Policy Making in the GCC: State, Citizens and Institutions 9781350987517, 9781786732453

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‘This important and timely work mixes thematic issues with country specific case studies and will appeal to scholars and policy makers alike.’ Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Fellow for the Middle East, Rice University’s Baker Institute

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a major player in the post-2011 reordering of the Middle East. Despite the rise in prominence of individual Gulf states, and the growth of the GCC as a collective entity, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the actual mechanics of policy making in the region. This book analyses the vital role that institutions are coming to play in shaping policy in the Gulf Arab states. The emergence of a new generation of leaders in the Gulf, and the era of low oil prices, has given institutions new importance in the policy process. Along with dramatic demographic change, these developments have compelled state and citizens to re-evaluate the nature of the social contract that binds them together. This book shows how academic, social and economic institutions are responding to the increasingly complex process of decision making. With contributions from academics as well as practitioners, this book will be a vital resource for both researchers and policy makers. MARK C. THOMPSON is Assistant Professor of Middle East Studies at King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. He is Senior Associate Fellow at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh. His publications include Saudi Arabia and the Path to Political Change: National Dialogue and Civil Society (I.B.Tauris, 2014) and articles in the Journal of Arabian Studies; Asian Affairs; Middle Eastern Studies; and Diplomacy and Statecraft.

Cover image: Saudi officials and businessmen attend the Euromoney conference, on May 6, 2014 in Riyadh. FAYEZ NURELDINE / Staff Cover design: www.paulsmithdesign.com

EDITED BY MARK C. THOMPSON AND NEIL QUILLIAM

NEIL QUILLIAM is Senior Research Fellow in the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. He also serves as Director for Strategic Advisory Services at Rapidan Group, an energy consultancy. Recent publications include a contribution to the book Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy: Conflict and Cooperation (I.B.Tauris, 2016) and an article in the journal East Asia (2015). He advises European governments on foreign policy issues and energy companies with operations in the region.

Policy Making in the GCC

Tim Niblock, Emeritus Professor, Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter

STATE, CITIZENS AND INSTITUTIONS

‘For those seeking to understand the dynamics of GCC governance, in all its diverse dimensions, this work should be required reading.’

Policy Making in the GCC STATE, CITIZENS AND INSTITUTIONS EDITED BY MARK C. THOMPSON AND NEIL QUILLIAM

Mark C. Thompson is Assistant Professor of Middle East Studies at King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, where he teaches courses in International Relations and Globalisation. He is Senior Associate Fellow at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh. His publications include Saudi Arabia and the Path to Political Change: National Dialogue and Civil Society (I.B.Tauris, 2014) and articles in the Journal of Arabian Studies; Asian Affairs; Middle Eastern Studies; and Diplomacy and Statecraft. Neil Quilliam is Senior Research Fellow in the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. He also serves as Director for Strategic Advisory Services at Rapidan Group, an energy consultancy. Quilliam is an expert in international relations of the Middle East and focuses on the Gulf Arab states, Syria and Lebanon. Recent publications include a contribution to the book Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy: Conflict and Cooperation (I.B.Tauris, 2016) and an article in the journal East Asia (2015). He advises European governments on foreign policy issues and energy companies with operations in the region.

‘This is an important book, covering a range of issues which are seldom given detailed attention or analysis in other literature. Its concerns are central to how GCC governments engage with their populations. For those seeking to understand the dynamics of GCC governance, in all its diverse dimensions, this work should be required reading.’ Tim Niblock, Emeritus Professor, Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter ‘With domestic and regional power structures in the Gulf in a state of flux, this important and timely work mixes thematic issues with country specific case studies and will appeal to scholars and policy makers alike.’ Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Fellow for the Middle East, Rice University’s Baker Institute

POLICY MAKING IN THE GCC State, Citizens and Institutions

Edited by

MARK C. THOMPSON

AND

NEIL QUILLIAM

Published in 2017 by I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd London • New York www.ibtauris.com Copyright Editorial Selection 2017 q Mark C. Thompson and Neil Quilliam The right of Mark C. Thompson and Neil Quilliam to be identified as the editors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Copyright Individual Chapters 2017 q Rhea Abraham, Nassir Alkasabi, Alanoud Alsharekh, Mehtab Currey, Sherif Fawzi Abdel Gawad, Shafeeq N. Ghabra, Gauri Gupta, David Jones, Maggie Kamel, Faisal Kattan, Abdullah Kaya, Susan Kippels, Adam Kulach, Radhika Punshi, Neil Quilliam, Natasha Ridge, Abdullah M. Al-Shoaibi, Mark C. Thompson and I-Tsung Tsai. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Every attempt has been made to gain permission for the use of the images in this book. Any omissions will be rectified in future editions. References to websites were correct at the time of writing. Library of Modern Middle East Studies 201 ISBN: 978 1 78453 884 2 eISBN: 978 1 78672 244 7 ePDF: 978 1 78673 245 3 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: available Typeset in Stone Serif by OKS Prepress Services, Chennai, India Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

CONTENTS

List of Illustrations Abbreviations Acknowledgements Introduction and Overview Mark C. Thompson and Neil Quilliam

vii x xiv 1

PART I THE STATE AND E-GOVERNMENT 1. Identity and State in the Gulf: The Case of Kuwait Shafeeq Ghabra

17

2. Saudi Arabia’s Support for International Development Mehtab Currey, Abdullah Al-Shoaibi and Nassir Alkasabi

44

3. GCC Governments Responding to Public Needs through E-government: Progress and Limitations of Public Administration Reform Sherif Fawzi Abdel Gawad and Maggie Kamel 4. Governance, Participation and ICT: Assessing the Role of E-government in the State of Qatar Rhea Abraham

84

111

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PART II CITIZENS: ECONOMY AND LABOUR ISSUES 5. Economic Diversification and the Emergence of Inclusive Economic Institutions in the Gulf Cooperation Council States I-Tsung Tsai and Abdullah Kaya 6. Youth Employability and its Cultural and Institutional Context: Do Current Institutions and Policies Promote or Prevent Greater Productivity and Positivity within Local Labour Markets Towards the Knowledge-Based Economies of the Future? David Jones, Radhika Punshi and Gauri Gupta 7. A Review and Critique of the Saudisation Metanarrative: Bringing ‘the Citizen’ into Focus Faisal Kattan

137

173

205

PART III INSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES 8. Institutional Processes and Gender Issues: The Women’s Cultural and Social Society as an Agent of Change in Kuwaiti Politics Alanoud Alsharekh 9. The Rise and Role of State Philanthropy in the United Arab Emirates Natasha Ridge and Susan Kippels

247

271

10. The Role of Private, Non-Government Organisations and New State Institutions in the Gulf in the Development of Civil Society: The Example of Saudi Arabia 299 Adam Kulach Bibliography

317

Contributors

337

Index

341

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Boxes Box 9.1

Private philanthropy undermining public education

274

Box 9.2

Exploiting youth in the name of doing good

276

Box 9.3 The Al Qasimi Foundation: philanthropy for research, policy and practice

285

Box 9.4

Dubai Cares: an international emphasis

286

Box 9.5 Sharjah Art Foundation: promoting the arts and art education

287

Box 9.6 Mohamed bin Zayed Species Conservation Fund: a lone voice for the environment

290

Figures Figure 2.1

Saudi aid in US$ billion

50

Figure 2.2 Saudi International Development Assistance: Aid Architecture

52

Figure 2.3

Saudi aid allocations 2011 – 15

54

Figure 2.4

The Coordination Group members at their table

59

Figure 2.5

Increasing trend of annual funding by SFD

62

Figure 2.6

Sectors funded by SFD

63

Figure 3.1

Public sector wage bill in GCC (% of GDP) (2013)

90

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Figure 5.1 Share of oil in GDP and government revenues and share of manufacturing in exports in the GCC economies

149

Figure 6.1

175

Key characteristics of the GCC labour markets

Figure 6.2 Conceptual model of relative institutional policy making and policy implementation for promoting employability

181

Figure 6.3 Creating an eco-system for partnership towards youth advancement

197

Figure 9.1

Growth of philanthropic foundations in the US

273

Figure 9.2 in the UK

Main areas of philanthropic foundation funding

Figure 9.3

Years of establishment

280

Figure 9.4

Locations

281

Figure 9.5

Social media use and number of followers

282

Figure 9.6

Main programmatic areas of UAE foundations

284

275

Tables Table 2.1 Saudi aid according to different reports (in US$ million)

50

Table 3.1 Public sector employees

90

Table 3.2 Corruption perception index (CPI) scores

91

Table 3.3 GCC ranking in UN global e-government survey

94

Table 3.4 Internet and mobile penetration in GCC

96

Table 3.5 GCC portals

98

Table 3.6 GCC populations

101

Table 5.1 Diversification guidelines of the GCC states

144

Table 5.2 Number of GCC SOEs by industry and country

146

Table 5.3 FDI as percentage of GDP in the GCC states

148

Table 5.4 Sectors under state control by law in the GCC economies

150

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

ix

Table 5.5 National population employment by sector

152

Table 6.1 An overview of key institutions focusing on employability and labour market reform: who is responsible and accountable?

180

Table 6.2 Life satisfaction, engagement, hope, academic relevance, academic guidance and regularity amongst students

192

Table 6.3 Students’ most preferred source of finding a job

193

Table 6.4 Understanding the education and employment preferences in the region

195

Table 6.5 When things get tough in school/college, you reach out to?

196

Table 6.6 Source of career advice

196

Table 7.1 Status of Nitaqat programme in 2011

207

Table 7.2 Number of employees in the private sector by nationality and gender

208

ABBREVIATIONS

ADFD ADMAF ADNOC AfDB AfDF AFESD AGFUND AMF AUW AWEF BADEA BCG BMGF BOT CEES CG CIA CIS COBRA CORDIS CPI CSO DEWA DFID DFWAC

Abu Dhabi Fund for Development Abu Dhabi Music and Arts Foundation Abu Dhabi National Oil Company African Development Bank African Development Fund Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development Arab Gulf Program for Development Arab Monetary Fund Arab Union of Women Arab Women’s Enterprise Fund Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa Boston Consultancy Group Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation build-operate-transfer Citizen-Oriented Evaluation of E-government Services Coordination Group Central Intelligence Agency Commonwealth of Independent States cost, opportunity, benefit, risk analysis Community Research and Development Information Service Corruption Perception Index civil society organisation Dubai Electricity and Water Authority Department for International Development Dubai Foundation for Women and Children

ABBREVIATIONS EGDI EU FDI FfD GCC GDP GONGO GPEDC HR HRDF IBRD ICD ICIEC ICT IFAD IFC IFI IIROSA ILO I-MEET IMF IRTI IsDB ISIS IT ITFC KD KPI KSHARC MAR MCPS MDB MDG MENA

xi

E-Government Development Index European Union foreign direct investment Financing for Development Gulf Cooperation Council gross domestic product government operated non-government organisation Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation human resources Human Resource Development Fund International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Islamic Corporation for Development of the Private Sector Islamic Corporation for Insurance of Investment and Export Credit information and communications technology International Fund for Agricultural Development International Finance Corporation international financial institution International Islamic Relief Organisation, Saudi Arabia International Labour Organization Integrated Model for Evaluating E-government services transformation International Monetary Fund Islamic Research and Training Institute Islamic Development Bank Islamic State information technology International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation Kuwaiti dinars key performance indicator King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre Multilateral Aid Reviews Member Country Partnership Strategies Multilateral Development Bank Millennium Development Goals Middle East and North Africa

xii MEPI MIGA MOU NED NGO NOGA NPO OCR ODA OECD OECD-DAC OFID OIC OMSAR OPEC PAYS PCT PFM PIU PPP RIA ROTA SAMA SAR SDGs SFD SIB SME SOE SPC SRC UAE UN UN DESA UNDP UNESCWA UNGA

POLICY MAKING IN THE GCC Middle East Partnership Initiative Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency memorandum of understanding National Endowment for Democracy non-governmental organisation National Oil and Gas Authority non-profit organisation ordinary capital resources overseas development aid Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development OECD-Development Assistance Committee OPEC Fund for International Development Organisation of Islamic Cooperation Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Public Authority for Youth and Sports political Coase theorem public financial management parallel implementation unit public private partnerships regulatory impact assessment Reach Out To Asia Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency Saudi Arabian riyal Sustainable Development Goals Saudi Fund for Development Social Impact Bond small and medium-sized enterprise state-owned enterprise Supreme Petroleum Council Saudi Red Crescent United Arab Emirates United Nations UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs United Nations Development Programme United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia United Nations General Assembly

ABBREVIATIONS UNHCR UNICEF UNID UNIFEM UNOCHA UNOPS UNPACS UNRWA UNWOMEN VAT WAMY WB WCSS WHO WRACTI YTI

xiii

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations International Children’s Fund United Nations Industrial Development Organization see UNWOMEN United Nations Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs United Nations Office for Project Services United Nations Public Administration Country Studies United Nations Relief and Works Agency United Nations Development Fund for Women value-added tax World Assembly of Muslim Youth World Bank Women’s Cultural and Social Society World Health Organization Women’s and Children’s Rights through Access to Information Youth Thriving Index

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The editors would like to thank the Gulf Research Centre Cambridge, organisers of the 6th Annual Gulf Research Meeting at Cambridge University, for their support and assistance. We would also like to thank all participants, both paper presenters and listening participants, for their valuable input during our workshop, ‘Building an Institutional Process of Socio-Politics in the Gulf’, upon which this edited book is based.

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW Mark C. Thompson and Neil Quilliam

At present there is very little academic literature that applies analysis of better understanding the role of institutions in decision making to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. There is a wealth of academic enquiry into the role of institutions in the developed world and also regions of the developing world, but nothing that focuses on the GCC.1 There is a wealth of literature that emphasises how tribal society, rentierism and patronage are at the core of decision making in the GCC states, but they miss the role of institutions. This book draws upon existing theory on the role of institutions,2 but tests it against our own line of academic enquiry and the intimate knowledge of our contributors. The editors hope that this compilation of chapters will add to a better understanding of how decision making in the GCC is changing and developing. Academic studies have tended to emphasise the role played by elites, tribe, majalis, the military, rentierism, environment and external relations in shaping domestic and foreign policy decisions in the GCC. However, political, social, economic and cultural institutional processes as well as established and newly founded institutions also contribute to the wider policy debate and inform the socio-political processes. There are very few academic studies that account for the role that institutional processes, in particular in the shape of newly founded institutions, play in advancing the process of socio-politics in the Gulf. As such, this book not only advances understanding of decision making in the Gulf but also makes a clean

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break from more traditional elite analysis. Hence, the overall goal of the book is to better understand the complexity of decision making in the Gulf by acquiring a more insightful appreciation of how institutional processes as well as established and newly founded institutions contribute to policy processes. GCC governments are often accused of not being transparent in their decision making. In addition, they are perceived to be unable, or unwilling, to respond to their citizens’ needs and aspirations, a situation that is made particularly acute by the demographic reality of the Gulf region. Furthermore, it is sometimes claimed that GCC states create new institutions to accommodate pressures for increased sociopolitical participation without establishing an alternative to their own rule.3 Therefore, it is argued that in the absence of ‘responsive’ governance, societies need to develop the ability to build consensus, advocate for their own interests, or partner with both public and private sectors to pursue these interests. This can be achieved by building an effective institutional process and mechanisms that provide entry points for citizen participation in the decision making process. Indeed, delivery of fair and equitable citizen services requires government responsiveness and accountability, as well as motivated civil society organisations with the know-how to mobilise citizens and effectively engage with government to promote and sustain progress. There is a clear need for effective institutions to help GCC states meet the needs of their growing populations. In the past, the ruling families were able to do so through well-established patterns of privilege and patronage. With the growth in population, increase in economic activity and rising public expectations, ruling families can no longer govern in such a way. Moreover, the collapse in the oil price has cut short the options of largesse at a time when public expectations are increasing. Therefore, Gulf Arab states will increasingly come to rely upon institutions to act as a medium to service public demands – both economic and political. In short, breakdowns in governance and the lack of effective civic institutions can lead to broader failures, creating the conditions for corruption and unrest.4 When examining institutional processes in the Gulf we also need to measure institutional effectiveness, that is, the systematic, explicit and documented process of measuring performance against mission in all aspects of an institution, because institutions matter, they influence norms, beliefs and actions; In other words, institutions shape outcomes.5

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

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The book considers how institutional processes, as well as institutions themselves amongst the GCC states, could create the mechanisms to engage citizens in decision making processes, that is, increase citizen socio-political and/or socio-economic participation, whilst resisting state efforts to co-opt and transform them into vehicles for high profile figures and/or high profile projects. Indeed, this book tries to reach a better and more balanced understanding of the contemporary process of politics in the Gulf by examining the roles played by both formal and informal institutions at informing and shaping decision making at a national level. A large part of the discussion in the book focuses on whether formal institutional mechanisms, such as e-governance – which arguably brings citizens closer to government – elections to governing bodies – or transformations in labour markets actually engage nationals in decision making or simply limits meaningful engagement. For example, does the provision of service delivery by egovernance lead citizens to demand more from their governments and naturally call for increased transparency and a greater say over policy? Informal institutions, which manage to operate without a formal state mandate but enjoy privileged access to former officials, many of whom are still in close proximity to decision makers, are considered the most effective means of engaging citizens and advancing their interests. Whereas formal institutions may be better endowed with resources, capacity and a clear mandate, they continue to face constraints imposed upon them from ‘above’. As such, efforts made by formal institutions to engage and empower citizens offer a sanitised form of governance, unlike informal institutions, which operate most effectively at the level of citizen and family. Political, economic and social development in the GCC states has outpaced academic enquiry. Most of the available literature attributes decision making in the Gulf to elite politics and bases state–society relations on rentierism. The political, social and economic environment in the GCC has undergone significant change over the past decade and the terms of the social contract that manages state– society relations is also undergoing profound change. The sustained drop in the oil price since 2014 has compelled Gulf Arab states to not only rein in expenditure but also lift a range of subsidies, which has led to complaint and public disquiet. By so doing, the states have opened up a new chapter in state–society relations wherein citizens

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either demand a greater say in policy or expect new forms of compensation. There is an academic need for a better understanding of how these changes impact on the increasingly complex decision making processes within the Gulf, and focusing on the role played by the institutions lends critical insight into how policy is both formulated and implemented. Very little academic research has been carried out on the role of institutional processes, mechanism and institutions, especially from a comparative perspective, across the GCC. Furthermore, with the collapse of so many weak institutions across the Middle East and the breakdown of states, there is growing interest in the roles that institutions play in the GCC states. This makes the book’s focus important not only to academia but also to wider policy making circles trying to better understand the resilience of the GCC states. This volume is distinct because of two key factors: first, the subject matter remains under-researched and poorly understood; second, we have drawn together contributors that not only come from an academic background but are also practitioners within institutions in the Gulf. Consequently, the book will bring together rigid academic analysis with insights from practitioners, which means that the book will also appeal to the wider policy making community. Moreover, we have purposely chosen institutions at different stages of development, so that the analysis can inform debate and discussion amongst practitioners too. In sum, the book’s aim is to facilitate the sharing of ideas and contribute to building a body of knowledge on this topic, based on real-life experiences, in order to represent a broad range of opinion. In addition, by bringing together chapters from scholars and practitioners from the GCC states, it is possible to identify and analyse not only differences between individual states but also commonalities shared by institutions and citizens within the region.

Overview This edited book is based on discussions and surveys involving scholars and practitioners from the GCC states, Asia, Europe and North America. A strength of the book is that it incorporates the perspectives of both scholars and practitioners, whether sociopolitical, socio-economic or socio-cultural, with Gulf experience

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(both native and non-native) and/or those working in the Gulf field. These scholars and practitioners were brought together for a workshop entitled ‘Building an Institutional Process of Socio-Politics in the Gulf’ at the Sixth Annual Gulf Research Meeting convened at Cambridge University, UK, in August 2015. The workshop brought together scholars and practitioners from all six GCC states, Asia, Europe and North America. The workshop considered how institutions amongst the GCC states could create the mechanisms to engage citizens in decision making, whilst resisting state efforts to co-opt and transform them into vehicles for high profile figures and/or high profile projects. The presenters focused on three key areas where institutions enable citizens to participate in decision making: state-led service delivery, political processes (elections) and citizen-centric civil society organisations. The book is structured into three broad focus areas: the state, citizens and institutional processes. The structure aims to capture the complex nature of decision making and the increasing agency given and claimed by formal and informal institutions.

Part I: The State and E-Government In Chapter 1, Shafeeq Ghabra examines the critical role states play in managing social cohesion, especially as societies become increasingly complex. Given the changing political and social order in the Gulf region and wider Middle East, Ghabra argues that the path to social cohesion requires an entire society to acknowledge and respect inclusivity, with its bountiful identities, and to reject a monoculture. He opines that the state has responsibility for fostering social cohesion, which is essential to deterring political violence and advancing progress, and in his case study he focuses on the Kuwaiti state. Ghabra makes a convincing case that Kuwait’s moment for social cohesion followed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and its subsequent liberation. The experience fostered a strong sense of nationalism, which helped overcome any social or sectarian divisions that had preceded the invasion. Accordingly, it broadened the parameters of Kuwaiti identity and arguably made it more inclusive. However, the state’s wavering commitment to both meaningful political and economic change has undermined social cohesion and made society more vulnerable to extreme ideas. In this chapter,

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Ghabra assesses the state’s success in supporting social cohesion and focuses on elite business families and the ruling family, tribes and urban families, Shia, Christians, Bedouin and youth. He asserts that the state should establish fair policies that respect human rights, equality and justice, if it is to remain stable and prosperous. In other words, the state should create an environment that is supportive of individuals and groups forming independent institutions to represent their interests and inform policy. Chapter 2, by Mehtab Currey, Abdullah Al-Shoaibi and Nassir Alkasabi, makes an important contribution to better understanding the role that the Saudi state and its various agencies play in supporting international development aid. The authors argue that whilst Saudi Arabia’s contribution to humanitarian endeavours is well documented, very little research has focused on its commitment to development. Moreover, they argue that whilst Saudi humanitarian contributions may appear ad hoc they complement substantial, well-planned and sustained Saudi financing for international development projects. The chapter explores the kingdom’s aid programme through two key institutions, the Saudi Fund for Development (SFD) and the multilateral Islamic Development Bank (IsDB). It highlights the important role that these state institutions play in fulfilling the country’s mandate as the ‘Centre of Islam’ and, in turn, lending legitimacy to the state itself. As such, the institutions are instrumental in both shaping policy and responding to the expectations of Saudi society. In other words, they serve as conduits between state and society and mediate domestic interests through the medium of international development aid. Sherif Fawzi Abdel Gawad and Maggie Kamel in Chapter 3 assess the GCC’s experience in implementing e-government as a means of public administration reform, but also evaluate its potential as a vehicle for furthering political openness, fostering greater transparency and accountability, and encouraging public participation. The authors provide insights into the key institutions responsible for public administration reform; structure and capacity of such institutions in the GCC; and an assessment of e-government initiatives to date. Moreover, they identify pathways that GCC states could follow in the provision of e-government that would enhance transparency, accountability and public participation in decision making. Abdel Gawad and Kamel argue that e-government provides the GCC states with a mechanism to meet public demands and

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expectations, which are likely to increase in the post-oil era, as public spending will require much tighter control than ever before. However, in order to do so, it would require GCC states to move beyond the modest steps taken so far in implementing e-government and to adopt a more ambitious programme predicated on meeting the changing needs of society, rather than simply providing services. The authors assert that e-government can provide GCC states with a means to transition to a new post-oil era and limit the political, social and economic upheaval associated with radical change. Chapter 4 assesses the role of e-government in Qatar and evaluates its impact on issues of governance and citizen participation. Rhea Abraham focuses on Qatar as a case study, as it is a leading state amongst the GCC in terms of e-government readiness and provides all government services using electronic transactions. She notes that more generally the internet has contributed to a wider of circle of civic engagement and open political communication, which has not only affected citizen participation, but also the quality and frequency of such participation. The chapter examines whether the provision of e-government is an outcome of ‘top-down’ politics or has been driven by public demand and, by doing so, addresses a key question about the country’s transition to a post-hydrocarbons era. Abraham argues that e-government has developed in Qatar as a highly efficient means for service provision and has lent the state considerable success in meeting the public’s material demands. However, she opines that it has made very limited progress in furthering citizen participation and attributes this particular failing to two main factors: a lack of trust amongst citizens in e-government being an effective conduit between state and society; and the government’s limited investment in the specialised institutions and new competencies required to fully realise its potential as a mechanism for introducing essential reforms. Abraham concludes that e-government is an instrument that holds the potential to not only provide government services but also be an important source for political growth, economic development and greater political participation.

Part II: Citizens, Economy and Labour Issues Part II shifts the focus away from the state as the primary focus of decision making and examines the role played by citizens in the GCC.

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Rentier literature has tended in the past to emphasise the transactional relationship between state and citizen and essentially described it as a trade-off between economic welfare and political rights.6 In this section, the authors explore the contours of this relationship more closely. I-Tsung Tsai and Abdullah Kaya in Chapter 5 assess the likely influence that economic diversification will have on the emergence of economic institutions in GCC. The authors are careful to place the current strategies of diversification within the context of low oil prices and the coming post-oil era and argue that current efforts will prove more sustainable than previous ones. For example, whilst there remains considerable scepticism about implementing Saudi Vision 2030 and plans to sell a 5 per cent stake in Saudi Aramco, it is indicative of a structural change in both the Saudi economy and society. However, they assert that whilst the strategy to sustain growth has led GCC states to engage in vertical and horizontal diversification, it has been driven by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and underpinned by social networks intimately associated with ruling families, in each case. The ruling elites, they opine, will retain control over oil and non-oil revenues and state and SOEs. Consequently, I-Tsung and Kaya argue that economic diversification within each GCC state, therefore, is unlikely to develop neither economic nor political institutions to support and inform policy. However, they point to economic integration amongst the six GCC states, as a catalyst for supporting non-capital intensive and knowledge-based industries, which will facilitate private capital accumulation and lead to upward social mobility, but on a basis that is non-threatening to political elites. David Jones, Radhika Punshi and Gauri Gupta evaluate the role of GCC governments as prime employers of national youth and as regulators of both public and private sector labour markets. They highlight the successes and pitfalls of GCC workforce-nationalisation programmes to date. The authors posit that because GCC governments are halfway between inception and completion of respective Visions (such as Saudi Vision 2030) it is instructive to review progress at this time. A strong argument runs throughout the chapter that all six GCC states have pursued labour market policies and institutional frameworks that are inimical to stated commercial philosophies and goals. Whilst the political elite believe that traditional society, based on social norms and cultural doctrines, can operate alongside a

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modern global economy, Jones et al. point to a fundamental tension between the two. They conclude that whilst the workplace has come to symbolise the meeting place between the traditional and the modern, GCC governments will need to reconcile the differences if they are to develop knowledge-based economies. This will mean moving beyond the creation of Vision documents and creating and implementing tangible measures to bring about an actual transformation of the workforce. The chapter also provides a comparative analysis of students (925 respondents) across the GCC with a view to their employability and career readiness. The authors argue that the current programmes aimed at bridging the education-to-employment divide will take a least a decade to bear fruit and, therefore, governments are in danger of missing the demographic dividend, which would support diversification efforts. Chapter 7 continues with a focus on citizens and addresses the much-maligned practice of Saudisation. Kattan provides an insightful critique of Saudisation policy, which was included in the sixth Development Plan (1995 –9). It was intended to address rising unemployment by increasing the number of Saudi nationals working in the private sector and to develop a labour force that could sustain a knowledge-based economy. He argues that the government’s drive for transforming the economy away from oil dependence and rentierism and towards sustainable economic growth was based upon the relationship between successful Saudisation and the development of a knowledge-based economy. However, he asserts that knowledgebased economies require individuals who are adaptive, analytical, mobile and creative, but the environment in Saudi Arabia does not support such characteristics. Moreover, the relationship between citizen and state acts as a break in progress. As such, Kattan argues persuasively that the very conception of Saudisation remains flawed and will ultimately limit its success. He draws upon two theoretical frames to account for its failings, which he labels the Saudisation metanarrative. However, he argues that the metanarrative itself is inadequate and opines that understanding the limitations of Saudisation requires a more expansive framework that includes analysis of political structures and the basis of the social contract between citizen and state. Kattan concludes that the concept of citizen and citizenship, which is missed in most academic research,

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should be considered a key variable when analysing the failure of Saudisation policy. He demonstrates clearly how competing conceptions of citizen and citizenship have supported the shift to knowledge-based economies in some countries, but has constrained success within the context of Saudi Arabia.

Part III: Institutional Processes The third section of the book focuses on the institution processes that shape policy making. The authors stress the importance of formal and informal institutions in managing the space between state and citizen. In many ways, informal institutional processes appear to be the most effective means of informing decisions, rather than institutions established by the state.7 Chapter 8 analyses how civil society has shaped both political process and policy in Kuwait. Alanoud Alsharekh argues that civil society in Kuwait has played an instrumental role in advancing society’s interests. Moreover, Kuwaiti civil society movements, she asserts, have been at the forefront of the push for change in the Gulf. The chapter documents the interaction between non-state actors and state institutions, and focuses specifically on the role played by the Women’s Cultural and Social Society (WCSS). Alsharekh uses WCSS as a case study to investigate how civil society groups shape and have been shaped by political processes around civil society itself. She describes in some detail the environment in which civil society groups in Kuwait emerged and prospered, in part facilitated by the absence of political parties, and the informal political space claimed by nascent civil society institutions and pressure groups. However, she also attributes the robust character of Kuwaiti civil society groups to the influence of regional trends, most notably, Iraq’s invasion of the Gulf state in 1990. Civil society groups and NGOs (nongovernmental organisations), she argues, played an instrumental role in protecting the sovereignty of the Kuwaiti state and the interests of all Kuwaiti nationals, and so have been able to extract meaningful concessions from the central government in its negotiations over policy. Furthermore, the rise of social media and high penetration rates of high-speed internet in Kuwait and the GCC at large have made it easier for civil society groups to not only transmit their messages to a wider audience but also develop and cultivate a deeper

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base of support. In doing so, civil society groups, which are better equipped than the bureaucracies of GCC governments to take advantage of social media and information technology, have become much more effective pressure groups than before. Consequently, they are able to mobilise support, occupy virtual space and advance policies that the government may have resisted with more gusto in the past. Alsharekh argues that civil groups play a critical role in capturing and mobilising public sentiment through constructive means, with a focus on changing policy, rather than leaving a vacuum only to be filled by the appeal of extremism and the nihilism of extremist groups. The author focuses on the role played by WCSS in advancing its agenda of challenging the legal and political marginalisation of women in Kuwait and concludes that by remaining philanthropic, social and political – with an international mandate too – it will continue to evolve and push for women’s interests outside the formal structures of state institutions. Natasha Ridge and Susan Kippels document the growth of 11 statefunded philanthropic foundations in the UAE and analyse the similarities and differences in how they engage stakeholders and promote social change. The chapter explores the reasons that led to the creation of these foundations, their areas of focus and how they engage with citizens throughout the UAE and the GCC. The authors situate the proliferation of philanthropic foundations in the UAE within the broader global context, which has given rise to a new generation of foundations that seek, amongst other things, tax relief, public relations and soft power.8 Ridge et al. argue that whilst philanthropic giving is not new in the GCC, where Islam and the requirement of zakat9 has long influenced charitable culture, the formalised structure of giving through philanthropic institutions is a new undertaking. They assert that the establishment of Western-style foundations in the UAE, in particular, has created new avenues for bringing about social change – both nationally and internationally. The authors’ research finds that education and youth is the most common area of focus, with foundations such as Emirates Foundation creating programmes on entrepreneurship, mentoring and organised volunteering. Although Ridge et al. present research that analyses the purpose of foundations in the UAE – impact of programmatic work, roles played by national and international staff and the sustainability of such foundations – they argue that the subject matter requires

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further research. They conclude that whilst it is possible to understand why and how philanthropic foundations have been established in the West, the reasons for doing so in the UAE (and GCC) remain largely unknown. Moreover, the relationship between these new bodies and government agencies remains unclear, which makes it particularly difficult to evaluate their impact on both government policy and direct benefit to UAE society. The final chapter in the book considers the role of private sector and NGOs in developing civil society in Saudi Arabia. Adam Kulach argues that in spite of the legal and institutional barriers that governments have put in place to discourage the founding of independent organisations and institutions, civil society has grown significantly in GCC states over the past decade. He argues that civil society groups have emerged in many shapes and forms, some philanthropic, others social or with a service delivery mandate, and seek to exploit loopholes in current legislation. It is in this ‘third’ space that groups have mushroomed and begun to push agendas that were previously off-limits to independent groups. However, Kulach argues that the proliferation of such groups, including those with single-issue agendas such as preventing domestic violence, promoting environmental awareness and women’s empowerment, are broadly seen as complementing the mandates of formal government institutions. As such, informal civil society groups and the networks they share with formal institutions serve as important channels to not only influence policy but also shape and deliver outcomes. The author pays specific attention to the role of the media as the ‘fourth estate’ and social media. He notes that social media has played a major part in opening up both the political and social space for civic activists to engage in public debate. However, he draws the reader’s attention to the limits of both public debate in the media and the activities and programmes of civil society. Whilst the Saudi government is inclined to tolerate civil society efforts aimed at addressing social issues, it remains hostile to any form of political association of activism that exists outside the formal state structures. Although Kulach believes that the government will increasingly open up the formal political space, it will only do so at a pace it determines and, in the meantime, will crack down on any signs of dissidence. Kulach’s chapter benefits from his unique insights having served as EU Ambassador to Saudi Arabia.

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Outlook This book aims to break with the more traditional ways of understanding how decision making takes place within GCC states. In doing so, it has drawn together a collection of authors familiar with policy making either by academic endeavour or practice; in some cases, both. Instead of emphasising the role of the state, it evaluates the contribution that institutions – both formal and informal – make towards shaping and informing policy. Although the movement towards institutions playing a more significant role is not uniform, every chapter of this book points in its general direction. The book focuses on three core components that contribute to decision making: the state, citizens and institutions. It is clear from the following chapters that whilst the weight of decision making rests with states in the GCC, there is an irreversible transfer of authority towards citizens and institutions. The transfer has been without doubt accelerated by the low oil price era and subsequent decisions taken by GCC leaders to diversify their economies. In some cases, they have appeared far-reaching, as in the case of Saudi Arabia Vision 2030. Nevertheless, GCC citizens will need to demand further engagement rather than wait for states to divest themselves voluntarily of any authority. As and when oil prices rebound, states will want to recover some of the ground ceded to citizens and institutions. In the academic literature and present amongst the chapters in this book is a discussion on whether formal or informal institutions are more effective at engaging nationals in decision making. There is no broad agreement in this volume, though the editors conclude that at present informal institutions are the more effective vehicles for conveying public sentiment. In many cases, formal institutions perform the functions of the state and, as such, limit meaningful citizen engagement. It is clear from what follows that GCC citizens would need to demand further engagement rather than wait for the state to divest itself voluntarily of any authority. Informal institutions, which manage to operate without a formal state mandate but enjoy privileged access to former officials, many of whom are still in close proximity to decision makers, were considered the most effective means of engaging citizens and advancing their interests. Whereas formal institutions may be better endowed with resources, capacity and a clear mandate, they continue to face constraints imposed upon

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them from ‘above’. As such, efforts made by formal institutions to engage and empower citizens offer a sanitised form of governance, unlike informal institutions, which operate most effectively at the level of citizen and family. Finally, there is also little doubt that social media as a forum for citizen engagement will come to play an important role in influencing policy – in fact, it already has. Although difficult to imagine, in time, if not already, the combination of e-governance and social media could make more formal political structures, such as Shura Councils and local councils redundant. In other words, e-governance and social media hold the potential to circumvent formal political institutions and engage directly with citizens.

Notes 1. Vivien Lowndes and Mark Roberts, Why Institutions Matter: The New Institutionalism in Political Science (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 2. For example, research such as Adam Przeworski, ‘Institutions matter?’, 2004. Available from http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/2800/go_2004. pdf (accessed 11 June 2016). 3. For further discussion see Paul Dresch and James Piscatori (eds), Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab Gulf States (London: I.B.Tauris, 2013). 4. The series of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Arab Human Development Reports starting in 2002 highlight the risks. The 2012 report, in particular, is pertinent to out case. UNDP, Arab Development Challenges Report 2011, 2012. Available from http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/HDR/ UNDP-ADCR_En-2012.pdf (accessed 11 June 2016). 5. See for example Barbara Halla, ‘Leading nowhere: do institutions matter or not?’, 2013. Available from http://harvardpolitics.com/books-arts/ leading-nowhere-do-institutions-matter-or-not/ (accessed 11 June 2016). 6. David Held and Kristian Ulrichsen (eds), The Transformation of the Gulf: Politics, Economics and the Global Order (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012). 7. For more on formal institutional processes see Lowndes Roberts, Why Institutions Matter. 8. This is an issue addressed by Nabil A. Sultan, David Weir and Zeinub Karake-Shalhoub (eds), The New Post-Oil Arab Gulf: Managing People and Wealth (London: Saqi Books, 2011). 9. Zakat is a form of alms-giving treated as a religious tax and/or religious obligation in Islam, which, by Qur’anic ranking, immediately follows prayer (salat) in importance.

PART I THE STATE AND E-GOVERNMENT

1 IDENTITY AND STATE IN THE GULF: THE CASE OF KUWAIT Shafeeq Ghabra

Introduction The editors of this book have focused on ‘examining the roles played by both formal and informal institutions’ in the Gulf region. To both scholars this is a deeper way into the understanding of the components that shape the GCC decision making at a national level. In their Introduction, Thompson and Quilliam focus on trying to understand the underpinnings of the GCC resilience in light of ‘the collapse of so many weak institutions across the Middle East’. In this context this chapter focuses on the critical role Kuwait plays as a state in managing social cohesion. On many levels of analysis we will discover that the state is a central institution to the potential breakdown or build-up of social cohesion. I will argue that the path to social cohesion requires an entire society to acknowledge and respect inclusivity, with its bountiful identities, and to reject a monoculture. As modern societies become more diverse, they can also move towards social disintegration. This deterioration in social cohesion is often due to the failure of the political process and institutions. Marginalisation, racism, gender inequality and humiliations become powerful factors in shaping opposition to a dominant culture.1 Social cohesion is impossible in a state biased towards one class, one religion, one ethnicity, one gender, one clan – one anything. In the

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absence of neutrality, force will maintain the social order for a period of time, but such a situation can only be temporary. It may last for years or decades, but it merely suppresses simmering discord that will ultimately lead to an explosion within the society.2 This chapter, which is focused on Kuwait, is situated in a Gulf/Arab context. Due to an element of openness it is still possible to study the case of Kuwait with an open spirit. However, underlying every Gulf and Arab state are problematic currents. This chapter is therefore a case study, yet it is not an isolated case. Kuwaitis live in a nation that provides them with a reasonable level of social care and a degree of rights acceptable to most, for the time being. The 1990 invasion by Iraq revealed the extent of Kuwaiti citizens’ interconnectedness despite differences in wealth and power. The upheaval resulted in a commitment by them to the nation as an independent, sovereign and constitutional state. Despite disagreements among Kuwaitis prior to 1990 about the unconstitutional nature of democracy and state policy, the sense of nationalism among them and their sentiment towards their country and political symbols after the invasion superseded their disagreements.3 A Kuwaiti identity has evolved since Sabah I took control of the area of Kuwait in the middle of the eighteenth century. Kuwaitis have consented to the 1962 constitution guiding and defining their relationship with the government, with the ruling family and among themselves. While Kuwaitis have become more diverse due to education, travel, immigration and growth of a middle class, the state itself has been slow to adapt to societal changes in attitudes and unable (or unwilling) to actively promote equality among the various groups of its citizenry. Over the decades since attaining independence in 1961 the Kuwaiti establishment has vacillated between protecting diversity, or inclusiveness, and suppressing it. This issue grew in importance with the unexpected occurence of the Arab Spring in 2011, as the Kuwaiti government attempted to deal with the complexities flowing in its wake. To understand Kuwaiti social cohesion requires an assessment of the country’s historical context and an understanding of the interplay between the forces in the society and the state. Here the focus is on the elite trading families and the ruling family, tribes and urban families, Shiites, Christians, women, the Bidun and youth.

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The ruling family and the commercial families The arrangement that brought about Kuwait’s independence was a bargain between the two major groups in control of the balance of power affecting Kuwait’s social and political structure. The arrangement included elections to a parliament and a level of constitutional and political rights. One group consisted of members of the Sabah monarchy and the other of members of a long-standing urban community and business class. The 1962 constitution and the laws emerging from it codified the power prerogatives of the Sabah family. The presence of a leading personality, Sheikh Abdullah al-Salem Al Sabah, the reform-minded emir who took power in 1950, contributed to the success of the semidemocratic state he envisioned. The periodic elections for parliament from 1963 onwards and rights to citizenship stimulated the development of a uniquely Kuwaiti social fabric. The urbanite families that formed the first Kuwait in the mid 1800s arrived there from different regions. They were of Najdi (present-day Saudi Arabia), Zubairi (present-day Iraq), Ihsa (present-day Saudi Arabia), Iranian and Bahraini origins. Groups of tribal origins as are known to have settled within the wall surrounding Kuwait City. Prior to Kuwait’s early formation, a well-known tribal group by the name of Awazem were among the first inhabitants of the area. The working definition of a Kuwaiti during that time was a citizen from Kuwait City and its immediate environs. In most cases, that meant an urbanite whose roots went back to the city and a few villages surrounding it. Most citizens were Sunni, while the remainder consisted of a sizeable Shiite minority along with a small number of Christians and Jews. The role of the settled urban population, especially merchants, is foundational in Kuwait’s history. They founded and sponsored the first schools during the 1920s and 1930s, libraries, newspapers and publishing houses. They pursued the ideas of rights, citizenship and constitutional law and government. They had earlier led a genuine reform movement that was crushed by the Emir in 1938. Over the years, Kuwaiti businessmen and prominent urban families have demanded the full application of the 1962 constitution in regard to political freedoms and parliamentary prerogatives. This has led to conflicts with the leading power holders of the Sabahs, consequently producing a series of constitutional crises involving parliament and

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the ruling family. The conflicts deepened after the death of Abdullah al-Salem in 1966.4 Kuwait’s transformation into a rich, oil-exporting country beginning in 1948 led to a change in the political equation. By the 1960s the government-owned oil had become the primary source of income in Kuwait, and the state emerged as the main employer, with 90 per cent of Kuwaitis engaged in some form of labour in the government sector. Thus began the traditional merchant class’s loss of power, as the old traders and commercial businessmen gradually became reliant on government hand outs themselves.

Tribes and the urbanites The process of incorporating nearby villages and oases brought in tribes that had traditionally resided in the Kuwaiti desert and areas of present-day Saudi Arabia and Iraq. This is a process that began over time, evolving in the nineteenth century and particularly during the Mubarak era at the start of the twentieth century. After the Britishimposed 1922 Treaty of Uqair between Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, which established Kuwait’s current borders, the tribes began to feel that they were part of an emerging country. Kuwait was then a British protectorate. Thus with Kuwait’s formal independence in 1961 citizenship was no longer limited to the urban population, but was extended to include the nomadic Bedouin tribes in outlying desert regions. The tribes that lived in the surrounding deserts became the newest members of the social fabric as citizens with full rights. This new state of affairs was unsettling to those living in the city, surrounded by its protective wall. An examination of Kuwait’s urban population would be incomplete without looking at the role and movement of the tribes into the centre of the nation’s life. Tribal Bedouin members arrived in the city in stages, usually to work in the oil fields or in the army or security services. The period from the 1940s to the 1960s witnessed a shift in tribal stability, as for the first time in their history the tribes began to give up their lifestyle of roaming across the desert. The Ajman, Anouz, Motraan, Rasheed, Shammar and Thafeer go back hundreds of years and were never confined within a particular border. What brought them together into a unified Kuwait were the new opportunities in the

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burgeoning city, which came with attendant economic, political and social challenges. Prior to the modern settlement of Kuwait more than two centuries ago only one tribe living on the existing land of Kuwait city and its surroundings was able to maintain its presence till the present day. This tribe, the Awazem, are the predecessors of the modern-day Sabahs and other urban families. The Awazem were a different tribe when compared to others in the region, being more settled, and made an income from fishing on the shores of Kuwait. The Awazem is one of the oldest Kuwaiti social groups and today comprises about 15 per cent of its population. Although urbanites, members of the tribe have maintained some of their traditions, thus melding family, city and tribal elements in their identity.5 When the flow of tribal members to the city increased during the 1950s, the asheesh – cheaply built communal settlements for housing the newcomers in nearby towns – soon became overcrowded. In the tribes’ adaptation to city life during the 1960s and 1970s the city served as a big mould, fusing newcomers into its mechanism. During that time, many of those of tribal origin began to focus on their family group within the tribe. The tribes as entities seemed to be on the way to extinction due to the urbanisation process, in accordance with the melting pot political theory of modernity in times of optimism. The tribe had been important for trade and travel in the desert, but this dynamic changed as the tribes’ economic and social contexts transformed with the emergence of a modern state of citizens and life in residential neighbourhoods.6 Kuwait’s citizenship law distinguishes between two categories of people: native and naturalised Kuwaitis, the latter being those whose grandparents immigrated to Kuwait after 1920. The 1920 battle of Jahra, when forces from Kuwait fought the Saudi Wahabi militant attack on its territory, was a turning point in its ability to maintain its territorial integrity. Although many Kuwait City residents were categorised as naturalised citizens if they could not adequately trace their ancestry to 1920 or before, most of the people affected by this classification were from tribal groupings. This naturally led to feelings of discrimination and created a barrier between them and their new neighbours. Furthermore, a naturalised person had to reside in Kuwait for 30 years before obtaining the right to vote (lowered to 20 years in the 1990s). There are many limitations on naturalised Kuwaitis, such

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as not being allowed to run for public office or hold a ministerial position. In addition, there is a law that allows the Minister of Interior to withdraw a naturalised person’s citizenship irrespective of how many years had passed since their naturalisation. Another aspect of the citizenship issue emerged in the 1960s, when Kuwait became anxious about internal political transformations driven by Arab nationalism, as was occurring in many countries. In Egypt the Free Officers, led by Gamal Abdul Nasser, overthrew the monarchy in 1952. Six years later brought the toppling of the monarchy in Iraq. Jordan experienced several attempted coups in the 1950s and 1960s, and the House of Saud in Saudi Arabia faced down various crises in the mid-1960s during the upheaval in Yemen. At the time, the ruling elite in Kuwait began to view the tribes as a possible source of stability and internal balance and therefore moved to build new alliances with them. The goal was to lessen the influence of the merchant-class opposition in Kuwait City. The tribes were known for their loyalty to their leaders, and they transferred the same devotion to the ruling family. The natural alliance between the tribes and the ruling family had also been exhibited during the 1938 confrontations over reforms. In the latter half of the 1960s, the government changed the citizenship status of some tribal groups and individuals by reclassifying them as native (originals) rather than naturalised. This was done in an effort to guarantee their votes for defeating the nationalist and city-based middle class opposition groups. The politicisation of the naturalisation process compromised the historical trust between the traditional merchant class urban opposition and the ruling Sabah family wielding executive power.7 The insular enclaves of Kuwait City dominated by families of the traditional urban centre ensured that new neighbourhoods would need to be developed to accommodate the shifting housing demographics. Thus new neighbourhoods with tribal majorities began to appear. These more remote areas became known as the ‘outside regions’. Although members of tribal groups have a natural and historical tendency to live close to one another, the state contributed to this pattern’s perpetuation by designating land for them during the 1970s close to the asheesh settlements consisting of simple unregulated housing. This allowed the tribes to cluster in entire new towns and cities in the ‘outside areas’.

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After independence, the tribal population increased rapidly, eventually becoming the majority of the population by 2015. Although constituting more than 65 per cent of the population, they discovered that Kuwaiti economic and political power remained divided between the ruling family and the old urban commercial families. This situation led to the emergence of the role of parliamentary deputies as facilitators, brokering favours between tribal members and the state. This led in turn to administrative corruption, which would later come to dominate state agencies and arouse the public’s ire. The tribes eventually came to realise that they were being used to limit the influence of the merchant class but without improved representation for themselves. Tribal members looked around to find themselves without proper housing, services or influence in the city. This became a particularly pressing issue in the mid-1990s as new generations entered the workforce and levels of education rose tremendously, paving the way to an evolving integration crisis. With the growth in numbers of intellectuals, teachers and the educated in general among tribal members, this segment of the population was no longer alienated or isolated from the reforming and critical ideas of the Kuwaiti middle class. They were becoming middle class themselves. Tribal members who travelled for education outside their milieu on generous scholarships from the state were exposed to critical thinking and the values of equality. Beginning in the 1990s, the social changes among the tribes led to their increased political participation, which with time transformed them from a bastion of allegiance to the status quo power structure to the stronghold of the new opposition. Later, among other developments, conservative Islamist currents would begin to penetrate tribal groups as they increasingly tried to assert their place in the Kuwaiti political order and demand a more active role. Thus tribal culture was becoming politicised, demands were being voiced and concerns about rights were being raised. When the tribes began to assert themselves, it caused anxiety among other groups, in particular the urban merchant class and establishment Shiite families. In 1996 a law was passed prohibiting the tribes from collectively agreeing on candidates in parliamentary elections. The tribes recognised the manoeuvre for what it was – a way to contain their influence, even as other societal groups, that is, merchants, urban families and religious organisations, continued to nominate whomever they wanted before general elections. The tribes

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saw clearly that there was a concerted effort afoot to keep them politically and socially marginalised. Many among the urban groups not only feared the loss of their power and prerogatives, but were also concerned about possible chaos stemming from growing tribal demands to redistribute wealth, lower interest rates on loans and increased allocations for employees in the government sector. There were also worries about the popularity of Salafism, an extremely conservative form of Islam, and the advocacy of some tribal members for the application of sharia in civil disputes.8 New politically focused efforts to discredit the tribes emerged in 2006, including media attacks calling their loyalty to Kuwait into question. Privately owned media channels also raised the issue of dual citizenship. A number of individuals belonging to tribes hold dual citizenship, in particular Kuwaiti and Saudi documents. Private media outlets promoted the slogan ‘Kuwait for Kuwaitis’, suggesting the tribes were outsiders. This issue had not been raised in 1990, when the tribes fought during the Iraq invasion in defence of the country. Because many members of the tribes had developed similar sympathies the attempt to block oppositional influence made the tribes feel that their very existence was threatened.9 From 2007, their fears about the developing situation led a section of the traditional urban and city groups to call for the dissolution of the National Assembly and suspension of the constitution. Previously such elite groups had been the democracy’s most fervent defenders. Calls to dissolve the assembly faced strong opposition from the tribal majority, which considered it an attempt to undercut them. What happened with the tribes reflects a common Kuwaiti response to inclusivity. The state has a history of forming an alliance with one segment of the society in an attempt to marginalise another. It ignores the possibility that the excluded, sometimeshumiliated group might morph into a more radicalised entity later because of its exclusion. As noted, the state has allied with different groups throughout Kuwait’s history. It has allied with the tribes against urban groups, and has also used them, along with some segments of the urban population, to reduce Shiite power. In recent years the state has allied with Shiite groups to try to control the tribes. It has also encouraged different religious currents to challenge nationalist, urban, liberal and business groups. This policy has led entire segments of society to feel targeted at one time or another,

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each in its turn, and to believe that every political battle threatened its survival in that arena.10 This style of governance, widespread in the Arab world, has contributed to weakening social cohesion. It is governmental policy carried to excess. In the end, the state creates wounds that are hard to heal. Without insightful policy and respect toward different social forces and societal groups, Kuwait will face major challenges in the future.

The Shiites The Shiite community has had experiences similar to other groups, growing increasingly assertive in trying to obtain rights and being marginalised during certain periods. The Shiites have averaged five or six deputies in the National Assembly, at one point reaching nine, out of 50, despite being one-quarter of the population. There is one exception to such representation: the short-lived parliament elected in the December 2012 election. Due to the boycott by the Sunni majority and a large number of tribes, the parliament ended up having 17 Shiites. Their number fell back to ‘regular’ levels in the following election of June 2013, when many of the boycotters returned to the political arena. Shiites, part of original Kuwaiti society, have been major contributors to its construction and growth. At the same time, however, they have faced pressures related specifically to their religious minority status. The division between Sunnis and Shiites in Kuwait has fluctuated over time. The 1960s and 1970s witnessed a decline in sectarian tensions in both Kuwait and the rest of the region due to the decline of the role of religious identity in favour of local, national and Arab identities. Arab nationalist sentiment was a unifying ideology for millions of Arabs. Many of the leaders of the movement in Iraq were Shiites, and Shiites in Bahrain and Lebanon played leading roles in the Arab nationalist and leftist movements. The 1962 constitution and 1963 parliament in Kuwait represented the start of new relations between Shiite and Sunni citizens, as Shiites were allowed to vote, run for elected office and participate in government.11 At the same time, however, the tacit, unwritten definition of Kuwait as a Sunni country began to surface in the political realm. The

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Sunnis and trading class would come to dominate the country, while Shiites would play a lesser role as a protected and tolerated minority. In the period after independence, a group of influential Shiite families well connected to the Sabah elite dominated Shiite interests.12 Although all citizens were considered to be equal in terms of rights and obligations, the Shiites recognised early on, as the tribes would later discover, the discrepancy between the articles of the constitution proclaiming respect for rights, freedoms and differences and actual laws, which restricted freedoms and equality in citizenship. Discrimination occurred more outside the laws and in unwritten forms. For example, even today there are limitations on Shiites in security services positions or National Guard appointments. This does not mean, however, that no progress has been made or that such policies only apply to Shiites.13 The 1979 Iranian revolution generated admiration throughout the Islamic world. Shiites in particular took great pride in the establishment of a state guided by Jaafari Shiism. For Sunni Muslims the revolution was proof of the power of Islam and the possibility of a regime guided by its principles. Admiration for the Iranian revolution was also tied to animosity in the Arab world towards the deposed shah and satisfaction with the closing the Israeli embassy in Tehran and its subsequent delivery to the Palestine Liberation Organization. The Arab and Islamic mood in 1979 contrasted sharply with the unpopularity of Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat’s 1977 visit to Jerusalem that had paved the way to relations with Israel. A Shiite middle class had emerged in Kuwait before the Iranian revolution. The result of modern education, the middle class grew outside the traditional Shiite commercial families close to the political establishment and the Sabah leadership. New Shiite groups with a religious focus and a newfound sense of solidarity and assertiveness also appeared in Kuwait and in the region. Beginning in 1979, the association of religion and politics deepened among Shiites across the Middle East. This mobilisation transformed the Shiites from disassociated and unconnected minorities into a larger community whose solidarity crossed borders.14 Furthermore, religion became a motivating force among Sunnis through the example of the Iranian revolution and by virtue of the rise of Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist groups in Arab societies. At the same time, it became clear

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that the increasing influence of religion on society was leading to inflexibility, indoctrination and worse. In the early 1980s, a rift opened in the relationship among faiths in the Arab world, and in this Kuwait was no exception. This is not to say that all of Kuwait’s Shiites and Sunnis became extremely conservative. Groups on both sides still had segments that believed in liberal and centrist ideas tied to a largely flexible understanding of religion. When Iraqi president Saddam Hussein launched his destructive war on Iran in 1980, relations between the Sunni and Shiite communities suffered a sharp setback. Shiite anger rose due to Western countries’ embargo on trade with Iran after the revolution, Israel’s stance toward Iran and the support of the Gulf States and most other Arab countries for Hussein against Iran. There were violent Shiite attacks against US and Gulf State interests and citizens. Assorted aeroplane hijackings and embassy attacks made the 1980s a distinct phase in ‘Shiite terrorism’. At the height of tensions, in 1989, Kuwait closed the Social-Cultural Association because of its alleged connection to Shiite groups in the region. That year, some of its members were linked to an attempt to blow up facilities in Saudi Arabia during the Hajj. Saudi authorities executed 16 Kuwaiti allegedly involved in the plot, although it was unclear what the exact charges were against them or whether their trial was legal. The executions were also controversial because the executed included some under the age of 18. In Kuwait, a closure similar to the one in 1989 had occurred in 1976, when the government banned the Independence Club, which consisted of secular and Kuwaiti Arab nationalist groups. Shiites are often accused of having some kind of affiliation with Iran, an accusation often used in political conflicts. Shiites in Kuwait have varied backgrounds. Some are of Persian origin, but others have, Belouchi and Turkmen roots. There are also Hassawi and Qoutaifi Arab Shiites from regions in present-day Saudi Arabia and those with Arab Bahraini roots. The others, with Ahwaz and Iraqi roots, have religious connections to Iraq not Iran. There are also Shiites from the Bedouin Shammar tribe. Shiism has a variety of religio-political currents. There are, for example, those who believe in the velayat al-faqih, leadership by an Islamic jurist, as in Iran. There are many other Shiites who are assertive but object to the velayat al-faqih, preferring instead a degree of separation between religion and state. Among such proponents are

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Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in Iraq and the late ayatollah Mohammad Husain Fadlallah from Lebanon.15 Some active Sunnis also belong to overtly religious political groups seeking regional connectivity, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and some Salafists, at the more peaceful end of the spectrum, and more recently al-Qaida and the Islamic State (Da’ish), on the extremist, violent end. Active political Shiites would inevitably sympathise with Iran were it to be attacked, but they would not identify themselves with it if Tehran were to attack their own countries or commit acts that violated others. However, the lines have become somewhat blurred in many areas in the context of the civil wars raging in the region between religious/nationalist Sunni and Shiite groups. This is clear in places like Yemen and Syria. Since 2011 there have been opposing positions between Shiites and Sunnis towards every revolution and every movement in the region. A memorial service in Kuwait for Imad Mughniyya, the Hezbollah commander assassinated by Israel in Damascus in 2008, became a point of contention between Kuwaiti Sunnis and Shiites. Many of the participants were arrested on the charge of organising and participating in the memorial, because Mughniyya had taken part in the hijacking of a Kuwaiti plane in the 1980s. The participants at the service, however, were there to honour Mughniyya as a Lebanese and Arab hero who had fought against Israel in 2006 and contributed to the liberation of southern Lebanon from Israeli occupation in 2000. The Shiites’ reaction to the disruption of the memorial service and the arrests of Shiite deputies was manifested by increased solidarity and re-election of the detained deputies by a large majority the following year. The incident led to a split in the Kuwaiti opposition, as Shiite deputies accused it of not taking a clear stand on the incident. The charges were later dropped. However, in another incident in 2010, a Shiite religious leader, Sheikh Yasser Habib, was stripped of his citizenship after provocatively attacking some historical Islamic figures. Many Shiites demanded similar action against a Kuwaiti citizen who had attacked Shiite religious doctrines on Twitter. The withdrawal of citizenship has been used to target certain individuals whenever the state has felt the need to bring a group into line. This happened in 2014 to several opposition figures, mostly Sunnis. Such policies will undermine the foundation of the state in

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the long run. No court is allowed to look into these matters, which makes the revocation of one’s citizenship a much-feared weapon that could be used and abused by the executive in times of political tensions. A look at religious expression by Kuwaiti Shiites finds that it is defined by a sense of ‘presence’. There are 50 licensed hussainiyahs, a public space usually connected to a mosque where such events as meetings, religious ceremonies, teaching about religion and condolences after funerals, take place. Fifty is an insufficient number for the community’s needs. Therefore there are hundreds of unlicensed hussainyahs in people’s homes. This situation points to the state’s lack of enthusiasm for building new hussainyahs to accommodate the community’s numbers.16 The religious curricula in Kuwait are similar to those in other Arab Gulf states with a strong Sunni emphasis, where those who practice different rituals are considered heretical. The religious curriculum is taught according to Sunni doctrine in all school grades in Kuwait. This can lead to questioning by children who are not practising Muslims, are of other faiths or are Shiite. Even in a school dominated by Shiites the curriculum remains nonetheless Sunni, indicating a lack of sensitivity towards the Shiites’ understanding of religion. It does not help that there are only a few teachers of Shiite religion in Kuwaiti schools, public or private. They must still teach Sunni doctrine. No wonder the country and the region has experienced sectarian problems. A way to ease some of these tensions, at least in regard to religious teaching, is obvious. In Kuwait, as in other societies of immigrants, the group that arrives first feels superior to those who come later. Discrimination among citizens occurs on the basis of class, time of immigration, place of origin, denomination and mother tongue. The situation grows even more complex if the law and state policy are based on one group’s dominance. In an oil-based welfare state this translates into different levels of privilege. Although a mosaic, the society becomes easy to divide, a process that ends up harming the state.17 Ending discrimination in education and services would send a further message of a commitment to justice to the group’s members. One must always distinguish between the racism of ordinary people and the larger, more insidious racism practised by corporations, companies and the state. Institutionalised discrimination by the state

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is key. One woman, a Shiite but a liberal activist, told me: ‘The Shiite youths in Kuwait are more open to emigration. This nation of ours will always consider us as a fifth column. Many of us feel a great sense of sadness.’ While some Shiites might flee or want to withdraw into their community, others want to reach out and meet others with an openness of spirit. Some want to establish an individual political identity distinct from the majority of Shiites, but in the charged atmosphere between the sects the individual faces pressure to conform. If an influential person from the Shiite community tried to cross the boundary between the communities, as it were, he or she would face intense pressure from his sect. This is what happened to Hassan Jowhar, who tried to take a centrist position while voting in the National Assembly. He lost his seat in the next election due to a lack of support from his fellow Shiites.18 The June 2015 Da’ish (Islamic State, ISIS) suicide bombing at the famous and well-attended Shiite Imam Sadiq mosque in the heart of Kuwait City has contributed to heightening tensions and fears. It followed attacks on a Shiite mosque in May in Saudi Arabia. In Kuwait, dozens of worshippers were killed and more than 200 injured. The state and the Emir of Kuwait in particular reacted with sensitivity to unite Kuwaitis, at least for the short term. Most of the Shiite youth that I interviewed advocated the adoption civil society values as a way to improve the future. The Shiites are concerned about the application of strict Salafist interpretations of Islam, which clash with their understanding of religion and rights.19 In 2015 the bestselling young Arab and Kuwaiti novelist Saud Alsanousi published a novel that was banned in Kuwait when it first appeared. Fi’ran Ommi Hissa (Mama Hissa’s Mice) is a brilliantly written philosophical and perceptive novel envisioning a Shia Sunni civil war in Kuwait. Saud was only ringing a bell through fiction.

Women With Kuwaiti independence, the constitution provided women more rights, representing major changes in regard to work and education, but at the same time, women were denied political rights from independence in 1961 until 2005. After women received full political

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rights, four women were elected to the National Assembly in 2009, and two women won seats in 2013. There were no women in the government in 2012 and only one in 2015. As women are half of the Kuwaiti population, the problem of equitable social and political participation is apparent, threatening social cohesion and unity. In the past five years in Kuwait notable changes have occurred at the social level outside the framework of the law. The culture of discussion introduced by coffee shops, dialogues and chats on Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and other social media platforms have all expanded women’s social and political space and freedoms. They can talk freely about issues with men, offering opinions, proposals and analysis. Young women have obtained prominence as bloggers, presenting their views to the world and at home online. Women have also received atypical acknowledgement as singers in competitions followed by thousands of young men and women. Despite the traditional mistrust and conflict that has plagued relations between men and women – stemming from state policies, social norms and some religious interpretations – new and more open spaces for contact with the opposite sex have been opened that were not available a decade ago.20 In this new environment, young men and women are meeting to discuss a cause, lead a movement, establish cultural councils, hold poetry readings and exchange political ideas in salons. This movement can be viewed as an alternative or equivalent platform to Kuwaiti men’s diwaniyyahs. The concept of friendship between a man and a woman is evolving, despite the existing societal obstacles. There has even been a change in young men’s and women’s outlooks about women’s roles in the Islamic currents that interact more directly with communities. Even among the youth of the Muslim Brotherhood, men and women have held meetings and discussions in coffee shops without the approval of the older leadership. All this could bode well for the society of the future. Despite decades since independence, women face many challenges. Women represent 40 per cent of the workforce in the Kuwait public sector but only a very small percentage of leadership positions. Until recently, state-supported housing was not available for women unless they were married. The law has now changed to provide such housing to divorced and widowed women over 40 years old with one child or more. Even the right to rent a place in which to live alone is not guaranteed for Kuwaiti women. Those who want to live by

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themselves must skirt the law to do so. Among younger women, one finds increasingly strong feelings about being oppressed in a society that still rejects the concept of equality.21 Women face other domestic difficulties in addition to housing. For instance, when a woman marries a non-Kuwaiti, he is not naturalised as a citizen, regardless of how long they remain married, nor are the children from the marriage. From the perspective of Kuwaiti law children must take the father’s nationality. In addition, she cannot pass on her citizenship to her children unless the non-Kuwaiti husband dies or they divorce. A non-Kuwaiti woman who marries a Kuwaiti man, however, automatically receives naturalised citizenship after a certain number of years, as do their children. Women look to the state to offer professional, social and legal equality, but it is clear that the state has a long way to go in ensuring equal rights for women. For instance, a woman cannot change her son’s or daughter’s school without the father’s agreement. In the event of divorce, the matter becomes even more problematic. A woman cannot open a bank account for her son or daughter without the father’s signature, even if she is a senior employee at her firm, is a businesswoman or has a bank account whose balance exceeds that of her husband’s. Until struck down in the courts, the law prohibited a woman from obtaining a passport without the consent of her husband, or her father if unmarried.22 Kuwait has one of the highest divorce rates in the region, at slightly more than 40 per cent. It is now normal for young professional women to look for opportunities to move to places where they can live independently, experience equality and have some control over their destiny. Although Kuwaiti society, like many others, has socially liberal and conservative segments, gender cannot be understood in isolation from class, social background (urban versus tribal), religion and sect. The central issue, however, is a matter of state law and how it affects individuals and communities.23 School curricula are weak in spreading awareness about the many roles women play today globally and the possibilities for Kuwaiti women if they were allowed the opportunities. According to the curricula, a woman’s role remains that of mother, and her place is at home. She is rarely presented as an engineer, doctor, writer or leader. While many women do not have a problem with motherhood per se, they would like to see some balance in the way they are represented.

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In addition, sport and other physical activities, important to health and wellbeing, are typically absent from girls’ education. In 2007 the Kuwaiti parliament passed a law designating a group of industrial jobs as difficult and therefore off-limits to women. The same law forbids women from working from 8 pm till 7 am, and forbids them from working in jobs that provides services to men only, although it gives a minister the right to make exceptions in medicine and some other fields. This law is very difficult to implement, yet when selectively implemented it adds another layer of bureaucracy. The increased religiosity of the state has hindered its development in regard to women and resulted in a decline in civil values.24 Women today recognise that they have been made vulnerable and forced into lives controlled by others. This awakening among younger women should not, and ultimately cannot, be ignored. Men also have a stake in the situation, as both genders suffer from the consequences of outdated laws and assumptions about women’s abilities and their role and place in society.

Christians A Kuwaiti Christian told me: In the past, coexistence happened easily and simply between all categories of people. We used to respect and love one another, no matter the group. There was openness between us, and we did not feel fanaticism, one against another. Suddenly, in the 1980s, this welcoming world ended. In the early 1980s a member of the National Assembly demanded that the government give him the names of all the Christians in the country. It was a strange request that instinctively made Kuwaiti Christians anxious. Their concern was exacerbated when 91 names were published in the newspapers and announced at other venues. The media frenzy resulted in new legislation banning the naturalisation of non-Muslims. The surprising decision meant that the children of a Kuwaiti Christian woman married to a non-Kuwaiti man would never have Kuwaiti citizenship. Although Christians had lived in the country for decades, after passage of the naturalisation law they

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no longer felt safe. A large number left Kuwait for other countries to marry, work and live in an atmosphere of inclusiveness. The total number of Kuwaiti Christians does not exceed 150.25 Christians feel that it is increasingly difficult for them to obtain appointments or advance professionally. The problem is not so much the law as social practice. There is no anti-discrimination legislation protecting Christians or, for that matter, anyone based on denomination. In fact, there is no legislation that protects against discrimination or racism by government institutions or private companies. On the other hand, the constitution in its articles announces nondiscrimination and equality in front of the law for all. Every now and then, as happened in 2012, there are calls to prohibit the building of new churches to accommodate the more than 600,000 Christian expatriots living in the country. Catholics alone number about 350,000. They are all served by only eight churches.26 In general, relations between Christians and Muslims are comfortable in workplaces and in the streets. Despite this, there is an underlying unease due to certain laws and the occasional clamour that arises from the more strident political and religious quarters. It is equally clear that the state has made sure that such sentiments do not transform into endangering the safety of the large expatriate and the small indigenous Christian communities.

The Bedouin As Kuwait was naturalising people after independence, some groups from the surrounding deserts and regions of Kuwait asked to join their Kuwaiti relatives as citizens. The government, however, did not naturalise all those who lived close to its territory or its desert, even though it counted them as Kuwaitis in census statistics from the 1970s until the mid-1980s. It did so because it wanted to be able to assert that the country had a higher percentage of Kuwaitis than expatriates. Those individuals were mostly relatives of Kuwaitis from the same tribes and groups of people who had been earlier naturalised. Until 1986 Kuwait provided the Bedouin – composed of mostly tribal groups consisting of Sunnis as well as Shiites – prerogatives reserved for citizens, especially in the areas of education and health, but not citizenship. It also provided passports to many of them who worked in the security services and the army. For a long time, the

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Bedouin represented the backbone of the Kuwaiti army and police, especially before the Iraqi invasion of 1990.27 The Bedouin as a group evolved from immigrants or refugees who crossed into Kuwait after having been cut off from their home country, Iraq, Saudi Arabia or Iran. Many lived in close proximity to the existing borders of Kuwait. In short, the Bedouin are a category of people who do not hold Kuwaiti citizenship but also do not have residency papers from any other country. The word bedoun in Arabic means ‘without’. In 1986, Kuwait stopped including the Bedouin as Kuwaitis in national statistics. They were no longer counted as Kuwaitis in the census. It seems this was a policy intended to force Bedouins to leave the country or declare not being from Kuwait. Suddenly their rights to education and medical treatment ended. Another shock came with the 1990 Iraqi invasion. After the liberation of Kuwait, thousands of Bedouin, mostly with origins in Iraq, left the country with the retreating Iraqi army. Many were fearful of reprisals resulting from cooperation by some Bedouin with the invasion. Official statements decreed that the Bedouin who remained, not being Kuwaitis, had to declare their real nationality or leave Kuwait to normalise their situation. The Bedouin had conditions imposed on them prohibiting them from obtaining work permits and health benefits and attending schools. Most lost their jobs in government service after 1991. They could not obtain marriage, birth and death certificates or other official documents. Suddenly they became illegal aliens. These procedures, counter to the essence of human rights, created suffering, isolation and poverty within the community. Major companies had to comply with government regulations, so they could not hire Bedouin, now officially categorised as ‘illegal residents in Kuwait’. This is a form of necropolitics by the state and conforms with Agamben’s state of exception.28 The Bedouin now live in extremely bad housing conditions, sometimes an entire family in one room. It is difficult to describe the amount of anger, frustration, fear and hatred the Bedouin embody for Kuwaitis and the resulting social alienation. Some Bedouin are under a ‘security constraint’, usually the result of some act such as protesting against their situation or an accusation of having collaborated with the Iraqi army. These security constraints, transferred from one decade to another, are a constant problem for anyone living under them.

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The Bedouin in Kuwait are mainly from northern tribes with Iraqi roots and this may explain the vehemence of the reaction against them, especially after the invasion. They were essentially held responsible and punished for something they no involvement in. The state, having contributed to the creation of the problem, is now exacerbating it by leaving it as is. It is no surprise that groups like Da’ish and al-Qaida find the conditions under which the Bedouin live an ideal environment for recruitment. Several people from the tribes and Bedouin were implicated in the bombing of the Shiite mosque in Kuwait city. The Bedouin population in Kuwait was estimated at more than 100,000 in 2012. The Arab Spring encouraged the third generation of Bedouin to take its issues to the street, where it found support from the Kuwaiti youth movement.29 This moved its cause onto the front burner. This generation of Bedouin is more assertive about finding a solution to their status, and connecting with the youth movement has transformed their cause into a national debate. Peaceful protests have been used as a means of pressure to find a humane and political solution. In 2006, I became the first person to interview a Bedouin on television, during the course of a show I hosted for a year. Their issues had never been addressed on Kuwait television. After that programme and another on bloggers, the show, along with two similar shows, was cancelled, based on a politically driven move by the government-owned and -run local TV satellite channel. The Bedouin do not have another country or place where they can go. Their ancestral lands of Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Iran have no reason or desire to take them in. They have no ties there. They are in Kuwait essentially as citizens in waiting. The Bedouin problem will not disappear by itself, so the state should either naturalise them, given their contributions to the country or, at a minimum, ensure their permanent residency and civil rights.

The youth movement The youth movement from 2011 to 2013 added a new element to Kuwaiti social structure. It and the civil society based movement were among the few forces unifying Kuwait’s different religious sects, tribes, urban groups, Bedouin and others. They embraced adaptation

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to difference and thereby the possibility of national integration. The movement represented an important example of the people’s integrative power despite the repressive actions of the state.30 Although unifying values in Kuwait are in decline and racism, mostly aimed at the tribes, Shias and Bedouin, has hit a high mark, attitudes among the young, who are the majority of the population, seem more positive when involved in a social movement. Despite several demonstrations and clashes with police, the youth movement represented a historic opportunity to transcend the limitations of tribe, sect and other self-interests in the grander pursuit of justice, equality and national integration. The values driving the new generation may not always be well articulated, but they need to be discussed and adopted by the state, not fought against or cynically emptied of content. In 2011, the youth movement focused on government corruption, with the hope of removing the prime minister, dissolving the National Assembly and paving the way for new elections. Thousands of young people gathered for months in Iradah Square (Will Square) and other central plazas, such as al-Safat Square and Liberation Square. They rallied tens of thousands behind their slogans. The daily protests escalated, with some protesters breaking into the National Assembly in the presence of opposition deputies in 2011. It was clear that the Arab Spring was making an impact on the small nation. A crackdown by the state followed, and numerous activists were arrested. Young female activists then gathered in front of the Ministry of Justice demanding their release, exhibiting a manifestation of social unity never before seen in Kuwait. Tribal youth was heavily represented in the movement. This was a new phenomenon. In the past, activists had come from the urban groups but they were now joined by educated tribal members who had integrated into Kuwaiti culture, but who nonetheless harboured feelings and experiences of being at the bottom of the social political totem pole. While the tribes traditionally focused on ensuring the victory of their own branch of relatives in elections, tribal youth activists have moved towards urban civil and human rights. These young people, many of them medical doctors, engineers, teachers and students, have moved away from the divisive sub-election politics of the tribe and made their goal a state with greater representation, fairer justice and more inclusive democracy.

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Discussions on Twitter have become one of the most important tools of social integration among Kuwaiti youths. Young men and women from different groups listen to each other via tweets. There are many instances of a Salafist telling a liberal, ‘I respect your opinion’, while others are shocked to hear individuals with opinions different from theirs. In 2011, cultural salons emerged from the Twitter debates. Men and women from diverse backgrounds gathered to talk with each other and discuss issues. It was a totally new experience for some of them. This mix of cultures, with men and women from liberal backgrounds talking to people from more religious and Islamist origins, helped advance a broader identity that has not yet broken into the mainstream. For youth movement participants, one way of bringing people of different backgrounds together was through art exhibitions, music, theatre, poetry and other cultural activities. This opened the way to discovering commonalities. The art and theatre typical in Kuwait often lacks creativity and free expression. Monitored and censored art does not touch the soul. Government-controlled book exhibits tend more to alienate people and weaken the will to be open to new thoughts than to encourage reading. The resurgence in expression, reading groups and private theatre groups offers young people a cultural outlet to circumnavigate spirit-crushing state interference. The state’s response to the youth and reform movements was predictably heavy-handed. Many protesters had dozens of court orders issued against them, some were arrested and sentenced, while others fled the country. Several prominent Kuwaitis who supported them were stripped of their citizenship by the state. The major opposition TV station (al-Youm TV) was closed, alongside its newspaper, and its owner and his siblings lost their citizenship. Another major TV station with alternative views (Al-Watan) was closed in 2015, alongside its newspaper. The main symbol of the opposition, the secular Mosallam al-Barrak, was jailed, having been sentenced in the summer of 2015 to three years in prison (for a speech he had directed at the emir in 2011). Scores of young people are serving sentences of two to five years or have gone into exile for repeating that same speech publicly and on YouTube. The state’s actions ultimately fragmented the movement. Yet this fragmentation adds to a deeper fragmentation of the social fabric of the country.

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The economic challenge The overall political challenges of reform cannot be isolated from economic structural reforms in Kuwait. A central problem for the Kuwaiti labour market is that most of the country’s university graduates have government jobs. Indeed, the government employs an astonishing 90 per cent of the citizen workforce. Most Kuwaitis continue to be attracted by the government’s relaxed working hours, along with its generous salaries and vacation policies. Since Kuwait depends on oil for 95 per cent of its income and has failed to devise a strategy for economic diversification, it will encounter further economic obstacles as a direct result of the falling oil prices since 2014. No government policies since 2004 to diversify have been implemented. Today Kuwait has a budget shortfall of $15.3 billion in the fiscal year that ended in March 2015. Revenues dropped by 45 per cent to $45.2 billion while spending was cut by 14.8 per cent to $60.5 billion.31 Salaries account for more than $17 billion. With the dip in prices it is becoming difficult for Kuwait to meet many commitments. At the time of writing, budget shortages and borrowing from the market are just starting. With the development of new sources of oil and energy elsewhere in the world, Kuwait’s diversification problem will only intensify. According to the Minister of Finance Anas al-Saleh, during the fiscal year 2016 –17 the government of Kuwait intends to ‘borrow up to three billion dinars ($10 billion) in U.S.-denominated bonds from international markets’. According to the minister it also intends to borrow another $2 billion Kuwaiti dinars ($6.6 billion) from the domestic market.32 A series of strikes in 2011 revealed another socio-economic problem. Teachers, customs workers, jurists and other professionals organised protests to demand salary increases in line with inflation. Their actions resulted in major losses for merchants, and the government had no choice but to agree to many of the strikers’ demands. Lacking a tradition or system of human resources, the Kuwaiti government and its huge bureaucracy is not equipped to negotiate with organised labour. This is exactly what happened during the three-day oil unions’ strike in 11 April 2016. That strike had to do with economic advantages and packages, and the country was in shock as its most vital economic engine was brought to a halt. Such strikes are a warning sign of how things would be

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if the government delayed a fully fledged political and economic reform package that includes taxes and an end of the monopoly by a small number of family-run and government-supported businesses. In March 2016 Kuwait approved a reform plan in an effort to reduce the fiscal deficit and address other imbalances in the economy. The plan includes significant cuts in subsidies such as gas, electricity and water. But the National Assembly approved a watered-down version of the cuts that should still save the budget around 1 per cent of GDP (gross domestic product). Other taxes on income and products seem to be on the way.33 These minimal changes created a social backlash. The isolated economic measures, without clear reforms both political and economic that also include progressive taxes, will harm the government and bring Kuwaitis closer to the idea of more representation in order to accept taxes. The private capital of the commercial class is one of the most important factors in Kuwait’s future development. However, significant amounts of this class’s investments have migrated to the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and other countries in the region and the world. The biggest complaint has been the Kuwaiti bureaucracy and restrictions on the private sector, much of which is overly dependent on government for contracts and projects. Many of the contracts, of course, are determined by politics, which ends up creating a sense of injustice in the system since government always favours a small group of contractors over all others.

Conclusion The future of youth will help decide the future of Kuwait’s acceptance of diversity or social integration. The youth movement’s influence on civil society has been tremendous in bringing down imagined barriers between Kuwaitis from different backgrounds. Although the movement suffered a setback when the state used its power to undermine its appeal and disperse its organisers the demand for democratisation and more representation did not go away. With the fall of the centre, extremism fills the vacuum. The youth movement’s fragmentation has opened space for more deterioration in the Kuwaiti social fabric. It would be a mistake to view the suicide bombing carried out by Da’ish in Kuwait at the Imam Sadiq mosque in 2015 as an isolated incident.

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Discrimination frustrates, hurts and turns individuals and groups into angry partisans. If left to fester, it has the potential to turn partisanship and disobedience into rebellion and possibly violence. To counter discrimination, Kuwait needs to deepen the semidemocratic experience that began with the 1962 constitution. The entire power structure needs become more reform oriented by, for example, initiating political parties and developing the election law, and eventually electing the government and its prime minister. A private economy monopolised by the few must be restructured to make it easy for young entrepreneurs to enter the market. The relationships between the different groups in Kuwaiti society – urban and tribal, Shiites and Sunnis, men and women, the Bedouin, Christians, youths and, ultimately, individuals – require that the government establish fair policies that respect human rights, equality and justice. The glass is not empty and is in many respects half full. The rest of the glass needs to be filled before the empty part swallows up all the accomplishments of the last several decades.

Acknowledgements During fieldwork for the study between 2012 and 2013 I interviewed some 70 (mostly young) men and women from different social groups and strata in Kuwait. Their views included those of Islamists, liberal democrats, Shiites, feminists, urbanites, tribes, Bedouin and Christian Kuwaitis. Their positions and experiences serve as the basis for this examination of social cohesion in Kuwait and how it relates to the state in the context of prevailing political structures and systems. I would like to thank Dalal Al Dayel, a researcher and social activist, for helping organise meetings and interviews with different groups in Kuwait for this chapter. I must also thank all those who took the time to meet with me and share their impressions. I have kept all of those I interviewed anonymous while trying to place the most important ideas and perceptions that emerged from our discussions at the forefront of this discussion. Any errors are my own. I would also like to thank, Kuwait University for a Sabbatical year (2016 –17), and the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (Doha, Qatar) for hosting me as a visiting scholar during the writing of the final versions of this study.

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Notes 1. See relevant theoretical studies such as Timothy Campbell and Adam Sitze (eds), Biopolitics: A Reader (London and Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013). See as well in the same volume, Achille Mbembe, ‘Necropolitics’, pp. 161 – 92. 2. See Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). See also Allen G. Johnson, Privilege, Power and Difference, 2nd edition (New York: McGraw Hill, 2006). 3. Shafeeq Ghabra, ‘The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait: An eyewitness account’, Journal of Palestine Studies 20/2 (Winter 1991), pp. 112 – 25. 4. For an in-depth discussion see Shafeeq Ghabra, Kuwait: A Study in the Dynamics of State Authority and Society [al-Kuwayt: Dirasah fi Aliyyat al Dawlah wal Sulta wal Mujtama’ ], 2nd edition (Kuwait: Afaq Books, 2010), pp. 15 – 44; for an older study see also Shafeeq Ghabra, ‘Kuwait and the economics of socio-economic change’, in Barry Rubin (ed.), Crises in the Contemporary Persian Gulf (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), pp. 105– 26. 5. Discussions and open-ended qualitative interviews with leading members and historians of the Awazem tribe 2013 such as lawyers Khalid al-Juwaisri’ and Abdalla al-Rumaidi and historian Talal Rumaidi. The Awazem are a political phenomenon in almost every parliament and government formed since independence. 6. Open-ended interviews with members of different tribes in Kuwait, 2012 – 13; Hind Ahmad al-Naqib, Social Development and its Effect in Settling Bedouins in Kuwait [al-Tanmiya al-Ijtima’iyyah wa Atharoha fi Tawteen al-Bado fi al-Kuwayt ] (Kuwait: That al-Salsil, 1981), p. 188. 7. See Ghabra, Kuwait, for an extensive analysis of this dynamic. 8. Open-ended extended qualitative interviews with members of different urban families and youth, in addition to interviews with members of tribes and tribal youth, Kuwait 2011 – 12. The interviews were always in groups and would take place over several meetings and long discussions of three hours per session. 9. These issues were always raised during interviews. Personally I have observed the media racism and the many racist editorial attacks on the tribes. 10. Agamben’s state of exception is quite relevant in this context. See Agamben, State of Exception. See also Johnson, Privilege, Power and Difference. 11. Since 1963 Shia representatives have been elected to every Kuwaiti parliament. 12. Open-ended extended interviews with Shia youth and groups, Kuwait, 2011 – 12. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid.; see Ghabra, Kuwait.

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16. Interviews with Shia groups who are involved in Shia religious affairs, Kuwait 2011 –12. 17. On privilege see Vivian M. May, Pursuing Intersectionality, Unsettling Dominant Imaginaries (New York: Routledge, 2015). 18. Open-ended interviews with both liberal and religious Shiite groups. 19. The theoretical context of biopolitics and intersectionality provides a deeper understanding of the issues facing different groups in Kuwait. 20. All the interviews agreed on the evolution of this new culture as a counter culture of resistance to domination. 21. Open-ended extended interview with young women and women’s groups, Kuwait, 2011 – 12. 22. Ibid. 23. Studies on intersectionality are of great help in creating a better understanding of such a context. 24. Man’ Alnisa’ min Al ‘amal laylan fi Al-Kuwait [Forbidding Women from Working at night in Kuwait]. Middle East Online, 11 June 2007. 25. Interview in Kuwaiti Rai Amm by Kuwaiti Reverend Emanuale Ghareeb, Arabian Business, 28 February 2012. Available at http:// arabic.arabianbusiness.com/politics-economics/society/2012/feb/28/ 69442/#.VdLrk7fuU6k (accessed 28 February 2012). 26. These figures vary from half a million to 700,000. Expatriot Christians are the second-largest community in Kuwait, after Moslems. Ibid. 27. This section is built on open-ended extended interviews with the Bedouin’s of Kuwait. I met with about 12 male and female Bedouins of different ages. Most were in their 20s and 30s. Kuwait, 2011 – 12. 28. See Mbembe, ‘Necropolitics’. 29. Open-ended qualitative interviews with Bedouin youth and representatives, Kuwait, 2011 – 12. 30. This section is based on actual observation and long discussions between 2009 and 2015 with leaders and activists in the Kuwait youth movement. This section is also based on the author’s interaction with the events. 31. Gulf News, 12 September 2016. Available at http://gulfnews.com/busi ness/economy/kuwait-posts-budget-deficit-after-16-years-of-surplus1.1876179 (accessed 13 September 2016). 32. Asharq Al-Awsat, ‘Kuwait borrows money to finance budget deficit’, 4 July 2016. Available at http://english.aawsat.com/2016/07/article 55353881/kuwait-borrows-money-finance-budget-deficit (accessed 5 July 2016). 33. Arab Times, ‘Kuwait’s new budget keeps spending unchanged – by National Bank of Kuwait’, 3 August 2016. Available at http://www. arabtimesonline.com/news/kuwaits-new-budget-keeps-spendingunchanged-national-bank-kuwait/ (accessed 4 August 2016).

2 SAUDI ARABIA’S SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1 Mehtab Currey, Abdullah Al-Shoaibi and Nassir Alkasabi

Introduction A significant donor Saudi Arabia makes headlines with its very generous giving to humanitarian causes2 but its funding of international development is less well known. Of the 18 non-OECD-DAC (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development-Development Assistance Committee) donors that report to the OECD3 and that together in 2013 provided 13.4 per cent of total estimated global aid, Saudi Arabia stood out as the largest, providing 34.4 per cent of this total.4 In 2014 Saudi aid totalled $14 billion, with a gross domestic (GDP)/aid ratio of 2.1 per cent.5 This is well above the 0.7 per cent agreed by donors in 2002 in Monterrey and recommitted in July 2015 in Addis Ababa towards achieving the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The Islamic principles of solidarity building among people and nations, zakat6 and sadaqah,7 are the foundations for this generous aid, influenced no doubt with security and political considerations.

Different aid sources being consolidated Saudi aid comes from several sources within the country, royal as well as other public and private sources and is disbursed through

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different channels, so tends to be disjointed. The setting up of the new King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre (KSHARC), or KSRelief in short,8 in May 2015 in Riyadh heralds change. Its mandate is to coordinate all Saudi humanitarian assistance and, in due course, international development assistance (currently provided by the Saudi Fund for Development) within a single institution, and it could well be the precursor to a Saudi Ministry for International Development.

Ad hoc but also planned: the low profile of development aid Saudi Arabia’s large humanitarian contributions may appear ad hoc but they complement the substantial well-planned and sustained Saudi financing for international development that implicitly supports the SDGs for economic development and poverty reduction globally. This chapter explores Saudi Arabia’s aid programme, particularly through the bilateral Saudi Fund for Development (SFD)9 and the multilateral Islamic Development Bank (IsDB).10 Saudi Arabia is the largest shareholder in IsDB (23.6 per cent) among the 56 member countries that are all shareholders. Although IsDB’s development financing and its achievements are not attributable to Saudi funding alone, IsDB’s inclusion here is to illustrate some of the values and principles of international development to which Saudi Arabia subscribes.

SFD and IsDB: development effectiveness SFD and IsDB respectively spend on average $2 billion (about onethird of total Saudi aid in 2013)11 and $6 billion annually on development projects. SFD funding is global so that 48 per cent of countries receiving aid are non-Muslim. IsDB funding is essentially for its 56 Muslim member countries and it also covers Muslim populations in non-member countries. From its inception in 1975 SFD has provided a total of $33.4 billion in development assistance, 56 per cent of which was in grant form and the remaining as very soft loans.12 IsDB follows Islamic financing principles strictly and since its inception in 1976 has provided $101.7 billion in development assistance, largely as ordinary financing at market rates. The SFD and IsDB development models are simple, with elements that are unique and with some indicators of effectiveness similar to those agreed by the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation

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(GPEDC)13 in Busan in 2011. Both continue to pursue ways to further enhance effectiveness of their development financing and are active members of the Coordination Group (CG)14 of 10 mainly Arab bilateral and multilateral donors and participate with the international community in the GPEDC.

Challenges Foreign aid policy To the extent that SFD does follow defined guidelines for its development assistance and the IsDB’s vision and mission statements and objectives are clearly defined and followed, one can assume they also reflect Saudi development policy. It would be commendable for Saudi Arabia to define its overarching policy and strategy to rationalise how it aims to achieve its objectives related to the SDGs. International aid policy and architecture is changing rapidly in the context of increasing conflict and fragility globally, and particularly in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, which is leading to protracted crises and large-scale long-term displacement of people, both internal and external. This shift in policy, combining humanitarian and development aid, for economic development of long-term displaced populations was launched at the London Conference on Syria and the Region and has evolved through the World Humanitarian Summit, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and the Obama Summit, all of which took place in 2016.

Consolidating and publishing aid information While Saudi Arabia’s policy of quiet giving in line with Islamic principles is appreciated, its commendable role in international development deserves greater visibility. It already reports its aid to the OECD-DAC. Complementing this with a state-of-the-art information system that consolidates Saudi aid from its various sources and distribution channels should help to put Saudi Arabia solidly on the map of global donors.

Presence in partner countries The importance of in-country engagement on the partner country’s longer-term development plans, the role of other donors, the political and developmental implications of their collective soft powers and

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how this interacts with the soft power of Saudi Arabia cannot be overemphasised. Since SFD is not present at country level, Saudi Arabia is missing out on this vital dimension of effective development assistance. SFD’s country presence would also bring greater visibility about Saudi Arabia’s overseas aid programme.

Development results on the ground Saudi Arabia’s aid is generous but it is unable to assess the results this funding achieves on the ground on the country and its people. Both SFD and IsDB are adopting results based project planning and setting up systems and procedures to be able to assess their results. KSRelief’s emphasis on monitoring and evaluation from the very outset shows that Saudi Arabia is interested in the results of its financing and seriously wishes to address this.

About the chapter While the annual reports of SFD and IsDB provide insights into their development programmes, working closely with them brings an indepth understanding and appreciation of the principles, values and commitment these institutions demonstrate in order to achieve their objectives. This chapter is therefore less about the amounts of Saudi aid and more about the values and principles that the aid propagates. It first describes Saudi Arabia’s aid architecture and goes on to elaborate how SFD and IsDB support development and what they achieve. It assesses the relevance of the Paris and Busan indicators of effectiveness to SFD and IsDB and brings out their additional values and principles for the wider development community to understand. How to further enhance the effectiveness of Saudi aid is also discussed.

Saudi Arabia: a leading Arab donor There are 22 Arab countries with a total population of about 372 million (six times the UK population of 62 million or a third of India’s 1.2 billion people). Six of these countries – namely, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain – form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), with aspirations similar to aspects of the European Union (EU).15 According to the World Bank, and based on OECD-DAC data, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait accounted for over 90 per cent of Arab aid in 2009,16 with Saudi Arabia the largest among them. It is expected that the fall in oil revenue will

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have an impact on Saudi Arabia’s economic development plan and its track record of generous international aid. It does remain a significant donor for Yemen, Syria and the region in general. At the London Conference Saudi Arabia announced $200 million bilateral assistance for Syria and the Islamic Development Bank announced $9 billion multilateral credit for Syria and the region.

Financing international development Participants in international policy making As a member of the United Nations Saudi Arabia participates in the many global forums that deliberate and decide international policies such as, for example, the 2030 SDGs, Financing for Development (FfD) and the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC), which is coordinated by the United Nations (UN) and the OECD-DAC. Saudi Arabia is also represented in many of the ‘groups’ that bring nations together for strategic decisions on areas of common interest such as the G2017 and the G8’s Deauville Partnership, launched in May 2011 to support Arab Countries in Transition.18 Within the Gulf region, Saudi Arabia is a leading member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as noted above. These forums provide some of the broad frameworks for Saudi Arabia’s participation in international development.

Aid is under-reported Saudi Arabia reports its development financing to the OECD-DAC. However, not all of its development financing is captured in the DAC reporting system. For example, the 2015 OECD report on multilateral aid describes Saudi Arabia’s funding of multilaterals.19 The report refers to the usual set of multilaterals funded by DAC donors but misses out the significant Saudi funding for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (at over $10 billion it is Saudi Arabia’s largest contribution among its core-funded multilaterals) and for other multilaterals such as those in the Coordination Group, including the Islamic Development Bank (see Annex 1).

Aid information not easy to access Following Islamic principles of quiet giving and not publicising, much of Saudi aid thus remains under-reported and Saudi Arabia’s

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development financing is not widely known about. The website of the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs lists Saudi announcements, but mainly on humanitarian aid. Often the information available is not easily accessible, either because of language (some official documents available on the web are in Arabic) or because it is embedded within other URLs, so is not easy to find. Further, while much information on Saudi funding is available on an annual basis from the reports of the many international aid organisations it funds (Annex 1), there is no regular report that consolidates Saudi funding as a whole or is aggregated over the years. The 2015 Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) report20 for the first time provides official information on annual aid figures since 1994. Importantly though, it is possible to get an understanding of the values and principles that Saudi Arabia follows through its range of funding.

Rapid increase in financing for international development

The OECD-DAC21 noted: ‘Among Arab donors, the figures for Saudi Arabia are particularly striking. Its USD 5.56 billion in 2008 exceeds the ODA volumes of fifteen of the 23 DAC countries.’ Since then Saudi aid has fluctuated, falling to $3.37 billion in 2009,22 increasing to $5.09 billion in 2011 and then to $5.7 billion in 2013, giving an ODA/ GNI ratio of 0.8 per cent. The 2015 OECD-DCD report23 somewhat revises the above figures on Saudi aid, and reaffirms the rising trend in financing. There is a small difference between the aid data reported by Saudi Arabia (Table 2.1). Exceptionally in 2014, Saudi Aid shot up by 112 per cent over 2013 to $14 billion. Figure 2.1 shows that the funding trend from 2004 to 2014, as reported by Saudi Arabia. It is likely that these figures still do not capture the full picture of Saudi Arabia’s annual development financing.

Aid characteristics Saudi funding goes through both bilateral and multilateral channels as well as through semi and non-government organisations. It uses many different financing instruments, from grants and soft loans to budget support, to contributions to the capital funds of major international development institutions. It finances trade and private sector development together with risk insurance. It funds globally, irrespective of geography, religion, race or culture, although it

Table 2.1 Saudi aid according to different reports (in US$ million) Year

OECD-DAC Report*

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

1,734 1,005 2,095 1,734 5,565 NA 3,494 5,239 1,436 5,825 Not yet available

SAMA Annual Report 2015 1,804 9,80 2,070 1,628 5,057 3,114 3,704 5,440 2,070 6,184 13,882

* Source: 2004–08: ‘Beyond the DAC. The welcome role of other providers of development cooperation’, Kimberly Smith, Talita Yamashiro Fordelone and Felix Zimmermann, DCD Issues Brief, OECD-DAC, May 2010; 2009: DAC Working Party on Development Finance Statistics, ‘Update on multilateral agencies’, non-DAC countries’ and private foundations’ statistical reporting to the OECD-DAC in 2013’, DCD/DAC/STAT(2014)2, OECD-DCD, 31 March 2014; and 2009–13: ‘Development cooperation by countries beyond the DAC’, OECD-DCD, May 2015.

2014

14.00

2013

6.18

2011

5.44

2009

3.11

2008 2004 Figure 2.1 2015.

5.06 1.80

Saudi aid in US$ billion. Source: SAMA Annual Report

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predominantly funds Muslim countries and countries in its immediate neighbourhood of MENA. Its funding is largely untied, that is, its aid is not conditional on buying Saudi goods and services. Its project financing is mainly for large infrastructure projects across the key sectors of energy, transport, telecommunications, agriculture, health, education and water, sanitation and housing. Its aid therefore delivers tangible hard assets to its partner countries. Through IsDB’s Islamic financing, it shares in project risks as well as gains. It is a shareholder in key multilaterals like the international financial institutions (IFIs) and Arab institutions and coordinates project financing with them. A recent SFD article24 appreciates the important role IsDB plays in managing three crucial funds in Palestine,25 funded by SFD and others and notes that SFD and IsDB are together ‘leading the Arab Financing Agencies in the development efforts and contributing largely in poverty reduction and mitigation of power crises; especially in clean power generation (Hydropower) to reduce carbon emission’. From the examples of its financing, including through the SFD and IsDB, it is evident that Saudi funding is primarily for humanitarian, economic development and solidarity building purposes, mainly for low- and middle-income countries, and that Saudi Arabia makes strategic use of its considerable soft power, like most donors, to achieve its security and political interests as well. The literature on Saudi aid misses out some areas, for example, a clearer link to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the countries it funds; considerations for governance and priorities such as women and girls, climate change, engagement in fragile states; and the extent to which it works with other international development partners towards a planned eradication of global poverty.

Aid Architecture Saudi Arabia’s aid architecture is represented in Figure 2.2.

The Royal Diwan Like most donor countries, Saudi Arabia’s aid comes from different parts of government and is distributed through different channels. At the very top the Royal Diwan, headed by the King, Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, approves the largest proportion of aid both bilaterally and through multilateral channels, much of it as grant and for both humanitarian and international development purposes.

Figure 2.2 Saudi International Development Assistance: Aid Architecture.

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The Royal Diwan is the focal point for Saudi Arabia’s humanitarian aid architecture and as acknowledged by the UN, Saudi Arabia’s humanitarian assistance is based on core humanitarian principles regardless of nationality, race or religion.26 Three publications, among others, have documented Saudi humanitarian assistance at length.27 Al Yahya and Fustier sum it up well: Saudi Arabia has emerged as the world’s largest donor of humanitarian assistance outside the Western states, traditionally the members of OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). In many recent natural disasters, the country’s contributions far exceeded those of any traditional donors. Rather than repeat what has been already noted about Saudi Arabia’s humanitarian aid, this chapter will focus on aspects of Saudi Arabia’s financing for international development. It is, however, important to note here a major recent development on the humanitarian front: the setting up of KSRelief in May 2015, with the aspiration of becoming a centre of excellence, in line with international best practice on humanitarian assistance. It signals a step change towards a strategic approach from the current ad hoc and uncoordinated Saudi humanitarian response. As it begins to take off, KSRelief is actively engaging with the international community of bilateral and multilateral donors, including the UN,28 towards its institutional development, together with preparation of policy and strategy frameworks and professional staffing. KSRelief reports directly to the Royal Diwan and will be the main channel for Saudi Arabia’s humanitarian aid, beginning with the $274 million announced in May 2015 as humanitarian aid to Yemen through the UN.29 Side by side with this development, the Royal Diwan is active in its strategic international development role. According to Arab News of 19 May 2015,30 referring to an IMF report, Saudi Arabia has given a total of $22.7 billion in direct aid to Arab countries since 2011 (Figure 2.3). According to the article, Egypt received the largest proportion at $6.5 billion, with $5.9 billion (2.3 per cent of Egypt’s GDP) delivered directly to the country. Yemen was allocated $3.8 billion, of which only $1.2 billion (8.4 per cent of Yemen’s GDP) was delivered due to political developments there. Jordan was allocated $3 billion, of which only $1.9 billion (8.1 per cent of Jordan’s GDP) was delivered

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Figure 2.3 Saudi aid allocations 2011 –15. Source: Arab News, 19 May 2015, http://www.arabnews.com/saudi-arabia/news/748966. till May 2015. Bahrain and Oman were each allocated $2.8 billion (8.4 per cent of its GDP) and $2.5 billion (3.1 per cent of its GDP) respectively. The West Bank and Gaza Strip received $1.8 billion (14.4 per cent of Palestine’s GDP), Morocco $1.6 billion (1.5 per cent of its GDP), Sudan $527 million (0.8 per cent of its GDP) and Djibouti $68 million (4.3 per cent of its GDP). In addition, Saudi Arabia has increased its monthly allocation to Palestine from $14 million to $20 million for a total of $240 million annually.31 This bilateral development assistance is in line with the principle of solidarity building among the Muslim ummah.32 It also illustrates the use of Saudi soft power to help shore up the economies of neighbouring Arab nations that are either in conflict (e.g., Yemen,

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Syria and Palestine), are emerging from conflict (e.g., Egypt and Tunisia) or are vulnerable due to conflict in the region (e.g., Jordan, Morocco and Bahrain). Countries outside the region also receive similar budget support, for example, Pakistan received $1.4 billion in 2014, at least half of it as grant, to bolster the country’s foreign reserve.33 These figures, together with the latest data from the Ministry of Finance showing that in 2014 Saudi foreign aid was above $14 billion,34 dwarf those reported by Saudi Arabia to the OECDDAC,35 although some of this under-reporting is because, at the time of writing, data for 2014 are still to be published by the OECD.

Line ministries Under the Royal Diwan, the aid architecture branches out to different line ministries that also provide aid, including humanitarian assistance. For example, until recently the Ministry of Interior coordinated humanitarian aid provided by Saudi citizens in response to National Campaigns. Following the attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11) Saudi Arabia instituted the National Campaigns as a measure of transparency and accountability of Saudi public and private funding of humanitarian causes. All donations by Saudi nationals, for example for Syria, are collected, coordinated and distributed officially by the National Campaign, through its own staff as well as through approved NGOs such as the Saudi Red Crescent (SRC), International Islamic Relief Organisation, Saudi Arabia (IIROSA) and others. Separately from this, the General Expenditure Department of the Ministry of Finance runs a large humanitarian relief programme, with warehouses full of relief goods ready to be flown out as needed. Again, this is part of the quiet giving not advertised by Saudi Arabia. From October 2015 all Saudi humanitarian relief will come under the management of KSRelief, for a less fragmented approach, bringing greater efficiency. In parallel, the Minister of Finance chairs the Board of the bilateral Saudi Fund for Development. The Ministries of Health and Defence and other line ministries apparently also support international development in their respective sectors.

Aid delivery channels: multilateral institutions Saudi Arabia also contributes to the capital funds of a large range of multilateral institutions engaged in international development and is a

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shareholder in them (Annex 1). For example, it contributes to the capital funds of: – a range of Arab multilateral institutions in which it is a major shareholder, for example, 30 per cent contribution to the capital of OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) Fund for International Development (OFID); – the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD; 12.7 per cent of capital); – the World Bank Group’s International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD; 3.5 per cent of capital); the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA; 3.1 per cent of capital); International Development Agency (IDA; 1.1 per cent of capital) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC; 1.2 per cent of capital); – the International Monetary Fund (IMF; 2.9 per cent of capital); and – the African Development Bank (AfDB; 0.2 per cent of capital) and its African Development Fund (AfDF). In addition to the above, the UN family of institutions also receive Saudi funding.36 Some, like the UNDP, the United National International Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and IFAD have received core funding and, together with others (e.g., the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)), they have received project funding, for example, for the Syrian refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey as well as large humanitarian grants. However, Saudi Arabia has not used its contributions to capital funds of multilaterals to negotiate and lever reform, as is done by, for example, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) through its Multilateral Aid Reviews (MAR).37 Among non-DAC countries, including Gulf donors like Saudi Arabia, there is a high level of scepticism about the effectiveness of the UN system and its high overhead costs. Despite this scepticism, Saudi Arabia has given very large humanitarian grants to the UN, as noted earlier. UN accountability for these grants has, however, not always met expected standards, for example, Saudi Arabia’s grant of $500 million to the UN for Iraq was in excess of the $312 million then

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sought by the UN. However, the UN failed to meet expected accountability standards. Disappointed, in 2015 Saudi Arabia exercised more stringent accountability measures for its humanitarian aid for Yemen, also through the UN. This inevitably caused delays. While there are lessons to be learned by both sides on effective humanitarian response, one can hardly blame Saudi Arabia for continuing to insist on greater UN accountability, as the latter continues to take time to apply the lessons learned in Iraq. A welcome outcome could well be that Saudi Arabia joins hands with donors like the DFID to use core funding to UN agencies as a means of leveraging a more effective multilateral system for international development, including humanitarian assistance. The OECD-DAC launched its analysis of multilateral aid at the conference on Financing for Development in Addis Ababa in July 2015.38 The report notes that: – the role of multilaterals for achieving the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals is going to be even more important than in the past; – the UN received mainly earmarked funding, that is, non-core; – large non-DAC sovereign providers have been increasing their multilateral funding; – to be fit for purpose multilaterals will need to adapt rapidly and flexibly to an increasingly complex operating environment and enhance and demonstrate their comparative advantages; and – the international donor community has a role to play, through incentives and disincentives, to support multilateral organisations to reform. This is precisely the role that Saudi Arabia and its development arms like SFD and KSRelief need to play in tandem with the international community for a more efficient and effective multilateral system.

Aid delivery channels: the Coordination Group A large proportion of Saudi development assistance is channelled through and coordinated with institutions of the Coordination Group (CG). This group of largely Arab national and regional development institutions was set up in 1975 to optimise development through coordination of resources and harmonisation of procedures.

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The Secretariat of the CG is hosted by the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development (AFESD) based in Kuwait. Other members of the CG are: four Gulf bilateral funds: the Saudi Fund, the Abu Dhabi Fund, the Kuwait Fund and the Qatar Fund, the last joining in 2013; together with . six Arab multilaterals: the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD); the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB); the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF); the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA); OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID); and the Arab Gulf Program for Development (AGFUND).

.

Saudi Arabia is a large shareholder in all six multilaterals (Annex 1) and together with the bilateral Saudi Fund for Development, represents an important part of Saudi Arabia’s aid architecture. Alongside the three other bilateral Funds (Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar), they collaborate as the Coordination Group (Figure 2.4), to plan and implement their development financing. In the period 2008 – 12 the CG funded a total of $53.6 billion.39 With common project formats and approval procedures they are, in some ways, further ahead in harmonisation than DAC donors. They regularly consult on sharing project costs. Areas for further improvement are joint missions to monitor, review and report on projects, joint assessment of the results achieved on the ground by their financing, greater transparency on reporting their financing data and further collaboration of the CG with other donors including with DAC donors where relevant.

Aid delivery channels: semi- and non-government organisations (NGOs) The Saudi aid architecture also includes non-state actors or NGOs. For example, the Saudi Red Crescent is semi-government and together with NGOs like IIROSA and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), they deliver Saudi humanitarian and development aid nationally and internationally. Saudi funding of international NGOs like Care or Oxfam is not direct but indirectly through the UN, for example in Pakistan. The Saudi government aid architecture outlined above illustrates the many different institutions through which Saudi Arabia funds

Figure 2.4

OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID) (Vienna)

The Coordination Group members at their table.

Multilateral

Bilateral

Qatar Development Fund (joined in 2013) (Doha)

Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD) (Abu Dhabi)

Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) (Kuwait)

Saudi Fund for Development (SFD) (Riyadh)

About the Coordination Group • Forum of 10 bilateral and multilateral institutions to coordinate their funding of international development. • Common development objectives prioritising country-owned and country-led development; no conditions or interference in sovereignty issues. • Financial and administrative autonomy of each member. • Independent boards and management. • Heads meet every two years; Heads of Operations twice a year. • Coordinated (shared policies, templates and documents, operations) but independent decisions. • CG commitments for 2008–12 totalled approx. US$53.6 billion for 922 transactions in 103 countries. Commitments for 2012 totalled US$13.2 billion. • By 2012 completed 278 projects worth US$20 billion. • Funding largely for public infrastructure, two-thirds of total on concessional terms. • CG summits promote Arab integration; private sector; trade, CSOs and women. • World Bank and Arab Partnership Initiative besides others, e.g, energy for the poor; Arab food and water; education for employment; Islamic financing, etc.

Secretariat: Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD) (Kuwait )

Arab Gulf Programme for Development (AGFUND) (Riyadh)

Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) (Khartoum)

Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) (Abu Dhabi)

Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) (Jeddah)

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international development and the many different channels through which Saudi aid reaches a country and its people.40 The humanitarian and development objectives of these institutions and their values and principles also reflect those promoted and adhered to by Saudi Arabia. KSRelief has a challenging task in bringing these many actors together towards a more coordinated Saudi humanitarian aid and, in due course, more coordinated international development assistance as well. Like many other donor countries, this still does not capture the whole picture of Saudi Arabia’s aid architecture. However, it does show that Saudi Arabia’s contribution to international development is significant and is not ‘hidden’ as many tend to think. Information is much more widely available now, perhaps a lot of it in Arabic. Information is also readily shared by institutions like SFD and IsDB. These two institutions are now described in more detail to illustrate Saudi Arabia’s international development assistance.

Bilateral aid through the Saudi Fund for Development ‘Founded in March 1975, the charter of the Saudi Fund for Development defines its objectives as ‘financing development projects in developing countries by granting them the necessary loans and encouraging the national non-crude oil exports by financing and insuring them’. The fund is a legal entity with independent financial status and is managed by a six-member Board of Directors chaired by the Minister of Finance. Executive authority rests with the vice chairman and managing director to implement Board decisions. SFD has an approved capital of 31 billion Saudi Arabian riyal (SAR) (US $8.26 billion approximately). Its operations are centralised in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and it does not have country offices. Since inception, SFD has provided over $33.4 billion in development assistance to about 83 countries globally. Its activity is not geographically restricted, and it deals directly with the governments of the developing countries in order to participate in financing priority development projects. The fund gives financing priority to the least developed and low-income countries.

A. Objectives SFD’s main objective is to support socio-economic development in developing countries by providing very soft loans for projects at 1–3 per cent over 20 –30 years, with grace periods of 5–7 years. Since 2000

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SFD has also been providing grant financing. Another objective is to finance and provide insurance for Saudi national non-crude oil exports. Its funding decisions are guided by the following: the project should be economically or socially feasible; the loan should be disbursed and repaid in Saudi riyal; . the loan amount for any project should neither exceed 5 per cent of SFD’s capital nor 50 per cent of the total cost of the financed project; . the total amount of loans granted at one time to any country should not exceed 10 per cent of the fund’s capital; . in 2015 the Board agreed that SFD can finance 100 per cent of project costs and that Technical Assistance grant financing can also be provided. . .

A set of separate parameters guides the financing and insurance coverage for Saudi non-crude oil exports.

B. Funding development projects SFD follows a simple model for its development financing. It prioritises country ownership and leadership and only funds projects in response to requests from government. An agreement to fund a project is essentially about the project itself with no conditionality attached about the wider country political or governance environment. Since almost all projects are infrastructure, most SFD officials of the Operations Department are qualified engineers so bring professional expertise. Of the total of $33.4 billion of project funding provided since inception, about $14.6 billion was soft loans, including $1.3 billion from the Ministry of Finance channelled through SFD. About $7.7 billion of this was for Africa, $6.5 billion for Asia and the remaining for countries in Central Asia, Europe and Latin America. From 2000 SFD loans were complemented with grants of about $18.8 billion (56.22 per cent). SFD loans also include grant components that range from 35 per cent to 59 per cent (footnote 12). The grants mainly finance humanitarian causes, largely through UN agencies. SFD grants also provide budget support to some countries. Projects cover a range of sectors, from transport and communication (30 per cent); social sectors (health, education, water and

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sanitation; 25 per cent); power (21 per cent); agriculture (15 per cent); industry and mining (5 per cent); and other sectors (4 per cent). In line with the principle of country ownership, SFD works jointly with government on project appraisal, procurement (mostly international bidding), awarding of contract and monitoring and reporting of projects.

C. Effectiveness of development financing

Based on the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005)41 and the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (2011)42 principles of development effectiveness, SFD presents a rather positive picture compared to some OECD-DAC donors. Although SFD does not use the country financial management or procurement systems, its funding is reported on the country’s budget and approved by parliament, or in its absence by the Chief Justice. It manages project funds, either by directly funding contractors following government approval or, in some cases, by reimbursing government if agreed works have been carried out as per project design. Funding is usually not conditional on buying Saudi goods and services and procurement is usually through international bidding. Since there is joint project implementation and monitoring with government, accountability, particularly mutual accountability, is less of an issue. SFD disburses funds in agreement with government and the output is a hard asset

Annual funding by SFD (in million SAR) 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Figure 2.5

Increasing trend of annual funding by SFD.

SAUDI ARABIA’S SUPPORT

Industry and mining 5%

Other 4% Transport and communication 29%

Agriculture 15%

Power 21%

Figure 2.6

63

Infrastructure 26%

Sectors funded by SFD.

such as a school, hospital, bridge, road, dam, etc. received by government. Both the recipient and the financier have hard evidence of what is funded and delivered. Many SFD funded projects are co-financed with other members of the Coordination Group. Although SFD does not report on project results, it does report on annual fund disbursement and on the infrastructure built and delivered in countries, so there is a sense of reporting on project results. It is launching a major reform whereby project documents are incorporating logical frameworks to be able to monitor project outputs and over time assess the results of Saudi financing. Annex 2 summarises SFD’s assessment of its development effectiveness relative to the Paris and Busan indicators. The 2010 OECD-DAC stocktake on aid effectiveness prepared for Busan showed that DAC donors met only one of the Paris targets – the coordination of technical cooperation, which already had a high baseline. The remaining targets were unmet. Comparatively, performance of the Saudi Fund, if it had taken part in the survey, would have been better, particularly on country ownership, alignment to country priorities, coordination and harmonisation

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among the CG and on mutual accountability. SFD is now moving towards reporting on its results. Given this level of performance, SFD might be encouraged to address other areas of development effectiveness such as prioritising women and girls or climate change, including keeping a close eye on the environmental impact of its infrastructure projects.

Multilateral aid through the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) A. Objectives With 23.5 per cent contribution to IsDB’s capital resources of $150 billion, Saudi Arabia is its largest shareholder and a key player in steering the role IsDB plays in international development. Finance ministers of IsDB’s 56 member countries (Annex 3), including Saudi Arabia, are members of IsDB’s Board of Governors. IsDB has an inspiring vision statement: to significantly transform the landscape of comprehensive human development in the Muslim world, to help restore its dignity. Its mission is to promote comprehensive human development with a focus on priority areas of alleviating poverty, improving health, promoting education, improving governance and improving prosperity for the people. It values building solidarity among its member states as they are shareholders as well as borrowers of IsDB finances, so it is not a donor –recipient relationship like other Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). It is the only MDB that follows Islamic financing principles.

B. Medium-term business strategy The above objectives are implemented through the medium-term business strategy and the comprehensive development model of the IsDB group of five, namely: the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB established 1975); the Islamic Research and Training Institute (IRTI created 1981); the Islamic Corporation for Insurance of Investment and Export Credit (ICIEC initiated 1994); the Islamic Corporation for Development of the Private Sector (ICD formed 1999); and the International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation (ITFC founded 2008). For its fortieth anniversary IsDB commissioned an independent evaluation by the Boston Consultancy Group (BCG) and some of its recommendations are the basis of the current medium-term business strategy.

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Each member country benefits from the bank group approach that combines the bank’s credit for projects with ICD’s private sector financing, ITFC’s financing for trade, ICIEC’s provision of risk insurance and IRTI’s advisory, research and training activities to support member countries to achieve their development objectives. In addition, the Group Operations Evaluation Division undertakes independent evaluations of projects, sectors and strategies. The IsDB Group’s comprehensive development approach predates recommendations made by the international community in Busan in 2011 for inclusion of private sector and trade financing for more effective development. In that sense, IsDB has been quietly setting the trend for international development. It should also be noted that, unlike some MDB’s, IsDB does not have a development fund that is annually replenished by donors. This explains why IsDB does not have a sizeable soft loan window like other MDBs.

C. Funding development projects In 2014, as part of the global economy IsDB member countries faced challenges of increasing geopolitical tensions; volatile commodity prices; high youth unemployment; macroeconomic imbalances; widening income inequality; sluggish private sector growth; and outbreaks of epidemic diseases, especially Ebola, all of which led to increasing conflict and fragility. With a considerable increase in development needs of member countries, the IsDB group responded with an almost 12 per cent increase in financing, approving $10.9 billion in project financing. Of this total, the IsDB ordinary capital resources (OCR) and ITFC operations (also on OCR terms) accounted for 47 per cent each, followed by the ICD (4.5 per cent), with other funds and Special Assistance operations accounting for the rest. Projects are mostly large-infrastructure and are planned, implemented, monitored and reported on jointly under the leadership of the partner country government. In 2014 project approvals by sector were: infrastructure (energy, transport, water and sanitation) 83 per cent; agriculture 8 per cent; education 4.5 per cent; health 3 per cent; others 1 per cent. In 2014 the regional allocation of funding was Middle East and North Africa ($4.8 billion); Asia ($2.7 billion); Sub-Saharan Africa ($2.6 billion); and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS, $592.6 million). In 2014 the top five recipients of IsDB Group

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financing were Egypt ($2.1 billion; 18.9 per cent); Bangladesh ($1.9 billion; 17.1 per cent); Morocco ($795.3 million; 7.3 per cent); Pakistan ($729 million; 6.7 per cent); and Turkey ($482 million; 4.4 per cent).43

D. Development effectiveness Key components of IsDB’s financing model that indicate the effectiveness of its financing (according to the 2005 Paris and 2011 Busan indicators of effectiveness) and endorsed by its member countries, including Saudi Arabia, are country ownership and leadership, a comprehensive funding package that combines credit with financing for trade and the private sector; results focus; increasing transparency with project financing data available on its website; a high level of coordination and harmonisation among the Coordination Group of which it is an active member; and accountability to its member countries that are members of its Board. Annex 4 provides more information on IsDB’s development effectiveness.

E. Challenges faced by IsDB being actively addressed Its financing, mostly for infrastructure, is suited for economic development of middle-income countries that can afford its market rate loans. Its soft loans and grant financing are very limited. To meet the increasing needs of low-income countries, IsDB is seeking ‘blended financing’ opportunities to complement its ordinary loans with grants that pay the interest or mark-up. . While IsDB projects are not assessed for their impact on women, recently a ‘Women’s Empowerment Classification System’ has been launched to assess the extent to which IsDB projects are focused on development of women. . With an increasing number of its member countries caught in conflict, IsDB financing in these countries is often suspended without a legitimate government in place. IsDB is preparing a strategy and funding mechanism for financing countries in conflict and in fragile situations. . Slow and cumbersome programme planning and implementation systems are a major issue and are being addressed following an independent performance review in 2014 by the Boston Consultancy Group. .

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Absence on the ground at country level limits its participation in country policy forums and in discourses with other donors present. The IsDB Group has launched their first set of Country Gateway Offices, with those in Turkey and Indonesia now operational.

Conclusion The bilateral SFD and the multilateral IsDB provide a small window into how Saudi Arabia finances development and the values and principles it follows. There are some interesting differences between these two organisations. The former focuses mainly on poor countries globally whereas the latter, set up under the aegis of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), serves the development needs of its 56 Muslim member countries, including low- and middle-income countries as well as Muslim communities in non-Member countries. This provides Saudi Arabia with a global spread of countries for its financing. IsDB strictly Islamic financing principles follows whereas SFD does not. In addition, IsDB mainly provides ordinary financing (non-concessionary) with very small soft loans, grants and Technical Assistance whereas SFD mostly provides very soft loans together with grants and technical assistance, thereby offering a range of financing options and spreading funding across low- and middle-income countries. IsDB member countries are its shareholders and its financing of member country projects is a means of solidarity building, not a donor –beneficiary relationship. The Saudi Fund does not have shareholders and provides Saudi bilateral development assistance as a donor. While Saudi Arabia is an important player in international development, its aid programme needs to be consolidated, further enhanced and given more visibility. Several mechanisms can help achieve these aims, primarily through the development and publication of its international development policy and of its objectives and how these will be achieved. The setting up of KSRelief signals Saudi Arabia’s intent in that direction, perhaps in time leading to a dedicated Ministry for International Development Cooperation. The emphasis by KSRelief on monitoring and evaluation also indicates Saudi Arabia’s keen interest in assessing the efficiency, effectiveness and results of its financing, in line with international best practice. Systematic publication of this information, through the

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OECD, with which it already works, as well as through a dedicated website, will bring transparency as well as visibility to Saudi Arabia’s much valued development assistance. Such a policy would help guide Saudi Arabia towards enhanced achievement of global standards as a donor. The policy would clearly show which global priorities to fund, when and how to fund them and who among the global players to work with in order to achieve Saudi objectives. For example, the needs of women and children, climate change, the challenges of working with countries in conflict and in fragile situations and joining the donor league to eradicate global poverty. Among the Gulf donors, Saudi Arabia remains a dominant force in the region, not only due to its geographic size and natural resources and revenue but also for its unique position in the Islamic world with the location of the Two Holy Mosques in Saudi Arabia. This ‘centre of Islam’ effect, at this juncture in global political development, deserves separate analysis in terms of its impact on international development. Further issues to consider are: (a) the extent to which Saudi Arabia’s budget support to its partner countries (e.g., Arab countries in transition, Palestine, Pakistan, etc.), is supporting stabilisation and economic development; (b) with the UN falling short of meeting Saudi expectations of effective and efficient delivery of its generous humanitarian assistance, can Saudi funding be instrumental, in coordination with other donors, in driving major reform of the multilateral system?; and (c) the extent to which Saudi aid, in coordination with other donors, can provide focused development, for example, to lift women and children in poor countries, including Muslim countries, out of illiteracy and provide them with skills to improve their livelihoods and leave poverty behind. International development needs, including humanitarian needs, are evolving and changing. The usual humanitarian needs following natural disasters are now compounded by needs of the long-term displaced following protracted conflict, fragility and terrorism. To address the needs of the long-term displaced, bilateral and multilateral donors have designed innovative support packages that combine humanitarian aid with economic development support to turn refugee populations into economic assets for their host economies. Developments such as the WB –IsDB– UN-led MENA Financing Facility, the Grand Bargain of the World Humanitarian

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Summit and UNGA 2016 meetings, including the Obama Summit, which expands the concept of the London Conference for global application, are all guide posts to more effective financing of evolving humanitarian and economic development needs. The big challenge lies in reorganising, reskilling and retooling the international development system to deliver these plans. Saudi Arabia needs to join this international movement to leverage the scale of change of global international development policy and architecture required.

OPEC Fund for International Development Special Account for financing small and medium-sized private sector projects in Arab Countries Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development Islamic Development Bank Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development Islamic Corporation for Investment Insurance and Export Credit International Islamic Trade Financing Corporation Islamic Corporation for Private Sector Arab Monetary Fund Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation International Fund for Agricultural Development Islamic Solidarity Fund for Development

Institution 1,033,279.607 500,000.000 684,952.444 1,640,985.158 6,204,416.000 108,990.000 23,303.100 120,000.000 150,000.000 487,001.250 13,612.500 462,923.000 1,000,000.000

3,435,008.438 2,000,000.000 2,800,000.000 6,840,034.200 26,280,000.000 485,735.172 134,574.164 750,000.000 1,000,000.000 3,265,487.000 94,749.051 3,652,000.000 10,000,000.000

Capital (US$)

16.00 15.00 14.91 14.40 12.67 10.00

17.32

24.46 24.00 23.61 22.43

30.00 25.00

Kingdom’s Kingdom’s contribution contribution (US$) % of the capital

Annex 1 Contributions of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Arab, Regional and international development institutions up to 31 December 2014

8,022,800.000 59,813.000 10,313,252.500 371,318.163 30,062.000 2,498,330.000 193,912.200

232,791,000.000 1,918,180.000 351,556,491.000 —* 2,502,450.000 225,800,000.000 103,561,813.800

3.12 2.93 —* 1.20 1.11 0.20

3.44

*The African Development Fund has no capital of its own. It depends on the replenishments made by the donor countries.

The capitals of these institutions as well as the Kingdom’s contribution have been converted from Arabic dinar, Islamic dinar, Kuwaiti dinar and IMF’s SDR according to the exchange rate in December 2014.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency Fund International Monetary African Development Fund International Finance Corporation The International Development Agency African Development Bank

Alignment † Aid flows are aligned to national priorities † Donor coordination of capacity building support † Use of country procurement and public finance management (PFM) † Avoid parallel implementation units (PIUs) † Aid is predictable (Busan: in-year or medium-term predictability) † Aid is untied

Ownership and partnership † Countries have operational development strategies † Busan: inclusive ownership and partnership with CSOs and the private sector

Paris and Busan indicators of effectiveness

† † †

† †

†

†

†

Countries request funding for projects from national development plans so funding is aligned to national priorities Only small TA funds; not coordinated with others Funds not transferred to government so PFM not applicable; international bidding for procurement to ensure value for money Does not fund parallel implementation units Predictability not applicable to kind of funding International bidding ensures funding is untied

Will only fund projects requested by the country, so country-led development top priority; no conditions or interference into sovereignty issues Does not fund CSOs or private sector

SFD indicators

Annex 2 SFD’s assessment of the indicators of its development effectiveness, relative to the Paris and Busan indicators, are as follows

Transparency † Implementation of common, open standard for electronic publication or provision of information by providers of development co-operation through country-level aid information systems

Accountability/mutual accountability † Busan: Funding reflected in country budget approved by parliament † Mutual assessments of progress and of aid effectiveness

Harmonisation † Use of common arrangements or procedures among donors † Shared country analysis/diagnostic reviews, joint missions, etc. Managing for results † Busan: Use of country-led results frameworks as common tool

†

†

†

Information on development cooperation available in annual reports and from the research and economic studies department Is interested in sharing data with OECD, but together with CG and on same lines.

Funding is reflected in country budgets and is approved by parliament or Chief Justice. SFD disburses funds in agreement with government. Outputs are hard assets such schools, hospitals, bridges, roads, dams, etc. providing hard evidence of what is funded.

Is adopting results-oriented project frameworks and systems to monitor results.

†

†

Strong coordination of funding with Coordination Group; harmonisation of operational policies and procedures among CG members including shared analysis.

†

†

†

Gender equality † Gender disaggregated data

Fragmentation † Aid fragmentation ratio

Identify within CG relative strengths and advantages of each; share areas for funding to avoid duplication and aid fragmentation at country level

Not overtly monitored though projects reflect women as users, for example, in schools, hospitals, etc.

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Annex 3 IDB member countries The present membership of the bank consists of 56 countries. The basic condition for membership is that the prospective member country should be a member of the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC). The IDB Board of Governors has the authority to set the terms and conditions on the subscription and payment to the capital of the bank. The cumulative capital subscription from the Initial to the fifth General Capital Increase and the shareholding position of the IDB member countries as at Hijri financial year-end are as follows: Statement of IDB share capital subscription As at 30 December 1435H (24 October 2014) year-end 1435H SN

Country

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

Saudi Arabia Libya Iran Nigeria United Arab Emirates Qatar Egypt Kuwait Turkey Algeria Pakistan Indonesia Malaysia Bangladesh Yemen Morocco Sudan Jordan Senegal Oman Brunei Cameroon Burkina Faso

No. of shares

Amount (in mill ID)

% of total

1,189,680 477,166 417,463 387,452 379,949 363,236 357,965 350,000 326,384 128,559 128,559 113,795 82,308 50,996 25,862 25,669 23,295 21,976 14,781 14,255 12,836 12,836 9,017

11,896.80 4,771.66 4,174.63 3,874.52 3,799.49 3,632.36 3,579.65 3,500.00 3,263.84 1,285.59 1,285.59 1,137.95 823.08 509.96 258.62 256.69 232.95 219.76 147.81 142.55 128.36 128.36 90.17

23.52 9.43 8.25 7.66 7.51 7.18 7.08 6.92 6.45 2.54 2.54 2.25 1.63 1.01 0.51 0.51 0.46 0.43 0.29 0.28 0.25 0.25 0.18

24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56

Gabon Kazakhstan Azerbaijan Mali Iraq Guinea Niger Mauritania Bahrain Kyrghyzstan Mozambique Uganda Benin Palestine Tunisia Syria Sierra Leone Tajikistan Uzbekistan Comoros Afghanistan Chad Lebanon Albania Gambia Maldives Suriname Djibouti Guinea-Bissau Somalia Togo Turkmenistan Cote D’Ivoire Total subscribed available for subscription Total Issued Capital

5,458 5,400 5,092 5,092 4,824 4,585 4,585 3,577 2,588 2,584 2,584 2,463 2,080 1,955 1,955 1,849 1,816 1,816 1,344 1,302 993 977 977 923 923 923 923 496 496 496 496 496 465

54.58 54.00 50.92 50.92 48.24 45.85 45.85 35.77 25.88 25.84 25.84 24.63 20.80 19.55 19.55 18.49 18.16 18.16 13.44 13.02 9.93 9.77 9.77 9.23 9.23 9.23 9.23 4.96 4.96 4.96 4.96 4.96 4.65

0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01

4,986,572 71,630 5,058,202

49,865.72 716.30 50,582.02

98.58 1.42 100.00

Annex 4 IsDB’s parameters of development effectiveness

Country ownership and leadership of development: the bank responds to country requests for projects so is aligned to the country’s development plans. This together with the fact that the bank does not impose any conditions encourages country ownership. Partner country’s budget shows IsDB financing: project financing by the bank is reported on the partner country’s budget so there is accounting for this external funding. However, the funding is not processed through the country’s financial, procurement or audit systems. The processing is done jointly by the bank and the partner country through a control system that ensures integrity of the bank’s financing of projects and delivery of project outputs. Combining credit with trade and private sector financing: Member Country Partnership Strategies (MCPS) are prepared jointly by the IsDB Group thus bringing together the bank’s credit with funding for the private sector, for trade and for risk insurance, offering a comprehensive package for overall economic development. Results focus: increasingly the MCPS are results focused, outlining the specific outputs the Bank Group’s financing expects to achieve. Increasingly also all project management documents are results focused and together with systems development the bank expects to publish its annual results from 2015 onwards. Transparency: the bank is one of the pioneers among non-DAC multilaterals, working with the OECD to make its financing information available publicly.44 Its project financing data is available on its website. Range of Islamic financing instruments used: different financing instruments are used, based on Islamic principles, so that projects are funded through instalment sale; lease financing; delivery of a finished product built by the bank, etc. About 90 per cent of IsDB Group financing is Ordinary (non-concessionary) and only about 10 per cent is soft loans, grants and technical assistance. The Islamic Solidarity Fund for Development, which is poverty focused, also provides microfinance. The bank also manages trust funds, e.g. over $1 billion annually for Palestine, and special funds from philanthropists for specific purposes, for example the delivery of mobile clinics to poor countries. These together totalled $661 million in 2014.

Co-financing projects: IsDB has a long history of co-financing projects with the Coordination Group as well as with IFIs like the World Bank (WB) and AfDB. More recently it has co-financed with UK’s bilateral Department for International Development, providing matched financing for a total of £20 million ($33 million approximately) for the Arab Women’s Enterprise Fund (AWEF). The project is specifically for Arab transition countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and Yemen and implementation is underway. The innovative ‘triple win’ or blended financing approach was used in 2013, with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) paying the mark-up amount for the bank’s Ordinary financing of $227 million for Pakistan’s polio eradication programme. In Afghanistan the BMGF matched the bank’s grant financing for polio eradication. Based on this experience, the BMGF-IsDB partnership has launched a $500 million Lives and Livelihoods facility (20 per cent contribution by BMGF), which should leverage $2 billion in IsDB project financing over time. South-South cooperation: the bank’s South-South Cooperation or Reverse linkage initiative is unique. When assessing country needs the bank also assesses the country’s strengths and matches it with countries that could benefit from that strength. It is an exemplary form of South-South or triangular cooperation. The bank has been the catalyst for several such reverse linkage projects, including water quality treatment between Burkina Faso and Morocco, artificial insemination of livestock between the Kyrgyz Republic and Indonesia, rice production between Brunei and Malaysia and eye-care treatment between Niger and Turkey. Indonesia is the first country to include a budget allocation of $2 million specifically for use in IsDB’s reverse linkage projects. Support for Muslim populations in non-member countries: besides financing development in its 56 member countries the bank also supports development of Muslim communities in non-member countries, for example, the UK, India and other countries, through scholarships, education, health, micro-finance projects, etc. Promoting decentralisation: the bank is expanding its country presence, through further empowerment of its four regional offices in Kazakhstan, Senegal, Malaysia and Morocco and opening of new IsDB Group Country Gateway Offices in Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey. This should help overcome the limitations the IsDB Group face in policy discussions and networking with the international development community present at country level. Active member of the Coordination Group: its strong partnership with the Coordination Group provides coordinated and harmonised funding to countries and leverages additional financing through cofinanced projects. Since inception, the IsDB has co-financed 285 projects with the CG for a total of $19.7 billion, which includes IsDB funding of $6.8 billion.

Active in international forum: IsDB has played an active role in the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) and worked in tandem with the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and with the Coordination Group for progress towards increased effectiveness. It also collaborates with other partners, ranging from international institutions such as the MDBs, the UN, OECD-DAC as well as bilaterals like the UK, Japan, France, Germany and others.

Notes 1. Saudi Arabia launched its landmark National Transformation Programme or Vision 2030 in 2016, charting out its economic development plan. The plan does not refer specifically to Saudi international development assistance. However, the bilateral Saudi Fund for Development now comes under the Council of Economic and Development Affairs, so is no longer under the Ministry of Finance. This chapter has drawn on two main sources of data on Saudi Aid: (i) OECD-DAC, which analyses and publishes information it receives from Saudi Arabia (Development Assistance Committee (DAC), ‘Development co-operation by countries beyond the DAC’, May 2015. Available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/Dev% 20Coop%20by%20Countries%20beyond%20the%20DAC.pdf (accessed 15 June 2015); and (ii) the 2015 Annual Report of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), which contains information on Saudi aid from 1994 to 2014, provided by the Ministry of Finance (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), Fifty First Annual Report, 1436H, 2015, p. 119. Available at http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-US/ EconomicReports/AnnualReport/5600_R_Annual_En_51_Apx.pdf (accessed 17 July 2015). There are some differences in the figures reported by the two sources, probably because of differences in defining aid. Also, the SAMA report has just revised the aid data reported earlier in 2015. 2. For example: $500 million to the World Food Programme for the food crisis (2008); $50 million to the UN Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs (OCHA) for the earthquake in Haiti (2010); $100 million to the UN for floods in Pakistan (2010); $500 million to the UN for Iraq (2014); $100 million to the UN for Pakistan (2014); $111.5 million to the UNRWA for Palestinian refugees in the region, including $10 million for those in Syria (2015); $274 million to the UN for Yemen (April 2015); and more than 190 tons of relief goods, including food, tents and medical supplies for the earthquake in Nepal (May 2015). 3. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), based in Paris, is a forum to discuss issues surrounding aid, development and poverty reduction in developing countries. Available at http://www.oecd.org/.

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4. DAC, ‘Development co-operation by countries beyond the DAC’. 5. According to SAMA, Fifty First Annual Report, 1436H, 2015, Saudi Arabia’s GDP in 2014 was SAR 2,431,877 million (p. 25) and its foreign aid SAR 52,061 million (p. 119), giving a GDP/aid ratio of 2.1 per cent. The foreign aid reported includes several categories of financing, and the overseas development aid (ODA) component, by OECD classification, is not clear. 6. One of the four pillars of Islam, zakat is mandatory requiring Muslims to give 2.5 per cent of their net savings to the poor annually. 7. The Islamic principle of voluntary giving or charity. 8. King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre (KSHARC) website: http://www.ksrelief.org/en/Pages/default.aspx. 9. See Annual Report of the Saudi Fund for Development 2014. Available at http://www.sfd.gov.sa/webcenter/faces/oracle/webcenter/page/ scopedMD/s5dc73d77_7324_4d08_b347_444721019cba/Page24. jspx;jsessionid¼ NWlQYBspHbGSFHvQ82ny6y02Mh8DncKnVYb0s rpt4vnk9m9h6Jyv!1998641404!NONE?_afrLoop ¼778544335020 826#%40%3F_afrLoop%3D778544335020826%26_adf.ctrl-state% 3Dxkngudej3_4 (accessed 15 May 2015). 10. See Islamic Development Bank, Annual Report 1435H, 2014. Available at http://www.isdb.org/irj/go/km/docs/documents/IDBDevelopm ents/Internet/English/IDB/CM/Publications/Annual_Reports/40th/ IDB_Annual_Report_1435H_English.pdf (accessed 15 May 2015). 11. SFD’s $2 billion annual spend is close to a third of all Saudi aid if the OECD-DAC estimate of $5.7 billion in 2013 is taken into account. 12. Abdullah Al-Sakran, Saudi Fund for Development; Bazoumana Ouattara, University of Manchester, and Rajeh AlRagas, Swansea University, ‘Estimation of the grant element of the Saudi Fund for development loans (2014), unpublished research paper based on Al Sakran’s Doctoral thesis. 13. Information on the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation can be accessed at http://effectivecooperation.org/. 14. The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development is the Secretariat for the Coordination Group and information is available at http://www.arabfund.org/Default.aspx?pageId¼472. 15. http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/profile-what-gcc-18030284 (accessed 15 May 2015). 16. World Bank, ‘Arab Development Assistance: Four Decades of Cooperation: Middle East and North Africa’, June 2010. Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/ADAPub 82410web.pdf (accessed 15 May 2015). 17. http://www.g20ewg.org. 18. http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ecosum/2012g8/deauville/. 19. OECD DAC, ‘Multilateral aid 2015: better partnerships for a post2015 world’, see Figure 5., A1.9, p. 201. The conclusion in the report

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20. 21.

22.

23. 24.

25. 26. 27.

28. 29.

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that Saudi funding is largely of the UN and earmarked for humanitarian aid needs to be re-examined taking into consideration the information in Annex 1 in this paper. 2015 Annual Report of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. Kimberly Smith, Talita Yamashiro Fordelone and Felix Zimmermann, ‘Beyond the DAC. The welcome role of other providers of development cooperation’, DCD Issues Brief, OECD DAC, May 2010. Available at https://www.oecd.org/dac/45361474.pdf (accessed 15 May 2015). DAC Working Party on Development Finance Statistics, ‘Update on multilateral agencies’, non-DAC countries’ and private foundations’ statistical reporting to the OECD-DAC in 2013’, DCD/DAC/ STAT(2014)2, 12 March 2014. Available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/ dac-global-relations/Statistical%20reporting%20of%20non-DAC% 20countries,%20multilateral%20organisations%20and%20private% 20foundations.pdf (accessed 15 May 2015). DAC, ‘Development co-operation by countries beyond the DAC’. Abdullah Al-Shoaibi, ‘The partnership between the Saudi Fund for Development and the Islamic Development Bank’, paper presented at the 2015 Annual Meeting of IsDB, 7–11 June 2015, Maputo, Mozambique. The three funds are Al-Aqsa Fund, the Jerusalem Fund and GCC Program for Reconstruction of Gaza. Andrea Binder, Claudia Meier and Julia Steets, Humanitarian Assistance: Truly Universal? A Mapping Study of Non-Western Donors, GPPi Research Paper No. 12. Berlin, GPPi, 2010. The three publications are: Adele Harmer and Ellen Martin (eds), ‘Diversity in donorship. Field lessons’, Overseas Development Institute, HPG Report, 30 March 2010. Available at https://www. odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/ 5876.pdf (accessed 15 May 2015); al Yahya and Fustier, ‘Saudi Arabia as a humanitarian donor’ Khalid al Yahya and Nathalie Fustier, ‘Saudi Arabia as a humanitarian donor. High potential, little institutionalization’, Global Public Policy Institute Paper No. 14, March 2011. Available at http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/user_ upload/media/pub/2011/al-yahya-fustier_2011_saudi-arabia-ashumanitarian-donor_gppi.pdf (accessed 15 May 2015); and World Bank, ‘Arab Development Assistance. This is despite considerable reservations about UN efficiency and effectiveness. With Yemen now declared at Level 3 (most severe, large-scale humanitarian crises) by the global humanitarian system’s classification, timely and effective humanitarian assistance is critical. It is a test case for the new centre and particularly sensitive given Saudi Arabia’s dual role in leading the coalition effort to facilitate a

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30. 31. 32. 33.

34. 35. 36. 37.

38. 39.

POLICY MAKING IN THE GCC legitimate government in Yemen as well as leading in the delivery of humanitarian aid. Arab News, ‘Egypt, Yemen are top recipients of Saudi aid’, 19 May 2015, http://www.arabnews.com/saudi-arabia/news/748966 (accessed 20 May 2015). Rashid Hassan, ‘KSA raises financial aid to Palestine’, Arab News, 29 July 2015. Available at http://www.arabnews.com/saudi-arabia/ news/783426 (accessed 30 July 2015). Ummah or the collective community of Islamic peoples. Farhan Bokhari, ‘Saudi Arabia gives financial aid to Pakistan’, Financial Times, 14 March 2014. Available at https://www.ft.com/ content/d40980de-aa88-11e3-9fd6-00144feab7de (accessed 15 May 2015). 2015 Annual Report of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA). DAC, Development co-operation by countries beyond the DAC. OECD DAC, ‘Multilateral aid 2015: better partnerships for a post2015 world’. Department for International Development (DfID), ‘Multilateral aid review update: driving reform to achieve multilateral effectiveness’, December 2013. Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/ uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/297523/MARreview-dec13.pdf (accessed 15 May 2015). The MAR reviews in 2011 and in 2013 show consistent improvement in the multilateral system. In 2011, 43 organisations were assessed under the MAR. Nine were deemed to offer very good value for money for UK aid, 16 to offer good value for money, nine to offer adequate value for money and nine to offer poor value for money. The findings of the review were used to make decisions about UK aid to multilaterals. Many very good and good value for money organisations received increases in UK aid funding. At the same time, the UK also withdrew voluntary core aid funding from four poor value for money organisations and placed four others in ‘special measures’, demanding urgent improvements in performance. The 2013 MAR update showed there had been reform. Organisations asked to make urgent improvements to secure continued DFID investment had made progress. Other organisations that were already doing well did even better. But there was also slower progress in some organisations, with disappointing progress on some important thematic areas such as focus on women and girls, greater transparency and reduced administrative costs. OECD DAC, ‘Multilateral aid 2015: better partnerships for a post2015 world’. CREST Report 2014. OFID. Available at http://www.ofid.org/Portals/0/ Publications/Special%20Publications/CrestReport_2014.pdf (accessed 15 May 2015).

SAUDI ARABIA’S SUPPORT

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40. Side by side there are large Saudi philanthropies that also provide international development assistance, e.g., Alwaleed Bin Talal Foundation and Bab Rizq Jameel, among others. 41. See http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccra agendaforaction.htm (accessed 15 May 2015). 42. http://www.oecd.org/development/effectiveness/busanpartnership. htm (accessed 15 May 2015). 43. IsDB 2014 Annual Report 1435H. 44. IsDB, ‘Statistical reporting to the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), March 2014. Available at http://www.oecd.org/ dac/dac-global-relations/ISDB%20brief.pdf (accessed 15 May 2015).

3 GCC GOVERNMENTS RESPONDING TO PUBLIC NEEDS THROUGH E-GOVERNMENT: PROGRESS AND LIMITATIONS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM Sherif Fawzi Abdel Gawad and Maggie Kamel

Introduction Responding to public needs is becoming a key concern for governments all over the world. Citizens no longer demand just delivery of efficient and effective public services; they want to play a larger role in policy making. There is also increasing pressure from citizens for accountability and transparency of governments and policy makers. To be able to hold policy makers and government officials responsible for their actions, timely and adequate information needs to be made available to the public. Maintaining both transparency and accountability is necessary for effective and efficient management of public institutions.1 Thus, governments are under pressure to find new ways not only to deliver better services but also to be more open and inclusive. Information and communications technology (ICT) has affected the way governments operate and has provided new opportunities for them to deliver quality services efficiently and engage with the public. The internet, and social media in particular, has increased the space

GCC GOVERNMENTS RESPONDING TO PUBLIC NEEDS 85 available to the public for participation and voicing their opinions on public services and a variety of policy issues that influence their daily lives. Social media provides governments with tools to assess services before implementing them at full scale and helps governments to understand citizens’ needs better and be more responsive to them by reacting quickly to issues before they can escalate.2 The GCC states are no exception to this growing global trend. Providing a certain standard of living, through the welfare state facilitated by rent from hydrocarbon resources, is no longer sufficient as the public aspires to more participation in decision making, transparency and accountability of leadership. GCC governments are finding it more challenging to respond to these aspirations using existing structures and mechanisms. They need to build strong public administration institutions capable of meeting public aspirations. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), public administration comprises two interrelated meanings: (a) The aggregate machinery (policies, rules, procedures, systems, organisational structures, personnel and so forth) funded by the State budget and in charge of the management and direction of the affairs of the executive government, and its interaction with other stakeholders in the State, society and external environment; (b) The management and implementation of the whole set of government activities dealing with the implementation of laws, regulations and decisions of the Government and the management related to the provision of public services.3 Based on this definition, public administration reform refers to any change in government structures or processes through redesigning systems or policies or raising the capacity of personnel with the aim of delivering better quality services cost-effectively. In this chapter the authors look at GCC experience in implementing e-government as an example of public administration reform because of its potential significant implications for government openness and accountability as well as public participation. It should be noted that this chapter does not purport to offer a comprehensive and thorough review of e-government programmes in GCC states; rather it provides an indicative evidence of change in this area.

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The chapter is divided into six main sections. In the first section the authors outline the relevance of institutions to public administration reform. The second provides an overview of public administration in GCC in terms of structure and capacity. The third looks at GCC e-government initiatives while the fourth provides an assessment of e-government portals. In the fifth section the authors consider the outlook for GCC states and explore a possible path for the way forward to allow them to enhance transparency, accountability and public participation in decision making by building on what has already been initiated with e-government. In the final section the authors offer some concluding remarks. Before moving on, the authors would like to point out that whilst recognising the differences among GCC states (in terms of population size, maturity of civil society and degree of economic diversification) and the specificity of each country, this chapter does not deal with each country individually. This is because the authors believe that GCC countries share similarities in political, social and cultural conditions that allow for extensive learning from each other’s experiences. The relevance of regional experiences is recognised by GCC leadership itself, as evidenced by the introduction of some reforms over the past 15 years. For example, Saudi Arabia decided to televise the deliberations of the Consultative Council in 2003, following broadcasting of sessions of Kuwait’s National Assembly, which started in 1999, and the question and answer sessions between ministers and the Majlis al-Shura in Oman in 2003.4 Similarly, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) introduced elections in 2006 after their success in Saudi Arabia in 2005.

Why do institutions matter for public administration reform? Institutions are important in shaping human behaviour in society through rules, norms and frameworks.5 They are the medium through which policy decisions are made, implemented, evaluated and revised; meanwhile norms and rules of the institutions act as constraints on policy makers. Institutions are key factors for the success of reforms, including public administration reform. Realising their importance, policy makers have often tried to copy institutions to ensure the success of the implementation of policies and

GCC GOVERNMENTS RESPONDING TO PUBLIC NEEDS 87 programmes. However, this has not necessarily produced the desired results because institutions are endogenous. They evolve based on history and culture and therefore they function within a specific context. While one can borrow broad features or a framework, they need to be adjusted to local conditions.6 Accordingly, political actors need to take institutions into consideration when seeking to bring about reform, because they produce change through institutions.7 Another important question to consider in public administration reform is whether institutions are fixed or variable. In other words, are they inherited and shaped by historical processes or can they be changed? The implications of this are that if institutions are fixed, they only act as constraints on policies that can be made and a society is trapped by its existing institutions; but if they are variable, they can be redesigned (i.e., reformed) to maximise outcomes in the future. The authors take the view that although institutions might be largely fixed in the short term (i.e., they act as constraints on policy options made by policy makers), they could be altered in the long term. Institution building and evolution is, however, a long-term and painful process, as building strong and sustainable institutions takes years. What makes some institutions stronger and more durable than others depends on the ability of political actors to cultivate internal and external constituencies through coercion and widely accepted beliefs and norms that provide them with legitimacy. Those who create the institution empower it with a mandate and resources (human and financial). Governance, systems and processes are also developed to establish rules for the institution’s functioning. People along the hierarchy of the institution work to preserve it; thus the institution replicates itself over time and outlives its members. Once in place, institutions influence choices, strategies and outcomes. Furthermore, external constituencies that benefit from the institution also defend it. Both constituencies ensure its durability and longevity. However, institutions are not rigid. Societal changes, caused, for example, by demographic changes or technological advances, could lead to a gap between society’s welfare demands and policies implemented by institutions. Thus, as new challenges arise, existing institutions need to adjust to the changing environment; failure to adjust leads to political decay.8 This could ultimately lead to growing demands for institutional reform.9

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Factors that precipitate institutional reform could be internal, external or a mixture of both. Internal factors include eruption of a crisis that requires a quick response, or the pursuit of certain economic, social or political policy objectives that necessitate more incremental and slow change.10 Reform could also be initiated by external factors such as international obligations (commitment to agreements and treaties) or pressures from aid organisations. For reforms to be effective there need to be champions, who often seize a window of opportunity for change and lead that change. Equally important, the presence of ‘distributed agents’ is crucial to articulate and diffuse the new rules and build coalitions with those at lower ranks, to overcome barriers of distrust and resistance to change to something unfamiliar that could potentially threaten their interests (such as autonomy and resources).11 Having established the importance of institutions in shaping choices of policy makers and determining success and durability of reforms, the authors now look at the public administration in the GCC states.

Overview of public administration in GCC Public administration institutions in GCC countries reflect the history and cultural values of these societies. Most of these structures were established under colonial rule and have largely been influenced by local cultural factors. Institutionalisation of tribal and social norms ultimately led to the emergence of public administration institutions ‘dominated by patronage networks’, wasta and brokerage, which have bred inefficiencies.12 Due to the structure of society, the importance of patronage and the need to satisfy different government departments and agencies, public administration funding is not necessarily based on efficiency or the viability of government programmes.13 The expansion of public administration over the past four decades is explained by the dominance of government in GCC economies since the first oil boom in the 1970s. Not only is capital accumulation and consumption skewed towards the government, but the government also employs the majority of national labour in all GCC economies except Bahrain.14 Despite attempts to nurture the private sector over the past two decades, the government remains the major player in economic life. Although the private sector accounts on

GCC GOVERNMENTS RESPONDING TO PUBLIC NEEDS 89 average for more than 60 per cent of non-oil gross domestic product (GDP) in GCC states,15 growth remains largely driven by government spending (through subsidised utilities or wages and benefits), which they are able to finance through hydrocarbon revenues. The large role of government in society is dictated by GCC constitutions (or Basic Law in Saudi Arabia and Oman), which provide that the state is committed to securing social and economic rights of citizens, including health, education and social security. All GCC countries have implemented nationalisation policies to create jobs for their citizens in order to allow them to share in their countries’ wealth and address the imbalance in employment between nationals and non-nationals. However, the results of these programmes have been less than satisfactory. Most of GCC nationals are employed in the government sector (Table 3.1). GCC youth generally prefer government over private sector employment because of more generous packages, job security and shorter working hours offered by the former.16 This puts pressure on the government’s payroll, which has increased following the Arab Spring as GCC governments sought to dissipate public discontent through more generous economic packages to public employees.17 The expansion of public sector employment is reflected in a rising wage bill, which constituted on average 9.38 per cent of GDP in GCC states in 2013 (Figure 3.1). In terms of government efficiency, according to ‘The global competitiveness report 2014 – 2015’,18 Qatar was the leading country not only regionally but also globally, although it is not clear why it has received such ranking. It was followed by the UAE (5), then Oman (19), Saudi Arabia (23) and Bahrain (24), while Kuwait was lagging behind, occupying 90th position out of 144 countries.19 The UAE’s advanced ranking could be attributed to the reforms pursued over the past decade, including adopting a more competitive approach in public administration, where government agencies have key performance indicators (KPIs), following the private sector management approach. Moreover, the government used public private partnerships (PPP) to manage some public services better (such as provision of water, electricity, and sewage water treatment).20 The UAE has also started implementing pioneering budgetary reforms in 2009.21 This constitutes a major step towards an efficient and accountable government because resources are allocated based on results, performance and priorities. It could also

Table 3.1 Public sector employees

Country Employees Population Bahraina Kuwaitb Omanc Qatarb Saudi Arabiad UAEa

% of nonnationals in the population

Public % of sector national employees public as % of sector population employees

45,973 331,333 166,707 32,500 1,224,821

1,234,571 3,268,431 3,869,873 1,836,676 29,994,272

54% 65% 43% 84%c 32%

3% 10% 4% 2% 4%

97.4% 27.5% 11.4% 47.4% 2.5%

894,524

8,264,070

89%

11%

40.0%

Notes: a 2010. b 2012. c There are no official statistics for national vs. non-national population but some according to unofficial estimates the local population is 300,000.

d 2013. Source: Government statistics of GCC countries.

12.0% 10.0%

10.2%

11.2%

10.7% 9.1%

8.0%

5.7%

6.0% 4.0% 2.0% 0.0%

Bahrain

Kuwait

Oman

Qatar

Saudi Arabia

Figure 3.1 Public sector wage bill in GCC (% of GDP) (2013). Note: Data are not available for the UAE. Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), ‘Labour market reforms to boost employment and productivity in the GCC – an update’, Annual Meeting of Ministers of Finance and Central Bank Governors, Kuwait, 25 October 2014. Available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/102514a. pdf (accessed 17 March 2015).

GCC GOVERNMENTS RESPONDING TO PUBLIC NEEDS 91 help get rid of programmes, agencies and institutions that are inefficient or ineffective. Government inefficiency in Kuwait, on the other hand, could be partially explained by the parliament’s pursuit of a populist agenda. Dominated by tribal members, the parliament has, on several occasions, blocked the curtailment of the welfare state in order to preserve the interests of their constituencies.22 However, the government envisages creating a macro-fiscal unit in the Ministry of Finance and adopting performance-based budgeting in eight years in order to improve public spending efficiency.23 It should be noted that some public administration institutions in GCC countries – that is, those that are more tied to the global economy (mainly central banks, finance, oil, public enterprises) – are generally efficient and service-oriented. The ones that tend to be less efficient are ministries and agencies that deal with the public (such as labour, health and education).24 In terms of corruption, GCC states rank ahead of all Arab countries (except Jordan, which comes before Saudi Arabia). As Table 3.2 shows, according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) (which has a scale from 1 to 100, where 1 is the least corrupt), Qatar and the UAE are the least corrupt among GCC countries. However, countries scoring below 70 ought to be implementing measures to enhance the integrity of public officials. Based on this, almost all GCC countries need to apply such reforms; even Qatar and the UAE, the best performers (with scores of 71 and 70 respectively), are just on the border of the differentiation line. Table 3.2 Corruption perception index (CPI) scores Country Qatar UAE Saudi Arabia Bahrain Kuwait Oman

2015

2014

2013

2012

71 70 52 51 49 45

69 70 49 48 44 45

68 69 46 49 43 47

68 68 44 51 44 47

Source: Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perception Index 2015’. Available at http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015 (accessed 11 September 2016).

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A possible explanation of reduced corruption among public officials in GCC is the good packages provided to national employees and fear of deportation for non-national employees due to strict labour laws.25 It should also be noted that public tendering is not fully transparent in accordance with international standards, in terms of tendering criteria and explanation to non-qualifying companies.26 There is also no distinction between public and private interests. Although some GCC countries have transparency bodies,27 their reports are not published. Another area of weakness in public administration, generally common across all GCC countries, is poor collaboration among public sector organisations, which operate according to silo mentality.28 This has had a negative impact on progress of cross-cutting reforms, including e-government, due to agencies’ resistance to sharing information and collaborating with each other in the re-engineering of provided services.29 One could claim that GCC states have generally managed to create public administration institutions largely capable of meeting the needs of their economies. However, their efficiency is questionable in the absence of accountability and the pressure on government to absorb more of the national labour. In this context, e-government offers an attractive option to address government inefficiencies and improve quality of public services.

E-government in GCC: approach and progress Various definitions are used to describe e-government;30 for the purpose of this chapter the authors will follow the OECD definition, which refers to e-government as ‘the use of information and communications technologies (ICTs), and particularly the Internet, to achieve better government’.31 It should be noted that the focus of e-government here is ‘government’ rather than technology. Better government means ‘enabling better policy outcomes, higher quality services, greater engagement with citizens’.32 E-government can help improve efficiency, transparency and accountability. Savings could be achieved through streamlining administrative procedures, collection and processing of data and communicating with customers. E-government is also customer-focused, which means that services ought to be developed based on understanding customer

GCC GOVERNMENTS RESPONDING TO PUBLIC NEEDS 93 needs and requirements. By offering online services and information, e-government allows delivery of quality services to citizens and businesses quickly and at their convenience. E-government could also contribute to building trust between government and citizens by promoting open and accountable government, preventing corruption and enabling citizens to engage in policy making.33 All GCC countries have introduced successful e-government initiatives. With a vision embraced by the rulers to transform their societies into knowledge-based economies, they adopted ‘citizen centric’ ICT strategies. They put in place the necessary foundational regulatory framework for the transformation to e-government (including e-transactions and cybercrime laws); established the required infrastructure (including national portals and security architecture); and built capacity of government officials in this respect. However, the approach and progress in this area varies across the GCC countries. Bahrain was the first to start its e-government project in the early 1990s, as it was seeking to become a regional financial centre. Bahrain launched its Government Strategic Information Systems Plan in 1993 and installed the Government Data Network project in 1996, connecting all ministries and service shared resource applications. The government introduced a national smart card system that allows citizens to carry out e-transactions for various services (such as accessing money and recording personal, educational and health data). The smart card includes e-signatures in addition to other stored information. The UAE was the first country to introduce e-payment, with the launch of e-Dirham, in 2001, which is a system for collection of government and non-government fees in an efficient and secure way.34 The UAE subsequently launched a project for developing and managing an integrated system for population data and identity management systems for the UAE population. It issued a smart card with digital identities for all its population, which allows users to access all identity-based services provided by federal or local authorities. Furthermore, the UAE merged government services and information in a single portal.35 Thus, within a few years, the UAE managed to advance ahead of most GCC states (Table 3.3). Qatar’s first e-government effort was a pilot project to renew resident permits launched in 2000. After the success of this project an

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Table 3.3 GCC ranking in UN global e-government survey 2003 Country Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE Average

2016

EGDI* score Global rank EGDI score Global rank 0.510 0.370 0.355 0.441 0.338 0.535 0.425

46 90 98 77 115 38

0.7734 0.7080 0.5962 0.6699 0.6822 0.7515 0.6969

24 40 66 48 44 29

* EGDI (E-Government Development Index) is a composite measure of three important dimensions of e-government, namely: provision of online services, telecommunication connectivity and human capacity. It is based on an expert assessment survey of the online presence of all 193 United Nations member states, which assesses national websites and how e-government policies and strategies are applied in general and in specific sectors for delivery of essential services. Source: ‘UN global e-government survey 2003’. Available at http://unpan3. un.org/egovkb/portals/egovkb/Documents/un/2003-Survey/unpan 016066.pdf (accessed 10 May 2015); and United Nations, ‘E-government survey 2016’. Available at http://workspace.unpan.org/sites/Internet/ Documents/UNPAN96407.pdf (accessed 11 September 2016).

assessment was made of ministries’ and agencies’ capacity to provide e-transactions. The assessment revealed that they provide 1,350 services and it was decided that they could provide 22 of these online through a single portal within 30 months. Qatar’s e-government strategy was subsequently launched in 2006 with the following vision: ‘Qatar online services, anytime, anywhere, providing government transactions, information and knowledge.’ However, the programme faced early challenges related to limited citizen awareness about e-services, lack of citizen trust in online services and resistance of government officials to change, as they were not involved in the design of e-services.36 In 2006, Saudi Arabia set itself the over-ambitious goal of being able to provide ‘everyone in the Kingdom’ with 24-hour seven-days-aweek access to government services in a seamless, user-friendly and secure way by 2010. The Saudi government’s approach to fulfilling its vision was through large-scale infrastructure investment and

GCC GOVERNMENTS RESPONDING TO PUBLIC NEEDS 95 liberalisation of the telecommunications sector in order to increase internet and mobile penetration. The government also established the yesser (make it easy) initiative, with the aim of minimising ‘centralization in e-government implementation while ensuring the minimum level of coordination between government departments’.37 The objective set by the kingdom, however, proved to be unrealistic. Several challenges precluded the achievement of this goal. For example, despite the substantial increase in internet and mobile penetration, most of these services were offered to residents of the main cities; internet connections were poor or lacking in many small towns and villages. Additionally, poor coordination and cooperation among government agencies slowed down progress.38 Furthermore, the digital divide among government employees also constituted a challenge in the implementation of e-government. Hence, the second action plan (2012 –16) was set, with a more realistic objective, namely to enable ‘everyone to use effective government services, in a secure integrated and easy way, through multiple electronic channels’. Learning from previous experience, the plan also involved extensive training of the workforce.39 The Omani government established a government organisation, Oman Digital, in 2003, to be responsible for all e-government and ecommerce services in Oman. The main focus of Oman e-government strategy is enhancing the competency and skills of Omani citizens to promote nationalisation of employment. However, Oman faced some challenges in implementing its e-government programme, especially at the beginning, most notably the lack of adequate ICT infrastructure, low internet penetration rate, lack of commitment of senior management at some agencies and lack of availability of staff with the required skills and competences.40 Seeking support from a leading country in e-government, Kuwait government signed three memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with Singapore in 2004, 2005 and 2008 to proceed with its vision to transform it into one of the leading knowledge based economies in the world. The government also established in 2006 the Central Authority for Information Technology (IT), mandated with the development and maintenance of the e-government portal, coordination with government agencies on e-government projects and raising public awareness about e-government. Like other GCC states, Kuwait launched its portal, in 2008, to provide a single point of access

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to government e-services. The key challenge encountered in implementing e-government was lack of complete synchronisation of e-services between the main government portal and individual ministry websites, as some agencies did not provide full e-services; moreover, the lack of collaboration and reluctance to share data among agencies hindered the provision of integrated e-services involving multiple agencies.41 All GCC governments have managed to reduce the digital divide (i.e., the gap between those who are computer literate and those who are not) to enhance citizen readiness to benefit from e-government services. GCC stats’ investment in infrastructure has boosted internet and mobile penetration, as demonstrated in Table 3.4. This strategy has certainly paid off; today the GCC lead Arab countries in e-government readiness. The average for GCC countries in 2016 (0.6969) was well above the world average (0.4922) and that of upper middle-income countries (0.4964). Leading the region in e-government, Bahrain also experimented with e-voting in the referendum of National Action Charter (2001) and municipality elections (2002).42 The UAE introduced e-voting in the Table 3.4 Internet and mobile penetration in GCC

Country Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE

Internet penetration 2015a

Mobile penetration Q2 2015b

Facebook penetration Jun 2016c

90.0% 75.5% 66.5% 85.3% 60.5% 88.0%

189% 222% 154% 191% 187% 175%

58.0% 57.4% 71.1% 97.4% 43.5% 83.1%

Sources: a Internet Society, ‘Global internet report’. Available at http://www. internetsociety.org/publications/global-internet-report (accessed 11 September 2016). b GSMA, ‘The mobile economy: Arab states 2015’. Available at https://www. gsmaintelligence.com/research/?file¼7910cff3a3e6f96219cd50e31d6d3e1 c&download (accessed 11 September 2016). c Internet World State, ‘Middle East’. Available at http://www.internet worldstats.com/middle.htm (accessed 11 September 2016).

GCC GOVERNMENTS RESPONDING TO PUBLIC NEEDS 97 first elections in the country’s history in 2006. In contrast, both Bahrain and Kuwait had to abort their plans to use e-voting on a full scale in 2006 and 2008 parliamentary elections respectively, in the face of accusations by the opposition that results would be manipulated by the government. The success of the UAE in introducing e-voting could be due to openness and transparency of the National Election Committee, which was responsible for organising the elections, as they made the system available to the public for testing and inspection before the elections, as well as to the high level of public trust in politicians in the UAE, who are perceived to be leading the country to prosperity through their enlightened vision.43 Notwithstanding this progress, one of the key gaps in GCC countries that needs to be addressed is the regulatory framework related to e-government, which is incomplete. For example, although GCC countries have general provisions in laws concerning data protection, none of them has data protection legislation.44 This is particularly important in usage of e-services, as citizens’ concern about the privacy and security of their personal information negatively affects their use of the service. Furthermore, none of the GCC countries has access to information legislation. It is difficult to imagine establishing open data portals, as they all have done, without instituting the right of citizens to information held by the government.

Assessment of e-government portals in GCC In this section, the authors will provide an assessment of e-government portals of GCC countries (Table 3.5). This section is divided into two parts. The first part will provide an overall assessment of government portals in terms of accessibility, availability of information and e-participation features. The second part evaluates the impact of the portal on transparency, accountability and public participation. This assessment is based on the authors’ examination of GCC e-government portals and does not aim to provide an in-depth evaluation of these portals, which ought to be the subject of further extensive research.

Accessibility, availability of information and e-participation features GCC portals are bilingual, available in Arabic and English. This is particularly relevant to the GCC where a large proportion of the

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populations is foreigners; hence it is important for accessibility of e-services.45 The portals seek to cater to the needs of various customers, including those with special needs, by presenting text in various typeface sizes. The Saudi and Kuwaiti sites have, in addition, a text reader feature, which is useful to those with impaired vision or who have difficulty reading text on the internet. Moreover, Oman, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have sound features, although not available for all pages. All portals enable users to obtain information about online services easily. Services are generally classified into those for citizens, businesses, visitors and government. For example, there is information on how to conduct secure online payments for various public services (such as utilities, traffic fines, etc.) or obtain business-related services (such as licences, permits and visas). There is also information about ministries and government agencies, with links to their respective websites; however, not all of these websites provide e-services and not all are linked to the portal. There is also a large variance among services provided by individual ministries’ websites, where ministries that are more service-oriented are more mature in their e-services. This is because e-service provision (which requires process re-engineering to allow for provision of the service electronically) is generally left to each ministry or agency. All portals have open data initiatives that include some statistics from various government authorities. All GCC e-government portals have Twitter accounts and Facebook pages, which they mainly use to disseminate news about their work. Some of them use these tools to raise awareness about specific issues, services or initiatives. For example, Qatar’s government portal posted on its Facebook page steps to obtain a health card;46

Table 3.5 GCC portals Country

Portal URL

Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE

http://www.bahrain.bh http://www.e.gov.kw http://www.oman.om http://portal.www.gov.qa http://www.saudi.gov.sa http://www.government.ae

GCC GOVERNMENTS RESPONDING TO PUBLIC NEEDS 99 and Kuwait posted a video about e-government.47 The UAE also posts news about the royal family, which generally attracts more views, likes and comments. Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia seem to be more active on Facebook, as they upload posts on an almost daily basis. Many of them also use other social media tools such as Flickr and YouTube as well as forums, blogs, chats, surveys and polls to answer citizens’ queries, capture feedback on provided services and obtain suggestions for improvement of services or some government policies.48 Citizens are offered various channels for communication with the government including phone, fax, SMS, chat, email, Facebook and Twitter. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have national communication centres for receiving complaints and suggestions.49 Both Oman and Qatar have e-participation policies while the UAE has e-participation guidelines. Oman also has guidelines on use of social media.

Transparency, accountability and public participation E-government has contributed to the transparency of GCC governments, as it provides information on service requirements and payments. Open data initiatives adopted by all of them have allowed the publishing of some data and information that was not readily available before. For example, they all have laws and regulations published on e-government portals, although it is doubtful whether this represents a complete inventory of their regulations. Nonetheless, one striking feature based on a quick review of websites of public institutions and open data portals of all GCC countries is the paucity of information, which is mainly available on non-sensitive political issues. They have brief news about meetings (especially of senior management), conferences and other events organised by these institutions, which do not even inform the public about outcomes of these events or decisions taken. All sites include the mandate, vision, objectives and organisation charts of these organisations. However, there is no information on expenditure, revenues, management teams, number of employees, or the number of employees vis-a`-vis managers in these organisations. Nor do they include policy documents and analyses or reviews of their performance. Making such information available would not only increase transparency but would also allow citizens to hold public

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institutions accountable. Lack of transparency could be partly attributed to the resistance of public administration to openness. Evidently, embracing the values of open government requires more than use of ICT tools or the launch of open data portals, as this by itself cannot change institutional culture. It requires genuine commitment to transparency, accountability and participation, and reform of institutions to inculcate these values in public administration. In the absence of willingness to share information, technology has been used to communicate non-sensitive information with limited impact on transparency and accountability. Notably, the UAE and Bahrain are the leading GCC countries in e-participation in the ‘UN global e-government survey 2016’50 (both sharing a ranking of 32 out of 193 countries surveyed). The UAE makes more extensive use of surveys. In 2011 it launched e-participation sessions where, using a predesigned form,51 citizens could address questions and comments about policy issues related to the federal state to the Prime Minister, Mohamed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, and he answered them. The Prime Minister selectively responded to 22 questions out of allegedly ‘thousands of questions’, which it was thought would ‘comprehensively benefit all’.52 However, it seems to have been a one-off activity, as there is only one session posted. Posted public engagements, which were answered by the Prime Minster, covered a wide range of issues on internal (education, cabinet shuffle, reckless driving, the future of women’s status in the UAE, Emiratisation, local government, national identity and e-government) and external affairs (the UAE’s image in the Western media, relations with Iran and foreign aid). Although too small in number to be deemed representative, two things come across from reading some of the questions: first, the public would like to have more information about policy issues; second, they are seeking more accountability of their government. Bahraini citizens seem to engage more with their government, as evidenced by the number of comments on the government portal’s blogs, which are addressed by senior leadership of concerned institutions (such as ministries or directors). Most of the comments, however, are related to complaints or suggestions to enhance government services.53 In terms of engagement, e-government has increased citizen interaction with the government as people access these services from

GCC GOVERNMENTS RESPONDING TO PUBLIC NEEDS 101 Table 3.6 GCC populations

Country Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE Total

Population mid-2015 (million)

% of population aged , 25 (mid-2015)*

Population projected mid-2030 (million)

Population projected mid-2050 (million)

1.4 3.8 4.2 2.4 31.6 9.6 53.0

35.3% 40.5% 49.7% 25.5% 46.2% 34.4% 38.6%

1.7 5.0 5.2 2.8 39.0 12.3 66.0

1.9 6.1 5.7 3.0 47.1 15.5 79.3

* Calculated from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), ‘The world factbook’. Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-worldfactbook/ (accessed 11 September 2016). Source: Population Reference Bureau, ‘2015 world population data sheet’. Available at http://www.prb.org/pdf15/2015-world-population-datasheet_eng.pdf (accessed 11 September 2016).

their mobile phones and tablets as well as computers at any time. In this sense, one could claim that use of ICT in GCC, as in other countries, has brought the government closer to the public. However, based on the assessment undertaken by the authors, the existence of e-participation features does not mean they are fully utilised. For example, although they use polls and surveys, public institutions generally focus more on one-way communication, mainly informing the public about availability and accessibility of services. Although this could increase the number of users accessing the services, it is, however, unlikely to improve public participation in policy making. Participation, on the other hand, has been limited to seeking feedback on service delivery rather than input on policy issues. Notwithstanding the limitations outlined in this chapter, one could argue that GCC states were able to achieve relatively good progress in e-government over a period of less than two decades. This could be attributed to the desire of their rulers to modernise their governments in order to enhance their competitiveness and boost diversification efforts to better prepare them for the post-oil era, and the availability of financial resources, thanks to hydrocarbon revenues.

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Outlook for the GCC and the way forward Evidently, the introduction of ICT and e-government in the GCC has improved openness and political participation; but the results to date are quite modest. So far GCC states have managed to control, to varying degrees, pressure for better governance (based on transparency, accountability and political participation) by seeking to co-opt various groups in society and distributing wealth (through employment and subsidies). This approach, however, is unviable in the long term for three main reasons. First, GCC economies are becoming more complex with time, especially as they try to diversify. This imposes certain demands on these states in serving the needs of their local business constituencies, which are becoming more independent from the state. The state has to find new ways to engage with businesses and address their needs. Second, although the interests of the business elite are currently convergent with those of the ruling regimes, the business elite are likely to seek to exert more pressure on the state in the post-oil era. The depletion of hydrocarbon resources would mean a reduction in the privileges they now enjoy; as state infrastructure investment is likely to decline, they will be expected to pay for production inputs and contribute to state revenues through taxation.54 Hence stakes will be higher for them; and they would want to have more say in policies that affect them, particularly those concerning the employment of foreigners, which is likely to be resisted by GCC citizens. Third, this level of spending is not sustainable as GCC oil and gas resources are finite; it is projected that they will be depleted within less than a hundred years.55 They would then be faced with the problem of a public accustomed to a certain lifestyle and comfort now facilitated through state subsidy. Currently, the GCC’s combined population amounts to less than 55 million, with nearly 39 per cent below the age of 25. GCC states will be under more pressure to deliver, especially with growing populations, which are expected to reach more than 79 million by 2050 (Table 3.6). Not only would this put pressure on the welfare state sustained by GCC regimes, but also better educated youth are likely to demand more participation in making decisions that affect their lives and would seek more accountability of rulers. Faced with these challenges, GCC regimes realise that they need to equip themselves for the new era, not only economically but also politically.

GCC GOVERNMENTS RESPONDING TO PUBLIC NEEDS 103 Ruling elites in the GCC have tried to preserve their rule by maintaining a balance among different interests in society; to this end, they have administered reform in such a way that it does not get out of control. The result has not always been satisfactory to various groups in society, leading to frustration and societal tensions. The search continues for a magic formula that would satisfy everybody. The answer could lie in institutional reforms of public administration. GCC regimes need to build on successful reforms, such as e-government, to enhance governance. So far the focus in the GCC seems to have been more on achieving efficiencies and providing better quality services and less on governance and engagement with citizens. This could be the next phase for GCC governments. In the remaining part of this section, the authors will discuss two areas that could be taken on by governments in the region, namely regulatory impact assessment (RIA), and structured consultation. RIA is a tool, adopted by all OECD countries and many developing countries, to promote evidence-based policy making. It seeks to explore different policy options and assess the positive and negative impacts (both intended and unintended) of these options. In the process, relevant stakeholders who are affected by the issue are consulted and their views are taken into consideration. The process promotes transparency, accountability and participation. Transparency is ensured because RIA entails open discussion of the analysis of the issue under study. Publishing RIA studies and consultation results further increases the transparency of the process and helps build trust in the process and the government. As the impacts of different options are examined, decision makers can be held accountable. Finally, consultation allows for participation of relevant stakeholders. To build an RIA system, a country needs to: have the necessary institutional setup (including regulatory framework) in place; establish RIA policy, systems and processes; and build the capacity of institutions and stakeholders to undertake the required analysis and consultation. There are various models for the institutional setup that could be tailored according to the local political and historical conditions as well as administration culture of each country.56 Experiences from other countries also show that the existence of champions and networks of officials and coordinators (or what was

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described earlier as ‘distributed agents’) is crucial for the success of RIA and consultation. In implementing these tools, GCC governments could capitalise on e-government systems already in place. For example, they could allow for online consultation, or crowdsourcing in legislation;57 they could also publish all RIA studies undertaken on their open data portals. Some GCC countries have already engaged in some form of ad hoc online consultation that they could build on. For example, Saudi yesser uploaded documents on its website58 for consultation on issues related to e-government. The public were invited to provide feedback or comments by email, fax, by hand or regular post. However, to download documents, respondents needed to fill in a form requiring mandatory data (name, email, mobile, company name and purpose for downloading the file) and optional data (job title and business domain). It is not clear whether sufficient time has been allowed for consultation, especially as in some cases the end date precedes the issue date of consultation. Also, the outcome of the process is not known, as consultation results are not published on the website. Similarly, Qatar’s Ministry of Information and Communications Technology posted various documents for consultation.59 Here again, neither the process nor the outcome of consultation is clear. GCC states could support the evolution of a more open and responsive government (which converges with their embraced visions) by empowering both public administration and formal and informal institutions in society to engage in RIA and structured consultation. They could adopt RIA and consultation in a gradual way, using a pilot approach by first focusing on non-sensitive policy issues. They could, for example, start with a few pilots in selected areas of economic legislation, where they have already some experience and have some form of institutionalised business interests that could engage in consultation. Once RIA has taken off, they could extend it to a range of other policy areas such as health, education and environment as they build institutional and human capacity. The GCC could also benefit from an exchange of ideas and lessons learnt amongst the different states of the region using existing GCC platforms. By installing these tools, GCC regimes would not only enhance the quality of the policy making process and its outcome but could also, and more importantly, ensure social peace in the long term.

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Conclusion Protests across most of the GCC states – triggered by the Arab Spring, which raised hopes in the region that change was possible – demonstrated how reforms introduced by ruling regimes fell short of meeting public demands for influencing policy making and holding government accountable. These demands are likely to intensify in the post-oil era as these states are compelled to control public spending, mainly on subsidies and public sector wages, which will result in reduced prosperity for citizens. While this chapter had shown that the impact of e-government on transparency, accountability and participation has been quite modest, capitalising on the work undertaken in e-government and trying to move towards the next level of effective e-participation could provide a valuable opportunity for more reforms. GCC states need to move away from the current model of policy making, which is characterised by opacity and concentration of decision making at the top of the political system, and adopt a more open and inclusive policy making process. This would not only help them deliver better policy outcomes, as they understand the needs of society, but also meet the demands of the public for more participation and reduce societal tensions.

Notes 1. UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), ‘Definition of basic concepts and terminologies in governance and public administration’, 5 January 2006. Available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/ public/documents/un/unpan022332.pdf (accessed 16 March 2015). 2. Arthur Mickoleit, ‘Social media use by governments: a policy primer to discuss trends, identify policy opportunities and guide decision makers’, OECD Working Papers on Public Governance, No. 26 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2014), p. 40. 3. ECOSOC, ‘Definition of basic concepts and terminologies in governance and public administration’. 4. Naomi Sakr, ‘Media policy as a litmus test of political change in the GCC’, in Abdulhadi Khalaf and Giacomo Luciani (eds), Constitutional Reform and Political Participation in the Gulf (Dubai: Gulf Research Center, 2006), pp. 132–56, pp. 135–6. 5. Douglass C. North, ‘Institutions’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 5/1/ (1991), pp. 97 – 112. Available at https://www.aeaweb.org/articles. php?doi¼ 10.1257/jep.5.1.97 (accessed 21 May 2015).

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6. Przeworski, Adam, ‘Institutions matter?’, 2004. Available from http:// politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/2800/go_2004.pdf (accessed 16 March 2015). 7. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, ‘What Bill Gates got wrong about why nations fail’, Foreign Policy, 12 March 2013. Available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/12/what-bill-gates-got-wrongabout-why-nations-fail/ (accessed 15 March 2015). 8. Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution (London: Profile Books, 2012), p. 7. 9. Robert H. Bates, Itai Sened and Sebastian Galiani, The New Institutionalism. The Work of Douglas North (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). Available at http://scholar.harvard.edu/ rbates/publications/new-institutionalism-work-douglas-north#_ftn1 (accessed 1 April 2015). 10. William Galston and Elizabether McElvein, ‘Institutional innovation: how it happens and why it matters’, Center of Effective Public Management at Brookings, 22 April 2015. Available at http:// www.brookings.edu/, /media/research/files/papers/2015/04/22institutional-innovation-galston-mcelvein/cepmgalstoninnovation final.pdf (accessed 21 May 2015). 11. Duncan Green, ‘The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development: a big new book by Matt Andrews’, 5 July 2013. Available at http://blogs. worldbank.org/publicsphere/limits-institutional-reform-developmentbig-new-book-matt-andrews (accessed 21 May 2015). 12. Fadi Salem and Yasar Jarar, Cross-agency Collaboration in the UAE Government: The Role of Trust and the Impact of Technology, (Dubai: Dubai School of Government, 2009), p. 12. 13. Ghazi Joharji and John Willoughby, ‘The Saudi Arabian budgeting system: an institutional assessment’, Public Administration and Development 34 (2014), pp. 63 –80, p. 74. 14. Steffen Hertog, ‘The sociology of the Gulf rentier systems: societies of intermediaries’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 52/2 (2011), pp. 1–37, pp. 11–12. 15. The percentage varies across GCC states depending on the success of diversification effort. It is highest in the UAE and Bahrain (reaching 80 per cent), followed by Saudi Arabia and Oman (almost 70 per cent), and finally Kuwait and Qatar (around 50 per cent). Pascal Devaux, ‘Economic diversification in the GCC: dynamic drive needs to be confirmed’, Conjuncture (July–August 2013) pp. 17–25, p. 18. Available at http://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/Views/DisplayPublicati on.aspx?type¼ document&IdPdf ¼ 22570 (accessed 31 March 2015). 16. Steffen Hertog, ‘The GCC’s national employment challenge’, Washington Post, 31 July 2014. Available at www.washingtonpost. com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/07/31/the-gccs-national-em ployment-challenge/ (accessed 17 March 2015).

GCC GOVERNMENTS RESPONDING TO PUBLIC NEEDS 107 17. Saudi Arabia offered a package of $130bn; UAE increased salaries by 100 per cent in addition to a Dh 10bn ($2.7bn) fund to assist indebted citizens; Qatar announced 50–120 per cent pay rises for public sector employees; and Kuwait announced 70–100 per cent salary raise to enforcement personnel and subsequently a 25 per cent raise for public sector employees. The GCC promised to invest a total of $20bn in the less wealthy states of Oman and Bahrain. See Tom Gara, ‘UAE raises public sector salaries’, Financial Times, 30 November 2011. Available at https://www.ft.com/content/f59357be-1b4e-11e1-85f8-00144feabdc0 (accessed 17 March 2015); and Suliman al-Atiqi, ‘Labouring against themselves’, 23 February 2013. Available at http://carnegieendowment. org/sada/51044?lang¼en (accessed 17 March 2015). 18. Klaus Schwab (ed.), ‘The global competitiveness report 2014–15’, World Economic Forum. Available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/ WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2014-15.pdf (accessed 13 August 2015). 19. Efficiency is measured based on several indicators, including wastefulness of government spending, burden of regulation and transparency of policy making. Aarti Nagraj, ‘Qatar, UAE among top 10 nations with most efficient governments’, Gulf Business, 16 July 2015. Available at http://gulfbusiness.com/2015/07/qatar-uae-amongtop-10-nations-efficient-governments/#.VbXUY0UeWag (accessed 27 July 2015); Schwab, ‘The global competitiveness report 2014–15’. 20. Laurent Lambert, ‘Water, state power, and tribal politics in the GCC: the case of Kuwait and Abu Dhabi’, Georgetown University Center for International and Regional Studies Occasional Paper No. 15 (2014), p. 20. 21. For more details on the introduced reforms, see Ministry of Finance. Available at https://www.mof.gov.ae/En/budget/FedralBudget Preparation/Pages/default.aspx (accessed 21 May 2015). 22. Lambert, ‘Water, state power, and tribal politics in the GCC’, pp. 25–6. 23. Joharji and Willoughby, ‘The Saudi Arabian budgeting system’, p. 76. 24. Hertog, ‘The sociology of the Gulf rentier systems’, pp. 11 – 12. 25. Lina Khatib, ‘Corruption in Qatar? The link between the governance regime and anti-corruption indicators’, European Research Centre for Anti-Corruption and State-Building Working Paper No. 40 (December 2013). Available at http://www.maarefah.net/sites/default/files/ corruption_in_qatar_qatar_by_ercas_2.pdf (accessed 25 March 2015). 26. The Business Anti-Corruption Portal is at http://www.business-anticorruption.com/country-profiles/middle-east-north-africa/qatar/ public-procurement.aspx. 27. Qatar established Administrative Control and Transparency Authority in 2011, and in the same year the Saudi cabinet approved the establishment of the National Anti-Corruption Commission. In the UAE, the State Audit Institution is the main anti-corruption authority.

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28. Silo mentality describes the situation where several departments or groups within an organisation do not want to share information or knowledge with other individuals in the same organisation. 29. Hendrik Kraetzschmar and El Mustapha Lahlali, The State of e-Services Delivery in Kuwait: Opportunities and Challenges (London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2011), p. 16. 30. See, for example, UN Division for Public Economics and Public Administration and American Society for Public Administration, ‘Benchmarking e-government: a global perspective, assessing the progress of the UN member states’, 2001, p. 1. Available at http:// unpan3.un.org/egovkb/Portals/egovkb/Documents/un/English.pdf (accessed 6 April 2015); and Szila´rd Molna´r, ‘eGovernment in the European Union’, 2007, pp. 5–6. Available at http://www.ittk.hu/ netis/doc/ISCB_eng/09_Molnar_final.pdf (accessed 6 April 2015). 31. OECD, ‘Background paper: implementing e-governement in OECD countries: experiences and challenges’, p. 2. Available at http://www. oecd.org/mena/governance/36853121.pdf (accessed 4 April 2015). 32. OECD, The e-Government Imperative, 2003, pp. 11–13. Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264101197-en (accessed 4 April 2015). 33. OECD, The e-Government Imperative, 2003, p. 11. Available at http:// dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264101197-en (accessed 4 April 2015). 34. Ali al-Khouri, ‘eGovernment strategies: the case of the United Arab Emirates (UAE)’, European Journal for ePractice 17 (September 2012), p. 134. 35. Ahmed Mustafa Elhussein Mansour, ‘E-government in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries: a comparative study’, Journal of Social Sciences 40/1 (January 2012), pp. 13 –44. 36. Shafi al-Shafi and Vishanth Weerakkody, ‘Exploring e-government in the State of Qatar: benefits, challenges and complexities’, Proceedings of European and Mediterranean Conference on Information Systems, 24 – 26 June 2007. Available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/ viewdoc/download?doi¼ 10.1.1.108.5455&rep¼rep1&type¼pdf (accessed 9 May 2015). 37. Yesser was established by the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology with the support of Ministry of Finance and the Communication and Information Technology Commission. See ‘Overview’. Available at http://www.yesser.gov.sa/en/ProgramDefini tion/Pages/Overview.aspx (accessed 9 May 2015). 38. Walid Qassim Qwaider and Khaled Abdullah al Shafi, ‘Understanding factors influencing e-government in Saudi Arabia’, International Journal of Computer Applications 81/2 (November 2013), pp. 37 – 41, pp. 39 – 40. 39. Yesser, e-Government Second Action Plan (2012 –16). Available at http://www.yesser.gov.sa/en/MechanismsandRegulations/strategy/ Pages/The2ndEgovernmentActionPlan.aspx (accessed 9 May 2015).

GCC GOVERNMENTS RESPONDING TO PUBLIC NEEDS 109 40. Moaman al-Busaidy and Vishanth Weerakkody, ‘The e-government implementation directions in Oman: preliminary investigation’, Proceedings of the European and Mediterranean Conference on Information Systems, 12 – 13 April 2009, Abu Dhabi, (2010). Available at http:// bura.brunel.ac.uk/bitstream/2438/4368/1/C99.pdf (accessed 9 May 2015). 41. Kraetzschmar and Lahlali, The State of e-Services Delivery in Kuwait. 42. Mansour, ‘E-government in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries’. 43. Salem and Jarar, Cross-agency Collaboration in the UAE Government, pp. 34 – 5. 44. Dubai has issued Data Protection Law 2007, which is only applicable in the jurisdiction of Dubai International Financial Center. 45. Kraetzschmar and Lahlali, The State of e-Services Delivery in Kuwait, p. 17. 46. Hukoomi Facebook page. Available at https://www.facebook.com/ HukoomiQatar (accessed 27 March 2015). 47. Kuwait Online Government Facebook page. Available at https:// www.facebook.com/video.php?v¼ 131854276947188&set¼vb.4272 08230629740&type ¼ 2&theater (accessed 27 March 2015). 48. For example, UAE: http://www.government.ae/en/web/guest/e-parti cipation. Saudi Arabia has a blog and forums on its portal: http:// www.saudi.gov.sa/wps/portal/yeseserRoot/home (both accessed 27 March 2015). 49. Saudi Arabia: http://www.199099.gov.sa/faq/Amer/Pages/default. aspx; and Bahrain: http://oservices.bahrain.bh/wps/portal/ncs (both accessed 27 March 2015). 50. United Nations, ‘E-government survey 2016’. Available at http:// workspace.unpan.org/sites/Internet/Documents/UNPAN96407.pdf (accessed 11 September 2016). 51. UAE Cabinet, Prime Minister, Public E-Sessions. Available at http:// uaepm.ae/English/GetInvolved/Pages/Publicesessions.aspx (accessed 26 March 2015, no longer available). 52. UAE Cabinet, Prime Minister, Public E-Sessions. Available at http:// uaepm.ae/English/GetInvolved/Pages/Public-E-Sessions.aspx (accessed 26 March 2015, no longer available). 53. Bahrain. bh, eGovernment blog. Available at http://www.bahrain. bh/wps/portal/!ut/p/a1/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfGjzOLd Pb0dDU1MDLwtXPwMDBxNAlyMPLycDfzdDYEKIoEKDIx8nQ09TY y8DHx9gQosnIJ8QtycDQzcjYnUjwM4GhDSH5xYpB-uHwVWhs8V EAW4rSnIDY2o8ExXBACBWu25/dl5/d5/L0lHSkovd0RNQUprQUVn QSEhLzRKU0UvZW4!/ (accessed 21 May 2015). 54. Steffen Hertog, ‘State and private sector in the GCC after the Arab uprisings’, Journal of Arabian Studies 3/2 (2014), pp. 174 – 95. Available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/54399/ (accessed 31 March 2015). In June 2016 the GCC agreed to introduce 5 per cent value added tax (VAT) in

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55. 56. 57.

58. 59.

POLICY MAKING IN THE GCC 2018 to offset the rise in fiscal deficit, which is projected to reach 12.5 per cent in 2016, up from 9 per cent in 2015, due to a 75 per cent drop in oil prices since mid 2014. The VAT Framework Agreement is expected to be finalised at the October 2016 meeting of the GCC Financial and Economic Cooperation Committee. ‘GCC set to see stunted growth, rising deficits in 2016’, Arabian Business, 26 March 2016. Available at http://www.arabianbusiness.com/gcc-set-seestunted-growth-rising-deficits-in-2016-626109.html#.V9zkmWh942w (accessed 17 September 2016); ‘GCC nations on “tight timeline” to prepare for VAT implementation’, Gulf Times, 22 August 2016. Available at http://www.gulf-times.com/story/499012/GCC-nationson-tight-timeline-to-prepare-for-VAT-I (accessed 12 September 2016). Stasa Salacanin, ‘Oil and gas reserves: how long will they last?’, BQ Magazine, 1 February 2015. Available at http://www.bqdoha.com/ 2015/02/oil-gas-reserves-long-will-last (accessed 21 May 2015). OECD, Building an Institutional Framework for Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA): Guidance for Policy Makers, (Paris: OECD, 2008). Crowdsourcing is a new trend in participatory legislation whereby the government seeks ideas on legislation from the public, starting with their priorities, ideas on content of legislation and editing it. By enhancing the legitimacy of legislation, it seeks to increase compliance. It is being used – on a limited basis – in Finland, Iceland, New Zealand and some states in the US. For more information about the subject: Govlab, ‘seven lessons from the crowdsourced law reform in Finland’, 30 October 2013. Available at http://thegovlab.org/seven-lessons-fromthe-crowdsourced-law-reform-in-finland/ (accessed 10 May 2015). Yesser, Public consultation. Available at http://www.yesser.gov.sa/ en/PublicConsultation/Pages/default.aspx (accessed 4 April 2015). Ministry of Transport and Communications, Consultation. Available at http://www.ictqatar.qa/en/type/consultations (accessed 21 May 2015).

4 GOVERNANCE, PARTICIPATION AND ICT: ASSESSING THE ROLE OF E-GOVERNMENT IN THE STATE OF QATAR Rhea Abraham

Introduction In the early years, until the introduction of the internet and the widespread use of personal computers, the main objective of technology use in government services was to enhance the capacity of public administration. Technology was seen as a means to manage the limitations and provide the infrastructure within the bureaucratic workforce. However, the promise of significant efficiencies with the emergence of information communications technology (ICT) in the provision of governmental services, time constraints and more involved citizenry have significantly fuelled the growth and interest in e-services around the world. In the current security environment, therefore, e-government has become the strategic aim of public governance modernisation reforms around the world. Society in the Arab Gulf monarchies has significantly transformed in the current decade with the opening up of Gulf countries to information flows largely as a by-product of economic and technological changes. Media, education and greater connectivity have been improving the ability of Gulf citizens’ not just to consume

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and receive information but also to participate more freely and actively in both local and global discussion about politics and societies. Despite the support for monarchies among the locals, GCC countries are witnessing growing internal pressure for popular participation, including deliberation on representation by young people and women in the region. The Arab Gulf monarchies have been investing in e-government services, which have in turn opened up avenues for the international community to foster relations with the Gulf countries, which were otherwise considered inward-looking. E-government is the optimisation of service delivery and communication through technology, the internet and online media,1 which provides the potential to bring people closer to their governments. Regardless of the type of political system in the nation, the public benefits from interactive features enabling dialogue between the people and their governments.2 However, as we discuss further, the relation between governance and ICT has become more of a policy issue than merely a subject of academic research, as its constructive employment can influence perceptions of citizen participation. It is important, however, to know that while e-government use in these countries may not be fundamentally rooted in sustaining participatory democracy, it still has a significant impact on governance interactions as it helps to facilitate more individualised communication between citizens and officials, as is seen through services being offered on national web portals of the Gulf countries.3

An overview of Gulf e-governments The E-Government Index developed by the United Nations Public Administration Programme ranks Arab countries, including United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar, in the category of high egovernment capacity, suggesting that there is a great potential for Arab countries to boost up their e-government index performance.4 In the late 1990s, Arab Gulf governments invested heavily in ICT, enabling them to not only renew but also to expand their ICT infrastructures by implementing new technologies. From 2003 to 2008 ICT expenditure on related services in the region was approximately 3.4 per cent of the countries’ gross domestic product (GDP), which increased to 5.8 per cent.5 Market demand for oil and gas led to increases in the GDP of each of these countries, and

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subsequently these countries increased investment in their ICT infrastructure first as a means of attracting foreign investors. The approach adopted by countries such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the UAE involved partial privatisation of the state-owned telecommunication sector, which acted as the key catalyst for modernisation and the expansion of public telecommunications networks. In the Arab States, national network upgrades, technological improvements, enhanced national connectivity and the gradual introduction of new internet provider delivery technologies started creating a favourable environment for the uptake of ICT.6 In turn there was a revolutionary change in the amount of information available due to its effect on the development of the economy, exposing Arab youth to a far greater diversity of ideas, including political and social ideas than ever before. At present, the e-government services in these countries conduct tasks by proposing public policy and suitable legislations and decisions for the implementation of the e-government programmes, providing services and facilitating communication, in addition to providing technical and scientific support to ministries and other government organisations. As some Arab countries continue their investments into digital knowledge-based economies, the regional ICT infrastructure has also been growing exponentially. The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) report on e-government shows a high level of preparedness in Arab countries, classified as heavy users of electronic social networks, and high dependence on digital communication.7 Growing efforts of the GCC governments to promote digital transformation and literacy have also elevated the region’s readiness. The UAE, Bahrain and Qatar are identified as the Arab e-government leaders, with a single entry point national e-government portal to provide transaction capabilities to users of e-government services.8 Along with leadership backing, funding for modernising the existing infrastructure and demographics, the GCC countries have been investing in e-participation services to boost public confidence, with e-participation guidelines including suggestions, observations, communication with officials and customer feedback. Importantly, the ease with which public opinion can be monitored through the internet has increased the shura9 (consultation) component in decision making, as individuals are able to

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access and monitor important government documents for active individual or organised participation in the policy making debate.10

Qatar as a case study In recent years, Qatar has emerged as one of the more recognised Gulf States, mainly as an outcome of its stability in terms of immense natural gas reserves, its recent policy initiatives, including international branding and institution-building, having the highest GDP growth rate in the region, its position on the Human Capital Index and its education services. Also, the success of the Al Jazeera media network and Qatar’s rapidly evolving institutions including the Qatar foundation have been able to project the country as an aspiring international ‘tech savvy’ nation. In 2005 Qatar’s written constitution came into effect and a new labour law came into force, expanding and, albeit in limited fashion, protecting rights of workers and its people.11 Qatar has ranked third among the top 10 Asian economies on the Online Service Index of the biannual E-Government Development Index released by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA).12 Qatar’s e-government project has been recognised as one of the best in the West Asian region, with a ranking of 27 in the World Economic Forums Global Networked Readiness Index.13 Significant strengths of Qatar in successful e-government have been the government procurement of advanced technology, venture capital availability, mobile network coverage, households with personal computers, government visions and the quality of its education system.14 The country’s ambitious knowledge agenda has been balanced with financial support and infused with the concept of developing a Qatari ICT adoption model for the government and people. This has in turn been successful in securing a sense of community participation, mainly through the accessibility of government services at large. Despite some resistance to making e-government prominent within a short time frame, a wide spectrum of local communities has been successfully engaged in the transformation project.15 Qatar’s e-participation policy is an attempt by the Qatari government to be more inclusive and accommodating of public involvement in governmental affairs. However, one has to keep in mind that Qatar remains a constitutional monarchy and, despite the ensured stability

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its citizen’s support for the regime provides, any kind of internal demand for democratisation of the political system is limited. Nonetheless, with an educated younger urban population and a smaller demographic profile, the standard of living and secure internet servers, Qatar offers an excellent case in point to help understand the dynamics among modernisation efforts, traditional elements in the society and state functioning and their effect on e-government services.

Objectives and methodology This chapter is part of ongoing research on Qatar and various modernisation processes taking place in the country. The researcher aims to understand the relationship between governance and ICT in one of the Gulf monarchies, namely Qatar, and its use of ICT through e-government. The chapter aims to set a background for assessment of e-government by exploring the theoretical relevance of ICT in governance and citizen participation in the form of e-participation. The concept of citizen participation may be limited in its objectives and traditional role, as Qatar is a constitutional monarchy and thereby restricts political participation and civil society in its democratic sense, but can be studied as modernisation processes being facilitated by the Qatari government in the recent years. However, the research will highlight an understanding of e-services as a platform for incorporating citizen interaction and engagement, along with features of new media. The information collected through interaction with Qataris is also reflected in the chapter. However, the chapter has to be exploratory, mainly because the only sources of published information on e-government in Qatar are official government reports and publications. Despite their significance, some of the publications are ambiguous, some lack citizen perspective and some are not able to provide an overall picture of the benefits and current challenges facing e-government in Qatar in adequate depth.16

Governance in the technological age Governance in the broader sense is defined as the processes of interaction and decision making among actors that leads to the creation and reinforcement of social institutions. Good governance as

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its qualitative outcome is an efficient and objective practice of inclusive participation of citizens with emphasis on consensus building and responsive government, including significant development oriented complexes of policy such as political and economic liberalisation; and the introduction and maintenance of political transparency and accountability.17 Improvement in governance mechanisms is therefore imperative to empower individuals and local communities to develop access to information18 and critical in meeting the present and future needs of the society at large.

Significance of ICT in governance Since the last decade of the twentieth century many countries have promoted citizen engagement in the process of governance, ranging from new decentralised institutions to a wide variety of participatory and consultative processes in national and global policy deliberations. ICTs have allowed information to traverse borders and individuals to interact with other audiences beyond the reach of the state, accelerating and intensifying a global social transformation. These further inspired theorists to posit that new governance is characterised by network-based steering, a weakened role of the state, a blurred state– society division and managerialism.19 ICT aims to act as a catalyst for organisational transformation and change in government machinery by influencing governance in managing large volumes of data and work flow connectivity, reducing personal interface of citizens with public service providers, and corruption.20 It also enables decentralisation in political or governmental institutions for expansion and interaction, with a procedure to deal more effectively with citizen inputs, demand, political capacity, mediation and support.21

Definitions of e-government While situations vary from one region or country and another, the e-government discourse seems to emphasise the efficient delivery of services through re-engineering government processes and e-participation or citizen centric services. E-government is a concept defined by the objective of the activity, which is transfer of government information and services, rather than by the specific technology used and provider of the service/information.22 Hence, many definitions of e-government are rather loose and stress its possible multiple

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meanings, depending on the specific context, regulatory environment, dominance of a group of actors in a given situation and different priorities in government strategies.23 E-government encompasses many characteristics, such as management of human resources and access to and quality of public services.24 There are four main types of e-government services:25 government-to-citizen; government-tobusiness; government-to-government; and intra-governmental. The Qatari e-government initiative was launched in 2000 with a pilot project to renew resident permits that involved the Ministry of Interior as the service provider, the Qatar National Bank as the payment gateway and the Qatar Central Bank as the host.26 As a result of the success of this project, government support was given to start the second phase of e-government, aimed at assessing all ministries for their ability to commence electronic transactions.27 The objectives of e-government vision in Qatar were identified as the following:28 – to interlink government agencies, improve the internal working of the public sector, migrate paper-based processes to online services and reduce financial costs; – to make service delivery faster and more efficient; – to broaden access to and uptake of new technologies; – to create efficiency in government administration, and increase government openness. The establishment of ictQATAR, the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology, in 2004 was to regulate the two sectors of information and communications technology and create an advanced information community by preparing a suitable infrastructure environment.29 It was established to manage and develop the overall ICT strategy in Qatar relating to service delivery and legislation of public services. A year later ictQATAR took overall control of the national electronic government initiative, along with e-health and e-education programmes using a phased implementation plan. The ictQATAR strategy provides broadband connectivity for all, wireless neighbourhoods and a National Data Centre to provide the secure storage of data. It has been fostering ICT literacy through educational projects and foreign enterprises as well as stimulating the ICT job market and the development of technology ventures, including research and development. Regulatory and legal frameworks

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are currently in place for ensuring universal access, preventing cyber crime, providing privacy and enabling secure transactions. ictQatar established a Computer Emergency Response Team, with the mission of making Qatar a regional ICT security hub. It also has the task of setting up emergency communications in support of disaster relief operations. ictQATAR has been promoting and supporting opportunities for the adoption of ICT into education by the training of personnel and upgrading infrastructure across educational institutions and creating knowledge communities. The broadband internet connectivity of hotels, conference centres and other public areas has been improved under ictQATAR, developing services and applications such as high speed video streaming and web hosting and high quality mobile and wireless broadband available at sports facilities. There are three designated wireless internet hotspots throughout selected public parks in the city.30 E-government services currently offered include visa applications, driving licences, payment of traffic fines, delivery and payment of electricity and water bills, employment services, health cards, residence permits and student registration.

E-government and citizen participation Governance of the political and administrative system is closely linked to citizen participation where, as an instrument of coordination, the hierarchy of absolute power is substituted by networks comprised of individual and collective actors with different degrees of institutionalisation.31 Citizen participation means involvement of citizens in a wide range of policy making activities, including determination of levels of services in order to orient government programmes towards community needs and is mostly expressed through information, awareness raising, consultation, questioning and dialogue.32 Citizen participation can be divided into political and administrative participation, which involves both passive and active participation such as information delivery and formation of a consensus on specific political, social or economic issues. For citizen participation to work, transparency of government information and the understanding of the significance of participation by the citizens is needed. The contemporary use of ICT, namely social media, in governance has had an impact by helping governments provide

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formal online channels for citizens to report crime, comment on policy or petition for change. Citizens often use social media to organise among themselves for activism and protest and to communicate as well as to report and map issues in society, which has increased pressure on governments to respond.33 However, the government’s leadership in promoting greater public participation is critically important for this stage.34 It is also important to understand that social, political, economic and cultural factors are also determinants of technological change. National culture as a source of acceptable norms and behaviours may influence online participation, the preferences and experiences of the public and their attitudes towards e-government.35 It also affects leadership and decision making in public organisations through its influence on organisational cultures, which may also influence governments’ strategies regarding the offering of e-service to citizens. National culture and demographics may influence e-government readiness and explain the variation in e-government preparedness across nations and the limitations of a universalised e-government framework.36 A nation’s e-government readiness therefore depends on factors such as a government’s willingness to understand and cater to the needs of the people, cultural dimensions, languages, trust and confidentiality.37 In Arab countries, the limitations of the political system, socio-cultural factors such as image perception (in terms of societal superiority in usage of ICT), influence of others including tribe members, resistance due to behavioural norms of the society and the concept of wasta or interpersonal social networks may impact the use of e-government services and the success rate of ICT on participation in the country.38 ictQATAR has developed an effective e-governance model (i-Gov, launched in 2006) involving the highest level of government and other stakeholders, with full political support of a customer-focused and government-wide approach.39 This is achieved through the regular meeting of various levels of management committees, including groups involving the Emir and his ministers. There are also quarterly ICT forums, which are attended by all government Chief Information Officers and ICT managers.40 This encourages broad participation, an exchange of information, expertise and knowledge as well as the development of a professional IT community. ictQATAR has also

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established strategic alliance agreements and MoU’s (memoranda of understanding) with several countries, such as Singapore and Korea, leading technology and solution providers such as Microsoft and Oracle. ictQATAR is a member state of the International Telecommunication Union project to close the digital divide and is collaborating with NGO’s (non-governmental organisations) such as Reach Out To Asia (ROTA) (a Qatar-based NGO under the Qatar Foundation) on initiatives to promote ICT usage.41 Through i-Gov, Qatar has been able to establish a single access point in February 2008 for all interaction with the government called Hukoomi,42 which has enabled the provision of hundreds of online services through a single portal. It is a safe and reliable platform with secure identification and authentication of users, providing convenient and cost free services for citizens and businesses. Qatar has set up a data portal, Qalm,43 to provide access to some government data and information for innovative usage of the data and information available on the data portal.44 ictQATAR has also created a comprehensive project management reference manual that sets out common architecture, standards and procedures for developing all government ICT systems, facilitating improvements in integration and efficiency.45 The e-correspondence government-to-government system transfers and tracks letters between government entities, while the Government Data Exchange will provide governance, processes, policy, standards, data dictionary and technology for exchanging data between government entities. Online forms are documented, with core data held by government, and data held by other entities.46 Also, the Qatari government has been conducting roundtable discussions on Big Data, the bulk of information available on the internet from the government and its users, which can be used securely for enhancing services in healthcare, education and transport; along with the publications of White Papers on ICT usage by the Qatari government and its people. The Qatari government has also partnered with Microsoft to help government agencies by building a transformation platform, named ‘Sadeem’. As per the agreement, Microsoft will assist in offering e-services tools and capabilities, business intelligence and other benefits, which focus on the streamlining of initiatives designed to enhance government e-services in the country. The Qatari leadership expects all government services to be online by 2020, allowing the

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public to interact better with the government and executives to have access to information and tools that will promote better-informed decision making.47 The Qatari e-government houses the open data policy that provides public access to information, a digital Qatar blog and a safe space for child cyber security.48 In its open data policy, the Qatari government is issuing information relating to commodities and prices under the Ministry of Economy and Commerce portal, and a workers’ welfare charter under the Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy. Similarly, the Qatar Statistics Authority compiles data reflecting the economic and social development of the State of Qatar and is online for open access. All ministries and government agencies in Qatar have websites with information and services readily available in both English and Arabic for public access. In e-government policies and strategic documents there has been a strong rhetorical emphasis on citizen perspective as part of customer orientation, which is put forward distinctively. The consumption of information and public services online is a form of citizen participation in political and social activities.49

E-participation policy The UN has adopted an e-participation index as a proxy for measuring capability maturity in e-democracy among its members.50 E-participation is meant to assess the quality, usefulness and relevance of the information and the willingness of governments to involve citizens in the public policy making process.51 It is generally defined as ICT-supported participation of citizens in governance. The e-participation index contains three benchmarks, namely e-information, e-consultation, and e-decision making, which respectively enable, engage and empower citizens. Taken together, these benchmarks measure the degree of the country’s strength in e-participation through the tools of surveys, forums and social networking sites.52 There are two forms of participation, the first form is government driven participation, where e-participation is the responsibility of the government, primarily enacted by governments. The second is citizen driven participation which means that the technology adaption and development is not only the responsibility of the government but is also a social movement driven and enabled by citizens through the use of the internet.53

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The availability of new technology encompasses the Qatari and expatriate population, as 73 per cent of Qataris own a smart phone with access to the internet, compared to 63 per cent of expatriates.54 Though not yet undertaken, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOI) will send a delegation to Estonia to learn about e-voting services practised and the related electronic solutions. During the recently held Central Municipal elections, registration of voters was made possible through METRASH2, a smart phone application of the MOI. Also, electronic voting workshops and campaigns were conducted at Carnegie Mellon University in Qatar while through its write-ups and presentations Al Jazeera’s new media department has been encouraging youth to get involved in regional political and social dialogue. ictQATAR is currently conducting a comprehensive study on the impact of ICT on Qatari youth to affirm their increasing use of internet for harnessing collective action. QatarDebate,55 which encourages debating among youth, and the television series The Doha Debates – both as part of Qatar foundation (an NGO supported by the Emir) and the latter in collaboration with BBC – have been openly encouraging a culture of discussion and dialogue on several important issues in the country. This has been positively received by the youth, and has opened up avenues for them to discuss, albeit hesitantly, regional and local issues. The Qatari government recently launched its e-participation policy, which establishes a culture of e-participation in government entities and aims to improve transparency and public engagement. Ranking 55th in the UN e-participation index, the policy aims to commit to consult and solicit people’s opinions and engage and empower in decision making through online polling and petitioning.56 The policy sets up e-participation leadership by appointing senior officers in each ministry to oversee the administration and implementation of e-participation activities, lead online communication and spread awareness.57 Each agency will also establish an exclusive webpage for participation for commitment, consultation (follow-ups and public responses) and the engagement of the public through social media, online polls, online satisfaction surveys and identity control.58 After consultation from the public this initiative has been a welcome change for the Qataris, despite its restriction on the subjects available for discussion. It nonetheless paves the way for e-participation guidelines and e-decision making to be implemented more practically in Qatar’s public policies.

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Through its e-participation section the Hukoomi portal allows citizens to update themselves about polls and surveys being conducted by the Qatari government and also be a part of such activities online. There is also a section for citizens’ suggestions to the prime minister, under the Ministry of Interior, which can be in the form of a note, proposal or complaint. The Social Impact Department of ictQATAR conducted a study of the impact of ICT on Qatari society and online attitudes and behaviours, named ‘Rassed’.59 Currently, there are polls and forums active on various government sites, including the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Energy, while e-town hall meetings are active on the Ministry of Administrative Development and Ministry of Environment websites. A number of recent initiatives have been launched by the government that highlight the commitment of the leadership and officials to endorse e-participation and governance successfully in the future. These initiatives include an assistive technical centre called MADA,60 for people with disabilities, WASLA,61 an initiative for youth to teach technology to the elderly, e-learning portals for young and old people alike, safety campaigns and publicity, the national information security centre and hosting workshops for more user friendly international collaborations.62 In 2009, research by Brunel University, the American University of Beirut and Turkat (a Turkish central e-government service provider) assisted three governments in evaluating and improving their egovernment services, to make them more user-friendly for citizens. CEES (the Citizen-Oriented Evaluation of E-government Services project, funded by EU’s Seventh Framework Programme for Research People programme), delivered a new evaluation model, COBRA (cost, opportunity, benefit, risk analysis), for benchmarking e-government services from citizens’ perspective. The research outcome enabled the launch of a new project, I-MEET (Integrated Model for Evaluating E-government services transformation), which had been introduced in Qatar, Lebanon and the UK. The project, which was funded by the Qatar National Research foundation, conducted a number of meetings and publications (involving Lebanon and UK governments) highlighting the importance of assessing the e-services from a user and provider perspective. In 2014, the project came to an end.63 However, e-government service providers such as ictQATAR and OMSAR (Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform)

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have decided to adopt the COBRA framework to evaluate and improve their e-government services in Qatar and Lebanon respectively in the future.64

Assessing challenges and existing complexities Throughout the chapter it has been maintained that ICT adoption has been benefitting governance and citizen participation across the world. The use of e-government services, especially by otherwise conservative societies like Qatar, has been providing a platform for the citizens and social institutions to discuss and connect and, at the same time, has been opening these countries up to better relations with the international community. However, despite the success rate of e-participation in terms of e-information and e-consultation, the use of e-government in Qatar comes with a number of challenges, limitations and complexities. In the research it has been understood that the Qatari e-government project lacks a substantive awareness campaign programme to promote and raise awareness of e-government with a proper feedback mechanism from its citizens. As already mentioned, a number of projects and international tie-ups have been initiated, but the progress of these remains slow and tactical. Despite the use of technology in governance, authenticity of information and response seems to be blurred.65 The government discussion forums continue to have limitations for users, who have to filter their comments so as to restrict them from any defamation of the political system and are not to allowed discuss issues relating to religion, ethnicity and sectarianism.66 Another challenge is the influence of socio-cultural, and not technology or economic related, factors on the perception of reliability of e-government by Qatari citizens. The relevance of wasta persists in Qatari societies, and though a large proportion of its youth is internet educated, a section of the society, including government officials and older citizens, continues to resist the role of e-governance in the country. This is mainly due to the change in traditional roles brought about by technology and the pace of interaction between the people and the authorities. Similarly, there are large discrepancies in participation among youth and many young people do not recognise the importance of active citizenship, and thus not taking part in open discussion on e-voting, civil society

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formations and migrant recruitment policies, which are essential to encourage participation in the region. E-government in Qatar is a brave, bold and innovative approach by the government in the governance of its people and to a large extent has been successful in gaining the recognition of its people and the international community on its accessibility and the usability of services. E-government in Qatar has readily been used to create spaces and opportunities for citizens to express their opinions, but making them stronger and more meaningful is a challenge that is political and not technical in nature. With the postponement of the legislative elections for the Advisory Council to 2019, public participation and voting rights as an extension of e-participation policy continues to see a bleak future.67 The e-participation policy has increased quantity, quality and availability of information to citizens in the public sphere through mobile, broadband and internet access, but continues to be a form of government driven participation, as it lacks the citizen’s perspective that is necessary to process and act upon information, to facilitate citizen driven participation.68

Conclusion In the current regional scenario, with diminishing oil prices and the impact on public subsidies, Qatar continues to be a steadier option than the other neighbouring GCC states, due its massive natural gas reserves. However, Qatar is said to be facing a financial deficit for the first time in 15 years and has recently implemented measures such as raising utility rates, doubling fines for wasting water and increasing the cost of its postal services.69 Qatar has also ordered state-owned institutions such as Qatar Museums and Al Jazeera to reduce their programming and lay off expatriates and has reduced the Qatar Foundation budget by 40 per cent, with significant cuts at Western academic institutions in Education City. However, on the other hand, despite massive investments in ICT and fluctuating oil prices, Qatar’s e-government may not be affected, as it requires more than financial investments to withstand any future shortcomings. Much e-government research in the country has focused on the technological component of e-government initiatives without assessing environmental factors or the vast differences in government resources for citizen participation.70 Such delivery systems need to be

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designed to provide the ability to monitor e-government progress with an understanding of the levels of customer satisfaction. In the current context the level of citizen trust needs to be continuously increased by harnessing ICT to encourage citizens to be more proactive and constructive in the public domain and to contribute in public debates.71 Consistent support from leaders and empowered institutions is needed to overcome cultural resistance to process and organisational changes, change skills and mindsets and maintain a long-term vision of transformation while insisting on concrete short-term results.72 Specialised institutions and new competencies are required to create, acquire, adapt and diffuse technologies and move beyond merely e-services to policy activism and synchronisation of associated governance reforms.73 It is necessary for government to be able to build citizens’ trust by revealing goals and methods to achieve them through techniques of ICTs such as advocacy, constituent mobilisation and social monitoring.

The way forward for Qatar’s e-government E-government begins as an efficiency-oriented government that computerises the operations of government agencies and provides basic services for the purpose of improving work efficiency, then progresses to become a service oriented government that seeks to enhance customer satisfaction by linking operations of different agencies and finally develops towards a participatory government where people can play a leading role in public administration proceedings.74 To build a citizen-oriented participatory e-government, it is necessary to raise quality of e-government in terms of process efficiency, service and participation. Similarly, the vagueness of the term e-governance/e-government and the treatment of the subject require a more in-depth analysis of the political nature of the e-government development processes, and a deeper recognition of complex political and institutional environments, beyond restricting it to the study of information systems. Qatar’s e-government requires a coherent strategy, starting with an examination of the nation’s political will, resources, regulatory environment and the population’s ability to make use of planned technologies.75 The aim of involving citizens is not only to ensure satisfaction with and use of e-government services but also to involve

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the requirements of the entire resident population in redefining government. E-government as a major instrument for achieving good governance in future, accompanied by timely changes, can be an important source of political growth, along with economic development and, maybe, non-Western-style democracy in the region.76

Notes 1. Gajendra Sharma, Xi Bao and Li Peng. ‘Public participation and ethical issues on e-governance: a study perspective in Nepal,’ Electronic Journal of E-Government 12/1 (2014), p. 83. Available at http://www.ejeg.com/issue/download.html?idArticle¼312 (accessed 18 March 2015). 2. Darrell M. West, ‘Global e-government’, Center for Public Policy, Brown University, August 2006, p. 8. Available at http://www.insi depolitics.org/egovt06int.pdf (accessed 20 March 2015). 3. Caroline J. Tolbert and Karen Mossberger, ‘The effects of e-government on trust and confidence in government’, Public Administration Review 66/3 (2006), p. 355. 4. Zakia Al-adawi, Shumaila Yousafzai and John Pallister, ‘Conceptual model of citizen adoption of e-government’, paper presented at the Second International Conference on Innovation in Information Technology, Dubai, 2005, p. 3. Available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu. edu/viewdoc/download?doi¼10.1.1.92.2165&rep ¼ rep1&type ¼ pdf (accessed 18 March 2015). 5. World Bank, ‘Econstats: Information and communication technology expenditure (% of GDP)’, 2010. Available at www.econstats.com/ wdi/wdiv_533.htm (accessed 19 May 2015). 6. UNESCO, ‘ICT education in five Arab states: a comparative analysis of ICT integration and e-readiness in schools in Egypt, Jordan, Oman, Palestine and Qatar,’ Information Papers, (Canada: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2013), p. 5. Available at www.uis.unesco.org/Communi cation/Documents/ICT-arab-states-en.pdf (accessed 6 May 2015). 7. UN, ‘UN e-government report 2014’, pp. 30, 118. Available at unpan3.un.org/egovkb/en-us/Reports/UN-E-Government-Survey2014 (accessed 27 August 2015). 8. Akemi Takeoka Chatfield and Omar Alhujran, ‘A cross-country comparative analysis of e-government service delivery among Arab countries’, Information Technology for Development 15/3 (2009), pp. 160 – 1. Available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10. 1002/itdj.20124/abstract (accessed 20 May 2015). 9. The Shura is the consultative principle in Islamic political theory. The Qur’an uses the word al-Shura to refer to mutual consultation between believers on issues of public concern. However, the Qur’an

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itself offers no specific idea concerning the mechanism to be used for consultation but the shura system can be effectively used for participation of the public in effective governance in any suitable and appropriate political system. It should be noted that as compared to a parliament, Majlis al-shura, or the consultative council in Islamic countries, is neither sovereign nor supreme and is limited in matters of legislation, and expenditure. See further Fazlur Rahman, ‘The principle of “Shura” and the role of the umma in Islam’, American Journal of Islamic Studies 1/1 (1984), p. 1; Manochehr Dorraj, ‘Islam democracy and governance’, in Paul J. Magnarella, Middle East and North Africa: Governance, Democratization, Human Rights (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), pp. 11 – 36. Giacomo Luciani, ‘Democracy vs Shura in the age of the internet’, in Abdulhadi Khalaf and Giacomo Luciani (eds), Constitutional Reform and Political Participation in the Gulf (Dubai: GRC, 2006), p. 288. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ‘Arab political systems: baseline information and reforms – Qatar’, 6 March 2008. Available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2008/03/06/arab-political-systemsbaseline-information-and-reforms-pub-16918 (accessed 26 August 2013). Ministry of Transport and Communications, ‘Qatar ranks 3rd on 2016 online service index’, 1 August 2016. Available at http://www. ictqatar.qa/en/news-events/news/qatar-ranks-3rd-2016-online-serviceindex (accessed 1 September 2016). ‘Qatar’, in Soumitra Dutta, Thierry Geiger and Bruno Lanvin (eds), The Global Information Technology Report 2015 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2015), p. 224. Available at http://www3.weforum. org/docs/WEF_Qatar.pdf (accessed 6 May 2015). ‘Qatar among top 30 nations in “network readiness”’, Gulf Times, 15 April 2015. Available at http://www.gulftimes.com/qatar/178/ details/435133/qatar-among-top-30-nations-in-%E2%80%98networkreadiness%E2%80%99 (accessed 20 May 2015). Hessa al-Jaber and Soumitra Dutta, ‘Qatar: leveraging technology to create a knowledge-based economy in the Middle East’, in Dutta and Mia, The Global Information Technology Report 2007 – 2008, p. 143. Available at http://www.motc.gov.qa/sites/default/files/docum ents/Qatar_LeveragingTechnology.pdf (accessed 19 May 2015). Shafi al-Shafi and Vishanth Weerakkody, ‘Exploring e-government in the State of Qatar: benefits, challenges and complexities’, Proceedings of European and Mediterranean Conference on Information Systems, 24 – 26 June 2007, p. 6. Available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi¼10.1. 1.108.5455&rep¼rep1&type¼pdf (accessed 29 January 2015). Judith Tendler, Good Governance in the Tropics (Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

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18. John Mathiason, ‘Information and communication technologies and e-participation for the empowerment of people and e-governance’, concept note for the Expert Group Meeting on the Priority Theme of the Commission for Social Development 2013 – 14, 20 June 2013. Available at www.un.org/esa/socdev/egms/docs/ 2013/ict/BackgroundPaper.pdf (accessed 18 March 2015). 19. Yuliya Makarava, ‘Friends without benefits: critical assessment of the relationship between e-governance and democracy’, MA thesis, Mid Sweden University, December 2011, p. 9. Available at www.diva-portal. org/smash/get/diva2:504522/FULLTEXT01.pdf (accessed 28 May 2015). 20. Prasanna K. Mohanty, ‘Using e-tools for good governance and administrative reforms’, Center for Good Governance, Hyderabad, 2005, p. 4. Available at www.cgg.gov.in/workingpapers/eGov PaperARC.pdf (accessed 6 May 2015). 21. Seung-yong Uhm and Rod Hague, ‘Electronic governance, political participation and virtual community: Korea and UK compared in political context’, paper presented at European Consortium for Political Research, Institut d’E´tudes Politiques de Grenoble, France, 6–11 April 2001, p. 6. Available at http://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperPropos al/7555de16-8908-4a28-a4ef-ec3d32411d1f.pdf (accessed 19 May 2015). 22. Mete Yildiz, ‘E-government research: reviewing the literature, limitations, and ways forward’, Government Information Quarterly 24/3 (2007), p. 654. Available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/ article/pii/S0740624X07000056 (accessed 18 March 2015). 23. Ibid. 24. ‘E-government primer’, Infodev/World Bank, 2009. Available at http:// www.itu.int/ITU-D/cyb/app/docs/eGovernment_Primer%5B1%5D. pdf (accessed 19 May 2015). 25. Donna Evans and David C. Yen. ‘E-government: evolving relationship of citizens and government, domestic, and international development’, Government Information Quarterly 23 (2006), p. 209. Available at http://mail.imb.usu.ru/docs/Bank%20English_Transleted%20Articles/ English/HR%20Management/E-Government_%20Evolving%20relati onship%20of%20citizens.pdf (accessed 19 May 2015). 26. al-Shafi and Weerakkody, ‘Exploring e-government in the State of Qatar’, p. 4. 27. Hukoomi, ‘Qatar e-government 2020 strategy’. Available at portal. www.gov.qa/wps/portal/about-hukoomi/integrated-e-government (accessed 15 January 2014). 28. Gemalto, ‘E-government services in Qatar’. Available at http://www. gemalto.com/brochures-site/download-site/Documents/gov-Qataregov.pdf (accessed 29 January 2015). 29. Shafi al-Shafi and Vishanth Weerakkody ‘Understanding citizens’ behavioural intention in the adoption of e-government services in

130

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

POLICY MAKING IN THE GCC the State of Qatar’, report of the 17th European Conference on Information Systems, 2009. Available at http://unpan1.un.org/ intradoc/groups/public/documents/un-dpadm/unpan035996.pdf (accessed 28 October 2015). Shafi al-Shafi and Vishanth Weerakkody, ‘Technology acceptance of free wireless internet park initiatives’, in Ganesh P. Sahu, Vishanth Weerakody and Yogesh K. Dwivedi (eds), E-Government Development and Diffusion: Inhibitors and Facilitators of Digital Democracy (New York: Information Science Reference, 2009), p. 162. Available at https:// books.google.co.in/books?id¼WrAfYOCN2ZUC&pg ¼ PA161&lpg ¼ PA161&dq ¼ Technology þ Acceptance þ of þ Free þ Wireless þ Internet þ Park þ Initiatives&source ¼ bl&ots ¼ NjYjkNcpmB&sig ¼ wMv7wCmnDVHEBN-xBRsBNLY2wMk&hl ¼ en&sa ¼ X&ved ¼ 0 ahUKEwjd06PKts7QAhXkslQKHYUCAiAQ6AEIKjADv ¼ onepage&q ¼ Technology%20Acceptance%20of%20Free%20Wireless%20Internet %20Park%20Initiatives&f ¼ false (accessed 14 May 2015). ´ ngel Iglesias Alonso, ‘E-participation and local governance: a case A study’, Theoretical and Empirical Researches in Urban Management 3/12 (2009), p. 53. Available at http://www.um.ase.ro/No12/4.pdf (accessed 30 October 2015). ‘E-governance and citizen participation in West Africa: challenges and opportunities’, The Panos Institute West Africa and UNDP, 2009, p. 18. Available at http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/ Democratic%20Governance/IParticipation/e-Governance%20and %20Citizen%20Paticipation%20in%20West%20Africa%20(UNDPIPAO%20Report%20English).pdf (accessed 7 October 2015). Jooho Lee and Soonhee Kim, ‘Active citizen e-participation in local governance: do individual social capital and e-participation management matter?’, Proceedings of the Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 25 – 27 May 2013, Shanghai, China, pp. 2044 – 5. Available at www.computer.org/csdl/mags/ex/2009/05/ mex2009050014.pdf (accessed 6 May 2015). Al-Husein N. Madhany, ‘New media to further global engagement’, US Islamic World Forum Papers, Brookings Institute, 31 December 2010, p. 9. Available at http://www.brookings.edu/,/media/research/files/ papers/2010/12/middle-east-media-madhany/12_middle_east_media_ madhany.pdf (accessed 20 May 2015). Fang Zhao, ‘Impact of national culture on e-government development: a global study’. Internet Research 21/3 (2011), p. 365. Available at https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/63a4/7472017fa53fba8e089c3d2 f25f379e4d946.pdf (accessed 19 May 2015). Omar E.M. Khalil, ‘E-government readiness: does national culture matter?’, Government Information Quarterly 28/3 (2011), p. 390. Available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/07406 24X/28/3 (accessed 18 March 2015).

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37. Ibid., p. 388. 38. Saleh Alghamdi and Natalia Beloff, ‘Towards a comprehensive model for e-government adoption and utilisation analysis: the case study of Saudi Arabia’, in Proceedings of the Federated Conference on Computer Science and Information Systems, 2014, p. 1221. Available at https:// fedcsis.org/proceedings/2014/pliks/146.pdf (accessed 14 May 2015). 39. ictQatar, ‘Integrated e-government’, 2009. Available at http://www. slideshare.net/AlHaqqNetwork/ict-qatar-integrated-egovernment (accessed 22 April 2015). 40. Ibid. 41. Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), ‘National profile of the information society in Qatar’, Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, 2007, p. 4. Available at www.escwa.un.org/wsis/reports/docs/qatar-07-e.pdf (accessed 6 May 2015). 42. http://portal.www.gov.qa/wps/portal (accessed 29 October 2015). 43. Qatar Information Exchange, http://www.qalm.gov.qa (accessed 13 May 2015). 44. Ali al-Kubaisi, ‘Improving the transparency, openness and efficiency of e-government in Qatar in the era of open government data and beyond’, PhD thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2004, p. 134. Available at http://eprints.qut.edu.au/75540/2/Ali_Al-Kubaisi_ Thesis.pdf (accessed 29 January 2015). 45. Alghamdi and Beloff, ‘Towards a comprehensive model for e-government adoption’. 46. Ministry of Transport and Communications, ‘Critical projects’. Available at http://www.ictqatar.qa/en/qatar-digital-government/ projects-services/critical-projects (accessed 27 August 2015). 47. Ministry of Transport and Communications, ‘Ministry of Transport and Communications, Microsoft sign agreement to broaden e-services implementation’, 29 June 2016. Available at http://www.ictqatar.qa/ en/news-events/news/ministry-transport-and-communicationsmicrosoft-sign-agreement-broaden-e-services (accessed 1 September 2016). 48. Ministry of Transport and Communications, ‘Open data policy’, 24 November 2014. Available at http://www.ictqatar.qa/en/documents/ document/open-data-policy (accessed 17 September 2016). 49. Uhm and Hague, ‘Electronic governance’, p. 8. 50. Chatfield and Alhujran, ‘A cross-country comparative analysis of e-government service delivery’, p. 154. 51. Alaa-Aldin Abdul Rahim and A. al Athmay, ‘E-governance in Arab countries: status and challenges’, Global Journal of Business Research 7/5 (2013), p. 85. Available at econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:ibf:gjbres:v:7: y:2013:i:5:p:79-98 (accessed 27 April 2014). 52. Ibid.

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53. Raya al-Dalou’ and Emad Abu-Shanab, ‘E-participation levels and technologies’, paper given at the 6th International Conference on Information Technology, Amman, Jordan, 8 – 10 May 2013. Available at sce.zuj.edu.jo/icit13/images/Camera%20Ready/E-Technology/656. pdf (accessed 28 October 2015). 54. Social and Economic Survey Research Institute, ‘A survey of life in Qatar 2012’, Annual Omnibus Survey, Qatar University, 2012. Available at qspace.qu.edu.qa:8080/handle/10576/4675 (accessed 29 October 2015). 55. http://www.qatardebate.org (accessed 27 August 2015). 56. United Nations Public Administration Country Studies (UNPACS), ‘Qatar’. Available at https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/ en-us/Data/Country-Information/id/137-Qatar (accessed 19 January 2015). 57. Ministry of Transport and Communications, ‘E-participation policy’, 16 April 2015. Available at http://www.ictqatar.qa/en/documents/ document/e-participation-policy (accessed 1 September 2016). 58. Ibid. 59. Ministry of Transport and Communications, ‘ictQATAR’s Rassed unveils findings of new study into social media usage in Qatar’, 10 December 2014. Available at http://www.ictqatar.qa/en/newsevents/news/ictqatar%E2%80%99s-rassed-unveils-findings-newstudy-social-media-usage-qatar (accessed 13 May 2015). 60. http://mada.org.qa/en/ (accessed 13 May 2015). 61. http://www.wasla.com (accessed 13 May 2015). 62. Ministry of Transport and Communications, ‘The Better Connections program marks 100 ICT facilities for migrant workers’, 12 March 2016. Available at http://www.ictqatar.qa/en/news-events/news/betterconnections-program-marks-100-ict-facilities-migrant-workers (accessed 1 September 2016). 63. Research Excellence Framework 2014, ‘An evaluation tool co-developed by Brunel University has helped Turkey, Qatar and Lebanon governments to improve their e-government services’. Available at http://impact.ref.ac.uk/CaseStudies/CaseStudy.aspx?Id¼ 11954 (accessed 30 October 2015). 64. European Union Community Research and Development Information Service (CORDIS), ‘CEES Periodic Report Summary 2’. Available at http:// cordis.europa.eu/result/rcn/158395_en.html (accessed 30 October 2015). 65. al-Shafi and Weerakkody, ‘Exploring e-government in the State of Qatar’. 66. Ministry of Interior (MOI), discussion forum. Available at https:// portal.moi.gov.qa/wps/portal/MOIInternet/discussionforum (accessed 29 October 2015). 67. Shabina S. Khatri, ‘Legislative elections in Qatar postponed until at least 2019’, Doha News, 17 June 2016. Available at http://dohanews.

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68.

69. 70. 71. 72.

73. 74. 75.

76.

133

co/legislative-elections-in-qatar-postponed-until-at-least-2019/ (accessed 1 September 2016). National Democratic Institute (NDI), ‘Citizen participation and technology’, 2013. Available at https://www.ndi.org/files/CitizenParticipation-and-Technology-an-NDI-Study.pdf (accessed 30 October 2015). World Bank, ‘How is Qatar reacting to low oil prices?’. Available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/gcc/publication/economicbrief-july-qatar-2016 (accessed 5 September 2016). Khalil, ‘E-government readiness’, p. 390. al-Kubaisi, ‘Improving the transparency, openness and efficiency of e-government in Qatar’, p. 19. Nagy K. Hanna and Christine Zhen-wei Qiang, ‘National e-government institutions: functions, models, and trends’, in Information and Communication for Development: Extending Reach and Increasing Impact, (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2009), p. 92. Available at http:// siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTIC4D/Resources/5870635-12420 66347456/IC4D_2009_Chapter6.pdf (accessed 29 January 2015). Ibid., p. 85. Sam Young Suh, ‘Promoting citizen participation in e-government’, p. 9. Available at unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/ un/unpan020076.pdf (accessed 7 October 2015). Sahraoui Sofiance, ‘E-government in the Arabian Gulf: government transformation vs government automation’, paper presented at eGovernment Workshop ’05 Brunel University, London, 13 September 2005. Available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi¼ 10.1.1.132.8011&rep ¼ rep1&type ¼ pdf (accessed 29 January 2015). Nasser Saidi and Halar Yared, ‘E-government: technology for good governance, development and democracy in the MENA countries’, 2003, p. 2. Available at http://www.mafhoum.com/press4/114E13. pdf (accessed 14 May 2015).

PART II CITIZENS: ECONOMY AND LABOUR ISSUES

5 ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF INCLUSIVE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS IN THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL STATES I-Tsung Tsai and Abdullah Kaya

Introduction Institutions play a critical role in economic development. Greif defines an institution as a social system that generates in or dictates to its subject members a certain type of behaviour.1 This social system comprises organisations, laws, rules of games, beliefs and norms that together shape the way economic activities perform. Acemoglu and Robinson suggest that institutions, more precisely the political institutions that determine economic institutions, are the dominating explanatory factor for why some nations fail and others succeed.2 They point out that political institutions can be divided into two kinds – ‘extractive’ institutions, in which a small group of individuals might exploit the rest of the population, and ‘inclusive’ institutions, in which the majority of the population are included in the governing process hence exploitation is either attenuated or absent. They further conclude that economies with inclusive institutions tend to outperform economies with extractive institutions.

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The GCC states, with their large hydrocarbon reserves and absolutist political system, are commonly recognised as rentier states that are subject to resource curse. While the effect of resource curse is not an essential feature of resource rich economies, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) indicated that the extent of resource curse is primarily determined by: (1) the effect of natural resources on the competitiveness of non-natural resource sectors; (2) the degree of integration of the natural resource sector with the rest of the economy and the nature of its linkages to other sectors; (3) the roles of the state and market forces in determining ownership structures in the natural resource sector, leading to the possible emergence of perverse incentives; and (4) the interrelationships between accountability in public spending and the impacts of natural resource-related commodity price fluctuations on the overall economic structure.3 UNIDO further suggested that the future development of the GCC states is highly related to the interrelated issues of oil revenue reliance, non-oil sector competitiveness and the institutions of the economy. However, exploration of the interrelationships between the ‘oil-to-non-oil’ economic diversification process and the evolution of institutions in the GCC states has been limited. Social conflict theory suggests that inclusive economic institutions are unacceptable to absolutist political institutions. However, GCC countries have achieved above global average rankings on some inclusive economic measures such as property rights protection, business entry barrier and perception corruption.4 Kaya and Tsai suggest that the emergence of inclusive economic institutions in the GCC is probably due to: (1) the weakened rent extraction capacity of the ruling elites as a result of intensifying regional integration and competition: and (2) the alignment of the ruling elites’ and the populations’ interest in long-term economic gain from market-based economies. These arguments, however, do not provide an explanation of whether and how the economic diversification process might affect the institutions in the GCC. Analysing economic diversification activities directly undertaken by the GCC governments and the governing structures of the diversification initiatives provides crucial indications of whether and how government-orchestrated economic diversification, driven by external shocks (i.e., depletion of natural endowment), thought be a self-preserving mechanism of political and economic institutions.

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In the next section of this chapter we review critical theories related to economic institution, political governance and rentier states. The following section summarises economic diversification plans and initiatives undertaken in the GCC, after which we report on the governance structure of economic diversification activities in GCC states. The penultimate section summarises the key implications of the relationship between economic diversification and the development of inclusive institutions in the GCC and is followed by the conclusion and discussion of the findings.

Theories on economic institutions, political governance and rentier states Among factors such as culture, climate, geography, natural endowments or genetic makeup of the population that might have affected the development of an economy, there is a growing consensus among researchers regarding the dominant role of the quality of institutions in economic development.5 Acemoglu et al. showed that difference in economic institutions accounts for 75 per cent of income difference across the former colonies of Europe.6 Other empirical studies have also confirmed the critical role of institutions in differentiating economic performance across countries.7 There are two types of institutions: economic and political. Economic institutions comprise economic transaction rules, contract enforcement mechanisms and social norms of behaviour.8 The quality of economic institutions is reflected in the market efficiency of the transactions of goods and services.9 Political institutions, on the other hand, include laws that regulate the labour and financial markets, rules that determine the distribution of economic rent (land, licence, etc.) and the taxation system.10 Acemoglu et al. divide political power into de jure and de facto political power.11 De jure political power is allocated by existing political institutions and is explicitly secured by law, whereas de facto political power is determined by economic wealth. The equilibrium of the interaction of these two political powers determines the structure of economic institutions. Inclusive economic institutions are defined as a set of legal and social establishments that enforce contracts, honour property rights and provide access to economic opportunities to a broad section

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of society.12 Extractive economic institutions, on the other hand, distribute economic wealth in favour of power owners and prevent the remaining section of society from performing most of the economic activities.13 Contrary to inclusive economic institutions, where competitive market and accountable taxation prevail, extractive economic institutions are characterised by excessive taxation, high entry barriers for (parts of) economic activities, corruption and predation of private property.14 While inclusive economic institutions incentivise efficient development, social conflict theory argues that absolutist regimes will not tolerate the emergence of inclusive economic institutions due to the fear of de facto political power change, which might in turn change the allocation of de jure political power.15 There have been numerous examples in history (notably in nineteenth-century Europe), when economically empowered groups demanded greater political rights and power in absolute regimes, which eventually led to the change of political institutions.16 The GCC states are normally consider countries with absolutist political regimes where the population has limited or no participation rights to the governance process of public affairs. In general, an absolutist political regime will introduce extractive political institutions. However, GCC states have performed better than many developing countries on some economic inclusivity indices and rankings.17 The co-existence of an absolutist political regime and inclusive economic institutions in the GCC can be explained by three theories: (1) rentier social contract theory; (2) market-preserving federalism; and (3) political Coase theorem (PCT). 1. Rentier social contract: the GCC countries, with their large hydrocarbon revenue, are commonly recognised as rentier states.18 For such economies, a ‘rentier social contract’ can be established with the introduction of little or no tax in exchange for the relinquishment of the population’s political rights.19 Consequently, the expropriation of wealth or property through taxation, as commonly found with extractive economic institutions, is minimal in the GCC states.20 The rentier social contract can be sustained as long as oil continues to generate revenue and the government distributes the revenue in a perceived satisfactory manner. Under this rentier social contract, any form of excessive

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141

taxation becomes unlikely. Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have failed to introduce taxation due to public resistance.21 On the other hand, the rentier social contract also exempts the government from policy accountability.22 As a result, taxation is a very delicate issue in the GCC states. It is very difficult even for the countries with decreasing hydrocarbon revenue to introduce tax.23 2. Market-preserving federalism: GCC countries are moderately embarking on a federal economic system with a vision of integrating their markets with each other, freeing the flow of labour, capital, services and products among the borders.24 This initiative has the potential to lead to ‘market-preserving federalism’, where the coercive power of the central authority or state on the economy can be restrained.25 The existence of marketpreserving federalism, subject to certain conditions, may decrease the risk of private property predation and lessen entry barriers generally exercised in an absolutist political system.26 The effect of market-preserving federalism is likely to intensify in the GCC as hydrocarbon revenue decreases and intra-regional trade and investment increase. 3. The political Coase theorem: the political Coase theorem suggests that coexistence of inclusive economic institutions and absolutist political system is possible when potential economic benefits that may be generated from inclusive economic institutions are very high for the political elite. Acemoglu argues that the ruling elite may promote inclusive economic institutions as long as they do not perceive any threat to their political status and power.27 Nonetheless it is uncertain that the economically growing class will not demand political power eventually, which is known as the commitment problem.28 Empirical evidence suggests that the political elite in an absolutist system thus refrains from allowing inclusive economic institutions to emerge because of the commitment problem.29 Acemoglu shows, however, that the ruling elite may still introduce inclusive economic institutions to prevent underground economic activities that would result in loss of tax as well as other rentier revenues.30 It should be noted that the emergence of inclusive economic institutions in an absolutist political system depends heavily on the

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perception of the political elite’s authority and privilege in the new regime. It should also be noted that the political system of GCC countries, based, as it is, on tribal alliance, has been in place for a long time.31 The absolutist political system, intertwined with the tribal social system, tends to reinforce the ruling elite’s authority. Economic booms, with the introduction of more liberalised regulation, and the costly and chaotic changes of political regimes elsewhere in the region produce counter examples to a demand for political regime changes by the people in the GCC.32 The political security and potential benefits of a growing economy may lay the groundwork for the ruling elite in this region to accept the development of inclusive economic institutions.

Economic diversification in GCC states The GCC countries have been engaged in economic diversification ever since the 1960s for three major reasons:33 (a) Reliance on a single resource is risky especially if this resource is depletable. From the early days of oil export, the depletion of fossil fuel as a precious natural endowment has been raised constantly as an inevitable threat to the GCC economy.34 (b) Volatile fossil fuel prices introduce instability to the nation’s economy.35 Unlike other oil producing economies such as the UK and Norway, where non-oil industrial establishments exist, government expenditure in the GCC, as the major driver of economic development, is funded predominately by oil revenue.36 (c) Insufficient supply of oil and gas jobs to meet the employment demand of the national work force. Jobs created by the oil and gas sectors have appeared to be insufficient to employ the rapidly growing national population. Also, the required expertise of the oil and gas industry cannot be adequately met by the domestic work force in the absence of advanced human capital on oil and gas production.37 While globally proven oil and gas reserves have increased over time with the advancement in oil exploration and extraction technologies, the increasing investment on unconventional fossil fuel (e.g., tar sands, shale gas and clean coal) and renewable energy (due to

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concerns about energy security and global warming) have shifted the perceived constraints for the GCC from the depletion of oil and gas to the substitution of conventional fossil fuel with other forms of energy.38 Meanwhile, the recent revolution in shale gas and oil production technology has introduced a competing supply of fossil fuel to the global energy market.39 The implication for economic diversification in the GCC is profound, as the effect of energy supply substitution as a result of technology advancement might materialise earlier than the depletion of oil and gas in the region. Historically, the intensity of government effort on diversification in the GCC seems to have fluctuated inversely with the incomes from oil and gas, such that low oil prices spurred strong political emphasis on diversification.40 However, diversification has been intensified recently in a period of high oil prices.41 There are two major approaches to economy diversification: vertical and horizontal diversification. Vertical diversification refers to an industrial development strategy where the economy expands to the sectors along the vertical value chains of industries as the economy enjoys comparative advantage.42 Horizontal diversification refers to investments in new products and services within or outside existing industries.43 Since the 1960s, the GCC states have been engaged in a series of initiatives to vertically diversify the oil and gas industry by leveraging the comparative advantage in cheaper oil prices. However, the growth of the non-oil sectors has shown to be limited.44 In spite of the slow progress, vertical diversification remains a key diversification strategy after oil prices pick up. Table 5.1 summarises the economic diversification strategies report by the GCC governments as part of their 2020 –35 economic vision. According to the economic visions, all the GCC states are in the process of expanding their production capacity in the oil and petrochemical industries. They have also increased their effort in horizontal diversification through extensive investments in the nonoil sectors such as utilities (including telecommunications, water and electricity), tourism and transportation as well as logistics services.45 The development strategies, however, are necessarily different across countries. Bahrain and Oman are prioritising the role of the private sector in both manufacturing and the services sector as a result of decreasing hydrocarbon revenues.46 Saudi Arabia plans to further intensify investment in the refining and petrochemical industries to

Vision 2020

National Vision 2030

Oman

Qatar

UAE

Vision 2021

Saudi Arabia Long-term Strategy 2024

State Vision 2035

Kuwait

†

†

† †

†

†

† †

†

Economic Vision 2030 † †

Bahrain

Support of private sector and attracting foreign direct investment. Declining role of government in many industries other than education and health. Envisages government-led investment in infrastructure, transportation means and trade facilities. Necessity of institutional reform is mentioned Plans diversification and industrialisation into logistics infrastructure and new manufacturing industries. Privatising poorly performing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and lessening the role and effect of the oil industry. Continuing investment in infrastructure, oil and gas and other traditional industries such as aluminium, steel and petrochemicals. Gradual and careful diversification is envisaged. Increasing role is planned for the private sector while the g overnment will keep investing into oil, petrochemicals and some other related industries. Government-led diversification plan from finance to tourism to manufacturing industries. Plans for investment to infrastructure and logistic sectors to attract foreign expertise and capital.

Diversification strategy summary

Plan

Country

Table 5.1 Diversification guidelines of the GCC states

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diversify away from the volatile international oil markets.47 Qatar is aiming to develop a modern infrastructure for the 2022 World Cup and is expanding its petrochemical, oil and gas industries.48 Kuwait, with its unique political system among the GCC states, has focused more on traditional vertical diversification, with less government engagement in non-oil sectors.49 The UAE, and Abu Dhabi in particular, has the most ambitious vision – that of becoming a knowledge-based economy. To achieve this aim the Abu Dhabi government has developed various initiatives to establish high-tech firms to develop advanced technology and diversify the export portfolio to high value-added products. In addition to existing petrochemical, steel and aluminium industries, the Abu Dhabi government has engaged in developing nuclear and renewable energy, shipbuilding and the military and aeronautical industries. It is also actively promoting employment of UAE nationals in these industries with emiratisation programmes to create highly paid jobs for the locals. Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) cannot easily take up investments in most of the newly developed industries as they tend to be capital intensive and longer time horizons to pay back loans are required. These industries are essential to the development of a modern economy and to attract foreign capital and expertise. The GCC governments have initiated many state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as part of their diversification strategy.50 The major SOEs that have been established to engage in key areas of economic diversification are summarised in the Appendix. Table 5.2, which summarises the statistics from the Appendix, shows that SOE-driven diversification has emerged from the primary into the secondary and tertiary sectors, with the secondary sector focusing primarily on the infrastructure and resource intensive industries. The UAE and Saudi Arabia have established SOEs to engage directly in technologyintensive manufacturing. It is generally believed that the petrochemical SOEs, with their cost advantage, will continue to play a core part in GCC countries’ diversification strategy.51 In general, the SOEs in the GCC states (with the exception of Kuwait) tend to out-perform their SOE counterparts in other developing countries, due to lower restriction on the engagement of foreign human capital.52 With the states’ heavy involvement, GCC states have developed large airline companies, ports and numerous industrial cities and

Total

Tertiary sector (service)

Secondary sector (technology intensive)

Secondary sector (resource intensive)

Secondary sector (infrastructure)

Oil and gas Telecommunication Utilities Transport Agriculture Steel Aluminium Petrochemical Cement General industry Aviation Automobile Military Shipbuilding Semiconductor Real estate Finance Airlines 7

2 1

1 1

1 1

Bahrain

14

3 1

1 2

5

1 1

Kuwait

Number of GCC SOEs by industry and country

Primary sector

Table 5.2

10

4 1

1 2

1 1

Oman

11

1 2 1

2 1

1

20

8 1

1

1

1 2 1 2

Saudi Arabia

2

1

2 1

Qatar

36

1 1 1 4 1 1 1 10 2

1 1

4 2 5 1

UAE

9 8 7 3 5 1 2 6 3 6 2 1 5 1 1 2 29 7

Total

ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION

147

special economic zones with state of the art infrastructure. Meanwhile, the financial sector is tightly controlled by the states as well with the government’s dominating holding of shares of the domestic banking sector.53 Table 5.3 shows that flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) is increasing as a share of the gross domestic product (GDP) in most of the GCC states with the exception of Kuwait where slow infrastructure investment and regulation reforms due to political stalemate distracted investors.54 In spite of the diversification efforts, GCC countries remain highly dependent on oil revenues. Figure 5.1 shows that oil revenue still plays a dominant role in the domestic economy and is a primary component of government revenue. Except for the UAE and Saudi Arabia, the share of manufacturing in exports is still less than 10 per cent for GCC countries.

Institutions and governance structure of economic diversification activities in GCC states The governance structure of the economic diversification activities determines the reallocation of economic power under structural changes of the economy, which in turn affects long-term allocation of the political power. It is useful to analyse the governance structure of the oil and gas sector in the GCC as a reference for the governance structure of the newly established sectors. The governance structure comprises two components: formal institutions such as law, policy and regulation and informal institutions such as implicit rules, social values and norms of conduct. Regarding formal institutions, all GCC countries except for Bahrain impose explicit laws that endow the state with the exclusive rights to own, extract and trade fossil fuel assets (Table 5.4). The execution of these activities is performed by the national oil companies under the regulation of the state authority. By law the domestic private sector is not allowed to perform any oil and gas extraction or exploration activities. Foreign companies can engage in oil and gas production only through establishing venture capital with the national oil companies, or can serve as subcontractors for the national oil companies. The natural resources of each emirate in, for example, the UAE are considered the public property of that emirate under Article 23 of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Federal Constitution. Consequently, each emirate is entitled to pursue its own policies and regulations

0.9 0 1.2 2 0.1 0.1 0.3

1986 –90 7.5 0.1 0.8 1 0 0.5

1991– 5

Source: Gani and Al-Abri, ‘Indicators of business environment’, p. 516.

1.8 0 1.7 0 3.8 0

1981 – 5

FDI as percentage of GDP in the GCC states

Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE

Table 5.3

10.6 0.3 0.4 2.6 0.5 2 0.2

1996 –2000

4.9 0 1.2 3.4 0.6 4.9

2001 –05

9.3 0.3 5.1 5.8 7.4 5.4

2006 –09

ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Bahrain

Kuwait

Oman

Qatar

Saudi Arabia

149

United Arab Emirates

Oil revenues as % of total government revenues 2013 Oil revenues as % of GDP 2013 Manufacturing as % of total exports (2012 or latest year available)

Figure 5.1 Share of oil in GDP and government revenues and share of manufacturing in exports in the GCC economies. Source: Callen et al., Economic Diversification in the GCC, p. 9; Albassam, ‘Economic diversification in Saudi Arabia’, p. 114. regarding the development of oil and gas within its borders, with the ruler in each emirate retaining ultimate control over the development of its reserves. For Abu Dhabi, the Supreme Petroleum Council (SPC) directs oil and gas policy and regulates operations of this sector. Meanwhile, the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) leads the day-to-day operations of oil and gas exploration and production through its 15 subsidiaries, following SPC directives. While there is no comprehensive petroleum legislation in Abu Dhabi, there are a number of laws and decrees relevant to the industry, which include: Law No. 7 of 1971 on establishing ADNOC; Law No. 4 of 1976 on gas ownership; Law No. 2 of 1973 on petroleum ports; Law No. 8 of 1978 on the conservation of petroleum resources; and Law No. 1 of 1988 on establishing the SPC. Under the legislative framework, ADNOC is entitled to develop all underground assets, including hydrocarbon resources as well as pores, in the oil and gas fields. ADNOC oversees the ownership, organisation and operation of oil and gas transmission and distribution infrastructure. Third parties may gain access to the oil and gas infrastructures by negotiating the terms and fees of access rights with ADNOC on a contract basis. Project level activities are regulated by ADNOC through its mandate to manage all oil and gas projects in Abu Dhabi.

Sectors under government control by law Related laws and decrees

Source: Kaya and Tsai, ‘Inclusive Economic institutions in the Gulf Cooperation Council states’, p. 10.

Oil and gas exploration, production, Regulated by National Oil and Gas Authority (NOGA). Key parties distribution include state owned Bapco, Tatweer Petroleum (JV), BANAGAS and GPIC. Kuwait Oil and gas exploration, production, Regulated by the Ministry of Oil. Article 3 of Law No. 6 entrusts distribution, refinery and selling of state-owned Kuwait Petroleum Corporation for all oil and gas petroleum products related activities Oman Oil and gas exploration, production, Regulated by Ministry of Oil and Gas following Sultani Decree distribution 8/2011 (Oil and Gas Law). State-owned companies play major role in producing Oman’s oil and gas, private sector actively engaged by government. Key parties include state-owned Oman Oil Company, Oman Gas Company, Oman LNG, PDO and ORPIC. Qatar Oil and gas exploration, production, Regulated by the Ministry of Energy and Industry under distribution, refinery and selling of Laws No. 3, 4, 8, 10, 15, 30. Except for Dolphin Pipeline, oil and petroleum products gas businesses in Qatar are operated by state-owned Qatar Petroleum, with foreign firms subject to Amiri Decree. Saudi Arabia Oil and gas exploration, production, In the absence of explicit law, state-owned Saudi Aramco has distribution, refinery and selling of the sole concession for oil and gas extraction, process, petroleum products transportation and selling. Since 2015 Saudi Aramco is no longer overseen by the Ministry of Petroleum. UAE Oil and gas exploration, production, No federal law in UAE on oil and gas. Emirate of Abu Dhabi distribution, refinery and selling of has laws that grant all rights of oil and gas activities to petroleum products state-owned ADNOC subject to regulation by the Supreme Petroleum Council. Similar practice in Dubai.

Bahrain

Country

Table 5.4 Sectors under state control by law in the GCC economies

ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION

151

In contrast to the oil and gas sectors, there are no explicit laws governing non-oil sectors in the GCC. In general, non-oil sectors are governed primarily by company, labour and investment law, which are generic across sectors. Meanwhile, the commercial laws of the GCC states are in the process of unification under the Economic Agreement among the Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The unified commercial law is expected to create unified consumer protection laws, a commercial anti-cheat system, trademark law, antidumping law, compensation measures and a competition system that would enhance economic integration in the GCC bloc. The Economic Agreement provides the smaller GCC countries with a larger ‘domestic’ market to develop their industries and awards Saudi Arabia with the greater influence over the region. At the same time, it improves the cost competitiveness of GCC produced goods, which facilitates the implementation of import substitution policy in the region. Institution wise, the Economic Agreement only affects the regulation of non-oil sectors. The governance structure of the SOEs provides further implications for the allocation of economic power after diversification. While most SOEs do not operate in explicitly regulated markets, many of them have a natural monopoly in their corresponding countries, given their size, resource requirements and the arrangements they may develop with their clients and suppliers, which are mostly also SOEs. These SOEs are thus not fully subject to market competition. Our observation is that most of the SOEs are, in general, chaired either directly by members of the ruling families or by merchants who are close allies of the rulers. While this governance structure allows efficient and coherent decision making to implement economy agenda, it leaves economic power in the hands of the ruling elites, with the help of a social network largely inherited from the traditional tribal system. At the time of writing, no explicit regulations on the sectors where SOEs dominate has been introduced in the Economic Agreement. However, the regulations on these sectors (either implicit or explicit) provide important implications for the incentive for privatisation and the structure of government revenue, as well as jobs for nationals in the non-oil sector. Historically, the public sector has been the major employment source for nationals (as shown in Table 5.5). SOE-driven economic diversification essentially increases the potential job pool available to national populations.

Q4 2013 Dec. 2013 Dec. 2013 Apr. 2012 Dec. 2013

Data date

149,868 439,204 378,335 161,748 3,034,201 n.a.

Total population 111,841 309,417 350,813 69,328 2,920,217 n.a.

Nationals 496090 1314800 1362118 1039541 8487533 n.a.

95592 89308 171818 13485 1134633 n.a.

Nationals

Private and other sectors Total population

Source: Gulf Research Center, Gulf Labour Markets and Migration.

Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE

Country

Public sector

Table 5.5 National population employment by sector

74.63 70.45 92.73 42.86 96.24 n.a.

Public sector

19.27 6.79 12.61 1.30 13.37 n.a.

Private and other sectors

% nationals

ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION

153

Implications of economic diversification on the emergence of inclusive economic institutions in the GCC The above review of existing economic diversification strategies in the GCC leads to the following implications: 1. The GCC economies are following the state capitalist model (or the East Asian model) to diversify their economy. This reflects substantial government involvement in identifying, planning and developing new industries with strategic interest. The GCC governments leverage existing hydrocarbon revenue to develop non-oil sectors with the intention of expanding the job pool for the national population, which has been incentivised to grow to strengthen national security. 2. Major sectors of diversification in the GCC countries are primary and secondary industries such as mining, aluminium, petrochemicals and transportation. These industries are operated with mature technology, which is less risky and readily importable but is capital intensive. While this diversification strategy may improve domestic infrastructure and justifies the development of capital intensive SOEs, it may fall short in supporting the development of technology required to advance import substitution industries. 3. Diversification into high value-added sectors (e.g., high tech and creative industries) is critical to high-income GCC economies such as Qatar, Dubai and Abu Dhabi, as the primary and second sectors would be sufficient to support the wage level without government subsidy. It is worthwhile distinguishing the diversification models adopted by Dubai and Abu Dhabi. (a) The Dubai model: Dubai has adopted an ambitious development path which may look unique in the GCC context. However, Dubai’s development model can be viewed as mere extension of the old vertical diversification model. The emirate has been focusing on enhancing its traditional position as a regional trade centre and has rapidly expanded to relevant service sectors such as tourism and finance. The large construction GDP in the emirate is not a development goal but rather the means to support the three strategic sectors. Nevertheless, the Dubai model remains unique in the following aspects:55

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(i) efficient decision making with a strong focus on economic development; (ii) focus on extremely large-scale projects that are easier to brand globally. (iii) Meanwhile, the job effects of Dubai’s development model have not been well identified. For UAE nationals, it is clearly perceived that Abu Dhabi is the emirate that provides well-paid jobs to nationals from all emirates in the country. The more merit-oriented job market in Dubai may reflect the consequence of both a market-based business environment and lower pressure to employ locals as compared to Abu Dhabi. (b) The Abu Dhabi model: unlike the Dubai model, the Abu Dhabi government is adopting a unique and aggressive diversification strategy, with newly established SOEs developing technologies to tap into the advanced manufacturing sectors with multifaceted initiatives. Abu Dhabi’s strategy requires longer to achieve a fruitful outcome as it demands substantial investment in human capital. In contrast to Dubai’s ambition to be a regional hub in the service sector, Abu Dhabi is also exposed to fiercer global competition in the high-tech sector. The investment of the Abu Dhabi Advanced Technology Investment Company in Global Foundries provides one such example. 4. As stated in the economic diversification plans, all GCC governments are committed to supporting the private sector even though it generates lower-income jobs and, as a result, is more attractive to expatriates than to nationals. Nevertheless, the expanding private sector is likely to drive greater demand for public service. which will ultimately support public sector jobs for nationals. It should be noted that while taxation is low in the GCC, public service fees such as business registration and licence fees are not exempt in the region. 5. GCC governments are also committed to the improvement of the domestic business environment to attract foreign direct investment. This has been done by not only establishing free zones, new ports and other necessary infrastructure but also the enforcement of property rights protection laws and corrupt-free management. While the GCC countries have been net capital exporters for decades, the objective of attracting FDI has been

ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION

155

mostly to introduce technologies at a lower cost. Therefore, inclusive economic institutions are vital to ensure a good business environment for foreign investors. 6. Privatisation is not directly related to economic diversification but it can be used as an indicator to measure a government’s control over economic activities. Privatisation has been introduced to the utility sectors for some countries to address unemployment (in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and to a lesser extent Oman and Kuwait) as a result of rising consumer prices due, for example, to the elimination of utility subsidies.56 However, the scale of privatisation has been limited in the GCC. Ghanem et al. argue that the slow progress of privatisation in GCC is probably due to lack of prerequisites such as a functioning stock market, legislative infrastructure, sophisticated financial services and a functioning legal framework. It is also possible that privatisation is not an appealing strategy, with its potential to change the de facto political power.57 These factors together imply that the market structure of GCC economies will remain rigid, at least in the short term. However, less capital-intensive sectors will be subject to market competition as these areas are dominated by private SMEs.58 Liberalisation of these non-capital intensive sectors will release (at least partially) the social pressure as well as attracting foreign investments to create jobs.

Discussion and conclusions Social conflict theory suggests that absolute monarchies will not tolerate inclusive economic institutions due to fear of political power change. However, the GCC countries have regularly achieved above average global ratings for property rights protection, entry barriers, disruptive wealth redistribution and corruption,59 which indicates the emergence (if not full development) of inclusive institutions. This chapter asks the question whether and how economic diversification might have contributed to the development of inclusive economic institutions in the GCC. We observe that: (1) the GCC governments initiate economic diversification to explore non-oil revenue and increase the job pool for an increasing national population; (2) both vertical and horizontal diversification has been found in the GCC after 2000; (3) most of the diversification initiatives have been undertaken

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by capital-intensive SOEs without explicit regulation; (4) the governance structure of the SOEs is supported by social practices inherited from the tribal system. Since diversification is likely to sustain the ruling elites’ economic and political power, with their increasing control over non-oil revenue and semi-public jobs, we suggest that economic diversification in the GCC will not introduce major impacts on the existing structure of local economic and political institutions. However, in the quest to develop import substitution industries as part of the economic diversification strategy, economic integration in the GCC region is likely to introduce market-preserving federalism, which may facilitate the development of inclusive economic institutions, at least in the non-oil sectors that are non-capital intensive, high risk and knowledge intensive. The liberalised regulation of these sectors is likely to provide the critical channels that allow the accumulation of private capital, which in turn enhances social mobility acceptable to the existing regimes. This chapter has examined the effects of economic diversification on the evolution of political–economic institutions in GCC from the classical ‘elite study’ viewpoint. The results of the analysis introduce further questions to be answered: (1) how do GCC citizens respond to emerging job and business opportunities from structured economic diversification; and (2) how would these responses affect the evolution of institutions as well as the institutional process in GCC? Theoretically, it is unclear if inclusive economic institutions can be sustained in only part of an economy in a constrained manner. Further studies on the evolution of institutions as well as the institutional process of GCC could provide critical insight on this question.

One of the first airlines of the region

Fully owned by the Bahraini Government

10.14% owned by the Bahraini government 45% owned by the Bahraini government

Fully owned by the Bahraini government

58% owned by the Kuwaiti government

60.4% owned by the Kuwaiti government

National Industries Company

Gulf Cables

Manufacturing and production of various materials such as pipes, cement, stones and ceramics Produces various types of cables and wires for industrial applications

National telecommunication firm of Bahrain Banking services One of the leading banks in Bahrain

33.3% owned by the Bahraini government

Gulf Petrochemical Industries Bahrain Telecommunication Al Ahli United Bank National Bank of Bahrain Gulf Air

Kuwait

Manufactures a variety of aluminiumrelated products Produces ammonia, methanol and urea

Area

69.38% owned by the Bahraini government

Ownership

Aluminium Bahrain

Bahrain

Name of Firm

Summary of major GCC SOEs

Appendix

Production agricultural products Fish production Banking services Offering full range of commercial services and brokerage to national and international customers One of the main banks in the country National telecommunication firm

100% owned by the Kuwaiti government 55.8% owned by the Kuwaiti government

13.1% owned by the Kuwaiti government

49% owned by the Kuwaiti government

Fully Owned by the Kuwaiti government Fully owned by the Kuwaiti government

National airline of Kuwait National petroleum firm of Kuwait with various subsidiaries both domestic and overseas

Production of agricultural products

87.4% owned by the Kuwaiti government

24% owned by the Kuwaiti government 24.24% owned by the Kuwaiti government

Production of agricultural products

16.6 % owned by the Kuwaiti government

Boubyan Bank Zain Telecommunications company Kuwait Airline Kuwait Petroleum

Production of agricultural products

49.5% owned by the Kuwaiti government

Agriculture Food Products Company United Agriculture Products Co. Agriculture Palm Company Flower Mill Company United Fisheries Company Bank of Kuwait and the Middle East Kuwaiti Finance House

Area

Ownership

Name of Firm

Continued

99.8% owned by the Omani government

Oman Air

Qatar Steel

Fully owned by the Qatari government

27% owned by the Omani government

Bank Dhofar

Qatar

46% owned by the Omani government 23% owned by the Omani government 43.3% owned by the Omani government

Majority owned by the Omani government Fully owned by the Omani government Majority owned by the Omani government Fully owned by the Omani government Fully owned by the Omani government

36.1% owned by the Kuwaiti government

Raysut Cement Oman Cement Oman Petroleum ORPIC Oman Telecommunication Bank Sohar National Bank of Oman Bank Muscat

Oman

Kuwait Cement Company

The first integrated steel plant in the Arab Gulf region

Production of various cement types Production of various cement types Producing petrochemical products Fully integrated petrochemical firm National telecommunication firm of Oman One of the leading banks in Oman One of the leading banks in Oman Offering full range of commercial services and brokerage to national and international customers Offering full range of commercial services and brokerage to national and international customers National airline of Oman

Cement production

Biggest bank of Qatar One of the leading banks in the Gulf region The firm has operations in all oil and gas activities including exploration, production, refining, transport and storage in Qatar. Parent firm of many manufacturing firms operating in Qatar such as Qatar Steel and fertiliser firms Operates in real estate development business and related financial services in Qatar

80% owned by the Qatari government

50% owned by the Qatari government 18% owned by the Qatari government

Qatar Petrochemical Company Ooredoo

Fully owned by the Qatari government

Majority owned by the Qatari government

45% owned by the Qatari Government

Qatar Fertilisers Company Qatar National Bank Al Khalij Commercial Bank Qatar Petroleum

Industries Qatar

Barwa Real Estate

75% owned by the Qatari government

Fully owned by the Qatari government

One of the fastest growing airlines with connections to more than 140 destinations A petrochemical company producing various polymers and related products A fast-growing national telecommunications firm of Qatar Producing various types of fertilisers

Fully owned by the Qatari government

Qatar Airways

Area

Ownership

Name of Firm

Continued

Fully owned by the Saudi Arabian government

50% owned by the Saudi Arabian government

Fully owned by the Saudi Arabian government

11.85% owned by the Saudi Arabian government

Majority owned by the Saudi Arabian government Fully owned by the Saudi Arabian government

Military Industries Corporation

Maaden

Saudi Aerospace Engineering Industries

Mobily

Saudi Telecom

Saudia Airlines

Fully owned by the Saudi Arabian government

Majority owned by the Qatari government

SABIC

Saudi Arabia

Qatargas

A large petrochemical conglomerate having subsidiaries in steel, fertiliser and numerous manufacturing sectors Established to manufacture advance military hardware to supply of Saudi Arabian army The largest mining company in Saudi Arabia actively developing mine reserves of the kingdom from gold to phosphate Responsible for the maintenance, repair and overhaul of aircraft owned by Saudi Airlines The second mobile service provider in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia established by Etisalat One of the largest telecommunication firms in the Arab region National airlines of the Saudi Arabia connecting the kingdom with more than 30 countries

The largest liquefied natural gas (LNG) firm in the world

Ownership

Majority owned by the Saudi Arabian government

25.1% owned by the Saudi Arabian government

10.4% owned by the Saudi Arabian government

Riyadh Bank

Alinma Bank

Saudi Hollandi Bank

Fully owned by the Saudi Arabian government Fully owned by the Saudi Arabian government Saudi Electricity Fully owned by the Saudi Arabian government Al Rajhi Bank 10.1% owned by the Saudi Arabian government Samba Financial Group Majority owned by the Saudi Arabian government

Saudi Public Transport Company Saudi Railways

Name of Firm

Continued

National operator of buses and cargoes inside the Kingdom Responsible for operation and maintenance of the country’s railways Kingdom’s major electricity production and distribution One of the largest Islamic banks in the world Offering full range of commercial services and brokerage to national and international customers Offering full range of commercial services and brokerage to national and international customers Offering full range of commercial services and brokerage to national and international customers Offering full range of commercial services and brokerage to national and international customers

Area

Majority owned by the Saudi Arabian government

The Company for Cooperative Insurance

Abu Dhabi government is the major shareholder

Fully owned by the Abu Dhabi government

100% owned by Abu Dhabi government through Mubadala

Aldar Properties

Mubadala

Masdar Firm

UAE

Saudi Investment Bank 34.5 % owned by the Saudi Arabian government Aramco Fully owned by the Saudi Arabian government Rabigh Refining and 37.5% owned by the Saudi Arabian Petrochemical government

13.29% owned by the Saudi Arabian government

Banque Saudi Francis

Conducts large-scale real estate projects from shopping malls to residential compounds in the UAE Investment in a wide range of industries, service sectors and projects both inside the UAE and overseas. One of the biggest investment firms in the world. Investment in renewable energy firms, projects, services and education both inside the UAE and overseas

Petrochemical firm jointly operated by Aramco of Saudi Arabia and Sumitomo of Japan

Offering full range of commercial services and brokerage to national and international customers Insurance firm for motor, marine, fire, medical, engineering, aviation and casualty services Offering full range of commercial services including Islamic banking The largest oil firm in the world

The firm has a production plant in Abu Dhabi focusing on high-aend petroleum products Manufacturing of firearms, sniper rifles and other light weapons Manufacturing of diversified calibres and variants of small arms ammunition Manufacturing, assembling and testing a wide range of ammunition such as infantry, artillery and aircraft bombs Manufacturing Spare parts for Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) industry

Abu Dhabi Government is the major shareholder through its parent firm Borealis

Subsidiary of Tawazun (owned by the Abu Dhabi government)

Tawazun Dynamics

Caracal Light Ammunitions Burkan Munitions System

Subsidiary of Tawazun (owned by the Abu Dhabi government) Subsidiary of Tawazun (owned by the Abu Dhabi government) Subsidiary of Tawazun (owned by the Abu Dhabi government)

Caracal International

Abu Dhabi Autonomous Defense Systems Borouge

Abu Dhabi Ship Building Firm NIMR Automotive

Manufacturing composite aerostructures Repairing, refitting and manufacturing of military ships Manufacture and support of wheeled vehicles for military services Various autonomous defence systems for military services

100% owned by Abu Dhabi government through Mubadala 40% open to public, 49.96% by Abu Dhabi government 60% owned by Abu Dhabi government and 40% owned by the private entity Subsidiary of Tawazun (Owned by Abu Dhabi Government)

Strata

Area

Ownership

Name of Firm

Continued

Equally shared by Abu Dhabi and Dubai governments Fully owned by the UAE government

Fully owned by the Dubai government Fully owned by the Abu Dhabi government

Fully owned by the Abu Dhabi government

Majority owned by the Abu Dhabi government Majority owned by the Abu Dhabi government Jointly owned by the Abu Dhabi and Dubai governments

Emirates Aluminum

Emirates Airlines Etihad Airlines

Global Foundries

National Bank of Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank Union National Bank

Etihad Rail

Wholly owned by the UAE government

Emirates Nuclear Energy Firm

One of the biggest banks in the UAE regarding market capitalisation A UAE bank offering full range of commercial services and brokerage to national and international customers

The only authorised entity in the UAE responsible for deployment, operation and maintenance of nuclear power plants in the UAE One of the world’s biggest integrated manufacturer of aluminium products The only authorised entity in the UAE responsible for deployment, operation and maintenance of rail transport in the UAE One of the biggest airlines in the world Abu Dhabi-based airline firm and national carrier of the UAE with stakes in various airlines throughout the world Manufacturing of integrated circuits with the plan of establishing a production plant in Abu Dhabi Second-largest bank in the UAE

Ownership

29.81% owned by the Dubai government

20% owned by the Dubai government

Majority owned by the Abu Dhabi government

Majority owned by the Abu Dhabi government Fully owned by the Abu Dhabi government

99% owned by the Dubai government

Majority owned by the Dubai government Fully owned by the Abu Dhabi government

Fully owned by the Dubai government

Name of Firm

Dubai Islamic Bank

Commercial Bank of Dubai

Union National Bank

Abu Dhabi National Insurance Company Al Hilal Bank

Emirates NBD

Tamweel ADNOC

Emirates National Oil Company

Continued

A UAE bank offering full range of commercial services and brokerage to national and international customers A UAE bank offering full range of commercial services and brokerage to national and international customers A leading mortgage firm in the UAE One of the largest integrated oil firms in the world The second-largest oil and energy firm in the UAE

One of the leading Islamic banks in the region A UAE bank offering full range of commercial services and brokerage to national and international customers A UAE bank offering full range of commercial services and brokerage to national and international customers Insurance firm operating in the UAE

Area

Fully owned by the Dubai government

Dubai Electricity and Water Authority Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Company

Sharjah Electricity and Water Authority

Majority owned by the Dubai government

TAQA

Fully owned by the Sharjah government

Fully owned by the Abu Dhabi government

Fully owned by the Dubai government

Emarat

Retailer of oil and related products in Dubai and northern emirates A diversified energy firm with domestic and overseas investments into various energy projects Main entity responsible for electricity and water services in Dubai Main entity responsible for electricity and water services in Abu Dhabi and northern emirates Main entity responsible for electricity and water services in Sharjah

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Notes 1. Avner Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 2. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty (London: Profile Books, 2012). 3. United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), Proceedings of the conference ‘Competitiveness and Diversification: Strategic Challenges in a Petroleum-rich Economy’, 14–16 March 2011, Accra, Ghana, pp. 3–6. Available at https://www.unido.org/fileadmin/ user_media_upgrade/What_we_do/Topics/Business__investment_ and_technology_services/Competitiveness__Diversification_2011.pdf (accessed 1 November 2016). 4. Abdullah Kaya and I-Tsung Tsai, ‘Inclusive economic institutions in the Gulf Cooperation Council states: current status and theoretical implications’, Review of Middle East Economics and Finance 12/2 (2016), pp. 139– 73. 5. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson, ‘Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth’, in Philippe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf (eds), Handbook of Economic Growth, vol. 1A (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005), pp. 385 – 472. 6. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson, ‘The colonial origins of comparative development: an empirical investigation’, NBER Working Paper No. 7771, National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2000. Available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7771 (accessed 1 November 2016). 7. Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Barry R. Weingast, ‘The economic role of political institutions: marketpreserving federalism and economic development’, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 11/1, (1995), pp. 1–31; Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, ‘Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests using alternative institutional measures’, Economics and Politics 7/3 (1995), pp. 207–27; Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian and Francesco Trebbi, ‘Institutions rule: the primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic development’, Journal of Economic Growth 9/2 (2004), pp. 131–65; Christopher Clague, Philip Keefer, Stephen Knack and Mancur Olson, ‘Contract-intensive money: contract enforcement, property rights, and economic performance’, Journal of Economic Growth 4/2 (1999), pp. 185–211; Nicholas Apergis and James E. Payne, ‘The oil curse, institutional quality, and growth in MENA countries: evidence from time-varying cointegration’, Energy Economics 46/C (2014), pp. 1–9. 8. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 9. Henri Pirenne, Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe, vol. 14 (Boston: Harcourt, Brace, 1937).

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10. David Reed, Economic Change, Governance and Natural Resource Wealth: The Political Economy of Change in Southern Africa (London: Earthscan, 2001); Daron Acemoglu, ‘The form of property rights: oligarchic versus democratic societies’. NBER Working Paper No. 10037, National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2003. Available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10037 (accessed 1 November 2016); Gianluca P. Parolin, ‘Generations of Gulf constitutions: paths and perspectives’, in Abdulhadi Khalaf and Giacomo Luciani (eds), Constitutional Reform and Political Participation in the Gulf (Dubai: Gulf Research Center, 2006), pp. 51 – 87. 11. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, ‘Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth’. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid. 14. Douglass C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981); Stephen Coate and Stephen Morris, ‘On the form of transfers to special interests’, Journal of Political Economy 103/6 (1995), pp. 1210 – 35; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, ‘The colonial origins of comparative development’. 15. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, ‘Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth’; Peter J. Boettke, Christopher J. Coyne and Peter T. Leeson, ‘Institutional stickiness and the new development economics’, American Journal of Economics and Sociology 67/2 (2008), pp. 331 – 58. 16. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, ‘Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth’. 17. Abdullah Kaya and I-Tsung Tsai, ‘Inclusive economic institutions in the Gulf Cooperation Council states’, Review of Middle East Economics and Finance, 12/2, (2016), pp. 139– 73. 18. Hazem Beblawi, ‘The rentier state in world’, Arab Studies Quarterly 9/4 (1987), pp. 383 – 98; Michael Herb, ‘Taxation and representation’, Studies in Comparative International Development 38/3 (2003), pp. 3–31; Martin Harrison, ‘Taxation and the GCC states’, Gulf One Lancaster Centre for Economic Research Report, Lancaster University Management School, Lancashire, October 2010; Martin Hvidt, ‘Economic and institutional reforms in the Arab Gulf countries’, Middle East Journal 65/1 (2011), pp. 85–102. 19. Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘The limits of democracy in the Middle East: the case of Jordan’, Middle East Journal 53/4 (1999), pp. 606–20; Michael Herb, ‘Emirs and parliaments in the Gulf’, Journal of Democracy 13/4 (2002), pp. 41–7; Tim Niblock and Monica Malik, The Political Economy of Saudi Arabia (London: Routledge, 2007); Andy Spiess, ‘Developing adaptive capacity for responding to environmental change in the Arab Gulf States: uncertainties to linking ecosystem conservation, sustainable development and society in authoritarian rentier economies’,

170

20. 21. 22.

23. 24.

25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

33.

POLICY MAKING IN THE GCC Global and Planetary Change 64/3 (2008), pp. 244–52; Ibrahim Saif, ‘The oil boom in the GCC countries, 2002–2008: old challenges, changing dynamics’, Carnegie Papers 15, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2009; Apergis and Payne, ‘The oil curse, institutional quality, and growth in MENA countries’. North, Structure and Change in Economic History; Coate and Morris, ‘On the form of transfers to special interests’; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, ‘The colonial origins of comparative development’. N. Janardhan, ‘Saudi income tax plan scares Gulf expatriates’, Inter Press Service, 10 May 2002; Harrison, ‘Taxation and the GCC states’. Steffen Hertog, ‘Oil prices: eventually the Gulf States will run out of power’, The Conversation, 5 January 2015. Available at http:// theconversation.com/oil-prices-eventually-the-gulf-states-will-runout-of-power-35867 (accessed 23 September 2016). Christopher Davidson, Dubai: The Vulnerability of Success (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), ch. 5 and Abu Dhabi: Oil and Beyond (El Paso, TX: Cinco Puntos Press, 2009), ch. 6. Hazem Beblawi, ‘Gulf industrialization in perspective’, in JeanFranc
ois Seznec and Mimi Kirk (eds), Industrialization in the Gulf: A Socioeconomic Revolution (London: Routledge 2011), pp. 185 – 97; Martin Hvidt, ‘Economic diversification in GCC countries: past record and future trends’, research paper, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2013. Available at http://citeseerx. ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi¼ 10.1.1.692.3697&rep ¼ rep1& type ¼ pdf (accessed 22 September 2016). Weingast, ‘The economic role of political institutions’. William H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1964), p. 31; Weingast, ‘The economic role of political institutions’. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, ‘The colonial origins of comparative development’. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, ‘Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth’. Ibid. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, ‘The colonial origins of comparative development’. John E. Peterson, ‘Rulers, merchants and shaykhs in Gulf politics’, in Alanoud Alsharekh (ed.), The Gulf Family: Kinship Policies and Modernity (London: Saqi, 2001), pp. 21 – 36. Jim Krane, City of Gold: Dubai and the Dream of Capitalism (London: St Martin’s Press, 2009); Mohammed Nuruzzaman, ‘Politics, economics and Saudi military intervention in Bahrain’, Journal of Contemporary Asia 43/2 (2013), pp. 363–78. Hvidt, ‘Economic diversification in GCC countries’.

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34. Hvidt, ‘Economic and institutional reforms in the Arab Gulf countries’, p. xxx. 35. Ibrahim A. Onour, ‘Impact of oil price volatility on Gulf Cooperation Council stock markets’ return’, OPEC Review 31/3 (2007), pp. 171 – 89. 36. Alexandros Flamos, Ch. V. Roupas and John Psarras, ‘GCC economies diversification: still a myth?’, Energy Sources, Part B: Economics, Planning, and Policy 8/4 (2013), pp. 360 – 8. 37. Ingo Forstenlechner and Emilie Rutledge, ‘Unemployment in the Gulf: time to update the ‘social contract’, Middle East Policy 17/2 (2010), pp. 38 – 51. 38. Toufic Mezher, Daniel Goldsmith and Nazli Choucri, ‘Renewable energy in Abu Dhabi: opportunities and challenges’, Journal of Energy Engineering 137/4 (2011), pp. 169 – 76. 39. Lutz Kilian, ‘The impact of the shale oil revolution on US oil and gasoline prices’, CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5723, 26 January 2016. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id¼2743100 (accessed 22 September 2016). 40. Atif A. Kubursi, Oil, Industrialization and Development in the Arab Gulf States (London: Croom Helm, 1984). 41. Hvidt, ‘Economic diversification in GCC countries’. 42. Lilach Nachum, ‘Diversification strategies of developing country firms’, Journal of International Management 5/2 (1999), pp. 115– 40. 43. Hvidt, ‘Economic diversification in GCC countries’. 44. Ibid. 45. Hvidt, ‘Economic and institutional reforms in the Arab Gulf countries’ and ‘Economic diversification in GCC countries’. 46. Hvidt, ‘Economic diversification in GCC countries’. 47. Jim Krane, ‘Stability versus sustainability: energy policy in the Gulf Monarchies’, The Energy Journal 36/4 (2015), pp. 1 – 21. 48. Matthew Gray, Qatar: Politics and the challenges of development (Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, 2013); Hvidt, ‘Economic diversification in GCC countries’. 49. Herb, ‘Taxation and representation’; Steffen Hertog, ‘Benchmarking SME policies in the GCC: a survey of challenges and opportunities’, Working Paper, Eurochambres, Brussels, 2010. 50. Mithqual Sartawi, ‘State-owned enterprises in Kuwait: history and recent developments’, in OECD, Towards New Arrangements for State Ownership in the Middle East and North Africa (Paris; OECD Publishing, 2012); OECD, State-owned Enterprises in the Middle East and North Africa: Engines of Development and Competitiveness? (Paris; OECD Publishing, 2013). 51. Giacomo Luciani, ‘The Gulf countries and nuclear energy’, Gulf Monitor 1/6 (2007), pp. 20 – 4; Makio Yamada, ‘Gulf – Asia relations as “post-rentier” diversification? The case of the petrochemical industry in Saudi Arabia’, Journal of Arabian Studies 1/1 (2011), pp. 99 – 116.

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52. Hertog, ‘Benchmarking SME policies in the GCC’. 53. Abdullah Al-Hassan, May Khamis and Nada Oulidi, ‘The GCC banking sector: topography and analysis’, IMF Working Paper, April 2010, pp. 1 – 45. 54. Luciano Zaccara, ‘Comparing elections in Gulf Cooperation Council countries after the Arab Spring: the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Kuwait’, Journal of Arabian Studies 3/1 (2013), pp. 80 – 101. 55. Martin Hvidt, ‘“The Dubai model”: an outline of key developmentprocess elements in Dubai’ (reprint), in Kristian Coates Ulrichsen (ed.), The Political Economy of Arab Gulf States (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012), pp. 397 – 418. 56. Abdeljalil Ghanem and Said Elfakhani, ‘Privatization of Gulf industrial institutions: the secret of success’, Middle East Policy 18/2 (2011), pp. 84 –101. 57. Ibid. 58. Hertog, ‘Benchmarking SME policies in the GCC’. 59. Kaya and Tsai, ‘Inclusive economic institutions in the Gulf Cooperation Council states’.

6 YOUTH EMPLOYABILITY AND ITS CULTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT: DO CURRENT INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES PROMOTE OR PREVENT GREATER PRODUCTIVITY AND POSITIVITY WITHIN LOCAL LABOUR MARKETS TOWARDS THE KNOWLEDGEBASED ECONOMIES OF THE FUTURE? David Jones, Radhika Punshi and Gauri Gupta Introduction Whilst ongoing ethnic, religious and/or geopolitical struggles and the impact of slumping oil prices have dominated the recent popular global discourse about the region, a much less debated issue that significantly shapes the outlook of the region’s economies has been a pervasive and persistent influence on government policies towards promoting greater employability across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Average youth unemployment rates within MENA are the highest in the world.1 The structural unemployment amongst young Arabs, and more specifically national youth, within

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the six countries constituting the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) has continued to be a significant drag on the region’s economies for several decades, causing them collectively to fail to operate towards their full macro-economic productive potential. Hence the region has been unable to reap the full development benefits of the financial dividend afforded by the exploitation of energy resources during the second half of the twentieth century. More broadly, not only does the region have some of the highest and most persistent levels of youth unemployment, it also has a relative lack of representation of females at work and dismally low levels of labour productivity and employee engagement.2 We also continue to witness often alarming living and working conditions for the millions of blue-collar workers who are building the crystal towers of the region’s new cities, where improving human resources (HR) practices is more about improving basic human rights rather than human resources policies and procedures. Whilst similar issues also exist in many places across the world, it is critical for these to be addressed as a priority if the region wants to sustain progress towards establishing and differentiating itself as a growing ‘modern’ influence on a global stage.3 The Gulf States provide some fascinating dichotomies in terms of their sociocultural landscape, with their extremely diverse local and expatriate populations forming a rich social fabric of varied ethnic, cultural, national and international influences. One of the most interesting settings where this plays out is within the region’s labour markets. Over the past few decades, the speed and scale of expansion in economic activity and the accelerated development of the formal employment sector (both public and private) has been remarkable. The region’s talent landscape and the nature and operation of its labour markets are unique in many respects.

A brief overview of labour markets in the GCC .

Historical dependence on foreign workers. The initial exploitation of fossil fuel discoveries and the lack of capacity within nascent labour markets led to a massive inflow of foreign workers into the GCC. The monetary strength provided by the energy endowments over the intervening decades allowed the reliance on expatriate workers to continue. This is especially pertinent for the vast majority of jobs providing physical and service labour, along with a high proportion of more specialised technical and managerial roles.

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Figure 6.1 Key characteristics of the GCC labour markets. Source: From Jones and Punshi, ‘Unlocking the Paradox of Plenty’, p. 20. Whilst employment rights and development prospects may be curtailed as a result of working in the GCC, expatriates have been historically attracted by significantly higher net earnings than they could receive for similar work at home. This has led to an addiction to ‘cheap labour’ at the bottom of the market, where it is still a common sight to hire a dozen or more men with shovels to dig a hole rather a single skilled worker with a JCB. Remarkably, even today, of the world’s 20 countries with highest proportion of international migration, approximately half are in the Arab world,4 with Qatar and UAE leading in the GCC. . Oversaturated public sector. An atypical feature of the GCC labour market is the over-active public sector. It has been the primary source of employment in the region and its proportional expenditure is double that of the world average.5 It is the employer of first choice and usually also the last resort. Public sector employment is four times that of Japan. In the GCC, close to 80 per cent or more nationals work in the public sector.6 There is popular and widespread acknowledgement of the attractiveness of public sector jobs for local talent, based on a number of favourable conditions including higher pay, shorter working hours, job security and other associated benefits. The government remains the preferred employer for nationals and this in turn has a wider and far-reaching impact on prevailing wage rates in the private sector for

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GCC nationals. In addition, increasing differentials between public sector pay and that able to be offered by truly commercial organisation can only exacerbate the challenges of making the private sector more attractive to GCC-national employees and, vice versa, helping to make GCC-national employees more attractive to private sector employers. More consistent policies need to be followed in the government’s dual role as both the dominant employer of GCC nationals, and therefore as the price-setter for local talent, and its concurrent role as the regulator of labour market policies and practices. . Relatively low levels of total workforce participation of local talent. There are deeply entrenched views about employment amongst the local population. Participation rates, especially in the private sector amongst nationals, are startlingly low. In the past many GCC national women did not seek employment for cultural reasons and national men were relatively more likely to have independent sources of income due to the sponsorship, family business interests and local partnership requirements across most of the Gulf States. Hence, traditionally, the need, incentives and willingness to be in formal employment have not been as compelling for the local population. Many have only come to terms with the concept of formal, exclusive employment within the last generation, compared to many generations in most other parts of the world. . Comparably open economies. Whilst the regulation of the region’s labour markets is amongst the most interventionist in the world in favour of local workers, access for the majority of expatriates into most GCC countries remains alarmingly open by international standards. Virtually any economic migrant simply requires a signed employment contract to enter the workforce officially across most of the GCC. Whilst this situation is changing rapidly, it means that employers are able to employ some of the cheapest labour in the world, and they have become used to this arbitrage advantage. From a macroeconomic perspective, the savings from employing cheaper foreign labour come at a significant cost to the wider economy, as a high proportion of the wages earned locally are not spent locally. As an example, Saudi Arabia is recorded as having the world’s thirdlargest source of foreign-worker remittances7 after the United States and Russia, which are significantly larger economies.

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Highly segmented labour markets. All of the aspects described above have led to the creation of a highly segmented workforce. This demarcation is largely along national lines, both at a macro level and within organisations. Employment of GCC nationals is much higher in the public sector or in management and administrative positions more generally. Technical, service and manual jobs are mostly held by expatriates, due to the non-availability of or the lack of attractiveness of their jobs for local talent. This segmented, lowskill, low-wage environment reduces labour mobility and productivity more generally and encourages a relative lack of investment in training and development across the workplace. . Demographic growth and youth bulge. The single largest dominating factor moving forward is the unprecedented local demographic growth forecast for the region. According to the World Bank, ‘the dynamics of demography in the Arab Region have created some of the most intense pressures on labour markets observed anywhere in the post-World War II period’.8 At a time when most other populations in the world are in decline, the Arab world’s population is expected to double by 2050.9 A significant majority of the population is of working age, as a result of high fertility rates in the region. This ‘youth bulge’ has resulted in the most rapid growth of young people as a proportion of the region’s population in recorded human history. Unsurprisingly, employability has become a policy priority for the region’s government and its collective choices and actions will determine whether this demographic dividend can be leverage or could decelerate towards a demographic disaster. Either way, this single factor has the potency to determine the economic future for the region in the twenty-first century, more so than any other single social, political or economic issue. . Increasing rates of female inclusion in the workforce. The increasing representation of females in the GCC workforce, combined with continuing changes in their social and economic position, will also significantly alter the labour market in the near future. More and more women are not only entering the formal labour market but also remaining active for longer periods of time. With typically higher levels of educational attainment and equal or arguably better workplace skills to match, national women offer a tremendous productive opportunity. Though the current trend is moving in the right direction, there is still a long way to go. The existing .

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participation by women in the GCC workforce is relatively low compared to international benchmarks, with only a fifth of females in formal employment, compared to 70 per cent in the UK or 65 per cent in Singapore.10 . Unemployment and underemployment. Despite the rapid and ongoing growth recorded in the region, unemployment amongst the Gulf’s national population, particularly amongst the young, remains exceptionally high even by global standards. Although unemployment is a global phenomenon, it is very concerning to see a third to half of the region’s youth without jobs.11 The causes of structural unemployment or underemployment are wide-ranging, including a mismatch in available skills and opportunities. A predominant concern also has to do with the mindset and a lack of urgency amongst those without jobs. Many are prepared to wait for several years for the ‘ideal’ job, rather than accept any entry-level position, as would be more likely elsewhere. . Education to employment gap. The education-to-employment system is not adequately aligned for most employers and young people, particularly in the GCC but also in many other regions of the globe. Fewer than half of students and employers believe that the education system has prepared them for the workplace. Students report that the relevance of their education to the job market is insufficient. Furthermore, most need to wait six to 12 months to find employment and more than half are unable to do so in their chosen area of study.12 Ironically, on the other hand, employers cite a global skills shortage and unavailability of qualified talent, despite the pressing levels of unemployment. In addition, vocational and technical education remain unpopular choices amongst national youth, denying them a significant source of future job opportunities.

Policy priorities within the labour markets of the GCC Although most government institutions responsible for the regulation and reform of the GCC’s labour markets would claim that their strategies and organisational cultures are extremely visionary and contemporary, often drawing comparisons to London, Singapore or Washington, the truth remains that this perception of modernity is equally balanced with the realities of extremely traditional structures

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and practices, ‘below the surface’ cultural norms and unstated rules and expectations. There is a constant and visible dichotomy between a quest for modernity and a reliance on tradition, a desire for social stability, on how ‘things are always done around here’. This relates to aspects such as policy reform, decision making, leadership styles of policy makers and organisational leaders and most importantly in the successful implementation of any policy changes. Arguably, achieving a greater ‘nationalisation’ of the workforce has been the primary objective of many labour and educational policies.

Labour market institutional reform

In many cases the ‘beneficent dictatorship’13 of many Gulf leaders and their subsequent policy prescriptions, including the creation and execution of employability policies, are characterised by a ‘build it and they will come’ approach. This can mean that there can often be a lack of impact analysis and focus on benefits realisation, with more focus on the announcement of a series of new initiatives. Interestingly, this can also lead to a series of launching new projects and agencies without reforming existing projects or agencies, leading to a complex and opaque approach to government structures with regard to promoting employability and national development. In many cases, investigating the nature of institutional reform within education and employment regulation and provision can be described as ‘administrative archaeology’. It has often meant the addition of new authorities or entities without disbanding the old, a phenomenon which can lead to administrative conflicts, limited collaboration between key stakeholders, ineffective execution, a lack of accountability and/or an inability to demonstrate tangible benefits or impact. The 2016 announcement of the Saudi National Transformation Plan is possibly the most recent example of this phenomenon. Further, when it comes to labour market institutional reform, each country within the GCC has adopted a different approach to policy making and executive administrative amendments in terms of the regulation of their own labour markets. The conceptual model below maps the nations along a scale of open compared to closed socio-political processes towards the formulation of policies and opaque compared to clear communication and implementation of these policies.

Table 6.1 An overview of key institutions focusing on employability and labour market reform: who is responsible and accountable? Country

Labour market institutions

UK

† † † † † † † †

Saudi Arabia

UAE

Bahrain

Qatar

Oman

Kuwait

† † † † † † † † † † † † † † † † † † † † † † † † † † † † † † † †

Department of Work and Pensions Department of Education Department of Trade and Industry OfQual Skill councils and industry bodies Saudi Council of Economic and Development Affairs (SEDA) Job Creation Commission Ministries of Labour, Education and Economy and Planning Human Resource Development Fund TakaMoL Saudi Skills Standards King Abdullah Scholarship Program CoE and TVTC Colleges Ministry of Education Knowledge and Human Development Authority Tanmia Abu Dhabi Tawteen Council Abu Dhabi Educational Council Khalifa Fund for Enterprise Development Federal Authority of HR Ministries of Labour, Happiness and Youth Affairs Labour Market Regulatory Authority Tamkeen Economic Development Board Higher Education Council Bahrain Institution of Public Administration Civil Services Bureau Ministry of Labour Ministry of Labour Silatech Qatar Career Fair Qatar Foundation Ministry of Manpower Ministry of Education Ministry of Higher Education Higher Colleges of Technology Public Authority for Applied Education and Training Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour Ministry of Education Ministry of Higher Education

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Figure 6.2 Conceptual model of relative institutional policy making and policy implementation for promoting employability As a result of its current lack of direct taxation of all forms, in particular corporate tax, corporate governance and institutional reform within the GCC have a dual impact. First, the lack of legal requirements for financial reporting means that most entities, including government institutions, operate in a relatively opaque manner. In addition, it also means that any audits which do take place are conducted on behalf of the ‘ownership’ or the ruler of the country in the case of the public sector, and not the ‘people’. Legal ownership of government-owned entities are difficult to determine. One is reminded of the apocryphal quotation from Louis 14th of France, when asked by a courtier about matters of state, who retorted, ‘L’e´tat? C’est moi’.

The impact of policy reform on nationalising the workforce The demographics of the GCC are akin to financial gearing on a balance sheet. Similar to the financial multiplier effect, assuming constant productivity, in periods of high economic growth population growth makes strong economic performance even stronger and in periods of economic stagnation it makes poor performance even worse. The key focus in the future will be on

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ensuring that productivity increases are achieved in a region where relative economic inefficiency currently abounds across all factors of production. Given that the public sector is now saturated as a realistic option for employment growth, the private sector needs to emerge as the driver of greater opportunity for the future. This shift towards the private sector as the new frontier of the struggle for greater nationalisation of the region’s workplaces is predicted to continue to accelerate for the foreseeable future as oil revenues are likely to continue to dampen the public sector’s capacity to continue to act as employer of first choice and last resort amongst their local population. However, to date governments across the GCC act as both as the major employer of nationals, operating as both the favoured employer of many nationals, and as the promoter of private sector employment, still dominated by expatriates. In many cases, the government’s current emphasis on the lack of consistency in promoting more employment within the private sector whilst at the same time continuing to offer significant increases in public sector pay and enhancements to relative benefits and working conditions is not helpful in making market wage levels in the commercial sector more attractive. Given the current policy focus on promoting employment of GCC nationals in the private sector, the link with private sector employers is often missing. Many employers, whilst committed in principle to national development, state that they are confused by the plethora of government initiatives and agencies with which they are confronted.14 Most understand the requirement to support national development and are likely either to have their own talent attraction and development practices in place to suit the local and/or international operations of their organisations or simply to respond to the periodic policy emphasis on increasing employment opportunities for nationals. From an investment perspective, in many aspects of government policy execution, but particularly in this case, where the necessity for collaboration with employers in the commercial sector is so important, there is a lack of effective private– public partnerships within the region. This is a growing phenomenon across the rest of the world and aims to inject some commercial discipline into capital and social infrastructure projects that has previously been missing.

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For example, the most recent initiative within the UAE to promote private sector employment is called absher, which means, ‘you’re welcome’ or ‘your privilege’ in Arabic. H.E. Saqr Ghobash, UAE Minister for Labour, describes absher as an effort to encourage more Emiratis to enter the commercial labour market as an ‘offers programme’ to ‘compensate’ and ‘recognise’ the efforts of the Emirati workers in the private sector. His primary concern is capacity building within the ministry and he has praised the introduction of 40 Tasheel Centres, aimed at placing Emiratis in the private sector, primarily because they have created more than 900 jobs for Emiratis by employing them directly as ministry staff within the centres themselves.15 Strictly speaking they are an example of public–private partnerships, although the 900 Emiratis are employed on government contracts, with all the standard public sector benefits of short working days, 60 days annual holiday, extended public holidays, enhanced benefits and pension rights and wages that are many times higher than the average private sector levels. This indicates that one of the perceived benefits of the additive approach to institutional reform is that it directly supports further employment of GCC nationals. Governments around the world have a poor track record for achieving results from major organisational change efforts,16 mostly because of flawed programme execution and management, not lack of funding. Dispersed accountability and competing interests can often make substantial and sustainable transformation challenging to achieve. Yet large-scale reform remains the only option for many governments under pressure to reduce costs and deliver services more effectively. Most studies indicate that a failure rate of the order of 70 per cent can be expected for major change efforts17 within the public and private sectors.

The unintended consequences of nationalisation to date .

The first and most critical impact has been attitudinal in terms of how national talent is understood or, more often, misunderstood. GCC nationals typically suffer from stereotypes in the workplace, both positive and negative. Regarding the former, national talent tends to get preferential priority with regard to recruitment or accelerated career opportunities through policies of positive discrimination. Over time, this positive discrimination has encouraged a sense of entitlement and expectation in the workplace, effectively reducing

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the individual’s incentives to invest the consistent effort required to enhance their own performance and productivity. However, on the other hand, research by The Talent Enterprise18 indicates that more subtle negative perceptions and biases are rife in terms of undermining their self-confidence and perceptions of their relative lack of contribution, particularly in the private sector. There is a general lowering of expectations with regard to national talent, both within their own community and also amongst expatriate counterparts. Both outcomes are regrettable and need to be addressed as a matter of urgency. . Rigid segmentation in the labour market has led to a world where national talent typically occupy most public sector jobs or have most representation in corporate support roles. Although on paper this may reflect 10 per cent, 20 per cent and even 50 per cent nationalisation, it is key to ensure that national talent is encouraged to take on more technical or core business roles. This of course is a direct outcome of the education system, where most GCC national graduates currently have a liberal arts, humanities, religious studies or general management degree, or none. Also, in many cases the representation of GCC nationals largely remains at the entry or supervisory level positions, with relatively few demonstrating the willingness to advance to the most senior technical or functional positions in the private sector. National talent report a degree of ‘tokenism’, in particular within the private sector.19 . Another consequence has been the emergence of ‘rent-seeking’ behaviour amongst the local population as a result of a quota-driven approach and the highly segmented labour markets of the GCC, where those positions largely attractive to or reserved for locals often require rival employers to compete intensely to attract and retain scarce national talent. Simply stated, the economic ‘rent’ is the value of the wages earned over and above that necessary to keep workers in their current employment. Due to the nationalisation agenda and a lower population base, nationals have been able to command a premium in terms of wages and benefits. Further, this approach has been adopted as a socially acceptable means of distributing economic rents by the government to its local population (and to some extent amongst expatriates as well) as a way of preserving social stability and

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indeed harmony for many decades. Historically, and on average, nationals typically command a premium of 20 – 30 per cent in terms of wages and benefits.20 . The pay premiums and wage increments across the GCC’s public sector have increased wage inflation across all industries in the region. Unlike the rest of the world, it is public sector pay that set the pace for remuneration in the private sector and not the other way around. With the majority of the GCC national workforce employed in the public sector, this makes their ‘segment’ of the labour market even less competitive for private sector employers to secure the talent they need to sustain their long-term growth. The commercial sector struggles to keep up and compete for a currently limited pool of national talent, further lowering participation in the private sector. This also creates a sense of entitlement and expectation, where significant pay increases, considered more than ‘good enough’ elsewhere, are no longer ‘good enough’ within the GCC. History elsewhere would suggest that such increases are not sustainable in the long term without similar growth in productivity. It is unlikely that productivity, particularly in the public sector, will increase by double or triple percentage points and so it is likely that earnings will have to decline in real terms over the long term, particularly as greater numbers of GCC nationals enter the labour markets over the decades ahead whilst government budgets and policies are already signalling that they are unlikely to be able to support the employment practices of the past. . The most concerning trend from an organisational perspective is the significantly lower level of employee engagement reported by national talent as compared to the rest of the workforce. On an average, only one out of two nationals is fully motivated21 and actively contributing to their job. It is not difficult to imagine the impact of this on individual performance and organisational productivity. A generally lower participation in the workforce, combined with lower morale amongst GCC nationals in general, creates a cycle of continued reliance on expatriates, particularly amongst truly commercial organisations in the region. A noteworthy fact is that national talent working in the private sector report much higher levels of engagement that those working for the

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government.22 This defies the traditional assumption that aspects such as high pay, better working hours, favourable benefits and so on lead to higher levels of engagement. This is emphatically not the case. National talent are looking for greater growth opportunities, personal and professional development, recognition and fulfilling, challenging work. A purely quota-driven, role-filling, supernumerary approach is no longer working. The evolving economic and talent landscape has led to an acceleration of the institutional and regulatory amendments to the functioning of GCC labour markets. As the majority of the rest of the world grapples with population decline and challenges in managing an ageing workforce, the GCC’s story will be quite the opposite, at least for the next generation. The Arab world has a replacement ratio of between four and six new entrants23 for every person leaving the workforce. The median age for a Saudi national is 25 years.24 This demographic profile requires a completely different orientation towards institutional reform. Countries such as India and China are already witnessing a stabilisation or a decline in their respective populations. Regions such as Latin America and Africa have expanding populations projected through to the middle of this century, although they do not necessarily have the financial endowments to invest in human capital to the same extent as the GCC had in the past. Although the ways and means to achieve this objective have varied, the end goal has been to increase the participation of national talent within the formal workforce more generally, and the private sector in particular. Some GCC countries are taking a more ‘protectionist’ approach by announcing legislation that limits the influx of an expatriate workforce to their countries. Other GCC member countries are adopting a more aggressive focus on developing and empowering their national workforce so that they remain competitive in the labour market. Bahrain was the primary GCC nation to implement widespread and integrated policies to encourage greater competition and deregulation in the operation of the labour market, combined with introducing taxes and levies on the employment of expatriates. The Saudi government introduced the Nitaqat programme25 several years ago, due to be updated by the end of 2016 as announced in the National Transformation Plan. Of all the initiatives undertaken by Saudi Arabia, Nitaqat stands out as one of

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the most bold and ambitious in order to secure the employment of Saudi nationals, thereby reducing the number of sponsorship visas (or iqamas) granted to expatriates in the private sector. Under the Nitaqat programme private companies and establishments are currently classified as ‘Green’, ‘Yellow’ or ‘Red’, depending on the number of national employees in their workforce and the length of employment. On the basis of the classification, various benefits and sanctions are extended by the Ministry of Labour, including the continued recruitment of foreign manpower and the transfer of sponsorship visas. ‘Nationalisation’ of the workforce has been a priority for decades and there is no denying that progress has been achieved. Largely, the policy of nationalisation followed by GCC governments has been to identify target occupational sectors that are considered to provide suitable careers for national men and women to pursue and to allocate progressive quotas for employers to achieve in these sectors. Bahrain and Oman come to mind as early adopters of these policies. From an early stage, they have been able to firmly embed the process of localisation as part of their overall strategy, be it within the energy sector or in financial services. Bahrainisation as a policy began in the early 1980s, when the government initiated a training and employment scheme called ‘Project 10,000’,26 which targeted the placement of young Bahrainis in private sector jobs. In 1994, the Bahrainisation percentage laws were issued and forecast that a 5 per cent annual increase of Bahrainis in the private sector could alleviate unemployment. The progress to date in Bahrain and Oman is commendable. As an example, varying sources estimate that Omani’s now represent close to 85 or 90 per cent of the workforce in the banking sector27 and have successfully extended this to important industries such as hospitality and tourism. Due to a largely supernumerary approach to date, nationalisation in its current shape and form is sometimes at odds with the genuine progress and long-term inclusion of its key constituency. Hence, at the time of writing the next phase of its evolution is overdue – ‘nationalisation 2.0’, which requires a fundamental reboot of the speed and the direction of localisation moving forward. An orientation towards ‘nationalisation 2.0’ would focus on matching labour supply with labour demand, with developing the skills, strengths and capacities of local talent, allowing them to

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complete freely within our labour markets, without dealing with the pitfalls of securing quotas or positive discrimination. This would herald a more sustainable and long-term approach to localisation, cognisant of the region’s ambitions to diversify into knowledge-based economies.

The state of expatriation Two institutions that have become enshrined at the core of the region’s workplaces are expatriation and nationalisation. Both phenomena segment internal and external labour markets and each has its own further subdivisions and strata. This can serve to reduce labour market mobility across these boundaries, particularly of high potential talent, thereby reducing efficiency and engagement levels within the region’s workplaces. Arguably, both need to be eradicated and re-addressed in their current forms in order to unfreeze the region’s sclerotic labour markets, particularly as the GCC aims to achieve a transition from an energy-based towards a knowledge-based economy. Decades of reliance on imported labour have generated deeply entrenched views about many jobs as unattractive to nationals, precisely because they are associated with unattractive working conditions, particularly in the private sector. In turn, many private sector employers expect to receive more output from expatriates in terms of working hours than they would from nationals and at lower rates of pay than they would be prepared to pay their compatriots. Expatriation, with its foundation built on the exclusive iqama and temporary/renewable sponsorship system, inhibits productivity and discourages part-time working and flexibility in general. Nationalisation, and its current focus on achieving higher quotas of GCC nationals within the workforce, encourages a sense of tokenism and reduces the incentives for individuals, employers and the state to invest in developing more sustainable productivity and human capital. Both expatriation and nationalisation in their current forms are built on the operation of rent-seeking behaviour.28 The structure of these two social shibboleths promotes the pursuit and operation of wasteful competition within the key cohorts of the highly segmented labour markets rather than between them. A lack of significant social mobility means that workers do not compete for their share of economic rent through a meritocratic demonstration of

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their productive potential in an integrated labour market, as tournament theory and ideas associated with human capital theory would suggest. Rather, they seek to protect their knowledge, enhance their influence and trade informal obligations and unspoken influence in order to get things done outside of the official production or service process. This serves to further segment a divided workforce and to stiffen the sclerosis of hierarchical, bureaucratic and anachronistic workplace practices, including within the public sector specifically. Moreover, it also reduces the potential benefits of positive competition between talent, which arguably ensures the most productive rise to the top of the organisation and incentives exist for average levels of performance and productivity to rise, as the outcomes of these ‘tournaments’ are determined by effort, engagement and their resulting business impact. Any perception of the futility of these ‘tournaments’, for example, through a lack of consistency and fairness arising from excessive reliance on government-sponsored outcomes, can result in a negative impact on effort, engagement and arguably productivity, wellbeing, and ultimately, international competitiveness. Negative internal competition, also known as dysfunctional organisational politics, between the multifarious segments of the internal and external labour markets across the region, can only serve to reduce external competition with the region’s organisational and international rivals. We often see that an already segmented labour market is further characterised by a largely transactional nature of working relationships that exist between nationals and expatriates, between sponsor and employee. This can be attributed to the lack of permanence of employment and long-term residency prospects. This sometimes has an impact on the sense of personal ownership, investment and accountability of expatriates as decision makers and business leaders across the Gulf States. The interesting question remains, whose interests does this system of rent-seeking behaviour within the region’s labour market serve? Arguably, no-one. Ruling elites suffer from a long-term diminishment of international competiveness and the ultimate reduction in the pool of rents that they can seek to distribute through the established channels of munificent dictatorship. Employing organisations suffer from byzantine formal and informal hierarchies and practices, predicated on the peddling of petty influence as a priority over and

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above performance and productivity. Individual employees suffer from a sense of dependence and disengagement, frustration and being tufshan29 in colloquial Arabic – isolated, powerless and adrift. More broadly, in terms of the overall dichotomy between modernism and tradition, society can suffer from a ‘saying-doing gap’, a lack of authenticity, a feeling of anomie between those excluded constituents of the community, thereby creating long-term uncertainty and instability as a result. The fundamental question here is, whose interests are served by the persistence and pervasiveness of traditional forms of supernumerary nationalisation policies? Arguably, they serve to cement dependence on patronage for advancing personal interests in all aspects of life, including at work. Serving to legitimise the status quo and strengthen the position of those at the top of social and organisational hierarchies has proved a functional model, in a situation with significant economic rents to distribute, along with securing the position of relatively nascent ruling elites across most of the GCC. Social stability has been the great prize of the current system of privilege and patronage. However, such a system has limitations in dealing flexibly and effectively with the implications of social change and modernisation, specifically within the workplace. The question remains, how sustainable are current modes of production in the region when the rents start to run out, if environmental degradation accelerates and if those more marginal social groups grow further and continue to be excluded from the centre of existing policy making institutions? The frustrations expressed in the so-called Arab Spring and the low levels of employee engagement and productivity in the region need to be addressed. This will require a socially negotiated transfer of power from the older generation to the younger as established social contracts shift and government budgets increasingly come under pressure from both long-term low oil prices and the accelerating ambitions of policy reform. It is clear that traditional forms of nationalisation, or national development, have negative unintended consequences, in that they effectively serve to reduce the productivity and positivity of national talent in the workplace, with the resulting impact on their attractiveness to private sector employers. With youth unemployment at the highest average levels anywhere in the world, this is alarming, to say the least. The current system provides a mechanism for cementing

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the legitimacy of the leader who bestows employment or controls the distribution of economic rents. In traditional societies, endowments of wealth and patronage mattered more than any potential income earned from labour.30 With the availability of cheap expatriate labour, the incentives to invest in our own human capital in order to be able to increase one’s own productivity and earnings are limited. This means that work and its role in determining our identity are necessarily more peripheral to the identity of GCC national citizens than to their expatriate counterparts.

Rationale for the research and its methodology The research was targeted at directly understanding the views of those most affected by changes, reform and amendments to education and labour markets, that is, youth, towards their perceptions of employability and career readiness. Specifically, the research design focused on the areas of career guidance, job prospects and employment preferences amongst students in the GCC, both national and expatriate, as well as UK students for a comparative analysis. In addition, key outcomes such as life satisfaction, engagement, hope, academic relevance and satisfaction with academic guidance were also assessed. Key demographic data on nationality, age, gender and location were also caputured in the research questionnaire. The questionnaire included 120 questions and data were collected using online and paper-based surveys in English and Arabic. The target sample for this research included students under the age of 25 years, enrolled in undergraduate or vocational programmes. In UAE and Oman, data were collected via random sampling at career fairs. For Saudi Arabia, a market research agency was appointed to collect data. Within the UK, The Talent Enterprise directly joined select schools and colleges for data collection. The sample size for the research study is n ¼ 925, with n ¼ 173 for GCC national students, n ¼ 175 for GCC expat students and n ¼ 285 for UK students. Other participants include Indian, African and North American nationalities. The questionnaire also assessed personal strengths of students, based on the theoretical foundations of Positive Psychology and Positive Education, using The Talent Enterprise’s proprietary psychometric assessment tool, the Youth Thriving Index (YTI).31

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Discussion Our research re-iterates the growing gap between education and employment not only in the GCC but also in the UK. Fewer than half of GCC national students surveyed believed that their education was relevant to the world of work and this figure was only marginally higher for GCC expat and UK students. Further, all students reported limited academic guidance and support, which might directly affect their engagement with education at 36 per cent, 45 per cent and 41 per cent for GCC national, GCC expat and UK students respectively. While they remained hopeful about the futures, they also reported alarming levels of current life satisfaction, which had a direct impact on their overall levels of happiness and well-being. One of the first barriers faced by youth is their search for employment at their entry point into the formal labour market. Interestingly and uniquely for the region, education has an unexpected effect on predicting joblessness. If jobseekers have been to college, their likelihood of being unemployed almost doubles, whereas in most other countries and regions in the world, graduates have a statistically significant higher chance of being employed. In the GCC region, graduates have an equal and opposite statistically significant lower chance of finding employment after graduating from college, with Saudi Arabia having the highest number of unemployed PhDs in the world.32 In other words, the region’s labour Table 6.2 Life satisfaction, engagement, hope, academic relevance, academic guidance and regularity amongst students Key Outcomes Life Satisfaction Engagement with Education Hope Academic Relevance Academic Guidance Regularity/Attendance

National StudentsA

Expat StudentsB

UK StudentsC

24% 36% 68% 48% 45% 49%

24% 45%AC 71% 57% 49%A 73%AC

31% 41% 63% 55% 59% 56%

Source: Youth Employability Research by The Talent Enterprise (2015). Notes: Superscript upper case letters denote two-sided tests with significance level 0.05. Tests are adjusted for all pairwise comparisons within a row of each innermost subtable using the Bonferroni correction.

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markets are not sufficiently efficient and outcomes are determined by other, exogenous, factors. This provides further evidence that labour markets are not sufficiently driven by meritocratic imperatives or on potential productivity in the workplace to the same extent as they are elsewhere in the world. Rather, non-economic factors are at play. Clearly more research is required, although clearly the region’s regulation of its sclerotic labour markets has an impact here. For most adults, finding a job is a daunting task, but the situation is even worse for a young jobseeker, with limited access to information, resources and limited opportunities to have developed significant contacts or connections. The results from the research (Table 6.3) indicate that the main source of finding a job for students was through their friends, family and connections rather than through their college placement counsellors or establishing contact with employers directly. This was seen as a less likely option for UK students, in comparison. However interestingly, within the GCC both national and expat youth responded in a similar way. This implies Table 6.3 Students’ most preferred source of finding a job National Expat UK StudentsA StudentsB StudentsC Searching online/job portals, etc. Via your friends, family and personal contacts Through securing part-time work, internships or apprenticeships first I don’t know yet Government agencies Your school/college student placement cell Recruitment consultants/talking directly with prospective employers Advertisements/newspapers

23% 24%

14% 23%C

31%B 13%

13%

21%

17%

15% 10%C 8%

17% 2% 13%

18%B 2% 12%

5%

8%

6%

2%

3%

2%

Source: Youth Employability Research by The Talent Enterprise (2015). Notes: Superscript upper case letters denote two-sided tests with significance level 0.05. Tests are adjusted for all pairwise comparisons within a row of each innermost subtable using the Bonferroni correction.

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that students in the region are compelled to rely on personal connections, clout, wasta or ‘whom they may know’ versus more structured entry options into organisations. This research is supported by Bunglawala33 who highlights that: the major obstacles most frequently identified to gaining labor market access included: lack of awareness of how to job-search, connect to employers, and access career advice; needing connections (wasta) to get a job. Many students said that despite their willingness to go through open competition (rather than rely on wasta) to find employment, they found it difficult to actually find a job by responding to job vacancies or through sending out CVs to potential employers. This is further substantiated by the Silatech Index,34 where: needing connections to get a job, or selection system readiness, is another obstacle youth frequently mentioned. The perception that jobs are only given to people who have connections (wasta) is not dominant in any one region, but youth in Bahrain (32%) . . . are among the most likely to mention this. When asked separately whether knowing people in high positions is critical to getting a job, majority of youth in every country surveyed agree. Further, seven out of ten national students expressed a preference for studying further or working with the government rather than working with the private sector, volunteering or starting their own business (Table 6.4). When it comes to access and preferences regarding social support, GCC national students reported a greater reliance on themselves or friends and family when things get tough, instead of reaching out to counsellors or teachers at school or university, which deviates from the responses of GCC expat and UK students. There is also evidence to support that when it comes to seeking career advice (current as well as in the future), GCC national student’s ranked family, friends and themselves as the top influencers, suggesting a lack of effective career guidance in the region at the time. However, their responses do not differ significantly from GCC

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Table 6.4 Understanding the education and employment preferences in the region After completing your education, do you hope to . . . Work with the government Study further Work with private sector employers Get a paid internship or apprenticeship Start my own business/join family owned business I don’t know yet Get an opportunity to volunteer Work with a not for profit organisation/ do some volunteer work Be a homemaker

National Expat UK studentsA studentsB studentsC 34%BC 37%B 7%

5% 27% 16%AC

4% 60%AB 4%

5%

21%AC

13%

6%

17%AC

5%

9% 1% 1%

9% 1% 3%

10% 1% 2%

1%

1%

1%

Source: Youth Employability Research by The Talent Enterprise (2015). Notes: Superscript upper case letters denote two-sided tests with significance level 0.05. Tests are adjusted for all pairwise comparisons within a row of each innermost subtable using the Bonferroni correction.

expat students and UK students who also rated career counsellors significantly lower, suggesting a wider need to improve the quality and quantity of career guidance internationally. Career planning and development is one of the most vital aspects of a student’s life and youth can benefit greatly from effective guidance on their career options, prospects in the labour market and how these match with their strengths and interests. Furthermore, guidance on job search techniques, interviewing skills and personal etiquette, can also improve the likelihood of actually finding a job. Again, the most effective solution is in ensuring that educational institutions provide effective and meaningful career guidance to their students and, importantly, build capability amongst career counsellors. None of the GCC nations currently have a national standard or qualifications for career education. Greater access and use of tools and resources, including updated occupational handbooks to include new and emerging careers, relevant psychometrics and technology will

Table 6.5 out to?

When things get tough in school/college, you reach

Friends Myself Family No one Social networking channels Career counsellor or student advisor A teacher or faculty member Other

National studentsA

Expat studentsB

UK studentsC

36% 20%C 18% 9% 5% 4%

37% 15% 21% 6% 3% 3%

33% 7% 29%B 14%B 2% 1%

6% 2%

14%A 1%

11%A 3%

Source: Youth Employability Research by The Talent Enterprise (2015). Notes: Superscript upper case letters denote two-sided tests with significance level 0.05. Tests are adjusted for all pairwise comparisons within a row of each innermost sub-table using the Bonferroni correction.

Table 6.6 Source of career advice Currently receive career advice from National students Family Friends Myself

Would like to receive career advice from

39% Family 31% Friends 20% Myself

40% 24% 23%

Expat students

Family 51% Family 47% Friends 37% Friends 30% A teacher or 23% Career counsellor 23% faculty member or student advisor

UK students

Family Friends

56% Family 43% 26% Career counsellor 26% or student advisor A teacher or 20% A teacher or 15% faculty member faculty member

Source: Youth Employability Research by The Talent Enterprise (2015). Notes: Superscript upper case letters denote two-sided tests with significance level 0.05. Tests are adjusted for all pairwise comparisons within a row of each innermost sub-table using the Bonferroni correction.

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also help in addressing the private sector’s challenge in identifying skilled workers and matching the right students to the right jobs. Currently there is a visible lack of labour market intelligence to gauge either labour market supply and demand.

Recommendations The current research clearly indicates that some of the key constituents of education and labour market reform are failing to see the impact of any amendments or developments towards the positive, where fewer than half of students believe that the current skills and knowledge they are gaining will be relevant in the near future.

Figure 6.3 Creating an eco-system for partnership towards youth advancement.

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With over 50 per cent of the population in the region under the age of 30, most GCC nations have declared ambitious plans for greater diversification and sustainability. However, if current trends continue, we are at very high risk of letting our greatest demographic advantage slip by. It is crucial that policy makers, educators, employers and other stakeholders work closely together to harness the collective potential and energy that the region’s youth offer. Failure to do so will squander one of the greatest demographic opportunities in recent times. We are at a crossroads in the making of the region, with distinct challenges and concerns regarding the fate of youth in particular. However, taking a rationally optimistic view, we can take clear and deliberate measures to accelerate the human capital development of future generations. Though this is a complex and multifaceted issue, requiring changes at all levels, we can make some key recommendations on how we can commit to successful collective action. First, we need to invest in building crucial employability and life skills that will help prepare youth for the world of work. These need to go deeper than our generic ‘soft skills’ towards building character strengths such as self-confidence, determination and resilience. Our efforts to develop employability skills could include relatively quicker fixes as well as longer-term reforms such as revising academic curricula, updating methods of instruction and enhancing the skills of teachers themselves. However, it could take at least a decade before the benefits of reforms in education are wholly realised; hence we also need to be active and creative in identifying shorter-term, high-impact actions. . Educators and employers can clearly step up and do more in terms of providing early exposure to the world of work by supporting traineeships, internships, apprenticeships and other programmes during their formative years. Unlike other parts of the world, most of our youth enter the workplace for the first time once they have completed their formal education, without having opportunities to work part-time as students, and they genuinely suffer in the relatively fast-paced work environments and because of the type of work itself, leading them to question their own skills, education and self-confidence.

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Further, with the projected demographic increases and current rates of youth unemployment, the creation of jobs in the private sector remains the overriding priority of all governments in the region. Private sector employers need to do more to make themselves attractive to youth. Even today there is an overwhelming preference for the younger generation to want to work in the public sector. Hence, private sector employers have to be proactive to engage with youth early on and update their fairly archaic and traditional company policies and practices to attract and retain this talent pool. Opportunities in entrepreneurship are also massively untapped and are key to job creation. . Much more can also be done in terms of elevating the role and impact of career guidance support in the region. Most students rely on themselves, their families and friends when it comes to soliciting career advice. There needs to be greater self-awareness of their skills and strengths, and of the various career paths they could potentially consider, instead of relying on the more conventional or popular options. . Finally, youth themselves need to be more realistic of their expectations from the world of work, overcoming any sense of ‘entitlement’ they may have. They need to feel more empowered, more capable, more driven and more willing to take on the opportunities and challenges they may face ahead in their roles as employees, entrepreneurs and citizens. Thus, citizens and policy makers need to reconcile their desire for sustainable enhancements to employability within the region’s labour markets to enable the productive potential of youth within the current social contract. .

Conclusion The persistence of current labour market policies and institutional frameworks for regulating the workplace is inconsistent with the stated commercial modernisation philosophy of most GCC nations. All six GCC countries are members of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and signatories to the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (which includes the right of workers to associate freely and bargain collectively, the end of forced and compulsory labour and the end of unfair discrimination among workers)35 and yet their formal commitment to international

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standards of modern work practices is not necessarily consistently reflected in the practical experience of work within the region, particularly amongst the 22 million expatriates. To date, the expectation is that a the region can be a unique, traditional society based on the social norms cultural doctrines of the region and at the same time run a modern, global economy. This is a fundamental tension in the future trajectory of the region’s model of governmentdirected development. The role of the workplace represents a major facet of this dichotomy between the traditional and the modern. Rent-seeking behaviour requires the existence of economic rent and higher wages in order to persist. As the economies of the region all aim to diversify into knowledge-based economies, international competitiveness and productivity will continue to become more important, as workers in particular will effectively compete with workers from across the world. History elsewhere would suggest that such high wage rates are not sustainable in the long term without similar sustained increases in productivity. Post-communist Eastern Europe could serve as a constructive, if salutary, comparison. The decline of party affiliations and the nomenclature system of influence after the fall of communism in 1989 led to a ‘lost generation’ of workers. Many were unable to make the successful transition to compete within the alternative and alien meritocratic, modern capitalist economic and social system. This phenomenon persists today to the extent that average living standards, wage rates and employment levels, amongst many other social and economic outcomes, remain significantly lower in Eastern Germany than in Western Germany, more than a quarter of a century after the fall of communism. Moreover, the pervasiveness and persistence of anticompetitive approaches to organising work will be likely to create further tensions in the workplaces of the future as ‘best practices’ and reality continue to diverge. We also have to accept than modern work practices themselves may not be wholly ideal by any means. Many people believe that modern growth naturally favours labour over inheritance and competence over birth. What is the source of this belief, and how can we be sure it is correct?36 Moreover, if the growth in earnings from capital continues to outpace the growth in earnings from labour, then this may further complicate the meaning of work within a region with some of the highest per capita income ratios in the world.

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Nonetheless, from a positive perspective, all the ingredients are in place – a young, growing and educated workforce and an increasingly supportive government policy framework. We also have to recognise that the fiscal framework that surrounds most policy making around the rest of the world is different in the Gulf region. Although the progressive introduction of taxation may be imminent, it is currently not applied by any GCC state in any comparable way to international standards. The link between policy making and public scrutiny is therefore also likely to be different.37 Without taxes, society has no common destiny and collective action is impossible. This has always been true. At the heart of every major political upheaval lies a fiscal revolution. The Ancien Re´gime was swept away when the revolutionary assemblies voted to abolish the fiscal privileges of the nobility and clergy and establish a universal system of modern taxation. The American Revolution was born when subjects of the British colonies decided to take their destiny in their own hands and set their own taxation (‘no taxation without representation’). Two centuries later the context is different, but the heart of the issue remains the same. How can sovereign citizens democratically decide how much of their resources they wish to devote to common goals such as education, health, retirement, inequality reduction, employment, sustainable development and so on? The key difference with the GCC is that there is little representation without taxation and so the engagement of key constituencies in determining and reviewing the effectiveness and efficiency of public sector is limited. In the case of policy making and execution for promoting employability, this has led to a diffusion of institutions and a lacuna of private–public partnerships and consultation with the public sector in particular. As this research on youth demonstrates, the education to employment gap is real and students report a distinct lack of relevance of academic instruction and guidance. Linking the interests and needs of jobseekers and potential employers is the key to improving labour market efficiency and reaping the benefits this can have for social outcomes and macroeconomic performance. More research of this nature and more communication of its results can only assist in terms of better matching the future supply and demand for labour across the GCC countries. It is clear that time is increasingly of the essence in terms of labour market policy reform in the GCC. As policy agendas accelerate

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in their ambition budgets are likely to tighten, whilst those available for productive employment are projected to increase in the decade ahead. The effectiveness, efficiency and economy of reforms will be critical for success.

Notes 1. International Monetary Fund (IMF), ‘Regional economic outlook, Middle East and Central Asia’, World Economic and Financial Surveys, April 2011. Available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ ft/reo/2011/mcd/eng/pdf/mreo0411.pdf (accessed 5 November 2016). 2. David Jones, ‘5 key drivers for employee engagement and productivity of GCC nationals and expatriates: a longitudinal study 2010–2012’, in Annika Kropf and Mohamed A. Ramady (eds), Employment and Career Motivation in the Arab Gulf States: The Rentier Mentality Revisited (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2015), pp. 122–57. 3. David Jones and Radhika Punshi, Unlocking the Paradox of Plenty. A Review of the Talent Landscape in the Arab World and Your Role in Shaping It (Dubai: Motivate Books, 2013), pp. 155 – 8. 4. Barry Mirkin, ‘Population levels, trends and policies in the Arab region: challenges and opportunities’, Arab Human Development Report, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Regional Bureau for Arab States, 2010. Available at http://www. arab-hdr.org/publications/other/ahdrps/paper01-en.pdf (accessed January 2012). 5. International Labour Organisation (ILO), ‘Growth, employment and decent work in the Arab region: key policy issues’, thematic paper, Arab Employment Forum, Beirut, Lebanon, 19–21 October 2009. Available at http://www.bollettinoadapt.it/old/files/document/3470GROWTH_ EMPLOYMEN.pdf (accessed March 2015). 6. Noora Al-Ali, ‘MENA – the great job rush: the unemployment ticking time bomb’, Al Masah Capital, 2011. Available at https://www. scribd.com/document/93683064/MENA-The-Great-Job-Rush-TheUnemployment-Ticking-Time-Bomb-and-How-to-Fix-It-3-JULY2011 (accessed February 2015). 7. World Bank, Migration and Remittances Factbook, 2nd edition (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011). Available at http://sitere sources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/Factbook2011-Ebook.pdf (accessed July 2014). 8. World Bank, ‘Unlocking the Employment Potential in the Middle East and North Africa: Towards a New Social Contract’, MENA Development Report, 2004, p. 95. Available at http://documents. worldbank.org/curated/en/343121468753030506/pdf/288150PAPER0 Unlocking0employment.pdf (accessed January 2012).

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9. Mirkin, ‘Population levels, trends and policies in the Arab region’. 10. International Labour Organisation (ILO), ‘Global employment trends for women’, 7 March 2007. Available at http://www.ilo.org/empelm/ pubs/WCMS_114287/lang–en/index.htm (accessed January 2012). 11. Booz and Co., ‘Meeting the employment challenge in the GCC: the need for a holistic strategy’, 2010. Available at https://www.scribd.com/ document/181142346/Booz-Co-2010-Meeting-the-EmploymentChallenge-in-the-GCC (accessed April 2013). 12. Dominic Barton, Diana Farrell and Mona Mourshed, ‘Education to employment: designing a system that works’, McKinsey and Company, January 2013. Available at http://www.mckinsey.com/ industries/social-sector/our-insights/education-to-employmentdesigning-a-system-that-works (accessed July 2014). 13. Christopher Davidson, After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies (London: Hurst and Company, 2012). 14. Informa Middle East and The Talent Enterprise, MENA Labour Market Confidence Index, 2014. Available at http://www.slideshare.net/ IIRME/mena-labour-market-confidence-index (accessed March 2015). 15. Al Amal, 1/1 (2015), pp. 22 – 6 (published by the UAE Ministry of Labour). 16. HR Echo, 1/1 (November 2014), pp. 15 – 29 (published by the UAE Federal Authority for Government Human Resources). Available at https://www.fahr.gov.ae/portal/en/studies-and-statistics/hr-echo. aspx (accessed March 2015). 17. John P. Kotter, ‘Leading change: why transformation efforts fail’, Harvard Business Review (March – April 1995), pp. 1 – 9, cited in Carolyn Aiken and Scott Keller, ‘The irrational side of change management’, 18. Informa Middle East and The Talent Enterprise, MENA Labour Market Confidence Index. 19. Jones and Punshi, Unlocking the Paradox of Plenty. 20. Hay Group, 2012. 21. Jones and Punshi, Unlocking the Paradox of Plenty. 22. Ibid. 23. Mirkin, ‘Population levels, trends and policies in the Arab region’. 24. Farzaneh Roudi, ‘Youth population and unemployment in the Middle East and North Africa’, presentation to the Population Reference Bureau, July 2011. Available at http://www.un.org/esa/population/m eetings/egm-adolescents/roudi.pdf (accessed January 2012). 25. DLA Piper, ‘Be aware: focus on Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’, June 2012. Available at http://www.dlapiper.com/files/Publication/8013ec0e9213-4de5-93b1-769e55e29b70/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ c8a4d367-e2f0-4df4-83c4-8b94cf0e0e88/Be_Aware_Middle_East_ June_2012.pdf (accessed March 2013).

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26. Mohammed Dito, ‘Migration policies and challenges in the Kingdom of Bahrain’, paper prepared for the Forced Migration and Refugee Studies Program, The American University in Cairo, Egypt, 23 – 25 October 2007. 27. Oman Ministry of Manpower, Industry Omanisation rates, 2015. Available at https://www.manpower.gov.om/portal/En/default.aspx (accessed September 2015). 28. Jones and Punshi, Unlocking the Paradox of Plenty. 29. Pascal Menoret, Joyriding in Riyadh: Oil, Urbanism, and Road Revolt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 30. Thomas Piketty and Arthur Goldhammer, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014). 31. The Talent Enterprise, Youth Thriving Index. Available at http:// www.thetalententerprise.com/profiling-tools/youth-thriving-index/ (accessed September 2015). 32. World Economic Forum, ‘Rethinking Arab employment. a systemic approach for resource-endowed economies’, October 2014. Available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_MENA14_RethinkingArab Employment.pdf (accessed May 2015). 33. Zamila Bunglawala, ‘Young, educated and dependent on the public sector meeting graduates’ aspirations and diversifying employment in Qatar and the UAE’, Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper No. 4, December 2011. Available at http://www.brookings.edu/,/media/ research/files/papers/2011/12/15-qatar-diversify-employment/1215_ qatar_diversify_employment_bunglawala_english.pdf (accessed January 2015). 34. Silatech, in partnership with Gallup, ‘The Silatech index: voices of young Arabs’, June 2009. Available at http://www.silatech.com/docs/ default-source/publications-documents/the-silatech-index-voicesof-young-arabs0cf855ea1cec6cff92deff0000037dc4.pdf?sfvrsn¼ 6 (accessed November 2014). 35. See International Labour Organization website: http://www.ilo.org/ declaration/lang – en/index.htm. 36. Piketty and Goldhammer, Capital in the Twenty-First Century. 37. Ibid.

7 A REVIEW AND CRITIQUE OF THE SAUDISATION METANARRATIVE: BRINGING ‘THE CITIZEN’ INTO FOCUS Faisal Kattan

Introduction On 25 April 2016 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia announced Vision 2030 – the blueprint for economic diversification over the medium to long term in the context of declining oil prices. Spearheaded by Deputy Crown and Chairman of the Council of Economic and Development Affairs Prince Mohamed Bin Salman, the vision outlines a comprehensive and ambitious 14-year strategy to reduce the kingdom’s dependence on oil (by boosting non-oil revenues) and improve its fiscal posture (by reining in rising state expenditures). This plan will be accompanied by a number of structural reforms to improve the efficiency and transparency of the public sector, develop and empower the private sector, revamp immigration and strengthen and orient the education system towards the global economy. The declining oil prices and the ongoing reform process is forcing the government to turn to human capital, and rethink and re-imagine the ideal citizen needed to achieve its economic policy aspirations. It is important to remember that at the core of any economic policy is the citizen. In order to

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assess the practicality around any policy, it is crucial to understand the citizen, their broader institutional context and their decisionmaking processes.

Setting the stage In A History of Saudi Arabia,1 Madawi al-Rasheed uses the title ‘From affluence to austerity, 1973 – 1990’ to frame Saudi Arabia’s transformation during the 1970s and 1980s. During this period, which coincided with the events and aftermath of the 1973 oil embargo, Kings Faisal, Khalid and Fahd implemented policies to modernise and expand the state in Saudi Arabia. While the state’s expansion was striking, the ‘boom of the 1970s’ was accompanied by economic vulnerability characterised by a lack of economic diversification and a labour force dependent on expatriate labour. Later, this sense of vulnerability turned into an acute sense of alarm as oil prices declined during the 1980s. Other regional developments in the 1980s (the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, the 1980s Iran – Iraq war and the 1990 invasion of Kuwait) compounded economic uncertainties by raising questions of security and its impact on regional stability. As a result of these transformative events, Saudi Arabia transitioned into the 1990s in poor economic standing. The economy’s friability was affirmed by a slew of ominous statistics: oil accounted for 90 per cent of Saudi exports (25 per cent of GDP), unemployment rates hovered between 10 per cent and 15 per cent (the majority being youth), the effects of the ‘Dutch disease’2 still lingered, labour market dependence on expatriates was significant (they consisted of 66 per cent of total labour force) and remittance outflows accounted for 35 per cent of total imports.3 In 1994 Saudi Arabia’s Council of Ministers approved a number of policies under the 6th Development Plan (1995 –9) to address the country’s poor economic standing. Saudisation4 was one such policy. The policy’s principal objective was to: (1) address rising unemployment rates by increasing the proportion of Saudi nationals in the private sector; and (2) develop a national labour force capable of sustaining a knowledge-based economy.5 An accompanying development narrative framed the relationship between Saudisation and the knowledge-based economy as

Green category

Premium category

113,558 6757 265 19 120599

52% 28% 9% 3% 48%

34617 5058 624 42 40341

16% 21% 21% 6% 16%

66,890 11014 1843 500 80247

30% 45% 61% 67% 32%

4678 1,468 307 188 6641

2% 6% 10% 25% 2.6%

219742 24297 3039 749 247827

No. of % of No. of % of No. of % of No. of % of All companies companies companies companies companies companies companies companies companies

Yellow category

Source: Ministry of Labour, ‘Annual Report on Labour Statistics’. Note: Categories from Red to Premium are ordered from least compliant to most compliant in fulfilling Saudisation quotas. The nationalisation performance of the companies is calculated based on a moving average. Nationalisation quotas vary by economic activity and size and the entities are classified into four categories: premium, green, yellow and red.13

Small (10 – 49) Medium (50 –499) Large (500 þ ) Very large (3000 þ ) All companies

Size of company (employees)

Red category

Status of Nitaqat programme in 2011

Category classification*

Table 7.1

Male

Female

Both

Saudi nationals Male

Female

Both

Non-Saudi nationals Male

Female

Both

Nationals and non-nationals

Source: Ministry of Labour, ‘Annual labour statistics’.

No. of EEs 744990 99487 844476 6823554 113466 6937020 7568544 212952 7781496 No. of EEs as a % of LF by 88.22% 11.78% 100% 98.36% 1.64% 100% 97.26% 2.74% 100% nationality Number of EEs as % of TLF 9.57% 1.28% 10.85% 87.69% 1.46% 89.15% 97.26% 2.74% 100% No. of EEs as a % of TLF 9.84% 46.72% 10.85% 90.16% 53.28% 89.15% 100% 100% 100% by gender

Gender

Nationality

Table 7.2 Number of employees in the private sector by nationality and gender

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interdependent and reciprocal. Specifically, Saudisation would strengthen the private sector and develop the national labour force needed to sustain the knowledge-based economy. And the knowledge-based economy would provide the knowledge, information and technology needed for economic growth and private sector development. Both processes were framed as necessary for the success of Saudisation. More importantly, in order for the knowledge economy to function properly certain assumptions were made about the ‘ideal’ individual needed to manage knowledge, information and technology. Knowledge economy discourse requires this individual to be adaptive, analytical, mobile and creative. It also stipulates that this individual needs to be able to produce knowledge, ideas and information.6 As a result of this process of production, the knowledge economy develops human capital. Knowledge and education, which are the core components of human capital, are treated as business products, productive assets and innovative intellectual products capable of yielding high value return to society. Walter Powell and Kaisa Snellman view the knowledge economy as being based on knowledge-intensive activities that contribute to technical and scientific advancement; the key component of a knowledge economy is greater reliance on intellectual capabilities, as opposed to physical or natural resources.7 With Saudisation,8 the state sought to address unemployment and its negative externalities. However, since its inception, the policy has registered low to moderate levels of success in terms of reducing unemployment and increasing private sector employment.9 In 2011, the Ministry of Labour published the ‘Annual Report on Labour Statistics10 detailing the status of Saudisation. While the publication of the report was unprecedented, given that no previous report detailing the status of Saudisation had been published, it served as an irritating reminder of the continued stagnation of Saudisation. Tables 7.1 and 7.2 provide a general overview of the status of Saudisation in 2011. Table 7.1 shows that in 2011 64 per cent (48 per cent þ 16 per cent) of private companies fell under the ‘non-compliant’ red and yellow categories, the overwhelming majority of which were small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (of all ‘red’ firms 99 per cent are SMEs and of all ‘yellow’ firms 98 per cent are SMEs). This problem is

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notable because SMEs are framed as the firms most capable of establishing a thriving middle class, employing a great proportion of the national labour force and driving economic growth. Table 7.2 shows that in 2011 Saudis represented 10 per cent of the private sector labour force (844,476 of 7,781,496 employees). This statistic has remained stagnant since the 1990s, which suggests that Saudi Arabia has largely been unsuccessful in creating a self-sufficient national labour force.11

Why is Saudisation failing? The Ministry of Labour’s report did not adequately address the question of why the policy was failing. The report’s descriptive approach simply surveyed the status of Saudisation and paid little attention to more pressing questions, such as: what are the sources of the policy’s stagnation? Why are Saudis not taking up private sector work? Is the policy’s stagnation a question of demand- or supply-side economics, or is it a combination of both? How do questions of politics and socio-economics affect Saudisation? Rather, these questions were taken up by a legion of scholars and policy experts who sought to fill this analytical gap. Many notable scholars contributed to the development of a body of knowledge that tackled this issue. The executive summary of the International Monetary Fund’s report entitled ‘Saudi Arabia: selected issues’ neatly summarises the main arguments found in the literature.12 The authors argue that in order to achieve the goals of Saudisation, that is, in order to increase private sector employment and improve the competitiveness of Saudi workers, Saudi Arabia must focus primarily on improving the quality of education and on labour policy reform. In the section that follows I expand on the tenets of both arguments.

Saudisation ‘metanarrative’: a review and critique Several academics and policy makers have attempted to unpack the reasons behind Saudisation’s stagnation. From this literature, two theoretical strands have emerged to form what I refer to as the ‘Saudisation metanarrative’: the dominant narrative that has emerged to explain the structural inefficiencies of Saudisation policy. The first narrative identifies the structural inefficiencies of Saudisation policy

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and argues that if these issues are systematically addressed Saudisation will automatically adjust and the indicators will improve. A second narrative identifies the significance of human capital and argues that the reason behind the policy’s stagnation is due to a deficit in human capital. The narrative argues further that education and its careful reform will correct these problems and spur Saudisation. These two narratives are not mutually exclusive and often borrow from one another. It is important however to identify these two strands as separate ideas and approaches to the problems surrounding Saudisation. Their respective demarcation allows us to think more critically about how they relate to Saudisation. This chapter argues that the analytical framework constructed by the Saudisation ‘metanarrative’ is limited; the limitations of each narrative will be reviewed in turn.14 The policy narrative is limited because it assumes that ‘effort’ and ‘ability’ across nationals and non-nationals are constant. Given Saudisation, this implies that if the wage gap was reduced and monitoring costs minimised, employers would have a greater incentive to employ Saudi nationals, ceteris paribus. However, Steffen Hertog,15 Asad Sadi16 and Adel S. al-Dosary17 challenge the robustness of this assumption. They postulate that even in the absence of a wage gap and monitoring costs, employers will still prefer to hire nonnationals.18 The policy narrative does not rigorously address this limitation: it overlooks how policy recommendations will alleviate this problem long term, fails to discuss why the problem persists and does not account for shirking practices on the part of the employer and the employee. The human capital narrative is limited because, first, it overlooks a trend in the late 1960s where investment in education and health did not in itself guarantee development any more than capital formation did. Second, it places the responsibility for the ‘lack of development’ on the individual, and ignores or underestimates the role of the state.19 Third, it assumes that the quality of education is uniform, complete and perfect; often government agencies claim that ‘holistic education’ is the solution.20 However, in so doing, they fail to account for important questions such as: what does Saudi education look like? What is being taught in the Saudi curriculum? What is the education system’s underlying pedagogy? And what exactly are students learning? Failure to account for these contingencies allows policy

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makers and politicians to conclude that countries are underdeveloped because most of their people are underdeveloped. The accompanying economic rationale suggests that no economic development can take place in a society until the people embrace values favourable to the constructed ideas of modernisation and progress. Additionally, the people must be trained in the basic skills needed in a transitional society. This chapter takes up this issue and argues that while education is an important part of Saudisation discourse, it cannot be conceptualised as a fixed and immovable object. Education must be properly framed and contextualised if we are to understand the machinations of Saudisation policy. We need to understand ‘the ways in which institutions concerned with education are assembled and reassembled over time’, ‘how these configurations of knowledge/power produce particular kinds of subjectivities’21 and how these configurations of power translate into a ‘functional and scalar division of labour and education between global, regional, national and local scales’.22 The limitations suggest a need to depart from an assumption found in the Saudisation metanarrative. Rather than beginning with the assumption ‘countries are underdeveloped because their people are underdeveloped’, what if we were to assume that people were underdeveloped because their countries were underdeveloped? If this were to be our theoretical beginning, would our understanding of educational issues change? Would we begin to ask a different set of questions? Would our conceptualisation of the role of the state in education change? And would our conceptualisation of the citizen in society change?

Conceptual and analytical omissions of Saudisation metanarrative This section challenges the singular modality and the narrow determinism of the Saudisation metanarrative. It suggests that if we are to frame the problems of Saudisation through the broad lens of policy and human capital, we overlook important historical, social, economic and political exigencies that can potentially enrich Saudisation discourse. I argue that the metanarrative does not go far enough in its analysis of Saudisation’s stagnation. Additionally, its narrow frame presents serious obstacles to the understanding of Saudisation policy.

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Specifically, it frames the state as an exogenous actor when discussing the problems of Saudisation. The following discusses important conceptual and analytical omissions in the Saudisation metanarrative that this chapter aims to address and overcome. First, by blaming education for the failure of Saudisation, the metanarrative assumes that the stagnation is somehow related to low levels of literacy, access to education, low enrolment rates, deficiency in education expenditure, etc. However, a brief overview of UNESCO education statistics on Saudi Arabia tells a story of growth and development in education. Since the 1970s literacy rates23 have risen exponentially: literacy rates in 1970 were 15 per cent for men and 2 per cent for women. Today, they stand at 96 per cent for the proportion of the population aged 15 –24 years (97 per cent for men and 95 per cent for women) and 83 per cent for those aged 15 years and older (88 per cent for men and 76 per cent for women). Primary education net enrolment rates have steadily increased, reaching 93.4 per cent in 2012 (96.3 per cent for females and 90.8 per cent for males). Secondary education net enrolment rates stood at 90 per cent in 2012. Tertiary education gross enrolment rates increased from 27 per cent in 2003 to 51 per cent in 2012. And education expenditures have hovered between 17 – 25 per cent of total government expenditures.24 We can question the validity and accuracy of statereported statistics; however, it is difficult to deny that the trend in education since the 1970s has been positive. Moreover, since 2001, the metanarrative has expanded to incorporate questions of education quality. By focusing on issues of curriculum content, hours spent on religion, teacher training and pedagogy, the debates about education quality have become more nuanced. Still, the reform process in Saudi Arabia has been slow and the discussion about education quality has been limited to questions relating to barriers to entry and skill mismatch. The question now is why has Saudisation not benefited from this story of growth and development? Second, the metanarrative often identifies a ‘peculiar’ set of beliefs that have come to embody the national ‘social contract’ and concludes that this carries an impact on job localisation policies in the Gulf.25 It does not however critically engage, challenge or disentangle the ‘peculiar’ set of beliefs that have allegedly penetrated the national social contract. Rather, the literature intermittently tackles the questions surrounding the social contract in the Gulf and

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simply concedes that there appears to be a set of ‘beliefs’ and ‘practices’ that is detracting from workforce development. The origins of these beliefs and practices are usually ignored, which effectively reduces our understanding of how and why this process occurs. In the Gulf, beliefs are shaped around expectations that future employers will provide secure and well-paid work that is not particularly challenging. If the national expects and believes this to be true of their future employer, which is what Saudisation is implicitly doing, then there is no incentive to develop individual human capital. Saudisation is contributing to a social contract that promotes a sense of national entitlement and rewards unemployment. The fundamental problem this dynamic creates is the relative disconnect between education and work. In short, if the state provides a generous welfare system to its citizens, then educational performance and the connection between education and work preparations are sacrificed. This education deficiency perpetuates national dependence on foreign labour and technology, which is a trend observed across the Gulf. I posit that once we comprehend how and why these beliefs and practices pervade and underlie the national social contract, we can enrich our understanding of why Saudisation is failing. This chapter explores the contours of the ‘social contract’ in Saudi Arabia through the idea of citizenship. Third, the metanarrative overlooks the political implications of Saudisation: it does not analyse the incentives of political actors and fails to address how the status quo, that is, Saudisation’s continued stagnation, benefits state elite. Prominent economist Joseph Schumpeter posits that state elites prefer the status quo because they are fearful of creative destruction – ‘a process of industrial mutation that incessantly revolutionises the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, and incessantly creating a new one’.26 What he means here is that changes in the economic structure will also bring changes to social and political structures that will likely disrupt the status quo. One could reasonably argue that creative destruction explains why Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries have remained opposed to labour policy reform. Inclusive labour policy reform in Saudi Arabia carries the implication of Schumpeter’s creative destruction. Rigorous labour reform will likely shift the status quo, along with the hierarchical power structure it has institutionalised. It will turn current winners into losers and current losers into winners.

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Sidestepping the discussion of politics reduces its significance as a potential explanatory variable and assumes a static polity characterised by political acquiescence in Saudi Arabia. What if, under these political conditions, Saudisation, initially conceived to help develop human capital in Saudi Arabia, is in fact detracting from the genuine accumulation of human capital amongst its national labour force? Is it possible that it is part of a mode of living that discourages the development of a citizenry that is engaged in the cultural, economic, and political life of a nation? The conceptual and analytical omissions discussed suggest that the Saudisation metanarrative is limited, that is, it lacks the necessary nuance needed to explain the problems underlying Saudisation. The Ministry of Education states that the primary function of education is to prepare citizens for work. If that is indeed the stated goal of education, then why do Saudisation indicators continue to stagnate? Moreover, if education indicators such as literacy, education expenditure and access to education institutions are improving, then why does Saudisation continue to stagnate? More importantly, why do Saudis only represent 10 per cent of the private sector labour force? The fundamental problem of the Saudisation metanarrative is that it fails to question the circumstances and varying purposes surrounding political, economic and social structures. Analyses that fail to account for these dimensions tend to be a-contextual and limiting in their explanation of complex socio-political phenomena. Once again, this is not to say that the Saudisation metanarrative, in its current form, is not useful. On the contrary, the arguments found within these narratives are important. What I am proposing is expanding the paradigm to incorporate aspects that have largely been overlooked by the Saudisation metanarrative, that is, the role of the state and state–society relations. The following section suggests ‘citizenship’ as a useful frame to explore. I argue that exploring ideas, beliefs and discourses about citizenship in Saudi Arabia will enrich our understanding of why Saudisation has been unsuccessful.

Expanding the Saudisation paradigm with citizenship Thus far, I have shown that the Saudisation metanarrative relies on two foundational assumptions. First, it assumes that targeted policy reform will act as a ubiquitous cure to the ills of Saudisation. And

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second, it assumes that the number of Saudis working in the private sector will increase once education indicators improve and questions of education quality are addressed. While there is merit to both arguments, this chapter takes issue with these broad and narrow assumptions and asks: what if these teleological processes do not occur? What if intervening political variables cause a rupture in these processes? What happens when political and economic interests do not align and what impact does this have on policy outcomes? The metanarrative identifies education and policy as the focal points of Saudisation discourse. In both narratives the role of the state is presented as a separate and exogenous dimension, not directly implicated in the structural failure of Saudisation. Rather, the framing of these narratives as complex technocratic issues allows the state to evade certain criticisms. It grants the state the ability to say that this type of change takes time, or ‘we are working on it’, or ‘they are not ready’. In some cases, it blames the individual for not being educated enough. This type of evasion involves diverting attention away from the institutional shortcomings of the state to the alleged problems of policy and education. The critique suggests that the metanarrative lacks, amongst a slew of other dimensions, an understanding of the role of the state and the relationship between state and society, that is, what are the tenets of the social contract in Saudi Arabia and how does it impact the success or failure of Saudisation. The idea of citizenship, which Nils A. Butenschøn, Uri Davis and Manuel S. Hassassian27 define as the contractual relationship between the state and the inhabitant under its jurisdiction, becomes a useful analytical frame in the determination and assessment of the social contract in particular contexts.28 State governance, broadly defined, is concerned with the role of the state in economy, models of participation, the rule of law, distribution, the value of politics, public administration and so on. These dimensions are only relevant when there is an established agreement on who legitimately constitutes society and the state. Once these questions are answered, a country’s citizenship is institutionalised, and the criteria used during these processes determine who is and who is not included in the political community. Concomitantly, the answers to these questions are often a matter of historical contingencies that have determined the shape and structure of the state: colonial legacy, military conquest and expansion, territorial reorganisation, modernisation and so on.

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As an explanatory variable, citizenship allows us to unveil important aspects of power relations between rulers and ruled and analyse the logic behind these relations and how they connect to various decision making processes. 29 Citizenship is a major institutional contrivance that regulates the distribution of rights and values in society and access to government bureaucracy and state-controlled resources. Moreover, it acts as a mechanism for societal integration, participation and economic justice. The concept of citizenship acts as an analytical framework for state – society relations and their underlying contingencies.

Locating and identifying citizenship as an analytical category The concept of citizenship is composed of a number of key elements. These include ‘the notion of participation in public life, the idea that a citizen is one who both governs and is governed, a sense of identity, an acceptance of societal values, and rights and responsibilities’.30 While there is consensus around these core components, there is no universal agreement about the precise meaning and purpose of each of these components. Consensus has been elusive because experiences are not universal. They vary across context and space. As a result, the citizenship debates have produced multiple understandings of what citizenship is and how it operates in various contexts. In its most basic form, citizenship is the right to have rights. It is a scarce public good that is distributed by the state, a source of elective identity and an instrument of political control.31 In Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East, Suad Joseph writes: citizenship is a certificate of membership in a political community, and, thus, represents political identities and loyalties. It regulates the access of the citizen to the civil, political, social, and material resources of the state and can be seen as a core concept in the analysis of political and social relations in any state.32 The power of citizenship is probably best known by those who are denied access to it; it is then that ‘the right to carry a passport and be protected by a state, the right to abode, the right to membership in a

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political community with access to decision-making institutions and public welfare’ becomes most visible.33 In the twentieth century, the nation state was the principal political community with which a person identified. The nation state appeared as the actor capable of outlining a set of core values and rules by which everyone lived. Citizenship, as a category fostering ideologically inflected and ideologically narrated subjectivities, became a frame that explained what the core values and rules were in a given society. This is not to say that citizens actually shared these values or believed in these rules. Rather, it was imagined and assumed by the state that citizens should share these values and should believe in these rules. Through citizenship the modern nation state answers the eminent question: ‘What are the values necessary to maintain which specific conditions given extant political beliefs in a given society?’34 During the process of answering this question, the state connects members/citizens to its political, social and economic structures; it mediates the relationship and determines how and why the citizen connects to state structures and resources. Thus citizenship, as an analytical frame, becomes a useful paradigm in explaining how society and the state are connected. Citizenship becomes a deliberate practice of assemblage that is contingent, tense and often articulated through contradiction. Citizenship is often an overlooked institution, despite the centrality of individual decision making processes to any policy trajectory.

Citizenship education in Saudi Arabia The literature on citizenship in the Middle East suggests that the citizen can be ‘created’ and ‘recreated’. Many scholars, such as Suad Joseph, Mervat Hatem and Mounira Charrad, have assessed state formation processes and traced how they have reshaped societies into new national entities. These processes have redefined former subjects as citizens of modern states. The ongoing debate over the compatibility of the nation state with some of the sociocultural formations in the region has problematised the notions of modern citizenship and political participation. The ‘citizen’, as a category, emerges as a legal and embodied subject when its negation, the ‘non-citizen’, is present. Citizenship is not

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successfully instilled in a population by restricting individuals and their actions. Rather, it is accomplished by producing individuals with a set of normative conceptualisations. Institutions – armies, factories, schools (distinctive institutions of the modern nation state) – produce the modern individual. They are constructed as a disciplined political subject. The individuality of the political subject, formed within such institutions, is the product of power relations. Ideas of the citizen and citizenship are communicated through a number of mediums: legal frameworks, official state rhetoric, societal norms and practices, education and so on. I have chosen to analyse an explicit articulation of the citizen in Saudi civic education textbooks because I want to know how the state imagines and constructs the ideal citizen in Saudi Arabia. As a production of knowledge, the textbook under analysis, al-shaba¯b wi-qiyam al-muwaṭana fy al-mujtama‘ al-‘araby al-sa‘udy (Youth and Concepts of Citizenship in Saudi Society),35 is used at the university level to teach tarbiyya wattaniyya (civic education); it is required for all university students.36 The textbook, written by Turki al-Harthi, Mushabeb al-Asmary, Mohamed al-Ghamdi, Fateeha al-Qarshi and Haifa Kobrah, was first published in 2011 by Da¯r Ha¯fiz.37 I chose this textbook because it was recently ˙ ˙ published and provides a comprehensive overview of the civic education curriculum in Saudi Arabia. The textbook represents a distilled and comprehensive presentation of citizenship concepts produced by the Saudi Ministry of Education for the purpose of tarbiyya wattaniyya Although the textbook is used at the university level, Youth and Concepts of Citizenship in Saudi Society can be used to proxy for civic education at the high school level because its ideas and themes appear throughout the civic education curriculum at the high school level.38

Textbook as objects of analysis: the idea of citizenship in Saudi Arabia Youth and Concepts of Citizenship in Saudi Society’s introduction begins with a conceptualisation of society: ‘there are several elements of human/civil society, and these vary based on a multiplicity of frameworks that shape them and divisions that organize them’.39 Society depends principally on the existence of individuals, groups and a geographical environment, ‘and the survival and sustainability

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of society relies on a population that is alive, interactive, and active’.40 And finally, the sustainability of society depends on ‘a social, economic, and political structure that is responsible and capable’.41 At the epicentre of this conceptualisation of society lies the critical injection of values (qayam): ‘it is necessary to point out that the relationship/interaction between individuals and groups with values is considered the focal point around which societal life is organized’.42 Societal formation, its growth, survival and sustainability, rely principally on the preservation of these values. And this is substantiated by ‘analyses and studies that show the impact values have on the continuation and stability of groups and society’.43 The authors list a slew of values and principles, the most critical of which are, ‘shura, human rights, social responsibility, social solidarity, and dialogue’.44 Islam, as divine revelation, ‘is the ultimate source of these values and principles and provides the most efficient and effective model in its application’.45 The textbook’s narrative of society, values and sustainability is contrasted against a counter-narrative embodying the destabilising currents of ‘rapid change’ and ‘globalisation’. Al-Harthi et al. determine that the expansion of ‘human society’ and its exposure to the effects of globalisation has resulted in, ‘differences in the homogeneity of the population and differences in the institutions of tarbiyya’.46 The joint processes of expansion and globalisation have led to changes in values and principles that have altered the directional path of the state. For this reason, the authors contend that these processes demonstrate ‘the importance of focusing on the nature and characteristics of values which allows for compatibility in expectations and makes for a safer and more stable social life’.47 The activities and operations of society rely on a set of values that are, ‘standardized, aggregated, and appropriated’.48 Al-Harthi et al. conclude that values will create a society that is able to respond to the dynamism of nature and the changing needs of society’.49 Al-Harthi et al. identify a set of mo’ț aya¯t (variables) that are necessary for the stability and development of a society’s value system: ‘citizenship, nationalism/patriotism, and moderation’. The authors contend that these variables ‘are interrelated and mutually supportive values, so they cannot be split and cannot be dealt with individually’.50 The introduction to Youth and Concepts of Citizenship in Saudi Society ends by neatly framing the purpose and objective of the textbook:

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Based on the importance of rooting, spreading and activating these values and principles and their role in stabilizing and developing societies, this book was developed to explain the related concepts, fields of applications and the importance of these values and principles in the organization of social and economic aspects of life and strengthening the unity between individuals and groups and limiting the spread of disputes and conflict.51 The purpose and objective of Youth and Concepts of Citizenship in Saudi Society is to explain ‘the importance of these values and principles in the organisation of social and economic aspects of life and strengthening unity’.52 To uncover the central ideas behind the conception of citizenship in Saudi Arabia I have chosen to explore the content of the textbook’s third chapter.53 In what follows I identify and analyse five dominant themes that appeared in the chapter on citizenship in Saudi Arabia: (1) citizenship vs globalisation; (2) citizenship as an expansive state paradigm: religion, society and the monarchy; (3) citizenship and Islam; (4) citizenship without the individual citizen; and (5) citizenship demands unwavering loyalty. My aim in identifying these themes is not only to show how the state creates the image of the citizen in Saudi Arabia, but also what the state wants the citizen to know about citizenship. The next section of this chapter contrasts ideas of the citizen in Saudi society against ideas of the citizen in the knowledge economy. There is significant rhetorical overlap in my discussion of the textbook themes. This is indicative of a broader trend found in the text. The ideas involved in the construction of Saudi citizenship borrow heavily from one another. The language (and translation) is esoteric and ambiguous, which makes the deciphering process for the reader challenging. Whether intentional or not, it creates barriers between the text and the reader.

Citizenship vs globalisation Youth and Concepts of Citizenship in Saudi Society casts citizenship as a stabilising force against the ubiquitous and disruptive forces of globalisation.54 Al-Harthi et al. pose globalisation as a looming and inevitable danger to Saudi society. They determine that the heightened interconnectivity of human society and its exposure to the effects of

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globalisation have resulted in ‘differences in the homogeneity of the population and differences in the institutions of tarbiyya’.55 According to the text, the joint processes of expansion and globalisation have led to a rupture in Saudi values, its principles and its direction. Thus, ‘the importance of focusing on the nature and characteristics of values’56 becomes increasingly salient because these values are seen as the precursors for a ‘stable social life’.57 As such, the activities and operations of society need to be standardised, aggregated and appropriated.58 In the narrative presented in the textbook, globalisation, with its tendency to fragment national consensus about values, poses a direct challenge to the idea of the nation state, which relies on a monolithic conceptualisation of society. Citizenship, as a set of complete and discrete values, appears as a tool capable of ensuring the simultaneous processes of protection and integration. It is important to note that this alarmist presentation of the relationship between the state and globalisation is not unique to Saudi Arabia. Many countries have endured similar encounters with outcomes varying across country and context. Anthony Giddens argues that ‘[g]lobalisation isn’t only about what is “out there”, remote and far away from the individual. It is an “in here” phenomenon too, influencing intimate and personal aspects of our lives’.59 Andrew Marr adds that the multiplicity of communities, both internal and external, creates uncertainties and insecurities about identity and loyalty.60 Both scholars suggest that how states manage globalisation has a profound impact on the conceptualisation of citizenship and serves as a significant factor in the way individuals behave politically as citizens. Thus it is important to note how and why globalisation occurs and the implications it has on political, economic and social structures. The textbook claims that globalisation, rapid change and the Other embody potentially destabilising currents that citizens must fear. The authors assert that these forces ‘threaten our faith and undermine our morals’.61 Based on this narrative, one would assume that the state would follow suit and avoid the so-called disruptive forces of globalisation, which the textbook classifies as socially and politically perilous.62 However, in The Political Economy of Saudi Arabia, Tim Niblock and Monica Malik tell the dynamic story of how, for 50 years, Saudi Arabia has greatly benefited from globalisation despite its alleged inherent ability to subvert political and social stability.63

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To suggest that the state has managed to avoid and isolate itself from globalisation, oil markets and technology is empirically fallacious; Niblock’s chapter ‘Planning for transformation 1970 –85’ substantiates this claim.64 Distinct from the other four themes, citizenship vs globalisation has less to do with the creation of the citizen per se and more to do with the creation of the setting in which they exist. By representing society as a bounded object that needs to be shielded from the looming threat of globalisation, the textbook creates an alarmist and uncertain setting for the citizen to move in. Within this setting the state appears as the only qualified interlocutor capable of mediating the complex relationship between society and globalisation. Since the state is represented as the only actor that understands and is familiar with ‘the contents and definitions of national values’,65 it alone is able to determine the contours of the relationship between society and globalisation, and the mechanisms (prioritising homogeneity) for its limitation. According to David Scott and Helen Lawson, the purpose of citizenship education is to build a common identity and a shared history and to encourage patriotism and loyalty to the nation.66 The version of citizenship found in Youth and Concepts of Citizenship in Saudi Society has the same function. What distinguishes the Saudi narrative is its context. In the textbook the context is constructed around ideas of globalisation, homogenisation of society and state stability. The civic education textbook serves as a useful analytical frame because it is able to capture the intricacies of the complex encounter between globalisation and society.

Citizenship as an expansive state paradigm: religion, society and the monarchy Youth and Concepts of Citizenship in Saudi Society sets out an expansive framework for citizenship in Saudi Arabia. Within this framework every relationship, whether political, economic or social, can be structured, categorised and delineated according to a defined set of ‘values,67 principles,68 and variables’69. These three core components become the theoretical underpinning of the discussion of citizenship in the text. Thus, because the textbook constructs a citizenship framework that is able to explain every relationship, citizenship is able to provide a complete guide for living in the imagined world of Saudi Arabia.

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These rules and provisions extend to all members of society: individual, family and state. The notion of citizenship expands to encompass and impact all aspects of life. Moreover, the values used to define citizenship are framed as interrelated and mutually supportive, which suggests a cohesive whole that cannot be fragmented and dealt with individually. Questioning one dimension immediately calls into question another dimension, which is why the book discourages questioning the citizenship paradigm, warning that it leads to ‘disputes and conflict’.70 While the book’s version of citizenship appears as a ubiquitous frame capable of explaining and organising all aspects of Saudi polity, the curriculum fails to address many of the issues confronting Saudi society in the twenty-first century. Specifically, it fails to address the socio-economic changes of the 1970s oil boom and its many implications for Saudi society. The spread of mass education has increased literacy among both men and women, opened up new career opportunities and generated debates about social responsibilities. Globalisation has brought new images, new products, new means of communication and so on, which have furthered the debates about gender roles, state powers and economic diversification. By overlooking these important socio-economic dimensions, the textbook frames a narrative about citizenship that is removed from contemporary realities and lacks the nuance necessary to explain the complex social phenomenon it intends to.71 Thus, the book presents a version of citizenship characterised by theoretical and practical omissions, which calls into question the so-called totality of this narrative and the purpose it allegedly serves. The textbook’s citizenship narrative omits significant aspects of Saudi life and compensates by discouraging any questioning or discussion around its validity and completeness. This explains why the strongest messages in the book are negative ones, illustrating the costs of misbehaviour by its members and the threats of attack by external forces. The text warns, at various points, that the failure to accept citizenship in its entirety detracts from the process of integration. To counter these potentially destabilising effects, the book makes definitive and irrefutable statements on nearly all aspect of citizens’ lives, often presented in numbered or bullet point lists of conclusive facts. It is important to note here that the process of listing in any

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context carries several implications. First, it suggests the collective narrative of an entire population or nation state can theoretically be listed – that somehow four or five bullets points can neatly explain the complexities of society. Notable examples include: two-level classification of value systems;72 two-dimensional characterisation of values;73 four determinants of values;74 citizenship’s two foundational ideas;75 the four requirements for effective and true citizenship;76 and the four principles of citizenship in Saudi society.77 The process of listing also creates a fixed boundary around the object of analysis and limits the discourse to this list. The boundary is defined for the citizen and their agency is limited to this space. Concomitantly, pushing against this boundary is said to endanger the stability of society: ‘he (the citizen) must be convinced by them (values) and behave in accordance to them (values); they determine areas of thinking and patterns of behaviour that affect learning’.78 The process of creating these lists, which is inextricably linked to the modalities of an expansive citizenship paradigm, poses an important question: who creates the lists? The Ministry of Education, under the auspices of the state, appointed the book’s authors. The publication was then approved by the Ministry of Education and the book became part of the curriculum.79 In the context of Saudi Arabia, we can assume two things. First, educational textbooks reflect the political interests of the state, the ultimate interest being to maintain the core political structure. And second, in the absence of institutions that systematically incorporate public opinion, one can assume that Saudi society was not actively involved in the production of these textbooks. The book becomes a locus of ideas the state wants the citizen to know about on various topics and issues. It is not surprising to observe a series of carrots and sticks used by the authors to keep students away from transgressions that could potentially destabilise society. A recurring theme is that obedience brings stability and misbehaviour brings instability.80 The textbook does not grant the citizen the agency to discuss the fields of influence affecting their lives nor grant them the power to determine their life’s role, that is, what makes them happy and what makes them sad. Additionally, the textbook asserts that the primary function of citizenship in Saudi Arabia is to homogenise society.81 The homogenisation process is linked to a reciprocal relationship between citizenship and a defined set of cultural and social gains. Al-Harthi et al. argue that

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if this process is not effectively managed, a ‘cultural gap’ will appear, ‘which represents the epicentre of social and economic problems which disrupts the social balance and retards material gains’.82 Ultimately, citizenship, as an expansive paradigm, produced and packaged by the state, has a dual function; to homogenise the state and reduce the ‘cultural gap’.83

Citizenship and Islam A third theme that comes through in the text is the emphasis on Islam. As divine revelation, Islam ‘is the ultimate source of these values and principles and provides the most efficient and effective model in its application’.84 Moreover, Islam ‘governs all aspects of life’.85 Betty Anderson, in her analysis of education in Jordan, begins with a powerful quote from a Jordanian textbook: ‘Islamic society is a society established on reality and rights and conviction, and not on uncertainty and doubt and suspicion’.86 Anderson argues that, in establishing this reality, the state co-opts the institution of Islam to create the Islamic society in its own vision: All faiths establish absolutes by which their followers should abide. Textbooks present an idealised image of life within their nation. Every state employs school curricula to generate obedience for its leadership or its value system, and no state can avoid the inherent problems of defining an entire society and its history within the pages of a book.87 Similarly, in creating its vision of an ‘Islamic society’ Saudi Arabia uses Islam to inform the values and principles of citizenship, and to legitimise the official version of citizenship as a divine conceptual framework. In Youth and Concepts of Citizenship in Saudi Society Islam appears as a perfect set of beliefs. It is the omnipresent and absolute voice of authority that teaches citizens how to navigate life within the ’umma. Islam delineates the national world for the citizen. Within the texts, an unmolested version of Islam is a central actor in the framing of citizenship in Saudi Arabia. Definitive statements such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a country based on beliefs that are rooted in Islam (dawla ‘aqdayya) . . . Saudi society is a Muslim society governed by the Promotion of Virtue and

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Prevention of Vice’ (‘’al-’amr bi al-ma‘rūf wa al-nahyi ‘an al-munkar’) . . . the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s ethical character is demonstrated through the worship of God and the obedience to Islamic ethics, which advances the benefit of the collective and also helps individuals of the society through the provision of public services . . .88 affirm Saudi Arabia’s commitment to Islam and its significance in Saudi polity. Concomitantly, questioning the significance of Islam would imply a direct challenge to the foundational ideas of Saudi Arabia. Because Saudi Arabia is framed as the embodiment of Islam, it would follow that questioning the ideas of citizenship is akin to questioning Islam. Another notable feature associated with the theme of Islam is the mode of ‘conditionality’ it assumes in the text. Every right and freedom that is discussed is usually followed by ‘so long as it complies with the rules and regulations of Islam that aim to benefit the individual and society’.89 The conditionality scheme imbues Islam with a shielding mechanism capable of protecting Muslims from their own weaknesses and from the destabilising effects of external forces. What develops in the texts is a unitary Islam that dictates the way citizens should understand their history, their faith, their socioeconomic circumstances and, most importantly, their citizenship. The immediate question that follows is who determines when something is in compliance with the rules and regulations of Islam and how do we disentangle the political and economic interests associated with this determination? An underlying question that appears consistently throughout the chapters of Teaching Islam: Textbooks and Religion in the Middle East,90 an edited volume by Eleanor Doumato and Gregory Starrett, is how does the state benefit from transferring authority to the entity of Islam? What does this look like in the context of Saudi Arabia? First, by absolving itself of the responsibility involved with the ‘direct’ production of the knowledge in the texts, the state guarantees that the ideas and principles associated with citizenship appear unscathed by secular and external intervention. The ‘divine dictates’ of citizenship are said to originate from an undisputable and irrefutable ‘truth’ that is Islam. Second, while these dictates are said to override all national and state concerns, the active role of the nation state in

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determining these dictates is never explicitly discussed, which again serves state interests. The state, in choosing the authors and committees involved in the production of this knowledge, decides what divine dictates to include and what to leave behind in order to create the desired characteristics of an ‘Islamic society’. Starrett writes: ‘just as wild plants have to undergo systematic genetic alterations to make them useful as cultivated foods, so “Islam” has to be altered to make it useful as a political instrument’.91 The power-laden dynamics involved with ‘knowing’ Islam grants the state the ability to articulate religion as a defined set of beliefs such as those found in textbook presentations about citizenship.92 In shaping the idea of citizenship in Saudi Arabia, Youth and Concepts of Citizenship in Saudi assumes a singular and pure Islam. Official state ideologies of Muslim identity and criteria for community belonging, which reference a singular Islam, have shaped Saudi society since the introduction of mass education during the 1970s.93 However, Doumato and Starrett argue that although the text claims authenticity in ancient roots, ‘they [the textbooks] espouse an Islam that is a modern amalgamation of home-grown Wahhabism, the Salafism of the MB, and a pan-Islamic agenda that inhabits the texts along with the Saudis’ own state-building agenda’.94 By dismissing this complex history, the state presents a narrative of one Islam. This pure form of Islam grants the state legitimacy. What is circular about this process of production is that the state effectively determines what this form of Islam looks like.

Citizenship without the individual citizen Within the conceptualisation of citizenship in Saudi Arabia, the main unit of analysis is, paradoxically, never the individual citizen, a phenomenon I refer to as ‘citizenship without the citizen’. Rather, citizenship emphasises the importance of broader categories to which the individual citizen belongs, ‘the human is an individual in a family, a national in a nation, and a member in society; his completeness is tied to the completeness of the group to which he belongs’.95 In this definition, and throughout the chapter, the individual citizen is never an independent object of analysis. He/ she is always tied to a structure that is governed by a defined set of values that again are determined by the state. The citizen is

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required to prioritise ‘collective good over individual good’.96 While the textbook assures that ‘this process (of prioritising collective good over individual good) does not compromise the individual and his personality’,97 it is difficult to imagine how a context that denies individual agency from the citizen is not, to a degree, somewhat compromising. The ‘family’ is the building block of society to which each person turns for support. Each person becomes situated in an authoritative hierarchy in society, in which ‘older’ members are positioned over ‘younger’ members. What qualifies the respective categories is never explicitly discussed. Joseph has found that in the region, not only have the states privileged family above the individual legally, but they have engaged in discourses that represent the family as something a priori, ‘pre-political’, a domain so beyond current time and conditions that it is best apprehended in the domain of the divine’.98 According to Joseph, the idea of the ‘pre-political’ family creates the opportunity for the state to assume control over the personal domain, effectively granting the state access to the ‘family’. In some instances, the state and the king are embedded within the ‘family’ structure, thus the family becomes a metaphor for benign rule. Throughout the texts, obedience to the state structure is required, and the state has intervened to co-opt the family, society and Islam to serve as its functional mediums. Citizenship in Saudi Arabia frames and treats the citizen as an ‘empty vessel’ to be filled with knowledge. The metaphor, used by Paulo Freire in his Pedagogy of the Oppressed,99 suggests that students are considered empty bank accounts that should remain open to deposits made by the teacher, which, in the case of Saudi Arabia, is the state. The textbook, by framing the dynamic in this way, implies a particular type of pedagogy. The influence of the ‘banking approach’ in Saudi Arabia’s civic education is pervasive. The stated functional goals of citizenship are: ‘(1) instil systems of value, ideational, and social in the souls of individuals, (2) instil ambition and individual progress, (3) support/strengthen national identity among individuals, and (4) support/strengthen personal belonging to the community and the preservation of its abilities.’100

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Using the term ‘instil’ in conjunction with seemingly intangible ideas such as ‘values’, ‘ambition’ and ‘progress’ implies that the citizen is without agency and that information flows in one direction. Additionally, the mere proposition that the state can so easily co-opt the souls of individuals suggests that souls are somehow accessible and can be penetrated by a particular regime of power and knowledge. Essentially, what this intimates is that the modern processes of discipline can reach the ‘soul’ of the Saudi citizen. And citizenship becomes the instrument that grants the state access to the souls of Saudi citizens. It operates by setting limits to behaviour, establishing negative prohibitions and laying down channels of proper conduct. Ultimately, the textbook frames a citizen who is inactive and immobile in the practice of their citizenship.

Citizenship demands unwavering loyalty Al-Harthi et al. present citizenship as a modern construct and define the term as an individual’s affiliation to a piece of land: The citizen is an individual who permanently resides in the state or carries its citizenship and participates in achieving its (the state) goals and follows its laws and benefits from granted rights that are given to other citizens and fulfils a group’s of responsibilities towards the state to which he is affiliated with. And from this vantage point, we can begin to understand the conception of citizenship, what it incorporates, what are its foundations, how to grant citizenship, and other concepts and practices in daily life. The relationship between the individual and the state is governed by the law and the promise of certain rights and duties. Thus, the basic element that guides citizenship is affiliation, which cannot be achieved without civic education.101 The main aspect of citizenship is affiliation, which cannot be accomplished without the civic education. ‘Linguistically, citizenship (muwaṭṭana) is taken from the term nation (watan), which is a place of residence and protection.’102 Throughout the book, Al-Harthi et al. make no conceptual distinction between citizenship and nationalism, which suggests that these two concepts are rhetorically synonymous. In Youth and Concepts of Citizenship in Saudi Society, the citizen’s primary responsibility centres on the recurring theme of loyalty (walā’).

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The text identifies two dimensions that demarcate the ‘root’ of citizenship in Saudi Arabia: ‘(1) inherited loyalty and (2) gained/ obtained loyalty’.103 Inherited loyalty is characterised by an identity that is defined by Saudi Arabia’s history, language, society, religion, tribe and family.104 The text determines that this component is fixed and unchangeable. Gained/obtained loyalty (for the citizen), on the other hand, is variable. It increases and decreases based on a ‘collective end’105 that the state provides to the citizen. The parameters of this ‘collective end’ are defined and determined by the state. Taken together, fixed inherited loyalty and variable gained/obtained loyalty construct what I call a ‘loyalty equation’,106 where the citizen’s citizenship is the dependent variable and fixed inherited loyalty and variable gained/obtained loyalty are the independent variables. The rationale I wish to introduce with the notion of a ‘loyalty equation’ is that movement, either up or down, in the independent variables will immediately bring movement to the dependent variable; put more simply, a change in x brings a change in y. The textbook uses simplistic mathematical jargon and reasoning to explain a far more complex sociological phenomenon. In this equation, citizens are forced to manoeuvre within a narrow field predetermined by the state. The parameters of the fixed component are a matter of state-produced knowledge that already exists. And the parameters of the idealised notion of a collective end are determined by the state. Civic education, which acts to inform these parameters, frames the rubric that assesses the citizen’s affiliation and loyalty. Concomitantly, the equation becomes a tool used by the state to determine whether a citizen’s practice of citizenship is positive or negative, that is, if they are contributing to stability in society or detracting from it. The ideas of loyalty and affiliation become the precursors of stateconstructed patriotism. Citizenship in Saudi Arabia conceptually links the ideas of citizenship to a patriotism that is determined by one’s commitment not only to the state but also to God. The citizen is expected to, ‘sacrifice all he has for the sake of God, and maintain the integrity of his country, its security and its stability. Nationalism is less about rhetoric and more about action’.107 The authors argue that achieving these goals requires an, ‘understanding and familiarity with the contents and definitions of national values’.108 The text positions

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the state as the only able arbiter capable of unpacking the complexities associated with this understanding and familiarity. Ultimately, this leads to a sacrosanct relationship between the state and society that is devoid of mediation and reciprocity. The state frames citizenship without explicit mention of the citizen’s agency. Principally, the citizen is expected to be loyal. And with this loyalty citizens have come to expect the idea of the ‘good life’ from the state and are unable to conceptualise this framed good life outside of a bounded state framework.

Ideational contradiction: citizenship vs Saudisation Thus far, I have unpacked and explored official state narratives regarding the citizen in the knowledge economy and in Saudi society. The analysis identifies an ideational contradiction between the citizen needed to inhabit the knowledge economy that the state claims is needed to ensure the success of Saudisation, on the one hand, and the citizen created in the civic education textbook, on the other. The state narrative draws a link between Saudisation and the knowledge economy and asserts that the citizen needed to create and maintain this conceptual link is independent, rational, creative, mobile in their movement, adaptive and skilled; this link relies on a citizen who has agency to make decisions and develop new skills and abilities that not only lead to economic growth but also support wider social objectives of inclusion and equality.109 However, the civic education textbook, which is produced by the Ministry of Education, creates a citizen who is fiercely loyal to the state, obedient, disciplined, never independent, limited in their mobility, without agency and tethered to the state project. The stark thematic differences in both constructed citizens suggest an inherent ideational contradiction within the official state narrative. The salient question now is why is this discussion relevant to Saudisation discourse? I argue that this discussion of citizenship is important because, in its current conceptualisation, the Saudisation metanarrative is too narrow and lacks the contextual significance necessary to address the policy’s limitations. By introducing citizenship into Saudisation discourse we can begin to think more critically about the policy’s structural failures beyond just the deterministic variables of policy and education. A grounded

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understanding of the role of the state and the relationship between state and society enriches Saudisation discourse. How? Citizenship, as an explanatory variable, allows us to unveil important aspects of power relations between rulers and ruled, as well as analyse the logic behind these relations. It demonstrates how intervening political variables can in fact detract from state’s objectives rather than reinforce them. As Ana Longva astutely points out, citizenship in the Gulf should be thought of in culturaland not universal terms. Here she means that citizenship should be contextualised: it is not an ‘abstract’ institution that comes with a string of political rights and responsibilities attached to it, rather, it is a relationship between two social categories, individual and state, complexly mediated by ideas of authority, legitimacy, and allegiance.110 With this in mind, this chapter identifies prevailing themes about citizenship in civic education textbooks with the analytical intent of framing how members of society are expected to imagine various societal actors and the contractual relationship that binds them together. In the context of Saudi Arabia, the textbook’s constructed notion of citizenship appears as a discrete, defined, complete and selfdirected ideational configuration that sprawls across the entire societal surface. The book instils the concept of citizenship with immense explanatory capacity; effectively creating a frame that is able to explain all social, economic and political complexities of Saudi polity. Additionally, citizenship is imbued with an explicit and layered material dimension that defines a complete set of benefits and costs associated with acquiescence and transgression respectively. The distinct purpose of citizenship as a body of knowledge in the context of Saudi Arabia is to bring stability to a society that the state has predetermined as inherently unstable. While the state may position citizenship as an educational practice that is neutral and at the service of the well-being of society, it is profoundly naive to assume that such an ideal exists or is even imaginable. In Pedagogy of Hope: Reliving Pedagogy of the Oppressed,111 Freire argues that:

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there neither is, nor has there ever been, an educational practice in zero space-time – neutral in the sense of being committed only to preponderantly abstract, intangible ideas. To try to get people to believe that there is such a thing as this, and to convince or try to convince the incautious that this is the truth, is indisputably a political practice.112 For Freire education is used to soften any rebelliousness on the part of those to whom injustice if being done. Civic education, as an educational practice, is not a neutral enterprise. Citizenship education in Saudi Arabia explicates a manifest, latent and coded mode of material production, ideological values and structures of social power on the state of consciousness of peoples in a specific historical or socio-economic situation. To borrow from Gramsci, citizenship builds a type of ideological hegemony. For Gramsci, there are two requirements for ideological hegemony. First, an economic order that ‘creates’ categories and structures of feeling that saturate our everyday lives. And second, a group of ‘intellectuals’ who employ and give legitimacy to the categories and who make the ideological forms seem neutral.113 In Saudi Arabia, citizenship, as part of a much larger welfare-based system, acts as a political tool to create the categories and structures that fortify an economic order. This economic order is given legitimacy by intellectuals chosen and approved by the Ministry of Education. The process of citizenship education establishes an ideological hegemony that is truly total. Raymond Williams argues that the existence of this ideological hegemony is not merely secondary or super-structural, like the weak sense of ideology, but which is lived at such a depth, which saturates the society to such an extent, and which, as Gramsci put it, even constitutes the limit of common sense for most people under its sway . . . the notion of hegemony as deeply saturating the consciousness of a society seems to be fundamental . . . it emphasizes the facts of domination.114 Hegemony refers not to congeries of meanings that reside at an abstract level somewhere at the ‘roof of our brain’. Rather it refers to an organised assemblage of meanings and practices, the central,

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effective and dominant system of meanings, values and actions, that are lived.115 Educational institutions in Saudi Arabia act in and spur on this process of saturation. In Culture and Imperialism Edward Said writes: ‘Texts are not finished objects. They are, as Raymond Williams once said, notations and cultural practices.’116 Said implies that texts are open-ended, but far less in themselves than one would assume. Dunja Mohr asserts that aspects such as syntax, semantics and phonology change, but these factors are far less important than those changes in us. She argues that ‘it is Said, and you, and I, all of us – as reader-teacher-critic – who are open-ended, constantly re-coded by additions, deletions, and revisions in our personal semiotics, in what actively constitutes and motivates the operative “I”’.117 In order to understand what motivates the operative ‘I’ in Saudi Arabia we must understand the narratives of Saudi citizens and how they have come to understand citizenship and its significance. We must pose and address a slew of questions: how do citizens read these texts? How do students acquire this ‘objective’ knowledge? How, and to what extent, have citizens internalised the ideas of citizenship in Saudi Arabia? How do citizens imagine their roles in society? And to what extent is this imagined ideological hegemony a real manifestation?

Notes 1. Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 2. The ‘Dutch disease’ is the negative impact on an economy of anything that gives rise to a sharp inflow of foreign currency, such as the discovery of large oil reserves. The currency inflows lead to currency appreciation, making the country’s other products less price competitive on the export market. 3. Mohamed Ramady, The Saudi Arabian Economy: Policies, Achievements and Challenges (New York: Springer, 2005), pp. 2 –11. 4. The title given to localisation policy in Saudi Arabia: labour policy that aims to replace foreign workers with skilled and qualified local labour. Other Gulf countries have implemented similar labour policies: Qatarisation, Omanisation, Emiritisation, Kuwaitisation and Bahrainisation. 5. Ministry of Planning, ‘Achievement of the development plans, 1970 – 2000, facts and figures’, Riyadh (2002). 6. Peter Drucker, The Age of Discontinuity: Guidelines to Our Changing Society (New York: Harper and Row, 1969).

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7. Walter Powell and Kaisa Snellman, ‘The knowledge economy’, Annual Review of Sociology 30/1 (2004), pp. 199–220. 8. When Saudisation was introduced in the 1990s its policy framework consisted of five core features: (1) national employment quotas mandating companies to fulfil a 30 per cent requirement; (2) a kafala system of sponsorship that controlled the mobility of expatriate labour; (3) ‘hire and fire’ policies that explicitly favoured Saudi nationals; (4) job reservations for Saudi nationals in certain sectors; and (5) a Human Resource Development Fund (HRDF) that subsidised the training of nationals and distributed employment and unemployment benefits. In 2011, Resolution No. 4040 restructured Saudisation under the new Nitaqat Programme. Despite the reform, the general approach to Saudisation remained the same – a quota-based job localisation policy that aims to increase the share of Saudi nationals in the private sector through a system of benefits and sanctions to ensure firm compliance. Additionally, the Ministry of Labour was assigned the task of policy regulator. 9. Tim Niblock and Monica Malik, The Political Economy of Saudi Arabia (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), pp. 139 – 40. 10. Ministry of Labour, ‘Annual report on labour statistics’, trans. author, 2011. Available at http://nitaqat.mol.gov.sa/Pages/Default. aspx (accessed 1 August 2015). 11. More recent reports estimate the percentage of Saudis in the private sector to be between 12 –13 per cent. 12. From Cornelius Fleischhaker, Malin Hu, Padamja Khandelwal, Jimmy McHugh, Haonan Qu and Niklas Westelius, ‘Saudi Arabia: selected issues’, International Monetary Fund, IMF Country Report No. 13/230, 24 June 2013, p. 14: ‘a young and increasingly well-educated Saudi labour force provides a tremendous opportunity to boost growth and living standards. However, despite rapid economic growth in recent years, Saudi unemployment has remained high, especially among youth and women. Investments in education and labour market reforms are aimed at improving skills and raising private sector employment of Saudi workers. Improving the competitiveness of Saudi workers will require strengthening the quality of education and careful implementation of labour market policies. Additionally, efforts to expand employment opportunities for women can help raise the productive potential of the economy.’ 13. Premium: entities achieving superior nationalisation performance with the highest percentage of local employees; green: entities achieving good nationalisation performance, with good percentage of local employees; yellow: entities achieving below average performance with lower percentage of local employees; red: entities achieving poor nationalisation performance by hiring the lowest percentage of local employees.

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14. One caveat to note: I do not wish to suggest that the two subnarratives are without merit. On the contrary, these two approaches are crucial to understanding Saudisation and its stagnation. I am asserting that a grounded and more nuanced understanding of the limitations behind Saudisation policy requires expanding the frame of analysis beyond just macro-economic indicators, policy adjustments and educational reform rhetoric. It requires an understanding of the political structure and the underlying social contract in Saudi Arabia; I expand on the reasoning and justification for this approach later in this chapter. 15. Steffen Hertog, ‘A comparative assessment of labour market nationalization in the GCC’, in Steffen Hertog (ed.), National Employment, Migration and Education in the GCC (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2012), pp. 65–106. 16. Mohamed Asad Sadi, ‘A framework of the implementation process: the case of Saudization’, International Management Review 5/1 (2009), pp. 70 – 84. 17. Adel S. Al Dosary and Syed M. Rahman, ‘Saudization (localization): a critical review’, Human Resource Development International 8/4 (2005), pp. 495 – 502. 18. Under these conditions, firms would continue to hire nationals up to the quota requirement and, ceteris paribus, use non-nationals to fill the remaining positions because they are perceived as relatively more productive. The studies also show that even the Saudis that are hired are less willing to work because they are cognisant of the dynamics behind Saudisation’s principal-agent problem, that is, they know they cannot be fired. As a result, the genuine employment of Saudis is neglected and the national labour force does not matriculate with Saudisation’s intended effects. 19. Mohamed Ramady, an economist at the fore of the Saudisation debate, writes: ‘the Saudi Government is caught in a dilemma – nurturing the private sector to play a more effective role in a sustained and diversified economy, while at the same time trying to manage the rising tide of youthful unemployed through government imposed quota decrees.’ Ramady excludes the state from the problem of Saudization. He instead says that the state is ‘faced’ with a dilemma of managing the private sector and containing a burgeoning youth bulge. He assumes the state to be exogenous and overlooks the explicit role of the state in the success or failure of Saudisation. Mohamed Ramady, ‘Gulf unemployment and government policies: prospects for the Saudi labour quota or Nitaqat System’, International Journal Economics and Business Research 5/4 (2013), pp. 476–98. ¨ rg Schubert, ‘Getting labour policy to work in 20. Gassan Al-Kibsi and Jo the Gulf’, The McKinsey Quarterly (2007), pp. 19 – 29. 21. Susan Robertson, ‘Absences and imaginings: the production of knowledge on globalization and education’, Globalisation, Societies and Education 4/2 (2006), pp. 303 – 18, p. 307.

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22. Ibid., p. 308. 23. The total number of literate persons in a given age group, expressed as a percentage of total population in that age group. The sources of data are mainly national population censuses, household surveys and labour force survey. 24. Statistics on these indicators are inconsistent but the trend follows other indicators that strongly correlate with this indicator. 25. The idea of a ‘peculiar’ set of beliefs embodying the social contract appears in the work of: Stephen Swailes, Loay G. Al Said and Saleh Al Fahdi, ‘Localization policy in Oman: a psychological contracting interpretation’, International Journal of Public Sector Management 25/5 (2012), pp. 357– 72: Kasim Randeree, ‘Workforce nationalization in the Gulf Cooperation Council state’, Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar (2012); and Hertog, ‘A comparative assessment of labour market nationalization in the GCC’. 26. Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942), p. 83. 27. Nils A. Butenschøn, Uri Davis and Manuel S. Hassassian, Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: Approaches and Applications (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000). 28. The contractual relationship is based on a series of legal statuses, which include age, sex, family, ethnicity and so on, as codified within the legal system. Accordingly, the state has certain obligations towards individuals under its jurisdiction. 29. Butenschøn et al., Citizenship and the State in the Middle East, p. 6. 30. David Scott and Helen Lawson, ‘Introduction’, in David Scott and Helen Lawson (eds), Citizenship Education and the Curriculum (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002), pp. 1 – 6, p. 1. 31. Ibid., p. 5. 32. Suad Joseph, ‘Preface’, in Suad Joseph (ed.), Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000), pp. xvii – xxii, p. xvii. 33. Butenschøn et al., Citizenship and the State in the Middle East, p. 5. 34. John E. Petrovic and Aaron M. Kuntz, ‘Prologue: citizenship and the purposes of education’, in John E. Petrovic and Aaron M. Kuntz (eds), Citizenship Education around the World: Local Contexts and Global Possibilities New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. ix – xxii, p. xiii. This same question appears in the preface of the Saudi textbook under analysis. 35. Turki Al Harthi, Mashbab Al-Asmary, Mohamed Al-Ghamdy, Fatheya Al-Karshy and Haifa Kobrah, Youth and Concepts of Citizenship in Saudi Society (Riyadh: Da¯r Ha¯fiz, 2011). 36. Interview with Professor of Tarbeya Wataneyya, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

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37. I do not have extensive background information on these authors. What I do know is that they were selected by the Ministry of Education to write this textbook. Whether they work in academia or not, it is likely that they have ties to the government. The professor I spoke to told me that the names of the author do not matter. The ideas in the textbook are produced by the state. The names could change and the content would remain the same. 38. Interview with Professor of Tarbeya Wataneyya, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 39. Al Harthi et al., Youth and Concepts of Citizenship in Saudi Society. 40. Ibid., p. 1. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid. 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid. 49. Ibid. 50. Ibid., p. 2. 51. Ibid. 52. Ibid. 53. Content from the other chapters will be threaded throughout the conceptualisation and analysis of citizenship in Saudi Arabia. No textbook chapter is self-contained and quite frequently draws on the ideas of history, culture, society and so on found in other chapters. 54. In the textbook it is used as a generic term to refer to changes: means of communication, technology, environment, population growth and so on. 55. Al Harthi et al., Youth and Concepts of Citizenship in Saudi Society, p. 1. 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid. 59. Anthony Giddens, Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p. 12. 60. Andrew Marr, The Day Britain Died (London: Profile Books, 2000). 61. Al Harthi et al., Youth and Concepts of Citizenship in Saudi Society, p. 1. 62. Niblock’s discussion of the political economy demonstrates how the state is not a monolithic actor with a singular set of interests; its diversified interests can clash. However, the ultimate goal of preserving the state structure and stability is constant. While the state does not act as one in every policy decision, the ultimate goal of any state is to preserve the status quo. Tim Niblock, Saudi Arabia: Power, Legitimacy and Survival (New York: Routledge, 2006).

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63. Niblock and Malik, The Political Economy of Saudi Arabia, p. 53. 64. See ibid., pp. 52–93. ‘The 1970–85 period saw a major transformation in the Saudi economy, carried through with a vision of development which had a number of key components: developing the oil industry and gaining control of the full benefits from oil production, building up a substantial industrial base through utilizing hydrocarbon resources and energy for petrochemicals and downstream industries, promoting agriculture and a measure of agricultural self-sufficiency through the spread of irrigation, an creating social and physical infrastructure of a modern state. The state was to be the instrument not only shaping the vision but also implementing it’ (ibid., p. 92). 65. Al Harthi et al., Youth and Concepts of Citizenship in Saudi Society, p. 67. Essentially these values proxy for citizenship. 66. Scott and Heen Lawson, Citizenship Education and the Curriculum, p. 2. 67. Al Harthi et al., Youth and Concepts of Citizenship in Saudi Society, point to a number of values throughout the textbook, but state that the most critical values are ‘shura, human rights, social responsibility, social solidarity, and dialogue’ (ibid., p. 1). The authors recognise that values vary and are sourced by a number of dimensions such as ‘religion, morals, philosophy, social norms, economics, politics, civics, and others’ (ibid., p. 65). 68. Citizenship in Saudi Arabia rests on two foundational ideas. First, shari’a eslameya, which ‘governs all aspects of life’ (ibid., p. 75). All government policy, whether civil, criminal, family or national, must conform to shari’a eslameya. Second, shura, the origin and definition of which comes from Islamic governance. Shura stipulates ‘consulting expert opinion to reach consensus’ or ‘consulting the opinion that results in the reinforcement of loyalty and citizenship’ (ibid., p. 76). From these foundations, Al-Harthi et al. derive several principles on which citizenship in Saudi society is based: (1) participation/ cooperation (musharaka), which can be seen in the principle the shura: (2) justice (adl), which is defined by religious scholars ‘as the behavior that results in the happiness of the nation and works to advance the umma based on principles and origins of the shari’a eslameya’ (ibid., p. 76); (3) freedom/liberty (horeya) – ‘there are no limits to the freedom of speech in Saudi Arabia as others strongly contest’ (ibid., p. 77). It is a freedom given without constraint so long as it complies with the rules and regulations of Islam that aim to benefit the individual and society; and (4) equality (almosawa), which stipulates that there is universal access to rights without discrimination to colour, race, or social status. ‘Everyone under shari’a law is the same and equal, whether rich or poor, which explains why there is stability in Saudi Arabia’ (ibid., p. 77).

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69. Al-Harthi et al. identify a set of variables that are necessary for the stability and development of a society’s value system: citizenship, nationalism/patriotism, and moderation. The authors contend that these variables ‘are interrelated and mutually supportive values, so they cannot be split and cannot be dealt with individually’ (ibid., p. 2). 70. Ibid. 71. At certain points in the book, citizenship concepts are presented as still being strongly influenced by the ideas of King Abdulaziz, ‘his thoughts and opinions towards citizenship continue to impact contemporary conception of citizenship’ (ibid., p. 78). Al-Harthi et al. list seven central ideas that are attributed to King Abdul Aziz: ‘ (1) performance of duty and diligence; (2) tawhid and reunite Arabs and defence of homeland; (3) diligent work; (4) implementing shari’a so that the country develops; (5) efforts to achieve the required support and freedom of opinion; (6) compassion and convergence and interaction between the leadership and the people; and (7) respect for the traditions and values and to obey them’ (ibid., p. 78). 72. Ibid., p. 65. 73. Ibid., p. 66. 74. Ibid., p. 76. 75. Ibid., p. 76. 76. Ibid., pp. 72 – 3. 77. Ibid., p. 77. 78. Ibid., p. 66. 79. Interview with Professor of Tarbeya Wataneyya, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 80. Al Harthi et al., Youth and Concepts of Citizenship in Saudi Society, p. 5. 81. Citizenship appears as an important ideational concept that must be developed and given incentives, ‘because it relates, in large part, to the nature or modern/civilized societies, which tend to lack homogeneity and stability. Prosperity requires a sufficient amount of shared values and mutual dependence’ (ibid., p. 82). ‘More homogeneity will occur as people get more education, and it will unify thought and control behavior’ (ibid., p. 80). 82. Ibid., p. 82. 83. Al-Harthi et al. assert that if the homogenisation process is not managed accordingly, a ‘cultural gap’ will appear, ‘which represents the epicenter of social and economic problems which disrupts the social balance and retards material gains’ (ibid., p. 82). 84. Ibid., p. 1. 85. Ibid., p. 75. 86. Mohamed Rakan Al Daghmi, Mohammed Nabil Tahir, Ibrahim Al Qaysi and Said Mohamed Al Ruqab, Al-Tarbiyah al Islamiyah (Islamic

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87.

88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109.

POLICY MAKING IN THE GCC Education). literary secondary level, first year, grade 11 (Amman: Wizarat Al Tarbiyah wa-al-ta’lim al Urduniyah, 1991), p. 241. Betty Anderson, ‘Jordan: prescription for obedience and conformity’, in Eleanor Doumato and Gregory Starrett (eds), Teaching Islam: Textbooks and Religion in the Middle East (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), pp. 71 – 88, p. 87. Al Harthi et al., Youth and Concepts of Citizenship in Saudi Society, p. 74. Ibid., p. 77. Doumato and Starrett Teaching Islam. Gregory Starrett, Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics, and Religious Transformation in Egypt (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998), p. 8. Ibid., p. 9. Eleanor Doumato, ‘Saudi Arabia: from “wahhabi” roots to contemporary revisionism’, in Doumato and Starrett, Teaching Islam, pp. 153–76, p. 153. Ibid., p. 154. Al Harthi et al., Youth and Concepts of Citizenship in Saudi Society, p. 78. Ibid. Ibid., p. 65. Suad Joseph (2000). ‘Gendering citizenship in the Middle East’, in Joseph, Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East, pp. 3 – 30, p. 19. Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Seabury Press, 1968). Al Harthi et al., Youth and Concepts of Citizenship in Saudi Society, p. 83. Ibid., p. 67. Ibid., p. 68. Ibid., p. 74 (italics added). Ibid. The ‘collective end’ is characterised by a conception of a ‘dignified life’ (in that you do not have to ask for things) and the preservation of his rights as a citizen by the state (ibid., p. 74). I chose to call it a loyalty equation because the terms fixed and variable were used in the textbook. Al Harthi et al., Youth and Concepts of Citizenship in Saudi Society, p. 67. Ibid. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UNESCWA), ‘Towards an integrated knowledge society in Arab countries: strategies and implementation modalities’, report E/ESCWA/ ICTD/2005/3 (New York: United Nations, 2005), p. 7.

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110. Ana Longva, ‘Citizenship in the Gulf States: conceptualization and practice’, in Butenschøn et al., Citizenship and the State in the Middle East, pp. 179– 97, p. 180. 111. Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of Hope: Reliving Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014). 112. Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 167. 113. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (New York, International Publishers, 1971), quoted ibid., p. 9. 114. Raymond Williams, The Country and the City (New York: Random House, 1973), pp. 204– 205. 115. Michael Apple, Ideology and Curriculum (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 4. 116. Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), p. 259. 117. Dunja Mohr, Embracing the Other: Addressing Xenophobia in the New Literatures in English (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2008), p. 13.

PART III INSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES

8 INSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES AND GENDER ISSUES: THE WOMEN’S CULTURAL AND SOCIAL SOCIETY AS AN AGENT OF CHANGE IN KUWAITI POLITICS Alanoud Alsharekh

Introduction The fight for women’s political rights was often begun in the fringes of the national emancipation struggle for Arab countries under colonial rule, and this was the case in Kuwait. The Women’s Cultural and Social Society (WCSS) was set up in 1963 to ‘encourage their [women’s] participation in community activities and increase their awareness of their rights’. Over the course of 40 years, the WCSS would play a pivotal role in campaigning for women’s political participation in Kuwait, with members suing the Minister of Interior in 2000 for violating the constitutional right of Kuwaiti women to participate politically. Allied since its inception with the Pan-Arab Nationalist oppositional movement, and famous for never having had a member of the ruling elite in its leadership, the WCSS naturally faced some attempts from the establishment to derail its momentum. There were several attempts to create and support other women’s associations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as the Volunteer Women’s Association for Community Services, which was

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set up in 1991 and headed by the wife of the Crown Prince at the time, Sheikha Latifa al Sabah. However, the WCSS’s ability to maintain its civil society coalition with the two main bodies that were a vehicle for the liberal oppositional movement, the Kuwait Democratic Forum and Kuwait’s Graduate Society, ensured that it remained an important partner as the female arm of the movement. In the vacuum created by the absence of political parties, many civil society institutions such as the WCSS became important lobbying groups associated with one political movement or another. For example, the women’s club at the Social Reform Society is regarded as the female arm of the Muslim Brotherhood and does most of the female recruitment and political mobilisation for the organisation through its very successful community activities. Following the decision to grant women full suffrage in 2005, the The decade that followed witnessed has witnessed an increase in the WCSS’s power to influence votes and rally support behind the causes it chooses to highlight. This has been especially true in the two voting districts (Districts 2 and 3) where WCSS board members, who are usually from the liberal merchant elite (the families that have a greater share of the corporations and boards that dominate the private sector in Kuwait) have kinship-based voter relationships. The extent of their influence was made clear by the number of National Assembly candidates and MPs who solicited their support, even those from opposing ideological camps, and their track record of backing a winning candidate in the Second District; arguably because through its members and their extended network the WCSS plays an instrumental role in guaranteeing that success. As the oppositional movement became increasingly tribal, and political Islam’s influence grew in the National Assembly, the accusation that the WCSS was an ivory tower refuge of ‘ladies who lunched’ began to resurface, as it had done in the 1970s. Infighting among members of the National Democratic Alliance and the older Kuwait Democratic Forum had a knock-on effect on some WCSS members and split their political stance between the two groups. Lately, and almost 55 years since its inception, the organisation has had difficulty retaining younger board members, and countered accusations of a privileged leadership, out of touch with the concerns of young women in Kuwait, through partnering with young female lawyers on the Women’s and Children’s Rights through Access to Information

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(WRACTI) project. This chapter will attempt to shed light on the various aspects that have led to the prominence of the WCSS in the struggle for suffrage and what could be in store for the both the movement and the NGO in future.

The Women’s Cultural and Social Society within the context of civil society organisations in the region Mahmood Hafez Baluchi, the director of the Executive Office of the Council of Ministers of Labour and Social Affairs of the Gulf Cooperative Council States, argues that the Johns Hopkins University definition of a ‘civil society organisation’ – formal or informal selfgoverning organisations that are not part of the apparatus of government, do not distribute profits to their directors or operators and in which participation is a matter of free choice1 – is the one widely accepted in the Arab world today. And yet this definition is problematic in its most basic terms because of the heavy involvement of governments in the region in both the governing and the funding (reaching almost 90 per cent of both operational and financial support in the case of Saudi Arabia2) of most so-called ‘nongovernmental’ and civil society organisations. Most NGOs in the GCC, in both their inception and the bulk of their activities, are charity-oriented. The socio-religious background of most nationals is geared towards giving alms (Zakat for Sunni Muslims and the Khoms for Shiite Muslims are just two examples) and highlights the importance of financial aid to those in crisis, but the lack of an established and incentivised culture of volunteerism and of professional NGOs and philanthropic systems makes a flourishing, independent civil society organisation (CSO) culture difficult to maintain. Out of the 5,000 civil societies that are officially registered in the GCC today, only 177 are focused on women-oriented activities, and these for the most part do not engage in the issue of women’s political and legal rights.3 Qatar remains the only country in the GCC that still does not have any NGOs specifically geared to deal with women’s issues. This vacuum, created by a lack of non-governmental pressure on improving the status of women, tends to benefit extremist and traditionalist rhetoric, both institutionalised and insidious, that keep women trapped in traditional gender roles. The importance of

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institutions that empower women and defy enforced limits on them is especially important in conservative cultures like the GCC, where family and kinship policy remain the cornerstone of political, economic and social life. Antonio Gramsci, the Italian political theorist, is credited with initiating many of the debates on the often contradictory function of civil societies; they can act like a bridge between the economic sector and the government and be a re-inforcer of this state produced ‘hegemony’,4 or form an independent and powerful balancing mechanism to represent the interests of people who do not fall into the previous two categories and through that become an agency for the emergence of a new social order that resists the status quo. This often conflicted role describes the civil society scene in Kuwait, especially many of those institutions that were created at the birth of the newly independent modern state. The Women’s Cultural and Social Society, in its resistance to the mainstream institutionalised traditionalist rhetoric and in its representation of the liberal and educated segment of Kuwaiti society, provides an interesting case study of how civil society institutions can play this dual role in Kuwait and the GCC. The Women’s Cultural and Social Society was founded in 1963, and at one point held a consultative position in the UN Economic and Social Council. It is a member of the Arab Union of Women (AUW), and its previous chairwoman is the vice president of the Gulf Region in the AUW.5 Its position as the most important women’s NGO in Kuwait is difficult to contest and it is considered an influential liberal political partner both in civil society and in general political terms. Throughout its history it has managed to resist having a member of the ruling family in its leadership or even as a board member and has both suffered financially and gained political credibility as a result. The ability of organisations such as the WCSS to wield significant influence in the socio-political sphere in Kuwait is tied into the sociohistorical background of the country’s particular brand of rentierism, and the exposure of Kuwaiti nationals to Arab expatriates early on in the past century, who spread the ideas of the Arab renaissance, ‘al-Nahda’, and its emphasis on education and civic engagement to Kuwait. This connectedness with regional politics and Arab woes influenced civil society activity in Kuwait over the course of the century, such as pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli rallies starting in

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1948 and support of the Algerian independence wars against the French colonialist occupiers in the late 1950s and early 1960s.6 Sometimes the regional conflicts spilled into the domestic arena and civil society groups were called into action to protect Kuwait itself from its northern neighbour, firstly in 1961, when Abdulkarim Kassem wanted to annex Kuwait to Iraq, and again during the 1990 occupation of Kuwait. In both instances of outside aggression, civil society groups and non-governmental organisations played an important role in protecting the interests of nationals and the sovereignty of the Kuwaiti state, in spite of escalating disagreements with the regime. This is perhaps why the importance of civil society as an influential third sector outside of business and government in Kuwait differs greatly from other Arabian Gulf states.

The history of civil society in the State of Kuwait The first known civil society organisations in the Arabian Gulf were organised in Kuwait and Bahrain in 1913; Al-Jami’yah Al Khairiyah Al-’rabiyah in Kuwait and the Al-Nadi Al-Islami in Bahrain.7 NGOs and civil societies started in Egypt, Levant and North Africa as a reaction against colonialism and to counter the missionary movement that accompanied colonialist expansion to preserve local identity and Mahmood Hafez Baluchi suggests that similar circumstances led to the establishment of NGOs in Bahrain and Kuwait.8 The first half of the twentieth century witnessed stops and starts to CSO activity in Kuwait, but the first genuine NGO in many considerations is the 1924 al-Nadi al-Adabi al-Kuwaiti, established by Khaled Sulaiman Al Adsani, who was voted into the leadership position by 45 members who shared intellectual and political concerns influenced by the arrival of Arab teachers from elsewhere in the region and their nationalist rhetoric.9 Among the many concerns that were discussed at al-Nadi Al-adabi was the state of women’s education (the first school for girls opened in Kuwait in 1937), mirroring the arguments of Egyptian figures such as Qasim Amin, Safiya Zaghloul and Huda Shaarawi on the necessity of an educated mother to produce an educated nation. The organisation was shut down in 1926 and for the next two decades there was no documented attempt to set up another civil society organisation of that calibre in Kuwait.

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The 1950s witnessed a revival of Arab nationalist ideas and political action as the first wave of Kuwaiti students to be sent abroad by the Kuwaiti government in 1946 returned and brought their enthusiasm for social work and political engagement back with them. After signing several petitions and lobbying the authorities concerned, the School Principal’s Council looked into the idea of setting up a separate Majlis (council) for teachers, and this affiliated union/NGO produced a publication called al-Raed (The Pioneer) that was reflective of their ideological standpoint on social issues in 1951. This was quickly followed by the establishment of several NGOs, each of whom had their own publications, such as the religious Jam’iyat al Irshad al Islamiyah (Islamic Guidance Society) in 1952, the Pan-Arab Nationalist leaning al Nadi al Thagafi al-Gawmi (Nationalist Culture Club) in 1953 and in 1954 Jam’iayat a lKhirejeen (Graduates Society). The establishment of the Lajnat al Andiyah al Kuwaitiah (Kuwait Clubs Committee) to facilitate cooperation between these NGOs gave them political significance, especially as they established success in mobilising popular movement on regional issues such as support for Egypt’s Independence, and the boycott of British and French goods, forcing the government to cancel a contract worth a Million rupees (the currency at the time), and the prevention of Zionist activity to reach Kuwait, and support for the independence movements in the Arab world.10 It is worth noting that these movements, like the one that preceded them, were also concerned with the issue of improving the status of women, especially from an education perspective. These were discussed in a space called Rukn al-Mar’ah (Women’s Corner) in all three publications, al-Fajr, al-Iman and even al-Irshad, though the latter focused more on the Islamic perspective on women’s issues. There was much debate about the unfair decision to withhold university scholarships from Kuwaiti women, which finally changed in 1956, when the first group of Kuwaiti women students were sent to study abroad, in Cairo.11 The return of this first group of women from studying abroad coincided quite closely with the world events that led to the independence of the State of Kuwait and the writing of its constitution in 1962. After that date a system was put in place for the formation and

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regulation of civil society organisations for educated and aspirational young people who were eager to become politically engaged with the process of modernising the state. Act 24/1962 regulated the political and legal framework of Kuwaiti civil society organisations under the umbrella of the Ministry of Social Affairs and in 1965 specific amendments were introduced to ban registered NGOs from being involved in overt political activities.

Socio-historical background: the lack of formal political parties and the politicisation of NGOs Article 43 of Kuwait’s Constitution (1962) grants Kuwaiti citizens the right to form societies and unions with the condition that they are built ‘on nationalistic foundations and with guaranteed peaceful means according to the conditions and circumstances that are outlined by law’. The law governing these civil society organisations covers their right to hold activities such as workshops and seminars, commission studies, convene conferences and study groups that aim to develop the professional skills of the members of their organisation. Part of the reason it was difficult for these groups to gain much autonomy from the government was that they were licensed to operate as NGOs under the umbrella of the Ministry of Public Affairs and were under scrutiny and annual review by representatives of the ministry, who would attend general assemblies and were empowered to shut these organisations down for any operational violations. Besides the official credibility gained by being registered with the ministry, the government used to provide free land for headquarters and an annual stipend of 4,000 KD (Kuwaiti dinars), but this aid was suspended for newly registered organisations in 2004, which has led to many new organisations choosing to remain independent and unregistered, especially since the registration process has become more complicated and includes many bureaucratic hurdles, a long waiting period and a background check on members by the Ministry of the Interior. Bahrain is the only GCC country that has legislation to govern the actions, formation and establishment of political parties (it is also the only country in the GCC, along with the UAE, that allows foreigners to form unions and civil society organisations). Dr Ghanim Al Najjar argues for the existence of ‘de facto political parties in Kuwait’,12 and many of those operate and lobby and recruit under the cover of NGOs

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and CSOs that have been formed either to represent their specific interests or through converting established professional NGOs (Economic Society, Human Rights Society, Kuwaiti Lawyer’s Association, etc.) to a platform to disseminate a certain political viewpoint and assist their representatives and candidates to political office. This was also made possible because of the problematic nature of the explanatory note attached to article 43 of the constitution, which does not explicitly state that the formation of political parties is illegal, but in the vacuum created by not legislating for their creation many NGOs were naturally used to congregate and lobby for certain political groups, which detracted from and polarised the work of many organisations.

Most politically active NGOs in Kuwait Even taking differences in geographical location and historical specificity into consideration, Arab civil society organisations seem to go through three distinct phases and the history of Kuwaiti CSOs seems to match that cycle pretty closely. During colonialism many of these organisations were created as a form of resistance to the colonial occupation and focused very much on promoting Arab nationalism and anti-colonial rhetoric. After the liberation movements proved successful, the different regimes that were established in the Arab states cracked down and regulated civil society organisations through dismantling them, absorbing them into state-run institutions or introducing legislation as a result of which these NGOs were not really independent but were reliant on state sponsorship and open to state surveillance and interference. In the 1990s some Arab countries, including Kuwait, began to increase state support for certain CSOs, such as promoting the Union of Kuwaiti Women’s Associations, headed by Sheikha Latifa al Fahad al Sabah, which became the only organisation allowed to represent Kuwaiti women on an official basis. This ushered in a phase of government favoured and government neglected NGOs, in which certain Islamic associations received political and social support. Besides the power to refuse to license an association, dissolve its elected board or terminate it for vague concerns, such as ‘not being beneficial to society’ or being unconstitutional, the Kuwaiti government controls the ability of CSOs to behave independently

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by limiting their sources of funding, or at least attempting to. This makes organisations such as the WCSS, with its mercantile connections and large endowments, uniquely better placed to access a more sustainable source of sponsorship than other NGOs whose board members might not be as well connected, in terms of both inkind services and other forms of accepted fundraising. The level of funding that an NGO can raise outside of the governmental stipend had a direct relationship to the level of influence it could wield on the political sphere in Kuwait. Ghanim Al Najjar and Neil Hicks13 suggest that the many civil society organisations, both regulated and ‘traditional’, were centres of resistance to and protest against enforced change by authoritarian decision makers in both the Kuwaiti and the Occupying Iraqi regimes, proving their resilience and strong ideological foundation as well as a certain independence from the establishment despite all the measures of control that it tries to enforce. They emphasised the role that religious authority played in giving Islamic NGOs a level of independence and credibility that was made more potent by the ability to gather and recruit in mosques. The fact that the place of worship was for a long time protected from too much state meddling also gave civil society institutions affiliated with political Islam, both Sunni and Shiite, greater room to manoeuvre than other nonreligious groups. The most famous and well-connected of the many ‘Islamic’ NGOs in Kuwait is the Jam’iyat al Islah al Ijtima’i14 (Social Reform Society), founded in 1963, and made up of an impressive collection of well-connected merchant families who have consistently dominated its leadership and used it as a base for the promotion of Muslim Brotherhood social and political activities, in spite of its leadership’s recent attempts to distance the organisation from the Brotherhood15 label. The correlation between funding opportunities for civil society organisations and political influence has been somewhat reversed by the new demographic reality in Kuwait, following the naturalisation of certain tribes in the 1970s and 1980s. Former MP and oppositional coalition member Khalid al Tahoos discussed the difficulty of separating civil society work from political concerns in Kuwait in his former role as president of the Kuwait’s Trade Union Federation.16 Trade unions have played a big role in the conversion of Kuwaiti CSOs into political instruments that put pressure on the government and

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Members of Parliament to give in to populist demands that may not be fiscally sound (such as campaigning for the government to pay off all consumer debt and labour related demands that contribute to the rising wage bill). Since 2006 regular strikes and sit-ins have demonstrated the ability of this sector to inflict real damage on the Kuwaiti economy. This has made these types of civil society groups influential vehicles for ambitious young men like Khalid al Tahoos to build popular support prior to running for office. Trade unions tend to reflect in their membership the largest demographic group in Kuwait, from a mostly ‘tribal background’, which makes it almost imperative that they are headed by men who tend to be conservative, kinshiporiented and not encouraging of female leadership. These organisations, and the future populist politicians that they promote, are a counterbalance to organisations such as the Kuwaiti Chamber of Commerce, which had been the traditional enclave for the transfer of power from the merchant to the political elite. The tendency of political candidates from tribal and union-based civil society backgrounds to block the interest of merchant groups in parliament, such as introducing legislation in 2008 that led the cancellation or stalling of build-operate-transfer (BOT) contracts worth over $6.12 billion,17 has led to a renewed interest by certain merchant families to get involved in civil society organisations and push through candidates for political office who have their interests in mind. This has not been particularly useful to promoting women’s issues (the Chamber has only had one female board member since the first board was elected in 1959), except that the animosity between merchant and tribal representatives has made highlighting and exposing the latter’s conservative positions on female leadership a useful tool to discredit them by the former. In addition, women’s organisations and campaigns, which are traditionally not from tribal backgrounds, may get more sympathetic sponsorship and support for civil society activity as a result.

Socio-historical background: women’s NGOs in Kuwait and their political affiliations It can be argued that in every decade women civil society institutions have been established to fit the prevailing political mood and serve a specific purpose for social and political powers in Kuwait. The emergence of civil societies geared specifically to the needs of women

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and to promoting their rights started in the early 1960s, with both the Jma’iyat Al-Nahdhah al Arabiya Al Nisaaeyah (Arab Women Renaissance Society), later called Jamiyat al Nahdah al-Usariyya (Family Renaissance Society) (now closed), and alJam’iyah althagafiya alijtimaiya alniss’iyah, referred to in this chapter mostly by its English name, the Women’s Cultural and Social Society, being established in 1963. Both these organisations were formed by newly educated Kuwaiti women with more liberal leanings than the conservative community around them and both had very clear political demands for female inclusion right from the start. It is interesting to note that both NGOs offered social services such as nurseries and various social care committees to women and families, both as a way of validating their ministry obligations and because of a real need at that time for progressive childcare and educational facilities that would enable women to focus on their careers. Although Jami’yat al Nahdah was formally shut down in 1979, its founder, Noriah Al Saddani, who is credited with being the first woman to hand in a petition to National Assembly in 1971 demanding female suffrage rights, continued to chronicle and lobby for women rights actively in Kuwait. Nadi al Fatat al-Riyadhi (The Girls Sporting Club) is a sports-oriented girls’ organisation that was formed in 1975 and for many years it was an active promoter of women’s athleticism and engagement in the field of sports and other cultural and social activities. In 1994 a decision was made to no longer treat the organisation as a civil society group regulated by the Ministry of Social Affairs and instead handle it as a sports association under the umbrella of the Public Authority for Youth and Sports (PAYS). Even though two new women’s sports clubs were registered under PAYS in 2009, increasing ruling family interference had changed the independent nature of athletic clubs in Kuwait so that they did not have the autonomy that the original Girl’s Sporting Club once enjoyed.18 Internal bickering between members and demands for government intervention grew as takeover attempts between the club’s leadership figures became increasingly ugly over the course of a decade; from 2003 until the Kuwaiti court’s ruling declaring the club’s election results illegal in 2013. In October 2013 Sheikha Fariha al Ahmad al Sabah, sister to the current emir, was elected to the leadership position and has led the organisation since then until the time of writing. In the 1980s, coinciding with the rise of power for political Islam groups, two religious female societies, Bayader Alsalam19 and the

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Jam’iyat Al-Riwayah Al-Islamiyyah (Islamic Care Society), were established. They were more concerned with social outreach projects and the promotion of religious social and moral values than female empowerment. It was around this time that the Muslim Brotherhoodassociated Jam’iyat al Islah established its female committee, which, like the Salafist Jam’yat Ihyaa al Turath al Islami (Islamic Heritage Revival Society) women’s committee, was more active in recruitment and lobbying and therefore more politicised than the stand-alone Islamic women civil society groups. In 1994 the most government-backed registered female NGO was created under the leadership of Sheikha Latifa al Sabah, the wife of then Crown Prince Sheikh Saad alSabah – Etihad Nissaa alKuwait (Union of Kuwaiti Women’s Associations). As the only official representative of a Kuwaiti women’s organisation, it was supported by the government and managed to bring several female organisations, such as the Islamic Care Society, under its umbrella. The main challenger to the Union of Kuwaiti Women’s Association has been the WCSS, and there has been something of a cold war between the two organisations, with battles over international recognition and attendance at events and conferences. In August 2016 the Kuwaiti chapter of the Soroptomists Club International, the first internationally recognised women’s group to get through the complicated bureaucratic process of the Ministry of Public Affairs, managed to obtain legally registration and joined these women-centric NGOs. It remains to be seen how this NGO will interact with the established women organisations and if rivalries or collaborations will emerge between it and the WCSS or the leadership of the Union of Kuwaiti Women’s Association.

History of the Women’s Cultural and Social Society According to the literature in the presentations and brochures distributed by the WCSS, it was established in 1963, thereby becoming the second registered NGO in post-independence Kuwait, following Kuwait’s Society of Engineers. It was founded by a group of Kuwaiti women who were among the first in Kuwait to graduate from universities and higher education institutes. They had been educated abroad, since Kuwait University had not been established at that stage, and belonged to open-minded liberal households that encouraged a

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degree of female emancipation. It should also be noted that these women came from an affluent, merchant-class background and this may have set the tone for the future affiliates and members of the WCSS and most certainly its board.20 The seven-member board tightly controls all the committees underneath it by assigning a board member to chair each, which has led to a dampening down of enthusiasm among some older members and a drop in younger members’ involvement over the past 20 years. The stated objectives of the WCSS were to develop women in all fields, encourage their participation in community activities and increase their awareness of their rights and duties.21 The last goal seems to be a clear reference to increasing Kuwaiti women’s awareness and demand for political, legal and economic rights, which has been an essential part of the organisation’s activities over the years. The first gathering for the explicit purpose of female political inclusion was recorded in 1964, and a 1973 flyer22 invites attendees to a ‘Woman and Political Rights’ conference organised by lajnat tahreer al mar’ah (Women’s Emancipation Committee), which included the then editor-in-chief of al-Mujtama’ (The Society) magazine, a female dean in Kuwait University, Dr Badriya Alawadhi, and an MP, Salem Al Marzook. Over the years the WCSS’s clear association with both the educated merchant elite and Pan-Arab nationalists, and political groups associated with both such as Kuwait University student’s group alWasat al-Democrati (Democratic Circle), established in 1974, and the National Democratic Forum, which initially led the reformist opposition against the ruling regime both in parliament and outside of it, would colour much of the political and social discourse on female political emancipation in Kuwait. The close association of the call for women’s rights with the reform demands on the ruling family members and the government meant that there was resistance to the granting of these rights and an added incentive to encouraging and facilitating the establishment of female civil society organisations that were either clearly non-political, such the sports-oriented Girls Club in 1975, or the conservative and anti-emancipation Islamist women groups that came about in the 1980s. When the late emir, Sheikh Jaber al Ahmad al Sabah, declared an unconstitutional dissolution for the National Assembly in 1986 and no elections took place after the six months’ constitutional period, there

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was an escalation in civil society activity. Political gatherings, called the ‘Monday Diwaniyas’, demanded a return to the constitution and the reinstatement of elected officials and a parliament. Women were an important part of this process of demand, even though they were not legally allowed to vote or run for office. Many WCSS members were overt supporters of the Monday-night assemblies. A number of them (such as current president Lulwa Al Mulla, who became a WCSS member after attending the Monday Diwaniyas, and former board member Firyal Al Furaih) were married to MPs in the dissolved parliament. This pattern of political and personal interests converging in the WCSS would continue to repeat itself even as board members left and new ones joined, and the political climate in Kuwait shifted. After using force and the threat of imprisonment to dispel the Monday assemblies, the ruling family decided to employ a more diplomatic tactic. Kuwait’s government issued a hastily constructed alternative for political assembly called al-Majliss al-Watani (National Council) and tried to transfer the constitutional credibility of the national assembly to it. This experiment was cut short by the occupying forces of Saddam Hussein’s armies in August 1990 and the political climate in Kuwait was changed forever.

The Women’s Cultural and Social Society and women’s suffrage in Kuwait post liberation There were many demands for female political inclusion after Kuwait’s independence in 1961 and a 1964 gathering at the WCSS was held specifically to address political inclusion demands,23 but this took on a greater urgency after Kuwait’s liberation in 1991. Mary Ann Te´treault24 argues that the role that women in Kuwait played during the occupation led to a greater demand for political inclusion, and this in turn led to the use of more aggressive tactics by female CSOs following liberation. After the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, and the return of its nationals, the WCSS took a distinctly more assertive route in its campaign for political inclusion. As normality returned to political life in Kuwait many of the women who had remained during the occupation felt that this newly liberated Kuwait should honour their sacrifices and loyalty and the promises that had been made during the Tayyef Conference in Jeddah in October 1990 between the ruling

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family and the political representatives of the ‘people’ of Kuwait, which included reforms to political gender inclusion. WCSS members capitalised on that momentum in the 1992 elections.25 In the 1992 candidates’ campaign headquarters, which were usually held in tents, Kuwaiti women shared the platform with candidates running for parliamentary office for the first time to express their dissatisfaction with being on the sidelines. WCSS members and others who were passionate about this cause attempted to register in election centres across Kuwait’s districts; they went into local police stations (considered an unsavoury act for respectable women) and presented their civil identification cards to be registered as voters in the forthcoming election. Even though it was a symbolic gesture, it empowered women to behave in ways that broke with social norms; marches were organised in the residential streets leading to candidates’ tents and an all-day protest was held outside another candidate’s campaign headquarters. Organised protests outside the parliament building were staged as well and, although the numbers were small, it was enough to garner local and international media attention. In the 1994 elections, WCSS members repeated these tactics, attempting to register and organising protests; their advocacy campaign this time included attending the parliamentary sessions held to discuss the possibility of female political inclusion and delivering signed petitions to both government officials and National Assembly members. The MPs who supported the Mashroo’ al Hag al Siyassi lil Mar’ah (the bill to grant women political rights) were invited to an open discussion at the WCSS headquarters in 1995 to reassert the organisation’s role in mobilising the movement for female political inclusion. That same year the Committee for Women’s Issues was formed to end political discrimination against Kuwaiti women and, though initiated by the WCSS, it was a coalition of 24 NGOs with both male and female members. The first official attempt by the Kuwaiti government to push through a bill for women’s rights through an Amiri decree was in 1999. It lost by one vote (an MP abstained) but it can be argued that the government was not serious in pushing this bill through. From 1999 to 2005 the language of demand and protests by women escalated, and the same registration attempts were made, but with greater numbers and support for the WCSS, as women who had attended that parliamentary session were enraged by the reaction of

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some MPs and audience members. WCSS member Hind Al Shaflan and current president Lulwa Al Mulla brought legal action against the then Minister of Interior, suing him (and by implication the government) for violating their constitutional right to vote and run for office. Protests became much more organised and included several organisations such as the Economic Society, the Graduate Society and other liberal-leaning NGOs. The WCSS was becoming more sophisticated in its advocacy and rode the wave of this movement’s popularity, with members speaking openly of the organisation’s long struggle for women’s rights featured on the main platforms of political candidates at the candidates’ campaign tents in 2003. In 2005 another Amiri decree was introduced to legislate women’s political rights and this time the government was more serious about its success. A series of media campaigns highlighted Kuwait women’s many different successes and their contribution to society, but more importantly, how this right was not a violation of Sharia (fortified with a fatwa from Al-Azhar, the most respected authority on Sunni fatwas) because many conservative and Islamist MPs were making the claim that allowing women to take leadership positions over the state (wilayat almar’ah) was un-Islamic. Some liberal MPs expressed concern in private interviews26 that the inclusion of women would give a wider base to tribal and Islamist MPs because they had the demographic advantage, and they assumed that these women were more likely to vote along family affiliations. One could also argue that there were international considerations for Kuwait to become a gender inclusive democracy, since so many democratic nations were involved in its liberation, and this created pressure on the government to speed up the process by which females would be involved in the political system. Dr Masooma AlMubarak became the first female Minister (Planning) in May 2005, two days after the bill was passed in parliament on 16 May 2005, which also suggests that the move towards female political inclusion had been in the works for some time.

The Women’s Cultural and Social Society’s political involvement after achieving political rights (16 May 2005) There is some support for the argument that the bill granting women their full political rights in Kuwait was partly due to international

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pressure led by the US, which was involved in Kuwait’s liberation from Iraqi occupation partly on the premise that it was a democratic country. After 2005, the freedom agenda of the Bush administration highlighted women’s rights as a priority and Lisa Cheney headed the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), which still continues to finance initiatives that support a feminist agenda in Kuwait.27 The WCSS shifted the focus of its organisation’s main campaigns from demanding equal political rights to making certain that Kuwaiti women took full advantage of this right and highlighting legislation that was unfair or that held women back. In 2006 the WCSS held a series of workshops to promote political awareness and lobbying skills with international partners such as Freedom House, the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) (now UNWOMEN), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the National Democratic Institute. They also launched the first in a series of graphic campaigns aimed at encouraging women to exercise their right to vote called Liya’lu Swatik (Raise your Voice). Another campaign followed soon after, called Noorik Ganoonik (Your Law is your Light) and these were developed over the years into the more ambitious WRACTI Project with UNDP, qhich highlights women’s legal rights and breaks the information down into easily accessible information. The WRACTI programme had been implemented in six Arab countries but Kuwait became the first in the GCC to do so through the WCSS. Besides its attempts to promote women’s rights through its affiliated programmes, the WCSS has proved an important ally in election results since 2005. The number of Islamist, tribal and merchant-elite MPs that have attended and contributed to the organisation’s events over the past ten years has been impressive, especially those from the Districts 1, 2 and 3, whose votes are not controlled solely by tribal affiliations. Since 2006 WCSS members have mostly supported representatives of the Democratic Forum and those of the National Democratic Alliance and women MPs who ran as part of those groups, such as former MP Assail Al Awadhi, among a few others. This has led to many criticisms of the selective nature of the WCSS’s political agenda, especially since the former and current president had close relations in both organisations who ran for office.28

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The Women’s Cultural and Social Society as a social and political influencer and its detractors Haya Al Mughni argues that: as the only legitimate forum for Kuwaiti women to engage in public activity, women’s organisations, by and large, have inhibited the development of a feminist movement, in part by providing elite and upper-class women the power to control other women’s access to the public sphere.29 The idea that the WCSS and other female NGOs have not done enough to further women’s causes in Kuwait is one that is perhaps echoed by others about the performance of civil society in general. In 2007, the Supreme Council for Planning commissioned a study to evaluate the status of the NGOs registered under the Ministry of Public Affairs and the findings echoed criticisms that had been levelled at the WCSS over the years. The leadership and membership of most NGOs were ‘closed diwaniyas for a small group clustered around the head of the organisation, with little competition or renewal in posts’.30 The WCSS, which has had only six presidents in its 52-year history, and a small cadre of active members, could be guilty of this inner circle promotion. The same study found that women were generally absent from most civil society activities and leadership roles, except when elections are held, when they show up to vote for male candidates. This exclusion of women from civil society activity was seen as a problem that needed to be resolved; ironically, the WCSS, an organisation whose role revolves around promoting female inclusion, has often times been accused of the very same thing. Women such as Dr Rola Dashti, who found it difficult to break into the WCSS despite several attempts and obvious qualifications, found themselves seeking positions in other non-female oriented NGOs to fulfil their ambitions. After unsuccessful attempts to use Nadi al Fatat (Girl’s Sporting Club) as a vehicle for fulfilling her political ambitions, Dr Dashti joined and succeeded in becoming president of Kuwait’s Economic Society. There she managed to find ways to incorporate her interests in women’s issues into the NGO’s interests and run programmes such as the Women’s Entrepreneurship Development

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Project,31 funded by MEPI, and similar organisations that also provided support to programmes at the WCSS. LOYAC,32 a non-profit organisation working towards the overall development of the youth and the most successful youth development organisation in Kuwait, started as a committee dealing with youth empowerment and mentorship within the WCSS in 2001. Farea Al Saqqaf, the dynamic businesswoman behind this initiative, felt that that there was no room for the growth of her vision for the programme with the WCSS board and moved it to Bait Lothan, setting it up as an independent NGO after a few years. While some argue that in this way WCSS has lost opportunities over the years to appeal to a wider membership base, Dr Suhal Al Fulaij, current secretary general of the WCSS,33 sees the WCSS as an incubator of projects that are meant to develop independently and grow outside of the organisation. Others, like ex-board member Kawther Al Jo’an, left to set up their own women’s centres, Ma’had Al Mar’ah Litanmiya Wassalam (Women’s Development Institute), or attempted to. She has not been complimentary in her assessments of WCSS activities since leaving the organisation and there has been no cooperation between her NGO and the WCSS since.34 A common thread in attacks on the WCSS, whether directly in the media or privately in discussions of NGO activity, is to describe it as an elitist, unsupportive organisation, or to couch these criticisms of the WCSS under the vaguer banner of ‘female civil society groups’.35 These accusations reached their zenith after women candidates’ attempts to achieve political office initially failed. It is not only women who have had disparaging comments to make about the WCSS and female-centric NGOs in Kuwait in general. In a 2014 interview in Al-Anbaa newspaper,36 Nasser al Ammar, director of the civil society department in the Ministry of Public Affairs, stated that all four of the female civil society organisations in operation at the time needed to work harder to increase the number of Kuwaiti women in political leadership positions. For their part, members of the WCSS do not see that the association with a certain socio-political viewpoint is necessarily a bad thing. Dr Fatma Ayyad, a Kuwaiti of Palestinian origin and a board member at the WCSS for over 15 years, dismisses the claim that members do not suffer from the same obstacles as do the women they claim to

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represent. She sees no negativity in the fact that most WCSS members came from privileged socio-economic backgrounds that ‘allowed them to travel, see the world, interact with other cultures, and bring back the best of that knowledge to serve their fellow country women’.37

Conclusion Across the GCC NGO legislation needs updating to comply with global standards, especially in financing. The UAE and Bahrain are the only countries in the GCC that have civil society organisations for migrants; in all the rest only nationals are allowed to set up registered NGOs. By 2014 the number of registered NGOs in Kuwait had reached 88, with 50 more in the process of expediting their registration papers.38 Sultan al Qassemi claims that ‘the rise of Islamic movements in the Gulf has greatly hampered the work of civil society associations’.39 Kuwait’s Transparency Society, an influential registered NGO that was mysteriously shut down in May 2015 after ten years of high-profile political activity, undertook a research project looking at the effectiveness of civil society organisations in 2014. It concluded that civil society organisations were incapable of fighting the rampant corruption that has been made worse by the ‘community values of the rentier state’.40 The rise of social media and the high penetration rates of highspeed internet and its ubiquitous usage in the GCC has made it easier for civil society groups to get their message across, raise awareness and use the less restrictive virtual space to attract new members and launch campaigns without the traditional expenses involved. It also meant that getting large groups of interested people together and mobilising them for a cause did not have to necessitate their membership of one particular NGO, which has greatly revived and diversified both the civil society and the political scene in Kuwait and the GCC over the past ten years. It has also created greater freedom for those wanting to be involved in civil society, from both governmental interference and the tight and hierarchal control of certain established NGOs that had proved difficult for outsiders or new members to penetrate.41 In the case of the WCSS, this has meant that many new organisations are in action today that do work that is parallel or complementary to its own committees, or occasionally

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tackle subjects that the WCSS board is either uninterested in or deems too controversial. BirthKuwait, which deals with women’s maternal health issues, has been active for five years and is steadily increasing its influence and membership, has been supported both morally and financially by the WCSS. Tabeebat, a union of female doctors, emerged in 2014 with a focus on violence against women, and partnered with the WCSS and other NGOs on a walkathon to raise domestic violence awareness in December 2014. In 2013 UN statistics showed that women occupied only 21.8 per cent of seats in elected parliaments worldwide; in the Arab world that number was only 7.96 per cent.42 In Kuwait that number had gone down to 0 per cent after the only elected female resigned from political office in late 2013. Organisations like the WCSS, with a clear emphasis on challenging the legal and political marginalisation of women, are needed to balance the lack of political representation and combat the conservative rhetoric that attempts to keep them trapped within narrow labour and social options. Over the past ten years the organisation has taken on the thorny issue of promoting female judges in Kuwait, the rights of national women married to nonnationals and its refusal of the controversial Women’s Labour Bill, which aimed to control aspects of women’s contribution to the labour market. It has also had a clear stance on the Palestinian issue both before and after the liberation of Kuwait (Kuwaitis for Jerusalem is a joint committee between the WCSS and Kuwait’s Graduates Society) and in supporting and hosting organisations providing relief for the Iraqi people after 2003. By being involved in philanthropic, social and political issues both in Kuwait and on an international stage, such as relief work in Kosovo and the Sudan, the WCSS has given women in Kuwait and the region hope for civil society engagement that can lead to real institutional change, free from a ruling elite patron that almost all female NGOs in the region need to have. In this defiant stand, the WCSS has paved the way for others who may want to be nonconformist and confrontational, and refuse to compromise their independence. As GCC governments continue to look for less combative and more inclusive ways to handle the rising number of youths in their national populations, and as the continuing drop in subsidised income in light of falling oil prices leads to an inevitable renegotiation of roles between rulers and those they rule, the third sector of NGOs, and

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those civil society actors that operate them, will become increasingly important. Smaller groups and associations are set to increase in Kuwait, especially after a Ministry of Public Affairs legislation introduced in January 2015 allowed the formation and registration of ‘volunteer groups’ that needed a minimum of five Kuwaiti members to be recognised. Whether this will consolidate more power within established organisations such as the WCSS as a natural leader of women’s causes or cause increased friction between new groups and older NGOs, it is clear that the civil society groups will continue to lead the political rhetoric and the demands for reform during these times of change.

Notes 1. The Centre for Civil Society, Johns Hopkins University. Available at http://ccss.jhu.edu/?section¼ content&view ¼ 9&sub ¼ 3 (accessed 22 November 2015). 2. Mahmood Hafez Baluchi, ‘Civil society organisations in the GCC states: inception-reality-challenges’, 5th Symposium on Civil Society Organisations, College of Social Sciences, Kuwait University, 19 April 2015. 3. Ibid. 4. Helmut K. Anheier and Regina A. List, A Dictionary of Civil Society, Philanthropy and the Non-Profit Sector (Routledge: London: 2005), p. 116. 5. Other accolades include a Special Award by the French Republic Human Rights Consultative National Committee in 2007, the Sharjah Volunteer Work Award in 2008 and the 2009 Voluntary Works Award of Ministers of Social Affairs in the GCC for the Al-Bustan Nursery for special needs. 6. Ayyid Ateeq AlJareed, ‘The NGO movement in Kuwait from 1913 – 1961’, 5th Symposium on Civil Society Organisations, College of Social Sciences, Kuwait University, 19 April 2015. 7. Baluchi, ‘Civil society organisations in the GCC states’. 8. Ibid. 9. AlJareed, ‘The NGO movement in Kuwait during from 1913 – 1961’. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. Ghanim al Najjar, remarks made during APSA MENA workshop, session on democracy and the resource curse, SESRI, Qatar University, Doha, 20 May 2015. 13. Ghanim al-Najjar and Neil Hicks, ‘The utility of tradition: civil society in Kuwait’, in Augustus Richard Norton (ed.), Civil Society in the Middle East, vol. 1 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2005), pp. 186 – 213.

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14. Other Islamic NGOs that are politically active include the Salafist Revival of Islamic Heritage Society, Committee for African Muslims and Islamic Care Society, among others. 15. Marzook Al-Harbi, ‘Jam’yat al-Islah al-ijtima’I . . . is it a terrorist organisation?’, Al-Watan, 3 May 2015. 16. ‘Do CSOs have the right to engage in politics?’, al-Qabbas, 21 April 2007. 17. Ahmad Jabr, ‘Politics eclipses Kuwait development hopes – BOT law amendments on hold’, Kuwait Times, 12 April 2013. Available at http://news.kuwaittimes.net/politics-eclipses-kuwait-developmenthopes-bot-law-amendments-hold/ (accessed 22 November 2015). 18. For more on the deterioration of the sporting scene and the growing interference by Kuwait’s ruling family members see Abdullah Baabood, ‘Sport and identity in the Gulf’, in Alanoud Alsharekh and Robert Springborg (eds), Popular Cultures and Political Identity in the Arabian Gulf States (Saqi: London: 2008), pp. 97 – 120. 19. The literal translation is ‘threshing floor of peace’, as bayadir is where the wheat is brought to be extracted. The association itself uses the same name in English. 20. Since its inception the WCSS has always been presided over by a female member of the ‘merchant elite’. In spite of 52 years of existence, it is now only on its sixth president. 21. The Women’s Cultural and Social Society website is at http://www. kwtwcss.org. 22. WCSS Archives. 23. Ibid. 24. Mary Ann Te´treault, ‘Civil society in Kuwait: protected spaces and women’s rights’, Middle East Journal 47/2 (Spring 1993), pp. 275– 91. 25. Interview with Dr Fatma Ayyad, WCSS board member, 29 October 2015. 26. Alanoud Alsharekh, ‘Women in the 2006 elections’, in Alsharekh and Springborg, Popular Cultures and Political Identity in the Arabian Gulf States, pp. 28 –36. 27. MEPI In Kuwait blog. Available at http://mepi.state.gov/where-wework2/kuwait.html (accessed 22 November 2015). 28. For example, former MP Saleh al Mulla is current president Lulwa al Mulla’s nephew and current MP. Rakan al Nusif is former president Sheikha al Nusif’s nephew. 29. Haya al-Mughni, ‘Women’s organisations in Kuwait’, Middle East Report 26/198 (Spring 1996), pp. 32 – 5. 30. ‘Supreme Council to Public Affairs: civil society organisations have turned into closed diwanniyas’, al-Qabbas, 28 April 2007. 31. Ralph Falzone, ‘Kuwaiti civil society group partners with MEPI to support women entrepreneurs’, Dipnote, US Department of State Official blog, 10 August 2010. Available at https://blogs.state.gov/

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32. 33. 34. 35.

36. 37. 38. 39.

40. 41. 42.

POLICY MAKING IN THE GCC stories/2010/08/10/kuwaiti-civil-society-group-partners-mepisupport-women-entrepreneurs (accessed 10 December 2015). LOYAC website: http://loyac.org/default_en.aspx. Comments made at the WCSS, 21 December 2015. Remarks made during meeting with Rose Thelen from the Gender Violence Institute organised by the US Embassy in Kuwait, 21 March 2015. Although other female-centric organisations exist in Kuwait, the WCSS is the only politically active organisation. It is generally understood that ‘female CSOs’ in a political framework is a veiled reference to this particular organisation. Bushra Shaaban, ‘Al-Ammar: ‘civil society organisations’ is evaluating the performance of NGOs’, Al-Anbaa, 10 April 2014. Suwaidan, ‘Her rights . . . a long road’. Shaaban, ‘Al-Ammar’. Sultan Sooud Al-Qassemi, ‘The civil society movements in the Arab Gulf States’, Huffington Post, 24 September 2010. Available at http:// www.huffingtonpost.com/sultan-sooud-alqassemi/units-of-the-civilsociet_b_720583.html (accessed 5 November 2015). Project on corruption: six separate research projects, Transparency Society, 2014. Alanoud Alsharekh, ‘Social media and the struggle for authority in the GCC’, Canadian Journal for Middle East Studies 1/2 (July 2016), pp. 8 – 33. Inter-parliamentary Union, Women in Parliament in 2013: The Year in Review. Available at http://www.ipu.org/pdf/publications/WIP2013e.pdf (accessed 10 December 2015).

9 THE RISE AND ROLE OF STATE PHILANTHROPY IN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES Natasha Ridge and Susan Kippels

Introduction Philanthropic giving in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) currently accounts for the largest share of all philanthropy in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (exclusive of official development aid (ODA)).1 In 2013 UAE institutions gave approximately US $1.47 billion, 80 per cent of all philanthropy in the region).2 The last decade has been marked by a remarkable growth in philanthropy across the country and, in particular, strong growth in state philanthropy on the part of the nations’ ruling families despite the global fall in oil prices and resulting decline in state revenue. This chapter begins by discussing the development of global philanthropy and some of the historical reasons behind the creation of major foundations, including tax relief, public image and soft power. Following that, the chapter outlines general philanthropic trends globally and in the GCC. It then moves to consider the case of the UAE through a deeper examination of 11 state-funded foundations operating in the country. The chapter explores the timing and purpose behind their creation, their primary areas of focus and some of the ways in which they operate and engage across the country. It concludes with a discussion of the

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challenges facing these institutions and offers suggestions for areas of future research that could improve sustainability and impact, as well as foster greater cooperation amongst foundations and related institutions.

The global development of philanthropic foundations The Industrial Age marked the rise of the corporation across both Europe and North America and led to a corresponding rise in the number of self-made millionaires. However, passing family wealth from generation to generation posed taxation problems, especially in the United States. With a series of changes in American taxation laws, such as the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 and the New Deal inheritance tax in 1936, loopholes emerged whereby philanthropic endeavours were taxed at lower rates.3 Many wealthy industrialists such as Carnegie, Rockefeller and Ford therefore decided to bequeath the majority of their estates to newly created foundations, which were administered by family members, to avoid paying inheritance taxes. As such, the early twentieth century marked a rapid growth in philanthropy in the West, with the establishment of philanthropic foundations such as the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (1905), the Rockefeller Foundation (1913) and the Ford Foundation (1936).4 By the start of the twenty-first century, there were more philanthropic foundations around the globe than ever before.5 In Europe alone, 100,000 foundations were established between 1930 – 2000,6 and in the US, as of 2012, there were approximately 86,200 foundations.7 In fact, more than half of all philanthropic organisations in Europe and the US were created post-2000.8 In 2000, a survey of the top third of the Forbes 400 in the United States list revealed that three-quarters of the richest Americans had their own foundations.9 Figure 9.1 shows the growth in American foundations and, in turn, their increasing assets over time, with approximately 86,200 foundations holding US$715 billion in assets in 2012.10 Today, generous tax breaks for philanthropic endeavours in the US and elsewhere continue to incentivise the growth of foundations. A recent example is the Bill, Hillary & Chelsea Clinton Foundation. The entire Clinton family collects speaking fees, which can range from anything from US$10,000 to US$1 million and are paid into the foundation. By directing payments to the foundation, they avoid paying taxes for

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these engagements, to a total amount of which is said to lie somewhere between US$12 – $26 million.11 The Clintons have understandably come under scrutiny for this practice and also for discrepancies relating to the foundation’s tax returns, which reportedly have both over- and under-reported donations from foreign governments.12 As the Clinton Foundation’s public accountability has been questioned, it has had to refile at least five tax returns.13 In addition to substantial taxation incentives, the creation of a philanthropic foundation provides a vehicle for corporations and their boards to exercise soft power and pursue agendas that either directly or indirectly benefit their shareholders. Soft power, as originally defined by Joseph Nye, refers to ‘the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies’.14 Soft power is exercised by governments, foundations, businesses, religious groups and other non-government organisations (NGOs).15 Many large philanthropic foundations, such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, use their large budgets to exercise soft power and influence policy in the sectors where they operate, such as education (see Box 9.1) and health. Three family members govern the Gates Foundation and in many ways these three 1905: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching 1913: Rockefeller Foundation 1936: Ford Foundation 1950: Approximately 2,000 foundations in the US 1980: Make-a-Wish Foundation 1980: Nearly 22,100 foundations with assets of US $48 billion 1988: Walton Family Foundation 1990: Roughly 32,400 foundations with assets of US $143 billion 1999: Eli and Edythe Broad Foundation 2000: Approximately 56,600 foundations with assets of US $486 billion 2000: Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 2001: William J. Clinton Foundation (renamed Bill, Hillary & Chelsea Clinton Foundation in 2013) 2012: Nearly 86,200 foundations with assets of US $715 billion

Figure 9.1

Growth of philanthropic foundations in the US.16

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members now steer current global health policies.17 In 2002, the Gates Foundation distributed more than US$1.2 billion to grants and programmes, which was more than quadruple the World Health Organization’s (WHO) operating budget of US$250 million.18 The Gates Foundation, however, has come under criticism from organisations like WHO, which claim that it is difficult to find independent reviewers not funded by the Gates Foundation to serve as reviewers for health research proposals.19 It is not only the Gates Foundation, however, that seeks to exercise soft power as many other modern-day foundations also seek to influence the policy environment in which they work and, to that end, award grants that focus on particular topics or programmes that promote a particular ideology or point of view.20 Philanthropic organisations have a long history of supporting programmes in particular sectors, notably education and health. Sectors are typically chosen based on need but there is also the Box 9.1

Private philanthropy undermining public education

In addition to its focus on global healthcare, the Gates Foundation has been funding and promoting neoliberal reforms in US education, alongside other major philanthropic players such as the Walton Family Foundation and Eli and Edythe Broad Foundation.21 Gates, Walton, Broad and other philanthropists have been advocating for private sector management of public schools and the replacement of traditional public schools with privately run charter schools.22 The recent shift towards charter schools in the US has been strongly driven by these philanthropic organisations, which have given billions of dollars in grants to school operators and districts that will promote charter schools.23 The ideology behind this contains neoliberal values that espouse a distrust of government efficiency, a belief in small government and an increased desire for the privatisation of the education sector. Despite studies showing no clear evidence of increased student achievement24 and many charters failing,25 the privatisation of public schools continues to be unabatedly promoted by these foundations. Foundations that support charter schools contend that they provide greater school choice for families. However, in reality, charters benefit only select students and can exacerbate inequities.26 Additionally, forprofit charter schools are particularly incentivised to cut costs, which has historically led to rejecting costly students (e.g., those with special needs or English as a second language), underpaying experienced teachers, hiring cheaper less experienced teachers (e.g., using Teach for America), and altering test scores to attract greater funding.27

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feel-good factor and the desire to support work that will be popular with the general public (thus improving the image of the funders). In recent years one of the most popular sectors to fund has been youth, which has meant that large amounts of money have become available to non-profits working in this sector from both foundations and governments. In the UK alone, more than 70 per cent of philanthropic funders give, either directly or indirectly, to youth while far less is spent, for example, on programmes for the elderly or the environment (see Figure 9.2). This could be a reflection of the need in the youth sector or of the fact that the general public is likely to look more favourably upon programmes targeting youth as opposed to less visible sectors, thus making supporting youth a priority for many foundations. While there is nothing inherently wrong with a focus on youth, there is the danger that, in sectors that are saturated with funds, there is less accountability for the non-profit providers receiving the funding. In the UK, the recent case of the Kids Company charity and its misappropriation of millions of pounds of foundation and taxpayer monies (see Box 9.2 below) provides a cautionary tale. Globally, in high-profile sectors such as youth, where there is an

Figure 9.2 Main areas of philanthropic foundation funding in the UK.28

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POLICY MAKING IN THE GCC Exploiting youth in the name of doing good

The Kids Company charity scandal in the UK highlighted the tendency for public officials and celebrities to want to be seen to be helping charities supporting youth. Since its establishment in 1996 the charity, which was ostensibly supporting at-risk youth, received endorsements from public figures like Richard Branson, Prince Charles and the band Coldplay.29 As a result of widespread support, the charity had an annual budget of approximately £25 million (US$37 million).30 In 2015, it was found that Kids Company had misappropriated millions of pounds and significantly over-reported the number of its beneficiaries.31 Just prior to the charity announcing insolvency and coming under investigation for fraud, the UK government gave it £3 million pounds (US$4.4 million) after receiving pressure from British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Creative Director, Alan Yentob (who also served as the charity’s Chairman), who claimed that children and families would be devastated and become a public threat if the charity closed.32 Associating not funding a charity with the harming of children meant that the government was put in a no-win situation and thus chose to release the funds. However, less than a week later, the charity closed.33

abundance of funding and often a shortage of implementers, this kind of graft becomes more common and is something that foundations need to be wary of. While philanthropy is traditionally associated with individuals or families, the 1980s saw the development of a new form of philanthropy, one funded by governments. Government operated non-government organisations, or GONGOs as they are typically referred to, have proved increasingly popular since the 1980s34 and have allowed nation states to exercise soft power through channels other than traditional aid departments. In 1983 the US government created the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).35 Today, NED is involved with more than 1,000 projects led by various non-governmental groups working to promote democracy in over 90 countries.36 Correspondingly, in China in the 1980s there was a shift towards the use of GONGOs rather than traditional state-led development programmes. Chinese GONGOs are still growing on the international stage and are operating across the world, particularly in Africa.37 Over the ten-year period of 2003 – 13, China is estimated to have committed US$75 billion in aid to development projects across all but four countries on the continent.38 In Africa, China makes use of GONGOs with an

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‘NGO-like appearance’39 to run and influence programmes, with the majority of the projects targeting government/society, health and education.40 The utilisation of these GONGOs not only increases China’s standing as a major global aid player but also increases the country’s soft power through foreign governments actively seeking out the assistance of such organisations.41 Globally, beginning with the rise of industry and accelerating post2000, there has been an explosion in the philanthropic sector, not only on the part of individuals but also on the part of governments. Internationally this has meant that there are new players in the development field that are no longer constrained by the laws and regulations governing nation states and the private sector now has a growing footprint in development, for better or worse. If we look now at the GCC, we can see that there has been a similar rise in Westernstyle philanthropy over the past 15 years.

Philanthropy in the Gulf Philanthropic giving is not new in the GCC, where Islam and its associated requirement of zakat42 has influenced a longstanding charitable culture.43 While religious faith, a sense of duty and the desire to give back continue to be important reasons for individual philanthropic giving in the region today,44 the formalised structure of giving back through philanthropic institutions is a relatively new undertaking. In a preliminary mapping of Arab philanthropy in eight Middle Eastern countries (including four GCC countries, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE) Ibrahim and Sherif found that while the premise of giving was historically rooted in the region, most current philanthropic institutions are only a few decades old.45 Similar to the development of foundations in the West, Ibrahim and Sherif found that laws and government policies play a vital role in the development of philanthropic work in the region and that state officials often set the trend for giving.46 In 2013 foundations, corporations and families in the Gulf donated US$1.84 billion (including an exceptionally large five-year grant of US $1.25 billion by the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development) to a variety of causes.47 In terms of areas of giving, the majority of donations from the Gulf region were allocated to charities overseas48 and the primary areas of focus were human services, education and arts, culture and

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the humanities.49 Within the countries of the Gulf, the UAE has proved to be home to some of the most generous individuals in the world, with both state and non-state figures giving generously to a range of sectors and that is the focus of the second half of this chapter.

Philanthropy in the UAE Prior to 2003 there were few Western-style philanthropic foundations in the UAE.50 While the UAE, like other Muslim countries, has a longstanding culture of benevolence, giving was typically done through local charities, which often had religious ties, or through using discrete personal channels.51 Over the past decade the establishment of Western-style foundations across the country has created new avenues for instigating social change domestically and internationally. In 2013, the UAE was ranked by Coutts as the most benevolent nation amongst all GCC countries, with its 26 donations making up 80 per cent of the total value of all philanthropic giving in the region.52 While the UAE is relatively small, with a population of 9.3 million,53 it is nevertheless home to at least 33 philanthropic institutions. Foundations examined for this study were identified using several criteria: they had to be funded and/or cofunded by the UAE government or members of a ruling family; self-identify as a ‘foundation’ or a ‘fund’ (with the exception of Dubai Cares); receive the majority of their funding, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, from the state; distribute grants, donations, in-kind gifts, scholarships or the equivalent and be actively operational. Initially, 33 philanthropic institutions across all seven emirates of the UAE (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Fujairah, Ras Al Khaimah and Umm Al Quwain) were assessed against the aforementioned criteria. Of the 33 institutions, only 11 foundations fitted our definition. The 11 foundations therefore included in this study (in order of year established) are the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD), the Abu Dhabi Music and Arts Foundation (ADMAF), the Make-A-Wish Foundation UAE, Emirates Foundation, Dubai Cares, the Dubai Foundation for Women and Children (DFWAC), the Mohamed bin Zayed Species Conservation Fund, the Sharjah Art Foundation, the Sheikh Saud bin Saqr Al Qasimi Foundation for Policy Research, the Salama bint Hamdan Al Nahyan Foundation and

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the Al Jalila Foundation. Hereafter, they are each referred to as a ‘foundation’. Following their identification, qualitative data was taken from websites and compiled, and then upper-level management and mid-level staff at each of the foundations were invited to participate in an interview to provide more insight into their operations and missions. Ten of the 11 foundations identified participated in interviews. Naturally, there were some limitations to the research. The online presence of foundations varied greatly, with some having more sophisticated websites with detailed information and others that were outdated with minimal information. While this was challenging in the initial stages of data collection, website data was later supplemented with interviews. There were also some topics that were not open for discussion, such as budget details and nationalities of staff, and information about these areas remains unclear. Following the interviews and collation of print and online material, we pieced together an overview of state-funded philanthropy in the UAE, which included examining when and where institutions were established, the ways in which they communicate with stakeholders and finally their key grant and programmatic areas. The findings are explained in more detail in the sections below.

Creation, Location, and Communication In terms of when the majority of foundations in the UAE were created, we can see in Figure 9.3 that nine out of the 11 foundations included in this chapter were started in 2003 or later, reflecting a foundation boom occurring over roughly the past decade. This is consistent with the rapid growth of philanthropic institutions globally over the same time period.54 The two exceptions to this were the ADFD, which was established in July 1971, just prior to the formation of the UAE, and ADMAF. Established in 1996, ADMAF’s operations, however, only really gained momentum in 2004, when it started the annual Abu Dhabi Festival, making it more in line with other foundations. Overall, therefore, there has been a rapid increase in state philanthropy from 2003 onwards and this shows no signs of abating. A new foundation operating under the auspices of the Ruler of Ajman was inaugurated in 2015 as we were finalising this chapter.55 Regarding the location of foundations, we found that the capital of the country, Abu Dhabi, is home to the most state foundations,

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Figure 9.3

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Years of establishment.

with six located in the emirate. Dubai, the financial hub of the country, boasts the second-largest number of foundations with three, while Sharjah and the northern emirate of Ras Al Khaimah have one state-funded foundation each. The physical locations of foundations can be seen on the map in Figure 9.4. There were some cases when a foundation had a head office and also additional offices within the same emirate (e.g., Salama bint Hamdan Foundation) or had plans to open branches in other emirates (e.g., Emirates Foundation) but these are not displayed below. Following the global trend of philanthropy being focused on close to home causes,56 most of the foundations examined for this study focus on domestic/regional issues. Eight of the 11 foundations primarily focus on domestic issues and typically they dedicate the majority of resources to their specific emirate, although there is some work happening countrywide. The three foundations that focus on international issues primarily do so through by distributing funds or grants to specific areas of focus in the outside countries and do not typically have staff or offices in the foreign countries as the work or research is being implemented by third parties. One aspect that was stressed by all foundations was the importance of effective communication. Whether with the local

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Figure 9.4

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Locations.

community, donors, government entities or other groups, the foundations we spoke to strove to connect with their stakeholders using as many means as possible. As a part of their communication strategy, the majority of foundations use their websites and various social media accounts to promote their grants and programmes. All 11 of the foundations in this chapter had a YouTube channel with at least one video posted and are actively using the website to share information.57 Foundations in the UAE also use Instagram, Facebook and Twitter to reach targeted audiences. As shown in Figure 9.5, each of the foundations, with the exception of the Mohamed bin Zayed Species Conservation Fund, use Instagram, Facebook and Twitter to some degree. Figure 9.5 also shows the number of users for each of the social media channels, with the largest social media reach, in terms of combined number of followers, being Facebook (177,030), followed by Twitter (138,920)

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Social media use and number of followers.58

and finally Instagram (25,500). In interviews with foundation staff, Instagram was described as a platform growing in popularity in the country, particularly as a way to reach younger, local audiences. In contrast to this, Facebook was regarded as a platform used largely to attract and inform international audiences, with some foundations only using English on their Facebook accounts. Ten of the 11 foundations in the study have bilingual websites, and foundations in the UAE typically post and publish materials in both Arabic and English. During interviews, foundations described how vital bilingual materials are as they serve both a local and expatriate community (expatriates are almost 90 per cent of the UAE population).59 A concern heard repeatedly during interviews was the difficulty of having accurately translated materials, whether from English to Arabic or vice versa, as important messages and nuances can be easily lost in translation. In contrast to high usage rates of social media, only four out of the 11 foundations published annual reports, even though these reports help establish credibility in the marketplace for foundations and serve as a valuable reflection exercise for staff.

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Key grant and programmatic activities Overall, the interviews and publically available materials revealed a variety of grant and programmatic activity taking place across the different foundations. Grants are typically awarded through a formal application process, although in some cases they are given to specially nominated individuals. Some grants are awarded to UAE nationals to send them overseas, and are given to help finance their study abroad, to support their participation in international workshops and to encourage them to volunteer in foreign countries. Conversely, grants are also used to bring in foreign and local talent to do research, run short-term training and to lead other programmatic or strategic activities. In terms of the accessibility of programmatic activities, all of the eight foundations that run programmes in-country predominantly offer them for free. While these programmes sometimes require registration, they are typically open to all members of the UAE community. However, most programmes are specifically geared towards Emiratis (e.g., the majority of Emirates Foundation’s programmes are designed to develop Emirati youth). Regarding the areas of focus for foundations in the UAE, Figure 9.6 shows that they work across a variety sectors, and that the four main focus areas are education and youth, health, arts and culture and infrastructure.

Education and youth Education and youth is the most common area of focus for foundations, with the Al Qasimi Foundation, ADMAF, Salama bint Hamdan Foundation, Emirates Foundation, Sharjah Art Foundation and Dubai Cares all working in this area. In Ras Al Khaimah, the Al Qasimi Foundation runs programmes in collaboration with UAE public schools, including programmatic activity for students, teachers and administrators from both private and public schools (see Box 9.3). ADMAF and the Salama bint Hamdan Foundation run educational programmes outside of school hours for students, families and teachers based in Abu Dhabi. The Salama bint Hamdan Foundation also collaborates with major international universities, such as Yale, to develop early childhood programmes in Abu Dhabi.

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Figure 9.6

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Main programmatic areas of UAE foundations.

With 45,000 young people in its database, Emirates Foundation has also created a series of educational programmes across the country for local youth, focusing on areas such as entrepreneurship, mentoring and organised volunteering. One of Emirates Foundation’s primary programmes is Takatof, which is a programme that supports youth volunteerism in association with a variety of social programmes, both domestically and abroad. Other foundations, such as Dubai Cares, focus on education in international contexts, financing primary education projects (e.g., establishing libraries, translating books and building schools) in over 35 countries (see Box 9.4). Meanwhile, the Sharjah Art Foundation runs education programmes related to the arts (see Box 9.5).

Health Health is the second major area that foundations are focusing on in the UAE, with the Al Jalila Foundation, Make-A-Wish Foundation UAE, the Salama bint Hamdan Foundation, Dubai Cares and the

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Box 9.3 The Al Qasimi Foundation: philanthropy for research, policy and practice60 The Sheikh Saud bin Saqr Al Qasimi Foundation for Policy Research is dedicated to the social, cultural and economic development of the emirate of Ras Al Khaimah. Founded in 2009 by His Highness (HH) Sheikh Saud bin Saqr Al Qasimi, UAE Supreme Council Member and Ruler of Ras Al Khaimah, the Foundation employs a hybrid approach that links research, policy and practice to achieve its objectives and contribute to the Ras Al Khaimah community. At the centre of this approach has been a focus on education. The Research Department of the Al Qasimi Foundation is central to its work, as through research generated by in-house and external researchers, papers are written and then programmes are designed. In 2015, the Al Qasimi Foundation (with a team of only 25 people) published 14 research papers, awarded seven research grants, ran eight teacher professional development courses, led two programmes to promote skills development among vulnerable populations and offered a range of courses to prepare over 220 Emirati students for university study overseas. The Al Qasimi Foundation realises its role requires it to be continually adapting to meet the needs of Ras Al Khaimah’s evolving society. Its delivery of demand-driven programmes initiated from the ground-up and support for researchers at the teacher, doctoral and faculty levels has enabled a hybrid model of in-kind philanthropy that is deeply embedded in and committed to the local community.

Al Qasimi Foundation all operating in this arena. The Al Jalila Foundation’s sole remit is for the support of the health sector, in both the UAE and the wider region, through providing scholarships and supporting research. The Al Jalila Foundation also has plans to open the Al Jalila Foundation Research Centre in 2016 to act as ‘a beacon for regionally-relevant medical innovation produced by home-grown biomedical researchers’.61 Make-A-Wish, in collaboration with hospitals, works to grant wishes to children aged 3–18 who have life-threatening medical conditions designated by Make-A-Wish International. Wishes granted include meeting famous celebrities and being a princess for a day, amongst other things. The Salama bint Hamdan Foundation also works in the health sector and runs health awareness campaigns, funds health research grants and works on system reviews with public health authorities. One area of the health sector that the Salama bint Hamdan Foundation is focusing on is Alzheimer’s disease. It has hosted a talk about treating and preventing

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Alzheimer’s through its Muntada speaker series, in addition to supporting four researchers to conduct a public health system review of memory care (in collaboration with Karolinska Institutet and Abu Dhabi Health Services Company).62 The Al Qasimi Foundation has some activity in the health sector through the provision of grants for visiting researchers in the field of public health in Ras Al Khaimah. Dubai Cares is focused on programmes in developing countries and has funded public health programmes overseas, such as child deworming projects in developing countries like India, Angola and Liberia.

Arts and culture The third key area that UAE foundations are focusing on is that of arts and culture. Foundations working in this area are the Sharjah Art Box 9.4

Dubai Cares: an international emphasis63

Dubai Cares was founded in 2007 by HH Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice President and Prime Minister of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai, to provide children in developing countries with access to quality primary education. Dubai Cares receives its funding from various government bodies (e.g., Dubai Electricity and Water Authority (DEWA) and HH Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum), private companies (e.g., Visa and CitiBank) and private individuals. The organisation believes that education is ‘one of the most effective tools to break the cycle of poverty’64 and strives to support children regardless of their nationality, creed or religion. Since its founding Dubai Cares has reached over 13 million children in 39 developing countries. The organisation works to improve the quality of education through programmes focusing on improving early childhood education, school health and nutrition, sanitation facilities and teacher training. Although Dubai Cares’ focus lies on international initiatives, the foundation also supports domestic engagement, encouraging Dubai residents to volunteer and donate. For example, an annual Walk for Education fundraiser takes place in Dubai, with approximately 10,000 participants showing up. Dubai Cares operates out of the emirate of Dubai with a team of approximately 30 staff. Programmes are designed by Dubai Cares and implemented by partnering NGOs or other entities, such as Save the Children, Care International, Plan, Oxfam or the United Nations International Children’s Fund (UNICEF), in the targeted countries. Dubai Cares’ social media presence is one of the strongest of the UAE foundations (see Figure 9.5), with the organisation actively using Twitter, Instagram and Facebook in both English and Arabic. Dubai Cares has over 125,600 followers on Facebook and 81,700 followers on Twitter.65

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Foundation, ADMAF, the Al Qasimi Foundation and the Salama bint Hamdan Foundation. The Sharjah Art Foundation and ADMAF focus almost solely on the arts. The Sharjah Art Foundation runs exhibits, funds projects, publishes a variety of artist publications and leads community art events, primarily in Sharjah (see Box 9.5). ADMAF devotes resources to education, community outreach and cultural events associated with arts, primarily in Abu Dhabi, and more broadly across the country. With a team of 30 full-time employees, ADMAF’s programmes include organising the Abu Dhabi Festival, funding arts-related awards and grants and running theatre and music programmes with special needs students, amongst other things. Started in 2004, the Abu Dhabi Festival is ADMAF’s largest annual event. In 2014, the Festival ran 34 productions (e.g., classical, dance and jazz performances) and 115 events over 29 days, and these were attended by almost 30,000 people.66 While not their only priority area, other foundations, such as the Al Qasimi Foundation and the Salama bint Hamdan Foundation, host

Box 9.5 Sharjah Art Foundation: promoting the arts and art education67 Formally established in 2009, the Sharjah Art Foundation is headed by Her Excellency Sheikha Hoor Al Qasimi and is supported by the Government of Sharjah’s Department of Culture and Information. The foundation is an expansion of the work of the Sharjah Biennial, which started in 1993 to serve as a cultural bridge between artists and institutions, both regionally and internationally. Today, the Sharjah Art Foundation continues to organise the Sharjah Biennial, while also offering variety of programmatic activities and disbursing grants to both locals and expatriates. In addition to the Biennial, the Sharjah Art Foundation runs a residency artist programme, education workshops and a community garden, while also offering grants, art publications and physical spaces for art displays. In 2010, the foundation started running education programmes. Currently, it also hosts weekly free arts events for the community. When events are in high demand, the foundation prides itself on never turning visitors away and making extra space. At the Sharjah Art Foundation there are roughly 50 full-time and 50 part-time staff members, along with other volunteers and interns. The foundation works to foster a team environment for its staff through daily staff lunches at the office and staff trips. Large-scale events and collaborations are planned roughly three years in advance at the foundation.

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events to engage the community in the arts and culture. For example, the Al Qasimi Foundation hosts a monthly Community Gatherings Series and the annual Ras Al Khaimah Fine Arts Festival. Similarly, the Salama bint Hamdan Foundation funds scholarships for nationals and long-time residents to study the arts, in addition to supporting domestic arts and culture-related programmes. Infrastructure. Infrastructure is the final major area of focus for foundations in the UAE. In particular, the ADFD and Dubai Cares are heavily focused on this sector, although largely at the international level. Dubai Cares takes on infrastructure projects such as funding the building of schools in developing countries, while ADFD acts as a development aid agency of the Abu Dhabi government and supports international infrastructure projects such as funding building roads, houses and other initiatives. On a smaller scale, the Al Qasimi Foundation also works on infrastructure through funding research on urban planning in the emirate of Ras Al Khaimah. Foundations across the UAE are therefore working in a wide array of sectors. Their efforts have been invaluable in promoting the arts and education and in getting youth actively involved in many exciting volunteering opportunities. By being able to be more flexible and responsive to needs than their government counterparts, they are able to fill gaps and meet needs as they arise, and this is one of their many strengths. Foundations also demonstrate a commitment to the population on behalf of the rulers of the different emirates, and reflect an overwhelming desire to improve the quality of life in the UAE. The final part of this chapter offers some conclusions and areas for future research.

Conclusions and areas for future research Overall, this preliminary examination of state-funded philanthropy in the UAE raised more questions than answers. While it exposed some areas of over- and undersupply, it also revealed several areas where future research would be beneficial in assisting and understanding state-funded foundations in the UAE. In terms of over- and undersupply, there is an abundance of foundation programmes targeting gifted youth and not enough foundations tackling issues related to the environment and family wellbeing. The areas for future research include examining evaluation practices, a closer

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investigation of staffing issues, ensuring foundations’ sustainability, investigating ways to improve collaboration and more theoretically exploring the raison d’eˆtre behind the notion of state foundations in general. When looking at the core activities of state-funded foundations in the UAE, it is clear that education, youth and health are areas that are popular across many foundations. In particular, education programmes for high-achieving Emirati youth are found across the country. These are programmes that exist alongside many other opportunities for gifted youth, sponsored by different ministries, local government agencies and foundations. This poses problems for foundations in that they often end up competing with each other and with other agencies for the same students. A student in Ras Al Khaimah, for example, chose to forgo an opportunity to study abroad with the Al Qasimi Foundation in order to take up another, more lucrative opportunity with a different agency. While this is good from the talented student’s point of view, the situation reflects that there could be too many programmes targeting the top achievers. Conversely, there are probably too few programmes targeting youth who are struggling. Supporting domestic at-risk youth is a focus for only one foundation, despite low international test scores and the number of students dropping out of school in the UAE.68 More programmes for disadvantaged youth, who may not be so academically inclined, would make a valuable addition to the programmes on offer by foundations. In contrast to the abundance of education and youth programs, there is a serious shortage of programs focused on environmental issues. The Mohamed bin Zayed Species Conservation Fund is the only foundation dedicated to the environment in the UAE but it largely operates outside of the country (see Box 9.6). Internally, only one other foundation addresses the environment, despite a host of serious environmental issues in the UAE, such as a shortage of water, vulnerable and endangered native animals and threatened ecosystems.69 As such, the environment is an area that would greatly benefit from more attention. Family well-being is another neglected area, with only the Dubai Foundation for Women and Children working specifically in this field. DFWC was the first licensed shelter in the UAE and provides a great deal of assistance for at-risk women and children. It also helps in

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Box 9.6 Mohamed bin Zayed Species Conservation Fund: a lone voice for the environment70 As the main environmental philanthropic institution in the Middle East, the Mohamed bin Zayed Species Conservation Fund was established in 2008 to give grants to individual species conservation initiatives. The fund is a philanthropic endeavour of the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, HH General Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, who started the fund with an initial endowment of approximately US$29 million. The endowment structure means that institution has been created with a long-term and sustainable vision. Headquartered in Abu Dhabi, the fund has a global reach despite its small staff of only nine people. Ninety-seven per cent of its grants are given to projects targeting species outside of the UAE. In 2013, projects in 83 countries were supported, with a total of over US$1.34 million awarded. Unlike the other foundations in this chapter, the fund does not use social media to target those working in the species conversation field (see Figure 9.5). Instead, it uses targeted networks of actors in the environmental field to spread the word to conservationists about the grants. Grants from the fund are highly competitive, with only 13 per cent of roughly 1,500 applications receiving funding in 2013.

the fight against human trafficking. While there are other official government initiatives working on this issue across the country, family well-being is not an area that other state-funded foundations have been focused on. However, this is a space that also needs greater attention as increasing divorce rates, domestic violence and human trafficking cases require organisations to help women, children and families who may be suffering.71 In many emirates there is currently nowhere for women to turn to in case of an emergency, especially if they are not Emirati. In terms of research, there are also areas of need. The long-term impact of programmatic work conducted by these foundations needs to be properly studied, not only help to determine if grants and programmes are achieving the desired outcomes,but also to ensure funds are being used efficiently. Research that looks at even a single programme in a particular organisation would be a meaningful and positive addition to the current scarce literature on the topic, and if made public would set the trend for other foundations to follow. It is not good enough only to list the amount of training held or certificates awarded; rather, impact must be determined with regard to sustainable outcomes.

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Foundation staffing is a second area that would benefit from additional research, both through a closer examination of national and non-national staff and of the staffing pipeline. This would include exploring where current philanthropic staff come from, how long they stay and possible ways to improve retention. During the writing of this chapter the chief executive of one foundation in the study suddenly disappeared from the foundation’s website and was replaced with an acting head, with no mention of the previous executive or where they might have gone. Such sudden moves do not inspire confidence within the sector and will make it hard to attract senior talent, especially from overseas. As foundations work with communities and other partners, having a high turnover of staff, especially at the executive level, can undermine trust and damage good relationships. The sustainability of state-funded foundations is a third area where research would be useful. Of particular benefit to the long-term view would be exploring issues such as how foundations can ensure financial sustainability and thus longevity. Only one foundation in the study operated with an endowment, which meant that it did not have to spend time being concerned with the financial situation of the country or shifting policy priorities. As a result, this foundation was able to focus more on the daily operations of the organisation. Research in this area might include an examination of some ways to leverage waqfs72 for greater financial sustainability. Other means of ensuring sustainability recently put forward in venture philanthropy circles in the UAE73 include the use of Social Impact Bonds (SIBs), however, these are highly complex and risky and can incentivise profit-driven behaviour over stakeholder well-being.74 Fourthly, additional research on some of the ways that foundations could strengthen collaboration, both with other foundations and with government bodies, would be valuable. Many foundations recognised that it takes a long time to build productive foundation–foundation and foundation–government relationships and noted that, even after such relationships are established, they are difficult to maintain since they require stability in staff on all sides. The need for greater collaboration between foundations countrywide, whether through sharing ideas, best practices, and/or combining financial resources for greater impact, was raised in interviews. Collaboration with government agencies was also said to be

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difficult, yet necessary, as they often have mandates in the same areas in which local foundations are operating. Foundations spoke about complications working with ministries or government bodies, stating they sometimes met resistance when trying to gather data or run programmes, even though they were state funded. Relationships between government agencies and other foundations can be precarious if there is competition to show that each is doing a good job. As such, research not only on how to best bring these entities together but also on how to clarify and define the responsibilities and mandates of foundations with each other and with government entities would be beneficial. The final area for future research deals with the broader question of why state-funded foundations exist. A deeper examination of their purpose would be beneficial, not only at the theoretical level, but also at practical level, both for the individual/s seeking to establish a foundation and for those who are tasked with running them. One of the primary reasons foundations are established in the West includes tax relief. However, that same motivation does not hold in the UAE as foundations operate in a tax-free environment. This means additional research is needed to determine the purposes and expectations of foundations and their leadership, whether it is to embrace what has become considered modern in terms of charitable giving, to act as aid delivery vehicles, to overcome civil service inefficiencies, to serve as a PR vehicle for a particular individual or entity, to exercise soft power, to act as a policy laboratory or perhaps some other reason. Clarification in this area would enable foundation executives and staff to meet their benefactors’ expectations fully through better focusing activities. A deeper understanding of all of the above issues could lead to more effective and wider-reaching philanthropy, and also provide insight into the directions that the state itself might choose to take in the future. Ultimately, the UAE government and the various ruling families have demonstrated a clear desire to help both Emiratis and non-Emiratis through the creation of numerous state-funded philanthropic foundations. The UAE is now well regarded as a centre of philanthropy that benefits people both near and far. It is hoped that these endeavours continue to grow and mature and, with greater support and more research, perhaps serve as new models for state-funded philanthropy across the region.

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Notes 1. Mehtab Currey, Abdullah Al-Shoaibi and Nassir Al-Kasabi, ‘Saudi Arabia’s support for international development’, presentation to the Gulf Research Meeting, Cambridge, 24 – 27 August 2015. 2. Coutts, ‘Middle East’, report, 2014. Available at http://philanthropy. coutts.com/en/reports/2014/middle-east-gcc/findings.html (accessed 6 April 2015). 3. Olivier Zunz, Philanthropy in America: A History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), pp. 4, 172 and 173; Sujani K. Reddy, Nursing and Empire: Gendered Labor and Migration from India to the United States (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), p. 75. 4. Joan Roelofs, Foundations and Public Policy: The Mask of Pluralism (New York: SUNY Press, 2003), pp. 7 – 8. 5. Helmut Anheier and Siobhan Daly, ‘Philanthropic foundations: a new global force?’, in Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor (eds), Global Civil Society 2004 – 5 (London: Sage, 2004), pp. 158– 76. 6. Ibid. 7. Foundation Center, ‘Key facts on US foundations’, 2014. Available at foundationcenter.org/gainknowledge/research/keyfacts2014/pdfs/ Key_Facts_on_US_Foundations_2014.pdf (accessed 28 May 2015). 8. Joan E. Spero, Charity and Philanthropy in Russia, China, India, and Brazil, Foundation Center, 24 March 2014, p. v. Available at http:// foundationcenter.issuelab.org/resource/charity_and_philanthropy_ in_russia_china_india_and_brazil (accessed 28 May 2015). 9. William P. Barrett, ‘How the other half gives’, Forbes, 30 October 2001. Available at www.forbes.com/forbes/2000/1030/6612104a.htm l (accessed 6 April 2015). 10. Foundation Center, ‘Key facts’, p. 2. 11. Robert W. Wood, ‘Why aren’t those $26.4m speech fees taxable to Bill & Hillary Clinton?’, Forbes, 26 May 2015. Available at http://www. forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2015/05/26/why-arent-those-26-4mspeech-fees-taxable-to-billhillary/#31877d4bfff0 (accessed 6 April 2015). 12. Jonathan Allen, ‘Exclusive: Clinton charities will refile tax returns, audit for other errors’, Reuters, 23 April 2015. Available at http:// www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-clinton-taxes-exclusiveidUSKBN0NE0CA20150423 (accessed 6 April 2015). 13. Ibid. 14. Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p. 17. 15. Ibid. 16. National Philanthropic Trust, ‘Philanthropy timeline’. Available at www.nptrust.org/history-of-giving/timeline/1900s/ (accessed 9

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18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

24.

POLICY MAKING IN THE GCC August 2015); Claire O’Connor, ‘Report: Walmart’s billionaire Waltons give almost none of own cash to Foundation’, Forbes, 3 June 2014. Available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/clareoconnor/ 2014/06/03/report-walmarts-billionaire-waltons-give-almost-noneof-own-cash-to-family-foundation/ (accessed 9 August 2015); Foundation Center, ‘Key facts’, p. 2; Todd Alan Price, John Duffy and Tania Giordani (eds), Defending Public Education from Corporate Takeover (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2012), p. 109. Michael Edwards, ‘Why “philanthrocapitalism” is not the answer: private initiatives and international development, doing good or doing better’, in Monique Kremer, Peter van Lieshout and Robert Went (eds), Doing Good or Doing Better: Development Policies in a Globalising World (Amsterdam: WRR Investigation, 2009), pp. 237 – 51, p. 249. Anheier and Daly, ‘Philanthropic foundations’. Edwards, ‘Why “philanthrocapitalism” is not the answer’, p. 249. Roelofs, Foundations and Public Policy, p. 28. Kenneth J. Saltman, The Gift of Education: Public Education and Venture Philanthropy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 33. Kenneth J. Saltman, ‘Neoliberalism and corporate school reform: “failure” and “creative destruction”’, Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies 36/4 (2014), pp. 249 – 59, p 54. Kenneth J. Saltman, ‘Putting the public back in public schooling: public schools beyond the corporate model’, DePaul Journal for Social Justice 3/1 (2009), pp. 9–39, pp. 9, 18; ‘All current investments’, The Eli and Edythe Broad Foundation. Available at http://broadfoundation. org/education/ (accessed 15 October 2015); Motoko Rich, ‘A Walmart fortune, spreading charter schools’, The New York Times, 25 April 2015. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/26/us/a-walmartfortune-spreading-charter-schools.html?_r¼1 (accessed 15 October 2015). Julian R. Betts and Y. Emily Tang, ‘The effect of charter schools on student achievement: a meta-analysis of the literature’, National Charter School Research Project, University of Washington Bothell, October 2011, p. 55. Available at econweb.ucsd.edu/,jbetts/Pub/ A75%20pub_NCSRP_BettsTang_Oct11.pdf http://www.crpe.org/ sites/default/files/pub_NCSRP_BettsTang_Oct11_0.pdf(accessed June 15, 2016); Mike Rose, ‘The mismeasure of teaching and learning: how contemporary school reform fails the test’, in Michael B. Katz and Mike Rose (eds), Public Education Under Siege (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), pp. 9–20, p. 17. Moise´s Naı´m, ‘Democracy’s dangerous impostors’, The Washington Post, 21 April 2007. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/04/20/AR2007042001594.html (accessed 15 October 2015).

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25. Sam Dillion, ‘Ohio goes after charter schools that are failing’, The New York Times, 8 November 2007. Available at www.nytimes.com/2007/ 11/08/us/08charter.html?pagewanted¼ all http://www.nytimes. com/2007/11/08/us/08charter.html (accessed June 15, 2016). 26. Kevin Welner, ‘Free-market think tanks and the marketing of education policy’, in Katz and Rose, Public Education Under Siege, pp. 67– 74, p. 69. 27. Saltman, ‘Putting the public back in public schooling’, p. 19. 28. Cathy Pharoah, Richard Jenkins and Keiran Goddard, ‘Giving trends top 300 foundations: 2014 report’, Association of Charitable Foundations, 2014, p. 6. Available at http://www.acf.org.uk/ downloads/publications/Giving_Trends_Top_300_Foundations_ 2014.pdf (accessed 15 October 2015). 29. Guy Adams, ‘Why does Kids Company Camila tell so many tall stories about her life? This troubling investigation reveals her own colourful account of her past doesn’t quite add up’, Daily Mail, 28 August 2015. Available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3214710/ Why-does-Kids-Company-Camila-tell-tall-stories-life-troublinginvestigation-reveals-colourful-acount-past-doesn-t-quite-add-up. html (accessed 6 April 2015). 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Steven Swinford, ‘Alan Yentob warned Kids Company closure “could lead to riots”’, The Telegraph, 25 August 2015. Available at www. telegraph.co.uk/news/bbc/11823864/Alan-Yentob-warned-KidsCompany-closure-of-could-lead-to-riots.html (accessed 6 April 2015). 33. Ibid. 34. David Brenner, ‘Are Chinese NGOs “going out”?’ The role of Chinese NGOs and GONGOs in Sino-African relations’, Journal of Public and International Affairs 2012, pp. 131 – 52, p. 135. Available at https://www.princeton.edu/jpia/past-issues-1/2012-2/2012.pdf (accessed 6 April 2015). 35. Naı´m, ‘Democracy’s dangerous impostors’. 36. The National Endowment for Democracy homepage: http://www. ned.org/ (accessed 15 May 2015). 37. Brenner, ‘Are Chinese NGOs “going out”?’, pp. 135, 136, 138. 38. Claire Provost and Rich Harris, ‘China commits billions in aid to Africa as part of charm offensive – interactive’, Guardian, 29 April 2013. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/interactive/2013/apr/29/china-commits-billions-aid-africa-interactive https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/interactive/ 2013/apr/29/china-commits-billions-aid-africa-interactive (accessed June 15, 2016). 39. Brenner, ‘Are Chinese NGOs “going out”?’, p. 139.

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40. Provost and Harris, ‘China commits billions’. 41. Ibid.; Brenner, ‘Are Chinese NGOs “going out”?’, p. 136. 42. Zakat is one of the five pillars of Islam that mandates individuals donate a percentage of their wealth to benefit those less well off. 43. Dina H. Sherif, ‘The United Arab Emirate’, in Barbara Ibrahim and Dina H. Sherif (eds), From Charity to Social Change (Cairo: The American University at Cairo Press, 2008), pp. 165 – 83, p. 165; Maysa Jalbout, ‘The case for engaging Arab donors in financing global education’, Brookings, 31 October 2014. Available at https:// www.brookings.edu/research/the-case-for-engaging-arab-donors-infinancing-global-education/ (accessed 15 October 2015). 44. Forbes Insights, ‘2015 BNP Paribas individual philanthropy index: a wealth of choices: complexities of today’s philanthropy’, BNP Paribas Wealth Management, February 2015, p. 9. Available at http:// images.forbes.com/forbesinsights/StudyPDFs/BNPPWM_Forbes_ Philantropy_2015-REPORT.pdf (accessed 15 October 2015). 45. Ibid., p. 11. 46. Ibid., pp. 18 and 172. 47. Coutts, ‘Middle East’, report, 2014. 48. Ibid. 49. Ibid. 50. Sherif, ‘The United Arab Emirate’, pp. 165 and 171 – 2. 51. Ibid. 52. Coutts, ‘Middle East’, report, 2014. 53. World Bank, ‘United Arab Emirates, world development indicators’. Available at http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-arab-emirates (accessed 6 April 2015). 54. Spero, ‘Charity and philanthropy in Russia, China, India, and Brazil’, p. v. 55. Abdulaziz Bin Humaid Foundation, ‘About us’. Available from www.abdulazizlp.com/aboutus/abdulaziz-foundation.html (accessed 3 October 2015). 56. Coutts, ‘Common trends across the region’, 2014. Available at http:// philanthropy.coutts.com/en/reports/2014/executive-summary.html (accessed 1 September 2015). 57. We have defined ‘actively posting’ as meaning uploading one video during the period of 9 August 2014 to 9 August 2015. 58. Figures taken from social media websites during the period 20 – 28 May 2015. 59. ‘Expats make up over 88% of UAE population’, Emirates 24/7, 17 April 2011. Available at www.emirates247.com/news/expats-make-upover-88-of-uae-population-2011-04-17-1.381853 (accessed 8 June 2015). 60. The authors of this chapter are affiliated with the Al Qasimi Foundation.

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61. Al Jalilia Foundation, ‘About us’. Available at http://www.aljalila foundation.ae/who-we-are/about-us/ (accessed 12 May 2015). 62. Salama bint Hamdan Al Nahyan Foundation, SHF presentation, 2015, p. 14. 63. Interview with Dubai Cares, 2015; Dubai Cares, ‘Programs report 2012 – 2013’, pp. 1– 3; Dubai Cares, ‘Our story’. Available at http:// www.dubaicares.ae/en/article/about-us/our-story-1.html (accessed 8 June 2015); Dubai Cares, ‘Walk for education 2015’. Available at http://www.dubaicares.ae/en/campaigns/campaigns-events/section5/walkforeducation.html (accessed 8 June 2015). 64. Dubai Cares, ‘Programs report 2012 – 2013’, p. 1. 65. This contains a note and a citation: ‘In October 2015, Dubai Cares and 27 other development organisations in Dubai, operating in areas such health, poverty, culture, education and community empowerment, were amalgamated into a single organisation, the Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum Global Initiative’. ‘Dh1b Mohammad Bin Rashid Al Maktoum global initiatives launched’, Gulf News, 4 October 2015. Available at http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/dh1bmohammad-bin-rashid-al-maktoum-global-initiatives-launched-1. 1594711 (accessed 8 June 2015). 66. Interview with Abu Dhabi Music and Arts Foundation, 2015: Abu Dhabi Music and Arts Foundation, ‘ADMAF yearbook 2013 – 14’, 2014, p. 96. Available from http://www.admaf.org/en/media/get/ 20160620_4-ADMAF-Yearbook-2014.pdf (accessed 8 June 2015). 67. Interview with Sharjah Art Foundation: Sharjah Art Foundation, ‘Mission and history’. Available from http://sharjahart.org/ sharjah-art-foundation/about/mission-and-history (accessed 24 May 2015). 68. Sharmila Dhal, ‘UAE students score “abysmally low in maths, problem solving”’, Gulf News, 9 April 2014. Available at gulfnews. com/news/uae/general/uae-students-score-abysmally-low-in-mathsproblem-solving-1.1316989 (accessed 8 June 2015): Natasha Ridge, Samar Farah and Soha Shami, ‘Patterns and perceptions in male secondary school dropouts in the United Arab Emirates’, working paper 03, February 2013, Al Qasimi Foundation, pp. 35 –7. Available at http://www.alqasimifoundation.com/admin/Content/File1612201535124.pdf (accessed 8 June 2015). 69. Sanya Nayeem, ‘How you can help save the UAE’s endangered species’, Gulf News, 22 December 2014. Available at http://gulfnews. com/your-say/your-reports/how-you-can-help-save-the-uae-sendangered-species-1.1430372 (accessed 28 May 2015). Muhammad F. Al-Rashed and Mohsen M. Sherif, ‘Water resources in the GCC countries: an overview’, Water Resources Management 14/1 (2000), pp. 59 – 75: Umer Hafeez Goursi, Malik Rapaie and Abid Mehmood, ‘Conserving the hidden nature: an overview on conservation efforts

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70.

71.

72. 73. 74.

POLICY MAKING IN THE GCC in United Arab Emirates (UAE)’, Annual Research and Review in Biology 7/6 (2015), pp. 408– 14, 409 – 11. Interview with Mohamed bin Zayed Species Conservation Fund (MBZSCF), 2015: MBZSCF, ‘Annual report 2013’, pp. 6– 8. Available at http://www.speciesconservation.org/media/mbz-species-conservationfund-38.pdf (accessed 28 May 2015); MBZSCF, ‘Endowment’. Available at http://www.speciesconservation.org/about-us/endowment (accessed 28 May 2015). Nick Webster, ‘Social media and money blamed for increasing UAE divorce rate’, The National, 11 August 2015. Available at www. thenational.ae/uae/social-media-and-money-blamed-for-increasinguae-divorce-rate (accessed 28 May 2015); Wam, ‘UAE domestic violence cases up 50% in H1 2014’, Emirates 24/7, 26 August 2014. Available at www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/uae-domesticviolence-cases-up-50-in-h1-2014-2014-08-26-1.560878 (accessed 28 May 2015): Jen Thomas, ‘Human trafficking cases on the rise’, The National, 25 April 2011. Available at www.thenational.ae/news/ uae-news/human-trafficking-cases-on-the-rise (accessed 28 May 2015). A waqf refers to a religious endowment in Islam. Emirates Foundation Youth Philanthropy Summit 2015, conference in Abu Dhabi, 26 – 28 October 2015. Duncan Green, ‘Development impact bonds and impact investing – genuine impact, or snake oil?’, Oxfam blogs, 2 August 2013. Available at oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/development-impact-bonds-and-impactinvesting-genuine-impact-or-snake-oil/ (accessed 28 May 2015).

10 THE ROLE OF PRIVATE, NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS AND NEW STATE INSTITUTIONS IN THE GULF IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY: THE EXAMPLE OF SAUDI ARABIA Adam Kulach

Introduction The awakening of civil society across all the GCC Member States and the emergence of different relevant organisational/institutional forms channelling the energy of both Gulf citizens and residents involved in this process has been perhaps one of the most interesting societal phenomena in recent years. The absence of Western-style legal grounds to regulate the non-government organisation sector has led non-government organisations (NGOs) to operate either in accordance with regulations that govern formal state organisations or in the ‘grey margins’ of society. The lack of a clear framework and the uncertainty that this brings helps Gulf monarchies achieve prevailing ambitions to retain control over the public activity of citizens. Saudi Arabia has been no exception in this regard. Recent years (after 2001 and even more so since 2014) have seen the establishment of new institutions and platforms for discussion, gradual expansion of scope for public debate and growing interest of Saudis in engagement

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in public discussions or decision making processes at the state, regional and local levels. At the same time some of the already functioning institutions such as non-profit organisations, charities and foundations, in addition to business-related institutions, professional associations and literary/poetry clubs, have started exploring and searching for new areas of activity in response to new expectations and social demand. This has been complemented by the expansion of private educational institutions having broader social and public impact ambitions, more socially engaged traditional media, the rapid development of social media and the internet and their widespread use. Finally, it coincided with an increased degree of attention paid at least by an important part of the Saudi royal leadership and government to the new societal challenges related to the growing citizens’ interest in state affairs and the search for a new style of communication between the king and state institutions and the Saudi public.

The NGO framework: the role of formal and informal institutions in advancing citizen engagement Traditional (for the realities of the Saudi political and social system) forms of citizens’ engagement in discussions on issues of public interest, serving as tools meant not only to ensure the loyalty of the ruled towards the rulers but also to enable addressing the existing grievances and complaints used to include: 1) petitions to higher authorities voiced or conveyed during periodic meetings with the king, crown prince, governors and other senior royals open for the Saudi public; 2) diwaniyas, majalis (councils) or open houses held regularly by tribal leaders, officials, prominent businessmen and other renowned personalities; 3) letters and messages to media outlets discussing and raising issues of public interest. They are mostly not subject to specific modern day legal regulations, but still continue to play an important role in maintaining at least a certain form of direct communication channel between the citizens on one side and the top-level members of the royal family, regional governors, locally important princes, officials and tribal leaders. Media, especially newspaper columns and at times quite extensive opinion or editorial pages, here additionally play a role of a transmission belt enabling outreach to a larger public.

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In most recent years (since 2004 onwards) the above forms have been more and more effectively complemented among others with: 4) functioning of enhanced and partially elected (since 2005) municipal councils; 5) real possibility to observe plenary debates and discussions or to send in questions and inquiries to Shura (Consultative) Council debates; 6) National Dialogue Center; 7) National Society for Human Rights and its regional branches; 8) academic or business forums and conferences; 9) art galleries and poetry and film clubs; 10) professional or business organisations and associations; 11) non-profit, charitable or philanthropic private foundations and institutions; 12) expanding private colleges and universities; 13) authorised (state sponsored) and non-authorised campaigns; 14) rapidly growing internet and social media use and outreach and; 15) continuously expanding scope of traditional media debates. The institutions and entities referred to have been established either by specific royal decrees/orders or licenced based on existing laws and regulations relevant to the specific category of institutions (on charitable and non-profit institutions, professional organisations, literary clubs, etc.). The common denominators of all those regulations have been their exclusiveness and restrictiveness. As a rule, they do not provide space for activities other than those enumerated in the specific licence, by-laws or the charter and are subject to monitoring and control by various state authorities (mostly line ministers but also Royal Court or Cabinet). In Saudi realities, paradoxically the relatively greatest independence has often been enjoyed by institutions established by Royal Decrees either based on Basic Law of Governance (Shura Council) or reflecting strategic decisions taken by subsequent Saudi monarchs, as they are usually financed from dedicated financial endowments (or independent state budget allocations) and report only to the King (National Dialogue Center, National Society for Human Rights), so they cannot be directly influenced by other levels of Saudi administration or bureaucracy. An equally broad amount of flexibility has been enjoyed – within their respective scopes of activity – by non-profit or charitable/educational foundations and institutions established, and at least initially funded, by influential royals who would also provide a necessary ‘political’ umbrella or ‘cushion’ against unwanted interference in their functioning from other state or religious establishment actors

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when needed. Examples – among many others – of such institutions include: .

.

.

.

.

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the Al-Nahda Philanthropic Society for Women, which helps to promote women’s empowerment socially and economically through implementing the vision aimed at making women ‘active partners in the development of Saudi Arabian society’;1 the King Faisal Foundation, which undertakes a whole range of public activities from promoting global excellence in science through international and regional initiatives focusing on intercultural and interreligious dialogue;2 the King Khalid Foundation, whose ambition is to ‘provid[e] innovative solutions to critical socio-economic challenges in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’,3 whose range of activity includes influencing legislation (i.e., on the prevention of the abuse of women and children), offering training and running public awareness campaigns, such as that run in 2013 focusing on domestic abuse and violence; the Arab Open University network, which draws on the experiences of its UK equivalent, with the curricula adapted to the local culture and needs;4 AGFUND (the Arab Gulf Program for Development), which promotes global and regional public and private partnerships through implementation of development assistance projects;5 Alwaleed Philanthropies (established by Prince Talal’s son, the business tycoon Alwaleed), which defines its mission as empowering women and youth, developing communities, bringing cultures together and providing vital disaster relief.6

As the three last institutions operate predominantly outside Saudi Arabia, their detailed scope of activities will not be analysed further in this chapter, but all three naturally have an impact on Saudi civil society as they promote community-oriented relief and development activism. Since the first partial municipal elections held in 20057 municipal councils have established themselves in many parts of Saudi Arabia as genuine centres capable of unleashing the energy of local communities. Enjoying the partial popular elected mandate, the councils have not only contributed to the improvement of the aesthetic image

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of hundreds of even remote Saudi towns and villages, but also allowed the Saudis to start realising the impact of a given composition of local representative bodies. This has been especially remarkable in several towns across the Eastern Province, where the majority of Saudi Shi’a community live. Local community leaders in Qatif and some other locations have been able to run the whole network of activities ranging from art promotion through business skills development to public lectures and discussions related to some of the key national and regional challenges, under the patronage and within the organisational framework of the councils to which they had been elected. The participation of women in the 2015 municipal elections added to the importance and representativeness of this element of local self-governance in the country. Recent years have also witnessed a growing interest among Saudis in the workings of the Shura (Representative) Council, the appointed 150-member advisory consultative chamber, which has developed over time into an institution playing an increasingly important role within the state structures’ set-up. Although the council formally enjoys only limited legislative powers, it is internally organised in a similar way to most parliaments and it has gained in relevance and importance through occasionally hot and agitated debates on both internal and foreign policy issues of real public interest (which tend to be at times more genuine and substantial than is the case of some elected parliaments in the region), broadcast by state TV. Its role in initiating or shaping and fine-tuning legislation and influencing key executive decisions has also increased. In 2013 King Abdullah appointed 30 women as members for the first time, announcing that they should constitute at least one-fifth of all members. Women’s arrival as Shura Council members has visibly improved further the overall level and quality of debates. Citizens can observe the proceedings from a special dedicated visitors’ balcony, a right they seem to be using more and more often. It has also become an established practice that individual Shura members would consult with the Saudi public (mostly online) about some of the questions to be raised at plenary sessions or during questioning of government officials. The King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue was established in 2003 as part of the post-9/11 efforts aimed at addressing selected issues identified as key in the process of building a society more

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capable of absorbing steps towards modernisation in the context of the globalised world. It has contributed to the broadening of the scope for public debate in Saudi Arabia, holding ten thematic sessions organised in different cities of the country from June 2003 through February 2014.8 Topics of the discussions (usually attended by several hundred participants) included such important issues as ‘National unity and international relations’, ‘Fighting religious fanaticism and extremism’, ‘Women’s rights and duties’, ‘Youth’s expectations’, ‘The National vision for dealing with world cultures’, ‘Education: reality and ways of improvement’, ‘Dialogue between society and work establishments’, ‘Dialogue between society and medical establishments’, ‘Media: reality and ways of improvement’ and ‘The effect of ideologies on national unity’. All Dialogue’s debates have been held in an open format conducive to engaging participants in meaningful lively exchanges and formulating recommendations and have on a number of occasions been followed (mostly on TV) with interest not only by Saudis but also by citizens of other GCC member states not familiar with this kind of open discussion. The key issue for the centre seems to be the ability to maintain public interest in its proceedings without prejudice to the relevance or importance of the issues raised or quality of the respective debates. Mark Thompson argues that through the national dialogue the Saudi government has sought to transform the Saudi patrimonial state into a hegemonic state. In the former, the House of Saud ruled through extended networks between patrons and clients. In the latter state, the government rules through the active consent of major sections of society. Thompson argues that the ultimate purpose of the House of Saud’s hegemony over society is to instil a Saudi national identity manufactured by the royal family. The King Abdulaziz Centre for National Dialogue, alongside annual celebrations of the Saudi National Day, promotes this Saudiness. By inviting representatives of marginalised elements of Saudi society, such as Shiites or youth, into a state-controlled national forum, it makes these groups part of a government-led national endeavour. In this process, the House of Saud persuades Saudi society to accept its beliefs and values.9 Although the National Society for Human Rights, established in 2005 and financed out of a dedicated royal endowment, is perceived as being closely associated with the Saudi government it has quickly

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gained a reputation of a solid actor dealing with several aspects of human rights in the country. The Society has so far: issued five reports on human rights in Saudi Arabia; conducted regular inspections of prison facilities helping to improve detention conditions in the country; monitored selected judicial cases; raised at times sensitive issues with government institutions and following up on citizens’ complaints (an important example refers to the issue of ‘security prisoners’, whose number was significantly reduced in recent years as a result of the society’s interventions); and established dedicated ‘hotlines’ for reporting human rights abuses, mostly related, among other issues, to instances of family violence against women and children and abuses on foreign domestic workers. The society has been able to attract and integrate a number of renowned human rights activists to work in its regional offices and has been studying international human rights and conventions, in addition to issuing recommendations for the government on how to address selected human rights related issues. it has also been organising meetings and seminars to promote human rights awareness in Saudi society. Families of a number of jailed activists have confirmed the society’s helpfulness in effectively solving basic humanitarian issues such as improving prison conditions, allowing family visits, the provision of adequate medical care, etc. In some cases the society has been able to achieve release of wrongfully incarcerated detainees. As a rule, the society functions strictly within the existing legal order and it does not undertake interventions in cases of people with serious security-related charges or perceived from outside (by international NGOs and others) as prisoners or detainees of conscience. Academic or business forums and conferences (the most renowned being the Jeddah Economic Forum and Riyadh Economic Forum, organised by respective chambers of commerce) also play important roles in the process of the development of civil society in Saudi Arabia. They all have relatively unrestricted freedom to discuss various sensitive issues, such as corruption-related challenges, drug abuse, Saudisation, poverty and social housing, women’s empowerment and employment, ways of attracting foreign and domestic investors while ensuring active (as much as possible) participation and follow-up from relevant governments institutions.

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In Saudi reality, where citizens have limited scope to voice their views and opinions on the social realities publicly, art has played a special role in helping people express themselves. This relates not only to poetry and literary clubs that traditionally serve as platforms for unrestricted discussions on a number of social issues but also public art galleries featuring works of local Saudi artists, including women (with exhibitions occasionally also hosted by foreign diplomatic missions) using art to illustrate their emotions and frustrations. It also includes such forms as underground rock groups and bands performing exclusively on private grounds to wellselected and vetted audiences and a relatively new phenomenon in Saudi Arabia, which is the emergence of a film industry (despite the ban on the operations of regular cinemas). The latter has become known to the wider public after a series of international successes by the socially engaged Saudi – German co-production movie Wadjda (2012), considered the first ever feature film with a Saudi cast and shot entirely in Saudi Arabia. In addition, a number of Saudi short films and documentaries have been produced and the second Cinemaless Saudi Film Festival, held in Dammam in February 2015, attracted more than 60 short films (selected from over 120 submissions) competing for Golden Palm Tree trophies, with most of the participating filmmakers being under the age of 25. Many of the films in question touch on important social topics that are the subject of current popular Saudi public debates; issues such as poverty, women’s status and employment, the environment, crime (including domestic violence), drug abuse, labour-related issues, identity problems and others – thus adding to the development of civil society through the provision of an innovative vehicle enabling another dimension of discussion on some key internal ‘hot’ social issues. Professional or business organisations and associations (chambers of commerce and industry, associations of lawyers, engineers, medical doctors, journalists, educators and others) regularly go beyond their regular scope of activities as well, serving not only as platforms for discussions on various current issues but also enabling them to exercise democratic procedures in the elections of internal bodies, an issue which will hopefully pay off in the future when those become more popular and used in another context of participation of citizens in the state affairs.

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At the forefront of the non-profit actors dealing with the issue of women’s empowerment in Saudi Arabia, and one of the oldest and most reputable institutions of that sector, has been the Al-Nahda Philanthropic Society for Women. Established in 1962 under the patronage of Princess Effat Al-Thunayan, the wife of the late king Faisal, the society – run by a group of dedicated pioneering and visionary women – has evolved over time from volunteer efforts related to general social service into a comprehensive charitable nonprofit institution aiming at women’s social, cultural and economic empowerment. During its more than 50 years of functioning, the society has implemented a large number of projects in the fields of social welfare, family health, special needs (helping for example to develop a network of education institutions to aid families raising children with Down’s syndrome), human capital development and the promotion of female employment. All realised projects are undertaken on the basis of needs studies and guided by the need to serve the principle of achieving sustainable and comprehensive female development. The society conducts its multifaceted work through offering training opportunities and rehabilitation programmes (many of them run with the help of renowned external partners), organising workshops and seminars, employment promotion (supporting volunteer work in addition to both short- and long-term employment in the public and private sectors) and material support meant to help Saudi women achieve an increased degree of personal economic independence and self-confidence that would enable them to find their fully fledged rightful place on the labour market and in the society as a whole. The King Faisal Foundation, established in 1976, is a Saudi nonprofit institution with international ambitions and probably the greatest global outreach. Founded with the mission of ‘preserving and perpetuating King Faisal’s legacy’, a monarch who ‘had his eyes set on advancement while keeping a foot on tradition’, the Foundation defines itself as the one ‘pushing the boundaries to empower the generations of the future’.10 Financed out of profits from its large and diversified portfolio of investments, the foundation has been able to establish and develop over the years five pillar or core projects meant to ‘enrich knowledge and reward scholars locally, regionally and globally, support scientific research and enhance education in Islamic societies’.11 These are:

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(1) the King Faisal International Prize, awarded every year in five categories: service to Islam, Islamic studies, Arabic language and literature, medicine and science; (2) the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, a leading Saudi private institution not only conducting its own research and possessing an impressive collection of old Islamic manuscripts but also committed to disseminating knowledge on religious, social and religious issues, a task that is carried out through hosting public lectures by foreign and Saudi academics and foreign visiting officials in the climate of fairly unrestricted debate; (3) the King Faisal School (up to a high school pre-university level), the first Saudi national school that has applied international standards to its curriculum; (4) Alfaisal University, a private higher education establishment developed since 2008 with the aim of producing research and graduates who are capable of coping with the challenges of building the knowledge-based economy; (5) Effat University (earlier known as Effat College), the first ever female-only university, based in Jeddah, which promotes modern education and employability linked with social responsibility and community outreach among women.12 All the foundations’ activities are largely focused on education as the most important vehicle to promote social modernisation and prepare new generations of Saudis to increasing interactions with the contemporary world and have been effectively adding, though in different ways and forms, to the development of civil society. The most important of these is the promotion of critical thinking and cultivation of the culture of public debate, in addition to the expansion of societal capabilities to absorb further reforms and various aspects of future possible change. A special place on the map of civil society development-oriented non-profit charitable organisations established by prominent Saudi royals (which would require a more detailed, in-depth study), belongs to the Riyadh-based King Khalid Foundation, established in 2001 by the family of King Khalid, who ruled from 1975 until 1982. Apart from its statutory goal of promoting the legacy of the former

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monarch, the foundation, which employs only some 20 –30 people, focuses on the promotion of capacity building, research and support for non-profit organisations through donations, grants, training and research. Since its inception the foundation, working in partnership with a number of renowned external national and foreign (mainly US) partners, has managed to implement a number of impressive projects. Its Program Department consists of three centres dealing with different aspects of social and economic development, namely: 1) the Non-profit Organisation (NPO) Support Center: 2) the Project Support Center (PSC); and 3) the Emergency Support Center (ESC). The most prominent results under research and legal framework development achieved by the foundation so far have been a draft Women and Child Abuse Prevention Law, endorsed and adopted by the government in 2013, making it the first ever case in the history of Saudi Arabia that the legislation proposed by an NGO became a law in force, and a research study on the development of an Islamic Orphans Village Organisation. The foundation’s NPO Support Center activities include: (a) training programmes focusing on non-profit management and business skills, proposal writing, project development, fundraising strategies and volunteering; in addition to the development of general managerial skills; (b) creating a database of all non-profit organisations in Saudi providing basic information on each entity, including name, address, contact details, mission and vision;13 (c) operating the Non-profit Resource Clearinghouse, designed as a toolbox and information resource manual to efficiently help nonprofit organisations in the development of their mission and vision. The services offered here include: access to information and resources for NPOs (both funding agencies and grantees), including definitions used in relation to the NPO sector, access to national and international best practice examples in non-profit leadership, management and performance; access to ‘How to’ manuals and guidelines on strategic planning, capacity building, change management, evaluation, budgeting and fundraising, information about rules and regulations on establishing and operating non-profit organisations in Saudi Arabia and a list of

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relevant national, regional and international events such as conferences, workshops and seminars; (d) running a non-profit organisation online community portal serving as a permanent discussion forum for non-profit sector actors and offering links to both international thematic portals or websites and relevant online courses; and (e) partnership building activities aimed at encouraging and facilitating non-profit collaboration initiatives through organisation of workshops, conferences and meetings, focusing inter alia on NPO management and development, and the idea of responsible philanthropy, in addition to facilitating public – private partnerships between non-profit entities, foundations, businesses and government for the benefit of local communities. The Project Support Centre functioning within the foundation deals with: a) grant making (soliciting proposals from non-profit sector actors related to economic development, social change, training and capacity building, evaluating them and offering grants based on its results); b) training focused on strengthening the capacity of all relevant local stakeholders, including non-profit organisations, government officials, municipalities and community groups, in addition to identifying development needs, training the trainers, development and implementation of various community-based projects; c) partnership building aiming at encouraging local community and development collaboration through stimulating relevant intellectual debates, organising national and international workshops and facilitating public – private partnership initiatives between non-profit actors, local communities, business and government for the benefit of local communities; and d) monitoring and evaluation, which includes monitoring and oversight of project implementation, measuring the impact and effectiveness of the emergency support and using lessons learned to inform future grant making activities. The foundation’s Emergency Support Centre focuses on providing effective and strategic grant making assistance for disaster and emergency relief through: a) establishing emergency guidelines and criteria based on internationally recognised standards and best practices; b) provision of emergency grants, from identification of

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emergency situations through developing internal and soliciting external emergency aid proposals to making grants; c) monitoring and evaluation activities’ and d) partnership building through advance identification of potential grantees and through exploring partnership and cooperation potential, close collaboration and coordination with relevant government agencies, in addition to working with the media to inform the public on the emergency situation and the offered or needed support. Apart from formally established and legally functioning institutions described earlier, recent years have also seen the mushrooming of informal or statu nascendi institutions with ambitions to deal, independently from official bodies, with the monitoring and protection of human rights or abuses of state institutions. Some, such as the Adala Center for Human Rights, attempted, without success, to get an official licence for their activities and following the final refusal by Ministry of Social Affairs (in 2013) abandoned the idea for fear of possible legal action against them. Some, like Human Rights First – despite the absence of an official licence and regular publication on its website of quite outspoken and critical content (including that originating from international NGOs related to monitoring selected aspects of human rights situation in the country)14 – have been somehow tolerated by the authorities. Others, such as prominent members of the Saudi Civil and Political Rights Association (ACPRA), blogger Raif Badawi’s online initiative ‘Free Saudi liberals’ or lawyer Waleed Abu AlKhair’s ‘Monitor of human rights in Saudi Arabia’, who decided to embark on a path of at least partially challenging legitimacy of the Saudi state or its legal and judicial system, have been subjected to prosecution on various charges (mostly related to the alleged undermining security of the state or insulting Islam or the judiciary) and sentenced to long prison terms. Among popular forms of engaging Saudi citizens’ energy and interest in current ‘hot issues’ and contemporary world affairs there have been public campaigns (legally organised, informal or illegal under Saudi laws and regulations). Legally organised campaigns would include either relief or emergency assistance fundraising campaigns (following natural disasters or in response to acute humanitarian needs in a particular country) or awareness campaigns related to issues such as energy efficiency or water

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conservation, but also touching on some sensitive topics such as domestic violence, genetic marriage compatibility, drug abuse or disease prevention. Informal or illegal campaigns would mostly include periodic campaigns about allowing women to drive or calls for the release of prisoners, with participants in the latter risking at least brief detention or prosecution as a consequence. An interesting example of an informal women-led and addressed framework can be seen in the popular ‘Baladi’ initiative, which in recent years has focused on the promotion of women’s empowerment, their rights awareness and emancipation, through activities ranging from defying ban on women driving to the promotion and assisting of women’s registration for municipal elections. The NGO draft law, although discussed in past years at the Shura Council, has not been so far translated into law through a Cabinet decision or Royal Decree. The new (2015) leadership of the Ministry of Social Affairs has, however, has the ambition of preparing and enacting a new law or set of regulations that, based on selected European and Western experiences, would see the whole Civil Society Organisations sector in Saudi Arabia revamped and equipped with the necessary legal framework.

Public debates and the growing civil society leverage in the social and economic spheres: The role of the media Another remarkable feature of recent years is the ongoing development and substantial broadening of the scope of public debates, mostly in the media (both printed and electronic) but also at the Shura Council, academic, business or other public forums. The Saudi Arabia of 2015 is in this context very different from Saudi Arabia of 2003 and 2004. Such important societal topics as: women’s rights, including driving; foreign labourers’ and domestic helpers’ rights, youth problems, including unemployment and ways to address the issue; domestic abuse and violence; the need to establish a minimum legal age for marriage; unfair lawsuits and verdicts; sexual harassment and sexual abuse, including in relation to children; the stigmatisation of employment in certain jobs; the quality of public services; the quality of education; exposing ridiculous or opaque fatwas and the Islamic scholars issuing them; the need to scale back the scope of religious subjects taught at schools to provide space for more science,

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practical and employability education; radicalisation and deradicalisation and the need to confront religious extremism and religiously motivated terrorism; Shia community grievances; the environment and pollution; drug abuse; genetic diseases related to close consanguineous marriages; the abuse of public funds and the fight against corruption and;15 the competence of officials, have all been among the topics that have not only gradually entered the public space but have also become a constituent part of the public debates involving a growing number of Saudis. New subjects, hitherto considered ‘taboo’ either in the entire society or in the media, tend to appear regularly. It is also worth mentioning that some of these issues continue to be taboo in some other GCC Member States, despite the fact that their national media outlets have been regularly ranked higher in international rankings measuring media freedom. Social media constitutes a separate phenomenon. According to data found on statista.com16 as at the fourth quarter of 2014, 29 per cent of the total population of Saudi Arabia were active social media users with a penetration rate ranging from 22 per cent for WhatsApp, 21 per cent for Facebook and 19 per cent for Twitter (according to other data almost half of all Arabic language Twitter content globally originates from Saudi Arabia), with all other communicators (Google þ , Instagram, Skype) also popular. Social media has developed into a very important tool for asserting ambitions to be socially active in the eyes of Saudis from all walks of life, from conservative or controversial Islamic scholars to dissidents with instances (or numbers) of people actually prosecuted for social media posts being relatively low and limited to cases deemed by the authorities as touching on or undermining basic principles (religious or political) of the Saudi state.

The predicament of political and human rights activism, religious sensitivities and opportunities for an effective state –civil society interaction in the Saudi setting While since the accession to the throne of late King Abdullah in August 2005 the scope for civic activism has objectively grew in Saudi Arabia over the 10 years to 2015, particularly in relation to social issues mentioned earlier, the Saudi state (and one could risk

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saying the majority of Saudis) does not yet seem ready to accept citizens’ right to express freely their opinions on key issues such as the political system, religious values (especially the monopolistic omnipotent role of Islam understood as the main source of the constitution, Qur’an and Sunnah, and jurisprudence or Shariah law). The same applies to those advocating human rights in relation to unrestricted freedom of speech and freedom of religion or belief. As long as the majority or a large visible part of Saudi society will not consider and assert clearly that limitations in this regard should be relaxed, far-reaching changes in this respect cannot be expected anytime soon. On the other hand, there seems to be growing realisation that citizens should be given, and expect to be given, sooner rather than later, a greater role or say in state decision making processes one way or another. This is also true of the royal leadership, as can already be seen from several occasions since January 2015, particularly in the way in which the new king, Salman, addressed his subjects on accession day, when he not only became the first Saudi monarch to use Twitter to communicate with the nation but also forcefully stressed his vision of serving his fellow Saudis. Moreover, the impact of the low oil price on the standard of living will necessitate improved state – society communication. The government needs to both explain and justify the budgets cuts that it started making in 2016 to the wider society. This may lead to the addition of further competencies to Municipal Councils and the Shura (Consultative) Council – eventually, in terms of a few years to come, at least partially elected – or the introduction of new and the use of existing mechanisms to ensure citizens’ role in exercising some degree of control over how executive powers are exercised, regionally and locally, and especially how public and state funds are allocated and cleared. Such steps, aimed at increasing the sense of ownership and identification of citizens with their state, including those belonging to ethnic and sectarian minorities, would be of tremendous importance and could be even considered ‘desired milestones’, in ensuring the long-term stability of the Kingdom, as well as the continuation both of reforms and pf providing solid ground for further national modernisation efforts.

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Religious sensitivities (especially those touching on existing sectarian tensions) will continue not only to underpin all major developments across Saudi Arabia, the Gulf and the broader region in many ways, but they will also have a visible impact on the speed, modalities and direction of the Saudi civil society’s development, with this being somehow the function of intensity of tensions, enmity versus state’s readiness to allow citizens to have a greater say, the margin of freedom in co-managing state affairs and the ability of citizens to have their views heard. Ways the Saudi state can further engage with the emerging or already established civil society actors will also depend greatly on the dynamics of regional and international developments, with the perpetuation of regional instability risking empowering more conservative elements in both royal leadership and the religious establishment, thus adding to an increased degree of assertiveness in dealing with civil society as a whole (and possibly also resulting in a reduced appetite among or pressure from citizens for new openings in civil society development. A calmer and more stable external environment could help create additional space that would prove to be more conducive to further development of civil society opportunities and could lead in a longer-term perspective to a gradual increase of the level of citizens’ participation and say in both decision making processes and daily management of state affairs.

Notes 1. The Al-Nahda Philanthropic Society for Women homepage: http:// www.alnahda-ksa.org/Home.aspx (in Arabic). 2. The King Faisal Foundation homepage: http://www.kff.com. 3. The King Khalid Foundation homepage: http://www.kkfeng.org. 4. The Arab Open University homepage: http://arabou.edu.sa 5. AGFUND homepage: http://agfund.org. Both the Arab Open University network and AGFUND are flagship undertakings of Prince Talal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, a royal pioneer of civil society, constitutional monarchy and rule of law-minded critical thinking in Saudi Arabia, dating his activism back to 1950s. 6. Alwaleed Philanthropies homepage: http://alwaleedphilanthropies.org 7. 50 per cent of the total number of members. 8. See Mark C. Thompson, Saudi Arabia and the Path to Political Change: National Dialogue and Civil Society (London: I.B.Tauris, 2014), pp. 236– 7.

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9. Ibid. 10. The King Faisal Foundation (KFF). Available at http://www.kff.com (accessed 5 June 2015). 11. Ibid. 12. Effat University homepage: www.effatuniversity.edu.sa. 13. Accessible at the KFF website: http://www.kff.com www.kff.org.sa 14. Human Rights First Society homepage: http://hrfssaudiarabia.org. 15. King Salman made a remarkable statement on 3 June 2015 in the presence of top officials that nobody, including the King himself, can be put above the law. ‘King, Lebanese premier discuss regional issues’, Arab News, 4 June 2015. 16. https://www.statista.com.

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CONTRIBUTORS

Rhea Abraham is pursuing her doctorate in Gulf Studies from the India-Arab Cultural Centre, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. Her research focuses on the political reforms in Saudi Arabia and Qatar and their implications for Indian foreign policy. Her research interests include Qatari socio-political developments and India-Gulf relations and she has published on topics such as the Indian Diaspora in the Arab Gulf and issues of GCC regional integration. Nassir Alkasabi is Head of Project Management Office, Operations Department of the Saudi Fund for Development, KSA, where he appraises, evaluates, monitors and supervises development projects. He established the Project Management Office and is currently working on aid effectiveness improvement. Alanoud Alsharekh is Research Associate at the London Middle East Institute at SOAS and her focus is primarily on sociopolitical, cultural and security issues. She has published several books and articles on gender and kinship policies in the GCC examining the persistent importance of family and tribe in modern Gulf politics and society. Her work won the Arab Prize for best publication in a foreign journal for 2013 –14 and the Voices of Success Kuwait Award in 2012. Mehtab Currey, Development Counsellor, Department for International Development, UK, is currently posted to Saudi Arabia to partner more effective development financing, particularly in fragile states, by the multilateral Islamic Development Bank and by the Saudi

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government’s bilateral Saudi Fund for Development and the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre. Over the last 20 years she has represented DFID widely in Asia, Africa, Europe, Latin America and the Gulf. Sherif Fawzi Abdel Gawad is Executive Director and Partner at Arab African Advisers consultancy based in Cairo, Egypt. He is an expert in good governance and has advised governments in various countries in the MENA region on different areas of governance, such as public administration reform, institutional development and regulatory reform. Shafeeq N. Ghabra is Professor of Political Science at Kuwait University. His recent writings include Kuwait and the Dynamics of State and Society (2011) (in Arabic), Hayat Ghayr Amina (Unsafe Life: The Generation of Dreams and Disappointments) (2012), Kuwait at the Crossroads (2013) and ‘The Egyptian Revolution of 2011’ in Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring, ed. Larbi Sadiqi (2015). Gauri Gupta is Head of Analytics and Technology at The Talent Enterprise. With a strong background in quantitative research, including conducting large-scale research and analytics, she is an expert in working with big data and advanced statistical modelling, including techniques such as cluster analysis, factor analysis, structural equation modelling, discriminant and conjoint analysis. David Jones is Founder and Managing Director of The Talent Enterprise, a human capital ‘think’ and ‘do’ tank. David is the coauthor of the book titled Unlocking the Paradox of Plenty and has also published widely in academic journals as well as leading consulting reports such as the MENA Labour Market Confidence Index, ‘Al Masar: Human Capital Imperatives for Expo 2020’, The Qudurat Report and The Aon Hewitt People Risk Index. Maggie Kamel is General Manager and Partner at Arab African Advisers consultancy based in Cairo, Egypt. She is an expert in public policy and monitoring and evaluation. She has been engaged in many consultancy projects aiming to enhance public service delivery.

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Faisal Kattan is a senior economist at the Gulf Research Center. His research interests include state formation, political economy and wealth distribution, and citizenship theory and pedagogy in Saudi Arabia. He holds a master’s degree in Economics and Public Policy from the London School of Economics and a master’s degree in the Political Economy of the Arab World from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. Abdullah Kaya is currently studying his PhD degree in the Department of Engineering Systems and Management at Masdar Institute of Science and Technology (MIST) in Abu Dhabi, UAE. He obtained his MSc degree from the same department with a thesis titled ‘Dynamics of technology strategy under changing regulatory regimes: an analytical framework and a case study on the global solar photovoltaic industry’. Susan Kippels is Research Fellow at the Sheikh Saud bin Saqr Al Qasimi Foundation for Policy Research, Ras Al Khaimah, United Arab Emirates. Her research interests include philanthropy and education, private education in the Gulf and Arab migrant teachers. Adam Kulach is currently Head of EU Delegation in Djibouti but has spent most of his career on Arab/Gulf Affairs. He served as Poland’s Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Oman in 2004 – 10 and Head of EU Delegation in Riyadh, also covering Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar in 2012 –16 (until 2013 also accredited to UAE). Radhika Punshi is Founder and Director of Innovation at The Talent Enterprise. An HR professional and organisational psychologist, she has lived in the GCC for over 15 years. Her prime focus is on nationalisation and local talent development, with an emphasis on gender and youth inclusion. She is the co-author of a book titled Unlocking the Paradox of Plenty. Neil Quilliam is Senior Research Fellow in the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. He also serves as Director for Strategic Advisory Services at Rapidan Group, an energy consultancy. Quilliam is an expert in international relations of the Middle East and focuses

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on the Gulf Arab states, Syria and Lebanon. Recent publications include a contribution to the book Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy: Conflict and Cooperation (I.B.Tauris, 2016) and an article in the journal East Asia (2015). He advises European governments on foreign policy issues and energy companies with operations in the region. Natasha Ridge is Executive Director of the Sheikh Saud bin Saqr Al Qasimi Foundation for Policy Research, Ras Al Khaimah, United Arab Emirates. Her latest research focuses on the role and impact of Arab father involvement, philanthropy and education and access and equity in the Gulf education sector. Abdullah M. Al-Shoaibi is Regional Manager of the Operations Department of The Saudi Fund for Development and is currently posted to the Asian Region to appraise, evaluate, monitor and supervise infrastructure and humanitarian projects through effective development financing. Over the last 34 years he has represented SFD widely in Asia, Africa, Europe and the Gulf. Mark C. Thompson is Assistant Professor of Middle East Studies at King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, where he teaches courses in International Relations and Globalisation. He is also Senior Associate Fellow at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh. His publications include Saudi Arabia and the Path to Political Change: National Dialogue and Civil Society (I.B.Tauris, 2014) and articles in the Journal of Arabian Studies; Asian Affairs; Middle Eastern Studies; and Diplomacy and Statecraft. I-Tsung Tsai is Assistant Professor of Engineering Systems and Management at Masdar Institute of Science and Technology, Abu Dhabi, UAE. His primary research areas are the energy and environmental policies of resource-rich economies. He has published on topics such as energy subsidy reform, environmental regulation and institutional transformation in the Gulf Cooperation Council region.

INDEX

Abu Dhabi, 145, 149, 153, 278, 279, 283, 287 Abu Dhabi Fund for Development, 277– 9, 288 Abu Dhabi Music and Arts Foundation (ADMAF), 278, 279, 283, 287 accountability development aid, 67 e-government, 92, 98 –9 government, 84 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 85, 103 humanitarian aid, 55 –6 participation, 85 philanthropy, 274 protests, 105 reform, 179, 183 regulatory impact assessment, 103 rentier social contract, 140 Saudi Fund for Development (SFD), 62 United Arab Emirates (UAE), 100 United Nations, 56 Acemoglu, D., 137, 139, 141 advice, 196 t6.6, 199 Agamben, G. (b. 1942), 35 State of Exception, 35 agency, 187, 189, 190, 192 AGFUND (Arab Gulf Program for Development), 58, 302

aid allocation, 54f2.3 aid architecture, 51, 52f2.2, 55 aid delivery channels, 55– 8 Al Jalila Foundation (UAE), 279, 284, 285 Al-Nahda Philanthropic Society for Women, 302, 307 Al Najjar, Dr. G., 253, 255 Al-Yahya, K., 53, 55 analysis, 217–18, 219–29 annual funding, 62f2.5 Arab Spring (2011), 18, 89, 105, 190 arts and culture, 286, 287, 305–6 al-Asmary, M. Youth and Concepts of Citizenship in Saudi Society, 219–29 assessment, 97 –100 authority, 13, 142, 227, 233, 255 Awazem tribe, 19, 21 Bahrain Al-Nadi Al-Islami, 251 corruption, 91 diversification, 143 e-government, 92, 96, 113 E-Government Index, 112 e-voting, 96 efficiency, 89 foreign aid, 55 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 47

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labour markets, 186– 7 NGOs, 265 participation, 100 political parties, 253 privatisation, 155 social media, 99 taxation, 140 Bahrainisation, 187 Baluchi, M.H., 249–50, 251 Bedouin tribes, 20, 34 –5 beliefs, 26– 7 bilateral aid, 60 –1 Bunglawala, Z., 194–5 business strategy, 64 –5 capacity building, 309–10 career planning, 195, 196t6.6, 198 case study, 114–15 challenges, 31, 39–40, 46 –7, 66, 95, 124– 5 Christians, 33 –4 citizens citizenship, 228–9 decision making, 2 e-government, 116, 124 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 7 –8 policy making, 84 status, 219 citizenship affiliation, 230 analysis, 217–18, 220 Bedouin tribes, 34 citizens, 228–9 citizenship education, 218–19, 234–5 conceptual model, 222 defined, 229– 30 framework, 223 function, 225 globalisation, 221–2 integration, 224 Islam, 226–8 Kuwait, 19 politicisation, 22 politics, 234

power relations, 233 Saudi Arabia, 213–14, 219–20, 313 Saudisation, 232–4 social contract, 212 tribes, 23 –4 withdrawal, 28 youth movement, 38 citizenship law, 21–2 civic education, 219, 234–5 civil society development, 315 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 299 institutions, 10–11 Kuwait, 10, 250, 251– 2 media, 312 Saudi Arabia, 12, 302, 304 state interactions, 313–14 youth movement, 40 civil society organisations (CSOs) defined, 248– 9 Egypt, 251 engagement, 315 funding, 255 informal institutions, 311 King Faisal Foundation, 308–9 Kuwait, 251 Ministry of Social Affairs (Saudi Arabia), 311 political parties, 253–5 social media, 266 women, 260 collaboration, 92, 96, 291 communication, 101, 224, 280– 1, 300, 314 conceptual model, 181f6.2, 220, 222, 234 conflict, 65, 68 consequences, 183–6 constitution, 18–19, 114, 252, 253 constitutional law, 19, 89 consultation, 103–4, 121 Coordination Group (CG), 57, 58, 59, 63 corruption economic institutions, 139 FDI (foreign direct investment), 154

INDEX Gulf Arab states, 2 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 91 ICT (information and communications technology), 116 Kuwait, 23, 265 Saudi Arabia, 305 youth movement, 36 Corruption Perception Index, 91t3.2 creation of philanthropic foundations, 279– 82 criticisms of The Women’s Cultural and Social Society (WCSS), 263–5 culture, 38, 100, 119, 122 Culture and Imperialism, 235 Da’ish (Islamic State, ISIS), 30–1, 36 decision making e-participation, 121 Gulf Arab states, 13 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 1 –2 labour markets, 179 participation, 85, 102 Saudi Arabia, 299, 313 delivery channels, 55–6 demographics, 177, 181, 186, 197 development aid, 45, 62 –3, 65–6 discrimination, 26, 29, 31, 33 –4, 40 diversification Dubai, 153 economic development, 138 economic power, 151 economic reform, 101 employment, 155–6 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 142–3, 144t5.1, 145, 197 institutions, 145–50 Vision 2030, 205 diversity, 17, 186 donors, 46, 47, 48 Doumato, E., 228 Teaching Islam: Textbooks and Religion in the Middle East, 227 Dubai, 153, 279–80 Dubai Cares, 278, 282, 283, 286b9.4, 287

343

Dubai Foundation for Women And Children (DFWAC), 278, 288–9 e-government awareness, 124 defined, 92, 112, 116–18 e-payments, 93 efficiency, 126 governance, 111 Gulf Arab states, 112–13 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 6 –7, 85, 92– 6 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) ranking, 94t3.3 ICT (information and communications technology), 101 infrastructure, 94 monitoring and evaluation, 123– 4 participation, 118–22 progress, 101 Qatar, 117, 119–20, 125–6 regulatory framework, 97 regulatory impact assessment, 103 E-Government Index, 112, 113 e-government portals, 97 –100, 119 e-participation, 120–2 e-voting, 96, 121– 2 eco-system, 197f6.3 Economic Agreement, 151–2 economic development, 3, 112, 137, 139 economic diversification, 8–9, 151–2 economic institutions, 137, 138–44, 152 economic performance, 139 economic power, 144–9 economic reform, 40, 101 education Bedouin tribes, 34 career planning, 195 citizenship, 230, 232 employment, 178, 191, 192 function, 215 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 102 ICT (information and communications technology), 117

344

POLICY MAKING IN THE GCC

Jordan, 226 King Faisal Foundation, 307 knowledge-based economies, 206 Kuwait, 250 labour markets, 184 philanthropic foundations, 283–4, 289 philanthropy, 273, 274b9.1, 276 politics, 225–6 preferences, 195t6.4 Qatar, 113, 118 quality, 210, 213 reform, 179, 197, 198, 211 religion, 29 Saudi Arabia, 208, 300 Saudisation, 212 tribes, 23 women, 30, 31 –2, 178, 151–2 effectiveness development aid, 62 –3, 64 –5 informal institutions, 3 institutions, 2, 13 Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), 45, 78 –9 Saudi Fund for Development (SFD), 72 –3 efficiency e-government, 92, 112, 126 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 102 ICT (information and communications technology), 111 institutions, 91 multilateral institutions, 56 public sector, 205 Qatar, 89, 120 Saudisation, 210 Egypt, 22, 26, 53, 251 Emirates Foundation, 278, 283, 284 employee engagement, 174, 185 employment Bedouin tribes, 20, 35 diversification, 155– 6 education, 177, 191, 192–3 government, 38 Gulf Arab states, 7– 8

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 88 Kuwait, 19 modernisation, 199 patronage, 190 policy making, 101, 181– 8 populations, 152t5.5, 175–6 positive discrimination, 183 preferences, 195t6.4 private sector, 154, 181–2, 184, 185 public sector, 90t3.1, 151, 175 reform, 179 rights, 114, 175 sectors, 208t7.2 students, 192, 193t6.3 women, 30, 32, 177 youth, 194–5, 198 engagement Bahrain, 100 campaigns, 311 employee engagement, 185 governance, 2 –3, 115 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 102 King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue (Saudi Arabia), 303 Kuwait, 250 Nadi al Fatat al-Riyadhi (The Girls Sporting Club), 257 NGOs, 300–9 Qatar, 122 Saudi Arabia, 315 students, 192t6.2 environmental issues, 289, 290b9.6 establishment of philanthropic foundations, 280f9.3 expatriates, 176, 182, 188–90, 206, 250 exports, 149f5.1 failure of Saudisation, 209–11 family issues, 288–9 FDI (foreign direct investment), 148t5.3, 154 financing, 48–60 Financing for Development (FfG), 48 Fi’ran Ommi Hissa (Mama Hissa’s Mice), 30

INDEX focus, 179, 280 foreign aid, 49, 50f2.1, 51, 73 –4 foreign aid policy, 46 –7 foreign workers, 174–5 fragility, 65, 68 Freire, P. Pedagogy of Hope: Reliving Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 233 Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 229 function, 215, 225 funding, 249, 253, 254, 260, 279, 309 Fustier, N. Saudi Arabia as a humanitarian donor: high potential, little institutionalization, 53, 55 GDP (gross domestic product), 148t5.3 gender, 32, 224, 249 Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East, 217 al-Ghamdi, M. Youth and Concepts of Citizenship in Saudi Society, 219–29 global development, 272–6 Global Partnership for Economic Development (GPEDC), 48, 50 globalisation, 220–1, 222–3, 224, 304 governance corporate governance, 181 defined, 115– 16 diversification, 145– 50 e-government, 111 e-participation, 121 enhanced, 102 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 101 ICT (information and communications technology), 112, 114 – 15, 124 ictQATAR, 120 institutions, 2 participation, 119 state, 215–16 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 151, 155 theories, 139–45

345

government, 19, 38, 84, 88, 92, 116 Graduate Society (Kuwait), 248, 252 Gramsci, A. (1860–1937), 234, 250 grants, 283–7 Gulf Arab states authority, 13 corruption, 2 diversity, 174 e-government, 112–13 labour markets, 175f6.1 participation, 113 unrest, 22 al-Harthi, T. Youth and Concepts of Citizenship in Saudi Society, 219–29 health, 29, 273, 276, 284, 285b9.3, 289 history, 254, 258–9 History of Saudi Arabia, A, 206–7 Hukoomi, 120, 122 human capital, 154, 198, 205, 206, 210, 212 human rights, 37, 304–5, 313 humanitarian aid, 53, 55, 68 Hussein, Saddam (1937–2006), 27 ICT (information and communications technology) e-government, 101, 119 governance, 115–16 government, 84 investment, 112 participation, 123 philanthropic foundations, 278–9 public administration, 111 Qatar, 113 Saudi Arabia, 300 ictQATAR, 118, 120 impact, 11, 181–8, 290 importance, 12, 86, 221–2 inclusivity, 16, 24, 36– 7, 84 independence, 18, 20, 30, 252 influence, 27,248, 255 Women’s Cultural and Civil Society (WCCS, Kuwait), 251, 263–5

346

POLICY MAKING IN THE GCC

informal institutions, 3, 311 information, 98 –9, 121 infrastructure diversification, 145 e-government, 94, 117 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 145 ICT (information and communications technology), 111, 112, 113 investment, 96, 101 philanthropic foundations, 288 institutions citizenship, 218 communication, 101 culture, 100 defined, 137 diversification, 145– 50 economic development, 137 effectiveness, 29 efficiency, 91 formal institutions, 3 globalisation, 221 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 1 –2 Islam, 226 labour markets, 180t6.1 lobbying groups, 248 management, 69 patronage, 72 processes, 2 public administration, 87–8 quality, 139 reform, 88, 103, 179 regulatory impact assessment, 103 role, 13 Saudi Arabia, 302 state, 17 integration, 23, 37, 38, 120, 224 international development financing, 48– 60 Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), 64 policy making, 68 Royal Diwan, 51 Saudi Arabia, 6, 44, 58– 9, 70

International Islamic Relief Organisation Saudi Arabia (IIROSA), 55, 58 International Monetary Fund, 55, 210 internet penetration, 96t3.4 investment, 40 –1, 96, 102, 113, 154 Iranian Revolution (1979), 26 –7 Iraq, 18, 251, 259 ISIS see Da’ish (Islamic State, ISIS) Islam citizenship, 225–7 Kuwait, 248 NGOs, 254 philanthropy, 277 society, 219 tribes, 23 women, 252 Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) challenges, 66 effectiveness, 77 –8 international development, 45 membership, 75 –6 multilateral aid, 64 –6 Palestine, 51 Saudi Arabia, 49 Syria, 48 Islamic State see Da’ish (Islamic State, ISIS) Israel, 26, 27, 28 Jam’iyat al Islah al Ijtima’i (Social Reform Society), 255–6, 257–8 Jam’iyat Al-Riwayah Al-Islamiyyah (Islamic Care Society), 258, 259 Jam’yat Ihyaa al Turath al Islami (Islamic Heritage Revival Society), 258– 9 Jones, D., 175f6.1 Jordan, 53, 91, 226 Joseph, S., 218, 229–30 Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East, 217 justice, 37 King Faisal Foundation, 302, 307– 08 King Khalid Foundation, 302, 308–09

INDEX King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre (KSHARC), 45, 47, 53, 55, 67 knowledge-based economies Abu Dhabi, 145 Gulf Arab states, 8 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 92, 199 ICT (information and communications technology), 117 King Faisal Foundation, 307 Kuwait, 95 Saudi Arabia, 171 Saudisation, 9, 232 Kobrah, H. Youth and Concepts of Citizenship in Saudi Society, 219– 29 KSRelief see King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre (KSHARC) Kuwait Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development (AFESD), 58 Arab nationalism, 252 Bedouin tribes, 34– 6 Christians, 33–4 civil society, 10, 250–1 corruption, 91, 266 discrimination, 29 diversification, 143 e-government, 95 –6 E-Government Index, 112 e-voting, 96 economic challenge, 39– 41 efficiency, 89 equality, 32 formation, 18– 20 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 47 independence, 252 inefficiency, 91 invasion by Iraq (1990), 18 Kuwaiti law, 31 liberation (1991), 260 NGOs, 253–5 oil revenues, 39 opposition, 38

347

privatisation, 155 religious expression, 29 –30 rentier states, 250 Shiites, 25–30 social cohesion, 5 –6, 17 social media, 99 taxation, 116 tribes, 17 –21 women, 30 –2, 247, 249–51 women’s suffrage, 260 youth movement, 36 –7 Kuwait Democratic Forum, 248, 249 labour markets career planning, 194 expatriates, 188– 9 Gulf Arab states, 175f6.1 policy making, 178– 81 productivity, 174, 176 public sector, 175 quality, 210 reform, 179, 180t6.1, 181, 201–2, 214 regulatory framework, 186 research, 197 segmented, 177, 184 women, 177, 307 legislation, 97, 266, 277, 303–4 legitimacy, 87–8 literacy rates, 213, 224 lobbying groups, 248, 263 location, 279, 280f9.4, 295–6 Make-A-Wish Foundation UAE, 278, 284, 285 Malik, M. Political Economy of Saudi Arabia, The, 222 media, 300, 312 membership, 47, 59f2.4, 75 –6 Microsoft, 120–1 Middle East, 25 –6 migration, 20, 29, 34 –5, 176 mobile phone penetration, 96t3.4, 113 modernisation, 115, 199, 206, 304

348

POLICY MAKING IN THE GCC

Mohamed bin Zayed Species Conservation Fund, 278, 289, 290b9.6 monitoring and evaluation e-government, 123, 125 institutions, 301 King Khalid Foundation, 310 King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre (KSHARC), 46, 68 Saudi Fund for Development (SFD), 63 multilateral aid, 63 –5 multilateral institutions, 55, 56 municipal councils (Saudi Arabia), 302 Muslim Brotherhood, 26, 27, 31, 248, 255 nationalisation policies, 89, 182–4 nationality, 32, 191, 208t7.2 NGOs aid delivery channels, 55 –8 creation, 254 Egypt, 251 engagement, 300 funding, 255 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 285 Kuwait, 247 political parties, 248 politically active, 247– 8 politicisation, 247 politics, 247 protests, 255 status, 251 women, 247, 249– 53 Niblock, T. Political Economy of Saudi Arabia, The, 222 Nitaqat programme (Saudi Arabia), 207t7.1 objectives, 60, 118 OECD-DAC (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee), 46, 47, 49, 57

OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), 103 oil, 2, 29, 39, 144f5.1, 206 Oman corruption, 91 diversification, 138 e-government, 85 efficiency, 80 foreign aid, 53 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 47 investment, 112 labour markets, 187– 8 privatisation, 155 research, 191 social media, 99 opposition, 38 Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), 67, 75 outlook of GCC, 102–4 Pakistan, 55 Palestine, 54, 55 Pan-Arab Nationalist movement, 247, 252 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 62 participation citizens, 2, 126 civil society, 299 decision making, 115 e-government, 6 –7, 85 –6, 102, 105–11 e-government portals, 86 –7 e-participation, 97 –101 ICT (information and communications technology), 111 – 13, 114, 115 institutions, 102 perceptions, 112 Qatar, 114, 120 regulatory impact assessment, 103 Saudi Arabia, 300, 315 Shiites, 25 social media, 12, 85

INDEX tribes, 20 women, 30, 248, 258 patriotism, 220–3 patronage, 88, 190 Pedagogy of Hope: Reliving Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 233 Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 229 philanthropic foundations arts and culture, 281 creation, 281–4 education and youth, 283–5 founded, 280f9.3 health, 284–6 impact, 290 programmes, 290f9.6 purpose, 291–2 Saudi Arabia, 307 social media, 282f9.5 United Arab Emirates (UAE), 282 philanthropy education, 274b9.1 global development, 273–9 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 277 state funded, 280 United Arab Emirates (UAE), 271, 279–88 United Kingdom, 275f9.2 United States of America, 273f9.1 youth, 274b9.2 policies, 121–3, 212 policy making citizens, 84 conceptual model, 181f6.2 e-participation, 122 eco-system, 197f6.3 employment, 102 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 201 institutions, 86 international development, 68 labour markets, 178– 80 participation, 119 reform, 181–3 regulatory impact assessment, 103 social media, 12

349

political Coase theorem, 140 Political Economy of Saudi Arabia, The, 222 political governance, 139–40 political institutions, 139, 145 political rights, 30, 247 politicisation, 22, 23, 253 politics citizenship, 234 e-government, 118 education, 224–5 NGOs, 252 religion, 27 Saudisation, 206 tribes, 142 women, 261 Women’s Cultural and Social Society (WCsS, Kuwait), 260–2, 264–6 populations demographics, 197 employment, 152t5.5, 175–6 Gulf Arab states, 174 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 101t3.6 institutions, 2 role, 19 tribes, 21 –2 portals, 98t3.5, 114, 120 power relations, 233 pressure groups, 10 –11 private sector development, 205 employment, 181–2, 185, 186, 198 Gulf Arab states, 89 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 153 Saudisation, 206 productivity, 176, 190 programmes, 283, 284f9.6, 286b9.4, 290 projects, 52, 60– 62 protests, 105, 261, 262 public administration, 85–6, 87–8, 89

350

POLICY MAKING IN THE GCC

public sector, 90f3.1, 90t3.1, 151, 175, 176, 182 Punshi, R., 175f6.1 purpose of philanthropic foundations, 291– 2 al-Qarshi, F. Youth and Concepts of Citizenship in Saudi Society, 219–23 Qatar case study, 114 corruption, 92 diversification, 143 e-government, 94 –5, 114, 118, 125–6 E-Government Index, 112 e-voting, 121–2 efficiency, 89 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 47 integration, 120–1 migration, 175 NGOs, 249 social media, 99 transparency, 122 quality, 140, 209, 212, 213

religion, 17, 26, 27, 223, 286, 314 religious expression, 33 –4 rentier states, 138, 140–1, 250, 266 reporting, 48, 49 representation, 23, 25, 37, 40, 112 research, 191, 201, 272, 274, 278, 285– 6, 288 resilience, 4, 17 resource curse, 138 rights employment, 118 Kuwait, 19 Shiites, 25 tribes, 22 women, 30, 259, 304 Robinson, J.A., 137 role gender, 224 government, 89 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 1 institutions, 2, 5, 13 populations, 19 state, 211, 215 women, 261 Royal Diwan, 51, 53, 55

al-Rasheed, Madawi History of Saudi Arabia, A, 206 reform accountability, 182 education, 197, 198, 209 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 101 ICT (information and communications technology), 112 institutions, 88, 99 labour markets, 179, 180t6.1, 181, 198, 201–2 opposition, 214 policy making, 181– 8 public administration, 85, 86 –7 public sector, 205 Saudi Fund for Development (SFD), 63 United Arab Emirates (UAE), 89 regulatory framework, 93, 103, 117

Sabah family, 18, 19, 20, 21–2 al-Sabah, Sheikha Latifa al Fahad, 248, 254 Said, E. (1935–2003) Culture and Imperialism, 235 Salama bint Hamdan Al Nahyan Foundation, 278, 280, 283, 284, 285 Saud Alsanousi (b.1981) Fi’ran Ommi Hissa (Mama Hissa’s Mice), 30 Saudi Arabia aid allocation, 54f2.3 aid architecture, 51f2.2 arts and culture, 305–8 citizenship, 216–17, 219–24, 233 citizenship education, 219–21, 223, 233–4 civic education, 219 civil society, 12, 303, 306 corruption, 92

INDEX demographics, 186 diversification, 143 donors, 47 e-government, 95 efficiency, 89 employment, 192 engagement, 301, 315 expatriates, 176 foreign aid, 48, 49, 50f2.1, 50t2.1, 51 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 47 informal institutions, 311 international development, 44, 60 –1, 72 Islam, 239–40 Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), 48, 64 labour markets, 186 literacy rates, 117, 213 media, 312 modernisation, 232 multilateral institutions, 55 national dialogue, 304 NGOs, 300 patriotism, 231–3 privatisation, 155 research, 191 selected issues, 233 social media, 98, 312 soft power, 46, 51 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 145 taxation, 139 terrorism, 27 Vision 2030, 205 Saudi Arabia as a humanitarian donor: high potential, little institutionalization, 51, 54 Saudi Fund for Development (SFD) annual funding, 62f2.5 bilateral aid, 62 –3 effectiveness, 72 –3 international development, 45, 67 objectives, 61 Palestine, 53 projects, 63 sectors funded, 63f2.6

351

Saudisation citizenship, 232–4 civil society, 305 employment, 8 failure, 209–12 metanarrative, 213–14 policy making, 206 politics, 214 stagnation, 211 segmentation, 176, 184 Sharjah Art Foundation, 278, 282, 287, 287b9.5 Sheikh Saud bin Saqr Al Qasimi Foundation for Policy Research arts and culture, 287, 288 education, 284 health, 285, 285b9.3 infrastructure, 288 philanthropic foundations, 278 Shiites, 25 –30 Shura Council (Saudi Arabia), 305–6, 312 Singapore, 95, 120 social change, 11, 23, 278 social cohesion, 5– 6, 17, 25, 31 social conflict theory, 138, 140, 155 social contract, 214, 216 Social-Cultural Association (Kuwait), 26 social media civil society organisations (CSOs), 249 e-government portals, 86 governance, 118 importance, 11 participation, 84 philanthropic foundations, 282f9.5 policy making, 12 Saudi Arabia, 300, 313 women, 30 youth movement, 38 social practices, 34 Social Reform Society (Kuwait), 248 society, 219–20 soft power China, 277 defined, 272 foundations, 10

352

POLICY MAKING IN THE GCC

government operated non-government organisations (GONGOs), 276 philanthropic foundations, 292 Saudi Arabia, 47, 52, 55 Starrett, G., 227 Teaching Islam: Textbooks and Religion in the Middle East, 227 state citizenship, 233 civil society, 314– 15 control, 229 culture, 38 development, 211 education, 212 gender, 23 governance, 216–17 inclusivity, 23 institutions, 16 role, 216, 225 tribes, 22 state controlled sectors, 150t5.4, 151 State of Exception, 33 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 145, 146t5.2, 151, 153, 156 status, 24, 32, 207t7.1, 218, 252, 264 students, 192t6.2, 193t6.3, 194, 196t6.5 Sunnis, 25, 26, 27, 28 support, 196t6.5 sustainability, 198, 272, 289 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 44, 45, 46 Syria, 28, 46 taxation, 141, 179, 272, 274 Teaching Islam: Textbooks and Religion in the Middle East, 227 technology, 153, 151, 153, 206 terrorism, 27, 68 Te´treault, M.A., 260 theories, 140–46 transparency e-government, 85, 92 –6, 101 government, 84

humanitarian aid, 53 –7 National Election Committee (UAE), 97 participation, 85, 118 public sector, 205 Qatar, 122 regulatory impact assessment, 104 Saudi Arabian international development funding, 68 Transparency International, 91t3.2 tribes, 18, 20 –24, 88, 90, 142 unemployment rates, 174, 178, 187, 190 UNESCO, 213 United Arab Emirates (UAE) accountability, 97 corruption, 116 diversification, 143 e-government, 116 E-Government Index, 113 e-payments, 93 efficiency, 88 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 47 migration, 175 NGOs, 266 participation, 99 philanthropic foundations, 278 philanthropy, 271, 277, 278–88 research, 191 social media, 98 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 145 United Kingdom, 191, 274, 275f9.2 United Nations accountability, 57 e-participation, 113 King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre (KSHARC), 45 Saudi Arabia, 48 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), 114 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 85 United Nations Economic and Social Council, 249

INDEX United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), 138 United Nations Public Administration Programme, 112 United States of America, 217, 272f9.1 unrest, 3, 21 values, 220, 223 Volunteer Women’s Association for Community Services, 247 wages, 90f3.1, 185 women Al-Nahda Philanthropic Society for Women, 302–3 education, 250–1 employment, 175–6, 177 King Faisal Foundation, 307 King Khalid Foundation, 308 Kuwait, 30– 2 National Society for Human Rights (Saudi Arabia), 301 NGOs, 249, 256–8 political rights, 247 Saudi Arabia, 302 Shura Council (Saudi Arabia), 303 status, 249 Women’s and Children’s Rights through Access to Information (WRACTI), 248, 263

353

Women’s Cultural and Civil Society (WCCS, Kuwait) civil society, 10 –11 civil society organisations, 249–50 criticisms, 263–5 Etihad Nissaa alKuwait (Union of Kuwaiti Women’s Associations), 258 founded, 247 funding, 255 history, 258–9 influence, 264–5 Kuwait, 256 Pan-Arab Nationalist movement, 259 political influence, 250 politics, 262–3 suffrage, 248 women’s suffrage, 260–2 Yemen, 28, 48, 53 youth e-government, 122 employment, 176–7, 194–5 philanthropic foundations, 283–4, 289 philanthropy, 273, 276b9.2 research, 191 unemployment rates, 173–4, 190 Youth and Concepts of Citizenship in Saudi Society, 219–29 youth movement, 36– 7, 40, 103, 265

‘This important and timely work mixes thematic issues with country specific case studies and will appeal to scholars and policy makers alike.’ Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Fellow for the Middle East, Rice University’s Baker Institute

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a major player in the post-2011 reordering of the Middle East. Despite the rise in prominence of individual Gulf states, and the growth of the GCC as a collective entity, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the actual mechanics of policy making in the region. This book analyses the vital role that institutions are coming to play in shaping policy in the Gulf Arab states. The emergence of a new generation of leaders in the Gulf, and the era of low oil prices, has given institutions new importance in the policy process. Along with dramatic demographic change, these developments have compelled state and citizens to re-evaluate the nature of the social contract that binds them together. This book shows how academic, social and economic institutions are responding to the increasingly complex process of decision making. With contributions from academics as well as practitioners, this book will be a vital resource for both researchers and policy makers. MARK C. THOMPSON is Assistant Professor of Middle East Studies at King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. He is Senior Associate Fellow at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh. His publications include Saudi Arabia and the Path to Political Change: National Dialogue and Civil Society (I.B.Tauris, 2014) and articles in the Journal of Arabian Studies; Asian Affairs; Middle Eastern Studies; and Diplomacy and Statecraft.

Cover image: Saudi officials and businessmen attend the Euromoney conference, on May 6, 2014 in Riyadh. FAYEZ NURELDINE / Staff Cover design: www.paulsmithdesign.com

EDITED BY MARK C. THOMPSON AND NEIL QUILLIAM

NEIL QUILLIAM is Senior Research Fellow in the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. He also serves as Director for Strategic Advisory Services at Rapidan Group, an energy consultancy. Recent publications include a contribution to the book Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy: Conflict and Cooperation (I.B.Tauris, 2016) and an article in the journal East Asia (2015). He advises European governments on foreign policy issues and energy companies with operations in the region.

Policy Making in the GCC

Tim Niblock, Emeritus Professor, Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter

STATE, CITIZENS AND INSTITUTIONS

‘For those seeking to understand the dynamics of GCC governance, in all its diverse dimensions, this work should be required reading.’

Policy Making in the GCC STATE, CITIZENS AND INSTITUTIONS EDITED BY MARK C. THOMPSON AND NEIL QUILLIAM