Policy Network Ties in the Dynamic Process of Environmental Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Evolution of Environmental Governance (Environment & Policy, 60) 3030708543, 9783030708542

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Environment & Policy 60

Seunghoo Lim

Policy Network Ties in the Dynamic Process of Environmental Conflict Resolution Uncovering the Evolution of Environmental Governance

Environment & Policy Volume 60

The series, Environment & Policy, aims to publish research that examines global and local environmental policies. It covers a variety of environmental topics ranging from biodiversity, ecology, pollution, climate change, agriculture, biodiversity, sustainability, resources, to water security. This long-standing series has published renowned authors for over a decade and it continues to be the home for environmentalists, policy experts, and related discipline experts who are genuinely interested in tackling the issues of our days. More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/5921

Seunghoo Lim

Policy Network Ties in the Dynamic Process of Environmental Conflict Resolution Uncovering the Evolution of Environmental Governance

Seunghoo Lim Graduate School of International Relations International University of Japan Minamiuonuma, Niigata, Japan

ISSN 1383-5130     ISSN 2215-0110 (electronic) Environment & Policy ISBN 978-3-030-70854-2    ISBN 978-3-030-70855-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70855-9 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021, corrected publication 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Dedicated to my Family

Preface

Extensive previous research has investigated environmental conflict management issues in networked settings and the design of policy networks, but the emergence and evolution of self-organizing policy networks are still not fully understood. Especially misunderstood is the problem of how the multiple motivations or incentives of competing policy actors in conflictual situations affect their structures of interaction, as this issue has not been studied systematically. This book aims to address the following research questions: how do policy stakeholders cope strategically with collective action or environmental conflict resolution? How do they utilize or maintain formal and informal policy networks to resolve problems effectively? What motivates them to engage or be involved in collaborative or conflictual networks? What influences their networking or their decisions on partner selection for conflict resolution? This book advances and tests several hypotheses about policy ties between competing coalitions of allies and opponents, both for reducing conflict and promoting collaboration and for expanding coalitions competitively and selecting partners based on their shared background, in the process of the Hantan River Dam construction in South Korea. This book will contribute to understanding how major public disputes are resolved effectively by analysing informal connections. By generally requiring the consent of all members, self-organizing institutions in this case tried to enhance the search for a mutually advantageous resolution of collective action problems and mitigate the prolonged conflicts that arose when both allies and opponents confronted mutually harmful outcomes. A self-governing policy network could ensure sufficient flexibility for rules, procedures, and exchanges to be decided locally and customize these rules to best fit the local conditions and specific collective action situations. Instead of seeking a new institution or a new set of responsibilities for an existing institution, we need to recognize that new collective patterns of behaviours are becoming apparent in the environmental conflict resolution field. In these new patterns, approaches that depend on only one formal or public institution have been replaced by a growing network of formal and informal institutional arrangements that operate across sub-regional and regional boundaries in a

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self-­organizing way. There is some evidence in this study to suggest that these arrangements occurred for a variety of purposes and that the dominant types of formal/informal policy ties varied widely depending on the specific context of each conflict resolution stage. Therefore, it is important to understand these informal patterns of collective conflict resolution by empirically analysing how and why certain strong patterns of connection develop and what potential they have to reshape strategies for environmental conflict management. This book consists of four studies. The goal of the first study is to examine the form of a policy network by focusing on how policy networks emerge and evolve at the micro-level to solve collective action dilemmas endemic to decentralized and democratized policy decision-making processes, particularly in the environmental conflict resolution arena. The goal of the second study is to examine the main policy actors and structural characteristics of network governance evolution in the dynamic process of environmental conflict resolution. The goal of the third study is to highlight the role of policy tie formality in the evolution of multiplex ties in the environmental conflict resolution process. The goal of the fourth study is to demonstrate the relationships between patterns of interactions among policy actors and their modified and adjusted strategic behaviours within policy networks and across advocacy coalitions. Shibuya, Tokyo, Japan Minamiuonuma, Niigata, Japan

Seunghoo Lim

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Dr. Frances S.  Berry for her guidance and support of my research and Dr. Ralph Brower for his helpful suggestions, insights, and criticisms. This work was supported by IUJ Research Institute (IRI) Research Grant.

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Abstract

The purpose of this book is to explore the import of the policy network for environmental policy conflict resolution. Emergent networks, or self-organizing informal relationships that appear below the surface of formal networks or relationships, could be viewed as conflict resolution mechanisms despite their potential to conflict with or crowd out formal networks or relationships. Informal policy networks can complement formal solutions and resolve certain coordination problems more efficiently than would be possible between pairs of groups. The literature on public management topics in network settings and on the design of policy networks is extensive, but the emergence and evolution of self-organizing policy networks are not yet fully understood. In particular, one poorly understood aspect of these networks is how the presence of multiple motivations or incentives for various actors in situations of conflict affects the structures of interaction among these actors; this recurrent decision-making process has not been studied systematically.

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Contents

1 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    1 1.1 Current Insights into Policy Networks and Environmental Conflict Management����������������������������������������    1 1.2 Objectives and Significance of the Book������������������������������������������    3 1.3 Overview of the Book ����������������������������������������������������������������������    4 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    5 2 Self-Organizing Policy Network Ties in the Dynamic Process of Environmental Conflict Resolution��������������������������������������    9 2.1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    9 2.2 Why Does Public Policy Conflict Occur?����������������������������������������   11 2.3 How Can Multiple Efforts to Mitigate Public Policy Conflicts Be Initiated and Driven?����������������������������������������������������   12 2.4 Hypotheses����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   14 2.4.1 Coordination ������������������������������������������������������������������������   17 2.4.2 Cooperation��������������������������������������������������������������������������   18 2.4.3 Competition for Tie Expansion (Resource Dependency)��������������������������������������������������������   20 2.4.4 Homophily����������������������������������������������������������������������������   21 2.5 Case, Data, and Methods������������������������������������������������������������������   23 2.5.1 Case Selection����������������������������������������������������������������������   23 2.5.2 The Dataset ��������������������������������������������������������������������������   23 2.5.3 Statistical Model of Network Change����������������������������������   25 2.6 Analysis��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   25 2.7 Conclusion����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   33 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   35

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3 Stability of the Main Policy Actors, Resilience of Their Control of the Agenda, and Intensified Conflicts as Underlying Dynamics of Network Governance in the Environmental Conflict Resolution Process�������������������������������   41 3.1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   41 3.2 The Assumed Positive Aspects of Networks: Network Governance and Conflict Management������������������������������   43 3.3 The Plausible Drawbacks or Neglected Aspects of Networks: Network Governance and Conflict Management��������   45 3.4 Description of the Conflict in the Case of Hantan River Dam Construction��������������������������������������������������   46 3.4.1 Stage I: Latency/Emergence ������������������������������������������������   47 3.4.2 Stage II: Escalation ��������������������������������������������������������������   48 3.4.3 Stage III: Deadlock ��������������������������������������������������������������   48 3.4.4 Stage IV: Resolution ������������������������������������������������������������   49 3.5 Results of Descriptive Network Analysis ����������������������������������������   49 3.5.1 Stage I: Latency/Emergence ������������������������������������������������   51 3.5.2 Stage II: Escalation ��������������������������������������������������������������   54 3.5.3 Stage III: Deadlock ��������������������������������������������������������������   56 3.5.4 Stage IV: Resolution ������������������������������������������������������������   57 3.6 Discussions ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   59 3.6.1 Stability of the Main Policy Actors in the Evolution of Network Governance ����������������������������   59 3.6.2 Resilience of Their Agenda Control ������������������������������������   61 3.6.3 Intensified Conflicts��������������������������������������������������������������   64 3.6.4 Limitations����������������������������������������������������������������������������   65 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   65 4 Multiplex Dynamics for the Co-evolution of Formal and Informal Policy Networks in the Environmental Conflict Resolution Process��������������������������������������������������������������������   69 4.1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   69 4.2 Emerging Formal and Informal Policy Networks in Environmental Conflict Resolution Processes������������������������������   71 4.3 Co-evolutionary Interplays Between Formal and Informal Policy Networks: Multiplexity������������������������������������   72 4.4 Hypotheses����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   75 4.4.1 Multiplex Enforcement ��������������������������������������������������������   76 4.4.2 Substitution ��������������������������������������������������������������������������   78 4.4.3 Complementarity������������������������������������������������������������������   81 4.4.4 Coordination ������������������������������������������������������������������������   82 4.4.5 Tie Expansion ����������������������������������������������������������������������   83

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4.5 Case, Data, and Methods������������������������������������������������������������������   83 4.5.1 Case Selection����������������������������������������������������������������������   83 4.5.2 Dataset����������������������������������������������������������������������������������   84 4.5.3 Method����������������������������������������������������������������������������������   85 4.6 Analysis��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   85 4.6.1 Uniplex Results��������������������������������������������������������������������   88 4.6.2 Multiplex Results������������������������������������������������������������������   90 4.7 Conclusions��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   92 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   93 5 Co-evolutionary Dynamics of the Development of Connection for Policy Conflict Resolution by Policy Actors Across Advocacy Coalitions and Their Media Attention-Seeking Strategies in Environmental Governance��������������   97 5.1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   98 5.2 Social Selection vs. Contagion: Relationships Between Connection Expansions Used for Policy Conflict Resolution and Media Attention-­Seeking Behaviours in Environmental Policy Processes ��������������������������������������������������   98 5.3 Hypothesis Development: Selection and Contagion/Influence��������  100 5.3.1 Selection: The Impacts of Media Attention-Seeking Behaviour on the Development of Connections for Environmental Policy Conflict Resolution����������������������  101 5.3.2 Contagion/Influence: The Impacts of the Development of Environmental Policy Conflict Resolution Connections on Media Attention-Seeking Behaviour����������  104 5.4 Research Design and Method ����������������������������������������������������������  107 5.4.1 Case and Data ����������������������������������������������������������������������  107 5.4.2 Methodology: Stochastic Actor-Oriented Model of Network Dynamics������������������������������������������������  109 5.5 Empirical Findings����������������������������������������������������������������������������  110 5.6 Conclusions��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  112 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  114 6 Conclusion������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  117 6.1 Theoretical and Analytical Implications ������������������������������������������  117 6.2 Limitations and Future Studies ��������������������������������������������������������  119 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  121  orrection to: Co-evolutionary Dynamics of the Development C of Connection for Policy Conflict Resolution by Policy Actors Across Advocacy Coalitions and Their Media Attention-Seeking Strategies in Environmental Governance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   C1 Appendix ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  123

About the Author

Seunghoo  Lim  is a professor of public policy in the Graduate School of International Relations at the International University of Japan (IUJ). His main areas of research interest include policy processes, public/nonprofit management, network governance structures, and policy tools. Since graduating summa cum laude from Seoul National University with a major in political science in 2007, he has accumulated a wealth of research, professional, and teaching experience at the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) in New York, the Korea Institute of Public Administration in Seoul, and Florida State University. He also graduated from Seoul National University with a master’s degree in public administration, focusing specifically on public management, as the valedictorian of the class of 2011. Furthermore, he earned a Ph.D. in public administration, with a specific focus on public policy, from the Askew School of Public Administration and Policy at Florida State University in 2015. He is a recipient of the 2011–2016 Legacy Fellowship from Florida State University, the 2013 Raul P. deGuzman Award for the Best Ph.D.  Paper from the Askew School of Public Administration and Policy, the 2013 Morris W.  H. Collins Award for the Best Ph.D. Paper from the Southeastern Conference for Public Administration (SECoPA), the 2014 ASPA Founders’ Fellowship from the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA), and the 2014 NASPAA Statts Emerging Scholar Award from the Network of Schools of Public Policy, Affairs, and Administration (NASPAA). His research has appeared in refereed journals, including Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Public Administration & Development, Public Performance & Management Review, Social Science & Medicine, International Review of Administrative Sciences, VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, Lex Localis – Journal of Local Self-Government, Public Personnel Management, Politics and Governance, Romanian Journal of Political Science, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Disaster Prevention & Management, International Journal of

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Disaster Risk Reduction, International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, International Journal for Equity in Health, Sustainable Cities and Society, Sustainability, Sustainability Accounting, Management and Policy Journal, Social Networks, and International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. In the future, Dr. Lim hopes to focus on the study of network governance arrangements as a means of overcoming public problems and policy conflicts.

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1

Portrayal of evolving network structures over four phases ����������   26

Fig. 3.1 Fig. 3.2

Three forms of network governance ���������������������������������������������   44 Portrayal of the evolving networks for whole, ally, and opponent groups ���������������������������������������������������������������������   52 Changes in each organization’s degree centrality score for allies and opponents�������������������������������������������������������   62 Changes in each network’s out-degree centralization scores��������   63 Changes in each network’s in-degree centralization scores����������   63 Changes in each network’s density scores�������������������������������������   64

Fig. 3.3 Fig. 3.4 Fig. 3.5 Fig. 3.6 Fig. 4.1 Fig. 4.2 Fig. 5.1 Fig. 5.2 Fig. 5.3

Fig. 6.1

A multiphase model for the coexistence of formal and informal policy networks��������������������������������������������������������   74 Portrayal of the evolving policy network structures for the four phases ������������������������������������������������������������������������   86 Two main competing mechanisms: social selection vs. contagion/influence������������������������������������������������������������������   99 The hypothesized co-evolutionary dynamics of the formation of policy conflict resolution connections and the development of media attention-seeking behaviours��������  102 The observed sequence of the co-evolutionary dynamics of connection formations for environmental policy conflict resolution and media attention-seeking����������������������������  112 A multilevel networked setting structuring interactions among policy actors in environmental conflict resolution processes�����������������������������������������������������������������������  120

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List of Tables

Table 1.1

Variations among four studies/chapters on policy network ties in the dynamic process of environmental conflict resolution����������������������������������������������    5

Table 2.1 Table 2.2

Intergroup policy conflict as a 2 × 2 matrix�����������������������������������   12 Network concepts of collective conflict resolution from the perspective of transaction cost economics and social capital���������������������������������������������������������������������������   16 Definition of the formality of linkages based on the types of partner�������������������������������������������������������������������   24 Descriptive statistics of changes in network densities and dyadic relationships�������������������������������������������������   28 Changes in links over four sequential phases��������������������������������   28 Estimated results for network dynamics over four sequential phases������������������������������������������������������������   29

Table 2.3 Table 2.4 Table 2.5 Table 2.6 Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 3.3 Table 3.4 Table 3.5 Table 3.6 Table 3.7 Table 3.8

Degree centrality and network structural measures for Stage I����������������������������������������������������������������������   53 Brokerage roles within or across allies, opponents, and neutral groups at Stage I���������������������������������������   54 Degree centrality and network structural measures for Stage II���������������������������������������������������������������������   55 Brokerage roles within or across allies, opponents, and neutral groups at Stage II��������������������������������������������������������   56 Degree centrality and network structural measures for Stage III��������������������������������������������������������������������   58 Brokerage roles within or across allies, opponents, and neutral groups at Stage III������������������������������������   59 Degree centrality and network structural measures for Stage IV�������������������������������������������������������������������   60 Brokerage roles within or across allies, opponents, and neutral groups at Stage IV������������������������������������   61 xxi

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Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 4.4 Table 4.5 Table 5.1

List of Tables

Structural specification of multiplex ties���������������������������������������   72 Network concepts of collective conflict resolution according to the uniplex perspective���������������������������������������������   77 Network concepts of collective conflict resolution according to the multiplex perspective������������������������������������������   79 Descriptive statistics of changes in network densities and dyadic relations��������������������������������������������������������   88 Estimated results for network dynamics over four sequential phases������������������������������������������������������������   89 Estimated results for the co-evolutionary dynamics of network formation and behaviour development over four sequential phases������������������������������������������������������������  111

Chapter 1

Introduction

Abstract  This introductory chapter provides a brief overview of policy networks in terms of the formality of ties developed among policy actors in environmental conflict resolution processes and explains the main goals and the theoretical and methodological significance of the studies included in this book. Keywords  Policy networks · Environmental policy conflict resolution · Formal and informal policy ties · Social network analysis

1.1  C  urrent Insights into Policy Networks and Environmental Conflict Management Emergent networks, or self-organizing informal relationships that underlie the surface of formal networks or relationships, can serve as environmental conflict resolution mechanisms despite their potential to conflict with or crowd out formal networks. Stakeholders need these types of informal institutions in certain situations when formal institutions do not provide satisfactory solutions for resolving collective action problems. The role of informal policy networks is not to settle every collective action problem. However, informal policy networks could be designed to complement formal conflict resolution mechanisms and settle coordination problems that can be resolved more efficiently as a collective unit than between pairs of groups (Ahn et al. 2009; Brousseau and Raynaud 2006). Despite emerging formal and informal policy networks in environmental conflict resolution processes, the public administration and policy literature reveals a disconnect between formal and informal policy networks (Isett et al. 2011; Isett and Provan 2005; Koliba et al. 2011; Robins et al. 2011). Our understanding of policy networks is limited to uniplex or single links representing either formal (Shrestha 2010; Minkoff 2013) or informal (Andrew and Carr 2012; Berardo 2009) relationships. In other words, under the divided approach, it is little wonder that there is no research on the coexistence of and interactions between formal and informal linkages of policy networks.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Lim, Policy Network Ties in the Dynamic Process of Environmental Conflict Resolution, Environment & Policy 60, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70855-9_1

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2

1 Introduction

For the purposes of structural analysis, policy networks are conceptualized as a set of policy stakeholders which activities are mutually connected by diverse types of relationships and that perform various functions in public policy processes (Berry et  al. 2004; Heclo 1978; Klijn and Koppenjan 2000; Rhodes 1997; Knoke et  al. 1996; Scharpf 1993). Examples of such functions of relationships are consultations or exchanges of information, resource mobilization, and the coordination of independent actions (Waarden 1992). In cases of environmental conflict resolution, policy networks can be regarded as interorganizational exchange systems in which resources and information that are critical to collective actions are exchanged by stakeholders experiencing specific environmental policy disputes. In addition to the relational contents of such networks, mutual linkages among policy actors can be differentiated according to the structural origins of their tie formation. In particular, networks are often distinguished in terms of whether the component ties are formal or informal (Blau 1955; Powell and Smith-Doerr 1994): formal ties are explicit relationships with functions fixed through legal arrangements among groups, while informal ties are implicit and do not have any legally specific mechanisms. By the same logic, the formality of a policy network—i.e. whether a policy network consists of formal or informal links—is based on legally binding or mandated relationships occurring among stakeholders participating in policy processes (Isett et al. 2011; Isett and Provan 2005). When the ties between two stakeholders are deemed legally enforceable, the relationship between the parties is formal. In contrast, informal relationships are links between stakeholders that are associated with no legal obligations. Formal policy networks in environmental conflict resolution processes represent the links of obligations or promises based on legally binding agreements with authority; thus, they aim to produce particular future actions or fulfil certain duties (Bingham et al. 2003; Macneil 1980; O’Leary et al. 2004). The more complicated the linkage between the parties, the greater the specification of the requirements and processes needed for potential conflict resolution. Hence, complicated formal ties that are intentionally created may describe roles and responsibilities in detail, specify penalties for noncompliance and procedures for monitoring that arise from follow-­ up interactions among the parties, and determine the desired outputs or outcomes. In reality, the relationships among multiple stakeholders observed in a policy decision-making process involve more than formal linkages. Typically, informal interactions among stakeholders represent repeated exchanges of information and resources embedded in environmental conflict resolution processes where specific patterns of interaction emerge from the voluntarily negotiated rules and agreed-­ upon norms or values emerged in dialogue processes (Bingham 2009; Bingham et al. 2003; O’Leary et al. 2004). In informal networks comprising all of the relationally governed ties, obligations, expectations, and promises among the parties, interactions occur spontaneously—not through formal means but through social processes that facilitate stakeholders’ adaptive rationality in responding to unforeseeable and changing environmental conflict resolution processes.

1.2  Objectives and Significance of the Book

3

In sum, we can expect that voluntary collective efforts will take place in the same disputes in which formal (or mandated) conflict resolution is employed. This book will focus on how concerned stakeholders initiate and develop informal policy networks to overcome collective action problems and to maximize collective benefits in conflicts in which they are embedded.

1.2  Objectives and Significance of the Book The literature on public management or environmental conflict resolution topics in network settings and on the design of policy networks is extensive, but the emergence and evolution of self-organizing policy networks are not yet fully understood. In particular, one poorly understood aspect of these networks is how the presence of multiple motivations or incentives for various policy actors in situations of conflict affects the structures of interaction among these actors; this recurrent policy decision-­making process has not been studied systematically. Therefore, the purpose of this book is to explore the importance of the policy network for environmental policy conflict resolution using the construction of the Hantan River Dam in South Korea as a case. The first objective is to examine the form of a policy network by focusing on how networks emerge and evolve at the micro-level to solve collective action dilemmas inherent in decentralized and democratized policy decision-making processes, particularly in the environmental conflict resolution arena. More specifically, this study intends to understand the temporal sequences of formal and informal dispute resolution processes and determine how each of these processes is used over time to respond to the same public policy dispute. The second objective is to investigate the main policy actors and structural characteristics of network governance evolution in the dynamic process of environmental conflict resolution. One lens through which these dynamics can be considered is the consensus/conflict debate. Consensus theories often have an underlying assumption that the nature of social interactions is to move towards consensus and equilibrium. Conflict theorists believe that conflict, power, and coercion are viable dynamics for explaining social interactions. When previous studies of policy networks or collaborative governance have suggested that networks move towards governance-oriented solutions that solve collective action dilemmas or problems, they have implicitly made value-laden, one-sided, and benign assumptions. Through the analysis of network structures, this study intends to understand what hidden, neglected, or negative aspects of networks can be detected throughout the evolution of network governance. The third objective is to highlight the role of tie formality in the evolution of multiplex policy ties—i.e. relationships that feature both an informal and a formal component—in the environmental conflict resolution process. Therefore, this study clarifies and extends the theoretical framework on network multiplexity by evaluating the extent to which two distinct tie formality-related logics—formal and

4

1 Introduction

informal policy networks—and their underlying mechanisms lead to the emergence of multiplex policy ties (i.e. the interplay between formal and informal linkages). The fourth objective is to examine the mutual interactions between shifts in advocacy stakeholders’ media attention-seeking behaviours and networking among stakeholders for environmental conflict resolution. In particular, this study aims to empirically analyse which social micro-steps—between two distinct and competing social selection and contagion/influence mechanisms—are predominantly observed or whether the two mechanisms coexist as advocacy coalition activities and strategies for environmental conflict resolution. In addition, this study provides policy implications for the patterns of interactions among policy actors and their modified and adjusted strategic behaviours within policy networks and across advocacy coalitions.

1.3  Overview of the Book This book consists of four independent studies on the same case regarding environmental policy conflict resolution for the construction of the Hantan River Dam in South Korea. Each study is written as a separate paper and is self-contained. Table 1.1 shows the variations in theoretical frameworks/backgrounds, the boundaries and time spans of networks, the definition of the formality of linkages, the level of analysis, the methodological approach in terms of social network analysis, independent variables, and dependent variables (Borgatti and Halgin 2011; Caiani 2014; Diani and McAdam 2003; Kadushin 2012; Raab and Kenis 2009; Ysa and Esteve 2011; Prell 2012) across the four studies. All the studies generally depend on the common network literature and social network analysis but answer distinct although related questions on the emergence of policy networks (Chap. 2) or the co-evolution of policy networks with a specific behaviour of policy actors over time (Chap. 5), the roles that informal and formal ties play in the policy networks that develop (Chap. 4), and the roles each prominent policy actor plays in this conflictual policy issue (Chap. 3). The structure of the rest of the book is as follows: Chap. 2 presents the first study, titled “Self-Organizing Policy Network Ties in the Dynamic Process of Environmental Conflict Resolution”. Chapter 3 presents the second study, titled “Stability of the Main Policy Actors, Resilience of Their Control of the Agenda, and Intensified Conflicts as Underlying Dynamics of Network Governance in the Environmental Conflict Resolution Process”. Chapter 4 presents the third study, titled “Multiplex Dynamics for the Co-evolution of Formal and Informal Policy Networks in the Environmental Conflict Resolution Process”. Chapter 5 presents the fourth study, titled “Co-evolutionary Dynamics of the Development of Connection for Policy Conflict Resolution by Policy Actors Across Advocacy Coalitions and Their Media Attention-Seeking Strategies in Environmental Governance”. The conclusions are presented in Chap. 6.

References

5

Table 1.1  Variations among four studies/chapters on policy network ties in the dynamic process of environmental conflict resolution

Theoretical frameworks/ backgrounds

Boundaries and time spans of networks

First study (Chap. 2) Policy network combined with the theory of collective action

Changes in “whole networks” over time

Based on partners’ organizational characteristics Level of analysis/ Network interactions structural level; dyadic level; individual level Inferential Methodological network approach in analysis terms of social network analysis Independent Network and variables non-network variables as antecedents

Definition of the formality of linkages

Dependent variables

Network variable as outcome

Second study (Chap. 3) Network governance

Third study (Chap. 4) Multiplexity (i.e. the interplay between formal and informal linkages) in the context of embeddedness theory Changes in Changes in “different types of “within networks” over networks” (i.e. separate networks time of allies and opponents) over time Based on the Based on characteristics of partners’ linkages organizational characteristics Actor level; Dyadic level; network level triadic level; degree-related level Descriptive Inferential network network analysis analysis

Non-network variables as antecedents

Network and non-network variables as antecedents

Network variables as outcomes

Network variable as outcome

Fourth study (Chap. 5) Advocacy coalition framework combined with the theory of co-evolution (social selection/ influence) Changes in “whole networks” over time

Based on the characteristics of linkages Network structural level; individual level Inferential network analysis

Network and non-network (behaviours) variables as antecedents Network variable and behavioural changes as outcomes

References Ahn, T. K., Esarey, J., & Scholz, J. T. (2009). Reputation and cooperation in voluntary exchange: Comparing local and central institutions. Journal of Politics, 71(2), 1–16. Andrew, S. A., & Carr, J. B. (2012). Mitigating uncertainty and risk in planning for regional preparedness: The role of bonding and bridging relationships. Urban Studies, 40(4), 709–724. Berardo, R. (2009). Processing complexity in networks: A study of informal collaboration and its effect on organizational success. Policy Studies Journal, 37(3), 521–539.

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1 Introduction

Berry, F. S., Brower, R. S., Choi, S. O., Goa, W. X., Jang, H., Kwon, M., & Word, J. (2004). Three traditions of network research: What the public management research agenda can learn from other research communities. Public Administration Review, 64(5), 539–552. Bingham, L. B. (2009). Collaborative governance: Emerging practices and the incomplete legal framework for public and stakeholder voice. Missouri Journal of Dispute Resolution, 2009(2), 269–326. Bingham, L. B., Fairman, D., Fiorino, D. J., & O’Leary, R. (2003). Fulfilling the promise of environmental conflict resolution. In R. O’Leary & L. B. Bingham (Eds.), The promise and performance of environmental conflict resolution. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future Press. Blau, P. M. (1955). Dynamics of bureaucracy: A study of interpersonal relations in two government agencies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Borgatti, S. P., & Halgin, D. S. (2011). On network theory. Organization Science, 22(5), 1168–1181. Brousseau, E., & Raynaud, E. (2006). The economics of private institutions: An introduction to the dynamics of institutional frameworks and to the analysis of multilevel multi-type governance. Working Paper. (Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=920225 or https://doi. org/10.2139/ssrn.920225) Caiani, M. (2014). Social network analysis. In D. Porta (Ed.), Methodological practices in social movement research. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Diani, M., & McAdam, D. (Eds.). (2003). Social movements and networks: Relational approaches to collective action. New York: Oxford University Press. Heclo, H. (1978). Issue networks and the executive establishment. In A.  King (Ed.), The new American political system. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Isett, K. R., & Provan, K. G. (2005). The evolution of dyadic interorganizational relationships in a network of publicly funded nonprofit agencies. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 15(1), 149–165. Isett, K. R., Mergel, I. A., LeRoux, K., Mischen, P. A., & Rethemeyer, R. K. (2011). Networks in public administration scholarship: Understanding where we are and where we need to go. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 21(suppl 1), i157–i173. Kadushin, C. (2012). Understanding social networks: Theories, concepts, and findings. New York: Oxford University Press. Klijn, E. H., & Koppenjan, J. F. M. (2000). Public management and policy networks: Foundation of a network approach to governance. Public Management Review, 2(2), 135–158. Knoke, D., Pappi, F. U., Broadbent, J., & Tsujinaka, Y. (1996). Comparing policy networks: Labor politics in the U.S., Germany, and Japan. New York: Cambridge University Press. Koliba, C., Meek, J.  W., & Zia, A. (2011). Governance networks in public administration and public policy. New York: CRC Press. Macneil, I. R. (1980). The new social contract: An inquiry into modern contractual relations. New Haven: Yale University Press. Minkoff, S. L. (2013). From competition to cooperation: A dyadic approach to interlocal agreements. American Politics Research, 41(2), 261–297. O’Leary, R., Nabatchi, T., & Bingham, L.  B. (2004). Environmental conflict resolution. In R.  F. Durant, D.  J. Fiorino, & R.  O’Leary (Eds.), Environmental governance reconsidered. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Powell, W.  W., & Smith-Doerr, L. (1994). Networks and economic life. In N.  J. Smelser & R. Swedberg (Eds.), The handbook of economic sociology. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Prell, C. (2012). Social network analysis: History, theory & methodology. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Raab, J., & Kenis, P. (2009). Heading toward a society of networks: Empirical developments and theoretical challenges. Journal of Management Inquiry, 18(3), 198–210. Rhodes, R.  A. W. (1997). Understanding governance: Policy networks, governance, reflexivity, and accountability. Buckingham: Open University Press. Robins, G., Bates, L., & Pattison, P. (2011). Network governance and environmental management: Conflict and cooperation. Public Administration, 89(4), 1293–1313.

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Scharpf, F. W. (Ed.). (1993). Games in hierarchies and networks. Boulder: Westview Press. Shrestha, M. K. (2010). Do risk profiles of services alter contractual patterns? A comparison across multiple metropolitan services. In R. C. Feiock & J. T. Scholz (Eds.), Self-organizing federalism: Collaborative mechanisms to mitigate institutional collective action dilemmas. New York: Cambridge University Press. Waarden, F.  V. (1992). Dimensions of types of policy networks. European Journal of Political Research, 21(1–2), 29–52. Ysa, T., & Esteve, M. (2011). Assessing public networks: Proposal for a new unit of analysis. In S.  Groeneveld & S.  Van de Walle (Eds.), New steering concepts in public management. Bingley: Emerald.

Chapter 2

Self-Organizing Policy Network Ties in the Dynamic Process of Environmental Conflict Resolution Abstract  This study focuses on how concerned policy actors initiate and develop formal and informal policy networks to overcome collective action problems and to maximize joint benefits in the environmental policy conflicts in which they are embedded. Based on a policy network framework for resolving collective action problems, this chapter investigates the role of institutional mechanisms, measured by several network structures, in explaining how effectively competition-driven policy actors mitigate collective action dilemmas when the mutual efforts of a number of stakeholders are required to accomplish common policy objectives. Relational data on the Hantan River Dam conflict from over a decade were collected through a media search and analysed using a longitudinal network dynamics technique in order to determine whether certain hypothesized networking patterns are more likely to emerge in self-organizing conflict resolution interactions among stakeholders. The competing behavioural mechanisms stakeholders face—caused by their motivational incentives to coordinate, cooperate, compete, and select—coexist significantly throughout the multiple stages of the environmental conflict resolution process, and the distinct temporal patterns of stakeholder motivation and the choices at each stage are revealed. Keywords  Self-organizing policy networks · Environmental policy conflict · Collective action problem · Coordination · Cooperation · Competition · Selection

2.1  Introduction In the case of a multi-party dispute in a highly decentralized and democratized environment, conflict resolution can be regarded as a type of collective action (Ostrom 1972, 1990). In public policy conflicts, stakeholders represent constituents in intergroup conflicts. Each stakeholder’s efforts to contribute to conflict resolution require time and resources. When non-participants benefit from collective action activities without participation, stakeholders face dilemmas about how to proceed (Bornstein 1992; Lubell et  al. 2002; Olson 1965; Schneider et  al. 2003). If all stakeholders were to pursue self-centred benefits, no collective benefits of conflict resolution © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Lim, Policy Network Ties in the Dynamic Process of Environmental Conflict Resolution, Environment & Policy 60, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70855-9_2

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2  Self-Organizing Policy Network Ties in the Dynamic Process of Environmental…

would be achieved. The reality of decision-making in the process of voluntary collective conflict resolution illustrates the nature of public goods, which combines the potential joint benefits of cooperation and the inherent risks of opportunism and freeriding by other actors (Williamson 1975; Berardo and Scholz 2010; Scholz et al. 2008). Due to the imbalance of individual incentives to contribute to the emergence and function of collective institutions that deliver collective benefits, collective governance may fail to emerge or achieve its purpose (Brousseau and Raynaud 2006). The environmental field is ideal for observing conflict resolution strategies. Environmental conflicts can present particularly complicated problems with serious consequences and increasingly require public involvement in the decision-making process (Beierle and Konisky 2000). Therefore, intergroup conflicts may be inevitable given each actor’s cause and interest, but there are ways to turn conflict into collaboration. Evidence from various policy arenas and at multiple levels of governance shows that policy networks play a critical role in coordinating decentralized stakeholders (Heclo 1978; Meier and O’Toole 2002; Provan and Milward 1995; Scholz and Stiftel 2005). Extensive previous literature has investigated public management issues in network settings and the design of policy networks (Berry et al. 2004), but issues of the emergence and evolution of self-organizing policy networks are not yet fully understood. In particular, one poorly understood aspect of these networks is how the presence of multiple motivations or incentives that various actors face in situations of conflict affects the structures of interaction among these actors; this recurrent decision process has not been studied systematically. Emergent networks, or self-organizing informal relationships that are found beneath the surface of formal networks or relationships, can serve as conflict resolution mechanisms despite their potential to conflict with or crowd out formal networks. Agents need these types of informal institutions in certain situations when formal institutions do not provide satisfactory solutions for resolving collective action problems. The role of informal policy networks is not to settle every collective action problem. However, informal policy networks could be designed to complement formal conflict resolution mechanisms and settle coordination problems that can be more efficiently resolved as a collective unit rather than between pairs of groups (Ahn et al. 2009; Brousseau and Raynaud 2006). This paper aims to answer the following research questions: How do stakeholders cope with collective action or conflict resolution strategically? How do stakeholders utilize or maintain formal and informal networks to resolve problems effectively? What motivates stakeholders to engage or be involved in collaborative or conflict networks? What influences stakeholders’ networking and partner selection decisions for conflict resolution? This study advances and tests several hypotheses about ties between a coalition of allies and opponents not only to promote coordination and seek cooperation but also to competitively expand coalitions and select partners based on shared backgrounds. The process of the Hantan River Dam construction in South Korea is used as a case study. Network data on the Hantan River Dam conflict were collected from a media search over the time period of 1995–2009. R Simulation Investigation for Empirical Network Analysis (RSIENA) techniques are utilized to evaluate observed

2.2  Why Does Public Policy Conflict Occur?

11

configurations in the structures of voluntary ties and networks of connections over time (Ripley et  al. 2019; Snijders 2005; Snijders et  al. 2010) and to determine whether certain hypothesized networking patterns are more likely to emerge in self-­ organizing conflict resolution interactions among stakeholders.

2.2  Why Does Public Policy Conflict Occur? From an institutional theory perspective, it is possible to interpret policy conflict as the result of rational decision-making by individual actors. Institutional theory assumes self-interested actors handle incomplete information within a bounded rationality, seek satisficing alternatives within that bounded rationality, and then make a utility-maximizing decision (North 1990; Kasper and Streit 1998). Institutions enable actors to make decisions and engage in stable social interactions in countless decision-making situations by decreasing uncertainty and reducing transaction costs (North 1990). If a government opts to change the rules regarding projects, public policies, or institutions, which are related to existing stable transaction processes or social interactions, actors will confront a rapid escalation of transaction costs and an extension of uncertainty. This escalation thus creates incentives for actors to direct their decisions toward the protection of their rights and maximize utility to avoid uncertainty. Because externalities—uneven effects of policies or projects—change the structure of costs and benefits, winners and losers could be generated. Conflicts between beneficiary organizations and cost-bearing organizations become inevitable when some groups are confronted with negative externalities. Governments can adopt policies of administrative openness, procedures for democratic participation, or the promise of negotiation and trust to facilitate the resolution of policy conflicts. Governments generally set up formal procedures for large environmental disputes following statutes and laws. However, in the absence of sufficient incentives to countervail the infringement of property rights that result from its policies or of guaranteed opportunities to address conflicting interests, policy conflict situations become even more difficult to resolve. Policy conflicts are tremendously complicated and dynamic. Two types of explanations appear to be at the core of the studies on policy conflict: (1) identification of causal factors and operating principles in these multidimensional phenomena and (2) understanding how policy stakeholders in conflict situations make decisions that lead to cooperation or competition. The first explanation could be addressed in terms of the following three institutional variables: incentives, norms, and credible commitment. First, incentives, viewed from the perspective of institutional theory, are interpreted as actions to guarantee property rights by public authority. In the policy process, a government generally suggests compensation alternatives to preserve the present value of property. It is required that incentives include institutional guarantees considering both the present and future value of property loss, as well as monetary preservation. Institutional guarantees are emphasized because problems of trust arise in the

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2  Self-Organizing Policy Network Ties in the Dynamic Process of Environmental…

absence of enforcement mechanisms for property rights regimes (i.e. credible commitment) as a result of time urgency and the “one-shot” system that characterizes any public policy process (Moe 1990). Second, social norms are defined as “standards of behaviour that are based on widely shared beliefs about how individual group members ought to behave in a given situation” (Bernhard et al. 2006: 217). Among the institutional characteristics of norms, the most important aspect is that a stable expectation is established for social interactions (North 1990). In this respect, social interaction norms function as constraints on the behaviours with which people must comply. Therefore, the behavioural standards that policy actors comply with during policy interactions could be considered norms. For example, policy interaction norms may include the openness or transparency of the administration, the guarantee of procedures for democratic participation, and the protection of property rights for affected groups, among others. Third, credible commitment refers comprehensively to strategies that guarantee the execution of institutions (Ostrom et  al. 1992; Williamson 1983). Incentives, such as the guarantee of property rights, would contribute to conflict resolution when coupled with credible commitment by the government authority (Shepsle 1991). The importance of multiple mechanisms for the execution of institutions, such as third-party intervention, is also emphasized in that these mechanisms lead to the punishment of norm violators and the cooperation among actors in securing the effectiveness of norms (Bernhard et al. 2006; Kandori 1992). Therefore, in the absence of forcefulness or the guarantee of credible commitment, it becomes difficult to execute incentives.

2.3  H  ow Can Multiple Efforts to Mitigate Public Policy Conflicts Be Initiated and Driven? The resolution of any public policy conflict must involve modifying, to some degree, the extreme forms of each side’s stance. Accordingly, this is also true of a joint collaborative solution, which is discussed here as consensus building between conflicting coalitions (Quirk 1989). Each side is faced with a choice between modifying and maintaining its preferred policy, which is analogous to a choice between cooperation and competition in the prisoner’s dilemma (Axelrod 1997) (see Table 2.1). Thus, the following question is necessary: how can collaborative effort emerge from this collective action dilemma? Table 2.1  Intergroup policy conflict as a 2 × 2 matrix

Opponents Modify position Maintain position

Allies Modify position Consensus building Abolishing the original public policy plan

Maintain position Maintaining the original public policy plan Conflict

2.3  How Can Multiple Efforts to Mitigate Public Policy Conflicts Be Initiated…

13

Political institutions contribute to the mitigation of collective action problems, such as commitment and enforcement problems, and facilitate cooperation among stakeholders involved in policy conflicts to achieve benefits through exchanges and interactions (Moe 1990). The autonomous and independent policy actors or organizations, which are locked in collective action dilemmas, could employ various political institutional mechanisms to mitigate policy conflict, ranging from informal policy networks to centrally consolidated solutions (Bardach 1998; Berardo and Scholz 2010; Feiock and Scholz 2010; Scholz and Stiftel 2005). A consolidated general government resolves collective action problems by depending on centrally developed solutions and the centralized authority to make decisions. By contrast, informal policy networks approach collective action problems horizontally, while guaranteeing the autonomy of the concerned actors. These two extreme institutional modes on the continuum of political institutional mechanisms sometimes coexist at different levels of coordination. Even when centrally consolidated solutions to policy conflicts are provided through vertical mandates, stakeholders confronted with ineffective formal solutions could prefer to create informal policy networks or self-organized institutions. Instead of relying solely on formal political institutions, stakeholders could voluntarily organize collective coordination and cooperation through self-regulating or self-organizing processes (Brousseau and Raynaud 2006). Heclo (1978) also argues that loosely connected stakeholder issue networks form to effectively coordinate conflicting interests and diverse policy issues in a fragmented system. This study focuses on how concerned policy actors initiate and develop informal policy networks to overcome collective action problems and to maximize collective benefits in the conflict in which they are embedded. Voluntary collective efforts are expected to take place in the same disputes in which formal (or mandated) conflict resolution is employed. One of the objectives of this research is to understand the timing sequence of formal and informal dispute resolution processes. An additional goal is to understand how each of these processes is used over time to respond to the same public policy dispute. The most important issue in informal stakeholder policy networks is how stakeholders at multiple levels can organize themselves to create collective benefits and respond to problems that are inherent in the collective action process. The policy network, which is studied here and combined with the theory of collective action, regards these informal relationships as building blocks or collaborative glue that links institutionally fragmented and interdependent stakeholders (Berardo and Scholz 2010; Feiock and Scholz 2010). Based on this framework, this study focuses on the role of institutional mechanisms, measured by several network structures, in explaining how effectively competition-driven actors—advocacy coalition groups and public/private/nonprofit (or civil society) organizations—mitigate collective action dilemmas when the mutual efforts of a number of stakeholders are required to accomplish common policy objectives. This framework investigates the underlying mechanisms that motivate actors to address pre-defined or socially constructed problems and coordinate their activities to increase the welfare of an entire group of actors or their communities. Repeated

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2  Self-Organizing Policy Network Ties in the Dynamic Process of Environmental…

interaction and communication among stakeholders could facilitate the establishment of rapport and trust, thereby enhancing mutual monitoring and reducing uncertainty. The decisions of actors in recurring interactions become increasingly codependent, and such interdependent connections could be key factors that help decrease the cost of political contracts or exchanges. For example, interdependency can facilitate collaborative experiences and information sharing among actors or even third parties. The transaction costs of political exchanges or contracts are regarded as complicated recurring problems in interactions among stakeholders in the institutional approach to decentralized decisions. The explicit assumption is that stakeholders are rational and are most likely to engage in collective action only when the potential benefits outweigh the time and cost of participation. Over time, most stakeholders become “rationally ignorant” of what has occurred and what is expected in the policy-making process (Horn 1995). Therefore, the transaction costs of organizing, monitoring, and maintaining collective action are important in the policy process. Incomplete and asymmetric information about the conditions for conflict resolution in exchange or contractual situations creates risk and transaction costs for potential institutional arrangements. Even if the problem of information costs is addressed, cooperation problems continue to thwart potential collaborative efforts and mutual gains (Riker and Sened 1991). In fact, the negotiating and bargaining processes regarding proper institutional arrangements and the resulting mutual gains would, if achieved, lead to a decision for a specific governance structure, which can be aligned along the continuum that extends from government hierarchies to market-based arrangements (Jung et al. 2009). The negotiation and bargaining processes for conflict resolution can consume significant time and resources. Furthermore, even after a collaboration to address conflicts among stakeholders is successfully formed (i.e. the first-order dilemma), credible commitments and contributions of stakeholders must be maintained to mitigate enforcement problems (i.e. the second-order dilemma) (Ostrom 1990). When enforcement or measurement is insufficient, freeriding without actually contributing to conflict resolution or hidden activities with asymmetric information tend to occur. Therefore, the effectiveness of the mechanism depends on how efficiently policy actors can create a self-organized process of collective action to complement the externally organized collective action.

2.4  Hypotheses In this paper, it is assumed that the rise and evolution of informal institutions and the coexistence of multiple modes and levels of coordination contribute to the creation of efficient mechanisms for instigating and maintaining communication links or

2.4 Hypotheses

15

transactional chains to solve public policy conflicts. Based on the policy network framework for resolving collective action problems, the capabilities and dynamics of the mechanisms that stakeholders encounter in the process of resolving conflicts that are caused by public policies or programs are investigated in terms of two network views: (1) transaction cost economics and (2) the social capital view of networks. Network concepts and structures can explain a dynamic political exchange process among the affected stakeholders or authorities. The network hypotheses based on the concept of transaction costs (Coase 1937; Williamson 1975, 1981) are related to the degree of complexity and uncertainty in finding solutions to collaboration problems, both in the presence of conflicting interests and in pursuit of collective benefits. Higher complexity or uncertainty intrinsic to voluntary cooperation is associated with higher transaction costs due to the increased time required to acquire information, imperfect monitoring/enforcement, and hard-to-measure benefits or costs (North 1990). In the social capital view of networks, transaction costs are determined by relational properties, as well as the attributes of actors. The creation of social capital is a means for building and maintaining trust and familiarity through social interactions (Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993, 1995, 2000; Moody and Paxton 2009). Social trust can be regarded as a common good or an emergent property of dense contacts and exchanges among multiple actors which are abiding by norms. The network itself affects the transaction costs of maintaining ties, the degree of social interaction among actors, and the relative familiarity of potential exchange partners (Schneider et al. 1997; Lubell 2015; Nakazato and Lim 2016, 2017; Aung and Lim 2021). Therefore, policy actors continuously engage in cooperative actions with each other with the expectation of reciprocal trust, or reciprocity, to exchange resources and promote future collaborations. This can occur across different advocacies or within advocacy networks. Drawing on transaction cost economics and social capital theories, the structure of a network has four types of effects during the conflict resolution process: (1) increasing the efficiency of information exchange through bridging relationships, (2) enhancing reciprocity and deepening social trust through bonding relationships, (3) competing with other stakeholders for the preeminence of norms and values, and (4) affiliating with reference groups that share similar attributive characteristics (Berardo and Scholz 2010; Carpenter et al. 2004; Jones et al. 1997; Laumann and Knoke 1987; Lubell et al. 2012). In other words, when actors seek partners, they face multiple complex choices including the following: (1) coordination, (2) cooperation, (3) competition, and (4) selection. Table 2.2 summarizes the key aspects of the four interaction mechanisms that transaction cost theory and social capital theory predict stakeholders will employ. Table 2.2 also includes the expected types of networks associated with each of the four interaction choices.

j

X

h

or negative three-cycles (local hierarchies)

i

j

In-star network

i

Bridging relationships (weak ties) Improving efficiency of information transmission

Developing informal and local hierarchies Establishing social order and resolving needs to achieve stability

(a) Coordination Reducing information costs

i

i

h

or transitive ties

j

Reciprocal ties

j

(b) Cooperation Reducing the costs of monitoring, enforcement, and sanctioning Bonding relationships (strong ties) Enhancing credible commitment and deepening social trust

i

Out-degree activity

j

Strengthening values, beliefs, and norms based on shared political, social, and economic backgrounds

Enforcing each side’s value system by creating links and expanding a coalition of like-minded actors by rendering stakeholders overlapping members (competitive expansion/outreach competition)

Homophily

i

Affiliating with reference groups

Competing for the preeminence of norms and values

j

(d) Selection Reducing bargaining and negotiation costs

(c) Competition Reducing the costs of uncertainty

Note: Circles indicate stakeholder groups. The circled stakeholders (i) are the ego groups and the other circled stakeholders (e.g. h and j) are the alter groups. Solid-line arrowheads around the circles indicate current network ties and the direction of interaction between actors. Dotted arrowheads around the ego circles (i) indicate to-be network ties from the ego groups to the other alter groups. In the last column representing the homophily effects, the same colour (i.e. yellow) of the circles indicates that the stakeholder groups share the same or similar characteristics

Network structures

Functions

Social capital perspective

Transaction cost economics perspective

Table 2.2  Network concepts of collective conflict resolution from the perspective of transaction cost economics and social capital

16 2  Self-Organizing Policy Network Ties in the Dynamic Process of Environmental…

2.4 Hypotheses

17

2.4.1  Coordination It is possible for collective action by one group to harm the collective interests of another group in situations of conflict (Ostrom 1990). In such a situation, collective actions of equal strength by both parties result in mutually harmful consequences that, from a community’s point of view, should therefore be avoided. Within both groups with contradictory collective interests, each stakeholder faces the dilemma of how to provide “step-level public goods” (Erev and Rapoport 1990), which cannot be provided unless a certain level of contribution is reached. However, group-­ beneficial collective action is challenging to attain because individual contributions are costly. Due to the interdependency of individual decisions, obtaining and updating information about the decisions of other stakeholders accurately and consistently is a critical factor in reducing the costs of contribution. Upon the emergence of conflict between stakeholders, where the need for collaboration may arise, groups are likely to create mechanisms of coordination by forging two types of network structures: (1) in-star networks to transmit information efficiently and reduce information costs and (2) local hierarchies to informally establish social order and resolve needs to achieve stability. First, through weak ties, structural hole-spanning actors may efficiently acquire critical information for conflict resolution and benefit from coordinated activities to monitor or manage mutual or closed relationships without incurring significant costs (Burt 1992, 2005; Granovetter 1985). The network structure for coordination could be constructed based on each actor’s propensity to seek links to a coordinator with high “popularity”. As actors become linked with a single tie to a central actor, which already controls the flow of information and reliably obtains valuable resources, they can efficiently coordinate alternative opinions and practices through the network (see Table 2.2a). Among the diverse types of network structures, an in-star network structure facilitates information and resource sharing through each current or potential tie while avoiding redundancy in relationships. All actors in an in-star network are connected to only one leading actor which controls the flow of information to all other actors in the network. This leading, or “popular”, actor plays a critical role as the primary coordinator, which disseminates essential information, solves problems among actors if they arise, mediates each actor’s divergent interests, distributes useful resources, and responds to conflicts among actors, in addition to performing similar actions in the conflict resolution process (Berardo and Scholz 2010; Heclo 1978). As the star (i.e. popular actor) performs its information-coordinating role, other actors that have links with the star are able to observe the behaviours of the members of the policy community with lower information costs and relational redundancy. Hypothesis 1: When stakeholders pursue efficient mechanisms for sharing information about conflict resolution to avoid mutually harmful outcomes, they seek to connect with popular stakeholders which serve as dominant coordinators in the network.

18

2  Self-Organizing Policy Network Ties in the Dynamic Process of Environmental…

Coordination could also be achieved through hierarchical solutions, which— although often taken for granted—have been a critical dimension of social relational structure to address the public problem of achieving coordination (Peters 2013). As more policy actors become involved and the complexity of their relationships grows, they tend to arrive at a hierarchical structure, in which stakeholders engage either in (1) forging an implicit or explicit system of rank-ordered roles or (2) developing a process of interactions while constructing at least one valued dimension (Magee and Galinsky 2008). These multiple hierarchies are not created formally but are established informally and spontaneously among actors (Blau and Scott 1962). In collective action situations, repetitive formal and informal interactions and observations help participants make inferences about each other’s values and judge the expected development of the situation. There is also a tendency to build mutual consensus on the hierarchical differentiation of each other’s rank when performing conflict resolution tasks. Therefore, hierarchy shapes the structure of social relationships and indirectly influences social capital by both encouraging stakeholders to comply voluntarily with local rules and reducing the need for formal controls (Adler and Kwon 2002). The two primary functions of emergent local hierarchies in conflict resolution processes (Magee and Galinsky 2008; Neuberg and Newsom 1993; Overbeck et al. 2005) are as follows: (1) to develop social order and thereby reduce the complexities and uncertainties inherent in a conflict and resolve individual stakeholders’ need for stability and (2) to satisfy the need for control by providing incentives for actors to attain a higher rank and greater authority or more resources in goal-directed networking processes. Stakeholders’ motivation to build local hierarchies could be measured by the negative three-cycles (Ripley et al. 2019) (see Table 2.2a).1 Hypothesis 2: When stakeholders pursue social order during a conflict resolution process to resolve the need for stability and control, which are inherent in making coordination work with and among actors, they informally develop local hierarchies.

2.4.2  Cooperation Even if the problem of coordination/information costs is addressed, collaboration is still difficult to achieve due to cooperation obstacles. The potential for joint returns does not guarantee that cooperative relationships will be established (Kollock 1998; Riker and Sened 1991). Therefore, even when collaboration risks are relatively low, actors are more likely to pursue the construction of social mechanisms—such as structural embeddedness (Granovetter 1992)—to create conformity through mutual and closed relationships, which prevents their collaborating partners from being 1  A negative three-cycles effect, accompanied by positive transitive triplets, is interpreted as an actor’s tendency toward local hierarchies (Snijders et al. 2010).

2.4 Hypotheses

19

defectors or free riders (Berardo and Scholz 2010). Although cooperation may offer collective benefits, actors could decide to act opportunistically and invest an asymmetric level of resources or time to exploit their collaborators. Furthermore, the informal binding feature of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes, which have emerged as the dominant processes in the conflict resolution field (Lan 1997; Dryzek 2013), makes it difficult to prevent participating actors in voluntary bargaining processes and negotiations from defecting. Alternative dispute resolution is itself a public good and therefore poses a second-order dilemma of who is going to police the agreement. Policy actors could lower the risk of partners’ misbehaviours, even without a central authority, by participating in a densely connected or tightly clustered network, i.e. a closed network, to cooperate with their partners over time. In this case, beyond efficient information sharing, matters of trustworthiness, credible commitment, and social capital become relevant as an effective sanction and safeguard against potential problems of shirking responsibility (Coleman 1988; Ostrom and Ahn 2003; Putnam 1995). The network structures related to cooperation among actors emphasize reciprocity and transitivity. As actors in the network create stronger and closer relationships, they attempt to prevent defection among themselves and maintain credible commitments to collective activities. For stakeholders to reduce the transaction costs of monitoring cooperation and credible commitments in a network, two types of relationships are forged: (1) reciprocal relationships and (2) bonding relationships. First, in collective action situations, reciprocity can transform a unilateral tie into a bilateral tie. Reciprocity, therefore, is an important norm to minimize opportunistic misbehaviour and freeriding on others’ efforts (Ostrom 1998, 1999; Thurmaier and Wood 2002). Although stakeholders may benefit from information and resources that are obtained through coordination, they may also recognize the need to cope with uncertain circumstances and develop strategies to preclude partners’ misfeasance as collaboration risk increases. One strategy is to form reciprocal ties of mutual cooperation in the network. Joint cooperation could help stakeholders conform to the norms of actions and decisions that are based on shared information in the network. This reciprocity may help stakeholders directly obtain more credible and predictable information about a partner’s behaviours and easily respond to untrustworthy actions through the selective application of punishment and mutual deterrence (Axelrod 1997; Berardo and Scholz 2010). In particular, reciprocal ties play a crucial role of social control in the development of social capital (Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993, 1995). As one stakeholder develops a relationship with another that already has ties with that stakeholder, the two parties could establish strong bonds of mutuality (Coleman 1988; Putnam 2000). Through these bonds, the actors can develop more credible commitments or structural embeddedness among network participants (Granovetter 1985, 1992; Jones et al. 1997), which is measured by “reciprocal ties” (see Table 2.2b).

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2  Self-Organizing Policy Network Ties in the Dynamic Process of Environmental…

Hypothesis 3: When stakeholders seek more credible commitments and trustworthiness from a partner in a conflict resolution process, they forge reciprocal relationships. Another strategy to mitigate the credible commitment problem and monitor cooperation calls for the creation of densely clustered ties with additional stakeholders beyond the dyadic level. Although overlapping and tighter relationships are relatively inefficient, they can resolve problems under collective action constraints because the redundant relationships reduce the transaction costs of monitoring, enforcement, sanctioning, and uncertainty. Closely connected relationships thereby enhance social trust (Putnam 1995, 2000; Coleman 1988, 1990). Redundant contacts driven by transitive relationships and subsequent trust could enable actors to understand each other’s situations or the frame of reference of each actor’s preferences would be defined. In such a highly clustered network, all participants could also have access to information on any shirking or misbehaviour and impose sanctions against those who betray cooperative activities. If all actors are connected to each other, they could easily recognize each other’s ex ante or ex post opportunistic behaviours, effectively monitor defection, and strictly punish non-cooperative actors. This cooperation is measured by “transitivity” (see Table 2.2b). Hypothesis 4: When stakeholders seek more credible commitments and trustworthiness or avoid painful isolation and expulsion from a group in conflict resolution processes, they develop triadic relationships that are more tightly clustered.

2.4.3  Competition for Tie Expansion (Resource Dependency) Organizations seek to avoid dependency or external control and the resultant uncertainty. At the same time, organizations attempt to maintain discretion and autonomy (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). From the perspective of resource dependency, various activities aimed at altering interdependencies, such as mergers, joint ventures, cooptation, etc., could be understood as managerial responses to the uncertain environments in which organizations are embedded. Environmental and public policy conflicts are usually driven by disparate values held by the various groups in the conflict (Tribe et al. 1976). These value differences determine the issues to which stakeholders pay attention, the ways in which they define these issues, and the actions that they take in response to these issues (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). Because value differences are often very pronounced, such value conflicts can become severe and tremendously difficult to manage or resolve. Furthermore, environmental policy conflicts are also complicated by the fact that stakeholders have competing beliefs about the relationship between humans and the environment. Individuals also have different perceptions of the risks and benefits that they are willing to accept with regard to environmental issues. These discrepancies contribute to environmental conflicts, as they affect how stakeholders understand and address these issues. Therefore, the cohesiveness of a dominant

2.4 Hypotheses

21

coalition is critical. There are strong pressures on stakeholders involved in environmental issues to conform to a coalition’s view of important values and ideas (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). For a group embedded in a coalition of like-­ minded stakeholders, it is very difficult to resist social pressure from within that coalition to agree with the group’s core values. This pressure becomes powerful as soon as a dyadic interaction expands to additional actors (Burt 2005; Krackhardt 1992, 1999; Krackhardt and Kilduff 2002). According to Truman’s (1971) concept of “overlapping membership”, groups are not likely to maximize their interests under pressure when their members are overlapping members in other groups that have vastly divergent interests. Individual stakeholders that belong to multiple groups with conflicting interests are unable to justify their involvement in any given stakeholder action. Furthermore, creating ties raises the possibility that the desired results are realized because ties help to foster knowledge of one another and mediate the flow of mutual obligations. Once established, ties become social resources (Rethemeyer and Hatmaker 2007). In this situation, each stakeholder benefits from the establishment of new links that may reduce the power held by other stakeholders, which those stakeholders had previously exerted to influence environmental issues, as stakeholders with additional links now have a higher level of embeddedness in the cohesive network. A stakeholder’s spreading pattern of new links or ties, which causes other stakeholders to be overlapping members in coalitions with divergent interests, could be measured by stakeholders’ out-degree activity (Ripley et al. 2019) (see Table 2.2c).2 Hypothesis 5 (Resource Dependency): When stakeholders seek to avoid becoming dependent or controlled externally and pursue the resultant certainty in a conflict resolution process, they are likely to develop a spreading pattern of new links or ties, which causes the other stakeholders to be overlapping members.

2.4.4  Homophily The concept of homophily helps explain the diverse motivators that lead to collective action. One of the problems with interaction among actors results from the bargaining cost of exchanges. The effects of homophily, such as political and socioeconomic homogeneities, play a critical role in helping actors affiliate with reference groups (Smith et al. 1956) and also in facilitating collaboration within networks through the reduction of bargaining costs (Carley 1991; Carpenter et  al. 2004; Lubell 2007). Actors are likely to seek collaborative relationships with others with whom they share a common set of values, beliefs, and norms. A similarity in the political, social, and economic backgrounds or policy preferences among actors can help to resolve conflicts that occur in the collaborative process and to more easily 2  The out-degree activity effect represents the self-reinforcing tendencies of actors, which currently have high out-degrees ties, to develop more outgoing ties.

22

2  Self-Organizing Policy Network Ties in the Dynamic Process of Environmental…

understand partners through shared cultural backgrounds. These influences of shared norms or experiences could reduce the transaction costs of the formation of formal and informal relationships (Feiock et al. 2009; Siciliano and Wukich 2015). Similarities in the dyad’s policy preferences, activities, or interests may prompt actors to communicate or relate with each other even if they often disagree (Carpenter et al. 2004; Laumann and Knoke 1987). Similarities in the actors’ political characteristics (e.g. public orientation or ownership) are conducive to connections or contacts between public entities (Carpenter et al. 2004; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998; Sapat et  al. 2019). Physical proximity—measured in the case study by whether actors are located in the same territorial region among the ten administrative districts involved in the case—could also be a critical predictor of tie formation (Lazer 2011). Actors are more likely to contact those which are closer geographically and thus more readily available than those which are far away (McPherson et al. 2001). Lastly, actors with similar problem severity or conflict resolution needs are motivated to respond to deteriorating problems and develop relationships with each other as one of the means to address a problem (Sharp et  al. 2011). Proxies for problem severity in this study are the flood-affected geographical location of actors and the level of exposure to the media. The actors located in the same directly affected territorial region would feel a stronger incentive to interact with each other in conflict resolution than they would with actors located in indirectly affected regions. Additionally, it is assumed that the more the actors feel obliged to respond to problems urgently, the more the media would pay corresponding attention to the actors’ increased activity. Therefore, problem severity was measured by the number of news articles reported in the media that mentioned each actor’s name during each stage of the conflict from 1995 to 2009. For the homophily effects, five attributes of each actor are analysed: (1) the actor’s stance on the dam construction (i.e. whether the actor agrees with and belongs to the allies, opponents, or neutral groups); (2) organizational characteristics (i.e. whether the actor is a public agency, nonprofit, regional advocacy organization, or political party); (3) physical proximity (i.e. administrative district); and as a proxy for problem severity and need for conflict resolution, both (4) the flood-­ affected geographical region of the actors (i.e. whether the actor is located in a directly or indirectly affected region) and (5) media attention (i.e. the number of media reports mentioning each actor) (see Table 2.2d). Hypothesis 6 (Stance on Dam Construction): Stakeholders with the same stance on dam construction are more likely to create relationships with each other. Hypothesis 7 (Organization Ownership): Stakeholders with the same ownership are more likely to create relationships with each other. Hypothesis 8 (Geographic Location): Stakeholders that are located in the same territory are more likely to create relationships with each other. Hypothesis 9 (Flood-Affected Region): Stakeholders that are located in the same flood-affected territory are more likely to create relationships with each other. Hypothesis 10 (Media Attention): Stakeholders with similar levels of media attention are more likely to create relationships with each other.

2.5  Case, Data, and Methods

23

2.5  Case, Data, and Methods 2.5.1  Case Selection Based on the theories above about the expected types of ties among actors that compete, coordinate, cooperate, and select partners in public policy disputes, the hypotheses above are expected to be generalizable in public policy conflicts. However, to illustrate and test the validity of these hypotheses, this study analyses data from a controversial case surrounding the construction of the Hantan River Dam in South Korea. The data considered spans the entire conflict timeline. Based on previous case studies (Kim 2005; Kim and Chae 2009; Jeong 2007; Park 2008), the periods of the conflict—between June 1995, when the Ministry of Construction and Transportation (MOCT) initiated the Imjin River Basin research project, and May 2009, when the Supreme Court of Korea dismissed an appeal on the revocation of notice of the Hantan River Dam project plan—could be categorized into four stages: latency/emergence, escalation, deadlock, and resolution. The first stage, latency/emergence, is the period when the Hantan River Dam construction project was officially announced and conflicts emerged. In the second stage, i.e. escalation, a procedure to reach social consensus was attempted through the Hantan River Conflict Mediation Committee (HRCMC) of the Presidential Commission on Sustainable Development (PCSD). The establishment of a formal collaborative institution (Lubell 2004; Weible 2008; Ley and Weber 2015) or organization (Imperial 2005), the HRCMC, was intended to stimulate coordination and relieve conflict on the basis of inclusiveness, representativeness, adherence to due process of law, and consensus-oriented decision-making. However, this attempt intensified the opposing stances of interested parties. In the third stage, i.e. deadlock, the central government transferred responsibility for the project to the Office for Government Policy Coordination (OGPC) and created another formal collaborative institution, the Special Council for Floods (SCF). At the same time, a broad range of self-organizing networks evolved dynamically and voluntarily to informally coordinate the actions among the stakeholders in parallel to the official conflict resolution process. The last stage, resolution, refers to the period when the territorial neighbourhood organizations opposed to the project initiated legal proceedings after the official authority, the SCF, finally decided to construct the dam.

2.5.2  The Dataset Longitudinal network data among the concerned and affected stakeholders—including public, private, and nonprofit/civil society organizations—were collected through content analysis of the names of organizations that appeared in newspaper

24

2  Self-Organizing Policy Network Ties in the Dynamic Process of Environmental…

articles.3 All observed information exchanges and formal and informal interactions between dyadic or triadic organizations (e.g. mutual consultations, joint statements, conferences, committees, councils, litigations, informal arbitrations, mediations, negotiations, inspections, audits, and requests for information) were coded at discrete points in time. The observed co-occurrences of policy actors for specific activities are converted into relational data, which is represented as actor-by-actor square matrices. In particular, interactions among the remaining stakeholders, except for formal collaborative institutions that were established by a mandate, could be regarded as informal alternative dispute resolution methods (see Table 2.3). These interactions could be considered informal, voluntary attempts to resolve conflicts without conventional methods that rely exclusively on the expertise and discretion of judges and professional technocrats (Lan 1997; O’Leary and Raines 2001). The increasing complexities of environmental policies and expanding stakeholder involvement in this policy arena create incentives for stakeholders to invest in contact with other actors to obtain policy-relevant information and tacit understanding of crucial issues or to affect a mutual construction of the policy framework (Carpenter et al. 2004). The data of this study were collected through a media search to examine the patterns of formal and informal tie formations among stakeholder groups over time. The entire time period of the Hantan River Dam construction conflict, which lasted from 1995 to 2009, was categorized into four stages using criteria that reflect the four major institutional changes or events that occurred during that time frame. The major institutional changes or events that had a significant impact on ties developed among stakeholders in the evolutionary process of this conflict settlement, which were also highlighted by previous studies, were as follows: (1) attempted conflict mediation by the PCSD (Kim 2005; Kim and Chae 2009), (2) failure of efforts by the PCSD and involvement of the OGPC (Jeong 2007), and (3) conflict resolution through legal processes (Park 2008). Four phases can thus be defined from this description of key institutional changes or events: latency/emergence (t1, from June 1996 to December 2003), escalation (t2, from January 2004 to May 2005), deadlock (t3, from May 2005 to February 2007), and resolution (t4, from March 2007 to May 2009). The dynamic process of environmental conflict resolution through institutional (informal or formal) ties emerged beneath the formal political institution in a Table 2.3  Definition of the formality of linkages based on the types of partner Formal collaborative institution Formal ties/ relationships The rest of the actors except formal Formal ties/ collaborative institution relationships Interactions between: Formal collaborative institution

The rest of the actors except formal collaborative institution Formal ties/relationships Informal ties/relationships

3  “Hantan River Dam” was used as the search term for 17 major nationwide daily newspapers and 7 regional newspapers in this media search.

2.6 Analysis

25

self-organizing and endogenous way during these periods and was not exogenously induced by institutional changes or events. The network data can be aggregated into four binary association matrices that represent the observed relationships throughout the four consecutive stages. In each square matrix, a “1” in a cell indicates a direct link from the row actor i (the ego stakeholder A) to the column actor j (the alter/partner stakeholder B), and “0” represents the absence of a link between them. Figure 2.1 presents the resulting visualizations of the observed relationships among the 97 stakeholders located in the 10 regions for each phase.

2.5.3  Statistical Model of Network Change To analyse the longitudinal stakeholder network data, the actor-oriented network model, as expressed in the software program RSIENA, was employed (Burk et al. 2007; Snijders 2005, 2013; Ripley et al. 2019).4 The model evaluates changes in the stakeholder networks that are caused by the rational actions of affected/concerned stakeholders. In this model, each participant’s decision in a network is assumed to maximize an implicit “utility function”. The utility function is built on substantive utility arguments and constructed such that the function represents the costs and benefits for a stakeholder group based on their relationship to a specific link (e.g. creating a new link, deleting a previous link, avoiding a link, or maintaining a previous link) at one moment in time.

2.6  Analysis The descriptive statistics of the changes in network densities and dyadic relationships across phases are presented in Table 2.4. Stakeholders in the deadlock phase (t3) are more proactive in forging relationships than in the escalation phase (t2). While 98.5% of dyads between stakeholders in the escalation phase are null, the average degree for stakeholders in the deadlock phase is much greater than that in the escalation stage. That is, actors in the deadlock phase have a propensity to create a denser network structure (0.045 > 0.009). This result partially implies that stakeholders in the deadlock stage are more actively involved in connecting behaviours, or networking, in the process of environmental conflict resolution. The changes in institutional ties for the dataset between these two consecutive phases are summarized in Table 2.5. The results show that stakeholders established new links (0→1; 399 ties) rather than terminating the previous links (1→0; 65 ties) as the conflict progressed from escalation (t2) to the deadlock phase (t3). By contrast,

 In this case, actors indicate stakeholder groups.

4

SUST_Com

President

Assem_Def

Sland Gr_C

Min_Dif

Latency/ Emergence

GG_Parli

HTR_C

CW_LocG

Water_com PC_R

Min_ConTrans Env_R

CW_Parli

YC_R GW_Parli

Min_Env

CW_R

Env_C

CYP_C EnJus_C

Coord_PubAff GW_legislators

Natiol_Assembly

GW_Parli Assem_Def LP_R

GW_OpposP

BAI

GW_StateG CW_LocG CW_C

LBW

HR_REnv_C YC_R

Escalation

Water_comCW_R Min_ConTrans

GG_StateG

YC_Subm CYP_C CW_Parli

Peop_C Eco_R

YC_LocG

Conflict_Coord PC_R Gr_C

PC_Subm

BH_Civil

PC_LocG

PJMS_floodVict EnvSoc_C HTRO_C GW_RulingP

CW_candi Assem_CT

CWP_C

Fig. 2.1  Portrayal of evolving network structures over four phases Note: The size of the nodes is proportional to the stakeholder’s degree centrality. Arrowheads around the nodes indicate the direction of interaction between stakeholders. The colours of nodes (i.e. organizations) are based on each stakeholder’s stance on the dam construction: red for allies, green for opponents, and blue for neutral groups. The shapes of the nodes are based on ownership: triangles for public agencies, squares for nonprofits, pentagons for regional advocacy groups, and hexagons for political parties

27

2.6 Analysis

GGD_R HTRO_C JCS

Def_R Land_R Candi_elect Min_PubAff Min_Env President Min_Budg Min_Unif KDIgradu

Flood_Com Min_Finance

Min_Dif NEnv_R

Deadlock

GW_legislators CCC

GW_PC HTR_C CW_Parli CWP_C

GW_OpposP

Assem_BudPol

YG_Parli

GW_StateG CW_RulingPr Coord_PubAff GG_StateG BAI Min_ConTrans GW_RulingP CW_LocG Assem_CT Policy_OpposPr Assem_Budg CW_C Natiol_Assembly PJ_LocG

PriMin CW_Agri

Policy_MinPr BH_CivilCYP_C LCW CW_R

Env_R

PC_Parli

GW_Parli CWPR_C

HR_R PC_R YC_R JCI_KOREA

YC_LocG

Policy_RulingPr Env_C

Court_SeoulPb Sland

Cult_Agency Water_com PC_LocG

HTRS_C Par_C Cult_C Gr_C EnvAsso

HEW_C GG_Parli

PJMS_floodVict

Policy_RulingPr Policy_MinPr GG_ParliCW_R

Policy_OpposPr

PJ_R CT_R

PC_R GW_LC GW_Parli

Cult_C

CYP_C

GW_PC

HR_R

Par_C

CWL_C Cult_Agency

Court_SeoulPb YC_R

Resolution

Court_SeoulHg

PJ_LC

Env_C SupremeCourt

Natiol_Assembly

GG_StateG CW_Parli GW_StateG Water_com CW_C Min_ConTrans PriMin YC_Subm

President

YC_C

Sland

CW_LocG

CWPR_C

GW_CJPr PrCand_Min CWP_C

CJPr

CW_senior

Fig. 2.1 (continued)

CWD_R HTR_Rafting

Assem_Budg

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2  Self-Organizing Policy Network Ties in the Dynamic Process of Environmental…

Table 2.4  Descriptive statistics of changes in network densities and dyadic relationships Phases Latency/emergence (t1) Network density indicators Density 0.009 Average degree 0.865 Number of ties 83 Dyad counts Total 9312 Mutual 62 Asymmetric 42 Null 9208

Escalation (t2)

Deadlock (t3)

Resolution (t4)

0.009 0.917 88

0.045 4.396 422

0.012 1.125 108

9312 40 96 9176

9312 252 340 8720

9312 68 80 9164

Table 2.5  Changes in links over four sequential phases No link (0→0) From latency/emergence (t1) to escalation (t2) 9154 From escalation (t2) to deadlock (t3) 8825 From deadlock (t3) to resolution (t4) 8821

New link (0→1) 75 399 69

Broken link (1→0) 70 65 383

Maintained link (1→1) 13 23 39

Note: 0 = the absence of a link, 1 = the presence of a link

stakeholders broke previous links (1→0; 383 ties) as they progressed from the deadlock to the resolution phase (t4). In summary, the stakeholders’ choices for partners changed a fair amount between phases. These changes in the broad network of stakeholders over the four time periods are modelled in Table 2.6. Four models with RSIENA were run as presented in Table 2.6. The first three models (Models 1, 2, and 3) represent the transition of two subsequent phases: from latency/emergence (t1) to escalation (t2), from escalation (t2) to deadlock (t3), and from deadlock (t3) to resolution (t4). The final estimation results of the longitudinal modelling of network dynamics for the four phases (Model 4)—latency/emergence (t1) through resolution (t4)—are presented in Table 2.6. For network evolution, the first three rows of results describe the rate parameters that provide the estimated changes in network ties per actor between the two consecutive measurement points. For example, actors consider altering ties almost 13 times (p