Political Islam in Post-Revolutionary Iran: Shi‘i Ideologies in Islamist Discourse 9780755610778, 9780857736789

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To my wife Artemis, that without her love and care, this book would have been impossible

TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 12.1: Islamist Ideologies: Realm, Background and Representation. Source: courtesy of the author.

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Table 12.2: Islamist Ideologies: Issues and Positions. Source: courtesy of the author.

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Table 13.1: Shi‘i Islamisms with Respect to Critical Public Policy Issues. Source: courtesy of the author.

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Table A1: Religious Research Programs and their Specifications in Post-Revolutionary Iran. Source: courtesy of the author.

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Table A2: Foundations and Institutions of Religious Research Programs in Iran, 1990s. Source: courtesy of the author.

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Table A3: Sources and Main Scholars of Religious Research Programs in Post-Revolutionary Iran. Source: courtesy of the author.

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Figure A1: Apex of Iranian Religious Research Programs in Three Decades. Source: courtesy of the author.

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PREFACE

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a unique phenomenon in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The Islamic regime is defined by its aims to enforce Islamic law and establish an Islamic state modeled on the Prophet Mohammad and Imam Ali’s rule of pristine Islam. Iran is the only Shi‘i state in the world, and it enforces as many Islamic regulations as it can. The mixture of Shi‘i Islamism, feudalistic authoritarianism and traditional paternalism embedded in clerical values and the constitution has made the country a rare case in the modern state era. Similar to other modern states, the Iranian Islamic state has its own very specific theoretical ideology which forms the basis of its society and political system. Islamist groups in post-revolutionary Iran are usually introduced as radical, moderate/conservative and reformist Islamist factions. In fact, the reality is somewhat more nuanced. Having read media analyses and the academic literature on ideological developments in Iran, I have come to the conclusion that without understanding the diversity of ideologies, their contextual discourses, and the social and political groups that cling to them, it is impossible to grasp the dynamics of internal politics in Iran. The goal is not to find and foster a third way, but to open a conversation and to study the diversity of Islamist ideologies, even in a very small section of the Islamic world, and the way that they act and interact in contemporary Iranian politics. In this book, I seek to demonstrate how Iranian clerics,

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religious and secular intellectuals, and political theoreticians and activists have responded to the cultural, political and social transformations within their society from the end of 1970s to the late 2000s. By delving into the theory and practice of Iranian Shi‘i Islamisms at work, this study is intended to provide information and analysis of an ongoing project of Islamism and Islamicization in Iran, and implicitly argues for a more measured and far-sighted reaction to this phenomenon. Analyzing the response and critique to which these ideologies have given rise, the task is to locate the ideological formation, articulation and reformation of Islamism in the framework of the Islamic Republic of Iran. How do Islamist ideologies function within the context of the Islamic regime? This study will provide some information and analyses for researchers and scholars who seek a broader view of Islamist political thinking and the relationship between various stages of its development. Islamist literature consists mostly of statements and counterstatements, prayer lectures, rhetoric, polemic and newspaper commentary. My work aims to extract the main ideas and foundational theories of each Shi‘i ideology from these sources. Although the Islamists’ internal debates and inquiries may not offer the basic premises and discourse of Islamist ideologies, they highlight some critical aspects of Islamist discourse and the foundations and differences of each ideology compared to others. The focus is not on the failures1 and successes of Islamist ideologies in this work. I have instead tried to use a historical, comparative, and critical approach to study the phenomenon of development in Shi‘i Islamic thought in the post-Iranian revolutionary era. This study therefore stands somewhere between political sociology, political theology, religious studies, and the history of ideas and ideologies. I refer to Islamism as a modern political ideology that presents a sustained and systematic program, reflects concerns and benefits of a specific social class, proposes a certain set of changes in a society and the way of their implementation, and offers a way of approaching and controlling state power. It also provides the base for political actions, programs for political parties, and the required apparatus for a state

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to rule. In spite of its diversity and heterogeneity, most of the Islamism brands call for people to live in states which are governed by a monolithic reading of Islam, whether Islamic shari‘ah or Islamic values and norms.

Presumptions Three points are presumed in this study: 1) the sociality (ejtema¯iyyat), secularity (‘orfiyyat), politicality (sia¯siyyat) and historicity (ta¯rikhiyyat) of religion in general and Islam in particular, 2) the interaction among law, religion, ethics, society and politics as independent areas of a community life, and 3) the heterogeneity and inconsistency of Islam as a historical entity. As a sociologist I regard religions including Islam as historical entities; as social and political scientists we do not have anything concrete other than the history of these religions. All religions that we know today have been interacting with other institutions and have influenced and been influenced in this process. There is not any one Islam,2 timeless and eternal; there are Islams, situated in time and place. There is not even a Twelver Shi‘i3 Islam; there are Twelver Shi‘i Islams. Each branch and sect of Islam is divided into different cultural, political, ideological and geographical forms from North Africa to South East Asia, similar to Christianity in different parts of the world. For this reason, I will relate the ideologies I examine to their political and socio-economic contexts. The authoritarian claim to orthodoxy and authority in the framework of Islam is to assert what Islam is and exclusively explain its roots, while there are different Islams, and their roots could be traced to despotic political cultures and relations of power in Iran and other parts of the world. The ideas, concepts, statements and actions of Islamist ideologies are determined in relation to social and political conditions such as institutional structures and power relations in each Muslim society. Orthodoxy and originality in this context only mean having been developed in different and specific communities, polities and cultures.

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Analyzing and understanding Islamic ideologies is an important endeavor for any study on Orientalism, the question of the West, modernism and post-modernism in the Muslim world, secularism and secularization, history of civilizations, contemporary Islam and the Middle East, and inter-religious dialogues. Students and scholars of new social movements, political conflicts, and international security in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries cannot ignore the shaping and developments of modern Islamic and Islamist ideologies in Iran and elsewhere in the world. Even though Islamist ideologies shape an important chapter in understanding Islamist movements in Iran and elsewhere in the Muslim world, I will only focus on Islamism as an ideology with its nuances and species; another study should explain the implications and impacts of this ideology on Iranian society by considering the potential for Islamism to be an umbrella for a group of social movements. An important contribution to current discussions on Iranian modern history is to answer this question that rages in some Iranian intellectual circles: was Shi‘i Islamism an aberration in Iranian history, a sickness that came upon a relatively healthy and civilized nation, or was it a natural outgrowth of traits entrenched in the national political and public culture and religion? In this study, I can only look for the theoretical and ideological grounds to help us answer this important question. My aim is to provide a bigger picture of the state of religion and ideology interacting with the polity and the society in post-revolutionary Iranian society. This picture will be more analytic, critical, and discursive rather than sequential and chronological. The research strategy of this study uses an “analytical, interpretive and comparative method”. The principal fields of this study are the sociology of ideology, political sociology and the sociology of religion. This study is concerned with understanding societal and political dynamics of important social and political processes such as Islamicization, secularization and the interaction of these processes and other social processes in Iran in shaping different brands of Islamist ideologies. I will avoid jumbling ideas and narratives, piling anecdotes upon anecdotes, the dissolution

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of cultural and political boundaries, and the intermingling of irrelevant arguments to make my case. My study of the ideological map of the country, its political discourses, and its discursive practices of Iranian ideologues demonstrates that Shi‘i ideologies in post-revolutionary Iran are not originally and purely Islamic or Shi‘i. Shi‘i Islamist ideologies are prepared and brought to fruition in the context of an Islamic Shi‘i political culture, whilst also borrowing components from other ideologies of the modern world. This book is neither a history of modern Shi‘i political thought and philosophy nor a socio-political study of Shi‘i intellectuals. It is not about what Michael Mann calls “ideological politics”.4 I will merely focus on the achievements, results, and implications of modern Shi‘i political thought and the work of Iranian Shi‘i intellectuals on the construction and transition of Iranian Shi‘i Islamisms. The passage of Islamists (in Persian, maktabiha) from society, politics and law to religion and vice versa is theory- and power-laden, deploying religious symbols and signs derived from Islamic traditions to set a new field of action and practice. The formal and substantive contents of these symbols and signs are determined through individuals’ self-conceptions that are conditioned by social settings and the epochal knowledge. Religious motifs and themes are constructed and reconstructed through everyday life processes and life cycles. While correctly emphasizing on theory-laden aspects of these developments, the epistemological approach to understanding these ideologies usually ignores the power-laden aspects of the developments of Islamist ideologies. Understanding these processes will help us to analytically explain the foundations of Islamic and Islamist ideologies, see them in the political and social context, and compare them to each other. Islamic ideologies are engines of these processes, and have been reshaped and reconstructed in the pursuit of these processes. I consciously avoid orientalist, essentialist, historical masternarrative, statist/political economy, and culturalist perspectives. The orientalist approach usually constructs an a-historical and a-temporal

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Islam that is challenged only by modernity. The Islam/modernity dualism is the main obstacle for understanding the diversity inside Muslim communities and nations around the world. Orientalism thus far has ignored the dynamics of each Muslim community and interactions between one and the other.5 The essentialist approach often obscures the diversity and multiplicity characterizing Islamist movements and ideologies. This diversity may be understood in terms of three elements: 1) social policies suggested and executed by these Islamist ideologies, 2) the patterns of political behaviors undertaken by Iranian Islamists, and 3) the direction and intensity of social and political control during the reign of each of these ideologies in the country. The statist/political economy approaches often neglect cultural and ideological processes while focusing on social and political processes such as urbanization, state building, secularization and differentiation. The consequences of implementing the recommendations of different Islamist ideologies on the Iranian economy and state are undeniable but it is difficult to explain the foundations and roots of ideologies based solely on their economic policies. The culturalist approach is often a-historical in its focus. This approach therefore frequently neglects the exchanges of ideas between Muslim communities and Western societies, the formation and reformation of new strata, the birth and development of ideologies, and a diverse set of discourses of legitimation. Public culture in Iran has always been influenced and even manipulated by governmental ideologies; it should be taken as an independent factor when attempting to explain the developments of ideologies and social movements. Thus, I will look at the institutions that organize Iranian social life and the social structures that shape Islamist movements. I will also look at the reference groups which are referred to in ideological and theoretical challenges and socio-economic processes. The reformation of Islam is a very critical element in shaping these processes. Crucially, I do not believe that Islamism is unique and that the Islamic world is essentially different from the rest of the world, and that therefore social scientific theories are inapplicable to the study of

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Islamist ideologies. In order to attempt to discourage the close examination of Islamist ideologies and in order to distance themselves from the “West”, many Islamists assert that Islam is not a religion similar to other religions but instead a comprehensive and perfect way of life, and that non-believers cannot understand this phenomenon. They present an “essentialist and a-historical Islam”.6 However, it is my goal to highlight that although Islamism is a set of different ideologies, it is nonetheless understandable and can be made subject to explanation. Even if we do not consider Shi‘i Islamism as a necessary part of the rise of the religious violence around the globe, Islamic reformation, or political movements such as populist and fascist ones, this consideration does not mean that Islamist Shi‘ism is unique and inexplicable by existing theories of social sciences. Iranian Shi‘i Islamists not only pursued revolution in the real world to monopolize power in their hands, but also wanted a revolution as depicted in the Western social sciences, as it is called by Shi‘i Islamists. Shi‘i Islamists claim that there is an Islamist social science that may explain the actions and decisions of Islamists but an Islamist social science similar to Marxist and fascist ones is yet to be produced; the previous productions are ideologies not science. In this book, I will present an integrated historical and comparative analysis of the last three decades of ideological production and intellectual conflicts in Iran by providing a categorical discussion of two of the leading ideologues of the Islamic movement in Iran and nine of the leading ideologues of the Islamic Republic of Iran as well as examining the socio-economic conditions of the country in this period in order to contextualize these ideologies. It is clear that discussing post-revolutionary Islamist ideologies is impossible without going back to pre-revolutionary Shi‘i ideologies that framed the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which toppled the monarchic regime and laid the foundations of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the introduction, the central concepts of recent political Islam and the advent of Shi‘i Islamist ideologies will be discussed. Chapters 2 and 3 will be concerned with the preliminary stages of Shi‘i Islamist ideologies when they were mostly in their revolutionary

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phase, i.e. when they were rejecting the secular Pahlavi regime. Revolutionary and identity-oriented Islamisms are for the most part the mainstream ideologies among Shi‘i Muslims with political agendas. Totally against the traditional political theory of Shi‘is who believed in a link between religion and politics by giving religious legitimacy to political power, revolutionary Islamists of the second half of the twentieth century maintained that religion and politics are not separated, and politicized a specific reading of Islam. I will explain how this phase was shaped and how it was transformed in the next phase after the Revolution of 1979, something I see as a positive phase where different brands of Shi‘i Islamisms came to the scene with so-called Islamic political mandates, agendas and policies. Chapters 4 to 11 will present an account of these ideologies focused on their ideas on topics such as democracy, governance, human rights, constitutionalism, leadership, secularism, social justice, development, identity and independence. My criteria when selecting Iranian Islamist ideologues for examination was not their popularity, the number of followers, the circulation of their lectures, articles and books, and their influence on Iranian political parties and administrations since the Revolution of 1979, but instead was their contribution in shaping a new brand of Islamic or Islamist ideology by creative selection of Islamic texts and some ideas from traditional and modern political philosophies and ideologies. The ideologues of these ideologies stand somewhere between concerned, reflective and sensitive observers of Iranian cultural and social transformations in the ninteenth and twentieth centuries and active, responsive, vocal and devoted participants in the political sphere. They have articulated the most disputed theoretical and practical challenges of political activism, and exemplified the predominant response of Iranian ideological circles since the Iranian Revolution of 1979. They are also the source of aspiration for political groups and parties. The final chapter will explain the exclusivism of Shi‘i Islamism, the consequences of this ideology for Iranian society, and the paradoxes and challenges of Islamist ideologies in contemporary Iran. I will also discuss the reaction of the public to these ideological

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platforms as well as actions and counter-reaction of ruling clerics. In the appendix, I will present the contemporary religious studies in Iran using Lakatos’ research program model. I present Shi‘i Islamist ideologies as they are presented in their literature. I will use their own books and lectures as references for my quotations. I will explain them as they are related to their intellectual roots. Another criterion is their political behavior. I will also try to categorize them based on what they do – fortified by my observations – not merely what they say. To explain the diversity of Shi‘i Islamist ideologies in Iran, I have avoided putting all of them together in a meta- and encompassing category. I do believe that these ideologies may neither be explained just by considering their reactions to the West and Western doctrines nor by merely finding their domestic roots and socio-political contexts. During more than three decades of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Shi‘i Islamism as an ideology has been used by both members of the opposition and those at the very heart of government. This has made Islamist ideologies and their agendas, aspirations and frustrations clearer for the Iranian public and Iranian studies scholars. This dual use of the Islamist ideology has given us this opportunity of being able to discuss their real and intended agendas, both, as they have been used and manipulated in the political world. Other than seeking to understand the multifaceted driving forces behind Shi‘i Islamisms, I will discuss their performance in the Iranian polity with respect to violation of human rights, oppressing democratic movements, crashing civil society institutions, the violation of minority and women’s rights, and ignoring democracy and rule of law. This book will be sceptical of Islamist ideologies in terms of their theoretical frameworks and the actions that have been based on their normative frameworks. My critique is targeting their ordinances, the policies they choose, and the political cultures they endorse, and their attempts to ensnare ordinary people in a giant web of Islamist identity pretending to be of a common interest. Islam in its very nature may be a “political” or “non-political” religion. But it can be argued that there is nothing natural about religions. Islam may be used as a weapon against secularist oppressive

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and authoritarian states in the Muslim world or to legitimize them. Islamists ideologized religion and religionized politics to address their own legitimacy crisis as opposition and their position in national politics. Religion per se is primarily a danger for open society or destructive. It could fit into open society if believers question themselves all the hard questions that atheists and agnostics usually ask. Belief in God and an afterlife that are above reason are not incompatible with tolerance, human rights, and democracy, if believers do not use them for their political agendas and to deligitimize other agendas. To be congruent with the foundations of liberal democracy, religious beliefs should be considered as some habitual emotions that shape patterns of response, and are not eternal truths above the cosmos of truth in the real world. Almost all religions in their earliest period were mostly calls to rebellion than insistence on narrow conformity, more a challenge than a set of certainties. Almost all prophets challenged the authorities with public acts and public debates. These anti-establishment actions were their passion. What they were passionate about were God and the Kingdom of God. They believed in God’s passion for justice. They were not clearly passionate about freedom, democracy and human rights. When organized, religions turn to be a powerful section of the establishment, whether totally in power or influential. This book is an attempt to present to the Western audience an outline of ideological and religious developments in Iranian Shi‘ism since the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Most of the English language analyses of the religious developments in Islamic movements in Iran are scientifically rooted in political science, history and religious studies. Ideologically, they are mainly based on Marxism, Orientalism, or modernization theories. My book seeks to offer an historical and comparative study of Shi‘i Islamism based on the theories and frameworks of political sociology, sociology of religion and historical sociology. Although I consider the historical and cultural specifications of Iranian society, I do not believe that this society is essentially different and distinct from other societies in the world. While considering the Islamist movements, Islamic parties, Islamic governments and Islamic beliefs as the carriers and

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facilitators of Islamist ideologies, I will not discuss these subject matters in this book. Islamist movements as the clusters of different social groups with different social agendas, Islamist political parties as the instruments of promoting Islamist candidates in elections to public offices to influence and control the personnel and policy of the government and Islamic governments as the instruments for executing Islamic laws are in dire need of Islamist ideologies, and manipulate them when they have one of these ideologies. In the text to follow, I have a modest scheme of transliteration: I have indicated the ‘ayn (a grave, ‘), medial hamzeh (apostrophe, ’) and long vowel a¯, but have omitted all other diacritical marks. To make a Persian or Arabic name plural, I have simply added an “s” to the singular form. The common spelling of place names has been used, and in cases where an Iranian or Arab author has written in European languages, I have adopted her/his own name. Dates throughout the text refer to the Christian calendar, but whenever necessary I have added the solar or lunar Islamic year. Any Persian and Arabic word that is used in the text comes with the translation in the first usage of the term. I have translated the writings of Iranian Shi‘i Islamists, if not available in English, in a strictly literal manner so that personal interpretation was avoided as much as possible. Because no standard translations exist for many technical terms, I felt it necessary to add the Persian and Arabic original in brackets for the benefit of scholars and Persian/Arabic speakers. I have been working on this book for several years. It initially arose from my lecture notes whilst I was at Princeton University working on contemporary religious studies in Iran. The book’s chapters represent my reflections on a very long engagement with the issues from 1970s to the present day. Some of the writing was made possible by the time off from my teaching duties granted when I was working as a research fellow in Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies. I dedicate this work to all those who struggle for critical thinking, tolerance, openness and diversity.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

Iran has been the hub of Islamism for more than three decades since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 that led to the establishment of an Islamic regime. Since then, Iranian Islamists of different political persuasions have been trying to put their theories in practice. Often, they are accused of doing so without any thought as to the consequences for the country’s national interest, security and happiness of their subjects. Iran has become the first Shi‘i Islamic state in the Middle East in modern times. Meanwhile, almost all Shi‘i movements, from Lebanon to Iraq and from Bahrain to Afghanistan have been supported by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The struggle between Shi‘i movements and secular and despotic states has been intense, violent and complicated. The big project of Shi‘i Islamists is to establish an Islamic state that will allegedly enforce shari‘ah1 law and stand against the Western interests and domination in the region. The failures and shortcomings of political Islam and the idea of the Islamic state in the social, political, economic and cultural arenas that arose at the very outset of the victory of the Iranian Revolution paved the way for alternative approaches within the movement. The diversity of Shi‘i groups that were fighting against the monarchy, and the struggle for power among Iranian revolutionaries, highlighted the ideological diversity of the revolutionary movement. The failure to deliver the promises and difficulties involved in enforcing shari‘ah

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law has been evident not just for the political elite and political analysts inside and outside the country but also to the subjects of the state themselves. Even the suppression of alternative political approaches and the closing down of their media outlets have not decreased the outcry against ineffectiveness, nepotism, corruption, brutality, and the hidden agenda and policies of the ruling clerics and their loyalists in the military forces. The environment of paradox, frustration and hope in post-revolutionary Iran is reflected in contemporary Iranian art and literature and often voiced by the large Iranian dispora. For more than a century, there has been widespread popular support for real reforms which will end the country’s authoritarian regime and establish a more effective, representative and transparent government. The demand for democracy, freedom and respect for human rights has increased by conjunction with the upswing of the literacy rate, the urban population and the number of university graduates in recent decades. The disastrous experience of Islamic state regarding human rights and democracy is an unforgettable section of every Iranian’s personal experience. The revolutionary regime was expected to be a part of the solution and now is part of the problem. In Iran, the Islamism project has not been adept at the smaller goals of delivering public services and the mobilization of young Muslims for social change and social justice, which other Islamic movements in Palestine, Turkey and North Africa have successfully experienced.2 The speedy victory of the Iranian Revolution did not give Iranian Islamists enough time to put some efforts in proposing practical solutions to the real day-to-day needs of the people for health services and education, freedom from sexual harassment especially at local levels, and access to micro-credit. The Iranian Revolution offered the Shi‘i clerics an opportunity to have total power in a modernized and centralized state; but this position did not immediately translate into their delivering the basic needs of the population. The nature of the Iranian state, constructed as it was around the networks of absolute power and the nature of the rentier state, soon meant that the authoritarian power structures and corruption that were seen under the Pahlavis and Qajars were quickly

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duplicated and reinforced. Iran was never a failed or collapsed state that the Islamists had to rescue. Instead, they took over the already existing power structures and merely perpetuated them. The struggles related to the Islamist and non-Islamist readings of traditional Islam have shaped and have been shaped by local and national social, cultural and political struggles. Understanding these political developments is not possible without a better understanding of the ideological struggles related to a variety of Islamist ideologies. With the Islamic Republic of Iran now in existence for more than three decades, we have now a rather large body of literature to help us understand the varied actors, schools, institutions, events and activities that have an Islamist point of reference. This study will reflect on the ideas, policies and agendas of Islamist ideologies in Iran through focusing on concepts and categories of analysis that this extended literature offers. The principal focus of this book is the theoretical confrontation among an array of Islamist ideologies in contemporary Iran. The discussions in this book reveal the rich complexity of Islams and Islamisms in this country. It seeks to provide analyses and explanations for this complexity to fill an important gap in the ideological history of Iran in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The main goal of the study is to present Islamism as it has been developed in modern Iran, not as a monolithic phenomenon, but instead as a diverse and disparate grouping of theories. The ideology of the Islamic state in Iran is an amalgam of a different and diverse set of Islamist ideologies which are interacting and fighting against each other. The spectrum of Islamist ideologies grew wider and wider as Iranian Islamists struggled for and monopolized power in the Islamic Republic of Iran. This has opened the door to greater internal debates among Iranian Islamists. For the most part, Shi‘i Islamist ideologies differ in two grand respects: political and ideological. Their political differences are very similar to political differences among non-Islamist groups, in issues related to transparency, speed of change, institution-building, flexibility, expediency, degree of rotation of the elites, wealth distribution, tolerance toward corruption of high-ranking officials, political

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participation and political competition, and the recruitment criteria for public offices. The ideological differences relate to the methods and premises of reading the religious texts, the most essential component(s) of Islam, the level of clerical authority, the basic values and their priorities, Islamic state and non-Islamic state relationships, the definition of sacred violence, the ways and means of executing Islamic rules, helping other Muslims under repression, and the rights of individuals in an Islamic state. The perils of examining these phenomena are political, cultural and religious. The political peril is to reduce the political conflict in the country into clashes among different ideological readings of Islam. The political clashes in Iran go beyond religion and ideology and are entwined in the cultural, economic and social realities. The cultural peril is relativism, i.e. to legitimize the beliefs and practices of these ideologies in spite of their history of violation of civil and human rights and their animosity toward rule of law, human rights, democracy and tolerance. The religious peril is to reduce faith to religion and religion to religious ideology.

Background To understand the background of Islamist ideologies and Islamist movements, it is incumbent upon us to study the religious and intellectual context, ideological circumstances, cultural developments, the socio-economic context and the political scene of Iran during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Iranian society has experienced two political revolutions, one in 1906 and one in 1979, three national movements during 1951– 3, 1996 – 9, and 2009 and a great number of periods of reforms, whether political, social, judicial, religious or cultural. The Religious Context Religion in Iran is diverse: Muslims, Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, Baha’is and Sa¯’ebis have lived there side by side for centuries. Islam in Iran is also hugely diverse; there are Shi‘is and Sunnis, and each of them includes a whole variety of sects, schools, and branches. There

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are Twelvers, Esma¯‘ilis, Zaidi and Ahl-e Haqq among Shi‘is. There are Hanafi, Ma¯leki, Sha¯fe‘i and Hanbali Sunnis mostly living in provinces on the borders of Iran. Sunni Muslims constitute approximately 9 per cent of the Iranian population. A majority of Kurds, virtually all Baluchis and Turkamans, and a minority of Arabs are Sunnis, as are small communities of Persians in southern Iran and Khorasan.3 There are also hundreds of mystical orders or sufi brotherhoods such as the Ne‘matolla¯hi, the Dhahabi and the Kha¯ksa¯r, the Naqshbandi and the Qa¯diri among Shi‘is and Sunnis. Iranian Shi‘i Islam as a lived experience is a very diverse phenomenon. There are usulis and akhba¯ris in Shi‘i jurisprudence tradition; Shi‘i, Ash‘ari and Mo‘tazeli schools of theology among Shi‘is and Sunnis, to name the most important ones; there are Mashsha¯’is, Eshra¯qis and Sadra¯’is in Islamic philosophical traditions; mystical, philosophical, literary, canonical and scientific approaches to interpretation of the the Qur’an and hadith have been competing against each other; there are sufi, philosophical-Aristotelian and Platonic-canonical, scripturalist, theological and traditional chivalry or warriorship (ayya¯ri) approaches to ethics among Iranian Muslims.4 For about two centuries, there has been an ongoing process of Islamic revivalism, whether revolutionary or reformist, during the reign of the Qa¯ja¯rs, Pahlavis and on to the period of the Islamic Republic. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was not the end of this movement but instead represents a new beginning. Modern Shi‘i revivalism does not represent a return to any situation in the Shi‘i history or any former Shi‘i political theories: it is a reconstruction of the Shi‘i political tradition by recruiting modern theories and ideologies. Intellectual Context Iranian Shi‘i ideologies are produced and reproduced by religious intellectuals and clerics. The intellectual bases for these ideologies are religious studies research programs that are usually shaped by the intellectual and clerical circles and are mostly presented in academic and scholarly lectures and cultural magazines. Iranian religious studies research programs are under the influence of Western social

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sciences and humanities and flourish through the interactions and manipulations by critical comments as well as public demand for religious understanding of day-to-day events and social and political processes. A set of these religious studies research programs is presented and explained in the appendix at the end of this book. These religious studies research programs which stand somewhere between religious studies theories and religious ideologies provide enough materials for ideology producers. Most of the time, the people who are working on these religious studies research programs initially aim to build new schools of thought. They are the ones who establish the new ideologies. Other than the researcher/ideologue, a group of disciples and followers participate in the production, post-production, distribution and the publicizing processes by asking questions and writing ideology-made-simple treatises for public magazines. Ideological Circumstance During three decades of Iranian Shi‘i clerics’ rule, Iranian society has experienced a range of Islamic and Islamist ideologies.5 These ideologies as doctrines in action reflect the cultural and religious developments in society as well as international and regional conflicts. The clerics and religious intellectuals have created and elaborated these ideologies to serve specific causes such as mobilizing the public and strengthening their bases. Iranian society over the last three decades has been a fruitful field for breeding different brands of Islamic and Islamist ideologies which have their roots in a variety of sources, such as Shi‘ism, Iranian culture and history, Western ideologies, international and regional conflicts and dynamics of a developing society such as Iran. All Iranian Shi‘i Islamists in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have argued that Islam promotes a vision of society, provides guidelines for social life, and is inherently a political religion. They believe that the rules, ordinances and laws laid out in the Qur’an and the hadith mandate Islamic government. Nevertheless, they disagree about the way in which one should create an Islamic state, the methods of acquiring power, the way the government functions, and the way the government ought to deal

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with its citizens (subjects, in Islamists’ terms). Iranian Islamists range from those who advocate limited democratic politics to those who advance theories of armed struggle, terror, and violence against their critics and dissidents. Political Scene Islamism is the most important ideological challenge for European and American societies in the twenty-first century. Although some varieties of Islamist ideology limit themselves to Muslim societies, others do not, and instead look to to extending their operating zone(s) to include Europe and North America. Due to the perceptions of a lasting Western colonial domination and imperialist tendencies, military interferences of European and American forces in the Muslim world and the occupation of Palestinian territories by Israel, Islamism is imbued with a particular hostility towards the West. Over the past century, Islamist thought has coincided with both external conflicts with non-Muslim powers and internal ones with local authoritarian and secular regimes. Iranian Shi‘i Islamism has been the response of Iranian Muslim theoreticians, activists, and scholars to a variety of developments: the challenges of Western hegemony (British and then American), internal despotism, alternative anti-imperialist ideologies such as nationalism, secularism, and socialism, and frustrated aspirations and grievances due to socio-economic underdevelopment. It is also a reaction to authoritarianism and disillusionment with the failures of Western-inspired governments in the nations with a Muslim majority. Contemporary Shi‘i Islamism is not the outcome of a reaction to the abuse of secularism. Iranian society never truly experienced secularism. Before the Iranian Revolution of 1979, religious intellectuals and only a limited group of clerics were intellectually and ideologically responding to the modernization and secularization processes implemented by the secular governments. The modern state of the Pahlavis, while following the path of a despotic state, did not subjugate the men of religion to impose on them concepts aimed solely at legitimizing the state’s political options.

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Iranian Shi‘i Islamism is not a response to the problems of globalization and fragmentation. Shi‘ism has already been fragmentized from Sunnism and other Islamic sects. When Iranian Shi‘i Islamism was flourishing, globalization was already in its early stages. By inventing tradition and repoliticizing Islam in modern times, Iranian Shi‘i Islamists focused on the idea of the nation-state, something that they could build to reflect their ideological position. As opposed to some brands of Sunni Islamism,6 Shi‘i Islamism is not solely the expression of revolt against the West; it can also read as the expression of revolt against liberal democracy and what liberal democracy stands for. Shi‘i Islamism is the enemy of democracy for all, human rights, and freedom of the media and expression, while the Western idea of global domination and hegemony is entirely absorbed by different brands of Islamism. While responders to modernism were redefining Islam in the context of the new political and social environment and uniting the Muslim communities through a reform of Islamic beliefs, the majority of clerics were rejecting both the new ideas of Islamic reformers and the policies of the Western-oriented governments. They accused the Islamist nationalists and socialists of borrowing from Western thought and institutions, while they were attempting to establish a form of continuity between their Islamic heritage and modern change.7 The religious reformers and Islamist ideologues’ questioning the status quo was believed to be a threat to traditional religious authority. In spite of the absolute power of clerics, this feeling of threat has extended to the Islamic Republic era. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 awakened this majority and they began to build their own ideology to oppose the previous ones in order to have a share in the unexpected power of the clerics within the framework of the Islamic regime. While only a couple of Islamist ideologies may be recognized before the Iranian Revolution, they have been flourishing since the establishment of the Islamic regime. Launching a new Islamist ideology is often seen to be a prerequisite of entering into the political scene and having a share of power. The socialist Islamism of Ali Shari‘ati, the nationalist Islamism of Mehdi Ba¯zarga¯n, and the clerical authoritarian Islamism of Ruhullah

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Khomeini belong to the pre-Iranian Revolution era but the shari‘ahoriented Islamism of Morteza Motahhari, the scripturalist Islamism of Mohammad Reza Hakimi, the mysticism-oriented Islamism of Abdolkarim Soroush, the militarist Islamism of Mohammad Taqi Mesba¯h Yazdi, and the fascist Islamism of Ahmad Fardid and Reza Da¯vari were, for the most part, born after the revolution. In addition to these listed above, at various stages and with varying degrees of access, revised versions of nationalist, socialist and clerical authoritarian Islamism have been quite active in Iranian politics with some ups and downs. The socialist and nationalist Islamism have been under severe pressure of authoritarian Islamism, i.e. fascist, militarist and clerical Islamisms. Iranian Shi‘i clerics who were labeling revivalists and reformists such as Shari‘ati as apostates, atheists and heretics, competed with each other in reinterpreting and reformulating Islamic heritage in the light of the new Islamic state. Now the majority of clerics’ agenda was not only restoring Islamic practices and beliefs but also protecting the Islamic regime through constantly ideologizing shari‘ah and other aspects of Islamic heritage. While Jama¯l ul-Din Asad A¯ba¯di,8 and later Shari‘ti and Ba¯zarga¯n appealed to Muslims’ faith and pride and stressed their Islamic historical and cultural accomplishment to mobilize the masses against forces of colonialism and imperialism (Asad A¯ba¯di’s letter to the chief mujtahed,9 a few Iranian Shi‘i clerics called upon Muslims to back the idea of Islamic government and return to Islam for reasons of political autonomy and hierocracy.10 The Iranian Revolution of 1979 changed the clerical establishment’s attitude toward the idea of Islamic government and the majority of the population began to support Khomeini’s thesis. Now Islam, even for the majority of clerics who were queitist, was and had to be the religion of progress and change, as far as their rule is protected. The Iranian Shi‘i clerics as a social group have been calling for unity and solidarity of Iranians against world hegemonic powers (estakba¯r-e jaha¯ni) to support the clerical regime. Different brands of Islamic and Islamist ideologies in Iran have responded differently to the Islamic revivalism and social

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movements, and to different extents. Its immediate ancestry lies with the revivalist thinkers of subcontinent such as Eqba¯l La¯hoori, and Abul ‘Ala¯ Moududi11 who advocated returning to the roots of Islam, Egyptian Islamic militants and ideologues such as Sayyid Qutb (1906– 66) who advocated Islamic government and execution of shari‘ah law,12 and pan-Islamic modernists such as Sayyid Jama¯l Asad A¯ba¯di and his disciples Mohammad Abdu (1849– 1905) and Rashid Reza (1865– 1935). Among these ideologues, Sayyid Qutb was the most influential figure in transforming Iranian Shi‘i activists from nationalist and revivalist Muslims to the believers in the Islamic state. In this state, Islam is understood as a complete system of morality, justice and governance, whose shari‘ah laws and principles should be the sole basis of governance and everything else in life.13,14 The questions of national sovereignty, independence, identity, rule of law, constitutionalism, democracy, morality and law, and lately tolerance, civil society and human rights have been the main themes for discussion in circles of Iranian Islamists in the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries. These questions have been mostly introduced to Iranian society by secular intellectuals and West-educated scholars. Iranian Islamists have always tried to neutralize the liberal and democratic effects of these questions in Iranian public discussions. There are hundreds of Islamist political parties in Iran with different manifestos and agendas. They are fed by different brands of Islamist ideologies and they make coalitions during parliamentary, presidential and municipality elections based on the premises and schemes of these ideologies. The factional struggles in Iran are based on these ideologies too. By monopolizing the power in the hands of a few mullahs, Khomeini deprived Iranian society the opportunity to at least build a partial democracy. He demolished all the new institutions that blossomed right after the Revolution (the press, political parties and publishing houses) and fought for the monopoly of power in the hands of a jurist. Under the dictatorship of Khamenei’s reign (Khomeini’s successor), every measure of institutional democracy gained in the course of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 was severely

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curtailed; even the reform movement of 1997 – 9 could not put the democratization process on track. Almost all groups, whether secularist or Islamist, organized or unorganized, and from all class backgrounds want a say in political and religious issues in contemporary Iran. Although non-Islamists are deprived of having representatives in the polity, they influence any national election and political process through cultural and social activities. But, the Islamist governments have succeeded in pushing these secular groups aside, often by resorting to violence. There is a public dialogue between secular groups in the civil society and Islamist groups in power that shape the political agendas of each side. Socio-economic Context The disastrous socio-economic trends in Iran, especially in the postrevolutionary era, have favored Islamist groups whether in power or not. The socio-economic situation has been shaped by: 1. The unequal distribution of power, wealth and influence on a the national and international scale, exacerbated by neo-liberal globalization;15 there has been growth in income distribution gaps in most areas, in spite of education and urban growth, global cultural homogenization, and population increase due to health improvement; 2. The Western economic and military penetration and intervention that Islamists have used to justify a sacred wrath against the West; 3. The failure of other ideologies such as nationalism, up-down secularism, and socialism to address and solve the profound social and economic ills of Muslim societies; 4. The search for a secure identity in the face of rapid cultural changes and the desire to return to the purity of an earlier Islamic Golden Age; Islamic pride plays well into the hands of Islamists: they present themselves as the saviors of “Muslim” identity and claim to have sole ownership of its mystical heritage;

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5. The change in the status of women, the family and sexual mores; 6. Corruption, disorder, and political oppression; 7. The increase in the number of people who live in slums and poor neighborhoods because of internal immigration; 8. The factors that have brought people to the point of frustration such as high inflation and unemployment rates, inadequate housing, and poverty in the last three decades; 9. The growing power of central government; this level of power intrigues every group to have a share or almost all of it, if it can; 10. The increasing number of military and security forces in national politics to the point where elections are meaningless. Knowing that Islamism has a number of very different streams, this study will take into account the diversity of outlooks within Islamism in the context of Iranian society. By differentiating between violent and non-violent oriented, between popular and isolated, and between shari‘ah-based and identity-based Islamic ideologies, liberal and democratic ideologies may have better outlooks to confront the old and new Islamic ideologies in Iran and elsewhere in the Islamic world. Iranian Islamists have not been able to deliver based on their platforms for change but “the socioeconomic realities that sustained the Islamist wave are still here and are not going to change: poverty, uprootedness, crises in values and identities, the decay of the educational systems, the North– South opposition, the problem of immigrant integration into the host societies.”16 Due to the before-mentioned socio-economic situation in Iran, there can be found fertile ground for Islamist ideologies to exist, it is problematic to declare the end of the ideology era in the country.17 Frustrations in an Islamic context added to failures of other ideologies usually lead to a sense of deprivation and deracination and in the next step appeal to Islamic values, Islamic institutions and Islamic ordinances. The ‘ulama¯ have been very successful in capturing the emotional nature of the return to Islamic values but they have ignored the repercussions of Islamic oppressions.

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Cultural Developments The conjuncture of advancing levels of education, the rise of new communications media which a large number of Iranians from all strata are enthusiastically consuming, and a huge increase in the number of university students have dramatically changed the supplydemand setup in the Iranian cultural market. The literacy rate of the population aged over six years of age has increased from about 62 per cent in 1987 to about 86 per cent in 2007.18 Enrollment in institutions of higher education increased from about 175,000 in 1979 to about 1.2 million in 2005.19 Considering night time programs and teacher training schools, the number increases to about 3.5 million in 2009.20 The demand for an independent media, the free flow of information and entertainment not monitored by the government has been increasing. The Islamic government of Iran has been swimming against the flow in this arena: it has been closing the semiindependent press, confiscating satellite dishes (in the 1990s and 2000s), banning VCRs and videocassettes (in the 1980s), filtering internet sites and censoring books. All Islamist ideologies agree on the policy of limitation and their followers have been involved in these closing and limiting processes, although they have had different methods and styles. The number of VCRs at the end of the 1980s was so high that even the authoritarian faction stopped punishing and fining the sellers and buyers. In spite of eventual raids of the Disciplinary Forces of properties to confiscate satellite dishes, the number of users has been exponentially rising. According to some estimates, more than 50 per cent of the population in 2007 had access to satellite TV channels. The number of regular and irregular internet users was seven million in 200321 and 23 million in 2009.22 Iranians have learned how to break through the filters. These developments have broken the monopoly of Islamist ideologies on media and culture. The important implication of these developments has been the rise of national identity crises and quests for national authenticity.

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Research Questions This study investigates several questions. These are the main ones: . . . . .

. . .

. . .

What are the main brands of Islamism in contemporary Iranian society? What are the main agenda and characteristics of each brand of Islamism in Iran, their contents, directions, and influences? In which social conditions and social structure have these brands been cultivated, produced and flourished? What are the specific features of Shi‘i Islamist ideologies, such as their utopias and arch nemeses? How do they relate to Shi‘i Islam, Iranian history, Iranian culture, international conflicts and the political developments of Iranian society? What are the similarities and differences of these brands? What are the institutional frameworks of these ideologies? Who are the most prominent architects and ideologues of these brands? What are their theoretical backgrounds and affiliations? Who are their audience? How have these brands interacted and communicated among themselves? Which ideologies does each brand specifically oppose? Is there any possibility that these brands could have coexistence in the long run? How could they coexist?

These questions will lead us to a new set of queries that relate to Shi‘i Islamist ideologies’ implications, challenges, and positions on everyday events and developments: .

.

What are the social, economic, cultural and political implications and consequences of enforcing different Shi‘i Islamist ideologies in public life of Iranian citizens? How do Shi‘i Islamist ideologies in Iran interact and communicate with Islamic and Islamist ideologies in other parts of the Muslim world?

INTRODUCTION . .

. . .

15

What are the stated/potential social and cultural policies of each brand of Iranian Islamist ideologies? What are the positions of these Islamist ideologies on human and civil rights, women’s rights, globalization, democracy, civil society, the non-violent movement, political and religious tolerance, the rule of law, constitutionalism, good governance and economic development? What are their theories of state? What was the nature of state in the period of their birth and growth? What are the most important social and cultural crises that they are responding to? What are the challenges that Islamic and Islamist ideologies are confronting?

In rushing to pass judgment on Iranian Shi‘i Islamism, we become unable to analyze and explain its true characteristics, the reasons for its emergence, its present objectives, and the strengths and the weaknesses that will cause this phenomenon to grow still more or decline. We want to know where the borders of Twelver Shi‘i Islamisms lie in relation to Islam in general, how its political, religious, cultural, and social dimensions are articulated, whether it still has the capacity to mobilize and galvanize the masses and to win over activists, and whether or not it has been oversimplified by its enemies.

What is Islamism? Islamism as it is used in this study is an Islamic movement and a set of Islamic ideologies,23 characterized by: 1. A call for Islamic awakening in the personal and collective lives of Muslims to reassert Islam as a system of beliefs and actions in public and private life. The Islamist approach lives on religious beliefs regarding the claimed inclusiveness and superiority of Islam24. Islamists tend to view Islam not merely as a religion in a narrow sense of theological beliefs, private prayers and ritual

16

2.

3.

4.

5.

POLITICAL ISLAM IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN

worships, but also as a total way of life with guidance for economic, political and social agenda and behavior; The attempt to reflect, articulate and implement Islamic values in all spheres of life through political solidarity and mass mobilization; this attempt is based on the principle of prophecy in Islamic doctrine. According to this principle, God has intervened in human affairs through his prophetic emissaries, and his followers are supposed to take that path seriously. Due to incomplete intellect, human wisdom does not provide enough ammunition for human beings to be able to answer all their questions and provide them with what they need in fighting against evil and acquiring happiness in this world. If human beings accept the intervention of God and his true representatives, i.e. Islamists, in human affairs, God will give them victory; Defining an Islamic identity for Muslim communities and individuals based on the idea that Islam is a total way of life, and a framework of all debates in public sphere. From this point of view, historical Islam as a religion and culture is only the context for shaping a new text that presents a political/religious phenomenon; Advocating the reordering of government and society in accordance with laws and ordinances prescribed by Islamic shari‘ah as introduced by Muslim scholars, most of them clerics. The reason for this advocacy is that Islam is believed to be the solution for everything or at least for most of the basic problems of humanity. Islamists believe that Islam possesses a theory of politics and the state. Islam and politics are believed not only to be related, but politics is supposed to be subservient to Islam. In this respect, political Islam is one of the presuppositions of Islamism. In this view, Islam as introduced by Islamists is panacea and it includes all that human society needs; Islamists position themselves as holding the monopoly of legitimate representations of Islam in politics; and Acquiring the means of coercion through control of the state or local power and constructing Islamic state to reach these goals.25 By resorting to this characteristic, Islamists challenge

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17

the Islamicity of the existing societies that are called Muslim, which are “sometimes refusing all compromise with the de facto governments and believing, in any case, that an authentically Islamic society can only be established by installing an Islamic state”,26 and not just by putting some chapters of shari‘ah into practice. Wherever I use the term “Islamism” in this work, I have these five characteristics in mind. Any of these characteristics alone is not enough to justify calling an ideology “Islamism” or a group, organization or movement “Islamist”. If an ideology has the first four characteristics, I will call it “Islamic” instead of Islamist. The first three make an ideology revivalist. It is obvious that a society as a whole cannot be Islamist;27 all members of a society cannot agree on these five characteristics. It is very probable that some sections of Muslim majority societies, especially Muslims themselves, think and believe differently. Islamists do not believe that Islam is principally and merely a set of ritual conducts and is only secondarily a system to guide political conduct. They believe that “the Glorious Qur’an and the Sunnah28 contain all the laws and ordinances man needs in order to attain happiness and the perfection of his state”.29 Islam for them is a religion and a system of rule at the same time. Precise and full compliance of individuals with the absolute totality of Islam in order to be a good Muslim is not enough to be an Islamist. “Anyone who believes that Islam has something important to say about how political and social life should be constituted and attempts to implement that interpretation in some way”30 is not an Islamist. The Fuller definition of Islamism falls short of my fifth criterion. As far as a group of Muslims promotes its ideas and agendas in a democratic society and wants to have a share in power to implement its ideas, it is not an Islamist group. Islamists want to monopolize state power to implement their interpretation of Islam and have no intention to share power with their opponents, whether other Islamists or nonIslamists. Any sharing of power with non-Islamists is looked at as an obstacle for implementing shari‘ah laws widely in the whole society.

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Islamism in general and Shi‘i Islamism in particular are not religious movements per se; they are social and political movements whose aims are the conquest of state power and domination. These movements advocate submission to high authority of political ideologues and political leaders, not submission to God or emancipation from worldly powers. Islamists are concerned less with procedures than with results, less with forms than with contents, and less with methods than with substance. The built-in violence in Islamist movements has its theoretical root in this attitude. They want to have the monopolized power of the state to interfere with any social and cultural task. The centralized state is far more attractive for Iranian Islamists due to its intrusiveness into society and culture. With respect to democracy, they believe in two principles: the winner takes all, and democracy is not a continuing process. Democracy for Islamists is helpful as far as it helps them to grab the power and monopolize it. When they are in power, democracy is the Western and colonial plan to weaken the Muslim countries and oppose God’s rule, and there will be no way to change the government through democratic processes. Democracy is accepted tactically to gain the power forever. Similar to other national, regional, and international Islamists, Iranian Shi‘i Islamists preach the unity of religion and politics (sia¯sat), religion and state (dowlat), religion and ethics (akhla¯q), religion and law (hoquq), and religion and public policies (sia¯sat ‘omoumi). As a result, they do not draw a distinguishing line between citizenry and membership in a religious community. They believe that rulers and governmental officials should be faithful adherents to a true belief that makes them honest, trustworthy and reliable; therefore, there is no need for periodical elections, checks and balances or the rotation of elite. When in power, Islamists see themselves as an important section of the constituted authority, both in religious and political orders. Two examples of Islamist states in our time, Iran under the mullahs and Afghanistan under the Taliban, witnessed the merged political and religious authorities introduced as one. On the other hand, when they fight against the existing

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governments, they see themselves in opposition against the religious and political status quo. Some of the critical observations about the Islamists’ true agenda, that “their main concern is not Islam, but power” are irrelevant. Their main concern is to grab power through resorting to Islamic beliefs to execute Islamic ordinances. Islamists do not draw any line between political power and religious authority; this is due to their deep anti-secularist approach and the belief in the Islamists’ right and duty to rule. They do not see any separation of the mosque and state or religion and politics, while the first one is necessary to keep the independence of religious institutions and the second one is not possible. Other than having these five factors in common, they neither share idealization of the period immediately followed by the revelation to the Prophet, nor challenge the authority, status and pronouncements of the official religious establishment.31 They do not share advocacy for the restoration of the past institutions. According to Islamists, it is not enough to preach and guide: “If the actual life of human beings is found to be different from this declaration of freedom . . . then it becomes incumbent upon Islam to enter the field with preaching as well as the movement.”32 “After annihilating the tyrannical force, whether it be in a political or a racial form, or in the form of class distinctions within the same race, Islam establishes a new social, economic and political system, in which the concept of the freedom of man is applied in practice.”33 According to Sayyid Qutb and his Iranian followers, Islam has a political mission “to abolish all those systems and governments which are based on the rule of man over men and the servitude of one human being to another”.34 Qutb is loyal to the basic element of Islamism that is establishment of an Islamic government: “if Islam is to be effective, it is inevitable that it must rule”.35 “The way to establish God’s rule on earth is not that some consecrated people – the priests – be given the authority to rule, as was the case with the rule of the Church, nor that some spokesmen of God become rulers, as is the case in a ’theocracy’. To establish God’s rule means that His laws be enforced and that the final decision in all affairs be according to these laws.”36

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Hereby, he tries to dissociate himself from people who believe in clerical rule and hierocracies. Iranian Islamists began their movement with the same perspective but when the 1979 Revolution led to overthrowing the monarchy with a cleric as the leader, the Islamist movement led to clerical rule. Lay people were more active than clerics in the initial revolutionary movement but they did not have organization and resources. Sayyid Qutb staunchly denies the rule of selfish desires,37 i.e. anyone with desires other than what Islamists pursue in their life. This includes anyone who does not match the Islamist echelon and does not want the rule of God that is usually embodied in rule of a person or group; from here, he goes in the opposite direction of any democracy. Any regime in any time can accuse its subjects of having selfish desires to make its rule despotice and eternal. Shari‘ati in Ummat va Ema¯mat (Muslim Community and Leadership) and Mas‘ouliyyat-e Shi‘eh Boudan (Responsibility of Being a Shi‘i), and Khomeini in Hokoumat-e Eslami (The Islamic Government) repeat the same ideas about the necessity of Islamic rule; they both warn Muslims that just preaching and being preached to is not enough to be a devout and responsible Muslim.38 Sa¯lehi Najaf A¯ba¯di did a great service to the Islamist movement by shifting the mission of Imam Husayn, Shi‘ite third Imam, from becoming a martyr to establishing a just government in the Muslim world.39 In this perspective, the existence of an Islamist state is a necessary precondition for the believers to achieve total virtue. In this respect, Islamism is a modern ideology that presumes the absolute power of the state to manipulate individuals’ lives and to guide them to heaven from above. I do not define the reformist Islamic ideologies, which aim to re-Islamicize the society from the bottom up, as Islamist. The means by which an Islamic state is established are crucial in building the power structure, shaping the dynamics of political process, and defining the way country is run. The means that are used would be very effective in defining the methods of governance. Based on this definition, Islamism is not a shorthand designation for political Islam, Islamic fundamentalism, radical Islam, Islamic social movements, revolutionary Islam or Islamic resistance, whereas it shares

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many specifications with these terms and phenomena. Islamism forms only a small subset of a larger pattern of political Islam and Islam in action. Considering Islam and Islamism as equal is only good for making drama out of existing conflicts, and not understanding the theoretical and institutional foundations and dynamics of events related to this phenomenon. Although Islamists have certain points of view and approaches to social and cultural policies, and ways and means to deal with conflicts and processes of decision-making, they have lots in common with these secular ideologies. These policies distinguish them from other politicians and ideologues who attempt to adhere to nationalism, socialism and military authoritarianism. Islamism, whether Sunni or Shi‘i, far from being a retrograde traditionalism clashing against Western civilization and Western ideologies, is rather precisely a product of interaction between Islam and modern world and has been involved in a complex interaction with the social and political processes that brought it into being. Tradition in Islamist point of view is a construction of Islamic inheritance in a new framework for claiming worldly power. Similar to any other Muslim, an Islamist believes that the original message of Islam is eternally valid; Islam presents the only comprehensive and cohesive way of life that encompasses politics, culture and social policies; Islam has a dynamic, creative, compatible, adaptable and progressive character; and true Muslims are the only ones who carry God’s will in history and society. Islamists believe that salvation belongs to activist Muslims who work for the establishment of Islamic government. By Islamist, I do not mean “persons, organizations, or institutions that offer explicit Islamic justifications for their policy positions”.40 Every believer offers explicit Islamic justifications for her/his policy options; this is also true for observers of other religions. Every religious person makes an explicit use of scriptural, historical, cultural, or philosophical materials normally associated with the specific religion. Islamists view Islam as a political ideology that intends to establish a new society and polity by resorting to political power and

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instruments of the state. Iranian Shi‘i Islamism has a very strong element of Shi‘i mythical utopianism; it pursues an ideal community and state of affairs by resort to the power of state. It is due to this belief that leadership is the main focus of Shi‘i Islamism. All Muslims want to live by Islam’s principles in legal, social, political, economic and political spheres of life, but Islamists want to implement these principles by acquiring a monopolized state power. Therefore, every Islamist is a Muslim but it is not true that every Muslim is an Islamist. Every Islamist ideology is an Islamic political ideology but it is not true that all Islamic ideologies are Islamisms.41 Islamists tend to focus on the state.42 Islamism is a nation-state era phenomenon. Islamists believe that individual virtue can only be enforced if the state interferes in people’s privacy. Without having absolute power and control of state apparatus, Islamists are not able to establish their ideal state. Other than the necessity of the state for implementing Islamic rules, the Shi‘i Islamists have different ideas on the mission, function and structure of the state in Iranian society. They believe that the classical version of Islam has to modernize or adapt.43 This modernization or adaptation should be based on the internal dynamics of Islamic law and theology as opposed to being influenced by external ideologies and schools of thought. Khomeini always presumed the concept of the nation-state in his lectures and statements while there is no equivalent for this concept in traditional Islamic political theory and jurisprudence. In traditional Islam, there were da¯r al-Islam and da¯r al-harb, but not the idea of nation-state. Khomeni and his followers were haunted by the powers of this political entity to the point that they forgot to look at their books to check its Islamic credentials. Although he ridiculed international law and ignored some of the implications of leading a nation-state, he never questioned the territoriality and authority of the Iranian nation-state. But as an Iranian revolutionary leader, he could not put all his eggs in the nation-state basket and had to pay attention to Islamic ummat (such as his messages to hojja¯j, pilgrims, during hajj pilgrimage and his fatwa against Salman Rushdie). At the same time, he had no other choice but to act in favor of a

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territorial nation-state, i.e. Iran. Even in his talks of exporting the revolution, pointing to the US as the great Satan, and condemning Saddam’s attack, the idea of international borders is presumed.44 Islamists are also obsessed with the imagined, dreaded and dominant West. For Iranian Shi‘i Islamists who are now in power the West is a real threat from outside and from within. Iranian Shi‘i Islamists have portrayed the confrontation between Islam and the West as a fight between good and evil, as Shaykh Fazlullah Nuri put it a century ago, a “confrontation between light and darkness”.45 Anybody who has a different lifestyle and way of approaching the issues other than that of the dominant mullahs is a Westerner disguised in Muslim/Iranian clothes. Moral conservatism and literalism do not represent the specifications of this ideology. There are some brands of Islamism that have an eclectic view on morality, bringing some traditional and modern European ethical systems together. They are also different in the method of interpreting the Qur’an and hadith while they all fit into the five characteristics of Islamism mentioned above. The majority of Muslims are often too rigid in their adherence to literal interpretations of the Qur’an. Many believe that the Qur’an is the exact word of God. This has pushed Iranian and non-Iranian Islamists to focus on this book as the text for dealing with the existing social context. From their point of view, it is time for many verses – especially those having to do with social and moral order, religion and state – to be reinterpreted in favor of a more active and involved Islam. It is time for Muslims to question their interaction with the West and Western teachings and doctrines, to reach their own understanding of the world and to call for a bold renewal of their faith as a faith of domination, of aggression, and of resistance. As opposed to Iranian Islamist ideologies of the pre-revolutionary era, the existing Islamist ideologies in Iran are not allowed to have their own understanding of the prophet’s words in this process. They consider theological questions such as, “was the Qur’an really the word of God?”, “had it really been revealed to Muhammad?”, or “did he create it himself?” as the conspiracy of Western states to weaken the Muslim faith. Any question marks in front of traditional beliefs

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in the authenticity of Islamic texts and a clerical understanding of these texts is projected to be not only a religious threat, but a threat to national security and the establishment of the Islamic state. The mere deploying of signs and symbols from Islamic tradition to mobilize and agitate in the political sphere and constructing frames of reference from Islamic tradition are not enough to call a movement Islamist. Bottom-up Islamization or Islamicization without resorting to violence and state power as social actions are not necessarily part of the Islamist ideologies’ project, as it is defined in this text. For example, observing Islamic ordinances such as wearing hejab for women and not shaving for men, as far as they are not enforced by the government and do not express a particular political project to enforce shari‘ah law from above, are not expressions of Islamism. Islamist ideologies and ideologists were introduced to Iranian society as maktab and maktabi, a school of Islamic activism and follower of this school. These terms changed when Shi‘i Islamists confronted each other in the 1980s and 1990s. Hezbullah and hezbullahi replaced those terms to indicate shari‘ah-oriented, activist, loyalist, militarist and clerical authoritarian aspects of Islamism. For Islamists, whether Sunni or Shi‘i, it is not enough to be a good Muslim; Muslims should be active outside the mosques and madresehs as well. According to Sheikh Fazlullah Nuri, one of the founding fathers of authoritarian Islamism in Iran, “our Divine Law is not limited to acts of worship but, on the contrary, embraces every major and minor political issues, down to indemnity for a minor abrasion”.46 The role of the ‘ulama¯ (the scholars of Islamic law) is not merely to teach haiz and nefa¯s (menstruating and puerperiums, purity of women); Islam is not only a system of worship and ritual but also a governmental and economic system.47 According to Islamists, introducing Islam as a mere spiritual teaching was advocated by colonial powers: “the servants of imperialism declared that Islam is not a comprehensive religion providing for every aspect of human life and has no laws or ordinances pertaining to society. It has no particular form of government. Islam concerns itself only with rules of ritual purity after menstruation and

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parturition. It may have a few ethical principles, but it certainly has nothing to say about human life in general and the ordering of society.”48 There are scholars who have the opposite opinion; they believe that Islamism or, in their term, Islamic fundamentalism itself is created by colonial powers: “modern political Islam was invented by the orientalists serving British colonialism in India . . . consisted mainly in proving that Muslim believers may only live under the rule of Islamic State-anticipating the partition of India-because Islam cannot permit separation of Church and State.”49 Islamism is one of the vocal and explicit venues for the embodiment of the Muslim identity. Islamist ideologies begin with reasserting identity at the level of personal affairs and then the collective, but any brand of Islamism expands its agenda to politics, meaning without political power this reassertion is meaningless and futile. This hunger for political power is recent. Early anti-Western moods were used to be translated into cultural and communal actions. The recent reactions, ignoring the Western impact in its own make-up, are mostly political; Islamists in Iran and other parts of the Muslim world believe that the only way to fight against the West and its domination is to capture political power and coercively push Muslim masses to observe Islam and then lead them into battlefields. When the first response of the Muslim world, i.e. the return to nationalism and other European ideologies did not work for some strata, Islamism was the only alternative that hardened the positions against the West and narrowed the vision of fighters.50 Iranian Shi‘i Islamists’ activism is socially and politically presented by their participation in an Islamicization process. Islamicization is a social process in which the Muslim society increases its observance by considering new approaches and methods for implementing all aspects of Islamic law. Under this process, every aspect of human society and civilization including science, knowledge, culture, norms, and values are supposed to be transferred from the influence of human and secular values and norms to the dominance of Islamic values and ordinances. Islamicization is pursued by small groups and in closed communities where Islamists have no access to state power; after

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monopolizing the state power by the Islamist groups, Islamicization is the most important mission of the government and a grass root aspect of this process is ignored. The constant increase of literacy rates, the development of mass media and telecommunication, the monopolization of electronic media, the increase of urban population, and the oil revenues in the hands of Iranian Islamists have helped them spread their messages more easily under the guise of the Islamicization process. When and where Islamism is the dominant ideology in polity, political candidates and politicians always talk about their faith and the priority of ruling caste’s rights compared to individual rights. In this framework, atheism/agnosticism/non-loyalty to Islamic government and the ruling Islamists are considered as deterrents to holding public offices; politicians encourage people to look to their political leaders, not to their religious leaders, for moral instructions; and there are also privileges for the members of the ruling caste.

Shi‘‘i Islamism Shi‘i Islamism was born in Iran, although it was first under the influence of Sunni Islamism in Egypt. From its birthplace, it expanded to Lebanon, Iraq and elsewhere. Lebanese, Iraqis and other Shi‘i Islamists are totally under the influence of teachings and doctrines of different brands of Iranian Islamism. The Najaf seminary has been on a decline in the recent decades and Qom has been on the rise. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 gave an upper hand to Khomeini and his disciples in Qom; as a result, clerical authoritarianism and shari‘ah-oriented Islamisms are the dominant ideologies in its seminaries. Shi‘i Islamism Production Machinery How are ideologies created, shaped, articulated and manipulated? Iranian society in the second half of the twentieth century has behaved as a workshop for ideology production. The main purpose behind this ideology production has been to offer change in society

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through a normative thought process. Rival and alternative articulations of beliefs and practices were introduced to change the status quo and create a new social setting in Iranian society. The Iranian Shi‘i Islamism production line is a set of sequential intellectual and institutional operations established in intellectual and political circles whereby materials from Shi‘i sacred texts and Western ideologies, theologies, and political philosophies are put through a refining process of inner-circle discussions to produce an end-product that is suitable for mass political mobilization. The end-product has an impact on power through interest groups who want to have some say in policy-making processes. In this process, theoretical and conceptual components are assembled to make new concepts and ideological elements beneficial for political besiege. The target is the whole Shi‘i population, young and old, educated and illiterate, white and blue collar, men and women, and rich and poor. The members of these ideological circles did not arise so much from defenders of literalist (Akhba¯ri) or traditionalist orthodoxy as from professionals, intellectuals, and university students who might in earlier decades of their lives have studied in the West and turned into nationalism, socialism, spiritualism, existentialism, fascism, authoritrianism, totalitarianism, developmentalism and identity politics. Disillusionment with the failure of these ideologies helped turn these people toward a search for an idealized and constructed Islamic past as the embodiment of a more distinctive identity than offered by non-Islamist ideologies51 while unconsciously carrying the baggage of these ideologies in their mindset and worldview (weltanschauung). Ideologization of Islam was a pathway to find linkages between these ideology circles and Muslim masses. While followers of other ideologies had huge challenge to communicate with the masses, Islamists had no problem in circulating their ideas and doctrines. The Islamic beliefs of the masses have always been mentioned as the reason for clinging to the Islamism project. Iranian Islamists essentially espouse nationalist, socialist, fascist, militarist, authoritarianist and developmentalist programs, translate

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them into religious terms and promises to deliver happiness in this world and salvation in the other one, and try to achieve popular support and political power. The main approach has been to add Islamic taste to the doctrines and teachings of new ideologies to facilitate their propagation in the wider society. The different schemes, approaches and perspectives of Islamist ideologies have their roots in their mother secular ideologies. The irony of the Islamist project is its mission to overcome the Western ideologies by resort to them. Typically, raw materials such as verses from the Qur’an and books of hadith require a sequence of selection based on necessities of the time – as understood by every circle – to render them useful for the Shi‘i audience. With respect to the Qur’an, the processes include selecting, labeling, categorizing, and renaming the hidden ideas of the verses to fit the demands of the time. Regarding hadith, more careful processes of selecting are required due to lack of trust to most of the conveyers and narrators of Prophet Mohammad and Shi‘i imams’ words (qowl), deeds ( fe‘l) and affirmations (taqreer). In dealing with so many of Shi‘i imams’ stories and narratives, further refining is required: useful materials have to be separated from contaminants and then treated for presentation to the public. In this process what looks outdated and weird are regularly pushed aside. The whole process of selection, categorization and labeling is theory-laden that means the elements of Islamist ideologies were the end results of interaction among the religious texts and popular demands and secular ideologies. As it is clear here, non-Islamic materials which were already translated or read were taken into consideration. In this theory-laden process of reading and selection, those sections of the so-called sacred texts that fit into the ideologues’ agenda were picked and highlighted and those sections that do not fit are ignored or marginalized. The non-Islamic materials, including the methodology of research and study and epistemology, usually have an impact on shaping the mindset of Islamist ideologues in selecting, reformatting, recategorizing and reconstructing systems of beliefs that are presented as purely Islamic. I will show in this study that all Shi‘i Islamist

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ideologues, including ideologies that were produced by the clerics, have been under the influence of one or more Western philosopher or school of philosophy, political philosophy, ideology and political theory. At the same time, all these ideologues claim that they are presenting the pure Islam. Islamist ideologies have been formed in “dialectical conversation”, not with the West as a whole as Dabashi claims52 but with the Western ideologies as they were transferred to Iranian society and were dominant in Iranian public sphere at the time, Iranian history and Islamic heritage. In the translation process of Western philosophy, ideology and culture, there is a selection process that enforces some limitations over this conversation. Although the term “West” was extensively used by Iranian Shi‘i Islamists, they had no idea about the whole elephant; they had some ambiguous sensation about its trunk or feet. Iranian Islamist ideologues have always understood some sections and some layers of Western civilization and presented a reductionist perception of this civilization to their audience. I am also not sure about who was talking with those Western elements: but I am sure that was not “Islam”; a very diverse set of forces with different agenda and ideologies were involved in this conversation with their heritage and the Western hegemony in the region. As a result, Islamist ideologies are the product of a long process of confrontation among a very diverse set of imaginary entities: the West as a phenomenon that includes whatever is not “us”, Islam as it is considered to be “traditional/original/historical us”, the third world as the miserable and wretched, Iran that is considered as the homeland and the cradle of Islamo-Persian civilization and culture, and an array of ethnic, linguistic, religious and local entities. While some of the Shi‘i Islamist ideologies accuse others of copying Western ideologies and theories and parroting Western philosophers and political theorists, all of them have undergone similar evolutions. Authenticity and purity is merely a myth. These accusations have always been an effective instrument to exclude some forces from participation in political processes and power.

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The main purposes of producing Islamist ideologies are: 1. Providing a coherent system of ideas, relying upon a few basic normative assumptions that everybody in the society can understand and identify with; 2. Rendering a new meaning to existing normative and accepted texts guiding to action; 3. Shaping public opinions based on a specific direction and vision different from so-called secular ideologies; 4. Providing a cause for establishing organizations, the role that ideas play in the structure of an organization; 5. Extracting vigor and fervor, certitude and rigor of the population against real or imaginary enemies; and 6. Strengthening hegemony and control of the ruling class when it is in power. In spite of a huge production line for making Islamist ideologies, the consumption has been very low in the last two decades. In postrevolutionary Iran, ideas lost their mobilizing power due to the painful experience of the revolutionary generation and exercise of power; they easily trusted their political and ideological leaders, and in the meantime the substance of the mobilizing ideas were easily ignored by the same leaders. In spite of their unpopularity, the Shi‘i Islamists monopolized the ideology production machinery in order to monopolize material forces and sources of the country in their hands. The ruling clerics consider the majority of the population as “outsiders” who have no say in the legislation and decision-making processes. The material resources of the country are only in the hands of a few and only people who pretend to be true believers are benefited from these resources. Shi‘i Islamism and Sunni Islamism Both Shi‘i and Sunni Islamisms share all the characteristics mentioned in my definition of Islamism. However there are some differences between these two grand categories of Islamism. Firstly

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Shi‘i Islamism has its political roots in imamate theory (leadership in Islamic society belongs to the descendant of the Prophet Mohammad) while Sunni Islamism feeds from caliphate theory of leadership (a group of elders and nobles elect leader of Muslim societies among themselves). Imamate is absolutely central to any aspect of Shi‘i belief and conduct. According to believing Shi‘is, a grave injustice was perpetrated when their first charismatic leader, Ali, did not have a chance to lead right after the Prophet as the legitimate leader of all Muslims. They have emphasized the charismatic authenticity of their ima¯ms from Ali to the Hidden Imam that, according to them, covers almost all Islamic history. Shi‘i Islamists are supposed to establish a just/jurist rule in which the just ruler/jurist is the deputy of the Hidden Imam and paves the way for Mahdi’s just government, whereas Sunnis, for the most part, are trying to establish a caliphate that requires the dismantling of most of the Arab nations established by British Empire since the end of the first and second world wars. Many Shi‘i Islamists in Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain and wherever they have a majority are trying to copy the model of the Islamic Republic of Iran: having an Islamic state in the framework of a nation-state. There is no scope for political autonomy and civic culture in both Shi‘i and Sunni models of governance. Right after the Iranian Revolution of 1979, there were some panIslamist or internationalist factions among Iranian Shi‘is who were routing for an international Islamic state; this utopian idea soon evaporated due to Saddam’s military invasion and political backlash against the Iranian Revolution in the Arab world. Iranian panIslamists manipulated their agenda from establishing an international Islamic state to just supporting the Islamic movements in the Muslim world. This agenda also shrank to just Shi‘i communities in the Muslim world and Palestinians since the end of the Iran– Iraq war in 1988. Iranian Islamists ignored the cause of Muslims in Kashmir, Chechnya and Xinjiang due to their East-oriented and anti-American foreign policy. Secondly, Shi‘i Islamism has been prevalently under the influence of Marxism/Leninism and nationalism while Sunni Islamism has been

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mostly under the influence of puritanism/salafism53 and nationalism. Marxist/Leninist influence on Shi‘i Islamism was translated to supporting all the social movements in the first years of the Islamic Republic when the leftist Islamists were in power. As soon as the Shi‘i clerics monopolized power, only Islamic movements around the world had to be supported (later only Shi‘i Islamic movements with the exception of Palestinian Islamist groups). Thirdly, Shi‘is are mobilized by the tragic uprising of Imam Husayn who was killed in Karbala in 680 A.D. According to the dominant narrative, he was trying to establish a just government in the Muslim world. Although he and his family members and loyalists were killed, they made an example of resistance and pursuing the high aim of social justice and pursuing just governance through criticizing the men in power (promoting virtue and prohibiting vice that is one of the secondary principles of Shi‘i Islam). The Karbala incident for Shi‘is is a revolutionary confrontation of good and evil and Husayn is a savior of Islam and the Prophet’s tradition. Husayn’s movement has shaped the strategies and tactics of all Shi‘i movements through history: acting on the basis of principles and ignoring the implications and high value of martyrdom are two important lessons from Karbala for true believers among Shi‘is. Fourthly, any government other than imamate is illegitimate from a Shi‘i traditional perspective. Shi‘ism at its inception was an oppositional religious movement presenting alternative methods and beliefs opposed to monarchy and caliphate that implicitly posed a threat to the political status quo. Shi‘i Islamists emphasize charismatic leadership. It also characterizes itself in terms of the pursuit of legitimate rule by a descendant from the house of Ali (ahl-e bait) with a presumed charisma of descent.54 Sunnis usually believe in the legitimacy of the de facto authority. Fifthly, Shi‘ism has evolved provisions for a loose hierarchy of authority over the centuries and the religious authority has been mainly centralized during the twentieth century. Both the government’s weakness and ‘ulama¯’s independence of the government worked in favor of building a national network, having its headquarter at Qom. This network took the side of the ‘usuli school

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of jurisprudence. This school asks Shi‘is to follow a living mujtahed. This has had a tremendous effect on the networks and structure of Shi‘i clerical authority. Without this network and structure, the theory of guardianship of juristconsult was almost impossible to be implemented. And sixthly, Iran is one of the rare states in the Middle East that has never officially been ruled by the West. Since the Revolution of 1979, Iranian Shi‘i Islamists are no longer able to challenge and blame a secular- and Western-oriented government for failing to develop alternative legitimizing factors. The Iranian Islamic regime does not rely on foreign support to stay in power. As a result, the regime and its Islamist supporters cannot blame Western governments and their allies for their perceived inability to deal with social and economic problems of their country. The Islamists’ take over exposed the Iranian Islamists’ inability to govern or devise economic and social policies that were expected to be radically different from (let alone superior to) those of the secular governments. The hierocratic regime has relied upon cooptation and increasingly autocratic procedures and policies to remain in power. As opposed to Sunni Islamists, Iranian Shi‘i Islamists cannot appeal to the weaknesses of their governments to promote their cause. Other than reliance on the West and submission to International Monetary Fund strictures, widespread corruption, squandering of oil revenues, nepotism, clientalism and cronyism have been transferred from the Pahlavi secular regime to the Islamic one.55 With respect to social and political contexts, there are many similarities between Sunni and Shi‘i brands of Islamism. Both of them have been influenced by the political repression of secular nationalist and Marxist trends by authoritarian governments in the Middle East.56 Both brands use Islam as a religion, historical civilization, and heritage to build a new identity as opposed to the West and often justify xenophobia. Both brands have a very deep belief in a conspiracy theory that a small group of powerful men in the West are running the world and that these men are ultimately responsible for all that occurs. And both brands blame the West for the underdevelopment of the Muslim societies. They

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both have no interest in self-criticizing and collective wisdom of the public. Similar to Sunni Islamism, Shi‘i Islamism in Iran has seen five phases. During the first and formation phase before the Iranian Revolution, it was headed to overthrow the existing regime without having a clear view about what the structure and shape of the Islamist regime that is supposed to be built on the ruins of the ancient regime would be. In the second phase between 1979 and 1981, different Iranian Shi‘i Islamists were trying to present their own scheme of the Islamist government and to have more share in the political power. Between 1981 and 1988, the clerical authoritarian Islamism dominated the Islamist ideological discourse in Iran. After the death of the charismatic feature of Khomeini, shari‘ah-oriented Islamism became the dominant Islamist ideology. In the mid 1990s, a powerful alternative ideology challenged the dominant one. Nationalist, mysticism-oriented and ex-socialist Islamists had some share in this alternative Islamist ideology. In response to this alternative, a militarist/messianist Islamism has risen in the Iranian polity from 2004. Iranian Islamism vs Non-Iranian Islamism Iranian Islamism was not born out of colonialism. Iran was never officially under colonial rule. Iranian regimes before 1979 were under the influence of colonial powers, especially UK and the US, but Iranians never felt the direct rule of Westerners in their homeland. In contrast, Egypt, sub-continent and some other Muslim majority countries were colonized during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Any other ideology could have addressed the grievances of Iranian people who did not agree with their despotic and Westernoriented governments. Shi‘i Islamism was not necessarily the only response to the despotic policies of the Qa¯ja¯rs and Pahlavis. The political power of Iranian Shi‘i Islamists is not rooted in providing all kinds of social services, while the political power of Hamas and the Lebanese Hezbullah is based on their social service networks. Iranian Shi‘i Islamists have never had a network of public schools, hospitals,57 day cares or the like to serve the poor people in

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the country. Iranian clergy have never been in the business of serving people in their worldly needs. Their participation in the public education (maktabs) was mostly directed to religious propaganda; teaching individuals to read in the nineteenth and early twentieth century was limited to teach them how to read the Qur’an. Islamism for Iranian Shi‘i clerics is more of a state of mind rather than a mere religious ideology. They were resistant to adopt an ideology, but competing with Marxism and other Islamic ideologies in the religious market pushed them to make more than one. When they realized that taking power, staying in power, and ruling a country is almost impossible without having an ideology they began founding a diverse set of this modern phenomenon and tool. Iranian Shi‘i Islamists shifted the idea of philosopher-king into political domain of an Islamic state. Imamate, as they describe, is the pillar of society; as Iranian Shi‘is believe “it is by [the Leader’s] blessing that God maintains the heaves, that they do not fall and destroy their inhabitants, and it is by their blessing that God sends the rain and shows forth His mercy”.58 During occultation of infallible imam they were ready to accept the just sultan who by definition is a ruler that “orders what is proper, forbids what is reprehensible, and places thing in their places”.59 This character could have any positive specification in the world. Shi‘i ‘ulama¯ could merely focus on this point to introduce the Hidden Imam as the jurist. Other specifications were ascribed to this character by philosophers and mystics: vali by mystics and hakim by philosophers. Mulla¯ Sadra¯ merged these two characteristics by bridging between mysticism and theology.60 Khomeini was brave enough to introduce Hidden Imam’s deputies as capable to be absolute rulers of a state, something that traditional clerics did not. During the twentieth century, the special role of the jurists developed enormously and with dramatic results in Iranian politics. It is due to this combination of jurist, vali, theologian (introduced as hakim or philosopher in the Muslim societies) and king that absolute guardianship of jurist made its way into politics only in Iran. The premise for the need to have this kind of leadership is

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presuming all human beings are fallible and in need of guidance from jurist leaders who are presumed to be almost infallible, immune from sin and error, and totally capable of guiding.61 This phenomenon could not ever happen in other countries of the Muslim world. This makes Shi‘i Islamisms unique; each and every of them carry out some elements of this philosopher-king idea; some are more focused on the mystic aspect of Islamist ideologue and some other on its jurist aspect. While pre-revolutionary Islamist ideologies were denying the ruling regime and the Western countries’ domination, postrevolutionary Islamists began to deny each other: a shift from one set of denials to another. Early Shi‘i Islamism The essence of Islamism before the Iranian Revolution of Iran in 1979 was the opposite of what was going on in society including the trends in religious institutions and establishment. Revivalism was a “no” to traditional Islam that was part of the establishment. The negation of the West and Eastern bloc, their ideologies and the existing political regime did not accompany the vision of Islamists on what is going to replace the status quo. The whole theme of the “third way”, common to all Islamists, and taken up by Iranian Shi‘i Islamists during the 1960s to 2000s in the form of denunciation of capitalism and socialism, the Eastern and Western bloc before the collapse of the Soviet Union and democracy and monarchy, was constructed to support this negative perspective. Later on the unexpected opportunity to rule a country challenged Iranian Shi‘i Islamists to get together their ideas, and elaborate and deliver Islamist ideologies as systems of running a society, whether a modern or traditional one. Their imaginations, expectations and understanding of Islam, modern world and Iranian society were put together and used as raw materials to create new ideological systems that the Iranian public have been hungry for to address their grievances and to answer their demands. The following Islamist ideologies are the results of decades of preparation:

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a. Revivalist and Revolutionary Islamism. This ideology was first introduced to the Iranian public by Seyyed Jama¯luddin Asad A¯ba¯di and was mostly publicized by Ali Shari‘ati decades later. Revivalist Islamism has opposed secular despotism and imperialism, focused on the responsibilities of the Muslim in society and politics, and emphasized the Qur’an rather than hadith as the source of faith and belief. The recent version that was introduced by Shari‘ati was ideologically under the influence of new Marxism, and politically under the influence of Sayyid Qutb, Hasan al-Banna, Franzt Fanon and Seyyed Jama¯luddin Asad A¯ba¯di himself. It was firstly introduced in its raw shape in the early 1970s by Shari‘ati and elaborated by his followers as an ideological system to mobilize the public in the late 1970s. This ideology has had its ups and downs during the Shi‘i clerics’ reign. Revolutionary Islamism believes in revolution as the method and the end. It is focused on the need for Muslims to return to the original teachings and the models of Islam, politically under the influence of Sayyid Qutb, Mohammad Abdu, Hasan al-Banna ‘Abd al-Rahma¯n al-Kawa¯kebi, Iqbal Lahouri and Seyyed Jama¯l Asad A¯ba¯di, elaborated in the 1970s. When presenting their utopian and ideal Muslim society, revolutionary Shi‘i Islamists talk about the first community of believers in Mecca and Medina at the time of the Prophet and fourth caliph, Ali. They envy that allegedly egalitarian and undifferentiated society, and want to rebuild the existing society out of its model in the modern time. This is their project for the real world; building the mentality for this social relationship based on an intellectual endeavor. By revival, they mean pursuing two projects: rejection of any diversity and tolerance for others that has its roots partially in this nostalgia for a community without segmentation (social oneness, towheed), and emancipation from any worldly power which blocks the road to this utopia. From this point of view, there is only one Islam which has lost its way. The true Islam is that of the age of the Prophet; Shi‘i imams advocated it for two centuries but were not successful in making it a reality. The true Islam, according to the revivalists, was stolen by rich, powerful and hypocritical strata.

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b. Identity-oriented Islamism. This ideology was mostly represented by Jala¯l-e A¯l-e Ahmad who was first a devoted Marxist and Communist, who was later religiously opposed to anything Western, including communism and liberalism. This identity-oriented Islamism was fed and strengthened by four realities, mindsets and arguments: 1. Nostalgia for the golden age of Islam; identity-oriented Islamists believe that the Islamic civilization made the West civilized; 2. Nativism. It has a naive nativist approach to indigenous cultural customs, values, norms and beliefs qualified by Islamist authority that calls for revival, reconstruction and reinstatement of native Islamic heritage as understood by Islamists; 3. Homogeneity of the Western culture as opposed to the uniqueness of the Islamic one; and 4. Continuity of long-standing Islamic characteristics of Iranian society over time. Islamists have always emphasized the dark sides of capitalism, democracy, civil society, humanity, modernity and human rights. They repeat the criticisms of the West that are usually presented by Westerners themselves to strengthen Islamic identity. It is said that other than progress there are many failures within Western societies; some Western societies have failed to find the balance between the interests of society and powerful and rich individuals, to deal with some malfunctions of the expected melting pot, to recognize the need for spirituality, to recognize the appropriate limits of growth, and to understand the benefits of multilateralism.62 In the Islamist literature, the endeavors to tackle these issues in the Western world are entirely ignored. To reject individual freedom and limited and accountable government, identity-oriented Islamism denounces Western culture for its moral laxity and extends this to Western political culture; it also rejects this culture for the debased and acculturated local elite and intellectuals who have betrayed their own heritage.

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Contemporary Shi‘i Islamism Immediately after the collapse of the monarchic regime in 1979, Iranian Shi‘i Islamists were expected to make their own choices about how to rule the country. They were united against the old regime, followers of secular ideologies and other Islamist ideologies who opposed the clerics. Soon the honeymoon was over and different sides of the equation began to provide their own visions of what is going to happen next. The “positive” aspect of Islamism begins here. Post-revolutionary Islamist ideologies stopped talking about the kingdom of heaven and the rule of deprived right after the victory of Revolution; they now knew that they could not deliver such a utopia. It was impossible to deliver free utility, housing, land and other services to everyone in the country in spite of these kinds of promises before the victory. The vested interests of clerics were the most powerful obstacle to distribute wealth, deliver democracy and promote social justice. Different sets of theological doctrines were still translated into the political arena. The new regime was to be presented as the last and enduring one in the country, similar to the prophecy of Prophet Mohammad. Iran was the chosen society and Iranians were supposed be patient and wait for heaven to be recreated on earth. How could Shi‘i Islamists conceptually deny what they had just established and they were benefiting from? The sacred has already descended as tangible and it had to be the best scenario. If the revolutionary era was the time for “no” (la¯ in Shari‘ati’s term, that is Arabic for “no”) the Islamic Republic demanded “yes”. The ruling clerics no longer needed to persuade believers that God was on their side all the time: the unexpected victory of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and establishment of the Islamic Republic were strong evidence that He really was on the clerics’ and their loyalists’ side. They still needed Islamist ideologies to justify their actions and legitimize their rule; they needed ideologies to persuade the public that God is going to be on the ruling caste’s side in any event, whatever happens and however the regime behaves. A meaningful way to categorize Islamic and Islamist ideologies in contemporary Iran is to do it based on their standing in society, the

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way they require society to change, and the direction of change they imagine. We can also classify them by referring to their social and political foundations, the way they relate to society, whom they relate to in the greater Islamic ummat and how they relate to the traditional Islam and Islamic texts. The question among people who believed in reconstructing traditional Islam, choosing Islam as the main factor of their identity and revolution as the method and as the end was “what comes first” in the formulation of this identity and revival. Islam even before the new wave of Islamist movements was not a homogeneous entity; it included shari‘ah, morality, mysticism and theology and elements of popular and ceremonial religion. Islamists chose different chapters and different sections of this heterogeneous entity. Due to the strength of socialism, nationalism, clerical authoritarianism, militarism, scripturalism, mysticism and feqhism (ideologized shari‘ah) during and after the Iranian Revolution, Islamist Shi‘i ideology was branched into different slots. There are different configurations and problems as well as approaches and weltanschauung with regard to understanding the relationship between the state and religious establishments in any of these ideologies. It ranges from total mergence and dependence to total independence based on how independence and mergence are defined. They are also different with respect to the relationship between state and its subject, from guided democracy to authoritarianism and totalitarianism. I have selected eight Islamist ideologies and nine Islamists whose ideas shaped the ideological configuration of post-revolutionary Iranian society. I want to address my research questions in the framework of these eight ideological species: a. Socialist Islamism. Shari‘ati advocated the revival of the Islamic community modeled on the precepts and examples of the pristine Islam and Medina community, the sacred texts and the conduct of Prophet Mohammad and Shi‘i imams. Based on his socialist agenda, he gave the greatest weight to the people, ummat (ummah in Arabic) or na¯s. He preaches for almost all elements of a socialist party manifesto:

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authoritative leadership (imamat) which has absolute and unquestioned authority over the people, ummat, political imperatives for action, superiority of ideology over any other human construct, class struggle, and the unending conflict between good and evil. Shari‘ati rediscovered the Qur’an in the image of new Marxism: he tried to extract revolutionary ideas of Marxism with a human face from religious texts. Religion for him is a practical force for mobilizing the masses to fight for radical social change; this is religion for the sake of revolution, and not a revolution for the sake of religion.63 b. Nationalist Islamism. While the majority of nationalists during the Pahlavi era were secularist, believing in the separation of politics and religion, a small group of them wanted Islam as the main element of their national identity. Iranian nationalist Muslims wanted a constitutional monarchy that respects Islamic ordinances and recognizes the authority of religious institutions. When the Pahlavis failed to build this kind of relationship between state and religion, Muslim nationalists began to choose a more radical position. They ideologized religion to fight the status quo and acted as a bridge between constitutionalism and more violent types of Islamism. Nationalist Islamists were the first in the country to introduce Islam as an ideology. c. Clerical authoritarian Islamism. This brand was mostly represented by Ruhullah Khomeini who was opposed to secularism and liberalism, nationalism and Marxism. He was also focused on opposing super-powers’ hegemony and establishing an Islamist government. Khomeini was politically under the influence of Mirza-ye Na’ini and Mirza-ye Shira¯zi and developed and elaborated his theory of guardianship of the jurist in the 1960s to 1980s. To oppose any democratic and liberal interpretation of Islam he invented the idea of American Islam vs pure Mohammadan Islam. d. Shari‘ah-oriented Islamism. Feqhist or shari‘ah-oriented Islamism believes that 1) Islamic shari‘ah covers all the regulations for a happy life and working society, 2) due to its dynamism, it is for all times and places; 3) it is straightforward and easy to follow; and 4) if implemented, it will cure all problems and crimes of human societies. Islamic shari‘ah, ethics and theology, and not mysticism, are

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the core of Islam in this ideological system, and monopolized power is to execute and enforce this important aspect. e. Justice-oriented scripturalist Islamism. Mostly shaped and developed in Khorasan, in the northeast of Iran, scripturalist Shi‘i Islamists believe that salvation is in following the words of God and his messengers. This anti-philosophy and anti-mysticism movement, inspired by the teachings of Mirza¯ Mehdi Esfaha¯ni, Shaikh Mojtaba¯ Qazvini, and Ha¯j Mahmoud Halabi, presents Islamic philosophy and Islamic mysticism as deviance from the main stream Islamic belief system. A justice-oriented approach was added to this perspective under the influence of the justice-oriented aspects of Iranian Revolution and Islamic ideologies’ competition with Marxism during 1970s. The justice-oriented ideologues believe that social justice is the main agenda of Islam in all times and places. Mohammad Reza Hakimi and his brothers upgraded this school of thought to an ideology in their book Al-haya¯t (Life). f. Mysticism-oriented Islamism. This ideology was mostly represented by Abdolkarim Soroush who was opposed to Marxism, secularism, liberalism and religious totalitarianism. This ideology focused on an aspiritual reading of Islam, and Islam as identity rather than merely an instrument for gaining political legitimacy, and was culturally under the influence of Mohammad Qazzali and Jalaluddin Rumi. Elaborated in the 1980s and 1990s, it was the ideological basis for the reform movement in the late 1990s in Iran. g. Militarist/messianist Islamism. It is mostly represented by Mohammad Taqi Mesba¯h Yazdi who is rigidly opposed to democracy, liberalism and pluralism. The anti-liberalism and anti-pluralism approach of this Islamist ideology is way beyond reaction to atheists that believe religion is nothing more than a useless, and sometimes dangerous, evolutionary accident. A very small group of Iranian atheists have publicly claimed that religion is at its core an empty undertaking, a mis-direction, and a vestigial artefact of a primitive mind. This ideology usually uses the eventual evangelical fervor of neo-atheism as a pretext for its violent-oriented views against non-Islamists and other Islamists who do not agree with militarist Islamism.

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Militarist/messianist Islamism is focused on Islamic shari‘ah as the provider of the only legitimate lifestyle in society and the coming of Hidden Imam as Shi‘i apocalypse. They consider militant clerics and their loyalists as the only group who has the right to rule. The followers of this ideology believe that true believers should resort to force to enforce the legitimate lifestyle and to promote their truthful ideas. This ideology is philosophically under the influence of Sheikh Fazlullah Nuri who was an absolutist and monarchist during the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 and its aftermath, and was executed by the constitutionalists because of his support for the king. This ideology was mostly elaborated in the 1990s and 2000s when shari‘ah-oriented Islamists were under public and ideological pressure and they were losing to reformists in elections, and public opinion was against them. As a messianic ideology, it picks and elaborates the Shi‘i apocalyptic approach to political philosophy. Ahmadinejad and his close team members were followers of this brand of Islamism. h. Fascist Islamism. Presented by Reza Da¯vari and other disciples of Ahmad Fardid,64 it has persistently advocated authoritarianism and opposed nationalists and religious intellectuals. As followers of Heidegger, they are opposed to liberalism and parliamentary democracy and introduce vali-ye faqih as the leader (pishva). Although negative judgments of fascism are so strong that placing other ideologies in the same category appears to be name-calling, the similarities are so wide that it is hard for any researcher to name the Iranian version otherwise. Iranian Islamist fascists, similar to their German ideal type, long for an authoritative tradition to hold onto against the chaotic tide of modernization and uniformity of collective will and identity. They reject bourgeois civilization and democracy, call masses to destroy the ruling order and restore spiritually authentic truth, and present the West as the “other”, the living incarnation of evil, injustice, corruption and decay.65 The figures that are selected for this study did not have a static position on how Shi‘ism should be interpreted and whether it should be transferred to an ideology; they did change their ideas in different stages of their political, ideological and academic life. There are at

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least two stages for Soroush, Da¯vari/Fardid, Khomeni, Ba¯zarga¯n, and Mesba¯h. In this study I will focus on those stages where these ideologues present Islam as an Islamist ideology. Soroush has transferred from the ideologue of mysticism-oriented Islamism in the 1980s and 1990s to a more mystic interpretation of Islam in the 2000s. Mesba¯h has transferred from an Islamic philosophy teacher in the 1970s and 1980s who did not believe in fighting against the monarchy to the main theoretician of militarist Islamism in the late 1990s and 2000s. Da¯vari/Fardid were philosophy teachers who had no revolutionary and ideological agenda in the 1960s and 1970s but immediately after the victory of the Iranian Revolution changed to adamant supporters of this Revolution as the end of the West. Ba¯zarga¯n was a Muslim nationalist in the 1950s and 1960s but with the increasing pressure of the regime on independent nationalists, he turned toward an ideological interpretation of Islam. The failed experience of the Revolution to establish a nationalist democratic state transformed his reading of Islam from an ideological interpretation to a spiritual one. His last work, Resurrection and God: the Prophets’ Mission,66 presents religion as a collection of spiritual teachings that mostly deals with sacred entity and the Day of Judgment. Khomeni transformed from a traditionalist source of emulation in the 1940s to 1960s to a clerical authoritarian Islamist in the 1970s and 1980s. He has at least four different sets of political ideas in five different eras. When he wrote Kashf al-Asra¯r (Uncovering the Secrets) in the 1940s, he believed that the rule by monarchs or others is permissible so long as shari‘ah law was followed: “Monarchy is fine and fits the interests of the country and the nation if it is established based on God’s rule and justice”.67 In his lectures in Najaf in the 1970s, Vela¯yat-e Faqih: Hokoumat-e Esla¯mi (Guardianship of the Jurist: Islamic Government), he turned against the monarchy and advocated Islamic government ruled by a juristconsult. This was due to the failure of his movement in 1963 and his exile to Iraq. During the Iranian Revolution of 1979 he put his ideas about the guardianship of the jurist aside and advocated a partial and guided democracy that is only monitored by the jurists. When the

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constitution was under discussion in the Expert Council for Drafting the Constitution, he brought his authoritarian Islamist ideas back and the Constitution of the Islamic Republic was passed giving priority to the rule of the jurist in all matters of governance.68 In the 1980s in his letter to President Khamenei (dated 24 April 1989),69 he made the rule of the jurist absolute to the point that he can suspend all Islamic beliefs and ordinances if the survival of the regime is dependent on this suspension. In reality, the ideologies of the Iranian political coalitions and successive administrations have been promoting ideological systems that preserve the interests of some sections of Islamist groups. The overall ideology of the state has been a combination and mixture of the mentioned Islamist ideologies. There has been shifting coalitions in executive and legislative branches of the Islamic Republic of Iran since the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The coalitions in power have been shaped by different Islamist ideologies in different periods and administrations: . . . .

. . .

1979– 80: nationalist/clerical authoritarian Islamism, Ba¯zrga¯n administration 1980 – 1: nationalist/clerical authoritarian/socialist Islamism, Bani-Sadr administration 1981 – 9: clerical authoritarian/shari‘ah-oriented/socialist Islamism, Musavi administration 1989 – 97: clerical authoritarian/shari‘ah-oriented/socialist Islamism, Rafsanjani administration (socialist Islamism was not as powerful as the other two) 1997– 2005: mysticism-oriented/socialist/clerical authoritarian Islamism, Khatami administration 2005 – 12: fascist/militarist/clerical authoritarian/shari‘ahoriented Islamism, Ahmadinejad administration 2012– : clerical authoritarian/shari‘ah-oriented/socialist Islamism, Rowhani administration

There are some streaks of other ideologies born or imbued into these Islamist ideologies. The most prominent ideologies that

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could have been interacted and mixed with these ideologies are totalitarianism, socialism, messianism, pragmatism, militarism, fascism, clientalism, developmentalism, authoritarianism, praetorianism, machiavellism, nationalism and populism.

Conceptual Remarks The term “Islamic fundamentalism” indifferently puts some of the mentioned ideological categories in one box. Due to lack of explicit definition and lumping together widely different phenomena,70 this term often functions as an obstacle to understand the actual tendencies and trends involved in a social movement or ideology. Islamic fundamentalism has been used to refer to populist,71 revivalist,72 scripturalist,73 anti-rationalist,74 doctrinally and socially conservative,75 revolutionary,76 and militarist Islamisms,77 without mentioning their differences in theoretical and practical approaches. Borrowed from Christianity, the term fundamentalist is equally used for Islamists who are against Western domination, modernism and reform in Islam and Muslim societies, and fundamentalist is ambiguously defined as Islamist in the Islamic context as opposed to Islamic that denotes any religiously oriented trend.78 Some scholars equate Islamism and Islamic fundamentalism and define Islamism as a fundamentalist ideology of political Islam.79 The problem with this definition is ambiguity of the term usuliyyah or fundamentalism; this term is so inclusive that everybody could consider himself/herself a fundamentalist, from a liberal democrat to a believer in totalitarian ideology; they all cling to principles and want to be recognized as principalists. What Tibi considers as the core of Islamic fundamentalism, i.e. aggressive politicization of religion undertaken in the pursuit of non-religious ends, adds to the ambiguity.80 There is no clear border between religious and nonreligious ends other than the intentions of people, something that we do not have access to all the time. Religion has always been politicized even by their founders. The non-religious end, in this case acquiring power, is only a means for enforcing Islamic laws and pursuing Islamic values in the eyes of Islamists.

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The term Islamic fundamentalism represents a series of events involving Muslim communities all around the world targeting Western interests while it has no meaning among Muslims with respect to what they think and what they believe in. Neofundamentalism,81 traditionalism, and neo-traditionalism82 have the same features. There are tens of traditional cultures in the Muslim world and every one of them has had different reactions to modernity, the West, Western domination, colonialism and globalization. Almost all brands of Islamism in Iran believe in controlling human body, especially women’s bodies; other than nationalist, socialist and mysticism-oriented Islamism they all reject any cultural and political pluralism, and they do not believe in any wall between religion and politics, or religious and governmental institutions. These positions are reactions to feminism, liberalism and secularism. In this respect, Islamic fundamentalism as it is used is a reactionary ideology. This kind of analysis explains what Islamic fundamentalism is not but it does not explain what it really is. Having these criteria in hand, every Islamist ideology is fundamentalist, while firstly they deny different aspects of the modern world and secondly they focus on different aspects of traditional Islam. For example, reformist political factions condone interference of religion in politics but warn against interfering of religious institutions in real politics. I avoid using modernist Islamism due to modernist elements in all Islamist ideologies. They all emphasize modern techniques of social organization and mobilization, repression, political propaganda, and spiritual crises; they tend to accept some modern institutions such as monopoly of violence and coercion, constitution, political parties and social welfare; and they all share a positive orientation toward change and progress but they provide their own vision of progress and change. Using the terms modernity, modernization, modernism, and postmodernism does not help us to explain the situation of Islamist ideologies in Iran for four clear reasons: 1. It does not matter whether Islamisms reject or embrace modernity; they are living the experiences of modernization, in

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any definition of the term. When they reject all political achievements of the West and its import to the Muslim world, “their various political ideas, organizations and aspirations are implicitly premised upon the models and assumptions of modern nation-state politics”.83 Instead of presenting ambiguous terms for all civilizational developments lumped together, it is better to explain what aspects of the West have had some or more influence on Islamist movements and Islamist ideologies; Islamists are reacting to developments in the West in one way or another. 2. Modernity and modernization are usually associated with and explained as Westernization and Westernism, and secularism and secularizatio.84 It is better to use the latter terms that are more explanatory than the former; 3. These terms place the West as the ultimate referential frame of understanding that does not serve my cause to explain internal dynamics of Shi‘i Islamism project. Master-narrative approaches have an essentialist view of Islam85 and the West that ignore the socio-political dynamics of state building, formation of ideologies and secularization processes in the Muslim world; and 4. Modernity did not happen in Iranian society to let us explain the recent developments in society as reactions to this phenomenon. There were imaginations, aspirations, ambitions and longings among intellectuals and some political elite from the mid nineteenth century to modernize the government, society, economy and culture but openness and inclusive qualities of modernity, enlightenment and moral ideals remained on paper. We do not know what would happen to Islamic and Islamist ideologies and movements if Iranian society would be an open and inclusive society in twentieth and twenty-first centuries. I will not categorize Islamists as radical, moderate and liberal; these terms do not say anything meaningful about different brands of Shi‘i Islamism; these are just simplification of the facts by mainstream media. There is no liberal Islamist: for the most part, they all oppose liberalism, equality in front of the law, human rights and basic freedoms for all. Terms such as moderate and radical are used

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subjectively; a group of Islamists is radical from the viewpoint of one group and moderate from the other. Any opposition to a government is not radicalism and any compromise is not the sign of being moderate. The term revivalism does not explain the variety of Islamisms in the country since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, although it is based on an affirmative approach to analyzing different brands of Islamism. It does not make clear what brand of Islam and which elements of it are going to be revived and what will be the product of this procedure. The historical actuality of this movement is under question while it rejects its own historicity. The revivalist movement is going to revive something that was novel, pure and eternal in a specific time and place, whereas every phenomenon including the revived is by definition situated, historical and socially constructed. I did not use the terms “conservative” and “radical” Islamism due to their failure to explain different backgrounds, fundamental ideas and social and cultural policies of Islamist ideologies and movements. Using these terms reflects this intention to lump Islamist groups together as one or two monolith entities, while Islamism is being diversified all around the world including in Iran in the last decades of the twentieth and first decade of the twenty-first century. In different points of view, one Islamist political movement and political party may be considered as conservative or radical due to its values and normative system; from another point of view, they are all radical or conservative due to their strategies and methods of activism. I do not use the term reformist Islamism in this work due to its ambiguity in explaining different brands of Islamism in Iran in the 1990s and 2000s.86 This term may be equally used to refer to nationalist, mysticism-oriented and development-oriented Islamisms. These three were working as a coalition during the Reform Movement of 1990s and the Green Wave of late 2000s. For the same reason I did not use the term traditionalist Islamism. Iranian Islamists do not politically function based on respect for elders or for consensus, adherence to traditional methods and teachings, and holding that all knowledge is derived from original divine revelation. The term traditionalist also refers to a group of different concepts in the history of Muslim societies. To make a few generalisations,

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No Islamist is interested in the whole package; Islamists are very selective when confronted with the Islamic tradition. All Islamists consider themselves as traditionalists while they are picking some fruits from this and that tree of what is considered to be Islamic knowledge and Islamic practice; all of them are not traditionalist due to their new methodologies and theories. I also avoided popular or populist Islamism. Due to overlapping of different brands of Islamism in different periods and having partial support of the Iranian population or resort to populist policies and strategies, they all are populists. The public support has been fluid, changing and unstable, and labeling one Islamism or another as popular or populist will not help us to understand the phenomenon at hand. The terms that I will avoid using as explanatory terms share the same reductionist perspective. While I will try to categorize and capture most of the characteristics of Islamist ideologies and I will try to catch as many as Islamist ideologies as I can, I do not believe that I can explain all aspects of these ideologies and all consequences of their actions in Iranian polity. There are other Islamist ideologies such as justice-oriented and developmentalist Islamisms that I will not discuss here due to their low level of importance in Iranian contemporary politics. Some elements of mysticism-oriented and nationalist Islamists are also developmentalists. Based on the emergence of Islamist movements all around the Muslim world, there is a wave of historical and regional studies based on the idea of Islamism, reviewing history in the framework of Islamic movements.87 These studies are useful from a comparative point of view; through the prism of these studies we can look at the specific characteristics of Iranian Shi‘i Islamisms as opposed to Sunni Islamisms.

PART I PRE-IRANIAN REVOLUTION ERA

Islamism in its early stages was mostly a rejection of the political status quo based on Islamic beliefs and Islamic tradition. Islamism was not “simply a means for retreating to a nostalgic past but also a device for coping– in one way or another – with the present and future”.1 Returning to Islam as an important element of political life is not obviously going back to any situation that existed in the past; the past is a model and guidance to build the future. Coming from affluent and middle class families, most of the Shi‘i Islamists were not just expressing their own grievances; Islamism was not just a battle cry of the oppressed and deprived masses. Iranian Shi‘i Islamists from Seyyed Jama¯l to Ali Shari‘ati and Morteza Motahhari did not see any positive aspects in social and cultural processes that were going on in Iran from the late nineteenth to the late twentieth centuries. Negation of the status quo was the mood of Iranian intellectuals and ideologues and anybody who had a realist point of view would be labeled as “selfsold” (khod foroukhteh) or “compromising” (sa¯zeshka¯r). Negativism was the essence of Islamism before the victory of the Iranian Revolution in 1979. The radical mood was so prominent in which one would expect to find dissent rather than obedience, self-criticism rather than conformity, and introspective individuals rather than doctrinaire ideologues.

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Negative Islamism has four important characteristics. The first characteristic is introducing the West as the source of almost all problems and grievances in the Muslim world and acquitting Islam as it has been introduced and observed from any accusations in this regard. Due to their beliefs, Muslims cannot accept that there is something wrong with their own religion and their understanding of Islam; any evil has its roots in infidels and materialists. Self-criticism is only directed to the secular leaders and some clerics not even the Muslim community and its members. This is how Seyyed Jama¯l describes his secular opponents in the Muslim world and the West: “They [the materialists, influenced by the West] are the destroyers of civilization and the corrupters of morals . . . they are the annihilators of peoples . . . their kindness is a ruse, their truthfulness a deceit, their claim to humanity imaginary, and their call to science and knowledge a snare and a forgery. They make trustworthiness into treachery; will not keep a secret; and will sell their closest friend for a copper coin. They are slaves to the belly and bound by lust.”2 Seyyed Jama¯l cannot see any of these negative characteristics in his fellow Muslims. Iranian Islamic government and almost all Iranian Islamists have the same attitude toward Iranian secular intellectuals and the West. The second characteristic is the huge gap between their ideological ideals such as establishing a just and Islamic government and their policies, programs and plans. Iranian Shi‘i Islamists never talked about the possibility of the Islamic state in Iran before the Revolution. The victory was a shock for them. They had no plan to run the state and it took years for them to learn how to run a state by resort to force, intimidation and propaganda. Another characteristic of negative Islamism is to label individual phenomena and generalize instead of providing explanation. The terms such as fokoli (literally someone who wears a collar, a snob, used by Fakhroddin Shadman)3, gharb zadeh (westoxicated) and qerti (effeminate) were used repeatedly by Fardid and later A¯l-e Ahmad.4 This prescription was pursued by the Islamic government and the ruling clerics to get rid of their opponents. Terms such as eslam-e amrika’i (American Islam, used by Khomeini), shabikhoun-e farhangi

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and bar anda¯zi-ye narm (cultural invasion and soft toppling, used by Khamenei) have had the same function during the clerical rule. These terms are only good for rejection of “others” and ideological profiling. Secularists could coin another set of terms such as “Islamoxication” or “Islamosis” but they did not. For the most part, Iranian democracy and human rights activists believed that name calling is for defaming and depriving other individuals and groups from participating in public discussions and access to power. The fourth characteristic is about negative orientations. Revivalism per se was an ideological orientation instead of ideology itself. Before the 1979 Revolution, most of the teachings of religious leaders were ideological orientations presented under the disguise of religious studies and spiritual teachings in Shi‘i political circles; since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the ideological orientations have turned to real particular ideologies with political mandates and agendas, leadership styles, and social relations. Shari‘ati is an exception in this regard. He was aware of modern ideologies and how they are developed and shaped to an Islamist one modeled on secular ideologies which were popular in the 1960s. Now let us see what negative revivalism was not. It was not modeled on Ghazzali’s style of revivalism, i.e. shifting from shari‘ah based Islam and obeying God to Sufism and love of God. Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali (1058– 1111) in the second phase of his career was an advocate for love of God: “‘Love for God is the furthest reach of all stages, the sum of the highest degrees, and there is no stage after that of love except its fruit and its consequences, nor is there any stage before love which is not a prelude to it, such as penitence, longsuffering, and asceticism.”5 The official position of ‘ulama¯ was to “deny the possibility of love for God and say that it means nothing more than persevering in obedience, while true love of God is impossible, except metaphorically. They also deny any intimacy with Him, or passionate longing for Him, or the delight of confiding in Him, and other consequences of his love.”6 Negative Islamism promoted by Seyyed Jama¯l and A¯l-e Ahmad and other religious intellectuals and clerics was not for spiritual renewal of clerical institution. The advocate for Islamic revivalism

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were either religious intellectuals who were denied by Shi‘i clergy or maverick clerics such as Seyyed Jama¯l who had no base in the religious establishment. Iranian Shi‘i revivalism is also different from literalistic revivalism of Taqiuddin Ibn Taymiyya (1263– 1328) whose main point was that the goal of human life is not to have a special relationship with God, nor is it to speculate about God (the goals of theology); nor is the goal to love Him. The goal is to serve God through worship and obedience and executing shari‘ah laws: “The religion of Islam turns on these two principles: worshipping God alone and worshipping Him by what He prescribed. He is not served by innovation . . . It is not permissible when guilt has been established by proof or by witness to suspend the legal punishment, whether by remitting it or by substituting a fine or any other thing: the hand of the thief must be cut off, for the application of the punishments is one of the acts of religion like the jihad in the Way of God.”7

CHAPTER 2 EARLY ISLAMISM: REVIVALISM AND REVOLUTION

Seyyed Jama¯l Asad A¯ba¯di1 advocated for a reformed Islam that included political activism and was prone to rational and modern ideas. He believed that the root causes of Muslims’ suffering and troubles are the despotic rule of Muslim nations,2 ignorance of Muslims and their lag in science and technology, superstition and distance from pristine Islam,3 divisive policies of Muslim nations and groups, and the influence of colonial powers in the Muslim world.4 He advocated these ideas all around the Muslim world. This made him a prototype for many and different generations of Muslim intellectuals. He tried to find a third way between traditionalism of ‘ulama¯ and Westernism of intellectuals. He wrote in a climate of renaissance for awakening (nehzat-e bida¯ri) in the Muslim world when Muslims were beginning to become restive, worrying about lagging behind Western civilization materially and wondering what to do about it. While praising the West for its civilizational achievements, Seyyed Jama¯l rejects Western colonialism and materialism. In his The Truth about Materialism and the Materialist Sect (Hakikat-e Mazhab-e Naycheri va Baya¯n-e Ha¯l-e Naycheriya¯n, first published in Haydarabad-Deccan, 1298/1880), reacting against Western colonialism in the Muslim world, Seyyed Jama¯l asks for reform in Islam not because reform is necessary for Middle Eastern societies but as the first step to meet the challenges from European cultures. The direct

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conclusion from this line of reasoning is that if there was no threat from Western civilization and colonial powers there was no need for reform too. Seyyed Jama¯l presents a new perspective of religion; what we should expect from it and how it should function in society. He tries to overcome the dark side of religion and to highlight the bright sides from his point of view; “From all we have expounded, it becomes clear in the most evident manner that religion, even if it be false, and the basest of religions, because of those two firm pillars, belief in a Creator and faith in rewards and punishments . . . is better than the way of the materialists.”5 Although he tries to be rational in approaching religion in the context of modern world and modern discourse of religion, he as a cleric cannot surpass his apologetic approach: “The Islamic religion is the only religion that censures belief without proof and the following of conjectures; reproves blind submission; seeks to show proof of things to its followers; everywhere addresses itself to reason; considers all happiness the result of wisdom and clear-sightedness; attributes perdition to stupidity and lack of insight; and sets up proofs for each fundamental belief in such a way that it will be useful to all people.”6 His main agenda is to revive religion as a pathway to development and modernity: “since it is known that religion is unquestionably the source of man’s welfare, therefore, if it is placed on firm bases, that religion will naturally become the complete source of total happiness and perfect tranquility.”7 Shi‘i and Sunni Islamists have extended this idea to its untold details that covers every area of human life. If religion is the source of perfect worldly happiness, politics and policy-making should automatically be part of the package. To have perfect happiness, it is not enough for Muslims to observe their faith; they should have the power to enforce all laws that will bring this happiness for everyone. Based on the Islamist social logic, human happiness will not happen for individuals as individuals; it should happen for everyone. Similar to Muhammad Abduh, Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Muhammad Iqba¯l, Seyyed Jama¯l rejected blind adherence to tradition and called for reopening the “doors of ejtehad” (independent

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scholarly work on Islamic law) in the whole Muslim world. From Seyyed Jama¯l’s point of view, this was the major way for modernizing Islam. Sunni Muslims closed the door of ejtehad at least when rational and independent thinking was considered politically incorrect. Seyyed Jama¯l was advocating pan-Islamism or Islamic unity with emphasis on Islamic caliphate. He sent a number of letters to various religious and state leaders all over the world. He wanted Muslim entrepreneurs to mobilize and unite them against the British rule while at the same time trying to establish the foundations of a mutual rapprochement between the Sunnis and the Shi‘is.8 His pan-Islamism did not stop him to inspire religiously oriented nationalism. As an advocate for law and justice, he wanted Muslim people to rise up against colonial powers and despotic leaders and overcome their deficiencies as a united nation. In spite of his aggressive approach against tyrannical regimes of the Muslim world, he does not present a clear scheme of the ideal political regime in this part of the world.9 It seems that he swings between the Western constitutionalism and Eastern consultative absolutism but leans toward a government with a benevolent and enlightened ruler. He was suspicious against constitutional governance that at the time was promoted by colonial powers and secularists. His political career stands as an evidence for the later position. He promoted an Islamic revivalism in his lectures, polemics, short essays, and newspaper columns. In his position on modernizing Islam, he was responding to the philosophical and scientific challenges of the modern West. While he continues to be a source of inspiration for advocates of change and reform in the Muslim world, militarist, fascist and justice-oriented Islamists completely ignore him. To promote his revivalist ideas, Seyyed Jama¯l forged his essential distinction between revelation and its unfolding in history, viz., the distinction between Islam and Muslims. This duality has played a crucial role in ideologizing and re-routinizing Islam in Muslim societies by coming generations of Muslim intellectuals such as Ali Shari‘ati, Mehdi Ba¯zarga¯n and Abdolkarim Soroush. Although Seyyed Jama¯l used this distinction to respond to the criticism of Europeans against Islam,10 the next generation of Muslim

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intellectuals and later Islamists used it to mobilize their communities against the status quo in their own societies. In his response to Ernest Renan, he relates the intolerant aspect of religions and suppressing the free investigation of scientific and philosophical truth to historical religion or Muslims.11 If this is the case, according to him, Muslim societies will overcome these obstacles someday: “If it is true that the Muslim religion is an obstacle to the development of sciences, can one affirm that this obstacle will not disappear someday? How does the Muslim religion differ on this point from other religions? All religions are intolerant, each one in its way.”12 As European societies overcame the intolerance and superstitious aspect of their religion, Muslims are able to awaken and march in the path of civilization: “The Christian religion, I mean the society that follows its inspirations and its teachings and is formed in its image, has emerged from the first period to which I have just alluded; thenceforth free and independent, it seems to advance rapidly on the road of progress and science, whereas Muslim society has not yet freed itself from the tutelage of religion.”13 Against the odds of the Muslim world and strong resistance against change in this part of the world, Seyyed Jama¯l was hopeful that Muslims will overcome the obstacles. This hope was based on his optimism and activism and his experience of Western civilization: “Realizing, however, that the Christian religion preceded the Muslim religion in the world by many centuries, I cannot keep from hoping that Muhammadan society will succeed someday in breaking its bonds and marching resolutely in the path of civilization after the manner of Western society . . . No I cannot admit that this hope be denied to Islam.”14 Similar to other revivalists and reformists, Seyyed Jama¯l wanted to strip away the myriad practices adopted into Islam by the cultures that have embraced it, looking beyond the decisions Muhammad and Shi‘i imams made in their lifetime, then confronting contemporary questions with their ideals, goals and motivations instead, and disregarding the traditional interpretations that have become embedded in the faith.

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He asserts that religions in their pure nature have played a vital role in bringing humanity from barbarism and myths to the level of advanced civilizations, but the historical religion has turned against the free use of reason and stifled scientific progress at some points in human history. By bringing back reason and science to Islam, he wants to rebuild it to a point that it regains its status in society and polity. This belief is the motivating source for building new set of ideas with religious substance to fit into the new civilizations and at last claim it for itself.

CHAPTER 3 IDENTITY-ORIENTED ISLAMISM: ISLAM VS THE WEST

Jala¯l A¯l-e Ahmad (1923–69) is a very good representative of almost all preliminary arguments and agenda of Islamism as well as its, misunderstandings, confusions and dogmas, rhetorical and unsound arguments. Iranian Shi‘i Islamists have widely read, cited, and quoted A¯l-e Ahmad’s ideas and endeavored to translate them to policies of the Islamic government. In his last works, i.e. Occidentosis and On the Service and Betrayal of Intellectuals, he presented the framework of antiWesternism and anti-intellectualism and paved the way for the most authoritarian and absolutist faction in Iranian politics to gain and hold political power. As a former communist and political activist who was disappointed by his comrades in the Tudeh (People) Party and was against the top-down modernization of the new elite, A¯l-e Ahmad was the voice of a generation who suffered the angst and shame created by 1953 CIA-supported coup against Mohammad Mosaddeq. He began his political life by turning against his background in a clerical family and at the end came back to what he rejected in earlier times. His basic idea for explaining the present circumstance of Iranian society and politics is occidentosis.1 Other than clerics, he portrays almost all Iranian educated strata including intellectuals, writers,

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politicians, lawyers and others as occidentotic or westoxicated. According to his definition of the term, an occidentotic or westoxicated person has no social base in society: “he is like a particle of dust suspended in the void,2 or a shaving floating on the water . . . never comes to rest on a solid ground . . . is devious, is totally without belief or conviction . . . seeks ease . . . has no specialty . . . no character . . . is effete . . . is effeminate . . . hangs on the words and handouts of the West . . . has no concern with the basic assumption of Western philosophy . . . knows absolutely nothing about the oil question.”3 This total negation of individuals who look at the West as the solution is due to the political failures of Iranian intellectuals to mobilize the masses. A¯l-e Ahmad believes that these failures are because of the distance between intellectuals and the masses, something that the clerics have advantage over new educated strata. According to him, anything that the Iranian educated strata have done is no achievement; they are governed in a way that they are “left to the fate decreed by the machine and to the leadership of occidentotic intellectuals, to these seminars, conferences, second and third Five-Year Plans, relying on ‘grants’ and absurd investments in rootless industries”.4 In these statements he is showing his individual frustrations of how this world works. A¯l-e Ahmad does not provide any observations or facts to back up his argument. Electricity, vaccinations, urban planning and access to healthy water were just some of the achievements of these Five-Year Plans. A¯l-e Ahmad’s argument against intellectuals and the West includes five premises: 1. Iran at this point of its history is not an industrialized and developed country: “we fall into the category of the backward and developing nations”.5 A¯l-e Ahmad entirely ignores the continuum of development and the levels of development of Iranian society in the twentieth century. 2. The essence of the West is machine: “history has fated to fall prey to the machine” and the machine is a monster.6 Machine is

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monster, demon, and dreadful only when it is not under “our” control. If we build it, it will be our magic: “To achieve control of the machine, one must build it. Something built by another-even if is a charm or sort of talisman against envy-certainly carries something of the unknown, something of fearsome.”7 By confirming the home-made technology, he implicitly makes clear that his metaphysical opposition to machine in the first chapters of his book should not be taken seriously. He is not only making a metaphysical case against technology, borrowed from Fardid, but is criticizing the marketing strategies and psychological aspect of the Western technological dominance: “we see machine as a demon . . . so long as we are only buyers, only customers, in the give and take of this world, there must be a maker and vendor who knows how to arrange the ins and outs of the business”.8 He also criticizes the machine based on its domination over human beings and pushing individuals toward conformity in the workplace.9 This criticism has its roots in anti-colonialism and socialism of the 1950s and 1960s. Therefore, a fight over technology and by technology is a political conflict between the haves and have nots. 3. Non-Westerners’ “otherness” that would help them to stand against this monster is lost: “we have been unable to preserve our own historico-cultural character in the face of the machine and its fateful onslaught . . . we have been routed”.10 Referring to the Western anthropological works and museums, he believes that the West has reduced “us to a raw material like the people of Africa”,11 nothing more than objects of research. 4. There are two poles in the world: the West and others, and the West is “not us, under their domination”: “the day is past when we could divide the world into two blocs, East and West, or communist and noncommunist”.12 He has back and forth position on the issue of non-West; it is Islam as well as East that includes Africa and other undeveloped nations.13 5. Only Islam can defend us against the aggressive attacks of Western civilization and colonialism: “only we in our Islamic

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totality, formal and real, obstructed the spread . . . of European civilization”.14 Based on the fourth premise, he reaches to this conclusion that there is a contradiction between Islam and the West: “as Mr. Fardid says, where the West ends, we begin. As the West stood, we sat down. As the West awoke in an industrial resurrection, we passed into the slumber of the Seven Sleepers.”15 Here and in the entire book, it is not clear what and where is the West, and what are the significant characteristics of this phenomenon other than technology. This Westernology fits the historical and cultural knowledge of a primary school teacher of a village in 1960s Iran who happens to have access to newspapers and magazine and read some translation of antiestablishment Western writers. His antagonism against Iranian secular intellectuals and the West goes to the limit that he weeps for Sheikh Fazlullah Nuri who was for despotism during the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 – 7. He receives the hanging of Nuri as the retreat of Islam against the West: “I look on that great man’s [Nuri] body on the gallows as a flag raised over our nation proclaiming the triumph of occidentotis after two hundred years of struggle.”16 In this way, Nuri becomes the symbols of “self” and people who were against him are demonized. This symbolism is to discredit the Iranian intelligentsia of his time for an execution that happened about six decades earlier. In this sensational statement, he does not mention Nuri’s advocacy for despotism and traditional Islam and his support for a corrupted and broken monarchy. Neither Nuri is the representative of the whole clerical institution and Islam, nor his execution as an individual and rare incident could be taken as a sign of final retreat. Here he tries to artificially make the two sides of a conflict: absolute evil and absolute good. He presents Nuri as the sole defender of Islamic law and tradition during the Constitutional Revolution that is not true, and his executioners as the representatives of Western civilization and colonialism that is spurious.

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His negative attitude towards intellectuals is so deep that he denies any positive function of modern education products: “the two generations that have cropped up here since the Constitutional Era [that includes himself and his philosophical mentor, Fardid] to become professors, writers, ministers, ministers, lawyers, general directors, and so on, only the doctors among them having any true specialized competence.”17 Why are the physicians an exception? How is it possible that all the products of Iranian universities for 50 years be incompetent? Other than inherent hate of the West and his rival intellectuals, and his frustration and impotence to mobilize the masses, what factors can explain this attitude? A¯l-e Ahmad defines occidentotis as “the aggregate of events in the life, culture, civilization, and mode of thought of a people having no supporting tradition, no historical continuity, no gradient of transformation, but having only what the machine brings them”.18 This phenomenon has never existed anywhere in the so-called nonWestern world. The people mentioned in this definition do not exist: even individuals who are pro-West and Western civilization have experienced their own culture and tradition and believe that there should be change in some areas. The implication of this labeling led to many Iranian Muslim activists looking to the clerics instead, as was seen during the Iranian Revolution of 1979. It can be argued that Occidentotis as it is presented by antiWestern intellectuals and clerics is a mere construction, one that serves to condemn a social group that does not want the authority of clerics. Similar to a lot of individuals and groups, A¯l-e Ahmad believes that there are only two ways to choose: the West that for Iranians means westoxication, and Islam that is loyalty to clerics. Only some religious intellectuals such as Shari‘ti and Ba¯zarga¯n tried to find the third path between traditional Islam and the West. A¯l-e Ahmad and his philosophical mentor, Fardid, failed to see this path. A¯l-e Ahmad’s hatred of colonialism and the West is so deep that he presumes everything that could obstruct the spread of colonialism is positive, whatever shape it may have. His resort to traditional and absolutist Islam and a pro-monarchy political figure at the time of the

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Constitutional Revolution is the evidence of this presumption. Due to this position, his re-conversion to traditional Islam at the end of his career was well received by the clerics. A¯l-e Ahmad renders an ideological basis to the animosity between Western colonial countries and Middle Eastern ones. According to his explanation, this animosity is essential, historical, and intrinsic; it is so entrenched that nothing can resolve it. If being influenced by the West is a disease,19 there will be no compromise, only a cure. Similar to other identity-oriented Islamists, he repeats this allegation that “it is our region . . . giving birth to . . . the sources of all that Western civilization contains”.20 Nai’ini on the other side of the political spectrum presents the same idea: “prior to the Crusades, the Christian nations and the Europeans were deprived not only of all the varieties of natural sciences but also of the sciences of civilization, practical reason, and political axioms . . . They appropriated the principles of civilization and politics implicit in the Islamic holy books and traditions.”21 He does not provide any evidence or argument to back up his statements. Borrowing the term westoxication or occidentosis (gharbzadegi) from Fardid, A¯l-e Ahmad, a former Communist, articulates all critiques of the dominant West around one ambiguous term, as if secular intellectuals are responsible for all underdevelopments and social and cultural challenges of Iranian society just for looking into the West for the solutions. He is haunted by the idea of authenticity. His negative project portrays modernization as a disease. This portrayal has had an important share in paving the way for later Islamist ideologies, mostly fascist and militarist and clerical authoritarianist versions. His spiritual leader in the last years of his life, Sheikh Fazlullah Nuri, uses the same language for any institution that comes from the West: “Constitutionalism is a fatal disease, a terminal injury.”22 A¯l-e Ahmad’s manipulated image of modernization as the path to nihilism leads him to the only authentic element of Iranian culture, i.e. Islam according to the Shi‘i clerics. He believes in intellectual development toward Islam and ultimate return to it as a source of collective and national identity.

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His anthropological monographs were aimed at “gaining renewed acquaintance with ourselves, a re-evaluation of our native environment in accordance with our own criteria.”23 In this identity-formation process, he reduces Iranian identity to only one section of it that is Shi‘i Islam. Return to Islam for intellectuals such as A¯l-e Ahmad was not return to Islamic theology, shari‘ah law or Islamic ethics, but return to Islam as the main element of Iranian identity. They needed this heritage 1) to stand against the alleged offensive Western culture, and 2) to link themselves to the masses that have not stopped believing in this religion. The recurring failures of social and political movements in twentieth-century Iran taught some sections of Iranian intelligentsia this lesson that without masses no change would happen. Hence, return to Islam for them was a return to the masses. Iranian Islamist ideologues’ turn toward masses is even clear in their style of representing their ideas. By blaming intellectuals, questioning the West and name-calling individuals who identified with the West, A¯l-e Ahmad believed that he was rejecting the hegemony of colonial and dominant powers. Gharbzadegi does not represent a simple return to tradition but a negation of the West, the western-educated elite, and intellectuals who identify with it. He believes that his fellow intellectuals were carriers of a disease: occidentosis. While condemning intellectuals who have been following the Western approach, he himself was mirroring Heidegger’s ideas when he criticized machinism and follows Sartre and Camus’s existentialism.24 Identity-oriented Shi‘i Islamism was an encompassing rejection of the intellectual status quo. The anti-Western approach was so powerful that it led A¯l-e Ahmad to the open arms of clerics with a shari‘ah-oriented agenda, whom he left behind when he was younger. His panacea for all Iranian problems is to return to their own identity, and Shi‘i clerics are the only representatives of this identity left untouched to the twentieth century. This identity should rise from the ashes of this widespread disease, i.e. occidentosis. A¯l-e Ahmad believes that the war between the West and Islam is lost: “We now resemble an alien people, with unfamiliar customs, a culture with no

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roots in our land and no chance of blossoming here.”25 In his view, Muslims should recapture their talisman, technology of God, to push the West back. The technology of God later produced an authoritarian and repressing state based on identity politics of converting intellectuals to the clerical religion. Khasi dar Miqa¯t (A Trifle in the Congregation) marks a further stage in his journey toward Islam. While A¯l-e Ahmad reconciled with his clerical background,26 other intellectuals who followed him exchanged their best-known arch-nemesis, i.e. secular intellectuals, with unknown friends, i.e. clerics. For A¯l-e Ahmad, Islam and its representatives were the solution that ought to be created by interaction with new ideas and working with new strata. He was one of the forerunners of populist Islamism when he praised the ‘ulama¯ due to the trust of masses for them and their ability to speak the language of the people.27 The failure of political parties such as the People’s Party (Hezb-e Tudeh) and the National Front (Jebheh-ye Melli) to mobilize the masses and the 1953 successful coup against the democratically elected government of Mohammad Mosaddeq are the main motivation for this romantic return to the masses through their religious leaders. By referring to a “time when the great Mirza Shira¯zi could set aside the tobacco concession . . . with a simple fatwa and indicate what a support . . . was the power of the clergy”,28 he repeatedly mentions the impact of religious leaders in leading successful movements against the Western agenda: “the leaders of the time [during the nationalization of oil movement] were smart enough to so order the struggle that, with the aid of the religious leaders, any ordinary unschooled person could see that the ruling party was the agent of oppression, giving away oil to the company and drawing sabers against the people. This is the greatest lesson the intellectuals and leaders must draw from the event.”29 A¯l-e Ahmad’s fascination with the social authority of the clergy was so powerful that he could not see the consequences of clerical power in the country. As it is clear from his last point, “the secret government of religion” and “the godly technology” are necessary elements of the picture for a new era not because of their specifications (shari‘ah law,

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theology, Islamic ethics, mysticism) but for their power to mobilize people in a pan-Islamic movement against imperialists and their agents in the developing world. This analysis has many elements of Shi‘i Islamist movements which were born later in Iran. He combines romantic and pastoral criticism of modern culture with anti-colonial sentiments in counting the contradictions of occidentosis. As a novelist, he draws a picture of rural life that can be questioned as to whether it has ever existed: “The logic of machine consumption compels urbanization, which follows from being uprooted from the land. . . to respond to the machine’s call to urbanization, we uproot the people from the villages and send them to the city, where there is neither work nor housing and shelter for them.”30 As far as I know, there has not been any governmental policy to displace population against their will in Iran. Other than that, the rosy picture of Iranian villages, “ever fresh and green”31 is not verified by the socio-economic conditions of rural Iran at the time and climate of Iran. Most of the Iranians who were living in villages were dealing with diseases, poverty and suppression, and immigration to cities was preferred to the status quo. Another malfunction of technology in the Iranian context, according to A¯l-e Ahmad, is its damage to local business: “the machine entrenches itself in the towns and villages, be it in the form of mechanized mill or a textile plant, it puts the worker in local craft industries out of work”32 while he admits its positive aspects for “the hands and eyes and lungs of village children not to be ruined producing carpets to adorn the homes of the high and mighty.”33 He is also worried about the risk of modern technology for primitive mode of thought34 that is endangering the simple society that most Iranians were living in. Other contradictions, i.e. necessary consequences of occidentosis are emancipation of women and disruption in Iranians’ lives according to religious principles.35 The Iranian government which cannot deal with these contradictions and “sees itself standing on such shaky ground . . . has no recourse but to draw all the closer into the embrace of the West.”36 Based on this analysis, there are only two modes of social life: the West and the simple, pure and original rural/pastoral life: following

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the first is occidentosis and pursuing the second is authenticity. To push the idea of Islam against the West, he even rejects the promotion of the nation-state: “In such an age [of internationalization], we try to promote the nation state through schools, the national anthem, the secret police, military aid, a twenty-five hundredth anniversary celebration and pasteboard leaders.”37 In his view, even Iranian identity is not the core of Iranian “self” due to the root of nation-states in modern Europe. Although he does not elaborate on the international corporations as an important aspect of the West, he talks about their influence on Islamic lands. His criticism of the corporate world is along the way of socialist ideologies of which he was an adherent before turning to Islam and the clerics: “while today the fates of the worlds’ governments, flags, and boundaries are determined on the bargaining tables of great powers, our government content themselves with serving as border guards for the corporations.”38 Here, the colonialism is reduced to the corporate world due to the socialistMarxist taste of criticism. Instead of analyzing the West and its different agendas in the Middle East, taking it apart, describing its modus operandi, and disclosing and explaining its financial, political, cultural, educational and social institutions, A¯l-e Ahmad blames just the Iranian intellectuals for the wretchedness of all Iranians. There is also no critical analysis of the developments of clergy as the representative of tradition in his works. Within the parameters of his argument, the Shi‘i clergy do not bear any responsibility for any of the ills which plague Iranian society. Standing on three pillars of Marxism, existentialism and romanticism, A¯l-e Ahmad can be understood to have misread Iranian contemporary history to allocate the higher seat of rescuing the nation to the Shi‘i clerics just because they can mobilize the masses, ignoring the direction and content of this “secret government of religion”. Authenticity and return to Islamic self are based on these beliefs. These statements are to be seen in almost all teachings and manifestos of Islamist ideologues and their loyalists in decades after A¯l-e Ahmad and his generation.

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A¯l-e Ahmad exclusively offers the key to Iran’s salvation to the Shi‘i clerics. His argument for clerical authority is due to the absence of corruption amongst their ranks. But after the change of leadership in the wake of the Iranian Revolution, the perception of corruption amongst Iranian leaders did not abate.

PART II POST-IRANIAN REVOLUTION ERA

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 completely changed the map of Iranian polity and the structure and arrangement of social and political forces in the country. This in turn altered the relationship and interaction of ideologies which were competing against each other for more than a century. The Iranian Revolution was the cradle of most of the Islamist ideologies and the beginning of the end for Marxist ideologies in the country. With the advent of the Revolution came the ousting of the old socio-political elite and rise of a new one that was recruited and trained based on revolutionary and ideological criteria. The members of the new elite had to believe that they were living in God’s community and follow the advice of the ruling clerics as the only and best path to happiness in this world and the world after this one. The Revolution polarized Iranian society along cultural and religious lines: the ideological Islamist culture versus the secular one. It also led to a handful of privileges, for the clerical strata. The revolutionary forces failed to deliver a radical economic redistribution program to achieve the promised social justice. They had no clear development strategy for achieving their declared plans for economic independence and running the economy based on sources other than oil revenues. They have failed to tackle inflation,

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unemployment and corruption. These are some of the real bases for political competition that is framed by different Islamist ideologies. The prospect of establishing an Islamic government was totally absent in early Islamic thought in Iran. Even in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Shi‘i ‘ulama¯ and their followers were asking for governance based on the 1906– 7 Constitution that endorsed constitutional monarchy. When the Nationalization of Oil Movement failed to institutionalize and consolidate a constitutional democracy and Mohammad Reza Shah came back on the waves of violence and repression, the mood of the dissidents changed. In the first phase, Iranian dissidents came to believe that the monarchic regime was not going to accept any reform platform and share power with dissidents. As a result, the older generation advocated cultural activities as opposed to political ones and the younger generation advocated revolution. In the second phase the imaginary utopian world demolished the real one. The issues Islamic thought and Islamic ideologies were grappling with before the Iranian Revolution of 1979 were diverse and extensive compared to the issues that have been discussed since the victory of the Revolution in clerical and religious circles. The relationship between religion and all other areas of life such as economy, art, science, philosophy, ethics, development, mysticism and politics were at the center of attention for the clerics and religious intellectuals before the Revolution. Since the Revolution, religious studies are for the most part, reduced to Shi‘i Islam and politics, directly or indirectly. Even Islamists who focus on other issues such as civil society and social justice can be seen to be using these concepts in an attempt to challenge the existing leadership and to assert their own claims to power. The social context has dramatically changed in the three decades since the victory of the Revolution. There is a huge increase in population (doubled in three decades); as a result, dramatic changes have occurred in the age structure of the population, so that half of the population are under 30 and more than two-thirds a have no experience of the Ancient Regime. The percentage of the population who live in urban areas has increased to about 70 per cent and the

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literacy rate is up to about 85 per cent. The number of university students has increased from about 150,000 in 1979 to 4 million in 2013. Nevertheless, the rentier state, the gap between haves and have nots, and non-transparency have been continued. The principal features of Islamic regimes have been loyalty to the person of the jurist (instead of the shah), glorification of pristine Islam, Islamicization of education, culture and public spheres, exclusive policies in recruitment and promotion in public offices, ideological profiling, tough censorship of print media and monopoly of electronic media outlets, nepotism, and an element of suppression of opposition and political repression of intellectuals. These are the main reasons for the gradual erosion of the bonds between the Islamic state and its subjects. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Shi‘i official theologians do not have to cover their agenda in abstract theological doctrines, as was done during Abbasids with the discussions concerning the creation of the Qur’an.1 The execution of al-Ja‘d as the first asserter of the creation of the Qur’an for his heretical view by Ummayids is evidence for this new idea’s threat to the traditionalist and political establishment. The same doctrine was imposed during the Caliph al-Ma‘mun and the time of the mihna.2 This was not the eternity of the Qur’an but the eternity of traditionalist interpretation of the text itself that was under question. The new idea was also challenging the eternal authority of the religious establishment during Ummayids. It can be argued that Iranian Shi‘i Islamists in the postrevolutionary era have little to do with theology or shari‘ah; Shari‘ah for them is a set of rituals to be used as the base for controlling the population. According to this argument, the Islamicization and reIslamicization processes have been to consolidate the clerics’ power and to totally control the actions and thoughts of their subjects. There is almost no reference to theological texts in the Islamists’ literature in the post-revolutionary era. During these three decades, the Islamist ideologies have been competing to control the meaning, discourses, lifestyles and organizations in Iranian society. These ideologies have been in transition from a revivalist, awakening and revolutionary type to a

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conservative and authoritarian type in the framework of the Islamic regime. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was a critical moment is this transformation. Khomeini’s clerical authoritarianism, the idea of guardianship of jurist, transformed to absolute guardianship of jurist in the 1980s. The majority of Shi‘i ‘ulama¯ transferred from community-based Islamicizing activities to state-sponsored Islamicizing programs. Among the Islamist ideologues discussed in this book Shari‘ati died in 1977 and Motahhari was assassinated in 1979. I included the ideologies that were presented by these two ideologues in my discussion of post-revolutionary Islamist ideologies due to their great influence on post-revolutionary politics in Iran. Most of Shari‘ati’s lectures were transcribed and published during and after the Iranian Revolution. His works have had huge readership since the victory of the Revolution and the Islamic left or socialist Islamists have been tremendously influenced by his ideas. Motahhari was not known to most revolutionaries during the Revolution but his lectures were transcribed, published and well circulated all around the country after his assassination, mostly by the government. The Iranian government has had a very important role in publicizing his works by assigning them as textbooks for theology courses in universities and training sessions in governmental offices. Soroush, Da¯vari/Fardid, Mesba¯h, and Hakimi mostly developed their ideologies after the victory of the Revolution. Khomeini and Ba¯zarga¯n began shaping their Islamist ideologies before the Revolution but revised them during and after the Revolution.

CHAPTER 4 `

SOCIALIST ISLAMISM: ALI SHARI ATI

Shari‘ati (1933 – 77) belongs to the pre-Iranian Revolution era but his ideas were crucial in establishment of the Islamist ideologies that shaped the Islamic Republic and made its political and institutional arrangement possible. Most of Shari‘ati’s followers gradually shaped the Islamic left in the country and supported the idea of guardian jurist as the absolute power in the country. Presenting Islam as the religion of justice, equality and brotherhood, Shi‘i socialist Islamists shared with non-religious socialists a fierce antipathy towards the West as a civilization run by capitalists and big corporations. Whereas non-Muslim socialists tended to look to the Soviet Union for international support, the Islamists were equally opposed to Western capitalism and Soviet Communism. The reaction of the Tudeh Party and the USSR to the 1953 CIA-supported coup against the Mosaddeq administration has been a big blow to secular socialism in the country. According to Shari‘ati, almost all religions in their early times were more a call to rebellion than an insistence on narrow conformity, more a challenge than a set of certainties, and more of an awakening than a consolation. In his belief, almost all prophets challenged the authorities with public acts and public debates. These anti-establishment actions

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were their passion. What they were passionate about was God, the Kingdom of God, and God’s fervour for justice. What Shari‘ati misses here is that those religions were a little more ambivalent on the subjects of freedom, democracy and human rights. When organized, they all turned to a powerful section of the establishment, whether in power or separated from it and even lost the elements of social justice, equality and brotherhood. To compete with the revolutionary ideas of Marxism/Leninism and its outreach to the deprived and mobilization machine, the Iranian Shi‘i Islamists tried to revolutionalize religion as a whole and Shi‘ism in particular. They knew that “a revolutionary religion gives an individual, that is, an individual who believes in it, who is trained in the school of thought or maktab of this religion, the ability to criticize life in all its material, spiritual and social aspects”.1 Having the experience of Russian and Chinese revolutions in front of them, they knew that revolution is impossible without an ideology: “It [ideology] gives the mission and duty to destroy, to change and to eliminate that which one does not accept and believes to be invalid and replaces it with that which one knows and recognizes as being the truth.”2 They believed that it is impossible to have a revolution in a religious society without revolutionizing the religion itself. The revolutionary religion will mainly confront with another “religion” i.e. the conservative reading of it: “throughout history, religion has not been confronted by non-religion. Religion has been confronted by religion. Religion has always fought with religion.”3 From the socialist Islamist point of view, the conservative religion has been shaped and promoted by social forces who are against the poor and needy class: “[a class of new bourgeoisie] changed Islam from the form of a ‘revolutionary ideology’ into the form of a ‘government religion’”.4 From Shari‘ati’s point of view, if Muslims want to have a revolutionary religion as opposed to the conservative one, they should direct all their capacity and resources toward one cause, that is mobilization of the masses towards social justice. To do this, religion should be transferred to an ideology as a school of thought and action.

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This ideology or maktab “consists of an assembly of coordinated, commensurate perceptions, insights or attitudes of philosophy, religious ideology, ethical values and scientific methods which are built together in one cause and effect relationship, one moving, meaningful form which has orientation, which is living and all of its various parts are nourished from one blood and are alive with one spirit.”5 Iranian socialist Islamism draws the drama of history as a battle between good and evil inside man: “However, with man being the battlefield, God and Satan are at war with each other. Thus, unlike former religions, the duality in Islam consists of worshiping two deities, which exist in the constitution of man rather than in nature . . . This is why in Islam Satan is not standing against God but against the divine-half of man.”6 In contrast, militarist and fascist Islamists define the polity as the battlefield between Islam and the West. For them, God is on the side of Muslims and Satan is the West itself. For Shari‘ati, religion is not reduced to ideology but ideology is made out of it when it is mixed with other historical elements. They have some characteristics in common such as satisfying worldly and Godly dimensions of human beings: “since man is a two-dimensional creature who is kneaded of mud and God, he is in need of both. His ideology, religion, life, and civilization must all be capable of satisfying both of these dimensions.”7 In his view, there are two religions: one that is a social tradition and the other one that is ideology.8 They are different with respect to focusing on mobilizing the masses toward a new social and political setting. Religion as a social tradition functions as the collective conscious of the society while religion as ideology functions as the force for change and promoting ideals that are absent in the society.9 Despite having a sense of history and history of religions, Shari‘ati is not an historicist. He understands in which era different sections of Iranian society live: “it is not fitting that we mimic the European free-thinkers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and reject religion. In a society like Iran, whose foundation is a religious one, we must not turn ourselves into a so-called free-thinker cadre (that gathers in coffee houses, cabarets, and parties to ‘talk big’, and show

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off by reciting new personalities), while our average citizens are still living in the Middle Ages, having no access to our talents, religion, ideology, and writing.”10 Why do Muslims need to have ideology? “Ideology has always been the victor in history. We now have ideology in Asia and Africa.”11 According to Shari‘ati, the oppressing forces are equipped with ideology: “The three ever lasting false Gods are oppressing more than ever. Today’s pharoah is not a person; it is a system! Croesus is not one; it is a class. Bal‘am does not speak of faith anymore; rather he speaks of science, ideology and art!”12 Pharaoh, Croesus and Bal‘am are symbols of force (zoor), wealth (zar) and (false) social status (tazveer, hypocrisy). Now Muslims have to be equipped with the same instrument to resist them. What are the characteristics of this ideology? It not only should not be against Islamic religion, but also consistent with its teachings: “An enlightened person in the Islamic world can commit a great error by mistaking the religious feeling that exists among the Muslim masses today as their true historical and cultural religion, thus fighting it as a source of calamities. He may then invite his society to accept an ideology compatible with nineteenth century German industrial society, thereby playing a deviant role in his society.”13 If he wants to mobilize his people, he should shape an ideology that is based on local culture and religion: “Does the intellectual individual who feels a responsibility towards his people and a Muslim whose faith endows him with a responsibility or an intellectual Muslim who has this dual responsibility feel at ease by sitting passively? Does he think resorting to a western ideology will save his people and solve their problems? No.”14 Shari‘ati believes that Islamist ideology is in a phase of its development that needs sacrifice. In the Islamic context, the story of Husayn’s martyrdom in Karbala is used to promote sacrifice by true believer Muslims who are active in politics: “Of all aspects of Islamic ideology and culture, people preserve dearly the uprising of Husayn. It is his martyrdom that they mourn and commemorate yearly.”15 Jihad is the pretext of this sacrifice: “On the other hand, the Prophet of Islam and other religious leaders have always invited people to

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wage jihad.”16 Shari‘ati complains that in spite of the mobilizing forces of this narrative, the religious clerics and intellectuals have not been able to make it work in society: “Yet, in actuality, one sees little effect. Why? The reason is that although slogans are authentic and genuine, their interpretation has been negative.”17 According to Shari‘ati, it is incumbent upon Muslim intellectuals to understand their own culture and rebuild it into a political agenda: “An enlightened Muslim . . . should be fully aware of the fact that he has a unique culture which is neither totally spiritual, as is the Indian culture nor totally mystical, as is the Chinese, nor completely philosophical, as is the Greek, and nor entirely materialistic and technological, as is the Western culture. His [culture] is a mixture of faith, idealism and spirituality and yet full of life and energy with a dominant spirit of equality and justice, the ideology that Islamic societies and other traditional societies of the East are in desperate need of.”18 Shari‘ati considers ideology as one of the important factors in shaping an individual, right after her/his father and mother. Ideology for him is a crucial part of the socializing and educational processes: “There are five factors that participate in the formation of an individual: first, it is the mother who shapes the first dimensions of the personality of a child; second, the father; third, ideology, educational institutions and culture; fourth, civilization; fifth, essentially the spirit of the period in which you live.”19 Therefore, even civilization and the spirit of the time are secondary with respect to ideology. Ideology will be more effective when it is based on popular religion and mores. The religious ideology that is presented by socialist Islamists is believed to be new. It is new due to its priority for devotion and spirituality while “the ideology of all the modern educated people is the worship of sciences as opposed to religious commands and belief in dogma, edicts and principles of religious devotion which must be followed without question”.20 Similar to other Islamists, Sharia‘ti accuses the West of scientism while Western scholars in general do not worship science. It seems that Shari‘ati does not recognize rationalism and analytical understanding and argument from scienticism. Misrepresentation of “other” is often one of the

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characteristics of Islamism in general. Shi‘i and Sunni Islamism share this trait. In spite of differentiating religion and ideology in some lectures, Shari‘ati uses the term ideology for religion and vice versa, as if they are the same: “Restructuring an unknown desert-dweller and halfsavage like Jundab ibn Junadah into an Abu Dharr Ghifari is unique in any ideology or movement. If the result of Islam was no more than educating these four or five human beings like Abu Dharr, Salman, Ammar Yasir and Bilal, it would suffice for the intellect to be amazed at the victories of Islam.”21 In his other works, ideology is introduced as a set of ideas which is to be sought and shaped: “If responsible enlightened souls in Muslim societies who are searching for a method, an ideology and a solution to the problems of their nation would return to the greatest book, they would learn the best lessons from it.”22 It seems here that ideology is something that should be searched for and Islam is the text and raw material for this endeavor. From Shari‘ati’s point of view, Shi‘i ideology is not something new. It has been a revolutionary ideology before Safavids. This dynasty changed it to state religion: “We can see that for over eight centuries (until the Safavid era), Alavite Shi‘ism was more than just a revolutionary movement in history which opposed all the autocratic and class-conscious regimes of the Omayyid and Abbasid caliphates and the kingships of the Ghaznavids, the Seljuks, the Mongols, the Timurids and the two Khanids, who had made the government version of the Sunni school their official religion, and it waged a secret struggle of ideas and action. Like a revolutionary party, Shi‘ism had a well-organized, informed, deep-rooted and welldefined ideology, with clear-cut and definite slogans and a disciplined and well-groomed organization. It led the deprived and oppressed masses in their movements for freedom and for seeking justice. It is considered to have been the rallying-point for the demands, distress, and rebellions of the intellectuals seeking to gain their rights, and for the masses in search of justice.”23 To assign authenticity to this revolutionary Shi‘i ideology, he forgets that ideology is a modern phenomenon and that arguably there was no ideology in thirteenth or fourteenth century Iran.

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What does an ideology take to be a success story in mobilizing the masses and establishing a new political system? What are the building blocks of this ideology? Every ideology needs to dismantle the existing tradition and belief systems and reconstruct a new set of ideas out of the existing pieces. This new set needs new meanings for the existing ceremonies and observations, utopia, a set of symbols, a good justification for obedience and listening to ideologues, and sacrifice. Shari‘ati was one of the successful ideologues who knew how a new ideology can be established and shaped. His knowledge of Islam and passion for revolutionary change led him to find the equivalent of those five elements in the Iranian context. These elements in twentieth century Iran were a revolutionary reading of Islamic beliefs and observations,24 a belief in a pristine Islamic community in Medina,25 charismatic figures,26 a belief in immamate (and its offshoot, guardianship of the jurist),27 and martyrdom28 respectively.29 All Islamic ceremonies and ordinances are interpreted as elements of this new ideology; for example, Hajj is a show of Islamic ideology.30 True believers such as Abu Dhar sacrifice living for ideology.31 Shari‘ati has successfully interpreted most of the ceremonial elements of Islam as inseparable elements of a revolutionary movement. While attaching great importance to leadership, socialist and nationalist Islamists do not specify qualifications for leadership in terms of descent or institutional ranks. Rising to a position of leadership in the revolutionary process is enough to prove leadership skills of a charismatic leader. In clerical authoritarian, and shari‘ahoriented Islamisms, it is not enough to have a just and learned leader that attracts the support of the community of believers; he should have an institutional standing such as that of sources of emulation (mara¯je‘). Khomeini’s theory of guardianship of jurist is centered on the question of leadership, believing that a faqih with leadership characteristics could be a panacea for all the problems of society. What is presented by some Shi‘i clerics as an anti-clerical tendency of Shari‘ati and Ba¯zarga¯n is about these two approaches to leadership among the Shi‘i Islamists. In his lectures on ummat va ima¯mat (Islamic community and the leadership), Shari‘ati explicitly rejects democracy and individual

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freedom as they are presented in Western political thought. He believes that Islamic societies are on a revolutionary path and “democracy in a society that is in need of rapid revolutionary change cannot be fruitful”.32 In his view, “individuals will never vote for somebody who is against traditions, habits, beliefs, and lifestyle of those individuals”33 while society is in dire need of change and a revolutionary leader. Society later will understand that it should have been changed by the forces of revolution.34 On the other hand, individuals including revolutionaries would understand that the direction of society was not what they have been promised or expected when it is too late to shift gear or turn around. Shi‘i socialist Islamism adopted the Marxist theory of imperialism and the Marxist program of state ownership and redistribution of wealth. Iranian socialists, Muslim and secular, viewed the state as an economic provider with monopoly of key resources, centrally managed on behalf of the population. Islamists believe that these key resources are anfa¯l (natural resources such as national forests, mountains, seashores, booty) and should not be in the hands of individuals and special groups.35 They believe that they belong to Allah and the Messenger (al-Anfal, verse 1: They ask thee concerning (things taken as) spoils of war. Say: “(such) spoils are at the disposal of Allah and the Messenger”). By denying private ownership, these natural resources will be in the hands of the deputy of imam during the occultation. Socialist Islamists grant these natural resources to the religious leaders as the guardians of the Muslim nation.36 Shari‘ati believed in an Islamic classless society in which no privileged groups such as the bourgeoisie or proletariat exists37 and society is not divided.38 This was in line with two different political traditions: the socialist economic policy of governmentalization of wealth and the tradition of patrimonial monarchy in Iran where there was no proletariat and independent bourgeoisie. Taleqani, Payman and Shari‘ati not only did not believe that they were copying the socialist economic policies but believed that socialists copied them from Islam.39 Shari‘ati has almost all the elements of political theories that are used to support Islamist ideologies such as conspiracy theories,40

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guided democracy,41 the unity of worldly and heavenly matters,42 considering Islamic society in its early years and hence in need for authoritarian rulers with good intentions,43 unity of religion and politics,44 imam as the political ruler, spiritual leader and the ideologue,45 and unity of good governance and authoritarian rule.46 He equates democracy with ejma¯‘ (consensus) and bai‘ah (confirmation, allegiance).47 By counting the challenges of some democracies such as the influence of wealth and corporations, flawed foreign policies, poverty, corruption, and other social problems, he tries to disqualify democracy in favor of revolutionary authoritarian rule.48

CHAPTER 5 NATIONALIST ISLAMISM:

MEHDI B AZARG AN

The political discourse of Iranian society in the 1960s and 1970s was an ideological discourse. Iranian secular and religious activists were all trying to establish new ideologies using their own cultural traditions and Western ideologies. The common purpose was to have a native ideology to mobilize the masses, although the results were to be different due to the materials and methods they were recruiting. They all wanted to present a revolutionary ideology independent of the traditional religious and political establishment and elite. The failure of the 1963 uprising that was led by Khomeini expedited the ideologization process of Islam in Iran. The new generation of educated young Muslims was looking for a system of ideas to lead them in their fight against injustice and despotism, the domination of the West in their country and the powerful Marxist movement in Iranian universities. The traditional religious authorities were not able to answer this demand; they were focused on shari‘ah law; they were mostly unaware of ideological developments and battles in the West and their impacts on Iranian cultural circles; they preferred to work with lay people in mosques and other religious institutions rather than intellectuals and educated people; and they were mostly conservative and did not want to have a face-to-face struggle with the existing regime. Maverick clerics such as Mahmoud Ta¯leqa¯ni and ideologues such as Ba¯zarga¯n were the only people who could satisfy these expectations.



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Ba¯za¯rgan played a major role in ideologizing religion in Iran long before Shari‘ati and his socialist agenda rose in the public arena and Shi‘i clerics recognized the necessity of ideology to mobilize and rule. Similar to Shari‘ati, Ba¯za¯rgan introduces the outcome of the ideologizing process of religion in his time by the Muslims as a necessity of the time. He believes that: 1. Ideology is a fundamental need of the time: “Human societies have progressed to the point that a people will not succeed unless they believe in an ideology or political philosophy. In the civilized world it is no longer possible to imagine a nation and state without ideology”;1 2. Prophets have tried to give ideology to man as “a basis for an ideological and intellectual foundation, and a designation of a path and a method for living”;2 3. “Ideal ideology is divine ideology for sure”;3 no religion has emphasized tolerance, peace, amnesty, and conflict resolution as Islam does;4 4. Due to its base in Islamic beliefs and as a divine ideology,5 it is totally different from worldly ideologies of the time such as absolutism, rationalism, utilitarianism, and Marxism and promotes a political system that is different from existing political regimes such as hierocracy and autocracy;6 5. Islamic ideology is representing Islamic faith and action as intertwined entities and, as a result, closes the gap between politics and religion in Muslim societies;7 and 6. It is all-inclusive and universal and covers every aspect of human life.8 This inclusion and universality, according to Muslims, is the result of being extracted from God’s eternal laws that no human institution is able and has the right to establish and mandate. What makes up and strengthens Ba¯za¯rgan’s ideology and other Islamist ideologies is the fifth characteristic that is to respond to totalitarian claims of Marxism and to establish Muslims’ monopolization of truth and virtue. It takes the rights of legislation from human beings by resorting to their inability compared to the

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omnipotence of God and then delivers it to the ideologues who are ordinary human beings. In the last decade of his life, Ba¯zarga¯n returned to his early ideas about the role of religion in people’s lives (1993) and changed his idea about using religion as an ideology for political purposes. For three decades, he was a staunch advocate for Islamic ideology to mobilize Muslims against tyranny and put forward an alternative for secular ideologies such as Marxism. After having resigned his post in government and closely watching what he believed to be the failures, atrocities and cruelties of the Islamic government that was based on Islamist ideologies, as a Muslim he found out that it is not necessary for religions to be the foundation of religious ideologies: “It is fine for divine religions to have promoted justice, fought against injustice, and managed the Islamic community but [it is also fine for them to] have not offered specific ideology, ordinances and teachings.”9 His conversion to a spiritual approach to religion was mostly due to his opposition to the Islamic government. From Ba¯zarga¯n’s point of view, “shifting from monotheism to multi-theism”, “taking hope of people toward religion”, and “conquer of religion and state by clerics” are some of the negative consequences of the theory of political Islam that recruits religion for worldly causes.10 Ba¯zarga¯n during his late intellectual career believed that without religion people would not have a good understanding of God and resurrection while they could take care of their worldly affairs: “There is no need for God and his prophets teach people how to live and how to solve their individual and social problems.” His argument for this idea is that “hardship and challenge and endeavor to tackle the problems are a part of the plan for creation of human being”.11 In this respect, politics and governance are not principally different from other worldly affairs and issues of life and hence there is no need for an Islamic or religious ideology. He calls the plan for ideologizing religion as “religion for worldly cause” as opposed to “worldly cause for religion”. In Ba¯zarga¯n’s view, the theory of “religion for society or religion for better world that were introduced in recent modernism and pragmatism era” has its



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roots in “self-centering, selfish, and exploiting nature of human beings” and “looking at God and religion from the window of personal benefits and regular human needs”.12 The nature of religion in his second view is mainly centred around ethics and theology, and not ideology and social policy: “Prophets had two missions: a huge and encompassing revolution against human selfishness and pushing them to the creator, and declaring the eternal future world that is much bigger than this world.”13 Prophets have been sent to introduce God and monotheism to human beings; they have nothing to do with day-to-day affairs and if they did, it was from their role as humans in society not as the messengers of God. If he is asked why the Qur’an has lots of references to worldly matters, he will reply that the “Qur’an deals with worldly issues as far as they are instrumental in making us close to God and critical in life after death” and the “Qur’an and prophet’s worldly teachings are secondary to their main agenda”.14 From the Islamist point of view, almost all worldly activism including the establishment of new ideologies and taking sides in politics as true believers could be considered as instrumental in making Muslims close to God and major acts in helping people to have a better life after death.

CHAPTER 6 CLERICAL AUTHORITARIAN ISLAMISM: RUHULLAH KHOMEINI

Iranian Shi‘i clerics and their followers have always maintained that sovereignty and rule belongs to sha¯re‘ (heavenly legislature, God), who had invested it in Prophet Mohammad and twelve Shi‘i imams one after another. This opens up room for discussion on leadership during the alleged occultation of the Twelfth Imam. Khomeini’s political innovation was to argue that during the absence of an infallible imam, sovereignty belongs to his general deputies, i.e. Shi‘i jurists or clerics. In their rule, they are not accountable and responsible before any one person or institution other than God himself. Khomeini always swings between two traditions of political Shi‘ism in Iran: Nuri’s absolutism and Na’ini’s constitutionalism. Na’ini tried to legitimize a limited government based on the separation of powers and protection of certain civil liberties. He believed that during the Hidden Imam’s occultation sovereignty belongs to the people with the permission of the jurists, but he did not go further to separate the state from religion. Khomeini advocated the same ideas in the third phase of his political life, i.e. 1978– 80. These ideas are reflected in some chapters of the IRI Constitution of 1979. Similar to the Constitution of 1906, this was

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the result of the balance of power between the constitutionalist religious intellectuals and some constitutionalist clerics such as Ta¯leqa¯ni on the one hand and the absolutist ‘ulama¯ on the other. In the early stages of his political life, he leaned toward Na’ini. In that period, he did not promote this idea that “the jurist should be the king, the minister, the military [commander]” (Khomeini, 1943: 185). He promoted the amended constitution of 1906 that gave authority to a committee of five Shi‘i jurists who could veto bills that are against Islamic principles. In his forth period of political life, he presented a more absolutist theory of governance. In matters of clerical rule and authority on every aspect of public life, he is not following both Nuri and Na’ini. Based on his theory of absolute rule of the guardian jurist, he believed Shi‘i clerics should ratify every direction and regulation in the land. Nuri believed in the traditional approach of clerics to differentiating between commandments (ahka¯m) and objects (masa¯diq, mo‘zou‘a¯t): “should the ruler of Islam (sulta¯n-i Isla¯m) graciously decide to issue a directive for the conduct of his officials in order to prevent the oppression of his subjects . . . its ratification and execution is not related to the function of the General Deputies (novva¯b-i a¯mm) [of the Hidden Imam ]”.1 Limiting the clerics’ intervention to the area of commandments is clearly against the idea of the guardianship of the jurist. In his shift from the theory of the guardianship of the jurist to the absolute guardianship of the jurist in the 1980s, Khomeini states that government is one of the primary principles of Islam: “the guardianship of jurist is not bound to shar‘i and secondary ordinances . . . and has precedence over other [Islamic] principles . . . the ruler may prevent observation and execution of worshiping and nonworshipping affairs if they are against the expediency of Islam”.2 In his view, “governance is prior to all primary Islamic pillars even praying and fasting and pilgrimage to Mecca”.3 Until Khomeini and his theory of the guardianship of the jurist, the ‘ulama¯ were content to have control over the laws of the land; they had no claims over the coercive powers. Their main demand of any government was enforcing Islamic laws; they did not even think

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about holding state power. Having mujtaheds to veto laws that are contradictory with Islamic shari‘ah was the highest goal that they had during the Constitutional Revolution and later in the first half of the twentieth century. When Khomeini jumped on the waves of public resentment and took the leadership in the 1960s, he used the revolutionary sentiment to promote the conditions for the exercise of power by the clergy. Iranian Shi‘i clerics had never even imagined such a situation. This is why there is no indication of this theory before Khomeini in Shi‘i jurisprudential tradition. Even Khomeini did not publicly mention his theory in the months before the victory of the 1979 Revolution. Muslim students and other activists before the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran had no idea about the clerical monopoly on state power. Shi‘i clerical authoritarian Islamism as the absolute authority of clerics was born with Khomeini’s theory of the guardianship of the jurist. The separation of religion and government was taken for granted among the Shi‘i ‘ulama¯ establishment during the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries. Contrary to Khomeini’s idea that this separation was a colonial plan, it can actually be seen as the clerics’ self defence against the further marginalization of the clerics and Islamist groups. The most that Shi‘i ‘ulama¯ asked for was a just king (sulta¯n ‘a¯del) who would govern in accordance with the teachings of the Qur’an and enforce shari‘ah law.4 Khomeini was witnessing the failure of this quest on the one hand and the gradual rising power of ‘ulama¯ in Iranian social setting on the other. He replaced the supposedly just king with a jurist ( faqih) that by definition in Shi‘i tradition is supposed to be just without any checks and balances. Khomeini used to accuse secular governments and intellectuals, who were against the authority of clerics, of believing in segregationist paradigm with regard to the relationship of religion and politics, an idea that was relatively rare. No Iranian secular believed that religious people do not have the right to participate in the political process. Iranian seculars believed in the separation of the clergy and the state, that is the Iranian version of the separation of church and state in the Western world.

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This false and baseless accusation was to encourage the clerics to involve themselves in politics, something that was very rare during Khomeini’s early life, and to oppose secular intellectuals’ of questioning clerical authority and critique of the clerics’ stands on public policies. Clerical authoritarian Islamism denies the separation of politics and religion to emphasize unification of clerical and political authority; this denial really refers to the necessary engagement of ‘ulama in political affairs. Khomeini’s insistence on the unity of religion and politics in theory and practice was to engage Shi‘i ‘ulama¯ in every aspect of public affairs and encourage their pursuit of a monopoly on state power. Shi‘i authoritarian Islamists believe that “reason, the laws of Islam, and the practice of the Prophet (s), and that of the Commander of the Faithfuls [Imam Ali], the purport of various Qur’anic verses and Prophetic traditions – all indicate the necessity of forming a government”.5 Khomeini presents seven arguments for the necessity of Islamic government in his time: (1) Historical argument: “The Prophet himself established a government, as history testifies. He engaged in the implementation of laws, the establishment of the ordinances of Islam, and the administration of society”; (2) Theological argument I: According to Shi‘i belief, “he [the Prophet] designated a ruler [Imam Ali] to succeed him, in accordance with divine command”; (3) Theological argument II: “It is not permissible . . . according to divine wisdom that God should leave men, His creatures, without a leader and guide”; (4) Jurisprudential philosophy argument I: ‘The nature and character of Islamic law and the divine ordinances of the sharı¯ah furnish additional proof of the necessity for establishing government, for they indicate that the laws were laid down for the purpose of creating a state and administering the political, economic and cultural affairs of society . . . The fiscal provisions of Islam also point to the necessity for establishing a government, for they cannot be fulfilled without the establishment of the appropriate Islamic institutions”;

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(5) Jurisprudential philosophy argument II: “Is it proper that the laws of Islam be cast aside and remain unexecuted, so that everyone acts as he pleases and anarchy prevails? Were the laws that the Prophet of Islam labored so hard for twenty-three years to set forth, promulgate, and execute valid only for a limited period of time?” (6) Scriptural argument: “There are numerous proofs and causes that necessitate formation of a government, and establishment of an authority from the words of the imam”; (7) Political argument: “In order to assure the unity of the Islamic ummat, in order to liberate the Islamic homeland from occupation and penetration by the imperialists and their puppet governments, it is imperative that we establish a government.”6 Other than number seven, all of these arguments are internal or first order arguments for true believers based on Islamic tradition. From Khomeini’s point of view, the restoration of imamate in the framework of clerical rule was a vital condition for revival of Islam as an identity and enforcing shari‘ah law: “If we examine closely the nature and character of the provisions of the law, we realize that their execution and implementation depend upon the formation of a government, and that it is impossible to fulfill the duty of executing God’s commands without there being established properly comprehensive administrative and executive organs.”7 Islam for Khomeini is a religion which requires both the governmental apparatuses and legal system as necessary parts of its functioning. According to Khomeini, only the enemies of Islam have promoted the idea that Islam has nothing to do with politics: “the servants of imperialism declared that Islam is not a comprehensive religion providing for every aspect of human life and has no laws or ordinances pertaining to society. It has no particular form of government.”8 But, there is not even a single quote in Khomeini’s discussions to show who and when the enemies of Islam have stated that idea. Khomeini’s arguements serve to mobilize the Shi‘i clerics

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against the West and instigate them to be active in politics based on his theory of political engagement. Khomeini’s main internal argument for unity of Islam and politics is based on the necessities of Islamic society and the way Islamic shari‘ah is shaped. For him, Islam is not limited to prayer and worship: “Of the approximately fifty sections of the corpus of hadith containing all the ordinances of Islam, not more than three or four sections relate to matters of ritual worship and the duties of man toward his Creator and Sustainer. A few more are concerned with questions of ethics, and all the rest are concerned with social, economic, legal, and political questions – in short, the gestation of society.”9 According to all Islamists including the clerical authoritarian branch, Islamic governance is not limited to the periods of the prophet or imams; it is for any time and place. At the same time they are aware that it is impossible to have Islamic government in societies in which Muslims are minorities. While the Shi‘i style government is to be obliged on Muslim societies with a majority of Shi‘is first, Sunni majority and non-Muslim societies should be conquered by force and converted to Shi‘i Islam to have an Islamic government.10 Khomeini did not address the question of compatibility of Islam and the nation-state. Although he supported the Muslim movements around the world, he was never for a pan-Islamist state during Hidden Imam’s occultation. He did not think that there is something about Islam and Shi‘ism which makes them incongruous with the idea of the nation-state. Clerical authoritarian Islamism is established on the foundations of Shi‘i clerics’ networks, institutions and doctrines. Socially it is partly clerical and partly lay-based ideology, while shari‘ah-oriented Islamism rests its legitimacy on the shoulders of Iranian Shi‘i clerics and their loyalists. By monopolization of the state in the hands of clerics after 1979, the state apparatus began to absorb as many clerics as was possible in its higher and middle ranks. The payoff was total control of the state over the clerical affairs. The control was complete after some years of both Khomeini and Khamenei’s rule; all large seminaries are directly or indirectly controlled by the guardian jurist; a governmental body controls nomination of clerics for leading

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prayers in all mosques over the country; the leader’s office controls security and intelligence affairs; the clerics have control of all media outlets and propaganda; most of the budgets for seminaries are provided by the government; and the highly educated clerics are mostly employed in the judiciary and universities. Clerical authoritarian Islamists present their political doctrines in terms of the traditional Shi‘i imamate theory due to their opposition to the language of modern statehood and its concepts of democracy, rotation of elite, rule of law, constitutionalism, liberty, equality and public participation in policy-making and the legislative processes. Their resort to imamate doctrine is also in order to legitimise a regime that many claim has no rational-legal base. It is not the case that they ignore modern elements of statehood due to their belief in the theory of imamate. Their reading of Islamic texts is theory laden, and their political theory has much in common with authoritarianism and totalitarianism. Instead of clothing democratic and libertarian concepts of statehood in Islamic terms, Khomeini and his disciples clothed authoritarianism in Islamic terms.11 Instead of humanizing and rationalizing the traditional institutions and disciplines, they tried to Islamicize (ideologize and politically control) them. The theory of vela¯yat-e motlaqeh-ye faqih (absolute guardianship of the jurist) as the most important element of clerical authoritarian Islamism is not based on the internal logic of shari‘ah. Islamic shari‘ah, as it has shaped throughout the history and as it is, does not necessitate jurist’s rule. It survived among Muslims for centuries without this rule. As initially formulated, the theory of the guardianship of the jurist has its political roots in one-man control of the government in Iranian monarchical regimes, mystical guidance that calls for unquestionable obedience of the followers and the authoritarian populism of Iranian revolutionaries during the Revolution of 1979. By his actions during and after the victory of the Revolution, Khomeini further developed his theory of vela¯yat-e faqih. Khomeini had a totalitarian and maximalist view of shari‘ah: “the laws of the sharı¯‘ah embrace a diverse body of laws and regulation, which amounts to a complete social system. In this system of laws, all

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the needs of man have been met: his dealings with his neighbors, fellow citizens, and clan, as well as children and relatives; the concerns of private and marital life; regulations concerning war and peace and intercourse with other nations; penal and commercial law; and regulations pertaining to trade, industry and agriculture.”12 Clerical authoritarian Islamism uses the idea of applying the tenets of Islamic doctrine and shari‘ah to all aspects of social, political and economic life by the state as its justification for the authoritarian Islamic state. Khomeini was not a pan-Islamist; his theory of guardianship of jurist presupposes a modern nation-state that was shaped during Qajars and Pahlavis. He was aware that this theory is based on Shi‘i doctrines, and that for the most part, Sunnis would not accept it. In 1989, Khomeini made it clear that the expediency of the state takes precedence over the application of shari‘ah law and even Islamic beliefs. The ruling faqih can issue hokm-e hokumati (executive order) whenever he sees it necessary in accordance with social and political conditions. This is to guarantee the survival of the regime. From a clerical authoritarian Islamist ideology point of view, Islamist ideology is more comprehensive than shari‘ah, and clerical authority comes first. By presenting the theory of vela¯yat-e faqih, Khomeini changed the question of leadership from “how” to “who”; instead of asking how a Muslim society should be ruled, he posed the traditional question of Shi‘ism about who should rule this community. Highlighting the qualifications of an Islamic ruler in his lectures on Islamic government,13 he limited the scope of the question of leadership to the question of “who” to redirect his audience to the clerical leadership as the only existing authority in the Muslim world. Clerical authoritarian Islamism emphasizes the clerical prerogative and duty to interpret religious commands and obligations – not rights – for the faithful masses and guide them in their daily activities, public and private, political and economic, through public policies and regulations. Khomeni’s argument for clerical authoritarianism is built up as follows:

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(1) Islam is for today and it is not outdated.14 This is to address Iranian intellectuals and educated people who did not observe religion in their everyday lives. To build social support for clerical rule, Khomeini and other followers of clerical authoritarian ideology had to promote this belief that Islam is eternal and can serve as a perennial ideology. (2) Khomeini had a maximalist view of the role of religion in public and private life of individuals. The intention behind this maximalism was to include politics within the remit of clerical duties. According to him, Islam is a comprehensive set of rules for every aspect of life15 including governance.16 Without this maximalist view, clerical authoritarian Islamists could not make their case for monopoly of power in the hands of a few clerics. (3) Religion and politics are not separated.17 He believed that the “colonial powers have promoted the separation of religion from state; they have said that ‘ulama¯ should not interfere in social and political affairs”.18 Khomeni and other mullahs do not usually cite the quotes that they mention in their speeches and books. It is not clear who has mentioned this idea. This is not to mobilize the masses; no body in the country and abroad promoted this idea that the religious masses should not be active in politics. This idea was mostly addressed to the Shi‘i clerics who traditionally were involved in religious institutions’ affairs and did not run for public offices or did not participate in political discussions. (4) Iranian authoritarianist clerics believe that they “are ordered to execute Islamic rules”.19 To follow this order, they needed political power. The secular administrations were against executing Islamic rules during the era of the Pahlavis. To execute God’s ordinances, they first had to overthrow the secular regime and then monopolize power to be able to follow God’s orders without any resistance from non-believers and secularists. (5) The most important tenet of Shi‘i clerical authoritarianism is the idea of charismatic delegation. According to this idea, Islamic jurists are the deputies of the Hidden Imam and they are entitled to rule.20 To establish an Islamic government, Khomeini had no

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choice other than using the charismatic delegation of clerics to seat them as the political leaders of the country. When he reached this conclusion that monarchy is no longer eager and able to support the Islamic establishment, he shifted the rule to the clerics who were able to guide the masses. (6) Khomeini could not trust any other strata other than clerics. The Shi‘i clergy who believe that they are God’s representatives on earth believed that they have been and they will be the savior of the nation: “It is this stratum [clergy] that can rescue the nation.”21 Their implicit and explicit word with their followers has always been an emphasis on this point that “the enemy of clergy is your [nation’s] enemy”.22 They believe that it is not the people’s beliefs and sacrifices that have made Islam the active religion of the majority of Iranian people but it “is the seminaries that have held Islam alive”.23 The role of clergy is so crucial that “Islam minus clergy is Islam minus content.”24 Khomeini goes to this extreme point that equates Islam and clergy: “mullah means Islam”.25 As a result, “opposition to clergy is to oppose Islam”.26 (7) From Khomeini’s point of view, Muslims are ordered to do their Islamic duties; the results and consequences are less important than doing these duties: “We have divine duty (taklif shar‘i) and we should act on it. We are not bound to succeed . . . If killed I have done my duty; if I succeed I have done my divine duty.”27 The outcome is in God’s hands and He will take care of the rest. Khomeini himself did not act based on this premise and several times considered the expediency of the state and clerical government. While Khomeini sparingly used his powers to directly control governmental affairs, his successor, Khamenei, has used his powers frequently so that even dispassionate observers often describe his control as dictatorial. Khamenei’s evolution of authority has been broad enough that after over two decades of his rule only one individual in Iran can be said to have control. The dominant Islamist ideology of the state during Khameini’s rule has had a totalitarian

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approach to social and cultural issues but Khomeini did not have to be a totalitarian dictator to rule the country. Although no one could “predict a successor to Khomeini as faqih who would exercise more control than does Khomeini”,28 Khamenei with his ties to the military and security systems and his absolute power within the framework of the Constitution proved that he could hold such power. Instead of relying on charismatic leadership and symbol manipulation for its survival, the Islamic regime during Khamenei’s rule has relied on the intimidation of a vast majority of the population and harsh silencing of the opposition. In the postKhomeini era, coercion was centralized and was enforced through a unified and centralized leadership. Clerical authoritarian Islamism marginalized nationalist, socialist and mysticism-oriented Islamist ideologies and tightened its ties to militarist and fascist Islamists. After over two decades of Khamenei’s rule, it was even hard to differentiate between clerical and militarist Islamists who were running the country. Gradually, the Clerical authoritarian Islamism merged into a militarist one. Clerical authoritarian Islamism has had three defining characteristics that have been the bases of its control. The most crucial characteristic was its focus on religious leadership that gives clerics the ability to mobilize support from their constituent through the manipulation of Shi‘i ideas, symbols and ceremonies. Iranian Shi‘i clerics have promoted this idea that they have a monopoly on understanding and presenting the true Islam. The second characteristic was the intensity of clerical Islamism’s appeal to the unsatisfied masses. This was to recruit supporters among social strata that secular intellectuals and nationalists did not have access to. Lower class strata have been the target for recruiting loyalists for Shi‘i clerics. The unemployed and repented criminals are frequently the pool for capturing the cadres of the Islamic Republic propaganda machine, security and paramilitary systems and religious institutions. In spite of a broad and consistent call for mass participation, the ruling class has always tried to resist open political competition. The third one was to provide a Shi‘i identity that was supposed to counter the Western and Iranian identities as the Western-made,

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colonial and satanic ones. The Shi‘i identity was to provide worldly pride and divine sanction when secular intellectuals were looking at the Iranian ancient culture and Western culture to build a new identity for Iranians. Whoever has been resistant to religious leadership, clerical-style mass mobilization and Shi‘i identity has been subject to a system of intimidation, elimination and terror control in the Islamic Republic. The multi-faceted system of clerical authoritarian control consists of a multiplicity of governmental coercive instruments such as the judiciary, security systems and military and disciplinary forces, semi-official coercive forces organized in the religious institutions such as mosques, and multi-layer profiling and monitoring offices whose missions are to gather information and disqualify “outsider” individuals and groups who want to be active in public affairs. The most effective of these monitoring and profiling agencies are ideological recruitment cores in the governmental offices and monitoring commissions which monitor the political parties, press, satellite TV and radio stations, the internet and elections. There have been at least four judicial systems (regular, military, revolutionary and clergy courts), four security systems (the Ministry of Intelligence, the security system of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC), the security system of the disciplinary forces and the security system of the judiciary), two military forces and tens of offices to enforce religious laws. Almost all affairs of the religious institutions are under the control of the clerical ruling caste. In over three decades of clerical rule, the historical independence of the clergy with respect to the government has entirely deteriorated. The government funds almost all seminaries and religious propaganda organizations and the dissident and independent clerics often find themselves under house arrest or prosecution. The governmental media is even granted the authority in awarding titles to Shi‘i clerics.29

CHAPTER 7

SHARI‘AH-ORIENTED ISLAMISM: MORTEZA MOTAHHARI

Ideology for Morteza¯ Motahhari (1920– 79)1 is “a general theory, a comprehensive, harmonious, and concrete design whose central object is to perfect man and secure universal happiness. Along the lines and through the methods it suggests, musts and must nots, goods and evils, ends and means, needs, ailments and remedies, responsibilities and duties may be discerned.”2 Ideology is expected to give unity, direction, and shared aspirations to the man; only the comprehensive and perfect ideology may render this function. For him, this ideology is the “revealed law” or shari‘ah.3 Islam as a religion is also an ideology.4 The most Islamist aspect of Islamist ideology is well deliberated by Motahhari. He believes that the best ideology is the one that is shaped by God: “Who can lay down such an ideology? Undoubtedly the intellect of any single individual cannot do so. Can the collective intellect do that? Can man with the help of his total experience and his past and present information lay down such an ideology? If we admit that man does not know himself, then how can we expect him to know human society and social weal. Then what to do?”5 His answer is that “the great creative machinery has not left this big question unattended and has already specified the fundamental

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outlines of an ideology from a horizon above the horizon of human intellect that is from the horizon of revelation”.6 He believed that human beings have had no effect on the launching and shaping and reshaping of this ideology. He presumes that this ideology offers anything that human beings need to know. They should follow this ideology due to their lack of knowledge about good and evil, while the creator and his representatives on earth have this knowledge. Muslims who have tried to ideologize Islam and introduce Islam as an ideology in modern times believe that designing such a teaching is beyond the power of individual and collective intelligence.7 According to Motahhari, not only has the need for this divine ideology not been passed and is not outdated, but as man has evolved this need has intensified. Motahhari bases his Islamist ideology on four fundamental ideas: (1) The insufficiency of reason;8,9 (2) Due to the effects of human beings’ worldly desires, people are not able to discern their true interests;10 (3) Islamic faith possesses the only true and final revelation from God;11 and (4) Human beings are not politically equal.12 The presuppositions of these ideas are: (1) Sufficiency of reason on the side of religious leaders and clergy who provide guidance for others and hence upgrading them from human status to spiritual one (rowha¯ni). He also assumes that the Shi‘i clergy, imams and the prophets have no worldly desires while history tells us otherwise. (2) People with worldly desires are not able to discern their true interests. This is true when “true” interests are defined by the clerics; they have frequently claimed that they are the only group who can understand the true desires of human beings and ascribe them to God, as if God talks only to them.

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(3) Islam provides the last and the best set of ideas for human happiness. Almost all religions have claimed the same thing and no one has an upper hand in arguing for its claim. (4) Inequality of human beings based on their religious beliefs and observation of religious ordinances; this is the most critical base for discrimination against “others” that is as dangerous as race, ethnicity and gender due to the strength of religious feelings among human beings. Politics was not Motahhari’s first priority throughout most of his career. Approaching the Iranian revolution of 1979, he gradually became more interested in ideology and political theory and political Islam. In his last years, politics became his main agenda. Almost all of his lectures during and after the Iranian Revolution deal with the political issues at hand, such as who should rule, how the new regime should be established and what values and norms should be pursued in the new regime. He was the harbinger of a new brand of Islamist ideology that was called “esla¯m-e feqa¯hati” (jurisprudential Islam) after the victory of the Iranian revolution. Based on this ideology, Islamist jurists should monitor and interfere in all state affairs. This ideology recognizes Islamist jurists alone as the true experts of Islam. Islamist jurists as the carriers of true Islam in this ideology are responsible for running the state, executing Islamic laws, and fighting against other ideologies and beliefs, even other brands of Islamist ideologies. Other than Motahhari, Seyyed Mohammad Husayn Beheshti (IRI’s first Head of the Supreme Court)13 and Seyyed Ali Khamenei14 were advocates for this brand of Islamist ideology. Motahhari’s political theory is based on five pillars: (1) Similar to other Islamists who focus on the question of “who” instead of question of “how” to run a state, Motahhari believes that having a ruler is a necessity in any society and the discussion on specifications of this ruler comes first.15

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(2) As a Shi‘i cleric, he emphasizes the necessity of executing and enforcing the orders of Islamist ideology.16 This means that all brutal and inhumane Islamic laws should be enforced even against the will of the public. (3) He believes in the necessity to establish an Islamic government as the best and easiest way to execute Islamic laws;17 for him, the content of the governance should be guided by Islamic ideology while people can decide who should execute the principles of this ideology;18 later he allocates the leadership of this state to the Islamic juristconsults. (4) He emphasizes the ‘ulama¯’s privilege in ruling society.19 While rejecting most cases of discrimination against human beings, Motahhari believes in ideological discrimination. He believes that “Islam is a humanistic school based on human criteria. There is nothing in it based on wrong discriminations between human beings. In Islam, there exists no country, race, blood, zone and language. These things are not an evidence and criterion of privilege for human beings. That criterion in Islam is those human values.”20 In his discussion on humanism, there is not even one remark on legal equality of human beings before law. What he focuses on to describe the differences between human beings are values. He accepts that human beings are biologically equal but does not go further. Basically these are not general values of humanity that he is talking about; they are Islamic values that are presented as the best value system in the world. (5) While it is impossible to always have an elected ruler with an Islamic agenda, it is better to establish a government that gets its legitimacy from divine positions.21 These points are direct results of his Islamist ideology. The direct results of these ideas are as follow: 1) The Islamic character of a society depends on executing Islamic laws, which is only possible by having an Islamic ruler; 2) People should be ruled by a group of people who are just and expert in Islamic laws ( fuqaha¯), whether a source of emulation or a group of fuqaha¯; 3) It does not matter if the hardcore of the political establishment is not elected; their main

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function is to guarantee the Islamity of the state; and 4) Islamic government is not equal to clerical theocracy or hierocracy.22 The primary demand of shari‘ah-oriented Islamism is the total implementation of shari‘ah in public and private life. The coercive power of the state is the pushing force for this implementation. According to this brand of Islamism, Islamic laws specifying punishments for individuals who break these laws cannot be applied without an authoritative Islamist government; Muslims cannot wait for the powerful true-believer ruler to enforce Islamic laws. Shari‘ah-oriented and clerical authoritarian Islamisms share these basic points. According to Motahhari, even during the period of Great Occultation (the time in which nobody has any contact with the Hidden Imam which has extended to the present time), Islamic laws should be enforced. Shari‘ah-orientated Islamists are aware that in the modern world there is tough resistance to this implementation. The Western mindset has difficulties accepting some of the punishments that are administered for crimes and misdemeanors in shari‘ah law. Realizing the monopoly of the state over violence, this apparatus seemed perfect for implementing Islamic laws. Before and even after the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Khomeini and his followers believed that if the state would be in the hands of clerics, they will eradicate crime and misdemeanors just by applying shari‘ah law.23 According to this belief, “men have been set upon a well-defined path, and commanded not to stray from it, nor to transgress against the established limits and norms; for if they were to stray, they would fall prey to corruption. Now men would not be able to keep to their ordained path and to enact God’s laws unless a trustworthy and protective individual (or power) were appointed over them with responsibility for this matter, to prevent them from stepping outside of the limit and transgressing against the rights of others.”24 Having the laws are not enough for men to be in the right direction; state power should enforce God’s law and then people will follow the right direction. By implication, if men are ruled by God’s men, they will not step outside the limit and they will not transgress against the rights of others. The existence of the Islamic Republic and

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the rule of the clerics for more than three decades is the proof against this argument. Shari‘ah-oriented Islamism specifically insists on enforcing Islamic penal law (hodud and ta‘zira¯t), enforcing observances of prayer and fasting, obligatory hejab and gender discrimination and segregation by resort to state apparatuses. These ordinances have enough pressure on the public and give substantial control of the public arena to the government. Motahhari was very successful in classifying, categorizing and deliberating the political interests and demands of the traditional strata and clerics in the 1970s. This is the reason why his writings became the materials for publicizing and promoting the official ideology of the state in the 1980s, when the Shi‘i clerics finally had the upper hand in Iranian politics and monopolized power. Khomeini believed that it is up to the government to decide which ordinances are to be enforced and which are to be suspended. In the framework of shari‘ah-oriented Islamism, Islamist jurists are believed to be able to address all the questions arising in contemporary societies. Ejteha¯d (personal effort in interpretation of the Qur’an, hadith and scholarly work of ‘ulama¯) if carried out in the right way, will tell us Islam’s position on any old and new question. Shari‘ah-oriented Islamists have ideologized Islamic shari‘ah that goes beyond codification. For these Islamists, it is not enough to have shari‘ah laws as the state law in areas of personal and family affairs (hoquq-e khosusi), what was the result of de facto, later de jure, differentiation between state and religion after the Constitutional Revolution of 1906– 7 and during the legal reforms of the 1920s to 1930s. They want shari‘ah laws as both private and public law (hoquq-e ‘omumi) of the state. Feqhist (jurisprudentialist) Islamists usually try to present Islam’s position on any event and issue by referring to different chapters and sections of traditional Islamic shari‘ah. The religiosity and Islamity of this ideology is anchored in feqh. The socially constructed norms of the Islamists are placed within religious frames just by mentioning a fatwa or hadith or a verse from the Qur’an.

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The affinity between shari‘ah law and ideology makes the transformation from shari‘ah scholar to Islamist ideologue very easy. Islamic shari‘ah and specifically Shi‘i shari‘ah law has four characteristics that makes it a very good philosophical tool which can be utilized in order to construct a political ideology: (1) It claims to be an encompassing and comprehensive system that includes every answer for every question and every need of human individuals and societies. (2) It claims to be dynamic and changing based on new developments; ejteha¯d works as the facilitator for this dynamism. (3) It is not up to every believer and follower of the Islamic shari‘ah to have a say in developments of the law as it is the case in any ideology and ideological system; the central committees and ideologues (clerics) are the ones who have this privilege of manipulating the details based on the needs of the time. (4) It claims to create an ideal state that materializes God’s rule on earth and help men to realize their divinely causes. Ideologization of Islam by resort to socialism, nationalism and mysticism were not as successful as ideologization of Islam through feqhism in taking hold of the power of the state. There are four characteristics of Shi‘i feqh that helped the Shi‘i clerics to succeed in their ideologizing effort and introducing shari‘ah as the ideology of the state: (1) It claims to govern all human activities and include detailed ordinances (hokms) for every action of all human beings that usually ends in confiscation of the public sphere by the political realm, if ideologized shari‘ah is going to be the dominant force in society; what is missing should be extracted from the texts through ejteha¯d and expediency of the ruling caste. (2) It has already been routinized, secularized and codified during centuries of scholarship and political activism of Iranian Shi‘i clerics.

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(3) The clerics’ common claim for ejteha¯d is only one step to absolute power: treating the whole public as a minor which disqualifies individuals from having any rights and readings of Islam and gives the state the power to control. (4) There is no separation of political, legal and religious domains, institutions, and orders in shari‘ah law. This approach to Islamist ideology insists on rationality of religious prescriptions, whether we as human beings understand or do not understand it; shari‘ah-oriented Islamists “believe” in rationality of all Islamic ordinances. This belief is a priori and has no ground in rational thinking and argument. Shi‘i jurists believe that the door for ejteha¯d is open. The permitted ejteha¯d for Motahhari is “the employment of careful consideration and reasoning in reaching an understanding of the valid proofs of the shari‘ah”.25 This definition, of course, is deliberated in a way that only a specific group, i.e. ‘ulama¯, monopolize the means and basics of having ability to be called mujtahed: “the ‘ulama¯ of Islam gradually realized that the deduction and derivation of the precepts from the combined valid proofs of the shari‘ah necessitated [the learning] of a series of preparatory sciences and studies such as the sciences of literature, logic, the Qur’anic sciences and tafsir (Qur’anic exegesis), the science of hadith and the narrators of hadith (rejal al-hadith), the science of the methodology of usul al-feqh [principles of jurisprudence], and even a knowledge of the feqh of the other sects of Islam. A mujtahid was someone who was a master of all these sciences.”26 According to him, only Shi‘i clerics as a class meet this need and have the knowledge of “a series of sciences as a suitable preliminary basis on which to develop the ability to consider and reason correctly and systematically”.27 In his view, similar to other clerics, it is only the clergy who have made and supported Islam to survive: “If the flag [of Islam] is taken from the clergy and given to the intellectuals, after a generation, not a century, Islam will be metamorphosed.”28 Interpreting shari‘ah as an ideology, Shi‘i shari‘ah-oriented Islamism is supported by this idea of clerics as ideologues29 that later became the ruling caste of the

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Islamic regime. A set of Islamist ideologies including shari‘ahoriented one facilitated this political transfer in modern Iran. Other than a class of ideologues, Motahhari introduces four other characteristics of ejteha¯d that pave the way for Islamic government: specialization of ‘ulama¯ in different branches of feqh that means getting ready for complicated governance, the idea of a council of ‘ulama¯ that makes the rule of the juristconsults more rational and was picked by drafters of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Constitution (later pushed aside in the revisiting of the constitution in 1989), ruling based on the understanding of the requirement of the necessities or expediency of the time, and recognizing the fact that the faqih’s outlook on the world affects the legal opinions he issues. Motahhari believed that Shi‘i jurisprudence is in that level of development that is no longer one discipline but a set of disciplines that every jurist should specialize in one branch of it. He thought that the Shi‘i feqh has gradually progressed and has reached the point where it is no longer possible for a single person to investigate all the problems it raises: “At the present time, after this advance in the development of our feqh, which occurred in the same way as similar advances in other sciences all over the world, and which has been the result of the efforts of the ‘ulama’ and fuqaha’ of the past, the scholars of today will find themselves faced with the choice of either curbing any further progress in feqh or putting this sensible and progressive recommendation into practice and creating branches of specialization, as a result of which people will come to discriminate in their taqlid, in the same way as they discriminate in referring to a doctor.” 30 To make Islamic feqh a more rational discipline, Motahhari suggests collective endeavors because “now, solitary theorizing or experiment no longer has any value, nothing is to be achieved from going one’s own way . . . In every branch, scholars and scientists are constantly engaged in exchanging ideas.”31 He also suggests a method for solving the problem of differences of fatwas in ruling the society: “If scientific consultation were to come into existence in the science of feqh, and the principle of the exchange of ideas were to be thoroughly practiced, many of the differences between legal

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opinions would be resolved.”32 This is just wishful thinking and there is no guarantee that the differences will be resolved. The Islamic Republic experience showed that the differences may be resolved only by resort to force. In case there is no point in Islamic feqh related to a specific social and political issue or policy, he suggests the principle of necessity: there are “some cases in our feqh where our fuqaha [jurists] have given a definite ruling on the requirement of something only because they have seen the necessity and importance of the matter.” 33 To establish an Islamic government, Shi‘i jurists should get involved in daily issues and politics of the society. If this happens, a jurist will enter the process of jurisprudence with “his knowledge and understanding of all things; in other words, his worldview, has a great influence on the decisions he makes”.34 To issue a relevant and effective fatwa “the faqih must have all the information on matters upon which he is going to issue a fatwa”.35 To do this, he should engage in all the social and political processes in society. This faqih is totally different from an isolated one: “If we imagine a faqih who is always sitting in the corner of his house or his madrasa, and compare him with a faqih who is conversant with the currents of life, both of them refer back to the valid proofs of the shari‘a, but each one of them will derive his legal rulings in a particular way, using a particular method.”36 There are three differences between clerical authoritarian Islamism and shari‘ah-oriented Islamism. The first one is the degree of emphasis on executing shari‘ah laws. What is crucial for clerical authoritarian Islamism is clerics’ absolute rule; they can even suspend or standstill execution of Islamic laws to sustain clerical rule, while shari‘ah laws where it has a rule could not be suspended for any reason in shari‘ahoriented Islamism. While considering the idea of velayat-e faqih as an authentic theory of the Islamic ideological state, shari‘ah-oriented Islamists view the guardian jurist as a guide that “should not put himself in a position as the head of government and rule”.37 Motahhari depicts the position of the ruling cleric as an ideologue, not a leader. This Islamist ideologue is supposed to monitor the procedures and processes of legislation, execution and judicial decision-making to see if Islamic ideology is carefully and fully implemented.

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The second difference is about the way that shari‘ah law develops and transforms over time. According to clerical authoritarian Islamism, shari‘ah laws could be changed by political authority due to political and social expediency while shari‘ah-oriented Islamists believe that the transformation of shari‘ah laws has its own disciplinary logic that is objectified in a discipline: the principles of Islamic jurisprudence (usul-e feqh). The third one is about the source of legitimacy of the government. According to shari‘ah-oriented Islamism, the clerics are the only group who has the right to rule not because they have grabbed power after the revolution but because they are familiar with the Qur’an, sunnah, feqh, and other Islamic disciplines.38 On the contrary, the clerical authoritarian Islamists do believe that the clerics are the only group who should rule because they have the military, security and judiciary in their hands. Their words are final because they have the power. As opposed to what Noah Feldman believes,39 shari‘ah does not mean the rule of law for shari‘ah-oriented Islamists. Rule of law is not a big issue for Islamists, even when they have absolute power. Shari‘ah as the divine law for Islamists is completely different from the proposal made by the Archbishop of Canterbury to allow the shari‘ah and Jewish law to be considered in voluntary family and arbitration courts in 2008. The situation of a Muslim religious minority having the option of voluntary recourse to arbitration or court settlement in the West cannot be compared with that of a Muslim majority using the coercive power of the state to enforce shari‘ah law in the land.40 Islamists who demand “the execution of the shari‘ah” do not really mean the rule of law, even rule of shari‘ah. The demands for the implementation of the shari‘ah primarily mean that of its penal code. The ideological demand for shari‘ah as the basis of the Constitution and source of all laws appeals to the puritanical moralism strengthened by the resurgence of Islam that sees divinely-ordained severe punishment as the most effective way of stopping the moral corruption and liberties coming from the West.41 Islamists in general cannot logically call for the rule of law. If they do they distance themselves from mainstream Islamism. Almost all who have cried for the rule of law in the Muslim world for at least 150 years

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have nothing to do with Islamism. As opposed to the absolutists, the secularist and religious constitutionalists asked for the rule of law (ha¯kemiyyat-e qa¯nun), limited and legal government (mashrutiyyat) and state law (qa¯nun). The key term for constitutionalists is qa¯nun, meaning public law or state law, while the key term for Islamists is shari‘ah or divine law. Public law or state law is passed in the parliament representing the will of people, while shari‘ah is God’s law observed just by the true believers. Shari‘ah has never been expected to function as something like a modern constitution in Muslim countries. It mostly establishes duties and not individuals’ rights. Shari‘ah could function as a limitation on government and a source of law that is completely different from the law of the nation and a source for the rule of law. Islamic shari‘ah was drawn upon in the writing of the civil codes of Iran, and functioned as a limitation on government in a few years of the Islamic Republic of Iran,42 but it has never been the law of the nation. There is no demand for law-based government embodied in Islamic law. The call for execution of shari‘ah law by Islamist sections has no constitutional dimension. For the most part, Shari‘ah has no historical association with the rule of law tradition and rule of law promotion in the Islamic world. The law of the land was mainly a secular one that in some sections was inspired or manipulated by shari‘ah law. It also lacks any civilizational dimension; shari‘ah as a system of law cannot be the main reason of Islamic civilization and the rise of Islamic empires.43 It primarily means calling for a new identity, nostalgia for the imagined golden age, revival of Islamic tradition and scripturalism. Mandating the veiling of women or the use of corporal punishments are the most crucial elements of this call. Sexism, paternalism and anti-Westernism are to support this call and strengthen that identity. Shari‘ah cannot provide the necessary resources for implementation of the rule of law for four significant reasons: (1) It addresses individuals not states. It does not principally institute any effective institution. It is up to the believers in each era to recruit appropriate ways and means to execute shari‘ah ordinances. Shari‘ah is silent especially on procedural and formal

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matters. Legal governance is contingent upon effective institutions for reinterpreting and enforcing the law and primarily deals with procedural and formal matters. (2) In its essence, shari‘ah does not aspire to be a law that applies equally to every human being; men and women, Quraish (the prophet’s tribe) and non-Quraish, and Muslim and nonMuslims are not treated in the same way; there is no equality of human beings in front of the law in Islamic shari‘ah. (3) It does not recognize a territory to be the base of modern state power; state law has no place in the framework of shari‘ah law. (4) It does not recognize the monopoly of coercive power in the hands of the state, which is one of the foundations of the rule of law in modern nation-states.

CHAPTER 8 JUSTICE-ORIENTED SCRIPTURALIST ISLAMISM: MOHAMMAD REZA HAKIMI

The hotbed of Shi‘i scripturalist Islamism is the province of Khorasan, in the northeast of Iran. Neither Islamic philosophy nor Islamic mysticism could flourish in Khorasan seminaries in the recent centuries. Instead, Qom has been the center of Islamic jurisprudence for about a millennium. The last famous Iranian philosopher, Mulla¯ Sarda¯ lived in the suburb of this city because of the Shi‘i clerics’ anger against him. In spite of pressure on mystics and philosophers in religious circles, seminary students in Qom still can have access to some scholars who focus on Islamic mysticism and Islamic philosophy. The Mashhad seminary has been more closed to non-feqhist and scripturalist readings of Islam. Mohammad Reza Hakimi names the Mashhad school of religious thought as the “separation” school. The most important figures of this school are Seyyed Musa¯ Zara¯ba¯di Qazvini (1877– 1935), Mirza¯ Mehdi Esfa¯ha¯ni (1935– 46), and Shaikh Mojtaba¯ Qazvini (1901– 67). Scripturalist Islamism presents Islamic teachings as something completely different from science, philosophy and mysticism. It separates pure divine understanding from worldly knowledge: “the school of separation is a worldview, cosmology, epistemology and

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system of belief and thinking . . . that differentiates between human concepts and terms and hybrid [concepts and terms on the one hand] and pure divine and heavenly knowledge (adopted from the Qur’an and sunnah) [on the other]”.1 This approach draws a distinction between religion on the one hand and philosophy and mysticism on the other. More moderate versions of scripturalist Islamism do not reject Islamic philosophy and Islamic mysticism but do not consider them as purely Islamic.2 From this point of view, “conformity of old philosophy and glorious Qur’an could not be guaranteed and there is no evidence [of success].”3 Islamic philosophy is eclectic and hybrid.4 Scripturalist Islamists are looking for a pure Qur’anic school that potentially has answers for every question of human beings, including political questions. This brand of Islamist ideology believes that prophetic revelation is enough for leading human societies to happiness: “If human thinkers and scholars were following the path of prophets and messengers of God’s words . . . they would reach to eternal spark [of knowledge] . . . and achieve ‘correct knowledge’.”5 In that situation, there would be no difference or diversity of opinions among them. Other Islamist ideologies also dream of this situation of non-diversity and consensus. The followers of the “separation” school emphasize pure understanding of revelational and divine knowledge,6 an epistemology that denies theory-laden understandings of religious ideas and ordinances. Separationists vie for a vacuum of knowledge that nothing can influence divine understanding of the revelation and the world. This dream has never come through. They presuppose that no worldly knowledge has influenced the Prophet Mohammad’s messages from God. According to this school, “in almost all cases, only pure Qur’anic research on [divine] knowledge deserves to be called research”.7 The most important argument against separationist/scripturalist’s epistemological premise is its belief in comprehensibility of Islamic teachings that has no precedent in Islamic history. In no point in Islamic history, other than modern times, have Muslims claimed that Islam has plans and programs for every aspect of their lives.

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Hakimi and his predecessors believe that Islamic society will only be established based on the teachings of the Qur’an and infallibles: “The Qur’anic human being and Qur’anic society and that ‘transcendent city’ (the highest society) that the Qur’an wanted to establish under infallibles’ watch is far from what has been shaped under caliphates and Islamic governments.”8 To do this, nonQur’anic understanding should be marginalized and only the Qur’an and hadith should be taught as public knowledge. Similar to other Islamists, Hakimi believes that the Qur’an and hadith respond to all human needs: “In that [ideal] society, all and everything, from architecture and buildings to education and politics and economy and judiciary, all and everything, are pure Qur’anic and are different from what is presented in the name of Islam.”9 There is little evidence that the Qur’an and hadith have addressed all areas of human life, and it is not clear what is pure Qur’anic and what is not. It is difficult to see how this utopia corresponds to Islamic tradition. Instead, it was shaped in reaction to Marxist ideal society presented to the Iranian public in the first half of the twentieth century. Hakimi does not believe that what Islamic philosophy and mysticism present is monotheism. According to him, non-Qur’anic disciplines merely pretend to include Islamic beliefs and doctrines: “everywhere there is claim for monotheism and there is no justice; monotheism is only a claim”.10 His main argument for this claim is based on the outcome. If the outcome of philosophical and mystical belief systems in society is not social justice, they are therefore not monotheist belief systems. He evaluates the monotheistic aspect of a religion by its products and from those products, social justice is the most important one. He differentiates Islamic civilization as the status quo from Qur’anic ideal society: “this [way of] life and this economy, this way of education, these schools of interpretation [of the Qur’an], these methods of extracting God’s ordinances, and these philosophical and mystical disciplines are in the category of Islamic civilization”.11 The Qur’anic civilization that is different from (historical) Islamic civilization would have a very different outcome. From the scripturalist

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point of view, “philosophy and mysticism are two ways [of understanding] totally different from Qur’an”.12 For Hakimi, Maktab-e Tafkik (the separation school) is the venue for separating Qur’anic knowledge as a divine understanding of the world, the human being and society from worldly disciplines that even in the Islamic world are mixtures of Qur’anic understanding and other human disciplines. His collection and re-categorization of Qur’anic verses and hadiths, Al-Haya¯t (The [Eternal] Life), is to present this Qur’anic encompassing understanding that responds to all human needs. Modeled out of Shi‘i hadith collections from the tenth to sixteenth centuries with the emphasis on social justice, The Eternal Life is a compendium of Qur’anic verses and hadiths categorized in a way to seemingly address all spheres of life in modern times. The subtitle of the book expresses this goal: “an Islamic scientific and categorical encyclopedia which delineates the ways and means for transcendental free life for individual and society and calls for true human system in all corners of the world”. In spite of the claimed epistemological vacuum that scripturalists and separationists root for, they reorganize Qur’anic verses and hadiths in a way that now we categorize human sciences, issues and areas of life. Comparing Al-Haya¯t and Beha¯r al-Anva¯r (The Seas of Lights), a compendium of hadith organized by Mohammad Ba¯qer Majlesi during the Safavid era, would show us that two Shi‘i scholars in two different centuries with different agendas and issues have reorganized Shi‘i traditional texts into these new compendia. The differences between agenda and issues come from the knowledge and worldview of the time. Scientific vacuum is as impossible as air vacuum in the world that we are living in. A very crucial difference is Hakami’s focus on Islamic leadership and governance compared to Majlesi’s perspective of leadership and governance. These points are totally forgotten or unseen in Majlesi’s work. Similar to other Islamists, scripturalist Islamists believe that “survival of the Shi‘i ideals, superior religious truth, and independence of Islamic nations are dependent on a persistent and smart religious leadership and chiefdom”.13 From a scripturalist Islamist point of view, “a competent scholar . . . is the representative

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of prophetic regime in our time”.14 This idea depicts the influence of the theory of the guardianship of the jurist on different brands of Islamism including the scripturalist one. In the question of leadership, scripturalists are in agreement with the clerical authoritarian point of view: “this is the same political authority that is turned over from God to the Prophet, then to pure imams and after that to the divine scholars”.15 The scholar who takes the lead and “encourages the people to tear the chains of slavery and exploitation apart, and resort to religion and follow its guidance has to get rid of the obstacles. This cannot be done except with force and power.”16 This is the foundation of Islamism in the modern world, meaning without force and power, religion will die out: “a scholar who wants to rise to pursue his mission . . . before everything else he should establish a powerful and constructive government”.17 It is incumbent upon this leader to rise to establish religious power and Islamic government.18 The missions and duties of this leader include revival of the forgotten sections of religion, propagate Qur’anic truth, execute Islamic ordinances and promote social justice.19 In this brand of Islamism, similar to the other authoritarian brands, the religious leader is the pillar of truth, justice and expediency.20 Individuals have only two choices: good and evil. Rejecting the Islamic government is equal to accepting unjust governance.21 The new scripturalist perspective in Iran is mostly driven by social justice, one part of the agenda of the Iranian revolution of 1979 to support the deprived and the poor. The recent brand of scripturalism in the Shi‘i world has been under the influence of egalitarian perspectives of the political left and has put its endeavors to show that social justice is the number one priority of Islam. From justiceoriented Islamist view, theological philosophy and political philosophy are related,22 a statement that is difficult to find in any religious text throughout the history of Islam. This is an element of modern ideologies that “any ideology that lacks political philosophy is not ideology”.23 By equating religion and ideology, Hakimi extends this belief to religion. Justice-oriented scripturalist/ separationist Islamism needs this political philosophy to address

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poverty and social justice. Even Islamic government is pursued to implement this goal. In Al-Haya¯t’s section on economy, social justice is the most important topic that is discussed in detail.24 This is due to the mindset of Iranian justice-oriented scripturalist Islamists who are working for egalitarian policies and distribution of wealth. If they had another agenda, the most important subject in the text would be something else. Similar to other Islamists, justice-oriented scripturalists focus and pick those sections of the religious texts that fit into their concerns and agendas. Not only the social justice topic itself, but other topics in Al-Haya¯t related to society and economy are totally related to the paradigm of social justice. Charity, poverty, greed, social cooperation, economic level of life for the masses, the necessity of production, distribution, public trust, alms, public budgeting, job creation, economic balance, and accumulation of wealth25 are discussed through bringing up Qur’anic verses and hadiths in a way that supports the idea of social justice as the most important issue of a society and the only way for social reform.26 In contrast, for example, there is almost nothing about liberty, human rights or civil society; these ideas were not part of the dominant discourse among Islamists in the 1970s and 1980s in Iran. Due to their exposition to Marxist theory, Hakimi and other Islamists in the late 1970s gradually realized that specific social and economic fields can be systems rather than collections of transactions between individuals. This view was considered when Hakimi and others were talking about Islamic economy and social justice. Not only different elements of economy were perceived as interrelated elements of a system but economy was viewed as only a section of a bigger system in society that includes polity, culture and law. More than two-thirds of Al-Haya¯t is allocated to economics. It seems that the materials in the first two volumes that discuss knowledge, faith, praxis, ideology,27 prophetic mission, the Qur’an, ‘ulama¯, Islamic government, and the guardianship of the jurist28 are introductory notes to discussing Islamic economy as a social justice-

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based phenomenon. Hakimi and other justice-oriented Islamists need the acclaimed just jurist with absolute power to pursue the social justice agenda. For them, freedom, human rights, rule of law, and democracy are impediments for this goal. Justice-oriented Islamism is fed by Shi‘i justice discourse;29 based on the teachings of Imam Ali in Nahj al-Bala¯gheh (The Way of Eloquence), this discourse advertises distributive justice and its main agenda is fighting against poverty. Shi‘i justice-oriented Islamists mostly believe that mere distribution of wealth and income will root out poverty. They never talk about equal opportunity for everyone in front of the law. As far as this distribution could not be based on existing laws, and democracy and freedom would be harmful to the cause, absolute power should be granted to a just ruler whose agenda is only promoting social justice. Justice-oriented Islamists draw a line between democracy and social justice. Commutative and restitutive theories of justice are, for the most part, absent among justice-oriented Islamists. Among major contemporary theories of justice, Islamists lean towards an egalitarian perspective; libertarian, communitarian, and utilitarian perspectives have points of clashes with Islamism in other ideological issues. Due to the Islamist nature of this ideology, equality of opportunity is, by and large, only for Shi‘is. The divine ideology30 presented by scripturalist justice-oriented Islamists is based on five pillars: submission to God and His orders, the divine root of rights, equality of individuals before God, morality, and the guardianship of the jurist. In this picture, there is nothing about social and political participation, freedom of expression and rule of law that together are often considered to be the bases for justice in any society. According to justice-oriented Islamism, the people should believe that if they follow a just and righteous jurist they will have a just and morally based egalitarian society. The Islamic Republic of Iran therefore backs up this theory due to the belief of Islamists that the guardian jurist is a just person. Hakimi believes that Khomeini and Khamenei are just and righteous jurists and they had absolute power; but in over three decades it can be argued that social justice is still lacking in Iran.

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Another aspect of scripturalist Islamist ideology is that it accepts religious politics while denying political religion.31 Scripturalist Islamists do not make the distinction between religious politics and political religion clear. If it is fine to run politics based on religious values, and the religious establishment monopolizes political power, what kind of religion will be shaped in this process? Why is it wrong to call this religion a “political religion”?

CHAPTER 9 MYSTICISM-ORIENTED ISLAMISM: ABDOLKARIM SOROUSH

Mysticism-oriented Islamism flourished during the 1980s and 1990s in response to the obligatory Islamicization process that was to promote shari‘ah-oriented and clerical authoritarian Islamisms. Due to its promotion of guided democracy and belief in domination of Islamic values enforced by the government it can be characterized as an Islamism in disguise. Only in the late 1990s and 2000s, the ideologues and followers of this brand began to question the basic ideas of Islamism and revise their position on the role of the public in decisionmaking procedures, the role of religion and religious institutions in public life, and the way the government should treat its subjects. Similar to other Islamist ideologies, the theoretical root of mysticism-oriented Islamism goes back to an insistence on the development of understanding Islam. The emphasis on the possibility of different readings of Islam was politically motivated by denying the clerics’ monopoly on interpreting Islam, and stripping Islamic shari‘ah from its monopoly on religious understanding and knowledge. However this understanding has a narrative history similar to Islamic shari‘ah; Muslim mystics and Sufis have always presented their own alternative interpretation of Islam that is mostly focused on spiritual aspects of Islamic teachings.

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Even the revised mysticism-oriented ideology conditionally accepts nonconditional democracy, human rights, pluralism, and a vocal civil society. These concepts are accepted as far as they do not contradict the mystic interpretation of Islam and the moral superiority of religious teachings that is to recognize the main core of Islamic teachings as truth. This interpretation is mainly introduced by rejecting other Islamist ideologies such as shari‘ahoriented, clerical authoritarian and socialist Islamisms. The basic foundation of Islamity in this ideology is belief in the prophet’s revelation experience that leaves the door open for any “positive” interpretation of Islam. Nevertheless, other than guided democracy or Islamic democracy that is guided and monitored by religious intellectuals or experts, mysticism-oriented Islamism has not offered specific ideas about Islamic government. The primary goal has been the reinterpretation of the sacred texts to create a modern understanding of Shi‘i Islam compatible with contemporary political and social values and norms. This is in the same vein as the early Islamic revivalism of Seyyed Jama¯l Asad A¯ba¯di and Mohammad Iqbal Lahouri. Similar to Soroush, Iqba¯l was under the influence of Islamic mysticism when he was shaping his theory of reconstruction of Islamic beliefs: “The more genuine schools of Sufism have, no doubt, done good work in shaping and directing the evolution of religious experience in Islam; but their latter-day representatives, owing to their ignorance of the modern mind, have become absolutely incapable of receiving any fresh inspiration from modern thought and experience.”1 Iqbal tries “to meet, even though partially, this urgent demand [scientific form of religious knowledge] by attempting to reconstruct Muslim religious philosophy with due regard to the philosophical traditions of Islam and the more recent developments in the various domains of human knowledge”.2 He did not want to make an ideology out of Islam and launch an Islamic movement to capture power in his country. His plan was to reconstruct Islamic knowledge. Abdolkarim Soroush (1945 – ) has been the most vocal voice of mysticism-oriented ideology in the 1980s and 1990s. His main achievement was to differentiate between religion and the

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understanding of religion in the 1990s. According to him, if it is possible to have a diverse set of ideas of any religion in different times and places, no understanding is final: “[the] last religion is already here but the last understanding of religion has not yet arrived”. Indeed, he distinguishes not only “between religion and our knowledge of religion”, but also “between personal knowledge of religion and religious knowledge”.3 His effort to distinguish religion and religious understanding was to deny the monopoly of religious knowledge claimed by Shi‘i jurists and clerics. Nurtured by epistemological ideas of analytical philosophy, Soroush believes that religious knowledge similar to any human knowledge is “incomplete, impure, insufficient, and culturebound”.4 Accepting these characteristics of religious knowledge will let believers reconstruct their own understanding of religion based on the knowledge and necessities of their own specific time and place: “rehabilitating religious thought; correcting mis-readings . . . redirecting religion towards it essence; rectifying misunderstandings; and tearing asunder the veils of ignorance and ill will are among the duties of the faithful and, as such, they are part of the history of religion”.5 Introducing the theoretical contraction and expansion of shari‘ah theory challenged the clerics’ claim on monopolizing understanding of shari‘ah and Islam and sacredness of the existing feqh that were the basic principles of monopoly of power in the clerics’ hands. The religious establishment’s response to Soroush was harsh and he was confronted with questions coming from high-ranking elements of the religious establishment: “Everywhere they turned they were haunted by agonizing questions: What is your claim and goal anyway? What is the ‘defect’ in religion that you propose to repair? What error or ailment has befallen it that it has provoked this empathy and reformist zeal? What essential subject has escaped the Prophet’s mind, what good or evil has religion left out that now demands your help in explicating or teasing out? And, anyway, if religion really does harbor such flaws and faults, why are you still committed to it?”6 Soroush’s epistemological approach leads him to provide the basis for his view on theoretical expansion and contraction of shari’ah:

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religion is permanent and eternal while religious knowledge varies according to time and place. Religion is mystical and seemingly ineffable while religious knowledge is usually expressed in philosophical, sociological and theological terminology. The bulk of Soroush’s lectures in the 1990s detail the interaction of religious knowledge with other forms of knowledge, including science, philosophy, art and literature. In The Theoretical Contraction and Expansion of Shari’ah, Soroush introduced this serious epistemological question to Iranian intellectuals and clerics: “to what extent ought we take the edicts deduced by Islamic jurists as literal and immediate divine commandments?” His answer is to separate religion per se from religious knowledge. The former is perceived as beyond human reach, eternal and divine. The latter is a sincere and authentic but finite, limited, and fallible form of human knowledge.7 This is a huge step to the heart of the liberal tradition, paving a way towards the basic values of reason, liberty, freedom and democracy. Similar to other mystics, Soroush believes that shari‘ah does not present answers to all the questions of the time. Its meaning comes from the interaction between Islamic tradition and recent human and secular knowledge. This is a theory-laden understanding of shari‘ah that is introduced as shari‘ah itself. Accordingly, nobody and no group can claim access to the essence of this body of human understanding and deny other understandings of its elements.8 For this reason, no one can presume any particular meaning of shari‘ah and monopolize understanding of religion in a group or profession.9 Soroush criticizes feqhism as getting in the way of true religious experience, but his mystic approach to religion would have the same functions. His theory of expansion and contraction of shari‘ah, where contraction signifies clearing away “useless” canonical rituals that hinder truth, is based on the visible change of religious decrees during centuries of scholarship work of Islamic jurists. Therefore, this worldly and changing knowledge may not be the essence of religion and should not be considered as the main dough for reconstructing religious ideas in our time. In his view, Islamic shari‘ah is silent and any reading of it is not sacred while religion

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itself is sacred.10 Due to a lack of sociological knowledge he does not address the social reconstruction of religion as a human institution. He believes that earlier revivalists and sages “did not countenance the eclipse of truth of religion behind a parade of rituals, nor did they appreciate a religion restricted to the strictures of appearance”.11 The same argument would be made for mysticism. According to a wouldbe theory of expansion and contraction of mysticism, contractions signify clearing away “useless” mystical rituals and beliefs that hinder true Islamic mysticism. This logic could be applied to any readings of any religion and at the end no sacred entity will be left. But it could be questioned whether this was what Soroush was looking for. Soroush emphasizes the activity of reason (the process of understanding) that seeks over the product of reason (what we do understand): “We can have two visions of reason: reason as destination and reason as path. The first sees reason as the source and repository of truths. The second sees it as a critical, dynamic, yet forbearing force that meticulously seeks truth by negotiating tortuous paths of trial and error . . . Here it is not enough to attain truth; the manner of its attainment is equally important”.12 To make his case for religion, Soroush introduces it as an element of truth not to be forgotten by rational people: “Our mission as rational human beings is to search actively for the truth. This view attaches more value to earning a modest living in a small trade than to finding a treasure in the wilderness.”13 Reason as a path may also lead people to disbelief that includes disbelief in mysticism. If reason is not “a form of isolated individual reason, but a collective reason arising from the kind of public participation and human experience that are available only through democratic methods”,14 there is no guarantee that it will go hand in hand with religion (that is religious institutions) in society. This collective reason may reject any interpretation of Islam including mystic-oriented Islamic or Islamist ideology. While Soroush’s theory of contraction and expansion of shari‘ah was to diversify the ideology and religion market in Iran and open the window for other Islamist ideologies in the country, it was a huge step toward de-ideologizing the Shi‘i religion. Soroush followed this implication in the late 1990s and 2000s.

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Is Mysticism-Oriented Ideology Possible? Historically, mystics have been introduced as peaceful agents and opposed to using violence. They are also often seen as individuals who are not directly involved in power relations and politics. Researchers on mysticism and Sufism believe that Sufis and mystic cults encourage fatalism and quietism. There are some exceptions to these general statements. Even if this is the case, is it possible to have a mysticism-oriented Islamist ideology that pursues power in a society in which violence is a necessary element of any political game? The answer is yes. Iran’s history shows that mystics have shaped groups which have attempted to take state power and rule the country. The Safavid Dynasty that ruled the country for more than two centuries was established by mystics; other than conquering the whole country, they pushed Sunnis to convert to Shi‘ism by force. They established a Twelver Shi‘i nation-state when the majority of Iranians were Sunnis, and legitimized it by resort to Shi‘i beliefs such as the belief in Hidden Imam and establishing shari‘ah laws. Due to these policies, the Shi‘i ‘ulama¯ supported this dynasty and some important Shi‘i figures moved from Lebanon to Iran to support the Safavid kings in their causes. The rivalry and controversies between Shi‘i mystics and the ‘ulama¯ were almost dissipated by the rise of Safavid empire. Safavids who came from mystic sects15 tried to buy the support of the Shi‘i ‘ulama¯ through appointing them to high ranking positions relating to judicial and public administrations. The position of qa¯zi al-qoza¯t (chief justice) was preserved for the clerics who had ties with the central government in Isfaha¯n. Due to this history of compromise and cooperation between mystic and feqhist Shi‘is in Iran and their alliance against Sunnis, neighboring countries and colonialists, the conflict between Sufis and Islamists that surfaced during recent decades in some countries such as Lebanon16 did not have a fruitful ground in the first and second decade of the Islamic Republic of Iran. When a more militarist and totalitarianist faction came to power in 2005, dervishes and mystics were often punished and prosecuted for having their ceremonies in their khaneqahs and their places for worship were demolished in some cities (such as Qom and Borujerd) in Iran.

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Wherever Sufis were influential in politics, they have left their imprint. Sufi organizations and mystic circles usually combine informality, equality and brotherhood with strict personal allegiance. The social bond in these groups is based on authoritative and fraternal relationships. The spiritual leaders of these collective entities are new types of religious leaders to whom the followers owe unquestioning obedience. The authority of the spiritual leader is absolute. These groups paradoxically define freedom as slavery to God. It can be argued that slavery to God usually ends in slavery for individuals who are alleged to be closer to God. Some branches of Sufism came to see themselves as having a role in government, such as the Ghazi regime in Anatolia.17 Other than the Safavids, Iranian Sufi sects have always been powerful interest groups in the country. Due to the centrality of the spiritual leader in the social order and political leadership of Shi‘i communities, mystic cults have often-functioned as a bridge between Shi‘ism and Sufism. The millenarian revolutionary approach to politics has only been one of the results of this connection. Even in the Arab countries and Turkey, the Sufi sects have not always acted as pacifists and moderates; they have run for public offices and have been vocal in public affairs. They organize and recruit, and work on social services networks. Their competition with Islamist movements has pushed them to be politically and socially active. Neither Shi‘i mystics were so gnostic to ignore shari‘ah to reach unity with God, nor Shi‘i ‘ulama¯ were so legalist and conservative to likewise marginalize the Sufis. Charismatic authority in Iran was not in possession of Sufis alone, and ‘ulama¯ did not always enjoy the final say on such matters. From the late nineteenth century, the inclination toward mysticism has been a very powerful trend among Iranian intellectuals, secular or religious. They were also strongly involved in Iranian politics. Many Iranian intellectuals have welcomed the return to Islamic mysticism in ideological debates in the country. These intellectuals who are interested in mysticism have never been a member of Sufi sects and had never made a commitment to pacifism and non-political agendas. Abdolkarim Soroush who is inspired by the mystic writings of Rumi,

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Hafez and Ghazzali, is presented as someone “who experiments with mysticism as a way to transcend Iranian Islamism and Western secularism”.18 There are four points of intersection between Islamic mysticism and mysticism-oriented Islamism. The first one is vela¯yat-e erfa¯ni (mystical guardianship) that is spiritual/mystical leadership. The idea of spiritual leadership is a critical teaching and observation in mystic tradition and among Sufi sects. This idea was central in the Shi‘i-educated generation to support and promote the idea of vela¯yat-e faqih (the guardianship of the jurist). Although Khomeini in his short treatise on Islamic government defends this system of governance in the context of Shi‘i jurisprudence, the popularity of this idea in the years after the Iranian Revolution of 1979 has its roots in Khomeini’s charismatic leadership and his long affinity with mysticism. Many educated Shi‘is were looking at him not only as a jurist but a mystic. The mora¯d-moreed (pundit-follower) relationship that is presumed in mystic circles has had a very powerful impact in Iranian religious politics. The second point of intersection is state-sponsored promotion of values and norms. Soroush questions the sameness of ideology and religion in the 1990s but he does not deny that there would be religious ideologies. He never criticized vice police and obligatory observation of Islamic ordinances. In the late 1990s, he utters his dislike of ideologies: “In this sense ideology is the veil of reason; it is the enemy of rationality and clarity. It contradicts objectivity and forces one to see the world through a single narrow aperture even if the result is a distorted view of the world. Idealism and dogmatism often accompany an ideology, but its core is the quality that conceals its falseness by placing it above rational discourse.”19 Marx has almost the same ideas about ideologies while he was one of the most important ideologues of the world. Soroush has always played two roles at the same time: observer and player. As an observer of ideologies, he wants to “look for the causes and the origins of the idea in question. Here we can trace the interests and advantages of various groups in so far as they constitute the causes of certain ideas. This [matter] points to the ideological nature of ideas or, in Marxist

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parlance, to their ‘class origins’. With this definition the fight against ideology cannot be a rational one because ideology is by definition antirational.”20 As a player, he has played in to the hands of the ruling clerics by not rejecting the foundations of the Islamic regime, i.e. promoting and enforcing Islamic values and norms by the state power. The third one is the duality of internal/external freedom. Soroush observes that Westerners may have external (political) freedom; they have largely abandoned the internal freedom of the soul.21 Who is going to bring back this internal freedom of the soul lost in modernism to the picture? Individuals, communities or states? Sufism and mysticism claim to free individuals from their internal tyrants but make them unquestionably follow an individual, in this case sheikh or mora¯d (pundit) in an authoritarian and sometimes tyrannical relationship. Promoting internal freedom by oppressing the individual external freedoms has frequently been on the agenda of repressive regimes, usually justified by ethical concerns. The fourth point of intersection is the tyranny-friendly approach. Similar to other religious intellectuals, Soroush never used that section of Shi‘i literature that is explicitly against tyranny to explicitly or implicitly condemn the behavior of the Islamic government until 2009 when the regime shot, tortured and raped protesters on the streets and in detention centers for having peaceful rallies against the government. In his letter to Khamenei, he explicitly condemned the religious despotism of the regime. Shari‘ati, Na’ini and Motahhari presented the Pahlavi dictatorship as a government that Imam Husayn would surely fight against. They likened the acquiescence of the Islamic community to tyrants to polytheism and idolatry.22 In spite of the crimes of the Islamic government against humanity and day-to-day violation of Islamic law and human rights, mysticism-oriented Islamists merely criticized officials and not the Islamic regime itself for more than three decades. Why do Iranian religious intellectuals not use the same literature that was used before the Iranian Revolution to condemn the regime while Islamic regime’s brutality is, some might argue, worse than Pahlavis? It has taken over three decades for many

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of these Iranian intellectuals to begin to critique the government for its coercive and often oppressive tactics. The mysticism-oriented Islamism includes all five criteria of Islamism mentioned in the introduction of this book while presenting a new element in each instance. It includes: 1) a call for Islamic awakening in the personal and collective lives of Muslims to reassert Islam as a system of beliefs and actions in public and private life. This system is based on a new Islamic theology and mysticism; 2) the attempt to reflect, articulate and implement Islamic values in all spheres of life through an increasing awareness toward Islam and modern world; 3) in spite of rejecting the concept of Islam as an identity, it defines a new Islamic identity for Muslim communities and individuals; this new identity is founded on Islam as truth (haqiqat), as opposed to Islam as a set of regulations (shari‘at) and Islam as identity (hoviyyat); 4) advocating the reordering of the government and society in accordance with laws and ordinances prescribed by a new interpretation of Islam or ejteha¯d in principles instead of ejteha¯d in secondary issues; and 5) acquiring state and local power and constructing a new Islamic state to reach these goals. Iranian mysticism-oriented Islamists have never denied the idea of Islamic government and acquiring power through violence such as revolution, although they have criticized the existing Islamic government in Iran and its policies.

Islamic Democracy If Nai’ini and Khora¯sani wanted to strengthen democracy by recruiting ideas from Islamic jurisprudence, Soroush centres his endeavor around Islamic mysticism. He believes that habitus of erfa¯n informs democracy, and constitutes the substance of religious democratic government. The ambiguous term “religious society” is used to build a base for the “religious” element of “religious democracy”: “Religious society is based upon a free and invisible faith and dynamic and varied understanding.”23 Moreover, he expresses

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scepticism toward Muslims who attempt to defend democracy with Qur’anic concepts such as consultation (shura¯), consensus of the faithful (ijma’), and oath of loyalty to a ruler (bei’at): “Rather, the discourse on religious government should commence with a discussion of human rights, justice, and restriction of power (all extra-religious issues)”24 while he himself has had critical approach toward human rights, democracy and liberalism. Soroush has a hard time to make a religious government democratic. If religion is to sit in the higher seat, democracy has to be understood in ways that do not contradict the premises of the specific religion. In this process, democracy loses more than what religion (actually religious institutions) has to submit: “In order to remain religious, they, of course, need to establish religion as the guide and arbiter of their problems and conflicts. But, in order to remain democratic, they need dynamically to absorb an adjudicative understanding of religion, in accordance with the dictates of collective ‘reason’.”25 If people are obliged to secure God’s approval, they have to give in some of the desires that are presumed as evil and unacceptable in any democratic process: “Securing the Creator’s approval entails religious awareness that is leavened by a more authentic and humane understanding of religiosity and that endeavors to guide the people in accordance with these ideals. In thus averting a radically relativistic version of liberalism, rational and informed religiosity can thrive in conjunction with a democracy sheltered by common sense, thereby fulfilling one of the prerequisites of a democratic religious government.”26 The most critical approach to Islamism is not about rationality or common sense but it is about the method of acquiring and sharing power and the role of the government in defining values and norms in society. While he takes into consideration the historicity of religious understanding to democratize it, in the 1980s and 1990s he fails to consider religion itself – whatever it is in the religious cosmos – as a historical phenomenon that is worldly and hence exposed to imperfections of this world. He replaces dictators with religion to

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overcome the deficiencies of secular democracies without paying enough attention to the fact that religion objectifies in this world in religious institutions and they have shown that they could be worse than any other dictators if they are given absolute power and the position of arbiter of the society: “For democratic governments, ‘common sense’ is the arbiter of society’s antagonisms and difficulties; religious governments assign this arbitration to religion, while dictatorships leave it in the hand of one powerful individual.”27 As opposed to what some of Soroush disciples believe,28 his ideas do not end the political Islam project. Soroush has never denied Islamic government per se; he has never critiqued Khomeini’s era; he had merely argued against the actions of the existing Islamic government in Iran during Khamenei’s leadership. If religion has no role in religious democracy why should we give it this characteristic, and if this characteristic is meaningful, what role is religion to play in a religious democracy? Reminding the readers of Soroush’s other ideas such as his theory of expansion and contraction of shari‘ah, expansion of the prophet’s experience and religious minimalism does not necessarily help them to understand his political theory. Soroush was very successful in desacralizing religious understanding but kept religion itself sacred. In his belief, “the text does not stand alone, it does not carry its own meaning on its shoulders, it needs to be situated in a context, it is theory-laden, its interpretation is in flux, and presuppositions are as actively at work here as elsewhere in the field of understanding. Religious texts are no exception. Therefore their interpretation is subject to expansion and contraction according to the assumptions preceding them and/or the questions enquiring them . . . We look at revelation in the mirror of interpretation, much as a devout scientist looks at creation in the mirror of nature . . . [so that] the way for religious democracy and the transcendental unity of religions, which are predicated on religious pluralism, will have been paved.”29 This desacralization of religious understanding does not extend to religious values and ordinances themselves. In the framework of mysticism-oriented Islamism, the role of the government to enforce religious values is left untouched.

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Embedded Islamism Although Soroush and his followers may distantiate themselves from Islamism, there are many aspects of Soroush’s ideas that reveal the embedded Islamism in his ideas. The first one is rejecting quietism. Soroush’s Sufism is a reconstructed one and he explicitly rejects certain basic tenets, including its political quietism but it does not rise to promote non-eclectic democratic and liberal policies. It can be argued that Sufism and mysticism are hardly conducive to habits of democratic self-government and political liberalism. Soroush introduces Islam as the point of reference. He proposes that Islam should be the central reference point for society. He has never criticized shari‘ah per se; he has criticized the priority that clerics give to particular interpretation of Islam. He even advocated the execution of divine laws and Islamic values.30 He does not deny the privilege of religious pundits in an Islamic polity. In spite of political Islam, the nature of Islamism is not mere political engagement of Muslims or the promotion of Islamic agendas in public but is instead the policy of giving priority to a specific group of people to dictate their own values and norms for the whole population. His criticism of technology is similar to other critiques of the West. He presents regular mystic Islamists’ criticism of modern technology: “technique in the world has not brought more welfare . . . technique leads to more demands, and to be demanding is in contradiction with being powerful . . . technique has not increased human leisure time . . . technical society is similar to a gluttonous human with more demands and more problems”.31 Later he changed his position on economic development and reached the conclusion that development provides the opportunity “for cultivating the higher and more spiritual needs”.32 Another point that reveals his embedded Islamism is his criticism of liberal democracy and his belief in the distinction between internal and external freedom. He believes that Western societies are onesidedly preoccupied with the second type. He instead asks, how can individuals accomplish internal freedom? But moral criticism of

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freedom has always played into the hands of authoritarianism by resort to “guided democracy”. When an ideologue – not a preacher without a political agenda – asks us to struggle against desires and inner compulsions, this has something to do with obedience that all despots ask us to show. Soroush decouples liberalism and democracy to establish moral (guided/religious) democracy that has frequently ended with authoritarianism. He equates liberal democracy with amoral indifference to establish his argument for religious democracy. In spite of mysticism-oriented expectations, the route to religious democracy in Iran has ended with clerical authoritarianism. If morality is something personal, liberal democracies have nothing against it and they usually facilitate it; if morality is supposed to be enforced by government in public, this is an important pillar of guided democracy; the Islamic Republic is one species of this political system. In this argument he confuses religion and morality and does not clearly differentiate one from another. He believes that “religious morality would be the guarantor of democracy”. The history of human societies is evidence for the opposite; religion has not always been the guarantor of democracy but democracy has often been the guarantor of religious and nonreligious morality; civil society institutions, religious diversity, distribution of wealth, cultural pluralism, expansion of education and health and social welfare have been the guarantor of democracy. Soroush does not advocate the “privatization” of religion. He believes that religion is an important part of the public sphere. This is evident in his theory of the “religious democratic state”.33 Unlike socialist, clerical authoritarian, shari‘ah-oriented, militarist and fascist Islamisms, the Islamity of the state for Soroush is not defined by a priori power of Muslims in the polity. The state is religious in so far as it reflects and realizes the general values and goals of Islam. Therefore, the Islamity of the state is measured by the enforcement of religious values rather than by the rule of a specific group. The most important questions that are unanswered in Soroush’s works are why Islamic values should precede other values and how these values are defined. If the Islamic elite, whether clerics or intellectuals, are to

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present these interpretations, they will have the same privilege that the ruling class has in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Just calling a society “Islamic” does not legitimize the rule of Islamic values and norms in the whole society. Why does he use the adjective “religious” when he talks about Iranian society? The only reason that makes sense here is to prioritize Islamic values and norms with respect to others. Soroush has stated his tolerance for divine belief systems and not every religion and non-religious belief system: “Belief is a hundred times more diverse and colorful that disbelief. If the pluralism of secularism makes it suitable for democracy, the faithful community is a thousand times more suitable for it.”34 But it is claims of this sort which are often used to justify neglecting the rights of atheists and non-believers in the country. Soroush’s focus was on the state in the 1980s and 1990s. Even in the second half of the 1990s he did not intellectually shift from the state or central government to the domain of civil society when this idea was introduced by the secular intellectuals. His literature and religious discourse have not been broadened to a range that overpasses exclusion. His language has not accommodated a more general humanistic vocabulary, especially the vocabulary of human rights, individual freedoms and women’s rights. Soroush has been silent on women’s issues, which is one of the most challenging issues for Islamist ideologies. Women’s rights have for the most part been ignored by Islamist forces all around the Muslim world. Additionally, Soroush has never defended the rights of religious minorities in Iran. Due to his moral approach, he believes that the Western liberal belief that society and government should not interfere in selfregarding acts (actions of individuals that affect no one but one’s self) is harmful to a moral community. This belief opens the way for violating every right of individuals usually justified by “promotion of virtue and prohibition of vice”. Soroush and his followers have never absolutely rejected filtering, censorship, licensing for media and cultural institutions and confiscating satellite dishes. Their complaints are usually directed

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to specific cases of their own works and activities. Will there be any censorship office in Soroush’s religious democracy? Is this against human rights? Do police officers in this democracy breach people’s privacy to confiscate satellite dishes? These are unanswered questions. In some of his lectures, he substitutes shari‘ah with ethics in the same role that is assigned for shari‘ah in the public sphere by shari‘ah-oriented Islamists. He criticizes modernity for freeing human beings from internal constraints of traditional piety.35 Shari‘ah-oriented Islamists criticize modernity for freeing humans from following shari‘ah rules. What kind of ethical system is he asking individuals to follow? Is this system of ethics going to replace feqh in Iranian politics? Will there be a Guardian Council that vetoes bills of rights and disqualifies political activists based on moral behavior in religious democracy according to Soroush? Can a prostitute run for office in that ethical state of affairs? Can a homosexual legally run for presidential office in Soroush’s religious democracy? Is promiscuity a crime? Are women to be stoned for adultery? These are all unanswered questions. Saying that Islamic feqh is a worldly legal system does not mean that in religious democracy it will be thrown away. While Soroush does not deny Islamic feqh, how does this legal system fit in the framework of a legal framework which is based on vindication of human rights? Due to its roots in Islamic Sufism, mysticism-oriented Islamism emphasizes an inward approach to Islam and personal commitment rather than observing shari‘ah ordinances as custom, habit and conformism. At the same time, it cannot distance itself from the use of power by the state to enforce Islamic rules and to promote Islamic ideologies. Islamist aspects of Soroush’s ideas are for the most part ignored by his critics inside the country and abroad. To present a moderate face of Islam, the Western mainstream media and Near Eastern studies scholars have merely focused on some democratic and liberal aspects of dissident intellectuals and clerics such as Soroush and Khatami while often ignoring their shared visions of Islam as an ideology. Those elements of Soroush’s ideas which are for dialogue, tolerance and democracy have been highlighted by scholars in the West who

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want to see Islam and democracy together in the big picture of the Middle East and try to promote the relationship between the West and Islamic world. But Soroush’s emphasis on guided democracy (religious and democratic rule) and its positive consequences should not close our eyes to his affinity to the Islamist movements. Mysticism-oriented Islamists who want to live under the foundations of the Islamic Republic have tried to give a human face to Islamism. In ideological politics, people should also be evaluated by what they have not said or what they have not done. Anyone who criticizes the Islamic government of Iran is not necessarily a liberal or democrat and is not inevitably against Islamist ideologies. There are, of course, different readings of Islam, different species of Islamism and different brands of Islamic government. Despite its mild version of Islamism, mysticism-oriented Islamism shares the core foundation of modern Shi‘i Islamism with its ideological brothers and sisters in contemporary Iran. Even Soroush’s absorption with mysticism is entwined with an Islamist agenda. What we know about this interpretation is that: 1. It has been publically silent on violating religious rights of other faiths in the country. 2. It has been publically silent on most of the Islamic regime’s atrocities against non-religious and secular groups such as Marxists and liberals and Baha‘is. 3. It has had a share of power under the rule of both Khomeini and Khatami. 4. It has supported state-sponsored morality promotion or at least it has been silent about violation of many civil, constitutional and human rights in the Islamicization process. 5. Although it has a critical approach to the clerical regime, it has never publically challenged religious authority in the country. 6. It has advocated democracy and rights for “insiders” (not all Iranian citizens). 7. It has not publically criticized Iran’s Constitution of 1979 and 1989. 8. It was silent on the Rushdie issue. 9. It has not criticized Khomeini’s ideas on the guardianship of the jurist in public.

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10. Its main ideologue has not signed any petition condemning the violation of human rights in Iran.

Developments This ideology was shaped in the 1980s, rose in the early 1990s and persuaded some factions of power in elected bodies of government in the late 1990s. Comprising fascist, militarist, clerical authoritarian and shari‘ah-oriented Islamist groups, the Iranian authoritarian faction defeated and rendered powerless the reformist movement by closing down the semi-independent press and civil society institutions in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The analysis of the rise and fall of mysticism-oriented Islamism as a faction in the reformist movement can help us to explain the social and political foundations of the reform movement that was to partially democratize the Islamic Republic. The movement was based on a new reading of Islam mostly called reformist Islamism. The social foundations of the rise included an increase of the urban population, increase in literacy rate, access to new media such as satellite TV channels, and the restructuring of power in the Iranian family. The fall was due to lack of organization, elitism, a crackdown by military and paramilitary forces and not paying enough attention to the suburban population in the reform camp. The political foundations of the rise of this ideology included the gap between the Islamic right and left, the end of charismatic leadership, and the reaction of the masses to the totalitarian social and cultural policies of the state. The social foundation of its rise were an increase in the urban population, an increase in the number of university students and the failure of the Rafsanjani administration to have a social reform agenda. The social foundations of its fall were the strength of the clerics’ network in the country, and the merging of religious institutions into the state. The political foundations of its fall were the upper hands of the guardian jurist in the Constitution, the low level of reformist groups’ organizations, and the inability of the reformist administration to deliver its promises in the first term (1997– 2001).

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The reformist project was initially based on a rethinking of the Islamic left. Most of the reformist Islamists were themselves leftist Islamists in the 1980s. The ex-leftist Islamists approached the task through a mannered critical and epistemological theory that looked at the problems of the method of interpretation as well as the moral and political consequences of political discourses of revolutionary, popular and revivalist Islamism. They acknowledged the postKhomeini and post-war demise of coherent popular and revolutionary narratives, and deplored the Islamist left’s approach to violence, absolutism and authoritarianism, wondering “in what way shall we confront with dominant challenges of the Islamic world and Iranian society?” Their solution was an open and tolerant public sphere where silenced voices, mostly Islamist ones, get a respectful hearing. Even totalitarian and absolutist voices were welcome to this arena. This dialogue should have included different branches of the Islamist movement as well as other ideologies such as Marxism, Millenarianism and secularism while the coercive power was in the hands of Islamists. For ex-leftist Islamists, the consensus that might emerge from the conversation remained unclear, but they assumed it would echo the issues and approaches of Iranian politics at the time: an independence-oriented and anti-imperialist approach, a civil approach to national security requirements, and a commitment to peace, social justice, legal equality for more, democratic participation and mutual respect. They idealistically wanted to balance a nationalist perspective of the state and its hegemony on the one hand, and an enlightenment faith in the positive features of human beings in collective actions on the other. They had this conviction that open communication would resolve intractable political conflicts. Mysticism-oriented Islamism was viewed as the best carrier for this agenda. In the second half of the 1990s, mysticism-oriented Islamism attempted to mobilize its social base in the civil society sector. It insisted on the importance of endowing upon the religious community itself the right to make political choices, having this wishful thinking that they would never make decisions against

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Islamic ordinances. This brand of Islamism did not and still does not question the legitimacy of the Islamic government per se; it merely questions the legitimacy of clerical reading over other interpretations of Islam that are as Islamic as the clerical one. While clerical authoritarian, shari‘ah-oriented, militarist and fascist Islamisms emphasize the absolutist and authoritarian dimensions of the Islamic Republic of Iran, mysticism-oriented as well as nationalist and socialist Islamisms emphasize the republican and constitutional dimensions without questioning the Islamic foundations of the regime. They tried to organize through NGOs, including professional associations, voluntary agencies, and independent religious institutions. Soroush’s view of Islam was an Islamist ideology in its inception but gradually developed into a system of belief bigger than an ideology. It still includes many elements of an Islamist ideology. Soroush gradually distanced himself from basic elements of authoritarian Islamist ideology that was anti-liberalism, antisecularism and anti-democracy. The critical element of his view of political Islam and the role of Islam in politics rests on the idea of a morally based democracy. This public morality has led him to the idea of a guided democracy in which a group of charismatic leaders, say religious intellectuals who in the modern time are replacing the Muslim mystics of the traditional Islamic world, show the people upon which person or persons the sovereignty of the people should be bestowed. What he introduces as “religious democratic governance” is a democracy guided by Islamic pundits, not necessarily clerics. It seems that he transfers the political privileges of clerics to mystics in his Islamic democracy. Mysticism-oriented Islamism views democracy and democratization as the major issues in Middle East politics. As Zubaida puts it, “Islamists’ credibility as political alternatives [in their own societies] hinges upon the alternatives they can present to authoritarian government and the skewed distribution of wealth and resources.”36 Their alternative, i.e. Islamic-guided democracy, has, for the most part, been proved to be ineffective in satisfying the authoritarian and liberal democrats in pover and opposition camps in Iran and elsewhere.

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Although Soroush is presented as an intellectual opponent of Islamism,37 he himself has never opposed the basic tenets of Islamist ideology as introduced in the introduction of this book: a call for Islamic awakening in the personal and collective lives of Muslims to reassert Islam as a system of beliefs and actions in public and private life, the attempt to implement Islamic values in all spheres of life through political solidarity and mass mobilization, defining an Islamic identity for Muslim communities and individuals, advocating the reordering of government and society in accordance with the laws and ordinances prescribed by Islam, and acquiring state and local power and constructing the Islamic state to reach these goals. Other than being one of the intellectual founders of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Soroush has never opposed the idea of an Islamic state, although he has criticized the existing clerical version. Soroush and his co-thinkers began their project of modernizing and reconstructing Islam by totally rejecting secularism as a competing ideology, while he was always for epistemological and philosophical secularism. Some of the religious intellectuals who have a grounding in sociology expressed that they have no problem with secularization as a social process in the 1990s but have rejected secularism as a religious ideology. Soroush later defended political secularism while rejecting social secularism.38 He seems to be the last Iranian religious intellectual who recognized the issue of political secularism. Before him, almost all members of this group accepted this point and defended it more clearly. Soroush has always used the term “democratic religious government” that gives priority to both the religious and democratic nature of the government; he goes from religiosity of the majority in a country (putting aside what kind of religion they believe in) to giving a color of religiosity to the government. This ambiguity of “coloring” is here to give strength to religious policies of the government in social sphere. I have not seen any criticism from religious intellectuals on the subject of the compulsion to wear the hejab, policies against pre-marital relationships and censorship on literature and art. They have been advocating politically open and yet often very socially closed policies.

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Soroush as one of the influential religious intellectuals in Iran introduces two pillars for political secularism: 1) justice, and not religion, as the source of the legitimacy of the government, and 2) neutrality of government in religious matters. Although he does not mention which faith should be freely observed and which faith should receive less oppression, this was the first time he publicly advocated freedom of religion in Iran. He does not mention separation of religious and political institutions, which many would argue is the most important aspect of secularism. Surrendering the social sphere to secular forces and institutions is the last front from which religious people in Iran and elsewhere are inclined to retreat, whether traditionalist, modernist or fundamentalist. They still have a long way to go to advocate freedom of being non-religious. Accepting social secularism, for religious intellectuals, means tolerating homosexuality, promiscuity, pre-marital relationship and many other things that they deem socially and politically corruptive. Although they partially fell into the trap of the Islamic Republic and guardianship of the jurist because of this anti-social secularism, they still cannot get over it. From this respect there is no real liberal democrat among religious intellectuals. They all accept and welcome political liberalism (free and fair elections, political – and not social – rights for minorities, free “political” press and the right of association and demonstration) but totally resist social openness and tolerance. Iranian religious intellectuals usually keep silent when they are asked about women’s issues. In this respect there is no difference among the episteme-oriented religiosity of religious intellectuals, business-oriented religiosity of traditionalists and identity-oriented religiosity of fundamentalists. After 40 years of listening to general, ambiguous and seemingly beautiful statements about the role of religion in public life, now the revolutionary generation and generations to come deserve a set of distinct and clear statements on these issues.

CHAPTER 10 MILITARIST/MESSIANIST ISLAMISM: MOHAMMAD TAQI MESBAH YAZDI

Known as the theoretician of violence in Iran, Mesba¯h Yazdi1 has been the most vocal ideologue of using force against anyone who does not think and behave according to what he conceives of as the ruling clerics’ expectations. Despite their influence in the coercive powers of the state, he and his followers in Iran’s security system and IRGC do not believe in a monopoly of violence in the hands of the government. Instead, they have extremely trenchant views when it comes to nonbelievers and non-conformists. This ideology was partly established to fight Baha’ism in the 1960s and 1970s. They were organized and well funded in order to oppose Baha’i communities and received very high membership all around the country. The Anjoman-e Hojjatiyyeh (Hojjatiyyeh Society) was a political/religious organization that was opposed to Baha’ism in Iran and did not have any other discernable agenda. Most of the followers of Mesba¯h have at one time or another been the members of this organization. Since the Iranian Revolution, the members of these circles have gravitated towards the security and military forces of the Islamic Republic and have often advocated using force against “enemies” in any circumstances. Mesba¯h is the spiritual leader and ideologue of a new caste of Iranian high-ranking military and security officials that had a lot of

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power during Ahmadinejad administration. It can be argued that Ahmadinejad looked at his presidency as an opportunity to realize Mesba¯h’s ideas and used state resources to support Mesba¯h’s foundations. He also supported Mesba¯h and his plans to make the government an absolute state.2 Beside Dorri Najaf Abadi (ex Attorney General), Gholam Husein Mohseni Eje’i (ex Minister of Intelligence), and Mustafa Pourmohammadi (ex Minister of Interior and later the Head of General National Inspectorate), Mesba¯h is one member of a circle who issued fatwas against some of the Iranian secular and religious intellectuals and political activists who were killed in the 1990s. Mesba¯h is seen by Khamenei, the leader of the country from 1989, as the ideologue of the state,3 very similar to Motahhari’s intellectual and ideological position during Khomeini’s era. He is often referenced as the spiritual mentor of high-ranking commanders of IRGC and is a constant presence as a speaker at meetings of the IRGC and Tehran Friday prayer ceremonies. Before the Iranian Revolution of 1979, he ran an institute in Qom (Dar Rah-e Haq/On the Route to Truth), which used to publish theoretical and propaganda booklets against Marxism and religious intellectuals such as Shari‘ati. Because of his harsh attacks against religious intellectuals and his closeness to the Anjoman-e Hojjatieh, he had no place in the close circle of clerics around Khomeini.4 Since the 1990s, he has been running a university/seminary in Qom (Bager al-‘Ulum) which is indirectly funded by the leader’s office and directly funded by the government and its mission is to train authoritarian-minded clerics who are for the most part supposed to believe in messianism and militarism. Mesba¯h believes that any true believer is responsible for promoting virtue and prohibiting vice and if people do not listen and obey, there will be fierce consequences. The followers of Mesba¯h in the Basij organization (paramilitary forces) have killed tens of individuals just for walking with their boyfriends or girlfriends, drinking, not wearing perfect hejab and committing other “vices”.5 Mesba¯h believes that “anything that is related to values and ultimate human perfection” should be expected from religion.6 He

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completely rejects the minimalist expectation theory of religion.7 Due to its relation with the idea of Islamic terrorism, this kind of Islamism in the Muslim world has been more interesting for Western media compared to clerical authoritarian or mysticism-oriented Islamisms. It is presented as the ideology of terror.8 The mainstream media and political leaders in the West try to make a distinction between “Islam” as a religion and “Islamism” in the sense of a militant mindset, while Islamism is only one modern reading of traditional Islam.

Militarism Iranian militarist Islamism is ideologically rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood’s Islamist militarism in Egypt and well nurtured during the Iran– Iraq war. This strain of thought was not dominant during the war and Khomeini prohibited the political activism of military staff during his reign. He did not need to resort to military power to rule. But his lack of a social base gradually pushed Khamenei toward the security and military forces to the point that these forces had full and free access to his office in the 1990s and 2000s. In exchange for receiving huge public funds to establish his Mo‘aseseh-ye A¯mouzeshi va Pajouheshi-ye Ema¯m Khomeini (Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute), Mesba¯h became the theorist of militarist Islamism and promoted the theory of vela¯yat-e motlaqeh-ye faqih (the absolute guardianship of the jurist) emphasizing its position as God’s appointee and the commander in chief. Iranian Shi‘i militarism is not only the belief and desire of a group of activists and ideologues that the country should maintain a strong military capability and be prepared to use it aggressively to defend or promote Islamic beliefs, but also the belief and desire to use it aggressively against non-true believers whenever and wherever necessary. Shi‘i militarists believe that the whole population should be dependent upon and subservient to the needs and goals of Islamic military forces of the country, whether the Guard Corps or the Basij organization. In their view, the threat and show of force are prior to diplomatic relations with other nations; and with respect to Iranian citizens, threat and terror is the most effective way to control the public and rule.

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Militarist Islamism lacks “positive” effective Islamic thinking and scholarship within its ranks. It is not a movement based on intellect, as socialist, nationalist and democracy-oriented Islamisms during their heyday were. Its main agenda is to negate others, Islamists or seculars. It is intellectually lacking in rigour and has substituted this with praxis and mobilization. Its mobilization is focused on foreign threat and conspiracy theory. Shi‘i Islamist militarists believe that just executing shari‘ah law by resort to coercive power supported by the state will cure every social and political ill in the country. In this respect, its agenda and tactics are very similar to populist movements. This type of Islamism sees any open environment of research and discussion as potentially hostile and is therefore unwelcome. The militarist administration of Ahmadinejad and the authoritarian regime of Khamenei have closed tens of NGOs, hundreds of newspapers and magazines, and have filtered millions of websites and blogs to prevent such an environment to be a context within which civil society institutions can be shaped and flourish. This brand has become protected by the authoritarian state and its appointed bodies that dominate Iranian politics and society. The use of force to protect the intellectually weak brands of Islamism in Iran lies at the heart of the current Islamist crisis in the country. Due to the rast and far-reaching power of militarists in the Islamic Republic and at the same time the diversity of Islamist forces in power in the 1980s and 1990s, militarist Islamism in Iran remained suspended between the state-coercive power and reversion to voluntarism and a mission-oriented approach. This changed after the tenth presidential election when militarist Islamists got the upper hand in Iranian politics as a result of what some believed to be questionable election results. Iranian militarists resort to state power wherever exercising violence through state apparatus is possible and has no grave consequences for ruling clerics and militarists. Wherever exercising violence through state machinery is not possible or has a very high price, they resort to the volunteer approach. Paramilitary forces and militias are good instruments for pursuing the militarist Islamist cause in this situation. The violence in this

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context is not labeled as jihad as the Salafi movement labels it; it is labeled “enforcing God’s rule” (ejra¯-ye ahka¯m-e ela¯hi) by the Islamic state and “promoting virtue and prohibiting vice” (amr-e be ma‘rouf va nah-ye az monkar) by “true believers”. While the coercive apparatus of the state is totally in the hands of Islamists, there is no justification for jihad but “promoting virtue and prohibiting vice” is incumbent upon any Muslim in any circumstances. The battle here is among different sections of the polity that most of its forces are Islamists not infidels. Shi‘i militarist Islamists even use force against other Islamist forces. The role of violence in this brand is primary and crucial; violence is sacred in this ideology and should be exercised whenever and wherever the authoritarian state and its loyalists consider it necessary. They locate violence on a moral and transcendental level: to prevent vice and to improve virtue any means including violence without limit is permitted, whether by the state or individual true believers. Some other brands of Islamism question the effectiveness of violence to bring about the social, cultural and political change the shari‘ah-oriented and militarist Islamists desire. The opponents of exercising violence by the true believers believe that the practice of violence by individuals has not succeeded in its major objectives. Militarist and shari‘ah-oriented Islamists have always responded by asserting that they are not exercising violence for specific results; they are doing it due to their mission and duties that God has ordered them to pursue. During the Ahmadinejad administration, which was supported by Khamenei, the security and military forces had prominence in politics, the economy and culture, and as a result many top Iranian politicians were former high ranking members of the IRGC and the security system. In this period, the Islamist military class and its ideas dominated governmental discourse. Iranian militarist Islamists are aware that they are not capable of waging war against imperial forces; instead, they often advocate war against their own people. While they cannot wage a war against the US and Israel, they have had a very active role in every conflict in the Middle East such as Lebanon, the Syrian civil war, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Iraq and Afghanistan.

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The Islamic Revolution Devotees Society (Jam‘iyyat-e Isa¯rgara¯n-e Enqela¯b-e Esla¯mi) – a fundamentalist group of revolutionary veterans co-founded by Ahmadinejad – and later the Good Fragrance of Service (Rayeheh-ye Khoush-e Khedmat) coalition were the political alliances shaped by Shi‘i Islamist militarists in the first term of the Ahmadinejad administration. Most members of the Ahmadinejad cabinet and the Seventh and Eighth Parliament were affiliated to this coalition.

Expansionism Shi‘i militarist Islamists do not believe that their mission is accomplished by holding power in Tehran or even in the Middle East. They claim that they want to expand their power to the whole world.9 From their point of view, “the goal of every Iranian hezbullahi (a member of Iranian Hezbullah) should be establishing a united Islamic republic to conquer the whole world. This is because God has created Iranians to capture the globe.” These hezbullahis believe that “we can build atomic bomb and we should have it. We should prepare ourselves for a war in space and if war is launched we can put the whole world on fire . . . we will attack the United States in their lands and will throw grenades into Americans’ mouths and bedrooms.”10 Based on their militaristic, aggressive, expansionist, interventionist, even hegemonic and imperialistic view, Iranian Shi‘i militarists understand the whole world to be in a crisis, revolutionary situation11 and hungry for the ideology of Islamism. They believe that everyone who wants justice is waiting for the Hidden Imam’s coming. One of the reasons they are waiting for the rise of the Hidden Imam is to be with him when he conquers the whole world. They believe that in this demand they are not alone: “All people of the world are thirsty for truth and justice and this system [of truth and justice] is only found in Islam.”12 This is not the idea of a small and non-influential group; this idea belongs to most of the high ranking members of the IRGC and officials in the security system. According to this ideology, militarist Islamism does not primarily promote expansionism but the demand comes from the people of the

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world. Many Iranian militarist Islamists really believe that the whole world is looking at them, expecting emancipation. Ahmadinajad has repeatedly asserted that “the people of the world are asking us to emancipate them”.13 He consistently talked about the management and directing the world. According to him, the president’s office has been receiving thousands of letters from other countries’ citizens every day asking Iran to emancipate them.14

Sacred Violence Mesba¯h Yazdi’s notion of legitimate and sacred violence, which he proposed during his lectures in Friday prayer ceremonies in Tehran,15 is understood as the basic panacea for the legitimacy crisis of the Islamic government. The idea of sacred violence that gives the green light to “insiders” and loyalists to clean society from so-called secularists, atheists, converters, dissidents and people who commit vice16 contradicts the monopoly of violence in the hands of the Islamic government, a government that is entirely ruled by the clerics. Mesba¯h asks his followers to find anyone who is against the guardianship of the jurist and kill him or her: “Try to know who is mercenary of Satan. Make silent any voice against the guardian jurist. If it is because of ignorance, explain it to them to make it clear. If s/he is consciously against it, suffocate him/her.”17 Sacred violence is to justify fast-track execution of divine law based on a totalitarian reading of Islam. To be an activist and non-insider will automatically make individuals “deserving of being killed” (mahdoor ul-dam). The labels in Mesba¯h’s theory of sacred violence are so broad and ambiguous that any criticism of the government could be interpreted as an action to overthrow the Islamic government and the perpetrator should be killed. While adherents of an open and civil society have completely avoided any partial or relative acceptance of violence during the Reform Movement of 1997 – 99 and the Green Wave of 1988, militarist Islamists believe that violence is permissible for cultural and ideological reasons. Shi‘i militarist Islamists accept violence for particular reasons and restrict its use by specific groups and institutions who have permission from a faqih. Mesba¯h Yazdi,

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Ahmad Jannati, Aziz Khoshvaqt, Abulqa¯sem Khaz‘ali, Ghola¯mhusayn Mohseni Eje’i,18 Qorba¯nali Dorri Najafa¯ba¯di and Ali Falla¯hia¯n were among mujtaheds who issued these permissions. Khamenei should have been informed about these permissions through his chief of staff, Mohammad Reza Golpa¯yega¯ni and one of his men, Asghar Mir Heja¯zi, both security agents. The “coterie violence” was enforced by members of the Basij (paramilitary forces) who were organized by the leader’s office and the IRGC. The government has no interest in fighting the cultural roots of this sacred violence; it has been beneficial to the government due to eliminating its rivals. Mohammad Reza Parva¯zi, a cleric who left the Ansa¯r-e Hezbullah vigilante group in the late 1990s, spoke about Mesba¯h Yazdi’s links with this group. The judge in the case of the serial murders in Kerman revealed that the killers had Mesba¯h Yazdi’s fatwa (religious sanction) to kill people whom they considered as morally corrupt.19 Mesba¯h has been the ideologue of military circles who lead the Basij in its actions against dissidents and non-conformists, but he attributes his achievements to the Hidden Imam and to God. Speaking as the pre-khutbeh (main lecture) speaker at Tehran’s Friday prayer sermons, he cited a verse from the Qur’an which uses the word “irhab” and exploited it to endorse terrorism.20 An enthusiastic supporter of the death penalty, amputation, stoning and public floggings, and the use of suicide bombers against “enemies of Islam”, Mesba¯h Yazdi serves as the theoretician of the propagators of violence within Khamenei’s regime. From Mesba¯h’s point of view, all individuals who believe in the separation of religion and state, reject the idea of the guardianship of the jurist, and believe that the existing regime of the guardianship of the jurist, contradicts democracy, are agents of the enemies of the country; he accuses them of conspiracy and treason.21 Based on this point of view, hundreds of Iranian intellectuals, political activists, journalists and university students have been prosecuted, tortured and imprisoned. Islamist militarists believe in the five basic tenets of Islamism. They easily resort to violence to promote these tenets. This violence could be directly through state apparatus, i.e. military, police, militia, or indirectly exerted by loyal civilians but supported by the state.

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Mesba¯h reiterates Khomeini’s premises to argue for Islamic government, i.e. opposing the separation of state and religion,22 comprehensibility of Islam that includes a specific system of government,23 necessity of executing Islamic rules,24 and divine selection and divine duty of the clerics to rule.25 He even goes further and calls for the conversion of the Islamic Republic to Islamic government to get rid of some of the few republican aspects of the IRI constitution.

Cultural Conspiracy Theory While there is no colonial domination in Iran and the clerics have absolute power in the country, what is supposed to justify sacred violence is a perceived Western cultural invasion that, according to the Shi‘i clerics, is not apparent to the wider Iranian public. According to Iranian Shi‘i authoritarians, whether militarists, fascists or shari‘ah-oriented, Western countries are pursuing the “destruction of moral and religious principles” in Muslim societies.26 Iranian authoritarian Islamists believe that all cultural products that are distributed and broadcast in Iran and are not controlled, redacted or licensed by the government are evidence of the cultural conspiracy of the Western countries. Militarist Islamists believe that the main target of this cultural invasion is the guardian juristconsult that is also the commander in chief.27 Those who bear the brunt of this way of thinking are many dissident writers and journalists. Authoritarian Islamists believe that “the national press is the base for the US, some other enemies and Zionists”.28 This opinion has opened the door for accusations and prosecutions of dissident writers and journalists. In the decade between 1999 and 2009, hundreds of newspapers and magazines were closed and thousands of journalists and writers were persecuted, tried and imprisoned.

State-Sponsored Coercive Islamicization Shi‘i militarist Islamism supports the idea of state-sponsored coercive Islamicization of society, science and culture, the elimination of

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dissidents presented as the agents of foreign enemies, and the elimination of individuals who commit “vice”. To justify this violence, Mesba¯h needs to set the stage for six important beliefs: 1. The Divine legitimacy of the jurist ruler. The legitimacy of the jurist ruler has nothing to do with popular support or the constitution. He receives his legitimacy from God, and violations of civil, constitutional and human rights would not delegitimize him. Even the constitution is legitimate due to the signature of the jurisconsult, not vice versa: “the constitution has no credibility without being confirmed by the guardian jurist”.29 2. First and second order citizenships. First order citizens are true Shi‘i Muslims who are loyal to Shi‘i Islam, the Islamic government, the idea of the guardianship of the juristconsult and the existing ruling jurist; second order citizens are the rest. Individuals are not principally and legally equal: “this view that because a man and a woman both are human beings and their rights and duties should be equal is wrong . . . there is a set of natural and deterministic differences among human beings . . . there is another set of differences that are chosen”.30 In his belief, “nonMuslims are not entitled to the rights as well as responsibilities of Muslims in an Islamic government”.31 In this discussion, Mesba¯h does not differentiate between legal and natural differences. Another important criterion for discrimination is gender. From the militarist Islamist point of view, a true believer Muslim man (based on militarist Islamist standards) is a first order citizen and Muslim women and non-Muslims are second order citizens. 3. Equating crime and sin. From the militarist Islamist point of view, people who commit sin should be punished by the government and true believers: “in the Islamic government, regulations are due to the signature of the guardian jurist rather than popular and secular obligation that is based on people’s sovereignty; they are obligatory by shari‘ah and opposing those laws is sin and deserves divine punishment”.32 Members of the Basij, who see themselves as the agents of God execute those punishments. Accordingly, Mesba¯h gave religious sanction to government death squads that

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assassinated political opponents and sinners in the 1990s and 2000s.33 4. Victory by intimidation (nasr be al-ro‘b). All second order citizens should live in a permanent situation of intimidation. This will guarantee the survival of the regime even if its loyalists are the minority in society. This intimidation is set by militia attacks on bookstores, press offices, cinema theatres, music programs and house parties, random checkpoint all over the country, programs such as social safety or social discipline executed by the Disciplinary Forces, and promotion of virtue and prohibition of vice programs. Mesba¯h and his disciples and followers have been supportive of these actions and programs and as a result, the Basij has been implementing these missions for more than three decades. 5. Declaring non-Muslims as being “deserving of being killed” (mahdour al-dam). If a person loyal to the government decides to kill someone who he thinks is not a Muslim and does not obey the orders of a true Muslim and carries out the excecution himself, he shall be acquitted by the court due to this principle of being “deserving of being killed”. “If somebody says that you have your own reading and I have mine, there is no longer a space for compromise, and being nice, you should attack them . . . We should fight against people who consciously oppose the truth”.34 6. Rejecting human rights as anti-Qur’anic. Mesba¯h believes that “according to the Human Rights Declaration, execution and whipping and violence should be banned, and this is explicitly against Qur’an”.35 Mesba¯h does not want to see any alternative legitimate theory take the place of his theory of sacred violence. Mesba¯h is against any dialogue among Iranians and between Iranians and the West, believing that “the dialogue among civilizations has no logical support”.36 From the militarist Islamist point of view, the dialogue among civilizations is in favor of foreign enemies and some domestic political parties with which they disagree.37

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Messianism Mesba¯h’s messianism before the Iranian Revolution was a passive one; he did not believe in rising up and fighting against the government to pave the way for the rising of Hidden Imam. But when Khamenei took power in 1989 and shifted toward some of the more brutal factions of the government and authoritarian parties and groups, Mesba¯h presented his active messianic message. He and his followers believe that every true believer Shi‘i should be politically active and hold power to set the stage for the Hidden Imam to rise; they believe religious quietism is a mistaken course of action and Muslims should not passively wait for the time of the last uprising. The messianism research program presupposes almost all beliefs of an authoritarian political program. These Messianists are against the ideologyoriented but rational Islamic views. Iranian Shi‘i messianism as presented by Mesba¯h is often in political coalition with militarist and clerical authoritarian Islamists and insistently rejects nationalist, socialist and mysticism-oriented Islamisms. The messianist Islamist ideology has eight basic tenets. The first one is the secularization of history through a sacred channel. Mesba¯h tries to replace the Shi‘i sacred history with a secular one. He transfers the conjectural perspective on the “end times” to an “end time” ideology. In this process, international conflicts and domestic issues are seen as stages of signs of the Hidden Imam’s coming. In a masterpiece of political maneuvering, Ahmadinejad presents an entirely new reason for the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. In his view, Americans knew that something was going to happen in Iraq and a “divine hand” was going to rise in this Shi‘i country; they attacked the country to prevent the advent of Hidden Imam and cut this hand.38 He does not explain how the Bush administration was aware of the coming event and more importantly how infidels have access to this highly confidential information. The second one is the imminence of the Hidden Imam’s rise. Shi‘i messianists believe that the signs for the Hidden Imam’s rising are imminent and the end of time is on the horizon: “our era is the end time”.39 They have a very pessimistic approach toward modern times.

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For them, modernity is synonymous with infidelity, heresy and apostasy: “today is the day that faith is easily lost”.40 Armageddon and the final battle will be fought between the forces of good and evil. The third is the necessity for the Hidden Imam’s followers to demand his rise. Shi‘i Islamist messianists insistently demand the appearance of the Hidden Imam in their prayers. To make the case for the so-called thirst for truth and justice to the level that all people of the world demand the appearance of the Shi‘i king, the world should be portrayed as a centre of sin and excess corruption and decadence: “[the West] is now a hell full of corruption and decadence”.41,42 Not only are Western values, whatever they are opposed to Islamic values, Iranian traditional and ancient rituals and heritage is also working against doing one’s duty in the End Time era.43 The fourth one is the followers’ political and social desperation. What requires the Hidden Imam uprising is the desperate situation of Muslims and the deprived. This is a sign for them: “his appearance is imminent”.44 He has to come soon due to the need of the ummat that has established an Islamic government: “Till now, the Imam has been showing the way to heaven and hell to the ummat . . . but now that they have chosen their way and they want to establish the Islamic community, the Imam has to [arrive] and take the lead and guide the people to happiness and excellence.”45 The fifth one is social and political activism. Mesba¯h as the ideologue of the Islamic Republic during Khamenei’s reign converted to political and social activism to support the Islamist government. He asks his followers to wait for the Hidden Imam through participating in social and political processes: “when we are waiting for the appearance of the Imam of the Time, we are active in society”.46 This waiting will grant a meaning to the waiters: “one who waits for the appearance of the Imam of the Time, [he/she] has a purpose in his/her life”.47 This will facilitate the rise of the Hidden Imam. The sixth one is military activism. While Shari‘ati converted the quietism and pacifism of Shi‘i Messianic belief of Hojjatieh to a revolutionary activism (Entezar Maktab e E’teraz, Waiting, the Ideology of Protest), Mesba¯h transformed revolutionary messianism to militarist

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messianism. Mesba¯h could not say when the imam-e zama¯n (leader of the time) will rise but he could mobilize Shi‘is to get militarily ready for the time of his rise by neutralizing his potential enemies.48 Shi‘is in general do not designate a time for the emergence of the Mahdi. They believe that any prophecy concerning the Messianic moment is, by definition, false and heretical. A hadith declares that “kazeb al-vaghghatoon” (“the time-setters are liars”). Mesba¯h and his followers believe that true believers may hasten the Almighty to bring about the End of Days through observing God’s ordinance, praying for the Hidden Imam and getting ready to be a soldier in his army. The link between Shi‘i messianism and militarism is the bloody path of the establishment of the promised government. The apocalypse in Shi‘i eschatology is as bloody as it is in its Christian counterpart. According to one hadith, the horse of the Mahdi will wade in a vast pool of blood of the unjust and the corrupt. According to Shi‘i messianism, he does his battles in the name of justice and on the path of reaching the peaceful kingdom of heaven by resort to any violent action and nothing can stop him from massacre and bloodshed. The seventh one is a belief in the Hidden Imam’s superintendence and His supervision. He accompanies all true believers: “the master (a¯qa¯) is aware of our soul and our fate . . . the world is under his control and he has control on our hearts”.49 According to Mesba¯h, the Hidden Imam says that “we never betray you and we always take care of you”.50 Based on this idea, Mesba¯h’s followers, such as Ahmadinejad, believe that the Master is with them all the time: “When I was there [Columbia University in 2007] I was certain that my Master [the Hidden Imam ] would come and direct the scene due to the poisonous environment that they had made.”51 According to messianist Islamists, without His supervision, the Islamic state would collapse.52 The rise of the military-based Ahmadinejad government under the supervision of Khameini, and its totalitarian policies represented a coming of age for the entire idea of an Islamist state. Ahmadinejad claimed he was working to bring about the return of the Mahdi, who will return to usher in the end times in Shi‘i eschatology.

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Ahmadinejad’s 2007 speech to the UN General Assembly began with the words: “In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful. Oh God, hasten the arrival of Imam Al-Mahdi and grant him good health and victory and make us his followers and those who attest to his rightfulness.” And he closed with the words: “Without any doubt, the Promised One who is the ultimate Savior, together with Jesus Christ and other holy saviors, will come. In the company of all believers, justice-seekers and benefactors, he will establish a bright future and fill the world with justice and beauty. This is the promise of God; therefore it will be fulfilled. Let’s play a part in the fulfillment of all this glory and beauty.” He repeated almost the same words every year that he spoke at the UN. And last, the eighth one is Shi‘i clerical rule. In the absence of the Hidden Imam, that section of Shi‘i clerics who are seriously waiting for Him and are considered as His deputies shall rule. Mesba¯h presumes that this section is capable of ruling in a fashion that forestalls anarchy and implements justice until the Hidden Imam rises. Opposed to the clerics who do not believe that Shi‘is should wage war against infidels and sinners in the Imam’s absence, Mesba¯h believes that waiting Shi‘is should wage this war whenever they have enough strength to win and they should implement an Islamic global government that will be consolidated with the advent of the Promised One. Who is going to fight against the Imam of the Time? According to Mesba¯h, the archnemesis of the Hidden Imam is pluralism: “the idea of different readings of religion is the most dangerous weapon that they use for fighting against the Imam of the Time.”.53 Another new way of fighting against the Imam is by opposing the clergy.54 Shi‘is should not have tolerant dealing with followers of other religions, if they want to get ready for the appearance of the Hidden Imam.55 Any new discussion and question, from Mesba¯h’s point of view, is based on confusion, scepticism and agnosticism. It is incumbent upon Shi‘i clerics during the Occultation to deal with these questions in any capacity due to their potential to weaken peoples’ beliefs. The word shobheh (loaded, pointed and destroying question asked about the tenets and ordinances of Shi‘i Islam) in clerical literature have all these repercussions and demand precaution from religious experts. All these

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questions and confusions have been produced by the enemy, the West, as part of their cultural invasion.56 Mesba¯h Yazdi said in a pre-sermon speech in Tehran that “the prophets of God did not believe in pluralism. They believed that only one idea was right.”57 Mohammad Taqi Mesba¯h Yazdi, the ideologue of violence, who has been providing the religious justification for others to attack figures accused of undermining the Islamic system, and his followers do believe that liberal democracy and “the ideology of human rights”, as they refer to it, are religiously and ethically wrong and undesirable.58 The Ahmadinejad administration was a staunch follower of Mesba¯h’s messianism. To acquire legitimacy, Ahmadinejad implicitly claimed to be connected with the Twelfth Imam. He tossed his administration pact into the sacred Well of Jamkara¯n near Qom in order to obtain the Hidden Imam’s confirmation. Ahmadinejad even claimed that he believed he was selected by God himself: “somebody was asking me, ‘excuse me, they say you have a connection.’ I said ‘yes, I do.’ He asked, ‘do you really have a connection? With who?’ And I said, ‘I have a connection with God . . . Does a camel have to walk out of a mountain in this day and age for people to believe in miracles. . .?’”59 He claims direct revelation from divine sources: “this American president (George W. Bush) is just like us. He also has visions . . . satanic visions, Satan makes revelations to the American President. . .”60 The legend of the appearance of the “halo of light”, and how world leaders were in awe of Ahmadinejad at his speech at the UN General Assembly were early indicators of this phenomenon: “. . . the last day I gave a speech, almost all the leaders were present. One of them told me, ‘when you started out by saying, ‘In the Name of God’ and ‘Allahumma’ [Oh God] I saw a light appear; it wrapped around you and you were enveloped in this protective shield right up to the end.’ I felt this myself, that there occurred a sudden change in the atmosphere and for about twentyseven or twenty-eight full minutes, none of the leaders blinked even once [. . .] as if their eyes and ears had been made to open and see what the message was from the Islamic Republic.”61 Negative reactions to this claim resulted in denial of such statements, despite the fact they were made in public and recorded on film.62

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In another speech, he claims his popularity among all nations: “. . . just last year when I went to New York . . . people were just standing there lining the streets hoping to spot me, and after catching a onesecond glimpse of me they would do this . . . (Ahmadinejad holds up his fist making the V sign with his fingers for his listeners.) A two- or three-year-old girl was in the arms of her friend, she was pointing at me and saying, “Who is this? Who is this? Actually, they were speaking in Spanish . . . the kid kept looking at me and said, ‘This is Mahmoud, this is Mahmoud. . .’”63 He claimed that all nations do need his help and ask for it: “People from all over the world get in touch with us for solutions to their problems and ask us to solve their problems with the help of our scientists, and this has enraged all the imperialistic regimes.”64 By resort to this connectivity to spiritual sources, Ahmadinejad announced that his Islamic Administration “. . . is in the middle of preparing a letter for world leaders concerning the economic crisis in the world and solutions offered by the Islamic Republic of Iran in this regard . . . In this letter we have worked out, in detail, solutions devised by the Islamic Republic of Iran to resolve the economic crisis and this letter will soon be sent to world leaders . . . A new definition for the economy must be formulated and a new system must be created . . .”65

Theocratic Authoritarianism Militarist Shi‘i Islamists support the practice of shura¯ (consultation) among true believers or insiders instead of democracy. Democracy, they argue, is un-Islamic because it is borrowed from the West and advocates the rule of the people rather than rule of God, rule by the people rather than rule by God, and rule for the people rather than rule for God. While God himself is not among us by person, the rule by God implicitly leads to rule by the people who represent Him the most, the ‘ulama¯ and their loyalists. Shura¯, on the other hand, is a concept that comes directly from the Qur’an, the word of God, and thus reflects the will of God on matters of governance.

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Individual members of the shura¯ or council were to be elected but only from a pool of qualified individuals (confirmed by the clerics), and they are bound in their deliberations to conform to the principles of the Islamic Shari‘ah (Islamic law). Their main function is not to represent the people but to give advice to the leader of the country and ruling clerics. In their opinion, those who support democracy in the sense that the West does, i.e. free from any restrictions imposed by religion, are regarded as outside the confines of Islamic society. They believe that there is no indication of democracy in Islamic shari‘ah, and those who belong to the ranks of Muslims cannot depart from Islamic principles and Islamic doctrine and accept democracy as a legitimate system of rule. They believe that they cannot think of doing anything which is not permitted by the Islamic shari‘ah. They demand to be governed according to the Islamic shari‘ah, and do not accept anything which diverges from it under the name of democracy. Due to these beliefs, according to Mesba¯h, it could be acceptable to make sure that elections have the “correct outcome” to avoid unwanted results.66 Other than providing the law of the Muslim community, militarist Shi‘i Islamists believe that “the executive power should also be appointed by God”.67 Islamist militarists believe in the theory of the guardianship of appointed jurists. God always appoints someone to be the leader of the country during the Occultation, and the duty of the people is to recognize the appointee by resort to the clerics. The clerics are to consult and introduce this appointee to the nation every time that an appointee passes away.

Populism Mesba¯h and his followers are against the idea of political parties and the concept of civil society. They do not want to see a layer of civil society institutions and political parties between the masses and the government. From the Islamist militarist/messianist point of view, any independent political and social institution is the source of disunity, discord and conflict. The only political system that they

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approve of is the one-party system: “there was only one good party in the country called the Islamic Republic Party that was closed by Imam [Khomeini]”.68 The militarists’ populist literature used by the leader and governmental media has two clear characteristics. The first one is linking unrelated individual groups to accuse the opponents and prosecute them. This is based on the pretext of “my enemy’s friends are my enemy”. The second one is that there is little need for substantiated facts and evidence to persecute “others”.

Anti-West Propaganda The anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist rhetoric of the militarist/ messianist Islamists is used to not only mobilize some ordinary people in Iran but also to take advantage of anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiments in the wider Muslim world. By depicting Iranian officials in an unsympathetic light, the mainstream media in the West play into the hands of the militarist Islamists in Iran. This is a failure of Western countries’ foreign policy to deal more sensitively with the conflict in the Middle East and the failure of mainstream media to report many aspects of internal politics in the region. In the years of the Ahmadinejad’s administration, book censorship was greatly intensified. Even the relatively neutral newspapers loyal to the IRI (fewer than the fingers on one hand) were under pressure to self-censors. They cannot even name the leader “leader” (it should be “the revered position of leadership”). Iranian journalists are beaten to death in the streets.69 The editorial members of Iranian newspapers (e.g. Aftab Daily) were injured by Khamenei’s militias when they were going home at night. The most politically neutral intellectuals such as Ramin Jahanbegloo (he did not sign any letter or petition on political issues to Iranian officials during the reform movement) and Kian Tajbakhsh.

CHAPTER 11 FASCIST ISLAMISM: AHMAD FARDID AND REZA D AVARI

Iranian fascist Islamists have for the most part been entirely ignored by Western mainstream media. These Islamists have followed the official policies of the Islamic regime and have not criticized even a word or action of the ruling Shi‘i clerics. Acting as a closed clique, Iranian Islamist fascists have also kept themselves far from the cameras and pens of foreign correspondents. While advocating the end of the Western civilization and accusing political activists who have contact with Westerners as spies and traitors, they do not present their ideas in Western newspapers and journals. The term fascist Islamism, as used here, is completely different from “Islamo-fascism” that is used by American neo-cons and proponents of the “War on Terror” in Western media since the events of 11 September 2001, to condemn anti-American sentiments in the Muslim world.1 They all too often use this term to indistinctively refer to any Islamist movement that is against US policies in the Middle East and resorts to violence to pursue its agenda. From their point of view, Hamas, Hezbullah, Muslim Brotherhood, Jama¯‘at Islami, al-Qaeda and IRGC are equally Islamo-fascists. This term ignores the differences among these groups. Iran as a state is not at that level of political and economic development and party politics to embrace fascism as the state ideology but there are very influential groups in the government

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which lean toward this ideology. One cannot say that Iranian society at the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century is plagued by extreme nationalism or racism, nor a syndicated notion of the state. Although Khamenei and his office have been trying to organize the masses in the IRGC and its affiliate organizations such as the Basij and local plain clothes, the Iranian government lacks the organization and other means of imposing state control over all aspects of life in Iranian society. They have tried their best but have not been as successful as they wished. The leadership during the Khamenei period and some factions are willing to do so but there is resistance in society against this approach. Fascist Islamism in Iran is a brand of Islamism that theoretically, ideologically and practically follows the path of Nazism in 1930s and 1940s Germany. The theoreticians of this ideology, Ahmad Fardid (1910 – 94),2 an atheist philosophy teacher of Tehran University, and Reza Da¯vari3 another philosophy teacher from this university, both display influences of Martin Heidegger. Taking on board many of Heidegger’s theories, these Islamists are vocal against Judaism (not merely Zionism), liberalism, modernism, democracy, human rights, analytical philosophy and enlightenment, civil society, and religious reformation. They explicitly express their animosity toward the values of liberal democracies: “we want to reject liberty, equality, and brotherhood of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”.4 Fascist Shi‘i Islamism has many similarities with German fascism in the mid twentieth century. They both claim to be a rage against historical humiliation; they are inspired by what is believed to be an earlier golden age of Muslim or German societies and they desire to restore the perceived glory of this age. They are determined to get on top of history after being underfoot for so many generations; they both believe that malicious, predatory forces (such as the Jews) are conspiring against and within the nation/community and violent action is necessary to defeat and expel these forces; they both believe in the decadence and weakness of the malicious, predatory enemy forces. The anti-modernist

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approach of German Nazism and its calling for a discourse of authenticity5 has played very well into the political narratives of Iranian fascist Islamists. They both are against Western democracy, open society and rationalism.6 Although there is nothing in any section of the Muslim World that resembles the corporate fascist states of Western history, there are groups that pursue the ideology of fascism in Iran. Similar to his German romanticist predecessor, Fardid and his disciples believe that European philosophy and history has diverted from the essential truth to scientism, humanism and cosmologism.7 Rejecting the West as a terrain dominated by science and technology, Fardid was searching for the philosopher-king of the Orient, a benevolent and compassionate leader that could lead Iranian society out of the abyss of modernism. Suspicious about Western ideas such as democracy and republicanism and hopeless about secular monarchies, Fardid and Da¯vari were taken by the idea of guardianship of the jurist interpreted as absolute leadership, as some argue, Heidegger8 found in Hitler.9 The basic theoretical foundations of fascist Islamism are historicism, anti-positivism, anti-humanism, anti-rationalism, Occidentalism and anti-modernism. The political ideas of fascist Shi‘i Islamism are anti-Westernism, rooting for mass society, absolutism, anti-intellectualism, belief in the cultural invasion of the West beside its political domination, anti-Semitism, and anti-liberalism. Fascist Islamists believe that the Iranian Revolution is the end of the West and religious intellectualism is eclecticism. They make prophetic statements to make their case. While militarist Islamists who were brought up during the war took the position of promotion of violence during the Khamenei era, fascist Islamists propagated the main ideas against tolerance and diversity. They both theorized violence, and spread anti-Semitism and anti-liberalism in society from the outset of the Islamic Republic. Fascist, militarist, and identity-oriented Islamists share the term Westoxication, coined by Fardid and then popularized by Jala¯l A¯l-e Ahmad, both dismissed tolerance, democracy and freedom as products of the West.

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Philosophical and Theoretical Foundations Occidentalism. Da¯vari begins his theories on Occidentalism and antiOrientalism with the premise that “unless something is possessed and occupied and dominated, it will not be the object of research for a researcher”.10 This is to prove that Westerners do research on the East because they dominate it. This premise does really show his intention: the Easterners could not do research on the West unless they dominate it; therefore expansionism is the solution for launching research on the Western world. They also justify their failure to understand and explain Western civilization by resorting to this idea of “research by domination”. This is also to discredit all studies that Iranians have done on the West. From his point of view, the only way to understand the West is to revolt against it when domination is not possible: “understanding the essence of the West is not possible by merely studying and doing research on this subject”.11 He wants to reverse history. In his view, “the East for the West is only the object of domination”.12 By confusing domination and research and rejecting Iranians researching the West, fascists reveal their lust for power and domination. When Iranian fascist Islamists talk about the West – East relationship, the only subject that they have in mind is domination. In their view, the Iranian Revolution should be extended to the point of Western civilization’s demise: “if the Revolution stops, it will perish”.13 History begins with this revolution: “the Islamic Revolution is a global revolution and a new world will be established by this revolution”.14 Da¯vari, who was not a revolutionary before the events of 1979, believes that the Iranian Revolution has expedited the advance of history: “in these three years it seems we have passed three hundred years”.15 Exaggeration of the Revolution’s achievement is something that many Islamists share. According to this brand of historicism, the Iranian Revolution is the beginning of a new era: “the Islamic Revolution happened at a time when the road to human arrogance is reaching to the end point”16 and “imperialism has reached to its final point”.17 Similar to fortune-tellers, he tells us about the future of the West: “imperialism

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began with the beginning of new Western history”18 and “our Islamic Revolution is a sign for the end of Western history and beginning of a new era under God’s grace”.19 Shi‘i Islamist fascists have been very optimistic about the coming era of their domination: “the West has realized every bit of its potential and has reached its final extension” while “the East is covered and obscure”.20 This view romanticizes the Eastern heritage and the destruction of the West. Shi‘i Islamist fascists believe that there is an eternal and essential conflict between the West and Islam, and that: “the truth of the West has covered the truth of Islam”.21 Fascist Islamists who did not believe in Islam before the Iranian Revolution have become “true believers” since the Iranian Revolution and justify any action of the ruling clerics. Nobody has ever heard any criticism of the Islamic state and Shi‘i clerics from the fascist Islamists. In spite of complaining about the premises and consequences of Orientalism and the emphasis on understanding the essence of the West,22 Da¯vari and Fardid never launched a program or a course on Occidentalism. In his whole academic life, Da¯vari has called Iranian intellectuals who want to know more about/Western civilization shallow and ignorant but he has done nothing on this subject other than rejection of others’ works. He asks researchers to “understand the totality of Western history” but understanding Western philosophy is the recommended approach.23 Western history, for him, is objectified in technology.24 Technology is the soul of the West25 and God is technologized too.26 Technology is the center of attention because, according to fascist Islamists, the West has conquered the world by its technology. Fascist Islamists reduce the West to technology to reduce and present it as the face of domination. Similar to Heidegger, they do not have any respect for analytical logic, observation and evidencebased research, let alone science and technology. These Islamists believe that there is the guardianship of the West27 and guardianship of Islam, and with the demise of one, the other will rise. Iranian fascist Islamists understand the West as an anti-religious civilization: “the dominant title of the world now is

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against religion”.28 This Islam that is opposed by the West is not explained and left completely vague.29 For Da¯vari, it is impossible to be selective when confronting the West: “this is out of discussion that we may take good things from the West and leave the bad things aside”.30 Da¯vari has a negative approach to Occidentalism and does not explain what he means by this concept. Occidentalism for him is only the fight against imperialism: “Occidentalism is only possible by emancipating from the West.”31 This attitude reduces knowledge to political action and revolt. The main agenda for understanding is not understanding but action. This means that people can learn only by action or there is no need to understand something that is going to be demolished. One of their aims of understanding the West, if necessary, is to reject other ideologies such as secular nationalism: “to understand the nature and truth of nationalism someone should understand the nature of the West”.32 Da¯vari and Fardid represent other views as shallow.33 Da¯vari describes his critiques as degenerate, thoughtless, and inconsiderate.34 His opponents are people who make noises and express their lusts.35 They are miserable and westoxicated36 and should be marginalized: “these people will be marginalized with the extension of the Revolution”.37 Anti-intellectualism. Religious and secular intellectuals have been the main rivals and opponents of fascist Islamists. Fascist Shi‘i Islamists regard intellectuals as their arch-nemesis to the point that they question their social identity and role in the revolution: “what status do intellectuals have in our revolution and what is their affiliation with wisdom?”38 Even the Islamic intellectualism is rejected due to its view on dialogue and communication with the West: “our Muslim intellectuals who are serving the Revolution have not deeply understood . . . that the West and the East [Eastern European bloc during the Soviet era] are the same”.39 Any group who has a positive approach to democracy and freedom is labeled as short-sighted: “[the] intellectual has no clear sight and clear thought, and turmoil and depression has replaced it”.40 All descriptions of intellectuals are degrading: “[the Iranian] intellectual

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avoids thinking”;41 “for about one hundred years our intellectuals have imitated [the West] and follow this [independent practical] reason [of human being]”.42 These are the words of individuals who have picked their subject of study from Heidegger; language, art, technology and metaphysics are Heidegger’s subjects of study and have been directly copied in the Iranian fascist research program. Another accusation of intellectuals in the post-revolutionary period, when non-believing was an accusation, is atheism: “intellectualism does not accompany religiosity”.43 Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, religion has risen to the highest point of power and “all philosophies, theories, modern sciences and especially logicism and playing with logics are secondary to it and follow it”.44 Another way to discredit Iranian intellectuals is to label them as imitators of Western intellectuals: “our intellectual is the caricature of intellectuals of the eighteenth century Europe”45 and “intellectualism of these 150 years was the wall and obstacle [for understanding]”.46 Fardid names most Iranian intellectuals as people who are the slaves of their “evil-inducing soul”. He makes a long list of them in this regard: Ehsan Naraqi,47 Abdolkarim Soroush,48 Iqbal Lahouri,49 Abolhasan Bani Sadr,50 Seyyed Jama¯l,51 Dariush A¯shouri,52 Ahmad Sha¯mlou,53 Ali Shari‘ati,54 and Nima Youshij.55 Similar to shari‘ah-oriented and clerical authoritarian Islamists, Iranian fascist Islamists see religious intellectualism as eclecticism. According to them, “interpreting Islam and the Islamic Revolution based on any non-Islamic philosophy and ideology hurts Islam and the Islamic Revolution”.56 The fascist Islamists themselves intrepet Islam and the Islamic Republic based on existential philosophy of the 1960s. Fardid complains about the mood of his era as having a tendency to conflate modernism and Islam: “our era is the era for defense of liberalism and making the Qur’an liberal; the Qur’an is given the face of liberalism, democracy and Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This is reverse austerity and taking refuge in evil. Democracy means austerity in taking refuge in Satan.”57 The most critical sin of Iranian religious intellectuals such as Shari‘ati and Seyyed Jama¯l is understood as interpreting the Qur’an based on humanism.58 From

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the fascist Islamist point of view, this interpretation is “to give priority to human rights in front of God’s rights”.59 They believe that none of the modern ideas could be justified by resort to Islam and Islamic texts: “There is no way to present democracy as something that is congruent with the Qur’an.”60 Of course, for both of them fascism and Nazism are exceptions. Every ideology in the West is the symbol of tyrants and human evil inclinations, including imperialism, Marxism, colonialism, rationalism, irrationalism, realism, idealism, spiritualism, individualism and collectivism.61 They do not include totalitarianism and authoritarianism in this list of ideologies. It seems that these ideologies are absent in the West and in the East. Scholars and intellectuals who dare to oppose Islamist fascists are labeled as followers of Karl Popper, Rudolf Carnap and Bertrand Russell, and “kharejites (rejectionists who deserve annihilation) and pseudo Muslims”.62 Some others are labeled as ignorant, non-thinkers and novices.63 Their way of thinking is called pseudo-philosophy that is equal to “scientism, laxity, and moral slovenliness”.64 Other than a couple of fascist Islamists, all Western-educated and secular Iranians are intellectually tasteless and incompetent: “although we were eager to become Western, we did not have enough taste and competent”.65 Anti-rationalism. Shi‘i fascist Islamism is opposed to rationalism. According to this ideology, reason and religion can only be brought together within the framework of modernity and reason takes priority.66 Fardid calls this “reason” self-founded, opposed to reason in theology that is subject to religion and is founded by a sacred entity. He complains about the dominance of this reason in modern times. Humanism, in his belief, is based on this approach to rationality and has shaped reformed religions in our time.67 Fardid calls humanism the “originality of chimpanzee” (nasna¯s) as opposed to the originality of human being (ensa¯n). Anti-modernism. Da¯vari presents the proponents of modernism in contemporary Iran as opponents of Islam. He categorizes them as secular mystics, Marxists and scientisists who advertise Western values and manners as modern science.68 He equates Iranian modernism with sciolism, naivete´, superficiality and shallowness.

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All Iranian modernist intellectuals are labeled as shallow69 because they do not understand the nature and essence of the West that is domination.70 Modernism for him is westoxication.71 From this point of view, Iranian Shi‘i clerics (added since the victory of the Iranian Revolution) and Iranian Islamist fascists are the only groups who have a deep understanding of the complicated Western thought and ideologies.72 Others are illiterate and eclectic.73 One of the aspects of anti-modernism in Heidegger was his return to Greek philosophy. His Iranian followers replace Greek philosophy with the Islamic one: “what is called modern science and civilization and logic today are the pale and weak form of philosophy”.74 Similar to their model figure who was looking for a way to return to Greek philosophy,75 Da¯vari and Fardid have been trying to return to Islamic philosophy as the original and accepted framework of thinking: “we cannot head to any point without Islamic philosophy and nobody in this country can be a thinker unless they are a member of Islamic thinkers’ inner circles”.76 As a prerequisite they negated modern Western philosophy and knowledge. They believe that any civilization and intellectual system is based on philosophy77 and Iranians should return to their own philosophy if they want to establish their own system of knowledge. Nevertheless, they have not yet produced any academic work on Islamic philosophy. As Heidegger seems to have thought that the future of the West depended on the proper understanding of metaphysics, supposedly presented in his own thought,78 his Iranian followers think that the future of the Muslim world depends on the proper understanding of Islamic philosophy, as presented in their own readings of this philosophy. Historicism. Shi‘i fascist Islamists view the political and social developments of contemporary Iran as a deterministic extension of Western history: “all people of the world had to enter this history”79 and they have already entered this road.80 Before the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Da¯vari believed that “the West’s past is our future”81 but after the Revolution, Islam, for which read the clerical establishment, replaced the West’s past and a new era began for Iranian fascists.

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Iranian fascist Shi‘is believe that the West’s history is over and now it is the time for revolutionary/active Muslims. Therefore, anybody who wants to be on the side of the winners should shift to the Iranian ruling clerics and equip them with new ideas to win the determined victory. Fardid and Da¯vari’s ideas gradually took up the seats of power during the Khamanei era, who was eager to have his own personal and freindly intellectuals oppose to his critics. From the Iranian historicist perspective, any analytical and critical thinking is positivism, and while positivism is not an accepted philosophy from their point of view, “there is no thinking [in Iran]”.82 From the Iranian fascist point of view, “thinking is a journey between right and wrong”.83 In this perspective, modern science is positivistic and has nothing to do with right and wrong; therefore, “there is no thinking in modern science”.84 Anti-humanism. Fascist Islamists view the entire course of Western history as a connected series of humanisms: Hellenism, the Roman Empire, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. This connected line for them is the problem not the solution to the human question. Anyone who is in favour of this line of developments is called humanist and hence against authenticity and Islam. For example, nationalist forces, whether Islamist or secular, are rejected due to their positive approach to the developments in the West: “Today the National Front has presented Mosaddeq as opposed to the Imam (Khomeini), because it is wextoxicated and its way of thinking is self-founded. It is humanist and nationalist; it means that it believes nation is God and says that God is gone and the nation has replaced Him. In Western history, ta¯qoot (tyrants) perished and humanism came in, and nationalism followed humanism.”85

Political Theory Anti-Westernism. Fardid coined the term qarbzadegi (westoxication/ occidentosis). He and his disciples upgraded anti-colonialism and antiAmerican foreign policies to anti-Western civilization sentiments. To do this, they granted the West a satanic essence that could not be removed by any positive action of Western countries. He and his

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disciples were very crucial in giving a philosophical and metaphysical sense to the anti-Western sentiments of the Shi‘i clerics and Iranian revolutionaries who were against the West due to its colonialism and hegemony and not its basic nature. Later clerical authoritarian Islamism followed the same path and called the US the “Great Satan”. Animosity toward the West is the direct result of philosophical anti-Westernism. According to Shi‘i fascist Islamism, “although the substance of atheism and infidelity [in Iranian society] is local, the forms have been imported from the West”.86 The main cause of atheism and infidelity, in his view, is Western humanism, i.e. this belief that “man himself is in charge of his life and his future and everything depends on his decisions and policies. In other terms, he is the center of the world”.87 According to him “obtuseness that has roots in disbelief in the sacred text is one of the characteristics of the West”.88 Any unpleasant ideology and social movement is ascribed to this evil identity. As an example, Wahhabism is presented as one of the productions of the West: “the founders of Wahhabism acquired obtuseness from the West and applied it to the substance of what was presented in Najd and Hejaz”.89 To make a unified essence of the West, he asserts that “the differences among Western ideologies are secondary and accidental”.90 Nationalism is not appropriate for Islamic countries because “it has been exported from the West”.91 As its model in the mid twentieth century Europe, fascist Shi‘i Islamism declares the end of the West: its metaphysics, its political ideologies, its economic domination and its cultural influence. Fardid calls all Western-educated scholars and intellectuals westoxicated; this means their mindset is polluted with the products of western philosophy and humanities. In spite of their animosity toward the West and all schools of philosophy and ideology except fascism, Islamist fascists pretend to be post-modern in front of Western scholars, a Western audience,92 and some sections of the Iranian intelligentsia. Post-modernism has become a cover-up for authoritarian and anti-modernist sentiments. Absolutism/Totalitarianism. Shi‘i fascist Islamists believe that the clerical leadership and especially the juristconsult is the most

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important element of an Islamic nation and its law. Therefore, people as people have no voice in their real politics: “in the Islamic government, the source of power is the supreme omnipotent creator”.93 This is the position of ultra-authoritarian clerics in Shi‘i seminaries. If only loyal people have the right to confirm the leaders who are appointed by God, non-loyalists have no say in politics: “there should not be opportunity for people who take sides and wait for a space to grab power to hold it”.94 Fardid and Da¯vari looked out their office windows in Tehran University for years after the Revolution and saw members of the Basij and Hezbullah members confronting liberal and reformist and dissident students; for them this was uncovering the essence of the East, and objectification of the end of the West. Similar to what Heidegger did for Nazism,95 Da¯vari gives philosophical seriousness and professorial respectability to the conceptualizations and justifications for hate, destruction, unreason and death that has dominated so many Iranian lives since the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Based on an optimistic view of the fascist Islamists’ cause, Da¯vari and Fardid’s call for submission to the whim of the Islamic fuehrer is to give momentum to the rise of Eastern civilizations. Despotism and authoritarianism in the twentieth century are helpful instruments for this cause. Their voluntary subordination of philosophical criticism to political totalitarianism and authoritarianism has its roots in their will of power and deep hatred toward their intellectual rivals. Fardid and Da¯vari’s way of thinking has every intrinsic resource to push them to accept Islamism and the totalitarian state. They wanted to be the official philosophers of the new rulers of Iran (mullahs). Khomeini did not need these philosophers to rule but Khamenei really did, and still does, need them. They theorized repressive ideas such as the cultural invasion of the West, and in return they got crucial memberships of the cultural councils of the country. Khamenei has appointed Da¯vari to a couple of these councils. While Heidegger’s enthusiasm for Nazism was dampened only by the lack of interest of the Nazis for him,96 Fardid and Da¯vari’s enthusiasm for the Islamic totalitarian state were appreciated by

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many of the ruling mullahs. They needed a group of previously secular intellectuals to support them and work in academia. This group was to justify some of the violations of human rights in the area of higher education and culture. Iranian fascist Islamists not only were silent when rights of individuals were violated but also theorized violence against dissidents and justified the government’s action for a higher cause, i.e. opposition to the West. Similar to Heidegger, Iranian fascist Islamists have no moral theory and have not even touched discussion of moral principles. Any murder and any violation of human rights, if helping the cause of the anti-Western movement and domination of Islamists, can be justified according to Iranian fascist Islamists. This absence of ethics and concern about the wider population will not really surprise anybody who is familiar with their philosophy of domination. Instead of racial and ethnic elements of discrimination, that have no precedent in Iranian history, Shi‘i fascist Islamists base their foundation of argument against “not-pure” or “outsider” individuals on religion. Ideology is what they build their discrimination system on. Individuals who are not religiously obedient to authority have no rights in the country and if their rights are violated they are the ones who should be blamed. Fascism in Iran has embraced ideas of religious and ideological superiority as part of a nationalist creed of a people’s revival under one true leader. Iranian fascist Islamism is a totalitarian ideology that reveres and organizes around a single “secular” leader (vali-ye faqih) and a single party (clerics in its Iranian version), and is geared toward mass mobilization behind religious and ideological objectives. The founding fathers of Iranian Shi‘i fascism have manipulated it to fit a Muslim society that is ruled by a loose network of religious figures. As long as nationalism is not mixed with secularism, it is welcome. The principle that attracted Da¯vari, Fardid and their followers to Khomeini and his version of Islamic government was his antiWestern rhetoric that fitted their view on the decadence of Western civilization in order to install an authoritarian or totalitarian order. Da¯vari describes Khomeini as a pishva¯ (fuehrer),97 something that was

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rare in the years before and after the Iranian Revolution. In his view, Khomeini was someone of whom “powerful leaders of the world were terrified”.98 By appearing to Islam and the clerics, Iranian fascists wanted to give a spiritual face to their own fascism. Anti-liberalism. To discredit others’ ideologies in a Muslim society, Islamists declare them as atheist. Fascist Islamists use the same technique for rejecting liberalism: “liberalism . . . is one of the clear factors of potential atheism”.99 The prophetic fascist style is to declare something, and the whole world should follow the direction. When fascist Islamists declare that “liberalism today is discredited and notorious”100 they proclaim that liberals are doomed and nobody should believe in this ideology. Their main reason to oppose liberalism today is that “liberalism deep inside is humanism”.101 Reduction of liberalism to humanism is to show that it is based on human interests and concerns not God. They want to show the opposition of liberalism to Islam. But Anti-political liberalism often leads to anti-freedom and antihuman rights positions. When “human rights are the rights of evil driving instinct in human soul” and “freedom as it is defended [in the West] is freedom from God of the day before yesterday [before the Western domination and modern world] and slavery for evil-driving force of the eighteenth century”102 there will be no room for Muslim true believers to support these ideas. Fadid and Da¯vari were ultimately theorizing dictatorship and religious despotism. They were opposed to any institution that limits the power of the leader. Human rights and democracy are the most challenging issue for a group of faculty members that are defending dictatorship in universities. Similar to Marxist/Leninists, Da¯vari believes that human rights are used to protect the interests of the bourgeoisie,103 a dirty trick used by the bourgeoisie against workers and the underprivileged.104 The same statements have been made about democracy. The teachers of fascist Islamism used to tell their students that all the discussions and lectures in the world about justice, human rights, democracy, tolerance and freedom are lies and all of the world’s cultural and political organizations are conspirators, supporting the

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imperialists’ cause. Fascist Islamists believe that the whole world revolves around insincerity, duplicity and satanic power: “modern science, modern technology, modern philosophy and specifically modern social sciences and humanities revolve around the fingers of politicians . . . [they are for] the dominance of human lust (hava¯-ye nafs) and superpowers’ dominance over the world and human beings”;105 the world has one grand master, i.e. a group of Freemasons and Zionists, and that all international organizations are their tools. Fascist Islamists’ attack on liberalism is from the position of fascism, not Islam. They are the only group in the country who were opposed to intellectuals, religious or secular, from the outset of the Revolution and accused them of being members of the Freemasons or having the same kind of mindset. They believe that the world today is ruled by a Freemasonry network106 that is under the influence of Zionists. For Fardid, democracy and human rights are founded on the same ground, that is rationalism: “there is another trend that is poisoned with democracy and is for secular human rights and in short, rationalism”.107 All Iranian social forces fighting for human rights, democracy, freedom, equality, and brotherhood are labeled as decadent: “Bazargan’s world . . . is the world of defending the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that is the world of freedom from this human world, in the name of human rights and freedom and brotherhood and equality. This is a transfer from the original human world to the decadent, outdated and apocalyptic world of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”108 While Ba¯zargan was fighting against the Pahlavi regime and using human rights as a tool to decrease pressure on dissidents, Fardid and Da¯vari were members of governmental councils making policies and plans for Iranian culture. From this ideological point of view, pluralism is also a phenomenon that, to use their terminology, the totality of Satan is objectified in it.109 From this perspective only human rights, democracy, pluralism and freedom are decadent and poisonous not fascism and Nazism, ignoring the fact that both come from the West.

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According to fascist Islamists, “freedom begins with thinking and recitation”.110 The result is: anybody who does not think and reaffirm the way that is approved by specific commentators does not deserve to be free and does not have any rights. According to fascist Islamists, human freedom is merely equivalent to will power and arbitrary choice. As a sign of good faith, individuals should submit their will to the higher sources, in this case, God and his representatives on earth. Similar to traditional Islamic theology, they portray God as an absolute bearer of rights and free of all duties; the charismatic leader, and later the leader in charge is also viewed as a mirror or replica of divine authority. The position of the guardianship of the jurist in fascist Islamism is inclusive of reason and sacred scriptures.111 The Islamic jurist replaces the position of the fuehrer in European fascism: an absolute power that is above human reason. Fardid defines two categories of religiosity: the religiosity of yesterday and the religiosity of the day before yesterday and the day after tomorrow. The second one comes about when the West is demolished. He believes that the Qur’an and hadith are the original sources of knowledge but not every person is allowed to interpret the Qur’an. Religious authorities are entitled to interpret the Qur’an; this is to establish an authority that is beyond human reason.112 This is where fascist Islamism and clerical authoritarian Islamism come to the same point of reference in politics. Shi‘i fascist Islamists understand the political world through two terms: imperialism and vela¯yah (guardianship): “American imperialism today is consuming the world’s people . . . Everybody is consuming others because vela¯yah is gone, and in modern history there is a persistence of animosity toward vela¯yah.”113 In order to defend the notion of a guardian jurist’s absolute power, Da¯vari suggested that Plato was a proponent of this idea and that Popper opposed it (1985). There have been individuals who have acted as intellectual links between clerical authoritarian Islamism and fascist Islamism. Morteza A¯vini was the link between Khamenei’s office, the Basij and the fascist Islamists. He tried to further Islamicize the fascist

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Islamist perspectives of Da¯vari and Fardid.114 He uses the theoretical foundations of fascist Islamism to justify the clerical authoritarian state. To demonize democracy and human rights and justify clerical rule, he declares Western civilization to be satanic and evil,115 an idea that has no roots in Islamic tradition. The ideologues of this ideology had little to do with the Iranian Revolution of 1979. They were considered secular intellectuals by Islamic revolutionaries. After the Revolution, they found their lost love, i.e. an authoritarian leader who is against the US liberalism, democracy and Israel. Before the Iranian Revolution, religiosity and a sense of religious mission did not figure in the slightest in the utterances of Iranian secular fascists who later converted to Islamism. After the Iranian Revolution, they suddenly overtook even Ba¯zarga¯n and Shari‘ati in piety, to the point where Fardid used to condemn them for not being true servants of God. After the Revolution, Fardid became a full-blown devotee of the Hidden Imam. Fascist Islamists are firm proponents of violence. They have approved of all incidents that have occured under the Islamic government. One of the most important psychological characteristics of fascist Islamists is deviation sensitivity. This characteristic functions as an instrument of control; control of society, culture and media. Iranian fascists have been very active in the area of censorship, filtering, jamming and licensing. They are consistently members of licensing panels, censorship boards and filtering committees in Iran. To make their case against liberty and freedom and open the window for censorship and repression, Iranian fascist Islamists believe that the whole world is flawed and deviant. They believe that the positive for human beings in this world is negative, and that values are all reversed.116 Da¯vari’s most important concept in discussing the ideas of Iranian religious thinkers, such as Morteza¯ Motahhari and Mohammad Husayn Taba¯taba¯’i is to introduce the idea of the “deviancy” of Iranian modernists and intellectuals.117 He is even able to read the intentions of intellectuals who wanted to interpret Islam based on modern knowledge: “among them almost no one had the intention to promote religion”.118 Other than Da¯vari, Fardid and their loyal followers, authoritarian and

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militarist clerics believe that all Iranian thinkers and intellectuals are fooled, Westoxicated and shallow. By pointing to these deviant groups, fascist Islamists function as the intellectual arm of the Islamist regime. The main function of fascist Islamists in their governmental capacity is an attempt to control minds and thought. They are occupying senior positions in the cultural sector of a country in which culture is in the hands of the government. They occupy some places in cultural offices abroad, cultural bodies at home, confidential bulletins, newspapers, the Ministry of Islamic Guidance and Culture, the Kayhan newspaper in particular, and art and literature magazines that are published by the Organization of Islamic Propaganda. Fascist Islamists’ anti-Semitism was loudly voiced by Ahmadinejad in its original form, i.e. denying the Holocaust. This is where fascist and militarist Islamisms converge on the same agenda. The anti-corruption and social justice policies of some fascist Islamists is in many ways an attempt to ameliorate their opposition to freedom and democracy. While they believe that the people amount to nothing and their vote is worthless, the promise for justice is lower down on their political agenda substitute value. The worthlessness of people’s vote, which is the heartfelt view of Mesba¯h Yazdi and his militarist ilk, is exactly the sort of thing that Fardid used to say. In line with the Nazis and Hitler, he used to ridicule democracy and voting at all levels and only believed in the cult of the leader. Anti-Semitism. Although Shi‘i clerics have historically had a negative view toward Jewish people,119 officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran have always expressed their opposition toward Israel as anti-Zionism and not anti-Semitism. They have always emphasized that they are not against the Jewish religion or Jewish people. As opposed to this position, Iranian fascist Islamists clearly express their anti-Jewish sentiments. This sentiment could be seen in many cases and many positions. From the Iranian Islamist fascists’ point of view, the “Jew does not want to sin but makes others to sin”.120 To denigrate the Frankfurt School and Henri Corbin, Fardid labels them as Jewish.121 According to Fardid, all social sciences and

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the humanities are in the hands of Jews and they are weak as a result: “Today the humanities are vaccines and they are in crisis in this apocalypse. The objectve of all these disciplines is to defend the policy of the apocalypse of history. Contemporary Jews have forgotten death and they are doomed to be eliminated.”122 Of course, all of the humanities are created by Jews.123 All modern ideologies are ascribed to Jewish people as their method to make sure that the Qur’anic teachings forgotten: the “Jew is a Freemason, or rationalist and irrationalist . . . under these ideologies and schools we forget the Qur’an.”124 To denigrate the Jews they are introduced as the leaders of secretive clubs: “Jews are spiritual leaders of the Freemasons.”125 This is because “Jews are ill-mannered, secretive, and helpless.”126 If anything is wrong in Iranian society it is because of them. For example, if the laws are not working in Iran, it is because “Jews brought about the issues of law in Iran [for the first time].”127 Similar to its German counterpart, Iranian fascist Islamism is obsessed with the Jews, usually presented as Freemasons, Zionists, capitalists, and imperialists. Most of the studies and books about Freemasonary in Persian are written by the disciples of this school of thought. They have been very influential in pushing officials towards anti-Jewish and anti-Western rhetoric. Fardid is the most vocal Iranian intellectual against Judaism as the main source of evil in history: “[The] Jew is pulled out from the land . . . as far as he does not have heaven he does not have any relationship with God and angels. He does not have any relationship with Moses and Abraham’s God. His God is a human evil – inducing soul . . . His God is bank and bankers. His God is capital and capitalism . . . This tribe has no roots, it is nationless.”128 Fardid uses Judaism as a curse in his lectures, beside Freemasons and Zionists, for people whom he calls weak, fearful, greedy and crazy.129 According to him, Judaism is the source of deviation for most Iranian intellectuals, such as Nima Youshij and Dariush A¯shouri to name but a few.130 Fascist Islamists are anti-Jewish in the true sense of the word,131 something that is totally new in Iran’s cultural history. They have borrowed this view from the German fascist movement. According to them, all philosophers fall into two groups: Jewish philosophers and

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non-Jewish philosophers. Whatever Jewish philosophers may have said and whatever they may have done, they are irrelevant and there is no need to think about them or consider their ideas and thoughts. They have learned this kind of anti-Semitism from German Nazism and Heidegger, who was a theoretical supporter of Nazism and fascism. Iranian Shi‘i fascists have always had a favorable approach to Germany: “Germany did never implement colonial domination similar to the UK.”132 Here Fardid and his followers deliberately forget about the role of Germany in World War II and its horrendous consequences for humanity. Mass society, Ummat/Tudeh. Iranian fascist Islamists usually talk about mardom or toudeh (the people) as an indistinguishable whole of the Iranian nation united in reverence for the guardian jurist. After Marxists, it is only the Islamists who represent society in these terms. In Iranian fascist thinking, a single, united, and of course highly centralized party (made up, of course, by the clerics) would embody the mission and leadership of the people, “revive” their faded glories, and seize absolute control of the state. Its methods and symbolism give great importance to the coercive power and personal character of the leader. In the Iranian version of the authoritarian state under Khamenei, this concept of the state embodies a corporatist/cleintalist approach partly borrowed from capitalist authoritarianism and partly from Marxist ideologies. Da¯vari presents a collectivist authoritarian view of the nation. For him, the people constitute an amorphous mass; to deny the cause of his opponents, he claims that the Iranian people are collectively on his side and reject his opponents: “people do not pay attention to you”.133 There is no differentiation. There is only one people which is loyal to the clerics (ummat, religious community) and their loyal philosophers.

How Do They See the World? The Iranian Revolution as the end of the West. In praising the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Da¯vari thinks of himself as the only Islamist

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who is able to understand the essence of the Islamic movement. The Islamic movement, in his view, is a return to a purer past. His antiWest, prophetic, historistic reading of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 is introduced as something that only a meta-intellectual such as himself can offer. According to him, Iranian Shi‘i clerics did not understand the metaphysics that Da¯vari uses as his intellectual foundations. He presents all intellectuals as imitators of the satanic West: “people who oppose the Revolution . . . their souls belong to the real power of the West”.134 Even the differences among intellectuals in understanding the Revolution of 1979 are not considered as something to help others in understanding the nature of the Revolution: “the differences among people who oppose the Islamic Revolution are not serious and they are all dependent upon the same place [the West]”.135 He rejects any opinion and idea just by labeling it as “Western”. The Iranian Revolution is according to Da¯vari, a present, ongoing phenomenon. He believes that this revolution has no characteristics other than Islamity. This reality, however brutal and cruel, is rational and moral just due to its reality. Reality in 1979 was Khomeini and his loyal clerics. The truth and greatness of the Islamic Revolution was an authentic uncovering of the reality of the East as opposed to the West that is the Imposter (dajja¯l). According to Da¯vari, the West is the Imposter riding the monstrous ass before the advent of the Twelfth Imam,136 and when the Islamic Revolution comes, the West will fall. Here the non-authentic West is exchanged with authentic despotism and authoritarianism. Due to the “evil” nature of the West, all Western propaganda is “satanic”.137 The reason for the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic is its consistency with historicist philosophers of the West: “I interpret Heidegger based on Islam. The only thinker that is in the same direction as the Islamic Republic is Heidegger.”138 Shi‘i fascist Islamists have a different approach to the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 – 7. They see it as very different from the Iranian Revolution, mostly as a movement under the influence of the West. They believe that the Constitutional Revolution had a “Western face that means westoxication”.139 The

FASCIST ISLAMISM : AHMAD FARDID AND REZA DAVARI 183

Constitutional Revolution, for them, was a revolution and “move in appearance not in essence”.140 And hence it was not against colonialism and exploitation.141 The main reason for rejecting this revolution is its leadership that was mainly secular: “the Constitutional Revolution was Western, and the Islamic ‘ulama¯ could not be its leaders”.142 Therefore, Iran was only Islamic before the Constitutional Revolution143 and since the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Hereby Fardid writes Iran’s contemporary history by ascribing secularism to yesterday (during the Pahlavi era) and religiosity to the day before yesterday (under the Qa¯ja¯rs) and the day after tomorrow (the Islamic Republic). This is to say that the Qa¯ja¯rs and other dynasties before them were against the West and the Pahlavis were allies of the West. But this recasting of the Qa¯ja¯rs and their predecessors can of course be questioned. To present the West as the source of all evils in the world, they say that “all dictators over the world are great powers’ agents”144 while the dictators of Iran and Russia, whom they believe are not agents of the West refute that theory. The result of this argument is that if a country is independent, its leaders could not be dictators. By confusing freedom and independence, this argument grants legitimacy to any leader who is against the West, whatever he does and whatever agenda he might have. The Iranian Revolution, according to the fascist Islamists, is the end of Western history, an event that opens the window for a human being to see the world “from a revolutionary horizon”. This human being “jabs at today’s world with the point of his dagger”.145 The secularism of what used to be Christian societies in the West compared to those who embrace fascist Islamism is yet another sign of the decadence of the West. The anti-Western approach rises to chauvinism in Da¯vari’s approach. Da¯vari’s cultural chauvinism is evident in his insistence on Islamic philosophy as the sole legitimate system of thinking. Cultural Invasion. The term cultural invasion was coined by fascist and militarist Islamists together. This term is used to justify the repression of intellectuals and scholars who dare to criticize the government. This theory establishes the ground to look at culture as a

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section of the security challenges of a society and profile intellectuals and scholars as security threats for the country. According to fascist Islamists, this cultural invasion is not new and “began two hundred years ago”.146 Why are Iranian people not aware of this phenomenon? Because their “ears have got used to the Western propaganda”.147 In the fascist Islamist view, “the world today is run by Freemasons and the metamorphosed wisdom of apocalypse (Jewish)”.148 The target of this theory is to limit the work of intellectuals and the distribution of ideas in the country. What really shows the target of this theory is its main agenda, i.e. the imagined links between Western and Iranian cultures: “writers and scholars are the first targets of [cultural] invasion”.149 Therefore, they should always be under the surveillance of the culture police. This is to justify cultural engineering that means the total control of public and private education, censorship, repression of intellectuals and curtailing the freedom of the press and the freedom of speech.

How Do They Make Their Case? Similar to other brands of Islamism, fascist Shi‘i Islamism has no rational argument to show its superiority with respect to other Islamisms and other ideologies. Its argument is mainly based on prophesy, foresight, presage, and oracles. The statements of this ideology look more like purple prose than a politically grounded argument. For example, this is what Da¯vari says about the Iranian Revolution: “If a revolution is real it is the beginning of a new era . . . and opening of a new horizon in the midst of roaming end of an era and its darkness of its demise.”150 Just due to the truth and reality of Islam, “Through God’s will, all societies will convert to Islam but all their manners and rituals and transactions should be Islamic.”151 To present the West as satanic, it should be introduced as completely profane: “In the new world [the West] there is no perfection out of the existence of human being and his everyday life.”152 According to Iranian fascists, hypocrisy, lies and deceit are ruling the West.153 Enemies should be demonized and dehumanized: “new imperialism is an appearance of Satan”.154 The rationality of

FASCIST ISLAMISM : AHMAD FARDID AND REZA DAVARI 185

Western civilization is presented as the evil’s deed: “the wisdom of the West is a satanic wisdom”.155 There is not even a word about Iranian society since the Revolution in Iranian fascist literature. There are some questions that they should address: If there is no perfection in the West, is there any in Muslim societies? What about the religious failings of the current political elite? Is Satan, as presented by Islamists, totally absent from Iranian society? Iranian fascists believe they are on a higher mission to save Iranian society from itself. Why should people believe in what fascist Islamists say? They have news from the future: “I have come early. I belong to the day after tomorrow.”156 They claim that they have extra powers and are unique; Fardid explicitly declares that “since the Constitutional Revolution, I am the only one who has reached self-consciousness”.157

PART III NOW AND THEN

The Iranian polity and public sphere is the field of competition for the Islamist ideologies that are discussed in part II of this book. Now it is time to compare these ideologies and evaluate the results of their execution in the polity and the promotion in the public sphere by different administrations in Iranian society and their implications for Iranian political society. After comparing Iranian Shi‘i Islamist ideologies with respect to their theoretical, educational and social background, focus and dominating sector in public, political representation, and main issues and positions, I will shift to conclude by discussing their consequences, paradoxes and policies in Iranian society. At the end, I will take a look at different scenarios for Islamism’s future and how the Iranian polity and society have reacted to these scenarios. The ideology production line of the Islamic Republic and the fertile ground of Iranian society for launching new practice-oriented ideas have made the ideological map of the country more transparent. After three and a half decades of challenges and public discussions, it is now clear what these Islamist ideologies are about, what they want, what path they follow if in power and what future they will bring about. Although the Iranian public has paid a very high price for this ideological transparency, i.e. the sufferings of a Revolution, a war and more than three decades of repression of an unaccountable and nontransparent regime, the myths of just Islamic government and the

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spiritual leadership of Shi‘i clerics are very much under inquiry, and the level of realism, as opposed to pessimism and optimism, is on the rise. This social and political learning process has been very hurtful, expensive and elongated in this time and age. Iranians have been patient in getting along with policies that have repeatedly enforced and failed. Islamist ideologies in action changed the dynamics of Islamity and control in social and political institutions. Before the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the state was secular but the institution of family was mostly based on religious values. The Islamicization process enforced by a sequence of Islamist administrations pushed families to be more protective of their members and have a softer interpretation of Islam and Islamic values. The state-sponsored Islamicization process has instigated a socially supported secularization process in religious institutions. The clergy lost all of its spiritual and moral assets by monopolizing power and became an oppressive stratum, what it was longing for about a century since the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. Religious institutions which were financially and institutionally independent from the government during the Pahlavi era lost their independence due to receiving funds from the government and giving up their rights in policy-making and decision-making procedures. Almost all Islamist ideologies have a share in demolishing the independence of the religious institutions. The Islamists exchanged their moral and spiritual positions and institutional independence with monopolized political power. The discussions among these ideologies are about the level of loss and the advantages of a monopoly of wealth and power in the country. They challenge each other on the authenticity and legitimacy questions and the dialogue has not extended to the way they have treated the Iranian public.

CHAPTER 12 COMPARISONS

Other than A¯l-e Ahmad who was originally a writer, other Islamist ideologues were for the most part, orators; they knew that an orator may wield more influence than a writer in Iranian society where the majority were illiterate or low-literate. Oral culture has always been dominant in the country. Most of the essays, articles and books of Shari‘ti, Motahhari, Ba¯zarga¯n, Da¯vari, Mesba¯h, Fardid, Khomeini and even Soroush are transcripts of their lectures. Other than nationalist and mysticism-oriented Islamisms, Iranian Shi‘i Islamists define themselves as holistically opposed to the West. They question the universality of Western values and oppose the essential and dominant characteristics of the Western vision, i.e. capitalism and the free market, human rights and secular liberal democracy. Even the nationalist and mysticism-oriented Islamists oppose technology and some aspects of open society such as homosexuality. They have all accepted the nation-state framework of international relations or at least do not oppose it anymore. Iranian socialist and fascist Islamists have criticized the West for its humanism; they understand humanism as an ideology that replaces the reign of God with the reign of “man” or humanity. Followed by feqhist, clerical authoritarianist, militarist and scripturalist Islamists, they believe that Western democracy has replaced God’s sovereignty with the sovereignty of the people. By God’s sovereignty, they usually mean God’s authority in the daily

Justice-oriented Scripturalist

Shari‘ah-oriented

Qur’an and Hadith

Natural Science and Technology Islamic Theology, Jurisprudence, and Mysticism Islamic Jurisprudence

Nationalist

Clerical Auth.

Social Sciences

Theoretical and Educational Background

Lower Class, Rural

Lower Class, Rural/Middle Class, Urban

Middle Class, Urban Lower Class, Rural

Middle Class, Urban

Social Background

Islamist Ideologies: Realm, Background and Representation

Socialist

Table 12.1

Media, Culture, Intelligence, Militia Industry, Media, Academia Propaganda, Trade, Legislature, Intelligence Judiciary, Propaganda, Trade, Public Education Seminaries

Focusing and Dominating Sector in Public Domain

Nationalist-Religious Forces Islamic Republic Party (1980s), Militant Clerics Assembly Militant Clerics Society, Qom Seminary Instructors Society, Islamic Coalition Party NA

Islamic Left

Representing Political Group(s)

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Source: courtesy of the author.

Fascist

Militarist/Messianist

Mysticism-oriented

Mysticism, Analytical Philosophy (Kant and Popper) Islamic Theology, Political Science, Management Continental Philosophy (Heidegger) Middle and Upper Class, Urban

Lower Class, Urban

Middle and Upper Class, Urban Military, Intelligence, Trade, Industry Governmental Cultural Institutions

Media, Academia

NA

Devotees Society

Participation Front

COMPARISONS 191

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life of His creatures and servants enforced by a theocratic regime. This is usually interpreted as meaning some form of clerical despotism or elitism. They present democracy as a state of disarray and incoherence, domination of lust and corruption, and superiority of greed and injustice. Unlike mysticism-oriented Islamists, fascist and clerical authoritarian Islamists are in favor of the supremacy of the jurist leader in every aspect of the political sphere and against concepts such as democracy, civil society and pluralism. Reza Da¯vari Ardaka¯ni and Ahmad Fardid as anti-Western philosophy teachers take some of the features of Heidegger’s thought, mainly the criticism of modernity and put it into an Islamist wording. They reject the Western model of democracy, which is based on the separation of religion and state. Feqhist Islamists assign absolute power to Shi‘i feqh; clerical authoritarians assign it to the clerical strata; justice-oriented scripturalists advance the leadership of a just jurist to promote social justice; fascist Islamists assign it to a charismatic leader who has the masses in his hands; militarists designate the jurist as the commander in chief in a leadership position; mysticism-oriented Islamists believe in the leadership of religious intellectuals as a new version of mystics; socialist Islamists look for a charismatic leader to pursue the manifesto of the socialist parties; and nationalists ascribe leadership to a national leader with Islamic qualifications. The question of how to rule a country is, for the most part, totally ignored in Islamist political literature. Islamist Shi‘i ideologies are compared in Table 12.1 in terms of theoretical and educational foundations, social background, the sector that they focus on in public domain, and the political groups that represent them. Other than mysticism-oriented and nationalist Islamisms of the 1990s, all other Islamist ideologies frequently ignore the role of civil society; their politics can only be a politics of domination. They are focused on the state; capturing state power is their ultimate aim in order to enforce their policies and execute their plans. Socialist, clerical authoritarian, scripturalist, feqhist, fascist and militarist Islamists agree upon a rule that is lifelong, above

Non-compatible

Justice-oriented Scripturalist Mysticism-oriented

Source: courtesy of the author.

Militarist/Messianist Fascist

Compatible, Guided (religious intellectuals) Non-compatible Non-compatible

Non-compatible

Shari‘ah-oriented

Nationalist

Clerical Auth.

Democracy and Islam

No Rights No Rights

Constitutional (minimal) Constitutional (minimal) Constitutional (minimal) Constitutional/ Civil

Constitutional/ Civil

Constitutional

Rights

Islamist Ideologies: Issues and Positions

Compatible, Guided (rel. intel.) Compatible, Guided (national leaders) Non-compatible

Socialist

Table 12.2

Coercive Apparatus Coercive Apparatus

Absolute State Sovereignty Executing Shari‘ah Laws Distribution of Wealth and Resources NA

Distribution of Wealth and Resources Territorial Sovereignty

Theory of State

No No

Yes

NA

No

No

Yes

No

Non-violent Movement

COMPARISONS 193

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the law, unchecked and arbitrarily defined due to its revolutionary, traditional, interpretive, professional, apocalyptic/charismatic, and coercive essence respectively (Table 12.2). Socialist Islamism even defends its hereditary aspect by recalling an era of “pristine” Islam and any revolutionary situation.1 They all encapsulate themselves in a nostalgic and apologetic historiography.2 Although Shi‘i Islamists do not have the same concept or approach to the relationship between religion and state, they all oppose the depoliticization of religion. Religion has been a very helpful asset for Shi‘i politicians to mobilize the masses, legitimize their rule, justify their shortcomings and keep them in power against their shortcomings and corruptions. Soroush and his co-thinkers have staunchly opposed fascist, militarist and clerical authoritarian Islamist ideologies and have had intermittent cooperation with nationalist, shari‘ah-oriented and socialist Islamists. Militarist/messianist and fascist Islamists are totally against mysticism-oriented and nationalist Islamism.

Big Issues The divide that has been growing in Iran is not only between religious and secular groups, but among the religious groups themselves. The debate is over five fundamental issues: the sanctity of ordinance versus life; the source of the government’s legitimacy; the relationship between messianism and Islamism; the essence of Western civilization; and the place of non-Shi‘is and non-believers in a sovereign Shi‘i state. The religious reformists (socialist, mysticism-oriented and nationalist Islamists) argue that the authoritarian/totalitarian camp (shari‘ah-oriented, militarist/messianist, fascist, clerical, scripturalist) has made a fetish of the ordinances of Islam instead of letting life take precedence. They believe that a legitimate government is based on popular support through elections and constitutional politics, while the other side takes the rule of the clerics as God-given and absolute. The religious reformists also reject the messianic nature of

COMPARISONS

195

the authoritarian/totalitarian discourse; it argues that Islamic tradition values all life, not primarily Muslim life. The authoritarian/totalitarian camp tends to make an equation between authenticity and violence against “others”, as if the idea of humanism and tolerance would be a Western and alien import to Islam. The authoritarinist Shi‘i clerics seem not to know, or to care, that nationalism and fascism are also Western ideas and that totalitarianism is not necessarily Islamic in its character. According to the totalitarian/authoritarian camp, Western civilization is essentially evil and represents Satan in our world, while Muslims are representing the good and heavenly. The final fight will be between these two forces and the good will succeed.

Anti-Intellectualism All authoritarian/totalitarian Islamist ideologies share anti-intellectualism. They consider the intellectuals as the culprit for the secular state of the Pahlavis and the fifth column of the Western enemy within Iranian and Islamic societies. Among the Islamist Shi‘i ideologies, militarist/messianist and fascist Islamists have the highest degree of antagonism toward intellectuals. Fighting against intellectuals is also one of the main agendas of militarist and fascist Islamists. When confronted with their rivals in political campaigns, militarists and fascists represent themselves and authoritarian clerics as the real intellectuals in the country. Intellectualism does not merely belong to secular or religious intellectuals, and different circles have different approaches toward the main discussions and discourses in the modern Iranian histories. The history of intellectualism in Iran is a mirror that reflects the multi-faceted and diverse cultural scene of Iranian society, something that militarist/messianist and fascist Islamisms cannot tolerate. Iranian intellectuals have been the reference groups for almost all Iranian social movements and counter-movements, from the Constitutional Movement of 1906–7 to the Nationalization of Oil Movement of 1953 and from the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the Civil Rights Movement of 1996–8 to the Green Wave of 2009. Absorbing ideas

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and thoughts from neighboring countries, i.e. the Ottoman Empire and Russia, European countries, the US, India and Japan, Iranian intellectuals at a variety of points in history have done a great job in importing ideas, interacting with other cultures and producing native ideas, theories and thoughts. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, Iranian intellectuals have been preoccupied by issues of cultural, economic, political and social development, Iran’s relations with the West, despotism, law and reason, and the role of religion in modern society. Iranian intellectuals have been the prime mediators between the forces of tradition and modernity and have contributed significantly to the formation of the modern Iranian self-image. A series of fundamental questions regarding nationalism, identity, democracy, development and the relation between Islam and modern politics in Iran cannot be addressed and analyzed without looking at the thoughts and ideas of Iranian intellectuals. The basic questions that Iranian intellectuals have been trying to address, deal with confrontation with the West, the gap between the nation and state, the ways and means to overcome underdevelopment of the nation, nepotism, cronyism, autocracy and authoritarianism, and building a national identity shared by all Iranians. Some of the solutions offered by different groups of intellectuals are religious revivalism, an Islamic caliphate, Islamic internationalism, reviving the pre-Islam Persian Empire, the separation of values and technology, being selective toward Western civilization’s achievements, secularization, democratization, civil society, and the separation of state and religion. Although contradictory, the solutions are addressing different sets of questions. There are four sets of dualities in Iranian society that differentiates Iranian intellectuals from each other: religious/secular, authoritarian/ democrat, liberal/totalitarian, and left/right. Three decades ago, the traditional/modern duality was the most important schism to divide Iranian intellectuals but now they are not trapped solely within a traditionalism/modernism duality anymore and other issues have pushed this one to the periphery. Secularists believe in the separation of religious and political institutions, while Islamists do not believe in

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this separation and have tried to merge religious institutions with the state. Authoritarians put the power in a few hands that are unelected, unaccountable and above the law. Totalitarians do not believe in the free flow of information, universal human rights, due process and the rule of law. Leftists believe in centralization of the economy and more regulation while right wing oriented groups are inclined toward privatization of governmental companies and deregulation. There are five groups of intellectuals in post-revolutionary Iran. The first group is religious, mainly authoritarian, and left wing oriented. This group does involve democracy and freedom in their discourse, but in essence it serves the cause of a religious authoritarian regime. ‘Ali Shari‘ati (1933– 77) and Morteza Motahhari (1920– 79) are the father figures for this brand. This group identifies itself with the worldwide struggle of previously colonized and developing societies against imperialism (estekba¯r) and injustice. Religion for this group is a tool to oppose Western hegemony and the despotic secular regime and revive the glorious epoch of Islam. Although this brand rejects the West uncritically, it does not confirm all doctrines of Islamic tradition. Shari‘ati rejects conservative Shi‘ism (Shi‘eh-ye Safavi) and Motahhari criticizes the rural reading of Islamic jurisprudence and distortions ( feqh-e deha¯ti, tahrifa¯t): they exalt the radical and revived versions (Shi‘eh-ye alavi and Esla¯m-e asil) respectively. They both ideologized Islam and made it a practical political ideology that later served the clerics to create their Islamic government. They incorporated many ideas from leftist intellectuals such as ideology, class, capitalism, imperialism, bourgeoisie, labor, revolution and exploitation, and internalized them in the Islamic ideology of themselves. The second group is secular, democrat and mostly left wing oriented. Samad Behrangi (1939– 68), Amir Husayn A¯rya¯npour (1924– ), Ehsa¯n Tabari (1916– 90) and Bizhan Jazani (1939– 75) are the prominent figures of this branch before the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The followers of this brand of intellectualism took an active part in the revolution of 1979 but for the most part they were either prosecuted or ostracized after the consolidation of power by the clergy. This group believes that religion belongs to confined

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individual privacy and even in that realm is not a healthy prescription for the masses. They have been criticizing Sufism as the main cause of the decline of Iranian society and culture. Some members of the Iranian Writers Society that is still active and under pressure in Iran pursue the same route of thought and action. Two members of this group, Mohammad Mokhta¯ri and Mohammad Ja‘far Pouyandeh, were killed by the Intelligence Ministry high officials in 1998.3 The third group is religious, authoritarian, somewhat totalitarian and right wing oriented. Jala¯l A¯l-e Ahmad (1923– 69) has been the most influential intellectual who advocated anti-Westernization policies and almost all authoritarian and right wing oriented intellectuals in post-revolutionary Iran consider him as their spiritual teacher. This brand of intellectualism looks at religion as a vital, native and effective asset to fight the West and consolidate the authoritarian regime and to push for totalitarian policies in society and culture. Therefore, not only are religious institutions merged into political institutions and vice versa, but ideologized religion is identified with politics. This group, after the clerics, has been effectively advocated theory of jurist guardianship (the vela¯yat-e faqih). The most important question for this group concerns identity and their answer is an authoritarian/totalitarian religious identity that is modeled after Shi‘i clerical authority. The disciples of Ahmad Fardid (1910– 94), especially Reza Da¯vari (1933– ), converted to the authoritarian religious right after the Islamic Revolution and joined the authoritarian branch of intellectualism. The totalitarian intellectuals give their followers faith-based wars, faith-based justice, faith-based social services, faith-based law enforcement, faith-based education, faith-based medicine, and faithbased science. For this group, religion and politics are the same. As a result, religious sin is considered to be a crime and any government should punish its subjects for committing sin. The fourth group of intellectuals which call themselves “religious intellectuals” is religious, democrat, somewhat politically liberal and mostly left wing oriented. Mehdi Ba¯zarga¯n (1907– 95), Abdolkarim Soroush (1945– ) and Ali Shari‘ati (his more humanistic side) are the most important figures of this category. Religious intellectuals have a

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199

selective approach toward Islamic tradition and the West. Their project has been to re-examine their own cultural and scientific heritage and reconstruct Shi‘ism based on the epochal necessities and the basic principles of Islam, i.e. freedom, democracy, spirituality and justice. Religious intellectuals fully engaged in debate about democratization and the role of religion in this process in the 1990s and 2000s while in the 1980s and 1970s they were more focused on identity and social justice issues. Exploring and finding indigenous forms and expressions of modernity is another project pursued by the religious intellectuals. Religious intellectuals believe that modern ideas could not be extracted from religious texts. Religion for them is not merely a subject of study but a subject for faith. They have a mission to demystify religion and clean it from superstitions. In spite of Shi‘i clerics, they do not make a living through believing and advocating for their religion. They believe that other than ejteha¯d in offshoots and non-essentials of Islam, i.e. Islamic jurisprudence, there should be ejteha¯d in principles: in how believers understand their beliefs, how they extract ordinances from religious texts and how they relate to the sacred. The fifth group is secular, democrat, somewhat politically liberal and mostly right wing oriented. The members of this group mainly lives abroad in exile. Da¯riush Sha¯yega¯n (1935– ), Ehsa¯n Nara¯qi (1926– ) and Seyyed Hussein Nasr (1933– ) are prominent figures of this group. These secular intellectuals may be publicly faithful to a religion, like Nasr, or be silent about their faith, or atheist. Religion for this group is a matter of spirituality; they are completely against using religion as an ideology. Politically, they are liberal democrats and because of this position, they have never had a place in political society and polity in the Islamic Republic. Among this group, only Nara¯qi is enthusiastic about the democratization process in Iran; Nasr and Shayega¯n have been silent about it. The religious liberal intellectuals believe in dialogue and exchange between cultures on a global scale. While religious intellectuals still have a social justice agenda, the liberal group insists on open doors to the West. Their critical position toward Iranian Islamic government

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has not stopped them from criticizing empiricism, modern technology, scientism and physicalism. The members of this group are inclined toward oriental Sufism and mysticism. Similar to the third group, the identity crisis of Iranian intellectuals is another issue that this group has been working on, while religious intellectuals have left it behind. Thinking about identity issues, some sections of the followers of the third group still identify with the writings of Nasr and Sha¯yega¯n. Out of these five branches of intellectualism in Iran, the first three were direct responses to the process of change under the Pahlavis. The fourth one is the direct result of the presence of religion in public affairs after the Islamic Revolution. The fifth one has been around for around 150 years, from when Iranians began to know the West better and study it from a civilizational and developmental point of view. In spite of differences in ideas and opinions, all these five groups have a number of common features. They are all politically active and have been trying to translate their thoughts to strategies and policies. They have been taking sides in political events and tried to influence the political process. Whether in power or opposition, inside Iran or in exile, in prison or free, they have tried to reach out and make known their thoughts on the nation’s crises and alternatives. Iranian intellectualism has been an intellectual and political project. They have all been trying to create ideologies to fight the status quo and build the new system. Whether Islamism, religious nationalism, socialism, liberalism, totalitarianism and mixtures of them, all colored with Iranian cultural specifications, the ideological concern is part of the contemporary intellectual history of Iran. The third common feature is constructing a negative image of the West. Introducing themselves as an indigenous response to the perceived cultural and political attack of the West, they share with the authoritarian government the blame for demonizing the “other”. This image could be focused on the Western countries’ foreign policy and imperialism. Almost all of them are reactions to the close contact of Iranian society with Western civilization from the second half of the nineteenth century.

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201

In spite of their differences, the work of Iranian intellectuals shows the diversity of ideas and thoughts in Iranian society and public discourses at any moment of Iran’s contemporary society. Coming from different backgrounds, Iranian intellectuals, other than the second group, have been trying to keep Shi‘i religion alive in the public sphere in different ways. They all recognize this need that the Iranian version of Islam should be theoretically and organizationally reformed.4 They have failed to institutionalize a modern political and legal culture, to decrease the gap between the nation and the state, and to tackle xenophobia and conspiracy theory. Iranian militarist/messianist and fascist Islamists have only some inclination toward the third group. They entirely reject other groups and are not hesitant to advocate their elimation. They look at religious intellectuals as their political alternative and accuse them of not believing in religious dogmas similar to secular intellectuals.

CHAPTER 13 CONCLUSION

The new wave of Islamic social and political movements has motivated case studies on different local, national and regional brands of Islamism that advocate a militant and aggressive approach to Islam.1 Islamist literature is partially religious, but the force with which it expresses its political objectives and its social agenda are mostly secular. These ideologies differ with respect to the proper role of religion in the public sphere, democracy, development, social norms (see Table 13.1), rights, economy and foreign policy. Iranian Shi‘i Islamism encapsulates ideologies of a variety of movements and groups, from reformist Islamists who have sought change within the scope of the limited electoral process to antidemocratic Islamists who espouse violence against “others”. The complexity of Iran’s domestic politics is partially due to the diversity of Islamist and non-Islamist ideologies and the way they interact in the Iranian political sphere. Due to the juxtaposition of contradictory ideas and agendas, Iranian Shi‘i Islamism seems labyrinthine. Is it a set of repressive or liberating ideologies? The worsening status of women, the application of shari’ah law, limiting the free flow of information, the daily repression of university students, women and labor movements, the proliferation of moral strictures, authoritarian policies toward political participation and competition, and daily violation of human rights are the signs of a set of repressive ideologies that differentiate

Charismatic Leader

State Law

Clerical Leader

Shari‘ah Law

Sacred Texts

Nationalist

Clerical Auth.

Shari‘ah-oriented

Justice-oriented Scripturalist

Rule of

NA

Clerics

Labor Unions, Student Associations, Scientific and Professional Societies, etc. (licensed) Religious Institutions

Labor Unions, Islamic Associations (licensed)

Civil Society

Shi‘i Islamisms with Respect to Critical Public Policy Issues

Socialist

Table 13.1

Social (more participation in religious Institutions) Economic (distribution of wealth)

Political (elite)

Political (mobilization of masses), Economic (distribution of wealth) Economic, political (elite)

Development

The leader’s ejteha¯d as the source of all personal and public laws The source of all personal and public laws Justice as an independent value domineering in reading shari‘ah

Qur’an as the source of Islamity

Qur’an as the main source of Islamity

Shari‘ah

CONCLUSION 203

Source: courtesy of the author.

Leader

Leader

Militarist/ Messianist Fascist

Rule of

State Law

continued

Mysticismoriented

Table 13.1

Labor Unions, Student Associations, Scientific and Professional Societies, etc. (licensed) Religious, military (loyal to the leader) Religious/military (loyal to the leader)

Civil Society

Political

Political

Cultural political

Development

Public law as it is enforced by the leader

Politicized

Secondary as compared to ethics and mysticism in Muslims’ public life

Shari‘ah

204 POLITICAL ISLAM IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN

CONCLUSION

205

themselves from Western and secular ideologies. Supporting oppressed social groups and fighting Westernization imposed on Islamic societies by colonialism and despotism are some aspects of a liberating ideology in a developing country such as Iran. Shi‘i Islamist ideologies are a mixture of both reactionary and progressive agendas. The progressive agenda is only limited to social justice and social welfare programs. These programs have been diminishing through the years. Due to the necessities and obligations of political power and social and economic demands, Iranian Shi‘i Islamists had to occupy official positions themselves in a political field that is structured by Western political thought to run a government. The Iranian modern state structure from the early twentieth century is based on the primacy of the state in shaping public policies and allocating resources. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 added some aspects to this structure that are the offshoots of Islamic and Islamist ideologies. These aspects are the major themes of populism, privileges of clerical establishment, the ideologization of religion, the primacy of Islamic laws, and the importance of social and cultural policies to manipulate public opinions and the public sphere.

Democracy for a Few, Pluralism for Insiders By the late 1990s Iran’s domestic opposition movement, an alliance of mysticism-oriented, nationalist and some sections of socialist Islamists, posed the most potent challenge to clerical authoritarian rule in the country. Its success was especially striking for analysts who do not recognize the plurality of Islamic and Islamist ideologies in Iran. Although the office of the religious leader wants to permeate all levels of government, micromanage the whole country and prefers militarist Islamism, it should and usually does work on a mandate agreed upon by a couple of groups that have different Islamic and Islamist agendas. From 2005, when Ahmadinejad was elected as the president, these groups were limited to clerical authoritarian, Shari‘ah-oriented, militarist and fascist Islamists. The presidential election of 2009 was a turning point that elevated militarist Islamists

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to the highest point of their power since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. What explains the variation between competitive, contested autocracy in Iran is the plurality of Islamist agendas and programs in the Islamic Republic. This plurality may have positive consequences for the democratization process as well as limiting the process to insiders whose bases are shrinking exponentially. It dynamically includes some factions and excludes others at the same time. Khomeini mostly stood above the divisions between clerical authoritarian, socialist, nationalist, mysticism-oriented and shari‘ahoriented Islamist ideologies in action and this is the key for his success to mobilize many sections of Iranian society. But as a clerical authoritarian Islamist he was successful in recognizing the demands and concerns of other Islamist groups and to move based on the common denominator of all Islamists at the time. He was trying to have most of these Islamists under his charismatic leadership and traditional authority. After consolidating power, Khamenei distanced himself from socialist, nationalist and mysticism-oriented Islamists to rely on clerical authoritarian, shari‘ah-oriented, militarist and fascist Islamist forces. He knew that other Islamists had their doubts about his leadership and he needed the authoritarian political camp’s confirmation to survive in his leadership position. By using the coercive powers of the government to silence his critics, he lost his legitimacy among many Islamist groups in the beginning of his reign. The Ba¯zarga¯n administration was mainly shaped by the leaders of nationalist parties who were sympathetic to nationalist Islamist ideology. Although they had a softer version of Islamic ideology, they accepted the core ideas of the Islamic state. The Musavi administration’s agenda was based on an amalgamation of socialist, shari‘ah-oriented and clerical authoritarian Islamisms. Khomeini wanted the Mir Husayn Musavi administration to work with Islamist revolutionaries who were representing these brands of Islamism while they had to confront nationalist, Marxist, and some other Islamist and Islamic ideologies (such as the ideologies of the Muja¯hedin-e

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Khalq, the Forqa¯n and the Hojjatieh2) who did not agree with the foundations of the Islamic Republic and its clerical leadership. The Rafsanjani administration worked with the politicians who were advocating clerical authoritarian, shari‘ah-oriented, and softer versions of socialist Islamisms but decreased the role of the latter one. The Kha¯tami administration gave the upper hand to ex-socialist, and now reformist, Islamists while working with mysticism-oriented and nationalist Islamists. The Ahmadinejad administration took a new direction, giving priority to militarist and fascist Islamisms while working with shari‘ah-oriented and clerical authoritarian Islamists. As we can see, different administrations during the Islamic Republic have been based on loose coalitions of different brands of Shi‘i Islamisms. The internal political dynamic of the Islamic Republic in spite of its rejection of ‘others’ is due to the competition and conflict among these ideologies. What is constant in more than 30 years of Islamist rule is the presence of clerical and Shari‘ahoriented Islamists in all post-revolutionary administrations, except that of Ba¯zarga¯n. In the pre-revolutionary era, most Iranian Shi‘i Islamists were against the clerics, although some of them praised their distance from the secular governments and their opposition against the West. Since the Revolution, Islamists have been cooperating with the Shi‘i clerics to make the idea of Islamic government take place within the framework of a nation-state.

Outcomes Have Iranian Islamist ideologies fulfilled their express missions? The answer for some of them is yes and for some others is no. They have failed to deliver what could benefit the general public but they have been successful in taking power and holding on to it. As a result, Iran has been the first country with a Shi‘i government in charge that tries to implement (only the penal code of) the Islamic shari‘ah. But what can be seen is that Iranian Islamist ideologies in power have not proven themselves as a workable alternative for liberal democracies in the West. Iranian Islamism has established a brutal

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hierocratic sultanism that in many ways oppresses Iranian individuals on a daily basis. None of the Islamist ideologies discussed in this book provide a viable template for the organization of Iranian society. Three decades after the victorious Iranian Revolution of 1979, the majority of the population are still dealing with poverty, drug abuse, corruption, mismanagement, environmental disasters and oppression. Even a popular reform movement in the 1990s was not able to overcome the systemic hurdles to foreseeable political and economic developments. In contrast to Iranian Islamist ideologies’ claim to provide a systematic and comprehensive worldview, a political and social program for social justice development, a decent economic situation, and a satisfying moral system, even when they took power they failed to deliver. Islamists in power, from each brand, have not, for the most part, lived up to their ideals. The instrument of ejteha¯d (scholarly endeavor to make a jurisprudential and ethical decision by independent interpretation of the sacred texts) and estesla¯h (considering expediency of the Muslim community) have not been helpful in this respect. Appointment of close associates to positions for which they are unqualified, coupled with the award of billion dollar no-bid contracts to political allies (such as the IRGC during the Ahmadinejad administration) have brought charges of cronyism, nepotism and political favoritism for every administration. The Islamic Republic has held thousands of political prisoners. It is typical for these prisoners to be subjected to physical and psychological torture, lengthy interrogations, solitary confinement, inhumane prison conditions and denial of medical care. Iranian university students, women and ethnic activists are being routinely degraded and humiliated. The repressed usually report when they have the opportunity. There are hundreds of books, short stories, blogs and recorded memoirs which reflect the suffering of the repressed.4 Every year hundreds of Iranians, among them human rights activists and leaders of ethnic and religious minority groups, have been prosecuted, tried and imprisoned without due process.

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Ordinary people have been executed for non-violent accusations. Some have been stoned to death, and some have been executed less than ten days after their arrest. Iran has had the highest rates of executing individuals who were under 18 years old at the time of committing crimes every year.5 In large numbers, Iranian women nationwide have been prosecuted for campaigning for legal equality and an end to discrimination using non-violent, grassroots strategies.6 Despite their peaceful approach, they have been charged with acting against national security, and the government has employed all manner of violence against them; the Islamic Republic has systematically intimidated, harassed, beaten, imprisoned and tortured women for pursuing their rights. Iranian governmental officials routinely call Iran an Islamic utopia, a land ruled by social justice. Yet the country has the highest rate of heroin addiction in the world,7 staggering levels of unemployment, prostitution, depression and suicide. About half of the population lives below the poverty line.8 The country has had, since the Revolution, one of the highest rates of brain drain in the world.9

Consequences Islamic studies since the victory of the Iranian Revolution have been a set of governance-centered debates. The domination of Islamism pushed all other subjects of study out of the clerics’ research topics. For example, not a single treatise or book has been written on the science– religion relationship to create a nexus of these two, while before the revolution tens of them were published.10 There is almost no effort to engage with the public. Before the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iranian Shi‘i clerics were eager to participate in any discussion on religion, and the aim was to persuade Muslims that Islam provides the best form of political and personal governance. Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Iranian Shi‘i clerics do not see the need for defending their beliefs, policies, and agendas. They all too frequently resort to force whenever and wherever confronted with criticism and dissidence.

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Implementing Islamism and executing the ordinances of the Islamist reading of Islam have been disastrous for religion and religiosity in Iran. While America’s separation of church and state has encouraged the flourishing of religion in the US, Islamism in power and equating religion and politics have actually discouraged religiosity in Iran.

Paradoxes There are some paradoxes inherent in Islamist ideologies. The first one is related to Islamic, Shi‘i, local and party-based ummat. The idea of an Islamic ummat is based on pan-Islamism that does not recognize any nation-state. In spite of Sunni salafism that advocates an Islamic caliphate,11 the Shi‘i Islamic state is bound to national borders. This is due to the geopolitics of Shi‘i Islam that is scattered around the Muslim world and has a majority in only four countries: Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Bahrain. The Muslim majority states are considered contingent, provisional and incomplete while almost all provisions of modern national states are embodied in the Islamist state in Iran. The idea of Islamic ummat works for a revolutionary movement, but it does not work for a sovereign state. Supporting Shi‘i movements in other parts of the world does not replace the idea of ummat (ummah in Arabic). Another paradox that exists relates to the situation of Islamists that are imprisoned by the nature of the state; they all benefit and suffer from clientalism, centralism, patrimonialism, authoritarianism and territorialization. Iranian Islamists in power formed a new social strata that are born out of and parasite to the state, what they had been criticizing the secular state for before capturing power in 1979. Iranian Islamists in power not only did not introduce a universal outlook against particularism in the Muslim world but also contributed to Shi‘i particularism and tried to establish a coalition against Sunni secular states. The third one is rooted in the question of the West. This question has been at the center of Islamist ideologies’ quest and re-evaluation of the world around them. Other than antagonism, Islamists have not

CONCLUSION

211

come to terms with the West. Whether the West is seen as an important section of internal dialogue or a dominant civilization in the world, whatever its geographical domain is considered to be, this kind of confrontation with the dominant power of the world may very well not further the Islamists’ cause. Scripturalist Islamists totally ignore Western philosophy and social sciences as well as Islamic philosophy and mysticism that are considered non-Islamic and eclectic by this brand. Militarist Islamists are only interested in Western technology and Western literature on security, world order and military – industrial complexes. Nationalist Islamists are not interested in Western philosophy and social sciences but natural and pure sciences and technology. Mysticism-oriented Islamists and socialist Islamists are the most open brands toward Western philosophy and social sciences. Clerical authoritarian Islamists among clerics do not want to be exposed to Western knowledge while fascist Islamists in the universities are disciples of Heidegger in this regard and totally reject analytical philosophy. The fourth paradox is secular/religious dualism. While almost all Islamist ideologies reject secularism in one way or another, they all play a part in secularization of imagined idealistic Islam which has governed Muslim minds for centuries. Iranian society has been in the process of transformation from close identification with religious institutions to a more separated relationship. Following the emergence of the Islamic regime and monopolization of power and wealth in the hands of a few clerics and their loyalists, there has been a cultural shift in the public from religion as ideology to religion as a set of spiritual teachings, and hence a reduction of the authority of Shi‘i clerics who advocate ideologized religion. In spite of this shift, the government has continued its emphasis on religion as the ideology of the state. Iranian society no longer looks at the clergy as the sole custodians of revealed knowledge. Due to the high levels of perceived corruption and repression, religious institutions have been losing their position of social and spiritual authority. Obligatory religious observations in public and execution of harsh punishments in Islamic penal code have obscured the humane

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aspects of religion and religious creeds, practices and institutions are losing their social significance. The state-sponsored Islamicization process has led to a decrease in mosque attendance, alms payments, and trust in clergy and other religious institutions.

Totalitarian Quest Although there were strong elements of totalitarianism in the clerical authoritarian, socialist and shari‘ah-oriented Islamisms, Islamist totalitariansm was absent from the Iranian political scene in the 1980s and 1990s. This was due to four phenomenon in Shi‘i tradition and Iranian modern culture: the traditional legitimacy of diversity of fatwas and opinions among the clerics that was a detriment to issuing a unified set of opinions and rules for everyone in the country, the loose network of ‘ulama¯ that did not help ruling ‘ulama¯ to build a single party political system, the horizontal bonds among people in different political factions and civil society institutions, and the rise of the middle class during the Pahlavi era that has resisted Islamicization policies. Khamenei has considered and executed four set of policies to tackle these issues and establish a totalitarian state. By putting pressure on high-ranking clerics such as blocking their bank accounts and putting them under house arrest, he has made sure that no one will dare to issue a fatwa with political nuances. After two decades of his reign, the voice of Shi‘i clerics is less diverse and more homogenized. The traditional legitimacy of a diversity of fatwas and opinions among the clerics can no longer be a detriment to the issuing a unified set of opinions and rules for every one in the country by the leader’s office. Khamenei has built a tight network of militia in the country that is always ready to take action against dissidents. This network was crucial in repressing the Green Wave unrests after the 12 June 2009 presidential election. This network is supported by the security system and judiciary and is run by the IRGC. This network has replaced the loose, slow-responding and trustless network of ‘ulama¯ that failed to build a single party during Khomeini’s rule.

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To tackle the horizontal bonds among people in different political factions and civil society institutions, Khamenei has pursued three strategies: to create questionable civil society institutions in every aspect and area of Iranian social and political life, closing the doors of polity to them, and putting them under the constant pressure of coercive forces. Khamenei has tried to replace the lower class in rural areas for the middle urban class as the political base for the government. Almost all economic, social and cultural policies of the government are pointed against the middle class: stagnation of wages for white collar workers in a country with double digit inflation rates, pork barrel projects for rural areas, having no connections with members of civil society and political parties and instead having people metropolitan margins around him, and funding seminaries that attract their disciples from rural areas and suburban poor neighborhoods. Khameni’s platform of economic justice and clean government without triggering concrete change in government openness or accountability is to marginalize the demands of the middle class and highlight the need of the lower class and rural residents.

State Corporatism Khamenei is the most powerful leader in Iran now. The jurist members of the Guardian Council, the members of the Expert Assembly and Expediency Council, the head of judiciary and high ranking commanders of the IRGC, all Khamenei’s appointees, are the next order of power. Members of parliament and the president are indirectly appointed through the disqualification process by the Guardian Council. After the end of the Khatami era and the beginning of the Ahmadinejad administration, Khamenei maintained a heavy influence over all inner circles of power and has a grip on the coercive powers in the country. Even when Khatami was elected to office, power remained in the hands of Khamenei and his entourage, although some sections were not entirely loyal to him. In any situation and during any administration, Khamenei has remained in a position of significant power in the last two decades.

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His continued and encompassing presence within the government ensures the ongoing influence of his authoritarian policies and ideology, or clerical sultanism– a new authoritarianism that provides the foundation for a clientalist/hierocratic state. This ideology has a strong flavor of totalitarianism both in political and social senses during Khamenei government. The 12 June presidential election was an important development in shifting from clerical sultanism to military dictatorship. In the post-Green Wave era, Khamenei rules mostly through a reliance on his military commandership. In this period, the IRGC has control over every aspect of governance. During Khamenei’s reign, the state systematically recovered despotism and firm control of the country’s politics and the key sectors of the society, economy and culture, creating a regime that closely corresponds to the traditional definitions of authoritarianism, a form of government in which the ruler is an absolute dictator not restricted by a constitution or laws or opposition. Khamenei suppressed the remaining political forces that Khomeini did not crush. The authoritarian government of Khamenei promoted the habit of conduct, thought, and speech expressing total submission to the personal will of the clerical rulers and absolute obedience to clerical authority, as against the individual freedom of Iranian people. By resort to executive order, Khamenei has violated many articles of the constitution especially chapter three that is about the people’s rights. The two elections (parliamentary in March 2008 and presidential in June 2005) before 12 June 2009 and 14 June 2013 presidential elections can be more correctly called “bai‘ah” (confirmation of the leader’s office candidates by the people) than elections; not only was the opposition shut out of the elections by mass disqualifications, but the results of both were so questionable (despite clear evidence that the coalition loyal to the leader and its candidates would win) that the true results cannot be calculated. Even the opposition that is loyal to Khomeini, the Islamic Republic and its constitution had no media and no chance to express itself. All ways of protesting and criticizing the government were rendered unavailable. This situation was worsened after the presidential election of 2009.

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The regional governors, the presidents of universities and the heads of sport federations are appointed and removed by the executive branch that should be confirmed by the leader, while the judicial branch is subservient to the leader and the media are tightly controlled by his office. All members of the appointed bodies such as the Expert Council, the Guardian Council and Friday prayer leaders are loyal to the leader due to their direct appointment. The Expert Assembly members are indirectly selected by the Guardian Council through disqualification and the bai‘ah processes. Khamenei appoints the board members and executives of Shi‘i and Sunni seminaries in the whole country. The Islamic Republic transferred from a traditionalist authoritarian state in the 1980s to a developmentalist authoritarian one in the 1990s. In the late 1990s for a short period of time, the regime shifted to a partially democratic regime but this situation did not last. In the 2000s, the regime shifted toward a militarist/corporatist one to suppress the civil rights movement and at the same time guarantee the survival in power of a small group of ex-military commander and security agents. In addition to the characteristics of classic authoritarianism, clerical sultanism has a number of other distinct features that bear a remarkable similarity to the common components of modern authoritarianism. Under Khamenei, the government became one of personal asset, power, authority, and showing off. Renewed senses of nationalism and nostalgia have also sprung up under Khamenei by resort to nuclear proliferation: the Islamic state is constantly glorified, external (Western) enemies lurk everywhere, any opposition is the voice of the nation’s the enemies, and reclaiming the heritage lost by the collapse of the Islamic empires is a priority. The Islamist government is to establish the ideal state on earth. An even more long-standing legacy of Khamenei is the sultanistic corporatism built on the ruins of the despotic monarchy’s clientalist state and the Iran– Iraq war’s organizational heritage. Iran under Khamenei has been constructing a semi-corporatist state model, with cabinet members or key leader’s aides and appointees chairing or serving on corporate boards. These corporations in the Islamic

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Republic were reconstructed as the tools of the state when bureaucracy was not working for the benefits of the leaders and transformed to the hardcore of the state when ex soldiers and commanders entered the boards and used them as the apparatus of gaining and sustaining power. The IRGC possesses the most important institutions and infrastructures in the communications, oil industry, import and export, mining and auto industries, transferring them from state companies to corporations under its rule. These corporations in the state-capitalist Iranian society used to belong to the state and even after pseudo-privatization receive funds and low interest loans from nationalized banks. In this situation, the state mediates between the key institutional economic actors created and supported by and in the framework of the state, especially the main industrialists and trade unions, and distributes the rents and subsidies. Khamenei’s government has a number of distinct features that bear a remarkable similarity to common components of totalitarian states. The clerical sultanistism of Khamenei’s regime does correspond to a broader definition of corporatism, defined by political scientist Richard Weiner as “the institutionalized tendency of recognizing vital groups and bringing them into a privileged stable relationship of collaboration in a particular policy area”. In the Iranian case, this means an activist state that, while nationalizing big industries, banks and foreign trade, has regained majority ownership or complete control (through the so-called state corporations or sherkat-ha-ye dowlati managed by the executive branch, and the foundations or bonya¯d-ha directly managed under the leader) over the most technologically advanced or profitable sectors of the economy. The former section that was not under the leader were, for the most part, transferred to the foundations under the IRGC during the Ahmadinejad administration. Max Weber defines authoritarian regimes distinguished by patronage, nepotism, and cronyism as sultanistic. This label captures the tendency for Khamenei’s friends, appointees and officers to control most of the ‘state corporations’, foundations and public and private companies majority-owned by the state or people who are loyal to Khamenei. The political and personal allies of the leader

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head the boards of companies that together account for 55 per cent of Iran’s economy run by the foundations.12 The rest was captured by Ahmadinejad’s allies who are ex-military and intelligence service officers also loyal to Khamenei and the foundations under IRGC. Ahmadinejad’s conquer of the executive branch was the result of Khamenei’s leadership capturing the whole economy in his hands directly or indirectly. Khamenei has installed loyal figures in all critical positions in the country; other than the high ranking military positions, members of the Cultural Revolution Council, the head of the staterun TV and radio organization and other appointed bodies which are explicitly left at the leaders’ disposal in the constitution. The leader enforces his will in hiring individuals to run the state-owned oil company, defence-related activities, arms import and purchases, import and export of consumption goods and services, banks, information technologies and telecommunications. In the Iranian version, sultanism is distinguished by its almost caste-like character: nearly all of the top officers and high ranking bureaucrats in the Khamenei era began their careers in the 1980s in the IRGC and other revolutionary organizations or clerical establishments. In keeping with Weber’s concept of sultanism, this group, whose powers and wealth grew continuously during Khamenei’s leadership, may be called a Janissary corporation after the elite corps of the Ottoman Empire’s army and the sultan’s guards, whom the sultan personally leads into battle and with whom he generously shares the booty. During the Khatami administration in the 1990s, the political caste was divided between Khomeini’s and Khamenei’s loyalists and the members of this caste were openly competing under the rubric of Islamic ideology and the guardianship of the jurist defined by Khomeini; in real politics, the divided caste backed different candidates and blocs and made the 1997 presidential and 2000 parliamentary elections highly competitive. By contrast, entry into Khamenei’s chosen closed circle is virtually restricted to those with a past in the military, security and intelligence services with total obedience of the ruling clerics, and

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the new members of the caste were said to be “bound” in secrecy; they do not usually give interviews to the media and just give lectures to friendly audiences. Even mid and lower ranked positions in the government and the public sector and college studentships in graduate programs are saved for non-dissidents through harsh ideological recruitment procedures. More than 70 per cent of Ahmadinejad’s cabinet member and Seventh and Eighth Parliaments were former IRGC and former Ministry of Intelligence members. Licences for launching a business in the economy, media and cultural sectors are usually issued for former IRGC and Ministry of Intelligence members. The most powerful men in Iran besides Khamenei – including the president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the speaker of the parliament, Ali La¯rijani, the head of the state-run TV and radio organization, Ezzatullah Zarghami, and the mayor of Tehran, Mohammad Ba¯qer Qa¯liba¯f–have been in the top ranks of the IRGC. Though the authoritarian camp has criticized some of its members for occupying multiple positions, these officials have been serving in multiple high ranking positions. The owners of Iran’s largest firms and enterprises seem to be all insiders (khodi-ha), those deemed politically loyal and willing to share and give back their wealth and revenues as khoms (one-fifth) and other religious taxes to the leader and other ruling clerics. Outsiders (ghair-e khodi-ha) can only work in small business sectors and cannot benefit from the subsidies and rents of the state. The former individuals are allowed to prosper and expand, while many of the latter live under various degrees of pressure to sell at least some of their assets to the state or the “insider” tycoons. During the Khatami administration, an outsider plausibly revealed the details of what would be called the security-based possession of private enterprise;13 in 2007, an insider revealed the details of the “privatization” or possession of public properties and enterprises, in which the assets are “transferred” from the government to the “insider high ranking clerics” and their loyalists.14 The court proceedings against Mohammad Sa‘idi, and his oil transportation company’s subsequent bankruptcy and sale of its most profitable divisions to the former intelligence agents, were

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meant to teach Iranian entrepreneurs a lesson. Private wealth in huge amounts, while it has grown and developed substantially, remains provisional; as far as it is shared with state officials, it remains safe. If it is not subject to redistribution and sharing and the owner experiences conflict with the state or with people close to power, the assets will be at risk of confiscation. Khamenei’s personal friends, former colleagues and appointees tend to control most of the ‘state corporations’ and ostensibly private companies majorityowned by the state or state officials. Even insiders such as Pa¯lizda¯r are not immune to prosecution if they talk about some sections of insiders’ corruption. Oil Ministry officials who were loyal to the former president, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, were purged during the Ahmadinejad administration. During his administration lucrative no-bid petroleum contracts were granted to the military and paramilitary forces and ex-commanders of IRGC. The IRGC is now active in receiving thousands of no-bid contracts in oil, construction, irrigation, transportation, agriculture and mining industries and then redistributing them to the private sector, mostly companies shaped by ex-IRGC commanders. IRGC owns tens of unofficial docks and is highly involved in import and export activities. State-sponsored movie productions (now more than 70 per cent of the entire movie industry),15 lucrative TV productions, and giant publishing contracts go to Khamenei’s loyalists in the media and culture sector. The most popular and famous sport clubs are funded by the government and their board members are often state officials appointed by the executive power. Should the economy – which has achieved huge revenues of more than $270 billion in the first three years of the Ahmadinejad administration (Iran had about $400 billion from exporting oil from 1979 to 2005) – begin to falter, so too would the legitimacy of the Khamenei regime for its supporters in the clerical establishment and ba¯za¯r. The decrease in oil production and oil prices from the mid 2008 and high inflation (up to 30 per cent)/high unemployment (up to 14 per cent) in Iran, along with the almost certain new government spending on national projects, religious programs, social

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welfare, and salary and pension increases to ensure Ahmadinejad’s popularity, make Iran’s economic and political situation look less stable than the clerics would like. Ahmadinejad declared ‘social justice’ and distribution of oil revenues key focuses of his presidency, something he could not deliver. According to Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index, Iran’s ranking rose during Ahmadinejad’s administration (from 87 in 2005 to 88, 105, 131 and 141 in 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 respectively). Pandemic corruption has reached the level of a national catastrophe, yet the very nature of the regime makes fighting it nearly impossible. Khamenei’s authoritarianism and sultanistic corporatism have destroyed the legitimacy of all key political and social institutions in Iran; the regime’s foundation lies only in its claims to religious authority, fighting against the West and social justice. In the short term, the clerical sultanism of Khamenei’s regime has created a strong, unchallenged political entity and offered political stability for Iran; it also represents a proud, truculent face to the world. Yet in the long term, its policies have brought economic stagnation, political destabilization, and the deterioration of external relations. As students of the Iranian Revolution, Khamenei and his clique must be aware of this evolution, yet as successful authoritarian rulers, they will doubtless ignore it and continue to marginalize any alternative voice in the country.

It Does Not Work: The Guardian Jurist Theory in Crisis The aftermath of the 12 June 2009 election, in which the Islamic Republic suffered one of its periodic crises, gave the memory of Ruhullah Khomeini a new lease of life. Events demonstrated the limits of the theory that a country can be relied on to be stable and on the right track if it is ruled by a guardian jurist that is claimed to be just and appointed by God. There was much talk of the paradox of legitimacy, whereby the will of individuals can prove collectively ruinous for the government, and of the need for government to counteract the inherently deligitimizing tendencies of people who

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cannot trust the government. Khomeini was revived because he understood that people are very often unreliable. His theory of guardian jurist and his absolute power was mainly based on this premise. Based on slogans and graffiti throughout this time, the political situation can be read as prefiguring the current disillusionment with the Islamic government. The trouble with the theory of the guardianship of the jurist is that it assumes human beings are more subject to power than they actually are. There are five different ways in which these ‘subjects’ can affect the political behavior of the government. First, the state of politics depends on the level of confidence individuals feel about future. The guardian jurist’s legitimacy is fed by the past, not the future. Second, a concern for fairness can trump political motivations: elementary politics teaches that a fraudulent election should result in greater mistrust toward the government and lower turnout in governmental gatherings; at least urban middle class Iranians believe that the rule of this government is unfair. Third, the actions of military and paramilitary forces do have an impact on the entire polity: the belief that the IRGC had acted in bad faith leads to people being “fed up with ideological rule” in general. Fourth, people make many of their political decisions without taking account of the absolute rule of the jurist: instead of acting to maximize their obedience, they succumb to illusions of freedom and democracy. Finally, human behavior is heavily influenced by stories, narratives with a dramatic logic that drive people to action. The internet boom at the start of the millennium was not just a response to the development of a new technology; it expressed a view of the world, including the belief that a new era had arrived in which the monopolized communication and media system of the religious state is going to confront powerful alternatives. Each of these manifestations of human actions shows behavior being driven by forces other than obedience and trust. None of them offers irrational grounds for action in any sense that the ruling caste would recognize. If Iranian politicians have failed to explain repeated crises, it is because they have interpreted political actions through

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an unreal model of irrational decision-making. Thinking of human behavior in this way allows them to claim a high degree of precision for their discipline, which is presented as a kind of applied jurisprudence. The observation that polities are prone to violent swings of emotion, recurrent illusions and powerful stories is a piece of perennial wisdom that is presented by the guardians of the Islamic regime. The ruling caste unconsciously insist that political behavior is a reflexive process intrinsically liable to lead to cycles of unrests and rests, as the beliefs and decisions of participants are reinforced by a desire to go with the trend until the polity becomes unsustainable. The fact that polities in authoritarian states are unstable seems novel only in the context of the Islamic government’s small circles that prevailed after the consolidation of power by the clerics, and in the run-up to the recent crisis. It is wrong to imply that the clerics believed otherwise. Just as emulation is the keynote of traditionalist clerics, Mesba¯h’s “domination by terror” is key to his different view of the Islamic polity – a view that explains the underlying instabilities of the Islamic government. Here Mesba¯h endorses the caricature of imamate propagated by Islamist ideologues anxious to confer a distinguished patrimony on an illegitimate despotic rule. Certainly, “domination by terror” is Mesba¯h’s central idea, but he never saw it as working in a mechanical fashion. Through a network of hidden followers carrying conflicting interests, in a complex process that always involves human emotions, the domination by terror was neither all-effective nor non-problematic. It could be thwarted by collusion among security and military forces, and when given free rein its social effects could be seriously harmful. Like other thinkers of the Islamist generation, Mesba¯h understood the imperfectability of human institutions. He was concerned about the ways in which everyday politics detach people from their religious communities. The central flaw of Khomeini’s theory against which Mesba¯h fought in the 1990s and 2000s was to imagine that an insoluble problem – obedience in the age of rationality – had been solved

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just by the establishment of the Islamic Republic and its absolute rule of the guardian jurist. The error was repeated in the 1990s by the reformists, when they came to believe that complex political formulae and dual sovereignty could tame the public. This was a delusion that none of the traditionalist authoritarians entertained. They knew from the outset that the authoritarian government should resort to force and atrocity to stay in power and, opposed to the raw belief of Khomeini, “people’s vote cannot be the yardstick”. The hegemony of totalitarianism in the Iranian polity obscured Khomeini’s scepticism about ruling without the people’s consent, his most important contribution to the clerical political tradition. Mesba¯h was not welcome in the polity during Khomeini’s rule but he knew Khomeini’s theory and its shortcomings well. He argued that Khomeini’s inclination toward people’s consent was just a trick when political participation was part of the dominant discourse. Mesba¯h said that governments could never totally rule based on people’s consent and legitimacy should come from a divine source that only clerics have access to, a claim vindicated by the miserable record of Khamenei who had no social bases in society. At the same time, he attributed near omniscience and omnipotence to the guardian jurist, and never doubted that if left to its own devices the polity would lead to mistaken decisions and a return to crises. Mesba¯h believed that there is no political mechanism that ensures survival of the regime other than coercion and total control. The clerics who were against the guardianship of the jurist before the revolution, all converted to this theory when they benefited from it. This was through a mix of dogmatic ordinance prescriptions and rhetoric that enjoyed the support of the great majority of clerics. According to this creed, the Islamist regime that was installed from the 1980s onwards could not only ensure stability and promote the execution of Islamic law there but was a model – the only possible model – for Muslim countries everywhere. It was bound to drive every other system out of existence, and would eventually be adopted worldwide. This faith in the universal spread of the Islamist regime animated much of the thinking of the clerics and their loyalists overseeing the world scene.

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An appeal to feqhism helped persuade the villagers and suburban poor to contribute to the regime’s plans for Islamist absolutism in the 1980s and 1990s. Khomeini and the clerical authoritarians knew that there is no realm of the urban public that blindly obeys shari‘ah law. They mobilized the suburban poor as Basij to intimidate the middle class and silence the intellectuals and dissident political activists. It must be doubted, though, that the supporters of this theory would succeed in persuading Iranian people of the adequacy of the conception of guardianship. The theorists of the guardianship of the jurist failed to institutionalize it in universities and public forums, while the members of the ruling caste believe that the notion of guardian jurist is self-perpetuating. They also failed to persuade the public that the jurist rule will bring happiness and welfare for everyone in the country.

Reformist Muslims: Majority or Minority Experiencing various aspects of modernity, grappling with different aspects of colonialism, and interacting with Western civilization have led to different brands and approaches to Islam and Islamic tradition in Muslim societies all around the world. Now we are confronting this question that Iranian Muslims who are advocating reform in their religion, cultures and societies and oppose existing and promised Islamism as the only alternatives for the status quo are in a majority or minority in their communities. The surge of Islamic values and identification with Islamic principles in Muslim nations as well as in the West should not lead us to think that the majority is in the hands of conservatives all over Muslim majority communities. The spreading of Islamic revivalism across the globe in the past 30 years from the Middle East and North Africa to other parts of the world due to US foreign policies and increasing awareness of the colonial past and domestic despotism are not evidence for arguing for this statement that the majority of Muslims are conservative or authoritarinist. There are about 90 countries in the world with more than 50 per cent Muslim populations and these people identify themselves with different ethnicities, races and cultures. They also live under

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different political regimes and social structures. There are secular and Islamists, democrat and authoritarian, liberal and conservative, traditionalist, modernist and post-modernist, and leftist and rightist Muslims. The secular Muslim agendas are promoted in Iran and Afghanistan because there is increasing demand for vindication of human rights, the rule of law and democracy in these Islamic-rule-experienced nations. Due to the social and political experiences of these two nations, these ideas do not reflect a Western vision for the future of Islam. Although the Iranian ruling clerics, members of the Taliban movement and Al-Qaedah introduced these ideas as prescribed by the US and other native secular intellectuals and as a preferred remedy for radical Islam, Iranian and Afghan reformists have not stopped talking about the privatization of religion, democracy and the rule of law as intrinsic remedies for their native problems. According to ideologized Islam that is to legitimize clerical rule, the reformist project is to change the faith to imbue it with Western values as a colonial or imperialistic project. This prescription is divorced from reality in those countries which have not experienced Islamic governance and executed shari‘ah laws. If Muslims are fed a steady diet of clerical rule and enforcing shari‘ah, they will embrace modernity, secularism and everything else the modern world has to offer. The Islamic reformists represent only a small minority of Muslims in countries which have been under authoritarian and secularist rulers and have not experienced Islamic governance. In those Muslim countries whose people have a sense of harsh Islamic rules by their flesh and skin, i.e. lashing, cutting fingers and palms, chopping heads, and stoning demand for democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights reflects the views of the majority. Khamenei and the ruling clerical elite in Iran have always thwarted the exercise of meaningful democracy in Iran, in part because the people, repeatedly, have shown themselves unfaithful to clerical rule. The majority of Iranian people showed their dissatisfaction and dissent by voting for reformist Mohammad Khatami in the short-lived “Tehran spring” to protest against the

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superiority of theocracy over democracy that derives not only from the clergy’s greater knowledge of the Holy Law and its special, frequently charismatic role in Iranian history but also the superiority of Islamic ordinances. The majority of Iranians have showed in consecutive elections that they are not loyal to the clerical elite and their praetorians – the Revolutionary Guards Corps, the Basij, and the Ministry of Intelligence – who see themselves as the ideological vanguard of the nation and Islam. While the ruling elite pretend to maintain its sense of religious mission, the Iranian people, especially the young who do not remember the charisma of Khomeini, are not true believers anymore. Most of the Iranian people remain faithful Shi‘i Muslims but for the vast majority of Iranians, an Islamic missionary spirit is no longer happily married to the national identity and the happiness of its citizens. The Iranian Shi‘i clerics claim to occupy a special and didactic place between God and man. This position is claimed for a class, not individuals. This claim contradicts their post-revolutionary greed and despotic manners. A national survey on Iranians’ public opinions shows that most Iranians believe religious values have been weakened in recent decades.16 The political future of the Muslim world is under the influence of two phases of reactions to Islam in politics. In the first phase, Muslim nations that were successful to establish Islamic governments and Islamic parties were far less tolerant of Western values and more committed to implementing shari‘ah law in varying degrees (Iran under the mullahs, Afghanistan under the Taliban). In the second phase, when the Muslim public would be confronted with the consequences of Islamist ideologies for their public life there will be a backlash. These consequences include but are not limited to sexual segregation, harsh and brutal punishments such as amputation and stoning, disqualification of candidates due to their beliefs, discrimination against women, and intervention of the government in private lives. The first phase begins with Islam as identity, but in the second phase Islam turns to be a set of laws and ordinances; people who do not want to pay a high price for this identity would be disillusioned and they will ask for another brand of Islam or they will leave the

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faith. When disillusioned, women who wear headscarves to express their religiosity in the first phase would find out that most of their rights are violated in the second phase. Then, they will fight for more rights to participate in politics and greater equality in ‘personal status’ laws – the right to gain custody of children or to initiate divorce – but also view Islam as their moral compass and not their political ideology. Due to the colonial experience of the Muslim world, European and American support for Middle Eastern authoritarian and despotic regimes and the total/unconditional support of the West for Israel, Muslims are increasingly embracing Islamic values to oppose the West. Even in the West, a growing number of Muslims advocate enforcing shari‘ah law to identify with a different set of ideas and principles. Western hopes for full integration by Muslims in the West are unlikely to be realized unless a different set of policies and approaches to the Muslim world are adopted. The West should give this opportunity to all Muslim nations to democratically establish their Islamic governments to see the consequences of executing Islamic ordinances in public life.

Slipping Social Authority In the days after the 12 June 2009 presidential election, defeated candidates, political parties, relatives of political prisoners, and others dissatisfied with the outcome appealed to senior members of the clergy to intervene to halt government-led repression. Many reformists hoped that senior clerics would step in following the mass demonstrations, deaths and the arrest of political activists. Yet the only high-ranking leader to openly condemn the government’s actions was Husayn Ali Montazeri, who was once seen as a possible successor to Ruhullah Khomeini, but fell out with him shortly before his death in 1989 over a difference of opinion on human rights. Two other high ranking clerics Yusef Sanei, who once famously issued a fatwa declaring suicide bombings to be “acts of terrorism”

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and Abdolkarim Mousavi Ardebili, who is also seen as close to the reformers, confined themselves to asking the authorities to review allegations made by protestors, and sending their condolences to the families of those killed during the protests. Of the other clerics, some either said nothing, like Java¯di A¯moli, Musa¯ Shobairi Zanja¯ni and Husayn Vahid Khora¯sa¯ni, while others such as Husayn Nuri Hameda¯ni came out in support of the government’s actions. Naser Maka¯rem Shira¯zi was among those who tried to persuade protesters to accept the election result and move on. Lutfullah Sa¯fi Golpa¯yaga¯ni, meanwhile, tried to conciliate between the two sides, urging them to seek a middle way. Two groupings of clerics, the Militant Clerics Assemble and the Qom Seminary Researchers and Lecturers Association, backed the stance taken by defeated reformist candidate Mir Husayn Mousavi throughout the protests. However, these two bodies only represent a small fraction of Shi‘i clerics in Iran. Two powerful clerical bodies from the conservative camp, the Association of Combatant Clerics and the Qom Seminary Instructors Society, chose to remain silent when demonstrators came out onto the streets, although they had not lent their support to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s bid for re-election. Some believe these groups were intimidated into silence by the attacks leveled against Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the former president who chairs both Iran’s Assembly of Experts and the Expediency Council, and backed Mousavi’s election bid. Allies of Ahmadinejad accused Rafsanjani and family members of corruption. When a delegation of protestors visited Qom to speak to clerics on 19 June only Sa¯ne‘i agreed to see them. Elsewhere in Iran, two other conservative clerical associations – located in Tabriz and Isfahan – supported Mousavi prior to the election, an unusual step given the heightened level of repression facing provincial clerics critical of the government. Once again, however, they lapsed into silence once the demonstrators appeared on the streets, and made no comment when Mousavi said the results were illegitimate. Despite the clerics’ reticence about speaking out after the election, the backing that many gave to Mousavi indicates their

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concern that the Ahmadinejad’s administration has acquired too much power and reach. Iranian clerics may be heavily dependent on the state, and its highest-ranking members enjoy the largesse of an oil-rich government, but they have no desire to lose the public’s respect. Since the Revolution of 1979, Shi‘i clerics have been sensitive to developments in society, and have been careful to try to reflect popular moods and trends. They have also long been on their guard against an administration that is shaped by the military and security forces, and espouses policies that principally benefit these groups. To understand the Shi‘i clergy’s behavior before and after the election day, it is best to break them down into three categories – seminary students and lecturers; mosque and Friday prayer leaders; and thirdly clerics in government employment as judges, teachers, managers and religious instructors. Although there is some overlapping between these groups, all three groups are dependent on the office of the Leader for their livelihoods, one way or another. They no longer derive their principal income from religious tithes paid by members of the public, and their lack of economic dependence on the state is merely notional. Ali Khamenei quite clearly prefers to maintain the status quo, given that he has long seen Ahmadinejad as his natural ally. The first category, seminary students, is naturally more supportive of Ahmadinejad because they aspire to fill government posts that will fall vacant once the older generation of clerics step aside. It is also worth noting that government funding for seminaries went up substantially during Ahmadinejad’s time in office. The second group, i.e. mosque and prayer leaders, are more traditional and conservative in outlook. They tend not to be so trusting of the president, given his idiosyncratic religious views. They are also in closer touch with ordinary people, and get to hear their complaints about government policies and actions on a daily basis. The third group, that includes clerics holding down government jobs, are even more solidly supportive of the leader than the students. Under Khamenei, favored clerics have benefited from a good press, with the statements they make accorded far more weight than those

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of regime critics, who get dismissed as “low-level” clerics by the media. The negative press given to Montazeri is a case in point. Given the high level of clerical dependence on the state, it was never likely the religious classes as a whole would stand up for the anti-Ahmadinejad protesters. Senior clerics have failed to respond to the many letters they have received from members of the public asking for help. That silence could undermine public confidence in the clerical establishment, if people begin to believe the authority it has enjoyed in society has been traded for the patronage of an increasingly authoritarian government.

The Islamic Republic on Trial: The Guardianship of The Unjust Jurist The disputed tenth presidential election in 2009 and its violent aftermath have led members of the Iranian religious establishment to question the moral, legal and religious foundations of the Islamic Republic. Prior to the election, Shi‘i clerics mostly debated the relative balance of the Republic’s Islamic and democratic aspects. Now debate has shifted to the fundamental nature, pillars and theoretical justifications for the regime itself – centered on the Shi‘i concept of the guardianship of the jurist (vela¯yat-e faqih). Shari‘a Chiefship The guardianship of the jurist did not appear in the original draft of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s constitution, which prescribed virtually no role or authorities for clerics. In 1979, the Assembly of Experts for Constitution, dominated by the religious elite and convened to review the constitutional draft, added the Shi‘i principle of an Islamic jurist providing guardianship of the people. Almost a decade later, Ruhullah Khomeini imbued the jurist – or Leader – with absolute power, arguing that the jurist can discard the basic decrees of Islam to protect the Islamic regime. Since then, the dominance of the jurist, in the position of the Leader, has evolved such that coercive power has become more important than social or

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religious authority. The Leader now holds the power to abrogate laws as well as ordinances of shari‘ah. In the wake of the June elections, Iranian clerics debated the source of the Leader’s legitimacy: does it come from God or from the people? Is his position a shari’ chiefship (qaimumat) or shari’ deputation? The clerical opposition advocates deputation, in which the guardian jurist monitors state affairs and gives counsel to authorities. The religious establishment sides with chiefship, allowing the Leader to interfere in legislative, executive and judicial affairs whenever he deems it appropriate. Based on deputation, the jurist should consult with the reference groups and political elite, consider public opinion and work within the legal framework. Under a chiefship, he is above the law and unaccountable to the people. Guardianship of Unjust Ruler In the 1970s and 1980s, Shi‘i clerics understood democracy as the people’s power to select a leader and put him into office. Now opposition clerics are looking at the flip side of the coin – how to change the leadership, without resorting to revolution, through the power to disqualify and remove a leader from office. Though the Iranian Constitution, in Articles 109 and 111, provides criteria and the process for the dismissal of the Leader, in practice his removal is virtually impossible within the framework of Iran’s power relationships. The Assembly of Experts, which on paper has the authority to supervise the Leader, is formed by direct election from a closed list of candidates vetted by the Guardian Council. The Leader directly or indirectly appoints the members of the Guardian Council, giving him significant influence over the selection of his own oversight body. Any member of the Assembly of Experts who dares criticize the Leader is likely to be disqualified from running in the next election, providing a strong disincentive for members to hold the Leader accountable. However, taboos against criticizing the Leader are breaking down among the broader elite. In an unprecedented 10 July 2009 posting on his website, Husayn Ali Montazeri, a senior Islamic scholar and grand marja‘ (source of emulation), pointed to three characteristics of

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unjust rule (velayat-e jowr) based on Islamic shari‘ah: intentional opposition to shari‘ah ordinances, breaking benchmarks of wisdom and norms and violating national contracts. According to Montazeri, religious experts, political elites, legal experts and the population at large all have the authority to evaluate – and hold accountable – the Leader against these criteria. And increasingly political and religious leaders demanded that Leader Ali Khamenei answer for the regime’s actions during and after the elections. Shi‘i clerics in an anonymous letter on 15 August called for his removal, labeling him a dictator, while a group of former parliamentarians and political science students called upon the Assembly of Experts to investigate Khamenei’s actions and qualifications in line with the Constitution. For many Iranians – including protesters who shout “death to the dictator” – the position of Leader is no longer sacrosanct. Due Process Public and clerical outrage was fueled by reports of brutality at the Kahrizak detention facility where hundreds of protestors and activists were held. Families of the detained, held incommunicado for weeks, were returned the bodies of their loved ones with crushed teeth, fractured skulls and bruises. Reports also surfaced that some detainees, male and female, were savagely raped. Other detainees were apparently coerced into making televised confessions through torture and solitary confinement. Some of the high-ranking clerics, including Montazeri, Yusof Sa¯ne‘i, Asadullah Baya¯t and Mostafa¯ Mohaqqeq Da¯ma¯d issued letters, statements and fatwas condemning the brutality and forced confessions. Their basic demand was that detainees should have the same access to due process in Iranian courts as is afforded in liberal democracies. Hardliners, however, made the argument that Iranians arrested in the post-election unrest had no right to due process as characterized by opposition clerics. Their rationale was based on four premises: 1) non-believers are not equal to believers and do not benefit from the same set of rights; 2) people who do not follow the decrees of the guardian jurist are not true believers; 3) the protesters, in line with Khamenei’s 19 June Friday prayer sermon, were responsible for all

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illegal actions and killings; and 4) the guardian jurist is allowed to suspend laws when the regime is at risk. Therefore, their argument proceeds, the guardian jurist not only is not violating his mandate, but he actually has a shari‘ah obligation to defend the regime against these protestors by any means, including denying their access to due process. Denial of due process, the raising of the guardian jurist above the law and his diminishing need for popular authority have brought Shi‘i clerics to a crossroads where they seem forced to decide whether to side with a chiefship – supported by the armed forces and above the legal code – and work as ideological agents of the current regime or to side with the people and hold the jurist accountable to the legal code and shari‘ah ordinances. Which path clerics ultimately choose will shape the future of Islam in the Iranian public sphere. For the time being, the Islamic Republic is on trial in the people’s court and the clerical opposition is making the case against the establishment.

EPILOGUE

The last three decades of the twentieth and first decade of the twentyfirst century saw the rise of an unexpected phenomenon in Iran: Islamist ideologies. Emerging in a modernizing and secularizing setting of Iranian society in the early 1970s, ideologies quickly propagated across the country and became the object of fascination among university students and some sections of the intelligentsia. Islamist ideologies were the motivating force for mobilization among traditional strata such as clerics, ba¯za¯ris and religious university students. These ideologies presented a powerful alternative for Marxist ideologies that introduced themselves as the only science of revolution at the time. Those in power as Iranian Shi‘i Islamists have been accused of multiple misdemeanours: beating non-Muslim and Muslim dissident students on university campuses, forcing women to wear the veil, killing thousands of political prisoners while they were doing their terms (in 1988), scandals involving “Islamic” investments, embezzlement, censure of books and artworks, filtering of websites, confiscating satellite dishes from roofs, jamming satellite TV channel signals, terror against authors and political activists, terrorizing tourists, kidnapping university students, holding foreign diplomats hostage, rejecting the bills passed in parliament and disqualifying candidates for elections by the Guardian council, and executing harsh punishments of shari‘ah law such as stoning, lashing and amputation. Women and ethnic and religious minorities do not hold equal rights

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in the courts and elsewhere. Baha‘is in particular are persecuted, denied a right to education, employment, and access to justice. Socially conscious aspects of the Islamic banking system, support for humanitarian organizations, fighting poverty, and anti-corruption policies advertised by Shi‘i Islamists have not, so far, come to fruition. In the twentieth and twenty-first century, Iran experimented with every possible variant of Islamism in the realm of politics and economy. Iranians had socialist Islamism under Musavi, economic developmentalist and clerical authoritarian Islamism during Rafsanjani’s rule, political developmentalist Islamism during Khatami’s administration and totalitarian/militarist Islamism under the Ahmadinejad administration. Iran experienced communist Islamist and “liberation Islamist”movements before the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Iran had the “pragmatic Islamism” of the central planners and the chaotic jungle Islamism of messianists. Iran has experienced Islamism with Chinese-oriented characteristics, Islamism with Soviet-oriented characteristics, and Islamism with Wahhabi-oriented characteristics. Iranians tried lots of its versions, and every time its command-and-control economy and security- and conspiracy-oriented politics have led to poverty and oppression. After three and a half decades of turmoil and violence, terror and vying for innocence and purity, and grievances and hopes during the Islamic Republic, the Iranian people and the voices from its reference groups are deeply torn about the country’s future. Now that the utopian visions of that era have been replaced by concrete realities, the struggle among different Islamist ideologies and their followers is fluid and unstable. Disgruntled young who are deeply affected by the “Islamization” of mores and culture and unequal distribution of resources, disillusioned intellectuals and activists, and passive clerics who have been watching a tumultuous competition for hegemony over the meaning of Islam are no longer ready to sacrifice for an ideology that with which they don’t identify. All Islamists are now competing for the precious resources for monopolizing power, wealth and status in the country. When Iranian reformists won a majority in parliament in 2000 after their victory in the presidential election of 1997, a number of

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intellectuals and journalists in Iran and elsewhere1 in the late 1990s raised the possibility of a transition from the militant Shi‘i Islamism to an “Islamic democracy” or post-Islamism.2 Some others talked about the metamorphosis of Islamism in Iranian society with respect to its ideas, approaches and practices.3 It was too soon to evaluate the power and strength of Islamist ideologies in Iran and premature to declare the end of the Islamism era in Iran. The reformers’ goal was to moderate the harshness of the theocratic despotism but without questioning its basic principle, i.e. the monopoly of power in the hands of the clerics and their loyalists. Although the end of the Iran–Iraq war, the death of Khomeini as a charismatic leader, and the after-war construction era led to the popularity of a more practical approach to the challenges of Iranian society and the rise of a pro-partial democracy executive and legislative powers, the reform movement of the late 1990s was crushed by the authoritarian camp due to its lack of organization, and the upper hand of the authoritarian camp in the legal, coercive and judicial domains of the state. The authoritarian camp of Islamists had a more powerful comeback in the mid 2000s and Islamism does not yet seem to be in demise in polity. The victory of the Revolution and later monopolization of power by the clerics was the beginning of the demise of Islamism in Iranian society but this has not stopped clerics from consolidating their power in every aspect and area of the country. By closing down the independent press and survey institutions, they believe that there is no alternative voice in the country. Iranian Shi‘i Islamists have not weathered the disqualification of their ideology as a global vision and a national mood, and ascribe these visions and moods to antagonistic tendencies of imperialist powers.

APPENDIX RELIGIOUS STUDIES IN IRAN TODAY: RESEARCH PROGRAMS

Iranian scholars and religious studies experts fervently pursued religious thinking developments during the 1980s and 1990s. Iranian intellectuals and scholars had to work on many issues and subjects due to the diversity of religious symbols, behaviors and institutions involved in the Iranian public sphere. Religious experts and scholars in universities and seminaries reflect in their research the basic problems and agendas of Iranian individuals’ and groups’ religious actions. The schema of religious studies in Iran can be seen from the window of research programs adopted by religious studies experts at different stages of their work on religious matters. There are 12 noticeable and active research programs in post-revolutionary Iran; these are “religious authoritarianism”, “elected guardianship”, “religious rationalism”, “scripturalism” or separation of religion, science and philosophy, “understanding sacred texts in various ways on the basis of hermeneutics”, “religion as an ideology”, “Islamization of knowledge”, “feqhism”, “Sadra¯ism”, “Islamist fascism”, “religious scientism”, and “messianism.” Each of these research programs has its hardcore, protection belt and positive and negative heuristics in Imre Lakatos’s framework of explaining scientific methodology. Each of them is developed and presented by certain experts, researchers, believers, schools, media

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and other institutions. These research programs are opposing each other and competing for more public support and political power in Iran now. Many of them have been successful in giving momentum to Islamist ideologies. Most of the ideologies discussed in this book have been established due to the results of the following research programs. Research programs function as the power plant for ideologies; they provide energy, enthusiasm and theoretical bases for pursuing Islamist ideologies in public. Sone of the founders of these research programs have functioned as ideologues at the same time.

1. Introduction The development of religious thought in seminary, academic and intellectual circles in Iran is the result of the interaction between Iranian and Muslim traditional culture on the one hand and Western culture and civilization on the other. To review the courses of religious intellectual endeavors in Iran, one must go further from traditional ideas and beliefs and consider the synthesis of different religious and non-religious, Western and Iranian, and modern and traditional knowledge and sciences. This may be beyond imagination and confirmation of some religious authorities’ taste and agenda but it is happening. Iranian contemporary religious thought has been vigorously proceeding in the following areas: theology (i.e. theoretical apology for religious beliefs), religious studies (discussing theoretical foundations and consequences of religious beliefs and behaviors) and canonical law studies (Islamic jurisprudence, feqh, and principles of jurisprudence, usul-e feqh). The causes for the flourishing of these studies are the confrontation of believers and researchers with competitors and rivals, the transformation of religious beliefs to one of the sources of political legitimation, and the everyday presence of religion in people’s lives in an Islamic Republic. Other factors influencing this phenomenon are shifting the religion and canonical law to ideologies during the religious revolution, the Islamicization of the state, society, art and knowledge, cultural and social

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institutions and some sectors of the economy (such as banking), and the continuation of religious reformations and reforms. We can also see some developments in religious ethics and interpretation of religious texts, but they are not as important as the above-mentioned areas. In this section, I do not want to review all aspects of religious studies in post-revolutionary Iran, but I only focus on research programs in this area. I think with this subject I can report the main and important ways of the city plan of this area. For reporting research programs of religious thinking in Iran, I use Lakatos’s configuration of how research programs are developed and presented. Although Islamist ideologies have been heavily dependent on the following research programs, there is no necessity that a research program evolves into a religious ideology. At least some of these research programs have not been used as a theoretical foundation for Islamist ideologies, although their ideas have been borrowed by some Islamists to strengthen their doctrines. Some of the research programs are providing services for more than one Islamist ideology. For example, research programs focused on “religious authoritarianism”, “elected guardianship” and “religion as an ideology” could be recruited in many Islamist ideologies. The majority of Islamist ideologies share religious authoritarianism and the idea of religion as an ideology. In reporting the main ideas of the hardcore, protection belt, positive and negative heuristics of each research program, I have reported the ideal types. It is obvious that most of the religious research programs in Iran are pursuing different agendas and picking ideas from different sources to respond to the challenges of other ideologies and research programs. For this reason, I have not used the exact terms or quotations from the scholars that have been working on these programs and have not mentioned the sources one by one. The basic ideas of these programs are implicit in tens of lectures, books, essays, articles and rhetoric. Most of the Iranian ideologues do not believe in making clear and distinct statements. In the Iranian context, clear and distinct statements are not effective in recruiting and mobilizing the masses. I have used the common and scholarly understanding of each program. These ideas are repeatedly mentioned in the authors’ and ideologues’ works on religion and politics.

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2. Modern Religious Thinking Modern religious thinking began in Iran about 100 years ago before the Constitution Movement of 1906. In that period, the main subjects were the revival of Islam in the public sphere, making progress and Islamic ideas (on asceticism and mortification, justice, equality, and liberty) congruent, and reconciliation between the constitutional framework of politics and sacred texts. The new wave of rereading the Islamic texts in the early twentieth century was to reconcile the rule of law and Islamic tradition of showra¯, and democracies and Islamic political tradition (also known as tradition of bai‘ah, allegiance). Some Iranian religious thinkers in that period insisted on tradition (traditionalists or fundamentalist) and some tried to modernize Islamic ideas. The first group asked for the executing of shari‘ah law and this was enough for them to accomplish their mission; the second group, i.e. constitutionalists, asked for a government in which power is distributed and limited by a system of laws that must be obeyed by the rulers and a parliament that was elected by the people. The Iranian fundamentalist movement arose in the early part of the twentieth century in reaction to modernism. The members of this movement stress the infallibility of the prophet and some of his disciples or offshoots and the infallibility and perfection of the Qur’an not only in matters of faith and morals but also as historical realities and record, holding as essential to Islamic faith in such areas as resurrection, shari‘ah law and theology. At the same time, they were emphasizing the fallibility of human beings and their need to be guided by religious doctrines and teachings. Six decades later and especially after the CIA-supported coup d‘etat against the nationalist government of Mosaddeq, another wave of modern religious ideas appeared. This wave was under the effects of nineteenth and twentieth centuries ideologies such as rationalism, Marxism, socialism, scientism and positivism. In this period the main subjects that religious thinkers talked about were the relationship between science and religion, the relationship between religion and the secular world, the relationship between religion and philosophy, and how to understand religion and to be religious in the modern world.

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The religious groups were concerned about the reconstruction of religious thinking to adapt recent developments in society and culture. They were wondering about how to read the history of religion, how to change religion to use it as a political instrument, how to read religious texts, who are eligible to revive religion (clerics or religious intellectuals), what is the religious world view (weltanschauung) and religious action in modern times, what are the criteria for religious leaders, what is the mission of religion, and why religion is eternal. These subjects were discussed in religious circles in the 1960s and 1970s. Iranian Shi‘i activists wanted to establish their own religious anthropology, religious economics, religious sociology and religious political science. Due to the consequences of the Iranian Revolution and the Iran – Iraq war, in the 1980s and 1990s, the subject matters for religious studies significantly differed. The new subjects were mostly produced by the tensions between religious values and ordinances on the one hand and public policies and political processes on the other. The new challenges for religious circles were related to expectations from religion, religious experience, toleration, violence and censorship by the religious establishment, protection of private life, the possibility of different readings of sacred texts, and the implications of understanding religion as an ideology and its social and political consequences. Muslim activists had to answer questions about the relationship between religion and democracy, human rights in the framework of religion, economic and political development from a religious point of view, and the legitimacy of civil society institutions from a religious point of view. There were many Shi‘is who could not accept religious pluralism and the consequences of living as a member of a nation-state. A set of research programs have been shaped to react to these issues and each research program has its own agenda and approach to confront these subjects and challenges. In post-revolutionary Iran, there have been 12 active religious research programs under construction and scrutiny in private and public research centers, and pursued by individuals and collective entities (Table A2). These research programs have their bases in a

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religious or secular science such as theology, canonical law, hermeneutics and philosophy. They also have institutions in different areas such as media, education, business and polity. These institutions are public, private and governmental. The characteristics of these research programs are shown in Table A1. Research programs have many different sources and theoretical bases. These sources are religious texts, traditional canonical law, traditional theology and some schools of mysticism and scripturalism from the Islamic tradition, and totalitarian and authoritarian ideologies, social democracy, Marxism, analytic and continental philosophy, and hermeneutics literature from the Western traditions (Table A2). Political and social activism in the modern world has been the motive for adding new sources to Islamic tradition and interaction with the modern Western tradition. In the 1970s there was a big distance between the seminaries and universities, and common ideas and programs between them were rare, but in the 1980s and 1990s the distances were gradually decreased. Each of the above-mentioned research programs can be followed both in universities and in seminaries. Religious rationalism, religion as an ideology, Islamist fascism, religious scientism, and hermeneutics research programs have their origins in the universities and elected guardianship, scripturalism, Islamization of knowledge, messianism, Sadra¯ism, and feqhism have their origins in Shi‘i seminaries.

3. Research Programs I use Lakatos’s theory of knowledge to explain religious studies in post-revolutionary Iran. According to his theory of scientific change, any research program has some theories and experimental techniques developed over time and shared ideas, called “hard core”. These ideas are never put aside and ignored. Based on this theory, religious researchers similar to other researchers are involved in an attempt to protect the theoretical core from falsification attempts behind a protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses. The religious research programs are marked by their expansion, along with development or adoption of new methods and approaches

– – Yes Yes

Yes Yes Pol. –

Maximal

No

No No

Yes No

Economic

Prohibited

Allowed

–

Yes Yes

Yes Yes

Yes

Minimal

Elected Religious GuarReligious Authoritarianism dianship Rationalism

Prohibited

–

– –

– –

–

Maximal

Allowed

–

– Yes

Yes Yes

Yes

Minimal

Allowed Yes but*

Political

Yes but* Yes

Yes Yes

Yes

Maximal

Prohibited

Yes but* Islamic

Yes –

– –

No

Maximal

Religion Islamicizaas an tion of Scripturalism Hermeneutics Ideology knowledge

Religious Research Programs and their Specifications in Post-Revolutionary Iran

Expectation of Religion Religious Pluralism Toleration Monopoly of Violence in the Hands of Government Censorship Protection of Private Life Economic vs Political Development Different Readings of Sacred Texts

Table A1

RELIGIOUS STUDIES IN IRAN TODAY 243

Expectation of Religion Religious Pluralism Toleration

Yes but* Yes but* Yes Yes Sadra¯ism

No

Feqhism

Yes, but* No Yes

Yes, but*

Yes, but* for Insiders

No

–

Maximal

Islamist Fascism Maximal

Yes

Yes Yes Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Religious Scientism Moderate

–

– – –

Hardcore of – Religion Not necessarily –

–

No

No

Maximal

Messianism

Yes

Yes Yes Yes

Hardcore of Religion –

–

–

–

–

Yes

Yes Yes but* Yes

Yes

–

–

–

–

–

–

– – –

–

–

Religion Islamicization of as an Scripturalism Hermeneutics Ideology knowledge

Not Hardcore of Religion Yes but* Only Authoritarian No No No

Elected GuarReligious Religious Authoritarianism dianship Rationalism

continued

Religious Experience Religion as an Ideology Democracy Human Rights Equality in Front of Law Civil Society

Table A1

244 POLITICAL ISLAM IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN

Not Hardcore Not Allowed No

Allowed Hardcore Not Hardcore Yes Yes, but* No No No Yes, but* No Yes, but* No

Not Hardcore of Religion Yes

No No No

Yes, but*

Yes

Prohibited

Yrs

Yes Yes Yes

Allowed

Political

No

No No No

Yes

Prohibited

Political

Yes No

Prohibited

Economic

Yes, but* Yes

–

Yes No

Economic

No

Yes –

Yes

Yes Yes

Yes

–

No

Source: courtesy of the author. Note: but* ¼ but limited

Monopoly of Violence in the Hands of Government Censorship Protection of Private Life Economic vs Political Development Different Readings of Sacred Texts Religious Experience Religion as an Ideology Democracy Human Rights Equality in Front of Law Civil Society –

– – –

–

–

–

–

– –

–

–

– – –

–

–

–

–

– –

–

RELIGIOUS STUDIES IN IRAN TODAY 245

Canonical law Theology & Ethics Theology and Canonical Law Theology & Hermeneutics Interpretation of Qur’an Theology

Elected Guardianship Religious Rationalism Scripturalism Hermeneutics Religion as an Ideology Islamicization of Knowledge Feqhism Sadra¯ism Islamist Fascism

Source: courtesy of the author. Note: but* ¼ but limited

Messianism

Religious Scientism

Theology & Canonical Law

Religious Authoritarianism

Theology and Interpretation of Qur’an Theology

Canonical Law Theology Theology

Knowledge Base

Education & Media

Education & Media Education Policy-making, Education & Media Media

Education, Research Centers & Media Seminaries & Media Media Education Education & Media Education & Media Research Centers

Institution of Action

Foundations and Institutions of Religious Research Programs in Iran, 1990s

Research program

Table A2

Public

Private

Private/Public Private Public

Private Private Private Private Private/Public Private/Public

Governmental

Sector

Communal

Communal

Communal Individual Individual

Communal Individual Individual Individual Communal Individual

Communal

Level of Action

246 POLITICAL ISLAM IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN

Traditional Canonical Law, Traditional Theologies, Totalitarian Ideologies Traditional Theology, Canonical Law, Direct and Guided Democracies Nationalism, Marxism, Socialism, Interpretation of Qur’an Analytic Philosophy, Mowla¯na¯ School of Mysticism Khora¯sa¯n School of Srcipturalism Islamic Tradition of Interpretation of Sacred Texts & European Continental Hermeneutics Traditional Canonical Law, Traditional Theology, Marxism Traditional Islamic Feqh Transcendence Philosophy (hekmat-e mota‘a¯lieh) Heidegger and Existential Philosophy Qur’an and Natural Sciences Hadith and Islamic Jurisprudence

Religious Authoritarianism

Source: courtesy of the author.

Feqhism Sadra¯ism Islamist Fascism Religious Scientism Messianism

Islamization of Knowledge

Scripturalism Hermeneutics

Religious Rationalism

Religion as an Ideology

Elected Guardianship

Sources

Seyyed Moneeruddin Husayni/Islamic Disciplines Academy Most of the schools in Qom Seminary Morteza Motahhari Reza Da¯vari, Ahmad Fardid Mehdi Ba¯zarga¯n Mohammad Taqi Mesba¯h Yazdi/ Dar Ra¯h-e Haq, Ba¯qer ul-‘Uloom, Haqqa¯ni

Ali Shari‘ati (d. 1977), Mehdi Ba¯zarga¯n (d. 1995)/Husaynieh Ersha¯d Abdolkarim Soroush/Knowledge and Research Institute Mohammad Reza Hakimi, Musa¯ Zara¯ba¯di Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari

Husayn Ali Montazeri/ Mohsen Kadivar

Ruhullah Khomeini

Major Scholar(s) or Ideologue(s)/School/ Research Center

Sources and Main Scholars of Religious Research Programs in Post-Revolutionary Iran

Research Program

Table A3

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for explanation, and their way of reaction to alternative religious research programs. Religious research programs similar to other research programs contain “methodological rules”, instructions on what paths of research to avoid, “negative heuristic” and instructions on what paths to pursue, “positive heuristic”. All the religious research programs presented here are frameworks for studying religion and especially Islam to revise and reconstruct it in a way that it will be able to guide groups and communities and even a nation toward establishing an Islamic society. The statements of these programs have been mentioned in the context of Shi‘i Islam. These ideas have been used to shape manifestos of Islamic and Islamist political parties, drafting bills, making public policies and launching programs for political campaigns. 3.1 Religious Authoritarianism 3.1.1 Hardcore A. Salvation can be obtained by following powerful religious leaders; B. It is only religion that presents the way of happiness; C. There is only one true understanding of religious texts and it is the understanding of religious leaders in charge; D. There is no ambiguity in what religious leaders present as orders and teachings of religion; E. Religions present duties and obligations, not rights; F. It is the religious government that establishes religious society; G. The religious state may be established with or without the consent of majority of citizens. 3.1.2 Protection Belt A. The power of religious leaders is just and legitimate; B. Only powerful religious leaders can be the speakers of religious truth; C. Criticizing powerful religious leaders means eliminating religion from society;

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D. There is no alteration including excess and shortage in the sacred book and the books of Shi‘i imams; E. The words of the sacred book are exactly the words of God interpreted by religious leaders; F. There are no secular rights for religious and ethnic minorities; G. Toleration and plurality are poisonous for the religious establishment; H. Studying religion and talking about it should be limited to a specific group of religious experts, i.e. the Islamic jurist; I. God’s sovereignty is the clerics’ sovereignty; J. Executing religious commandments cannot be suspended or stopped except through the exigency recognized by the religious leader in charge. 3.1.3 Positive Heuristic A. Religious individuals and groups can exercise violence to promote their cause; exercising violence is not limited to the government; B. Religious violence, i.e. exercising violence by religious people and for a religious cause on others, is a necessity; C. Those religious people who do not agree with the intentions of powerful religious people must be eliminated from the public sphere; D. Religious citizens are first order citizens and unreligious citizens are second order citizens; E. Explaining the religious aspects of affairs is not enough; religious individuals should execute religious commandments by resort to their political power; F. Religious rulers are entitled to violate the privacy of individuals; G. Censoring cultural and intellectual goods and services is a religious necessity; H. Executing religion’s commandments by resort to power will prove their righteousness; I. Religious people can use democracy only to gain power so as to impose their Islamic ideology; any election they win will be the last one.

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3.1.4 Negative Heuristic A. B. C. D.

There must be no toleration in executing religious commandments; There is no need for religious reformation; Religious pluralism is wrong; There can only be one true reading of religious texts and other readings are wrong; E. Human beings have some rights only in the framework of canonical law; F. Sovereignty of people is against God’s sovereignty and is wrong; G. No one can criticize religious ideas and ordinances; H. There is no need for dialogue among civilizations. 3.2 Elected Guardianship 3.2.1 Hardcore A. Salvation can be obtained by following religious leaders; B. Religious teachings include individual and social principles and commandments; C. Establishing the religious state is a necessity to objectify religious ends; D. Establishing the religious state in every period is allowed; E. The religious state follows religious ends in macro- and micropolitics and religious state law should not be in conflict with canonical law; F. The religious state may be established with the consent of the majority of citizens; G. Common sense and human experience can determine the form of the religious state in each time; H. There is only one true understanding of religious texts and it is the understanding of religious experts; 3.2.2 Protection belt A. Explaining religious truth is not allowed for special groups; B. It is religion that presents the way of happiness;

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C. There is no alteration including excess and shortage in the sacred book and the books of Shi‘i imams; D. The words of the sacred book are exactly the words of God interpreted by the religious experts; E. Only one religion presents the right way; F. Executing religious commandments can be suspended or stopped; G. People’s sovereignty is god’s sovereignty; H. There are some secular rights for religious and ethnic minorities. 3.2.3 Positive Heuristic A. The religious duty of believers is to support religious institutions not to support non-elected religious leaders; B. Only the religious state can exercise violence, not individuals or groups; C. Individuals’ rights can be extracted from canonical texts; D. Tolerance toward believers is one of the teachings of religion; E. Conformity between religion and democracy is possible; F. Practising religious jurisprudence would improve religion’s performance in the public sphere; G. Minorities have all the citizenship rights of any other citizens in the country.1 3.2.4 Negative Heuristic A. Liberalism is not acceptable from a religious point of view; B. The separation of religion and state is not acceptable from a religious point of view; C. Absolute democracy is not allowed. 3.3 Religious Rationalism 3.3.1 Hardcore A. Salvation can be obtained by following religion; B. There is a difference between religion and religious knowledge; C. Religious text is silent and human beings project their ideas on phrases of these texts while interpreting them in different times and places;

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D. Religious knowledge has exchanges with secular ones; E. Religious knowledge is relative and time-dependent; F. By changing and developing human knowledge, religious knowledge changes and develops; G. In a religious society, religion is the arbitrator; H. The religious state belongs to religious societies; I. Scripture does not have priority over human reason in all matters of social policies. 3.3.2 Protection Belt A. Religion offers the minimum of what people need, not the maximum of it; B. The religiosity means to give priority to religious judgments in every aspect of life; C. Religion determines the limitations for public and private life; D. Religious commitment means deepening religious knowledge, sensations, beliefs, attitudes, and actions in one’s soul; E. People can find their own way of happiness and that is the way of prophets; F. The meaning of the sacred text’s words and statements is different in different readings of that text; G. Religious truth can be heard from different individuals and groups; H. The words of the sacred text have been said from the medium of the Prophet? 3.3.3 Positive Heuristic A. Non-essential aspects of religion must be separated from inherent aspects of it; B. Mystical and humane aspects of religion have priority over canonical aspects of it; C. Different readings of religious texts are permitted; D. Great world religions are the bases and grounds of salvation;

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E. Each religion has its own special understanding of salvation and special manifestation of final existence; F. Toleration is a necessary idea for religions; G. Religions should recognize human rights and democracy; democracy and Islamic ideas and teachings are not fundamentally incompatible; H. There is no difference between religious power and non-religious power if they are evaluated by their actions; I. Making religion and democracy compatible is possible; J. Studying religion and talking about it should not be limited to a specific group of religious experts, i.e. the Islamic jurist; K. Studying religion is not limited to Islamic jurisprudence; it also includes studying its principles and foundations; L. Criticizing religious ideas and ordinances is permitted; M. There should be dialogue among civilizations. 3.3.4 Negative Heuristic A. B. C. D.

Jurisprudential religion is embraced by imitation; Liberalism is not acceptable from the religious point of view; Secularism is not accepted from the religious point of view; The mission of religions is to invite people to grace and mercy, not violence; E. Only censorship of unethical materials can be defended from the religious point of view; F. There is no difference between citizens from the religious point of view. 3.4 Scripturalism 3.4.1 Hardcore A. Following the religious texts is the key of salvation in this world and future life; B. People should submit to God’s revelation; C. The sacred book (the Qur’an) is revealed to the prophet exactly with the existing words;

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D. The statements and words of the sacred book are completely clear; E. The teachings and commandments of the sacred book are for everyone, every time, and every place; F. Religious texts are necessary and sufficient for guiding people. 3.4.2 Protection belt A. Religious knowledge is not pure and is mixed with false interpretations and adaptations; B. Revelation is completely different from reason and intuition; C. Only the religious ideas that are part of revelation and divine knowledge are true; D. It is possible to separate sacred truth from human knowledge, ideas, concepts, and terms; E. Purification of intentions is as possible as purification of believers; F. Every religion has its own independent knowledge and doctrines; G. The foundations of human knowledge may be extracted from religious texts (instead of philosophy or mysticism); H. Only one religion presents the right way. 3.4.3 Positive Heuristic A. It is necessary to discover the roots of mixing religious knowledge and human cultures; B. It is important to understand how political rulers interfered in the mixing of ideas especially in leadership of ummat; C. It is necessary to know about the efforts of trimming the religion of other cultures; D. The history of religious knowledge should also include the period of revelation; E. Exploring pure knowledge is necessary and possible; F. The reason for revelation is internal; G. There has not always been conflict between theologians, philosophers, mystics and Gnostics.

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3.4.4 Negative Heuristic A. The mystical and philosophical interpretations should be purged; B. Development in religious beliefs is not possible; C. Explaining, interpreting, rearrangement, and completing schools of philosophy is forbidden; D. Gnostics and mysticism are forbidden; E. Points of intersection do not mean similarity of essential elements of revelation, reason, and intuition. 3.5 Hermeneutics 3.5.1 Hardcore A. Salvation can be obtained by rereading religious texts; B. Interpretations of religious texts are based on pre-understandings, expectations, concerns, agendas, and interests; C. Text and its meaning are two different things; D. The meaning of a text is a hidden reality; E. Understanding people’s words is understanding their life; F. Each text does not have only one meaning. 3.5.2 Protection Belt A. Meaning is not detached from the text; B. There are interpretations of each text, not one interpretation; C. The interpreter can only receive answers from the text that he expects; D. Common phenomena among human beings are the basis of understanding different periods; E. Each text is a special phenomenon and has a special meaning; F. The principle explaining factors for different ideas and ordinances are different pre-understandings, interests and expectations. 3.5.3 Positive Heuristic A. Interpretation does not stop at the borders of religious, legal and philosophical texts;

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B. There are different historical and vertical horizons in different texts; C. Interpretations and sentences are acceptable when pre-understandings, interests, and expectations are expurgated; D. Irrelevant interpretations must be excluded; E. Knowledge of historical conditions of audience, languages, and contingencies are important for understanding the text; F. It is necessary to see how texts in their special forms usually impact the audience; G. To ask about the history is the method of discovering the meaning core of the text; H. Criticizing religious ideas and ordinances is permitted; I. Speaking about divine values and commandments is not devoted to a special group; J. Religious concepts change during different periods of time; K. Hidden aspects of text may be discovered through interpretation; L. The proper question to be asked is which political and social organizations help believers to observe their duties in front of God in this era and world. 3.5.4 Negative Heuristic A. People cannot understand different texts how they want; B. Religious ideas and theories are not sacred; C. Traditional understanding of revelation in Islamic doctrines is not rationally defendable; D. God could not have talked to human beings (God’s words are the prophet’s words); E. The canonical law that is now in our hand is not enough to make a religious system, but it is helpful to answer some questions; F. The language of duties as opposed to the language of rights does not fit the modern era of governance and policy-making.

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3.6 Religion as an Ideology 3.6.1 Hardcore A. Salvation can be obtained by following religious doctrines in the political sphere; B. Religions are collections of ideas that are tuned to social and political change; C. Religion is for every time, every one and every place; D. Religion is for human beings, not vice versa; E. Due to its dynamic nature, only religion as an ideology may offer salvation to the people; F. Religion has ordinances and commandments for every aspect of a human being. 3.6.2 Protection Belt A. A special religion includes final truth but other religions include less important truth; B. Only religion can present the way of happiness; C. Only religious ideologues may speak of religious truth; D. Historical religion is different from pristine one. 3.6.3 Positive Heuristic A. Religious knowledge must be translated to new languages in each period of time; B. Social and political aspects of religion should be extracted; C. Religious symbols should be introduced; D. Understanding religious concepts is not possible without building ideologies. The elements of religious concepts will be meaningful in the context and framework of an ideology; E. It is necessary to introduce religious figures in religious history who are unknown to believers and non-believers; F. Human intellectual productions such as system theory and socialism may be used for compilation of religious ideology; G. To practise some elements of shari‘ah can improve religion in the public sphere.

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3.6.4 Negative Heuristic A. Religion as merely a part of existing culture, and religion as merely a collection of spiritual teachings are not acceptable; B. Religious leaders who are not activists in the public sphere should not be followed; C. Religious values should be differentiated from political power, wealth and social status; D. Humanism is not accepted; E. Western ideologies should be rejected. 3.7 Islamisization of Knowledge 3.7.1 Hardcore A. Salvation can be obtained by Islamicization of every aspect of human life especially human khowledge; B. Foundations and bases of all human knowledge can be extracted from revelations; C. Values are to be extracted from religious texts; D. Religious teachings include individual and social ordinances and commandments; E. The teachings and commandments of the sacred book is for everyone, every time, and every place; F. There is only one true understanding of the sacred text; G. Religious knowledge is a part of a religion. 3.7.2 Protection Belt A. There is no alteration including excess and shortage in the sacred book and books of Shi‘i imams; B. Only religious knowledge presents religious truth; C. It is only religion that presents the way of happiness. 3.7.3 Positive Heuristic A. The textbooks of various sciences including natural and practical sciences should be written by religious people;

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B. The power of the religious state is a good instrument for spreading religious values to all areas of knowledge and sciences. 3.7.4 Negative Heuristic A. There is no difference between the understanding of religious texts and what the texts want to offer; B. No one can criticize religious ideas and ordinances; C. There is no need to have religious reform. 3.8 Feqhism 3.8.1 Hardcore A. Salvation can be obtained by following Shi‘i jurisprudence; B. There is only one true understanding of religious texts and it is the understanding of Shi‘i jurists; C. There is no ambiguity in what Shi‘i jurists present as ordinances and teachings of religion; D. The religious texts present the maximum of what human beings need to accomplish a happy and successful life; E. God’s commandments and teachings in sacred texts are eternal, for every one, every time and every place; F. The jurists are just and their power is legitimate; G. Religions present more duties than rights; H. It is the execution of religious ordinances that establishes religious society; I. The religious state may be established with or without the consent of majority of citizens. 3.8.2 Protection Belt A. There is no alteration including excess or shortage in the sacred book and the books of Shi‘i imams; B. It is only religion that presents the way of happiness; C. Only one religion presents the right way; D. Only Islamic jurists can be the speakers of religious truth;

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E. Criticizing Shi‘i jurists means eliminating religion from society; F. Religious knowledge is completely independent from human knowledge and there has been no exchange between them; G. There is no development and change in basic principles of religious knowledge; H. The words of sacred books, whether the Qur’an or hadith, are exactly the words of God; I. There are no secular rights for religious and ethnic minorities; J. Toleration of non-religious ideologies is poisonous for the religious establishment; K. Studying religion and talking about it should be limited to a specific group of religious experts, i.e. the Islamic jurist; 3.8.3 Positive Heuristic A. To explain the religious aspects of affairs is not enough; religious individuals should execute religious commandments by resort to their mission; B. Religious violence i.e. exercising violence by religious people who are authorized by Shi‘i jurists and for a religious cause on others, is a necessity; C. Those religious people who do not agree with the intentions of the jurists and their loyalists must be eliminated from the public sphere; D. Religious citizens, those who obey the ordinances of Islamic shar‘iah, are first order citizens and unreligious citizens are second order citizens; E. Censoring cultural and intellectual goods and services based on Islamic shari‘ah is a religious necessity; F. Shi‘i jurists are entitled to violate the privacy of individuals; G. Executing religions’ commandments by resort to power will prove their righteousness; H. Religious people can use democracy only to gain power so as to impose their Islamic ideology; any election they win will be the last one.

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3.8.4 Negative Heuristic A. There must be no toleration in executing religious commandments; B. There is no need for religious reformation; C. Religious pluralism is wrong; D. There can only be one true reading of religious texts and other readings are unacceptable; E. Human beings have some rights only in the framework of canonical law; F. Sovereignty of people is against God’s sovereignty and is wrong; G. No one can criticize religious ideas and ordinances. 3.9 Sadra¯ism 3.9.1 Hardcore A. Salvation can be obtained by following Islamic theological and mystical doctrines; B. There is only one true understanding of religious texts and it is the understanding of Islamic theologians perfected by Mulla¯ Sadra¯; C. The meaning of a text is a hidden reality; D. The religious texts present the maximum of what human beings need to accomplish a happy and successful life; E. God’s commandments and teachings in sacred texts are eternal, for every one, every time and every place; F. Each text has only one true meaning; G. Religious texts are necessary and sufficient for guiding people. 3.9.2 Protection Belt A. There is no alteration including excess or shortage in the sacred book and the books of Shi‘i imams; B. The sacred book is revealed to the prophet exactly with the existing words; C. The words of the sacred book are exactly the words of God; D. Religious knowledge is completely independent from human knowledge and there have been no exchanges between them;

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E. Religious knowledge has been improved by theologians and mystics; F. It is only religion that presents the way of happiness; G. Only mystic theologians can be the speakers of religious truth; H. There is no freedom of belief but there is freedom of conscience; I. Studying religious beliefs and talking about it should be limited to a specific group of religious experts, i.e. Islamic theologians. 3.9.3 Positive Heuristic A. Hidden aspects of text may be discovered through interpretation; B. Censoring cultural and intellectual goods and services is a religious necessity. 3.9.4 Negative Heuristic A. There must be no toleration in executing religious commandments; B. There is no need for religious reformation; C. Religious pluralism is wrong; there can only be one true reading of religious texts and other readings are wrong; D. Sovereignty of people is against God’s sovereignty and is wrong; E. No one is allowed to criticize religious ideas and ordinances. 3.10 Fascist Islamism 3.10.1 Hardcore A. Salvation can be obtained by following a powerful religious leader in charge; B. Religion is what is expressed by powerful religious leaders; C. Anti-Westernism can be pursued by following powerful religious leaders; D. There is no ambiguity in what religious leaders present as orders and teachings of religion; E. God’s commandments and teachings in sacred texts are to unite the people against the satanic West; F. The power of religious leaders is just and legitimate;

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G. Religions present duties not rights; H. It is the religious government that establishes religious society; I. The religious state may be established with or without the consent of a majority of citizens. 3.10.2 Protection Belt A. There is no alteration including excess or shortage in the sacred book and the books of Shi‘i imams; B. Criticizing powerful religious leaders means eliminating religion from society; C. Only powerful religious leaders can present themselves as philosopher-kings; D. Islamic philosophy is the mother of human knowledge; E. The development and change in religious knowledge goes with the development of philosophy; F. The words of the sacred book are exactly the words of god; G. There are no secular rights for religious and ethnic minorities; H. Toleration is poisonous for the religious establishment; I. Studying religion and talking about it should be limited to a specific group of religious experts, i.e. Islamic philosophers and jurists. 3.10.3 Positive Heuristic A. Executing religious commandments by resort to power will prove their righteousness; B. Religious violence, i.e. exercising violence by religious people and for a religious cause on others, is a necessity; C. Those religious people who do not agree with the intentions of powerful religious people must be eliminated from the public sphere; D. Religious citizens are first order citizens and unreligious citizens are second order citizens; E. Explaining the religious aspects of affairs is not enough; religious individuals should execute religious commandments by resort to their political power;

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F. Religious rulers are entitled to violate the privacy of individuals; G. Censoring cultural and intellectual goods and services is a religious necessity; H. Religious people can use democracy only to gain power so as to impose their Islamic ideology; any election they win will be the last one; I. There is a clash between Islamic and Western civilizations. 3.10.4 Negative Heuristic A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H.

There must be no toleration in executing religious commandments; There is no need for religious reformation; Religious pluralism is wrong; Humanism is the mother of all flawed ideologies; Sovereignty of people is against God’s sovereignty and is wrong; No one can criticize religious ideas and ordinances; There is no need for dialogue among civilizations; The fundamental assets of Western democracy are to be denied. Those assets are the rule of law, equal citizenship, universal suffrage, the accountability of elected leaders before the people who elected them, and the separation of church and state. 3.11 Religious Scientism 3.11.1 Hardcore

A. Salvation can be obtained by following scientific understanding of religion; B. There is a difference between religion and science while religion does not say anything against science; C. Muslims should go back to the Qur’an as the main religious text; D. Religious knowledge has exchanges with natural sciences; E. Religious knowledge should change in accordance with changes and developments of natural sciences; F. Revelation and reason reach to the same conclusions but by taking different routes.

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3.11.2 Protection Belt A. Religiosity depends on giving priority to religious judgments in every aspect of life; B. Religion determines the limitations for public and private life; C. Religious commitment means deepening religious knowledge, sensations, beliefs, attitudes, and actions in one’s soul; D. People can find their own way of happiness and that is the way of prophets; E. Religious truth can be heard from different individuals and groups. 3.11.3 Positive Heuristic A. Scientifically-proven-wrong aspects of religion must be separated from inherent aspects of it; B. Scientific aspects of religion have priority over canonical aspects of it; C. Hadith has a secondary role with respect to the Qur’an in extracting Islamic ordinances; D. Great world religions are the bases and grounds of salvation; E. Religions should recognize democracy and civil rights; democracy and Islamic ideas and teachings are not fundamentally incompatible; F. There is no difference between religious power and non-religious power if they are evaluated by their actions; G. Studying religion and talking about it should not be limited to a specific group of religious experts, i.e. the Islamic jurist; H. Studying religion is not limited to Islamic jurisprudence; it also includes studying its principles and foundations; I. There should be dialogue among religions. 3.11.4 Negative Heuristic A. Jurisprudential religion is embraced by imitation; B. Liberalism is not acceptable from the religious point of view; C. Socialism is not accepted from the religious point of view;

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D. The mission of religions is to invite people to grace and mercy, not violence; E. Only censorship of unethical materials can be defended from the religions point of view; F. There is no difference between citizens from the religious point of view. 3.12 Messianism 3.12.1 Hardcore A. Salvation can be obtained by longing and taking action for the rise of the Hidden Imam; B. There is no doubt that the Hidden Imam will rise when the world is full of vice and corruption; C. The religious texts present the ways and means that expectants should make themselves ready for the apocalypse; D. God’s commandments and teachings will be completely in action when the Hidden Imam rises. 3.12.2 Protection Belt A. Only expectants for the Hidden Imam are the speakers of religious truth; B. True believers may kill people who are not answering the call for getting ready for His rise; C. There is only one true understanding of religious texts and it is the understanding of expectants for the Hidden Imam; D. The task of religious leaders is to get Muslims ready for the time that the Hidden Imam will rise and the best way for this is to grab and hold absolute power in their hands; E. It is the religious government that paves the way for His rise; F. The religious state may be established with or without the consent of a majority of citizens; G. Studying religion and talking about it are not enough; expectants should act.

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3.12.3 Positive Heuristic A. All the doctrines of religious authoritarianism are necessary for building grassroots support for the rise of the Hidden Imam; B. Those religious people who do not agree with the intentions of expectants of the Hidden Imam must be eliminated from the public sphere; C. Expectants of the Hidden Imam are first order citizens and others are second order citizens; D. To wait for the Hidden Imam is not enough; expectants should execute religious commandments to get ready for His rise; E. Religious individuals and groups can exercise violence; exercising violence is not limited to the government; F. Executing religions commandments by resort to power will prove their righteousness; G. Religious violence, i.e. exercising violence by religious people and for a religious cause on others, is a necessity; H. Western civilization will be destroyed by the Hidden Imam. 3.12.4 Negative Heuristic A. Toleration is poisonous for the religious establishment and there must be no toleration in executing religious commandments; B. There is no need for religious reformation; C. There can only be one true reading of religious texts and other readings are wrong; D. Sovereignty of people is against God’s sovereignty and is wrong; E. No one can criticize religious ideas and ordinances; F. There is no need for dialogue among religious groups and among civilizations. 1980s 1990s 2000s Religious authoritarianism Religious Rationalism Fascist Islamism Islamisization of knowledge Elected Guardianship Messianism Scripturalism Hermeneutics Religion as an Ideology

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1990s

2000s

---------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Religious authoritarianism

Religious Rationalism

Fascist Islamism

Islamisization of knowledge

Elected Guardianship

Messianism

Scripturalism

Hermeneutics

Religion as an Ideology Religious scientism Sadr 'ism Feqhism

Figure A1 Decades

Apex of Iranian Religious Research Programs in Three

4. Conclusion In passing from the 1980s to the 1990s, we can see that seven research programs are losing strength and popularity and three are coming to the public sphere (Fig. A1). However, in the 1990s all of these research programs are alive and hard at work. These research programs from some points of view are contradictory to each other but due to some similarities and the cultural cleavages of Iranian society all of them accompany each other. Two research programs which are losing strength in intellectual arenas, i.e. religious authoritarianism and Islamicization, were powerful in the political sphere. The institutions that are working on these two programs, are supported by the government. Two of those three research programs, i.e. religious rationalism and hermeneutics that were getting strength in the 1990s were not institutionalized and two others i.e. elected guardianship and religion as an ideology were under pressure from the state.

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The Iranian religious studies programs have leaned toward totalitarianism on different levels. The basic ideas of religious totalitarianism are present in most of these programs; the hardcore of religious authoritarianism, scripturalism, feqhism, Islamist fascism, messianism, and Islamization of knowledge mostly includes clear totalitarian approaches to religion and religiosity. Sadra¯ism, elected guardianship, and religion as an ideology programs contain some of the foundations of totalitarian ideas. Religious scientism, religious rationalism, and the hermeneutics program contain the least amount of totalitarian perspectives in the hardcore and protection belt. These are collectively the basic tenets of religious totalitarianism that could be traced in different religious research programs in Iran: 1) God’s commandments and teachings in sacred texts are eternal, for every one, every time and every place; 2) The religious texts present the maximum of what human beings need to accomplish a happy and successful life; 3) There is no alteration including excess or shortage in the sacred book and the books of Shi‘i imams; 4) Religious knowledge is completely independent from human knowledge and there has been no exchange between them; 5) It is only religion that presents the way of happiness; 6) There is no development and change in religious knowledge; 7) Each text has only one true meaning; 8) Toleration is poisonous for religious establishment; and 9) Religions present duties and obligations, not rights.

NOTES

Preface 1. Olivier Roy has discussed the failures of Islamism in his book, The Failure of Political Islam, 1994. 2. Even in the post-modern approach to studying Islam, there is only discussion of one Islam and one Muslim culture, not Islams: see Ahmad, 1992: 5, 38, 41, 48 & 158 (just as examples). 3. A Shi‘i sect who believes in 12 imams as the deputies and descendants of the Prophet Mohammad. 4. Mann, 1986. 5. The same concept of the unity and permanence of Islam shared by Orientalists and the ‘ulama¯ “was criticized in the middle of the twentieth century by three currents: by Marxists, often close to Arab nationalism, who were concerned to locate religion in history and hence to relativize apparent permanent features (Maxime Rodinson); by anthropologists, who paid attention to particular localities, where they rightly saw other things than cultural permanence (Geertz), and by Islamists, such as Sayyid Qutb. . . . The Marxist approach contributed to the normalization of Muslim societies and history, breaking strongly with the idea that their special features placed them outside the rest of the world. The anthropological approach by contrast privileged the study of local societies, insisting on the specificity and complexity of each segment, and refusing broad theoretical generalizations; things were always more complex and always evolved faster than the generalists thought. These two approaches contributed to the critique of Orientalism, one by insisting on what is universal, the other by emphasizing local specificity.” (Olivier Roy, Is Islamism an Invention of Scholars of Islam? Esprit, Aug-Sept 2001; Draft translation by Nikki R. Keddie: www1. columbia.edu/sec-cgi-bin/gulf/dataplug.pl?dir¼/wwws/data/cu/sipa/GULF

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2000/chronology/pat&ddfile¼chron&display¼p&hh¼b&hd¼b&sp¼619417627 &qw¼Islamism, accessed on 15 February 2008). 6. Kazemzadeh, 1998: 52.

Chapter 1

Introduction

1. The straight way or discipline of human activity, path or track by which men may achieve salvation or, in a narrow definition of this term, Islamic law. 2. De Waal, 2004: 6; 11 – 12; Abdu, 2000. 3. countrystudies.us/iran/56.htm. 4. I have explained the ethical schools in the Muslim world in one of my books in Persian: Ethical Systems in Iran and Islam, Tehran: Kavir, 2001. 5. There is a subtle difference between Islamic ideology and Islamist ideology. The former is an ideology that considers Islam as its body of doctrine, myth, and belief system and expects individuals, social movements, institutions, classes, and large groups to follow Islamic beliefs, ordinances and teachings as their guidance. This ideology may or may not get involved in politics and acquisition of power. The latter is an Islamic ideology that puts politics and acquiring power at the center of its agenda and considers Islam as a political ideology. According to Islamists, acquiring power and forcing society toward Islamicization are the prerequisite of being a Muslim. 6. Tibi, 1998: 5. 7. Esposito, 1991: 56. 8. Afghani, 1938– 98. 9. Browne, 1910/1995: 15 – 22; Shari‘ati,1999; Ba¯zarga¯n, 1970: 211. 10. Khomeini, 1978. 11. 1952: 6 – 18. 12. Qutb, 1964/2005. 13. Ibid.: 15. 14. Most of Qutb’s books were translated into Persian in the 1960s and 1970s by clerics who then ruled the country. Seyyed Ali Khamenei, the second leader of the Islamic Republic translated first two volumes of In the Shade of Quran, and The Future of This Religion into Persian. His brother, Seyyed Mohammad Khamenei translated Basic Principles of Islamic Worldview. 15. Turner, 2003: 140. 16. Roy, 1994: 26. 17. Right after the victory of reformers in the sixth parliamentary elections, Hamid Dabashi declared the end of Islamic ideology in Iran: “This parliamentary election reveals beyond any shadow of a doubt the cataclysmic moment when the long and arduous history of Islamic Ideology has finally come to an end.” He believes that Islamic ideology is “a specific product of the fateful encounter between the ancestral faith of a people and the colonially mitigated project of

272

18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

24. 25. 26.

27. 28.

NOTES

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12 –17

Modernity”. (The End of Islamic Ideology – Iran, drsoroush.com/English/ On_DrSoroush/E-CMO-20000600-The_End_of_Islamic_Ideology-Hamid_ Dabashi.html, accessed on 28 October 2007). In this judgment, firstly he completely ignores the power of appointed bodies of government and the upper hand of mullahs who have ruled the country through appeals to Islamic ideologies. Secondly, he merely considers colonialism as the root cause of Islamic ideology, while different Islamist ideologies have different root causes. Even if colonialism was over, Iranian Islamists would have created new and imagined enemies to justify their ideological approach to politics, both domestic and international. Dabashi does not pay enough attention to the diversity and complexity of Shi‘i Islamist ideologies and their strength in reconstructing in a variety of circumstance favorable to them. Dabashi views the production of Islamic ideology as a “project that begins in the earliest parts of the nineteenth century with such figures as Mulla¯ Ahmad Nara¯qi (d. 1829) and concludes with Ali Shari‘ati in the latter part of the twentieth (d. 1977)” while the Islamic Republic of Iran has a huge industry of ideology production in action, and is still active today. sci.org.ir/content/userfiles/_census85/census85/natayej/tables/jadval12.html (accessed on 25 June 2008). irphe.ir/fa/statistics/Stat-1383 –84/EnrolmentTABLES/B22.htm (accessed on 25 June 2008). Tabnak, 8 September 2009. payvand.com/news/03/oct/1003.html. Hamshahri Online, 19 August 2008. By ideology, I mean a set of guiding ideas, principles, symbols, theories, doctrines and beliefs reflecting collective aspirations deliberated and organized to be put into action and change the world; reflecting and justifying group interests, ideology is where theory and praxis meet. State power is the main apparatus for making these ideas operational. Islamists presume the existence of truth only in Islam; according to them, truth exists outside and above human language, history and interests because Islam confirms this existence. Nikkie Keddie argues that the term ‘Islamist’ is probably the most accurate, distinguishing belief from movements to increase Islam’s role in society and politics, usually with the goal of an Islamic state (Keddie, 1986: 26). Olivier Roy, Is Islamism an Invention of Scholars of Islam? Esprit, Aug-Sept 2001; Draft translation by Nikki R. Keddie: www1.columbia.edu/sec-cgi-bin/ gulf/dataplug.pl?dir¼/wwws/data/cu/sipa/GULF2000/chronology/pat&dd file¼chron&display¼p&hh¼b&hd¼b&sp¼619417627&qw¼Islamism (accessed on 15 February 2008). When Hriar Dekmejian talks about Islamist societies he means Islamist groups and associations with Islamist agendas (Dekmejian, 1995: 60). Sayings, deeds and confirmations of Prophet Mohammad and Shi‘i imams in Shi‘i tradition.

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273

29. Ruhullah Khomeini, Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist, tr. by Hamid Algar: al-islam.org/islamicgovernment/. 30. Fuller, 2003: 47. 31. Takyeh and Gvosdev believe that Islamists do share the idealization and challenge (2004: 6). 32. Qutb, 2005: 54. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. Qutb, quoted in Esposito, 1984: 136. 36. Ibid.: 2005: 52. 37. 2005: 117– 118. 38. Khomeini, 1978: 8; Shari‘ati, 2000, 1979 & 1972. 39. Salehi, 1970. 40. Malik, 1999: 14. 41. Olivier Roy thinks the opposite: “I will refer to the contemporary movement that conceives of Islam as a political ideology as ‘Islamism’” (Roy, 1994: ix). According to my definition, Islamism is a specific kind of Islamic political ideology and there are other Islamic political ideologies opposed to Islamism. 42. Roy, 1994: xi. 43. Olivier Roy does not recognize this approach as part of the Islamist agenda: 1994: 37. From a Shi‘i Islamist point of view there is no conflict between believing in Islam as a complete and universal system and making it up-to-date by resort to ejteha¯d. The most important pillar of Shi‘i Islamism, all brands, is capturing the state apparatus not rejecting modernism or implementing all shari‘ah ordinances. 44. Piscatori, 1986: 112. 45. Nuri, 1988/1908: 365. 46. Ibid.: 354. 47. Motahhari, 1991b: 41. 48. Ruhullah Khomeini, Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist, tr. by Hamid Algar, Introduction: al-islam.org/islamicgovernment/(accessed on 9 January 2008). 49. Amin, 2001: 3. 50. Van Nieuwenhuijze, 1995: 13. 51. Keddie, 1998. 52. 2005: 2. 53. A Sunni Islamic school of thought that takes the pious ancestors (Salaf) of the patristic period of early Islam as exemplary models. 54. Watt, 1973: 34 – 7. 55. The Islamic Republic of Iran has always been in the highest 20th percentile on lists of non-transparent and corrupt governments. By definition, corruption is measured by non-transparency: http://www.transparency.org/country#IRN; According to Ahmad Tavakkoli, an Iranian MP and one who is very loyal to Khamenei and the regime, “corruption in Iran is systematic. . . even

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56. 57.

58. 59. 60.

61. 62. 63. 64.

65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78.

NOTES

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33 – 46

the monitoring institutions which have to look for corruption are corrupt”: http://alef.ir/vdcipwar3t1a5v2.cbct.html?245839. In his message to a seminar on corruption, Khamenei said: “what miracle is going to come out of this seminar? Is the situation [of corruption] clear for you, the head of three branches of government? . . . Why something fundamental and decisive is not done in this regard?”: http://farsi.khamenei.ir/news-content? id=28427. Salame, 1993: 30. The only hospital that was built by a source of emulation is in Qom and it mostly gives service to the clerics and seminary students. Ayatullah Golpa¯yega¯ni Hospital was established to serve clerics in case governmentowned hospitals would not treat them. Golpayegani was far from the Islamist approach in handling society and politics. Lambton, 1981: 237. Tusi in Madelung, 1980: 30. He did not bridge the gap between mysticism and philosophy. What most Iranian Islamic philosophers such as Seyyed Hussein Nasr mean by Islamic philosophy (1996: 371) is really theology due to its mission to prove the existence of God and resurrection and defending basic tenets of Islamic belief system. Halm, 1991: 41. Fuller, 1995: 148. Bayat, 1980: 166. In spite of ideological and theoretical agreements, Da¯vari and Fardid have some differences. Fardid has a mystical way of writing to promote Islamist fascism while Da¯vari uses a theological language to do the same thing. Fardid is more vocal against Jews but Da¯vari tries to follow the official position of the Islamic Republic in this respect. Mirsepassi, 2000: 165– 157. tebyan.net/index.aspx?pid¼19667&BookID¼16315&Language¼1e. Khomeini, 1943: 186. Articles 5 and 110. Khomeini, 1991: Vol. XXI: 129. Shepard, 1987. Margot Patterson, Islamic Fundamentalism Feared, Misunderstood, Fundamentalism – Second in an occasional series, National Catholic Republic, 8 October 2004: ncronline.org/NCR_Online/archives2/2004d/100804/100804a.php. Sayyid, 2004: 7. Zubaideh, 1989: 2. Euben, 1997. Keddie, 1998: 696. Moaddel, 2006: chap. 11. Steve Schippert, Understanding Ahmadinejad: threatswatch.org/analysis/2005/ 11/understanding-ahmadinejad/ (28 November 2005). Halliday, 1995: 399.

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275

79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86.

Tibi, 1998: ix. Ibid.: xxvi. De Waal, 2004: 6 – 7; Roy, 1994: ix. Shepard, 1987. Zubaida, 1989: ix. Ahmad, 1992: 31. Ismail, 2003: 11. I have used this term when it refers to reformist political parties and groups in the 1990s and 2000s. 87. Nanda, 2002 on conflict between Indian nationalist loyalties and pan-Islamic ones; Lybarger, 2007 on Palestinian political identity.

Part I 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Pre-Iranian Revolution Era

Ayubi, 1991: x. Keddie, 1968: 167. 1948, 14. 1984. Ghazzali, 1994: 159. Ibid. Quoted in Williams, 1994: 164f.

Chapter 2

Early Islamism: Revivalism and Revolution

1. Afghani, 1838– 97. 2. Letter to the Leader of the Shi‘is and Letter to Iranian ‘Ulama¯ in Letters and Political-Historical Documents of Seyyed Jama¯l Husayni, collected by Seyyed Ha¯di Khosrowsha¯hi: khosroshahi.net/book/fehrest.php?book_id¼4 (accessed on 5 February 2008). 3. Ha’iri, 1977: 53; Keddie, 1968: 169. 4. Ibid.: 1977: 54. 5. Keddie, 1968: 168. 6. Ibid.: 172. 7. Ibid.: 160. 8. Letters and Political-Historical Documents of Seyyed Jama¯l Husayni, collected by Seyyed Ha¯di Khosrowsha¯hi: khosroshahi.net/book/fehrest.php?book_id¼4 (accessed on 5 February 2008). 9. Ha’iri, 1977: 52 –3. 10. In his famous lecture “Islam and Science” given at Sorbonne and published in the Journal des De´bats, 29 March 1883, responding to Ernest Renan who attacked Islam and Arabs as innately incapable of doing philosophy and producing science.

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11. Kurtzman, 2002: 107–10 12. Answer of Jamal al-Din to Renan, Journal des Debats, 18 May 1883 in Keddie, 1968: 183. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid.

Chapter 3 Identity-Oriented Islamism: Islam vs the West 1. A¯l-e Ahmad, 1984: 78. 2. Sheikh Fazlullah Nuri uses the same terms when he talks about the situation of Iranian Muslims confronting the West: “why you are . . . uprooting yourselves as you do with your own hands” (Nuri, 1988/1908: 366). 3. A¯l-e Ahmad, 1984: 92 – 101. 4. Ibid.: 91. 5. Ibid.: 27. 6. Ibid.: 30 & 31. 7. Ibid.: 79– 81. 8. Ibid.: 81– 2. 9. Ibid.: 124–6. 10. Ibid.: 31. 11. Ibid.: 33. 12. Ibid.: 29. 13. Ibid.: 128. 14. Ibid.: 33. 15. Ibid.: 35. 16. Ibid.: 57. 17. Ibid.: 58. 18. Ibid.: 34. 19. Ibid.: 27. 20. Ibid.: 35. 21. Na’ini, 2002/1909: 116. 22. Nuri, 1988/1908: 365. 23. A¯l-e Ahmad, 1977: 52. 24. Ibid.: 1984. 25. Ibid.: 64. 26. On the Service and Treason of Intellectuals, 1977. 27. A¯l-e Ahmad, 1976: 252– 3. 28. Ibid.: 1984: 59. 29. Ibid.: 76. 30. Ibid.: 66. 31. Ibid.: 79. 32. Ibid.: 68.

NOTES 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

Ibid.: Ibid.: Ibid.: Ibid.: Ibid.: Ibid.:

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69. 69. 70, 71. 74. 75. 76– 7.

Part II

Post-Iranian Revolution Era

1. Madelung, 1985: 504– 25. 2. Any of the Islamic courts of inquiry established about AD 833 by the ‘Abba¯sid Caliph al-Ma‘mu¯n (reigned 813– 3) to impose the Mu‘tazilite doctrine of a created Qur’an (Islamic sacred scripture) on his subjects.

Chapter 4 Socialist Islamism: Ali Shari‘ati 1. Ali Shari‘ati, Religion vs Religion, tr. by Laleh Bakhtiar, Abjad, 1988, p. 31: ezania.net/stuff/books/shariati/religion.vs.religion.pdf. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid.: And Once Again Abu-Dhar: shariati.com. 5. Ibid.: 1982b: 11. 6. Ibid.: Man and Islam: shariati.com (accessed on 22 January 2008). 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid.: 1982b: 73. 9. Ibid.: 1982: 74 – 9. 10. Ibid.: Mission of a Free Thinker: shariati.com. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid.: Hajj, tr. from the Persian by Ali A. Behzadnia & Najla Denny, Prepared by Evicena Cultural & Education Foundation (ECEF), Costa Mesa CA: shariati. com. 13. Ibid.: Where Shall We Begin: shariati.com. 14. Ibid.: Hajj: shariati.com. 15. Ibid.: Where Shall We Begin: shariati.com. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid.: Where Shall We Begin: shariati.com. 19. Ibid.: The Visage of Prophet Mohammad: shariati.com. 20. Ibid.: A Glance at Tomorrow’s History: shariati.com. 21. Ibid.: And Once Again Abu-Dhar: shariati.com.

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22. Ibid.: A Message to the Enlightened Thinkers: “Surah al Rum – The Romans”: shariati.com. 23. Ibid.: Red Shi‘ism: The Religion of Martyrdom, Black Shi‘ism: The Religion of Mourning: shariati.com. 24. Collected Works, Vol. II, Revolutionary Self-formation & Vol. VIII, Worship (giving new meanings to prayer); Collected Works, Vol. V, We and Iqbal (the necessity of reconstructing Islam); Collected Works, Vol. IV, Analysis of Hajj Ceremony (giving new meaning to pilgrimage); Collected Works, Vol. VII, Shi‘ism (presenting Shi‘ism as an ideology and political party); Collected Works, Vol. XI, Alavi Shi‘ism and Safavi Shi‘ism (differentiating red or revolutionary Shi‘ism from black or conservative Shi‘ism); Collected Works, Vol. X, Class Orientation in Islam (representing Islam on the side of the poor, deprived and disenfranchised); Collected Works, Vols. XVI, XVII, & XVIII, Islamology, Husaynieh Ersha¯d Lectures, Vol. XXX, Islamology (presenting the foundations and schemes of Islam as understood by a sociologist religious intellectual); Collected Works, Vol. XX, What Should We Do? (emphasizing the responsibility of Muslims to be active in the society and politics and reject quietism); Collected Works, Vol. XXI, Woman (Discussing why and how women should get involved in real politics of Muslim societies); Collected Works, Vol. XXII, Religion vs Religion (introducing the conservative and quietist religion as the archnemesis of true religion); Collected Works, Vol. XXIII, Worldview and Ideology (presenting Islam as an entity that includes ideology and worldview, revolutionary reading of towhid (monotheism), hejrat (Prophet Mohammad’s emigration from Mecca to Medina), and enteza¯r (waiting for Hidden Imam)); Collected Works, Vols. XXIV, Human Being & XXV, Human Being without Self (rejecting existentialism and Western humanism). 25. Ibid.: Vol. XXIIX, The Method of Understanding Islam (on Mecca and Medina communities during Prophet Mohammad’s mission and rule). 26. Ibid.: Vol. III, Abu Dhar; Collected Works, Vol. IXX, Husayn, Adam’s Heir; Collected Vol. XXVI, Ali; Collected Works, Vol. XXIX, Meeting Abraham. 27. Ummat va Ema¯mat (Islamic Community and Leadership), Collected Works, Vol. XXIVX. 28. Ali Shari‘ati, Martyrdom: Arise and Bear Witness.: al-islam.org/arisewitness/. 29. For the complete list of Shari‘ati’s work look at: drshariati.org/show.asp? ID¼3&q¼. 30. Ali Shari‘ati, Hajj: shariati.com. 31. Ibid.: And Once Again Abu-Dhar: shariati.com. 32. Ibid.: 1979a: 177. 33. 1979a: 177. 34. 1979a: 178. 35. Taleqani, 1983: 90. 36. Ibid.: 95. 37. Ali Shari‘ati, An approach to the Understanding of Islam: shariati.com.

NOTES 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48.

82 –93

279

Ibid.: Hajj: shariati.com. Ibid.: 1998: 2, 3; Taleqani, 1983: 223, 224; Payman, 97, 217, 231–2, 261–4. 1979a: 153. Ibid.: 199–213. Ibid.: 155–7. Ibid.: 179–180, 182–3. Ibid.: 157. Ibid.: 165. Ibid.: 178. Ibid.: 175. Ibid.: 187–99.

Chapter 5 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

TO PAGES

Nationalist Islamism: Mehdi Bazargan

Ba¯zarga¯n, 1993. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. 1998: 291, 370. Ibid.: 282, 306, 375. Ibid.: 286–291, 337. Ibid.: 345, 346, 348 & 349. Ibid.: 293. Ibid.: 285. Ibid.: 236. Ibid.: 276.

Chapter 6 Clerical Authoritarian Islamism: Ruhullah Khomeini 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Nuri, 1988/1908: 356. Khomeini, 1991, Vol. 20: 170 –1. Ibid., Vol. 21: 129. Ara¯ki explained by Kadivar, 1997: 60 – 79. Ruhullah Khomeini, Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist, tr. by Hamid Algar: al-islam.org/islamicgovernment/. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

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10. Khomeini preached for conquering the White House and raising the flag of Islam over it, which, for Islamists, is the symbol of power in the West: Sahifeye Nour (Khomeini’s collected writings and speeches), Vol. 17, p. 481; “Islamic Revolution is going to raise the flag of Islam in every corner of the world. . . We can defeat the materelist world and raise the flag of “no God bu Allah” and “Mohammad is the Allah’s prophet” all over the world.” (Khomeini’s message for celebrating fifth anniversary of the Revolution, Sahifeye Nour, Vol. 18, p. 227). 11. I do not believe that Khomeini’s political doctrine is “exclusively conducted in terms of traditional Islamic discussions” (Zubaideh, 1989: 13). There is no precedent for the theory of ruling of the jurist as the head of state in traditional Islam. 12. Ruhullah Khomeini, Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist, tr. by Hamid Algar: al-islam.org/islamicgovernment/. 13. Khomeini, 1978. 14. 1978: 15. 15. Ibid.: 8– 14. 16. Ibid.: 20. 17. Ibid.: 23. 18. Ibid.: 23. 19. Ibid.: 29. 20. Ibid.: 62– 3 & 75. 21. 1982: 52; 1983: 30. 22. Ibid.: 85. 23. 1983: 15. 24. Ibid.: 17. 25. Ibid.: 52. 26. Ibid.: 57. 27. 1982: 141 & 137. 28. Cottam, 1986: 57. 29. Kayhan daily (as the voice of Khamenei) is the semi-official tribune for undertaking this task. From a specific day, Javadi Amoli, one of the resolute opponents of reform and loyal to Khamenei was a grand ayatullah. The day before, he was an ayatullah. It is as chaotic as it seems: kayhannews.ir/860824/3. HTM#other311. When the Green Wave rose and Amoli did not support the military-security based Ahmadinejad administration, he came back to be an ayatullah from Kayhan’s point of view. Another example was Sadeq Larijani who was appointed as the head of the judiciary in 2009. Before the appointment, he was not called an ayatullah but the day after he was one from Kayhan’s view.

Chapter 7

Shari‘ah-Oriented Islamism: Morteza¯ Motahhari

1. For a list of Motahhari’s works and his books online (in Persian) see: aviny.com/ Library/Motahari/Index.htm.

NOTES 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

9. 10. 11. 12.

13.

14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

TO PAGES

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Motahhari, 1985: 50. Ibid.: 51. Ibid.: 1991b: 80. Ibid.: Man and Universe: al-islam.org/universe/index.htm. Ibid. Ibid.: 1985: 51 – 2. This is the regular argument for religiosity: individual and collective reasoning is not enough for responding and confronting the cosmological and social challenges. Therefore, there is no other choice other than going to God’s messengers and messages. The religious apologists use the uncertainties of the world to reject self-sufficiency of human beings and to prove what is presented by the prophets. Motahhari puts this argument as follows: “no two philosophers can be found in the world who are of one mind as to where this road [from adversary to happiness] lies . . . even now man himself, with his potentialities and possibilities remains unknown. Is it possible, while man himself remains unknown, to know what constitutes his happiness and the means of attaining it?” (1985: 50). Motahhari, 1985: 49 – 50. Ibid.: 1994; 19. Ibid., 1991c: 22. Motahhari does not make it clear which kind of government he advocates for, but it is clear which kind of government he rejects; he clearly rejects democracy that considers every individual legally and politically equal. His political theory suspends between aristocracy and guided democracy that people are allowed to pick their leaders among ‘ulama¯ (Motahhari, 1991a: 154). “The Islamic Republic Party’s position regarding leadership is that leadership belongs to a just, pious, resourceful, and courageous jurist who is aware of the time and possesses administrative ability” (Jomhouri Esla¯mi Daily, 10 July 1983) “To be professional is valuable but it comes second . . . first comes ideology” (Jomhouri Esla¯mi Daily, 14 November 1980). “Revolutionary Council could be divided to two factions; one that believed in the line of jurisprudence . . . and the other one that did not believed in this line or at least did not pay attention to it” (Jomhouri Esla¯mi Daily, 13 February 1982) Khamenei presents himself, Motahhari, Ardebili and other cleric members of the Council as advocates of the first line. Motahhari, 1991a: 150. Ibid.: 1991b: 81. Ibid.: 1991a: 152. Ibid.: 1991b: 80. Ibid.: 1991a: 154. Ibid.: Spiritual Discourses: shia.org/discourse.html (accessed on 6 December 2007). Ibid.: 1991a: 150, 152– 4.

282

NOTES

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22. Ibid.: 1991b: 87. 23. Mohyeddin Ha¯’eri Shirazi: “if we could enforce shari‘ah law with respect to theft [amputation] we would not witness this high rate of theft in the society,” (gooyanews, 23 June 2008). 24. Khomeini, 2002: 33. 25. Morteza¯ Motahhari, The Principle of Ijtihad in Islam, tr. by John Cooper: al-islam. org/al-serat/ijtihad.htm. 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid. 28. Motahhari, 1991b: 194. 29. Motahhari present the guardian jurist as an ideologue of the Islamic state: “the guardianship of the jurist does not mean that the jurist himself will take the rule and practically govern. The role of the jurist in an Islamic country . . . is the role of an ideologue not a ruler” (1991b: 85). 30. Morteza¯ Motahhari, The Principle of Ijtihad in Islam, tr. by John Cooper: al-islam. org/al-serat/ijtihad.htm. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid.: 1991b: 85. 38. Ibid.: 1992: 71. 39. “Why Shariah?” The New York Times Magazine, 16 March 2008. 40. Said Arjomand, Letter to the Editor of the New York Times concerning the article by Noah Feldman. 41. Ibid. 42. 1928 and 1935. 43. Noah Feldman believes that “without shari‘ah, there would have been no Haroun al-Rashid in Baghdad, no golden age of Muslim Spain, no reign of Suleiman the Magnificent in Istanbul” (“Why Shariah?” The New York Times Magazine, 16 March 2008). This is absolute reductionism and a misrepresentation of the facts. In this statement, he ignores the role of Muslim scientists, philosophers, artists and other scholars from all conquered lands as well as their organizing and managing capacities in building and maintaining an Islamic civilization and an Islamic empire.

Chapter 8

Justice-Oriented Scripturalist Islamism: Mohammad Reza Hakimi

1. Hakimi, 1996: 161. 2. Ibid.: 56– 8.

NOTES

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114 –124

283

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

Ibid.: 61. Ibid.: 60– 67, 154– 5. Ibid.: 51. Ibid.: 151. Ibid.; 152. Ibid.: 58. Ibid.: 58. Ibid.: 58– 9. Ibid.: 59. Ibid.: 59. Hakimi et al., 1994: 589. Ibid.: 590. Ibid.: 590. Ibid.: 591. Ibid.: 590. Ibid.: 591. Ibid.: 591. Ibid.: 626. Ibid.: 658. Ibid.: 634. Ibid.: 679. Ibid.: 1989. Hakimi, 1996, 1997, 2001. Hakimi et al., 2001: 600– 638. Ibid.: 1981a. Ibid.: 1981b. This discourse is depicted in the writings and other works of modern Shi‘i thinkers. Motahhari believes that “Islam in being a religion . . . exists to institute social justice” (1985: 53). 30. Hakimi et al., 1981: 336– 422. 31. Ibid.: 1994: 689.

Chapter 9 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Mysticism-Oriented Islamism: Abdolkarim Soroush

Iqbal Lahori, 1989: Preface. Ibid. Soroush, 2000: 34, 37. Ibid.: 32. Ibid.: 86. Ibid.: 31. Ibid.: 259.

284 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

NOTES

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124 –143

Ibid.: 1995: 34. Ibid.: 186. Ibid.: 52. Ibid.: 2000: 27. Ibid.: 89– 90. Ibid.: 89– 90. Ibid.: 127. The Sanusiyyah movement in North Africa began as a Sufi movement but became militant in response to French and Italian colonialism (Humphreys, 1982). Hamzeh and Dekmejian, 1996. Trimingham, 1971: 68. Time, 18 April 2005, 88. Soroush, 2000: 94. Ibid.: 94– 5. Ibid.: 103. Na’ini, 2002/1909: 122– 3. Soroush, 2000: 142. Ibid.: 132. Ibid.: 128. Ibid.: 128. Ibid.: 127. Arash Naraqi, Perfection of Religious Intellectualism Project: roozonline.com/ archives/2007/11/post_4699.php. Soroush, 2000: 245, 251. Soroush, 1987: 325. Soroush, 1986: 313– 6. Soroush, 2000: 44. Soroush, 1994: 217– 83. Soroush, 2000: 144– 5. Ibid.: 43. Zubaideh, 2001. Filali-ansary, 1996: 77. Soroush in his interview with Shargh daily: sharghnewspaper.ir/850529/html/ newssoc.htm#s462399.

Chapter 10 Militarist/Messianist Islamism: Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi 1. 1924, the founder of On the Route to Truth Institute, founder and director of Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institution (funded by non-transparent rents and subsidies of the government), member of Expert Council and the

NOTES

2.

3.

4. 5.

6. 7. 8. 9.

10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15.

TO PAGES

143 –149

285

secretary of Ahl-e Bait International Society. His main function in the Islamic Republic has been disclosing the enemies of Islam, confronting religious intellectuals and rejecting their ideas, and justifying the killings of nonconformists and dissidents as morally corrupted and converted people. Ahmadinejad’s speech in Mesba¯h’s institute: youtube.com/watch?v¼bMjitlSYt Wo&eurl¼http%3A%2F%2Fnews%2Egooya%2Ecom%2Fdidaniha%2Farc hives%2F2009%2F06%2F089379%2Ephp&feature¼player_embedded; youtube.com/watch?v¼cAKAPJwPSpI&eurl¼http%3A%2F%2Fnews%2Egooya %2Ecom%2Fdidaniha%2Farchives%2F2009%2F06%2F089379%2Ephp& feature¼player_embedded (accessed on 16 June 2009). In his meeting with university students in 1999, Ali Khamenei said: “if this generation is not blessed to benefit from the works of ‘Alla¯meh Taba¯taba¯’i and Martyr Motahhari, to God’s grace, this dearest and great person [Mesba¯h] fills the vacuum in our time” (rajanews.com/News/?27517, accessed on 22 June 2008). ‘Abdolva¯hed Musavi La¯ri: “Imam was against appointing Mohammadi ‘Era¯qi [Mesba¯h’s son in law] as his representative in IRGC to prevent Mesba¯h influence in this organization” (roozonline.com/archives/2008/04/post_7126.php). In the case of serial killings in Kerman, where more than a dozen were killed for breaking private Islamic codes, the main defendant, Mohammad Hamzeh Mostafavi, mentioned Mesba¯h as his spiritual mentor and someone who issued the fatwa for the killings (Shahram Rafi‘zadeh, Rereading Kerman Serial Killings, gooyanews, 22 Mehr 1382/14 October 2003). Mesba¯h Yazdi, 2003a: 46. Ibid.: 48. Desai, 2007. Davood Ahmadinejad, the President’s brother and his special representative on the Air Defense Committee said: “with the blessing of Prophet Mohammad, we will conquer the whole world. . . . we will conquer all the world peaks that are at the hands of imperialists” (Emrooz News Website, 11 March 2009: emruz.net/ ShowItem.aspx?ID¼21228&p¼1). Mohammad Ba¯qer Kharra¯zi, Rooz news website, 2 March 2008. The second part was stated in 2005 during Ahmadinejad’s presidential campaign. (roozonline.com/archives/2008/03/post_6420.php). Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s prediction of social unrest all over the world: Poul Daily, 19 June 2008. 2003b: 124. info/ShowItem.aspx?ID¼4535&p¼1. Tens of thousands per day add up to tens of millions of letters per year. It is impossible for the Iranian postal service even to deliver this volume of letters to the president’s office in Pasture Street. It is also impossible for his staff to deal with them. Mesba¯h Yazdi’s theory of sacred violence is expressed clearly in one of his Friday prayer lectures: “the verdict for offending Islamic holies is execution and where there is no possibility for having him/her tried in a court, every Muslim has an

286

16.

17. 18. 19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

NOTES TO PAGES 149 –151

obligation to take action personally. . . . If it is proved to some people by certain evidence that there is a conspiracy against the Islamic Republic and the regime is going to be overthrown and others do not pay enough attention to this issue for any reason or do not see it in their interests, and they are sure about this, they should take action. This is one of the cases that enforcing violence is permitted. If somebody offends Islamic sensibilities, Islam gives authority to any Muslims to shed his/her blood and there is no need for trial in the court.” (Sobh-e Emrooz Daily, 29 January 2000). A spate of murders of dissident intellectuals and political activists in the 1990s, the shooting in March 1998 of Saeed Hajjarian, a prominent reformist and the President Khatami’s advisor, the serial killings of prostitutes in Mashhad, and the serial killings of people who were believed to commit vice in Kerman among others are the most prominent examples of sacred violence. The murders of Furahars, Mohammad Mukhta¯ri, Mohammad Ja‘far Puyandeh, Pirooz Dava¯ni and Majid Sharif were made public by reformist newspapers, all closed later by the government. In 1998 December, Dariush Foruhar and his wife Parvaneh Eskandari, both in their seventies, were butchered and mutilated at home. Both had been founders of the Iranian Nation Party, and vociferous critics of the government. Within a few weeks three writers, Majid Sharif, Mohammad Mokhtari and Mohammad-Ja’far Puyandeh – all closely involved in the rebirth of the Writers’ Association – disappeared after leaving home and their murdered bodies, showing signs of torture, appeared a week to ten days later. Almost all who commit these crimes, similar to Saeed Asgar who later confessed in court to shooting Hajjarian, proclaimed they were motivated in part by religious zeal instigated and justified by Mesba¯h’s theories. The murderers were given short sentences and then freed. Mesba¯h’s lecture in the gathering of the members of the Basiege organization in Qorveh, 29 July 2002. Amir Farsha¯d Ebra¯himi, Layla¯j Ba¯zandeh (Losing Chess Player): goftaniha. org/2007/11/blog-post_25.htmla¯a¯ (accessed on 5 December 2007). bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/story/2005/11/051120_ra-mesbah-clergy.shtml; bbc.co. uk/persian/iran/story/2004/11/041119_mf_mb_kerman.shtml; peiknet.com/ 1386/09tir/24/page/32dustali.htm (accessed on 17 February 2008). Mesba¯h Yazdi: “if promoting Islamic causes is not possible other than by violence, it is necessary to condone it” (Sobh-e Emrooz Daily, 15 March 2000); “we have erha¯b (terror) in Quran; those who are familiar with Arabic literature can go and find the word for this term; if I say the meaning, tomorrow the newspapers will have my words as headline and will accuse me of endorsing terrorism.” (Khorda¯d Daily, 7 August 1999). 1999: 30 – 3. Ibid.: 52– 4, 61. Ibid.: 46, 62. Ibid.: 109–10. Ibid.: 31, 109.

NOTES

TO PAGES

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287

26. Mesba¯h Yazdi: news.gooya.com/society/archives/066077.php (accessed on 18 December 2007). 27. Ibid.: 1997: 125. 28. Ibid.: Dar Partov-e A¯zarakhsh (In the Ray of Lightning): mesbahyazdi.org/farsi/ (accessed on 28 January 2008). 29. Ibid.: personal website, 14 October 2009. 30. Ibid.: 1999: 315– 6. 31. 1999: 318. 32. Ibid.: 319. 33. Sobh-e Emrooz Daily, 29 January 2000. 34. Mohammad Taqi Mesba¯h Yazdi, Khoshounat va Tasa¯hol (Violence and Tolerance): porsojoo.com/fa/node/3270 (accessed on 15 November 2007). 35. Mesba¯h’s personal website, 21 October 2009. 36. norooznews.ir/news/4361.php (accessed on 27 November 2007). 37. Ibid. 38. roozonline.com/archives/2008/05/post_7271.php. 39. Mesba¯h, 2003b: 80. 40. Ibid.: 97. 41. 2003b: 158. 42. This image is based on some trips to the West: according to the people who have accompanied him during his visits, Mesba¯h has mostly visited gay bars and poor neighborhoods in the US and Canada. I cannot disclose their identities here in this book. In New York I saw people who were looking for food in the garbage bin: http://noandish.com/fa/news/14929/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A8%D8%A7% D8%AD%E2%80%8C%DB%8C%D8%B2%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D8% AF%D8%B1-%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%88%DB%8C%D9%88%D8%B1% DA%A9-%DA%86%D9%87-%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF. According to Dr, Hossein Kamali who was an interpreter in the U.N., Mesbah visited gay bars in New York City. Mesbah was hosted by the Iranian mission in the U.N. when he was in New York. 43. 2003b: 189. 44. Ibid.: 190. 45. Ibid.: 204. 46. Ibid.: 88. 47. Ibid.: 88. 48. Imam Sadeq said: “He (Hidden Imam) will not conquer without a sea of blood and sweat.”: http://www.hawzah.net/fa/Magazine/View/89/7350/91546/ (this is the official website of shi‘i seminary in Qom). 49. 2003b: 141. 50. Ibid.: 142. 51. Ahmadinejad addressing members of the Basij student organization in ‘Elm va San‘at University, 12 November 2007: emruz.biz/ShowItem.aspx?ID¼10989 &p¼1.

288

NOTES

TO PAGES

156 –162

52. Ka¯zem Seddiqi, a Qum Seminary instructor: rajanews.com/News/?28367 (accessed on 9 July 2008). 53. 2003b: 234. 54. Ibid.: 232. 55. Ibid.: 220. 56. Ibid.: 212–3. 57. The verdict of Qom, Economist, 19 July 2007: economist.com/surveys/ displaystory.cfm?story_id¼9466854. 58. 2002: 17. 59. As quoted by Aftab News, Sunday, 15 October 2006. 60. Ibid. 61. Baztab website, 27 November 2005. 62. Rasa News, Baztab website, 5 December 2005. 63. The video recording of the speech of Mr Ahmadinejad, “This is Mahmoud”, by Amir Farsha¯d Ebra¯himi may be viewed at www.goftaniha.org, http://www. goftaniha.org/2008/01/blog-post_15.html 15 January 2008. The video is also available at youtube.com. 64. Speeches given in the province of Ilam and the province of Sistan and Baluchestan, ILNA News, December 2005. 65. Ahmadinejad in Switzerland, ISNA News, 2 April 2009. 66. In a confidential meeting with the elections’ supervisors of the Ahmadinejad administration, while quoting the Bagharah Soureh, verse 249, of the Qur’an, to justify vote fraud, Mesba¯h stated that, “If someone is elected the president and hurts the Islamic values that have been spread [by Mr Ahmadinejad] to Lebanon, Palestine, Venezuela, and other places, it is against Islam to vote for that person. We should not vote for that person, and also warn people about that person. It is your religious duty as the supervisors of the elections to do so.” He then harshly criticized the other candidates [Messrs Mir Husayn Mousavi, Mahdi Karroubi, and Mohsen Rezaaee],” and continued, “You should throw away those who are unqualified, both morally and lawfully. Your highest call of duty at this time is to preserve your achievement.” (Open letter of a group of employees of Iran’s Interior Ministry: tehranbureau.com/2009/06/07/fatwaissued-for-changing-the-vote-in-favor-of-ahmadinejad/, accessed on 7 June 2009). 67. Mesba¯h, 1999. 68. payam-e-emrooz.persianblog.ir/1385_4_31_payam-e-emrooz_archive.html. 69. Fatemeh Kheradmand was beaten in the street: http://www.alarabiya.net/ articles/2013/01/25/262508.html.

Chapter 11

Fascist Islamism: Ahmad Fardid and Reza Davari

1. Islamo-fascism and Islamic fascism were also adopted by journalists who intended these terms to refer to Islamist radicals.

NOTES

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289

2. ahmadfardid.com/bio.htm (accessed on 15 January 2008). 3. Due to their loyalty to the leader, Reza Da¯vari Ardakani and other fascist Islamists are appointed to most of the administrative positions related to academia and culture in the country. Da¯vari is the president of the Academy of Sciences of the Islamic Republic of Iran. These are the positions that he has held since the victory of the Iranian Revolution in 1979: Dean, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Tehran, Tehran, 1979– 81 (the presidents, deans and chairs in Iranian universities are selected by the government); Head, Iranian National Commission for UNESCO, 1979– 82; Head, Department of Philosophy, University of Tehran, Tehran, 1982–8; Editor-in-Chief, Name-ye Farhang Journal, Iran, 1992–present; Managing Director, Scientific and Cultural Publications, Tehran, 1996–97; Editor, Farhang Journal, 1996– PRESENT; Head, The Academy of Sciences of Islamic Republic of Iran, 1998– PRESENT. 4. “The Relationship between Real Religion and Philosophy and Science”: ahmadfardid.com/nesbat%20dianat.htm (accessed on 23 September 2007). 5. Mirsepassi, 2000: 131. 6. When Popper’s Open Society and Its Enemies was translated and published in Iran in 1985, Da¯vari presented the major ideas of open society as opposing to revolution and religion, promoting capitalism and liberalism, and giving priority to scientific methodology as opposed to religious intuition (1985: 1986b). 7. The Establishment of History: ahmadfardid.com/gozide-sokhanan.htm#tasis. 8. Ahmad Fardid, “I have a negative position to all Western philosophy except Heidegger”: ahmadfardid.com/way.htm. 9. In his review of Farias’ Heidegger et le Nazisme, Thomas Sheehan (Heidegger and the Nazis, the New York Review of Books, 16 June 1988) sums up the political situation of Heidegger as follows: “In outline, the story of Heidegger and the Nazis concerns (1) a provincial, ultraconservative German nationalist and, at least from 1932 on, a Nazi sympathizer (2) who, three months after Hitler took power, became rector of Freiburg University, joined the NSDAP, and tried unsuccessfully to become the philosophical Fu¨hrer of the Nazi movement, (3) who quit the rectorate in 1934 and quietly dissociated himself from some aspects of the Nazi party while remaining an enthusiastic supporter of its ideals, (4) who was dismissed from teaching in 1945, only to be reintegrated into the university in 1951, and who even after his death in 1976 continues to have an immense following in Europe and America.” 10. Da¯vari, 2000: 2. 11. Ibid.: 10. 12. Ibid.: 1983: 18. 13. Ibid.: 32. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid.: 208. 16. Ibid.: 181.

290 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60.

NOTES

TO PAGES

Ibid.: 175. Ibid.: 1986: 167. Ibid.: 1983: 144. Ibid.: 2000: 26. Ibid.: 1983: 39. Ibid.: 2000: 9. Ibid.: 6. Ibid. Ibid.: 30. ahmadfardid.com/tafakor.htm. Da¯vari, 1983: 39. Ibid.: 253. Ibid.: 222. Ibid.: 2000: 94. Ibid.: 9. Ibid.: 1986a: 235. Ibid.: 2000: 20. Ibid.: 74. Ibid.: 1983: 16. Ibid.: 35. Ibid. Ibid.: 27. Ibid.: 39. Ibid.: 45. Ibid.: 46. Ibid.: 49. Ibid.: 53. Ibid.: 59. Ibid.: 60. Ibid.: 220. 2002: 386. Ibid.: 371. Ibid.: 379. Ibid.: 398. Ibid.: 370. Ibid.: 274, 405. Ibid.: 278. Ibid.: 145, 281. Ibid.: 405. Da¯vari, 1983: 64. Fardid, 2002: 53. Ibid.: 144–5. Ibid.: 79. Ibid.

165 –169

NOTES 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75.

76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92.

TO PAGES

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Ibid.: 79 –80, 127. Da¯vari, 1987: 26. Ibid.: 86, 88. Ibid.: 28. Ibid.: 1978: 10. ahmadfardid.com/tafakor.htm. Ibid. Da¯vari, 1978: 12. Ibid.: 141; 1986a: ‫ﺝ‬. Ibid.: 1986: ‫ﻩ‬ Ibid.: 1978: 146. Ibid.: 1986a: 233. Ibid.: ‫ﺝ‬،‫ﻡ‬ Ibid.: 1987: 24. “It was Heidegger’s courses and lectures on Aristotle and Plato during these years [1924– 5] that drove German students like Hannah Arendt, Jacob Klein and Leo Strauss (and others) to wonder whether a return to Greek philosophy was now possible.” (Martin Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer translators, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997. Reviewed by Clifford Angell Bates, Jr.: omega.cohums.ohio-state.edu/ mailing_lists/BMCR-L/Mirror/1998/1998 – 11 – 11.html) (accessed on 6 November 2007). Da¯vari, 1978: 85. Ibid.: 978: 16, 18, 141: 1999: 16. Rockmore, 1992: 92. Da¯vari, 1978: 10. Ibid.: 141. Ibid.: 24. Ibid.: 11. Ibid.: 15. Ibid.: 15. Fardid, 2002: 36. Da¯vari, 1987: 13. Ibid.: 13. Ibid.: 13. Ibid.: 18. Ibid.: 18. Ibid.: 1986a: ‫ﺩ‬. When asked about the state of philosophical debates in the West received in Iran after coming back from a visit to Iran in 2001, Habermas introduces Da¯vari’s ideas as post-modernism: “During the Nineties, Heidegger and Popper were the main points of reference for a debate between Reza Davari Ardakani, on the one side, and Abdolkarim Soroush on the other. Today Da¯vari is president of the Academy of Sciences and is viewed as a

292

93. 94. 95.

96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119.

NOTES

TO PAGES

172 –179

‘postmodernist’. Such post-modernists have mainly taken over Heidegger’s late analysis of the ‘Essence of Technology’ and allied themselves with local criticism of Western modernism.” (Interview with Ju¨rgen Habermas, At the Crossroads of Persia: The German philosopher on his journey to Iran, Art and Thought: admin.qantara.de/uploads/265/FWF76_Habermas.pdf.) Other than rejecting modernity, there is no other common view between Iranian fascism and post-modernism. Da¯vari, 1983: 128. Ibid.: 78. Heidegger’s political entanglements are related to his thinking, the thinking of Sein und Zeit, especially as relating to the notion of dread when applied to the destiny of the community, the Volk, may allow for the politics of fascism, even though it does not necessitate, or even authorize these politics: JeanFrancois Lyotard on Heidegger in his book Heidegger et “les juifs” reviewed by Pierre Joris in his essay, Heidegger, France, Politics, the University: anti-rev. org/textes/Joris89a/. Rockmore, 1992: 110. Da¯vari, 1987: 12&17. Ibid.: 12. Fardid, 2002: 74. Da¯vari, 1983: 25. Ibid.: 25. ahmadfardid.com/kalamat-ghesar.htm. aftab.ir/articles/politics/world/c1c1148738023_human_rights_p1.php (accessed on 19 February 2008). The Fall of Intellectualism, rdavari.com/articles/khazane%20roshanfekri.htm. ahmadfardid.com/interview_fardid.htm. Rajabi, 1986; Taba¯taba¯’i, 2001. Fardid, 2002: 36. Ibid.: 77. Ibid.: 78. Da¯vari, 1999: 5. |‫ﻣﻘﺎﻡ ﻭﻻﻳﺖ ﻓﻘﻴﻪ ﻭ ﻧﻴﺎﺑﺖ ﺍﻣﺎﻡ ﻋﺼﺮ ﺟﺎﻣﻊ ﻣﻌﻘﻮﻝ ﻭ ﻣﻨﻘﻮﻝ ﺍﺳﺖ‬: ahmadfardid.com/ interview_fardid.htm. ahmadfardid.com/interview_fardid.htm. Fardid, 2002: 55. aviny.com/article/aviny/Chapters/YekHoshdar.aspx. aviny.com/books/book_Aviny/HokomatFarzanegan/1_2.aspx. Fardid, 2002: 148. Da¯vari, 1987: 62, 74, 84, 92, 102, 115, 123. Ibid.: 83. Khomeini reflects the same attitude in the opening pages of his book on Islamic government: “From the very beginning, the historical movement of Islam has had to contend with the Jews, for it was they who first established anti-Islamic

NOTES

120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157.

TO PAGES

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propaganda and engaged in various stratagems, and as you can see, this activity continues down to the present. Later they were joined by other groups, who were in certain respects, more satanic than they [were].” (al-islam.org/islamicgovernment) In this approach, Khomeini does not reflect a philosophical and metaphysical hate toward Jewish people as fascist Islamists do. Fardid, 2002: 177. Ibid.: 37, 279. Ibid.: 284. Ibid.: 61. Ibid.: 195. Ibid.: 358. Ibid.: 343. Ibid.: 358. Ibid.: 280. Ibid.: 369–70. Ibid.: 405. “Westoxication and Its Historical Universal Crisis in the Contemporary World”, ahmadfardid.com/bohran10.htm. Fardid, 2002: 37. Da¯vari, 1983: 36. Ibid.: 10. Ibid. Ibid.: 169. Ibid.: 11. Fardid, 2002: 11. Ibid.: 72. Ibid. Ibid.: 75. Da¯vari, 1983: 90, 96. Fardid, 2002: 132. Da¯vari, 1983: 15. ahmadfardid.com/kalamat-ghesar.htm. Da¯vari, 2000: 77. Ibid., 86. Fardid, 2002: 177. Da¯vari, 2000, 95. 1983: 19. Da¯vari, 1983: 23. Ibid.: 24. Ibid.: 27. Ibid.. Ibid.: 265. ahmadfardid.com/kalamat-ghesar.htm. Ibid.

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Chapter 12

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Comparisons

1. Shari‘ati, 1979a. 2. Dallmayr, 2002: 173. 3. Due to the report of a committee appointed by Mohammad Khatami, the Intelligence Ministry was involved in the killings. Later the Minister was dismissed and the deputy for internal affairs was arrested. He was later committed suicide in prison. Later his colleagues were tried in the court and were convicted and sentenced to some years in prison: http://www.independent.co.uk/ news/people/profiles/the-new-suffragettes-shirin-ebadi–the-campaigner-whohas-become-an-international-figurehead-for-womens-rights-8638504.html; http://www.gozaar.org/english/articles-en/A-Caricature-of-Justice.html. 4. A¯l-e Ahmad, 1984; Ba¯zarga¯n, 1998; Boroujerdi, 1996; Gheissari, 1997; Nasr, 1981; Shari‘ati, 1979; Soroush, 2000.

Chapter 13

Conclusion

1. Arabs and Turks: Kayali, 1997; Bangladesh: Riaz, 2004; Egypt: Musallam, 2005; Horn of Africa: De Waal, 2004; North Africa: Ruedy, 1996; Palestine: Lybarger, 2007. 2. The Muja¯hedin-e Khalq and Forqa¯n were removed from the public sphere by violent surgery in the first decade of the Islamic Republic (Abrahamian, 1989: 218– 223); The Hojjatieh that was carrying an Islamic ideology of quietism/ messianism was depoliticized further due to the pressure of Islamist ideologies in the political scene (Ba¯qi, 1984 and 1998). 3. In 1988, under orders from Khomeini, over 4,000 political prisoners were summarily executed in Iranian prisons in less than one month. Mostafa Pourmohammadi, Ahmadinejad’s Interior Minister, was one of three members of a committee designating which political prisoners would be executed. In a string of state-sanctioned political assassinations, 89 dissidents outside Iran and over 300 inside Iran were killed in the 1990s. The killing of Kurdish leader Abdolrahman Ghassemlou and the 1992 ‘Mykonos’ restaurant terror attack in Berlin are among the violent incidents to which Iranian leaders are linked. 4. For some examples listen to a radio series produced by Radio Farda: http://www. radiofarda.com/content/b18-solitary-comfienment-part15/24741712.html. 5. http://shaheedoniran.org/english/dr-shaheeds-work/latest-reports/march-2014report-of-the-special-rapporteur/. 6. For example, the one million signature campaign. 7. Janne Bjerre Christensen. Drugs, Deviancy & Democracy in Iran: The Interaction of State & Civil Society. I.B.Tauris, 2011. p. 121. 8. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/03/irans-cities-asea-of-poverty.html.

NOTES

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295

9. Iran: Coping With The World’s Highest Rate Of Brain Drain: http://www. rferl.org/content/article/1051803.html. 10. For some examples look at Islamists’ work on evolution (Meshkini, 1977; Saha¯bi, 1970) and intelligent design (Ba¯zarga¯n, 1957; Maka¯rem Shira¯zi et al., 1970). 11. The Draft Constitution by Hizb ut-Tahrir, Article 3: “The Khaleefah (caliph) is empowered to adopt divine rules (ahkaam shar’iyyah) enacted as constitution and canons. Once the khaleefah has adopted a divine rule, that rule alone becomes the divine rule that must be enacted and then implemented. Every citizen must openly and secretly obey that adopted rule.” (http://www.hizbut-tahrir.info/english/constitution.htm.) 12. http://kevanharris.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/2013-02%20Harris% 20IJMES%20The%20Rise%20of%20the%20Subcontractor%20State%20-% 20Politics%20of%20Pseudo-Privatization%20in%20the%20Islamic% 20Republic%20of%20Iran_0.pdf. 13. Mohammad Sa‘idi, Iran Marine Service’s CEO; he was in prison for five years without charge. 14. ‘Abba¯s Pa¯lizda¯r. 15. http://www.filmreference.com/encyclopedia/Independent-Film-Road-Movies/ Iran-POSTREVOLUTION.html; https://books.google.com/books?id=CPtUfi3K_JYC&pg=PA144&lpg=PA144&dq=iranian+cinema+funded+by+the +government&source=bl&ots=ad2KPwuAwu&sig=h-VO8eRrFDKgP4ycjFDHkYnV1xs&hl=en&sa=X&ei=wAHcVJ-OI7GLsQSJ3oCgAw&ved=0CEEQ6AEwBg#v=onepage&q=iranian%20cinema%20funded%20by% 20the%20government&f=false; http://www.merip.org/mer/mer219/iraniancinema. 16. Iranians’ Values and Attitudes Survey, 2000 and 2003.

Epilogue 1. David Hirst, Islamism, in Decline, Awaits a Wake-Up Call From Voters in Iran, International Herald Tribune, 18 February 2000; Michael Ladeen, Iran’s shi’i islamism failing!, Fox News Network, 12 July 2002. 2. Oliver Roy uses the term in another way: “When I evoke the theme of postIslamism, I do not mean that we are finished with the political role of Islam but only, and this is essential, that Islamist movements can no longer position themselves as holding the monopoly of legitimate representations of Islam in politics, which was their former leitmotif. Post-Islamism . . . only emerges in relation to a new structure of political space, which is that of modern political parties.” (Olivier Roy, Is Islamism an Invention of Scholars of Islam? Esprit, Aug-Sept 2001; Draft translation by Nikki R. Keddie: www1.columbia.edu/sec-cgibin/gulf/dataplug.pl?

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dir¼/wwws/data/cu/sipa/GULF2000/chronology/pat&ddfile¼chron&display¼ p&hh¼b&hd¼b&sp¼619417627&qw¼Islamism, accessed on 15 February 2008.) 3. Asef Bayat, “The Coming of a Post-Islamic Society”, Critique: Critical Middle East Studies, no. 9 (Fall 1996), 43 – 52.

Appendix Religious Studies in Iran Today: Research Programs 1. “The Baha‘i sect does not have a revealed book like the followers of Judaism, Christianity, or Zoroastrianism, and are not considered a religious minority in the Constitution; but because they are the residents of this country, they have territorial rights, and benefit from the rights of citizenship, and they should benefit from the Islamic gentleness which is so much emphasized by the Quran and our religious leaders” (Husayn Ali Montazeri’s website, accessed on 28 May 2008).

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INDEX

Abbasids, 73 Abdu, Mohammad, 10, 37, 86 Absolutism, 57, 85, 88, 139, 164, 172, 224 Afghanistan, 1, 18, 147, 225– 6 Africa, 62, 78, 284, 294 North-, xii, 2, 224 Agnosticism, 26, 157 Ahl-e Haqq, 5 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 43, 45, 144, 146– 8, 154, 157– 9, 161, 179, 205, 207– 8, 213, 216– 20, 228– 30, 235, 274, 281, 285–6, 288– 9, 295, 296 Akhba¯ri, 5, 27 Alavite Shi‘ism, 80 A¯l-e Ahmad, Jala¯l, 39, 52 – 3, 60 – 1, 64 – 7, 69 – 70, 189, 198, 276– 7, 294 Ali (fourth caliph) 31, 32, 37 Al-Qaeda, 162, 225 America, 290 North-, 7 American foreign policy, 31, 171 American Islam, 41, 52 American neo-cons, 162 American president, 158 Americans, 154 Anatolia, 127

Anti-American, 31, 161, 162 Anti-Semitism, 164, 179, 181 Arab countries, 127 Arab nationalism, 270 Arabic, xx, 39, 210, 287 Arab nations, 31 Arab world, 31 Arabs, 5, 276, 295 Aristotelian, 5 Armageddon, 155 A¯rya¯npour, Amir Husayn, 199 Asad A¯ba¯di, Jama¯l ul-Din (Seyyed Jama¯l), 9, 10, 37, 51 – 58, 122, 168, 275 Ash‘ari, 5 A¯shouri, Dariush, 168 Asia, 78 South East-, xii Assembly of Experts, see Experts Assembly Assembly of Experts for Constitution, 230 Atheism, 26, 168, 172, 175 Neo-, 42 Authoritarianism, x, 7, 21, 26, 40, 43, 46, 94, 134, 139, 169, 173, 181– 2, 196, 210, 214–5, 220 Clerical-, 74, 95 – 6, 134

INDEX Religious-, 237, 239, 243– 6, 247– 48, 267– 69 Theocratic-, 159 Ayya¯ri, 5 Baha’is, 4, 137, 235, 296 Baha’ism, 143 Bahrain, 1, 31, 210 Bal‘am, 78 Baluchis, 5 Bani Sadr, Abolhasan, 168 Banna, Hasan al-, 37, Baya¯t, Asadullah, 232 Ba¯zarga¯n, Mehdi, 8, 57, 84 – 7, 198, 247, 279 Beheshti, Seyyed Mohammad Husayn, 102 Behrangi, Samad, 197 Bilal, 80 Borujerd, 126 Brotherhood, 5, 75 – 6, 127, 163, 176 Camus, Albert, 66 Canterbury, Archbishop of, 110 Capitalism, 36, 38, 180, 189, 197, 289 Western-, 75 Carnap, Rudolf, 169 Censorship, 73, 135– 6, 141, 161, 178, 184, 241, 244, 246, 253, 266 Centralism, 210 Chechnya, 31 Christianity, xii Christians, 4 CIA, 60, 85, 240 Civil society, xviii, 10 –1, 15, 38, 72, 118, 122, 134– 5, 138– 9, 146, 150, 161, 163, 192, 196, 206, 212– 3, 241, 295 Clerics, x, 6, 8, 16, 20, 29, 39, 52 – 4, 60 – 1, 64 – 7, 69 – 73, 79, 84, 86, 101, 104– 8, 109– 10, 113, 121, 123– 4, 126, 128, 133– 4, 136, 138, 140, 144, 149, 151, 161, 173– 5, 181– 2, 187, 197– 198,

307

203, 207, 209, 211– 2, 218, 220, 222, 227– 31, 233– 4, 236, 241, 249, 274 Militant-, 43, 190, 228 Militarist-, 179 Opposition-, 232 Passive-, 235 Rule of the-, 196 Ruling-, xviii, 2, 30, 39, 52, 71, 130, 143, 146,160, 168, 173, 180, 217– 9, 225 Shi‘i-, 2, 6, 9, 32, 35, 7, 66 –7, 69 – 70, 81, 85, 88 – 99, 157– 8, 162, 166, 170, 172, 179, 182, 188, 195 199, 207, 209, 211– 2, 226, 229– 32, 233– 5 Authoritarianist-, 195 Traditional-, 35 Traditionalist-, 222 Ultra-authoritarian-, 173 Clerical authority, 4 Clerical circles, 5 Clientalism, 33, 46, 210 Colonialism, 9, 25, 34, 47, 55, 64, 69, 169, 172, 205, 224, 272, 284 see also Western Anti-, 62, 171, 183 British-, 25 Communism, 38, 75 Conspiracy theory, 4, 33, 146, 151, 176, 201, 235, 286 Cultural-, 151 Constitutionalism, xvii, 10, 15, 41, 57, 65, 88, 94 Constitutional Movement of 1906, 4, 43, 63, 90, 183 Corruption, 2, 3, 11, 33, 43, 50, 72, 83, 104, 194, 208, 211, 219– 20, 228, 273–4 Anti-, 179, 235 Moral-, 110, 155, 192, 266 Cosmologism, 164 Croesus, 78 Cronyism, 33, 196, 208, 216

308

POLITICAL ISLAM IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN

Cultural developments, 12 –4 Cultural Revolution Council, 217 Dabashi, Hamid, 29 Da¯r al-harb, 22 Da¯r al-Islam, 22 Dava¯ni, Pirooz, 286 Da¯vari, Reza, 9, 43, 163, 192, 198, 247, 289, 292 Democracy, xvii– xix, 2, 4, 10, 15, 18, 20, 35 – 6, 39, 42 – 3, 76, 81 – 2, 94, 119, 124, 135, 137, 140, 150, 159, 160, 163– 4, 167– 9, 175–6, 178– 9, 192, 196– 7, 299, 202, 221, 225– 6, 231, 244– 5, 251 Absolute, 251 Activists, 53 Anti-, 140, 176, 178– 80, 192 Constitutional-, 52 For a few, 205 Guided-, 40, 45, 83, 121– 2, 134, 137, 140, 281 Institutional-, 10 Islamic-, 122, 130– 3, 140, 193, 236 Liberal-, 8, 133– 4, 158, 187 Morally based-, 140 Nonconditional-, 122 Oriented Islamism, 146 Parliamentary-, 43 Partial-, 10, 236 Religion, 241, 249, 251, 260, 264 Religious-, 134– 6 Social-, 242 Western-, 164, 189, 264 Democratization, 11, 140, 196, 199, 206 Derwishes, 163, Despotism, 7, 37, 63, 84, 129, 173, 175, 182, 192, 196, 205, 214, 224, 236 Developmentalism, 46 –7 Dhahabi, 5 Dialogue, xiii, 11, 136, 139, 153, 167, 188, 199, 211, 250, 253, 264– 5, 267

Disqualification of candidates, 213– 5, 226, 236 Differentiation, xv Dorri Najafabadi, Qorba¯nali, 150 ¯ ohseni, 144 Eje‘i, Gholam Husein M Ejtema¯iyyat (socialibity), xii Elitism, 138, 192 Enlightenment, 48, 139, 163, 171 Esfaha¯ni, Mirza¯ Mehdi, 42, 113 Eshra¯qi, 5 Esma¯‘ilis, 5 Essentialism, xiv Europe, xx, 7, 58, 63, 65, 69, 168, 172, 290 Existentialism, 27, 66, 69, 278 Expediency, 3, 106, 108, 110, 117, 208 Council, 213, 228 of Islam, 89 of state, 95, 97 Experts Assembly, 228, 230– 1 Fanon, Franz, 37 Fardid, Ahmad, 9, 24, 43 – 44, 52, 62– 5, 74, 162– 85, 189, 192, 198, 247, 274, 289 Feqh, 105– 10, 123, 136, 192, 197, 238, 247 Feldman, Noah, 110 Feqhism, see ideologized shari‘ah Filtering (websites), 13, 135, 178, 234 Filters, 13 Freemasonary, 180 French Revolution, 171 Fruhars (Dariush and Parvaneh), 286 Fundamentalism, 274 Islamic-, 20, 25 – 6, 46 –7 Ghassemlou, Abdolrahman, 295 Ghazi regime, 127 Ghazzali, Abu Hamid al-, 53, 128 Ghazzali, Mohammad, 42 Ghaznavids, 80 Ghifari, Abu Dharr, 80

INDEX Globalization, 8, 11, 15, 47 God’s Party, see Hezbullah Golpa¯yega¯ni, Mohammad Reza, 150 Green Movement of 2009, 4, 49 Guardian Council, 136, 213, 215, 231, 234 Guardianship, 177, 221, 223– 4, 282 Elected, 237, 239, 242– 4, 246– 7, 250, 267– 69 of Islam, 166 of jurist, see jurist guardianship Mystical, 128 of the people, 230 of the West, 166 Hadith, 5, 6, 23, 28, 37, 93, 105, 107, 115– 6, 118, 136, 156, 177, 190, 247, 260, 265 Hafez, 128 Hajjarian, Saeed, 286 Hakimi, Mohammad Reza, 9, 42, 74, 113, 115– 9, 247 Halabi, Mahmoud, 42 Hamas, 34, 162 Hashemi Rafsanjani, Akbar, 45, 138, 142, 207, 219, 228 Haydarabad-Deccan, 55 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Frederic, 211 Heidegger, Martin, 43, 163– 4, 166, 168, 170, 173, 174, 181– 2, 191– 2, 211, 247, 289– 92 Hejab, 144 Obligatory-, 105, 141 Heja¯zi, Asghar Mir, 150 Hellenism, 171 Hermeneutics, 237, 242– 4, 246– 7, 255, 267– 9 Hezbullah, 24, 148, 162, 173 Ansar-e-, 150 Lebanese-, 34 Hidden Imam, 31, 35, 43, 88 – 9, 93, 96, 104, 126, 148, 150, 154– 8, 178, 266– 7, see also Mahdi Hierocracy, 9, 95, 104

309

Hitler, Adolph, 164, 179, 290 Hojjatieh, 144, 155, 207, 295 Humanism, 103, 164, 168– 9, 175, 189, 195 Anti-, 164, 171, 258, 264 Western-, 172, 191, 278 Human Rights, xvii– xix, 2, 4, 8, 10, 38, 49, 53, 76, 118– 9, 122, 129, 131, 135– 6, 138, 152– 3, 168– 9, 174–78, 189, 197, 202, 208, 225–7, 241, 244–5, 253 Human Rights Declaration, 154 Ibn Taymiyya, Taqiuddin, 54 Identity, xvii, xviii, 10 – 12, 27, 33, 40, 43, 92, 99, 111, 172, 196, 198–200 Authoritarian religious-, 198 Based Islamic ideologies, 12, 38, 60 – 70 Crisis, 202 Evil-, 174 Islamic-, 16, 38, 130,141, 226 Islamist-, xviii Muslim-, 11, 25 National-, 13, 41, 196, 226 Oriented Islamists, 164 Oriented religiosity of fundamentalists, 142 Palestinian political-, 275 Shi‘i-, 98 – 9 Social-, 165 Ideologization of religion, xix Imam Husayn, 32 Imamate, 31 –2, 35, 92, 94, 224 Imperialism, 9, 24, 37, 82, 92, 165, 167, 169,177, 184, 197, 200 American, 177 Anti-, 161 Intellectuals, 36, 27, 39, 48, 51, 60 – 1, 64, 66 – 7, 69, 73, 80, 84, 96, 107, 124, 127, 134, 136, 151, 166, 168–72, 176, 179, 181, 183, 196–8, 200, 224, 235– 7 Anti-, 195

310

POLITICAL ISLAM IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN

Intellectuals cont. Anti-Western-, 64 Occidentotic-, 61 Politically neutral-, 16 Religious-, 5 – 7, 36, 43, 54 – 5, 57 –8, 64, 72, 79, 89, 122, 129, 167– 68, 192– 5, 198–201, 241 Secular-, xi, 10, 52, 63, 65, 67, 90 –1, 98– 9, 135, 140–2, 144, 167, 174, 178, 199, 201, 225 Shi‘i-, xiv Totalitarian-, 198 International Monetary Fund, 33 Internet, 99 Boom, 221 Sites, 13 Users, 13 Intolerance, 58 Iran-Iraq war, 31, 145 Iranian Nation Party, 286 Iraq, 1, 26, 31, 44, 145, 147, 154, 210, 215, 236, 241 IRGC (Islamic Republic Guard Corps), 99, 143 – 4, 147 – 8, 150, 162 – 3, 208, 212 – 4, 216 – 19, 221, 285 Isfahan, 126, 228 Islamic Golden Age, 11 Islamicization, xi, xiii, 24 – 6, 73, 121, 137, 151, 188, 212, 238, 243– 4, 246, 258, 268, 271 Islamic Coalition Party, 190 Islamic propaganda, 293 Islamic Republic Party, 161, 281 Islamism Definition of-, xi, 15 –46 Developmentalist-, 27, 50, 215, 235 Ex-, 14 Fascist-, xvi, 9, 27, 43, 45, 57, 65, 77, 98, 134, 138, 140, 151, 162– 85, 189, 191– 5, 201, 204– 7, 211, 262, 267– 9, 289, 293 Identity-oriented-, xvii, 12, 38, 60 –70, 142, 164, 276

Justice- oriented-, 42, 50, 57, 113–20, 190, 192–3, 203, 283 Messianist-, 34, 42 – 3, 143– 61, 191, 193– 5, 201, 204, 235, 285 Militarist-, 9, 24, 27, 34, 42–6, 57, 65, 77, 98, 126, 134, 138, 140, 143–61, 164, 179, 183, 189, 191– 5, 201, 204–7, 211, 215, 235, 285 Mysticism-oriented-, 9, 34, 42, 44–5, 47, 49–50, 98, 121–42, 145, 154, 189, 191–4, 205–7, 211 Negative-, 52 Nationalist-, 8 –10, 27, 41, 44, 47, 49 – 50, 81, 84 – 7, 98, 140, 146, 154, 189– 90, 192– 4, 203, 205– 7, 211 Pan-, 57 Revivalist-, x, 17, 37, 49, 57, 74, 139 Revolutionary-, 37 Scripturalist-, 9 Shari‘a-oriented-, see shari‘ah Shi‘i-, 26 – 46 Socialist-, 8, 9, 27, 34, 40, 45, 47, 69, 74 – 83, 85, 98, 122, 134, 140, 146, 154, 189– 90, 192– 4, 203, 205– 7, 212, 233, 277 Israel, 7, 147, 161, 178– 9, 227 Jahanbegloo, Ramin, 161 Jama¯‘at Islami, 162 Jamming, 178, 234, Jannati, Ahmad, 150 Java¯di A¯moli, ‘Abdullah, 228 Jazani, Bizhan, 197 Jesus Christ, 157 Jewish law, 110 Jews, 4 Judaism, 163, 180, 296 Junadah, Jundab ibn, 80 Jurisprudence, 5, 22, 33, 107– 10, 113, 128, 130, 190, 197, 199, 222, 238, 247, 251, 253, 259, 265, 282, see also Feqh

INDEX Principles of-, 107, 110, 238, see also Usul-e Feqh Jurist guardianship, 33, 41, 43, 45, 74, 81, 89–90, 95, 117–9, 128, 137, 142, 149–50, 152, 160, 164, 177, 198, 218, 221, 223–4, 230–1, 282 Absolute-, 35, 74, 89, 94, 145 Karbala, 32, 78, Karrubi, Mahdi, 289 Kashmir, 31 Kawa¯kebi, ‘Abd-al Rahma¯n al-, 37 Kayhan newspaper, 179, 280, 281 Kha¯ksa¯r, 5 Khamenei, Ali, 10, 45, 53, 93, 97 – 8, 102, 119, 129, 132, 144– 7, 150, 154, 155, 161, 163–4, 177, 181, 206, 212– 32, 271, 274, 280– 282, 285 Khamenei, Mohammad, 271 Khan, Seyyed Ahmad, 56 Khanids, 80 Khatami, Mohammad, 45, 136– 7, 213, 217– 8, 225, 235, 286, 294 Khaz‘ali, Abulqa¯sem, 150 Khomeini, Ruhullah, 9, 10, 20, 22, 26, 34 – 5, 41, 52, 74, 81, 84, 88– 98, 104– 5, 119, 128, 132, 137, 139, 144– 5, 151, 161, 171, 173– 5, 182, 189, 206, 212, 214, 217, 220– 4, 226– 7, 230, 236, 247, 271, 273– 4, 279–80, 282, 285, 293, 295 Khorasan, 113 Khora¯sani, Mohammad Kazem, 130 Khora¯sa¯ni, Vahid, 228 Khoshvaqt, Aziz, 150 Kingdom of God, xix Kurds, 5 Lahouri, Iqbal, 37, 122, 168 La¯rijani, Ali, 218 La¯rijani, Sadeq, 281 Lebanon, 1, 26, 31, 126, 147, 210

311

Leninism, 31 – 2 Liberalism, 38, 41–3, 47–8, 131, 133– 4, 140, 142, 163–4, 168, 175–6, 178, 200, 251, 253, 265, 289 Literacy rates, 2, 13, 138 Machiavellism, 46 Mahdi, 31, 156–7, see also Hidden Imam Majlesi, Mohammad Baqer, 116 Maka¯rem Shira¯zi, Naser, 228 Ma’mun, al-, 73 Mann, Michael, xiv Marxism, xix, 37 Mash-had, 113, 286 Mashsha¯’i, 5 Mass media, 26, 220 Mass mobilization, 16, 27, 99, 141, 174 Mass participation, 98 Mass society, 164, 181 Mecca, 37 Medina, 37 Mesba¯h Yazdi, Mohammad Taqi, 1, 9, 42,143– 61, 179, 247, 287 Middle Ages, 78, 171 Middle class, 51, 190, 212– 3, 221, 224 Middle East, xiii, 1, 33, 55, 65, 69, 137, 140, 147– 8, 161– 2, 224, 227, 296 Militant Clerics Assembly, 190, 228 Millenarianism, 139 Minimalism, religious-, 132, 145, 193, 243 Ministry of Intelligence, 99, 218, 226 Ministry of Islamic Guidance and Culture, 179 Modernism, xiii, 8, 46 – 7, 86, 129, 163–4, 168– 70, 172, 196, 240, 273, 292 Anti-, 170 Post-, xiii Modernization, xix, 7, 22, 43, 48, 60, 65– 6 Mohaqqeq Da¯ma¯d, Mostafa¯, 232 Mokhta¯ri, Mohammad, 198

312

POLITICAL ISLAM IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN

Mongols, 80 Montazeri, Husayn Ali, 227, 230– 2, 247, 296 Mosaddeq, Mohammad, 60. 67, 75, 171, 240 Mo‘tazeli, 5 Motahhari, Morteza, 9, 51, 74, 100–9, 111, 129, 179, 189, 197, 247, 281– 3, 285 Moududi, Abul ‘A¯la¯, 10 Mujtahid, 9 Mujtahed Shabestari, Mohammad, 247 Mulla¯ Sadra¯, 35, 113, 261 Mullas, see clerics Musavi, Mir Husein, 45, 206, 235 Musavi Lari, ‘Abdolvahed, 285 Muslim Brotherhood, 145, 162 Muslim identity, 11 Mysticism, 35, 40, 42, 68, 72, 106, 113– 6, 121– 43, 189– 91, 200, 204, 211, 242, 247, 254– 5, 274 Na’ini, Mohammad Husein, 41, 129 Najaf, 26, 44 Najd, 172 Naqshbandi, 5 Naraqi, Arash, 284 Naraqi, Ehsan, 168, 199 Naraqi, Mulla Ahmad, 272 Nasr, Seyyed Hussein, 199 –200, 274 Nationalism, 7, 11, 21, 25, 27, 31 –2, 40 – 1, 46, 57, 106, 163, 167, 171– 2, 174, 195– 6, 200, 215, 247, 270 National Front, 67, 171 Nationalist-Religious Forces, 190 Nationalization of Oil Movement, 72, 195 Nativism, 38 Nazism, 163– 4, 169, 173, 16, 179, 181, 290 Ne‘matolla¯hi, 5 Nepotism, 2, 33, 73, 196, 208, 217 New York Times, 159

NGO, 140, Nihilism, 66, Nostalgia, 37 –8, 111, 215 Nuri, Sheikh Fazlullah, 23 – 4, 43, 63, 65, 89 Nuri Hameda¯ni, Husayn, 228 Occidentalism, 164– 7 Occidentotis, 63 – 4, see also Westoxicated Occultation, 35, 82, 88, 93, 104, 157, 160 Omayyids, 80 ‘Orfiyyat (secularity), xii Organization of Islamic Propaganda, 179 Orientalism, xiv –xv, xix Orthodoxy, xii Pahlavis, 2, 5, 7, 129 Palestine, 2, 288, 294 Parva¯zi, Mohammad Reza, 150 Patrimonialism, 210 Payman, Habibullah, 82 Persian Empire, 196 Pharaoh, 78 Physicalism, 200 Platonic, 5 Political competition, 4, 72, 98 Political ideology, xi, 21, 106, 197, 227, 271, 273 Islamic-, 22 Political Islam, xvi, 1, 16, 20 –21, 25, 46, 86, 102, 132– 3, 140 Political oppression, 12, 67, 89, 142, 208, 235 Political participation, 3 – 4, 119, 202, 223 Political religion, xviii, 6, 120 Popper, Karl, 169, 177, 191, 289, 292 Populism, 46, 94, 160, 205 Positivism, 164, 171, 240 Pourmohammadi, Mostafa, 295 Pouyandeh, Mohammad Ja‘far, 198 Praetorianism, 46

INDEX Privatization of religion, 134 Prophecy, 16, 39, 156 Prophet Mohammed, x, 37 Qa¯diri, 5 Qaimumat, see Shari‘ah chiefship Qa¯ja¯rs, 2, 5 Qa¯liba¯f, Mohammad Ba¯qer, 218 Qazvini, Shaikh Mojtaba¯, 42, 113 Qom, 26, 32, 113, 126, 144, 158, 192, 228, 274, 288 Qom Seminary, 247, 288 Qom Seminary Instructors Society, 190, 228 Qom Seminary Researchers and Lecturers Association, 228 Quraish, 112 Qur’an, 5– 6, 17, 23, 28, 35, 37, 41, 73, 87, 90, 91, 105, 107, 110, 114– 8, 131, 150, 153, 159, 168– 9, 177, 180, 190, 203, 240, 246– 7, 253, 260, 264– 5, 271, 277, 287, 296 Rafsanjani, see Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani Rationalism, 79, 85, 164, 169, 176, 240, 242, 243– 4, 246 Anti-, 164, 169 Ir-, 169 Religious-, 237, 243– 4, 246– 7, 251, 267– 69 Reform movement of the 1990s, 49 Renaissance, 55, 171 Renan, Ernest, 58 Revivalism, 49, 53, 55 Islamic-, 5, 9, 53, 57, 122, 225 Religious-, 196 Shi‘i-, 36, 54 Revolution, xvii, 23, 37, 40 – 1, 55, 72, 76, 82, 87, 130, 167, 199, 231, 234, 275, 289 of 1906, see Constitutional Revolution

313

of 1979, xvi, xvii, xix, 1, 2, 5, 7 – 10, 20, 26, 31, 33 – 4, 36, 39 –40, 42, 44 – 5, 49, 51 – 3, 64, 71 – 2, 74 – 5, 90, 94, 102, 104, 110, 117, 128– 9, 143– 4, 154, 166– 70, 172– 3, 175– 6, 178, 181– 5, 187– 8, 195, 197– 8, 200, 205, 207– 9, 220, 223, 229, 235 –6, 241, 275, 277, 280, 289 French, 171 Religious-, 238 Reza, Rashid, 10 Reza Shah, Mohammad, 72 Rezaaee, Mohsen, 289 Roman Empire, 171 Romanticism, 69 Rotation of elite, 18, 94 Rule of law, xviii, 4, 10, 15, 94, 110– 2, 119, 197, 225, 264 Rowhani, Hasan, 45 Rushdie, Salman, 23 Russell, Bertrand, 169 Sa‘ebis, 4 Sadra¯’i, 5 Sadra¯’ism, 5, 237, 242, 244, 246– 7, 261, 268– 9 Safavids, 80, 126 Sa¯fi Golpa¯yega¯ni, Lutfullah, 228 Sa‘idi, Mohammad, 218 Salafism, see Sunni Sa¯lehi Najaf A¯ba¯di, Ne‘matullah 20 Salman, 80 Sanei, Yusuf, 228 Sartre, Jean Paul, 66 Satan, 77, 149, 158, 168, 176, 184– 5, 195 Great-, 23, 172 Satanic, 99, 178, 195, 293 Essence, 171 Power, 176 Visions, 158 West, 182, 184– 5, 262 Satellite dishes, 13, 135– 6, 234

314

POLITICAL ISLAM IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN

Satellite TV channels, 13, 99, 158, 234 Sayyid Qutb, 10, 37 Scientism, 79, 164, 169, 200, 240 Religious-, 237, 242, 244, 246– 7, 264, 268– 9 Scripturalism, 40, 111, 117, 237, 242– 4, 246– 7, 253, 267– 69 Secularism, xiii, xvii, 7, 11, 41 – 2, 47 – 8, 128, 135, 139– 42, 174, 183, 211, 225, 253 Secularization, xiii, xv, 7, 48, 141, 154, 188, 196, 211 Seljuks, 80 Separation school, 113– 4, 116– 7, 237, 301 Separation of religious and political institutions, 41, 91, 96, 107, 142, 196 Separation of powers, 88 Separation of state and religion, 19, 25, 90, 150–1, 192, 196, 210, 251, 264 Shadman, Fakhroddin, 52 Sha¯mlou, Ahmad, 168 Shari‘ah (shari‘at, shari‘a), xii, 1, 9, 12, 16 – 7, 24, 26, 40, 42 – 3, 53, 73, 90 – 1, 93 – 5, 100, 104– 7, 109– 32, 121– 5, 127, 130– 1, 133, 153, 160, 193, 203–4, 207, 225, 231– 3, 257, 260, 282– 3 Ethics, 136 Chiefship, 230 Ideologized-, 9, 40 Law, 1, 10, 17, 24, 44, 54, 66, 67, 84, 91 – 2, 95, 104, 106– 7, 109, 110– 2, 126– 7, 146, 193, 202–3, 224– 7, 234, 240, 282 Ordinances, 111, 136, 212, 233, 273 Oriented Islamism, 9, 24, 26, 34, 41, 43, 45 – 6, 66, 81, 104– 5, 107– 10, 101– 2, 134, 136, 138, 140, 147, 151, 168, 190, 193– 4, 203, 205– 7, 212, 281 Rules, 136 Scholar, 106

Shari‘ati, Ali, 8 – 9, 20, 37, 39, 40 – 1, 51, 53, 57, 64, 74 – 92, 95, 126, 144, 156, 168– 70, 178, 189, 197–8, 247, 271– 3, 277– 9, 294 Sharif, Majid, 286 Sha¯yega¯n, Dariush, 199– 200 Shira¯zi, Mohammad Hasan (Mirza), 41, 67 Shobeiri Zanja¯ni, Musa¯, 228 Sia¯siyyat (politicality), xii Socialism, 7, 11, 21, 36, 40, 46, 62, 75, 106, 200, 240, 247, 257, 265 Social justice, xvii, 2, 10, 32, 39, 42, 71– 2, 76, 79, 115–9, 139, 179, 192, 199, 205, 208– 9, 213, 220, 283 Social movements, xiii, xv, 20, 32, 46, 172, 195, 271 Socio-economic context, xii, xv, xvi, 4, 7, 11– 2, 68 Soroush, Abdolkarim, 9, 42, 44, 57, 74, 121–5, 127– 37, 140– 42, 168, 189, 194, 198, 247, 284– 5, 292, 294 Soviet Union, 36, 75, see also USSR Sufism, 53, 122, 126, 127, 129, 133, 136, 198, 200 Sunni, 5, 21, 24, 31, 33, 56 – 7, 80, 93 Islamism, 8, 26, 30 – 1, 33 – 4, 50, 60 Salafism, 32, 210 Secular states, 211 Seminaries, 215 Sunnism, 8 Tabari, Ehsa¯n, 197 Taba¯taa¯’i, Mohammad Husayn, 178 Tabriz, 228 Tajbakhsh, Kian, 161 Taleqani, Mahmoud, 82, 84 Taliban, 18, 225– 6 Third way, 36

INDEX Tolerance, xix–xx, 3–4, 10, 15, 37, 85, 135–6, 142, 164, 175, 195, 251, 287 Torture, 129, 150, 209, 232, 286 Psychological-, 208 Totalitarianism, 27, 40, 42, 46, 94, 169, 172–3, 195, 200, 212, 214, 223, 269 Religious-, 269 Transparency, 3, 73, 187, 220, 273 International, 220 Tudeh (People) Party, 60, 67, 75 Turkey, 2, 127 Turkmans, 5 Twelvers, 4, 5 UK, 34 ‘Ulama, see Clerics Ummat (Muslim global community), 40 Unemployment, 12, 72, 209 United States, 34, 148 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 168 USSR, 75, see also Soviet Union Usul-e Feqh, 107, 110, 238, see also jurisprudence Usuli, 5, 32 Vahidi, Ahmad, 142 VCR, 13 Venezuela, 288 Violence, 7, 11, 18, 24, 72, 126, 130, 139, 143, 146–7, 152– 3, 162, 164, 174, 178, 195, 202, 209, 235, 241, 243, 245, 253, 266 Exercising-, 146– 7, 249, 251, 260, 263, 267 Ideologue of-, 47, 158 Monopoly of-, 47, 104, 143 Religious-, xvi, 249, 260, 263, 267 Sacred-, 4, 149– 51, 286– 7 Wahhabism, 172 War on Terror, 162

315

West, the, xiii, xvi, xviii, xix 7, 8, 11, 18, 23, 25, 27, 33, 36, 38, 43 – 44, 47–8, 52, 55, 57, 61–7, 69, 75, 77, 79, 84, 92–3. 110, 133, 136–7, 145, 154–5, 158–61, 162, 164–77, 179, 181–5, 189, 196–200, 207, 210–2, 220, 224, 227, 276, 280, 287, 292 Anti-, 161 Educated scholars, 10 Satanic-, 262 Western, v, x, 16 Civilization, 194– 5, 200, 224, 264, 267 Colonial domination, vii Culture, 228 Democracy, 189, 264 Hegemony, 7, 174, 197, 219 Humanism, 278 Ideologies, 258 Oriented governments, viii Philosophy, 192, 211, 289 Political thought, 205 Societies, 18 Tradition, 242 Values, 189, 225– 6 Westernism, 48, 55, 60, 111, 164 Anti-, 164, 171– 2, 262 Westernization, 48, 198, 205 Westoxicated, 52, 60 – 1, 169, 174, 177, 293, see also occidentotis Xenophobia, 33, 201 Xinjiang, 31 Yasir, Ammar, 80 Youshij, Nima, 168, 180 Zaidi, 5 Zara¯ba¯di Qazvini, Seyyed Musa¯, 113 Zargha¯mi, Ezzatullah, 218 Zionism, 163 Anti-, 179 Zoroastrians, 4