, and Thomas A. Ulrich, ―Business Ethics, SocialResponsibility and Business Students: An EmpiricalComparison of Clark's Study,‖ Akron Business and Economic Review 11, pp. 17-22, 1980. 53 Quoted in Andrew Wallmeyer, ―More than Just Following the Rules,‖ Wisconsin State Journal, May 1, 2005. 54 Doh, ―Can Leadership be Taught?‖ 51

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CAPITALIST INSTITUTIONS, FINANCIALIZATION, AND MARKET ANARCHY The question of whether ethics can be taught in business schools raises the fundamental question of whether ethics even fits with the broader message of the business school and, more generally, with capitalist institutions. Many economics professors teaching in business schools are likely to hold, and profess, the Friedmanian position that economics and commerce are amoral. Indeed, the hegemonic model in American business schools is the shareholder value model of the corporation, which asserts the primacy of shareholders and rejects altogether the idea that corporate management has any obligation to other stakeholders such as employees or the community. Khurana documents the ascendance of this model in American business schools in his excellent book, From Higher Aims to Higher Hands.55 In this institutional sociology of business schools, Khurana explains how management emerged as a new and unfamiliar occupation beginning in the late 19th century as the growth of massive corporations become too unwieldy for entrepreneurial control and required increasingly more managers. This new class needed to establish legitimacy for itself – in the eyes of direct owners and shareholders among others. Thus began a project to create business schools as the institutional basis for training professional managers, with the explicit idea being that management would become a bona fide profession; management would, among other things, have its own code of ethics and an obligation to serve the broader interests of society as stewards of the country‘s corporations. Business schools, that is, were explicitly created as professional schools, with the very idea of profession signaling that managers had an obligation to society as a whole, analogous to the notion that doctors have a responsibility to the larger society. However, this mission gave way to what Khurana calls a managerialist vision that emphasized technical knowledge and, eventually, to the shareholder value model. As a result, any notion of social purpose for management was replaced with a purely market logic. When presented as a profession, ethics was equally as important to management as was technical knowledge. University-based business schools aligned with the university‘s mission of public service. This model eventually faltered in the face of institutional and competitive pressures to transform management into a social science-based occupation emphasizing quantitative analysis and behavioral science theory (particularly economics). Over the 1950s and ‗60s, American business schools were transformed into the managerialist model of narrow, discipline-focused training centers, which emphasized research and doctoral training over ―pedagogy designed to produce managers‖ in the economy.56 Among many institutional forces behind these transformations were competitive pressures from a proliferation of vocation-oriented schools emphasizing technical training (rather than professionalism and ethics). While rejecting the professional model of management, the managerialist phase of business schools did still emphasize the stakeholder model of corporate responsibility. Corporations had obligations to employees and communities in addition to shareholders. But as the economy entered the phase of investor 55

Rakesh Khurana, From Higher Aims to Hired Hands: The Social Transformation of American Business Schools and the Unfulfilled Promise of Management as a Profession, Princeton (Princeton, New Jersey), 2007. The current paragraph and the following two summarize this work. 56 Ibid.,p. 285. Political Leadership and its Significance in a Time of Troubles, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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capitalism in the 1970s – part of a broader transformation of into an era of financial capitalism – driven by the growing power of institutional investors, the stakeholder model was replaced with a shareholder value model. These institutional changes found expression in the theories of financial economists like Michael Jensen, which emphasized the maximization of shareholder value, measured by share price, as the sole objective and criterion of success for corporations. In Khurana‘s words, ―The new logic of shareholder primacy absolved manager and corporate executives of responsibility for anything other than obtaining the desired financial results.‖57 The ascendance of the shareholder value model amounted to the deprofessionalization of management. The hegemony of the shareholder value model raises serious questions about how effectively ethics can be integrated into business school curricula. First of all, implicit in the shareholder value model is an amoral view of economics; the only criterion for judging behavior is financial performance. A deeper point, however, has to do with the lessons of the history of business schools. Was the complete takeover of the professional model by the shareholder model a matter of contingency? It is arguable that it was not, that ideas of broad managerial obligation, community responsibly and the like were simply incompatible with the institutional and competitive forces driving the American economy. Despite intensive efforts by institutional entrepreneurs – including millions of dollars by the Ford foundation in the 1950s and ‗60s – put into institutionalizing the elite business schools as professional schools, competition from hundreds of lower-tier schools and the influence of neoclassical economics effectively eclipsed the professional model. Neoclassical economics, indeed, exerts influence far beyond the confines of the university. Free market doctrine is a central part of the American civil religion, along with freedom and individualism. The very fabric of American society – its culture and institutions – are constituted by faith in markets and private enterprise. Competition and the pursuit of self interest are core American values. Of course, one may argue that fairness and honesty are also core American values. However, the pursuit of self interest and competition are celebrated across a range of American cultural institutions and are often enshrined the economic and political institutions of the society. There are laws against egregious forms of dishonest behavior, but otherwise moral values are taught in the family. In contrast, the pursuit of self-interest and competition are taught throughout the entire educational system. Economics courses, in addition to teaching these values of competition, profit making and self-interest, teach students that individuals are universally hedonistic and untrustworthy, that only with proper economic incentives can behavior be shaped. Honesty and fairness fall by the wayside while self-interest and competition continue to be taught and celebrated. Transaction costs economics teaches that individuals are by nature opportunistic, that behavior is motivated by ―self interest seeking with guile.‖ Indeed, the agency theory underlying the market for corporate control and justifying the shareholder value model explicitly teaches that ―managers, as a matter of economic principle, could not be trusted.‖58 Corporate mismanagement, including malfeasance, may actually be encouraged by the shareholder value model of the corporation and, more fundamentally, by the cultural exaltation of pursuit of self interest and competition. But the question remains, why has the 57

Ibid., p. 303. Khurana, From Higher Aims, p. 323. See his discussion on pp. 317-326 for a detailed discussion of the role of agency theory in delegitimizing managerial authority.

58

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frequency of corporate scandals seemingly increased over the last thirty years, beginning with the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s? A central part of the story in the savings and loan crisis is the deregulation of S&Ls that preceded the scandals. The repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999, which separated commercial from investment banking, also allowed previouslybanned conflicts of interest to emerge again in banking. However, it should be noted on this point that Canada repealed its equivalent of Glass-Steagall in 1987, but did not experience the types of scandals as the US.59The argument that I have developed here suggests that mismanagement, from malfeasance to predatory behavior to short-termism, is effectively encouraged by the institutions of American capitalism, as opposed to human nature. American institutions and culture celebrate both obscene profit making and individualism. What is, in the academic theory, consecration of efficiency, gets translated into a celebration of profits which, in turn, filters through cultural institutions to become a glorification of making money in the market and in private enterprise. Economists, for their part, do little to discourage this vulgarization of their theories; after all, they serve on the boards of major multinational corporations that are a far cry from the small private enterprises envisioned in their theories of competitive efficiency. If the foundational principles of the society are based in the individual pursuit of self interest – a value system which is particularly strong in the US – scheming and fraud should not be surprising, especially when the opportunity presents itself. Such an opportunity opened up with the deregulation of the S&Ls and the repeal of Glass-Steagall. But this deregulation was just a symptom of a much larger structural transformation in the American economy known as financialization.60 Profits from financial corporations as a share of GDP began to overtake profits from manufacturing corporations in the 1980s, and have been consistently higher than the manufacturing profit share since the mid-1990s.61 The share of total GDP for financial versus manufacturing corporations went from just over 10% and just under 50% in 1950, respectively, to over 40% and just above 10% in 2001. That is, the profit-share of financial corporations in US GDP went from just about10% in 1950 to over 40% in 2001. The financialization of the economy has opened up heretofore undreamed of opportunities for profit making.62 As John Bellamy Foster and Fred Magdoff, among others, have argued, the economy financialized largely because of overaccumulation and overcapacity in the productive sector.63 Industrial capacity has been used at an average of 81% over the last thirty years. As the scope for productive investment has narrowed, speculative investment has increased. Trading on the world currency market has gone from $18 billion per day in 1977 to $1.8 trillion per day in 2009. In the first half of 2006 alone, the global credit derivatives market increased 52% to $26 trillion.64 The notional amount of credit 59

Hugh Thomas and Ingo Walter, ―The Introduction of Universal Banking in Canada: An Event Study,‖ Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting 3,2, 1991. I am indebted to Michael Smith for bringing this point to my attention. 60 See John Bellamy Foster, ―The Financialization of Capitalism,‖ Monthly Review 58,11, 2007. Julie Froud, Colin Haslam, Sukhdev Johal, andKarel Williams, “Shareholder value and Financialization: consultancy promises, management moves,‖ Economy and Society 29, pp. 80-110, 2000. Greta R. Krippner, ―The Financialization of the American Economy,‖ Socio-Economic Review 3, pp. 173-208, 2005. 61 Greta Krippner, ―The Financialization of the American Economy.‖ 62 This argument has also been made in a brief comment by Richard Marens, ―Two, Three, Many Enrons: American Financial Hypertrophy and the End of Economic Hegemony,‖ Organization 10, pp. 588-593, 2003. 63 John Bellamy Foster and Fred Magdoff, The Great Financial Crisis, Monthly Review Press (New York), 2009. 64 Ibid., pp. 56, 58.

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default swaps peaked at $54.6 trillion in mid-2008, before falling to $38.6 trillion by the end of the year.65 There are massive pools of money just looking for places to find a return. In the heady days of the first decade in the new century, this money was finding fantastic returns, particularly in the real estate market. After the subprime crisis broke, investors are, for the time being, looking for safer bets. If the opportunities opened up by financialization were a new development that contributed to the scandals, a much older structural source of the scandals is market anarchy. Specifically, the anarchy of the market contributes to competitive mimesis, in which market actors may simply imitate successful behaviors of others.66 It is manifestly obvious that corporate mismanagement is widespread, and that that the market cannot efficiency contain it (unless one is prepared to argue that the billions of dollars spent on bailing out banks and cleaning up the scandals, as well as the billions in losses borne by investors and workers have been an efficient use of resources). This is exactly what happened in the subprime crisis. Many bankers knew from experience and existing principles that giving no-income, no-asset loans was a disaster waiting to happen, but they felt pressure to do the same given that there competitors were doing it and making millions. As strategies like pushing NINA loans continued to return outsized profits without any official scrutiny, established norms became replaced with new standards. Likewise, if one investment bank was making millions off using collateralized debt obligations for regulatory arbitrage, then others would experience intense pressure to follow suit. The same could be argued for rating agencies, which provided consulting services showing banks how to repackage their loans into securities that would get AAA ratings. These banks were in competition for business, and the pressure must have been strong. The cost of corporate crime is hard to determine, for various reasons, but, as criminologist Neal Shover has noted, ―No one seriously disputes that white-collar crime … dwarfs comparable losses to street criminals.‖67 Congress estimates that corporate crime costs nearly $200 billion annually.68 However, even if we assume that criminals constitute a small percentage of managers, when behavior that is criminal (such as accounting fraud), predatory (such as actively selling mortgage loans to people without verifying income or assets), or otherwise highly questionable (such as using CDOs for regulatory arbitrate) results in increased profits and market share, the pressures on management in competing firms may be intense. In this fashion market competition arguably does produce mismanagement. When managers cut corners, bend rules and so on, this type of behavior may quickly spread through informal executive networks or through the competitive process itself. In any case, when it becomes clear that a competitor is profiting and/or gaining market share from a new strategy, this strategy is likely to be copied. Economic theory assumes that only best practices will be copied, effectively equating profitably with ―high road‖ strategies. But low-road, questionable 65

―Year-End 2008 Market Survey Results,‖ International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. http://www.isda.org/press/press042209market.html 66 Competitive mimesis is similar to the widely influential idea of institutional isomorphism, in which a state of uncertainty induces managers simply copy their competitors. See Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, ―The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields,‖ American Sociological Review 48, pp. 147-160, 1983. However, it is unclear what would differentiate competitive from institutional uncertainty, or whether this distinction is anything more than semantics. 67 Neal Shover, ―White-Collar Crime,‖ pp. 133-158 in Michael Tonry (Ed.), The Handbook of Crime and Punishment, Oxford University Press, 1998. 68 Richard D. Hartley, Corporate Crime: A Reference Handbook, ABC-CLIO, 2008, p. 43.

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and criminal practices may also be profitable and, indeed, may be more profitable in cases. Competitors may simply follow suit.

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CONCLUSION The leadership analysis of the accounting scandals and subprime crisis is correct in assigning a fundamental role to management, but it reduces to an individual problem what is in fact the outcome of the institutional structure of American financial capitalism. Of course, many of the specific practices associated with the crisis, such as particular forms of accounting fraud or subprime lending strategies, were initiated by individuals. These began as individual innovations which cannot be read directly off any particular institutional structure. But how did these individual practices evolve into system-wide crises? Estimates put the costs of the accounting scandals at over $200 billion in shareholder wealth and $176 million in retirement savings, and the costs of the subprime crisis at nearly $1 trillion. These costs do not begin to calculate the costs of direct job losses, explosions in person debt, or the personal and social costs of deep recession, all of which can be directly related to the scandals of the 2000s. My argument here has been that these astronomical losses to the US economy, and the extensive damage to American homeowners and families, cannot be attributed mainly to a lack of leadership in corporate America or, indeed, to any other individual-level cause. Rather, these forms of mismanagement and corporate misbehavior have been facilitated by the structural characteristics of the financialized economy, encouraged by the institutional worship of private enterprise and profit in the US (and shielded from early detection by faith in the same), and systematically spread through mimetic behavior resulting from market anarchy. The story I have articulated here begins with the concept of mismanagement, which, I am arguing, is, in a variety of forms, endemic to organizational behavior. Managers are human beings – fallible, satisficing individuals that vary widely in capability and have a range of goals and ways of thinking about the world based on their experiences in an institutionally dense and diverse world. While people are embedded in different networks and institutional frameworks, one of the most extensive ideologies in American life, itself embedded in range of institutions, including nearly the entire educational system, the political system, and mainstream economics, is free market fundamentalism. This doctrine celebrates, indeed sanctifies individual self-interest, private enterprise and profit. While mismanagement is arguably an intrinsic aspect of organizational life, the sanctification of private enterprise and competition is an historical product. The structural context of mismanagement and satisficing under competitive conditions, generally infused with uncertainty, can produce mimetic behavior that systemically spreads profit-making strategies, without regard for whether such strategies are efficient or inefficient, high road or low road, legal or illegal. The final component of the institutional context in my argument is the financialization of the economy, in which opportunities for profitable investment in the real economy decline just as available capital for investment skyrockets. In a highly competitive and uncertain context, when individuals develop profitable-yet-questionable practices, whether fraudulent accounting practices, predatory loans or high-risk speculative instruments, mimetic behavior should be expected. Not all market actors are innovators and

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leaders. Most are arguably followers. When a firm gets ahead using these questionable methods, it may be hard for many managers in competing firms to resist the pressures to follow suit. This is all the more likely given that American culture exalts profits and making money through business and trade. Better ethics training and improved oversight will have limited impact on the core problem of mismanagement, of which corporate malfeasance is an important instance. Substantially increasing regulation, beginning with the regulation of all forms of derivatives and a Tobin tax and speculative investment, would be a good start. But solutions that focus on individual behaviorwill be partial at best. Americans need to fundamentally rethink their love affair with free markets, competition and private profits, and begin to make associated changes to their economic institutions. Markets may maximize efficiency in theory, but the real world of capitalism is a whole other story.

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In: Political Leadership and Its Significance in a Time… ISBN: 978-1-61668-396-2 Editor: Anna L. Larsen © 2011 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 4

MULTI-POLAR LEADERSHIP – SUCCESS IN NAM PUOI VILLAGE RESETTLEMENT, VIETNAM Pham Thi Bich Ngoc and Anders Hjort-af-Ornas

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ABSTRACT The decentralization process in Vietnam stresses stakeholder participation. A new leadership style is then needed, one that replaces traditional top-down management. This study of a voluntary resettlement of Nam Puoi village in northern Vietnam puts the policy to a test. The process supporting villagers‘ request combined natural disaster relief and development with support from administrations trained in the Sida-financed Chia Se Poverty Alleviation Program. As expected, the involved administrations were trained in stakeholder interaction, bottom-up, and rights based approaches. Yet, put in action, the resettlement process revealed a range of complications that called for good leadership and new thinking for involved parties. This learning process involved interaction across stakeholder categories. Facilitation proved necessary at a point where this communication had come to a deadlock. The result was success for the villagers to shape their new homes along with the experience for the administration to address issues that are frequent for resettlement projects in an empowerment style. The study concludes that multi-polar leadership and participatory interaction process were crucial factors for the success in Nam Puoi resettlement. This process has involved collective action linking local community, administrations, and local decision makers that moves its leadership gravity away from a highly centralized tradition into decentralization. The success in Nam Puoi was not automatic just because initiative came from the village, and the Chia Se program offered stakeholder participation. There have been a number of specific circumstances around even this small project. At the onset, interaction across stakeholder boundaries was absent. Tackling tension and security threats proved awkward and interaction even came to a stand-still until proper facilitation was introduced. The ways in which this obstacle was resolved has lessons of value for scaling-up into other resettlement. When going into the implementation of decentralization not only for routine administration management but also for problemsolving, all parties need to show flexibility and courage to improvise and delegate when

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Pham Thi Bich Ngoc and Anders Hjort-af-Ornas confronted with specific concerns. The article addresses one case where a multi-polar leadership has been effective.

Key words: leadership, decentralization, resettlement, stakeholders, multi-polar, Vietnam.

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INTRODUCTION: LANDSLIDE AND LIVELIHOOD THREATS CALLING FOR QUICK ACTION Nam Puoi village is located in Nam Bung Commune, Van Chan District of Yen Bai Province in the northern part of Vietnam. Before the resettlement in 2006, the villagers lived with a chronic scare of landslide and rock-fall from the tall steep mountain towering 300 meter above their homes. They had experienced serious rock-fall during rainy seasons in the recent past (years 1998, 2002) and worried over the bad erosion of the mountain ridge. These worries were reported to authorities, who commissioned a study in March 2006. The study confirmed an acute danger of major rock-fall and landslides from the badly eroded mountain. At the time for resettlement Nam Puoi village consisted of 211 people living in 40 householdsBich Ngoc & Hjort-af-Ornas 2007a and 2007b). All its inhabitants were Dao, an ethnic minority group in Vietnam. The village was a stable and homogenous one where the domestic economy was very poor with a poverty rate of 45% in 2006. Livelihood was constrained by the environmental layout. The residential area before resettlement was stony, steep in places and crowded (400 m2 plots per household in average, including gardens and livestock pens), and not as fertile as the outlying village lands. The cash income was extremely low; less than one million VND/household/year ( 70 USD, exchange rate in March 2006). Cash generating activities were encouraged to remedy poverty within the Chia Se program; such as tea plantation and goat rearing (the Chia Se program is funded by Sida, Swedish International Development Agency). The initiative to move came from poor villagers who have been afraid to sleep at night during August to October every year because of the threat of rock-fall. People have desired to resettle but have not seen a practical way until in late 2005 when new options to access the needed resources suddenly appeared in the form of regional disaster relief after a major storm. The discussions on movement and resettlement among village inhabitants then gained force. Villagers raised the potential risks and suggested moving in general terms to the representatives of the commune at two village meetings. A letter was submitted by the Village Head to the Commune People Committee (CPC) expressing the Villagers' request to resettle. The Commune involved into discussions with Villagers, and investigated the threat; then taking the issue to the District People Committee (DPC). The DPC reacted quickly and took the necessary decisions to remedy an acute situation on the request from the Commune. The Province (Province Department of Planning and Investment) in turn responded with willingness to release its disaster relief resources together with Sida. The principal decision for the resettlement came already in December 2005,linked with the Chia Se program and its management of the Flood Relief Fund for the communes affected by the September 2005 storm. The Nam Puoi resettlement was a border case but several key policy notions were highlighted that address key government concerns; poverty reduction, natural disaster remedy, sustainable development.

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The decision for support of resettlement proved necessary. It was taken so quick since all stakeholders at that time, Administrations and Villagers alike, feared a landslide and agreed on the need for immediate action. The general expectation was to have the process to be finished in time for the threatening August raining season half a year later. The initiative by the Villagers to identify and seek access to disaster relief became the crucial driving force for the resettlement decision. In addition, leaderships in decision-making of all stakeholders at different levels (Village, Commune, District, Province, Nation as well as Donor) were supportive. The Villagers‘ request was in tune with the national decentralization policy in general and with the aims of community support in the Chia Se program framework in particular. The quick follow-up and back-up from local administrations to the Villagers‘ initiative can be understood against the background of linking up also with the other interests in a potential resettlement process.

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BOTTOM-UP AND RIGHT-BASED APPROACH A prime feature of the resettlement process was the involvement of a multitude of stakeholder through joint interaction in very intensive period (in 6 months - June to December 2006). Concerned stakeholders were involved during this period in their leadership roles. They have followed the whole process of planning, design, implementation and monitoring and solved all major issues that might have led to conflict such as resettlement site, village layout, land distribution and certificate, house movement and allowances, design of roofs and tiles, graves relocation, water supply and sanitation, and public infrastructure. The Chia Se program, present in the area, aimed at supporting local activities and empowering poor people through an increased access to financial resources and information. In the design the Nam Puoi resettlement was linked to the Chia Se program with different stakeholder categories involved. (i) The Administrations, and Local Political Decision Makers at province, district, and commune; (ii) Project Management Units of Chia Se program (PMU) established at each level of administration; (iii) Technical specialists; (iv) The formal and informal leaderships and cultural structures of the village, such as village head, lineages, other kin-based channels, class and culture forms. The design of the Chia Se program has shaped dual roles for the leadership - the leaders of administrations and PMUs are the same at each administrative level. The interaction process is shown in Figure 1. A collective, multi-polar leadership emerged through continuous interactionas a joint knowledge build-up over half a year. Different stakeholder categories, Administrative levels, Chia Se program staff as well as technical specialists and local political decision makers, became partners with Villagers. Bottom-up and right-based approaches have been applied.The Villagers took initiative during the resettlement process, got involved in decision making, and participated in design, implementation, monitoring and management activities. Commune Administration interacted and communicated with Villagers, and then backed up local initiatives by taking the issues to higher-level administrations. District and Province administrations responded to local demands after interaction and provided services and gave advices on specific technical, financial and administrative issues. The independent team recruited by the Donor (Sida) had as its task to facilitate the interaction process between

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different stakeholders to ensure all partners have been mobilized and effectively interacted over the range of specific issues to reach everybody‘s satisfaction at the end. In the process Villagers became exposed to a learning process in the Administrations. Both sides built valuable experience thanks to the goal-oriented facilitation. The roles for each relating to responsibilities, interaction, and communication could become clear to all involved. Empowerment and confidence then built up gradually. A few key leaders at province level, along with district and commune, turned into gate openers for the needed facilitation process. In the village too, a leadership culture change took place. With the facilitation support both Administrations and Villagers won insight in how communication and interaction across stakeholder categories could be a way to break down pre-conceived ideas and move a political agenda into problem-solving in a way that benefited all stakeholders.By doing this systematically and in response to acute tension, misunderstandings and potential conflicts were overcome. Lessons were learnt in Administrations as well as in the Village. In the Village, affected people found ways to learn about technical issues, getting deepened insight into constraints and solutions. Such understanding opened for more involvement in design and implementation, which in turn meant in the end that problems coming to the new village were all solved. In Administrations, a leadership style unknown before emerged, with a problemoriented base. Administrations got a deeper understanding of the potential in local community interaction. Based on this a change in Administration culture emerged through the joint interest in problem solving for a concrete goal. The combined effect was a multi-polar leadership involving Village and Administration to reach the decentralized performance step by step as confidence and willingness to improvise and build trust increased. Cutting across stakeholder boundaries for the sake of improved understanding is what opened for supplementary leadership roles.

LEADERSHIP INTERACTION: THE ACTORS, ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES The Nam Puoi resettlement reaches beyond routine Commune and Village administrations into acute problem solving, to include also District and Province administrations. Confronted with a threatening issue Villagers have assumed rights and responsibilities in the process, and empowered themselves, finding confidence in two-way communication with the resettlement administration. Facing a well-defined problem to solve, the Administrations had to go from theory to practice with decentralization and democratization. The way this happened was based on both specific circumstances but also on the emerging new Administration culture. The Nam Puoi resettlement has a story to tell about how the learning process for both sides turned into a multi-polar leadership, in tune with implementation of Vietnam‘s decentralization policy. This section shows how different stakeholders interacted and solved successfully all major issues could found in resettlement process, and how the leadership roles supported this process.

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Initiatives Involvement in decision making process: design, implementation, monitoring and management Van Chan DPC Van Chan DPMU

Nam Bung CPC Nam Bung CPMU

Independent Facilitation Team

Nam Puoi villagers

Yen Bai PPC/DPI Yen Bai PPMU

Provide service and advice on technical and financial issues Support on Administrative issues Monitoring & Evaluation

PPC - Provincial People‟s Committee DPI - Department of Planning & Investment DPC - District People‟s Committee CPC - Commune People‟s Committee

PMUs - Project Management Units of Chia Se program CPMU - Commune Project Management Unit of Chia Se DPMU - District Project Management Unit of Chia Se PPMU - Province Project Management Unit of Chia Se

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Figure 1.

Resettlement Site Selection. Understanding Villagers’ Requirements to Change Decisions When the process began (December 2005), resettlement site options were discussed between Commune administration and the Villagers in Nam Puoi at village meetings. If a resettlement proved necessary in the forthcoming disaster study of March 2006, the intention of the Commune administration was to settle the new village at Doi Xe Tang (close to the village‘s irrigated paddy fields, and opposite, even within sight of, the administrative centre). The preference of the Villagers in contrast, was to move to Doi Ho Bom (one km from old village). They expected authorities to solve the problem and did not consider the financing side. The Commune administration pressed for a quick decision. It saw the possibility to access disaster funds for the operation and was anxious to access such resources. Therefore, the Commune administration had already settled for the Doi Xe Tang option as resettlement site with support from District administrationbut without considering the Villagers‘ reasons, and the pro-s and con-s among these two options. The Villagers had kept silent because they did not feel confident to raise their voices in front of official staff. Under such circumstances, interaction and communication between the Villagers and Commune leaders were locked. The option decided by Commune and District administrations had created unhappy

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atmosphere, tension and distrust from the Villagers. The Villagers felt run over and unmotivated to involve in the process. The independent Facilitation Team came to Nam Puoi (March 2006), with the task to facilitate an interaction process. It set up open and structured discussions between stakeholders (Villagers, Commune, and District administrations). When interacting with Commune leaders in the new dialogue format, the Villagers now realized that they had a right to talk and should take responsibility for their own decisions. They talked straight about pro-s and con-s, compared the difficulties, challenges and opportunities linked with each resettlement site (SWOT analysis). The concerns the Villagers had over the proposed resettlement site was how to avoid the drastic soil degradation in the proposed site, how to deal with outsiders‘ graves inside the area, how to reach fields, forests and pasture, and how to gain access to domestic water. More careful analyses and comparisons between two potential options now led the Commune administration and Villagers to select the Villagers‘ preferenceDoi Ho Bom. The Villagers were satisfied with this selection. The Chairman of the commune declared that they had been wrong in their understanding before, and now had a better understanding of Villagers‘ position thanks to interaction process. The local authorities therewith cancelled earlier decisions at Commune and District administration levels, and a formal decision on the new site was taken at the end of May 2006.

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Design of Resettlement Village. Responding to Meet Ethnic Minority Culture In order to meet the target of quick movement before the rainy season for the villagers‘ safety, a detailed Action Plan was prepared for Nam Puoi resettlement by District administration and agreed on by relevant stakeholders. Decision-making power was delegated from the District to the local administrations and for empowerment of local people. Enhancing this process has been a highlight in the Chia Se program. District administration took the responsibility to mobilize design and construction agencies, and to interact with the Villagers about technical measures during planning& design. The goal was to get opinions/feedback from the Villagers before implementation, as well as to consider and adjust the design if the Villagers‘ comments were reasonable. At the local level, the Commune administration established a Resettlement Management Committee, consisting of nine civil servants plus the Village Head with ascribed specific responsibilities in the resettlement plan. The Villagers had insight in the technical details this way and through interaction with Construction and Administration Teams in the field. Both ways were communication channels for Villagers to give comments or suggestions for adjustments. A serious conflict relating to new village layout emerged in the design stage (June 2006). The option offered by the Design Company with two rows of houses along the village road in Kinh style was agreed on by almost all Villagers. It had to be dropped when Villagers realized the complications for them with this village layout. In that situation they came up with a new proposal for a village design in line with Dao culture.

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Photo 1.

Responding seriously the changed attitude of Villagers with high respects in sociocultural aspect, a 3D visual model of the new village layout had been presented by Design Company and District Administration for Villagers‘ comments. Seeing and understanding further the future village layout by eyes, the Villagers had the opportunity to freely point out, comment and suggest some adjustments so that locations of road, housing plots, public facilities etc. would fit with their own socio-culture (Photo 1). The road location was discussed, for instance, with a concern linked strongly to Dao ethnic culture. The Villagers preferred to have a road that did not pass by close to or above the back of their houses (especially in connection with funerals when the dead should not pass other houses‘ doors) and still be accessible for those living in the upper part of the village. The top-down attitude from Local Administration and Design Companies was moderated. The memory from earlier projects, including Village distrust of Commune management, gradually penetrated in the continuous interaction process. Through the dialogues Villagers now got insight into requirements for the construction details of road, water system, school, and meeting hall etc. District and Commune paid attention to the Villagers‘ comments, responded and adjusted the design when motivated.

Grave Relocation. Harmonizing Administrative and Village Patriarch Authorities The re-location of graves in the resettlement site proved highly sensitive. Once Doi Ho Bom had been selected, an agreement was reached that seven graves in this site should be moved and relocated by the owners themselves, with due compensation given from the resettlement budget. It was widely thought that there should not be a big problem since the graves would stay within village territory. All Villagers had agreed that the movement, through the support of Commune administration, would not be a big issue. However, after agreeing, and when the choice of site no longer drew attention, internal conflict emerged. One family, the one of the Village Patriarch, requested a solution that could leave two graves

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untouched. They also demanded the three neighboring plots would not be allocated for house construction because of religious reasons (disturbance). The position and statement of the Village Patriarch had strongly influenced not only the resettlement plan of three families but also whole process. Tension and potential conflict between the two dominant families in the village appeared. Neither Village Head nor the three affected households could get a chance to discuss or negotiate with their Village Patriarch. In this situation Commune leaders (both administration and Communist Party) had to involve in the village negotiation with the aim to minimize conflict among the villagers and between administration and village. The Commune administration had the legal option of forced movement, but this was never considered since it would break down the sensitive confidence building that had been achieved. Negotiations now took place but failed several rounds. The whole resettlement was delayed. In the final negotiation the Commune Leader argued convincingly for the need for good governance at village level. A compromise solution was reached at the end when the Village Patriarch accepted re-allocation on the three neighboring plots plus removal of one of his family graves.

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Land Distribution. Transparency, Democracy and Fairness After the issues of ownership and grave relocations had been settled, it was time for arranging with compensation, allocation and plot leveling. This took place with consent from the villagers during only two months (June and July 2006). One important smoothening factor was the fact that most land considered for resettlement was village property. Decisive leadership support came from the District and Commune administrations. Customary land claims in the resettlement site (including pasture rights) were accordingly respected by them. The Commune administration negotiated a consensus solution based on random land allocation with Villagers so as to avoid a top-down decision to expropriate land (Photo 2). Transparency, Democracy and Fairness have been lead notions in this process. District administration supported the ownership procedure in that the land use certificates showing ownership by both Husband and Wife. The Construction Company was also supportive by interacting with the Resettlement Committee, District administration and the representative of each family in order to fix location, direction and area needed for the house, by carrying out the rough leveling work. Villagers supported each other to complete plot leveling.

Voluntary Resettlement.Quick Action with Fully Resources Mobilization The final resettlement was carried out by the villagers in accordance with a schedule worked out on the basis of cultural considerations, ritually ―good days‖ being a function of i.a. age of family leader. All schedules for the movements had been individually decided by each household with the agreed target to finish by the end of year 2006. No forced migration occurred. This process was quick in action - about two months (beginning in September but mostly in November and December 2006). Villagers‘ initiative in preparation and good cooperation in implementation were major factors for quick process; time scheduling, interaction with

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neighbors to form work groups, interaction with the construction company to settle location of toilet, water tank and water tap. The work groups aimed at supporting members in removing the house, transporting all materials to the new site and re-constructing the house (Photo 3). Complementary work continued up to two weeks after the ―good day‖; improved water tank, water tap, toilet, roof, and livestock facilities in comparison with the resources in the old village. Apart from the constraining factors of finding suitable lunar calendar dates, and deliveries of additional building materials, the uncertainty with water supply design quality caused delays. The crucial need for access to domestic water coupled with the concern over poor design quality even threatened to terminate the whole resettlement process and return to the old village site, described below.

Photo 2.

Photo 3.

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The asbestos roofs of the old village houses posed a health issue. All old roofs were replaced on initiative from the Commune and District administrations. A separate budget was identified to introduce cement tiles and the needed improved wood frames for all houses. This initiative was much appreciated by villagers. The coordination of District administration with local producers went smooth, so that deliveries of tiles and frames were managed in time for most households. The Commune and the Village administrations interacted daily about timing, and also about quality control. In spite of the Commune administration‘s efforts, however, deliveries were barely in time during the most intensive migration period. The high pace had another price; some claimed to receive poor quality leaking roofs. The problem was addressed and gradually resolved through interaction between Village, Commune, and District administrations.

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Public Infrastructure. Learning Community-Based Monitoring and Evaluation Relevant public infrastructure such as primary school, village hall, road, electricity etc. was built in the new village in order to improve living standards for the villagers. On the whole, the villagers, in coordination with the Commune and District administrations, were deeply involved in all stages of infrastructure design, adjustment, construction layout and monitoring. The continuous process of Monitoring and Evaluation in Nam Puoi mobilized all stakeholders. In order to coordinate them, a Resettlement Committee was set up with nine members including all relevant actors at all levels. The duties for this committee comprised monitoring and evaluation, and was carried out in close interaction with the whole village. All public works were quality checked as they got finished before handling over to the village for management. All villagers realized their rights and responsibilities and got involved into onsite daily quality control. Technical issues sometimes seemed complicated for the Villagers but they could discover small things such as cement losses and serious things such as the primary water pipe located too close to the main road. The best example of how Villagers took initiative and interacted with Administration to manage technical issues is the water supply system. The Villagers got insight into technical details of water system through interacting with the consultants at village meetings. The Design Company solution caused much worry in the village. Two aspects in particular were disturbing; the primary pipe line came close to the main road, and a gully crossing for this primary line that was thought to be vulnerable. Villagers came together and talked with the Commune and the District administrations about these concerns. But the Villagers did not only register concern; they also came up with suggestions for adjustment. The Commune administration agreed with the Villagers‘ worry, and recommended the District administration to change the design, even though that was costly. Modifications of the water system design were made accordingly. The interaction between Village, Commune, District administrations, and the Construction Company was quick and targeted once the problems reached the agenda (Photo 4).

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Photo 4.

POTENTIAL AND RISK WITH MULTI-POLAR LEADERSHIP

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A number of highly critical issues in the Nam Puoi resettlement have been solved successfully thanks to the great efforts from a multitude of stakeholders. The multi-polar leadership at different levels has played an important role for this success, but it has also revealed a number of critical points in the implementation. A summary is the following one.

(A) Local Initiatives to Resettle, with Back-up from Administrative Leadership Actors involved in the Nam Puoi resettlement have been trained and applied bottom-up and right-based approach through participatory activities implemented at their localities. The willingness of villagers to move away of high risk rock-fall has existed for many years but no solution could be found.When a chance to access the support from Natural Disaster Relief Fund came,village level leadership grabbed the opportunity to try linking up with support from a broader leadership. This village initiative was also met with immediate response from the Commune and District administrations. It could be said that due to an approach for supporting local activities in the Chia Se program, administrators were already tuned to interacting with grass-root levels and supporting them. The Nam Puoi resettlement offered an occasion to apply this new knowledge. The partnership that developed between Villagers and Commune formed a leadership style that was new to both sides. The Village met with active response to their initial fears over resettlement site. The Commune got involved in identifying the behind-lying issues and opened interaction with both District and Province levels. On the other hand, thanks to the broader decentralization policy training, the attention to the village problems associated with resettlement were captured at District and Province administrations at a scale

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that was new in Vietnam. The District administration gave active attention to the strong argumentation for an alternative site from the Commune counterpart. The Province administration reacted equally quick and contacted the Chia Se program Donor (Sida) for help with risk impact assessment. The donor found the request and its underlying grass-root process valuable and mobilized resources jointly with the province. All these sides to partnership interaction have been in tune with decentralization and democratization. However, the approach Administration staff applied in the first stage of resettlement (i.e. selection of resettlement site, design of village layout) has shown constraints that led to some wrong or premature decisions. The quick decision needed to indicate resettlement as a disaster mitigation measure gave rise to hasty decisions by administrations with limited capacity. Looking for resources in a Natural Disaster Relief Fund became a prime motif. Confusion and mistakes of decision-makers during implementation may then be difficult to avoid because of limited experience and rushed decision-making. The lack of careful considerations by local officials has forced Villagers in a wrong direction due to a top-down treatment based on traditional Administration culture. In addition to the village and commune level leadership operation, the Nam Puoi situation was a-typical in that the process could emerge not only thanks to village initiative but also thanks to externalities, such as the presence of a donor, curiosity in decentralization from Administration individuals, and good timing within fiscal budget constraints.

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(B) Leadership and Improved Living Standards The initiative to move the Nam Puoi village also proved to be an opportunity for leadership to interact over a range of long-term development issues for improved living standards. District leadership‘s design of the resettlement plan emphasized upgraded public facilities (primary school, meeting hall, access roads etc.). Village leadership, in cooperation with Commune and District administration, mobilized additional house construction materials for extended house sizes of all resettlees. District and Commune authorities introduced water tank and pit latrines for every household in the drive for improved sanitation. The donor insisted on cement tiles replacing the unhealthy asbestos roofs. The Village leadership, with their responsibility for monitoring and evaluation, tried to insist on good quality infrastructure constructions for long-term reliable services to new village. Province leadership gave free hands to facilitation in an effort to develop a modern way for empowerment in the implementation of decentralization, Commune leadership exhibited the same interest in empowerment, and facilitators made use of their independence status to provoke communication across stakeholder categories. With all these measures in place, the resettlement linked to the Chia Se program to support the Nam Puoi villagers getting out of poverty. In this respect the approach to combine the disaster mitigation through resettlement away from the threat of rock-fall and landslides proved correct. The individual leaders involved in the resettlement were by and large the same as those involved in the Chia Se implementation.

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(C) Leadership’s Dual Roles and Training Capacity The process of resettlement in Nam Puoi has gone smooth with the involvement of different categories of stakeholders. Multi-polar leadership in the study has referred to the Administrations and local political decision makers at province, district, and commune. It has also included Technical specialists; staff of Chia Se program; the Village‘s formal and informal leaderships and cultural structures such as Village head, Lineages, other kin-based channels, class and culture forms. In actual fact, the Chia Se program and Administration leaders comprised the same persons, with dual roles of leadership. The program has also provided clarity for the roles and duties for each actor in the process. This design has created necessary conditions for good coordination and effective interaction across administrative levels, as well as shaping shortcuts in decision-making process to make quick actions possible. During the Chia Se program implementation, local Administrations and Villagers have been trained in bottom-up and right-based approaches through participation in its activities. This training proved suitable for the participatory interaction in the resettlement process. When the Villagers initiated the resettlement, they could get involved in decision making at all stages; design, implementation, monitoring and management. They met active response to their feedback and viewpoints on administration management in the form of adjustments in plans. The Administrations in turn saw their own role to be to provide service and give advice on specific technical, financial and administrative issues. Technical staff from design and consultant companies has reported technical findings and listen to Villagers‘ comments. The net effect has been improved decentralization awareness. In spite of the training to involve local stakeholders in commune affairs, the resettlement planning had come to a dead end when Facilitation was called for. As indicated above, the reason was a mix of haste, limited competence, and top-down traditions. Facilitation enabled interaction across stakeholder categories in a way that built confidence gradually. The resettlement issue was then suitable for the emerging multi-polar leadership since all were mobilized around a single issue. All Administrative levels and the Villagers became partners through the emerging interaction, driven by a joint knowledge build-up over half a year. The stakeholders found the multi-polar leadership constructive, at least providing active response to efforts, and often coming up with win/win solutions to issues that arose during the resettlement. The acceptance of stakeholders‘ roles came into place through structured facilitation of interaction and communication between the various categories. The Chia Se staff and Administrations had also been provided training in interaction. Reaching across stakeholder boundaries was new to all, however. The Administration was quick in decisionmaking. Mistakes were made in the beginning due to application of improper ways of interaction. The most obvious one was when the Administration was too quick in decisionmaking on the resettlement site. Also other mistakes occurred during this time. No fatal further mistakes appeared once the multi-polar leadership process had been established. Both Administration and Village expressed active support to the facilitation approach.

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(D) Class and Culture Differences Out in the Open As mentioned in last section, the administration staff had been trained in decentralization policy. Yet, they did not have the confidence to put empowerment into practice through joint decision-making. When the resettlement process emerged, with its clear goal and need for multi-polar leadership, individuals in both Village and Administrations were keen to understand how to apply the policy. This interest, rooted in the problem solving resettlement agenda, can be seen as an emergence of a new Administration culture. In this sense the curiosity of these individuals in the Administrations follows the intentions in the decentralization initiative. In the transient period when the Nam Puoi resettlement process took place, however, there were also Administration sections ―of the old school‖ of top-down attitudes. This mixed situation applied for all administrative levels involved in the process. Technical departments and companies were more conservative in performance, still keeping in their mind that Villagers have limited understanding about the complications of technical issues. The Villagers in turn had a tradition of silently accepting directives from the Administration, rooted in their minds – ―we are uneducated, lack of knowledge‖ (passive attitudes). The new approach with active participatory management based on interaction and communication has brought new thinking to Administration staff and Villagers alike. The Administrations would listen and respond to issues and recommendations from Villagers. By paying attention, the local leadership created a positive atmosphere to problem solving early in the process, so that villagers could gradually build confidence to involve in the resettlement implementation by contributing their opinions and knowledge. The sensitive opening-up in communication between commune and village came quick, thanks to the interest of the involved individuals, especially since they soon realized the win-win derived from the information exchange. Nevertheless, much constructive facilitation was needed. This had two phases. In the early part of multi-leadership operation it opened eyes and channels, so that the whole interaction process could start up, coming from a dead-lock. In the design phase the facilitation focused on key conflicting issues, with the effect that leadership nodes could widen their scope, understand other views better, and see alternative decisions more clearly. In this way the Nam Puoi practice through learning-by-doing opened for the gradual change of passive attitudes of villagers and centralized administration culture of officials. Merely introduction of, and training in, decentralization policy had not achieved this; external facilitation was needed. Thanks to the proper facilitated interaction, the consensus-based approach to major issues had been made so that potential conflicts could be avoided. By crossing socio-cultural and class barriers, the Nam Puoi villagers could speak out in the process: Even when they might be wrong in some instances, administrators would always pay attention.

(E) Interaction and Communication Build Confidence in Leadership The interaction and communication that resulted from the resettlement arrangements were important for the multi-polar leadership. Building confidence in this way could enhance

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empowerment for both Administrators and Villagers. Once facilitated interaction had opened proper communication between them, leaders realized that they made some mistakes at the beginning and changed opinions toward real needs of the local people. And when passive attitudes gradually changed among the Villagers, so that they realized their rights and responsibilities, the scene was set for active interaction in all stages of the process. As the interaction gained in momentum, it became obvious for the Administration leaderships both that Villagers could contribute with specific assessments, and that this made the planning process more effective and less expensive. The mutual trust between actors grew quick, and Administrations with good leadership could act effectively. The initial distrust in the beginning of the process was experienced-based for both. Villagers have been accustomed to top-down management, and Local government has been used to seek efficiency in a centralized tradition, irrespective of decentralization decisions. Such traditions reinforce the importance of making use of such experience from empowerment and confidence building that the Nam Puoi resettlement offers. The Chia Se program, in spite of its decentralization ambitions, had not had the opportunity to facilitate across stakeholder categories sufficiently for the implementation of the resettlement process. This might reflect a drawback when it comes to confidence building with the dual role of stakeholders in both program and administration roles. The Nam Puoi resettlement process therefore highlights the more complicated political process where drastic change is urgently called for, and where multi-polar management is a necessity. The independent facilitation team proved to be catalytic under such circumstances. But comprehensive facilitation inputs cannot be afforded as routine in village and commune interactions, even if the function is needed. Both Commune and District administrations noted this as a major lesson. And Province administration intended to draw on the experience as a model approach under other programs. The conclusion is that leadership role must be taken on by the Administrations in such a way as to include facilitation. Details are not offered here, but the hope is that the leadership style developed during the resettlement remains, and does not stay a function of the interest of a few leaders that happened to harmonize in time.

(F) Bringing Stakeholder Categories in Tune an Issue for Leadership Facilitation The facilitation of the Nam Puoi resettlement process brought the different stakeholder categories together and mobilized the leadership effectively in the process. From one day to another, Villagers found their resettlement desire within reach. Suddenly they could move fast to a situation that had been utopia over many years. This made them very motivated for interaction with other leadership, once facilitation had broken the ice to open the two-way communication. The independent Facilitation team contributed energy in critical stages by setting up consensus-building around specific problems and their solutions, along with outlining the potential of various development options. This process, with external facilitation, is exceptional and was brought about through the support at Province level by the responsible technical department. The trust given to facilitation in the specific Nam Puoi case helped to penetrate a top-down tradition and open for interaction and communication. The democratic process for decentralization it cannot be

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sustainable without an independent facilitation function in one way or another. This opens for the multi-polar leadership with interaction and communication processes across stakeholder boundaries. Facilitation needs to be combined with, not replacing, technical information in order for interaction processes to be meaningful.

STAKEHOLDERS’ VIEWS ON MULTI-POLAR LEADERSHIP The Nam Puoi experience of multi-polar leadership contrasts with the common-day plight of the poor in this world when encountering state institutions. Narayan et al. (2000:109) conclude on this issue: ―Dysfunctional institutions do not just fail to deliver services – they disempower, and even silence, the poor through patterns of humiliation, exclusion, and corruption. Legal and other formal barriers that prevent the poor from gaining access to benefits or trading further compound the problem. Thus, those at society's margins are further excluded and alienated.‖

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The inhabitants of Nam Puoi, about half of them below the poverty line, seemed to fall in the same category at the onset of the facilitation process; passive, and without an ambition to involve in Commune arrangements for resettling. But with facilitation and its positive interaction this changed. The village poor became highly active to provide such feedback that could improve the local institutions; multi-polar leadership had worked by empowering villagers to join it. This is a response to the general difficulty for political leadership, whether under multi-polar or other formal structures, to break the isolation of poor population strata. The United Nations (2008:4) notes: ―People living in rural areas are further from achieving several of the MDGs in most regions. The rural population is suffering from the cumulative neglect of agriculture over the years, but is also disadvantaged because progress towards several of the MDGs depends on government institutions, services and support, such as schools, health facilities, agricultural extension, and physical infrastructure as well as trade and interchange with others. Such facilities are usually less readily available in rural areas, and much of the rural population remains trapped in their own circle of poverty.‖

Many decentralization projects are designed to break this isolation, such as Chia Se in Vietnam has done. Intention and strategy seem to be in place. The bottleneck is, as for all development change, the process of implementation (Cf. Hjort-af-Ornas 2007). That involves changes in attitudes and expectations among various stakeholders. Even the simplest of cases from resettlement, the Nam Puoi small village with financing in place and inhabitants ready to resettle, stumbled on the barriers indicated in the quote above. The Nam Puoi resettlement in the comparison with most other resettlements is simple: No land conflict except internal strife, no ethnic conflict except internal between two family groups, one small sized village, movement only short distance in group within the own commune (even on village lands), and no pressing sharp time limit for resettlement. Yet, key issues have emerged, concerns known from most resettlement situations. Dealing with them has formed a process with good stakeholder participation and interaction. Facilitation

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managed to set up an interaction process across stakeholder boundaries -- the seemingly simple option – could trust be invested in consensus building mechanisms. The six observations for multi-polar leadership above suggest that initiatives should be locally driven, have an element of improved living standards, offer training to build an experience base, including on how to deal with culture and class differences, develop mutual confidence through interaction and communication, and mobilize facilitation capacity for interaction between different stakeholder categories. The Nam Puoi experience can be seen as a critical test case of how the Vietnamese decentralization policy and grassroots democracy are being implemented. This resettlement project is linked to the Chia Se Poverty Alleviation Program since the target group is the same. The aim is to support local level activities in the poorest communities and encourage villagers‘ involvement through participatory planning and setting up of local development funds. But the natural disaster situation, with decisions that bring profound changes in village life, reaches beyond established local government involvement in the development program. Consequences of mistakes would be drastic and immediate. The multi-polar leadership of this one issue of resettlement can be a drastic case that gives insight into the principles for implementation of the decentralization policy of Vietnam. Actors involved in the Nam Puoi resettlement offer a range of experiences of general value for a democratization process. When policy intentions (decentralization) are turned into action through a facilitated implementation, this wealth of experience is drawn upon for one of the most difficult political issues – that of village resettlement. Reaching the sustainable end result has called for good governance in a sophisticated sense where multi-polar leadership has had to harmonize for the sake of problem solving. Both Villagers and Administrations agree on this. The resettlement project in Nam Puoi was finished after more than half a year of implementation (May – December 2006) with the end result reached everybody‘s satisfaction. Villagers began new lives in new resettlement site. They expressed their satisfaction with the whole voluntary resettlement process, especially with site selection and village formation. The stakeholder involvement had been active for all Villagers. Almost all had felt engaged in discussions and considered that they had expressed their real opinions; 75% of the village inhabitants felt well informed. In particular, the interaction style around the specific issues during the resettlement was much appreciated; as many as 80% felt both that they could give comments and that these comments resulted in adjustments. From the villagers‘ viewpoints the results of the stakeholders‘ interaction was visible. Removal of graves, one major sensitive issue, was solved through a lengthy process in an appreciated manner without potential conflicts. Another one, the process of plot distribution, was done through a lottery system that was felt to be fair by most (78%). Most village inhabitants commented that plot sizes were generally still small but most of them satisfied with the leveling of plots. The application of cement tiles replaced old roofs was broadly appreciated by 74% of villagers. Regarding domestic water, all villagers appreciated response and adjustments for long-term sustainability from Administrations. Administrative leaders at all levels have appreciated the interaction process and realized lessons learnt from that. They were aware of the responsibilities to respond to local initiatives and support them - ―We have learnt to respect and respond to the local people‖. Their views focused on the importance of involvement of local people - ―The project would have failed without the involvement of local people‖. Through the participatory process ―Villagers could

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involve in the decision-making process, influenced by taking their initiative as well as expand their possibilities to benefit from the resettlement‖ (Mr Du, chairman of DPC). Commune leaders learnt the ways of facilitation and interaction with villagers to have better understand Villagers‘ needs. The Nam Puoi resettlement process left all involved stakeholders satisfied with its smooth implementation. The many obstacles and challenges have been overcome as they appeared with great efforts from all stakeholders. The Nam Puoi resettlement had the benefit of independent facilitation to support such a process. This set-up can probably not be replicated under regular budgets with their usually tight cost frames. But with the positive reception summarized above, there is at least great hope that the lessons from the implementation of this one resettlement project remain and that they spill over to other projects, and to other actors.

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REFERENCES Hjort-af-Ornäs, A. (2007). Turning Hydropower Social. Where Global Sustainability Conventions Matter. Springer Verlag. Berlin. Narayan, D., with R Patel, K., Schafft, A. Rademacher, & Koch-Schulte, S. (2000). Voices of the Poor. Can Anyone Hear Us? IBRD/WB. Published by Oxford University Press. New York. Pham Thi Bich Ngoc, A. Hjort-af-Ornas. (2007a). Landslide, Resettlement and Stakeholder Performance- Lesson learnt from Nam Puoi village, Nam Bung, Van Chan, Yen Bai province (English and Vietnamese version). Booklet. Sida in Hanoi. Pham Thi Bich Ngoc, A. Hjort-af-Ornas. June (2007b). A village fearing land slide. Lessons from the voluntary resettlement of Nam Puoi. Newsletter Natural Disaster Mitigation Partnership Vol. 4, 2007. United Nations (2008). The Millennium Development Goals Report 2008. United Nations, New York.

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Chapter 5

JAPAN’S HISTORIC 2009 ELECTIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS 

Weston S. Konishi*

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SUMMARY In a historic landslide victory, on August 30, 2009, Japan‘s largest opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), ousted the main ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), in elections for control over Japan‘s Lower House of parliament. The LDP has had almost continuous control of the Japanese government since 1955 and has been a staunch supporter of the U.S.-Japan alliance throughout the postwar period. The DPJ, which includes a mixture of right- and left-leaning members and is led by Yukio Hatoyama, is now Japan‘s main ruling party. The Diet (Japan‘s parliament) is expected to elect Hatoyama as Japan‘s new prime minister in a special Diet session scheduled to begin on September 16. Since 2007, the DPJ has controlled the less powerful Upper House of the Diet, along with two smaller parties, a coalition that is expected to continue once the DPJ officially takes over the government. The DPJ policy platform advocates sweeping economic and administrative reforms and has called for a ―proactive‖ foreign policy with greater ―independence‖ from the United States through deeper engagement with Asia and a more United Nations-oriented diplomacy. In particular, the party has in the past criticized many issues related to the U.S.-Japan alliance, such as plans to realign U.S. forward deployed forces based in Okinawa, Japan‘s ―Host Nation Support‖ (HNS) payments (worth around $4 billion) that defray much of the costs of American troops and bases in Japan, and the bilateral Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). In 2007, the DPJ briefly blocked legislation allowing the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) to continue the refueling of U.S. and allied vessels engaged in Operation Enduring



This is an edited, reformatted and augmented version of a CRS Report for Congress publication dated September 2009. * Email: [email protected], 7-7525 Political Leadership and its Significance in a Time of Troubles, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. For the United States, the most significant of these issues would be the HNS and base realignment plans. During the campaign for the Lower House elections, the DPJ showed signs of a more pragmatic approach toward the U.S.-Japan alliance in order to deflect LDP criticism that it was not prepared to run the country. The DPJ dropped demands to end the current legislative authorization for the JMSDF refueling mission in the Indian Ocean, and took a slightly more ambiguous position regarding the SOFA and other bilateral alliance management issues. The party‘s call for a U.N. and Asia-oriented diplomacy also appears to fall short of a more strategic shift to replace the U.S.-Japan alliance with an alternative regional security arrangement. Other signs suggest that the party might indirectly support U.S. foreign policy interests over the long-term through enhanced Japanese contributions to U.N.-sanctioned activities, as well as engagement in regional trade institutions and multilateral fora. Nonetheless, the party remains deeply divided on many foreign policy-related issues and continues to send conflicting signals about its overall approach toward the United States. While a political changeover in Tokyo represents a watershed moment for Japan and potentially for U.S.-Japan relations, the extent to which there will be significant policy changes in Tokyo remains uncertain. It is not clear whether some of the DPJ‘s past criticism of the U.S.-Japan alliance and other LDP-backed policies was the result of opposition party politicking or more fundamental policy principles that will be implemented now that the party is coming to power. The DPJ faces daunting political and economic challenges at home that many see as a higher priority for the party than its proposals for adjusting the structure of the U.S.-Japan alliance. This report analyzes the DPJ‘s policy platform and reviews the implications for U.S. strategic and economic interests now that the party and its coalition allies are set to take control of the Japanese government in the wake of the August 30 parliamentary elections.

INTRODUCTION The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) defeated the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in August 30, 2009 elections for the Lower House of parliament. The DPJ won 308 seats, compared to 119 for the LDP in the 480-seat Lower House chamber (see Figure 1 below). The DPJ is now the main ruling party, in coalition with at least two smaller parties, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the People‘s New Party (PNP). Incumbent Prime Minister Taro Aso has announced that he will resign as head of the LDP, effectively ending his premiership, to take responsibility for his party‘s defeat. He will likely be succeeded as prime minister by DPJ party leader Yukio Hatoyama, who is expected to be confirmed as the next prime minister in a special session of parliament scheduled for mid-September. The political changeover in Tokyo could significantly affect U.S. interests and goals in Asia, although most analysts predict the DPJ will not fundamentally alter the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship.1 The DPJ has long called for a more ―independent‖ relationship with the United States and has been critical of aspects of the U.S.-Japan alliance, such as plans to realign U.S. military forces based in Japan, Japan‘s ―Host Nation Support‖ (HNS) payments (worth around $4 1

For an overview of U.S.-Japan relations, see CRS Report RL33436, Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, coordinated by Emma Chanlett-Avery.

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billion) that defray about 75% of the costs of maintaining American troops and bases in Japan, and some provisions of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The party also calls for closer relations with Asia and greater participation in United Nations-mandated activities. Now in power, the DPJ is expected to focus initial attention on sweeping domestic reforms, particularly reforming the political-bureaucratic structure, and on a large-scale stimulus package aimed at transforming Japan‘s struggling economy. Aside from a 10-month period in the early 1990s, the conservative LDP has governed Japan since 1955 as either a stand-alone ruling party or, as is currently the case, in coalition with other parties. Throughout this period, the LDP has been a staunch supporter of the U.S.Japan security treaty and, in recent years, has sought a major expansion of bilateral defense cooperation. The LDP‘s grip on power was significantly weakened in 2007, when the leftleaning DPJ won control of the Upper House of Japan‘s bicameral parliament (known as the Diet) in coalition with the SDP and PNP. The resulting ―twisted Diet‖ was marked by legislative gridlock across a range of domestic and foreign policies. Over the past year, the DPJ has increased its popular support by attacking the LDP‘s handling of the economy, opaque governing style, and unpopular leadership. This strategy increasingly put the LDP on the defensive, and on July 12, 2009, the DPJ defeated the LDP in the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly elections, prompting Prime Minister Aso to dissolve the Lower House on July 21 and schedule nationwide elections. Although the DPJ won a decisive victory over the LDP on August 30 it fell just short of winning a two-thirds supermajority in the Lower House. In Japan‘s parliamentary system, the Lower House can pass legislation over opposition in the weaker Upper House if there is a two-thirds majority of votes. Had the DPJ won a supermajority on its own, it would have had the option of shedding its coalition partners. As it is, the DPJ will maintain the coalition with the leftist Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the anti-reform People‘s New Party (PNP) in order to maintain control of the Upper House of the Diet.2The next Upper House elections are scheduled for July of 2010.

Source: Nikkei Shimbun. Notes: Number of seats in Japan‘s Lower House of parliament as of September 1, 2009. Figure 1. Post-Election Seats in 2009 Lower House of Diet 2

The DPJ may consider adding two other small parties to the coalition. These include the New Party Nippon and New Party Daichi, which both cooperated with the DPJ to overthrow the LDP in the August 30 elections.

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Now that the DPJ is the main ruling party, it will be expected to make good on at least some of its ambitious campaign proposals to ―change Japan.‖ The party is expected to focus initial attention on implementing a number of domestic programs, including an allowance for families with children, a reduction of highway toll charges, and a reorganization of the power structure between politicians and central government bureaucrats. According to DPJ sources and media reports, foreign policy and alliance relations with the United States will not be the immediate focus of the new government. In the run-up to the August 30 election, the DPJ toned down some of its criticism of the bilateral alliance, indicating a potentially more pragmatic approach toward the United States. However, the party remains deeply divided on foreign policy issues and party leaders continue to send conflicting signals about the kind of relationship they seek to strike with the United States over the short and long term.

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DPJ Background The DPJ was formed in 1998 as a merger of four smaller parties and was later joined by a fifth grouping. Several party leaders are former centrist or center-right LDP lawmakers, but many rank-and-file members have a left-of-center political orientation that includes a number of former Socialist Party members. The amalgamated nature of the DPJ has led to considerable internal contradictions, primarily between the left and right wings as well as the pacifists and national security hawks who occupy the party ranks. In particular, the issues of deploying Japanese troops abroad and revising the war-renouncing Article 9 of the Japanese constitution have generated which both cooperated with the DPJ to overthrow the LDP in the August 30 elections. considerable internal debate. As a result, for much of its history, the DPJ had a reputation of failing to agree on coherent alternatives to the policies implemented by the LDP. Additionally, battles between various party leaders have at times weakened the party. Since winning the Upper House in 2007, the party appeared to present a more unified front, at least on the strategy of criticizing LDP policies and offering a more compelling alternative approach to Japanese voters. But it is uncertain whether this greater level of public unity is sustainable now that the DPJ is the ruling party. Leading up to the August 30 Lower House elections, the DPJ had shown greater resilience in overcoming both external political challenges and internal strife. Earlier in the spring of 2009, Prime Minister Aso and the LDP appeared emboldened by a fundraising scandal that engulfed Ichiro Ozawa, a co-founder and then leader of the DPJ. In early May, Ozawa resigned. He was succeeded as DPJ president by former party leader Yukio Hatoyama, an Ozawa backer. Ozawa‘s resignation as party leader was followed by a considerable popular boost for the DPJ. By mid-July, many polls showed the DPJ having double-digit leads over the LDP when voters were asked which party they would support in the Lower House elections. Although Ozawa relinquished his high-profile role in the party, he remained in the DPJ as a behind-the-scenes campaign strategist and top party leader. He is widely credited with recruiting a large number of new party candidates who won in this year‘s landslide Lower House elections, causing many to speculate that Ozawa will continue to wield considerable influence in the intra-party decision-making process.

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The DPJ Policy Agenda Ideological divisions within the DPJ have kept the party from reaching a consensus on foreign policy and national security issues. However, the DPJ platform and other policy statements throughout the years consistently raise the following main themes3:  

 



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

Adopting a more ―assertive‖ foreign policy and enhancing Japan‘s defensecapabilities to better defend against outside threats. Maintaining the U.S.-Japan alliance as the center of Japan‘s national securitypolicy while aiming to achieve a more ―mature‖ alliance partnership with theUnited States. The party has called for a reduction of the approximately 50,000 U.S. forward deployed troops in Japan, particularly those based in Okinawa Prefecture. Maintaining constitutional restrictions on collective self-defense while expanding contributions to international security through UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operations (UNPKO). Improving Japan‘s relations with Asian countries by reconciling historical and territorial disputes, as well as actively promoting regional economic integration through economic partnership agreements (EPA) and free trade agreements(FTA). Supporting the global common good through overseas economic development, environmental conservation, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, humanitarian relief, and other measures.

In the broadest sense, the pacifist/leftist wing of the DPJ adheres to a strict interpretation of Japan‘s ―peace constitution‖ and postwar role as a non-military power. The hawkish/conservative wing of the party, most prominently led by former party head Seiji Maehara, seeks stronger defense capabilities and looser restrictions on Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) missions to support international security. Former party head Ichiro Ozawa has called for Japan to increase its contributions to international security strictly in missions that are authorized by the U.N. Security Council. Yukio Hatoyama, the presumed next prime minister of Japan, appears to support that basic position, although he is said to take a more flexible view of JSDF deployments that are not under direct U.N. mandate.4 The DPJ promotes a reformist domestic agenda for Japan that stresses government decentralization and a broader social safety net for citizens. The party‘s ―Basic Policies‖ and campaign manifestos call for improving transparency, efficiency and accountability in government. One main objective is to bolster the decision-making authority of Japan‘s Cabinet over the powerful bureaucracy, thus reversing the established power dynamic in which many policy decisions rest in the hands of the bureaucrats, not the politicians. Another plan that emerged from the Lower House campaign is the creation of a National Strategy Bureau under the prime minister‘s office that would provide top-down direction over the 3

4

See, for instance, Democratic Party of Japan, Our Basic Philosophy, at http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/ about_us/philosophy.html. The party‘s mainstream members appear to support the provision that foreign JSDF missions should only be carried out under UN mandate. However, hawkish elements of the party believe that such a provision would, in effect, give UN Security Council members such as China and Russia veto power over JSDF overseas operations.

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national budget and other domestic policies. The DPJ believes that a ―regime change‖ in Japan will reduce the influence of vested interests over policymakers and lead to a more dynamic and decentralized nation that is better prepared to handle future challenges. Although the DPJ‘s reform agenda appeals to many Japanese voters, the party is often criticized for lacking details about how it will finance and implement its proposals. This is particularly true of its plans to reform the domestic economy and social welfare system. The party wants to transform Japan‘s highly regulated, export-oriented economy into a deregulated economic system propelled by consumer-led growth. As part of the DPJ‘s twoyear ¥21 trillion ($218 billion) stimulus proposal, household disposable income would be increased through tax cuts and payment transfers.5 Income support for struggling workers, as well as sweeping health-care and pension reforms, are also proposed. The DPJ claims that it will offset the cost of these programs by trimming the national budget and eliminating wasteful spending, but it has been criticized for lacking details about how its programs will be paid for over the long-run. With Japan‘s public sector debt approaching 200% of GDP this year, there are outstanding concerns about the nation‘s long-term budgetary health.

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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES The political changeover in Tokyo following the August 30 elections represents something of a watershed moment for U.S.-Japan relations. Cooperation between Washington and previous LDP-backed governments has been virtually unbroken for much of the postwar period. Many experts believe that the high point of bilateral relations occurred earlier this decade, partly as a result of the close personal rapport between former President George W. Bush and former LDP Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, which set the tone for close working-level coordination between their two governments. In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Koizumi government stated its unequivocal support for the United States and took unprecedented steps to provide rear-area assistance for U.S.-led anti-terror operations in Afghanistan. In 2003, Koizumi dispatched ground and air units of the JSDF to contribute to humanitarian reconstruction efforts in Iraq. These measures were followed by major bilateral agreements in 2005 and 2006 to ―transform‖ the U.S.-Japan alliance in order to meet emerging security challenges.6The DPJ has often expressed skepticism, and at times outright opposition, to many of these bilateral security initiatives, giving rise to questions among many U.S.-based experts as to the potential impact a DPJ government might have on the U.S.-Japan alliance. These concerns are compounded by a relative lack of familiarity between DPJ leaders and counterparts in the United States, although interaction between both sides has increased in the months leading up to this year‘s Lower House elections.7 A review of stated DPJ foreign policy positions indicates some areas of concern for U.S. interests, but

5

Democratic Party of Japan, ―‗Economic and Financial Crisis Measures‘: Opening up a Path Towards the Future by ‗Putting People‘s Lives First,‘‖ November 5, 2008, http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/financial/f_crisis.html For more on the alliance transformation, see CRS Report RL33740, The Changing U.S.-Japan Alliance: Implications for U.S. Interests, by Emma Chanlett-Avery and Weston S. Konishi. 7 Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton met with Ichiro Ozawa and other DPJ leaders during her trip to Tokyo in February 2009. This was followed by high-level meetings between U.S. officials and party leaders in subsequent months. 6

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does not rule out potential avenues for enhanced bilateral cooperation with the incoming DPJled government. DPJ Foreign Policy Goals

DPJ FOREIGN POLICY GOALS     

Develop proactive foreign policy strategies and build a close and equal Japan-U.S. alliance. Establish intra-regional cooperative mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific region with the aim of building an East Asian Community. Ensure that North Korea halts development of nuclear weapons and missiles, and makes every effort to resolve the abduction issue. Play a proactive role in UN peacekeeping operations, liberalization of trade and investment, and the fight against global warming. Take the lead to eradicate nuclear weapons, and remove the threat of terrorism.

Source: 2009 DPJ Manifesto

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The DPJ Position on the U.S.-Japan Alliance The DPJ has often sent conflicting signals about its approach toward the U.S.-Japan alliance—a result of intra-party ideological divisions, past attempts to differentiate itself from the LDP, and episodic statements about the alliance by party leaders. The party‘s acknowledgment of the bilateral alliance as the center of Japanese national security policy is a tacit endorsement of the U.S. alliance system. However, the DPJ has not provided a clearer definitional explanation of what a more ―independent‖ and ―equal‖ alliance relationship with the United States actually signifies. Although these statements do not advocate a strategic disengagement from the United States, at the very least, they suggest apprehension concerning perceived inequities in the alliance structure. Some analysts interpret the DPJ‘s call for greater independence as a desire to avoid Japanese entanglement in the U.S. global strategy, especially in activities that may involve financial or military contributions to U.S.led operations.8 The party sharply denounced former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi for supporting the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, in what it saw as Japanese cooperation with ―unilateralist‖ U.S. policies.9 Another interpretation of independence, as offered by some DPJ officials, is a desire for Japan to take greater initiative in international affairs, as opposed to merely reacting to policy directions from Washington. Nonetheless, past legislative actions and policy statements by the DPJ demonstrate the party‘s opposition to certain alliance management issues and U.S.-led military operations. Specifically, the party has in the past:

8

9

See Leif-Eric Easley, Tetsuo Kotani and Aki Mori, ―Electing a New Japanese Security Policy?: Examining Foreign Policy Visions within the Democratic Party of Japan,‖ Asia Policy, January 2009 (advance copy). The authors further contend that ―A DPJ government will maintain the [U.S.-Japan] alliance, but may revise down the LDP goal of a global security partnership, limiting the scope of the alliance to Japan‘s defense and regional stability.‖ Democratic Party of Japan. DPJ Present Position on the Iraqi Issue, February 14, 2003, http://www.dpj.or.jp/ english/news/030224/02.html

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

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

Opposed the February 2009 U.S.-Japan Guam accord that pledges to implement the transfer of 8,000 U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam. In April 2009, theDPJ-led Upper House voted against the accord (it was eventually passed by themore powerful Lower House). The DPJ opposed the associated relocation of U.S.Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to Nago, instead calling for the air station tobe moved ―outside‖ of Okinawa. Defeated implementing legislation in the Upper House that temporarilysuspended, in November 2007, the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)deployment to the Indian Ocean to refuel coalition ships involved in OperationEnduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. Promised a ―drastic‖ review of Tokyo‘s estimated $4 billion per year Host NationSupport (HNS) for U.S. forces stationed in Japan. Proposed comprehensive revisions to the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement(SOFA) in order to make the alliance more ―equal.‖

DPJ leaders have also, at times, made remarks that cast doubt about their commitment to the alliance. In February 2009, Ichiro Ozawa sparked controversy when he told reporters that Japan should seek an ―equal‖ alliance with the United States by reducing the U.S. force presence in Japan to all but the U.S. 7th Fleet, based in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture. The remark was widely interpreted as advocating the withdrawal of the thousands of other U.S. military personnel based in Okinawa and other parts of Japan. Ozawa later modified his statement by suggesting that U.S. forces in Japan should only be drawn down as the SDF shoulders greater responsibilities for defending the homeland against outside threats.10 Despite these concerns, many of the DPJ‘s past objections to the bilateral alliance have been viewed as opposition to LDP policies rather than anti-U.S. positions per se. As the party campaigned to broaden its support base prior to the Lower House elections, the DPJ appeared to moderate some aspects of its message on the United States, although it still sent conflicting signals about key alliance issues. In mid-July, DPJ President Hatoyama announced that he would not seek to end the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law that authorizes the MSDF refueling mission in the Indian Ocean before the bill expires in January 2010. The DPJ had previously promised to terminate the mission at the earliest opportunity.11The party also toned down its demands to ―drastically‖ revise the current SOFA and HNS agreements with the United States, instead proposing a more ambiguous review of the bilateral agreements in its campaign manifesto. As the party transitions to take control of the government, it has left many questions about whether, and to what extent, it plans to change Japan‘s relations with the United States.12

10

Sneider, Daniel, ―Ozawa in his own words,‖ The Oriental Economist, June 2009. In contrast to the 2007 DPJ Manifesto, which firmly states the party‘s opposition to the Indian Ocean mission, the 2009 Manifesto makes no mention of the operation. Many experts still do not expect the DPJ to renew the Indian Ocean refueling bill after the law expires next year. 12 In a controversial article published in English a few days before the Lower House elections, Yukio Hatoyama railed against ―U.S.-led globalism‖ and appeared to some observers to minimize the importance of the U.S.Japan alliance. See http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/27/opinion/27iht-edhatoyama.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq= hatoyama &st=cse. 11

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Other Implications for U.S. Interests

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As a way of asserting greater independence in foreign policymaking, some elements in the DPJ call for a UN-centered diplomacy and closer ties with Asia. Although this shift could ostensibly reposition Japanese diplomacy away from the United States, it may not necessarily portend a divergence from broader U.S. goals and interests over the long-term. The DPJ, at least in rhetoric, supports a more active international role for Japan through United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPKO) and other UN-sanctioned activities that are largely consonant with U.S. foreign policy goals and interests. The DPJ‘s position on foreign deployments was put to test during the last Diet session (ending on July 21), when the Aso Cabinet introduced two new bills that would allow Japanese Coast Guard and MSDF vessels to take part in overseas anti-piracy and interdiction operations sanctioned by the UN Security Council.13Although the DPJ ultimately opposed both bills due to domestic political considerations, the measures caused considerable debate between conservative and liberal wings of the party. In the end, the party qualified its opposition to the bills by agreeing in principle to the purpose and legitimacy of the UNsanctioned operations.14 Some experts believe that the DPJ will vote to approve similar measures once it becomes the main governing party of Japan.15

Afghanistan There has been considerable debate within the DPJ on enhancing Japan‘s role in the stabilization of Afghanistan. The party has publicly opposed Japan‘s involvement in the U.S.led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), since the U.N. Security Council has not explicitly sanctioned the operation. However, Ichiro Ozawa and other party members have advocated dispatching SDF troops for peace-building operations in Afghanistan as long as the mission operates under the UN-mandated International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF). Ozawa‘s resignation as party president this spring appears to have set back momentum for the proposal within the party. The DPJ‘s 2009 ―Policy Index‖ (a detailed blueprint for the party‘s campaign manifesto) drops any direct mention of Afghanistan, instead promising that Japan will play an active role in reconstructing impoverished states that are breeding grounds for terrorist activities. There are signs, however, that the party leadership is considering alternative proposals for on-the-ground assistance in Afghanistan, such as vocational training programs and other non-combat reconstruction efforts.

13

One bill, which was eventually passed in the Lower House, permits Japanese Coast Guard and MSDF vessels to engage in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and other international waters. The other bill, which was not voted on, was to approve Japan‘s participation in enforcing UN Security Council Resolution 1874, calling for member states to inspect the cargo of North Korean vessels suspected of shipping illicit weapons. Hawkish members of the DPJ, including Akihisa Nagashima and Seiji Maehara, were early proponents of the bills, but were outnumbered by party members who opposed the measures. 14 See, for instance, ―Anti-piracy legislation rejected by Upper House,‖ June 19, 2009 at http://www.dpj.or.jp/ english/news/index.html?num=16326. 15 The Yomiuri Shimbun reports on September 2, 2009, that the DPJ, as one of its first pieces of legislation as main ruling party, is planning to introduce a bill permitting Japanese inspections of North Korean cargo ships in line with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874. See http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/ 20090902TDY02311.htm.

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Regional Diplomacy Interest in increasing Japan‘s participation in Asian regional institutions and other initiatives to enhance regional cooperation is another indication of the DPJ‘s desire for a more independent relationship from the United States. The party‘s call for Japan to become a full ―member of Asia‖ suggests a departure from what the DPJ has characterized as the LDP‘s over-emphasis on relations with the United States, but appears to fall short of a more strategic shift to replace the U.S.-Japan alliance with an alternative regional security arrangement. Instead, the party views Japan‘s role in helping to create an ―East Asian Community‖ as an opportunity to assert leadership outside the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance.16 DPJ leaders have emphasized that regional institutions also provide a multilateral framework for engaging China and managing its rising influence on the world stage. It should be acknowledged that even under LDP rule, Japan has long been an active participant in all of the major regional fora, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and the East Asia Summit. Exactly how the DPJ intends to alter the character of Japan‘s participation in these regional meetings is not clear. Despite the DPJ‘s stated interest in greater policy independence from the United States, its emphasis on enhanced regional relations largely complements U.S. policies for maintaining peace and stability in East Asia. In particular, the party proposes stronger ties with China and South Korea through deeper economic integration and enhanced diplomatic engagement. It advocates ―constructive dialogue‖ to resolve contentious territorial disputes with the two mainland countries.17The DPJ also believes it can restore trust with its neighbors by admitting to Japanese aggression during World War II. Party leaders vow not to make official visits to Yasukuni Shrine, where 14 Class-A war criminals from the World War II era are honored. Past visits to the shrine by LDP prime ministers have triggered sharp reactions from Beijing and Seoul that have raised concerns in Washington about tension in the region. North Korea (DPRK) While it was the main opposition party, the DPJ was reluctant to criticize the LDP‘s hardline approach toward North Korea due to public outrage at Pyongyang. North Korea‘s abduction of Japanese nationals in the 1970s and early 1980s and repeated acts of nuclear brinkmanship have become politically charged issues in Japan—often restricting Tokyo‘s options for negotiating with North Korea. The DPJ, in turn, has strongly condemned recent North Korean nuclear tests and missile launches, and supports Japan‘s cooperation with the United States and other nations in the Six-Party Talks aimed at denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. Following North Korea‘s May 2009 nuclear test, the DPJ issued a statement in support of UN Security Council Resolution 1874, which authorizes strict new sanctions against the regime.18 In June, DPJ President Yukio Hatoyama told reporters that he supported the possible reinstatement of North Korea to the U.S. State Department‘s list of state sponsors of terrorism as punishment for Pyongyang‘s recent provocations. North Korea was removed

16

It is uncertain whether the party, as a whole, envisions U.S. inclusion in a potential East Asian Community. Japan has ongoing disputes with South Korea on sovereignty over the Takeshima islands (known as Dokdo islands in Korean), and with China on the Senkaku islands (or Diaoyutai islands in Chinese) and areas in the East China Sea. 18 Democratic Party of Japan, ―Statement on approval of new UN Security Council resolution against North Korea,‖ June 13, 2009 at http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/news/index.html?num=16239 17

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from the list in October 2008, after agreeing at the time to allow inspections of its nuclear facilities and take other actions toward denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.

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Climate Change The DPJ‘s relatively progressive policy agenda in other areas also parallels some of the Obama Administration‘s global initiatives. One such area is the effort to prevent global warming, one of the party‘s core agenda items. The party‘s 2009 Manifesto calls on Japan to take a leadership role in environmental diplomacy and to encourage the United States and other ―major emitter nations‖ to concede to new emissions standards under a post-Kyoto protocol framework. Among other measures called for in the Manifesto, the party proposes to reduce Japan‘s greenhouse gas emissions to 25% below 1990 levels by 2020, and to introduce a U.S.-style cap-and-trade system for domestic industrial polluters. As with previous LDP governments, the DPJ-led government would likely welcome the Obama Administration‘s expected support for more ambitious international action on climate change in preparation for the UN climate change conference in Copenhagen this December. Nuclear Issues The DPJ and the Obama Administration share overlapping core principles on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, although with important differences. The party has made clear its staunch support for Japan‘s long-held Three Non-Nuclear Principles: not to possess, produce, or transit nuclear weapons on Japanese territory. President Obama‘s April 2009 speech in Prague on a ―nuclear-free world‖ was seen by the DPJ as a rallying call for Japan to take a leading role in strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).19The DPJ‘s rigid adherence to nuclear disarmament principles, however, differs from U.S. policies that allow for some flexibility, such as the 2005 atomic energy agreement between India and the United States.20Further, several party leaders, including Katsuya Okada and Yoshio Hachiro, advocate a ―nuclear-free zone‖ in Northeast Asia that to some extent contradicts Japan‘s reliance on the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent.21The recent disclosure of a secret agreement between Tokyo and Washington allowing U.S. nuclear-armed vessels into Japanese ports, in violation of Japan‘s Three Non-Nuclear Principles, has focused media attention on the DPJ‘s response to the issue as it maneuvers to take control of the government.22 It remains to be seen whether some members of the DPJ will modify their position on nuclear arms to accommodate the U.S. nuclear umbrella in light of the North Korean nuclear program and other regional security threats. Economic Policies The DPJ‘s economic policy offers possibilities for cooperation as well as potential conflict with U.S. interests. The party‘s ¥21 trillion ($218 billion) stimulus plan and emphasis on a consumer-oriented economy parallel the Obama Administration‘s effort to encourage 19

See the 2009 DPJ Policy Index (in Japanese) at http://www.dpj.or.jp/policy/manifesto/seisaku2009/index.html. The DPJ Policy Index asserts that the U.S.-India nuclear agreement sends ―the wrong message‖ to states, such as Iran and North Korea, that pursue nuclear programs outside the conventions of the NPT. 21 Hachiro was previously named the ―shadow foreign minister‖ in a hypothetical DPJ Cabinet lineup, although the actual Cabinet ministers may now change. Media reports in early September state that Okada, known as a defense dove, has been chosen to head the foreign ministry. 22 See ―DPJ gov‘t an opportunity for Japan to step out from U.S. skirts,‖ The Mainichi Daily News, July 25, 2009. 20

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foreign governments to support recovery from the global financial crisis through expanded public spending and policies that encourage domestic consumption. In that vein, it is possible that the DPJ‘s plan to shift Japan away from an export-driven economy by supporting household demand might boost imports of U.S. goods and services—especially if it is accompanied by the deregulation that the DPJ has, at times, suggested it would pursue. In the past, the DPJ has largely supported a free-trade agenda, although the party is increasingly cognizant of protecting domestic agriculture and labor interests. The party has previously called for Japan to pursue bilateral economic partnership agreements (EPA) and free trade agreements (FTA), as well as promote global trade and investment through the successful conclusion of World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Round negotiations. In what was widely considered a cooperative gesture toward the United States, the 2009 party Manifesto calls for the creation of a U.S.-Japan Free Trade Agreement.23 It is not clear, however, that the DPJ would be prepared to consider the kinds of liberalization in sensitive agricultural sectors that would likely be required to negotiate an FTA with the United States. Indeed, several aspects of the DPJ economic policy agenda indicate potentially troubling signs for U.S. commercial interests. As the party has expanded its voter support base from urban to rural districts, agriculture policies that protect domestic farming interests have become an increasingly prominent feature of the party platform. Tokyo‘s long-held protection of the agriculture sector is widely acknowledged as a major impediment to Japan‘s ability to play a more constructive role in multilateral trade negotiations, including the ongoing WTO Doha Round. Of particular concern to U.S. food exporters is the DPJ‘s call for severe restrictions on U.S. beef imports in response to Japan‘s BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, otherwise known as ―mad cow disease‖) scare. In the past, the party has called for a complete ban on U.S. beef imports as well as strict inspection laws that may continue to restrict future U.S. beef sales in Japan.

Post-Election Prospects The implications of the DPJ‘s victory in the Lower House elections are wide-ranging and significant. At the very least, the political turnover in Tokyo has broken the half-century of near continuous LDP rule and has to some degree changed the face of Japan‘s political class—the elections increased the total number of female lawmakers in the Lower House from 43 to 54 (11.25% of the chamber) and brought in 158 first-time lawmakers from all parties to the chamber. But the DPJ‘s ability to implement its campaign promise of ―regime change‖ and other reforms is likely to encounter several challenges. Many experts believe that the structural realities of the Japanese political system will force the DPJ to compromise on many of its boldest proposals. Regardless of the DPJ‘s overwhelming victory, it must continue to depend on a coalition with the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the People‘s New Party (PNP) to control the Upper House of the Diet. The leftist SDP and the anti-reform PNP will likely exert some influence on DPJ decision-making—further stretching the already fragmented party in opposite ideological directions—although far less so now that it has gained an overwhelming majority of seats in the Lower House. The LDP and New Komeito coalition, now in the 23

See the DPJ‘s 2009 party Manifesto at http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto/manifesto.html. In response to criticism from domestic agriculture interests, the party revised the Manifesto to tone down the promise of concluding a FTA with the United States, instead suggesting that it will pursue talks on a bilateral trade agreement with Washington.

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opposition, is severely weakened but may regroup to mount a significant challenge to DPJ-led policies and legislation.24 Several key developments will be of importance for U.S. policymakers to monitor in the near- to mid-term. The first is the immediate transition of power from the LDP- to DPJ-led government and other related issues. Top DPJ officials have reportedly met with LDP counterparts to coordinate the transition, and the DPJ is in the final stage of discussions with leaders of the SDP and PNP to solidify their participation in a coalition government. According to Japanese media reports, Hatoyama has begun making initial selections of key party posts and Cabinet positions. The DPJ‘s strong showing in the August 30 elections gives Hatoyama relatively free rein to select a Cabinet without significant input from the SDP or PNP, the DPJ‘s probable coalition partners. The still unconfirmed Cabinet lineup includes several top party members with ruling party experience such as Naoto Kan (the likely state strategy minister and deputy prime minister), Hirohisa Fujii (finance minister), and Katsuya Okada (foreign minister).25The Cabinet will be officially formed in mid-September, when a special session of the Diet will be called (September 16-19) to vote on Hatoyama‘s presumed appointment as prime minister. A related issue involves Ichiro Ozawa‘s role in the party. Ozawa was instrumental in recruiting many members of the incoming class of DPJ lawmakers and was the mastermind in orchestrating the party‘s eventual accession to power. Due to health reasons, he was ruled out as a contender for the premiership or as a possible Cabinet minister. According to reports, Ozawa has been named the DPJ secretary general and will remain a behind-the-scenes player and principal campaign strategist in preparation for next year‘s Upper House elections, which are likely to be held by July 2010.26 A second important trend to monitor is party cohesion over the mid- to long-term. The otherwise deeply divided DPJ, it is generally believed, was united by a common objection to the LDP and its policies. With the victory over the LDP, opposition to the ruling coalition is no longer a unifying factor for the DPJ. The party leadership may be challenged to maintain party cohesion beyond the Lower House elections and through future legislative battles in the Diet. A great deal may depend on whether party leader and presumed next prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama, will be able to command loyalty among the party‘s ideologically diverse rank-and-file, while also managing a disjointed coalition with the SDP and PNP. It also remains to be seen whether Ozawa and his numerous followers in the Diet will remain part of the mainstream DPJ or will congeal into a faction that leads to deeper intra-party divisions. Of primary concern to U.S. policymakers will be the DPJ-led government‘s eventual position on the U.S.-Japan alliance—somewhat of an open question given the party‘s inconsistent signals on the bilateral alliance. Although party leaders make a point of highlighting the centrality of the alliance with the United States, they continue to criticize many aspects of the bilateral security arrangement. Analysts believe that the DPJ-led government will put off addressing alliance-related issues to focus initial attention on 24

Many prominent members of the LDP and Komeito lost their seats in the August 30 elections, raising questions about who will lead the respective parties back to strength. The LDP will hold an internal vote on September 28 to elect a new party chief. 25 ―DPJ heavyweights set for key posts,‖ Asahi Shimbun, September 7, 2009. 26 See ―Election 2009/ DPJ prepares for government/ Top brass discuss Cabinet makeup; Hatoyama woos SDPJ, PNP,‖ The Daily Yomiuri, September 1, 2009. For more on Ozawa, see Tobias Harris, ―Japan‘s New Shadow Shogun,‖ Foreign Policy, August 27, 2009.

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economic and administrative reforms.27 U.S. officials will nevertheless closely monitor DPJ policies regarding the following key alliance issues: 

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 

Base realignment plans, including the relocation of Futenma and implementationof the Guam accord. Under the current agreement, the Futenma relocation must precede the transfer of U.S. Marines to Guam. Host Nation Support (HNS) and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Renewal of the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law permitting MSDF refueling missions in the Indian Ocean after the law expires in January 2010.

The DPJ‘s handling of the Japanese economy, still one of the world‘s largest, is also a major concern to U.S. policymakers, as with Japanese voters. Japan is in the midst of its worst recession since the end of the Second World War, and its GDP is expected to shrink by 6.2% this year.28Now in power, the DPJ‘s ¥21 trillion stimulus package will be put to the test, including the promise to raise household disposable income and shift the economy to rely more on domestic consumption—all while setting out a medium and long-term strategy to slow the growth of Japan‘s burgeoning public sector debt. Combined with the costs associated with Japan‘s aging society, public sector debt would present additional challenges to the Japanese system if left unchecked. Japan‘s trade policy may also be a concern if the DPJ government implements its recent proposals to explore new free trade agreements with the United States and other countries, or whether it reverts to protectionist policies that shield certain domestic sectors from foreign competition. Finally, a significant benchmark for the DPJ government will be its ability to carry out major administrative reforms, including its plan to overhaul the political-bureaucratic power structure in Japan. Although it is widely agreed that this structure needs to be replaced by a more effective system, the DPJ will need to carry out administrative reforms in a way that does not ultimately damage Japan‘s governing institutions. Indeed, even if a dramatic transformation of the government is achieved, the DPJ will still require cooperation from the bureaucracy to implement policies. Striking the right balance between reform and restraint will be an important test of the new government‘s ability to manage Japan for the first time in history.

CONCLUSION The political changeover in Japan requires the United States to cooperate with a new and largely unfamiliar government in Tokyo. Several upcoming high-level events, such as the opening session of the U.N. General Assembly and the G20 summit, both in September, and a planned U.S.-Japan bilateral summit in Tokyo this November, may present President Obama with multiple opportunities to interact with the new Japanese prime minister in the coming months. It remains to be seen whether the two leaders will see eye to eye on strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance and enhancing bilateral cooperation to confront a range of global challenges. In a statement released shortly after the August 30 Lower House elections, the 27 28

Watanabe, Tsuneo, ―A Watershed Election and Its Policy Implications,‖ The Tokyo Foundation, July 24, 2009. Economist Intelligence Unit, Japan Country Report, August 2009.

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White House stated its confidence that the close partnership between Japan and the United States will continue to flourish under the new leadership in Tokyo.29

APPENDIX. UPCOMING EVENTS August 30, 2009 September 16-19, 2009

September 23, 2009 September 24-25, 2009 September 28, 2009 October 2009 November 2009

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January 2010 July 2010 November 2010

DPJ defeats LDP in Lower House elections to become Japan‘s main ruling party Current prime minister Taro Aso to resign; special session of the Diet to convene to elect new Japanese prime minister and Cabinet Japanese prime minister to attend start of U.N. General Assembly debate in New York (tentative) Japanese prime minister to attend G20 summit in Pittsburgh (tentative) LDP scheduled to elect new party chief to succeed former Prime Minister Taro Aso Extraordinary Diet session (tentative) President Obama scheduled to visit Japan for bilateral summit with Japanese leader Regular Diet session Japanese Upper House elections to be held by July 2010 Japan to host 2010 APEC summit in Yokohama, Japan

29

See ―Statement by the Press Secretary on Parliamentary Elections in Japan,‖ The White House, August 30, 2009.

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In: Political Leadership and its Significance in a Time… ISBN: 978-1-61668-396-2 Editor: Anna L. Larsen © 2011 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 6

IRAN’S 2009 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS



Casey L. Addis*

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SUMMARY On June 12, 2009, following a heated campaign between reformist candidate Mir Hussein Musavi and incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iranians turned out in record numbers to vote in the presidential election. Shortly after the polls closed, the Interior Minister announced that President Ahmadinejad had been reelected by a 62% margin. The announcement was followed by allegations of vote rigging and election fraud and prompted supporters of leading reformist candidate Mir Hussein Musavi and others to hold public demonstrations in several major cities of a size and intensity unprecedented since the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Despite a government ban on unauthorized public gatherings, protests reportedly have continued since the election. Restrictions on foreign and domestic journalists, reported disruptions of mobile phone networks, limited accessibility of some internet sites, mass arrests, and clashes between civilian protestors and Basij forces have garnered international attention and increased concerns about the Iranian government‘s apparent disregard for human rights and basic civil liberties. Regardless of the actual election results, the Supreme Leader Khamenei, along with the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij, appear determined to impose the election outcome by force. The government crackdown on protestors appears to be effective, even as smaller gatherings have continued in Tehran and other major cities. Attention has now focused on the potential long-term effects of the post-election unrest on Iranian government and society, and what the outcome might mean for U.S. efforts to resolve the issues of Iran‘s nuclear program, its support for terrorism, and other national security concerns. The Obama Administration‘s response has been cautious, but somewhat has hardened as reports of deaths, injuries, and mass arrests of Iranian citizens have increased. Many 

This is an edited, reformatted and augmented version of a CRS Report for Congress publication dated July 2009. Email: [email protected], 7-0846

*

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observers believe that President Obama is attempting to balance the need to condemn the violence against the protestors with the need to avoid the perception of U.S. interference, which some worry could prompt the Iranian government to clamp down further on freedom of expression or jeopardize U.S. efforts to engage Iran on the issue of its nuclear program. For more information and background on Iran, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman.

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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS On June 29, the Guardian Council confirmed the validity of the election outcome despite ongoing complaints of irregularities from reformist candidates Mir Hussein Musavi and Mehdi Karrubi. In its official letter to the Interior Minister, the Council acknowledged ―minor violations that happen in every election and can be ignored,‖ but insisted that, after a recount of a randomly selected 10% of the votes, the results were valid.1 Musavi, along with Karrubi and former President Mohammad Khatami have continued to reject the election results, and Musavi has called for ―independent arbitration‖ of the election disputes.2 Meanwhile, the government continues its crackdown on protestors in Tehran and elsewhere and continues to level accusations of ―foreign interference‖ in Iran‘s domestic affairs by Great Britain and other Western countries. On June 28, nine local staff members of the British embassy in Tehran were reportedly arrested for ―inflaming post-election tensions in Iran.‖3 In response, EU nations on July 3 summoned Iranian ambassadors and threatened to withdraw their ambassadors from Tehran if the employees were not released.4 Since then, eight of the nine employees detained have reportedly been released, but one remains in custody.Senior Iranian cleric Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati announced during Friday prayers on July 3 that the remaining embassy staffers in custody would ―inevitably be tried as they have made confessions.‖5 Many observers view this move as part of an ongoing campaign by the Iranian government to blame the postelection protests on the West, and to use allegations of foreign interference to distract from the government‘s use of force against the demonstrators. Supreme Leader Khamenei along with the military apparatus of the state appears willing and capable, at this point, of imposing the election outcome by force. While smaller protests have continued since the June 20 crackdown, most observers agree that Musavi and his supporters, at least in the short-run, cannot maintain their momentum as long as the Revolutionary Guard and Basij are deployed to stop demonstrations. Many analysts have

1

U.S. Open Source Center Document IAP20090629950144, ―Iran: Guardian Council Approves Polls Despite ‗Minor Violations,‘‖ Tehran Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1 in Persian, June 29, 2009. 2 U.S. Open Source Center Documents IAP20090628950063, ―Iran: Musavi Wants Election Dispute Referred toIndependent Arbitration,‖ Tehran Qalam in Persian, June 27, 2009 andFEA20090702866255, ―Iran: ReformistsReaffirm Rejection of Election, Security Crackdown,‖ OSC Feature, July 2, 2009. 3 U.S. Open Source Center Document IAP20090628950012, ―Local Staff of British Embassy in Iran said Arrested,‖Tehran Press TV Online in English, June 28, 2009. 4 U.S. Open Source Center Document EUP20090703102001, ―EU Nations Summon Iranian Ambassadors Over BritishEmbassy Detentions,‖ Paris AFP (North European Service), July 3, 2009. 5 U.S. Open Source Center Document IAP20090704950095, ―MP: Iran Will Not Drop Charges Against Local Staff ofBritish Embassy,‖ Tehran Fars News Agency, July 4, 2009.

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turned their attention to the possible long-term implications of the post-election unrest on both the government of Iran and Iranian society. Following the Guardian Council‘s announcement on June 29, fissures in the Iranian government appeared to surface, particularly within the clerical establishment. Initial speculation about tension within the government centered around Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who has in the past clashed with Khamenei and who initially was silent on postelection events. On June 29, however, Rafsanjani reportedly accepted the outcome of the election review and praised the Supreme Leader for extending the time allowed for the investigation.6 While some observers view Rafsanjani‘s statement as an expression of support for Khamenei and an Ahmadinejad presidency, others suspect that Rafsanjani is acting out of his own self-interest, and is supporting the Guardian Council‘s decision to preserve his own political standing and protect himself and his family from possible action against them.7 More recently, attention has focused on the holy city of Qom, where two prominent clerical groups have expressed opposing viewpoints on the election outcome. The Association of Researchers and Teachers of Qom Seminary expressed their disapproval of the Guardian Council‘s decision and urged the judiciary to release all detainees and arrest those responsible for ―beating, death, and damage.‖8While some analysts perceive that the religious establishment is beginning to split, others downplay the statements of this group, citing that the most powerful and influential group, the Society of Scholars of Qom Seminary, has congratulated Ahmadinejad on his reelection and accepted the ruling of the Guardian Council.9

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IRAN’S 2009 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION The reported outcome of the June 12, 2009 presidential election in Iran prompted public demonstrations in several major cities of a size and intensity unprecedented since the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The announcement that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was reelected by a 62% margin was followed by allegations of vote rigging and election fraud. Supporters of leading reformist candidate Mir Hussein Musavi and others staged large protests in the streets of Tehran and other major cities that have drawn international attention. The actions taken by the Iranian government in the hours following the election, ongoing demonstrations, arrests, and clashes between civilians and Iran‘s paramilitary Basij forces have led some observers to argue that Iran‘s political dynamics have shifted considerably, and that the relationship between the government of the Islamic Republic and its citizens has been fundamentally shaken. While some analysts have speculated about military coups, color revolutions, and the future of the Iranian regime, others have reserved judgment about the likelihood of various potential short term developments because of the unpredictability inherent in this dynamic situation. Iran‘s institutions and centralized decision making are 6

7

8

9

U.S. Open Source Center Document IAP20090629950042, ―Rafsanjani Terms Unrest in Iran Plot by Secretive Elements,‖ Tehran Fars News Agency, June 29, 2009. On June 21, 2009, five members of Rafsanjani‘s family, including his daughter, were arrested but have since beenreleased. See also, ―Iran: Silence Highlights Regime Divisions,‖ Oxford Analytica, June 29, 2009. U.S. Open Source Center Document IAP20090705950142, ―Iranian Clerics Protest Against Election Result,‖ AdvarNews in Persian, July 4, 2009. Ibid. See also, U.S. Open Source Center Document EUP20090705167008, ―Two Clerical Bodies in Iran‘s Qom atLoggerheads Over Election Results,‖ London FT.com, July 5, 2009.

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opaque and the United States has not had a diplomatic presence in Iran since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, further limiting its understanding of the Iranian system. Outside observation and analysis is further hampered by the fact that the Iranian government has restricted access to foreign and domestic journalists and interrupted the availability of mobile phone service and various internet sites and services. The long term effects of the election and its aftermath on Iran‘s political system and social contract are difficult to foresee. Short term, it appears that government has decided to impose the election outcome by force. As a result, many analysts agree that the events surrounding the 2009 Iranian presidential elections and aftermath have upset the balance between the official and civil spheres of Iranian society and will have long term implications for both the government and thepeople of Iran and for U.S. policy.10

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CANDIDATES AND CAMPAIGNS In 2009, nearly 500 candidates for Iran‘s presidency filed their candidacy with the Guardian Council.11 On May 20, 2009, the council announced that four candidates had been approved: incumbent president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, conservative Mohsen Reza‘i, reformist Mir Hussein Musavi, and reformist Mehdi Karrubi. Social and political restrictions are often eased in Tehran during campaign season, but observers remarked that public activity this year was notably more energetic than would be expected. Some attribute this shift to the four years of crackdowns on social freedoms that have characterized President Ahmadinejad‘s term in office.12 Others attribute the pre-election atmosphere to increased public tension between the candidates in the days leading up to the election, when the campaign became increasingly acrimonious. During the week of June 3, 2009, the candidates participated in six live debates. The debate between incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and reformist candidate Mir Hussein Musavi was particularly heated, most notably because of Ahmadinejad‘s open criticism of Musavi‘s wife, Zahra Rahnavard.13The debates offered the public an opportunity to observe fierce exchanges between the candidates for the first time in a presidential election and reportedly were watched by 40 to 50 million viewers, according to Iranian media reports.14 On June 9, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former president who now heads two powerful oversight bodies, issued an open letter complaining about the silence of Khamenei following the ―insults, lies, and false allegations‖ by Ahmadinejad during the campaign 10

11

12

13

14

For more information and background on Iran, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman. The Guardian Council is a 14-member body appointed by the supreme leader and responsible for overseeingelections, among other things. U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Document IAP2009061295001, ―Editorial Says Entire Nation Will Win WithMusavi Victory In Iran‘s Election,‖ E‟temad Online, June 10, 2009. See also Robert F. Worth, ―In Iran, Harsh Talk asElection Nears,‖ New York Times, June 8, 2009. Musavi‘s wife, Zahra Rahnavard, a political scientist and former chancellor of Alzahra University in Tehran, played a visible role in his campaign and garnered much support from female voters, an unconventional role in Iranian politicsas wives of candidates have not in the past appeared at campaign events. U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Document FEA20090610861590 ―Iranian Election TV Debates Signal MoreBalanced Coverage,‖ BBC Monitoring, June 10, 2009.

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debates.15 It is rare in Iran for senior leaders to publicly criticize the supreme leader and many observers viewed the letter as a reflection of the intensity of the campaigns. Others perceive that Rafsanjani, who is often at odds with the Khamenei and lost the 2005 presidential race to Ahmadinejad, may be interested in forming an alternate power center in the government. Rafsanjani later accepted the election results, perhaps out of political self-interest. Musavi appeared to experience a surge in public support in the final days of the campaign. The night before the election, on June 11, Musavi supporters reportedly formed a human chain on a main thoroughfare through Tehran.16The mass rally prompted some analysts and observers to speculate that Ahmadinejad‘s chances at reelection were dwindling. Some reports that the rural and urban poor population of Iran was shifting its support away from Ahmadinejad also surfaced in the week before the election. Many attributed this to increases in inflation and unemployment, compounded by international sanctions and the global financial crises that had disproportionately affected the poor, despite increases in wages and pensions provided under the Ahmadinejad government.17 The large rallies in favor of Musavi during the last days of the campaign may have caused alarm among some factions of the Iranian government.18Prior to the election, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander General Mohammad Ja‘fari publicly stated that any attempt at a velvet revolution in Iran would be crushed.19The statement further fueled speculation that the regime felt threatened by the apparent popularity of Musavi in the last days of the campaign. As observers watched the campaign unfold, most predicted a close race between Musavi and Ahmadinejad and many anticipated that a run-off would be necessary to determine a winner. Many observers also agreed that voter turnout may tip the election in favor of Musavi. During past elections, low voter turnout has been due in part to boycotts on the part of reform-minded Iranians, including many Iranian Americans who are eligible to vote. The Iranian system, in which the Guardian Council chooses which candidates are eligible to run, has in the past led some Iranians to feel that they have no genuine choice among the candidates.

ELECTION AND RESULTS On June 12, following the heated campaign between Musavi and Ahmadinejad, Iranians went to the polls. Record voter turnout was reported throughout the day and the Interior Ministry ordered that voting centers stay open to accommodate those waiting to vote.20 Many observers were optimistic that pro-reform segments of the population, who had boycotted 15

See ―Iranian Conservative Media Angry as Rafsanjani Lays Into Ahmadinejad,‖ BBC Monitoring, June 10, 2009 and U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Document IAP20099610950037, ―Iranian President to Reply to Accusations Raised in Debates,‖ IRNA, June 10, 2009. See also Thomas Erdbrink, ―Ex-Iranian President Criticizes Ayatollah,‖ New York Times, June 10, 2009. 16 Robert F. Worth and Nazila Fathi, ―Huge Campaign Rallies Snarl Tehran,‖ New York Times, June 11, 2009. 17 See Thomas Erdbrink, ―Rural Iran May Shift Its Loyalty, Washington Post, June 7, 2009. 18 See, for example, Marc Lynch, ―Could There Be a Musavi Effect?,‖ Foreign Policy, June 10, 2009. 19 U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Document IAP20090611950041, ―Iran: Candidate Musavi Warns Against IRGC,Basij ‗Interference‘ in Election,‖ Farda in Persian (Tehran), June 11, 2009. 20 U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Document IAP20090612950172, ―Iranian Governors-General Authorized to ExtendVoting Time,‖ Voice of the Islamic Republic Iran Radio in Persian, June 12, 2009.

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elections in the past, had gone to the polls in favor of Musavi. Large campaign rallies prior to the election had even sparked discussion of a possible ―Green Revolution.‖ As the polls closed, however, the prospects began to dim for a Musavi victory, and for a popularlyaccepted election outcome. As the polls closed, police and Basij paramilitary forces reportedly were deployed throughout Tehran, locking down the Interior Ministry where votes were being counted. Internet sites and mobile phones were also reportedly disabled. Less than three hours after the polls closed, the Interior Ministry announced that the election results were in and that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had won, capturing 62% of the vote. The Interior Ministry also reported that 39 million votes were cast (about 85% of Iran‘s eligible voters), an unprecedented turnout.21 Following the announcement by the Interior Ministry, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a statement congratulating President Ahmadinejad, which most observers interpreted as a certification of the election results. Khamenei said the ―miraculous hand of God‖ was evident in the ―great epic‖ of the election.22 Both Ahmadinejad and Musavi claimed victory as the announcement was made, even before the Guardian Council certified the results.

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ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD Since no independent international observers were present for Iran‘s elections, it is difficult to ascertain the extent of alleged vote rigging or election violations that may have taken place. The expulsion of most foreign journalists from Iran and the government‘s interruption of mobile and internet communication have further complicated efforts to gain a clear picture of the events surrounding the election and its aftermath. While many democracy promotion groups and NGOs have criticized the elections process in Iran as undemocratic, most agree that Iran‘s election procedures have been relatively well codified and that the irregularities reported in this particular election were substantial.23 However, in the 2009 presidential election, doubts about the wide margin of victory reported for Ahmadinejad have overshadowed a number of serious procedural irregularities reported on election day, which are the subject of the formal complaints filed by the defeated candidates. The Guardian Council reportedly received and nearly 650 poll complaints from the three losing candidates. Musavi‘s formal complaints include: the heads of governors‘ offices sabotaged the issuance of identification cards to electoral observers before the ballots were collected and counted manually; ballot papers were not distributed properly in Shiraz and Tabriz; additional television campaigning was allowed for Ahmadinejad; the headlines of agencies including Rajanews, Fars, and IRNA focused on Ahmadinejad‘s victory in the election; and Article 40 of the Criminal Code regarding army-related crimes was broken

21

U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Document IAP2009061350119, IRNA (Tehran), June 13, 2009. U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Document IAP2009061350138, ―Leader Hails Iranians‘ Massive Turnout in Election,‖ Fars News Agency (Tehran), June 13, 2009. 23 For information on Iran‘s election law and procedures, see the International Foundation for Election Systems Election Guide for Iran, available at: http://www.electionguide.org/country-news.php?ID=103. 22

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through the involvement of Basij members in Ahmadinejad‘s campaign meetings.24 Karrubi expressed similar concerns. Conservative candidate Mohsen Reza‘i also filed formal complaints, which some have perceived as an indication that it is not just reformist candidates and supporters who are dissatisfied with the results. According to the official result totals he received 678,000 votes. He argues that he received between at least 5.3 and 7 million votes and that some estimates could be as high as 9 million. He says that his claim is based on his observers‘ reports from polling stations, information collected from 1,000 ballot boxes by his electoral headquarters, official opinion polls held in the country, and remarks addressed to him by voters and members of his electoral headquarters.25 Taken together, doubts about the margin of victory and concerns over perceived fraud stemming from procedural violations fueled the largest protests since the Iranian Revolution and stoked international concerns about the legitimacy of the election results. Initially, the candidates, the Iranian people, and many who followed the election expressed doubts that the record 39 million votes cast could have been counted in such a short time, especially in light of reports that voting times were extended. Others have pointed to additional irregularities. While individual reports are difficult to verify, some reports suggest that, in some cases, ballot boxes were picked up by Interior Ministry officials before polling places closed which would mark a change in election procedures whereby ballots are typically counted by officials at the local level.26 Khamenei urged the Guardian Council on June 15 to examine seriously the allegations of vote rigging, but urged the candidates to pursue their complaints through legal channels. He went on to state that the probe into vote-rigging allegations would be completed by June 25.27 Musavi has said that invalidating the election is the only way to regain the people‘s trust in the regime and rejected outright the Guardian Council‘s offer to recount some of the votes.28 Some observers dismissed the investigation into the election results as an attempt to provide a cooling off period for the demonstrators and dissatisfied public, rather than a legitimate review of the results. On Saturday, June 20, the Guardian Council held a meeting with all presidential candidates to discuss the election outcome and fraud allegations. Reformist candidate Mir Hussein Musavi did not attend the meeting on Saturday on the grounds that he has already rejected any solution to the current stand-off other than a new election.29 Reports circulated on Monday, June 22 that the number of ballots cast in at least 50 voting stations as reported by the government exceeds the number of registered voters in that area. The Guardian

24

U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Document IAP20090615950012, ―Musavi Files Formal Complaint Against Result in Iran‘s Presidential Election,‖ Fars News Agency (Tehran), June 14, 2009. 25 U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Document IAP20090615950012, ―Musavi Files Formal Complaint Against Result in Iran‘s Presidential Election,‖ Fars News Agency (Tehran), June 14, 2009. 26 See Eric Hooglund, ―Iran‘s Rural Vote and Election Fraud,‖ Tehran Bureau, June 17, 2009, available online at: http://tehranbureau.com/2009/06/17/irans-rural-vote-and-election-fraud/. 27 U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Document IAP20090615950044, ―Iran‘s Supreme Leader Says Musavi‘s Letter tobe Given Careful Consideration,‖ Islamic Republic of Iran News Network Television (IRINN), June 15, 2009. 28 U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Document GMP20090614647001, ―Musavi Demands Elections Cancelled; KarrubiRejects Ahmadinezhad‘s Win,‖ Al-Arabiyah Television (Dubai), June 13, 2009. 29 U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Document IAP2009062011002, ―Iran: Text of Musavi‘s Letter to the GuardianCouncil,‖ Tehran Qalam (in Persian), June 20, 2009.

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Council acknowledged the ―irregularities,‖ but insisted that they in no way would have changed the election outcome.30 Some observers argue that the election results could be valid, despite the appearance of irregularities. They support this assertion with the claim that the young, liberal demographic in Iran is much smaller than it is often portrayed and that Ahmadinejad enjoys widespread support among the rural and urban poor, a more significant group in terms of size. These analysts also question the reliability of the polls prior to the election that indicated a close race. Others say that Ahmadinejad is often underestimated, as he was in 2005, and that his message of piety and anti-corruption coupled with his hard line on national security issues are both popular among the majority of Iranians. Others have argued that election fraud on such a massive scale would have involved many levels of the government and would be difficult to perpetrate and conceal.31 Other analysts assert that the allegations of fraud are likely true, and that the regime had motivation to interfere with the results. These analysts argue that the Iranian government might have felt sufficiently threatened by the success of Ahmadinejad‘s reformist opponents to mobilize a segment of the population that in large part boycotted the last elections. Some analysts have speculated that Khamenei engineered the election results in Ahmadinejad‘s favor so drastically in an effort to avoid a close election that could have been contested. Others argue that Khamenei wanted to send a political message to the U.S. and others that overtures to the Iranian public did not sway Iran from its policies—a commitment to the nuclear program and an approval of Ahmadinejad‘s inflammatory rhetoric about Israel—and that discussions with the U.S. are not perceived by the Iranian people as a coveted prize. Some agree that Khamenei miscalculated, either by misjudging popular opinion or out of paranoia over suspected regime change efforts on the part of the U.S. and the West.32 Regardless of the actual election results, the public demonstrations on election night and continued protests in major cities across Iran caused observers to speculate about how the stand-off between the government and Musavi‘s supports would be resolved, and what the outcome might mean for U.S. efforts to resolve the issue of Iran‘s nuclear weapons program, its support for terrorism, and other national security concerns.

30

31

32

U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Document IAP20090622950080, ―Iran Guardian Council Spokesman: ‗No MajorViolations‘ in Vote Counting,‖ Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1, June 22, 2009. See George Friedman, ―Western Misconceptions Meet Iranian Reality,‖ Stratfor Geopolitical Weekly, June 15, 2009. See, for example, Suzanne Maloney, ―Reacting to Iran‘s Disputed Presidential Election Outcome,‖ Brookings.edu, June 15, 2009, and Mehdi Khalaji, Patrick Clawson, Michael Singh, and Mohsen Sazegara, ―Iran‘s ‗Election‘: What Happened? What Does It Mean?, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch #1537: Special Policy Forum Report, June 18, 2009.

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AFTERMATH

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Demonstrations in Iran Shortly after the election results were announced, Iran‘s interior ministry issued a ban on unauthorized public gatherings.33 Despite the warning, protests reportedly continued every day in Tehran and other major cities—including Mashhad, Tabriz, Shiraz, and Isfahan, until the Basij crackdown on June 20.34 Restrictions on journalists and government efforts to restrict telecommunications made it difficult to know the scope of the public protests, but most accounts indicate numbers in the hundreds of thousands or more in Tehran. A counter demonstration in support of President Ahmadinejad also was reported, but most estimates indicate that it was significantly smaller than those in protest of the results—less than 10,000 people. Some media outlets alleged that the images of the Ahmadinejad rally were doctored to inflate the apparent size of the crowd.35 Smaller protests have reportedly continued since June 20, with estimates ranging from hundreds to thousands of people. In his speech on Friday, June 19, Supreme Leader Khamenei demanded an end to the protests, reiterated his support for President Ahmadinejad, and accused foreign ―enemies‖ of interfering in Iran‘s domestic affairs. Protests continued in Tehran and in other cities, however, and on Saturday, June 20, Iranian Basij and Revolutionary Guard forces reportedly used tear gas and live ammunition to disperse crowds. Ten deaths were reported, bringing the unofficial toll to at least 17, although many speculate that violence between police and military forces and the protestors may be more widespread and lethal than media reports indicate. On June 22, reports indicated that the Basij and Revolutionary Guard have been deployed throughout Tehran as the government crackdown on demonstrations continues to intensify. In addition, the Iranian government also appears to be continuing its arrests of reformist leaders. On June 21, members of former President Rafsanjani‘s family were reportedly arrested, causing speculation that rifts in Iran‘s religious leadership could be widening.36 Smaller protests have reportedly continued since June 20, with estimates ranging from hundreds to thousands of people. Reports of arrests, injuries, and deaths are difficult to substantiate, but have gained international attention and raised concerns about human rights and freedom of expression. As of July 1, according to the Iranian government, 627 people have been arrested and 27 have died since June 13. Most observers believe that the actual numbers are much higher.37

33

U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Document IAP20090613950098, ― Iran‘s Interior Minister Warns Against Public Gatherings Without Permits,‖ Tehran Islamic Republic of Iran News Network Television (IRINN), June 13, 2009. 34 ―Iran Opposition Keeps Up Pressure,‖ BBC News, June 16, 2009. 35 David Clark Scott, ―Iran‘s pro-Ahmadinejad media: Using Fake Crowd Photos?‖ International News Editor, June 17, 2009. 36 Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani currently presides over the Assembly of Experts, a powerful body of clerics that hasthe authority to remove the supreme leader by a two-thirds vote. 37 See, for example, ICHRI, available online at http://www.iranhumanrights.org/2009/06/list/.

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International Response World wide, attention has focused on the events unfolding in Iran. Demonstrations took place in Western Europe and in other regions to protest the election outcome or the use of force against the demonstrators in Iran. Iranian expatriates also joined the protests. In the United Arab Emirates, protesters gathered in front of the Iranian consulate in Dubai to protest alleged election abuses. The consulate denied that any protests had taken place. After protests were held for five consecutive days, UAE authorities ordered the protestors to disperse.38 While some leaders offered congratulations to Ahmadinejad after the election,39 others withheld their felicitations until the Guardian Council‘s election probe is completed. The international community, particularly the United States and the European Union, has now focused its attention on the public demonstrations in Iran, but most official statements have been cautious, likely to avoid the appearance of interference in Iran‘s domestic affairs. The European Union expressed concerns about the alleged irregularities, adding that it ―expects the new Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran will take its responsibility towards international community and respect its international obligations.‖ Britain‘s Foreign Secretary David Miliband also expressed concerns about the elections in Iran, saying that Britain had ―followed carefully, and admired, the passion and debate‖ during the election and that the reports of irregularities and accusations of fraud were ―a matter for the Iranian authorities to address‖ and that ―our priority is that Iran engages with the concerns of the world community, above all on the issue of nuclear proliferation.‖40

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U.S. Response The Obama Administration‘s response has been cautious. President Obama expressed ―serious concern‖ about the events in Iran and the allegations of election fraud. He also indicated after the election that he would pursue his policy of engaging with Iran to find a solution to the nuclear issue regardless of the outcome of the election. Some analysts fear, however, that recent events have diminished the prospects for diplomacy, particularly as use of the Basij to violently confront civilian protestors renewed concerns about Khamenei‘s disregard for human rights and basic civil liberties. At a State Department press conference on June 17, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that the people of Iran deserve to have their voices heard and votes counted, and reiterated the position of other Administration officials that it is for the Iranians to determine how best to resolve the current situation in Iran. She also expressed the Administration‘s intent to pursue engagement regardless of the election outcome. The U.S. government‘s response has been praised by some who argue that avoiding any appearance of involvement or meddling in Iranian affairs is the most likely choice to avoid provoking a harsh response from the Iranian government, one that would likely further 38

Nour Sumaha, ―Dubai Bans Iran Protests,‖ The National (Abu Dhabi), June 17, 2009. Among those offering congratulations were the leaders of Syria, Lebanon, Indonesia, the Palestinian Authority,Turkey, Afghanistan, Russia, China, Iraq, and Head of Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council Abdul Aziz al-Hakim. 40 U.S. Open Source Center Document EUP20090614086006, ―Britain‘s Miliband Comments on Iranian Election,‖ London Foreign and Commonwealth Office, June 13, 2009. 39

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endanger the lives of the demonstrators. These arguments tend to highlight the nationalist tendencies of Iranians from all parts of the political spectrum, particularly with regard to the complex history of intervention by the United States and other powers in Iran‘s domestic affairs. Others have criticized President Obama‘s response as too conciliatory toward Iran‘s existing leadership, particularly what some view as a lack of a strong enough condemnation of the use of force against civilians. On June 16, 2009, President Obama drew criticism after saying in an interview with CNBC and the New York Times that, from an American national security perspective, there may not be a significant difference between Ahmadinejad and Musavi. He went on to say that the United States is going to be dealing with an Iranian regime that has historically been hostile to the United States. Critics of the statement argue that the President may be viewing the events in Iran solely through the lens of the nuclear issue.41 Other analysts have argued that if Obama does not offer a stronger statement on the current situation it may be perceived by Iranians as a green light for Khamenei and the IRGC to use force to dispel the demonstrations.42 On June 19, the U.S. House of Representatives passed 405-1 H.Res. 560, which expresses support for Iranian citizens and ―condemns the ongoing violence against demonstrators by the Government of Iran and pro-government militias, as well as the ongoing government suppression of independent electronic communication.‖ The Senate also passed two measures— S.Res. 193 and S.Res. 196—which express support for Iranian citizens who ―embrace freedom, human rights, civil liberties and rule of law‖ and which express the sense of the Senate on freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and freedom of expression in Iran. As the government crackdown against protestors increased, the Obama Administration‘s position on Iran somewhat hardened. President Obama on June 20 called upon the government of Iran to ―stop all violent and unjust actions against its own people‖ and stated that, ―The Iranian people will ultimately judge the actions of their own government. If the Iranian government seeks the respect of the international community, it must respect the dignity of its own people and govern through consent, not coercion.‖43 On June 25, the Administration announced that it was withdrawing its prior invitation to Iranian diplomats for U.S. embassy Fourth of July parties, citing the recent events in Iran. Some observers believed that this small gesture indicates that the Administration is gradually moving away from its policy of engagement.44 Many observers believe that President Obama is attempting to balance the need to condemn the violence against the protestors with the need to avoid the perception of U.S. interference, which some worry could prompt the Iranian government to clamp down further on freedom of expression as well as jeopardize U.S. efforts to engage Iran on the issue of its nuclear program.

41

Helene Cooper and Mark Landler, ―For Obama, Pressure to Strike Firmer Tone,‖ New York Times, June 18, 2009. Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace added that ―up until now, the president had very thoughtfully calibrated his marks on Iran,‖ but called this particular statement an ―uncharacteristic and egregious error.‖ Sadjadpour and others have expressed concerns that such statements make Obama appear unsympathetic to the Iranians who are risking their lives to protest the elections by saying that the outcome does not matter to the United States. 42 See Mehdi Khalaji, Patrick Clawson, Michael Singh, and Mohsen Sazegara, ―Iran‘s ‗Election‘: What Happened? What Does It Mean?‖, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch #1537: Special Policy Forum Report, June 18, 2009. 43 The President‘s Statement on Iran, June 20, 2009, available online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog. 44 Peter Spiegel and Jay Soloman, ―U.S. Retracts July 4 Invites it Gave Iran,‖ Wall Street Journal, June 25, 2009.

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POSSIBLE OUTCOMES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

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There is much debate about where the current situation in Iran could lead, with some experts predicting significant changes in Iran‘s political and social structure, and others arguing the Iranians at present do not appear to be seeking or experiencing a wholesale change in the basic nature of their government. Among those predicting significant change, some analysts are arguing a brewing ―green revolution‖ is about to unfold in Iran. They cite the continued momentum of the protests, and say that the damage done by the regime to its own legitimacy is irreversible. Other observers have stated that the circumstances surrounding the election amount to a military coup, orchestrated by Khamenei and his allies in the military establishment. Both groups maintain that the current situation in Iran has caused or will cause significant changes that may even mean the end of the ―Islamic Republic.‖45 At the opposite end of the spectrum are experts and practitioners who have argued that the public protests have more to do with Iranians‘ complaint that the Islamic Republic‘s electoral system was abused, rather than dissatisfaction with the notion of the Islamic Republic itself. These analysts tend to believe that some negotiated solution could possibly resolve the situation in Iran. Given the widespread popular dissatisfaction with the actions and statements of Supreme Leader Khamenei, it is possible that the doctrine of velayet e faqih46 that undergirds the supreme leader‘s position may be losing more support among some Iranians. As the Iranian government continues to use the Basij and Revolutionary Guard to enforce the election outcome, reports of arrests, injuries, and deaths fuel human rights concerns and diplomatic tensions. The long-term implications on U.S. policy of post-election unrest and government infighting in Iran are difficult to foresee.

Prospects for Engagement The Obama Administration has maintained its commitment to engaging with Iran to resolve the issue of Iran‘s nuclear weapons program, its support for terrorism, and other national security concerns. Some analysts have speculated, however, that the long-term implications of the post-election events in Iran may complicate or alter the course of U.S. policy. Optimists consider the recent outpouring of public support for Musavi and calls for a new election from his supporters and some members of the clerical establishment as an indication that the Iranian public is no longer satisfied with the existing social contract, and may be less willing, as a result, to accept the international isolation that accompanies the government‘s position on the nuclear program, support for terrorism, and Ahmadinejad‘s rhetoric toward Israel. Even if the government manages to repress this popular opinion in the short run, some observers have acknowledged the possibility that, over the long run, the

45

46

Ibid. See also Mohsen Makhmalbaf interview with Foreign Policy, June 2009. Available online athttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=5018. Velayet e faqih (Guardianship of the Jurisprudent) is the principle on which the Islamic Republic is based, whereby Islamic (Shariah) law governs society and a leading Islamic scholar (in Iran, the Supreme Leader) is the guardian of the law.

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regime might not be sustainable against public unrest and widespread perceptions of illegitimacy.47 Skeptics see the recent events differently. Some argue that the engineered election outcome is a signal that Khamenei and the government establishment do not see engagement with the United States as a ―prize to be won,‖48 and that no amount of diplomacy could change the perception that the United States is using the nuclear issue as a cover under which to pursue its real objective of regime change. As the Obama Administration works to strike a balance between not being perceived as interfering in Iranian affairs while appearing sympathetic to the civilian demonstrators, Khamenei has continued to accuse Western leaders of encouraging popular unrest. Continued calls for an end to the protests and warnings during his June 19 speech indicate, according to some analysts, that the Iranian government is prepared to take whatever means necessary to protect against a breakdown of the current system.49 While the Obama Administration has become increasingly willing to more harshly condemn the deaths and arrests of protestors and British embassy officials, it has not articulated a change in U.S. policy toward Iran. Some speculate that blatant human rights abuses on the part of the current government, coupled with criticism of its tempered response, could make it difficult for the Obama Administration to negotiate with Iran over its nuclear program and other issues. These analysts argue that engaging with Iran undermines U.S. commitments to human rights, democracy, and freedom of expression, and that this policy could alienate supporters of Musavi who have historically been more sympathetic to U.S. interests in the region.50 Others argue that continuing on the path of engagement is the only viable mechanism for dealing with Iran‘s nuclear ambitions, and that all other issues are subordinate to the nuclear issue as time is short for reaching a solution.51

47

See, for example, ―U.S. Should React Cautiously to Iran‘s ―Stolen Election,‖ CFR Interview with Gary Sick, June 14, 2009 and Suzanne Maloney, ―Reacting to Iran‘s Disputed Presidential Election Outcome.‖ 48 Mehdi Khalaji, Patrick Clawson, Michael Singh, and Mohsen Sazegara, ―Iran‘s ‗Election‘: What Happened? What Does It Mean?, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch #1537: Special Policy Forum Report, June 18, 2009. 49 Ibid. See also, for example, Mehdi Khalaji, ―Khamene‘i‘s Coup,‖ Washington Post, June 15 ,2009 50 See, for example, Michael Gerson and Roger Hertog, ―Realism on Iran? It‘s Called Freedom,‖ Washington Post, June 21, 2009. 51 See, for example, Suzanne Maloney, ―Diplomacy with Iran: The Show Must go On,‖ ForeignPolicy.com, June 29, 2009.

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In: Political Leadership and its Significance in a Time… ISBN: 978-1-61668-396-2 Editor: Anna L. Larsen © 2011 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 7

PARTY LEADERS IN THE HOUSE: ELECTION, DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 

Valerie Heitshusen

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Each major party in the House has a leadership hierarchy. This report summarizes the election, duties, and responsibilities of the Speaker of the House, the majority andminority leaders, and the whips and whip system. For a listing of all past occupants ofcongressional party leadership positions, see CRS Report RL30567, Party Leaders inCongress, 1789-2009. For more information on legislative process, see[http://www.crs.gov/products/ guides/guidehome.shtml].1

SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE The Speaker is elected by the House on the first day of a new Congress.Customarily, the caucus or conference of each major party first elects a candidate at earlyorganizational meetings. When the new Congress convenes, each party places the nameof its candidate in nomination, and the majority party‘s candidate is typically elected ona party line vote. A rules change adopted at the beginning of the 108th Congress requiresthe Speaker to submit the names of Members designated to serve as Speaker pro temporein the event that the speakership becomes vacant, or in the event the Speaker is disabled.House rules invest the Speaker with substantial powers.2 These duties include, but are notlimited to 

administering the oath of office to Members;



This is an edited, reformatted and augmented version of a CRS Report for Congress publication dated November 2008. 1 Thomas P. Carr, former Analyst in American National Government at CRS, originally wrote this report. The listed author has updated the report and is available to respond to inquiries on the subject. 2 The Speaker has other powers specified in law, typically relating to appointing either occupants of House offices (e.g., the Parliamentarian) or members of various commissions and advisory boards. On the latter authority, see CRS Report RL33313, Congressional Commissions, Committees, Boards, and Groups: Appointment Authority and Membership, by Matthew Eric Glassman.

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Valerie Heitshusen          

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

recognizing Members for the purpose of speaking or making motions; referring bills and resolutions to committees; putting questions to a vote of Members; declaring a quorum (or the absence of one); counting and declaring all votes; deciding points of order; appointing House Members to select and conference committees; exercising additional committee appointment authority under party conference rules; making appointments to fill temporary vacancies in House administrative offices; appointing the Chair of the Committee of the Whole and the Speaker pro tempore; and signing all bills and resolutions passed by the House.

Traditionally, the Speaker has no formal committee assignments, but serves as an ex officio member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.3The Speaker infrequently votes or participates in floor debate. Although not prescribed in any formal way, the Speaker is the principal spokesperson for the House and, oftentimes, for the party, taking a leading role in negotiations with the Senate and President. When in the majority, each party designates the Speaker as chair its committee assignment panel, which assigns party members to standing committee slots, subject to conference or caucus approval and House election. According to both Democratic Caucus and Republican Conference rules, a Speaker from the respective party organization also makes nominations (for conference consideration) for membership on the Committee on Rules and the Committee on House Administration, nominates those committees‘ chairs, and also appoints one Member to serve on the Budget Committee. Caucus and conference rules also give the Speaker some appointment authority for chairs of his or her party‘s internal committees.4 (See CRS Report 97-780, The Speaker of the House: House Officer, Party Leader, and Representative; and CRS Report RL30857, Speakers of the House: Elections, 1913-2007.)

MAJORITY LEADER The majority leader is second to the Speaker in the party hierarchy. Elected by secret ballot of the majority party‘s caucus or conference in organizational meetings prior to the start of a new Congress, the majority leader‘s role has largely been defined by history and tradition. Working closely with the Speaker and the party‘s whips, the majority leader is charged with scheduling legislation for floor consideration, and does not, in modern practice, serve on House committees. The majority leader helps plan daily, weekly, and annual legislative agendas; consults with Members to gauge sentiment on issues; urges colleagues to 3

The Speaker‘s ex-officio membership, as well as that of the Minority Leader discussed below, is pursuant to House Rule X, clause 11(a)(2). U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Constitution, Jefferson‟s Manual, and Rules of the House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, compiled by John V. Sullivan, Parliamentarian, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., H.Doc. 109-157 (Washington: GPO, 2007). 4 Examples include the party‘s policy committee or its campaign committee. See 110 th Congress House Republican Conference Rules; and 110th Congress House Democratic Caucus Rules.

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support or defeat measures on the floor; and, in general, works to advance the goals of the majority party. The majority leader is also responsible for closely watching floor activities, especially the opposition party‘s parliamentary maneuvers, but by custom, does not typically lead floor debate on major measures. (See CRS Report RL30665, The Role of the House Majority Leader: An Overview.)

MINORITY LEADER The minority leader is both the minority party‘s counterpart to the Speaker, and the floor leader of the ―loyal opposition.‖ Elected by the minority party caucus or conference at organizational meetings prior to the start of a new Congress, theminorityleader speaks for the minority party and its policies. The minority leader strives to protect the minority‘s rights, organizes and leads criticism of the majority party, and devises parliamentary strategies and tactics that can put to best use the abilities of his party to influence legislative outcomes. The minority leader chairs the party‘s committee assignment panel and also directly nominates or appoints minority party members to serve on certain standing committees.5 Like the Speaker, the minority leader serves as an ex officio member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. When the minority leader‘s party holds the White House, the minority leader may be the President‘s chief spokesperson in the House. By custom, the minority leader does not typically lead floor debate on major measures. (See CRS Report RL30666, The Role of the House Minority Leader: An Overview.)

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Party Whips Republican and Democratic party whips are elected by each party caucus at early organizational meetings. Each majority and minority whip heads an extensive whip network comprised of party loyalists. Each party selects at least one chief deputy whip and a number of deputy and other whips.6 The job of the whips is to maintain communication between the leadership of the party and its members, marshal support for party positions on the floor, count votes on key legislation, and persuade wavering Members to vote for the party position. Whip notices and advisories to all party members about the legislative agenda are staple products of both parties‘ whip organizations and are posted on each party‘s website. (See CRS Report RS20499, House Leadership: Whip Organization.)

5 6

When in the majority, the conference or caucus rules provide these powers to the Speaker, as outlined earlier. Each party‘s chief deputy whip is appointed by its chief whip; other members of the whip team are either similarly appointed or elected by subsets of the party organization.

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In: Political Leadership and its Significance in a Time… ISBN: 978-1-61668-396-2 Editor: Anna L. Larsen © 2011 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 8

THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE: HOUSE OFFICER, PARTY LEADER, AND REPRESENTATIVE 

Valerie Heitshusen*

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SUMMARY The Speaker of the House of Representatives is widely viewed as symbolizing the power and authority of the House. The Speaker‘s most prominent role is that of presiding officer of the House. In this capacity, the Speaker is empowered by House rules to administer proceedings on the House floor, including the power to recognize Members on the floor to speak or make motions and the power to appoint Members to conference committees. The Speaker also oversees much of the non-legislative business of the House, such as general control over the Hall of the House and the House side of the Capitol and service as chair of the House Office BuildingCommission. The Speaker‘s role as ―elect of the elect‖ in the House also places him or her in a highly visible position with the public. The Speaker also serves not only as titular leader of the House but also as leader of the majority party conference. The Speaker is often responsible for airing and defending the majority party‘s legislative agenda in the House. The Speaker‘s third distinct role is that of an elected Member of the House. Although elected as an officer of the House, the Speaker continues to be a Member as well. As such the Speaker enjoys the same rights, responsibilities, and privileges of all Representatives. However, the Speaker has traditionally refrained from debating or voting in most circumstances, and does not sit on any standing committee of the House.



This is an edited, reformatted and augmented version of a CRS Report for Congress publication dated March 2009. * Email: [email protected], 7-8635 Political Leadership and its Significance in a Time of Troubles, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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Valerie Heitshusen

INTRODUCTION Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution states: ―The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers.‖1 The position of Speaker combines several roles: the institutional role of presiding officer and administrative head of the House, the partisan role of leader of the majority party in the House, and the representative role of an elected Member of the House. As the ―elect of the elect‖ the Speaker has perhaps the most visible job in Congress. By statute, the Speaker is also second in line, behind the Vice President, to succeed to the presidency.2 The Constitution does not describe the office of the Speaker or its duties, nor was there any significant discussion of the office during the Constitutional Convention. The use of the title ―Speaker‖ probably has its origins in the British House of Commons, where the presiding officer acted as the chamber‘s spokesman to the Crown, but any assumptions the authors of the Constitution had for the office undoubtedly also drew upon their own experiences in colonial legislatures and the Continental Congress. There does not seem to have been any grand plan or specific expectation as to how the Founding Fathers envisioned the speakership. Rather, the speakership has been largely shaped by the various individuals who have held the post, the circumstances in which they have operated, formal obligations that have been assigned to the office by House rules and by statute, the character of the House as a political and constitutional institution, and traditions and customs that have evolved over time.

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SELECTION OF THE SPEAKER3 When the House of Representatives convenes at the beginning of a new Congress, its first order of business is to elect a Speaker. Because the House dissolves at the end of a Congress and must start anew at the beginning of each new Congress, the clerk of the House presides over the House under general parliamentary law until a Speaker is elected. For its first 50 years, the House elected the Speaker by ballot. In 1839, this method was changed to election by vive voce, meaning that each Member names aloud whom he or she favors for Speaker. Tellers then record the result. In modern practice, each party places the name of a single Member in nomination for the position, but otherwise virtually the same vive voce method is used to elect the Speaker. Because the election of the Speaker typically takes place before the

1

The other officers of the House are not specified in the Constitution. Currently, under House Rule II, the clerk, sergeant-at-arms, chief administrative officer, and chaplain are identified as officers to be elected by the House, although the rule also states that the clerk, sergeant-at-arms, and chief administrative officer may be removed either by the House or the Speaker. Rule II also identifies additional officers, the historian of the House, the general counsel, and the inspector general, to be appointed by the Speaker. 2 The Presidential Succession Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-199, 61 Stat. 380) provides that if ―there is neither a President nor Vice President to discharge the powers and duties of the office of the President, then the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall, upon his resignation as Speaker and as Representative in Congress, act as President.‖ To succeed to the presidency a Speaker would also need to qualify under the terms of Article II, Section 5 of the Constitution, which requires that the President be a ―natural-born citizen,‖ at least 35 years of age, and a resident within the United States for 14 years. 3 For more on elections of the Speaker, see CRS Report RL30857, Speakers of the House: Elections, 1913-2009, by Richard S. Beth and Valerie Heitshusen.

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House adopts its rules of procedure, the election process is defined by precedent and practice rather than by any formal rule. To be elected Speaker, a candidate must receive an absolute majority of the votes cast, which may be less than a majority of the full membership of the House because of vacancies, absentees, or Members voting ―present.‖4 Although the major parties nominate candidates for the position of Speaker, there is no limitation on for whom Members may vote. In fact, there is no requirement that the Speaker be a Member of the House.5 None of the other officers of the House is a Member. If no candidate receives the requisite majority, the roll call is repeated until a Speaker is elected. Again, Members may continue to vote for any individual, and no restrictions, such as eliminating minority candidates or prohibiting new candidates from being named, are imposed. For example, at the beginning of the 34th Congress in 1855, 133 ballots over a period of two months were necessary to elect Nathaniel Banks of Massachusetts as Speaker.6 The last occasion on which multiple ballots were required to elect a Speaker was in 1923. At the beginning of the 68th Congress, the nominees from both major parties initially failed to receive a majority of the votes because of votes cast for other candidates by Members from the Progressive Party and from the ―progressive wing‖ of the Republican Party. After the Republican leadership agreed to accept a number of procedural reforms, the Progressives agreed to vote for the Republican candidate on the ninth ballot, making Frederick Gillett of Massachusetts the Speaker.7 If a Speaker dies or resigns during a Congress, the House immediately elects a new Speaker. Although it was an earlier practice of the House to elect a new Speaker under these conditions by adopting a resolution to that effect, the modern practice is to use the same practice as employed at the beginning of a Congress. The most recent example of this occurred during the 101st Congress when Thomas Foley of Washington was elected Speaker following the resignation of Jim Wright of Texas.8 In the 19th century, longevity of House service was not as important a criterion in selecting the Speaker as it is today. It was not unusual for a Member to be elected Speaker with only a few years service. From 1789 to 1899, the average length of House service before a Member was elected Speaker was 7.1 years. In fact, Henry Clay of Kentucky (in 1811) and William Pennington of New Jersey (in 1860) were each elected Speaker as freshmen (the first Speaker, Frederick A. Muhlenberg of Pennsylvania, was obviously a third, albeit special, case). The 19 Speakers elected between 1899 (David B. Henderson) and 2007 (Nancy Pelosi) served an average of 22.9 years in the House prior to their first election as Speaker. The longest prespeakership tenure in this period belonged to Jim Wright, who served for 17 terms 4

The controlling precedent dates to Mar. 18, 1879, when in response to an inquiry, the clerk, while presiding over the House, stated: ―It requires a majority of those voting to elect a Speaker, as it does to pass a bill.‖ Asher Hinds, Hinds‟ Precedents of the House of Representatives of the United States (Washington: GPO, 1907), vol. 1, sec. 216. (Hereafter cited as Hinds‟ Precedents.) 5 For example, in the election of the Speaker at the beginning of the 105 th Congress, two former Members of the House (Robert H. Michel and Robert Walker) each received one vote. Congressional Record, vol. 143, Jan. 7, 1997, p. 117. 6 On the 133rd ballot, Nathaniel Banks received 103 votes while his four opponents received a total of 111. Since this was not a majority, the House subsequently adopted a resolution, by majority vote, confirming the election. Congressional Globe, vol. 25, 34th Cong., 1st sess., Feb. 2, 1856, pp. 337-342. 7 Congressional Record, vol. 65, Dec. 3-5, 1923. 8 Congressional Record, vol. 135, June 6, 1989, p. 10800.

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before being elected as Speaker. Sam Rayburn of Texas served longer as Speaker than any other Member: a tenure of 17 years (interrupted twice by Republican majorities). Thomas P. ―Tip‖ O‘Neill Jr. of Massachusetts holds the record for the longest continuous service as Speaker: 10 years. The record for the shortest tenure belongs to Theodore M. Pomeroy of New York who served one day. (Appendix A lists all the Speakers of the House as well as their party affiliations, home state, and dates of service in that office.)

THE SPEAKER AS LEADER OF THE HOUSE Although the office of the Speaker is mentioned in the Constitution, that document is silent on its duties. Today, the Speaker possesses substantial powers under House rules. Among the duties performed are 

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       

 

administering the oath of office to Members (the act of 1789 (2 U.S.C. 25) provides that, on the organization of the House, the oath shall be administered by any Member, traditionally the Member with the longest continuous service, to the Speaker and by the Speaker to the other Members); calling the House to order (Rule I, clause 1); preserving order and decorum within the chamber and in the galleries (Rule I, clause 2); recognizing Members to speak and make motions (Rule XVII);9 deciding points of order (Rule I, clause 5); counting a quorum (Rule XX, clause 7(c)); presenting the pending business to the House for a vote (Rule I, clause 6); appointing Speakers pro tempore (Rule I, clause 8) and chairs of the Committee of the Whole (Rule XVIII, clause 1);10 certifying various actions of the House, including signing all acts and joint resolutions, writs, warrants, and subpoenas of (or issued to) the House (Rule I, clause 4);11 appointing select and conference committees (Rule I, clause 11); appointing certain House officers (such as the inspector general under Rule II, clause 6, the historian of the House under Rule II, clause 7, and the general counsel under Rule II, clause 8);

9

This provision is augmented by the provision in Rule XVI, clause 1, which states that the Speaker shall not entertain any dilatory motions. 10 By tradition, the Speaker does not preside over the Committee of the Whole, but instead names a party colleague as chair. According to historian DeAlva Stanwood Alexander, this tradition has its roots in Stuart England when conflicts over taxation arrayed the Crown against the Commons, and suspicion assumed the Speaker to be a tale bearer to the King. To avoid the Speaker‘s espionage Commons met in secret, electing a chairman in whom it had confidence. Even after any need for secrecy in its proceedings had passed, Commons continued to require that the Speaker withdraw whenever the Committee of the Whole convened. DeAlva Stanwood Alexander, History and Procedure of the House of Representatives (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1916), pp. 257-258. The American tradition does not require the Speaker to withdraw from the deliberations of the Committee of the Whole, only that she not chair it. 11 Responses to subpoenas are also governed under Rule VIII.

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 

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referring measures to committee(s) (Rule XII, clause 2); and examining and approving the Journal of the proceedings of the previous day‘s session (Rule I, clause 1).

The Speaker‘s powers offer him or her considerable latitude to exercise discretion. Under most circumstances, the Speaker has the authority to ask Members who seek recognition, ―For what purpose does the gentleman (or gentlelady) rise?‖ The Speaker may then decide whether or not to recognize that Member for the specific reason given. In this way the Speaker is able to assert control over what motions may be made and therefore what measures will be considered and the general flow of House floor proceedings. House Rule XV, clause 1 allows the Speaker to entertain motions to suspend the rules on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays, as well as during the last six days of a session. Discretion over who may be recognized to make such motions gives the Speaker virtually complete control over the suspension process. The institutional role of the Speaker also extends beyond the duty to preside over the House. The Speaker also exercises general control over the Hall of the House and the House side of the Capitol (Rule I, clause 3), and serves as the chair of the House Office Building Commission. The Speaker frequently is authorized in statute to appoint Members to various boards and commissions, and it is typically the Speaker who is the formal recipient of reports or other communications from the President, government agencies, boards, and commissions. The role of the Speaker also extends to the requirement in House Rule V, clause 1 that he or she administer a system for audio and video broadcasting of the proceedings of the House. Rule I, clause 9 provides for the Speaker, in consultation with the minority leader, to devise a system of drug testing in the House. Finally, although it is not prescribed in any formal way, the elevated profile of the office of the Speaker often means she must take a leading role in negotiations with the Senate or President.

THE SPEAKER AS PARTY LEADER Under both Republican and Democratic majorities, Speakers have played similar roles as leader of their parties. A Speaker‘s role as leader of the majority party is manifested in two ways: within the party conference or caucus and on the House floor. Under the rules of the House Democratic Caucus, the Speaker recommends to the Caucus nominees for officers of the House. The Speaker‘s prominence within the Caucus is reinforced because she chairs the Steering and Policy Committee, and appoints two co-chairs, two vice- chairs, and up to 15 of its Members. In addition, the Speaker is empowered to appoint one Member to the House Budget Committee, as well as make appointments to joint and select committees, and various boards and commissions, giving due consideration to spreading the workload among qualified and interested Democrats. She nominates the Democratic membership on the Committees on Rules and House Administration, and recommends to the Caucus a nominee for chair of these committees. If a nominee is rejected, the Speaker may make another nomination until the position is filled.

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Within the Democratic Party, the Speaker serves as a member of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and also nominates the DCCC chair. Previously, within the Republican Party conference, the Speaker acted as the chairman of the party‘s Steering Committee, and thus played a major part in the committee assignment process because Members are nominated to serve on or chair a committee by the Steering Committee. These nominations are subject to approval by the full party conference, and subsequently by the House. In the 104th Congress, it appears that the Speaker exerted further influence in the process of nominating Members to chair committees by naming a slate of candidates before the Steering Committee had been formed. Although the Speaker‘s choices required the approval of the Steering Committee before they were placed before the full conference, his influence was reported to have exceeded that of recent previous Speakers.12 In addition, the Speaker was empowered to make nominations directly for the Republican Conference‘s consideration for membership (including chairs) on the Rules Committee and the House Administration Committee, as well as the chair and one Member (to serve as the second ranking Republican) on the Budget Committee. House Republican Conference rules also provided for the Speaker to serve on the National Republican Congressional Committee. Because the Speaker‘s role as leader of the majority party in the House is sometimes at odds with his role as presiding officer of the chamber, House Republican Conference rules stated that

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A Member of the elected or designated Republican Leadership has an obligation, to the best of his/her ability, to support positions adopted by the Conference, and the resources of the Leadership shall be utilized to support that position.

The success of every person to hold the Speaker‘s office since the late 20th century has been judged, at least in part, on the basis of their ability to use personal prestige, and the powers of persuasion and bargaining to enunciate and advance his or her party‘s vision and legislative agenda, as well as work to ensure majority control of the House. To accomplish these objectives modern Speakers have used varying personal styles and engaged in a variety of activities, not just in Congress or their party conference, but outside as well.13 For example, they publicize their party‘s policies and achievements (by giving speeches, appearing on radio and television, holding press conferences, etc.); assist party members who are seeking reelection; consult with Presidents about both Administration and congressional agendas and goals; and, when the majority in the House is not the same party as the President, they act as a spokesman for the loyal opposition. In the words of one commentator: To an increasing degree, the way for a Speaker to win support among colleagues is to influence public opinion ... [A] House leader now needs some credibility outside the institution in order to win on the inside.14

12

Karen Foerstel, ―House Chairmen: Gingrich Flexes His Power in Picking Panel Chiefs,‖ Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, vol. 52, Nov. 19, 1994, p. 3326. 13 Jackie Koszczuk, ―Master of the Mechanics Has Kept the House Running,‖ Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, vol. 57, Dec. 11, 1999, p. 2960. 14 Alan Ehrenhalt, ―Speaker‘s Job Transformed Under O‘Neill,‖ Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, vol. 43, June 22, 1985, p. 1247.

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Bringing coherence and efficiency to a decentralized and individualistic legislative body requires a Speaker to use the entire range of tangible and intangible rewards that can be bestowed orwithheld. In an interview, Speaker O‘Neill once described how he wielded these various minor powers by saying:

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You know, you ask me what are my powers and my authorities around here? The power to recognize on the floor; little odds and ends—like men get pride out of the prestige of handling the Committee of the Whole, being named Speaker for the day.... [T]here is a certain aura and respect that goes with the Speaker‘s office. He does have the power to pick up the telephone and call people. And Members oftentimes like to bring their local political leaders or a couple of mayors. And oftentimes they have problems from their area and they need aid and assistance.... We‘re happy to try to open the door for them, having been in the town for so many years and knowing so many people. We do know where a lot of bodies are and we do know how to advise people.15

The power to schedule legislation for floor consideration can be used in ways that reflect both institutional and partisan considerations. The Speaker is charged with ensuring that the House processes its fundamental annual workload, but determining what, when, and in which order a measure reaches the floor can help determine its fate. A week‘s delay in scheduling acontroversial bill may work to enhance or minimize its chances for passage. According to Speaker O‘Neill, it was one of his most important powers because ―if [a Speaker] doesn‘t want a certain bill to come up, it usually doesn‘t.‖16 Similarly, the Speaker‘s authority to appoint conferees can be a powerful tool for influencing the final provisions of a bill. The Members appointed represent a complex balance of support for House, committee, and party positions as determined by the Speaker, and are not subject to challenge. Modern Speakers have also frequently had to act as mediators of conflicts within their parties. As one leader put it, this involves: Trying to mollify members who are angry with other members, trying to keep dangerous rifts from developing within the party. Sometimes getting people together of opposite viewpoints and letting them talk their problems out in a way that lets each understand that the other has a problem. Sometimes you can come to a compromise. 17

Balancing parliamentary and partisan roles is not always easily accomplished. At the start of the 20th century, historian Mary Follett assessed this conundrum by writing: The Speaker ... is not only allowed, but expected to use his position to advance party interests. It must not be supposed, however, that this implies gross partisanship on the part of our Speakers. They neither attempt to use every inch of power to be conjured out of the rules,

15

Michael J. Malbin, ―House Democrats Are Playing With a Strong Leadership Lineup,‖ National Journal, vol. 9, June 18, 1977, p. 942. 16 Thomas P. O‘Neill Jr., Man of the House (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 273. 17 The unidentified leader was quoted in Barbara Sinclair, Majority Leadership in the U.S. House (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), p. 38.

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Valerie Heitshusen nor guide the House entirely from party motives. Their office has on the whole been administered with justness and fairness ...18

Another assessment states that Tradition and unwritten law require that the Speaker apply the rules of the House consistently, yet in the twilight zone a large area exists where he may exercise great discrimination and where he has many opportunities to apply the rules to his party‘s advantage.19

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THE SPEAKER AS A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE Although elected as an officer of the House, the Speaker continues to be a Member of the House as well. Accordingly, the Speaker continues to have the same rights, responsibilities, and privileges as all Members. However, because of the Speaker‘s position as leader, it may be notable or even controversial when he or she exercises the powers granted to other Members, such as debating, voting, and sitting as a member of a standing committee of the House. Under the principles articulated in Jefferson‟s Manual,20 the Speaker is typically only heard on matters of order, and it is highly irregular to speak on any other matter while presiding. The Speaker, however, may speak from the floor (as would any other Member), and the precedents of the House include examples of the Speaker leaving the chair to speak from the well, make motions21 or debate a point of order.22 However, in most periods in the history of the House these privileges were infrequently exercised. Jonathan Dayton of New Jersey was the first Speaker to speak out on a matter in Committee of the Whole (during the Fourth Congress), and it was not until Henry Clay of Kentucky became Speaker that this practice became generally accepted. As late as 1850, Chauncy Cleveland of Connecticut, then a Member of the House, questioned whether it would: be right or just by the power of party to place a man in the Speaker‘s chair, and then compel him to use the influence of the chair when he had defined his position.... It was utterly

18

Mary P. Follett, The Speaker of the House of Representatives (New York: Longmans Green, 1902), p. 300. Floyd M. Riddick, The United States Congress: Organization and Procedure (Washington: National Capitol Publishers, 1949), p. 67. 20 Prepared by Thomas Jefferson while serving as Vice President (and President of the Senate), the Manual was adopted as a part of House rules beginning in 1837 to the extent that it is applicable and ―not inconsistent with‖ the standing rules of the House (Rule XXIX). 21 On Apr. 4, 1864, Speaker Schuyler Colfax of Indiana came down from the chair to move a resolution to expel Representative Alexander Long of Ohio. He justified his action on the basis of Henry Clay‘s frequent speeches from the floor while Speaker, but, according to Asher Hinds, Colfax evidently ―confused‖ Clay‘s actions in Committee of the Whole with participation during sessions of the House itself. See Hinds‟ Precedents, vol. 2, sec. 1367 and footnote. 22 Ibid., vol. 5, sec. 1607. 19

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impossible that the Speaker, after having taken his side upon the floor, could go back to the chair, and award the floor with the same impartiality as if he had never spoken.23

Even today the Speaker does not typically participate in debate on the floor, although the Speaker may do so when he or she feels it necessary to highlight or rally support for the majority party‘s agenda.24 The right of the Speaker to vote has also evolved over time. The first rules of the House provided: In all cases of ballot by the House, the Speaker shall vote; in other cases he shall not vote, unless the House be equally divided, or unless his vote, if given to the minority, will make the division equal, and in case of such equal division, the question shall be lost.25

The Speaker was thus prevented from voting on legislative matters, although the precedents of the House record several examples of Speakers voting contrary to this rule.26 The Speaker was allowed to vote in Committee of the Whole, but most early Speakers apparently refrained from this practice as well. At least twice (in 1833 and 1837) the House debated proposals to compel the Speaker to vote on all questions, but these proposals were defeated.27 It was not until 1850 that the rule was amended to allow the Speaker to vote at his discretion, and the modern form of the rule was not adopted until 1880. Rule I, clause 7 currently reads:

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The Speaker is not required to vote in ordinary legislative proceedings, except when his vote would be decisive or when the House is engaged in voting by ballot.

Unlike other Representatives, the Speaker does not sit on any standing committees of the House.28 This was not always the case. The Rules Committee was for many years a select committee authorized to report a system of rules at the beginning of a Congress, and later also to report from ―time to time.‖ Beginning in 1858, and continuing after the Rules Committee was made a standing committee of the House in 1880, the Speaker served as chairman. This practice continued through 1910 when the House adopted a rule prohibiting the Speaker from sitting on the Rules Committee.29 The formal prohibition was removed from House rules by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 194 6,30 but the tradition has continued. Today, the Speaker does not sit on the Rules Committee, but does nominate the majority members in the party conference, effectively making the Rules Committee an integral part of the leadership structure. 23

Congressional Globe, vol. 21, 31st Cong., 1st sess., Jan. 14, 1850, p. 144. One such example occurred when Speaker Newt Gingrich claimed time in opposition to a motion to recommit the Tax Relief Act of 1997. See the Congressional Record, vol. 143, June 26, 1997, p. 12827. 25 Annals of Congress, vol. 1, 1st Cong., 1st sess., Apr. 7, 1789, p. 99. The House customarily uses balloting only for the election of its officers, not for resolving legislative questions. 26 Hinds‟ Precedents, vol. 5, secs. 5966-5967. 27 Ibid., vol. 5, sec. 5964. 28 However, the Speaker is designated as an ex officio member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence under House Rule X, clause 11 (a)(2). 29 This restriction was adopted as a part of the so-called revolt against Speaker Joseph Cannon of Illinois at the beginning of the 61st Congress. See the Congressional Record, vol. 45, Mar. 15-19, 1910. 30 P.L. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812. 24

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APPENDIX A. SPEAKERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1789-2009 Speaker Frederick A.C. Muhlenberg

Party/State [NKPA] - PA

Jonathan Trumbull Jonathan Dayton Theodore Sedgwick Nathaniel Macon Joseph B. Varnum

[NKPA] - CT [NKPA] - NJ [NKPA] - MA [NKPA] - NC [NKPA] - MA

Henry Clay

R (DR) - KY

Langdon Cheves John W. Taylor

R (DR) - SC R (DR) - NY

Philip Barbour Andrew Stevenson

James L. Orr William Pennington Galusha A. Grow Schuyler Colfax Theodore M. Pomeroy James G. Blaine Michael C. Kerr Samuel J. Randall J. Warren Keifer John G. Carlisle Thomas B. Reed

R (DR) - VA [NKPA] - VA Jacksonian - VA [NKPA] - TN Jacksonian - TN W - VA W - KY D - VA D - IN W - MA D - GA D - KY American Party MAe D - SC R - NJ R - PA R - IN R - NY R - ME D - IN D - PA R - OH D - KY R - ME

Charles F. Crisp David B. Henderson Joseph G. Cannon

D - GA R - IA R - IL

John Bell James K. Polk Robert M.T. Hunter John White John W. Jones John W. Davis Robert C. Winthrop Howell Cobb Linn Boyd Nathaniel P. Banks

Congress 1st 3rd 2nd 4th-5th 6th 7th-9th 10th-11th 12th-13th 14th-16th 18th 13th 16th 19th 17th 20th 21st-23rd 23rd 24th-25th 26th 27th 28th 29th 30th 31st 32nd-33rd 34th

Dates Apr. 1, 1789-Mar. 3, 1791 Dec. 2, 1793-Mar. 3, 1795 Oct. 24, 1791-Mar. 3, 1793 Dec. 7, 1795-Mar. 3, 1799 Dec. 2, 1799-Mar. 3, 1801 Dec. 7, 1801-Mar. 3, 1807 Oct. 26, 1807-Mar. 3, 1811 Nov. 4, 1811-Jan. 19, 1814a Dec. 4, 1815-Oct. 28, 1820b Dec. 3, 1823-Mar. 6, 1825c Jan. 19, 1814-Mar. 3, 1815 Nov. 15, 1820-Mar. 3, 1821 Dec. 5, 1825-Mar. 3, 1827 Dec. 4, 1821-Mar. 3, 1823 Dec. 3, 1827-Mar. 3, 1829 Dec. 7, 1829-June 2, 1834d June 2, 1834-Mar. 3, 1835 Dec. 7, 1835-Mar. 3, 1839 Dec. 16, 1839-Mar. 3, 1841 May 31, 1841-Mar. 3, 1843 Dec. 4, 1843-Mar. 3, 1845 Dec. 1, 1845-Mar. 3, 1847 Dec. 6, 1847-Mar. 3, 1849 Dec. 22, 1849-Mar. 3, 1851 Dec. 1, 1851-Mar. 3, 1855 Feb. 2, 1856-Mar. 3, 1857

35th 36th 37th 38th-40th 40th 41st-43rd 44th 44th-46th 47th 48th-50th 51st 54th-55th 52nd-53rd 56th-57th 58th-61st

Dec. 7, 1857-Mar. 3, 1859 Feb. 1, 1860-Mar. 3, 1861 July 4, 1861-Mar. 3, 1863 Dec. 7, 1863-Mar. 3, 1869f Mar. 3, 1869g Mar. 4, 1869-Mar. 3, 1875 Dec. 6, 1875-Aug. 19, 1876h Dec. 4, 1876-Mar. 3, 1881 Dec. 5, 1881-Mar. 3, 1883 Dec. 3, 1883-Mar. 3, 1889 Dec. 2, 1889-Mar. 3, 1891 Dec. 2, 1895-Mar. 3, 1899 Dec. 7, 1891-Mar. 3, 1895 Dec. 4, 1899-Mar. 3, 1903 Nov. 9, 1903-Mar. 3, 1911

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Table. (Continued) Speaker James B. (Champ) Clark Frederick H. Gillett Nicholas Longworth John Nance Garner Henry T. Rainey Joseph W. Byrns William B. Bankhead

Party/State D - MO

Congress 62nd-65th

Dates Apr. 4, 1911-Mar. 3, 1919

R - MA R - OH D - TX D - IL D - TN D - AL

Sam T. Rayburn

D - TX

Joseph W. Martin, Jr.

R - MA

66th-68th 69th-71st 72nd 73rd 74th 74th-76th 76th-79th 81st-82nd 84th-87th 80th 83rd 87th-91st 92nd-94th 95th-99th 100th-101st 101st-103rd 104th-105th 106th-109th 110th-

May 19, 1919-Mar. 3, 1925 Dec. 7, 1925Mar. 3, 1931 Dec. 7, 1931Mar. 3, 1933 Mar. 9, 1933-Aug. 19, 1934i Jan. 3, 1935-June 4, 1936j June 4, 1936-Sept. 15, 1940k Sept. 16, 1940-Jan. 3, 1947 Jan. 3, 1949-Jan. 3, 1953 Jan. 5, 1955-Nov. 16, 1961l Jan. 3, 1947-Jan. 3, 1949 Jan. 3, 1953-Jan. 3, 1955 Jan. 10, 1962-Jan. 3, 1971 Jan. 21, 1971-Jan. 3, 1977 Jan. 4, 1977-Jan. 3, 1987 Jan. 6, 1987-June 6, 1989m June 6, 1989-Jan. 3, 1995 Jan. 4, 1995- Jan. 3, 1999 Jan. 3, 1999- Jan. 4, 2007 Jan. 4, 2007 -

John W. McCormack D - MA Carl B. Albert D - OK Thomas P. O‘Neill Jr. D - MA James C. Wright Jr. D - TX Thomas S. Foley D - WA Newt Gingrich R - GA J. Dennis Hastert R - IL Nancy Pelosi D - CA Notes: Party affiliations are indicated by initials: [NKPA] - No Known Party Affiliation R (DR) - Republican or Democratic-Republican Party (the Jeffersonian precursor of the Democratic Party) W - Whig Party D - Democratic Party R - Republican Party a. Resigned from office, January 19, 1814, to serve on the negotiating team that produced the Treaty of Ghent,ending the War of 1812. b. Resigned from the speakership, October 28, 1820. c. Resigned from office, March 6, 1825, to serve as Secretary of State. d. Resigned from office, June 2, 1834. e. Speaker Banks served in the House three separate times under three different party designations. In the34th Congress, he served as a member of the American Party. f. Resigned from office, March 3, 1869, to serve as Vice President. g. Elected Speaker, March 3, 1869, and served one day. h. Died in office, August 19, 1876. i. Died in office, August 19, 1934. j. Died in office, June 4, 1936. k. Died in office, September 15, 1940. l. Died in office, November 16, 1961. m. Speaker Wright resigned the speakership on June 6, 1989, and subsequently resigned from the House onJune 30, 1989.

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Valerie Heitshusen

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APPENDIX B. SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY Albert, Carl Bert. (1990). Little Giant: The Life and Times of Speaker Carl Albert. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Bentley, Judith. (1994). Speakers of the House. New York: Franklin Watts Inc. Biggs, Jeffrey R. (1999). Honor in the House: Speaker Tom Foley. Pullman: University of Washington Press. Clancy, Paul R. (1980). Tip, A Biography of Thomas P. O‟Neill, Speaker of the House. New York: Macmillan. Cheney, Richard B. & Lynne V. Cheney. (1983). Kings of the Hill: Power and Personality in the House of Representatives. New York: Continuum. Chiu, Chang-wei. (1968). The Speaker of the House of Representatives Since 1896. New York: Columbia University Press, 1928; reprint edition New York: AMS Press. Cooper, Joseph & David W. Brady. (1981). ―Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The HouseFrom Cannon to Rayburn,‖ American Political Science Review, vol. 75, (June). Davidson, Roger H., Susan Webb Hammond, & Raymond Smock. (1998). Masters of the House: Congressional Leadership Over Two Centuries. Boulder, CO: West Press. Follett, Mary P. (1974). The Speaker of the House of Representatives. New York: Longmans Green, 1902; reprint edition New York: Burt Franklin. Fuller, Hubert Bruce. (1974). The Speaker of the House. Boston: Little Brown, 1909; reprint edition New York: Arno Press. Harris, Douglas B. (1998). ―The Rise of the Public Speakership,‖ Political Science Quarterly, vol. 113, (summer). Hinds, Asher C. (1909). ―The Speaker of the House of Representatives: Origin of the Office, Its Duties and Powers,‖ American Political Science Review, vol. 3, (May). Hitchner, Dell G. (1960). ―The Speaker of the House of Representatives,‖ Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 13, (spring). Kennon, Donald R., ed. (1986). The Speakers of the U.S. House of Representatives: A Bibliography, 1789-1984. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Moser, Charles A. (1979). The Speaker and the House: Coalitions and Power in the United States Houseof Representatives. Washington: Free Congress Research and Education Foundation. O‘Neill, Thomas P. Jr. (1987). Man of the House. New York: Random House. Peters, Ronald M. (1997). The American Speakership: The Office in Historical Perspective (2nd ed.).Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. ——, ed. (1995). The Speaker: Leadership in the U.S. House of Representatives. Washington: Congressional Quarterly. Peabody, Robert L. (1976). Leadership in Congress: Stability, Succession, and Change. Boston: Little Brown. Ripley, Randall B. (1967). Party Leaders in the House of Representatives. Washington: Brookings Institution. Rohde, David W. (1991). Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Sinclair, Barbara. (1983). Majority Leadership in the U.S. House. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

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——. (1995). Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking: The U.S. House of Representatives in the Postreform Era. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Smith, Steven S. ―O‘Neill‘s Legacy for the House,‖ Brookings Review, v. 5 (winter 1987). Smith, William Henry. (1971). Speakers of the House of Representatives of the United States. New York: AMS Press.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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This report was written by James V. Saturno. The listed author has updated the report and is available to respond to any inquiries on the topic.

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In: Political Leadership and its Significance in a Time… ISBN: 978-1-61668-396-2 Editor: Anna L. Larsen © 2011 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 9

THE ROLE OF THE HOUSE MINORITY LEADER: AN OVERVIEW 

Walter J. Oleszek*

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SUMMARY The House minority leader is head of the ―loyal opposition.‖ The party‘s nominee for Speaker, the minority leader is elected every two years by secret ballot of his or her party caucus or conference. The minority leader‘s responsibilities involve an array of duties. Fundamentally, the primary goal of the minority leader is to recapture majority control of the House. In addition, the minority leader performs important institutional and party functions. From an institutional perspective, the rules of the House assign a number of specific responsibilities to the minority leader. For example, Rule XIII, clause 6, grants the minority leader (or his designee) the right to offer a motion to recommit with instructions; and Rule II, clause 6, states that the Inspector General shall be appointed by joint recommendation of the Speaker, majority leader, and minority leader. The minority leader also has other institutional duties, such as appointing individuals to certain federal or congressional entities. From a party perspective, the minority leader has a wide range of partisan assignments, all geared toward retaking majority control of the House. Five principal party activities direct the work of the minority leader. First, he or she provides campaign assistance to party incumbents and challengers. Second, the minority leader devises strategies, in consultation with other partisan colleagues, that advance party objectives. For example, by stalling action on the majority party‘s agenda, the minority leader may be able to launch a campaign against a ―do-nothing Congress.‖ Third, the minority leader works to promote and publicize the party‘s agenda. Fourth, the minority leader, if his or her party controls the White House, confers regularly with the President and his aides about issues before Congress, the



This is an edited, reformatted and augmented version of a CRS Report for Congress publication dated January 2009. * Email: woleszek@crs. loc. gov, 7-7854 Political Leadership and its Significance in a Time of Troubles, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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Administration‘s agenda, and political events generally. Fifth, the minority leader strives to promote party harmony so as to maximize the chances for legislative and political success.

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INTRODUCTION The minority leader of the modern House is the head of the ―loyal opposition.‖ The party‘s nominee for Speaker at the start of a new Congress, the minority leader traditionally hands the gavel to the Speaker-elect, who is nearly always elected on a straight party-line vote. The speakership election spotlights the main problem that confronts the minority leader: the subordinate status of his or her party in an institution noted for majority rule. The House, said a Democratic leader at a time when his party was in the majority, ―operates under the principle that a determined majority should be allowed to work its will while protecting the rights of the minority to be heard.‖1 Minority party lawmakers are certain to be heard, but whether they will be heeded is sometimes another matter. Thus, the uppermost goal of any minority leader is to recapture majority control of the House. The minority leader is elected every two years by secret ballot of his or her party caucus or conference. These party leaders are typically experienced lawmakers when they win election to this position. When Nancy Pelosi, D-CA, became minority leader in the 108th Congress, she had served in the House nearly 20 years and had served as minority whip in the 107th Congress. When her predecessor, Richard Gephardt, D-MO, became minority leader in the 104th House, he had been in the House for almost 20 years, had served as chairman of the Democratic Caucus for four years, had been a 1988 presidential candidate, and had been majority leader from June 1989 until Republicans captured control of the House in the November 1994 elections. Gephardt‘s predecessor in the minority leadership position was Robert Michel, R-IL, who became GOP leader in 1981 after spending 24 years in the House. Michel‘s predecessor, Republican John Rhodes of Arizona, was elected minority leader in 1973 after 20 years of House service. The minority leader of today‘s 111th Congress, John Boehner of Ohio, began his House career after winning his seat in the November 1990 elections. The roles and responsibilities of the minority leader are not well-defined. To a large extent, the functions of the minority leader are defined by tradition and custom. A minority leader from 1931 to 1939, Representative Bertrand Snell, R-N.Y., provided this ―job description‖: ―He is spokesman for his party and enunciates its policies. He is required to be alert and vigilant in defense of the minority‘s rights. It is his function and duty to criticize constructively the policies and programs of the majority, and to this end employ parliamentary tactics and give close attention to all proposed legislation.‖2 Since Snell‘s description, other responsibilities have been added to the job. These duties involve an array of institutional and party functions. Before examining the institutional and party assignments of the minority leader, it is worth highlighting the historical origin of this position.

1

Congressional Record, Sept. 16, 1982, p. H7097. Quoted in Floyd M. Riddick, Congressional Procedure (Boston: Chapman and Grimes, 1941), p. 346.

2

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ORIGIN OF THE MINORITY LEADER’S POST To a large extent, the minority leader‘s position is a 20th century innovation. Prior to this time congressional parties were often relatively disorganized, so it was not always evident who functioned as the opposition floor leader. Decades went by before anything like our modern two-party congressional system emerged on Capitol Hill with official titles for those who were its official leaders. However, from the beginning days of Congress, various House members intermittently assumed the role of ―opposition leader.‖ Some scholars suggest that Representative James Madison of Virginia informally functioned as the first ―minority leader‖ because in the First Congress he led the opposition to Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton‘s fiscal policies.3 During this early period, it was more usual that neither major party grouping (Federalists and Republicans) had an official leader. In 1813, for instance, a scholar recounts that the Federalist minority of 36 Members needed a committee of 13 ―to represent a party comprising a distinct minority‖ and ―to coordinate the actions of men who were already partisans in the same cause.‖4 In 1828, a foreign observer of the House offered this perspective on the absence of formal party leadership on Capitol Hill:

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I found there were absolutely no persons holding the stations of what are called, in England, Leaders, on either side of the House.... It is true, that certain members do take charge of administration questions, and certain others of opposition questions; but all this so obviously without concert among themselves, actual or tacit, that nothing can be conceived 5 less systematic or more completely desultory, disjointed.

Internal party disunity compounded the difficulty of identifying lawmakers who might have informally functioned as a minority leader. For instance, ―seven of the fourteen speakership elections from 1834 through 1859 had at least twenty different candidates in the field. Thirty-six competed in 1839, ninety-seven in 1849, ninety-one in 1859, and 138 in 1855.‖6 With so many candidates competing for the speakership, it is not at all clear that one of the defeated lawmakers then assumed the mantle of ―minority leader.‖ The Democratic minority from 1861 to 1875 was so completely disorganized that they did not ―nominate a candidate for Speaker in two of these seven Congresses and nominated no man more than once in the other five. The defeated candidates were not automatically looked to for leadership.‖7 In the judgment of a political scientist, since 1883 ―the candidate for Speaker nominated by the minority party has clearly been the Minority Leader.‖8 However, this assertion is subject to dispute. On December 3, 1883, the House elected Democrat John G. Carlisle of Kentucky as Speaker. Republicans placed in nomination for the speakership J. Warren Keifer

3

See Garrison Nelson, ―Leadership Position-Holding in the United States House of Representatives,‖ Capitol Studies, Fall 1976, p. 17. 4 James Sterling Young, The Washington Community, 1800-1 828 (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1966), pp. 135-136. 5 Ibid., p. 137. 6 Nelson, ―Leadership Position-Holding in the United States House of Representatives,‖ p. 18. 7 Randall B. Ripley, Party Leaders in the House of Representatives, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 28n. 8 Ibid., p. 28.

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of Ohio, who was Speaker the previous Congress.9 Clearly, Keifer was not the Republicans‘ minority leader. He was a discredited leader in part because as Speaker he arbitrarily handed out ―choice jobs to close relatives ... all at handsome salaries.‖10 Keifer received ―the empty honor of the minority nomination. But with it came a sting—for while this naturally involves the floor leadership, he was deserted by his [partisan] associates and his career as a national figure terminatedingloriously.‖11 Representative Thomas Reed, R-ME, who later became Speaker, assumed the de facto role of minority floor leader in Keifer‘s stead. ―[A]lthough Keifer was the minority‘s candidate for Speaker, Reed became its acknowledged leader, and ever after, so long as he served in the House, remained the most conspicuous member of his party.‖12 Another scholar contends that the minority leader position emerged even before 1883. On the Democratic side, ―there were serious caucus fights for the minority speakership nomination in 1871 and 1873,‖ indicating that the ―nomination carried with it some vestige of leadership.‖13 Further, when Republicans were in the minority, the party nominated for Speaker a series of prominent lawmakers, including ex-Speaker James Blaine of Maine in 1875, former Appropriations Chairman James Garfield of Ohio, in 1876, 1877, and 1879, and ex-Speaker Keifer in 1883. ―It is hard to believe that House partisans would place a man in the speakership when in the majority, and nominate him for this office when in the minority, and not look to him for legislative guidance.‖14 This was not the case, as noted earlier, with respect to ex-Speaker Keifer. In brief, there is disagreement among historical analysts as to the exact time period when the minority leadership emerged officially as a party position. Nonetheless, it seems safe to conclude that the position emerged during the latter part of the 19th century, a period of strong party organization and professional politicians. This era was ―marked by strong partisan attachments, resilient patronage-based party organizations, and ... high levels of party voting in Congress.‖15 Plainly, these were conditions conducive to the establishment of a more highly differentiated House leadership structure.16 (See Appendix for a listing of House minority leaders, 1899-2009.) Two other points of historical interest merit brief mention. First, until the 61st Congress (1909- 1910), ―it was the custom to have the minority leader also serve as the ranking minority member on the two most powerful committees, Rules and Ways and Means.‖17 Today, the minority leader no longer serves on these committees; however, he or she appoints the minority members of the Rules Committee and influences the assignment of partisan colleagues to the Ways and Means Committee. Second, Democrats have always elevated their minority floor leader to the speakership upon reclaiming majority status. Republicans have not always followed this leadership succession pattern. In 1919, for instance, Republicans 9

Congressional Record, Dec. 3, 1883, pp. 4-5. Neil McNeil, Forge of Democracy: The House of Representatives (New York: David McKay Co., 1963), p. 70. 11 Herbert Bruce Fuller, The Speakers of the House (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1909), p. 208. 12 DeAlva Stanwood Alexander, History and Procedure of the House of Representatives (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1916), p. 131. 13 Nelson, ―Leadership Position-Holding in the United States House of Representatives,‖ p. 19. 14 Ibid. 15 Randall Strahan, ―Thomas Brackett Reed and the Rise of Party Government,‖ in Roger Davidson, et al., eds., Masters of the House (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998), p. 36. 16 See Nelson Polsby, ―The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives,‖ American Political Science Review, Sept. 1968, pp. 144-168. 17 Charles O. Jones, The Minority Party in Congress (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970), p. 31. 10

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bypassed James R. Mann, R-IL, who had been minority leader for eight years, and elected Frederick Gillett, R-MA, to be Speaker. Mann ―had angered many Republicans by objecting to their private bills on the floor;‖ plus, he was a protégé of autocratic Speaker Joseph Cannon, R-IL (1903-1911), and many Members ―suspected that he would try to recentralize power in his hands if elected Speaker.‖18

INSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS The style and role of any minority leader is influenced by a variety of elements, including personality and contextual factors, such as the size and cohesion of the minority party, whether his or her party controls the White House, the general political climate in the House, and the controversy that is sometimes associated with the legislative agenda. Despite the variability ofthese factors, there are a number of institutional obligations associated with this position. Many of these assignments or roles are spelled out in the House rule book. Others have devolved upon the position in other ways. To be sure, the minority leader is provided with extra staff resources— beyond those accorded him or her as a Representative—to assist in carrying out diverseleadership functions. Worth emphasis is that there are limits on the institutional role of the minority leader, because the majority party exercises disproportionate influence over the agenda, partisan ratios on committees, staff resources, administrative operations, and the day-to-day schedule and management of floor activities. Under the rules of the House, the minority leader has certain roles and responsibilities. They include, among others, the following:

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Drug Testing Under Rule I, clause 9, the ―Speaker, in consultation with the Minority Leader, shall develop through an appropriate entity of the House a system for drug testing in the House.‖

Inspector General Rule II, clause 6, states that the ―Inspector General shall be appointed for a Congress by the Speaker, the Majority Leader, and the Minority Leader, acting jointly.‖ This rule further states that the minority leader and other specified House leaders shall be notified of any financial irregularity involving the House and receive audit reports of the inspector general.

Questions of Privilege Under Rule IX, clause 2, a resolution ―offered as a question of privilege by the Majority Leader or the Minority Leader ... shall have precedence of all other questions except motions 18

Ripley, Party Leaders in the House of Representatives, pp. 98-99.

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to adjourn.‖ This rule further references the minority leader with respect to the division of time for debate of these resolutions.

Oversight Plans Under Rule X, clause 2, not later ―than March 31 in the first session of a Congress, after consultation with the Speaker, the Majority Leader, and the Minority Leader, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform shall report to the House the oversight plans‖ of the standing committees along with any recommendations it or the House leaders have proposed to ensure the effective coordination of committees‘ oversight plans.

Committee on Standards of Official Conduct: Investigative Subcommittees Rule X, clause 5, stipulates: ―At the beginning of a Congress, the Speaker or his designee and the Minority Leader or his designee each shall appoint 10 Members, Delegates, or Resident Commissioners from his respective party who are not members of the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct to be available to serve on investigative subcommittees of that committee during that Congress.‖

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Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence ―The Speaker and Minority Leader shall be ex officio members of the select committee but shall have no vote in the select committee and may not be counted for purposes of determining a quorum thereof.‖ In addition, each leader ―may designate a member of his leadership staff to assist him in his capacity as ex officio member.‖ (Rule X, clause 11).

Motion to Recommit with Instructions Under Rule XIII, clause 6, the Rules Committee may not (except in certain specified circumstances) issue a ―rule‖ that prevents the minority leader or a designee from offering a motion to recommit with instructions. In addition, the minority leader has a number of other institutional functions. For instance, the minority leader is sometimes statutorily authorized to appoint individuals to certain federal entities;19 he or she and the majority leader each name three Members to serve 19

For example, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-343) created a ―Congressional Oversight Panel‖ to oversee the administration of the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP)—the $700 billion program to address the nation‘s financial crisis that began in the housing industry. The minority leader has exclusive authority to name one of the five members to the Panel. Worth mention is that the House, by resolution (H.Res. 895), created an Office of Congressional Ethics on March 11, 2008. The Speaker and minority leader are each authorized to name— subject to the approval of the other party leader—three private citizens (plus an alternate) to the six-member ethics board. The board may initiate investigations or refer ethics matters to the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct.

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as Private Calendar objectors; he or she is consulted with respect to reconvening the House per the usual formulation of conditional concurrent adjournment resolutions; he or she is a traditional member of the House Office Building Commission; he or she is a member of the United States Capitol Preservation Commission; and he or she may, after consultation with the Speaker, convene an early organizational party caucus or conference. Informally, the minority leader maintains ties with majority party leaders to learn about the schedule and other House matters and forges agreements or understandings with them insofar as feasible.

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PARTY FUNCTIONS The minority leader has a number of formal and informal party responsibilities. Formally, the rules of each party specify certain roles and responsibilities for their leader. For example, under Republican Conference rules for the 111th Congress, the minority leader ―may designate certain issues as ‗Leadership Issues.‘ Those issues will require early and ongoing cooperation between the relevant committees and the Leadership as those issues evolve.‖ GOP Conference meetings―may be called at any time by the chair of the Conference,‖ after consultation with the minority leader. The minority leader, or a designee, ―may present any resolution to the Conference for its immediate consideration.‖ The minority leader nominates party members to the Committee on Rules and the House Administration Committee, subject to Conference approval. The GOP leader is a member of the party‘s Policy Committee and the National Republican Congressional Committee. As a final example, the minority leader exercises ―supervisory authority over all Republican employees of the House of Representatives, and direct authority over the Republican Floor Assistants and Republican Conference.‖ Informally, the minority leader has a wide range of party assignments. Lewis Deschler, the late House Parliamentarian (1928-1974), summarized the diverse duties of a party‘s floor leader: A party‘s floor leader, in conjunction with other party leaders, plays an influential role in the formulation of party policy and programs. He is instrumental in guiding legislation favored by his party through the House, or in resisting those programs of the other party that are considered undesirable by his own party. He is instrumental in devising and implementing his party‘s strategy on the floor with respect to promoting or opposing legislation. He is kept constantly informed as to the status of legislative business and as to the sentiment of his party respecting particular legislation under consideration. Such information is derived in part from the floor leader‘s contacts with his party‘s members serving on House committees, and with the members of the party‘s whip organization.20

These and several other party roles merit further mention because they influence significantly the leader‘s overarching objective: retake majority control of the House. ―I want to get [my] members elected and win more seats,‖ said Minority Leader Richard Gephardt, D-

20

Lewis Deschler, Deschler‟s Precedents of the United States House of Representatives, Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 211-212.

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MO. ―That‘s what [my partisan colleagues] want to do, and that‘s what they want me to do.‖21 Five activities illustrate how minority leaders seek to accomplish this primary goal.

Provide Campaign Assistance Minority leaders are typically energetic and aggressive campaigners for partisan incumbents and challengers. There is hardly any major aspect of campaigning that does not engage their attention. For example, they assist in recruiting qualified candidates; they establish ―leadership PACs‖ to raise and distribute funds to House candidates of their party; they try to persuade partisan colleagues not to retire or run for other offices so as to hold down the number of open seats the party would need to defend; they coordinate their campaign activities with congressional and national party campaign committees; they encourage outside groups to back their candidates; they travel around the country to speak on behalf of party candidates; and they encourage incumbent colleagues to make significant financial contributions to the party‘s campaign committee.

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Devise Minority Party Strategies The minority leader, in consultation with other party colleagues, has a range of strategic options that he or she can employ to advance minority party objectives. The options selected depend on awide range of circumstances, such as the visibility or significance of the issue and the degree of cohesion within the majority party. For instance, a majority party riven by internal dissension, as occurred during the early 1900s when Progressive and ―regular‖ Republicans were at loggerheads, may provide the minority leader with greater opportunities to achieve his or her priorities than if the majority party exhibited high degrees of party cohesion. Among the variable strategies available to the minority party, which can vary from bill to bill and be used in combination or at different stages of the lawmaking process, are the following: Cooperation. The minority party supports and cooperates with the majority party in building winning coalitions on the floor. Inconsequential Opposition. The minority party offers opposition, but it is of marginal significance, typically because the minority is so small. Withdrawal. The minority party chooses not to take a position on an issue, perhaps because of intraparty divisions. Innovation. The minority party develops alternatives and agendas of its own and attempts to construct winning coalitions on their behalf.

21

Guy Gugliotta, ―For Minority Leader, A Matter of Consensus; Inquiry Vote Tests Gephardt‘s Skills,‖ The Washington Post, Oct. 8, 1998, p. A18.

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Partisan Opposition. The minority party offers strong opposition to majority party initiatives, but does not counter with policy alternatives of their own. Constructive Opposition. The minority party opposes initiatives of the majority party, and offers its own proposals as substitutes. Participation. The minority party is in the position of having to consider the views and proposals of their president and to assess their majority-building role with respect to his priorities.22 A look at one minority leadership strategy—partisan opposition—may suggest why it might be employed in specific circumstances. The purposes of obstruction are several, such as frustrating the majority party‘s ability to govern or attracting press and media attention to the alleged ineffectiveness of the majority party. ―We know how to delay,‖ remarked Minority Leader Gephardt.23 Dilatory motions to adjourn, appeals of the presiding officer‘s ruling, or numerous requests for roll call votes are standard time-consuming parliamentary tactics. By stalling action on the majority party‘s agenda, the minority leader may be able to launch a campaign against a ―do-nothing Congress‖ and convince enough voters to put his party back in charge of the House. To be sure, the minority leader recognizes that ―going negative‖ carries risks and may not be a winning strategy if his party fails to offer policy alternatives that appeal to broad segments of the general public.

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Promote and Publicize the Party’s Agenda An important aim of the minority leader is to develop an electorally attractive agenda of ideas and proposals that unites his or her own House members and that energizes and appeals to coreelectoral supporters as well as independents and swing voters. Despite the minority leader‘s restricted ability to set the House‘s agenda, there are still opportunities for him to raise minority priorities. For example, the minority leader may employ, or threaten to use, discharge petitions to try and bring minority priorities to the floor.24 If he or she is able to attract the required 218 signatures on a discharge petition by attracting majority party supporters, he or she can force minority initiatives to the floor over the opposition of the majority leadership. As a GOP minority leader once said, the challenges he confronted are to ―keep our people together, and to look for votes on the other side.‖25 Minority leaders may engage in numerous activities to publicize their party‘s priorities and to criticize the opposition‘s. For instance, to keep their party colleagues ―on message,‖ they insure that partisan colleagues are sent packets of suggested press releases or ―talking points‖ for constituent meetings in their districts; they help to organize ―town meetings‖ in Members‘ districts around the country to publicize the party‘s agenda or a specific priority, 22

These strategic options have been modified to a degree and come from Jones, The Minority Party in Congress, p. 20. 23 Jennifer Babson, ―Democrats Refine the Tactics of Minority Party Power,‖ Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, July 15, 1995, p. 2037. 24 Ethan Wallison, ―Gephardt Plans Petition Strategy,‖ Roll Call, May 17, 1999, p. 1. 25 Irwin Arieff, ―Inside Congress,‖ Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Feb. 28, 1981, p. 379.

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such as health care or education; they sponsor party ―retreats‖ to discuss issues and assess the party‘s public image; they create ―theme teams‖ to craft party messages that might be raised during the one- minute, morning hour, or special order period in the House; they conduct surveys of party colleagues to discern their policy preferences; they establish Web sites that highlight and distribute party images and issues to users; they organize task forces or issue teams to formulate party programs and to develop strategies for communicating these programs to the public; and they appear on various media programs or write newspaper articles to win public support for the party‘s priorities. House minority leaders also hold joint news conferences with party colleagues and consult with their counterparts in the Senate. The overall objectives are to develop a coordinated communications strategy, to share ideas and information, and to present a united front on issues. Minority leaders also make floor speeches and close debate on major issues before the House; they deliver addresses in diverse forums across the country; and they write books or articles that highlight minority party goals and achievements. They must also be prepared ―to debate on the floor, ad lib, no notes, on a moment‘s notice,‖ remarked Minority Leader Michel.26 In brief, minority leaders are key strategists in developing and promoting the party‘s agenda and in outlining ways to neutralize the opposition‘s arguments and proposals.

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Confer with the White House If his or her party controls the White House, the minority leader confers regularly with the President and his aides about issues before the Congress, the Administration‘s agenda, and political events generally. Strategically, the role of the minority leader will vary depending on whether the President is of the same party or the other party. In general, minority leaders will often work to advance the goals and aspirations of their party‘s President in Congress. When Robert Michel, R-IL, was minority leader (1981-1995), he typically functioned as the ―point man‖ for Republican presidents.27 President Ronald Reagan‘s 1981 policy successes in the Democratic controlled House was due in no small measure to Minority Leader Michel‘seffectiveness in wooing so-called ―Reagan Democrats‖ to support, for instance, the Administration‘s landmark budget reconciliation bill. There are occasions, of course, when minority leaders will fault the legislative initiatives of their President. On an administration proposal that could adversely affect his district, Michel stated that he might ―abdicate my leadership role [on this issue] since I can‘t harmonize my own views with the administration‘s.‖28 Minority Leader Gephardt, as another example, has publicly opposed a number of President Clinton‘s legislative initiatives from ―fast track‖ trade authority to various budget issues.29 When the President and House majority are of the same party, then the House minority leader assumes a larger role in formulating alternatives to executive branch initiatives and in acting as a national spokesperson for his or her party. ―As Minority Leader during [President 26

Congressional Record, Sept. 12, 1989, p. E3000. William F. Connelly, Jr. and John J. Pitney, Jr., Congress‟ Permanent Minority? Republicans in the U.S. House (Lanham, Maryland: Littlefield Adams, 1994), p. 15. 28 Dorothy Collin, ―Michel Plays to Peoria—and U.S.,‖ Chicago Tribune, Aug. 16, 1982, p. 2. 29 See Jim Vande Hei, ―White House Sidesteps Gephardt‘s Leadership,‖ Roll Call, July 7, 1997, p. 1. 27

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Lyndon Johnson‘s] Democratic administration, my responsibility has been to propose Republican alternatives,‖ said Minority Leader Gerald Ford, R-MI.30 Greatly outnumbered in the House, Minority Leader Ford devised a political strategy that allowed Republicans to offer their alternatives in a manner that provided them political protection. As Ford explained: ―We used a technique of laying our program out in general debate,‖ he said. When we got to the amendment phase, we would offer our program as a substitute for the Johnson proposal. If we lost in the Committee of the Whole, then we would usually offer it as a motion to recommit and get a vote on that. And if we lost on the motion to recommit, our Republican members had a choice: They could vote against the Johnson program and say we did our best to come up with a better alternative. Or they could vote for it and make the same argument. Usually we lost; but when you‘re only 140 out of 435, you don‘t expect to win many. 31

Ford also teamed with Senate Minority Leader Everett McKinley Dirksen, R-IL, to act as national spokesmen for their party. They met with the press every Thursday following the weekly joint leadership meeting. Ford‘s predecessor as minority leader, Charles Halleck, RIN, probably received more visibility in this role, because the press and media dubbed it the ―Ev and Charlie Show.‖ In fact, the ―Republican National Committee budgeted $30,000 annually to produce the weekly news conference.‖32

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Foster Party Harmony Minority status, by itself, is often an important inducement for minority party members to stay together, to accommodate different interests, and to submerge intraparty factional disagreements. To hold a diverse membership together often requires extensive consultations and discussions with rank-and-file Members and with different factional groupings. As Minority Leader Gephardt said: We have weekly caucus meetings. We have daily leadership meetings. We have weekly ranking Member meetings. We have party effectiveness meetings. There‘s a lot more communication. I believe leadership is bottom up, not top down. I think you have to build policy and strategy and vision from the bottom up, and involve people in figuring out what that is.33

Gephardt added that ―inclusion and empowerment of the people on the line have to be done to get the best performance‖ from the minority party.34 Other techniques for fostering party harmony include the appointment of task forces composed of partisan colleagues with conflicting views to reach consensus on issues; the creation of new leadership positions as a way to reach out and involve a greater diversity of partisans in the leadership structure; and 30

James M. Cannon, ―Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, 1965-1973,‖ in Masters of the House, p. 275. Ibid., p. 271. 32 Burdette Loomis, ―The Consummate Minority Leader: Everette M. Dirksen,‖ in Richard Baker and Roger Davidson, eds., First Among Equals (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1991), p. 250. 33 Eliza Newlin Carney, ―Don‘t Count Us Out,‖ National Journal, Apr. 29, 1995, p. 1024. 34 Davidson, et al., Masters of the House, p. 323. 31

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daily meetings in the Leader‘s office (or at breakfast, lunch, or dinner) to lay out floor strategy or political objectives for the minority party.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS Given the concentration of agenda control and other institutional resources in the majority leadership, the minority leader has his work cut out for him in promoting and publicizing his or her party‘s priorities, serving the interests of his rank-and-file Members, managing intraparty conflict, and forging party unity. The ultimate goal of the minority leader is to lead his or her party to majority control. Yet there is no set formula on how this is to be done. ―If the history of elections is any guide, it seems apparent that the congressional record of the minority party is only one of many factors that may result in majority status. Most of the other factors cannot be controlled by the minority party and its leaders.‖35

APPENDIX. HOUSE MINORITY LEADERS, 1899-2009

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Minority Leader James D. Richardson, D-TN Richardson John Sharp Williams, D-MS Williams Williams/Champ Clark, D-MOa Clark James R. Mann, R-IL Mann Mann Mann Clark Claude Kitchin, D-NC Finis J. Garrett, D-TN Garrett Garrett John N. Garner, D-TX Betrand H. Snell, R-NY Snell Snell Snell Joseph W. Martin Jr., R-MA Martin Martin Martin 35

Congress 56th(1899-1901) 57th(1901-1903) 58th(1903-1905) 59th(1905-1907) 60th(1907-1909) 61st(1909-1911) 62nd(1911-1913) 63rd(1913-1915) 64th(1915-1917) 65th(1917-1919) 66th(1919-1921) 67th(1921-1923) 68th(1923-1925) 69th(1925-1927) 70th(1927-1929) 71st(1929-1931) 72nd(1931-1933) 73rd(1933-1935) 74th(1935-1937) 75th(1937-1939) 76th(1939-1941) 77th(1941-1943) 78th(1943-1945) 79th(1945-1947)

Jones, The Minority Party in Congress, p. 23. Emphasis in the original statement.

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Sam Rayburn, D-TX 80th(1947-1949) Martin 81st(1949-1951) Martin 82nd(1951-1953) Rayburn 83rd(1953-1955) Martin 84th(1955-1957) Charles A. Halleck, R-IN 86th(1959-1961) Halleck 87th(1961-1963) Halleck 88th(1963-1965) Gerald R. Ford, R-MI 89th (1965-1967) Ford 90th(1967-1969) Ford 91st (1969-1971) Ford 92nd(1971-1973) Ford/John J. Rhodes, R-AZb 93rd(1973-1975) Rhodes 94th(1975-1977) Rhodes 95th(1977-1979) Rhodes 96th(1979-1981) Robert H. Michel, R-IL 97th(1981-1983) Michel 98th(1983-1985) Michel 99th(1985-1987) Michel 100th(1987-1989) Michel 101st(1989-1991) Michel 102nd(1991-1993) Michel 103rd(1993-1995) Richard A. Gephardt, D-MO 104th(1995-1997) Gephardt 105th(1997-1999) Gephardt 106th(1999-2001) Gephardt 107th(2001-2003) Nancy Pelosi, D-CA 107th(2001-2003) Pelosi 109th(2005-2006) John Boehner, R-OH 110th(2007-2009) Boehner 111th(2009-2011) Source: Guide to Congress, Fifth Edition, Vol. II, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2000, pp. 1102-1103. a. Clark became minority leader in 1908. b. Rhodes became minority leader on Dec. 7, 1973, filling the vacancy caused by the resignation of Ford on Dec. 6, 1973, to become vice president.

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In: Political Leadership and its Significance in a Time… ISBN: 978-1-61668-396-2 Editor: Anna L. Larsen © 2011 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 10

THE ROLE OF THE HOUSE MAJORITY LEADER: AN OVERVIEW 

Walter J. Oleszek*

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SUMMARY The majority leader in the contemporary House is second-in-command behind the Speaker of the majority party. Typically, the majority leader functions as the Speaker‘s chief lieutenant or ―field commander‖ for day-to-day management of the floor. Although the majority leader‘s duties are not especially well-defined, they have evolved to the point where it is possible to spotlight two fundamental and often interlocking responsibilities that orient the majority leader‘s work: institutional and party. From an institutional perspective, the majority leader has a number of duties. Scheduling floor business is a prime responsibility of the majority leader. Although scheduling the House‘s business is a collective activity of the majority party, the majority leader has a large say in shaping the chamber‘s overall agenda and in determining when, whether, how, or in what order legislation is taken up. In addition, the majority leader is active in constructing winning coalitions for the party‘s legislative priorities; acting as a public spokesman— defending and explaining the party‘s program and agenda; serving as an emissary to the White House, especially when the President is of the same party; and facilitating the orderly conduct of the House‘s business. From a party perspective, three key activities undergird the majority leader‘s principal goal of trying to ensure that the party remains in control of the House. First, the majority leader assists in the reelection campaigns of party incumbents by, for example, raising campaign funds and traveling to scores of House districts to campaign either with incumbents or challengers of the party. Second, the majority leader promotes the party‘s agenda by developing themes and issues important to core supporters in the electorate. Third, the 

This is an edited, reformatted and augmented version of a CRS Report for Congress publication dated January 2009. * Email: woleszek@crs. loc. gov, 7-7854 Political Leadership and its Significance in a Time of Troubles, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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majority leader encourages party cohesion by, for instance, working to minimize internal factional disagreements that may undermine the majority party‘s ability to govern the House.

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INTRODUCTION The majority leader in the contemporary House is second-in-command behind the Speaker of the majority party. Typically, the majority leader functions as the Speaker‘s chief lieutenant or ―field commander‖ for day-to-day management of the floor. ―I‘m the Speaker‘s agent,‖ stated a recent majority leader.1 Another majority leader said: ―I see it that [the Speaker] is the chairman of the board and I am the chief executive officer.‖2 Or as one Speaker put it, the majority leader‘s ―job is to run the floor and keep monitoring committees and legislation.33 Elected every two years by secret ballot of the party caucus or conference, the majority leader is usually an experienced legislator. For example, Representative Richard Armey of Texas became the GOP‘s first majority leader in 40 years when Republicans won control of the 104th House in the November 1994 elections. Armey began his House service in 1985, became GOP Conference chairman during the 1 03rd Congress, and was one of the principal authors of the Republican ―Contract with America.‖ When Richard Gephardt, D-MO, became majority leader in June 1989, he had been in the House for more than a decade, had served as chairman of the Democratic Caucus for four years, and had been a 1988 presidential candidate. Two fundamental and often interlocking responsibilities orient the work of the majority leader: institutional and party. From an institutional perspective, the majority leader is principally responsible for exercising overall supervision of the order of business on the floor, especially as it affects the party‘s program. As Lewis Deschler, the late House parliamentarian (1928-1974), wrote: A party‘s floor leader, in conjunction with other party leaders, plays an influential role in the formulation of party policy and programs. He is instrumental in guiding legislation favored by his party through the House, or in resisting those programs of the other party that are considered undesirable by his own party. He is instrumental in devising and implementing his party‘s strategy on the floor with respect to promoting or opposing legislation. He is kept constantly informed as to the status of legislative business and as to the sentiment of his party respecting particular legislation under consideration. Such information is derived in part from the floor leader‘s contacts with his party‘s members serving on House committees, and with the members of the party‘s whip organization.4

From a partisan perspective, the majority leader‘s paramount assignment is to employ his or her talents, energy, and knowledge of procedural rules and political circumstances to insure that the party maintains majority control of the House. Each of these major responsibilities 1

Mark Wegner, ―The Speaker‘s Agent,‖ National Journal‘s CongressDailyAM, May 14, 2002, p. 16. Jonathan Kaplan, ―Hastert, DeLay: Political Pros Get Along To Go Along,‖ The Hill, July 22, 2003, p. 8. 3 Alan Ota, ―Setbacks Test Hastert‘s Leadership Style,‖ CQ Today, May 4, 2005, p. 24. 4 Lewis Deschler, Deschler ‟s Precedents of the United States House of Representatives, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), pp. 211-212. 2

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gives rise to a wide range of leadership activities. Before discussing the primary duties of the majority leader, it is worth highlighting the historical origins of this party position.

ORIGIN OF THE MAJORITY LEADER POSITION

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Congressional scholars assert that in 1899 Speaker David Henderson, R-Iowa, appointed Sereno E. Payne, R-NY, as the first officially designated majority leader.5 Prior to this date, there is neither an accurate nor complete compilation of House majority leaders. Two factors seem to account for the absence of a compilation. First, it took many decades before anything like our modern party structure emerged in the House. As a result, not until nearly the end of the 19th century did the position of ―majority leader‖ become a recognized party office. Second, neither official congressional sources nor party records of this early period identify a lawmaker as the majority floor leader. Several historians of the House suggest that from the chamber‘s early beginnings various lawmakers informally assumed the role of ―floor leader.‖ Usually, but not always, these informal party leaders were the chairs of either the Committee on Ways and Means (established in 1795) or the Committee on Appropriations (following its creation in 1865). Speakers often appointed either their allies or their principal rivals for the speakership to head these panels. Explained the late Floyd M. Riddick, a political scientist who served as parliamentarian of the Senate from 1951 to 1975: In the House, the early titular floor leaders were at the same time the chairmen of the Ways and Means Committee. Before the division of the work of that committee, the duties of its chairmen were so numerous that they automatically became the actual leaders, since as chairmen of that committee they had to direct the consideration of most of the legislation presented to the House. From 1865 until 1896 the burden of handling most of the legislation was shifted to the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, who then was designated most frequently as the leader. From 1896 until 1910 once again the chairmen of the Ways and Means Committee were usually sought as the floor leaders. During all of these years before the ―Cannon revolution‖ of 1910, the Speaker, who appointed all members to committees, saw to it that his party opponent for Speakership, some Representative with a large following, or one of his faithful lieutenants was made the floor leader.6

Thus, these early titular floor leaders were appointed by the Speaker rather than chosen separately, as occurs today, by vote of the majority party caucus.7 (Appendix contains a list of House majority leaders since 1899.) 5

Randall B. Ripley, Party Leaders in the House of Representatives (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 24. 6 Floyd M. Riddick, The United States Congress: Organization and Procedure (Manassas, Va.: National Capitol Publishers, Inc., 1949), p. 86. For further historical information about the floor leader, see DeAlva Stanwood Alexander, History and Procedure of the House of Representatives (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1916), Chapter VII; Garrison Nelson, ―Leadership Position-Holding in the United States House of Representatives,‖ Capitol Studies, Fall 1976, pp. 11-36; and the Congressional Record - Appendix, vol. 102, Mar. 20, 1956, pp. A2489-A2494. The Record insertion is a report on the majority leadership prepared by George B. Galloway for then-House Majority Leader John McCormack, D-MA. 7 Early House members also recognized that certain lawmakers informally assumed floor leadership roles on behalf of presidents or executive officials. For example, in 1789 Congress requested Treasury Secretary Alexander

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When the House ―revolted‖ in 1910 against the autocratic leadership of Speaker Joseph Cannon, R-Ill., the power to designate the floor leader was taken away from the Speaker. In 1911, with Democrats in charge of the House, Oscar Underwood of Alabama became the first elected (by the party caucus) majority leader in the House‘s history. (Subsequently, all Democratic floor leaders have been selected in this manner.) Underwood also chaired the Ways and Means Committee and his party‘s committee assignment panel. The political reality was that Majority Leader Underwood‘s influence in the House exceeded that of the Speaker, Champ Clark of Missouri. ―For the first time the leader of the House was not at the rostrum, but was on the floor.‖8 Probably no majority leader ever has matched Underwood‘s party power and institutional influence. (Underwood left the House for the Senate in 1915.) When Republicans reclaimed majority control of the House in 1919, Franklin Mondell of Wyoming, a high ranking member of the Appropriations Committee, became majority leader upon nomination by the GOP committee assignment panel. (Four years later the GOP Conference began the practice of electing their majority leader.)9 Mondell set the contemporary practice of majority leaders usually relinquishing their committee positions, and always any committee chairmanships, upon assuming this important and busy post. To be sure, there have been exceptions to the practice of majority leaders not serving on standing committees.10 April 15, 1929, the start of the 71st Congress, witnessed a first-ever event that remains the practice to this day: the official announcement in the House of the selection of the majority leader. Representative Willis Hawley of Oregon, the chairman of the majority Republican caucus addressed the presiding officer: ―Mr. Speaker, the Republican caucus of the House has reelected Hon. John Q. Tilson, of Connecticut, majority leader for the Seventy-first Congress.‖ As Houseprecedents state, ―this was the first occasion of the official announcement of the selection of party leaders in the House.‖11 Hamilton to prepare a plan to deal with the public debt. Representatives Fisher Ames and Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts and Jonathan Trumbull of Connecticut ―served as Hamilton‘s lieutenants on the chamber floor, exercising some control over what proposals were made and how they were voted on by coordinating Hamilton‘s supporters in the House.‖ John H. Aldrich, Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995) , p. 79. President Thomas Jefferson (18011809) also relied on trusted House members to function as de facto floor leaders to shepherd his program through the House. 8 George Rothwell Brown, The Leadership of Congress (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1922), p. 176. Also see James S. Fleming, ―Oscar W. Underwood: The First Modern House Leader, 1911-1915,‖ in Roger H. Davidson, et. al., eds., Masters of the House: Congressional Leadership Over Two Centuries (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 91-118. 9 Ripley, Party Leaders in the House of Representatives, p. 25. 10 For example, starting in the 1970s, Democratic majority leaders held leadership-designated positions on the Budget Committee and served ex officio on the Permanent Select Intelligence Committee. Since Republicans took control of the House in the mid-1990s, the majority leader has held no standing committee positions. However, in 2002, Majority Leader Richard Armey (R-TX), chaired a Select Committee on Homeland Security. This panel assembled the recommendations of several standing committees to craft legislation (H.R. 5005) authorizing the creation of a Cabinet- level Department of Homeland Security. As an historical point of interest, it is worth noting that Underwood‘s successor as majority leader was North Carolinian Claude Kitchin (1915-1919), who also served as chairman of the Ways and Means Committee. However, Kitchin disapproved of President Wilson‘s war policies and his floor and committee roles proved to be ―cumbersome and impractical,‖ as one scholar wrote. ―A separation of the two roles was effected after the Democrats became the minority in 1919. Ever since then, the majority leader‘s job has existed as a full-time position.‖ See Nelson Polsby, ―The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives,‖ American Political Science Review, Sept. 1968, pp. 157-15 8. 11 Clarence Cannon, Cannon‘s Precedents of the House of Representatives of the United States, Vol. VIII (Washington: GPO, 1935), p. 957.

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Separate election of the majority leader by the party caucus elevated the status and influence of the person who held this position. The majority leader soon became the ―heir apparent‖ to thespeakership. In the modern House, no Democrat has been elected Speaker without having been the majority leader immediately prior to his or her elevation. Republicans, the minority party for 40 consecutive years until the mid-1990s, do not have as well-defined a leadership succession ladder. When Speaker Newt Gingrich, R-GA., retired from the House at the end of the 105th Congress, Appropriations Chairman Bob Livingston, R-LA., moved quickly and lined up the necessary votes to be the next Speaker. However, when Livingston announced that he planned to resign from the House for personal reasons soon after the 106th Congress began, Republicans chose their chief deputy whip, Dennis J. Hastert of Illinois, to be the next Speaker. Unfortunately, there is scant scholarly commentary about the duties and functions that devolved upon the informal floor leaders of the pre-20th century period. Nor are the duties and functions of today‘s majority leaders spelled out in any detail in the House rulebook or in party rules, although those sources make brief reference to the position. As a recent majority leader stated, ―[E]ach leadership position is defined by the person who holds it. It‘s not defined by a job description.‖12 In short, factors such as tradition, custom, context, and personality have largely defined the fundamental institutional and party roles and responsibilities of the majority leader. Several of the most important of these two overlapping categories merit mention. However, it bears repeating that the scope of the majority leader‘s role in carrying out these assignments is shaped significantly by the Speaker and the sentiments of the majority party caucus or conference.

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INSTITUTIONAL The style and role of any majority leader is influenced by a plethora of elements, including personality and contextual factors, such as the closeness of his relationship with the Speaker, the size and cohesion of the majority party, whether the party controls the White House, the general political environment in the House, and the controversial nature of the legislative agenda. Despite the variability of these factors, a number of institutional assignments are now associated with the majority leader, and Members of each party expect him or her to perform them. To be sure, the majority leader is provided with extra staff resources beyond those accorded him or her as a House member to assist in carrying out these diverse leadership functions. Majority Leader Armey even established a new leadership post—―assistant majority leader‖—at the start of the 106th Congress and named two Republican colleagues as assistant majority leaders. Their assignment was to assist him on ―floor scheduling, legislative and communications strategy, the policy agenda, and leadership decisions.‖13

12

Ben Pershing, ―DeLay Adjusting to His New Role,‖ Roll Call, Mar. 17, 2003, p. 3. CQ Monitor, Jan. 21, 1999, p. 8.

13

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Scheduling Floor Business Although scheduling is a collective activity of the majority party, the majority leader has a large say in shaping the chamber‘s overall agenda and in determining when, whether, how, and in what order legislation is taken up. Everything from setting policy priorities; drafting the schedule; consulting with Members, committee chairs, and the minority party in making up the schedule; and announcing the schedule on the floor are within the purview of the majority leader. Scheduling is a complex process and the majority leader must juggle a wide range of considerations and pressures. Five concerns illustrate the scheduling role of the majority leader. First, the majority leader commonly lays out the daily, weekly, monthly, and annual agenda of the House. For example, when the majority leader laid out the planned schedule for the 2009 legislative session, it indicated that the House would ―hold votes on 137 days.‖ It also specified that there would be ―11 weeks where the House will be in session for five days. This is in keeping with a pledge by Democratic leaders who, after taking control of Congress in 2006, vowed to extend the typical workweek of three days to five days.‖14 Of course, scheduling and agenda-setting are responsibilities done in close consultation with the Speaker, majority whip, and others. The majority leader may specify in advance that certain priority bills are to be taken up prior to a congressional recess; he or she may even designate theme weeks (―reform,‖ ―high tech,‖ ―families first,‖ and so on) for the consideration of related bills. Typically, on Thursday after the House‘s business for the day and week is winding down, the majority leader will announce the projected agenda for each day of the next business week, identify when votes are expected to occur, and respond to inquiries from Members about the House‘s program of activities. Second, a host of strategic considerations influence scheduling. For instance, with an eye toward upcoming elections, the majority leader may schedule legislation that better defines his or her party for the upcoming presidential and congressional campaigns. He or she may not schedule a bill unless there is reasonable certainty that the Senate will take floor action on it. The majority leader may also coordinate strategy on measures with the Senate party counterpart. He or she may schedule floor action at specific times—for instance, a constitutional amendment to ban flag desecration just before July 4—to maximize public attention on the issue. The majority leader may use ―deadline lawmaking,‖ indicating to Members that floor action on certain legislation must occur before the House will adjourn for a district work period. Or he or she may suggest general themes, messages, or strategies that unify party colleagues around a set of domestic and international policies. A majority leader may even propose his or her own annual legislative agenda—even if the White House is controlled by the same party—and present it to the Speaker and the party‘s caucus or conference. Third, majority leaders try to balance the House‘s workload requirements with Members‘ family or personal obligations. ―Family friendly‖ scheduling aims to achieve better balance in the public and private lives of lawmakers. Fourth, majority leaders advance or delay action on measures for a variety of reasons, including whether they have the votes to achieve their objectives. To be sure, there are occasions when measures are brought to the floor, and it is 14

Jennifer Bendery, ―House Democrats Plan 137 Days of Voting Next Year,‖ Roll Call, December 5, 2008, online edition (provided at http://www.rollcall.com).

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unclear whether they will pass. Asked if a bill would pass, a majority leader replied: ―Who knows? We‘re writing the bill on the floor.‖15 Fifth, majority leaders recognize that timing considerations suffuse the lawmaking process. There are timetables to meet, pressures associated with the end-of-session rush to adjourn, the electoral needs of individual Members, and a multitude of other considerations that the majority leader must address as he strives to accommodate the rank-and-file, committee chairs, the minority party, the president, and his own extended party leadership. As one majority leader put it: ―Youhave to find that elusive grail of harmony among this most heterogeneous mix of opinionated individualists.‖16

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Manage Floor Decision Making Majority leaders are active in constructing winning coalitions for their legislative priorities. To this end, a majority leader will consult with the chair of the Rules Committee to discuss procedures for considering legislation on the floor. For example, an open or restricted amendment process might be options for discussion. Or, the majority leader might decide to call up a bill under suspension of the rules procedure, which limits debate and bars any amendments. To limit policy riders on appropriations bills, the majority leader might invoke House Rule XXI, clause 2 (d). This rule grants preference to the majority leader to end consideration of an appropriations bill in the Committee of the Whole by offering a successful ―motion to rise.‖17 Majority leaders engage in many other activities to promote policy success on the floor. They may, for instance, meet weekly or biweekly (more frequently, if needed) with committee chairs, ad hoc groups, or individual lawmakers to persuade them to support priority measures; woo lawmakers through the provision of various legislative services or rewards; coordinate votecounts with the party whip organization; propose changes in bills to attract support from wavering Members; reach out to lawmakers on the other side of the aisle to draft compromise legislation; craft ―leadership amendments‖designed to attract majority support; synchronize strategic activities with majority floor managers; and rally outside support for the party‘s legislative issues and political messages.

15

Andrew Taylor, ―Budget Enforcement Legislation Founders in the House,‖ CQ Today, June 24, 2004, p. 1. Julia Malone, ―To Jim Wright, Being Majority Leader Is One Long Juggling Routine,‖ Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 19, 1983, p. 40. 17 The Rules of the House make specific reference to the majority leader in several other instances. Rule II, clause 6, states that the House‘s inspector general ―shall be appointed for a Congress by the Speaker, the Majority leader, and the Minority Leader, acting jointly.‖ Rule II, clause 8, states that the ―Office of General Counsel shall function pursuant to the direction of the Speaker, who shall consult with a Bipartisan Leadership Advisory Group, which shall include the majority and minority leaderships.‖ Under Rule IX, a question of privilege offered from the floor by the majority leader ―shall have precedence of all other questions except motions to adjourn.‖ Under Rule X, clause 2, not later than ―March 31 in the first session of a Congress, after consultation with the Speaker, the Majority Leader, and the Minority Leader, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform shall report to the House the oversight plans‖ of the standing committees along with any recommendation it or the House leaders have proposed to ensure the effective coordination of committees‘ oversight plans. By tradition, the majority leader also serves as a member of the House Office Building Commission, and he names three members to serve as Private Calendar objectors. In addition, the majority leader may, after consultation with the Speaker, during any even-numbered year convene an early organizational caucus or conference. 16

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Majority leaders may also take on other functions relevant to floor action. To forge winning coalitions, for instance, they engage in deal-making, appeal to Members‘ party loyalty, enlist allies to overcome resistance to policy-party objectives, devote considerable time and energy in promoting consensus among colleagues, and work behind-the-scenes to get things done. Majority leaders might also encourage party colleagues to deliver oneminute, morning hour, or special order speeches that spotlight the party‘s program and defend it against criticism from the other party.

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Public Spokesperson There are two interconnected dimensions associated with this role: external and internal. Externally, especially in this ―24/7‖ news cycle and Internet era, majority leaders are national newsmakers. When he became majority leader in 1973, Thomas P. ―Tip‖ O‘Neill Jr., D-MA., said, ―the media couldn‘t stay away ... I was interviewed constantly.‖18 Majority leaders are expected to explain and defend the actions and decisions of the House and their party to the general public. ―The role of the majority leader puts you in a spokesman role,‖ noted a recent majority leader.19 Accordingly, these leaders appear on the major network and cable television programs, the Sunday morning news shows, talk radio, or Internet chat rooms. Periodically, theydeliver major addresses in diverse forums, and write articles or ―op ed‖ pieces on the major issues before the House. They meet with journalists and newspaper editors. Regularly, they give news briefings (so-called pen and pad sessions) to reporters on the schedule and agenda of the House, the priorities of the majority party, legislativeexecutive relations, and sundry other topics. Internally, majority leaders are ready on the floor to defend their party, program, or President from criticism by the opposition. They participate in debate on measures and may make the closing argument on legislation. Majority leaders rise to defend the prerogatives of individual Members; offer critiques and rebuttals to minority party initiatives; work with committee chairmen and others to coordinate and integrate the party‘s communication strategy; employ floor speeches ―to set the tone on a newsworthy issue or provide the proscribed leadership perspective before a major vote‖;20 and may establish websites to provide information to House members and others. In brief, majority leaders generally function as their party‘s chief spokesperson on the floor and in other forums as well. Sometimes the internal and external roles coincide when majority leaders introduce legislation, monitor executive branch actions, or champion proposals nationally. For example, Majority Leader Armey and another GOP colleague traveled the country in a ―Scrap the Code Tour,‖ a ―national campaign to take the tax reform debate directly to the American people.‖21 Armey also attracted national attention with respect to his legislative efforts to monitor executive branch implementation of a 1993 law designed to measure the performance of government programs.22

18

Speaker Tip O‘Neill, Man of the House (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 226-227. Jim VanDeHei, ―DeLay Nears Top of House He Reshaped,‖ The Washington Post, Nov. 13, 2002, p. A4. 20 Susan Crabtree, ―DeLay Will Deliver a `Speech of the Week‘,‖ Roll Call, Jan. 29, 2003, p. 13. 21 Dick Armey and Billy Tauzin, ―Should We Scrap the System,‖ Los Angeles Times, Oct. 6, 1997, p. A11. 22 Stephen Barr, ―House Leader Flunks Agencies‘ Plans,‖ The Washington Post, Aug. 27, 1997, p. A17. 19

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Confer with the White House

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Majority leaders regularly attend meetings at the White House—especially when the President is of the same party—to discuss issues before Congress, the Administrations‘s agenda, and political events generally. For example, the joint bipartisan congressional leadership, including the House majority leader, may meet at the White House to discuss agenda priorities for the year.23 There are occasions, too, when the President will journey to Capitol Hill to meet with the top leaders of Congress. There are instances as well where majority leaders can be sharp critics of the President.Majority leaders consult with executive branch officials plus scores of other individuals (foreign dignitaries, governors, mayors, and so on.) Majority leaders may also be active on international issues: brokering foreign policy compromises with the White House, championing the interests of certain nations, or criticizing some foreign governments. In general, anyone who occupies the House‘s number two leadership post has strengthened leverage with the White House and greater public prominence on international issues. ―People are now listening to what I‘ve been saying because I‘m majority leader,‖ declared a former holder of the post.24 Strategically, the role of majority leaders will be different depending on whether the President is of the same party. In general, majority leaders will strive to advance the goals and aspirations of their party‘s President in the Congress. If the President is of the opposite party, then the procedural and political situation is more complicated. When should the majority leader cooperate with the President? When should he or she urge the House to reject Administration policies? When should he or she propose alternatives to the President‘s priorities? In brief, the majority leader, the Speaker, and their other party colleagues need to determine when to function as the ―governing‖ party in the House and when to act as the ―loyal opposition.‖

Facilitate the Conduct of Business To expedite the work of the House, a wide range of other responsibilities is typically performed by the majority leader. For example, the majority leader may ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns that it meet again at a specific date and time. The majority leader may either appoint people to certain boards or commissions or be self-named to various commissions or boards. He or she may lead congressional delegations to different parts of the world. The majority leader may act as Speaker pro tempore; offer resolutions affecting the operations of the House, such as establishing the hour of daily meeting of the House; perform various ceremonial duties; and support initiatives to revamp or reform the internal procedures and structures of the House. In brief, the majority leader is responsible, along with other Members of the leadership, for insuring the orderly conduct of House business.

23 24

See Ethan Wallison, ―Adding DeLay Makes It a ‗Gang of Five‘,‖ Roll Call, Mar. 6, 2003, p. 3. Juliet Eilperin, ―Mideast Rises on DeLay‘s Agenda,‖ The Washington Post, Oct. 16, 2003, p. A7.

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PARTY The majority leader, former Speaker ―Tip‖ O‘Neill once said, ―helps set policy and carries out the duties assigned to him by the Speaker.‖25 One of the most important duties of the majority leader is to try to ensure that his or her party remains in control of the House. After all, legislative organization is party organization. The majority party sets the agenda of the House and controls all committee and subcommittee chairmanships. Thus, along with other party leaders and Members, the majority leader works in numerous ways to help elect and reelect rank-and-file partisan colleagues, to forge unity on priority legislation, and to promote a favorable public image of the majority party. Three activities of the majority leader illustrate these points.

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Assist Colleagues’ Reelection Campaigns Majority leaders are typically energetic campaigners on behalf of their partisan colleagues. They assist incumbents and challengers in raising campaign funds, and they travel to scores of House districts to campaign with either incumbents or challengers of their party. Majority leaders develop computer-based campaign donor lists, so they can funnel campaign funds quickly to electoral contests; establish their own ―leadership PACs‖ to raise money and then donate money from their political action committee to candidates of their party; help to raise large sums of money so campaign ads can be run on television and elsewhere in the months leading up to the November election; and coordinate their campaign activities with congressional, national, and state party campaign organizations and encourage outside groups and allies to raise money for the party. Majority leaders assist in recruiting qualified challengers to take on incumbents. They promote get-out-the-vote drives, in part by devising strategies to energize their party‘s grassroots supporters. In short, majority leaders are heavily engaged in the electoral campaigns of many party candidates. Their ultimate goals: to retain their majority status and, if possible, to increase the number in their ranks.

Promote the Party’s Agenda Majority leaders may undertake a variety of actions to accomplish this goal. They develop legislative agendas and themes (e.g., an ―innovation agenda,‖) that address issues important to the country and to core supporters and swing voters in the electorate. These agendas may be posted on their Web sites. A key aim of this form of ―message sending‖ is to animate and activate their electoral base to turn out on election day. Another objective is to develop electorally attractive ideas and proposals that may enable their party to retain or retake the House, the Senate, or even the presidency. Still another is to advance policies that strengthen the nation, such as its global competitiveness in science, engineering, or other fields.

25

O‘Neill, Man of the House, pp. 218-219.

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The majority leader may help to organize ―town meetings‖ in Members‘ districts, which publicize and promote the party‘s agenda or a specific priority, such as health care or tax cuts. He or she may sponsor party ―retreats‖ to discuss issues and to evaluate the party‘s public image. The majority leader may also distribute reports, memorandums, briefing books, and Web videos that highlight partisan campaign issues; conduct surveys of party colleagues to discern their priorities; organize ―issue teams‖ or ―task forces‖ composed of junior and senior lawmakers to formulate specific party programs; and form ―message groups‖ or ―theme teams‖ to map media strategies to foster favorable press coverage of party initiatives and negative views of the opposition party. Sometimes the majority leader will attend partisan luncheons with Senators to better coordinate inter-chamber action on the party‘s legislative and message agenda. ―We‘re having more bicameral meetings,‖ remarked a majority leader, ―so that ... we understand what each other is doing ... and what can and can‘t be done.‖26 Majority leaders are also named as conferees on major bills ―to represent the overall interests of the [majority] leadership.‖27 In brief, the majority leader is a key strategist in promoting the party‘s agenda, in outlining ways to neutralize theopposition‘s arguments and proposals, and in determining when it is better to compromise with the other party on policy priorities or have no agreement.

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Encourage Party Cohesion If a party is to maintain its majority, it is generally a good idea to minimize internal factional feuds or disagreements that may undermine its ability to govern the House. One majority leader explained this job as a ―combination of evangelist, parish priest, and part-time prophet. You have to be a peacemaker in the family.‖28 To forge party cohesion means, in part, that majority leaders will consult widely with the diverse factions within their party; they will argue the need for party loyalty on crucial procedural and substantive votes; they will try to offer persuasive arguments that ―educate‖ colleagues on a measure‘s policy and political benefits; and they will schedule breakfasts, lunches, or dinners to keep in touch with party members and to listen to their concerns. Aiding the majority leader in these efforts is his membership on various party units, such as policy committees or the committee-oncommittees. Majority leaders may also enlist the support of outsiders, such as lobbyists, to assist in building party cohesion. In fact, majority leaders may develop an external network of contacts in universities, think tanks, or consulting firms to function as an informal ―brain trust‖ in policy development and in strategic analysis, suggesting how the majority party might mobilize the support required to enact their ideas into law. Majority leaders, then, work to boost their party‘s fortunes internally and externally by acting as a political cheerleader, negotiator, consensus- builder, and peacemaker.

26

Alan Ota, ―DeLay Sees Improvement in Communications Between House, Senate Leaders,‖ CQ Today, Mar. 3, 2005, p. 6. 27 Alan Ota, ―Hastert Calls on DeLay as ‗Super Conferee‘,‖ CQ Today, May 23, 2005, p. 1. 28 Malone, ―To Jim Wright, Being Majority Leader is One Long Juggling Routine,‖ p. 40. Political Leadership and its Significance in a Time of Troubles, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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FINAL OBSERVATIONS The majority leader‘s duties and functions, although not well-defined and contingent in part on his or her relationship with the Speaker, have evolved to the point where it is possible to highlight the customary institutional and party responsibilities. As one majority leader said about his institutional duties: ―The Majority Leader has prime responsibility for the day-today working of the House, the schedule, working with the committees to keep an eye out for what bills are coming, getting them scheduled, getting the work of the House done, making the place function correctly.‖ On the party side, the majority leader added: ―[Y]ou are also compelled to try to articulate to the outside world what [your party stands] for, what [your party is] fighting for, what [your party is] doing.‖29

APPENDIX. HOUSE MAJORITY LEADERS, 1899-2009

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Majority Leader Sereno E. Payne, R-NY Payne Payne Payne Payne Payne Oscar W. Underwood, D-AL Underwood Claude Kitchin, D-NC Kitchin Franklin W. Mondell, R-WY Mondell Nicholas Longworth, R-OH John Q. Tilson, R-CT Tilson Tilson Henry T. Rainey, D-IL Joseph W. Byrns, D-TN William B. Bankhead, D-ALa Sam Rayburn, D-Texas Rayburn/John W. McCormack, D-MAb McCormack McCormack McCormack Charles A. Halleck, R-IN McCormack McCormack 29

Majority Leader 56th(1899-1901) 57th(1901-1903) 58th(1903-1905) 59th(1905-1907) 60th(1907-1909) 61st(1909-1911) 62nd(1911-1913) 63rd(1913-1915) 64th(1915-1917) 65th(1917-1919) 66th(1919-1921) 67th(1921-1923) 68th(1923-1925) 69th(1925-1927) 70th(1927-1929) 71st(1929-1931) 72nd(1931-1933) 73rd(1933-1935) 74th(1935-1937) 75th(1937-1939) 76th(1939-1941) 76th(1939-1941) 78th(1943-1945) 79th(1945-1947) 80th(1947-1949) 81st(1949-1951) 82nd(1951-1953)

Christopher Madison, ―Message Bearer,‖ National Journal, Dec. 1, 1990, p. 2906.

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Halleck 83rd(1953-1955) McCormack 84th(1955-1957) McCormack 85th(1957-1959) McCormack 86th(1959-1961) McCormack/Carl Albert, D-OKc 87th(1961-1963) Albert 88th(1963-1965) Albert 89th(1965-1967) Albert 90th(1967-1969) Albert 91st(1969-1971) Hale Boggs, D-LA 92nd(1971-1973) Thomas P. O‘Neill Jr., D-MA. 93rd(1973-1975) O‘Neill 94th(1975-1977) Jim Wright, D-TX 95th(1977-1979) Wright 96th(1979-1981) Wright 97th(1981-1983) Wright 98th(1983-1985) Wright 99th(1985-1987) Thomas S. Foley, D-WA 100th(1987-1989) Foley/Richard A. Gephardt, D-MOd 101st(1989-1991) Gephardt 102nd(1991-1993) Gephardt 103rd(1993-1995) Richard Armey, R-TX 104th (1995-1997) Armey 105th(1997-1999) Armey 106th(1999-2001) Armey 107th(2001-2003) Tom DeLay, R-TX 108th(2003-2005) DeLay/John Boehner, R-OHe 109th(2005-2007) Steny Hoyer, D-MD 110th(2007-2009) Hoyer 111th(2009-2011) Sources: Congressional Quarterly‟s Guide to Congress, Fifth Edition, Vol. II, Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2000), pp. 1102-1103; George Archibald, ―GOP Elevates DeLay To House Majority Leader,‖ The Washington Times, November 14, 2002, p. A1; Susan Ferrechio and Alan Ota, ―Charge Takes DeLay Out of Lineup,‖ CQ Today, September 29, 2005, p. 1; and Alan Ota, ―Upset Win Comes With Expectations,‖ CQ Today, February 3, 2006, p. 1. a. Bankhead became Speaker of the House on June 4, 1936. The post of majority leader remained vacant until the next Congress. b. McCormack became majority leader on Sept. 26, 1940, filling the vacancy caused by the elevation of Rayburn to the post of Speaker of the House on Sept. 16, 1940. c. Albert became majority leader on January 10, 1962, filling the vacancy caused by the elevation of McCormack to the post of Speaker of the House, also on January 10. d. Gephardt became majority leader on June 14, 1989, filling the vacancy created when Foley succeeded Wright as Speaker of the House on June 6, 1989. e. On September 25, 2005, Majority Leader DeLay stepped down from his post. Majority Whip Roy Blunt, RMO, served as interim majority leader until Ohio Republican John Boehner was elected to be the new majority leader on February 2, 2006, by the House Republican Conference.

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INDEX

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A Abraham, 61 access, 31, 70, 71, 73, 74, 77, 79, 80, 84, 106 accessibility, x, 103 accountability, 91 accounting, viii, 47, 48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 65, 66 accounting fraud, 48, 51, 52, 65, 66 achievement, 26, 27, 32 activism, 45 adjustment, 78 administrators, 79, 82 affective experience, 45 Afghanistan, ix, 88, 92, 94, 95, 112 Africa, 31, 40 age, 6, 10, 27, 37, 43, 44, 49, 76, 122 agencies, 51, 52, 65, 74, 108, 125 agenda-setting, 154 aggression, 3, 10, 13, 14, 96 aggressiveness, 21 aging society, 100 agricultural sector, 98 agriculture, 84, 98 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 106, 108 Ahmadinejad, President Mahmoud, x, 103, 105, 106 alternatives, 90, 142, 143, 144, 157 alters, 38 ambassadors, 104 ambiguity, 26, 34, 35 ambiguous events, 34 american culture, 67 anger, 12, 30, 35, 37, 42 anxiety, 35 appointments, 118, 125 appropriations, 155

arbitrage, 51, 65 arbitration, 104 arrests, x, 103, 105, 111, 114, 115 asbestos, 78, 80 ASEAN, 96 asia, ix, 1, 10, 16, 18, 87, 88, 89, 93, 95, 96, 97 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, 96 asian countries, 4, 18, 91 assessment, 7, 30, 80, 128 assets, 51, 65 assignment, 118, 119, 126, 138, 150, 152, 153 assumptions, 56, 122 atrocities, 5 attacks, 9, 11, 12 attitudes, 29, 82, 83, 84 attribution, 60 auditing, 51 authorities, 8, 70, 73, 74, 80, 112, 127 authority, xi, 12, 25, 26, 63, 91, 111, 117, 118, 121, 125, 127, 140, 141, 144 authors, vii, 1, 93, 122, 150 autonomy, 2, 9, 17, 18, 20, 21 availability, 106 awareness, 34, 35, 81

B background, 71, 104, 106 baggage, 25 bank failure, 53 bankers, 52, 54, 56, 65 banking, 49, 51, 52, 54, 64 banking industry, 54 banking sector, 51 bankruptcy, 50, 51, 52 banks, 49, 51, 52, 53, 65

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164

Index

bargaining, 126 barriers, 82, 84 Basij forces, x, 103, 105 beef, 98 behavior, 25, 26, 33, 37, 39, 42, 45, 49, 50, 52, 55, 56, 58, 61, 63, 64, 65, 66 behavioral theory, 40 behaviors, 9, 26, 27, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 52, 59, 65 Beijing, 9, 18, 96 beneficial effect, 28 bias, 60 birth, 27, 28, 37, 39, 44, 45 blame, 54, 60, 61, 104 blog, 56, 57, 113 blood, 31 Boeing, 48 borrowers, 52 brain, 159 brass, 99 breakdown, 115 breakfast, 146 breeding, 95 Britain, 15, 18, 104, 112 brothers, 28 brutality, 2, 3, 5, 7, 21 Budget Committee, 118, 125, 126, 152 buffer, 11, 17 bureaucracy, 91, 100 Bush, President George W., 92 Butcher, 36, 40

C cabinet, 91, 95, 97, 99, 101, 152 cable television, 156 campaign funds, xii, 149, 158 campaign organizations, 158 campaigns, xii, 22, 107, 149, 154, 158 Canada, 64 candidates, 29, 37, 44, 90, 104, 106, 107, 108, 109, 123, 126, 137, 142, 158 capitalism, 22, 48, 49, 56, 63, 64, 66, 67 Capitol Hill, 137, 157 case study, 42, 44 cast, 94, 108, 109, 123 category a, 84 causal relationship, 39 certificate, 71 certification, 108

challenges, viii, x, 23, 25, 36, 37, 74, 86, 88, 90, 92, 98, 100, 143 channels, 33, 71, 74, 81, 82, 109 character, 24, 25, 26, 34, 37, 39, 54, 96, 122 childhood, 27 children, 3, 7, 11, 13, 21, 27, 28, 37, 90 China, vii, 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 91, 96, 112 city, 6, 10, 58 civil liberties, x, 103, 112, 113 civil servants, 74 clarity, 81 classes, 61 classification, 26, 31, 38 cleaning, 65 clients, 55 climate, 97, 139 climate change, 97 Clinton, Hillary Rodham, 92 coal, 8, 9 Coast Guard, 95 coercion, 113 cognition, 35, 38 cognitive reaction, 45 coherence, 127 cohesion, xii, 99, 139, 142, 150, 153, 159 colonization, vii, 1 color, 105 combined effect, 72 commerce, 62 communication, viii, 29, 33, 35, 37, 38, 69, 72, 73, 74, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 108, 113, 119, 145, 156 communication skills, 29, 33, 35, 38 communism, 9, 11 Communist Party, 20, 76 community, ix, 12, 25, 30, 51, 58, 62, 63, 69, 71, 72, 112, 113 community support, 71 compensation, viii, 28, 47, 50, 75, 76 competence, 27, 32, 33, 81 competition, 49, 59, 63, 65, 66, 100 competitive conditions, 66 competitive process, 65 competitiveness, 158 competitors, 53, 65 compilation, 151 complaints, 104, 108, 109 complexity, 25, 27, 32, 35, 61 complications, viii, 69, 74, 82 concentration, 146

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Index concrete, 72 conference, xi, 30, 97, 112, 117, 118, 119, 121, 124, 125, 126, 129, 135, 136, 141, 145, 150, 153, 154, 155 conference committees, xi, 118, 121, 124 confessions, 104 confidence, 33, 51, 53, 59, 72, 76, 81, 82, 83, 85, 101, 124 conflict, viii, 23, 71, 74, 75, 76, 84, 97, 146 congressional budget, 53 consensus, 29, 76, 82, 83, 85, 91, 145, 156, 159 consent, 76, 113, 157 conservation, 91 conspiracy, 51 constitution, 19, 118, 122, 124 constitutional amendment, 154 construction, 36, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80 consultants, 78 consulting, 65, 154, 159 consumption, 31, 98, 100 contingency, 60, 63 control, ix, x, xi, xii, 7, 9, 19, 30, 32, 49, 61, 62, 63, 87, 88, 89, 94, 97, 98, 121, 125, 126, 135, 136, 141, 146, 149, 150, 152, 154, 158 control group, 61 convention, 7 conviction, 27 cooling, 109 coordination, 25, 78, 81, 92, 140, 155 corporate fraud, 51 corporate governance, 56 corporate scandals, vii, viii, 47, 48, 50, 51, 54, 64 corporations, 48, 49, 62, 63, 64 corruption, 84, 110 cost, 9, 17, 48, 49, 52, 53, 65, 86, 92 costs, ix, 51, 53, 54, 63, 65, 66, 87, 89, 100 cotton, 18 counsel, 122, 124 coup, 114, 115 CPC, 70 creativity, 35, 41 credibility, 25, 126 credit, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 60, 64 credit rating, 52 creditors, 49 crime, 65 criminal behavior, 56 criminals, 65, 96 crisis management, 44 criticism, ix, x, 25, 88, 90, 98, 106, 113, 115, 119, 156

critics, 20, 30, 157 cultural norms, 38 culture, viii, 14, 23, 28, 54, 58, 63, 64, 67, 71, 72, 74, 75, 80, 81, 82, 85 curiosity, 80, 82 currency, 64 curricula, 49, 57, 63 curriculum, 14, 61 cycles, 43

D dance, 14 danger, 70 death, 4, 5, 6, 7, 14, 22, 48, 105 death penalty, 7 deaths, x, 103, 111, 114, 115 debt, 47, 51, 54, 65, 66, 92, 100 debts, 9 decentralization, viii, ix, 69, 70, 71, 72, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 91 decision makers, ix, 69, 71, 81 decision making, 50, 71, 81, 105 decision-making process, 81, 86, 90 decisions, 2, 34, 39, 70, 74, 80, 82, 83, 85, 91, 153, 156 defendants, 22 defense, vii, 1, 2, 5, 11, 22, 89, 91, 93, 97, 136 definition, 24, 25, 32 deflate, 52 degradation, 74 delivery, 39 democracy, 22, 31, 41, 85, 108, 115 democrat, 137, 153 Democratic Party, ix, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 96, 98, 126, 131 democratization, 40, 72, 80, 85 demographic characteristics, 26, 37 demography, 24, 25 demonstrations, x, 103, 104, 105, 110, 111, 112, 113 denial, 14 density, 38 Department of Homeland Security, 152 deployments, 91, 95 deprivation, 28 deregulation, 64, 98 derivatives, 54, 57, 64, 67 detainees, 105 detection, 66 dialogues, 75

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diffusion, 39, 43 dignity, 113 diplomacy, ix, 87, 88, 95, 97, 112, 115 diplomatic engagement, 96 directives, 82 directors, 54 disaster, viii, 65, 69, 70, 71, 73, 80, 85 disaster relief, viii, 69, 70, 71 discipline, 50, 56, 57, 62 disclosure, 51, 97 discrimination, 28, 128 disposable income, 92, 100 dissatisfaction, 114 distribution, 28, 61, 71, 85 divergence, 95 diversity, 25, 145 division, 129, 140, 151 doctors, 62 Doha, 98 domestic agenda, 91 domestic economy, 70, 92 doors, 75 draft, 15, 155 drawing, 55 dream, 13, 18, 29 drug testing, 125, 139 duties, x, xi, xii, 34, 55, 78, 81, 117, 122, 124, 135, 136, 141, 149, 151, 153, 157, 158, 160 dynamics, 40, 45, 105

E earnings, 50, 51 East Asia, 9, 93, 96 East China Sea, 96 ecology, 58 economic crisis, 34 economic development, 91 economic incentives, 63 economic institutions, 67 economic integration, 91, 96 economic policy, 97, 98 economic theory, 49, 50 economics, 49, 55, 56, 57, 62, 63, 66 economy, viii, 9, 47, 48, 49, 50, 54, 62, 63, 64, 66, 70, 89, 92, 97, 100 editors, 156 education, 4, 14, 58, 132 education reform, 25, 43 educational system, 63, 66

egoism, 14 elaboration, 3 election, vii, x, 24, 25, 38, 40, 90, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 117, 118, 122, 123, 129, 136, 153, 158 election fraud, x, 103, 105, 110, 112 electricity, 78 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, 140 emotion, 35, 38 emotional reactions, 29 emotional responses, 29 emotions, 29, 32, 35, 37 empathy, 25, 27 employees, 41, 44, 48, 51, 53, 62, 104, 141 empowerment, ix, 69, 74, 80, 82, 83, 145 encouragement, 55 enemies, 6, 7, 111 energy, 41, 83, 97, 150, 156 engagement, ix, x, 87, 88, 112, 113, 115 engineering, 158 England, 41, 43, 124, 137 enthusiasm, 34 entrepreneurs, 34, 43, 63 environment, viii, 27, 28, 34, 47, 50, 58, 153 environmental factors, 58 EPA, 91, 98 equality, 56 equating, 65 equity, 49 erosion, 70 espionage, 124 ethics, viii, 26, 40, 47, 48, 49, 50, 55, 57, 61, 62, 63, 67, 140 ethnic culture, 75 ethnic minority, 70 Europe, vii, 1, 16, 22 European Union (EU), 104, 112 evil, 17 examinations, 2 exchange rate, 70 exclusion, 84 execution, 7, 54 exercise, 49, 125, 128 expenditures, 17 experts, 92, 94, 95, 98, 114 exploration, 44 exports, 18 expulsion, 108 externalities, 80 extroversion, 27

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F fabric, 63 facilitators, 80 failure, 25, 32, 50, 57 fairness, 55, 63, 128 faith, 48, 63, 66 family, 5, 24, 26, 27, 28, 37, 45, 63, 75, 76, 84, 105, 111, 154, 159 fear, 9, 15, 30, 57, 112 fears, 34, 79 feedback, 74, 81, 84 feelings, 30 feet, 15 filters, 64 finance, 58, 92, 99 financial capital, 49, 63, 66 financial crisis, 48, 52, 53, 56, 98, 140 financial instability, 48, 54 financial market, 57 financial performance, 63 financial regulation, 56 financial resources, 71 financial system, 51, 52 financing, 73, 84 firms, 49, 51, 52, 54, 59, 65, 67, 159 flexibility, ix, 27, 69, 97 floating, 5, 6 flood, 52 focusing, 10, 50, 56, 59 food, 98 forced migration, 76 Ford, 63, 145, 147 Ford, Gerald R., 145, 147 Fordism, 59 foreclosure, 48 foreign policy, vii, ix, x, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 157 foreign policymaking, 95 forests, 74 forgetting, 18 formula, 146 fragments, 29 France, 18, 30, 35, 38, 42, 43, 45, 48 fraud, x, 48, 50, 51, 52, 64, 65, 66, 103, 105, 109, 110, 112 free trade, 91, 98, 100 free will, 10 free world, 97 freedom, x, 63, 104, 111, 113, 115 freedom of expression, x, 104, 111, 113, 115

freezing, 53 friendship, 13 fuel, 26, 114 fundraising, 90 funds, 13, 49, 54, 73, 85, 142, 158

G Garfield, James, 138 GDP, 64, 92, 100 gender, 27, 30 Germany, 12, 16 gestures, 29, 30, 35 get-out-the-vote, 158 girls, 28 global trade, 98 globalization, 37 goals, 6, 25, 32, 34, 35, 36, 39, 57, 66, 88, 95, 119, 126, 144, 157, 158 God, 14, 21, 108 goods and services, 98 governance, 40, 56, 57, 76, 85 government, ix, x, 4, 8, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 25, 29, 31, 34, 35, 48, 52, 53, 57, 70, 83, 84, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 97, 98, 99, 100, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 125, 156, 157 government failure, 57 government intervention, 48 grants, xi, 31, 135, 155 grass, 79 grassroots, 85, 158 gravity, ix, 69 Great Britain, 104 greed, 123 green revolution, 114 Green Revolution, 108 greenhouse gas emissions, 97 gross national product, 38 grouping, 90, 137 groups, 25, 26, 29, 33, 77, 84, 105, 108, 114, 142, 155, 158, 159 growth, 28, 51, 62, 92, 100 guardian, 114 guidance, 22, 138 guilt, 3 guilty, 3, 51 gut, vii, 1

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H Hamilton, Alexander 137, 152 hands, 25, 80, 91, 136, 139 harbors, 12 harm, xi, 136, 145, 155 harmony, xi, 136, 145, 155 Hawaii, 10, 22 headquarters, 109 health, 25, 49, 78, 84, 92, 99, 144, 159 health care, 144, 159 hegemony, 22, 63 height, 52 heroism, 30 high school, 4, 14 hip, vii, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 33, 34, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 84 homeowners, 66 Honda, 4, 8 honesty, 30, 63 host, 101, 154 hostility, 55 house, vii, ix, x, xi, xii, 29, 32, 33, 38, 41, 44, 48, 53, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 94, 95, 98, 99, 100, 101, 113, 117, 118, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161 households, 70, 76, 78 housing, 51, 52, 75, 140 human nature, 64 human rights, x, 8, 103, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115 Hunter, 32, 35, 38, 39, 130 husband, 5 hypothesis, 44, 48

I ideal, 30, 34 ideals, 26 identification, 29, 32, 33, 108 identity, 29, 33, 45 ideology, 50 image, 9, 17, 32, 33, 144, 158, 159 images, 21, 111, 144 IMF, 53 immobilization, 22 impact assessment, 80

impacts, 59, 61 imperialism, 10, 22 implementation, ix, 35, 69, 71, 72, 74, 76, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 156 imports, 98 imprisonment, 31, 40 incentive effect, 56 incentives, 49 inclusion, 96, 145 income, 50, 52, 65, 70 increased access, 71 incumbents, xi, xii, 135, 142, 149, 158 independence, ix, 2, 3, 9, 10, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 80, 87, 93, 95, 96 India, 16, 97 indication, 96, 109, 114 individualism, 14, 63, 64 Indonesia, 112 industry, 49, 58, 59, 140 ineffectiveness, 143 inefficiencies, 56 inefficiency, 47, 48, 50 inevitability, 20 infection, 34 inferences, 42 infinite, 28 inflation, 38, 107 information exchange, 82 infrastructure, 71, 78, 80, 84 injuries, x, 103, 111, 114 innovation, 43, 137, 158 insanity, 3 insecurity, 9 insertion, 151 insight, 72, 74, 75, 78, 85 inspections, 95, 97 inspectors, 22 instability, 51 institutional change, 63 institutions, x, 24, 25, 48, 49, 56, 57, 62, 63, 64, 66, 84, 88, 96, 100, 105 instruction, 6, 57 instruments, 29, 51, 54, 66 integration, 36, 91, 96 integrity, 26, 27, 54, 57 intelligence, 35, 44, 59 intentions, 27, 82, 85 interaction, viii, ix, 28, 37, 39, 42, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 92 interaction process, ix, 69, 71, 74, 75, 82, 84, 85

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Index interdependence, 25, 51, 52 interest rates, 38, 49, 52 interference, x, 50, 104, 112, 113 international affairs, 93 international law, 7, 10 international relations, 21 internet, x, 103, 106, 108 intervention, 42, 48, 113 interview, 113, 114, 127 intonation, 35 intuition, 35 investment, viii, 47, 50, 52, 53, 54, 64, 65, 66, 93, 98 investment bank, 52, 53, 54, 64, 65 investors, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 63, 65 Iran, v, vii, x, 22, 97, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115 Iraq, 92, 93, 112 irony, 42 isolation, 84, 114 Israel, 110, 114 issues, vii, ix, x, xi, xii, 4, 22, 23, 25, 37, 56, 57, 58, 69, 71, 72, 76, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 84, 85, 87, 88, 90, 91, 93, 94, 96, 99, 103, 110, 115, 118, 135, 141, 144, 145, 149, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159

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J Japan, v, vii, ix, x, 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101 Jefferson, Thomas, 128, 152 jobs, viii, 47, 48, 51, 53, 138 Johnson, Lyndon, 145 journalism, 13 journalists, x, 14, 19, 103, 106, 108, 111, 156 judgment, 3, 5, 12, 61, 105, 137 judiciary, 105 junior high school, 4 justice, 13, 28 justification, 36

K Keynesians, 56 Khamenei, Supreme Leader, x, 103, 104, 111, 114 killing, 6, 7 Korea, vii, 1, 8, 9, 17, 18, 20, 22, 93, 96, 97 Kyoto protocol, 97

L labor, 22, 49, 98 labor force, 22 land, 9, 13, 16, 71, 76, 84, 86 land use, 76 language, 28 laughing, 14 laws, 6, 7, 18, 63, 98 leadership, iv, vii, viii, ix, x, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 66, 69, 70, 71, 72, 76, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 89, 95, 96, 97, 99, 101, 111, 113, 117, 119,ꀐ123, 129, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 151, 152, 153, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159 leadership abilities, 26 leadership style, viii, 69, 72, 79, 83 learning, viii, 69, 72, 82 learning process, viii, 69, 72 Lebanon, 30, 112 legislation, ix, xii, 87, 89, 94, 95, 99, 118, 119, 127, 136, 141, 149, 150, 151, 152, 154, 155, 156, 158 lending, 51, 52, 54, 66 lens, 113 liberalization, 93, 98 life span, 44 likelihood, 37, 105 limitation, 123 line, 2, 7, 34, 55, 74, 78, 95, 96, 110, 117, 122, 136, 145 liquidity, 53 listening, 25, 27, 157 livestock, 70, 77 living standards, 78, 80, 85 loans, 51, 52, 65, 66 lobbying, 36 lobbyists, 159 local authorities, 74 local community, ix, 69, 72 local government, 25, 85 longevity, 123 love, 13, 67 loyalty, 26, 31, 99, 156, 159 lying, 79

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M Machiavellianism, 27, 33, 37, 38, 40 mad cow disease, 98 Madison, James, 137 magazines, vii, 1, 39 Maine, 138 major cities, x, 103, 105, 110, 111 majority, x, xi, xii, 3, 14, 25, 51, 89, 98, 110, 117, 118, 119, 121, 122, 123, 125, 126, 129, 135, 136, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161 malaria, 8 malfeasance, 47, 49, 51, 52, 61, 63, 67 management, viii, ix, xi, 8, 18, 25, 29, 34, 35, 36, 37, 42, 44, 47, 49, 50, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 64, 65, 66, 69, 70, 71, 75, 78, 81, 82, 83, 88, 93, 139, 149, 150 mania, 52 mantle, 137 manufacturing, 59, 64 marijuana, 45 Marine Corps, 94 market, viii, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 56, 57, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66 market discipline, 49, 50 market failure, 57 market share, 65 markets, 18, 20, 48, 49, 50, 56, 63, 67 measurement, 43 measures, 74, 80, 91, 92, 95, 97, 113, 119, 125, 154, 155, 156 media, 2, 14, 25, 35, 38, 40, 57, 90, 97, 99, 106, 111, 143, 144, 145, 156, 159 membership, 118, 123, 125, 126, 145, 159 memory, 75 men, 3, 5, 6, 19, 20, 28, 127, 137 mental model, 32, 34, 35, 36, 43 messages, 29, 35, 144, 154, 155 metaphor, 42, 43 meter, 70 Microsoft, 51 Middle East, 22 migration, 18, 76, 78 military, vii, 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 22, 88, 91, 93, 94, 104, 105, 111, 114 militias, 113 mimesis, viii, 47, 50, 65

minority, x, xi, 33, 117, 119, 123, 125, 129, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156 minority groups, 33 missions, 91, 100 misunderstanding, 19 mobile phone, x, 103, 106, 108 model, 25, 26, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 42, 43, 49, 57, 62, 63, 75, 83 models, vii, 23, 25, 31, 32, 35, 45, 50 modernization, 18 momentum, 83, 95, 104, 114 monetarists, 56 money, viii, 18, 19, 28, 47, 48, 50, 53, 64, 65, 67, 158 Moon, 35 moral standards, 33, 61 morning, 144, 156 mortgage-backed securities, 47, 53 motif, 80 motion, xi, 129, 135, 140, 145, 155 motivation, 26, 110 motives, 57, 128 movement, 20, 45, 70, 71, 74, 75, 76, 84 multinational corporations, 64 muscles, 55

N naming, 126 nation, 13, 16, 18, 19, 20, 35, 92, 140, 158 national culture, viii, 23, 44 national product, 38 national security, x, 90, 91, 93, 103, 110, 113, 114 nationalism, 3 negative emotions, 37, 42 negative outcomes, 60 neglect, 84 negotiating, 96, 131 negotiation, 19, 31, 76 neoliberalism, 48 network, 34, 119, 156, 159 New Zealand, 29, 38, 40 newspapers, 51, 53 NGOs, 108 nodes, 82 normative economics, 56 North America, 30 North Korea, vii, 1, 8, 22, 93, 95, 96, 97 Northeast Asia, 1, 97 Norway, 42

Political Leadership and its Significance in a Time of Troubles, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Index novelty, 35 nuclear power, 22 nuclear program, x, 97, 103, 104, 110, 113, 114, 115 nuclear weapons, 93, 97, 110, 114

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O Obama Administration, x, 97, 103, 112, 113, 114, 115 Obama, Barack, 40 Obama, President, x, 48, 53, 97, 100, 101, 104, 112, 113 objectives, xi, 33, 126, 135, 142, 144, 146, 154, 156 obligation, 7, 62, 63, 126 observations, 85 obstacles, 86 obstruction, 143 oil, 15, 16, 50 Oklahoma, 132 omission, 52 opacity, 50 Operation Enduring Freedom, ix, 88, 95 opinion polls, 109 opportunism, viii, 23, 49, 52 opportunities, 25, 32, 34, 35, 59, 60, 64, 65, 66, 74, 100, 128, 142, 143 order, ix, xii, 10, 27, 29, 37, 39, 42, 44, 45, 54, 74, 76, 78, 84, 88, 89, 92, 94, 118, 122, 124, 126, 127, 128, 144, 149, 150, 154, 156 organ, 119 organizational behavior, 36, 50, 58, 66 organizational culture, 58 orientation, 90 originality, 36 oversight, 48, 49, 53, 67, 106, 140, 155 ownership, 76

P Pacific, 1, 2, 3, 6, 15, 17, 93, 96 packaging, 52 PACs, 142, 158 Palestinian Authority, 112 paradigm, 39 parallel, 97 paranoia, 110 parents, 28, 39 Pareto, 56 partnership, 79, 91, 93, 98, 101

171

passive, 82, 83, 84 pasture, 74, 76 peacekeeping, 91, 93, 95 pedagogy, 62 penalties, 51, 52 pension reforms, 92 pensions, 107 perceptions, 21, 26, 33, 115 performance, 24, 26, 35, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 49, 52, 58, 59, 60, 63, 72, 82, 145, 156 personal benefit, 33 personal qualities, 38 personal styles, 126 personality, viii, 23, 26, 32, 37, 42, 61, 139, 153 personality characteristics, 37 personality traits, viii, 23 personality type, 61 persuasion, 126 Philippines, 7, 18 philosophers, 56 piracy, 95 planning, 9, 35, 39, 71, 74, 81, 83, 85, 95 plants, 22 platform, ix, x, 17, 87, 88, 91, 98 police, 9, 108, 111 political leaders, vii, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 84, 127 political party, 26, 27 politicization, 20 politics, vii, 1, 10, 13, 19, 21, 25, 27, 28, 31, 58 Polk, James K., 130 polling, 109 polluters, 97 pools, viii, 47, 50, 65 poor, 25, 49, 50, 70, 71, 77, 78, 84, 107, 110 popular support, 89 population, 9, 10, 18, 58, 84, 107, 110 portfolio, 53 ports, 9, 97 positive emotions, 35 poverty, 70, 80, 84 poverty line, 84 poverty reduction, 70 power, x, xi, 15, 19, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 53, 57, 63, 74, 88, 89, 90, 91, 99, 100, 107, 121, 127, 128, 139, 152 power plants, 22 power relations, 31 pragmatism, 43

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Index

precedent, 123 precedents, 128, 129, 152 preference, 73, 74, 155 prejudice, 19 preparedness, 16 presidency, 105, 106, 122, 158 president, 25, 34, 90, 95, 106, 113, 143, 147, 155 President Clinton, 144 press conferences, 126 pressure, 24, 55, 65 prestige, 126, 127 prices, 49, 52, 53 primacy, 62, 63 primary school, 14, 78, 80 prisoners, 3, 7, 8, 22, 31 prisoners of war, 22 prisons, 31 private enterprises, 64 probability, 33, 34 probe, 109, 112 problem solving, 35, 36, 72, 82, 85 procedural rule, 150 producers, 78 product market, 49 production, 9 professional development, 57 professionalism, 62 profit, viii, 47, 48, 49, 50, 63, 64, 66 profits, 51, 53, 54, 64, 65, 67 program, ix, xii, 52, 55, 56, 69, 70, 71, 74, 79, 80, 81, 83, 85, 110, 114, 140, 145, 149, 150, 152, 154, 156 project, ix, 33, 34, 55, 62, 69, 85, 86 proliferation, 62, 91, 97, 112 propaganda, 2, 4, 5, 21 propagation, 4 prosperity, 10 prototype, 44 psychology, 24, 26, 44 Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 51 public debt, 152 public opinion, vii, 1, 126 public schools, 13 public sector, 92, 100 public service, 62 public support, 107, 114, 144 punishment, 96

Q quality control, 78 questioning, 6, 49 Qwest, 51

R race, 107, 110 radio, 3, 35, 52, 126, 156 range, viii, xi, 63, 66, 69, 72, 80, 85, 89, 100, 127, 135, 141, 142, 151, 154, 157 rating agencies, 52, 65 ratings, 51, 65 rationality, 56 reactions, 25, 29, 45, 54, 96 Reagan, Ronald, 144 real estate, 52, 65 reality, 152 reason, 17, 18, 21, 28, 31, 35, 38, 81, 125 reasoning, 55 reception, 28, 86 recession, 54, 66, 100 reciprocity, 41 recognition, 35, 125 recommendations, 82, 140, 152 reconciliation, 144 reconstruction, 92, 95 recovery, 98 recruiting, 90, 99, 142, 158 reelection, xii, 105, 107, 126, 149 reflection, 45, 49, 57, 107 reforms, ix, 43, 48, 54, 57, 87, 89, 92, 98, 100, 123 region, 9, 93, 96, 115 regional cooperation, 96 regulation, 48, 52, 54, 56, 57, 67 regulations, 25, 53 regulators, 53, 57 rejection, 20 relationship, vii, 9, 11, 15, 19, 20, 26, 27, 32, 36, 38, 41, 48, 59, 61, 88, 90, 93, 96, 105, 153, 160 relatives, 138 relevance, 24, 29, 35, 37 reliability, 110 relief, viii, 12, 69, 70, 71, 91 religion, 63 Reorganization Act, 129 reparation, 15 replication, 37

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Index reporters, 94, 96, 156 Republican Party, 123, 126, 131 reputation, 21, 49, 90 requirements, 43, 75, 154 reserves, 15, 16, 52 resettlement, viii, ix, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86 resilience, 90 resistance, 31, 156 resolution, 96, 123, 128, 139, 140, 141 resource management, 58 resources, 16, 20, 28, 57, 59, 65, 70, 71, 73, 77, 80, 126, 139, 146, 153 respect, viii, 14, 23, 25, 28, 30, 35, 36, 37, 52, 75, 80, 85, 112, 113, 127, 138, 140, 141, 143, 150, 156 responsiveness, 35 retirement, viii, 47, 48, 54, 66 returns, 65 Revolutionary Guard, x, 103, 104, 107, 111, 114 rewards, 127, 155 rhetoric, 29, 44, 95, 110, 114 rhythm, 35 rights, viii, x, xi, 7, 8, 12, 69, 72, 76, 78, 83, 103, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 119, 121, 128, 136 risk, 49, 51, 52, 54, 66, 79, 80 robberies, 5 rubber, 52 rule of law, 113 rural areas, 84 rural population, 84 Russia, vii, 1, 9, 16, 17, 19, 20, 91, 112

S sadness, 35, 37, 42 safety, 74, 91 sales, 98 sanctions, 16, 96, 107 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 48, 51 satisfaction, 72, 85 savings, viii, 47, 48, 51, 53, 54, 64, 66 scaling, ix, 69 scandal, 48, 50, 51, 90 scattering, 51 scheduling, xii, 76, 118, 127, 149, 153, 154 schema, 27 school, 14, 49, 55, 56, 57, 58, 61, 62, 63, 75, 82, 84 school community, 58 scores, xii, 149, 157, 158 Second World, vii, 1, 3, 21, 100

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Secretary of the Treasury, 15 secularism, 22 securities, 52, 53, 65 security, ix, 3, 9, 10, 18, 19, 25, 49, 69, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 96, 97, 99 selecting, 54, 123 self-concept, 44 self-confidence, 33 self-control, 30 self-esteem, 28 self-interest, viii, 47, 48, 50, 63, 66, 105, 107 semantics, 65 seminars, 56 senate, 10, 13, 48, 53, 113, 118, 125, 128, 144, 145, 151, 152, 154, 158, 159 separation, 152 sex, 45 shame, 13, 19, 37 shape, ix, 69 shaping, xii, 81, 149, 154 shareholder value, 49, 57, 62, 63 shareholders, 62 shoot, 11, 52 short run, 114 short-termism, 64 shoulders, 94 sibling, 28, 39 siblings, 28, 37, 40, 45 signals, x, 30, 88, 90, 93, 94, 99 signs, ix, 88, 95, 98 skills, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, 43 social capital, 24, 44 social change, 32, 33, 41, 44 social construct, 60 social contract, 106, 114 social costs, 66 social group, 32 social identity, 33 social influence, 27 social network, 34 social order, 34 social sciences, 31 social skills, 28 social structure, 114 social welfare, 92 soil, 74 South Africa, 31 South Asia, 16 South Korea, vii, 1, 96 Southeast Asia, 16

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Index

sovereignty, 96 Soviet Union, 3, 9, 11, 20 space, 48 specialists, 71, 81 specialization, 55 spectrum, 113, 114 speculation, 9, 52, 105, 107, 111 speech, 7, 13, 29, 97, 111, 113, 115 Spring, 2, 19 stability, 56, 57, 60, 93, 96 stabilization, 95 stakeholder groups, 25 stakeholders, 62, 70, 71, 72, 74, 78, 79, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86 State Department, 96, 112 statute, 122, 125 stimulus, 89, 92, 97, 100 stock, 48, 51 stock price, 51 strategies, xi, 25, 34, 35, 38, 49, 65, 66, 93, 119, 135, 142, 144, 154, 158, 159 strategy, 34, 38, 40, 58, 65, 84, 89, 90, 93, 99, 100, 141, 143, 144, 145, 146, 150, 153, 154, 156 strength, 99 stress, 27 stroke, 15 structural characteristics, 66 students, vii, 1, 13, 14, 22, 55, 61, 63 subprime loans, 52 substitutes, 143 succession, 39, 138, 153 suicide, 15, 16, 17 supervision, 150 supervisor, 39 supply, 71, 77, 78 suppression, 14, 113 survival, 16 sustainability, 85 sustainable development, 70 symbols, 60 sympathy, 35 symptom, 64 Syria, 22, 112 systemic risk, 49

T tactics, 27, 43, 44, 119, 136, 143 Taiwan, 4, 17, 31, 40 takeover, 63

Takeshima (Islets), 96 talent, 49 tanks, 17, 159 tariff, 18 tax cuts, 92, 159 tax reform, 156 taxation, 124 teachers, 4, 22 teaching, 55, 61, 62, 63 technical efficiency, 49 telecommunications, 111 telephone, 127 television, 29, 108, 126, 158 tension, ix, 69, 72, 74, 96, 105, 106 tensions, 104, 114 tenure, 123, 124 territory, 75, 97 terrorism, x, 43, 93, 96, 100, 103, 110, 114 terrorist attacks, 40, 92 testing, 125, 139 textbooks, 2, 4, 11, 14, 55 textiles, 18 theft, 51 thinking, viii, 18, 66, 69, 82 third dimension, 27 thoughts, 38 threat, vii, 1, 9, 10, 30, 35, 70, 80, 93 threats, ix, 12, 20, 34, 69, 91, 94, 97 time pressure, 35 timing, 78, 80, 155 Togo, 14, 15 trade, x, 9, 67, 84, 88, 93, 97, 98, 100, 144 trade agreement, 91, 98, 100 trade policy, 100 trading, 50, 51, 84 tradition, ix, 55, 69, 82, 83, 118, 124, 129, 136, 153, 155 traditions, 81, 83, 122 training, 28, 49, 57, 61, 62, 67, 79, 81, 82, 85, 95 training programs, 95 traits, viii, 23, 59 trajectory, 34 transactions, 52, 54 transformation, 63, 64, 92, 100 transformations, 62 transition, 29, 99 transitions, 31, 94 translation, 7 transmission, 25 transparency, 48, 49, 51, 91

Political Leadership and its Significance in a Time of Troubles, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

175

Index transportation, 12 treaties, 12, 22 trial, 3, 5, 10, 13, 14 trust, 29, 36, 37, 44, 72, 83, 85, 96, 109, 159 turbulence, 51, 53 Turkey, 112 turnout, 107 turnover, 98

U U.N. Security Council, 91, 95 U.S. policy, 99, 100, 106, 114, 115 uncertainty, 21, 26, 35, 36, 51, 65, 66, 77 underlying mechanisms, 50 unemployment, 107 United Arab Emirates, 112 United Nations (UN), ix, 8, 84, 86, 87, 89, 91, 93, 95, 96, 97 United States, ix, x, 3, 13, 15, 18, 22, 34, 35, 38, 43, 45, 50, 87, 88, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 106, 112, 113, 115, 122, 123, 128, 132, 133, 137, 138, 141, 150, 151, 152 universities, 159 use of force, 11, 104, 112, 113

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V vacancies, 118, 123 variability, 139, 153 variables, 38 vein, 98 vessels, ix, 87, 95, 97 vested interests, 92 veto, 91 victims, viii, 47, 48 video, 125, 159 Vietnam, v, vii, viii, 69, 70, 72, 80, 84, 85 village, viii, ix, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86 violence, x, 104, 111, 113

vision, 32, 33, 34, 38, 39, 45, 62, 126, 145 vocational training, 95 voters, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 37, 90, 92, 100, 106, 108, 109, 143, 158 voting, xi, 107, 109, 121, 123, 128, 129, 138 voting times, 109

W wages, 107 war, vii, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 30, 90, 96, 152 war crimes, 6, 7 war hero, 30 warrants, 124 waste, 34 watershed, x, 88, 92 wealth, viii, 47, 48, 51, 54, 66, 85 weapons, 4, 6, 12, 30, 93, 95, 97, 110, 114 websites, 156 welfare, 55, 92 welfare economics, 55 welfare system, 92 Western countries, 4, 104 Western Europe, 42, 112 White House, xi, xii, 101, 119, 135, 139, 144, 149, 153, 154, 157 wholesale, 114 winning, xii, 89, 90, 136, 142, 143, 149, 155, 156 withdrawal, 15, 20, 94 witnesses, 6, 22 wives, 106 women, 3, 7, 11, 31 wood, 78 work environment, 60 workers, 8, 60, 65, 92 workload, 125, 127, 154 World Trade Organization, 98 World War I, 4, 96 worry, x, 18, 20, 78, 104, 113 writing, 21, 22, 127, 155

Political Leadership and its Significance in a Time of Troubles, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,