Political and Economic Liberalization in Mexico: At a Critical Juncture? 9781685856410

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Political and Economic Liberalization in Mexico

Political and Economic Liberalization in Mexico At a Critical Juncture? edited by Riordan Roett

Lynne Rienner Publishers

•

Boulder & London

Published in the United States of America in 1993 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers. Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London W C 2 E 8LU © 1 9 9 3 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Political and e c o n o m i c liberalization in Mexico : at a critical juncture? / edited by Riordan Roett p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1 - 5 5 5 8 7 - 3 8 2 - 0 (alk. paper) 1. Mexico—Politics and g o v e r n m e n t — 1 9 8 8 - 2. M e x i c o — E c o n o m i c p o l i c y — 1 9 7 0 - I. Roett, Riordan, 1 9 3 8 JLI211.P58 1993 972.0835—dc20 92-38414 CIP

British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available f r o m the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America T h e paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for P e r m a n e n c e of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

Contents

vu

List of Illustrations Preface, Anne McKinney Acknowledgments List of Acronyms

1

IX XI

Xlll

At the Crossroads: Liberalization in Mexico Riordan Roett P A R T 1 T H E RELATIONSHIP B E T W E E N POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION IN MEXICO

2

3 4 5

Political Liberalization: The Last Key to Economic Modernization in Mexico? Roderic Ai Camp

17

Economic Reform and Political Change in Mexico Luis Rubio

35

Mexico's Second Revolution: Pathways to Liberalization M. Delal Baer

51

Power, Value, and Distribution in the NAFTA Clark IV. Reynolds

69

PART 2 6

PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL C H A N G E

Is Mexico Headed Toward Its Fifth Crisis? Miguel Basähez v

95

CONTENTS

vi

7 8

The Inevitability of Democracy in Mexico Sergio Aguayo Quezada

117

Mexican Democracy: You Can't Get There from Here Michael Coppedge

127

PART 3 9

THE PERSPECTIVES OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES

Political and Economic Reform in Mexico: The PAN Perspective Luis H. Alvarez.

143

10 The False Hopes of the Economic Reform Cuauhtemoc Cardenas Solorzano

149

11 Why the PRI Won the 1991 Elections Luis Donaldo Colosio

155

PART 4

CONCLUSION

12 The Dynamics of Change in Mexico Riordan Roett

About the Contributors Index About the Book

169

175 177 185

Illustrations

Tables 6.1

Fifty Years of C h a n g e in Mexico, 1 9 4 0 - 1 9 9 0

6.2

Opinions on the Reprivatization of the Mexican Banking S y s t e m A m o n g Different S e g m e n t s of the Mexican Population, 1990

100

Opinions on the Proposed Free Trade Agreement with the United States A m o n g Different Segments of the Mexican Population, S e p t e m b e r 1991

102

O p i n i o n s on the Statement " T h e G o v e r n m e n t Should Be M o r e O p e n to the Public" A m o n g Different S e g m e n t s of the M e x i c a n Population, 1990

104

6.3

6.4

6.5

6.6

6.7

6.8

11.1

97

Opinions on the Statement "Political R e f o r m Is H a p p e n i n g T o o F a s t " A m o n g Different Segments of the M e x i c a n Population, 1990

105

Political Party Preferences A m o n g Different S e g m e n t s of the M e x i c a n Population, 1991

107

Percentage of Survey Respondents Characterizing T h e m s e l v e s as Political Radicals, Moderates, or Conservatives, Thirteen Countries, 1990

108

O p i n i o n s on the Likelihood of a Revolution in M e x i c o A m o n g D i f f e r e n t S e g m e n t s of the Population, 1989

109

Results of the 1991 Federal Elections

162

VII

viii

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figures 5.1

Average Productivity in M e x i c o by Sector, 1985

77

5.2

Average Productivity in M e x i c o by Region, 1985

78

5.3

Voting for the PRI in the 1988 Presidential Election by Region

82

Average Productivity in Metropolitan Mexico City by Sector, 1985

83

Metropolitan M e x i c o City Voting, 1988 Presidential Elections

84

Voting for the PRI in M e x i c o ' s 1988 Presidential and 1991 Senatorial Elections

86

Composition of the Mexican Chamber of Deputies Following the 1988 and 1991 Elections

87

5.4

5.5

5.6

5.7

6.1

Trends in Mexicans' Preferences of Political Parties, 1982-1991

107

11.1

Voting for the PRI, 1 9 7 9 - 1 9 9 1

163

11.2

Electoral Participation, 1979-1991

163

Preface Anne McKinney

The economic restructuring undertaken during the administrations of Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado and Carlos Salinas de Gortari has elicited renewed debate about the relationship between economic and political processes and the nature of economic and political development in Mexico. That the economic reforms in Mexico have been dramatic is unquestioned; the controversy arises over their relationship to the political process and the shape and magnitude of political liberalization in Mexico. Together these issues form the framework for the varied speculations on the future course of Mexican politics that are developed in this collection of essays by eight Mexican and U.S. scholars. To broaden the academic debate, the leaders of the three most prominent political parties in Mexico today— the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the National Action Party (PAN), and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD)—also share their perspectives on the country's political and economic liberalization. To set the stage, Riordan Roett provides an overview of the economic, political, and social changes under way in Mexico. In Part 1, the authors approach these changes with diverse perspectives on the relationship between political and economic liberalization. Roderic Ai Camp, Luis Rubio, and M. Delal Baer hypothesize about the consequences of economic liberalization for the political system and consider whether further political change is necessary for the successful completion of Mexico's economic modernization program. Adjoining the debate, in the international realm, are questions concerning M e x i c o ' s response to a new relationship with the United States and to the rapidly transforming global economy. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has been portrayed in many quarters as a key to consolidating economic reform in Mexico and as an example of how Mexican-U.S. relations are adapting to the trends toward regional integration. Clark W. Reynolds concludes Part 1 by evaluating the significance of the NAFTA for Mexico's economic and political future. In Part 2, the discussion centers more on the political system and

IX

X

PREFACE

p r o s p e c t s for M e x i c o ' s f u t u r e . T h e authors return to one of the u n d e r l y i n g t h e m e s of Part 1 — t h e role of societal values in the p r o c e s s of c h a n g e in M e x i c o . M i g u e l Basáñez provides a detailed examination of changing values in M e x i c a n society with a review of recent surveys of M e x i c a n s ' views on e c o n o m i c and political liberalization. Sergio A g u a y o Q u e z a d a identifies the variables that may m a k e a political t r a n s f o r m a t i o n inevitable, and Michael C o p p e d g e e n u m e r a t e s the obstacles that may i m p e d e or delay any dramatic c h a n g e in M e x i c a n politics. In Part 3, L u i s H. A l v a r e z (of t h e P A N ) , C u a u h t é m o c C á r d e n a s S o l o r z a n o (of the P R D ) , and Luis D o n a l d o Colosio (of the PRI) present their u n i q u e perspectives, as leaders of their respective political parties, on the current political and e c o n o m i c situation in M e x i c o and share their insight into their respective parties' roles in M e x i c o ' s future. T h e book closes with Riordan R o e t t ' s examination of two d e v e l o p m e n t s in late 1992 that point to the complexity and flux of the d y n a m i c s of change in M e x i c o . Political and Economic Liberalization in Mexico is the third in a c o n t i n u i n g s e r i e s of b o o k s e d i t e d by t h e P r o g r a m on U . S . - M e x i c a n Relations. T h e p r o g r a m has been operating since 1986 at the Paul H. Nitze S c h o o l of A d v a n c e d I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s ( S A I S ) at the J o h n s H o p k i n s University with the support of the W i l l i a m and Flora Hewlett F o u n d a t i o n . Its p r i m a r y goal is to bring together scholars and p o l i c y m a k e r s to foster a better u n d e r s t a n d i n g of relations b e t w e e n M e x i c o and the United States. T o w a r d this end, this and the previous v o l u m e s in the s e r i e s — M e x i c o and the United States: Managing the Relationship and Mexico's External Relations in the 1990s—have b e e n p u b l i s h e d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y in both c o u n t r i e s and h a v e been d e s i g n e d to reach a w i d e a u d i e n c e of scholars, students, policymakers, and the general public. Anne McKinney Coordinator, S A I S P r o g r a m on U . S . - M e x i c a n Relations

Acknowledgments

I w o u l d like to e x p r e s s my a p p r e c i a t i o n to the several i n d i v i d u a l s and institutions w h o took part in the creation of this edited v o l u m e . First and foremost, i m m e n s e gratitude is due to Clint Smith and the William and Flora H e w l e t t F o u n d a t i o n f o r their s u p p o r t of t h e P r o g r a m on U . S . - M e x i c a n R e l a t i o n s at the S c h o o l of A d v a n c e d International S t u d i e s of the J o h n s H o p k i n s U n i v e r s i t y . T h i s b o o k is a p r o d u c t of their c o m m i t m e n t to strengthening the study of relations between M e x i c o and the United States. M y s i n c e r e t h a n k s g o to my f e l l o w a u t h o r s f o r j o i n i n g m e in this e n d e a v o r to e x a m i n e the m a n y facets of e c o n o m i c liberalization and the p r o c e s s of political c h a n g e in M e x i c o . I w o u l d like to t h a n k W e n d y C a m p b e l l and Patricia F o r s y t h e for their superb editing work, which greatly r e f i n e d the style of the m a n u s c r i p t ; Rita A. C l a r k - G o l l u b , the translator of several chapters for the English edition; and Bertha R u i z de la C o n c h a , the t r a n s l a t o r of t h e S p a n i s h e d i t i o n . In p a r t i c u l a r , this b o o k r e f l e c t s t h e dedication and hard work of Sergio A g u a y o Q u e z a d a and A n n e M c K i n n e y , w h o very ably m a n a g e d all aspects of the publication process in M e x i c o and W a s h i n g t o n , D.C., respectively.

Riordan Roett

xi

Acronyms

ACUDE ADESE ANCIFEM CNDH CNOP COFIPE CONASUPO COPADE COPARMEX COPLAMAR DEA DF DFS EC FC FDN GATT GDP IFE NAFTA NGO PAN PECE

Agreement for Democracy Democratic Assembly for Real Suffrage National W o m e n ' s Civic Association National Commission on Human Rights National Confederation of Popular Organizations Federal Code of Electoral Institutions and Procedures National Commission on Popular Subsistence Council for Democracy Employers' Confederation of the Mexican Republic Federal Coordination of the National Plan for Depressed Zones and Marginal Groups Drug Enforcement Administration Federal District Federal Security Bureau European Community Cardenista Front National Democratic Front General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade gross domestic product Federal Electoral Institute North American Free Trade Agreement nongovernmental organization National Action Party Pact for Stability and Economic Growth (renamed Pact for Stability, Competitiveness and Employment in October

1992) PIDER PNR PRD PRI

Integral Program for Rural Development National Revolutionary Party Party of the Democratic Revolution Institutional Revolutionary Party

xiii

xiv

PRM Pronasol PSE SNTE

ACRONYMS Party of the Mexican Revolution National Solidarity Program Pact for Economic Solidarity National Union of Education Workers

At the Crossroads: Liberalization in Mexico Riordan

Roett

The conventional wisdom about Mexico in the 1970s was relatively simple. First, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was a stagnant and immobilized bureaucratic machine that was determined to cling to power at any cost. Second, economic liberalization was highly unlikely given the power of the public- and private-sector interests that benefited from the traditional model. Third, political change was almost impossible because of the first two components of the conventional wisdom. The party was either unwilling or unable to undertake structural change in Mexican society. Even if one faction within the national leadership favored political or economic change, the established interests that stood to gain the most from the prevailing system would succeed in exercising their well-recognized, if illdefined, veto power. The conventional wisdom shifted only slightly during the administration of President Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado (1982-1988). Although de la Madrid was viewed as a more sympathetic figure than his two predecessors, Luis Echeverria and José Lopez Portillo, both of whom had fled Los Pinos (the presidential offices in Mexico City) in disgrace, he was an unlikely figure to upset the delicate balances of power within the ruling elite. Indeed, it was during the de la Madrid years that Mexico faced the massive earthquake of September 1985, the lengthy economic recession that coupled scant investment with the flight of domestic capital, and the dubious honor of being identified as the d e v e l o p i n g country that had initiated the debt crisis (in August 1982, with the a n n o u n c e m e n t that M e x i c o could no longer service its outstanding loans). But, at the same time, de la Madrid was taking the first policy initiatives that would be viewed by many at the end of his administration as revolutionary. C o m m e n t i n g in the m i d - 1 9 8 0 s on the probability of political liberalization in Mexico, Wayne Cornelius wrote:

1

2

RIORDAN ROETT

F e w i n f o r m e d o b s e r v e r s b e l i e v e that the p r o s p e c t s for a t h o r o u g h internal reform and m o d e r n i z a t i o n of the P R I — e v e n for strategic, c o m p e t i t i v e p u r p o s e s — a r e very high. But w h i l e there is little belief in the capacity of the PRI to reform itself, there is e v e n less c o n f i d e n c e in the ability of the present ruling group to reach a n e w a c c o m m o d a t i o n with opposition forces. . . . From our present vantage point, it is hard to e s c a p e the c o n c l u s i o n that the p o l i t i c a l l i b e r a l i z a t i o n p r o c e s s in M e x i c o — a t least as w e h a v e k n o w n it during the last ten y e a r s — h a s reached a dead end. 1

Views on economic reform were not much more optimistic. One school of thought relegated the Mexican economy to a permanent position of subordination to global forces. Subscribers to this dependencia hypothesis, which was often invoked in the 1970s and 1980s, saw little hope for autonomous economic decisionmaking by Mexico. One study, which focused on the country's automobile industry, asserted: T h e political e c o n o m y of M e x i c o has been continually shaped by its d e p e n d e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p s with the w o r l d capitalist s y s t e m , and the M e x i c a n a u t o m o b i l e industry by its dependent relationships with the world auto industry. T h e s e c o m p l e x structures delimited the alternatives and shaped the interests of the actors and their p o w e r to c h o o s e a m o n g them.2

Those hoping for e c o n o m i c liberalization had little to shore up their faith. Even if there were forces for change in the Mexican economy, the global system and the power of transnational corporations would severely restrict the ability of the Mexican state to initiate reforms. In addition, it was widely believed that the Mexican bourgeoisie and business elites were fully capable of overriding any new development goals of the state. M e x i c o ' s industrialization policy of import substitution, which was highly protected by the government, had generated an inbred, uncompetitive, and influential business class whose interests were best protected by opposing economic and financial innovation. But as Luis Rubio observed: T h e private sector must undergo a monumental transformation. Private industry has to adjust to a world e n v i r o n m e n t w h e r e c o z y a g r e e m e n t s a m o n g c o m p e t i t o r s d o not work, where a g o v e r n m e n t can d o little to s a v e a firm, and w h e r e profitability is based on high v o l u m e and l o w margins, rather than the reverse. A b o v e all, to c o m p e t e internationally or, at least, to produce on a scale at w h i c h it will be c o m p e t i t i v e in the world market, the private sector will have to specialize in a f e w select industrial sectors rather than to operate in all sectors of a protected economy.3

LIBERALIZATION IN MEXICO

3

The Chance to Change: Economic Liberalization The conventional wisdom seemed to be validated in 1987 when the PRI selected Carlos Salinas de Gortari as the next president of Mexico. An apparently nondescript bureaucrat, well educated, from a traditional political family, and one of de la Madrid's chief technocrats, Salinas appeared ill prepared for or little interested in dramatic change. The national electoral campaign of 1988 confirmed that image. Running hard against the candidate of the Left, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solorzano, Salinas barely won the July 1988 election, receiving only 51 percent of the votes. Cárdenas officially received 30.7 percent, but there were widespread rumors that he actually carried the election and lost only to ballot guarantees lent by the PRI machinery. Following his inauguration in December 1988, Salinas would abruptly challenge the received wisdom. Suddenly, he was everywhere doing everything. The economy was obviously the new president's highest priority. He announced that Mexico's foreign debt would need to be dealt with at the international level sooner rather than later. Corruption would be met head-on. Economic and financial innovation would become commonplace, and eschewing decades of Mexican antipathy toward the United States, Salinas announced his interest in negotiating a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States. Mexico's economic future was clearly to be linked to that of its neighbors in the north—the United States and Canada. These sea changes in Mexican policy did not occur in a vacuum. The global context, economically and politically, was shifting rapidly at the end of the 1980s. Salinas and his team, international by training and increasingly by experience, recognized the need for adapting an old Mexico to the new realities. Their task was made immeasurably easier, first off, with the election of George Bush as U.S. president in November 1988. Contrary to the conventional wisdom in the United States, the new Republican administration was not the same as the old one. Throughout the Reagan years the United States and Mexico had been at loggerheads over foreign policy and macroeconomic issues. Washington had viewed Mexico City as unsympathetic, even openly hostile, to its war against communism in Central America. Before Bush's inauguration in January 1989, drug trafficking and immigration had been issues of "high politics" and great animosity between the two states. U.S. officials accused their Mexican counterparts of, at best, ignoring the growing infiltration of drugs and, at worst, allowing members of the security apparatus to participate in and cover up illegal drug running. Migration northward created friction on both sides of the border. While Mexican newspapers were decrying violations of Mexican

4

RIORDAN ROETT

w o r k e r s ' h u m a n rights in the U.S. S o u t h w e s t , m a n y U.S. pundits rued the c o n t i n u i n g influx of poor M e x i c a n s , w h o would surely, they alleged, burden the tax system and the already overloaded social infrastructure. At the end of the R e a g a n years W a s h i n g t o n w a s also d o m i n a t e d by h a n d w r i n g i n g in n u m e r o u s policy a n a l y s e s and s e m i n a r s o v e r political instability in M e x i c o — r e a l or potential. T h e impact on the United States c o u l d only be n e g a t i v e . M u c h t i m e w a s s p e n t a r g u i n g a b o u t policy alternatives, m a n y of which verged on deliberate interference in M e x i c o ' s internal a f f a i r s . " T h i n g s can only get w o r s e , " w a s the c o n s e n s u s , and f e w observers predicted that the election of Carlos Salinas in 1988 would change the course of events. C o n v e n t i o n a l w i s d o m was w r o n g again. Bush and Salinas established a s t r o n g r e l a t i o n s h i p even b e f o r e their r e s p e c t i v e i n a u g u r a t i o n s . It quickly b e c a m e clear that the W h i t e H o u s e placed a high priority on its relations with Los Pinos. As significant, President Bush and Secretary of State James B a k e r d e c i d e d on a d r a m a t i c r e d e f i n i t i o n of U.S. policy t o w a r d Central A m e r i c a . T h e y struck a deal with the D e m o c r a t i c majority in C o n g r e s s to terminate U.S. support f o r the Nicaraguan contras and to endorse direct and f r e e e l e c t i o n s in that c o u n t r y . In addition, the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n c o m m i t t e d itself to s u p p o r t i n g a p e a c e f u l , negotiated s e t t l e m e n t of the civil w a r in El S a l v a d o r . Both w e r e h i s t o r i c d e c i s i o n s , and both were u l t i m a t e l y successful. T h e s e p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s w o u l d not o n l y f o s t e r S a l i n a s ' s m a s s i v e redirection of M e x i c o ' s e c o n o m y but also ease the way for his reorientation of M e x i c a n foreign policy. T h e M e x i c a n people could not begin to share S a l i n a s ' s interest in the N A F T A if they still feared and mistrusted the United States. But the s u b s t a n c e and tone of B u s h ' s policy would protect Salinas f r o m the criticism of nationalists and foster a n e w view of the United States as a s p r i n g b o a r d to o p p o r t u n i t y instead of an imperialist threat. S a l i n a s finally may have o v e r c o m e the lament of Porfirio Diaz, president at the time of the Revolution: " P o o r M e x i c o ! So close to the United States, so far f r o m God!" T o g e t h e r with political c h a n g e s e l s e w h e r e in the world, these shifts in U . S . policy a l l o w e d S a l i n a s both to r e d e f i n e the internal e c o n o m i c and f i n a n c i a l strategy of the M e x i c a n state and, as a necessary c o r o l l a r y , to a b a n d o n the outdated attitudes underlying M e x i c o ' s international relations. M e x i c o s o u g h t n e w allies and b r o a d e n e d t h e s c o p e of its i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . 4 W e s t e r n E u r o p e , Latin A m e r i c a , and A s i a all b e c a m e h i g h e r priorities for Mexico, and there was no longer the morbid preoccupation with the United States in Mexican debates over international relations. M o r e specifically, the d i s a p p e a r a n c e of the revolutionary L e f t in Latin A m e r i c a (with the exception of Fidel Castro) and the restoration of civilian r e g i m e s t h r o u g h direct elections represented a s e c o n d set of key external c h a n g e s that influenced M e x i c a n s ' view of the world. M e x i c o ' s support f o r

LIBERALIZATION IN MEXICO

5

i n s u r g e n t m o v e m e n t s in L a t i n A m e r i c a had b e e n an irritant to W a s h i n g t o n , as h a d its v o c a l o p p o s i t i o n to b u r e a u c r a t i c - a u t h o r i t a r i a n g o v e r n m e n t s in t h e h e m i s p h e r e . W i t h the c o l l a p s e of the S o v i e t U n i o n and w o r l d c o m m u n i s m in 1 9 8 9 - 1 9 9 0 , t h e L e f t in L a t i n A m e r i c a s h r a n k d r a m a t i c a l l y . A s c i v i l i a n g o v e r n m e n t s w e r e r e s t o r e d , a n d the B u s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s i g n a l e d its s u p p o r t for d e m o c r a c y , M e x i c a n - U . S . relations i m p r o v e d . A third i m p o r t a n t set of f a c t o r s s u p p o r t i n g c h a n g e w a s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s in t h e global e c o n o m y . S a l i n a s and his e c o n o m i c a d v i s o r s u n d e r s t o o d that the M e x i c a n e c o n o m i c m o d e l w a s u n c o m p e t i t i v e . T h e r u l e s of t h e g a m e w e r e c h a n g i n g r a p i d l y . T o attract f o r e i g n capital, d i v e r s i f y the e x p o r t b a s e , e x p a n d m a r k e t o p p o r t u n i t i e s , and c a p i t a l i z e on the n e w t e c h n o l o g i e s a v a i l a b l e w o u l d require a p r o f o u n d restructuring of the national e c o n o m y . T h e r e v o l u t i o n in t h e M e x i c a n e c o n o m y t h a t h a d b e g u n d u r i n g t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of M i g u e l de la M a d r i d e x p l o d e d in the first three y e a r s of the Salinas government. The foreign debt was successfully renegotiated within the c o n t e x t of the s o - c a l l e d B r a d y initiative, p r o m u l g a t e d by U . S . S e c r e t a r y of t h e T r e a s u r y N i c h o l a s B r a d y . E c o n o m i c l i b e r a l i z a t i o n and p r i v a t i z a t i o n w e r e s p e a r h e a d e d by t h e M e x i c a n state, u r g e d on by a n e w g e n e r a t i o n of b u s i n e s s o w n e r s a n x i o u s t o c o m p e t e — a n d to s e e t h e s i z e of t h e state considerably reduced. A f o u r t h s o u r c e of c h a n g e in t h e e c o n o m i c r e a l m w a s t h e that Salinas a s s e m b l e d

in

team

1988. It is s i m p l y t h e m o s t c o m p e t e n t

and

i n n o v a t i v e in the A m e r i c a s . L e d by F i n a n c e M i n i s t e r P e d r o A s p e A r m e l l a , w h o in e a r l y 1992 w a s a l s o g i v e n r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r b u d g e t a n d p l a n n i n g , Mexico's developing

macroeconomic countries.

s t r a t e g y h a s b e e n t h e e n v y of m a n y

Salinas,

Aspe,

and

a host

of

other

other

foreign-

trained, y o u n g decisionmakers remade the Mexican economic model and d r a g g e d t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e e l e m e n t s in M e x i c o ' s p r i v a t e s e c t o r a l o n g w i t h them. D e r e g u l a t i o n b e c a m e a k e y t h e m e of t h e S a l i n a s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . F o r e i g n capital returned, new investments flowed into the country, and Salinas s u c c e e d e d in n e g o t i a t i n g a social pact ( f o r m a l l y t e r m e d t h e P a c t f o r Stability a n d E c o n o m i c G r o w t h , or P E C E ) in D e c e m b e r 1988 a m o n g t h e g o v e r n m e n t , labor, and t h e private sector. It p r o v i d e s a broad f r a m e w o r k f o r d i s c u s s i n g and d e t e r m i n i n g w a g e a n d p r i c e levels a n d g e n e r a l e c o n o m i c g o a l s . In O c t o b e r 1 9 9 2 t h e p a c t w a s e x t e n d e d f o r t h e s e v e n t h t i m e to D e c e m b e r

1993.

( A l t h o u g h still r e f e r r e d to as t h e P E C E , t h e pact w a s r e n a m e d t h e P a c t f o r Stability, Competitiveness and Employment.) B y t h e e n d of 1991 M e x i c o ' s i n f l a t i o n had p l u m m e t e d to 18.8 p e r c e n t , t h e l o w e s t a n n u a l rate in thirteen years. M o r e o v e r , foreign investment in the Mexico stock market reached a record $19.05 billion in 1991, an increase of 348 per cent from 1990, according to the M e x i c a n stock market authorities. The very steep rise in foreign investment reflected the Mexican stock market's 118 percent increase in

6

RIORDAN ROETT dollar terms last year; 17 international equity offers by Mexican companies which initially raised over $3 bn—of which Telmex [the privatized national telephone company] accounted for $2.2 bn; and new investment in existing shares of around $6 bn.5

Indeed, as of early 1992 there was little deviation from the common theme: Salinas and his economic team were transforming the Mexican economy. Mexico was an economic success—with a great deal left to accomplish, of course—and few observers doubted that the changes were permanent. The integration of Mexico into a North American market was well under way; the country's exports were competitive; the exchange rate policy was "correct"; and new investment flows comfortably covered the current account deficit. Although the success of Salinas's economic and financial pragmatism can be acknowledged, the question for the remainder of his administration is whether the government's accomplishments in the economic arena will be matched by changes in the structure of politics—and whether one will depend upon the other. The new debate, very different from the general pessimism of the 1980s, now f o c u s e s on the political c o m p o n e n t of M e x i c o ' s modernization. The country has demonstrated that it can rise to the demands of global economic interdependence. It has come to terms with the United States and decades of nationalistic resistance to close ties with its northern neighbor. The Mexican regime has introduced a new pragmatism in its foreign relations, due in part to changed attitudes in Washington and in part to transformations in other regions of the world. What is not clear in the early 1990s is whether the country's political system can keep pace—or needs to—with the other megachanges that have taken place both internally and externally.

The Chance to Change: Politics, Too? The emphasis on economic modernization was relatively easy to understand in the late 1980s. As we have seen, important global trends m a d e it imperative that Mexico adopt a policy of economic and financial realism. Changes in the international system, and in the U.S. government, facilitated the moves toward pragmatism in both economic affairs and foreign policy, which were complementary. But do those movements also require political change? By the end of Salinas's first year in office there were some signs of a shift in the conventional wisdom. The Economist found: Those who called Mexico's President Carlos Salinas de Gortari a dry little man when he was elected last year, and suspected he was not up to the job, did him an injustice. Mr. Salinas has transformed the style of

LIBERALIZATION IN MEXICO

7

the M e x i c a n presidency, and has made a start on the e v e n harder task of c l e a n i n g up the l o n g - r u l i n g Institutional R e v o l u t i o n a r y Party (PRI), which has rigged Mexican elections for decades. . . . . . . under Mr. S a l i n a s ' s g u i d a n c e , the PRI n o w a l l o w s the opposition to win s o m e state and local e l e c t i o n s . 6

H o w e v e r , the s h i f t w a s barely p e r c e p t i b l e to others. J o r g e C a s t a ñ e d a c o m m e n t e d gloomily on the early years of the Salinas government: T h e r e is no w i d e s p r e a d , a c t i v e , and e x p l i c i t c l a m o r f o r the d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n of the c o u n t r y . M o s t M e x i c a n s w o u l d p r e f e r d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n , and a s i g n i f i c a n t number of M e x i c a n s reject the e x i s t i n g political s y s t e m , but there is not a t r e m e n d o u s a m o u n t of p r e s s u r e d e m a n d i n g the creation of a n e w p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m . . . . S o m e t h i n g n e w is n e e d e d but n o t h i n g n e w is e m e r g i n g , and the p r o b l e m s arising from this contradictory situation are more and more severe. On the o n e hand, both electoral c o m p e t i t i o n and i n s t a n c e s and perceptions of electoral fraud are increasing; on the other hand, the rates of a b s t e n t i o n and non-participation in e l e c t i o n s are a l s o g r o w i n g dramatically. P e o p l e are voting in a different w a y , but they are also v o t i n g less and less. T h e implications of this for the democratization process are unclear. 7

A s the chapters in this volume demonstrate, opinions vary widely o v e r h o w c o m m i t t e d Salinas and his team are to political liberalization and h o w m u c h liberalization is taking place. T h i s a u t h o r ' s best g u e s s is that the c o n v e n t i o n a l w i s d o m is off the mark once again. W h i l e there may not be a T h o m a s J e f f e r s o n or John L o c k e inhabiting L o s P i n o s on a daily basis, Salinas and his leadership group are, if nothing else, realists and pragmatists. At a m o m e n t when the world is moving toward democratic, civilian regimes, can M e x i c o afford to lag very far behind? E v e n g i v e n its c o m m i t m e n t to the N o r t h A m e r i c a n c o n c e p t , t h e M e x i c a n r e g i m e is certainly well aware that many of its citizens criticize the N A F T A , as well as closer ties to the United States in general and M e x i c o ' s lack of d e m o c r a c y , violation of human rights, and dysfunctional judiciary. T o c o m p l e t e the overall modernization process, s o m e significant adaptations of t h e p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m will be r e q u i r e d . T h e y m a y not c o m p l y w i t h W e s t m i n s t e r i a n models of d e m o c r a c y , but they will provide the opportunity f o r a continuing evolution. S a l i n a s ' s strategic decision at the b e g i n n i n g of his six-year term w a s p r o b a b l y correct: Put the e c o n o m i c h o u s e in order and all good things will f o l l o w . T h e first three years w e r e a w h i r l w i n d of structural c h a n g e and i n n o v a t i v e e c o n o m i c and f i n a n c i a l p o l i c y . L a r g e l y u n n o t i c e d o u t s i d e of M e x i c o , it w a s also a period in w h i c h s i g n i f i c a n t social and political e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n took place. In 1992 the outlines of f u t u r e political c h a n g e are only barely discernible, but they are there.

RIORDAN ROETT

8

Social

Reform

One significant experiment in the social sphere was the channeling of extensive financial resources into the National Solidarity Program (Pronasol). Pronasol, which carries federal funds for local infrastructure and service projects to the village level, has begun to create a form of prosperity at the grass roots where none previously existed. It is a way of getting funds into the local communities without creating a huge bureaucracy or being totally beholden to the l o c a l — a n d reactionary—PRI machinery and is not threatening to the new economic imperatives—which has won for it the tacit support of the business community. When Pronasol was announced, it was promptly denounced by critics as little more than another pork-barrel program to win elections. Of course, that is a time-honored practice in democratic and nondemocratic regimes alike, and it is difficult to fault the Salinas team for seeking to strengthen its political position locally with an eye toward the next round of elections. However, something more than Pronasol would have been needed to begin to convince the skeptics. Electoral

Reform

Elections have always been the crux of the argument that the PRI will never allow democratization. In critical midterm elections for Congress and some governorships in August 1991, the PRI received 61.5 percent of the national vote. The main opposition groups did very poorly, with none receiving more than 18 percent of the ballots. Although it was widely admitted that these elections were probably the most honest in Mexico's history, there were two exceptions. Most observers viewed the PRI victories in the states of San Luis Potosi and Guanajuato as fraudulent. Unduly dedicated local candidates and the party machinery were alleged to have ignored the legalities of the election process. Salinas knew that he had a problem within days after the elections. The international press had picked up the story. Influential academic and media commentators were beginning to use the San Luis Potosi and Guanajuato outcomes as a litmus test of the administration's commitment to even gradual democratization. With Eastern Europe and other Latin American countries holding election after election, the vast majority of which were considered honest and well run, the Mexican president had to act. Given Mexico's new profile and prominence in the United States, particularly in political circles in Washington, D.C., he understood that even a hint of a rollback in political reform would impinge on the delicate negotiations for the NAFTA. It would reinforce the civil liberties and human rights lobbies in the United States and elsewhere and provide a convenient excuse to oppose the N A F T A — e v e n if the opponents actually cared little about democratic procedures in Mexico.

LIBERALIZATION IN MEXICO

9

Within w e e k s the t w o PRI governors were out, temporary replacements a c c e p t a b l e to the opposition were in, and new elections were to take place within eighteen m o n t h s . Opposition candidates were expected to take both governorships.

Land

Reform

T h e next set of political signals was issued when President Salinas presented his State of the Nation speech to C o n g r e s s on N o v e m b e r 1, 1991. In one of the most dramatic decisions taken since the Revolution itself, the president a n n o u n c e d a n e w land r e f o r m p o l i c y . T h e s y s t e m of ejidos (small c o m m u n i t y - h e l d f a r m properties) would be r e f o r m e d to give the m e m b e r s rights more like those of private ownership, including the security of tenure, the ability to sell their land to other ejidatarios (although not to outsiders, to prevent speculation and fraud), and the right to enter into joint ventures with the private sector. S i n c e ejidatarios still occupy more than half of all land u n d e r cultivation in M e x i c o , even if the land is of m a r g i n a l quality, the decision w a s historic. T h e r e were many reasons to address the issue of land tenure as embodied in the e j i d o system. T h e inefficiency of the system had b e c o m e a stumbling block to agricultural c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s — a necessary ingredient in M e x i c a n participation in the N A F T A . On the other hand, the g o v e r n m e n t did not want to destroy the basic c o n t o u r s of the system, which remains one of the pillars of rural social organization. N o w ejidatarios will find it easier to m o d e r n i z e their agricultural practices and b e c o m e more competitive. They will also be less d e p e n d e n t on the g o v e r n m e n t f o r financial inputs. Units of landholding should grow in size, b e c o m i n g more efficient and productive—and profitable. F u r t h e r m o r e , over time, the influence of the regressive local PRI bosses will be s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i m i n i s h e d , giving S a l i n a s and his t e a m m o r e r o o m to m a n e u v e r in local politics.

New Signals in Education,

Church-State

Relations, and Justice

T h e r e are a n u m b e r of o t h e r signals that societal m o d e r n i z a t i o n is m o v i n g ahead. In late 1991 President Salinas a n n o u n c e d d r a m a t i c c h a n g e s in public education. Henceforth, the role of trade unions would be sharply reduced, with a p p o i n t m e n t s within schools to be m a d e directly by education ministry officials without recourse to the teachers' unions. D e c i s i o n m a k i n g in education w o u l d be shifted to the m o d e r n i z e d education ministry, m a k i n g it increasingly difficult for the national teachers' union, the National Union of E d u c a tion W o r k e r s ( S N T E ) , to control a p p o i n t m e n t s . T o g u a r a n t e e that the ref o r m s m o v e forward, Salinas transferred a close collaborator, Ernesto Zedillo P o n c e de Leon, to the education ministry in January 1992. (Zedillo had been budget minister during the first three years of the Salinas government.)

RIORDAN ROETT

10

Other recent political innovations have been as impressive in indicating new a p p r o a c h e s to old problems. Salinas announced in N o v e m b e r 1991 federal recognition of the legal status of the R o m a n Catholic church. The church may also be given a formal role in education and may be allowed to own property once again. The decision on legal status is an astute one, in that it builds bridges to the influential conservative elements in Mexican society, particularly in the most modernized states in the north and within the National Action Party ( P A N ) , long identified with the church and with pragmatic economic and financial policies. In the arena of criminal justice, the administration appears to be taking a harder line on drug trafficking. In December 1991 the National Commission on H u m a n Rights ( C N D H ) , which was established by Salinas, decided that a senior army general carried m a j o r responsibility in the killings of seven M e x i c a n narcotics a g e n t s by M e x i c a n soldiers. T h e c o m m i s s i o n also r e c o m m e n d e d that two generals, three lower-ranking officers, and fourteen soldiers be investigated by military tribunals under charges of violating both military discipline and federal law in connection with the case. A few days before the decision was announced, President Salinas, at a presentation of the c o m m i s s i o n ' s annual report, promised " f i r m action against those who, having responsibility to c o m b a t drug trafficking, s o m e t i m e s forget their responsibility and instead of fighting it, assist it in noxious activity." 8 Although the c o m m i s s i o n ' s decision has been well received, observers both in and outside of M e x i c o agree that the regime is fighting an uphill battle. Care must be taken in the g o v e r n m e n t ' s relations with the military establishment. The drug trafficking problem is an explosive one in M e x i c o ' s dealings with the United States, and the human rights issue goes far beyond the drug mafia in Mexican society. Salinas needs to consider the wide range of reactions his e f f o r t s to reinforce the c o m m i s s i o n ' s work are likely to engender. Of course, that work should and must be done, but the pace and balance of the effort are crucial, given the other important political changes that are now being sown in the country.

Interpreting

the Signals

Political change in M e x i c o has proven to be a far more delicate process than e c o n o m i c liberalization. This statement is meant neither to c o n d o n e the current political system nor to look for excuses to p o s t p o n e continued o p e n i n g of that system. It is merely to point out that there are multiple stakes and multiple stakeholders at play in Mexico in the 1990s. T h e economic and financial modernization is in place. It is difficult to imagine a return to the state-dominant model that prevailed in the 1960s and 1970s. Not only d o global trends f a v o r the e c o n o m i c r e f o r m s , but no significant opposition force seems to have an alternative plan that would appeal to the reforming business community or the middle class, especially

LIBERALIZATION IN M E X I C O

11

given the stability of the peso, the recent drops in inflation, and the benefits being held out of a market-oriented economy. Societal change is under way. The northern states contiguous with the United States already share in the North American concept. They are Mexican but they move socially and economically in a broader, still-emerging, North American community. Central and southern Mexico are moving in that direction, but at slower rates of change. The reform of the land tenure system, the recognition of the Roman Catholic church—always popular in rural and northern Mexico—the educational reforms, and the comprehensive Pronasol all attest to the efforts of the government to move on the societal front. The first intimations of structural political change are appearing. They must. It is foolhardy to introduce massive economic and financial liberalization, foster the integration of the economy into North America and the new global marketplace, and begin the modernization of Mexican society while ignoring political change. At issue is how far Salinas will be able to carry electoral reform in the remaining years of his administration. Local and party pressures obviously exist to maintain the status quo. The president demonstrated that he will not do so, as in the case of the elections in San Luis Potosi and Guanajuato, when it will reflect poorly on his overall reform strategy. Other local election results, in early 1992, have gone in favor of opposition parties, and although there is not yet a firm trend, it would appear that there has been significant recognition of the need for ballot box honesty. The medium-term expectation among Salinas's group, it appears, is that a modernized and efficient PRI will remain the principal party in Mexico with room for one or two others to make reasonable electoral gains. Much of what Salinas hopes to do may well be the responsibility of his successor. The next president will be able to consolidate the economic and financial innovations, move the societal changes forward, and deepen political reform and change. It is this author's view that the current leadership of the PRI sees an eighteen-year (three sexenios) sequence of events ending the twentieth century. President Miguel de la Madrid's six-year term of office was devoted to laying out the grand strategy, identifying the key players, and introducing basic macroeconomic reforms. President Carlos Salinas's responsibility has been rapidly implementing the economic and financial strategy, initiating societal modernization, and sending up the first signals of political liberalization. His successor, who surely will come from within the current leadership team (which assembled under de la Madrid in the early 1980s), will understand his own role in this evolutionary process. Poorly noted, President Salinas has had political change on his agenda since his inauguration. He championed the successful July 1990 passage in Congress of a new national electoral law, known as the Federal Code of Electoral Institutions and Procedures (COFIPE). The new law has made feasible such reforms as the creation of a nonpartisan Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) to oversee elections and the multiparty Federal Electoral

12

R I O R D A N ROETT

Tribunal to settle election disputes. Salinas has supervised the creation of a new voter registration list, the issuing of new voter credentials, and multiparty observation of polling booths on election day. T h e s e are only a b e g i n n i n g — b u t a beginning the president himself initiated and continues to support—and Salinas has promised to introduce further electoral reform. Again, the critical question is how far the regime will go. There were important state-level elections in 1992, and the president surely has begun to consider the candidates to succeed him in December 1994. His decisions now will h a v e an i m p a c t on the s u c c e s s i o n and on the next steps in democratization. Just as the early underpinnings of economic and financial reform in the mid-1980s were not perceptible to many observers, the modest beginnings in the political arena need to be recognized and placed in context.

Conclusion There is no guarantee that Mexico will liberalize politically in the 1990s, but there is s o m e indication that the intention to do so exists. E c o n o m i c and financial change is well under way. Societal innovation has begun. Political adaptation surely will follow, but it will do so within the context of Mexican history. Social and political engineering is far more complex and tentative than the mechanics of markets and economic structures. All those who call for rapid political evolution in M e x i c o need only c o n t e m p l a t e a series of political missteps by Salinas and his colleagues, which could result in political instability, to understand the need for caution. Is Mexican politics at a crossroads? The answer is yes, but change will proceed through various turning points, not just one. All in all, C a r l o s Salinas has had his priorities right since 1988. The e c o n o m i c and financial t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of M e x i c o has placed the nation in a highly c o m p e t i t i v e position. It has allowed the president to initiate some redistribution of wealth and to recreate the Mexican middle class, which was almost destroyed in the early 1980s. Salinas has now undertaken renovation of rural Mexico and the last outposts of the original revolutionary c o m p r o m i s e s of the 1920s and 1930s—the ejido system, the church, and education. Only labor remains, and it is highly probable that the political role and function of the unions will be addressed in the next year or two. Together these internal changes are more likely to p r o m o t e c o n t i n u e d political liberalization than a r e a c t i o n a r y retrenchment. T h e M e x i c a n g o v e r n m e n t ' s policies thus far h a v e proven to be increasingly popular. In the August 1991 elections, not only did the PRI take more than 6 0 percent of the vote, but the level of abstentions d r o p p e d significantly. T h e opposition parties, touted just three years earlier as the w a v e of the future, did very poorly and have all but disappeared at the national level. Pronasol has won new support in the rural areas. Conservative

LIBERALIZATION IN M E X I C O

13

s o c i a l f o r c e s , l o n g a l i e n a t e d by t h e P R I , h a v e b e e n c o u r t e d w i t h d e c i s i o n s r e g a r d i n g t h e R o m a n C a t h o l i c c h u r c h and e d u c a t i o n . All of this p r o v i d e s s u b s t a n t i v e s u p p o r t f o r t h e a r g u m e n t that structural political c h a n g e will take p l a c e in t h e 1 9 9 0 s a n d that it will b o t h r e i n f o r c e a n d b e r e i n f o r c e d by t h e e c o n o m i c c h a n g e s and societal i n n o v a t i o n s n o w t a k i n g p l a c e in M e x i c o . T h e s u c c e s s of the c o m b i n e d r e f o r m p r o g r a m s h a s e n o r m o u s s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r N o r t h A m e r i c a , a n d to a lesser d e g r e e C e n t r a l A m e r i c a and other a r e a s of the hemisphere. M e x i c o f a c e s c o n t i n u e d c h a l l e n g e s in t h e 1990s, and n o n e is g r e a t e r than the pace and speed

of p o l i t i c a l c h a n g e — t h e c u l m i n a t i o n

of t h e

new

r e v o l u t i o n that b e g a n in 1982 with the i n a u g u r a t i o n of M i g u e l d e la M a d r i d . P r e s i d e n t S a l i n a s s u m m a r i z e d his strategy b r i e f l y in his State of the N a t i o n s p e e c h on N o v e m b e r 1, 1991: " T h e goal is to g u a r a n t e e e c o n o m i c viability a n d political stability in a b r o a d c l i m a t e of f r e e d o m s as an i n d i s p e n s a b l e c o n d i t i o n f o r an u n d e r t a k i n g of m a j o r i m p o r t a n c e : the m a s s integration of the p o p u l a t i o n into the a c t i v e e c o n o m i c and political life of t h e n a t i o n . " 9

Notes 1. Wayne A. Cornelius, "Political Liberalization in an Authoritarian Regime: Mexico, 1976-1985," in Mexican Politics in Transition, ed. Judith Gentleman (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987), 34-35. 2. Douglas Bennett and Kenneth E. Sharpe, Transnational Corporations Versus the State: The Political Economy of the Mexican Auto Industry (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), 4 - 5 . 3. Luis Rubio, "The Changing Role of the Private Sector," in Mexico in Transition: Implications for U.S. Policy, ed. Susan Kaufman Purcell (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988), 41. 4. For a variety of scenarios of Mexico's foreign relations in the 1990s, see Mexico's External Relations in the 1990s, ed. Riordan Roett (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991). 5. Damian Fräser, "Foreign Holdings in Mexico Hit Record," Financial Times (London), January 9, 1992, p. 16. 6. "Mexico: Not Bad at All," Economist, December 16, 1989, p. 44. 7. Jorge G. C a s t a ñ e d a , "The Choices Facing M e x i c o , " in Mexico in Transition, 24-25. 8. Tim Golden, "Mexican Panel Faults Army in Death of Drug Agents," New York Times, December 7, 1991, p. 3. 9. "Mexico on the Record," vol. 1, no. 1 (December 1991), Press Office of the President of Mexico.

— PART 1 — The Relationship Between Political and Economic Liberalization in Mexico

Political Liberalization: The Last Key to Economic Modernization in Mexico? Roderic A i Camp Twenty-eight years ago, on a cold, dark, rainy night, I arrived at Amsterdam 52, Colonia Hipodromo, in the heart of Mexico City, at the door of Matilde Alducin, descendant of a Porfirian family forced by economic circumstances to take in boarders. My clothes still damp from my trip, I met with Señorita Alducin in a darkened parlor, settling back into a well-worn, overstuffed chair, the upholstery absorbing the moisture. She explained the terms of my lodging, and I paid her in traveler's checks for the first month. When she asked if I would like a receipt, I replied, without hesitation, that her "palabra de honor" was sufficient. The act of placing my trust in Señorita Alducin marked the beginning of a respectful friendship that lasted until her death many years later. My show of confidence in her spoken contract, my trust in a stranger, was a treasured key, one which, I will argue, also opens doors to both political and economic modernization. Without it, only some cylinders in the lock click open, and liberalization remains forever tantalizing behind closed gates.

The Compatibility of Economic and Political Liberalization in Mexico: An Overview A principal concern raised by many observers of recent developments in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is the compatibility of political and economic liberalization, a question given even greater weight by the August 19, 1991, attempted coup against Mikhail Gorbachev, reformer par excellence. Analysts, journalists, scholars, and government officials offer in essence two questions on the subject: Is political liberalization necessary for successful economic modernization, and by implication, what are the essential ingredients in economic modernization? 1 Gabriel Almond has identified four potential relationships at play: capitalism supports democracy, capitalism subverts d e m o c r a c y , democracy subverts capitalism, and

17

18

RODERIC Al CAMP

d e m o c r a c y fosters c a p i t a l i s m . 2 T h o s e who see a critical linkage b e t w e e n e c o n o m i c and political modernization include among their arguments that a culture of d e m o c r a c y p r o m o t e s competitiveness, and competitiveness is a crucial ingredient in the recipe of modern capitalism. Furthermore, for M e x i c o , starved of domestic capital for more than a decade, foreign investment is essential to economic development. T h i s too has its relationship to political modernization. Since the ascent of political liberalization in the late 1980s (although the anti-Gorbachev c o u p and subsequent political disintegration of the Soviet Union may cast a g l o o m y blanket over world democratic dreams), many observers have noted that U.S. investors are increasingly tying their choices to political conditions, o n e of which has now b e c o m e democracy in addition to stability. 3 A secondary but critical adjunct to that interpretation is that democracy is essential to longterm stability. Naturally, contrarians counter that political democratization, paced alongside economic change, itself produces instability. 4 For M e x i c o the key a c t o r in i n t e g r a t i n g t h e s e d e v e l o p m e n t a l philosophies, or proving t h e m incompatible, is President Carlos Salinas, architect of the c o u n t r y ' s radical economic reforms since 1988, building on the more incremental policies of his predecessor, Miguel de la M a d r i d . Salinas, often questioned about the intensity of his commitment to political reform, has argued: Freedoms of what you call the glasnost kind have existed for decades in Mexico. What hasn't existed is the freedom of productive activity, because the government owned so many enterprises. So, actually, we have been more rapidly transforming the economic structure while striving along many paths of reform on the political side. But, let me tell you something. When you are introducing such a strong economic reform, you must make sure that you build the political consensus around it. If you are at the same time introducing additional drastic political reform, you may end up with no reform at all. And w e want to have reform, not a disintegrated country. 5

Salinas thus m a k e s clear his own philosophy. Although he is e x t r e m e l y sensitive to charges that his political reforms are slow or merely rhetorical, he contends they must take a second seat to economic policy changes while he builds support for a new breed of Mexican capitalism. S a l i n a s ' s motivation for pursuing this strategy, d e p e n d i n g on o n e ' s perspective, is either visionary, realistic, or merely self-serving. Critics argue that Salinas and his technocratic advisors are less than true b e l i e v e r s in political r e f o r m i s m , wanting only to perfect a strategy, both political and economic, for maintaining themselves in power. Of course, few leaders exist w h o , as did those portrayed in John F. K e n n e d y ' s Profiles in Courage, willingly c o m m i t political suicide for the well-being of their state. W e can only speculate about S a l i n a s ' s motivations, but we can examine concretely

POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION

19

his p o l i c y c o m m i t m e n t s . H e has g o n e on record as saying, "I b e l i e v e that what p e o p l e demand first and above all is to have a better standard of living in an e n v i r o n m e n t o f liberty and f r e e d o m . T h o s e g o together. A n d I am c o n v i n c e d that as w e m o v e along the path toward consolidating our e c o n o m i c reforms, political reform will continue to e v o l v e in M e x i c o . " 6 Thus stated, S a l i n a s ' s v i e w posits political modernization not as essential to e c o n o m i c development, but rather as a consequence

of e c o n o m i c liberalization.

President S a l i n a s is an astute observer of his citizens, and of human b e i n g s in general. T w e n t y years of studying the literature on d e v e l o p i n g countries, and w i t n e s s i n g the winds of political c h a n g e in the United States, indicate to this author the precedence of e c o n o m i c conditions over an ideal m o d e l of political liberty. T h e greater the e c o n o m i c inequality and the lower the standard of living, the more important is e c o n o m i c growth than political liberty to the a v e r a g e citizen. U . S . citizens, w h o enjoy a c o m p a r a t i v e l y a f f l u e n t standard o f living, o f t e n fail to s e e that, w h i l e they take it for granted, for others political liberty may be a luxury. E c o n o m i c issues should be f o r e m o s t a m o n g the political concerns of the average citizen in M e x i c o , w h e r e from 1981 to 1987, just b e f o r e S a l i n a s ' s election, one out of four M e x i c a n f a m i l i e s c h a n g e d their s o c i o e c o n o m i c status in a radical w a y , descending to the next class b e l o w . 7 In fact, in a 1 9 9 0 survey of the issues M e x i c a n s considered most critical for the c o m i n g d e c a d e , nearly six out o f ten respondents ranked e c o n o m i c g r o w t h most important, w h e r e a s only one in four ranked greater political participation as significant. T h i s is not to suggest, h o w e v e r , that greater political participation w a s unimportant, s i n c e it w a s the s e c o n d

most

important issue a m o n g the respondents. 8 Nevertheless, it is not o b v i o u s that most

Mexicans

establish

a connection

electorally

between

political

participation and e c o n o m i c growth, and this is a f u n d a m e n t a l point in a s s e s s i n g the interrelationship between e c o n o m i c and political liberalization. R e c e n t election results suggest that voters do not c o n n e c t the possibility of bringing about rapid e c o n o m i c growth beneficial to their o w n interests with c h o o s i n g a n e w political leadership, an alternative that can be a c c o m p l i s h e d only through more participation. Indeed, many M e x i c a n s s e e m to be in agreement with Salinas's personal philosophy

that e c o n o m i c

growth

is

more

important

than

political

participation. T h e y appear implicitly to subscribe to S a l i n a s ' s explanation that rapid political reform produces instability, a real fear in the e y e s of many M e x i c a n s . W h e n survey respondents were given four c h o i c e s as to the most important issues in the country, they ranked c o m b a t i n g inflation first and m a i n t a i n i n g order s e c o n d , f o l l o w e d by liberty of e x p r e s s i o n and m o r e participation. 9 Perhaps having s w a l l o w e d the Salinas party line, increasingly evident in PRI c a m p a i g n tactics, many M e x i c a n s s e e m e d predisposed to the idea that the opposition approach, notably in Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas's Party o f the Democratic Revolution (PRD), signified disorder.

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RODERIC Al CAMP

Economic Modernization: Some Theoretical Brushstrokes A plethora of literature exists on the never-ending a r g u m e n t over the causes of e c o n o m i c growth and m o d e m i z a t i o n - c u m - c a p i t a l i s m in the Third W o r l d . Simply put, the two main theoretical explanations for slow d e v e l o p m e n t are structural and cultural. A third e x p l a n a t o r y variable, generally s u b s u m e d under the second, can be labeled psychological. T h e structural e x p l a n a t i o n f o r slow e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t relies on t h e o r i e s p r o p o s i n g that m o s t d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s , as f o r m e r c o l o n i e s , remain dependent on the industrialized world, a relationship that works to the d i s a d v a n t a g e of the f o r m e r c o l o n y . T h e n u m b e r of t h e s e d e p e n d e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p s , and their a d v a n t a g e s and d i s a d v a n t a g e s f o r the d e v e l o p i n g nations, have been well d o c u m e n t e d . 1 0 On the issue of linkages to political d e v e l o p m e n t , the structural e x p l a n a t i o n — o r dependency t h e o r y — h a s less to o f f e r than d o e s the c u l t u r a l or p s y c h o l o g i c a l theory. N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e important linkage b e t w e e n the two e x p l a n a t i o n s is that the g o v e r n m e n t s of d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s , w h i c h are p r e d o m i n a t e l y a u t h o r i t a r i a n , c o u l d be r e p l a c e d w i t h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s m o r e r e s p o n s i v e to the m a s s e s . It m i g h t follow, therefore, that g o v e r n m e n t s elected within a genuinely c o m p e t i t i v e d e m o c r a t i c political context would o f f e r a leadership capable of eliminating the w o r s t a b u s e s of e c o n o m i c and political d e p e n d e n c y , thus b r i n g i n g g r e a t e r b e n e f i t s to the o r d i n a r y citizen. Political l i b e r a l i z a t i o n f r o m a structural, nationalistic point of view does imply significant i n f l u e n c e s on the kind of capitalism the country pursues, and on beneficiaries of e c o n o m i c reform. T h e Mexican case exhibits some features of economic d e p e n d e n c y in the d e v e l o p i n g w o r l d , e s p e c i a l l y given its p r o x i m i t y to and d o m i n a n t t r a d e relations with the United States. Moreover, the shared boundary b e t w e e n the leading international e c o n o m y and a d e v e l o p i n g e c o n o m y has e x a g g e r a t e d certain psychological tendencies within M e x i c o ' s private sector. O n e of these attitudes, a m o n g at least s o m e business o w n e r s , is an inferiority c o m p l e x when measuring their productive processes against those of the United States. A s D i l m u s J a m e s noted in his study of M e x i c a n t e c h n o l o g y , e v e n w h e n M e x i c a n p r o d u c e r s use techniques superior to those of a U.S. c o u n t e r p a r t , they b e l i e v e their b u s i n e s s is i n f e r i o r . " N o t a b l e e x c e p t i o n s d o o c c u r , h o w e v e r . In o n e of t h e f e w e x a m p l e s a n y w h e r e of a d e v e l o p i n g - w o r l d corporation taking over an industrialized-world company, the Monterrey giant Vitro recently bought out A r m o r Glass, the second-largest glass p r o d u c e r in the United States. 1 2 T h e structural aspects of e c o n o m i c interdependency have produced other interesting, and equally understudied, psychological consequences. O n e of the m o s t i n t e r e s t i n g in t h e c a s e of M e x i c o is the impact of m u l t i n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n s on M e x i c a n s ' p r o d u c t i v e p s y c h o l o g y , and on their political

POLITICAL

LIBERALIZATION

21

loyalty. James Dull discovered, for example, "that for most of the [Mexican] executives, the needs, goals, and welfare of the firms often take precedence over national policy and that the managers will promote corporate objectives through direct challenges to or through manipulation of national law and p o l i c y . " 1 3 He also concluded that numerous Mexicans affiliated with multinational corporations regarded national economic practices and values as inferior to those of foreigners. It is reasonable to argue, therefore, that the internationalization of Mexico's economy is likely to lead to increasingly favorable appraisals of those economic values and processes that the industrialized economies are selling to the developing and socialist countries as a panacea for their economic woes. On the positive side, given the goal of an efficient, competitive, capitalist economy, is a predisposition toward certain necessary values and techniques, such as a smaller state role or decentralization of decisionmaking. On the negative side is the risk of shifting loyalties away f r o m a native culture to an outside culture, and thinking of oneself as culturally inferior in the transition. A cultural/psychological explanation for economic underdevelopment unrelated to structural causes was suggested three decades ago by David McClelland, who studied the presence of a value he believed essential to successful economic growth and the private sector system: achievement motivation. McClelland concluded that the citizens of the most economically successful countries are more likely to be risk t a k e r s — t o seize an opportunity, to contribute to innovation—than their counterparts in other cultures. Thus, the problem for the other cultures is to increase the proportion of risk takers within their own citizenry. 14 The cultural explanation for economic development has had a long history of adherents from Max Weber to the present, although it was in general disfavor for most of the last twenty years. It provides a more sophisticated, less ethnocentric analysis and some strong arguments that can be closely associated with political development. 1 5 The most sophisticated of the more recent cultural explanations of differences between U.S. and Mexican orientations toward the private sector is Glen D e a l y ' s work, The Public Man,16 Dealy basically argues that people in the United States place much more emphasis on the acquisition of wealth as their primary path to power, whereas Latin Americans focus on the aggregation of friends as their means of acquiring status and prestige. As a result, according to Dealy, the most ambitious Latin Americans are attracted to politics, whereas ambitious people in the United States choose careers in the private sector. Beyond personal motivation, Dealy and others also point to the extent of authoritarian values in both the private and public sectors of Latin America. Authoritarianism promotes paternalism and discourages initiative; it is also

22

RODERIC Al CAMP

difficult to eliminate in a culture. Nevertheless, if e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t is a c c o m p a n i e d by a b r o a d e r distribution of wealth, it may ultimately lead to less a u t h o r i t a r i a n v a l u e s . A s R a f a e l S e g o v i a f o u n d in his s t u d y of M e x i c a n s c h o o l c h i l d r e n , the higher the f a m i l y ' s standard of living, t h e l o w e r t h e d e g r e e of a u t h o r i t a r i a n v a l u e s . 1 7 T h u s , a l t h o u g h r e d u c i n g a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m is not an explicit goal of S a l i n a s ' s p r o g r a m , e c o n o m i c liberalization o v e r the long term may have certain by-products that f o s t e r political reform. Yet another cultural explanation for u n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t is organizational in origin, a d v o c a t e d by such d i v e r s e authors as Arthur L e w i s , R a y m o n d V e r n o n , and Albert O. H i r s c h m a n . T h e y posit a dearth in Latin A m e r i c a of highly d e v e l o p e d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s k i l l s — h u m a n r e s o u r c e s n e c e s s a r y for e c o n o m i c g r o w t h . In fact, several authors, such as Vernon, anticipated t h e l e a d e r s h i p of t h e M e x i c a n t e c h n o c r a t , an e c o n o m i c a l l y t r a i n e d p o l i c y m a k e r s y m b o l i z e d by S a l i n a s and his e c o n o m i c c a b i n e t . 1 8 T h e s e s c h o l a r s also a r g u e for d e c e n t r a l i z i n g d e c i s i o n m a k i n g and giving g r e a t e r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to lower-level m a n a g e m e n t in both the private sector and p u b l i c a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . In C h a p t e r 5 Clark W . R e y n o l d s also a r g u e s that e c o n o m i c i n t e g r a t i o n will lead to d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of e c o n o m i c d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , thus increasing local a u t o n o m y . T h e basic c o n c e r n of all these a u t h o r s is that failing to shift responsibility and initiative to l o w e r levels in the society limits the d e v e l o p m e n t of the skills n e c e s s a r y f o r e c o n o m i c growth. Finally, trust and a sense of mutual responsibility play an essential role in e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t . Although economists often note the importance of p u b l i c c o n f i d e n c e in t h e g o v e r n m e n t , and in b u s i n e s s , f o r g e n e r a t i n g investment and capital, seven out of ten M e x i c a n s surveyed in the late 1980s agreed with the statement that people in g o v e r n m e n t really did not care what h a p p e n e d to people like them. 1 9 T h e issue is, in fact, much more than o n e of c o n f i d e n c e in institutions; the c o n f i d e n c e must e x t e n d to o n e ' s f e l l o w citizens. E d u a r d o A. Elizondo, a former governor of N u e v o Leon with strong ties to the private sector, expresses this well: What we have lost in Mexico is a feeling of solidarity. To me, this is essential for development, but no one cares enough about his neighbor here. Gabriel Khalil, the philosopher, once said something to the effect that if you persecute Christians and I don't worry because I am not a Christian, and if you persecute Jews and I don't worry because I'm not a Jew, and if you persecute Muslims and I don't worry because I am not a Muslim, then eventually you will be persecuted, and no one else will care either. Solidarity is reflected very strongly by the North American consumer, who provides a wonderful example of the importance of this economically. Here, it is everyone for himself. The [Mexican] State uses this attitude, and I believe it actually prefers that this lack of solidarity continue because it can manipulate people who don't share this value. 2 0

POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION

23

Political Modernization: Some Theoretical Brushstrokes What is political modernization? It is difficult to conceptualize, but however it is defined, it incorporates cultural and national biases. As Octavio Paz indicated in his acceptance speech for the 1990 Nobel Prize in literature, modernity is, "first of all, an ambiguous term: there are as many types of modernity as there are societies. Each society has its own. The word's meaning is as uncertain and arbitrary as the name of the period that precedes it." 21 Political modernization, as the singular element in the broader concept of modernity, has taken on a Western, democratic flavor. Critics of this form of modernization have argued it was no coincidence that the preeminence of liberal developmental thought in modernization theory went hand in hand with the expansion of U.S. economic and political power. 22 Conversely, the economic decline of what was the Soviet Union and its former Eastern European bloc has only enhanced the prominence of democratic capitalism since the beginning of the 1990s. Whether we view the sources of democratic liberalism as political or economic, or both, we still have not answered the semantic conundrum of democracy. What exactly does democracy mean? Policymakers' lack of concern for the semantics of democracy has plagued Mexican-U.S. relations specifically and Third World-U.S. relations generally. Even the most detailed recent overview of this subject, that formulated by the Bilateral Commission on the Future of United States-Mexican Relations, failed to come to grips with this issue. As commission member Fernando Canales Clariond indicated in a dissenting note, Mexico and the United States conceive of democracy in different ways. 23 Several authors have tried to wrestle with this problem in the Latin American context. David Llehmann has avoided the pitfall of assuming that the number of elections or elected bodies is the basis of democracy, suggesting instead that open and transparent avenues for citizens to channel their interests are requisite. 24 Terry Lynn Karl, who recently offered one of the most careful comparative analyses, states that democracy requires (1) policy contestation and political competition, (2) participation of the citizenry, (3) accountability of rulers to the ruled through law and representative mechanisms, and (4) civilian control of the military. 25 Although L l e h m a n n ' s and Karl's definitions overcome important weaknesses in many other definitions of democracy as they apply to the Mexican case, their characterizations are largely oriented to structural and process issues and overlook a fundamental component of democracy: respect for the views and rights of others, a quality deeply intertwined with the concept of societal trust. Karl does not, however, completely ignore trust, the importance of which is presented in a more sophisticated way by Almond and Verba's classic study Civic Culture.26 Instead, Karl views a high degree of mutual trust, a willingness to tolerate diversity,

24

RODERIC Al CAMP

and a tradition of accommodation more as products of democracy than as its preconditions. 2 7 In the media, and in the eyes of the U.S. public, the focus tends to be on elections and a vague definition of political liberalism involving individual rights such as f r e e d o m of speech and the press. But in the Latin American context electoral democracy and individual freedoms are not sufficient goals for political modernization because they would be superimposed on societies in which inequality a b o u n d s . This e x p l a i n s why C y n t h i a M c C l i n t o c k found that Peruvians "believe that democracy also means social justice." 2 8 Social injustice and e c o n o m i c inequality contribute u n q u e s t i o n a b l y to interpersonal and ideological intolerance. M e x i c o ' s leadership in fact recognizes that electoral democracy must be built on a foundation of greater social equality. As Salinas himself has said, "Removed from all context of inequality, electoral d e m o c r a c y is easy prey to the most p o w e r f u l in s o c i e t y . " 2 9 T h i s is precisely why electoral d e m o c r a c y could f u n c t i o n relatively smoothly for decades in Chile yet never address the fundamental p r o b l e m s of inequality that actually led to the destruction of that same democratic model in 1973. 3 0 In their excellent survey of secondary studies, Larry Diamond and Juan Linz identify a strong relationship between political culture and political processes. 3 1 Thus, societal values are critical to the actual functioning of a democratic process, which cannot be superimposed successfully on a culture that d o e s not s h a r e c o m p l e m e n t a r y v a l u e s to sustain d e m o c r a c y ' s institutional relationships. Nevertheless, John Booth and Mitchell Seligson have proposed that the authoritarian tradition in Mexican, Costa Rican, and N i c a r a g u a n politics is not a reflection of mass cultural values in those countries, s u g g e s t i n g instead that strong democratic values already are e m b e d d e d in their belief s y s t e m s . 3 2 T h e y d i s c o v e r e d , h o w e v e r , o n e disharmonious note a m o n g the prodemocratic set of values: an intolerance of other political and ideological views. 3 3 M o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e and recent surveys of Mexican values confirm a high level of intolerance toward others holding differing views. 3 4 In his values survey comparing changing social, economic, and political values over the 1980s, Ronald Inglehart discovered an explanatory variable for Mexican intolerance. In 1990, when asked if they had complete trust in their families, M e x i c a n respondents were not much different f r o m North A m e r i c a n s , with 82 p e r c e n t of the M e x i c a n s indicating full trust and respondents f r o m Canada and the United States posting only slightly higher f i g u r e s . H o w e v e r , w h e n asked about the general populace, half of all C a n a d i a n and U.S. r e s p o n d e n t s expressed c o m p l e t e trust in their f e l l o w citizens, but only o n e in three did so in M e x i c o . In 1984, at the time the Booth and Seligson study was done, that figure was closer to o n e in f i v e M e x i c a n s . H o w e v e r , it is important to report a significant positive change in Mexican attitudes toward their fellow citizens. From 1981 to 1990

POLITICAL

LIBERALIZATION

25

C a n a d i a n and U . S . attitudes r e m a i n e d essentially stable, but M e x i c a n s ' levels of trust in their p e e r s g r e w f r o m 18 p e r c e n t to 3 3 p e r c e n t , an 8 3 p e r c e n t increase. 3 5 O n social i s s u e s M e x i c a n s h a v e also b e c o m e i n c r e a s i n g l y m o r e t o l e r a n t in r e c e n t y e a r s . In f a c t , t h e i r t o l e r a n c e of d i f f e r i n g p o s i t i o n s o n

such

c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s s u e s as a b o r t i o n , h o m o s e x u a l i t y , a n d prostitution has r e a c h e d levels s i m i l a r to t h o s e of their c o u n t e r p a r t s in the U n i t e d S t a t e s . 3 6 T h i s trend b o d e s well for f u t u r e political c h a n g e s , but it d o e s not n e c e s s a r i l y s u g g e s t that M e x i c a n levels of tolerance are n o w adequate for a w o r k i n g d e m o c r a c y . O n e last i n g r e d i e n t m i s s i n g f r o m M e x i c o ' s ability to a c h i e v e d e m o c r a c y is h o w M e x i c a n s v i e w t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n d e m o c r a c y and i n e q u a l i t y . F o r m o s t M e x i c a n s , a c h i e v i n g p e r s o n a l liberty is far m o r e i m p o r t a n t than e l i m i n a t i n g social inequality. 3 7 T h e a v e r a g e M e x i c a n e q u a t e s d e m o c r a c y with liberty, not with social e q u a l i t y . T h e a v e r a g e M e x i c a n also a s s o c i a t e s liberty with his o r her o w n rights, b u t not n e c e s s a r i l y with t h e r i g h t s of o t h e r s or o n e ' s o w n o b l i g a t i o n to r e s p e c t o t h e r s ' rights. A s O c t a v i o P a z c o n c l u d e d , M e x i c a n s fail, in t h e private and p u b l i c s p h e r e s , to k n o w and r e c o g n i z e o n e a n o t h e r ' s limits. P a z b e l i e v e s political r e f o r m is i n s e p a r a b l e f r o m intellectual and m o r a l r e f o r m , b u t all t h r e e c a n o c c u r , h e c o n t e n d s , o n l y individual

and

interpersonal

actions,

not

through

anything

through imposed

superficially.38

Linkages B e t w e e n Political a n d E c o n o m i c Liberalization C r i t i c i s m s aside, p l e n t y of e v i d e n c e exists to s u g g e s t a r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n political c u l t u r e , e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t , a n d political m o d e r n i z a t i o n - c u m d e m o c r a c y . R o n a l d I n g l e h a r t , o n t h e b a s i s of his m u l t i c o u n t r y

survey,

c o n c l u d e s u n e q u i v o c a l l y that " p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e is a c r u c i a l link b e t w e e n e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t and d e m o c r a c y . " 3 9 T h e l i n k a g e s b e t w e e n d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n and e c o n o m i c l i b e r a l i z a t i o n a r e c o m p l e x . E v e n m o r e i m p o r t a n t , M e x i c a n society is in a state of f l u x , in both its e c o n o m i c a n d p o l i t i c a l v a l u e s . I n g l e h a r t ' s

1990 survey illustrated a

r e m a r k a b l e d e c l i n e in t h e p r o p o r t i o n of M e x i c a n s w h o s u p p o r t a statist e c o n o m y , d o w n b y half f r o m t h e f i g u r e f o r 1981. E v e n m o r e i m p o r t a n t , s u p p o r t f o r p r i v a t i z a t i o n and e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n is up, n e a r l y to a level f o u n d in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d C a n a d a . M o s t i m p o r t a n t , s u p p o r t f o r m o r e a c t i v e f o r m s of political p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n c r e a s e d in all t h r e e c o u n t r i e s d u r i n g t h e past d e c a d e , but e s p e c i a l l y in M e x i c o . T h e p e r c e n t a g e of M e x i c a n s i n d i c a t i n g a w i l l i n g n e s s to t a k e a d e m o n s t r a t i v e action, such as p a r t i c i p a t i n g in a b o y c o t t , i n c r e a s e d nearly 2 0 0 p e r c e n t in j u s t nine years, and t h e n u m b e r of M e x i c a n s w h o r e p o r t e d a c t u a l l y p a r t i c i p a t i n g in s o m e f o r m of p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n i n c r e a s e d s i x f o l d o v e r t h e past d e c a d e , e x c e e d i n g t h e f i g u r e f o r U . S . respondents

40

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These political changes come at some cost to the present political structure. Many critics would argue, however, that political democracy cannot develop without major alterations in the current political system, particularly in those features of the political system that not only serve as obstacles to democratization but also may stand in the way of economic liberalization. The N A F T A highlights the focus on linkages between political and economic liberalization. 41 Indeed, U.S. critics of the N A F T A tend to center their criticisms on the political differences between Mexico and the United States, and on the lack of U.S.-style democracy in Mexico. Others have suggested that electoral fraud prevents Mexicans from defending their rights, and that M e x i c o ' s lax environmental, health, and safety standards tempt unscrupulous U.S. firms to shift their investments to Mexico. 4 2 Even some strong supporters of free trade have conditioned their approval of any agreement on political reform. An editorial in the Journal of Commerce is typical of the view propounded in many leading U.S. newspapers: M e x i c o ' s history of electoral fraud is a slumbering issue in the current debate over proposed free trade with the United States. . . . President Carlos Salinas de Gortari and his ruling P R I party must act quickly to investigate these allegations, even though local P R I o f f i c i a l s have denied wrongdoing. With a national midterm election scheduled f o r A u g u s t , a w e a k response now will be politically d a m a g i n g f o r M r . Salinas in his own country and in the United States. At the same time, the Bush administration must make it clear that it will pursue free trade only with a country that permits free and fair elections. One of the strongest arguments f o r the proposed trade a g r e e m e n t is the p r o m i s e of political stability in M e x i c o through e c o n o m i c g r o w t h . M r . B u s h should remind M e x i c a n leaders that democracy is the best way to ensure long-term stability.43 (emphasis added)

There seems to be a common assumption, even among some leading M e x i c a n intellectuals, that an open economy, further pressured by the N A F T A , will flower into an open political system. Enrique Krauze avers that a closed political system cannot long survive in an open economy, believing optimistically that once solid economic foundations are achieved, political transition will be only months away. 4 4 What exactly makes Krauze and others believe the two are so tightly linked? According to Luis Rubio, economic reform has already altered the relationships and relative power of various actors in Mexican society. He cites the specific case of labor unions, noting that individual unions have been forced to negotiate with their employers, and that democratic elections within individual unions are on the increase. 4 5 Rubio also notes that tough international competition has forced employers and unions to work together for survival, which suggests a rising level of mutual trust as well.

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Opposition leaders have also linked political liberalization with economic opening, both before and after the N A F T A . On the Left the Cardenistas have strongly criticized the Salinas administration for its tepid commitment to political reform. Cárdenas himself bluntly stated that the a p p a r e n t o p e n i n g of t h e M e x i c a n e c o n o m y t o the rest of t h e w o r l d h a s , in f a c t , r e s u l t e d in t h e M e x i c a n p e o p l e b e i n g shut in b e h i n d a w a l l of p o l i t i c a l i n t o l e r a n c e , h u m a n r i g h t s a b u s e s , e l e c t o r a l f r a u d a n d growing social inequality. . . . The Mexican g o v e r n m e n t ' s free-trade a g e n d a is s i m p l e and n a r r o w : M e x i c o will sell its c h e a p labor in o r d e r to a t t r a c t f o r e i g n c a p i t a l , w h i c h in turn will g u a r a n t e e the s u r v i v a l of o n e of t h e last r e m a i n i n g a u t h o r i t a r i a n political s y s t e m s in L a t i n A m e r i c a . 4 6

To guarantee that economic opening will actually promote rapid political reform, the Cardenistas advocate the inclusion of a social charter, based on common social and labor rights. T h e Mexican Right, represented by the PAN, which in principle supports the N A F T A , links political and economic reform differently. It argues that neither policies of economic liberalization nor the NAFTA will succeed if they are not accompanied by structural political change. P A N ' s president, Luis H. Alvarez, suggests that without the full participation of civil society in the discussion of free trade policies, and access to all information on specific aspects of the N A F T A negotiations, Mexicans cannot make informed decisions about this or any other economic policy. 47

Concluding Thoughts The Mexican case is replete with ironies on the question of the linkage between economic and political liberalization. It is very unlikely that the e c o n o m i c opening of the late 1980s, and the reversal of government economic policies in effect before 1982, would have taken place without the dominant executive leadership, which relied extensively on authoritarian powers. A careful empirical study of the record demonstrates that ever since the presidency of Luis Echeverría ( 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 7 6 ) , congressionally initiated legislation has continued to decline; within the first year of Salinas's administration alone, a mere 9 percent of the federal legislation enacted had its origins in legislators' proposals. 4 8 Indeed, a number of observers of the Mexican political scene since 1988 point to a pattern of rising abuse of executive authority and declining party tolerance of opposition, qualities counterproductive to reforms within the present political structure, and within the culture itself. By mid-1990 the PRD alone claimed to have suffered a total of forty-one political assassinations. Stephen Morris concluded that "new techniques feature greater national control over elections." 4 9 In a point too often overlooked, Salinas abused his executive authority to remove more

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state g o v e r n o r s in the first two years of his administration than in any since that of M i g u e l A l e m á n ( 1 9 4 6 - 1 9 5 2 ) . 5 0 Authoritarian d e c i s i o n m a k i n g not only reflects a lack of c o m m i t m e n t to political r e f o r m , but also m o d e l s a f o r m of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g c o n t r a r y to e c o n o m i c and cultural openness. T h e Mexican private sector, in the past, has had similar p r o b l e m s , especially a m o n g c o r p o r a t e leadership and in many leading private sector interest groups. T h e president is both a p r o m o t e r of centralized authority and its key beneficiary. Salinas, not the s y s t e m itself, acquires support f r o m the electorate through authoritarian d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . T i m e and time again, in poll after poll, M e x i c a n s give much greater support to S a l i n a s than to his party, and similarly to his d e c i s i o n m a k i n g style. A recent statistical analysis of voting behavior and support for the P R I reveals a m a j o r finding: T h e i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e that c l u s t e r s p e r s o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s [of t h e p r e s i d e n t ] was the only statistically significant variable, a n d it w a s s t r o n g l y so. T h a t is, v o t e r s s u p p o r t e d S a l i n a s if they t h o u g h t w e l l of his m o s t p o s i t i v e p e r s o n a l traits. O t h e r v a r i a b l e s , such as his n e g a t i v e p e r s o n a l traits as well as his d e g r e e of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e n e s s and his s t a n c e on issues, m a t t e r e d little. 5 1 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d )

T o d a y , polls suggest that a large m a j o r i t y of M e x i c a n s s u p p o r t the e c o n o m i c policies advocated by President Salinas. They also exhibit greater c o n f i d e n c e in large c o r p o r a t i o n s than in their political institutions. Yet in advocating such e c o n o m i c r e f o r m s while at the same time slowing the actual pace of political liberalization, M e x i c o ' s g o v e r n m e n t introduces the seeds of its own decline. As early as 1970, Barry A m e s discovered that modernization in M e x i c o , c o n c e p t u a l i z e d as rising levels of urbanization, literacy, h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n , and industrialization, was resulting in declining support f o r the P R I . 5 2 In his c o m p r e h e n s i v e examination of variables linked to support f o r the party, Joseph Klesner f o u n d that this trend held for two decades, and that electoral r e f o r m s and e c o n o m i c crises did not alter these voting patterns. 5 3 E c o n o m i c modernization would lead inexorably to the decline of the PRI if truly f r e e elections were permitted. W h e n that might occur is impossible to predict, but if those supporting a free trade agreement are accurate in their a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t its increasing the pace of e c o n o m i c m o d e r n i z a t i o n and g r o w t h in M e x i c o , then that process will o c c u r sooner, not later. A s John Bailey so aptly warns, h o w e v e r , e c o n o m i c growth that does not a f f e c t the distribution of wealth or social inequality is not likely to p r o m o t e political liberalization. E c o n o m i c scarcity and inequality e n c o u r a g e elite-controlled decisionmaking, not increased openness. 5 4 Yet the lack of e c o n o m i c g r o w t h , or the failure of S a l i n a s ' s e c o n o m i c r e f o r m s , m a y not n e c e s s a r i l y a f f e c t M e x i c a n s ' s u p p o r t f o r t h e P R I . D o m í n g u e z and M c C a n n f o u n d to their surprise little connection b e t w e e n e c o n o m i c p e r f o r m a n c e and defection f r o m the PRI. Instead, they discovered

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that "Mexicans were clearly divided in their preferences for presidential candidates; they were also clearly divided in their views on particular issues." However, they found no statistical relationship between citizen perception of specific economic issues and their support for presidential candidates. 55 Perhaps the most significant political variable that could contribute to economic modernization is the attack on state corporatism in Mexico. Salinas has begun a restructuring of the system but not its elimination. This feature perpetuates state paternalism politically, structurally, and culturally, thus serving as a model for society. 5 6 Some observers suggest that Salinas is using Pronasol, a government-financed public works program for the poor at the grass-roots level, to establish a new basis for the PRI or even for a new party altogether, altering the traditional corporatist structure. 57 One of the most interesting developments since 1988 is a greater emphasis on political organizations that rely on individual associations. Since the PRD associates corporatism with authoritarianism, it has sought, as Stephen Morris suggests, "to build a party of individuals, one that has no institutional place for social organizations or movements. This is not only a difficult process, but runs against the grain of political experience and culture in Mexico." 5 8 This explains why the PRD has confronted so many internal problems and difficulties. Although it is too soon to evaluate the party's ability to achieve such a structure, a shift by Mexican political organizations to relying on an individual rather than a corporate basis of membership has broad implications for economic reform. The PRI itself proposed such a reform within the party statutes, but it has never been implemented. Such a change would encourage individual initiative and autonomy, qualities many developmental economists and social scientists consider essential for competitive capitalism. Another feature of political liberalism that might contribute to economic modernization is a serious commitment to human rights. Human rights are integral to the issues of social justice, social equality, respect, and trust. Trust relies in part on respect for the law and the legal process. Salinas himself expresses concern for human rights, having created the C N D H . He claims that the "recommendations of this commission are being followed by the authorities, and sometimes they collide with our efforts in the drug war." 5 9 Yet the record in Mexico is poor, in spite of recommendations from the new human rights commission. According to a recent article in El Financiero Internacional, "The C N D H presented its second activities report, in which it indicated that in 51 cases—2.1 percent of the 1,913 complaints received over the six-month period—the C N D H issued recommendations to the appropriate authorities. Of these 51 recommendations, 17 have been satisfactorily acted upon by these authorities, in the commission's opinion." 6 0 Furthermore, between 1989 and 1990, 20 percent of the complainants alleging human rights abuses were political party activists. Since the legal system itself is responsible for most abuses, economic competitiveness will

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not be f a v o r e d by a s y s t e m protecting the rights of s o m e but not others, especially those w h o dissent f r o m public policies or statements. Equally important, e c o n o m i c growth within a capitalist f r a m e w o r k is a hollow a c h i e v e m e n t without a more favorable distribution of wealth. M e x i c o has failed to a c c o m p l i s h this since the 1960s. Despite long periods of rapid growth, maldistribution is increasing. E c o n o m i c growth that ignores equality will p r o d u c e the social conditions f o u n d in Brazil in recent years. Finally, c e n s o r s h i p is a key issue in political and e c o n o m i c m o d e r n i z a tion. A c c e s s to i n f o r m a t i o n is critical to open e c o n o m i c a n d political d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . 6 1 D e s p i t e high levels of f r e e d o m of speech and relatively open f r e e d o m of the press, M e x i c a n s still s u f f e r constantly f r o m the threat of c e n s o r s h i p . 6 2 As G a b r i e l Zaid e x c l a i m e d , "If I had the ability to c h a n g e things, I w o u l d c h a n g e o n e small condition in M e x i c o , to c r e a t e a truly independent press. This will not happen very quickly, but if it did, it would have tremendously positive results for participation." 6 3 Zaid was referring not j u s t to traditional f o r m s of political participation but to i n v o l v e m e n t in actual d e c i s i o n m a k i n g as well. A free press is a key to decentralization of authority, and decentralization of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g is critical to the e c o n o m i c and political success of M e x i c o ' s reforms. 6 4 It c a n n o t be a r g u e d that political r e f o r m is essential to i m m e d i a t e e c o n o m i c m o d e r n i z a t i o n ; witness S o u t h K o r e a ' s e c o n o m i c and political contrasts (although South Korea is culturally quite d i f f e r e n t f r o m M e x i c o ) . Of course, if e c o n o m i c modernization e n c o m p a s s e s more than high rates of growth and extends to concerns for social justice, equality, and distribution of w e a l t h — a l l interrelated to societal trust—then it would be enhanced by, and ultimately require, political reforms incorporating similar social goals.

Notes 1. For an e x c e l l e n t c o m p r e h e n s i v e bibliography on d e m o c r a c y in Latin America, see Peter Hakim and Abraham Lowenthal, Latin American Democracy in the 1990s: The Challenges Ahead ( Q u e e n s t o w n , Md.: Inter-American D i a l o g u e , A s p e n Institute, 1991). 2. Gabriel A l m o n d , "Capitalism and D e m o c r a c y , " PS, Political Science and Politics 24, no. 3 (September 1991): 4 6 7 - 4 7 3 . 3. T h e s e observations were expressed in numerous editorials f o l l o w i n g the disputed A u g u s t 1991 c o n g r e s s i o n a l and state e l e c t i o n s in M e x i c o . The Wall Street Journal, h i g h l y s u p p o r t i v e o f President S a l i n a s ' s e c o n o m i c r e f o r m s , s p e c i f i c a l l y c a l l e d on him to annul the gubernatorial e l e c t i o n in Guanajuato. Editorial, A u g u s t 2 9 , 1991. 4. A s Judith Gentleman has aptly warned, "Liberalization has c o m e c l o s e to being a panacea for a variety of ills without appropriate empirical and theoretical s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the relationship." In "When T h i n g s D o n ' t Fall Apart . . . : T h e C a s e of M e x i c o in Latin American Studies," in Latin American Studies and the Social Sciences, ed. Jorge Garcia, Gary Hoskin, and A m y Oliver (Buffalo: Council on International S t u d i e s Programs, State University of N e w York at B u f f a l o , 1989), 128.

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5. "A New Hope for the Hemisphere?" Interview with Carlos Salinas, New Perspective Quarterly 8, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 8. 6. Ibid. 7. Enrique Alduncín, Los valores de los mexicanos, México en tiempos de cambio (Mexico City: Fomento Cultural Banamex, 1991), 36. 8. Raw data from the University of Michigan, World Values Survey, 1990, courtesy of Miguel Basáñez, Neil Nevitte, and Ronald Inglehart. 9. Ibid. 10. A useful general account is Paul Harrison's Inside the Third World (New York: Penguin, 1981). 11. Dilmus James, " M e x i c o ' s Recent Science and Technological Planning: An Outsider Economist's Critique," Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 22 (May 1980): 163-193. 12. In August 1991 Vitro joined forces with Corning Glass, putting it into an even more significant position for selling glass products to a larger market. See "Vitro and Corning Joining Forces," El Financiero Internacional (Mexico City), August 19, 1991, p. 3. 13. James Wallace Dull, "Effects of Multinational Corporations in Mexico on the Attitudes of M e x i c a n E x e c u t i v e s " (Ph.D. dissertation, C o l u m b i a University, 1981), 121, 179. 14. David C. McClelland, The Achieving Society (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1961). 15. The best general work on cultural explanations is Lawrence E. Harrison, Underdevelopment Is a State of Mind: The Latin American Case (Lanham, Md.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, and Madison Books, 1985). 16. Glen Dealy, The Public Man: An Interpretation of Latin American and Other Catholic Cultures (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1977). 17. Rafael Segovia, La politización del niño mexicano (Mexico City: El Colegio de Mexico, 1975), 68. 18. Raymond Vernon, The Dilemma of Mexico's Development (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), 123ff. 19. Enrique Alduncín, Los valores de los mexicanos. México: Entre la tradición y la modernidad (Mexico City: Fomento Cultural Banamex, 1986), 12. 20. Personal interview, Monterrey, Mexico, March 5, 1986. 21. New York Times Book Review, June 30, 1991, p. 35. 22. P e t e r F. K l a r é n , " L o s t P r o m i s e : E x p l a i n i n g Latin A m e r i c a n Underdevelopment," in Promise of Development: Theories of Change in Latin America, ed. Peter F. Klarén and Thomas J. Bossert (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), 8. This is one of the clearest presentations of development theory I have encountered in the literature. 23. Bilateral Commission on the Future of U.S.-Mexican Relations, The Challenge of Interdependence: Mexico and the United States (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1989), 237-238. 24. David Llehmann, Democracy and Development in Latin America: Economics, Politics and Religion in the Postwar Period (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), 206. 25. Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," Comparative Politics 23 (October 1990): 2 - 3 . 26. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963). See especially their Civic Culture Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1980). 27. Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization," 3.

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28. Cynthia McClintock, "The Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in a 'Least Likely' Case: Peru," Comparative Politics 22 (January 1989): 141. 29. In John J. Bailey and Leopoldo Gómez, "The PRI and Liberalization in Mexico" (Paper prepared at Georgetown University, Washington, D C., 1989), 18, which cites Salinas's speech in Puebla, Mexico, April 22, 1988. 30. See César Caviedes, The Politics of Chile: A Sociogeographical Assessment (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), 272. 31. Larry Diamond and Juan Linz, "Politics, Society and Democracy in Latin America," in Democracy in Developing Countries: Volume 4, Latin America, ed. Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 10. 32. Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth, "Political Culture and Democratization: Alternate Paths in Nicaragua and Costa Rica" (Paper presented at the 16th International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Washington, D C., April 4 - 6 , 1991). 33. John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, "The Political Culture of Authoritarianism in Mexico," Latin American Research Review 19, no. 1 (1984): 106-124. 34. Enrique Alduncín, Los valores de los mexicanos; and Alberto Hernández Medina and Luis Narro Rodríguez, eds.. Cómo somos los mexicanos (Mexico City: Centro de Estudios Educativos, 1987). 35. Raw data from the World Values Survey, 1990. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. Octavio Paz, "Remache, burocracia y democracia en México," Vuelta 127 (June 1987): 63. 39. Ronald Inglehart, "The Renaissance of Political Culture," American Political Science Review 82 (November 1988): 1219. 40. Raw data from the World Values Survey, 1990. 41. For a discussion of these, see M. Delal Baer, "North American Free Trade," Foreign Affairs 70 (Fall 1991): 143. 42. A n d r e w Reding, "Civil Rights Test T i m e for M e x i c o ' s President Salinas," Christian Science Monitor, August 15, 1991. 43. "Free Trade, Fair Votes," Journal of Commerce, March 19, 1991. 44. Enrique Krauze, "The Historic Dimensions of Free Trade with Mexico," Wall Street Journal, May 24, 1991. 45. Luis Rubio, "Yes, If Mexico Prospers, So Will the U.S.," Washington Post Weekly Edition, May 13-19, 1991, p. 7. 46. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, "Free Trade Is Not Enough," New Perspective Quarterly 8, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 21. 47. Luis Alvarez, "Free Trade Without Free Debate?" New Perspective Quarterly 8, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 22. 48. Estrategias Actuales (Mexico) 3, no. 2 (October 1989): 47. 49. Stephen Morris, "Salinas at the Brink: The Challenge from the Left and Political R e f o r m i s m in M e x i c o " (Paper presented at the 16th International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Washington, D.C., April 4 6, 1991), 17. 50. Roderic Ai C a m p , "Political Modernization in Mexico, T h r o u g h a Looking Glass," in The Evolution of the Mexican Political System, ed. Jaime Rodriguez (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, forthcoming). 51. Jorge I. D o m í n g u e z and James A. M c C a n n , "Whither the PRI?: Explaining Voter Defection from Mexico's Ruling Party in the 1988 Presidential

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E l e c t i o n s " ( P a p e r p r e s e n t e d at the W e s t e r n Political S c i e n c e A s s o c i a t i o n Meeting, San Francisco, March 1991), 2 3 - 2 4 . 52. Barry Ames, "Bases of Support for M e x i c o ' s Dominant Party," American Political Science Review 64, no. 1 (1970): 153-167. 53. J o s e p h Klesner, " M o d e r n i z a t i o n , E c o n o m i c Crisis, and Electoral Realignment in M e x i c o " (Paper presented at the 16th International Congress of the Latin A m e r i c a n Studies Association, Washington, D.C., April 4 - 6 , 1991), 14. Klesner also provides a useful survey of other studies supporting this conclusion. 54. John J. Bailey, "Populism and Regime Liberalization: Mexico in C o m parative P e r s p e c t i v e " (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1991), 8. 55. D o m í n g u e z and McCann, "Whither the PRI?" 16-17. 56. T h e effects of state corporatism on democracy, and the means of eliminating it, are analyzed in Jaime Sánchez Susarrey, "Corporatismo o democracia?" Vuelta ( M e x i c o City) 12, no. 136 (March 1988): 12-19. 57. T h e r e is no question that Pronasol, which had reached over 1,500 municipalities by August 1991, has helped the PRI electorally. For background, see Matt M o f f e t , " M e x i c o ' s Poverty Program Wins Voters' Support," Wall Street Journal, A u g u s t 6, 1991; Roberta Lajous, "The 1991 Elections in M e x i c o , " Examen ( M e x i c o City) 3, no. 27 ( A u g u s t 1991); and S e r g i o S a r m i e n t o , "Solidarity O f f e r s Hope for Votes," El Financiero Internacional (Mexico City), September 30, 1991. 58. Morris, "Salinas at the Brink," 34. 59. "A New Hope for the Hemisphere?" 8. 60. Gabriela Aguilar Martinez, "Prison Releases Key Rights Image Reform," El Financiero Internacional (Mexico City), July 15, 1991, p. 14. 61. See Roderic Ai C a m p , The Role of Economists in Policymaking: A Comparative Study of Mexico and the United States (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1977). 62. See Roderic Ai C a m p , Intellectuals and the State in Twentieth Century Mexico (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), for a chapter on multiple f o r m s of direct and indirect censorship. 63. Personal interview, Mexico City, June 7, 1988. 64. For an excellent overview of the probability of d e m o c r a c y , and the i m p o r t a n c e of decentralization and other issues, see Daniel C. Levy, "Mexico: Sustained Civilian Rule W i t h o u t D e m o c r a c y , " in Democracy in Developing Countries: Volume 4, Latin America, ed. Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 459^197.

= 3 = Economic Reform and Political Change in Mexico Luis Rubio

T h e process of transition f r o m one economic-political system to a n o t h e r — particularly when it involves significant e c o n o m i c d i s c o n t i n u i t y — i s not a x i o m a t i c . W h e t h e r the society in question is u n d e r g o i n g an e c o n o m i c l i b e r a l i z a t i o n or a d e m o c r a t i c t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , it will e x p e r i e n c e f u n d a m e n t a l c h a n g e s in both its e c o n o m y and its politics. T h e r e are p r o f o u n d l i n k a g e s and interrelationships a m o n g e c o n o m i c a c t i o n s and d e c i s i o n s and political decisions and processes, but no systematic causee f f e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p . H i s t o r i c a l l y , t h e r e is a c o m p l e x b i d i r e c t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p ; political and e c o n o m i c p r o c e s s e s interact, s t r e n g t h e n i n g or w e a k e n i n g the o v e r a l l stability of a g i v e n polity. In s o m e c a s e s p o l i t i c a l e v e n t s d o m i n a t e the s c e n e ; in o t h e r s , the e c o n o m y . E a c h , h o w e v e r , a f f e c t s the other. T h e nature of the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , c a n b e r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m c o u n t r y to c o u n t r y : w i t n e s s S p a i n , K o r e a , Chile, G r e e c e , t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , the f o r m e r S o v i e t U n i o n , and C h i n a . D e s p i t e the similarities, each one has e x e m p l i f i e d a d i f f e r e n t process. L i k e w i s e , t h e c a s e of M e x i c o d o e s not fit e a s i l y into o n e of the patterns of transition w i t n e s s e d e l s e w h e r e . Its political s y s t e m has b e e n not a d i c t a t o r s h i p b u t a c o m b i n a t i o n of c o r p o r a t i s t a n d semiauthoritarian political structures. Furthermore, in M e x i c o the thrust of r e f o r m u p to n o w h a s b e e n largely e c o n o m i c . M e x i c o ' s p u r s u i t of e c o n o m i c l i b e r a l i z a t i o n is h a v i n g and will h a v e p r o f o u n d p o l i t i c a l c o n s e q u e n c e s ; and political reform, in turn, will a f f e c t the e c o n o m y . T h i s s y m b i o s i s o f t e n m a k e s it i m p o s s i b l e to d i s t i n g u i s h e c o n o m i c f r o m political processes. T h e p u r p o s e of this c h a p t e r is to trace the origins of the e c o n o m i c r e f o r m initiated in the mid-1980s, to analyze the impacts of t h e e c o n o m i c r e f o r m , to e x a m i n e political c h a n g e and t h e p r o c e s s of t r a n s i t i o n u n d e r w a y in M e x i c o , and to assess the implications of these c h a n g e s for M e x i c o ' s future.

35

36

LUIS RUBIO

The Origins of the Economic Reform O n e could argue that the economic reform could and should have been initiated during the 1970s to avoid a future economic collapse and to cope with the political d e m a n d s that had surfaced with the 1968 student m o v e m e n t . The balance of payments at the time was evidencing serious financing constraints, largely due to the gradual decline of agricultural exports. The Echeverría administration ( 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 7 6 ) was indeed the first o n e to advocate reform. The first attempts at reform, however, met the intransigence of various vested interests. Echeverría thus equated reform with instability. He abandoned all attempts to introduce the kind of reform that was needed, but not its rhetoric. Echeverría could afford not to reform simply b e c a u s e the e c o n o m y kept growing at about 6 percent, albeit ominously fueled largely by increasing foreign borrowing after the first oil shock in 1973. In that context, inducing a recession for the sake of reform was logically considered to be political suicide. During the 1980s, in the midst of the deepest recession in M e x i c o ' s recent history, the reform was launched, but not without hesitation. For f o u r years the administration of Miguel de la Madrid attempted to avoid harsh choices. It had stabilized the economy but had failed to reform its structures; thus no economic recovery was achieved. During those years ( 1 9 8 2 - 1 9 8 5 ) , social instability became a distinct possibility as millions of new entrants into the labor force found no j o b opportunities; worse, many p e o p l e w h o had been w o r k i n g b e c a m e u n e m p l o y e d , and no f o r m a l m e c h a n i s m as a safety net was in place to sustain them. The political bureaucracy was confronted with the need to act on the foremost threat to its rule since 1917. Not unlike the f o r m e r Soviet Union, a p r o f o u n d c h a n g e in the u n d e r l y i n g g o v e r n m e n t rationale led to a dramatic shift in priorities, premises, and, therefore, strategy. Three new premises became the core of the r e f o r m . First, given M e x i c o ' s population growth rate, size, and structure, e c o n o m i c growth was a matter of political survival. In the absence of economic growth, the interests of the political bureaucracy are irrelevant. Second, political stability is crucial to the economic viability of M e x i c o . T h u s , in the absence of political stability, the interests of the political b u r e a u c r a c y are i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l and u n s u s t a i n a b l e . T h i r d , economic reform creates short-term political instability. Absence of reform engenders permanent instability. T h e political imperative was no longer to ride the wave of growth, but to do anything necessary, including the destruction of vested interests, to revitalize the c o u n t r y ' s economy. By 1985 the recession and the debt crisis had changed the political equation altogether. Sheer political pragmatism thus lies at the core of the ongoing economic reform; not r e f o r m i n g had b e c o m e as disruptive as reforming. The issue had become how to deal with

ECONOMIC REFORM & POLITICAL CHANGE

37

the transition, and with those affected by it. At stake in 1985 were the sources of wealth and privilege of the PRI bosses. Today conditions have evolved: at stake are the sources of power and control, an altogether different political scenario. Carried to its natural conclusion, this imperative will end up transforming Mexico's political system, probably well beyond what the government envisaged at the outset.

The Impact of Economic Reform Since 1985 the economic reform has been impressive. As imports have poured in (increasing the import bill by more than 20 billion U.S. dollars in the last four years), competition has become the driving force of the economy. Many firms and sectors have succeeded in the new environment, although others have failed miserably. Full sectors, such as toys and electronics, have been virtually wiped out. In others, however, a mixture of entrepreneurship and technological skills have begun to create what may ultimately become a solid basis for Mexico's development. The adjustment has entailed bankruptcies, temporary unemployment, and shifts in the relative economic strength both of regions and industrial sectors.

Closed Versus Open Economy: The Interaction of Economic and Political

Processes

As the Mexican government liberalizes the economy, it is de facto radically altering the political processes as well. Relatively closed economies, as Mexico's was until 1985, tend to produce lower levels of overall political participation, while giving enormous leeway to vested interests to exert pressure. Open economies, on the other hand, tend to promote broader political participation and generate multiple sources of political power. This is not dogma; case after case confirms the pattern, and for a simple reason. In closed economies the government (regardless of its electoral nature or democratic quality) and special-interest groups have the last word in all, or most, decisions that are critical for development. Closed economies generate lucrative monopolies that make a few privileged groups very wealthy and most people very poor. Power tends to be concentrated, forcing the majority of the population to live on the fringes. An open economy decentralizes decisions and, therefore, political power. In many countries, Mexico included, this ability of the government to exert greater control has led many observers and politicians to talk of greater sovereignty for the government in a closed economy. Reality, however, is more complex. A government in a closed economy may have greater theoretical ability to make decisions, but it is also permanently besieged by all sorts of vested interests that attempt to influence its

38

LUIS RUBIO

decisions. The result is that the population at large has a smaller impact upon policy, regardless of the formal nature of the political system. The government de facto b e c o m e s a black box for the benefit, and for the creation of, vested interests. Open e c o n o m i e s often lend themselves to similar practices, but foreign competition imposes absolute limits on these. The relationship between economics and politics, the central theme of this discussion, is always present in the comparison between a closed and an open e c o n o m y : the latter is always more democratic than the former. Often, as in Korea and Chile, e c o n o m i c o p e n n e s s leads to unstoppable demands for democracy, or, at least, for political liberalization. In a closed e c o n o m y vested interests (usually the corporatist structures) exert permanent pressure to enhance their benefits. A greater e c o n o mic interaction with the rest of the world reduces a government's autonomy while enhancing the long-term ability of the country's economy to grow. The c o m m o n denominator of closed e c o n o m i e s is that they are all characterized by a de facto repression of political participation. Attempts to control only a few sectors, activities, or groups never work. An attempt to control one thing leads to ever greater controls. Ultimately, everything ends up being controlled. Ironically, governments in closed e c o n o m i e s experience a constant political erosion that eventually surpasses their ability to maintain control. The more frequently the government resorts to outright controls, the greater the erosion of those control mechanisms. The c l o s e d nature of M e x i c o ' s e c o n o m y led to severe e c o n o m i c distortions that necessitated mechanisms of control. In the absence of foreign competition, wages, for instance, could have grown unbridled had there not been a structure of tight control o v e r labor. L i k e w i s e , productivity lagged behind, as there was no competition to force its growth. Lack of competition in its relatively small economy required an active government and a very concentrated political structure to maintain control. Obviously, all societies develop mechanisms of control; the difference in an open versus a c l o s e d e c o n o m y is that in the former those mechanisms are created by the market and by society, while in the latter they are organized, shaped, and enforced by the government. In an open e c o n o m y , for instance, it is the presence of foreign competition that automatically limits the demands for wage increases beyond productivity growth. In a closed e c o n o m y it is the government and other political structures that enforce political controls, while in an open economy it is the market and other decentralized institutions that do so. The relationship between economics and politics in an open economy has a fundamental implication for political stability. While long-term political stability is dependent upon e c o n o m i c performance, there is

ECONOMIC REFORM & POLITICAL CHANGE

39

e v i d e n c e that e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t is a l s o r e l a t e d to p o l i t i c a l participation. T h e larger the g r o u p of beneficiaries of d e v e l o p m e n t , the greater the d e m a n d s for participation; conversely, the larger the participation of the population in a political system, the larger the options f o r e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t . This is why e c o n o m i c r e f o r m s usually e n j o y greater p o p u l a r support than one might a s s u m e at the outset. A s long as people perceive the benefits—political and e c o n o m i c — t o be derived f r o m an e c o n o m i c r e f o r m , e c o n o m i c r e f o r m will r e m a i n popular. E c o n o m i c r e f o r m can be achieved in one of two ways: either it is carried out through d e m o c r a t i c m e a n s (as in Spain or Britain), or it is imposed f r o m above (as in Chile). E c o n o m i c r e f o r m brings about political participation to the point of, as in C h i l e , f o r c i n g the d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n of ihe political s y s t e m . It is p a r a d o x i c a l to n o t e that in Chile the e c o n o m i c r e f o r m carried out and i m p o s e d f r o m a b o v e by the military was not an issue in the recent presidential elections; almost nobody in C h i l e ' s (then) opposition disputed the e f f i c a c y and legitimacy of the economic reform. O n c e the d e m o c r a t i c spirit has been awakened, the democratization of decisionmaking processes b e c o m e s the only possible way for economic transformation. This reasoning has o b v i o u s implications for M e x i c o today.

Transformation

of Social and Economic

Relationships

On the basis of c h a n g e s that have already taken place in the e c o n o m y and in political life, how is e c o n o m i c reform altering traditional relationships? A s c o m p e t i t i o n begins to affect every region, e c o n o m i c sector, and firm, n e w relationships have g r o w n within firms, a m o n g business people and politicians, between labor and government, and so on. T h e rules governing the e c o n o m y are changing, forging a dramatic c h a n g e in the nature of the political system, despite the fact that the structure of the political system has not been fundamentally altered. T h e launching of the e c o n o m i c reform generated immediate e c o n o m i c i m p a c t s . All e c o n o m i c actors n e e d e d to a d j u s t to g r o w i n g f o r e i g n and d o m e s t i c competition. S o m e factories have closed; s o m e have restructured their p r o d u c t i v e p r o c e s s e s . M a n y f i r m s h a v e had to r e n e g o t i a t e labor contracts. In all instances, however, e c o n o m i c a d j u s t m e n t has entailed the redefinition of relationships a m o n g key e c o n o m i c actors, m o r e often than n o t — a n d in s h a r p c o n t r a s t w i t h t h e p a s t — w i t h o u t g o v e r n m e n t p a r t i c i p a t i o n . T h e p o t e n t i a l l o n g - t e r m political i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e s e c h a n g e s are mind-blowing. In the c a s e of c o n s u m e r s — b o t h industries and i n d i v i d u a l s — f o r i n s t a n c e , the s u d d e n a p p e a r a n c e of o p t i o n s e n t a i l s a d r a m a t i c a n d unprecedented transformation of crucial relationships around the production processes. T h e availability of alternative goods to those that the c o n s u m e r

40

LUIS RUBIO

has traditionally had access to implies that historical chains of dependency have been broken overnight. The fact that a buyer no longer depends on only one supplier of a given good or service brings about unheralded freedom of action. For individuals it does not matter that the options are related to mundane items, such as brands of soap or cereal. The important thing is that there are options. Industrial consumers, with more leverage, can now demand from their suppliers conditions of quality, price, and service that would have been inconceivable in the past. The growth of consumer options has a political significance. Once options and opportunities are unveiled, nobody should be surprised to see that consumers (and, after all, w e all are consumers), perceiving the existence of options in one realm of life, will start demanding them in others. The distance between one and the other is much shorter than between a closed and an open e c o n o m y . Sooner or later, demands for options in elections, in city councils, in mayors, in schools, and so on will flourish. The same type of transformation is already taking place in the workplace. Import liberalization is beginning to exercise growing pressure upon the labor force. The growth of real wages has constricted in some cases but expanded in others. Demands for increased productivity and modification of the structure of production accompany demands for increased quality and e f f i c i e n c y . All of this has affected political relationships in the production process. First, relations between labor and union bosses and between these elements and firms are changing. Second, worker participation has suddenly become a critical component in decisions about production. The change in labor relations is already claiming its first victims in the corporatist union structures—that is, the pyramid-like labor confederations that were designed to exert control from above through layers of bureaucratic structures. To the extent that the success of firms increasingly will depend upon their international competitiveness and not upon traditional domestic practices, labor relations will largely cease to be negotiated at the highest corporatist levels (among the heads of labor confederations and the heads of business organizations, brokered by the government) but negotiated directly by the firm and the union. The individual unions will strengthen while the federations, confederations, and other traditional corporatist structures will weaken. This will be a transcendental political change, one that will dismantle the strongholds of the old PRI bosses. The question is what will replace them. On the other hand, international c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s requires the cooperation of workers, not only in their traditional jobs, but in the transformation o f the production lines, in increased quality and productivity, and so on. All of this will entail, and is already requiring, discussions, exchanges, and joint work within different hierarchical levels

ECONOMIC REFORM & POLITICAL CHANGE

41

in f i r m s . T h e r e s u l t s h o u l d b e g r o w i n g p a r t i c i p a t i o n of w o r k e r s decisions,

greater

responsibility

on

strength the

part

of of

workers labor

within

leaders

the

toward

in

unions,

more

workers,

and,

c o n c e i v a b l y , i n c r e a s e d w o r k e r p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e p r o c e s s of p r o d u c t i o n . A s in t h e c a s e of c o n s u m e r s , all of t h e s e c h a n g e s s o o n e r or later will t r a n s l a t e i n t o d e m a n d s f o r p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . W h y p a r t i c i p a t e in d e c i s i o n s at t h e s h o p level but not at the city, state, or national level? W h y h a v e the ability to d e m a n d responsibility f r o m a u n i o n leader and not f r o m a n a t i o n a l l e a d e r ? I n t e n t i o n a l l y or not, e c o n o m i c l i b e r a l i z a t i o n b r i n g s a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of t h e e n t i r e p o l i t i c a l relationship

between

economic

s t r u c t u r e of t h e c o u n t r y .

liberalization

The

and the formation

of

d e m o c r a c y is not direct, i m m e d i a t e , or a u t o m a t i c , but it is a b s o l u t e .

Political Change in M e x i c o T h e r e l e v a n t q u e s t i o n f o r M e x i c o as it t r a n s f o r m s its e c o n o m y f r o m a c l o s e d to an o p e n s y s t e m is w h a t t h e political i m p l i c a t i o n s of e c o n o m i c c h a n g e will be. T h e r e are t w o a n a l y t i c a l levels at w h i c h this q u e s t i o n can b e a s s e s s e d . O n e is b a s e d u p o n t h e t h e o r i e s that h a v e a t t e m p t e d

to

understand the linkages between e c o n o m i c and political processes. T h e o t h e r e n t a i l s s p e c u l a t i n g a b o u t the l o n g - t e r m i m p a c t s of e c o n o m i c r e f o r m u p o n political life b a s e d on c h a n g e s that h a v e a l r e a d y b e c o m e n o t i c e a b l e . M o d e r n i z a t i o n t h e o r i s t s h a v e l o n g a r g u e d t h a t it is t h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m t r a d i t i o n a l to m o d e r n s o c i e t y that c a u s e s instability, and not t h e s o - c a l l e d t r a d i t i o n a l s o c i e t y . In o t h e r w o r d s , t h e o r i e s of m o d e r n i z a t i o n that

what

brings

about instability

is t h e p r o c e s s of e c o n o m i c

political change. As M e x i c o moves toward economic the question

is w h e t h e r

stress and

liberalization,

it is a b o u t to f a c e s u c h a c h a l l e n g e .

The

f o r m e r S o v i e t U n i o n c l e a r l y e n t e r e d i n t o a s t a g e in its t r a n s i t i o n w h e r e i n s t a b i l i t y b e c a m e a d i s t i n c t p o s s i b i l i t y , and t h e n e w C o m m o n w e a l t h of I n d e p e n d e n t S t a t e s a p p e a r s to b e instability r e a l i z e d . Is M e x i c o on s u c h a course? M e x i c o is c l e a r l y a b a n d o n i n g an e c o n o m i c p o l i c y that l a s t e d o v e r t h i r t y y e a r s , b u t it is not in a p r o c e s s of transition f r o m t r a d i t i o n a l society to modern society (about which modernization theorists speculated). That t r a n s i t i o n t o o k p l a c e , if a n y t h i n g , f r o m 1 9 4 0 t h r o u g h the 1 9 6 0 s a n d w a s v e r y s u c c e s s f u l b e c a u s e of the e x i s t e n c e of t h e P R I . T o d a y , M e x i c o is i n v o l v e d in a t r a n s i t i o n p r o c e s s — i n m o d e r n i z a t i o n t h e o r y p a r l a n c e — f r o m o n e s t a g e of m o d e r n i t y t o a n o t h e r . W h a t a p p e a r s t o b e at s t a k e is n o t stability itself b u t t h e political a r r a n g e m e n t s that c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e e r a of a c l o s e d and p r o t e c t e d e c o n o m y . T h e relevant q u e s t i o n then b e c o m e s w h e t h e r M e x i c o ' s p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e s h o l d , e v e n w h i l e t h e y t h e m s e l v e s a r e in transition.

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Political and Economic Linkages in Mexico's Political Development M e x i c o ' s current political system has its roots in the 1930s. T w o f o r c e s shaped this u n i q u e political system: the extraordinary diversity of Mexican society and its political groups in the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution ( 1 9 1 0 - 1 9 1 7 ) and the incipient industrial base that began to grow as the country transformed rapidly f r o m a rural to an urban society. T h e political s y s t e m that d e v e l o p e d c o r r e s p o n d e d to the nature of M e x i c a n society and the e c o n o m y at the time. T h e first priority w a s to c r e a t e a m e c h a n i s m to c h a n n e l d e m a n d s and settle d i s p u t e s . W i t h a w o r k a b l e political structure in place, the revolutionaries reckoned, it would be possible to establish viable e c o n o m i c processes. Indeed, for d e c a d e s M e x i c o built a relatively strong domestic market, based upon a relatively c o m p e t i t i v e industrial base within a closed and protected e c o n o m y . T h e s e m i a u t h o r i t a r i a n political s y s t e m m a t c h e d the c l o s e d and p r o t e c t e d e c o n o m y . In fact, it probably would have been as disruptive to d e v e l o p an open and participatory political system in a closed and protected e c o n o m y as to sustain a semiauthoritarian political system in an open e c o n o m y . M e x i c o has experienced rapid economic growth in a tightly controlled political s y s t e m built on corporatist structures in labor, the peasantry, professional and middle classes, and business. Limited political participation and subtle quasi-authoritarian controls allowed for e c o n o m i c growth without creating a pressure c o o k e r e f f e c t that typically characterizes military g o v e r n m e n t s , which generally repress without creating escape valves. T h e result w a s a very slow process of both e c o n o m i c modernization and political evolution. O v e r the last f e w years, increasing c h a n g e s in the domestic e c o n o m i c scene in M e x i c o , f o l l o w i n g a series of m a j o r e c o n o m i c shocks during the 1970s and 1980s, h a v e led to a d e e p e n i n g political d e b a t e . Political c o n s c i o u s n e s s of the n a t u r e of the e c o n o m i c crisis of the 1980s and o p i n i o n s a b o u t solutions to it have proliferated. T h e d y n a m i c of the last f e w y e a r s — e c o n o m i c r e f o r m along with contested e l e c t i o n s — r e f l e c t s the a w a k e n i n g political consciousness.

Political Change

Today

T h e r e are three main sources of political c h a n g e today. First is the natural evolution of society, which has resulted in a growing electoral challenge to the m o n o p o l y of the PRI, m a n i f e s t e d t h r o u g h protest, votes against inc u m b e n t s , the d e v e l o p m e n t of independent labor organizations, and the like. By the 1960s the PRI no longer represented most of M e x i c o ' s organized c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , as it had since its inception in the 1930s. T h e first sign of g r o w i n g d i s a f f e c t i o n was the student m o v e m e n t of 1968. F u r t h e r evidence of disaffection accumulated, exploding in the federal elections of

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1988. The economic crisis of the 1980s had accelerated the process. The tide does not appear to have turned in the 1990s, despite the impressive mandate President Carlos Salinas received in the 1991 federal elections. The second source of political change, and probably the one with immediate consequences, is the stabilization program of the 1980s and the economic reform that followed. The third source is the social forces unleashed by the economic reform, forces with their own dynamic over which the government has no control. The recent political events—the 1991 elections and particularly their aftermath—cannot be understood outside the context of these new social forces. The political processes currently at work in Mexico go well beyond the economic crisis of the 1980s. These complex, traumatic processes are likely to transform Mexico radically in the coming decade. Change in Mexico's political system today has been ignited essentially by the implementation of an economic program aimed at making the country's economy competitive internationally. The attenuation of the old protectionist economic structure led the government to recognize the need for reform as the prerequisite for increasing the standard of living and reducing the extreme disparities in the distribution of income. The economic program launched in the mid-1980s consisted primarily of the elimination of regulations and bureaucratic procedures and other obstacles to trade (domestic and foreign). These radical changes in the economic structure of the country have produced major alterations in economic, social, and political relations as outlined above. Indeed, as the economic adjustment is well under way, the big political issue in Mexico today is how to complete and consolidate this extraordinary process of change—that is, how to match economic liberalization with a similar political thrust.

The Implications of Change for Mexico The success or failure of Mexico's transformation will have an impact far beyond its borders. The transition from a closed society and economy into a modern one implies changes in structures, habits, traditions, and even political culture. Success along these lines requires an ability to participate in international markets as well as a transformation of Mexico's society and polity. Failure will evidence the uncertainties of the reform. Mexico's success is by no means granted and, much less, independent of what happens elsewhere. The results of the 1991 federal elections conferred on Salinas and the reform the legitimacy that was missing in 1988. The first step in the process of reform was thus accomplished; nobody questions the essence of reform anymore. Nevertheless, the success of the economic r e f o r m — together with the political dynamic that it and the post-1968 crisis and,

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particularly, the 1988 elections had u n l e a s h e d — h a s created a new set of political realities that the current structure of the PRI and the political system are ill e q u i p p e d to handle. Society and the e c o n o m y are b e c o m i n g increasingly decentralized, while the PRI and the political system, with the possible exception of Pronasol, are still heavily centralized and seemingly incapable of responding to the rapid changes taking place. T h e irony is that these c h a n g e s were initiated by the g o v e r n m e n t . T h e e c o n o m i c r e f o r m is not the result of a social consensus, but of g o v e r n m e n t initiative. T h e challenge posed by M e x i c o ' s b a c k w a r d n e s s and stagnation, as well as the c h a n g e s that have taken place in the rest of the world over the last d e c a d e and a half, impelled government action. C o m p a r e d with the f o r m e r Soviet Union, M e x i c o ' s reform is almost an unqualified success. Politically, however, the f o r m e r Soviet Union has attained a much greater degree of openness. For the Mexican reforms to be consolidated, they have to trickle d o w n through society and acquire a c o n s t i t u e n c y — n o t only f o r the r e f o r m itself but f o r the government. O n e a t t e m p t to do so is e v i d e n c e d by the creation of P r o n a s o l . Pronasol is intended to structure a new political f o u n d a t i o n for a f u t u r e political system (and conceivably, a replacement of the PRI) and diminish the p o t e n t i a l f o r instability in the p o o r e s t a r e a s of the c o u n t r y by c h a n n e l i n g resources to large segments of the population that, o t h e r w i s e , would not have perceived any benefits f r o m the reform. Pronasol has thus b e c o m e the single most important c o m p o n e n t of the impressive coalition Carlos Salinas has succeeded in putting together. A f t e r d e c a d e s of m i s g o v e r n m e n t , however, M e x i c a n s have p r o f o u n d s u s p i c i o n s a b o u t any new g o v e r n m e n t policy. It is in this context that the g o v e r n m e n t ' s initiative to d e v e l o p closer e c o n o m i c ties with t h e United States has more than e c o n o m i c significance. At the heart of the search f o r a trade a g r e e m e n t is the intention to c o n s o l i d a t e the d o m e s t i c e c o n o m i c r e f o r m , c o n c l u d e the process of e c o n o m i c stabilization, and set the stage f o r a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the political s y s t e m . E a c h of t h e s e c o m p o n e n t s is linked to the other and to the M e x i c a n belief that t h e economic reform represents a fundamental and, more important, a p e r m a n e n t shift in priorities. T h e o u t c o m e of the N A F T A will be crucial in the l o n g - t e r m consolidation of M e x i c o ' s r e f o r m . This is why the next step of the r e f o r m is likely to p r o v e m u c h m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d , f o r it involves not only e c o n o m i c consolidation but also political and institutional change.

The Consolidation of Economic Reform F o r the e c o n o m i c r e f o r m to succeed, the political transition has to be s m o o t h . T h e p r o c e s s of industrial a d j u s t m e n t could entail large u n e m p l o y m e n t p o c k e t s , strikes, and o t h e r institutional or n o n i n s t i t u t i o n a l

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sources of c o n f l i c t in a society long controlled f r o m above, very centralized, and not heir to a d e m o c r a t i c culture. Traditionally, politicians and apparatchiks have successfully maintained political stability. T h e e c o n o m i c r e f o r m , h o w e v e r , is g r a d u a l l y e r o d i n g their p o w e r s . A s the r e f o r m a d v a n c e s , political c h a n g e is also u n d e r m i n i n g traditional authoritarian culture. U n i o n s and m a n a g e m e n t , g o v e r n m e n t and business, and political parties must cooperate, negotiate, and work in an open e n v i r o n m e n t , thus creating the e s s e n c e of a d e m o c r a t i c process. T h e e c o n o m i c r e f o r m must succeed b e f o r e the politicians and apparatchiks lose their grip so that the transition can be managed without a political explosion. T h u s , while the e c o n o m i c r e f o r m is in fact laying the f o u n d a t i o n for the e m e r g e n c e of a d e m o c r a t i c s o c i e t y , t h e t r a n s i t i o n p r o c e s s is extraordinarily c o m p l e x politically. W h e r e the g o v e r n m e n t has yet to be successful is in the key r e f o r m areas of agriculture and education, both of which lie in the p o w e r base of the P R I ' s a p p a r a t c h i k s . A l t h o u g h n e w legislation has been passed for both areas of r e f o r m , it will take years before the actual results are evident.

Transitions to Political and Institutional Change M e x i c o ' s r e f o r m is advancing fast but is yet to prove fully successful. It is critical to understand the process of transition—political and e c o n o m i c — that M e x i c o has experienced in order to assess the odds for success in the next few years. At the very least, f o r a transition to d e m o c r a c y to be possible and succ e s s f u l , three f u n d a m e n t a l c h a n g e s have to occur in the political system. First, a d e m o c r a t i c culture has to e m e r g e and imbue society at large, despite the tradition of monopolies and m o n o p o l y practices in both the economy and the political system that are still deeply e m b e d d e d in most Mexican institutions. Second, all parties, including those in opposition, have to b e c o m e real political parties, representing people rather than their own bureaucracies. H o w e v e r , in the absence of a democratic culture, competitive practices, and real incentives to develop a new political culture based upon constituencies rather than bureaucracies, competitive parties cannot emerge. W i t h the partial exception of the P A N , M e x i c o has no competitive political parties, despite the fact that there are nine formally existing parties. Finally, for d e m o c r a c y to be possible, the parties must agree on the rules of the g a m e , play by those rules, and accept the results. For this to be viable a series of initiatives aimed at confidence-building would be necessary.

Are There Demands for Democracy

in Mexico?

Is anybody d e m a n d i n g d e m o c r a c y ? Is democracy just an intellectual fad that r e p r e s e n t s only small and isolated g r o u p s ? W h a t kind of d e m o c r a c y d o M e x i c a n s envision?

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T h e s e q u e s t i o n s are less idle than they may a p p e a r at first sight. T h o u g h there are a f e w , limited instances that are truly d e m o c r a t i c in M e x i c o , these are exceptions to the overall nature of political life. M e x i c a n political culture, with its precedents in the Aztec world and the Spanish colonial period, is characterized by values of subordination and authoritarianism. For e x a m p l e , in the structure of the prototypical Mexican f a m i l y , the f a t h e r f i g u r e is a u t h o r i t a r i a n . T h e a u t h o r i t a r i a n v a l u e is r e p r o d u c e d in the work place, in school, in the unions, in business, and in political parties. A l t h o u g h m e m b e r s of one g r o u p may criticize the way other groups operate, all follow a similar pattern: business o w n e r s criticize the a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m of the g o v e r n m e n t , even t h o u g h b u s i n e s s o w n e r s b e h a v e the s a m e way in their o w n f i r m s ; u n i o n s c o m p l a i n a b o u t the hierarchical structures of f i r m s and the g o v e r n m e n t , t h o u g h it would be hard to find a more hierarchical s c h e m e of top-down domination than the c o r p o r a t i s t s t r u c t u r e s of t h e l a b o r s e c t o r . M o s t n e g o t i a t i o n s a n d t r a n s a c t i o n s that can be properly t e r m e d political are carried out in an authoritarian atmosphere, where there is always an implicit hierarchy. Few c h e c k s and b a l a n c e s h a v e e x i s t e d , and many h a v e been e l i m i n a t e d or w e a k e n e d o v e r the last f e w d e c a d e s . H e n c e , d e m o c r a t i c v a l u e s and institutions have all but been absent in M e x i c o since the PRI era. T h e r e are three w a y s to assess the question of whether anybody wants d e m o c r a c y . First, if the traditional political culture of M e x i c o is projected into the future, the future looks more like the past than different f r o m it. In this p e r s p e c t i v e old values and political practices prevail. Even increased electoral c o m p e t i t i o n m e r e l y r e p r o d u c e s traditional values rather than s t i m u l a t i n g i n n o v a t i o n . T h e u n u s u a l e l e c t o r a l c o m p e t i t i o n of 1988 b e c o m e s not an e x a m p l e of d e m o c r a c y but a r e f l e c t i o n of i n t e r n e c i n e d i s p u t e s about the f u t u r e of the country. This scenario holds that n o o n e f a c t i o n believes in d e m o c r a c y on its own merits, but only insofaras its own interests are advanced. D e m o c r a c y means nothing more than cut throat elections. T h u s a political s y s t e m with a d o m i n a n t party would remain in place even though there might be more accountability and more electoral competition. A s e c o n d way to a n a l y z e the f u t u r e of d e m o c r a c y in M e x i c o is to a s s u m e that the e c o n o m i c r e f o r m , d e e p e n e d since 1989, will p r o f o u n d l y alter the future. For those w h o argue this scenario, ongoing c h a n g e s — f r o m e c o n o m i c liberalization to electoral c o m p e t i t i o n — w i l l m a k e M e x i c o ' s f u t u r e d i f f e r e n t f r o m its past; since t o d a y ' s c i r c u m s t a n c e s are n e w , it is invalid to project the past, as significant and pervasive as its values and institutions may appear. W h a t is in store is a clear b r e a k — w h e t h e r violent or p e a c e f u l — w i t h the past. In this scenario what is relevant about events such as t h e electoral c o m p e t i t i o n of 1988 is not the b e h a v i o r of t h e political actors, but the fact that d e m o c r a c y is b e i n g d e m a n d e d . W h a t matters are the d e m a n d s , tangible demonstrations that, sooner or latter, will

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lead to a true d e m o c r a c y . Election squabbles are seen as a prerequisite f o r democracy, and thus democratic practices will be learned and developed over time. T h e 1991 elections have given strength to this view. A third view of the f u t u r e of Mexican d e m o c r a c y is that what is being d e m a n d e d in M e x i c o is electoral integrity, not d e m o c r a c y . P r o p o n e n t s of this scenario posit a qualitative d i f f e r e n c e between electoral integrity and political d e m o c r a c y . T h e y argue that, as in India, electoral integrity (and w h a t goes a l o n g with it) does not mean that there is representative and participatory d e m o c r a c y , only that elections are free and fair. India is a formal democratic model with a social structure and a caste system that is anything but democratic. S o m e part of each s c e n a r i o is likely to s h a p e the political s y s t e m M e x i c o finally adopts. It is obvious, for instance, that the political culture that has been forged o v e r seven hundred years will not simply vanish as a result of e c o n o m i c reform. T h e type of democracy that exists in the United States is different f r o m that of France, and the latter's is different f r o m that of Italy. Yet it is e n o u g h to witness how S p a i n — a country with a history not a bit less authoritarian than M e x i c o ' s — h a s b e c o m e a democracy to see evidence that a democracy can be grown into. Political c u l t u r e e x p l a i n s why political values are d i f f e r e n t f r o m country to country, and a truly democratic political structure can e m e r g e in spite of the d i f f e r e n c e s . Spain, once again, is a case in point: the support of its E u r o p e a n n e i g h b o r s , the rejection of d i c t a t o r s h i p , and an o p e n e c o n o m y all contributed to the creation of its d e m o c r a c y . India is another e x a m p l e . India has a formal d e m o c r a c y but not a democratic society. T h e f u t u r e of d e m o c r a c y in M e x i c o is still uncertain. Ultimately, if carried to their natural c o n s e q u e n c e s , c h a n g e s in the e c o n o m i c , social, and political r e l a t i o n s h i p s b r o u g h t on by the e c o n o m i c r e f o r m will lead to t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of a m u c h m o r e c o m m i t t e d and responsible citizenry. T h e transformation of the political structures will then be hard to contain.

Can Democracy

Simply

Emerge?

E c o n o m i c c h a n g e is altering every single political relationship. A very c e n t r a l i z e d s o c i e t y , c h a r a c t e r i z e d by p o w e r s t r o n g h o l d s c o n t r o l l i n g e v e r y t h i n g t h r o u g h c o r p o r a t i s t structures (labor, p e a s a n t s , t h e p r i v a t e sector) is being o v e r t u r n e d . T h r e e noticeable e f f e c t s of political c h a n g e h a v e e m e r g e d . First, the confederations of labor are being destroyed. E a c h union is going its o w n w a y , often in cooperation with firms, in an attempt to s e c u r e t h e s u r v i v a l of j o b s . S e c o n d , p o w e r s o u r c e s are e m e r g i n g t h r o u g h o u t society in parallel with decentralization and diversification of e c o n o m i c activity and d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . Third, opposition to the e c o n o m i c r e f o r m has ceased to be a m o r p h o u s and has taken specific shape. F o r m a l opposition, the P R D , has been challenging the P R I at the polls. In 1988 it

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succeeded in mounting a very powerful challenge in the presidential race. Ideological opposition, mostly intellectual, claims that the reform betrays M e x i c o ' s r e v o l u t i o n a r y p a s t . B u r e a u c r a t i c o p p o s i t i o n , mostly in government offices, has tried to derail the reform inside the government. T h e most important and critical factor in the process of political change lies in the opposition within the bureaucracy. The politicians and a p p a r a t c h i k s of the PRI r e f u s e to give up their e c o n o m i c interests or relinquish key pieces of the structure of political control. They continue to exercise s o m e control over unions, labor federations and confederations, peasant organizations, popular groups, party cliques, some ministries, and the bureaucracy. It is within these groups where the reform will ultimately succeed or fail. These structures operate the electoral machinery and carry out the electoral f r a u d . S u c c e s s f u l reform will have to eliminate the b u r e a u c r a c y ' s m a s s i v e reach throughout the political and p a t r o n a g e systems.

Scenarios of Future Political Systems T h e question for M e x i c o ' s political transition is not whether it will take place but what the future Mexican political system will look like. A few characteristics of the likely political system are easy to project. Others are i m p o s s i b l e to anticipate. G r e a t e r diversity in economic decisions and significantly reduced bureaucratic intrusion in daily decisions will both shrink, and conceivably eliminate, the power of the traditional corporatist p o w e r structures. M e x i c o ' s society is likely to develop endless and very diverse sources of p o w e r to replace its current supercentralized political s y s t e m . S u c h a structure will b e c o m e associated with d e m a n d s for accountability. O n e side of the political system is, thus, likely to become extraordinarily modern and competitive. It is impossible to anticipate whether a democratic culture will develop together with the structure described above. Indeed, is it possible to develop a sense of respect and responsibility among the various political forces in M e x i c o today as a first stage in that direction? The answer is both yes and no. T h e P A N , the opposition party of the center-right, has created a truly democratic tradition that demonstrates that democracy is not something necessarily alien to the Mexican culture, even though its internal schism of the last f e w years has revealed a much less institutional and much more radical streak within its ranks. There is no doubt that a democratic culture can be absorbed and cultivated in Mexican society. What is less certain is whether t o d a y ' s political structures and parties can deliver such a culture. Most likely, there will be a direct clash between the existing structures and a democratic culture. T h e r e r e m a i n s , of c o u r s e , the crucial issue of the s u b s t a n c e of

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d e m o c r a c y . A d e m o c r a t i c culture is clearly a precondition for d e m o c r a c y , but the content of d e m o c r a c y is just as important. T h e processes of m a k i n g d e c i s i o n s — s e p a r a t i o n of p o w e r s , j u d i c i a l p r o c e s s e s , the rule of law, individual f r e e d o m s , and due process of law ( S c h u m p e t e r ' s d e f i n i t i o n ) — a r e all critical c o m p o n e n t s of a d e m o c r a t i c polity. W h i l e M e x i c a n society is r a p i d l y b e c o m i n g inherently d e m o c r a t i c , w i t h o u t these s t r u c t u r e s and institutions d e m o c r a c y b e c o m e s impossible. T h e debate over the nature of M e x i c a n d e m o c r a c y will most likely be the battleground t h r o u g h o u t the 1990s. M e x i c o needs a visionary strategy to t r a n s f o r m the current structures and parties and to cope with social change. T h e irony is that there is hardly a party or g r o u p that represents this thrust for change today.

Conclusion M e x i c o is well on its way in the transformation of its e c o n o m y , while the transformation of its political processes is just beginning. T h e p r o b l e m s of transition d o not stem f r o m the lack of m o v e m e n t , either in society or f o r m a l p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , but f r o m the lack of c o n v i c t i o n in a d e m o c r a t i c process that pervades most political parties, particularly the PRI and P R D . T o d a y , that lack of c o n f i d e n c e appears to limit the viability of a truly d e m o c r a t i c process more than anything else. T h e more the e c o n o m i c r e f o r m advances, however, the more irrelevant the traditional institutions, practices, and parties b e c o m e . Hence, either as a result of a c a r e f u l and s u s t a i n e d n e g o t i a t i n g e f f o r t or by the sheer p r e s s u r e of the e c o n o m i c reality, M e x i c o will e m b r a c e d e m o c r a c y in the not-too-distant future. T h e path to this future, however, will m a k e an e n o r m o u s impact on the type of d e m o c r a c y that results. T h e e c o n o m i c reform of the last f e w years, together with the liberation of s o c i e t y — a process that started two decades a g o — h a s gradually eroded and in m a n y cases destroyed the old political institutions, but n o n e w political institutions have been built. C a r l o s S a l i n a s ' s skillful coalition b u i l d i n g a l l o w e d the PRI to recover part of its 1988 losses but has not altered the fact that M e x i c o ' s political system is changing fast. D o e s this m e a n that the traditional political system is about to collapse? T h e a n s w e r is an u n q u a l i f i e d no. T h e issue has less to d o with survival than with l e g i t i m a c y . T h e 1991 federal elections w e r e the cleanest in decades, but dirty e n o u g h to throw into question their overall legitimacy. That did not h i n d e r t h e P R I f r o m c l a i m i n g victory but did i m p o s e an e n o r m o u s p r e m i u m on the victory. T h e P R I could continue r e f u s i n g to r e f o r m f o r a long time, but at an increasing cost. M e x i c a n society is d e m a n d i n g participation and electoral integrity, and M e x i c o is increasingly being scrutinized f r o m abroad. T h e

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costs of less-than-perfect electoral processes will keep on climbing. In fact, the results of Guanajuato and San Luis Potosí suggest that electoral fraud is now working against the P R l ' s interests. Whether this will induce reform, h o w e v e r , is another matter. T o maintain itself in o f f i c e , the government would have to transform the PRI or, rather, replace the PRI with its new Pronasol constituencies plus the rest of the Salinas coalition. That would signal the final break with the old PRI bosses and would be no mean feat. The PRI's historical success is due precisely to the centralized nature of its decisions. (In fact, the reform itself would have been inconceivable in the absence of the PRI, though its growing relative weakness, itself the result of the reform, makes such an initiative unlikely again.) Such an organization probably cannot be decentralized and still remain in power. The e x a m p l e o f Baja California Norte, which has the first opposition governor in M e x i c o ' s modern history, suggests that the PRI cannot function in the absence of a strongman at the top. Thus, the political reform, if there is to be one, ought to start by creating the conditions in which a system of checks and balances can maintain the political control that the P R I ' s centralized machinery is increasingly incapable of accomplishing. The party that replaces the PRI, if organized to fit the new nature of M e x i c o ' s e c o n o m y and society, could in theory maintain some sort of dominance; yet everything conspires against it. The advantage reformers could derive from creating a new party might be that of imposing the new rules of the game upon those parties that have not yet reformed, but not much more than that. Nothing hinders such a new party from dominating M e x i c o ' s political scene temporarily or permanently, except that it would have to accomplish its dominance in a competitive and open environment where accountability will become a centerpiece of political relationships. The coming reform will require all the power Salinas's coalition can muster, and it will not be an easy task. M e x i c o is at a real crossroads, but never have conditions been better to hedge the odds in favor of democratic success.

— 4 — Mexico's Second Revolution: Pathways to Liberalization M. Delal Baer

Since Mexico embarked on its economic reform program in the early 1980s, there has been steady pressure for political liberalization. A significant consensus across ideological boundaries holds that liberalization of Mexico's traditional authoritarian social and political relations has been a consequence, if unintended, of economic opening. 1 It is not accidental that demands for political liberalization have coincided with e c o n o m i c liberalization. Economic liberalization reduces the role of government in the economy. The Mexican economic reform is decentralizing decisionmaking and gradually decoupling the economy from single-party control of the PRI. Political diversity has emerged as a result of the decline of corporatist organizations, the displacement of party apparatchiks, privatization, deregulation, and trade liberalization. Mexican society finds itself less dependent on a state-driven economy and, as a result, less beholden to political authorities. The democratization pressures that have surged to the fore do not always meet with a receptive response from Mexican authorities. For example, considerably less consensus exists regarding the pace and sincerity of M e x i c o ' s official efforts at electoral reform. 2 Nonetheless, Mexico has a more liberal political environment in 1992 than it had only ten years earlier, when e c o n o m i c r e f o r m began. M e x i c o ' s progress toward political liberalization has been neither linear nor free of setbacks, but the overall direction has been toward greater openness. Electoral foot-dragging will grow more and more costly, both in terms of incurring public wrath and international approbation. Democratization might be delayed, but not for long. The process of economic reform in Mexico can be divided into two phases—stabilization and consolidation—and these distinct phases have different impacts in the political arena. A nuanced consideration of these phases sheds light on Mexico's uneven movement toward political reform. Stabilization policies throughout Latin America, for example, typically have generated anti-incumbent sentiment. 3 The period between the disman51

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tling of state-driven e c o n o m i c models and the functioning of new market policies is painful. T h e early years of economic reform unbottle all sorts of social and political forces, some of which are hostile to the reform process. The degree to which stabilization is politically sustainable depends upon the condition of the political system. Systems that begin economic reform with low political legitimacy and a weak state have difficulty sustaining the process and may resort to authoritarian practices to defend economic reform. In M e x i c o the administration of Miguel de la Madrid ( 1 9 8 2 - 1 9 8 8 ) marked the beginning of economic reform and economic stabilization. The dislocations and austerity of these years stirred a wave of voter vengeance and d e m o c r a t i c aspirations. In M e x i c o ' s single-party system, anti-incumbent s e n t i m e n t w a s t a n t a m o u n t to a n t i - r e g i m e s e n t i m e n t and was met by authoritarian discipline and electoral fraud. Although democratic fervor ran high, not a s i n g l e o p p o s i t i o n electoral victory of c o n s e q u e n c e was r e c o g n i z e d . M e x i c o ' s a u t h o r i t a r i a n response was greatest d u r i n g the stabilization years in order to suppress voter backlash and resistance f r o m entrenched interests. By contrast, Carlos Salinas has presided over the low inflation and export-generated growth typical of the consolidation phase, which has redounded to the political benefit of his administration. It is during consolidation that the constituencies that benefit f r o m economic reform begin to o u t n u m b e r those that oppose reform. O n c e the worst of the transition has passed, the benefits of reform extend more broadly throughout society. For example, the 1991 midterm elections in Argentina and Mexico could be interpreted as rewarding the incumbent parties and leaders of successful economic reforms. Consolidation and growth during the Carlos Salinas administration has coincided with a recuperation of the P R I ' s electoral support. The consolidation of economic reform also enables greater tolerance of opposition party victories, since reformers no longer need fear for the survival of their policies. Salinas's administration has included acknowledgment of m a j o r opposition victories, albeit grudgingly and after initial resistance. T h e e c o n o m i c r e f o r m e x p e r i e n c e f r o m 1 9 8 2 - 1 9 9 2 has u n d e r m i n e d traditional pillars of Mexican authoritarianism and reinforced pre-existing social and political trends toward democracy. M e x i c o ' s anti-incumbent fury brought it to the brink of a regime change during the stabilization years of the 1980s, a potential change that met with staunch resistance from the PRI. The return of economic growth during the 1990s has caused electoral support to swing back to the ruling party and allowed the PRI to tolerate s o m e opposition victories. Consolidation of market reforms, though it may have an initial proincumbent effect, is likely over time to exert pressure in the direction of c o n t i n u e d liberalization. E c o n o m i c r e f o r m , h o w e v e r , is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy to take root. It is only o n e of a mix of f a c t o r s necessary to c o m p l e t e a M e x i c a n d e m o c r a t i c transition.

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The Politics of Economic Stabilization The economic stabilization and structural reform undertaken by President de la Madrid destabilized three key features of the traditional political system. First, economic reform undermined unity among elites within the ruling party. Second, the multiclass pacts and corporatism that had harnessed the better part of Mexican mass society to the PRI since the era of Lázaro Cárdenas were eroded by economic reform. Third, economic reform reduced the resources available to the political system to continue the economic dependence and subordination of civil society. Although the stabilization years created conditions for a more active civil society, they were also the years of unrelenting political closure. Economic reform in single-party regimes provokes internal division within the ruling elite. These divisions sow the seeds for political pluralism and incipient multiparty tendencies. In Mexico, throughout the 1980s, elite consensus and PRI unity were ruptured by bitter public debates over privatization, subsidy reductions, and public spending cuts. These policies were considered heretical to the PRI's revolutionary heritage and ultimately inspired the defection of former Priistas Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Porfirio Muñoz Ledo. Their defection led to the creation of the left-leaning PRD. The PRI's historic marriage of social revolution and capitalism had long generated competing ideological factions within the party. Cardenistas coexisted uneasily with Alemanistas, who coexisted uneasily with Echeverristas. These contradictory forces were accommodated by alternating the presidency between the left and right wings of the party, which policy became an unwritten corollary to Mexico's proscription against reelection. Partisan swings that in other systems would have been expressed in multiparty politics were contained within the single-party framework. De la Madrid's decisive turn toward economic orthodoxy alienated the left wing of the party, but it was his designation of like-minded successor Carlos Salinas that brought ideological tensions to the breaking point. By selecting a man who would continue his economic program, de la Madrid ended the alternating of the presidency between the two wings of the PRI, violating in essence the taboo against reelection. The defection of Cárdenas and Muñoz Ledo was one part ideological dispute over economic policy and one part frustrated ambition at the prospect of permanent political irrelevance should de la Madrid's policies be consolidated. Elite unity also suffered as economic reformers faced hostility from entrenched public bureaucracies, second echelons, and regional political machines. De la Madrid confronted an apparatchik problem similar to that in the former Soviet Union, and many Priistas worried about an economic reform that forced the president to attack the very political machine that supported him. Fiscal austerity and privatization were not compatible with the demand for patronage and special favors from hungry políticos and

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bureaucrats. The Cárdenas vote in 1988 reflected the defection of the PRI's patronage-starved political machines at the regional level. The introduction of market forces and privatization interfered with the lucrative manipulation of the Mexican economy for political and personal ends. The most spectacular case of a defection from the PRI pantheon of traditional strongmen, or "dinosaurs," was the leader of the petroleum workers' union, Joaquin Hernandez Galicia ("La Quina"), who threw support surreptitiously to Cárdenas in the 1988 elections after he realized that the economic rationalism of the reformers would bring an end to his fiefdom. Thus, economic reform provoked multiple cleavages in the ruling party, among both ideological and vested interests. The crisis in elite unity would not have been as crucial had it not been accompanied by the rupture of traditional social pacts and the disaggregation of the PRI's multiclass coalition. The PRI's electoral support had been gradually slipping (ten points every ten years), but mass support plummeted with the shock of e c o n o m i c stabilization. The PRI's grand coalition dissolved into two major electoral realignments during the mid and late 1980s. The center-right P A N captured the alienated business elite, middle classes, and the church. The left-leaning PRD expressed the discontent of labor, peasants, and public sector employees. Mass discontent, when added to elite disunity, nearly brought the Mexican regime to its knees in the presidential election of 1988. During the first phase of mass realignment, the stresses of stabilization and repeated currency devaluations propelled the middle class into an electoral revolt and the arms of the PAN. Francisco Madero's banner of sufragio efectivo was raised in northern municipal elections in 1983, in midterm elections in 1985, and in the Chihuahua gubernatorial race in 1986. 4 The private sector was aroused by the 1982 nationalization of the banks under President José López Portillo (1976-1982), which shattered the pact between business and the state. President de la Madrid paid the political price of business's wrath, a cruel irony given that his policies were designed to correct the errors of his predecessors. Although business once viewed democracy as a risky affair, a portion of the private sector grew convinced that a democratic transition led by the urban middle class and the P A N would provide a counterweight to the PRI's capriciousness. In particular, northern business owners who o w e d little to government favors rallied to the democratic cause, providing financial support for PAN candidacies and becoming candidates themselves. Business, the middle class, and the P A N soon found a de facto ally in the Catholic church, whose priests took to issuing sermons against the sins of electoral fraud. Private sector activists and c o n s e r v a t i v e organizations issued comprehensive critiques of Mexican civil society and politics. They discovered the virtues of guarding individual liberties from the state with institutionalized checks and balances, limited government, and the rule of

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law. A surprising degree of theoretical attention was devoted to the problems of civil society by groups like the Employers' Confederation of the Mexican R e p u b l i c ( C O P A R M E X ) and the National W o m e n ' s Civic Association ( A N C I F E M ) , which advocated the creation of intermediary, autonomous civic organizations, or what was called "la sociedad vertebrada." 5 This struck a responsive chord a m o n g M e x i c o ' s middle classes, for w h o m corporatist institutions were denigrating. This attention to the relationship between the state, the e c o n o m y , and civil society was a relatively pure expression of a liberal, market-oriented, and democratic worldview. Many of these precepts had b e c o m e widely accepted by the 1990s. Even the Mexican Left absorbed the liberal critique of corporatism and turned those ideas toward the creation of independent trade unions. The second phase of mass realignment c a m e with the neo-Cardenista vote in 1988, which reflected the accumulated discontent of six years of no net economic growth and the breakdown of the P R I ' s longstanding pact with organized labor. Stabilization and economic austerity induced a decline in labor's income and political power vis-à-vis other social actors. Labor's share of congressional candidacies declined throughout the 1980s and dropped precipitously a f t e r 1988. Stabilization also weighed heavily on vulnerable lower-income families. Fiscal austerity forced the state to relinquish subsidies on basic c o n s u m e r items and services and to reduce the flow of assistance programs. Fiscal health was restored at the expense of social spending, and the austerity was felt disproportionately by M e x i c o ' s urban poor. Economic stabilization initially resulted in a decline in real wages of 4 0 percent f r o m 1 9 8 2 - 1 9 8 8 . T h e backlog of social needs of the 1980s and the market orientation of the regime sorely tried the pacts implied in the revolutionary origins of the Mexican regime. 6 M o r e profoundly, the adoption of a market economy is fundamentally incompatible with corporatism. Corporatist organizations had existed in a s y m b i o t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p with parastatal industries, which f u n c t i o n e d as politicized economic preserves of labor unions. W h e n efficiency and market forces replaced patronage as employment criteria, reductions in force and a decline in union clout were inevitable consequences. Privatization cut into vested union-held interests. Although formally the alliance between unions and the PRI withstood the crisis years of the 1980s, austerity and the loss of privileges m a d e it hard for corporatist leaders to deliver their constituents' votes. Equally significant, economic reform implies that the government has relinquished the e c o n o m i c leverage that bound labor to the state. A more a u t o n o m o u s labor m o v e m e n t driven by m a r k e t forces, local e c o n o m i c variables, and individual plant conditions may be o n e of the long-term impacts of economic reform. T h e evolution of a vigorous civil society was curtailed by dependence on economic favors distributed by the state. This dependence on the state and the petitionary culture of favoritism touched virtually every sector of society. It

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included the elite business owner who once charged monopolistic prices under a shield of protectionism or gained special access to financing intermediary goods in exchange for political loyalty to the PRI. 7 It included the lowliest bureaucrat whose job was a reward for delivering the votes of his block. It included the union leader whose participation in state-owned businesses and contracts required acts of political gratitude. Depoliticizing the Mexican economy meant confronting the reality of inefficiency, uncompetitiveness, and vested interests. However, depoliticizing the e c o n o m y also meant repoliticizing society. E c o n o m i c reform undercuts the s u b m i s s i v e , paternalistic, and petitionary political culture.

Economic Consolidation and the PRI's Political Recomposition The Salinas administration took the lessons of 1988 to heart and recognized that market reforms tend to stimulate political liberalization. They consciously designed a strategy to enable the PRI to meet the political challenges of market reform and survive in a more open electoral climate. This strategy included moving rapidly from economic stabilization to consolidation and growth. Economic growth would provide a more favorable backdrop in which to reconstruct a new multiclass alliance, update legitimating ideologies, stanch elite defections, and overhaul the PRI's organizational and electoral techniques. After the debacle of 1988, many would have been relieved to see the PRI merely survive as yet another competitor in a multiparty environment. The combined success of economic consolidation and the PRI's political renewal has been greater than even the most optimistic PRI reformers probably expected. The PRI may be poised to enter an era of electoral hegemony. The apparent restoration of single-party dominance in M e x i c o ' s 1991 midterm elections created the deceptive appearance of continuity. In fact, the PRI has engaged in a self-restructuring tailored to the realities of a market economy. This renovation of the PRI's modus operandi, combined with economic restructuring, is of such a qualitatively profound nature that it possibly constitutes a silent regime change. The grand old party may be poised on the threshold of a historic self-transformation composed of four thrusts. First, the PRI has absorbed a crucial tenet of the civic awakening of the 1980s—that the electoral process is a definitive legitimating source of power. The party has embraced the objective of winning votes, which has led to a shift from sectoral to grass-roots electoral organization. If PRI dominance is reconstructed in the 1990s, it will be based on a new model of territorially based organization and somewhat cleaner electoral mandates. Second, the Salinas government has departed from the mythological font of 1910 to

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f o r m u l a t e n e w l e g i t i m a t i n g doctrines c o m p a t i b l e with a market e c o n o m y . Third, the party has renewed the multiclass a c c o m m o d a t i o n a m o n g the P R I ' s traditional alliance partners in the private sector, the middle class, organized labor, and the peasantry. 8 Fourth, the traditional relationship between public s p e n d i n g and political legitimacy has been revived and placed on a fiscally sound basis in the f o r m of S a l i n a s ' s brainchild, Pronasol. A r e v i e w of P R I ' s recomposition in the 1990s b e s p e a k s the impact of e c o n o m i c r e f o r m and c o n s o l i d a t i o n . S a l i n a s ' s top priority u p o n e n t e r i n g o f f i c e w a s to e n d austerity and return to e c o n o m i c g r o w t h as q u i c k l y as possible. A rapid-fire series of initiatives was i m p l e m e n t e d to achieve that goal. T h e B r a d y initiative r e m o v e d the debt crisis f r o m the a g e n d a , the privatization of the banks began the process of capital repatriation, the P E C E kept inflation low, the p e s o was kept stable, and p u r s u i n g the N A F T A s p a r k e d an i n v e s t m e n t b o o m . O n e n e e d o n l y c o m p a r e the e c o n o m i c conditions of 1 9 8 2 - 1 9 8 8 with those of 1 9 8 8 - 1 9 9 2 to understand the recovery of the PRI in the 1991 m i d t e r m elections. T h e 1991 m i d t e r m s took place against the b a c k d r o p of three years of growth. Inflation, which peaked at 160 percent in 1987, hovered around 18 percent in 1991. T h e public sector deficit d r o p p e d f r o m 14 percent of gross d o m e s t i c product ( G D P ) in 1982 to a surplus in 1992. M e x i c a n s regained hope and President Salinas reaped the political r e w a r d f o r their r e n e w e d o p t i m i s m . T h e political r a m i f i c a t i o n s of e c o n o m i c consolidation have been profound. T h e natural c a n d i d a t e s for leading a m o d e r n i z i n g coalition are business and the urban m i d d l e class. Salinas worked to repair the rift with business by privatizing the b a n k s and other m a j o r industries as well as p r o p o s i n g f r e e t r a d e with the United States. H e has apparently utilized the privatization process to reward f r i e n d s and create a network of loyal business allies w h o will p e r p e t u a t e his political and e c o n o m i c vision. Salinas also courted the independent northerners by highlighting his ties to his h o m e state of N u e v o L e o n , visiting with the b u s i n e s s scions of the M o n t e r r e y c o m m u n i t y and extolling their entrepreneurial values. T h e strategy killed two birds with one stone: Salinas attained his e c o n o m i c objectives by enticing the private sector to b e c o m e a m o t o r of growth and attained his political objectives by enticing business to w i t h d r a w its support f r o m the P A N . T h e low inflation and stable peso of the consolidation years h a v e been e l o q u e n t p e r s u a d e r s of the middle class. M i d d l e - c l a s s alienation, rooted in morality charges, also has been appeased with highly visible anticorruption acts like the arrest of L a Q u i n a . In an especially daring g a m b i t to steal the P A N ' s middle-class constituency, Salinas sought a diplomatic rapprochement with the V a t i c a n , personally w e l c o m e d the P o p e to M e x i c o in his highly p u b l i c i z e d visit in 1989, and m o d i f i e d the anticlerical p r o v i s i o n s of the M e x i c a n constitution. E c o n o m i c consolidation has m a d e resources available to respond to the strain of six years of austerity on the urban poor, making it more difficult for

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Cárdenas and the P R D to take advantage of a backlog of unmet social needs. Fears of social instability, the example of riots in Venezuela and Argentina, and the Cárdenas vote in poor districts were vivid reminders of the dangers of prolonged austerity. Pronasol, a 3 billion U.S. dollar social spending program, brings basic services to and formalizes property rights for millions of urban and rural poor. This injection of new resources has been a key to the PRI's political revival. Pronasol meets basic social needs with pork-barrel politics in a streamlined market economy. Social policy used to be conducted through the manipulation of the price structure for basic consumer items, subsidization of basic services, preferential programs for union members, and the politicized management of parastatal companies. The exigencies of fiscal responsibility and efficiency made these social policy tools obsolete. It was no longer feasible to subsidize government industries or engage in union-appeasing featherbedding. Many programs, such as National Commission on Popular Subsistence ( C O N A S U P O ) supermarkets and housing for union workers, represented subsidies to the relatively better off and never met the needs of the truly poor. Pronasol is compatible with economic reform. It eschews fiscal deficits, industry nationalizations, and distortions of the price system. Pronasol is politically nonthreatening to Mexico's private sector, since it defines social policy so as to eliminate government participation in most economic activities. It facilitates the reconstruction of the grand multiclass alliance between labor and capital that characterized precrisis Mexico. It reconciles social goals with the macroeconomic and structural requisites of market-based growth. Pronasol has been accompanied by a new legitimating vocabulary that reconciles the r e g i m e ' s historical revolutionary commitments with the marketplace. Salinas used his first State of the Nation address to argue that a proprietary state is not necessarily the route to greater social justice. Rather, he has argued, it is privatization that has generated resources for social purposes such as education, health, and infrastructure. Adroit ideological positioning defines the PRI as a center-progressive party—holding the center while chipping away at opposition constituencies on the right and the left. Salinas's ideological banner of "social liberalism" artfully rejects both the heartlessness of pure neoliberalism and the economic dysfunction of socialism. Defections of the elite from the PRI have been slowed to a trickle, the result of careful bridge building and wooing of formerly radical intellectuals. This task was aided by the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the general delegitimization of socialist doctrine. 9 The P R I ' s recovery was also boosted by the weakness of M e x i c o ' s opposition political parties, which have been unequal to the task of leading the electorate to a democratic breakthrough. While the PRI eradicated complacency f r o m its ranks, opposition parties coasted on a false sense of security after the 1988 presidential elections. They tolerated deficiencies, both

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organizational and programmatic, which cost t h e m the c o n f i d e n c e of the electorate and restricted their scope of action to regional contests. T h e unexpected strong success of S a l i n a s ' s e c o n o m i c r e f o r m has validated a market-oriented consensus that has made it harder for opposition parties to d e v e l o p c r e d i b l e identities. T h e Right has seen its p l a t f o r m s stolen wholesale, while the Left finds its traditional platforms irrelevant. The PRI has reduced the opportunities for opposition parties to make inroads on its constituencies, at least in the short term. The P R I ' s 1988 setback was due partially to the fact that the party had g r o w n c o m p l a c e n t . It s u f f e r e d f r o m l e a d e r s h i p a r t e r i o s c l e r o s i s and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l d e f i c i e n c i e s . T h e P R I g o v e r n m e n t ' s c a p a c i t y to field interlocutors and intermediary m e c h a n i s m s had withered away by 1988, leaving a d a n g e r o u s gulf b e t w e e n the party and society. T h e p a r t y ' s traditional corporatist and sectoral-based organizations, created in the 1930s, were anachronistic. Corporatist organizations no longer represented M e x i c o ' s new sociological reality: its new urban universe of voters. The regime was d u e for an o v e r h a u l , but a s i m p l e r e f u r b i s h i n g of c o r p o r a t i s m was incompatible with the new market orientation. T h e PRI engaged in a crash course to restructure itself, moving away f r o m corporatism and toward grassroots organization. O n e lesson of 1988 is that corporatist c a n d i d a t e s are not a l w a y s electorally e f f e c t i v e . Labor-sector candidates performed poorly in M e x i c o City. Accordingly, the PRI moved to diminish the role of labor, according it only 16 percent of single-member district candidacies in 1991 compared with 21 percent in 1988. T h e n u m b e r of u r b a n - b a s e d , nonunion candidacies increased f r o m 55 to 63 percent f r o m 1988 to 1991. Simultaneously, greater influence was placed on revitalizing the urban "popular sector" of the PRI, previously k n o w n as the National Confederation of Popular Organizations ( C N O P ) . T h e central t h e m e of PRI President G e n a r o B o r r e g o ' s historic " r e f o u n d i n g " of the PRI in 1992 was the creation of the Movimiento Popular Territorial and the Frente Nacional Ciudadano. 1 0 The reorganization signified that e m p h a s i s was to be given to urban grass-roots structures with local block, neighborhood, precinct, and committee ties. Many 1991 congressional candidates were drawn f r o m local precinct and district committee structures. T h e P R I ' s 14th National Assembly reflected this shift; over 50 percent of delegates were selected f r o m locally based structures with only 18 percent f r o m the labor sector. Although the a s s e m b l y ' s reforms proved disappointing and only a few candidates were selected through a primary process in the 1991 midterms, the party did encourage greater decentralization and local grassroots i n p u t . " The move f r o m sectoral to grass-roots organization has not been without bitter internal d e b a t e . L a b o r unions have resisted this assault on their political influence. Early efforts at PRI reform elicited the withering scorn of Fidel Velazquez, w h o excoriated what he described as young ideological

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s c o r p i o n s that sting the b o d y of their o w n parent. H o w e v e r , territorial strategies w e r e vindicated in the 1991 midterm elections, m a k i n g f u r t h e r transformations likely before the 1994 presidential elections. T h e P R I has e n g a g e d in a p r o c e s s of s e l f - d e m o l i t i o n and selfreconstruction that is key to its ability to withstand the corrosive e f f e c t s of e c o n o m i c market reform. Essentially, the PRI has transformed itself f r o m a c o r p o r a t i s t p a r t y e n t r e n c h e d in a g o v e r n m e n t - o w n e d e c o n o m y to a geographically based party focused on electoral turnout in an open e c o n o m y . A g e o g r a p h i c a l l y d e c e n t r a l i z e d party structure is more sensitive to local political markets and can survive the decentralization of e c o n o m i c decisions. U n d e r the leadership of L u i s D o n a l d o Colosio f r o m 1 9 8 8 - 1 9 9 2 , the P R I ' s s u p p o r t e r s w e r e identified and logged in c o m p u t e r banks in e x c r u c i a t i n g detail. An i m m e n s e machine of precinct captains was constructed and charged with d e l i v e r i n g PRI voters one by one. T h e PRI has devoted itself to the electoral tasks of c o n s t i t u e n c y building and voter turnout with a singlem i n d e d intensity that can only be e x p l a i n e d by the shock of the 1988 elections and an acute sense of the political d i l e m m a that e c o n o m i c r e f o r m presented to the party's traditional m o d u s operandi. T h e restructuring of p a t r o n a g e distribution has mirrored the political restructuring of party organization. Pronasol is organized by n e i g h b o r h o o d c o m m i t t e e s , paralleling and c o m p l e m e n t i n g the reconstruction of the PRI along g e o g r a p h i c lines. T h e m a n a g e m e n t of Pronasol resources is conducted by local n e i g h b o r h o o d - s e l e c t e d c o m m i t t e e s and grass-roots leaders. T h e s e local leaders may ultimately play a role in replenishing the P R I ' s political cadres at the precinct and district level. Pronasol, which claims to have over ten thousand c o m m i t t e e s involving approximately one hundred local citizens in each committee, c o m p l e m e n t s the P R I ' s territorial refurbishment. Pronasol, c o m b i n e d with e c o n o m i c reform and PRI reorganization, may lay the f o u n d a t i o n s f o r an even more ambitious restructuring. T h e PRI has a record of phoenix-like rebirth at critical junctures. Three times in the past the party renamed and restructured itself. It remains to be seen whether Pronasol and the g r a s s - r o o t s r e s t r u c t u r i n g of the PRI constitute a fourth historical transformation.

Political Implications of Economic Modernization M e x i c o enters the 1990s facing the question of whether economic r e f o r m and consolidation will push M e x i c o t o w a r d a democratic transition or facilitate t h e r e c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e P R I ' s e l e c t o r a l s t r e n g t h . It is a p p a r e n t that e c o n o m i c consolidation has initially redounded to the P R I ' s benefit. T h e PRI r e g r o u p e d its f o r c e s and m a d e a surprisingly strong c o m e b a c k in the 1991 m i d t e r m elections. H o w e v e r , opposition party forces also have m a i n t a i n e d their m o m e n t u m and extracted grudging willingness on the part of authorities

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to recognize their electoral victories. Democratization and the PRI's electoral recuperation need not be mutually exclusive. Nor is a violent rupture the only means to effect fundamental change. The PRI need not be destroyed, but it must be transformed in order to effect a democratic transition. 12 Similarly, opposition party forces must develop greater organizational maturity and political tolerance than they have shown to date. What would a future of sustained growth and market reform bring to the political arena? T w o scenarios appear likely. First, the P R I ' s selfrestructuring may result in a new era of long-term dominance. Second, a successful economic reform may strengthen middle-class pressures for democratization. The PRI's self-reform, which is hampered by its traditional overweening presence, may falter and signify only survival into a new era of more competitive multiparty politics. The recuperation of single-party dominance in the 1991 midterm elections was especially confounding in the light of expectations of an imminent transition to the alternating of parties in power after the 1988 presidential elections. Debate swirled around the question of whether M e x i c o ' s democratization glass is half empty or half full under the Salinas administration. It is still unclear whether the anti-incumbency of the 1980s was simply an economic protest vote or a genuine prodemocracy vote. It is also unclear whether the regime is committed to true political reform or is only dealing in limited concessions and lip service. The return of the electorate to the PRI fold in 1991 seemed to validate the protest vote interpretation and to indicate the electorate's willingness to accept the status quo for the sake of smooth economic management. If the protest vote of 1988 was directed against the sin of poor government and not the legitimacy of the regime, the system bounces back once the sin is corrected and confidence restored. If this is the case, the electoral movements of the 1980s may have peaked and with them the likelihood of a multiparty system. A second scenario would point out that the persistent opposition vote and civic activism as evidenced in the 1991-1992 electoral consequences in San Luis Potosi, Guanajuato, and Michoacan support the prodemocracy thesis and portend the likelihood of continued electoral volatility. Economic consolidation has not erased opposition strength at the municipal and gubernatorial level. Furthermore, qualitative change in Mexico's civic culture has made fraud of the sort committed in the gubernatorial elections in Chihuahua in 1986 virtually impossible to carry off in the 1990s. Nothing in the modern history of Mexico compares to the gubernatorial victories of the PAN in Baja California Norte (1989), Guanajuato (1991), and Chihuahua (1992), and their municipal victories in Merida, Mazatlan, Guanajuato, and five major cities in the state of Nuevo Leon. Similarly, the PRD has won fifty-six out of fifty-seven municipalities, including the state capital in the state of Michoacan, and forced the resignation of a PRI-elect governor in Michoacan through the adoption of radical civil disobedience measures in 1992.

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M e x i c o m a y , f o r s o m e time, d e v e l o p as a two-tiered system in which opposition parties retrench to e x p a n d their constituencies at the local level, while the PRI r e m a i n s the only political party with a national reach. Indeed, M e x i c a n s may h a v e the o p p o r t u n i t y to split their vote at the state level. Opposition victories at the local level, however, will keep the possibility of a national multiparty system alive. D e m o n s t r a t i o n s of civic activism in d e f e n s e of electoral integrity at the state and local level n o w quickly turn into a cause célèbre at the national and international levels, m a k i n g it m o r e and more d i f f i c u l t f o r the r e g i m e to sustain a policy of political e x c l u s i o n . T h e inability of the r e g i m e to e s t a b l i s h c r e d i b l e e l e c t o r a l rules of t h e g a m e , c o m b i n e d with radical opposition party tactics designed to destabilize the electoral process, has led to the d a n g e r o u s p h e n o m e n o n of the segunda vuelta, or "second round." T h e utilization of civil d i s o b e d i e n c e in the aftermath of questioned elections had, by 1992, led to the resignation of PRI-elect governors in three states. It was widely believed, even in opposition party circles, that the PRI candidates had won all three races, albeit with s o m e irregularities. T h e p h e n o m e n o n of the s e c o n d r o u n d i n c r e a s i n g l y t h r e a t e n e d to u n d e r m i n e the r e l e v a n c e of the electoral p r o c e s s to political o u t c o m e s , d e m o r a l i z e PRI activists, reward a d v o c a t e s of radical destabilization in opposition party ranks, and set the stage f o r an unstable presidential succession in 1994. In his fourth State of the Nation address Salinas w a s pressured to accelerate the institutionalization of profound electoral reforms. It is u n c l e a r w h e t h e r f u t u r e PRI candidates can ride S a l i n a s ' s p o w e r f u l coattails. T h e n e w a l i g n m e n t of voter loyalty may be largely attributable to the "Salinas e f f e c t " and may not, therefore, be assured beyond his mandate. Future support f o r the P R I may be conditioned upon p e r f o r m a n c e rather than u n q u e s t i o n i n g loyalty. Any failure to c o n s o l i d a t e the r e f o r m model or an e c o n o m i c downturn could threaten the P R I ' s precarious recovery. A failure on the part of the P R I to c o n s o l i d a t e s u c c e s s f u l l y its n e w political model of organization could lead to continued electoral dissatisfaction, especially if c o m b i n e d with an uptick in opposition party organizational capacity. T h e M e x i c a n e l e c t o r a t e is volatile, and party loyalties m a y be susceptible to sudden realignment. Political revival of the PRI may be one of the initial c o n s e q u e n c e s of e c o n o m i c c o n s o l i d a t i o n . It may not, h o w e v e r , be the ultimate o u t c o m e of longer-term, market-driven e c o n o m i c growth. T h e key elements of the P R I ' s m o d e r n i z i n g c o a l i t i o n , t h e p r i v a t e sector and t h e m i d d l e class, are the c o n s t i t u e n t s m o s t politically sophisticated and c o m m i t t e d to a d e m o c r a t i c transition. T h i s will be especially so if postconsolidation e c o n o m i c g r o w t h f r e e s the m i d d l e c l a s s f r o m e c o n o m i c w o r r y to c o n c e n t r a t e on political values, as has occurred in Chile, South Korea, and T a i w a n . T o the extent that modernization depends on a well-educated middle class and a market economy rewards self-initiative, M e x i c o ' s urban classes will continue to break with the

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ascriptive and hierarchical political culture. P o s t c o n s o l i d a t i o n e c o n o m i c maturity has yet to be attained in M e x i c o , but it is not u n r e a s o n a b l e to expect another surge of democratization in the years to come. Finally, if M e x i c o m o v e s into a long period of e c o n o m i c g r o w t h and maturity, the d e v e l o p m e n t of multiparty political c o n s e n s u s on e c o n o m i c policy could p r o m o t e the prospects for stable d e m o c r a c y . O n e e x a m p l e of how a successful e c o n o m i c policy facilitated d e m o c r a t i c transition is Chile. T h e r e a Christian D e m o c r a t - t o - s o c i a l i s t coalition decided that the costs of undoing G e n e r a l A u g u s t o P i n o c h e t ' s e c o n o m i c r e f o r m s would be high. It made no sense to upset a policy approach that had cut inflation and brought c o n s i s t e n t g r o w t h . T h i s c o n s e n s u s on e c o n o m i c policy m o d e r a t e d the e x t r e m e L e f t and u n d e r c u t the scare tactics of the far Right. E c o n o m i c consensus may be a precondition for stable multiparty democracy in Mexico.

Notes on Comparative Pathways to Liberslization P e r e s t r o i k a and g l a s n o s t are the w a t c h w o r d s of the p o s t - C o l d W a r era. Q u e s t i o n s r e g a r d i n g t h e interplay b e t w e e n and s e q u e n c e of t h e s e t w o d y n a m i c s have been f r a m e d by three contrasting models: the Asian model, in which e c o n o m i c r e f o r m p r e c e d e s political o p e n i n g ; the Soviet m o d e l , in which political liberalization precedes e c o n o m i c restructuring; and the Latin American model, which combines democratization and economic reform more or less s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . 1 3 T a l k of " S a l i n a s t r o i k a " m a k e s f o r c a t c h y j o u r n a l i s m , but M e x i c o ' s p a t h w a y to liberalization s e e m s a sui g e n e r i s composite of elements f r o m all three models. At first glance, M e x i c o bears s o m e resemblance to the Asian models like South Korea, T a i w a n , and Singapore, where high growth was achieved under modernizing, relatively benign authoritarian regimes. T h e seeds of democratic transition in such r e g i m e s are found in their tolerance of limited legislatures, o p p o s i t i o n party a c t i v i t y , f r e e d o m of p e r s o n a l m o v e m e n t , and m o d e r a t e liberty of press and intellectual life. M e x i c o might eventually a p p r o x i m a t e the d e m o c r a c y of J a p a n with its l o n g s t a n d i n g d o m i n a n c e by the Liberal Party, a feat a c h i e v e d within an open electoral e n v i r o n m e n t . P r e s i d e n t S a l i n a s ' s personal interest in Asia and his comparison of the single-party rule of M e x i c o ' s P R I with J a p a n imply an attraction to d i s c i p l i n e d authority and hierarchy. "I k e e p hearing," argues Salinas, "that in M e x i c o one party has held p o w e r f o r seventy years, but w h e n I think of h o w o n e party has ruled long in c o u n t r i e s like J a p a n and Italy, I pay less attention to the criticism." 1 4 Like the leaders of the Asian tigers, President Salinas has been unwilling to j e o p a r d i z e or s a c r i f i c e the n a t i o n ' s e c o n o m i c stability and g r o w t h f o r a potentially unstable d e m o c r a t i c transition. Multiparty d e m o c r a c y is tolerated to the extent that it is perceived as nonthreatening to e c o n o m i c r e f o r m . " W e

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need to c o n s o l i d a t e o u r e c o n o m i c r e f o r m and that d e m a n d s the creation of political c o n s e n s u s that m a k e s possible all of the [economic] d e c i s i o n s that w e have been a d o p t i n g . " 1 5 S u c h a view suggests again that the n a r r o w i n g of i d e o l o g i c a l p o l a r i z a t i o n a n d the p e r m a n e n t i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of t h e e c o n o m i c r e f o r m m o d e l may be a prerequisite for the evolution of a stable d e m o c r a c y . W h a t e v e r t h e i n t e n t i o n s of M e x i c o ' s e c o n o m i c r e f o r m e r s , political liberalization may be an inevitable product of successful e c o n o m i c m o d e r n i z a t i o n . E v e n the Asian nations noted a b o v e have been u n a b l e to contain domestic pressures f o r political liberalization. M e x i c o shares important characteristics with the Soviet model, notably a legacy of revolutionary origins and an entrenched single-party b u r e a u c r a c y . T h e d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t that both nations suffered vis-à-vis their revolutionary heritage led to a sense of f r a u d , or "the M y t h t r a n s f o r m e d into the Lie," which u n d e r m i n e d the legitimacy of both regimes. 1 6 T h e interpénétration of e c o n o m i c and political life resulted in widespread e c o n o m i c i n e f f i c i e n c i e s and corruption. T h e subordination of economics to single-party politics led to the f o r m a t i o n of a core of retrograde forces and vested interests o p p o s i n g reform. In m a n y respects, M e x i c o ' s r e f o r m trajectory is best d e s c r i b e d as a reaction to the Soviet e x p e r i e n c e rather than as a d e v e l o p m e n t a l parallel to the Asian experience. T h e Soviet reform offered a vivid lesson in the dangers of d e l i b e r a t e l y f o s t e r i n g g l a s n o s t in a d v a n c e of p e r e s t r o i k a . M i k h a i l G o r b a c h e v ' s rationale f o r a glasnost-first strategy was that his e c o n o m i c r e f o r m f a c e d o b s t r u c t i o n f r o m c o n s e r v a t i v e forces within the s y s t e m . H e b e l i e v e d that the reactionary party nomenklatura could be kept at bay by aligning with the f o r c e s of d e m o c r a t i c reform. Glasnost w a s to rectify the h i d e o u s past of Stalinism w h i l e simultaneously clearing political d e a d w o o d f r o m t h e path of e c o n o m i c r e f o r m . G l a s n o s t , h o w e v e r , u n l e a s h e d an u n f o r e s e e n and uncontrollable tide of anti-regime sentiment, and ultimately m a d e t h e n a t i o n u n g o v e r n a b l e and e c o n o m i c a l l y u n r e f o r m a b l e u n d e r G o r b a c h e v . G o r b a c h e v w a s p e r c e i v e d as part of the s y s t e m a n d w a s o v e r w h e l m e d by the clamor for fundamental change. 1 7 T h e d i l e m m a of all r e f o r m s f r o m above, particularly in aging regimes, is h o w to avoid unleashing a revolution f r o m below. T h e history of what Jerry H o u g h describes as "westernizing czars" suggests they are often casualties of the very f o r c e s of c h a n g e that they help to bring about. M e x i c o ' s t o p - d o w n m a n a g e d e c o n o m i c and political liberalization has unbottled pressures f r o m below. Salinas's troubled election of 1988 warned of accumulated anti-regime sentiment and must have m a d e him sensitive to the risks of a G o r b a c h e v i a n strategy. Attentive to the dangers, Salinas has observed: S o m e countries are attempting both e c o n o m i c and political reform at the s a m e time, and they e n d up with no reform at all, and e v e n graver p r o b l e m s . In s o m e c o u n t r i e s it has been demonstrated that b e c a u s e e c o n o m i c c h a n g e has failed, the long-awaited hour of democratic c h a n g e

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h a s n ' t m a t e r i a l i z e d . . . . W e will r e s p o n d to t h e call of M e x i c a n s f o r i m p r o v e d w e l l - b e i n g . I t ' s a m a t t e r of the t w o r e f o r m s g o i n g at d i f f e r e n t r h y t h m s , but the priority is e c o n o m i c s . 1 8

P r e s i d e n t Salinas, like G o r b a c h e v , has viewed political o p e n i n g as a technique f o r curbing reactionary forces, the dinosaurs, and inducing a more c o m p e t i t i v e spirit to a PRI grown complacent. Opposition electoral victories were treated as object lessons to recalcitrant Priistas w h o may have doubted the need f o r s e l f - r e f o r m . President S a l i n a s n o n e t h e l e s s a p p e a r s to h a v e c o n c l u d e d that threats to his rule and to his e c o n o m i c r e f o r m f r o m P R I apparatchiks are not sufficiently dangerous to warrant a precipitous glasnost. Moreover, f r o m the regime's perspective, radical democratization did not have the moral urgency of the Soviet case. It is important to reflect on the differences that m a d e the PRI r e f o r m a b l e and the Soviet C o m m u n i s t Party unreformable. O n e distinction is that while the PRI is a central institution of Mexican authoritarianism, it never assumed the a l l - p e r v a s i v e b u r e a u c r a t i c and e c o n o m i c f u n c t i o n s of the S o v i e t C o m m u n i s t Party. Indeed, the comparatively limited f u n c t i o n s of M e x i c o ' s single party and the survival of a mixed e c o n o m y c o m p r i s e the distinction between an authoritarian and totalitarian system. M e x i c o ' s mixed e c o n o m y meant that e c o n o m i c r e f o r m was a shift in emphasis rather than a revolution. T h e PRI also w a s more successful at adapting to e c o n o m i c r e f o r m because of its q u i n t e s s e n t i a l p r a g m a t i s m and i d e o l o g i c a l d i v e r s i t y . T h e M e x i c a n Revolution and its vehicle, the PRI, was never w e d d e d to a quasi-religious doctrine. T h i s p r a g m a t i s m was enhanced with the defection of o p p o n e n t s to m a r k e t r e f o r m like C u a u h t é m o c C á r d e n a s , w h i c h m a d e the P R I m o r e r e f o r m a b l e . By contrast, the departure of reformers like Boris Yeltsin m a d e the C o m m u n i s t Party unreformable. M e x i c o ' s managed political opening has had f e w e r destabilizing e f f e c t s d u e to its history of limited pluralism and o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s . M u l t i p a r t y d e m o c r a c y and a l i b e r a l i z e d p r e s s a n d i n t e l l e c t u a l e n v i r o n m e n t a r e natural o u t g r o w t h s of t h e 1960s s t u d e n t m o v e m e n t . M e x i c o ' s m i x e d e c o n o m y and a u t h o r i t a r i a n s y s t e m c o u l d s u c c e s s f u l l y r e f o r m itself, w h e r e a s the Soviet U n i o n ' s c o m m a n d e c o n o m y and totalitarian system could not. Latin A m e r i c a o f f e r s M e x i c o a model of m o r e or less s i m u l t a n e o u s political and e c o n o m i c liberalization. It is a model f r a u g h t with difficulty. In A r g e n t i n a u n i o n s have f o u g h t the privatization process tooth and nail, and b o m b s h a v e been hurled o u t s i d e the stock e x c h a n g e . In Brazil C o l l o r de M e l l o has been toppled, and the philosophies of e c o n o m i c r e f o r m have m a d e only tentative intellectual and political headway a m o n g the n a t i o n ' s l e a d e r s h i p elite. V e n e z u e l a n d e m o c r a c y has c o m e d a n g e r o u s l y c l o s e to p e r i s h i n g a f t e r the F e b r u a r y 4, 1992, c o u p attempt, and in Peru A l b e r t o F u j i m o r i opted for authoritarian-led reform. Yet the progress of nations like A r g e n t i n a and Chile suggests that democracy and e c o n o m i c r e f o r m can occur simultaneously, even during the difficult years of stabilization.

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Of the three r e f o r m models, Mexico most resembles Latin America in both the nature of its authoritarian culture and its tentative democratization. W h i l e some have seen a sort of oriental despotism in M e x i c o ' s Aztec past, unlike Asia, Mexico has no cultural equivalent of Confucian subordination of the individual to hierarchy in service of the collective well-being. 1 9 Rather, M e x i c o ' s cult of presidentialism, described by Mexican historian Daniel C o s i o Villegas as the emperador sexenal, has a uniquely Latin flavor. Its characteristics derive from pre-Columbian pyramidalism, Spanish m o n a r c h i s m , and indigenous strongman traditions. M e x i c o ' s authoritarian disposition is reinforced by a belief in its ungovernability. S i g n i f i c a n t portions of M e x i c o ' s political elite still doubt that democracy is compatible with stability and the preservation of national sovereignty. T h e glorification of the state and the subordination of civil society are legacies of the Mexican Revolution, which shunted aside the liberal traditions of Benito Juarez and Francisco Madero. Mexico distanced itself f r o m its liberal heritage to the extent that liberal ideals were associated with the U n i t e d S t a t e s . L i k e m a n y o t h e r Latin A m e r i c a n nations, M e x i c o ' s resentment of U.S. incursions led it to pursue the logic that the enemy of my enemy is my friend; many Mexican (and Latin American) intellectuals of the 1960s embraced the mystique of the antiwestern Cuban Revolution and the state as the solution to Latin A m e r i c a ' s social problems. 2 1 ' L i k e m a n y Latin A m e r i c a n nations, M e x i c o ' s liberal i n h e r i t a n c e of respect for individual liberty and aspirations to constitutional democracy were drawn f r o m European and U.S. influences, finding m a x i m u m expression during the brief period known as the Restored Republic during the nineteenth century. These liberal strands have not predominated in modern M e x i c o , but neither w e r e they entirely erased. It is important not to u n d e r e s t i m a t e the d e g r e e to which M e x i c o and Latin A m e r i c a have moved toward reclaiming the liberal strands of their political heritage. It was residual liberalism that m a d e possible the reconciliation of the Mexican Left and the guerrilla m o v e m e n t s with the electoral reforms of 1973 and 1977. T o d a y , the principle of electoral integrity, the legitimation of p o w e r through the ballot box, and the rule of law have b e c o m e the standards by w h i c h p u b l i c a u t h o r i t i e s are m e a s u r e d . M e x i c o ' s civic c u l t u r e n o w incorporates a new body of democratic, electoral, and legal norms to control government. T h e P R I ' s e c o n o m i c liberals will not be able to escape a twentiethcentury encounter with political liberalism. The most durable reform will be constructed on the basis of democratic consensus. Mexico has not yet made a c o m p l e t e transition to multiparty democracy, nor does it fall into simplistic c a t e g o r i e s of repressive authoritarianism or single-party totalitarianism. M e x i c o ' s e c o n o m i c r e f o r m will be incomplete without an u n a m b i v a l e n t e m b r a c e of its liberal heritage, and that includes full electoral d e m o c r a c y , limited government, and the rule of law.

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Notes 1. An e x a m p l e of the agreement found a m o n g scholars of d i f f e r e n t persuasions regarding the politically liberalizing impact of economic reform can be found in the writing of Jorge G. Castañeda, "El desafio democrático," in Mexico: El futuro en juego (Mexico City: Joaquin Mortiz Planeta, 1987); Sidney Weintraub, Marriage of Convenience: Relations Between Mexico and the United States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); and "Why We Support Free Trade with M e x i c o , " a letter to C o n g r e s s signed by t w e n t y - f o u r distinguished specialists in Latin American affairs, in the Wall Street Journal, April 24, 1991. 2. T w o nuanced treatments of the ambivalent record of the Salinas government on political reform can be found in Wayne A. Cornelius, "El PRI en la encrucijada," Nexos 149 (1990); and Lorenzo Meyer, "El limite neoliberal," Nexos (1991). 3. See Karen L. Remmer, "The Political Impact of Economic Crisis in Latin America in the 1980s," American Political Science Review 85, no. 3 (1991); and Joan M. Nelson, Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council and Transaction Press, 1989). 4. M. Delal Baer, "The 1985 Mexican Midterm Elections," "The 1986 Mexican Elections: The Case of Chihuahua," and "The 1988 Mexican Presidential Elections," in the CSIS Latin American Election Study Series (Washington, D C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies). 5. Alfredo Sandoval, "La Participación Ciudadana en la Formacion de la Voluntad Política," in 53rd Asamblea Nacional Ordinaria de COPARMEX, Mexico Nuevo: Compromiso Personal, Acapulco, Guerrero, October 13, 14, and 15, 1988. See also 44th Asamblea Nacional de C O P A R M E X , Gobierno para la Sociedad o la Sociedad para el Gobierno, March 1984. 6. For an exhaustive look at the social impact of the stabilization years, see Mercedes Gonzalez de la Rocha and Agustin Escobar Latapi, eds., Social Responses to Mexico's Economic Crisis of the 1980s (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1991). 7. Susan Kaufman Purcell, The Mexican Profit-Sharing Decision: Politics in Regime (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Sylvia an Authoritarian Maxfield and Ricardo Anzaldua Montoya, Government and Private Sector in Contemporary Mexico (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1987). 8. M. Delal Baer, "The 1991 Mexican Midterm Elections," CSIS Latin American Election Study Series, vol. 9, study 1 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1991). 9. Carlos Salinas de Gortari, Primer Informe de Gobierno, November 1, 1989; Salinas, "Social Liberalism: Our Path," address on the occasion of the 63rd anniversary of the PRI, March 4, 1992. 10. Genaro Borrego, "La refundacion estructural del PRI," Examen 4, no. 37, June 1992. 11. John Bailey, Denise Dresser, and Leopoldo Gomez, "Balance Preliminar 14th Asamblea del PRI," La Jornada (Mexico City), September 26, 1990. 12. Luis Rubio, "Las paradojas de la transición," La Jornada, April 19, 1991; "Transición hacia q u e ? " La Jornada, May 3, 1991, "Una transformación acelerada," La Jornada, April 26, 1991. 13. Sidney Weintraub and M. Delal Baer, "The Interplay Between Economic and Political Opening: The Sequence in Mexico," The Washington Quarterly 15, no. 2 (Spring 1992); and M. Delal Baer, "Profiles in Transition in Latin America

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a n d t h e C a r i b b e a n , " The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, M a r c h 1993. 14. I n t e r v i e w w i t h C a r l o s S a l i n a s , Newsweek, D e c e m b e r 3, 1990, p. 39. 15. I n t e r v i e w w i t h C a r l o s S a l i n a s , El Norte ( M o n t e r r e y ) , N o v e m b e r 26, 1990, p. 13A. 16. M r . X , " T o the Stalin M a u s o l e u m , " Daedalus 119, no. 1 ( W i n t e r 1990). 17. D u s k o D o d e r a n d L o u i s e B r a n s o n , Gorbachev: Heretic in the Kremlin ( N e w Y o r k : V i k i n g B o o k s , 1990). 18. I n t e r v i e w w i t h C a r l o s S a l i n a s , Newsweek, D e c e m b e r 3, 1990, p. 39. 19. A l a n R i d i n g , Distant Neighbors: A Portrait of the Mexicans (New York: A l f r e d A. K n o p f , 1985). 20. E n r i q u e K r a u z e is one of the m o s t e l o q u e n t s p o k e s m e n for the M e x i c a n liberal tradition. S e e his Por una democracia sin adjectivos (Mexico City: Joaquin M o r t i z P l a n e t a , 1986) and " V u e l t a al l i b e r a l i s m o , " Excelsior, O c t o b e r 22, 1989.

Power, Value, and Distribution in the NAFTA Clark W. Reynolds

Throughout the world, economic forces are driving politics in the direction of regional integration. This is in part a need to legitimate and place in a stable legal and institutional framework the integration already under way in the international system. It is also in part a reaction of some regions to the process of integration of other regions, in which both economics and politics are playing a role.

A Political-Economic Approach to the New Regional Integration The present wave of integration interests and policies differ in important ways from those of the past. In the 1950s and 1960s free trade areas and common markets were designed to extend market reserves and market shelters from individual countries to groups of countries. The process was analyzed in terms of trade creation and trade diversion, with regional integration treated as a second-best strategy in an environment not yet ready for global free trade. The "gains from trade" resulting from such a process were generally seen to be static, resulting from a shift in the allocation of existing resources toward greater comparative advantage. The new pattern of regional integration manifests a different approach, one heavily influenced by the expected benefits (over costs) of development in the direction of dynamic comparative advantage through trade and investment liberalization. This approach focuses on the economic gains from expansion of subregional and international markets and from the reduction of transport, communication, and other transaction costs through the removal of legal and institutional barriers to exchange and the provision of requisite market-integrating infrastructure. According to most economists, the proposed NAFTA is such a manifestation, one that can be viewed in part as stemming from the desire of Canada, Mexico, and the United States to 69

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legitimate, safeguard, and rationalize the integration of their economies that is already taking place and that has been accelerating in recent years. In part the proposal is also a reaction among North American partners to the processes of regional integration taking place elsewhere. Political theorists offer differing arguments to explain why Mexico and Canada have pursued integration with the United States and why in general smaller states are willing to take the risk implicit in such arrangements, given their asymmetrical bargaining power vis-à-vis the larger state (the United States in NAFTA; Germany in the European Community [EC]). They also use different approaches to address the question of why larger states are willing to relinquish sovereignty in the process of multilateral decisionmaking, including dispute settlement. One set of approaches focuses on the likely benefits in the form of externalities that will move all partners toward a "Pareto optimal" frontier—offsetting the loss of sovereignty to the larger state and the weaker bargaining position of the smaller states. These approaches also highlight the likely benefits to the smaller partners of pooling their bargaining power vis-à-vis the regional leader. The other set of approaches to these questions of motivation stresses the importance of sovereignty and national power relations and the problems inherent in severely asymmetrical regional associations, especially those between developing countries and advanced industrial economies (as would be the case with links between Mexico and the United States or Canada). A variation of this argument explains asymmetrical integration in terms of second-best arrangements, where the losses to some of the partners from not joining would exceed those from integration. The result is suboptimal in Pareto terminology—because all partners are not actually as well off or better off after the integration—but it is superior to the alternative of going it alone. From this perspective, which tends to deemphasize or even ignore the dynamic economic gains from integration, countries such as Mexico and Canada, which already have a large share of their trade with the United States, are seen as pursuing "reluctant regionalism" for fear of losing their present trade advantages in a wave of U.S. protectionism. Political economists can make an important contribution to this debate by estimating the economic and social opportunity costs of alternative strategies, such as regional integration versus unilateralism. Whatever the approach taken, changing patterns of economic openness and regional integration have important political implications within as well as between countries. In Mexico and Canada the economic policies of the last few years have been associated with major changes in the political landscape. As economics drive politics, countries participating in a regional pact alter their respective negotiating positions on economic policies. In the case of the EC this is apparent most recently in some of the issues raised in France's spring 1992 elections, in the role of the French farmers, and in France's position on the Common Agricultural Policy in the Uruguay Round of the

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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In the case of the United States and Canada the continuing recession in 1992, falling profits, and rising unemployment have reduced their degrees of freedom to pursue trade liberalization with Mexico. The remainder of this chapter examines how Mexico's position on the NAFTA is influenced by and influences regional political developments. Although the discussion focuses primarily on the economic implications of political liberalization in Mexico, it also touches on the political implications of economic liberalization.

Defining the Concepts of Power, Value, and Distribution Throughout this discussion power is defined as the ability of some social groups to exercise authority over others. Particular attention will be paid to the use of actual or potential economic power to affect the political process, and the feedback of the resulting political changes on the economy itself. The focus here on the interactive relationship between economics and politics is not intended to ignore the importance of military and paramilitary power and its role in nation building and the exercise of sovereignty or the effect of discrimination on the exercise of power by racial, ethnic, gender, or other groups. Notwithstanding their importance, these manifestations of power are not dealt with here except as they relate to economic factors. Changes in domestic and international economic relations carry with them important implications for the military and security arenas. This fact is extremely important to recognize in considering the N A F T A and other regional economic associations and the internal development of Mexico. 1 The EC, for example, is facing growing pressures to adapt political structures and military and security activities to the new dimensions of e c o n o m i c integration, and this process will become even more complicated with the inclusion of the "outer seven" in the free trade activities of the original twelve members of the EC. With the diminishing importance of Cold War strategies—a decline that is in part due to economic and technological challenges (which have increased the opportunity costs of highly centralized, security-based regimes)—changing economic conditions are playing an ever more salient role in the structure of power relations within and between countries. Value in this discussion means the prices and quantities of goods and services as determined by market and nonmarket forces in the respective economies. To the extent that imperfections in markets reflect natural or artificial barriers to market entry, the combination of obstacles to competition, including monopolistic and monopsonistic forces as well as legal and institutional barriers, will alter prices, quantities, a n d —

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a c c o r d i n g l y — m a r k e t value. T h e m o v e m e n t f r o m one pattern of laws and i n s t i t u t i o n s to a n o t h e r , and c h a n g e s in the social and institutional configuration of market forces (market power), will have an impact on value as defined above. Hence, the recent shift toward economic liberalization in M e x i c o , deregulation and greater liberalization in the United States and C a n a d a , and the addition or removal of tariffs and nontariff barriers (and "tariffication") all have implications for the level of value within a country and the distribution of value between two countries. Distribution as used here refers to the way in which value, and associated power relations, are allocated within and between the economies engaging in economic integration. Distribution is presented primarily in functional terms, as the allocation of value added in the economy (with G D P being the sum of value added) between recipients of labor and property income. Some effort is m a d e to relate a r g u m e n t s about the functional distribution of income to income shares a m o n g social groups, such as skilled and unskilled labor, but for the most part the points raised in this chapter refer to disaggregation by region and sector rather than by social group. Of course M e x i c o ' s regional and sectoral patterns of income distribution are highly unequal and o f f e r important insights into the social c o n s e q u e n c e s of the patterns (between north and south, rural and urban e c o n o m i e s , irrigated and nonirrigated agriculture—all of which tend to follow a regional pattern of distribution). T h e approach taken is to suggest in very broad terms the likely winners and losers f r o m structural adjustment, international economic liberalization, and increased regional integration of recent years. The goal here is to relate these p r e d i c t i o n s to c h a n g e s in voting patterns, by region and social group, in order to suggest linkages between the social outcomes of economic policy and the political process. The data presented are necessarily f r o m the period prior to any formal N A F T A treaty; no attempt is made to simulate p o s t - N A F T A conditions, although a n u m b e r of conjectures about f u t u r e o u t c o m e s of present strategies are raised, in both political and e c o n o m i c terms. While economic forces have driven politics in Mexico in the direction of regional integration, the implicit threat that integration poses to M e x i c o ' s sovereignty remains a barrier to a regional accord, as does the fear of adverse distributional consequences and the danger that, for some sectors, regions, and social groups, losses will outstrip gains, at least in the short to m e d i u m term. If the battle over issues of sovereignty and distribution is joined, all three countries may well experience an adverse political reaction to economic integration that could upset the N A F T A process. Yet if the strategy for economic integration includes a compensation principle (offsetting losses out of present and future gains) and if supranational institutions are empowered to settle d i s p u t e s and o t h e r w i s e arbitrate the integration process, a new s o v e r e i g n t y may e m e r g e c o n s i s t e n t with h i g h e r i n c o m e and g r e a t e r distributive justice.

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A Regional Approach to the Political Economy of Structural Adjustment T h e essence of a viable d e v e l o p m e n t strategy in a d e m o c r a c y (or a minimally coercive authoritarian regime) calls for a social pact in which the e c o n o m y is g r o w i n g m o r e rapidly than the population and in which all regions, sectors, and social g r o u p s p e r c e i v e t h e m s e l v e s to be sharing in the d e v e l o p m e n t process or at least not being h a r m e d by it. These conditions held for M e x i c o f r o m 1940 t h r o u g h 1981. It is generally accepted that M e x i c o ' s p o s t w a r growth m o d e l — b a s e d on e x p o r t s of raw materials and primary p r o d u c t s together with state-subsidized, import-substituting industries and the growth of urban c o m m e r c e , construction, and s e r v i c e s — w o r k e d well e n o u g h to be called the Mexican Miracle by the 1960s. By the 1970s, h o w e v e r , the pact had begun to reveal its limitations. P r o d u c t i v i t y g r o w t h based on i n w a r d - o r i e n t e d d e v e l o p m e n t could not be sustained i n d e f i n i t e l y . E x c e s s i v e increases in imports relative to e x p o r t s caused a severe deterioration in the trade balance, requiring increased foreign b o r r o w i n g . T h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s e f f o r t s to sustain g r o w t h t h r o u g h p u b l i c expenditures, without any m a j o r tax increase (part of the de facto pact with the private sector) w i d e n e d fiscal d e f i c i t s , which in turn led to steadily e x p a n d i n g domestic debt and inflation. Although the oil b o o m of 1 9 7 8 - 1 9 8 1 o f f e r e d a brief respite by o p e n i n g up new lines of credit and permitting the e c o n o m y to e x p a n d by a third in just f o u r years, the handwriting was on the wall. T h e sharp rise in world interest rates and the collapse in oil prices at the b e g i n n i n g of the 1980s caused M e x i c o to be the first m a j o r casualty of the Latin A m e r i c a n debt crisis in August 1982.

End of the Postwar Socioeconomic Pact: The Political-Economic Crisis of the 1980s T o deal with the e c o n o m i c crisis, the new administration of President Miguel d e la Madrid pursued a m a j o r stabilization program designed to cut drastically g o v e r n m e n t expenditures, raise revenues, devalue the real exchange rate (raise t h e price of tradables over nontradables to reverse the trade deficit), privatize p u b l i c - s e c t o r e n t e r p r i s e , and s t i m u l a t e private i n v e s t m e n t . T h i s a p p r o a c h r e p r e s e n t e d an a b o u t - f a c e f o r the PRI, which c o n t i n u e d to d o m i n a t e the g o v e r n m e n t w h i l e b r i n g i n g n e w players, and n e w ideas, into t h e policy p r o c e s s . T h e l o n g - s t a n d i n g pact b e t w e e n the g o v e r n m e n t and t h e private sector, including the official labor unions, peasant agriculture, and p o p u l a r organizations, was bankrupt both literally and figuratively. W h a t w a s clearly an e c o n o m i c crisis proved to be a political crisis as well. T h e initial latitude to u n d e r t a k e such drastic changes in e c o n o m i c policy derived f r o m both the failure of the previous regime and the magnitude of the

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problems facing the de la Madrid administration as it entered office in D e c e m b e r 1982. Perhaps surprisingly, there was no major political opposition in that election year. Yet even many of the party faithful accused the old-line PRI oligarchy of ineptitude at best or venality at worst. At the outset they were less critical of the underlying development model than of flaws in its implementation. Whatever the reason for blame, however, it was evident that a model dependent on major expenditures by a "rector-state" (rectoria del estado) was no longer viable economically. Only a major reform capable of raising significant private revenues could rescue the economy. Unfortunately, the severe burden of debt, coupled with a lack of trust in the government by the private sector (badly burned by the August 1982 Mexdollar devaluation and subsequent bank nationalization), meant that whatever the new administration's commitment to reform, it would take some time to reestablish government credibility. While all sides recognized after 1982 that the old regime could no longer be pieced together, less attention seemed to be given to the fact that even in an authoritarian regime, fundamental economic reforms cannot take place in a political vacuum, unless policymakers are prepared to pay the costs of shortterm coercion; and that route could have adverse economic repercussions. It took several years—and the election of 1988—to demonstrate that bringing about change through the highly centralized Mexican system, while still preserving some degree of political stability, would require a totally new social pact between the state and civil society. All major interest groups with political voice and with potential disruptive power would have to perceive that the benefits of such a pact would exceed its costs, net of compensation. It was simply not possible to meet this objective in the mid-1980s. The condition of the economy and the lack of additional lines of external credit were so serious during the time of Mexico's stagflation that no serious zerosum deal was possible, and gains from economic growth were unavailable to support a positive-sum approach. The country was in a catch-22. Without restructuring and growth, a new social pact could not be forged. Yet without a new social pact, private-sector expectations would remain too low to justify the major expenditures on which restructuring and growth depended. The uncertainty, in short, was political as well as economic. By the presidential election of 1988, skepticism was rife that a reform of the PRI would ever be possible, certainly not a reform that would match the economic reforms that had already taken place. Having been burned once, private investors continued to resist committing their resources to the future of an uncertain political economy. Those in the popular wings of the PRI, frustrated by the continuing commitment of the de la Madrid administration to fiscal conservatism, orthodox stabilization measures, and belt-tightening (perceived to be at the expense of social expenditures), began to seek alternative political paths. For many the choice was one of virtual desperation, given the importance of PRI patronage to political careers in

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Mexico (including many in the loyal opposition) and the highly centralized nature of decisionmaking under the imperial presidency. Meanwhile, a surprisingly vigorous popular opposition movement spread throughout much of the country in reaction to the general recession and collapse of real wages and employment. For a growing number in the urban middle class, the northern border states, and the Catholic church, the PAN now offered an attractive, if somewhat unproven, alternative to the PRI.

The Sectoral and Regional Pattern of Productivity by the Mid-1980s The ability to implement major policy reforms depends not only on political will but also on the economic capacity to pay for the costs of reform, including compensation of losers by winners. That economic capacity is circumscribed by the patterns of production and productivity in the economy and the scope of change during the period of reform. The demand for policy reform depends in part on the participation of interest groups. Unfortunately, the 1980s were a time of increasing demands for political reform against a backdrop of shrinking economic latitude. This section examines Mexico in the mid-1980s from the standpoint of the structure of output, employment, and productivity after forty years of growth followed by three years of stagflation. Data are presented for the year 1985, reflecting conditions before the impact of crisis-induced restructuring had begun to be visible. The data point to the uneven pattern of Mexican productivity (value added per worker) by sector and region in the mid-1980s and are juxtaposed with voting trends at the time. No attempt is made to use these data for more than an introductory exploration of major politicaleconomic issues. 2 Nevertheless, some key relationships between the uneven distribution of income and productivity and voting behavior come to light even in the rough data. These bear important implications for future policies to link growth with regional decentralization of the development process through the diffusion of productivity, income, and political decisionmaking. The main issue that links economics and politics is diffusion. Increases in output per worker must be achieved in ways that promote not only growth but also expansion of social participation through a functional process of regional and sectoral diffusion. Reforms in public policy should favor the spread of competitive investment and rising real wages. In simplest terms, if the reform model of the postcrisis years is to be successful, Mexico must overcome the extreme inequality in income by sector and region that has characterized the nation for decades. This can take place only if the underlying pattern of productivity converges by sector and region. Convergence means new investment in economic and social infrastructure in response to entrepreneurship and the diffusion of financial

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capital, technology, and improved labor skills; the removal of obstacles to the exchange of goods and services; and the mobility of labor and capital a m o n g sectors and regions. Since some factors are not m o b i l e — f o r example, resources such as land and water—it may well be necessary for s o m e labor and capital to m o v e b e t w e e n countries as well. T r a n s f e r p a y m e n t s are insufficient and run the risk of distorting resource allocation. Just as growth without distribution is inconsistent with political stability, social security, and incentives for investment, so is distribution without growth. Alone, either a p p r o a c h tends to be s e l f - d e f e a t i n g in p o l i t i c a l - e c o n o m i c terms, creating d i s i n c e n t i v e s for investment, e x a c e r b a t i n g social and political differences, and ultimately leading to increased instability, risk, and capital flight. 3 Figure 5.1 presents the official estimates of G D P per worker in 1985, or average labor productivity, allocated among the nine major production sectors and weighted by the number of workers employed per sector. Presented as such, the integral of the area of the bars in the figure equals G D P . A quick glance shows that productivity per worker remained highly skewed in 1985, despite forty years of the Mexican Miracle. (Similar distributions for 1970 and 1980 indicate that the crisis did not significantly worsen sectoral inequalities. Introducing estimates for the low-productivity u n d e r g r o u n d economy would only increase the skewness of the figures by extending the flat area farther to the right.) Output (value added) per worker in Mexico, on average, rose in the decade before the crisis f r o m 5,900 U.S. dollars in 1970 to 7,200 in 1980. T h e figure was only slightly higher at 7,300 in 1985 (measured in constant 1980 U.S. dollars, as are all values in the chapter unless otherwise indicated). Yet the disparity between average productivity in financial services and agriculture remained at eight to one in 1985 (see Figure 5.1). Since the diagram presents sectoral averages rather than the distribution within given sectors, which was itself highly uneven, the gap between the highest productivity activities and the lowest was clearly much greater than eight to one. The geographical pattern of Mexican productivity is also highly skewed, as shown in Figure 5.2 for 1985. Mexican G D P per worker is divided into the country's six m a j o r regions, according to the number of employed workers in each region. 4 (As in Figure 5.1, the integral of the area of the vertical bars represents total G D P in 1985.) Not surprisingly, Metropolitan M e x i c o City had by far the highest value added per worker, though much of the value was attributable to the concentration of business, finance, and g o v e r n m e n t services in the capital. The importance of the capital is due to the continuing role of the state in the e c o n o m y ; even the steps toward privatization are tightly orchestrated by the central government. T h e fiscal system radiates f r o m M e x i c o City to which most revenues accrue. Those revenues are then reallocated through federal, state, municipal, and regional institutions.

Figure 5.1

Average Productivity in Mexico by Sector, 1985 (in 1980 U.S. dollars)

30 - 2:9,440

25 22,334 20,368 =

20 -

15 -

13,983

13,618

9,720

I0 -

4,551

5 -

4,432 2,227

10 mil.

5 mil. 1 2 3 4

5

6

7

15 mil. 8

20 mil. 9

Sectors (million workers) Source: From tables prepared by Matt Carnes and Dolores Nieto-Ituarte for the Americas Program at Stanford University, using data f r o m M e x i c o ' s Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía, e Informática (INEGI). Note-, Productivity is defined as value added per worker per year. The sum of all areas in the bars equals G D P . Sectors: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Financial services (470,000 workers) Mining and petroleum (266,000) Electricity (99,000) M a n u f a c t u r i n g (2,451,000)

5. C o m m e r c e , restaurants, and hotels (3,147,000) 6. Transport and communications ( 1,029,000) 7. Other services and government (6,450,000) 8. Construction (1,959,000) 9. Agriculture, cattle, forestry, and fishing (6,096,000) Total labor force = 21,967,000

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Figure 5.2

Average Productivity in Mexico by Region, 1985 (in 1980 U.S. dollars)

12 10,710

10 -

7,315 6,946 6,043 6

-

5.821

4 3,674

2

-

0 H

H 5 mil.

h 10 mil.

Metropolitan Mexico City

North

North Pacific

l

1 15 mil. Rest of Center

Gulf

—I 20 mil. South Pacific

Source : From tables prepared by Matt Carnes and Dolores Nieto-Ituarte for the Americas Program at Stanford University, using data from Mexico's Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía, e Informática (INEGI). Note: Productivity is defined as value added per worker per year. The sum of all areas in the bars equals GDP. Number of Workers in Each Metropolitan Mexico City North North Pacific Rest of Center Gulf South Pacific Total labor force

Sector: 5,710,000 3,935,000 1,791,000 5,386,000 2,727,000 2,418,000 21,967,000

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Perhaps surprisingly, even as late as 1985 the North and North Pacific regions remained well below Metropolitan Mexico City in output per worker. Despite the fact that the northern states contain border regions that have been the focus of much of Mexico's economic growth during the 1980s—due in particular to the astonishing acceleration of production and employment in the border industries or maquiladoras—much of the growth of border production has been extensive, based on steady or declining capitallabor ratios. The dollar cost of real wages fell below Northeast Asian levels after the crisis of 1982. (Real wages are now beginning to recover on the border, and maquiladoras are expanding southward.) Much of the border industry production in the 1980s has been based on assembly operations, using imported raw materials and intermediate goods, and a growing percentage of workers in the northern region are employed in lowproductivity services and agriculture. Productivity averages in the Rest of Center are not far below those in the North Pacific, while the Gulf average is pulled up by the location of Mexico's oil production, which employs a disproportionately small share of the labor force, as indicated in Figure 5.1, and the impressive growth of tourism in the Yucatán region, especially Cancún. In fact, the majority of workers in the Gulf region are not too far above those in the South Pacific, so that if a more detailed profile of the geographical distribution of productivity were provided, the curve in Figure 5.2 would be much more skewed to the left. Here we begin to see the economic dimensions of the political-economic crisis. In the mid-1980s, at the very time when Mexico was attempting to r e s t r u c t u r e the e c o n o m y in pursuit of i m p r o v e d e f f i c i e n c y and competitiveness, the great majority of households remained dependent for their livelihood on employment in sectors and regions that lagged far behind the national average in productivity, and the new policies of economic openness and liberalization had not yet demonstrated any commensurate growth in labor productivity. The areas of most rapid growth were still registering extensive rather than intensive increases in production. Prospects for increased fiscal outlays based on productivity growth were bleak, yet the political front required real resources for any new social pact linking growth and distribution.

The Heterodox Adjustment Program: 1987-Present By the end of 1987 the orthodox structural adjustment program of the government did not seem to be working. The economy was moribund under the pressures of fiscal restraint, falling real wages, and private-sector uncertainty. The large domestic financial deficit was being funded by shortterm borrowing and the inflation tax, and the shortage of foreign exchange

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forced the peso steadily downward. Mexico faced stagflation on an unprecedented scale just as the international financial market experienced its own melt-down. The collapse of the Mexico City stock market followed. The government decided to change course and attempt a heterodox stabilization program. The peso was pegged to the dollar, and agreements were announced between the government, labor, and the private sector to freeze wages and prices. Since the fiscal balance had already been greatly improved in operational (real) terms (not financial ones, which included the robbing-Peter-to-pay-Paul dimension of short-term rollovers of the domestic debt), a concertacion or social pact was considered sufficient to eliminate the so-called inertial component of inflationary expectations. Nominal interest rates should decline, the financial deficit of the government (much of which was accounted for by high nominal borrowing rates to refinance short-term debt) should vanish, and stability should be restored. Those corrections in place, investor expectations would improve, capital would return to Mexico, and growth could resume. This 1987 social pact, the Pact for Economic Solidarity (PSE), with its successive renewals (it was negotiated under the Salinas administration as the Pact for Stability and Economic Growth), was not a long-term social pact, nor was it ever intended to be. Rather it was a short-term strategy to halt inflation by a unique accord among major social and economic groups and the state to stop de facto indexing of wages, prices, interest rates, and the exchange rate. The PSE was accepted by all sectors because each stood to gain more from an agreement than it would lose, provided that all adhered to the deal. In addition, and of great importance to its acceptance as broker, the de la Madrid administration had won enough respect to inspire confidence that it would stay the course in macroeconomic policy without too great a bias toward any one sector. The strategy met great, but incomplete success. From the end of 1987 to the present, the rate of inflation has fallen to below 20 percent. The PSE, however, did not jump-start the economy, and for the PRI its results did not come in time to stave off major political challenges for de la M a d r i d ' s hand-picked successor, Carlos Salinas, in the 1988 election campaign. In the wisdom of hindsight, the strategy of the PRI in the 1980s appears to have had a sequential character in which economic efficiency and price stability were given priority over reform in the social pact. The model was heavily biased toward accomplishing economic adjustment first. Pressure for reform of distribution was held back in the short run in order to gain sufficient recovery, restructuring, and growth in the medium run. Those goals, when realized, could provide the "dividend" for more equitable social participation in the long run. The 1988 election appeared to short-circuit that strategy.

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The Presidential Election of 1988: Regional Results In the d r a m a t i c election of 1988, the single-party d o m i n a n c e of the PRI was more vigorously c h a l l e n g e d than at any time since 1940, when the o p p o s i tion candidate, General Juan Andreu A l m a z á n , provided serious competition for the PRI candidate, M a n u e l Avila C a m a c h o , and appeared to have w o n in M e x i c o C i t y , t h o u g h not in the nation at large. Ironically, the historically low f i g u r e s p u b l i s h e d f o r the PRI, while c h a l l e n g e d by the o p p o s i t i o n as being too high, were probably less distorted than in earlier years b e c a u s e the official c a n d i d a t e and party leadership expressed c o m m i t m e n t to a highly visible and more democratic electoral process. In Figure 5.3 w e see the officially reported voting pattern f o r the PRI in the 1988 presidential elections. T h e election results by region h a v e been ordered in the s a m e way as the productivity rankings in Figure 5.2. With the e x c e p t i o n of the n o r t h e r n states, the P R I vote in 1988 has an i n v e r s e relationship to the distribution of productivity by region. In fact the highest region in output per w o r k e r , Metropolitan M e x i c o City, s h o w s the lowest PRI v o t i n g p e r c e n t a g e ( 2 8 percent), w h i l e the poorest r e g i o n , the South Pacific, s h o w s the highest percentage (70 percent). T o the e x t e n t that e c o n o m i c c o n d i t i o n s matter, and it is h y p o t h e s i z e d here that they play a considerable role in support f o r the PRI, the explanation seems to lie in the skewed distribution of productivity (and income, which is not presented here) and the degree of politicization of the regions and social g r o u p s b e i n g studied. T h e r e is little question that most s e g m e n t s of society in M e t r o p o l i t a n M e x i c o C i t y , especially after the c o m b i n e d s h o c k s of the crisis and the 1986 earthquake, were relatively politicized and disinclined to vote f o r the incumbent. In F i g u r e 5.4 the pattern of productivity in Metropolitan M e x i c o City f o r 1985 is p r e s e n t e d f o r the nine m a j o r p r o d u c t i o n sectors. T h e s e v e r e s k e w i n g in o u t p u t p e r w o r k e r within the area is e v i d e n t . I n d e e d o t h e r longitudinal data (not presented here but included in the larger study) indicate that the s k e w i n g of p r o d u c t i v i t y and i n c o m e is g r o w i n g w o r s e . W o r k e r s m i g r a t i n g to M e x i c o C i t y are f o r c e d to find e m p l o y m e n t in t h e u r b a n informal sector, in low-skilled construction and service activities, and b e c o m e part of an i m p o v e r i s h e d urban underclass. This process, already a serious p r o b l e m by the 1970s, w a s exacerbated by the crisis of the 1980s. T h e interesting relationship between voting patterns and productivity in M e t r o p o l i t a n M e x i c o City can be seen in Figure 5.5. In the 1988 presidential election, the e x t r e m e inequality in Metropolitan M e x i c o City w a s associated with a h i g h l y polarized voting pattern as w e l l — o n l y a b o u t 3 0 p e r c e n t of the vote f o r the P R I and 5 0 percent for the united L e f t opposition candidate, C u a u h t é m o c C á r d e n a s of the National D e m o c r a t i c Front ( F D N ) , with a heavy bias toward the l o w e r - i n c o m e districts. T w e n t y percent, with strong

CLARK W. REYNOLDS

82

Figure 5.3

V o t i n g for the P R I in the 1 9 8 8 Presidential Election by Region (percentage)

70% 65%

63%

53% 48%

28%

Metropolitan Mexico City

North

North Pacific

Rest of Center

Gulf

South Pacific

Source: Data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía, e Informática (INEGI), Mexico City. Voting Population

in Each

Metropolitan Mexico City North North Pacific Rest of Center Gulf South Pacific Total

Region: 10,399,000 6,381,000 3,095,000 9,458,000 4,694,000 3,598,000 37,625,000

Figure 5.4

30 -

Average Productivity in Metropolitan Mexico City by Sector, 1985 (in 1980 U.S. dollars) 29,222

25 22,484 21 714

20

16,961 15 -

11,459 10

-

7,790

5 -

2,216 "T" 1 mil 2

3

2 mil.

3 mil.

4 mil.

1,358 — 1,355 5 mil.

5 Sectors (million workers)

Source: From tables prepared by Matt Carnes and Dolores Nieto-Ituarte for the Americas Program at Stanford University, using data from Mexico's Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía, e Informática (INEGI). Note: Productivity is defined as value added per worker per year. The sum of all areas in the bars equals GDP. Sectors: 1. Commerce, restaurants, and hotels (691,000 workers) 2. Financial services (242,000) 3. Transport and communications (217,000) 4. Manufacturing (869,000) 5. Electricity (35,000) 6. Other services and government ( 1,480,000) 7. Construction (1,380,000) 8. Mining and petroleum (188,000) 9. Agriculture, cattle, forestry, and fishing (610,000) Total labor force = 5,710,000

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84

representation of s u b u r b a n middle- and u p p e r - i n c o m e groups, voted for the colorful opposition candidate of the Right, M a n u e l Clouthier of the PAN. In o t h e r w o r d s , p o l a r i z a t i o n in p r o d u c t i v i t y (and i n c o m e ) in M e t r o p o l i t a n M e x i c o City, o n e of the most heavily politicized locales in M e x i c o , was associated with political polarization as well. L a c k of c o n v e r g e n c e in p r o d u c t i v i t y and i n c o m e , c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of M e x i c o ' s o v e r c r o w d e d m a j o r city, could have severe repercussions for the P R I . If the c o u n t r y ' s m a c r o e c o n o m i c s t r a t e g i e s c o n t i n u e to lead to polarization, associated with a period of severe adjustment and stabilization, the upper middle-class voters would be expected to move toward the P A N and the large and swelling proletariat toward the F D N or its c o m p o n e n t parties. T h e PRI also faced problems f r o m both ends of the political spectrum in other regions in 1988, with the higher-productivity (and - i n c o m e ) North and North Pacific regions s h o w i n g the P A N strongly outpacing the F D N , while in the lower-productivity Rest of Center (see averages f r o m Figure 5.2) the F D N d o m i n a t e d the P A N . 5 In both regions, however, the PRI continued to receive over one-half of the officially reported vote. In other words, based on the 1988 results, if on a national basis c o n t i n u e d d i v e r g e n c e rather than c o n v e r g e n c e in productivity and income prevailed, further erosion of PRI support could be anticipated in direct proportion to the degree of polarization

Figure 5.5 Metropolitan Mexico City Voting, 1988 Presidential Elections Other

2.37%

PRI

28.32%

FDN

49.69%

PAN

19.62%

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and result in increased support for other political parties. M e x i c o would divide even f u r t h e r into political as well as e c o n o m i c regions, and the sharpest polarization in both economy and politics could take place in the location with the highest output per capita, Metropolitan M e x i c o City. Moreover, as the forces of democratization continued to spread throughout the country, and if all the other factors had remained the same, this trend toward polarization would almost certainly have increased.

C o m p a r i s o n of 1988 and 1991 Regional Election Results However, things did not remain the same. By the 1991 election the economy had begun to emerge f r o m the doldrums. After the shock of 1988, President Salinas promoted a major new social development program, Pronasol, that focused on pockets of poverty and politically sensitive areas throughout Mexico. A large and growing share (44 percent of the programmable federal investment budget in 1991, exceeding 1.4 billion U.S. dollars) of the federal budget, which w a s now in operational surplus, was committed to a more diffused and inclusive process of development promotion. T h e c o m b i n a t i o n of gradual e c o n o m i c recovery, even as the United States moved into recession, and increasing attention to social programs and problem areas had a favorable effect on the fortunes of the PRI, as can be seen in Figures 5.6 and 5.7. The decision of President Salinas to m o v e toward negotiation of the N A F T A met a surprising groundswell of support in M e x i c o all a l o n g the political s p e c t r u m , despite the m i s g i v i n g s of many business, political, and intellectual c o m m e n t a t o r s . T h e " a n n o u n c e m e n t e f f e c t " of the N A F T A appeared to lower d i s c o u n t s for political and e c o n o m i c risk. The inflow of financial capital f r o m abroad increased and f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e reserves strengthened, even though imports were growing far more rapidly than exports (as the peso was revalued against the dollar). By 1991 the t w o opposition parties had begun to lose much of the ground they had gained. In 1988 their relatively strong presidential candidates had run against the then relatively u n k n o w n Salinas and against the g o v e r n m e n t ' s austerity program. The F D N coalition that had provided such strong support for Cárdenas in the 1988 presidential election was showing signs of fragmentation by the 1991 election for the C h a m b e r of Deputies and half of the Senate. The 1988 presidential candidate of the P A N , Clouthier, had been killed in an automobile accident shortly after the election. F i g u r e 5.6 gives the P R I percentages in 1988 (as in Figure 5.3) for c o m p a r i s o n with the 1991 results. There was far less skewing against the P R I in 1991 than in 1988. Metropolitan M e x i c o City was the only location with a significantly lower share of PRI votes than the other regions, and even there the m a j o r p a r t y ' s percentage of the vote had risen f r o m 28 to 4 7

CLARK W. REYNOLDS

86

p e r c e n t . T h e r e a p p e a r e d to b e little d i f f e r e n c e in the p a t t e r n b e t w e e n t h e leading and lagging regions. Only the poorest region, the South Pacific, s h o w e d a s i g n i f i c a n t d e c l i n e in t h e P R I s h a r e of the vote. T h e S o u t h P a c i f i c h a s b e e n t h e s l o w e s t to gain f r o m t h e n e w l i b e r a l i z a t i o n p r o g r a m

and,

s i t u a t e d n e x t t o G u a t e m a l a , f a c e s i m m i g r a t i o n of e v e n l o w e r - w a g e l a b o r w h e n e v e r its productivity m o v e s ahead. In F i g u r e 5.7, t h e c o m p o s i t i o n of the C h a m b e r of D e p u t i e s f o l l o w i n g t h e 1988 a n d 1991 e l e c t i o n s is s h o w n . T h e gain of sixty seats f o r t h e P R I s u r p a s s e d e v e n t h e m o s t o p t i m i s t i c party p r e d i c t i o n s . T h e P A N lost t w e l v e seats,

and

the

left-wing

opposition,

forty-eight.

Even

taking

into

c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e g r a s s - r o o t s p r e s s u r e of the official party to e n s u r e victory in local and regional elections, this w a s a r e m a r k a b l e t u r n a r o u n d f o r the P R I . A c o n s c i o u s d e c i s i o n w a s m a d e by t o p p o l i c y m a k e r s to d r a w f r o m t h e s o - c a l l e d a d j u s t m e n t d i v i d e n d to pay f o r a p r o g r a m of g r e a t e r

social

participation in the d e v e l o p m e n t process. T h e dividend c o m p r i s e s g o v e r n m e n t m o n i e s r e a l i z e d f r o m p r i o r c u t b a c k s in p u b l i c e x p e n d i t u r e s , i n c r e a s e d tax c o l l e c t i o n , g a i n s f r o m t h e s a l e of p r i v a t i z e d

banks and other

public

e n t e r p r i s e s , l o w e r debt costs f r o m falling real interest rates and r e d u c e d rates of i n f l a t i o n , a n d a r e c o v e r y of international lending, i n c l u d i n g W o r l d B a n k s u p p o r t f o r i n f r a s t r u c t u r e - r e l a t e d a c t i v i t i e s in t h e key states of C h i a p a s , Guerrero,

Oaxaca,

and

Hidalgo.

All

of

these

resources

permit

a

n o n i n f l a t i o n a r y f u n d i n g of a r a p i d l y e x p a n d i n g P r o n a s o l and o t h e r h i g h l y visible g o v e r n m e n t activities. (It can be a r g u e d with s o m e j u s t i f i c a t i o n that a n u m b e r of P r o n a s o l activities r e p r e s e n t a restoration of e a r l i e r g o v e r n m e n t p r o g r a m s that had been cut back d u r i n g the crisis and fiscal a d j u s t m e n t in t h e 1980s.)

Figure 5.6 Voting for the PRI in Mexico's 1988 Presidential and 1991 Senatorial Elections (percentage)

Metropolitan Mexico City

North

North Pacific Rest of Center •

1988 •

1991

Gulf

South Pacific

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Figure 5.7 Composition of the Mexican Chamber of Deputies Following the 1988 and 1991 Elections (number of seats)

A t t e n t i o n to d i s t r i b u t i o n as well as g r o w t h h a s paid big d i v i d e n d s to t h e p r e s i d e n t a n d his p a r t y . A true d i f f u s i o n of p r o d u c t i o n and p r o d u c t i v i t y as well as p u r c h a s i n g p o w e r will c o n t r i b u t e to a m o r e b a l a n c e d

economic

g r o w t h p r o c e s s c o n s i s t e n t with the g o a l s of d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n and p o l i t i c a l stability. O n e a r e a of p a r t i c u l a r i m p o r t a n c e is t h e p r o v i s i o n of c r e d i t and t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e to m i c r o - and s m a l l - s c a l e e n t e r p r i s e s a n d to g r o u p s f o r m e d u n d e r t h e a u s p i c e s of P r o n a s o l ( G r u p o s d e S o l i d a r i d a d ) to f u r t h e r t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of p r o d u c t i o n and c o m m e r c e at t h e g r a s s - r o o t s level. T h e key issue is w h e t h e r s u c h activities will b e a b l e to s u r v i v e w i t h o u t s u b s i d i z e d c r e d i t or o t h e r i n p u t s . T h e r e is s o m e e v i d e n c e that w h i l e m a n y s m a l l - a n d m i c r o - e n t e r p r i s e s t a r t u p s a r e b o u n d t o fail, as in a n y m a r k e t e c o n o m y , a c r u c i a l n u m b e r of s u c h b u s i n e s s e s will p r o s p e r , w i d e n i n g t h e d i f f u s i o n of entrepreneurship and development throughout the e c o n o m y . International c o m p e t i t i o n and t h e t e n d e n c y of M e x i c o ' s n o w - p r i v a t i z e d c o m m e r c i a l b a n k s to f o c u s on u r b a n a r e a s and larger e n t e r p r i s e s a d d s to t h e c h a l l e n g e in this area. 6

Conclusion: Growth, Convergence, and Distributional Inequality V i e w e d o v e r recent d e c a d e s , M e x i c a n e v i d e n c e on production and productivity p r o v i d e s s u p p o r t f o r the so-called K u z n e t s h y p o t h e s i s — t h a t t h e early s t a g e s of d e v e l o p m e n t d o not c r e a t e c o n d i t i o n s f o r i m p r o v i n g e q u a l i t y in i n c o m e . I n d e e d , K u z n e t s f o u n d e v i d e n c e that t h e r e m a y e v e n b e an i n v e r t e d U - c u r v e b e t w e e n g r o w t h and inequality during the long-term d e v e l o p m e n t process, and d i s t r i b u t i o n c a n a c t u a l l y w o r s e n in t h e e a r l y d e c a d e s . F o r a n u m b e r of

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e c o n o m i c and d e m o g r a p h i c reasons—including the m o v e m e n t f r o m lowproductivity agriculture to higher-productivity raw material and primary product production and to urban e m p l o y m e n t , as well as the customary acceleration in population growth during the first phase of the demographic transition (after the fall in mortality rates and before the decline in birth rates)—growth begins with increasing inequality in productivity and income by sector, region, and social group. H o w e v e r , the same structural reasons help to account for a gradual reversal f r o m inequality to equality as urbanization, industrialization, education, and improvement in labor skills proceed. For the United States and a n u m b e r of E u r o p e a n countries, Kuznets (researching in the 1960s and 1970s) shows that distribution did improve over the last century for countries that had achieved advanced stages of development. He declined, however, to speculate why the pattern of inequality reversed, except to suggest that social f o r c e s and political d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n may well have p l a y e d a role complementary to economic development in the process. For Mexico it appears from the initial data that despite the social pacts of earlier decades, the uneven pattern of production and productivity has not yet facilitated a movement from the increasing inequality of the first phase of the Kuznets curve to a subsequent phase of productivity convergence and improved income distribution. Indeed, the dismal performance of the 1980s did nothing to improve the situation, 7 as the crisis and its aftermath caused income levels for the mass of the population to regress to conditions in the early 1970s or before. There is reason to believe that integration of the Mexican economy with the U.S. and international markets might speed up c o n v e r g e n c e between Mexico and its higher productivity partners. The crucial question is the speed and extent of diffusion of productivity growth a m o n g regions, sectors, and i n c o m e groups. T h e d i f f u s i o n of income will depend upon an eventual tightening of the domestic labor market that permits real wages to rise in response to productivity increases. If diffusion-enhancing programs such as Pronasol are successful and can go beyond simple income-transfer schemes, it is quite possible that real wages and incomes will rise in M e x i c o and that there will be an eventual improvement in income distribution (the second phase of the Kuznets curve). W e have estimated that the distributional impact of the N A F T A on w a g e s of M e x i c o ' s lower-skilled labor could be significantly positive, increasing the share of lower-income households in G D P . 8 The distributional implications of the N A F T A for the United States and Canada, however, are more a m b i g u o u s . T h e results d e p e n d heavily on the ability of M e x i c o ' s northern partners to move f r o m recession to a period of major restructuring and g r o w t h , as a r e s p o n s e to greatly increased rates of s a v i n g s and i n v e s t m e n t , e d u c a t i o n a l r e f o r m s , i m p r o v e m e n t s in labor skills, and the provision of new infrastructure and support for science, technology, and

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i n n o v a t i o n . T h i s s h i f t w o u l d r e q u i r e a m a j o r c h a n g e in t h e p o l i c y e n v i r o n m e n t and social behavior of both countries. T o date, t h e e v i d e n c e of f a l l i n g labor i n c o m e s h a r e s in U . S . and C a n a d i a n G D P is not encouraging. Recent distributional trends indicate that for a d v a n c e d industrial countries that fail to achieve high rates of savings and investment, not only their share of w a g e s but their absolute levels f o r lowskilled labor are e r o d i n g . A n u m b e r of a d v a n c e d industrial e c o n o m i e s , including the United States, the United K i n g d o m , and an increasing n u m b e r of northern E u r o p e a n countries, are s h o w i n g increasing inequality b e t w e e n the e a r n i n g s of high- and l o w - w a g e labor, along with d i v e r g e n c e in i n c o m e shares between those dependent on low-wage labor and those benefitting f r o m skilled labor and property income. In e x t r e m e cases, such as the United States f r o m the late 1970s through the 1980s, real w a g e s have actually declined f o r the majority of the work force, these declines occurring well before the recent recession and despite the significant growth of G D P during most of the period. This latter-day erosion of equality appears to be directly related to a falling rate of s a v i n g s and i n v e s t m e n t in the m o r e m a t u r e e c o n o m i e s . In cases such as Japan and the newly industrialized countries in Asia, which have much higher savings and i n v e s t m e n t rates, real w a g e s have c o n t i n u e d to rise with rapid g r o w t h in G D P . S o m e observers d o report that the impressive i m p r o v e m e n t s in relative i n c o m e shares in Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s and 1970s have now begun to reverse. T h e deterioration of i n c o m e distribution within h i g h - i n c o m e countries has been associated with the global spread of multinational e n t e r p r i s e s in pursuit of c o s t - m i n i m i z a t i o n and p r o f i t - m a x i m i z a t i o n , linking international labor and capital m a r k e t s at the e x p e n s e of labor in a n u m b e r of previously h i g h - w a g e e c o n o m i e s . T h i s s u g g e s t s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a n e w p o s t d e v e l o p m e n t inequality inflection point in the Kuznets curve, turning it f r o m an inverted U - c u r v e into a lazy S - c u r v e of g r o w t h and distribution. I n c o m e shares would first worsen, then improve, and then worsen again as e c o n o m i e s shift f r o m i n v e s t m e n t to c o n s u m p t i o n in their later s t a g e s of d e v e l o p m e n t in the face of an ever-more-competitive world market. 9 M e x i c o is likely to a c h i e v e improved distributional equality if and when it is able to integrate f u l l y with the rest of N o r t h A m e r i c a . T h e political c o n s e q u e n c e s of such an o u t c o m e would be m o r e c o n d u c i v e to a secure and s t a b l e d e v e l o p m e n t path, w h e r e political d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n and e c o n o m i c g r o w t h w o u l d be m u t u a l l y r e i n f o r c i n g . T h i s w o u l d be far better than a reluctant regionalism, at least f o r M e x i c o . T h e c h a l l e n g e then shifts to the m o r e developed partners, which are in turn forced to adjust economically and to deal with the resultant social and political problems. T h i s responsibility to adjust need not u n d e r m i n e North A m e r i c a ' s o w n e c o n o m i c productivity, c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s , or e m p l o y m e n t , all of which are closely related to political stability in the United States and C a n a d a . T h e role

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CLARK W. REYNOLDS

of the more developed partners becomes one of avoiding the new inflection point in the lazy S-curve of inequality, so that distributional inequity problems can be resolved. This too is a political-economic challenge that shifts f r o m the South to the North in the process of increasing global interdependence. M e x i c o ' s new model of development, combining social participation with political stability, must not result in a d o w n w a r d convergence of productivity, wages, and income for its northern partners, a situation that could lead to political polarization in all three nations. The literature that addresses the political-economic dynamic of NorthSouth interdependence is only beginning to emerge. Much of it stresses neoKeynesian arguments extended to the international level. While demand-side studies give modest attention to supply-side constraints on the quality and quantity of production, particularly in aging industrial countries like the United States, they fail to deal adequately with the need for massive output expansion in a world of pervasive poverty and inequality. What is needed is a more comprehensive framework for the politicaleconomic component of asymmetrical interdependence. This new approach would include an analytical framework and set of workable policies in which national self-interest is recast in a context of shared gains with international partners. Such policies would encourage the developing countries in their commitment to reform their own economic structures in the direction of increased international integration and offer counterpart inducements to high-income countries such as the United States to increase dramatically public and private savings and investment and support for education, science, technology, innovation, and industrial development. With such cooperation, the "lagging" developed countries could transform their production structures on the supply side in order to respond to growing domestic and foreign demand with increased output of high-quality goods and services. Once gains from economic integration are being realized, de facto or de j u r e political integration will be needed to implement compensation mechanisms capable of tapping those gains in order to support lagging sectors, regions, and income groups. This support will be necessary to sustain political stability throughout North America as the societies of the three countries surmount the problems of structural adjustment. The process of subregional integration in the Western Hemisphere is a step toward the political management of economic interdependence. So far, however, the politics of integration have lagged well behind the economics.

Notes 1. Clark W. Reynolds and Stephen J. Wager, "U.S.-Mexican Economic Integration: Implications for the Security of Mexico and the United States" (Stanford University Americas Program working paper, no. 89-1, prepared for

P O W E R , VALUE & DISTRIBUTION IN THE NAFTA

91

Social Science Research Council workshop, "Issues in M e x i c o ' s Security," Mexico City, February 1989). 2. A more detailed analysis by sector, region, and income group—as well as of functional income shares among wages, profits, and economic rent—will be presented in the author's forthcoming volume, The Mexican Economy: Challenge of interdependence (in preparation). 3. See C. W. Reynolds, "Will a Free Trade Agreement Lead to Wage Convergence? Implications for Mexico and the United States," in U.S.-Mexico Relations: Labor Market Interdependence, ed. Jorge A. Bustamante, Clark W. Reynolds, and Raul A. Hinojosa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992) 4 7 7 486. 4. The regions included in this and other figures are defined as follows: Metropolitan Mexico City, state of México and the Distrito Federal (DF); North: Coahuila, Chihuahua, Durango, Nuevo León, San Luis Potosí, Tamaulipas, and Zacatecas; North Pacific: Baja California Norte, Baja California Sur, Nayarit, Sinaloa, and Sonora; Rest of Center: Aguascalientes, G u a n a j u a t o , Hidalgo, Jalisco, Michoacán, Morelos, Puebla, Querétaro, and Tlaxcala; Gulf: Campeche, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Veracruz, and Yucatán; and South Pacific: Colima, Chiapas, Guerrero, and Oaxaca. 5. Regional economic polarization appears to be contributing to political polarization in gubernatorial elections. The PAN, which won the governorship of Baja California Norte in 1988. won the governorship of Chihuahua in July 1992. The official victories of the conservative opposition in the northern regions parallels greater economic integration with the United States and the income gains, especially for Mexico's emerging middle class, in the north relative to much of the rest of Mexico. This pulling apart of economic and political forces is less evident in the official results of votes where the left coalition parties dominate. 6. See Clark W. Reynolds and Ana Paula Pessoa, "The Promotion of Micro and Small Enterprise Development in Mexico: A Preliminary Report" (Working paper sponsored by the Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D.C., October 1991). See also Clemente Ruiz Duran, " C h a n g e s in the Industrial Structure and the Role of Small and Medium Industries in Developing Countries: The Case of Mexico" (Paper prepared for conference at the Institute of Developing Economies, Tokyo, Japan, February 25-March 1, 1991). 7. See Clark W. Reynolds, "A Lost Generation? Why Latin American Development Depends on Growth," in Issues in Contemporary Economics, Vol. 3: Policy and Development, ed. Partha D a s g u p t a ( H o u n d s m i l l s , U.K.: International Economic Association with Macmillan, 1991). 8. Robert K. McCleery and Clark W. Reynolds, "A Study of the Impact of a U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement on Medium-Term Employment, Wages, and Production in the United States: Are New Labor Market Policies Needed?" (Paper presented at conference, "North American Free Trade: Economic and Political Implications," sponsored by the Fraser Institute, Vancouver, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., June 2 7 - 2 8 , 1991). 9. Demand-side arguments are made that such trends go against the national interest of advanced industrial countries such as the United States. See Robert Reich's provocative book The Work of Nations (New York: Knopf, 1991). Reich makes an idealistic appeal for a new "positive economic nationalism, in which each nation's citizens take primary responsibility for enhancing the capacities of their countrymen for full and productive lives, but who also work with other nations to ensure that these improvements do not come at others' expense." Demand-side arguments also form the basis for the expanding literature on global

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K e y n e s i a n i s m , w h i c h a n t i c i p a t e s the threat of international o v e r p r o d u c t i o n in the f a c e of i n a d e q u a t e world d e m a n d . In this m o r e alarmist literature, the lack of a d e q u a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i v e m e c h a n i s m s is seen to f o s t e r the c o l l a p s e of d e v e l o p e d - c o u n t r y l a b o r m a r k e t s and a d a n g e r o u s p r o l i f e r a t i o n of p o v e r t y in d e v e l o p i n g countries. S e e W a l t e r Russell M e a d , Mortal Splendor: The American Empire in Transition ( B o s t o n : H o u g h t o n M i f f l i n , 1987).

— PART 2 —

Prospects for Political Change

=

6

=

Is Mexico Headed Toward Its Fifth Crisis? Miguel Basahez

The economic restructuring of Mexico being promoted by the administration of Carlos Salinas carries with it not only promise but also considerable political risks. In simplest terms, the deep roots of the political system established by the 1917 Constitution are incompatible with the current economic program. This chapter explores how much the e c o n o m i c reform may hinder political stability, whether a perestroika can be maintained in Mexico without glasnost, and what shape political reform might take. Four provisions of the Constitution laid the foundation for the presentday Mexican state: those on common land, labor, education, and presidential succession. 1 These became institutionalized by their guarantees of upward social mobility, which for over fifty years united the social bases—farmers, workers, the lower middle classes, and PRI politicians—with the national leadership. The arrangement worked acceptably well until the early 1970s, when signs of wear began to show. Today, all of those laws and institutions seem dysfunctional, if not obsolete, and at the very least incompatible with the current economic program. During the last twenty-five years, Mexico has undergone four successive severe economic declines, each snowballing into the next one and each culminating in a moment of crisis. Presidentialism was one of the key factors triggering the snowball effect. 2 First came the exhaustion of Mexico's development plan and its contradictions, as expressed in the 1968 student movement, which culminated in la noche de Tlaltelolco. Second was the 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 7 3 reconciliation between the government and the students, which unleashed clashes between the government and business between 1973 and 1976 and resulted in the 1976 devaluation. Third was the 1976-1981 reconciliation between the government and business, which stepped up foreign borrowing and overheated the economy, ending in the 1982 nationalization of the banks. Fourth was the reconciliation between the government and the financial sector from 1982 to 1987, which triggered the 95

96

MIGUEL BASÁÑEZ

economic plummet and led to the stock market crash of 1987. Each of these four crises arose when structural problems collided with temporary swings in public attitudes, which in turn found their expression in sudden eruptions of discontent over unmet expectations. The central explanation for each of these crises lies in the excessive concentration of presidential authority. To keep the country working, the president in each case had to offer the populace the hope of resolving the problems he inherited from his predecessor—not in a decade or more, but during his first three years in office. That is, after skillfully manipulating perceptions to raise the public's expectation to a new plateau, the president had to deliver. In the face of such an enormous commitment, the easiest approach has been to make the president a gambler. If he loses, the country pays. Mexico paid off Luis Echeverría's bet by losing twenty-two years of stability in monetary exchange; it paid off José López Portillo's losses with 80 billion U.S. dollars in foreign debt; and it paid for the gambling of Miguel de la Madrid's cabinet with the lost decade of the 1980s. 3 Obviously, the stakes are getting higher and higher, which brings us to the roll of President Salinas's dice. Will we finally see the lasting recovery promised the last four times, or are we simply headed toward a fifth crisis'?4 This question leads to four more specific ones. First, has Mexican society undergone social changes that demand far-reaching reform, and if so, what kind of reform do those changes demand? Second, what support does the economic modernization program actually have among the various sectors of society? Third, how do those sectors view political reform? Fourth, is it correct to describe Mexican society as one fundamentally opposed to radical political change? Each of these will be examined in turn, followed with some likely scenarios of the economic and political future of the country.

Social Changes and Necessary Reforms The Mexican political system as it exists today was designed during the 1930s to represent and respond to a society that was predominantly agricultural and sparsely populated—in essence, isolated. As illustrated in T a b l e 6.1, Mexican society today seems the exact opposite: urban, predominantly literate, employed in the service sector, and experiencing serious problems of population growth. More specifically, over the last fifty years Mexico's population and per capita income have quadrupled, 5 its urban-to-rural ratio has almost reversed, its network of roadways has expanded twenty-four-fold, illiteracy has been reduced to less than a tenth of what it was, and the ratio of agricultural to service-sector employment has largely reversed. The social changes implied by these figures call for a profound altering of the

IS MEXICO HEADED TOWARD ITS FIFTH CRISIS? Table 6.1

97

Fifty Years of Change in Mexico, 1940-1990

Total Population Percentage of population in rural areas 0 Percentage of population employed in agriculture Percentage of population employed in services Percentage of population illiterate Paved and unpaved roads in kilometers

¡940

1990

19,600,000

81,500,000

78

28

65

24

20

60

48

3.5

10,000

235,000

Source: Miguel Basáñez, El pulso de los sexenios: City: Siglo XXI, I991), 345-359. Note: a. T o w n s wilh fewer than !0,000 inhabitants.

20 años de crisis en México

(Mexico

relationship betweensociety and politics. Added to the country's material progress, and largely because of it is the equally important change that has occurred in the deep-seated values of the Mexican people, particularly in the past few years. 6 Regardless of one's analysis of the Mexican political system, the truth is that it provided the country with stability and growth until 1968, when it began to show signs of weakness. The government's persistent obstinacy and its authoritarianism over the following years resulted in the PRI's running unopposed in the 1976 presidential campaign. By 1977 it was apparent that the society had become much more critical and participatory than in the past, and the urgent need for political reform was widely recognized. Although the Mexican government managed to take some important steps, the departure of Jésus Reyes Heroles from the Ministry of the Interior (Gobernación) in 1979 lost for the political reform movement its direction and m o m e n t u m . Little progress has been made since then. One must acknowledge, however, the presence of the opposition, minimal though it may be, in local legislatures and a few municipal governments. Only two short periods of relative political optimism bear mention: one in the first year of de la Madrid's sexenio, and one in the first year of Salinas's. These were months in which each president proposed to respect local elections and the PRI began to suffer more than isolated electoral defeats. 7 It is thus not surprising that since Salinas's 1988 campaign, calls have grown louder for greater reform, not only of the economy but also of politics. Indeed, the economic opening and privatization started by de la Madrid, as well as the strong competition in the 1988 election, seemed to portend political reform. Since 1988, however, it has become clear that although the economic reform will continue, political reform will have to

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MIGUEL BASÁÑEZ

wait. T h e p r o b l e m s the f o r m e r Soviet Union f a c e d in trying to carry out its p e r e s t r o i k a s i m u l t a n e o u s l y with g l a s n o s t p r o v i d e d a c a u t i o n a r y tale f o r M e x i c a n o f f i c i a l s , d i s c o u r a g i n g t h e m f r o m f o l l o w i n g a similar strategy. 8 D e s p i t e the r e n e w e d hope f o l l o w i n g the failure of the A u g u s t 1991 Soviet coup, unrelieved deprivation a m o n g the citizens of the new C o m m o n w e a l t h of Independent States continues to dissuade M e x i c o ' s officialdom. T h e S a l i n a s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n h a s u n d e r t a k e n c h a n g e s to o v e r c o m e inefficiencies in production, but not to address political inequities. It has not s u f f i c i e n t l y r e c o g n i z e d that politics and e c o n o m i c s are e x p r e s s i o n s of the s a m e p h e n o m e n o n , nor has it realized the s o u n d n e s s of letting society in on g o v e r n m e n t p o l i c y m a k i n g . It is true that pluralist, d e m o c r a t i c d e c i s i o n m a k i n g processes are slower than centralist, authoritarian ones, but the payoff is the longer durability of d e c i s i o n s if they are m a d e with s u f f i c i e n t discussion and analysis. T h e M e x i c a n g o v e r n m e n t has i n d e e d d e m o n s t r a t e d a t r a d i t i o n a l propensity f o r authoritarian speed over d e m o c r a t i c longevity. E x a m p l e s of this are its n e g o t i a t i o n of the N A F T A , the i m p e t u o u s n e s s of P r o n a s o l , a n d t h e s p e e d w i t h w h i c h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m s w e r e p r o p o s e d in N o v e m b e r 1991. T h e p r o b l e m is that w h e n g o v e r n m e n t d e c i s i o n s are perceived as hasty, there can be public indifference or even repudiation of the m e a s u r e s taken, even more so u n d e r a g o v e r n m e n t with strong presidential authority. R e c e n t M e x i c a n history s h o w s h o w a p r e s i d e n t ' s priorities may be a b a n d o n e d as soon as his term c o m e s to an end. G o v e r n m e n t p r o g r a m s to aid the rural poor, such as E c h e v e r r í a ' s Integral Program for Rural D e v e l o p m e n t ( P I D E R ) and L ó p e z P o r t i l l o ' s Federal Coordination of the National Plan for D e p r e s s e d Z o n e s and M a r g i n a l G r o u p s ( C O P L A M A R ) , are very clear e x a m p l e s . T h e e x p r o p r i a t i o n of land in S o n o r a ( E c h e v e r r í a ) and the nationalization of the banks ( L ó p e z Portillo)—both during the last w e e k s of t h e i r p r e s i d e n c i e s — a r e o t h e r e x a m p l e s . T h e d e la M a d r i d and S a l i n a s administrations provided continuity, since the latter was the lead author of the f o r m e r ' s m e a s u r e s . Is t h e r e a risk, h o w e v e r , that as soon as the Salinas administration goes out of office, its programs will be a b a n d o n e d ? O n e sure w a y to p r e v e n t that, as U.S. a m b a s s a d o r to M e x i c o John N e g r o p o n t e has noted, is to sign the N A F T A . 9 Constitutional r e f o r m s could be a n o t h e r w a y to lock t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s p o l i c i e s in, a l t h o u g h less s e c u r e l y , as e v i d e n c e d by the reprivatization of the b a n k s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , r e a c c o m m o d a t i o n s , realliances, and readjustments within the governing team will o c c u r with g r o w i n g intensity in the second half of S a l i n a s ' s term, and therefore the risk of a reversal exists. In s u m m a r y , during the last fifty years M e x i c a n society has u n d e r g o n e p r o f o u n d c h a n g e s in its structure and values, which necessitate substantive r e f o r m s in both e c o n o m i c s and politics. T h e f o r m e r have been rushed; the latter, postponed. W h o supports and w h o opposes these r e f o r m s ?

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99

Support for and Resistance to Economic Reform In fifty years M e x i c o multiplied the size of its e c o n o m y by eighteen, growing at an average annual rate of 6.2 percent between 1933 and 1981. 1 0 E c o n o m i c g r o w t h , political stability, and social m o b i l i t y w e r e the c o r n e r s t o n e s of the c o u n t r y ' s d e v e l o p m e n t . R e l e g a t e d to s e c o n d a r y importance were social problems, inefficiencies in production, and political authoritarianism—all of which remained rife throughout the five decades. When growth stagnated in 1982 and then remained at virtually zero through 1989, the postponed needs began to show. It is false to a s s u m e that M e x i c o ' s economic problems began in 1982. They had been apparent since 1972, and several analysts had already sounded the alarm, 1 1 but it was in 1982 that they became unbearable. The start of M e x i c o ' s economic decline can actually be traced to 1966, when problems in agricultural production began to appear. The decline intensified in the 1970s with M e x i c o ' s fiscal imbalances and was finally exacerbated by the foreign debt crisis in the early 1980s—all within the context of a loss of direction in the country's economic course. A f t e r two attempts to stimulate the e c o n o m y had failed over only a twelve-year period ( 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 8 2 ) — t h e shared development of Luis Echeverría and the oil development of José López Portillo—a third attempt began in 1982 that was strengthened in 1988. The primary measures of what has c o m e to be called internationalist development include the sale of governmento w n e d c o m p a n i e s , the abolition of protectionism, o p e n i n g s to foreign investment, and e n c o u r a g e m e n t of exports. 1 2 The intended effect of this c o m b i n a t i o n of m e a s u r e s was to enhance business c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s and stimulate investments in technological upgrading—in short, to modernize the Mexican economy. Although an economic liberalization program can be successful without a concurrent political opening, its success will be only temporary and at the cost of continuing restrictions on individual f r e e d o m s and growing public discontent. S o m e analysts believe that economic reform will automatically produce a political opening. But unless one considers a period of more than twenty years, the Chilean case under A u g u s t o Pinochet and evidence in M e x i c o f r o m 1985 t h r o u g h 1991 point to f u r t h e r c r a c k d o w n s on civil liberties and not to political opening. As is to be expected because of its overall political implications, the current economic program is producing a wide range of reactions among the sectors of Mexican society. Recent public opinion surveys have attempted to capture M e x i c a n s ' responses to key c o m p o n e n t s of the program, such as privatization and the N A F T A . T h e reaction of any one g r o u p or person depends largely, of course, on the benefit or harm each expects to derive f r o m the new rules. The observations derived f r o m an economic analysis of the groups likely to be affected by economic liberalization often coincide with

MIGUEL BASÀNEZ

100

t h o s e d e r i v e d f r o m o p i n i o n polls, w h i c h s h o w h o w t h e d i f f e r e n t a c t o r s in M e x i c a n society a r e a n t i c i p a t i n g t h o s e possible e f f e c t s . W h a t d o t h e M e x i c a n p e o p l e t h i n k of t h e sale of g o v e r n m e n t - o w n e d c o m p a n i e s ? In a n a t i o n a l l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s u r v e y c o n d u c t e d by U n i v e r s i t y of M i c h i g a n r e s e a r c h e r s o n e m o n t h a f t e r t h e reprivatization of t h e b a n k s in M a y 1990, 51 p e r c e n t of t h e r e s p o n d e n t s w e r e n e u t r a l or had n o o p i n i o n , 35 p e r c e n t w e r e in f a v o r , a n d 14 p e r c e n t w e r e o p p o s e d , as is s h o w n in T a b l e 6 . 2 . 1 3 T h e s e f i n d i n g s c o n t r a s t with t h o s e of a n o t h e r s u r v e y c o n d u c t e d eight y e a r s earlier, in O c t o b e r 1982, on the nationalization of t h e b a n k s , c o n d u c t e d o n e m o n t h a f t e r that m e a s u r e w a s t a k e n . At that t i m e the r e s p o n s e s in f a v o r w e r e 52 p e r c e n t ; o p p o s e d , 11 p e r c e n t ; neutral, 19 p e r c e n t ; and n o o p i n i o n , 18 p e r c e n t . 1 4 W h e r e a s in 1982 o v e r half of t h e r e s p o n d e n t s f a v o r e d g o v e r n m e n t o w n e r s h i p a n d o n l y 11 percent w e r e o p p o s e d , in 1990 o n l y 14 percent of the r e s p o n d e n t s o p p o s e d r e p r i v a t i z i n g t h e b a n k s . T h e d i f f e r e n c e c a n n o t j u s t be attributed to g o v e r n m e n t p r o p a g a n d a , since it w a s s i m i l a r in both y e a r s . 1 5 B e f o r e w e e x a m i n e t h e s o u r c e s of this u n u s u a l s h i f t in o p i n i o n , it is i m p o r t a n t to note that k n o w l e d g e and approval of the reprivatization m e a s u r e was higher a m o n g higher-income groups. Returning to Tabic 6.2, we find t h e a p p r o v a l r a t i n g at t h e l o w - i n c o m e level w a s j u s t o v e r o n e - f o u r t h , but at t h e h i g h - i n c o m e level it w a s m o r e than o n e - h a l f . S i m i l a r l y , fully o n e - t h i r d of

Table 6.2

Opinions on the Reprivatization of the Mexican Banking System Among Different Segments of the Mexican Population, 1990 N (sample size)

For

Againsl

Neutral

No Opinion

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

Age group 50

678 596 257

34.7 36.4 32.3

11.8 16.3 12.8

26.3 22.7 19.1

27.1 24.5 35.8

Income Low Middle High

946 425 80

27.4 46.1 56.3

14.7 13.2 11.3

24.6 23.5 18.8

33.2 17.1 13.6

81 281 243 273 399 47 55

54.3 48.0 38.3 30.8 28.1 12.8 21.8

12.3 18.1 14.0 10.3 14.0 21.3 9.1

24.7 22.4 27.6 24.9 21.6 12.8 32.7

8.6 11.4 20.1 34.0 36.4 53.2 36.4

1,531

34.9

13.7

23.6

27.7

Segment

group

Occupation Business owner Professional Admin./clerical Homemaker/student Blue collar Farmer Underemployed All respondents Source:

II World Values Survey 1990, University of Michigan.

IS MEXICO HEADED TOWARD ITS FIFTH CRISIS?

101

the former group did not know what to think, whereas that was true of only a small m i n o r i t y of the latter group, 14 p e r c e n t . In the o c c u p a t i o n a l breakdowns, business owners, as one would expect, were in first place with a 54 percent a p p r o v a l rating and only 9 percent had no o p i n i o n , while c a m p e s i n o s (farmers) were in last place with only a 13 percent approval rating and over half with no opinion. Professionals c a m e in second with 48 percent approving, but interestingly they were also in second place with disapprovals, at 18 percent. Age did not appear to be a significant predictor of opinions on this issue. Although the overall approval rating of 35 percent for reprivatization of the banks may s e e m low at first glance, it must be recalled that several g e n e r a t i o n s of M e x i c a n s have been raised to b e l i e v e in g o v e r n m e n t ownership. In a January 1991 survey that asked whether the g o v e r n m e n t should sell its companies, 66 percent still thought not, while 28 percent said yes and 6 percent did not know. 1 6 When asked whether privatization would be beneficial or harmful to the c o m m o n people, 39 percent of respondents said beneficial, 29 percent said harmful, 17 percent predicted no effect, and 15 percent did not know. 1 7 T h e s e data seem to indicate that the attitudes of the Mexican people on this subject are less a matter of principle than one of pragmatism. That is, business and high-income people perceive a possible benefit f r o m it and are therefore in favor. By contrast, such a benefit is not perceived by or is not as clear for lower-income groups, and their support is limited. Another important subject in the modernization program is the N A F T A . Mexicans' image of the agreement is contradictory, although the underlying values of the three countries i n v o l v e d — M e x i c o , the United States, and C a n a d a — a r e heading toward a progressive convergence. 1 8 M e x i c a n s w h o show any interest in the treaty (14 percent) or who think they will benefit from it (17 percent) are in a distinct minority, according to an October 1991 survey, while 44 percent believe that it will benefit the United States more than Mexico and two-thirds believe that it will increase Mexican dependence on its northern n e i g h b o r . Yet at the s a m e t i m e the N A F T A e n j o y s a generally positive o p i n i o n — 6 2 percent, as shown in Table 6 . 3 — w i t h 20 percent completely in favor of it and 4 2 percent somewhat supportive. 1 9 These paradoxes are explained by the hard sell in Mexico of the supposed immediate benefits of the N A F T A , and s o m e aftereffects can be expected f r o m the high expectations that selling has raised. An e c o n o m i c analysis would predict problems for agricultural producers, textile manufacturers, and financial services and tensions among oil and labor interests. Opinion polls show that a large majority of the population believes the treaty will create jobs (77 percent) and will permit access to more and better goods and services (68 percent). This may be why almost half believe that the N A F T A will generally be good for M e x i c o (48 percent). The findings in Table 6.3 suggest older Mexicans are less inclined toward the N A F T A than younger ones; the

MIGUEL BASÁÑEZ

102

Table 6.3 Opinions on the Proposed Free Trade Agreement with the United States Among Different Segments of the Mexican Population, September 1991 For

Against

No Opinion 3

(%)

(%)

(%)

656 578 298

64.8 61.1 55.0

15.1 14.3 15.4

20.1 24.6 29.5

1,023 366 127

57.6 66.6 81.9

15.2 15.0 11.0

27.3 18.3 7.1

Occupation Ruling elite Business owner Professional Admin./clerical Blue collar Farmer Underemployed

139 265 256 272 242 174 63

68.4 66.8 75.4 56.6 59.1 48.8 60.3

11.5 11.7 12.6 21.3 12.0 18.3 14.3

20.1 21.6 12.2 22.1 28.9 32.8 25.4

All respondents

1,545

61.6

14.9

23.4

N (sample size)

Segment Age group 50 Income Low Middle High

group

Source: Los Angeles T i m e í - P r o s p e c l i v a Estratégica A.C. (Peac), national survey, September 1991. Note: a. Includes "have not heard of the NAFTA," "do not know," and did not answer.

proportion of proponents rises with income level; and among occupational g r o u p s the most enthusiastic supporters are m e m b e r s of the ruling elite, professionals, and business owners, with campesinos alone registering under a 50 percent approval rating. In many ways M e x i c a n s ' long-standing resentment over the loss of half of their territory to the United States in the last century seems to be on the wane, although there still are more than vestiges of distrust and fear that may affect acceptance of the N A F T A . In the October 1991 survey almost half of the r e s p o n d e n t s predicted A m e r i c a n s will not be fair in their b u s i n e s s dealings, and a similar proportion reported that U.S. influence over M e x i c o is already excessive. It should be noted that many M e x i c a n s can base their opinions of the United States on more than shared history or attention to current world affairs: an estimated 4 3 percent of the Mexican people have relatives in the United States, and 28 percent are estimated to have visited. M o r e o v e r , as of O c t o b e r 1991 an estimated o n e in five M e x i c a n s — t h e equivalent of one in every f a m i l y — w a s contemplating the possibility that s o m e o n e in their family would emigrate in search of work during the next twelve months. 2 0 T h e evidence on M e x i c a n s ' changing economic values, which are mani-

IS MEXICO HEADED TOWARD ITS FIFTH CRISIS?

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fested in a general but diffuse support for modernization, shows a desire to believe things are getting better and to be optimistic. These attitudes doubtlessly help the economic reform, but they can also weaken it if the hopes turn into disillusionment and rebuke replaces support. On the other hand, the specific program that the current administration is promoting enjoys its greatest support among the higher-income groups; enthusiasm dwindles as we look farther down the income ladder.

Support for and Resistance to Political Reform Who wants political reform? The government leadership considers political reform a secondary priority and shows little interest in democracy. That the leadership may be more concerned with the threat to its hold on power than with the benefits reform could provide 21 was particularly apparent in the elections in Michoacán and Guerrero in July and December 1989, in Uruapan and the state of México in April and November 1990, and in the federal election in August 1991. There has also been the removal of ten governors—a phenomenon that has not occurred on such a large scale since Miguel Alemán's presidency ( 1 9 4 6 - i 9 5 2 ) . 2 2 Another symptom was the PRI's violation of its own internal procedures at the party's 1990 convention. 23 In 1991 party regulars in Guanajuato evinced a willingness on the part of the PRI to sway the system toward docile bipartisanism with the PAN, 2 4 while during the same year events in San Luis Potosí were revealing the vulnerability of the system. 2 5 Both states thus offer a glimpse of nascent political conflicts within the cabinet as presidential succession begins to become an issue. The government's behavior does not seem to be acceptable to the public. When the 1990 World Values Survey asked whether "the government should be more open to the public," 83 percent of Mexican respondents agreed, 5 percent disagreed, 9 percent were neutral, and 3 percent did not know, as shown in Table 6.4. This consensus was very strong and clear in all segments of the population surveyed, with percentages largely in the low to mid-80s but with a high of 90 percent for business owners and a low of 73 percent for the underemployed. In comparative terms Mexico ranked fourth a m o n g the thirteen countries surveyed, after Nigeria, Chile, and Czechoslovakia, whose citizens evinced even stronger agreement with the statement that their government should be more open to the public. 26 We must also examine the sources of greatest influence in Mexico: the United States, the business sector, the Catholic church, the military, and the political parties. Without a doubt pressures from the United States weigh heaviest on the Salinas administration. The influence of the United States— its press, government officials, business people, and, to a lesser degree, scholars—is considerable, and they are not all equally concerned for Mexican

MIGUEL BASÀNEZ

104

Table 6.4

Opinions on the Statement "The Government Should Be More Open to the Public" Among Different Segments of the Mexican Population, 1990 N (sample size)

Agree

Age group 50

678 596 257

Income Low Middle High

Segment

Disagree

Neutral

N o Opinion

(%)

(%)

82.9 83.3 80.6

5.7 5.2 4.2

8.8 9.2 10.1

2.5 2.2 5.1

946 425 80

83.7 81.6 80.1

4.3 6.1 6.3

8.4 10.6 12.5

3.6 1.6 1.3

81 281 243 273 399 47 55

90.1 85.1 85.2 81.0 81.9 85.1 72.7

3.7 7.1 5.3 2.6 6.3 2.1 10.9

6.2 6.4 7.8 11.7 8.0 8.5 16.4

0.0 1.5 1.6 4.8 3.8 4.3 0.0

1,531

82.7

5.2

9.2

2.8

(%)

group

Occupation Business owner Professional Admin./clerical Homemaker/student Blue collar Farmer Underemployed All respondents Source:

(%)

II World Values Survey 1990, University of Michigan.

democracy. Pragmatic defense of its own interests has been the general rule of the White House. Thus, U.S. support for the Salinas administration will continue as long as it does not imply too high a cost. Mexican business owners are divided into two groups: owners of large businesses versus owners of medium-sized and small businesses. The first group is clearly happy with the current administration, and the return of domestic capital to Mexico is a demonstration of that fact, although it is primarily flowing into the securities market. What is not clear is whether owners of medium-sized and small businesses are equally enthusiastic. Symptoms of disagreements and conflicts with the government are appearing, although they tend to be neutralized as soon as they arise. 27 The position of the Catholic church in Mexico is not monolithic either. In historical terms it has not been a democratizing force, since it was a dominant institution until the middle of the last century. Today, it plays an active role in the southern part of the country as a champion of the poor, 2 8 while in the north it is more conservative. In spite of the divisions within the cabinet regarding the church, 2 9 the Salinas administration has taken some concrete initiatives to change the existing relationship. 30 The advances seem to have been rebuffed by the church, which resists establishing transitory,

IS MEXICO HEADED TOWARD ITS FIFTH CRISIS?

105

superficial a l l i a n c e s f o r t h e P R I ' s e l e c t o r a l gain. 3 1 P e r h a p s a d e m o c r a t i z i n g f o r c e c o u l d b e u n l e a s h e d by C a t h o l i c s t h e m s e l v e s , r a t h e r t h a n t h e c h u r c h hierarchy, w i t h t h e f o r m a t i o n of a C h r i s t i a n d e m o c r a t i c p a r t y , w h i c h w o u l d receive the h i e r a r c h y ' s s u p p o r t (and U . S . s k e p t i c i s m ) . A n i n d i c a t i o n of M e x i c a n s ' s u p p o r t f o r political r e f o r m c a n b e g l e a n e d f r o m t h e r e s p o n s e s c h a r t e d in T a b l e 6.5. In 1990 o p i n i o n s w e r e d i v i d e d . T h e u n d e r e m p l o y e d , p r o f e s s i o n a l s , t h o s e u n d e r a g e 5 1 , a n d t h o s e in t h e h i g h i n c o m e b r a c k e t e x p r e s s e d the g r e a t e s t d i s a g r e e m e n t w i t h the s t a t e m e n t that ' political r e f o r m is h a p p e n i n g t o o f a s t , " w h e r e a s b u s i n e s s o w n e r s m o s t o f t e n agreed with this s t a t e m e n t . L a r g e p e r c e n t a g e s in all s e g m e n t s , h o w e v e r , w e r e neutral or had n o o p i n i o n . T h e M e x i c a n m i l i t a r y is likely to r e m a i n a l o o f f r o m p o l i t i c a l r e f o r m unless v i o l e n c e b r e a k s out. T h e a r m y in M e x i c o has d r a w n its r a n k s f r o m the p o p u l a r a n d m i d d l e c l a s s e s — n o t t h e e l i t e s — a n d s i n c e t h e 1 9 3 0 s it h a s m a i n t a i n e d an i n s t i t u t i o n a l position clearly s h o w i n g its distaste f o r d o m e s t i c policing f u n c t i o n s . 3 2 I l l - c o n s i d e r e d d e c i s i o n s by the e x e c u t i v e — s u c h as u s i n g the m i l i t a r y f o r civil r e p r e s s i o n o p e r a t i o n s or f i g h t i n g d r u g t r a f f i c k e r s , or u n d e r e s t i m a t i n g c o n f l i c t s b e t w e e n t h e p r e s i d e n t ' s c h i e f of s t a f f a n d t h e M i n i s t r y of D e f e n s e — h a v e d a m a g e d t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m of t h e a r m y . T h e military p r e f e r s to r e m a i n o u t s i d e the political g a m e .

Table 6.5

Opinions on the Statement "Political Reform Is Happening Too Fast" Among Different Segments of the Mexican Population, 1990 N (sample size)

Agree

Disagree

Neutral

No Opinion

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

Age group 50

678 596 257

28.1 31.0 31.9

33.4 32.0 24.2

25.5 23.9 22.6

12.9 13.0 21.4

Income Low Middle High

946 425 80

29.3 31.8 28.8

29.1 34.8 38.8

23.4 25.6 25.0

18.2 7.7 7.5

81 281 243 273 399 47 55

38.3 25.2 27.2 33.7 33.8 23.4 23.7

29.6 44.5 35.4 24.6 26.8 23.4 38.2

22.2 23.1 24.3 22.7 26.3 17.0 27.3

9.9 7.1 13.1 19.0 13.0 36.2 10.9

1,531

29.9

31.3

24.3

14.4

Segment

group

Occupation Business owner Professional Admin, /clerical Homemaker/student Blue collar Farmer Underemployed All respondents Source:

II World Values Survey 1990, University of Michigan.

106

MIGUEL BASÁÑEZ

T h e p o w e r role being played by political parties in Mexico, including the PRI, is perhaps more formal than real, particularly since 1990. T h e problems of the governing party began in 1987 when Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Porfirio M u ñ o z Ledo left the party. The P R I ' s actions in 1988 revealed that it was tacitly and ideologically slipping to the right of the political s p e c t r u m , which caused s o m e internal factions to dissociate t h e m s e l v e s further. M e m b e r s of the P R I ' s center-right and center-left began to identify more with like thinkers in the P A N and the P R D (previously the Cardenista Front, or FC) than with fellow members of their own party. This created a split w i t h i n the P A N . S o m e P A N m e m b e r s p r o p o s e d a d h e r i n g to the g o v e r n m e n t ' s economic program, while others rejected it in favor of a focus on more d e m o c r a c y . W h e n the former group prevailed, it supported the electoral reform of 1990 and encouraged the government's attempt to eradicate the PRD. By preventing the P R D f r o m advancing and growing stronger, both the P A N and P R D were weakened and lost influence. The PRD, for its part, facilitated the g o v e r n m e n t ' s destructive work with its conflicts, defections, and internal splits. T h e reaction of individuals and their disenchantment with the parties is clearly seen in Table 6.6, which shows responses in 1991 to the question: " D o you sympathize with any party?" Fifty-six percent had no preference; 28 percent, the PRI; 12 percent, the P A N or PRD; and 4 percent, other parties. It is noteworthy that the PRI enjoyed a high level of support among political leaders (67 percent) and high-income groups (43 percent). Also noteworthy is the apparent connection between low income and lack of interest in the parties. In spite of the fact that the PRI won a high percentage of support a m o n g voters in A u g u s t 1991 (61 percent), its s u p p o r t f r o m the total population is low (28 percent). 3 3 At first glance the percentage showing no p r e f e r e n c e for a party seems surprisingly high, but data obtained in surveys over the last ten years exhibit the same phenomenon. 3 4 In fact, there was a clear and increasingly marked trend a m o n g electors to distance t h e m s e l v e s f r o m the parties, except at election time (not shown in these tables). M e x i c a n society supports political reform but differs on the pace of i m p l e m e n t a t i o n and in the willingness to risk a d v e r s e reaction f r o m economic reform. The Mexican government, large business, and conservative e l e m e n t s in the Catholic church and the United States advocate slow and c a u t i o u s p r o g r e s s toward political r e f o r m . M e d i u m - s i z e d b u s i n e s s and progressive elements in political parties, the Catholic church, and the United States desire m o r e expeditious m o v e m e n t toward d e m o c r a c y . S o far the military has stayed out of the political debate. In general terms, society is somewhat ahead of the government and the parties.

IS M E X I C O HEADED T O W A R D ITS FIFTH CRISIS?

Table 6.6

107

Political Party Preferences A m o n g Different Segments of the M e x i c a n Population, 1991 N No Preference (sample size) (%)

Segment

PRI (%)

PAN or P R D (%)

Other Party (%)

Age group 50

610 653 335

62.8 50.5 57.3

21.6 32.6 30.1

12.1 13.0 9.9

3.4 3.8 2.7

Income Low Middle High

969 428 186

59.0 49.3 48.1

27.3 31.1 42.6

10.3 15.2 7.5

3.3 4.4 1.9

50 160 114 306 459 105 129 172

17.7 48.1 50.9 58.5 58.7 56.2 57.4 68.6

66.7 33.8 28.9 24.8 27.7 24.8 31.8 19.2

12.5 13.8 14.0 13.7 11.5 15.2 6.2 8.1

3.1 4.4 6.1 3.0 2.0 3.8 4.7 4.1

1,614

56.3

27.9

12.2

3.5

group

Occupation Ruling elite Business o w n e r Professional Admin./clerical Homemaker/student Blue collar Farmer Underemployed All respondents

Source: Este País, national survey, July 1991.

Source:

Miguel Basáñez, "Encuesta Electoral 1991," Este País, August 1991, p. 3.

M I G U E L BASÀNEZ

108

A Radical, Moderate, or Conservative Society? N o society can withstand a never-ending process of radical change, nor can it permanently stagnate without any changes at all. This section examines the propensity of Mexican society to lean left or right. This necessarily means j u d g i n g values and, in sociopsychological terms, choosing between tradition and modernity. A c c o r d i n g to Enrique Alduncin, Mexican society is comprised of an equal n u m b e r of individuals sensitive and insensitive to their environment, and two-thirds are willing to change their environment before adapting to it. 3 5 His research s h o w s that the stereotypes of passivity formulated by Samuel R a m o s and Octavio Paz are no longer applicable, and that today " w e ' r e not only receptive to change, we act as agents of it." 36 On the other hand, when individuals were asked about h o w they characterized their politics—radical, moderate, or c o n s e r v a t i v e — a clear majority were moderates (71 percent), and this majority did not vary by age, income, or occupation (see Table 6.7). 3 7 The inclination of Mexicans toward gradual change is clear, but Mexico ranks fourth for percentage of respondents w h o described themselves as radicals (16 percent, after Czechoslovakia, Nigeria, and Poland). A n o t h e r survey question that provides insight into society's attitude toward change is whether individuals believe that a revolution will occur in M e x i c o within the next five years (see Table 6.8). 3 8 There is an almosteven division between those who believe it is probable (50 percent) and improbable

Table 6.7

Percentage of Survey Respondents Characterizing Themselves as Political Radicals, Moderates, or Conservatives, Thirteen Countries, 1990 N (sample size)

Radical

Moderate

Conservative

(%)

(%)

(%)

Czechoslovakia Nigeria Poland Mexico India South Korea United States Chile Canada Spain Norway Japan Denmark

1,396 1,001 938 1,531 2,500 1,251 4,422 1,500 1,729 2,068 1,239 2,224 155

42.3 28.1 22.9 16.5 14.0 7.3 6.5 5.3 5.0 4.2 2.4 2.1 1.6

42.3 58.9 65.1 70.7 68.8 81.4 76.0 71.5 81.9 89.7 66.2 76.9 76.8

15.4 13.0 11.9 12.8 17.2 11.4 17.5 23.2 13.2 6.1 31.4 21.0 21.6

All respondents

21,954

11.5

72.3

16.3

Source'.

II World Values Survey 1990, University of Michigan.

IS MEXICO HEADED TOWARD ITS FIFTH CRISIS?

109

(42 percent). This high percentage of "probable" replies may be because the term revolution had a positive connotation in Mexico until 1982. It was only eliminated from government jargon in 1988. There may have been a different result if the question had asked about civil war instead of revolution. Differences of opinion varied little when broken down by age but substantially when broken down by income. The higher-income strata had percentages of 31 and 68 for the probability and improbability of revolution respectively, while the lower strata responded at 55 percent and 36 percent. Professionals are the least concerned about the possibility of a revolution (34 percent and 62 percent), while government leaders are evenly divided (47 percent and 47 percent), as are business owners (48 percent and 47 percent). At the opposite extreme, the underemployed see a greater probability of revolution existing (63 percent and 25 percent). The Mexican people have a clear inclination toward change, and in this sense Mexico is not a conservative society. Though there is dissatisfaction with the establishment, Mexican society does not seek radical changes; rather it prefers gradual ones, though it is somewhat impatient for them. The most appropriate characterization of Mexican society today would be moderate radicalism.

Table 6.8

Opinions on the Likelihood of a Revolution in Mexico Among Different Segments of the Population, 1989 N (sample size)

Probable

Age group 50

557 612 309

Income Low Middle High

Segment

Improbable

No Opinion

(%)

(%)

53.5 48.1 48.9

38.5 44.4 43.0

8.1 7.5 8.1

846 427 142

54.5 47.5 31.0

36.3 46.3 67.6

9.3 6.1 1.4

75 279 195 215 154 204 157 161

46.7 48.4 34.3 51.6 51.3 53.4 52.8 63.4

46.6 46.6 61.5 42.3 42.8 37.7 33.8 24.8

6.6 5.1 4.1 6.0 5.8 8.8 13.3 11.8

1,487

50.0

42.0

8.0

77mes-Prospectiva

Estratégica

(%)

group

Occupation Ruling elite Business owner Professional Admin./clerical Homemaker/studenl Blue collar Farmer Underemployed All respondents Source: Los Angeles September 1989.

A.C.

(Peac), national

survey,

110

MIGUEL BASANEZ Conclusion

T h i s e x a m i n a t i o n of M e x i c a n society s e e m s to indicate that the g r a d u a l c h a n g e s that have occurred in the infrastructure and values of Mexican society o v e r the past fifty years are now t r a n s f o r m i n g into calls for political as well as e c o n o m i c r e f o r m . In the M e x i c a n e x p e r i e n c e , political r e f o r m is not simply the e f f e c t of e c o n o m i c change. Rather, the engine of change seems to lie in society, and e c o n o m i c modernization, undertaken in propitious international conditions, has started u p the engine. T h e high-income strata f a v o r e c o n o m i c r e f o r m but are u n e n t h u s i a s t i c a b o u t political r e f o r m , while the lower strata are the opposite. W h i l e Mexican society as a whole is moderate, gradualist, and centrist, it would be incorrect to describe it as a d v e r s e to radical political change. In this c o n t e x t , in late 1991 an important contradiction has b e c o m e a p p a r e n t : the incongruity b e t w e e n the g o v e r n m e n t ' s e f f o r t s to h a n d l e the e c o n o m y and its public image. T h e Salinas administration has put its best e f f o r t s into e c o n o m i c r e f o r m , but even though there is general support f o r key c o m p o n e n t s such as privatization and the N A F r A , 6 0 percent of those polled find the Mexican e c o n o m y weak. E c o n o m i c conditions are cited as the c o u n t r y ' s main problems: u n e m p l o y m e n t (20 percent), inflation (23 percent), and the f o r e i g n debt (7 p e r c e n t ) . 3 9 At the s a m e time, 41 percent of those surveyed state that bribery has increased during the last three years, while 32 p e r c e n t think it is the same, and only 17 percent think it has d i m i n i s h e d . I n d i v i d u a l s ' a s s e s s m e n t of their personal e c o n o m i c situation is not very o p t i m i s t i c : equal n u m b e r s believe that they are better off, the s a m e , and w o r s e off than they were three years earlier. Nevertheless, e x p e c t a t i o n s of i m p r o v e m e n t in the next three years have increased (46 percent). T h e w o r r i s o m e t h i n g a b o u t the a b o v e f i g u r e s is that t h e y a r e a f o r e w a r n i n g that if the significant progress m a d e in m a c r o e c o n o m i c s is not translated into c o n c r e t e benefits f o r M e x i c a n s across sectors, the p r o m i s i n g f u t u r e of the e c o n o m i c p r o g r a m e n v i s a g e d by the administration will be in j e o p a r d y . A n y snag in the e c o n o m y , politics, or international relations could p r e c i p i t a t e a s u d d e n c h a n g e f o r the w o r s e in p u b l i c opinion and h a v e a devastating e f f e c t on both reform efforts. T h e e c o n o m i c reform is, technically s p e a k i n g , feasible, but it is subject to severe risks in the broader context. A l t h o u g h there is n o fiscal deficit today and inflationary pressure is less, s o m e c o n d i t i o n s are similar to t h o s e present d u r i n g the third year of the L o p e z Portillo administration. 4 0 T h e popularity of the two presidents is even similar: 8 0 p e r c e n t in 1979 f o r L o p e z Portillo and 78 percent in 1991 f o r Salinas in M e x i c o City. 4 1 T h e s e reflections strengthen the a r g u m e n t that political r e f o r m c o n c u r rent with e c o n o m i c r e f o r m is necessary to e n s u r e the viability of e c o n o m i c m o d e r n i z a t i o n in the m e d i u m term. H o w e v e r , the Mexican g o v e r n m e n t and the P R I , laden with b a g g a g e f r o m its long stay in power, do not share that

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111

opinion; nor do they show any real intention of changing things, and that recalcitrance places them in a catch-22 situation. Economic reform requires profound constitutional changes that are politically destabilizing. The reinstatement of political stability requires a democratic opening that makes constitutional reform difficult. Their reluctance for a democratic opening—understood as a government initiative to lead a democratizing process—was confirmed by the "consultation" on the constitutional reforms of 1991. Up until 1990 the government would have been able to lead the creation of a system of real political parties by taking advantage of the societal initiative shown in 1988. The conditions for an opening were present during the 1989 elections, and they would have been strengthened by scrupulous respect for the votes for each party. Perhaps new political cadres would have developed at the local and state level, as is happening now in Baja California Norte, that would have permitted the slow dissolution of the PRI and its two tendencies: the center-right and the center-left. A three-party system (PRIPAN-PRD) would have been a transition toward a two-party system (PANPRD) under the leadership of the president. However, this gradual evolution no longer seems likely. Mexican society has become disenchanted with both the government and the political parties. It wants to participate, as it showed in 1988, but when it does so and its wishes are not respected, as happened starting in November 1990 in the state of México, it retreats and matures. There have been multiparty attempts, such as the Democratic Assembly for Real Suffrage (ADESE), Council for Democracy (COPADE), Agreement for Democracy (ACUDE), and attempts at an opposition consensus, such as P A N ' s , 4 2 and even nonparty ones such as the movement around Salvador Nava in San Luis Potosí. It is hard to imagine the administration promoting an openness now since it controls Congress and has lost the confidence of the opposition. T w o political scenarios are (1) progress toward a democratic transition led by society or (2) an authoritarian crackdown led by the government. Conflicts between the population and the government, as in the cases of Guanajuato and San Luis Potosí, will propel Mexico toward one or the other, and progress in either direction would be intimately linked to international pressure. Gains made by society in its civic struggles and backed by international public opinion could lead toward democratization. Such a reform from below would not easily include the PRI as it has existed thus far, nor any party that it might become. In this scenario society could perhaps accelerate its political coming of age and get the PAN and the PRD to support joint candidates and c o m e together to defeat the PRI in 1994. They could then establish a transition government and postpone political debate for six years, while the foundations were laid for a real democratic system that could make its debut in the elections in 2000. The two political forces that would emerge would resemble a social democratic party and a Christian democratic party.

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T h e s e c o n d scenario, a g o v e r n m e n t c r a c k d o w n , requires either the g o v e r n m e n t to s t o p c a r i n g a b o u t i n t e r n a t i o n a l p u b l i c o p i n i o n or t h e w o r l d to s t o p s u p p o r t i n g t h e d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n of t h e c o u n t r y . T h e first h y p o t h e s i s c o u l d o c c u r if t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s d r a s t i c a l l y c h a n g e d its s u p p o r t f o r M e x i c o , f o r e x a m p l e . A c e s s a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l s u p p o r t f o r d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n is h a r d e r to i m a g i n e . All in all, an a u t h o r i t a r i a n c r a c k d o w n w o u l d p r o b a b l y c a u s e s u c h u n m a n a g e a b l e social t e n s i o n and political instability as to hurt the e c o n o m y . F r o m a p u r e l y t e c h n i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e , the e c o n o m i c f u t u r e of M e x i c o h o l d s n o great u n c e r t a i n t i e s . T h e p r o b l e m s that m a y arise s e e m m a n a g e a b l e . T h e political f u t u r e , h o w e v e r , is not e q u a l l y optimistic. T h e m o s t likely path s e e m s to lie b e t w e e n the t w o s c e n a r i o s : a d e m o c r a t i c push f r o m society, but w i t h l i m i t e d v i c t o r i e s , or an a u t h o r i t a r i a n push by the g o v e r n m e n t t o w a r d a t w o - p a r t y s y s t e m w i t h t h e P A N . T h e i n a d e q u a c i e s of the c u r r e n t p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m r e q u i r e p r o m p t a t t e n t i o n . T h e n e w e c o n o m i c c o n d i t i o n s will i n c r e a s i n g l y r e q u i r e , a m o n g m a n y o t h e r c h a n g e s , labor m o b i l i t y and f r e e d o m to m a k e c o n t r a c t s , w h i c h still d o e s not exist; c l e a r f o r m u l a t i o n and e n f o r c e m e n t of t h e law; a t r u s t w o r t h y j u d i c i a l s y s t e m ; t h e end to c o r p o r a t e a r r a n g e m e n t s as e v i d e n c e d in pacts and p r i v a t i z a t i o n s ; and a p r o f e s s i o n a l a r m y and p o l i c e force. W h y d o e s t h e p o p u l a t i o n not laud the g o v e r n m e n t today with a c l e a r l y p o s i t i v e o p i n i o n of t h e e c o n o m y , w h e n that is w h e r e t h e g o v e r n m e n t h a s e x e r t e d t h e m o s t e f f o r t a n d a c c o m p l i s h e d the m o s t ? W h y is s o c i e t y n o t c l e a r l y critical of its d e m o c r a c y w h e n that is w h e r e the clearest s h o r t c o m i n g s a r e ? W h e r e did M e x i c o ' s s u p p o s e d l y p r o f o u n d historical n a t i o n a l i s m g o ? Is M e x i c o h e a d e d t o w a r d a p r o m i s i n g f u t u r e , or will the cyclical d e c l i n e of t h e s e c o n d half of e a c h p r e s i d e n t i a l t e r m b e r e p e a t e d and hurl its p e o p l e into the f i f t h c r i s i s ? G o v e r n m e n t a c t i o n s u n f o r t u n a t e l y p o i n t t o w a r d the g l o o m i e r o p t i o n . O n e h o p e s s o c i e t y w i l l k n o w h o w to a v o i d it. R e d u c i n g

the

e x c e s s i v e p o w e r of the p r e s i d e n t will be a key factor.

Notes This chapter was translated from the Spanish by Rita A. Ciark-Gollub. 1. Laws on the subjects of common land (Article 27), labor (Article 123), education (Article 3), and no reelection (Article 83) came to be powerful social issues. Added to them is the section on the church (Article 130), established in 1857. See Miguel Basanez, La lucha por la hegemonia en Mexico: 1968-1990, 8th ed. (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1990), 190. 2. Miguel Basanez, El pulso de los sexenios: 20 anos de crisis en Mexico (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1991). 3. In this case the bet seems to have been made more by the economic cabinet, rather than by the president himself. 4. In a document analyzing the III Presidential Report, the Employers' Confederation of the Mexican Republic (COPARMEX) warned of "a very dangerous e x c e s s i v e optimism and self-satisfaction on the part of the government" that could result in serious consequences, as with other adminis-

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trations that "turned out very badly, amidst widespread jeering." El Financiero (Mexico City), December 2, 1991, p. 65. 5. In millions of 1970 pesos, per capita income in 1933 was 2.889, and in 1981 it was 12.754. Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI), Estadísticas Históricas de México (Mexico City: INEGI, 1986), 311. 6. See Ronald Inglehart, Neil Nevitte, and Miguel Basáñez, Convergence in North America: Trade, Politics and Values (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 7. In 1982-1983, the first year of the de la Madrid administration, the PRI lost the capitals of San Luís Potosí, Guanajuato, Sonora, Chihuahua, and Durango; and in Salinas's first year the PRI lost the governorship of Baja California Norte and half of the deputy's seats and municipalities of Michoacán. It would seem that the initial democratic enthusiasm for their six-year terms was short-lived for both of them. 8. Lorenzo Meyer and Wayne Cornelius called attention to this point from the beginning. 9. Confidential memorandum from Ambassador John Negroponte to the State Department. " M e m o r a n d u m Confidencial al Subsecretario de Estado, Bernard Aronson," Proceso (Mexico City), May 13, 1991, p. 6. 10. In millions of 1970 pesos, total G D P was 50,349 in 1933 and 908,765 in 1981. INEGI, Estadísticas Históricas de México, 311. 1 1. Edmond Valpy Knox Fitzgerald, Patterns of Savings and Investment in Mexico: 1939-1976 (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Latin American Studies, 1977); Carlos Tello, La política económica en México: 1970-1976 (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1979); Laurence Whitehead, The Economic Policy of the Echeverría Sexenio: What Went Wrong and Why'l (Pittsburgh, Penn.: Latin American Studies Association, 1979). 12. Basáñez, La lucha por la hegemonía en México, 182. 13. The exact question was: "Last Thursday the 3rd the government announced the reprivatization of the banks. What is your opinion on this measure: good, fair, or bad?" II World Survey of Values 1990, University of Michigan. (All quotations are translated from the Spanish.) 14. Basáñez, El pulso de los sexenios, 78. 15. T h e high approval rating of the measure published in El Excelsior in 1990, purported to be the general result of a survey, was merely an example of government propaganda. The figure reported was for the business sector alone. El Excelsior (Mexico City), May 6, 1990, p. 1. 16. They were asked: "Some people think that the government should sell all of its companies; others say most of them; some think only a few; but others think it should not sell any. What do you think?" Los Angeles 77'me.s-Prospectiva Estratégica, A.C. (Peac), national survey, January 1991. 17. They were asked: "As you may know, many banks, companies, and industries that were once government property have recently been sold to private investors. Do you believe that the sale of these government-owned companies to the private sector will wind up helping or hurting common people like yourself, or do you think it will have no effect at all?" Los Angeles Times-Peac, national survey, October 1991. 18. Inglehart, Nevitte, and Basáñez, Convergence in North America. 19. Los Angeles Times-Pt&c, national survey, October 1991. 20. Ibid. 21. Federico Reyes Heroles, interview, "La Renovación del PRI sería su Muerte," Proceso, August 27, 1990, p. 16. 22. From 1988 to 1991 the governors of Veracruz, Jalisco, Tabasco, Baja

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California Norte, Michoacán, México, Yucatán, Guanajuato, and San Luis Potosí were removed from their posts through different mechanisms and sent to different posts. Also, the newly elected governor of Michoacán stepped down in October 1992. 23. Rodolfo González Guevara, interview, "La Asamblea del PRI será una Farsa," Proceso, August 27, 1990, p. 10. 24. The resignation of PRI candidate Ramón Aguirre and his replacement by Carlos Medina, the PAN mayor of León, instead of the combative Vicente Fox, the PAN candidate for the governorship, would seem to indicate that. 25. "Salinas Viajó a Elevar a Zapata. . . ," Proceso, October 14, 1991, p. 6. 26. See Table 6.7. 27. The most recent and important example occurred at the closing of the C O P A R M E X assembly in Sonora, when participants asked that "the economy be depoliticized" and that labor legislation be changed to make it more like prevailing conditions in the United States. This provoked an exaggerated government reaction through the National Association of Economics and the Labor Congress, which was reminiscent of the confrontations between business and the government during Echeverría's term. El Excelsior and El Nacional, October 14, 1991, p. 1. 28. A recent example was the incarceration of parish priest Joel Padrón of Chiapas. 29. An account of these splits can be read in an interview with an advisor to the episcopate, Manuel Olimón. He made it clear that without constitutional reforms there will be no progress. El Financiero, October 23, 1991, p. 35. 30. The invitation of the Catholic hierarchy to the presidential inauguration, the designation of a presidential representative to the Vatican, and the second visit by Karol Wojtyla in May 1990 are some examples. 31. P. López Gallo, Relaciones diplomáticas entre México y la Santa Sede (Mexico City: Ediciones El Caballito, 1990), 111. 32. R. Camp, Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). 33. Miguel Basáñez, "Encuesta Nacional," Este País, August 1991, p. 3. 34. Ibid. 35. Enrique Alduncín, Los valores de los mexicanos: México, entre tradición y la modernidad (Mexico City: Fomento Cultural Banamex, 1986), 95 36. When A c k o f f ' s alternative typology is applied—proactive, interactive, reactive, and inactive—the dominant profile is interactive, with the following characteristics: social ills will be resolved when the majority makes an effort to do so; times are hard, but they can get better if the social system is changed and new citizens are trained; customs and traditions do not make much sense; success is keyed to knowledge and not age; and the poor are a product of society, which is why they must be given jobs and not handouts. See Alduncín, Los valores de los mexicanos, 102. 37. The exact question was: "There are three basic kinds of attitudes toward the society we live in. Please choose the one that best describes your own opinion: (a) The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action; (b) Our society must gradually be improved by reforms; (c) Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces." II World Survey of Values 1990, University of Michigan. 38. The exact question was: " S o m e people say that because of poverty, corruption, and other problems, there may be a revolution in Mexico within five years. Do you think that is probable or improbable?" Los Angeles Times-Peac, national survey, September 1989.

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39. Los Angeles Times-Peac, national survey, October 1991. 40. These conditions include, among others, very positive economic results, but a c c o m p a n i e d by a current account deficit that is hard to maintain; a very optimistic popular mood, but one that is also based on hard-to-meet expectations; and increasing internal conflicts within the administration starting the third year. 41. T h e data are compared to data on the Federal District because the 1979 survey was local. Los Angeles Times, 1979 and 1991. 42. "Propuesta para un C o n s e n s o Nacional," Proceso, October 21, 1991, p. 46.

— 7 — The Inevitability of Democracy in Mexico Sergio Aguayo Quezada

After standing still for a long time, Mexico is now changing, and the uncertainty that this generates gives rise to speculation about the future. As illustrated in the accompanying chapters in this volume, current conjecture about M e x i c o ' s future takes as its point of departure the discussion—both critical and supportive—of the major economic transformations initiated by Presidents Miguel de la Madrid and Carlos Salinas and the discussion of how economics interrelates with politics. This chapter approaches this theme from a more historical perspective, which leads to the conclusion that, regardless of the intentions of the Mexican presidents, the forces now unleashed offer Mexican society a rare chance to move toward a more democratic regime. Presidents Lázaro Cárdenas and Miguel Alemán were the great architects of modern Mexico. The former laid the foundation for the authoritarian, corporatist, presidential, and single-party political system. The latter brought to M e x i c o ' s economic development a kind of industrialization that was upheld by a policy of import substitution, protectionism, generous subsidies, and heavy state involvement in the economy. Underlying Mexico's relations with the rest of the world, particularly the United States, was the assumption of potential threats to national sovereignty and development. To counter these threats, the Mexican people had to remain united around the group that was most capable of defending the nation and maintaining an independent foreign policy. This system, whose central features were mutually supportive, gave the country decades of economic growth, a certain diplomatic independence, and great political stability. However, the structure had flaws and contradictions. Rapid economic growth enabled protected industries to remain inefficient and state involvement in the economy to increase dramatically, and promoted urban pollution and a skewed distribution of income. Mexico's independent

T h e research for this chapter w a s carried out with the support of the Research and Writing Program of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. 117

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foreign policy was unable to prevent increasing economic integration with the United S t a t e s — b e it legal, such as U.S. investment in the maquiladora industry, or illegal, such as the movement of undocumented workers and drug trafficking. A political system characterized by impunity led to tremendous corruption, notorious abuses of power, and the alienation of vast sectors of a changing society that no longer felt represented. T h e political, e c o n o m i c , and financial crises that began in 1968 are discussed in more detail in other chapters. What is worth emphasizing here is the process by which the governing elite was obliged to dismantle s o m e of the old system during the 1980s and how these changes have touched all d i m e n s i o n s of national life. In the e c o n o m i c realm, the size of state involvement was reduced, and an opening to the outside was begun that has culminated in the negotiations for the N A F T A with the United States and C a n a d a . In f o r e i g n policy, M e x i c o ' s activism in Central A m e r i c a , so irritating to conservatives, was discreetly replaced by a policy of mediation. T h e f a m o u s arrival of the technocrats to the political leadership signals change in that realm as well. These changes included a fundamental reassessment of the role of the United States in Mexican life. Symbolically, a fitting epilogue for a long period of c o n t e m p o r a r y history seems to have been written by the U.S. ambassador to Mexico, John Dimitri Negroponte. In December 1991 a small note appeared in some Mexican newspapers quoting a document attributed to the ambassador, in which he affirmed that the United States was no longer viewed as "a threat" by Mexicans. 1 In other words, f r o m the perspective of the Mexican ruling elite, the proximity of the United States ceased to be a disadvantage (as in the saying "poor Mexico, so far from God and so close to the gringos") and instead had become an opportunity for Mexico to c o m e out of its economic crisis and take its place in the world economy. T w o pillars of the old structure changed: the economic model and the foreign policy model. T o d a y , all that remains intact is the corporatist, presidentialist, authoritarian, and single-party political system. W h e r e is M e x i c o headed? The answer depends on the path that the Mexican political system follows and h o w that path unfolds; both will affect the economic and foreign policy d i m e n s i o n s , particularly vis-à-vis the United States. This a u t h o r ' s h y p o t h e s i s is that a c h a n g e in M e x i c a n a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m is inevitable, and that the unknown factors are its pace and timing and its final features. 2 This hypothesis is supported by an argument made by Theda Skocpol in States and Social Revolution. Skocpol argues that although social c h a n g e (and revolutions) take on d i f f e r e n t characteristics in each country, three variables a l w a y s a p p e a r during periods of transition: a deterioration of bureaucratic structures, the emergence of new social forces, and the impact of i n t e r n a t i o n a l f a c t o r s . 3 F o r M e x i c o a fourth variable is involved: the intentions of the president and his group, since they are central to the

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Mexican system. The outcome of Mexico's transition will depend on the importance that each of these variables acquires and how they interrelate.

The Deterioration of Bureaucratic Structures To state that Mexico's bureaucratic structures have deteriorated may seem a bit provocative in the light of the remarkable successes of the Salinas administration's economic reforms. Here, deterioration means the Mexican governing elite's diminishing capacity to maintain the old relations of domination through the use of coercion—the hegemony obtained through persuasion, the belief that one's interests are better served by the existing regime, or the fear of potential coercion by the dominating party. The "Revolutionary Family" has been extremely artful at maintaining relations of domination by exercising combinations of coercion. The trend of recent years to reduce the size of the state has meant fewer positions for political allies and fewer resources to feed the client structure. Moreover, as the economic reform progresses and increasingly larger sectors of society adopt the independent initiatives that characterize market economies, the traditional customs of the governing PRI lose their usefulness. The efforts of Salinas and his group to transform the PRI are a response to these developments. The relative deterioration of the bureaucratic structures is particularly visible in the institutions in charge of internal security—coercion. Through their reputation and actions they have inhibited or repressed the political participation of citizens that typifies democracy. Institutions such as the Federal Security Bureau (DFS), the Federal Judicial Police, and the armed forces operated with impunity for decades in Mexico. Lately, they have been confronted with greater and greater restraints. Take the example of the DFS, which President Alemán created in 1947 by verbal decree. The DFS came to be the regime's largest political police force. Its role was to surveil and, if need be, to control or eliminate those whom it categorized as enemies of the regime. Its influence reached its peak during the 1968 student movement and Mexico's antiguerrilla struggle during the late 1960s and late 1970s. DFS impunity had unexpected consequences. During the 1970s, drug trafficking encroached upon Mexico, and drug lords penetrated the security structures. The result was DFS complicity in drug trafficking, which came to light with the February 1985 assassinations of U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent Enrique Camarena and a Mexican pilot, Alfredo Zavala Avelar. Largely due to pressure from the United States, President de la Madrid was obliged to order the disbanding of the DFS at the end of that year. De la Madrid decreed the creation of the Dirección General de Información y Seguridad Nacional to replace the DFS. During the first weeks of the

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Salinas administration, the agency w a s renamed the Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional. This new security structure seeks to reduce the autonomy of its security a g e n c i e s by t r a n s f o r m i n g a historically political police f o r c e into a p r o f e s s i o n a l intelligence apparatus. This task is h a m p e r e d by the fact that these state security forces continue to be part of the executive branch, so public (or legislative) control over t h e m — c o m m o n in democratic r e g i m e s — is absent. Another pillar of the state coercion apparatus, the Federal Judicial Police, has f o u n d its a c t i o n s increasingly constrained. F r o m the very b e g i n n i n g , C a r l o s S a l i n a s ' s administration decided to give high priority to fighting d r u g traffickers (partially out of the need to have good relations with Washington). Called on to i m p l e m e n t the fight and accustomed to acting with impunity, the Federal Judicial Police p r o v o k e d a noticeable increase in h u m a n rights violations. In turn, protests by various social organizations proliferated. W h e n the c o m p l a i n t s of h u m a n rights violations g r e w louder both within and outside Mexico, the president ordered the creation of the National H u m a n Rights C o m m i s s i o n ( C N D H ) in June 1990. He appointed a wellk n o w n jurist to chair it, Jorge C a r p i z o , and formed an advisory council of p r o m i n e n t citizens. Since the C N D H was determined to curtail human rights v i o l a t i o n s , f r i c t i o n and c l a s h e s with the Federal Judicial P o l i c e w e r e inevitable. T h i s confrontation was the main factor behind the resignations of J a v i e r C o e l l o T r e j o , the o f f i c i a l in c h a r g e of the f i g h t a g a i n s t d r u g trafficking, and Enrique Alvarez del Castillo, the attorney general. Meanwhile, the Mexican armed forces have been gradually changing their p e r c e p t i o n of social c h a n g e and its p r o p o n e n t s . T h e a r m e d f o r c e s are i n c r e a s i n g l y c o n v i n c e d that c o e r c i o n cannot resolve M e x i c o ' s c o m p l e x e c o n o m i c , political, and social problems. They view most social m o v e m e n t s not as tools of a subversive foreign conspiracy but as the natural result of social tensions that are inevitable in a country full of inequalities. T h e s e e x a m p l e s illustrate the important c h a n g e s taking place in the b u r e a u c r a t i c s t r u c t u r e s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r m a i n t a i n i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p of d o m i n a t i o n by m e a n s of coercion. T h e institutions in charge of security have not lost their ability to use force (in absolute terms they have maintained or i n c r e a s e d it), but their s c o p e f o r acting with impunity has s h r u n k . O n e c o n s e q u e n c e has been a loosening of the strict relationship of traditional d o m i n a t i o n , which has allowed various social sectors to lose their f e a r to organize.

The Emergence of New Social Forces S k o c p o l argues that social c h a n g e is also due to the e m e r g e n c e of new social forces. Although this p h e n o m e n o n has not yet been sufficiently studied, there is e v i d e n c e that n e w g r o u p s have appeared in M e x i c o and that s o m e of the

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most traditional social and political actors have been freeing themselves from authoritarian control. This is particularly clear with the opposition parties, the Catholic church, business organizations, some mass media, and groups that have emerged around very specific demands. Their growth has been more apparent in those sectors that were relatively excluded from the exercise of authoritarian control—the middle classes and the urban poor, for example. A comparison of the regime's response to independent groups in Mexico's recent history supports this thesis. Taking the 1968 student movement as a starting point, and including other cases of citizens' insurgency such as the events in Chihuahua in 1986, and concluding with the 1988 elections, it is clear that although the regime has not relinquished the use of force, it has curtailed its application. An examination of the 1988 election is instructive. Observers and analysts were expecting the PAN to have an upsurge. Instead, the nationalist Left, in the form of the National Democratic Front (FDN) won big. Many have insisted that it was an act of protest against the economic crisis, combined with the charisma and name of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. Doubtless, both factors were important. However, some of those who participated in what was the FDN have told this author that part of its success lay in its ability to bring together the actions of hundreds of organizations that had grown throughout the country in the shadow of authoritarianism around very specific demands. That year they decided to participate actively in the electoral contest. Four years later President Salinas's popularity is as remarkable as the organizational and programming limitations the Left has shown. There are, however, some relevant questions left unanswered. Were the results of the election of 1988 of only passing significance? If one looks only at elections, that conclusion is valid. However, the inclusion of other factors gives a different reading. The president's popularity does not extend to the PRI, which continues to be distrusted by most of the public. Indeed, the opposition parties are no better trusted, which leads one to wonder what the future of the parties will be. The fact that the PRD has not maintained the strength it showed in 1988 is due to its structural limitations. The Left still has a significant social base, but it has not yet been integrated into the political system. A distinction must be made between the opposition parties and the emerging social forces. Several small, large, and mid-sized organizations have begun to act to obstruct or change government policies, and in the process are altering the mechanisms under which the relationship of domination operates. In the early 1980s, for example, a couple of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were concerned with human rights. In 1991 a directory prepared by the C N D H listed seventy-five N G O s located throughout the country. The work of these organizations was decisive in the protests of human rights violations perpetrated by the Federal Judicial Police in its fight

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against drug trafficking and led directly to the creation of the C N D H . The existence of these organizations was decisive in limiting s o m e abuses of authority, and this has affected the relationship of domination. Another e x a m p l e would be Convergencia de Organismos Civiles por la Democracia, an umbrella group of 120 N G O s working on popular education and the environment. It provides advisory services to grass-roots movements. C o n v e r g e n c i a has a presence in nineteen states and directly or indirectly t o u c h e s f i v e million M e x i c a n s . 4 C o n v e r g e n c i a m e m b e r o r g a n i z a t i o n s participated extensively in electoral activities during some of the states' elections as independent actors observing the f r e e d o m and fairness of the elections. T h e PRI m a d e a remarkable c o m e b a c k in the 1991 federal elections, although in several states the pattern of elections devoid of f r e e d o m and fairness persisted. Lack of electoral integrity provoked very large protests in G u a n a j u a t o , San Luis Potosí, and T a b a s c o . R e s p o n d i n g to the outcry, President Salinas replaced the governors of those three states with interim governors. Sources close to the president report that external considerations also had a very real influence on his decision. Yet the mobilizations of the N G O s in each of these states were different. In G u a n a j u a t o the protest was organized by the P A N ; in San Luis Potosí, by a regional movement, Frente Cívico Potosino; and in Tabasco, by the P R D . In all three cases N G O s belonging to Convergencia participated through pilot p r o j e c t s to o b s e r v e elections. T h e y d o c u m e n t e d the irregularities and galvanized the protest movements. In summary, the actions of the N G O s are a symptom of social discontent with the antidemocratic procedures typical of Mexican elections.

The Impact of International Factors T h e external factor, S k o c p o l ' s third variable evident in periods of transition, has taken on increased importance in Mexico. This is especially evident in another historical comparison. When President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz ordered the student massacre committed on October 2, 1968, he was able to ignore the w o r l d ' s criticism because at that time the country was stable, the economy was growing behind walls of political and economic protectionism, and national unity w a s secured by invoking the prospect of f o r e i g n intervention. In comparison, President Salinas exhibits extreme sensitivity and care to what is said abroad about his regime. Not only has Salinas given interviews to many foreign media and received hundreds of visitors, he has also been waging an aggressive and costly public relations campaign. This policy is completely logical in the light of the new model of development that depends on the goodwill of foreign actors, particularly the United States. This campaign has been unquestionably successful, and most of the U.S.

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elite has rallied behind President Salinas because it is believed that if the e c o n o m i c r e s t r u c t u r i n g is c o n s o l i d a t e d , M e x i c o will e x p l i c i t l y and permanently b e c o m e one of the closest allies of the United States. This is a very attractive possibility because it would eliminate some of the concerns and frictions that have arisen between the two countries due to M e x i c o ' s p r e v i o u s search for i n d e p e n d e n c e . H o w e v e r , the e n t h u s i a s m abroad is confronted with a Mexican political system that is quite different f r o m the liberal paradigm proposed by the United States. The fact that the elections do not meet universal criteria of freedom and fairness poses very sticky problems f o r the United States. A brief c o m m e n t on U.S. reaction to the 1988 elections is in order, because what the United States does or does not do will influence the profile and timing of the Mexican political transition. T h e 1988 elections w e r e full of irregularities. A Washington Post editorial of July 19, 1988, summed up the attitudes and ambivalence of many U.S. citizens. According to the editorial, " M e x i c o is now in the midst of an extraordinary series of r e f o r m s led f r o m within the dominant party. Ballot f r a u d a l w a y s deserves attention, but it's the r e f o r m that is the great and historic change." 5 In other words, given a choice between their principles and their interests (and faced with the possibility of the nationalist Left coming to p o w e r ) , the U.S. p o l i c y m a k e r s o v e r w h e l m i n g l y opted for their own interests. T h o s e public calls for free elections m a d e in 1985 and 1986 had turned into a discreet silence. W i t h the beginning of negotiations for the N A F T A in 1990, concern with the type of regime with which the United States was merging destinies was reborn. Nevertheless, the criticism that appeared in various newspapers o v e r the irregularities in the 1991 elections reveals the same ambiguities. U.S. policymakers want to see the economic reform consolidated, but avoid adopting a strong position against authoritarianism. Nevertheless, the international attention now being paid to M e x i c o has had c o n s e q u e n c e s . It is generally believed that President de la M a d r i d ' s decision to order the d i s b a n d i n g of the D F S was heavily influenced by pressure f r o m W a s h i n g t o n . T h e creation of the C N D H was also decisively a f f e c t e d by the i m m i n e n t publication in June 1990 of the first report on M e x i c o by the U.S. human rights organization Americas Watch. T h e report w a s to appear shortly b e f o r e the Salinas-Bush meeting in Washington when they were to a n n o u n c e the intent to negotiate the N A F T A . In this context President Salinas decided to create the C N D H , and it was created within seventy-two hours. T w o years later there is no doubt that the determination and e f f e c t i v e n e s s shown by the C N D H has curtailed the impunity of the police corps, which in turn has affected the relaxing of controls imposed by the relationship of domination. Curtailment of the use of force has provided more maneuvering room for the emerging social forces. T h u s when a Mexican organization defends s o m e rights, such as free and fair elections or the environment, it is well protected

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by the full legitimacy extended to it by the new international agenda, now freed from the old anticommunist rhetoric and the East-West conflict. There is no doubt that this has facilitated the geometric growth of many NGOs. In addition, the growth and consolidation of NGOs in Mexico has been part of a world phenomenon. Tim Brodhead, for example, believes that "the 1980s may well be called the decade of the NGOs. From relative obscurity a decade ago, NGOs have suddenly found themselves catapulted into international respectability. Donor governments and multilateral institutions now routinely pay tribute to their presumed capacity to reach the poor, and to the qualities of innovation and flexibility which are supposed to characterize their work." 6 For many years the efficiency of the authoritarian control mechanisms and the effectiveness of the nationalist message caused Mexican NGOs to be very careful about establishing relations with their counterparts in other countries. The openness to the outside that the government began promoting in 1985 gradually legitimized the development of independent international agendas (known as citizens' diplomacy). When negotiations for the NAFTA were announced, the foundations were laid to strengthen ties between social groups in Mexico, the United States, and Canada. To summarize what has been argued thus far, "the likelihood of the government tolerating the opposition increases as the costs of repression increase." 7 In the 1990s it is evident that in Mexico the relative deterioration of the bureaucracy, the emergence of new social forces, and the impact of external factors have raised the costs of repression. These trends will continue, although it is impossible to predict what these changes will bring or how long they will take. Another clue to the length and form of Mexico's transition lies in the president's actions or inaction.

The Intentions of the Mexican President The power of the Mexican presidency is illustrated by a conversation between President Salinas and a U.S. scholar, in which Salinas said that part of the explanation for seeking the NAFTA was that "changes in Europe and East Asia and an apparent reliance on blocs convinced me that we should also try to be part of an economic trading bloc with the United States and Canada" 8 (emphasis added). That is, he did not speak of consulting with anyone on his idea. When Salinas reached his decision, he sent two of his closest collaborators, José Cordoba and Jaime Serra Puche, to speak with U.S. officials. The rest is history. In light of his power, it is useful to discuss President Salinas's intentions regarding democracy. Evidence shows that his main priority is economics. One of the few times he spoke about the linkages between economic and political reforms, he said that "when you are introducing such a

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strong e c o n o m i c r e f o r m , you must m a k e sure that you build the political c o n s e n s u s around it. If you are at the same time introducing additional drastic political r e f o r m , you m a y end up with no r e f o r m at all. A n d we want to have reform, not a disintegrated country." 9 Salinas is c o n v i n c e d that e c o n o m i c r e f o r m and the N A F T A are the best t h i n g s f o r the c o u n t r y , but that it is i m p r u d e n t to s u b m i t t h e m f o r the a p p r o v a l of the citizenry. It is true that there has been an e f f o r t to attain a c o n s e n s u s for the N A F T A , and it is even possible that most M e x i c a n s would back the treaty if given the c h a n c e to do so. H o w e v e r , the g o v e r n m e n t has sought approval for decisions only after they are made, which m e a n s that the e c o n o m i c revolution has been carried out in an authoritarian fashion. T h i s p r e s i d e n t i a l a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m is r a t i o n a l i z e d and j u s t i f i e d with another idea that is deep-rooted in the g o v e r n i n g elite: Mexican society and the o p p o s i t i o n parties are not ready for d e m o c r a c y . T h o u g h rarely said in public, President de la M a d r i d a c k n o w l e d g e d this in an interview granted in 1985 to Roderic C a m p . According to de la Madrid, " M e x i c o was not ready for a b i p a r t i s a n or pluralistic political s y s t e m in which the o p p o s i t i o n could w i n . " H e a d d e d that M e x i c a n s ''need a b e t t e r - e d u c a t e d s e n s e of civic responsibility b e f o r e they will be ready f o r the type of political s y s t e m that t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a s . " 1 0 If it is true that M e x i c a n s are i n c a p a b l e of d e m o c r a c y , then it is largely b e c a u s e they c a n n o t practice it, and d o not practice it because they are not ready. A sense of civic responsibility has yet to be c u l t i v a t e d . T h i s vicious cycle s t r e n g t h e n s the a r g u m e n t — t y p i c a l of a u t h o r i t a r i a n r e g i m e s — t h a t since n o n e of the o t h e r political parties is r e s p o n s i b l e e n o u g h , the party in p o w e r must stay in p o w e r in order f o r the country to be governable. S a l i n a s ' s s t a t e m e n t s r e v e a l his c o n f i d e n c e that the r e l a t i o n s h i p of d o m i n a t i o n will be flexible e n o u g h for the e c o n o m i c revolution to take hold. In o t h e r w o r d s , the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n will d e c i d e the pace and t i m i n g of the uncertain political r e f o r m . With S a l i n a s ' s six-year term n o w m o r e than half o v e r , it m u s t be a c k n o w l e d g e d that so f a r he has been right b e c a u s e the political s y s t e m has e n d u r e d . L o o k i n g to the future, several questions arise. Will he be able to maintain his success in the second half of his term, when h e will h a v e to r e c o n c i l e the N A F T A , c o n s o l i d a t i o n of t h e e c o n o m i c program, and a presidential election? Will the deterioration of the bureaucratic structures be slow e n o u g h f o r the e c o n o m i c r e f o r m to take hold and then let d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e s take hold? Will the increasingly i n d e p e n d e n t social g r o u p s accept this c o m p r o m i s e ? Will they be influential enough to i m p o s e a faster transition, or would that upset a fragile equilibrium? T h e r e are no d e f i n i t i v e a n s w e r s to these questions, with one exception: the transition toward a more democratic regime seems inevitable. The interaction of the relative deterioration of the bureaucracies, the e m e r g e n c e of n e w social forces, and the external factor is creating pressure for r e f o r m . T h e f o r m s that this interaction acquire are of c o u r s e infinite, particularly if the

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factor of timing is included. One can expect authoritarianism to remain in the short term, but in the medium and long terms the forces of democracy will be strengthened. Paradoxically, Mexican presidential authoritarianism could be spending its last reserves of power by imposing economic reform and signing a treaty that will hasten the dismantling of authoritarianism. From this perspective, Salinas resembles one of the characters in a Greek tragedy: the success of his program means the destruction of the system that made it possible. Whether President Salinas or his group have a vocation for democracy d o e s not matter much. More important is whether the t r e m e n d o u s pragmatism and intelligence that they have demonstrated will manifest itself in the political sphere. If so, perhaps the Mexican political elite will accept that the old-style Mexican authoritarianism is now obsolete in Mexico. If so, perhaps they will find a political niche in the new pluralist system being constructed by Mexicans.

Notes This chapter was translated from the Spanish by Rita A. Clark-Gollub. 1. "According to one study, the U.S. ceased to be a threat to Mexico." La Jornada, December 27, 1991. 2. The direction that this chapter finally took was heavily influenced by the concise but brilliant essay by Alfred Stepan, "The Tasks of a Democratic Opposition," Journal of Democracy 1, no. 2 (Spring, 1990). 3. Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979). See particularly chapter 1. 4. "Qué es Convergencia de Organismos Civiles por la Democracia?" Convergencia (Mexico City), May 1991, p. 3. 5. Editorial, Washington Post, July 18, 1988. 6. Quoted in "Relations Between Southern and Northern NGOs: Effective Partnerships for Sustainable Development," in Documents in Development, 1981-1989 (Geneva: International Council of Voluntary Agencies, 1989), 27. 7. Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971), 15. 8. Robert A. Pastor, "Salinas Takes a Gamble," The New Republic, September 10 and 17, 1990, p. 32. 9. Interview with Carlos Salinas, "North American Free Trade: Mexico's Route to Upward Mobility," New Perspectives Quarterly 8, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 8. 10. Roderic A. Camp, "Attitudes and Images of the Mexican Entrepreneur: Political Consequences," in Government and Private Sector in Contemporary Mexico, ed. Sylvia Maxfield and Ricardo Anzaldúa (San Diego: Center for U.S.Mexican Studies, 1987), 141.

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Mexican Democracy: You Can't Get There from Here Michael Coppedge

Mexico has made undeniable progress toward political liberalization in the last four sexenios (six-year terms). A new opposition party has been born; some of the old opposition parties have become more autonomous; the pressures for clean elections have intensified; opposition candidates have won control of numerous municipalities, four Senate seats, and two governorships; and Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas nearly beat the PRI at its own game in the presidential election of ¡988. From a long-term perspective, Mexico appears to be moving in the direction of democracy. Since 1988, however, the movement toward democracy has been stalled. Despite some stunning concessions to the opposition—Ernesto Ruffo's 1989 gubernational victory in Baja California Norte and the forced resignations of two PRI gubernatorial candidates in 1991—the regime has taken several steps backward for every step forward. After a string of particularly unfair elections in 1990 and early 1991, some commentators have come to the conclusion that Mexico is less democratic now than it was before 1988. Two reasons explain why progress toward democracy has stalled: the concentration of power in the presidency and the PRI's determination to rule alone. The country has been approaching democracy, but it can't get there from here. This is not to say that Mexico can never attain democracy, only that it must find a path that is not blocked or remove the blockage. Further progress can only be made if (1) the leaders and activists of the ruling party are willing to surrender power to the opposition or (2) power is dispersed enough to enable the opposition to force the PRI from power. In the long run, one of these two conditions is probably inevitable, but neither of them is likely to be realized during the next few years.

I wish to express my gratitude to my superb research assistant, Alejandra Grosse, and to Anne McKinney, who transcribed the authors' meeting I was unable to attend.

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M e x i c o ' s Path Before discussing the conditions that block the birth of democracy in Mexico, it is useful to clarify the nature of the democratic forces. M e x i c o ' s political l i b e r a l i z a t i o n is s o m e t i m e s e x p l a i n e d as the result of the e c o n o m i c t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s the country is u n d e r g o i n g . O n e a r g u m e n t is that trade liberalization disperses p o w e r by encouraging the formation of p o w e r f u l coalitions united by shared economic interests. Government has less absolute p o w e r a f t e r r e m o v i n g itself f r o m discretionary d e c i s i o n s on t a r i f f s , permits, and exemptions, and less relative power with respect to the new trading groups. A second and closely related argument is that privatization and the general paring back of the state's involvement in the management of the e c o n o m y also d i s p e r s e s p o w e r by reducing the o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r politicians to tailor e c o n o m i c policies, regulations, and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e decisions to their political ends or to reward supporters and co-opt opponents with patronage. The obvious critique of the first argument is that dispersion of p o w e r is not necessarily identical to d e m o c r a c y . The growth of these coalitions certainly would disperse power, but to w h o m ? To private-sector interest groups. Lobbies, no matter how influential or vigorous, d o not m a k e a c o u n t r y d e m o c r a t i c . P r o g r e s s toward d e m o c r a c y would be a c h i e v e d only if these g r o u p s w e r e to recruit a mass m e m b e r s h i p and contest elections. A n o t h e r critique is that there are equally good arguments that economic liberalization hinders democratization. If economic liberalization p r o m o t e s g r o w t h , as it has begun to do in Mexico, then there is every reason to expect that it will shore up the legitimacy of the ruling party and w e a k e n the opposition, thus postponing the advent of truly c o m p e t i t i v e politics. T h o s e who believe that a leaner and meaner state is necessarily a less politicized state should ponder the implications of Pronasol, which is both an efficient g o v e r n m e n t agency and a very effective political tool, as the 1991 midterm and 1992 gubernatorial elections showed. 1 Furthermore, the new social m o v e m e n t s that s o m e observers looked to for p r o d e m o c r a c y activism have tended, in Judith Adler H e l l m a n ' s estimation, "to fall squarely into the logic of clientelism that has always guided the political strategies and tactics not only of the official party organizations, but of M e x i c a n opposition m o v e m e n t s as well." 2 W h e n maintaining control is the state's top priority, it will always find enough patronage to get the j o b done, and oftentimes, it can do more with less. Selective distribution of a small pie is just as effective as selective distribution of a large one as long as it is the only pie in town. T h e r e are causal connections between economic change and political c h a n g e , but m a n y of the r e c e n t w o r k i n g h y p o t h e s e s as to w h a t those c o n n e c t i o n s are have been too focused on short-term relationships

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to be consistently valid for Mexico. Even when the hypotheses do seem to explain what is going on in Mexico, the causal effects are overtaken by events before reaching fruition. Thus the political fallout from the economic decline following the crisis of 1982 began to be reversed by the political benefits of the economic turnaround beginning in 1990, and Cárdenas's rising star was eclipsed by Carlos Salinas's sudden popularity. The valid connection between economic and political change is the longterm relationship, which is not much of an improvement over the modernization theories of twenty-five years ago. 3 Economic development (growth, industrialization, improvement in standards of living) causes social changes (literacy, urbanization, diversification of occupations, greater political awareness and personal independep.ee), which create new social groups for whom the old political structures are no longer legitimate. These new groups exert pressure for political change, and, to maintain order, rulers are repeatedly forced to choose between placating the new groups with concessions or repressing them. Sometimes the rulers repress, and sometimes they grant concessions and then try to take them back. But over a long period of time (decades, usually), some of those concessions stick. The concessions accumulate, and in that accumulation of concessions lies progress toward democracy. 4 Therefore, if economic development is sustained over a long period of time, some progress toward democracy is inevitable. This is as true for Mexico now as it was for Mexico during the Porfiriato, for Argentina at the turn of the century, or for the former Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. It is important to remember, however, that progress is often interrupted. 5 Along the pathway to democracy, there can be plenty of retreats, detours, and pauses, which reflect both political forces and transitory economic conditions. Economic development sets the stage, but political actors decide how the drama will play itself out. Moreover, nothing guarantees that the process will culminate in a full-fledged democratic regime. In successful transitions to democracy, whether they become stable democracies or not, there is usually a critical point reached at which the old regime becomes unraveled; it loses control of the process, and the process takes on a life of its o w n . 6 Most regimes, however, have never reached that critical point of unraveling. 7 Mexico is one of those regimes. Power is still so concentrated in the hands of the ruling group that no one is able to force them to surrender it. The president and his compañeros are still very much in control of the process of political liberalization, and they are not interested in surrendering national power to the opposition. This is the blockage that remains on the path Mexico has been following. Until it is removed or until a different path is found, Mexican democrats will find that they cannot get to democracy from where they are now.

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Three Unlikely Scenarios A good way to gain an appreciation for the difficulty of achieving full political liberalization in Mexico is to spell out the conditions necessary for such an outcome and then assess the chances for the existence of each one, taking into consideration contemporary economic circumstances and the motives, interests, and influence of the relevant actors. There are three general scenarios for Mexican democratization. In the first scenario, Salinas leads the PRI to surrender power voluntarily to a popular opposition candidate. In the second scenario, the PRI divides into two large parties that agree to channel their struggle for power through competitive elections. In the third scenario, Salinas modernizes the PRI into a true political party with enough genuine popularity to win elections without abusing its control of the state or cheating at the polls. Each of these scenarios has been considered plausible by some people at some time. Cárdenas campaigned for voluntary surrender, a split actually took place in 1987, and Salinas promised modernization of the PRI. When analyzed closely, however, each of these scenarios depends on a highly improbable combination of unlikely conditions. The most likely outcome is that the liberalization of Mexican politics will remain stalled at least until after the presidential elections of 1994.

Voluntary

Surrender

The first scenario, voluntary surrender of power, could come to pass only if four conditions are met: (1) Salinas himself sincerely wants a true political opening, (2) he wants it even if it means that his party loses power, (3) the PRI machine agrees to go along with Salinas's commitment to fair elections, and (4) an opposition candidate emerges who is able to win an honest election. How realistic are these conditions? Does Salinas really want to make Mexico a democracy? Does he want to create a political system in which fair elections decide who governs? His prodemocratic behavior cannot be explained except in terms of his desire for political democracy. Salinas has opened more seats in the Senate to opposition parties and allowed Panistas (members of the PAN) to take office as the governors of Baja California Norte and Chihuahua—the first opposition governors ever. Rumor has it that Salinas cut a deal with the old guard of the PRI in July 1988 to allow him to win that election with "only" 50.7 percent of the vote. Salinas has created enemies within his party by using the rhetoric of political reform and by creating the Democratic Consulting Committee to pressure state and local party leaders to run attractive, competent candidates and to learn to win the voters' approval through legitimate means. Most recently, Salinas forced Ramón Aguirre and Fausto Zapata to renounce their August 1991 elections as governors of

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Guanajuato and San Luis Potosí, respectively, in favor of interim governors, one of whom was from the PAN. If Salinas had no desire to democratize, these actions would be mystifyingly self-destructive. All of these positive actions, however, must be interpreted in the context of other, less inspiring, actions taken by Salinas and other PRI leaders since 1988. Fraud has been used in every state or federal election since 1988. The levels of fraud and intimidation practiced in 1989— 1990 in Michoacán and the state of México were shocking in their extremity and brazenness. 8 In 1990 the electoral law was modified to include a governability clause that virtually guarantees the PRI's majority in Congress. Furthermore, the replacements for the old charro (corrupt but progovernment) leaders of key unions have turned out to be as corrupt and authoritarian as the old ones, their only distinguishing feature being their loyalty to Salinas. For example, after Salinas daringly unseated the notorious Joaquin Hernandez Galicia ("La Quina") as head of the oil workers' union, Narciso Villaseñor was allowed to take his place as the head of the largest state federation, quickly earning the nickname "La Triquina" for being three times as corrupt as La Quina. 9 While Salinas cannot be held responsible for absolutely everything the PRI does, due to the well-known tensions between Salinas's technocratic faction, "the técnicos" and the "dinosaurs" of the old guard of the PRI, some of these actions were obviously carried out with Salinas's blessing, if not his active instigation. The only way to reconcile these antidemocratic actions with the political modernization program is to see Salinas as a man with a conditional commitment to democracy. He wants Mexico to become democratic eventually, but feels that the country is not yet ready for full democracy. In the meantime, he is promoting selected reforms to lay the groundwork for future democracy, and making limited concessions to mollify the opposition until that day arrives. Viewed from this perspective, the events in Guanajuato and San Luis Potosí were not victories for the opposition. The PRI's candidates for governor did resign, but the opposition candidates did not take office. Instead, interim governors were appointed, and new elections would be rescheduled within an eighteen-month period. It should not be assumed that the PAN candidates will win the rescheduled elections; in the August 1991 elections, exit polls showed the PRI leading by a wide margin even in these two s t a t e s . 1 0 By forcing Aguirre and Zapata to resign, Salinas was not recognizing defeat at the hands of the opposition. He was opening a valve to allow opposition pressure to escape so that his party would have a chance to win these two governorships under less polarized circumstances in 1992. The only conclusion that is consistent with these facts is that for the time being Salinas is not interested in opening the political process all the way. For the sake of argument, however, and because the true intentions of Carlos Salinas are ultimately unknowable, let us assume that he would like

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to d e m o c r a t i z e M e x i c o i m m e d i a t e l y . This is where the first s c e n a r i o bifurcates into the second, depending on whether the PRI is able to win an election honestly. T h e results of the 1991 midterm elections suggest that it can, but for the time being we must stay with the first scenario and assume that it cannot. In this case, there is a second condition for a successful democratic opening: that Salinas be willing to recognize an electoral defeat of the PRI and surrender p o w e r to a candidate f r o m the opposition. This condition is far f r o m realistic, credible only if one believes Salinas's rhetoric and ignores his actions during the past four years. It makes no sense for Salinas to sacrifice the PRI, whether he is acting as statesman, party leader, or policymaker. As a statesman, Salinas surely believes that it is important to preserve the advantage Mexico has had over the rest of Latin America for the last sixty years—its political stability. That stability has been the direct result of the o f f i c i a l p a r t y ' s d o m i n a n t role in m a n a g i n g presidential s u c c e s s i o n , reconciling sectoral interests, and co-opting potential opponents. It may prove impossible to preserve that dominant role forever, but it is in Salinas's interests as a statesman to preserve it for as long as it is feasible. As a party leader, he o w e s his power to the PRI m a c h i n e , as he discovered in 1988 when he tried, at first, to campaign without the P R I ' s m o b i l i z a t i o n a l e x p e r t i s e . " Party loyalty requires that he maintain P R I d o m i n a n c e . Apparently, he has chosen to do so by transforming the party into a more honest and responsible organization than it has been in the past. 1 2 T h e president seems to be willing to do anything to keep his party in power, including r e f o r m i n g it. This strategy has antagonized s o m e of the dinosaurs in the party, but any strategy Salinas could have chosen would have antagonized s o m e o n e . By 1988 the costs of preserving the electoral d o m i n a n c e of an u n r e f o r m e d PRI had become unacceptably high to many both inside and outside the party. The prospect of replaying the C h i h u a h u a elections of 1986 over and over in different states was more than many party leaders could bear. If Salinas succeeds in modernizing the party, he will be saving at least some Priistas; surrendering to the opposition would be selling out t h e m all. Only an e x t r e m e idealist would sacrifice his own party for democracy. A f t e r making all the compromises necessary to reach the top of the Mexican political system, Salinas cannot possibly fit that description. T h e one area that Salinas the policymaker cares most a b o u t — e c o n o m i c r e f o r m — w o u l d almost certainly suffer if his team were to lose power. S o m e believe that Cárdenas would return Mexico to the economic policies of Luis E c h e v e r r í a or L á z a r o C á r d e n a s . Others believe, more realistically, that C á r d e n a s w o u l d bring only marginal changes to the current e c o n o m i c program, especially if the e c o n o m y were responding strongly to S a l i n a s ' s reforms when power changed hands. But whether victory went to a pragmatic Cárdenas or a dogmatically liberal Panista, ño one believes any group could m a n a g e economic policy as competently as Salinas and his team have. T h e

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near certainty of declining confidence and a loss of m o m e n t u m in economic liberalization must add to Salinas's reluctance to surrender power. Even if Salinas were willing to lead the PRI out of power, little would c o m e of his good intentions unless the PRI were willing to follow him out of power, a possibility that is even more remote than Salinas's surrendering it. There are no signs that the party machine is willing to do such a thing; on the contrary, the machine has resisted Salinas's modernization efforts at every turn. 1 3 And why not? Party members have nothing to gain and everything to lose from surrender. If Salinas were idealistic enough to hand over power to the opposition, at least he might have the consolation of being remembered as the architect of Mexican democracy. Lesser party leaders would go down in history as nameless has-beens. While Salinas apparently is able to force state PRI leaders to surrender one state at a time (judging from the experience of Baja California Norte), surrender of national power would be another matter. Any attempt to make such a drastic change would certainly be annulled by a massive rebellion within the party. So far it has been argued that there is little reason to expect either Carlos Salinas or the P R I m a c h i n e to be willing to s u r r e n d e r p o w e r to the opposition. In order to analyze this first scenario exhaustively, however, suppose that both Salinas and the PRI are willing to make such a sacrifice. Democracy still would be out of reach because a democratic transition would not be complete until there was an opposition large enough to defeat the PRI in a national election. There is little chance that this condition could be met in the next few years. If anyone ever had a chance at defeating a PRI candidate in a presidential election, it was C u a u h t é m o c Cárdenas. T h e PAN has no program to o f f e r that differs f r o m the P R I ' s and no charismatic candidate to put forward, especially since the tragic death of Manuel Clouthier. W e will never know whether Cárdenas was the real victor in July 1988, but the vote was certainly closer than the official tally of 50.7 percent to 31.1 percent. W h a t matters now is whether Cárdenas can d o as well or better in 1994. Those who believe that he can point to the six years he will have had to campaign and organize between 1988 and 1994, and the fact that many people will expect him to d o better the second time around. It is possible that the reason many admirers did not vote for him in 1988 was that they did not think he had a chance; now that he has demonstrated his status as a serious contender, he will attract a larger following. This factor would be especially important for PRI members w h o contemplate defection to Cárdenas's camp, since they will have the most to lose. A more sober consideration of the facts suggests, however, that Cárdenas has less of a chance in 1994 than he did in 1988. True, he has had time to c a m p a i g n , but that campaign has served as much to publicize infighting in the P R D and criticism of his "authoritarian" leadership style as it has to attract potential s u p p o r t e r s . C á r d e n a s has also lost the p r o g r a m m a t i c

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a d v a n t a g e h e h a d in 1988, w h e n h e o f f e r e d an alternative to an u n r e m i t t i n g e c o n o m i c crisis. N o w that t h e e c o n o m y h a s started to turn a r o u n d , he

finds

h i m s e l f r u n n i n g a g a i n s t p r o g r a m s that a r e p r o d u c i n g r e s u l t s a n d m a k i n g S a l i n a s a p o p u l a r p r e s i d e n t . A s M i g u e l B a s á ñ e z reported in C h a p t e r 6, p o l l s s h o w that a large m a j o r i t y of M e x i c a n s a p p r o v e of f r e e trade with the U n i t e d States, and S a l i n a s ' s approval rating has stayed above 6 0 percent since A u g u s t 1989. F i n a l l y , t h e s u r r e p t i t i o u s s u p p o r t that C á r d e n a s w o n f r o m d i s a f f e c t e d g r o u p s w i t h i n t h e P R I in 1988 will b e m u c h h a r d e r to o b t a i n in 1 9 9 4 , s i n c e S a l i n a s h a s j a i l e d his p r i n c i p a l n e m e s i s , La Q u i n a of t h e oil w o r k e r s ' u n i o n , a n d t a k e n c a r e to put his o w n f r i e n d s in c h a r g e of m o s t g r o u p s that o n c e threatened to b e c o m e disloyal.

Division

of the

PRI

D i v i s i o n of t h e P R I c o u l d lead to the d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n of M e x i c o only if (1) a large d i s s i d e n t f a c t i o n g r o w s within the P R I or unites with a large m o v e m e n t o u t s i d e t h e p a r t y , (2) p u b l i c o p i n i o n s h i f t s t o w a r d a m a s s i v e r e j e c t i o n of t h e official party or its presidential c a n d i d a t e , and (3) the divided f r a g m e n t s of the P R I a g r e e to c h a n n e l their p o w e r s t r u g g l e t h r o u g h a c o m p e t i t i v e e l e c t o r a l process. T h e o p e r a t i v e w o r d in t h e first c o n d i t i o n for a d e m o c r a c y - p r o m o t i n g split in t h e P R I is " l a r g e . " S m a l l s p l i t s d o n o t i n c r e a s e p a r t y

competition

s i g n i f i c a n t l y b e c a u s e they a r e easily i g n o r e d or a b s o r b e d . In o r d e r f o r a split to c r e a t e a c o m p e t i t i v e party s y s t e m , it w o u l d h a v e to d i v i d e the P R I r o u g h l y in half. B o t h p a r t s m u s t be e q u a l e n o u g h to g i v e e a c h a shot at w i n n i n g a n d , m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , e q u a l e n o u g h to g i v e e a c h c o n t r o l of e n o u g h of t h e e l e c t o r a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n to g u a r a n t e e that their strengths are r e c o g n i z e d at t h e p o l l s . T h e r e a r e t w o w a y s f o r an " o u t " f r a g m e n t to b e c o m e that l a r g e , b u t n e i t h e r of t h e m is very likely to b e realized in the present situation. A d i s s i d e n t m o v e m e n t c o u l d g r o w solely w i t h i n t h e P R I . T h i s is not l i k e l y to o c c u r d u r i n g S a l i n a s ' s s e x e n i o b e c a u s e it t a k e s t i m e f o r s u c h f r a c t i o n s to g r o w in t h e P R I , and t h e last o n e left t h e party j u s t f i v e y e a r s a g o . I n t e r n a l l y , t h e P R I is n o w like a s p e n t v o l c a n o — n o t e n o u g h t i m e h a s p a s s e d s i n c e t h e last e r u p t i o n to a l l o w p r e s s u r e to build e n o u g h f o r a n e w o n e . T h e i n t e r n a l d i s s i d e n t m o v e m e n t t h a t c u l m i n a t e d in t h e C o r r i e n t e D e m o c r á t i c a is n o w d i v i d e d and w e a k e n e d . It lost its best l e a d e r s — P o r f i r i o Muñoz

Ledo,

Ifigenia Martínez,

and Cuauhtémoc

Cárdenas—to

the

o p p o s i t i o n in 1987, a n d t h o s e w h o r e m a i n e d in the party w e r e d i s c o u r a g e d by t h e e x a m p l e that w a s m a d e of t h e m and by C á r d e n a s ' s d i f f i c u l t i e s o r g a n i z i n g an o p p o s i t i o n p a r t y s i n c e 1988. S o m e d i s s i d e n t c u r r e n t s h a v e s u r v i v e d — n o t a b l y , t h e C o r r i e n t e C r í t i c a and D e m o c r a c i a 2 0 0 0 — b u t S a l i n a s a n d f o r m e r P R I P r e s i d e n t L u i s D o n a l d o C o l o s i o h a v e b e e n a d e p t at h a n d l i n g t h e m . T h e s e c u r r e n t s a r e a l l o w e d t o exist, but their leaders are p r e s s u r e d t o a c c e p t c o - o p t i v e d e a l s o r l e a v e t h e p a r t y , a n d e v e n t u a l l y they s u c c u m b to t h e s e

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pressures, one by one. In effect, pressures are vented before they can explode. The energies of the dissident leaders are dissipated, and their currents remain small and ineffectual. The second way for a sufficiently large split to take place would be for the dissidents remaining in the PRI to unite with groups outside the PRI, including, but not limited to, Cárdenas and his supporters. Since the P R D has not been very successful in organizing a mass base of support since 1988, the n u m b e r of defectors f r o m the PRI would still have to be quite large. The scenario here supposes that if enough state-level PRI officials simultaneously cast their lot with an opposition candidate and administered elections accordingly, there is little that PRI officials at the national level could do to stop them. The dissident officials could mount, for the first time, an effective challenge to the official election results that under the best of circumstances could lead to the election of a presidential candidate f r o m a party other than the PRI. The problem with this scenario is that it requires a bold defection by a large number of Priistas who are ordinarily inclined to play it safe. Most of the ideologues who took the social and economic promises of the Revolution seriously left the party with C á r d e n a s . T h o s e w h o stayed behind are opportunists w h o prefer to support the candidate who has the best chance of winning. Miguel Basáñez reported in Chapter 6 that as of July 1991, polls showed the PRI winning more support than the PAN and P R D combined in every age, income, and occupational group. T h e r e f o r e , unless there is a dramatic change in levels of party identification, the candidate with the best chance of winning will be the PRI's, and he will be the one the vast majority of PRI activists will want to support. 1 4 T o ensure that all of the necessary conditions for this second scenario are e x a m i n e d c a r e f u l l y , the possibility that the PRI will b e c o m e massively unpopular before 1994 must be considered. If such a public rejection were to materialize, there might be a sufficient number of PRI activists willing to defect to C á r d e n a s ' s c a m p (or that of some dark horse charismatic opposition figure yet to emerge). The government does not appear to be vulnerable on economic issues, as structural adjustments to the economy have begun to bear fruit: growth is up, inflation is down, the foreign debt is considered manageable, and the prospect of free trade with the United States and Canada only makes M e x i c o ' s future brighter. The fact that free trade will dominate the economic debate for the next few years is all to the g o v e r n m e n t ' s favor, since the official position is a p o p u l a r one and neither the P A N nor the P R D has staked out a f i r m position for or against it. Corruption is an issue with greater potential to h a r m the PRI, but no m o r e so than usual, since it is a perennial issue. M o r e o v e r , Salinas has been skillful at mounting symbolic attacks against corruption that have added to his popularity. T h e November 1991 decision to permit the sale of ejido lands will provoke some backlash, but only a mixed

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one because it is likely to be popular with the middle-class constituency Salinas is wooing and with those peasants who choose to become individual property holders. Besides, the division and sale of ejido lands could easily be used to win the support of caciques, or local bosses, who need the government to look the other way while they build their personal fortunes. There seems to be no issue on the horizon that could undermine the PRI's dominant position in the next few years. Even if such an issue were to emerge, its impact would be dampened by distortions in the media. It is no secret that the Mexican media give preferential treatment to official versions of the news. There is no lack of critical comment in the print media, but these publications are read by only a small part of the population. The medium with the greatest impact—television—routinely devotes the bulk of its reporting to official versions and tends to favor bad news when reporting on the opposition. In the face of these biases, which are just another aspect of PRI dominance, it is hard for opposition groups to get their message out to most of the population. The salience of issues depends not just on their substance and the receptivity of the media, but also on the identity of the messenger. Issues become important if an important person raises them. In Mexico issues do not make the person; the person makes the issues. Opposition groups are caught in a catch-22 situation. They would grow larger if they could publicize their criticism of the government, but the media will not publicize their criticism because they are not large. Once again, the PRI's dominance stands in the way of further political liberalization. For all of the reasons above, the PRI is not likely to divide evenly enough to create a competitive party system. Even if it did, democracy would not be favored in the short term unless the conflict between the two parts could be resolved through peaceful elections. A peaceful outcome cannot be taken for granted. The danger is not that there would be a coup because the army would most likely refuse to take sides in what would initially seem to be an internal dispute in the governing party. The danger is that there would be widespread fighting between militants of the two camps at the local level. It would be difficult or impossible to forge a power-sharing arrangement between the two parts because the anger generated by the division would be too raw. In other countries with parties that are as disciplined as the PRI, such as Venezuela, survivors of major party splits often carry lifelong grudges against their former colleagues and prefer to form coalitions with unrelated parties, even if they are from a distant spot on the political spectrum. 1 5 This kind of division, even a violent one, could be considered progress of sorts toward democracy for Mexico because it would end the PRI's dominance. The challenge would then be to find a way to conciliate a divided society, rather than to find a way to promote greater competitiveness. In effect, Mexico would have switched to a different path to democracy. The

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process would be less likely to proceed smoothly, but at least the blockage on the old path would have been destroyed. The best outcome under this "divided PRI" scenario would be a radical decentralization of power, which would allow the two parts of the PRI to consolidate their local bases, from which they could then eventually negotiate a power-sharing arrangement at the national level. In the short term, however, even this optimal situation would be bad for democracy, because electoral fairness would suffer if state party bosses administered elections without national supervision.

Modernized

PRI

If the first two scenarios are rejected, democratization is possible only if it takes place without removing the PRI from power--in other words, only if Salinas's program of political modernization turns the PRI into a genuinely popular party that can win elections without cheating. For this outcome to take place, three conditions are necessary: (1) The economy must continue to do well so as not to handicap the incumbent PRI, (2) the PRI must run a popular candidate, and (3) the PRI machine must cooperate in holding an honest election. This would be the best outcome for Mexico—the only way to combine an efficient, growing economy with fully liberalized politics—and it is, most likely, what Salinas is aiming for. It was a risky undertaking from the beginning, and Salinas has been taking a gamble to achieve it. Chances are, however, that this gamble will not pay off. Although the economic policies that began Salinas's sexenio seemed risky in the beginning, they are not the reason for this pessimistic outlook. As of summer 1992, the economic picture is mixed, but positive overall. It is true that growth has slowed since 1991, direct foreign investment is declining (while foreign investment in the stock market is booming), the trade deficit is rising, and oil prices are below their projected level, but these are manageable problems, not crises. When the Foreign Investment Law is revised and the NAFTA enters into force, the economy will very likely enter a boom period. The pessimistic outlook stems, rather, from a basic political dilemma: how can the PRI produce and elect a candidate who is both popular and politically correct (an economic liberal in Salinista terms)? The current PRIand president-dominated Mexican system does not provide opportunities for popular candidates to emerge. In the PRI everyone defers to the president, who receives credit for every successful program and is never blamed for a bad one. 1 6 It is exceedingly difficult in this environment for anyone to build a base of support that extends beyond a rather narrow bureaucratic clique. Cabinet ministers enjoy visibility but are too much in the president's shadow to establish a track record distinct from the president's. Governors have the best opportunities for building an independent base of support, but

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governorships have been dead-end jobs since 1970, when the last Mexican president ever to have been a governor left office. 1 7 Moreover, none of Mexico's states is large enough to give its governor an automatic national spotlight; there is no equivalent to the Russian Republic of the former Soviet Union from which to launch a Mexican Boris Yeltsin. Perhaps the only figure besides the president who has the visibility and independence to build a national base of support is the governor of the Federal District. The Federal District governor, however, is a political appointee who can be removed at the president's whim if he begins to challenge the president's authority. In practice, even elected governors can be removed. Salinas has done it ten times so far. From time to time there has been talk of allowing prominent leaders to campaign for the PRI's presidential nomination. For example, at the end of his term de la Madrid made the first step in that direction by identifying six potential candidates and inviting them to debate, although there was little doubt as to who would choose the winner. 18 The problem with this procedure is that in a truly open competition for the nomination, there is no guarantee that just one candidate will emerge. Bitter nomination fights and party splits are fairly common in other Latin American parties, especially in those with a membership as diverse as the PRI's. If the president wants to allow contenders to campaign freely, he has to be willing to oversee a messy struggle for the nomination, and that is something every Mexican president wants to avoid in the interests of orderly succession and stability. Inevitably, therefore, presidents pick loyal bureaucrats as their successors, and these bureaucrats then attempt to become popular before the balloting. They need a lot of help, and the PRI machine provides that help. In the process, democracy is lost, for popularity (if it comes) comes at the price of media manipulation, orchestrated rallies, bribery, and intimidation. No matter how popular Salinas is, the one thing we can count on is that he will not be a candidate in the next presidential election. 19 In fact, the more popular Salinas is, the longer his shadow will be, the harder it will be for his destapado to climb out from under it, and the more that candidate will need the dinosaurs in the party machine to get him elected.

Conclusion Once the economy is running and growing well and there is a consensus around the kinds of policies that put it on that path, it may become possible for a Mexican president, if so disposed, to begin a process of real political liberalization. But that process will require a degree of freedom that has not been approached yet in Mexico. It will require a willingness to allow opposition victories wherever they occur at the local and state level and encouragement of a greater diversity of opinion within the PRI. Only this

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degree of openness will make it possible for new, electable leadership to arise before

the presidential candidate is selected. This is not a reform that can be

enacted from above overnight; it takes time for genuine leadership to emerge. E c o n o m i c liberalization took about ten years to produce results; political liberalization will take at least as long. In the m e a n t i m e , the p r o c e s s of political liberalization is likely to remain stalled. In fact, the presidential election of 1 9 9 4 will probably be a replay of 1988. Cárdenas will run again, Salinas will pick a f e l l o w t é c n i c o to stay the course, and the party m a c h i n e will get the t é c n i c o e l e c t e d by any means necessary. Mexican democracy will have to wait for the day when the g o v e r n m e n t s c o n c e s s i o n s to the opposition have accumulated to the point w h e r e it is no longer able to prevent others from w i n n i n g the presidency.

Notes 1. M. Delal Baer, "The 1991 Mexican Midterm Elections," CSIS Latin American Election Study Series, vol. 9, study 1 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1991). This is a good source on the dimensions and impact of Pronasol. 2. Judith Adler Hellman, "Mexican Popular Movements and the Process of Democratization: Is There a Link?" (Paper presented at the 16th International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Washington, D.C., April 4 6, 1991). 3. For a recent restatement, see Lucian W. Pye, "Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism," American Political Science Review 84, no. I (March 1990): 3 - 1 9 . 4. As stated by Robert Dahl, "the more the costs of suppression exceed the costs of toleration, the greater the chance for a competitive regime." Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971), 15. 5. Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978). 6. Guillermo O ' D o n n e l l and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). 7. Michael Coppedge and Wolfgang Reinicke, "Measuring Polyarchy," Studies in Comparative International Development 25, no. 1 (Spring 1990). 8. Andrew Reding, "Mexico Under Salinas: A Facade of Reform," World Policy Journal (Fall 1989): 685-729. 9. Salvador Corro, "Desaparecieron ranchos, tiendas, maquinaria, ganado y dinero que La Quina dejo al sindicato petrolero," Proceso, February 11, 1991, p. 25. 10. Wayne Cornelius, "Mexican Elections: A Salinas Solution," Hemisfile 2, no. 6 (November 1991): 4. 11. Larissa Lomnitz, Claudio Lomnitz, and Ilya Adler, "The Function of the F o r m : Power Play and Ritual in the 1988 Mexican Presidential Campaign," (Manuscript, 1990), 34. 12. Baer, "The 1991 Mexican Midterm Elections."

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13. E l i a s C h a v e z , "El ' n u e v o P R I ' p o s p o n e sus a f a n e s d e m o c r a t i z a d o r e s , " Proceso, J a n u a r y 7, 1991. 14. P e t e r H . S m i t h , Labyrinths of Power (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979). 15. M i c h a e l C o p p e d g e , " S t r o n g P a r t i e s and L a m e D u c k s : A S t u d y of t h e Q u a l i t y a n d S t a b i l i t y of V e n e z u e l a n D e m o c r a c y " ( P h . D . d i s s e r t a t i o n , Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y , 1988), c h a p t e r 7. 16. S u s a n K a u f m a n Purcell, The Mexican Profit-Sharing Decision (Berkeley: U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1975), 1 3 0 - 1 4 7 . 17. S m i t h , Labyrinths of Power, c h a p t e r 5. 18. P e t e r H . S m i t h , " T h e 1 9 8 8 P r e s i d e n t i a l S u c c e s s i o n in H i s t o r i c a l P e r s p e c t i v e , " in Mexico's Alternative Political Futures, ed. W a y n e A. C o r n e l i u s , J u d i t h G e n t l e m a n , a n d P e t e r H. S m i t h (San D i e g o : C e n t e r f o r U . S . - M e x i c a n S t u d i e s , 1989), 3 9 1 - 4 1 5 . 19. T h e r e h a s b e e n s p e c u l a t i o n a b o u t a m e n d i n g the C o n s t i t u t i o n t o a l l o w S a l i n a s to s e r v e a s e c o n d term, but as M i g u e l B a s a n e z r e p o r t e d in C h a p t e r 6, this w o u l d not b e a p o p u l a r p r o p o s a l . It is i n s t r u c t i v e that the g r o u p that is best i n f o r m e d a n d m o s t in f a v o r of r e e l e c t i o n — b u s i n e s s l e a d e r s — i s the g r o u p that is m o s t p e s s i m i s t i c a b o u t such a c h a n g e actually h a p p e n i n g .

=

PART 3

The Perspectives of the Political Parties

=

9

=

Political and Economic Reform in Mexico: The PAN Perspective Luis H. Alvarez T h e N a t i o n a l A c t i o n Party ( P A N ) has been a political f o r c e in M e x i c a n public life f o r f i f t y - t w o years. During this time, the validity of its political philosophy and its doctrine has been proven, and the influence that it has had in the e c o n o m i c and political evolution of M e x i c o has been widely accepted. In 1940, o n e y e a r after the birth of the party, M a n u e l G o m e z M o r i n , its f o u n d e r , postulated the need for an urgent r e f o r m of the M e x i c a n state. This d e m a n d w a s a clear response to the cultural and political facts of his time, a d e m a n d that is still valid. At that t i m e G o m e z Morin p r o c l a i m e d the "ideological d e f e a t " of the ruling r e g i m e and attributed public discontent to n u m e r o u s political blunders, authoritarian attitudes, and outright h u m a n rights violations: the failure of i m p o s e d collective f a r m i n g and the utter lack of respect f o r the f a r m e r s and land laborers; the poor technology and the widespread corruption in the stateo w n e d oil i n d u s t r y ; the e x i s t i n g " c e s s p o o l " in the totally u n d e m o c r a t i c t e a c h e r s ' u n i o n ; the moral, political, and j u d i c i a l absurdities c o n t a i n e d in Article III of the Constitution, which creates a virtual m o n o p o l y by the state in e l e m e n t a r y education, e m p o w e r i n g g o v e r n m e n t officials to i m p o s e severe s a n c t i o n s on private e d u c a t i o n ; the m o n e t a r y c h a o s and the g o v e r n m e n t ' s i r r e s p o n s i b l e e c o n o m i c policies; and the illegal and i m m o r a l link b e t w e e n g o v e r n m e n t - s t a t e and a single party, the Institutional R e v o l u t i o n a r y Party

(PRI). It w a s clearly e v i d e n t that the so-called R e v o l u t i o n a r y R e g i m e w a s acting against the national interest. But it has taken fifty years of failures for this r e g i m e to a c k n o w l e d g e its ideological d e f e a t . National public opinion, clearly e x p r e s s e d in the polls in 1988, emphatically told the r e g i m e that the situation had to change, that the state had to b e c o m e a servant of the national c o m m u n i t y , and that the regime could not c o n t i n u e destroying the n a t i o n ' s w e l f a r e through its exorbitant growth, r a m p a n t corruption, inefficiency, and undemocratic practices. O u r f o u n d e r w a s , of course, s e v e r e l y c o n d e m n e d f o r criticizing the

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regime. In answer to accusations made by President Lázaro Cárdenas in February 1940, Gomez Morin stated that "the authentic revolutionary seeks to make the State understand its true function, exercising authority with dignity devoid of tyranny, broadening its scope when the Common Good demands it without being subversive." He added that "whoever openly criticizes the regime based on these enlightened, progressive and truly revolutionary ideas, does so only because the regime's behavior has been backward and counter-revolutionary." 1 His was a fair criticism and events have borne him out. Gomez Morin's criticism was based on universally accepted principles: The nation is a living reality superior to its individual components; the national interest is preeminent; the dignity of the human being is a material and spiritual reality and his or her rights arise from prepolitical communities; the state is an instrument of the people and society, an authentic expression of the community, a promoter of social justice and of the common good, with authority over the economy but not its proprietor; labor is a human reality above the nature of capital; the observance of political duty is the motor of social order; government is the embodiment of the true will of the people, freely expressed at the ballot box. Unfortunately, eighty years after the Mexican Revolution started, respect for the vote continues to be the demand of the Mexican people. President Carlos Salinas's regime has adopted modernization as a strategy. The political group in power has tried to define, on numerous occasions, the term modernization and say why, according to their diagnosis, the nation urgently demands this course of action. They have repeatedly said that theirs is an adequate strategy to meet the internal and external challenges faced by the nation. While it is true that the concept of modernization and related ideas used by the regime are acceptable and even necessary, we hold that they are incomplete. We consider them incomplete because they stem from a solely structuralist, technocratic, and econocentric view of society, and they are applied in an authoritarian and centralist manner. We propose an integral, humanistic, and democratic modernization. The Salinas regime has implemented measures that on the surface seem to have been taken from the P A N ' s political platform. However, they are similar only in part. The difference resides in the intention, scope, and spirit that inspired them. The current regime "modernizes" only to insure its permanence in power. As a presidential candidate, Carlos Salinas illustrated this point in a speech on April 22, 1988: "We change to strengthen ourselves, not to weaken ourselves." The modernization proposed by the PAN does not have as an objective merely the acquisition of political power. The PAN is interested in the establishment of social, political, and economic conditions that encourage all Mexicans to live in justice and liberty and thus become fully developed human beings. The governing regime modernizes, but at the same time it redesigns and strengthens its corporative controls over

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Mexican society. T h e P A N , on the other hand, seeks the self-fulfillment of the Mexican people. The present regime proposed a reform of the state. It announced that an a l l - e n c o m p a s s i n g , o v e r g r o w n state, i n c a p a b l e of satisfying its primary responsibilities, is undesirable. W e applaud the decision to sell state-owned enterprises, but we regret that the proceeds have been utilized in programs such as Pronasol, whose objective, among others, is winning back the P R I ' s clientele. O n e result of Pronasol has been an opulent federal executive branch, off which feed indigent local g o v e r n m e n t s and municipalities. In other words, the r e f o r m amounts to a conversion f r o m a partisan-centralist o w n e r state to a partisan-centralist welfare state that has no qualms about substituting public monopolies for private monopolies. The P A N reiterates that "the objectives of an economic policy are not fully achieved by the simple qualitative or quantitative increase of goods, if such an increase does not ensure social justice, or if it affects adversely the liberty and rights of the people and the c o m m u n i t y . " 2 It is not enough for only gigantic national or international interests to obtain advantages. This would b e an oligarchic modernization. In addition to d e m o c r a t i z i n g the political system, it is necessary to give assistance to artisans and the small and medium-sized producers, while at the same time giving the labor force the opportunity to participate in stock ownership. The P A N asserts that it does not suffice to reform the state in order that it may play a smaller role in the economic life of the country if Mexicans continue to be victims of human rights violations. Modernization of labor laws, including laws regarding f a r m labor, is required if M e x i c o is to meet successfully international competition. Yet one cannot proclaim the end of the era of state paternalism over peasants or labor if the corporative system continues to exist and the right to work or receive government aid is subject to militant adherence to the official party. Timid changes in electoral laws and processes are useless if at the same time the illegal support of an official party by the government is maintained. T h e P A N holds that political action, correctly understood, must pursue the c o m m o n good. Therefore, in our opinion, to modernize government, a deeper and more thorough undertaking is required than merely trying to update welfare state techniques. What is truly required are the opportunities for the development of each citizen's potential, thus promoting the community as a whole. For this reason w e insist that the political and social dimensions of public policy be harmonized with production, distribution, utilization, and c o n s u m p t i o n of g o o d s . A stable and s e c u r e e c o n o m i c b a s e must be constructed, but simultaneously, the exercise and e n j o y m e n t of liberties and civil rights must be g u a r a n t e e d . T h e r e f o r e , w e insist on our d e m a n d of democracy for justice with liberty. G i v e n our c o n v i c t i o n s , it can be understood why the P A N holds that the present modernization is insufficient. On several occasions the Salinas administration has stated its conviction

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t h a t it is n o t p o s s i b l e t o i m p l e m e n t e c o n o m i c

and p o l i t i c a l

reforms

simultaneously. W e wholeheartedly disagree. The P A N considers

that

p o l i t i c a l r e f o r m s h o u l d c o m e h a n d in h a n d with e c o n o m i c r e f o r m . W e hold t h e v i e w that t r u e p o l i t i c a l m o d e r n i z a t i o n explicitly m a n i f e s t s itself in t r u e d e m o c r a c y . T h i s d e m o c r a t i c o p e n i n g c a n n o t b e p o s t p o n e d in

Mexico,

p r e c i s e l y f o r e c o n o m i c r e a s o n s . T h e p o s i t i v e and n e e d e d c h a n g e s that t h e M e x i c a n g o v e r n m e n t has initiated in t h e e c o n o m y may not only b e f r u s t r a t e d b u t c o m p l e t e l y d i s m a n t l e d if they a r e not i m p l e m e n t e d with parallel c h a n g e s in

the

structure

of

power

that

allow

community

participation

in

d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . W e M e x i c a n s k n o w that with a d e m o c r a t i c w a y of life a n d social o r g a n i z a t i o n the c r e a t i v e and p r o d u c t i v e potential of o u r society has a b e t t e r o p p o r t u n i t y of s a t i s f y i n g the h u m a n and e c o n o m i c n e e d s of s o c i e t y . W e f i n d n o historical or s o c i o l o g i c a l reason to j u s t i f y w a i t i n g indefinitely for s o l u t i o n s that w e b e l i e v e a r e b o t h viable and possible n o w . W e c a n n o t r e f r a i n f r o m r e f e r r i n g to the c a s e of the f o r m e r S o v i e t U n i o n , w h e r e t h e liberation of social f o r c e s a n d the creation of d e m o c r a t i c a c t i o n s by g l a s n o s t w e r e i m p e d e d — a t least t e m p o r a r i l y — b y the s u c c e s s of t h e c o u p d ' e t a t . T h e e c o n o m i c m o d e r n i z a t i o n and internationalization of M e x i c o can b e s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t e d by an i n s u f f i c i e n t political o p e n i n g . W h a t is w o r s e is that t h e e c o n o m i c r e f o r m is b e i n g used to s t r e n g t h e n an u n d e m o c r a t i c , p r e m o d e r n p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m . T h i s c l o s e d political s y s t e m lags c o n s i d e r a b l y b e h i n d the e c o n o m i c r e f o r m . T h e electoral p r o c e s s e s c o n t i n u e to be m a n i p u l a t e d ; there is n o a u t h e n t i c a n d e q u i t a b l e c o m p e t i t i o n a m o n g political p a r t i e s in e l e c t o r a l p r o c e s s e s . T h e legislative b r a n c h is c o m p l e t e l y s u b s e r v i e n t to the e x e c u t i v e , and the federal c e n t r a l i s m s m o t h e r s t h e states and municipalities. T h e M e x i c a n p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m is c l e a r l y o u t m o d e d . T h e

increasing

p l u r a l i t y in M e x i c a n s o c i e t y has g e n e r a t e d g r e a t e r c o m p e t i t i o n b e t w e e n the political parties, but the existing political model

is n o t d e s i g n e d

for

a l t e r n a t i o n in p o w e r . M e x i c a n c i t i z e n s and t h e a u t h e n t i c political parties are d e m a n d i n g e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y in their s t r u g g l e to win v o t e s . M e x i c a n s w a n t i m p a r t i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s to o r g a n i z e and j u d g e elections, but t h e p r e s e n c e of a p a r t y of t h e g o v e r n m e n t n u l l i f i e s w h a t f e w a d v a n c e s in e l e c t o r a l l a w s h a v e been achieved. I n t e r n a l a n d e x t e r n a l c o n d i t i o n s h a v e s h o w n t h e i n v i a b i l i t y of this premodern

Mexican

political

system. However, the technocratic

and

n e o l i b e r a l e c o n o m i c a p p r o a c h of the present r e g i m e c o n t i n u e s to g i v e priority in its m o d e r n i z i n g a g e n d a to e c o n o m i c r e f o r m and s u b o r d i n a t e s p o l i t i c a l c h a n g e to t h e s e r e q u i r e m e n t s . T h i s , in turn, p r o d u c e s greater c o n c e n t r a t i o n of p o w e r , a c o n t i n u e d c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , and a r e c o r p o r a t i z a t i o n of p u b l i c l i f e . T h e r e g i m e h a s t o u n d e r s t a n d that a l t h o u g h

necessary,

e c o n o m i c c h a n g e is not s u f f i c i e n t . Political c h a n g e is i n d i s p e n s a b l e ; w i t h o u t it e c o n o m i c r e f o r m is d o o m e d to fail. T h e g o v e r n m e n t a c c e p t e d only recently t h e n e e d to m o d e r n i z e t h e political s y s t e m . Yet as long as n o m e c h a n i s m e x i s t s to e r a d i c a t e e l e c t o r a l f r a u d a n d until t h e legislative b r a n c h b e c o m e s a

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counterweight to the executive, there can be no real modernization in this field. There is no doubt that Mexico needs to be modernized. However, this modernization has to be all-encompassing and not limited to the extent necessary to guarantee the permanence in power of the same corrupt group. We in the PAN are committed to a profound and real change in the economic, political, and social structures of Mexico. Inspired by the doctrine of humanism, which demands equal opportunities for full personal and community development, we support any measures that move in that direction and point to that objective. The PAN, secure in its cultural and historical roots, reaffirms its identity and philosophy: a political party based on principles and national values that seeks to install democracy to attain justice and liberty. W e assert that only a participative society is capable of producing a sovereign nation and a democratic state. We want to ensure this participation with laws and institutions that fortify the nation and place the state at its service. We want laws and institutions that make the state genuinely national. The true reform of the state that Mexico needs cannot be attained by unilateral governmental decree, nor by a gracious concession by those who now hold power. The reform requires the cooperation of mature and participative c o m m u n i t i e s that are willing to carry out their social responsibilities. For this reason we reiterate that only the people can save the people and that Mexicans need to form—and are in the process of forming—a social power capable of forcing the ruling group to institute a thorough reform of the state in line with what the PAN has proposed for a new and truly democratic Mexico.

Notes 1. Diez Años de México (Mexico City: Partido Acción Nacional, 1983), 39. 2. Partido Acción Nacional: Principios de Doctrina (Mexico City: Partido Acción Nacional, 1991), 62.

=

10

=

The False Hopes of the Economic Reform Cuauhtemoc Cardenas Solorzano

As the second half of the administration of Carlos Salinas begins, and the Mexican economy enters its tenth year of adjustment and the supply-side experiment, the results are not particularly encouraging. The overnight, indiscriminate, and ideologically driven trade opening has generated a huge trade deficit, now running at 15 billion U.S. dollars. Goods and, increasingly, services from abroad, partly from the United States, partly from Asia, are displacing Mexican goods and services. Many industrial sectors—from textiles to automobiles—that previously ran trade surpluses are now running deficits, and large entrepreneurs that used to be manufacturers are turning into import retailers. Jobs are being lost, and industries are closing down. Potential comparative advantages in world trade are being lost to this illconceived policy. Instead of establishing new sectors, encouraging existing ones, and trying to make them both truly competitive on the world market as does every other country—through protection, subsidies, and support—the Mexican administration decided to leave everything to the market. The result is that the fastest-growing export sector is frozen melons, and Mexico is returning to the age of exports of raw materials, tourism, and speculation. Formal employment is not growing and manufacturing jobs are down. Anyone who walks through Mexico City can see the informal, underground economy that has taken over our sidewalks, streets, and economic initiative. The paradox is that the Mexican economy, fueled as it is by huge inflows of capital attracted to Mexico by an indiscriminate fire sale of national assets, is not creating jobs or expanding the economy. It is simply making the rich richer and generating demand for depressed economies abroad. W e are selling off important national assets in strategic sectors of the economy in order to finance the frenzied import bill being run up by some industrialists and by the conspicuous consumption of the upper classes. The size of the informal economy and the speed at which it is growing is proof of the failure of the modernization program. The increasing disparities in wealth and income and the ostentatious consumption of upscale imported 149

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C U A U H T E M O C CARDENAS SOLORZANO

g o o d s u n a v a i l a b l e to the vast m a j o r i t y of the population are proof of the m o d e l ' s true colors: an unjust, depredatory, and humiliating program. Since 1982 M e x i c o has been applying an economic and political model designed by t h e W o r l d B a n k and t h e International M o n e t a r y F u n d . T h i s is the s a m e model, indeed identical in practical terms, that has caused so many troubles in Brazil, the D o m i n i c a n Republic, Argentina, and Venezuela. T h e s e policies have brought M e x i c o to the verge of a new crisis, as deep and wide as the one in 1982 and w h o s e e f f e c t s w e still resent. By m i d - 1 9 8 9 M e x i c o ' s external debt w a s renegotiated with more than f i v e h u n d r e d creditor banks. At that m o m e n t the debt a m o u n t e d to 92 billion U.S. dollars. T h e negotiations reduced it, in absolute terms, by about 7 0 0 m i l l i o n (less than 1 p e r c e n t ) ; the real gain w a s that the new c o n d i t i o n s f a c i l i t a t e d p r o m p t and full p a y m e n t . T h e policies then f o l l o w e d by the M e x i c a n g o v e r n m e n t did not release the resources previously used to service the debt, and those policies have failed to attract productive investment, be it national or f o r e i g n . It is true that M e x i c o has been receiving i n v e s t m e n t s f r o m a b r o a d , but m o r e than 80 percent has g o n e to speculation, around 2 0 billion U.S. dollars in the last few years. M e x i c o has thus been living on the r a z o r ' s edge, and e c o n o m i c stability has been kept only through the loans a c c o r d e d , for political reasons, by President G e o r g e B u s h ' s administration. T h e debt has risen again and now reaches 104 billion U.S. dollars. After t w o years of p o s i t i v e values, a c c o r d i n g to o f f i c i a l figures, in 1989 the trade b a l a n c e turned negative, s h o w i n g a deficit in 1990 of 5 billion U.S. dollars and 12 billion in 1991, and is expected to reach at least 18 billion in 1992. M e a n w h i l e , the net savings of the private sector decreased in the last two years by more than 9 0 percent. It fell f r o m 37 billion U.S. dollars in 1989 to only 2 . 3 2 billion in 1990, and in the first six months of 1991, it already s h o w e d a negative value of 4.92 billion, with the negative trend expected to continue. O u r p e s o is overvalued. W e fear a fall, with all its e c o n o m i c and political c o n s e q u e n c e s — a fall that will be m u c h more drastic than those that took place in previous administrations. T h e s e are clear signs of an e c o n o m i c crisis due to lack of productivity, corruption, the waste of the c o u n t r y ' s resources, and the structure of massive u n e m p l o y m e n t g e n e r a t e d by the g o v e r n m e n t ' s protection of s p e c u l a t i o n , f o r e i g n products, and the privileges of the very few. Social conditions have fared no better under the e c o n o m i c reforms. In the last decade wages have lost m o r e than 6 0 percent of their purchasing p o w e r in real terms. T w e n t y - f i v e percent of the loss occurred during the Salinas administration. In this s a m e d e c a d e , only 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 j o b s were created, w h e n there are 1,100,000 y o u n g people seeking e m p l o y m e n t every year. A third of the c o u n t r y ' s work f o r c e — 8 , 9 0 0 , 0 0 0 p e o p l e — a r e u n e m p l o y e d . Only 17 percent of the j o b d e m a n d has been met. In 1982 salaries represented 36 percent of the G D P ; n o w they represent only 24 percent, which shows how income has concentrated a m o n g the few.

THE FALSE HOPES OF THE ECONOMIC REFORM

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Traditional problems such as rural migration have been aggravated by the model. It is important to point out that the late 1991 constitutional reforms modifying the legal basis of our agrarian structure, if not reversed, will in the near f u t u r e m e a n that two million peasant f a m i l i e s — a r o u n d ten million people—will be expelled f r o m the land they now work. Many will move to the cities in search of a livelihood. Half of them are expected to go to the United States to join the five million Mexicans that have emigrated there in the last decade. The centerpiece of the g o v e r n m e n t ' s efforts to lock in the policies and conditions that will perpetuate the e c o n o m i c liberalization model is its pursuit of the N A F T A with Canada and the United States. Instead of being an o p e n - e n d e d m e c h a n i s m to s t i m u l a t e e c o n o m i c g r o w t h , the N A F T A is conceived by its proponents as a supranational instrument to consolidate the status quo, perpetuate current structures, and lock us into a series of binding agreements with the United States that neither help Mexico to face its own realities nor to enter the world economy in a truly advantageous way. Despite numerous attempts on the part of organizations in Mexico, Canada, and the United States to engage the authorities in a constructive dialogue regarding the context and extent of this agreement, the governments have stubbornly p u r s u e d a line of n e g o t i a t i o n s that is u n r e s p o n s i v e to the n e e d s and aspirations of citizens in all three countries. In the N A F T A negotiations, the Mexican government presented as our c o m p a r a t i v e advantages the low wages (which continue to drop) paid to M e x i c a n workers, the fact that there are no requirements for industries establishing in M e x i c o to invest in social or community infrastructure, and the lack of e n f o r c e m e n t regarding our environmental regulations. Mexican environmental laws are very similar to those in the United States, but they are not fully enforced in practice. Funding of our environmental programs is scarce and corruption is rampant. The maquiladora industry provides a disquieting example of the results of i m p r u d e n t e c o n o m i c integration with the United States. T h e r e are now approximately two thousand U.S.-owned maquiladoras in our border areas, and it is very clear that they disregard environmental regulations. A clear illustration of the p r o b l e m of waste m a n a g e m e n t is provided in a 1991 publication by the D e v e l o p m e n t G r o u p f o r Alternative Policies, " L o o k B e f o r e You L e a p . " In 1990 only 19 percent of the plants using toxic substances were able to demonstrate that they had properly disposed of these materials. In 1988 only twenty out of sixteen hundred maquiladoras operating in M e x i c o returned their toxic wastes to the United States in compliance with the 1983 La Paz treaty signed by the two countries. Pollution on the border is a serious problem. Raw sewage discharged in the Tijuana River flows into the N e w River, causing diseases and infections on both sides of the border; the N o g a l e s W a s h , on our S o n o r a - A r i z o n a border, is highly contaminated with industrial and residential sewage, including toxic chemicals.

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W h i l e still subject to legislative approval, the N A F T A in its present form will consolidate the imbalances existing between Mexico and the United States. It is the m e a n s by which M e x i c o is being inserted into the world e c o n o m y through a path of subordination and, in fact, being absorbed into the U.S. e c o n o m y . W e are therefore concerned about the probable results of any trilateral trade agreement. Above all, we are deeply concerned that this could be our country's destiny. T o deal with these concerns, the Party of the Democratic Revolution ( P R D ) has proposed a social charter as a fundamental part of the N A F T A . This would be c o m p l e m e n t e d by measures to protect the environment and intellectual property; m e c h a n i s m s for the settlement of disputes so that national jurisdictions are not invaded by giving advantage to one or another of the parties; labor mobility; and compensatory investments, similar to those agreed upon by the European Community (EC) with Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Ireland when their incorporation into the EC was decided. By r e c o g n i z i n g the d i f f e r e n c e s and eliminating them through joint efforts, c o m p e n s a t o r y investments b e c o m e the keystone of the agreement and its articulating axis. Furthermore, the P R D feels that a social charter should be M e x i c o ' s national objective as well. Before the country agrees on a domestic social c h a r t e r , there is little that can be d o n e to bring those ideas into an international pact. T h e national social charter is a central component of our struggle for d e m o c r a c y in Mexico. It must be the outcome of a series of consultations a m o n g workers, business people, social organizations, and academics. A social charter must take into consideration what has already been achieved in our legislation, social security systems, wage negotiation agreements, and working conditions, and it must represent real progress for all Mexicans. Our vision for future hemispheric cooperation is predicated on the f u l f i l l m e n t of one n o n n e g o t i a b l e condition: the d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n of M e x i c o ' s political life. A national social charter would be complemented and reinforced by a new a p p r o a c h to e c o n o m i c p o l i c y m a k i n g . T o attain adequate conditions for balanced and self-sustained development—and for equitable relations, both internally and internationally, especially in our h e m i s p h e r e — M e x i c o must utilize different economic tools simultaneously and together with long-term goals: gradual trade liberalization; compensatory investments; a new external debt negotiation that would free resources for investment; the adoption of measures to stimulate productive investment and deter financial speculation; and the determination and recognition in each country of its economic role vis-à-vis the world. T h e P R D would like to go further, however, and propose an alternative to the N A F T A . W e consider the N A F T A , as the point of departure for President B u s h ' s Enterprise for the Americas, to be an insufficient proposal to d e v e l o p Latin A m e r i c a due to its open pretensions to consolidate the

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153

h e m i s p h e r i c h e g e m o n y of the United States. W e propose a continental agreement for trade and development that would begin with the recognition of the existing differences in degrees of development and productivity of the e c o n o m i e s and social conditions. T h e a g r e e m e n t would fix as its first objective the decrease and eventual eradication of these differences so that an equitable system of economic cooperation and competitiveness could be established. This proposed continental agreement would utilize multiple economic i n s t r u m e n t s in order to o v e r c o m e the existing a s y m m e t r i e s and our b a c k w a r d n e s s — a n d utilize a different vision of international relations, particularly between Mexico and the United States. Considering what should be resolved between the United States and Mexico, the negotiations should deal with trade matters specifically; they should also c o n t e m p l a t e the coordination of investment rules and antimonopolistic laws and incorporate the elements of the aforementioned North American social charter. In the past decade it has been clearly demonstrated in Mexico that trade liberalization does not automatically lead to political o p e n i n g . On the contrary, our experience shows that it leads to the hardening of the political system. T o remain in p o w e r , the party of the state r e g i m e w e have in Mexico, one of the few that survive in the continent and in the world, has b e c o m e more rigid, and has had to resort regularly and systematically to electoral fraud, repression, and violation of basic human rights. The Mexican authoritarian regime survives and finds relief today in the e c o n o m i c aid and political and d i p l o m a t i c s u p p o r t it r e c e i v e s f r o m W a s h i n g t o n . Through the offices of the Bush administration, a favorable international image of the M e x i c a n g o v e r n m e n t , as a r e s p o n s i b l e and democratic regime, has prevailed, although this does not correspond in any way to reality. In direct contradiction to the positions held in recent years by the main public opinion currents in the world in favor of democracy, the international community has granted the Salinas administration a political legitimacy it does not have and a reputation it has not earned. On our continent there has been, in the cases of s o m e governments and political m o v e m e n t s , a change f r o m an attitude of veiled support of the Mexican authoritarian regime, mainly through omission, to an open and unquestioned support. Short-term interests and complacent attitudes keep the cause of M e x i c a n d e m o c r a c y , save for a few isolated exceptions, almost without advocates in the official sectors of the continent. If M e x i c o ' s political system remains unchanged; if there is no opening, w h i c h n e c e s s a r i l y r e q u i r e s that the v o t e be r e s p e c t e d in f r e e and unmanipulated elections; and if on the basis of the existing political system the e c o n o m i c policies of subordination, income concentration, and social e x c l u s i o n prevent the d e v e l o p m e n t of strong, active, broadly national markets, with consumers with increasing purchasing power, the e c o n o m i c distortions will grow larger. Export-oriented modern sectors, together with

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disaster areas such as agriculture and the consumer goods industry, will tend to disappear. W e will continue to depend on substantial foreign assistance, as has been the practice since 1982 and especially f r o m 1988 on, paid for mainly by U.S. taxpayers. The flow of Mexican workers to the United States will increase. In spite of the many obstacles to overcome, we are optimistic about our future. Democracy is really close at hand in Mexico. Numerous organizations and groups of the civil society are preparing for 1994 and the decision on the presidential succession. W e are struggling to end, once and forever, electoral fraud and the imposition of candidates upon us. The democratic forces in M e x i c o are asking Americans f r o m South, Central, and North America w h o are convinced of the need for d e m o c r a c y and justice to adopt a watchful attitude toward Mexico. T h r o u g h o u t the world, in the past and present struggles against dictatorships, interventions, and racial discrimination, and in the defense of sovereignty, democracy, and the respect for life and human rights, we have and will continue to maintain our solidarity. Mexican democrats ask this same solidarity today for those in M e x i c o who are struggling to end the oneparty domination that is so autocratic and corrupt. Then democracy of broad social participation will begin. It is important to maintain the dialogue with representatives of the democratic forces of other countries. As a contribution to d e m o c r a t i z i n g our political life, their help and solidarity will help organize, a m o n g other things, the oversight of our elections, both municipal and state, that will take place in 1992 and 1993 and the national elections in 1994. Freely exchanging opinions will give a more solid basis for a closer and more fruitful collaboration in the ideal our countries share—a world without exploited or exploiters, a world of justice and peace, welfare, friendship, and happiness. T h e democratization of Mexican political life—based on broad social participation—will lead to a more equitable process of e c o n o m i c d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , which can provide the foundation for the new f o r m of hemispheric collaboration that we envision.

=

11

—

Why the PRI Won the 1991 Elections Luis Donaldo Colosio

On August 18, 1991, midterm federal elections were held in Mexico, which, in our national political calendar, are second in importance only to the presidential elections. My party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), set out to regain its sizeable majority in Congress in order to carry forward President Carlos Salinas's national modernization program. 1 In the federal elections of 1988, some of the electorate withheld its vote from us in protest over the economic crisis. Three years later, the context in which the elections were held was totally different. We had gone from threedigit to almost single-digit inflation. Since 1989 we have been recovering our capacity for economic growth, in contrast with the seven years preceding the last presidential election, when the economy was stagnant. Most important, however, there is a new mood in Mexico, a definite optimism and great hope for the future. In the 1991 federal elections the PRI reaped the fruits of a good administration that had delivered results and, above all, had a great leader committed to making a national transformation. Our electoral campaign boiled down to one phrase: So that change may continue. In December 1988 those of us who assumed the leadership of the National Executive Committee examined the political changes that had occurred in the country in the previous few years and became convinced of the need to conduct a profound restructuring of the PRI. We wanted to strengthen it to make political change possible. We wanted to bring the party in line with the times and knew that the 1991 midterm elections would be the test. In the 1991 federal elections all of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies (500) and half of those in the Senate (32) were up for election. At the same time, six states held elections for governor, 209 municipalities held elections to determine their local governments, and six state legislatures were elected. 2 The results, to the surprise of many, were favorable for the PRI. W e had acted with determination and a clear strategy to change the structure and modus operandi of the PRI. After the 1988 elections we did some soul-searching. W e spent almost a 155

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year organizing and holding the 14th National Assembly; the delegates had been elected f r o m each district in the country. There we received a m a n d a t e f r o m party a c t i v i s t s to a m e n d o u r b a s i c d o c u m e n t s : t h e b y l a w s , the D e c l a r a t i o n of P r i n c i p l e s , and the P r o g r a m of Action. A m o n g the m a n y c h a n g e s m a d e , the A s s e m b l y decided that m e m b e r s h i p in the party would be on an individual basis. In January 1991 w e reduced the n u m b e r of secretariats w i t h i n t h e N a t i o n a l E x e c u t i v e C o m m i t t e e in o r d e r to s t r e a m l i n e its operations. W e have strengthened the local structure without a b a n d o n i n g the peasant, worker, and urban organizations. T h e National Political Council w a s created as an i n s t r u m e n t to e n s u r e pluralistic leadership. T h i s m o d e l w a s r e p r o d u c e d on the state and m u n i c i p a l levels to g u a r a n t e e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e citizen participation in the p a r t y ' s d e c i s i o n m a k i n g at the d i f f e r e n t levels of leadership. This modified structure has m a d e the PRI more competitive in elections. O u r ideological position is well d e f i n e d ; we are committed to social j u s t i c e within a f r a m e w o r k of respect f o r individual f r e e d o m s . 3 In order to put this p r i n c i p l e into practice, w e h a v e also d e v e l o p e d a new p r a g m a t i c attitude t o w a r d e l e c t o r a l c a m p a i g n i n g . W e h a v e b e g u n an internal p r o c e s s of identifying our s y m p a t h i z e r s and m e m b e r s . W e have assembled an electoral i n f o r m a t i o n system that allows us through public opinion polls to establish priorities for our c a m p a i g n s in a c c o r d a n c e with the aspirations of M e x i c a n society. T h e P R I is n o w a party that responds to contemporary M e x i c o — i t s diversity and plurality. It is an organization that has adapted to the increasing c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s of elections and supports the administration it brought into p o w e r in 1988.

Our Electoral Strength T h r o u g h o u t its history, the PRI has been accustomed to winning presidential e l e c t i o n s h a n d i l y a n d e n j o y i n g a s i z e a b l e m a j o r i t y in C o n g r e s s . T h e w e a k n e s s of the opposition parties, or at best their p r o n o u n c e d regionalism, i m p r i n t e d s t a n d a r d s of b e h a v i o r on our political parties s y s t e m similar to those that h a v e existed in S w e d e n , J a p a n , or Italy, which m o d e r n political science calls dominant-party systems. 4 T h e P R I ' s electoral strength, until recently, resided in the organizations that b r o u g h t t o g e t h e r the most d y n a m i c and influential social f o r c e s in the M e x i c a n social setting. O u r model of a protected e c o n o m y provided g r o w t h . T h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k w a s reflected in three c o r p o r a t e structures within the P R I : labor, p e a s a n t s , and the urban sectors. S i m u l t a n e o u s l y , the political notions of the w e l f a r e state and state intervention in the e c o n o m y gained a c c e p t a n c e in the w o r l d . M e x i c o ' s political f o r m u l a w a s consistent with the s t a t e ' s increasing involvement in the e c o n o m y up to the m i d - 1 9 8 0 s . T h e golden age of so-called stabilizing development ( 1 9 5 4 - 1 9 7 0 ) yielded

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a significant rise in the indicators of social welfare and urbanization. Substantial changes occurred in job structure and demographics. Mexico ceased to be an essentially agricultural economy as industrialization took hold. The service sector grew. Mexico City was no longer the center of economic growth as important poles of regional development emerged and consolidated. 5 A new, more diversified, and complex society is the result; this social pluralism expresses itself in greater competition in elections. In the 1980s high inflation coincided with a winding down of economic growth. The swelling public deficit and the amount of the federal budget earmarked for servicing the external debt made things worse. With this combination of adverse factors the economic crisis knocked down the standard of living for many layers of Mexican society. Thus, the presidential elections of July 1988 were held in an atmosphere of discontent among the citizenry, which translated into lost votes for the PRI. The downward trend in votes for the PRI, which started during the years of crisis, took a plunge of 14 percentage points in 1988 compared with the 1985 midterm elections. Consequently, our presence in the Chamber of Deputies shrank, although we did hold on to 52 percent of the seats. For the first time our party faced a different situation. Part of society withdrew its support from the PRI and threw it behind other parties. In July 1989 we lost the governorship of Baja California Norte. These two experiences triggered the emergence of a new political culture within the PRI: we had to learn to win votes in a more competitive party system.

Remodeling the Party This political climate moved the PRI to the urgent task of internal reform. We designed new strategies to improve our position in the next elections and to adjust our organizational structures so as to respond more fully to the aspirations of the new Mexican society. We had to perform this task between 1989 and 1990, while maintaining a difficult balance between four considerations. First, we had to implement measures that would allow us to hold the 14th National Assembly with adequate representation. Second, we had to design and adopt a National Electoral Plan that would allow the party to act effectively and in a coordinated way in the elections. Third, we had to maintain our presence in the local elections that were held during that period. Fourth, we had to prepare and hold the 14th National Assembly, where we were to discuss the party's internal reform. The simultaneity of these four factors demanded the utmost efficiency of our political agenda. The old formula of representing interests through corporate organizations had been useful in the past but was insufficient to respond to our diversified and increasingly participatory population. Following that logic, the first step toward ensuring equal amounts of local and corporate representation was to

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count our members and organizers (campaign volunteers) in order to know how many and where we were. We needed a PRI census of our members and activists in order to align them with our almost forty-six thousand sectional committees in the almost twenty-five hundred municipal committees of our electoral geography. 6 The PRI census began to be our basic tool of reorganization, and it was needed to serve several functions. First, it helped restructure the leadership bodies at the different levels, primarily in the municipal committees, in order to quantify the weight of the sectors and of the territorial structure in the party's different leadership posts. Second, it helped establish precise responsibilities and goals in the electoral contests. Third, it helped select delegates to conventions and assemblies. During 1989, more than half of the sectional committees and 60 percent of the municipal ones were restructured. Fourteen state committees were elected at assemblies of delegates. Conventions of delegates or internal primary elections were held to choose candidates for the various publicly elected posts. In 1990 the task of restructuring the leadership committees at the different levels was practically completed. A national catalogue of affiliated organizations was also prepared.

The National Electoral Plan The National Electoral Plan was adopted in June 1990. It was another tool that enabled us to prepare our strategy to win back the votes of the people. The plan established priorities and goals for each of our sectional committees. Commissioners were placed in charge and progress was periodically evaluated. We classified the sectional committees of each district into three categories, based on a careful analysis of the 1988 voting returns: (1) those in which we had a certain historical majority; (2) those in which there was a high level of electoral competitiveness (where we had won or lost by small margins); and (3) those in which we had lost outright. Our electoral plan for 1991 consisted of strengthening the regions in which we were in the majority. We began by going where we had the votes and expanding our constituency. We also went to those districts in which recovering a small percentage of the vote could mean the difference between victory and defeat. We set out to do our best to try to win those districts back. We did so with remarkable results by directly promoting the vote through volunteers at all levels of our organizational structure. Finally, having covered our home turf, we went to fight where we had apparently lost ground. The National Electoral Plan created a single operational structure to coordinate and optimize the efforts of the different party institutions. It was very important to establish a program to study public opinion through

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surveys and a computerized system of electoral statistics. One of the most outstanding p r o g r a m s was called C o m p r o m i s o Político, or political commitment. It coordinated the efforts of volunteers working with potential voters at the block level, and its results were splendid. It allowed our activists to campaign door-to-door in city blocks, face-to-face with citizens. The various state elections held in the fall of 1989 and 1990 gave us a chance to put to the test each of the different components of the National Electoral Plan. We found out which strategies were well designed and which had to be corrected. We began to get a higher rate of votes for the PRI than in the 1988 federal elections, but there were still high levels of abstention. In some places, like Chihuahua, where the PAN has a significant presence, territorial organization was implemented successfully. In other places such as Michoacán, where support for Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and the PRD was strong, we had trouble in the elections. During the November 1990 elections for town council in the state of México, we put the programs of the National Electoral Plan into practice on a large scale for the first time. This is where the PRI had lost a greater amount of votes to the FDN in 1988. 7 In 1990 we found to our satisfaction that we had won back the electorate, almost doubling the 30 percent of the vote we had received in 1988. This experience was the basis for assessing our operational effectiveness. It was our dress rehearsal.

The 14th National Assembly of the PRI At the November 1989 meeting of the National Council we began to work toward the 14th National Assembly and defined the three challenges before us. First, we needed to establish a new political platform; second, inroads needed to be made into representing the interests of the new social actors; and third, the party's image had to be improved. The 14th National Assembly was held in September 1990. We intended to carry out the reform of the party with the extensive participation of our activists, members, and sympathizers. As we reviewed the party's organization it became clear that, in order to represent the interests of an increasingly diversified society, it was necessary to make the party more locally based. The work of the Assembly was organized around four themes: the Declaration of Principles, the Program of Action, the bylaws, and national modernization. Organizing committees were set up to do the preparatory work, and district assemblies were held to elect the delegates to this national meeting. The main changes to the bylaws were as follows: (1) membership was made open to citizens on an individual basis, including members of the affiliated organizations; (2) local representation and corporate representation at assemblies, councils, and conventions would be on an even basis; (3) the party was to be debureaucratized; (4) political decisionmaking was to be

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decentralized and based at the municipal level; (5) the procedures for selecting leaders and candidates were to be revamped; (6) political councils were to be established at the national, state, and municipal levels as entities of pluralist and collegial political leadership; and (7) the municipalities and sections were defined as the basic units in which party activities were to take place, both under the local and sectoral structures. As we prepared to choose candidates to run in the federal elections in 1991, emphasis was placed on finding people with well-established roots in the communities they sought to represent. We tried to run candidates who were well known and well liked at home. The average age of our candidates in the three hundred electoral districts was around forty. This infusion of young blood reflects our capacity to bring new faces to the electoral contest. They were men and women with new political styles who had ties to the communities they wanted to represent. When the party thought that experts were needed in the Chamber of Deputies to work on future legislative reform, they were included in the slates. All of these measures had just one target: to win the 1991 elections as part of our larger goal of political modernization. This internal reform is not yet finished. We have successfully begun to change structures and procedures, but that does not mean our job is over. We will continue to carry out our strategy of transformation from within.

A New Regulatory Framework The 1991 elections were regulated by constitutional provisions amended in 1989 and by the Federal Code of Electoral Institutions and Procedures (COFIPE), passed in 1990. During the revision of the electoral legislation, our party decided to reach an accord that was satisfactory to the majority of the political organizations represented in Congress. We wanted to draw up, together with all the parties, a set of clear rules to guarantee electoral integrity. Thus COFIPE was passed with the support of five out of the six parties represented in the Chamber of Deputies. We not only wanted to win the elections, but we had made a commitment to society to do so fairly. Many of the changes that were introduced in the new legislation were proposals made by the opposition parties. One of the innovative features of COFIPE was the creation of the Federal Electoral Institute, which is responsible for organizing the elections. It is staffed with career professionals, and the composition of its general council is designed to avoid giving advantage to any party. A Federal Electoral Tribunal was also created to resolve any conflicts that may arise over the elections themselves. The establishment of COFIPE meant that a new register of voters had to be drawn up. The one used through 1990 was the product of voter registration conducted between 1980 and 1982. It was fraught with problems of upkeep

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and updating, thus making it the target of complaints by the opposition parties. Since we were interested in strengthening the legitimacy of the elections, the PRI agreed to prepare a new register. Between M a y and July 1990 the National Electoral Registry, under the supervision of all the parties, u n d e r t o o k the gigantic task of categorizing forty-three million citizens, collecting thirty-nine million applications for voter registration, and giving out thirty-six million voter registration cards, all of which entailed at least three visits to virtually every home.

The O p i n i o n Polls Starting in 1989, we began to conduct public opinion polls to determine the p r e f e r e n c e s of the electorate. T h i s was the first t i m e the party had systematically used such a tool in election campaigns at either the state or national level. Between early 1991 and a few weeks b e f o r e the federal elections in August, surveys mainly for internal use were conducted in the three hundred federal districts. T h e s e enabled us to corroborate a heightened interest in voting as well as the p o p u l a t i o n ' s electoral preferences. T h e results of the August elections confirmed the accuracy of our estimates. T h e PRI was not the only organization sponsoring polls. Other polls were conducted and sometimes published by different parties, companies, and associations. One of the most important polls, which announced its results shortly b e f o r e election day, was done by an international c o m p a n y . Like others, it confirmed trends seen in our polls—that votes for the PRI would run around 63 percent, which they in fact did. 8

The Proof Is in the Pudding T h e P R I ' s performance in the elections shows that the strategy we followed was right. On August 18, 1991, voters went to the polls in large n u m b e r s to support our candidates. T h r e e factors explain these results: the successful policies of the administration the PRI had brought into office, 9 the p a r t y ' s intense work, and the work of our candidates. Sixty-two percent of the total n u m b e r of registered voters turned up at the polls. The distribution of votes a m o n g the three main parties was 61 percent for the PRI, 18 percent for the P A N , and 8 percent for the P R D (see Table 11.1). The decline in votes for the P R I seen during the long years of the economic crisis turned around (see Figure 11.1), and even the areas in which the situation was critical in 1988 (the F e d e r a l District, the state of M é x i c o , B a j a C a l i f o r n i a Norte, and Michoacán) had significant increases in 1991. In the Mexican electoral system, three hundred seats in the C h a m b e r of D e p u t i e s are filled by plurality and two hundred seats are filled through

162

Table 11.1

LUIS D O N A L D O C O L O S I O

Results of the 1991 Federal Elections Votes

Percentage of Total

Other parties Valid votes

14,117,571 4,071,031 1,898,208 2,877,728 22,964,538

61.5 17.7 8.3 12.5 100.0

Total votes

23,977,020

65.9

Registered voters

36,355,033

100.0

PRI PAN PRD

Source: Data from the Executive Board on Electoral Organization of the Federal Electoral Institute published in La República on September 2, 1991.

proportional representation. This means that although the P R I candidates obtained 289 victories through plurality, because of the system of mixed representation, its share of the five-hundred-seat legislature corresponded to a proportional amount of the percentage of votes the citizens cast for it at the polls. Of the thirty-two Senate seats that were also at stake in this federal election, w e lost only one, that of Baja California Norte.

The Debunking of Electoral Myths In the federal elections of August 1991, we showed that we have what it takes politically to win over new constituents. Four and a half million more voters went to the polls in 1991 than in 1988; many of them were f r o m the most urban districts in the country, and they supported the PRI. 1 0 In the d e b a t e p r e c e d i n g the elections, opposition o b s e r v e r s m a d e assertions that were not borne out by events. Their thinking can be s u m m e d up into three ideas: first, that a high voter turnout would favor the opposition parties and that, conversely, a low turnout would favor the PRI; second, that the P R I ' s constituency was concentrated in rural parts of the country (the "green vote") and that it would be hard for us to win the urban vote; and third, that the turnout would be higher in the rural areas and that the cities would have low turnouts. All of these myths were debunked on August 18, 1991. In spite of the fact that it was a midterm election, the rate of participation was 15 percent higher than for the 1988 presidential elections (see F i g u r e 11.2). An analysis of the election shows that the greater turnout favored the PRI. Furthermore, in three-quarters of the urban districts, voting for the P R I was strengthened. By contrast, the relative importance of PRI voting support in the countryside diminished. This would seem to indicate

W H Y T H E PRI W O N T H E 1 9 9 1

Figure 11.1 80

ELECTIONS

163

Voting for the PRI, 1979-1991

-

70%

6 9 %

65%

62%

60 51%

40-

20 -

1979

1982

1986

1988

1991

Source: Data from the PRI.

Figure 11.2

Electoral Participation, 1979-1991

80

66%

66%.

60 51%

49%

47%

40 -

20 -

1979 Source: Data from the PRI.

1982

1986

1988

1991

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that the v o t e s in the urban areas and the most modern sectors of M e x i c a n society are with the PRI. This midterm election marked a turnaround in the population's patterns of electoral behavior. Peasants were no longer the ones to g o to the polls in the largest numbers; cities became the major source of voters. Thus the h y p o t h e s i s that the PRI manipulates the rural vote through its peasant organizations, which had constituted its national power base, has been disproved by the 1991 electoral results.

Toward the Twenty-First Century T h e PRI has b e e n a central i n s t i t u t i o n in the c o n s o l i d a t i o n and transformation of M e x i c a n politics. 1 1 Today, it faces the challenge of making S a l i n a s ' s program of political c h a n g e viable. If between 1988 and 1991 w e made w i n n i n g the elections our priority, w e now want our party to represent the broadest cross-section of society. Thanks to the sizeable majority that our party has had in C o n g r e s s since N o v e m b e r 1991, unequaled reforms have b e e n passed for M e x i c o ' s future. The PRI will continue to change in order to be the centerpoint of political c o n v e r g e n c e . Our sights are set on the next century.

Notes This chapter was translated from the Spanish by Rita A. Clark-Gollub. 1. The Institutional Revolutionary Party was founded in January 1946. Its predecessors were the National Revolutionary Party (PNR), founded in 1929, and the Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM), founded in 1938. 2. Gubernatorial elections were also held on August 18, 1991, in the states of Campeche, Colima, Guanajuato, Querétaro, San Luis Potosí, and Sonora. The state of Nuevo León held elections the previous month, foreshadowing the trends in the August 18 federal elections. 3. Felipe González, head of the Spanish Socialist Party, alluded to this problem of compatibility between individual freedoms and collective solidarity in "Por una nueva izquierda europea," Leviathan 28 (Summer 1987): 53-58. 4. T. J. Pemel d e f i n e s a dominant-party regime as one that meets the f o l l o w i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s : the party d o m i n a t e s n u m e r i c a l l y , it d o m i n a t e s negotiations with other parties, it dominates for a long time, and it dominates in the administration of a historic program. In Democracias diferentes (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1991). 5. Manuel Villa analyzes this problem extensively in El Archipiélago mexicano (Mexico City: Editorial Cal y Arena, 1990). 6. A sectional committee is the lowest organizational structure in the party. It covers an area similar to a district in the United States and is composed of organizers living in that area. 7. This led to the formation of a splinter group, the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). 8. The Gallup Company conducted a poll on August 18, 1991. A worthwhile

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analysis of it can be found in an article by Luis Medina Peiia, "Notas sobre una Encuesta," Examen (magazine of the National Executive Committee of the PRI) 31 (December 1991). 9. Giovanni Sartori rightly says that the effectiveness of an administration can strengthen its legitimacy. See "Una nueva reflexion sobre la democracia," Examen 33 (February 1992). Other authors already analyzed this assertion. See Martin Lipset, El hombre politico (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1977); Juan Linz, La quiebra de las democracias (Mexico City: Alianza Editorial Mexicana, 1990). 10. See the analysis by Guadalupe Pacheco, "Las tesis equivocadas," Examen 30 (November 1991). 11. Plutarco Elias Calles, president of Mexico from 1924 to 1928 and the driving force behind the formation of the PNR, said: "the same circumstance which Mexico faces, perhaps for the first time in its history, in which the prevailing climate is one in which there are no caudillos, should allow us—will allow us—to permanently direct the country's policy down the path to a truly institutional life, going once and for all from the historical status of a 'one-man country' to a 'nation of institutions and laws '" President's State of the Nation address, September 1, 1928.

— PART 4

Conclusion

— 12 — The Dynamics of Change in Mexico Riordan Roett

Two developments in late 1992 illustrate the complex dynamics of furthering the process of political liberalization in Mexico in this decade. The first was contained in the November 1 State of the Nation address that President Salinas delivered to the Mexican Congress; the second occurred on November 3 with the victory of Governor Bill Clinton of Arkansas in the U.S. presidential elections.

Electoral Reform The PRI and the government of Mexico were both under increasing pressure to introduce more transparent rules of the game in the national electoral process as Salinas entered the last half of his six-year term. A recent, embarrassing incident took place in Michoacán in October when a newly elected PRI governor was forced from office by a leftist campaign of civil disobedience. In 1991, two other state governors had been removed from office after widespread popular protests against electoral fraud. Even though the government appointed an interim governor from the PRI, the opposition in Michoacán claimed a moral victory. The Michoacán crisis was particularly galling because it is the home state of the Cárdenas family— and Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas of the P R D had almost defeated Salinas in the 1988 presidential election. Moreover, after the election the P R D achieved the status of the official opposition to the PRI-dominated political system. Since Salinas's narrow election victory in 1988, he has tried to address the growing pressures for reform by overhauling the mechanics of the electoral system. A new election law was drafted and an electoral institute established. New voter rolls were compiled, new registration cards were handed out, and new ballot boxes of clear plastic were introduced; the changes were limited almost entirely to the way in which votes were cast, collected, 169

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and c o u n t e d . In the c o n t e x t of the very successful e c o n o m i c modernization p r o g r a m , the 1991 electoral results w e r e viewed as a success by the party l e a d e r s h i p in spite of the r e m o v a l of the two P R I g o v e r n o r s . T h e party i n v e s t e d h e a v i l y in M i c h o a c á n t h r o u g h the P r o n a s o l social i n v e s t m e n t p r o g r a m that transferred large a m o u n t s of money to the grass roots. It w a s expected in M e x i c o City that the combination of successful m a c r o - e c o n o m i c m a n a g e m e n t with p l e n t i f u l micro-level distribution would o v e r w h e l m the P R D and allow the P R I to win the elections without resorting to traditional methods of fraud and ballot box stuffing. But the P R D c h a n g e d its tactics in M i c h o a c á n . Rather than accuse the g o v e r n m e n t of traditional fraud, it began to argue long before election day that a fair c o m p e t i t i o n w a s impossible. T h e P R D claimed that the m a s s i v e resources available to the PRI for spending on publicity, billboards, rallies, and the like m a d e it impossible for any other party to c o m p e t e fairly. Then the issue w a s suddenly recast: the P R D tacitly admitted that the old fraud was n o longer their best o f f e n s e and shifted the strategy to a r g u e for a "level p l a y i n g g r o u n d " f o r all parties c o m p e t i n g in the elections. C á r d e n a s and his s u p p o r t e r s stated that w h a t e v e r the o u t c o m e , the election w o u l d be invalid. Voting observers reported on election day that there was negligible fraud and what did o c c u r probably had little to d o with the victory of the PRI c a n d i d a t e . T h e P R D ' s c a n d i d a t e , Cristobal Arias, took to the streets and o r g a n i z e d m a r c h e s , sit-ins, and the seizure of g o v e r n m e n t a d m i n i s t r a t i v e b u i l d i n g s . S i m u l t a n e o u s l y , the party leadership targeted the next round of e l e c t i o n s f o r m u n i c i p a l seats (held in D e c e m b e r 1992). C o o l e r h e a d s apparently prevailed both in M i c h o a c á n and in M e x i c o City. Salinas directed E d u a r d o Villaseñor, the wealthy f a r m e r w h o had carried the election f o r the PRI, to resign; the P R D accepted the g o v e r n m e n t ' s o f f e r to meet and discuss further an electoral reform agenda. On N o v e m b e r 1, 1992, in the annual State of the Nation address to the C o n g r e s s , t h e p r e s i d e n t , to the s u r p r i s e of m a n y o b s e r v e r s , c a u t i o u s l y e n d o r s e d the o p p o s i t i o n ' s general p l a t f o r m f o r electoral change, including n e w regulations on party financing, limits on campaign spending, and more e q u a l a c c e s s to n e w s outlets. 1 A l t h o u g h not specific in his s p e e c h , the p r e s i d e n t clearly used this d r a m a t i c occasion to put the issue of political r e f o r m f r o n t a n d c e n t e r in his a g e n d a f o r the last three years of his administration: If the political parties consider that it is necessary to adapt the electoral legislation, let us go ahead. While they build their consensus, I propose that we move forward in three fundamental aspects of political reform: making the sources of party financing transparent, placing limits on the cost of election campaigns, and working on the communications media and procedures that guarantee the impartiality of electoral processes. 2

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As the chapters in this volume have discussed, the need to respond to pressure for political reform must be balanced with the potential destabilizing impact of that reform that would spill over into the economic and financial areas. Salinas's goal during his sexenio has been to further consolidate the market-oriented reform process begun under his predecessor. An important role has been given to foreign investment, and what investors fear most is the unacceptable levels of risk generated by political uncertainty. As Mexico prepares for the selection of the next PRI candidate in 1993, the incumbent president has accepted the challenge of the opposition and of other observers to deepen the political reform process. Whether he can shield the economy from a negative fallout of that goal is a critical question for Salinas and for Mexico.

The Democrats W i n The decisive electoral victory of Arkansas governor Bill Clinton on November 3 is the second development that affects the attitude of the Mexican government toward political liberalization. During the Reagan and Bush administrations, Washington was willing to overlook the anomalies of the one-party-dominant political system in Mexico. The foreign policy and economic stakes were sufficiently high to argue that an exception needed to be made for Mexico—even as the rest of the hemisphere restored competitive democratic regimes. Presidents Salinas and Bush quickly established a strong personal friendship. The talented members of Salinas's economic team were frequent visitors to Washington and New York. The Bush administration quickly obliged Salinas by providing visible and strong support for the renegotiation of the Mexican debt with private commercial banks. And, of course, the rapid negotiations over the NAFTA were the capstone of the new relationship between the two countries. It became obvious during the presidential campaign in the United States that Clinton's attitude toward free trade, generally, and the NAFTA, in particular, was influenced by strong domestic constituencies. The organized labor movement, farm groups, and environmental lobbyists were all lobbying for the Democrats to distance themselves from the NAFTA. The second-ranking Democrat in the House of Representatives, and probable next Speaker of the House, Congressman Richard Gephardt, made it clear that the Democratic Congress, working with a Democratic president for the first time in twelve years, would have reservations about the agreement. Clinton, at the end of the campaign, finally endorsed the NAFTA but stated that he would seek legislative action in the Congress to further protect workers' rights and environmental concerns. The Mexicans tactfully accepted the governor's statement that he favored the treaty with exceptions, although they made it clear that they would not be willing to renegotiate the three-country treaty again.

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In addition to the N A F T A and issues related to trade, the Mexican elite became sensitive during the U.S. presidential campaign to the probability that a Democratic administration would take a more aggressive position on the issue of internal democracy in Mexico. They remembered with concern the Carter administration in the late 1970s in which the furtherance of human rights and civil liberties was prominent in the U.S. agenda. Would a Clinton administration, or important segments of it, perhaps associated with the Carter legacy, favor the linkage of democracy and progress on other foreign policy and economic agenda issues? During the hearings in Congress last year to discuss whether or not to grant the president "fast track" authorization to proceed with the negotiation of the N A F T A , the human rights issue appeared frequently. Did the United States want to enter into a complex economic relationship with a country whose political culture was so different from that of the United States and Canada? The probable Democratic party victory in the U.S. elections, which followed Salinas's State of the Nation address by only a few days, must have had an impact on his approach to political reform. Although perhaps not the most critical element, it must be viewed as one of a number of developments that led to the decision to offer further electoral change on November 1. Other elements were the continued civil protest, the upcoming presidential election in Mexico, and the need to maintain an image of internal stability to reassure current and potential investors that risk levels in the economy are and will remain reasonable and manageable. A s the chapters in this book have illustrated, the issue of political liberalism is an old one in Mexico. At the beginning of the Salinas sexenio it was clear that e c o n o m i c and financial restructuring had highest priority. T w o years into Salinas's presidency, social investment acquired a new urgency with the organization of the Pronasol program. It appeared, in 1991, that the president and the PRI leadership believed they could postpone political change until at least the next sexenio, which begins in 1994. At the time of this writing it is clear that they have reassessed that position. The cumulative impact of external developments—the general trend toward democracy in the world, especially in the Western Hemisphere, and the election of Governor Clinton and the traditions of the Democratic party in the area of free e l e c t i o n s and democratic c o m p e t i t i o n — j o i n e d with an a s s e s s m e n t that internal civil protest would continue in spite of the impressive economic reform program. Salinas and his colleagues apparently concluded that political liberalization could not wait until 1994. The challenge for the Mexican government and the PRI is to convince the internal opposition and external observers that the reform process will be transparent. Just as the PRI was unable to win over the political opposition with administrative and procedural innovations in 1991 and 1992, it will face a credibility c h a l l e n g e in 1993 and 1994. What is now clear to many observers is that political liberalization in M e x i c o is inevitable. The

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pertinent question is whether or not it will come in time to preclude societal disruption, and thereby further consolidate the modernization process, or whether there will be further polarization with unforeseen implications for economic and political stability. It is a question that has implications for the United States as well as Mexico. The management of the process of political liberalization will require all of the political skills that Carlos Salinas de Gortari has so masterfully applied to the economic and financial rebirth of Mexico.

Notes New

1. Tim Golden, "Mexico's Leader Cautiously Backs Some Big Changes," The York Times, N o v e m b e r 2, 1992, p. A3. 2. Ibid.

About the Contributors

Sergio Aguayo Quezada is a professor and researcher at the Center for International Studies at El Colegio de México. Luis H. Alvarez is the president of the National Executive Committee of the National Action Party (PAN). M. Delal Baer is a senior fellow and director of the Mexico Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Miguel Basáñez is the president of Market and Opinion International (MORI) in Mexico City.

Research

Roderic Ai Camp is a professor of political science and Latin American studies at Tulane University. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solorzano Democratic Revolution (PRD).

is the president of the Party of the

Luis Donaldo Colosio was the president of the National Executive Committee of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) from 1989 until April 1992. Michael Coppedge is an assistant professor of Latin American studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University. Clark W. Reynolds is a professor of economics and the director of the Americas Program at Stanford University. 175

176

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

Riordan Roett is the Sarita and Don Johnston Professor and director of Latin American studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University. Luis Rubio is a policy analyst and director general of the Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo (CIDAC) in Mexico City.

Index

ACUDE. See Agreement for Democracy ADESE. See Democratic Assembly for Real Suffrage Agreement for Democracy (ACUDE), I1 1 Agriculture, 9, 7 0 - 7 1 , 73, 88, 151, 154 Aguirre, Ramón, 130, 131 Alduncín, Enrique, 108 Alemán, Miguel, 28, 103, 117 Alemanistas, 53 Almazán, General Juan Andreu, 81 Alvarez, Luis H., 27 Alvarez del Castillo, Enrique, 120 Americas Watch, 123 Ames, Barry, 28 A N C I F E M . See National W o m e n ' s Civic Association Argentina, 52, 65, 150 Ariza, Cristobal, 170 Armed forces. See Military Armor Glass, 20 Asia, 4, 149 Aspe Armilla, Pedro, 5 Assassinations, 27, 119 Authoritarianism, 2 1 - 2 2 , 24, 28, 29, 48, 52, 66, 111, 117, 124, 125; change f r o m , 118, 121, 126; of PRI, 65, 97

Baker, James, 4 Banks, 87, 95, 98, 100-101, 150 Bilateral Commission on the Future of United S t a t e s - M e x i c a n Relations, 23 Booth, John, 24 Border states, 75. See also by name Borrego, Genaro, 59 Borrowing, 79, 80, 95 Brady, Nicholas, 5 Brady initiative, 5, 57 Brazil, 30, 65, 150 Brodhead, Tim, 124 Bureaucracy, 48, 124 Bush, George, 3, 4, 5, 123, 150, 152, 153, 171 Business, 10, 20, 42, 45, 46, 54, 57, 95, 101, 102, 103, 104; and political reform, 106, 121. See also Multinational c o r p o r a t i o n s

Avila Camacho, Manuel, 81 Bailey, John, 28 B a j a California Norte, 50, 11, 114(n22); elections in, 61, 113(n7), 127, 130, 133, 157, 161, 162 177

Camarena, Enrique, 119 Campesinos, 101, 102. See also Peasantry Canada, 2 4 - 2 5 , 72, 89; free trade with, 2 1 , 7 1 , 135; N A F T A , 6 9 - 7 0 , 88, 118, 124, 151, 172 Canales Clariond, Fernando, 23 Cancún, 79 Capital, 5, 76, 85 Capitalism, 17-18, 20, 30, 53 Cárdenas, Lázaro, 117, 132, 144 Cárdenas Solorzano, Cuauhtémoc, 3, 19, 53, 58, 65, 127, 139, 169; and PRI, 106, 130, 134; support for, 54,

178

INDEX

81, 85, 121, 129, 133-134, 135, 159 Cardenista Front (FC), 106. See also Party of the Democratic Revolution Cardenistas, 27, 53 Carpizo, Jorge, 120 Castañeda, Jorge, 7 Catholic church, 54, 75, 106, 114(n30); influence of, 103, 121; recognition of, 10, 11, 13, 57; and Salinas administration, 104-105 Censorship, 30 Central America, 3, 118 Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional, 120 Chamber of Deputies, 86, 87(fig.), 157, 160, 1 6 1 - 1 6 2 Chiapas, 86 Chihuahua, 121; elections in, 54, 61, 113(n7), 130, 132, 159 Chile, 24, 63, 65, 99 Christian democratic party, 105, 111 Civic organizations, 55 Civil war, 4, 109 Clientelism, 128 Clinton, Bill, 169, 171, 172 Clouthier, Manuel, 84, 85, 133 CNDH. See National Commission on Human Rights CNOP. See National Confederation of Popular Organizations Coello Trejo, Javier, 120 COFIPE. See Federal Code of Electoral Institutions and Procedures Collor de Mello, Fernando, 65 Colosio, Luis Donaldo, 134 Common Agricultural Policy, 70-71 Commonwealth of Independent States, 41, 98 Communism, 3 Communist Party, 65 Companies, 26, 39, 99, 113(nl7). See also Maquiladoras; Multinational corporations Compromiso Político, 159 CONASUPO. See National Commission on Popular Subsistence Constitution, 57, 95, 98, 140(nl9), 143 Construction, 81 Consumers, 22, 39^10, 41 Contras, 4 Convergence, 7 5 - 7 6

Convergencia de Organismos Civiles por la Democracia, 122 COPADE. See Council for Democracy COPARMEX. See Employers' Confederation of the Mexican Republic COPLAMAR. See Federal Coordination of the National Plan for Depressed Zones and Marginal Groups Córdoba, José, 124 Corning Glass, 31 (n 12) Corporatism, 29, 46, 55, 59, 144-145 Corriente Crítica, 134 Corriente Democrática, 134 Corruption, 3, 1 14-115(n38), 131, 135, 150 Cosio Villegas, Daniel, 66 Council for Democracy (COPADE), 11 1 Cuban Revolution, 66 DEA. See U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration Dealy, Glen: The Public Man, 21 Debt: external, 5, 36, 74, 96, 1 10, 150, 157 Debt crisis, 1, 57 Decisionmaking, 21, 22, 28, 47, 70, 75 Declaration of Principles (PRI), 156, 159 Deficit, 57, 79, 149, 157 Democracia 2000, 134 Democracy, 5, 26, 49, 73, 125, 130, 133, 145, 153, 154, 172; and capitalism, 17-18; concepts of, 2 3 24; development of, 4 5 - 4 7 , 1 3 6 137; and economy, 38, 124-125; multiparty, 6 3 - 6 4 ; and tolerance, 24-25 Democratic Assembly for Real Suffrage (ADESE), 111 Democratic Consulting Committee, 130 Democratization, 7, 8, 23, 35, 39, 51, 61, 66, 85, 111, 125-126, 127, 154; and economy, 45, 63, 88, 89, 128 Dependencia, 2 Dependency: economic, 20, 40 Dependency theory, 20 Deregulation, 72 Destabilization: radical, 62 Devaluation: monetary, 74, 80, 95

INDEX

Development, 73, 86, 95, 99, 153; long-term, 8 7 - 8 8 ; stabilizing, 156157 Development Group for Alternative Policies: "Look Before You Leap," 151 DFS. See Federal Security Bureau Diamond, Larry, 24 Diaz Ordaz, Gustavo, 122 Dirección General de Información y Seguridad Nacional, 119-120 Distribution, 72, 76, 80, 87, 88; of income, 88, 8 9 - 9 0 , 117 Dominican Republic, 150 Donaldo Colosio, Luis, 60 Drug trafficking, 3, 10, 118, 119, 120, 122 Dull, James, 2 0 - 2 1 Eastern Europe, 17, 23 EC. See European Community Echeverría, Luis, 1, 27, 36, 96, 98, 99, 132 Echeverristas, 53 Economic development, 2 1 - 2 2 , 25, 39, 129 Economic growth, 19, 21, 42, 52, 74, 79, 87, 99, 117-118, 155; and capitalism, 20, 30; and democratization, 89, 128; and middle class, 6 2 - 6 3 Economic liberalization, 1, 5, 10, 11, 35, 41, 72, 99, 139, 151; and democratization, 63, 128; impacts of, 3 7 - 3 9 , 9 9 - 1 0 0 ; and political liberalization, 17, 22, 51, 66 Economic reform, 12, 19, 3 6 - 3 7 , 49, 63, 110-111, 119; impacts of, 3 8 40, 4 3 - 4 5 ; opposition to, 4 7 - 4 8 ; and politics, 64, 124-125, 146; and stabilization policies, 5 1 - 5 2 , 5 3 56 Economy, 2, 3 - 4 , 5, 21, 23, 25, 42, 43, 55, 70, 79, 88, 132-133, 153154; closed, 3 7 - 3 8 ; open, 3 8 - 3 9 ; and politics, 2 8 - 2 9 , 4 1 - 4 3 , 47^18, 85, 128-129 Education, 12, 28, 88, 122; reform of, 9 - 1 0 , 13, 88 Ejidos, 9, 135-136 Elections, 4, 19, 28, 39, 52, 97, 103, 127, 128, 132, 136, 139, 159; and democracy, 24, 47; fraud, 50, 54,

179

131, 153; 1988, 4 2 ^ 3 , 44, 4 7 - 4 8 , 54, 55, 6 4 - 6 5 , 80, 8 1 - 8 2 , 121, 155-156; 1991, 12-13, 43, 56, 6 0 61, 8 5 - 8 6 , 122, 123, 128, 130131, 155, 160, 161-164; reform of, 9 - 1 0 , 11-12, 132, 169-170 Elites, 1, 56, 102, 123; political role of, 118, 119; unity of, 5 3 - 5 4 Elizondo, Eduardo A., 22 El Salvador, 4 Emperador sexenal, 66 Employers' Confederation of the Mexican Republic (COPARMEX), 55 Employment, 75, 81, 88, 149. See also Jobs; Unemployment Enterprise for the Americas, 152 Environment, 122 Environmental standards, 26 Europe, 4. See also Eastern Europe; European Community European Community (EC), 70-71, 152 Exchange rate, 6, 80 Exports, 99, 149 Families, 48, 55 Favoritism, 5 5 - 5 6 FC. See Cardenista Front FDN. See National Democratic Front Federal Code of Electoral Institutions and Procedures (COFIPE), 11, 160161 Federal Coordination of the National Plan for Depressed Zones and Marginal Groups (COPLAMAR), 98 Federal District, 138, 161 Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), 11, 160 Federal Electoral Tribunal, 11-12 Federal Judicial Police, 119, 120, 121122 Federal Security Bureau (DFS), 119, 123 Finance, 10, 11, 12, 9 5 - 9 6 Foreign exchange, 7 9 - 8 0 , 85 Foreign Investment Law, 137 Foreign policy, 118, 123-124 France, 7 0 - 7 1 Fraud: electoral, 26, 50, 54, 131, 153 Free trade, 28, 69, 135. See also North American Free Trade Agreement Frente Civico Potosino, 122

180

INDEX

Frente Nacional Ciudadano, 5 9 Fujimori, Alberto, 6 5 G A T T . See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade G D P . See Gross domestic product General A g r e e m e n t on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 71 Gephardt, Richard, 171 Germany, 7 0 Glasnost, 64 G o m e z Morin, Manuel, 1 4 3 - 1 4 4 G o o d s , 71, 76, 101, 149 G o r b a c h e v , Mikhail, 17, 64, 65 G o v e r n o r s , 8 - 9 , 5 4 , 113(n7), 1 1 4 ( n 2 2 ) , 1 3 0 - 1 3 1 ; removal of, 28, 169; and PRI, 1 3 7 - 1 3 8 Greece, 152 Gross d o m e s t i c product (GDP), 76, 89, 150 Grupos de Solidaridad, 87 Guanajuato (city), 61 Guanajuato (state). 111, H 4 ( n 2 2 ) , 122; e l e c t i o n s in, 8 - 9 , 11, 50, 61, 103, 113(n7), 131, I 6 4 ( n 2 ) Guatemala, 86 Guerrero, 103 Guerrilla m o v e m e n t , 6 6 Gulf region, 7 9 Health, 2 6 H e g e m o n y : U . S . , 153 Hellman, Judith Adler, 128 Hernandez Galicia, Joaquin ("La Quina"), 54, 57, 131, 134 H i d a l g o , 86 Hirschman, Albert O., 2 2 Housing, 58 Human resources, 2 2 H u m a n rights, 4, 7, 2 9 - 3 0 , 1 2 1 - 1 2 2 , 123, 153, 172 IFE. See Federal Electoral Institute Immigration. See Migration Imperialism: U . S . , 4 Imports, 3 7 , 4 0 , 1 4 9 - 1 5 0 Import substitution, 2, 117 I n c o m e , 84, 9 6 , 109, 149; distribution of, 4 3 , 7 2 , 7 5 , 88, 8 9 - 9 0 , 117, 150 Industrialization, 2, 2 8 , 88, 117, 157 Industry, 4 4 ^ 5 , 1 1 3 ( n l 7 ) , 149, 154. See also Maquiladoras Inequality: e c o n o m i c , 24, 9 0

Inflation, 52, 57, 110, 155, 157 Informal sector, 81, 1 4 9 - 1 5 0 Infrastructure, 88, 110 Inglehart, Ronald, 2 4 Injustice: social, 14 Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), 1, 3 3 ( n 5 7 ) , 37, 4 9 - 5 0 , 51, 56, 97, 103, 105, 106, 110, 111, 132, 171; c h a l l e n g e s to, 42, 4 4 ; division of, 1 3 4 - 1 3 7 ; and e c o n o m i c reform, 5 3 - 5 4 , 66, 7 3 - 7 4 , 80, 119; modernization and, 41, 1 3 7 - 1 3 8 ; National A s s e m b l y of, 1 5 9 - 1 6 0 ; National Electoral Plan of, 157, 1 5 8 - 1 5 9 ; in 1988 e l e c t i o n s , 4 7 - 4 8 , 55; in 1991 elections, 12, 122; power of, 62, 127, 143; reform of, 7, 8, 11, 5 6 - 5 7 , 61, 6 2 - 6 3 , 65, 7 4 75, 130, 1 3 2 - 1 3 3 , 1 3 8 - 1 3 9 , 1 5 5 158, 169; support for, 2 8 - 2 9 , 5 8 59, 8 4 - 8 6 , 1 13(n7), 1 3 7 - 1 3 8 , 145, 1 6 1 - 1 6 4 ; unions and, 5 9 - 6 0 ; voter registration by, 1 6 0 - 1 6 1 Insurgency, 5, 121 Integral Program for Rural D e v e l o p m e n t (PIDER), 98 Integration: regional, 70, 8 9 Interest rates, 8 0 International Monetary Fund, 150 Investment, 1, 57, 69, 85, 88, 89, 9 0 ; c o n v e r g e n c e , 7 5 - 7 6 ; foreign, 5, 9 9 ; U . S . , 18, 26, 118 Ireland, 152 James, Dilmus, 2 0 Japan, 6 3 Jobs, 101, 149. See also E m p l o y m e n t John Paul, P o p e , 57, 114(n30) Juarez, Benito, 6 6 Justice: social, 2 4 Karl, Terry Lynn, 2 3 - 2 4 Klesner, Joseph, 28 Korea, 89 Krauze, Enrique, 26 Kuznets h y p o t h e s i s , 8 7 - 8 8 Labor, 39, 4 0 , 4 2 , 55, 59, 89, 114(n27), 145; skill c h a n g e s of, 76,

88 Land, 98, 151; ejido, Land reform, 9, 11 La Paz treaty, 151

135-136

INDEX Latin America, 4, 5, 65, 66. See also countries by name Laws, 10, 11-12, 27, 145 Left, 4, 5, 55, 66, 81, 121 Legal system: and human rights, 2 9 - 3 0 Legitimacy, 43, 57 Lewis, Arthur, 22 Liberalism, 23, 24, 29 Liberties, 54, 99 Liberty, 25, 66 Linkages: political and economic, 2 6 27 Linz, Juan, 24 Literacy, 28 Llehmann, David, 23 Loans, 150. See also Borrowing "Look Before You Leap" (Development Group for Alternative Policies), 151 López Portillo, José, 1, 54, 96, 98, 99, 110 McClintock, Cynthia, 24 Macroeconomy, 5, 110 McClelland, David, 21 Madero, Francisco, 54, 66 Madrid Hurtado, Miguel de la, 1,5, 11, 13, 18, 53, 54, 96, 97, 117, 123, 125, 138; economic reform by, 36, 52, 7 3 - 7 4 ; on security forces, 119120 Maquiladoras, 79, 118, 151 Market reform, 52, 56, 65 Markets, 43, 69, 7 1 - 7 2 , 88, 89 Martinez, Ifigenia, 134 Massacre: student, 122 Mass media, 121 Mazatlán, 61 Mérida, 61 Mexdollar, 74 Mexican Miracle, 73 Mexican Revolution, 42, 65, 66 México (state of), 103, 114(n22), 131, 161 Mexico City: elections in, 81, 84; productivity in, 76, 79, 83(fig.), 85 Michoacán, 114(n22), 169, 170; elections in, 61, 103, 113(n7), 131, 159, 161 Middle class, 10, 12, 42, 54, 57, 75, 121, 136; and electoral reform, 6 2 63 Migration, 3 - 4 , 81, 86, 151, 154 Militants, 136

181

Military, 10, 39, 71, 103, 105, 119, 120 Modernization, 2, 9, 18, 41, 101, 155; economic, 6, 10, 28, 29, 57, 6 2 - 6 3 , 110; political, 2 3 - 2 4 , 25, 131133, 138-139, 144-145; support for, 102-103 Money: devaluation of, 74, 80, 95 Morris, Stephen, 27, 29 Movimiento Popular Territorial, 59 Multinational corporations, 2 0 - 2 1 , 89 Munoz Ledo, Porfirio, 53, 106, 134 Nava, Salvador, 111 NAFTA. See North American Free Trade Agreement Narcotics agents, 10 National Action Party (PAN), 10, 27, 45, 48, 54, 61, 86, 106, 111, 112, 122, 133, 144; goals of, 145-147; 1988 elections, 54, 84, 121; support for, 57, 75, 135, 143, 159, 161 National Assembly (PRI), 159-160 National Association of Economics, 114(n27) National Commission on Human Rights (CNDH), 10, 29, 120, 123 National Commission on Popular Subsistence (CONASUPO), 58 National Confederation of Popular Organizations (CNOP), 59 National Democratic Front (FDN), 81, 84, 121, 159 National Electoral Plan (PRI), 157, 158-159 National Electoral Registry, 161 National Executive Committee (PRI), 155, 156 Nationalization: of banks, 95, 98, 100 National Political Council (PRI), 156 National Solidarity Program (Pronasol), 8, 12, 33(n57), 44, 58, 60, 85, 97, 128, 145, 170 National Union of Education Workers (SNTE), 9 National W o m e n ' s Civic Association (ANCIFEM), 55 Negroponte, John Dimitri, 98, 118 Neighborhoods, 60 New River, 151 NGOs. See Nongovernmental organizations

182

INDEX

Nicaragua, 4, 2 4 Noche de Tlaltelolco, la, 95 N o g a l e s Wash, 151 Nongovernmental organizations ( N G O s ) , 1 2 1 - 1 2 2 , 124 North America, 11, 89. See also Canada; United States North American Free Trade Agreement ( N A F T A ) , 3, 7, 8, 9, 6 9 - 7 0 , 71, 98, 110, 112, 125, 137, 151; alternatives to, 1 5 2 - 1 5 3 ; impacts of, 21, 4 4 , 57, 8 8 - 8 9 , 98, 99; linkages in, 2 6 , 27; negotiation of, 85, 118, 123, 124, 1 7 1 - 1 7 2 ; support for, 1 0 1 - 1 0 2 , 125 North Pacific region, 7 9 North region, 7 9 N u e v o León, 61 Oaxaca, 86 Oil industry, 36, 73, 9 9 Output, 75, 76. See also Production; Productivity Pact for E c o n o m i c Solidarity (PSE), 8 0 Pact for Stability and E c o n o m i c Growth (PECE), 5, 8 0 Pact for Stability, C o m p e t i t i v e n e s s and E m p l o y m e n t (PECE), 5, 57 P A N . See National Action Party Panistas, 130 Party of the D e m o c r a t i c Revolution ( P R D ) , 19, 27, 29, 4 9 , 58, 106, 111, 122, 133, 135, 161, 170; creation of, 5 3 , 164(n7); elections, 4 7 ^ 1 8 ; on N A F T A , 1 5 2 - 1 5 3 Paternalism, 2 1 , 145 Patronage, 4 8 , 5 3 , 6 0 , 7 4 - 7 5 Paz, O c t a v i o , 23, 25, 108 Peasantry, 4 2 , 73, 136, 151, 164 PECE. See Pact for Stability and E c o n o m i c Growth; Pact for Stability, C o m p e t i t i v e n e s s and Employment Peru, 24, 6 5 Peso, 80 PIDER. See Integral Program for Rural Development Pinochet, A u g u s t o , 63, 9 9 Pluralism: social, 146, 157 Political culture, 25, 4 6 Political liberalization, 1 - 2 , 12, 2 0 , 51, 5 6 , 127, 129, 1 7 2 - 1 7 3 ;

conditions for, 1 3 0 - 1 3 9 ; and e c o n o m i c liberalization, 17, 27, 38, 66; and e c o n o m i c reform, 64, 128. See also Political reform Political parties, 107, 134, 136; establishing, 111, 112; i n f l u e n c e of, 103, 106, 121; 1991 elections, 6 0 - 6 1 ; o p p o s i t i o n , 6 1 - 6 2 ; strength of, 5 8 - 5 9 Political reform, 1 8 - 1 9 , 22, 25, 27, 28, 29, 50, 9 7 - 9 8 . 1 0 3 - 1 0 7 . 110. 1 3 0 - 1 3 1 , 146 Political stability, 37, 3 8 - 3 9 , 4 5 , 9 9 Political s y s t e m s , 42, 4 4 , 95, 9 6 , 146; dominant-party, 156, 164(n4); future, 4 8 ^ 1 9 Politics, 71, 108; authoritarian, 24, 125; and e c o n o m y , 2 8 - 2 9 , 38, 4 1 43, 4 7 - 4 8 , 5 3 - 5 6 , 85, 1 2 8 - 1 2 9 ; single-party, 56, 61, 64, 117, 171; and society, 9 6 - 9 7 Pollution, 1 17, 151 Population growth, 36, 9 6 Portugal, 152 Poverty, 90, I 14-1 15(n38) Power, 1, 23, 37, 71, 128, 129; PRI surrender of, 1 3 0 - 1 3 4 PRD. See Party of the Democratic Revolution Presidency, 1 1 8 - 1 1 9 , 1 2 4 - 1 2 5 Presidentialism, 66, 95, 137 PRI. See Institutional Revolutionary Party Prices: indexing, 80 Private sector, 1, 2, 5, 21, 28, 5 4 - 5 5 , 58, 73 Privatization, 5, 25, 55, 57, 99, 1 0 0 101, 110 Production, 9 1 - 9 2 ( n 9 ) ; c h a n g e s in, 40^41, 88, 98. See also Output Productivity, 81, 84, 86, 88, 150; regional, 7 5 - 7 9 , 8 3 ( f i g . ) Professionals, 4 2 , 101, 102 Program of Action (PRI), 156, 159 Pronasol. See National Solidarity Program Protectionism, 5 6 , 99, 117, 122 Protests: electoral, 122 PSE. See Pact for Economic Solidarity Public Man, The (Dealy), 21 Public opinion polls, 161 Public sector, 1, 21, 57

INDEX Quina, La. See Hernandez Galicia, Joaquin Radicalism: moderate, 109 R a m o s , S a m u e l , 108 R e a g a n administration, 3, 171 R e c e s s i o n , 1, 36, 71, 85 "Rector-state," 7 4 R e f o r m , 25, 75; calls for, 9 7 - 9 8 ; e c o n o m i c , 2, 10, 3 6 - 3 7 , 39; educational, 9 - 1 0 ; electoral, 8 - 9 , 1 1 - 1 2 , 5 1 ; political, 2, 7, 1 8 - 1 9 , 22, 27, 28, 2 9 Resources, 150 Restored Republic, 66 R e v o l u t i o n , 109, 1 1 4 - 1 1 5 ( n 3 8 ) Revolutionary R e g i m e , 143 R e y e s Heroles, Jésus, 97 R o m a n Catholic church. See Catholic church Rubio, Luis, 2 6 R u f f o , Ernesto, 127 Rural sector, 12, 98 S a f e t y , 26 Salinas Gortari, Carlos, 3, 10, 13, 24, 4 4 , 4 9 , 58, 85, 97, 117, 120, 139, 145, 173; and Catholic church, 1 0 4 105; on democratization, 61, 6 3 64; on e c o n o m i c reform, 19, 52, 57, 5 9 , 6 4 - 6 5 , 80, 95, 9 7 - 9 8 , 110, 1 2 4 - 1 2 5 , 137; e c o n o m y under, 5 - 7 , 149; on electoral reform, 1 1 - 1 2 , 62, 1 6 9 - 1 7 0 ; on e x e c u t i v e authority, 2 7 - 2 8 ; on political reform, 1 8 - 1 9 , 2 7 , 29, 5 6 - 5 7 , 1 19, 1 3 0 - 1 3 3 , 135, 140(n 19), 1 4 4 - 1 4 5 ; support for, 28, 4 3 , 110, 121, 129, 136; and United States, 4, 104, 1 2 2 - 1 2 3 San Luis Potosi, 111, 114(n22), 122; e l e c t i o n s in, 8 - 9 , 11, 5 0 , 61, 103, 1 1 3 ( n 7 ) , 131, 1 6 4 ( n 2 ) S a v i n g s , 88, 89, 9 0 S c i e n c e , 88 Security, 7 1 , 1 1 9 - 1 2 0 S e g o v i a , Rafael, 2 2 Segunda vuelta, 6 2 Seligson, Mitchell, 24 Serra Puche, Jaime, 124 S e r v i c e s , 71, 76, 81, 101, 149, 157 S k o c p o l , Theda: on social change, 1 2 0 - 1 2 1 , 122; States and Social Revolution, 118

183

S N T E . See National Union of Education Workers Social charter, 27, 152 Social democratic party, 111 Social mobility, 9 9 Social pacts, 73, 88 Social p o l i c y , 5 7 - 5 8 Social security, 7 6 "Sociedad vertebrada, la," 55 S o c i e t y , 5 5 - 5 6 , 66; c h a n g e s in, 96, 98, 1 0 8 - 1 0 9 , 110, 1 1 4 ( n n 3 6 , 3 7 ) , 1 2 0 - 1 2 1 , 129; e v o l u t i o n of, 4 2 - 4 3 ; plurality of, 146, 157; and politics, 96-97 Sonora, 98, 114(n27), 164(n2) South Pacific region, 79, 81, 86 S o v e r e i g n t y , 70, 7 2 S o v i e t Union, 5, 17, 23, 41, 44, 146; political reform in, 64, 65, 9 7 - 9 8 Spain, 47, 152 Stabilization policies, 80; under de la Madrid, 7 3 - 7 4 ; and politics, 5 1 - 5 2 , 53-56 Stagflation, 74, 75, 8 0 Standard of living, 19, 22, 4 3 States and Social Revolution ( S k o c p o l ) , 118 Stock market, 5 - 6 , 80, 9 6 Strikes, 4 4 Structural adjustment program, 79-80 Student massacre, 122 Student m o v e m e n t , 4 2 , 95, 121 Subordination, 4 6 S u b s i d i e s , 117 Sufragio efectivo, 54 Supermarkets, 5 8 T a b a s c o , 114(n22), 122 Taiwan, 8 9 Taxes, 4, 7 9 Technocrats, 2 2 T e c h n o l o g y , 20, 76, 88 Tijuana River, 151 Tolerance, 2 4 - 2 5 Tourism, 7 9 Trade, 69, 149, 153; liberalization of, 71, 128, 153. See also Free trade; North American Free Trade Agreement "Triquina, la." See Villasenor, Narciso U n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t , 21, 2 2

184

U n e m p l o y m e n t , 4 4 , 7 1 , 110, 150.

INDEX See

also Employment

V a l u e s : social and p o l i t i c a l , 2 4 - 2 5 V e l á z q u e z , Fidel, 5 9 - 6 0

U n i o n s , 9 , 4 0 , 4 5 , 4 6 , 5 5 ; and P R I ,

Venezuela, 65,

5 9 - 6 0 , 73 Unilateralism, 7 0 United Kingdom, 8 9 U n i t e d S t a t e s , 10, 2 3 , 2 4 - 2 5 , 8 5 , 8 9 , 90, 96, 112, 114(n27), 149, 150, 153; e c o n o m i c relations with, 3 - 4 , 7, 4 4 , 7 2 ; f r e e trade with, 2 1 , 7 1 , 135; influence of, 1 0 3 - 1 0 4 ; i n v e s t m e n t b y , 18, 2 6 , 1 1 8 ; m i g r a t i o n to, 1 5 1 , 1 5 4 ; and N A F T A , 6 9 - 7 0 , 88, 118, 124, 151, 152, 1 7 2 ; on p o l i t i c a l r e f o r m , 8, 19; r e l a t i o n s w i t h , 1 0 2 , 1 2 2 - 1 2 3 , 153 Unity: national, 122 Urbanization, 28, 88 Urban sector, 81, 164 Uruapan, 103

Vernon, Raymond, 22

U . S . Drug E n f o r c e m e n t Administration ( D E A ) , 119 V a l u e : o f g o o d s and s e r v i c e s , 7 1 - 7 2 V a l u e added. See Output

150

Villaseñor, Narciso ( " L a Triquina,") 131,

170

V i t r o , 2 0 , 31 (n 12) V o t e r registration,

12,

V o t i n g patterns, 7 5 , 8 1 , regional, 82(fig.), 84,

160-161 164; 85-86

Wages, 40. 75, 79, 80, 88, 89 W e a l t h , 12,

149

W o j t y l a , K a r o l . See J o h n Paul, P o p e Work, 40 W o r k e r s : undocumented, 1 18 W o r l d B a n k , 8 6 , 150 Yeltsin, Boris, 65 Yucatán, 79, 114(n22) Zaid, Gabriel, 3 0 Z a p a t a , F a u s t o , 130, 131 Z a v a l a A v e l a , Alfredo, 1 19 Z e d i l l o P o n c e de L e o n , Ernesto, 9

About the Book

E x a m i n i n g M e x i c o ' s political system within the context of the restructuring of its e c o n o m y , the authors review the c o u n t r y ' s e c o n o m i c and political situation, propose various theoretical f r a m e w o r k s for discussing the relationship between e c o n o m i c liberalization and political modernization, and consider h o w the Mexican political system might evolve. T h e b o o k includes c h a p t e r s by key M e x i c a n politicians, w h o p r o v i d e their own perspectives on the political and e c o n o m i c liberalization processes in their country.

185