Plato’s Stepping Stones: Degrees of Moral Virtue 9781472597984, 9780826488084

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This book is dedicated to the memory of my very good friend, Thad Wooster. The beauty of the world has been diminished with the loss of his charm and laughter, and we are now in a sadder place without him.

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Acknowledgements This book originally began as my Ph.D. dissertation, ‘Virtue, Knowledge, and Happiness in Plato’s Early and Middle Dialogues’ (University of Kansas, 1999). Accordingly, I wish to thank all those teachers who helped me see the beauty of Plato’s philosophy in general and of the Platonic dialogue in particular. Specifically, I want to thank Karen Bell for sparking my initial interest in Plato, and Mike Young for showing me what it means to be a lover of wisdom. I especially want to thank Tom Tuozzo for the expert guidance he provided as my dissertation advisor. Any significant insight I have gained into Plato’s philosophy has been a direct result of his example of rigorous scholarship. I would also like to thank James Fieser, University of Tennessee at Martin, and Philip de Bary and Sarah Douglas at Thoemmes Continuum for making the publication of this book possible. I especially want to thank Timothy Bartel and John Sargant for their careful editing and helpful suggestions which greatly improved the quality of this book. Most importantly I want to thank my wife, Jill Hardesty, and our two beautiful daughters, Emma and Anna. The world is made more beautiful by your love, your smiles, your sparkling eyes, your mere presence in it. The three of you are the best teachers anyone could ever hope for. I thank you for the constant love and support you have always given me. My life would truly be incomplete without you.

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Introduction Human wisdom is worth little or nothing. — Socrates1 Human history, in one significant sense, can be characterized by the drive to attain greater knowledge about ourselves and our surroundings. Coupled with the desire for knowledge is the belief that the accumulation of human wisdom might enable us to lead better lives. This same view was prevalent nearly twenty-four centuries ago in ancient Athens, and it plays a central role in Plato’s philosophic dialogues. Given the obvious benefit of accumulated knowledge, what could Socrates mean when he states that human knowledge is worth little or nothing? Socrates, perhaps the most enigmatic of ancient philosophers, claimed that it was his awareness of his own ignorance that distinguished him from his fellow Athenian citizens and earned him the divine recognition of being the wisest of men.2 Yet in spite of his claim that his wisdom is worthless, the character Socrates implies throughout many of Plato’s dialogues that the proper way to live one’s life is to strive toward the attainment of knowledge and wisdom. In fact Socrates serves as the exemplar of the wisdom-lover, for in claiming that ‘the unexamined life is not worth living’ (Apology 38a), he suggests that the search for knowledge and wisdom itself plays an essential part in the achievement of a good life. The unexamined life is what Socrates implored his fellow Athenians to avoid, a life in which one’s beliefs, values, and actions remain unquestioned and untested. If Socrates’ claim about the importance of knowledge is to be believed, then there must exist a kind of wisdom that Socrates does not deem worthless. The focus of this book will be upon the nature of that worthwhile wisdom and its relationship to virtue. A paradoxical view found throughout Plato’s early and middle dialogues is the identification of virtue with knowledge. Contemporary and ancient readers alike have found this view puzzling, if not counterintuitive, for it certainly seems that one could be considered virtuous without the possession of knowledge.3 For example, a soldier who goes into battle to face the enemy is generally considered to be courageous. But is the

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soldier’s courage dependent upon the possession of knowledge, as Socrates implies? Additionally, there are many seemingly knowledgeable people who nonetheless fail to exhibit even the first signs of virtue. Given that knowledge, as it is commonly understood, appears to be neither necessary nor sufficient for virtuous action, it seems puzzling to think that there must exist a connection between knowledge and virtue, as Socrates implies in so many of the dialogues.4 If there does exist a relationship between knowledge and virtue, then how does Plato intend for this connection to be understood? What exactly is entailed in Plato’s use of the terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘virtue’? Is knowledge necessary if one is to be virtuous? Is knowledge itself sufficient or are there additional requirements for virtue? If virtue is a type of knowledge, then what is the object of that knowledge, and how does this moral knowledge relate to other kinds of knowledge? Answers to questions such as these are required if one is to gain any insight into the relationship between knowledge and virtue. In this book I explore the relationship between knowledge and virtue in several of Plato’s early and middle dialogues.5 In doing so I explain the Platonic conception of moral knowledge by examining Plato’s views concerning the nature of knowledge in general, the existence of different degrees of knowledge and opinion, and finally the relationship of these different cognitive states to different levels of virtue. In my examination of the dialogues I show that Plato makes several distinctions between different types of knowledge and different types of opinion. For example, while Plato distinguishes ‘true virtue’, which involves knowledge, from ‘the illusory appearance of virtue’ (Phaedo 69b),6 which does not involve knowledge, I recognize further distinctions between varying degrees of virtue that correspond to different cognitive states not captured by this general distinction. Furthermore, whereas Plato clearly distinguishes between the cognitive states of knowledge and opinion in dialogues such as the Meno, Phaedo, and Republic, his distinctions between the more subtle varieties of knowledge and opinion are not always as obvious. I hope to clarify this aspect of Plato’s philosophy. I argue that the various cognitive states introduced in the dialogues correspond not to a single virtue but that each cognitive state corresponds to a unique level or degree of virtue. Thus my claim is that there are more degrees of virtue at work in the dialogues than one might commonly imagine and that any discussion of Platonic ethics must take this feature into account. Furthermore, the different levels of virtue are not merely interesting from an academic standpoint. They also have a practical significance, for they enable one to progress from one level of virtue to

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another. The various degrees of virtue are the stepping stones in one’s upward journey toward knowledge and wisdom. I begin in Chapter 1 by illustrating the differences between the primary interpretations of the dialogues as a whole, concentrating on the historical, developmental, and unitarian accounts. I ultimately hope to show particular weaknesses with both the historical and developmental interpretations and to demonstrate that the unitarian interpretation is the best way to account for the existence of consistent ethical views found throughout Plato’s early- and middle-period dialogues. I emphasize the protreptic and proleptic nature of the early dialogues by showing that the purpose of many of the early dialogues is to turn the reader toward philosophy by introducing significant philosophical questions and problems that are more fully addressed in the middle-period dialogues. Plato’s dialogues are protreptic in that they introduce readers, both ancient and modern alike, to important concepts that affect us in our daily lives, such as piety, courage, moderation, and justice. The dialogues point to the study of philosophy as the path one must take to gain a deeper understanding of these concepts. In this sense, the dialogues turn one toward philosophy as a means to achieve a greater understanding of what initially appear to be only practical concerns. Plato’s dialogues are also proleptic in that the early dialogues anticipate a more complete elaboration and explanation of concepts in later dialogues. A reader may initially only be attracted to the idea of courage and its acquisition, but the protreptic and proleptic nature of the dialogues can eventually lead the reader far beyond the original practical topic of interest, to the ultimate apprehension of universal truths. In Chapter 2, I begin my investigation into the role of knowledge in the Platonic conception of virtue by examining the kinds of knowledge described in the early dialogues of definition, those dialogues in which the participants seek the definition of a particular virtue. I concentrate on Socrates’ use of craft knowledge as a model for understanding moral knowledge. I look specifically at the Euthyphro, Laches, and Charmides. In these dialogues Socrates clearly recognizes the analogous nature of a craft (te´xnh) and virtue (a| reth´). Within the examination of what has come to be called the craft analogy, I investigate the nature of craft knowledge and the strong and weak points of Socrates’ analogical arguments based upon the similarity between the various crafts and virtue. I also investigate the nature of Socratic self-knowledge, for the concept of the recognition of one’s knowledge and ignorance, as well as the limitations of knowledge, will play an important role in my overall view of Platonic epistemology and ethics. In Chapter 3, I examine selections from the Gorgias, Republic I, and

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Hippias Minor in an attempt to see how Plato addresses some of the problematic issues concerning the craft analogy. I explore the particular problem of the possible misuse of knowledge as it is addressed in these dialogues. In doing so I first demonstrate the sufficiency of knowledge for virtue. Yet within this discussion is the recognition that there exist other possible routes toward virtue that apparently do not require knowledge. Thus while knowledge may be a sufficient condition for virtue, it would appear that it is not a necessary condition for virtue. The implications of this claim will be further addressed in Chapters 5 and 6. Ultimately, I show that certain essential features of craft knowledge can be gleaned from a number of the early dialogues, and that Plato intends for the reader to view craft knowledge as an adequate model for understanding moral knowledge. In Chapter 4, I address the concept of virtue and its acquisition by examining selections from the Protagoras, Euthydemus, and Meno. In my examination of the Protagoras I emphasize the distinction between the Platonic conception of virtue, which necessarily involves knowledge, and the popular conception of virtue, which does not involve knowledge. The Meno serves as a transitional dialogue between Plato’s early and middle periods of composition. As such, it is an important dialogue which provides further clues that aid in the construction of a comprehensive understanding of Plato’s epistemological and ethical views throughout the dialogues. My examination of the Meno primarily emphasizes the distinction Plato draws between knowledge (e|pisth´mh) and true opinion (a| lhuh`q do´ja) and the implication this epistemological distinction has for Platonic ethics. The discussion of the Meno is complemented by an examination of passages from the Euthydemus. In Chapter 5, I examine the role knowledge plays in the Phaedo, Republic, and Symposium, dialogues in which one finds reference to Plato’s metaphysical theory of forms. Recognizing that Plato holds the forms to be the proper objects of knowledge, I compare this type of knowledge to both self-knowledge and craft knowledge, to better understand their relationship to Platonic moral knowledge. The dialogues of the middle period demonstrate that knowledge of the forms serves as the paradigm for Platonic wisdom. This type of knowledge is stable and certain because the corresponding objects of knowledge are perfect, eternal, and changeless. The difficulty, however, with this level of epistemic certainty is that it appears to be impossible to attain.7 This fact is addressed in greater detail in Chapter 6. Given that Plato distinguishes knowledge from opinion in several dialogues, I return to this relationship in Chapter 6 and investigate the

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role true opinion plays as a guide in one’s actions, as well as examining the benefit and reliability of true opinion. Within this discussion I recognize two types of opinion: true opinion acquired by nature and true opinion acquired through habit. I argue that the primary difference between these two states of opinion, when seen as guides for one’s action, is to be found in their degree of reliability. One’s opinion could be stable or transient, depending upon the manner in which it was acquired. Similarly, the degree of one’s virtue will correspond to the particular accompanying cognitive state. I illustrate the distinction Plato intends to draw between true opinion acquired by nature and true opinion acquired through habit by recognizing the auxiliaries in the Republic as representatives of habitually acquired true opinion. I argue that the habitual true opinion of the auxiliaries, acquired through many years of practice and training, is more reliable as a guide for action than the mere possession of naturally acquired true opinion. Consequently, the type of virtue that corresponds to habitually acquired true opinion is more reliable than any type of virtue acquired by nature. Additionally, I examine the possibility of true opinion of the forms, and discuss the relationship between this cognitive state and the other varieties of true opinion. Recognizing true opinion to be a lesser cognitive state than that of knowledge, I explain the relationship between knowledge and true opinion and then examine the relationship between these various cognitive states and their corresponding degrees of virtue. Given our limited ability to acquire knowledge in this life, the incomplete nature of knowledge is an important aspect of Platonic epistemology. If Plato were not interested in emphasizing the incomplete nature of knowledge and wisdom, perhaps he would have written his philosophical works in a different style. The character of a philosophic dialogue, especially an aporetic dialogue, is such that knowledge and understanding are often explicitly expressed only to the degree of the interlocutor’s abilities, and the task is left for the reader to continue the philosophic investigation on her own. Plato recognizes the limitations placed upon knowledge and the difficulty in committing his philosophy to writing due to the static nature of the written word and the inability of language to express the truth fully: There is no writing of mine about these matters, nor will there ever be one. For this knowledge is not something that can be put into words like other sciences; but after long-continued intercourse between teacher and pupil, in joint pursuit of the subject, suddenly, like light flashing forth when a fire is kindled, it is born in the soul and straightaway nourishes itself. (Seventh Letter 341c–d)8

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Plato further claims that knowledge of the highest truths cannot be written in a book, but rather must be ‘written on the soul of the hearer together with understanding’ (Phaedrus 276a).9 One cannot simply impart knowledge from teacher to student. Knowledge takes hold in one’s soul as the result of a dynamic, interactive process of investigation between teacher and student. This dynamic process was exemplified by Socrates’ elenctic method of investigation. Plato’s dramatic portrayal of the philosophic conversations of Socrates and his companions, however, is only a static example of the dynamic search for truth. As such, the dialogues serve to remind the reader of the incomplete nature of knowledge. Like Socrates, one must be cognizant of these limitations. In fact, to live an examined life is to make oneself aware of the incomplete nature of one’s understanding and to continue one’s search for truth. Thus in my examination of the various levels of knowledge, I also address the degree to which each cognitive state is limited and incomplete. I examine a variety of cognitive states that Plato describes throughout the dialogues and show their relationship to various levels of virtue. Although each of these cognitive states can serve as a guide toward virtuous action, and although the virtuous actions themselves may be remarkably similar if not identical, I argue that the degree of virtue is unique to each particular cognitive state. In arguing for different levels of virtue I do not intend to claim that the various degrees of virtue are completely distinct from one another. Rather, the various types of virtue differ in degrees of reliability, permanence, and completeness. Furthermore, I examine the relationship between these differing cognitive states and their product of happiness, showing that these distinct cognitive states produce degrees of happiness that also differ in their reliability, permanence, and completeness. I believe that Plato intends the reader to recognize that the various degrees of happiness and the various levels of virtue can be measured by their relationship to their corresponding cognitive states. A good life, which is a life of virtue and happiness, is ultimately a life guided by knowledge and wisdom. I hope to demonstrate additionally that the active search for knowledge and wisdom, and not only the achievement of this goal, can also be characterized as a virtuous life in several ways. The different degrees of virtue play a significant role in one’s search for knowledge. As one embarks upon the journey from the initial recognition of ignorance to the attainment of knowledge, one can take advantage of the different levels of virtue and their corresponding cognitive states by using them as stepping stones along the path toward the good and happy life of knowledge and virtue.

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Chapter 1

Interpreting the dialogues Socrates did not make the universals of the definitions exist apart; his successors, however, gave them separate existence, and this was the kind of thing they called Ideas. — Aristotle1 Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle: collectively these are arguably the three most significant philosophers in the history of western philosophy. Their influence upon the subsequent development of western philosophy cannot be overstated. Plato was, of course, both pupil of Socrates and teacher of Aristotle. Yet the influence of each teacher upon his student is not entirely clear. Aristotle implies a significant philosophic difference between Socrates and his pupil Plato. Yet Aristotle, born fifteen years after the death of Socrates, had no first-hand account of Socrates’ teachings. More than two millennia later the exact relationship between the philosophy of Socrates and that of Plato is still uncertain, and it is this uncertainty that leads to questions of interpretation. As with the examination of any text, the question of interpretation plays a significant role in the understanding of Plato’s dialogues. The problem of interpretation stems from the fact that Plato chose to express philosophical views in dialogue form and that any philosophical views put forth in the dialogues are expressed by the characters and not directly by the author himself. The question of the proper interpretation of the dialogues is a lively and current debate based upon several factors, including: the proper chronology of the dialogues; whether the dialogues in general and the character of Socrates in particular represent Plato’s philosophical views; whether the dialogues are accurate representations of the historical Socrates; and Plato’s intended purpose for writing each dialogue. The question of chronology is one that continues to generate conflicting opinions. Stylometric analysis of the dialogues has demonstrated that they fall roughly into three categories, usually referred to as Plato’s early, middle, and late periods of composition. Although there is general agreement concerning the threefold division of the dialogues, there is less agreement concerning the exact placement of individual

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dialogues within their respective groups.2 Another method used to determine the chronological order of the dialogues is based upon philosophical connections between the various works. Scholars have used the evidence of similar philosophical views expressed within different dialogues to suggest an internally revealed chronological order of the works. Textual references within one dialogue to other dialogues are also helpful in constructing a chronology, yet there are very few instances in which one dialogue refers either directly or indirectly to another Platonic work.3 Finally, a chronology can also be determined in part from the testimony of ancient sources. Related to the topic of chronology is the ‘Socratic problem’, the question concerning the degree to which Plato’s character Socrates represents the historical Socrates. There exists a reciprocal relationship between the Socratic problem and the question of chronology, for the way in which one answers the questions posed by the Socratic problem may influence one’s view of the chronology of Plato’s works. Similarly, one’s understanding of the chronological order of the dialogues may also influence one’s approach to the Socratic problem. Given that stylometric analysis indicates that the dialogues of definition appear to be earlier in their composition than other dialogues, one may be inclined to consider the philosophical views put forth by the character Socrates in these dialogues as representative of the views of the historical Socrates. Yet such an identification fails to take into account the fact that the dialogues are highly crafted works of art and not simply historical accounts of the thinking and activities of Socrates and his followers. As such, Plato the author could use the character Socrates to serve any number of purposes, and in doing so Plato could have the character Socrates hold different philosophical views from those of his historical counterpart. While there is no universal agreement on the reading of Plato’s dialogues as a whole, there are different interpretations that bring interesting points to bear on the central questions of chronology and interpretation. Historical, developmental, and unitarian interpretations Some scholars, in their attempt to address the Socratic problem, describe Plato as a type of philosophic reporter who attempts to portray dramatically the opinions of the historical Socrates in the early dialogues, while expressing his own views in the middle dialogues. According to this historical interpretation there exists a fundamental distinction between the earlier Socratic dialogues and the Platonic dialogues of the middle and late periods. The Socratic/Platonic distinction is further strengthened

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by the belief that Plato is thought to articulate views in the middle dialogues that not only differ from, but both criticize and supersede, the views of Socrates in the early dialogues. Although the Socratic/Platonic distinction can be traced to some extent to Aristotle,4 many in contemporary scholarship maintain the distinction between early Socratic and later Platonic dialogues.5 Although this interpretation can account for the differences between the early and middle dialogues, it fails to address adequately the many similarities and the continuity of philosophic views one finds within the dialogues. Additionally, this solution to the Socratic problem is not without its own difficulties. Even if it is assumed that the character Socrates in the middle dialogues does not represent the historical Socrates, the question remains concerning the relationship between Plato’s views and those expressed by the character Socrates. Questions such as these reveal the shortcomings of the historical interpretation of the dialogues. A different, yet related, interpretation accounts for apparent differences as well as similarities in philosophic content by claiming that the dialogues illustrate the ongoing development of Plato’s philosophy. According to this developmental interpretation, one finds the more complex views of a more mature philosopher in the middle dialogues. Many base this interpretation upon what appears to be a lack of a developed metaphysical view in the early dialogues, in contrast to a more fully developed metaphysical theory of forms in the middle dialogues. The primary distinction between the developmental interpretation and the historical interpretation is found in the emphasis placed upon the early dialogues. Those who hold a strict version of the historical interpretation tend to see the early dialogues as Plato’s faithful re-creation of the Socratic philosophic conversation. As such, the philosophical content of the early dialogues is believed to reflect the thinking of the historical Socrates. The developmental interpretation, while acknowledging that the historical Socrates may have been quite similar to the character Socrates, recognizes the Socrates of the early dialogues as a Platonic construction. Furthermore, the historical interpretation tends to emphasize the difference between Socrates and Plato, whereas the developmental interpretation tends to emphasize the ongoing advancement and enrichment of Platonic thought while still acknowledging its Socratic origins. As with the historical interpretation there are many in contemporary scholarship who hold a version of the developmental interpretation.6 For scholars such as these the early dialogues are seen as stylized re-creations of the philosophic activity of Socrates, whereas the middle and later dialogues are representative of Plato’s own developing philosophic views.

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That one can discover both similarities and differences between the early and middle dialogues is taken as evidence of Plato’s philosophical development. Obviously these two interpretations are not mutually exclusive, for one could hold a view of the dialogues that falls somewhere between the two perspectives of the historical and developmental interpretations. In addition to the historical and developmental interpretations, some scholars hold a unitarian interpretation of Plato’s dialogues in which they emphasize the unity of certain common philosophical elements found throughout the dialogues.7 The unitarian interpretation tends to reconcile differences between the early and middle dialogues by demonstrating that many of the unanswered philosophic problems raised in the early dialogues find their resolution in the middle dialogues. Furthermore, the apparent development one sees between the early and middle dialogues is primarily stylistic and literary development, while the metaphysical core of Plato’s philosophy receives greater or less emphasis depending on Plato’s purpose for writing the dialogue. Both the historical and developmental interpretations may appear to be sound on initial examination, for there are differences between the early and middle dialogues. These differences can be seen in both the philosophic doctrines as well as the methods employed by the character Socrates. These are not merely apparent differences, but real differences between the Socrates of the early and middle dialogues. Although both the historical and developmental interpretations can account for these differences, they are not the only viable interpretations, nor are they without their own difficulties. The historical interpretation accounts for the differences by positing the philosophical views of two separate philosophers, the earlier historical Socrates and the later Platonic Socrates. The developmental interpretation accounts for the differences by emphasizing the ongoing development of Plato’s thought. Although both interpretations are helpful in understanding possible relationships between the dialogues, and the scholars who hold these interpretations have provided immeasurable insight into Socratic and Platonic scholarship, neither the historical nor the developmental interpretation provides the best perspective for understanding Plato’s overall philosophical views. While I disagree with some of the views expressed by those who hold the unitarian interpretation, my own understanding of Plato’s dialogues follows this interpretation most closely. Any proper interpretation must attempt to incorporate Plato’s intended purpose for writing the dialogues. Understanding the probable purpose of the dialogues enables one to understand better the variety of philosophic

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views expressed within them. Thus one central aspect of my interpretation of the dialogues concerns the necessity of considering the intended purpose of each dialogue, recognizing that while Plato’s central philosophic views remain largely unchanged, his intended purpose changes from dialogue to dialogue. A change in purpose could be reflected in a change in the views held by the characters, even a character as central to the dialogues as Socrates himself. One should recognize that Plato is the single author of all the dialogues and rather than focus on the apparent differences, one should attempt to account for these discrepancies with an interpretation that incorporates all the dialogues sharing a common theme. I believe that a consistent account of the philosophic content of the dialogues can be given by relying upon a unitarian interpretation that incorporates the purpose Plato had in mind when writing the dialogues. Purpose of the dialogues Although there are several ancient sources who refer to the historical Socrates, it is Plato who gives us our richest and most lively portrait. Our primary historical understanding of Socrates the man, his philosophic beliefs, and the actions that stem from those beliefs is given to us through the gift of Plato’s dramatic talents. Yet the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues, whether the Socrates of the early or middle period, is a character in Plato’s literary and philosophical works. Adherents of the historical or developmental interpretations tend to overlook this point. Plato gives the reader no direct access to Socrates the man, only to Socrates the character. We know that Socrates existed, that he lived in Athens, that he was a father and a husband, that he fought in the Peloponnesian Wars, and that he was brought to trial, convicted, sentenced to die, and executed. These historical facts can be gleaned from Plato as well as other sources. Yet the philosophic spirit that shines through the dialogues, although it may have its origin in Socrates the man, is given to us by Plato the dramatist and philosopher. The dialogues are highly polished works of art in which we see an image of Socrates, but that image is not necessarily a reflection of the actual, historical person. The dialogues also reveal to us an image of ourselves, for the questions that Socrates addresses are the questions that we should all be asking ourselves. How should we live our lives? What is the good toward which we all strive, and how might we come to know it? Significant questions such as these are addressed throughout the dialogues. Although Plato offers somewhat different answers in different dialogues, the questions remain the same. Any interpretation that lessens the importance of some of the dialogues—

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as do the historical and developmental interpretations—will fail to account for the totality of Plato’s thought. Both the historical and developmental interpretations fail to recognize that Plato distances himself from the reader by never appearing or speaking as himself in any of the dialogues. Thus it would seem foolish to assume blindly that everything one reads in the dialogues is representative of the philosophical thinking of Plato. Rather, what we read in the dialogues is that which Plato wants us to read in the dialogues. The philosophical views are put into the mouths of numerous speakers, and usually, but not always, it is Socrates who appears to be the spokesman for some specific philosophic view. Yet this appearance is itself a construct, an artifice, a work of art created by Plato for some purpose. If the purpose of Plato’s writing of the dialogues were simply to inform the reader of his philosophic views he could have expressed his views more clearly in a more direct fashion. Furthermore, he would not have needed the dialogue form as a vehicle with which to express his philosophic beliefs. Yet Plato uses the dialogue form for a reason, perhaps because his teacher Socrates engaged his fellow Athenian citizens in dialogue. Plato possibly learned from witnessing the conversations of Socrates that the enquiry into truth differs from time to time and person to person, while the truth itself remains objectively fixed. It is the journey toward the truth that changes, depending on the road one is able to cognitively travel. Plato recognizes this point in the Phaedrus, where he states the need to alter one’s form and style of discourse so that it might correspond to a particular audience: [One] must analyse on the same principles the nature of soul, and discover what type of speech is suitable for each type of soul. Finally, he must arrange and organize his speech accordingly, addressing a simple speech to a simple soul, but to those which are more complex something of greater complexity which embraces the whole range of tones. (Phaedrus 277c) Plato has employed this literary tactic in his philosophical works. The various dialogues are tailored to audiences who have different levels of understanding. In the early dialogues one finds the character Socrates enquiring about the definition of ethical terms, and each of the dialogues proceeds along a different line of investigation. Recognizing the different abilities of the interlocutors and thus the different starting points of the dialogues, one should expect occasional differences between dialogues. Yet rather than

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construct an interpretation based upon these apparent differences one should recognize that the course followed in the dialogues is largely determined by Socrates’ interlocutors and their ability and willingness to participate in the dialectical search for the truth. Plato has crafted the dialogues to introduce the readers to specific aspects of his overall philosophical views. Granted, direct contradiction between dialogues should arouse one’s suspicions, but one must remember that contradiction itself is what drives the dialectic progression of the dialogues. The recognition of contradictory or conflicting opinions is what Socrates uses as the motivating force to drive one toward self-examination. It should therefore be no surprise to find conflicting philosophical views within the dialogues. It is my claim that the contradictions, discrepancies, gaps, and unanswered questions in Plato’s dialogues serve a purpose: to spur the reader on to question her own views. The dialogues indirectly involve the reader in the conversation between Socrates and his interlocutors, but they directly involve one in the examination of one’s own beliefs. When reading the dialogues one should not expect an exposition of Platonic philosophy, as one might find in the works of other philosophers. Plato does not give the reader any direct indication of the truth. He leaves it to the reader to discover that truth herself, for one of the purposes of the dialogues is to promote questioning in the minds of his readers. Just as Socrates takes it upon himself to promote the generation of knowledge in others, Plato attempts to accomplish the same task by relying on the dialogue form to involve the reader directly in the conversation and thus help promote the growth of knowledge and understanding. Yet in order to accomplish this task Plato recognizes that he must communicate through the imperfect medium of the written word. Plato describes written discourse as an image or shadow of the true discourse which, when in conjunction with knowledge, is ‘written on the soul of the hearer’ (Phaedrus 276a). The static nature of written discourse, however, limits its ability to impart the truth, for it cannot respond or defend itself when questioned, nor does it possess the ability to tailor itself to the appropriate level of understanding of the audience.8 Plato further describes the activity of searching for the truth and the moment of attaining the truth as a flash of insight.9 The attainment of such insight can only occur by personally involving oneself in the dialectical search for truth, much as the historical Socrates must have involved the citizens of Athens in his quest for truth. Yet the essence of the Socratic elenchus cannot be fully captured by the written word. Recognizing the importance of preserving the dynamic, interactive nature

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of a Socratic conversation, one can imagine that Plato chose to write in a format that would best approximate the type of discourse he had learned from Socrates. The dialogue form allows Plato to construct his own Socratic conversations through which the reader, if capable of understanding, can be led to her own flash of insight. When one reads a Platonic dialogue one is spanning time and space to engage in a philosophic conversation with Plato the author, much as we can imagine Plato engaged in conversation with Socrates. Thus Plato writes for a general audience that spans the centuries. Yet he also writes for a very specific audience of those individuals capable of appreciating and recognizing both the inherent worth of the topics discussed in the dialogues, and the necessity of living an examined life in order to live a good life. As a result, the ethical topics that may have formed the central core of the historical Socrates’ concerns become the centrepiece of the early dialogues. Plato introduces certain relevant philosophical questions in the early dialogues, usually attached to issues that would attract the attention of the average intelligent Athenian: What is courage? What is moderation? What is justice? What is virtue, and how can it be acquired? These are questions about which young, aspiring Athenian citizens would have most likely had an opinion. As such, these questions serve as an excellent introduction to the philosophic pursuit of the truth. The early dialogues of definition, however, end in apparent failure, in aporia, where the participants are reduced to a state of perplexity. If one were to assume Plato the author were equally at a loss, and that the aporetic dialogues reflected a certain stage of his development, then one would naturally look to later dialogues for his more mature philosophy. Yet if Plato only intended to introduce certain elements in these early dialogues—such as the importance of universal definitions of ethical terms, the proper philosophic method of investigation, and most importantly the role knowledge plays in virtue—then one could recognize the early dialogues of definition as the starting point of philosophic enquiry into the truth. Furthermore, their aporetic endings should not be seen as an admission of failure on Plato’s part, but as a device by which Plato could spur the reader on to further examination of these important issues. This further examination could take the form of a continued investigation or of a re-examination of the philosophic ground previously covered. Retracing one’s philosophic steps through the dialogues often allows one to discover promising paths of enquiry that, for any number of reasons, were not followed. In fact many dialogues contain hints which reveal possible paths of continued investigation. Thus one feature of the

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aporia at the end of the dialogues is that it fosters either further examination or re-examination of important philosophical issues. Additionally, when one adopts a protreptic and proleptic reading of the early dialogues, looking ahead to the middle-period dialogues for the expression of more substantive and positive doctrines, one can recognize an additional important feature of the early dialogues. The early dialogues are designed in part to introduce the reader to certain central philosophic notions, which are then addressed more fully in subsequent middle-period dialogues. Such an interpretation implies that the early dialogues are works that can be understood on a number of different levels. Plato asks important questions about particular virtues and virtue as a whole, he suggests possible solutions to these questions, and although the dialogues end in aporia, he points the reader in the direction of continued philosophic enquiry. I adopt a unitarian interpretation of the dialogues, in which I recognize the early dialogues as largely protreptic in nature. The unanswered questions introduced in the early dialogues force one to turn toward philosophy to discover their solutions. Furthermore, in addition to recognizing the inherent significance of each dialogue, I also interpret the early dialogues in a proleptic fashion, looking ahead to the dialogues of the middle period for their completion. Such an interpretation will not only maintain the integrity of the dialogues as a whole, it will also account for the similarities as well as the differences and discrepancies that arise between the dialogues. Most importantly, this interpretation invites one to investigate the variety of types of knowledge and opinion addressed in the early and middle dialogues, as well as their relationship to virtue. While recognizing specific differences in Plato’s articulation of his ethical and epistemological views, it is possible to account for these differences within a comprehensive, unitarian interpretation of the dialogues.

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Chapter 2

The craft analogy in the early dialogues Avenging Dike¯ [Justice] was there with her retributive keys. The drivers knew what to say, their passwords persuaded her to slide back the bolts and the gates flew open, swinging on pins set in heavy bronze hinges and creating the vastness of space as they turned. —Parmenides1 Parmenides’ poem describes the beginning of a journey toward knowledge. Ultimately this is a journey that leads one away from the world of changing appearances toward a stable and consistent truth. One purpose of Plato’s dialogues is to persuade readers that the proper path to follow is the one pointed out by philosophy, for the end of the philosophic journey is the attainment of knowledge, and with knowledge comes virtue. In the early dialogues of definition Socrates attempts to illustrate the relationship between knowledge and virtue by demonstrating that knowledge plays a significant role in the definition of each particular virtue under investigation. Yet the exact nature of this knowledge is not immediately obvious. One central question addressed in several of the dialogues concerns the exact nature of moral knowledge and its ability to guide one’s actions properly. Several different cognitive states are addressed throughout the dialogues, but in the early dialogues Socrates links the cognitive states of knowledge (e| pisth´mh) and wisdom (sofºa) to virtue (a| reth´). Throughout the dialogues Socrates attempts to describe moral knowledge by employing arguments based upon the type of knowledge that pertains to a particular craft (te´xnh) possessed by a particular craftsman (texnºthq, dhmioyrgo´q). In his search for moral knowledge, Socrates’ reliance upon the craftsman as a possessor of knowledge serves as the basis for what has come to be known as the craft analogy, a collection of analogical arguments designed to illustrate the nature of moral knowledge by reference to craft knowledge. Socrates’ use of analogical arguments has been widely recognized by scholars since Aristotle. Yet Plato’s intended purpose for employing the craft analogy, as well as its significance in relation to the dialogues as a

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whole, is somewhat more controversial. Whether the craft analogy ultimately succeeds or fails as a model for moral knowledge, the analogical arguments that comprise the craft analogy represent Socrates’ chosen method of examining the soundness of his interlocutors’ opinions. Given Socrates’ emphasis upon craft knowledge as a possible model for moral knowledge, the craft analogy serves as a key to the investigation into the relationship between knowledge and virtue. Plato’s use of the craft analogy can be seen in the earliest dialogues. For example, the importance of craft knowledge is illustrated in the Apology when Socrates explains his service to the god Apollo: Finally, I went to the craftsmen, for I was conscious of knowing practically nothing, and I knew that I would find that they had knowledge of many fine things. In this I was not mistaken; they knew things I did not know, and to that extent they were wiser than I. (Apology 22d) Of the craftsmen, the poets, and the politicians, only the craftsmen are recognized as possessors of knowledge, even if it is only particular knowledge of their particular craft. Ultimately the craftsmen, like the poets and the politicians, are guilty of believing themselves to be most wise concerning the greatest things (ta\lla ta` me´gista sofv´tatoq ei \nai), when in fact they only possess limited craft knowledge. Nonetheless, Plato uses craft knowledge with all its distinctive features as a model for moral knowledge throughout the dialogues. In the use of the craft analogy one can recognize several central features of craft knowledge. The craftsman possesses knowledge that allows him to understand both the materials with which he works as well as the various methods of rendering a final product from those materials (Apology 20a–b). The knowledge possessed by the craftsman is specific to his particular craft (Ion 537d). Furthermore the craftsman has an aim in mind, specifically the creation of a product or the provision of a service for some specific purpose (Charmides 165d–e). As possessor of craft knowledge, the craftsman can be recognized as an expert in his field (Gorgias 455b, Protagoras 311b–c), and thus the possessor of craft knowledge is the one most qualified to render such a product or service (Republic 332d– 333d). The possessor of craft knowledge possesses not only the knowledge of how to perform a specific craft, but apparently also the ability to teach that craft to others (Protagoras 311b–c). The craftsman is able to give an account of his craft as a result of the possession of knowledge, whereas one who lacks such knowledge is unable to give a similar account (Laches 190c,

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Apology 22d). Finally, craft knowledge, which involves knowledge of how to work appropriately with the tools and materials of one’s trade, produces results that are beneficial with respect to one’s particular trade (Euthydemus 279e–281e). These various aspects of craft knowledge, while not explicitly stated in every dialogue or in each use of the craft analogy, are nonetheless commonly recognized elements of craft knowledge. The doctor, for example, possesses knowledge of health and disease and employs her knowledge for the beneficial result of producing health in the human body. The builder possesses knowledge of houses and employs his knowledge for the beneficial result of producing a house. In both cases the skills possessed by the doctor and the builder are skills directly related to their possession of knowledge. The knowledge of how to produce both health and a house, along with the successful production of each, serves as an indication of one’s possession of craft knowledge. This was true in Plato’s day as well as in our own time. If a doctor consistently fails to heal or if a builder consistently produces poor work, possession of the particular craft knowledge is appropriately questioned. Public recognition of one’s ability to produce beneficial results serves to convey expert status upon the craftsman. Thus one of the strengths of the craft analogy is that in using craft knowledge to illustrate moral knowledge, Socrates is referring to a commonly recognized type of knowledge. One possible difficulty with the craft analogy, however, is that the possession of craft knowledge does not guarantee the production of a beneficial result, for the possessor of craft knowledge apparently has the ability to misuse such knowledge. Thus the doctor, in knowing best how to heal, also knows best how to kill. Similarly, the clever guardian is also a clever thief (Republic 333e–334a). Yet Plato portrays moral knowledge in a positive light, claiming that with knowledge as a guide one would live well and be happy.2 As we will see, potential difficulties such as the possible misuse of craft knowledge pose significant questions concerning the efficacy of the craft analogy. Thus, although craft knowledge seems to play a paradigmatic role in the identification of knowledge with virtue, it is not immediately clear whether craft knowledge can serve as an adequate model for moral knowledge. Nor is it clear whether Plato intends for the craft analogy to be understood as an exact comparison or only an approximate comparison between craft knowledge and moral knowledge. Additionally, in the early dialogues the craft analogy is employed in a negative sense as a tool to refute many common conceptions of virtue. In this chapter I will investigate the use of the craft analogy in the Euthyphro, Laches, and Charmides, three early

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dialogues of definition, in an attempt to illustrate more clearly both the nature of craft knowledge and Plato’s intended purpose for his use of the craft analogy. In doing so I will illustrate the particular strengths and weaknesses of the analogy between craft knowledge and moral knowledge, for an awareness of Plato’s conception of craft knowledge will assist in understanding the relationship between knowledge and virtue.

The craft analogy and piety in the Euthyphro In the Euthyphro Plato illustrates the importance of knowledge in the investigation of holiness or piety (Œsion, eªsebe´q). The Euthyphro shares the features of many of the early dialogues of definition: it illustrates the Socratic elenctic method of investigation, it addresses a particular virtue, and it employs the craft analogy. Both implicit and explicit statements of the craft analogy can be found in the Euthyphro. From the beginning of the dialogue Socrates addresses Euthyphro as one who has ‘full knowledge of such things’ (Euthyphro 6b),3 thus treating him as an expert in the field of piety. Furthermore, Socrates ironically becomes his pupil, thereby representing another aspect of the craft analogy. Thus without any direct reference to a particular craft or craftsmen, Plato has incorporated elements of the craft analogy into the Euthyphro in his investigation of the nature of piety. Euthyphro initially fails to answer Socrates’ question concerning the nature of piety itself, largely because he fails to recognize the scope of the question. When Euthyphro offers only a particular example of piety and not the essential nature of piety itself, Socrates reminds him of the scope of their investigation: Bear in mind then that I did not bid you tell me one or two of the many pious actions but that form itself (aªto` to` ei \doq) that makes all pious actions pious, for you agreed that all impious actions are impious and all pious actions pious through one form (miQ` |i de´Q). . . Tell me then what the form (th`n |i de´an) itself is, so that I may look upon it, and using it as a model, say that any action of yours or another’s that is of that kind is pious, and if it is not that it is not. (Euthyphro 6d–e) Although Euthyphro’s second definition (‘what is dear to the gods is pious, and what is not is impious’, Euthyphro 7a) avoids the earlier difficulty of being only a particular instance of piety, it nonetheless raises an interesting point, namely that the gods disagree with one another and are at times in a state of discord. If this is truly the case with the gods, then

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Euthyphro’s second definition of piety has failed, for what is pleasing to one god may be displeasing to another. Given the universal nature of the definition sought by Socrates, piety cannot be defined simply as that which is pleasing to the gods. In their attempt to understand the possibility of disagreement among the gods, Socrates once more implicitly employs an aspect of the craft analogy. He argues that with respect to number, size, and weight one could turn to counting, measurement, and weighing in order to resolve any disagreements. Given that there exists an objective standard by which to judge and decide any disagreements of this nature, there is no reason to believe that if the gods disagree with one another they disagree over such issues as number, size, or weight. In using these examples Socrates is illustrating the three related skills or crafts of counting, measuring, and weighing. The skill of counting, for example, is possessed by the mathematician, and the mathematician serves as an expert who, because of the possession of craft knowledge, can resolve disagreements concerning number. This discussion, however, not only serves as an investigation into the subjects about which the gods might disagree, it also leads to a positive description of the type of knowledge Socrates is searching for concerning piety. Socrates asserts that if the gods were to disagree with one another, they would disagree concerning ‘the just and the unjust, the beautiful and the ugly, the good and the bad’ (Euthyphro 7d), for these are the subjects about which humans disagree. By discussing the good, the just, and the beautiful, Socrates has accomplished two tasks. First, he has suggested a relationship of some kind between piety and justice, for it is recognized that piety entails justice, in that all that is pious is thought to be just (Euthyphro 12a). This raises the question of the exact relationship between piety, justice, and the other virtues. If piety is identified with a type of knowledge, then piety might involve knowledge of the just and the unjust, the beautiful and the ugly, the good and the bad. Second, by referring to the mathematician as a craftsman who has access to a universal standard with which to settle disagreements, Socrates has indirectly illustrated the possible objects of the knowledge identified with virtue as a whole. If, for example, the gods had access to a kind of knowledge that could discern what was just, beautiful, and good, as do mathematicians and related craftsmen concerning number, size, and weight, then there would be no cause for enmity among the gods. One might also infer that if there existed such a human craftsman who possessed knowledge of the just, the beautiful, and the good and who could guide others with this superior knowledge, then perhaps humans could also be free from strife concerning these issues.4

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The craft analogy is finally made explicit in the dialogue when Euthyphro claims that piety is ‘the part of the just which is concerned with the care (uerapeºan) of the gods’ (Euthyphro 12e). Socrates introduces the crafts of horse breeding, hunting, and cattle raising (Euthyphro 13a–b), for in each of these three crafts the care given to the animals results in their improvement. Thus by analogy, when piety is defined as care for the gods, it should also result in the improvement of the gods. Euthyphro describes care for the gods as ‘the kind of care, Socrates, that slaves take of their masters’ (Euthyphro 13d), thus allowing Socrates to slightly reformulate the definition of piety as ‘a kind of service (yJphretikh´) to the gods’ (Euthyphro 13d). Yet the intended result of such service to the gods remains unclear to Socrates. While service to doctors, shipbuilders, and house builders results in health and the building of ships and houses, Socrates asks Euthyphro, ‘what is that excellent aim that the gods achieve, using us as their servants?’ (Euthyphro 13e) Socrates is pointing out that the other craftsmen are capable of using their knowledge for the purpose of producing some good or beneficial result, while it is uncertain what good or benefit is produced as a result of human service to the gods. Euthyphro can only answer ‘many fine things’ (Euthyphro 13e), which leaves the way open for Socrates to remind him that generals and farmers, while also capable of producing many fine things, are most concerned with victory in war and the production of food (Euthyphro 13e–14a). In response to Socrates’ questioning, Euthyphro—possibly sensing his ignorance about that which he claimed to know—apparently begins to tire of the conversation: I told you a short while ago, Socrates, that it is a considerable task to acquire any precise knowledge of these things, but, to put it simply, I say that if a man knows how to say and do what is pleasing to the gods at prayer and sacrifice, those are pious actions such as preserve both private houses and public affairs of state. (Euthyphro 14b) Socrates then restates Euthyphro’s definition of piety as ‘knowledge of how to give to, and beg from, the gods’ (Euthyphro 14d). Euthyphro claims that the gifts given to the gods would include honour, reverence, and gratitude (Euthyphro 15b). Yet if the gods derive benefit from honour, reverence, and gratitude, then these would be recognized as qualities that are themselves dear to the gods. Thus the dialogue has returned to an earlier unsatisfactory definition, namely that piety is ‘what is dear to the gods’ (Euthyphro 7a, 15b). The dialogue ends without the discovery of an accurate definition of

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piety. The reader has been led through a circular course of definitions, ultimately to an aporetic ending. Yet neither the circular progression nor the aporetic ending should imply that the definition of piety cannot be discovered. Although the definition of piety apparently escapes both Euthyphro and Socrates, the reader can nonetheless discover certain indicators that point toward a Socratic notion of piety. For example, it seems clear that Socrates believes that piety, if ever fully and accurately defined, will contain some element of knowledge. The clearest indication of this is Socrates’ implicit and explicit use of the craft analogy. Socrates’ implicit reference to Euthyphro’s expert status and the skills of the mathematician, as well as his explicit reference to doctors, shipbuilders, house builders, generals, and farmers, point the way in which Plato intends for his readers to continue the investigation. In this dialogue one can begin to see the craft analogy as Plato most likely intended for it to be used. Plato implies that knowledge is necessary for virtue by illustrating the analogous nature of craft knowledge and moral knowledge. Yet if piety involves the possession of moral knowledge that is in some way analogous to craft knowledge, then several important aspects of this analogy must be investigated. First, what is the object of this knowledge? The horse breeder knows horses and how to bring about their best overall condition. Similarly, the shipbuilder knows ships and how to construct them most efficiently. In both of these cases the craftsman possesses knowledge of how to produce or create a beneficial product. Yet piety, when defined as a type of knowledge of ‘how to say and do what is pleasing to the gods at prayer and sacrifice’ (Euthyphro 14b), was reduced to a ‘sort of trading skill between gods and men’ (Euthyphro 14e), with no indication of what possible benefit the gods might receive from such an arrangement. Second, what is the beneficial product (‘rgon) that results from the possession of such knowledge? The general achieves victory as a result of his knowledge of strategy, and the shipbuilder produces a seaworthy vessel. Yet Euthyphro’s suggestion that piety results in honour, reverence, and gratitude paid to the gods was reduced to the idea of that which is dear to the gods, itself an unsatisfactory definition of piety. One possible suggestion concerning the benefit of piety might be seen in Euthyphro’s statement that piety enables one to ‘preserve both private houses and public affairs of state’ (Euthyphro 14b). This not only suggests a practical benefit derived from the possession of piety, but also foreshadows a passage in the Meno in which the character Meno initially offers a definition of virtue that entails ‘being able to manage public affairs’ as well as ‘manage the home well [and] preserve its possessions’ (Meno 71e).5 Furthermore, managing the affairs of the state is a topic addressed in the

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Gorgias concerning the political craft and in the Protagoras when Protagoras explains the benefit of his teaching, as well as in Plato’s description of the philosopher-rulers of the just state in the Republic. Defining the benefit of piety in such a way reveals a possible practical benefit derived from the possession of moral knowledge, much as the possession of craft knowledge similarly produces practical benefits. Here we see aspects of the proleptic nature of the early dialogues. The Euthyphro introduces a possible definition of piety that, although not fully investigated in this dialogue, will appear again in subsequent dialogues. Plato implies that moral knowledge provides a particular benefit, specifically the preservation of private houses and public affairs of state. In the Euthyphro the benefit of piety is seemingly dependent upon the knowledge of ‘how to do and say what is pleasing to the gods in prayer and sacrifice’ (Euthyphro 14b). Plato will give a more complete examination in the middle dialogues of the benefit or goodness derived from knowledge, as well as the object of knowledge that imparts benefit and goodness. One additional proleptic feature of the Euthyphro can be seen in Plato’s reference to forms (Euthyphro 5d, 6d–e), the proper objects of knowledge that will occupy a central position in the metaphysical middle-period dialogues. Finally, if piety involves knowledge, then who is the possessor of such knowledge? It is relatively easy to point out the general, the shipbuilder, the doctor, and other craftsmen by observing the benefits derived and works produced from the employment of their specific craft knowledge. Yet this is not as obvious with the pious individual. Questions concerning the exact nature of the analogy between a craft and virtue can be further addressed by examining Plato’s use of the craft analogy in other early dialogues. The craft analogy and courage in the Laches Unlike the Euthyphro, a dialogue in which the discussion centres around Socrates and an individual who is otherwise unknown to the modern reader, the primary characters in the Laches are famous Athenians known for their military reputations.6 With such credentials they should serve as experts concerning the nature of courage (a| ndreºa), the particular virtue under investigation in this dialogue. Furthermore, Socrates is recognized as having a personal involvement in the virtue of courage as well as piety. In the Euthyphro Socrates was on his way to the king-archon’s court to answer the charge of impiety brought against him by Meletus, while in the Laches the reader is reminded of Socrates’ bravery at the battle of Delium.7

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Given their past experience, the primary participants in the Laches might be expected to possess knowledge of courage, yet like the Euthyphro, the Laches also ends in aporia, with the speakers unable to discover a satisfactory definition. Within the dialogue, however, Plato once again provides the reader with several clues concerning the proper course to follow. As in the Euthyphro the role of knowledge is illustrated in the Laches through the craft analogy. When Nicias raises the Socratic claim that courage involves a type of knowledge, Socrates asks if this knowledge is similar to the knowledge of playing the flute or playing the harp (Laches 194e).8 These specific types of knowledge are immediately rejected by Nicias as models for courage. Yet if courage is a type of knowledge, then there must exist an object of knowledge or a specific subject matter related to this knowledge. Nicias defines courage as ‘knowledge of what is fearful and what is encouraging’ (Laches 194e–195a). Yet the difficulty with this definition is also illustrated through the use of the craft analogy. Doctors are those who are aware of the dangers present in the case of health, just as farmers are those aware of the dangers concerning agricultural matters. Yet in both cases the knowledge possessed by the doctor and the farmer does not suffice to make either person courageous. Courage seems to require an additional element to one’s particular craft knowledge. Nicias recognizes that doctors, while possessing knowledge of health and sickness, do not ‘know more about their patients than what is healthy and unhealthy for them’ (Laches 195c). This reference to the lack of additional knowledge reveals a distinction that can be drawn between different types of goods. The doctor, having the knowledge of medicine, is able to produce the conditional good of health. Yet the doctor does not possess knowledge of what is truly good for the patient. In fact Plato points out that health might not always be the best situation for an individual.9 This distinction between true goods and conditional goods points toward a distinction between different types of crafts. Although Plato does not explicitly make this distinction in the Laches, he is nonetheless implying that courage will involve knowledge of one’s true good. This can be seen in the critique of courage when defined as ‘wise endurance’ (Laches 192d). When Laches is asked to define courage, he arrives at the conclusion, with some help from Socrates, that those who are able to endure hardships with the possession of wisdom are to be considered courageous. Laches is thinking of courage in militaristic terms of courage on the battlefield. Thus Socrates uses a military example: Well then, suppose during a war a man showed endurance by being

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prepared to fight: he has calculated his chances wisely and realized that others will support him, that he’ll be fighting an enemy outnumbered and outclassed by his own side, and that he has the stronger position— now, which would you say is the braver, the man showing endurance with the benefit of this kind of wisdom and these resources, or a man from the opposing camp willing to show endurance in standing against him? (Laches 193a) Laches responds that of the two soldiers, the man from the opposing camp would be the more courageous of the two, given the overwhelming odds he must face, although he does not possess wise endurance but foolish endurance. Socrates continues by using examples of other military crafts and craftsmen, such as the person who possesses knowledge of ‘slinging, archery, or any other skill’ (Laches 193c). In each of these cases Laches claims that the person who possesses wise endurance is less courageous than the other who foolishly stands his ground. Given the examples of courage in which wisdom seemingly plays no part, the proper definition of courage must be more comprehensive than wise endurance. In the above example of endurance on the battlefield, both men could be recognized as possessors of courage to some degree. Yet Plato wants the reader to see that the knowledge associated with courage is not merely the knowledge that allows one to calculate one’s chances of survival, but the knowledge of what is truly good for oneself. Thus we see an implicit reference to the distinction between conditional goods, such as health and survival, and true goods. Given this subtle introduction to the distinction between true goods and conditional goods, Plato’s readers will recognize the distinction between different types of crafts that produce these different types of goods when the distinction appears in other dialogues.10 Once again we see the proleptic nature of the early dialogues, with the introduction of philosophical elements that will be more fully addressed in subsequent dialogues. The Laches ultimately ends in aporia when Socrates illustrates that Nicias’ final definition of courage as ‘knowledge of what is fearful and what is encouraging’ entails the knowledge of future good and evil (Laches 194e– 195b). Given the atemporal nature of knowledge, Nicias’ definition of courage is then amended to knowledge of good and evil, or virtue as a whole. Thus Nicias has defined the whole of virtue when it was agreed that courage was itself only a part of virtue. Although the Laches is technically an aporetic dialogue, the use of the craft analogy helps reveal the type of knowledge thought to be identified with courage. Laches, Nicias, and Socrates all agree that courage involves the possession of knowledge, yet

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they are unable to discover that exact type of knowledge. Although they themselves do not possess this knowledge, Socrates obviously thinks it can be possessed and urges them all, himself included, to ‘cooperate in looking for the best teacher we can find’ (Laches 201a). They agree that if one could be found who possesses such knowledge, that person would not only be courageous, but could teach others to be courageous as well. Teachability appears to be a central feature of craft knowledge, and thus if the craft analogy is to be seen as a model for moral knowledge, then courage should be a subject capable of being taught. Socrates implies that the quest for courage and an appropriate teacher should continue in spite of the aporia reached at the end of the Laches. The protreptic nature of the Laches is seen in the association of courage with knowledge and in Socrates’ insistence upon finding a teacher of courage, for the only proper course of study that can lead one to moral knowledge is ultimately that of philosophy. Finally, as in the Euthyphro, the craft analogy is partly used in the Laches to illustrate the problems with the various definitions of courage. The craft analogy serves two purposes in these dialogues, one negative and the other positive. It is used to refute the tentative definitions given by Socrates’ interlocutors, while at the same time providing a model for moral knowledge. It is the positive aspect of the craft analogy that provides insight into the relationship between knowledge and virtue. To understand this relationship better I next examine the use of the craft analogy in the Charmides. The craft analogy and moderation in the Charmides In many ways the Charmides can be seen as a companion dialogue to the Laches, continuing the investigation into the role of knowledge in virtue by examining the particular virtue of moderation (svfros¥nh). The Greek svfros¥nh can be translated in a number of ways, and ‘moderation’, ‘selfcontrol’, and ‘soundness of mind’ are all appropriate translations. Given such a translation, when one possesses this particular virtue one is able to control one’s desires or moderate one’s passions. Plato seems to recognize that in our daily actions we are presented with numerous instances in which we might be tempted to go too far in one direction or another.11 Thus to be moderate, self-controlled, or sound of mind (sv´frvn) would enable one to resist temptations and to maintain a life of virtue. The fact that the possessor of this particular virtue is sound of mind clearly implies that it involves a cognitive component. Given the central position of moderation among the virtues,12 the Charmides can be seen as an

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important dialogue of definition that not only addresses the particular virtue of moderation but also the importance of knowledge in the Platonic conception of virtue. In this dialogue, as in the Euthyphro and Laches, Plato employs the craft analogy to signify that knowledge plays an important role in moderation.13 The serious use of the craft analogy begins with the third and fourth attempts to define moderation as ‘doing one’s own (job)’ (to` ta` e\aytoy` pra´ttein, Charmides 161b)14 and ‘the doing of good things’ (h\ tv`n a| gauv`n pra`jiq, Charmides 163e). Socrates interprets ‘doing one’s own’ as performing all necessary tasks oneself. Thus one grows one’s own food, makes one’s own shoes, builds one’s own house, and weaves one’s own clothes. Yet it is further recognized that these particular crafts are best performed by those who possess the specific requisite knowledge. The implication is that the best and most beneficial situation would be brought about when each craft is performed by the appropriate craftsman who possesses the appropriate craft knowledge, and not by each person performing all the necessary tasks oneself. The emphasis upon the knowledge possessed by the appropriate craftsman will be addressed in greater detail in the Republic when Socrates introduces what I refer to as the One Task Principle.15 In the Republic, the notion of ‘doing one’s own’ entails each person performing that one task to which he or she is most naturally suited, while being released from any further obligations. The result of the application of the One Task Principle in the Republic is not moderation but the particular virtue of justice (dikaios¥nh). In the Charmides, however, Socrates appears to be playing upon the dual meaning of poie¡n (‘to make’ or ‘to do’). Does Socrates understand ‘doing one’s own’ as each person doing (pra´ttein) all things, or does he understand it as each qualified person making or producing (poie¡n) that which comes naturally? When Critias points out that Socrates has conflated the uses of doing and making, Critias then concentrates on moderation as ‘the doing of good things’ (Charmides 163e). Once moderation has been defined as the doing of good things, Socrates wonders if the moderate person would recognize the possession of moderation. At this point in the dialogue knowledge is even more strongly emphasized, specifically self-knowledge. Socrates finds it surprising that a moderate person could be unaware of the possession of moderation, and thus the conversation turns to the topic of self-knowledge when moderation is defined as ‘knowing oneself’ (to` gignv´skein e\ayto´n, Charmides 164d). The craft analogy plays a significant role in the investigation into selfknowledge. It is argued that if moderation is a type of knowledge then

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there must be some product of this knowledge, just as health is the product of the knowledge of medicine and a house is the product of the knowledge of building. Yet Critias correctly replies that some areas of knowledge have no product, such as arithmetic (logistikh´). Socrates points out that even those types of knowledge that have no product nonetheless have an object of knowledge that is distinct from the knowledge itself. Thus arithmetic, which seemingly has no product, is nonetheless the knowledge of the even and the odd. If we pursue this analogy it would seem that if moderation is a type of knowledge then it too must have an object of knowledge, even if its product is not immediately recognizable. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between two different types of crafts and to recognize the implication this distinction has for different types of knowledge. In using crafts such as building and medicine as the models with which to investigate moderation, Socrates seems to be comparing two different types of crafts. The builder possesses knowledge of how to work with specific materials in order to produce a beneficial result, specifically a building of some kind. The doctor possesses knowledge of how to treat sickness and disease in the human body in order to produce the beneficial result of health. But are these two crafts strictly analogous? Whether the builder builds a house or a temple, he works with his materials, using his various skills, in order to reach his desired end. Yet when the doctor treats a patient she does not merely work with the human body, as a builder does with wood and stone. The doctor must use her various skills in order to treat a variety of illnesses and diseases that affect the human body in a number of different ways. The treatment of a headache, leprosy, or injuries received on the battlefield requires a wider variety of skills than those required of the builder. Yet it is not simply that the knowledge possessed by the doctor is more comprehensive than that possessed by the builder. Rather, the doctor works to produce health in the human body, and in doing so, she acts so as to alter or improve the condition of the body from a state of sickness to a state of health. The builder, however, works to create a product, not to alter or improve the condition of something that presently exists. The purely productive craft of building is similar to yet somewhat unlike the more complex, therapeutic craft of medicine. Thus we see two types of craft knowledge in the dialogues. A productive craft is one that has as its goal the production of an inanimate object, and thus carpentry, farming, and shipbuilding are examples of productive crafts. Therapeutic crafts are those that have as their goal the improvement or perfection of an animate

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object, and thus medicine is a therapeutic craft because it cares for and attempts to improve the health of the human body. Recognizing that all types of knowledge have a particular object, Socrates asks, ‘what is moderation the knowledge of, that thing being different from moderation itself?’ (Charmides 166b) Just as sight and hearing can only be fully understood as the sight of visible objects and the hearing of audible sounds, it would seem that knowledge can only be understood as knowledge of knowable things. Yet in response to Socrates’ claim that all types of knowledge must have some object, Critias strongly disagrees: You’ve come in your investigation to the question of what the difference is between moderation and all the other knowledges. You’re trying to find some similarity between it and the others. There isn’t any. All the others are knowledges of something else, not of themselves. Moderation alone is the knowledge both of the other knowledges and of its own self. (Charmides 166c) This statement leads them into a discussion of the knowledge of knowledge (e| pisth´mhn e| pisth´mhq), since moderation, according to Critias’ most recent definition, is the ‘knowledge both of the other knowledges and of its own self’ (tv`n te a[llvn e| pisthmv`n e|pisth´mh kai` aªth` ayJth q` , Charmides 166c). Socrates points out that other mental phenomena are not comparable. There is no vision of vision itself, hearing of hearing itself, love of love itself, or opinion of opinion itself. Thus by analogy, knowledge of knowledge would seem to be impossible. Yet an interesting and telling point is made when Socrates states that ‘my great fear is that I may some time not notice that I’m thinking I know something when in fact I don’t’ (Charmides 166d). Plato is reminding the reader of the paradigmatic example of self-knowledge, which is seen in the form of Socratic self-knowledge. Socrates is aware of his own ignorance, and it is his self-awareness, his knowledge that he does not know, that both sets Socrates apart from others and drives him to search for positive knowledge. It seems odd that Plato would want his readers to conclude that knowledge of knowledge is impossible, as the argument seems to imply, for knowledge that one does or does not know something is surely possible, at least in its negative Socratic form. Furthermore, the impossibility of knowledge of knowledge is only established if one agrees to the analogous relationship between seeing, hearing, loving, fearing, opining, and knowing. Although one may only see visible objects and not sight itself and only hear audible sounds and

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not hearing itself, it seems possible that one might love the idea of loving, fear nothing but fear itself, and have an opinion about opinions in general. If this were the case, as it seems to be, then knowledge of knowledge should be possible. I believe that Plato intends for the reader to recognize this point and to recognize further the need for a continued examination of the possibility of knowledge of knowledge. That Plato intends for the reader not to give up on this quest is seen by the fact that Socrates grants, for the sake of argument, the possibility of knowledge of knowledge. Thus although the earlier argument seemed to imply that such knowledge is impossible, the investigation continues. One must recognize that in Platonic dialogues the argument, based on the freely given opinions of the interlocutors, is not always correct. Failure to recognize this point can lead one to the dangerous conclusion that everything said by Socrates or everything said with seriousness by other speakers in the dialogues must reveal the true philosophical thinking of Plato the philosopher. Such a conclusion would necessarily force one into considerable difficulties when trying to interpret which of the many conflicting philosophical views actually belong to the author. In their investigation of the knowledge of knowledge Socrates and Critias conclude that if moderation is to be understood as knowledge both of the other knowledges and of its own self (tv`n te a[llvn e| pisthmv`n e|pisth´mh kai` aªth` ayJth q` ), then it will be both the knowledge of knowledge and the knowledge of ignorance (e| pisth´mh e| pisth´mhq kai` a| nepisthmos¥nhq). Furthermore, Critias equates knowing oneself (to` gignv´skein e\ayto´n) with knowing that one either does or does not possess knowledge. Yet a subtle question arises concerning whether moderation should encompass knowledge that one does or does not know something, or knowledge of what one does or does not know, or both. Is moderation a knowledge that has as its object the content of everything one knows, or is moderation only a recognition of the possession of other varieties of craft knowledge? The former view portrays moderation as much like craft knowledge, or knowledge of what one knows and does not know. The latter view portrays moderation as unlike craft knowledge; thus it seems not to be a specific type of knowledge (e| pisth´mh) in the strict sense but only the ability to recognize (gignv´skein) that one either does or does not possess knowledge. If, for example, a doctor possesses knowledge of medicine, then as a possessor of medical knowledge, she knows what is healthy and unhealthy, and this knowledge correctly guides her in the production of health. But since moderation has been defined by Socrates and Critias as knowledge that one knows and does not know (Charmides 170d), then the doctor, as one who knows the healthy and the unhealthy, would not be moderate.

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For only the moderate individual would know that she possessed knowledge. Furthermore, the moderate person, recognizing only that she does and does not know, would not know what she did or did not know, for the possession of moderation allows one to recognize one’s knowledge, but does not enable one to understand the object of that knowledge. Plato is claiming that there is some knowledge in addition to the knowledge of health and sickness that the doctor does not possess. This knowledge allows one, at a minimum, to recognize the possession of knowledge and could more fully allow one to understand the goodness or benefit of one’s knowledge.16 This is clearly an unsatisfactory conclusion. What is obviously needed is the possession of a type of knowledge in which the possessor recognizes both that she knows and does not know and what she knows and does not know. A life guided by such knowledge, Socrates claims, would enable all activities to be guided by their appropriate knowledges. Socrates describes such a life, and his description is based upon the model of craft knowledge: No one who claimed to be a pilot, but wasn’t, would deceive us. No doctor, no general, or anyone else who pretended to know something he didn’t know, would escape our notice. Under those circumstances, wouldn’t the result be that we should be healthier of body than now, that when in danger at sea or in war we should escape unharmed, and that all our utensils, clothing, footwear, indeed all our possessions and many other things too, would be works of skill and art, because we employed true craftsmen? (Charmides 173b–d) Once again Socrates is using the craft analogy in order to illustrate the type of knowledge that must be analogous to moderation. The benefit of such knowledge seems to be that we would live better lives. Yet Socrates recognizes a problem: Now I agree that the human race, given this, would do things and live as knowledge directed—because moderation would mount guard and wouldn’t let ignorance creep in and be a partner in our work. But that by doing things as knowledge directed we’d do well and be happy, that is something we can’t as yet be sure of[.] (Charmides 173d) Thus what appears at first to be a beneficial type of life guided by knowledge based upon craft knowledge may be a type of life that provides no benefit at all. The problem is that living a life completely guided by

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moderation, where moderation is defined as the knowledge of both what one does and does not know and the recognition that one does and does not know, apparently cannot guarantee happiness. Yet doing or living well (e« pra´ttein) and happiness (eªdaimonºa) are seen as the goals of living a life of virtue. Thus the craft analogy has shown a possible problem with the type of knowledge thought to constitute the virtue of moderation. Unlike the other crafts that produce beneficial results, moderation, as it has been defined in the Charmides, apparently cannot produce similar results.17 Critias claims that one will do well and be happy if one possesses the knowledge of good and evil (Charmides 174b). This becomes the implicit penultimate definition of moderation,18 and at last an object of knowledge is suggested, specifically the knowledge of good and evil.19 Yet Socrates claims that if knowledge of good and evil is separate and distinct from the other knowledges, then the various crafts will not be able to produce beneficial results, since it is knowledge of good and evil that apparently enables one to live well and be happy. Critias responds that if moderation were defined as a superordinate type of knowledge that governed over all types of knowledge, including knowledge of good and evil, then it would still produce benefit. At this point Critias is offering the final definition of moderation as a superordinate knowledge that oversees all other knowledges. Yet Socrates replies that such knowledge would be unable to produce benefit, for only the knowledge of good and evil has been recognized as having the ability to produce benefit (Charmides 174d). As a result, the superordinate knowledge that governs all other knowledges and ignorances would itself be incapable of producing benefit. The conclusion seems to be that moderation, when defined as a superordinate knowledge of knowledge that rules over all other knowledges, is not beneficial. Nor is moderation beneficial when defined simply as the knowledge that one knows and does not know. Yet Socrates recognizes that all the virtues, including moderation, are beneficial. Thus the Charmides ends with the participants again in an apparent state of aporia, unable to discover an appropriate definition of moderation. The role of knowledge in the early dialogues The Euthyphro, Laches, and Charmides reveal the role knowledge plays in the particular virtues of piety, courage, and moderation. The type of knowledge in each dialogue is illustrated through the use of the craft analogy. Plato implies that moral knowledge, as it is found in each of these three particular virtues, is analogous to craft knowledge. If the analogy between craft knowledge and moral knowledge is to hold, then one can

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infer that the essential features of craft knowledge should be features of moral knowledge as well. Craft knowledge is a specific type of knowledge possessed by those who are recognized as experts in their particular fields. The degree to which one is an expert in one’s field is apparently related to the degree of one’s practical success. Yet the characters in these three dialogues cannot claim expert status. Euthyphro sees himself as an expert concerning pious and holy matters, Laches and Nicias are recognized as possessors of knowledge concerning military matters, and Charmides is recognized as having the potential for the possession of moderation. But are these individuals actually recognized experts in their fields, as is the craftsman in his craft? Laches and Nicias can perhaps be recognized as knowledgeable concerning political and military matters, but given that both die in battle one must wonder if their knowledge of military strategy was sufficient to warrant expert status.20 Furthermore, Euthyphro appears to be merely a self-proclaimed expert who receives little public recognition or acknowledgement. And Charmides and Critias, as history demonstrates, were unable to moderate or control their desires and passions.21 Thus it appears that none of the participants in the dialogues qualify as an expert concerning piety, courage, or moderation. This, in itself, does not illustrate a significant flaw with the craft analogy but merely shows that those who believe they possess knowledge most often do not. Apparently none of the interlocutors in these three dialogues were skilled in the craft of virtue. Not only are craftsmen possessors of a specific type of knowledge, but each type of craft knowledge is concerned with a specific subject matter. Yet this does not seem to be the case with moral knowledge as described in the Euthyphro, Laches, and Charmides. In all three dialogues the speakers end in a state of aporia and are unable to describe the nature of the particular virtue under investigation. One significant aspect of this aporia is that no one can identify the object of the particular type of moral knowledge. Piety is not simply knowledge of what is pleasing to the gods, because it is not clear in what way the gods might benefit from our honour, reverence, and gratitude. Similarly, courage does not seem to be knowledge of what is to be feared and encouraged, because in many cases such knowledge does not constitute courage at all. Finally, moderation does not appear to be knowledge of knowledge, for such knowledge, even if it were a superordinate knowledge of all other knowledges, apparently cannot guarantee happiness. Thus in each dialogue, the object of knowledge corresponding to each particular virtue has apparently escaped detection. Finally, craft knowledge is used to produce a beneficial (v| fe´limon) result, a particular product, or the accomplishment of a particular task.

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Medicine produces health, weaving produces a cloak, and the craft of building produces a house. Similarly, the cobbler produces shoes while the farmer grows crops. Each of these products provides some benefit to its recipient. Yet the beneficial results of piety, courage, and moderation are not so easily discerned. One might claim, for example, that the beneficial result of courage would be the ability to fight bravely and achieve victory on the battlefield. Yet this is not the only aspect of courage. One could face personal illness or the loss of a loved one with courage without ever stepping onto a literal battlefield.22 Furthermore, the Laches seems to imply that the knowledge that produces beneficial results is the knowledge of good and evil, not simply the knowledge identified with courage. A similar point is made at the end of the Charmides, for it appears that the knowledge that leads to happiness is not knowledge of knowledge but in fact the same knowledge of good and evil discussed in the Laches. Additionally, piety is thought to be beneficial, yet the origin of this benefit has not been discovered in the dialogue, although Plato does point the reader in the direction of the just, the beautiful, and the good (Euthyphro 7d). It is also claimed that piety necessarily involves justice (Euthyphro 11e), and so once again that which is beneficial seems to reach beyond the scope of the particular virtue under investigation.23 At the conclusion of all three of these dialogues the actual benefit gained as a result of the possession of that virtue remains uncertain. These discrepancies between craft knowledge and moral knowledge can be reconciled by recognizing a distinction between different types of virtues. When the characters in the dialogues investigate the virtues of piety, courage, and moderation, they are addressing the popular, common conception of these virtues. Euthyphro claims that piety is simply ‘to prosecute the wrongdoer’ (Euthyphro 5e), yet Euthyphro has no knowledge of what constitutes a wrong action. Laches believes courage to consist in the ability to ‘stand in the ranks, face up to the enemy and not run away’ (Laches 190e), yet Laches does not know whether it is always best to remain and fight or to flee. Similarly, Charmides claims that moderation involves acting ‘in an orderly and quiet way’ (Charmides 159b), while failing to recognize that at times such actions are not virtuous. Each of the above definitions can be seen as partially accurate descriptions of piety, courage, or moderation, but what is lacking in each case is the knowledge of why and how each particular type of act is an instance of the particular virtue. Significantly, each definition is merely a manifestation of piety, courage, or moderation. While the pious person might in fact prosecute the wrongdoer, true piety will involve a cognitive component that indicates when the prosecution of such a person is a pious action. Following the

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orders of one’s commander and not retreating in the face of overwhelming odds might be a case of courage or it might be a case of foolishness. Yet even if it is calculated that one’s chances of survival are minimal, such as the chances of the Spartans who faced the Persians at Thermopylae, retreat might not be the proper course of action. Thus courage must be more comprehensive than the mere ability to calculate one’s chances for survival on the battlefield. As pointed out in the Laches and the Charmides, the doctor can produce health in the body when guided by the knowledge of medicine, yet the doctor cannot foresee whether or not the production of health is itself beneficial. To recognize that the production of health is beneficial one must possess an additional knowledge. This knowledge would distinguish between conditional goods and what is truly good for a person. The Charmides suggests such knowledge through the discussion of a superordinate knowledge that oversees the other knowledges. A knowledge such as this would be able to recognize the goodness produced by the various crafts. Yet Plato has only superficially addressed such a superordinate craft in these three early dialogues. Finally, all three dialogues are aporetic in nature. In each case the object of knowledge identified with piety, courage, or moderation remains a mystery to the participants in the dialogues. Does the failure to discover an accurate definition of each virtue illustrate a potential problem with the craft analogy? Or does the failure to discover analogous moral knowledge rest with the interlocutors and not with the analogy itself? Might moral knowledge be analogous to craft knowledge yet remain undiscovered by the individual participants in the dialogues? Such an interpretation would account for the apparent dissimilarities between craft knowledge and moral knowledge while still allowing for the viability of the craft analogy. This interpretation would also recognize the possible merit of some of the definitions that were abandoned in the course of the investigation, thus calling into question the sincerity of the aporetic endings of the dialogues. Although some might see the dissimilarities between craft knowledge and moral knowledge as evidence that moral knowledge is not technical in nature, I believe that a further examination of the craft analogy is required to make a proper evaluation of its benefit and usefulness. To appreciate more fully Plato’s use of the craft analogy I will next examine selected passages from the Gorgias, Republic I, and Hippias Minor, in order to shed light on its further use as a model for moral knowledge. Further analysis of the craft analogy will reveal that Plato does intend to describe moral knowledge by reference to the model of craft knowledge.

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Chapter 3

Potential difficulties with the craft analogy For these things having changed round are those, and those having changed round are these. — Heraclitus1 Heraclitus describes the world in terms of a measured stability found within the matrix of constant change. Recognizing this Heraclitean concept, Plato claims that we must look beyond the world of changing opinion to the realm of constant and stable knowledge. Yet Plato’s insistence upon the avoidance of the everyday world in the search for knowledge is initially subtle. Although he intends to direct his readers toward a stable type of knowledge, his model of craft knowledge is based squarely in the realm of changing appearances. The Euthyphro, Laches, and Charmides all illustrate specific aspects of craft knowledge, and in doing so they clarify Plato’s conception of moral knowledge. Yet the degree to which moral knowledge mirrors craft knowledge is not yet fully apparent. It is not clear whether Plato intends the reader to recognize an exact comparison or an approximate comparison between craft knowledge and moral knowledge. In this chapter I will examine selections from three dialogues that address additional aspects of the craft analogy and that point out apparent difficulties in the comparison of craft knowledge and moral knowledge. In spite of these difficulties I intend to show that Plato uses craft knowledge as a workable model for moral knowledge. I begin by examining specific passages in the Gorgias, for the discussion of rhetoric and its possible status as a craft further illustrates Plato’s conception of craft knowledge. One possible difficulty with the craft analogy as it was portrayed in Euthyphro, Laches, and Charmides concerned the inability to discover the objects of knowledge relative to piety, courage, and moderation. In the Gorgias justice is put forth as the possible subject matter of the craft of politics. Thus we see an example of a superordinate craft that oversees other particular crafts. The discussion of the craft of politics will augment in significant ways the picture of the craft analogy developed in the previous chapter. Finally, the Gorgias also addresses the potential problem of the possible misuse of knowledge.

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I next turn to Book I of the Republic to investigate the way the craft analogy is used by Socrates to refute Thrasymachus’ claim that justice is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger. Additionally, I show how Republic I addresses other significant philosophical issues, such as the sufficiency of craft knowledge for the production of a beneficial result and the possible misuse of craft knowledge. I supplement the discussion of the possible misuse of knowledge by turning briefly to the Hippias Minor. By examining these additional dialogues I hope to show that the craft analogy, in spite of its apparent difficulties, is a viable model for understanding moral knowledge. Once it has been established that craft knowledge is the paradigm Plato uses to describe moral knowledge, I will then be prepared to turn to the examination of the various cognitive states and their relation to virtue. Craft knowledge in the Gorgias In the Gorgias, Socrates addresses the question of whether rhetoric or oratory (Whtorikh´) is a craft similar to the other types of crafts. Ultimately rhetoric fails to meet the necessary requirements of craft knowledge. Yet in addressing the nature of rhetoric Plato provides the reader with an interesting classification of the crafts and their relationship to those lesser activities that do not qualify as craft knowledge. In this sense the Gorgias helps to define craft knowledge further and illustrates more clearly the nature of the craft analogy. Although the Gorgias is a dialogue in which Plato defends the philosophic life as superior to the political life of the orator, I will limit my discussion to Plato’s use of the craft analogy and the implications this dialogue holds for the Platonic conception of moral knowledge. Socrates and Gorgias attempt to define both the particular subject matter and the appropriate product of rhetoric, for if rhetoric is to be recognized as a craft it must possess both of these features. Gorgias describes the product of rhetoric as ‘the ability to persuade by speeches judges in a law court, councillors in a council meeting, and assemblymen in an assembly or in any other political gathering that might take place’ (Gorgias 452e).2 Recognizing that rhetoric is a type of persuasion, Socrates then asks about the particular subject matter of rhetoric, for if it is to be defined as a craft and thus as a type of knowledge, it must concern itself with a particular object of knowledge. Gorgias responds that rhetoric ‘is concerned with those matters that are just and unjust’ (Gorgias 454b). In making this claim, Plato has illustrated an aspect of craft knowledge that remained hidden from the interlocutors of the Euthyphro, Laches, and

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Charmides. In these dialogues the aporia reached by the speakers was primarily due to their failure to discover the proper subject matter of piety, courage, and moderation. While the Euthyphro briefly addressed the just, the beautiful, and the good, and both the Laches and Charmides touched upon the knowledge of good and evil, the participants in the dialogues never fully addressed these as the possible objects of the virtues under investigation. Plato’s introduction of these elements into the dialogues is designed to provide the reader with clues concerning which direction to follow in one’s further investigations. The Gorgias suggests that the proper subject matter of rhetoric is the just and the unjust. What remains to be seen, however, is whether or not justice is the true subject matter of rhetoric. If rhetoric were a craft like the other crafts, then the orator, if able to persuade an audience, would apparently possess knowledge about the subject of which he intends to speak. Yet the type of persuasion practised by the orator does not require the possession of knowledge. Recognizing the distinction between having learned and having been convinced, Socrates and Gorgias agree that there exist two types of persuasion, ‘one providing conviction without knowledge, the other providing knowledge’ (Gorgias 454e). The orator, in his practice of rhetoric, persuades through conviction without imparting any knowledge to his audience. The mathematician, for example, can persuade one of the truths of arithmetic, and in doing so, she would be persuading through teaching and ultimately providing knowledge. Yet although the orator possesses the ability to persuade an audience, he does not possess the particular knowledge of that of which he speaks. As Socrates points out, ‘evidently oratory is a producer of conviction-persuasion and not of teaching-persuasion concerning what’s just and unjust’ (Gorgias 454e–455a). This implies a significant difference between rhetoric and the traditional crafts. Socrates goes on to demonstrate in a lengthy speech that rhetoric is not a craft, but merely a knack (e| mpeirºa),3 for lacking knowledge, it cannot give an account of that which it addresses.4 Thus the orator, although capable of giving fine speeches, is nonetheless unable to give a rational account of the truth. As Socrates states, [Rhetoric] guesses (stoxa´zetai) at what’s pleasant with no consideration for what’s best. And I say that it isn’t a craft, but a knack, because it has no account of the nature of whatever things it applies by which it applies them, so that it’s unable to state the cause of each thing. (Gorgias 465a) Rhetoric, therefore, gives one the ability to please an audience by guessing

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at what is most pleasant, yet it does not entail knowledge of what is, in fact, good. The distinction between pleasure and the good helps to reveal the true nature of rhetoric. Although Gorgias may have supposed that rhetoric pertained to ‘what’s just and unjust, what’s shameful and admirable, what’s good and bad’ (Gorgias 459d), it appears that the true domain of rhetoric is merely that of pleasure. One of the requirements for the possession of craft knowledge is the ability of the craftsman to give an account of his craft. The orator cannot give such an account, precisely because he lacks the requisite knowledge. Thus it is the stochastic nature of rhetoric, the fact that it guesses at what is pleasant without knowledge, that separates it from a true craft. Rhetoric aims at the pleasant, mistakenly believing pleasure to be the good. Rhetoric, Socrates claims, is merely ‘an image of a part of politics’ (Gorgias 463d). In making this claim, he opens the way for a classification of those crafts that address the benefit and health of the soul and the body and their corresponding images, which only appear to be beneficial. Socrates describes the fourfold crafts of gymnastics and medicine (which pertain to the body) and legislation and justice (which pertain to the soul). The true crafts that care for the body and the soul are subverted by flattery, and as a result we find the knack of cooking masquerading as medicine, cosmetics instead of gymnastics, and sophistry in the place of legislation. Rhetoric, then, is not a craft but a knack, which the unknowing mistakenly take for justice (Gorgias 464b–466a). Although Plato does not explicitly state the identity between knowledge and virtue in the Gorgias, we can nonetheless see their relationship in his criticism of rhetoric as an activity that does not involve knowledge. Gorgias had earlier claimed that the proper subject matter of rhetoric was the particular virtue of justice. But if rhetoric is not a craft because the orator does not possess knowledge, then the question remains concerning the identity of the craft that is properly concerned with justice, as well as the craftsman who practises justice. Socrates claims that the craft of politics (politikh´) is that which concerns itself with justice. The idea of a political craft foreshadows the political views expressed in the Republic while also reflecting an idea expressed in the Charmides concerning superordinate knowledge. Self-knowledge, when defined as the recognition that one does or does not know, was seen as a superordinate knowledge that took other knowledges as its object. As expressed in the Gorgias (464b–466a), the craft of politics can be seen as a superordinate craft in that it oversees both legislation and justice. The political craft, consisting of a type of knowledge, would allow its practitioner to give an account of its activity as well as of the objects with which it is concerned. Thus unlike rhetoric—

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a knack that allows one to speak without knowledge, concerning subjects about which one cannot fully explain, to an unknowing audience—the true political craft would allow one to understand and explain justice as well as bring it about. Thus the Gorgias does much to help illustrate the Platonic conception of a craft that allows one to live well. Politics would apparently be such a craft, for since it is a type of knowledge, the practitioner would look to this knowledge as a guide in order to bring about justice. Knowledge such as this would allow the individual as well as others to live well. In this sense, the Gorgias clearly foreshadows the Republic concerning care for the individual as well as the community. The discussion of the political craft also enriches the craft analogy, thus providing the reader with a more complete picture of Platonic moral knowledge. A craft must have a determinate subject matter of which the craftsman can give a rational account. The orator, however, cannot give an account of his supposed craft. Furthermore, for each particular subject matter there is only one craft.5 Rhetoric claims that it is concerned with justice, yet Socrates shows that this is not the case, for it is the craft of politics that is properly concerned with justice. A craft can also be taught and learned, yet the subject taught by Gorgias is not a craft but merely a knack. Because it fails to meet these criteria, rhetoric therefore cannot be considered as a craft. One additional point of interest is raised concerning the misuse of craft knowledge. In praising the achievements made possible through rhetoric, Gorgias cautions that one should use one’s rhetorical skills justly: ‘One should, however, use oratory like any other competitive skill, Socrates. In other cases, too, one ought not to use a competitive skill against any and everybody’ (Gorgias 456c–d). In making this statement Gorgias raises a problematic aspect of the craft analogy concerning the possible misuse of craft knowledge and the placement of blame for such misuse. Is blame to fall upon the teachers who impart the knowledge or upon the students who misuse it? One might claim that the misuse of rhetoric is unimportant and inappropriate to this discussion, given that rhetoric has not satisfied the requirements of a craft. But leaving aside the issue of the status of rhetoric, the possible misuse of craft knowledge poses significant problems for the craft analogy. If craft knowledge is to serve as an adequate model for moral knowledge, then the possibility of misusing craft knowledge implies that moral knowledge, too, could be misused. Yet Socrates has implied that moral knowledge cannot be misused by its possessor.6 Thus the Gorgias has touched upon two important issues. The first concerns the recognition that justice is the subject matter of the superordinate craft of politics. While the discussion of a superordinate

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knowledge of knowledge was implied in the Charmides, here in the Gorgias we see an actual example of such a craft. The concept of a superordinate knowledge that oversees other knowledges will ultimately play an important role in Plato’s conception of moral knowledge. The second issue concerns the possible misuse of craft knowledge. I next turn to the examination of the Republic I and the Hippias Minor, for an examination of these two dialogues will help to clarify Plato’s views on these significant issues. The craft analogy and justice in the Republic I The first book of the Republic contains many of the same elements found in other early dialogues. When taken alone, Republic I can be seen as a dialogue of definition much like the Euthyphro, Laches, and Charmides. The structure of Book I is similar to these early dialogues: a definition of a particular virtue is sought, the views of the speakers are critically evaluated through Socratic questioning, the dialogue ends in aporia, and craft knowledge serves as a model for moral knowledge. Furthermore, the first book of the Republic addresses the virtue of justice (dikaios¥nh), one of the virtues Socrates addresses in the Protagoras concerning the unity of virtue. Given that the Euthyphro, Laches, and Charmides address three of these related virtues, it seems appropriate to include an examination of Republic I with an analysis of the earlier dialogues of definition.7 The Republic is probably Plato’s most widely read and closely studied dialogue. This is partly due to the philosophical depth of the dialogue, for in addition to being ten times the length of the earlier dialogues of definition, the Republic contains far more dramatic and philosophical complexity. Additionally, the Republic presents the reader with a developed metaphysics, something that was almost completely lacking in the earlier dialogues. Yet Book I of the Republic has generated conflicting opinions concerning its relationship to the other nine books of the dialogue. Some scholars see all the books of the Republic as forming a complete whole, while others see Book I as a separate dialogue capable of standing alone. Whether Book I should be seen as an earlier dialogue that Plato amended at a later date (possibly called the Thrasymachus),8 or as part of a cohesive whole, is not immediately important for the purpose of this chapter. I address Republic I because of its structural and philosophical similarities to the other early dialogues of definition and because it provides a further illustration of Plato’s use of the craft analogy. The craft analogy is employed early in the dialogue in order to refute Polemarchus’ Simonidean characterization of justice as ‘to give to each

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what is owed to him’ (Republic 331e).9 In less than three Stephanus pages (331e–334b), Socrates refers either directly or indirectly to the crafts of medicine, cooking,10 navigation, farming, shoemaking, game playing, building, lyre playing, horse breeding, shipbuilding, vine pruning, boxing, and guarding. Socrates points out that each of these crafts is distinguishable from the others insofar as they all have a particular object of knowledge, whereas the craft of justice apparently does not. Furthermore, they are all useful inasmuch as each craft produces some beneficial result, whereas justice, once again, apparently does not. Plato is not claiming that justice significantly differs from the particular crafts. Rather, he is illustrating the degree to which the definitions offered by the interlocutors are deficient. This is the negative use of the craft analogy. More positively, however, Plato is using the craft analogy here, as he does in the other early dialogues, to illustrate the nature of moral knowledge in general and the virtue of justice in particular. Recognizing his ignorance concerning the subject of justice, Polemarchus abandons the argument, thus giving way to the next and most significant character in Book I, Thrasymachus. Thrasymachus is a character unlike those in the Euthyphro, Laches, or Charmides. He is persuaded of the truth of his own beliefs and as a result he is not as easily convinced of their falsehood. Thrasymachus’ definition of justice is simply ‘the advantage of the stronger’ (to` toy` kreºttonoq jymfe´ron, Republic 338c). Yet there is nothing simple about his view, for he further states that while justice is the advantage of the stronger, the stronger individual will benefit more from injustice than justice.11 His claim that justice is simply the advantage of the stronger is a definition given from the perspective of the weaker. From the viewpoint of the stronger, it is not justice but injustice that brings one benefit. His claim that injustice is superior to justice serves as the primary point of investigation for the remainder of the Republic. In defence of his claim, Thrasymachus appeals to political institutions, since the city serves as the arena of justice, and claims that the stronger element in each city is the element wielding political power. Whereas Polemarchus defined justice by looking primarily to just actions, Thrasymachus goes beyond the level of actions and claims that justice is the same in each form of political organization, whether it be democratic, oligarchic, or tyrannical: Democracy makes democratic laws, tyranny makes tyrannical laws, and so on with the others. And they declare what they have made—what is to their own advantage—to be just for their subjects, and they punish

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anyone who goes against this as lawless and unjust. This, then, is what I say justice is, the same in all cities, the advantage of the established rule. (Republic 338e–339a) Thus although it may initially appear that Thrasymachus is appealing to a kind of political relativism, given that democracies constitute one kind of justice and aristocracies another, he is not in fact making a relativistic claim about justice. Justice is a single, definable concept for Thrasymachus. Socrates focuses the craft analogy upon Thrasymachus’ conception of justice. After pointing out the possibility of rulers mistakenly making laws that benefit those who are ruled (Republic 339b–e), Thrasymachus responds with the claim that ‘no craftsman ever errs’ (Republic 340e), claiming that the scenario Socrates has envisioned is impossible. Thrasymachus claims that ‘the ruler in the most precise sense’ (Republic 341b), like the craftsman in the most precise sense, is one who acts with knowledge. If and when his knowledge fails him, then just as the craftsman is no longer a craftsman, the ruler is no longer a ruler. Plato is giving stronger emphasis to the role of craft knowledge than he had in earlier dialogues by claiming that craft knowledge alone is sufficient for the performance of one’s craft and the production of a beneficial result. If a craftsman makes a mistake it is due to his failure to be guided properly by his relevant craft knowledge. Thus the true craftsman in the precise sense—one who possesses the relevant craft knowledge—never makes a mistake. If the craft analogy is to be successful, then moral knowledge must be sufficient for virtuous action. While the sufficiency of knowledge for virtue was implied in the early dialogues, it is here in the Republic that Plato attributes mistaken or immoral action to ignorance and claims that knowledge is a sufficient condition for virtue. Yet the object of moral knowledge and the beneficial product of such knowledge have yet to be defined. Socrates then addresses the function of a craftsman in the precise sense by referring to the doctor and the ship’s captain. The doctor in the precise sense is someone who treats the sick and not a money-maker. Similarly, neither is the ship’s captain in the precise sense a money-maker but rather a ruler of sailors. The doctor, seen as a craftsman concerned with the care of the human body, seeks the advantage of the patient, not of herself. Additionally, the ship’s captain, seen as a craftsman concerned with his rule over sailors, seeks the advantage of his crew, not of himself. Given the similarity implied between the crafts of medicine, sailing, and justice, Socrates claims that justice cannot be defined as the advantage of the

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stronger. Recognizing that each craft has a different function, and ‘that each craft brings its own particular benefit’, Socrates claims that ‘whatever benefit all craftsmen receive in common must clearly result from their joint practice of some additional craft that benefits each of them’ (Republic 346c). Thus the doctor and the ship’s captain in the precise sense are only concerned with the welfare of the patient and the sailors. Any monetary remuneration that might be gained while performing one’s craft stems from the additional craft of wage-earning or money-making. Socrates concludes that since no craft provides for its own advantage then Thrasymachus’ definition must be incorrect. Plato has successfully used the craft analogy to illustrate the difficulties with the given definition of justice, showing that the just ruler, like the other craftsmen, must seek not the advantage of himself, but the advantage of those who are ruled. Although the subject of justice has only been superficially addressed, certain interesting features of justice can be appreciated by the end of Book I. Thrasymachus initiated the discussion of justice within a political framework by defining justice in terms of the advantage of the politically powerful. If justice can be understood through the craft analogy then justice appears to be a craft of ruling. In this sense it shares with the therapeutic crafts of medicine and sailing the goal of seeking the advantage of others. The doctor cares for her patients, the ship’s captain cares for his sailors, and the ruler cares for the citizens of the state. As we will see in the discussion of subsequent books of the Republic, justice is a therapeutic craft that brings about a balance in both the state and the soul. Furthermore, Plato implied that knowledge was sufficient for virtue by stating that the craftsman, when guided by knowledge, will never make a mistake. While the idea of the sufficiency of knowledge for virtue can explain mistakes made from ignorance, it remains to be seen whether a similar explanation can be given for the possibility of the misuse of one’s craft knowledge. I next turn to the Hippias Minor to examine the question of the possible misuse of knowledge and the implication this topic has for the craft analogy and the Platonic conception of virtue. The possible misuse of knowledge in the Hippias Minor Plato implies throughout the early dialogues that the possession of craft knowledge is what enables a craftsman to perform his craft. Yet there apparently exists the possibility for the craftsman to misuse his knowledge for some detrimental end. In the examination of the nature of justice in the Republic Polemarchus claims that justice is a useful tool that ‘gives benefit to friends and harm to enemies’ (Republic 332d). In response

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Socrates points out that the doctor is not only the person best qualified to guard against disease but also the most qualified to bring it about unnoticed (Republic 333e). One could imagine further examples of the misuse of one’s craft knowledge. The general would best know how to bring about one’s own military defeat, and the ship’s captain would best know how to lose cargo and passengers at sea. By analogy, the just ruler would best know how to subject his citizens to unjust, tyrannical rule. The misuse of craft knowledge has serious implications for the craft analogy, for if such misuse is possible, then this would imply that moral knowledge could also be used for some detrimental end. Yet implicit in the early dialogues is the claim that knowledge is sufficient for virtue. Since Socrates implies that virtue or goodness is identified with knowledge, any implication that moral knowledge could be misused would seemingly demonstrate that knowledge is not sufficient for virtue. The craft analogy is invoked in the Hippias Minor in order to demonstrate that the possession of knowledge not only allows one to exercise one’s craft, but that apparently this same knowledge qualifies one best to perform the opposite function as well. The person who is best at arithmetic, for example, is the most qualified not only to speak truly about mathematics but also to lie about the same subject. This claim is based upon the recognition that ‘liars are capable, wise, knowledgeable and clever at their falsehoods’ (Hippias Minor 366a).12 The possession of this cleverness allows one to lie convincingly, whereas one who lacked such cleverness would be unable to lie. Socrates continues this lengthy analogical argument when he examines running, wrestling, and other physical activities, concluding that in each of these cases it is the clever person who is the best at performing both the particular craft and its opposite function. Since the archer who can intentionally miss the target is superior to the archer who cannot help but miss, it follows that ‘a soul which involuntarily misses the mark is more worthless than one which does so voluntarily’ (Hippias Minor 375b). Socrates then claims that in any craft it is the better soul that can intentionally produce detrimental results. Since everyone wants one’s soul to be in the best possible condition, it is better to possess a soul that intentionally acts badly than one that does so unknowingly. Given that it is the good person who is capable of such misuse of one’s knowledge, Socrates surmises that ‘the one who voluntarily misses the mark and does what is shameful and unjust—if there is such a person—would be no other than the good man’ (Hippias Minor 376b). This is a surprising conclusion for a Platonic dialogue. There exists an obvious tension at the conclusion of the Hippias Minor between two views

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that Socrates holds in other dialogues, specifically that virtue or moral knowledge is best modelled by reference to craft knowledge and that moral knowledge cannot be misused because no one does wrong knowingly. The idea that moral knowledge cannot be misused serves as the basis for the view that immoral action arises entirely from ignorance, and thus we see the sufficiency of moral knowledge for virtue. Yet the Hippias Minor concludes that the good person is the one who voluntarily ‘does what is shameful and unjust’ (Hippias Minor 376b). If this were true, then knowledge could no longer be seen as a sufficient condition for virtue. Even Socrates himself recognizes the undesirable nature of the conclusion of the dialogue. How, then, is the conclusion of the Hippias Minor to be understood in relation to the philosophical views held in the other dialogues? One possible way to understand this tension is to take the words of the character Socrates at face value, recognizing not only the views of the historical Socrates in the dialogue, but those of Plato as well. In this sense, although possibly aware of the difficulties presented in the dialogue, Plato is unable to extricate either himself or his mentor from the confusion. One who accepts the historical interpretation of the dialogues might hold such a view, possibly recognizing the Hippias Minor as an early dialogue in which Plato is not only reporting the confusion of the historical Socrates but his own confusion as well. Another possible way to address this tension is to recognize that Plato is moving beyond the philosophical views of the historical Socrates and that a dialogue such as the Hippias Minor serves as a critique of the Socratic identification of virtue with craft knowledge. This view, although certainly consistent with the text, is contingent upon interpreting the views of the character Socrates as distinct from the philosophical views of his historical counterpart and as representative of Plato’s philosophical thought at the time of composition. Such a view might be generally accepted by those who hold the developmental interpretation of the dialogues. Such a conclusion, however, would seriously question the usefulness of the craft analogy, as well as the beneficial result of moral knowledge. If craft knowledge could be misused, as Socrates seemingly implies in the Hippias Minor, then by analogy, so too could moral knowledge be used for some detrimental end. Yet moral knowledge is identified with virtue, which is itself a good and admirable thing. Thus it appears that the reader is left with one of two options: (1) in order to maintain the analogy between craft knowledge and moral knowledge, one must surrender the claim that knowledge is a sufficient condition for virtue; (2) conversely, in

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order to maintain that knowledge is sufficient for virtue, one must recognize the failure of the craft analogy. I believe there is a third alternative, however, that maintains both the sufficiency of knowledge for virtue and the viability of the craft analogy. First we must recognize that neither Hippias nor Socrates accepts the conclusion of the argument. Although the dialogue does not formally end in aporia,13 Plato has made it abundantly clear that Socrates finds the conclusion to be highly problematic. There are two passages in which Socrates demonstrates his dislike for the conclusion. In response to Hippias’ disagreement with the view that the person who commits a deliberate wrong will be the good person, Socrates claims, ‘nor can I agree with myself, Hippias’ (Hippias Minor 376b). This claim distances the character Socrates from the established conclusion. Plato is telling the reader to be wary of the claim that the good person would knowingly do wrong. Instead of interpreting the Hippias Minor as Plato’s criticism of the craft analogy and the earlier Socratic method of doing philosophy, one should treat the ending of the dialogue as a puzzle that Plato has left to be worked out by the reader. Additionally, Socrates states the conclusion in the form of a conditional statement: ‘the one who voluntarily misses the mark and does what is shameful and unjust, Hippias—that is, if there is such a person—would be no other than the good man’ (Hippias Minor 376b). Thus if there exists a person who deliberately misuses his knowledge, then that person would be the good person. Yet the antecedent of the conditional statement has not been established. That the good person has the ability to misuse his knowledge does not entail that such a person would, in fact, do so. Socrates is not condemning the good man to a life of shame and injustice, as one might imagine, but recognizes that if shameful and unjust actions are to be committed, then the person guided by the appropriate knowledge would be the most qualified to do so. One might argue, however, that the antecedent has been clearly demonstrated by reference to the craftsman who has the ability knowingly to misuse his knowledge. If craft knowledge can be misused, is it possible for moral knowledge to be misused in a similar fashion? This question can be answered by looking to the way in which a craftsman might misuse his knowledge. It appears that craft knowledge can seemingly be misused in two ways. The doctor, for example, strives to achieve the production of health in the body, and the successful production of such a beneficial result is a sign of the expert status of the doctor. Yet it was argued in the Republic that the person most skilled in the treatment of disease is also the most qualified to bring it about unnoticed (Republic 333e). Yet if a doctor

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were to kill a patient intentionally one must question the underlying reason for the action, for Plato holds that one’s actions are determined by one’s knowledge or opinions. Thus if a doctor poisoned a wealthy patient in order to acquire his property, then the guiding principle in this action is not the particular craft knowledge of medicine but rather an opinion or belief concerning what the doctor considers to be good. Similarly, if a doctor poisons a terminally ill patient in order to bring about an end to suffering, that which guides the actions of the doctor is not the craft knowledge of medicine, but again an opinion or belief about what is good. Thus the example of a doctor who kills her patients is not a true example of the misuse of craft knowledge. There is yet another possible instance of misuse to consider. The product created by the craftsman can be misused by another person. The blacksmith, for example, when forging a weapon, has no knowledge of its use, and therefore the weapon could be used for good or ill purposes. Similarly, the doctor, when curing one of an illness, has no knowledge of whether the continuation of the patient’s life is a good or ill state of affairs.14 In some cases the goodness or benefit of the products of craft knowledge is dependent upon their proper use. In these cases the knowledge of the proper use of the product extends beyond the boundaries of mere craft knowledge. A similar point is made in both the Euthydemus (279a–281d) and the Meno (87e–88d), where Socrates argues that the benefit or goodness of a thing is derived from its right use. In emphasizing the proper use of a product, Plato illustrates a type of knowledge that transcends craft knowledge in that it can recognize the right use of those products and services rendered by the craftsman. The knowledge that allows one to recognize the goodness of other varieties of craft knowledge, as well as the goodness of their products, is itself a superordinate knowledge. This superordinate craft knowledge is the clearest example Plato has given of moral knowledge. Thus the apparent misuse of craft knowledge can be understood as the result of a craft being guided by an additional superordinate knowledge. In the best case one’s actions would be guided by the superordinate knowledge of good and evil, as proposed in the Laches (199d–e) and Charmides (174b–e). Yet in many cases one’s actions are in fact guided by mistaken notions of the good. If one mistakenly believes the good to be wealth, honour, or pleasure, then one’s mistaken opinion of the good will guide one’s actions in an immoral and inappropriate direction. The proper superordinate knowledge would be that knowledge which oversees

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the other knowledges and has as its object that which is truly good for humans. Although this superordinate knowledge is illustrated through the craft analogy, it is similar but not identical to craft knowledge. The craft analogy is, after all, a device in which one item is described or explained through reference to another, similar item. The nature of the analogy between a craft and virtue seems to be an approximate resemblance, not on identity, for moral knowledge shares many, but not all, of its characteristics with craft knowledge. Although Plato portrays moral knowledge as analogous to craft knowledge, there are several aspects of moral knowledge that have yet to be explained. Nonetheless, Plato’s approximate analogy between craft knowledge and moral knowledge can be understood in the following manner. Just as the craftsman is a recognized expert in a particular craft due to the possession of craft knowledge, so too would the possessor of moral knowledge be recognized as a virtuous person. Yet unlike the possession of craft knowledge, which determines one’s profession, the possession of moral knowledge determines one’s character. Furthermore, since the possession of craft knowledge is sufficient for the production of a beneficial result, then moral knowledge will be sufficient for virtue and virtuous action. Both the object of moral knowledge and the beneficial product of moral knowledge have yet to be clarified. Plato has, however, alluded to the object of moral knowledge in the early dialogues. Both the Laches (199d–e) and the Charmides (174b–e) addressed the knowledge of good and evil. In each case the knowledge of good and evil was rejected because it pertained to virtue as a whole and not to the particular virtues of courage or moderation. Thus Socrates has alluded to the fact that moral knowledge, or virtue, consists in the knowledge of good and evil. As such, moral knowledge could account for the goodness or benefit of the other particular virtues, as well as for the proper use of craft knowledge. To return to the discussion in the Hippias Minor, the good person can be seen as one who possesses knowledge of good and evil. As a possessor of such knowledge, the good person will have the ability to do wrong, for in knowing the good one will also recognize its opposite. But given that everyone desires the good,15 the good person will never act contrary to her knowledge of the good, although she may have the ability to do so. Moral knowledge is prescriptive in nature and guides us in the proper direction. Taking these points into consideration we can understand the problematic conclusion of the Hippias Minor and see that knowledge of good and evil is sufficient for virtue. Finally, moral knowledge has been illustrated in several dialogues by

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reference to craft knowledge. If Plato intends, as I have argued, for his readers to recognize that moral knowledge is adequately modelled by reference to craft knowledge, then we are now in a position to understand more clearly the nature of moral knowledge. The Platonic conception of virtue is identified with moral knowledge. As such it can be seen as a superordinate craft that has as its object the good. The beneficial result produced by moral knowledge, however, has yet to be discovered. I will ultimately argue that the product of moral knowledge is happiness, for when one is guided by knowledge of the good, one will do well and be happy. Yet a more important question concerning the relationship between knowledge and virtue must first be addressed. It was shown in the Gorgias that rhetoric could be used to persuade those who lack knowledge into accepting a ‘conviction without knowledge’ (Gorgias 454e) concerning the benefit of certain actions. Gorgias even claimed that the use of rhetoric produced more beneficial results than the other varieties of craft knowledge (Gorgias 456b). Thus rhetoric, which lacks knowledge, is apparently capable of producing beneficial results. Are there other cognitive states that, though not knowledge of good and evil, can nonetheless produce virtue? The craft analogy has shown that knowledge is a sufficient condition for virtue. Yet the existence of other cognitive states capable of producing virtue would imply that knowledge is not a necessary condition for virtue. A further examination of the complexities of Platonic epistemology is required to understand fully the relationship between knowledge and virtue.

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Chapter 4

Virtue and its acquisition He questioned softly why I failed? ‘For beauty,’ I replied. ‘And I for truth, — the two are one; We brethren are,’ he said. — Emily Dickinson1 As we have seen, the craft analogy figures prominently in the early dialogues. Yet in spite of Plato’s insistence upon the analogous nature of craft knowledge and moral knowledge, there are still important differences between these two types of knowledge. I intend next to examine the limits of the analogy by recognizing one area in which craft knowledge appears to differ from the moral knowledge Plato identifies with virtue. An interesting question concerns the acquisition of moral knowledge, specifically whether or not virtue can be taught. While craft knowledge is clearly a type of knowledge that can be imparted from teacher to student, it is not immediately clear whether virtue can be taught in the same manner. In this chapter I investigate the role of knowledge in virtue by examining passages from the Protagoras and the Meno, two dialogues that specifically address the nature of virtue and its acquisition. I supplement this discussion by examining selected passages from the Euthydemus. The concept of a superordinate knowledge was introduced in the Charmides within the brief discussion of moderation as knowledge of good and evil. This concept is further addressed in the Euthydemus and the Meno in the recognition that the goodness or benefit of an object requires its proper use. In these two dialogues Plato indirectly addresses the knowledge of good and evil by demonstrating that benefit stems from right use, and right use stems from knowledge. The knowledge that allows one to use something properly is an aspect of what has been referred to up to this point as the knowledge of good and evil. As Plato further articulates his metaphysical views he will describe this superordinate knowledge as knowledge of the form of the Good. I will argue that one can trace a continuous line of thought describing moral knowledge as a superordinate knowledge of the good, beginning in the Charmides, running

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through the Euthydemus and the Meno, and pointing forward to middleperiod dialogues such as the Republic. In this sense the transitional dialogues of the Meno and the Euthydemus can be seen as stepping stones, revealing the proleptic nature of the dialogues and leading the reader toward a more complete and more complex articulation of Platonic ethics. In examining the Protagoras and the Meno I demonstrate that the Platonic conception of virtue differs from commonly held ideas about virtue. I examine the important distinction raised in the Meno between knowledge and opinion in order to distinguish between true virtue and popular or demotic virtue. I show how the distinction between knowledge and opinion can enable one to understand better some of the surprising views that Socrates seems to hold, such as the view in the Meno that virtue cannot be taught and is therefore not a type of knowledge, as well as the claim put forth in the Protagoras concerning the unity of the virtues. If true virtue can be understood along the lines of a superordinate knowledge, then the type of virtue espoused by the characters Protagoras and Meno can be seen as variations of the imitative, popular virtue associated with mere opinion. This fundamental epistemological distinction between knowledge and opinion is reflected in Plato’s ethical distinction between true and popular virtue. Furthermore, it foreshadows the metaphysical distinction introduced in the middle-period dialogues between the intelligible realm of the forms and the sensible realm of appearances. Whether one approaches this important distinction from an ethical, epistemological, or metaphysical perspective, one must recognize that this is the central aspect of Platonic philosophy. In the next two chapters I argue that Plato’s earlier dialogues, while primarily concerned with the role of knowledge in the particular virtues, are also designed to introduce the distinction between true virtue and popular virtue. Dialogues such as the Protagoras and the Meno build upon this distinction and lead the reader to the further articulation of this same distinction as it is seen from epistemological and metaphysical perspectives in the middle-period dialogues. The Protagoras and the teaching of virtue The teaching or acquisition of virtue is a recurring theme throughout the early dialogues of definition. An even stronger emphasis upon virtue and its acquisition is found in the Protagoras and the Meno, where Protagoras himself claims to teach it and Meno desires to possess it. Furthermore, the Euthydemus features the two brothers Euthydemus and Dionysidorus, both sophists who claim a superlative ability to teach virtue. While the twofold

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theme of virtue and its acquisition appears in all three dialogues, the distinction between the nature of virtue and the teaching of virtue is not always clear. This is largely due to Plato’s use of the craft analogy. If virtue is analogous to a craft, then just as the various crafts can be taught, one would expect that virtue can also be taught. Both the Protagoras and the Euthydemus emphasize virtue and its acquisition. The character Protagoras, for example, seems to enjoy thoroughly his reputation as a teacher of virtue. When asked to explain the subject of his instruction, he proudly boasts: Young man, this is what you will get if you study with me: The very day you start, you will go home a better man, and the same thing will happen the day after. Every day, day after day, you will get better and better. (Protagoras 318a–b)2 A similar confidence is shown by the attitude of Euthydemus and Dionysidorus, who claim: ‘Virtue, Socrates, is what it is . . . and we think we can teach it better than anyone else and more quickly’ (Euthydemus 273d).3 When Protagoras is further pressed to explain how his instruction will make one a better person each and every day, he answers: What I teach is sound deliberation, both in domestic matters—how best to manage one’s household, and in public affairs—how to realize one’s maximum potential for success in political debate and action (¤pvq ta` th q` po´levq dynatv´tatoq a[n ei=h kai` pra´ttein kai` le´gein). (Protagoras 318e– 319a) Protagoras’ claims that virtue allows one to manage both the household and political affairs echoes the views of Euthyphro concerning piety (Euthyphro 14b) and anticipates Meno’s view concerning virtue as a whole (Meno 71e). The fact that Plato has three different characters from three different dialogues refer to the concept of managing both public and private affairs implies that this is likely a widely recognized formulation of popular virtue. While Protagoras refers to the practical benefit of his instruction, Euthydemus and Dionysidorus simply make the broader claim that they are ‘the best people in the world to incline a man toward philosophy and the practice of virtue’ (Euthydemus 274e–275a).4 In both dialogues Plato portrays the sophists as extremely confident of their ability to teach virtue. Protagoras identifies virtue with the political craft (th`n politikh`n te´xnh). Socrates, believing that this subject cannot be taught, cites the Athenian

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people and their belief that all citizens are equally qualified to give advice concerning the management of the city (Protagoras 319b–e). When advice is needed concerning a particular craft, then it is the practitioner of that craft who is called upon. Yet when advice is needed concerning civic administration, anyone can offer advice. Socrates claims that the difference must be that the Athenian people do not believe that the political craft of managing the city can be taught. As further evidence Socrates points out that those who possess the highest reputation for virtue are unable to pass this quality on to their offspring (Protagoras 319e–320b). Although Socrates claims that he believes virtue cannot be taught, one should not necessarily assume this to be a view held by either the historical Socrates or Plato. One must recognize that the character Socrates is speaking of the popular conception of virtue as recognized by the Athenian people. Plato’s own conception of virtue and its acquisition will emerge as the dialogue progresses. In spite of his apparent belief that virtue cannot be taught, Socrates immediately qualifies this claim by deferring to Protagoras’ wisdom. In response Protagoras delivers a mythic account of the origin of humankind and the allotment of the various crafts and abilities. The significance of this account is the claim that the craft of politics, which comprises justice (dºkh) and a sense of shame (ai| dv´q), is shared equally by all. This, according to Protagoras, explains why the Athenians will listen to advice given by anyone concerning virtue, for ‘everyone here is a teacher of virtue, to the best of his ability’ (Protagoras 327e). Protagoras states that although everyone possesses virtue, ‘[i]f there is someone who is the least bit more advanced in virtue than ourselves, he is to be cherished’. He then ensures his own position as a teacher of virtue by claiming, ‘I consider myself to be such a person, uniquely qualified to assist others in becoming noble and good’ (Protagoras 328b). Thus Protagoras not only claims that virtue can be taught—here expressed in terms of the noble and the good (to` kalo`n kai` a| gauo´n)—he also claims that he possesses the ability to teach it. While Protagoras is somewhat immodest in his claim to be a ‘uniquely qualified’ teacher of virtue, the brothers Euthydemus and Dionysidorus are even bolder in their claim to be experts in the teaching of virtue. Although neither Protagoras nor the brothers are true teachers of virtue, perhaps the difference in their attitudes is proportional to the actual subjects they teach. Protagoras claims to teach virtue but in fact only persuades an audience concerning the popular conception of virtue. He nonetheless sees himself as concerned with the truth. Euthydemus and Dionysidorus, however, are only concerned with eristic arguments and

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have no real concern for the truth at all. It appears that Plato has portrayed those who are the furthest from the truth as possessing the highest degree of self-confidence. Socrates’ claim that virtue cannot be taught distinguishes the Protagoras from other early dialogues in which the craft analogy plays a significant role. This raises interesting questions about the relationship between knowledge and virtue. What should one make of Socrates’ claim that virtue cannot be taught? Does this serve as evidence that virtue, which was identified with moral knowledge in the early dialogues, is no longer analogous to craft knowledge? Furthermore, does such a claim imply that Plato holds a different conception of virtue and its acquisition from that held by the historical Socrates? Before addressing these questions I will first examine Protagoras’ claim that virtue can be taught, in order to gain an understanding of the Protagorean conception of virtue. In his explanation of the origin of justice (Protagoras 322c–323a), Protagoras claims that virtue is possessed by all. In this respect virtue is not analogous to the other traditional crafts, which are possessed only by experts. If virtue were possessed by everyone, then there would apparently be no need to teach it. Yet Protagoras, seeing himself as one who is more advanced in the possession of virtue, claims just such an ability. How can Protagoras hold the position that he himself is a recognized teacher of a subject that, being universally known, apparently has no need of being taught? Protagoras addresses this by recognizing that although political virtue was originally given to all of humanity, it must nonetheless be passed down, just as knowledge of the native language is passed down from generation to generation. Linking his craft with the other teachable crafts, Protagoras claims ‘[i]t is the same with virtue and everything else’ (Protagoras 328a), implying that virtue can be taught. Finally, seeing himself as one superior in the possession of political virtue, Protagoras claims to be a teacher of virtue while still accounting for the fact that it is possessed by everyone. His status as an expert is not due to his possession of a specific type of knowledge, for Protagoras never equates virtue with knowledge. Thus the nature of virtue remains undefined, for the discussion in the Protagoras focuses on the acquisition of virtue, not its essence. The Protagorean account of virtue and its acquisition differs from the Platonic account, which claims that virtue is a type of knowledge and can therefore be taught. In the Protagoras, however, we see an account of virtue that is not analogous to craft knowledge. Protagorean virtue is neither identified with knowledge nor possessed by a particular expert in a

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particular field. The one common element between Protagorean virtue and the traditional crafts is that they are apparently both capable of being taught. Perhaps even more interesting is the fact that Socrates claims that virtue apparently cannot be taught. The fact that the character Socrates holds a different view from the view he holds in other dialogues should be a signal that perhaps something is amiss with the claims made by Socrates, or that we cannot blindly and consistently accept Socrates the character to be a spokesman for Plato the philosopher. To understand better why Socrates holds this particular view it is helpful to realize that he begins by referring to the popular conception of political or civic virtue held by the Athenian people (Protagoras 319b–320b). Protagoras, as well, equates civic virtue with the craft of politics. Both Socrates and Protagoras are speaking of one particular instance of virtue: the virtue that manifests itself in the realm of the political arena. With this recognition it becomes easier to understand why the craft analogy, so prominent in the earlier dialogues, all but disappears in the Protagoras. In this dialogue neither Socrates nor Protagoras describes goodness in itself, but only a lesser type of political goodness.5 Plato intends the reader to recognize that a true craft, consisting of a type of knowledge, can be taught if the craftsman actually possesses the relevant knowledge. In the case of virtue, Protagoras would have to be truly virtuous himself in order to teach virtue. Protagoras, however, never claims to possess knowledge. In fact what Protagoras possesses is the ability to persuade an audience through his gift of eloquence.6 Thus he does not teach from the standpoint of one who possesses knowledge of his subject matter. In this sense Protagoras’ teaching of virtue conforms neither to the craft analogy nor to the Platonic conception of virtue. The unity of virtue The Protagoras provides the reader with beneficial insight into the relationship between the various virtues featured in the early dialogues of definition. While it is clear that knowledge plays an important role in virtue, the Protagoras describes the way in which the individual virtues are unified in knowledge. Much as Emily Dickinson recognizes the unity of truth and beauty, Protagoras claims that ‘virtue is a single entity’ (Protagoras 329d). A brief examination of the virtues discussed thus far will help to describe Plato’s idea of the relationship between the virtues, as well as help to define the role of knowledge in virtue. Throughout the early dialogues Socrates portrayed each of the

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particular virtues in a positive sense, implying that each was fine or good. This claim illustrates an important common feature of the virtues and supports the idea that the virtues are inseparable. The implication that knowledge is sufficient for virtue further indicates that the virtues are unified in knowledge or wisdom. I intend to show that Plato ultimately wants the reader to recognize that the virtues are unified in knowledge of the good. This unity not only entails that all the virtues are one, but also that one cannot possess one virtue without possessing the other virtues as well. Concerning the virtues of justice and piety, Protagoras claims that the relationship is simply one of resemblance. Socrates, however, argues for the stronger position. His claim that ‘justice is pious and piety is just’ (Protagoras 331b) implies that the two virtues are identical. The first statement of the relationship between justice and piety occurred in the Euthyphro, where it was stated that ‘the pious is a part of justice’, specifically that part of justice ‘concerned with the care of the gods’ (Euthyphro 12e). Here we see another example of the proleptic nature of the early dialogues. The Euthyphro introduced the relationship of piety and justice, yet the full extent of that relationship is not realized until the Protagoras. Similarly, the virtue of moderation introduced in the Charmides was identified with a variety of types of knowledge. Here in the Protagoras we see a more thorough investigation of that relationship as well. Having briefly examined the relationship of justice and piety, Socrates turns to the relationship between wisdom and moderation.7 Socrates and Protagoras recognize that folly (a| fros¥nh) appears to be the opposite of both moderation (svfros¥nh) and wisdom (sofºa, Protagoras 332a–e). Since they agree that each thing has only one opposite, Socrates concludes that wisdom and moderation must be the same thing. The ease with which Socrates draws this conclusion stems from the different senses of the terms involved. First Socrates distinguishes folly from wisdom, implying that folly (a| fros¥nh) is identified with ignorance or a lack of wisdom. Yet he next claims that those who do not act correctly act foolishly or without sense (a| fro´nvq), and those who act this way are not moderate. Here it seems that one’s foolish action is opposed to the practical ability to judge correctly the benefit of one’s actions. This second sense of folly is phrased in the context of action and is quite unlike the initial sense of folly, whose meaning is purely intellectual. Although Protagoras only grudgingly agrees with the conclusion, it is the wide linguistic meaning of the terms involved that allows Socrates to speak as though he has demonstrated the identification of wisdom and moderation. In spite of this apparent weakness with the argument, I believe Plato intends for the reader to

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recognize the continuation of discussions from earlier dialogues and to conclude with Socrates that the virtues are identical. At this point the course of the dialogue is diverted before Socrates can fully argue that the just person could not do anything that was not also moderate, yet it seems clear that Socrates’ intention is to imply just such an identity between justice and moderation. In claiming that the pious person cannot help but be just, moderate, and wise, Socrates is implying that justice, piety, moderation, and wisdom are identical to one another. Seen this way, the Protagoras continues the discussion started in the Euthyphro, Laches, and Charmides, where Plato first tacitly introduced the idea of the unity of virtue.8 The remaining virtue to be addressed is the virtue of courage, which Socrates investigates when Protagoras claims that courage can be possessed in the absence of all the other virtues. Socrates’ response is to demonstrate that the courageous person is courageous due to the possession of a specific kind of confidence that results from the possession of wisdom, for ‘the most confident are the most courageous’ (Protagoras 350c). Thus Socrates identifies courage with wisdom. He explains this identity by addressing the way in which the majority of people (oi\ polloº) mistakenly believe in the ability to be overcome by pleasure. Most mistakenly believe that in spite of one’s wisdom, one’s actions are guided by pleasure, pain, love, fear, or other non-cognitive factors. Socrates’ task is to demonstrate that the presence of knowledge rules one’s soul and that it is impossible for one in possession of knowledge to be controlled by these non-cognitive factors. Speaking from the perspective of the many, Socrates equates pleasure with good, claiming that to live pleasantly is good and to live unpleasantly is bad (Protagoras 351c). The reason Protagoras believes it is possible to possess courage without any of the other virtues is because he himself is speaking of the popular conception of courage as well. Socrates points out that most people believe one is overcome by pleasure when one acts contrary to one’s knowledge. Yet Socrates previously recognized the equivalence of the terms ‘pleasant’ and ‘good’. Thus it is not the case that pleasure outweighs one’s knowledge. Rather, one mistakenly believes one thing to be more pleasant or better than another. What is required is a craft of measurement (h\ metrhtikh` te´xnh, Protagoras 356d) that would allow one to judge accurately present and future pleasures and pains. Socrates claims this craft would be ‘nothing other than knowledge’ (Protagoras 357a) and would have the power of correctly guiding one’s actions. Armed with such knowledge one could never choose a lesser pleasure for a

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greater pain or a lesser good for a greater evil, and thus the idea that one could be overcome by pleasure is impossible. The bearing of this discussion upon the virtue of courage becomes apparent when we realize that Protagoras is holding the popular, demotic conception of courage, which fails to distinguish between bold or daring actions and true courage, which possesses a cognitive component. While it is true that one could act in a bold or daring way without the possession of any of the other virtues, this would not constitute a legitimate example of courage apart from the other virtues. Cowardice, according to Socrates, is ignorance of what is and is not to be feared. Conversely, courage is knowledge of what is and is not to be feared (Protagoras 360d). Thus the courageous person is guided in her actions by her knowledge. The proper type of guiding knowledge would be similar to the craft of measurement. Furthermore, the craft of measurement, which Socrates eventually equates with knowledge of the good, can be seen as a superordinate knowledge that recognizes the goodness of possible future actions. Thus just as in the Laches and Charmides, where Plato first introduced the knowledge of good and evil, the Protagoras also points the way toward the Platonic conception of virtue. While Socrates spoke from the perspective of the many when he discussed pleasure and pain, one must recognize that pleasure is simply an instance of the good, much as honour is an instance of the good.9 The proper knowledge that would guide one concerning what is and is not to be feared is not knowledge of the pleasant, but knowledge of the good. Thus courage is identical to wisdom, and Socrates has shown that the various virtues are unified in wisdom. In particular Plato is pointing ahead toward knowledge of the good as the unifying element in all the dialogues. Although the character Socrates identifies pleasure with the good in this dialogue, this identification is simply a device by which Plato can address the popular conception of the virtues held by Protagoras. Pleasure is simply used as a model understandable to the many and is not reflective of Socrates’ or Plato’s personal views on the nature of the good. Furthermore, Plato discusses the good in terms of pleasure in order to distinguish clearly between popular virtue and true virtue. Protagoras claimed to teach virtue without recognizing this distinction and without fully examining the nature of virtue. The dialogue marks the beginning of Protagoras’ education concerning virtue, its nature, and its acquisition. Whereas Socrates initially appealed to the popular conception of virtue and thus argued that it could not be taught, Protagoras, without fully reflecting upon the subject, argued that it could be taught and presented himself as a teacher of virtue. By the end of the dialogue, however, it appears that each character is holding the opposite position. Protagoras

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has attempted to defend the popular conception of the virtues as separate parts of a larger whole. Socrates, however, has shown that all the virtues are united in wisdom, thus once again supporting the claim that virtue is knowledge. Thus the Protagoras is a dialogue designed to achieve many ends: it discusses the nature of virtue as a whole; it addresses the issue of the acquisition of virtue; it builds upon the earlier view that each of the virtues can be identified with knowledge by addressing the concept of the unity of virtue; and most importantly it implicitly distinguishes between knowledge and opinion by explicitly distinguishing between true virtue and popular virtue. Plato intends for the reader to recognize that the popular conception of virtue is associated exclusively with opinion, while the Platonic conception of true virtue is uniquely identified with knowledge. Several of the early dialogues implicitly distinguish between true virtue and popular or demotic virtues. The popular virtues are generally contrasted to those involving knowledge, for the absence of knowledge is one of the distinguishing characteristics of the popular virtues. Yet what has the ability to guide one’s actions if not some type of knowledge? Plato would have the reader believe that one can also be guided by the cognitive state of opinion. Important distinctions between knowledge and opinion, as well as their respective abilities to act as a guide, are more fully addressed in the Meno. The Meno not only sheds additional light on the central topics of the early dialogues, but also directs the reader forward toward Plato’s more detailed articulation of those same philosophical issues as they appear in the middle-period dialogues. Epistemic pessimism in the Meno The Meno is an important dialogue that contains elements found in the early dialogues of definition while also presenting novel philosophical views. In the Meno one can clearly see the protreptic and proleptic nature of Plato’s dialogues. The Meno is protreptic in that it illustrates the important role that knowledge plays in a virtuous life. It is also proleptic because it anticipates the completion of Plato’s ethical and epistemological views in the middle-period dialogues. Thus we find certain ideas introduced in the Meno, such as recollection of pre-natal knowledge, the immortality and transmigration of the soul, and a reference to forms, which are only fully explained in later works. Most importantly, the Meno serves to strengthen the claim stressed throughout the early dialogues that virtue is somehow tied to the possession of knowledge. Yet the Meno examines the relationship between knowledge and virtue from a more

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complex perspective, providing the reader with a more sophisticated understanding of this relationship. Although the Meno is initially concerned with virtue and its acquisition, the most important philosophical position presented in the dialogue is the distinction between knowledge and true opinion (a| lhuh`q do´ja). The importance of knowledge is illustrated in Socrates’ response to Meno’s paradox that one cannot search either for what one knows or for what one does not know. This paradox is stated twice. Meno first states it in the form of a question about their ability to continue searching for virtue: How will you look for it, Socrates, when you do not know (mh` oi \sua) at all what it is? How will you aim your search for something you do not know (oªk oi \sua) at all? If you should meet with it, how will you know (pv`q ei=sh/) that this is the thing that you did not know (oªk h/[dhsua)? (Meno 80d) The emphasis upon knowledge and the difficulty brought about by the lack of knowledge is obvious from the several instances of the verb ‘to know’, as well as from the fact that Plato has the character Socrates repeat the paradox: Do you realize [see, know] (o\rQ`q) what a debater’s argument (e| ristiko`n lo´gon) you are bringing up, that a man cannot search either for what he knows or for what he does not know (o{te ¤ oi \den o{te ¤ mh` oi \den)? He cannot search for what he knows (oi \de)—since he knows it (oi \de), there is no need to search—nor for what he does not know (mh` oi \den), for he does not know (oªde` ga`r oi \den) what to look for. (Meno 80e) Meno’s paradox, with its emphasis upon the inability to discover what one does not presently know, brings about a change in the direction of the dialogue. No longer is the primary aim of the dialogue the discovery of the ethical concept of virtue and its acquisition, for now the Meno is concerned with the more immediate epistemological question of knowledge and its relationship to virtue. Meno’s paradox reminds the reader of a feature common to Socratic enquiry known as the principle of priority of definition: the idea that if one does not know the essence of a subject, one can then know nothing at all about any accidental features of that subject. Meno’s paradox, however, does not simply state that knowledge of secondary characteristics is impossible without knowledge of essences, but rather that knowledge of the essence of a thing is impossible without some kind of prior knowledge

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to guide one’s investigation. To address Meno’s epistemic pessimism Plato introduces two concepts never discussed in the earlier dialogues: the theory of recollection and the immortality of the soul. Given the significance Plato places upon Meno’s paradox, it seems that Plato wants the reader to recognize it as more than simply an eristic argument employed by Meno to divert Socrates from the task of discovering virtue. Although Plato puts these esoteric doctrines into the mouths of ‘priests and priestesses10 whose care it is to be able to give an account11 of their practices’ (Meno 81a–b), Plato here for the first time gives the reader a glimpse of the transcendent nature of the soul and the knowledge it possesses. Plato’s answer to Meno’s paradox is to propose the recollection (a| na´mnhsiq) of pre-natal knowledge. The geometrical experiment with the slave boy (Meno 82b–86c), itself a microcosm of the Socratic elenctic method, is intended to illustrate the way in which knowledge can be recalled or recollected from within one’s soul. Socrates asks the young boy questions concerning the construction of a geometric figure with particular properties. One trained in geometry would recognize the solution based upon one’s education and experience with similar problems. Yet the young slave boy, lacking any mathematical education, can only offer guesses in his attempt to answer the question. Through Socratic questioning, the slave boy offers both incorrect and correct answers. His incorrect answers are his own opinions that, after gentle guidance from Socrates, are recognized as false. With continued Socratic questioning and guidance the young boy is finally able to discover the proper answer. Given that he has had no education, Socrates concludes that he has always had this knowledge present in his soul, and that ‘the truth about reality is always in our soul’ and thus we should always ‘try to seek out and recollect’ (Meno 86b) that which we do not know. In this way Socrates offers a solution to Meno’s paradox, showing that we can and should keep searching for the truth, even if the truth is something as apparently elusive as the essence of virtue itself. The theory of recollection not only answers Meno’s paradox, it also gives the reader a glimpse of Plato’s more sophisticated epistemology, as well as insight into the metaphysical doctrines yet to come. While the theory of recollection emphasizes the cognitive state of knowledge, it also introduces another cognitive state that can apparently guide one in the proper direction. If one skilled in geometry were to possess the knowledge required to answer Socrates’ geometric puzzle, there would be no need for questioning. Yet if one were totally ignorant and completely lacking in such knowledge, then there would be no

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possible chance for success, for without knowledge as a guide one would not recognize the truth if and when one discovered it. Yet the young boy, while clearly not in possession of knowledge, nonetheless recognizes the solution to the question as a correct solution (Meno 85a–b). In order for him to recognize the truth as the truth he must have been guided by something. The theory of recollection implies that the boy was able to recall knowledge as a result of Socratic questioning. Yet in his explanation of recollection, Socrates refers to two cognitive states: knowledge and true opinion. The boy’s innate knowledge enables him to recognize the correct answer, yet once he sees the correct answer for what it is, that particular cognitive state is described as true opinion (Meno 85c). Thus Meno’s paradox serves two distinct dramatic and philosophic purposes. First, it allows Plato to introduce both the metaphysical doctrine of the immortality of the soul and the epistemological theory of recollection. Yet it also affords Plato the opportunity to introduce the cognitive state of true opinion. Socrates concludes that ‘the man who does not know has within himself true opinions about the things that he does not know’ (Meno 85c). As this quotation points out, Plato is distinguishing true opinion from knowledge and implying that one can be guided toward knowledge through true opinion. Socrates then implies that through further questioning, the boy’s true opinions about geometric figures would eventually become knowledge,12 a view that he makes explicit later in the dialogue (Meno 97e–98a). The idea that the best life is a life guided by knowledge was a concept first addressed in the early dialogues of definition. Socrates’ response to Meno’s paradox reminds the reader of this principle. The theory of recollection is designed to show that one has the ability to discover what one does not know by recollecting the a priori knowledge already present in one’s soul. It partially accomplishes this task by illustrating the existence of true opinion, that cognitive state between knowledge and ignorance that can and does guide us in our successful investigations and actions. Not only does the introduction of the state of true opinion assist in answering Meno’s paradox, but it also provides the key ingredient for the next topic of discussion in the dialogue: the related questions of whether virtue is knowledge and whether virtue can be taught. Can virtue be taught? The role of true opinion in the Meno In order to investigate the nature and acquisition of virtue, Socrates agrees to proceed ‘by means of a hypothesis (e| j yJpoue´sevq) . . . the way geometers often carry on their investigations’ (Meno 86e). To some this move might

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be seen as evidence that Plato is critical of the Socratic elenchus. Meno, however, has revealed throughout the dialogue that he is only concerned with the acquisition of virtue and not with the investigation into the essence of virtue. While Meno believes that Socrates is now investigating the acquisition of virtue, Socrates is actually relying upon a hypothesis that will show whether or not virtue can be taught only if it is a type of knowledge. Thus the method of hypothesis now employed by Socrates should be seen as yet another method by which to discover the essence of virtue and not as evidence that Plato is either critical of, or developing beyond, the historical Socrates. Additionally, the Socratic elenchus is effective only insofar as one is willing and able to participate in the discussion. Yet Meno has clearly exhausted his opinions concerning the nature of virtue. Thus the method of hypothesis is now used to continue the investigation. The change from the elenctic method to the method of hypothesis is neither an indication of Plato’s philosophic development nor a boundary between Socratic and Platonic philosophies. It is rather a device employed by Plato to illustrate previously stated points in greater detail and clarity. Although the Meno differs from other earlier dialogues—due to the inclusion of the theory of recollection, the method of hypothesis, and the introduction of true opinion—these novel elements should be seen as tools used to examine more closely previously established philosophical views. When seen in this manner the proleptic nature of the dialogues becomes more apparent. The use of the hypothetical method also contains a veiled reference to craft knowledge. By relying upon the method of hypothesis, Plato is employing a tool used by the mathematician, the possessor of a particular craft. Plato is again implying that virtue, or moral knowledge, is analogous to craft knowledge, for in this instance the method of discovery employed by the mathematician to discover mathematical truths is the same as the method used by Socrates to discover the nature of virtue. Once Meno agrees to proceed by the method of hypothesis, two separate arguments follow. Beginning with the hypothesis, ‘if virtue is knowledge, then virtue can be taught’ (Meno 87c), the first argument concludes that virtue is knowledge: the antecedent of the conditional hypothesis is satisfied, and so it follows that virtue can be taught. Yet almost immediately a second argument is formulated that concludes that virtue cannot be taught, and thus virtue is not knowledge. This section of the dialogue, by way of these two contradictory conclusions, serves to clarify the important epistemological distinction between knowledge and true opinion. To understand better the importance of true opinion and its relationship to virtue, I will examine both of the arguments.

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Although the first argument begins with the hypothesis ‘if virtue is knowledge, then virtue can be taught’, it is followed by the hypothesis ‘virtue is a good’ (Meno 87d). Both Socrates and Meno readily agree to this claim, and Plato never argues for its veracity in the Meno. Any argument explaining why virtue is a good thing must wait until the discussion of Plato’s metaphysical views in the middle dialogues. Recognizing that all good things are beneficial or advantageous, Socrates concludes that virtue must be beneficial. Yet an examination of those things thought to be beneficial quickly reveals that while a thing might be beneficial at one time, it is not necessarily beneficial at all times. Thus strength and wealth, two of Socrates’ examples (Meno 87e), are recognized as beneficial only when used properly, for the misuse of one’s strength or wealth could easily lead to a harmful or detrimental result. A similar concept is presented in the Euthydemus, in which Socrates argues for the benefits of a philosophic life. In the Euthydemus the argument begins from the recognition that everyone wants to do well. It is then agreed that one avenue of success is to acquire good things (Euthydemus 278e). Socrates then lists a catalogue of goods that closely resembles the list of goods described in the Meno. Wealth, health, good looks, noble birth, and power are all considered good attributes that lead toward a good life (Euthydemus 279a–b). Similarly, the Meno describes health, strength, beauty, and wealth as things that bring benefit to their possessor (Meno 87e). In both dialogues Socrates then moves from the description of tangible attributes to a list of particular virtues. Both the Meno and the Euthydemus describe the virtues of moderation, justice, and courage as good things. Thus those things that assist one in living a good life are not simply the popularly recognized attributes that allow one to live comfortably. In order to live well one must possess virtue. The Euthydemus differs from the Meno in the addition of wisdom as one of the virtues described as a good. The discussion of wisdom is designed to show that good luck, which is popularly recognized as a good, is nothing other than wisdom. Socrates argues this point by referring to the craftsman. An expert helmsman has the best luck facing dangers at sea, just as an intelligent general has the best luck concerning matters of warfare (Euthydemus 279e–280a). From this Socrates argues that ‘wisdom is good luck’ (Euthydemus 279d).13 Having stated the importance of wisdom in a good life, Socrates then claims that the mere presence or possession of goods cannot guarantee a good life. Rather they must be used properly for them to be beneficial. Thus the possession of goods coupled with their right use is required in order for one to live a good life. When not guided by wisdom, ‘both good and bad things are valueless’ (Euthydemus 281d).14

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Here we see another reference to the unity of the virtues, for justice, courage, and moderation, when not properly used, would have no value and would bring their possessor no benefit. What seems to be required is a superordinate knowledge capable of properly guiding one’s actions. As we have seen in the early dialogues Plato implies that knowledge of the good would constitute such superordinate knowledge. The discussion of a superordinate knowledge occurs in the Euthydemus as well. To emphasize further the importance of the proper use of a thing, Plato distinguishes between the acquisition of goods and their right use. Just as the hunter hands his quarry over to a cook, the mathematicians entrust their discoveries to dialecticians, those who understand the proper use of their discoveries (Euthydemus 290b–c). What is required is an understanding of the knowledge that oversees other knowledges. Thus as in the Charmides, the Euthydemus also points the reader toward a superordinate knowledge. Returning to the argument in the Meno, given the importance of the right use of a thing, Socrates claims that knowledge is what enables one to use something in the right way. When one is guided by knowledge in the use of one’s strength or wealth, for example, a beneficial result will be achieved, yet there is no guarantee of such a result when one lacks knowledge. Socrates then states, ‘all the soul undertakes and endures, if directed by wisdom (fronh´sevq), ends in happiness, but if directed by ignorance (a| fros¥nhq), it ends in the opposite’ (Meno 88c). At this point in the argument it appears that wisdom or knowledge is both a necessary and sufficient condition for benefit, for as Socrates has stated, the presence of knowledge is enough to guarantee the beneficial result of happiness, while the lack of knowledge will apparently lead to an opposite result. Given that the only thing that leads to benefit is knowledge, Socrates concludes that virtue must be knowledge. The argument has the following general structure: Hypothesis: If virtue is knowledge, then virtue can be taught. (Meno 87c) (1) Virtue is a good. (Meno 87d) (2) All that is good is beneficial. (Meno 87e) (3) Thus, virtue is beneficial. (Meno 87e) (4) The only thing that is beneficial is knowledge. (Meno 88c) (5) Thus, virtue is knowledge. (Meno 87d) (6) Therefore, virtue can be taught. (Meno 89c)

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The crucial step in this argument is the claim that a beneficial result can only be guaranteed by the presence of knowledge. Although the implication that knowledge is both a necessary and sufficient condition for benefit is not immediately challenged, Socrates will return to this point later in the dialogue. Socrates, however, questions the conclusion of this argument on different grounds. The theoretical conclusion of the argument is not confirmed by actual experience, for there appear to be no teachers of virtue. A second argument is constructed based upon the logically equivalent contrapositive of the original hypothesis, recognizing that if virtue cannot be taught, then virtue is not knowledge. Socrates and Meno begin their search for teachers of virtue in an attempt to discover whether virtue can be taught. The fact that neither the poets (the traditional teachers of virtue) nor the sophists (the more modern claimants to that position) are able to teach virtue lends credibility to Socrates’ claim that there are no teachers of virtue. When Anytus joins the discussion and suggests that ‘any Athenian gentleman’ (Meno 92e) is capable of teaching virtue, Socrates points out the distinction between being virtuous—as in the cases of the famous Athenians Themistocles, Aristides, and Pericles—and being able to teach virtue.15 Since it appears that there are no teachers of virtue, it would follow that virtue cannot be taught. Once again the antecedent of the conditional hypothesis is satisfied, and Socrates concludes that virtue is not knowledge. This second argument has the following general structure: Hypothesis: If virtue cannot be taught, then virtue is not knowledge. (1) If a subject can be taught, then there must be both students and teachers of that subject. (Meno 89d) (2) There are neither teachers nor students of virtue. (Meno 89e–96b) (3) Thus virtue cannot be taught. (Meno 96c) (4) Therefore, virtue is not knowledge. (Meno 99a) The reader is presented with a situation in which two arguments based upon two logically equivalent hypotheses lead to two contradictory conclusions. While clearly both arguments cannot be correct, it is not yet clear where the fault lies. Nor is it clear in which direction the dialogue should proceed. By presenting this stark contradiction, Plato is spurring the reader on toward further consideration of the role of knowledge in virtue. The recognition that one holds contradictory opinions about a subject necessarily forces one to stop and re-examine one’s beliefs. Plato is inviting the reader to reconsider the earlier propositions concerning virtue and its acquisition. It is helpful to examine the possible problems

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with both arguments, largely because the characters in the dialogue do not proceed in such a fashion. Socrates and Meno find fault with the first argument and continue their investigation from that point. Yet although the second argument goes unchallenged for the remainder of the dialogue, I believe that Plato wants his audience to recognize alternative routes that the discussion might have taken at this point and thus also recognize the possibility for alternative conclusions of the dialogue. The second argument centres around the apparent lack of teachers of virtue, for without teachers and students it is assumed that virtue cannot be taught. While Socrates, Meno, and Anytus find no traditional teachers of virtue, their failure does not entail that virtue cannot be taught, but simply that virtue is not taught. The absence of teachers of virtue does not entail the logical impossibility of virtue being taught. Thus although no teachers of virtue have been found, the possibility remains open that teachers of virtue do exist, although they may have escaped the notice of Socrates and his companions in the Meno.16 Furthermore, this argument seems to rely upon the analogy with the traditional method of teaching between teachers and students. The fact that the sophists are proposed as possible teachers of virtue clearly illustrates the model and method of teaching being considered. Yet Socrates made it very clear earlier in the dialogue (Meno 81c–d) that teaching and learning are a matter of recollection. Thus although there appear to be no traditional teachers of virtue, perhaps there are nontraditional teachers of virtue, such as Socrates. This point seems to have escaped Meno’s attention. Keeping these points in mind, we can see that the second argument suffers from several weaknesses. The initial premise—if a subject can be taught, then there must be both teachers and students of that subject—is faulty, for in the case of recollection, the presence of traditional teachers and students is not required. Furthermore, given the logical possibility that there might exist other teachers of virtue, the claim that there are neither teachers nor students of virtue is too strong, and thus it does not follow that virtue cannot be taught. Rather than concluding that virtue cannot be taught, one should conclude that virtue is not taught, leaving open the possibility of the acquisition of virtue through Socratic teaching or recollection. Yet the statement ‘virtue is not taught’ is not the antecedent of the conditional hypothesis ‘if virtue cannot be taught, then virtue is not knowledge’. Therefore the conclusion that virtue is not knowledge is mistaken, for it does not follow from the assumed hypothesis. Plato, interestingly, does not address these points in the dialogue. He focuses the attention of the characters Socrates and Meno on the first

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argument, letting stand the mistaken conclusion from the second argument. Socrates recognizes a difficulty with the first argument concerning the necessity and sufficiency of knowledge for beneficial results. The first argument claims that the only thing beneficial is knowledge. Yet Socrates recognizes the importance of true opinion, a cognitive state different from knowledge that has the same ability to guide one reliably in one’s actions (Meno 96e–97c). Given that both true opinion and knowledge are equally good guides for action, it follows that both can produce beneficial results. Whether one has knowledge or only true opinion of how to use one’s wealth, for example, the result will be beneficial in both cases because both cognitive states provide proper guidance (Meno 98b–c). Since the second argument is never challenged, Plato allows the character Socrates to rely upon its conclusion, claiming that since virtue cannot be taught, virtue must not be knowledge, thus eliminating one of the two possible guides for right action. Curiously, the dialogue ends with Socrates implying the possible identification of virtue with true opinion, claiming that ‘if it is not through knowledge, the only alternative is that it is through right opinion that statesmen follow the right course for their cities’ (Meno 99b–c). Although the dialogue ends with Socrates stating his dissatisfaction, the reader is left with the specific claims, offered by Socrates, that virtue is not knowledge and that virtue should perhaps be identified with true opinion. Are we to conclude that virtue is not knowledge and that the character Socrates holds different views by the end of the Meno from those held by the character of the same name in the earlier dialogues? While few, if any, would claim that Plato actually holds the belief that knowledge has no relationship to virtue, many do recognize the differences between the Socrates of the early dialogues and the Socrates of the Meno. The historical interpretation of the dialogues states that the Socrates of the early dialogues is an accurate representation of the historical Socrates and that the Meno is a dialogue that illustrates the transition to philosophical views that are quite distinct from those held by the historical Socrates. The developmental interpretation of the dialogues states that dialogues such as the Meno are representative of the gradual process of Plato’s philosophical development. Both the historical and the developmental interpretations tend to point out the differences between dialogues such as the Meno and the earlier Socratic dialogues of definition. In particular they point to the introduction in the Meno of the method of hypothesis and the claim that virtue is not knowledge. One difficulty with these interpretations, however, is that they both view

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the character Socrates as a reliable spokesman for either the historical Socrates or Plato himself. Both views fail to recognize that Socrates is first and foremost a character in a dialogue written by Plato. We should not assume that the views put forth by the character Socrates are always representative of what Plato is thinking at the time of composition. Nor should we assume that when Socrates concludes that virtue is not knowledge, this is a view that either Socrates or Plato ever held. This can be seen when recognizing that Plato never examined the second argument, containing the intermediate conclusion that virtue cannot be taught. Plato has left that task for the reader. This, I believe, is an example of how Plato involves the reader in the process of philosophic discovery. He has presented the contradictory conclusions of the two arguments, thus necessitating a re-examination of earlier views. Yet instead of examining all possible options, Plato has allowed his characters to settle upon one possible problem and follow it to its logical, though unsatisfactory, conclusion. After introducing the necessary components, he has left any further investigation of the question of virtue and its acquisition to the reader. Plato intends for his audience to realize the possibility still exists that virtue is to be identified with knowledge. Thus the conclusion of the dialogue would seem to be that either virtue can be identified with knowledge—the view that was put forth in the earlier dialogues of definition—or that virtue can be identified with the recently introduced state of true opinion—a view that will be put forth in the Republic when Plato discusses the type of virtue possessed by the auxiliaries in his ideal state. I will ultimately argue that knowledge and true opinion can be identified with different degrees of virtue. The introduction of true opinion is one of the features of the Meno that prompts scholars to see the dialogue as transitional in character. Yet I believe that the Meno should be seen as a continuation of the philosophic project started in the early dialogues of definition. That project was to illustrate the importance of knowledge in virtue. The early dialogues discuss particular virtues, and while these dialogues end in aporia, knowledge plays an important part in the investigation of each of the particular virtues. Thus they are protreptic in that they turn one toward a life of philosophy—a life of seeking knowledge and wisdom. The Meno discusses virtue as a whole, and thus Plato devotes further attention to the discussion of knowledge in this dialogue. The Meno should be seen as a continuation of and an expansion upon the epistemological topics originally introduced in the early dialogues of definition. In the Meno one sees Plato’s further articulation of the relationship between knowledge and virtue. Furthermore, the use of the method of hypothesis

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provides Plato with an additional tool with which to explore the identification of virtue and knowledge. The question of whether or not virtue can be taught, a question addressed in both the Protagoras and the Meno, stems from Plato’s earlier discussion of the analogous relationship between craft knowledge and moral knowledge. The traditional crafts are marked by certain shared characteristics, such as the ability to both teach and learn the specific knowledge that constitutes a particular craft. As I have shown, the craft analogy is the centrepiece of the early dialogues of definition. Plato’s treatment of the acquisition of virtue initially appears to be merely an extension of his discussion of the relationship between virtue and the crafts. Yet the investigation of the teachability of virtue leads directly to the recognition of two distinct cognitive states, knowledge and true opinion, each capable of producing beneficial or virtuous results when used as a guide in one’s actions. The Meno does, in fact, differ from the early dialogues of definition in its introduction of true opinion, but this difference is the result of the further explanation of what it means to live a virtuous life. In addition to the claim that the virtuous life is one guided by knowledge, we now see that the virtuous life can be attained when guided by the cognitive state of true opinion. This is the most significant claim made in the Meno. The Meno further demonstrates the complex relationship between ethics and epistemology, for now it appears that both knowledge and true opinion play a part in the Platonic conception of virtue. Virtue and opinion in the Protagoras and the Meno In both the Protagoras and the Meno, Plato is clarifying his conception of the relationship between virtue and knowledge. Although both dialogues focus upon virtue and its acquisition, there are still differences to be found between them. In the Protagoras the Platonic conception of virtue is identified with knowledge, while opinion is associated with the popular conception of virtue held by both Protagoras and the Athenian people. In the Meno, however, we see the introduction of true opinion, a distinct cognitive state that nonetheless accurately guides its possessor toward virtuous action. Thus the Meno builds upon the Protagoras and carries the discussion to a higher level by providing a closer examination of the distinction between knowledge and opinion as possible guides for action. One can also see differences concerning the teaching of virtue in these dialogues. Protagoras claims that virtue can be taught and that he himself is a qualified teacher of virtue. Yet in spite of the self-promoting claims of

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Protagoras, the Meno implies that virtue cannot be taught, given the lack of proper teachers of virtue. Thus in these two dialogues the reader is presented with differing views concerning the nature of virtue, the acquisition of virtue, and the benefit of its teaching. One interesting similarity concerns the inability of virtuous citizens to pass along this character trait to their offspring. Socrates argues against the teaching of virtue in both dialogues by pointing out that some of the leading citizens of Athens, while recognized as virtuous citizens, were unable to pass this most important possession on to their children.17 Not only does this example tend to throw doubt upon the possibility of teaching virtue, it also raises the question concerning how one might originally acquire virtue. Here one can see the significance of Meno’s sophistic question that begins the dialogue. How can virtue be acquired? If not through teaching, then through what manner or method might one go about attaining it? Does it come by practice or perhaps naturally? These are questions that can be more readily addressed when one takes into consideration the distinction Plato draws between knowledge and opinion. If we recognize the type of virtue possessed by Pericles or any other leading statesman as identified with the cognitive state of opinion, then an answer can be found concerning why these men were unable to teach their children to be virtuous. Anytus is naively mistaking the possession of virtue for the ability to teach virtue when he suggests that ‘any Athenian gentleman’ (Meno 92e) can teach virtue. Yet the confusion between possessing and teaching virtue seems reasonable if one maintains the analogy between virtue and the crafts. The craftsman, as a possessor of a particular craft knowledge, can teach others to follow in his craft. Why, then, does the virtuous person fail to teach another to be virtuous? It is precisely because the type of civic virtue addressed in these dialogues is not identified with knowledge, but with opinion. Although both knowledge and true opinion are seen as equally good guides for action in the Meno,18 there are two important distinctions Plato draws between them. First, true opinion is fleeting and transient and must be tied or tethered, as in the case of the statues of Daedalus19 (Meno 97d– 98a), before one can derive any true value from it. Second, Plato describes the method by which one transforms true opinion into knowledge as the act of giving an ‘account of the reason why’ one’s opinion is true (Meno 98a). The concept of reasoning or calculating the cause (ai| tºaq logismˆ, Meno 98a) of a thing is then described as recollection: After they [true opinions] are tied down, in the first place they become

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knowledge, and then they remain in place. That is why knowledge is prized higher than true opinion, and knowledge differs from true opinion in being tied down. (Meno 98a) Thus not only is knowledge permanent, whereas true opinion is not, but the possession of knowledge enables one to give an account of why one’s knowledge is true. The possession of true opinion does not in itself enable one to explain why one’s opinion is true. Without the ability to explain the truth or the cause of one’s virtuous actions, one is unable to teach virtue to another. Thus the types of virtue described in the Protagoras and the Meno appear to be examples of popular civic virtue. This does not imply that Plato has changed his mind from the earlier dialogues in which Socrates claimed that virtue was to be identified with knowledge. Rather, what we see in the Protagoras and especially in the Meno is a more complex analysis of the epistemological and ethical relationship that lies at the heart of Platonic philosophy. If we recognize that both knowledge and true opinion are equally capable of guiding us in our actions, then we immediately recognize two routes to virtue. The most interesting question at this point is whether or not these two cognitive states are to be identified with one or two types of virtue. It is my claim that Plato intends for the two cognitive states of knowledge and true opinion to be identified with two distinct degrees of virtue, yet this is not immediately obvious from the dialogues. Given that both true opinion and knowledge are equally beneficial as guides for action, the two distinct types of virtue identified with knowledge and true opinion might be difficult to discern, for one guided by true opinion will act as virtuously as one guided by knowledge. One way to evaluate the different types of virtue is to compare the degrees of reliability of each corresponding cognitive state. Socrates claims that the reason knowledge is valued more highly than true opinion is due to its permanence, a quality lacking in true opinion (Meno 97d–98a). Thus the possessor of knowledge, when relying upon her knowledge as a guide, will consistently and reliably act in a virtuous manner. So, too, it would seem, the possessor of true opinion will consistently and reliably act virtuously, since neither cognitive state is better than the other as a guide for action. Yet given the fleeting and temporary nature of true opinion, there is no guarantee that one will possess it when it is needed in the future. Thus while the possibility of true opinion leading to virtuous action is no less certain than that of knowledge, the actual future possession of true opinion is itself uncertain. In this far-reaching, future-oriented view, it

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would appear that the cognitive state of knowledge will more consistently produce virtuous action than will the less reliable state of true opinion. Just as the statues of Daedalus have value only when tethered, so true opinion becomes a valuable and worthwhile possession only when it is tethered through recollection. It would appear that without its tether true opinion may be less consistent than knowledge and therefore less reliable as a guide to virtuous action. In this respect, the virtue identified with true opinion will be a lesser degree of virtue than that identified with knowledge. To investigate further the differences between knowledge and true opinion and to understand better the relationship between their corresponding degrees of virtue, I will next turn to selected passages from the Phaedo, Symposium, and Republic, the central dialogues of Plato’s middle period of composition.

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Chapter 5

Degrees of virtue in the middle dialogues I am your teacher, remember my words. There are two ways for the seeker to understand the world. The first is, it is, and that it isn’t cannot be. This route is committed to reality and truth. The second is, it isn’t, and that it isn’t must be. No information comes back from this road. You cannot know non-existence which cannot be accomplished. Cannot even speak of it. — Parmenides1 Parmenides clearly describes the difference between two epistemic and ontological realms, one of existence, the other of non-existence. One is the realm of knowable truth, the other a realm where knowledge is impossible. Influenced by the thinking of Parmenides, Plato will also focus the attention of his readers on a realm of unchanging, knowable truth. While Plato’s early dialogues distinguished true virtue from popular virtue, this ethical distinction is more clearly drawn in the metaphysical middleperiod dialogues, in which Plato describes the proper objects of knowledge and opinion. Furthermore, with the distinction drawn between the two cognitive states of knowledge and true opinion, one can now begin to recognize the corresponding subtle distinction between additional degrees of virtue. At this point the proleptic nature of the dialogues becomes more apparent. The continued exploration of the ethical views first expressed in the early dialogues of definition leads to the full expression of Plato’s epistemological and metaphysical views in the middle dialogues. In this chapter I examine selections from the Phaedo, Republic, and Symposium, three middle-period dialogues in which one finds the full articulation of Platonic epistemology and metaphysics. This, in turn, will lead to a more complete understanding of Platonic ethics. With the introduction of the forms in the Phaedo, their description as the proper

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objects of knowledge in the Republic, and the further examination of the Good and Beauty in the Republic and the Symposium, Plato is then in a position to explain more fully his ethical views originally introduced in the early dialogues of definition. In these three middle-period dialogues Plato devotes further attention to the role of knowledge in virtue and more clearly draws the distinction between knowledge and opinion by describing the objects of both cognitive states.

Popular virtue in the Phaedo In the Phaedo Plato clearly distinguishes between true virtue and popular virtue. In doing so he illustrates the importance of knowledge in true virtue, thereby clearly linking his epistemological and ethical views. Following the recognition that the popular virtues of courage and moderation are associated with neither knowledge nor wisdom, Socrates describes the characteristic feature of true virtue: With this we have real courage (a| ndreºa) and moderation (svfros¥nh) and justice (dikaios¥nh) and, in a word, true virtue, with wisdom (a| lhuh`q a| reth` meta` fronh´sevq), whether pleasures and fears and all such things be present or absent. Exchanged for one another without wisdom such virtue is only an illusory appearance (skiagrafºa) of virtue.(Phaedo 69b) Here in the Phaedo we see an image that Plato will use again in the central books of the Republic: common virtue without knowledge or wisdom is described as merely a rough sketch, a shadow, an imitation of true virtue.2 While Plato implied throughout the early dialogues the necessary relationship between virtue and knowledge, he only hinted at the proper objects of this knowledge. In the Phaedo we find the first serious attempt to describe the intelligible forms as the proper objects of knowledge. While there was no explicit description of the forms in the earlier dialogues and certainly nothing that constituted a ‘theory’ of forms, there were, nonetheless, passages in which Socrates referred to the essence or the form in his attempt to define a particular virtue. In the Euthyphro, for example, Socrates states: Bear in mind then that I did not bid you tell me one or two of the many pious actions but that form itself (aªto` to` ei \doq) that makes all pious actions pious, for you agreed that all impious actions are impious and all pious actions pious through one form (miQ` |i de´Q). . . Tell me then what the form (th`n |i de´an) itself is, so that I may look upon it, and using it as a

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model, say that any action of yours or another’s that is of that kind is pious, and if it is not that it is not. (Euthyphro 6d–e) Similarly in the Meno, after the character Meno has given a list of particular virtues, Socrates reminds him: Even if they are many and various, all of them have one and the same form (ei \doq) which makes them virtues, and it is right to look to this when one is asked to make clear what virtue is. (Meno 72c) Unexplained reference to the forms in works such as the Euthyphro and the Meno is yet another indication of the proleptic nature of the dialogues as a whole. The early dialogues introduce topics that are fully addressed in later dialogues. Here in the Phaedo the reader is given a more complete picture of Platonic metaphysics. In his attempt to demonstrate that the soul is immortal and that the philosopher should not fear death, Socrates relies upon the theory of recollection, an epistemological view discussed in the Meno. In the Phaedo, as in the Meno, the immortality of the soul and recollection are two intertwined beliefs. It is interesting to note that Socrates uses a mathematical concept in both the Meno and the Phaedo to explain recollection. Mathematics provides Plato with clear examples that possess the essential feature of any proper object of knowledge, for mathematical objects are non-physical and purely intelligible. In the Meno the example of recollection centred around a problem of geometry and an uneducated slave’s attempt to determine the length of one side of a square (Meno 82b– 85b). In the Phaedo Socrates explains recollection with the example of ‘the Equal itself’ (aªto to` =i son, Phaedo 74a). Both the idea of a square figure and the idea of equality bring to mind non-physical qualities that one comprehends through the power of the mind alone. Furthermore, both are components found within the framework of a mathematical education, an education Plato elsewhere deems essential for the philosopher.3 The example of equality, like other mathematical concepts, illustrates a constant, unchanging quality that is distinguished from the many examples of equal things. Plato is clearly distinguishing between the one form and the many particular instances of the form. This distinction, while not explicitly made in the earlier dialogues, was implied by Plato’s earlier references to forms. Socrates’ insistence upon finding the one form of piety, for example, is more than simply a request for the common characteristic of all pious things. Rather, it is an invitation for the other participants in the

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dialogues—as well as the readers of the dialogues—to draw a rigid distinction between the one and the many, between the one form and its many particular instances. While the discussion of recollection in the Meno failed to address the objects of our pre-natal knowledge, the Phaedo fills in that missing metaphysical gap with the notion of separately existing forms. Plato mentions other forms as well in the Phaedo, specifically the Just, the Beautiful, and the Good (Phaedo 65d). The discussion of the Just, the Beautiful, and the Good is a discussion of those objects comprehended by the soul of the philosopher, objects that Plato describes as ‘the reality of all other things, that which each of them essentially is’ (Phaedo 65d–e). The forms are shown to be stable and constant. Unlike the many particular instances of the form (the many beautiful things, just things, or equal things), which are always undergoing change through generation and destruction, the forms are changeless, for ‘each of them that really is, being simple by itself, remain[s] the same and never in any way tolerate[s] any change whatever’ (Phaedo 78d). Thus we find an interesting combination of a Heraclitean notion of change and a Parmenidean notion of constancy and unity incorporated within Platonic metaphysics.4 The intelligible forms are further distinguished from the sensible particulars in that the forms are not seen but are known.5 Thus Plato states that there are ‘two kinds of existences, the visible and the invisible’ (Phaedo 79a), where one’s physical body and the particular instances of the forms belong to the visible, while the incorporeal soul and the forms belong to the invisible. Having distinguished between the intelligible, invisible forms comprehended through the power of the mind alone and the changing, visible particulars recognized through the senses, Plato is now in a position to combine his recently articulated metaphysical distinction with his previously explored epistemological distinction. In doing so, he will illustrate a similar ethical distinction between true virtue and popular virtue. Socrates describes both the beneficial and detrimental aspects of popular virtue in relation to the afterlife journey of the soul. He states that those who practise vices such as gluttony, violence, injustice, and tyranny are destined to find their souls embodied in animals or humans who display those vicious characteristics. Yet not everyone is destined to such a fate, for those who practise popular virtue are offered a brighter future: The happiest of these, who will also have the best destination, are those who have practiced popular or social virtue, which they call moderation and justice and which was developed by habit and practice without philosophy or understanding. (Phaedo 82a–b)

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Here we find a clear reference to popular virtue, a type of virtue that lacks any degree of knowledge or understanding, but one that is developed purely through habit or practice. While this type of popular virtue is certainly preferable to vice, the true virtue possessed by the philosopher is far greater, for the defining characteristic of true virtue is knowledge. Socrates describes the life of learning as an attempt to separate the immaterial soul from the corporeal body. Thus he claims that one must put away one’s desires and strive to separate soul from body as much as possible. This is the sense in which philosophy prepares one for death and dying, for only in the death of the physical body is the soul completely released from its imprisonment. Once free, it can ascend to the forms and join ‘the company of the divine, the pure and uniform’ (Phaedo 83e). This is why ‘genuine lovers of learning are moderate and brave’ (Phaedo 83e), for they have spent their lives shunning physical pleasures and striving to gain knowledge of the forms, those objects that are most real and most true. Here we can see the connection between Platonic metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. Plato states that the philosopher spends her time ‘contemplating the true, the divine, which is not the object of opinion’ (Phaedo 84a). Thus the philosopher contemplates the forms, the proper objects of knowledge. In many of the earlier dialogues we see Plato distinguishing between knowledge and opinion, implying that virtue is identified with knowledge. Thus the philosopher, the lover of learning, is one who devotes her life to the search for knowledge and in doing so strives to attain knowledge of the forms. The acquisition of true virtue is dependent upon the comprehension of the proper objects of knowledge and not mere objects of opinion. Thus true virtue, according to the depiction given in the Phaedo, is identified with knowledge of the forms. While this statement does much to explain the core of Platonic philosophy—by identifying virtue with moral knowledge—there still remain unanswered questions concerning the nature of moral knowledge. For example, the Phaedo describes virtue as knowledge of the forms while the earlier dialogues, such as the Laches and Charmides, identify virtue with knowledge of good and evil. How is this apparent inconsistency to be explained? Furthermore, there still exists the possibility for one to be virtuous through popular or demotic virtue. This lesser type of virtue apparently does not require knowledge of the forms. What, then, is the cognitive component of popular virtue? Finally, are there more types or degrees of virtue than simply true virtue and popular virtue? These questions can be addressed with an examination of the Republic, a work in

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which Plato goes even further in the articulation of his metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical views. The virtue of the auxiliaries: Shaping the soul through practice and habit The opening lines of the Meno address the possibility of different methods of acquiring virtue.6 While Meno raises the possibility of three routes by which one may possess virtue, the dialogue only discusses the teachability of virtue, leaving aside the idea that virtue could be acquired through practice or by nature. Although the Republic can perhaps be seen as the dialogue in which Plato most clearly lays out his metaphysical views, it is also a dialogue in which he illustrates the possibility of acquiring virtue through practice or habit. This is most clearly seen in the education of the auxiliaries, those members of the second class of citizens in the ideal state. Socrates recognizes that the guardians of the ideal state must possess particular virtuous characteristics, for the strength of the state is dependent upon the strength of the guardian class. The nature of the guardian class is such that its members must be strong and courageous, possessing keen senses as well as spirited and wisdom-loving souls (Republic 375a–e). Recognizing the rarity of such a natural combination of virtues in a single individual, Socrates and his companions agree that the proper type of individual must be raised and educated in a manner that would make one beneficial to the state. Plato then devotes a substantial section of the Republic (376c–412b) to the discussion of education. It is within the discussion of the education of the guardians that Plato introduces the idea of acquiring virtue through practice and habitual action. Thus while the acquisition of virtue through habit and practice was ignored in the Meno, it is taken up with greater emphasis in the Republic. As we shall see, the virtue of habit possessed by the guardians is a distinct level of virtue, separate from the virtue identified with knowledge of the forms. One of the more striking aspects of Plato’s suggestions concerning education is the idea of censoring certain aspects of the young guardians’ education. The purpose of such censorship is to guarantee that the young are exposed only to examples of good behaviour. Stories that exemplify model behaviour will be accepted, while those that exhibit undesirable behaviour will be eliminated. Plato then briefly delineates the educational plan by illustrating which types of stories are to be accepted and which are to be rejected. Those stories, for example, that represent a ‘bad image of what the gods and heroes are like’ (Republic 377e), that ‘make children more cowardly’ (Republic 381e), or that ‘mislead us by falsehoods in words or deeds’ (Republic 383a) are to be rejected. Stories, however, that promote

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the development of fine and noble character traits are to be allowed, for these are the stories that will help shape the souls of the future rulers of the ideal state. The young guardians will be told stories that serve as models of strength, courage, moderation, and any other virtue that could make the guardian beneficial to the state. In fact, the guardians’ education culminates in the belief that what is good for the state is in fact what is good for oneself.7 Plato is describing a type of moral education acquired through habit. If the young are exposed only to positive examples of good behavior they will then emulate that behaviour until, through repetitive and habitual action, such behaviour becomes natural. Much as Aristotle claims that virtuous action must proceed from a ‘firm and unchangeable character’8 and that ‘we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts’,9 Plato initially sets out to establish the virtuous character traits of his future rulers of the state through practice and habit. Meno’s original question concerning the acquisition of virtue now has an additional possible answer not provided by Socrates in the Meno. First, as seen in the Meno, when virtue is identified with knowledge it can be acquired through teaching, provided that there are teachers to be found. Yet virtue can additionally be acquired through habit and practice, for the guardians acquire their particular level of virtue through the initial exposure to and habitual emulation of those models of virtue presented to them in their early education. At first glance the acquisition of virtue through habit might seem antithetical to the Platonic notion of virtue that has been repeatedly identified with knowledge. Yet upon further reflection one can see a clear similarity between the acquisition of moral knowledge and the acquisition of craft knowledge. When first learning a craft, whether building or medicine, one is shown the proper methods, procedures, and other socalled ‘tricks of the trade’ by an expert in the particular field. Thus the builder learns his trade largely through the observation and emulation of a master builder, just as the doctor learns her craft, in part, by following the instructions of those who possess the knowledge of medicine. In Books II and III of the Republic Plato describes a similar process of moral education where virtue is acquired through practice and habit. Yet the craftsman, if he is to be accurately recognized as a craftsman, will eventually become the possessor of craft knowledge. It remains to be seen whether the habitually trained guardian, by virtue of his early education alone, will possess moral knowledge or fall short of this epistemic goal.

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Justice in the state and justice in the soul While the early education of the guardians is intended to produce a particular type of individual capable of eventually ruling the state, there is no guarantee that the educational programme devised by Socrates will consistently succeed in achieving this desired end. Socrates recognizes the need to differentiate between those guardians capable of ruling with wisdom as their guide and those who fall short of this goal. Those who are able to preserve their belief that they should always do what is good for the state, in spite of hardship or incentives to do otherwise, will prove to be the most capable rulers. Thus Socrates distinguishes between the proper rulers and the remainder of the guardians, hereafter referred to as ‘auxiliaries’.10 Socrates claims that the state consists of three classes or parts: the rulers, the auxiliaries, and the workers. He further characterizes the differences between the classes by assigning a metaphorical ‘metal’ to each of the different natures of the class members.11 The rulers possess gold natures, the auxiliaries silver natures, and the workers bronze natures (Republic 415a–d). Partly to explain the qualifications of the rulers for ruling the state, Plato next defines justice in both the state and the soul. The description of the just state and the just soul, while fulfilling one of the central tasks of the dialogue, also further clarifies the distinction between different types of virtue, for the citizens of the ideal state will have recognizable differences in their ability to practise and possess virtue. Socrates claims that since their theoretical city is ‘completely good’ then it will ‘clearly’ possess the virtues of wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice (Republic 427e). Plato does not explain the way in which the possession of these virtues is clearly obvious, but perhaps he has in mind his notion that goodness and virtue are identical. If this is the case then his claim that the city is completely good is simply a claim that the city is completely virtuous. Given the unity of virtue described in the Protagoras, it follows that the particular virtues would be present in a virtuous state. Thus Socrates begins his search for wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice in the state.12 The location of each of the four virtues is hardly surprising, but it helps to illustrate both the different cognitive abilities of the various classes of citizens and their differing degrees of virtue. Although there are many kinds of knowledge present in the city, the particular type of knowledge that constitutes wisdom is found in the ruling class. Thus the whole city is recognized as wise due to the possession of wisdom by the ruling class. Socrates does not, at this point in the dialogue, elaborate on the object of this knowledge, although one could infer that it might minimally consist of the practical knowledge of how best to

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administer the affairs of the state. As we have seen, the idea of successfully managing the affairs of the state has been previously mentioned in the Euthyphro (14b), Protagoras (318e–319a), and Meno (71e) as a type of popularly recognized civic virtue. We will discover, as the dialogue progresses, that the wisdom possessed by the rulers is of a quite different nature. The virtue of courage is found in the auxiliary class, that part of the city that is charged with the defence of the state. Their courage is found not in their actions, however, but in their ability to maintain and preserve certain beliefs. Thus the city is courageous because of the habitually acquired stable belief possessed by the auxiliary class. The significant point is that the virtue of courage is acquired through habit without wisdom. The virtue of moderation is unlike wisdom and courage, for it is not found in any one class of citizens. Rather, moderation is found in the relationship between the three classes of the state. Socrates defines moderation as ‘a kind of order, the mastery of certain kinds of pleasures and desires’ (Republic 430e). Applying this concept of self-control to the state results in the recognition that moderation must consist of a harmony between the various parts of the state in which ‘the desires of the inferior many are controlled by the wisdom and desires of the superior few’ (Republic 431c–d). In each case, the actions and desires of each class of the state are controlled. The rulers are controlled by their wisdom, the auxiliaries are controlled by the stable beliefs impressed upon them during their education, and the workers are apparently controlled by their recognition of their lack of courage and wisdom, and thus the recognition of their own inferiority to the rulers of the state. In this sense the state as a whole is moderate. Finally, justice is recognized as none other than the One Task Principle as it is applied to the entire state. The One Task Principle was introduced when Socrates first founded the theoretical state (Republic 370a–c). This principle states that each person should perform the one task to which he or she is most naturally suited. Socrates now expands this concept to cover the three classes of the ideal state. Justice is defined as ‘doing one’s own’ (Republic 433b) when applied to the state as a whole. Thus the rulers rule the state by virtue of their wisdom, the auxiliaries assist the rulers and defend the city by virtue of their courage, and the workers, recognizing their social status, perform their particular tasks and allow themselves to be ruled by virtue of their moderation. Justice is not found in any one part of the state, for it exists throughout the state as a whole. Socrates describes justice in the state as ‘the power that makes it possible for the other virtues to grow in the city and that preserves them when they’ve

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grown’ (Republic 433c). As will soon be evident, the image of growth and sustenance will be repeated when Plato describes the function of the form of the Good and its relation to the other forms (Republic 509b). Having discovered justice in the state, Socrates next turns to the investigation of the just soul. Using the just state as a model he first explains the tripartite division of the soul, claiming that the soul consists of rational, spirited, and appetitive parts. The rational (logistiko´n) part of the soul is the seat of rational calculation, while the appetitive (e| piuymhtiko´n) part of the soul is the seat of our desires (Republic 439d). The spirited (uymoeide´q) part of the soul, the part with which one gets angry (Republic 441a), aligns itself with either the rational or appetitive part, and thus one is guided either by one’s desires or by one’s reason. Whether one is guided by wisdom or by appetitive desires determines whether one possesses a just or an unjust soul. The placement of the four virtues of wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice in the soul mirrors the placement of these virtues in the state. Wisdom is found in the rational part while courage is found in the spirited part. Although Socrates only briefly discusses the discovery of moderation in the soul, we can infer that in the soul as in the state, moderation consists of the ‘harmonious relations between the parts’ (Republic 442d) of the soul, when the appetitive part allows itself to be ruled by the wisdom of the rational part. Thus the just person is one who possesses a rationally ordered soul and whose desires are moderated and guided by reason. Here in the Republic we find a more complex psychological explanation of the consistent Platonic claim found throughout the earlier dialogues that virtue consists of a life guided by knowledge or wisdom. Yet while Plato demonstrates the identity of virtue and knowledge through the particular example of the rationally ordered, just soul, this discussion also provides the reader with evidence of a variety of levels of virtue. The type of virtue possessed by the rulers is obviously dependent upon the possession of wisdom that guides their actions. Just as the rulers rule the state by virtue of their combined wisdom, the soul of the individual ruler is guided by the wisdom present in the rational part of her soul. Yet it is not immediately clear whether Plato envisions all the members of the state in a similar fashion. Do the auxiliaries and the workers possess rationally ordered souls? Or are these classes of citizens ruled by other parts of their souls? One might first imagine that all the citizens of the just state must be guided by the wisdom in the rational element of their souls. If not, it would seem that the continued existence of the state, even on the theoretical level, would be impossible. If the auxiliaries and workers were ruled by the spirited and appetitive parts of their souls, then they would,

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by definition, be unjust. The state could never survive if two of the three classes were allowed to pursue their individual spirited and appetitive desires. The state is just because each class performs its particular task and does not interfere in the tasks of the other parts of the state. Thus it would appear that the rulers, auxiliaries, and workers must all be just citizens, each ruled by the wisdom present in the rational parts of their souls. Without such guidance, the just state as it has been defined apparently could not exist. Yet upon closer examination it becomes apparent that this is not necessarily the case. While the rulers who possess the particular virtue of wisdom are ruled by the rational parts of their souls, the auxiliaries and workers are of a fundamentally different nature. Socrates previously recognized the differences between people when he claimed that ‘we aren’t all born alike’ (Republic 370a) and characterized these broad differences in terms of gold, silver, and bronze natures (Republic 415a–d). The difference between the gold, silver, and bronze natures is reflected in the three classes of citizens in the state and the three parts of the soul. Since a ruler is ruled by the rational part of her soul she serves as an example of a just individual. Yet the defining characteristic of the auxiliaries is their spirited nature. Similarly, the defining characteristic of the workers13 is their appetitive nature. Neither the auxiliaries nor the workers have the requisite training or appropriate nature to live a life guided by wisdom. In order for members of these classes to lead just lives, they must be guided by other factors. The guiding factor in the lives of the auxiliaries is the virtue of courage, here defined as the set of beliefs impressed upon them as a result of their lengthy training and education. The auxiliaries are guided not by their own wisdom, but by the wisdom of the rulers.14 By following the laws established by the rulers and maintaining their stable beliefs about what is and is not to be feared, the auxiliaries lead courageous lives. Yet this type of courage is associated with habitually acquired stable belief or opinion, lacking any knowledge or wisdom. Similarly, the guiding factor in the lives of the workers is the virtue of moderation, here defined as the ability to recognize their particular role in the state and to be guided by the wisdom of the rulers. The workers lead moderate lives by following the laws established by the rulers and recognizing that the rational desires of the rulers should take precedence over their own appetitive desires. Yet this type of virtue is also lacking in knowledge or wisdom. Thus the civic virtues possessed by both the workers and the auxiliaries are dependent upon the guidance provided by the wisdom of the philosopher-rulers. Socrates makes this point very clearly when he states that the courage

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possessed by the auxiliaries is only civic courage: ‘This power to preserve through everything the correct and law-inculcated belief about what is to be feared and what isn’t is what I call courage, unless, of course, you say otherwise’ (Republic 430b). Although Socrates describes this stable true opinion as the virtue of courage, the phrase ‘unless, of course, you say otherwise’ qualifies his claim. Such a statement implies the possibility of doubt and serves as an invitation to question Socrates’ conclusion. Socrates then states that his account of courage should rather be seen as an account of ‘civic courage’ (Republic 430c) and promises to give a more complete account of courage at a later date. This is, however, the most complete discussion we have of the particular virtue of courage in the Republic. Nonetheless, Socrates has explicitly distinguished the courage possessed by the auxiliaries from true courage. Plato’s readers, accustomed to the philosophical views of the other dialogues, would recognize the weakness of civic courage from its identification with belief instead of knowledge. The just person interestingly reflects characteristics of the craftsman. While the craftsman is guided in his actions by the presence of knowledge, the soul of the just person is similarly guided by the wisdom present in the rational part of her soul. Furthermore, the craftsman employs his knowledge in order to render a beneficial product or service. The productive craft of shipbuilding produces a seaworthy vessel, while the therapeutic craft of medicine brings about health in the human body. The just person, guided by the wisdom present in her soul, brings about a beneficial harmony in the state due to her ability to rule. In this sense justice is a therapeutic craft that brings benefit to others by ensuring harmony among the various parts of the state. Yet justice appears to be beneficial for its possessor as well, for justice has been defined as the harmonious relationship of the various parts of the soul produced when each part performs its specific task. Thus not only will the just person’s actions be guided by wisdom, but their spirited and appetitive desires will be moderated by that wisdom as well. The significance of the courage and moderation possessed by the two lower classes lies in the fact that one can apparently be virtuous without the possession of knowledge. Yet Socrates consistently claimed throughout the early dialogues, and continues to claim in the middle-period dialogues, that virtue is identified with knowledge. Clearly it appears that there are multiple levels of virtue operating within the dialogues. Throughout the early and middle dialogues Plato primarily concentrates on the search for an understanding of true virtue, which he usually describes in terms of moral knowledge. Yet occasionally, as we find here in

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the Republic, Plato describes additional types of virtue not identified with knowledge or wisdom. One significant point is that the proper function of the rulers, auxiliaries, and workers is determined by the possession of a particular cognitive state. The rulers possess wisdom, the auxiliaries possess a stable belief that passes for courage, and the workers possess the recognition of their inferiority, which passes for moderation. Without the possession of these different cognitive states, the rulers, auxiliaries, and workers would be unable to perform their respective social tasks within the structure of the larger community. Without some type of cognitive guidance limiting their desires, the three classes would be unable to perform their particular tasks without interfering in the tasks of the other classes. Given the analogous nature of the state and the soul, we can infer that the just soul depends upon a similar arrangement of cognitive states. Once again we see the important cognitive component of virtue. In spite of the fact that Plato attributes different desires to different parts of the soul and implies that one’s actions might be guided by these desires, we see that in the just soul not only does wisdom rule the entire soul, but each specific part of the soul is additionally distinguished by its cognitive component. I return to the discussion of the different cognitive states and their corresponding degrees of virtue in the next chapter. First, however, it is necessary to understand the object of the rulers’ wisdom. By examining the proper objects of knowledge we can better understand the justification for the claim that the rulers are those most qualified to administer the affairs of the ideal state. Furthermore, by examining the proper objects of opinion we can achieve a better understanding of the difference between the various types of virtue found throughout the dialogues. The virtue of the philosopher-rulers: Turning the soul toward the Good The early education of the guardians sets them on the course that will ultimately lead them to the ability to rule the state. Plato claims, however, that the proper rulers, those capable of possessing the required wisdom, must be philosophers.15 These philosopher-rulers possess both the proper nature and the proper education that will enable them to acquire the wisdom required to rule the ideal state. Yet these future rulers must first undergo further education before they can effectively rule the state. By returning to the discussion of education of the rulers in Book VII, Plato is clearly distinguishing between the auxiliaries, whose virtue is acquired through habit, and the proper rulers, who are guided by knowledge as a result of their further education. In the Republic we discover the heart of

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Plato’s metaphysics and epistemology in his discussion of the forms as the proper objects of knowledge. As such, the forms become the objects of study for the prospective ruler. In order to understand fully the subject matter of the philosopher’s course of study, it is necessary to explain the metaphysical and epistemological significance of the central books of the Republic. Plato builds upon the discussion from the Phaedo in his explanation of the forms in the Republic. Having distinguished between one form and its many particular instances in the Phaedo, Plato employs a threefold approach in the Republic. The image of the Sun, the illustration of the Divided Line, and the allegory of the Cave are designed to give the reader a glimpse of the truth the philosopher strives to attain. Here we find the continuation of a concept introduced in the earlier dialogues. Both the Laches and Charmides hinted that virtue is to be identified with knowledge of good and evil. In the central books of the Republic we find the more complete expression of the same concept. Socrates claims that the highest goal toward which the philosopher strives is knowledge of the form of the Good. Having no knowledge of this himself, Socrates resorts to an analogy to explain the function of the Good in relation to the other forms. Just as the sun enables one’s eyes to see physical objects, so too does the form of the Good enable one’s soul to grasp the forms: So that what gives truth to things known and the power to know to the knower is the form of the Good. And though it is the cause of knowledge and truth, it is also an object of knowledge. (Republic 508d–e) Furthermore, just as the sun is the source of growth and generation of all physical objects, the Good occupies an analogous position in relation to the other forms: Therefore, you should also say that not only do the objects of knowledge owe their being known to the Good, but their being is also due to it, although the Good is not being, but superior to it in rank and power. (Republic 509b) Thus Plato describes the form of the Good as the object that, possessing the highest ontological status, provides all other knowable things with the ability to be known. As such, the form of the Good is the teleological goal of the philosophic life. This preliminary description of the function of the Good is augmented by Plato’s illustration of the Divided Line (Republic 509d–511e), in which

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we see perhaps the clearest association between different levels of Platonic metaphysics and epistemology. The significance of the Divided Line is the apparent one-to-one relationship between levels of reality and levels of comprehension. Plato describes those objects that possess the least amount of reality as images (ei| ko´naq), such as ‘shadows’ (skia´q) or ‘reflections’ (fanta´smata). These objects are comprehended through the cognitive state of imagination or conjecture (ei| kasºa).16 Images are distinguished from the physical objects that are their original counterparts. Physical objects are comprehended through belief (pºstiq), while both images and physical objects occupy the visible (o\rato´n) realm of opinion (do´ja), which Plato clearly distinguishes from the intelligible (nohto´n) realm of knowledge.17 The objects occupying the intelligible realm also fall within two levels, mirroring the two levels of the visible realm. Mathematical truths used as hypotheses are comprehended through reasoning or thought (dia´noia). Plato clearly intends the reader to recognize the similarity between the relationship of physical objects to images and the relationship of the intelligible mathematical truths to their visible images or instances. Finally, the forms occupy the top of the metaphysical hierarchy. Mathematical hypotheses can be used as stepping stones (e|piba´seiq) that carry the philosopher forward toward knowledge of the forms. These hypotheses, in that they are unsupported, are not as true as the forms. Similarly, the cognitive state of thought that pertains to them is not as clear as the cognitive state of understanding (no´hsiq) that pertains to the forms. The image motif, in which each level is an imperfect instance of the level above, runs throughout the Divided Line. The forms, comprehended through the cognitive state of knowledge or understanding, are the only objects that are not also an image of some higher object. The forms are the originals of which all other things are imitations.18 The Divided Line is Plato’s schematic diagram of both the ontological structure of reality and the different degrees of comprehension that pertain to the different levels of reality. Occupied with the trappings of quotidian existence, the average person concerns himself only with physical objects and their images, those objects on the lowest levels of the Divided Line. The philosopher, however, not content to remain fixed upon those objects occupying the visible realm of opinion, attempts to free herself through the study of the transcendent forms, the true and eternal objects of the intelligible realm. Yet Plato also sketches, in epistemological and metaphysical terms, one of the keys to understanding his ethical views. Interestingly, he does so without reference to any ethical concepts. While the linkage between levels of ontological reality and

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epistemic comprehension is clear, what is unspoken in the Divided Line is the implication for corresponding levels of virtue. I will return to this subject in greater detail below, but at this point it is important to recognize that knowledge of the forms will provide one with the requisite knowledge with which to lead a good life. This point is one of the reasons Plato returns to the subjects of the further education of the philosopher in Book VII, for the forms are prescriptive in nature, with the ability to determine one’s actions. Once one possesses knowledge of a form, such as Justice, one possesses knowledge that will not only allow one to identify properly instances of justice but also require one to act in a just fashion. It is for this reason that the philosophers, the future rulers of Plato’s just state, are required to undergo further training and education. If Plato intends to establish a just state, then the rulers must not only be capable of recognizing instances of justice, they must also be trusted to consistently perform just actions as well. The further discussion of the education of the rulers is patterned after an image from the well-known allegory of the Cave (Republic 514a–517a). In this illustration a prisoner, released from his bonds, is able to turn around to see what lies behind him and ultimately escape the dark ignorance of the cave and enjoy the clear, bright light of knowledge. The allegory of the Cave has certain similarities to the Divided Line which Plato must have intended his readers to recognize. A brief explanation of the allegory of the Cave will help to clarify Plato’s metaphysical views and further explain the necessity for the additional education of the rulers. The prisoners in the cave are restrained in such a way as to see only what lies directly in front of them. Behind the prisoners, however, others carry a variety of artefacts described as ‘statues of people and other animals’ (Republic 514e). Above and behind the prisoners is a fire that casts shadows of these objects onto the cave wall in front of the prisoners. Their entire understanding of reality is represented in the shadows they see passing in front of them on the cave wall. If one of these prisoners were to be mysteriously released from his bonds, he would, with considerable difficulty, be able to turn around and recognize the source of the shadows cast upon the wall. This represents a partial enlightenment of the prisoner concerning his understanding of reality. No longer is he content to sit looking at shadows once he recognizes that the shadows are merely imitations of the reality that lies behind him. His ability to turn around and see the truth that underlies the appearances has afforded him a perspective unavailable to his fellow prisoners. This individual, freed from his cognitive chains, has started the upward journey of the philosopher. If this prisoner is led—perhaps by his newly found, inquisitive,

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philosophic nature—up and out of the cave, he will find what appears to be a completely different realm of existence. At first he will be nearly blinded by the light of the sun, but if he perseveres he will eventually be able to see shadows of real physical objects, of which the statues in the cave were mere imitations. With great effort he will eventually be able to see the objects themselves and finally the sun itself, recognizing it as the source of growth and generation of all things.19 The significance of the Cave is that it represents the human condition: we are all cognitive prisoners in our cave of conformity, believing only in what we see in the visible realm of appearances, never questioning those appearances, never turning around to search for the truth. Thus the Cave illustrates the upward journey of the philosopher, much as the Divided Line illustrates both the goal of the journey as well as the metaphysical and epistemological steps along the way. An additional significant point of the allegory of the Cave is the initial turning around of the prisoner to see the truth that lies behind him. The notion of turning around to look for the causes that underlie the appearances is the central feature of the further education of the rulers of Plato’s ideal state. The further education of the rulers (Republic 522c–533d) is designed to accomplish the same result by forcing one to turn away from the realm of appearances and turn toward the contemplation of the forms. There are five initial areas of study, all of which can be seen as subsets of mathematics, and a final, sixth area of study that Plato refers to as the study of dialectic (dialektikh`n). The first five mathematical disciplines are designed to introduce the prospective ruler, in progressive steps, to the study of non-corporeal, purely intelligible objects. The disciplines range from number and calculation (a| riumo´n te kai` logismo´n), through plane and solid geometry (gevmetrºan), to astronomy (a| stronomºan) and finally harmony (a\rmonºa). While each of these areas of study has a practical application, the primary benefit of each lies elsewhere. The objects of enquiry are purely intelligible, ranging from the concept of number and two- and three-dimensional objects, to three-dimensional objects in motion, and finally to the mathematical study of harmonic intervals. In each case one is invited to turn away from the physical world of appearances and turn one’s soul toward the truth that underlies the appearances of the physical world. Plato’s emphasis upon mathematics as a tool by which one can progress toward knowledge of the forms reflects one aspect of the Divided Line. The penultimate level of the Divided Line, the level between the visible objects of the physical world and the intelligible forms, is described by reference to mathematical truths. The significance of the study of mathematics is that it enables one to grasp

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more easily the purely intelligible nature of the forms. The study and comprehension of the non-physical, intelligible objects of mathematics trains one to look beyond the physical world that fills our senses, and hints at the truth that is to be found in the philosophic life of reason and wisdom. Yet the full attainment of wisdom cannot be accomplished through the study of mathematics alone, and thus Plato describes the final area of study for the philosopher as the study of dialectic. Whereas the study of mathematics enables one to begin from certain hypotheses and then deduce certain truths about those physical objects found in the visible realm, the study of dialectic completes one’s philosophic quest for wisdom by providing the key with which one can attain knowledge of the forms. Plato vividly describes the final comprehension of the form of the Good as well as the comprehension of the other forms through the use of dialectic: [The soul] does not consider these [mathematical] hypotheses as first principles but as stepping stones to take off from, enabling it to reach the unhypothetical first principle of everything. Having grasped this principle, it reverses itself and, keeping hold of what follows from it, comes down to a conclusion without making use of anything visible at all, but only of forms themselves, moving on from forms to forms, ending in forms. (Republic 511b–c) Dialectic is the paramount science, the final discipline that enables one to acquire ultimate knowledge of the forms. My interpretation of the dialogues builds upon Plato’s metaphor of mathematical objects as stepping stones that lead the philosopher toward higher truths. I see the early dialogues in a similar fashion, as stepping stones that one can use to proceed from an initial discussion of ethical terms to a more complete examination of Platonic ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics. In middle-period dialogues such as the Republic we begin to see the completion of the journey begun in the early dialogues of definition. The early dialogues implied that the good life was a life of knowledge, yet the details of such a life were only roughly sketched in vague terms. The Republic brings together Plato’s epistemology, ethics, and metaphysics to reveal to us that the good life is the life guided by knowledge of the perfect and changeless forms. Knowledge of the form of the Good can now be seen as a superordinate knowledge that enables its possessor to understand the goodness and benefit of all other forms as well as their particular instances. At last the Platonic conception of virtue can now be clearly understood. Virtue is knowledge of the Good. This is

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the traditionally accepted understanding of Platonic virtue. Yet as we will see, there are additional degrees of virtue that have traditionally gone unrecognized. Results of the educational process Plato chose to address education in two separate areas of the Republic: Books II and III for the auxiliaries and Book VII for the rulers. While the philosopher-rulers will have undergone the same early education as the auxiliaries, only the rulers are given the full education culminating in knowledge of the forms. This results in two classes of citizens who represent two distinct levels of virtue. While it is clear that the philosopherrulers possess virtue, the auxiliaries are possessors of virtue as well, only to a lesser degree. The measure of one’s virtue, I believe, is relative to one’s particular epistemic condition. Those who possess knowledge of the Good possess true virtue. As a result of their knowledge, they not only know the Good and recognize instances of the Good, but they possess knowledge of the other forms as well. Not only can such a person grasp the essence of justice, courage, piety, and moderation, but they will consistently recognize the particular instances of these virtues. It is precisely this knowledge that qualifies one to rule Plato’s ideal state. The auxiliaries, however, or anyone who undergoes a similar education resulting in a fixed belief or stable opinion about good and evil, will possess a lesser degree of virtue. The auxiliaries, while not in possession of full knowledge of the form of the Good, have nonetheless been equipped with beliefs concerning which actions and behaviours are good and which are evil. Furthermore, it is expected that, as a result of this training, they will be able to preserve those beliefs through any hardship. Unable to comprehend the forms, they will be capable of virtuous action as a result of their training yet incapable of explaining why such action is virtuous.20 The education of the auxiliaries focuses on the guaranteed performance of good and virtuous actions, while the education of the rulers focuses on the reasons by virtue of which those actions are, in fact, good and virtuous. Thus Plato has portrayed the form of the Good as the ultimate goal of one’s philosophic quest. It not only makes all other good things good, but it gives the other forms their truth as well. As such, it is the model the philosopher-ruler of Plato’s ideal state holds in her mind and allows to guide her in her actions, rulings, and judgements. Plato, however, provides us with a similar description of Beauty in the Symposium, in which knowledge of the form of Beauty is the ultimate goal of the philosopher. To comprehend fully the significance of virtue as knowledge of the forms,

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I must briefly describe Plato’s depiction of the form of Beauty and its relationship to the form of the Good. I will then be in a position to illustrate what I find to be a consistent picture throughout Plato’s early and middle dialogues of separate cognitive states and their relation to separate levels of virtue. The philosopher’s love of Beauty in the Symposium Socrates’ account of Love (‘rvq), as taught to him by Diotima21 (Symposium 203b–212c), provides the reader with another glimpse into Platonic ontology that complements the account of forms given in the Republic. By combining Plato’s discussion of the forms in the Phaedo, Republic, and Symposium, one can piece together Plato’s vision of reality. A clear understanding of Platonic metaphysics is essential for properly understanding Plato’s epistemological and ethical views, for all three areas of philosophy are necessarily intertwined. While the Good was approached by way of the discussion of the education of the philosopher-rulers in the Republic, Beauty is approached by way of a series of discussions in the Symposium concerning the nature of Love. The significance of Diotima’s account of Love lies in the fact that it looks away from physical love and the love of beautiful things toward the desire to comprehend the essence of Beauty itself. In this sense, it serves as an alternative description of the forms, mirroring the discussion of the Good in the Republic. The object of Love is described as Beauty (to` kalo´n), yet as the discussion progresses it becomes clear that Plato is speaking of the Good (to` a| gauo´n) as well.22 Not only does the discussion of Beauty parallel the metaphysical discussion found in the Republic, but the parallel is furthered by Diotima’s hierarchical account of the objects of one’s desire (Symposium 210a–211a). Socrates explains that the lover begins his quest toward Beauty by first desiring a single beautiful body. After recognizing that ‘the beauty of any one body is brother to the beauty of any other’ (Symposium 210b),23 the lover then desires the beauty found in all beautiful bodies. Next the lover realizes that ‘the beauty of people’s souls is more valuable than the beauty of their bodies’ (Symposium 210b). At this point Plato is describing a change from the admiration of physical beauty to nonphysical beauty. Manifestations of the beauty found in one’s soul are to be found in laws and customs, themselves reflections of such an inner beauty. The next stage in the lover’s progress is the admiration of ‘various kinds of knowledge’ (Symposium 210c), in which the lover desires acquaintance with the ‘many glorious beautiful ideas and theories, in unstinting love of wisdom (filosofºa)’ (Symposium 210d). Finally, the lover, having ‘beheld

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beautiful things in the right order and correctly’, will suddenly catch a glimpse of ‘something wonderfully beautiful in its nature’ (Symposium 210e).24 Although Plato does not use such terminology at this point, he is here describing the form of Beauty.25 This is clear from the description given of Beauty: it always exists and neither comes to be nor passes away; it is purely beautiful, never allowing the presence of its opposite; and furthermore its true essence is not to be found in particular instances but only ‘by itself with itself [where] it is always one in form, and all the other beautiful things share in that’ (Symposium 211b). Thus Plato illustrates an upward progression from single, particular instances of beauty, through nonphysical instances of beauty, ultimately to the knowledge of the form of Beauty itself: This is what it is to go aright, or be led by another, into the mystery of Love: one goes always upwards for the sake of this Beauty, starting out from beautiful things and using them like rising stairs:26 from one body to two and from two to all beautiful bodies, then from beautiful bodies to beautiful customs, and from customs to learning beautiful things, and from these lessons he arrives in the end at this lesson, which is learning of this very Beauty, so that in the end he comes to know just what it is to be beautiful. (Symposium 211c–d) The upward progression toward Beauty is not simply an intellectual journey driven by reason alone. The original erotic attraction to the beauty found in one body and later in many bodies ultimately appears to be a rational desire for the truth. Thus that which begins as a form of sexual attraction to a beautiful body eventually results in rational discourse that ultimately leads one to the contemplation of Beauty itself. The discussion of the upward progression of the lover toward the goal of desiring Beauty mirrors in many ways the discussion in the Republic of the philosopher in her attempt to acquire knowledge of the Good. The Divided Line (Republic 509d–511e), the allegory of the Cave (Republic 514a–517a), and the ascension toward Beauty (Symposium 210a–212c) should be seen as illustrations of the nature of reality and the proper role of the philosopher within that reality. As such, they address not only fundamental metaphysical aspects of Platonic philosophy, but central aspects of Plato’s ethics as well. In each illustration the lowest level is occupied by particular physical objects. These are seen as images or instances of those objects on the next higher level. Just as the beauty of a single body is lacking in comparison to

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the beauty held in all beautiful bodies, shadows and reflections are inferior to, and to some extent dependent upon, their related physical objects.27 The progression from the admiration of beauty in physical bodies to the admiration of beauty in one’s soul is reflected in the Divided Line in the move from physical objects to non-physical objects. In the allegory of the Cave this is represented by the prisoner emerging from the darkness of the cave into the light of the sun. In each case Plato leaves the visible realm of Becoming (gºgnesuai) and emphasizes those objects in the intelligible realm of Being (ei \nai). The beauty present in one’s soul is that which gives birth to beautiful laws and customs, and while the laws may influence the daily life of a city, they are nonetheless non-physical instances of beauty. Similarly, while mathematical objects such as the geometric figure of a triangle may have numerous practical applications and manifestations, the idea of a triangle is itself a non-physical, purely intelligible object. Additionally, although the prisoner emerging from the cave sees only shadows of physical objects, the significance is found in the complete difference between the objects in the darkness of the subterranean realm and the objects illuminated by the brilliance of the sun. While the analogy between the Sun, the Divided Line, and the Cave must be somewhat forced, the similarities between these three illustrations far outweigh any particular problems that result from drawing out the analogy. The allegory of the Cave does not distinguish the four levels of objects as clearly as the Divided Line, but one can nonetheless recognize the correspondence between the darkened world inside the cave and the visible realm of Becoming, as well as the correspondence between the illuminated world outside the cave and the intelligible realm of Being. An additional similarity is found between the realm of the forms in the Divided Line and the love of ‘various kinds of knowledge’ (Symposium 210c) and the ‘many gloriously beautiful ideas and theories’ (Symposium 210d). In both cases those objects on the lower level (mathematical truths and beautiful laws and customs) are used to gain acquaintance with the more perfect objects above them. After loving beautiful laws and customs, the lover will ‘see the beauty of knowledge . . . [and be] turned to the great sea of beauty’ (Symposium 210c–d). Similarly, mathematical objects can be used as ‘stepping stones’ (e|piba´seiq, Republic 511b) toward knowledge of the forms just as beautiful objects are ultimately used as ‘ascending stairs’ (e| panabaumo¡q, Symposium 211c) toward Beauty itself. Additionally, in the allegory of the Cave the initial comprehension of the shadows of real objects outside the cave eventually leads to the knowledge of those objects themselves. Finally, just as the prisoner’s ability to gaze upon the sun is a

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metaphorical image of contemplation of the Good, both Socrates and Diotima also explain the ultimate acquisition of the Good and Beauty.28 In both cases the knowledge of the Good and Beauty is the result of a long process of acquaintance with a series of instances of the form. In the case of Beauty, knowledge ultimately comes in a sudden glimpse, which Diotima explains as the reason for the lover’s prior labours: in that life alone, when [the lover] looks at Beauty in the only way that Beauty can be seen—only then will it become possible for him to give birth not to images of virtue . . . but to true virtue. (Symposium 212a) Thus we see that full comprehension of the form of Beauty enables one to produce true virtue. Similarly, if one gains knowledge of the Good, one then understands the relationship between the Good and the other forms, seeing the way in which the forms are made beneficial by their relation to the Good. As the middle-period dialogues show, knowledge of the Good is the Platonic definition of virtue. Thus through a proper understanding of Plato’s metaphysical views, one can fully understand the meaning and significance of the Platonic identity of virtue with knowledge. The Symposium follows the course of Beauty, whereas the Republic pursues a definition of Justice, only for each to arrive at a description of the Good. In both cases true virtue is identified with knowledge of the Good. The Symposium and Republic simply represent two avenues toward the same ultimate truth. The primary protreptic aim of the early dialogues of definition, as well as transitional dialogues such as the Meno, was to lead the reader toward a more complete understanding of moral knowledge. With the metaphysical discussions of the Phaedo, Republic, and Symposium, Plato has shown the object of moral knowledge to be the forms. Although one can rightly proclaim that virtue is knowledge of the Good, there are still several important and interesting questions that must be addressed. First, is it actually possible to acquire true virtue? Given that Plato claims that the acquisition of this knowledge is possible only after the separation of the soul from the body,29 the acquisition of true virtue seems impossible during one’s lifetime. Second, if virtue is knowledge of the Good, yet this knowledge cannot be attained during one’s lifetime, then how is one to acquire virtue? Why does the philosopher concern herself with the care of her soul and living the examined life if that goal can never be achieved? Additionally, if one cannot reach full virtue during one’s life, then what kind of virtue, if any, can one hope to attain? Finally, in what way and to what degree does moral knowledge relate to

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craft knowledge? Now that we have been given a description of the proper objects of knowledge, we can return to an examination of the craft analogy to discover whether, and to what degree, these two types of knowledge are analogous. If moral knowledge is analogous to craft knowledge, then it too should have a product. Although Plato has shown the proper objects of knowledge to be the forms, he has yet to describe the product of such moral knowledge. An examination of these questions will provide the necessary clues for recognizing and constructing a consistent picture of Platonic virtue throughout the early and middle dialogues.

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Chapter 6

The role of knowledge in virtue Happiness, then, is something final and self-sufficient, and is the end of action. — Aristotle1 Throughout the early dialogues knowledge played an important yet only vaguely defined role in virtue. The requirement of knowledge was implied each time Socrates, either implicitly or explicitly, distinguished true virtue from popular virtue. The early dialogues suggested that the Platonic conception of virtue was one in which the virtuous person was guided in her action by the possession of knowledge. It was not until the transitional and middle-period dialogues that Plato began to explore in a more complete fashion the relationship between virtue and the various epistemic states of ignorance, opinion, and knowledge. We are now in a position to tie together the various threads Plato has skilfully woven throughout the dialogues and to discover a consistent yet multi-levelled conception of virtue that is to be found throughout the tapestry of his work. While both the historical and developmental interpretations emphasize the apparent philosophical differences between the dialogues, I believe the proper interpretation of Plato’s philosophy is one that brings together the similarities found in his writing while at the same time harmonizing any apparent differences. A unitarian interpretation emphasizing both the protreptic and proleptic nature of the dialogues accomplishes this task and can best illustrate the complex relationship that exists between the various cognitive states and their corresponding levels of virtue. I begin this final chapter by returning to the discussion of the technical nature of Platonic moral knowledge, by tying it to the example of craft knowledge used repeatedly throughout the early dialogues. Recognizing the technical nature of moral knowledge, I then examine the question concerning the product of such knowledge, arguing that happiness is the product of moral knowledge. I also examine the question of the benefit and beneficiaries of virtue. Finally, given Plato’s claim in the Phaedo concerning the impossibility of attaining knowledge of the forms in this life, I address the incomplete nature of such knowledge. The recognition

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of different degrees of virtue not only helps to explain the complex role of knowledge in virtue, it also accounts for the possibility of living a good life. I ultimately argue that the Platonic doctrine of the identity of virtue and knowledge should be extended to the claim that each distinct cognitive state—whether a variety of knowledge or opinion—can be identified with a distinct level of virtue. The completion of the craft analogy As I have shown in the previous chapters, the craft analogy plays a central role in the early dialogues of definition. Socrates argues that if virtue is a kind of knowledge, it should possess characteristics similar to the knowledge possessed by the craftsman. As we have seen, the Platonic conception of virtue can be identified with a type of moral knowledge that pertains to a specific subject; that allows its possessor to be recognized as an expert concerning that subject; that enables its possessor to render a specific product or service; that produces benefit; and that can be taught. This much can easily be gleaned from the dialogues of definition. Further examination of the craft analogy, however, reveals that not all crafts are alike. The crafts of shipbuilding and medicine, for example, require two distinct types of craft knowledge. While the craft of shipbuilding is a productive craft that creates a unique product, the craft of medicine is a therapeutic craft that alters the state of a presently existing object. The distinction between productive and therapeutic crafts is augmented by the concept of a superordinate knowledge. The idea of a superordinate knowledge was first clearly emphasized in the Charmides when moderation was at one point defined as knowing (or recognizing, gignv´skein) one’s knowledge and ignorance.2 The benefit of a superordinate knowledge is that it allows its possessor to recognize the goodness present in other varieties of knowledge. Once one recognizes different types of craft knowledge, one can better understand the nature of moral knowledge. Virtue can be seen as analogous to a superordinate craft that takes as its object the form of the Good and that produces a variety of beneficial results. Knowledge of the Good allows one to recognize the goodness present in other types of knowledge. Thus virtue can be used as a practical guide, ensuring that the employment of one’s craft knowledge will produce true benefit.3 Furthermore, not only does knowledge of the Good enable one to recognize, for example, the visible goodness present in a wellproportioned sailing ship, it also enables one to recognize the goodness or benefit of non-physical qualities present in particular instances of

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justice, courage, and moderation. Thus the goodness present in a just law, a courageous action, or a moderate individual will also be fully recognizable to one possessing knowledge of the Good. More important, however, is the realization that knowledge of the Good enables one to recognize the goodness present in the forms, such as Justice itself, Courage itself, and Moderation itself. This realization is significant, for it reveals that moral knowledge, while analogous to craft knowledge, is in fact much more. Knowledge of the Good brings with it an added ability to know the forms, the intelligible objects in the realm of Being, whose instances we find present here in the visible realm of Becoming. This special status of virtue is bestowed upon it by the nature of its object. The form of the Good is a single object of knowledge that, by virtue of its supreme ontological status, enables one to recognize accurately all instances of the Good as well as the goodness of the other forms. The difference between moral knowledge and craft knowledge can be seen further by examining the characteristics of craft knowledge discussed in the dialogues. While the productive craft of shipbuilding produces a good sailing ship, and while the shipbuilder might recognize the goodness present in the ship,4 and further, while he can give an account of the construction of the ship, he lacks knowledge of the Good and is therefore unable to give an account of its goodness. Similarly, while the therapeutic craft of medicine can bring about health in the human body, and the doctor can recognize health as a good thing, and further can give an account of how health was achieved, lacking knowledge of the Good she cannot give an account of why health is a good thing. Yet given the Platonic identity of virtue and knowledge of the Good, we can see that the possessor of virtue (or moral knowledge), while not able actually to produce a ship or health without the requisite craft knowledge, will nonetheless be able to give an account of the goodness present in both the well-built ship and the healthy human body. More significant, however, is the fact that the possessor of virtue will also be able to give an account of the other forms. Not only will the virtuous person be able to account for the goodness present in the just state, the healthy body, or the properly proportioned, beautiful ship, the possessor of virtue will be able to give an account of Justice, Health, and Beauty. This is an ability that possessors of the other crafts lack due to their lack of knowledge of the Good. The possessor of virtue, in knowing the form of the Good, will also possess knowledge of the other forms,5 as well as the ability to accurately recognize their manifestations. It is because of these special abilities bestowed upon one as a result of knowledge of the Good

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that Plato required his future rulers to undergo such rigorous mathematical education culminating in the study of dialectic. This, then, is the Platonic conception of true virtue: a permanent knowledge of the most fundamental of knowable objects—the form of the Good. Given that knowledge has been shown to be a permanent cognitive state,6 one’s knowledge of the Good will then be a reliable and consistent guide in one’s actions. The virtuous person will not only know the Good and recognize its instances, but also consistently act in a virtuous fashion. This is Plato’s idea of the good life: a life guided by permanent knowledge of the Good that consistently guarantees virtuous actions, decisions, and judgements. The product and benefit of virtue Although Plato successfully employs the craft analogy to illustrate the technical nature of virtue, a few questions remain that must be addressed to understand more fully the efficacy of the craft analogy. One question concerns the product of virtue: does virtue create a singular product, as does the productive craft of shipbuilding, or does virtue bring about a change within an already existing object, as does the therapeutic craft of medicine? An understanding of the product of virtue would determine whether moral knowledge shares the features of a productive or therapeutic craft. Several of the dialogues point to happiness (eªdaimonºa) as the product of a virtuous life. Much as Aristotle sees happiness as the end of all action, Plato implies that happiness is the final result of a virtuous life. The guardians of the ideal state, for example, are said to ‘live a life more blessedly happy than that of the victors in the Olympian games’ (Republic 465d). Alternatively, the tyrant is said to be the most unhappy due to his vicious actions (Republic 576b). Furthermore, Plato is fond of synonymously interchanging happiness with doing well (e« zh n` ) or living well (e« pra´ttein). In the Republic Socrates explains to Thrasymachus that the just man will live well, and one who lives well will be happy.7 Additionally, Socrates is reported by Echecrates to have ‘appeared happy both in manner and words’ in his final hours, and that ‘he would fare well’ upon arrival in the underworld (Phaedo 58e). In describing the benefit of moderation in the Charmides Socrates additionally links both virtue and happiness,8 and he associates happiness with the possession of good things in the Symposium.9 Finally, happiness is associated with both doing well and living well in the death scene of the Phaedo as well as the Myth of Er in the Republic.10 If we recognize happiness as the product of virtue we can understand

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virtue as a therapeutic craft, for happiness is brought about within the soul of the virtuous person. Thus just as medicine brings about the state of health in a human body, virtue brings about the state of happiness in the human soul. Happiness can be seen as a condition or state of the soul present when one possesses knowledge of the Good, and is guided by wisdom, and is secure in the recognition that everything one does will be an instance of the Good. If, however, one adheres strictly to the craft analogy, then one must also recognize that virtue must be teachable. Much of the discussion in the latter part of the Meno centres on the question of the teachability of virtue. A superficial reading of the dialogue may lead one to the conclusion that virtue cannot be taught due to the failure to discover teachers and students of virtue. Yet this faulty argument goes unanswered in the Meno primarily because the central purpose of the dialogue is to draw the epistemological distinction between knowledge and true opinion. Once the weakness of the argument is seen, the underlying identity of virtue and knowledge becomes clear and hence the teachability of virtue as well. In this sense the Meno serves as an excellent example of the proleptic and protreptic nature of the dialogues. It raises questions that are only answered in later dialogues, while at the same time turning the reader toward the philosophic life of knowledge and wisdom as the only route to the life of virtue. In teaching virtue one would, in effect, be creating other virtuous people. This is the purpose of the education of the philosopher-rulers in the Republic, to mould the souls of the best guardians into the right configuration in which knowledge can take hold, thereby guiding the rulers in their deliberations and actions. Furthermore, Socrates himself can and should be seen as a teacher of virtue. His repeated questioning leads one first to an awareness of one’s ignorance, then hopefully to the acquisition of true opinions, and ultimately to knowledge. In this sense, Socrates teaches virtue by helping others recollect the pre-natal knowledge in their souls. If Socrates can be seen as a teacher of virtue, and recollection can be seen as the method by which virtue is acquired, then the requirement that virtue be teachable is fulfilled. Clearly, however, virtue is not taught in the same manner as the traditional crafts. To learn the craft of stonecutting, for example, one would undertake an apprenticeship with a stonecutter. Similarly, in order to acquire medical knowledge one must be taught by a doctor who possesses the requisite knowledge. While it is not necessary for one to teach one’s craft in order to be recognized as a craftsman, the ability to impart one’s craft knowledge through teaching is required, for the

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possession of knowledge entails the ability to give an account of one’s knowledge. Yet the teaching of virtue differs from the traditional crafts in two respects. First, given that the care of one’s soul is the most important task one can undertake (Apology 30b), the teaching of virtue takes on more importance than the teaching of the other crafts. Second, there are no traditional teachers of virtue as there are teachers of the traditional crafts (Meno 89d–94e). The proper teaching of virtue consists of one being led toward knowledge of the Good as the result of living an examined life. The most obvious example of the teaching of true virtue is that of Socrates, who initiates recollection in the souls of those he questions. The ultimate product of Socrates’ teaching would be a virtuous person who, possessing knowledge of the Good, would live a life of happiness. In this sense virtue is analogous to the traditional crafts in that both can be taught and both bring benefit to others. One important question concerning the relationship between craft knowledge and moral knowledge concerns the benefit of virtue and upon whom that benefit is bestowed. Are the beneficiaries of virtue the possessors of virtue themselves, or others, or both? While virtue is similar to craft knowledge in that both bring benefit to others, virtue also brings the benefit of happiness to its possessor. The fact that virtue benefits both oneself and others is a feature that distinguishes virtue from the traditional crafts. When Thrasymachus offered his definition of justice as ‘the advantage of the stronger’ (Republic 338c), Socrates responded with an argument designed to show that each craft brings benefit or advantage not to the possessor of craft knowledge but to the recipient of the craft. The difficulty with this argument is that it implies that virtue, if analogous to craft knowledge, should only bring benefit to others and not to oneself. Yet virtue benefits its possessor by enabling one to live well and be happy. The difference, I believe, is to be found in the objects of knowledge that pertain to virtue and the traditional crafts. Unlike the traditional crafts, virtue takes as its object the Good, the teleological goal of the wisdomloving life. To possess virtue is to possess knowledge of what is good for a human being and to pursue that end toward the goal of self-fulfilment. If the object of virtue is the Good, and human virtue consists in knowing and striving for that goal, then virtue can be seen as a craft that produces benefit for its possessor by enabling one to achieve one’s natural end. Although Socrates and Thrasymachus agree that the traditional crafts bring benefit to others and not to the craftsman, we can understand the benefit virtue brings to its possessor by recognizing the fundamentally different nature of the object of moral knowledge. Thus virtue brings

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benefit to oneself as well as to others. The manifold therapeutic benefits of virtue to others can be seen in many different respects. With knowledge of the Good as a guide, one would administer the affairs of the state in a just fashion. Thus justice is simply one of the benefits of virtue that is enjoyed by everyone. The ultimate therapeutic benefit to oneself is the ability to live well and enjoy a life of happiness. Yet what is the exact relationship between virtue and happiness? Is virtue an instrumental good that is measured only in relation to its product of happiness? Or is virtue an intrinsic good that is merely accompanied by the state of happiness? I believe one way to examine this issue is to recognize, as pointed out above, the synonymous relationship Plato implies between ‘happiness’ and ‘living well’. Although synonyms, the two expressions are not identical. First, one could live well or do well in either a psychic or a physical sense. When Plato speaks of virtue and living well, his primary concern is with the state of the soul, not the state of the body. Although Plato may direct the reader’s attention toward a transcendent realm of truth, he is nonetheless concerned with one’s physical actions in the physical world, which stem from and bear a direct relation to the state of one’s soul. Thus Plato promotes virtue because it brings about both psychic and physical benefits. Finally, while it is possible both to be happy and to live well, one can be happy in one’s soul while still failing to live well or do well in a physical sense. There are two ways to distinguish between happiness and living well when considering one’s physical well-being. First, it is possible for one to live badly due to circumstances beyond one’s control, yet still be happy as the result of a virtuous soul. If, for example, one is terribly injured in battle or incapacitated by a debilitating illness, one could not be said to be living or doing well. Yet when Plato explains the properly ordered, virtuous soul in the Republic, he makes no mention of the fact that one’s happiness might be impaired by one’s bodily condition. While one’s physical condition may make living well impossible, it is the condition of the soul, not the body, that leads to happiness. Second, since happiness is a product of a virtuous soul and is found in the soul and not the body, it is possible to be happy while having no body whatsoever. Plato relies upon the notion of the immortality and transmigration of the soul in several instances.11 If the soul is immortal and outlives the human body, then there must exist a time, or a series of times, in which the soul is dissociated from the body. One could assume that the disembodied virtuous soul would be capable of possessing happiness in situations in which the idea of doing well or living well would be irrelevant. Thus by recognizing the difference between happiness and living well, it is

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possible to understand how the possession of virtue could lead minimally to happiness, or additionally to living well. Recognizing the distinction between happiness and living well enables one to understand the relationship between virtue as an intrinsic good and virtue as an instrumental good. True virtue is always an intrinsic good that produces happiness in the soul. In this sense virtue is analogous to a superordinate, therapeutic craft. Yet virtue can also be seen as an instrumental good that additionally affords one a good life, for it enables one to live well. Taken alone, virtue is an intrinsic good, and the product of happiness represents the soul reaching its final end, its highest achievement, the knowledge and contemplation of the Good. When the soul is present in a human body, then virtue is also an instrumental good that serves as a reliable guide in one’s actions, which in turn brings about the condition of living well. To live well or do well is a function of a living human being when guided in her actions by permanent and reliable knowledge. Thus virtue can be seen in one respect as an instrumental good and yet in another respect as an intrinsic good. That virtue could be both an instrumental and intrinsic good is an idea that Plato would recognize, for he begins the serious discussion of justice in the Republic with a brief categorization of goods. In that discussion Socrates recognizes justice to be both an intrinsic and an instrumental good.12 Thus virtue, of which justice is a part, can be understood as a type of knowledge that is intrinsically good, having happiness as its collateral product,13 and living well as the result of its instrumental value. Returning to the topic of virtue and its benefit, let us examine the practical aspects of a virtuous life and its corresponding practical benefits. The virtuous person, guided in her actions by the permanent and reliable state of knowledge, will live well and be happy. In this sense there is no distinction between the product of virtue and the benefit it produces for oneself. The product of virtue is happiness, and the beneficial result is a good life. Yet the virtuous person will also interact with others in a variety of ways. If, for example, the virtuous person is also a doctor, then she will not only be capable of producing health in the human body, but guided by knowledge of the Good, she will be able to recognize accurately those instances in which the production of health would be a good thing and distinguish those instances from when the production of health would be harmful.14 The doctor will recognize those times when her actions will produce an instance of the Good. Given that everyone desires the Good and that knowledge allows her to manifest the Good through her actions, she can be seen as bringing benefit both to herself and to others. Similarly, if the virtuous person were to hold high public office, the citizens of the

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state would benefit from her leadership. The decisions made, the judgements rendered, and the laws enacted by the virtuous ruler would all be instances of the Good. In these cases, the possession of virtue would benefit others by allowing its possessor to recognize the goodness present in the product brought about by the employment of one’s particular craft knowledge.15 In the above examples the possessor of virtue is also a possessor of craft knowledge. Yet what of those cases in which one does not possess a specific craft knowledge to accompany one’s possession of virtue? Who, then, will be the beneficiary of virtue? Given that virtue has been defined as knowledge of the Good, virtue will be beneficial to its possessor as well as to others, even if one does not possess an additional craft knowledge. The philosopher, a lover of wisdom who has attained knowledge of the Good, will be guided in every action by the possession of just such knowledge. In acting with knowledge of the Good as her guide, she will not only benefit personally, but her interaction with others will also bring benefit to them as well. In dealing with others she will act with justice, piety, courage, and moderation since her knowledge of the Good will entail knowledge of the forms of Justice, Piety, Courage, and Moderation. Given the prescriptive nature of the forms, the virtuous person will consistently act in a virtuous way. Thus the Platonic conception of virtue, first introduced in the early dialogues of definition and later more fully articulated in the middleperiod dialogues, can be defined as knowledge of the form of the Good. Equipped with this knowledge, one will act in a consistently virtuous fashion, recognizing and bringing about instances of the Good, enjoying the benefits of happiness and a good life, and bestowing these benefits upon others. The incomplete nature of knowledge of the forms While knowledge of the Good may be the goal of the philosopher, it appears to be an unattainable goal. Plato clearly states that the attainment of knowledge of the forms can come about only after the separation of the soul from the body. As we have seen in the Meno and the Phaedo concerning the theory of recollection, the immortal soul is said at one time to possess complete knowledge. While not described in the Meno as knowledge of the forms, the description of knowledge in the Republic and Phaedo makes this implication clear. The discussion in the Meno implies that the full acquisition of knowledge is at least partly due to the separation of the soul from the physical body.16 Plato states more clearly

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the requirement of the separation of soul and body in the Phaedo, where the body is described as an obstacle (e| mpo´dion)17 in one’s search for knowledge: It really has been shown to us that, if we are ever to have pure knowledge, we must escape from the body and observe matters in themselves with the soul by itself. It seems likely that we shall, only then, when we are dead, attain that which we desire and of which we claim to be lovers, namely, wisdom, as our argument shows, not while we live. (Phaedo 66d–67a) Thus the knowledge Plato describes throughout the early and middle dialogues as the ultimate goal for the philosopher appears to be impossible to attain. How, then, should we reconcile this fact with the numerous passages from various dialogues in which Plato either implicitly or explicitly states that virtue is knowledge of the Good? For in describing the importance of knowledge, Plato has implied that it is an attainable goal. A follower of the historical interpretation of the dialogues may be tempted to see this discrepancy as an indication of the distinction between the philosophy of Plato and that of Socrates. Socrates, the historicist might claim, never personally held a theory of transcendent forms, and so claimed that knowledge was attainable because he envisioned knowledge as completely analogous to craft knowledge. Yet Plato, holding a new and different ontological theory, and further recognizing the limitations of the soul while entrapped within the body, states that absolute knowledge of the forms is impossible. According to the historical interpretation the Socrates of the early dialogues is primarily concerned with the definition of ethical terms and does not concern himself with metaphysical speculation. The Socrates of the middle dialogues is a creation of Plato who, as such, articulates the philosophy of Plato, not that of the historical Socrates. Alternatively, one who holds the developmental interpretation of the dialogues may see this discrepancy as evidence of Plato’s philosophic development. Platonic metaphysics, according to the developmental interpretation, grew out of Socratic ethics. Both interpretations would not only account for the discrepancies found between early and middle dialogues but would actually predict them. A better interpretation of the dialogues is one that accounts for these apparent differences by looking to the specific purpose of each dialogue, recognizing different purposes for different dialogues. Although the particular purposes of the dialogues may differ from one another, when

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taken together they each provide an essential part of a complete, comprehensive system of philosophy. The fact that the character Socrates emphasizes ethics in some dialogues and epistemology or metaphysics in others should not be taken as evidence of a division between Platonic and Socratic philosophies or as evidence of Plato’s philosophic development. Rather, one should recognize that Plato is presenting only specific aspects of his overall philosophical system in each dialogue. The proper appreciation of the intended purpose of each dialogue can help unravel some of the apparent difficulties and discrepancies. In the Republic, for example, Socrates describes the education of the rulers in great detail, claiming that their education culminates in the study of dialectic and the attainment of knowledge of the Good. In this dialogue, more than in any other, knowledge is portrayed as an attainable goal. Why would Plato devote so much attention to the educational process if he believed that its goals were unreachable or unrealistic? In the Phaedo, however, it is obvious that absolute knowledge is not attainable during one’s life. In order to understand this apparent discrepancy we should first consider the dramatic setting of each dialogue. The dramatic setting of the Republic is one in which Socrates and his companions are constructing a theoretical city in order to define Justice. The just state, once constructed, must be ruled by just rulers, and thus Plato devotes a considerable section of the Republic to the description of the education of those rulers. The dramatic setting of the Phaedo, however, is one in which we find Socrates during the last day of his life, relating to his friends the importance of caring for the soul, so that one may, upon leaving this life, enjoy the rewards of living a just life with a purified soul. If knowledge of the forms is ultimately impossible, as Plato holds in the Phaedo, then one should understand the Republic, at least in part, for what it is—a discussion of a theoretical model of a just city, ruled by just rulers, who have been raised and educated so that they may rule with knowledge of Justice as their guide. Furthermore, although Plato portrays knowledge of the Good as an attainable goal in the Republic, the theoretical nature of the discussion, coupled with Socrates’ claim that even he himself has ‘no adequate knowledge’ of the Good (Republic 505a), should be seen as an indication that knowledge might not be fully attainable. More importantly, we must realize that the statement in the Phaedo, while claiming that absolute knowledge of the forms is impossible in this life, does not imply that one should not strive toward that knowledge. In fact the Phaedo implies just the opposite. Immediately following the claim that complete knowledge is impossible, Plato states that, ‘[w]hile we live,

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we shall be closest to knowledge if we refrain as much as possible from association with the body or join with it more than we must’ (Phaedo 67a). Thus one message of the Phaedo is that although complete knowledge of the forms may be impossible while the soul is joined with the physical body, one must nonetheless strive for knowledge, for the closer one comes to the possession of knowledge, the better one’s condition will be, in this life as well as after death. The fact that one can come closer to knowledge by purifying one’s soul is the key that allows us to recognize a variety of degrees of comprehension and their corresponding degrees of virtue. It is not the case, as Meno implied, that one either possesses knowledge or is ignorant, with no intermediate state.18 One can evidently approach knowledge in degrees, moving from the recognition of one’s ignorance to the possession of true opinion, and ultimately toward the possession of knowledge of the forms. While the soul is still associated with the body the philosopher is able to move closer to knowledge because of a lifetime spent caring for the soul. The recognition of different epistemic states and their corresponding degrees of virtue helps to account for the apparent differences between the dialogues. Furthermore, I believe a proper understanding of Platonic philosophy requires the recognition of the different levels of cognition and their corresponding degrees of virtue. It is not the case that we can see a rigid distinction between Socratic and Platonic philosophy, nor is it the case that one can trace the development of Platonic philosophy from the early dialogues through the middle-period dialogues. Rather, in the early dialogues Plato’s intention is to communicate the importance of virtue and to suggest its association with knowledge. In subsequent dialogues Plato’s purpose is to explain fully the various levels of knowledge and opinion as well as to describe the objects of both cognitive states. These distinct epistemic states are the stepping stones on one’s journey toward knowledge. Various degrees of virtue While the recognition of differing degrees of epistemic certainty theoretically allows for an infinite number of separate cognitive states, I propose to address five distinct levels of comprehension and their corresponding levels of virtue. Recognizing absolute knowledge of the forms as the highest and most reliable cognitive state, one can also recognize true opinion of the forms, stable true opinion of instances of the forms acquired through practice and habit, true opinion acquired naturally, and finally the recognition of the limitations of one’s knowledge. These

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distinct epistemic states are illustrated throughout the dialogues, and while it may be difficult to detect their significance upon an initial reading of the early dialogues, when looking back from the middle-period dialogues the proleptic significance of the early dialogues becomes apparent. If we look back to the Charmides, for example, we can see the introduction of several distinct cognitive states that have additional significance when viewed from the perspective of the middle-period dialogues. At one point the concept of moderation is defined as selfknowledge. To know oneself in this sense is to understand the limitations of one’s knowledge, or conversely, to be aware of one’s ignorance. Socrates is the perfect example of a philosopher aware of his own ignorance. The oracular claim that no one is wiser than Socrates is simply an announcement of Socrates’ recognition that, at least in most cases, he does not possess knowledge. While this claim may appear disingenuous to first-time readers of Plato’s dialogues, Socrates’ claim of ignorance becomes more believable once one understands Plato’s strict technical usage of the term ‘knowledge’. This is simply one aspect of the proleptic nature of the early dialogues. Like several of the early dialogues, the Charmides looks ahead to the middle dialogues for a more complete explanation of its philosophic views. Yet what is the significance of recognizing one’s ignorance beyond the glory of Delphic fame? First, Plato implies that we are always in a position to rely upon our knowledge as a guide in our actions. The recognition that one does possess knowledge allows one to proceed confidently and to avoid error. The benefit can be seen in any type of knowledge. If, for example, one were called upon to perform first aid upon an accident victim, one could act to save a life with one’s medical knowledge as a guide. Similarly, if one were called upon to speak in favour of legislation, one could look to one’s knowledge of justice as a guide. In both cases one requires an additional superordinate knowledge beyond the possession of any specific knowledge of medicine or justice. More important, however, is the recognition of one’s ignorance, for in these cases one would recognize that one has no reliable guide for one’s actions. In this situation the best alternative would be to refrain from action if possible, or at least to proclaim that one does not know. In this way one will not unintentionally harm or deceive oneself or others. Following the examples above, if one were called upon to perform first aid but lacked the specific medical knowledge, one would recognize the harm that could be caused to the individual if one were to act from ignorance. If one were called upon to speak in favour of legislation but lacked any

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knowledge of justice, one would recognize the harm that could be caused to the community if one were to act from ignorance. The specific cognitive state of recognizing one’s knowledge and ignorance is far preferable to the state in which many find themselves. Socrates implies that the majority of people spend their lives never questioning their knowledge or the reliability of their beliefs and opinions. His claim that the unexamined life is not worth living is an indictment of that lifestyle. In addition to the recognition of one’s knowledge, Plato also emphasizes the cognitive state of true opinion. The primary purpose of the Meno is to introduce the distinction between knowledge and true opinion and to show the possible identification of each with virtue. Although the Meno ends with no satisfactory definition of virtue, the reader is nonetheless left with several possible options: virtue may be identified with knowledge, true opinion, or both knowledge and true opinion. As I have shown in Chapter 4, a superficial reading of the Meno implies that virtue is not knowledge and seems to be identified with true opinion. Yet once we recognize the weakness of the argument against the identity of virtue and knowledge, we can see that the correct reading of the Meno is one which concludes that virtue may be identified with knowledge, true opinion, or both. Looking back at the Meno from a middle-period dialogue such as the Republic, which strongly emphasizes the distinction between knowledge and opinion, we can further infer that virtue should, in fact, be identified with both knowledge and true opinion. The two states of knowledge and true opinion, however, do not pertain to a single type of virtue. Rather, they are identified with two separate degrees of virtue. Having discussed true virtue as knowledge of the forms, I must now closely examine the relationship between virtue and true opinion. In doing so I wish to distinguish between true opinion that one might possess naturally and a more stable form of true opinion that comes about as the result of habit and practice. Both naturally acquired and habitually acquired true opinion take physical instances in the sensible realm of Becoming as their objects of opinion. After illustrating the differences between these two varieties of true opinion, I will discuss an additional type of true opinion that takes the forms as its objects of opinion. When Meno asks Socrates to describe the ways in which one might come to possess virtue, one possible option is the natural acquisition of virtue.19 Although in the course of the discussion Socrates and Meno conclude that virtue is not acquired by nature,20 there are nonetheless numerous examples of individuals who appear to possess at least some minimal degree of natural virtue. I am here identifying natural virtue as any type of true opinion concerning human action that one has acquired apart from

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any specific training or education. This sense of natural virtue is simply a continuation of the distinction made by Meno himself in the opening passage of the dialogue. One significant passage in the Meno implies that virtue cannot be taught because those who possess virtue are unable to pass this characteristic on to their offspring.21 Pericles, for example, the greatest and most popular of Athenian democratic statesmen, is recognized as a possessor of civic virtue for his political leadership. Yet what is the source of his virtue? He went through no specific training or educational process that resulted in his acquisition of civic virtue. While he did receive an education and was instructed by notable philosophers such as Zeno and Anaxagoras, he was never specifically trained in statecraft.22 Rather, he was naturally gifted to the extent that he was frequently able to manage successfully the complex affairs of the Athenian state.23 Here we see an example of natural virtue identified with naturally acquired true opinion. In the case of Pericles he possessed a certain collection of true opinions concerning how best to advance the well-being of Athens. Armed with this collection of true opinions as his guide, he was largely successful in his political endeavours.24 Yet ultimately the military policies of Pericles failed, he was temporarily removed from office, and after his death Athens suffered defeat at the hands of the Spartans, erasing many of the gains made during his rule. Here we see the negative aspect of naturally acquired true opinion. It is transient, fleeting, and inconsistent, just as Socrates described in the Meno (97e–98a). Pericles was able to lead the state successfully while guided by his naturally acquired true opinion. Yet untethered, his true opinion ultimately proved to be inconsistent and unreliable, and as a result Athens was led to near ruin. Plato implicitly refers to Pericles in both the Meno and the Protagoras as an example of someone who possesses naturally acquired true opinion.25 He leaves it to the reader, however, to recognize the strengths and weaknesses of its corresponding degree of virtue. The political excellence of someone such as Pericles is a quality needed by any successful ruler, and Plato, although himself no democrat, recognizes the necessity of properly qualified rulers. A more reliable form of virtue than that acquired by nature is best exemplified by the virtue possessed by the auxiliaries of the just state in the Republic. The additional reliability of the virtue of the auxiliaries is due to its identification with a stable type of true opinion. The primary weakness of true opinion as a guide for one’s actions is its instability due to its temporary, transient nature. In the Meno Plato states that this weakness can be remedied by transforming one’s true opinion into knowledge.26 The auxiliaries of Plato’s just state possess a stable true opinion based

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upon years of training and practice. Specific beliefs have been inculcated in the minds of the auxiliaries through habitual training to the extent that these instilled beliefs completely guide their actions. Thus unlike the naturally acquired true opinion of Pericles and its corresponding virtue, which suffered from inherent instability, the virtue possessed by the auxiliaries is more reliable due to its identification with a stable type of true opinion. Although the true opinion of the auxiliaries is stable, it should not be equated with knowledge, for the possession of knowledge enables one to understand the reasons behind the truth of one’s knowledge and to give an account of that truth. The auxiliaries, possessing only stable true opinion, can neither give an account of their opinions nor understand why their opinions are true. The auxiliaries simply believe them as a result of a lifetime of habit and practice. The benefit of stable true opinion over naturally acquired true opinion can be seen in any of the particular virtues. While a courageous soldier, for example, may naturally possess true opinions concerning how to act in order best to defend the city, there is no guarantee that once the city is attacked and overrun, the soldier will still have possession of those true opinions and act in the city’s best interest. With the enemy inside the walls of the city one might be tempted to care only for oneself and one’s personal possessions, in spite of one’s previous opinions concerning courage.27 Yet if one can make true opinion stable through habitual training and practice, then one can place a higher degree of trust in the consistency of the corresponding virtue as well. Thus just as true opinion acquired through habit is more stable and reliable than true opinion acquired by nature, the habitual virtue possessed by the auxiliaries is consequently more reliable and thus of a higher degree than natural virtue. Plato clearly distinguishes between knowledge and opinion in the Divided Line. The upper section of the line is where one finds the proper objects of knowledge, whereas the lower section of the line contains the objects of opinion. Plato is here distinguishing between two realms: the intelligible realm of Being and the sensible realm of Becoming. Yet he is also relating the metaphysical distinction between Being and Becoming to the epistemological distinction between knowledge and opinion, thus associating knowledge with the forms and opinion with physical objects. One can understand this distinction in either a strong or a weak sense. The weak sense of this distinction implies that the proper objects of knowledge are the forms, while the proper objects of opinion are physical objects. The implication is that one can have no permanent and stable knowledge of changing objects, only of forms. The stronger sense of this

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distinction, however, goes beyond the claim that the forms are the proper objects of knowledge and additionally claims that the only cognitive state that pertains to the forms is knowledge, never mere opinion. I believe this stronger reading of the distinction leads to a confusion between the metaphysical hierarchy and the epistemological hierarchy described in the Divided Line. While Plato wants to distinguish between the eternal forms and their changing instances, he does not, I believe, want to draw such a rigid epistemic distinction between knowledge and opinion. The stronger reading of the distinction would render the method of acquiring knowledge of the forms quite unlike the theory of recollection as it is explained in other dialogues. If knowledge were the only cognitive faculty with which one could comprehend the forms, it would be impossible for one to approach that knowledge from the perspective of true opinion. Yet the discussion of recollection in the Meno reveals that after one begins the process of recollection, one is initially in touch with true opinions, not knowledge.28 To progress from an opinion of instances of the forms to knowledge of the forms themselves, it seems that one would necessarily pass through the stage of true opinion of the forms. Furthermore, throughout the dialogues the interlocutors are asked to give their opinions freely on piety, courage, moderation, and justice. While the early dialogues contain little specific language identifying these particular virtues as forms,29 it is clear from the perspective of the middle-period dialogues that Socrates is asking for opinions concerning Piety, Courage, Moderation, Justice, and ‘all those things to which we can attach the word ‘‘itself ’’ ’ (Phaedo 75d). If true opinion of the forms were not possible, Socrates would not spend his time soliciting it. Thus the proper reading of the metaphysical and epistemological distinction in the Republic is one that recognizes that while the forms are the proper objects of knowledge, one can nonetheless possess true opinion of the forms as an intermediary stage in one’s progression toward knowledge. Consequently, true opinion of the forms can be seen as another unique cognitive state. The difference between this level of cognition and the other types of true opinion concerns the objects of opinion. Both virtue by nature and virtue by habit are associated with two degrees of true opinion that locate their objects within the sensible realm of Becoming.30 This last type of true opinion, however, is not concerned with instances of the forms but with the forms themselves. As a result the corresponding degree of virtue is more reliable than virtue acquired by nature or by habit, because the objects of this type of true opinion are constant and unchanging.

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True opinion of the forms, while unlike the other types of true opinion, can nonetheless be possessed simultaneously with naturally acquired true opinion. One might have an opinion about the best course of action in a particular situation, while at the same time believe that course of action to be an instance of the Good. For example, one might believe that it is good to treat others with justice because it not only benefits others, but also because justice is a good thing in itself that should be brought about when possible. Thus one might recognize the instrumental as well as the intrinsic value of justice.31 In doing so one would have an opinion about the particular just action as well as an opinion about Justice itself.32 One who possesses true opinion of the forms is closest to virtue, for through further recollection, one can progress to the possession of knowledge of the Good. Yet since knowledge of the Good is evidently impossible during one’s lifetime, true opinion of the forms may be the highest cognitive state one can achieve. Nonetheless, true opinion of the forms represents a practically achievable degree of virtue, while at the same time reconciling Plato’s claim that ultimate knowledge is impossible in one’s lifetime with his implication that virtue necessarily involves a cognitive component.

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Conclusion I have a beautiful child who has the form of a golden flower, my beloved Cleı¨s, for whom I would trade neither Lydia nor my lovely [Lesbos]. — Sappho1

The necessity of knowledge Sappho speaks lovingly of her daughter Cleı¨s, comparing her beauty and tenderness to that of a golden flower. Socrates also employs familiar language in the Republic, where he describes the sun as the offspring of the form of the Good. Additionally, Plato illustrates the objects on each level of the Divided Line as images or imitations of the objects on the level above, for in each case there exists a causal relationship between an object and its imitative, derivative image. Although neither as obvious nor as direct as the relationship between parent and child, the various degrees of virtue are also related to one another. The relationship between the various levels of virtue mirrors that of the various cognitive states. While the relationship between the various cognitive states is complex,2 each cognitive state can nonetheless be evaluated according to its degree of reliability, as well as the degree of happiness it produces. One of the least reliable cognitive states is that of naturally acquired true opinion. Someone who naturally possesses true opinion without any training or practice can use true opinion as a guide. Yet given the transitory nature of true opinion there is no guarantee that true opinion will be present when needed. Furthermore, the happiness produced by the associated degree of virtue will also be inconsistent and unreliable. Thus the cognitive state of naturally acquired true opinion and its corresponding degree of virtue, while beneficial, are not consistently reliable. This is the implicit point made in the Meno when Socrates claims that one should strive to transform one’s true opinion into knowledge. More reliable is the cognitive state of habitually acquired true opinion, for habitual practice and training have the benefit of stabilizing true opinion. While not fully tethered, for the possessor of stable true opinion

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cannot give an account of the truth of that opinion, habitually acquired true opinion is nonetheless more consistent and can therefore be relied upon to a higher degree than naturally acquired true opinion. Consequently, the corresponding virtue by habit can be seen as a higher degree of virtue than virtue by nature. Accordingly, the happiness produced by a more stable degree of virtue will be more consistent as well. The auxiliaries in Plato’s ideal state possess stable true opinion, yet their opinions pertain to objects in the physical, sensible realm of Becoming. The auxiliaries are trained and conditioned so that their actions can be guaranteed. Thus, while they have beliefs about courageous actions instilled in them, they have neither knowledge nor opinion of Courage itself. Although virtue by habit may be more reliable than virtue by nature due to its additional stability, the auxiliaries who possess virtue by habit are nonetheless extremely limited in their scope. The auxiliaries, who serve as the clearest example of habitually acquired true opinion, have neither true opinion nor knowledge of the forms. Their early education has resulted in the creation of stable beliefs in their souls, but it has done little to encourage the upward progression toward knowledge of the forms. A detrimental aspect of the habitually acquired true opinion of the auxiliaries is that a person educated in this manner never achieves a level of understanding that will enable him to give an account of his opinions. The auxiliaries have no knowledge with which to guide their actions but only beliefs instilled in them by others. If a novel situation arose which required action that fell outside the scope of their training, they would be left without a reliable guide. Plato presents a perfect example of precisely this weakness in his account of the afterlife experience within the myth of Er (Republic 614b– 621b). Plato describes how both the just and unjust souls are judged after death and either rewarded or punished depending upon whether each had lived a just or unjust life. After a thousand years of either reward or punishment, the souls then choose their next incarnation. Socrates states, ‘it is here that a human being faces the greatest danger of all’ (Republic 618b), for one must carefully distinguish a good life from a bad one. With every possible life in front of him, the first to choose his next life chooses ‘the greatest tyranny’ (Republic 619b), mistakenly thinking this to be a good life.3 Upon recognizing the terrible fate he has chosen for himself, he laments his choice and blames everyone but himself for his poor decision. While the reader might be tempted to think that this is someone who had lived an unjust and ignorant life in his past existence, Socrates describes this character differently:

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He was one of those who had come down from heaven, having lived his previous life under an orderly constitution, where he had participated in virtue through habit and without philosophy. (Republic 619c) This is a perfect description of one of the auxiliaries of Plato’s ideal state. It is someone who, having previously lived a just life, received a thousand years of reward. The auxiliaries are just because they are ruled by the reason possessed by the philosopher-rulers. They have been taught and conditioned to the point that they can consistently act according to what they believe to be best, in spite of any contrary desires that may arise from either the spirited or appetitive parts of their souls. Thus their just lives would merit the reward spoken of in the myth of Er. Furthermore, they live under an orderly constitution, for the structure of the city is designed to produce justice in the state. The orderly state that Plato describes is one organized according to the One Task Principle, in which each class or group of citizens performs its specific task and does not interfere with the tasks of the other classes. Finally, the auxiliaries have no knowledge of the forms but only the stable opinion that they should always act for the benefit of the city. Plato is clearly stating that while the auxiliaries serve as examples of just individuals, there is much more to a good life than simply acting in a just fashion. If one is to be truly just one must be guided by one’s knowledge of Justice. Even stable true opinion, it seems, cannot guarantee happiness. Separate from both naturally and habitually acquired true opinion is true opinion of the forms. When one possesses an opinion concerning Justice itself, as opposed to an instance of justice, one is closer to knowledge of Justice. While these varieties of true opinion are closely related, they are distinguished by their objects. Given that the forms are more fundamental than, and ontologically prior to, any particular instances of the forms, the cognitive state of opinion that takes the forms as objects of opinion will also be more reliable than any true opinion of mere instances or images of the forms. This is true of both naturally and habitually acquired true opinion. The corresponding degree of virtue may also be seen as higher than that of naturally or habitually acquired virtue since the contemplation of the object of one’s opinion has the potential to lead one further toward knowledge. Unlike the auxiliaries, the philosopher-rulers have been given an additional education in mathematics and dialectic. This additional education enables them to possess true opinion of the forms. The further one continues in one’s dialectical investigation, the closer one comes to reaching knowledge of the Good. While this ultimate goal may be

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impossible in one’s lifetime, it follows that one can nonetheless reach a level of stable true opinion of the forms as a result of one’s dialectical study. Complete knowledge of the forms is, of course, the most reliable cognitive state, which carries with it the most complete level of virtue. This is the Platonic conception of true virtue implied throughout the early dialogues and described in greater detail in the middle dialogues. Yet one additional significant cognitive state is the recognition of one’s knowledge and ignorance or the recognition that one knows or does not know something. While this may seem less significant than the three variations of true opinion just described, I believe that it is an extremely important component in the virtuous life. Recognizing that complete knowledge of the forms is impossible in this life, one can derive significant benefit from the recognition that one does or does not possess either knowledge or opinion about a particular subject. The unfortunate soul who chose the life of a tyrant lacked the recognition of his ignorance. If he were aware that he had no knowledge to use as a guide, perhaps his choice would have been more beneficial, for himself as well as for others. This example, found at the very end of the Republic, illustrates the supreme importance of knowledge as a guide for one’s life. Plato is clearly stating that without knowledge neither happiness nor a good life is guaranteed. Knowledge is a necessary condition for complete happiness, as well as the goal toward which the wisdom-lover should strive. While it may not be fully attainable, it nonetheless serves as a telos, an end of one’s philosophic quest. Thus although Plato describes a variety of cognitive states and their corresponding degrees of virtue, his ultimate lesson is that with knowledge as our guide we will do well and be happy. Plato’s continuing significance Plato has clearly had an enormous influence upon the subsequent development of western philosophy. His influence can be seen to stretch through the centuries, touching upon such diverse areas as religion, politics, art, and psychology. But there is another aspect of Plato’s continuing significance that can be seen on a much more individual level. Throughout the dialogues Plato promotes the benefits of a life guided by knowledge, on a personal level as well as a social and political level. On a personal level our decisions, judgements, and actions result from the possession of a reliable cognitive component as a guide. Whether we possess knowledge, a variety of true opinion, or even the recognition of our limited understanding, such an awareness can prevent us from acting in a mistaken or misguided manner. Furthermore, if we look to knowledge

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as a guide we avoid the often terrible mistake of acting from unexamined opinions or dogmatic beliefs. Similarly, political leaders who look to knowledge as a guide will consistently rule with an aim of the establishment and continuance of justice, as opposed to governing on the basis of particular untested opinions or beliefs. What would Plato think, nearly twenty-four centuries after he wrote his dialogues, of our contemporary world, its varieties of political and social organization, and the daily lives we lead? Can we give an account of our lives, our decisions, our judgements, and our daily actions? Do we as individuals live examined lives, in which our beliefs are questioned and tested for their soundness? Or do we unthinkingly act in accordance with our accepted beliefs? What of our social and political leaders, those who have perhaps the greatest influence over the greatest number of people? Have they been educated or trained in such a way as to rule unselfishly, always acting for the benefit of those they rule? Or do they rule with an agenda of personal gain and the accumulation of power? Today we find countries around the world with a variety of forms of political organization. In some cases religious leaders wield political control, sometimes imposing strict religious doctrine upon the daily lives of their citizens. In less extreme examples we find democratic forms of government where those in both high and low political offices are influenced by their personal religious beliefs or by the beliefs of others who hold some degree of political power. Theocracy, in any form and to any degree, is incompatible with the Platonic conception of the just state. We should remember, of course, that Plato was no democrat and that he saw democracy as a form of government surpassed only by tyranny in its degree of injustice. Plato’s ultimate claim is that the good life is a life guided by knowledge. We would do well both individually and collectively to consider his sound advice and let knowledge guide our actions. One of Plato’s additional goals was the production of educated philosophers capable of effectively ruling a state. He recognizes that states will suffer until they are ruled by properly trained individuals with the correct temperament and disposition.4 The historical Socrates, if we can trust the account given us by Plato, continually questioned those who supposedly possessed knowledge, whether they were the poets, the sophists, or the politicians of his day. Perhaps the world needs another Socrates, for in spite of the significant influence of Plato upon western philosophy, he seems to be exercising very little concrete influence upon the actions of societies, governments, or individuals. Yet Plato’s continuing significance within the realm of academic philosophy is unquestioned. More than two millennia after his death his

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dialogues are still read, discussed, and debated. I have attempted to provide a new interpretation of the relationship between virtue and knowledge, while at the same time presenting the dialogues within the framework of a unitarian interpretation, that accounts for various statements made throughout the dialogues concerning the role of knowledge in virtue. The centrepiece of my interpretation is the recognition of varying degrees of virtue and their one-to-one correspondence with different cognitive states. The philosophical significance of recognizing these various degrees of virtue and their cognitive components is that it provides readers of the dialogues with a unified interpretation of Platonic ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics. One need not try to distinguish the historical Socrates from the Platonic creation, nor must one try to discover the various stages of Plato’s philosophic development. Although Plato does not address every aspect of his overall philosophy in each of the dialogues, when we approach the dialogues with an eye to their protreptic and proleptic nature we can then see that Plato introduces key elements in the early dialogues only to address them later in a more complete fashion. The introduction of concepts in the early dialogues such as the nature of piety, courage, moderation, and justice is intended in part to attract the attention of those aspiring to a life of virtue. The early dialogues, however, clearly distinguish between the popular conception of virtue and the Platonic conception of virtue. Once it is shown that virtue is identified with the possession of knowledge, it becomes clear that the only path to virtue is through the practice of philosophy. Thus the dialogues turn the reader toward philosophy and initiate the upward progression out of the darkness of false and unquestioned beliefs toward the light of wisdom. I have played upon the imagery of stepping stones several times to illustrate the role played by the early dialogues. Plato’s original use of the term comes from his description of mathematical objects, which serve as stepping stones on the path toward knowledge of the forms (Republic 511b). The early dialogues can also be seen as stepping stones, for they not only introduce the reader to important philosophic concepts, but also carry the reader on to the more complete articulation of Platonic ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics in the middle dialogues. The progression we see from the early to the middle dialogues mirrors the progression of the wisdom-lover on her quest for knowledge. Furthermore, the upward progression toward greater and greater clarity is facilitated by the recognition of different degrees of virtue. These various degrees of virtue and their corresponding cognitive states are, in fact, the most significant example of Plato’s stepping stones, leading us out of ignorance, through

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opinion, and ultimately to the recognition of both the limits and extent of our knowledge. As Socrates pointed out, the unexamined life is not worth living. Plato, by laying down the stepping stones toward knowledge and virtue, has shown us the path to follow if we wish to lead such an examined life.

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Notes Introduction 1

Apology 23a. Unless otherwise noted all selections from the Apology are from the G. M. A. Grube translation in Cooper (ed.), Plato: Complete Works, pp. 17–36. 2 Socrates is referring to the Delphic claim concerning his superlative wisdom: ‘[Chairephon] went to Delphi at one time and ventured to ask the oracle . . . if any man was wiser than I, and the Pythian replied that no one was wiser’ (Apology 21a). 3 Given that many of the participants in the dialogues find this identification surprising, the contemporary reader can infer that the identification of virtue with knowledge was not a popularly accepted view. 4 In many of the early dialogues, especially the dialogues of definition, the idea is entertained that knowledge might play a definitive role in either virtue as a whole or the particular virtues under investigation. In particular see Euthyphro 14b; Laches 194e–195a, 199c–e; Charmides 164d, 174b–c, 174e; Meno 89a; and Republic 350c–d. See also the relationship between knowledge and virtue in Euthydemus 279a–281e and Protagoras 333b, 350c, 352b–c, 360d. 5 I will focus primarily on relevant passages from the Apology, Euthyphro, Laches, Charmides, Gorgias, Hippias Minor, Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus, Phaedo, Symposium, and Republic. Although there is considerable disagreement concerning the exact chronological arrangement of Plato’s dialogues, these dialogues would be regarded by most scholars as written during Plato’s early and middle periods of composition. Notable exceptions would be scholars such as Friedrich Schleiermacher and George Grote who, basing their conclusions on an examination of the philosophical views revealed within the dialogues and working without the benefit of modern stylometric analysis, place the Republic in a late stage of Plato’s works. Schleiermacher groups the Republic with the Timaeus and the Critias, while Grote places the Republic along with the Philebus, Sophist, Politicus, and Parmenides. 6 Unless otherwise noted all selections from the Phaedo are from the G. M. A. Grube translation in Cooper (ed.), Plato: Complete Works, pp. 49–100. 7 See Phaedo 78c–84b. Socrates’ description of the soul’s search for wisdom—itself part of his argument for the immortality of the soul—portrays the impossibility of attaining such knowledge while one’s soul is joined with one’s physical body. 8 Unless otherwise noted all selections from the Seventh Letter are from the Glenn R. Morrow translation in Cooper (ed.), Plato: Complete Works, pp. 1646–67. 9 Unless otherwise noted all selections from the Phaedrus are from Hamilton (trans.), Phaedrus and the Seventh and Eighth Letters, pp. 21–103.

Chapter 1 1

Aristotle, Metaphysics 1078b30–32, trans. W. D. Ross. Some scholars, such as Gregory Vlastos, actually divide the dialogues into four groups, recognizing different philosophical content within a group of ‘transitional’

2

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dialogues (Meno, Euthydemus, Hippias Major, Lysis, and Menexenus) that form a subset of the early-period dialogues. See Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher, pp. 46–47. Charles Kahn also places a group of dialogues between the early and middle dialogues. Kahn’s list of ‘pre-middle’ or ‘threshold’ dialogues consists of Laches, Charmides, Lysis, Euthyphro, Protagoras, Euthydemus, and Meno. See Kahn, ‘Did Plato Write Socratic Dialogues?’, p. 309, as well as Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue. Both Vlastos and Kahn, however, recognize a difference between the middleperiod dialogues and those that precede them. This difference largely concerns the explicit presence of a metaphysical doctrine of forms in the middle dialogues that appears to be absent from the dialogues of the earlier period. Statistical analyses of the stylistic elements of the dialogues can be found in Ledger, Re-counting Plato. See also Brandwood’s The Chronology of Plato’s Dialogues, as well as his article ‘Stylometry and Chronology’. 3 For a brief discussion of textual references between the dialogues see Rutherford, The Art of Plato, pp. 4–5; Ledger, Re-counting Plato, pp. 82–84; Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 4, pp. 52–53; and Tigerstedt, ‘Interpreting Plato’, p. 99. 4 See, for example, Metaphysics 987a32–b10, 1078b12–31 and 1086a37–b4. 5 See Vlastos’ catalogue of differences between the views of the Socrates of the early and middle dialogues in Socrates, pp. 47–49. See also Penner, ‘Socrates and the Early Dialogues’; Benson, introduction to Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates; Kraut, ‘Introduction to the Study of Plato’, in The Cambridge Companion to Plato; Reeve, Philosopher-Kings; McPherran, ‘Socratic Piety in the Euthyphro’; and Brickhouse and Smith, Socrates on Trial. 6 See Irwin, Plato’s Ethics; Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato, vol. 1; Grube, Plato’s Thought; Teloh, The Development of Plato’s Metaphysics; Grote, Plato and the Other Companions of Socrates; and Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy. 7 See Friedla¨nder, Plato, vol. 1, p. 161. See also Schleiermacher, Introduction to the Dialogues of Plato; Shorey, What Plato Said; and Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue. 8 See Phaedrus 275e. 9 Seventh Letter 344b.

Chapter 2 1

Lombardo, (trans.), Parmenides and Empedocles, p. 11. See, for example, Charmides 175b–c and Republic 354a, 621d. 3 Unless otherwise noted all selections from the Euthyphro are from the G. M. A. Grube translation in Cooper (ed.), Plato: Complete Works, pp. 1–16. 4 A similar point is raised in the Charmides at 173a–d concerning the benefit of being ruled by those who possess knowledge of knowledge. The philosopher-rulers of the Republic fit this description even more clearly. 5 Unless otherwise noted all selections from the Meno are from the G. M. A. Grube translation in Cooper (ed.), Plato: Complete Works, pp. 870–97. 6 Laches was an Athenian general during the Peloponnesian War and was killed in the battle of Mantinea in 418 BCE. Nicias was a prominent conservative Athenian politician and general, perhaps best known for the Peace of Nicias, a supposed fifty-year alliance between the Athenians and Spartans established in 421 BCE. The Peace of Nicias lasted only a few years, effectively coming to an end after the battle of Mantinea. Ultimately Nicias’ conservatism, timidity, and superstitious nature proved to be his ruin. When it became clear that retreat was the only option for the doomed Sicilian expedition under his command, Nicias delayed the retreat for one month due to a lunar eclipse. By that time a successful retreat was impossible. He 2

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eventually surrendered and was executed. The dramatic date of the Laches must fall between the battle of Delium in 424 BCE and the battle of Mantinea in 418 BCE. Assuming a dramatic date of approximately 420 BCE, some time during the Peace of Nicias, both Laches and Nicias would have been popularly recognized for their possession of courage at that time. 7 Concerning Socrates’ battlefield experience, see also Charmides 153a–d and Symposium 219e–221b. 8 Unless otherwise noted all selections from the Laches are from the Iain Lane translation in Saunders (ed.), Plato: Early Socratic Dialogues, pp. 69–115. 9 See Laches 195c–d, Charmides 164b–c, and Gorgias 511e–512b. 10 Of the early dialogues of definition, the Charmides contains a reference to a type of knowledge that ‘presides over the other knowledges’ (Charmides 174d–e). Furthermore, the Gorgias discusses the craft of politics, which is seen as a superordinate craft that oversees other crafts. Ultimately knowledge of the Good will be presented as the knowledge that allows one to recognize one’s true good. 11 Socrates’ two interlocutors, Charmides and Critias, were eventually tempted and did, in fact, go too far. Both were involved in the unjust rule of the Thirty Tyrants following the Peloponnesian War (404–403 BCE). Plato’s original audience would have been acutely aware of this fact. Thus the historical outcome of the lives of Charmides and Critias illustrates the importance of a life of moderation, as well as the consequences of a life in which this particular virtue is absent. 12 The virtue of moderation plays a significant role in several of Plato’s dialogues: it is the particular focus of the Charmides, it figures in the discussion in the latter part of the Gorgias, it serves as one of the four cardinal virtues described in the Republic, as well as one of the five particular virtues discussed in the Protagoras concerning the unity of the virtues, and it is also discussed throughout Plato’s final work, the Laws. 13 The Charmides is probably the most significant of the early dialogues concerning the role of knowledge in virtue. Plato addresses the topics of knowledge of oneself (164d–165c), knowledge of itself and other knowledges (166e–169e), knowledge of what one does and does not know (170c–171c), knowledge that one does and does not know (170d–171c), and knowledge of good and evil (174b–175a), all within this single dialogue. 14 Unless otherwise noted all selections from the Charmides are from the Donald Watt translation in Saunders (ed.), Plato: Early Socratic Dialogues, pp. 165–209. 15 See Republic 369e–370c. This principle is often referred to as the Principle of Specialization. I refer to the founding principle of the city as the ‘One Task Principle’ simply because the name denotes the essential feature of the principle: each person performs one task and only one task in the city. 16 A similar point was raised in the Laches at 195c when it was noted that the doctor does not know if the production of health is always good. 17 While the crafts of shipbuilding, medicine, and similar productive and therapeutic crafts produce beneficial results, it has been shown that the practitioners of these particular crafts can neither recognize nor understand the goodness or benefit of their products without an additional type of knowledge. 18 Knowledge of good and evil is introduced in order to address the claim that moderation, as defined by Socrates and Critias, provides no benefit. Nonetheless, Plato’s intention is for the reader to recognize knowledge of good and evil as a worthwhile definition of moderation and continue the investigation along these lines. 19 The knowledge of good and evil was also suggested as a possible definition of courage in the Laches. Although both dialogues end in aporia, one might infer that

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Plato, by his suggestion of knowledge of good and evil in both dialogues, is illustrating the significance of such knowledge. Furthermore, looking at the Charmides from a proleptic perspective, knowledge of good and evil, specifically knowledge of the form of the Good, will be the primary object of knowledge for the philosopher-rulers in the Republic. 20 Certainly Nicias’ inaction in the Sicilian expedition led to the defeat of the Athenian forces and his own demise. While he may have possessed knowledge of military strategy, his superstitious fears were able to supersede his particular craft knowledge. One way to address this possibility is to distinguish between the possession of knowledge and the possession of true opinion, a distinction Plato will make in the Meno. 21 One might argue that a complete lack of self-control or moderation led Charmides and Critias first to tyrannical rule and ultimately to their own deaths. Neither lived well nor achieved happiness, the twin results of a virtuous life. 22 Plato indirectly addresses this point when courage is defined as ‘knowledge of what is fearful and what is encouraging, both in wartime and in all other situations’ (Laches 194e–195a), although this point is not emphasized in the dialogue. 23 The fact that the investigation into the nature of courage and moderation leads to knowledge of good and evil and the fact that piety entails justice illustrate the interrelated nature of the particular virtues, a topic Plato directly addresses in the Protagoras concerning the unity of virtue.

Chapter 3 1

Heraclitus, fr. 202, in Kirk, Raven, and Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers. Unless otherwise noted all selections from the Gorgias are from the Donald J. Zehl translation in Cooper (ed.), Plato: Complete Works, pp. 791–869. 3 The term e| mpeirºa is variously translated as ‘knack’ (Zeyl), ‘routine’ (Woodhead), or even ‘habitude’ (Lamb). 4 It was shown in the Laches at 190c—and implied in the Charmides at 159a—that the possession of knowledge enabled one to give an account of one’s knowledge. 5 This point can be gleaned from Socrates’ initial examination of Gorgias and his supposed craft of rhetoric as well as from the traditional crafts. 6 Socrates claims that a just man not only does just things, but that the just man necessarily wants to do just things (Gorgias 460b–c). 7 The Euthyphro, Laches, Charmides, and Republic address piety, courage, moderation, and justice respectively, the four virtues that Socrates describes in the Protagoras as unified in wisdom. 8 Recognizing the importance of justice in terms of the unity of virtue as discussed in the Protagoras, and furthermore finding particular dialogues that correspond to the virtues of piety (Euthyphro), courage (Laches), moderation (Charmides), and knowledge (Thaeatetus), Paul Friedla¨nder claims that Book I of the Republic should be seen as the Platonic dialogue that addresses justice. Further recognizing the important role played by Socrates’ chief antagonist, Friedla¨nder refers to this dialogue as the Thrasymachus. See Friedla¨nder, Plato, vol. 2, pp. 50–66. 9 Unless otherwise noted all selections from the Republic are from the G. M. A. Grube translation in Cooper (ed.), Plato: Complete Works, pp. 971–1223. 10 In the Gorgias, cooking (o|copoiºa) is not seen as a craft (te´xnh) but as a knack (e| mpeirºa), an acquaintance with a thing gained through experience (Gorgias 462c). Yet in the present passage (Republic 332c) Plato uses te´xnh to describe cooking (mageirikh´) as well as the other crafts. In the Gorgias Socrates is comparing the persuasive abilities of the orator with the abilities of one who prepares fine and 2

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fancy meals (o\ o|copoio´q). Both the cook and the orator aim at pleasing. The more technical term used in the Republic (mageirikh´) seems to refer to the possession of a specific type of craft knowledge. The aim of the cook in the Republic is not merely to please but to provide some beneficial product. 11 ‘So, Socrates, injustice, if it is on a large enough scale, is stronger, freer, and more masterly than justice. And, as I said from the first, justice is what is advantageous to the stronger, while injustice is to one’s own profit and advantage’ (Republic 344c). 12 Unless otherwise noted all selections from the Hippias Minor are from the Robin Waterfield translation in Saunders (ed.), Plato: Early Socratic Dialogues, pp. 275–93. 13 There is no statement of perplexity on behalf of either Hippias or Socrates, as can be found at the end of the other aporetic dialogues. See Euthyphro 15e–16a, Laches 199e, Charmides 175b, Meno 100b, and Republic 354b–c. The Hippias Minor ends in mutual disagreement with the conclusion of the argument but not in aporia, since a conclusion has been reached. 14 A similar point is raised in several dialogues. See Laches 195b–e, Charmides 164b–c, and Gorgias 511e–512b. 15 This claim, if not explicitly stated in the early dialogues, can be recognized from an examination of the dialogues of definition. Piety, courage, moderation, and justice are all recognized as good things and are desired as such. Thus goodness constitutes part of the motivation behind the interlocutors’ desire to acquire these particular virtues. On the relationship of the particular virtues to goodness, see Laches 198a, Charmides 159c, and Republic 353e–354a. On the desire for the good, see Euthyphro 7e and Gorgias 468b, 509e. Socrates does explicitly state in the Meno that everyone desires what is good (77b–78b) and that virtue is a good (Meno 87d).

Chapter 4 1

Emily Dickinson, ‘I Died For Beauty — but was scarce’, in Bianchi and Hampson (eds), The Poems of Emily Dickinson, p. 161. 2 Unless otherwise noted all selections from the Protagoras are from the Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell translation in Cooper (ed.), Plato: Complete Works, pp. 746–90. 3 Quotation from the Rosamond Kent Sprague translation in Cooper (ed.), Plato: Complete Works, p. 711. 4 Quotation from the W. H. D. Rouse translation in Hamilton and Cairns (eds), The Collected Dialogues of Plato, pp. 388–89. 5 Although Protagoras does speak of nobility and goodness in an abstract sense (to` kalo`n kai` a| gauo´n) at 328b, it is nonetheless apparent that the virtue he claims to teach consists of nothing more than civic virtue. 6 As noted in the previous chapter, the ‘skill’ possessed by the sophist was described in the Gorgias as a ‘knack’ (e| mpeirºa) that lacks knowledge. See Gorgias 464b–465d. 7 While I translated svfros¥nh as ‘moderation’ in my discussion of the Charmides, ‘soundness of mind’ might best describe the particular virtue of svfros¥nh as it is addressed in this section of the Protagoras. I will, however, maintain the earlier translation for purposes of consistency. 8 While there is nothing in these three dialogues that directly suggests the concept of the unity of all the virtues, each particular virtue under investigation is, nonetheless, discussed in relation to another virtue. Thus we see a discussion of piety and justice in the Euthyphro, courage and wisdom in the Laches, and moderation and wisdom in the Charmides.

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9

‘Then, if it is honorable, we have agreed before, it is also good, for we agreed that all honorable actions were good’ (Protagoras 359e). 10 By claiming that these theories originate from someone other than Socrates, Plato can effectively employ them without stopping at this point to elaborate on their veracity or reliability. Both the notions of the immortality of the soul and the theory of recollection are given greater attention and emphasis in the Phaedo. 11 The ability to give an account is seen as an indication of the possession of knowledge (Laches 190c). This point will receive further emphasis later in the Meno in the discussion of knowledge and true opinion. 12 ‘These opinions have now just been stirred up like a dream, but if he were repeatedly asked these same questions in various ways, you know that in the end his knowledge about these things would be as accurate as anyone’s’ (Meno 85c–d). 13 Quotation from the Robin Waterfield translation in Saunders (ed.), Plato: Early Socratic Dialogues, p. 328. 14 Ibid., p. 331. 15 A similar point was raised in the Protagoras at 319e–320b. 16 The Greek didakto´n can be rendered either ‘teachable’ or ‘taught’. Thus the argument might be understood as either virtue is not teachable (implying the logical impossibility of it ever being taught), or virtue is not taught (implying that its being taught is still a logical possibility). 17 See Protagoras 319e–320b and Meno 93b–94e. 18 This point is illustrated through Plato’s example of the two guides on the road to Larissa, one a personification of knowledge and the other of true opinion: ‘And as long as he has the right opinion about that of which the other has knowledge, he will not be a worse guide than the one who knows, as he has a true opinion, though not knowledge’ (Meno 97b). 19 Plato presents a similar analogy in the Euthyphro. In expressing his confusion concerning the nature of piety, Euthyphro refers to the statues of Daedalus when he claims that his ideas ‘run away and will not stay where one puts them’ (Euthyphro 11b–c). This can be seen as another example of the weakness of opinion, for unlike knowledge, opinion is neither permanent nor grounded.

Chapter 5 1

Lombardo (trans.), Parmenides and Empedocles, p. 13. The idea of one object as an imperfect image of another, or as a shadow of its original, is a theme Plato uses in the illustration of the Divided Line (Republic 509d–511e). 3 See Republic 522c–531c. 4 This dichotomy between the constant, changeless forms and their constantly changing manifestations is drawn out more clearly in the illustration of the Divided Line, given in n.2 where Plato distinguishes between the visible realm of physical objects and the separate, intelligible realm of the forms. 5 ‘These latter [particular instances] you could touch and see and perceive with the other senses, but those that always remain the same can only be grasped by the reasoning power of the mind’ (Phaedo 79a). 6 ‘Can you tell me, Socrates, can virtue be taught? Or is it not teachable but the result of practice, or is it neither of these, but men possess it by nature or in some other way?’ (Meno 70a) 7 See Republic 412d–e, 413c. 8 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1105a33, trans. W. D. Ross. 9 Ibid., 1103b1–2. 2

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10 Those guardians who are able to maintain their belief that they should always act for the benefit of the state, even in the face of pleasures, fears, and other possible forms of coercion, are seen as fit to rule. Those who fail such tests are seen as unfit to rule and are thus placed in an auxiliary position, assisting the rulers in their administration of the state. See Republic 412b–414b. 11 The ‘myth of the metals’ (Republic 415a–d) helps to justify the One Task Principle and the earlier claim that ‘we aren’t all born alike, but each of us differs somewhat in nature from the others, one being suited to one task, another to another’ (Republic 370a–b). 12 Why only these four particular virtues should be found in the state, and not the additional virtue of piety as addressed in the Euthyphro, is not clear. Perhaps Plato recognizes piety as that part of justice concerning relations between humans and the gods and thus sees a discussion of piety as either misplaced or redundant in the discussion of the just state. 13 Socrates at times refers to this class as the money-making class (see Republic 441a). 14 Socrates states the importance of a life ruled by wisdom later in the Republic when he claims that those who are incapable of being guided by their own wisdom should be guided by the wisdom of others. See Republic 590c–d. 15 Plato’s claim that those most qualified to rule the state are the philosophers is not only found in the Republic (473c–e) but also in the Seventh Letter (326a–b). 16 Plato uses ei| kasºa at both Republic 511e and 534a. The significance of this particular cognitive state is that it enables one to recognize an image as an image and nothing more. 17 These two ontological realms correspond to the distinction made earlier (Republic 477a–479d) between the cognitive states of knowledge and opinion. 18 Plato repeats this fourfold epistemological hierarchy later, with slight variation of the terms. See Republic 533e–534a. 19 ‘And at this point he would infer and conclude that the sun provides the seasons of the years, governs everything in the visible world, and is in some way the cause of all things that he used to see’ (Republic 516b–c). This passage is similar to the passage in the analogy of the sun and the Good, where Socrates remarks that ‘the sun not only provides visible things with the power to be seen but also with coming to be, growth, and nourishment . . .’ (Republic 509b). Both descriptions of the sun are used to describe the function of the Good. 20 The possession of knowledge enables one to give an account of the truth of one’s knowledge. See Laches 190c, Meno 98a, and Phaedo 76b. 21 Socrates often points to others as the source of his views, such as the priests and priestesses mentioned in the Meno who serve as the origin of the theories of recollection and the immortality of the soul (Meno 81a–b). In the Symposium, a dialogue in which Socrates explains central aspects of the metaphysical theory of forms, the teachings come from the wise woman Diotima. 22 ‘Suppose someone changes the question, putting ‘‘good’’ in place of ‘‘beautiful’’ ’ (Symposium 204e); ‘That’s because what everyone loves is really nothing other than the good’ (Symposium 206a). 23 Unless otherwise noted, all selections from the Symposium are from the Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff translation in Cooper (ed.), Plato: Complete Works, pp. 457–505. 24 This echoes the claim made in the Seventh Letter concerning the attainment of wisdom: ‘after long-continued intercourse between teacher and pupil, in joint pursuit of the subject, suddenly, like light flashing forth when a fire is kindled, it [wisdom] is born in the soul and straightaway nourishes itself’ (Seventh Letter 341 c–d).

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25

Plato does refer to the one form or uniformity (monoeide`q) of Beauty shortly after this point, at both Symposium 211b and 212a. 26 The Greek is e| panabaumo¡q. Note the similarity to Plato’s description of mathematical objects in the Divided Line, which can be used as stepping stones (e| piba´seiq) along the path toward knowledge of the Good. 27 While the analogy between the two is not exact, Plato explains the significance of the relationship between a single beautiful body and the beauty found in numerous bodies by recognizing that ‘if [the lover] is to pursue beauty of form he’d be very foolish not to think that the beauty of all bodies is one and the same’ (Symposium 210b). Thus the recognition of beauty in many beautiful bodies helps the lover (of wisdom) to see more clearly the unitary nature of the desired form. In the Republic Plato speaks of ‘relative clarity and opacity’ (Republic 509e) when he describes the relationship between images and their originals. The essence of the form is more clearly (though still imperfectly) represented in a physical object than in its shadow or reflection. The prisoner in the cave possesses less epistemic clarity about the shadows on the cave wall than about the artefacts casting the shadows. The idea in each case is to show that comprehension and appreciation of the objects of the higher level (many beautiful bodies and physical objects) help to lead one toward ultimate knowledge of the forms. 28 Plato has both characters illustrate the difficulty in speaking of the form by qualifying their statements concerning the nature of the Good and Beauty. See Republic 505a and 533a as well as Symposium 210a. 29 ‘It really has been shown to us that, if we are ever to have pure knowledge, we must escape from the body and observe matters in themselves with the soul by itself. It seems likely that we shall, only then, when we are dead, attain that which we desire and of which we claim to be lovers, namely, wisdom, as our argument shows, not while we live; for if it is impossible to attain any pure knowledge with the body, then one of two things is true: either we can never attain knowledge or we can do so after death’ (Phaedo 66d–67a).

Chapter 6 1

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1097b20, trans. W. D. Ross. Charmides 167a. 3 The doctor, in curing one of an illness, does not know whether the production of health is, in fact, a good thing for each particular patient (Laches 195b–e). Similarly, the helmsman does not know whether saving one’s life at sea is, in fact, a good thing for each particular individual (Gorgias 511e–512b). Knowledge of the Good would successfully guide both the doctor and the helmsman in the beneficial employment of their particular crafts. 4 The craftsman, having an opinion about the manifestations of goodness, might recognize the presence of goodness in his product. Yet without knowledge of the Good he will be unable to give an account of that goodness. In a similar fashion, the slave in the geometrical example in the Meno, having his opinions stirred through Socrates’ questioning (Meno 82b–86c), was able to dimly recognize the truth when Socrates presented it to him. Lacking knowledge, however, he could not give an account of why the answer supplied by Socrates was true. 5 See Republic 511b–c. 6 ‘After [true opinions] are tied down, in the first place they become knowledge, and then they remain in place. That is why knowledge is prized higher than correct opinion, and knowledge differs from correct opinion in being tied down’ (Meno 98a). 2

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7

Republic 354a. Charmides 172a. 9 Symposium 204e–205a. 10 Phaedo 115d, Republic 621d. 11 See Meno 81a–d, 85c–86b, Republic 608c–611a, as well as the myth of Er (614a– 621d), and numerous examples in the Phaedo: 66d–67b, 70a–73a, 79b–81a, 105c–e, 108c, and 113d–114c. 12 ‘I myself put it [justice] among the finest goods, as something to be valued by anyone who is going to be blessed with happiness, both because of itself and because of what comes from it’ (Republic 357e–358a). 13 While living well and doing well can be seen as the result of virtue’s instrumental goodness, happiness is a concurrent or collateral good, coincidental with the possession of virtue. 14 See Laches 195b–e, Charmides 164b–c, and Gorgias 511e–512b. 15 The aporetic ending of the Charmides can be better understood by recognizing the proleptic nature of the dialogue. As I have argued in Chapter 2, moderation should be seen as the superordinate knowledge of good and evil that oversees all other knowledges. Plato introduced this as a possible definition of moderation in the Charmides, only to define virtue later in similar terms. 16 ‘As the soul is immortal, has been born often and has seen all things here and in the underworld, there is nothing which it has not learned’ (Meno 81c). Since this statement is not concerned exclusively with knowledge of the forms, there are two sources of knowledge mentioned: the repeated union of the physical body and the soul in the physical world, and the non-physical existence of the soul apart from the physical body. 17 Phaedo 65a. 18 Meno’s paradox–-that one can find neither what one knows nor what one does not know (Meno 80d–e)–-implies that one either possesses knowledge of a subject or is ignorant of it. Socrates’ introduction of recollection (Meno 82a–86c) not only refutes Meno’s claim, but introduces the distinct, intermediate state of true opinion. 19 Meno 70a. 20 ‘[I]f we were right in the way in which we spoke and investigated in this whole discussion, virtue would neither be an inborn quality nor taught’ (Meno 99e). 21 See Meno 93c–94e for the examples of Themistocles, Aristides, Pericles, and Thucydides. See also Protagoras 319e–320b, where Socrates makes the same point, again using the example of Pericles. 22 Plutarch, in his biography of Pericles, lists Zeno, Anaxagoras, Damon, and Pythoclides as tutors of Pericles. While all these tutors were educated in philosophy and the arts, none of them were capable of instructing Pericles in political or civic virtue. 23 Pericles played a leading role in Athenian politics from 460 BCE until his death from the plague in 429 BCE. During his rule he successfully oversaw the transition of the Delian League into the Athenian empire, expanded the democratic political process to include a larger number of citizens, initiated the beautification of Athens, and led Athens through the early stages of the Peloponnesian War. These successful endeavours would be considered by many as perfect examples of civic virtue. 24 The fact that Pericles was unable to pass this characteristic along to his offspring serves as proof that he lacked knowledge, for the possession of knowledge would have enabled him to give an account of the goodness of his actions, thus enabling him to teach virtue to others. 25 The explicit references to Pericles in both dialogues concern his inability to 8

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teach virtue, which stems from his lack of knowledge. Given that he is seen as a virtuous person and yet cannot teach virtue, his virtue must have been that degree of virtue identified with true opinion. 26 ‘For true opinions, as long as they remain, are a fine thing and all they do is good, but they are not willing to remain long, and they escape from a man’s mind, so that they are not worth much until one ties them down by giving an account of the reason why’ (Meno 97e–98a). 27 This is one of the reasons why the guardians of Plato’s state are not allowed to possess any private property (Republic 416c–417b). This is also the stated purpose of the ‘Noble Falsehood’ (Republic 414b–415d). The auxiliaries are taught to defend the city and their fellow citizens as they would defend their mother and their brothers and sisters. 28 See Meno 85c–d. 29 One notable exception is the Euthyphro, in which Plato uses the same language for describing the forms as he does in the middle-period dialogues. See Euthyphro 5d, 6d–e. 30 Both Pericles and the auxiliaries, serving as examples of naturally and habitually acquired true opinion, possess opinions about human actions or states of affairs in the sensible realm. 31 Socrates emphasizes the dual nature of justice at Republic 357b–358a. 32 One might argue that, in most cases, one’s true opinion about a just action coincides with a true opinion about Justice itself. This is not always the case, for one could have a true opinion concerning a just action, yet have no true opinion concerning Justice itself. For example, one could act in a just fashion toward others (by treating others with fairness) simply to develop a good reputation for oneself, with no concern or opinion whatsoever about the form of Justice.

Conclusion 1

Sappho, fr. 130, author’s translation. The complexity of this relationship can be seen when one recognizes that it is possible to possess more than one cognitive state at a time. One could, for example, recognize the possession of one’s true opinions and have a true opinion about an instance of justice, while also possessing a true opinion about Justice itself. In this example the virtuous actions produced by the possession of these cognitive states would be the same. 3 Plato is indirectly referring to Thrasymachus’ original view that justice is the advantage of the stronger (Republic 338c). Thrasymachus further argued that the most unjust life is the best life (Republic 344c). Plato is once again illustrating how that is not the case. 4 Plato makes this claim more than once. See Republic 473c–e and Seventh Letter 326a–b. 2

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Waterfield, Robin, ‘Euthydemus’, in Trevor J. Saunders (ed.), Plato: Early Socratic Dialogues (London: Penguin Books, 1987), pp. 297–375. ——‘Hippias Minor’, in Trevor J. Saunders (ed.), Plato: Early Socratic Dialogues (London: Penguin Books, 1987), pp. 267–93. Watt, Donald, ‘Charmides’, in Trevor J. Saunders (ed.), Plato: Early Socratic Dialogues (London: Penguin Books, 1987), pp. 165–209. Weingartner, Rudolph H., The Unity of the Platonic Dialogue (Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill Co., 1973). Welton, William A. (ed.), Plato’s Forms: Varieties of Interpretation (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002). Woodhead, W. D. (trans.), ‘Gorgias’, in Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (eds), The Collected Dialogues of Plato (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 229–307. Woodruff, Paul, ‘Plato’s Early Theory of Knowledge,’ in Hugh H. Benson (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). ——‘Socrates on the Parts of Virtue’, in William J. Prior (ed.), Socrates: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, vol. 4 (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 110– 23. Zeyl, Donald J., Plato: Gorgias (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1987), repr. in John M. Cooper (ed.), Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1997), pp. 791–869.

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Index allegory of the cave 90 and ascension to beauty 97–9 description of 92–3 and the divided line 97–9 purpose of 92–3 significance of 92–3 Anaxagoras 115 Anytus 69–70, 74 Apology 1, 18, 106 aporia 14, 34, 39, 42, 48, 72 Aristotle 9, 17, 83, 101 auxiliaries 5, 82–3, 84–9, 120–1 characteristics of 82 distinct from philosopher-rulers 84 education of 82–3, 120 virtue of 82–3, 87–9, 95, 115, 120 benefit of craft knowledge 32–3, 34–5, 43, 53 of knowledge of the Good 102–4 of moral knowledge 32, 43 beauty 96–100 and allegory of the cave 97–9 ascension toward 96–9 comprehension of 97–9 and the divided line 97–9 as form 80, 95 and the Good 96–9 instances of 21 as object of love 96–9 becoming, visible realm of 91, 98, 103, 114 objects in 103, 116 and opinion 98, 116 being, intelligible realm of 91, 98, 103 and knowledge 98, 116 objects in 103, 116 Charmides 3, 18, 19, 33–6, 37, 39, 113 aporetic nature of 33 craft analogy 27–33 and happiness 104 as historical figure 34, 129 n11 knowledge of good and evil 33, 39, 49–50, 53, 61, 81, 90 knowledge of ignorance 30 knowledge of knowledge 30–2

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superordinate knowledge 33, 36, 40, 42, 68, 102 conditional goods 26, 36 courage 14, 24–7, 35 as form 95, 109, 120 in the ideal state 85–9 instances of 95, 120 and pleasure 60 popular conception of 60–1 and wisdom 60–1 craft analogy 3, 18, 20–33, 38–41, 42, 50, 55, 72, 83, 102–3 difficulties with 36, 37, 48 negative use of 27, 43 uses of 27, 104 craft knowledge 17, 19, 33, 37, 101 benefit of 32–3, 34–5, 42, 53 characteristics of 18 discrepancies with moral knowledge 35, 53 misuse of 41, 46, 49 product of 29, 53 and productive crafts 29 proper use if 49 and therapeutic crafts 29, 105 Daedalus 74, 76 developmental interpretation of the dialogues 3, 9–10, 12, 47, 71, 101, 110 dialectic, study of 93–4, 121–2 dialogues of definition 20, 42, 54, 62, 65, 72 Dickinson, Emily 53, 58 Diotima 96, 99 divided line 90–3, 116–17 and allegory of the cave 92–3, 97–9 and ascension toward beauty 97–9 and cognitive state of belief, opinion 91, 116 and cognitive state of conjecture 91 and cognitive state of knowledge, wisdom 91, 116 and cognitive state of thought, reasoning 91 significance of 91 eristic 56

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Euthydemus 4, 19, 49, 67–8 importance of knowledge 67–8 superordinate knowledge 68 teaching of virtue 54–5 Euthyphro 3, 19, 25, 27, 33–5, 37, 38, 39, 42, 59, 60 aporetic nature of 23 craft analogy 20–4 forms 20 forms 4, 9, 62, 79–80 characteristics of 80 in early dialogues 20, 79 instances of 35, 54, 80 as objects of knowledge 78, 81, 90, 92, 117, 121–2 as objects of true opinion 112, 117–18, 121 Gorgias 3, 18, 24, 38–42, 51 and political craft 24, 37, 40 the Good 80 as form 90, 95, 109 function of 90 instances of 21, 61, 95, 105 knowledge of 53, 59, 61, 68, 80, 94, 95, 97, 99, 103, 106, 108–9, 111, 118 mistaken notions of 49 nature of 90 as object of virtue 106 and pleasure 60 relationship to other forms 90 as teleological goal 90, 95, 106, 108, 112, 121 and virtue 95 guardians 84, 104 education of 84, 89 happiness 33, 106 degrees of 6, 119–22 as distinct from living well 107 as product of moral knowledge 51 as product of virtue 104, 108, 122 as therapeutic benefit of virtue 107 Heraclitus 37, 80 Hippias Minor 4, 50 craft analogy 45–8 historical interpretation of the dialogues 3, 8–10, 12, 47, 71, 101, 110 image of the sun 90, 98, 133 n19 Ion 18

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justice 14, 28, 80 as the advantage of the stronger 43 benefit of 88 as the craft of ruling 45 as form 80, 92, 95, 109, 117–18, 121 in the ideal state 85–9 and injustice 14, 39, 43–4 instances of 21, 95 intrinsic and instrumental value of 118 and moderation 60 origin of, in Protagoras 56 and piety 59 in the state 84–6, 88–9 in the soul 86–9 as therapeutic craft 45, 88 knowledge (see also wisdom) of forms 78, 81, 89, 90–2, 94, 95, 109– 10, 112, 117, 122 of good and evil 26, 33, 39, 49–50, 53, 61, 81, 90 as guide for action 71, 74, 113, 122 of the Good 53, 59, 61, 68, 80, 90, 94, 95, 97, 99, 102–3, 106, 108–9, 111, 118, 121–2 of ignorance 31, 112–13, 122 impossibility of attaining 4, 99, 101, 109–12, 118, 121–2 incomplete nature of 5, 101, 109–12 of knowledge 30–1, 42 limitations of 112–13 misuse of 4, 37, 38, 41, 45–8 necessary condition for virtue 4, 23, 51, 122 objects of 37, 78, 81, 90, 92, 116 and opinion 2, 54, 62, 63, 73, 91, 116, 117, 121 permanence of 75 prescriptive nature of 50 and recognition 31 reliability of 75 self-knowledge 28, 30–1, 40 sufficient condition for virtue 4, 44, 46–8, 50, 51, 122 superordinate knowledge 33, 40, 42, 49–50, 53, 68, 102 and true opinion 4, 62, 65, 72 Laches 3, 18, 19, 33–6, 37, 38, 42 aporetic nature of 25–7

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Index craft analogy 24–7 knowledge of good and evil 26, 39, 49, 50, 61, 81, 90 love 96–8 mathematical truths 91 as area of study for rulers 93–4, 104, 121–2 as hypotheses 91 as stepping stones 91, 94, 98, 124 Meletus 24 Meno 2, 4, 23, 53–4, 55, 62–5, 73–6, 79, 109 method of hypothesis 65–7, 68–70, 72 right use 49, 53 and the teaching of virtue 65–73, 83, 105–6, 115 transitional nature of 72, 99 true opinion 71, 74–6, 114, 117 Meno’s paradox 63, 112, 135 n18 dramatic purpose of 65 philosophic purpose of 65 moderation 14, 27–33, 35 as form 95, 109 in the ideal state 85–9 instances of 95 and justice 60 and knowledge 30–2 and wisdom 59 moral knowledge 4, 33, 37 benefit of 32, 43, 51 craft knowledge, relationship to 17, 19, 47 discrepancies with craft knowledge 35, 103 object of 37, 43 Platonic conception of 42, 101 subject matter of 37 Nicias 25 One Task Principle 28, 85, 121, 129 n15, 133 n10 opinion (see also true opinion) 15, 49, 65, 77–8, 91, 95, 112, 116, 121 and knowledge 54, 62–3, 73–4, 81, 114, 116–17 object of 89, 116 Parmenides 17, 77, 80 Peloponnesian War 11, 128 n6 battle of Delium 24

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battle of Mantinea 128 n6 defeat of Athens 115 Peace of Nicias 128 n6 Sicilian expedition 130 n20 Thirty Tyrants 129 n11 Pericles 74, 115–16, 135 n21 accomplishments of 135 n23 education of 135 n22 Phaedo 2, 77, 90, 96, 101, 111–12 and happiness 104 metaphysical doctrines 99, 109–10 and popular virtue 78–82 Phaedrus 6, 12, 13 philosopher-rulers 89–95 distinct from guardians 84 education of 89, 93–4, 105, 111, 121 piety 20–4, 35 as form 95, 109 instances of 95 and justice 59 Platonic dialogues aporetic nature of 5, 35, 72 chronology 7–8 definition of ethical terms 12 proleptic nature of 3, 15, 24, 26, 54, 59, 62, 66, 77, 79, 113, 124 protreptic nature of 3, 15, 62, 72, 99, 124 purpose of 8, 10–15 role of the reader 13 significance of logical argument 31 transitional dialogues 72, 99, 127–8 n1 pleasure and the Good 60, 61 overcome by 60–1 political craft 24 and justice 56 and shame 56 as superordinate craft 41 and virtue 55 poets as teachers of virtue 69 politicians as teachers of virtue 69 principle of priority of definition 62 Protagoras 4, 18, 24, 53, 73–6, 115 teaching of virtue 54–8 recollection 62, 64–5, 70, 79–80, 105, 109, 117 Republic 2, 3, 18, 19, 24, 38, 40, 48, 54,

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77, 81, 82–3, 96, 104, 107, 109, 111, 115, 119 book I as the Thrasymachus 42, 130 n8 classes of citizens 84–9 craft analogy in book I 42–5 and happiness 104 metaphysical doctrines 89–94, 99 myth of Er 104, 120–2 myth of the metals 84, 133 n10 rhetoric 38–41, 51 Sappho 119 Seventh Letter 5 Socrates account of love 96–7 awareness of ignorance 1, 3, 30, 113 biography 11 elenchus 13, 66 historical figure 7 military experience of 24 representing Plato’s views 7, 48, 58, 71 as teacher of virtue 70, 105 and the unexamined life 1, 114, 125 and universal definitions 21 Socratic irony 20, 113 Socratic problem 7 sophists as teachers of virtue 70 soul dissociation from the body 109–10, 112 immortality of 62, 64, 79, 109 nature of 65 transmigration of 62 tripartite nature of 86 Symposium 77, 95, 96–100 and happiness 104 Thermopylae 36 Thrasymachus 43–4, 106 true opinion (see also opinion) acquired by habit 5, 112, 114, 116, 119 acquired by nature 5, 112, 114, 119 benefit of 116 characteristics of 5, 74, 115 of forms 112, 117, 121

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and happiness 121 impermanence of 75 as guide for action 65, 71, 74–6 reliability of 5, 75–6 transformed into knowledge 74, 76, 115 and virtue 116 unitarian interpretation of the dialogues 3, 10, 15, 101, 124 unity of virtue 42, 58–62, 68, 84 virtue its acquisition 14, 53, 61–2, 65–73, 74, 81, 132 n16 benefit of 106, 108 civic virtue 58, 87–8 cognitive components of 81, 112, 118 degrees of 2, 6, 72, 77, 88, 95, 112– 18, 119–22, 124 by habit 80–1, 82–3, 117 in the ideal state 84–9 as intrinsic and instrumental good 107–8 and knowledge 1, 2, 62, 65, 66, 72, 101, 114, 124 by nature 114–15, 117 and opinion 73–6, 78, 88, 112, 114 physical and psychic benefits 107 Platonic conception of 4, 28, 51, 54, 57, 61, 72, 73, 94, 102–4, 122, 124 popular conception of 4, 35, 54, 55– 6, 62, 80–1 Protagorean conception of 57 as superordinate craft 102 teachers of 56, 70, 74 technical nature of 101, 104 as therapeutic craft 105 and true opinion 114–18, 119–22 unified in wisdom 59, 62 without knowledge 88–9 wisdom (see also knowledge) and courage 61 in the ideal state 84–9 and moderation 59 Zeno 115

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