Police Shootings and Citizen Behavior (Criminal Justice: Recent Scholarship) 1593322984, 9781593322984

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Criminal Justice Recent Scholarship

Edited by Marilyn McShane and Frank P. Williams III

A Series from LFB Scholarly

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Police Shootings and Citizen Behavior

James P. McElvain

LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC El Paso 2009

Copyright © 2009 by LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC All rights reserved. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data McElvain, James P., 1964Police shootings and citizen behavior / James P. McElvain. p. cm. -- (Criminal justice : recent scholarship) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-59332-298-4 (alk. paper) 1. Police shootings--United States. 2. Police training--United States. 3. Police-community relations--United States. 4. Criminal investigation--United States. I. Title. HV8143.M34 2008 363.2'32--dc22 2008034681

ISBN 978-1-59332-298-4 Printed on acid-free 250-year-life paper. Manufactured in the United States of America.

This book is dedicated to the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department deputies, those who put themselves in harm’s way day and night for our safety.

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Table of Contents Acknowledgments

ix

1. Police Deadly Force

1

2. Understanding Police use of Force

15

3. Research Preceding Strict Limitations

59

4. Research Following Strict Limitations

89

5. One Department and its Shootings

107

6. Alcohol, Drugs, Violent Crimes, and Police Shootings

151

7. Examination of Police Shootings

167

8. Explaining Police Shootings

179

9. Discussion and Implications

193

References

205

Index

215

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Acknowledgements As a law enforcement officer with more than 22 years of experience, and one who has investigated or supervised the investigation of more than 50 police shootings, I believed citizen behaviors contributed to officer-involved shootings; however, there was very little research to confirm this idea. With encouragement and careful review of this manuscript by Augustine Kposowa, Robert Nash Parker and Kirk Williams, my research idea came to fruition. For each of their part, especially Augustine’s guidance through the analysis, I am indebted to them. I would also like to thank Jason B. Horton for his careful proofreading of this manuscript. I am also indebted to the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department for providing me access to some very rich data. Many law enforcement agencies hesitate to open their doors to research. As an insider, I believe I was trusted; as a researcher, I hope this examination of the data develops a relationship that encourages other departments to follow suit. Finally, I wish to thank my wife, Penny McElvain, for her patience and support. She is a truly forgiving person despite the long hours I spend working as a commander for a large sheriff’s station, my extensive involvement in our community, and on-going teaching assignments.

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CHAPTER 1

Police Deadly Force

In previous police deadly force research, the focus has been primarily on officer decision-making, policies, frequency of incidents, and race/ethnicity of the citizen versus the officer. In spite of what has been already learned, as well as efforts made in prior studies, much remains a mystery to those interested in the field of study. More specifically, very little is known about the effects of citizen behaviors as they relate to police shootings. As a result of past research practices, there may be an assumption that police shootings occur in spite of the actions or behaviors of the citizen. Said differently, some people may contend that the citizen’s actions or behavior did not contribute to the shooting; the incident was a result of the officer’s decisionmaking or actions solely. The present study serves to diminish the current void, and awaken further inquiry. To get there, it is important to develop an understanding about police use of force. Despite the fact that policing in the United States serves as a steady feature, which ensures social order, one of its hallmarks creates great public concern and debate. As keepers of the peace and enforcers of the law, police officers are entrusted with the authority to use affirmative coercion (i.e., force) if and when necessary to maintain public order (Bittner 1970). It is this particular facet of 1

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police work (i.e., when, how, upon whom, and to what level force is used) that causes the public to take notice, and in hindsight, question whether it was appropriate. Depending on the circumstances, if the amount of force employed appears to be greater than the situation dictates, or when the recipient is a person of color and the officer is white, chances are greatly increased that the incident will be publicly debated. An examination of most any news source in the United States will recount the fact that police use of force remains a controversial topic within the American social arena. Moreover, with the ever-increasing popularity of news coverage of live police chases, public demand for oversight and review of police practices, as well as police officers and departments being served with civil liability lawsuits, the focus on police use of force does not appear to be in decline. Notwithstanding the efforts of prior researchers studying use of force, the function of police coercion remains ambiguous and largely misunderstood by not only the public, but police officers as well. There are two particular reasons why the enigmatic nature of police use of force persists. The first reason is due to the limited access academicians have to information and data regarding police incidents of use of force (Alpert and Dunham 2004). With restricted access to data, researchers are often limited in how they examine the phenomenon. In other words, with limited data, the researcher is constrained in the manner in which he/she may methodologically and/or theoretically study police shootings. For example, if the researcher believes that a citizen’s socio-economic status contributes to a police shooting, he/she needs to have some way to measure this factor. If the data either does not exist or is not shared, the

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researcher is precluded from continuing with the investigation as desired. As will be demonstrated in the following chapters (chapters 2, 3, and 4), many police use of force studies, lethal or otherwise, are often dependent upon the availability of data or access to observing officers in the field. Surely, the second method (i.e., participative observation) would allow a researcher direct access to the event; however, as will be discussed later on, all forms of force used by officers during citizen contacts are rare occurrences. Thus, such means for data collection would be inefficient. A researcher could possibly spend several days riding along with an officer and never experience an incident involving an officer using force. On the other hand, being allowed permission to review police use of force files may yield rich information about the subject matter that continues to remain mysterious. As long as research efforts to gain admittance to use of force data remains restricted, any progress toward broadening our understanding of the field of study will remain stunted. Beyond the limitations realized with restricted access, other limitations exist as well when it comes to compiling data once the issue with admittance is overcome. Too often, the practices of many law enforcement agencies make data collection near impossible due to the manner in which police records are maintained. Moreover, several departments, the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department included, do not collect information about uses of force by officers. Typically, all that is required when an officer uses force is to document his/her actions in a police report. Even though the incident may be recorded in a police report, there is no mechanism in place to track any information about the incident. For example, criminal reports may be coded and tracked based on call

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type (i.e., robbery, burglary, vehicle theft, etc.), which is common for tracking crime trends; however, reports are not usually coded in a similar manner to allow for tracking uses of force. For instance, an officer investigating a robbery may contact the suspect and attempt to apprehend him/her. If the suspect resists and fights the officer, the officer will code the report for ‘robbery’ and document any use of force in the narrative of the report, but will not otherwise indicate that force was used in the incident. For the most part, police use of force is seen as incidental to the overall investigation. In other words, it is simply a ‘part of doing business.’ In sum, data that could be used to inform police administrators on training needs, or identify problem officers go largely undetected with regards to incidents of officers using force. The second reason police use of force continues to be unresolved is due to how expansively force has been defined by researchers studying the phenomenon, as well as the general public’s interpretation of what constitutes force (Alpert and Dunham 2004; Garner, Maxwell, and Heraux 2002). In part, the ambiguity of police use of force is the result of how broadly it has been defined or how easily it is disregarded. Rarely is police presence, verbal commands or orders classified as a use of force. Moreover, when incidents of police deadly force is investigated, some researchers have included only incidents that resulted in the death of a citizen, whereas others consider all firearms discharges to include accidental and/or animal shootings. Often defined along a continuum, police use of force begins at one end of the spectrum with an officer’s mere ‘command presence’ and ends at the other extreme with deadly force. However, when police use of force is studied, and for practical purposes, most people would not consider the presence of a uniformed police officer

Police Deadly Force

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investigating a call for service as a form of force even though an officer’s proximity may control the behavior of another person. Keeping in mind that the manner in which the officer carries him/herself may appear less offensive if he/she stands with an open posture versus turning his/her body in a modified defensive stance with a hand resting on his/her service weapon. Despite the way the officer stands, at this level, his/her presence tends to be innocuous and is often ignored as a representation of force in most, if not all, studies of use of force by police officers. Furthermore, it would be extremely rare for a citizen to file a complaint of excessive force simply because an officer was present during an incident requiring police service. Moving along the continuum, an officer’s verbal interaction with the public may increase his/her presence by progressing from simple interactive conversation to using commands with a raised voice and inflection, demanding a person’s compliance. Again, with the exception of complaints that the officer behaved in a rude or discourteous manner, allegations of police use of force are non-existent at this level of force. Thus, it is rare for anyone to categorize verbal commands as force. Complaints of an officer’s use of force1 typically coincide with the next stages along the force continuum. As police officers escalate their level of force by placing their hands on members of the public or apply force in the form of handcuffing, control holds, use of chemical agents, impact weapons, conducted energy devices (i.e., 1

For the purposed of this study, the phrase ‘use of force’ is preferred to ‘excessive’ or ‘inappropriate use of force’ because the latter terms are a matter of opinion drawn at the conclusion of an independent investigation. There is less bias attached to ‘use of force.’ It simply connotes the action taken by an officer without necessarily passing judgment whether it was reasonable and necessary.

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tazers), and firearms, citizen complaints of force logically begin to arise. Typically, the mere use of handcuffs and/or control holds, as means to restrain an uncooperative person, remain inoffensive as a level of force; however, as the person’s level of resistance increases, the level of force employed by an officer, in response, will grow as well. With little debate, there is a clear demarcation from the amount of necessary force an officer applies when a person is cooperative versus an actively resisting person, who demonstrates non-compliance by pulling away from, pushing, or assaulting an officer. For example, when an officer arrests a cooperative citizen, the officer may hold one of the citizen’s arms in a manner to ensure control of the citizen while he/she is handcuffed. On the other hand, if a citizen is committed to his/her freedom and attempts to thwart arrest by escape, resistance or outright assaulting the officer, the officer may resort to grabbing the citizen in a manner that causes pain as long as the citizen continues to resist. Depending on the level of the citizen’s resistance, the officer may employ greater levels of force such as chemical agents or impact weapons in order to gain control and submission of the recalcitrant citizen. Generally, it is at these more pronounced levels of force used by officers that provoke formal complaints or at least draw the public’s attention. Once this occurs, the officer’s actions are called into question, and claims that the officer abused his/her authority by using unreasonable or unnecessary force is lodged. As demonstrated above, the concept of police use of force does not have a clearly defined beginning point, which is a great concern for those who attempt to study and report findings on police practices. When police apply force at greater levels (i.e., swinging a baton at a person, or deploying pepper spray), there tends to be agreement that

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such actions are uses of force. Alpert and Dunham (2004) acknowledge that the process of defining police use of force has been a difficult task for researchers, but contend that deadly force is easy to identify. Defining deadly force, the two researchers assert that it is “the application of force likely to cause death or serious bodily injury” (Alpert and Dunham 2004: 20). Although deadly force is a rather broad concept, police shootings, without question, fall within this category and make up the highest level of force that can be employed by the police. With no intent to further the debate over what police use of force is or how it should be defined, this study focuses on police shootings, which eliminates the need to interpret what the officer did or did not do in order to categorize his/her actions as an application of force. Without a doubt, a police officer shooting at another person while in the performance of duty is a clear use of force. Whether the officer’s use of deadly force was reasonable or necessary under the circumstances remains outside the realm of this study. For definitional purposes in this study, police shootings are not to be confused with the broader term of ‘deadly force’ even though the concept may be used throughout this study. Comprehensively defined, ‘deadly force’ simply means any force used by a police officer that has the potential to cause the death of another person. For example, a police officer striking a person in the head with a baton or shooting the person in the head are different implements of force, which may result in death; however, firearms are considered more lethal than a police baton. Thus, unless specified differently, police shootings and deadly force are used interchangeably throughout this study.

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Overview of Previous Studies Previous research on police use of force has demonstrated that in relation to the number of calls for service handled by officers and how many citizen contacts they make during their tour of duty, officers rarely use force (Greenfeld, Langan, and Smith 1999; Henriquez 1999; Weitzer 1999; Langan, Greenfeld, Smith, and Durose 2001; Alpert and Dunham 2004). As stated earlier, because these incidents occur so infrequently, it is not beneficial for researchers to conduct participant observation by riding along with officers even if an agency agrees to allow such access. In addition to the fact that not all agencies track uses of force, many agencies refuse to allow researchers the opportunity to collect information on the individual incidents involving officers using force even if the information exists and is easily accessible. In the rare occasions researchers have been permitted to collect data, some agencies have cut-off access in the middle of the research project, which negatively impacts the thoroughness of the study (for examples of such occurrences, see Alpert and Dunham 2004). In the event that a police department collects information on incidents of police use of force, and they allow researchers to gather data, it is difficult for the researchers to generalize their findings because the data are usually agency specific and not easily comparable with data gathered from other departments. Prior to the 1970s, there was little research conducted regarding police shootings (Fyfe 1982). Subsequently, the phenomenon of police use of deadly force has been studied from various perspectives; however, most research on police use of force fails to look at the suspect’s actions or behavior. Typically, studies on police shootings have explored the frequency of deadly force used by the police

Police Deadly Force

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(Sherman and Langworthy 1982; Milton, Halleck, Lardner and Abrecht 1977/1982; White 2000); the impact of policy, departmental as well as state and federal, on the rate of police deadly force (Reiss 1980; Waegel 1984; White 2000); and the racial characteristics of the police officers and suspects (Jacobs and O’Brien 1998; White 2000). Reiss’s (1980) analysis on controlling police discretion to use lethal force is an example of research that focuses on police practices and behavior. Employing sequential decision theory to demonstrate that police shootings could be averted, Reiss (1980: 128) states, “…upon examination of cases where the legitimacy of the use of force is challenged, it appears that in every instance harm could have been averted by exercising some other options earlier in the decision sequence.” An interpretation of Reiss’s article could conclude Reiss contends that officer-involved shootings could be prevented if proper policies and officer decisions were utilized. In fairness to Reiss, in should be noted that some police shootings are a result of poor judgment on the part of the officer (e.g., attempt to apprehend a suspect known to be ‘armed and dangerous’ without adequate assistance from other officers when time permits such action); however, he does not allow for circumstances wherein the officer is suddenly assaulted without provocation (e.g., an officer stops a person for a traffic violation and is shot at by the violator as the officer makes his/her approach on the violator’s vehicle). Even though this may be an extreme example, the citizen’s assault on the officer, not the officer’s traffic stop, caused the officer to shoot. Certainly, it is rare for an officer to purposefully shoot a compliant citizen. Moreover, Reiss’s approach overlooks the fact that the citizen also is making a series of decisions that lead up to the point in which the officer fires his/her weapon.

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In most of the studies on police shootings, researchers commonly identify the victim as the person shot at or by a police officer. One of the earlier examinations of police shootings, specifically studying police homicides, Robin (1963: 226) identifies the dual role of the person who finds him/herself on the receiving end of the police use of lethal force. Robin delineates the two roles by writing, “…he is an offender because he violated the law and a victim because he was killed as a consequence.” Cleary, the term ‘suspect’ can be elusive in the study of police use of force. In some studies, as we have just seen, researchers have used the terms ‘suspect’ and ‘victim’ interchangeably when referring to the person shot by the police; however, in this study, for the purpose of remaining neutral, the terms ‘citizen’ and ‘officer’ will be used. The determination as to whether a person (i.e., citizen or officer) is a victim or suspect is made during the subsequent investigation. To decide this prematurely or without full knowledge of the facts and circumstances that led to the shooting is unfair to all parties involved. Thus, in this study, the term ‘suspect’ will only be used when the circumstances would indicate that it is appropriate to draw such a conclusion. Attempting to explain criminal conduct, researchers in the past have identified a correlation between a citizen’s consumption of alcohol and/or illicit drugs and criminal activity (Goldstein 1985; Lipsey, Wilson, Cohen and Derzon 1996; Parker 1998; Parker and Auerhahn 1998; Li, Priu and MacKenzie 2000). Studying this relationship, Goldstein (1985) developed a framework composed of three parts: the psychopharmacological, the economical, and the systemic. The psychopharmacological component asserts that the consumption of drugs creates a change within the user’s system, causing him/her to behave in an irrational and/or violent manner. The economic model

Police Deadly Force

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argues that because drug users find it difficult to maintain legitimate employment to support their habit, they tend to turn to alternative means such as committing violent crimes like robbery in order to afford future drug purchases. Last, systemic violence is the inherent illicit activity surrounding the drug market itself. This could consist of prostitution, drug transportation, fencing stolen property, or any other activity that supports or is attached to the illicit business. Similar to Goldstein’s belief about the psychopharmacological effects of drugs, Parker (1998) and Parker and Auerhahn (1998) state that although most people consuming alcohol tend to follow societal norms regarding behavior, under some circumstances alcohol consumption can selectively disinhibit the user to the point where he/she behaves violently. While under the influence of alcohol, a person is more likely to “misinterpret the actions of others, to mistake the response of others to their own behavior, to focus more closely on immediate goals rather than more distant goals…” (Parker and Cartmill 1998:1378). Further explaining selective disinhibition is the idea of active and passive constraint (Parker 1998; Parker and Auerhahn 1998; Parker and Cartmill 1998). Active constraint occurs when the intoxicated person recognizes the conduct he/she is engaging in is in contradiction to the norms of society, but chooses to continue because the activity is beneficial to him/her. Passive constraint takes place when the intoxicated person conforms to societal norms regarding his/her behavior because engaging in violence is not to his/her advantage. A Fresh Perspective The purpose of this research is to examine officer-involved shootings from a different perspective than taken by most

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previous studies as briefly discussed above. Instead of attempting to explain police deadly force by measuring its frequency, the effects of restrictive or liberal lethal force policies, or even the sequence of decision-making by the officer, this study turns the analysis toward the citizen. More specifically, the focus of this study is on citizen behaviors prior to the event, but remains connected based on the way in which he/she lives his/her life. Certainly, it is recognized that police shootings occur under some rather complex circumstances. The nature of the incident or call for service being investigated, the time of day, day of the week, weather conditions, the layout of the scene, presence of other officers or suspects, experience or skill level of the officer, cleverness and objective of the suspect, suspect cooperation or lack thereof, departmental policies and police procedures, as well as the series of decisions made by the officer or citizen are but a few of the factors that come together creating conditions for an officer-involved shooting to occur. As discussed earlier, most research is limited to and dependent on the availability of information/data collected and maintained by police departments following these events. Although data may have been rather limited in past research, which could have swayed the direction of a researcher’s inquiry, in the present study, data that has been made available allows for further investigation not previously explored. More specifically, the data compiled for this current research permits examination into whether citizen behaviors (i.e., propensity to being under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, and prior violent criminal conduct) contribute to police shootings. With access to 15 years worth of officer-involved shooting files, which includes toxicology results of the citizen’s blood following the shooting event, as well as

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his/her prior criminal history, this research project takes a fresh look at police use of deadly force not previously explored. Data were compiled from the Riverside County Sheriff's Department, in California, one of the largest law enforcement agencies in the United States. The aim of the project is to examine the correlation of citizen behaviors (i.e., intoxication and prior criminal violence) with police shootings. Even though this study intends to focus on citizen behaviors, it should not be forgotten that the citizen’s actions alone do not create the environment for police deadly force. Although many other factors, to include decisions made by the officer, may lead to the final decision to shoot, the focus here is on specified citizen behaviors. Given the past methods by which researchers have studied police use of deadly force (i.e., officer-involved shootings), here the examination attempts to take a different approach by focusing on citizen behavior. For this analysis, the present study will be divided into several chapters. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 provide a detailed review of the previous literature regarding police use of force. Because this topic is rather broad, each chapter addresses areas of use of force separately. Chapter 2 will cover police use of force research in a general sense. The following chapters focus on deadly force by the police. Chapters 3 and 4 are separated by the 1985 ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Garner. Because of the impact of the Court’s decision in this case, which limited the circumstances in which police officers can use lethal force, the research literature on deadly force was divided between pre and post-1985. Chapter 5 provides background information in regards to the setting in which the study was conducted. In other words, it will ‘set the stage’ so to speak. In this chapter, the

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Riverside County Sheriff’s Department, the department being used for the analysis, as well as the area being serviced by the department, will be explored so the reader can develop a basic understanding of the demographics for both the department and county. Chapter 6 establishes the theoretical framework for this study. In this chapter, it is contended that it is possible to combine two theories to explain how specific citizen behaviors, in part, contribute to police shootings. Chapters 7 and 8 respectively serve to outline the methodology used in this study, and lay out the findings. Through both of those chapters, the research design will be revealed, and a summary of the data analysis will be offered. Chapter 9 provides the discussion and implications, which summarizes the entire study.

CHAPTER 2

Understanding Police use of Force

Of all the various lines of work and diverse professions made available in the United States, few are as complicated as law enforcement. Beginning with the rigorous maze that must be traversed by an individual seeking to merely be hired as a police officer, which typically includes passing a written examination, oral interview, physical agility course, medical examination, psychological evaluation, polygraph interview, as well as an intrusive background investigation, the role of the officer remains as complex once employed.2 After a person has negotiated the arduous hiring process, he/she will spend nearly six months in an academy learning about law, patrol procedures, report writing, investigation and interviewing processes, first-aid, defensive tactics, firearms training, and many other training aspects in preparation for policing their community.3 2

Information reference typical hiring practices for law enforcement and the stringent training process required to be a police officer described in this section is based on the author’s intimate familiarity with law enforcement, which consists of more than 22 years of active service with three different departments.

3

This hiring process is typical for most law enforcement departments, large or small, throughout the United States.

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Following academy training, the new officer continues his/her indoctrination into the profession by riding with a seasoned ‘field-training officer,’ usually an officer with several years of patrol experience. Typically, the fieldtraining program consists of several phases of training, which takes the newer officer an additional four or more months to complete. While in the first phase of training, the trainee’s role is more of an observer, following the lead of his/her training officer. Throughout the next two phases, the trainee begins to handle calls for service as the primary officer while the training officer remains close by to give direction and answer questions the trainee may have or provide direction as needed. By the final phase of training, the trainee should be operating as though the training officer was not present, and only relying upon the training officer as a backup officer on calls requiring an additional officer for assistance. Sometime during this last phase of training, the training officer will ‘ghost’ the trainee. This process typically occurs in one of two manners or a combination of both. In the first, the training officer will ride with the trainee while wearing plain clothes and will appear as if he/she were a citizen on a ride-along to anyone they may encounter during their shift. The other approach is for the training officer to drive a separate patrol car and follow the trainee or periodically arrive at the trainee’s calls. At this stage of training, the training officer primarily operates as an observer. If the officer in training needs assistance from another officer, he/she will request one while following procedures as if working alone. This is one more step in the process of moving the trainee along toward being able to perform as a regular officer assigned to a solo patrol car. By the time the new recruit officer has completed the field-training program, he/she will have experienced nearly

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a whole year of training before operating on his/her own. Because of the continuous transforming environment of law enforcement, from the introduction of new statutory laws to modifications made to existing laws by the judicial system’s on-going case law, technologically advanced tools of the trade, evolving criminal methods of operation, or by simply changing assignments or achieving career advancement, training for most officers is perpetual. Departmental policies and procedures, which also never remain stagnant, can be viewed as another layer adding to the complexity of the profession. Notwithstanding all of the challenges an individual confronts just to hold a position as a police officer, perhaps the most treacherous demand placed upon an officer is to learn to walk the thin line between maintaining order and the methods employed to accomplish this task. Officers are expected to maintain positive relationships with the community they serve while being ever vigilant against gangs, illegal drugs, violent crime and acts of terrorism (Dine 2005). Implementing force under such precarious circumstances requires officers to employ “optimal force” (Luna 2005). Luna (2005) demonstrates how optimal force is nested between excessive, unnecessary, and insufficient force. Clearly, excessive force goes beyond what is reasonable and necessary to maintain order and control individuals. Defining excessive force, Adams (1999) explains that it is the amount of force used by an officer that exceeds the administrative, professional or legal procedures based on the immediate incident the officer is handling. Further commenting on the phenomenon of police using excessive force, Alpert and Smith (1994: 500) conclude, “…it is easier to define excessive force than it is to identify or measure it.” In spite of the fact that excessive force may be a matter of perspective, narrowly defined by

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police officers and broadly defined by the community, its definition remains straightforward and clear (Cao and Huang 2000). Cao and Huang (2000) maintain that whenever an officer uses excessive force, such force is an abuse of authority that violates the public’s trust. As opposed to clear-cut definition of excessive force, unnecessary and insufficient levels of force may need a little more explanation. Describing insufficient force, Luna (2005: 4) states that it, “increases the likelihood of an officer’s injury and death, decreases the officer’s ability to enforce the law, and heightens risks to public safety.” In other words, the officer and public are left at risk when force is necessary, but deficiently employed because it leaves the malevolent person in control and a prevailing threat. A little more obscure is the concept of unnecessary force, which is defined as “force that might be justifiable but could have been avoided” (Luna 2005: 4). For example, officers armed with less-lethal force options such as a conducted energy device (i.e., taser) may not have to resort to using lethal force to subdue an armed and violent citizen even though implementing lethal force may have been acceptable under the circumstances. In short, optimal force is that level of force necessary to take control of a person or situation without becoming excessive or remaining deficient given the level of resistance encountered. It is this particular aspect of police work, determining what level of force to use given a multitude of factors that may be encountered, that make it one of the most complicated professions. Most police/citizen contacts that result in a use of force by the officer are dynamic in nature. Depending on the officer’s gender, size, level of experience, confidence in his/her abilities, it is understandable why each officer does not react the same

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way or at the same time in any similar situation. Further obscuring police use of force decision-making is the citizen’s characteristics and behavior, as well as situational factors (e.g., other persons present, time of day, nature of offense committed, presence of weapons, intoxication, etc.). For these reasons, in combination with the officer’s actions being second-guessed and scrutinized by police superiors, the media, and the public, use of force has to be the most perplexing responsibility assumed by any police officer in an already multifarious occupation. In this chapter, previous research regarding police use of force, specifically deadly force, will be explored. The greater part of police use of lethal force research centers on the frequency in which officers use deadly force, the effects of departmental policies in reference to an officer’s permissibility to use deadly force, and whether a citizen’s race/ethnicity impacts police shootings. While past researchers displayed an interest in examining the racial relationship between the officer and citizen involved in the shooting incident, as well as certain officer characteristics such as the officer’s level of experience, it is particularly interesting to note that citizen behavior and characteristics were seldom examined. In some cases, research is limited to or influenced by the availability of information and access to data (Geller and Scott 1992; Blumberg 2001; Alpert and Dunham 2004). Until more recently, Blumberg (2001) points out that a great deal of research relied upon limited resources such as newspaper accounts or coroner’s reports. These sources of information were largely confined to those incidents wherein the citizen involved died or the incident caught the attention of the media and was considered to be interesting enough for reporting by the media. Alpert and Dunham (2004) not only acknowledge that police use of force data are difficult to

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gain access to in the first place, the authors assert it is not uncommon for research to be stopped in the middle of a study when an agency changes its mind by either further restricting what the researchers may collect or terminating the study all together. Even though admittance to data regarding police use of force may limit the focus of research, it is overwhelmingly evident that most academicians studying police use of force have relied too much on data regarding the officer’s actions to explain the dynamics of a deadly force encounter with a citizen. Notwithstanding the possibility that an officer may use force against a citizen without provocation, more than likely it is done in response to the citizen’s actions. Too often, researchers overlook or ignore the role of the citizen, and focus on the officer or situational factors surrounding the officer to explain police use of force. In addition to the central areas of research mentioned above, past research also appears to set around one particular controversy. This debate revolves around how much discretion an officer is provided to discharge his/her firearm. Prior to 1985, police officers were afforded a great deal of latitude of personal choice when it came to shooting felony suspects attempting to escape justice. In fact, much of the research up to that time was focused on whether officers should be permitted to shoot fleeing felons or if there should be some restrictions depending on the type of crime committed. In 1985, the United States Supreme Court decided when it was permissible for officers to discharge their weapons at fleeing felons when the justices made their ruling in Tennessee v. Garner (1985). Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling, police use of deadly force research began to wane, initially examining the impact on police shootings as a result of the restrictions placed on police use of deadly force, and then moving

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toward a general focus on the decision making and actions or tactics taken by officers that lead them to discharge their weapons. Despite the efforts of past research, as will become evident in this review, there is much more research to be done. The phenomenon of police use of force as a general point of reference, or deadly force more specifically, can be rather cumbersome to dissect for the purpose of fully understanding what it means, why it is used, what circumstances make is acceptable or objectionable, and why it remains so controversial. Here, an attempt will be made to bring clarity to police use of force by addressing past research in the context of police use of force in its broad context then narrowing in on lethal force. Due to the nature of this topic, it is difficult to approach it in an unambiguous manner. Despite the broad structure of police use of force, the following analysis of the literature will be divided into three general areas. First to be discussed is police use of force in its expansive sense. The last two sections will narrow the examination to lethal force, and will begin with those studies conducted prior to 1985, when Tennessee v. Garner was decided (Chapter 3). The final section will investigate the direction research has subsequently moved (Chapter 4). Police Use of Force: An Overview Interestingly, of all the activities and responsibilities performed by the police the one most discussed is use of force. What about an officer responding to investigate a burglary committed while a family was away from their home? How about an officer showing empathy and compassion for a parent who has lost a child in an automobile accident, or a young lady brutally raped? Why

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is there so little discussion about the ‘routine’ patrol activities of any given officer, in any American town, across this country? Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that police officers are exclusively empowered with the authority to use force against other members of the community. Maybe the attraction is a result of how force is employed, and whom officers tend to target most when force is used. Or, of all the activities performed by police officers, use of force tends to be one of the most intrusive actions. In such instances where officers use force, the officers are usually dealing with highly charged and emotional circumstances, resulting in physical contact with individuals in ways the citizen is either not familiar with, or may not be willing to submit to. Moreover, the appearance of the physical altercation is rarely perceived by outsiders to be nonviolent. How can an officer twist a person’s arm or wield a baton in a manner so as to look peaceful and emotionless? It is the nature of the business that using force remains primitive in its application, which tends to shock the contemporary delicate sensibilities of our society despite its expectation for the same police officers to keep them safe. Police officers are entrusted to use non-negotiable coercive force Prior to examining what researchers have to say about their various studies of police use of force, it is important to consider how police officers come to the authority to use force, why they continue to possess such power and control, and how it is managed in the interest of the community. One of the first people to consider the role of the police and their command to use force was Egon Bittner. Relying on the premise of legal theory, Bittner

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(1967: 703) asserts that the police “are empowered to use coercion in situations of imminent danger.” In his later work, which is often cited by researchers studying police use of force, Bittner expounds upon the power bestowed to police officers to use force. Bittner (1970: 34) writes, To make the point quite clear, once an officer feels justified in making an arrest he has the duty to overcome the suspect’s resistance and he may not retreat in the face of risks or threats of retaliation. The authorization and the obligation to use force on the basis of no more than reasonable belief that the undertaken action is justified is the exclusive monopoly of the police. No other official in any branch of civil government has this right or this duty. To say, however, that the police have a monopoly on force means that this is their unique role in society, one which, on the basis of practical considerations, neither the government nor the citizenry could presumably do without.

Thus, due to the very nature of the responsibility of police officers to enforce societal laws and arrest violators, these guardians maintain the right and obligation to use force to accomplish their tasks. The authority to use force is founded on the premise that the police act in place of and represent the state in order to maintain social control (Manning 1980; McCoy 1986; Holmes 2000). Manning (1980) further asserts that the law allows police officers to intervene and interject themselves into the affairs of other people on behalf of the state. In fact, the law goes so far as to allow police officers to use lethal force, taking the life of another under some circumstances. The power and responsibility for the police to use force is what Sherman (1980: 1) calls a “troublesome paradox” because officers resort to using force, or in other words the application of violence, as a means to thwart others behaving in a violent manner. Further complicating

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police use of force is the fact that although it is clear that police officers maintain the power to employ force as a means of social control, the law remains vague as to the circumstance force is to be used and what levels of force are to be imposed under those circumstances (Manning 1980). In fact, the force used by police officers may be appropriate or unwarranted depending on the circumstances (Holmes 2000). McCoy (1986) attempts to differentiate appropriate levels of force by delineating what she calls “legitimate force” from “illegitimate violence,” which addresses Manning’s (1980: 137) question “to whom, when, and to what degree, they [the police] should be violent [use force]?” Manning maintains that police use of force is necessary vis-à-vis a society without enforced oversight for those who wish to cause social disruption. In her definition of legitimate force, McCoy (1986: 273) contends that it is based upon “rational discourse and objective decisionmaking” in the interest of social control; however, legitimate force can become illegitimate violence when it is “too much” or cannot be justified under the circumstances. McCoy further claims that the balance between legitimacy and violence is based upon “community discourse.” In other words, the police are to employ force at the will and for the benefit of the society being served. To this end, McCoy (1986: 273) states, “The exercise of power becomes violence if the group does not agree that force should be applied for some particular end, or, in the quantitative sense, if the group does not agree that force may be applied but only to an extent that can be justified (that is, agreed upon) in a particular situation.” More often than anyone would like to admit, the responsibility placed on police officers to hold the thin line between lawless disorder and social control, as it is

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interpreted by the desire of the community, often leaves those entrusted to use force confused. On one hand, police officers are told they are the means to ensure laws are obeyed, and are authorized to use force to affect these ends. Elucidating the public’s expectation of the police, Bittner (1970: 122) states, A society committed to the achievement of peace by pacific means has created an institution with the monopoly to employ non-negotiably coercive force in situations where its use is unavoidably necessary. Procedures that go against the ideal may be perhaps excused occasionally, but they can never be defended. Above all, force may not be used for any other purpose but to effect restraint.

Any force used as a means to invoke ‘curbstone justice’ or to teach someone a lesson violates the trust granted by the public. Moreover, Bittner (1970) recognizes that power possessed by police officers to do good is also equally power for them to do evil. It is here, the control over “nonnegotiable coercive force” that police officers’ uncertainty begins, and is brought to the fore when these officers are made to decide what means are to be employed to achieve the desired ends. This predicament is referred to as the ‘Dirty Harry problem,’ coined by Carl B. Klockars. Klockars’ (1980/1999) conception of the ‘Dirty Harry problem’ is based on the character, Inspector Harry Callahan, portrayed by Clint Eastwood in a series of movies in which Inspector Callahan relies upon questionable means to accomplish sought-after ends. It is the inconceivable means employed by Inspector Callahan that earns him the endearing nickname ‘Dirty Harry,’ which is adopted by Klockars to explore how police decide to use force. Defining the ‘Dirty Harry problem,’ Klockars (1980/1999: 369) states, “As we have phrased it previously, the Dirty Harry problem asks when and to what extent does

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the morally good end warrant or justify an ethically, politically, or legally dangerous means to its achievement?” With some exceptions, police officers have good intentions when they enforce the law and serve the community. It is recognized that in all professions, law enforcement is no exception; there are those who possess and act upon ulterior motives. These are the ‘bad apples,’ not representative of the bunch. Those who fall into this category are not confused, they know where the line is and cross it purposefully, or simply do not care about the line at all. Confusion within officers occurs as a result of receiving conflicting messages all the while trying to do the right thing. It is clear, based on what was covered above, that police officers maintain the right to use force. Coupled with this responsibility is their own self-image as a result of what society has come to expect of them. This image is that of the ‘crime-fighter.’ Reasons why police officers may be bewildered when it comes to using force can be extrapolated from McCoy’s (1986) demonstration of police officers as crime-fighters. McCoy (1986: 277) explains, Arresting bad guys, which by the 1950s had been accepted as the primary police function, was surely more important to most people than had been the delivery of social services on the orders of machine politicians. But crime-fighting, although crowned in a haloed white hat, had a pathological side. Citizens wanted Jack Webb to spread his Dragnet and catch crooks, but they didn’t want obtrusive police prying into minor affairs, or overzealous crime-fighting that could hurt factually guilty but minimally involved or minimally dangerous persons.

Trouble for police officers takes place when they begin to follow the letter of the law, holding all violators of the law, whether egregious or trivial, to the same level of

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accountability. McCoy (1986: 277) sums this up when she defined what she meant by the “pathological side” of crime fighting. If police officers are to believe that fighting crime is their mission and the apprehension of criminals was the desirable end, then any means necessary should be permissible. However, when ‘any means necessary’ is applied, officers quickly learn that what they believed were to be well-meaning ends in fact did not allow for or justify the means they used. Thus, officers need to learn that the means must be ‘legitimate’ and in congruity with the violation committed by the citizen in order to be justified. Controlling Police use of Force Another way to look at the problem of officer uncertainty is to consider the extent of discretion an individual officer is permitted in his/her decision to use force. Often times, it is this very lack of affirmative direction that creates the environment for officers to make questionable decisions, which are second-guessed by the various stakeholders (i.e., the community, the media, supervision, and peers) and exacerbates the officer’s confusion. Recognizing that officers, although well intentioned, may cross the line with regard to the means they employ based on their discretion, various controls have emerged to provide guidance or regulate an officer’s implementation of force. Manning (1980) identifies four types of controls that influence police use of force and help manage its practice. The first is the community or ‘public standard,’ which is comprised of “public opinion, mass media attention, and politicians’ statements and reactions to an incident of violence [police use of force] that comes to public attention” (Manning 1980: 139). Manning contends the public standard is rather volatile, varying greatly depending upon the community,

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and its ability to be open-minded. As a result, depending upon a community’s expectation, police use of force may be closely scrutinized or greatly ignored. The second form of control identified by Manning (1980) is “legal controls.” Manning argues that legal controls of police use of force are weak at best. As previously mentioned, the law not only permits police officers to exercise their authority of coercive physical restraint of members of the community, it even allows for the use of deadly force. Because the law, as it pertains to police use of force, is so vague, police agencies often provide further guidance and control by implementing policies and procedures, which is Manning’s third type of control. Even though legal controls may shape departmental policies, or in some cases change the entire profession’s practice, it is the department head (i.e., chief or sheriff) that has the greatest control over police officer conduct by implementing and enforcing policies to be followed. An example wherein the judiciary can cause change is in the form of case precedence based on a court’s ruling regarding officer conduct under a certain set of circumstances. One particular case, which brought about a major paradigm shift in police use of deadly force, was the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Tennessee v. Garner (1985). This case and its impact on the practice of police use of deadly force and departmental policies will be discussed later in Chapter 3. Suffice to say, in comparison to the totality of legal controls, department policy tends to offer more useful direction, which limits an officer’s freedom of choice. Manning (1980: 140) explains, “In many respects, agencies ‘make law,’ and their patterns of discretionary decision making are the basis for and definition of ‘policy.’”

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Manning (1980) identifies ‘police culture’ as the fourth form of control over police use of force. Police culture is a subject of controversy in of itself. On one hand, Hunter (1999) asserts that in spite of the public’s perception, it is rare for police officers to view excessive force as a frequent event. Reporting on his research regarding police officer opinions about use of force, Hunter (1999) found officers tended to believe that persons possessing the propensity to be heavy-handed or participate in wrongdoing would not gravitate to law enforcement as a profession. On the other hand, other researchers contradict Hunter’s point of view, and maintain that police officers consider excessive force to be a normal part of the job and necessary to control citizens perceived to be a personal threat (Holmes 2000). As a largely white male dominated profession (Lersch 1998; Herbert 1998), policing in the United States has developed its own subculture, one that disproportionately represents society’s gender and racial makeup. Herbert (1998) contends that the police subculture is driven by distinct guiding beliefs that greatly influence how officers conduct business in most contacts with the public. Because police officers view themselves apart from the community they serve, the internal culture found within policing may not only condone, but also encourage officers to use force. “The way the police view the world can be described as a ‘we/they’ or ‘us/them’ orientation” (Kappeler, Sluder and Alpert 1998/1999: 243). Mutual distrust held by the community and police officers further develops the division of ‘us versus them.’ This suspicion by the police subculture encourages isolation from the public, which promotes the construction of a protective wall that discourages mutual communication (Mastrofski, Snipes, Parks and Maxwell 2000). In their examination of the police culture, Kappeler et al. (1998/1999) identified three

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philosophies embedded in the culture that supports the police subculture. The authors define the philosophies as “ethos,” which set apart “character, sentiments, and guiding beliefs” of police officers and law enforcement as a profession (p. 250). The three “ethos” outlined by Kappeler et al. (1998/1999) are: the value of bravery; autonomy; and, secrecy. Further expounding upon the police ethos, Kappeler et al. (1998/1999) examined several postulates of the police culture that were linked to the ethos. Without repeating all of the postulates, only a few are mentioned here to provide a sense of the culture as explained by Kappeler et al. Some of the postulates considered by the authors are: don’t give up another cop; if you get caught off base, don’t implicate anybody else; protect your ass; don’t trust a new guy until you have him checked out; and, be aggressive when you have to, but don’t be too eager. Trust in a newer officer usually occurs as a result of his/her demonstration that he/she is one of the team, and can be counted on when it matters most. These situations tend to involve physical altercations with a combative citizen. Officers need to know that they will be backed up in the heat of battle. During such life threatening encounters, bonds are formed. Almost nothing can earn the trust of one’s peers quicker than backing them up in a fight. Because each officer wants to belong and be accepted, he/she may feel inclined to seek opportunities to use force whether necessary or unnecessary. The police culture may allow for ostracizing an officer who did not use force when the opportunity was present, and more importantly, necessary. What is most important in determining the accepted culture within any police organization is the process of socialization, or what Herbert (1998) calls the “normative order.” Quite simply, the normative order

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consists of the commonly accepted rules and practices for the police culture, one of which is the code of silence; a means of protecting officers who have acted inappropriately by keeping quiet, or any of the postulates described by Kappeler et al. (1998/1999). Thus, if an agency’s normative order encourages officers to embrace opportunities to engage in acts of physical altercation as a display of bravery, or conversely his/her antipathy for cowardice, then an officer is more likely to look for the chance to use force to demonstrate his/her courage and value for being accepted by the group. For some police agencies, the normative order of the police culture persists when the older, more experienced officers influence and acculturate new recruits through training and demonstrating accepted conduct in the work environment. Some police use of force researchers (Scrivner 1994; Swope 2001) contend that if such cultural practices are left unchecked, misconduct can become the norm in the police work group. Some researchers would argue that the police code of silence runs throughout every department and encourages officers to conceal incidents of officers abusing their authority or similar acts of misconduct; however, the code of silence may be lifting. In more recent studies, investigators are finding that police officers tend to not approve of, or believe in, covering up incidents in which fellow officers use excessive force (Weisburd, Greenspan, Hamilton, Williams and Bryant 2000). Despite their general finding, Weisburd et al. (2000) assert that officers often turn a blind eye to officer misconduct and fail to report the ill-behaving officers to their superiors. It is clear that the culture remains such that to turn-in officers for their delinquent conduct has the potential to leave the informing officer ostracized by other officers, which may make the action unrealistic.

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Although it is recognized that the police culture may not be a good source to provide guidance for employing appropriate, just, and necessary force, or what Luna (2005) calls “optimal force,” department policy can be more effective. Despite the benefits of departmental policies as appropriate control and regulation, some researchers acknowledge that the policies are enacted by and reflect the opinions of agency leaders, which may not necessarily be in the best interest of all concerned. For example, Herbert (1998) uses the Los Angeles Police Department and one of its former chiefs, Darryl Gates, to make this point. Herbert asserts that Chief Gates encouraged an “ass-kicking” style of policing as a means to overcome a shortage of manpower, which resulted in the officers on the street behaving more aggressively. Thus, the officers resorted to aggressive tactics to display their command presence in the community as a means to compensate for the lack of available resources. In this case, LAPD officers acted in a manner reflective of Chief Gates’ management prerogative, which may have been an impetus for the public’s criticism of the department and its officers following the Rodney King incident and subsequent legal review in the early to mid-1990s. Prior to the 1970s, use of force policies, specifically those guiding the use of deadly force, were infrequently set by police departments. Relying on findings from other researchers, Fridell (2005: 22-23) concludes, “…policies do influence the frequency and nature of force used by officers.” Despite the risk of deficient or poorly enforced policies, policies that are appropriately implemented and enforced can competently instruct officers to use optimal force so as to reduce risk of injury to the officer and citizen, effectively control a potentially volatile situation, and minimize the exposure to liability. As a method to guide

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the formulation of policies, Alpert and Smith (1994: 486) maintain that the policies must be “based on the anticipated direction of the ‘reasonable person,’” which is a rather difficult and subjective task. The authors identify that the problem with the “reasonable person” standard is its “objectiveness.” Explaining the problem, Alpert and Smith (1994: 486) write, “Efforts to quantify what is ‘reasonable’ vis a vis that which is ‘excessive,’ have invariably resulted in the confusing tautology. What is reasonable has become what is necessary.” Alpert and Smith (1994) argue that the “reasonable person” standard falls short of expectation and offers little direction. In place of the current practice, the authors cautiously suggest an alternative formula or method to guide police use of force. It is the authors’ intent that their proposition will create an opportunity for both academicians and practitioners to reconsider the contemporary method. Alpert and Smith (1994: 497) contend, Once it is necessary for a police officer to use force, its reasonableness must be judged by an assessment of various factors. Specifically, the magnitude of force must be in relation to its necessity. Translated into applied language, this means that the police can use force, including what is necessary, to subdue or restrain a suspect or remove the threat, but must reduce the level of force when a suspect is placed under control or the threat is removed.

The two researchers believe that a force continuum should be developed to guide officers in their day to day contact with citizens, and can be used as an objective tool by those who sit in judgment of officers following a use of force. With respect to the attention given to police use of force, it is common for police agencies to develop and implement a force continuum to guide their officers through appropriate

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uses of force. In review of a number of different continuums, Garner and Maxwell (1999) found that most models begin with officer presence, which is presented as the least intrusive level of force. The two researchers report that increasing levels of force, which remain toward the lower end of the force spectrum are verbal commands, and weaponless tactics consisting of control holds and grappling maneuvers. Toward the middle of the force continuum is the implementation of chemical agents (i.e., pepper spray), and impact weapons (i.e., batons, and conducted energy devices). Lethal force (i.e., use of firearms or other means that are likely to result in death) is identified by Garner and Maxwell (1999) as the most extreme level of force permissible on the force continuum. Although there have been a number of varying force continuums developed, two primary forms have been promoted over the years. Fridell (2005) explores both versions, beginning with the linear model. The linear model calls for an officer to escalate force as the citizen’s level of resistance increases. This model begins with the officer’s presence, providing verbal direction in response to a citizen’s verbal or nonverbal noncompliance. If the citizen becomes passive resistant, the officer uses touch control. The force used by an officer will increase to empty-hand tactics and/or chemical agents when the citizen’s actions equate to active resistance. In the event that the citizen behaves in an actively aggressive manner, the officer’s force rises to employing impact weapons and/or a conducted electronic device (i.e., Taser). If the citizen resorts to aggravated aggression, the officer’s option may be deadly force. There are a number of identified problems with the linear model. Fridell (2005) considers three problems: First, the model does not consider a multitude of variables

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that may occur in real-life, which could affect the officer’s decision (i.e., age/gender of the citizen, size and strength of the officer versus the citizen, and/or number of officers or citizens present). Second, the complexity of the model may make it difficult for an officer to delay his/her response in a critical incident demanding immediate action. Third, the design of the model suggests that the officer has to exhaust lower levels of force before proceeding up the continuum. Fridell (2005) points out that even though officers are taught to skip steps along the continuum and use the most appropriate level of force in response to a citizen’s demonstrated behavior, it is a common tactic for lawyers to explain the linear model in a manner so as to communicate that officers are to attempt each step along the force scale before proceeding to the next highest level. In order to overcome some of the problems found within the linear model, some agencies have adopted the second model identified by Fridell (2005), which is the circular model. Such models are situational based with tactical options provided. The circular model possesses similar elements found in the linear model; however, in this model, the officer takes the position of the hub of the wheel, and force options available to the officer are mere spokes that radiate out toward the citizen’s displayed behavior. Summarizing the circular model, Fridell (2005: 48) states, “The circular configuration of situational models avoids the implied stepwise progression of the linear models but otherwise provides little guidance to the officers regarding force decisions.” Despite the identified limitations of the different force continuum models, while studying police use of force with respect to a suspect’s resistance, Alpert and Dunham (1999) found officers tend to appropriately follow their department’s force continuum. The two researchers maintain that as officers encounter

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situations requiring the use of force to gain compliance of an uncooperative suspect, the officer escalates his/her level of force as necessary to overcome the suspect’s resistance. Similar to the linear model already discussed, Alpert and Smith (1994) add two more elements to the model for consideration and to generate further discussion among those whom have a shared interest. Alpert and Smith recognize that an officer is justified to increase his/her amount of control (i.e., force) in response to a citizen’s resistance; however, they add into the equation the citizen’s offense as their first additional element. In consideration of the citizen’s offense, Alpert and Smith (1994: 498) contend that in reference to an officer using force “one must consider the threat of the suspect to the public if allowed to escape.” Although it may seem unnatural to a police officer to let a suspect get away, this is becoming more common in the profession. The restrictions of deadly force policies, as well as police pursuit policies, provide two examples where this practice occurs more frequently. Many agencies are restricting the circumstances permitting officers to pursue suspects in vehicles. At one point in time, most departments allowed its officers to chase any motorist failing to yield, even for the most minor of infractions. Clearly, such activity places the officer, the fleeing violator, and the general public at great risk. Following many lawsuits and community protest calling for more restrictive pursuit policies, many agencies have been moved to listen. These departments recognize that the risk of unnecessary injury or death does not outweigh the capture of a speeding motorist. In fact, some police agencies’ pursuit policies prevent officers from chasing known felony suspects if it is reasonable that the suspect can be apprehended at a later time.

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As a second addition to the linear force model, Alpert and Smith (1994) maintain that an officer’s level of training and experience should be included as it relates to the officer’s evaluation of the perceived threat posed by the citizen. The authors assert as an officer’s level of training and experience increases, he/she is able to better assess whether a citizen’s behavior and actions create a real threat that calls for action. As an example, Alpert and Smith (1994) suggest that an intoxicated citizen holding a bat in one hand and a six-pack of beer in the other, as he advances toward an officer in a staggering motion, may be cause for concern. Suggesting how an experienced officer may react, Alpert and Smith (1994: 499-500) write, “The threat may appear to be serious, requiring an immediate and aggressive response. However, in reality, the threat may be minimal, requiring the officer to merely retreat, call for back-up, and use a defensive maneuver or defensive weapon to remove the threat.” It is apparent that the model provided by Alpert and Smith runs a similar risk of objectivity that is found in interpreting what a ‘reasonable person’ would do. How do you measure an officer’s training in a given situation? When is a certain level of experience enough to make effective decisions? What about a whole host of variables that play into any given scenario wherein an officer uses some amount of force? Despite these concerning questions, Alpert and Smith’s model furthers the discussion, which was not only their objective, but more importantly, it helps develop greater understanding regarding the breadth of knowledge of police use of force and its on-going debate.

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Use of Force Training Although it may be difficult to measure the effectiveness of an officer’s level of training and experience given the outcome of a situation involving a use of force, it is logical, that all things being equal, an officer possessing more of these characteristics would make better decisions than a lesser-trained and inexperienced officer. Until more recently, officer use of force training was largely confined to the police academy regimen, where recruits learned ‘defensive tactics’ (i.e., weapons retention and other basic self-defense techniques in the form of orchestrated maneuvers conducted in a controlled environment), baton training, handcuffing procedures, and firearms training. Most often, each form of instruction consisted of theoretical lecture followed by practical application wherein the recruit was tested under placid and unemotional conditions. For example, once a recruit learned to manipulate a baton, he/she would demonstrate the different strikes in the air then on a large punching bag. In circumstances calling for the recruit to use a baton in a defensive manner against an assailant’s attack (e.g., punch or kick), the recruit was commonly told ahead of time what type of strike he/she would be defending, which eliminates the opportunity to practice spontaneous decision-making. In reference to firearms training, the recruits were instructed to fire a designated number of rounds, from a specified distance, in a given amount of time. The typical target was a non-threatening silhouette of a person hanging on a metal bar. Under such circumstances, the only stress imposed on the recruit was a time constraint. The recruit officer would be required to accurately fire a given number of rounds in a set period of time.

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Each of the use of force weaponry and tactics employed by police officers involve perishable skills, which means that as more time passes from the latest point in training, the less likely an officer’s proficiency in the skill will be maintained. Additionally, the skills developed in such a sterile and impracticable setting, as described above, fail to properly prepare an officer for an actual fight against an uncooperative and non-predictable suspect. More times than not, the officer learns that the combative citizen reacts completely different than anticipated, and the officer must resort to whatever fighting skills he/she may possess based on personal experience. In the end, the officer is left with little to no confidence in the tactics learned in the academy, and quickly replaces them with what comes natural to him/her in the heat of battle. Beyond the fact that the formal training provided lacks practical application, most officers receive very little further in-service hands-on use of force training with the exception of periodic firearms qualification. For some agencies, police officers shoot monthly whereas others may do so quarterly. At any rate, most agencies fall short of the weekly training suggested by some experts (Geller and Scott 1992). Praising the benefit of on-going training throughout an officer’s career, Geller and Scott (1992: 341) recognize, “Range firing and simulation exercises designed to maximize firing accuracy and self-confidence in officers that they can use deadly force decisively and skillfully when it is required” is correlated to “violence-reduction” and “conflict management” training. Although Geller and Scott were not directly speaking about the more recent developments in force options training, they had the foresight to appreciate the benefit of more advanced training than what most officers experienced in the academy. Police practitioners have

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recognized the numerous shortcomings of past training customs and have not only developed more heuristic methods, but also require periodic updated training throughout the officer’s career. Because it is known that these skills diminish over time, periodic update training has become a common industry standard. In fact, some accrediting agencies such as California’s Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) requires officers to attend twelve (12) hours of perishable skills training every two years. The mandated training consists of four (4) hours of arrest and control, four (4) hours of driver training, and four (4) hours of tactical firearms or force options simulator.4 Contemporary training experienced by officers is multifaceted, usually divided into areas such as legal standards, policy review, de-brief of real situations officers have encountered, and hands-on training with a constructive critique of the officer’s performance. It is common for these training sessions to begin with a lecture segment, which consists of reiteration of the legal standards. Development of a solid understanding of these standards is important because they frequently serve as the basis for departmental use of force policies. The two primary legal cases that have caused a fundamental paradigm shift in the policies of police agencies across the United States come out of the U.S. Supreme Court. These cases are Tennessee v. Garner (1985), which is discussed in detail later in Chapter 3, and Graham v. Connor (1989). Whereas the Tennessee v. Garner case focused on police use of deadly force, Graham v. Connor “set parameters on the use of force generally – not just deadly force” (Fridell, 2005: 22). 4

Information regarding the California Peace Officer Standards and Training requirement was obtained from the Commission’s website http://www.post.ca.gov/training/tdb_perishable.asp.

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Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Connor, lower courts employed a variety of legal standards to determine whether an officer’s use of force was excessive. One method was a four factor standard, which the U.S. Supreme Court recognized as, (1) the need for the application of force; (2) the relationship between that need and the amount of force that was used; (3) the extent of the injury inflicted; and (4) ‘[w]hether the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain and restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm’ (quote from a lower court) (Graham v. Connor, 1989).

In addition to defining the boundary of police use of force, the U.S. Supreme Court also addressed the constitutional right being violated in circumstances when an accusation of excessive force occurs. Whereas other courts relied upon a “substantive due process standard,” here the U.S. Supreme Court determined, “In most instances, that will be either the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures of the person, or the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments, which are the two primary sources of constitutional protection against physically abusive governmental conduct” (Graham v. Connor 1989). In Graham v. Connor (1989), the justices further clarified the appropriate constitutional right when they wrote, “All claims that law enforcement officials have used excessive force – deadly or not – in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a substantive due process standard.” After speaking to the constitutionality issue of police use of force, the Court focused on defining when force is reasonable in relation to the constitution.

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Writing for the Court’s majority, Chief Justice William Rehnquist declares, Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ against the countervailing governmental interests at stake… Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it (Graham v. Connor 1989).

Essentially, the Court recognizes that in order for police officers to carry out their duties, as they are currently responsible for, they must be empowered with the authority to do so even if it means that they will use coercive force. Providing an interpretation as to how police officers are to determine the appropriate practice of force, Chief Justice Rehnquist (Graham v. Connor 1989) writes, …its [police use of force] proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.

Thus, although some people may expect a clear-cut definition for police to apply force and at what level, the U.S. Supreme Court understands that the nuances of real life circumstances are fluid, and officers must be provided the flexibility to make decisions as the situation they are confronted with unfolds. Recognizing that police officers will be second-guessed for their actions, the U.S. Supreme Court provided guidance for these occasions as well. Chief Justice

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Rehnquist (Graham v. Connor 1989) states, “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Interestingly, the justices acknowledged that an officer’s perspective, based on his/her training and experience, may be more telling as to the reasonableness of force used versus that of a layperson with no personal stake (i.e., potential to suffer physical injury or death) in the incident. Further clarifying “reasonableness,” Chief Justice Rehnquist continues, “The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments – in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving – about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” The justices decided reasonableness is based on objectivity given the circumstances confronting the officer, not the officer’s “underlying intent or motivation” for using force (Graham v. Connor 1989). In short, what Graham v. Connor (1989) tells us is that force used by police officers may be reasonable and necessary. States have used the Court’s ruling in Graham v. Connor as a basis when they developed statutes to guide the authorization of police use of force. In California, Penal Code section 835a addresses when and how police officers may use force. The statute states, Any peace officer who has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a public offense may use reasonable force to effect the arrest, to prevent escape or overcome resistance. A peace officer who makes or attempts to make an arrest need not retreat or desist from his efforts by reason of the resistance or threatened resistance of the person being arrested; nor shall such officer be deemed an aggressor or lose his right to self-defense by the use of reasonable force

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Police Shootings and Citizen Behavior to effect the arrest or to prevent escape or to overcome resistance (LexisNexis 2001).

Here the law clearly supports police use of coercive force when confronting an uncooperative person. Under such circumstances, the officer’s actions [use of force] are taken on behalf or in representation of the people of the state. More importantly, the officer is not being labeled as the antagonist even though he/she may be taking proactive measures to apprehend the resisting citizen. It should be noted that although all nine justices concurred with the judgment in this case, three did not fully agree with the majority’s decision to address allegations of police excessive force prior to arrest. Writing for the minority, Justice Blackmun (Graham v. Connor 1989) states, “I see no reason for the Court to find it necessary further to reach out to decide that prearrest excessive force claims are to be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment rather than under a substantive due process standard.” Following the discussion of legal standards and their effect on police use of force, trainers may address departmental policies depending on their audience. In the event that officers attending the training session are from differing agencies, the class is instructed to refer to their own department’s policy. If the training is agency specific, the instructors typically spend some time reviewing the department’s use of force policy. For example, the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department has several policies that address use of force. The following General Orders sections (Riverside County Sheriff’s Department General Orders Manual 2001) are some of the more pertinent policies in regards to this chapter:

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G.O. 1000.01 – The Department considers the use of force or firearms/weapons to be defensive in nature and to be used only when necessary and justified. G.O. 1000.03 – The Department demands the exercise of good judgment at all times when force is necessary. G.O. 1000.04 – Members shall not use more force than is reasonably necessary in overcoming any resistance or force. G.O. 1000. 06 – Use of force on suspects, prisoners or inmates shall be discontinued once compliance is obtained. G.O. 1000. 07 – Lethal force will only be used when all other reasonable means have failed in the defense of a person’s life or the life of the Department member.

On the other hand, other agencies may address the use of force more broadly. In a recommended draft policy for the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department, LEXIPOL5 recommends the policy to read, It is the policy of this Department that deputies shall use only that amount of force that reasonably appears necessary, given the facts and circumstances perceived by the deputy at the time of the event, to effectively bring an incident under control. ‘Reasonableness’ of the force used must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable deputy on the scene at the time of the incident. Any interpretation of ‘reasonableness’ must allow for the fact that law enforcement officers are often forced to make split-second decisions in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.

Clearly, although not cited, the language in the proposed policy is drawn directly from the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Graham v. Connor (1989). In reference to the use of lethal force, the draft policy recommended by LEXIPOL states, 5

LEXIPOL is a corporation that provides model policy services to participating law enforcement agencies by customizing policies to the individual agency’s needs.

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Police Shootings and Citizen Behavior Use of deadly force is justified in the following circumstances: (a) A deputy may use deadly force to protect him or herself or others from what they believe would be an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury; (b) A deputy may not use deadly force to stop a fleeing suspect unless the deputy has probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed or intends to commit a felony involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious bodily injury or death. Under such circumstances, a verbal warning should precede the use of deadly force, where feasible.

Here, when we compare the Riverside Sheriff’s Department current policy with the one suggested by LEXIPOL in reference to lethal force, the LEXIPOL policy is quite broader or more permissible than presently allowed. In the examples provided, we can see that the legal standard served as a basis for police departments to follow in the formation of their use of force policies. Even though this is more likely to be the direction followed in the development of policies (i.e., legal standards precede or inform on policy), it is possible to move in the opposite direction as well. We will see an example of this in the next chapter when the case of Tennessee v. Garner is examined. In our current age of technology, it is the propensity for current events such as police use of force to be captured on videotape. With the advent of video cameras in police cruisers, surveillance cameras, media helicopters in metropolitan communities, and the general public’s possession of personal video cameras and cellphone cameras, more of these incidents are being recorded. The availability of these recordings assist in the next phase of training currently being carried out. Several years ago, any de-brief of a police use of force incident was based on information obtained from the officers involved, witnesses, or the evidence collected during the subsequent

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investigation if one was conducted. Today, trainers often rely upon filmed footage of an actual critical incident and objectively review what occurred for ‘lessons learned.’ These critiques are not meant to judge the officers involved, but used as an opportunity to learn from what the officers did right and what they could have done better. Oftentimes, instruction is built around identifying options that were available and utilized, as well as those overlooked during the incident. In light of the expectations of those people who remain as stakeholders (i.e., the public, peer officers, supervisors, etc.), options that are being sought are those that encourage a de-escalation of force or identify how it can be avoided early on in the scenario. If officers recognize the options available to them, the potential to minimize future uses of force are increased, which would likely, in turn, enhance police/community relations. The last phase of training is what Fridell (2005) identifies as “integrated training.” Earlier versions of this training were “shoot don’t shoot” scenarios. Sometimes these scenarios included role-playing with live actors or an interaction with a video screen wherein the officer would face a situation in which he/she would have to decide whether or not it was appropriate to shoot. Today, many force options training facilities offer computer-based training, which allows instructors to change the scenario midstream depending on how the officer reacts as the incident proceeds. In fact, as Fridell (2005) points out, the instructor is able to take aim and fire small, marble sized, plastic projectiles at the officer if he/she remains in the open instead of scanning the environment for positions of tactical advantage (i.e., cover and/or concealment). This device is meant to condition the officer to think and react appropriately while engaging an armed suspect.

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The advantage of the more advanced integrated training is that it allows officers to be armed as they would be on the street (i.e., sidearm, baton, pepper spray, Taser, etc.), and resort to any part of their arsenal as needed during the training exercise. Clearly, if the officer uses good, clear, and concise verbal skills while maintaining proper tactics of advantage by not needlessly exposing him/herself to danger, the scenario may be resolved without a need to use force beyond the officer’s command presence. This also requires the officer to recognize the need to appropriately increase his/her command presence in order to preserve a position of tactical advantage. For example, an officer dispatched to a nighttime prowler call may draw and aim his/her firearm at the suspected prowler, who conceals his hands from the officer’s view and refuses to cooperate with the officer’s commands to show his hands. Under such circumstances, the trainer may program the computer to have the suspect comply by showing his hands. On the other hand, if an officer allows him/herself to be exposed by remaining in the open and does not draw a firearm, the trainer will program the computer to have the suspect produce a firearm and begin shooting at the officer. The officer must then react defensively to the threat. The final aspect of the comprehensive use of force training is an analysis of the officer’s actions during the force options simulator training. During the evaluation, the instructor can determine the reaction time of the officer firing his/her weapon, where the officer’s projectiles went, and whether the suspect was struck. Beyond the mechanics of the scenario, the instructor will provide feedback regarding the officer’s performance. Good tactics and procedures are reinforced while areas for improvement are identified and positively discussed in a manner so as to encourage the officer to learn them in a controlled

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environment, which can be implemented later as a part of the officer’s regular practice when he/she returns to the street. Pervasiveness of Police use of Force Much of our understanding of police use of force is fed to us through mass media. We turn on our televisions to watch the evening news or pick up the daily newspaper from the driveway on the way to work, and discover the media’s account of a recent police use of force. Depending on how the story is spun, how shocking the officer’s actions are perceived, or whether the race/ethnicity of the officer versus the citizen are made to be an issue, the story can linger for days, if not weeks. In fact, the story will be resurrected periodically as different aspects of the ensuing investigation and/or court trial are revealed. Essentially, the more the media plays upon emotions rather than the facts, the more it influences the community’s perception of police use of force. In reference to the public’s perception, Weitzer (1999) maintains that although the rate at which the police use force is statistically infrequent, the public perceives it as a problem, particularly when speaking to excessive force. Certainly, not all people experience the police similarly. In fact, there is evidence to support the contention that citizens believe that a person’s race, as well as social class, influences an officer’s interaction with the citizen. Explaining how residents interpret the role of police officers patrolling the lower-class, minority neighborhoods, Mirande (1981: 68) asserts, “The police have traditionally been viewed not only as outsiders but as representatives of the dominant oppressive Anglo society.” Even though minorities desire nothing more than equal treatment by the

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police, Mirande (1981) concludes in his research on policecommunity conflict conducted in a southern California barrio that his findings are similar to prior research. Mirande (1981: 82) writes, Difference between our findings and those of the NORC study appear consistent with historical differences among the three racial-ethnic groups in attitudes toward crime, treatment by the police, and their relationship to the legal-justice system. Anglos obviously receive better treatment from the police and are more supportive of them than are blacks or Chicanos.

In opposition to Mirande’s argument that minorities perceive disparate treatment by officers, other researchers studying police officer perceptions found that officers based their actions on the citizen’s behavior, not their race (Son, Davis and Rome 1998). In their examination of officers review of their peers’ actions, Son et al. (1998) report that officers are more forgiving of fellow officers who are more violent when suspects were vocally or physically resistant with the peer officers. Comparable to Mirande’s (1981) assertion that minorities want police officers to treat them in a similar or equal manner as experienced by whites, Weitzer (2000: 129) maintains, “An overwhelming majority of blacks and whites in America believe that the criminal justice system should operate in a race-neutral fashion and favor federal government intervention to ensure that minorities and whites receive equal treatment by the courts and police.” In his study on the perception of police abuse of minorities, Weitzer (1999) examined the attitudes of residents from three different neighborhoods to include social class differences. One neighborhood was largely white middleclass, one was black middle-class, and the third was comprised of lower-class black residents. In this study, the

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researcher maintains that the findings “support the thesis that neighborhood context conditions residents’ attitudes and reported experiences with the police” (Weitzer 1999). It only makes sense that police use of force and the negative public perceptions that are produced as a result of deleterious police-citizen contacts are based on the probability that contact between police officers and citizens occurs in the first place. In other words, the greater the frequency that police-citizen encounters occur, and the more likely that these meetings involve negative interaction that leads to a use of force or other antagonistic outcome, the more likely the community in which this activity takes place will develop a poor perception of the police. Thus, if a particular community or neighborhood attracts a greater demand for police services, it will quite possibly develop a diminished outlook of the police. Relying on other researchers’ studies, Weitzer (2000: 130) furthers this assertion by stating, …relationships with the police are conditioned less strongly by residents’ racial backgrounds than by demands on law enforcement that vary by neighborhood class level. Because crime rates tend to be higher in both black and white lowerclass areas, residents of lower-class areas have more contacts with police and, hence, a greater number of contacts that might go awry and result in conflict.

When researchers study the public’s perception of the police in the context of both race/ethnicity and social class, a distinct division of perspectives develops. In his examination of the three different neighborhoods, Weitzer (1999) found that the social class from which someone lives affects their perception and experience with the police. Despite the person’s racial/ethnic background, those from middle-class neighborhoods tend to maintain a more optimistic view of the police (Weitzer 1999).

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Because poorer communities are inclined to statistically generate higher crime rates and calls for service, it only makes sense that police officers are deployed in greater numbers and patrol these neighborhoods with greater frequency. Weitzer (1999) concludes that due to more pronounced police presence, it is common for members residing in lower-class neighborhoods to develop a pessimistic view of the police and believe officers regularly resort to inappropriate uses of force. Despite Weitzer’s (1999 and 2000) findings that a person’s social class may be an apparent causal factor affecting his/her fond support for or aversion to the police, other studies have developed similar findings as those revealed in Mirande’s (1981) research. In fact, one study found that in relation to persons holding a similar social class, race/ethnicity possess a stronger influence on commonly held beliefs about the police (Weitzer and Tuch 1999). Weitzer and Tuch (1999) maintain that regardless of social class, African-Americans are more likely to perceive racial disparities by the police than whites. However, when actual incidents are examined, researchers have discovered that whites are more often the target of excessive force by the police than minorities, and when force is used, the recipient of the violence is more likely to be a member of the same race as the officer (Alpert and Dunham 1999; Holmes 2000). Further supporting this point, Lersch (1998) found that complaints of police misconduct are more likely to be made against officers of the same race/ethnicity as the community member lodging the claim of wrongdoing. It is further contended that when complaints are filed, people of color tend to do so more frequently than Caucasians. Notwithstanding the perception held by minorities that police officers behave rudely and condescendingly toward them, in his study,

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Weitzer (1999) learned that it was uncommon for minorities to report officers resorting to racial slurs. Thus, despite the perception maintained by minority citizens, in reality, the race of the citizen may not be a significant factor when officers decide to use force. Some of these findings should not come as a great surprise because a number of things appear to be converging in the social environment. First, as members from minority communities demand representation on the police force, many agencies deploy officers of color accordingly. As a result, when an officer resorts to using force to control a citizen, the officer is more likely to be the same race/ethnicity of the person being controlled. Furthermore, as is evident in the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department (discussed in Chapter 5)6, many police departments tend to attract and hire white males disproportionately in reference to their representation in the greater society the department serves. Thus, any level of force employed by the police could be interpreted or perceived as oppression of those who are not represented. Also, with respect to social class, people who feel that they are being protected by police action (i.e., the middle-class) tend to support the police as opposed to people who are likely to be exploited by or the focus of police interference (i.e., the lower-class). The chance that police officers will use force on any individual or segment of society is associated with how often officers come into contact with them. McElvain and Kposowa (2004: 266) argue,

6

Even though the racial and gender composition of the Riverside Sheriff’s Department is provided for descriptive purposes, it is not addressed specifically for the purpose of this study.

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Police Shootings and Citizen Behavior The likelihood that the police will use force during contacts with the public naturally increases with each contact. It is simply a matter of probability. If the police make zero contacts with the public, there is no opportunity for force to be used. However, as a matter of practice, police do encounter the public frequently, but they do not contact the public equally across society.

From examining police patrol patterns, and questioning police administrators as to their basis for deployment practices, researchers have found that officers are assigned to patrol beats based on the necessity to maintain order and handle calls for service in a timely manner. What researchers have found is that officers are assigned in greater numbers in the lower economic neighborhoods, which also tend to consist disproportionately of people of color (Lersch 1990; Weitzer 1999). As a result of the practice of patrolling minority neighborhoods with greater frequency, Lersch (1998) reasons that residents of such communities file complaints of police abuse more often than those living in less patrolled districts. Explaining the necessity for police officers to use violence as a means for controlling members of our society, and why the police display greater presence in the lowerclass communities, some researchers have relied upon conflict theory (Jacobs and Britt 1979; Weitzer 1999; Holmes 2000). Weitzer (1999) and Holmes (2000) assert that the police serve as the mechanism for controlling those people (i.e., the dangerous classes) who are perceived to pose the greatest threat to the status quo maintained by the privileged or dominant class. From the perspective of the privileged classes, typically members of the white middle and upper classes, anyone or any group of people who are perceived to behave or maintain cultures different from them are then presumed to be a threat to the comfort status they maintain and must be constrained. Based on the

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structure of society in the United States, the lower classes (i.e., the poor) and minorities lack the power and/or resources to thwart the power of the upper classes, which can also include their interpretation of police abuse (Weitzer 1999). It is argued that the relationship between the police and minorities further symbolizes the deeprooted division of the social classes; minorities or people of color represent the lower or dangerous classes and police officers are seen as the embodiment of the dominant class (Holmes 2000). To predict the level of police presence, Holmes (2000) developed a “threat hypothesis,” which is a calculation for matching the apparent level of deviance or criminal behavior being displayed by an individual with the amount of crime control employed by the police. As the perception of danger or “threat” to the interests of the privileged group increases in a particular area, police presence should, according to the hypothesis, coincide. This hypothesis supports Weitzer’s (1999) contention that greater police presence in the disadvantaged neighborhoods is a result of higher crime rates. Quite simply, if the police are not needed or called into a particular area, they will focus their resources elsewhere. Thus, whether by design or necessity, this tends to be where the poor, who are also more likely to be people of color, reside. In the end, it is logical that the underclass, the poor, and minorities, would possess a dim view of those persons who act as their oppressors. Notwithstanding the research findings in reference to public and police officer perceptions of police use of force, studies examining the frequency of occurrence indicate that, in relation to the number of police/citizen interactions, officers rarely resort to force (Langan, Greenfeld, Smith, Durose and Levin 2001; Holmes 2000; Weitzer 1999; Greenfeld, Langan and Smith 1999; Henriquez 1999;

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Garner and Maxwell 1999; Alpert and Dunham 1999). In their examination of a 1996 public survey, Greenfeld et al. (1999) found that the police in the United States made approximately 44.6 million citizen contacts, which equates to one in five persons 12 years old or older. The researchers further report that the public initiated about half of these contacts, which means, as a whole, police officers were no more likely to take up citizen contact than the citizen contacting the officer. As a result of the survey, Greenfeld et al. discovered that about 99 percent of the contacts ended without incident, or in other words, police officers either used or threatened to use force in about one percent of all citizen contacts. Interestingly enough, as Son et al. (1998) learned from officers’ perceptions that force is based on citizen behavior, Greenfeld et al. (1999) similarly discovered that of those citizens surveyed, the majority admitted their personal actions during the police encounter may have provoked the officer to use force against them. Regarding citizen behavior and/or actions during their contact with officers, other researchers examining public surveys learned 57 percent of persons who were the recipient of police use of force admitted to being under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and argued with, disobeyed, or resisted the police (Langan et al. 2001). In sum, aside from the perceptions held by some, there appears to be evidence to support the argument that most incidents of police use of force are in response to the citizen’s lack of cooperation in relation to the officer’s duty to uphold the law. Narrowing the focus on police/citizen encounters, Henriquez (1999) reports that the International Association of Chiefs of Police calculated use of force based on the number of dispatched calls for service. Using data collected in 1995, 110 police departments reported officers

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resorted to using force in nearly 4.2 of every 10,000 calls for service. Clearly, officers used force in less than a fraction of one percent of all calls for service. Of all tasks and responsibilities imposed on police officers, there is but one that begins to attract attention toward incidents wherein force is employed. These circumstances surround the process of arresting an individual. It is only logical that the thought of losing one’s freedom may motivate them to resist any effort made to apprehend them. Examining the custodial arrest of adults made by six police agencies serving urban communities, Garner and Maxwell (1999) learned that out of the 7,512 arrests considered for their study, the police used force in 1,418 of the arrests, or less than 19 percent of all arrests. With respect to all police/citizen contacts, arrest situations are but a small fraction, and of those encounters, police tend to manage most without resorting to any level of violence. Continuously refining their examination of police use of force, researchers considering actual incidents of force being applied have found officers are more likely to use lower levels of force (Garner and Maxwell 1999; Adams 1999; Henriquez 1999). Garner and Maxwell (1999) maintain that the most common form of force used was grabbing the suspect. The two authors further found that officers turned to weapons in slightly more than two percent of all arrest incidents when force was used, the most common weapon relied upon was a chemical agent (i.e., pepper spray). Reiterating Garner and Maxwell’s findings, Adams (1999) and Henriquez (1999) declare that when it is necessary for an officer to use force, the officer tends to do so at the least aggressive end of the force continuum. Such levels consist of pushing, shoving, and grabbing by the officer. Coinciding with the typical level

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of force used by officers, suspects sustaining injuries as a result of the applied force tend to receive minor abrasions and bruises as opposed to greater injuries (Adams 1999; Alpert and Dunham 1999). Thus, as we examine police use of force in context with the array of police/citizen contacts, the likelihood that an officer will resort to force during the encounter is extremely rare. More often than not, the situation will occur during the arrest of an uncooperative person, and in hindsight, the noncompliant person will acknowledge that his/her combative behavior prompted the use of force.

CHAPTER 3

Research Preceding Strict Limitations

Research on use of Deadly Force Before Tennessee v. Garner In the preceding chapter, police use of force was reviewed in its general sense. By reviewing the various literature on the topic, we covered how the police come to possess the authority to use force, how police use of force is controlled, the training officers receive and how departments develop policies restricting uses of force, and the reality of how frequent officers employ force as opposed to the public’s perception. Whereas chapter 2 covered a broad review of police use of force, this chapter considers a small, but probably the most controversial, aspect of police use of force – that is deadly force, and particularly the literature prior to 1985. Beyond the general debate over police use of deadly force that continues into the present, the period of time leading up to 1985 was filled with lively discussion over whether lethal force should be more restrictive. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court relied upon some of the research findings when it made its landmark ruling restricting police use of deadly force. It is quite common for academic reviews of police use of lethal force research to be divided into, or at least 59

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include, sections covering the frequency of police shootings, race of the citizen as a factor prompting police deadly force, and the implication of departmental policies as they relate to lethal force (for example, see Fyfe 1982; Blumberg 2001). Such review practices are not embarked upon by accident, but occur as a result of the common interests shared by researchers studying deadly force. In other words, the driving questions within this field of study are rather centralized based on the controversies that arise as a result of deadly force (i.e., officer-involved shooting) incidents. In this section, police use of lethal force will be explored in a similar manner, but will include comments on some of the limitations researchers have encountered along the way. In short, this section focuses on the earlier, preTennessee v. Garner decision, police use of deadly force literature. The purpose for this strategy is to highlight the impact that prior research and this specific court case made on police policies and practices, and the resulting direction academic research has subsequently taken. As one begins the exploration of the academic literature on police use of deadly force, it is important to acknowledge that very little was written prior to the 1970s. In fact, Blumberg (2001: 563) points out that Robin’s 1963 study on police justifiable homicides, “was the only empirical study of police deadly force reported in the social science literature.” Arguably, the 1960s was an era in which the status quo within the United States was called into question and challenged by people demanding their civil rights. During this period of time, police shootings tended to be some of the most controversial events, especially when the targeted citizen was a person of color, and more so if he/she were Black. During the 1960s, the impetus for many riots were as a result of negative police contact, usually a police shooting, with a member of the

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Black community (Kelley 2000; Geller 1982; Fyfe 1982a; Geller and Karales 1981; Sherman 1980/1982; Sherman and Langworthy 1979/1982; Jacobs and Britt 1979). In reference to the potential repercussions of police shootings, Geller and Karales (1981: 72) comment, “Regardless of the justifiability of shootings by police, such incidents sometimes have societal consequences far beyond the injury or death of the shooting victims.” Beyond the immediate impact on the individuals involved in the incident, it is clear that in some circumstances the whole community may become impacted. Limitations and Difficulties Surrounding Lethal Force Research To understand police shootings, we need to first appreciate some of the difficulties researchers face when they attempt to examine police deadly force, as well as some of the interpretations of the incidents themselves. Here, we attempt to elucidate some of the earlier interpretations of police shootings and how they tie into the greater understanding of the phenomena. To begin, it is necessary to recognize that the process for evaluating police shootings has been a difficult process for a number of reasons. First, researchers are either rarely provided access to the data or when admission is provided, reviewers discover that police files and reports lack specific information or are maintained in a manner that is not conducive for data retrieval (Goldkamp 1976/1982; Fyfe 1981/1982; Fyfe 1982a; Fyfe 1982b; Geller 1982; Geller 1985; Alpert and Dunham 2004). Fyfe (1982a: 11) maintains, “Access to data on when and under what circumstances police kill frequently is denied, and those who have merely reported upon the findings of their research have been castigated for doing

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so.” Beyond the logistical problems faced by researchers attempting to gather data from police reports, which are less than practical for data mining, many department administrators remain resistant to providing access. In some cases, department leaders feel that sharing information and tactics may be used against them in civil lawsuits (Geller 1985). On the other hand, police executives remain hesitant because they may be unfamiliar with the researcher and/or his/her intentions, and dread what the data may hold. Most of these reasons for discouraging researcher access leave the requesting academic and others believing that the agency will be embarrassed by the findings or is “hiding something” (Fyfe 1981/1982). Second, it is difficult to measure or use non-shooting incidents for comparison (Meyer 1980; Sherman and Blumberg 1981; Geller 1982; Geller 1985). The question to be answered is what is different about an incident that leads to a shooting, or why in similar calls for service (i.e., robbery in progress) will one call result in a police shooting and others end without incident? Surely, we can count and measure the circumstances of actual police shooting incidents because we know a shooting has occurred; however, how does one gather information about an incident where an officer could have shot but chose not to shoot? Explaining the problem with such data collection, Geller (1985: 159) states, “It is extremely unlikely that a police department would ever be able to record every averted shooting given the low visibility and inescapable definitional ambiguity of the phenomenon…” Meyer (1980) further explains that officers frequently encounter dangerous situations that could have ended in a shooting but did not (i.e., furtive movements by the suspect that

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could be interpreted as though the suspect were attempting to arm him/herself). For the most part, such encounters are overlooked and accepted as just routine occurrences; not much thought is given to them. The only time an officer may take note of an incident that ‘almost’ resulted in a shooting is while recounting the incident with his/her peers. Typically, the incident was so dramatic that the officer drew his/her firearm, aimed it at the suspect, and began to put pressure on the trigger, but did not complete the act because something happened (i.e., the suspect gave up, someone moved in front of the officer, etc.) that removed the immediate threat or prevented the shooting.7 Third, shootings are not only rare, especially those wherein the citizen is injured or killed (Fyfe 1982a), but the decision for officers to shoot has been misinterpreted as a “split-second” choice. In previous discussion in Chapter 2, we learned that police use of force occurs rarely in relationship to the number of police/citizen contacts. More specifically, use of force incidents are typically confined to those occasions wherein the officer is in the process of apprehending a citizen. Upon closer analysis, police use of firearms as a form of force used during arrests takes place in about two percent of all arrests situations requiring officers to use force (Garner and Maxwell 1999). Coupled with the reality that police shootings seldom occur in relationship to what officers do during their daily assignments is the fact that these incidents are largely an unpredictable part of police work (Van Maanen 1980). Although officers frequently receive direction from their 7

During the course of the author’s law enforcement career, he has heard many officers recall similar near lethal encounters. In several of these conversations, it was common for the officer to say something to the effect, “I nearly had to shoot this guy…” then continue with the story.

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supervisors, as well as departmental policies and procedures, while carrying out their duties, most incidents of use of force are done at the officer’s discretion. Moreover, it is quite rare for an officer to be given an order to fire his/her weapon or for police departments to impose policies requiring officers to shoot (Lindgren 1981; Sherman and Blumberg 1981). Describing the forethought in police use of deadly force, Van Maanen (1980: 146) writes, “When they [police officers] do kill [fire their weapons], it is usually without grand logic or preformulated strategy, but as an individualized response to an immediate, particular, and always peculiar situation.” It is arguable that Van Maanen was trying to say police shootings are rarely ever premeditated by an officer, and typically occur spontaneously or in a ‘split-second’ as a reaction to a perceived or real threat; however, other researchers would disagree in part. Although police officers have been assaulted without forewarning in an ambush or similar unprovoked attack causing the officer to immediately resort to using lethal force in a self-defense response, most analyses of police shootings find that the ‘final act’ (i.e., the officer discharging his/her firearm) was built around a series of decisions. In fact, Reiss (1980) contends that police shootings are based on an affirmative decision made by the officer. Regarding the shooting incident, and in opposition to the split-second argument, Reiss (1980: 127) writes, A point-in-time event – a shooting – is conceptualized as involving a decision. Examination of that point in time leads invariably to the conclusion that there is a relatively short interval during which an officer has an opportunity to make the decision to draw and fire.

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Using decision theory as his basis, Reiss believes that the final outcome is reached based on an officer’s “sequential decision making.” Without minimizing the magnitude of the shooting or the officer’s actions, other researchers (Binder and Scharf 1980; Geller 1982; Brown 1984; Geller 1985; Fyfe 1986/2001), may take different approaches than Reiss, but draw similar conclusions. Explaining decision theory, Reiss (1980: 127-128) states, “Decision theory based on sequential choice models focuses both upon the options or alternatives attached to each decision and how each decision affects subsequent ones.” Essentially, Reiss believes that the when an officerinvolved shooting happens, it occurs as a result of a series of choices made by the officer. Using Reiss’ theoretical contention as a basis, other authors (Brown 1984; Geller 1985) have developed similar phases of police sequential decision-making to explain what leads up to the final decision for an officer to shoot. Relying upon the work of prior researchers, Geller (1985) explains that an officer who has been involved in a shooting will experience five decision-making phases (i.e., anticipation, entry and initial confrontation, dialogue and information exchange, final frame decision to shoot or not shoot, and aftermath). Some of the decision-making phases may be selfexplanatory; however, others may need a little clarification. Anticipation is that time between the officer receiving information (usually limited at best) regarding a call for service and his/her arrival on-scene. During this phase, without any prior experience with the people involved in the call, what faces the officer upon arrival is left to his/her imagination. When the officer arrives at the call and enters the scene is the second phase of decision-making. A lot of the final outcome rides on the officer’s approach and entry. Is the officer oblivious to indications of danger, or is he/she

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making a tactical approach while considering all available options? During the dialogue phase, the officer is evaluating the scene while conversing with the people involved. Depending on the circumstances, the officer may be giving direct orders while seeking compliance from an uncooperative person. To shoot or don’t shoot is the fourth decision-making phase. Based on the situation immediately facing the officer, he/she decides to shoot. Although Brown (1984) concludes his decision-making here, Geller (1985) includes a fifth, which is the aftermath phase. This consists of a department review of the shooting incident. Typically, an internal investigation is conducted to determine whether there were any policy violations, training concerns, or lessons learned. Thus, based on the phases of sequential decision-making, an officer who remains cognizant of the circumstances confronting him/her will make an affirmative decision to discharge his/her weapon because it is the most appropriate response at the time. Although he was writing after 1985, it is fitting here to consider Fyfe’s (1986/2001) contention that it is possible for officers to avoid split-second decision situations. Fyfe (1986/2001: 595) identifies “two principles, tactical knowledge and concealment,” as methods for reducing an officer’s exposure to police shooting situations. Tactical knowledge is the officer’s “prior knowledge of the setting and the actors involved” whereas concealment is the process employed by the officer to conceal his/her “intent or identity, as well as employing actual physical cover or shelter” (Fyfe, 1986/2001: 595). By using these tactics, the potential for a lethal force encounter can be greatly reduced because the officer minimizes his/her exposure to possible threats. The following example is used to illustrate the difference between an officer operating in a manner

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oblivious to tactical knowledge and concealment principles versus an officer employing the principles to his/her advantage. It is quite common for officers to be dispatched to a ‘suicidal person’ call. For the purpose of this scenario, the officer is told that the desperate individual is in a residence, armed with a knife, and threatening to kill himself and anyone who tries to stop him. The reporting party is the man’s girlfriend calling from a neighbor’s house, and advises that her boyfriend is in the residence alone. In such circumstances, an officer ignoring the principles of tactical knowledge and concealment may arrive at the location and decide to confront the male by entering the residence. In doing so, the officer draws his/her firearm as he/she comes face to face with the armed and despondent male. During the confrontation, the officer tells the man to “drop the knife or I will shoot you.” Clearly, this is what the person desires and replies, “Go ahead, I want to die anyway.” The standoff continues for a few more minutes. The hopeless male advances toward the officer with the knife raised, and the officer responds by discharging his/her firearm, killing the man. Clearly, the shooting was justified when the man presented an imminent threat to the officer as he approached while holding the knife in a threatening manner; however, had the officer properly employed the two principles outlined above, this shooting may have been averted. Under the present circumstances, the only person in jeopardy is the man threatening to kill himself. When the officer enters the residence, he/she has now exposed him/herself to potential danger wherein the need to protect him/herself has greatly increased. At worse, before the officer entered, the male could only cause injury to himself; however, when the officer enters, another person’s life

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becomes jeopardized and needlessly exacerbates the situation. There was no immediate need for the officer to enter the residence. The threat of suicide has not been diminished by the officer’s presence. Certainly, it is the officer’s intention to save the person from himself and not cause him any harm; however, as seen in the scenario above, the assistance provided by the officer was to help take the man’s life. An officer familiar with the principles of tactical knowledge and concealment, typically a more experienced or seasoned officer, recognizes the problem with confronting a suicidal person under the circumstances provided in the situation previously outlined. Such an officer can predict the probable outcome if he/she were to directly approach the distraught male, and will make use of his/her alternative options. Typically, officers understand that in such incidents time is on their side. While maintaining a position of cover, the officer will call for assistance to secure a perimeter around the residence to prevent anyone from entering or leaving, thus limiting any further potential victims. At the same time, the officer may attempt to speak to the male or call for trained negotiators to talk to him in an effort to calm him and to begin to think about what he is doing. Using this approach, the officer has not made the situation worse, nor has the officer exposed him/herself to any direct threat by the suicidal male. As a result of the officer’s use of tactical knowledge and concealment principles, the probability for the incident to end in an officer-involved shooting has been lessened. Frequency of Police Shootings Measuring the frequency of police shootings has taken a number of paths – based on crime rates, the race of the

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citizen and/or officer, and in relationship to restrictive versus liberal department lethal force policies. While recognizing that there may be some intersection between the groups, each of these areas will be addressed independently over the next three segments of this chapter. If we were to logically look at police use of force, we should be able to draw a hypothesis that a series of correlations should exist in the following direction. First, as more officer/citizen contacts occur, the likelihood for police use of force will rise. This is just a simple matter of risk. If a citizen never has contact with a police officer, he/she will never be directly involved in a police use of force incident. Second, as citizens engage in criminal activity, it is more likely that they will come in contact with the police, which increase the likelihood that an officer will use force against them. Victims of crime or other citizens seeking assistance will rarely, if ever, have force used against them. Third, criminal suspects who behave violently or have the propensity to engage in criminal acts of violence are more likely to have more police contacts, and these encounters possess the potential to result in an officer resorting to violence to control the citizen. Finally, those citizens with a criminal history of participating in violent crimes and negative interaction with law enforcement will present the greatest resistance in subsequent police contacts, which leads officers to deploy force at the higher levels along the force continuum to include lethal force. As we have already seen earlier, some of these premises have been confirmed. If it is true that most uses of force by officers occur during arrests, then we should be able to surmise that as the crime and arrest rates fluctuate, so too should police use of force and officer-involved shootings. Several police use of deadly force studies considered crime and/or arrest rates as

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a prediction or causal factor explaining police shootings. Interestingly, there is some disagreement in their findings. Researchers such as Takagi (1974/1982), Jacobs and Britt (1979), and Sherman and Langworthy (1979/1982) have found a positive correlation between crime rates and police shootings. Although their examination was limited to officer-involved shootings resulting in a death, Jacobs and Britt (1979) considered regional crime statistics across the country along with police homicides in their analysis. Reporting their findings, the two researchers conclude, “…states with greater increases in population and more violence were likely to have more killings by policemen” (p. 408). Sherman and Langworthy (1979/1982) note in their study on police homicides that by all accounts, and not the fault of the police themselves, police killings are largely underreported. Despite this limitation, Sherman and Langworthy were able to conduct a comparison of violent crime rates, homicide rates, and violent arrest rates with police homicides. Even though their study, which was based on Uniform Crime Report and Vital Statistics data, was similarly limited to police shootings that resulted in a death, the two found a positive correlation for each of the variables and police homicides. These studies would suggest that crime is a causal factor for police shootings in general. In other studies, researchers could not confirm the correlation between police shootings and crime rates (Milton, Halleck, Lardner and Abrecht 1977/1982; Fyfe 1978/1982). Analyzing police shooting rates and crime rates (both violent crimes and Index crimes)8, Milton et al. 8

Milton et al. separated the FBI Uniform Crime Rates (UCR) into two categories. Index crime rates included all UCR crimes (i.e., homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and auto theft) whereas violent crimes were limited to the first four crimes.

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(1977/1982) gathered data spanning two years for seven different cities for comparison. The researchers found “no consistent relationship between changes in the number and rate of shootings and Index crime rates” (p. 58). Consistent findings occurred in regards to violent crime rates as well. As an example, Milton et al. (p. 58) write, In some instances, Index crime rates increased while the rate of shootings decreased; in other cases, the reverse was true. Kansas City experienced the greatest increase in Index crime rates of the seven cities. At the same time, the shooting rate decreased 38 percent in that city.

In another study, Fyfe (1978/1982) compared homicides, felony arrests, and police shootings in New York City over a six-year period. The analysis proved to be inconclusive. From the baseline year there was no consistent pattern as the rates changed from year to year. In some cases crime and arrests increased while police shootings went down, in other years all three rose, but not at the same rate, and in others police shootings increased while crime and/or arrests fell. Although there appears to be some difference in the various research findings, it may be due to the difference in data collection about police shootings (i.e., how a police shooting is classified – all shooting incidents or only those resulting in a death), or it could be as a result of differing city/geographical factors. Race and Deadly Force In comparison to studies examining the relationship between police shootings and crime rates, more has been said about the race/ethnicity of citizens shot or shot at by officers, and/or the race/ethnicity of the officer involved in

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the incident. Perhaps, the interest for this line of investigation has been driven by the consistent controversy surrounding police shootings involving minority citizens. To this end, the concern driving this area of inquiry is whether police officers disproportionately target people of color. Some people have suggested that officers have one trigger finger for white people and another for people of color. Not so surprising, research has uncovered inconsistent findings reference the correlation between race/ethnicity and police shootings. With regards to police use of deadly force, researchers have come to two general conclusions. First, minorities are more likely to be the target of police shootings. Second, race/ethnicity has nothing to do with police shootings; police shootings are situational and occur as a result of the citizen’s actions. There is a lot of evidence to suggest that police officers disproportionately shoot people of color (Robin 1963; Robin 1964; Takagi 1974/1982; Goldkamp 1976/1982; Milton et al. 1977/1982; Jacobs and Britt 1979; Sherman 1980/1982; Fyfe 1981/1982; Fyfe 1982b; Geller and Karales 1981; Geller 1982). At face value, minorities are shot or shot at by police officers at such a great frequency that some researchers have argued that police shootings are racially motivated (Goldkamp 1976/1982; Takagi 1974/1982); however, others contend they occur as a result of other factors. Robin (1963, 1964) was one of the first to study police shootings wherein he examined data collected from Philadelphia covering eleven years (1950-1960). During the years considered for the study, 32 “male criminals” were killed by Philadelphia police officers; 28 or 87.5 percent were Black (Robin 1963). Placing this figure into demographic context, Robin (1963: 32) writes, “In other

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words, the Negroes’ contribution as victims of police homicide was 2.9 and 4.0 times greater than their contribution to the number of persons arrested and their prevalence in Philadelphia’s population, respectively.” In a two-year examination of data collected from seven different cities, Milton et al. (1977/1982) found that 79 percent of persons shot by police officers were Black even though their representation in the seven cities was only 39 percent. In this study, the researchers also considered the arrest data for Index crimes and discovered that Blacks were arrested nearly (73 percent) at the same rate they were being shot by the police. Studying New York City police shootings between 1971 and 1975, Fyfe (1981/1982) learned that although Blacks comprised 20.5 percent of the city’s population, they were victims of more than 60 percent of all police shootings. As opposed to Milton et al.’s finding that Blacks were shot slightly more than their representation for committing Index crimes, Fyfe (1981/1982) found the opposite in his analysis. His study showed that Blacks made up 62.4 percent of all felony arrests, just a little more than two percent higher than their representation for all shootings. In another study, Takagi (1974/1982) considered national Vital Statistics data compiled between 1950 and 1968. Takagi learned that although Blacks represented ten percent of the nation’s population, they were killed by police officers between nine and ten times more than whites. In his interpretation of the data, Takagi suggests police officers abuse their authority against minorities. Takagi (1974/1982: 203) states, “It is the actual experiences behind the statistics like these that suggest that police have one trigger finger for whites and another for Blacks.” Takagi’s assertion that officers inconsistently shoot Blacks is similar to one belief perspective maintained

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by Goldkamp (1976/1982). Describing this perspective, Goldkamp (1976/1982: 129) writes, Others see disproportionate minority deaths as resulting from both irresponsible use of deadly force by a small minority of police officers and differential administration of law enforcement toward minority citizenry (which in effect produces disproportionately high arrest and death rates for minorities in general).

Conducting an interjurisdictional analysis of police shootings, Fyfe (1982b) discovered some evidence to support the argument that some officers excessively target people of color. To this end, Fyfe (1982b: 721) states, “The data strongly support the assertion that police there [in Memphis] did differentiate racially with their trigger fingers, by shooting blacks in circumstances less threatening than those in which they shot whites.” In all fairness to Fyfe’s (1982b) conclusion stated above, more should be stated. In his study, Fyfe was comparing police shooting data collected from New York City and Memphis. During this analysis, Fyfe found that in examining the reasons for police shootings, over 60 percent of New York City’s shootings were in defense of life compared to 28 percent for Memphis. On the other hand, more than 50 percent of all Memphis shootings occurred during the apprehension of suspects compared to only 6.1 percent for New York City. Much of the difference can be attributed to the lethal force policies for each city. New York City’s policy was quite restrictive and closely enforced whereas the Memphis policy was not. Even though departmental policies may account for the differences in the reasons why officers fired their weapons, the policies do not explain the racial/ethnic disparity found in the Memphis data. In the study, Fyfe (1982b) found

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when the race and actions of the victim were considered for Memphis, 50 percent of Black victims were unarmed and non-assaultive whereas nearly 63 percent of white victims were assaultive and armed with a gun. In other words, even though Black citizens were not assaultive or armed at the time of the shooting, they were nearly as likely to be shot as a white citizen posing the greatest threat to an officer. In an extensive study of 650 on and off-duty Chicago police shootings between 1974 and 1978, Geller and Karales (1981) make some interesting discoveries. In consideration of all the shootings, 80 percent were of minorities (70 percent Black and 10 percent Hispanic). When the two researchers considered arrest rates, they learned that the race of the citizen targeted by police gunshots was typically not a noteworthy factor. The authors (p. 1845) state, “… we find that, with one exception, civilians of different races face approximately equal chances of being either fired upon or actually shot by police in Chicago.” In consideration of whether racism plays a role in police shootings, Geller and Karales further explore the race of the officers involved in police shootings as well as other situational factors. During their analysis, the two discovered that “black officers are more likely than white officers to shoot black civilians” (p. 1855). As an explanation, Geller and Karales contend that “disproportionate assignment” of Black officers to beats with higher crime rates, and “housing patterns” account for the racial shooting relationship. Black officers were not only disproportionately more likely to experience off-duty shootings, but also when they did shoot, 90 percent of these incidents took place in medium to high-crime neighborhoods. In part, these shootings occur due to the

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fact that many Black officers reside in these neighborhoods whereas white officers tend to reside in lower crime areas. Despite the unequal shooting patterns of minority civilians, some researchers maintain that police shootings are as a result of situational factors and/or suspect actions, not because of the race of the citizen (Robin 1963; Robin 1964; Binder and Scharf 1980; Meyer 1980; Geller 1982; Brown 1984). In his examination of the Philadelphia incidents, Robin (1963: 227) argues that drawing a conclusion that officers fired their weapons because of racial discrimination “would be unwarranted.” In consideration of several factors, Robin maintains that the suspects “generally are responsible for their own death” (p. 231). Robin (1964: 34) further concludes, Yet, in view of the Negroes’ excessive involvement in crimes of violence and other serious offenses, and their resistance to authority when placed under arrest, it should not be too surprising that they are disproportionately represented among police homicide victims.

In an analysis of New York City police shootings, Fyfe (1981/1982) found that Black and Hispanic suspects shot by officers were more likely to be armed with a firearm than white suspects, and when officers were killed in the line of duty, the assailant was more likely to be Black. Furthermore, in consideration of police shootings, many can be attributed to precipitating suspect actions such as disobeying a command to halt, appearing to reach for a weapon, assaulting the officer, and using or threatening to use a weapon (Meyer 1980; Binder and Scharf 1980). In addition to a citizen’s direct actions that may create a real or perceived threat to an officer, which results in a use of lethal force, situational factors have been considered as well to explain the disparate shooting incidents of

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minorities. Fyfe (1981/1982) contends that a person’s social status may be a causal factor. Explaining why Blacks were more likely to be shot in New York City, Fyfe (1981/1982: 191-192) asserts, “…they [Blacks] are also the mode among the lower socioeconomic groups which most frequently participate in the types of activity likely to precipitate extreme police-citizen violence.” Certainly, there is little debate whether minorities are disproportionately targeted by police gunfire; however, the motivation for the shooting (i.e., racial discrimination versus suspect actions or situation factors) remains in dispute. In this section, we briefly discussed the effect differing departmental policies have on shootings; the next section explores this topic in depth. Police Policies and Deadly Force Prior to 1985, the year the U.S. Supreme Court made its ruling in Tennessee v. Garner, which restricted police use of deadly force, many state laws and police departments maintained rather liberal policies. For the most part, these permissive deadly force policies allowed officers to shoot fleeing felons, which led to a great deal of social controversy. As with other perspectives of police shootings, there has been a general concern that many shootings, although permissible by law and policy, were needless under the circumstances. In an era when executions were becoming more restrictive, deadly force by officers remained permissible. It is ironic that if a suspect was captured and convicted for most felonies, he/she typically would be sentenced to a set period of time in prison; however, an officer could execute him/her on the spot to prevent an escape from justice. Demonstrating this point, Fyfe (1982: 7) remarks, “Since 1967, we have

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executed four convicted murderers in this country; estimates of the numbers of people shot and killed by police in the same period vary between 4,000 and 8,000.” This is a remarkable difference, which has only added to the social debate. Earlier, we learned that neither crime rates nor the race/ethnicity of a citizen consistently proved to correlate with police shootings; however, policies may have a more universal effect on the frequency of shootings. Here, we will examine the basis for the controversy contiguous with liberal shooting policies, as well as the research findings comparing restrictive policies to more permissive ones. In search of the beginnings of police use of deadly force, researchers have traced its roots back to English common law and its effect on fleeing felons (Boutwell 1977/1982; Sherman 1980/1982). Explaining the reason deadly force has been allowed, Boutwell (1977/1982: 65) writes, The rationale for permitting deadly force to be used against a felon, at least at early common law and in 18th century America, was that all felonies – murder, rape, manslaughter, robbery, sodomy, mayhem, burglary, arson, prison break, and larceny – were punished by death. The use of deadly force was seen as merely speeding the process.

Addressing the argument for the continued practice of deadly force to apprehend fleeing felons, Boutwell (p. 67) continues, The whole criminal justice system breaks down unless society can require peaceable surrender to the exertion of law enforcement authority. Therefore, society benefits from that which facilitates arrest. Obviously, the right to use deadly force facilitates arrest. Its lawful use notifies the criminal that flight is not an option open for his consideration. If he flees from the commission of a felony, against the order of an

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officer of the law, he should realize that he invites the risk of injury or death.

Over the years, laws have changed to include many non-violent and property crimes as felonies. Typically, the distinction between a felony and a misdemeanor is based on the length of sentence imposed if convicted (Boutwell 1977/1982). Once people began to recognize the difference between felonies that would support lethal force (i.e., murder or other life-threatening crimes) and less menacing or merely property related crimes (i.e., theft, forgery, fraud, etc.), a trend of questioning the necessity for the police to use deadly force to apprehend suspects began to develop. Sherman (1980/1982) acknowledges one of the earlier protests that were voiced in an editorial published in the New York Times in 1858. Quoting from the editorial, Sherman (p. 92) writes, “if a policeman needed to defend his life, the use of force was permissible, but if he was chasing a suspect, he had no right to shoot the man. A policeman either had to be swift enough to catch the suspect or justice must be lost.” It did not seem reasonable to kill a non-threatening person simply because he/she was suspected of committing a felony and was getting away. Ultimately, there was a growing sense that using deadly force by the police should be restricted. As will soon be seen, police administrators were listening to the public’s concern over permissive police policies allowing officers to shoot fleeing felons even though the suspect posed no immediate threat to anyone. Either in response to the public’s demand or based upon their own accord, police departments across the nation began to implement more restrictive policies long before the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling on police use of deadly force. Addressing the environment in which policies are formed, Chapman (1967/1982: 234) states,

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Police Shootings and Citizen Behavior The police administrator who undertakes to formulate a firearms policy for his agency quickly confronts several factors which must be acknowledged and faced if his policy is to be both realistic and effective. Such limiting aspects may be classified, respectively as social, legal, operational, departmental, and supervisory.

In essence, an administrator needs to consider all the stakeholders when such a policy is being drafted. Prior to the Tennessee v. Garner decision, states and/or law enforcement agencies tended to institute three other models for police use of deadly force in addition to the common law rule (Geller and Karales 1981). The first is the “Model Penal Code formula, which permits shooting when an officer finds that a violent crime has occurred or otherwise might ensue;” the second is “the enumeration of certain ‘forcible’ or ‘violent’ felonies which justify deadly force to arrest suspects;” and the last is the “defense of life rule…[which] permits the use of force likely to kill only when the suspect is then posing a threat of death or serious bodily harm to the officer or another innocent person” (Geller and Karales 1981: 1988). Arguing on behalf of the “defense of life” model, Sherman (1980/1982) maintains that it is easier for an officer to remember in the heat of the moment. It is much more straightforward than trying to remember whether the alleged crime is a “forcible felony” or the circumstances fit the “Model Penal Code” model. As a case study examining the effects of a restricted deadly force policy, Fyfe (1978/1982) makes reference to data compiled from New York City. In the middle of 1972, the New York City Police Department enacted a restrictive shooting policy despite the state’s more liberal statute. The new policy limited officer discretion for shooting to defense of life or to affect the arrest of a person suspected of committing specified violent felonies. In short, the

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NYPD accepted the Model Penal Code model with a few exceptions such as prohibiting warning shots and limiting when an officer is permitted to shoot from or at a moving vehicle. In the study, Fyfe (1978/1982) examined NYPD police shootings between 1971 and 1975, and found that the restrictive policy made a great impact on police shootings. First, despite the fact that homicides remained relatively stable over the five-year period and the number of felony arrests continued to increase, the number of police shootings dropped to nearly half compared to the period prior to enacting the new policy. For example, in 1972, the year the policy was introduced, there were 1,691 homicides, 33,070 felony arrests, and 803 police shootings. By 1975, homicides slightly dropped to 1,645, and felony arrests increased to 38,922; however, police shootings declined to 448, which is a 44 percent decrease from the 1972 figure. Fyfe further discovered that subsequent to the new policy being implemented, warning shots and shootings at fleeing felons were greatly reduced. By all indications considered, the best explanation for each reduction was due to the more restrictive policy. In another study considered earlier wherein Fyfe (1982b) compared New York City and Memphis police shootings, he found that policy differences between the two police departments was the best explanation for the diverse types of shootings each agency experienced. In his analysis, Fyfe found that the majority of New York City police shootings were categorized as “defense of life” whereas more than half of all Memphis shootings occurred while attempting to apprehend suspects. Explaining the variation between the two departments, Fyfe (p. 717) contends there is “strong evidence that the variation in shooting rates between Memphis and New York is largely

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attributable to the great frequency with which Memphis officers engaged in elective shootings of fleeing property crime suspects…” On the other hand, New York maintained more restrictive policies. In a number of the police use of deadly force studies, researchers have uniformly concluded that it is in the best interest for police departments, officers, and the public for lethal force policies to be more restrictive and limit officer discretion (Chapman 1967/1982; Boutwell 1977/1982; Fyfe 1978/1982; Sherman 1980/1982; Reiss 1980; Lindgren 1981; Geller 1982; Fyfe 1982b; Geller and Karales 1981, Geller and Karales 1982). In the end, such policies build the public’s confidence in the police, which is necessary for the police to operate. Furthering this point, Geller and Karales (1982: 378) write, Police and the public at large have a common interest in identifying and employing the most effective control strategies possible, for the divisive impact that police-involved shootings can have on the community undermines all other efforts to combat crime and ensure public safety.

In fact, the stance maintained by several academicians, as well as the willingness of many police departments to selfimpose restrictive deadly force policies helped the U.S. Supreme Court in its ruling on police deadly force. A Review of Tennessee v. Garner In the previous chapter, we addressed the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision regarding police use of force in a general sense. In that case, Graham v. Connor (which was decided after the present case being considered), the justices ruled that police use of force must be reasonable and necessary under the circumstances based on “the perspective of a

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reasonable officer on the scene” (Graham v. Connor 1989). Here, the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling will be examined with regard to police use of deadly force in Tennessee v. Garner (1985). Prior to the Court’s decision in 1985, a number of states maintained statutes permitting deadly force during the apprehension of a fleeing felon. Based largely upon these permissive laws, a trend began to occur wherein victims or the estates of persons shot or killed by police bullets filed lawsuits in federal court proclaiming their rights had been violated. Leading up to this case, there has been some debate reference the constitutionality of police use of deadly force. In fact, numerous lawsuits were filed under Title 42 U.S.C. 1983. Outlining the elements of this section, Boutwell (1977/1982: 74) cites, “(1) conduct of some person, (2) acting under color of state law, and (3) which deprives another of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Claiming police use of deadly force infringed on their constitutional rights, plaintiffs filed suit declaring that deadly force by the police was a violation of the Fourth Amendment (unreasonable search and seizure), the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (due process before being deprived of life, liberty or property), and/or the Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual punishment) (Boutwell 1977/1982; Sherman 1980/1982). Upon appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the issue of police use of deadly force in Tennessee v. Garner (1985). Writing on behalf of the Court’s majority, Justice White states, “This case requires us to determine the constitutionality of the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of an apparently unarmed suspected felon.” In its decision, the U.S. Supreme Court imparted two important rulings with regard to police use of deadly force and the

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constitutionality of its use. The first ruling defined when deadly force was reasonable. The second ruling determined which particular constitutional amendment most appropriately addresses police deadly force. In order to address the constitutionality of police use of deadly force, the court had to identify which amendment(s) was being affected. Speaking on behalf of the Court’s majority, Justice White states, “While it is not always clear just when minimal police interference becomes a seizure,…, there can be no question that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” In light of the Fourth Amendment, the majority further acknowledges not all police uses of deadly force (i.e., seizures) are constitutionally permissible; it is necessary that a reasonable balance be reached, weighing the interest held by the person being seized against the government’s interest in holding a person accountable for his/her suspected criminal conduct. In reference to nonviolent suspects, Justice White (Tennessee v. Garner 1985) writes, “The use of deadly force is a self-defeating way of apprehending a suspect and so setting the criminal justice mechanism in motion.” In short, the U.S. Supreme Court recognizes that not all felonies carry the same level of threat or danger to the safety of others, thus the extent to which the police may go to apprehend a suspect attempting to elude capture is limited. During the course of making its decision in Tennessee v. Garner, the U.S. Supreme Court made reference to differing state laws, academic research, as well as selfimposed policies held by many police departments that restrict the use of deadly force. Regarding the varied state laws, the Court (Tennessee v. Garner 1985) recognized,

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Some 19 States have codified the common-law rule, though in two of these the courts have significantly limited the statute. Four States, though without a relevant statute, apparently retain the common-law rule. Two States have adopted the Model Penal Code’s provision verbatim. Eighteen others allow, in slightly varying language, the use of deadly force only if the suspect has committed a felony involving the use or threat of physical or deadly force, or is escaping with a deadly weapon, or is likely to endanger life or inflict serious physical injury if not arrests. Louisiana and Vermont, though without statutes or case law on point, do forbid the use of deadly force to prevent any but violent felonies. The remaining States either have no relevant statute or case law, or have positions that are unclear.

Despite the fact that consistency among the states did not exist, the Court commented that the tendency was in a direction moving away from the common law fleeing felon rule. Furthermore, the Court acknowledged the policies being followed by the police themselves, not wanting to rule in a manner that would place officers’ lives in needless jeopardy. To this end, Justice White, writing for the majority said, “We would hesitate to declare a police practice of long standing ‘unreasonable’ if doing so would severely hamper effective law enforcement. But the indications are to the contrary. There has been no suggestion that crime has worsened in any way in jurisdictions that have adopted, by legislation or departmental policy, rules similar to that announced today.” In the end, in their ruling of Tennessee v. Garner (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court decided, The use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable. It is not better that all felony suspects die than that they escape. Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from

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Writing further when circumstances would permit lethal force, Justice White continues, Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if where feasible, some warning has been given.

Essentially, the Court’s ruling was similar to the Model Penal Code, which is slightly more permissive than the more restrictive “defense of life” policy. The defense of life policy only allows deadly force to be used if the suspect poses an immediate deadly threat to the officer or another person. In other words, it does not take into consideration the gravity of the crime committed by the suspect. For example, in a strict “defense of life” policy situation, an officer would not be allowed to shoot a fleeing murder suspect who is not presenting an immediate threat. Writing on behalf of the three dissenting justices, Justice O’Connor (Tennessee v. Garner 1985) concurs that the shooting of a suspect by a police officer is, in fact, a seizure for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment; however, if the suspect is never apprehended, a seizure has not occurred. Justice O’Connor, unlike the majority, further argues nighttime residential burglaries are serious

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crimes and the only reason any force would be used to arrest the suspect is if he/she refused to comply with an officer’s command to stop or desist from resisting. Moreover, Justice O’Connor not only rejects the majority’s Fourth Amendment analysis, she contends that the Court’s ruling permits burglary suspects to flee justice unfettered. Supporting her position, Justice O’Connor (Tennessee v. Garner 1985) states, By disregarding the serious and dangerous nature of residential burglaries and the longstanding practice of many States, the Court effectively creates a Fourth Amendment right allowing burglary suspects to flee unimpeded from a police officer who has probable cause to arrest, who has ordered the suspect to halt, and who has no means short of firing his weapon to prevent escape. I do not believe that the Fourth Amendment supports such a right, and I accordingly dissent.

Addressing the majority’s comments that police departments have been imposing more restrictive deadly force policies, Justice O’Connor stressed, “the effectiveness or popularity of a particular police practice does not determine its constitutionality.” Even though the U.S. Supreme Court ruling restricts states from allowing less restrictive deadly force laws (i.e., the common-law rule for fleeing felons), states and/or individual police departments may impose more restrictive policies. As the reader may recall from the previous chapter, the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department deadly force policy closely follows the more limiting “defense of life” police whereas the policy recommended by LEXIPOL reflects the less restraining decision made by the U.S. Supreme Court. Most certainly, we can expect that the Tennessee v. Garner (1985) decision made an impact on law

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enforcement and the way researchers have examined police use of deadly force. The next chapter addresses the academic literature following this landmark ruling.

CHAPTER 4

Research Following Strict Limitations

Research on use of Deadly Force Post Tennessee v. Garner Surprisingly, although police use of force in its general context continues to be a topic of interest for researchers, research that specifically addresses police use of deadly force is rather limited. This is quite interesting given the amount of attention devoted by the media and the public following a police shooting. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that researchers have sufficiently covered this phenomenon to satisfy all curiosity and understanding. Most likely, as previously discussed, this explicit field of study has been underdeveloped due to a lack of access provided to researchers, or it may be due to the fact that police shootings do not occur in such great frequency outside of some of the larger police agencies to allow for a more detailed analysis. As one example, Fridell (1989) seeks to determine whether a difference exists between justifiable homicide rates (i.e., police killings) and deadly force rates (i.e., all police shootings to include missed shots and/or wounding) in relation to a variety of factors. In this study, Fridell relied upon previously compiled data reference police 89

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shootings that occurred between 1975 and 1979. On the one hand, Fridell (1989) acknowledges that the quality of available data has increased over time from that which was gathered in some of the earlier studies conducted in the 1960s and 1970s. However, Fridell (p. 164) further comments, “In light of the clear importance of this phenomenon, it is striking that no systematic and uniform data exist on police use of force.” As a result of her analysis, Fridell (p. 163) asserts that “justifiable homicides are not ‘adequate data’ for assessing variations in deadly force at the department level…[and] for further research on individual cities, justifiable homicide (or hits) should not be used as a measure of deadly force unless it can be established that the former is a representative subset of the latter.” Surely, this is an interesting finding, which increases our knowledge about police deadly force; however, the data used by Fridell is outdated in reference to current police practices subsequent to the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling on police use of deadly force. Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Tennessee v. Garner (1985), some avenues of research (i.e., whether the race of the suspect and/or officer matters, and whether homicide or other violent crime rates varying with police shootings) prior to the ruling have persisted. In other cases, similar to prior research inquiry regarding the effect of departmental policies on police shootings, researchers have sought to measure the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision by comparing officer-involved shootings before the ruling to those that followed. Keeping in mind that most studies tend to overlap into various categories of inquiry, in this section we will examine the more recent studies that have examined police shootings and their relationship to race/ethnicity, violent crime,

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departmental policies, and other paths of inquiry that do not fall neatly into one of these categories. Homicide and Police Shootings In earlier studies, some researchers discovered a correlation between crime rates and police shootings whereas others did not. This unresolved contention has left room for further investigation. Certainly, it seems reasonable that the necessity for police officers to use deadly force would rise as the occurrence for criminal offending increased with frequency and intensity of violence. In light of such logic, research in this area of inquiry has continued. In their analysis, MacDonald, Kaminski, Alpert, and Tennenbaum (2001) contend that police deadly force may be correlated to the nuances of criminal homicide, asserting that “dangerperception theory” explains police use of deadly force. Describing the theory, MacDonald et al. (p. 159) contend, “…the level of police use of deadly force is contingent on the danger police officers experience (real or perceived).” Thus, in their analysis, this group of researchers set out to distinguish between varying types of homicide, arguing that police shootings would differ in relationship to the type of homicide. To this end, MacDonald et al. (2001: 160) hypothesize, The ratio-threat model predicts a stronger temporal relationship between police killings of civilians and the types of criminal homicide that involve the greatest perceived risk to society compared with those homicides that pose a lesser perceived risk. Accordingly, we predict that justifiable citizen homicides and robbery-related homicides will have the strongest temporal associations with police killings of civilians. Conversely, we predict that homicides caused by love triangles will have the weakest temporal relationship with police use of deadly force.

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For the study, MacDonald et al. (2001) compiled data from the Supplementary Homicide Reports maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigations for the time frame of 1976 to 1996. In total, the researchers found that on average for the 252 months there were 36 police killings, 28 justifiable civilian homicides, 35 love triangle homicides, and 203 robbery-related homicides per month for the entire nation. Clearly, robbery-related homicides occur at a greater frequency than the other types of homicides being considered for this study. As a result of their analysis, the researchers found evidence to support their stated hypothesis that justifiable citizen and robberyrelated homicides correlate more with police shootings. Explaining their findings, MacDonald et al. (p. 168) state, “Robbery-related and justifiable citizen homicides represent patterns of social violence that police may view as presenting a greater threat than homicides caused by love triangles.” In spite of the findings in the current study, as well as the effort made by the researchers to contextually examine police shootings in a more precise manner, there remains room for the debate to continue. Although it is reasonable to draw the conclusion that police shootings would vary in relationship to the different types of homicide, arguably other types of criminal violence or other social factors may also serve as causal factors. Race and Police Deadly Force As is the case with several other studies following the Tennessee v. Garner decision in 1985, researchers continue to use earlier compiled data, which may lack relevancy to current police practices. In another similar case that scarcely edges over the 1985 timeline, Jacobs and O’Brien

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(1998) attempt to examine whether environmental factors may affect police shootings. The two researchers (p. 837) suggest, under some circumstances, “racial inequality explains police killings.” They set out to determine whether threat theories explain police violence. Explaining the idea of “threat theories,” Jacobs and O’Brien (p. 841) contend, “The menace of a racial or economic underclass with an interest in redistributive violence may lead to violent law enforcement.” In other words, those who occupy the lower classes (i.e., the poor and people of color) threaten the stability of the majority to which the police are obligated to control. Under these circumstances, as the perceived threat to the status quo is heightened by the presence of more underclass, police violence shall increase as well. Jacobs and O’Brien (1998) compiled data from 170 U.S. cities between 1980 and 1986. Data consisted of such factors as whether the city is in the South, if the mayor was Black, income inequality, percentage of families living in poverty, the murder rate, percentage of divorced persons, difference between white and Black income, percentage of Black population, and the rate of police killings. As a result of their analysis, Jacobs and O’Brien (1998) discovered evidence to suggest that under some conditions police use deadly force in a disparate manner based on race. For example, the findings tend to show that “racial inequality accounts for both the total rate of police killings and the rate of blacks killed by the police” (pp. 858-859). Of particular interest, the researchers further found that cities with Black mayors and less disparity of income between Blacks and whites tend to experience fewer police killings. Although this does not entirely settle the debate whether race affects police use of deadly force, especially in light of the legal changes made to the circumstances in

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which deadly force by the police is permissible, evidence appears to be mounting to suggest that racial/ethnic inequality exists regarding police deadly force. In another attempt to examine officer race and police deadly force, Smith (2003) conducting a macro-level analysis to compare agencies. Smith was interested in the diversity of officer race and gender within an organization to determine whether more diverse police departments were less likely to engage in police shooting incidents. In the analysis, Smith (2003) found there was no statistical difference regarding police-related homicides between more and less diverse police departments. In a separate examination of the data collected for this current study, McElvain and Kposowa (2008) set out to focus on officer characteristics and the chance of using deadly force. Clearly, the purpose of the study varied from the present study’s theoretical perspective in that the researchers were exploring a similar point of view tested by previous researchers (i.e., whether an officers race contributes to a police shooting). In their study, the researchers also explored officer age, level of education, gender, and history of prior shootings. In their analysis, McElvain and Kposowa found that White officers were more likely to engage in a police shooting incident than Hispanic officers. They further found that college-educated officers and female officers were less likely to be involved in a shooting incident. Interestingly, older officers were less at risk than younger officers, and officers with a previous history of shooting were 51 percent more likely to shoot during the follow-up period than officers without a history of shootings. In another more recent study examining racial bias, Correll, Wittenbrink, Park, Judd, Sadler and Keesee (2007) conducted a comparison of police officers and participants

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from the community regarding decisions to shoot during simulated video scenarios involving Black and White actors. Correll et al. (2007:1020) determined the police officers “outperformed the community sample.” Officers responded correctly to the situation in less time and maintained a higher threshold for their decision to discharge their weapons than members from the community. In their discussion, the researchers assert, The data suggest that the officers’ training and/or expertise may improve their overall performance (yielding faster responses, greater sensitivity and reduced tendencies to shoot) and decrease racial bias in decision outcomes (Correll et al., 2007:1022).

Impact of the Tennessee v. Garner Decision Perhaps one of the better covered areas in police use of deadly force research subsequent to the Tennessee v. Garner ruling is the effect it has had on the frequency of police shootings. Presently, we review three different analyses. In an earlier chapter, we addressed the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Tennessee v. Garner and how it restricted police use of deadly force. Even though the Court recognized and even commented that part of the basis for their ruling was due to an on-going process wherein many agencies had been restricting their shooting policies, Walker and Fridell (1992) sought to examine the impact of the Court’s decision. The authors acknowledge that the Court’s ruling would more likely affect the nation’s smaller law enforcement agencies; however, they chose to survey the nation’s 100 largest departments because they represented the majority of police shootings throughout the country. Of the 100 agencies surveyed, Walker and Fridell received 96 responses and learned that 67 of the

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departments already had in place policies that either met or surpassed the Court’s requirement. On the other hand, the remaining 29 responding agencies were required to make modifications to their existing policies to comply with the ruling. Of particular interest, these law enforcement agencies were located throughout the nation, indicating that no particular region was over represented in the sample (Walker and Fridell 1992). In the next two studies, one researcher explores the effect of Tennessee v. Garner (Tennenbaum 1994), and the other researcher examines the significance of administrative policy (White 2000) on police use of deadly force. First, Tennenbaum (1994) uses the Supplementary Homicide Reports to compile national data on police shootings between 1976 and 1988. The other study, conducted by White (2001) covers 982 police shootings in Philadelphia from 1970 through 1992. As in the earlier studies on restricted deadly force policies, both of these studies found that police shootings were reduced as a result of restrictions that limit permissible circumstances for police officers to employ lethal force. In his analysis, which is rather straightforward, Tennenbaum (1994: 85) reports “police homicides decreased from 29.43 per month to 24.68 following the Court’s decision in Garner,” which equates to a little more than a 16 percent decline. Even though White’s (2001) conclusion that departmental policies can appropriately control officer decisions to use deadly force is similar to previous research findings, his analysis is interesting in that it involves a single police department. During the time period considered by White (2001), he reports that the deadly force policy for the Philadelphia Police Department underwent several changes. In 1973, Pennsylvania enacted a restricted statute doing away with

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the fleeing felon rule and adopting a defense of life model. The Philadelphia Police Department followed suit only to change its policy back to the more permissive model in 1974. By 1980, the department assumed a more conservative defense of life and forcible felonies model. White’s (2001: 132) research attempts to address how the “internal police working environment” impacts police shooting discretion. In part of the analysis, White (2001: 140) learned that when situational factors were considered for the time period between 1970 and 1978, while the restrictive policy was eliminated, “the PPD officers showed more restraint in their decisions to use deadly force.” White (p. 140) concludes “these data suggest that the PPD officers were not following the administrative policy prior to its removal, and the department was not holding them accountable for their violations.” With consideration to police shootings following the 1980 implemented restrictive policy, White (2001) found that police shootings decreased for about ten years; however, a noticeable increase occurred between 1989 and 1992. Upon further investigation, White reports the rise in shootings was due to situational factors causing greater danger to the officers. White (p. 142) states, It is interesting that the shift occurs with nonelective incidents, particularly gun assaults, where officers generally have no other options at their disposal and are facing grave danger. This analysis indicates that as the 1990s began, Philadelphia police officers were getting involved in a much greater number of incidents where their lives were in immediate danger.

Moreover, White (2001) draws some correlation between the increasing number of police shootings and violent felony arrests and homicide rates during the latter 1980s and early 1990s. Here, White (p. 143) contends, as we

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have seen other researchers do in previously discussed studies, that “as police exposure to danger increases, so does the likelihood that officers will resort to violence to settle police-citizen encounters.” Although policies tend to restrict police shootings when officers abide by them and are held accountable, other circumstances encountered by an officer, to include real or perceived threats, may force the officer’s hand in order to defend him/herself. Out of the many research topics surrounding police use of deadly force, the affect of policies on police shootings has received the most attention and experienced the greatest consistency it its findings. As such, we can conclude with great confidence that more restrictive deadly force policies limit the number of police shootings overall. Other Aspects of Police Deadly Force Research In this last section, a few other areas of research interest that do not fit neatly into one of the other categories already examined will be addressed. Beyond crime rates, race, and policies, researchers have investigated the attitudes of the community regarding police deadly force. In other attempts to understand police use of force generally, and deadly force more specifically, researchers have also examined the level of education of officers. Moreover, although not all too common, some researchers have considered the role of a suspect’s prior criminal history and behavior during his/her encounter with police officers that may have contributed to the shooting incident. Although the first study considered here could have been included above when we discussed the more current literature on police deadly force for race/ethnicity, it is best to address it separately because it examines citizens’ attitudes about police shootings by comparing the

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responses of citizens based on their race. In this examination, Cullen et al. (1996) conducted telephone surveys with 239 residents of Cincinnati. The respondents were selected using stratified random sampling to include 103 African Americans and 136 whites. The researchers (p. 450) contend, “African Americans hold less favorable attitudes toward the police than do Whites…[and] are less willing to endorse the use of force by police.” In order to determine whether there exists a difference in support for police use of deadly force based on a person’s race, Cullen et al. (1996) provided the respondents with a series of eight different circumstances. All eight of the scenarios involved a fleeing suspect, identified in a nondescript manner as “a person.” In six of the incidents, it would be illegal, based on the Tennessee v. Garner decision, for the officer to use deadly force to prevent the suspect’s escape; however, in the other two episodes, the suspect’s actions demonstrates the propensity for being a danger to others, and lethal force would be justified. Based on their analysis of the respondents’ answers, Cullen et al. (1996) conclude that regardless of the race of the surveyed person, he/she either approved or disapproved of police shootings as authorized by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Tennessee v. Garner. Although the researchers found that both Blacks and whites responded similarly regarding the use of legal deadly force, they cautiously report a slight variation with police use of illegal lethal force finding; white respondents were more supportive. In their closing remarks, Cullen et al. (p. 458) write, “African Americans’ views toward deadly force should not be seen as a distinctive set of attitudes. Rather, they appear to be part of a more global liberal crime ideology that shapes views on a variety of specific policy issues.”

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Following some of the more recent high-profile officerinvolved shootings in which multiple officers fired numerous shots, Perkins and Bourgeois (2006) sought to determine whether such occurrences influence citizens’ perceptions of police use of deadly force. In their analysis, the two researchers devised two studies to measure citizen perceptions. Both studies used a mixture of male and female college students (351 in the first study and 175 in the second). Although there was some variation in the scenarios provided in the two studies, it is only necessary to understand the premise for this review. In both studies, the participants were provided a series of scenarios involving police shootings. The shooting incidents either involved two or six officers firing anywhere between four and 32 rounds in the event. Following the scenario, the participants were asked whether they believed the officer used excessive force, and if the suspect was responsible for being injured. Additionally, in the second study, the respondents had their personality measured to determine whether personality factors affect a person’s perception of police misuse of deadly force. Interestingly, Perkins and Bourgeois (2006) consistently found that there is a perception of misuse of deadly force in shootings involving fewer officers, firing more rounds. The researchers (p. 167) report, “Perceptions of misuse of force were lower in the six-officer condition than in the two-officer condition. In each of the six-officer conditions, and regardless of the number of shots fired, the perception of police MDF [misuse of deadly force] was less than in the two-officer condition.” Addressing the suspect’s responsibility for the shooting, Perkins and Bourgeois (2006) found that respondents perceived less culpability on the part of the suspect as the number of shots fired increased. Recognizing the personality of the

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respondent may affect his/her response, Perkins and Bourgeois attempted to control for this factor. In short, despite some interesting indications, Perkins and Bourgeois (p., 173) state, “…the personality variables were not significant predictors of force overall.” In other words, the respondent’s point of view regarding police misuse of deadly force was not affected by his/her personality or social dominance orientation (i.e., right-wing authoritarian, blind patriot, or constructive patriot). Exploring officer characteristics to include educational experience as it contributes to use of force incidents in a general analysis, researchers have discovered that officers with some college or a 4-year degree are generally less likely to engage in verbal coercion than officers with only a high school diploma (Paoline and Terrill, 2007). Paoline and Terrill further found that high school educated officers were more likely to use force than those with a bachelor’s degree; however, there was no difference in the likelihood for using force between officers with a high school diploma and their counterparts possessing some college, but less than a full 4-year degree. Conducting a meta-analysis of several studies that examined the effects of officer education on a variety of police-related circumstances, including use of force, Aamodt (2004) came to a similar conclusion as Paoline and Terrill. Explaining the findings, which may be interpreted as an advantage to possessing higher education, Aamodt (2004:51) states, Better-educated officers perform better in the academy (especially shorter academies), receive higher supervisor evaluations of job performance, have fewer disciplinary problems and accidents, are assaulted less often, use force less often, and miss fewer days of work than their less educated counterparts.

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Historically, a high school diploma has remained the minimum standard for entry into law enforcement. When this standard was set, the majority of our nation’s population was not completing high school, which meant those who received a high school diploma, by default, possessed a level of education that was above average (Roberg and Bonn, 2004). This is certainly not the case today. In fact, our society is much more complex and diversified. Making an argument for increasing the education standard for police officers, Roberg and Bonn (2004:478) contend, Logically, the analytical skills provided by higher education will prepare an officer to meet the complex challenges presented by terrorism, while exposure to the humanities and social sciences through higher education will produce a more sophisticated, “socially conscious” and culturally attuned officer.

In light of the research by Aamodt (2004), and Paoline and Terrill (2007), Roberg and Bonn’s stance on education certainly appears to be confirmed.. The last study explored for this section considers the suspect’s actions, specifically the suspect’s prior criminal history, as a contributing factor for police use of deadly force. For the most part, researchers have focused their examination of lethal force used by the police in several directions that do not consider the citizen’s role. In this study, Donahue and Horvath (1991: 19) acknowledge, A person with a prior record, therefore, may be more likely to become involved in a potentially lethal confrontation with the police than one without such a record. Moreover, as one with a prior record, he may be more desperate to escape custody and thus more apt to appear to be a greater risk to the arresting officer; hence, he may be more likely to encourage police gunfire.

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For their analysis, Donahue and Horvath collected data involving police shootings by the Detroit Police Department between 1976 and 1981. Even though the data consists of shootings prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s Tennessee v. Garner decision, which changed police deadly force practices, this study is important because it considers the suspect’s prior criminal history, as well as other situational factors such as the suspect’s actions at the time of the incident. Based on the data collected, Donahue and Horvath (1991: 29) found that “suspects killed by police gunfire have more serious and extensive criminal histories than either those who are injured” or not struck by the gunshots. The researchers acknowledge that it is not likely that the officers would have known the suspect’s criminal history at the time of the shooting, but the suspect knew his own prior history, which may have encouraged his actions to prevent apprehension and increased the necessity for police violence. Regarding the suspect’s present criminal activity, Donahue and Horvath (p. 30) further found the suspect tended to be involved in “serious criminal offenses, most frequently violent, assaultive crimes.” Under such circumstances, it is reasonable that officers would employ greater levels of force, including lethal force, to overcome resistance and/or apprehend the suspect. Summary It is evident that researchers have approached police use of force from a number of different angles in their attempt to explain the phenomenon. Although not too surprising, most of academicians studying this topic have spent more time focusing on this topic in a general manner, but seldom have they concentrated on police shootings specifically. As

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previously mentioned, much of this area of study relies upon the researcher’s access to data. All too often police departments either refuse admittance to their records and files or are overly protective of them, which detrimentally limits what can be analyzed. More importantly, there is little consistency in the way police use of deadly force data is maintained even if an agency compiles the information. At best, the data collected by researchers, typically from a single police department, does not allow for their findings to be generalized. To this end, there has been some discussion for police departments to report all uses of lethal force to a centralized location similar to the Uniform Crime Report data collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In review of the literature on police use of deadly force, two things appear to be abundantly clear. First, even though generally research in this area has been, with few exceptions, rather sparse, subsequent to the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Tennessee v. Garner (1985), too much of the research has relied upon older, outdated data. Second and more importantly, most research has ignored the citizen’s characteristics and behavior as if the officer is the only person dictating the shooting. Much of the research that acknowledges citizen behavior as a contributing factor does so as a secondary thought; the primary focus of the study was typically on some other aspect such as the race/ethnicity of the citizen. Interestingly, in one of the first studies for officer-involved shootings (Robin 1963 and 1964), the citizen’s behavior is acknowledged as a factor leading up to the deadly force employed by the officer; however, very little is said in later research. Typically, researchers such as Reiss (1980), Brown (1984), and Geller (1985) attempt to explain police deadly force using decision theory as though the actions taken only

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by the officer would prevent him/her from shooting at a citizen. Certainly, an officer’s decision-making (i.e., tactical knowledge and concealment) as identified by Fyfe (1986/2001) may minimize an officer’s exposure to incidents that may otherwise culminate in a shooting; however, overlooked or ignored in many studies is the citizen’s decision-making. For example, the citizen who chooses to engage in criminal activity exposes him/herself to the risk of contact with a police officer. Furthermore, if the citizen has a history of criminal activity, uses alcohol and/or drugs, which arguably diminishes his/her capacity for rational thinking, and participates in further violent criminal behavior, he/she is less apt to be cooperative during police contacts. Despite an officer’s ability or inability to appropriately employ tactical knowledge and concealment, the citizen, by his/her actions during an encounter with an officer, may present an immediate threat to the officer or others, which requires the officer to apply deadly force. Quite simply, what is missing from the past research is a direct examination of citizen behaviors (i.e., prior violent criminal behavior, as well as the effect of being under the influence of some form of intoxicant at the time of the incident) as they relate to police use of deadly force. Later in this study, these particular aspects of citizen’s behavior will be examined to determine whether they contribute to police shootings. Before moving into the analysis, one of the problems or limitations to police deadly force research as identified by Geller and Scott (1992: 25) is that “studies frequently lack important information about the characteristics of the police agencies or their personnel.” The next chapter attempts to attend to this concern by exploring the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department, the agency from which police shooting data is compiled for our analysis,

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from an historical perspective. In Chapter 5, we will look at the development of the department, the number of sworn employees in relationship to gender, race/ethnicity, as well as overall. Moreover, the population and demographics served by the department will be considered in relationship to the number of calls for service handled by the department’s officers, violent crime rate, and the number of officer-involved shootings that occur per year over a 15year period.

CHAPTER 5

One Department and its Shootings

Due to several methodological and data access limitations, it is recognized that most, if not all, research regarding police use of deadly force (i.e., police shootings) lacks the ability to draw generalized assumptions about all police agencies (Geller 1982; Horvath 1987; Donahue and Horvath 1991; Alpert and Dunham 2004). This study also falls into this category for similar reasons. For one, it examines officer-involved shootings from one department, which by no stretch of the imagination can be argued to accurately represent the more than 17,000 law enforcement departments throughout the United States. Secondly, the agency examined, the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department, is located in Southern California, and serves a diverse population not representative of all other regions of the nation. Moreover, the manner in which incidents of police shootings were considered for examination may not be similarly defined as in other research regarding this same topic. Despite these limitations, and until national level data are centrally collected for analysis, each investigation serves as a piece of the puzzle and strives to bring about a better understanding of police use of deadly force. 107

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For the reasons stated above, it is important to explore the characteristics of the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department, its members, the greater population it serves, as well as a general overview of the officer-involved shootings occurring within a 15-year period. In order to provide the reader with a general foundation about police shootings from this single department, this chapter explores three areas: The first area is a synopsis of the department, when it began, its size and demographics. Second, the county’s population characteristics, the number of calls for service the department handles, and its primary duties are considered for contextual purposes so that other researchers may be able to draw comparison when similar studies are conducted in other regions of the nation. The last area examined as a basis for background understanding is a general description of the department’s police shootings occurring over 15 years in reference to violent crime rate, calls for service and population. Throughout each of the following areas described, the methodology and reason for inclusion or exclusion will be discussed. The Riverside County Sheriff’s Department Notwithstanding its more than 115 years of existence, there is little documented about the history of the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department that serves well for reference. In 1996, one of the department’s former chief deputies, Gilbert R. Mundy, wrote A Star Was Born: A Centennial History of the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department. In large, Mundy’s historical account is relied upon to account for the earlier years of the department. The Riverside County Sheriff’s Department has a long history dating back to 1893 when San Bernardino County was divided and Riverside County was formed as an independent county

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(Mundy, 1996). In April of that same year, Riverside County’s first sheriff took office and by June, the first three deputies were appointed to serve the law enforcement needs of the county. By May 2008, the department was allocated 4,208 sworn and non-sworn employees. Of the 4,208 allocated positions, the department had 3,807 of those positions filled. 9 In his book, Mundy (1996) outlines the entry of women and provides several accounts of women serving as jail matrons. Mundy (1996: 161) writes, It was common practice, after about 1904, for the sheriff and his family to live in the quarters provided on the second floor of the jail at 11th and Orange streets. When the sheriff was not married, or his wife chose not to prepare the meals or take charge of the female prisoners, the sheriff would designate the wife of one of his deputies to serve as “matron.”

This practice remained in place until 1939 when non-family women were employed as matrons. Matrons were typically tasked with supervision of female inmates confined within the jail. Despite the fact that “the first female to meet all the qualifications and standards for the position” of deputy sheriff was achieved by 1955, women continued to serve limited roles as matrons in the jail, or the Juvenile Bureau until the 1970s (Mundy 1996: 163). Mundy (1996) clearly defined when women were classified as ‘deputy sheriffs,’ received equal pay and assumed supervisory roles within the department, but not when they were assigned to patrol 9

Allocated positions are those approved and funded by the Board of Supervisors. Due to the ever-increasing size of the department, as well as continual attrition, there is a constant gap between allocated and filled positions.

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functions. Throughout the early 1970s, female deputies remained confined to jail assignments. However, in 1979, Mundy (1996) documents a female deputy, who lateraltransferred from the Indio Police Department to the Sheriff’s Department and was assigned to patrol. That same year, a female supervisor, holding the rank of sergeant, transferred to a patrol assignment (there was no mention whether she worked patrol as a deputy) (Mundy 1996). As of the mid-1980s, it was more common for women to hold supervisory and mid-management positions, and began to fill executive staff (administrator) assignments by the 1990s. Even though Mundy (1996: 167) claims that “dozens” of women were applying for deputy positions in the 1970s, there remains no record documenting how many women were employed or what their compliment was in relation to male deputies. In fact, the department did not begin to consistently maintain this information in an easily accessible format until the year 2000. Since this study focuses on a particular period of time, 1990 through 2004, no effort was made to locate department demographics for earlier years. Furthermore, for the years prior to 2000, data reference to the gender and race/ethnicity of sworn deputies was obtained from the Bureau of Justice Statistics found in three documents reporting for three specific years: 1993, 1997, and 2000. The Riverside County Sheriff’s Department supplied this information to the Department of Justice for each year, but did not retain similar information for the interim years. As stated earlier, the department did not begin to consistently compile demographic data until 2000. Even though this information was available for each subsequent year, it was only collected for 2004, the final year included in this study, in order to remain consistent with the

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previous years. As the department began to compile demographic data, it did so in a manner that allows for comparing the racial/ethnic composition of the department’s membership by gender. Unfortunately, the data available from the Bureau of Justice Statistics only report these demographics separately. Thus, for consistency purposes, these data are reported in similar fashion here. In spite of several statistical archive limitations, the department maintained a detailed list of the number of sworn deputies it employed for each pay period and which division they were assigned. More importantly, this information covered the entire study period, which is beneficial on many levels for comparison purposes in this analysis. Patrol Deployment As previously stated, by May 2008, the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department was funded for 4,208 sworn and nonsworn employees. Within the County of Riverside and as his duty, the Sheriff maintains responsibility for the jails, courts, the coroner and public administrator offices, patrol functions in the unincorporated areas of the county and 13 contract cities, as well as administrative and training functions for the department. In comparison to other functions within the department, the patrol bureau serves to employ nearly half of all the department’s employees, which also comprises the greatest number of sworn employees. Keeping in mind that for most law enforcement agencies, especially the larger ones, it is nearly impossible to reach the level of being fully staffed. For example, as of May 2008, the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department was authorized 2,229 sworn (i.e., deputy sheriff) positions;

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however, due to continual attrition, on-going increases for authorized positions, and extensive application and hiring requirements, 212 of those jobs remained vacant. From pay period to pay period, these numbers constantly change as deputies are hired, resign, retire, or are terminated. For reporting purposes in this study, and in order to compare the ratio of the department’s total number of deputy sheriffs to those assigned to patrol, the last pay period for each calendar year was utilized for consistency over time. Furthermore, because this study is interested in examining officer-involved shootings, the number of authorized positions would not accurately portray the department’s risk for a deputy engaging in the use of deadly force; however, the number of ‘filled’ positions comes closer. In fact, deputies assigned to patrol, an environment accounting for nearly all police shootings, is the most accurate. Thus, data documenting total filled deputy positions and those occupying patrol assignments were gathered. It should be noted that a patrol assignment with the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department merely means that the sworn employee was assigned to a patrol station versus corrections, court services, or other administrative assignments. The deputy may not necessarily be assigned to work ‘patrol’ (i.e., uniformed duty answering calls for service); he/she may work as an investigator, supervisor, or management position as well. In other words, although assigned to a patrol station, deputies may be assigned tasks that a layperson would not traditionally associate with ‘patrol work.’ Clearly, the number of personnel assigned to patrol overestimates the amount of deputies handling calls for service. Table 5-1 depicts the total number of deputies (i.e., sworn employees) in the department, how many were

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assigned to patrol for each year, and the percentage of patrol staffing represented in comparison to the total sworn staffing. Even though department and patrol staffing levels decreased between 1991 and 1994, along with a slight dip in the number of sworn employees in 1997, which can be seen in Figure 5-1, the department realized an overall increase in deputy sheriffs, the number of deputies assigned to patrol, as well as the percentage ratio of deputies assigned to patrol. Figure 5-1 graphically demonstrates the commensurate increase of overall and patrol employees in relationship to a slower growth in patrol. Table 5-1. Patrol Versus Total Sworn Employees for the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department 1990-2004 Sworn Patrol % in Year Employees Officers Patrol 1990 1,052 689 65 1991 1,075 702 65 1992 1,067 700 66 1993 1,059 619 58 1994 1,068 634 59 1995 1,077 693 64 1996 1,167 812 70 1997 1,150 825 72 1998 1,210 866 72 1999 1,259 905 72 2000 1,331 909 68 2001 1,389 982 71 2002 1,471 1,049 71 2003 1,483 1,062 72 2004 1,489 1,093 73 % increase 1990 to 2004 42% 59% 12% Source: Riverside County Sheriff’s Department.

Based on the figures presented in Table 5-1, the department employed 42 percent more deputies in 2004

One Department and its Shootings 115 than in 1990. Coinciding with the overall increased staffing, patrol experienced a 59 percent increase as well. In comparison to the total department’s distribution of sworn employees throughout the various assignments, it increased the amount of deputies assigned to patrol from 65 percent of the total sworn population to 73 percent, a 12 percent increase. In short, as the department increased in size, it assigned more of its sworn staff to patrol positions than other assignments. Department Gender and Racial/Ethnic Compilation Notwithstanding the interest or desire of women entering law enforcement as a profession, and the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department in particular, during the 1970s, there clearly remains a disproportion of males filling the ranks. As stated earlier in this chapter, Mundy’s (1996) historical review of the department outlined the entry of women into the department; however, there was no mention of people of color. Thus, it is unclear when minorities began to fill the ranks of deputy sheriff. Despite this limited information, it is possible to examine the more recent racial/ethnic makeup of the department, which has fallen short for comparably representing the population it serves. More will be said about this later in this chapter when the population characteristics for the County of Riverside are explored. Because the department only recently chose to maintain consistent demographic records regarding its personnel, information about the race/ethnicity of the department’s deputies, as well as the number of women similarly employed, primarily came from three reports published by the U.S. Department of Justice. Covering the years 1993, 1997, and 2000, these reports document the department’s total sworn employees, and distinguish the number and percentage of men

116 Police Shootings and Citizen Behavior and women, and the racial/ethnic composition (Reaves and Smith 1995; Reaves and Goldberg 1999; Hickman and Reaves 2003a). In spite of the data available from the three reports, all of the U.S. Department of Justice reports were limited to only providing the race/ethnicity makeup for deputies as a whole. In other words, the reports did not distinguish the number of male and female employees by their race/ethnicity. As stated above, in 2000, the department began to not only systematically compile and track the gender compilation of both sworn and non-sworn employees within the department, it did so by race/ethnicity as well. Because of the limited information presented in the U.S. Department of Justice reports and the lack of data available from the department, information regarding the gender and race/ethnicity of deputies employed by the department were compiled consistently with the U.S. Department of Justice reports for comparison. Additionally, it was decided to only collect information for 2004 from the department, a similar four-year separation of available data reported in the U.S. Department of Justice documents, even though annual data were available. Tables 5-2 and 5-3 display the department’s deputy sheriff gender and race/ethnicity compositions for the years 1993, 1997, 2000 and 2004. In review of Table 5-2, it is evident that male deputies represent 90 percent of the department’s sworn staff. According to the available data examined for the specified study period, women reached their greatest level of representation among the sworn employee classification in 1993 maintaining a little more than 17 percent of the department’s sworn population. Clearly, the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department, as is typically found within the law enforcement profession as a whole, remains male dominated despite the “dozens” of women Mundy (1996) reported to be seeking employment with the department in the 1970s.

One Department and its Shootings 117 Without further information about the department’s historical hiring practices, it is difficult to surmise whether the 1970s trend continued over time or was just an aberration. If the last three years of data are any indication, the number of women filling sworn positions within the department has leveled-off at approximately ten percent. Even more interesting is the fact that while the department’s sworn staffing grew by 430 more deputies over 13 years, the number of females decreased. In 1993, the department employed the highest number of female deputies (N=184), but by 2004 their number had shrunk to 146. In other words, there were forty fewer female deputies 13 years later despite an addition of more than 400 new deputy positions. Whatever the reasons are for why the number of female deputies within the department has receded over the years remains unclear and is beyond the focus of this study. However, it is important to take note of the trend, which could serve as a topic for further research. Table 5-2. Riverside Year 1993a 1997b 2000c 2004d Mean

Gender Composition of Sworn Officers in the Sheriff’s Department for 1993, 1997, 2000, and 2004 Male % Female % Total 875 82.6 184 17.4 1,059 1,024 89 126 11 1,150 1,202 90.3 129 9.7 1,331 1,343 90.2 146 9.8 1,489 1,111

88

146

Sources: Reaves and Smith, 1995 b Reaves and Goldberg, 1999 c Hickman and Reaves, 2003a d Riverside County Sheriff’s Department Note: Percentages rounded to nearest tenth. a

12

1,257

118 Police Shootings and Citizen Behavior Data for the racial/ethnic composition of the department was gathered in the same manner as for gender as previously explained. Table 5-3 portrays the available data for the department’s racial/ethnic makeup, as well as the changes that occurred, during the years examined for this study. Notwithstanding some changes in the White, Black, and Hispanic race/ethnicity categories during the study period, the Asian and Other race/ethnicity groups each consistently accounted for approximately one percent of the total sworn staff. In review of Table 5-3, it is readily apparent that White deputies are the majority within the department. The overall number of White deputies consistently grew over time even though this group’s total percentage of population amongst the ranks fluctuated from a low of just under 71 percent in 1993 to a consistent high of 78 percent in 1997 and 2000, then dropping to slightly less than 73 percent in 2004. Of particular interest is the low representation of Black deputies. At most, Black deputies comprised almost eight percent of the department’s sworn personnel in 1993, and at its lowest, only three percent in 2000. By 2004, Black deputies not only made up slightly more than three percent of the department’s sworn employees, the overall number of Black deputies remained lower (N=51) than their overall high of 81 Black deputies in 1993. On the other hand, the representation of Hispanic deputies has taken a different path. Despite a marked decrease in overall numbers and percentage in 1997, the number of Hispanic deputies continued to increase over the years. Representing 16 percent of the department’s sworn personnel in 1997, the group’s lowest level of account, the percentage of Hispanic deputies had grown to almost 22 percent in 2004. Even though the data on hand do not allow for a breakdown and comparison of deputies by gender and

Table 5-3. Year 1993a 1997b 2000c 2004d Mean

White 750 898 1,038 1,083 942

Racial Composition of Sworn Officers in the Riverside Sheriff’s Department for 1993, 1997, 2000, and 2004 % Asian % % Other Black % % Hispanic 70.8 1.2 81 11 7.7 1 204 19.3 13 78 46 4 184 16 11 1 11 1 78 40 3 226 17 16 1 10 1 72.7 1.7 51 7 3.4 1 323 21.7 25 75 55 4 234 19 16 1 1 1

Sources: a Reaves and Smith, 1995 b Reaves and Goldberg, 1999 c Hickman and Reaves, 2003a d Riverside County Sheriff’s Department Note: Percentages rounded to nearest tenth.

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race/ethnicity, some assumptions can be drawn about the department. Clearly, and not surprisingly, the typical deputy sheriff within the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department over the 15 years considered for this study has, on average, been 88 percent male (Table 5-2), and 75 percent White (Table 5-3). How the department’s demographics compare with the entire county it serves will be discussed in the following section. Population Characteristics Within the County of Riverside Knowledge of a law enforcement agency’s composition is just one aspect toward understanding the context of police shootings. To further clarify the milieu, the population served by the department, the number of calls for service handled, and the department’s primary duties need to be considered as an overall contextual framework. As a basis to further this understanding, we will begin by exploring the size of the department and its primary duties. According to the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics: Sheriff’s Offices 2000 and Local Police Departments 2000 reports (Hickman and Reaves 2003a; Hickman and Reaves 2003b), there are 3,070 sheriff’s departments, 12,666 police departments, 49 state police agencies, 1,376 special jurisdictions, and 623 Texas constables for a total of 17,784 law enforcement agencies in the United States. Based on the figures documented in the reports, the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department was the 11th largest sheriff’s department, and the 44th largest law enforcement agency in the U.S. when compared to all law enforcement departments. Several factors play into why the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department is among the largest in the nation.

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The first factor is the size of the county itself, which covers approximately 7,208 square miles. Second, are the duties fulfilled by the department. The Riverside County Sheriff is responsible for operating several jails, providing security at the courthouses, staffing the coroner and public administrator bureaus, operating a regional training facility, staffing several patrol stations, as well as a number of other support units. Beyond the responsibility of serving the law enforcement needs in the unincorporated areas of the county, the sheriff’s department serves as the chief law enforcement agency for several cities within the county. Essentially, these cities contract services with the sheriff’s department to function as a police department. The difference of duties provided by the sheriff’s department in the unincorporated county areas versus a contract city needs some further explanation since some people may be unfamiliar with the nuances, what little they may be. Typically, the primary difference of service provided to the unincorporated areas of the county and contract city policing consists of traffic enforcement. In a contract city, the department provides all law enforcement services to include traffic enforcement (i.e., accident investigation, driving under the influence enforcement, proactive traffic violation ticketing, etc.). On the other hand, in the unincorporated jurisdiction of the county, with some exception, these functions fall under the responsibility of the California Highway Patrol. In some parts of the unincorporated area of the county, communities have formed ‘Community Service Areas’ (CSAs) wherein the community contracts for specific services, by way of a special tax, to be provided by the sheriff’s department, which may include traffic enforcement. Additionally, deputies assigned to work the unincorporated patrol areas of the county are not precluded from enforcing observed

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traffic violations, and often cite violators posing hazards to the public. However, most, if not all, traffic accidents and driving under the influence investigations are turned over to the California Highway Patrol. Contract policing needs further exploration since a considerable amount of the sheriff’s department patrol staffing is committed to contract cities. Over the 15 years considered for this study, three additional cities were incorporated in the County of Riverside. This is important to recognize for two primary reasons. First, the incorporation of each city changed the population size for the unincorporated areas of the county. Second, the newly incorporated city may or may not have contracted law enforcement services with the sheriff’s department, which directly impacts the overall population served by the department and how many deputies were needed to fill patrol positions. In 1990, the County of Riverside had 21 incorporated cities, nine of which contracted law enforcement with the sheriff’s department. There were 23 incorporated cities in 1991, ten with sheriff’s department contracts. The following year, a 24th city was incorporated, and chose to provide its own law enforcement. Throughout the 15-year study period, city contracts fluctuated from a low of nine cities to a high of 13 as cities decided to form or disband their own police departments. As of 2004, the sheriff’s department provided law enforcement services to 13 of the county’s 24 cities, as well as the unincorporated jurisdiction. Utilizing department records and data from the California Department of Finance, total patrol population served by the sheriff’s department was compiled for the years considered for this study. It should be noted that the population figures for 1990 and 2000 were based on the

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census; however, the interim years are estimates compiled by the California Department of Finance. As stated above, the incorporation of new cities, and whether a city chose to begin or end contract services with the sheriff’s department impacted the total patrol population served by the department. Table 5-4 displays the patrol population served by the sheriff’s department for each year included in this study. The zeros depicted for the cities of Calimesa and Canyon Lake in 1990 indicate both cities had not yet incorporated and the population was included in the unincorporated total. The ‘N/A’ represents cities that have contracted law enforcement services with the sheriff’s department at some time during the study period, but not for the year indicated. For example, the City of Desert Hot Springs maintained a contract with the sheriff’s department from 1990 to 1996 when it formed its own police department. Also, the population for a contract city was added or deleted from the table based on whether the contract was for the majority of a start or conclusion year. For example, the City of Perris provided its own police department until April 1996 when it was decided to disband the police department and establish a contract with the sheriff’s department. Since the contract covered the majority of the year, the City of Perris was included. Thus, the total population served by the sheriff’s department fluctuated with the total population of contract cities and unincorporated areas from year to year. Even though the majority of contract cities served by the sheriff’s department may be classified as small, a few can be considered to be medium to large cities. By 2004, the cities of Temcula and Moreno Valley possessed respective population sizes 78,841 and 157,865. Both of these cities pose similar law enforcement challenges that can be found in most other cities throughout the nation (i.e.,

Table 5-4.

Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Contract Cites and Unincorporated Population for Patrol Areas Served by the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department Between 1990 and 2004 Desert Canyon Hot Indian Lake La Moreno Calimesa Lake Coachella Springs Wells Elsinore Quinta Valley 0 0 N/A 11,668 2,647 18,316 11,215 118,779 12,400 2,720 19,050 12,800 125,800 6,750 N/A N/A 13,350 2,890 21,600 14,400 130,000 6,925 N/A N/A 14,200 2,990 22,000 15,100 131,500 6,975 N/A N/A 14,550 3,090 23,100 15,900 132,800 7,000 N/A N/A 15,100 3,090 23,850 16,600 132,700 6,925 N/A N/A 15,500 3,150 24,700 17,400 134,200 6,925 9,950 N/A N/A 3,290 25,750 18,550 136,300 6,975 9,900 N/A N/A 3,350 26,450 19,550 138,000 7,025 9,850 N/A 3,520 27,950 20,800 140,500 7,075 9,900 21,500 N/A 3,816 28,928 23,649 142,381 7,139 9,952 22,724 N/A 4,150 30,045 26,097 144,401 7,214 10,164 23,369 N/A 4,376 31,250 28,894 147,340 7,316 10,410 24,432 N/A 4,454 33,469 30,852 151,887 7,428 10,649 27,123 N/A 4,514 35,989 33,104 157,865 7,477 10,847 28,146 N/A

Source: Riverside County Sheriff’s Department and the California Department of Finance (March 28, 2006).

Table 5-4 cont.Contract Cites and Unincorporated Population for Patrol Areas Served by the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department Between 1990 and 2004 Palm Rancho San UninYear Norco Desert Perris Mirage Jacinto Temecula corporated Total 9,778 27,099 N/A 385,384 631,440 1990 23,302 23,252 N/A 10,050 27,450 N/A 390,600 654,720 1991 23,200 23,900 N/A 10,550 31,650 N/A 366,200 645,865 1992 23,250 25,050 N/A 10,800 34,150 N/A 375,800 663,965 1993 23,450 27,000 N/A 11,000 37,000 N/A 383,600 679,890 1994 23,700 28,150 N/A 11,100 40,850 N/A 385,600 693,815 1995 23,450 34,550 N/A 43,650 391,300 749,775 1996 23,500 35,500 32,650 11,300 N/A 46,150 393,900 745,915 1997 23,600 36,800 33,050 11,650 N/A 48,900 397,800 758,825 1998 24,050 37,850 33,950 12,050 N/A 51,600 405,100 798,895 1999 23,950 39,500 34,900 12,600 N/A 57,716 420,721 831,776 2000 24,157 41,155 36,189 13,249 N/A 61,803 431,455 856,070 2001 24,497 42,099 36,927 13,849 N/A 73,164 444,225 891,735 2002 25,026 43,129 37,742 14,431 N/A 75,996 460,689 926,407 2003 25,516 44,490 38,699 15,155 N/A 2004 25,861 45,610 42,048 15,787 27,198 78,841 485,379 998,666 Source: Riverside County Sheriff’s Department and the California Department of Finance (March 28, 2006).

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traffic congestion, gang activity, robberies, homicides, domestic violence, etc.). Additionally, minus the traffic responsibilities, many communities within the unincorporated areas of the county present similar law enforcement challenges despite the county’s vast size. To a great degree, a considerable part of the more than 7,200 square miles is sparsely populated on the one hand, and on the other, there are many communities that have population sizes similar to most of the incorporated cities within the county. Riverside County Population Demographics Unlike other communities throughout the United States, Riverside County’s geographical placement in Southern California and close proximity to Mexico has a lot to do with its racial demographics and lends to its growing Hispanic population. Since the sheriff’s department patrol area covers the entire unincorporated area and 13 of the county’s 24 cities, and due to its availability, it was decided to use the California Department of Finance’s data on gender and race/ethnicity for the entire county to compare changes over the 15-year period covered in this study (see Table 5-5). In comparison of the county’s total population and the population served by the sheriff’s department for each year, it is apparent that the department is responsible for providing law enforcement services to roughly half of the county’s population. Moreover, in spite of the fact that the racial/ethnic demography for some of the cities or portions of the unincorporated areas may differ in comparison to the representation for the overall county, the data compiled by the California Department of Finance, and presented in Table 5-5, provides a useful basis to draw comparisons for this study given the total patrol population

Table 5-5.

Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Average

Patrol Area Population Size and County Population by Race/Ethnicity for Riverside County 1990-2004 % % % County Patrol Area % Population White Black Hispanic Asian Population 1,170,413 631,440 65 5 26 3 1,221,330 654,720 63 5 28 3 1,275,500 645,865 61 5 29 4 1,312,300 663,965 60 6 30 4 1,340,200 679,890 58 6 31 4 1,365,500 693,815 57 6 32 4 1,391,800 749,775 56 6 33 4 1,420,600 745,915 54 6 34 4 1,451,600 758,825 53 6 35 4 1,490,500 798,895 52 6 36 5 1,545,387 831,776 52 6 37 4 1,590,473 856,070 50 6 37 5 1,654,220 891,735 49 6 38 5 1,726,754 926,407 48 6 39 5 1,807,858 998,666 46 5 40 5 1,450,962 768,517 54.9 5.7 33.7 4.2

Source: California Department of Finance (March 28, 2006). Note: Males and Females each made up 50% of the population.

% Other 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 4 1.5

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and vast number of cities served by the sheriff’s department. In Table 5-5, we find that during the 15-year period included in this study, the county’s population grew from 1,170,413 people to 1,807,858, which is an increase of 637,445 people. As for the patrol population served by the sheriff’s department, the department experienced a net increase of 367,226 people. In comparison of the overall rise in population percentages, the sheriff’s department responsibility for law enforcement services increased slightly more (58 percent) as opposed to the total county population (54 percent). In addition to the increased population in the county, the racial/ethnic demographics have experienced a remarkable change as well, especially for the White and Hispanic populations. While the Black population remained roughly 5 percent of the county’s total population, the Asian population increased by 2 percent (5 percent overall population), and the Other race/ethnicity group rose to a total of 4 percent of the county’s population. Interestingly, but not too surprisingly, the county’s White population decreased in relation to the Hispanic population’s increase. As can be seen in Table 55 for almost every year there was a drop in the overall percentage of Whites whereas the percentage of Hispanics rose. In the end, the Hispanic population realized a 14 percent increase while the White population decreased slightly sharper (19 percent). The additional 5 percent decline in the White population was absorbed by the growth of Asian and Other race/ethnicity populations. Throughout the racial/ethnic changes during the 15 years examined, the gender population remained a constant 50 percent male and 50 percent female.

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County and Sheriff’s Department Demographics It is logical that each community would hope that when it comes to law enforcement it was adequately represented so as to avoid discrimination based on group biases. We often hear that the face of local law enforcement agencies fail to similarly mirror the communities they serve. As we learned earlier in the chapter, the typical deputy in the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department over the 15 years considered for examination was White and male; however, to further understand officer-involved shootings within the department, these data need to be compared with the county’s total demographics. As it may be recalled, due to a lack of available data, deputy demographic information was collected for only four specific years (1993, 1997, 2000, and 2004). Thus, for year-to-year comparison purposes, the same years were used for the county’s race/ethnicity and gender demographics and are presented in Table 5-6. It was recognized earlier in the chapter that women were clearly underrepresented in the department and have been declining. Regarding female deputies’ representation of the community (12 percent), on average women in the community are 38 percent underrepresented. Thus, in direct contrast, male deputies out represent the county’s male population the same percentage women are neglected. The closest female deputies came to matching the overall female population in the county was in 1993, yet remained over 32 percent unequal. More convoluted is the racial/ethnic comparison of the county’s population with that of the sheriff’s department. Despite the declining White and rising Hispanic populations in the county, the racial/ethnic composition within the sheriff’s department has remained rather

Table 5-6.

Percentage Comparison of Department Demographics With County Population Demographics Between 1990 and 2004 White Off. Cit.

Black Off. Cit.

Hispanic Off. Cit.

Asian Off. Cit.

70.8 78 78 72.7 75

7.7 4 3 3.4 4

19.3 16 17 21 19

1.2 1 1 1.7 1

Other Off. Cit.

Male Off. Cit.

Female Off. Cit.

82.6 89 90.3 90.2 88

17.4 11 9.7 9.8 12

Year 1993 1997 2000 2004 Mean

60 54 52 46 53

6 6 6 5 5.8

30 34 37 40 35.1

4 4 4 5 4.1

1 1 1 1 1

1 2 1 4 2

50 50 50 50 50

Source: Riverside County Sheriff’s Department and California Department of Finance (March 28, 2006). Note: Numbers were rounded to nearest tenth.

50 50 50 50 50

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constant. In fact, the overall representation has become more disparate, in favor of White deputies, over the 15-year period studied. In 1993, Black deputies comprised 7.7 percent of the department’s population and 6 percent of the county’s population; however, by 2004 the department representation of Blacks fell to 3.4 percent whereas the county’s population only decreased to 5 percent. Although not a great discrepancy, the county’s Black population has gone from a slight over representation to an under representation. Throughout the study period, the county’s Asian population, although small, consistently remained under represented by the sheriff’s department personnel. On the other hand, the county’s Other race/ethnicity population, which too is small, has grown disproportionately mismatched. While the department’s Other race/ethnicity continued to be 1 percent, the county’s Other population increased to 4 percent. With respect to the county’s Hispanic population, it grew from 26 percent in 1990 to 40 percent in 2004, a 14 percent increase; however, the representation within the sheriff’s department grew by less than 2 percent (19.3 percent in 1993 to 21 percent in 2004). In fact, the overall representation grew more unevenly over time. In 1993, there was less than an 11 percent difference in the county’s population and the department’s representation of Hispanic deputies; however, by 2004 this grew to a 19 percent difference disfavoring the community’s population of Hispanics. In spite of the overrepresentation of White deputies in 1993, with each passing year this disparity constantly grew. At its lowest in 1993, White deputies over represented the county’s White population by almost 11 percent. By 2004, White deputies comprised nearly 73 percent of the

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department, whereas the community’s White population had reduced to 46 percent from its high of 65 percent in 1990. Thus, by 2004, White deputies over represented the total White population within the county by nearly 27 percent. What has occurred within the sheriff’s department over the 15-year study period is clear. While the community’s gender population remained constant, the department employed fewer female deputies. More noteworthy is the disproportionate representation of the county’s population of people of color. Despite the slight rise in Hispanic deputies, the influx of Hispanics in the county dramatically outpaced this increase. Furthermore, even though the overall White population has continued to decline in the community, the employment of White deputies has risen. Although the hiring practices of the sheriff’s department remains outside the focus of this study, it is important to acknowledge the department’s disparate representation of the community it serves as this factor may have a real or perceived impact on officer-involved shootings. Calls for Service and the Number of Patrol Deputies Another telling characteristic of any given community, although unorthodox, may be the number of police contacts or calls for service handled by the police. It should come as no surprise that citizen contacts are often a prelude to officer-involved shootings. In short, without the interactive encounter, no matter how brief it may be, there would be no foundation for the police shooting to take place. Thus, by having some reference point to draw from (i.e., the number of calls for service handled by the department’s officers) another layer of contextual knowledge is added

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and assists the overall understanding of officer-involved shootings. The Riverside County Sheriff’s Department maintains annual records of the number of calls for service handled by members of the department. These data were collected and used to figure, on average, how many calls were assigned to each patrol deputy for each year included in this study. Prior to discussing the data, further background information is necessary. The reader may recall that in Table 5-1, we explored the number of deputies on the department versus the number of deputies assigned to patrol; however, what was not discussed was the deployment of patrol deputies. The sheriff’s department counts all sworn deputies assigned to a patrol station as ‘patrol’ despite the fact that the total number includes investigators, supervisors, and managers (i.e., sworn deputies who will rarely be faced with handling calls for service). As a result, the total numbers indicated in Table 5-1 or elsewhere overestimate the actual number of deputies in a black and white patrol car, and who are essentially at a greater risk for being involved in a shooting incident. Likewise, as we consider the number of calls for service handled by patrol deputies, it is important to acknowledge that the sheriff’s department employs another group of people, although considerably small in numbers, who also are assigned calls for service. In addition to sworn deputies, the sheriff’s department assigns community service officers (CSOs) to patrol. CSOs are unarmed, nonsworn employees, largely tasked with transporting arrested citizens, traffic control, or investigating past incidents wherein contact with a suspect is unlikely (i.e., vandalism, theft, or runaway juveniles). Any calls for service involving violence or when a suspect is still present are

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assigned to sworn deputies. Unfortunately, it is not known how many calls are assigned to CSOs, thus for the purpose of this study, all calls for service are attributed to the total number of deputies assigned to patrol. It is believed that CSOs make little impact on the number of calls for service being attributed to the deputies because there are few CSOs working patrol, and much of their time is spent transporting citizens arrested by the deputies. Two other aspects of the patrol environment, as it relates to citizen contacts, need to be addressed. First, not all calls for service result in citizen contact (e.g., call for clearing a road hazard such as debris in the roadway). Second, the sheriff’s department counts all calls for service generated through its dispatch center (i.e., citizens calling for assistance), and whenever a patrol deputy or CSO requests an incident number when he/she conducts some sort of on-sight activity; however, deputies make many contacts throughout their shift that never result in a documented call for service. For example, a deputy may make several traffic stops during his/her shift, but issue a citation for only one violator. Only the single citation is documented as a call for service. Furthermore, in order for a call for service to be counted, a file number must be assigned to the call. This typically occurs when deputies are assigned to a call generated by the public through the dispatch center, or when the deputy requests a file number when conducting on-site activity that requires documentation. In spite of the limitations outlined above, comparing the number of calls for service to the number of patrol deputies for each year provides an additional level of information that would not otherwise be known. Table 5-7 displays the number of deputies assigned to patrol, the number of calls for service, and the average number of calls handled by

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each deputy for each year examined in this study. Clearly, with few exceptions, the number of calls for service increased each year as did the number of deputies. Although it is a highly unlikely occurrence, Table 5-7 assumes that all calls for service are evenly distributed among all of the patrol deputies. Based on the number of deputies and calls for service, the fewest number of calls handled by a deputy occurred in 1999 (476 calls), and the most occurred in 1993 (677 calls); however, on average over the 15 years considered, each patrol deputy handled about 561 calls for service per year. The following section looks at the number of shootings and officers involved, and Table 5-7.

Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Average

Comparison of Calls for Service, and Total Number of Officers Assigned to Patrol Between 1990 and 2004 Number Patrol Officers 689 702 700 619 634 693 812 825 866 905 909 982 1,049 1,062 1,093 836

Number Calls for Service 370,272 406,422 424,083 419,216 428,143 430,318 451,819 461,392 432,489 430,765 472,655 505,493 532,056 560,545 607,677 462,223

Average Calls per Officer 537 579 606 677 675 621 556 559 499 476 520 515 507 528 556 561

Sources: Number of officers and calls for service were obtained from the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department.

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compares them with the population served by the sheriff’s department, calls for service, and violent crimes. Comparison of Crime Rates, Calls for Service, Population, and Police Shootings The raw number of police shootings or the number of officers involved in shootings from one year to another leaves much to the imagination for those trying to understand the frequency of occurrence. It is not uncommon for local news agencies to report a given number of police shootings for a period of time, and insinuate that the frequency of occurrence is inordinate and something to cause concern for the public. Following these media stories, members of the community typically respond by writing letters to the editor of a local newspaper, questioning police tactics and making claims that police deadly force is ‘out of control.’ By either account, nothing is really learned about the true context of the shooting incidents, just that officers have discharged their weapons at citizens a given number of times within a period of time. Just as Durkheim (1895/2002) claimed that crime in society is normal, so too are police shootings in the United States. Durkheim (2002: 80) further explains “crime is normal because it is completely impossible for a society to be free of it.” If this is so, then officer-involved shootings can be presumed to be equally normal based on modern practices of law enforcement in the U.S. In comparison to the policing methods in other countries such as the United Kingdom, police officers in the United States are openly armed with firearms. Moreover, given our current justice system, which bestows upon law enforcement agents the authority to use coercive force, to include lethal force, as a means to enforce society’s laws and maintain order, the

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police will naturally use their firearms in certain circumstances. In other words, armed officers will use whatever means reasonable and necessary, to include their guns, as methods for controlling citizens when specific criminal conditions are met. Police Shootings, Population, and Violent Crime Beyond merely knowing the aggregate number of police shootings in a year, one way to develop a better understanding of them is to place them in context with the environment in which the officers work. For example, examining the amount of assignments officers handle, the total population they serve, and the crime rate in the community helps to provide more information for drawing a more informed conclusion. In order to gain a better understanding about the frequency of officer-involved shootings by members of the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department between 1990 and 2004, four types of data were relied upon as points of reference. Certainly, the number of shootings for each year was the first set of data compiled. Second, the size of the population for the area serviced by the department was collected. The third type of data gathered was annually totaled calls for service. Total reported violent crime (i.e., homicide, rape, assault, etc.) for the unincorporated and contract city patrol areas were the last category of data assembled. Table 5-8 represents that aggregate annual totals for police shootings, number of officers involved in shootings, the patrol population served by the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department, the number of calls for service, and the number of violent crimes reported to the department. In examining the number of shooting incidents and number of

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officers involved during the 15-year study period, there does not appear to be any particular pattern or trend occurring. In other words, it does not appear as if police shootings and/or the number of officers discharging their weapons followed any specific trend (i.e., rise or fall in frequency of occurrence) from one year to another. The pattern seems to be more random in nature. Furthermore, with some exceptions, the number of shooting incidents in any given year does not predict the number of officers Table 5-8. Totals for Shootings, Officers Involved, Patrol Population, Calls for Service, and Violent Crimes Within the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department Jurisdiction Between 1990 and 2004 Number Number Patrol Calls for Violent Year Shootings Officers Population Service Crime 1990 17 34 631,440 370,272 4,841a 1991 9 26 654,720 406,422 5,919 1992 15 18 645,865 424,083 6,272 1993 21 31 663,965 419,216 6,737 1994 12 24 679,890 428,143 6,267 1995 17 27 693,815 430,318 5,022 1996 14 28 749,775 451,819 4,826 1997 6 7 745,915 461,392 4,809 1998 10 14 758,825 432,489 4,644 1999 11 21 798,895 430,765 4,343 2000 12 17 831,776 472,655 4,770 2001 8 10 856,070 505,493 4,863 2002 9 16 891,735 532,056 4,916 2003 9 10 926,407 560,545 4,550 2004 16 31 998,666 607,677 4,268 a

Available violent crime statistics was limited to three contract cities and the unincorporated county area. Sources: Number of shootings, officers involved, and calls for service were obtained from the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department. Patrol population was collected from the California Department of Finance (March 28, 2006). Violent crime rate for Riverside County/Contract Cities statistics were obtained from the Bureau of Justice Statistics.

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involved. For example, in 1991 there were nine police shootings for the department, involving 26 officers, yet in 2002 and 2003 even though the department similarly experienced nine officer-involved shootings in each year, the number of officers discharging their firearms for each year were respectively 16 and 10. Thus, it seems that the relationship is by chance. Using a logical approach to explore possible relation trends that may be occurring from year to year, one may surmise that police shootings would be tied to the number of people in the community, calls for service, and violent crime. It would be natural to predict that as the population, calls for service, and incidents of violent crime increase, officers would be exposed to more situations ripe for an officer-involved shooting to occur. The mere increase for each of these categories should statistically place the entire department’s patrol force at greater risk, which means that with every police contact, especially in relationship to increasing incidents of violent crime, the likelihood that the encounter will result in an officer using deadly force will also rise. Table 5-8 attempts to compare each of these factors. The population served by the sheriff’s department patrol division and the number of calls for service it handled was previously discussed; however, violent crime was not. As explained earlier in this chapter, the sheriff’s department has law enforcement responsibility for the unincorporated, as well as a number of contract cities. In order to collect annual totals for violent crimes reported to the department, data were compiled from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, which proved to be a limited resource. The Bureau of Justice Statistics does not maintain crime statistics for cities with a population under 10,000. The reader will recall from reviewing Table 5-4 that the

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department provides patrol services to a number of cities with a population under 10,000 (e.g., Calimesa, Canyon Lake, Indian Wells). Also, the data for 1990 were limited to only three of the contract cities and the unincorporated area of the county. Thus, the violent crime totals were limited to contract cities with a population greater than 10,000 and the unincorporated county areas. Without attempting to explain why crime rose or fell, which is not the purpose of this study, we find that over the 15-year study period the population and calls for service typically increased with each passing year; however, with few exceptions, violent crime decreased. Comparing Violent Crime Even though portions of the unincorporated area of the county remain rural and sparsely populated, several communities have formed to the extent that they resemble most of the urban incorporated cities within the county. Due to the vast area of the county, and the fact that the contract cities are scattered throughout the county, it was decided to compare the violent crime rate of all the contract cities with the unincorporated areas served by the department. In review of the violent crime statistics for the cities, it is readily apparent that there is little consistency from one city to another; however, as a whole, they make for a good comparison with the unincorporated county area, which similarly experienced different levels of crime throughout the various communities. In order to make a comparison of violent crime within the jurisdiction of the sheriff’s department patrol, three trends were examined. Figure 5-2 demonstrates the three trends. The first is the violent crime rate for the total patrol

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area responsibility for the department (i.e., both unincorporated and contract cities). The second is the unincorporated county patrol area violent crime rate. Last, is the combined violent crime rate for the all of the department’s contract cities. One of the reasons unincorporated communities seek to incorporate or be annexed into an existing city is based on the perception of receiving better law enforcement services (i.e., lower response times), which can be equated to mean lower crime rates than what may be occurring in the unincorporated communities. On the other hand, in spite of potential lower response times, crime rates tend to be higher in urban cities for a multitude of reasons. Again, this study does not seek to explain crime, but whether violent crime may impact officer-involved shootings. Based on the trends displayed in Figure 5-2, violent crime rates remained higher than, but tended to parallel, those in the unincorporated areas of the county over the 15 years examined. By 2002, the contract cities and unincorporated area violent crime rates converged. Although it is not known with any certainty, the convergence may be as a result of the increased population in the unincorporated communities of the county, which has begun to closely resemble the urban cities within the county. Comparison of Police Shootings, Number of Officers Involved, and Calls for Service and Violent Crime The raw number of police shootings for any given year fails to ground the relationship of the phenomenon in the environment in which they occur. Table 5-8 merely represents the total number of shootings and how many officers were involved in any given year for the study; yet, as we learned earlier, there does not appear to be any trend

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occurring. However, when we include the population and calls for service in order to compute the rate for each factor for each year, and compare this to the violent crime rate, we do in fact find some interesting trends. Five different rates are presented in Table 5-9 for comparison. The rate of shootings and officers involved are based on 100,000 population and calls for service for each year. The violent crime rate is for the patrol areas served by the department, and is based on 1,000 population for easier comparison. Three trends are particularly interesting when the rate of population and calls for service are taken into account. First, even though the rate of police shootings and officers involved fluctuated from year to year, the trend has been for both to decrease, never surpassing their respective alltime highs in 1990. In fact, the rate of shootings and officers involved based on population reached a remarkable low in 1997 and maintained a similar constant low until 2004. Second, the rate of police shootings and officers involved based on calls for service nearly matched those based on population with two exceptions. One exception is that those based on population remained lower than those for calls for service. The other exception occurred in 1993 when the rate of shootings based on calls for service reached its peak, surpassing the rate for 1990. In all other cases regarding the rate of shootings and officers involved, 1990 remained the highest year. The third trend is in reference to violent crime rates throughout the 15-year study period. During the first four years, violent crime rate rose to an all-time high of 10.3 per 1,000 people; however, following the peak in 1993, and with little exception, violent crime continued to decline. Although there is some variation throughout the 15 years considered for examination, there appears to be some relationship between the overall decrease in officer-

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involved shootings and the similar pattern for violent crime. Figures 5-3 and 5-4 are provided to illustrate some of the trends discussed. Table 5-9. Rate of Shootings, Officers Involved, and Violent Crime Based on Population and/or Calls for Service Between 1990 and 2004

Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Shootings/ Pop 2.7 1.4 2.3 3.2 1.8 2.5 1.9 0.8 1.3 1.4 1.4 0.9 1 1 1.6

Shootings/ Calls 4.6 2.2 3.5 5 2.8 4 3.1 1.3 2.3 2.6 2.5 1.6 1.7 1.6 2.6

Officers/ Pop 5.4 4 2.8 4.7 3.5 3.9 3.7 0.9 1.8 2.6 2 1.2 1.8 1.1 3.1

Officers/ Calls 9.2 6.4 4.2 7.4 5.6 6.3 6.2 1.5 3.2 4.9 3.6 2 3 1.8 5.1

Crime/ Popa 9.2 9.2 9.9 10.3 9.4 7.3 6.6 6.6 6.3 5.7 6.1 6 5.8 5.2 4.5

a

Violent crime rate for Riverside County/Contract Cities, based on 1,000 population. All other figures are based on 100,000 population or calls for service. Sources: Number of shootings, officers, and calls for service were obtained from the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department. Violent crime rate for Riverside County/Contract Cities statistics were obtained from the Bureau of Justice Statistics. Note: Numbers were rounded to nearest tenth.

In Figure 5-3, two additional violent crime rates are included for comparison. The first is the national violent crime rate, and the second is the violent crime rate for the

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state of California. These were included to demonstrate whether the trend for violent crime in the areas served by the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department were unique or comparable to the trends throughout the nation. Clearly, although a little more dramatic than California and national trends, violent crime in the sheriff’s department patrol areas nearly follows a parallel path. For the most part, violent crime in the department’s patrol areas remained between the national and California rate with the national violent crime rate being the lowest. By 2004, the violent crime rate within the sheriff’s department jurisdiction dipped slightly below the national rate. In both Figures 5-3 and 5-4, the rate of officers involved in shootings, based either on population or calls for service, proved to be more volatile when compared to shooting incidents, which was similarly found in the yearto-year aggregate numbers (see Table 5-8). The best comparison for violent crime rate trends is the rate of shooting incidents. Arguably, the number of officers involved depends more upon the number of officers available to respond or are present at any given officerinvolved shooting scene. If each officer present perceives a similar threat at the same time, each will potentially take similar action. In other words, an incident that culminates into a shooting will likely have more officers discharging their firearms when more officers are present. Most noteworthy is the overall decreased rate of police shootings from 1990 to 2004. Even though they may receive more media and public attention today, perhaps due in part to the increasing population in the community, the rate in which officers fire their weapons in comparison to the increased population and number of calls for service they handle, has decreased.

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Summary In a best-case scenario, data regarding police shootings would be compiled similar to the Uniform Crime Report. To do so, law enforcement agencies would be required to annually report specified information about officerinvolved shootings to a centralized clearinghouse. Beyond the characteristics of the officer, citizen, and incident, additional information such as demographics for the department and the community served, as well as crime statistics would be required. Data such as this would afford a more comprehensive analysis of police shootings than is currently available, which may allow for various comparisons and generalized findings. Currently, officerinvolved shooting research, the present study included, typically examines police shootings from one department. The findings from such studies are generally limited to the agency itself, or at best, the region of the country in which the department is located. In spite of the limitations previously acknowledged, the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department provides a robust and unique setting for studying officer-involved shootings. As one of the nation’s largest law enforcement agencies, the sheriff’s department provides police services to a diverse population, from the rural to the urban. The sheriff’s department patrol operations are essentially several smaller law enforcement agencies combined together. The department provides policing to 13 contract cities ranging in population from as few as less than 5,000 people to more than 165,000 people, as well as an unincorporated county area comprised of nearly 500,000 people. In short, an analysis of the sheriff’s department police shootings is similar to conducting a comprehensive

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analysis of several smaller to medium or large sized police departments. As a means to establish a comprehensive understanding of the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department and a contextual foundation of officer-involved shootings that occurred within a 15-year period of time, this chapter briefly explored the department’s history, areas of responsibility, and demographics. Intermixed with the department’s characteristics was an exploration of the general demographics for the county’s unincorporated communities and cities served by the department. Furthermore, the chapter considered the contextual framework of police shootings, particularly as they relate to population, calls for service, and violent crime. In sum, we learned that, on average, over the 15 years considered for examination, the majority of the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department sworn deputy staff was 88 percent male, and 75 percent White. In comparison, females and people of color, particularly Hispanics, in the community served by the department were underrepresented. Furthermore, the total number of police shootings and number of officers involved in shootings from year to year, appeared to occur in a random manner; however, taken in relation to the population served by the department, number of calls for service, and violent crime, it was discovered that police shootings and the number of officers involved in shootings decreased over time. Most intriguing is the fact that the rate of officer-involved shootings followed a similar downward trend taken by the national, state, and local violent crime rate.

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CHAPTER 6

Alcohol, Drugs, Violent Crimes, and Police Shootings

By virtue of the distinguishing uniform they wear, the badge affixed to their chests, as well as the characteristic gun belt, which typically bears a baton, a sidearm, handcuffs, and pepper spray canister, the American police officer remains highly visible within the community. Certainly, the police uniform draws attention to those who are entrusted with enforcing the law, but more specifically it is the actual process of how the job is performed each day within the various communities that attracts social scrutiny. As we learned in chapter two, despite the infrequency of occurrence, police use of force is one of the most controversial, if not debated, aspects of police work. In fact, we further discovered that police use of lethal force (i.e., officer-involved shootings) has served as the stimulus sparking communities to riot throughout a number of cities from coast to coast. Incidents of police violence have also drawn the attention of social science researchers with an interest to investigate and explore the contributing factors surrounding the phenomenon. Over the years, police shootings and uses of force by officers have persisted with such frequency and under a variety of questionable circumstances that the attention of the media, as well as the general public, has been piqued. 151

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It is presumed that if we read in our newspapers or see incidents of police violence on the evening news, such occurrences must be common practice. With little to no insight into the world of law enforcement, many outsiders have questioned the frequency of police use of force, whether the actions by officers were racially motivated, as well as how well agencies have done to control an officer’s ability to use force. In earlier chapters, we explored previous research literature reference police use of force generally, and deadly force more specifically. The reader will recall from chapter two that previous research studies have consistently found that in comparison to the number of police-citizen encounters made each day, police use of force occurs quite rarely. When police officers use force, it typically occurs during the arrest process of a citizen, and the amount of force applied is toward the lower end of the force continuum (i.e., grabbing). Furthermore, out of all uses of force during the arrest of a citizen, less than two percent of these incidents involve a police shooting. In reference to the effect of departmental policies and legal statutes restricting officer discretion, research has consistently found that conservative policies have reduced the number of police shootings while sustaining the immediate safety of the public and officer alike. Despite some of the less controversial research findings, other areas of investigation have remained unresolved. Over the years, academicians have developed evidence, depending on the particular study, that both supports and refutes any relationship between police use of deadly force with crime rates (i.e., violent, Index, or homicide) (Takagi 1974/1982; Jacobs and Britt 1979; Sherman and Langworthy 1979/1982; Milton et al. 1977/1982; Fyfe 1978/1982; MacDonald et al. 2001) or the race/ethnicity of the parties

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involved in the incident (i.e., the officer or citizen) (Robin 1963; Robin 1964; Takagi 1974/1982; Goldkamp 1976/1982; Milton et al. 1977/1982; Jacobs and Britt 1979; Binder and Scharf 1980; Meyer 1980; Sherman 1980/1982; Fyfe 1981/1982; Fyfe 1982b; Geller and Karales 1981; Geller 1982; Brown 1984; Jacobs and O’Brien 1998; McElvain and Kposowa 2008). In spite of the progress made by previous researchers, much remains unanswered about police deadly force. Arguably, the greatest detriment to our advancing knowledge is access to the rich and untapped data maintained by law enforcement agencies. Once researchers are allowed greater access, we shall be able to broaden our investigation into the phenomenon because it is clear that many questions remain unanswered. Presently, we attempt to explore some of the unresolved questions. Since police officers and what they do remain highly visible in society, incidents of their use of force continue to be a topic of debate. Earlier in this study, it was argued that prior research of police shootings has either ignored or overlooked citizen behaviors; there has been more emphasis on the officer’s decision-making, use of force policies, crime rates, and the race/ethnicity of the citizen. Surely for an officer-involved shooting10 to occur, there needs to be an interaction, in time and space, between an officer and a citizen. For this encounter to occur, both the officer and the citizen have, individually, made a series of decisions, which ended in the shooting incident. In this chapter, we will focus on the citizen behaviors to determine 10

For definition purposes an officer-involved shooting in this study means the purposeful discharge of a firearm by a police officer while in the process of apprehending a suspect or in defense of the officer or another’s life. These shootings do not include accidental discharges or the shooting of any animal.

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whether specific characteristics contribute to officerinvolved shootings. Even though some people may insist that the police behave brutally toward certain segments of society and make it their practice to use excessive, even deadly, force against those they have sworn to protect, this study takes a different point of view. Specifically, this research attempts to examine police shootings (i.e., the dependent variable) with citizen intoxication (i.e., alcohol and/or drugs) and prior criminal conduct (i.e., violent criminal activity) as the primary independent variables. Thus, police use of deadly force, in this case shootings, is studied as a response to the citizen’s actions, which may be compromised by his/her being under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, drug or combination of the two, and his/her propensity to participate in crimes of violence. Notwithstanding some of the previous theories, which have tended to focus more on the officer, here a theoretical perspective based on the citizen’s behavior will be established. Since police use of force and police shooting literature has been previously explored in previous chapters, this chapter will examine other appropriate literature as a basis for the theoretical question to be addressed in this analysis of police shootings. More specifically, we will address the effect of a citizen’s drug and/or alcohol usage, and prior violent criminal conduct on officer-involved shootings. Drugs, Alcohol, and Criminal Conduct It has long been rationalized that a person’s indulgence in alcohol and/or illicit drugs is related to criminal activity (Goldstein 1985; Lipsey Wilson, Cohen and Derzon 1996; Parker 1998; Parker and Auerhahn 1998; and Li, Priu and MacKenzie 2000). Arguably, the behavior of persons

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engaged in nefarious doings causes concern for those paid to enforce the laws, and when this conduct is either brought to the attention of police officers by citizens or personally witnessed by officers on patrol, officers make every effort to eradicate it. We learned earlier that police officers are sworn to uphold the law and are authorized to use coercive force to apprehend suspects (Bittner 1967). Whether by instinct or choice, some criminals refuse to cooperate with police officers when their freedom is jeopardized. When these circumstances arise, police officers are empowered to use force to overcome a suspect’s resistance. Under some circumstances, it is permissible for this amount of force to rise to the level of lethality. It is believed that people with the tendency to participate in violent criminal activities and who are under the influence of alcohol, drugs or a combination of the two are more likely to encounter police use of deadly force than citizens who abstain from such conduct. Review of the literature regarding the relationship between violent criminal behavior and alcohol and/or drugs uncovers two interesting theories, which will ultimately serve as the basis for the theoretical framework for this study. The first theory is routine activities, which is a criminological based theory. The theory of social disinhibition is the second theory. It is sufficient to state at this time that both theories have the propensity to intersect with each other, which allows for an increased chance for citizens to resist police apprehension or engage in conduct that creates an environment rife for officers to use deadly force. The theoretical perspective will be discussed at length in the following section; however, before going there, it is essential to first consider the relationship between drugs, alcohol and crime.

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When it comes to studying the relationship between drugs, alcohol and criminal conduct, researchers have taken several approaches in the past. For instance, some have examined the illicit drug market and discovered a correlation with violent criminal behavior (Sommers and Baskin 1997). In other studies, researchers have examined alcohol consumption at the aggregate level based on the number of distribution centers (i.e., bars, liquor stores, etc.) in a given geographical area, finding that availability of alcohol positively correlates with violence (Alaniz, Cartmill and Parker 1998; Parker and Cartmill 1998). Even though research suggests the correlation between consumption of alcohol and violence exists, Lipsey, Wilson, Cohen, and Derzon (1996) assert that the causality is not a foregone conclusion. If it were, then everyone who consumes alcohol would engage in violent conduct, which clearly is not the case. Ultimately, Lipsey et al. (1996) conclude in their study that although the correlation between violence and alcohol consumption is consistent, it is not perfect. To this same end, Harrison (1992) contends that the correlation between drugs and crime is complex. Harrison (1992: 205-206) states, While it has been established that there are strong correlations among a number of different types of deviant behaviors, there is no strong evidence that either drug and/or alcohol use causes crime or that involvement in criminal activity causes drug and/or alcohol use. The general conclusion reached by several researchers is that deviant behaviors occur within the context of a general deviance syndrome… Those likely to engage in one form of deviant behavior are also likely to engage in other forms of deviant behavior.

In an effort to add to the understanding of the relationship between violence and drugs, Goldstein (1985) developed a framework composed of three parts: the

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psychopharmacological, the economical, and the systemic. The idea of the psychopharmacological component is that the consumption of drugs creates a change in the user’s body, which causes him/her to act irrationally and become violent. However, research found that depending on the type of drug used, for example heroin or marijuana, the effect of the drug may actually counteract violence. Regarding studies of homicide and violence, Parker (1998) similarly asserts that research has demonstrated that illicit drug use fails to correlate strongly with violence, whereas alcohol use reveals a strong connection. Similar to Goldstein’s belief about the psychopharmacological effects of drugs, Parker (1998) and Parker and Auerhahn (1998) state that although most people consuming alcohol tend to follow societal norms regarding behavior, under some circumstances alcohol consumption can selectively disinhibit the user to the point where he/she behaves violently. While under the influence of alcohol, a person is more likely to “misinterpret the actions of others, to mistake the response of others to their own behavior, to focus more closely on immediate goals rather than more distant goals…” (Parker and Cartmill 1998: 1378). Further explaining selective disinhibition is the idea of active and passive constraint (Parker 1998; Parker and Auerhahn 1998; Parker and Cartmill 1998). Active constraint occurs when the intoxicated person recognizes the conduct he/she is engaging in is in contradiction to the norms of society, but chooses to continue because the activity is beneficial to him/her. Passive constraint takes place when the intoxicated person conforms to societal norms regarding his/her behavior because engaging in violence is not to his/her advantage. The second component of Goldstein’s (1985) tripartite is the economic model. In this model, it is believed that

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drug users are unable to support their habit through legitimate employment and resort to violent criminal conduct such as robbing others to secure funds to pay for drugs. Li, Priu, and MacKenzie (2000) acknowledge that prior research demonstrates a relationship between drugs and criminal activity; however, the relationship remains ambiguous. Moreover, these researchers found that drug use was positively related to property crimes whereas the activity of dealing drugs correlated to property and violent crimes. Goldstein’s (1985) third component is what he calls “systemic violence.” Systemic violence refers to the inherent illicit activity surrounding the drug market itself. Because the law prohibits selling illegal drugs, sellers or buyers are left to their own devices to protect themselves and their interest in the market. For example, a buyer may resort to violence if he/she is sold a bogus product. Furthermore, the seller may rely upon acts of violence to protect his/her market, or in turn, violence may be used to take over another seller’s market. Studying inner city youth, Centers and Weist (1998) found that drug dealing was associated with criminal activity. The two researchers further contend that not only is homicide the leading cause of death for younger Black males, but it is also closely related to dealing drugs due to the fact weapons are commonly employed as a means for protection. Upon closer observation of the economic and systemic models, as portrayed by Goldstein (1985), it is easy to see that the theory of routine activities can debatably explain the relationship between drugs and/or alcohol and violence. In an effort to explain crime, Cohen and Felson (1979) theorized that it was necessary to have a convergence in time and space of someone wanting to commit a crime, an appropriate victim, and the lack of a deterring protector.

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On an individual level, when drug and/or alcohol use becomes part of a person’s lifestyle, arguably it is then a routine activity for him/her. Similarly, frequenting locations where alcohol and/or drugs are sold and consumed, which tend to be locations associated with violent crimes, is also a routine activity. Based on the theory of routine activities, it is possible that engaging in crimes of violence or becoming a victim of such occurrences increases while consuming alcohol and/or drugs. The intersection of social disinhibition and diminished guardianship occurs when the user is under the influence. Thus, the chance for violence increases. Beyond the contested relationship between alcohol, drugs, and violence, the study of violent crime offers another point of reference for researchers. Some researchers contend that violence may culminate based on circumstances occurring in a specific period of time (Cook and Laub 2002). An example is the introduction and increased popularity of crack cocaine into the drug market in the 1980s, which happened to coincide with the prevalence of guns in society at the same time. The availability of guns intermixed in the drug market becomes necessary due to the fact that illicit drug dealers cannot appeal to the police to settle differences regarding territory disputes or business deals that have gone awry. The result of adding guns to such a tenuous environment is increased violence (Blumstein and Cork 1996). Most violent crimes occur among those living in the lower socio-economic classes, which are typically comprised of visible minorities. Because people operating in an illegitimate culture (i.e., drug dealing or other illegal business) cannot call upon the police for assistance, violence may be the only recourse for those living in such dire conditions of poverty (Parker 1995). Such is the case

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made by Cook and Laub (2002) when they examined arrest rates and found that Blacks, specifically males, account for 41 percent of arrests of juveniles committing violent crimes even though they only comprised 14 percent of the population. Studying homicide trends, Blumstein, Rivara, and Rosenfeld (2000) found that the national homicide rate peaked in 1980 at 10 homicides per 100,000 people. During the 1980s to mid-1990s the rate fluctuated between eight and ten homicides per 100,000 people. These researchers discovered that although the rate of homicide remained stable during this period of time and began to decline to below seven homicides per 100,000 people by 1997, the rate for persons younger than 25 years old increased. In sum, Blumstein et al. (2000) found that persons younger than 25 years old, especially Black males, were more likely to be the victim and suspect of homicide by means of a gun, and Blacks were six times more likely to be a victim of homicide than Whites. In consideration of the literature explored above, and with respect to explaining police shootings based on citizen behaviors, a theoretical framework can be developed. The following section develops and outlines the theoretical argument that citizen behaviors contribute to police shootings. Ultimately, the purpose of this study is to move beyond the avenues of previous police deadly force studies, and test the fresh theoretical perspective that a citizen’s lifestyle (i.e., propensity to use alcohol and/or drugs, and participate in crimes of violence), at least in part, contributes to a police shooting.

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Theoretical Framework Most prior research on police shootings has focused on the actions of the officer and overlooked the involvement of the citizen. The theoretical framework for this research is designed to explore the role of the citizen’s behavior in officer-involved shootings. Two aspects of the citizen’s characteristics are of particular interest: (1) The prevalence of the presence of alcohol and/or drugs in the citizen’s system at the time of the police shooting. (2) The citizen’s propensity to engage in acts of violence. Arguably, there is an interaction effect between these two behaviors that falls within the two previously discussed theories (i.e., social disinhibition and routine activities), which will be further discussed below. As a foundational basis for the theoretical framework to be examined in this study, it is assumed that police officers do not routinely shoot or shoot at people without legitimate reason. Following the premise that police officers are not only trained to limit their use of force to situations when it is reasonable and necessary, and only engage in discharging their firearms in circumstances where the officer’s life or the life of another is imminently threatened11, it is assumed that some external action by another person prompts the officer to fire. Viewed against the preceding background, with few exceptions, officerinvolved shootings are often a result of the actions of the encountered citizen, not a consequence of an officer seeking opportunities to fire their weapons. Although it 11

Even though some police departments allow officers to shoot fleeing felons under certain conditions, the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department maintains a more restricted policy wherein the officer is only permitted to use lethal force when his/her life or the life of another is imminently threatened.

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was previously acknowledged that the final act of an officer discharging his/her firearm at a citizen is based on two independent streams of decision-making (i.e., the officer and the citizen), it is argued for this analysis that the citizen had the obligation to surrender. Thus, the citizen’s actions or failure to desist caused the officer to both fear for his/her own safety or that of another person and shoot. The shooting would have been averted if the citizen had submitted at any time during the encounter. As a basis to elucidate the dynamics of an officerinvolved shooting, this study relies upon the interaction of two theories, which explain criminal behavior. Since we have previously reviewed the literature in reference to these theories, the following is provided for contextual purposes in order to develop the basis for the subsequent analysis. The first theory to address citizen behavior is grounded in the theory of social disinhibition (Parker 1998; Parker and Auerhahn 1998; Parker and Cartmill 1998), which attempts to “explain why normatively proscribed behavior is disinhibited in relatively few cases of alcohol-involved interpersonal disputes” (Parker, 1998:12). In their review of previous research on the correlation between intoxicating substances and violence, Parker and Auerhahn (1998) found alcohol to be consistently related to violence; however, the relationship with illicit drugs, with few exceptions, lacks research evidence. Despite the fact that prior empirical research testing the theory of social disinhibition has primarily focused on the correlation of violent crime and alcohol consumption, it can be argued that drug usage may similarly disinhibit a person’s behavior as well. Certainly, it is recognized that not all people who consume alcohol and/or drugs engage in criminal activity or become the target of an officer-involved shooting; however, Parker (1998: 12) contends, “alcohol selectively

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disinhibits violence depending on contextual factors such as characteristics of the situation, the actors involved, relationships among the actors, and the impact of bystanders.” In other words, under certain circumstances, constraining societal norms may be interrupted due to a person’s intoxicated state. The concept of “contextual factors” leads to the second theory. The second theory is routine activities theory. As we previously learned, Cohen and Felson (1979) explain that for crime to occur three things must come together at the same time and place. First, there needs to be a willing participant. Second, there needs to be an available victim. Last, there can be nothing present to deter the crime from taking place. Arguing that it is the framework of a person’s routine activities that provides an opportunity for criminal behavior, Cohen and Felson (1979: 589) state, “We believe the structure of such activities influences criminal opportunity and therefore affects trends in a class of crimes we refer to as direct-contact predatory violations.” In other words, provided the right set of circumstances, what the authors hold to be “motivated offenders, suitable targets, and the absence of capable guardians,” the offender proactively violates the law. Moreover, a case can be made that routine activities may manifest themselves in a person’s habitual participation in criminal conduct, engaging in acts of violence, carrying weapons, and using drugs and/or alcohol. In short, it may be “routine activity” for a given person to frequently use alcohol and/or drugs, have contact with law enforcement, and engage in violent criminal conduct. Convergence of the two theories occurs as follows: Citizens who make it a practice to consume alcohol and/or drugs, and participate in violent criminal behavior do so not only as a personal “routine activity,” but are encouraged to

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continue to do so because of the disinhibiting influence of the alcohol and/or drugs. In conjunction, the citizen is at greater risk for negative law enforcement contact based on his/her criminal and inebriated conduct. Furthermore, during the police encounter, the citizen is less likely to cooperate due to the disinhibiting affects from being under the influence, which is obscuring his/her better judgment. As a result, a police shooting occurs. Essentially, this study attempts to examine citizen behaviors that lead to the moment just prior to a shooting incident. Certainly, as stated before, both the officer and citizen have set upon two separate courses of actions that eventually collide with each other at the instant the officer pulls the trigger. Just as it can be argued that the officer made poor “tactical knowledge and concealment” decisions (Fyfe, 1986/2001), which limit his/her options to use lethal force, so too can it be said about the citizen’s poor decisions. Although the environment in which a person lives may play a role in his/her decision to engage in criminal behavior, as well as alcohol and/or drug usage, such conduct is entered into based on the individual’s poor choice to do so. In other words, if not for the citizen’s proactive decision to place him/herself in a particular situation to commit a crime or consume intoxicating substances, he/she would not end up facing the muzzle of a police officer’s gun. This study does not focus on the citizen’s action (i.e., pointing a gun at the officer, concealing his/her hands or feigning he/she may be armed with a weapon, etc.), but his/her prior lifestyle decisions that placed him/her in the situation that attracted the police/citizen contact.

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Hypotheses In consideration of the theoretical perspective outlined in this chapter, it is argued that social disinhibition and routine activities not only converge, but also are exacerbated under certain circumstances similar to the following. As citizens become the target of a police shooting, there is a higher prevalence that the citizen is under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, has previous arrests and previous negative law enforcement contacts for engaging in acts of violence. Independently, two hypotheses are posited and further examined in the following chapters. First, among those shot or shot at by the police, there is a higher prevalence of alcohol and/or drug intoxication. Since previous research suggests that alcohol, and not illicit drugs, is related to violence, the data will be examined separately to see if any differences are uncovered in the patterns observed. Second, among citizens targeted by police shootings, there is a higher prevalence of prior arrests for violent crimes.

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CHAPTER 7

Examination of Police Shootings

Just as prior researchers studying police deadly force have found it difficult, if not impossible, to compare shooting and non-shooting incidents, this study similarly was unable to develop a comparison group of citizens not shot or shot at by police officers. The primary reason such comparison is not possible is due to the manner in which most police departments gather information for any given incident. For example, it is the practice of the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department to collect blood or urine from citizens involved in police shootings; however, this is not routinely done in other investigations unless the citizen is being investigated for being under the influence. Furthermore, officers generally do not document whether they perceive a person involved in an investigation is under the influence of an intoxicating substance unless the person’s intoxicated state was believed to be a factor in the incident. Thus, an assessment of the intoxication of citizens involved in police shootings versus non-shooting incidents is impossible. Later in this chapter, in the Statistical Technique section, there will be some discussion about how this limitation was managed for this study.

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Data Source For the purpose of this research, police shooting data were collected from one law enforcement agency between January 1, 1990, and December 31, 2004, a 15-year period. In order to conduct this study, access was granted to examine the department’s officer-involved shooting files with the objective to compile data. Additionally, permission was established to review personnel files12 to obtain further data regarding officers involved in police shootings as well as a control group of officers who had not used lethal force during the study period. All firearms discharges, with the exception of range training, are administratively investigated by the department, and upon completion, the Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) maintains the internal investigation. In this study, police deadly force data was limited to all on and off-duty officer-involved shooting incidents wherein the officer purposefully discharged his/her firearm while in the process of attempting to apprehend a suspect, or in selfdefense of his/her own life or the life of another person. In other words, even though the department investigates all accidental shootings, wherein an officer unintentionally fires his/her weapon, as well as the intentional shooting of animals (i.e., vicious or injured dogs), these were eliminated from the data. Moreover, there were no incidents involving “warning shots,” which are not permitted by the department’s policy. 12

It should be noted that in California, absent certain exceptions, police officer personnel files are protected from having their contents disclosed. Because the data compiled was for the purpose of conducting statistical analysis and does not individually identify any officer, access to the files, although limited, was allowed.

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With respect to the definition parameters for police shootings considered in this analysis, an examination of the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department (RSD) officerinvolved shooting files revealed 170 shooting incidents, involving 314 officers, during the 15-year study period. For analysis purposes, data were collected for each of the officers involved in the shooting incidents. For comparison, a control group was established, which consisted of similar data compiled for officers that did not use deadly force (i.e., experience a police shooting) during the study period. Over the 15-year study period, as would be expected, the RSD realized a continuous change of personnel (i.e., new hires, resignations, retirements, and terminations), which makes it difficult to create an accurately representative control group of non-shooting officers for the entire 15-year period. In an effort to come as close as possible, a number of layers of stratification were implemented in order to encourage a greater equal opportunity for representative groups of employees (i.e., gender, race/ethnicity, length of experience) to be selected for the control group. First, an employee identification number roster was obtained following the study period. The benefit of the roster was that it allowed employees to be categorized by length of experience. Second, the list was arranged into groups of male officers and female officers and ranked most experienced to least experienced. Within both of these groups, employees were further grouped by race using the same ranking method. Once the final list was established, all employees hired after December 31, 2004, were eliminated because they were not at risk for being involved in an officer-involved shooting during the study period. Also, all officers who were in the study group were removed from the list, which was

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comprised of officers who did not experience a shooting (i.e., the control group). Since there were a total of 314 officers who experienced a shooting incident, it was decided to gather a similar number for the control group. Based on the size of the final list, slightly more than 1,000 employees, every third employee was selected for the control group, which totaled 334 officers. Furthermore, all data compiled from the personnel files for the control group were based on 2004 information (i.e., age, length of experience, etc.) whereas similar information for the officer in the study group was based on the year in which the shooting incident occurred. In addition to information collected from the personnel files, data was gathered from the internal police shooting investigation files as well. Of particular interest for this study, it was discovered that the shooting files consistently maintain information about the citizen’s intoxication13 and prior criminal history. It is the practice of the RSD during the investigation of a police shooting, to draw blood from a citizen when he/she is taken into custody (i.e., arrested or deceased) to determine whether he/she was under the influence of an intoxicating substance at the time of the incident. Furthermore, the citizen’s criminal history report is obtained and noted in the investigation as part of the background information collected on the person. This information typically delineates the citizen’s local law enforcement contacts (i.e., listing whether he/she has been a victim, witness, suspect, or booked into the local jail), as 13

Between 1990 and 1991, the department inconsistently collected this information. Thus several investigations for this timeframe did not list any information regarding the citizen’s level of intoxication. In the event that no information was indicated about the citizen being tested for drugs and/or alcohol, it was coded “unknown.”

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well as his/her criminal history maintained in the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS). Variables and Measures In this study, officer involved shootings constitute the dependent variable. As stated above, only incidents wherein an officer purposefully shot or shot at a suspect(s) were considered during data collection. All other police shootings (i.e., accidental shootings or shooting animals) were excluded because the focus of this research is to determine whether citizen intoxication and/or prior violent criminal behavior contribute to police lethal force. Citizen intoxication is the first independent variable. This variable was measured by four dummy variables, one for none detected14, one for citizens testing positive for alcohol, one for citizens testing positive for drugs, and one for citizens testing positive for both alcohol and drugs. The reference group for citizen intoxication was ‘none detected.’ The second independent variable was citizen prior violence, which was defined by three dummy variables, one for no prior violence, one for prior violence, and one for unknown prior violence. No prior violence was the reference group. For the purpose of the study, violence was defined as any crime involving direct aggression against another person. For example, murder, rape, robbery, assault, etc., were considered crimes of violence. On the other hand, public intoxication, theft, forgery, etc., were classified as non-violent crimes and excluded. Moreover, the current purpose for the officer/citizen 14

This variable includes those citizens tested and found to have no intoxicants in their system, and citizens not tested (i.e., citizens who were not captured or cases in which there was no notation indicating the citizen was tested).

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contact that led to the shooting, if crime related, was not included in the data. In other words, even though the citizen may have been suspected of committing a robbery when the officer contacted him/her, if the citizen had no prior arrests, the incident was coded for no prior violence. Officer gender, race, and age were examined as control variables. Officer gender was coded one each for male, and female was the comparison group. Officer race was initially divided into five dummy variables, one for White, one for Black, one for Hispanic, one for Asian, and one for other; however, for analysis purposes this variable was collapsed into two dummy groups, one for non-White and White was the comparison group. Officer age was divided into four dummy variables. There was one each for officers thirty years old and below, thirty-one years to forty years, forty-one years and older, and in continuous form. In a separate analysis, age was kept in its continuous form. Descriptive Statistics The descriptive statistics for the independent variables can be found in Tables 7-1a and 7-1b. In Table 7-1a (officer characteristics), sample size is in reference to officers from both the study and control groups for each variable. Event refers to the number of officers who were involved in a shooting. Interestingly, even though female officers comprise nearly 7 percent of the department sample, their representation in the percent of shootings is disproportionately low. White officers represent nearly 73 percent of the sample, and slightly more the 76 percent of the shootings. This means that collectively, non-White officers comprise about 27 percent of the sample, and less than 24 percent of the shootings, which is nearly a direct representation of the dichotomous groups. As can be seen

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in Table 7-1a, the bulk of the officers on the department fall within the age group of 31-40 years old. Moreover, the same can be said for officers involved in shootings for the department. Officers in the age group 41 years and older are the least represented in police shootings. Table 7-1b represents the descriptive statistics for the citizen behavior variables. For reasons outlined earlier, it is impossible to collect data for those incidents that could have resulted in a shooting but did not. More importantly, most citizens are not tested to see if they are intoxicated unless it is part of the crime that caused their arrest. Of the citizens shot or shot at by officers in this study, 25 of them were clearly not drug/alcohol tested or no intoxicants were detected if they were tested, and for another 68, their intoxication level was unknown because the shooting investigation file did not indicate this information. On the other hand, the remaining 103 citizens tested positive for alcohol and/or drugs, with the majority possessing drugs in their systems. Although not presented in Table 7-1b, many of the 74 citizens with no prior violent arrest record, in fact, may have other, non-violent, prior criminal arrests. Thus, the reader should not interpret this variable to mean the citizen was never arrested prior to the shooting incident. Furthermore, just because a citizen has been arrested in the past for a crime of violence, one should not assume that the citizen was convicted. The variable is meant to represent the citizen’s propensity to be contacted by law enforcement for violent criminal behavior only. Despite the number of citizens without a prior violent criminal history, 107 citizens, or more than 56 percent of the sample, had been contacted and arrested by law enforcement for a violent criminal act.

Table 7-1a.

Descriptive Statistics of the Variables for Officer Characteristics Standard Standard % in Sample Deviation Error Variable Event Shooting Mean Size

Gender Female Male Race White Black Hispanic Asian Other Age