Political Economy of Colonial Relations and Crisis of Contemporary African Diplomacy 9819902444, 9789819902446

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Political Economy of Colonial Relations and Crisis of Contemporary African Diplomacy Edited by Kelechi Johnmary Ani

Political Economy of Colonial Relations and Crisis of Contemporary African Diplomacy

Kelechi Johnmary Ani Editor

Political Economy of Colonial Relations and Crisis of Contemporary African Diplomacy

Editor Kelechi Johnmary Ani Department of History and Strategic Studies Alex Ekwueme Federal University Ndufu-Alike Ikwo, Nigeria

ISBN 978-981-99-0244-6 ISBN 978-981-99-0245-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0245-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023, corrected publication 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Disclaimer: The ideas presented in each chapter remain the original intellectual position of the writer(s) and not that of the Editor. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

This book is dedicated to all African men and women that are suffering directly and indirectly due to the negative effects of the scramble and partition of Africa as well as the imperialism that became progressively instituted in the continent.

Foreword

In order for Africa to realize itself characteristically as one people (except for the partitioning by the colonialists), and regain her integrity as the cradle of human existence and even civilization, there should be a recourse to history, an evaluation of the precolonial era, and the retardation in integral development. The synergy needed to foster growth and true independence that liberates from neocolonialism needs to be cultivated through academic, economic, and sociopolitical engagements, facilitated by such rubbing of minds as manifested in this publication, edited by Kelechi Johnmary Ani: Political Economy of Colonial Relations and Crisis of Contemporary African Diplomacy. This book presents a historical account of the colonial foundation of African diplomacy. It revealed how the colonial companies and their agents penetrated different parts of Africa and colonized the continent. Fortunately, the arrival of these colonial companies became a driver of colonial labor migration and resource empowerment as the educated and few privileged African people have to move toward the location of the colonial companies in order to eke-out better standards of living. It further presents the dynamics of import and export trade as promoted by the colonial companies. Consequently, the second part of the study raised the nature of relations among some independent African states on the basis of geopolitics and concentric influence of neigboring states and the water diplomacy.

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The book is divided into eighteen chapters that highlights the role of poverty and the quest for better standards of living in promoting labor migration in the continent as well as the socioeconomic relations that sports and football have promoted in particular. It further highlights the changing nature of diplomacy in the continent and how China is increasingly becoming a major actor in the domestic economy and diplomatic relations in the African continent. Finally, you are encouraged to go through the content of the book and feed your appetite from this African study. Fr. Prof. Fidelis I. Agwulonu Vice-chancellor Democratic Republic of Congo Universite Notre Dame de Tanganyika Goma, Congo

Preface

The place of colonialism in the development of post-independence African societies has remained an issue of scholarly debate. Traditional analysts focused mainly on the negative effects of colonialism on the economy of African states during the colonial period. Others have also argued that the post-independence African developmental challenges are due to neocolonialism. However, this study does not want to pursue the Eurocentric justification of colonialism in Africa; as the White man’s burden nor engage in the historic criticism of the colonial administrators in Africa. However, this book presents the changing nature of colonialism and the direct post-independence effects on the sovereign African states. It went further to argue that the nature and culture of diplomacy in many African states are connected to their colonial history. The study identified the rise of industries in colonial West Africa and the link it had with the industrial revolution in Britain. It documents the nature of trade by the multinational corporation in British and French Africa. Consequently, the place of poverty, World War II, and other internal forms of national challenges promoted concentric cycle diplomacy with neighboring states, especially in West Africa thereby undermining the chances of sustainable African integration and regionalism. The study concludes with a focus on the nature of xenophobia in post-independence South African States and the challenges of migration across the continent in the quest for better standard of living. The Bakassi Peninsula resource competition between Nigeria and Cameroon was also

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documented as one of the post-colonial challenges of African diplomacy. The role of football in promoting African social integration and diplomacy as well as the strong influence of China in influencing the nature of contemporary diplomacy in the continent were also documented. Finally, African leaders, traditional rulers, and people must urgently think and act fast in order to transform the continent. We must collectively start to reconstruct the colonial past and turn it into a fillip for African development. The present African people must create innovative ways to develop and integrate beyond colonial borders and national interests in order to build innovative developmental strides across the African states that would naturally push the citizenry to live above the negative effects of colonialism. You are therefore encouraged to invest your time in exploring the rich intellectual meal that has been presented by the different authors across the eighteen chapters of the book. Ndufu-Alike Ikwo, Nigeria

Kelechi Johnmary Ani

Acknowledgments Special appreciation goes to all the scholars whose works have been cited in the process of the development of this book. May God bless the contributors and those who assisted in the review of all the chapters and editorial phases of the book.

Contents

1

Colonialism in Africa: An Introductory Review Lawson Onyema Chukwu and G. N. Obah-Akpowoghaha

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Industrial Processes and Labour Movement in Colonial West Africa 1885–1960 Ihuoma Chinonso and William Mary Aniefiok

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Industrial Revolution and International Conflicts: A Reassessment Timothy Chibuike Anyanwu, Ijeoma Genevieve Anikelechi, and Precious Onyekachi Okoye An Assessment of External Trade Dynamics in Colonial West Africa Angela Ogochukwu Odo and Dominique Emmanuel Uwizeyimana

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C.E.A.O and the Thrust of Economic Cooperation Since 1968 Chinonso Ihuoma and Alabi Folusho Adewumi

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Igbo Community in the Old Sokoto Province During the Colonial Era, 1903–1960 Udoka Collins Onyenachie and Chinyere Ecoma

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Poverty in Africa and Attainment of the Millennium Development Goal Nnanwube Ebere Florence and Enwereji Prince C.

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Nigeria Relations with Her Neighbours in Geopolitical Environment: The Concentric Circle Approach Kelechi Johnmary Ani and Chukwuemeka Oko Otu Steel Industrialisation and Ajaokuta Imbroglio in Nigeria: Exploring Need Analysis from South Korea Steel Industry Prince Habib Enesi and Olawale Isaac Yemisi The Colonial Nigeria’s Impact in the Allied Bloc’s Victories During the World War II Timothy Chibuike Anyanwu and Victor Ojakorotu The Water Diplomacy Conundrums in the Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam (GERD) Dispute, 2015–2021 Maryam Mohammed Jungudo Igbo Communal Idea: A Panacea to the Challenge of Forced International Migration in the Twenty-First Century Chinyere Lilian Nkama Economic Dimensions of Xenophobia in South Africa, 1994–2018 Martin T. Kpoghul, Thaddeaus T. Ityonzughul, and Asor Gbamwuan Natural Resources and Nigeria-Cameroon Bakassi Peninsula Border Conflict Chijioke Francis Onyebukwa and Gabriel Tiobo Wose Kinge Labour Migration in Africa: A Political-Economy Overview Kelechi Johnmary Ani, Siyan Oyeweso, and Yemisi Olawale

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Sports, Youth and Diplomacy: The Social-Economy and Driver of Societal Development in Africa John Chimezie Onu and Reuben Edafenene Ojighoro

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Examining the Dynamics of China–Africa Relations Tshepo Jan Ngobeni, B. N. Ndlovu, and Costa Hofisi

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Changing Dynamics of African Diplomacy: Concluding Thoughts from Pre-colonial Era to Contemporary Times Vincent Okwudiba Anyika and Kelechi Johnmary Ani

Correction to: Colonialism in Africa: An Introductory Review Lawson Onyema Chukwu and G. N. Obah-Akpowoghaha Index

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List of Contributors

Alabi Folusho Adewumi Department of History, Huddersfield, West Yorkshire, United Kingdom

University

of

Kelechi Johnmary Ani Department of History and Strategic Studies, Alex Ekwueme Federal University, Ndufu-Alike Ikwo, Nigeria William Mary Aniefiok Department of History, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria Ijeoma Genevieve Anikelechi Science Education Department, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria Timothy Chibuike Anyanwu Department of History and Strategic Studies, Alex Ekwueme Federal University Ndufu Alike Ikwo, Abakaliki, Nigeria Vincent Okwudiba Anyika Department of History and Strategic Studies, Alex Ekwueme Federal University Ndufu Alike Ikwo, Abakaliki, Ebonyi State, Nigeria Enwereji Prince C. Department of Financial Accounting, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa Ihuoma Chinonso Department of History and International Studies, Renaissance University, Ugbawka, Nigeria

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Lawson Onyema Chukwu Department of History and Strategic Studies, Alex Ekwueme Federal University, Ndufu Alike Ikwo, Abakaliki, Nigeria Chinyere Ecoma Department of History and International Relations, Veritas University, Abuja, Bwari, Nigeria Prince Habib Enesi Department of History and International Studies, Federal University, Lokoja, Nigeria Nnanwube Ebere Florence Department of Sociology, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria Asor Gbamwuan Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, KolaDaisi University, Ibadan, Nigeria Costa Hofisi Afrocentric Governance of Public Affairs Research Entity, North West University, Mahikeng, South Africa Chinonso Ihuoma Department of History and International Studies, Renaissance University, Ugbawka, Enugu State, Nigeria Thaddeaus T. Ityonzughul Department of International Studies and Diplomacy, Benson Idahosa University, Edo State, Benin City, Nigeria Maryam Mohammed Jungudo Department of History, Nigerian Army University Biu, Biu, Nigeria Gabriel Tiobo Wose Kinge Department of Politics & International Relations, NWU, Mafikeng, South Africa Martin T. Kpoghul Department of History, Benue State University, Makurdi, Nigeria B. N. Ndlovu Department of Politics and International Relations, North West University, Mahikeng, South Africa G. N. Obah-Akpowoghaha Department of Political Science, University of The Gambia, Serrekunda, Gambia Tshepo Jan Ngobeni Department of Politics and International Relations, North West University, Mahikeng, South Africa Chinyere Lilian Nkama Department of Religion and Cultural Studies, Alex Ekwueme Federal University Ndufu Alike Ikwo, Abakaliki, Nigeria

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

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Angela Ogochukwu Odo Department of History and Strategic Studies, Alex Ekwueme Federal University, Ndufu Alike Ikwo, Ebonyi State, Nigeria Victor Ojakorotu School of Government Studies, North West University, Mafikeng, South Africa Reuben Edafenene Ojighoro Department of Religious Studies, College of Education, Warri, Delta State, Nigeria Precious Onyekachi Okoye Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, University of Abuja, Abuja, Nigeria Yemisi Olawale Department of History and International Studies, University of Illorin, Illorin, Nigeria John Chimezie Onu Department of History and Strategic Studies, Alex Ekwueme Federal University Ndufu Alike Ikwo, Abakaliki, Ebonyi State, Nigeria Chijioke Francis Onyebukwa Department of History and International Studies, Kingsley Ozumba Mbadiwe University, Ogboko Ideato, Imo State, Nigeria Udoka Collins Onyenachie Department of History and International Studies, Renaissance Univerisy Ugbawka, Rewati, Nigeria Chukwuemeka Oko Otu Department of Modern War Studies, University of Buckingham, Buckingham, UK Siyan Oyeweso Department of History and International Studies, Osun State University, Osogbo, Nigeria Dominique Emmanuel Uwizeyimana School of Public Management, Governance and Public Policy, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa Olawale Isaac Yemisi Department of History and International Studies, University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria

CHAPTER 1

Colonialism in Africa: An Introductory Review Lawson Onyema Chukwu and G. N. Obah-Akpowoghaha

Introduction The history of post-independence Africa was the outcome of the history of colonialism. At the dawn of the twentieth century, majority of African territories were under European colonial rule (Asante, 2014). The division and subsequent colonization of the African territories were efforts of European nations to intensify European imperialism. European countries engaged in antagonistic expansion policy because of essentials that were created by Industrial Revolution (Uwechue, 1991). Put differently,

The original version of this chapter was revised: Incorrect author name ‘Nelson, OA.G.’ instead of ‘Obah-Akpowoghaha, G. N.’ has been corrected for this chapter. The correction to this chapter is available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0245-3_19 L. O. Chukwu (B) Department of History and Strategic Studies, Alex Ekwueme Federal University, Ndufu Alike Ikwo, Abakaliki, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023, corrected publication 2023 K. J. Ani (ed.), Political Economy of Colonial Relations and Crisis of Contemporary African Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0245-3_1

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European colonization of the African continent was primarily impelled by economic forces; Africa to serve as a source of raw materials for their industries in Europe and as well market place for their finished products. There were other factors that motivated European expansion into African territories. Such factors include; political reason which is akin to empire building and national prestige; and socioreligious reasons which came with the idea of civilizing benighted Africans. By the early twentieth century, African territories except Liberia had been partitioned among European nations. According to the European nations, colonization of Africa was a necessary evil that must be executed to enlighten the backward continent. They argued that colonization of Africa would bring new economic system (capitalist economy) and civilization (western education), which would ultimately provide higher standard of living for Africans and good government that is better than the eroded African traditional provided (Livingston, 1868). European countries writhed and fought themselves in order to establish territorial bases in Africa and control it’s enormous natural resources. Account of natural endowment of the African continent was given by early European explorers in the eighteenth century. These explorers include David Livingstone who sailed along River Zambezi; Mongo Park who explored the River Niger and the hinterland. They made ways for Christian missionaries to penetrate into the African continent and preach the bible, and as well introduced western education in Africa. The struggle to control the African continent by European nations was very fierce and chaotic. This made Otto Von Bismarck, the then German Chancellor to call for a conference in Berlin which lasted from 1884 to 1885. The core aim of the conference was to lay down rules that would govern territorial acquisition in Africa so as to stop European nations from fighting themselves over African territories. Conceptual Clarification Colonialism and imperialism are, sometimes used interchangeably nevertheless, both terms connote different meanings. Colonialism is an act of domination which encompasses conquest and suppression of people. It is a period where a nation overpowers and rules other territories (Oyebade, 2002). In a more precise term, colonialism entails exploiting resources of

G. N. Obah-Akpowoghaha Department of Political Science, University of The Gambia, Serrekunda, Gambia

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the conquered nations for the benefit of the conqueror. It is described as an act of establishing and maintaining satellites in another country. It is believed that the traits of the conqueror would be acquired by the conquered. Onwubiko (1973) defines colonialism as a period when the colonial powers regarded their West African territories as their possession, existing mainly for the economic, social and political welfare of the mother country.

Factors that Propelled the European Colonialism Scholars in the field of colonialism have suggested several factors that prompted European colonization of Africa. These factors include; Economic factor: these have been agreed to be the first main factors that induced the European colonization of the African continent. The Industrial Revolution that occurred in England in the eighteenth century prompted the need for raw materials and new markets. The Industrial Revolution spread from England into many other countries of Europe during the second half of the nineteenth century, each country began to produce more goods than it needed locally (Uwechue, 1991). The need for the market arouse to solve the export need of manufacturing countries and promote the dumping of the surplus production. The owners of African colonies became the best solution to the challenges. Also, the struggle for raw materials to feed their industries increased the quest by the European nations to get territories in Africa to serve as sources of raw materials. The Industrial Revolution also prompted the struggle to have territories in Africa and increase their returns from oversea investments. J.A. Hobson noted that, the goal of colonial expansion is commercial profit. As the Revolution caused an increase in profit, the European nations have to look for new areas where they can invest their surplus capital for more profit to be made (Hobson, 1938). According to former French Prime, Jules Ferry, colonial policy is the daughter of industrial policy. European consumption is saturated; it is necessary to raise new masses of consumers in other parts of the globe, else we shall put modern society into bankruptcy and prepared for the dawn of the twentieth century a cataclysmic social liquidation of which one cannot calculate the consequences (Onwubiko, 1973). The Industrial Revolution prompted the move to establish colonies throughout the globe. Although, empires always wanted to expand their territories as a show of national prestige, but the Industrial Revolution add a new push to conquer new territories for economic gain. Because the Industrial Revolution amplified the production ability of European

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nations exceedingly, there was too much demand for raw materials to satisfy industrial demands. However, European nations sought colonies where raw materials were plentiful and where they could be taken at little to no cost. Of course, Africa was their best option which was rich in oil, ivory, rubber cotton, cocoa, cooper, gold, iron, cobalt, diamonds, etc., hence the conquest and colonization of Africa. A second economic factor that prompted the European colonization of Africa was the discovery of huge natural resources in Africa which was rich in oil, ivory, gold, rubber, wood, cotton, copper, iron, cobalt, diamonds, etc. The quest for European appropriation of minerals from Africa owed its origin to the discovery in 1886, the largest gold deposits in the world in the Rand in South Africa. There was also a rumour that Katanga has large deposits of copper. However, mineral deposits in several parts of Africa arouse the interest of European nations to colonize the continent. There was struggle by European nations to establish territories for themselves in Africa in order to control these natural resources. Political Factor Apart from the economic factors, there were political factors that prompted European colonization of the Africa continent. First, there was the need to establish a balance of power in Europe as a result of unification of Germany and Italy. This meant that any additional territorial gaining or struggle for power would have to take place outside Europe (Uwechue, 1991). Second, the nineteenth century saw the increase of extreme nationalism in Europe which was further worsened by the unification of Germany and Italy, especially by the defeat of France by Germany in 1871. Ani (2013) maintain that German bid for colonies was a major filip to colonialism in Africa. With this nationalist feeling arose the need to ensure the security, power and, prestige of each nation-state. Unfortunately, for Africa and Asia, one of the accepted criteria for measuring the power and prestige of European nations during the period under review was the numbers of colonies or territories a particular nation possessed. Germany and Italy joined the scramble because they wanted to show that they have arrived as rue nation-states, while France actively participated to prove that despite her humiliating defeat by Germany in 1871, she was still a great power (Uwechue, 1991). Moreover, the need to ensure the security of each nation-state and safeguard its vital routes partly account

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for not only the British occupation of Egypt but for the occupation of many of the African and Pacific Ocean Island. The possession of colonies overseas became a matter of prestige for European powers and of great honor to their nationals who helped in acquiring such colonies. In the word of the French national in 1882, Colonialism is for France a question of life and death; either France will become a great African power or she will be no more than a secondary European power. In order words, national prestige and economic interests were the driving force for the imperial activities of men like; Goldie, Lugard, Harry Johnson of Britain, Nachtigal and Dr. Kaarl Peters of Germany and Gallieni of France. (Uwechue, 1991)

Social Factors European colonialism of Africa was also enthused by social factors. There were many people in Europe who supported the scramble and partition of Africa mainly for humanitarian reasons. Different humanitarian agencies as well as individuals opined that their government should colonize Africa so as to stop internal slave trade and other dehumanising cultural practices that was found among the African people. This they believed would lead to the spread of European culture and civilization to the African people (Uwechue, 1991). Second, the social condition in Europe resulted from the emergence of the industrial revolution. The Industrial Revolution has created the multipole challenge of managing labour relations especially bearing in mind that many of those that were engaged in direct labour hitherto lost their jobs and many problems of unemployment were created. This is because, Industrial Revolution came with the use of machine for widespread production, which reduced the quantity of human labour requirement. By the 1870s, Hanna noted that there were over a million paupers in Britain alone. It was partly to solve the problem of mass unemployment that the acquisition of colonies for settling the surplus population was embarked upon. Such settlement was found in South, Central, East and North Africa by various European powers (Hanna, 1961). Third, there is also their ideological and belief system that the EuroAmerican states have the mission to civilize and transform the African ways of life. Europeans. Although, this ideology was as ridiculous as every

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person’s develops their civilization. However, it arouses the zeal of many European colonizers and businessmen who wanted to engage in empirebuilding within Africa.

The Scramble for and Partition of Africa The scramble for Africa is often referred to as the “race for Africa”. European Nations clashed and fought among themselves for the main purpose of acquiring territories in Africa. Their struggles at some time became chaotic, unhealthy and out of control. This made Otto Von Bismarck (the then Chancellor of Germany) to convene Berlin Colonial Conference of 1884–1885. Purpose of the conference was to lay down the framework and conditions by which the scramble for African territories and resources were to be enforced. The Berlin West African Conference which lasted from November 1884 to January 1885 (Eluwa et al., 1996). The scramble and partition of Africa was first carried out by signing a treaty of trade and friendship or annexation or protection between the European powers and African rulers, and such treaties were signed between 1880 and 1900. The second phase was the conclusion of treaties between two or among the European participants usually based on the first treaties which defined the spheres of influence of each power and delimited the boundaries of their new acquisition. The result was the creation of new political boundaries across old tribal and political boundaries without regard to ethnic groupings (Uwechue, 1991). The attraction of West Africa as potential market for British manufacturers was undoubtedly great, and it was this consideration which led much more important and powerful groups than the West African merchants to look with favor on political expansion in these regions. Through military might, economic spheres of influence, and annexation, European nations subjugated the continents of Africa. The division of Africa was more or less an accidental by-product of the diplomatic conflicts among the European powers; especially between Britain and France. According to this view, the partition was triggered by the British occupation of Egypt in 1882. By 1914, Great Britain controlled the largest number of colonies, and the phrase “the sun never sets up on the British Empire” described its vast holdings (Uwechue, 1991).

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European Colonial Policies in Africa By 1900, in British West Africa, most of Britain’s sphere of influence had been conquered. Because financial status of the colonial rulers was such that Britain was not ready to spend on its colonies rather exploitation of the resources of her colonies, the shortage of manpower, language berries, and large size their territories, Britain opted to adopt indirect rule system to govern their territories in Africa (Ajayi and Espie, 1965). Just as Britain and France differed in the way in which they set about acquiring colonies in Africa, so they differed in their administrative policies. Both colonial powers developed policies to smoothen the process of colonial rule in their different colonies. Palmer and Perkins (2007) noted that “while certain similarities were present in the policies of the European powers which controlled most of Africa, there were also striking objectives. Moreover, the territories of a single power were often in various stages of economic, social and political development; and therefore the colonial power would follow a variety of practices in administering its territories”. Both British and French embarked upon certain practices which represented their strategies and plan of action to achieve a smooth colonial project. For instance, Britain adopted policy of “indirect rule”, which was first introduced in a large scale by Lord Lugard in Northern Nigeria and the official objective of British policy in Africa was “to guide the colonial territories to responsible self-government within the Commonwealth” (Palmer and Perkins, 2007). To achieve such policy, Lugard had two schemes: “to rule Africa through its natural rulers, the native administrations and to educate and develop the native administration into efficient organs of modern local government” (Ajayi and Espie, 1965). Afigbo (1972) argued it was the lack of sufficient staff, poor communications and the desire for economy in administration, rather than any other reason that accounted for the adoption of the indirect rule policy. Nkrumah (1963) in his book “Africa Must Unite” noted that the imperialists (Europeans) express no solidarity over Africa’s plight and this explains why even Sir George Taubman Goldie never over-bothered about the welfare of Africans, but strongly advocated also for the adoption of the policy of indirect rule. Thus, since the British were nonchalant towards Africa’s welfare, it however, made the job much easier for them since indirect rule was cheap. It was this cheapness that paved way for the gradual

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distortion of African cultures even though it claimed to protect their traditional institutions. Indirect rule emphasized slow and gradual change that would not disturb the customs, traditions, institutions, mores and rural lifestyles of Africans (Kamalu, 2019). Arguing further, Afigbo noted that the culture of any people, most especially in Africa is an “organic whole” and as such even though the indirect rule was a system of ruling an African through their traditional institutions, certain features or practices which were offensive to the British were “eradicated”. In practice, indirect rule became the system through which the British used African traditional rulers to subjugate the mass African populations (Kamalu, 2019). In other words, the British administration remained aloof from the people they were governing and, until the Second World War, did little to prepare the way for eventual independence. It is also worthy of note that the policy of indirect rule went hand in hand with the use of chiefs. The chiefs were used to implement policies that were churned out from the colonial offices in their respective metropolis. The British were full of the idea that there must be a chief and his council in every district, that if they could not find chiefs, they tended to appoint them. In Northern Nigeria, a Resident or District Officer was sent to each emirate headquarters to advise and supervise the emir’s administration (Miles, 1994). For instance, Lugard expected the DO’s to adapt and modernize existing institutions, but many DO’s saw their role as that of preservers rather than modifiers, falsely assuming that African society was fixed and unchanging. The emir’s appointed officials responsible to them kept control of the existing legal system and were responsible for collecting taxes, some of which were kept in the local treasury and some handed over to the central government. Such attitude was responsible for the riot in Eastern Nigeria; the Aba Riots of 1929. Furthermore, the idea of indirect rule was applied because it was successful in Uganda and to preserve the customs and traditions of the people. The factor of manpower, financial and communication problems initiated the idea for an indirect rule policy (Falola et al., 1991). The British also applied economic measures (Falola et al., 1991) to achieve their policies of consolidating their territories in Africa. The development of cash crops in Africa increased the desire of the European to consolidate their hold in those territories. Raw materials were in high demand and in this way; Britain provided an increased opportunity for trade among Nigerian peoples. It had become apparent that if there were to be any serious agricultural development for export, a major assault would have to be made on the problem of high transport costs, which

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had always been the greatest obstacle to Africa’s progress. Therefore, railways were constructed to enable Britain to tap the mineral and agricultural resources of the hinterland of Nigeria. For instance, between 1907 and 1911, railway lines were constructed from Lagos to Kano for the transportation of ground nuts, from Zaria to Jos for tin ore and likewise in Enugu for the coal. To supplement the rail system and to facilitate administration, a considerable effort was also devoted to road construction, which became a major preoccupation of the district administrators. For example, roads were built from Asaba to Benin and from Udi to Onitsha. Ports and harbours also became evident like in Port Harcourt in 1913. The benefits of this economic policy in transport were that between 1900 and 1903, the exports from Gold coast multiplied by five times, those from Sierra Leone about four times and from Nigeria, about three and half times, while imports rose in similar proportion (Ajayi and Espie, 1965). In addition to the modest investment in transport, the British had introduced a portable form of money in Nigeria owing to the fact that the scale of commerce had surpassed the value of cowrie shells, vanillas, iron bars and cases of gin. All these were supplemented with British coins and the West African Currency Board was established in 1912. In British Central Africa, three British territories were created: Northern and Southern Rhodesia (now Zambia and Zimbabwe) which were conquered for Britain by the British South African Company led by Cecil Rhodes while Nyasaland (now Malawi) became British largely as a result of missionary activities in the area. The policies that were applied to bring these territories under the whims and caprice of the British were economic and missionary activities. The British rules Zambia by indirect rule methods in which little provision was made for the detribalized urban Africans of the copper belt. In Uganda, for the British to strengthen their occupation effectively and facilitate economic exploitation, it became imperative for them to improve communications between Uganda and the coast. By 1901, a railway was constructed from Mombasa on the coast to Kisumu on Lake Victoria, known as the Uganda railway. Furthermore, Britain sent an envoy (Sir Harry Johnstone) to Uganda with the aim of establishing cordial relations with Uganda which was essential. Fortunately, a Buganda Agreement signed in 1900 controlled relations between the British and Buganda throughout the colonial period and was important for three main reasons: Land, Government and Tax. On the whole, Britain made

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use of indirect rule methods as much as possible. In 1902, a large part of eastern Uganda was transferred Kenya. The French ran a deep-rooted form of exploitation using the French assimilation and association policies. The policy of assimilation was the worst form of imperialism that did not just exploit the human resources but aborted the culture of the African people living in the communes of Rofisque, Dakar, Senegal and St Lois. King Leopold simply administered his African colonies as if the people were slaves.

References Afigbo, A. E. (1972). The Warrant Chiefs: Indirect Rule in Southeastern Nigeria. London: Longman Group Limited. Ajayi, A. J. F., and Espie, I. (Eds). 1965. A Thousand Years of West African History: A Handbook for Teachers and Students. University of Ibadan: Ibadan University Press and Nelson. Ani, K. J. (2013). “German Bid for Colonies in Africa: Fillip to Violent Imperialism and Global Integration.” NDUNODE; Calabar Journal of the Humanities 10 (1): 1–17. Asante, T. K. (2014). “National Movements in Colonial Africa.” Journal of The History of African Development 1: 1–12. Eluwa, G. I. C. et al. (1996). Africa and the Wider World Since 1800 A.D. Onitsha: Africana First Publisher Ltd. Falola, T., Uhomoibhi, M., Mahadi, A., and Anyanwu, U. (1991). History of Nigeria 3. Nigeria: Learn Africa Plc. Hanna, A. J. (1961). European Rule in Africa. Historical Association of Routledge and Kegan Paul. Hobson, J. A. (1938). Imperialism: A Study. Third Edition. London. Kamalu, N. C. (2019). “British, French Belgian and Portuguese Models of Colonial Rule and Economic Development in Africa.” Annals of Global History 1 (1): 37–47. Livingston, D. (1868). Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa. New York: Harpers. Miles, W. (1994). Hausa Land Divided: Colonialism and Independence in Nigeria and Niger. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Nkrumah, K. (1963). Africa Must Unite. New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publisher. Onwubiko, K. B. C. (1973). History of West Africa 1800-Present Day. First Edition. Africana Educational Publishers Ltd. Oyebade, A. (2002). Colonial Political System in Africa 1885–1939, Vol. 3, Edited by Toyin Falola. Durham: Carolina Academic Press.

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Palmer, N. D., and Perkins, H. C. (2007). Zac Relations. Delhi: A.I.T.B.S. Publishers. Uwechue, R. (1991). Africa Today. Second Edition, Published by African Books Ltd, 169–171

CHAPTER 2

Industrial Processes and Labour Movement in Colonial West Africa 1885–1960 Ihuoma Chinonso and William Mary Aniefiok

Introduction Industrial process in West Africa have its origin to the region’s very first contact with the Europeans, by this, the Africans were brought in touch with the people who later exploited them in disguise for trade. While Davidson’s (1964, p. 177) position that “… in exchange for textiles and metal ware, West Africa gold, ivory and spice began to reach Europe by sea instead of through the hands of middle men across the Sahara, a new period of history began” paints a scene of equal trade relation, we argue that Africa’s commodity for exchange greatly outweighed the Europeans quantitatively and qualitatively.

I. Chinonso (B) Department of History and International Studies, Renaissance University, Ugbawka, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] W. M. Aniefiok Department of History, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. J. Ani (ed.), Political Economy of Colonial Relations and Crisis of Contemporary African Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0245-3_2

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Before colonialism, the African economic system was primarily based on agricultural production mainly for direct consumption (Ani et al., 2018; Hymer, 1970). They also engaged in trading, which kept them in contact with others. Ananamba (1979, p. 3), notes that “trade unions that existed before 1939 were of Asian and European employees”. Labour Unions from its formation have been given the privilege to bargain for the better treatment of its members and have recorded a lot of successes in this field. Colonialism was encouraged or facilitated by capitalism. African workers sometimes oppose the coercive methods which described the capitalist disposition of the colonial powers, at a point, there emerged organized labour in the form of protest against the colonial capitalist structures and the early stages of these unions saw hostility by the colonial government who devised various means at frustrating the development of unionism in Africa. Labour unions in most African nation-states were important drivers of the anti-colonial movements before their evolution into transmission belts of political parties and government after independence. At their inception, the unions got the blessings of the colonial powers and their open support as they saw it as a means of keeping social peace (Shillinger, 2005). This paper assesses the British, French and Portuguese colonial policies in the West African region which led to the formation of labour movements in their respective colonies in the West African region as well as the response of some of these unions to those policies.

Conceptual Clarifications Industrialization According to O’Sullivan and Sheffrin, industrialization is the social and economic transformation of human group from the state of an agrarian people into an industrial society (O’Sullivan & Sheffrin, 2003, p. 472). The above definition as posited by O’Sullivan and Sheffrin suggests the mechanization of all sectors in a given economy. Simply put, industrialization could rightly be explained as the process of mechanization or the introduction of machines into the manufacturing, production and the transportation of goods as well as services. These definitions correspond with the meaning of industrialization as used in this paper.

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Labour Labour consists of a person or group of persons who, because of lack of capital, turn(s) in their services in exchange for compensation called salary or wage. These definitions provide adequate explanation of the situations that forced the Africans in the Western region into waged labour at the advent of the Europeans and their conditions under colonial employment. Accordingly, Osiruemu defines labour as the working class or wage earners who are subordinates to the employers both in public and private sectors (Osiruemu, 1993, p. 203). Labour Movement Labour movement is the activities of labour unions to further the cause of organized labour. These activities include actions such as strikes, agitations, demonstrations, etc. necessary to facilitate the improvement of working conditions or increase workers’ remunerations. Labour movement and trade or labour union to Shillinger (2005) “is often used as one nomenclature, Trade or Labour Unions means an organized grouping of workers”.

Historicizing Labour Movement in West Africa The industrial revolution which took place in Europe beginning from Britain in the eighteenth century transformed the traditional method of production from “slow hand methods to much more rapid mechanical process” (Gbenenye, 2011, p. 18). This development resulted in the pressing need for raw materials to furnish the growing industries and steady market for the produced goods. Consequently, the industrialized countries of Europe began the search for alternatives elsewhere outside Europe as Europe itself was already running short of the needed raw materials and also saturated with the industrial produce. Therefore, Africa with its vast deposits of raw materials of every kind became the victim of the scramble that followed such discovery. The procurement of raw materials and transportation of same from Africa (the source) to Europe (where it would be used), could not have been successfully carried out without ‘industrialization’ and labour. Britwum (2012, p. 5) notes that “Africa hitherto, had a way of exploiting their natural resources, there were a traditional method of production,

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mining, smelting, farming, etc., however rudimentary”. Her contact with Europe transformed the traditional method of production and introduced other forms of labour—waged labour. The severe working conditions which accompanied the new mechanized method of production, the employers’ inability or outright refusal to meet up with the employees’ grievances resulted in many labour actions especially after the first two decades of the twentieth century. As earlier stated, the pre-colonial African economy was predominantly agricultural as they depended on subsistence farming and intergroup trade for survival. The people who engaged in craft and trade banded themselves together in what would be called labour union as they were organized to protect the wellbeing of the African labour through regulation of trade practices, mutual aid, fixed prices and wages for services as well as disputes settlement, control of trade relationships among tradesmen, price control or the payment of tributes to rulers as there were no contracts as is obtainable today (Olusoji et al., 2012). These unions included the organization of hunters, blacksmiths, carvers and weavers. Following the emergence of the International Labour Organization in 1919, all member states of the League of Nations consented to grant the working people the right to form associations for the furtherance, promotion, and protection of their interests. To this, workers and employees can freely exercise the rights to organize (Oyelere, 2014), thus the emergence of labour movements in various colonies.

Industrialization and Industrial Process in Colonial West Africa 1885–1960 After the unpopular 1884/1885 Berlin conference, the European countries’ signatories to the conference, sent their nationals to Africa to occupy as much as possible territories on behalf of their mother countries. French territories in West Africa included: French Sudan (present-day Mali), Niger, Upper Volta, Senegal, Guinea Bissau, Togo (after World War 1), Dahomey (present Benin Republic), Ivory Coast and Mauritania. While Britain occupied Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Gambia. However, the European powers in West Africa did not take up the industrialization of the region on their arrival as that was not the motive behind their sojourn on Africa. What took place in Africa were, in reality, “industrial processes” which were necessary for the growth of the heavy industries in Europe. Accordingly, Thompson and Adloff, writing on the French

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colonial administration in West Africa observe that both European private initiative and capital were either absent or extremely cautious about the industrialization of Black Africa. They further maintain that the reluctance of the European colonialists in the industrialization of their West African territories was occasioned by the distance from foreign markets, the high cost of transportation of manufactured goods, irregular and low quality of output, etc., which in turn limited industrial development in the peripheries for a long period of time to the “semi-processing of Agricultural produce needed by the metro-pole” (Thompson & Adloff, 1958, p. 377). From the above observation, it could be deduced that whatever mechanization that was introduced into production in West Africa, especially before the Second World War, could rightly be described as industrial processes. The construction of railways, roads, and harbours for effective extraction and transportation of the needed raw materials from the West African hinterland to the coast for ease of shipment to Europe and introduction of little or no machines for the extraction of the raw materials, for instance, iron ore smelting, sawmilling, cash crop production were all industrial processes needed for the success of the real industries in continental Europe. Nothing, especially, during the pre-war years could be said to have been manufactured in Africa-south of the Sahara. Accordingly, Freund asserts that “before 1914, the tin that came out of Nigeria could in fact, hardly be said to have been produced” (Freund, 1981, pp. 38–39). However, these industrial processes, notably, the construction of roads and railways, tin and iron ore mining, cash crops production, and even the transportation of the extracted raw materials by head, employed a greater number of Africans in the region. For instance, in 1911, porters found on the Plateau route following the assumption of tin mining in the area by the British, numbered about 12,000 (Freund, 1981, p. 51). Many others were employed in the construction of the railways, roads and other infrastructures both as forced labour and wage labour. In the French West Africa, for instance, forced labour was particularly used for public works were every male from age eighteen to sixty was required to contribute a number of day’s labour to the government (Thompson & Adloff, 1958, p. 491). According to David Seddon, “between 1927 and 1936, thousands were conscripted to work on the Dakar-Niger railway and to improve the navigation of the Niger river” (Seddon, 2002, p. 27). In other places, notably, in the British West Africa where forced labour was noted to be less productive after its experimentation in Ghana mines

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and Northern Nigeria railway line (Britwum, 2012, p. 8), various forms of taxation including hut or poll tax which payment was to be made in cash, forced the Africans into wage labour so as to earn enough money for the tax (Damachi et al., 1979, p. 5). The introduction of taxation forced many Africans to leave their own mines to work in the European-owned mines (Freund, 1981, p. 50). While at the initial stage they worked as migrant labours, returning to their farms when rainy season began (Baldwin, 1957, p. 35). The government continuous enforcement of taxation and its adoption as a policy later resulted in the exodus “of rural youths seeking employment opportunities” (Munro, 1984, p. 66) in the colonial services. In French West Africa, the construction of railroads namely; the Conakry– Niger railway which began in 1900, Abidjan–Niger 1903, which linked Ouagadouguo in 1954, Benin–Niger 1907–1930, Dakar–Niger 1912, etc., and roads saw the evolution of new “towns” and urban centres housing the workers who, with time have become stable workforce. Agboville and Dimbokro for instance, evolved along the Abidjan-BoboDioulasso railway in 1906 and 1909, respectively (Thompson & Adloff, 1958, pp. 249–491). Seaports and airports were also developed and established respectively. For instance, the first flight between French West Africa and the metro-pole took off from Senegal to France as early as 1911. Apart from communication networks, the European colonialists also undertook the development of extractive “industries” including the development of tin smelter and sawmill in Tilde and Jos in 1905 (Freund, 1981), coal mining “industry” in Enugu in 1909 (Vinnika, 2002, p. 73), and cash crops plantations to encourage the production of export products. With the emergence of the various industrial process the European colonial administrators instituted many and some, obnoxious economic policies designed for the exploitation of the Africans in the colonies.

French Colonial Economic Policy The outbreaks of the first and second world wars in 1914 and 1938, respectively, disturbed industrial production and international trade in Europe as it was the centre for the wars. During these periods, Europe was plagued with food scarcity as every meaningful production was disrupted. Consequently, import substitution industries began to emerge in West Africa (Munro, 1984, p. 63). For instance, during and after the First

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World War , there evolved in the French West Africa, industries processing vegetable oils, rice, coffee, cocoa, timber, textile fibre and fruits. Thus, Dakar became “the site of about half the European type industries” developing within, “oil mills, soap, beverage, and brick factories, electric-power plants, sawmills, ice factories and abattoir” (Thompson & Adloff, 1958, p. 377) and even printing presses. Many so-called industries sprang up in the West African region mostly during and after World War II. After the war, industry growth was much more pronounced and there was a significant increase in the share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in manufacturing (Munro, 1984, p. 63). Accordingly, mobile crushers and presses were introduced in Porto Novo Cercle, Dahomey and Dabou-Ivory Coast in the late 1930s to increase oil production. Dabou for instance, gave an annual output of about 1,200 tonnes as a result of the mechanization of production process (Thompson & Adloff, 1958, p. 385). The war gave a boost to Senegal’s industrialization, “especially to the Oleaginous industry, whose output was encouraging, first to fill France needs in vegetable oils and to supply crude fuel for the Federation itself” (Thompson & Adloff, 1958, p. 377). In 1939, the manufacturing of paper began in Senegal, Ivory Coast and Guinea Bissau. In 1940, Senegal acquired its first fish processing plant while four more were built in Petite Cote and St Louis between 1943 and 1947. Flour milling and Bakeries was established in Dakar in 1943 (Thompson & Adloff, 1958, pp. 390–402). In 1948, Mauritania had its industries where it could dry, salt and preserve thousands of tons of fish, shark liver oil and skin, fish oil and meal. In 1949, Guinea Bissau alone had seven soap industries and turned out about 10,000 tonnes as of 1955. There were similar or better soap industries in Dahomey and Abidjan. In the 1950s, several mills were opened in Dabou, Bohicon, Ahozon putting out a total of about 2000 tons of oil and 1600 tons of kernels. In 1952, Ivory Coast had a textile in Bouake and a brick factory in 1954 which supplied construction materials to the French West Africa. There were similar ones in Guinea Bissau and Dahomey. Also, established were chemical industries (where fertilizers were produced from phosphate deposits at Thies) breweries, pineapple canneries, leather and hides industries (Thompson & Adloff, 1958). Thus, West Africa grew during the war from and import-dependent economy to an exporter of food product to war-ravaged Europe. However, the post-war industrialization of West Africa, as observed by J.F. Munro (1984, p. 63), was limited in character

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and extent. In spite of these limitations, West Africa witnessed significant growth in prices of export and about 50 per cent rise in the cost of living yet, wages remained low (Munro, 1984, p. 73) especially, for the African workers (Padmore, 1945).

British Colonial Economic Policy The exploitative conditions of colonial employment in addition to other factors already stated above culminated in several revolts by the workers in West Africa beginning from as early as 1897 in Lagos (Britwum, 2012, p. 8) and 1909 in the Plateau mine when the workers’ wages were pushed down. This 1909 strike, according to Bill Freund, resulted in the first known strike in the history of the minefield (Freund, 1981, p. 54). Workers’ strikes in the region became intensified after the First World War as an increase in exportation and the rise in cost of living were not accompanied by a colour-blind increase in wages of the workers. Hence, extensive labour actions were recorded across West Africa. For instance, the railway workers in Ghana embarked on strike in 1918 as a result of racial discrimination which defined the war bonus grant in the colonial civil service. In 1919, in Sierra Leone, the railway workers went on strike on similar grievances (Seddon, 2002, p. 34). In British Nigerian colony, since the 1914 amalgamation of the southern and northern protectorates, Labour Unions have been increasingly powerful and instrumental in the formation, the shaping and the implementation of public programs (Salisu et al., 2013). In Nigeria, Trade Unions are known to be among the legacy of colonialism as it was first introduced by the British administrators. The Trade Union Act of 1871 which became a functioning economic policy in British colonies maintained that “the purpose of any Trade Union shall not by reason merely that they are in restraint of trade, be unlawful so as to render void or voidable any agreement of trust. This was a law to regulate and develop trade unions and which was seen as a duplicate of the Trade Union Act Ordinance of 1938” (Oyelere, 2014, pp. 6–7). This led to the proliferation of labour unions with the most of them based on one employer or one enterprise and comprised of few members indeed. During the years of the Second World War, the British economic policy in the Nigerian colony was racially discriminatory as the colonial

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government denied the African workers the benefits of enjoying the costof-living allowances which every European civil servant received. They only increased wages modestly while there was a 74% rise in the cost of living from September 1939 up to October 1943. In response to the harsh economy and colonial economic racism demonstrated through remuneration, strike erupted in 1945 leading to the rapid formation of numerous labour movements. By 1950, there were over 144 unions with more than 144,000 members. This was also one of the reasons for the coal Mines Strike of 1949 as the mine workers demanded improved wages and better conditions of service but the colonial government considered this as a confrontation and an indirect call for independence. In 1924, the Enugu Colliery recorded its first strike and another in 1949. The 1949 strike was bloody as about 23 mine workers were shot dead by the colonial police with hundreds wounded (Vinnika, 2002, p. 72). Another issue that led to this historic event was the fact that the colonial Government had failed to recognize the Colliery Workers Unions, which had been in existence since 1937 in response to the colliery management’s demand for a workers’ council to act in an advisory position. This representative council was, however, to be used as a ploy to prevent the emergence of a radical trade union and also to create “labour aristocrats” within the workforce (Igwe & Onuegbu, 2015, p. 423). Similar repressive action by the colonial government had earlier occurred in Sierra Leone in 1926 when the striking railway workers were shot and their leaders imprisoned or exiled (Seddon, 2002, p. 34). Another significant event that impacted labour relations in the colonial West Africa was the 1929 Great Depression which brought serious economic hardship and retrenchment. This period, 1929–1932 saw the massive evolution of trade unions in West Africa to protect the interest of the workers. In Ghana, the biting depression that befall Accra as early as between 1920 and 1921 intensified workers’ struggles in the colony and brought about the evolution of a trade union called “Artisans and Labourers Union”. When the depression forced the administration to reduce the wages of the workers in Gold Coast, those employed in the Public Works Department joined the striking Artisans (Damachi, Siebel & Trachtman, 1979, p. 2). Accordingly, in 1929, the Sierra Leone Labourers’ Union was formed. In Gold Coast, the Ashanti motor drivers’ association was formed in 1931and in 1933 a trade union was formed in Bathurst (Damachi et al., 1979, p. 2).

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After the Great depression, labour unrest subsided only to be provoked after few years by the outbreak of the Second World War along with its inflated prices of food product as it is always the case during and immediately after a war. Again, while export rose, wages remained low and as such could not sustain the basic needs of the labourers. In Nigeria for instance, as have already been stated above, the cost of living rose by 75% between 1939 and 1942 without any significant increment in workers’ wages. Consequently, workers resorted to unionism for collective bargaining and security. Thus, union membership in Nigeria rose from 4000 in 1940 to 30,000 in 1944 and 900 in 1942 to 6000 in 1945 in Ghana (Damachi et al., 1979, p. 2). Simultaneous with the expansion in unionism were labour demonstrations across the West African region. Second World War, in particular, brought a remarkable boom in production and trade in Nigeria and the entire region, occasioned by the closure of the Mediterranean Sea lane (Vinnika, 2002, p. 75). Unfortunately, the African workers did not enjoy the proceeds of the boom as they were discriminated against. Consequently, the post-war years witnessed renewed and fierce struggles against colonial exploitation. Therefore, 1945 saw the first general strike in Nigeria. The strike had in attendance, about 150,000 clerical and nonclerical personnel in the Nigeria civil service (Padmore, 1945). This was to be the trend in the independent years as workers’ grievances were not properly addressed. Therefore, between 1949 and 1950, 54 strikes were registered in Nigeria alone and by this time, the number of unions had risen to 125,000 (Damachi et al., 1979, p. 3).

Portuguese Colonial Economic Policy In Guinea Bissau, the Portuguese presence was recorded before the fifteenth century and there existed a trade relationship between the people of Rio Grande (as was named by the Portuguese because it was the largest ocean inlet south of the Gambia River) till the rise of European imperialistic ambitions beginning from the second part of the nineteenth century (Davidson, 1969, pp. 21–22). The Portuguese colonial economy was characterized by the systematic use of forced labour which was in four categories; obligatory, correctional, voluntary and contract. In education, like most other colonial education systems, the Portuguese colonial government only allow its African

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colonists to acquire the type of education that encouraged their subordination of the colonial economic and political structures. But in finance, the Africans were incorporated and integrated into taxation in order to generate revenue for the colonial administration. The payment of tax was mandatory and stamped in the law. Taxation in colonial Portuguese territories evolved through stages from hut tax to head tax and later to personal tax which, at times, were enforced at the same time thereby forcing the Africans in to the labour market (Havik, 2013, pp. 159–221). Portugal forced her colonies to cultivate cash crops for export at fixed prices (Davidson, 1969, pp. 26–27). Forced labour and disguised forms of slavery, such as the “contract labour” practiced by them were prominent features of Portuguese of the colonial economy in Africa (Adu, 1900, p. 156). Forced labour had a distinct distinction between “penal labour” which was reserved for convicts and the “labour” which was a moral and social obligation for men between the ages of 14 and 60 for at least six months a year (Adu, 1900, p. 156). In 1956, Amilcar Cabrai founded The African Party for the Independence of Guinea (Bissau) and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC) to agitate and resist Portuguese economic policies (Davidson, 1973, p. 12). Portuguese colonial presence in foreign territories began to witness numerous challenges especially in the 1950s and 1960s. First was as a result of the developments in other Western industrial economies and colonies which forced the introduction of certain nominal policies into the colonies by the Portuguese colonialists. Second was the recurrent armed revolts of the colonial people against the Portuguese colonial administration which presented the Africans with the benefits and potentials of self-governance. Third was the development of new interest other than colonial political influence in the sixties. New development in the metropolitan cities demanded new labour techniques and increased productivity resulted to social change both at home and in the colonies. The obnoxious colonial economic policies of the Portuguese administrators and its highhandedness of the colonial population and delayed independence of the colonies enlisted the Portuguese territories among the colonial territories to be considered by United Nations’ special committee created in October 1967 for review of colonial activities in foreign colonies. It was reported that the Portuguese colonial administration was a capitalist enterprise with zero interest for the indigenous population, devastating exploitation of labour and natural resources while perpetuating in government with no intentions of granting independence soon.

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Conclusion Trade Union was another tool for the expression of anti-colonial grievances and nationalist demonstrations, even though union activities were not encouraged or allowed officially at the initial stages, example of which was the Sierra Leone Railway Workers Union, The Nigerian Union of Mechanics (1919) The Gambia Native Defence Union, etc. (Adu, 1900, p. 273). Yet, these unions agitated and reacted to colonial economic policies, using strikes as the only potent weapon. Accordingly, the colonial West African region recorded several demonstrations notably the 1919 railway workers strike in Serra Leone, the 1924 workers of Ashanti Goldfields strike in Gold Coast, and the 1924 and 1949 Enugu coal miners’ boycotts and hold-ups. This chapter has assessed the evolution of labour movements in West Africa; it has attempted a discussion of the industrialization and industrial process in West Africa between 1885 and 1960. The various colonial economic policies of European colonialists of the region were also discussed as well as Africans’ responses to the policies. It has been demonstrated that Labour movement in colonial West Africa was a result of unfavourable treatment and economic racism from colonial administrators meted out on the African labours. Also, what later became political parties were at its inception, geared towards inhuman and unfavourable colonial economic policies which had reduced the indigenous people to the status which in most cases was akin to slavery. One thing was common among the three colonial powers present in West Africa; their economic policies did not take into consideration, the feelings, or needs of their colonies. And where Africans resisted, they made laws to prevent further actions from them.

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Salisu, P. et al. 2013. Labour Unions and the transformation of Nigeria Civil Service. A Discourse. International Journal of Public Administration and Management Research. (IJPAMR) 2(1): 1. Seddon, D. 2002. Popular Protest and Class Struggle in Africa: An Historical Overview. In Zeilig, L. Ed. Class Strugglea nd Resistance in Africa. England: New Clarion Press. Shillinger, H. R. 2005. Trade Unions in Africa: Weak but Feared, Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Thompson, V., and Adloff, R. 1958. French West Africa. London: George Allen and Union Ltd. Vinnika, J. 2002. There Shall Be No Propty: Trade Unions, Class and Politics In Nigeria. Class Struggle and Resistance in Africa. In Zeilig, L. (Ed.) Class Struggle and Resistance In Africa. England: New Clarion Press.

CHAPTER 3

Industrial Revolution and International Conflicts: A Reassessment Timothy Chibuike Anyanwu, Ijeoma Genevieve Anikelechi, and Precious Onyekachi Okoye

Industrial Revolution is the term used to explain the series of changes and astronomical improvements in the production and distribution of goods and services that started in England in the eighteenth century. It was a capitalist-driven change which further changed who owns the means of production, who produces and what was to be produced. It is also the

T. C. Anyanwu (B) Department of History and Strategic Studies, Alex Ekwueme Federal University Ndufu Alike Ikwo, Abakaliki, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] I. G. Anikelechi Science Education Department, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria P. O. Okoye Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, University of Abuja, Abuja, Nigeria

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. J. Ani (ed.), Political Economy of Colonial Relations and Crisis of Contemporary African Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0245-3_3

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extensive substitution of labour as a means of production with machines. The change in the means of production further created essential and intertwined changes which transformed agrarian economic settings into industrial ones (Porter, 2008). Industrial Revolution was a capitalist-oriented sharp movement that defined what where and how production of goods and services were done. It also stands to say that the industrial revolution shifted production venues from the conventional sites which were homes and miniworkshops to factories and large workshops. With reliance on machines, production outputs, technical efficiency and consistency grew astronomically through the introduction of practical and scientific knowledge to productivity. Having started in England as the result of the supportive sociopolitical and economic environments, the Industrial Revolution spread to other states of Western Europe in the same century. By the nineteenth century, the wave of the revolution was topical in Northern America and by the twentieth century, Asian continent followed suit. This widespread was such that by the time colonialism and other forms of globalization kicked off, the products and ideas of the revolution became internationalized. Among other things that were shipped overseas during this era were weapons of different capacities. With these developments, it became unarguable that the Industrial Revolution which started in Britain greatly affected the entire globe both positively and negatively.

Methodology Drawing data from such secondary materials as textbooks, published dissertation works, online articles and journals, this research used qualitative research methodology to drive home the findings. The approach enhanced harvesting variables using content analysis to treat the information in the light of current work. To enhance understanding of the findings of this research, the results were chronologically arranged thematically. This was done to show linkages between the various events under study.

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Factors that Made Britain Most Favourable for the Industrial Revolution One of the questions people ask is: why did the Industrial Revolution start in Britain? The answer to this, is very simple as there were many enabling factors in England that placed the city at more advantageous position than other cities of Europe. One of the factors that made the Industrial Revolution to take place at the time and place it did was the agricultural revolution of the eighteenth century. With the agricultural revolution, there were changes and advancements in the methods of rearing livestocks and farming. These advancements resulted in a massive increase in productivity such that there were enough food and raw materials productions. The system of agriculture was such that could feed the teeming British population at a cheaper cost and still had enough surpluses for markets abroad. Britain was therefore more like a supplier to other European countries who had little because of numerous years they were saddled with wars and other internal skirmishes. Furthermore, the agricultural revolution resulted to a rapid population growth in Britain such that in the second half of the century, there was already surplus of labour who could man the Industrial Revolution when it finally came. Apart from the agricultural sector, England had a relatively peaceful sociopolitical atmosphere compared to other European countries of the period. Consequently, the conducive environment paved way for people to focus on economic activities with little or no disturbances.

Early Impacts of the Revolution in England The Industrial Revolution had enormous impacts once it started in England. For the sake of this study, these impacts can be divided into positive and negative ones. The following session discusses these impacts of the Industrial Revolution. One of the positive impacts of the revolution was the surge in the population of England. With the birth of the revolution, the population of England grew rapidly more than it did during the agricultural revolution. In order to track the speed of the population explosion of the period, the government resorted to periodic census which helped to monitor both birth and death rates. It was through these censuses that it was observed that in 1750, the total European population stood at an estimated 140

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million; by 1800, it had increased to 187 million and by 1850 to 266 million, almost twice its 1750 level. As the population was growing, there was a corresponding growth in the towns of Europe. The invention of the steam engine provided access to transportation network. Consequently, towns and cities started sprouting out along railways and stations. For instance, factory owners before the revolution cited their factories close to water bodies to enable water energy to power them. This system greatly affected business activities in adverse way. But with the coming of the steam engine, factories could be cited at choice places. Furthermore, railways served the purpose of citing and relocating already existing factories to choice places. This led to the emergence and growth of big cities. These cities also became populated and got more developed as unemployed people could move to the cities for employment opportunities. On the other hand, there were also adverse effects of the revolution. One of the negative effects was the manner it affected the peace of the world; a trend that continued till date. The following session will look into the negative effects of the revolution with major emphasis on its roles in encouraging international conflicts. In doing this, the research does not refute the all-time positive effects of the revolution in the aspect of peace in the wider world. Rather, it stands to argue that its positive effects have been overstretched to the detriment of national and international peace it jeopardized. To discuss the Industrial Revolution and international conflicts, this paper will be hinged on the following subtitles. 1. Colonial and military roles 2. Environmental roles 3. Social roles.

Colonial and Military Roles Colonialism simply means the domination of one country by another and the imposition of a new government through aggressive military actions (Cell, 2008). It is also seen as a complete domination and administration of a country by a foreign power (Nwankwo, 1998). There is no gainsaying that colonialism happened the time it did because of the leeway Industrial Revolution gave the countries of Western Europe. For instance, scientific

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and technological developments made it possible for ships powered by steam engines that could ferry intercontinental waters to thrive. It was such that by 1884, Europeans had navigated many African waterways as the colonial exercise was defined in the same year. Similarly, in places like the Americas and the Asian continent, the strongholds of the European powers were highly pronounced. After the Berlin Conference of the 1884–1885, colonialism started earnestly in Africa. Technological cum scientific breakthroughs that the Industrial Revolution created gave the countries of Western Europe military superiority over Africa. They were able to produce machines guns and other sophisticated weapons they used in inflicting conflicts in the African continents. For instance, on the 2 January 1851, Consul Beecroft visited Badagry, upon the invitation of Reverend C. A. Gollmerfor of the Christian Missionary Society. At this visit, Beecroft observed that he could make a deal with Akintoye to surmount the stiffness of Kosoko who was a Yoruba leader. He supplied the monarch with fire arms and other tools he needed to execute wars against his rivals. He, Beecroft further travelled down to Abeokuta; through Townsend’s assistance, he met many chiefs who agreed on a deal with England. Some of the business transactions that happened there also included deadly European weapons and so on. Upon his return from Abeokuta to Lagos, Beecroft was welcomed by a plea by Akintoye thus ….my humble prayer to you is that you would take Lagos under your protection, that you would plant the English flag there and that you would re-establish me on my rightful throne at Lagos and protect me under my flag; and with your help I promise to enter into a treaty with England to abolish the slave trade at Lagos and to establish and carry on lawful trade, especially with the English merchants. (Ajayi, 1965)

With the necessary plans put in place, there was the bombardment of Lagos targeted towards ousting Kosoko in December 1851. By the New Year Eve of 1852, the plundering was over and Akintoye was reinstated as the Lagos monarch. Expectedly, he reaffirmed his loyalty to the British crown. His relationship with the imperial power consolidated the British’s claims in Lagos (Adekoya, 2016). The foregoing was made possible because of the presence of the Europeans and the sophisticated weapons made available by the Industrial Revolution. This trend was not prevalent only in the Yorubaland described above. For instance, in the South

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East region of the present-day Nigeria, the Aro expedition of the early twentieth century comes to bare. The trauma and harm inflicted with the availability of European weapons in such places as the Old Okigwi District, Mbano and so remain glaring. By the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Aba Women Riot was ravaging the South East Nigeria. This can be directly linked to the Industrial Revolution because of the roles palm oil, European firearms and so on played in the dreaded riot. Furthermore, the indirect effects of the Industrial Revolution in the Nigeria civil war fought 1967–1970 cannot be overemphasized. There is little or no doubts that the proliferation of weapons which was birthed by the revolution had roles it played in the war. The foregoing did not happen only in Nigeria. The effects of the European presence in the Asante wars, Dahomey wars and so on, were the same. This is so because having no need for slaves because machines invented during the Industrial Revolutions have taken over productions, the Europeans who needed raw materials in Africa had to import weapons of varying capacities to plant conflicts in Africa. By the time colonialism ended, the wave continued as the effects of the colonial activities started sprouting out in the various African countries. Some of the major effects of colonialism were the birth of conflicts that have ravaged the post-colonial African countries. One of such cases was the Bakassi Peninsula in the western part of Cameroon. The peninsula juts into the Gulf of Guinea which is adjacent to the border between Cameroon and Nigeria. The Bakassi Peninsula has large untapped reserves of petroleum. In 1884, the native rulers of the region signed treaties of protection with the British agents thereby giving them the control of the peninsular. By 1970s, the Nigerian Military Head of State, Yakubu Gowon signed two treaties with the Cameroonian government. These treaties: (the Yaounde II Declaration) signed on 4 February 1971 and (the Maroua Declaration) signed on the 1st of June, 1975, defined the maritime boundaries between the two countries after the independence. By 1980s and 1990s, claims over the rightful ownership of the Peninsular posed one of the biggest threats the two nations ever had. This affected the peace of the continent until after a series of engagements; the International Court of Justice gave her verdict in 2002. Notwithstanding the court ruling, there still remain uncertainties in the future of relations between the two countries as the various governments have always given diverging analysis to the outcome of the conflict.

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Rwanda represents another African country where the negative impacts of colonialism were greatly witnessed. A republic in the East Central African region, Rwanda shares boundaries with Uganda (in the north), Tanzania (in the East, Burundi (in the South) while Lake Kivu and Democratic Republic of Congo lie on Rwandan western border (Fegley, 2008). Rwanda is made up of two major ethnic groups: Tutsi and Hutu. Inasmuch as one may argue that the relationship between these two before the colonial era was not very cordial, it stands to posit here that colonialism aggravated it and finally led to the genocidal cataclysm of the 1990s in the country which affected continental Africa generally. Affirming the foregoing, Uvin (2019) observed that the various ethnic nationalities of Rwanda existed peacefully with well-arranged mode of operations in a manner that represented their differences. For instance, the various ethnic groups were united by a common language, religion and other cultural practices. By the time colonialism and her notorious policies such as “divide and rule” were introduced, the differences among the ethnic groups started to be pronounced. The colonizers did not only favour the minority Tutsi, they as well treated the majority Hutu as subhumans. For instance, education and jobs in the administration were almost exclusively for the Tutsi, while the Hutu were not well represented in appointments and other governmental activities. With the colonial settings of the society, the independence struggles of Rwanda took ethnic lines. Instead of the Rwandans uniting to face the colonial government, the reverse was the case. For instance, the Hutu was more focused on subduing the Tutsi than securing their political independence from the Belgian colonizers (Mamdani, 1996). By the time the country gained her independence, ethnic politics became predominant. Another colonial insincerity that aggravated the bad politics and conflicts of the post-colonial era was the switching of their favour from the Tutsi to the Hutu whom they claimed to have observed were being marginalized. With their connivance, the Hutu carried out a sporadic “revolution” in 1959 that saw to the death of hundreds of Tutsi while many fled the country. There is therefore no gainsaying that the industrial products of the Industrial Revolution continue to catalyse conflicts in the international system, especially, in the “third world countries” till date.

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Environmental Roles In recent times, the concept of conflict has gone beyond the conventional physical warfare. It has grown to include environmental factors. There is no gainsaying that the Industrial Revolution birthed machines and factories of varying degrees. The underlying environmental crises caused by these factories are the emissions of pollutants that are harmful to the environment. In the early days of the Industrial Revolution, one of the major environmental conflicts is the emission of pollutants to the air, water and land. By the time, the Industrial Revolution started spreading to other parts of the world, there was the internationalization of this environmental conflicts. The place of this environmental hazard is such that has taken a front page in the discourses of the international community. Example of this is evident in the meeting of the world leaders in New York in September, 2019 for the 78th session of the United Nations General Assembly. In the meeting, nationals of different countries decried the fast-growing climatic hazard that was jeopardizing the peace and safety of the international system. Hence, promises and strategies were devised to arrest the climate question. For instance, such African countries as Nigeria, Sierra Leon and Ethiopia pledged to plant millions of trees in other to salvage the environment. The European Union said at least 25% of the next budget will go to climate-related activities. Apart from the foregoing, there is no gainsaying that the industrialized parts of the world have made the industrializing or the unindustrialized parts dumping grounds for outdated industrial products. This was made possible through the process of globalization which was the child of industrialization. Globalization is simply a capitalist invention after the Cold War to remove borders in the international system. In other words, it is the act and science of creating borderless borders in the international environment. It deals with the economic unification of the world whereby there will be a creation of a single market for all the countries of the world. The process of globalization is increasingly becoming unchecked. As a matter of fact, Trans National Companies have leveraged on that to export substandard goods unlike what is obtainable in their mother countries. It is also alleged that these developed countries massively shift outdated goods that are no longer useful to their taste to African countries. These products range from consumable goods, electronics and even weapons that have in divergent ways inflicted and sustained conflicts in various

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parts of the world. Africa is the home of majority of these outdated products; this therefore makes the continent a dumping ground. Taking the relationship between Chinese businesses in Nigeria, one observes that such products as mobile phones, electronics and so on that are imported to Nigeria are not of the same standard as what the Chinese use in their country. Furthermore, these transnational business enterprises are also mindful of the products they export to a developed country. For instance, the same Chinese companies that are the harbingers of substandard goods such as electronics in Nigeria are the ones producing most of the quality and durable goods used in the United States. This shows the ruse of the whole process of globalization as some people have argued that it is nothing but a ploy by the industrial world to keep dominating, under-developing and neocolonize the world (Anyanwu, 2018). To make the shipments of these perilous goods possible, the industrialized leaders have devised ways to either settle those at the borders of the recipient countries or boycotted such agencies as the Standard Organization of Nigeria (SON), who would sabotage their clandestine efforts. Social Roles There is no gainsaying that from the earliest time, one of the biting effects of Industrial Revolution is the creation and expansion of class stratification. This was made possible from the earliest time as the revolution created a new class of people called the middle class. This class of people who were powerful capitalist and industrialist see the less privileged as subhuman. Consequently, they resorted to subjecting the lesser class to various forms of inhuman treatments as they worked on dilapidated conditions. In many cases, they work hard without being paid a corresponding remuneration for works done, in other cases, they are subjected to unconducive environmental conditions. Once started in the industrializing Europe of the eighteenth century, this trend continued to cross the borders of the international communities till date. For instance, the case in Nigeria’s educational system stands out. Here, lecturers under the umbrella, Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) have been subjected by the government to work assiduously without a corresponding remuneration of conducive environment (Ani & Ojakorotu, 2018). This pitiful condition of service has aided conflicts in both Nigeria’s educational system and beyond. Example can be seen in the most

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widely spread protest that shook the foundations of the independent Nigeria in 2020 tagged the #ENDSARS protest (Ani & Uwizeyimana, 2022). This protest happened during a period of industrial action by the federal university workers. Consequently, students who were disengaged from schools made up of more than 80 percent of the protesters. This protest later resulted in conflicts that caused the death of many Nigerians (both civilians and non-civilians), destruction of properties and so on. Another social-economic impact of industrialization is dependency syndrome. During the early years of the United States’ independence, she shut her doors against foreign relations both in the areas of politics and economics until after the two World Wars made them central players in the international system. By then, the country was fully developed to face the challenges that come with the process of internationalization. The same thing was also seen in the early years of Japanese development down to the Tokugawa restoration era. The Chinese case is a new thing. The Chinese government in the 1940s and beyond had to landlock her economy until it was built to their taste before it fully joined the world market. The abovementioned countries are in the frontline of development and industrialization today. It was made possible because they concentrated on themselves, used their local ingenuity to develop and mature to the world-class level they are enjoying today before opening their borders for external relations. On the other hand, African countries have been prematurely drawn into the process of globalization and it undermined African civilization and culture of development (Ani, 2013; Ani & Ejiaga, 2014). A journey they were not prepared for because their domestic and local ingenuities are yet to be tapped and developed. This premature membership to the league meant for already seated countries have made them to be amateurs in both ways. As a matter of fact, to keep maintaining this status of a “rich man”, these countries have to resort to depending on the developed countries for almost everything they need ranging from food items to machines and so on. This dependency syndrome is such that countries like Nigeria import almost everything she needs, including toothpicks from China.

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Conclusion Although the Industrial Revolution has been seen as a positive development. This research is not to refute or discredit the positive effects of the revolution as it gave man mastery of his environment. But surfaces to argue here is in line with the aphorism that whatever has advantages also has disadvantages. The Industrial Revolution is one of those things that have both advantages and disadvantages. In this work, we looked at such disadvantages of the Industrial Revolution as its contributions to internationalization of conflicts. We focused my attentions on how it empowered the Europeans both politically and militarily and how these empowerments resulted to colonialism with a series of wars and conflicts that ensued. We argued that without the Industrial Revolution, there would not have been European disruption of African development patterns and the series of colonial and post-colonial conflicts that were caused by the wanton gerrymandering of the African continent would not have occurred. We further discussed the place of environmental degradation and hazards that Industrial Revolution caused. This paper made it obvious that the environmental factors resulting from the Industrial Revolution has jeopardized the peace and safety of man. The last was the social effects of the revolution. We made it glaring that from the earliest days of the revolution, social maladies were topical effects of the revolution. Families configurations were altered, class stratifications emerged, work conditions were dilapidated and consequently, series of conflicts ensued the exploitations that these social configurations have created. Example of such conflicts that resulted from the social effects of the Industrial Revolution were the #ENDSARS protest and the ASUU strike in Nigeria. Finally, with the foregoing, we argued that the industrial revolution greatly encouraged international conflicts as majority of the conflicts bedevilling the world today are related to the effects of the industrial revolution in different ways.

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References Adekoya, Preye. (2016). “The Succession Dispute to the Throne of Lagos and the British Conquest and Occupation of Lagos.” African Research Review: An International Multi-disciplinary Journal, Ethiopia. 10 (3): 207–226. Page 218, Serial No. 42. https://doi.org/10.4314/afrrev.v10i3.14. Accessed 23 January 2019. Ajayi, J. F. A. (1965). Christian Missions in Nigeria 1841–1891. Hong Kong: Commonwealth Printing Press. Ani, K. J. (2013). “Globalisation and Its Impact on the African Political Culture.” World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues 17 (2): 44–61. Ani, K. J. & Ejiaga R. (2014). “Nigeria and the Globalized International Economy: Factoring Ethical Strategic Trade Policy.” Africana Studies Review 4 (1): 83–104. Ani, K. J. & Ojakorotu, V. (2018). Organisational Conflict and Strike in Africa: A Focus on Academic Staff Union of Universities. Journal of Gender, Information and Development in Africa 7 (2): 203–220. Ani, K. J. & Uwizeyimana D. E. (2022). “End SARS and Post Lockdown Insecurity in South Eastern Nigeria.” African Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies 11 (3): 25. Anyanwu, T. C. (2018). “Cultural and Historic Connections and Exchange: An Appraisal of Politics, Religion and Economic Connections between Nigeria and the Asian World.” A Paper Presented at the 4th International Conference of the Transatlantic Research Group in Collaboration with Global Institute of Commerce and Technology, Abuja, Nigeria, Nile University of Nigeria, Abuja, University of Nigeria, Nsukka Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, USA, held at Nile University of Nigeria, Abuja on 28–30 June 2018. Apeh, A. (2015). Arab Expansionism in Africa. Lecture Note given to Final Year Students of History and International Studies Department. University of Nigeria, Nsukka. Ayandele, E. A. (1966). “External Influence on African Society.” In Joseph C. Anene and Godfrey N. Brown (Eds.), Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Ibadan: University Press. Bakassi. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bakassi. Accessed 21 October 2019. “Bakassi Peninsula.” Microsoft® Encarta® 2009 [DVD]. Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation, 2008. Braeckman, Colette. (1994). Genocide au Rwanda. Paris: Fayart. Cell, John W. (2008). “Colonialism and Colonies.” Microsoft® Encarta® 2009 [DVD]. Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation, 2008. Channels TV. (2020). “Nigerian Officials Signing Loan Documents in Chinese Language, LawmakersClaim.” Channels Television, 15 May. https://www.cha nnelstv.com/2020/05/15/nigerian-officials-signing/loan-documents-in-chi nese-language-lawmakers-claims/.

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Fegley, Randall Arlin. (2008). “Rwanda.” Microsoft® Encarta® 2009 [DVD]. Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation, 2008. Kuper, Leo. (1977). The Pity of It All. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Mamdani, Mahmood. (1996). Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism. Princeton: Princeton University. National Archives Ibadan (NAI). CSO 26: 14962 Papers Relating to the Family Dynasty in Lagos. Exhibit D (M. H. Macauly Evidence) 1933. Nwankwo, Basil Chukwuemeka. (1998). “Colonialism and Its Impacts in Africa.” In C. E. Emezi and C. A. Ndoh (Eds.), African Politics. Owerri: Achugo Publications. Payer, C. (1982). The World Bank: A Critical Analysis. New York: Monthly Review Press,. Porter, Glenn. (2008). “Industrial Revolution.” Microsoft® Encarta® 2009 [DVD]. Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation, 2008. This is What the World Promised at the UN Climate Action Summit. https:// www.climatechangenews.com/2019/10/02/world-promised-un-climate-act ion-summit/. Accessed 3 October 2019. Uvin, Peter (2019). Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda Different Paths to Mass Violence. https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web& rct=j&url=http://olympiasummeracademy.org/past/2010/files/Ivan%252 0Ermakoff/Uvin.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwjqmbu6oa3lAhWSN8AKHYtLAsoQ FjAKegQIAhAB&usg=AOvVaw3yljV2RVhwIbx1H6NT1PTR. Accessed 21 October 2019.

CHAPTER 4

An Assessment of External Trade Dynamics in Colonial West Africa Angela Ogochukwu Odo and Dominique Emmanuel Uwizeyimana

Introduction External trade, also known as foreign trade, simply means exchange of goods and services across national boundaries (Nwadike et al., 2020). It is also termed international trade. Before the emergence of nationstates, external trade dealt with material commodities such as slaves, palm produce, timber, gold, ivory, liquor, etc. With constant interactions between the actors, external trade established links between nations and societies that went beyond trade and acted as an engine of economic

A. O. Odo (B) Department of History and Strategic Studies, Alex Ekwueme Federal University, Ndufu Alike Ikwo, Ebonyi State, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] D. E. Uwizeyimana School of Public Management, Governance and Public Policy, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. J. Ani (ed.), Political Economy of Colonial Relations and Crisis of Contemporary African Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0245-3_4

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development for those nations. Nations, societies and regions participate in external trade according to their peculiar comparative advantage, giving rise to regional division of labour and specialization. In other words, the theory of economic growth achieved through international trade arose as a result of an adept application of the concept of specialization by various nations (Hopkins, 1973). In line with the concept of specialization, societies and nations were able to supply goods which other nations require but could not produce or could not produce cheaply and vice versa. The West African sub-region found its specialization in the production of gold and slaves, among other articles of trade, and Europe was always the principal recipients of the merchandise throughout the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries. The Portuguese being major players in West Africa’s external trade transported much of the region’s major articles to other European nations, (Malowist, in Ogot, 1992). Interestingly, Africa has so far remained key players in international trade as they never ceased to specialize in the most important articles. But the continent is hardly accorded a pride of place in international trade. This is probably because the continent didn’t dictate the terms of trade. It is rather derogated as third-world and underdeveloped. In agreement, Kwame Nkrumah (1965) stressed that Africa had been unable to make any reasonable progress in the realm of industrial development because her natural resources were not employed to that end, but for the greater development of the industrialized nations of the West. Obviously, Africa’s inferior technology left it as a major exporter of primary and semi-finished goods. In the history of international commerce, the transport factor far superseded other factors in determining the cost of producing export commodities in various nations. As a result of the freight cost, one nation may be able to produce a commodity at a cheaper rate than another, (Hopkins, 1973). Little wonder, the production of slaves was among West Africa’s specialization from the 1400s down to the mid-1800s. Recurring incidents of war between West African communities and the capture of criminals and miscreants ensured a steady supply of slaves as prisoners of war produced bountiful harvests each time (Malowist in Ogot, 1992). Slaves were self-transporting articles and as such, their freight cost was limited to their movement across the Atlantic. The slave dealers moved across the desert on camels, then known as the “ship of the desert”, while the slaves trekked along on foot under very inclement weather conditions.

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Instructively, the trade in slaves served to enhance the trade links from West Africa to Europe across the Sahara and across the Atlantic Ocean. Crude as they were, they became a push factor in West Africa’s place in international trade. It is therefore safe to assume that the Trans-Saharan and the Trans-Atlantic trade were rudiments of external trade in colonial West Africa The trade in slaves dragged West Africa into the international commerce of the middle ages (Hopkins, 1973). The notorious trade in slaves may well be viewed as “legitimate” in view of the fact that it was carried out on an intercontinental scale. Moreover, all the actors and indeed the rest of the world were unopposed to it while it flourished (Anyanwu & Ani, 2020). It was not a violation of any country’s laws nor international statutes. It only assumed an illegitimate status when the British abolition act of 25 March, 1807 was passed (Falola, 1996). Thereupon it gradually fizzled out and was replaced with trade in legitimate goods.

Prelude to Legitimate Commerce in Colonial West Africa With the emergence of the European Industrial Revolution of the mideighteenth century and the consequent abolition of the slave trade in the early nineteenth century, the character and articles of external trade changed. The direct consequence was the entrenchment of economic imperialism on West Africa in the wake of the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885. It was a period when the British society experienced an unprecedented and radical increase in the use of sophisticated equipment leading to a drastic shift from manual modes of production to the use of power-driven machines. Additionally, the traditional workplace shifted from people’s homes to the factories and new industrial estates (Ogbeidi, 2013). The British Industrial Revolution was provoked by some factors which included high capital accumulation sustained by development of essential banking and credit facilities, availability of affordable and efficient means of transport and communication, availability of the basic natural resources for building industries and factories such as coal and iron ore. There was also a preponderance of labour for the factories, facilitated by a new agricultural system which required less labour, thus, releasing more manpower for the growing industries. Moreover, there was political stability in Britain which fostered population growth and the consequent

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increased demand for industrial products as well as constant supply of cheap labour, among others (Ogbeidi, 2013). While industrialization swept across the capitalist countries, slave labour became redundant and slaves became liabilities for their owners. Thereupon, slave trade was nullified. Though some analysts have argued that the slave trade was abolished on humanitarian grounds, its timing which coincided with the British industrialization invalidates that argument. If the humanitarian rationale were true, trade between West Africa and the Europeans would not have taken an imperialistic form which for the most part served the interest of the Europeans. Michael Crowder summed it up when he wrote that Christian Europe, which had abolished the slave trade, felt itself to be morally superior to heathen Africa, which seemed to seek opportunity to continue it (Crowder, 1970). Unequivocally, the “legitimate” trade had monumentally disastrous effects as much as its forerunner, the slave trade on African societies. The replacement of slave trade with legitimate commerce was perhaps, a case of a lesser evil. Trade in other commodities thus commenced from the period of informal empire characterized by exploitative trade relations between the industrialized north and West Africa but without direct political control from those countries (Onyekpe, 2013). That ultimately metamorphosed into full direct political control occasioned by the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885. In the words of Onyekpe, what emerged from this metamorphosis was direct political control of the areas in question by the owner-colonial power. Needless to stress, the establishment of direct political control over an overseas area was to ensure effective economic presence and monopoly. Apart from the opposition from African rulers and commercial interests, there was greater rivalry among the imperial nations as each sought to exercise trade monopoly in place of the laissez-faire associated with informal empire (Onyekpe, 2013). A closer look at the trade relations between the industrialized nations and West Africa during the era of informal empire reveals that the international trade of that era was not entirely “laissez faire” after all. Perhaps, it was so for the Europeans but not really for West Africans who produced and sold mostly cash crops, not by choice but in response to the exploitative demands of the ‘superior’ partners. This meant that while foreign trade promoted the economic development of the industrialized partners, it was largely inimical to West Africa’s economic development. It brought on unabated exploitation of the sub-region and created room for the establishment of colonial rule in the sub-region.

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Rationale for the Development of External Trade in Colonial West Africa Legitimate trade in colonial West Africa was predicated on the need for raw materials for mass production of goods which will ultimately find their way back to the African markets, (Falola, 1996) It was thus no surprise, that the campaign for trade in commodities in lieu of slaves received positive response from much of Europe. Sir T. F. Buxton cited in Falola (1996) was the strongest propagator for Civilization, Commerce and Christianity in Africa. The British thus campaigned for African cooperation in promoting legitimate commerce. It was hoped that on the long run, the welfare and prosperity of the West African sub-region will be promoted. As it turned out, only the welfare and prosperity of few West Africans were promoted while the rest languished in perpetuated underdevelopment. The Industrial Revolution sparked mining explorations in West Africa by European governments and business associations for the purpose of unearthing its abundant wealth to grow the nascent industries. In furtherance of the explorations, there were attempts to set up plantations in West Africa as a means of encouraging them to adopt Euro-American farming system and ultimately produce large quantities of primary goods. The gradual repeal of the slave trade also meant dwindling fortunes for the West African slave dealer whose only option was to embrace legitimate trade in order to stay in business. Furthermore, the transition to legitimate commerce was made easy by the fact that many West African countries exported legitimate goods along with slaves during the era of slave trade, (Falola, 1996). For them, the transition entailed dropping the “obsolete” commodities and producing more of the legitimate ones.

Organization and Character of West Africa’s External Trade Being the first nation to industrialize, Britain took the lead in legitimate commerce. France followed next and later Germany joined the trade by the second half of the nineteenth century. Though Germany was the third to join the trade, she rose rapidly and by the 1880s, controlled up to a third of the entire West African overseas trade. Their speedy rise in the trade was attributed to the rise in the palm kernel trade, dominated by Hamburg, along with supply of cheap labour by Hamburg and

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the development of marine trade partnership between Germany and West Africa. The trade was transacted in three major ways. First, it started with the floating trade in which the Europeans stayed along the coast and exchanged their commodities with the West Africans. This system later gave way to the castle trade whereby the Europeans bartered their goods with the Africans straight from the entreports (warehouses) which lined the coasts. The third mode of transaction was done when the Europeans penetrated the hinterland where they built their trade posts and stores and traded with the Africans from there (Falola, 1996). Penetration of the hinterland was clearly a ploy to eliminate the African middlemen whose activities hiked the price of African primary products for the Europeans. The external trade of the late nineteenth century was dominated by the Royal Niger Company (RNC) established by Sir Taubman Goldie. Its single-point agendum was to colonize the West African territory. The flourishing trade in palm oil attracted other European competitors and bred a feeling of resentment among the competitors for obvious reasons. As a means of resolving the strife, Sir Goldie merged the most prominent business consortia into a single company known as the United Africa Company (UAC) in 1879. The UAC faced heated competition from two French companies, namely, the Compaignie de L’Afrique Equatoriale and the Compaignie de Senegal. Sir Goldie tried to co-opt these companies into the UAC as a way of ending the feud between British and French companies but he failed. He therefore changed the name of the British conglomerate from UAC to NAC (National African Company), cut down their prices by about 25 per cent and thus, stifled the French out of business (Falola, 1996). African merchants were not left out in the trade competition as they acted as middlemen forming the exchange link between African produce and European goods. They strove to monopolize direct trade with the Europeans as it was quite profitable. Their struggle to break the monopoly of the coastal states was largely rudimentary to the incessant wars between the Asante and Fante of Ghana and also the conflicts between the Yoruba and Niger Delta people of Nigeria (Falola, 1996). The African merchants became wealthy and powerful as a result of huge profits made from the trade and consequently, a class society emerged. As direct agents of the European firms, some made efforts to bye-pass the European merchants stationed along the coasts and took

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their goods directly to Europe. Falola (1996) listed some of the influential African merchants and they included, James Bannerman, George Kuntu Blankson, Robert Hutchingson, Francis Chapman Grant, John Sarbah, James Robert Thompson, Thomas Hughes, Johnson Ghartey and many others. They used their wealth and influence to attain positions of authority as in the case of James Bannerman who became the LieutenantGeneral of the Gold Coast from December 1850 to September 1851 and a member of the Gold Coast Legislative Council from 1850 to 1856.

The Trade in Palm Oil and Other West African Staples To produce the needed amount of oil for export, the economy of the sub-region crossed over from subsistence to the production of palm oil as a cash crop (Etemad, 2004) In the course of legitimate commerce, West African cash crops grew in importance especially within the decades 1820–1850. In that period, there was an increase in the volume of trade and exchanges between West Africa and France, Britain, Germany and other western countries. Within the supposed period, there was staggering increase in African primary commodities valued at European prices. For instance, British imports of palm oil from West Africa rose from 17,456 cwt. in 1820 to 434,450 cwt. in 1850. Also, British imports of West African oak rose from 297 loads (about 50 cubic feet) in 1817 to 23, 251 loads in 1837 (Newbury, 1971). An increase in the volume of trade in 1850, caused the British to create a “Court of Equity” at Bonny (southern Nigeria), overseen by John Beecroft, which would deal with trade disputes. A similar court was established in 1856 at Calabar, based on an agreement with local Efik traders, which prohibited them from interfering with British merchants. These courts were manned chiefly by the British and represented a new level of presumptive British sovereignty in the Bight of Biafra. West Africa also bought British exports, supplying 30–40 per cent of the demand for British cotton during the Industrial Revolution (Tekena, 1972). The major features of legitimate trade within this period is the bulk handling of European and African goods, that is a rapid increase in the quantities of freight exchanged by both continents. This was of course accompanied by a remarkable increase in prices of African primary products in Europe. For instance, the prices of major West African staples such as palm produce, groundnuts and timber rose tremendously from 1820

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owing to improvements in transport facilities coupled with the removal of import duties. But beyond 1850, these products witnessed a price decline. For instance, the price of groundnut rose more slowly from 35 Francs per quintal in 1847 to 36 Francs in 1861 and later fell to 34 francs in 1865 at the Marseille market. Other West African staples such as gum, copal, ivory and timber experienced the same price increase in the 1820s and eventual price decline beyond the 1850s (Newbury, 1971). It was the development of the railway transportation in Senegal in 1885 that triggered the extraordinary progress in the groundnut economy of Senegal and raked in unprecedented profits for France. Instructively, the upsurge in the production of this cash crop was provoked by French introduction of improved techniques for massive groundnut cultivation and export. Hitherto, the Senegalese peasant was confined to, and satisfied with subsistence farming. French colonialism awakened in the farmers, the inherent capacity for monumental production, (Samir Amin, 1973). Beginning from 1884–1885, some 45,000 tons of groundnut was produced in Senegal. By 1914, the cumulative production was above 200,000 tons. In 1956–1957, the harvest reached 600,000 tons and was over a million tons between 1965–1966. Meanwhile, groundnut production fluctuated in response to the withdrawal of some of the peasants owing to unfavourable terms of trade. It was no surprise that the harvests depreciated to 786,000 tons in 1966–1967 and to 598,000 in 1968–1969 (Amin, 1973).

The Negative Outcome While external trade fostered the economic development of the industrialized nations, its impact was chiefly negative for colonial West Africa. Walter Rodney (1976) believed that legitimate trade in colonial West Africa amounted to consistent expatriation of surplus produced by African labour from African resources. It meant the development of Europe as part of the same dialectical process in which Africa was underdeveloped. To begin with, the underlying principle of the legitimate commerce championed by the metropolitan countries of the northern hemisphere was the capitalist rationalization of minimum input for maximum output (Ake, 1981). Therefore, as trade and exploitation was the fundamental rationale for entrenchment of colonial rule, the colonial masters did not deem it fit to develop the industrial sector of the colonies. In retrospect,

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Nkrumah stressed this point and Claude Ake further noted that the colonial government did not do very much to encourage the development of manufacturing. Their interest in a colony lay primarily in the fact that it was a source of raw materials as well as a market for selling metropolitan manufactured goods. The companies such as the Royal Niger Company, which were given wide powers and privileges in the colonies as well as the obligation to develop them, did not consider that industrialization of the colony merited serious attention (Ake, 1981). Despite their lack of lustre attitude in the industrialization of West Africa, the metropolitan countries could not effectively exploit their colonies at zero costs. Hence successful legitimate trade which flourished under colonial rule entailed some investment in infrastructure such as roads, railways, seaports, water resources, electrical power, etc. Not surprisingly, these facilities were sited in areas where the repatriation of African raw materials was very convenient such as Lagos, Kano, Port Harcourt, and several others (Ake, 1981). There was incoherence in the transport system which was clearly illustrated in the manner in which the railway lines were built. They were built in a uni-directional manner moving from the point of extraction of raw materials to the point of export. Claude Ake summed up the railway system succinctly that in Nigeria, the Kano-Apapa railway line was built to facilitate the export of cotton, groundnuts and cocoa for export. And the Enugu-Port Harcourt line was built to serve the oil palm trade. Among other railway lines built specifically for export commodities were the Marampa-Pempel line in Sierra Leone, the Fria-Conakry line in Guinea, the entire railway system of Liberia, the Dakar-Niger railway line in Mali and Senegal, and the Port Etienne-Fort Gouraud line in Mauritania. As if to emphasize the fact that the railway was purely functional for gathering and exporting the commodities of the colonies, the Germans in Togo actually named their railway lines after the particular commodities and minerals which they were supposed to transport. Thus, there were the cotton line, the cocoa line, the coconut line and the palm oil line (Ake, 1981). Furthermore, there was incoherence in the development of export commodities because the colonial capitalists were only interested in the most profitable primary goods. And to ensure steady and adequate supply of their preferred commodities, they applied force or persuasion to compel a concentration of effort on those commodities while in the same vein, discouraging the production of other commodities (such as food crops) which were needed for the upkeep of West Africans. Such

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an economic subjugation upset the balance of the traditional economy. Ake exemplified this situation in the case of Ghana thus it was after the colonization of Ghana that cocoa was successfully grown in the colony. By 1901, the country was already the biggest producer of cocoa in the world. By 1939, cocoa accounted for about 80 per cent of the value of Ghana’s exports. This sort of change led to disequilibrium, for instance, shortages in the supply of traditional food crops, changes in land use creating changes in land tenure…the uneven development of different regions, the dependence of the economy on a few export crops, and associated with all this, profoundly unbalanced economic growth (Ake, 1981). Closely connected to the above factor was the fact that West Africans in the quest for financial gains subordinated the production of goods for their local needs to production for European needs. In other words, cash crops were produced massively at the expense of food crops needed for local consumption. The immediate outcome was a phenomenal increase in the price of food crops and of course high cost of living especially in the densely populated urban centres. By subordinating their economy to that of their European trade partners, West African nations became exposed to perpetual exploitation by the Europeans. Their best products such as palm oil, timber, coal, cocoa, gold, crude oil, to mention a few, were expatriated to Europe. These are primary and semi-finished goods that were used for production of consumable goods and for the maintenance of machines in the factories. Goods imported into West Africa were consumable goods such as liquor, tobacco and textiles, guns and gunpowder that were used to liquidate precious lives. Such goods held no value for the economic development of West Africa but were in high demand nevertheless, simply because of the trade link with Europe (Falola, 1996).

Enduring Impacts Hopkins (1973) agreed that the new export trade saw a marked increase in the commercialization of labour and land in Africa, instead of, as in the eighteenth century, the export of one factor of production (labour) and the comparative neglect of another (land), except for domestic needs. It was the beginning of the migrations of labour across the length and breadth of West Africa. There was employment of labour in hitherto unexplored economic spheres. Africans were employed in the Railway companies; shipping companies and seaports. The deserted lands were re-occupied for farming purposes in cognizance of the escalated demand for cash crops.

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Closely related, is the impact of foreign trade on gender relations in economic activities. In an article review of Robin Law (ed), From Slave Trade to Legitimate Commerce: The Commercial Transition in the Nineteenth-Century West Africa, Andrew F. Clark cited that Igbo women and slaves did the bulk of the work in “palm oil production until the development of an export trade when men appropriated most of the product” (Andrew F. Clark book review). This, to a researcher of gender relations in African studies, is an impact to be reckoned with. This turn of event, scholars have argued, is not unconnected to the fact that after the abolition of the slave trade, more males were available to work the lands and fields without fear of being raided. Some have argued that men took over from women because the business became very lucrative. Whatever the conclusion drawn, it is true that the era of the legitimate trade contributed its quota to the issues in today’s gender relations in West Africa. Because agricultural production, especially palm oil making, were predominantly female occupations in many areas, the transitional period must have had tremendous impact on gender relations (Clark, 1995). The advent of modern transportation is not unconnected to the era and developments of the legitimate trade. Indeed, the development of the railway transport system has been viewed in some quarters as the most enduring legacy of West African trade interaction with the Europeans. Starting in Senegal around 1885, the first phase of railway transport took off from Dakar and terminated at Saint Louis. In Ivory Coast, railway development began in 1903. In British West Africa, railway development started in the 1890s. Modern Ports were developed and road networks developed, helping to modernize the whole dynamics of transportation in West Africa. Such indices of development aided the exposition of West Africa to globalization, thereby improving the traditional means of transportation in the process. The Lagos-Ibadan railway which still exists till date was constructed within four years from 1896 to 1900. If colonial powers can be credited with the economic revolution in West Africa, it was through the construction of railways (Crowther, 1970). In the same vein, one of the ripple effects of the above developments in the transportation network especially maritime/ports and railway is the development of adjoining businesses in the hospitality, security and artisanship at the port areas and the railway stations. The urbanization and development of modern cities such as Lagos, Dakar, Port Harcourt, among others can be linked to the era of legitimate trade.

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Conclusion From the foregoing, it is quite obvious that international trade in colonial West Africa was indeed a major factor of economic dependence and inherent underdevelopment in the sub-region. It is a vivid evidence of the global stratification between Africa and the industrialized nations of the northern hemisphere. This is because economic relations between Europe and Africa was and always will be in the interest of Europe. The picture appeared dismal because it benefitted only a few Africans whose population was too negligible to effect any reasonable economic impact on West Africa. Suffice it to say that the West African sub-region has remained perpetually dependent on the industrialized countries as a result of the external trade of the colonial era. Most West African countries now run a “consumption economy” with a penchant for European goods instead of a “production economy”. Apparently, “how Europe underdeveloped Africa” was chiefly through foreign trade.

References Ake, C. A Political Economy of Africa. London: Longman, 1981, 43. Amin, S. Neo-Colonialism In West Africa. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973, 3–5. Anyanwu, T. C. & Ani, K. J. (2020). Slavery and Colonialism: The Roots of Postcolonial Conflicts in Africa, World Affairs, 24(1): 132–141. Clark, A. F. Book review of: Robin Law, ed. From Slave Trade to Legitimate Commerce: The Commercial Transition in the Nineteenth-Century West Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Available at http://hnet.org/ reviews/showrev.php?id=1216. Accessed on May 10, 2017. Crowder, M. West Africa Under Colonial Rule. London: Hutchinson, 1970, 7. Etemad, B. “Economic Relations Between Europe and Black Africa 17801938”, in Pétré-Grenouilleau (ed), From Slave Trade To Empire. New York: Cambridge Press, 2004, 69–81. Falola, T. “Trade with the Europeans in the 19th Century”, in Ogunremi, G. O. & Faluyi, E. K. (eds), An Economic History of West Africa Since 1750. Nigeria: Mayodele Ajayi Enterprises, 1996, 99. Hopkins, A. G. An Economic History of West Africa. London: Longman Group Ltd, 1973, 78–79. Malowist, M. “The Struggle for International Trade and Its Implication for Africa”, in Ogot, B. A. (ed), General History of Africa V: Africa From The Sixteenth To The Eighteenth Century. California: University of California Press, 1992, 6.

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Newbury, C. W. “Prices and Profitability in Early Nineteenth Century West Africa” in C. Maillassoux (ed), The Development of Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa. London: Oxford University Press, 1971, 91–92. Nkrumah, K. Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism. New York: International Publishers, 1965, 84–85. Nwadike, G. C. Ani, K. J. & Alamba, C. (2020). Impact of Trade Openness on Nigerian Economic Growth: An Empirical Investigation, 1970–2011, Foreign Trade Review, 1–9. Ogbeidi, M. M. “Industrialization and the Emergence of Advanced Capitalist Economies Revisited”, in Olukoju, A. et al (eds), Fundamentals of Economic History. Akoka: University of Lagos Press, 2013, 132. Onyekpe, J. G. N. “The Integration of the World Economy: From Informal Empire to Neo-Colonialism”, in Olukoju, A. et al. (eds), Fundamentals of Economic History. Akoka: University of Lagos Press, 2013, 217. Rodney, W. How Europe underdeveloped Africa. London: Bogle L’Ouverture Publications, 1976, 162. Tekena, T. The Evolution of the Nigerian State: The Southern Phase, 1898–1914. London: Longman, 1972, 4.

CHAPTER 5

C.E.A.O and the Thrust of Economic Cooperation Since 1968 Chinonso Ihuoma and Alabi Folusho Adewumi

Introduction The economic and developmental realities of the newly independent West African states which included absence of viable population, natural resources, differences in development among others forced the newly independent West African states into one form of economic cooperation or the other which they had at first at independence abandoned due to the fantasy and excitement of independence. Thus, the need for regional economic integration in Africa (Adebayo 1970, p. 123). African history soon became characterised by economic and political integration rather

C. Ihuoma (B) Department of History and International Studies, Renaissance University, Ugbawka, Enugu State, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] A. F. Adewumi Department of History, University of Huddersfield, West Yorkshire, United Kingdom © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. J. Ani (ed.), Political Economy of Colonial Relations and Crisis of Contemporary African Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0245-3_5

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than development (Habeler 1964, p. 1). Johnson (1991, p. 3) along the same line of thought opines that: African countries seem unable to surmount the associated difficulties that have arisen in all their attempts at economic integration of the type that is supposed to end with the formation of a customs union whether the defunct East African Economic Community, or any of those still in existence, such as ECOWAS, the Mano River Union (MRU), the Communaute Economique De l’Afrique De L’ouest (C.E.A.O.), the Union Douaniere Et Economique De l’Afrique Centrale (U.D.E.A.C.), or the Preferential Trade Area (P.T.A.) The precise structure and details of the actual schemes being promoted have been unrealistic in light of the costs and sacrifices that African governments and their citizens seem willing to bear

After the Second World War, as proceeds of the changes that accompanied the war, the French government began making efforts for democratisation for the people in Federation d’Afrique Occidentale Francaise (A.O.F.), and the Federation d’Afrique Equatoriale Francaise (A.E.F.) Mytelka 1974. However, the lack of a dynamic and willingness to provide inducement integration was a serious liability for integration in Francophone West Africa (Angui and David 1957). It is important to note that over 32 cooperation institutions exist in West Africa and each francophone West Africa belongs to more than three of these institutions. This paper evaluates the history behind the creation of Communaute Economique L’Afrique Ouest (CEAO), which will be subsequently referred to as CEAO, its focus, structure, and challenges.

Conceptual Clarification Economic cooperation has been differently conceptualised by scholars. According to Farrill (1999), it is a concept that is used to describe a simile of developmental, financial, monetary, economy and entrepreneurial cooperation. According to ECOWAS Treaty, it is a harmonisation of economic, social, cultural, developmental, policies of member states. It is a branch of international cooperation whose aim is the integration of financial and trade policies of member states with the aim of making a profit at a medium and long run. From the foregoing definitions, it is a deliberate decision and agreement entered into by states for the purposes of reducing discrimination against economies of member states.

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Economic cooperation is often misconstrued to be economic integration which the latter is a process, which comprises the removal of all forms of discrimination between economic units of member states and also a state of affairs as it is a representation of the removal of all forms of discrimination against national economies of member states. Economic cooperation reduces discrimination against economies while economic integration suppresses discrimination. Therefore, this work posits that economic integration has to do with all efforts aimed at facilitating cooperation amongst or between countries in a locality.

Cooperation Prior to the Establishment of CEAO West Africa was a human entity before the coming of Europeans as goods and people moved from one place. However, there was a reduction in the inter colonies interaction owing to the financial policies of the different colonial countries but not a total eradication of interactions. Various institutions were established by these colonialists within their areas of influence which cut across all their colonies such as the West African Cocoa Research Institute (W.A.C.R.I), West African Currency Board (WACB), among others. At the eve of independence, the desire of not wanting to lose their territories on the part of the colonialists was a spurring factor in the creation of institutions or organisations that would maintain a strong link between the metropolitan state and the then soonto-be-independent states. For the purposes of this topic, since CEAO is a brainchild of France, francophone economic cooperation initiatives in West Africa prior to the creation of CEAO and the organisations that metamorphosed into CEAO would be its focus. In 1959, there was an attempt to create Mali Federation which intervention areas were political and economic integration among Mali, Senegal, Burkina Faso and Benin but the attempt failed in 1960. Under the auspices and inspiration of France, Union Douaniere de l’Afrique Occidentale (U.D.A.O) also known as Customs Union French West Africa was established which later became Union Douaniere des Etats de L’Afrique de L’Ouest (UDEAO) in 1966 for the purposes of redistributing custom duties accrued by coastal states from transit trade among landlocked states (Bach 1983, p. 603). UDEAO also comprised of all West African Francophone states except Guinea. It was restricted to the circumscribed goal of trade promotion among member states through

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the use of Special Tax Credit (Bach 1983, p. 606). However, this union did not record far-reaching effects because of the various technical and administrative issues that emanated as each state within the union adopted regardless of the Unions agreement independent customs policies (Bach 1983, p. 606) and the superiority rivalry between Cote D’Ivore and Senegal accelerated its demise (Mamadou 2016, p. 240). At Nigeria’s independence, her influence on the African continent was great and had great potential of becoming a regional superpower which could endanger France’s influence in her territories. The fear of France losing its grip over its territories to Nigeria instigated measures put in place to checkmate Nigeria’s growing influence among Francophone West African States. In the monetary sphere, at the time of independence for French West Africa, Union Monetaire Ouest Africaine (UMOA) was established. The establishment of UMOA was not only a symbol of flag independence but also to perpetuate the extension of the integration of colonies to the finance of France. Members at establishment were Benin, Ivory Coast, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Mauritania and Burkina Faso. In 1972, Mauritania withdrew while Mali joined in 1983. Membership of the UMOA subjected member states to regulated economic monetary policies such as the inability to print money, save the BCEAO, restricted unanimous domestic credit expansion, fixed Franc CFA vies a vies the French Franc among other conditions (Anon 1982), which insidiously benefitted France. At a UDEAO meeting in May 1970 in Bamako, member states opposed any further extension of existing arrangement because it was seen as being favourable to the more industrialised economies of Senegal and Ivory Coast at the expense of the smaller ones (Bach 1983, p. 606). At this meeting, a protocol of agreement was adopted that any organisation that would be created subsequently must reflect the spirit of cooperation whereby the liberalisation of trade would be linked with the coordination of development plans and establishment of compensation measures especially for the poor members’ (Bach 1983, p. 606). The desire to wane Nigeria’s popularity and counterbalance it, especially in the 1970s, spurred France again to put in place measures to resuscitate and reshape the dying UDEAO by giving support and instigating Senegal and Ivory Coast, the two “developed” French West African states, for the achievement of this purpose (Mamadou 2016, p. 248). President Felix Houphouet-Boigny and Leopold Cedar Senghor of Ivory Coast and Senegal respectively under the influence of France decided to give

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economic cooperation among French West Africa another trial because its absence would amount to a loss of market for their finished manufactured goods and indirectly promoting the Nigerian influence and threat in West Africa owing to her huge human and natural resources coupled with its large market (Bach 1983). Colonialism brought with it political and ideological differences which was a divide and rule mechanism among West African states which had previously been a one human entity prior to colonialism. France and Nigeria’s francophone neighbours’ attempts at counterbalance Nigeria’s heavy weight in West Africa by promoting her break up to reduce her large market size spurred them to give great support to Biafra in the forms of offering military supplies and humanitarian services to the defensive forces, a step that alerted Nigeria of the intending danger posed by the growing France influence on its former territories in cementing attempts at checkmating Nigeria and protecting Senegalese and Ivorian markets. Upon discovery of Nigeria’s attempts at establishing an economic union, steps were immediately taken with support from France in 1971 to re-establishing the prior existing economic cooperation among French West African States with the announcement of their support for the creation of a new economic union called Communaute Economique de L’Afrique de L’Ouest (CEAO) (Bach 1983, p. 610) and preparation of a treaty for this purpose. In early 1972, the proposed prepared treaty had been served to member states. In June 1972, a meeting called for the finalisation of the agreement almost ended in a deadlock because land-locked countries refused to adopt the treaty. They feared that it was intended to favour the industrialised states at the expense of the weak and poor ones and insisted that it must be reviewed to accommodate the interest of the less developed members (Renninger 1982, p. 95) such that the poor states should be relieved from the payment of custom duties for the transit of their imports through the harbours of the coastal states and such payment should be remitted into a development fund which can be channelled to the development of the poor member states. In protest to the proposed treaty, Diori Hamani, the president of Niger Republic, expressed his fears when he said “do not be surprised if we are swallowed up by Nigeria. Our national routes are directed through Nigeria, Our Cattles are exported to Nigeria and many of our people come from there. If we are swallowed up, it will be as much your fault for leaving us alone as it is ours” (Bach 1983, p. 608). The meeting later ended with Senegal and Ivory

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Coast granting these requests though not favourable to them, but under France’s strong influence to keep Nigeria’s influence at bay, a shifting of ground was imperative. An agreement in principle was signed to this effect. After considerable delay, another meeting was held in Abidjan in April 1973 to assess the amendments, which was agreed to and the treaty was signed by 6 out of 7 UDEAO members (Bach 1983, p. 608) which include Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Burkina Faso. Benin Republic did not sign the treaty as she maintained an observer status which is a product of Nigeria’s counter-diplomatic offensives and influence on Benin (Adebayo 1995, p. 56). CEAO became operational in 1974 and immediately after its establishment, its first president Diori Hamani toured West African states to put up an explanation that the new community should not be considered as a machination nor as a machine de guerre against Anglophone West Africa (Bach 1983, p. 610). However, in the real sense, it was insidiously instigated by France and directed at checkmating Nigeria’s growing influence and a desire to promote the growth of a wider market in the CEAO, which was perceived as a condition to attracting foreign investors (Bach 1983, p. 610).

Historicising the Establishment of CEAO The establishment of the CEAO was the perfection of the several antecedents of strides to establish an efficient economic cooperation in Francophone West Africa. Some of the earlier cooperation efforts were tailored at preserving or reviving pre-independent links, while others were designed to bolster new political alliances through commercial and economic agreements (Adebayo 1970, p. 221). Since independence, African countries have been making efforts at revitalising their economies and resuscitating a one-human entity that Africa operated on, allowing for a free African economy driven by comparative advantage. However, these efforts have consistently proved elusive. As already established, France had wanted to maintain its ties with her former colonies in West Africa and to uphold hegemony and homogeneity of external trade relations and easy access to markets of her former colonies in the region. As such, France had consistently blocked the establishment of any economic federation that could alter its course. To tactically have an edge and frustrate an envisaged union, France encouraged the formation of customs unions in West and Equatorial Africa in its former

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colonies. Consequently, the trajectory of establishment of CEAO runs thus; In 1959, the states of the French West Africa created the Union Douaniere de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (U.D.A.O; meaning ‘West African Customs Union’ in English). With the independence of these states in 1960, the customs run into difficulties due primarily to the distribution of customs duties collected by coastal countries on goods travelling to poorer states (Ojo 1985)( By 1966, it was revitalized and became the Union Douanière et Economique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (U.D.E.A.O: meaning ‘West African Customs and Economic Union’ in English). This grouping, however failed to pool and increase trade relations among its members and therefore collapsed in 1969. It was replaced by what later became the Communaute Economique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (C.E.O.A: meaning ‘West African Economic Community). (Ahmed 1992, p. 572)

Structure of CEAO i. Conference of Heads of State: This body is the Community’s highest authority. It meets at least once a year in each of the member states in turn. The chairman of the conference is the head of the member state in which the conference is held. The conference pronounces on any matter concerning the purpose and basic aim of the community. ii. Council of Ministers: this body meets at least twice a year; one of their meetings must include on its agenda the preparation of the annual meeting of the conference of Heads of State. iii. The General Secretariat: This organ is directed by a secretary General appointed for four years. This is an organ responsible for preparing and implementing the decisions of the conference of Heads of State and the Council of Ministers. In its first decade of existence, CEAO succeeded in establishing a common customs system and boosting the intra-CEAO trade especially through compensation mechanism and same currency (Mamadou 2016, p. 280). Many efforts have been made to create a common external tariff and to eliminate internal tariffs; but the venture has thus far proved insignificant

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because of the problem of distributing benefits acceptably. To this, CEAO aims at. i. Developing common policies relating to research and technological development as well as coordinated development in transport and communication, development of common policies relating to research and technological development as well as coordinated development in transportation and communication. It places more emphasis on the development of adequate institutional machinery as an essential condition for the successful coordination of development policies. This would also include an active policy of integration in particular with respect to the development of agriculture, animal husbandry and industrial products. ii. Promoting the growth of a wider market which would attract foreign investors (Bach 1983, p. 611). iii. Promoting monetary union and integration; it has a common currency managed by a sub-regional central bank. The CEAO led the scene through the existence of a joint central bank, the BCEAO, which is a supra-national financial institution responsible for financial dealings and integrations. “This prevents the member states from financing budgetary deficits via the central bank. However, it did not prevent external borrowing. And this option was used extensively: external borrowing made up more than two or three times the amount of internal borrowing”. iv. The establishment of a customs union with a harmonised and balanced economic development which aims at creating a unified regional market with emphasis laid on industrialisation. v. The total abolition of internal customs barriers and the adoption of a common external tariff which Article 5 had stipulated should be fully implemented by 1986 (Journal Officiel de la CEAO 1974). Thus in 1976, CEAO introduced a “Taxe de Cooperation Regionale” (T.C.R.) known as Regional Cooperation Tax (R.C.T) in English, and Fiscal Compensation and Community Development Fund, (F.C and C.D F) (Mamadou 2016, p. 249) system for the collection of taxes previously levied by individual states on manufactured imports from other members Community was established. This was designed to boost the circulation of these products by simplifying customs formalities, by reducing prices, applying different tax rates to similar products so as to favour poorer nations

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(Ahmed 1992, p. 572). Regional Cooperation Tax (R.C.T) is one of the instruments of achieving the goal of promoting intra CEAO trade. It is a preferential tax on imported goods from member states. It is not a uniform tax but preferential and charged on the basis of the country the product originated from, company that manufactured it, the country importing it, volume of local materials used in its production, among other criteria. It came into operation in 1976. By December 1978, a total number of 600 products involving 175 firms had been subjected to RCT. About 54% of these firms were from Ivory Coast, 32% from Senegal and the remaining 24% shared among the four least developed states (Mamadou 2016, p. 250). This imbalance of trade and loss of revenue due to the tax was being compensated for through fiscal compensation. The compensation fund was derived from the contributions of member states in accordance to their level and degree of participation in trade. Between 1976 and 1981, the biggest exporting members of the community were Ivory Coast 50%, Senegal 48% and the biggest importers were Mali. Imports were about 33%, Mauritania 20%. Of the fund, 67% goes into compensation and the remaining 33% is for promoting development within the community. Compensation is dependent on the volume of imports from member states and the degree to which RCT has reduced tax revenue. Between 1976 and 1978, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Burkina Faso who reduced their taxes got 25% each, Mali 10% and Niger 8% and Mauritania 7% of the total sum transferred. A Solidarity Fund was established in 1978 to augment the compensation fund for the purposes of fostering regional balance in all spheres. A shortcoming as of 1980 was that no enterprise had been undertaken from the fund though it had sponsored feasibility studies on new projects, subsidising existing enterprises and also granting loans in 1980, as much as 95% of the fund was used for developmental projects in the four least developed status. In the achievement of the above objectives, various mechanisms and institutions were put in place. At the apex was the Conference of Heads of State of member states who met yearly or at the request of a member state or as the circumstances required, next was the Council of Ministers who meet twice in a year, Secretariat and the Court of Arbitration.

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The complete freedom of movement for goods and fields of raw materials such as cattle, agricultural products and fish products was agreed upon (but not accomplished) (Belabouane-Gherari and Gherari 1988). A long tradition of co-operation in the collection of customs revenues, which will help to facilitate the satisfactory resolution of the conflicts that tend to arise in this area (Johnson 1991, p. 7). In its first decade of existence, CEAO succeeded in establishing a common customs system and boosting the intra CEAO trade especially through compensation mechanism and same currency (Mamadou 2016, p. 280). vi. Harmonisation of tariffs: this was called for in 1983, “when a communiqué issued after the Conakry summit in May invited the francophone states to harmonise their tariffs with those of other E.C.O.W.A.S. members” (Bach 1983, p. 81). vii. CEAO’s originating rules involve a “higher degree of ‘concessions to foreign capital” (Bach 1983, p. 17). Community Development Fund (CDF) of CEAO also offers a more attractive package to member states than does ECOWAS. CEAO’s CDF is used to subsidise state budgets; establish enterprises in member states on their request; help states which have suffered from the negative economic and social impact of the creation of the Community, etc.” (Amuwo 1999, p. 12). viii. Encouraging free trade area, which is to imply a “no holds barred” operation ground for Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and their local subsidiaries. Even in areas as innocuous as free movement of persons, and freedom of residence and establishment, the economic nationalism of leading Francophone African states tends to stifle bold initiatives (Amuwo 1999, p. 12), a drive towards encouraging local industries (Simmons 1972).

Challenges of C.E.A.O Like every other regional and subregional attempts at integration and cooperation, C.E.A.O attempts at economic integration in Africa failed for both macro and micro reasons. In spite of its critiques, in its first decade of existence, it succeeded in establishing a common customs system. It succeeded in boosting the intra-CEAO trade especially through the compensation mechanism and common currency. It took matters

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of trade and monetary issues seriously as no room was created for multiplicity of currencies. CEAO was unable to give its members freedom from the dictates of France. Amuwo (1999, p. 13) posits that the logic of neocolonial economic relations is at variance with the logic of autonomous “Afro-centric” economic growth and integration. Virtually, all the trade liberalisation mechanisms put in place by the CEAO reinforce, perhaps unwittingly, external ties. Reductions in tariffs are essentially bilateral affairs which are largely determined by reference to existing arrangements with France. In this way, each community is assured that community arrangements would not adversely affect individual relations with France. To this, CEAO’s s commercial relations simply confirm and guarantee the historical position of France in the economy of the member states (Ahitudu 1989, p. 302). Thus, while the founding fathers of CEAO conceptualised the new regional body as a stepping stone to a West Africawide economic grouping, it has become more useful for feathering the nests of foreign capitalist interests and investors (mainly French) than deepening intra-African economic cooperation. Free trade policy is, in Africa, little more than a licence for the unbridled outflow of foreign exchange and investments. Similarly, it expanded cooperative as well as integrative markets benefit mainly foreign commercial conglomerates. Consequently, heads or tails, France and the European Union (EU) cannot lose in a region whose economies have over the years, experienced severe structural distortions and systemic crises. In fact, CEAO’s commercial relations simply confirm and guarantee the historical position of France in the economy of member-states (Ahitudu 1989, p. 302). What this amounts to is that, notwithstanding the rhetoric to the contrary, France is more interested in the division, rather than the integration, of Africa. This is why some scholars believe that Economic Community of West Africa (CEAO) or West African Economic Community as the case may be was established with French support (Obiozor 1993). Even CEAO’s effort at monetary integration also has a France taste, as French representatives are also present at each national branch of the BCEAO (Toure 1989, p. 5). Kohnert (1994) holds that This is because the BCEAO has to operate within the given framework of fixed exchange rates, its major concern was thus to avoid too large a difference between the French and the West African rate of inflation and to control the mass of money (Grimm 1999, p. 8). The duality of common

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monetary policy of the BCEAO and an ill-adapted autonomous economic and budgetary policy of the member states proved to be the main structural deficit of the West African Monetary Union (WAMU). The increasing overvaluation of the Franc CFA has done considerable harm to the zone. The decrease in real per capita income due to the over-valuation is estimated to be about 40 per cent since 1984.

Also, although it reinforced the agrarian economy of its member states, there was the absence of paying true attention to regional industrialisation, the purpose for which the CEAO was established. Consequently, “while CEAO has remained both in concept and practice a ‘thoroughgoing Francophone group’, thereby excluding sister English speaking African countries from its areas of privilege, France has continued to be part and parcel of CEAO’s free trade” (Bach 1983). Furthermore, it did not achieve a common external tariff. In 1994, it was replaced by UEMOA to achieve a customs Union to pursue the goals of all Francophone Union Monataire Ouest Africaine (UMOA). It has been critiqued to have similar functions with ECOWAS and there is no plan to integrate the Organisation into the ECOWAS structure. The new UEMOA treaty has also been critiqued to be similar to the ECOWAS treaty of 1993. This depicts a game of politics between ECOWAS and CEAO as often times, CEAO tries to outsmart ECOWAS moves at consolidating regional cooperation in West Africa. CEAO has been said to have put ECOWAS in a dilemma in spite of the agreement reached in 1991 by West African Heads of State to make ECOWAS the single economic community and sole organisation to promote integration in West Africa (Adebayo 1995, p. 58). It was hugely affected by the language barrier which poses a serious problem to the achievement of a total and more integration in West Africa. It could be recalled that language barrier was the reason for the creation of the West Africa Economic Community (C.E.A.O). The contemporary African international community is afflicted by a linguistic dilemma. On the one hand, the African elites are constrained imperative of adopting the inherited colonial languages in order access to the global international community currently dominated by the linguistic condominium of the erstwhile imperial powers (Ajulo 1997, p. 27). This challenge has continued to be a problem and a stumbling block towards the achievement of economic integration between the Francophone and Anglophone West Africa.

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Conclusion The need for Economic integration was captured in President Nyerere’s speech where he opined that “together, or even in groups, we are much less weak. We have the capability to help each other in many ways, each gaining in the process. And as a combined group we can meet the wealthy nations on very different terms; for though they may not need any one of us for their own economic health, they cannot cut themselves off from all of us” (Nyerere 1970, p. 12). The CEAO was regarded as the most successful of Africa’s arrangements in terms of intra-regional trade expansion and factor mobility. But although the CEAO has been more successful than other arrangements in integrating West Africa, (even though it was only successful in Francophone West Africa), its accomplishments have fallen short of the intended ambitions and most progress was made in the earlier years. CEAO has been critiqued as France Trojan horse within ECOWAS (Adebayo 1970) while it was expected that since the two groups were created for the achievement of integration, then they are expected to complement each other and not be in competition. However, it is observed that the members of CEAO saw the institution as a machinery to check Nigeria in the subregion and this led to a slack in the achievement of integration between the Francophone and Anglophone West African countries. Since 1985. the strains of the debt-adjustment crises have resulted in member states becoming more self-centred in their adjustment objectives rather than remaining as strongly committed to their CEAO obligations (Mistry 2000, p. 565). However, the failure and challenges of CEAO led to its decline, accompanied by the liquidation and the establishment of a West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). The building of the defunct WAEC in Ouagadougou became the seat of the organisation with a slight change in the structural composition. From the foregoing, it is clear that the creation of the various organisations that preceded the CEAO and the CEAO itself were not intended in the true sense to overhaul the colonial structure but to cement them though having a colouration of development. If the reuniting and development of the region is paramount, UDEAO its successor organisation should be melted and integrated into the ECOWAS structure or a single economic union because the purpose of creating an economic union was the realisation of the impediments set by colonialism. If West Africa will truly break loose from colonial apron strings, it must first be demonstrated in its economic cooperation orientation and decisions.

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References Adebayo, A. 1970. Prospects of Regional Economic Co-Operation in West Africa. The Journal of Modern African Studies. 8, 2:213–231. Adebayo, A. 1995. West Africa’s Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Ahitudu, M. 1989. Underdevelopment and Collective Self-Reliance in the Economic Community of West African States, PhD Thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan. Ahmed, A. 1992. Africa’s Experiences with Regional Co-Operation and Integration: Assessingsome Groupings. Africa: Rivista Trimestrale Di Studi E Documentazione Dell’istituto Italiano Perl’africa E L’oriente. 47.4: 563–586. Ajulo, S. B. 1997. Myth and Reality of Law, Language and International Organization in Africa: The Case of African Economic Community. Journal of African Law. 41:1:27–42. Amuwo, K. 1999. France and The Economic Integration Project In Francophone Africa. African Journal Of Political Science / Revue Africaine De Science Politique. 4.1: 1–20. Angui, A. and J. F. David. 1957. L’afrique Sans Frontiers The North Atlantic Area. Manaco Karl Deutsch Et Al. USA: Princeton. Anon. 1982. Economic Integration in West Africa. CSISS Africa Notes. African Studies of the Georgetown University. Centre for Strategic International Studies. No.4. Bach, D. 1983. The Politics of West African Economic Cooperation: C.E.A.O. and E.C.O.W.A.S. The Journal of Modern African Studies. 21(4): 605–623. Belahouane-Gherari, S. and Gherari, H. 1988. Les Organisations Regionales Africaines. Receuil De Textes Et Documents. Paris : Ministere De La Cooperation Et Du Developpement. Farrill, O. 1999. Economic Cooperation. Chile: Estardo Publishers. Grimm, S. 1999. Institutional Change in The West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) Since1994: A Fresh Start After the Devaluation Shock? Africa Spectrum. 34. 1:9. Johnson, O. 1991. Economic Integration in Africa: Enhancing Prospects for Success. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 29,(1): 1–26. https://doi. org/10.1017/S0022278X0002070X. Kohnert, D. 1994. Entwicklungen In Landern Und Regionen- Westafrika. Afrika Jahrbuch. Rolf Hofmeier. Ed. Opladen: Leske+Budrich, pp. 76–81. Mamadou, A. 2016. Regional Integration in West Africa (1960–2015). Brazilian Journal of African Studies. 1.1. Mistry, Percy. 2000. Africa’s Record of Regional Co-Operation and Integration. African Affairs. 99:553–573. Nyerere, J. K. 1970. Non-Alignment in The 1970s. Dar Es Salaam: Government Printer, 1970.

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Obiozor, G. A. 1993. Text of The Opening Address by The Director-General, Dr. George A. Obiozor at The Conference On West African Regional Integration: Nigerian Policy Perspectives Organized by The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, And Held in Lagos, On 26th And 27th October, 1993. Ojo, O. J. C. B. 1985. Regional Co-Operation and Integration. In O. J. C. B Ojo, D. K. Orwa and C. M. B Utete, Eds. African International Relations. p. 154, London: Longman. Renninger, J. 1982. Multinational cooperation for Development in West Africa: Future of Regionalism. Elsevier. Simmons, A. 1972. Economic Integration in West Africa. Western Political Quarterly (Salt Lake City), XXV, 2: 295–304. Toure, Y. 1989. L’union Monetaire Ouest Africaine: L’institution Et Sa Politique. Bamako: Centre Dioliba.

CHAPTER 6

Igbo Community in the Old Sokoto Province During the Colonial Era, 1903–1960 Udoka Collins Onyenachie

and Chinyere Ecoma

Introduction This study x-rays the activities of Igbo Community in the Old Sokoto Province from 1903 to 1960. The year 1903 was the year that the colonization of Sokoto caliphate by the British imperialists took place while 1960 was the year that Nigeria gained her political independence from the British overlords. Igbo incursion in Sokoto Province began with the migration and the consolidation of the community in the Province. The conquest of Sokoto Caliphate by the British colonialists in 1903 and the

U. C. Onyenachie (B) Department of History and International Studies, Renaissance Univerisy Ugbawka, Rewati, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] C. Ecoma Department of History and International Relations, Veritas University, Abuja, Bwari, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. J. Ani (ed.), Political Economy of Colonial Relations and Crisis of Contemporary African Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0245-3_6

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consequent imposition of colonial rule brought about the Igbo migration to Sokoto. Boyd maintains that “the colonial conquest of Northern Nigeria opened up the Muslim societies and exposed them to alien cultural influences both at local and international levels. The settlement of non-Muslims in the Sabon-Gari (new settlements) quarters of major Muslims cities and towns, for example, was one of such consequences”.1 In Sokoto, the areas called Rijiya Dorowa, (Atiku road), Konni quarters and Kalfu Quarters (Off Ahmadu Bello way) that the earliest Igbo settlers stayed. With the conquest of Sokoto Caliphate and the imposition of British rule, Igbo people in the company of Royal Niger Company with the British rulers found their way to Sokoto as cooks, clerks, stewards, drivers, masons, etc., serving the colonialists.2 Among the Igbo workers, according to Okwuidegbe, “was a man named Dike, who was among the earliest Igbo men to have arrived Sokoto”.3 Abba added that “Dike, the Onitsha Igbo man brought the first car to the Native Authority (NA) workshop during the reign of Sultan Maiturare (1916–1924)”.4 Apart from Mamman Dike, Chief J.N. Ogbunugafo, R.B. Ofoegbu, Chief A.A. Ike, Ebenezer Imo, etc. are other Igbos who arrived Sokoto from Igboland by the 1930s. This was closely followed by the arrival of the other members of Igbo communities in the Old Sokoto Province. However, Gusau was preferred to Sokoto by the members of Igbo community during the colonial era as Swindell puts it “the arrival of the railhead at Gusau in 1927 and at Kaura Namoda in 1929 exemplied the influence of communications. Both towns expanded, and the new link with Zaria and the South was vital to the modern development of cotton and groundnut as cash crops for export”.5 This book also discussed factors that made the consolidation of Igbo community in the Sokoto Province possible to include the change from expatriate

1 J. Boyd, and H. M. Maishanu, Sir Siddiq Abubakar III, Sarkin Musulmi, Ibadan, Spectrum Books, 1991, p. 92. 2 Okwuidegbe, Okwuidegbe, L. F., “From Migrant Workers to Traders: A History of the Igbo Trading Diaspora in Sokoto C. 1920–1967”, Unpublished M.A. Dissertation (Department of History), Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto, 1986, p. 25. 3 L. F. Okwuidegbe, p. 24. 4 A. Abba, & et al. (ed.), Sultans of Sokoto: A Biographical History Since 1804, Kaduna,

Arewa House, 2016, p. 371. 5 K. Swindell, Sokoto State in Maps, London, 1982, p. 57.

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firms to produce agents to trading, diversification of trading enterprises, preservation and protection of their place of abode, etc. The political activities of Igbo migrant community in the province were also examined. It is pertinent to note that Igbo community did not make a far-reaching impact on the political experiment in the Sokoto Province.6 This was partly because of the hegemony imposed on the colonial Nigeria and their attachment to trading enterprises. Another reason was that the bout of political enlightenment during the colonial period was low. The dominance of the political activities by the Nigerian political elites was another reason for the poor participation in politics by the Igbo Community.

Rationales for Igbo Migration to Old Sokoto Province Though the starting point of this study is 1903 which marked the British colonialization of Sokoto Caliphate,7 the 1930s recorded a milestone of Igbo migration to the province as Tibenderana puts it “….By 1930, Sokoto along with its neighbouring emirates exported merchandise and livestock to southern Nigeria as a result of improved security and efficient means of transport. The Benue bridge for example which was opened in 1932 tremendously facilitated the increase of commercial intercourse between Northern and Southern Nigeria; so attractive was the trade that by 1946 articles of trade worth twenty thousand naira (₦20,000.00) were annually taken to the South from Sokoto”.8 At the beginning of their arrival, they were among workers and labourers constructing bridges, railways, building roads, hospitals, schools and administrative offices for the British regimes. The British realized that labour was cheap and unlimited, and in the wake of laying the structure of the colonial economy, the available labour had to be utilized to enhance 6 Please note that the second generation of Igbo Community in the study area are Igbo that migrated to the host community at the end of the Nigerian civil war in 1970. 7 L. F. Okwuidegbe, “From Migrant Workers to Traders: A History Of The Igbo Trading Diaspora in Sokoto C. 1920–1967”, Unpublished M.A. Dissertation (Department of History), Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto, 1986, p. 55. 8 Tibenderana, P.K., Sokoto Province under British Rule, 1903–1939; A Study in Institutional Adaptation and Culturalization of a colonial society in Northern Nigeria, Zaria, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 1988, p. 476.

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their concept of development and to boost their colonial paternalism. Okwuidegbe has encapsulated the migration of Igbo into two categories namely; (i). “those who arrived originally as migrant workers and artisans and gradually switched over to trading after accumulating enough savings as capital and (ii) those who were attracted to Sokoto by the possibilities of trade and prospects in trading. Of these two, the former category constituted the elders of the Igbo community because they were the first group to arrive in Sokoto”.9 On his part, the immediate past Onye Ndu Ndi Igbo, Igbo leader in Sokoto, Dr. Martins Nwike averred that: The advent of the Igbos in Sokoto dates back to the colonial era. The first Igbos came as artisans and fitters, and plumbers posted to work with the Railway Corporation and the Post and Telegraph departments of government. Late Chief J.N. Ogbunugafo, the first Eze Igbo of Sokoto was one of them. My Late father, Chief J.N. Nwike came later after returning from the Second World War in which he fought in Burma. Since then these primary immigrants of Igbo extraction attracted their brethren in commerce and Industry. My father served as the first water board secretary, (Akawo Ruwa).10

On his account, Loverage has also observed that “the migration of the Igbo to other parts of the country was intensified during the period of great depression, and the inter-war years. Some of the migrant workers belong to the class of clerks and artisans who later raised some capital to establish petty businesses in the diaspora communities in the North”.11 There are also several Igbo who moved to the Province through the urban areas such as Kano, Kaduna, Jos, etc. This is because Sokoto Province according to Prothero “is the most conveniently located of the northernmost provinces of Northern Nigeria in relation to these, a factor of considerable importance for migrants travelling on foot. Zamfara was

9 L. F. Okwuidegbe, “From Migrant Workers to Traders; A History of the Igbo Trading Diaspora in Sokoto C., 1920–1967”, Unpublished M.A. Dissertation (Department of History), Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto, 1986, p. 42. 10 R. U. Okoro, “Ikolo Magazine”, A publication of Anambra State Indigenes Association (ASIA), Vol. 1, No. 1. No date, p. 10. 11 L. F., Okwuidegbe, “The Igbo and Hausa/Fulani in Sokoto, 1903–1940: A Study in Inter-Ethnic Relations”, Agbor Journal of Arts and Social Science, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2004, p. 63.

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the most destinations for Northern zone migrants….”12 Generally, Igbo migration to the Province was hinged on “Pull” and “Push” factors. Pull factors are factors in the Province that attracted Igbo peoples such as conducive atmosphere for business, serene environment, presence of their kiths and kins while Push Factors are factors in Igboland that make their presence in Igboland impossible such as acute shortage of land for cultivation, food shortage, population pressure, etc. Igbo migration to the Province was usually characterized by family ties and relationship. This simply implied that they do not come alone; they usually migrated with their families and had settled homes in the province. Moreover, Bola Ige aptly observed that “….when the Igbos settled in a place, they settled; they would send for other members of their family and make the place a home.”13 The reasons are not far fetched; (i) their families are seen as assets instead of liabilities because they serve as apprentices in their businesses, (ii) Members of their families in the province also meant less movement out of the study area to meet certain family demands at home, (iii) These family ties guarantied growth, sustenance and continuity of their businesses from which proceeds are invested in the host communities or repatriated home. Moreover, it was the Igbo men that first came, and established businesses before getting married in the host communities or bringing their family members to the Province. One of the rationales for Igbo migration was the shortage of lands at homestead and the need to explore other obscure areas which hitherto were seen untapped. To this Ajaegbo wrote that “among the Igbo, Nnewi indigenes were some of the earliest groups to migrate to the urban centres in large numbers across the country in search of jobs and other economic opportunities. As traders, clerks, messengers, drivers, carpenters, motor transporters, miners, bakers, civil servants and technicians of all types, agents or distributors under expatriate commercial concerns, Igbo people acquired business experience and considerable capital outlay. As shrewd and enterprising businessmen and women, the people specialized in not only transport business operations but also in the sale of assorted articles.

12 R. M. Prothero, Migrant Labour from Sokoto Province, Northern Nigeria, Kaduna, 1958, p. 27. 13 B. Ige, People, Politics and Politicians of Nigeria (1940–1979), Nigeria, Heinemann Educational Books PLC, 1995, p. 94.

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They were successful produce buyers and retailers in the import–export business”.14 Igbo indigenes in the Old Sokoto Province were among the produce agents in Sokoto, Gusau, Talata Mafara, etc. An example was Benneth Chikwendu who was one of the prominent Igbo indigenes in Gusau who achieved success in transport business (Chikwendu Transport Company). On the other hand, Frederick Ikedife worked with United African Company, (UAC) in Talata Mafara in the 1940s and 1950s. Furthermore, Ugochukwu penned that “their adventurous and courageous spirit copied by others have given rise to the migration of Igbo people to various parts of the country and even beyond, tapping the resources they met, bringing home the wealth thus acquired and re-investing them at Nnewi”.15 Similarly, Igbo indigenes had a monopoly of the source which Bako confirmed by aptly arguing that “they also have the access to the major spare parts markets in the country: Onitsha, Nnewi, Aba, Port Harcourt and Lagos from where they bring spare parts of varying degree”.16 Another major reason for Igbo migration to the Old Sokoto province was hinged on the fact that the province witnessed, for decades, unprecedented peaceful atmosphere and provided a safe haven for strangers and guaranteed conductive environment for business activities to thrive. Bako succinctly maintained that “Igbo were not resisted by Sokoto indigenes because of the long historical tradition of the city as an emporium and home of diverse occupational and ethnic groups”. The city of Sokoto had for decades before the colonial conquest occupied a leading position, as one of the most significant cities, in not only Hausaland, but also the entire West African sub-region”.17 For this reason, Igbo found it convenient to conduct their business activities which was the greatest driving force of their migration. Furthermore, Igbo were not oblivious of the fact of the peaceful atmosphere enjoyed by their pioneer Igbo colleagues who first came to the province. They included Mamman Garba Dike who lived in the Old Sokoto province for more 14 D. I. Ajaegbo, “Nnewi of North-Western Igbo Land: A Study of an Igbo Society In Transition, 1905–1995”, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis (Department of History & International Studies), University Of Nigeria, Nsukka, 2010. pp. 179–180. 15 Ugochukwu, Op.cit., p. 280. 16 Bako, Op.cit., p. 62. 17 A. Bako, Igbo Entrepreneurship in Sokoto City, 1937–2000, Ilorin Journal of Business and Social, Vol. 8, Nos. 1 & 2, 2004, p. 45.

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than 60 years, Chief J.N. Ogbunugafo, the first Sarkin Igbo Sokoto (Eze Igbo I in Sokoto), Chief R.B. Ofoegbu, etc. The cordial relationship between these pioneer Igbo indigenes and the province served as one of the motivating factors of Igbo migration to the Old Sokoto Province.

The Development of an Igbo Community in the Old Sokoto Province Aside the shrewd nature of the Igbo as one of the rationales behind thriving business enterprises in the Old Sokoto Province, the accommodative posture of the host community was another contributing factor that facilitated the consolidation of the community in the province. Okwuidegbe noted that “it was the goodwill of Sultan Tambari (1924– 1930) and subsequent directives he gave to the various district heads to accommodate the Igbo, that facilitated the early settlement of the Igbo people in Sokoto. After all, within the Palace walls were Dike, an Igbo and a confidant of the Sultan”.18 As more Igbo arrived, the settlement grew; some of the Igbo engaged themselves in developing the surrounding of the settlements. For example, trees were planted to provide shade and these trees were nurtured to maturity. Some workers and dependants started paddling petty articles alongside their homes within the settlement.19 Igbo migrant workers in Sokoto first settled in areas which later became popular as diaspora communities such as Rijiyar Dorowa, Konni and Kalfu quarters.20 These areas were all outside the old Sokoto gates in conformity with Islamic practice of separate abodes for “believers” and “non-believers”.21 Rijiyar Dorowa in particular was sparsely populated and barely inhabited. There were “mud and thatched huts” around. It was Igbo settlers-workers and artisans that perhaps built “modern” houses roofed with zinc. These were mostly carpenters, masons and bricklayers….There were other non-Igbo emigrants in the “strangers quarters” too, especially “Yorubas, Idomas, Igala, etc.”.22 In Gusau, Kaura Namoda 18 Okwuidegbe, p. 41. 19 A memograph, p. 9. 20 Okwuidegbe, pp. vii–viii. 21 J. Boyd, p. 93. 22 Boyd., p. 38.

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and Birnin Kebbi, it was in Sabon Gari and Tudun Wada that Igbo stayed during the colonial era. Bola Ige noted that “the Igbos was found all over the North in the 1950s. They were doing very well. They intended to be domiciled in the North. But the ‘North’ of their thinking was the North of their own making. It was not the true North. It was the North of the Sabongaris, not the North of the ‘birni’-the walled cities; it was the North of our own cosmopolitan fantasy, not the North that Hausa-Fulani aristocracy maintained….”.23 Another common characteristic that made Igbo excel in trading in the Sokoto Province was the astuteness they exhibited in their business transaction and this accounted for their survival amidst the more favourable European traders. Basden while noting the characteristics of Igbo people described them as “being generous in their gifts, as well as being astute in business affairs”.24 Another factor that necessitated the survival of the Igbo in the Province was assistance rendered to the traders by their families. Their wives and children also played significant roles in the business activities of their husbands and fathers. Bola Ige again aptly observed that “….when the Igbos settled in a place, they settled; they would send for other members of their family and make the place a home”.25 Members of their families served as apprentices in their businesses as it was usually cumbersome to get apprentices from home. And some of the apprentices are known to be fraudulent and corrupt and it usually took a lot of fortune to settle the apprentices at the end of their stay with their masters. But with the traders’ wives and wards as business assistants, transparency, accountability and honesty are guaranteed. As traders, the community during the colonial era also served as intermediary between the province and the homestead. This was because they guaranteed the flow of crops between the North and South especially food crops. The proceeds of the business were used for day-to-day upkeep of the family as well as any miscellaneous considerations in the host community. Trading as one of the predominant pre-occupations of Igbo community served as an agent of interaction between the community and the province. This was because the province usually served as a receiving ground for the wares from the East and they normally met a certain compromise before transaction was carried out.

23 B. Ige, People, Politics and Politicians of Nigeria (1940–1979), Nigeria, Heinemann Educational Books PLC, 1995, p. 95. 24 G. T. Basden, Niger Igbos, London, Francass and Company Limited, 1966, p. xi. 25 Basden, p. 94.

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Economic Activities of Igbo Indigenes in the Old Sokoto Province to 1960 Igbo People as Agents of European Firms From British labourers and workers, Igbo switched over to produce agents for the European firms and trading. The expatriate firms during the colonial era bought all produce through the agents who each financed a number of buyers in the hamlets and villages.26 Tibenderana27 also reports “that the first European firms to establish branches at Sokoto in 1913 were Messrs Ambrosini and London and Kano Trading Company. Later in 1916, Tangalakis and Company and Messres A. Cavaris also started trading in hides and skins in Sokoto”. Yasin28 added that “more European trading firms subsequently opened their branches in some other parts of the province”. The Expatriate companies mainly dealt on cash crops such as hides and skins, cotton, groundnuts, gum, beewax, etc. Sifawa29 maintains that “in addition to groundnuts and cotton, Hides and skins, gum, beeswax and many other commodities were equally exported in large quantity from the province. United African Company, (UAC) and many other expatriate firms operating in different parts of the province made a lot of spoils in the export of produce and other commodities from the province”. The European firms, locations and dates of establishment in some parts of the defunct Sokoto Province included i. Messrs John Holts & Co. and London & Kano Trading Company, Jega, 1928, ii. Nigeria Company, Gwandu Emirate, 1930, iii. Messrs G. Gottschalk & Company and United African Company (UAC), Birnin Kebbi, 1930, iv. African Company John Holt, & Co., Tangalakis & Ollivants, Gusau, 1930, v. Patterson Zochonis (PZ), London & Kano Trading Company, Gusau, 1930, 26 NAK/SOKPROF/228/Gusau District/Economic Condition/Middlemen, p. 14. 27 See, I. U. Isa, Metropolitan Sokoto: Issues in History and Urban Development Since

1960, Kaduna, Gaskiya Corporation, 2013, p. 6. 28 Y. Abubakar, Op.cit., p. 73. 29 A. A. Sifawa.

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vi. Ambrosin and British American Tobacco Company, Gusau, 1930, (vii.) United African Company, (UAC), Yelwa, 1945, etc. European Companies that Established Bases in the Old Sokoto Province; 1913–1945 S/No

Name of European Company

Arrival year

Town

1

London and Kano Trading Company Abrosin A. Cavaris Tangalakis & Ollivant British Cotton Growers Association Niger Company John Hol &Company United African Company, (UAC) G. Gottshalk & Company

1913

Sokoto, Gusau and Jega

1913 1916 1916 1920

Sokoto and Gusau Sokoto Sokoto and Gusau Gusau Area

1921 1928 1930 1930

Patterson Zochonis African Company French Company British American Tobacco Company Nigeria Company United African Company

1930 1930 1930 1930

Sokoto/Sokoto Emirate Gusau and Jega Birnin Kebbi and Kalgo Birnin Kebbi and Gwandu Emirate Gusau/Sokoto Emirate Gusau/Sokoto Emirate Gusau Gusau

1930 1945

Jega/Gwandu Emirate Yelwa, Yauri Emirate

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

Source M.T.Usman, “Commerce and Industry in the Former Sokoto Province, C. 1930– 1990”, in M.T. Usman and M.A. Rufai (ed.), Social and Economic History of Northern Nigeria Since 1500AD, Markudi, Aboki Publishers, 2015, p. 51. See also, Y. Abubakar, “A History of Modern Currency in the Former Sokoto Province, 1903–2015”, p. 72.

Among the prominent Igbo indigenes who worked with the expatriate firms and their locations included, Nelson Samson Nwokoli Ilotchonwu (Gusau), Agu Okoye (Gusau) Geoffrey Mbaelu, (Gusau) Benneth O. Chikwendu (Gusau), Frederick Ikedife (Talata Mafara), Francis Anyaegbunam, (Sokoto), E.E. Hilary (Tarata Mafara), Emmanuel Okwuka, (Sokoto), V. Ekwugha (Gusau), Kirean Anigbo (Talata Mafara), M.N. Udo (Gusau), Joseph Nwagbo (Sokoto), Dennis Chukwudimma (Gusau), J.O. Egbuji (Kaura Namoda), G.O. Iwobi (Ilesha), Chukwumaeze Chukwudimma, Anselem Ufearo (Sokoto), W.O. Nwagbo,

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Reuben Egwuonwu (Gusau), etc.30 For example, Samson Nwokoli Ilotchonwu served as a storekeeper/clerk of the United African Company Limited (UAC) in Gusau from 1935 to 1945 before venturing into motor transportation.31 He was also a B.P Petrol dealer and a contractor. On his part, Federick Ikedife worked with G.B.O and P.Z. Companies in Talata Mafara.32 G.O. Iwobi was the manager of Nigerian Mining Syndicate, Gusau, Zamfara State. From produce agents of the expatriate companies, Igbo community switched to transport and trading. In the area of trading, they began with items such as cigarettes, sweets and canned foods and later came with European products like pomades, cotton, woolen goods, caravans and shoes. Gradually other people joined as traders bringing palm oil, smoke-dry fish, garri, and fruit from the homestead.33

Igbo in Transport Business in Sokoto Province In the area of transport enterprise in the Sokoto Province, the members of Igbo community brought with them their expertise in transportation enterprise as Onokala wrote that “prior the Nigerian civil war, Igboland had one of the most developed road networks in West Africa”.34 Ajaegbo also aptly postulated that “Nnewi people have a strong tradition of trading and transport business. Their unique enterprising and competitive spirit drove them far beyond their own fronties in search of economic opportunities”.35 Modern transportation in Nigeria seemed to have begun in

30 N. Orizu, Liberty or Chains-Africa Must Be: An Autobiography, Nnewi, Horizontal Publications, 1994, p. 355. 31 WHCB, File No. PLT/30, Acc No. 30. Ref. No. SKT/25/2/30, Sokoto Disturbances, 1966–1967, 30/5/77, p. 78. 32 WHCB-No So.515.11, Acc No. 156, Ref. No. SKT/2/21/156, 1966 Disturbances Intructions, dated 26 April 1977, p. 157. 33 A memograph on the Life Biography of Chief Eze Igbo John Ogbunugafor, Struggles and Achievement Towards the Betterment of Igbo Diaspora Community and Vis-à-vis Sokoto State, p. 9. 34 P. C. Onokala, “Trade and Transport”, in G. E. K. Ofomata (ed.), A Survey of the Igbo Nation, Onitsha, Africana First Publishers, 2002, p. 550. 35 D. I., Ajaegbo, “Nnewi of North-Western Igbo Land: A Study of an Igbo Society In Transition, 1905–1995”, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis (Department of History & International Studies), University Of Nigeria, Nsukka, 2010, p. 220.

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1950s due to failure in the railway mode of transportation.36 It is instructive to mention that transportation made the trade in cash crops such as hides and skins, groundnuts, cotton, gums, etc., easy. Femi on his part asserted that “the history of motor transport development in Gusau in particular and Nigeria in general is connected with the history of colonial economic policies which were tied to the production and development of cash crops. Modern transport system no doubt came into existence mainly to enhance the easy evacuation of primary products from the interior of Nigeria to the coast for onward shipment to Europe”.37 Yasin38 reports that “large scale production and export did not commence in Sokoto Province until after the introduction of modern means of transportation-roads and railway. The extension of railway to Kano in 1912 and then, to Gusau and Kaura Namoda as from 1929, made it possible for large volume of export crops and other raw materials to be transported from the Province to Kano and Zaria from where they were railed to Lagos for onwards export to Europe”. Igbo transport magnates combined it with other forms of trading. Among the members of Igbo Community in the province who were transport merchants are John Chikwendu39 and Patrick Ezika who came to Gusau, in 1950 and 1955 respectively as apprentices and served Chief B.O. Chikwendu. They along with several other apprentices of Igbo origin toured the various parts of the province and beyond. Some of their routes included Gusau to Kaura Namoda, Gusau to Sokoto, Gusau to Talata Mafara, etc. On the other hand, Bernard Ojukwu40 came to Zuru in 1952 and traded in tube and tyre business before venturing into transport business. S.N Ilotchonwu, Geoffrey Mbelu, A.M. Okoye, etc., were also engaged in transport business. It is safe to assert that aside produce agents for the expatriate companies, transport was another prominent business venture that dominated the economic activities of the Igbo community. One major characteristic of the colonial Igbo transport enterprise was its

36 Ajaegbo, p. 550. 37 A. F. Usman, p. 152. 38 Usman., pp. 74–75. 39 John Chikwendu, 82 years, retired driver, interviewed at No. 76 Asutech road,

Mbanagu, Otolo, Nnewi, Anambra state on 31 July 2014. 40 Bernard Ojukwu, 84 years, farmer, interviewed at his Compound, Ekwulu Otolo, Nnewi, Anambra state on first of August 2014.

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concentration in the Old Sokoto Province without taking into cognizance the movement of the migrants out of the province.41 The operators of this business relied wholly on the host community for their passengers and luggage. They also engaged the services of the members of the province who scouted (hustled) for passengers for them. Another characteristic of the transportation business operated by Igbo indigenes was the absence of luxurious buses that conveyed a larger percentage of passengers from one area to another.42 Though 1950s marked the introduction of lorries and trucks in the transportation business in Nigeria, these vehicles were in short supply and only a few Igbo entrepreneurs engaged in it due to its enormous capital outlay.43 The commonly used vehicles included Dutch vehicles, Bedford, Austin, Desoto, GMC general motors, Mercedes, etc.44 The effect was that only few passengers were conveyed. There was also the absence of a well-coordinated and organized transportation association spearheaded by the transportation union called National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW) and other allied bodies.

Political Activities of Igbo in the Old Sokoto Province, 1903–1960 Nigerian Experiment It was in 1922 that Colonel Hugh Clifford, the then Nigerian GovernorGeneral introduced elective principle in Colonial Nigeria. From then, at least to an extent, Nigerians were given opportunity to have a say in the government of their country. This scenario continued until in 1940s and 1950s when political parties that were regional-based emerged. Then colonial Nigeria was divided into three geo-political zones namely, Northern region, Western region and Eastern region. Northern region was predominantly Hausa/Fulani, Western region predominantly was Yoruba and the Eastern region was dominated by the Igbo. Thus 41 Chief B. O. Chikwendu, 89 years, interviewed at his residence at Mbanagu Nnewi, Anambra State on 23rd of December 2014. He lives in United States of America but stayed at his home town Nnewi during the winter period. 42 P. C. Onokala, p. 550. 43 Onakala, 550. 44 Babangida Ibrahim, 44 years, interviewed at Sokoto Central Garage, Sokoto, on 13 June 2016.

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there emerged three regionally based political parties namely, Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) dominated by the Hausa/Fulani, Action Group (AG) dominated by Yoruba and National Council for Nigeria and Cameroun later National Council for Nigerian Citizens, (NCNC) mainly for the Igbo. Sifawa45 argued that “before the end of the Second World War, events in the political landscape of northern Nigeria clearly signaled the emergence of Nationalist Movements that would struggle and won the political independence of the region….So, the British were quite aware that the days of colonial administration in Nigeria were numbered”. On his part, Hamman46 tersely maintains that “the nature of inter-group relations in the colonial period was affected by political developments that took place in the last decade of British rule (1950–1960). The significance of this development to the whole question of inter-ethnic relations could be viewed from different perspectives”.47

Igbo Political Participation in the Old Sokoto Province, 1903–1960 Igbo Community supported the NCNC in the Old Sokoto Province. This is because most of the members of the Community were part of Igbo Union in the province.48 Igbo Union was established in Gusau on the 18 June 1933 and it lasted until 1966 when all cultural and tribal associations in Nigeria were proscribed by the military administration of Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi.49 The NCNC was dominated by the Igbo under Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe. Okwudibe argues that “there existed 45 A. A. Sifawa, p. 198. 46 M. Hamman, “Inter-Ethnic and Inter-Conflicts”, in A. M. Yakubu et al. (ed.),

Northern Nigeria: A Century of Transformation, 1903–2003, Kaduna, Arewa House, Ahmadu Bello University Press, 2005, p. 460. 47 Hamman, p. 460. 48 WHCB, File No. PLT/25, Acc No. 30. Ref. No. IUG/GHM/95/62/The Ibo

Union Matters/20/10/1962, p. 8. 49 NAK/SOKPROF/6094/The Resident, Sokoto Province/Ibo Union Gusau/19/ 02/1944/, p. 14. See also, WHCH/Provincial Office/File No. PLT/25/The Ibo Union Matters Regarding, /p. 10. Ibo Union Gusua had two main objectives namely; (i) to foster spirit of co-operation among the members for the uplift of the Ibo race, educationally, morally and socially. (ii) to provide educational facilities for the people of Nigeria. They had four trustees (Patrons) namely; (i) A. M. Okoye-Lorry owner and independent trader, Gusau (ii) M. N. Udo- Trader and Produce Buyer, Gusau, (iii) J. O. Egbuyi-Clerk

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good relationship between the Igbo people and the Hausa/Fulani until the advent of partisan politics in the late forties. Deterioration in relations resulted from political differences between the Igbo people who supported the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) and the Hausa/Fulani who constituted the bulk of supporters of the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC). Majority of the Yoruba supported the Action Group, (AG). the political campaign of the late forties, fifties and early sixties were conducted along ethnic, regional and religious grounds”. The political organizations of those days made it possible for some politicians to capitalize on ethnic and regional differences to cause disaffection among the Igbo, Yoruba and the Hausa/Fulani peoples. This was to serve the interests of the politicians, but it had serious effects on the sensibilities of the people. With partisan politics, there was an intensification of hatred, disaffection, disloyalty and divisiveness. Inter-tribal tension and ethnicity was also on the ascendancy.50 Confirming Okwuidegbe’s assertion, Nwaugo succinctly affirmed that “the introduction of party politics in Nigeria (1950s) and the ethnicization of politics were the foundations of hatred and suspicion among the ethnic groups which later found expression in open conflicts with severe consequences on the nation. The conflicts which started in the 1950s became pronounced in the post independent Nigeria and have become major obstacles towards national integration and peaceful harmonious relationship among the component units that make up Nigeria”.51 In Okwudiba account, “ ….by 1953 the major political parties in the country, the NCNC, AG and NPC had become associated with the three major ethnic groups, Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa, and the three regions of the country, East, West and North respectively”.52

and Gold miner, Kaura Namoda (iv) G. O. Iwobi, Manager, Nigerian Mining Syndicate, Ilesha. 50 L. F. Okwuidegbe, pp. 48–49. 51 F. N. Nwaugo, “The Igbo Community In Kano C.1913–2004: A Study of Inter-

Group Relations”, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis (Department of History), Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, 2013, p. 47, cited A. Umar, “A Study of Kano Conflicts c.1979– 1999”, Unpublished B.A. Project (Department of History), Ahmadu Bello University, Kaduna, 2008, p. 3. 52 O. Nnoli, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, Nsukka; Fourth Dimension Publishers Limited, 1978, p. 158.

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On the whole, Igbo Community during the colonial era did not make a substantial political impact in the Province for four major reasons: i. The political activities in the country was revolved around the Nigerian political elites like Sir Ahmadu Bello (Sarduana of Sokoto) in the Northern region, Chief Obafemi Awolowo in the Western region and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe in the Eastern region.53 ii. The bout of political awareness and enlightenment was low during the colonial era. iii. Their stay in the province was cut short by the Nigerian crisis which led to their movement out of the province.54 iv. Their concentration on commercial activities as the only means of livelihood.55 In summarizing the stay of the Igbo in the North, Bola Ige argued that “although in the thirties and forties, the Igbos in the North were mostly Government employees and teachers, by the fifties they had become interested in business and had moved in. They became big businessmen with sizable transport and haulage companies and were good in the retail and distributive trades. All over the North, they were doing well, buying landed property and digging their heels in. From the very beginning they gave their support to the NCNC”.56

53 With the opening of political space in the colonial government, coupled with the emergence of three regional based political parties namely National Council of Nigerian Citizens, (NCNC), Northern Peoples’ Congress, (NPC) and Action Group, (AG), there emerged also three prominent political elites in Nigeria; Sir Ahmadu Bello in the Northern region, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe in the Eastern region and Chief Obafemi Awolowo in the Western region. See also, Y. Turaki, The British Colonial Legacy in Northern Nigeria: A Social Ethnical Analysis of the Colonial and Post- Colonial Society and Politics in Nigeria, Jos, Challenge Press, 1993, p. 144. 54 Turaki, pp. 45–46. 55 Okwuidegbe, p. 59. 56 B. Ige, People, Politics and Politicians of Nigeria (1940–1979), Nigeria, Heinemann Educational Books PLC, 1995, p. 95.

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Conclusion This study has attempted to examine the migration and the activities of the Igbo community in the Sokoto Province during the colonial era. Here, the first task of the migrant community was to start trading which would enable them to earn a living and feed their families. This they accomplished by bringing food items such as garri, palm oil, sweet, canned food, etc., to the province and vice-versa. The trading activities of the Igbo community went side by side with the European trade. The economic activities of the Igbo at this period appeared to have been concentrated in Gusau, Zamfara State. This according to Okwuidegbe was because “the termination of the railway at Kaura Namoda tended to favour Gusau rather than Sokoto as an important commercial centre”.57 Another way the Igbo community consolidated on their new abode was by settling in the areas considered by the province as “strangers quarters”. This stimulated idea and trading acumen among them with the aim of advancing their commercial activities. Moreover, Sokoto province also played a vital role in the consolidation of Igbo people by their noninterference in the day-to-day activities of the migrants. The political participation of the Igbo community in the province had an insignificant impact on the province because the political education in Nigeria at this period was at its incipient stage-prerogative of the Nigerian elites.

Bibliography A memograph on the Life Biography of Chief Eze Igbo John Ogbunugafor, Struggles and Achievement Towards the Betterment of Igbo Diaspora Community and Vis-à-vis Sokoto State. Abba, A., & et al., (ed.), Sultans of Sokoto: A Biographical History Since 1804, Kaduna, Arewa House, 2016. Abubakar, Y., “A History of Modern Currency in the Former Sokoto Province, 1903–2015”, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis (Department of History), Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto, 2016. Ajaegbo, D. I., “Nnewi of North-Western Igbo Land: A Study Of An Igbo Society In Transition, 1905–1995”, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis (Department of History & International Studies), University Of Nigeria, Nsukka, 2010. Babangida Ibrahim, 44 years, interviewed at Sokoto Central Garage, Sokoto, on 13 June, 2016. 57 Okwuidegbe, p. 17.

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Bako, A., Igbo Entrepreneurship in Sokoto City, 1937–2000, Ilorin Journal of Business and Social, Vol. 8, Nos. 1 & 2, 2004. Basden, G. T., Niger Igbos, London, Francass and Company Limited, 1966. Bernard Ojukwu, 84 years, farmer, interviewed at his Compound, Ekwulu Otolo, Nnewi, Anambra state, 01/08/2014. Boyd, J., and H.M. Maishanu, Sir Siddiq Abubakar III, Sarkin Musulmi, Ibadan, Spectrum Books, 1991. Chief B. O. Chikwendu, 89 years, interviewed at his residence at Mbanagu Nnewi, Anambra State on 23rd of December, 2014. Hamman, M., “Inter-Ethnic and Inter-Conflicts” in A.M. Yakubu et.al. (ed.) Northern Nigeria: A Century Of Transformation, 1903–2003, Kaduna, Arewa House, Ahmadu Bello University Press, 2005. Ige, B., People, Politics and Politicians of Nigeria, (1940-1979), Nigeria, Heinemann Educational Books PLC, 1995. Isa, U., Metropolitan Sokoto: Issues in History and Urban Development Since 1960, Kaduna, Gaskiya Corporation, 2013. John Chikwendu, 82 years, retired driver, interviewed at No. 76 Asutech road, Mbanagu, Otolo, Nnewi, Anambra state on 31 July 2014. Kware, A. A., “Poverty in Sokoto State: An Historical Study, 1976–2009”, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, (Department of History), Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto, 2012. NAK/SOKPROF/207/VOL.1/A Short History of Gusau: Its Origin and Development to date, Economic Activities in Gusau/. NAK/SOKPROF/222/Gusau District/Economic Condition/Trading Firms. NAK/SOKPROF/228/Gusau District/Economic Condition/Middlemen. NAK/SOKPROF/2672, Vol. VA; Assessment Report On the Gusau District of Sokoto Emirate. NAK/SOKPROF/6094/The Resident, Sokoto Province/Ibo Union Gusau/ 19/02/1944. Nnoli, O., Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, Nsukka; Fourth Dimension Publishers Limited, 1978. Nwaugo, F. N., “The Igbo Community In Kano C.,1913–2004: A Study of Inter-Group Relations”, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, (Department of History), Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, 2013, p. 47, cited A. Umar, “A Study of Kano Conflicts C.1979–1999”, Unpublished B.A. Project (Department of History), Ahmadu Bello University, Kaduna, 2008. Okoro, R. U., “Ikolo Magazine”, A Publication of Anambra State Indigenes Association (ASIA), Vol. 1, No. 1, No date. Okwuidegbe, L. F., “From Migrant Workers to Traders: A History of the Igbo Trading Diaspora in Sokoto C. 1920–1967”, Unpublished M.A. Dissertation (Department of History), Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto, 1986.

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Okwuidegbe, L. F., “The Igbo and Hausa/Fulani in Sokoto, 1903–1940: A Study in Inter-Ethnic Relations”, Agbor Journal of Arts and Social Science, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2004. Olaloku, F. A., The Structure of the Nigerian Economy, London, Macmillan Press Limited, 1979. Onokala, P. C., “Trade and Transport”, in G.E.K. Ofomata, (ed.), A Survey of the Igbo Nation, Onitsha, Africana First Publishers, 2002. Orizu, N., Liberty or Chains-Africa Must Be: An Autobiography, Nnewi, Horizontal Publications, 1994. Prothero, R. M., Migrant Labour from Sokoto Province, Northern Nigeria, Kaduna, 1958. Sifawa, A. A., “British Administration of Sokoto Province, 1939–1960: Continuity and Change”, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, (Department of History), Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto, 2015. Swindell, K., Sokoto State in Maps, London, 1982. Tibenderana, P. K., Sokoto Province Under British Rule, 1903–1939; A Study in Institutional Adaptation and Culturalization of a colonial society in Northern Nigeria, Zaria, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 1988. Turaki, Y.¸ The British Colonial Legacy in Northern Nigeria: A Social Ethnical Analysis of the Colonial and Post- Colonial Society and Politics in Nigeria, Jos, Challenge Press, 1993. Usman, A. F., “Inter-Group Relations in Gusau: A Case-study of Yoruba and Hausa, C. 1920–1996”, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis (Department of History), Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto, 2003. Usman, M. T., “Commerce and Industry in the Former Sokoto Province, C. 1930–1990”, in M.T. Usman and M.A. Rufai (ed.), Social and Economic History of Northen Nigeria Since 1500AD, Markudi, Aboki Publishers, 2015. WHCB, File No. PLT/25, Acc No. 30. Ref. No. IUG/GHM/95/62/The Ibo Union Matters/20/10/1962. WHCB, File No. PLT/30, Acc No. 30. Ref. No. SKT/25/2/30, Sokoto Disturbances, 1966–67, 30/5/77. WHCB-No So.515.11, Acc No. 156, Ref. No. SKT/2/21/156, 1966 Disturbances Intructions, dated 26 April 1977. WHCH/Provincial Office/File No. PLT/25/The Ibo Union Matters Regarding.

CHAPTER 7

Poverty in Africa and Attainment of the Millennium Development Goal Nnanwube Ebere Florence and Enwereji Prince C.

Introduction Global poverty which has been a major challenge to human development and economic growth has been found to be most extreme in developing (third world) continents like Asia and Africa and the World Bank group took it up as a major challenge to see that by 2015, extreme poverty is reduced or completely eradicated around the world. According to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), one which is targeted at reducing to half, extreme global poverty in line with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), it was proposed that there will be—No Poverty, which is also targeted at ending poverty in all its forms everywhere. Recent trends indicate that there has been some high level of

N. E. Florence (B) Department of Sociology, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] E. P. C. Department of Financial Accounting, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. J. Ani (ed.), Political Economy of Colonial Relations and Crisis of Contemporary African Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0245-3_7

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progress globally since the invention of these goals. Between 2012 and 2016, the prevalence of undernourishment in Sub-Saharan Africa reduced to 23.2 per cent. There are various scholarly thoughts that conceptualize the emergence and perpetuation of poverty in the society; in as much as no single school of thought has explained the emergence and incidence of poverty without shortcomings, their insightful attempts have been eye-opening still. Arguing from why the society is unequally structured, the functionalist model has posited that social inequality is necessary and functional for the progress of the society. Based on evolutionism, Spencer and Sumner posited that the fittest individuals survive while the unfit die off due to their innate inabilities to adapt. By virtue of this idea, functionalists like Davies and Moore (1945) in particular, specifically argued that poverty serves an important social, economic and political functions for the society in general and for the middle and wealthy class in particular. They believe that the exceptionally intelligent and hard-working individuals by virtue of educational attainment get inevitably placed in high-ranking positions, having distinguished themselves by showing the capacity to handle rigorous, skillful occupations while those who have not worked hard enough to earn any special skill fill in the lower jobs with less skill. Consequent upon this explanation lies the assumption that individuals have the personal responsibility of placing themselves where they want to be since society has already structured the means through which every category of individuals would earn a means for survival. But on the contrary, the Marxian school of thought vehemently upholds that it is through deliberate social construction that people become either rich or poor based on whether they own the means of production or work for those who own it. Since the prevailing ideologies in the society represent those of the capitalist elites, the ordinary individuals who neither own wealth nor power can only remain exploited and impoverished, earning below their worth irrespective of their input. In addition to this, Marx Weber also added three additional variables which place people in distinguished positions in the society and they include: wealth, power and prestige. Individuals who occupy prestigious positions for instance medical doctors, are naturally made to earn higher than those in occupations that are less prestigious. Thus, they consequently amass more wealth than mere teachers (in Nigeria) or roadside police officers. And those who have been able to successfully get themselves into powerful positions automatically decide who earns what because they can

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readily exercise their wills over others who may not even be willing to obey. These socially constructed structures specify that every member of the society cannot be equal—some will earn higher because their roles are considered more important while some will earn very little because their roles are considered too simple and common. This structured inequality marks the history of poverty in the society today and how this structure has become so entrenched into social values across all societies of the world irrespective of the Marxian resistance. Hence, bearing upon this premise, this paper shall highlight some of the factors encouraging poverty to thrive in Africa as a continent and Nigeria as a country and also dutifully proffer means through which poverty might be curbed in Nigeria and Africa.

Conceptual Analysis For a clearer understanding of this paper, the concepts: poverty, social inequality and social exclusion shall be explained thoroughly based on their meaning in this paper. Poverty: The concept of poverty has enjoyed massive attention from numerous scholars, some view it from a single approach; for instance— The Economist defines poverty in relation to a specific level of income which is globally measured in US dollars ($1 or $2 US dollars) (Etanibi et al. 2015). This approach focuses on reducing inequality and promoting equality so that individuals should be able to choose from a list of available preferences and in the end be able to derive utility from whatever choices they have made—this is what is considered to be well-being. Another school of thought known as the basic needs or the pragmatic or humanitarian approach which is a direct alternative to the welfarist proponents focuses on tackling poverty-inducing issues straight on; (for example, removing malnutrition in children, eradicating diseases or educating the girl children) rather than seeking to abolish inequality or embracing egalitarianism (welfarist approach) which they consider to be too complex, ambiguous and abstract unlike meeting concrete needs of deprived groups in the society (Streenton et al. 1981). Laderchi et al. (2003) include that monetary resources are not sufficient to prevent the casual chain of poverty but indeed other resources are also required. But a holistic approach to poverty will incorporate these three dimensions

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or even more in order to capture its multiple effects. Social exclusion associates poverty with citizens’ lack of access to resources and participation. These two key concepts—social inequality and social exclusion jointly interfere in social relationships to ensure that poverty is perpetuated and in worse cases, a vicious cycle of poverty is created which ensures that the rich keeps maximizing their privileges and consequently getting richer while the conditions of the poor and deprived keep deteriorating until no individual in their lineage ever gets an opportunity to get liberated out of poverty. The scope of this study shall be narrowed down to how social structures and cultural factors contribute to poverty; the individual dimension (causes) of poverty will be deliberately excluded from this study because the researcher believes that personality traits contribute very little to widespread poverty—the kind obtainable in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, Near East and North Africa. Secondly, theories which attributed poverty to individual factors failed to produce empirical evidence (Rankin and Quane 2000).

Theoretical Issues The incidence of poverty in Nigeria shall be examined in this study using a structural approach. Structural theories of poverty emphasize that the larger society creates conditions which inevitably allow the incidence of poverty to thrive in such a way that the individuals cannot overcome because of its overwhelming effects on them. Thus, structured factors within the society such as class, gender, ethnicity, occupation, educational qualification and so on, determine who owns, controls societal resources and consequently shapes the way in which resources are distributed. Writers in the structural leaning argue that the lack of ambitions among the poor which is often taken for a “dependency culture” is in fact a consequence of their constrained conditions (Giddens 2008, p. 353). They further suggested that policy measures geared towards distributing income and resources more equitably throughout society will help to curb poverty. In this view, this approach shall be narrowed down to the model as given by William Julius, an American Sociologist. Theoretical Value: The essence of choosing this model to be used in explaining the incidence of poverty in Nigeria is because it captures succinctly the current Nigerian social structure which demarcates the rich

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from the poor, the powerful from the weak and the rulers from the ruled. And when these two opposing worlds exist apart, inequality develops thereby affording the advantaged class a higher privilege which guarantees them the opportunity to make more wealth and comfortably afford the good things of life whereas the poor and the weak who have no say in decision-making, who cannot find jobs in the midst of job scarcity are forced to remain more poor because they also lack the capital with which to venture into entrepreneurship. But however, just as this theory suggests, this paper shall proffer solutions and measures through which poverty can be reduced in Nigeria. Another important factor which was considered is the fact that modernization and industrialization have made it compulsory that people must move away from their villages and low-brow areas before they can get quality jobs and those who do not make this move definitely gets hooked by poverty.

Poverty in Africa and Nigeria in Particular Despite the progress Africa has made in the last ten years in terms of both economic growth and poverty reduction, the continent still faces major challenges daily due to the global decline in commodity prices and regionspecific risks. Africa’s economic growth slowed to 3.0 per cent in 2015, from 4.5 per cent in 2014 and per capita income growth also dropped due to rapid population growth (World Bank Annual Report). The consequence of this drop in per capita income growth rate still remains the prevalence of poverty across all African nations mainly in the rural areas. Hence, as at 2012, the population of Africans living on $1.90 a day or less is estimated at 42.7 per cent despite all efforts by both the internal leadership and agencies of the World Bank to combat poverty in the continent (World Bank Annual Report 2016). The politics of impoverishment, corruption and bad governance in Africa in general and Nigeria in particular has increased the number of people living within the range of poverty in the country (Ani and Osisioma 2014). Consequent upon this hard reality, millions of Nigerians and indeed Africans have been struggling for survival due to inaccessibility to good or no sufficient food at all, good housing facility, good or no education, modern healthcare facilities, which have consequently resulted in high mortality rate including infant and maternal mortality, outspread of diseases, high level of poverty in the rural areas, consistent rural–urban

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migration and constant dependency on the average urban and few rich dwellers who in recent cases have suffered unemployment due to massive retrenchment of staff from both indigenous and multinational companies in the country, vicious cycle of poverty and a continuous dependency on external aids. A huge percentage of Nigerian youths, graduates inclusive cannot boast of self-reliance and independence because there are no readily available jobs to absorb the teeming youthful population. The prevalence of poverty in Nigeria occurs in different aspects of society in relatively varying degrees and these dimensions include rural–urban, regional, state and gender dimensions. The incidence of poverty cuts across both the rural and urban areas in Nigeria. But however, facts and figures observable prove that poverty is more rampant in the rural compared to urban areas. The reasons for this disparity include the maximum level of exclusion of rural areas in infrastructural projects and development programmes and a high concentration of infrastructural facilities in the urban centres; low-income generating facilities as most rural dwellers survive on subsistence farming (most rural dwellers farm on a low scale with human energy only); illiteracy rate is more vastly spread across Nigeria’s rural areas; in many cases, most rural areas are located in the interiors and farremoved from city centres where goodly commodities are readily available for purchase. And also, due to low income and bad road networks most rural dwellers survive only on the meager stuffs they can find within their localities.

Causes of Poverty in Contemporary Nigerian Context Going by current events around Nigeria, the researchers have been able to keenly observe some peculiar factors that can be blamed for the prevalence of poverty. They are identified as follows: Boko-Haram terrorism, insurgency/militancy, Fulani herdsmen space encroachment and violent attacks, inflation/devaluation of the naira, poor academic orientation, poor rural development policies, corruption, gender inequality and social exclusion. Myriad of other factors may also apply. Boko-Haram Terrorism: Sadly, the terror killings, destruction of both residential and infrastructural government properties such as schools, hospitals and displacement of Nigeria citizens by the Islamic Jihadist group famously known as Boko-Haram has contributed immensely to

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the high rate of poverty in north-eastern Nigeria including Borno, Yobe, Kogi, Maiduguri, Kano, states, etc. The terrorism in these northern states and many more have resulted in low life expectancy rate in the terrorprone areas having inevitably recorded a high rate of mortality, including infant and maternal mortality, very low or no access to health care facilities, extreme hunger and malnutrition which often results in starvation and death, displacement of citizens from their homes thereby resulting in poor housing facilities in the camps for internally displaced people (Ani and Uwizeyimana 2021; Ani and Ojakorotu 2017). Records have it that a lot of women and young girls who are naturally defenceless are being raped and married off forcibly in these camps so that they can assess foods to be able to survive. Insurgency/Militancy: Destruction of oil pipelines, kidnapping, etc., by the Niger Delta militants has led to some degree of poverty in the Niger Delta areas and arguably, the entire Nigeria, because when companies’ properties are destroyed and vandalized, retrenchment of workers become inevitable due to the huge capital involved in fixing up the damaged properties, the National Bureau of Statistics (2012) also attributed part of the causes of poverty in the south-south to political instability and competition for economic resources. Also, kidnapping which largely developed in the Niger Delta has ultimately spread across other states in Nigeria thereby endangering the lives and life earnings of defenseless citizens (Ani and Nweke 2014). Fulani Herdsmen Space Encroachment and Violent Attacks: The current problematic issue in Nigeria today is Fulani herdsmen attacks in many rural communities across all the geo-political zones in Nigeria, including the eastern states. Fulani herdsmen invade farmlands of rural dwellers with their herds of cattle to graze on planted food plants which serve as staple foods to the people, and if they encounter resistance by the villagers, they launch fatal attacks on the villages and flee to safety, and return on a later date to continue with their unrestricted grazing (Ani and Uwizeyimana 2022). This evil menace kicked off in full force following the ascendancy of Muhammadu Buhari to the presidential position and unfortunately and sadly as most situations in Nigeria have been, state governments and even the federal government have done nothing to help protect the lives of these defenseless rural dwellers. The low life expectancy, hunger and insecurity of lives and properties which this menace has caused Nigerians in recent times account for the perpetuation of poverty in the country. Some states which have been experiencing these

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attacks include but not limited to Benue, Enugu, Nassarawa, Taraba, Delta states, etc. Inflation/High Foreign Exchange Value: Under the present administration, the cost of a dollar to one naira has drastically increased and depreciated the value of the naira to the barest minimum when compared with foreign currencies; such that with plenty naira notes, one can only purchase a few basic commodities from the market. The cost of living has gone too high even though the standard of living of most Nigerians still remains very low. Staple foods such as garri, beans, rice, cassava, red oil, tomatoes and also oil products like kerosene have skyrocketed beyond the grasp of an average Nigerian and consequently make bare and more glaring their low earning capacity of many households and individuals. This appalling situation of the economy has affected low-income earners the most, such that households who were managing to survive when the cost of living was a bit affordable can barely survive now because their meager income can barely afford anything. Poor Academic Orientation: The educational system in Nigeria lays emphasis mostly on paid job employment. Higher education students are usually not socialized into thinking in the direction of job creation but rather job hunting. This culture which has lasted since the independence of Nigeria has contributed hugely to youth unemployment. Because rather than planning towards self-employment after higher education, majority of Nigerian youths work and plan towards job-hunting in the midst of little or no opportunities. It is true that the Nigerian government has not provided adequate enabling environment for the younger generation to thrive easily, but at the same time, it is need that leads to innovation and creativity, and this has been lacking among Nigerian youths because of poor academic and family orientations. Poor Rural Development Policies: As has been highlighted earlier in the dimensions of poverty, rural areas are less developed and consequently poorer compared to their urban counterparts in Nigeria. This trend is evidently caused by poor development planning and policies which emphasize on developing some areas of interest which eventually becomes the urban centres. And consequently, health, business and academic opportunities are lacking in the rural areas because of their low population and little to no infrastructures scare business developers and investors away to areas of bigger opportunities. And as a result, these rural dwellers depend hugely on subsistence farming for survival, some villages

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across the six geo-political zones in Nigeria do not have hospitals and roads, and even academic infrastructures. Corruption: Corruption is a widespread issue in Nigeria, but its prevalence among the leaders and policymakers in the country has dealt a big blow on the development prospects of the country and consequently contributed to the myriad of social problems which has inevitably led the majority of Nigerians into poverty (Ani 2014). Gender Inequality and Social Exclusion: The patriarchal system which thrives on the inclusion of men in property inheritance and the exclusion of women in almost all the cultures across Nigeria; gender roles and socialization processes which nurtures the female children for marriage and child-bearing rather than for economic exploration and adventure accounts for the main reason why most women are poor compared with their male counterpart. In most cases, even when the female works, the money she earns does not belong to her, but it belongs to her husband as many people expect. Child marriage which is also a prevalent practice in northern Nigerian states more often than not leaves the girl child disillusioned as to how to add quality to her life besides being married off young to a much older man. In extreme cases (which often occurs), the incidence of vesicovaginal fistula occurs in the reproductive history of the child-mother who in most cases cannot access proper healthcare facilities due to either lack of funding, information or unavailability of health facilities. In some cases, such young mothers are quarantined and abandoned in secluded rooms due to their poor health conditions which eventually hinder them from working and associating in their immediate environment. Islamic doctrines, coupled with in widespread illiteracy in northern Nigeria which are more prevalent among female children have been noted to be the major factors contributing to child marriage which to a large extent constitutes to a vicious cycle of poverty among females and their offspring.

Pragmatic Ways Through Which Poverty Can Be Reduced in Nigeria Having made effort to bring to notice some vital factors which are directly responsible for the increasing perpetuation of poverty in Nigeria in particular and Africa in general, this section will also map out some ways through which the menacing effects of poverty can be minimized.

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The means are listed and briefly explained as follows: A Genuine Fight Against Corruption in Governance: Some administrations in the past have made some pragmatic moves towards fighting corruption, but from the realities on the ground one may not be wrong to assert that those moves against corruption are usually and majorly targeted at the opposition party members, while a blind eye is advertently turned against the corrupt practices of party members (usually the ruling party). Therefore, on this note, the researcher implores for a genuine fight against corruption so that derailing leaders can be appropriately sanctioned notwithstanding their political affiliation, that way the others can become responsible. A Boost in Security Provision: It is a fact that terrorism and other acts of violence and militancy are major global challenges at the moment, even in America and Britain; and so Nigeria just like the rest of the world is not immune to terror attacks, but realities on ground also show that some violent activities in the country are self-caused and therefore highly preventable. An instance is the Fulani herdsmen menace which is becoming a major question of corruption in Nigeria militancy in the Niger Delta which is majorly caused by acts of negligence and exploitation and the Boko Haram terrorism which is caused by religious extremism and fundamentalism, although this specific one may not be directly self-caused because of the pervasive and influential nature of religious doctrines but the other two can be easily curbed if the federal government openly condemns it and takes pragmatic measures towards protecting the lives and properties of defenseless Nigeria citizens. A Massive/Profound Campaign Against Child Marriages: The evil of child marriage has continued to increase in strength because the government still treats it as a religious and cultural issue rather than a public/government or modern-day challenge basically because of its prevalence in just one region of the country—the north. But, if the government outlaws’ child marriage and effects strict punitive measures against it in local governments across northern region then citizens would start viewing this as a public matter and no longer a private affair anymore. This move will in no small measure spearhead a new consciousness that is geared towards the female self-actualization in people. The Entrenchment of Property Rights for Women: One factor which has been identified as a major cause of income inequality between men and women is the exclusion of women from accessing land and property inheritance in almost all cultures across Nigeria. The actualization

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of a reversal of this age-long entrenched tradition might easily be qualified as dead on arrival because the perpetuators of these practices are mostly illiterate men who are resident in the rural areas—the custodians of cultures and tradition. But despite this challenge, the researcher believes that a mass re-orientation of these village elders might salvage the situation. Also, ministries and legislators should chart a cause towards granting more women access to land as well as other real properties so as to help boost their incomes. An Intensification of Girl-Child Education and Women Empowerment: Hardly can there be found an educated female who cannot assert herself and exercise her rights to lead a financially viable life. Little wonder level of educational attainment is associated with poverty. Therefore, there is a call for the government to support concerned non-governmental organizations to boost girl-child education most especially in the lowincome areas like the rural areas across the six geo-political zones with an intensification in northern Nigeria. This will also increase the age of first child birth in girls and women. A Re-Focus on the Essence of Education: The researchers hope that the rate of youth unemployment in Nigeria will be highly minimized if significant others such as teachers, lecturers, family members and the general public will stop over-emphasizing job-seeking as an end in itself and the ultimate goal of university education for the youths. The effect of this perceived wrong focus has been a mass population of unemployed Nigerian youths with potentials for innovation and creativity lying fallow due to an entrenched emphasis on paid jobs. This issue can equally account for the exploitation of Nigerian graduates by capitalist employees who pay them salaries/wages not commensurate with their inputs due to the large readily available jobless candidates waiting to replace those who get sacked. On this note, I therefore suggest that the general public should challenge Nigerian youths to become job creators rather than job seekers. The Need for an Enabling Environment: There is also a call on the government to create an enabling environment for the hardworking youths to explore their potentials and thrive. This includes encouraging them with funding, reviving the dead industries across the country where these youths can polish their skills and rewarding innovative youths especially the indigent ones with sponsorship. Good Governance: There is also the need for the government to channel public funds into public use by providing infrastructures in both

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the rural and urban areas. If the leaders can do away with fund embezzlement, then this goal can be easily actualized. The government should therefore provide rural communities with good roads, educational facilities, health facilities as well as improved, mechanized farming system (in addition to technical education regarding their uses) that will enable the people to have easy access to basic amenities and therefore lead a healthier life. Majority of the former poverty reduction policies failed due to lack of informed monitoring and evaluation. There is therefore the need to intensify effective monitoring and evaluation policies in this dispensation so that the essence of the initiatives can be actualized. Some policies also reportedly failed because they lacked targets and focus. Thus, the researcher is proposing that specific targets be included into each local poverty reduction goals for easier monitoring and identification. This way, the temptation of doing many things with minimal achievement can be minimized. A reduction in the cost of participation in governance: By way of promoting social inclusion and reducing social exclusion, the government should reduce the cost of participating in politics so that the average income earners who are visionary leaders with foresights will not be cut off from participating in politics. Also, as a rule, the legislators should enact strict rules against extravagant political campaigns and godfatherism so that modest, younger citizens can freely afford to participate in politics. Newly emerged governments should always endeavour to maintain the viable anti-poverty measures of previous administrations so that citizens who are already key beneficiaries and hence on the road to self-actualization can consistently access funds or the provided measures of improving their livelihood. The government should ensure to work with current, credible and reliable demographic data for effective implementation of poverty reduction and inclusive development programs (Umar et al. 2016). Legal rules which impede Nigerian citizens from accessing their legal rights should be checked and reformed. An instance is the land use act of 1978, the TETFUND Act of 2011, independent candidacy as well as some cultural practices so that citizens can easily use their lands as collateral for obtaining loans from banks. This will salvage the needy from lack and equally meet their needs as at when due (Umar et al. 2016). The local governments should be allowed by both states and federal governments to exercise their full autonomy when marking out povertyreduction strategies rather than making them to follow the top-down

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approach. This pattern will enable coordination; therefore, the bottom-up approach should be allowed and adopted. Government should as a matter of responsibility strive to stabilize and maintain price and the exchange rate in order to create a healthy balance of payment. There is a need for creation of consistency in monetary and fiscal policies which would be aimed at persistent reduction of the real sector on imported inputs. The government should as a rule, endeavour to include the target beneficiaries of poverty alleviation programs into their planning and implementation so as to be able to address and meet the people’s needs directly and effectively.

Conclusion and Recommendations This study has documented the factors that sustained poverty in Nigeria. Efforts channelled towards poverty reduction in poorer countries around the world have yielded significant positive results except for Africa, including Nigeria where the least impact has been recorded towards halving poverty by 2015 as the Millennium Development Goals set out to achieve. Data was collected for this study through secondary sources because the study merely required an in-depth review of some existing literature and the findings showed that structural factors as against individual weaknesses are largely responsible for the widespread poverty in Africa in general and Nigeria in particular. Also, poverty occurs in four different dimensions and they include—gender, states, regions and rural– urban divide. The features of poverty in Nigeria include hunger and malnutrition among households, especially female-headed households, low life expectancy, social exclusion, denial of human rights, disease outbreak, infant/maternal mortality to mention just a few. This study therefore recommends among other things a focus-driven, goal-oriented and well-targeted prop-poor policies which should be monitored and evaluated duly so as order to ensure effective goal implementations. Considering the theory that was adopted for this study as well as the literature reviewed so far, socio-structural factors have been discovered to be the major drivers and perpetuators of poverty across Africa in general and Nigeria in particular. They include political factors, cultural factors, religious factors and economic variables. Also, embedded in these structural forces lie some specific factors which are directly linked with poverty and they include: social exclusion, corruption, inequality in income and gender and also terrorism and violence. It has also been discovered that

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poverty is not evenly distributed across Nigeria. Some regions are poorer than others (northern region); some states are also poorer than the others (the 11 northern states are poorest while Oyo state has the least cases of poverty); the females are poorer compared to the males and finally, poverty is more widespread in rural areas than the urban. The resultant effects of poverty in Nigeria have manifested in hunger and malnutrition, low life expectancy and high mortality rate, widespread diseases, poor health facilities and a general low standard of living in the face of high cost of living. In a bid to reducing the widespread poverty in Nigeria, the following recommendations are given in addition to the solutions highlighted earlier: The government should strengthen the existing poverty alleviation strategies for effective performance. There is a need to institute propoor policies. That is policies that lay direct emphasis on emancipation of the less privileged from poverty. Government and concerned organizations should never relent in providing basic socio-economic infrastructure such as education, healthcare facilities, good road networks, employment opportunities, etc. The government should encourage and support the local small manufacturing industries by projecting and promoting them through the media and also through financial assistance. Government and concerned organizations should upgrade social welfare services, especially for the aged and the disabled due to their higher vulnerability to poverty.

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Issues.” Overseas Development Institute iii Westminster Bridge Road London SEI71D. Hickey, S., and Du Toit, A. 2007. “Adverse Incorporation, Social Exclusion and Chronic Poverty.” CPRC Working Paper No 81. http://www.chronicpoverty. org/resources/CP81.htm Inter-Regional Inequality Facility. 2006. “Overview,” February. http://www. odi.org.uk/interregional_inequality/papers/interregionalinequalityFacility_O verview_ODIsecretariat.pdf Jordan, B. 1996. A Theory of Poverty and Social Exclusion. Cambridge. MA: Polity Press. Kabeers, N. 1994. “Beyond the Poverty Lines: Measuring Poverty and Impoverishing Measures” in Reversed Realities, Gender Hierachies in Development Thought”. London: 162. Laderchi, C. Saith, R., and Stewart, F. 2003. “Does It Matter That We Do Not Agree On The Definition of Poverty: A Comparison of Four Approaches.” Oxford Development Studies. 31(3):233–274. Majid, S., Rahim, D. E., and Hassan, K. H. 2012. “Theories of Poverty: A Comparative Analysis.” Kuwait Chapter of Arabian. Journal of Business and Management Reviews. 1(6). Mamdani. 1996. In Hickey, S., and Du Toit, A. 2007. “Adverse Incorporation, Social Exclusion and Chronic Poverty.” CPRC Working Paper No 81. http:/ /www.chronicpoverty.org/resources/CP81.htm Narayan, D. 2000. “Poverty is Powerlessness and Voicelessness.” IMF Finance andDevelopment. 37(4):18–21. National Bureau of Statistics. 2012. The Nigerian Poverty profile 2010 Report. Retrieved from https://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/pdfuploads/Nigeria%20P overty%20Profile%202010.pdf National Bureau of Statistics. 2016. Unemployment/Underemployment Report Q3 and Q4 2016. Abuja. National Bureau for Statistics and World Bank. 2007. Nigeria Poverty Assessment 2007 . Abuja: NBS. OECD. 2006. “Promoting Pro-poor Growth: Key Policy Messages.” Paris, OECD. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/61/37852580.pdf Okoye, C., and Shimeles, A. 2006. Inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Synthesis of Recent Research on the Levels, Trends, Effects and Determinants of Inequality in its Different Dimensions. London: The Inter-Regional Inequality Facility. Rankin, B. H., and Quane, J. M. 2000. “Neighborhood Poverty and the Social Isolation of Inner-City African American Families.” Oxford Academic Social Forces. 79(1):139–164. Sen, A. 1985. Commodity Capabilities. NewDelhi , India: Oxford University Press. Sen, A. 1999. Development As Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Shildrick, T., and Rucell, J. 2015. “Sociological Perspectives on Poverty.” Joseph Rowntree Foundation Report. www.JRF.ORG.UK Silver, H. 1994. “Social Exclusion and Social Solidarity: Three Paradigms”. International Labour Review. 333(5/6):531–579. Silver and Miller. 2002. In Majid, S., Rahim, D. E., and Hassan, K. H. 2012. “Theories of Poverty: A Comparative Analysis.” Kuwait Chapter of Arabian. Journal of Business and Management Reviews. 1(6). Stewart, 2004 and World Bank, 2005: 40–43 in Inter-Regional Inequality Facility. 2006. Streenten, P. et al. 1981. First Things First: Meeting Basic Human Needs in Developing Countries. Oxford: University Press. Taiwo, J. N., and Agwu, M. E. 2016. “Problems and Prospects of Poverty Alleviation Programmes in Nigeria.” International Journal of Business and Management Review. 4(6):18–30. Transparency International. 2005–2013. Corruption Perception Index. Umar, I. M., Nwagwu, C., Obiri, L., Ogunyamo, I., and Nwakuche, S. 2016. Strengthening Institutional Mechanisms for Poverty Reduction and Inclusive Development in Nigeria. Senior Executive Course 38. Kuru: National Institute. United Nations. 1966a. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. United Nations. 1966b. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. United Nations (UN). 2001. Substantive Issues Arising in the Complementation of the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Poverty and the International Covenant in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. New York: UN. United Nations Development Programme. 1998. Human Development Report Oxford University New York. United Nations Development Programme. 2005–2014. Human Development Index. United Nations General Assembly. 1986. Declaration on the Rights to Development: Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 41/128 of 4 December 1986. New York. United Nations Development Program. 2006. “Human Development Report, 2006-Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis.” UNDP, New York. http://hdr.undp.org/ Wilson, W. J. 1996. When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor. New York: Knopf. World Bank. 2016. Annual report 2016. Retrieved from http://pubdocs.worldb ank.org/en/596391540568499043/worldbankannualreport2016.pdf

CHAPTER 8

Nigeria Relations with Her Neighbours in Geopolitical Environment: The Concentric Circle Approach Kelechi Johnmary Ani

and Chukwuemeka Oko Otu

Introduction The foreign policy of any nation sets out the rules that guide its diplomatic, economic and security relations with other countries of the word. Foreign policy determines the nature and structure of interstate relations viz a viz the national interests of the countries involved. At independence, Nigeria’s foreign policy was based on a policy of Afro-centrism that is Africa as the centrepiece of Nigeria’s foreign policy. In this sense, the promotion of African interest was paramount in the formulation

K. J. Ani (B) Department of History & Strategic Studies, Alex Ekwueme Federal University, Ndufu-Alike Ikwo, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] C. O. Otu Department of Modern War Studies, University of Buckingham, Buckingham, UK © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. J. Ani (ed.), Political Economy of Colonial Relations and Crisis of Contemporary African Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0245-3_8

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of Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives. During the early days of Nigeria, she demonstrated efforts aimed at liberating Africa from the shackles of colonialism in many African states as well as ending apartheid in South Africa. It was through the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), now African Union (AU) that Nigeria’s policy of Afro-centrism became so manifest that her contribution earned her the title Giant of Africa. However, the widening of the international system and its globalizing effects on states in the twentieth century created new boundaries within the African continent leading to the formation of sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS, SADC, etc. The rises of these regional organizations were directly due to the close nature of their boundaries that draws them on a concentric path rather than large-scale Afro-centrism. The dynamism of pursuing Nigerian’s Afrocentric posture has continued to change. This chapter is an analysis of Nigerian foreign policy towards her neighbours using the concentric circle analysis of foreign policy.

Nigeria Foreign Policy: Focus on Afro-Centrism A state’s foreign policy consists of self-interest strategies dictated by state’s national interests within the international political and economic landscape. National interests are achieved through an interplay between internal and external forces and influenced by foreign policy decisionmakers. Until 1960, the formulation and implementation of Nigerian foreign policy was exclusively preserved for the British colonial government. Given this scenario, the British determined solely Nigeria’s diplomatic relations within the West African sub-region, Africa and the world at large. Nigeria’s national interest was therefore an extension of the British interest. Ogo and Emakpo (2005) maintain that under colonial rule, Britain’s foreign policy dictates the relationship strategies of Nigeria globally. Put differently, the British government determined the kind of relationship Nigeria entered into. Under colonial rule, there was a sharp contrast between the policies of the British or Anglophone colonial countries and the Saxophone or French colonial countries in the sub-region which impacted on the relationship between these neighbouring countries. This is because the British and French perceived each other as rivals in the international political economy of colonialism and state relations. Consequently, at independence, they ensured that all their former colonies

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continued to follow the path of their foreign interest dynamics. That explains the delay in comprehensive relations between Nigeria and Chad irrespective of the deep-rooted cultural and pre-colonial contacts among the two states (Ani 2012). However, with the attainment of independence, what can be described as indigenous “Nigerian’s foreign policy” came into force. In this foreign policy, Nigeria’s attitude was one of commitment to the cause of Africa. This was manifest in the making of Africa the centrepiece of Nigerian foreign policy. By that time, there was no regional or intergovernmental organization within the West African sub-region which meant that there was no priority in the formulation of Nigeria’s foreign policy with other African countries or her immediate neighbours. Africa therefore became the centrepiece of Nigeria’s foreign policy. The policy of Afro-centrism as conceptualized by the Adedeji Commission was premised on the understanding that Nigeria’s engagement in the international system will be looked at through the binoculars of Africa. Similarly, on the significance of establishing an Afrocentric policy, Jaja Nwachukwu notes that since charity begins at home, any Nigerian foreign policy which does not take into consideration, the peculiar position of Africa and Africans remains unrealistic. In this regard Nigeria under Muritala Muhammad fought assiduously for the liberation of Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa among others from the shackles of colonial rule and apartheid. The government also rendered financial assistance as well as moral support to various liberation movements in Africa and opposed with vigour and un-equivocation international policies that were anti-Africans. President Shagari when he visited Britain in 1981 appealed to the Queen of England to fast track the emancipation of South Africa by imposing economic sanctions. Shagari has maintained in the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) that any supporting organization which defied African opinion would forfeit African and Nigeria’s goodwill. However, a careful examination at the various foreign policy engagements made by Nigeria towards African agenda in the areas of decolonization, peacekeeping missions as well as the facilitation of bilateral and multilateral aids will quantify the Afrocentric perspective of Nigeria’s foreign policy. In the area of peacekeeping, Ani (2013) explains that Nigeria’s peacekeeping operations are devoid of any strategic interest to the sovereign state but rather continues to weaken the financial base of the state. Wogu et al. (2015) also state that peacekeeping operation in Liberia and Sierra Leone has over the year put

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Nigeria under huge human, material and financial expenditures without any special benefits. Foreign policy decision-makers under successive Nigerian government have paid rapid attention to the country’s foreign policy philosophical allure rather than the rational pursue of Nigeria’s national interest. Hence, there seems to be an apparent disconnection between Nigeria’s national interest and Afrocentric foreign policy objectives and relationship strategies. Moreover, challenges of the twenty-first century, arising from the effects of globalization and the need to enhance the national interest of the nation especially in the area of security and economy have given rise to a new approach to analysing Nigeria’s foreign policy towards her neighbours, Africa and the world at large. This new approach emphasizes primarily, economic interest of the state and secondarily the concentric approach to foreign policy because what affect the immediate neighbours of a state has very high chances of spillover effect. According to Ali (2012) Nigerian foreign policy entered into another phase giving the state a diminishing profile in regional, continental and international affairs, which stemmed from her domestic problem. Ashaver (2014) contends that given the complexities of globalization, a state foreign policy must cast off an idealistic posture in favour of realism. Ironically, that has placed the burdens of nation building among her neighbours so heavily on the badly battered national economy. From the foregoing, when one attempts to analyse Nigeria’s foreign policy from the concentric perspective, one would first consider the interest of the nation as paramount before that of the sub-region.

Nigeria’s Foreign Policy Relations with Her Neighbours Geographically, Nigeria is located in the western region of the African continent. The sub-region consists of fifteen countries. Colonialism created political and ideological divide between these countries by dividing them between the former British territories and former French territories known as anglophone and Saxophone. However, these countries were later brought together under the auspices of ECOWAS. Nigeria played a major role in its formation and operation of ECOWAS (Nwanolue and Iwuoha 2012).

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Omede (2006) asserts that Nigeria was seriously threatened by the activities of her immediate neighbours who are mostly Francophone countries. The bilateral military, political and economic agreements between France and her erstwhile colonial states can be attributed to the frequency through which these countries infringe on the sovereignty of Nigeria. Nigeria’s policy towards her neighbours had, since independence, been based largely on the following four principles namely “the sovereign equality of all African states”; “respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of every African state”; “non-interference in the internal affairs of other African states”; and “a commitment to functional co-operation as a means of promoting African unity”. Over the years, several factors have led to the rise of bi-national commissions between Nigeria and their neighbouring countries. They include the increasing cases of insecurity in the West African region, widespread economic, and political crisis as well as cultural and social threats that could have a speedy spillover effect, thereby affecting the national interests of these countries that have brought them together to espouse policies which will help them surmount these challenges at their various national governments. Consequently, Nigeria’s foreign policy decision-makers consider it apt and appropriate to respond adequately to situations that have the potentials to threaten the stability, peace and security of their neighbouring countries as well as the sub-region, in an attempt to either avert or curtail the situation in order to ensure sustainable peace and harmony both in the neighbouring state and in Nigeria. Given this situation, this part of the study will focus on analysing Nigeria’s foreign relations with the West African sub-region. The analysis will be based on three strategic dimensions of foreign policy relations viz political, economic and military dimensions of their relations.

Nigeria-Benin Republic The two countries have a history of strong socio-cultural relationship as they share strong cultural ties among their ethnic groups. Ironically, given the political and ideological divide between these two countries arising from the colonial legacy of Britain and France, the relationship history has not been rosy. Colonial affinities of these countries have remained major constraints in their security relations. The Republic of Benin is a former French colony with significant bilateral economic, social, cultural and

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security relations with France, while Nigeria is a former British colony. This colonial factor remains a clog in the wheel of Nigeria-Benin Republic relations. Ate and Akinterinwa (1992) note that Nigeria and Benin Republic relations have continuously revolved around two issues namely—boundary and security (military relations). Boundary relations are important because of the imprecision colonial politics which manifested in the delimitation of boundaries. In pre-colonial period, border competition among the Egba and Dahomey laid the foundation for the pre-colonial war in the area. At independence, the policy of alienation by the colonial masters ensured that there were no close relations among the two powers as Britain and France competed for resource control. Border (security) has further been complicated by the activities of smugglers along the Nigerian-Benin Republic border areas. Again, the actions of overzealous state functionaries, especially the security agents who attempt to enforce their state legislation beyond their areas of jurisdiction within the border zone remain problematic. Again, political instability in Benin Republic is another principal factor influencing Nigeria-Benin Republic security relations. The period between 1967 and the late 1970s witnessed a decline in political relationship between the two countries. During these years of Nigerian Civil War, the Benin Republic border became a transit zone for erring Nigerian politicians. And a means of sabotaging Nigeria’s effort aimed at containing the Biafran forces. Ironically, while Benin was right in the rules of international engagement to allow right of innocent passage to the International Red Cross in their attempt to supply food and water to the Biafran civilians, the country lacked the economic and diplomatic muscles to content with Nigeria. Aluko (1977) notes that the Nigeria civil war fallout between the two countries led to rapid deterioration of relationship and also account for a series of border clashes between Nigeria and the Republic of Benin in 1969. Economically, the Nigerian-Benin Republic border areas witness the highest degree of smuggling of goods into the Nigerian state. The persistent smuggling of car, petroleum products and other essential commodities like rice, cloths, electronics, sugar, beverages, textiles and detergents constitute threats to the Nigerian economy. Sequel to the high population of Nigeria as well as the quest to access basic materials for good life, millions of Nigerian citizenries have discovered Benin Republic as the destination to buy all manners of cheap products provided one has

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the necessary courage and readiness to face unlimited risk in the border areas of Badagri, Seme and Idi-Iroko. Over the years, the number of Nigerian citizenry as well as security operatives that have lost their lives in smuggling trade along the border area cannot be estimated. Also, the activities of Beninese gendarmes who continuously and forcefully collect taxes from Nigerians along the Nigeria-Benin border villages constitute major threats to the economic relations of Nigeria and Benin Republic. In 1989 Nigeria gave the Benin Republic government a nonrefundable sum of 2.5 m US dollars to pay outstanding workers’ salaries and has since continued to provide the country with electricity. However, economic instability and security challenges in Niger Republic which have resulted into unemployment, have posed a great challenge to her relations with Nigeria. The gross migration of people from Niger to Nigeria is a big security threat to Nigeria. Refugees fleeing Niger has flooded Nigeria in recent times. Unfortunately, the rises of radical Islamic groups in the Northern Nigerian areas have witnessed favourable support and patronage from hundreds of Niger migrants into Nigeria. From Maitatsine to the current Boko Haarm terrorism, the Nigerian State has in several cases used her immigration forces to identify many foreigners from Niger that have given fillip to the fire of insecurity in the country and repatriated them.

Nigeria-Chad Relations Chad is another country sharing a border with Nigeria to the north east. Nigeria-Chad relations date to the pre-colonial era, when ancient KanemBorno Empire united the two entities. Although colonialism created new artificial boundaries, separating hitherto united communities, postindependence activities have been geared towards revitalizing old ties through new initiatives. Ani (2012) is of the view that official diplomatic relations between both countries started from 1963, the two states enjoyed fruitful relations in socio-economic dimensions before the rise of their independence due to cultural similarities and geographical proximity. Similarly, by the 1980s, their socio-economic relations entered a difficult period due to many factors. Among them include the NigeriaAfrican foreign policy review of 1980, the economic crisis of 1980s, the expulsion of Nigerian Neutral Troops from Chad in 1979 as well as the expulsion of Chadians from Nigeria in 1983 respectively (Ani 2012).

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However, it should be said that the ultimate driver of Nigerian-Chad relations is the economic benefits which Nigeria tends to derive from such a relationship. Throughout the 1980s, the country faced serious internal conflicts leading to mass exodus of refugees into Nigeria and other West African countries. As part of the collective efforts to bring peace to Chad in the 1980s, Nigeria participated actively in the OAU Peace Keeping Mission in Chad. Alkali (1996) is of the view that the OAU peace mission could not achieve its objectives because Hessain Habre finally took over power in Chad in 1982. In view of the significance of the Nigeria-Chad Basin Commission, as an instrument for the management of the trans-border resources along the Lake Chad basin, it became imperative to maintain continuous interest in all developments taking place in Chad (Alkali 1996). Therefore, though relations between Nigeria and the northern neighbours, Chad and Niger, are generally cordial, still several problems arise mainly because of ineffective border controls. This has made it easy for illegal aliens to move in and out of Nigeria. Although the role of aliens in Nigeria’s socioeconomic crises needs to be studied to ascertain its extent, the issues of religious riots particularly the Maitaseine uprisings in the 1980s (led by Muhammad Marwa, a Cameroonian) raised several questions about the implications of unrestricted alien movement in and out of the country. Ani (2012) on the other hand noted that both counties have been positively and negatively influenced by their relations with one another. Among the positive side include that Nigeria offered aids to Chad during drought and epidemic as well as contributed to the post-conflict peace building in Chad, while Chadians made use of Nigerian sea ports and imported many goods from Nigeria, etc. On the other hand, many Nigerians and their Chadian counterparts engaged in international banditry across Nigeria and Chad. The climax of the negative socio-economic impact of the relations between the two countries was exhibited, when the two countries were engaged in the Battle of Kinasara. Similarly, by the 1980s, their socio-economic relations entered a difficult period due to many factors. Among them include the Nigeria-African foreign policy review of 1980, the economic crisis of 1980s, the expulsion of Nigerian Neutral Troops from Chad in 1979 as well as the expulsion of Chadians from Nigeria in 1983 respectively. The documentation of the above realist behaviours between Nigeria and Chad, in a single volume, remained neglected, and the effects of these factors on Nigeria-Chad relations are yet to be compiled in a single literature.

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The two countries have since been involved in efforts to improve and strengthen bilateral ties through the Nigerian-Chad Joint Commission. Nigerian-Chad Joint Commission plays a significant role in promoting the socio-economic diplomacy of the two countries which has not attracted scholars’ attention. The history of Nigeria and Chad is consistently influenced by sociocultural, ethnic and religious issues. Thus, the potentiality of a spillover effect of negative social vices and conflict imperatives from Chad to Nigeria, or from Nigeria to Chad forms the basis of the continuous interaction between these two countries. This invariably strengthens the concentric approach of Nigeria’s foreign policy and national interest.

Nigeria-Cameroon Relations Nigeria shares the longest border to the east with Cameroon. NigeriaCameroon relations predate the independence of both countries. It is instructive to note that although Cameroon today belongs entirely to the Francophone regions of West Africa, the historic relationship which existed between these two countries was quite remarkable as some parts of Cameroon (South) and Nigeria were once administered as a British trust territory. The trusteeship of the region was necessary as Germany which hitherto had held the country as its own sphere of influence was defeated in the First World War in 1919 that historic defeat and the resolution of the league of nations to strip Germany of all her oversee colonial territories (including Cameroon), saw the division of Cameroon into north and south with each administered by French and Britain as trust territories. Recall that in the wake of nationalist agitations against colonial rule, Nigeria and parts of southern Cameroon forged an alliance known as the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon NCNC which later became the National Council of Nigerian Citizens following the disintegration of the union. However, beyond the colonial era, up to the division of Cameroon between France and Britain, the political delineation of the boundaries of these two nations was instrumental in forging a peaceful intergroup, economic and political relationship among them. This relationship survived until the region of south Cameroon voted to exit the union to unite with the other side of Cameroon under French colonial rule in 1959 when the Nigerian side pushed strongly for independence. Having become a purely Francophone and Anglophone, both countries became

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fundamentally different both in economic orientations, political ideologies and social affiliations. These differences were soon to manifest its ugly implications in the post-independent future of Nigeria-Cameroon relations. More so, in June 1961, the UN trust territory of British Cameroon was incorporated into northern Nigeria, now called Sarduana Province, following a plebiscite, which did not please Cameroon. Sarduana province today constitutes most part of Taraba state. During the Nigerian civil war from 1967 to 1970, President Ahmadu Ahidjo of Cameroon gave active support to the federal government (Alkali 1996). However, NigeriaCameroon relations became sour at the end of the civil war as a result of Cameroons’ claims to the disputed territory of the Bakassi peninsular in the Gulf of Guinea. Since the disagreement over Bakassi, both countries have become mutually antagonistic and hostile to each other contiguous border issues, national security, strategic and economic benefits, colonial legacies and the continued colonial affiliation of both countries became a serious source of consternation and conflict to Nigeria-Cameroon relations. The Cameroonians accuse Nigeria of formulating expansionist policies to grab more land from small and weak Cameroon, particularly over the disputed Bakassi region. Contemporary Nigerian-Cameroon relation has been defined by the dispute over the Bakassi Peninsula. The peninsula has caused frequent tensions between these two countries. On 25 July 1972, Cameroonian gendarmes apprehended a multi-purpose cooperative fishing boat belonging to Enayam. In 1977, there was a border clash along the southern border, in 1980 Cameroon unilaterally went ahead to construct a dam on river Benue, in 1981, five Nigerians were killed in a border clash. Sami asserts that Nigeria had the credibility in the form of preparedness to strike and hit hard at the nick of time but she resorted to diplomatic dialogue after the murder of five soldiers on 16 May 1981 (Sami 1984). Cameroon attempted to annex the Bakassi in 1991 which prompted Nigerian government to deploy troops to the region and since then, clashes between both countries have led to colossal loss of life and properties of those living along the peninsula. Moreover, amidst the dispute over the peninsula, the Nigeria government conscious of its position and acclaimed role especially within the Afrocentric ideology has not allowed the situation to degenerate into a full-scale war. Alkali noted that while Nigeria has proposed for a referendum and a bilateral solution to the problem, Cameroon has been

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insisting on the intervention of the United Nations Organisation and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in June 1996, the ICJ requested both Nigeria and Cameroon to present their submissions. Subsequently, Equatorial guineas were also asked to present their submissions. One of the options explored by Nigeria was to involve some African countries to arbitrate over the matter. The Republic of Togo for instance intervened to resolve the problem but not much progress was achieved (Alkali 1996). However, the matter was decided in favour of the Cameroonians on October 10, 2012. Similarly, Nigeria-Cameroon relations on the socio-political frontiers remained cordial until the hitches were caused as a result of the Bakassi dispute. Earlier commitments to peaceful coexistence between Nigeria and Cameroon were manifested in the Maroua Declaration of 1975, which Yakubu Gowon signed on the Nigerian side. Also, The Green Tree Agreement, which was mediated by the United Nations (UN), became the manifestation of the political will of the Nigerian and Cameroon governments to manage the numerous challenges that emanated from the ICJ judgement. It created room for peaceful negotiations and round table discussions. Nigeria has diplomatically managed her conflicts and relations with Cameroon. The diplomatic management accounts for why there was no open arms confrontation or full scale war. This is not also unconnected with the Afrocentric posture of Nigerian foreign policy.

Nigeria-Burkina Faso Burkina Faso is an active member of the ECOWAS, her relations with Nigeria under the ECOWAS umbrella have been cordial and hospitable (Nwanolue and Iwuoha 2012). An evidence of this cordial relationship is the Nigeria-Burkina Faso bilateral agreement on air services (BASA) with Burkina Faso. Several Nigerian investors have taken advantage of the relationship to invest in the country’s economy. For instance, United Bank for Africa (UBA) has invested and even Nigeria’s telecommunications giant, Glo has been granted license to operate in Burkina Faso. However, the major challenge between the two countries relation is the issue of human trafficking which is alarming in Nigeria. The degree of illegal migration of Nigerians to Burkina Faso has become a concern for the Burkinabe’s government. Bala in an interview stated that the way our people migrate illegally is the major challenge in the Nigeria-Burkina Faso relations. He also noted that sadly, majority of

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them are minors. He puts the working figure of Nigerian illegal immigrants as between 60,000 and 100,000. This phenomenon has only increased unemployment for the indigenes of Burkina Faso as these Nigerians compete with indigenous people in the labour market and are often ready to work at relatively low wages. It is estimated that by 2020, the number of Nigerians living in Burkina Faso if not reduced will be a quarter of the indigenous population thereby creating limitless problems for the country in the form of national planning. This situation if not properly managed could create room for xenophobia, expulsion of illegal Nigerians or at least increase the pressure on Nigeria-Burkina Faso relations, which will result in a diplomatic faceoff between the two countries.

Nigeria-Ghana The Nigeria-Ghana relations date back to the period of colonial rule. Both countries were under the same colonialists—the British government. Aluko (1977) contends that “relations between Nigeria and Ghana was broadly conceived and shaped by colonial economic and political policies and programmes”. At independence (Ghana in 1957 and Nigeria in 1960) Nigeria and Ghana joined the Commonwealth of Nations. However, despite the period of cordial relations, Ademola (2016) also notes that both countries’ relations have not been an easy one. Although rated as the two biggest economies in West Africa; the relationship between Nigeria and Ghana has been topsy-turvy over the years. Both countries have had issues of serious economic concerns. In 1969, Ghana expelled large numbers of Nigerian residents under the Alien Compliance Order. Nigeria responded by suspending oil exports to Ghana. This was before the discovery of crude oil in Ghana-Nigeria also expelled around 1 million Ghanaian residents in Nigeria in 1983 and another 300,000 in 1985 in what was popularly known in Nigeria as “Ghana Must Go”. In April 1988, a joint commission for cooperation was established under the leadership of Major General Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria, and J.K. Rawlings of Ghana. The two military leaders find common ground on several issues that focus on peace and prosperity within West Africa, bilateral trade, and the transition to democracy in both countries. In early January 1989, Babangida paid an official visit to Ghana to consolidate on the Nigeria-Ghana relations. Relations were restored but the Ghana Investment Promotion Council Act of 1994 brought the tempestuous

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relationship to the fore again. The implementation of the Ghana Investment Promotion Council Act since 2012 has resulted into xenophobic incidences leading to the closure of Nigerian business in Ghana. Ademola (2016) asserts that the cordial relationship between the two countries suffered a setback from 2007 to 2009 and again in 2012 when some businesses owned by Nigerians in Ghana were closed by the Ghanaian Authorities for alleged non-compliance with the 1994 investment law which placed restrictions and prohibits non-Ghanaians from engaging in retail trade and related business. This hitch affected the volume of trade between the two countries. Recently, the population of Nigerians going to read in Ghana has increased drastically. More worrisome is the fact that some of these Nigerian students in Ghana go to patronize schools that are not properly registered or accredited thereby creating opportunity for resource waste whenever the government of Ghana folds-up such institutions. The recent discovery of oil in Ghana has reduced Ghana’s dependency on Nigeria for oil and has increased competition among both the states within the sub-region and at the continental level. Their mutual suspicion has hindered some developmental policies of ECOWAS such as trade liberalization. It is regrettable that Nigeria and Ghana, who role in the formation of ECOWAS and regional integration, the too countries remain the greatest violators of the market integration protocols as enshrined in the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme (ETLS) (Nwanolue and Iwuoha 2012). Among this violation include: economic protectionist policies, high tariffs, long process of registration, transportation problem, obnoxious policies and bickering are some of the challenges identified in the trade relations between Nigeria and Ghana.

Concentric Analysis of Nigeria’s Relations with Her Neighbours Having examined Nigeria’s relationship with her neighbours in the concentric circle of its foreign policy, it is pertinent at this time to attempt a brief analysis of how Nigeria’s focus on the concentric approach has helped to achieve its stated objectives. It should be noted that the utmost concern of every government is to guarantee and protect the rights and lives of its citizen. In furtherance of this objectives, states or governments acting rationally formulate its foreign policy to reflect its national interest and the best policy through which it can achieve optimal national interest.

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This explanation provides one with a spectacle with which to appreciate the paradigm shift from large-scale Afrocentric approach to the concentric approach of Nigeria’s foreign relations which considers national interest and nearly relations as utmost in foreign policy. However, although Nigeria may claim to apply the concentric approach to its foreign relation, it can be argued that this approach has not translated into any meaningful benefit to its national interest. The Nigerian situation faces the opposite direction. Overtime, funds meant for national development are spent abroad while absolute poverty rages on in the land. Nigeria had paid the salaries of workers in a couple of African countries while in many states of the country teachers and several local government and state workers are not paid for months, some as much as a year (Ashaver 2014). Thus, it is not strategically correct to neglect internal problems and be solving the national problems of neighbours while Nigerian citizens are languishing in absolute poverty. Ashaver (2014) argued that “Nigerian foreign policy should hinge on the fact of elevating the welfare of her citizens over and above other considerations. The prioritization of citizen welfare is to strengthen the value of national interests”. Also, Adeniji (2005) maintains that “in implementation reality, the line between the centre of the concentric circles and the outer ones have remained blurred and the anti-colonial as well as anti-apartheid focus dominated all other considerations, including Nigeria’s interests. The implication is that while Nigeria spent billions of resources trying to put the neighbouring states in order, her citizenry is so horribly frustrated that they desperately migrate to these countries where they will engage in manners of positive and negative things to survive. Ashaver (2014) wrote that “the vagueness in the implementation of the principle of concentricism in Nigeria’s foreign policy has been viewed in many quarters as having a detrimental effect on the inner circle of the concentric circles”. In other words, there are many steps that the country took in international diplomacy which was clearly not in the country’s national interest. This partly stemmed from continuities and discontinuities in the Nigerian foreign policy brought about by rapid turnover of regimes in the country. Bamalia (2007) estimated that Nigeria had committed 13 billion US dollars to peacekeeping operations in West Africa. Across Africa, Nigeria’s contribution is unparalleled. Since independence, Nigeria has spent unquantifiable amount of money to bring about a liberated and united Africa. It contributed troops to UN Peacekeeping missions in troubled

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areas of Africa and the world at large but in many occasions abandons the families of those who lost their loved ones in such international peace engagements. At a point in Nigeria’s diplomatic history it stood over Africa like a colossus while Nigerian economy has remained unplanned for the unborn children till date. It indeed was respected by many of her neighbours and African state but because such respect is not sustainable as it does not emanate from strong national economy or policies, it often gives way to disdain and even xenophobic attacks on Nigerians from such countries as is currently largely witnessed in South Africa. Nigeria, more than any other country in Africa, had contributed to the emancipation of the continent from colonial rule. The prime victims of the xenophobic attacks in South Africa were targeted at Nigerians, but here is a country where workers in Nigeria were forced to contribute part of their meagre salaries during that country’s fight for independence and war against apartheid. Nigeria has reasonably borne the burden of peacekeeping missions in many African and West African States, but this burden did not translate into any meaningful development in the country. In the face of the ravaging Boko Haram insurgency and political instability, Nigeria is seriously challenged and given her contribution to peacekeeping in other nations within the sub-region, it is expected that they will reciprocate the same, but the reverse is the case. Many of the neighbouring countries of Niger, Chad and Cameroon remained aloof until the wind of terrorism penetrated their countries. Adeniji (2005) lamented that a critical analysis of the Nigerian situation demonstrates that the Nigerian people have not been directly considered as the focus or relevant factor in foreign policy postulations. Modern international relations and foreign policy formulation and implementation are economically driven. That is, if Nigeria, as it were, had spent so much to bring about peace and development across Africa, there would have been derivable benefits from such efforts. For instance, in Liberia, Nigeria contributed significantly to the peace process by investing human and financial resources into the Liberia peacekeeping mission under the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Unfortunately, Nigerian generosity abroad and penury at home are proofs that we are pretending to be what we are not, because we have been overstretching ourselves. Today, Nigerian roads are unfixed, educational system is in shambles, same goes with healthcare system, portable water is unknown to majority of the citizens, agriculture, which is the industry that provides a source of livelihood for over 80 per cent of

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the population is yearning for improvement, poverty is staggering everywhere and yet Nigerian leaders are more concerned with African and world welfare, and had since independence being spending the country’s resources to maintain the false giant outlook thereby exposing millions of Nigerians to dehumanizing path to death as they desperately migrate to other countries searching for means of survival. Ashaver (2014) writes that “the paradox of the Nigerian situation is that those countries that Nigeria sacrificed enormously to uplift have become globally accepted and respected much to the consternation of the country”. South Africa presents a good example unfortunately; Nigerian leaders are not learning the lessons of homeward looting. They still loot our collective commonwealth and foolishly go to invest them in foreign countries where they are often nationalized or seized thereby increasing the national treasuries of those states and undermining the Nigerian State economy.

Conclusion and Recommendations This study has presented the concentric approach to Nigerian foreign relations with special emphasis on her neighbouring states. It shows that Nigeria’s relationship with her neighbours is based mainly on the issue of avoiding border disputes which might escalate into full-fledged armed hostilities. The study captured a series of economic, socio-cultural and other joint initiatives between these countries and Nigeria as mechanisms directed at ensuring peaceful coexistence of all the states in the sub-region. It is worthy of note that Nigeria’s relationship with Francophone neighbours is seriously affected by the historically ill-defined and improperly delimitation of boundaries in the West-African sub-region by the erstwhile European colonial masters. The highly porous and easily permeable nature of these boundaries, coupled with the lack of a coordinated and coherent boundary policy by Nigeria and the governments of contiguous states’ accounts for the lukewarm and sometimes, frosty relations between Nigeria and her immediate neighbours. Given the above analysis, the applicability of the concentric circle analysis remains a strong mirage as far as Nigeria’s national interest is concerned. There is therefore the need to reappraise Nigeria’s foreign relations with her neighbours with a better and more practicable policy which could still revolve around the concentric circle.

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The study therefore recommends that Nigeria should adopt the smart power foreign policy approach in other to ensure a balance in her relations with other countries within the concentric circle. Smart power involves a kind of carrot-and-stick approach to foreign policy formulation and implementation, whereby Nigeria need to be both aggressive and persuasive in ensuring that almost all its activities overseas promote its national economy and development interest. Nigeria needs to tie her diplomatic benevolence to conditions that support her national interest in the beneficiary country and should speedily withdraw such support when the beneficiary country fails to do Nigerian’s bidding. This is because international relations are generally sustained on the principle of permanent interest and not permanent friendship.

Bibliography Ademola, A. (2016). Nigeria-Ghana trade relations: Politics, problem and possibilities. Developing Country Studies 6 (1): 94–102. Adeniji, O. (2005). “Cost and Dividends of Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy in Nigeria’s Democratic Transition”. A Publication of the Presidential Advisory Council on International Relations, Abuja. Ali, W. O. (2012). Nigeria in Regional Security Policy, Fredrick Ebert, Stipting. Alkali, I. A. (1996). Issues in International Relations and Nigeria’s Foreign Policy Kaduna: Northpoint Publishers. Aluko, O. (1977). The Foreign Policies of African States. London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd. Ani, K. J. (2012). “Nigeria-Chad Socio-Economic Relations” unpublished Master dissertations, University of Maiduguri. Ani, K. J. (2013). “Nigeria and the Need for Economic-Driven Strategic PeaceKeeping Operation” in Ojong Echum Tangban and Chukwuma C. C. Osakwe (Eds.) Perspectives in African Historical Studies: Essays in Honour of Prof. Chinedu Nwafor Ubah, Kaduna: Pyla-Mak Services Ltd, pp. 189–209. Ashaver, B. (2014). “Concentricism in Nigeria’s Foreign Policy” IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS), 19(6): 6–11. Ate, B. E., and Akinterinwa, B. A. (1992). Nigeria and its Immediate Neighbors: Constraints and Prospects of Sub - Regional Security in the 1990’s. Lagos: Institute of International Affairs and. Pumark Nig. Ltd. Bala. (2014). Nigeria-Bukina Faso Ties Excellent Mauricearchibongtravels.blogspot.com Maurice Achibong. Assessed on 24 April 2015. Bamalia B. N. (2007). “Redefining Nigeria’s Interest and Commitments in Peace Support Operations” in Akinterinwa, B. (Ed.) Nigeria’s National Interests

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in a Globalizing world: Further Reflections on Constructive and Beneficial Concentrisim (volume three Nigeria’s interest beyond Nigeria). Ibadan: Bolytag International publishers. Nwanolue B. O. G., and Iwuoha, V. C. (2012). A Reflection on Nigeria’s Past: Africa as the Centrepiece of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy Revisited. Developing Country Studies, 2(4): 76–84. Ogo and Emakpo. (2005). The Evolution of Nigerian Foreign Policy. http:// www.shvoong.com/books/1239-evolution-nigerian-foreign-policy/#ixzz2Q 7miHmtr. Omede J. A. (2006). “Nigeria’s Relation with her Neighbours”. Studies in Tribes Tribals, 4(1): 7–17. Sami, S. (1984). Nigeria: Her Problems of Border Security and Defence, Jos: NIPSS. Wogu et al. (2015). A Critical Evaluation of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy at 53, Research on Humanities and Social Sciences, 5(2).

CHAPTER 9

Steel Industrialisation and Ajaokuta Imbroglio in Nigeria: Exploring Need Analysis from South Korea Steel Industry Prince Habib Enesi

and Olawale Isaac Yemisi

Introduction The steel industry remains an important industry in contemporary global economic structures given its global supply and demand. Since the period of the First Industrial Revolution, the steel industry has grown to become the cornerstone of states with the quest for industrialisation (Jun Ma 2021: 1). According to the World Steel Association (2021), 1951.2

P. H. Enesi Department of History and International Studies, Federal University, Lokoja, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] O. I. Yemisi (B) Department of History and International Studies, University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. J. Ani (ed.), Political Economy of Colonial Relations and Crisis of Contemporary African Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0245-3_9

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million tons (Mt) of crude steel were produced globally in 2021. In terms of employment, the steel industry employed more than six million people globally in 2017 (Oxford Economic 2019; Jie Yang 2021: 11). However, despite global success in the steel industry, African countries—despite the availability of raw materials have not made a significant landmark in the global steel industry. The world steel-producing countries in 2021 ranking had only Egypt and South Africa out of fifty countries (World Steel Ranking 2021). This implies that African countries have not made significant progress in the manufacturing sector and particularly the steel industry. Industrialisation or the establishment of manufacturing industries remains an important driver of socioeconomic growth and development globally. The African Development Bank (AfDB) notes that the establishment of industries and infrastructural development is the prime mover for socio-economic growth and development (AFDB 2019). Undoubtedly, African countries also recognise the contributions of industrialisation (manufacturing sector) to economic liberation under the current globalisation dispensation. However, African countries’ manufacturing sector has been largely underdeveloped over the years. According to Wanboye, rather than the primacy of manufacturing and industry sector-led in African countries, the service sector-led is currently African countries’ output and employs one-third of Africa’s labour force (Wamboye 2022). Nigeria, despite the enormous human and natural resources as well as development potential, is faced with significant development challenges. Among the development challenges facing the Nigerian government lie in its ability to establish a sustainable industrialisation sector since independence. In developed countries of Europe, America and Asia, industrialisation is seen as the backbone to achieving rapid socio-economic growth and development (Adegbite 2021: 21). By industrialisation, it implies the extensive development of organised economic activity for manufacturing. Since independence, successive Nigerian governments have introduced economic policies and programmes towards rapid industrialisation which are also enshrined in the National Development Plans (NDP) (Adegbite 2021: 86–87). The Nigerian government not only launched four National Development Plans between 1960 and 1985 but has industrialisation as the basic priority of the country to rise out of underdevelopment shackles. Among the industrialised mega project is the Ajaokuta steel industry. However, since 1979, Nigeria is still yet to feature among the major steelproducing states. However, East Asian countries such as the Republic of

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Korea (South Korea) with similar economic level as to Nigeria in 1960 have become a major steel-producing country. According to the World Steel Association 2021 ranking, South Korea was ranked the sixth-largest producer of steel in the world after China, Japan, India, the United States and Russia, respectively (Jun Ma 2021: 1; World Steel Association 2021). The question the article context is built around is to examine why Nigeria has failed to achieve steel industrialisation. In other words, the article examines the challenges and constraints of why the Nigerian Steel Industry in Ajaokuta has become a failed mega-project in the country’s economic and industrialisation history as well as probes into available options for the completion and operationalisation of the industry. The chapter is organised as follows. The first section examines the Ajaokuta steel industry planning and formative stage between 1960 and 1985. The section is discussed to reflect Nigeria’s technological relationship with the Soviet Union and the United States in light of Cold War politics (1945– 1991). The second section also examines the trajectory of the Ajaokuta steel complex between 1980 and 1999 featuring the different regimes’ policies towards the steel industry and the effect of the Structural Adjustment Programme. The third section examines the Ajaokuta steel industry in Nigeria’s fourth republic. The fourth section examines the challenges and constraints affecting the successful completion and operation of the steel industry. The fifth section examines possible options that can be employed by Nigerian policymakers and the government in the completion of the mega project. The section reflects on the Republic of Korea’s (East Asia) path to industrialisation to offer some key ingredients.

The Ajaokuta Steel Industry: Planning and East–West Dichotomy, 1960–1980 Nigeria’s foray into steel production came into the national limelight in 1958 amidst independence agitations (Adegbite 2021: 58; Osita 2007: 41; Alli-Balogun 1988: 630). Like oil reserves discovered in 1956 at Oloibiri, iron ore reserves were also discovered in areas such as Itakpe, Agbaja near Lokoja and Udi near Enugu (Matusevich 2003: 191). With the discovery of iron ore, the position of Nigeria’s early independence leaders was to develop the steel industry considered an important step towards accelerating the industrial position of the newly independent state. Hence starting from the pioneer National Development Plan

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between 1962 and 1968, the government of Nigeria articulates industrialisation as one of its primary agendas (Adegbite 2021). According to Unongo, the steel industry is an important parameter in advancing emerging Nigerian state national interests and power status (Unongo 1980). The discovery prompted the Nigerian government to explore the establishment of the steel industry by initiating feasibility studies to determine the commercial size and quantity. In 1967, an extensive survey undertaken shows 0.57 million tons per year of blast furnaces (Adegbite 2021: 81). Between 1961 and 1965, the Federal Government of Nigeria invited proposals from developed countries for the construction of a steel complex. These invitations ultimately led to a rapid departure from Nigeria’s Western traditional allies to the Soviet Bloc. Given Nigeria’s colonial history, the country had established ties with Britain and its allies especially the United States in terms of political and economic matters. In 1961, Messrs Westinghouse and Koppers alongside the Nigeria Steel Association proposed the use of the Udy process although it was still under development in the United States (Osita 2007: 42). The proposal was followed by large-scale testing to prove the suitability of the proposed technology. After the testing, the Ferrostall-Wellman Mckee of the United States recommended the use of blast furnaces and while the David Ashmore of Britain and Demaz of West Germany recommended the direct reduction process but utilising Enugu coal instead of imported coking coal (Osita 2007: 42; 1992: 67). However, the Western states contractors’ response to Nigeria’s call for proposal argued against the suitability of local materials in the construction of the steel industry (Ibrahim et al. 2022: 187). Hence, despite the direct reduction process and electric smelting proposed, the Nigerian government considered the shipping of iron ores uneconomical. Despite Nigeria’s traditional relationship with the West, the government of Nigeria turned to the Soviet Union for the possibility of discussing the steel contract. Despite the contraventions that characterised the Nigeria-Soviet relationship before this period, it entered into a cooperation phase during the Nigeria Civil War when the Soviet bloc provided weapons to the Federal government of Nigeria (Matusevich 2006). Matusevich argued that Soviet interest in Nigeria biggest mega project was to enhance its image in the light of Western power’s dominance (Matusevich 2006). In February 1967, a team of Soviet experts led by V. Bilenko, a metallurgist, recommended the blast furnace process if quality iron ore

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and coking coal could be located in Nigeria (Ogunbadejo 1988: 93). These availabilities of adequate material led to a period of geological surveys to ascertain the availability of iron ore and coal deposits (Awojobi 1975; Olatunde 1976). The Federal Government of Nigeria commissioned the Russian firm Tryaproexport (TPE) for further geological surveys prospecting slated for five years, providing equipment and key specialists, as well as the recommendation of a blast furnace/basic oxygen facility to undertake a preliminary survey and report on the construction process (Ibrahim et al. 2022: 187). Between 1967 and 1969, several geological surveys were made and in 1970, the Nigerian government commissioned the Soviet supply to supply machinery and equipment worth N4.8 m needed for feasibility studies (Olatunde 1976: 58). This was followed by another agreement of N116m five-year geological survey for iron-ore and coal (Olatunde 1976: 58). The feasibility study was completed in 1971 but further development could not proceed because of essential and timeconsuming studies and preliminary work (Olatunde 1976: 58). In 1971, the Nigeria steel Development Authority (NSDA) was established to oversee the planning, construction and operation of the steel plant (Ibrahim et al. 2022: 187; Osita 2007: 42). After a series of reports and negotiations, the Soviet contractor, Tyajz-Prom Export (TPE) was awarded the contract and commissioned to prepare a preliminary project report for the construction of the steel plant in 1973. The document was submitted in 1974 and approved in I975, with Ajaokuta designated as the steel site (Osita 2007: 42). General Yakubu Gowon’s regime was toppled in 1975 and ushered in General Muhammed Muritala/Olusegun Obasanjo’s regime. The steel complex was part of the regime’s agenda. Hence, in 1976, the Nigerian government signed an agreement with Moscow on the steel industry construction. Also, in June 1977, after the unsuccessful coup of Buka Suka Dinka, that led to the death of General Muhammed Muritala, Obasanjo Olusegun constitute a delegation including Mallam Ahmed Joda—Permanent Secretary of the Federal Ministry of Industries and Dr. Adegboye (Nigeria Steel Development Authority Project Manager) to Moscow to discuss the Steel complex (Ogunbadejo 1988: 94). The visit outcomes were submitted in September 1977, modified and accepted in 1978, and the contract for the construction of the project was signed in July 1979 (Ogunbadejo 1988: 94). Under the regime, Soviet Union

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Tsvemepormexport also constructed two oil pipelines (Ogunbadejo 1988: 94). The civilian administration of President Shehu Shagari also considered the steel industry a high priority and demonstrated its commitment. Hence, apart from the NSDA, the administration established the Ministry of Steel and Industry (Ministerial Portfolio) (Alli-Balogun 1988: 630). The initial contract estimates a plant of 1.3 million tons of annual production capacity, for a sum of $2 billion (Ibrahim et al. 2022: 188). The plant site for construction is designated at Ajaokuta given its proximity to where iron ore and coal deposits can be found. Oyeyinka and Adeloye (1988: 26) argued that even though Onitsha was closer to the mineral resources, the Government of Nigeria considered it inappropriate to establish such a national industry in one of the strongholds of the Biafran secessionists. Furthermore, the Nigeria government’s desire for industrialisation led to the pursuance of other pipeline projects at the same time Ajaokuta was been implemented. In 1977, the Delta Steel Plant was awarded to a consortium of ten German and Austrian firms to construct a 1 M ton direct reduction plant. Also, in 1979, three rolling steel mills of 200 K tons per year in Katsina, Jos and Oshogbo to produce bars and wire rods (based on the steel output from Ajaokuta and Delta) were awarded to Japanese and German companies. The Delta Steel Plant at Ovwian Aladija and the Katsina Rolling Mill was formally commissioned in 1982. Also, the Jos and Osogbo Steel Rolling Mills were formally commissioned in 1983 while the Light Section Mill at Ajaokuta was commissioned in 1983 (Adegbite 2021: 82).

Ajaokuta Complex Under Structural Adjustment Programme Period, 1980–1999 The period between 1980 and 1999, marked the implementation of the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) policies and changes in the administration and implementation of the steel projects. The steel industry crisis began with the attitude of the Soviet Union’s workers to the project. Although the Government of Nigeria awarded the contract at the rate of $2000 million, another component of the contract was the government’s responsibility for 50% of the cost of transporting 7000 Soviet technician and their families by Nigerian Airways plus needed equipment and supplies by the Nigeria National Shipping Line (Alli-Balogun

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1988: 631). However, the Soviet Union’s attitudes such as secrecy about their construction formats and astronomical salaries of $19,000 affected government commitment (Alli-Balogun 1988: 632). Alli-Balogun (1988: 632–633) argued that the effect of SAP and the astronomical salaries received by the contractors affected the implementation process given the inability of the government to fund the programme. Also, the problem of adequate funding prevented the Federal Government of Nigeria to construct the Soviet personnel accommodation which brews up tension (Ibrahim et al. 2022: 190). Matusevich argued that given the economic recession, the steel contractors withdrew their personnel leading to TPE’s commitment to the steel project construction (Matusevich 2003: 214). Apart from SAP, the exasperating delay in the construction stage of the industry was also caused by the nature of the steel plant and the proportion of profit which in turn affected government commitment. Although the plant was projected to produce 1.3 million, 2.6 million, and 5.2 million in the first, second and third phases respectively the blast furnace capacity, raw materials, machinery and manpower needed were not available. For instance, an estimation of about one million tons of cooking coal importation estimation for Ajaokuta’s efficient and effective operation affected government commitment. Also, the nature of the equipment imported and the design made by the Soviet Union caused the delays. In 1981, equipment shipped from USSR was rejected on the fact that they were inappropriate thereby creating conflict between Soviet contractors and Nigerian officials (Alli-Balogun 1988: 633). The rejection was followed by rumours that the Soviet Union was using outdated materials to construct the main complex (Ogunbadejo 1988: 97). However, given Shagari’s administration’s view of the steel project as an important factor in Nigeria’s industrialisation and technological take-off, the Minister of Steel Development—Mamman Ali Makele was dispatched to Kremlin to clear the issue (Ogunbadejo 1988: 97). Also, the widespread corrupt practices, unaccountability and mismanagement recorded under President Shehu Shagari’s administration affected the steel industry starting from mid-1983. A Nigeria Tribune editorial published on 15 December 1983, stated that “officials charged with the responsibility of seeing the project to the contractors see corrupt practices as the order of the day” (Alli-Balogun, 1988: 632). President Shehu Shagari’s regime ends abruptly with the military takeover of General Muhammadu Buhari (1983–1985). The administration of General Buhari’s agenda was to fight corruption and corrupt

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practices considered the bane of Nigeria’s growth and development. On the Ajaokuta steel project, General Muhammadu Buhari jailed Dr. Ezemenari, the General Manager of Ajaokuta along with 12 fellow senior managers based on “stupendous dishonesties” (corruption and mismanagement) (Ibrahim et al. 2022: 190). This incident led to a halt in the construction of the Ajaokuta steel industry in 1983 because NigeriaSoviet Union relations become frosty. In 1984, General Muhammadu Buhari commissioned the Minister of Mines, Power and Steel—Alhaji Riliwanu Lukman to Moscow to dialogue on the state of the complex and the process to speed up its completion (Ogunbadejo 1988: 99). The product of the meeting led to a new agreement for the construction of the steel complex signed in August 1985 (Ogunbadejo 1988: 99). The government of Nigeria under President Muhammadu Buhari also conceived Soviet Union contractor’s delay in the completion of the project as a tactical ploy to recruit more “technical personnel” than necessary. However, the Nigerian embassy refused to grant visas to 500 Russians who applied to enter Nigeria in July 1987 (Ibrahim et al. 2022: 190). Also, President Ibrahim Babangida’s regime put the completion of the steel complex on the regime’s agenda. Apart from the dialogue with the Soviet contractors, the regime also encourages local companies to speed up and double their commitment to the project. Despite the increasing economic relationship between Nigeria and Moscow, the steel complex construction recorded sluggish development under the military regime of Ibrahim Babangida leading to the departure of the Soviet personnel (Ogunbadejo 1988: 100). By 1990, the steel project has been ground to a halt and by 1996, all funding for all steel projects was suspended and partial closure of operations. Matusevich described the Ajaokuta steel complex in the following words thus the empty concrete blocks of its township and the still rolling mills stand as silent monuments to the failed ambitions of Nigerian rulers to exorcise by fire and steel the demons of the colonial past. They stand as a silent reminder of the lost grandeur of the Soviet empire, which, terminally ill as it was, tried fitfully to plant its peculiar concept of modernisation in an African nation, tried and failed (Matusevich 2003: 189).

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Ajaokuta Steel Complex and the Political-Economy of Nigeria Fourth Republic, 1999–2021 Nigeria entered into a new democratic dispensation in 1999 with the administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999–2007). Before his administration, the steel project was grounded for about 10 years. However, given his role in the emergence of the steel project during his regime as Head of State under military rule. Olusegun Obasanjo considered it necessary to revive the steel project. However, the administration took to a public–private partnership (PPP) (Ibrahim et al. 2022: 191). At the instance of PPP, four private steel producers showed interest namely: Solar Energy Incorporated of USA, Kobe Steel Limited of Hapan, Voest-Alpine Industrial Services of Austria and the former contractor, Tiajpromexport (TPE) of Russia (former contractor) (Osita 2007: 50). After a series of proposals detailing the resuscitation of the steel project, the entered government entered into a concessionary agreement with the SOLGAS Energy of the United States for 10 years and renewable to manage and operate the plant. The $282 million was signed on 13 October 2003 (Osita 2007: 50). The agreement with SOLGAS entails the rehabilitation, completion, commissioning and operation of the steel plant. However, despite the optimism that followed the concessionary agreement, SOLGAS was unable to operate the industry due to the lack of required technical capacity to rehabilitate, complete and operate the steel (Osita 2007: 51). In 2004, another public–private partnership bidding concessionaire process was put up. In mid-August, an India-based company—Mittal Steel Subsidiary, Global Infrastructure Nigeria Limited (GINL), owned by Pramod Mittal won the concession (Ibrahim et al. 2022: 191). The GINL also bought the now-defunct Delta Steel for $30 M. The GINL secured a ten-year concession for the Ajaokuta steel complex in 2004 which was converted to 60% equity in May 2007 shortly before the end of Obasanjo’s regime (Ibrahim et al. 2022: 192). However, the post-Obasanjo administration was accused of private–public partnership corruption. The GINL concession process was considered an illegitimate and undervalued transaction. Given the above public sentiment, the administration of President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua set up an investigative panel to examine the GINL concession process leading to the cancellation of the concession in June 2008 alleging that GINL has failed to

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fulfil its concession agreements, especially in terms of concession fees (Ibrahim et al. 2022: 192). Despite the controversies, GINL proceeds to the International Arbitration Court in London in 2016 (Olawale 2013; Okafor 2016). The administration of President Goodluck Jonathan despite consistent assurance on the need to revitalise the Ajaokuta steel complex was unable to achieve the goal (Michael 2014). President Muhammadu Buhari renewed Nigerians’ hope and aspirations for the completion of the Ajaokuta Steel industry. The administration inaugurated the Ajaokuta Presidential Project and Implementation Team (APPIT) (Omeiza 2020). The APPIT was designated to lead a discussion with the Afrexim Bank and the Russian Export Centre (Omeiza 2020). A news report reveals that under the Eight National Assembly, the Ajaokuta Steel Company Completion Fund Bill was raised setting aside $1 Billion from the Excess Crude Account for its completion (Jacob 2018). However, this move was vetoed by the President who argued that such an option was not strategic enough for a country facing budgetary constraints (The Azimazi 2019). However, the government of Muhammadu Buhari has consistently allocated funds towards the completion of the steel company. In 2019, President Muhammadu Buhari attended the Russia-Africa summit in Sochi where he emphasised the importance of completing the Ajaokuta Steel complex to the Russian President Vladimir Putin (Garba 2022). Hence, in 2020, a bilateral agreement reached prompted President Buhari to approve the release of $2 billion for the steel renovation contract. However, despite this development, Russia forfeited the fund in 2022 given the effect of the Russia-Ukraine War (Akin 2022; Williams 2022). According to a news report, the Buhari administration between 2016 and 2021 allocated 20.4 billion to the steel industry (The Punch 2022). In 2022, a sum of 4.2bn was also allocated to the steel company limited (The Punch 2022). However, given the inability of the administration to complete the complex, the administration has resulted in concessioning of the steel complex. On 27 August 2022, the government approved N853.25 million to engage consultants—Messrs CPCS Transform Consortium for the services of concessioning Ajaokuta Steel Company Limited and also the National Iron Ore Mining Complex in Itakpe (Anthony 2022). However, despite the optimism presented by the administration to the public, the Minister of Mines and Steel Development—Olamilekan Adegbite in a news report stated that the government of Buhari might not

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be able to deliver the Ajaokuta Steel company because of the impact of COVID-19 and the effect of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War (Juliana 2022).

Ajaokuta Steel Complex: Realities and Constraints of Completion Ajaokuta steel complex remains one of the long-standing moribund mega industrialisation projects in Nigeria. Hence, between 1979 and 2022, the successive governments of Nigeria employed various means such as concessioning based on private–public partnerships to solve the logjam of the Ajaokuta steel complex. However, the current position of the Minister of Steel and Mines development that the current administration of President Buhari cannot deliver the operation of the steel industry as promised has made the steel industry become Nigeria’s primary failed mega project. From the review of the regime and administration analysis undertaken in the previous section, it is apparent that the development of the steel industry is faced with several challenges. The problem of leadership and corruption has affected the completion of the project over the years. Since the Second Republic under the administration of President Shehu Shagari, Ajaokuta has recorded significant corruption cases leading to the prosecution of some of the Nigerian contractors by Buhari’s military administration. Even though statistical data on corruption cases are not presented, unaccountability and lack of transparency in the use of public funds allocated to the completion of the project have been considered a primary challenge (Adegbite 2021). Corruption in the steel complex has affected the management process, especially in terms of planning, utilisation of budgetary allocation and procurement of infrastructures. The problem of corruption is subsequently complicated by the inadequate funds allocated available to complete the project. For instance, the allocation made under President Muhammadu Buhari’s regime was to find prospective private partnerships, not the completion. The $1 billion Ajaokuta fund from the excess crude account bill was rejected by the president given Nigeria’s fragile economy as an excuse (Azimazi 2019). Hence the reality of the steel complex from the government’s perspective is that unless a successful public–private partnership is secured, the government’s political and economic will to complete the complex is very low. By far, the longevity of the project has led to the ageing of the plant and infrastructure facilities available at the site. The successive government

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since 1999 with the interest of completing and operating the Nigeria Ajaokuta Steel industry firstly spent millions on understanding the state of the facilities as well as their appropriateness given the consistent advancement in technology. In 2001, it was estimated that the steel rolling mills will need a financial implication of about $15 and $20 million to refurbish and rehabilitate each steel rolling mill, and an estimated financial implication of $500 million for Delta Steel (Adegbite 2021). However, given the astronomical increase in the global economy, such funds will be grossly inadequate in light of current realities. The longevity of the project also affects the commitment of private investors who are always wary of the state of the steel complex and its possibilities of operation in light of its current state. In addition to the state of infrastructures in the steel, the complex is the issues of supporting external infrastructural facilities such as rail lines for transportation, the availability of raw materials (coking coal), uninterrupted power supply, and an ocean terminal among other requires adequate attention and must be well programmed it the steel complex will operate as envisioned (Adegbite 2021). The resuscitation of the steel industry and eventual workings needs adequate manpower. Unlike other sectors, the construction of Ajaokuta steel requires trained manpower. Given the longevity of the steel complex, Nigerians trained who worked in the facilities during construction with the Russian contractors have either sought better opportunities elsewhere while others have to stay idle for long years and have lost their consistency with the industry and its global best practices (Adegbite 2021). Hence, successive government wariness of completing the facilities without external assistance becomes disillusioned considering the unavailability of manpower and the cost of employing or supporting foreign staff to work on the steel complex. In the first phase of the project, the Russian contractor was expected to train about 1500 indigenous manpower featuring engineers, technicians and operational staff (Osita 1995). This manpower was sent to India, Russia, Canada, the United States, Italy, France, Britain and Japan with a successful record of steel complex. However, in light of current economic realities, it will be difficult for the Nigerian government to finance such training again in the resuscitation process. Also, the use of foreign contractors and their manpower is not sustainable for Nigeria’s steel industry. In light of Nigeria’s fragile economy, it would be difficult to commit millions to such a process while other mega projects are lying uncompleted.

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The availability of raw materials for the operation of the industry is another major challenge affecting government and private investors’ commitment. According to Adegbite (2021), three major raw materials are important to the operation of the steel complex namely Iron ore, coking coal and limestone. However, despite the fact the Itakpe mines will provide the needed iron ore, the absence of suitable coking coal which will have to be imported and transported to the steel industry is another major challenge. Nigeria coal found in Enugu and Lafia is non-coking and high in ash and sulphur respectively. Other raw materials are dolomite limestone, dolomite, magnesite, foundry sand, refractory clays and quartzines. A basic challenge of even local industry is the absence of suitable transport systems such as railways to facilitate the easy movement of raw materials to the steel site. Adegbite (2021) notes that transporting local materials by road for the operation of the steel industry is not a viable option. Hence, the question of importing coking coal and the logistics of local materials have also affected government and private investors’ commitment to the steel complex. Hence, the question of Ajaokuta has become more complicated than completing the steel complex. The process of sustainable and efficient operation has become more important just as its completion.

Restructuring Before Privatisation: Needs Analysis from South Korea Steel Industry The importance of the Ajaokuta steel complex in Nigeria’s domestic and manufacturing economy, West Africa sub-region and African economy cannot be underestimated. Nigeria is principally an oil-based and dependent economy with revenue from the sale of crude oil constituting significantly to budgetary revenues and close to 90% of its export the service dominates the economy of the state (Ndah and Gbadebo 2020: 27). Second, the service sector rather than the manufacturing sector has become the most important sector. In 2017, the services sector has overtaken both the agriculture and manufacturing sectors to become the biggest sector in the Nigerian economy and representing about 58% (Gbadebo 2020: 7). Hence, the primary debate surrounds the diversification and sustainability of the economy. Before Nigeria’s signing of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in July 2018 and the ratification of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Common External Tariff (CET), Nigeria’s government’s reluctance was

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based on the fact that Nigerian market will be flooded by goods from other African and non-African countries, thereby undermining domestic manufacturing and agribusiness capacities, many of which are currently producing below their potentials. However, given the fact that Nigeria has signed these trade agreements, the next step is to brace up the challenges by increasing the potential of its manufacturing sector among which Ajaokuta steel remains numero uno. In other to provide some perspective on the parameters of need analysis, it is important to discuss some key factors that must be considered. As argued by Adegbite (2021), the decision to complete the Ajaokuta steel must take into consideration several factors among which include: the current market size and projected demand; existing and planned domestic capacity for steel production; capital expenditure required to complete, and rehabilitate the steel plants: financial outlays expected to profit annually; the financial implication of supporting infrastructures such as electricity, railway transportation, the question of raw materials and transportation to site, manpower needed to operate the plant, the position of private investors and the international economic status of the plants. These factors will suffice in our arguments for possible ingredients which can be learned from the Republic of Korea case. Successive government efforts at completing and operationalising the Ajaokuta steel complex have taken a single pattern since 1999 which is sourcing private–public partnerships. President Muhammadu Buhari’s administration has also embarked on this course. The administration contracted the Messrs CPCS Transform Consortium for the services of concessioning Ajaokuta steel company limited and also the National Iron Ore Mining Complex in Itakpe to suitable and private investors with track records in the steel industry. However, given the inability of private– public partnerships to solve the Ajaokuta logjam, the primary question is what other means can be employed to solve the decade’s moribund steel project. Adegbite (2021) suggested that, unlike Nigeria’s inland rolling mills which have been conceded to private investors, it remains the responsibility of the private investors to solve the conundrums of inland rolling mills’ raw materials (billets). The establishment of inland rolling mills was premised on the fact that the Ajaokuta and Delta integrated steel will provide the inland rolling mills with billets needed for operation. However, given the constraint faced, the rolling mill is left with the option of billets importation or the inland rolling mills to erect facilities needed to produce billets which will require large capital.

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Despite the various contracts and deals made, integrated steel remains one of the living mega failures in Nigeria’s industrialisation and manufacturing sector. The privatisation of the Ajaokuta steel complex during this period also led to the privatisation of three inland rolling mills in Nigeria namely the Osogbo, Jos and Katsina rolling mills which concluded in 2004 (Adegbite 2021). The effort to outsource the Ajaokuta integrated steel has all ended as mega failures. On the Ajaokuta integrated steel complex, Adegbite suggested three basic options namely “to remain in the public domain as 100% state-owned enterprises”; “to divest the majority of the equity with the government remaining a minority shareholder with not more than 30% equity interest”; “to privatize 100% to private investors” (Adegbite 2021). Drawing from countries of the East Asian experience, it is important to state that the Ajaokuta steel industry is an important project that should remain completely in the public domain. However, this must be followed with the readiness of the Nigerian government to complete the project after which privatisation can be explored. East Asian countries remain among the world ranking top steel-producing countries. In 2019, China accounts for the largest share of global crude steel production followed by Japan—ranked second and the Republic of Korea ranked sixth (Jun Ma 2021: 1). These three East Asian countries cumulatively account for 62% of world crude steel production (Jun Ma 2021: 1). The development of the East Asian countries steel industry can be described within the catchup theories (Gerschenkron 1962; Sato and Sato 2016). The case of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) provides the fourth option of restructuring before privatisation. However, under restructuring, the project and its operation remain 100% in the public domain. The Republic of Korea (South Korea), despite being one of the poorest countries in post-Second World War has enjoyed rapid growth and development since 1960 thereby emerging as one of the leading industrially advanced countries. The Republic of Korea advancement was accomplished by borrowing from Japan’s growth and development pattern. The basic question is how was the Republic of Korea able to catch up in the steel industry in a very short time. In other words, the subsequent paragraphs will discuss how the Republic of Korea’s steel industry growth and development can become a model for the Nigerian government to emulate. Korea just like Nigeria was also disadvantaged in areas of steel industry, technical know-how and construction of integrated steel plants. For

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instance, Korea had not produced any good quality iron ore or coke, so all raw materials had to be imported from abroad neither did it have the technology and know-how to build and operate an integrated steel plant or the required manpower (Makoto 2016; Jie Yang 2021). However, despite the numerous objections to the Korean government’s plan to build an integrated steel mill was explicitly pursued under the Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1967–1971). The steel industry goal began with the establishment of the Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO) in 1968. However, unlike Western countries in which innovation was the primary drive for industrialisation, Korean industrialisation was based on learning the borrowed technology from abroad and then imitating it (Eul Yong 2003; Makoto 2016). Korean steel industry technology, market and capital reflect the state’s dependence on foreign country (Japan) technology. In 1969, the Korean government was able to persuade Japan to provide the necessary technical assistance and a commercial loan (US$67 million) to purchase Japanese machinery and equipment (Eul Yong 2003). Other industrial capital needed for the construction and operation of the steel industry was raised through share subscriptions by the Ministry of Finance, the Korea Development Bank and the Korea Tungsten Company, and with loans from Korean banks (Eul Yong 2003). Riding on the tail of tigers (successfully advanced states in the steel industry) is very important for undeveloped economies with the plan of industrialisation. The advantage of seeking assistance is that such a state can utilise technologies and know-how already available in industrial countries rather than trying to “re-invent” them (Eul Yong 2003). This also saves developing countries the time and cost associated with re-inventing or innovation. However, while Nigeria and the Republic of Korea both seek assistance from the wider world, the Republic of Korea had a strong absorptive capability and a concerted development effort while Nigeria neglected this important aspect. For instance, “technology transfer is usually limited to formal, codified and embodied technology without the tacit elements often involved. The sellers of technology do not usually assist to help buyers learn all the small but crucial steps involved in a particular product or process technology. The buyers of technology must have the technological capability to acquire, adapt and improve imported technology” (Eul Yong 2003).

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Government’s role in the growth and development of New Industrialised Economies (NIEs) cannot be underestimated. The developmental state perspective has identified the key role of government as an essential ingredient in the development process. The steel industry in Korea was influenced by the government’s extensive commitment and support for the industry. The Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO) was established in 1968 and received extensive government support in terms of operation and market protection. For instance, the “Steel Industry Promotion Law” 4 of 1970 granted POSCO numerous benefits, including low-cost and long-term foreign capital, discounts for electricity and rail transport, limits on steel imports, provision of subsidies, construction of infrastructures such as a harbour and roads (Shin and Ciccantell 2009; Chung and Sa 2017). The government in particular protected POSCO and its operation from private bodies. For instance, the government protected POSCO from Jeong Ju-Young Hyundai Group during subsequent integrated steel construction (Makoto 2016). Also, “major import substitution activities supported by the government and which require steel, such as shipbuilding, refining, automobile and machine manufacture, were allocated to private sector firms, usually, one of the Chaebols while the high-risk venture of steel was restricted to POSCO” (Eul Yong 2003). In addition, although POSCO operates as a State-Owned Enterprise (SOE), it was not run by the government. POSCO administration was independent of government intervention and operated like a private firm. “The law setting up POSCO falls under the Commercial Law of Korea as a joint-stock company, with its board of directors and stockholders, not the government, running the company” (Eul Yong 2003). The independence of POSCO’s management from government intervention was assumed in advance. Eul Yong (2003) justifies the appropriateness of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for high-risk and large industrial projects like the steel industry. According to Yong (2003), “developing economies’ market and private sectors are often weak and poorly developed. Hence, their commitment to large industrial projects is generally weak”. However, while reliance on foreign sources may be considered necessary for the supply of capital and technology to start such a project the operation and further development should employ indigenous manpower. In further circumstances, the SOE may be preferred to the private sector, especially since the government has to give monopoly status to the

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project to achieve scale economies. In addition, excellent managerial capability contributed to POSCO’s successful management of the steel industry. Although POSCO operates as a SOEs, the managers ensure that government interference in its management and operations was limited. However, this proved more successful given the government’s readiness to make POSCO’s management independent of government intervention and red tape. POSCO was privatised in the 2000s following the effect of the financial crisis which occurred in 1997. Korea also invested in indigenous technological capacity by investing in human capital and research and development during the initial phase of Japan’s assistance (Eul Yong 2003). At the formative and construction stage of the steel industry, POSCO invested significantly and support indigenous (Korean) engineers through the process of understanding the construction and operation of steel mills under Japanese engineers. During the construction stage, POSCO engineers not only worked closely with Japanese counterparts but received intensive training in iron and steel making. In subsequent phases of expansion Korean steel industry expansion witnessed the reduction of foreign engineers and at a more progressive phase, Korean engineers took control of steel mill construction and operation in the Republic of Korea. The successful performance of the Korean steel industry is anchored on three major factors despite the underdevelopment nature of the state economy, lack of experience in building and operating an integrated steel mill and weak market. These factors include: (1) the role of government and its political will, (2) the independent operation of POSCO and its excellent managerial capacity, (3) the incorporation and utilisation of indigenous technological capability alongside substantial investments in human capital (manpower) and Research and Development (R&D). However, all three factors have been equally absent in the case of Nigeria. Nigerian governments have not been wholly committed to the steel industry. Also, unlike POSCO, Nigerian governments assumed the responsibility for the completion and operation of the steel industry leading to wider spread corruption, mismanagement and inefficiency. A similar institution like POSCO—National Steel Development Authority established on 14 August 1971 under promulgated Decree No. 19 was dissolved in 1979 after the promulgation of the National Steel Council Decree. The decree led to the establishment of the steel industry and government total control. Also, in terms of incorporation and utilisation

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of indigenous technological capability with heavy investments in human capital (manpower) and R&D, Nigeria’s government commitment has been very poor thereby leading to economic and industrial independence.

Conclusion The chapter examines the trajectory of government enterprise with a particular focus on the Ajaokuta industrialisation steel project in Nigeria. Since 1979, despite Nigeria’s government’s commitment to engineering industrialisation through the Ajaokuta, the country is not ranked among the first fifty countries producing steel in the world. Despite successive Nigerian government commitment to engineering industrialisation in the state through the steel industry, the outcomes have fallen below expectations that the steel industry has become moribund after draining the national treasury. However, the chapter interrogation of the Republic of Korea’s path in the steel industry provides us with some important key variables. The Republic of Korea’s steel industry’s formative stage presents a concrete example and evidence of how a developing country with little steel industrialisation technology become one of the world-class steel producers. Within two decades, the country has achieved significantly in terms of steel industry size, the quality of steel produced and performance. From the Korea case study, the chapter finds out that the government’s role and steel institutions, development of humans, materials as well as research and development were crucial to the emancipation of Korea’s steel industry. It is clear that government intervention was minimal, and the company was managed just like a privately owned firm through POSCO. An interesting question is whether Nigeria should adopt the Korean approach to solve the Ajaokuta steel logjam. While the answer to this question is not simple. What is happening in Nigeria’s Ajaokuta steel industry is a product of a complicated perennial crisis in Nigeria’s political economy. However, the chapter is suggesting a path where the horse is put before the cart by restructuring the industry while privatisation can be discussed when the steel industry is completed.

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CHAPTER 10

The Colonial Nigeria’s Impact in the Allied Bloc’s Victories During the World War II Timothy Chibuike Anyanwu and Victor Ojakorotu

Introduction War is one of the major themes in human history; irrespective of continent, country, region, community and so on. Consequently, it has drawn the attention of many scholars and analysts who try to study and explain wars using different theories and approaches. Sometimes, people try to justify certain wars, why a group of people must fight wars in certain cases and why others who should ordinarily remain aloof get involved in a war that ordinarily does not concern them. To explain this, it is obvious that the primary aim of executing a war is victory. Therefore, to achieve this aim, the various parties in a war make such diplomatic overtures as the

T. C. Anyanwu (B) Department of History and Strategic Studies, Alex Ekwueme Federal University Ndufu Alike Ikwo, Achoro-Ndiagu, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] V. Ojakorotu School of Government Studies, North West University, Mafikeng, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. J. Ani (ed.), Political Economy of Colonial Relations and Crisis of Contemporary African Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0245-3_10

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formation of alliances and so on to involve any means that will guarantee their victory. It is on the foregoing premise that when World War II started in Europe in 1939, both the Allied and Axis Powers tried to adjust both their foreign and domestic policies to suit the war efforts as the two blocs lured friendly nations to their sides (Korieh 2014). Therefore, it surfaces to sum that the colonial Nigeria got involved in the war because the British colonial government needed the contribution of Nigeria to execute the war in her favour. Another explanation given to the involvement of Nigeria into the war was captured by Nwachukwu (1997) when he pointed that as soon as the war kicked off; the various factions went on a spree to change the course of things in one another’s oversea colonial territories. This led to the mobilization of locales to defend their territories. Aside the conscription by the colonial leaders, many Nigerians, both men and women voluntarily got themselves involved in the war (National Archives Enugu, CSE 1/85/8614, Vol. III; Lugard, CO 583/36/ 26633; Lugard to Colonial, 17 May, 1916, CO/445/37/48999, War Office to Colonial Office 4 September, 1916; Korieh 2014). There were both direct and indirect involvement of Nigerians. They made up both combatant and non-combatant participants. Even women who could not get directly involved contributed money to colonial offices (Korieh 2014; Rhodes House, Miss Afr.s.546, F.B. Carr papers), while others encouraged their husbands, fathers, sons and brothers to contribute to the war efforts (NAE, ABADIST 1/26/958a). There were also letters of encouragements written by both women and men to the colonial offices in Nigeria. Mrs. Agnes Garuba on 22 July 1943 wrote to the District Officer, Aba encouraging and pledging her unalloyed support to the British flag (NAE, ABADIST 1/26/958b) and stating the willingness of people to serve as warrant officers that would later lead to the Aba women riot (Ani and Uwizeyimana 2021). Others volunteered their shops, vehicles and so on to the war effort. Looking at all the impacts of the colonial Nigerians during this time, Korieh (2014), pointed that in Nigeria, communities mobilized to support the war effort. They contributed financial support both directly and indirectly. They supplied soldiers in a veracity of capacities and they provided resources, including nourishment for the troops. The sessions that followed are devoted to examining the level of support provided by Nigerians during these two wars. Such areas as combatant personnel, economic, psychological and social contributions are covered in the paragraphs that followed.

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Methodology Considering that this research is a naturalistic study, the researcher employed qualitative research approach. Then for easy understanding of the report of the findings, there is the use of thematic and chronological fashion. This approach helped to capture the research variable in the realworld setting. Chronological fashion was employed in the arrangement of the work into themes. The need for these approaches is to show the linkages between the various events under study. Finally, descriptive method was used for the presentation of findings. Furthermore, as a historical study, my work drew from primary and secondary sources of data. The primary sources used were archival materials, government gazettes, newspapers, oral interviews and so on. As for the secondary data, having gathered information from text by other scholars studied and classified them in a way that drives home the objectives of this study, this researcher had to employ content and secondary analysis was necessary. Such secondary sources included textbooks, unpublished theses, journal works and so on.

Colonial Nigerians as Combatants in the World War II I never saw men fight with more dash or ferocity, they came back and just dumped the hair. We were amazed (Nwachukwu 1997). In the foregoing quote, Nwachukwu captured the words of a British Officer who was reporting on the gallantry of Nigerian troops during the World War II in Japan. When Italy declared war on the Allied forces, it threatened the British interest in East Africa. This alarmed the British government who recalled the barbaric experience of the Battle of May Chew of 31 March 1936 where the Italians used poisonous gas against Haile Selassie’s retreating soldiers. Having examined the trend of the war and the Italians way of executing wars, the British government knew that her colonial territories in the East Africa and beyond were in danger (Grip and Hart 2009; Nwachukwu 1997). Consequently, the colonial government decided to involve East Africans to combat the Italian forces. Unfortunately, the East Africans were no match to the superior military might of the Italians. There was therefore a need for reinforcement. Lt. General D.P. Dikinson who was in command of the Allied forces there was already using both troops from Gold Coast and India to complement

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the East African troops. But this was not enough. Consequently, more reinforcement was needed. This reinforcement came from Battalions of the 23 Nigerian Brigade who arrived the East African coast in June 1941. Following her doggedness in the World War I as exemplified in the above report, the British government understood the need to involve her colonial Nigerian soldiers as combatants in the tough battles of the World War II. Like the ferocity of Nigerians in the World War I, the gallantry of these men was instrumental in containing the Italian troops at Moyale, Dolo, Yaveilo, Kismayu and Mogadishu. Nigeria Army Education Corps and Schools (1992), accounted that the Nigerian battalion had the major task of pursuing “the enemy to Mogadishu since Jelib had already been captured on 22nd February, 1941”. Accordingly, the task was accomplished and such booties as 350,000 gallons of fuel, 80,000 gallons of aviation spirit, stores and so on were recovered from Mogadishu (Nigeria Army Education Corps and Schools, 1992). Having accomplished this, the troops were also commanded to embark on other offensives in such places as Jijiga. In Jijiga, they covered a distance of 209 miles in order to achieve a reasonable victory. By the evening of 17 March 1942, they were already in Jijiga from where they advanced to Harar, on the Abyssinian highlands where they fought until victory was assured; although many Nigerians died while others were wounded (Nwachukwu 1997). By April, efforts were channelled towards safe returning of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia whom the Italian troops removed from his kingdom. Success was recorded when Nigerian forces joined in pushing out the Italian troops out of Ethiopian as they entered Addis Ababa on 5 April 1941, thereby paving way for the safe return of Haile Selassie. Nwachukwu (1997) observed that to guarantee the safe return of the Emperor, the Nigerian troops used eight weeks to cover a distance of 1700 miles between River Tana and Addis Ababa. Finally, in the offensives in the East African front, Nigerian troops were instrumental in the Round Field battle where about one hundred Italians were captured as prisoners of war, as they proceeded to secure Abalti where about 2800 Italians were also captured as prisoners of war. By August 1941, Galla-Sidamo operation was concluded thereby sealing the East African expedition. Around the dry season of 1943–1944, the two warring blocs took the war to South East Asia. Here, the Allied Powers targeted Burma, while the Japanese troops were out for a show of power in China for participating

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in the war on the Allied side, observed (Nwachukwu 1997). The news of the gallantry of the Nigerian troops got to Brigadier Wingate, who was commanding an Allied army in India. Thus, there was the demand of the Nigerian regiment. Consequently, the 3rd West African Brigade was the Nigeria’s contingent to the Burma campaign (Nwachukwu 1997). Describing their way from Nigeria to Asia, Nwachukwu (1997) reported that: The force which arrived Ibadan by rail from Northern Nigeria in April 1943 undertook simulation exercise in the jungle camps around Ibadan in preparation for deployment in the battle fields in Japanese jungles of Burma. In September 1943, the troops departed Burma passing through the Cape, reaching Bombay on 7th November, 1943. Adequately equipped for the campaign, the contingent had 50 days of African ration loaded on the ship for consumption on the voyage, together with three days of land ration.

Hope was restored when these ebullient Nigerians arrived. Prior to their arrival, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Burma were already in the possession of the Axis Bloc who had the upper hand because of the military expertise of the Japanese soldiers. But the emergence of the 3 Nigerian Brigade of 81(WA) Division under the command of General W.J. Slim brought a desirable change. This was made evident in the battles of Arakan Akyab where the Nigerians were used as a flank guard which covered Kaladan valley where they cut off the communications of the axis power until they captured Kyauktaw. Notwithstanding the counter offensive by the Axis armies in February 1944, the Nigerian soldiers were resilient and regrouped on March 11, after crossing the Praing Chaung River. The attack they launched on 17 March dealt a catastrophic blow on the enemies as there were massive casualties. By April 9, the White City was attacked by the Japanese. The ferocity of this attack led to the invitation of the 6th Nigerian Regiment and the 77 Brigade in the battle of “Operation Op Hill”. During this battle, such Nigerians as Sargent Major Hana Kin (who was trained in Zaria, Nigeria), and so on distinguished themselves as they were killing and presenting the heads of Japanese to their British colleagues (CO445/ 44/56760). At the end, the Japanese forces were forced to surrender. Describing the impacts of beheading the Japanese, Nwachukwu (1997) reported that:

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This action was in line with the practice back home where one had to display the head of one’s victim as a sign of heroism. The British officer was said to have exclaimed: ‘“I never saw men fight with more dash or ferocity, they came back and just dumped the hair. We were amazed”’. This action from the Nigerian troops was said to have helped in the successful prosecution of the war as many frightened Japanese surrendered instead of being killed in battle, contrary to their usual preference of death to being captured. They believed that Africans eat human heads and it generated much fear in them. ‘This fear, inspite of being unfounded, became an asset to the Allied Forces as the Japanese began to surrender or abandon their battle positions at the slightest pressure, as an alternative to being killed and beheaded, an act they regarded as a taboo’.

Economic Impacts of the Colonial Nigerians in the World War II One of the most essential things to man is food. The fact that survival is not possible without food cannot be overemphasized. Similarly, during wars, availability of food becomes one of the primary targets of warring parts. This explains why over the years, people try to sabotage supplies of food to their enemies during wars (Ezeani 2013; Ekwueme 2009). Citing the case of the Nigeria-Biafra War, Ezeani (2013) observed the place of food in straightening war efforts. He quoted the Nigerian Finance Minister who reiterated thus all is fair in war, and starvation is one is one of the weapons of war. I don’t see why we should feed our enemies fat in order for them to fight harder (Ezeani 2013). The foregoing were all indications that blockading the sources through which an enemy gets such economic advantages as food is a formidable military strategy. This explains why warring parties always adjust their policies to favour the supply of food, among other things during wars. When the World War II started, the British government took note of the foregoing. This led to several policies both in the metropolitan and overseas territories such as the Nigerian colony, observed (Korieh 2014). For instance, from 1939, the British government embarked on a series of information campaigns and propaganda where frantic efforts were made to convince her colonies to participate in the war by redirecting their local economic activities to those that would aid the war. The British made the colonies to believe that the war was “People’s War”. Calder (1969) explained that this term described the war as that which should be fought

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by everyone united in common cause, and a good war, fought by decent people for decent values against indecent enemies. This ideological propaganda had effects on the aboriginals as they were fully convinced to invest in the war both on the individual and group basis. Consequent to the foregoing drive, on Friday, the 15 October 1943, the Association of African Importers and Traders of Cycle Spare Parts, Aba which numbered over 300 men passed a unanimous resolution. Article one of the resolution which was signed by Mr. Egbo Nwoko, E.O. Igwilo, G.N. Okereke, P.M. Amakwe, P.A. Okpala, M.O. Agba, C.U. Obioha, Y.O. Nwankwo, S.M. Odoh, and J.O. Okere reads thus: That we hereby renew our loyalty to the King Emperor and re-affirm our determination to stand by the side of the Allied nationals to persecute this war to victorious end when Hitlerism and all it stands for are crushed down and the world made safe for Democracy, when oppression and other forms of man’s inhumanity to man will cease…God save the King. Long live the Empire, And Down with Hitlerism. (NAE, CSE 1/85/8614, Vol. III, see Anyanwu and Ani 2020)

The articles that followed after this revealed that these colonial Nigerian businessmen were not having rosy days during this war. There were challenges their businesses were passing through, but these were never the major concern as they made their determination to prosecute the war against the Axis power as their priority was exemplified by placing this allegiance as the number one on the article. In the same manner, the Motor Transport Union, Onitsha on the 16 October 1943 wrote through the Resident Officer, Owerri Province to the Chief Commissioner, Eastern Province of Nigeria. In the letter, they complained of the ill-treatment melted on them in their transportation businesses. They decried that the monopoly of motor transport affairs in Onitsha by Mr. Melikian of the Armels should not have occurred at the critical moment of the war, when it was the right time for them to do the best they could in support of the war effort (NAE, CSE 1/85/8614, Vol. III, see Anyanwu and Ani 2020). Looking at the following, it can be argued that this transporter may have been suffering different hinges in their business because of the colonial presence. It can further be averred that these challenges were managed before the letter. Finally, it can be concluded that the letter came at the time it did because they needed to invest in the war effort to win it for the Allied Bloc. Furthermore, they (Motor Transport Union, Onitsha) agreed

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to surrender their lorries for free conveyance of His Majesty’s Mail, from Onitsha to Enugu until the duration of the war. The following were some of the owners and numbers of the lorries surrendered for this war effort. S/N

Lorry owner

Lorry number

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Peter Achukwu P.O. Okpalugo Okudo Ikeako Benson Okeke C.E. Ubabuko Charles Ojukwu George Nwoliga

ON1300 ON1327 L2671 OW2491 K2008 OW2272 PH493

(NAE, CSE 1/85/8614 Vol III)

In the same manner, the Association of Garri Traders, Aba passed and signed a resolution on 23 August 1944 where among other things, the association having embarked on: Contributing our quota towards the defeat of Hitlerism and all that it stands for in order that Democracy will rule the world and all forms of man’s inhumanity to man be wiped off the face of the earth; whereas we, as subjects of His Majesty the King are doing our best to help win the war and have our brothers in the war theatre who are shedding their blood and facing danger for the freedom of mankind from the atrocities of Hitlerism so that Democracy…may triumph…Representatives members of this association, during the mass meeting…held in Aba today, August 23, 1944, have unanimously agreed to fight against…Hitlerism and all that it stands and whereas it has been further agreed that a Constitutional Resolution should be passed and communicated to the Authorities concerned BE IT RESOLVED…that this association do hereby renew the loyalties of the members of His Majesty the King and our willingness to stand by the side of the Allied Nations until victory over Hitlerism comes and Swastika disappears for the Union Jack to fly… GOD SAVE THE KING.LONG LIVE THE EMPIRE. (NA ABADIST 14/1/875)

Like their men counterparts, women showed their eagerness to contribute their quotas in the war efforts. Apart from encouraging their husbands, sons and brothers, they further took bold steps in writing letters to the colonial government to neglect their gender and give them the chance to impact in the war. For instance, a letter written by Mrs.

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Victoria Ohigbokie to the District Officer, Aba in 25 May 1943 reads thus: I beg most respectfully to submit this humble application to you to ask for a little chance to do my bit towards the winning of the present war. I have noticed that the cost of garri (the staple food in Nigeria) is high in big towns all over Nigeria today. There might be money adequate for the purchase of garri but there may not be sufficient garri to be had for the feeding of His Majesty’s troops in the area. I have then asked if I can be given some contract to help on buying garri for the Military Department of the area. The garri would be carried in bags by any convenient means His Majesty’s government might find at their disposal. Such would at least alleviate some of the previous difficulties experienced in the purchase of this important foodstuff. I would be thankful if your worship could let the authorities concerned know of this application. I am staying in Ndom Ebom in the Aba-Oron road. This station is 57 miles from Aba. (NAE, ABADIST 14/1/875)

Socio-Psychological Impacts Apart from the above accounts of people who volunteered either their businesses or other things, there were other groups of people whose contributions were more of advices, moral and psychological effort. The efforts of these people are so important to be pointed out because in war, keeping the moral high is a step towards achieving victory. Among these social roles included the activities of the Nigerian regiments in Asia. Nwachukwu (1997) pointed that the morale of the armies of the Allied Forces was maintained by such soldiers as RSM. Chari Margumeri and other non-commissioned officers of the Nigerian contingent. These men formed the Corps of Drums. The corps during entertainment in Asia wore the dresses they took with them from Nigeria. Their activities provided both psychological relief and morale anchorage during this time. Back home in Nigeria, there were the activities of such people as Mrs. Agnes Garuba who wrote from Makurdi in the present-day Benue State of Nigeria. In her letter dated 22 July 1943, she described herself as a widow of the World War II because of the absence of her husband who was transferred from “Hausa to Enugu and to overseas”. She reiterated that the women supported and encouraged their husbands, sons and brothers who were fighting in the war because Nigerians were in the same

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flag with the British government and by extension, the entire countries fighting under the Allied Bloc. She further recited a song thus: “Rule! Rule Britannia, Britannia, the pride of Ocean, Britannia shall never, never be a slave. May our God help to he so forever Amen” (NAE, ABADIST 1/26/958). The same was also applicable to Mrs. Rebecca U. Alozie who wrote from Kano to the District Officer, Aba on the 27 July 1943. In her letter, she attached documents showing her moral and material impacts “in the war work for victory” (NAE, ABADIST 14/1/873).

Conclusion Historians and others whose interests are on the World War II have assessed the war from multifarious dimensions. Yet such studies focused on the might and superiorities of the Allied Powers thereby ignoring the various aspects that such colonial peoples as the Nigerians contributed immensely and won battles of the war in many war zones. Using selected petitions, colonial newspapers, government gazettes, textbooks and so on, this research has examined the numerous ways the colonial Nigerians contributed their quotas in what they saw as the “People’s War” against humanity. The research made no effort to discredit the ingenuity of the Allied forces during the war. It rather pointed that this has been overstretched to the detriment of such non-European contributors like the colonial Nigeria. The research further examined different aspects of the contributions of the colonial Nigerian people which included economic, military personnel, and socio-psychological roles. It therefore stands to argue here that this research has succeeded in providing an insight into a neglected history of the World War II.

Bibliography Africa Year Book and Who’s Who 1977, 1st edition. Ani, K. J., & Uwizeyimana, D. E. (2021). Gender, Conflict and Peace-building in Africa: A Comparative Historical Review of Zulu and Igbo Women in Crisis Management. International Journal of Criminology and Sociology. 10:1726– 1731. Anyanwu, T. C., & Ani, K. J. (2020). Slavery and Colonialism: The Roots of Postcolonial Conflicts in Africa. World Affairs. 24(1):132–141. Asante, M. K. (2007). The History of Africa: The Quest for Eternal Harmony. New York: Rutledge.

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Calder, A. (1969). The Peoples War. New York: Random House. Editorial, West African Pilot, 12 February 1942. Ekwueme, Z. (2009). Biafra: No Statue of Limitation on Murder of Nd’Igbo Nigeriaworld. https://nigeriaworld.com/articles/2009/jan/22. html. Accessed February 21, 2021. Ezeani, E. (2013). In Biafra Africa Died: The Diplomatic Plot. London: Veritas Lumen Publishers. Grip, L., & Hart, J. (2009). The Use of Chemical Weapons in the 1935–36 Italo-Ethiopian War. https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.sipri. org/sites/default/files/Italo-Ethiopian-war.pdf&sa=U&ved=2ahUKEwja_ azMv_ruAhVTNuwKHVBjAcUQFjACegQIAxAB&usg=AOvVaw3zPuOo Hnaeyo64pkKyNeIr. Accessed February 21, 2021. Hoyt, E. P., Jr. (1968). The Germans Who Never Lost: The Story of the Konisherg. New York. Korieh, J. C. eds. (2014). Life Not Worth Living: Nigerian Petitions Reflecting an African Society’s Experiences During World War II. North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press. National Archives Enugu. (1916). Confidential Report, National Archives Enugu, CSE 1/85/8614, Vol. III (Lugard, CO 583/36/26633). National Archives Enugu. (1916). Confidential Report, Lugard to Colonial, 17 May 1916, CO/445/37/48999. National Archives Enugu. (1916). Confidential Report, War Office to Colonial Office 4 September 1916. National Archives Enugu. (1943). Confidential Report on Aba District NAE, ABADIST 14/1/873. National Archives Enugu. (1943). Confidential Report on Aba District, NAE, ABADIST 1/26/958. National Archives Enugu. (1943). Confidential Report on Aba District, NAE, CSE 1/85/8614, Vol. III. Nwachukwu, A. C. (1997). The Nigerian Veteran: 50 Years of Legioneering. Abuja: Pathway Publishers Limited. Selected Petitions and Resolutions from the National Archives, Enugu (NAE). Timeline of 20th and 21st Century Wars. https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/tim eline-of-20th-and-21st-century-wars. Accessed January 31, 2019.

CHAPTER 11

The Water Diplomacy Conundrums in the Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam (GERD) Dispute, 2015–2021 Maryam Mohammed Jungudo

Introduction Water diplomacy which often provides consensus solution to conflicting riparian states, has proven difficult to achieve among the main conflict parties of the river Nile basin (Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan). At the moment, there are two components to this dispute which are the Cooperative Framework Agreements (CFA) and the construction of the Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam (GERD). Unlike the CFA which involved all the river Nile riparian states, it is important to understand that the dispute over the dam construction in Ethiopia involves only Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan as the main conflicting parties. In 2011, the Ethiopian Government announced the construction of the Grand Ethiopia Renaissance

M. M. Jungudo (B) Department of History, Nigerian Army University Biu, Biu, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. J. Ani (ed.), Political Economy of Colonial Relations and Crisis of Contemporary African Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0245-3_11

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Dam (GERD) which is expected to be completed in 2023. After completion, the dam would be the 10th largest dam in the world and have the potential of generating about 6000 Mega Watts (MW) of electricity power supply in Africa. Perhaps, the dispute over the GERD construction has been a rivalry between the downstream countries of Sudan and Egypt on one hand, and Ethiopia upstream on the other. Despite disagreement over the construction of GERD, the Ethiopian government argued that the dam would no doubt immensely improve the livelihood of the inhabitants of the region. Recently, this tension escalated further after Ethiopian government announced to start filling the GERD reservoir. In this context, Egypt viewed this act as an action against water right agreement over the equitable allocation of the Nile’s water and therefore, called on a third party specifically, the United States to get involved. It is against this background that this paper examined the history of water diplomacy on the GERD disputes from 2015 to 2021.

A Brief History of the Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam (GERD) Dispute In an attempt to achieve the objectives of the national electrification program and climate-resilient green energy strategies, the Ethiopian government began the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile in 2011 (Jungudo 2022). This event took place just two days after the overthrow of the then Egyptian President Late Hosni Mubarak in the midst of the Egyptian revolution. Perhaps, the disputes over the construction of the GERD have been part of the long-standing conflict between downstream riparian states (Egypt and Sudan) and the upstream states (represented by Ethiopia) over the access of the waters of the Nile (Jungudo 2022). Despite the disagreements over the construction of the dam, Ethiopia continues with it, claiming that the hydroelectric project will greatly improve the livelihoods of Nile riparian states. However, this claim was challenged by the downstream riparian states, arguing that the project could impact and caused negative externalities on them and therefore kicked against the project completely (Jungudo 2022). For example, Egypt depended on almost 90 per cent on the waters of the Nile for industrial and domestic purposes and therefore, feared that the GERD will affect the amount of water flow to Egypt, hence, resulting

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in water scarcity in the country (John 2020). While Sudan fears that the GERD after completion could also decrease the electricity capacity production of its nation’s dam. On the other hand, the Ethiopian Government argued that the GERD after completion will have no negative impact on the downstream states, instead, the dam will be of assistance to both upstream and downstream riparian states of the river Nile including mitigation of drought, water salinity as well as a source of electricity (John 2020).

The Water Diplomacy Conundrums in the Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam (GERD) Dispute Since 2015 Since 2015 the Nile River riparian states had a series of negotiations in order to address the disputes as a result of the construction of this gigantic dam. The dam has created a serious aqua-conflict that has lingered for years in the region (Ani et al. 2018; Ani and Ojakorotu 2018). Below are some of the attempted negotiations: a. United Nations-led GERD Negotiation The United Nations (UN) intervened and succeeded in bringing the three conflicting parties to reach an agreement. In March 2015, the three countries agreed and signed the Declaration of Principles on the Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam (GERD) (European Union 2021). This agreement was inspired by the 1997 UN Convention on non-navigational uses of international watercourses, these principles include “equitable and reasonable utilization not to cause significant harm, cooperate on the filling and operation of the dam and exchange of information and data”. The UN emphasized “cooperation based on common understanding, mutual benefit, good faith, win–win and the principle of international law”. Despite series of negotiations and commission of technical reports, the three countries have not succeeded in agreeing on rules and measures that would secure the implementation of those principles. This led to the intervention by the United States in 2019.

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b. The United States of America (USA)-led Negotiation The intervention of the United States in 2019 after the President of Egypt Abdul Fatah Al-Sisi requested President Donald Trump to mediate the GERD issues is also one of the challenges in the GERD conflict (Mohammed 2021). Unfortunately, the US intervention does not solve the talks, but rather adds more salt to the injury. For example, in supporting the Egyptian side in the dispute, it was stated that during a broadcasted phone call between the President Donald Trump and Sudanese Prime Minister, Donald said, “Blow up the Dam” (John 2020). It is worthy to mention the weaknesses of US intervention in the GERD talks, for instance, Ethiopia and Sudan disagree on the role of the United States in the negotiation process because the decision of the Trump administration to get involved comes from only the Egyptian side. The US level of intervention was high, together with the World Bank they shifted their role from facilitator to one of the arbiters in the dispute. Though the United States did not get full recognition as a negotiator from all the three states, the US Secretary Mnuchin prepared a draft on the operation and filling of the dam and announced that final testing and filling should not take place without an agreement. As a result of this statement, the Government of Ethiopia discards the US-led negotiation and stressed its position to continue the agreement only through African-led mechanisms (Mohammed 2021). In accordance with the principle of the reasonable and equitable share of the water resource without causing significant harm to the riparian states, the Ethiopian government firmly stated that the filling of the dam will continue without getting any approval from anybody. On the other angle, Egypt and Sudan call for the involvement of the UN Security Council to stop Ethiopia from filling the dam until after an agreement is achieved. In this context, these two downstream riparian countries separately appeal to the UN Security Council that not reaching agreement will cause security tensions in the region. However, Ethiopia argues that the process should include all the NBI states, though Egypt and Sudan did not accept these demands (Mohammed 2021). The United States, during Donald Trump administration, decided to suspend the $100 million in aid to Ethiopia based on the allegations labelled against US-biased statement about the negotiation process. However, when President Joe Biden assumed office in 2020, he revoked this decision and changed the suspicion to other agendas (Mohammed 2021).

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c. The Arab League Negotiation The Arab League which consists of 22 Arab member countries is another major concerned actor in the GERD negotiation (Today 2021). As part of the Arab security, the League offered its support for Egypt and Sudan in the GERD dispute and considered the water security of Egypt and Sudan, even though, Mohammed (2021) describes three member countries (Djibouti, Somalia and Qatar) have rejected the Arab League’s resolution on the GERD dispute. Thus, some writers stated that Egypt as a host of the Arab League used it as an instrument of manipulating its interest within the Arab region. (Daily News Egypt 2020)

It is worthy of note that, several factors such as the nationalistic interest among the member states in the basin: the interlinkage of earlier contested negotiations on the utilization of the river; and the influence of the external actors has no doubt complicated the process of establishing cooperation among the Nile Basin countries. (Mohammed 2021)

d. The African Union (AU)-led GERD Negotiation The African Union (AU)-led delegation continues with the negotiation with the three leaders of Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia. This negotiation comes right after the United States of America (USA)-led negotiation team failed to arrive at a peaceful resolution accepted by all parties involved. According to Mehari (2020), the first and the second meetings between the conflicting parties on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) ever to be led by the African Union (AU) took place on 26 June 2020, and recently from 2 to 13 July 2020. In this regard, the AU issued a communique chaired by the AU chairperson, President Ramaphosa of South Africa on 27 June 2020. Moussa Faki (AU Commission chairperson) presented a report stating that already 90% of the issues of the Tripartite Negotiations between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan have already been resolved (Mehari 2020). Mehari (2020) stated that five significant decisions were made during the negotiation; these are as follows:

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1. The three Parties refrain from making any statements, or taking any actions that may jeopardize or complicate the AU-led process aimed at finding an acceptable solution on all outstanding matters. 2. The commission decided to augment the Tripartite Committee dealing with the GERD issues consisting of Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan with the participation of observers namely South Africa in its capacity as Chairperson of the AU, the Members of the Bureau of AU, experts from the AU Commission. 3. The augmented Committee presented its report to the Chairperson of the AU within a week from June 27, 2020 (hence before July 5, 2020). 4. It was all agreed to reconvene the AU-led meeting within two weeks from June 27, 2020 (i.e., before July 5, 2020) and consider a report on the outcome of the negotiations of the outstanding issues concerning the GERD matter. 5. Finally, the Bureau requested the UN Security Council (UNSC) to take note of the fact that the AU is seized of this matter.

The last round of AU-led talks took place in the first week of April at Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, hosted by the chaired President of DRC, President Felix Tshisekedi, who was the then Chair of AU (Mohammed 2021). Mehari (2020) mentions process has reached a breakthrough agreement revealing Ethiopia’s concessions on the following two major areas: 1) the need for a binding agreement (earlier Ethiopia refused any binding agreement, instead insisted on Sudan and Egypt to sign and ratify the CFA as the overarching Agreement for all riparian countries); and 2) the Agreement may not only be limited to the GERD filling and operation but may also include a comprehensive agreement on the Blue Nile River as well as future development projects on Blue Nile River….

At this stage, the main focus of disagreement is the annual replenishment plan, settlement of future conflict and the speed at which the reservoir would be filled (European Union 2021). Subsequent to the collapse of the treaty, the Sudan and Egypt’s air forces conducted a joint exercise known as the Eagles 2. The Egyptian President, Abdul Fatah Al-Sisi also warned Ethiopia that “all options were open” (European Union 2021).

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Unfortunately, the intensification of the conflict between the Ethiopian Government and the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) and border dispute further complicated the existing problematic relationship between Ethiopia and Sudan. Similarly, Sudan’s transitional government which is already facing internal and regional challenges, further demanded for AU’s involvement in the negotiation of the GERD. To this end, negotiation between the riparian states resumed on 21 November 2020 but also failed to yield a tentative covenant. Though, AU-led process is yet to yield any concrete progress, the fact that the AU is now in charge of the negotiations is a most welcome development. AU involvement, specifically the Bureau of Assembly of Heads of States, reinforces the principle of African solutions to African problems. e. The European Union (EU) Led-Negotiation The European Union (EU) has been an active actor in an attempt to foster collaboration among the three conflicting riparian states. As a strong supporter of AU-led negotiation process, EU involved itself and refused to put pressure on freezing funding just like the United States did during the Trump Administration. Instead, EU maintained the AU’s efforts to mediate the GERD issue and reach into solution among the riparian states because both Ethiopia and Egypt are their strategic partners in North East and the Horn of Africa (European Union 2021). In an attempt to reaffirm its position, the EU representatives and Vice President, Joseph Borell, stated that: …EU welcomes this engagement, which deserves unanimous support from the international community, in the days ahead, the parties will have to work out whether they can come to a collective agreement. If they do, and we encourage them to choose the conciliatory way forward, the benefits could be considerable; trust will be built; tensions diffused; and possibilities renewed for a conducive environment for investment in the development and water security of the entire basin. The European Union promised to fully supports a positive outcome for all conflicting parties. (Egypt Today 2021)

This statement is in line with the position reportedly reiterated by the European Council President, Charles Michel, in an interview with one of the Egyptian TV channels (Egypt Today 2021). Despite a series of

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talks, negotiations and external interventions, why is it difficult to solve the disagreements over the GERD? The next section will discuss these challenges.

The Challenges of Water Diplomacy in the GERD Disputes i. Lack of Legal Frameworks on the Utilization of the Waters of the Nile: There were several bilateral agreements signed from 1891 to 1959, between the former colonial powers mainly Great Britain and the downstream riparian states (Egypt and Sudan) in the Nile River basin, with no representative from the upstream states (Jungudo 2021). The terms of 1959 agreement allocated the waters of the Nile solely to the downstream states of Egypt and Sudan and denied the rights of the upstream states (Ethiopia and others) to use it for their development (John 2020). The major contributor of the Blue Bile which is Ethiopia rejected it because it was not represented and therefore, it was based on the colonial dictations. According to Mohammed (2021) the 1997 UN Convention on non-navigational uses of international watercourses was the key to various international laws and treaties on the utilization and sharing of transboundary water resources. These laws were rejected by some member states of the United Nations (UN) including the Nile River riparian states, especially Sudan and Egypt. In this sense, they are of the opinion that the colonial agreement should be regarded as a legal framework for the allocation and management of the river Nile water. Perhaps, Egypt’s dependency on the waters of the Nile makes it challenging to alter the agreement and also change the statuesque which makes water cooperation difficult to achieve in the region. In recent times, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) through the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) (Abadir 2011) attempted at fostering cooperation among the Nile riparian states, especially bringing together the interest of both the upstream and downstream states in the Nile Basin. This framework was also challenged by Egypt and Sudan. This issue of colonial agreements and lack of legal framework in the region, however, has become a major bond of contention.

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ii. Downstream Riparian’s National Interest: this issue has been one of the stubborn impediments to peace and stability in the waters of the Nile. For a long time, Egypt has claimed its historical right to an annual quota of 55.5 billion cubic meters of the Nile Waters. To this end, it has threatened Ethiopia’s use of the resources, yet the country is the source of 86 per cent of the river Nile water. The recent dispute over the construction of the Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam (GERD) and the rejection of the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), by both the downstream riparian states was manipulated in order to promote their national interest (Mohammed 2021). For instance, the Aswan Dam happens to be the Egyptian symbol of hegemony and dominance in the Nile for long and wishes to continue forever. After the construction of the GERD, there is the tendency of Egypt’s hegemonic power to shift to Ethiopia (Mohammed 2021). Accordingly, Egypt challenged the GERD project in the following ways: Threatening with military capacity. For instance, Egypt and Sudan organized a joint military force which consists of the Air, land Army and Naval forces known as the “Guardian of the Nile” (Egypt Today 2021). They went to the extent of sending warning signals to Ethiopia that they are ready at any time to protect their national interest; diplomatic channel was another tactic applied by the downstream states. Egypt persuaded international funding agents to refrain from giving financial aid to Ethiopia’s dam project. Unfortunately, Ethiopia does not rely on the international donor for construction. For them, it is a national pride because they used their internal revenue generated as well as public contribution to commence the construction of the GERD. The third tactic was supporting various rebel groups in Ethiopia, for instance, the Tigray. iii. Upstream Riparian’s Unilateral Decisions: unilateral actions based on national interest have always been a stumbling block to cooperation in this river basin. The upstream riparian states, represented by Ethiopia, overruled Egypt’s claim, for example: The colonial agreement of 1959 shall not be applicable to the upstream states because most of the upstream states were not independent and Ethiopia who was not under colonial influence was not represented; International law on the waters of the Nile was an exclusive approach which was not fair and just to its riparian states; Most of the upstream states are less developed and therefore, through

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various poverty alleviation programs they demand extensive use of the Nile waters in order to improve their status. This calls for a well-established legal mechanism for the Nile riparian states.

Recommendations for Water Diplomacy on the GERD Dispute a. Regional Framework The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) launched in 1999 is a nongovernmental organization and a partnership among the Nile riparian states. It can help the riparian states outline rights, obligations and principles for cooperation in the waters of the Nile. In order to make progress under this regional framework, the Nile riparian states should go back to the NBI’s Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) and use it as a mechanism for future obligatory legal system. b. Egypt National Interest There is a need for the upstream riparian to sympathize with the Egypt total reliance on the Nile waters. These would go a long way in assisting the riparian states in developing a mechanism that would importantly enhance equitable use and minimizing harm to downstream riparian states. However, Egypt shouldn’t take this advantage as a tool to aggravate the efforts of other riparians to protect a treaty that is fair, just and equitable to all. In order to make progress in the negotiation among the river Nile riparian states on the GERD issue, Egypt must also abandon the colonial agreement which granted her the water rights over the river Nile. For instance, the 1929 and 1959 agreements. c. Tripartite Agreement Tripartite agreement would enhance the relationship among the three riparian states. In these regard, Egypt should minimize trips, calling for international intervention. Similarly, their leaders should adopt agreements and increase their level of interactions, especially in the bottom-up approach, that would replicate the well-being of citizens, especially

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regarding poverty alleviation and economic development. For instance, Egypt and Ethiopia should appreciate their challenges in terms of climate change, water security, food production and poverty alleviation.

Conclusion Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan have been discussing water resources diplomacy for almost 6 years over the GERD project. Despite intervention by reputable state actors in addressing the disputes among the conflicting parties—Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan—there are still conflicting tensions as a result of concerns on the extent to which the flow of the river will reduce downstream at the time of filling the dam. The matter of averting future pressures among the river Nile basin countries is an important aspect of political, economic and security agenda in Africa. The major obstacles to cooperation in the river Nile basin are lack of legal framework, national interest and unilateral decision among riparian states. Therefore, in order to make progress in the negotiation among them, a legal framework is important, Egypt must abandon the colonial agreement which granted her the water rights over the river Nile, such as the 1929 and 1959 agreements; upstream states should sympathize with Egypt’s water situation and finally, the need to improve tripartite agreements among them. These would improve their countries’ standard of living especially, alleviating poverty and other related developments.

References Abadir M.I. 2011. The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA): The Beginning of the End of Egyptian Hydro-Political Hegemony. Journal of Environmental and Sustainability Law, 18 Article No. 4. Ani J.K. & Ojakorotu V. 2018. Aqua Conflict, Resource Conflict, Resource Curse and the Challenge of International Cooperation Among African States. African Renaissance, Special Issue, December, pp. 27–42. Ani J.K., Jungudo, M. & Ojakorotu V. 2018. Aqua-Conflicts and HydroPolitics in Africa: Unfolding the Role of African Union Water Management Interventions. Journal of African Union Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 5–29. Daily News Egypt, 2020. Arab League Adopts Resolution Supporting Egypt, Sudan in GERD Talks. Daily News Egypt, June 24. Egypt Today, 2021. Egyptians, Sudanese ‘Nile Guardians’ Joint Military Exercise Kicks Off. Egypt Today, May 28.

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European Union, 2021. New Ethiopian Dam Sparks Controversy Among Nile States, European Union Research Service, pp. 1–5. John, M.M. The Controversy Over the Gran Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Wednesday, August 5th, 2020. Africa in Focus, pp. 1–6. Jungudo, M.M. 2021. Power and Diplomacy in the Use and Control of the Waters of the Nile: The Case of Egypt and Her Neighbouring African States, 1929–2015. Liwuram Journal of Humanities, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 328–337. Jungudo, M.M. 2022. The Water Conflict on the Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam (GERD), a Paper Being Presented at the 2nd International Conference of the Center of Cultural Sustainability, held between 1st to 3rd February 2021, University of Maiduguri, Borno State, pp. 1–13. Mehari, T.M. 2020. The Nile Rivalry and its Peace and Security Implications: What Can the African Union Do? Policy Brief Vol. 1. No. 1 Institute of Peace and Security Studies Addis Ababa University, pp. 1–13. Mohammed, B. 2021. How the Concept of “African Solutions to African Problems” Ca be Applied to Resolve the GERD Dispute. Open Journal of Political Science, Vol. 11, pp. 594–613.

CHAPTER 12

Igbo Communal Idea: A Panacea to the Challenge of Forced International Migration in the Twenty-First Century Chinyere Lilian Nkama

Introduction It is a fundamental human right to move freely. This fact makes migration especially unforced or voluntary movement normal and less likely to be a problem. However, the reality facing humanity today is that poverty, violence, political and religious persecution, war, natural disasters, drought, epidemics, severe lack of economic opportunities and still counting, have forced people to migrate. Thus migration becomes a natural “human escape mechanism”. As noted in a Guardian article on Friday 4 September 2015, a vast majority of those reaching Europe that year were escaping war or repression, while about 20–30% so escaping from West Africa in particular, did as a result of poverty.

C. L. Nkama (B) Department of Religion and Cultural Studies, Alex Ekwueme Federal University Ndufu Alike Ikwo, Abakaliki, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. J. Ani (ed.), Political Economy of Colonial Relations and Crisis of Contemporary African Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0245-3_12

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Further to the foregoing, Amnesty International (2015) gives a shocking figure of 22 million+ people as refugees worldwide. Migrants fleeing especially through dangerous routes risk death by dehydration or ambush in the desert, death by drowning in the Mediterranean Sea, kidnap, forced labour, torture, etc. If eventually they ever make it to the “promised land”, they face dehumanizing treatment, rejection, xenophobic attacks, hunger and may resort to begging which makes them more vulnerable. They undertake odd jobs in restaurants, bars, clubs and other unskilled labours if allowed to work at all. Some of them are scavengers in refuse dumps. The summary is that migrant workers are exploited and meant to accept whatever is offered while having to live in unsuitable conditions. The paper specifically addresses migration in Nigeria generally as a mirror that views what happens in Africa, especially where there are unwholesome conditions that force the people to migrate. This does not an attempt to examine migration among the Igbo people but attempts to proffer solution to the challenges of migration in the twenty-first century from the purview of Igbo communal ideal.

Migration and Its Challenges in the Twenty-First Century Migration is as old as mankind. Adam and Eve, humanity’s first parents migrated from the Garden of Eden and resettled outside Eden, however, the fact is that they moved from their original settlement. Kalinowski (2006) had this view in mind when he quipped that, humans are potential migrants. “Migratio” is the Latin root of the word migration referring to the movement of humans (inhabitants) from country or region to another. There are basically two concepts that are closely related to migration which are emigration with Latin “emigratio” denoting wilful movement away from a homeland and immigration from Latin “immigro” arriving in a foreign country to settle for good. Krzysztof (2008) quips that immigration happens from emigration and both constitute the process of migration by humans. It can be defined also as the movement of humans within the same country (internal migration) or movement from one country to another (external migration), IOM (2011). In sociology two ideas are deduced from the definition of migration, namely: socio-structural change otherwise called “vertical migration”, and change

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in dwelling place referred to as horizontal migration, Zofia (2008). According to Zofia (2008), the first refers to change in man’s social status, interpersonal relations, distances and hierarchies and could bring about social advance when combined with new competencies, or could also mean degradation, a loss of hitherto material standards, rights, privileges, etc. The later refers to change in geographical location (dwelling place) which perhaps may not result in change in the social situation and status. Zofia (2008) further divided Migration thus: • Forced (involuntary)-this could happen when there are actions and or pressures from a political character/actors which could result to deportations/relocations of people (displaced persons, refugees); escape from threat to life and or health (refugees, asylum seekers, etc.). • Free (voluntary)-just as the name, there is no threat and or coercion anywhere but the reason for migration could be for joining one’s family, better standard of education, etc. • Economic: looking for better job and salaries. • Non-economic: religious persecution, natural disasters and ecological catastrophes, war, etc. The period of residence at which one may be classified as a migrant may differ, however, it is popularly believed that six months of settling in a new location is enough to suggest that one is a migrant (IOM, 2016), while others are of the view that one should have stayed for one year to be classified as such (Metcalfe-Hough, 2015). In Nigeria, the National Bureau of Statistics (2014) holds that there were estimates of about 11,257 internal migrants in 2010 as provided by National Population Commission. This figure as it wereraises worry, but the greater source of worry is from the fact that of late, insurgency and recent religious uprising have forced citizens of Nigeria in the North East to move away from their homes to settle in camps as refugees in other parts of Nigeria and even beyond. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2017) through the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), IOM reports round xiii December 2016 gives astonishing figures of 1,770,444 persons who are internally displaced (IDPs) in Nigeria resulting from insurgency. As

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of 31 January 2016, 198,322 Nigerians were taking refuge in neighbouring countries; whereas 164,281 Nigerians who returned including other refugees from Cameroon, Chad and Niger were registered by UNHCR and NIS as of 31 January 2016. On the contrary, figures of asylum seekers and refugees in Nigeria as of 29 April 2014 were put forward by IOM (2016). Migration trend in Nigeria could be pictured in the excerpt below: The most recent organization and situation reports on Nigerian migration trends have been predominantly focused on the forced migration trends driven by the Lake Chad conflict in the north of the country. An escalation of Boko Haram violence in 2014 resulted in mass displacement in north-eastern Nigeria. Even though a share of the affected population seeks refuge in neighbouring countries, the majority of displaced persons remain within Nigeria. According to the latest DTM Round Report from March 2017, a total of 1,832,743 individuals were internally displaced due to the insurgency (DTM Nigeria, 2017). The increase in the refugee population induced by the conflict amounted to a total of 210,674 by the end of May 2017, (just in the neighbouring countries) of which the largest share (106,146) was hosted by Niger followed by Cameroon (96,693 individuals) and a smaller share by Chad (7,835). (UNHCR 2017 in Desk Review Report on Nigeria by the IOM 2017, 13)

These revelations strengthen and give credence to UN 2015 reports cited in the introduction of this paper which claimed that a vast majority of those reaching Europe that year were migrating because of war or repression. It proves that forced or involuntary migration especially as a result of war, political or religious uprising/violence is predominantly higher in Africa than other forms of migration in the twenty-first century. Further to the foregoing, IOM (2015) puts forward a global overview of migrant death to 2800. Data from the source above is as revealing as it is shocking to know that a couple of thousands of world population encounter death while struggling to escape death in their homelands. If there were no political persecutions, religious uprising, insurgency, war, famine and hunger, poverty, other life threatening challenges, these fleeing migrants would not have deemed it necessary to migrate in the first place. This means that their death would have been averted all things being equal. All of those life-threatening challenges enumerated above are man-made and can truly be averted with the principle of live and let live inherent in

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Igbo communal living and ideality. The common denominator to those identified precursors to migration (forced migration in particular) and barrier to solutions to problems posed by migration is “individualism” resulting to selfishness. Individualism seeks for self-aggrandizement, selfglory, self-interest and protection of selfish interest, self-superiority and self-good only all at the expense of the good of others. Otherwise, how can it be explained that there is hunger and hardship in Nigeria in the midst of abundance? Why do we have rich and poor nations of the world or gaping margin between developing and developed nations? What causes war? When individualistic personal interests override the interest of others, social disequilibrium results, giving rise to challenges that could necessitate forced migration. On global scale, there are barriers to movement of migrants through closed borders which force migrants to take risks by resorting to dangerous escape routes. To these unfriendly tight border security policies, Amnesty International (2015) suggests that rich states and countries of the world should create safe routes for refugees. This will allow people to reunite with their relatives, and made possible by giving refugees visas so they don’t have to spend their life and still end up drowning to reach safety. But again it can only happen with the spirit and feeling of brotherhood in communal ideality against individualism. Adding voice to this urgent task for humanitarian aid for refugees and asylum seekers, Katy and Jeff (2010, 56–57) aver as follows: the real challenge in the coming years for researchers, UNHCR and refugees themselves will be how to persuade reluctant states that acknowledging and protecting the mobility of refugees may in fact help to ‘solve’’ twenty-first century displacement crises more effectively than insisting on return ‘home’. Collaborative research on this topic will be vital if we are not only to turn research findings into UNHCR policies but to turn such policies into practice, with the ultimate aim of securing the most effective protection possible for all refugees….

Thus, Igbo communal ideality which is exemplary brotherhood could be a veritable tool if adopted as a universal value, in first, plugging precursors to forced migration and second in remedying the plight of migrants when prevailing situations compel them to move outside their native boundaries.

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The Igbo People and Their Worldview For the purpose of this paper, the Igbo people will only include those found within the current South Eastern geopolitical delineation of Nigeria which includes in no particular order: Enugu, Imo, Ebonyi, Abia and Anambra. Very great expectation in this segment may possibly be on the origin of the Igbo. Rather than tow that line of action, this paper will instead try to summarize the Igbo worldview which is considered more crucial to its objective than an exposition on the origin. More so, to understand a people’s worldview is to understand who they are. Generally speaking, a people’s worldview is how they understand, conceive and perceive the world around them. More specifically, Ifesieh cited in Madu (1996) aver that worldview is people’s beliefs about the universe peculiar to them, which they exhibit in their values, namely: their philosophy of or about life, social conduct and morality, further expressed in or through folk-lore, myths, rites and rituals, norms, rules, ideas, cognitive mapping, theologies, etc. (Madu, 1996, 1). The Igbo conceive the world as divided into two, namely: visible and invisible world with the later being further divided into two which are heaven and underworld. The visible world (elu ala) is inhabited by earth goddesses, human beings and minor/nature deities; the heaven is inhabited by the Supreme Being (Chukwu or Chineke) the Creator with major divinities like Amadioha (god of thunder) and Anyanwu (god of light); whereas the underworld is inhabited by the ancestors and myriads of other spirit forces both benevolent and malevolent (Madu, 1996). The crux of the matter here is not which being inhabits where but the fact that inherent in Igbo worldview is the belief in the connectedness of the visible and invisible world which informs the Igbo cultural norms— written and unwritten laws, morality, ethics and justice that are practical guides to action. Summarizing the Igbo cosmology (worldview), Ejizu cited in Madu (1996) remarks that: • Traditional Igbo cosmology is a religious one, a cosmology in which holds unified view of reality. This is understandable under the backdrop that all the spheres of Igbo cosmic structure and their inhabitants are in continuous interaction. • Man is at the centre of everything, but he is not alone. He exists for the community and the community exists for him.

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• Human life is supreme and everything is done to keep it on (Madu, 1996, 7). Hence, Igbo worldview is deeply religious, with a belief in an eternal communion of the spiritual and the secular world (Osita, 2014). Lending credence to the foregoing, Nwala cited in Onwu (2002) quips that it is factual that basically, the sacred and the secular are bound together in Igbo worldview meaning that the secular life of the Igbo people cannot be divorced from their religious life. Their cosmology is of a deep religious root as well as their practical life and moral values completely intertwined with their religion. Leonard in Onwu (2002) had the following remarks to make about the Igbo: They are in the strict and natural sense of the word a truly and a deeply religious people, of whom it can be said that they eat religiously, drink religiously, bathe religiously, dress religiously and sin religiously. In a few words, the religion of these as I have all along endeavored to point out is their existence and their existence is their religion. (Onwu, 2002, 1)

To this end, one can conveniently aver that the value of Igbo communal living is a religious and social one because any action that undermines the good of others in the community is viewed as an affront to the invisible world. Hence to maintain harmony between the visible and invisible world, good neighbourliness in the spirit of brotherhood is priced very high in the Igbo cosmology. It is true that worldviews differ from culture to culture yet there are universal principles and virtues that are constant and those are common humanity, brotherhood of all men and love. These virtues underline all human worldviews just as that of the Igbo.

Igbo Communal Ideality and Its Viability in Ameliorating Migration Challenges in the Twenty-First Century The Igbo communal ideality manifests in diverse relationships in the Igbo community across the five states expressed in matrilineal and patrilineal (umunne/ikwunne and umunna) ties. More interestingly, beyond these ties mentioned above is the bond of oneness that exists in all Igbo communities even when seemingly distant from each other in terms of geographical proximity. That explains why Igbo from Anambra or any

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other state within the geopolitical zone would call another Igbo from another state “Nwanne m” (my brother), popularly upholds the belief that “nwanne di na mba” (there is brother away from biological home) and truly maintains the saying “onye aghala nwanne ya (do not abandon your brother). In response to a child’s greeting, an adult would say “ehee nwa m” (yes my child), not because the adult is the child’s biological parent but because “otu onye anaghi enwe nwa, nwa bu nwa oha” (the child belongs to all). As such an adult in all Igbo community cannot watch/keep quiet while another person’s child goes astray or falls into danger. So to that end “okenye anaghi ano na-ulo ewu amuo no ogbu” (an adult does not watch a travailing goat to give birth while tied to a stake), whether the goat is his or not. The implication of this is that the spirit of oneness and brotherhood forbids one to inflict pain or harm on his brother (another person) in Igbo land or watch on while his brother is in dire need for help or even pretend not to notice his brother’s pain when he actually does. Egbule (2002) in explaining the practicality of communal brotherhood (“umunne”) in Umuezeala Nsu, in Ehime Mbano, Imo state, Nigeria says that “uha umunne” (an edible tree planted in the village square) helps in reminding the community of the unity, oneness and bond that exist among them. It stands as a symbol or a witness that none would harm the other. He said that if one trespasses by any severe offence against one’s kinsman, he is considered to have offended the “deity of blood oneness” (o metala ihe umunne) which is a taboo (nsoala). Okafor cited in Ogbujah (2014, 209) highlights traditional African (Igbo) communal ideality as follows: “they share much of their life in common. For economic reasons, they have communal farmlands, barns, trees, streams and markets. This accounts for why entire community members may distinguish themselves by their expertise in a specific skill or trade as in wood carving, blacksmithing, etc. The communal ownership and relationships guarantee the prosperity of a town which, in African sense, concomitantly guarantees the prosperity of the individual. When a job needed to be done, the entire community turned out with supplies and music and went on to sing and dance its way through to the successful conclusion of each particular chore. The proceeds were commonly shared according to ‘family’ structures, and each one had something to look on to. In this way, poverty was an alien idea which could only be brought about to the entire community by an adverse climatic condition”.

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Further to the above, Biko in Ogbujah (2014) quips that “it never was considered repugnant to ask one’s neighbours for help if one was struggling. In most situations, there was help between individuals, tribes, chiefs, etc., even in spite of wars. In consequence, people’s basic needs were often met even when they could not be adjudged to be affluent. The traditional communities did not experience roaming beggars, destitute or solitary aged; neither did they give room for modern depersonalizing institutions like old peoples Homes’, ‘Motherless Babies Homes’, ‘Homes for the aged and handicapped”, etc. The implication is that communal living in the traditional Igbo community upholds helping one another in the spirit of brotherhood. This is what Mbiti observed when he overwhelmingly remarked about the Igbo deep sense of community thus: “I am because we are …” It further implies that “ofu osisi anaghi eme ohia” meaning that one tree does not make a forest full. This idea of community and communal living is expressed in various Igbo proverbs and wise sayings such as: “a hapuru otu onye uwa, uwa anyigbue ya ma o bu odudu atagbuo ya (no one man can survive in isolation); “igwe bu ike”, (an individual’s might cannot be compared to the might of the people), “gidi-gidi bu ugwu eze”, (an individual’s pride gets boosted when he sees his brothers), “oha ka”, (personal interest cannot override the interest of others), etc. This paper states that the spirit of Igbo communal life which is the spirit of brotherhood lies latent in every human society, only waiting to be aroused and fanned to action. Unfortunately, man’s tendency towards “self” has been allowed to becloud the spirit of brotherhood. The Igbo communal ideality has gradually given way to individualism since after the Nigerian civil war, probably because of the prevailing conditions of hardship which have given way to survival of the fittest. Thus the thrust of this paper is double-barrelled: on one hand it is a wakeup call to the Igbo people to endeavour to resurrect the spirit of communalism among them. On the other hand, it is an attempt to market or sell the ideality to the whole world. The world of the twenty-first century is a global community that has been knitted together by technology and common diverse human experiences, whether good or bad but differs by how different nations respond to those common human experiences. Agulanna (2010, 287) enunciates powerful views about community.

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Community, many great thinkers remind us, is a necessary condition for the realization of human social goals. A short list of the philosophical luminaries who have emphasized the importance of community includes people like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, to mention but a few. In the opinion of these thinkers, community life is a sine qua non for human flourishing and individual wellbeing. And as Aristotle says, the person is either a god or an animal that is able to survive outside of society, that is, the human community – here I use the words community and society interchangeably to mean one and the same thing.

Kneller cited in Agulana (2010) quips that the word “community” connotes that the people involved are: in personal contact; deeply concerned for each other’s welfare; united to achieving purposes and procedures that unite them; sharing responsibility for joint actions and; hold tenaciously to membership in the community as worthwhile. Without doubt, this cooperative instinct in humans is what ensures corporate survival among them. This way, self or community destructive tendencies are inhibited. All of what this paper has been proposing so far is that sense of community and communal living be upheld world over as cultural universal because it will establish “universal brotherhood and kinship of all human beings” instead of individualism in the society. It is tenable through building symbolic developmental structures in strategic places that could remind people they belong together while empowering those people to be self-reliant at the same time; through aggressive provision of social amenities to people to make them less restive and less vulnerable to be used as canon fodders for violence and extremism, this is most crucial having observed that the most recurring trend in the twenty-first-century migration is forced or involuntary migration; through adopting dialogue as alternative means in resolving existing social, political and religious issues rather than the use of force; through reorientation of people and nations to imbibe the culture of brotherhood in practical terms of helping one another; through eliminating selfish acquisition of wealth meant for all, that is (elimination of greed) by truly fighting corruption; through government wholesale embrace of justice, equitable distribution of common wealth and fair play in governance in other to win back the confidence and faith of the populace; as well as learning not to arrogantly and flagrantly display wealth and affluence in the midst of impoverished people in order not to push them to hatred, etc.

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Conclusion So far, this paper has attempted to discuss migration in Africa and Nigeria in particular with its challenges in the twenty-first century as well as attempted to proffer solution to the challenges from the purview of Igbo communal ideality. It was discovered that the most recurring trend in migration in Nigeria and Africa, in general, is forced migration which has resulted from political pressure, religious violence/insurgency, outright war and armed conflict, poor economic opportunities, poverty and hunger, etc. It was also observed that these realities in human societies could be averted if human beings are not selfish and individualistic such that selfish interests do not override the interest of others. As such the viability of Igbo communal living in quenching the ugly trend of migration (forced migration) was explored and the paper avers that the principles of Igbo ideality hinged on the spirit of brotherhood could actually stem the tide if embraced.

Recommendations • Nigerian government should replicate the planting of “oha ummune” of Umuezeala Nsu this time by building symbolic structures of peace, unity and brotherhood in all the six geopolitical zones in Nigeria. These structures should take the form of mechanizing agriculture for the massive production of items peculiar to each zone as well as building agro-industries for processing farm produce in these zones. It will be a form of communally owned structure where proceeds from such investment will be fairly shared among the states of each zone for its development. This will generate employment to engage idle youths. Bearing in mind that the production of cocoa, cotton, groundnut, palm oil/other palm produce once thrived in this country, before the oil boom, the workability is highly tenable. • Nigerian government should urgently embark on peace talks and dialogue with identified aggrieved sessions of Nigerian state to douse tension and agitations which could lead to war, violence and break down of order and consequently forced migration. When peace is maintained, foreign investors will be at ease to establish their businesses in Nigeria further reducing the pull factor to migration.

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• It is a popular idea that people living in glass houses should not throw stones. The implication of this fact is that insurgents live in the forest and operate from there because they have no good homes to live in; they bomb villages and towns, motor parks and government institutions wherever they target because they have nothing at stake and no investments to worry about. What this demands is fair sharing of national gains, fortunes and wealth to eradicate poverty and hunger. The saying that “a hungry man is an angry man” is as real as it is true. Removal of insurgency directly means reduction in the push factor of forced migration and consequently the reduction in the number of IDPs/refugees. • On the global scale, in the spirit of brotherhood and community, rich states and countries of the world should open up safe routes to sanctuary for refugees. That means allowing refugees and asylum seekers access to their countries and giving them visas for proper documentation and necessary follow-up. • Advanced countries of the world should consider extending their technological knowhow to other countries regarded as undeveloped and impoverished to reduce pull to migration.

References AI (Amnesty International). 2015. “Eight Solutions to World Refugee Crises”. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2015/10/eight-sol utions-worldrefugee-crises/. Agulanna, Christopher. 2010. “Community and Human Wellbeing in African Culture: The Relationship Between ‘Society’ and ‘Community’”. Trames: A Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences.14(64/59), 3, 282–298. https:// doi.org/10.3176/tr.2010.3.05. Egbule, Emmanuel M. 2002. A Survey of the Traditions of Umuezeala Nsu: Owerri: READON. Emmanuel, Nlenanya Onwu (2002). “Uzo Ndu na Eziokwu”- Towards an Understanding of Igbo Traditional Religion, Life and Philosophy. Ahiajoku Lecture. IOM (International Organization for Migration). 2011. Glossary on Migration. Second Edition, Geneva. Available from https://publications.iom.int/books/ international-migration-law-ndeg25-glossary-migration. IOM (International Organization for Migration). 2016. Migration in Nigeria: Country Profile 2014, Prepared by Uche C. Isiugu Abanihe and IOM

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Nigeria. Available from https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/mpnigeria.pdf. IOM (International Organization for Migration). 2017. Enabling a Better Understanding of Migration Flows and (Its Root Causes) From Nigeria towards Europe: Desk Report; Displacement Tracking Matrix. https://displacement. iom.int/nigeria. Katy, Long and Jeff, Crisp. 2010. “Migration, Mobility and Solutions: An Evolving Perspective”, in Disability and Displacement. https://www.fmreview. org/disability-and-displacement/katy-long-and-jeff-crisp.html. Krzysztof, Markowski. 2008. “Economic Aspects of Migration”, in Migrationa Challenge to the 21st Century (ed) by Maciej St. Zieba. Lublin: Publishing House of Catholic University of Lublin. Madu, Jude Emeka. 1996. Fundamentals of Religious Studies. Calabar: Franedoh. Metcalfe-Hough, Veronica. 2015. “The Migration Crisis? Facts, Challenges and Possible Solutions”. ODI Briefing. www.odi.org. Miroslaw, Kalinowski. 2006. “Integration of Migrants in the Enlarged Europe and Policies for the Return of Productive Intellect”, a Paper Presented During the Opening Ceremony of International Panel of Experts on Migration in Lublin, 2–3 April, 2006. NBS (National Bureau of Statistics). 2014. “Statistical Report on Women and Men in Nigeria”. https://www.nigerianstat.org.ng/.../2014. Ogbujah, Columbus. 2014. “African Cultural Values and Inter-Communal Relations, the Case with Nigeria: Sense of Communality”. Developing Countries Studies. Vol. 4, No. 24. Osita, Catherine Ezenwanebe. 2014. Community and the Individual in the Dramatic World of the Igbo: Conformity and Contestation”. Global Journal of Human Social Science: Arts and Humanities and Psychology. Vol. 14, No. 8 version 1.0. Patrick, Kingsley. 2015. “10 ways to manage the migration crisis”. The Guardian International Version, September 4. UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). 2017. “Nigeria Situation-Regional Update 01–31 January 2017”. https://reliefweb.int/rep ort/nigeria/nigeria-situation-unhcr-regionalupdates-01-31-january-2017. William, Swing. 2017. “3 Things Governments Need to Do to Solve Migration Crisis”. World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/.../3-thi ngs-government-need-to-do-to-solve-migration-cri. Zofia, Kawczynska-Butrym. 2008. “Migrations-Challenges of Social Position”, in Migration- a Challenge to the 21st Century (ed) by Maciej St. Zieba. Lublin: Publishing House of Catholic University of Lublin.

CHAPTER 13

Economic Dimensions of Xenophobia in South Africa, 1994–2018 Martin T. Kpoghul, Thaddeaus T. Ityonzughul, and Asor Gbamwuan

Introduction The world is made up of billions of people who relate together at the individual, group and ethnic or national levels. Such interactions are characterised by conflicts of ideas, identity, beliefs and fear of the unknown or xenophobia (Arogundade 2008). Notable countries of the world that experience xenophobia include Germany, with a long history of tension between Jews, Romans, Slavas and other coloured people. Japan is a country with a policy that excludes foreign interactions with other nations where the black minority continually confronts and conflicts with the

M. T. Kpoghul Department of History, Benue State University, Makurdi, Nigeria T. T. Ityonzughul (B) Department of International Studies and Diplomacy, Benson Idahosa University, Edo State, Benin City, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. J. Ani (ed.), Political Economy of Colonial Relations and Crisis of Contemporary African Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0245-3_13

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white majority. In the Middle East, continuous conflicts between Israel, Palestine, Cyprus, Lebanon and Iraq are some examples of xenophobic behaviour in the world (Arogundade 2008). In line with the above, Adeleke et al. (2008: 139–140) note that xenophobia is a global problem that has been experienced in both industrialised democracies of the North and the developing countries of the South. It has been experienced in places like Germany, Japan, South Zealand, Belgium, China, the United Kingdom, Ivory Coast, South Africa; it is not indigenous to any particular country of the world. The mutual slaughter between Turks and Greeks in the past has affected the Turkish desire to become a member of the European Union (EU) because on most occasions, Greece has always raised procedural objections against accession to the treaty of Rome and Turkey. The current hostility between Albani and Kosovo is a reflection of the past relation marred by xenophobia and the ethnic cleansing and slaughter (Osuntokun 2008). In the case of xenophobia, the consequences are felt in all spheres of human endeavours—governance, education, employment and economy, among others. Xenophobia has become a recurrent issue in South Africa’s national history (Ejoke and Ani 2017). It is on this premise that this paper set out to interrogate the economic implications of xenophobia in South Africa between 1994 and 2018. This is because xenophobic attacks in South Africa came into limelight in 1994 while the terminal point of this study in 2018 witnessed the scale down of xenophobic attacks in the area under consideration. To do this, some critical questions are considered: What is the context of xenophobia? What propelled xenophobic attacks in South Africa? What are the economic implications of xenophobia in South Africa? These and other variegated issues are the concerns of this paper. In order to achieve this aim, the paper is structured into sequence: introduction, conceptual and theoretical perspective, economic description and incidences of xenophobic attacks in South Africa, causes, economic implications and conclusion.

A. Gbamwuan Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, KolaDaisi University, Ibadan, Nigeria

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A Clarification of Conceptual Issues and Theoretical Perspective To fully understand the concept of xenophobia, there is a need to first understand the concept of phobia of which xenophobia is a subcategory. Ullman and Krasner (1975) conceived phobia as an intense, excessive, irrational and unrealistic emotion characterised by the avoidance of an object or situation or event which an individual characterises to be harmless. When approaching phobic objects, the individual responds with feelings of dread, discomfort, inhibited motor reaction, apprehension and a feeling of imminent catastrophe. When in contact with the phobic object, an individual trembles, perspires profusely and manifests other signs and symptoms of generalised anxiety disorder. American Psychiatric Association (APA) and World Health Organisation (WHO) identified three categories of phobia to include: agoraphobia (fear of open places), social phobia (fear of performing in the presence of other people) and specific phobia (fear of specific objects or situations) (APA 2001). Thus, xenophobia is described as the morbid fear or dislike of strangers, or foreign cultures or foreign places (Corsini 2002). Also, the Asian Pacific Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) defined xenophobia as “attitude, prejudices and behaviour that reject, exclude, and often vilify persons, based on the perception that they are outsiders or foreigners to the community, society or national identity” (Olowu 2008: 101–105). Xenophobia is therefore, a negative emotional disposition of one or more people towards a specific group of people. Terms for some specific groups include: negrophobia (fear of Negroes or blacks), anglophobia (fear of English people or whites) (Mogiekwu 2002). In all these, xenophobes manifest the same psychological and physiological systems that are characteristic of general phobia. However, for a proper understanding of xenophobia, there is a need to distinguish it from a similar concept known as racism. Racism focuses attention on races and ancestry; xenophobia focuses on various objects of hatred. Two major objects which xenophobia focuses on include; population group present within a society which is not considered as part of the society. It could be recent immigrants or people who have been present for centuries; and culture as an object of phobia, because all culture is subject to external influence (Adeleke et al. 2008). Although xenophobia is ubiquitous in contemporary societies, its targets vary across countries and nations. Xenophobia takes many

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different forms ranging from murder, to violence, discrimination, verbal abuse, public hostility and a host of others. The general climate of xenophobia renders foreigners vulnerable to exploitation and violence and it is believed to be the principal cause of violence around the world, especially in its explosive form (Osuntokun 2008). In the context of this paper, xenophobia refers to the violence instigated by the locals in South Africa against foreigners with the excuse of taking over their jobs, businesses and girlfriends, among others. This study is predicated on the Rational Choice Theory. According to this theory, xenophobia is the end product of the rivalry between foreign migrants and indigenes over scarce resources (Wimmer 1997). The theory further mentions economic necessity as a major cause of xenophobia in Africa and beyond. Steinberg views the economy as a finite lump. According to him, lack of access to resources breeds conflict in the society. Therefore, he relates this phenomenon to foreigners, and explains that the success of foreign migrants is often perceived to have been derived from unrightfully sources that usually belong to South Africans (Steinberg 2008). Consequently, seeing foreigners prosper without any assistance from the state “upsets one’s conception of one’s own relation to the state and what one’ sentiments are” (Steinberg 2008). South Africans perceive foreigners as “competing with them for jobs, housing and other resources to which they themselves feel entitled to” (Dodson 2010: 3–23).

Economic Description of South Africa South Africa can be described in geographical terms quite simply as the southern end of the African continental land mass; the southward prolongation of an immense plateau which stretches northward to the Sahara (Omer-Cooper 1966). Before Europeans settled in what later became South Africa, around fifteenth century, subsistence agriculture and hunting was the mainstay of the area (Baten 2016). For instance, the Bantu tribes occupied north, central and east of the country, they used land on a communal basis through their tribal chiefdoms. The area was notable by pastoral economy and wealth coupled with population growth which subsequently led to land demands that pushed many from their origins in central East Africa (Bunting 1964). In the Southern and Western parts of the country, San (Bushmen) peoples led nomadic lives based on hunting and the Khoikhoi (Hottentots) people led a pastoral existence (Maree 2019).

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The establishment of a permanent European settlement in Cape Town that was located in the farthest part of South West of South Africa took place in 1652 (Baten 2016). The original plan was for the settlement to be a refreshment station not a colony. Malnutrition, a vitamin deficiency arising from a lack of fresh fruit and vegetables, was a problem for the ships of the Dutch East Indian company that were plying their trade between the Netherlands and the Dutch East Indies in modern Indonesia (Bunting 1964). To deal with the problems, the company established a garden at the foot of Table Mountain and bartered cattle from the Khoikhoi to supply passing ships. However, the arrival of permanent European settlers triggered a profound change. The Europeans intentionally decimated the San through diseases, driving them to the Kalahari Desert region and virtually destroying the Khoikhoi people as they struggle against European colonialism (Bunting 1964). The Khoikhoi (Quena) were enslaved and their identity was destroyed in furtherance of European colonialism. Shortage of land led to wars between the Bantu as the settlers migrated eastwards from the original settlement in Cape Town. Between the wars, commerce developed between the settlers and indigenous peoples which has been sustained till date. South Africa’s economy is ranked the second largest in Africa, next to Nigeria (IMF 2018). The country is also most industrialised among all African countries; it is an upper-middle income economy by the World Bank rating—one of only four such countries in Africa, alongside Botswana, Gabon and Mauritius (Editor 2019). Since 1961, at the end of over twelve years of international sanctions, South Africa’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) almost tripled to peak at $400 billion in 2011, but has since declined to roughly $295 billion in both 2016 and 2017. During this period, there was an increase in foreign exchange reserves from $5 billion to almost $50 billion; this facilitated the achievement of a diversified economy with a growing and sizable middle class within two decades of ending apartheid. However, there were still challenges of perpetrating economic activities in South Africa. The Economics and Global Competitiveness Reports of 2015–2016 show that, in 2016 the top five challenges to doing business in the country include among others; inefficient government bureaucracy, restrictive labour regulations, a shortage of skilled workers, political instability and corruption, while the country’s strong banking sector was rated as a strongly positive feature of the economy (Editor 2019: 11).

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The above is an indication that, in spite of the numerous challenges that bedevilled the South African economy, business activities still flourished in that country. Indeed, according to Wood and Christopher, the South African nation is among the G-20; and is the only African member of the group.

Incidences and Incidents of Xenophobia in South Africa, 1994–2018 The history of discrimination and violence against immigrants in South Africa predates 1994. However, after the establishment of majority rule, the incidence of xenophobia increased. From December 1994 to January 1995, undocumented foreigners were asked to be forcefully removed from South Africa and their homes and properties were destroyed by armed youth gangs in the Alexandra Township outside of Johannesburg, Gauteng Province. Following this development, two Senegalese and a Mozambican were ejected from a moving train in Johannesburg in September 1998, by some persons who participated in a rally organised by a group that blamed foreigners for being responsible for the high level of unemployment, crime, and even the spread of AIDS in the country. Also, the town of Zandspruit, in Johannesburg, witnessed rampage burning down of shacks of Zimbabwean citizens who lived in the settlement. The indigenes planned to eliminate all immigrants because they allegedly stole their jobs and caused crime (Los Angeles Times 2015: 10). Only in the year 2000, Cape Flats district of Cape Town recorded seven xenophobic killings. The death of Kenyan Kingori Siguri Joseph in Tambo Close, Khanya Park in Gugulethu following his attack at gunpoint is one of the incidents worthy of note. More so, two Nigerians lost their lives to gun shot in NY 99 in Gugulethu. Similarly, Prince Anya, 36, the owner of a restaurant in Sea Point, was also hijacked in Adam Tas Road, Bothasig alongside his wife Tjidi and their toddler. In Langa, around Mdolomda Street precisely two Angolan brothers got rapt and burnt to death inside their own house. Nguiji Chicola, 23, and Mario Gomez Inacio, 25, were also burnt to death in their house when it was set alight by some men who took to flight thereafter (Kamnan & Ityonzughul 2019). On 11 May 2008, series of xenophobic violence were being triggered in many parts of the township by an outburst of xenophobic violence in the Johannesburg Township of Alexandra. It first spread in the Gauteng province, thereafter; the violence escalated and covered other urban areas

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across South Africa, such as Durban and Cape Town as well as rural areas like Limpopo Province. Basically, the nature of the violence was both verbal and physical attacks by citizens of the townships on other inhabitants. Mostly, the victims were foreigners, and were referred to as non-South African. They were mostly Zimbabwean and Mozambican by nationality. This resulted in, many houses been burnt, 342 shops were looted and 213 houses were burnt down. Hundreds of people were injured, thousands chased away and the death toll after the attacks stood at 62 (South Africa Human Rights Commission 2008; Gbamwuan and Ityonzughul 2015). Concerning moral regeneration event that was witnessed in Pongola, Kwazulu Natal Province on 21 March 2015, immigrants were asked to return to their homes by Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini (Landau 2011). According to him, they were influencing South African society with their goods and enjoying wealth that belonged to the local people. This request was made during the period Congolese nationals were mourning their loved ones who lost their lives in xenophobic attacks. Noel Beya Dinshistia from Congo, a bouncer at a local nightclub, was doused in a flammable substance before being set alight while on duty (Daily Trust 2015). On 12 April 2015, attacks on foreign nationals continued in KwaZuluNatal as shops in Umlazi and KwaMashu, outside Durban, were indiscriminately torched. Similarly, in V Section, a shop owned by a foreign national was set on fire by a mob. There was another fire, suspected to have been set by local people on a foreign-owned property in G Section. Apart from five people that were killed, almost 2000 foreign nationals were displaced as a result of the violence. On 14 April 2015, looting of foreign shops spread to Verulam, north of Durban, following a day of clashes between locals, foreigners and the police in the city centre, KwaZulu-Natal. About 300 local people looted foreign-owned shops, but only two people were arrested. A 14-year-old boy was shot dead during looting in Kwa Ndlanzi, allegedly by two security guards. In Durban’s Central Business District (CBD), a car was set alight (Kamnan and Ityonzughul 2019). In March 2016, another xenophobic treatment and violence was instigated in Katlehong community of Gauteng where foreign nationals were brutally harassed and labelled as “makwerekwere” (foreigners in South Africa). This trend reared its ugly head in June when waves of riots hit the city of Tshwane. Although, the riots were sparked by political discontent

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within the African National Congress (ANC), Somali, Pakistani, and other foreign-owned shops and micro enterprises were targeted and looted while a good number of other foreigners were attacked. The continued protest by South Africans on migrants led to AntiMigration Protest in 2017 in which large scale and officially sanctioned protest was organised and held in Pretoria. Protesters were said to have matched to the foreign ministry and handed a petition to government representatives. They accused migrants of taking their jobs, causing crimes, being arrogant and even lacking the skills to communicate peacefully with people. The protesters cited Nigerians for unfriendly communication. Although,136 protesters were arrested during this demonstration. Whenever xenophobic violence occurs in South Africa, the victims are not only foreigners but in fact everybody not belonging to the dominant ethnic groups in the main cities, Zulu or Xhosa. Members of smaller ethnic groups in South Africa are mostly considered as foreigners by fellow South Africans. However, white people are not viewed as foreigners in the context of xenophobic violence. There had been attacks by South Africans who “looked foreign” because they were “too dark” to be South African.

Causes of Xenophobic Attacks in South Africa As noted previously xenophobia and xenophobic aggression have, for long, been a part of the South African nation. But the country had never witnessed civil strife on anything in the scale of the May 2008 attacks before. What factor(s) is/are likely to have been responsible for this mass violence? Since the outbreak of the attacks in May 2008, many analysts and scholars have fingered deteriorating socio-economic conditions among a majority of black South Africans and the stiff competition for scarce, life-supporting resources—housing, jobs and other basic necessities—between black South Africans and blacks from other countries as its major causes. According to A. Markinor as cited in Johnson (2008: 38), early this month only 42% of South Africans had jobs and the larger percentage is living in shacks without basic amenities. He also mentioned that, during winter at night on the Gold Reef, on which Johannesburg was built, temperatures fall below freezing, so the homeless vacates the streets to take refuge there. Furthermore, food prices hiked and there was a sharp scarcity of maize which was the staple food for South Africans leaving many hungry

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in the country. Foreigners were suspected as a major criminal factor especially with this claim that “They are taking our jobs”. Employers preferred Zimbabweans and Malawians employees because they are often better educated, speak better English and work harder. In the valley of Cape Town, every domestic servant or gardener is traced to any of the two countries. Other immigrants are political refugees who came from Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, although majority were economic migrants, drawn by South Africa’s more developed economy. South Africa’s per capital income is, for example, 36 times Mozambique’s (Johnson 2008). Johnson’s analysis, quoted in extenso for its relevance, tallies with the perception of the new social movements in South Africa regarding the view of those who participated in the mayhem as to the cause. In their memorandum on the crisis, delivered in South Africa under the auspices of Coalition against Xenophobia (CAX) on 24 May 2008, the social movements explained that those (the black South Africans) who have openly attacked others have claimed that South Africans are being denied access to scarce jobs, basic services and better lives because of the need to compete with people from other African countries for limited resources (Lehulere 2008). Even though the new social movements do not agree that the poverty and unemployment rampaging a majority of black South Africans were caused by blacks from other African countries, laying these squarely on the neo-liberal economic policies that all African countries have adopted, they nevertheless accepted the perception of partakers in the xenophobic attacks in relation to its cause. The Bryant Park Project, in its 2 June 2008, analysis posted on the web, also aligns with this thinking. Marc Howard Ross posits that there are many factors responsible for the causes of the anger; first, townships are cut off by conditions that led to unemployment of a minimum of 25% adults. Secondly, sudden increase in prices for food and fuel formed another basis for the anger in the country. Thirdly, government’s failure to address the problems worsened the situation. From the foregoing, it seems commonly accepted that the xenophobic attacks in South Africa are a form of “competition for (scarce) resources” between South Africans and non-South African sections of the working class, even though it is argued in certain quarters (like the new social movements in South Africa) that this perception is “misguided” and “untrue”. The competition for scarce resources proposition aligns with the scape-goating hypothesis of xenophobia—one of the three mutually inclusive possible explanations of general xenophobia (Harris 2002). The

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other two are the isolation hypothesis and the bio-cultural hypothesis. The scape-goating hypothesis locates xenophobia within the context of social transition and change: Hostility towards foreigners is explained in relation to limited resources, such as housing, education, health care and employment, coupled with high expectations during transition. (Harris 2002: 171)

In the context of heightened expectations and unequal distribution of resources and wealth, people often create a “frustration scapegoat” that is, “they create a target to blame for ongoing deprivation and poverty” (Harris 2002). “Foreigners”, this hypothesis suggests, “often become such scapegoats…” because “they are interpreted as a threat to jobs, housing, education and health” (Harris 2002). Lehulere (2008: 3) has, however, queried the competition for scarce resources theory because it assumes a direct connection between the presence of immigrants living and working in poor townships and violent xenophobia outbreak. He asks two key and relevant questions as follows: In a context of falling living standards and rising poverty within the working class, why does the South African working class response to these conditions take the form of xenophobia? Why, for example, have we not seen the outbreak of socalled “food riots”, riots against fuel increases and, in general, riots against neo-liberalism and its effects? Lehulere situates the shocking May 2009 xenophobia attacks in South Africa in the gradual but real orientation, since the 1990s, of the South African working class towards xenophobia by the petty bourgeoisie of the townships—the local business people, the local councillors, functionaries of the South African National Civics Organisation (COASU) as well as members of the Community Policing Forums (CPF). The African National Congress at the local level, he argues, “has become… an organ for organising the self-enrichment by the pretty bourgeoisie of the townships”. He concludes that it is the specific response of these strata of the population to the specific economic crisis that has taken the form of agitation for a xenophobic response. It is the political and organisational weakness of the formations of the wrong class that has made it possible for the petty bourgeoisie of the townships to define the way the response to the crisis has unfolded (Lehulere 2008). Another way of looking at the xenophobic attacks is to locate them within South Africa’s history and culture of violence. Harris (2002)

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described the culture of violence, as a situation in which social relations and interactions are governed through violent, rather than non-violent means. This is a culture in which violence is proffered as a normal, legitimate solution to problems. Attributing the culture of violence in South Africa to its legacy of apartheid, Harris (2002) submits that though “violence today is described as criminal rather than political in nature” in the country, “violence itself still persists as the dominant means to solve problems in South Africa”. He canvassed that “it is in this context of a culture of violence that xenophobia in South Africa must be conceptualised” (Harris 2002: 171).

Economic Implications of Xenophobia in South Africa Xenophobia has negatively affected the economy of South Africa in diverse ways. A Southern African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) report notes that countries in Africa are protesting against xenophobia in South Africa and this affects the country economically. For instance, fear of violence that will negatively affect local businesses in South Africa and elsewhere in Africa is so high. The government of South Africa announced that South African citizens as well as businesses are vulnerable due to the attacks on foreigners. The impact of attacks has far reaching implications on our economic, social and cultural relations with the continent and the world. South African companies who are running successful businesses in the continent who help to contribute to our revenue and sustain our economy may suffer the same fate. Indeed, xenophobia has become an endemic attitude as South Africans continue to attack foreigners and destroy their businesses. South Africans blame the influx of foreigners for the high unemployment rate. The unemployment rate in South Africa decreased to 24.3% in the fourth quarter of 2014 from 25.40% in the third quarter of the year. The unemployment rate in South Africa averaged 25.25% from 2000 until 2014, reading an all-time high of 31.20% in the first quarter of 2003 and a record low of 21.5% in the fourth quarter of 2008. In his contribution to the economic effects of xenophobia, the Nigerian Consul-General in South Africa, Uche Afulu-Okeke was particularly on Nigeria, he stated clearly that Nigerians lost more than 102 million rand (12 million) in the … xenophobia attack. The loss included looted shops, burnt shops,

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two burnt mechanic workshops, 11 burnt cars and 2 stolen cars, among others. In effect, the economic strength of the victims was threatened or weakened. Xenophobia has also threatened the economy of South Africa. In supporting this argument, the incumbent President of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa argued that today, South Africa’s economy and society benefit from extensive trade and investment relations with partners on the continent and many of the continental compatriots live in the country where they are making important contributions to the development of South Africa. He further notes that, African development depends on the increased movement of people, goods and services between different countries for all of us to benefit. Therefore, criminals will not be allowed to set back these processes. According to the President, xenophobic attacks in South Africa coupled with the counter attacks in Nigeria, as well as deliberate attacks on foreign-owned businesses within and without South Africa and Nigeria have become a threat to Africa’s fragile economic recovery and development. Apart from that, Nigeria and South Africa’s xenophobic attacks and counter attacks have potentials of bringing about lost of job. This may lead to victims becoming easy prey to terrorist organisations, thereby aggravating the already worse security situations in both countries and Africa at large. Therefore, in Nigeria and South Africa presently, youths are usually rated high in most of the crimes committed due to high rate of unemployment as a major contributing factor. Undeniably, xenophobic attacks in South Africa are troubling, dehumanising and tragic events that negatively affected many people both those in South Africa and those in other countries (Mistry 2004). There is no doubt that, a large number of South Africans were subjected under perpetual fear of being attacked by foreign migrants. If care is not taken, it might lead to war among nations. According to Claassen (2015) victims of xenophobic attacks were not limited to foreign migrants hence South Africans were equally victims of these attacks. This is because; they did not support the violence, or were mistaken to be foreigners and treated same. Oyelana (2015) observes that majority of foreign investors have lost confidence in the police and the judiciary that fail to protect them. In this regard, the majority of foreign investors lack community security. Consequently, this increases foreign investors’ exposure to abuse, crime and extortion by individuals and community leaders as revealed by Charman et al. (2012).

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Due to lack of trust and faith in the law enforcement agents like the police and courts, investors from foreign countries were compelled to rely almost completely on the authorised institutes of justice especially because of cultural and language barriers. Charman et al. (2012) argue that the judgement of the police and prosecutor was not favourable to foreign investors. Worst of it is that, the lengthy justice process coupled with difficulties in communication, foreign investors’ victims of crime, found it hard to engage the law enforcement agents during court processes. Most common forms of violence during xenophobic attacks as mentioned by Charman et al. (2012), following the categories used by the South African Police Service (SAPS) which include: murder, attempted murder, robbery, theft and assault. The reality is that no country is unaware of the importance of investments is to their economic development. Every country values foreign investments and considers it as one or part of her economic growth and development priority if not, such a country will certainly collapse economically. It is as a result of this that countries in Africa like Nigeria, Ghana and Zimbabwe suffered the repercussions of carrying out xenophobic attacks on foreign investors, such countries regretted their actions and undiplomatic decisions taken against foreign nationals residing with them. (Atsenuwa and Adepoju 2010; Posen and Ross 2012) considers the execution of impromptu xenophobic attacks by Nigerians, Ghanaians and Zimbabweans against foreign investors residing in their countries as a factor that must have largely dissuaded many who may wish to invest in their economies. In essence, a country’s direct foreign investments could be negatively affected by xenophobic attacks. Since xenophobic attacks victimise those who fall casualties of the observable fact, this tremendously and overwhelmingly prompts the need to question the government in the areas of its country’s policy and its legislative environment for possible gaps, and also assesses how the victims of xenophobic attacks are compensated or treated. Furthermore, all citizens both South African local nationals or foreign immigrants, have absolute rights that ought to be respected and live successively in such a country, as long as he or she has legal right to reside in that country whether permanently or temporarily. Above all, except a person or group of people have been tried and found guilty no one should take laws into their hands to send people back to their countries without the approval of competent court of such country that must condemn such person or group of people for committing an offence

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that warrants deportation. Among the developing countries in the world, South Africa is ranked one of the fast-developing countries that the rights of all citizens are gallantly and courteously well stated in the country’s bill of rights and supreme constitution yet, its recent economic situation or state of affairs is reported to be fluctuating as a result of inadequate security to the economic migrants, and this has hindered huge investment opportunities in the country. There is a need to encourage other investors from different countries such as Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Somalia, Pakistan, Nigeria and Ghana, among others, to invest in her economy. Another perspective is that perpetrators responsible for xenophobic activities are to be blamed for the downfall of South Africa’s economic development either directly or indirectly. Unfortunately, these perpetrators don’t serve their due jail term as supposed; and after a short while, they are often released to walk free in the country. It therefore shows that South African laws favour these perpetrators. South African government needs to review her judicial system and amend some laws as one of the best ways or strategies to improve and strengthen her economic development. South African local nationals alone cannot effectively enhance their current economic state of affairs based on recent evidences. In fact, for South Africa or any other country to thrive or sustain economically, especially during this global economic dispensation, such a country must prioritise harmony between her local nationals and other nationals residing in the country, investing in one another’s economy and welcoming foreign nationals into their country with passion; in peace, tranquillity and to learn how to live with different people in harmony. Also, emphasis must be made that xenophobic attacks will certainly lead to poverty of the citizens of any country that executes it. Unfortunately, most African countries lack adequate and proper knowledge regarding what poverty means. Some African leaders felt xenophobic attacks could be a means to solve their identified economic problems, make them selfreliant and have full control of all their economic resources. There is a saying that “a tree cannot make a forest”, it thus suffices to assert that a country cannot grow or develop on its own; seeing that no state; no matter how technologically advanced, financially buoyant or blessed with natural resources is self-sufficient. However, all states must be able and willing to accommodate new opportunities such as foreign investments, new technologies from abroad, billion-dollar innovations and ideas, good

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vision and mission, as well as the basics such as the labour that foreign nationals bring into the country. The presence of foreign investors in South Africa can generate new and brilliant business ideas that have the capacity to empower South Africans which in turn will provide employment opportunities enough to engage huge population who are unemployed and without any skill in South Africa. Such investments have potentials to revolutionalise South African economy. Finally, foreign nations’ values, labour and education if properly channelled by South Africans, will go a long way to bring development, productivity and economic stability, by this, xenophobia will be eliminated in South Africa.

Conclusion This chapter hinged on the economic impact of xenophobic attacks in South Africa with special focus on the period, 1994–2018. However, it has acknowledged that xenophobic attacks are not restricted to South Africa. In this regard, the study has identified other countries that experienced xenophobia to include Germany, Rome, Japan, Middle East, and a host of others. The chapter concludes that xenophobia has tainted South Africa’s image at the international fora and as such weakened the economy of both victims and locals. In order to ensure peace and stability in South Africa, all the factors that have the tendency of degenerating into xenophobic attacks need to be stamped out. In this respect, a number of policy options are suggested below: The South African Government should create empowerment and employment opportunities for the teeming jobless youths and enthrone social security system to mitigate the problem of acute poverty which has the tendency of giving impetus to xenophobic attacks. Secondly, it is imperative for African regional and continental bodies like the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) to use their platforms to evolve mechanisms which can enhance the African philosophy of “be your brother’s keeper”. Again, South Africa had condemned discriminations during colonialism and apartheid regimes; they should also condemn discrimination against migrants in South Africa’s economic and social lives. More so, there should be a restriction on the number and calibre of foreign migrants going to South Africa. South Africa is not an ECOWAS country covered by the charter on free

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movement of people. And of course, when a situation like that arises, both the desired and the undesired migrants would get visas. African migrants who have flooded South Africa should not be transferring their inadequacies to their host country. The South African Government should also establish a special “Anti-Xenophobic Squad” and saddle it with the responsibility of patrolling all the states in South Africa so that any act having the tendency of igniting xenophobic attacks would be ruthlessly dealt with right from the initial stage. Furthermore, South Africans (especially the youths) should note that the problem of unemployment is a global phenomenon, and xenophobic attacks will not end it. Some migrants will leave, some will remain and new ones will come. It is also not a problem peculiar to their country. Even though several jobs are created by developed countries on a daily basis, these countries, including the United States, are still battling with the menace of unemployment. In developing countries unemployment is also noted to be on the rise most especially in the African continent. Considering this, the study recommends that South African nationals should stop attributing unemployment and crimes in their country to African migrants. Finally, the locals in South Africa should allow the migrants to work in their country and enjoy peace and justice which in turn will enhance a better economic development of the African continent.

References Adeleke, B. O., Omitola, A. A., & Olukole, O. T. (2008). Impact of Xenophobia Attacks on Tourism. In A. O. Olowu (ed). Xenophobia: A Contemporary Issue in Psychology. Ile-Ife: Centre for Psychological Studies, pp. 139–140. American Psychiatric Association. (2001). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder (4th Edition). Washington DC: APA. Arogundade, O. T. (2008). Xenophobia – Carl Jung perspective. In A. A. Olowu (ed). Xenophobia: A contemporary issue in psychology. Ile-Ife: Centre for Psychological Studies. Atsenuwa, A., & Adepoju, A. (2010). Rights of African Migrants and Deportees: A Nigerian Case. A Report Written for the Justice Without Border Project. Dakar: OSIWA Batlistella. Baten, J. (2016). A History of Global Economy: From 1500 to the Present. USA: Cambridge University Press. Bunting, B. (1964) The Rise of South African Reich. London: Penguin African Library. Business Technology, 16 October, 2017.

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Charman, A., Petersen, L., & Piper, L. (2012). From South African Survivalism to Foreign Entrepreneurship: The Transformation of the Spaza Sector in Delft, Cape Town. Transformation, (78), 47–73. Claassen, C. (2015). What Explains South African Xenophobia? A Test of Eight Theories. School of Social and Political Sciences University of Glasgow. Available at http://www.chrisclaassen.com/Xenophobia_SA.pdf (Accessed on 26th of Feb, 2018). Corsini, R. J. (2002). The Dictionary of Psychology. New York: BrunnerRoutledge. Daily Trust News Paper. (2015). April 24. Dodson, B. (2010). Locating Xenophobia: Debate, Discourse and Everyday Experience in Cape Town, South Africa. Africa Today, 56 (3), 3–22. Editor, Z. B. T. (2019). Africa’s Largest and Most Industrialised Economy SA in Technical Recession. Zambia Business Times. Available at Zambiabusinesstimes.com. Retrieved on May 30. Ejoke, U. P., & Ani, K. J. (2017). A Historical and Theoretical Analysis of Xenophobia in South Africa. Journal of Gender, Information and Development in Africa, 6(1 & 2), 163–185 Gbamwuan, A., & Ityonzughul, T. T. (2015). A Juxtaposition of Apartheid and Xenophobia in South Africa. In Africa Journal Management, Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. 4. No. 4. Harris, B. (2002). A New Pathology for a New South Africa? In D. Hook & G. Eagle (eds). Psychopathology and Social Prejudice. Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, pp. 171–179. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database. (2018). Johnson, R. W. (2008a). Cape Town, South Africa (A Report). Wall Street Journal Europe, May 27. Kamnan, M. A., & Ityonzughul. (2019). Reflections on Xenophobic Attacks in South Africa and Implications for Nigerian Migrants, 1994-2017. FUDMA Journal of Arts, 3(1), 134–146. Landau, L. B. (2011). Exorcising Demons with Xenophobia, Violence and State Craft in Contemporary South Africa. Johannesburg: Wit University Press. Lehulere. O. (2008). The xenophobia outbreak in South Africa: strategic, political and organisational questions facing the new social movements. Khanya Journal, (19), July 2008, 32–45. Los Angeles Times (2015). April 15, p. 10. Maree, J. (2019). The Emergence, Struggles and Achievements of Black Trade Unions in South Africa from 1973 to 1984. Retrieved from Scholar. google. co.za. Mistry, D. (2004). Falling Crime, Rising Fear: 2003 National Victims of Crime Survey. Crime Quarterly, 8, 17–24. Available at www.iss.co.za/pubs/Cri meQ/No.8/Mistry.htm.

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Mogiekwu, M. (2002). Mass Media and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development: Realities and Challenges. Inaugural Lecture Delivered on May 14, 2002, at the University of North–West, Mmabatho, South Africa. Olowu, A. A. (2008). Persons in Contact: A General Introduction. In A. A. Olowu (ed). Xenophobia: A Contemporary Issue in Psychology. Ile-Ife: Integrity Press Ltd. Omer-Cooper, J. D. (1966). South Africa at the Dawn of the 19th Century. In J. C. Anene & G. Brown (eds). Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries. Ibadan: University of Ibadan. Osuntokun, A. A. (2008). A Panoramic Historical Discourse on Xenophobia. In A. O. Olowu (ed). Xenophobia: A Contemporary Issue in Psychology. Ile-Ife Centre for Psychological Studies. Oyelana, A. A. (2015). Crime Phobia’s Effects on Immigrant Entrepreneurs in South Africa. Journal of Social Science, 44(2, 3), 131–136. Posen, B. R., & Ross, A. L. (2012). Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy. MIT Press Journals, 21(3), 5–53. South Africa Human Rights Commission. (2008). Xenophobic Studies. Steinberg, J. (2008). South Africa’s Xenophobic Eruption. ISS Paper 169. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. Ullmann, L., & Krasner, L. (1975). A Psychological Approach to Abnormal Behaviour (2nd Edition). Eaglewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. Wimmer, A. (1997). Explaining Xenophobia and Racism: A Critical Review of Current Research Approaches. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 20(1), 17–41.

CHAPTER 14

Natural Resources and Nigeria-Cameroon Bakassi Peninsula Border Conflict Chijioke Francis Onyebukwa and Gabriel Tiobo Wose Kinge

Introduction Africa, according to Obadina (2000), is endowed with huge deposits of natural resources. There are millions of acres of arable land and huge deposits of crude oil and natural gases in the continent. With its biggest and longest rivers and lakes, the African continent serves as a home to of some of the world’s beautiful natural wonders. The Western region of the Republic of Cameroon and the Southern region of the Republic of Nigeria, for example, harbour the largest concentrations of one of the most precious mineral (petroleum, bauxite, gold, etc.) and natural gas (methane) in the continent. However, according to Mathews (1970:

C. F. Onyebukwa (B) Department of History and International Studies, Kingsley Ozumba Mbadiwe University, Ogboko Ideato, Imo State, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] G. T. W. Kinge Department of Politics & International Relations, NWU, Mafikeng, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. J. Ani (ed.), Political Economy of Colonial Relations and Crisis of Contemporary African Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0245-3_14

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339), most conflicts among states in Africa have been the consequence of colonial boundaries African states inherited at independence. In 1963 when the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was born, there were already outstanding border issues (conflict over the control of natural resources as in the case of Cameroon and Nigeria), which needed urgent attention. Also, there were mixed feelings among the different African Heads of States as to whether or not to maintain colonial borders. The discovery of huge deposits of natural resources has worked to the advantage of most corrupt and tyrant regimes that used these natural resources as a means to orchestrate clashes within and between African countries in a bid for long-term ruler-ship (Ani 2021). Such conflicts are in the form of disagreements over the proprietorship of energy or oilrich areas along the borders, control of strategic oil and mineral zones (Okudolo et al. 2019).

Historical Background Before the coming of the Europeans in the 1870s, Africa was largely controlled by Chiefdoms (Rourke 1997). This form of leadership changed when Africa was colonized by European powers and therefore became European protectorates. Even after independence, most of Africa was hunted by the evils of European legacy (borderline issues). A glaring example is the conflict that arose as a result of border challenges between Cameroon and Nigeria, with particular reference to the Bakassi Peninsular (BP), which origin is traced back to colonialism (Aghemelo and Ibhasebhor 2006). The contested portion of the BP is an extension of 1600 km land boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria from the Lake Chad Basin to the BP to the Gulf of Guinea. Fishermen, predominantly from the Efik-speaking tribe of Nigeria, inhabit a mangrove swamp (an extension of about 1000 km) and half-submerged island of the contested portion of the BP (Anene 1970: 56). The history of the Peninsula can be traced to the colonial epoch following the influx of the European, namely Britain, to Nigeria in the mid-nineteenth century. During this time, the King of the Old Calabar Kingdom whose rulership also extended to the Bakassi area signed a pact of Protection with the Queen of England on the 10 September 1884. The King’s endorsement of the pact meant a public concession of the territory to the British as a protectorate. It also implied that he had relinquished his Kingdom to the authorities of the British. Essentially, the

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inference was that it gave the British authority to engage in any activity and implemented whatever she considered befitting in the area (International Court of Justice 2002). According to Ngang (2007), three eras later, the entire populace of Nigeria became a British protected area in 1914. Meanwhile in German “Kamerun”, the colonialist was deeply engaged in acquiring enormous amounts of seafood (shrimps in particular) from the surrounding waters of the BP, and in using the waters of the Cross River for easy access into “Kamerun” (Ngang 2007). The conflict over the BP between Cameroon and Nigeria has been one among the many conflicts between the two countries since independence. The conflict over a portion of the peninsula only became known publicly after the discovery of natural resources such as petroleum and natural gases in the area. However, the 1964 summit held in Cairo attended by the heads of African States and their governments was geared towards the adoption of the Resolution on the Intangibility of Frontiers. Following the resolution arrived at, border issues were recognized as perpetual factors of conflict, but it urged all 53 member states to “respect the borderlines existing at their achievement of national independence in the 60s.” According to Klare (2004), territorial claims, colonialism and natural resources remain the known dominant sources of global conflicts. According to Aghemelo and Ibhasebor (2006), the British wanted a safe and uninterrupted route to Calabar, regarded as a significant commercial seaport even in the contemporary eastern part of Nigeria. As a result, the activities of the Germans were limited with no extension into British-occupied territories. This followed the agreements made between Germany and Britain aimed at clear depiction of boundaries between Nigeria and Cameroon. These agreements were signed as a pact, which was code named The Anglo-German Pact of 1913 (Omoigui 2006). The first entitled: “The settlement of the Frontier between Nigeria” and “The Kamerun” from Yola to the sea, clearly situate the BP under the authority of the Germans. The second on: “The regulation of navigable portion”— of the offshore border of the peninsula went to Britain. Thus, Article 21 of the 1913 Anglo-German Pact, clearly lay down the exact position of the border: From the centre of the navigable channel on a line joining Bakassi Point and King Point, the borderline shall follow the centre of the navigable channel of the Akwayafe River as far as the 3-mile limit of international rule. The fundamental reason of the pact was for the purpose of defining

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this borderline, and to establish that the navigable channel of the Akwayafe River shall be considered to lie exclusively to the east of the navigable channel of the Cross and Calabar Rivers. (Aghemelo and Ibhasebhor 2006)

Following the outbreak of WW1 in 1914 with the defeat of the Germans, the French and British became the new colonial masters to Cameroon (Omoigui 2006). This led to the division of “Kamerun” into East and West “Cameroon” governed by the protectorates of France and Britain, correspondingly and the birth of A Franco-British declaration in July 1919. This new pronouncement left the BP under the British Command. Thus, British Cameroon was overseen as part of Nigeria with regard to the boundary produced in the pact of 1913 (Ngang 2007). The codification was extended with the signing of yet another pact in 1919 between the colonialists in which maps were originally used to demonstrate that the BP was actually a part of Southern Cameroon under the British colonial administration (Olumide 2002: 4). With the awakening call for independence movement, across many African States, in the later part of the 1950s, tensions grew in the British Cameroon territory. Upon request by the United Nations Organization (UNO), Britain was forced to conduct a referendum in the respective territories under her rule. Through it, the two British protectorates of Southern and Northern Cameroon exercised their rights to select and willingness to belong to whichever country of their choice to secure their independence. During the plebiscite conducted in the British Northern Cameroon and the following question was asked; “do you wish to attain independence by joining the Federal Republic of Nigeria or by joining the Republic of Cameroon” (Anyu 2007: 42). The votes were in favour of the British Northern Cameroon becoming part of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and consequently achieved independence in 1960 (Anyu 2007). British Southern Cameroon on the other hand, voted to join the previously independent Republic of Cameroon (former French Cameroon) in 1961 (United Nations 1961). It is interesting to note that the BP was not a bone of contention before independence as evidenced by the number of polling stations (21) and percentage of people who voted (73%) to become part of the Republic of Cameroon to gain independence (Ngang 2007). Besides these processes, Nigeria however, laid claims of ownership of the BP, a decade into her independence, following the discovery of huge oil reserves in the area and immediately deployed military forces to the

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territory in a bid to mark her presence and ownership. Nigeria had initially laid claims that the locals gave their right of sovereignty to the British far back in 1884, and the British since thereafter, did not surrender sovereignty. Nigeria continues to encroach on the Peninsula claiming that the 1913 treaties restricting the boundary from Yola to the sea were never authorized. This action on the part of Nigeria prompted a retrospection into the Anglo-German Treaty of 1913, which clearly describes and delineates acceptable nautical borders for both countries (Kirchner 2001). This prompted an exchange of visits between the presidents of both Cameroon and Nigeria. In 1971 former Head of State of Nigeria, General Gowon visited Cameroon’s President Amadu Ahidjo for discussions over the issue (Omoigui 2006). Their meeting ended with the signing of the “CokerNgo” Line delineating the “navigable portion” offshore border of the two countries, thereby reiterating the 1913 pact. Sadly, the signing of the “Coker-Ngo” Line, not long after General Gowon of Nigeria, changed his mind regarding the final decision taken at the meeting after listening to advices from his advisers (Omoigui 2006; Olumide 2002). A serious retrospection of their last meeting precipitated the July 1975 Maroua city repeat visit by General Gowon of Nigeria to the President Ahidjo of Cameroon. This time, the visit was in order to address the injustices of the Coker-Ngo Line mentioned in the 1913 pact. It is pertinent to indicate here that both meetings held by these heads of state were to understand colonial borders and also to decide where the sovereignty of BP lies (Aghemelo and Ibhasebor 2006). Moreover, a military coup that took place in July 1975 saw the ousting of General Gowon and the incoming General Murtala Muhammed as the new Head of State of Nigeria shortly after his visit from Cameroon. In order to win the support of his people, General Murtala Muhammed swayed the bulk of the Nigerian population to believe that General Gowon had handed the Bakassi over to Cameroon as reparation for her support during the Nigerian Civil War. He further laid claim that the 1971 and 1975 pacts between the two Heads of States, General Gowon and Ahidjo, were never consented to by a military council (Anene 1970). Unfortunately for General Murtala Muhammed he was killed in a military coup and was substituted by General Olusegun Obasanjo. The emergence of President Olusegun Obasanjo worked in favour of Cameroon because with the break of conflicts amid the two countries, President Obasanjo

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ordered the retreat of Nigerian forces from the area in accordance with the Green-Tree Pact of 2006 (Aghemelo and Ibhasebor 2006). Nigeria’s presence along the coastline of the Peninsula triggered the matter to take a legal approach. On the 24th of March 1994, the Cameroon Government introduced a lawsuit against Nigeria, seeking an injunction for the exclusion of Nigeria’s armed forces, which it said laid claim to sovereignty over the Peninsula (Olumide 2002: 4).

Conceptual Clarifications Natural Resources Natural resources are defined as those resources that exist without much influence of humans. Some of these resources include but not limited to sunlight, water and land (which includes all the minerals). Basically, all natural resources are grouped into two groups namely; renewable and non-renewable resources. By non-renewable natural resources we mean those resources that are not replenish-able such as fossil fuels, oil, natural gas, and coal and nuclear energy. For the purpose of this study we will be looking at the non-renewable resources such as petroleum and natural gas (Schilling and Chiang 2011).

Conflict The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIC) in Schwarz define conflict as “… the clashing of interests (positional differences) on national values of some duration and magnitude between at least two parties (organized groups, states, groups of states, organizations) that are determined to pursue their interests and win their cases.” According to Boulding (1962), conflict may be defined as “a state of antagonism in which the parties are aware of the incompatibility of potential future positions, and in which each party wishes to occupy a position that is mismatched with the wishes of the other.” Lewicki et al. in Tjosvold defines conflict as “the interaction of interdependent people who perceived incompatible goals and interference from each other in achieving those goals” Barki and Hartwick elaborated upon these efforts by defining conflict as “a dynamic process that occurs between interdependent parties as they experience negative emotional reactions to

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perceived disagreements and interference with the attainment of their goals”.

The Peninsula The word peninsula is derived from the Latin peninsula from paene “almost” and insula “island.” Therefore, a peninsula is defined as a piece of land prolonging out into a body of water, that is still linked to the mainland or a peninsula can be defined as a piece of land that is surrounded by water on three sides but connected to mainland (American Heritage Dictionaries 2004). Colonial master was a term often used back in the eighteenth century when Europeans invaded the African continent for the search of raw materials to feed their ever hungry industries. The colonial masters were the British, Germans, French, Portuguese, etc., who scramble for Africa in search of oversea territories and eventually, they became the colonial masters.

Literature Review This section comprises the literature review and theoretical framework. According to Denscombe (2007), the purpose of carrying out a literature review search is to conduct a serious and exhaustive appraisal of earlier research related to the subject. Natural resources and border conflicts in Africa have been an ongoing issue even before most African countries gained independence. Huge deposits of these natural resources in a particular location have always attracted rival clashes, which resulted in conflict. This section comprises the literature review and theoretical framework. According to Denscombe (2007), the purpose of carrying out a literature review search is to present a critical and in-depth evaluation of previous research related to the subject. He further emphasizes that literature review on previous work done ensures that the works of others are not plagiarized without acknowledging the source and identify gaps in the previous literature that the study will address. The idea of scarcity of resources as a cause of conflicts is confronted by many researchers (Percival and Homer-Dixon 1995; Sodaro 2001; Mathew et al. 2009) who argue that such scarcity hardly plays a part as a source for skirmish because natural resource scarcity can be resolved through technological progress. To them, issues arising from resource

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scarcity, as a result of overconsumption, and competition can be solved by high-tech innovations, lower resources inputs in production processes and salvaging. Those countries with scarce resource can have admittance to those resources through cooperation and international trade rather than engaging into costly and yet deadly clashes (Strüver 2010). Researchers like Klara and Wresting allude to the fact that paucity of replaceable and non-replaceable resources, uneven distribution of natural resources, increase in global demand of these resources, overuse of raw materials and resource dilapidation, explain the inception of natural resource conflicts (Klara 2001; Wresting 1986). According to Wresting (1986), paucity of natural resources precipitates conflict in several ways. An example of such way can be when an endowed natural resource nation acts as a conflict originator in order to frustrate an alternative nation from consuming the particular natural resources (Strüver 2010) or in another way such a country will act as a conflict initiator just to gain right to use the raw resources by military invasion (Wasson 2007). Wasson argues that: since most often natural resources are the fundamental building blocks of most state’s economy and a vital component of military might, a resource-poor nation incapable of obtaining these resources through trade with other nations may need to pursue alternative ways to access natural resources if they wish to progress economically, improve their military capabilities, and to meet up with the basic needs of their growing population. Wasson (2007: 9)

The presence of international actors like Britain, Germany and France in Africa has been very instrumental in ongoing conflicts in the continent and the outbreak of the Bakassi conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria is no exception. The colonial legacies inherited from their colonial past, the colonially negotiated boundaries of both countries Cameroon and are today haunting them. This underpins the assertion made by Nordquist that, although boundaries suggest a condition of state sovereignty, their relational nature contravenes that sovereignty (Nordquist 2001). Anene (1970) posits that, the disputed BP is a region of about 1000 kilometer (KM) of mangrove swamp and half-inundated islands predominantly engaged by fishermen settlers of the Efik-speaking tribe from Nigeria. The sighting of latent natural oil reserves in the waters around the Peninsula only facilitated amplified strains between Cameroon and

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Nigeria. The peninsula which boasts of huge oil wealth and substantial fish deposits since 1993 remained an issue of severe disagreement between the two countries resulting in ethnic clashes, military confrontations and loss of lives. “The maritime Bakassi has been the base of an important fishing industry. According to reports by colonial administrators, the Bakassi region or area is good for business and prosperity” (Olumide 2002: 4). The rift between the two countries only showed how selfish they were in that; they were after the regions natural endowment. The tension between the two countries became clear only after the discovery of natural resources which saw the two countries scrambling for control over the natural rich-resource area. Laying claims of sovereignty over the BP became clear after ten years down the line subsequent upon the sighting of huge availability of natural gas and oil reserves around the peninsula (Aghemelo and Ibhasebor 2006). The two former presidents of Cameroon and Nigeria respectively, met in Maroua in 1971 and 1975 to discuss the delineation and drawing of boundary line, which later became accepted as the Marous Treaty. Moreover, in the early 1990s, there was a certain measure of Nigerians who accepted Cameroon’s claim of sovereignty over the BP in the era heralding eruption of the dispute between the two countries. This period witnessed Nigerian researchers and authorities overtly confirming Cameroonian autonomy over the doubtful territory, and Nigerian maps inclined to trace the BP inside Cameroonian land (Essombe Edimo 1995). According to the International Court (2002), Nigeria’s state claims of the BP are premised on historical consolidation and the real application of her sovereign rights after independence, with the agreement of Cameroon. Akak (1999) alludes that the Nigerian administration has repeatedly laid claim that subordinates of the Old Calabar chiefs were the predominant occupants of the peninsula from before the colonial era. It further lay claims that, at the dawn of independence, these rulers shifted their sovereign rule over the peninsula over to Nigeria which had implemented authority over Bakassi over time, devoid of any disapprobation from Cameroon. In a bid to demonstrate its control over the BP after colonialism, Nigeria introduced diverse standards in the area such as tax collection, the extensive use of Nigerian money and passports by the people of Bakassi. Nigeria also built hospitals and schools in the area. This action was typical of the Nigerian government as it showed more

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seriousness on the ground (BP) compared to her counterpart who laid claims but in documentation. Nwokedi (1985) criticizes the vague status of these boundaries and lay emphasizes that like many others in the African continent, are the costs of uncertainty. He associates recurrent border disputes between Nigeria and her neighbours to vagueness of borders, the availability of significant mineral resources inside the border regions and the trans-border actions of citizens and agents of the government. This calls for increased cooperation in economic, industrial, socio-cultural and political reasons of communication between the states (Cameroon and Nigeria) as a reference for unwavering boundary policies.

Theoretical Framework The Paradox of Plenty denotes an irony that states and countries with profusion of natural resources, precisely of the point-source nonreplaceable natural resource, such as minerals and fuels, incline to having reduced economic advancement and worse growth results compared to states with lesser natural resources (Wenar 2008: 2). The significance of this theory to this research is that it provides an explanation as to how abundant resources turn to hinder economic development in resourcerich regions or countries. In order words, it explains the curse caused by the presence of abundant resources specifically point sources in a particular region or country are not properly utilized to the benefit of the citizens. However, resource curse theorists advocate that some countries or regions endowed with natural resources have over the years performed negatively in reference to economic development leading to the betterment of social welfare as compared to those states with little or no natural resources. Kuwimb (2010) articulates that resource curse theorists differ from the 1940s and 1950s modernization theorists who claim that natural resource-developed countries are more prone to rapid economic development that result in industrialization as opposed to resource-rich emerging countries characterized by reverting economic development tendencies, political insecurity and decrease in the living standards and social welfare of the people. In addition, Auty (2001) added that natural resources gifts may not be useful to nations characterize of stumpy revenue levels of growth than the conformist wisdom. This is evident in developing countries following the

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mechanization struggles after the war and the outcomes of the mineralrich developing countries since the early years of 1960s. The relevance of this new indication submits that not only may natural resources-rich nations benefit from this gift, but may also perform poorly too. Therefore, the counter-intuitive outcome is the basis of the resource curse theory. Favourable natural rich-resource endowed countries tend to have more of undemocratic regimes, unequal distribution of income and increasing corruption (Palley 2003: 54–55). Natural resources have been a curse in the BP located between the southern region of Cameroon and eastern region of Nigeria because of the weak economic performance yet it is a natural rich-resource region and also has displayed slow economic development over the previous years. In other words, the BP despite the discovery of huge deposits of favourable rich resources, has not only been unsuccessful in taking the population out of poverty but has remained afflicted by violent conflict over the control of these natural rich resources. The applicability of the resource curse theory to this research makes it very relevant to the exercise. It also explains the reasons why some rich resources countries fail to develop economically compared to countries with no rich resources. The disadvantage of this theory is that it fails to give motives for causes of conflict rather it explains reasons why rich resources are not always the fastest growing economies compared to little or no rich-resource countries. Since this theory was coined by Dollard in 1939 as a hypothesis, it had remained a very significant theory in the field of social science despite undergoing some levels of modernization. According to Soyombo (2008: 99), it is a theory which recognizes frustration as the principal cause of aggression. This is because the possibility of a group people displaying aggression after experiencing frustration is very high. Syoyombo further indicated that the probability of display of aggression among a group of people who experience frustration increases just as their level of frustration continues to increase. In this sense, when frustration results aggression with a group of persons, it often prevents such group from realizing its set objectives (Soyombo 2008: 99–100). The theory further warns against subjecting persons to frustration especially when such persons are incapable or unable to counter such frustrations to avert often, heavy potential aggressive consequences. Frustration can also mean resolving whatever issue there is in the sense of the frustrated group of persons seeking other ways to address the issue

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at hand. Like conflict, frustration too is said to be inevitable for as long as we cannot have everything we wish to have, irrespective of how manipulative we become and keep our wishes in tack. It becomes imperative for a person or group of persons to sort ways to deal with frustration. The theory sees preconception as a consequence of transferred aggression in which a strong group attribute faults to a weaker group caused by frustration. Frustration tends to show itself as aggression or hostility in a situation where a group of persons fail to achieve their desired objectives. As mentioned earlier, the conflict over the control of the natural richresource region of the BP started after the discovery of natural resources. Just like in the case of Cameroon and Nigeria’s conflict over Bakassi, when either of the country perceived they are being denied or restricted from attaining a particular goal (control of favourable natural rich-resource region of Bakassi), their frustration is more expected to result in aggression. As always expected, the closer one gets to his or her goal, the higher the enthusiasm and anticipation of the desire. Therefore, the closer each of them (Cameroon and Nigeria) are in achieving their goal, the more frustrated they get by being interrupted or held back. Conflict is either caused by frustration or greed. Natural resources extraction in the BP has exacerbated aggression, by creating revenues for either of the extractors other than the indigenes of the peninsula. Natural resources can function as the cause of conflict as in the case of the Bakassi conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria, fighting over control over a profitable favourable rich-resources source (Mildner et al. 2011). The combination of frustration and aggression can create the start-up of a conflict. This theory is appropriate for this study firstly because of its applicability. Secondly, it explains the outcome when some persons or group of persons are being held back (frustrated) from achieving a particular goal which results in aggression, then conflict.

Understanding Conflict Issues Clearly, two parties in a disagreement might have irreconcilable aims on a variety of issues. However, this bewildering variation may be reduced by categorizing these difficulties into three basic social categories: wealth, power and status. Without first determining the purpose and problem of the dispute, understanding political conflict is impossible. Furthermore, recognizing the subject and the reason of the disagreement is necessary for conflict resolution.

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The eminent sociology scientist and conflict researcher Deutsch distinguishes five key problems over which a dispute may occur to include: control over resources, preferences and nuisances, beliefs, values or the nature of the relationship. Singer went further to indicate that territory, ideology, dynastic legitimacy, religion, language, ethnicity, selfdetermination, resources, markets, domination, equality and of course, retribution is all common suspects when it comes to conflict causes and concerns. To this end, according to Pfetsch and Rohloff (2000) about nine commodities including; “territory (border), secession, decolonization, autonomy, system (ideology), national power, regional predominance, international power, resources” and others, have maintained a history of being behind the cause of the most contested natural resourcerelated conflict issues. This categorization is largely recognized by conflict specialists in political science. The question is: what is the commodity, or what commodities are the parties in dispute arguing for?

The Conflict Dynamics in the BP Conflict dynamics revolve around three major classifications of territory and border conflicts, minority, ethnic and government-power conflicts; and conflicts over resources. As such, the BP conflict could largely be perceived from two classifications: (a) territory and border conflicts, minority conflicts; and (b) conflicts over resources. Territory and Border Conflicts and Minority Conflicts Conquests of territories and territorial secession have long been political hot topics and major conflict concerns in numerous disputes, confrontations and wars. Not just geographical growth, but also the inclusion of ethnic boundaries into an existing state, as well as secession, might be among the objectives. Territorial goals are linked to resources or ethnic or religious minority, either tacitly or openly (Okoi 2016). Classic conflicts, according to Burton, are territorial disputes. Therefore, Vasquez, averred that one of the major issues in war is territory, and consequently he asserts that: “… of all the possible issues that could end in war, issues involving territorial contiguity is indeed the most war prone” (p. 23). Deducing from this, part of the Nigeria and Cameroon conflict in BP premised on the territorial contiguity of the entire BP (Mildner et al. 2011; Ani et al. 2018). The issue of territorial contiguity covered substantial grounds for

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argument on the proper demarcation of the land mass of the disputed BP. This issue also became a major part of the premise that fuelled the dispute in the BP. Conflicts Over Resources According to Okoi (2016), the fundamental root of conflict is a battle over access to and control over significant resources (such as water, oil, gold, diamonds and so on). Natural resources may seem clear as a source of conflict, but the role that resources might play in individual cases of a conflict is less obvious. The desire for resource management, as well as the demand for, usage, and distribution of such resources, has been a source of conflict and international and intrastate disputes (Taiwo and Igwebuike 2015). Similarly, natural resources and border conflicts in Africa have been an ongoing issue even before and after independence of most of the states in the continent. Huge deposits of these natural resources in a particular location have always attracted rival clashes which resulted in conflict. According to Baye (2010) the discovery of natural resources in the BP has been the reason behind the conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria. The newly developed interest to the peninsula after oil had been discovered was regarded with suspicion by the indigenes since they alleged that such curiosity could only be artificial and geared towards personal interest and not that of the locals (Taiwo and Igwebuike 2015). It is thus not in contention that one of the reasons why the Heads of States of Nigerian and the Cameroonian, at the time, laid claim the BP was as a consequence of their interest in the presence of natural resources, especially, oil, in the area. The implication remains that the BP conflict, apart from a conflict over territorial contiguity, equally stems from the angle of natural resources. In other words, the BP conflict is also a natural resource-related conflict despite its tie to territorial contiguity and control (Baye 2010).

Conclusion This paper has looked at the border conflict in the BP between Nigeria and Cameroon while linking the underlying causes to the availability of natural resources discovered in the area. One of the most contentious of these resources is oil deposits which were found in large commercial

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quantities there. Bearing the economic benefits of this resource in mind, both countries engaged in serious contention over its control and ownership. The degeneration of the conflict negatively affected the diplomatic ties that existed between Nigeria and Cameroon and increased tension between them. In the end, deep diplomatic actions and serious legal battle brought an end to the conflict.

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International Court of Justice. (2002). Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening). http://www.icj-cij.org (June 4, 2008). Kirchner, Stefan. (2001). Water, Oil and Blood: The Cameroon-Nigeria Boundary Dispute Regarding BPr and Lake Chad and the Threat of Water over Water Resources. Social Science Research Network. Available at: http:// www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=2136. Accessed on the 08/06/2016. Klare, M. T. (2001). Resource Wars. The New Landscape of Global Conflict. New York: Metropolitan Books. Klare, Michael T. (2004). Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America’s Growing Petroleum Dependency. New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt. Kuwimb, M. (2010). A Critical Study of the Resource Curse Thesis and the Experience of Papua New Guinea (Doctoral dissertation, James Cook University). Matthews, R. O. (1970). Interstate Conflicts in Africa: A Review. International Organization, 24(2): 335–360. Mathew, R., Brow, O., & Jensen, D. (2009). From Conflict to Peace Building: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment. UN Environment Programme Manitoba, Canada: IISD Publications Centre. Mildner, S. A., Lauster, G., & Wodni, W. (2011). Scarcity and Abundance Revisited: A Literature Review on Natural Resources and Conflict. International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCV), 5(1): 155–172. Ngang, Kevin. (2007). Understanding the Bakassi Conflict. A Showcase of Conflict Prevention in Practice. EPU Research Papers, 4: 1–38. Nordquist, K. A. (2001). Boundary Conflicts: Drawing the Line, in Preventive Negotiation: Avoiding Conflict Escalation, pp. 19–40. Nwokedi, E. (1985). Strands and Strains of “Good Neighbourliness”: The Case of Nigeria and Its Francophone Neighbours. Genève-Afrique/Geneva-Africa, 23(1): 39. Obadina, T. (2000). The Myth of Neo-Colonialism. African Economic Analysis. Okoi, O. (2016). Why Nations Fight: The Causes of the Nigeria–Cameroon Bakassi Peninsula Conflict. African Security, 9(1): 42–65. Okudolo, I. P., Amamkpa, A. W., & Ani, K. J. (2019). Towards Sustainable Energy Security and Socio-Economic Betterment of Nigeria: Focus on Challenges and Prospects of Nation Building. Journal of Nation Building & Policy Studies, 3(2): 5–23. Olumide, I. (2002). Letter from the Attorney General of the Federation to the Ministry of External Affairs. Punch Newspapers, p. 7. Omoigui, N. (2006). The Bakassi Story. Available from: http://www.omoigui. com. Accessed on the 18/10.

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Palley, T. I. (2003). Lifting the Natural Resource Curse. Foreign Service Journal, 80(12): 54–61. Percival, V., & Homer-Dixon, T. F. (1995). Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: The case of South Africa. Journal of Peace Research, 35(3): 279–298. Pfetsch, Frank R., & Rohloff, Christoph. (2000). National and International Conflicts 1945–1995: New Empirical and Theoretical Approaches. London. Rourke, J. J. (1997). International Politics on the World Stage. New York: Dushkin/McGraw Hill. Schilling, M., & Chiang, L. (2011). The Effect of Natural Resources on a Sustainable Development Policy: The Approach of Non-Sustainable Externalities. Energy Policy, 39(2): 990–998. Sodaro, M. J. (2001). Comparative Politics: A Global International. New York: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, p. 34. Soyombo, O. (2008). Xenophobia in Contemporary Society: A Sociological Analysis. IFE Psychologia: An International Journal: Xenophobia: A Contemporary Issue in Psychology, 16(2): 94–104. Strüver, G. (2010). Too Many Resources or Too Few? What Drives International Conflicts? Taiwo, R., & Igwebuike, E. (2015). Representation of Bakassi Peninsula conflict in Nigeria and Cameroon Print Media: A Critical Discourse Approach. Linguistik Online, 72(3). United Nations. (1961). UN General Assembly resolution 1608 (XV) of 21 April 1961. Wasson K. (2007). Natural Resources in https://www.bing.com/videos/search? q=Wasson+(2007)+on+natural+resources&qpvt=Wasson+(2007)+on+natural+ resources&FORM=VDRE. Wresting, A. H. (1986). Environmental Factors in Strategic Policy and Action: An Overview. Oxford, New York: Oxford University. Wenar, L. (2008). Property Rights and the Resource Curse. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 36(1): 2–32.

CHAPTER 15

Labour Migration in Africa: A Political-Economy Overview Kelechi Johnmary Ani, Siyan Oyeweso , and Yemisi Olawale

Introduction Migration across national and international borders has persistently generated a series of debates highlighting the patterns of migration, the nature and drivers of migration across various continents, countries and regions.

K. J. Ani Department of History and Strategic Studies, Alex Ekwueme Federal University Ndufu-Alike, Ikwo, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] S. Oyeweso Department of History and International Studies, Osun State University, Osogbo, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] Y. Olawale (B) Department of History and International Studies, University of Illorin, Illorin, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. J. Ani (ed.), Political Economy of Colonial Relations and Crisis of Contemporary African Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0245-3_15

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The role of States and international organizations on migration governance, as well as the experiences of immigrants and consequences of migration for both countries of origin and destination are major factors in diplomatic analysis. The illicit flow of undocumented irregular migration, and human trafficking among others affects African and global diplomacy (Frank and John 2022; Christina and Hélène 2008; Hein de Hass et al. 2020). Apart from these debates, the interdisciplinary study of migration from heterogeneous and diverse perspectives also encompasses various categories of immigrants, changing demography of immigrants and migration-related immigrants’ governance (Peter 2022). Among these categories includes the study of children and migration, youth and migration, women and migration, labour migration, sex migration and human trafficking among others. The above implies that although migration is not a new field, it has also continuously experienced diversity in terms of the topics covered, actors involved, theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches. Mathias and Constantin (2022) contends that international labour migration is driven by better life and other economic reasons. Recent mobility development from Africa has put intra-continent and intercontinental migration of African labour as one of the important issues. Given its importance, it has led to a series of policies, and programmes aimed at either encouraging the flow of labour such as Regional Economic Cooperation’s free movement policies or preventing the flow of labour to developed countries or reaping the benefits of labour migration through remittances, brain gain and brain circulation. Labour migration among other issues has become one of the most discussed aspects in any migration dialogue in Africa. It is important to state that despite the exponential rate of labour migration within and outside the shores of the African continent, it is hardly a new phenomenon. However, the exponential rate and intensity of contemporary mobility patterns have made it worrisome. In mid-year 2020, the stock of international migrants was estimated at 281 million (Black 2021). In Africa, the migration of individuals categorized as “labours” featured prominently in Africa’s pre-colonial, and colonial and become an important issue in Africa’s post-colonial phase. Put differently, Kwabena and Isaac (2018: 374) state that each historical phase in Africa has its labour history. However, the striking difference between these phases is the increasing figures (number) of African labour migrants. Migration data have shown that although Africa has a rich history of migration, it is

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not in its entirety a continent of a massive exodus. In 2020, the greater per cent of African migrants (51.6%) live in different countries of Africa (Africa-Europe Foundation Debate 2021). However, while the volume of intra-Africa labour migration cannot be underestimated, inter-continental migration from Africa largely directed towards Europe, North America and the Middle East has significant implications for Africa’s growth and development. Labour migration globally is also largely economically induced and often stratified into “high-skilled” (Boeri et al. 2012; Czaika 2018) and “low-skilled labours” (Castles 2011). Given this development, the chapter specifically focused on international labour migration to high-income economies countries and its implication on Africa. Therefore, this chapter is an effort to capture and reflects on labour migration within the context of African economy and development discourses. The chapter brings into the limelight this discussion using the three phases of African history—pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial era—state-of-the-art knowledge on the issues and debates surrounding labour migration in Africa. The chapter is divided into five sections apart from the introduction and conclusion. The first section examines theoretical perspectives on labour migration. The second section examines labour migration in pre-colonial and colonial Africa. The third section examines the push and pulls factors, nature and dynamics of labour migration in post-colonial Africa. The fourth section examines African Union within the context of international labour migration. The chapter relies on secondary sources of data drawn from books, journals, labour migration reports and newspapers.

Theoretical Perspectives on Labour Migration Scholars have focused on understanding the drivers of labour migration through theories. Among these theories include functionalist theories such as the neo-classical, push and pull theory and the historic-structural theories such as the globalization and neo-Marxist theory among others (Hein de Hass et al. 2020). The neo-classical theory examines labour migration from the perspective of economic development (Lewis 1954; Harris and Todaro 1970). The neo-classical theorists—from a macro perspective—perceive migrants as rational actors responding to economic indices ranging from increasing demand and supply of labour and market dynamics in countries of origin and destination (Kindleberger 1967; Straubhaar 1986). Using the development indices, the theory sees labour

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migration as a “redistribution of workforce from areas of low productivity to high productivity ones” (Lewis 1954). The theory from a micro perspective considers labour migration as a product of individual decisions shaped by rational appraisal of mobility costs and benefits (Harris & Todaro 1970; Stark and Bloom 1985). Mathias (2015) also notes that neo-classical theory emphasized geographical economic differences which in turn shape labour migration. Hence, the labour migrants’ response in turn is perceived as a cyclic means towards ensuring global labour balance. Mathias (2015) further contends that the endowment of labour relative to capital in a country determines the pattern of labour migration. The income (wage difference) sums up labour migration from low wages countries to high wages countries. Also, the push and pull theory has also provided a thorough thesis that shapes labour migration (Passaris 1989). Push–pull theory identifies socio-economic, political and environmental and demographic factors which are assumed to push people out of places of origin and pull them into destination places. Put differently, factors such as unemployment, and low incomes reinforce labour migrants’ rational individual approach and decisions to move to destinations with opportunities to access labour (Lee 1966). Another category of theories that seek to understand labour migration is the historic-structural theories (Castles and Kosack 1973; Massey 1988) which started around the 1970s and 1980s to provide an alternative explanation to labour migration. Historic-structural theories emphasize on institutional forces associated with the development of a capitalist production system cause an almost insatiable demand for migrant labour (Castles and Kosack 1973; Massey 1988). Among the sub-theories include the structural neo-Marxist theory, the globalization theory and the dependency/world system theory. These theories emphasized the role of the global capitalist States as well as capitalist-oriented multinational cooperation and employment agencies as drivers of labour migration which is needed to drive the wheel of capitalism through exploitation. The historic-structural dependency considers labour migration as a product of capitalism and global economic inequalities between developed and underdevelopment (Baeck 1993; Frank 1969). The dependency/world system theorist sees labour migration from developing countries to developed ones—especially highly skilled migrants as another way of furthering colonial exploitation or termed neo-colonialism. Dependency theorists are particularly concerned about global economic relations designed unfairly

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with capitalist powerful countries creating the rule of global economic relations to perpetuate further dependency. Globalization theorists consider globalization as an engine of global labour migration. Apart from the deepening global interconnectedness through information, communication and technological revolution, globalization has become a capitalist instrument that shapes global economic inequalities states. In this process, labour migration to economically advantaged countries will drive labour migration from disadvantaged countries. These forces provide the impetus to emigrate and position migrant workers as a precarious labour force, which then becomes a central feature of capitalist growth in industrialized countries (Burawoy 1976; Miles 1986; Bovenkerk et al. 1990). The increasing rate of irregular labour migration from African countries can be understood from the framework of structural difference advocated by both neo-classical and historic-structural theorists.

Labour Migration in Pre-Colonial and Colonial Africa The phenomenon of labour migration is not new in Africa. It has been featured repeatedly and is prominent in Africa’s pre-colonial economic history. Before colonial rule, Africa has a rich history of migratory mobility which involves the change of residence across administrative borders of kingdoms, clans and empires (Afolayan 1988; Adepoju 2005; Yaro 2008). Drawing from Africa’s rich migration history, it can also be argued that the concept of Africa as a mobile continent is not new. Put differently, Africans, from earliest times have always been on the move as far as the history of the continent is concerned. In pre-colonial Africa, there are records of labour movement either on a permanent or seasonal basis across kingdoms, clans and empires. The movement of labour in the pre-colonial period is not only economically induced but is also influenced by a series of political, social and environmental factors which might prevent labour from engaging in their occupations. Even in cases of migration caused by warfare (forced) or environmental crises, the response of labour is economically determined—moving to regions where economic activities can be facilitated. In pre-colonial Africa, trading activities and economic opportunities influence labour migration.

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African labours came into the international migration limelight through the slave trade aspect of the Trans-Saharan trade. The TransSaharan Slave trade between countries of West Africa and North Africa facilitated the migration of West African labour across regional and continental boundaries (Kehinde 2013). These labour captured as slaves served in the agricultural sector, and service sectors, as military and security guards household and domestic labours in North Africa, the Mediterranean shores and the Middle East (Kehinde 2013). Austeen’s (1992) research shows that over 28 million African slaves (labourers included) were matched as slave labours to North Africa, the Mediterranean shores and the Middle East. The migration of African labours experienced another dynamic with the emergence of colonial rule. During colonial rule, there are records of intra-African migration. Colonialism facilitated large-scale intra-African labour migration through the introduction of wage labour introduced to increase African labourers’ commitment to colonial economics policies and enterprise (Kwabena and Isaac 2018). Also, the introduction of harsh economic policies such as taxation policies, harsh-labour regimes, compulsory cultivation of cash crops and conscription triggered the migration of labour from one region to another in Africa. There are records of labour migration from French, Belgian, German and Portuguese colonies with harsh labour policies such as indignant policy into British colonies with liberal regimes. In addition, the availability of employment also encouraged labour migration during the colonial period. The movement of Nigerian traders comprising of the Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa into Ghana (formerly Gold Coast) remains a perfect example. The economic opportunities presented by the cocoa boom as well as expansive petty-trading opportunities facilitated large-scale labour who are willing to participate as active labourers in Ghana’s economy. Also, there are records of cocoa labour seasonal migrants from Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso working as labourers in cocoa farms. During colonial rule, the development of transportation systems such as roads, and rail as well as the growth of cities such as Accra, Lagos, Kano, Ibadan, Dakar, Lome and Cotonou contributed to labour migration dynamics (Yaro 2008: 3). African labour inter-continental migrants started while African colonies were still under the sphere of influence of European powers. During the early phase of European contact with African countries, the Trans-Atlantic slave trade. The slave trade occurred in terms of forced migration features as an international forced labour migration. The Trans-Atlantic slave trade

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led to the movement of African slaves to the New World (North America, Europe and the Caribbean). The Trans-Atlantic Slave trade led to the movement of African labours and able-bodied men to the New World. African migrants were forced to work on cash crops such as tobacco, sugar and cotton plantations. Slave trade entered its peak in the late nineteenth century which witnessed the movement of, about 80,000 Africans annually to the New World for intensive labour (Castles et al. 2013). It was also estimated that approximately 15 million Africans were migrated forcefully as slaves to the New World (Americas) by European and American slave traders and trading companies (Castles et al. 2013; Walters 1997). Also, another wave of African labours moved to Europe as part of the military force for metropolitan countries during the world wars. After the war, a substantial number of this ex-soldier did not return to Africa. Hence, the post-Second World War through the period of independence witnessed the migration of Africans to Europe. However, these migratory processes were temporary and were educationally induced rather than employment induced. During this period, the Africans’ migration to Europe was not permanent but only a year to acquire academic knowledge and specialized skills which would equip them better for service in their count. However, given the large disparities between countries of origin and destination during this period, many of these migrants became permanent residents of their host countries. In addition, during the colonial period, metropolitan countries’ dependency relationship with colonies was designed to shape Africans’ belief that metropolitan countries and cities are superior in terms of socio-economic and political development to what was obtainable in the colonies. Under colonial rule, a political strategy such as the policy of assimilation was used to create a strong bond through unequal between the core and the colonies. This was used to create a psycho-social orientation towards European modernity (Asong 2018). This mentality left the colonies with an external aspiration to live life not only along European modernity but desire to live abroad as an engineer by colonialism (Asong 2018).

Labour Migration in Post-Colonial Africa Since the attainment of independence in the 1950s and 1960s, African countries have continued to struggle with various challenges which in turn have affected the process and prospect of growth, development and nation-building. The African labour migration roots can be understood

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from two major African-political economy works titled “How Europe Underdeveloped Africa” (Rodney 1972) and “How Africans Underdeveloped Africa” (Stanley 2010). Drawing these two book titles, both detailed the colonial and post-colonial links of African labour migration. The chapter contends that African labour efforts to reach developed countries such as North America and Europe often considered as the El Dorado and the land of greener pastures were primarily shaped by colonial socioeconomic policies and programmes which affected African growth and development patterns. This was further shaped by the colonial mentality that these developed countries remain the most economically viable regions to work, prosper and achieve their dreams. Beyond the colonial effects, the intensity of African labour is also owed to post-colonial crises of nation-building and perpetual crises of underdevelopment which has been shaped by the crux of African leaders since independence. The perpetual crises of development and nation-building in Africa have contributed to the rate of labour migration from the African continent to Europe, the Middle East and North America among others, African countries witnessed large-scale migration of their labour to developed countries at the height of the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) recommended economic policy referred to as the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). The outcome of the Structural Adjustment Programme for African countries was disastrous. Under the SAP initiative, implementing countries’ governments were made to reduce the size of public sectors for higher privatization and low government involvement. The economic crises resulted in low salaries of professionals, deteriorating situation of infrastructures because of privatization and reduction in state participation, increased poverty admits chronic inflation caused by monetary devaluation which also leads to increase in the standard of living cumulatively contributed to the brain drain (Olawale 2021). Also, in several African countries, the cost of SAP reduced government commitment to the educational, health and industrial sectors given the rise in external debts and cost of debt servicing. As a means of ameliorating the effect of SAP, African professionals and highskilled labour begins to migrate massively to developed countries. This period in post-colonial migration literature has been described as a period of brain drain. During the Structural Adjustment Programme, high-skilled labour which include academics, health workers and physicians, technologists and engineers migrated to developed countries. At the height of SAP, the number of Africans that migrated to developed countries reached

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40,000 between 1975 and 1984, and by 1987, emigration figures hit 70,000 (Adepoju 1991). Under SAP, irregular migration started given the effort of African low-skilled migrants and individual quest to escape from endemic poverty during the period. Beyond the mass migration of African labour during SAP, the increasing rate of insecurity in Africa caused by ethnoreligious crises, insurgency and terrorism, banditry, kidnapping and other forms of domestic and inter-state warfare have contributed to African labour decision to migrate. Africa has become a breeding ground for insurgents and terrorist groups complicating state and international organizations’ efforts towards sustainable peace and security. From the Boko Haram and Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) terrorism groups in the area of West Africa involving Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and the Niger Republic to the growth of the Dan Na Ambassagou and Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam Wal Muslimin (JNIM) in Mali to the Al Shabaab in Somalia and East African among others have made Africa’s peace and security architecture fragile. The implication of terrorism for African countries cannot be underestimated as a push factor in labour migration. Terrorism and insurgencies have caused massive death, refugees and internally displaced persons as well as huge economic costs. The economic cost has, in turn, contributed to economic hardships, and the proliferation of ungoverned spaces, which is hindering Africans’ labour ability to freely engage in business, and make investments. Also, the internal security of African countries has been deteriorating over the years given the widespread natural resources war in the Nigeria-Niger Delta region, Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia and DR Congo among others, kidnapping and banditry, farmers-herders’ conflicts, religious and ethnic clashes among several others. Africa’s political landscape has also contributed to African labour’s decision to migrate. Despite the increasing political development in Africa especially with the spread of democracy, the political landscape has not demonstrated any element of democratic sustainability. For instance, in the periods of elections, there are records of religious and ethnic violence and disruption of the electoral process through widespread violence leading to the military incursion into politics. Also, the crux of leaders who are managers of African resources is riddled with corruption and diversion of national scare resources for personal gain, high debt profile and servicing leading to economic recessions and hardships which result in an unsupportive environment for investors and Foreign Direct Investment

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have also reinforced African labours decisions to migrate to developed countries. In addition, the unavailability of socio-economic facilities has contributed significantly to Africans’ decisions to migrate. The absence of basic socio-economic facilities that could support sustainable livelihoods such as sustainable educational facilities, water facilities, health facilities and sustainable peace that can support economic activities (business), increasing the rate of unemployment and income inequality. African countries such as Uganda, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Nigeria and Zambia to South Africa are currently witnessing massive migration of qualified persons moving to EuroAmerian and rich Middle East countries (Adepoju 2005). During the COVID-19 and post-COVID-19 period, several African countries faced acute unemployment. Taking Nigeria for instance, between 2020 and 2021, Nigeria increased unemployment has translated into enormous migration among its youth population in what is often described as the Japa syndrome (a cumulative surge among Nigerians to migrate) (Falola 2022). During the COVID-19 and postCOVID-19 period, the unemployment rate increased to 33.3% leaving millions of Nigerians unemployed. This has further been exacerbated by the economic recession and increasing inflation of food prices and basic needs. Hence, the urge of Nigerians to migrate as a survival strategy to European countries has increased more than ever. For instance, in 2020, 767,164 international passports were issued to Nigerians while 1,059,607 were issued in 2021 which signifies a 38% increase. In 2019, over 19,000 skilled workers and study United Kingdom Visas were issued to Nigerians and by 2021, the number has increased by 210% numbering 59,000. Also in 2019, more than 12,595 Nigerians migrated to Canada alone (Punch 2022). Also, the number of Nigerian youth who migrated based on the need to further pursue their graduate studies in the United Kingdom with the undeclared motive for work has increased tremendously. In a newspaper report published by The Times (2022), in the United Kingdom on October 11, 2022, Nigerians top the list of the highest number of immigrants with dependants (Table 15.1). Labour migration in post-colonial Africa can also be stratified into “high-skilled labour migrants” and “low-skilled migrants”. However, while the migration of both high- and low-skilled labour migrants has caused significant economic setbacks, further global inequalities and dependency on African countries, emphasis has been placed on highskilled labour migrants with emphasis on brain drain.

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Table 15.1 Highest number of students nationalities and numbers of dependants

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Countries

Students

Dependants

Nigeria India Pakistan United States China

34,931 93,049 18,740 15,267 114,837

31,898 4916 4750 3551 481

Source The Times, United Kingdom; October 11, 2022

Apart from highly skilled migrants, another category of labour migration generating significant controversies and debate in Africa is the low-skilled migrants. Low-skilled labour migrants involved individuals whose prerequisite to securing jobs in their point of destination (developed countries) do not require necessarily high levels of education or extensive professional experience (Castles 2011). As against high-skilled migrants recruited into developed countries’ universities, and technological and medical sectors, low-skilled migrants are recruited into flexible, casual and part-time work with stipend salaries which cannot be comparable to the salaries received in countries of origin. Put differently, despite global monetary exchange inequalities and despite the low salary level in destination countries when compared to high-skilled migrants, African low-skilled migrants still prefer such salaries and wages to those received in their countries of origin. Among low-skilled migrants, works include global domestic care and work. Migration of high and low-skilled labour has been shaped by intensified regular migration and irregular migration. Regular migration involves obtaining proper documents for entry into countries of destination which involves obtaining a visa or work permit. On the other hand, irregular migration is the process of moving into another country through unofficial means (Abebe 2017; IOM 2013). It is non-compliance to set-down rules due to a lack of required financial means, ignorance and general necessary documents to embark on regular migration (Abebe 2017; IOM 2013; Giménez-Gómez et al. 2017). In post-colonial Africa, highly skilled labours among academics, technological experts and health professionals often use regular migration routes. For many decades, African countries have seen the migration of academic professionals to developing countries. The outward migration is driven by the state of African countries’ educational sectors, income differences and professional support from the

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African governments at all levels among others. This is a reality of the technological experts migrating out of the continent due to a lack of government commitment to the development of the science and technology field as well as the absence of a supportive environment to pursue scientific development with far-reaching global effects and best practices. This is also the case of African countries’ health sectors in Africa. Africa is witnessing the movement of experts in the medical and health fields to developed countries. The intensity of low-skilled migrants in Africa has also further driven into the limelight of another waves of mobility crises affecting regional and continental migration as well as human security in Africa. Among these crises include human trafficking for domestic labour, prostitution and sex work, child labour and an exponential rate of irregular migration. This is increasingly notable among low-skilled labour. Scholars have contended that the rate of irregular migration can be attributed to the cumbersome requirements required to migrate into developed countries. Among labour migration dynamics which has become proliferated in terms of labour migration in Africa is human trafficking. The rate of human trafficking of labour to serve as domestic worker, care workers, prostitute and sex workers in Europe have also increased tremendously. Trafficking in humans has become one of the most patronized industries in Africa. Despite the ratification of the United Nations Palermo Protocol designated to stop trafficking in the human and related acts, it has continued to thrive in Africa. Trafficking from Africa has not only affected children and female as popularly discussed in most research works but men too (Justin and Jeffrey 2020). Among the major drivers of human trafficking include poverty, economic hardship and the lack of promising future push individuals away from their countries of origin. However, while this cause remains prevailing in Africa’s socio-economic space, human traffickers have banked on these drivers to recruit their victims. In many African countries like Nigeria, for example, the concept of Italo and Japa syndrome which is mostly defined as the inordinate desire of individuals and families (especially poverty-stricken) to travel to Europe as a means to improve their living conditions has made thousands vulnerable to human traffickers. The perception of Japa, Italo or Europe as El Dorado has permeated the mentality of almost African households.

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Shaping Outcomes, Addressing Causes: African Union and Labour Migration Given the rate of African high-skilled and low-skilled immigrants to developing countries, national governments of African countries have over time put in place a series of policies and programmes targeted at either reducing the rate of migration, fostering immigrants-homeland relationships and promoting diaspora-funded development. In this same manner, developed countries are also putting in place policies to attract high-skilled labour from developing countries of Africa. However, under the auspices of the African Union, African labour immigrants received a new recognition and perception (Olawale and Kelechi, 2023). For instance, the past readings of African labour migrants have been negative over the years given the question of the brain drain phenomenon furthering Africa’s dependency in global economic relations. Using the AU approach, a new reading sees Africans in Diaspora as development partners rather than problem domination discussion. The goal of the African Union is to tap into the ongoing wave of migration development nexus and diaspora-development strategies. The African Union has championed the course of diaspora engagement and development in Africa through the naming of Africa in Diaspora as the sixth region of the continent after North, West, East, South and West Africa. The Diaspora lexicon entered the AU development framework until January 2003 after the protocol to amend the Constitutive Act of the Union was reached at the Extra-Ordinary Summit of the OAU held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. In 2006, AU formally designated the African diaspora as the “sixth region” of the AU’s structure. With the above development, the AU encourage the national government of all African countries to pursue constructive diaspora engagement policies. Since 2006, African countries have developed various Diasporaengagement policies including facilitating the transfer of remittances, Diaspora-investment policies; dual citizenships and Diaspora voting, and celebration of Diaspora day among others. Despite the success recorded under the African Union Sixth region Diaspora policies, it has come under serious criticism. The AU Sixth Diaspora policies have been faulted for fostering African labour and manpower migration rather than stopping the process which is amounting to Africa’s underdevelopment. In the process of naming the Diaspora as the sixth region of the continent, an important aspect of the process was finding a

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generally acceptable definition to define “who and what constitutes an individual termed as African Diaspora”. In other to arrive at a generally accepted definition, the AU convened a workshop in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago between 2 and 5 June 2004, to look into appropriate definitions for Africans in Diaspora (Jinmi 2017: 43–44). In the AU Expert meeting at Addis Ababa between 11 and 12 April 2005, the AU definition of Diaspora was modified and accepted as the AU Diaspora definition. According to the definition, the Africa Diaspora consist of “people of African origin living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union” (Report of the Meeting of Experts from the Member States on the Definition of the Diaspora). Scholars have argued that the AU Diaspora initiative primarily focused on development from above—Diaspora—while the root causes of labour migration have been ignored. The AU definition emphasises the place of development. The definition—“willing to contribute to the development of the continent’ emphasises that anyone that would claim to be African in Diaspora must be committed to the development of Africa”. Put differently, Ben Page and Claire Mercer (2018: 146–147) also claim the AU definition does not factor in reasons why an individual of African descent left Africa but is rather concerned with such individual commitment to African growth and development. However, this development cannot provide the AU sustainable platform to realize its goals such as the “Agenda 2063: Africa We Want”—adopted in 2015 and the Africa Continental Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA). The reasons are clear. With an exponential increase in African high-skilled and low-skilled labour, African countries will be left with no required manpower to champion the course of development. In other words, the argument placed significant emphasis on developing African-based strategies developing sustainable policies that can promote intra-African labour migration, eradicating xenophobic and economic protectionist policies that can hamper smooth labour migration as well as addressing other root causes of labour flight from Africa. In addition, scholars have also criticized the AU and policymakers over the question of brain drain, brain grain and remittances. There has been an ongoing debate as to whether AU Diaspora initiatives only foster international migration and brain drain rather than addressing the factors pushing Africa into migration. Scholars such as Asong (2018: 247) have advocated for policies that can increase intra-African migration. The

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reason for such a position is not farfetched. Asong (2018: 247) contends that the damages done by brain gain cannot be equalled by remittance inflow. Put differently, remittance inflow does not tell the whole story about Africa’s development dilemma. However, Asong (2018: 247) argues that unlike migration to developed countries, intra-Africa migration and the pursuit of development and a safe Africa will contribute significantly to realising the AU Agenda 2063. However, despite the AU effort to improve intra-African migration through various Regional Economic Cooperation (RECs) through free movement policies, the increasing wave of xenophobia as in the case of South Africa and Ghana (economic protectionism) has been a major hindrance. However, while Asong’s argument remains logical, Adams (2013)—claims that increasing streams of remittance inflows in Africa is better than Western or Asian loans leading to debt crises and perpetual development. According to Adams (2013: 25), unlike loans, remittance targets are always met and without conditionalities which further hinder African countries’ economic growth. However, while the study does not in any way justify whose argument is more logical, the article contends that the development of Africa’s socio-economic and political space remains an important way to reposition Africa and its Diaspora in global affairs as active rather than passive actors. Also, scholars like Faini (2007) have questioned the development positions scholars and policymakers attribute to remittance inflow.

Conclusion The chapter examined the political economy of labour migration in Africa. Before the period of colonial rule, Africans has an established history of mobility. However, the major difference between migration in precolonial, colonial and post-colonial periods is rooted in the exponential increase in the number of African labours on the move. The chapter also examines various factors that have contributed to African labours decision to migrate. Although economic indices remain a paramount and logical factor driving labour migration, the mobility pattern has also been shaped by African post-independence crises emerging from terrorism and insurgency, and the absence of a sustainable political and economic environment among others. Labour migration in Africa to developed countries has also brought into the limelight several issues such as increasing irregular migration among low-skilled labour, and regular migration among skilled labour which in turn has been fostering brain

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drain, losses and perpetual African dependence on the developed countries and mobility insecurity crises emanating from irregular migration and human trafficking. The chapter also examines the response of the African Union through the naming of Africans in Diaspora as the sixth zone of the continent. Although the initiative has been laudable, especially in terms of increasing remittances inflow, brain gain and circulation, it has been questioned for providing more impetus for labour migration in Africa through the recognition of Diaspora high and low-skilled workers while the push factor leading to the emigration of high and low skilled migrants have not been successfully addressed.

References Abebe, T. T. (2017). Migration policy frameworks in Africa. Institute for Security Studies. Retrieved from https://www.africaportal.org/documents/ 17958/migration_policy_frameworks.pdf. Abumere, Frank Aragbonfoh., & John, Sodiq Sanni. (2022). Migration from Nigeria and the Future of Global Security. Palgrave Macmillan. Adams, B. (2013). African Diaspora Remittances are better than Foreign Aid. World Economics, 14(4). Adepoju, A. (1991). South-North Migration: The African Experience. International Migration, 29(2). Adepoju, A. (2005). Patterns of Migration in West Africa. In: At Home in the World? International Migration and Development in Contemporary Ghana, 24–54. Afolayan, A. A. (1988). Immigration and Expulsion of ECOWAS Aliens in Nigeria. International Migration Review, 22(1): 4–27. Africa-Europe Foundation Debate, Africa and Europe Facts and Figures on African Migrations. (2021). Asong, G. A. 2(018). The Impact of Brain-Drain and Brain Gain in Africa’s Development, in Samuel Olorutoba & Vusi Gumede (ed). State and Development in Post-Independent Africa. Pan African University Press, 231–251. Austen, R. (1992). The Mediterranean Islamic Trade Out of Africa: A Tentative Census. Slavery & Abolition, 13(1): 214–248. Baeck, L. (1993). Post-War Development Theories and Practice. Paris: UNESCO and The International Social Science Council. Black, J. (2021). Global Migration Indicators 2021. Geneva: International Organization for Migration (IOM). Boeri, T., Brücker, H., Docquier, F., & Rapoport, H. (2012). Brain Drain and Brain Gain: The Global Competition to Attract Highly Skilled Immigrants. Oxford University Press.

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Bovenkerk, F., Miles, R., & Verbunt, G. (1990). Racism, Migration and the State in Western Europe: A Case for Comparative Analysis. International Sociology, 5(4): 475–490. Burawoy, M. (1976). The Functions and Reproduction of Migrant Labour: Comparative Material from Southern Africa and the United States. American Journal of Sociology, 81(5): 1050–1087. Castles, S. (2011). Migration, Crisis, and the Global Labour Market. Globalizations, 8(3): 311–324. https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2011.576847. Castles, S., & Kosack, G. (1973). Immigrant workers and class structure in Western Europe. London; New York: published for the Institute of Race Relations, London, by Oxford University Press. Castles, S., de Haas, H., & Miller, M. J. (2013). The Age of Migration (5th ed.). New York: The Guilford Press. Christina, Gabriel, & Hélène, Pellerin (ed.). (2008). Governing International Labour Migration Current Issues, Challenges and Dilemmas. Routledge. Czaika, M. (ed.). (2018). High-Skilled Migration. Drivers and Policies. Oxford University Press. Faini, R. (2007). Remittances and the Brain Drain: Do more skilled migrants remit more? The World Bank Economic Review, 21(2): 177–191. Falola, Toyin. (2022). Japa. Available at: http://www.heartofarts.org. Accessed 20 October, 2022. Frank, A. G. (1969). Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. New York: Monthly Review Press. Giménez-Gómez, J.-M., Walle, Y. M., & Zergawu, Y. Z. (2017). Trends in African Migration to Europe: Drivers Beyond Economic Motivations. Centre for European, Governance and Economic Development Research, Number 330 – December 2017 . Retrieved from http://www.user.gwdg.de/~cege/Diskussio nspapiere/DP330.pdf. Harris, J., & Todaro, M. P. (1970). Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two-Sector Analysis. American Economic Review, 60, 26–142. Hein de Haas, Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller. (2020). The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World. Macmillan International and Red Globe Press. International Organization of Migration (IOM). (2013). World Migration Report 2013: Migrant Wellbeing and Development. Retrieved from https://publicati ons.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr2013_en.pdf. Jinmi, Adisa. (2017). The African Union Perspective on the Diaspora, in Jack Mangala (eds). Africa and its Global Diaspora: The Policy and Politics of Emigration. Palgrave Macmillan. Kindleberger, C. P. (1967). Europe’s Postwar Growth: the Role of Labor. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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Kehinde, Michael. (2013). Trans-Saharan Slave Trade Encyclopedia of Migration. DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6179-7_30-1. Kwabena, O. Akurang-Parry, & Isaac, Indome. (2018). Colonialism and African Migrations, in M. S. Shanguhyia & T. Falola (eds). The Palgrave Handbook of African Colonial and Postcolonial History. Switzerland: Springer, 373–383. Lee, E. S. (1966). A Theory of Migration. Demography, 3: 47–57. Lewis, W. A. (1954). Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor. The Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies, 22: 139–191. Massey, D. S. (1988). Economic development and international migration in comparative perspective. Population and Development Review, 14(3): 383– 413. https://doi.org/10.2307/1972195. Mathias (2015). Migration and economic prospects. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 41(1): 58–82. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X. 2014.924848 Mathias C., & Constantin R. (2022). Migration Drivers: Why Do People Migrate? In P. Scholten (ed.). Introduction to Migration Studies. IMISCOE Research Series, 49–83. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92377-8_349 Miles, R. (1986). Labour Migration, Racism and Capital Accumulation in Western Europe Since 1945: An Overview. Capital & Class, 28(Spring): 49–86. Olawale, I. Y. (2021). Engaging Migration-Led Development Strategies in Africa: Some Aspects of Africa (Under)-Development in Migration since 1980, in L. I. David, O. O. Patrick & S. A. Nneka (eds). West Africa and the Europeans since the 15th century. Galda Verlag, 2021. Olawale, Y., & Ani, K. J. (2023). Africa Union@20: The Context, Current Practices and Contours of Diaspora Initiative in Africa’s Development Strategy. Journal of African Union Studies, 12(1). Page, B., & Mercer, C. (2018). Diaspora and development. Routledge. Passaris, C. (1989). Immigration and the Evolution of Economic Theory. International Migration, 27: 525–542. Peter, Scholten (ed.). (2022). Introduction to Migration Studies: An Interactive Guide to the Literatures on Migration and Diversity. Switzerland: Springer. Rodney, Walter. (1972). How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, London: Verso Books. Stanley, Igwe. (2010). How Africa Underdeveloped Africa. Professional Printers & Publishers. Stark, O., & Bloom, D. (1985). The New Economics of Labour Migration. American Economic Review, 75(2): 173–178. Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. Straubhaar, T. (1986). The Causes of International Labour Migrations – A Demand-Determined Approach. International Migration Review, XX(4, Winter): 835–855.

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The Punch. (2022). Passport Issuance Rises by 38%, More Nigerians Relocate. Available at: http://www.punchng.com. Accessed 13 October, 2022. The Times. (2022). Migrants from Nigeria Bring Most Relatives. Times Newspaper, 11 October, 2022. Justin, Trounson, & Jeffrey, Pfeifer. (2020). The Human Trafficking of Men: The Forgotten Few, in John Winterdyk & Jackie Jones (eds). The Palgrave International Handbook of Human. Palgrave Macmillan. Walters, R. W. (1997). Pan-Africanism in the African Diaspora: An Analysis of Modem Afrocentric Political Movement African. Wayne: Wayne State University Press. Yaro, J. A. (2008). Migration in West Africa: Patterns, Issues and Challenges. Legon: Centre for Migration Studies, University of Ghana, p. 2. Online: http://www.waifemcbp.org/v2/dloads/MIGRATION%20IN% 20WEST. Accessed on 14 September, 2022.

CHAPTER 16

Sports, Youth and Diplomacy: The Social-Economy and Driver of Societal Development in Africa John Chimezie Onu and Reuben Edafenene Ojighoro

Introducing the Development of Sport in Nigeria Sport is ‘any activity that uses physical exertion or skills competitively under a set of rules that is not based on aesthetics’. Taking a clue from this definition, two terms are important to note. There are; Physical Exertion and Skills. In Nigeria, before the colonial rule, it is of import to note that, different communities have different sports that they engage in. Amongst these sports are; wrestling, dancing, etc. In the wrestling aspect, it is of importance to note that, it is able-bodied men of the communities that

J. C. Onu (B) Department of History and Strategic Studies, Alex Ekwueme Federal University Ndufu Alike Ikwo, Abakaliki, Ebonyi State, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] R. E. Ojighoro Department of Religious Studies, College of Education, Warri, Delta State, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. J. Ani (ed.), Political Economy of Colonial Relations and Crisis of Contemporary African Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0245-3_16

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participate in such competition. The physical appearance and the body build-up of an individual is a major criterion in his selection to fight for his community. The wrestling competition had its own rules. Amongst the rules are; no throwing of blows amongst the contestants, sharp or harmful objects are not allowed, for a contestant to be declared a winner, the back of his opponent must touch the ground. The winner of such competition is seen as the strongest man in the community and usually marries the most beautiful woman in the community. Wrestling as a sport was used to settle vendetta amongst warring communities. Both belligerent communities set aside a date for wrestling and bring strongest of their men to represent them. Most of the fights are held at the boundary between both warring communities. Whichever Community that wins does the bidding of the other. Amongst this include a king giving out his princess or the community giving out their daughters out in marriage to the community that won. Most wrestlers serve as ad-hoc warriors of their communities in case of war. Equally important to note is the sport of dancing. This sport is usually noticeable during festive periods in most communities. In Igboland, the New Yam festival, is such that brings different cultural troupes together. They engage in dancing competition to win coveted prizes and equally entertain the people. They dance, showcase the rich culture heritage of the people. During ‘moon-night’, different cultural troupes entertain their audience which is mostly made up of the youths. Their performance includes dancing, singing, wrestling, drama, etc. This show serves as an avenue for most men to scout and hunt for wives. With the consolidation of their rule in Nigeria, the British Colonial administrators helped to introduce some sporting activities which were hitherto not known in Nigeria. Amongst these sporting activities are; football, volleyball, table tennis, basketball, etc. Prominent amongst these sports was football. The first football match Nigeria played was in 1904.1 Whilst the first international recognized match was played on 8th October 1949, in Freetown against Sierra Leone.2 During this period Nigeria won some coveted international prizes. Emmanuel Arinze Ifeajuna became the first black African to win Gold Medal at an international sport3 event which he won at the 1954 British Empire and Commonwealth Games. Colonial rule which was widespread with racism and racial segregation manifested itself in sporting activities. A notable example of this was the denial of Nnamdi Azikiwe of the opportunity to compete in a track and field event at the 1934 Empire games because Nigeria was not allowed

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to participate and when his application to join a tennis club in Lagos was rejected because of his Igbo background.4 However, without fear of contradiction, Britain never made any tangible efforts to develop sporting activities in Nigeria to an international repute. Though, they laid the foundation for sport development in Nigeria. With the attainment of political independence in 1960, and with frequent coup, sporting activities became a shadow of its former self. As a result of military rule, Nigeria was not able to participate in some international sporting events. She did not participate in the 1996 AFCON (African Cup of Nations) tournament in South Africa in other to defend her title won in 1994. She was suspended from Commonwealth countries which affected its chances of participating in Commonwealth Games. Since her attainment of political independence and return to democracy in 1999, the Nigerian sport world has experienced some international and regional glories in the area of sport. Such glories are; 1980, 1994 and 2013 AFCON titles, 1996 Olympic gold medal for football, 1985, 1993, 2007, 2013 and 2015 FIFA U17 world cup titles, nine women AFCON titles, etc. Nigeria has won 27 Olympic medals in total, 3 Gold, 10 Silver and 14 Bronze.5 She has hosted some notable sports events such as the U17 FIFA world cup in 2009. However, in recent time, corruption such as embezzlement of funds, lack of sponsorship, favouritism, lack of funding has become the order of the day in Nigeria sporting sector. Many a times, Nigerian athletes have been stranded in airports as a result of unpaid allowances and match bonuses. Recently, the Nigerian U20 women’s team that represented the country in the FIFA women’s world cup held in Costa Rica, was photographed sleeping on bare floor of an airport in Costa Rica on their way back to Nigeria. This caused an uproar in the Nigerian sporting world. The Super Eagles has hitherto threatened to boycott football matches on the issue of unpaid allowances. During the FIFA confederation cup in Haiti, FIFA world cup in Brazil and South Africa, Nigerian players threatened to boycott matches. A player amongst them has to offset their hotel bills when they were threatened to be thrown out of their hotel rooms. Coaches have resigned as a result of unpaid salaries and match bonuses. This was the case between Gent Rohr and the Nigeria Football Federation (NFF). During the Tokyo Olympics in 2021, a member of the Nigerian athletic team, Chukwuemeka Enekwechi,6 was seen washing his already used jersey. During the FIFA world

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cup in Russia, it was reported that the Super Eagles players wash their jerseys after each match. Corruption in the area of embezzlement has enmeshed the sporting industry of the country, NFF has caught in this crisscross. The president of NFF, Amaju Melvin Pinnick and other top NFF officials were charged with issue bordering on money laundering and embezzlement. It was reported that ‘Pinnick among three others was charged for allegedly misappropriating 8.4 million USD paid by FIFA to NFF for appearance fee at the 2014 FIFA world cup in Brazil’.7 This, and other cases of such, has impeded the development of sport in Nigeria and Africa. Without fear of contradiction, what sport is to Britain is what oil and gas is to Nigeria. Therefore, there is a Clarion call to invest and reinvest in sport. Lack of funding and sponsorship has contributed to the downfall of sport in Nigeria. Aside this, other outings by the teams of the Nigerian Professional Football League (NPFL) have ended in abysmal failure. Most of the teams travel by road, spending hours on the road which leaves them with little time to train before the match kicks off. Some has boycotted games due to lack of fund to travel outside Nigeria for matches. It is on record that North African clubs are dominating regional football in Africa. Most team players have threatened to boycott NPFL games due to unpaid salaries and allowances. Coaches in NPFL have resigned due to unpaid salaries, allowances and match winning bonuses. Most club stadiums are in abysmal condition. Most players do not get proper medical attention when injured. Some are left to themselves causing untold hardship to such player. Some are not being taken to a good and equipped hospital to get proper medical attention. Most teams if not all travel by road for interstate matches. Most teams have been robbed and some were involved in accidents because of plying Nigeria’s bad roads. Unlike other countries where sport thrives, football clubs are owned by individuals or group of investors. In Nigeria and Africa, ninety per cent of football clubs are owned by the state government. Lack of funding has made most clubs not to compete favourably on a global stage and has made some athletes not to get to the global stage. This has caused and hindered those with the bright prospect not to fully utilize their potentials. Most of these athletes has ended up underperforming in competitions and not representing the country very well do to their poor outing. Some have engaged in illicit activities such as drugs, smuggling, kidnapping, etc. On the other hand, it has resulted in ‘sport drain’ in the country. There is a need to fully and properly fund

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sport from the grassroot level in other to allow young prospects to fully develop their sporting potentials. This is because, most if not all the sports around the world are dominated by the youth. Therefore, there is a need for Nigeria to provide its youth with the platform that will enable them to compete favourably with their peers around the world. This, if done will bring about development and reduction in crime amongst the youths.

Youth and Sport An average Nigerian is a lover of sport. Sporting activities around the world are largely done by youths. Even though golf is presumed in some quarters as old men’s game, its main competition is played by youths. Old men play golf for fun and pleasure. Little wonder, we have the Ministry of Youth and Sports Development (FMYSD). However, the ministry has done little in harnessing the sporting potentials embedded in most Nigerian youths. There is a need to fund and invest in sporting activities. In Nigeria and Africa in general, football is the most widely recognized and patronized sport. Meanwhile, indigenous sports and sporting games are grouped into; acrobatic, air, archery, ball games (ball-over-net games), board, catching games, climbing, cycling, combat (wrestling and martial arts), animal sports, etc. It is germane to state that, most of these different kinds of sports are lacking in Nigeria and Africa as a whole. Even, in a situation where some of them are found, it is underfunded, leaving the sport personnel with less passionate about it. There is a need to invest in these different kinds of sports in other to create an avenue for mobilizing youths from the grassroot level in other to reduce the level of crime and other social vices. These sports, if introduced with proper funding and sponsorship will go a long way in ameliorating the different security challenges witnessed in the geo-political zones that make up the country. Amongst these security challenges are kidnapping, cattle rustling, activities of unknown gunmen, robbery, banditry, ritual, etc. Without any fear of contradiction, in a country where these different kinds of sports thrive, it is mostly performed by the youth. Most countries have sport activities actively engaged by their youths. Example of this include the Asian Youth Games held every four years amongst athletes from all over Asia, Australian Youth Olympics Festival organized by the Australian Olympic Committee for athletes from 13 to 19 years of age. There is a need for Nigerian government to establish sporting events that will attract youths from the grassroot level. Sports that can be established include; Primary,

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Secondary schools and Tertiary institutions games. The Nigerian University Games Association (NUGA) is limited because it is only meant for University students. The implication of this is that anyone who is not a university student cannot participate. This and other sporting events in Nigeria are either limited, poorly funded and underdeveloped to an international status.

Crime and Sport In Nigeria, the top ten causes of crime in the country are; poverty, family conditions, peer pressure, society, drugs, unemployment, politics, deprivation, regionalism and religion. These factors in one way or the other contribute to high rate of crime in Nigeria. It is pertinent to note that ninety-five per cent of these crimes are being carried out by youths. However, crime does not just happen on its own, it is triggered by some factors. Idleness is a factor in aiding crime. This is because most youths are idling as a result of unemployment, thus becoming a prey in the hands of most perpetrators of crime. Therefore, if different kinds of sports can be introduced and properly funded, it will caution against crimes amongst youths. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has released a white paper on crime prevention through sports. This paper incorporates youths as agents of change. This is known as Doha Declaration. Amongst other things, it aims ‘to promote sports and related activities to prevent crime and to effectively build resilience of at-risk youth. By enhancing knowledge of the consequences of crime and substance abuse and developing life skills, the initiative seeks to positively influence behaviour and attitudes of at-risk youth and prevents anti-social and risky behaviour’.8 Youths were engaged and also shared their experiences on how sports helped them to stay away from crime. Crime in Nigeria is on the increase. This is as a result of poverty, unemployment, etc. However, to reduce this excessiveness, there is a need to adopt and implement the Doha Declaration of prevention of crime through sports and engagement of the youth. No sport can thrive without the active engagement and participation of youths. Even in the face of crime, some Nigerians has distinguished and made names for themselves. Amongst them are Oluwatobiloba Ayomide ‘Tobi’ Amusan, who won gold in the 2022 World Athletics Championship 100 metres hurdles and Ese Brume who won an Olympic Bronze Medal in

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the just concluded Olympic Games in Tokyo. These athletes and others can serve as ambassadors and mentors to upcoming youths in the country. Their success story will go a long way in boosting the morale of different athletes to achieve their sporting goals.

Sport and Development There is a need for the federal government to establish a Sport University. Even though National Universities Commission (NUC) has approved the establishment of a Sport University in Delta State. These universities are privately owned and cannot be afforded by all. There is a need to establish public owned sport institution that will train different athletes in different sporting activities. This will not only create jobs and employment but will also provide a platform for launching different athletes to a global stage. There is also a need to develop stadiums for different sporting activities. This will in turn attract major sporting events to Nigeria such as FIFA, AFCON, Olympics, Track and Field events, etc. Nigeria last hosted a FIFA event (U17 world cup) in 2009. This will increase the international image of the country. Sport development in the area of cycling will help in cautioning the issue of climate change. This is because cycling as a sport does not contribute to carbon emission. This sport, if properly developed and funded will reduce the use of cars, motorbikes, that affect and pollute environment through carbon emission. Sport development brings about career opportunities in sport journalism, sport agents, sport physician, fitness coach, sport psychologist coach, referees, etc. These professions are under utilized in Nigeria. Those that claim to be into it are no where to be found globally amongst their peers. It will bring about the coaching ability in one’s life. Most reputable coaches around the world are not from Nigeria and Africa in general. However, investing in sport will bring about reputable coaches across Nigeria. This is because the last two coaches are foreigners and the present coach of the Super Falcon is a foreigner. In the area of referee, most referees in Nigeria are not FIFA-licensed referees. There is a need to provide a platform for most Nigerian referees to be trained by FIFA and other training agencies to enable them compete favourably amongst their peers. In the commentary world, most Nigerian commentators are locally made. We need men like Jim Beglin, Jon Champion, Peter Drury,

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etc. Government should provide an avenue for their training to be a global force. Equally, we need sports agents like Jorge Mendes. We need sport journalists like Fabrizio Romanio. This can only be possible if the environment is conducive. Centre for the Study of the Economies of Africa (CSEA) outlined three factors for the development of Sport in any economy as; investment, the extent of popular (youth) participation, and the level of political stability that exists.9 Since 1999, which marked an end to military rule and a return to democratic rule, Nigeria had experienced relative political stability. However, recent happenings such as banditry, herders-farmers clash, flood, have resulted in displacement of communities indirectly affecting effective sport development. The bedrock of support development is investment and popular youth participation. Investment is critically lacking in every sporting activity in Nigeria. Due to lack of investment we have witnessed ‘sport drain’ in recent years. Amongst these sport personalities that were of Nigerian origin but refused representing the nation in any sporting activities because they were not horned in Nigerian environment are; Anthony Joshua, David Alaba, Angel Ogbonnaya, Dele Alli, Tammy Abraham, Fikayo Tomori, etc. Even when the funds for investment are available, they are embezzled by few people. Popular youth participation has hindered the development of different kinds of sports in Nigeria. This is because bulk of the youths engage in illicit crimes such as quick money syndrome, kidnapping, oil bunkering and banditry. Most youths use their time in carrying out these crimes due to lack of government attention. There is a need to partner with regional African countries in improving sporting activities in the region. This will not only build sporting confidence in Africa, Nigeria but also in West Africa. This partnership includes regional competitions, and bidding to host a tournament jointly. These, if implemented, will go a long way in accelerating the socio-economic and cultural development of Nigeria and Africa in general. There is a need to integrate our former sport legends into the sporting sector. This is because in the developed world, most people that head their sporting industries are those who have performed in the industry. Recently, Cameroon appointed a former football legend, Samuel Eto’o to head their football industry. Meanwhile, in Nigeria, most people appointed into our sporting sector has no track record of sport history.

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This if looked into and implemented will give our sporting industry a new look. This is because those with experience and results will be in charge.

Notes 1. Sesan, “New book traces Nigerian football history”, Punch, June 12, 2018, accessed on October 22, 2022. https://punching.com/new-book-tracesnigerian-football-history. 2. Barrie Courtney, “Sierra Leone—List of international matches (Details on world cup qualifying matches)”, November 19, 2015, accessed on October 22, 2022. https://www.rsssf.org/tables/sier-intres.html. 3. Brain Oliver, “Emmanuel Ifeajuna: Commonwealth Games gold to facing a firing squad”, The Guardian, July 12, 2014, accessed on October 22, 2022. https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2014/jul/13/common wealth-games-emmanuel-ufeajuna-nigeria. 4. Alegie Peter, African Soccerscapes: How a continent changed the world’s game (London: Hurst and Company, 2010). 5. Samuel Chukwudi Gabriel and Ihezie Ezra, Sport and Economy: The Fate of Developing Nigeria (Nigeria: CSEA, 2022), accessed on October 23, 2022. https://cseaafrica.org/sport-and-economy-the-fate-ofdeveloping-nigeria/. 6. Tunde Eludini, “Tokyo Olympics: More embarrassment for Nigeria as finalist posts video of himself washing jersey”, Premium Times, August 4, 2021, accessed on October 23, 2022. https://www.premiumtimesng. com/sports/nigeria-sports-news/44394-tokyo-olympics-more-embarrass ment-for-nigeria-as-finalist-posts-video-of-himself-washing-jersey.html. 7. Remi Sulola, “FG charges Pinnick with 8.4 USD fraud”, The Cable, May 7, 2019, accessed on October 23, 2022. https://www.thecable.ng/fg-cha rges-amaju-pinnick-to-court-over-8-4m-fraud/amp. 8. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Crime prevention through sports, accessed on October 23, 2022. https://www.unodc.org/ dohadeclaration/en/topics/crime-prevention-through-sports.html. 9. Samuel Chukwudi Gabriel and Ihezie Ezra, Sport and Economy: The Fate of Developing Nigeria, cited.

CHAPTER 17

Examining the Dynamics of China–Africa Relations Tshepo Jan Ngobeni, B. N. Ndlovu, and Costa Hofisi

Introduction The upsurge of China as a global superpower has inducted a new world order, whereby the China is up against the Western superpower and threatening to surpass the United States with regard to the economic indicator, influence and world dominance. The rise of China can easily be argued in the perspective of Edoho (2011: 104) that China has slowly risen up out of the shadow of an ideologically enlivened shut economy to end up as a powerful worldwide monetary player in the period of globalization, its economy has developed at an average of 9% for each year for over two decades and its foreign investments remained at US$165.6

T. J. Ngobeni (B) · B. N. Ndlovu Department of Politics and International Relations, North West University, Mahikeng, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] C. Hofisi Afrocentric Governance of Public Affairs Research Entity, North West University, Mahikeng, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. J. Ani (ed.), Political Economy of Colonial Relations and Crisis of Contemporary African Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0245-3_17

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billion starting from 2000 while expanding to more than US$1.5 trillion in 2008 and flooded to US$3.1975 trillion as of 2011. Thus, China’s activities in the international system verified its inevitabilities of being a superpower and possibly the biggest economy in the world, as they established themselves as a global partner for economic development and growth for developing countries. According to Maher (2016: 368) China’s sensational ascent has been apparently the most essential geopolitical advancement of the previous two decades whereby China has just turned into the world’s secondbiggest economy and second-greatest military financier and is the main nation that would in the near future be the opposition of the United States’ status as the world’s sole superpower. China is the second biggest economy in the world following the United States, however the Chinese has invested intensively in the international market which amplified their economic growth and development, reinforced their influence in the international system as a superpower and forged alliances with regional hegemonic states such as Russia, Brazil, South Africa and India. China’s sensational development cannot be maintained on the grounds that the political establishments have aspects of a dictatorship, ancestry and the present financial development and growth which cannot spearhead the inclusive economic institutions and innovative devastation except if major political changes are completed sooner rather than later (Schwienberger 2014: 170). Therefore, the political system which is used by the Chinese government is frowned upon by the international society or rather the Western society, as it strives not to subscribe to the perspectives of democracy, but rather a one-party system which has assisted in the growth and development of the Chinese economy. The economy of China is predicted to overgrow that of its counterpart (United States) in the next 5–10 years, while its influence in the African continent surpasses that of the Western society and it continues to invest intensively in the African geo-political borders. The industrial policy of China as explained by Schwienberger (2014: 174) has granted the basis of the David Goliath advantageous interaction in the state as its prosperous achievement is highlighted in a speech made by the president of the German Confederation of Industries at a show in Hannover (Germany) and China is no longer the workbench of the world as in the past twenty years, it has turned into a genuine contender of the German machine-construction industry owing its achievement to the

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amazing advances in innovation and building abilities improvement. The Chinese government has invested intensively on industrializing its country into arguably one of the biggest economies in the world which had a high turnover in the financial year of 2017–2018, while making advanced technological inventions and machineries which also contributes towards the development and growth of the country (Schwienberger 2014: 174). This paper will examine the benefits and costs of the China–Africa relation. Furthermore, this paper will present the conclusion of the analysis mentioned above. The drastic growth in Chinese–African relations is among the fastest growing cases of diplomacy in the twenty-first century and has been influencing the dynamics of transformations that are taking place globally. Chinese–African relations have been met with some consternation, excitement and reactions. To many African leaders, their alliance with the Chinese is the manifestation of a partnership that has been spawned by struggles especially against Western imperialism. A number of observers and analysts in Africa view the new marriage between Africa and China as neo-colonization since Africa will serve as cheap and good source for raw materials needed by China to manufacture their goods as well as return to the continent and sell it at a cheaper cost. The relationship between China and Africa is not based on the notion of a mutual beneficiation for both economies it is rather a relationship where China stands to gain more from the African continent as opposed to equal benefit for economic growth (Ani et al. 2018). Furthermore, it is worthy to note that the trade relations between Africa and China date as far back as 202 BC. However, the relations between the African continent and China are characterized by economic, military, social, political and historical connections between each other. In addressing the issue of whether the relationship of Africa and China is beneficial to one party or mutually beneficial it is imperative to have a two-fold argument that presents the negatives or benefits of this relationship. The following paragraphs intend on evaluating whether or not the assertion of win–win economic benefit does truly exist or it is a myth by examining the China’s African policy and the type of relationship it has with Africa (Shinn and Eisenman 2012: 40).

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Background of China–Africa Relations The relations between China and Africa have been an ongoing process and have further reached depth for the past decades. In the twenty-first century has been marked by closer ties between China and Africa more especially in the economic and political spheres. China and Africa are both working towards solidifying a sustained and strategic partnership. The two sides have been working on relationships that will signify a south-south cooperation that will equally benefit long-term interests between the two. The twenty-first century has again ushered in the introduction of FOCAC which stands for Forum on China-Africa Cooperation which is a forum between Africa and China that will promote economic cooperation and political dialogue with the sole aim of economic development as well as prosperity framed within the confines of the one China idealogy (Chan 2013: 3). China’s African Policy The principles that guide China’s Africa policy are equality, sincerity, solidarity, common development and mutual benefit, all these principles are the central driver of relations between China and Africa. Furthermore, the Chinese foreign policy respects the values behind the principle of equality and sovereignty, thus this appeals to a number of African countries that are still suffering the Western colonial legacy. China again has a non-intervention policy that binds it from interfering in African politics, retaining a certain degree of compliance among African states (Bräutigam and Xiaoyang 2015). The strategies that are employed by China when dealing with Africa is through the use of diplomatic efforts, institutional support, development assistance and state-owned enterprises specifically in the natural resources sectors. China’s diplomacy towards Africa makes it easier for African states to engage with the Chinese government which is willing to assist by providing preferential loans and as well development aid (Jiang 2015). The factors that have led to China’s Africa policy are solely because China has realized that the significance of African support especially in multilateral forums since the region has vast groupings of states and it also has the tendency of bloc voting. Secondly due to China’s rapid economic growth it has fuelled an insatiable thirst for natural resources and energy

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which are found in Africa. Thirdly due to the fall of colonialism after the cold war China so an opportunity to enter Africa in order to isolate Taiwan’s influence into Africa (Jiang 2015).

China–Africa Relations This section of the paper will detail the relationship between the African continent and the Asian superpower, as the relationship gained traction and much-needed attention in the early 2000s at the backdrop of the debt crises and dependence of African countries towards the Western society which focused their monetary and political relations towards the Eastern European Countries. China has cancelled US$10 billion of debts that African nations owed to the Chinese government, additionally offering to help thirty-one African countries from the debts they owed to the other superpowers and by 2007 the volume of exchange amid China and Africa was more than US$450 billion which expressed a 42% increase in only a year (Edoho 2011: 104). Mohan (2013: 1259–1260) Argues that China–Africa relationship is made out of a progression of interconnected changes, not slightest the development of worldwide generation to Southeast Asia from the late 1970s and the opening up of African economies amid the auxiliary change projects of the 1980s and can’t just read off Chinese exercises in Africa from a unique “revamping” postulation however need to represent how particular on-screen characters and talks on the Chinese side, and all the more generally, empower these particular exercises to appear. However, Liang (2012: 668–669) is of the perspective that China’s expanding presence in Africa basically mirrors its regularly broadening monetary reach, however it likewise comes from its rise as another superpower and China is focused on improving infrastructure, education and social or cultural trades in Africa, furthermore China introduces an elective model to different African expresses that try not to embrace the supposed Washington Consensus. China–Africa relation as stated above by Edoho (2011: 104), Mohan (2013: 1259–1260) and Liang (2012: 668–669) are of the perspective that this relation has to some extent assist the African continent with much-needed funds be it for debt relief or to improve infrastructure or even to create job. The relationship between China and Africa is one that can be realized in the military and financial assistances which were provided to African countries by China government during the decolonization era of 1970–1990. The assistances provided by China in the

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early 2000s: To loosen the debt burdens on African countries. China has reliably multiplied its financing responsibility to Africa amid the previous three Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) gatherings which began at $5 billion in 2006 to $10 billion in 2009 to $20 billion in 2012 (Yanqui and Matingwina 2017: 542). It was uncovered that before the end of 2014, the aggregate Chinese investment into Africa was recorded at $101 billion bringing about 3100 African-based enterprises while exchange volume stood at to $221.9 billion as the results of FOCAC and the general China-Africa participation have been obvious, basic perspectives on the expectations of China in Africa have continued prompting differing view of FOCAC (Yanqui and Matingwina 2017: 542). China’s investment into the African continent has increased significantly throughout the years and it’s projected to triple in the next ten years in trying to eradicate poverty and unemployment by creating jobs and enterprises which will benefit the African people. Trade Relations The trade relations between China and Africa have passed that of the United States in the year 2009 making China the largest African trading partner. Currently China has bilateral agreements with approximately 40 states from the African continent. Trade relations between Africa and China are often characterized by China seeking resources for growth consumption, and in exchange Africa receives funds in order to develop its structures (Duan and Gao 2014). Trade relations between China and Africa seem to be one sided observing the type of goods they trade among each other. China purchases mostly natural resources such as metals and minerals then African states import the finished products that range from electrical goods, machinery, rubbers to plastics. An arrangement of this nature would benefit the two parties, but rather it tends to be viewed in such a way that China is exploiting the natural resources in Africa so as to feed its industry output. The exporting of shoddy and cheap manufactured goods to African states makes local companies become less competitive and they tend to be highly dependent on China (Duan and Gao 2014). A good example of how China has exploited is Nigeria. The trade relations of Nigeria and China are marked by certain differences in terms of exports. The Chinese export a wide range of goods that have been manufactured such as textiles, machinery as well as equipment to Nigeria,

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while Nigeria exports gas products and oil to China. In the year 2014 petroleum products as well as natural resources amounted to 57% of Nigeria’s export to its trading partner China while China’s export to Nigeria only comprised mainly textile machineries and materials. In similarity China’s textile export specifically to Nigeria hiked at 222% from the year 2010–2014. However, the cheap textiles that are exported by China to Nigeria have grossly affected the local textile manufacturers in the Nigerian state this is due to the fact that these cheap Chinese products are able to meet the needs of Nigerians even though of less quality. By importing cheap Chinese products has caused textile industries in Nigeria to close down since their products are no longer produced locally this has led to a high unemployment rate (Anderson 2017: 73–74). In the case of Rwanda, it is rather a different narrative due to the fact that China is interested to trade with the country because of its mineral wealth. Rwanda has minimal natural resources, so rather it provides a new and flexible market for Chinese products. Chinese businesses have become key in the economic zone of Rwanda. Chinese companies are clothes, wooden doors and sanitary napkins. In Rwanda, second hand clothes were rather cheap before the year 2016. Lately there have been import tariffs and they are ten times even higher, the price of garments that have been used has become a new piece in Rwanda. Furthermore, there banning of second-hand clothes has led to demand for more fashion that’s affordable. This has become an advantage for China since there has been an increase in cheap textiles exported by them to Rwanda. Thereafter China supplies the market with very low-cost clothing that includes undocumented or more specifically illegal imports. The Chinese investors have heavily benefitted from their trade with Africa. Even though Rwanda has minimal natural resources, but however China in exchange does import tantalum which is a metal that is used for mobile phones (Anderson 2017: 73–74). Economic Aid The Chinese investment in Africa has grown from 210 million US dollars to about 317 million US dollars in 2011. Aid is a significant policy instrument that China uses in vast engagements with Africa, the African continent is the main recipient of Chinese aid. Officially the Chinese provide precisely eight kinds of foreign aid and that is medical assistance,

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complete projects with materials, human resource development cooperation, urgent humanitarian aid, debt relief and volunteer projects. China’s aid goes beyond the types of aid mentioned above, it even covers fields like education, agriculture, energy, transportation, health and communications. Analysts have said that since 1956 China has managed to provide 900 aid projects for African states, and that also includes assisting by supporting hydropower stations, textile factories, stadiums, schools and hospitals (Kluger 2014: 1–12). However, aid that is provided by China is associated with the securing of natural resources in the African continent. By using the Angola model China has managed to provide loans with low interest to various countries that heavily rely on commodities like mineral resources, and oil as collateral. By assessment of China’s aid, it is reflective of China’s selfish quest in gaining natural resources thus damaging Africa’s efforts of improving governance and building a sustainable future. Chinese projects often create an access into Africa’s natural resources as well as local markets, they also provide an access for business opportunities especially for Chinese companies so as to employ Chinese labour (Kluger 2014: 1–12). A case that would confirm these assertions is the case of Angola. Angola is heavily reliant on oil sales that comprised 95% of foreign revenues had slashed a significant third of its budget and was now in need of 25 billion. In this instance, China was the nearest donor to turn to so China lent Angola 20 billion US dollars after the 27-year-old civil war came to a halt in 2002. The repayments for this loan are paid in with oil or by directing funds to Chinese construction firms that have erected hospitals, roads, railways and houses all across the country (Kluger 2014: 1–12). Another example of a country that defaulted on its loan repayments to China is Zambia. The Zambian state could not afford to repay multibillion dollars to China thus secret talks were held to discuss a way forward to the repayment plan. The agreement on the repayment plan is that Zambia would hand over its largest energy producer named ZESCO which produces electricity for nearly about 80% of households in Zambia. Again Zambia will hand over its airport which is the Lusaka international airport and in addition to that Zambia will also hand over all its copper which is already occupied by Chinese companies. The Zambian state-owned radio news and television channel also called the Zambian

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National Broadcasting Corporation will also be handed over to China (Sperber 2018: 10–17). BRICS is also another enlightening case study to see whether both parties stand to benefit or is it a strategic move. Firstly, BRICS is an acronym that stands for the union or grouping of the emerging economies in the world and they are Russia, Brazil, South Africa and China. The main objective for the formation of BRICS is to broaden, deepen and intensify the relations among the countries that are within the group so as to achieve a more equitable, sustainable and a mutually beneficial development. The approach used by BRICS is very considerate of each member’s growth, poverty objectives, and development so as to ensure that they establish relations that are based on individual economy strengths in order to refrain from competition where possible (Sperber 2018: 10–17). However, China’s BRIC membership invite to South Africa could be nonetheless a strategically timed and also a diplomatic master stroke. China being a permanent of the UN was eager to illustrate global leadership by playing its cards right through supporting South Africa’s membership into BRIC (Mbukanma et al. 2019). China is now moving expeditiously in order to make sure that it has political capital in the African continent especially during the making of tactical decisions that would affect Africa’s international affairs and domestic affairs. Of the many decisions China participated one of them was the referendum in Southern Sudan when the situation regresses the spot held by South Africa in the UNSC could be useful to the interests of China. By South Africa being the main door to the Southern African Development Community Market furthers China’s corporate interests. The Chinese companies will be boosted by joining corporations in South Africa to explore and exploit markets and various opportunities in African economies. South Africa’s geopolitics and political leverage in Africa drove China’s decision to invite South Africa to BRIC (Curtis 2017: 17). The Chinese companies massively invested in the sub-Saharan power sector financing nearly 30% of states with new capacity additions for the last five years mostly with plants that are powered by coal. China’s energy companies may make up half of the new coal power in the following decade and little over half of the twenty biggest coal developers of coal are the Chinese. By 635 million people in sub-Saharan Africa living without any form of electricity, China will seize to benefit from this opportunity since there is a demand it will do so by investing in exporting the coal power plants that have been halted in China. The Chinese coal power

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plants have presented some serious challenges since they are low quality they break easily as well cause health and environmental issues through high levels of pollution. In addition to that, approximately one million Chinese now work in African construction sites (Curtis 2017: 17). Security In recent years, Africa and China’s military ties have reached a stage where they have deepened even further. There has been an introduction to the Africa-China Defence and Security Forum that commenced with the sole intention of strengthening military cooperation between African states and China. The forum has thus included participants that come from the African Union and forty-nine various nations. The forum reflects an expansion footprint on China’s growing influence more especially in Africa (Foster 2018: 11–18). China has established a military base in Djibouti as a way of illustrating its efforts towards the United Nations peacekeeping forces. China has also increased arms trade with African states. Recently China’s military ties with Africa have seen to be rather economically motivated and less concentrated in military matters. The defence strategy employed by China is rather complicated. China’s defence strategy for Africa is rather complicated thus it can be broken down into a simple correlation of the Chinese interests in African natural resources more especially where Chinese forces of peacekeeping have been deployed (Foster 2018: 11–18). The military relations between Africa and China have not seemed to be beneficial but instead they are one-sided like in the context of Sudan. China has managed to develop the oil industry in Sudan starting from the initial stages of drilling then finding the oil, manufacturing pipelines to setting up an oil refinery. The Sudanese oil on a daily basis weighs in at about 500 000 barrels and thus an estimated two-thirds of that amount goes to China in exchange for this China supplies Sudan with cheap weapons. The weapons that China supplies Sudan with are of less quality but they are of the type and price that African states bare interest in. The bilateral relations between the states only benefit China (Bellamy 2017: 8–28). The armed violence in Africa has become the greatest threat towards the development of Africa so by China providing ninety-five of the weapons that are being utilized during these conflicts leads to the support

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of genocide and undemocratic regimes that are terrorizing their own people so as to retain power. This has resulted negatively and undermines security and peace efforts in the African continent (Bellamy 2017: 8–28). Social Environment The substantial investments by China have caused a certain detriment especially in Africa’s competitiveness generally. Their projects often depend on deals that are negotiated at high political levels. They consistently lack competitiveness and proper bidding process, and even worse most of the people employed in these projects are of Chinese origin. The promises made by China of job creation for Africans never get fulfilled. Further when the African people are employed, regulations and local rules are flouted and that leads to poor safety (Bellamy 2017: 8–28). For example, China has invested in mines in Zambia’s copper belt and as such employees are to work for a period of two years before earning safety helmets. Ventilation that is below ground tends to be poor and deadly accidents emerge daily. On the regular jobs have been lost to Chinese employees that are ferried from project to project. For instance, the growth of Chinese existence in South Africa has cost the state an estimated 75,000 jobs from the year 2000 to 2011. In Nigeria, the textile goods that are low-priced and produced by China have caused serious detriment such that 80% of Nigerian companies have closed down in this industry (Redd 2016: 10). Political Environment The non-interference policy is producing bad government especially through investments and as well access to cheap capital. For instance, China has managed to invest 30 billion US dollars in Sudan’s oil and also served as its partner; this is rather disturbing since the whole world is shunning the Sudanese government for atrocities that were committed in the Darfur region. This policy by China has given dictatorial governments even more power (Redd 2016: 10).

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Positive Effects This section of the paper will examine the benefits which come with the relation forged by China and Africa for economic, political and social advancement as the China–Africa relation has to some extent benefitted the African continent and its people to reach economic expansion. For every instance, there are always negative and positive effects in this instance we shall highlight the positive effects in the Africa–China relations. China has become the largest donor to the African continent. In the past years, China has assisted Africa in building public facilities such as railway lines, new roads and new buildings for tourist attraction sites. Secondly China has helped in training African technicians and engineers, deployed medical staff, as well as eased the debt burden in Africa. Again what is worthy of note is that China has played a huge role in the correlation of the increase in Africa’s growth domestic product, this is due to the Chinese demand for the African commodity. Furthermore, the Chinese increased the price structure so that Africa could receive a better price for the goods they were selling (Redd 2016: 10). China’s foreign policy towards the African continent has changed significantly after 2000 as the interaction between China and Africa has been to a great extent based on financial reasons, for example, resource extraction, trade, investment/venture and China has been utilizing FOCAC to advance economic and political relations with Africa, which was founded in 2000 unites 51 African expresses that have ties with China (Mlambo et al. 2016: 259–260). Chinese Foreign policy towards Africa has changed for the betterment and growth of countries’ interaction and has increased the investment of China in Africa which has created jobs for many Africans while opening up new markets for Africans to partake in and offering African people much-needed skills in engineering and information technology. According to Edoho (2011: 112), China considers the African region as an undiscovered domain with enormous potential and financial opportunities with China adding to the new developing multi-polarity in the international development and developing wellsprings of investments and aid outside of the Western hub that has ruled for a significant part of the most past century. China provided African countries with an alternative as compared to depending heavily on the Western societies that intensively indebted African countries with high-interest rate loan, familiarizing them with aids, which inevitably paved the way for the high dependence issues

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which face African countries and finally the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAP’s) which crippled the domestic economies and to some extent enforcing Western cultures onto the African governance structures. The Chinese government illustrated a policy which would forge a partnership between African countries and China, which also entailed that the partnership will mutually benefit both countries while expanding the economic capacity. Delgado (2015: 3) details that the Chinese model has been an advancing methodology that incorporate trade, investment and cooperation as this model is essentially a collaboration program situated towards enhancing and expanding infrastructure, raising efficiency and broadening training of HR through school grants as the Chinese way of participation guarantees to set up a win–win relationship, even though the Chinese aids towards the Africa continent has been seen with doubt by Western observes and African common society groups. “Many African states have old and poor infrastructure and as a result of this they do not have a foundation for economic growth and development” (Mlambo et al. 2016: 262). The conditions of many buildings in the African continent are old and very unsatisfactory which leads to a slow economic development and growth as African people cannot utilize their limited factors of production to the best of their abilities. Mlambo et al. (2016: 263) further state that China has been instrumental in infrastructural advancement in Africa as various critical arrangements have been signed to enhance infrastructure in a few African states and the Chinese have invested massively in infrastructural projects which reconstructs African infrastructures as their greatest priority. The Chinese investors and government have upsurged to the main and biggest investor for African infrastructure development as they have prioritized it as one of their foreign policy goals in developing Africa. 4% of Africa’s population is exceedingly susceptible and 33% of the overall population is susceptible to food insecurities, as food insecurity in Africa is mostly triggered by philanthropic disasters and disproportionally pretentious rural areas (Gu and Shiere 2011: 17). “The FOCAC Action Plan 2010–2012 emphasizes the commitment to promoting a growthoriented agricultural agenda by providing technology and contributing to global initiatives and south-south cooperation in agriculture development” (Gu and Shiere 2011: 17). Chinese investments should play a role

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in creating employment to the local African people rather than substituting enormous numbers of African agriculturalists by acquainting with progressive agricultural technology that is capital-concentrated (Gu and Shiere 2011: 18).

Costs of China–Africa Relation This section of the paper will discuss the cost of the China–Africa relation, which has been documented as the major part that illustrates this relationship works towards the advancement of the Chinese as compared to empowering African black people. According to Mohan (2013: 1264) in Nigeria the most infamous case happened in 2002 whereby forty-five locals were killed in a terminate at a Chinese processing plant (firm) in Lagos, the labourers apparently having been unable to break-out of the fact that their Chinese managers had bolted them inside with somewhat horrid looking manufacturing plant remain open and in 2011 another Chinese plant in Lagos, killed two labourers and harming others as the Chinese supervisor would not enable locals to utilize his car to transport one of their injured co-worker to hospital. Some Chinese Factors have failed to reverence the labour laws and customs of some African countries whereby they have not maintained or obliged with safety protocols of Firms and forcing people to work double shifts by locking them inside the factor while paying employee’s salaries which are unsatisfactory or rather closely linked to slavery. Tanzania’s Urafiki production line experienced progressive strikes that made assurance disintegrate, yet wrestled not very many concessions from the Chinese firm, however the Tanzanian government supported the Chinese speculators over inside on-screen characters (Mohan 2013: 1265). The labour union’s power in China is limited and restricted by the government so that the productivity of the private and public entities may be elevated to its maximum capacity, however labour unions in Africa have the power to conduct strikes whenever they have disputes. The Chinese government and firms influence African governments to shut down or limit the participation of unions so that labours may not revolt against their employers, while threatening to fire them when they put forth their disputes about working conditions and standard pay. Unfortunately, many African governments favour the Chinese manufacturers over its own people in the name of keeping investors happy.

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Toogood (2016: 4) details that China now recognizes that the continual uncertainty and vicious conflict necessitates it to retort in a supplementary straightforward ways and China has inclined to alteration from its conventional standard of non-interference in state matters to commitment of an interference in the matters of a state of African states as this move has been more protuberant in the area of peace and security. China’s dedication to frolicking a vital protagonist in the peace and security difficulties of the African continent has raised some few concerns as to what their factual motives and purpose in the continent is as they came out claiming that they will not and are not interested in the internal politics but rather want to conduct trade and investment with the African countries and its people as a whole. The interference of China in domestic politics has raised concerns of yet another neo-liberalist country. China has arisen as the major purchaser of oil following the United States, shifting from a disposable exporter with Africa providing an alluring substitute to other supplies as demonstrated oil reserves amplified fivefold as equated to the rest of the world and petroleum from Africa encompassed approximately a third of China’s oil imports, abundant imminent after Chad reconstructed diplomatic relations with China in 2006 (Rich and Recker 2013: 66). Therefore, China’s necessity for natural resources such as oil, ore, steel, diamonds and many more is utterly recognized as China’s main trade partners depend heavily on natural resource and China attracts these countries by assisting them economically by building infrastructure and roads which they will inevitably have to pay them as they are offered as loan (in most cases) rather than non-bidding assistance. “China may be willing to finance projects that more traditional partners refuse to support because they are not sustainable” (Renard 2011: 38). Chinese invest heavily in the development of infrastructure and buildings, however they failed to realize that unemployment and poverty are still a problem which is still not resolved and they should concentrate more on creating jobs and opening up new markets in order for the citizens to enjoy the infrastructure erected. Countries that export exhaustive employment goods have a motive to fear rivalry of goods from China, whereas those exporting primary produces or capital-intensive and mechanically innovative goods will stand to gain as China leaks natural resources (Renard 2011: 38).

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China–Africa Relation: Beneficiary for Both Parties and One Over the Other? The debate around the costs and benefits of the Sino–Africa relations is adequately documented by scholars international, however the scholars have mixed emotions when it comes to who is the majority benefacator within this relationship. This section of the paper will examine the benefactor(s) of the Sino-Africa biopolar International relationship. Furthermore, this section of the paper will illustrator as to the Sino-Africa relationship is an expense. Leslie (2014: 11) states that in spite of having the laws and the Ministry of Labour and Social Services (LSS) there have been a few cases in which labourer’s rights and environmental laws have not been followed as the LSS has now and again needed to close manufacturing plants because of non-compliances of the safety and environment laws and the poor working conditions which also occurred in 2013, when the Zambian government renounced licenses of Chinese officials who managed the Collum-Coal mine, because of poor safety, health and ecological conditions. The negligence and misconduct which have been portrayed by the Chinese investor illustrates that Chinese investors and government only want to extract minerals from Africa, while disregarding the environment and labour laws entailed in the constitutions of African countries. Consequently, investment of the Chinese is much needed to develop and grow the economy of the African countries, however is the negligence by the Chinese investor portray outweigh the benefits of the investment? As the investor will sabbatical as soon as the environment is not conducive for them and further the disregard on the law and order of the countries underestimates the government causing security problems and rebellions. China subscribes to using soft power/diplomacy in order to achieve their desires and they don’t want to be portrayed as being colonizer, but rather as partner for the economic development of Africa. However, the “sunset” conditions of the loans that they provide to Africa and the take-over of the airport in Bangladesh paint a different picture as to what they say. Chipande (2014) expressed that the Chinese building the stadium has less to do with friendship or common cooperation and more with accessing Africa’s natural resources, however there is little which can be done in light of the fact that the government doesn’t communicate with its citizens on economic deals with China. There is criticism about Chinese companies getting extremely cheap workers to work in

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the construction of the stadium as in any case, there is by all accounts a general inclination among the citizens that it is adequate for the Chinese to build stadiums and other infrastructure in exchange for copper because the other option would enable Zambia’s politicians to take the benefits to enrich themselves and their families (Chipande 2014). Thus, the Chinese investors constructed a stadium which cannot be compared to the profits which they will make from the mines provided to them by the government. According to Sherling (2014: 73) in sub-Saharan Africa the reality on the ground is that foreign nations are importing their crude materials, exporting manufactured items back to Africa, the proof posted above is a solid indicator that this expanded foreign investment is the primary cause for eradicating poverty, which is in by no shaping or forming certain. Sherling (2014: 73) is of the view that China–Africa relation is equivalent to other multi-lateral relation which Africa has already established, as the aim for these investors is to exploit African resources, manufacture the resources and sell the final product at a high price as compared to the price they bought the natural resources. Hence, the establishment of the Chinese investor to create new market is economical, rather than a partnership to help Africa to develop and increase its economic capacity. However, Junbo (2007) argues that on the off chance that Chinese representatives are determined to destroy the African local monetary system (for instance, the nearby material industry), than African governments have the ability to stop them, since every one of these states is sovereign. Junbo (2007) neglected the fact that the Chinese government has intensive influence and military force in Africa, which it can use to arm-twist the African countries to assemble its policies towards their advantages as they did in Lesotho in 2018. “The government of Lesotho wants to pass a law that regulates the sale of wool and mohair. It insists this must be done locally as this will ultimately benefit all Basotho” (Radebe 2018). The Lesotho government passed a law which will prevent its farmers from selling their unprocessed wool from buyers of their choice but rather the buy for the wool will be centralized to a Chinese foreign investor who will have a monopoly over the buying price of the wool which is feared that it might bring down profit making for the local farmers by maximizing the returns of the Chinese investor. China’s influence and economy strength in Africa is adequately illustrated by the Forbes (2017), that China has launch from being a moderately diminutive investor in the continent to becoming Africa’s biggest

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monetary partner as Africa-China exchange is predicted to growing on a year to year bases influencing it to appear as a mythical beasts with new rulers of the African wilderness and Investment in Africa has somewhat been oriented around Chinese proprietorship, with about 90% of firms either dominant part controlled or owned all together by Chinese nationals evaluated to be more than 10,000 Chinese firms in Africa that have made work for a few million Africans. The investment made by China in Africa is significant and much need, however the hidden terms and conditions that come with these investments and loans account for the future of this partnership. The control or monopoly of the wool manufacturing in Lesotho represents the fears that China has elements of a neo-colonize, proving once again that the Sino–Africa relation is benefiting the Chinese government and its people as compared to a mutual beneficial partnership.

Conclusion China–Africa relation is a much-needed relation for the development of Africa as a whole, however the partnership merely benefits the Chinese government and investors as compared to the African who are once again marginalized. The investment made by the Chinese investors in Africa poses a threat to the Western society on the bases that China has increased its influence over Africa and it’s by far the greatest investor for Africa. The investment made by Chinese is improving the standard of African infrastructure. The costs of the China-Africa partnership are currently working in the advantage of the Chinese people while side-lining the African people. The partnership between Africa and China is a major international element, which is need for the establishment of a new world order which is slowly but surely taking over the international system by storm. However, this partnership must be closely observed and monitored by the African countries as this partnership should on paper and in reality benefit both parties, in order to avoid yet another colonial takeover. China should be willing to cooperate with African countries, with regard to pricing of the natural resources and comply with the environmental and labour laws. In conclusion, the challenge at present is for Africa to have a clear-cut strategy when pursuing its individual long-term interest with China or any other major power. The states that stand to benefit from their relationship with China are states with coherent policies and are democratically

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accountable meaning the states in Africa that are democratically developed. Even though they cannot manage on their own but is paramount to increase their leverage especially when dealing with the Chinese or China as significant whole.

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CHAPTER 18

Changing Dynamics of African Diplomacy: Concluding Thoughts from Pre-colonial Era to Contemporary Times Vincent Okwudiba Anyika

and Kelechi Johnmary Ani

Introduction Diplomacy since the ancient time has existed as a veritable tool for international relations and a means through which states pursued their interests in the international environment. Frechette (2013) as cited in Obuah (2019, p. 1) stated that “diplomacy is more about looking for and finding common ground, about forging agreement and achieving a balance of benefits that will allow each party go home with at least some degree of satisfaction.” Diplomacy according to Obuah (2019) is an art that is more about persuasions and not coercion. It is the ordered conduct of relations among states and human societies. Mirumbu (2017,

V. O. Anyika (B) · K. J. Ani Department of History and Strategic Studies, Alex Ekwueme Federal University Ndufu Alike Ikwo, Abakaliki, Ebonyi State, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. J. Ani (ed.), Political Economy of Colonial Relations and Crisis of Contemporary African Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0245-3_18

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p. vi) defined diplomacy as “the management of international interactions in a skilful and tactful way that promote the foreign policy of a state.” Since the ancient period, many human societies developed ways of relating with others outside their respective groups. Through such ways they resolved conflicts, made negotiations and came to agreements on issues that affected them. Over time, however, such ways or methods of inter-group relations have changed, been modified, progressed or retrogressed. Also, interests pursued by states or human societies have changed to reflect existing political cum socioeconomic realities. Such changes in the objects of diplomacy corroborate with the notion of Kissinger (1994) that the elements of diplomacy are in constant flux. The goals of diplomacy stem from the needs and aspirations of diplomatic entities and in some cases may vary or conflict with those of other actors within a given or global diplomatic space. In situations where interests are conflictual, diplomacy ensures that conflicts do not arise and that each side mutually benefits instead of one benefiting at the expense of the other. Diplomacy as a practice of human civilization is not foreign to the continent of Africa which is the cradle of humanity. In pre-colonial Africa, states, empires, kingdoms, chiefdoms and other independent human groups engaged in diplomatic practices. Through diplomacy, they maintained peaceful coexistence which guaranteed the flow of trade and people across boundaries. In situations where war alters relational equilibrium, diplomacy was deployed to restore peaceful coexistence. Some wellknown sophisticated civilizations in Africa such as the Ancient Egypt, Kush/Nubia, Axum, Ghana, Mali, Asante, Oyo, Kanem-Borno, Songhai, Benin, Ile Ife, among others extensively used the machinery of diplomacy for advancing their various interests. Apart from the centralized African empires, non-centralized societies also pursued inter-group relations through the tool of diplomacy. Military alliances, trade agreements, dispute settlements and other forms of relations were carried out through diplomacy (Spies 2018). Armistices were struck through agreements reached through diplomatic mechanism. The sanctity or inviolability of messengers or heralds was upheld among many African groups and even savages (Orugbani 2006). Various African groups recognized the value of peace and often gave it a chance through the instrumentality of diplomacy. There were also evidences of intercontinental relations in pre-colonial Africa. Early missionaries and traders met very organized societies in Africa and related with them in a dignifying and courteous manners

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(Obuah 2017). The African societies met by early missionaries and traders were never chaotic, backward or dark as painted by some colonial historians but were organized and exhibited potentials for progressive cultural advancement (Obuah 2017). As early as the fifteenth century, the Kingdom of Benin exchanged correspondence with the King of Portugal. Before the nineteenth century, Niger Delta chiefs and kings related with European traders on equal terms and no side undermined the interest of the other (Orugbani). The territorial boundaries of African states were respected by pre-colonial European traders. It was from the colonial time that European colonialists and their trading agents in incursively poured into Africa and subjugated the people and their leaders. Colonialism made African states to reel under the dominion of European powers for decades during which European economic interests and cultural values became entrenched and African interests greatly undermined. European colonial historians painted Africa in bad light to justify the so-called civilization mission of the colonialists. African societies were described as chaotic, backward, gyratory and uncivilized. In the course of colonialism, Africans were brainwashed and compelled to accept European values and civilization as superior to whatever they have. Colonialism became lords and masters of African people. It is therefore not surprising that Africans who fought against colonialism were the ones that had travelled to acquire Western education and through that process and exposure to philosophies of freedom exorcized the myth of European superiority from their minds. Other groups that were in the vanguard of anti-colonial struggle were ex-combatants that had had close shave with Europe in the Second World War and discovered that the colonialists were not demigods as they used to think. Through colonialism, a dependence or inferiority mindset was systematically foisted on Africans. Hence, by the time most African states attained political independence, they strove vehemently to assert themselves as equal actors on the global stage dominated by Western powers that had hitherto undermined Africa’s political rights.

Independence of African States and Effects of Colonialism By the end of 1960, many African states had secured political independence from colonial powers. The neo-African states upon such attainment set up their diplomatic machinery and entered the global stage dominated by the West. The new African leaders who participated in the struggles for

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independence entered the stage with great resolve and passion to advance the interest of the African people which had been undermined by colonialism. The African political elite recognized that they were ill-equipped to contend with the great powers in advancement of African interests. They acknowledged that if they acted as sole diplomatic entities on the global scene they would not exude sufficient power for global power politics and diplomacy. They saw the need for African states to come together and speak with one voice to counter existing marginalization and push for the interests of Africa. At this early stage, the benefits of Africa’s integration have become very espoused by some proactive afrocrats and leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Tafawa Balewa, among others. The various African leaders at the time had various views on the nature of the proposed African integration. Some Africans had a rather radical approach to African integration. They wanted a political unity of African states to be known as the United States of Africa. Leaders that expressed this line of thought on African integration include Kwame Nkrumah, Sékou Touré of Guinea and Modibo Keita of Mali. They were referred to as the Casablanca group. This group wanted a radical and full continental political integration. Countries such as Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Libya, Egypt, Morocco and Algeria belonged to this group. Another group of countries known as the Brazzaville group were indifferent to the idea of political integration. These were francophone countries that wanted to retain political, cultural and economic ties with France. This group of countries was led by Senegal and the Ivory Coast. The third group known as the Monrovia group comprises wanted a moderate and gradual approach to African unification. Countries in this group include Nigeria, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Liberia, Sudan, Togo and Somalia. Disagreement among the three blocs put the aspiration for African integration in a lull for a few years until May 1963 when a Pan-African organization, Organization for African Unity, was formed after some compromises were reached. OAU was formed to lead the process of African integration. OAU was formed with the vision of achieving “an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in global arena.” One of the major goals of the OAU was ridding the continent of Africa of colonialism and preserving territorial integrity of African states. The OAU showed relentless solidarity for some African states that were still reeling under the yoke of colonialism. It also was opposed to apartheid regimes in South Africa with the demise of colonialism and

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end of apartheid in South Africa, the primary goals of OAU seem to have been achieved hence, the body metamorphosed to become African Union in 2002 so that it would embody and advance the objectives of African integration as envisaged and expressed by some afrocrats in the early 1960s.

The Rise of African Diplomacy The term African diplomacy is a new diplomatic terminology that describes the efforts of African states that had hitherto suffered suppression to reassert their voice and exert influence as equal actors on the world stage. It arose from the conscientious efforts of African states to impact global diplomatic agenda. It is diplomatic thrust or advocacy for a redefinition of North–South relations to give equal economic opportunities to the people of global south. After African states had attained political independence, it became incumbent on them to attain economic development so that they can relate equally with the rest of the world (Spies 2018). Hence, African states began to pursue diplomatic agenda that would enhance their development rather than keep them in perpetual dependent status. African diplomacy as a new style of diplomacy or diplomatic posture is tacitly more confrontational than conciliatory (Huda and Muchatuta 2022). African states tried to pull away from the alliance system at the global stage. During the Cold War, it was from this diplomatic stance that many African states joined the non-aligned movement. African diplomacy implied that national interest would determine the foreign policy direction of states rather than any other consideration. African diplomacy is a diplomatic impetus that aims at readjusting the world economic order so that exploitative trade relations would be eliminated and development would consequently spread to the continent of Africa. African diplomacy is a collective diplomatic identity through which Africa would have a unified voice in most global issues. Through African diplomacy, debt cancellation has been secured from the World Bank for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) of the world (Spies 2018). The diplomatic identity that Africa created through her unified voice on global issues that concerned Africa made some rising power and international organizations to engage Africa as a single diplomatic entity. The acknowledgement of Africa as a diplomatic unit has been demonstrated by instances of institutionalized summits between Africa and external powers. Such summits include Tokyo International Summit,

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the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAD), the United StatesAfrica Leader Summit, India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS), European Union-African Union Summit (EU-AU Summit), among others. China is increasingly going the extra mile in furthering Sino-African relations. China funded and constructed the AU Conference Centre and Office Complex which it started in 2009 and completed in 2012 at the cost of US$200 million. The building which is 99.9 in height stands as the tallest edifice in Addis Ababa. The rise of African diplomacy is traceable to the ideals of PanAfricanism as championed by early Pan-Africanists (Ani and Ojakorotu 2017). The first generation of African leaders set the road map for African diplomacy. African diplomacy is aimed at giving Africa a unified voice on the global stage, and enhancing the prosperity of the African people through better economic relations. it also sought for political stability on the continent of Africa to give room for peaceful coexistence and the much-needed economic development.

Dynamics of African Diplomacy African diplomatic landscape is in a continual flux. It has recorded progressive changes and some shortcomings. The effect of foreign influence on the diplomacy of African states at independence was overwhelming. European powers had deep-rooted interest in their former colonies. Colonial investments and other economic and political connections ensured the continuation of relations of patronage. Former colonial powers such as Britain and France ensured that their former colonies remained within their web of influence. Through the Commonwealth, Britain maintained exclusive cultural and economic relations with their former colonies. Paris remained the cultural and economic hub of the francophone countries. Belgium on its part continued to have extra diplomatic resources in the Great Lakes region so as to advance its surreptitious interests. Furthermore, continued training of African political elites in the capitals of former colonial powers further advanced colonial tutelage. There were no diplomatic training centres in sub-Saharan Africa at the time the countries got political independence. Hence, African diplomacy became an embodiment or imitation of Western diplomacy. Conscious efforts were not made to outline some unique value system that would underpin African diplomacy.

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At independence, most African states were diplomatically disadvantaged. The political had limited knowledge in foreign policy. The states lacked diplomatic infrastructure and human resources. Thus, finding themselves in the vast ocean of global diplomacy, the OAU became a diplomatic rallying point for most African states who had acknowledged their disadvantaged positions. Also, the new states had the crisis of nationhood as the forging together of ethnic nationalities into single political entities created crises that in most cases resulted in civil wars. Ethnic politics were common in many states and often undermined effective leadership and lead to pursuance of parochial national interest. To ensure that they maintained political control, post-colonial African leaders became more dictatorial and often appointed their cronies and kins to positions of power instead of making appointments on the basis of competence. The first generation of post-colonial African leaders operated authoritarian governments which gave less attention to the effective use of diplomacy for the realization of national interests. Also, neo-independent African states were weak and had weak public institutions. Power was vested in a few individuals and public institutions were greatly underdeveloped to checkmate the recklessness of leaders. Economic resources were in most cases mismanaged and the available scarce resources were not channelled towards the development of diplomatic institutions and missions. From the 1970s there was a rekindled momentum for the advancement of African diplomacy. Some African leaders saw the need for the rejigging of African diplomacy. The likes of Tafawa Balewa adopted afrocentric foreign policy stance and tried to fully delink Nigeria from Britain. He gave robust support to citizens of Angola, Zimbabwe and South Africa who suffered foreign domination and apartheid. His successor Olusegun Obasanjo nationalized British assets in Nigeria owing to protest British support of apartheid in South Africa. A more articulated move towards the development of African diplomacy identity took place in early 1980s with the launch of the Lagos Plan of Action for Economic Development of Africa. It was an OAU-led action for Africa’s self-sufficiency. From this point, African leaders began to come together and took the destinies of the African continent in their hands. They acted in unison in their engagement with external powers on issues that affected African states. The Lagos Plan of Action (1980–2000) was succeeded by NEPAD through which African leaders sought partnership with industrialized nations for the development of Africa. By the year 2000, the AU had developed its

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framework for conflict resolution in Africa and started to mediate in most African conflicts. Although African diplomacy is hamstrung by the nature of the international system that is dominated by world powers it has been able to record some successes. African diplomacy has had its major thrust on conflict resolution on the continent of Africa. Its advocacy for restructuring of the global system to give African states a major stake in the Security Council of the UN has not yielded any positive out. One of the major preoccupations of African diplomacy in the past three decades has been in the area of conflict prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding. African diplomacy has developed a structural approach to conflict resolution whereby sub-regional blocs are given mandates for dealing with conflicts that erupt in their respective regions (Eke and Ani 2017). For instance, the ECOWAS-led Joint Military Task Force which is currently fighting violent extremists in the Lake Chad region received its mandate from the AU. Some notable achievements of African diplomacy include the successful ending of the Liberian and Sierra Leon crises. Also, in 2008, the Zimbabwean instability was resolved through mediation by the South African Development Community (SADC). In the West African region, ECOWAS continued monitoring of electoral processes has deterred post-election conflicts. Conflict resolution is a major determinant of the effectiveness of diplomacy (Akokpari 2016). Conflict resolution has been a major thrust in African diplomacy. Africa since 1960s is known for recurrent conflicts which in most cases assumed very violent forms resulting in huge losses in human lives. The African Union is the major diplomatic channel for conflict resolution in Africa. The AU has acted as the mediator in some of the conflicts that rocked parts of Africa. The AU in some cases acted through the leaders of sub-regional blocs such as ECOWAS and SADC in conflict resolution. For instance, South Africa acted on behalf of the AU in its mediatory role in the conflict that erupted in Burundi, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho and the Central African Republic. In 2003 barely a year after it came into force, the AU acting through South Africa successfully brokered peace between the two sides to the Burundi conflict and further assisted the country in the conduct of elections after the conflict. A major strength of African diplomacy is in the area of conflict resolution. The AU has developed a holistic approach to conflict resolution (Ani and Ojakorotu 2021). This approach has three pillars that include conflict

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prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding. These three pillars of conflict resolution make the AU approach to conflict very comprehensive. The AU Post-Conflict Conflict Reconstruction and Development Framework which was launched in 2011 to a large extent illustrates the broadness of the AU peacebuilding architecture. Although the AU has articulated and adopted holistic conflict resolution framework, application of the framework to African conflicts has become its major challenge (Anyanwu et al. 2020). For instance, its preventive arm is not always deployed. In places where conflict is currently simmering such as Niger, Cameroon and Mali, the AU has not sent delegations or warned leaders to respect civil liberties and be cautious of human rights abuses. The use of military action as a tool of diplomacy has been a canon of African diplomacy. Threat of military intervention has repeatedly served as a deterrent for conflicts. Political actors that constitute threat to security are often cowed by delegation of leaders of stronger nations that possess superior military might as was done in Cote d’Ivoire when former president Gbagbo refused to vacate offices after losing an election. The AU through its constant effort to manage African conflicts projects to the world that Africa has the capacity to deal with her problems. Through its continual efforts in resolution, the AU has received the support of and worked in concert with the UN in conflict resolution. The intervention of the AU in African conflicts arose from the realization that Africa strategically mattered less to the West and the rest of the world. Hence, African leaders acting through the AU had to take it upon themselves to protect the lives of African people to prevent some horrendous outcome of conflict as witnessed in Rwanda in 1994. The popular 1992 UN Agenda for Peace which taunted the maxim, Africa’s solution to African problems buttresses the reluctance of the global body in dealing with myriads of African security issues. Hence, they subtly passed the bulk to Africans. Such body language left Africa with no choice than to develop a very comprehensive approach to conflict resolution including military intervention where pure diplomacy failed as was seen in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Central African Republic (CAR). AU military operations have been carried out in states such as Burundi (2003–2004), CAR, Comoros, Darfur, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan.

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Challenges of African Diplomacy One of the observable defects of African diplomacy is its obvious lack of diplomatic clout. This shortcoming makes African diplomacy susceptible to external pressures (Akokpari 2016). Diplomatic resilience and clout are needed for achieving diplomatic successes on issues that are of great importance to Africa. Furthermore, the prevalence of conflicts and political instability in Africa has always projected Africa as a troubled continent that should not be taken seriously or given major stakes on the global scene. Also, the dearth of good leaders in Africa has made African diplomacy ineffectual. Often political instability undermined diplomatic efforts. Marginal diplomatic achievement of the AU has affected the ego of the body, hence, making the body not to assume full and exclusive responsibility for dealing with African issues. Consequently, the AU still yields to the directives of external bodies such as the UN and some Western powers which they consider more effective in dealing with certain issues. The collaboration of the AU with the UN in dealing with African conflicts demonstrates lack of diplomatic confidence and compromise of afrocentric stance. The use of military force is increasingly becoming a tool of African diplomacy. The use of pure diplomacy for dealing with African issues has been elusive. The successful ending of the conflict in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire and Burundi through the use of military force has no doubt led to greater acceptability of military force as a tool of African diplomacy. In situations where the military option was not applied, the ending of conflicts has remained elusive. This goes a long way to show that African diplomacy is limited in its efficiency and effectiveness. Another challenge of African diplomacy is the use of unskilled mediators who lack professional diplomatic training and experience in conflict resolution. Former African presidents or heads of state are often used as mediators. Person in this category that have featured in some conflicts include Thabo Mbeki, Olusegun Obasanjo, Goodluck Jonathan, among others. Some of these leaders lack diplomatic finesse to meddle into conflict situations and manoeuvre the situations adroitly to a mutually agreed peace. Such responsibilities require very skilled diplomatic personae. In the area of economic diplomacy, not much has been achieved. African leaders have not been able to achieve the much-desired African

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development through trade creation, trade expansion and integration. African development models such as the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). African leaders believe that Africa cannot initiate and drive her development but has to rely on development assistance from external actors. Critiques of African development models have continued to lampoon the dependency mindset of African leaders who think they can achieve development through funds or investments from economies that want Africa to remain dependent. The LPA failed to achieve its goals because the much-needed assistance from the West for the attainment of self-reliance did not come. Likewise, NEPAD failed because the proposed development partners failed to partner with Africa as anticipated. The NEPAD was a colossal failure. Another major challenge of African diplomacy which undermines the credibility of its diplomacy is the high prevalence of conflicts. The resolve of African leader under the umbrella of the AU to settle conflicts through diplomacy is obviously overwhelmed by multiplicity of conflicts. The AU lacks sufficient diplomatic resources to deal with myriads of conflicts that buffet the continent. The lingering conflict in Ethiopia which houses the headquarters of the AU shows that African diplomacy has not yielded the much-desired peace in Africa. The current AU mediation in the country is yet to yield any positive outcome. The continued use of violence to crack down on civilian protesters demonstrated that the ethos of democracy has not been acculturated and has its serious consequences on African diplomacy.

Conclusion African diplomacy has emerged to become an important diplomatic machinery of the African states. In recent years it has assumed a united identity owing to the persistent unity of African states on development issues and the ability of the states to act in unity in dealing with issues that relate to conflicts. However, the goal of African diplomacy as it wields much influence on the global stage is yet it be achieved. Africa is still developing and lacks the necessary economic and military capacity that will accord it the much-needed relevance in the international system. The use of pure diplomacy for conflict resolution is very minimal in Africa. Africa diplomacy deploys the use of military force for conflict resolution. Although the military interventions are plausible, more efforts should be made towards the use of pure diplomacy. The efforts of African diplomacy

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in preventing conflict escalation through peacekeeping is a demonstration of the united will of African diplomacy, however, the credibility of its diplomatic thrust can be enhanced when conflict preventive mechanism is strengthened.

References Akokpari, J. (2016). The Challenges of Diplomatic Practice in Africa. Journal for Contemporary History. https://doi.org/10.18820/24150509/jch.v41i1. Ani, K. J., & Ojakorotu, V. (2021). African Union and Conflict Management in Africa: An Analysis. Journal of African Union Studies, 10(1): 77–94. Ani, K. J., & Ojakorotu, V. (2017). Pan-Africanism, AU and the Challenge of Transformative Development in Africa. Journal of African Union Studies, 6(1): 5–23. Anyanwu, C. T., Ani, K. J., & Uwizeyimana, D. (2020). New Wine in Old Wine Skin: An Assessment of African Union’s Peace and Security Initiatives in Africa. Journal of African Union Studies, 9(1): 67–81. Eke, J. U., & Ani, K. J. (2017). Africa and the Challenge of Regional Integration. Journal of African Union Studies, 6(1): 63–80. Frechette, L. (2013). Diplomacy: Old Trade, New Challenges. In A. F. Cooper, J. Heine, & R. Thakur (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy. Oxford University Press. Huda, M. I. M., & Muchatuta, E. T. (2022). African Diplomacy Issues and Challenges. Journal of Positive School Psychology, 6(5): 2137–2146. Kissinger, H. (1994). Diplomacy. Simon & Schuster Paperback. Mirumbu, N. D. (2017). The 21st Century Diplomatic Engagement in Africa. Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi. Obuah, E. E. (2017). An Introduction to Elements and Modes of Diplomacy. Oscom Prints. Obuah, E. E. (2019). Introduction to Diplomacy. Oscom Prints. Orugbani, A. (2006). A History of European Diplomacy. Paragraphics. Spies, Y. K. (2018). African Diplomacy. In G. Martel (Ed.), The Encyclopedia of Diplomacy. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118885154.dipl0005.

Correction to: Colonialism in Africa: An Introductory Review Lawson Onyema Chukwu and G. N. Obah-Akpowoghaha

Correction to: Chapter 1 in: K. J. Ani (ed.), Political Economy of Colonial Relations and Crisis of Contemporary African Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0245-3_1 The original version of the Chapter 1 was inadvertently published with an incorrect author name ‘Nelson, OA.G.’ instead of ‘Obah-Akpowoghaha, G. N.’, which has now been corrected. The correction to the chapter has been updated with the changes.

The updated original version of this chapter can be found at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0245-3_1 © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. J. Ani (ed.), Political Economy of Colonial Relations and Crisis of Contemporary African Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0245-3_19

C1

Index

A Aba Women Riot, 32, 152 Abidjan, 19, 60 Africa Continental Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA), 238 African diaspora, 237, 238 African Union (AU), 110, 167–169, 203, 227, 237, 238, 240, 264, 281, 282, 284–287 Afro-centrism, 109–111 agricultural revolution, 29 Anti-Migration Protest, 196 Artisans and Labourers Union, 21 Aswan Dam, 171

B Bakassi Peninsular (BP), 118, 208–211, 214–220 Bakeries, 19 balance of power, 4 Berlin West African Conference, 6 Boko-Haram, 96

breweries, 19 British administration, 8 Buganda Agreement, 9

C capital accumulation, 43 capitalism, 14, 228 Capitalist economy, 2 China, 36, 129, 141, 154, 190, 235, 255–266, 268–273, 282 China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), 258, 260, 266 Chinese-African relations, 257 civilization, 2, 45, 278, 279 Coalition against Xenophobia (CAX), 197 Coal Mines Strike of 1949, 21 cobalt, 4 cocoa, 4, 19, 49, 50, 185, 230 Colliery Workers Unions, 21 colonialism, 1–5, 14, 20, 28, 30–33, 37, 48, 59, 67, 110, 115, 193,

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. J. Ani (ed.), Political Economy of Colonial Relations and Crisis of Contemporary African Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0245-3

289

290

INDEX

203, 208, 209, 215, 230, 231, 259, 279, 280 colonies, 3–7, 10, 14, 16, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 48–50, 57, 60, 61, 110, 113, 114, 156, 193, 230, 231, 282 Common External Tariff (CET), 61, 62, 66, 139 Commonwealth, 7, 120, 124, 246, 247, 282 Communaute Economique De l’Afrique De L’ouest (C.E.A.O.), 56, 57, 59–67 communication, 7–9, 18, 43, 62, 72, 155, 196, 201, 216, 229, 262 cooper, 4 Cooperative Framework Agreements (CFA), 58, 66, 163, 168, 170–172 corruption, 95, 96, 99, 100, 103, 133–135, 137, 144, 184, 193, 217, 233, 247, 248 crime, 194, 196, 200, 201, 204, 249, 250, 252 customs, 8, 56, 57, 59–62, 64, 268

64, 66, 67, 110, 112, 119, 121, 123, 139, 203, 284 economic gain, 3 economic hardship, 21, 175, 233, 236 empire building, 2 epidemics, 116, 175 European imperialism, 1 European owned mines, 18 European Union (EU), 34, 65, 165, 168, 169, 190 F FIFA, 247, 248, 251 Flour milling, 19 forced labour, 17, 22, 23, 176, 230 foreign policy, 109–113, 115–117, 121–123, 125, 258, 266, 267, 278, 281, 283 foreign power, 30 foreign trade, 41, 44, 51, 52 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAD), 282 Fulani herdsmen, 96, 97, 100 fundamental human right, 175

D Dahomey, 16, 19, 32, 114 Dakar, 10, 19, 51, 230 dependency, 36, 96, 121, 170, 228, 229, 231, 234, 237, 287 diamonds, 4, 220, 269 diplomacy, 117, 122, 173, 257, 258, 270, 277, 278, 280–288 direct foreign investments, 201 drought, 116, 165, 175

G globalization, 28, 34–36, 51, 112, 255 gold, 4, 9, 13, 21, 24, 41, 42, 47, 50, 85, 153, 196, 207, 220, 230, 246, 247, 250 Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam (GERD), 163–173 Great depression, 21, 22, 74 Great Lakes region, 282 Green Tree Agreement, 119 Guinea Bissau, 16, 19, 22

E Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 56,

H Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs), 281

INDEX

I Idomas, 77 Igala, 77 Igbo, 51, 71–79, 81–87, 176, 179–183, 185, 230, 247 indirect rule policy, 7, 8 industrial process, 13, 16–18, 24 Industrial Revolution, 1, 3, 5, 15, 27–35, 37, 43, 45, 47, 127 institutions, 8, 56, 57, 63, 67, 121, 144, 145, 183, 186, 250, 251, 256, 283 International Court of Justice (ICJ), 32, 119, 209 International Labour Organization, 16 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 132, 193, 232 international system, 33, 34, 36, 110, 111, 256, 272, 284, 287 interstate relations, 109 iron, 4, 9, 17, 43, 129–132, 139, 142, 144 Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP), 233 ivory, 4, 13, 16, 19, 41, 48, 51, 58–60, 63, 190, 230, 280 K Katanga, 4 King Leopold, 10, 58 L labour, 5, 15–18, 20–24, 28, 29, 42, 43, 45, 50, 73, 128, 176, 193, 203, 226–232, 234–237, 239, 262, 268, 270, 272 labour market, 23, 120 labour migration, 226–232, 234, 236, 238–240 labour movement, 14, 15, 21, 24, 229

291

labour unions, 14–16, 20, 268 Lagos Plan of Action for Economic Development of Africa, 283 Lake Chad Basin, 116, 208 League of Nations, 16, 117 leather and hides industries, 19 legitimate trade, 45, 47–49, 51 liquor, 41, 50 Livingstone, David, 2 M Mano River Union (MRU), 56 mass unemployment, 5 Mediterranean Sea, 22, 176 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 91, 103 Mongo Park, 2 mores, 8 multinational cooperation, 228 N national prestige, 2, 3, 5 natural disasters, 175, 177 neo-colonialism, 228 New Industrialised Economies (NIEs), 143 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 283, 287 Niger, 17, 18, 46, 49, 59, 63, 78, 97, 100, 115, 178, 233, 279 Nigeria Civil War, 32, 114, 130, 211 Nigeria Football Federation (NFF), 247, 248 Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), 170, 172 Northern Nigeria railway line, 18 O oil, 4, 19, 32, 46, 47, 49–51, 81, 87, 97, 98, 120, 121, 129, 139, 185, 207, 208, 210, 212, 214, 220,

292

INDEX

248, 252, 261, 262, 264, 265, 269 Old Calabar Kingdom, 208 Organisation of African Unity (OAU), 110, 111, 116, 208, 237, 280, 283 organized labour, 14, 15 P palm produce, 41, 47, 185 pan-Africanism, 282 pineapple canneries, 19 Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO), 142–145 poverty, 91–97, 99, 101–104, 122, 124, 173, 175, 178, 182, 185, 186, 197, 198, 202, 203, 217, 232, 233, 236, 250, 260, 263, 269, 271 power, 3–7, 14, 16, 24, 30, 31, 44, 49, 51, 66, 114, 116, 125, 130, 134, 154, 157, 160, 164, 170, 171, 208, 218, 219, 230, 263, 265, 268, 270, 272, 279–284, 286 pre-colonial African economy, 16 Preferential Trade Area (P.T.A.), 56 Public Works Department, 21 R raw materials, 2–4, 8, 15, 17, 29, 45, 49, 64, 82, 128, 133, 138–140, 142, 213, 214, 257 Regional Cooperation Tax (R.C.T), 62, 63 Regional Economic Cooperations (RECs), 226, 239 River Niger, 2 River Zambezi, 2 Rofisque, 10 rubber cotton, 4

S Second World War, 8, 17, 18, 20, 22, 56, 74, 84, 279 Security, 4, 22, 51, 73, 109, 112–115, 118, 166, 167, 169, 173, 179, 195, 200, 202, 203, 230, 233, 236, 249, 265, 269, 270, 285 Senegal, 10, 16, 18, 19, 48, 49, 51, 57–60, 63, 280 Sierra Leone Railway Workers Union, 24 slaves, 5, 10, 31, 32, 41–45, 51, 160, 230, 231 Southern African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), 199 sport, 245–252 St Lois, 10 Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), 129, 132, 133, 232, 233 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 91 T taxation, 18, 23, 230 The Gambia Native Defence Union, 24 The Nigerian Union of Mechanics, 24 timber, 19, 41, 47, 48, 50 Togo, 16, 49, 58, 119, 280 Trade Union Act Ordinance of 1938, 20 traditions, 8, 64, 76, 81, 101 transport cost, 8 Trans-Saharan Slave, 230 U unification of Germany, 4 Union Douaniere des Etats de L’Afrique de L’Ouest (UDEAO), 57, 58, 60, 67

INDEX

293

Union Douaniere Et Economique De l’Afrique Centrale (U.D.E.A.C.), 56 United African Company (UAC), 76, 79–81 United Nations (UN), 23, 34, 118, 119, 122, 165, 170, 210, 236, 263, 264, 284–286 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 177–179 United States (US), 35, 36, 129, 130, 135, 138, 165, 166, 204, 235, 256, 269, 280 UN Security Council (UNSC), 166, 168, 263 Upper Volta, 16

war, 18–20, 31, 32, 34, 37, 42, 46, 81, 118, 123, 136, 151–154, 156–160, 175, 177, 178, 183, 185, 193, 217, 219, 231, 233, 259, 262, 278, 281, 283 water diplomacy, 163–165, 170, 172 West African Cocoa Research Institute (W.A.C.R.I), 57 West African Currency Board (WACB), 9, 57 West African merchants, 6 western education, 2, 279 World Bank (WB), 91, 95, 132, 166, 193, 232, 281 World War 1, 16, 19 World War II, 19, 152–154, 156, 159, 160

V violence, 100, 103, 175, 178, 184, 185, 192, 194–196, 198, 199, 201, 233, 264, 287 Von Bismarck, Otto, 2, 6

X xenophobia, 120, 189–192, 194, 196–199, 203, 239

W waged labour, 15, 16

Y Yoruba, 31, 46, 77, 83–85, 230