Plato's Dialectic on Woman: Equal, Therefore Inferior (Routledge Monographs in Classical Studies) [1 ed.] 9780415526913, 9780203116548, 0415526914

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Plato’s Dialectic on Woman

Routledge Monographs in Classical Studies

The Roman Garden Katharine T. von Stackelberg The Eunuch in Byzantine History and Society Shaun Tougher Actors and Audience in the Roman Courtroom Leanne Bablitz Life and Letters in the Ancient Greek World John Muir Utopia Antiqua Rhiannon Evans Greek Magic John Petropoulos Between Rome and Persia Peter Edwell Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought John T. Fitzgerald Dacia Ioana A. Oltean Rome in the Pyrenees Simon Esmonde-Cleary Virgil’s Homeric Lens Edan Dekel Plato’s Dialectic on Woman Equal, Therefore Inferior Elena Duvergès Blair

Plato’s Dialectic on Woman Equal, Therefore Inferior Elena Duvergès Blair

NEW YORK

LONDON

First published 2012 by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Simultaneously published in the UK by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2012 Taylor & Francis The right of Elena Duvergès Blair to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Blair, Elena Duvergès, 1926– Plato’s dialectic on woman : equal, therefore inferior / by Elena Duvergès Blair. p. cm. — (Routledge monographs in classical studies) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Women—Philosophy. I. Title. HQ1121.B452 2012 305.4—dc23 2011048828 ISBN13: 978-0-415-52691-3 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-11654-8 (ebk) Typeset in Sabon by IBT Global.

To María, a woman whose wisdom I admire. and also to those close to my heart: George, Paul, Michele, Jason and Scott

Contents

Preface Acknowledgments Introduction: The State of the Question Prologue: The Feminine Presence in the Dialogues— A Methodological Consideration

ix xiii 1

10

PART I The Dramatic/Rhetorical Texts 1

Dramatic/Rhetorical Views of Woman

19

PART II The Philosophical Texts 2

The Socratic Origin

39

3

Satirical Criticism of Simplistic Views of Equality

56

4

The Three Waves in the Analogy between City and Soul

69

5

The Logic of the First Wave

94

6

Thematic Transformation: The Cosmology of Woman in Timaeus

132

Solving the Puzzle of Woman in Laws

152

7

viii Contents

PART III Plato’s Philosophy of Woman 8

Prolegomenon to the Results

189

9

Equal, Therefore Inferior: The Logic of Plato on Woman

196

10 Beyond Plato: Groundwork for a Theory of Woman Appendix to the Text: Greek Words on Women and the Feminine Bibliography Index of Ancient and Medieval Names Index of Modern and Contemporary Sources Index of General Concepts Index of Terms and Concepts Relevant to Specific Dialogues

204

213 217 233 237 241 249

Preface

The course of Platonic scholarship has been determined in great measure by the particular questions raised in each historical period and in each discipline. Philosophers, historians, theologians, poets, and scientists, bringing their own specific expertise to Plato’s works, have found that he always has something to say about their concerns. Cambridge Platonists, modern rationalists, German idealists, and Neo-Kantian subjectivists, among others, have for their own reasons found in Plato a kindred mind. Political scientists have seen him as a proto-Communist or a proto-Nazi, and physicists have even found him an ancestor of quantum theory. Yet these endeavors are vulnerable to a weakness in that the peculiar perspective and interest of each interpreter can weigh heavily on the results obtained, endangering their objectivity. A researcher is not just a system of guiding abstract principles, but a human being with a life of emotionally colored experiences never completely foreign to his thinking. This is perhaps even more the case with the issue of woman since the last third of the twentieth century. Previously, except for occasional remarks, the topic had for practical purposes been overlooked in studies of Plato. With the rebirth of the feminist movement, however, classicists and philosophers, educational experts and psychologists, all challenged by the question of whether or not Plato was a feminist, began to examine the dialogues in search of his conception of woman. Once again the possibility arose of a new focus affecting the view of texts written more than two thousand years in the past. And yet, in spite of the recent surge of interest on woman in Plato, no comprehensive work identifying his position on the subject has yet appeared, and by now the flurry of articles that began in the 1970s (many limited simply to feminist critiques1) has subsided. This approach has, it seems, yielded

1. Nancy Tuana (1994), Bat-Ami Bar On (1994), and Genevieve Lloyd (2002) have edited representative selections from this growing field. See note 6 in Bat-Ami Bar On’s Introduction for other sources.

x

Preface

all it could;2 and so the time has come for an exhaustive treatment of Plato on woman, independent of particular current concerns. The present work attempts to provide the reader with such a study: one that considers not only the totality of Plato’s texts on woman and the feminine, but also their place within both his philosophy and the historical context in which it developed. Its purpose is to draw from them Plato’s actual conception of woman, with particular care not to let personal inclinations cloud the work of objective reason, being especially wary of having contemporary ideologies color the fi ndings and yield just another dated interpretation. The reader will judge whether I succeed or not. But this book is not merely a textual study situating the subject of woman philosophically and historically; it also endeavors to uncover the implications hidden in the texts and the relationships that follow from them—but only when and if it can be shown that they were most likely intended by Plato himself. Its purpose is to draw an image of the Platonic woman as rich and full as the textual and historical information allows. By offering an interpretation fi rmly rooted in Plato’s thought, it hopes to correct many erroneous commentaries that partial readings were unable to avoid. The peculiar characteristics of the dialogue form also give this investigation a unique perspective. Plato’s writings are not a detached, impersonal exposition of a narrowly defi ned topic, but a living and organic expression—on multiple levels—of a complex interior reflection. Because of this, requirements of the current work have produced new and sometimes unexpected results beyond the topic of woman, illuminating aspects of Plato’s work that are of relevance to Platonic studies in general. The project itself grew out of a previous survey of Plato’s works that identified each and every text on woman and the feminine, where it was discovered that only Meno, Symposium, Republic, Timaeus and Laws contain passages that refer to her philosophically. Analysis of these passages shows that Plato’s reflection grew in precision and complexity in accordance with the generally accepted order of the dialogues. Hence, what woman is for Plato becomes clearer and clearer as the project proceeds and illuminates what makes the theory truly Platonic. Four initial chapters provide the framework for the investigation: The Introduction surveys what seems by now to have become a general consensus: that Plato contradicts himself in dealing with woman. This has not been fully contested, and needs to be examined, to fi nd out if in fact there is an as yet undiscovered internal consistency about woman in the Platonic texts. The critical evaluation of the current positions and the quest for a latent theory of woman are the overarching purposes that drive the argument of

2. For the emergence and characteristics of a more positive mood on feminist interpretations of Plato’s conception of woman, see G. Lloyd (2002), Introduction.

Preface xi the book. The Prologue establishes a methodological rule, based on the distinction between Plato’s philosophical reflection about woman and her dramatic/rhetorical treatment (i.e., where woman appears only to illustrate or clarify other topics in analogies, metaphors, or similes). Only the philosophical texts are key to identifying Plato’s thought about woman as such. Chapter 1 identifies and discusses throughout Plato’s writings the texts where women appears only dramatically or rhetorically, indicating how, though they might reveal Plato’s (or the culture’s) attitude toward woman, they are not directly relevant to her as the object of his dialectical3 reflection, the target of the examination that follows. Chapter 2 introduces the main body of the work, which examines the dialectical structure of Plato’s philosophical reflection on woman and the logic of its development. It shows how the topic, with singular logical characteristics, arises in Meno, confirming the Socratic origin of Plato’s position. Chapter 3 then reveals Plato as distancing himself from an extreme interpretation of Socrates’ view, by making explicit an aspect of Aristophanes’ speech in Symposium, which suggests the likelihood of a quarrel between Plato and some members of the Socratic school on the subject of woman, and by poking fun at the viewpoint upholding the sexes’ absolute equality. But it is not until Chapter 4 that Plato’s own dialectical reflection on woman emerges. This introductory chapter undertakes to settle the previously unsolved difficulty of the reason Plato has for interrupting the announced plan of the Republic with a discussion on woman in Book 5. Identifying and elucidating the passage’s subtext (i.e., its implicit logic) makes it possible to disclose the purpose of the book’s three waves of difficulty (the fi rst of which concerns woman) and their role in the general argument of the work (this methodological procedure will be used several times during the investigation, permitting the uncovering of some neglected aspects of Plato’s texts). Chapter 5 makes explicit the rigorous logical structure of the fi rst wave in Republic 5, a tour de force, given the time of its writing, central to Plato’s dialectic on woman. The argument proving that qualified men and women can share in the government of the city has heretofore not been recognized as unified, probably because the dramatic framework conceals the strict logic used by Socrates4 to refute the argument of the opposition. In Chapter 6, by using the myth of the creation of the sexes in Timaeus, Plato reveals the metaphysical foundations for his theory of woman. His cosmological approach emphasizes the architectonic unity of his dialectic and enlightens the unity of the various aspects of woman seen in previous works.

3. I am using “dialectical” in the Platonic sense of “logical,” “reasoned based on evidence,” not in the Hegelian sense. 4. The same sort of thing, interestingly, that was systematized and used in medieval disputations.

xii Preface Chapter 7 concludes the examination of the dialectical structure of the philosophical texts by uncovering the subtext of Laws, which dispels the alleged inconsistencies in the texts’ accounts of feminine character, as well as in the standards for judging women to be eligible for certain sociopolitical functions. This reveals Plato, in his old age, still essentially loyal to Socrates’ idea about the sexes’ equal capacity for virtue, his dialectic refining and enriching it during his life. Chapter 8 then discusses three preliminary difficulties dealing with the final chapter on the results of the investigation: the rules for the interpretation of the texts’ unity, the Platonic use of myth, and his perception of woman. Chapter 9 draws from the analysis of the philosophical texts nine features characterizing Plato’s conception of woman. His image of the divided line5 serves to outline the levels in the dialectical progression of his knowledge of woman, and functions as its synthesis. The conclusion of this chapter, at the line’s highest level of understanding, points to the cause of so many conflicting critical evaluations. Chapter 10 then fi nishes the book by suggesting ways of avoiding the difficulties encountered in Plato’s theory of woman and provides the essential steps for an investigation using the knowledge gained. Throughout the book, a dialogue with the secondary sources contributing to each issue provides the necessary perspective for evaluating my approach, and enriches it in various appendices. One result of this work, because of its comprehensiveness and careful attention to both Plato’s logic and his peculiar creative approach, is a new and more complete solution not only to some problems of recent interest about woman but also to some wider Platonic conundrums that have puzzled scholars for centuries. In addition, it validates, particularly on woman, what D. L. Roochnik6 calls Plato’s “extraordinary level of internal coherence,” by offering a consistent interpretation of many controverted questions, among which are (1) the distinction between the Platonic and the Socratic contribution to women’s issues, (2) the purpose of the statements about woman in Aristophanes’ speech in Symposium, (3) the reason for the appearance of woman and the unified logical structure of Book 5’s argument on her equality, (4) Plato’s purpose in proposing the “community of women” in the same book,7 (5) the importance of the cosmological synthesis in Timaeus for his view of woman, (6) his apparent reversal in Laws of Republic’s proposals, by reintroducing nuclear marriage and postulating exclusive functions for women, and (7) his silence on women’s sharing high government positions. These issues should contribute substantially to the understanding of Plato in general, and particularly to his conception of woman.

5. For an insightful discussion of this Platonic image, see N. D. Smith (1996) 25–46. 6. D. L. Roochnik (2003) 1. 7. Discussed in Chapter 1, p. 25.

Acknowledgments

I am especially grateful to the late John Felten, S.J., who, on hearing of my interest in the philosophy of woman, suggested Plato as a source worthy of consideration and later read the complete manuscript and provided valuable suggestions. Also to Maria Isabel Santa Cruz, who directed my doctoral dissertation and offered guidance and expertise generously; to Mary R. Lefkowitz, whose NEH Summer Seminar on Woman in Antiquity allowed me to expand my investigation on ancient woman; and to Hardy Hansen, whose Summer Greek Institute was a great help refreshing my Attic Greek. I am also grateful to Robert Murray, who helped with many of the Greek quotations, and Paul St. Francis Blair, who read the whole manuscript and contributed advice; to Richard Polt and the late Robert W. Schmidt, S.J., for reading important chapters and for their encouragement; to Librarians Tim McCabe, Sidnie Reed, and Anne Davies, for skillfully solving technical and search problems; to Yvan Verbesselt, who, while attending my classes, volunteered to translate an article from the Dutch; and, above all, to George A. Blair, who has supported, advised, and helped me in every way during the long years it took to bring this project to completion.

Introduction The State of the Question

The decade of the nineteen seventies saw the beginning of a very lively debate on Plato’s conception of woman. Although it would be unfair to say that there was no previous investigation of the subject, passages on woman up to that time were referred to only in passing while examining a whole dialogue. No attempt was made to look for overall consistency on the issue, let alone for the theoretical underpinnings of Plato’s position. The only exception, placing Plato’s theory of woman into historical context and maintaining that he upheld equality of the sexes, was J. Ithurriague.1 Some commentators overlooked Plato’s discussion about woman completely; some mentioned it only briefly. R. N. Murphy’s2 summary of Republic’s central books, for instance, does not mention either woman or the community of women and children. A few found a difficulty with Plato’s timing in introducing and developing the theme of woman in Republic 5 and suggested explanations, but most confi ned themselves to the “second wave” of the book, and focused on the issue of common marriages, where the general reaction was one of incredulity. They took it as a challenge to reconcile the text with their idea of an acceptable social order, something they obviously found diffi cult. Aristotle’s analysis typifies this attitude. Regarding Plato’s presentation as a practical project, he characteristically begins by criticizing not the initial proposal of equality of education and civic functions but the subsequent description of the community of wives and children, calling it ambiguous3 and impractical4 on grounds that Plato’s unity is destructive of the State5 and of

1. J. Ithurriague (1931). But he frequently turns to advocacy or describes texts without interpreting them, concluding that Plato made a synthesis of the tradition and ennobled it, without recognizing any personal or original element. 2. R. N. Murphy (1951) IX. For a fuller treatment of the issue, see N. H. Bluestone (1987) 3–4 and 24–26. 3. Arist., Pol. II 1261b20. 4. Ibid., 1261a14. 5. Ibid., 1261a23 and 1261b9.

2

Plato’s Dialectic on Woman

basic human relations,6 since a given woman will have no responsibility for any particular home. “If Socrates,” he says,7 “makes women common and retains private property, the men will see to the fields, but who will see to the house?” Aristotle’s reaction to equal social functions and education appears only after this, when he rejects the validity of the analogy of the watchdogs on sexual differences because “animals do not have to manage a household.”8 Later commentaries continued this critical approach toward common wives.9 B. Jowett, for example,10 harshly criticizes common marriages, astounded that Plato “should have contradicted himself to an extent which is hardly credible, falling in an instant from the heaven of idealism to the crudest animalism.” In contrast, T. Gomperz11 says that Plato dreamed of elevating women from ignorance and subjection, feeling the charm of the ideal woman. As to Platonists of the early last century, for A. E. Taylor12 Plato underestimates the spiritual importance of human sexuality, while U. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff13 holds merely that admitting women into education and public functions was an unwelcome corollary of his theory of the soul and transmigration, and states that since Plato did not understand woman as different but not inferior, he required her to become a male (and as such, an imperfect one), but could not relegate her to the third class because of the need to propagate the Guardians. Interestingly, G. L. Dickinson,14 as early as 1932, considered Plato the fi rst and most thoroughgoing feminist. But it was really not until the nineteen seventies and eighties that a series of articles approached Plato’s view on woman from every conceivable angle. This sudden concern was due both to the influence of the analytic method’s interest in the logic of philosophical texts and to the impact

6. Ibid., 1262b15. 7. Ibid., 1262a40 and 1264b1. 8. Ibid., 1264b6. For Averroes, however, a medieval Aristotelian, the discussion deals with procreation and preservation of the Guardians’ natures, requiring women’s equal education and civic functions to achieve that goal. See E. I. J. Rosenthal (1966) 164–171 XXV 2. 9. For E. Zeller (1876) 456–457, Plato “has not yet discovered the right point of view for the general relation of the sexes,” judging women warriors as incompatible with feminine nature. G. Grote (1885) IV 169–205 considers Plato’s proposals as merely political and pragmatic, assuring the use of talent and achieving the best breeding. R. L. Nettleship (1925) 173–180 distinguishes Plato’s principle of unity and cooperation of the sexes from its application, rejecting Plato’s dog analogy in Republic as not reflecting human complexity, and judging the community of wives as “barbaric” and also psychologically impossible. 10. B. Jowett (1892) III CLXXXI–CXCIV. 11. T. Gomperz (1905) III 115. 12. A. E. Taylor (1908) 112–119 and (1927) 277–278. 13. U. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1920) 398–399 and 722. 14. G. L. Dickinson (1932) 103–104.

Introduction

3

of contemporary feminist movements in academic circles—producing an abundant but diverging bibliography: the analytical approach dealing with the consistency of Platonic thought, the feminist centering on the question whether Plato could be called a feminist even if, as M. S. Kochin15 points out, “the question of Plato’s feminism leaves us very limited insight into his project.” What is remarkable about this explosion of interest is that both lines of recent research agree in fi nding a contradiction between Plato’s assertion of equality in Republic (451c–457b) and statements there and throughout the whole corpus that seem (for various reasons) to imply or assert inequality. But the agreement ends there, since there is anything but consensus on the poles of the contradiction. This makes it necessary to examine them as the fi rst step to fi nd out whether Plato could have been that inconsistent. Finding so many contradictions, in fact, is doubly extraordinary in that it is Plato who is accused of contradicting himself: Plato, after all, was recognized for millennia as a genius, and specifi cally as a genius who was most adept in spotting inconsistencies in others, and even in critiquing his own theories, as he did in Parmenides. That he would have overlooked so many blatant discrepancies in his own work seems prima facie extremely unlikely, implying that something is being overlooked by the commentators. Hence, it would seem that the fi rst task is to fi nd out, in each case, what Plato was driving at. The second is to examine these critiques to determine just how they consider Plato to be inconsistent, so that we can, by looking at the texts themselves, see if they are missing the point in one way or another. For the sake of order and readability, let me lump together those who see similar types of contradictions in Plato. I will identify them as briefly as possible, leaving nonessential information to footnotes, for those interested in detail. This book will then undertake a careful examination of each of the relevant texts to enable us to fi nd out whether or not Plato was basically consistent.

CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE CONTRADICTION 1. To begin with A. Bloom,16 Plato’s inconsistency lies in attempting to make public what belongs to the private realm: woman, family, and philosophy. Republic tries to politicize the erotic and make it conform to the public life of the city.

15. M. S. Kochin (2002) 37 n. 1. 16. A. Bloom (1968) 382.

4

Plato’s Dialectic on Woman 2. S. M. Okin17 and others accuse Plato also of equivocating on the term “nature” in order to concoct a convention regarding the “nature” of woman, with the purpose of legitimizing equal treatment. She also concludes that the perceived contradictory conclusions about the “nature” of woman in Republic and Laws reveal “nature” not as a description of a general standard but as a legislator’s authorization prescribing how to regard the feminine nature in each case. 3. Others,18 such as A. W. Saxonhouse, fi nd a contradiction in the tension between Plato’s feminism and his misogyny, on the one hand calling women equal, and on the other making pejorative remarks. 4. In a variant of the above,19 many claim that Plato seems to assert at once the equality and the inferiority of woman, since affi rmations of full sex equality in education and social functions coexist in several dialogues with passages that doubt equality or assert differences.

17. S. M. Okin (1979) 65 and 57–59. Another is A. W. Saxonhouse (1976) 199f., and (1994) 71f., for whom Plato explains sexual differences as superficial and not rooted in nature to avoid contradicting his principle of specialization (based on that nature). This view had been contested by C. Pierce (1973) LVII 3. The equivocation lies in that Plato would not deny that sexual (procreative) differences are natural. Again for A. Bloom (1968) 383, to legitimize equal treatment Socrates concocts a convention on women’s “nature”: Book 5 of Republic is preposterous and “provokes both laughter and rage in its contempt for convention and nature,” and because it wounds masculine pride and shame. Ibid. 380. 18. D. Wender (1973) 81–82; J. F. Smith (1983) 598, and (1994) 27f.; S. M. Okin (1979) 26–27; J. Annas (1976) 316; L. Lange (1979) 12; A. J. Cappelletti (1980) 91–92; A. Dickason (1973–1974) 48–49; A. Pérez Estevez (1986) 183–184; D. H. Coole (1988) 39–40; and N. D. Smith (1983) 473–474 share the view that Plato despises woman as a class, and at the same time postulates more freedom and privilege for them than any man in history. 19. S. Burns (1984) 136–137; A. A. Al-Rubairy and N. J. Ryser (1974) 53 (who ask how Plato could be an egalitarian on social roles of men and women if he is not a social democrat); A. Bloom (1968) 383, for whom “weakness” in Rep. 455e means inferiority, concluding that it is improbable for any woman to fit into the leadership class; B. Calvert (1975) 239 and 241, who is convinced that no theory affi rming difference in degree can avoid the conclusion that the best women are inferior to the best men, which cannot be reconciled with the equality of natures; and B. and G. Tovey (1974) 599–600, who, believing that Plato’s purpose was “to free woman from her biological chains,” recognize that, after sacrifi cing their functions as wives and mothers, women Guardians still do not reach total equality with the males of the class. E. Elrod (1978) 9 and (once again) A. Bloom (1968) 383 (Cf. J. Darling [1986] 124 III) even hold that the paradoxical reason why Plato concludes that women must share all activities with men is not that they are equal, but rather inferior.

Introduction

5

5. One or two20 find a slightly different contradiction in that Plato proposes the same education for both sexes within the class of the Guardians and, at the same time, states that women do not reach the level of men.21 6. But, as the case of Bloom has shown, the inconsistency seen in Plato is not necessarily a simple one. In fact, Gregory Vlastos, 22 one of our most respected Platonists, found it necessary to distinguish four different positions in Plato: 1. Radical feminism regarding women Guardians in Republic V; 2. antifeminism in industrial and agricultural class women in the same work; 3. a hybrid position (feminist in some respects, antifeminist in others) towards women of the Laws, the second best society; and 4. virulent antifeminism referring to the Athenian women of his time. 23 7. In a more benign view, Plato’s ambivalence only seems to give rise to contradictions. D. Wender24 finds this in all Greeks and in Plato’s dialogues only in the sense that he has the highest degree of skill in asserting a position and at the same time eliciting sympathy for the opposite, and had developed in the dialogue a literary form that best expressed that ambivalence, manifested particularly in his treatment of woman.25 8. Several other writers find a problem in Plato’s notion of justice as defined in Republic 4 (433a) (each person performing the social function which

20. L. Lange (1979) 3, and J. F. Smith (1983) 598 and 605, also in (1994) 28 and 42. 21. For Smith, Plato’s insistence on qualifying every assertion of equality by stating that women are weaker (even when not pertinent) questions his commitment to equal education. S. Frank (1970) 287 denies that Plato in Republic wanted to educate women in the same way as men, because that would contradict Laws, where he conceived women’s education as different in spirit from that of men. A. Bloom (1968) 383 makes the whole discussion on equal education unnecessary. 22. G. Vlastos (1989) 276 and 288, also in (1994) 11–23. 23. G. Vlastos asks whether it is possible that the sexism towards Athenian women and the theory of radical feminism in the highest class are not opposed to each other. On this issue, F. S. Halliwell (1993) 14–15, 146–147 and 152 n. to Rep. 455e4 has problems with calling Plato a feminist in any sense. He asks whether Plato can be called a proto-feminist, since he cannot be called feminist, even recognizing some resemblance, because modern feminism is essentially liberal and individualist, while in Plato women’s freedom represents degeneracy during the criticism of democracy. He falls into the anachronism of judging Plato’s position not on its own merits but by whether or not it agrees with twentieth-century positions. 24. D. Wender (1973) 83. 25. B. Calvert (1975) 242–243 also reads Plato as vacillating between the description of women Guardians in their public role as equal, and as unequal Guardians’ wives, chosen to conceive future Guardians. Even W. K. C. Guthrie (1978) 354, one of our best historians of Greek Philosophy, suggests that Plato’s position on feminine character is “somewhat equivocal.” His analysis tries to solve the inconsistency by distinguishing levels of enquiry.

6

Plato’s Dialectic on Woman his nature suits him for), which, for (once more) Bloom,26 makes treating dissimilar persons similarly unjust and unnatural. For other commentators, men’s superiority in Rep. 455d makes it contradictory to propose for woman a position that she does not deserve in justice.27 9. We also fi nd those that think that Plato reflects the historical identification of reason with the masculine, in the remarks about the triumph of reason over the darkness of feminine power in the mythology of Timaeus, and when Plato says in Menexenus (238a) that woman imitates the earth, which has influenced the formation of the idea of the feminine as linked to the dark powers of the goddesses of the earth and its fertility. How could this be consistent with the thesis of equal social functions?28 10. A few consider the matter just a question of language. For S. B. Pomeroy,29 the words Plato uses contradict what he is saying, revealing him as unable to conceive of woman as equal to man. For her, the use of the term țȠȚȞȦȞȓĮ, as well as several possessives, are interpreted as evidence showing that Plato understood woman as part of man’s property.30 11. But more substantively, Plato is found by A. J. Cappelletti31 to be inconsistent in that the difference between the sexes is quantitative and accidental in Republic, but becomes qualitative and essential in Timaeus. The way to reconcile assertions in Republic 5 that both sexes have the same nature but that men are still superior is to limit the difference to the degree of the capacity, not its kind; but if women are different in degree, how can they have the necessary capabilities? 12. In different consideration of the two dialogues, J. Mansfeld32 discovers a “flagrant contradiction” between the way Plato treats woman in Republic 5 and in Timaeus, labeling the fi rst cosmological optimism, and the second politico-social pessimism. But Mansfeld recognizes

26. A. Bloom (1968) 383. 27. Among them, B. Calvert fi nds two arguments in the fi rst wave of Rep. V (451c–457b); the initial one applying the principle of justice, the second contradicting it. J. Annas (1976) 313–314, who does not recognize Plato is applying his notion of justice, not the modern one, fi nds it contradictory that in a work that has so much to say about justice, he does not qualify his proposal about women as just. M. I. Santa Cruz (1988) 35, however, has shown that the fi rst wave of Rep. 5 is a dialectical application of Platonic justice and not a “utilitarian” or “feminist” argument. 28. This has brought M. Buchan (1999) 14 (for whom, to quote A. W. Saxonhouse (2002) 236 [See also G. Lloyd (1984) 2–5], the soul has a “sexual identity”) to identify the soul as masculine, since “femininity is seen to be threatening (and in confl ict) to reason.” 29. S. B. Pomeroy (1974) 33–34. 30. This view has been refuted by W. W. Fortenbaugh (1975) 1–4, and N. W. Senter (1977) 10. 31. A. J. Cappelletti (1980) 91. 32. J. Mansfeld (1987) 119–120.

Introduction

7

that, since all souls are equal, the sexual difference among them is transitory, secondary, and depends on ethics. 13. But when we come to Plato’s view of woman’s virtue, the reaction of the interpreters is overwhelming. How could there not be a contradiction between Meno, where Socrates states that the virtue of men and women is the same, and the cosmology of Timaeus, where women are created as punishment from the souls of cowardly men? How, if they are “twice as bad as men,” should they be incorporated among those who share in the leadership of the city?33 Calvert’s version of this holds Cappelletti’s position above with respect to Republic 5, reconciling the assertion that both sexes have the same nature but men are superior, by limiting the difference to the degree of the capacity, not its kind; but then he wonders how, if women are different in degree, they can have the capabilities to be Guardians.34 Since for him the best women are equal only to second-level men, this contradicts the requirement limiting guardianship to the best. For S. M. Okin, 35 Plato’s contempt for women is not limited to contemporary Athenians, and statements on women’s inferiority in both reason and virtue cannot be interpreted as a lapse from his convictions, because Plato “was not the kind of thinker we can readily believe forgot his beliefs,” especially on a subject such as this one, which took quite a bit of reflection.36 14. Others, seeing pejorative statements salting his works, think of Plato as on the one hand succumbing to contemporary prejudices when stating that inferior appetites are found in children, women, slaves and base people in Rep. 4 (431c) and on the other also contradicting general opinion (and provoking Aristotle’s indignation), when he denies that the virtue of each sex is different (Meno 73b). G. Vlastos,37 in fact, goes so far as to claim that if Plato had the same position as Aristotle, he could not have written Republic 5. 15. Contradictions have also been found within Plato’s biology and his conception of the body. In a curious interpretation, A. Dickason38 considers Timaeus’ theory of the origin of the sexes as the last stage in the biological thought of Plato, the fi rst being Aristophanes’ speech in Symposium. She explains the apparent inconsistency between Plato’s political theories in Republic and Laws by the influence of these

33. B. Calvert (1975) 238–239. 34. He cites E. Barker, J. L. Davies, D. J. Vaughan, and T. Gomperz among those that see the difference as one of degree, not qualitative. 35. S. M. Okin (1977) 345 and (1979) 15 and 27. 36. C. G. Allen (1975) 131, D. F. Krell (1975) 401, and S. Burns (1984) 136 also contributed approaches dealing with his contradiction on virtue. 37. G. Vlastos (1989) 276 and 288; also (1994) 19. 38. A. Dickason (1973–1974) 46.

8

Plato’s Dialectic on Woman two moments in his biological thinking. M. L. Osborne, 39 however, objects to this that for Plato the destiny of woman must be determined by her sovereign soul, not by her body, as Dickason’s biological interpretation implies. Yet even here, some such as E. V. Spelman,40 who recognizes that for Plato what is important in the person is the soul, whatever the body, find it contradictory that, in Spelman’s words, “a certain kind of body implies the presence a of certain kind of soul.” On the other hand, Plato has been accused of forgetting the body altogether to be able to assert the equality of woman, creating a convention about what she is;41 yet for A. Bloom,42 the reason for the inclusion of woman among the Guardians is precisely her body, since she can conceive and men cannot. There is yet another apparent contradiction discovered here: For L. Nicholson,43 the assertion that biological differences do not affect social function contradicts the fact that Plato does not apply it to the artisan class, because if biology is not destiny for female Guardians, it should not be destiny for any other woman in the State. 16. An interesting variation on this is found in N. D. Smith,44 who does not object to Plato’s consistency, but says that he contradicts his culture, since the Greeks conceived of women as without courage and political capacity, and as treacherous, duplicitous, and lacking rational control, while Plato believed they could be courageous and have political power over most men, and that some were also intellectually, morally and politically better than most men.45

OBVIOUS RESULTS OF THE ABOVE INTERPRETATIONS To sum up, Plato, when talking about woman, has been accused of contradicting his own notions of nature, reason, justice, virtue, and education, as well as his biological theory, especially the relationship between body and soul; he is blamed for having an inconsistent notion of sexual differences

39. M. L. Osborne (1975) 447. 40. E. V. Spelman (1982) 130 n. 6. 41. N. H. Bluestone (1988) 46f., and (1994) 114f. also counts biological difference as the most important among seven kinds of objections to the philosopher-queen. 42. A. Bloom (1968) 382–383 (cf. G. Klosko [1986] 289). 43. L. Nicholson (1982) 208. 44. N. D. Smith (1980) 5 and (1983) 469. 45. N. W. Senter (1977) 8 denies that Plato contradicts his culture with examples from literature, the visual arts, history and politics against opposed popular generalizations, thinking that Plato deserves applause for refusing to accept questionable empirical claims. But it is an open question whether Plato’s own opinion was that different from at least some aspects of his culture, as we will see in discussing the issue about women’s equality, current at the time.

Introduction

9

and sexual equality; for confusing the private and public realms; for showing an internal confl ict between his feminism and his misogyny, his theory of woman and the way he talks about her. Or, to cite two lapidary verdicts, Plato is either confused46 or joking.47 But is he? When one puts together this farrago of disparate accusations, there seems to be something fundamentally wrong in that the only point of agreement is the judgment that Plato contradicts himself. Given the caveat at the beginning of this chapter, it would probably be wisest to assume that Plato knew what he was talking about and meant what he said. Let us therefore take a closer and more thorough look at all the passages on the topic, a careful consideration of context and also of subtext in each case, with vigilant attention to the dialogues’ characteristic relationship between form and content and to Plato’s philosophical approach, particularly the logical structure of his arguments. Above all, let us resolve not to let either past or present unexamined opinions interfere with objectivity. In this way we can let Plato talk to us with his own voice, and we will be more able to make a valid judgment. I do not mean to deny the many positive contributions of either early or modern scholarship—contributions which I will acknowledge as the investigation progresses. My limited purpose was to show that there seems to have been some kind of serious flaw in interpreting Plato’s conception of woman in the recent past. S. Forde,48 among others, notices a lack of detachment when some “rush to fit Plato into one camp or another,” or treat arguments in isolation from the rest of the text. Although the question seems to have been abandoned for other approaches recently, the general consensus that Plato contradicts himself has not been contested and cries out for examination to fi nd out whether there is not an as yet undiscovered internal consistency in the Platonic texts. This makes clear the importance of recognizing that, since Plato’s thought was very complex, it is imperative to examine all the relevant texts, looking for some Ariadne’s thread for their internal consistency—the least that we should do for one of the greatest minds of all time. The quest for this coherent theory of woman is the overarching purpose that drives the argument of the book, and provides its logical structure.

46. J. Annas (1981) 184. 47. A. Bloom (1968) 381. 48. S. Forde (1997) 658.

Prologue The Feminine Presence in the Dialogues—A Methodological Consideration

Plato’s dialogues contain a long and varied gallery of women and feminine figures: priestesses, midwives, philosopher-queens, nymphs, courtesans, nurses, witches, brides, spinning women, flute-girls, Sirens, handmaids, harpies, muses, craftswomen, Amazons, heiresses, fates, teachers, primiparas, harp-girls, poetesses, wet-nurses, dancing-girls, maidens, bacchantes, magistrates, nursery maids, warriors, stepmothers, prophetesses; women pregnant, sterile, young, old, in love, sick, betrothed, orphaned, friends, foreign, adolescent; goddesses and female commoners, wives and concubines, mistresses and women servants, little girls and grandmothers, heroines and adulteresses, citizen women and slaves, mothers and daughters. This rich presence has a predominantly dramatic and rhetorical function, and reflects in great measure the place that woman had within Greek life, the arts, and the mythology of the times.1 Faced with this throng of examples, the investigator trying to uncover Plato’s conception of woman and whether he contradicts himself or not needs to fi nd a rationale for organizing and interpreting the material. The road taken by many has been to look for the passages for or against woman, making them the basis of a classification of Plato’s statements according to his apparent feminism or his equally apparent misogyny—with the results varying depending on the texts considered. None of these studies, as it happens, have used all of the data; but even if they did, the only possible result would be the obvious one: the Platonic corpus contains statements in favor of and against woman, many of which clearly contradict each other, sometimes even within a single paragraph. If this is accepted as representing his thought, the accusation of inconsistency is inescapable, and Plato, in this instance, fails as a thinker, let alone a profound one. But given the nature of Plato’s writings, it seems to me that the real fl aw in this approach consists in ignoring the diff erence between Plato’s use of dramatic and rhetorical techniques, on the one hand, and

1. See list of Greek words about woman in the Appendix to the text, p. 213.

Prologue 11 the dialogues’ philosophical content on the other. Let us bring out this distinction clearly: The dialogues are dramas, because in them, as Aristotle says, “the personages act the story.”2 For him, Plato’s dialogues, like Sophron’s and Xenarchus’ mimes, imitate by language as drama but without music, and he adds, “This form of imitation is to this day without a name.”3 A. Cameron4 has pointed out that, although Plato took sides in the old “quarrel between philosophy and poetry” (Rep. 607b), it cannot be denied that he himself writes like a dramatist. Hence, for the same reason that we do not think that Milton thought that it is “better to reign in Hell than to serve in Heaven” because he put these words in the devil’s mouth, judicious Platonists cannot assume that every statement about woman in the dialogues represents Plato’s view, even if they limit that assumption to the statements of those recognized as Plato’s spokesmen, such as Socrates, the Eleatic Stranger, Timaeus, and the Athenian in Laws. There might often be (as we will see) dramatic reasons why Plato’s Socrates would say some things Plato did not necessarily agree with. At the same time, and within the dramatic form, Plato frequently uses the classic means of rhetorical persuasion (ʌȓıIJİȚȢ), 5 one of which is to take one’s interlocutor where he is, and lead him on from there. This could very easily involve an initial apparent agreement with the other person’s prejudices in order precisely to lure him away from them. This fact has not been examined as thoroughly as his dramatic skill, although some 6 read it as something more central than just a tool for Plato’s thought (particularly regarding gender issues). W. K. C. Guthrie7 cannot believe that after the indictment of rhetoric described in Gorgias, Plato could have used it himself. But when Plato denied the possibility of a rhetorical art and denounced it as a sham and a form of fl attery, he was referring to the rhetoric of the sophists. He still does this as late as Laws (937e), where he bars it from his State. There is no question, however, that he himself uses rhetoric in Apology and throughout his writings, including, even, Laws—though his positive doctrine on the subject is not found until Phaedrus (259e–278d and 261a), where it is called the art of leading souls by means of words. This positive

2. 3. 4. 5.

Arist. Poet. 1448a29. Ibid., 1447a–1447b. A. Cameron (1978) 7. G. R. Morrow (1953) 234–250, attributes this reliance on persuasion to the horror Plato felt toward the violence between democrats and oligarchs. 6. E.g., M. S. Kochin (2002) 8–24, and H. Yunis (1996) 17, who recognizes him as “a rhetorical theorist of the fi rst order.” 7. W. K. C. Guthrie (1975) IV 320.

12

Plato’s Dialectic on Woman

view is not, as Guthrie8 argues, completely identifi ed with philosophy, though it is transformed by it. Aristotle9 probably refl ects Plato’s view when he clearly implies in his Rhetoric that it is in itself a morally neutral tool. We must recognize that dramatic and rhetorical components assist Plato’s philosophical reflection in a unique way. Proclus, as early as the fi fth century A.D.,10 had already noticed that dramatic details served the philosophical theme of the dialogues, and at the beginning of the nineteenth century, F. D. E. Schleiermacher11 claimed that the dialogues’ form and content are inseparable, and praised their dramatic quality.12 Relatively recent studies13 have made us keenly aware of the complexity of Plato’s artistry, where no element is spontaneous but, following the classic tradition, has been deliberately chosen to occur when and where it happens. But we must not go to the other extreme and read him as simply a dramatist or rhetorician, and consequently judge his statements to be “unreflective,” as some14 have done. Plato’s dialogues, a completely new literary genre, are neither orations nor philosophical treatises in dialogue form; they are dramatic works of art with both rhetorical and philosophical dimensions. His message must be deduced not only from what is said, but also from how it is said, because his use of rhetorical techniques and the dramatic setting and action are essential, and therefore are means for advancing his philosophical thought. If this is so, then it would be wise to be alert to the fact that the presence of woman in the text could respond in each case to different creative needs. This means distinguishing passages dealing with Plato’s philosophical reflection about what woman is from those in which he refers to a woman for some dramatic or rhetorical purpose. The key to the latter is that in them, he uses the commonly held view of woman to illustrate or elucidate a topic different from his refl ection about her as such. But in the philosophical passages, both form and content refer to her. In Plato’s words, we must divide the texts by classes where the natural joints are, and not after the manner of a bad carver (Phdr. 265e).

8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

Ibid., IV 413. Arist. Rhet. I 1 1355b 18–20. Proclus, In Alcibiadem 18.14. F. D. E. Schleiermacher (1973) 14. A long tradition of scholars, among whom are found P. Friedländer (1969) I 232, W. Jaeger (1943) 78–79, W. K. C. Guthrie (1975) IV 2–3 and 241, and L. Strauss (1964) 52, concur. 13. J. Klein (1965) 3–10, C. H. Kahn (1983) 75–121, A. A. Krentz (1983) 32–47, C. L. Griswold, ed. (1988), and J. A. Arieti (1991) Chapter I. 14. S. B. Levin (1996) 22.

Prologue 13 Those15 who do not make this distinction inevitably have difficulty explaining Plato’s position satisfactorily.

INFLUENCES ON PLATO’S UNDERSTANDING OF WOMAN But before going into this, it might be well by way of background just to mention some aspects in Plato and his culture which could have had some influence on his work and colored his thinking to some degree. I do not intend to do an exhaustive study on this subject, which would require a book in its own right, and would sidetrack us from the task of discovering what Plato in fact thought about woman (whatever the influences on this thought) and whether he contradicted himself when he did so. It is enough for our purposes merely to list them briefly here, and deal with them seriatim a bit more fully later, as texts of his seem affected by them. How much a person, especially a great genius, is influenced by his cultural milieu is in any case an open question, and is particularly so with Plato, since he, like his mentor Socrates, goes directly against the culture so often. Hence, it should be enough merely to recognize, in the relevant places, what he owes to his cultural milieu and its prejudices, or to the traits of his own personality. But even with that in mind, one should recall also what has been said: that Plato never copies, he rethinks. This becomes particularly evident when considering the influences on his view of woman. A man of his time and space, Plato’s powerful mind integrated into an original synthesis his own unique ideas, the cultural experience he shared with contemporary Athenian aristocrats, and his own personal traits. Among them: a) The social, political, and economic situation of women in Athens, Athenians’ admiration for Spartan women, and what was known about women from other cultures. b) Traditional feminine elements in mythology, found in his dramatic/ rhetorical texts as paradigmatic but ambivalent symbols of moral evil

15. E. V. Spelman (1988) 19–36; also in N. Tuana ed. (1994) 87–107 and BatAmi Bar On, ed. (1994) 3–24. This is also the main stumbling block in Th. M. Robinson’s (1998) 146–153 search for a gender-differentiation theory in Plato, though an awareness of the subtexts governing Republic, Laws, and Timaeus could have helped. F. S. Halliwell (1993) 45 n. to Rep. 45b and 147, does not make this distinction either, and even when recognizing that Plato challenges entrenched male assumptions, he accuses him of lack of conviction and imprecise generalizations about the female sex. A. W. Saxonhouse (2002) 236–237, however, recognizes what I am driving at here, when she says that M. Buchan “fi nds fodder for claims of inconsistency and misogyny” in Plato because, by taking his “words all at face value,” her “approach loses the subtleties suggested in the dialogic form.”

14

Plato’s Dialectic on Woman

(echoing Hesiod and Simonides), or moral excellence (prefiguring the female guardian in Republic). c) The contemporary discussion on woman’s role (revealed in Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and especially Aristophanes), in dialogue with whom Plato developed his thinking. d) The views of Socrates, who, as we will see, probably originated the contemporary interest in woman and made it a characteristic of the Socratic school. Plato not only expands this from the ethical to the social area, but also provides a metaphysical foundation for it. e) Among personal traits, Plato’s sexual orientation could also color his creativity and perhaps needs to be referred to. These influences and their effect on Plato’s thought will be treated, as I said, as we deal with the texts, when appropriate.

THE TEXTS ON WOMAN AND WOMEN IN THE TEXT To begin, then, looking at the texts, if the distinction between Plato as a dramatist and rhetorician and as a philosopher is valid, it follows that in Plato’s writing women appear in two classes of texts: 1). The first, which I will call “dramatic/rhetorical,” belongs to Plato’s literary and argumentative artistry, particularly the rhetorical task of involving the senses and the emotions by creating a concrete familiar framework to elicit a favorable disposition for the discussion of a philosophical question.16 Here, woman appears (among many other elements) to give a scene the color and character the particular topic demands. This can occur in three ways: (a) in establishing a setting, as part of Plato’s portrayal of Athenian life in a concrete situation; (b) when introducing a group of characters, making them credible by employing, among other things, the forms of expression (and the prejudices) about women current at the time17 (a reason why the attitude of male superiority is found throughout); and (c) more importantly, when using ideas about women common in his culture to develop analogies, similes, metaphors, myths or examples to illustrate philosophical arguments on other issues. While many of such statements about woman might well be what Plato would agree with, it is critical to be aware that the feminine presence in these three cases cannot be taken as evidence for his conception of woman

16. On Plato’s use of rhetoric, see G. R. Morrow (1953) 339–354. 17. For a survey of his outstanding caricatures and portrayals, see D. Tarrant (1955) 86–87.

Prologue 15 as such, because in these passages Plato’s focus is on something other than what woman is. It is only when he is investigating woman as woman that we can have any clear clue to his philosophical thought on the subject. The dramatic/rhetorical passages can only give vague hints of what might be his personal attitude toward her—and then again might be completely foreign to his position, and only part of his poetic creativity. 2). The second major class of texts, which I call “philosophical,” contains Plato’s specific reflection about woman herself—developed, of course, within the dramatic and rhetorical framework of which woman is also part. Here, both form and content are about her, and she is the principal element that moves the “plot” ahead. My complete survey of texts mentioning or involving woman has allowed me to conclude not only that the locus classicus of Plato’s philosophical reflection on woman is Republic 5 (449a–457c), but that there are also important passages in Meno (71e–73c), Symposium (189c–193d), Timaeus (41d–42d; 90e–91a), and Laws (VI, VII, et passim) where Plato unfolds his thinking about woman as woman: her education and social function, her ontological, ethical, and legal status. This distinction between “dramatic/rhetorical” and “philosophical” texts does not deny that form and content are inseparable in Plato’s philosophy; on the contrary, it attempts to point out the fact that the text cannot be understood independently of its context, which in our case means that it cannot be taken for granted that all the passages where women appear in the Platonic corpus have something to do with his ideas about what woman really is. This distinction will remove a major obstacle to interpretation, since once the philosophical texts on woman are identified and the dramatic/rhetorical passages are put aside, many of the apparent contradictions found by commentators will evaporate.18 An indispensable requisite, therefore, for the validity of our search for Plato’s conception of woman is to exclude those passages where he is not developing that conception.

18. Lacking this distinction, S. B. Levin (1996) 14, 22, 24 and 26, for instance, attempts to resolve the alleged contradictions by suggesting that Plato uses derogatory treatments when referring to “current” conditions, and positive evaluations when discussing woman “ideally.” But this does not work. The difficulty here is that within the presumably “ideal” case, the cosmology of the woman myth in Timaeus describes her as an inferior incarnation (from the souls of cowardly men); and in a “current” case, Laws recognizes her leadership capacities to hold government office in the concrete contemporary city, where he describes her inferior situation. Even in Republic 455a–e (which lies within the range of Levin’s article), the proof of the capacity of women to be guardians is given while asserting that, in general, women are inferior to men.

16

Plato’s Dialectic on Woman

But to make the validity of this method clear, our study of the text should begin with the dramatic/rhetorical passages so that we can show why what Plato says there is irrelevant to his view of what woman is, and why they can then be laid aside. This is not to say that these texts are not interesting or valuable, only that they belong to studies outside the scope of this particular investigation. The following chapter, then, will, with this as background, examine the texts that are only dramatic/rhetorical, to show why they can be eliminated as containing Plato’s view of what woman is as such.

Part I

The Dramatic/Rhetorical Texts

1

Dramatic/Rhetorical Views of Woman

The task now is to show just why Plato’s references to women either in a dramatic or rhetorical way cannot be used to indicate his view of what woman is. To do this, as I mentioned in the preceding chapter, I will examine passages in which woman is referred to (I) in analogies, similes, metaphors, myths or examples, where her presence contributes rhetorically to philosophical arguments on other topics, (II) in drawing characters, witnessing certain men’s current attitudes and prejudices about women, or (III) in portraying woman’s place in Athenian life or the Greek culture in general. As W. Brown has noted,1 these appearances of women assist or develop arguments by introducing an image, a myth, or an allegory which evokes the interlocutor’s experience of the world. Let me reiterate that although Plato may well have shared many of the attitudes portrayed in these dramatic/rhetorical instances referring to woman, (a) his personal attitudes are in large measure irrelevant to his philosophical thought; it is reason and evidence that govern his reflection, not personal inclination. But more importantly, (b) in most of these cases we cannot even guess how he personally felt, because of the nature of dramatic narrative or the techniques of rhetorical persuasion. The fi rst category listed above, Plato’s skill in depicting women while discussing other philosophical topics, is by far the most important, and the one most likely to mislead investigators. Being clear here will also sharpen our capacity to identify the texts where he reflects philosophically on woman herself.

I.

WOMAN WITHIN PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS ON OTHER TOPICS

A peculiar passage of mysterious quality and philosophical importance— which illustrates clearly the need to separate the two classes of texts— appears in Timaeus’ notion of “receptacle,” as “nurse of becoming,” and especially “mother,” or “space.”

1. W. Brown (1988) 602f. and (1994) 166.

20 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman After discussing the design and fi nal causes of the cosmos, when moving into physics and physiology, Timaeus discovers the need to add a baffling and obscure third element to the intelligible model and the sensible copy that he had used until then. He calls it the “receptacle” (ਫ਼ʌȠįȠȤȒȞ) of all coming into existence, a kind of wet-nurse (ȠੈȠȞ IJȚșȒȞȘȞ) (49a), and begins to distinguish the three elements as (1) becoming, (2) the place in which it becomes, and (3) the Demiurge, which he compares, respectively, to offspring, mother, and father (50d). The “receptacle” is revealed in an impressive text differentiating it from Empedocles’ four material elements: and so, we should not in fact speak of the mother and receptacle . . . as either earth or air or fire or water, or anything made up of them, or even [the] components out of which these [elements] come to be; rather . . . speaking of it as some invisible and characterless manifestation (ਕȞȩȡĮIJȠȞ İੇįȩȢ IJȚ țĮ੿ ਙȝȠȡijȠȞ) which receives everything, and shares in intelligibility in a way that is very puzzling and hard to fathom (51ab). This is also different from Anaximander’s ਙʌİȚȡȠȞ, an indefi nite substrate which becomes earth or something defi nite, because Plato’s “space” receives its determination. It is an ever-existing and neutral place, a substratum in which all material transformations occur, barely an object of belief, apprehensible by a kind of perverse reasoning or waking dream, without the aid of sensation. It provides room for the eternal ideas and qualities of things to enter and impress themselves: The nurse of becoming, once it is made liquid or fi ery or receives the characteristics (ȝȠȡij੹Ȣ) of earth or air, and once it submits to all the other influences that follow these, allows itself to be seen in all sorts of ways (52de). While the elements fleetingly transform themselves, the “receptacle” never departs from its own nature and, existing in itself, provides the space (ȤȫȡĮ) for all generation. The passage is so appealing, and the idea of the mother as the arcane place where things are born has so much power, that the reader investigating woman in Plato hears something profound and enigmatic about her which (since it contradicts other Platonic texts, particularly texts equating the two sexes, as in Republic 455e–456a), makes the charge of inconsistency unavoidable. G. Lloyd,2 for one, not realizing the text’s rhetorical function (which we will see shortly), finds gender differentiation in Timaeus’ mind-matter dualism, assuming that by comparing the roles of limiting form to the father

2. G. Lloyd (1984) 4–5.

Dramatic/Rhetorical Views of Woman

21

and of indefinite matter to the mother, Plato implicitly excluded the feminine from the nature of knowledge, since knowledge transcends matter.3 The notion has also had a powerful attraction for feminists such as E. Bianchi,4 who tries to show Plato’s “receptacle” “as offering a fecund and generative philosophical terrain in which a feminist rethinking of corporeality, spatiality, figurality, temporality, and life may take (its) place” within a critique of ancient metaphysics. Plato’s notion of “receptacle” has had a great impact on contemporary philosophy,5 partly because those who practice it are apt not to be familiar with Aristotle’s notions of act and potency which clarifies it, even when they try to relate receptacle with Aristotelianism, as L. Irigaray does.6 But let us examine what Plato is doing. Here he is introducing an entirely new and quite obscure metaphysical principle: the “receptacle” or space. Aristotle7 identifies it with his prime matter,8 though F. M. Cornford9 fi nds no justification for calling the “receptacle” “matter,” a term not used by Plato, since it is that “in which” things appear; but he does not recognize that Aristotle understands prime matter as pure potency (capacity to receive a form10) following the theory of potency and act mentioned above.11 Plato uses the metaphor of the mother to illuminate this all-receiving notion. Since a metaphor’s function is to clarify and enlighten a less-known

3. P. Allen (1985) 57–61, and (1987) 264 n. 2, for the same reason questions Plato’s consistency, thinking he is arguing for sex-polarity on the cosmic level using Father and Mother as Form and Matter, while defending sex-unity in the world. D. F. Krell (1975) 404, is another who, not distinguishing the dramatic use of woman from philosophical uses in other sections of the dialogue (Tim. 41d–42d and 90e–91a), finds a lack of consistency in the texts on woman, concluding that Plato must have disagreed with what Timaeus says. For C. M. Turbayne (1976) 135, “Plato was taking sides on a much debated issue in biology, the roles of the female and male in generation.” He conflates the metaphor of the mother as “receptacle” here with the mythological treatment of sex differentiation later (Tim. 91ad) which has philosophical import but which he interprets as containing the cosmos’ “primitives.” A. Geddes (1975) 39 shares the same confusion, and reads Plato’s views as formulating cultural prejudices. 4. E. Bianchi (2006) 126. 5. L. Irigaray (1985) 307, J. Butler (1993) 35–48f., E. Grosz (1995) 111–124, J. Derrida (1997) 82ff., J. Kristeva (2002) 35ff., etc. 6. L. Irigaray (1985) 173. See J. Sallis (1999) 151f., particularly n. 9. 7. Arist. G. & C. II 1, 329a24. 8. On the difference, see R. D. Archer-Hind (1888) 182–184 n. 9, and A. E. Taylor (1962) 312 n. 1. 9. F. M. Cornford (1937) 181. 10. This is the usual interpretation of Aristotle’s notion of “potency,” prevalent in the Middle Ages, and influenced by Plato’s theory; but G. A. Blair (1992), 51, holds that “potency” is rather the “ability” to do a form, which is its activity. But this is not the place to enter into discussions about Aristotle. 11. C. Bäumker (1890) 110ff., surveys the controversy. See also J. Dillon (2003) 25 n. 50 and 40 n. 25.

22

Plato’s Dialectic on Woman

concept using a better-known one,12 this itself is enough to show that it would not be consistent with the purpose of Plato here to use the notion of mother to introduce, at the same time and by means of the same term, both the difficult metaphysico-cosmological notion of “receptacle,” and some new view about woman which was foreign to the meaning accepted by the culture and which would not be understood immediately. This would defeat the very purpose of clarifying the concept of “receptacle.” Obviously, then, Plato is merely using the idea of mother as already understood by contemporary Greeks to introduce a radically new metaphysical concept: that of space.13 A mother as a recipient of the (male’s) seed was, of course, a familiar view. Aeschylus, for example, describes Apollo defending Orestes from matricide saying: The mother is not the parent of what we call the child but the nurse of the seed newly sown in her. The sire produces the young; and she is the stranger who preserves the foreign sprout (Eum. 658–661).

The Pythagoreans’ Table of Opposites already had classified the feminine as a cosmological and metaphysical principle of indeterminacy. Even Aristotle14 echoes this, considering the female sex as contributing only matter, while the male provides movement and form. In sum, not only is there nothing original about woman in Timaeus here, but given the proper purpose of a metaphor and the context, Plato could not have intended to say anything about woman as such at this point. The reason why it is difficult to accept that the text does not represent a Platonic contribution about woman is that it is impossible to deny the originality of the passage, even independently of its metaphysical content. But the originality here lies in the form of expression, not in some implicit new idea about woman. Mother as an invisible and featureless manifestation, purely receptive, which in a very puzzling and hard-to-fathom way shares in intelligibility, expresses a common idea in an entirely unique manner. 12. On the virtue of style, Aristotle (Rhet. 1404b–1405b and 1411b–1412b) states that metaphor [the transferred application of a term which in its proper sense applies to only one sort of thing, based on some likenesses of relations seen by the imagination] must be clear, pleasant, and unfamiliar, but sound natural; be taken from what is beautiful, and be appropriate as analogy, involving visualization and activity. The metaphor’s puzzling nature and unfamiliarity trigger learning. See also Poet. 1457b. Timaeus’ mother-metaphor is a beautiful example of this. 13. Both F. M. Cornford (1937) 187, and W. K. C. Guthrie (1978) V 264, concur on this, although, surprisingly, K. Sayre (2003) 61, 71–74, tries to show that the use of the “receptacle” is a “failed experiment.” For an insightful contribution, see J. Sallis (1999), particularly Chapters 3 and 4. 14. Arist., Gen. An. 730a 26–30.

Dramatic/Rhetorical Views of Woman

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But this contribution is purely literary and distinct from the first-rate philosophical importance of the metaphysical idea about the cosmos that it is used to convey. Its impact is due to Plato’s dramatic and rhetorical skills, the fruit of his incomparable artistic genius. It is true that, as suggested to me,15 there is a subtle shade of meaning here: the mother as involving the metaphysical dimension of that in which something takes root, as opposed to masculine transcendence. Plato includes this nuance, implicit in the popular notion, to adjust the metaphor to the cosmological model, without forgetting its function in the text, where a known element serves to explain something unknown. Apart from its role in Timaeus, the mother image is present throughout the dialogues. The term ȝȒIJȘȡ and its derivatives appears 143 times.16 Oddly, Plato’s emphasis on this notion has not been pointed out.17 It recurs in analogies, metaphors, similes, and examples expressing traditional connotations of respect, as when comparing a mother with the laws (Laws 859 and Crito 51a, c), care, as when Meletus is said to be going to the city “as a boy runs to his mother” (Eut. 2c), and when the earth is called “our nurse” (Tim. 40b and 49a), and origin, found when Socrates attributes Greek equality to being born of the same “mother Earth” (Menex. 239a), and when the motherland is called the mother who “gives birth, nurses, nourishes, and receives at the hour of death”18. The above have only dramatic or rhetorical functions. We will see later, however, that some of these references to mother reappear within Plato’s philosophical reflection, revealing a point of agreement with his culture. If the analogy of the mother in Timaeus is haunting and mysterious, the metaphor portraying the abuse of philosophy as forcing an orphan girl to wed an unworthy pretender is of superb dramatic beauty. After two initial allegories during Socrates’ explanation to Adeimantus in Republic of the reasons for the apparent uselessness of philosophy and for the corruption of young men gifted in it, philosophy herself appears (495c) as an abandoned young woman, when those supposed to be devoted to her leave her “deserted and unfulfilled.” Again, some commentators overlook the metaphor’s purpose and requirements, and assume that Plato is saying something about woman here,

15. C. Eggers Lan, letter, 1991. 16. Plato favors the explicit “mother and father” over the collective ȖȠȞİȪȢ or the plural of ʌĮIJȒȡ. ȆĮIJȒȡ appears 345 times, including a few plural cases referring to both parents (Symp. 183c; Rep. 461d, 463d, 467c, 546d; Menex. 238d, 248d; Laws 699d, 772e, 773a, 926e). 17. See particularly J. Derrida (1981) 143, and J. B. Elshtain, as quoted by C. Pierce (1994) 29. 18. Ibid., 237b–238a. We also fi nd “mother” used as home or abode as the “receptacle” of Timaeus (50d, 51a), and as the mother city (ȝȘIJȡȩʌȠȜȚȞ) of Atlantis (Critias 115c). “Mother” also frequently represents the country, the city, or the earth as a source of nourishment (Laws 958e).

24

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apparently contradicting other texts. Among them, A. W. Saxonhouse19 sees the return of woman and philosopher to their natural functions, confirming her view that the impossibility of the just State is the intended esoteric message here. Her reason is that, when politicized, woman and philosopher are denied their proper activities, which are private. If so, the metaphor would explain absolutely nothing—a common Straussian difficulty. In fact, the purpose here is not to say something about woman, but to use one of her familiar characterizations to point to something that does not refer to her at all. As in Timaeus, the artistic force has distracted some critics from the message that it so compellingly represents. Plato also uses other images of women in metaphors. We fi nd mistress (įȑıʌȠȚȞĮ, įİıʌȩIJȚȢ) applied to medicine and gymnastics (Gorg. 518a), to the kingly art (Pol. 305a), and to the tyrannical power of Aphrodite (Laws 841b). The city is “she who cares” (șİȡĮʌȓȢ, Menex. 244e), and poetry is called “girlfriend” and “darling” (ਦIJĮȓȡĮ țĮ੿ ijȓȜȘ, Rep. 603b); in similes, terms denoting women are applied to the soul (Tim. 34c) and to respect for the laws (Laws 698b); cicadas have voices like Sirens (Phdr. 259a), and the generative principle is like a goddess (Laws 775e). These metaphors have all of Aristotle’s required characteristics. 20 We also fi nd similes from activities proper to women. Some are so well chosen that they hardly seem a dramatic invention: traditionally, for instance, the midwife’s art has been identified with the teaching of the historical Socrates, in spite of the fact that the reference does not appear before Theaetetus (148e), a work of Plato’s maturity, is found exclusively in that dialogue, and is absent in the literature of Plato’s contemporaries. It has taken the powerful analytical examination of M. F. Burnyeat 21 to establish that the characterization of the Socratic method as midwifery is a creation of Plato’s later period, to which the historical Socrates himself was, of course, completely foreign. 22 Again, he uses a familiar Greek

19. A. W. Saxonhouse (1976) 203–211 and (1994) 76–84. Her view follows that of Leo Strauss (1975) 65, who holds (among other things) that Plato’s purpose in Republic was to show the “city in speech” to be impossible, so as to dissuade Glaucon from politics into becoming a philosopher. 20. See p. 22 n. 12. Among them we fi nd “reproductive metaphors,” where P. du Bois (1988) 180f. and (1994) 152 interprets Plato as appropriating the female experience as he “reinscribes” her reproductive act and “transfers it to” the [male] philosopher. 21. M. F. Burnyeat (1977) 7–16 and (1992) 53–65. 22. W. K. C. Guthrie (1969) III 444 n. 3, and J. Stenzel (1940) 4, had previously disagreed with this thesis as stated by D. Tarrant (1938) 172, and R. Robinson (1953) 83. W. K. C. Guthrie employs as contrary evidence a text from Aristophanes’ Clouds, where a disciple of Socrates uses the phrase “to abort ideas.” D. Sider (1991) 333–338 has also challenged M. F. Burnyeat’s interpretation using what he reads as a birthing scene beginning in Clouds 633. See also R. G. Wengert (1988) 5.1, 3–10. The whole controversy speaks volumes about the dramatic skill of Plato.

Dramatic/Rhetorical Views of Woman

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notion referring to woman, adding some features to make the notion fit his purpose, in this case the Socratic method. There may be more, however, to Plato’s use of the midwife image. D. Sedley23 has found in Theaetetus a Platonic doctrinal agenda where Socrates is implicitly drawn as the midwife of Platonism. Sedley submits that Plato’s purpose is to demonstrate the continuity between his master’s historic contribution and his own work, and show how it paved the way to his metaphysics and later projects. But the point here is that even so, the image, for all its force, is not part of Plato’s reflection about what woman is as such. That is, it is one thing to say that teaching philosophy is like midwifery, and quite another to say that midwifery is like teaching philosophy. What could that mean? This shows that he is not here saying something about midwifery or woman. Other dramatic/rhetorical uses of feminine figures within philosophical arguments follow the same pattern, as when Diotima declares the union between man and woman the fi rst step in the ascent through love (Symp. 206c, 208e); or when, in discussing division, Plato fi nds it better to divide human beings into males and females than into Greeks and Barbarians, 24 etc. We even fi nd her in the etymological elaboration of the term “woman,” part of the mischievous setting of Cratylus (414a), read by most as farcical, but recently as serious by Sedley. 25 None of these uses reveal Plato as investigating the nature of woman, but rather using common notions about her for some other purpose.

A Dramatic/Rhetorical Instance of Woman within a Philosophical Proposal Plato’s introduction of the community of women in Republic 5 is a remarkable example of his dramatic/rhetorical creativity, and his concern for consistency. In Chapter 4 we will see that what explains the abrupt appearance of woman into Book 5 of Republic is the fact that Plato is reexamining the city-soul analogy elaborated in the fi rst four books (on which his argument for the superiority of integrity [justice] is based)26 to answer possible objections to the analogy’s validity (434e). This “digression” also, as we will see, fits into a standard rhetorical procedure in that, after developing one’s position, one anticipates objections to it, answers them, and then draws conclusions. Here, Socrates fi nds

23. D. Sedley (2004) 8–13. 24. Pol. 262e. Similar uses of woman within philosophical arguments on other topics are found in Gorg. 470e, 473c, 512c, 514e; Ion 540bc; Alc. I 126e– 127b; Phdo. 84a; Rep. 433d; Tim. 69e; Tht. 174a, c, and 175d; and Laws 637bc, 694de, 695a, 688a, and 719d. 25. D. Sedley (2003) 172. 26. For a brief discussion of why I prefer “integrity” to “justice” as the translation of įȚțĮȚȠıȪȞȘ, see Chapter 4, p. 69.

26

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three “waves” of difficulty with his analogy, which will destroy it if they turn out to be valid. What interests us here is what Plato calls the second wave of difficulty, which considers the danger that particular interests, such as the family, pose for the city-soul analogy, because such interests in the city do not seem to have a parallel in the higher tendencies of the soul of integrity (the just soul). Hence, Plato introduces the idea of having women in common, which is already present in his culture, not actually as a practical project but as a purposely shocking illustration to serve his real objective: the thesis of the unity of the leadership classes and their devotion to the State. Therefore, the unity of the leadership, not woman, is the object of his proposal; we learn from it what is necessary for the ideal State, not about what Plato thinks regarding women’s nature. It is not the point here to do justice to this particular proposal because, since it has generated plenty of commentary, 27 it would take us from our topic of Plato’s consistency and his conception of woman as such; and so I will merely point here to its significance, as an instance of a nonphilosophical, dramatic use of woman, and perhaps in some other work, it will receive a more detailed discussion. The basic idea is that for the city to resemble the individual (whose soul’s aggressive aspect must look to the benefit of the whole person, not itself), the Guardians must not have any concerns, such as personal wealth or especially private family interests, distracting them from their full devotion to the community as a whole, or the analogy breaks down, and is useless as a heuristic device. Plato solves the problem in two ways: by introducing communism of property among the Guardians, and—what interests us here—by imagining a society in which the family (by adopting wife-sharing) is expanded into the whole State and its interests become ipso facto the interest of the society as a whole, showing that the proposal is at least conceivable because there is no necessary objection to the parallelism between the individual and society, and so the discussion can move forward. The colorful working out of this fantasy takes the reader to the realm of make-believe. Because the reflection is not about woman but merely a dramatic flight of the imagination that uses women in it, no consideration about the nature of woman is involved here; she has only a dramatic/rhetorical function. Textual evidence makes clear Plato’s intention: Let me take a vacation, in the way daydreamers usually do when they walk alone. People like that . . . suppose their project fulfi lled . . . and

27. Even J. M. Peramás’ study comparing the political conceptions of Plato and the Guaraní Indians (to whom he was a missionary) judged Plato deceived by the proverb that all is common among friends, with the result that he “desbarró por completo” (fell into nonsense.)

Dramatic/Rhetorical Views of Woman

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enjoy imagining how they will act when it happens . . . And so I would like to put off . . . feasibility [for] later. (458a) The point is that it would be folly to use this proposal as referring to Plato’s thought on woman as such. Even though he uses woman in it, its purpose, as in all other dramatic/rhetorical instances in which woman appears, has no relation to Plato’s reflection on her nature.

II.

WOMAN IN THE DRAMATIC/RHETORICAL DRAWING OF CHARACTERS

Another type of nonphilosophical reference to woman is found in Plato’s depiction of the moral nature (਷șȠȢ) of his male characters, which includes their sometimes prejudicial attitude toward women. The richest by far of these portrayals is Socrates’ complex interaction with women, done with particular care and detail.28 It includes the Pythia (Apol. 21a), who, through Chaerephon, gives Apollo’s verdict on his wisdom; the woman in his dreams (Crito 44ab), who instructs him about the time of his death; Aspasia (Menex. 235e-236c), Pericles’ mistress, who teaches him rhetoric; Diotima (Symp. 201d–212c), who speaks on love; and Phaenarete (Tht. 149a, 151c, 210c), his mother, to whom he refers in relation to his art of midwifery. Even his wife Xanthippe (Phdo. 60a)— representing the stereotypical overly emotional Athenian—“prophesies,” not as predicting what is coming, of course, but as expressing the deeper meaning of the last time he will speak to his friends (115a).29 Remarkably, most instruct him about something, often of a prophetic or mystical type. Also, uncharacteristically, Plato’s Socrates seems to accept their instruction with respect, without cross-examining them as he does men. Socrates’ respect for women is also shown when he bathes before drinking the hemlock to spare women the work of washing his body (Phdo. 115a), and when he spends time talking to the women of his family, giving them directions before his death (116b). He also respects the judgment of “wise men and women of old who have written,” like the “lovely Sappho” (Phdr. 235 bc), and of priests and priestesses who have studied so as to be able to give a reasoned account of their ministry (Meno 81a). This may be Plato’s attempt to document Socrates’ conviction about the intellectual capacity of woman in addition to her prophetic and mystical gifts, and to point to Socrates as the initiator of the discussion for the equality of woman in Athens.30 Women seem to share the features mentioned ear-

28. E. D. Blair (1996) contains a detailed analysis of the whole question. 29. I owe this insight to Ronald Polansky. 30. See Chapter 2, pp. 40ff.

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lier, however, in proportion to the limitations that historical facts placed on the creative liberty of Plato. The mystical dimension is missing, for example, in Socrates’ relation to Aspasia, though he respects her as “a very capable” (Ƞ੝ ʌȐȞȣ ijĮȪȜȘ) teacher of rhetoric (Menex. 235e). F. J. Olivieri31 notes here that the philosopher seemed to want to manifest by these relations to women Socrates’ mystical, prophetic, or demonic dimensions, to which Plato was foreign, finding them as enigmatic as the relations themselves. This is also shown when Socrates invokes goddesses32 and the Muses before acting,33 or attributes inspiration to the nymphs.34 He swears frequently by Hera.35 We may conclude that the feminine characters relating to Socrates fulfill both a dramatic and a rhetorical purpose by contributing two strokes to Plato’s portrait of the philosopher: the record of his revolutionary attitude about women and his mystical side. Socrates’ respectful attitude towards particular women coexists, however, with pejorative references to women as a class, common among Greek men. Dramatic truth required balancing Socrates’ unique characteristics and his sharing of the idiosyncrasies of Athenian men. Thus, he uses women as examples of lack of virtue as, when he comments that men afraid of the death penalty “are not any better than women.”36 Plato has left a complex but believable Socrates. What we have sketched above is just a narrow depiction, since woman is just one of the elements in this task.37 But still, none of these instances reveals Plato’s conception of woman as such, since they are conceived with the dramatic and rhetorical purpose of drawing Socrates’ moral and idiosyncratic character, or with advancing the argument (which is not about woman) in these dialogues, as when he refers to Aspasia in Menexenus, and to Diotima in the Symposium.38 Pace C. Pierce,39

31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

F. J. Olivieri (1982) 242–257. Phdo. 95a, Rep. 327a, 328a, 354a (Bendis), and 451a (Nemesis). Eud. 275d and Phdr. 237a. Phdr. 238d, 241e, 263d, and 278bc. Apol. 24e; Gorg. 449d; H. Ma. 287a and 291e; Tht. 154d; Phdr. 230b. Apol. 35b. Other instances can be found in Gorg. 527a; Alc. I 121d; Meno 99d; Rep. 469d, 536b and 548de; and Tht. 176b. 37. Of course, Plato’s portrait of Socrates is richer than what concerns us here. Among others, R. Weiss (2001) 138 describes the Socrates of the early dialogues as sarcastic, funny, making bad puns, striking at his interlocutors where they are most vulnerable, teasing, baiting, and annoying; G. B. Matthews (1999) 72ff. examines his “perplexity” even beyond Meno; T. C. Brickhouse and N. D. Smith have also devoted two books (1994 and 2000) to the examination of his philosophy. 38. Among others, L. Irigaray (1989) 34ff. and (1994) 183ff. perceives Diotima’s love as an intermediary between ignorance and knowledge; S. Hawthorne (1994), Bat-Ami Bar On, ed., 83–96, fi nds a particularly feminine nature in her speech; and A. M. Bowery (1996) 175–194, conceives its dramatic narrative structure as “tethered to the female.” 39. C. Pierce (1994) 29.

Dramatic/Rhetorical Views of Woman

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this explains Diotima’s use of homoeroticism, since Socrates usually starts his arguments where his interlocutors are (hence the homoeroticism of some of the first speeches) to bring them beyond their positions. Besides Socrates, Plato depicts his characters as representing moral qualities or philosophical positions using what have been called “ethological mimes,” where actions reveal the temperament and thought of the speaker.40 Pejorative and patronizing generalizations referring to women enter into the description of young Athenians when leaving the palaestra, in a symposium, or at the agora, as do the women they respect or keep company with41 and their preferred mythological feminine figures.42 These dramatic ingredients color the entire text; for instance, drunken Alcibiades (Symp. 215c) sees women as unskilled; mischievous Ctesippus (Lysis 205d) as gossiping; boorish Thrasymachus (Rep. 350e) despises old women; Nicias, the general in Laches (197b), sees women as rash; Megillus the Spartan in Laws (639b) as cowards; the Athenian in the same work qualifies nurses as servile (790a), and women in general as abusive and nagging (731d and 934e). Characters also speak condescendingly, as when Menexenus admits that Aspasia must be congratulated if, “in spite of being a woman (ȖȣȞ੽ Ƞ੣ıĮ),” she is really able to compose a speech such as Socrates reports (Menex. 249d).43 Women as sex objects include a “little Corinthian maid” (Rep. 404d), courtesans (373a),44 and mistresses (420a). Socrates also states that “one can fi nd fault with a courtesan as something harmful” (Phdr. 240b). When seriously concerned about women, Plato’s men refer mainly to marriage and family.45 The tyrant is defi ned by how he treats his mother,46 and what poets write about goddesses and mothers serve as a criterion for censoring them (Rep. 378d). Plato’s reason to consider family men more trustworthy is their concern for the family unit.47 This is how men talked about women in the Athens of that time. As I said earlier, like any author of a play, what Plato writes is not necessarily what he thinks. N. D. Smith48 forgets this when discussing Plato’s “sexist slurs,” though he grants that slurs show that Plato is “not the perfect master of his own message,” since they were part of the “common parlance of the day.”

40. J. Klein (1965) 18. H. D. Rankin (1964) 14 notes Plato’s “dramatist appreciation of individual human types.” 41. E.g., in Symp. 212cd, Alcibiades is brought into the symposium by a flute-girl. 42. Symp. 179de, 180b, d-182a, and 196d. Muses are found in 187e, 189b, 196e, and 197b, and Sirens at 216a. 43. See also Rep. 398e and Symp. 179b and d. 44. Also 568e, 573d, and 574bc. 45. Eud. 306e; Lysis 207de and 208de; Gorg. 511e; Menex. 248c; Rep. 548a and 589e; Phdr. 233d, 239e and 252a; Phil. 16a and 15e; Laws 650a. 46. Rep. 571c, 574ad, and 575d. 47. Letter VII 337b and 348d. 48. N. D. Smith (1983) 469–470.

30

Plato’s Dialectic on Woman

Others,49 who argue that Plato disliked women as a class by attributing to him the sexist slurs of his characters, suffer from the same problem. And even if we were to argue that he shared this attitude, pointing to the single expression in his doubtful Letter VIII (355c) that the phrase that calls the rich blessed is a “mindless phrase (ȜȩȖȠȢ ਙȞȠȣȢ) of women and children,” this only serves to note that he was a man of his culture, and underscores the extraordinary intellectual freedom from it that characterizes his actual theory about woman.

III.

WOMAN IN THE ATHENIAN AND WIDER GREEK BACKGROUND

Plato includes women in vignettes of Greek life while depicting Athenian society, as when Socrates mentions his being used by Lacedaemonians “the way children make use of old women, to tell stories agreeably” (H. Ma. 286a); or when Plato sets a scene with a “streamlet [that] looks very pretty and pure and clear and fit for girls to play by” (Phdr. 229b). Plato’s wider background also included such women as the Pythia (the Apollo priestess at Delphi) (Rep. 461e and 540c), poetesses such as Sappho (Phdr. 235c), seen above, and even women who pride themselves on their education in Sparta and Crete (Prot. 342d). The dialogues’ Greek background includes feminine characters in three ways: 1. As the result of confi nement. 2. In her unique role of mother. 3. As mythological. 1. Plato’s description of surroundings familiar to Athenians reveals the secluded status of Athenian women, 50 even from poor women working outside their homes to priestesses, but most of them appearing as inferior distractions that men must avoid. 51 (For considerably more detail on this, see Appendix A to this chapter.) 2. These prevalent dramatic pejorative representations of Athenian women contrast with portrayals of her as mother, important in Plato’s description of Athenian life. The Platonic Socrates compares mother and State (Eut. 2c), and respectfully asserts that his mother received her art from God (Tht. 210c). As educator, she is a storyteller, directing the development of body and soul using movement, massage, song, and the teaching of religion.52 Moreover, Menexenus’ funeral oration (236e)53 proclaims

49. J. Annas (1976) 316, N. W. Senter (1977) 9–10, and D. Wender (1973) 75 and 80–82. 50. See Chapter 7, pp. 181ff. 51. Prot. 347d. Also in Symp. 176e and Tht. 173d. 52. Prot. 325c; Rep. 377c and 378d; Laws 789a, 887d, and 930c. 53. Also 247c, 248b, and 249a.

Dramatic/Rhetorical Views of Woman

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the State’s responsibility towards the father and mother of the fallen. (See Appendix B to this chapter for relevant information.) 3. Plato also incorporates mythological feminine figures as part of the Greek Weltanschauung.54 They function as symbols, examples, and sources of inspiration, in short parables (Phdr. 243a), and in accounts of other cultures.55 (Appendix C to this chapter offers more on this.) The Muses, authorities worthy of respect, appear in invocations when beginning a new task.56 Fates appear in the myth of Er.57 Bacchantes elicit their inspiration from Zeus, and when possessed, draw honey and milk from rivers;58 the witches of Thessaly (Phdr. 243a), negative figures, embody the self-destructive power of witchcraft. All of these texts belong merely to the drawing of the Athenian setting, performing as backdrop of the dialogues’ action and fulfilling a dramatic or rhetoric function in Plato’s literary expression; they are not part of his philosophical reflection about what woman is.

CONCLUSION This brief overview of Plato’s dramatic/rhetorical texts on woman does not, needless to say, do justice to the extraordinary richness of Plato’s dramatic creation; its purpose here is limited to distinguishing these texts from texts where woman constitutes the object of his philosophical reflection. The Socratic method (elenchus), adopted and developed further into dialectic by Plato, usually starts from the convictions of those participating in the discussion, to bring them later to new conclusions; thus, examples and demonstrations are adapted to the audience. This chapter has shown that, in the necessary task of describing the dialogue’s scene, Plato uses, among many other things, views on woman familiar to the Greek culture. As part of the background of the action this includes woman’s contemporary situation in Athens, its surroundings, and the ways Greeks talked about woman; but most signifi cantly, woman enters 54. Of 1,209 references to feminine figures, 412 among them are mythological, in quotes from Homer or invocations. 55. Laws 657b. Also Menex. 239b; Phil. 26b; Rep. 586c, 588c, and 590a; and Ion 538c. 56. Ion 533e, 534b, c, and e, and 536a; Eud 275d; Crat. 406a, 409d, and 428c; Symp. 187e, 189b, and 197b; Rep. 364e, 411c, 411d, 499d, 545d, 547a and b, 548b and 607a; Tht. 191d; Phdr. 237a, 245a, 259b, c, and d, 262d, and 265b; Tim. 47d; Criti. 108c; Soph. 242d, and e; Pol. 309d; Phil. 67b; Laws 653d, 654a, 664c, 665a, 669c, 670a, 672d, 682a, 719c, 775b, 783a, 795e, 796e, 815d, and 817d; Epin. 991b; and Alc. I 108c. 57. Rep. 617cd and 620de. Also Laws 960c. 58. Phdr. 253a and Ion 534a.

32

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the dialogues as one of the dramatic/rhetorical tools to develop his philosophical arguments on other matters. None of the above are part of Plato’s philosophical investigation into the nature of woman. In fact, as should by now be quite clear, the dramatic/rhetorical nature of these texts cannot be used to identify Plato’s conception of woman (even if he shared some of the attitudes expressed here) nor can they be sources for determining whether Plato is contradicting himself or not. In the task of discovering his conception of woman, the only reliable procedure is to consider only those passages where the reflection focuses precisely on woman as woman; and this will require care in distinguishing the two kinds of texts by paying careful attention to context. This is the task of the following seven chapters, which identify particular texts in Meno, Symposium, Republic, Timaeus, and Laws, because they can be shown to be distinct from the dramatic/rhetorical ones, and contain positions that depart radically from those of the surrounding culture.

APPENDICES

A. The Seclusion of Woman The Athenians’ view on women is implied not only when Eryximachus refers to the women “within” (਩ȞįȠȞ, Symp. 176e), and when the tyrant is portrayed as hiding like a woman in the corners of her house (Rep. 579b), but also by Plato’s never even mentioning the women of his family, 59 whereas he used his brothers, for instance, as characters in Republic (though the exclusion of the women might be interpreted as a sign of his respect for them). Women also appear as uneducated and emotional when Socrates compares democracy to a cloak of many colors many consider beautiful “as do children and women,”60 when Phaedo refers to the outbursts of Xanthippe as “the kind of thing women usually say” (Phdo. 60a), and when Socrates qualifies the conduct of his family’s women in the prison as “discordant,” asking them to be taken away (117d).61 Their moral weakness, particularly cowardice, is implied when changing a deserter into a woman is called the most appropriate penalty (Laws 944de). Moral weakness is portrayed even in myth, when the king’s wife is easily seduced by Gyges the Lydian (Rep. 360b).62

59. See Thucydides 2.45, D. Schaps (1977) 329f., D. Cohen (1991) 64, and J. Gould (1980) 45. 60. Rep. 557c. See also Gorg. 512e, Crat. 392ce and 418bc, Rep. 381e, and Laws 695a. If Letter VIII, referred to above, is authentic, Plato might have shared this view. 61. See also Rep. 431bc and 605de. 62. For other texts depicting women’s character weakness, see La. 197b, Rep. 549de and 550de, and Tht. 171e.

Dramatic/Rhetorical Views of Woman

33

Plato also groups Athenian women with children, slaves, eunuchs, those appearing diminished, and even animals. His Socrates fi nds “many various desires, pleasures, and pains, mostly in children, women, and servants, and in the masses of vulgar people who are free only in name.”63 Women also enter into enumerations portraying the public;64 and here even educated women rank with young men and the masses (Laws 658d); for example, the Athenian promises that tragic poets will not be free to “inflame women and children and the whole mob” (817c). Instances grouping women with children are numerous.65 As to classifying women with animals, men were created with fi ngernails because out of them would spring women and other animals which will need them (i.e., claws) (Tim. 76de). In Atlantis (Criti. 117b) there were separate baths for kings and private citizens, others for women and others for horses. The dialogues reflect woman’s exclusion from social life in Athens and from recognition of any contribution to it; children, for instance, were identified as sons or daughters of their father, not their mother, 66 and no woman takes part in the dialogues. This is even true of Diotima of Mantinea, even though she delivers the Platonic theory of love (Symp. 201e–212a). Plato could not make her participate like the other speakers, since women other than entertainers did not attend symposia. The literary solution was to incorporate her as at a fourth remove from the action: the dialogue reports Apollodorus’ account of the speeches said on the occasion, which were reported to him by Aristodemus, and within that, Socrates reports his conversation with Diotima. 67 Women’s exclusion from the life of the city is reflected in Republic’s fi rst four books. They are not among what is needed in the basic city: “The indispensable minimum for the city will consist in four or five men” (ਕȞįȡ૵Ȟ, male humans, Rep. 369d). Engendering and having children is

63. Rep. 431bc and 909e. 64. Gorg. 502d; Rep. 433d, 471a, 492b, and 561e; Pol. 296b; Laws 665c. 65. See Gorg. 473c, 502d and 511e; La. 197b; Prot. 325a; Menex. 248c; Phdo. 68a and 116b; Rep. 423e, 431c, 449c, d, 450c, 451c, 453d, 457c, d, 461e, 464a, b, d, 502d, e, 543a, 557c, and 578e; Tht. 171e; Tim. 81cd; Pol. 272a; Laws 650a, 721cd, 739c, 807b, 817c, 838d, 874c, and 917a; Letters VII 337b and 348cd, and VIII 355c. 66. M. Hip. 298c; Lysis 204b and 204e; Charm. 153c and 154a; Tht. 144bc. But in Alc. I 105d, Socrates calls Alcibiades son of Cleinias and Deinomache, and himself, 131e, son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete; a telling exception, for a dialogue of doubtful authenticity. N. Denyer’s (2001) Intro. to Alcibiades offers a discussion on its authenticity. 67. Other historical or pseudohistorical women are referred to in the dialogues, but take no active part: Besides the Pythia, Aspasia, Xanthippe, Diotima and Phaenarete, Plato mentions Sappho, Phdr. 235c, as I said twice before, as well as prophetesses of Delphi and priestesses of Dodona, Phdr. 244ab; also Cleopatra, wife of Perdiccas of Macedon, Gorg. 471c. In Letter II 313a, of doubtful authenticity, Plato refers to Doris, mother of Dionysius; and in Letter XIII 361ce and 363a to his own mother, his nieces, and the daughters of Cebes.

34

Plato’s Dialectic on Woman

mentioned, but nothing is said of women, who only appear with the luxurious city, as courtesans or in services and for cosmetic or ornamental purposes (373a, c). While discussing the Guardians’ education Socrates explicitly refers to them as men (ਕȞȒȡ) (376de). Censorship of Homer’s passages is justified if it is “not proper for the ears of boys and men” (387b). The Guardians must avoid feminine characteristics, and not imitate a woman—whether she is a girl or an older woman, complaining to her husband, quarreling with the gods, singing her own praises, congratulating herself on her prosperity, or in trouble, pain and anguish—still less a woman who is sick, in love or in labor (395de).68 nor slaves, female and male (395e). Book 4’s statement (423e–424a) that Guardians will have women and children in common does not leave any doubt that Socrates is considering only men. This unquestioned acceptance of Athens’ status quo on women up to Book 4 contrasts sharply with Plato’s revolutionary philosophical refl ection about her in Book 5. But even after defending women’s capacity for the Guardians’ duties, education, and functions, Plato feels it dramatically necessary to identify rewards for courageous Guardians as more opportunities of access to women (460b). Even as late as Theaetetus, Socrates distinguishes his profession from his mother’s by saying that his “is practiced on men, not women, in that it tends the souls, not the bodies” (150bc), making it clear that the extension of his art to women is not considered even as a possibility. Apology (41c) contains an exception. Among pleasures expected after death, Socrates includes examining men and women to determine who is wise and who is not. But he is referring to their souls, not to living Athenians, and is therefore not bound by dramatic truth. Some also report that Plato broke with tradition by accepting women into the Academy.69

B. The Mother’s Role Mother, father, and country, primary objects of loyalty and respect, represented the identity of the Greek culture in time and space, its historical continuity and moral justification. Family lineage was a value of Greek culture. Several passages refer to families’ maternal line;70 Plato describes

68. See also 387e–388a, 469d and 605e. 69. See Chapter 2, pp. 53ff. 70. Charm. 158a and b; Alc. I 104b and 105d; Prot. 315a; Eud. 297e; Crat. 402c; Rep. 334b; Parm. 126b; Laws 766c, 774e, 856d, 878de, 924b and e, 925a and cd, and 929b.

Dramatic/Rhetorical Views of Woman

35

the honor due to mother and father,71 and stresses the mother’s authority within the family.72 Myth also echoes the authority of the mother. Demeter embodies caring; she is mother because her gift is nourishment; and Poseidon refl ects the Greek appreciation for the mother when he assigns to the fi rstborn son his mother’s dwelling.73

C. Feminine Characters Some feminine characters constitute personifications74 or appear paired with masculine figures.75 Frequently, the myth creates the tone of the discussion, as in the story of Oreithyia and Pharmacea.76 Praises of goddesses and heroines are frequent: Medea is one among many instances.77 Socrates swears by Hera;78 Alcibiades, by gods and goddesses (Symp. 219c).

71. 72. 73. 74. 75.

76. 77. 78.

Rep. 538b and Crito 50d. Lysis 209a–210d and 213a. Apol. 28c; Symp. 179e; Crat. 404b; and Criti. 114a. Symp. 178b, 195c, 197b, and 206d; Rep. 616c, and 617b–d; Laws 740a, and 943e. Eut. 302d; Prot. 321d and e; Crat. 401e, 402a and b; Symp. 177e; Rep. 379e, 380a, and 381d; Tht. 152e and 180d; Tim. 22a, 23e, 40e, and 41a; Criti. 109c, 112b, 113d, and 116c; Phdr. 229b; Laws 654a, 665a, 774d, 796e, 833b, 920d and e, and 921c; Epin. 984d. Phdr. 229b–d. Also Crat. 395cd, and Pol. 272a. Eud. 285c. Other instances are found in Apol. 28c; M. Hip. 371d; Crat 401cd, 402cd, 404cd, 406ab, 406d–407c, and 408b; Symp. 195d, 197b, and 203c; Rep. 391c; Phdr. 253b; and Laws 717d. See p. 28, n. 35.

Part II

The Philosophical Texts

PRELIMINARY REMARKS The following analysis of Plato’s philosophical texts about woman examines these issues: the likelihood that Plato owes his treatment of woman to the historical Socrates (chap. 2); the cause of the myth of the simultaneous and equal creation of the sexes (chap. 3); Plato’s reason for introducing woman in Republic 5 (chap. 4); the complex logical structure of the argument about woman in Republic 5 (chap. 5); the metaphysical principles upholding his view of woman (chap. 6); and the reason for the controverted legal position of woman in Laws (chap. 7). (Another relevant text, dealing with Plato’s community of women, was already treated as dramatic/rhetorical in Chapter 1.) The above chapters provide the evidence for my conclusion on Plato’s conception of woman and its logical consistency (chap. 9), and contains my contribution to Platonic scholarship.

2

The Socratic Origin

INTRODUCTION Plato’s philosophical reflection about woman unfolds dialectically within the debate on the subject taking place in the intellectual circles of Athens at the time, a circumstance which explains its tone of engagement and the form of its progression. The preceding chapter made clear that the logos of woman is present in the dialogues not only in its philosophical content but also in its dramatic/ rhetorical form. Their mimetic and analytic functions reinforce each other and contribute to the persuasive force of the text; therefore, as we devote our attention to the philosophical texts, our analysis will have to call attention also to the dramatic or rhetorical aspects of them when necessary. This and the following chapters will show that Plato’s thinking on this topic contains the same logical stages as the rest of his philosophy: it arises in its Socratic version in Meno, manifests its variance from certain aspects of Socratism (though, in this case, by satirical criticism) in Symposium, develops its dialectical justification, metaphysical roots, and distinctive formulation in Republic, receives its cosmological underpinnings in Timaeus, and fi nds its concrete, prudential, and most pervasive application in Laws. The texts furnishing evidence on Plato’s theory about woman confi rm the understanding of the dialogues as what was called a kind of cosmos,1 a living unity that shows “a nexus of interpretative interrelationships far richer than linear connections,” contributing a variety of perspectives upon the same core issue. 2 In our case, every text containing Plato’s reflection on woman in different dialogues becomes fully meaningful when considered in the context of the others. But this does not mean that the current debate on the chronology of Plato’s dialogues need really concern us here, even if the traditionally accepted chronological order seems also the most logical one. All this

1. L. G. Westerink (1962) 28, cited by J. Howland (1991) 193. 2. J. Howland (1991) 195.

40 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman study requires is what is widely accepted: the characterization of certain dialogues or parts of dialogues as “Socratic” irrespective of their chronological location, the close relation of Symposium and Republic as dialogues of Plato’s maturity, the fact that Timaeus was written after Republic, and that Laws was Plato’s last work. About all this there is no real dispute.

THE SOCRATIC ORIGINS We begin by examining the relevant section of Meno, where Plato’s theory of woman fi nds its roots. The relation that Plato’s portrayal of Socrates has with the Socrates of history will be shown to be true to the historical Socrates, particularly concerning what Plato’s character “Socrates” says about woman in this dialogue. This can be discovered underneath a short passage, and is relevant to our investigation because it suggests that the discussion on the equality of men and women in virtue seems not to have originated with Plato, as some assume, but instead to have initially followed Socrates, who apparently was the one who introduced the topic into the culture. The early section of Meno (71e–73c) brings up the dialogue’s subject matter using Socrates’ elenctic technique.3 Meno asks if virtue4 is teachable, if it can only be acquired by practice, or if it is a natural talent. Socrates answers, as usual, that it is necessary to defi ne it fi rst. Meno accepts the suggestion and falls into the typical error of confusing a defi nition with an enumeration of particular cases: This is what the virtue of a man (ਕvįȡȩȢ) is: to be capable of managing the affairs of the State, and in doing so to benefit his friends and harm his enemies, and to be careful not to suffer harm himself. And if you take woman’s virtue, it is not hard to describe: she ought to manage the household well, taking care of what is inside it and being obedient to her husband. (71e)

3. I.e., the method of cross-examining someone until he recognizes that he does not know what he is talking about. T. C. Brickhouse and N. D. Smith (1994) 11 and 13 conceive the elenchus not as a method but as a style of argument revealing the importance of the examined life. See W. K. C. Guthrie (1975) IV 108 in relation to Euthyphro, and, for a later reexamination, G. A. Scott (2002), who edited sixteen divergent approaches to the issue. 4. The term ਕpİIJȒ is usually translated “virtue,” but the Greek word is closer to our notion of “competence,” “proficiency,” or “expertise.” Originally from ૓ApȘȢ, the god of war (see Liddell and Scott, 1961 ed.) it meant “expertise in war” or “manliness.” In general, it means “what makes X a good X.”

The Socratic Origin

41

Meno also distinguishes virtues proper to male and female children and older men, whether free or slave; this implies that virtues are many and change according to occupation and age. Socrates objects, and identifies what they are looking for: what it is that virtuous acts of all kinds share, the nature or aspect (İੇįȠȢ) common to all, asking doubting Meno if the virtue of man is to administer the State well and that of woman the home . . . Is it possible to administer the State or the home or anything else, if it is not done . . . by means of good judgment and integrity? (įȚțĮȓȦȢ; “justly,” 73ab) As Meno recognizes this, Socrates concludes: If they are going to be good, both man and woman require integrity (justice, įȚțĮȚoıȪvૉȢ) and prudence. (73b) But this also applies to children and old men, free and slave. Meno must accept that all mankind is good in the same way and by having the same things, and that this could not be so if virtue were not one and the same. The dialogue then goes on to develop various implications of the original question.

ANALYSIS OF THE TEXT The discussion about how much Plato’s depiction of Socrates is a product of his imagination and how much it represents the historical Socrates has a long history. Lately, S. Kofman5 has revisited this issue as the way Plato “fictionalized” Socrates, particularly in Symposium. But most investigators agree that Plato’s early dialogues in general seem to be true to Socrates’ historical character and position in that Plato’s “Socrates” there leaves the interlocutor perplexed and offers no solution to his difficulty, while in the middle and late dialogues he becomes Plato’s spokesman, resolving the issue with a positive theory. Thus, it is important to note, as we examine the historical origin of the notion of sexual equality in Meno, that this work is not strictly an “early” dialogue but a dialogue of transition, and seems to constitute a bridge spanning the early dialogues and the great works of Plato’s maturity.6 Even if we do not accept the traditional chronological arrangement, it cannot be denied that Meno exhibits traits of both stages—a hybrid,

5. S. Kofman (1998) 41–67. 6. U. Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, quoted by F. J. Olivieri (1983) 275.

42

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according to some.7 Thus, in the fi rst part we still fi nd, as I mentioned, the elenchus, characteristic of the early dialogues. The discussion reduces Meno to perplexity, stung by Socrates as if by a torpedo fish.8 But, unlike the earliest dialogues, Meno does not stop here, but moves on to introduce positive doctrine: the theory of reminiscence, the method of hypothesis, and the distinction between knowledge and right opinion—something proper to the more strictly Platonic (“middle”) dialogues that will follow. As to the topic of woman, it belongs to the theme of Meno’s discussion only secondarily, as an example while Socrates was distinguishing the concrete diversity of virtuous acts from the essence of virtue as such. Most commentaries have not examined the implications of woman’s presence in this text, since her introduction does not affect the general argument.9 It differs, however, from examples of woman seen among the “dramatic/rhetorical” texts of Chapter 1, in that in this case the unity of virtue as stated by Socrates in the example of men and women presupposes his taking a position on the moral equality of the sexes.10 Those who accept that Meno was written before Symposium and Republic can also identify this text as the fi rst indication by Plato that the sexes are somehow equal; though, as was said earlier, it is only implied in the Socratic notion that virtue in men and women is the same. The fact that the passage discussing women’s virtue is found in the fi rst part, the elenctic or Socratic section of the dialogue, is the fi rst clue that what it says probably represents Socrates’ actual thought; and what distinguishes most clearly Socrates’ from Plato’s mature position is that for Socrates here, equality of virtue extends not only to men and women but also to children, male and female, and older men, whether free or slave (72d). Beyond this, the fact that the discussion lacks the nuances that the topic is going to acquire in later works of Plato doubtless also represents the early Socratic stages of his reflection on the matter—or, for those who want to prescind from the disputed issue of chronology, that Plato is recording, at some indeterminate

7. G. Vlastos (1991) 115 n. 41. 8. I.e., a stingray. Meno 80a. So it is surprising to fi nd J. Annas (1976) 314, n. 16, holding the unlikely view that “Plato seems to endorse Meno’s position that the scope of men’s and women’s virtue is different.” 9. Some studies, such as those of B. Jowett (1875) 259, G. Grote (1888) II 233–234, P. Shorey (1933) 155, and W. Jaeger (1943) II 62, only cite the passages; others, such as A. Sesonske (1967) 84–96, omit comment; R. G. Hoerber (1960) 97 n. 1 relegates the matter to a footnote; M. Andic (1971) 288–289 and W. K. C. Guthrie (1971) 5, overlooks the gender reference, reporting equality of virtue of different persons and, as in L. Robin (1968) 76, of various individual agents. 10. That is, his questions to Meno seen above show that women exercise moral virtues, and so are “as human” as men in this respect (animals do not exercise good judgment and integrity).

The Socratic Origin

43

time, the Socratic origin of his views and also certain features with which he does not necessarily fully agree any longer.11 Plato’s later reflection on woman, as we will point out, can be distinguished from the purely Socratic approach in that it is not always limited to the ethical field (as that of the real Socrates was), but extends to the social area and to its metaphysical foundation. In addition, given the known aversion of Socrates for political activity, some matters can be identified as exclusively Platonic, as for instance the interest in integrating woman into the life of the State, particularly in Laws.

THE INFLUENCE OF SOCRATES But Plato was not the only person to begin thinking about woman, and specifically her equality with men, around this time. At the end of the fi fth century B.C., the woman question rather abruptly burst into literature. This has not been explained in a completely satisfactory way, but a likely cause is the influence of Socrates—an interpretation which has merit, because, as we will see, Plato’s concern about woman is widely shared among Socrates’ followers, and the question of woman’s function in society is invariably present within the Socratic school. Even her presence in Euripides has been attributed to Socratic influence.12 Evidence pointing to the view of the historical Socrates on woman is found not only in Plato’s Meno, but also in Aristotle’s testimony and in Socratic writers, both Plato’s contemporaries and their successors. Let us look briefly at them, to shed light on what might be underneath the little passage we have seen.

ARISTOTLE’S TESTIMONY Aristotle seems to confi rm that Plato’s Meno states the historical Socrates’ position when he asserts that Socrates thought that good judgment, courage, and integrity are the same in women and men.13 Although his source is probably the Platonic text in Meno, there is evidence that he intends to refer to the historical Socrates not only because he appears to be doing so but also because in this case Socrates’ name is not preceded by the article14 and

11. 12. 13. 14.

A possible, if considerably less likely, interpretation. D. L. II 18. Aristotle Pol. 1260a21 and 1277b20. As observed by W. Fitzgerald (1850) 163 n. 3, and also D. G. Ritchie (1902) 56. For W. D. Ross (1924) XXXIX–XLI, this use is particularly intended by Aristotle. See recent objections in E. D. Blair (1996) 345 n. 32.

44

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uses the past tense (ફİIJȠ),15 which seems to be the form Aristotle prefers when discussing the historical person rather than “the Socrates” created by Plato to whom he refers usually using the article and the historical present. In Republic,16 for instance, where he is clearly arguing against Plato himself (e.g., in discussing the community of women), Socrates is always “the Socrates” who is Plato’s mouthpiece. But in the very same section, he pointedly refers to “Socrates” (i.e., without the article) when quoting Meno. Also, though the Platonic text refers also to children and older people, slave and free, Aristotle highlights only men and women, because his interest here is not the topic of virtue as such, but instead the derivative issue of sexual equality in virtue, which he attributes to Socrates, and which disturbs him because it opposes his own position on the conjugal relationship in the household. His argument here is against Socrates, not against Plato or Plato’s characterization of Socrates (one does not argue with a character). Some17 object that even if Aristotle was interpreting Meno as a historical report, this does not prove that Socrates actually held this view, but only that Aristotle thought he did, since he was not an eyewitness, but used information from Plato, Xenophon (who also depends on Plato), and Socratic literature, a genre generally thought of as imaginative fiction. Oral tradition is also held suspect, on grounds that after thirty or forty years it would be extremely difficult for Socrates’ contemporaries to distinguish their memories from fictional written accounts.18 This objection disregards how central a figure Socrates had been among intellectual Athenians.19 As Plato’s dialogues testify, his followers took notes of what he said, compared them, and kept his memory alive.20 He made a great impact on the lives of his disciples, and touched them too deeply for them to confuse their lived experience with imaginary reports. Besides, memories were better trained at that time. 21 Even today, when we depend on the media to remember, could anyone who lived through the days of the assassination of President Kennedy confuse the core experience of the event with fictional embellishments in a novel about it? And this does not involve a personal relationship. Is it reasonable to assume that those fiercely loyal young men

15. J. Stenzel (1963) 882. 16. Aristotle Pol. 1261–1264. 17. C. H. Kahn (1992) 235ff., for instance. J. Beversluis (1993) 298–301 also rejects G. Vlastos’ claim of Aristotle’s providing independent evidence on Socrates’ views. 18. C. H. Kahn (1996) 87. 19. According to H. S. Goldman (2004) 14, Plato casts Socrates in the Apology as a sage, the heir of a tradition which makes moral claims speaking in maxims and aphorisms. 20. Symp. 172c and 173b, Parm. 126c, and Tht. 142d–143a. W. K. C. Guthrie (1969) III 343ff. and (1971) 23ff. judges the dramatic passages “impossible without a foundation in a known practice” of Socrates’ disciples. 21. See W. K. C. Guthrie (1969) III 343 and (1971) 23.

The Socratic Origin

45

whose lives had been changed for good by Socrates’ influence, and who had committed themselves to a view of life at an age when those decisions take deep root, could not distinguish their experience from the fictional literature that that very experience engendered? And why would Aristotle, the meticulous scientist, devise a literary way of making a distinction between the historical and the Platonic Socrates if he had not carefully distinguished them by thorough questioning and consideration of what Socrates’ contemporaries remembered? It does not seem conceivable that Aristotle would make the mistake of attributing something to Socrates without considering his followers’ testimony. 22 Hence, the most reasonable interpretation of all of this is that the question of defi ning virtue allowed Plato to introduce unobtrusively in Meno the implicit Socratic doctrine of the equality of human beings in their capacity to exercise it. Beyond contributing to the refi nement of his dramatic characterization of Socrates, this points toward Plato’s later view of the human soul as virtue’s proper asexual source. One of what has been called 23 the “strongest practical results” of the Socratic-Platonic theory (that virtue is one) consists in excluding any distinction in the sexes’ moral excellence; and Aristotle recognizes that this signifies the equality of the sexes, since he accepts the thesis that human perfection consists in virtue understood as excellence. This is the reason for his disagreement. He argues against it by offering his own view that virtues vary as people vary among themselves. The text even provoked a curious reaction that Meno is right, because there are different and even incompatible virtues, and that the virtue of woman cannot be identified with the virtue of man “any more than the horse’s virtue can be identified with the elephant’s.”24 Still, it must be remembered that, even though the passage in Meno refers in particular to men and women, it does not refer only to them, but also to children, male and female, and to older people, free and slave. This evidence reveals this particular moment as exclusively Socratic. It has been objected 25 that Plato “derived from Socrates the conviction that human excellence, intellectual and moral, was unisex,” because Plato’s theory of woman cannot be totally justified as Socrates’ position, for whom excellence is common to the whole human species. But the examination of Republic will make it clear that Plato differs from this Socratic position in that he argues for the possible equality in virtue of the two genders but is far from the notion that the capacity for virtue of all individuals is the same. This distinction also shows it to be inappropriate to charge Plato, as

22. E. D. Blair (1996) 345–346. For a skeptical critique of Aristotle as historian, see C. H. Kahn (1996) 79–87. 23. E. S. Thompson (1980) 75 n. 7. 24. A. Koyre (1945) 8. 25. N. D. Smith (1980) 8, and (1983) 471, objecting to G. Vlastos’ view.

46

Plato’s Dialectic on Woman

we saw in the Introduction, with contradicting his view on woman’s virtue by comparing Meno’s Socratic position with Timaeus’ view, which was even later than Republic.26

SOCRATES’ FRIENDS AND FOLLOWERS Beyond the implications and interpretations of the text itself, Meno’s description of Socrates’ position is confirmed by many of his followers, who discussed and gave evidence of their teacher’s views27 in their Sokratikoi logoi, as Aristotle calls the new genre. Despite the scarcity of fragments and their diversity, quite a number show interest in the topic of woman, which seems to point to Socrates as its source, and whose revolutionary character could have been another of the irritants producing the Athenians’ reaction against him, because it challenged an axiom of the Greek culture: that excellence of character depends on class and gender.28 For those interested in going into detail on the views on women of the followers of Socrates, including his closest friends Antisthenes, Aeschines and Xenophon, as well as later Socratics, I have treated them at some length in the appendices to this chapter. The fragments which form the Socratikoi logoi, in spite of their being a fictional genre, and that writers influence each other, 29 reveal, among other things, a common characteristic: all write about women. 30 This single agreement not only in topic but also in how the problems were raised is remarkable because of both the paucity of fragments and the deep philosophical disagreements among them. Those who doubt that the statement of Meno represents the historical Socrates’ view must recognize that the persistent presence of women’s issues throughout Socratism appears highly unlikely without relation to Socrates. This should suffice to show Socrates’ role in introducing the topic. Of course, Socrates’ influence does not end with the minor Socratics, but becomes identified in the historical tradition with Plato’s contribution. Neoplatonic sources not only show that three women were part of Plotinus’ philosophical circle and that Sosipara of Pergamum and Hypatia of Alexandria were admired for their lectures and philosophy, but also that the idea of women rulers in the ideal State was defended by Proclus, who used as reason for women Guardians the sexes’ common nature and virtue, while limiting their difference to the sexual.31

26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

See Introduction, p. 7. T. Gomperz (1905) II 81. G. Vlastos (1989) 288, and (1994) 19. C. H. Kahn (1996) 3–4. J. P. Ghougassian (1977) 33. D. J. O’Meara (2003), 14, 18, 24, 83–86.

The Socratic Origin

47

Socrates’ method of questioning allowed personal peculiarities to color his followers’ reports. D. Wender32 suggests that if the doctrine on sex equality in virtue has Socratic origins, it would be transmitted according to the character of each disciple: Plato in philosophic and political theory, Aeschines the rhetorician using historical examples, Xenophon as material for still another anecdote—and I should add Aristophanes, his contemporary, as satire, Diogenes with an eccentric rendering, and so on. Their versions33 represent the way each applied what Socrates offered as principle, permitting disagreement while still claiming to represent Socrates’ position.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOCRATES’ CONTRIBUTION Looking back at Socrates from the perspective of the Socratic schools, it may be prudent at this point to reflect briefly on the circumstances that gave rise to his position. Socrates’ interest in women’s issues was revolutionary in the sense that it disturbed the status quo in Athens; but this is not the same as saying that he was a feminist as we understand the term today. His view needs to be seen in the context of his philosophical response to the current Greek situation. At a time when the old traditional values that until then had held the Greek culture together were shown to be inadequate, many sophists were offering as an alternative a teaching aimed not at truth but at a success empty of ethical content. The resulting crisis involved not only the traditional values but, most importantly, the value of the search for the right principles of a good life and also for truth in general. Socrates’ main contribution to Greek culture consists in preserving the scientific spirit that had been laboriously born during the investigation of the physical world in the previous couple of centuries. Whether what he saved is exclusively Greek or includes elements from other cultures, 34 Socrates’ intervention contributed decisively to making it the defining trait of Western culture, and to reorienting its thrust to ethical concerns. He achieved this by putting the intellects of young Athenians to work, shifting and expanding the fifth and fourth centuries’ cultural concerns to include not only public but also personal ethical problems. Nothing was excluded. His radical thinking seems to have entered into sensitive areas taken for granted previously, which nobody was interested in touching. Woman, an

32. D. Wender (1973) 85. 33. As mentioned by R. Waterfield (1990) 22–23. 34. The notion that rational thinking appeared spontaneously in Ionia, called the “Greek miracle,” was contested by M. Bernal (1987 & 1991) as a prejudiced interpretation that ignores its Afroasiatic roots. M. R. Lefkowitz and G. M. Rogers (1996) have edited twenty studies of reactions containing evidence that Bernal’s thesis is “highly uncertain and improbable.”

48 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman important part of that reflection, was one of them.35 D. Wender, 36 looking for the historical origin of Plato’s views on woman, considers Herodotus’ reports, 37 Spartan women’s freedom, Aspasia’s political shrewdness, and Socrates’ views. She notices that the subject is missing among the Pre-Socratics, except for a few misogynistic remarks. It appears, in short, that Socrates was the only one with the capacity for asking the right questions and for revealing the social and ethical implications of the topic. Although there is “no literature, no art of any country in which women are more prominent, more carefully studied and with more interest than in the tragedy, sculpture, and painting of fi fth-century Athens”38 (the plays of Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes providing ample evidence of this), the topic of woman had never previously been part of radical rational thinking on ethical and social issues. Until that century, the undisputed view saw the wife as an outsider to the cultural and political life of the city, exclusively in charge of procreation and administration of her husband’s property. The home (ȠੇțȠȢ), like a small, busy factory, belonged to the city conceived as a community of households. Trusted in its administration, women already had an important, clearly defined role, which supported all kinds of artisan work to meet the family’s needs for food, clothing, etc. Socrates’ intervention disturbed a comfortable state of affairs. A shift from the prevalent misogynistic attitudes39 to a new thinking about the place of women is then reflected not only in literature but in the plastic arts as well. The appearance of romantic relations between husbands and wives increased markedly at that time in Attic figure vases, and family emotional relations began to be represented in other works.40 Some have seen in Euripides’ questioning the traditional Athenian views of women, neither misogyny41 nor its opposite42 (as others interpret it), but rather the influence of Socrates’ approach to woman’s issues and his method of thought, which led the audience to reconsider traditional views. Euripides brings up the subjugation of women in Medea 230ff., and the 653 fragment

35. This has been remarked by G. C. Field (1948) 118, who observes Socrates’ interest in women’s issues, and N. Thompson (2006) 139 n. 46, who cites my 1996 article as source “for Socrates’ proclivity for taking the female side.” 36. D. Wender (1973) 82–83. 37. The Gyges myth, Rep. 359d–360b, for instance, is also in Herodotus I 8–12. 38. As A. W. Gomme (1925) 20. 1–25, remarks. 39. See Hesiod, Theog. 585–612 and Erga 53–82; Semonides (fr. 7) and Eur. Hipp. 618–624. 40. R. F. Sutton (1981) V and 232ff. 41. Aulus Gellius 15.20, cited by Pomeroy (1975) 105. 42. Athenaeus 13.557e; quoting Hieronymus in Historical Commentaries. Cf. 13.603e.

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of Protesilaus “țȠȓȞȠȞ Ȗ੹ȡ İੇȞĮȚ ȤȡોȞ ȖȣȞĮȚțİȓȠȞ ȜȑȤȠȢ,”43 written before Republic 5, seems to advocate the community of wives. In the following years, three plays of Aristophanes (Lysistrata and Thesmophoriazusae in 411 B.C., Ecclesiazusae in 391 B.C.) use the outrageous medium of comedy to attest, among other political issues, to the ferment about women’s role in the culture.44 From this background, deeply influenced by Socrates’ thought, Plato is going to develop his own reflection on the question.

CONCLUSION In tracing the sources of Plato’s theory of woman, we have found evidence of Socrates’ influence. Investigation shows that the subject had been a matter of theoretical discussion for a whole generation before Plato was able to contribute to it, and that he was by no means the fi rst to introduce it. This will be particularly true of the community of women that Plato brings up in Republic 5; it was a topic which was present throughout the history of Socratism. The above survey has made clear that the interest of Plato in the topic of woman is part of a wider movement, the deliberate effort of the Socratic school to rethink the situation of women in Greece, as part of the ethical reexamination of personal and social life. A critical reevaluation of all social and political questions could not avoid women’s issues. Meno contains the fi rst sign of Plato’s interest, and the fi rst pronouncement of Plato on sexual equality. Plato also owes to Socrates the ethical focus that characterizes his view on woman, giving his theory depth and direction. We must remember that for Socrates, the equality of men and women in virtue was only an instance of the equality in virtue of all human beings, young and old, free and slave, male and female. Plato, on the contrary, understands that men and women are equal in virtue only in the sense that gender distinction is irrelevant to this issue while, unlike Socrates, he later stresses the importance of individual differences in the capacity for virtue. Regarding our concern on possible Platonic contradictions, it is important to remark that there is no real inconsistency in such a position. It has been said that the characters in Plato’s dialogues perform the function of examples embodying the theme being discussed. It is worth noting that in the same phrase in Meno (81a), where the Socrates of the middle dialogues has been seen as making his entrance,45 Plato introduces an example of equality in virtue between the genders when he mentions the authority

43. “Marriage for women should be common.” (Lit.: “The womanly marriagebed should be common.”) 44. More of this will be found in the next chapter. 45. According to K. W. C. Guthrie (1975) IV 241.

50 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman of wise men and women, priests and priestesses who have studied so as to be able to explain their ministry rationally. This is also consistent with the Socratic notion of virtue as knowledge. In this moment of transition, Plato seems to make his own the Socratic position on woman. In sum, the importance of this passage from Meno, in spite of the fact that woman appears only in passing, consists in revealing the Socratic origin of Plato’s reflection about her,46 displays Plato’s original ethical focus, and distinguishes Socrates’ contribution from the Platonic development of the subject as it will appear later in Republic V.

APPENDICES: THE FOLLOWERS OF SOCRATES ON WOMEN’S EQUALITY

A. Early Followers Antisthenes, the oldest in Socrates’ intimate group, was probably the fi rst to write an Aspasia. He is reported as saying that “the virtue of men and women is the same.”47 This has been considered an expression of Antisthenes’ nonconformism, and probably his debt to Socrates as well.48 What interests us here is that Antisthenes seems to owe this view to Socrates. Aeschines of Sphettus, in fragments of his own Aspasia, shows Socrates defending the equal capacity of men and women for virtue, and using examples of women’s courage and prudence. He also pictures him as discussing the education and life of woman at the time,49 the question of education in virtue, and the promotion of women’s claims. 50 B. Ehlers’ view of Aeschines as the one who introduced “the educational influence of Socrates in terms of eros” has been accepted, 51 including the recognition that the issues of the equality of women “may be germane” to the contemporary debates on the question. There are objections, 52 however, to interpretations of Aspasia as a moral instructor, suggesting a charitable interpretation of the matter as farce, not ethical philosophy, but the objections to Aeschines’ reports as irony have been dismissed. 53

46. J. Adam (1902) 280 n. to 451cff. recognized Socrates’ influence on Plato’s thought about woman. Among later critics, see S. M. Okin (1979) I 21 and D. H. Coole (1988) 30–31 and 40. 47. D. L. VI 12. See H. D. Rankin (1983) 221. 48. C. H. Kahn (1996) 7. 49. T. Gomperz (1905) III 124 and 342. 50. G. C. Field (1948) 151. 51. C. H. Kahn (1994) 93 and 102 n. 44. 52. M. Pakaluk (1997) 168. 53. A. E. Taylor.

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Apparently, contemporary readers recognized the historical Socrates in Aeschines’ dialogues, to the point that rumors attributed their authorship to Socrates himself, from whose wife Xanthippe Aeschines would have obtained them after Socrates’ death. This has been attributed54 to malicious gossip, but he brings up the imaginary Persian queen Rhodogyne and the Milesian hetaira Thargelia, calling them as gifted and capable as an outstanding man. Aeschines’ Socrates also describes Aspasia as a counselor55 while cross-examining Xenophon and his wife. 56 This is a fictional work, since Socrates and Aspasia were probably dead when Xenophon married. But Aspasia is lauded for her political wisdom and for teaching rhetoric not only to Pericles (as Plato tells us in his Menexenus57), but also to Lysicles, a sheep merchant, whom she apparently helped to succeed in politics. Xenophon58 also reports on Socrates’ friendship with Aspasia, including his remarks on her knowledge, though the historian’s perception and fictional imagination appear to color the accounts. 59 Thus, when in his Symposium 60 he has Socrates commenting that the skill of a dancing female juggler shows that the nature of women is not in any way inferior to that of men, the fi nal qualification, “they lack only judgment and strength,” seems, according to D. G. Ritchie,61 to be Xenophon’s addition.62 Xenophon even makes Antisthenes ask Socrates why he has not educated Xanthippe, if his opinion is that women’s nature is not in any way inferior to that of men.63 Again, when Socrates states that courage can be taught to a girl dancer, Xenophon ends the statement with “even though she is a woman (țĮȓʌİp ȖȣȞ੽ Ƞ੣ıĮ).”64 Socrates’ comments still imply that virtue can be taught, and that the same virtue (courage in this case) can be taught to men and women.65 This agrees with Plato’s Meno. Woman’s educability also appears in a conversation with Ischomachus (portrayed as a model of a gentleman) and contains explicit recognition of woman’s contribution to the household as

54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65.

Athenaeus 611d and D. L. II 60. See C. H. Kahn (1994) 97-–99 for details and criticism. Cicero, De Invent. I 31, 51; Quintilian V. II, 27ff. According to H. Dittmar (1912) 40–41, 52, 56, Plato wrote Menexenus to satirize Aeschines. Xenophon, Mem. II 6. 36. Ibid., Oec III 14 and VII 11ff. Ibid., Symp. II 9. D. G. Ritchie (1902) 205 n. 20. In fact, the phrase is so out of character for Socrates that D. Wender (1973) 85 uses it as an example of Xenophon’s trivialization of Socrates’ thought. Xenophon, Symp. II 10. Ibid., Oec. II 11–12, 22–23. L. Strauss (1972) 146–148. He uses, as universally valid, Maimonides’ notion of esoteric literature, who introduced crucial doctrines secretly by suggestions and deliberate contradictions. See also A. Bloom (1968), A. L. Rosenthal (1973), J. Sallis (1975), and A. W. Saxonhouse (1976).

52 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman having the value of an equal partner, even making her judge her husband’s performances and sentencing him “to suffer some adequate penalty or fi ne” when evaluating his capacity in argument.66 A statement about the role of the wife in the economy of the family,67 for instance, is difficult to explain as Xenophon’s view: But because both must give and take, the god granted to both, in equal shares, memory and management ability; and so you could not tell whether the male or female sex has the larger share of this. And he also bestowed equally on them the power of due self-control, and gave authority (ਥȟȠȣıȓĮȞ) to whichever of them, man or woman, is better for bringing about the greater good. (Oec. VII 26–27) One does not expect such a conclusion in Xenophon’s description of the traditional division of activities in the Greek marriage,68 particularly if we recall its members’ disparity in age and education. Spartan influence on Xenophon does not explain what Ischomachus says either,69 since the radical content of this passage is far from Xenophon’s position. It coincides instead with Socrates’ view as found in Aristotle and Plato, that the soul’s qualities are not determined by gender. It is to be remembered that Xenophon’s position is radically different from Plato’s, since Ischomachus, in Xenophon’s conversation, clearly holds sex-complementarity;70 women’s education is stressed, but limited to the gender’s separate sphere of competence. That both Xenophon and Plato advocate capacity as a criterion for determining proper activity suggests a common source; and Xenophon’s frequent qualifications tempering Socrates’ views on women’s capacity point to a tension between his personal biases and his loyalty to his mentor’s radical stance. The passage above seems to represent a rare candid moment in reporting it. The characterization of woman in Xenophon’s Socratic works differs markedly from the way he depicts her in other places.71 He is, however, the fi rst ancient writer to give full recognition to the economic value of women’s domestic work,72 by applying Socrates’ views on sex equality as found in Plato’s Meno to a field not plowed by Socrates. Xenophon had difficulty grasping the depth of Socrates’ thought, and felt awkward

66. Xen., Oec. XI 25. 67. To which E. C. Marchant (1923) XXVI reacts, calling Ischomachus’ wife a long-suffering little saint. 68. E. D. Blair (1996) 346. 69. R. Waterfield (1990) 273; E. C. Marchant (1923) XXIV; and E. Delebecque (1957) refer to his Spartan relations. 70. Xen. Oec. VII 18–28. See S. B. Pomeroy (1994) 87–90. 71. S. I. Oost (1977/78) 235. 72. S. B. Pomeroy (1995) 182.

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articulating it. But he could deal easily with Socrates’ attitude toward woman at the concrete and practical level, without necessarily referring to its philosophical foundation.

B. Later Influence in the Socratics and Others The next generation of Socratic writers provides additional evidence of his influence. Woman is a constant feature,73 in extant works and fragments. The Cynic school’s outlandish Diogenes of Sinope has a Republic promoting common women and children, women dressing like men and exercising nude in public,74 and the woman’s consent as a requisite for a marriage to be valid.75 Socrates’ influence also seems to have extended to his followers’ lives. Several reports allege that at least two women, Axiotheia of Phlious and Lastheneia of Mantinea, attended Plato’s Academy. On this, however, the ancient accounts need cautious evaluation: Olympiodorus76 says: “He drew many, both men and women, wholly toward learning by preparing a courageous program for being his disciples.” Apuleius77 states: “Many of his listeners of both sexes flourished in philosophy.” Other reports were transmitted by Clement of Alexandria78 and Diogenes Laertius79 on the authority of Dicaearchus.80 A. S. Riginos81 mentions testimony from Themistius82 that “after Axiothea read Republic, she set forth from Arcadia to Athens where, concealing that she was a woman, she became a follower of Plato.” Dicaearchus also reports that Axiothea dressed as a man, an item also found in the Index Herculanensis.83 The widespread presence of intellectual women is surprising. Diodorus Cronus, who contributed innovations in logic, had five daughters who, according to reports, were distinguished dialecticians; their names have even been preserved.84 Diogenes Laertius reports that Aristippus wrote a Letter to His Daughter Arete of Cyrene, to whom he taught philosophy.85 As a philosopher, she imparted her father’s philosophy to her son,86 called

73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83.

According to H. D. Rankin (1983) 210. D. R. Dudley (1967) 36. D. L. VI 72 and H. D. Rankin (1983) 231. Olympiodorus, In Alcibiadem 2.147–149. Apuleius, De Plat. I.4. Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 4.122.2, 302. Diogenes Laertius, III 46 and IV 2. Dicaearchus, frag. 44 (Wehrli) and the Oxyrhynchus Papyri (1984) LII 3656. A. S. Riginos (1976) 183–184. Themistius, Or. 23.295C, 356 (Dindorf). Index Herculanensis, Col. VI 27.37 (Mekler). See also Riginos (1976) 184, and n. 13. 84. Menexene, Argia, Theognis, Artemicia, and Pantacleia. 85. D. L. II 72, 83 and 84. 86. H. D. Rankin (1983) 200.

54

Plato’s Dialectic on Woman

MȘIJȡoįȓįĮțIJoȢ87 (mother’s pupil),88 and probably systematized the tenets of the Cyrenaic school. Another Socratic, Stilpo of Megara, also wrote a dialogue To My Daughter. There is still more. Crates the Cynic put Diogenes’ theory about woman into practice in his țȣvoȖĮȝȓĮ (Cynic marriage) to Hipparchia, who was accomplished in argument and called “the female philosopher.”89 The activities of the couple are reported colorfully by many. It is also said that Asclepiades and Menedemus married a mother and her daughter, forming a miniature commune.90 Athenaeus’ book Deipnosophists section XIII concerns woman, where he refers to Nicion, a Cynic woman, nicknamed “Dog-fly.” Even Epicurus,91 so different from Socrates in significant respects, reflects Socrates’ influence not only on his ethical approach to philosophy, but also by including women in his philosophical community, the Garden.92 Contrasting with this, and excepting Theano, Pythagoras’ wife, and their three daughters, Arignote, Mya, and Damo, also reported as philosophers, philosophizing women appear to have been unthought-of before Socrates.93 Socrates’ views on woman were still present early in the third century among the Stoics, who recognized the full equality of husband and wife. Among them, Cleanthes wrote a work discussing (again) whether the virtue of men and women is the same;94 and also held the community of wives for an ideal State.95 The Stoics traced their thinking to Socrates through Crates, Diogenes the Cynic, and Antisthenes. The absence of references to Plato suggests the “community of women” as one of Socrates’ topics of discussion. The school’s founder, Zeno of Citium, defends in his Republic, against Plato, his view of Socratic doctrines: abolition of marriages,96 community of wives among the wise,97 and the rejection of distinctions based on gender as purely conventional.98 But his communal way of life dispenses with all distinctions based not only upon sex, but also upon birth, nationality, and property.99 This idiosyncrasy confi rms the approach as Socratic

87. D. L. II 86. 88. P. Merlan (1972) 151. W. K. C. Guthrie (1971) 171, translates “mothertaught.” 89. H. D. Rankin (1983) 235 and 237. 90. D. L. II 137 and H. D. Rankin (1983) 210. 91. G. Reale (1987) [J. Catan, ed. and trans.], 117. 92. H. D. Rankin (1983) 252, and A. A. Long (1986) 15. 93. M. N. Tod (1957) 140 has identified the names of other women philosophers in inscriptions. 94. D. L. VII 175. 95. A. C. Pearson (1973) 20. Also D. R. Dudley (1967) 99. 96. A. A. Long (1986) 110. 97. D. L. VII 33, 131. 98. P. A. Vander Waerdt (1994) 306. 99. A. A. Long (1986) 205.

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rather than Platonic. The Socratic tenet that the virtue of men and women is one and the same also seems to have grounded the Stoic view that women should philosophize100 and that matrimony, more than a community of the body, was a community of the soul.101 Echoes of this view are found even in Seneca, who, after qualifying Stoicism as manly endeavor, reminds us that this manly, heroic virtue is intended for men and women alike,102 and in Musonius Rufus, whose fragments advocate woman’s education, particularly philosophy.103

100. 101. 102. 103.

Lactantius, Divinae institutiones 3.25. L. Edelstein (1966) 73. Ibid., 10–11. M. R. Lefkowitz and M. B. Fant (1982) 75.

3

Satirical Criticism of Simplistic Views of Equality

This chapter offers another instance of what I had remarked before: Plato’s unfolding reflection on woman, like his treatment of many other issues, probably reflects current discussions taking place among intellectual Athenians at the time. Critical examination of views he disagrees with is one of the things that contributes to the engaged tone that makes his dialogues so attractive. Though the identity of many adversaries is lost to us, it must have been obvious to his contemporaries. This is particularly true of Symposium, where during the drinking party Agathon holds with his friends to celebrate his fi rst victory in tragedy, the group decides to have a competition praising Eros. It has been remarked1 that the dialogue is unique in that it is not strictly a dialogue at all, but an oratorical contest. Thus, there is no room for Plato’s still developing dialectical method; yet, and this will be crucial for its interpretation, it follows the structure of other Platonic dialogues, which begin with an initial exploration of opinions representing contemporary trends, followed by Socrates’ refutation of them, or, as here in the middle period, the articulation of Plato’s positive doctrine. The fi rst part of the dialogue is written in the spirit of the festivals, 2 which, like symposia, took place under the inspiration of Dionysius. This allows Plato to bring up several current positions and subject them to indirect criticism. Aristophanes’ comedic discourse (189a–193d), which interests us here, appears in fi fth place, just as in the festivals3 of that time an afternoon satyric play and a comedy followed the morning’s three tragedies. The comedian here competes with the sophistic rhetoric of Phaedrus and Pausanias, the scientific doctrines of Eryximachus, and the dramatic poetry of Agathon.

1. W. Jaeger (1943) II 176. 2. Cf. G. Krüger (1939) 82–92; H. H. Bacon (1959) 415–430; and D. Sider (1980) 41–56. 3. Found by A. Pickard Cambridge (1968) 64 in Aristophanes’ Birds 786ff.

Satirical Criticism of Simplistic Views of Equality 57 Interpretations of the speeches diverge. Some4 hold that Socrates sees the five initial discourses as pleasant fantasies with no foundation in truth; others, 5 that they are directed at appearances (įȩȟĮ) not reality (ਕȜȒșİȚĮ), and that the dialogue’s purpose is to honor the memory of Aristophanes, and to show that poet and philosopher are the only two critical and free spirits among those present. Be that as it may, the delightful speech of the comedian, an outstanding example of the complexity of Plato’s writing, addresses Eros by referring to several contemporary issues, including the subject of gender differentiation. There are several levels of meaning here, one of which is that of gender equality, suggesting that Plato had a defi nite purpose for bringing the issue up at this point, and underlining his awakening interest in the subject of woman. Let us review the speech.

ARISTOPHANES’ SPEECH The comic poet, who had yielded his turn to the physician Eryximachus because of an attack of hiccups (185c–e, referred to as “the most memorable case of hiccups in the history of literature”6), establishes the hilarious tone of the discourse by expressing amazement that the convulsion of sneezes Eryximachus prescribed could be necessary to restore the cosmic order of the body (189a). Dover has noted7 that since much of the humor in the Old Comedy was based on physical functions, Plato alludes to them here with this inoffensive incident. There follows what appears to be not only a parody of Eryximachus’ pretentious speech, but also of Pausanias’ self-serving justifi cation of pederasty. 8 Their pedantic and abstract tone is highlighted by contrast with the appealing freshness of Aristophanes’ storytelling, which emphasizes how little the preceding speakers deserve to be taken seriously. Aristophanes believes that to understand Eros’ power and what we owe him, we must know the origin of the human species. The text simulates an old tale: In the beginning there were three human sexes (ʌȡ૵IJȠȞ ȝ੻Ȟ Ȗ੹ȡ IJȡȓĮ ਷Ȟ IJ੹ ȖȑȞȘ IJ੹ IJ૵Ȟ ਕȞșȡȫʌȦȞ), (189d)

4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

G. Grote (1888) III 9, for instance. R. G. Bury (1909) liii and V. Tejera (1984) XX 340–341. A. Solomos (1974) 1. K. J. Dover (1980) 104. A. Nehamas (1989) XVI claims that the episode of hiccups is part of this.

58

Plato’s Dialectic on Woman

masculine, feminine, and hermaphrodite; human beings were round (ıIJȡȠȖȖȪȜȠȞ)9 and had four arms and legs, a head with two faces and four ears, two sets of reproductive organs and the other necessary parts; they walked erect, but to run they rolled, using arms and legs. By stating that “nothing in Aristophanes is more Aristophanic than this image,” B. Jowett10 underlines Plato’s skill in imitating others. The men are said to have proceeded from the sun, the women from the earth, and the hermaphrodites from the moon,11 which explains their circular form (189d–190b). Since the pride of their strength brought them to conspire against the gods, Zeus12 contrived to divide them in two, to weaken without destroying them so as to avoid losing their sacrifices, and decided that, if this punishment was not effective, human beings, reduced now to walking on two legs, would be divided again and condemned to hop on one.13 Finally, Apollo was charged with turning their heads to the side of the cut and closing the wound, gathering the skin at the navel (190b–191a). The result was that the halves desired to unite again, and spent their time clinging to each other, and so began to die of hunger and idleness until Zeus took pity on them and modified their reproductive organs to conceive in the union of male and female (and not in the earth like the cicadas, as they had done until then),14 to satisfy their desire for union so that they could return to the activities of life (191a–d). The halves of the hermaphrodites were attracted by the opposite sex, those of women by women and those of men by men. What is of interest to us here is that the evaluation of the hermaphrodites and the same-sex unions differed. On the one hand, Those among the men (IJ૵Ȟ ਕȞįȡ૵Ȟ) that are sections of that composite sex originally called hermaphrodite (ਕȞįȡȩȖȣȞȠȞ) are womanizers (ijȚȜȠȖȪȞĮȚțȑȢ), and the majority of the adulterers have come out of this class; also belonging to it are those women who are nymphomaniacs (ijȓȜĮȞįȡȠȚ) and adulteresses. (191de)

9. J. S. Morrison (1964) II 46–149, interprets the Aristophanic creatures—plausibly, for W. K. C. Guthrie (1975) IV 371 n. 2—as circular, not spherical. R. G. Bury (1909) 57 had rejected this earlier. 10. B. Jowett (1892) I 530. 11. W. R. M. Lamb (1983) 137 n. 1 fi nds the double sex of the moon mentioned in an Orphic hymn (ix. 4). K. J. Dover (1980) 115 observes it also in Philochorus (fr. 184) c. 300 B.C. 12. R. G. Bury (1909) 59, and S. Rosen (1968) 144, note the comic touch of Zeus’ being worried. 13. For A. E. Taylor (1927) 220, the source of conceiving gods threatened by his creatures is Aristophanes’ Birds, while details parody Empedocles’ doctrines. 14. Cf. Rep. 414de, and Phdr. 259bc.

Satirical Criticism of Simplistic Views of Equality 59 Yet Aristophanes asserts that it is a mistake to accuse the sections of the purely masculine being of immorality, since they are the best among the young, are inspired by courage and virility, and produce the best statesmen. They love young men, and marry and have children only because it is a duty. When the halves meet, they form friendships that last their whole lives. This section culminates with the declaration that the union is not something purely physical but of the soul.15 Thus, we are left with three original sexes, created equal and simultaneously, and a stark division: heterosexual relations are pictured as immoral (womanizers, adulterers, nymphomaniacs and adulteresses), and homosexual ones are praised as moral (courageous, virile, and best, both among the young and as statesmen). At the end (193b–d), Aristophanes pointedly denies that he is referring to anyone present, and asserts that to be happy we must reconcile ourselves with Eros and fi nd our other half, or at least one according to our nature that, in satisfying our love, would allow us to return to our original state as far as possible. (Of course, Socrates’ answer to this is in Diotima’s prophetic allusion to Aristophanes’ speech [205e], that the other half is sought only because it is good, and not because it is the other half.)

ANALYSIS OF THE TEXT Aristophanes’ myth is almost certainly attributable to Plato not as an expression of his position (which clearly is found later in Socrates’ account of Diotima’s revelations) but only as his invention, since it does not seem to have any historical precedent; its “plot” does not resemble any extant Aristophanic (or any other) comedy.16 Possibly its content has something to do with Plato’s thinking that comedy, fairy tales, and fables reflected the same attitudes and popular values, since the theme characterizes unsophisticated, subliterate folklore more than comedy per se. Nevertheless, in spite of the eccentricity of the story, antecedents have been reported17 in natural philosophy (the original androgynous beings in Empedocles) and in mythology (the Orphic god Eros-Phanes and some gods in oriental mythologies are bisexual). In addition, the cult of Hermaphroditus (whose statues, according to R. G. Bury,18 are mentioned by Theophrastus) was already known in Athens. He also mentions that the notion of a double and androgynous being is found in the Talmud, and

15. 191d–192d. On Plato’s role of body and soul in love, see L. Strauss (1972) 174. 16. K. J. Dover (1980) 113, and (1966) 45. 17. W. K. C. Guthrie (1975) IV 384, and (1965) II 203–205, where he cites Empedocles fr. 61. 18. R. G. Bury (1909) 57.

60

Plato’s Dialectic on Woman

cites Eusebius19 as claiming that Plato took the idea from Moses. I have not found, however, any antecedent for the three double sexes, which constitute the most characteristic trait of the myth and have the most potential for comic exploitation;20 they seem to be entirely a Platonic invention. We must not forget that Aristophanes’ discourse belongs to the fi rst part of Plato’s work, which he customarily uses to describe current opinions, and which in this case will be contrasted afterwards not only with Socrates’ thinking, sharing Diotima’s revelations about the ascent of the soul from the beauty of bodies to Beauty itself, but with his conduct also, 21 as portrayed by the encomium of intoxicated Alcibiades at the end. 22 Because of this, it has been noted 23 that the structure, characters, and arguments of the Symposium’s early speeches contribute to revealing their transformation in Diotima’s discourse. 24 It seems most reasonable, then, to reject two kinds of interpretations: fi rst, taking Aristophanes’ myth as expressing Plato’s position, as A. Dickason and E. Cantarella do,25 and second, reducing the speech to dramatic and humorous entertainment, empty of theoretical meaning, à la A. E. Taylor.26 As to the first, if we accept what was said above, that the speech follows Plato’s customary pattern in his dialogues, then it doubtless offers views Socrates will transcend or refute. In this case, Plato is using the poet’s satirical gift to express his own caricaturing of trends of thought argued in the city, highlighting theses opposed to his views which we will see at length in subsequent chapters.27 As to the second, the speech cannot be intellectually empty not only because it would be out of character for Plato to write empty rhetoric (his rational contribution is clearly not limited to the dialogue’s doctrinal heart in Diotima’s speech) but also because the speaker is Aristophanes, whose hilarious imagery always concealed a serious purpose; thus, it would be false also to the comic’s character if this speech were simple nonsense. Plato “no da puntada sin nudo,”28 as we Argentines say.

19. 20. 21. 22.

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

Pr. Evang. XII 12; cited by R. G. Bury (1909) 57. W. K. C. Guthrie (1975) IV 384 confi rms this. Noted by G. Grote (1888) III 8. The last section of Leonard Bernstein’s Serenade after Plato’s Symposium strongly suggests that his undergraduate reading of Symposium missed the fi nal episode that follows the entrance of drunken Alcibiades and the flute girl, because, inconsistently with the text, the music turns jazzy and rollicking at the end. K. Corrigan and E. Glazov-Corrigan (2006) 117–129. For suggested sources on Diotima, see H. L Smith and B. A. Carroll (2000) 14, which also includes my 1996 contribution. Cf. A. Dickason (1973) 46ff. and E. Cantarella (1992) 58ff. The position of A. E. Taylor (1927) 219. See also Rep. 430b and Laws 835d–841e. Plato never makes a stitch without tying it off.

Satirical Criticism of Simplistic Views of Equality 61 Actually, as has been remarked, 29 in choosing Aristophanes, Plato the dramatist undertook a very difficult task: that of re-creating the fi gure of the poet in all his complexity, depth, and comic genius. Scholars have recognized Plato’s fl air for imitating the writing style, characteristic expressions, idiosyncrasies and even regional speech of different people, to the point of even questioning whether or not he was quoting somebody else verbatim. 30 Plato has even been called “a master parodist.”31 A. Solomos points out 32 that Plato uses here the Attic speech of Aristophanic comedies; and that this is the only description of Aristophanesthe-man that has reached us “absolutely true to Aristophanes the poet, as we know him from his plays.” And this portrayal includes not only his comic gift of expression but also the principles that give that expression depth and foundation. Reviewing some of his positions will make this clear.

ARISTOPHANES’ CONVICTIONS It has been recognized that Aristophanes conceived the poet as teacher;33 had moral and political views far from revolutionary, and wrote tirelessly to promote them. L. Edmunds34 describes his political ideal as “that of the city at peace, the happy city, in which privacy, farming, devotion to the family, and piety, especially in the form of public feasting and festivals, are the way of life.”35 His plays are characterized36 as showing “instinct with deep religious feeling” and the idea that “man should act in harmony with the natural order.” Many37 believe that the poet is greatly concerned with the city and its requirements. I have found only one critic38 arguing against the thesis of Aristophanes’ traditional values. As to the medium used, the story is an instance of Plato’s myths of creation, used in this case to introduce contemporary trends into the discussion.39 This particular outrageously incongruous myth re-creates the comic

29. A. Solomos (1974) 1–2. 30. For instance, Lysias’ speech in Phaedrus, whose authenticity is still in question. See L. G. Fernandez (1970) XXXI n. 7; and W. K. C. Guthrie (1975) IV 433. 31. D. Wender (1973) 82. 32. A. Solomos (1974) 245c. 33. Ran. 1054–1056. 34. L. Edmunds (1987) 66. 35. Ran. 1054–1056. 36. K. McLeish (1980) 58–59. 37. L. Strauss (1980) 311–312. For Strauss’ approach, see Chapter 2, p. 51 n. 65. 38. A. W. Gomme (1938) and (1962) 70–91. 39. On P. Friedländer’s (1958) I. IX, classification of Platonic myths, it occupies the fi rst level, because it precedes conceptual discourse as non-Socratic and will be shown to be illusory.

62 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman muse of the poet where laughter is the access to insight and understanding, and the catharsis proper to comedy creates a feeling of good temper and relaxation. K. J. Reckford40 identifies three steps in Aristophanes’ comic strategy: relaxation, recovery, and recognition. His interpretation41 understands comic catharsis as “clarification through release.” The tone is in contrast with the abstract and pretentious speeches that preceded it, recovering the empathy and aesthetic distance needed to recognize the depth of his message. Probably only his contemporaries could have fully appreciated Plato’s artistry in re-creating Aristophanes’ wit. His imitation pays tribute to the work of the comedian, which succeeded in infusing transcendent value into the traditional rude burlesque farce by giving it ingenious symbolism. The re-creation achieves Aristophanes’ synergy of grotesque fantasy and vigorous realism which converted comedy into an instrument of cultural criticism. Reckford42 characterizes the myth as “a marvelous tribute from one artist to another,” listing the techniques that Plato borrows from the comedian as “lampooning of individuals and types; parody of literary genres; plays on words; buffoonery; mock didacticism; parodic use of scientific, technical, and conceptual language; straight-face telling of nonsense; wild fantasy; ridiculous explanations of things; irreverence toward the gods; comic moralizing; mixture of colloquial and “high” language; funny images and comparisons; sexual humor; topical reference; anachronism; and delight in bodily functions and circular motion.”

LEVELS OF COMPLEXITY Plato’s purpose in writing Aristophanes’ speech is also quite complex, with several levels of meaning. This may have encouraged, without justification, the unlikely thesis43 that although Aristophanes does not say that Eros is just, “there is no doubt” that the total purpose of the discourse is the defense of justice and political peace. What there is actually no doubt about is that the obvious message of the allegory, unforgettable for readers, is Aristophanes’ “existential anthropology,”44 describing love as the desire for completion in what is incomplete by recovering an original state (192e–193a). This is seen45 as clearing the air “of much cloudy abstraction and pretense.” It is a serious element, also considered 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45.

K. J. Reckford (1987) 10–13. Like C. L. Barber (1963) 8. K. J. Reckford (1987) 69 and 71. S. Rosen (1968) 121 n. 5. P. Friedländer (1964) II 18. K. J. Reckford (1987) 71.

Satirical Criticism of Simplistic Views of Equality 63 by many46 as prefiguring Socrates’ speech by anticipating in comic form Diotima’s search for the Good. This reading, however, does not account for other comic elements in the story which, though secondary, probably contain Plato’s comments on current events. Neither the peculiar creation of the three sexes nor the moral censure of heterosexuals and encomium of homosexuals are necessary to reveal the incompleteness noted above. Hence, the outrageous description doubtless refers to other current issues and people holding them, as new targets of Plato’s sharp satirical wit. This is worth an investigation. Athenians did not consider Aristophanes a reformer, and thus saw his exploiting woman’s situation as merely comic. N. D. Smith47 considers “the topsy-turvy world of Aristophanic comedy” an exception to the absence of sexual egalitarianism in the literature of Plato’s time, making its appearance more likely to reflect “a cultural bias against it than in its favor.” In his Ecclesiazusae the idea of “granting [women] political power is laughable.” Neither Ecclesiazusae nor Lysistrata promotes female emancipation. In the former, the Assembly’s decision favoring women in their political conspiracy does not present them as better, but is justified as the only thing not yet tried;48 they are portrayed49 as still responsible for manufacturing clothing, cooking, and managing material goods in their planned communism, whose purpose, as we are reminded, 50 is the good of the city. As to Lysistrata, S. B. Pomeroy51 points out that men prefer heterosexual relationships, and women do not consider homoeroticism. Lysistrata’s objective is peace based on stable marriages, a required presupposition for the plot to work. None of the women rebels against her traditional role. They only want peace to go back to their homes and their customary lives with their husbands.52 In addition, though Thesmophoriazusae exploits women for comic purposes, their roles remain the same as those Athenian women had. Turning to Aristophanes’ views on homoeroticism, the effeminate Agathon in Thesmophoriazusae’s Prologue is said to be “just the type whom Aristophanes always loves to mock,”53 and the homosexuals’ political success in Clouds54 is presented as the triumph of the Unjust Argument using terms Guthrie brands55 as not complimentary. It has also been observed56

46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56.

E.g., C. Salman (1990–1991) 240–247. N. D. Smith (1983) 469. R. G. Ussher (1973) 139, n. to 456. H. P. Foley (1982) 77 and 14. R. M. Harriott (1986) 150–156. S. B. Pomeroy (1975) 113–114. J. Henderson (1987) xxxii. F. I. Zeitlin (1981) 178. Clouds 1089–1092. W. K. C. Guthrie VI. S. Rosen (1968) 148 n. 70.

64 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman that Plato’s Aristophanes uses ਕȞȒȡ and ȖȣȞȒ for the union of men and women, while for the one between men he uses ਙȡȡȘȞ, ਙȡȡİȞȚ to suggest the humanness of the fi rst and the animality of the second. The description of the old-fashioned Just Argument in the Clouds is observed to turn poetic, “and we feel something of Aristophanes’ own nostalgia here,”57 contrasting with the Unjust Argument’s funny and self-confi dent immoralism. It can be said that Aristophanes is “by most standards quite orthodox in matters sexual.”58 This underlines his work as comedies of ideas. But in Symposium, Plato portrays him as propounding gender differences and sexual moral views diametrically opposed to those not only he but Plato himself were known to hold. Reckford 59 notes that “at least one joke, on homosexual politicians, is lifted directly from the Knights or Clouds.” Thus, Plato’s uproarious imitation probably furnished a special humor for his contemporaries when they saw Aristophanes defending what he was known to lampoon in his plays. Plato acknowledges this when his Aristophanes tells Eryximachus not to worry about his saying something funny, since that is proper to his Muse, but that what he is really afraid of is being utterly ridiculous (țĮIJĮȖȑȜĮıIJĮ). In view of this, if we look at Symposium, not only are both Aristophanes’ and Plato’s views stood on their heads, but the genesis of woman, the topic which is the point of this study, also differs radically from the customary Greek view. She appears not as derived from man, but created directly and at the same time as man by the gods. A. Dickason’s study60 concludes that she is, like man, a fully developed being, as complete as man, neither inferior nor secondary. M. Canto61 goes even further, saying that Symposium presents mythologically, from an archaic time, the origin of the political necessity of the female body. Still, it seems that Plato is working on two levels here, 62 because the fiction he imagines expresses a conception he disagrees with. The equal creation of the sexes here contradicts, as will be seen more clearly in Chapter 6, the myth in Timaeus which derives woman from the souls of cowardly men.63 Her inferiority there, though it will require qualification, is also asserted repeatedly (as physical and moral weakness), both in Republic 64 and in Laws. 65

57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65.

K. J. Reckford (1987) 426. D. Parker (1964) n. to p. 1. K. J. Reckford (1987) 71. A. Dickason (1973) 48. M. Canto (1986) 342 and (1994) 52. L. Robin (1968) 142. Tim. 42b and 90e. For the function of this myth, see Chapter 6, pp. 143f. Rep. 455cd and e, 456a, and 457b. Laws 781a and b, 917a, and 944de.

Satirical Criticism of Simplistic Views of Equality 65 As to sexual morality, although in theory the myth seems to affirm that the three classes of unions are equally natural, Plato’s Aristophanes, as I mentioned, praises with farcical exaggeration the qualities of the unions between men (a defense of lesbianism—a topic outside men’s interests—is absent),66 while pointedly using negatively charged moral terms as examples of heterosexual unions—something that, as we also saw, goes directly counter to the comic poet’s views and particularly Plato’s, who in Laws explicitly condemns homosexual practice (636c). All of this makes clear that Plato’s satire has two functions. His myth, a kind of reductio ad absurdum, seems to be ridiculing certain positions by making equally natural the simultaneous and equal creation of three sexes and of the three sexual inclinations.67 Both theses—on sexual equality and sexual orientation—are presented by Aristophanes at the same time and by means of the same image, conflating the ontological question of the origin of woman and the question of sexual morality. We may miss some of the allusions to people and events of the time, but it is still reasonable to assume that Plato is using this strategy to lampoon what he sees as two simplistic or self-interested contemporary trends. As some scholars68 suggest, Aristophanes’ immediate targets of criticism probably are the previous speakers’ defenses of homosexuality, with Pausanias as the main butt of his jokes. But the target of his satire on sex equality, “providing woman with a genetic and biological status equal to that of men,” and “a status never disputed as such elsewhere in the dialogue,” has, according to N. D. Smith,69 remained unidentified. It is possible that the reason for this could easily be that Plato is depicting, in order to ridicule, a position that opposes his own. Since Aristophanes’ central issue in his plays is neither woman nor her defense, making him assume the absolute equality of the sexes must have seemed obviously comic to contemporary Athenian men, who considered the inferiority of woman as a class a self-evident fact, and the theories of some Socratics questioning her current role as outrageous. However, I would like to suggest that, given the cultural ferment on the woman question manifested in Socratic literature (as seen in the previous chapter), it is not improbable that the most likely targets for Plato’s criticism here are particular members of the Socratic school and their interpretation of Socrates’ concern about the status of woman.70 The radical tone of some of their extant fragments suggests that many adhered to the absolute equality of the two genders. Therefore, it is likely that Plato used the opportunity 66. G. Clark (1989) 23 observes that “female homosexuality is scarcely mentioned (even in Aristophanes) until Lucian’s dialogues in the second century A. D.” 67. A. Nehamas (1989) XIV and XVII. 68. W. K. C. Guthrie (1975) IV 384; K. J. Dover (1966) 45. 69. N. D. Smith (1983) 468. 70. See Chapter 2, pp. 43ff.

66 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman to caricature their position and to distance himself from them by ridiculing what he considered a lack of discernment in interpreting, in an absolute sense, Socrates’ view on gender equality. This is the aspect relevant to our study, providing an interpretation that accounts for Plato’s intention.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF ARISTOPHANES’ SPEECH Thus, I submit that, in Aristophanes’ speech, Plato has not only achieved a masterful re-creation of the comic and imaginative exuberance as well as extravagant humor of the Athenian poet, an “incomparable morsel of high and delicious comedy,” as has been stated,71 but, at the same time, made fun of an error in the interpretation of Socrates’ conception of woman. It is important to remember that the place of Aristophanes’ entry in the fi rst part of the work indicates, as was concluded earlier when referring to the role of introductory speeches, that Plato is presenting the positions that he is going to refute. Here the comedian caricatures two extreme positions: one found in the previous speeches, the other in some contemporary Socratics. Plato’s theory of woman is going to sharpen Socrates’ doctrine of gender equality, overcoming the difficulties that he attacks in Symposium. His position will become more complex, far from what we find in the fragments of the Socratic schools. Its positive development, found in passages of Republic, Timaeus and Laws, presupposes the Platonic dualism of body and soul, and requires the distinction between the essential equality of souls of both men and women and the genders’ existential status, where women exist in an inferior but surmountable condition. He is preparing its future development here by revealing the distance between his view of woman and the extreme position of some Socratics. This is, I believe, one of the functions of Aristophanes’ satirization. Plato will then be free to work on his own reflection, and to argue for the compatibility between woman’s inferiority and her capacity to enter all activities in the life of the city. C. G. Allen’s insight is sound when she says72 that there is no inconsistency in Plato on this issue. The matter will be expanded upon in the chapters to follow. Thus, using familiar categories loosely, we might say that, if the text about woman’s virtue in Meno constitutes the Socratic thesis, Plato has presented the antithesis or its negation in the Aristophanic parody of a simplistic interpretation, in preparation for the theory that is going to present, in Republic, the synthesis that overcomes the difficulty (the negation of the negation). If this interpretation of Aristophanes’ speech seems novel, it arose as what appears the most sensible answer to what Plato could have intended

71. L. Robin (1968) 21. 72. C. G. Allen (1975) 135–137.

Satirical Criticism of Simplistic Views of Equality 67 with his imitation of Aristophanes, besides merely paying tribute to his personality and comic gifts. How else to account for the particularly outrageous characteristics of the myth, given that Plato would not have wanted to put into the mouth of Aristophanes humor empty of deeper meaning? Modern readers might have difficulty in realizing the satirical force of the way Plato introduces woman, since her equal creation appears conventional to them. Not so for Plato’s contemporary Athenians, whose view of woman makes them see this as extreme. Thus Plato needed to make clear that he disagreed with the extreme position shared by some Socratic writers, to make sure that his later theory of woman would not be confused with it. As for Plato’s position toward Aristophanes, the anecdotical traditions coincide on Plato’s respect for the comedian: among them, that Plato recommended Aristophanes’ plays to Dionysios of Syracuse when he showed interest in fi nding out about the Athenian form of government;73 that Aristophanes’ plays were found at Plato’s bedside when he died, and the epigram attributed to him: “When the Graces sought to have a shrine that would never fall down, they found the soul of Aristophanes.”74 Still, although the speech shows abundantly Plato’s profound respect for the work of Aristophanes and his appreciation of him, this coincides, as has been observed,75 with hints of an indirect yet quite conclusive assertion of the superiority of the philosophical over the poetical mind, particularly in the soaring discourse of Diotima, the praise of Socrates by Alcibiades, and the end where, while Aristophanes snores, Socrates, his mind fully alert, starts the day as usual.

CONCLUSION In trying to answer the question about Plato’s purpose in what he has Aristophanes say about women here, I considered the following four steps: 1. As a classic writer, every statement Plato makes has a reason. The creation of woman could not be just a pleasant fantasy reduced to dramatic and humorous entertainment and without purpose, empty of theoretical meaning. Plato never wrote empty rhetoric. 2. Nor could Plato’s depiction of Aristophanes be simple nonsense, because the latter’s hilarious imagery always concealed a serious purpose. The

73. R. G. Ussher (1979) 1 with n. 10; and also A. S. Riginos (1976) 176. 74. Olympiodorus, In Platonis Alcibiadem I, 2.65–75, cited by Riginos (1976) 176–177. 75. A. Solomos (1974) 247.

68

Plato’s Dialectic on Woman introduction of woman, then, had to display not only his satirical gift, but also the social ill that he was decrying by means of it. 3. Consistent with the purpose of the speeches of the fi rst part of Plato’s dialogues, the satire here does not express his own position, but offers views or contemporary trends that Socrates will transcend or refute. 4. Therefore, the targets of Plato’s satire on sex equality (whose satirical force was perceived by Athenians, since for them the equal creation of woman was an outlandish view) are most likely some members of the Socratic school who, if we consider the radical tone of some of their extant fragments, had introduced extreme positions on the absolute equality of the two genders. By making fun of their version of Socrates’ conception of woman, Plato’s satire reveals the distance between his view of woman and the extreme position of some Socratics. This is the main function of Aristophanes’ satirization, which, given what we said in the previous chapter, is consistent with what will develop as Plato’s position of basic equality of the genders, while, as we will see, recognizing differences in individual talents.

4

The Three Waves in the Analogy between City and Soul

Students of Republic have been puzzled by the sudden appearance of woman in Book 5, interrupting the logical progression of Socrates’ argument to discover integrity (justice) by examining the analogy between the State and the individual, at the point where he is going to begin examining unjust States and the corresponding unjust men.1 This, however, is only the initial problem in a series of challenges posed by this section of the text. Plato devotes Books 5 to 7 to considering not only woman’s social role, but also the abolition of the family and the rule of philosophers, with a detailed elaboration of their characteristics as well as a program for their education—things that many see as unconnected with the aim of the work and foreign to the analogy between the city and the individual. In fact, it has been confidently stated, 2 in starting a reflection on Book 5, that its topics “do not belong to the established analogy”—though in fact, as I will try to show, that is precisely what they are about. Before entering into the matter, the reader should be forewarned against understanding įȚțĮȚȠıȪȞȘ (traditionally translated as “justice”) in the sense of modern distributive or commutative justice, as, for example, no less than G. Vlastos seems to do3 when he sees a change in Plato’s notion of justice from Republic (“functional reciprocity”) to Laws (“proportional equality”), or when M. S. Kochin4 applies the notion to explain what he sees as woman’s inferior honor and status in Laws. The Greek term is much more complex. The meaning Plato himself gives, as he applies the term įȚțĮȚȠıȪȞȘ in discussing women Guardians (453b), is the inner harmony of the soul, or the integrity that comes from being true to one’s own reality. Among those aware of the difference from “social justice” (i.e., “commutative justice”), other translations are offered

1. Depending on context, in addition to “man,” the terms “person,” “soul,” and “individual” are used to mean “human being.” 2. Torsten J. Andersson (1971) 121. 3. G. Vlastos (1977) 23, (1978) 178. 4. M. S. Kochin (2002) 101.

70 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman such as “righteousness,”5 “morality,”6 and “honesty.”7 I prefer “integrity”; but to avoid confusing those accustomed to the traditional old translation, “justice” will be added in parentheses each time.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INVESTIGATION Turning to the text, the reader perceives Book 5 as a fresh start, with a new impulse driving its development. Commentators have recognized this, one8 calling it Plato’s “afterthought,” while another9 claims that “the interruption at the beginning of Book 5 signals the inadequacy of this first stage,” without giving a satisfactory explanation of just what is “inadequate.” Recent scholarly literature frequently approaches the two first “waves” of Republic 5 by isolating them from the theme and structure of the Republic as a whole.10 A. Bloom,11 in fact, calls Book 5 “comedy in competition with Aristophanes,” and casts doubt on the seriousness of what it proposes.12 Others, such as M. S. Kochin,13 hold (without substantiation) the opposite, stating that “the shocking and striking arguments of Republic 5 are in fact well integrated into its general argument” (but how?) and “have a crucial place” (what place?). But only R. L. Nettleship14 wonders about how subjects as different as woman and the family on the one hand and the extended treatment of the philosopher-king (covering Books 6 and 7) on the other are conjoined as an apparent unit of three waves of difficulty in Book 5. Puzzlement about these central books is all but universal. To give just a few brief examples, L. Campbell’s perplexity is evident when he attributes the key to the interruption between Books 4 and 8 “to Plato’s concealment of his art”;15 J. Adam16 offers the suggestion that Books 5–7 complete the description of the city and the perfect human being. One is again tempted to ask, “But how?” We also fi nd the two fi rst waves, called an appendix to Books 2–4, connected to the third wave only formally;17 or that Books 5–7

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

E. Urwick (1920) 45–49. R. Waterfield (1993) XII. G. A. Blair (1998) VIff. B. Bosanquet (1895) 174. D. Roochnik (2003) 4. M. S. Kochin (2002) 37. A. Bloom (1968) 381. Also A. W. Saxonhouse (1976) 195, 202f., 211 and (1994) 67, 75, and 84. But he notes (1968) 379 that its introductory lines appear similar in structure to the fi rst pages of Book I. M. S. Kochin (2002) 38. R. L. Nettleship (1897) 166. L. Campbell (1894) II 4. J. Adam (1902) 274. F. M. Cornford (1961) 144.

The Three Waves in the Analogy between City and Soul 71 embody just order, and relate to preceding books as substance to form;18 or that the three waves are the “keystone of the arch in the complete structure,” again without explaining how.19 There are even interpretations of the fi rst two waves as seeking to distract the reader to prepare for the introduction of the philosopher-king. 20 Some are also concerned about the reasons for the pause in the argument that Plato has been developing up to Book 4. W. Lutoslawski 21 considers the interruption a rhetorical artifice to attract attention to the subject, though it could have been inserted later, but insists that Books 5–7 belong to the whole (again, in what way?). Several interpretations consider Books 5–7 a later interpolation, 22 and the proposal of women Guardians even provokes the exclamation: “What in the world would lead him to say such an outrageous thing?”23 Indeed, what in the world would lead him to say such an outrageous thing? We must look carefully at the break between Books 4 and 5 to find the key to the structure of Book 5. To those particularly interested in understanding Plato’s conception about woman as such, as well as its consistency, the answer becomes necessary and fundamental, because uncovering Plato’s reason for his peculiar introduction of the topic cannot but help in accounting for the characteristics of the treatment of woman at this point.

A NEW APPROACH The following reading attempts to show how Books 5–7’s three waves of difficulty contribute to the structural continuity of the work, and also, by proposing a guiding motive of Plato’s reflection, to reveal him not to be inconsistent. This will require several steps: 1) A brief review of Books 1–4, as groundwork of Plato’s reflection. 2) The reason behind the interruption, and why it led to Book 5. 3) Self-examination as a Platonic trait. 4) An adequate method for the investigation. 5) How to discover the subtext. 6) Identifying the subtext. 7) Textual verification. 8) Conclusion. The hope is that uncovering the synthesis of logic and dramatic expression operating here will provide a deeper understanding of how Plato thinks. I have found that one of the difficulties in several interpretations has been the tendency to approach the text partially, considering it either a logical exercise or a dramatic work, making Plato either a

18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

E. Voegelin (1966) 48. P. Shorey (1933) 225. W. Jaeger (1944) 2: 242–246d and P. Friedlander (1969) 3.103. W. Lutoslawski (1905) 290f. A. Krohn in 1876, E. Pfleiderer in 1888, and G. Windelband in 1900. See B. Jowett and L. Campbell’s (1894) II 4 survey. 23. N. D. Smith (1980) 5.

72 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman mathematical mind or a romantic following his impulses. I think it is possible to account for both aspects, and reveal how their interaction is essential in Platonic thought. I should point out here that the result may also be a bit difficult to follow for contemporary readers not familiar with the procedures of classical logic, but going into it is necessary to explain the appearance of woman in Republic 5 and the argument of the fi rst wave, since the steps Plato takes there only make sense by following his logic. Let us, then, begin by reviewing Republic’s initial books, to identify Plato’s reflection culminating in Book 5.

1

THE GROUNDWORK FOR PLATO’S REFLECTION

At the end of his discussion with Thrasymachus (354a), Socrates had concluded that the group could not say whether a life of integrity (justice) is more advantageous than its opposite before knowing what it is (354c). In order to do this he fi rst asserts that there is an analogy between the State or city24 and the soul, 25 which implies that if they can fi nd integrity in the State (368d), they could discover the corresponding virtue in the soul. Once this is done, it forms the fi rst and by far the longest of three arguments to prove integrity’s (justice’s) superiority over its lack (injustice), by showing how the citizens of the just city (a city of integrity) are happier than those in corrupt ones and therefore, by analogy, the just person (i.e., one whose soul has integrity) will be happier than the one who is not. 26 It is in this argument that we fi nd material relevant to woman. In order to fi nd integrity (justice) in the State, Plato needs to construct a hypothetical ideal city, and because this is going to provide the context for his discussion on woman, a brief summary of its development follows: Individual needs require social life; the city’s organizing principle is the division of labor (369bff.) requiring specialization based on differences in nature (talent). The rudimentary city comprises four or five men (ਕȞįȡ૵Ȟ: male humans); but, to indulge Glaucon, Socrates describes the luxurious city

24. In ancient Greece, ʌȩȜȚȢ meant the political unit—city, State, or city-State. 25. Rep., 368c–580c. Plato’s use of analogy contributes to the attractiveness of Republic. It allows incorporating intuition into induction. R. Robinson (1980) 207 characterizes it as an argument from single case to single case, seeing into one thing by an insight from another. Working from an individual case, it refers implicitly to a universal. F. S. Halliwell (1993) 160 n. to Rep. 459a2–3 distinguishes clarificatory (Socratic) from persuasive (Platonic) analogy. 26. The second argument concerns the man of integrity (justice), who, after experiencing all pleasures, still prefers integrity (justice) (580c-583b); the third proves that since inferior pleasures include pain, they are not true pleasures (583b-588a).

The Three Waves in the Analogy between City and Soul 73 (372dff.), purified by specialization and education. When a need for expansion makes war necessary, the military class appears, whose members must be courageous and philosophic, by analogy with watchdogs that use their knowledge to behave gently to friends and harshly to enemies (374aff.). Military specialization requires training and a theory of education (376dff.) which seeks harmony in the soul, avoiding effeminacy and brutality by means of music (humanities) and gymnastics. In this class, Governors or Rulers are incorruptible Guardians (412cff.); the rest are Auxiliaries. A myth of metals (415aff.) explains three classes of men formed by mother earth: Rulers are made of gold, Auxiliaries of silver, and Workers (farmers and craftsmen) of iron and bronze. The governors determine a child’s class by considering his talent, and thus provide for his happiness. 27 The two leadership classes lack possessions, share room and board, and receive their sustenance as salary (416dff.); their only prescription is education and rearing, making them able to understand restrictions such as why the acquisition 28 of wives and children should, as far as possible, be made to follow the adage that things of friends are common. (423e–424a) Socrates’ description of the city is complete. He needs now to look for integrity (justice) in it, since the city—as a theoretical ideal—is good and must contain the four cardinal virtues (427eff.); integrity (justice) will be the one left after the others are found. M. F. Burnyeat 29 points out here that the ideal city does not belong to the world of Forms as justice does, for instance, but exists only where it is constructed, in Socrates’ and his interlocutors’ imagination and also in that of those reading Republic. Socrates notes that a city’s characteristics arise from the features of individuals in the particular State (435eff.), which makes Thrace an aggressive society, Athens a rational one, and Phoenicia one loving money and following appetite, based on the character of their respective citizens. He then proceeds to show that his ideal city is wise because of the Rulers’ wisdom (428eff.), courageous because of the Auxiliaries’ bravery (429bff.), and selfcontrolled because the three classes are of one mind as to who ought to rule

27. 420bff. For F. S. Halliwell (1993) 14, individual satisfaction is not provided for and is contrary to the collectivistic spirit of Republic. He disregards the fact that for Plato, full dedication to the community, where each one works according to his proper talent, results in the greatest happiness, because as the well-being of the city increases, life becomes more satisfying. Satisfaction (happiness) appears in context, not as a primary goal. 28. The word here (țIJોıȚȞ), while it sometimes means “possession” in the sense of “property,” is broader, meaning “getting” or “acquisition,” without the connotation of ownership. Even nowadays, men acquire wives, but there is no sense that men “own” them. 29. M. F. Burnyeat (1992) 176.

74 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman (430eff.). He then fi nds integrity (justice) also in the three classes, defi ning it as “each performing his own task and having no other occupation (432bff.).” That is, the city has integrity (is just) when this occurs, as each citizen has it when he behaves analogously. This enables him to distinguish three “parts” in the soul: rational, aggressive, and appetitive (436bff.), with their proper virtues (441cff.), corresponding to the classes of the city: the ruler is the city’s “rational” aspect, the Guardians and Auxiliaries (the defense force) the “aggressive,” and the workers the “appetitive.” When each class does what is proper to it, the city has integrity (justice), resulting in harmony. Analogously, when each part of the individual’s soul performs its proper function, his soul has harmony within it (444eff.). The integrity (justice) of the individual soul seems therefore to be like that of the city. This analogy is crucial, and should be kept in mind; it forms the background for the following, enabling us to solve the problem.

2

THE INTERRUPTION

At the end of Book 4, after mentioning aristocracy or monarchy as the only good forms of government, Socrates is planning to consider the four degenerate forms of society to show that they cause unhappiness to the citizens, and to compare them to the unhappiness of their human counterparts, and thus establish that it is advantageous to act with integrity (justice) even if nobody knows that one is doing so (445ab). But an interruption occurs here when the youngsters introduce an objection—which then results in the central books of Republic. This, interestingly, parallels Phaedo, which is also split in the middle (84c) by an objection raised against Socrates’ argument on the immortality of the soul, which he then answers with a more profound one. The dynamic that seems to drive Plato’s reflection there, and what all his dialogues show pellucidly, is that he is one of those rare human beings for whom logic—and an honest search for truth—has priority. The dramatic form of each of his dialogues hides a logic of iron, and so we must recognize the value of both. Because of this, what seems to explain the pause between Books 4 and 5 is that Plato is examining whether there were any difficulties he has overlooked in developing his argument in Book 4. The objection of the youngsters is only a dramatic way to introduce this. And there is a hint that what Plato was concerned with was precisely the validity of the analogy between the city and the soul. Socrates says: “Let us not take anything,” I said, “as definitely settled; but if we have applied this feature (İੇįȠȢ) to each and every human being, and have agreed that also in this case it is integrity (justice), only then we can accept the definition. . . . Otherwise, we must look for something else.” (434d)

The Three Waves in the Analogy between City and Soul 75 And, significantly, he adds: If something else appears in the individual, we will apply it to the city to evaluate it there, and perhaps by looking at them side by side and rubbing them together like fi re-sticks, we may make integrity (justice) burst into flame, and once visible we may evaluate it in ourselves. (italics mine) (434e)

3

SELF-EXAMINATION AS A PLATONIC TRAIT

This reveals a telling, not to say crucial, point. Plato has been using his analogy so far by studying characteristics of the city and applying them to the soul. For instance, he examines the three “parts” of the soul by noting the three classes of the city. So far, then, the analogy has seemed to work. But what he says here is that if the city is like the soul, then the soul is like the city, and so one should also be able to study the individual to discover traits that must exist in the city. But when one tries to do this, one encounters several difficulties. The soul does not have two parts corresponding to the two sexes with their separate roles; the aggressive aspect of the good individual’s soul is totally concerned with the good of the whole person and not its own good, while the Guardians have private families to look after; and in the individual, reason reigns, while in the city, the practical people, not philosophers, are considered the “best” rulers. There are two possibilities here: the apparent differences might be due (1) to the fact that present-day cities are really defective examples of what a city really ought to be by nature, or (2) to the fact that the city is not really analogous to the soul. In this latter case, it is a waste of time to try to examine the virtues of the city to fi nd out what the virtues of the individual should be. The whole enterprise of Republic would then be ruined. Plato, then, seems here to be looking for possible objections, a Platonic characteristic which we find, for example, fully displayed in Parmenides, when he courageously objects to aspects of the theory of Ideas, the very heart of his philosophy. In Republic, what we find is that the objection of Adeimantus against Socrates’ unsatisfactory mention of the community of wives suddenly appears to Socrates as a “swarm” (450ab), the equivalent of “stirring up a hornet’s nest.” Thus, just as with Phaedo, it is most likely that Socrates’ pause here conceals the fact that Plato had been examining in a new way the analogy between the city and the soul, and found a serious, and possibly fatal, flaw in it. For those who wonder why Plato would structure his dialogues in this way, “with a series of layers and fresh starts,”30 the answer is that, since

30. F. S. Halliwell (1993) 135 n. to Rep. 450a.

76 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman Plato was skilled in rhetoric, 31 the structure of both Republic and Phaedo in fact follows the pattern of a good speech: exordium, statement of the issue, proof, objections, answers to objections, and exhortation. This is another indication that the “interruption,” comprising Books 5 to 7, is actually devoted to identifying and answering objections against his fi rst argument, which holds that it is valid to argue from the nature of the State and its virtues to the nature and virtues of the individual soul.

4

AN ADEQUATE METHOD FOR THE INVESTIGATION

Before entering into the matter, it is necessary to introduce a method adequate to identifying what these presumed objections might be. Konstantin Stanislavski revolutionized acting technique by showing that in theater, the author’s lines are dead until an actor fi nds and brings out, using expressive resources, the inner life that gives them meaning. This chain of purposeful intonations and actions reveals the unity of the play and gradually discloses the underlying fundamental purpose the author had while writing (the super-objective); this is the “subtext” or meaning of the actors’ words (i.e., why the next sentence follows the one being spoken). “Spectators come to the theater to hear the subtext,” he said; “they can read the text at home.” In other words, a good performance illuminates the action by showing dramatically its hidden intent and motivation—its implicit structure. Failing to do this, the proceedings become fragmentary and uncoordinated, 32 as if they were broken pieces from an inspiring statue. In a word, it is the actor’s task to reveal what glues the parts into a meaningful whole. This insight is also true in other dramatic works of art, 33 especially in Plato, where the text mirrors the dialogue of the soul with itself. Just as the director brings out the meaning of the play through the performance, the mission of the Platonic interpreter is to provide the reader with the key to the meaning of the work: the chain of elements which expresses its subtext, particularly in relation to Plato’s logic, because the (often hidden) logical structure of his works is the governing principle in his writing, and therefore what an examination of the subtext must reveal. That is why the interpretation of a Platonic text presupposes a seasoned understanding of his thought, a reason why its lack makes Republic 5 appears fl at in some analyses.

31. For Socrates’ criticism of the sophists’ use of rhetoric, see Phdr. (259e–262c; 266d–267d), Menex. (234b-236a), where he gives his reconstruction of Aspasia’s well-crafted speech (236dff.), and Gorg., passim. 32. K. Stanislavski (1967) 260. 33. S. Moore (1988) 8, 28, and 71, and (1983) 160, 211, and 254–255.

The Three Waves in the Analogy between City and Soul 77 Since there has not been full agreement about the purpose of the work (its “super-objective” in Stanislavski’s terminology), this makes it difficult to uncover its organicity, asserted by Plato (Phdr. 264c) as necessary to every discourse. This fault is found not only among recent commentaries trying to interpret Plato’s conception of woman without sufficient background in Platonism,34 but also in experienced Platonists, who seem bewildered when faced with the apparently radical content of the fi rst two waves of Book 5.

5

HOW TO UNCOVER THE SUBTEXT

Then what is this super-objective? Plato is trying to prove, as he keeps saying, by using the analogy between the city and the soul, that a life of integrity (justice) is more advantageous than its opposite. The subtext, therefore, of Books 5, 6, and 7’s “digression” (dealing, as we said, with what he calls a “swarm” of difficulties) must contain, following the pattern of a good speech, objections to the validity of the city/soul analogy that need to be solved. These are the waves to be surmounted. Several commentators, as I said, become lost at this point. 35 I have found two36 who recognize that similarities between city and soul must not be sought in every aspect of the two but only in those relevant to the analogy. They are right in this. So the question is what aspects of State and soul must be similar in order for the virtues of both to be identical (a main aspect of the super-objective in this case)? That is, what the analogy obviously requires is that the virtues of the city be the same as the virtues of the individual; if not, examining civic integrity (justice) is not going to reveal anything about individual integrity. But

34. Noted also by N. H. Bluestone (1987) 6. 35. F. S. Halliwell (1993) 179 n. to Rep. 465b, for one, recognizes “the parallelism between social classes and parts of the soul” as causing difficulties, but specifies only one: how to achieve the people’s agreement with the rulers. But in fact, this is not a difficulty at all, since unruly emotions are ruled by reason and aggression (Rep. 430d–432b); temperance, common to all the classes, makes this possible. M. S. Kochin (2002) 75 n. 33, and 60, for another, ponders why Plato’s three waves lack any reference to the city-soul analogy, and reads instead the political place of gender as serving “to distinguish the human ideal of the philosopher from the civic ideal of masculinity” in the Guardians. T. J. Andersson (1971) 16, for a third, while considering polis and psyche as a motif, observes that Plato’s statement clarifies their relation—but he interprets Book 5 and its three difficulties as unrelated to the analogy, concluding that the comparison is interrupted or unmentioned during Books 5–7—even though he notices, 34f., that family, women, and children do not have parallels in the soul, or at least that such an analogy is not brought up. (This fi nal prudent qualification, of course, leaves room for another possibility.) 36. T. J. Anderson (1971) 74, and R. N. Murphy (1951) 70.

78

Plato’s Dialectic on Woman

Socrates had already realized37 that a prerequisite for this is that the structure of the city (the division of classes) should correspond to the structure of the individual soul—and, indeed, he found a tripartite division in both (434d). Without this similarity, he presumably thinks that the similarity between an individual soul’s virtue and civic virtue would be impossible to discover. This is why Socrates affi rms that the same features (İ੅įȘ) and dispositions (ਵșȘ) occur in each of us as occur in society itself. (435e) Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the interruption seems to indicate—since Book 5 addresses three waves—that at this point Plato became aware of three signifi cant differences in the structures of the parts of the city and the soul; and since the virtue of each means that its actions are consistent with its structure (it acts as it really is), diff erent structures would imply that the virtues of city and soul are different, and not analogous.

6

IDENTIFYING THE SUBTEXT

Given all this, we should note that in Republic’s previous books, women and family were totally absent in both the elemental city and the Guardians’ life and education. In the elemental city, reproduction is mentioned but neither family nor women are; and in discussing education, the term ਕȞȒȡ (male human being) is consistently employed for the Guardians, who should avoid feminine characteristics to become real men. These omissions facilitate the analogy, because acknowledging that the city contains beings different in sex, and families with typical divisive tendencies, might make the city (and therefore its virtue) not analogous to the soul, because the soul does not have them. If Plato happened to notice the omissions, he must have concluded that at fi rst glance, the structure of the individual soul did not look at all like that of the city. A closer look then seems to have uncovered three different waves of difficulty (his “swarm”): (1) An individual soul belongs to a single sex, while a city has two sexes in it (with different civic functions); (2) the aggressive aspect of the soul is totally dedicated to the good of the whole person, not its own particular advantage, while in the city the Guardians have families, which give them a possible aggressive interest away from the whole city; and (3) the individual soul is governed by reason, while in the city, “practical” people are seen as more competent in governance than theoreticians like philosophers.

37. See above, p. 74.

The Three Waves in the Analogy between City and Soul 79 If these were indeed the difficulties he saw, this means that he had to reanalyze the city to see if the “truly natural” city (the one fully consistent with itself) would turn out not to have separate roles for the sexes, nor the divisive interests proper to families, and could or should be ruled by theoreticians. Unless he can prove this, Republic’s fi rst argument in defense of integrity (justice), which depends on the validity of the analogy between city and soul, might be unworkable, and the whole of Books 2 to 9 used to develop it a waste of time. These objections, therefore, absolutely must be answered before anything else can be done. M. S. Kochin38 actually comes very close to my position when he says (but without giving a reason) that the three waves of Republic 5 are the radical core of Socrates’ defense of integrity (justice) against the tyrant’s life. On the other hand, R. N. Murphy39 believes that Plato goes beyond what the analogy requires, and cites marriage and women’s education as unrelated to it, overlooking the fact that their apparent lack of similarity with the soul damages the analogy and might be the precise reason for discussing them. In confi rmation that this is indeed Plato’s subtext, what Socrates does in Book 5 is to offer a proof that the State as presently constituted is actually a perversion (ʌĮȡ੹ ijȪıȚȞ) (456c), and that a really natural State would (1) not have separate roles for women, nor (2) contain nuclear families, nor (3) be governed by anyone other than a philosopher.

7

TEXTUAL VERIFICATION

Let us then give a brief overview of the text, considering each wave by using this approach, to see if it verifies our hypothesis regarding Plato’s problem. In the following chapter we will consider in detail what the fi rst wave reveals about Plato’s developing theory of woman. The second wave was already discussed earlier among the dramatic/rhetorical texts.40 The third wave, since it deals not with woman but with the philosopher-king, is outside the scope of this study. At the beginning of Book 5, Socrates reiterates that the discussion concerns the analogy between city and man (ਙȞįȡĮ) (449a); but before turning to examine the corrupted kinds of cities and people, Adeimantus, true to his character41 and encouraged by Polemarchus, insists that they are not

38. 39. 40. 41.

M. S. Kochin (2002) 6. R. N. Murphy (1951) 76. Chapter 1, pp. 25. For D. Tarrant (1938) 86, Plato’s characters embody the topics discussed. G. A. Blair (1998) XIII–XIV fi nds Republic’s main participants representing the parts of the soul: Socrates, reason; Glaucon, aggressiveness; and Adeimantus, appetite, while Polemarchus represents conventional wisdom and Thrasymachus, worldly practicality.

80 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman going to let Socrates proceed until he explains his statement about the community of women and children (423e–424a), since it could take many forms (this introductory vignette, with its legal overtones, parallels Republic’s fi rst lines). Glaucon and Thrasymachus add their vote. Socrates’ response amounts to abolishing the nuclear family which, as we saw, is in fact one of the difficulties with the analogy. Nevertheless, he does not immediately answer this question, but turns without warning to the equality of the two genders (the fi rst problem we saw with the analogy), even though none of the texts introducing the community of wives and children42 require discussing this. He evidently refuses to answer their request until this difficulty is settled; and this must be for two reasons: fi rst, a discussion of the family logically presupposes a discussion of its elements. In fact, Socrates explicitly says (using a verb for logical entailment) (457c) that the second wave follows (ਪʌİIJĮȚ) the earlier statements. But secondly, from a rhetorical standpoint, he sees that a cogent, logical case can be made for the equality of the sexes, while the second difficulty cannot be answered by strict, rigorous logic; and hence, like a good rhetorician, he puts the weaker argument in the middle of his presentation. Though attention has been paid to the order,43 the reason why Socrates changes the topic here has been ignored. For S. Forde,44 for instance, it appears fi rst mysterious and surprising, though he then suggests (without providing a reason) that Plato is serious about it. Now if the waves are those of difficulty with the analogy, then the problem in the first wave must be, as we said, that because the soul does not have masculine and feminine “parts” and activities, the truly natural city must not have separate civic functions for men and women.45 If not, integrity (justice) in the city cannot mean the same as integrity (justice) in the soul. Therefore, what Socrates must be saying here is that in the “truly natural” city sexual differences are limited to procreation (which is irrelevant to social functions) and that both men and women should be educated equally for all tasks for which as individuals they have the talent. For him, women as a class are not qualitatively different from men, but only a quantitatively inferior version of humanity. We will deal with this particular issue at length in the next chapter. The point here is that gender turns out to be irrelevant to civic activities; and this, of course, implies that in fact the ideal State has no distinct “male and female” parts in reference to those activities, and therefore the State that has separate civic roles for men and women is a perversion. Hence,

42. 43. 44. 45.

423e, 449cd, 450c and 451c. R. G. Hoerber (1944) 2. S. Forde (1997) 658f. Functions that are not civic ones are, as we said above, not pertinent to the analogy.

The Three Waves in the Analogy between City and Soul 81 Socrates can conclude that the analogy comparing the city and the soul is valid in this respect.46 Notice that although the logic of the demonstration concerns women of all classes and Socrates uses examples including all kinds of women (455e–456a), he applies his answer to women Guardians (457bc), because the discussion is framed by Glaucon’s question about them (450c). We must not forget either that in Republic’s first four books there is not only no hint that Plato intends to incorporate women into the leadership class, but that women are used constantly as model of what Guardians should avoid. All of this is relevant to the evaluation of commentaries on this “wave.” The next chapter will also show that the social function of women in Republic is in fact an application of Plato’s notion of integrity (justice). Still, as N. D. Smith remarks,47 the reason for the appearance of women Guardians is not Plato’s theory of justice (integrity) according to an interpretation offered recently,48 but the analogy itself. Not recognizing this simple point leads to all kinds of confusion. To cite just one instance (among a “swarm” of them), because Smith49 did not consider the role that the analogy between city and soul plays here when objecting to the views of S. M. Okin and others,50 he said that Plato needed to justify that the standards of justice (integrity) “apply to women in exactly the same way that they apply to men”; but sought a reason independent of Plato’s notion of “justice.” (Later51 he changed his position and hit upon nature—conceiving men and women as sexless souls embodied—as the possible source.) For the second wave of difficulty, our hypothesis supposes that the “really natural” State will have to have a Guardian class with no distractions from the good of the State itself, just as the higher aspects of the soul act, not for their own benefit, but for the good of the whole person. Concerns for the family form the most notable potential interference with the unity of the State as a whole, and so it would seem that the nuclear family must be done away with.52

46. It is intriguing here that T. J. Andersson (1971) 121–127 et passim recognizes the difficulty that two genders create for the analogy, but does not identify this as the point of the discussion, regarding Books 5–7 as an interlude belonging to a different discourse, with woman as part of social questions. 47. N. D. Smith (1980) 5. 48. G. Vlastos (1989) 276. 49. N. D. Smith (1980) 7–9. 50. Such as M. Piérart, E. Barker, and J. J. Rousseau who identify the abolition of property as the reason why Plato was forced to incorporate women into the Guardian class. 51. N. D. Smith (1983) 471. 52. Cf. Rep. 457cd: ਪʌİIJĮȚ ȞȩȝȠȢ . . . ੖įİ. . . . ȉ੹Ȣ ȖȣȞĮ૙țĮȢ IJĮȪIJĮȢ IJ૵Ȟ ਕȞįȡ૵Ȟ IJȠȪIJȦȞ ʌȐȞIJȦȞ ʌȐıĮȢ İੇȞĮȚ țȠȚȞȐȢ; (“there follows . . . this law . . .: that all these women should be common to all these men”), also 458bc, 459e, 461e, and 464a.

82 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman What Plato does here is to develop a deliberately shocking illustration of a community where men share women and children; and here he in fact explicitly asserts that the “expansion” of the family into the whole State removes the divisiveness of individual family interests, 53 confi rming our hypothesis that its function is to solve the second difficulty with the analogy between the city and the individual, making its basic purpose ethical, as he explicitly says,54 not political. What Plato is asserting, then, by this recognized fl ight of fancy is that if the State itself could be made one single family, everyone would be much happier in it, precisely because it lacks divisiveness (420b, 465d). But since, as we said, this is the weakest of Plato’s arguments, he places it in the middle between stronger ones, and like a good dramatist, he couches it in playful terms, as if he were taking a vacation from strict logical thought. But by his startling depiction, he has in fact done exactly what we would expect on our reading of the subtext. Once again, he can leave the lower classes unchanged because they parallel the appetites in the soul, with their multiple and contradictory drives, although he seems to suggest changes even there when advocating population control by regulating marriages (460a); but since this does not affect the validity of the analogy, he can leave it undetermined. This, and not the preservation of private property in the lower class, as Okin55 suggests, is why Plato does not require changes there. And in this connection, it is significant that Socrates himself reminds us before introducing the third wave that the issue is the analogy by qualifying the best city as: The city most like an individual human being [because its parts do not exist independently]. (462c) and again: The best governed city is like the man you referred to [because it hurts as a whole when any part hurts]. (462d) Therefore, since Auxiliaries in the city are neither divided into two classes (male and female: fi rst wave) nor torn apart by private interests (such as by the family: second wave), there can be an analogy between them and the aggressive part of the soul. After this there follows a discussion considering war, which answers a secondary objection and maintains men’s and women’s common activities even there.

53. E.g., in Rep. 464a. 54. R. G. Hoerber (1944) 113. 55. S. M. Okin (1977) 359 and (1979) 42.

The Three Waves in the Analogy between City and Soul 83 Finally, in the third wave of difficulty, Plato must have asked, “Do current politicians really govern cities well, or would philosophers actually be better at such a practical task?” This objection is, in fact (as he explicitly states), the most terrible because the obvious solution belittles such men as Pericles, and conflates in one image barefoot Socrates and a king. But what Socrates does here is to advocate a philosopher-king as the only one that can govern really well, because no one else knows reality and the good, even if this seems to contradict the private character of philosophical activity. This is not only a solution to the fact that practical people, ignorant of the good, cannot govern as well, but also because for the State to be like the individual, reason must rule. The analogy has thus revealed to Plato that for kings to be real kings, they must be philosophers. By “rubbing the two [individual and State] together like fi re-sticks” (435a) he has learned something about the State that would otherwise have gone unnoticed. The evidence points to this, and not to the topic of țȠȚȞȦȞȓĮ as F. S. Halliwell56 has asserted, as the reason why the philosopher-king is discussed. It should also be noted that there are no grounds for accusing Plato of circularity here, as Halliwell57 fi rst suggests and then denies, since Socrates is merely answering the last objection to the analogy. Plato not only alludes to this among the circumstances grounding his position in Sicily, 58 but before discussing his philosopher-king proposal in Republic, he also says: So, in praising correct philosophy I was compelled to declare that through it one is enabled to discern all forms of integrity (justice) both political and individual. (italics mine) (326a) The philosopher-king is a condition not simply for the existence of a “truly natural,” or ideal, State but also for a system that would lead toward it, starting from existing societies (473d, 501e). Discussion of this third wave includes examining the philosopher and his education at length, extending to the end of Book 7. Thus, if one looks at the text in the light of the subtext I have proposed, it very neatly and naturally reveals that Plato did indeed still have the analogy in mind and, as happened in the middle of Phaedo, found certain difficulties with his position that needed to be answered before he could honestly proceed. That is why this “digression” exists, and why it is here, as the place to answer objections in rhetoric. This interpretation explains why the central books of Republic are essential to the main argument of the whole work, the very opposite of a

56. F. S. Halliwell (1993) 31 n. 3. 57. Ibid., 26. 58. Plato, Letter VII.

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digression in the sense that some commentators, taking Rep. 543c out of context, seem to hold. (True, J. Adam59 had already denied that Book 5 constitutes a “digression,” and qualified the term used in 543c as literary form.) And, of course, my view explains why the three waves structuring Book 5 are called difficulties, something that has not up to this point been handled satisfactorily. So what Plato has accomplished here is that he has masterfully shown, by addressing these difficulties head on, that existing States are poor excuses for States, and that the best State will in fact be exactly analogous to the individual in all relevant respects. He can now move on to show how States and individuals become corrupted and consequently less happy. Republic, on this view, is revealed as a truly organic whole, as one would expect from Plato. Those who wonder why Socrates should not himself have stated such a motivation, openly justify the digression, or draw any moral from it at any point, have not noticed that in the course of his conversation, he does mention it, as we saw in the two texts quoted above, and will see further in what is below. But Plato is an artist, and has written a plausible conversation, not a lecture; and so the signposts he gives are apt to be missed by those who are not paying close attention. Nothing Plato says is mere fi ller. He even gives a confirmation of what I have been saying when Socrates reminds us, in the first lines of Book 5, that he is still referring to the analogy: This is the kind of city and regime that I call good and right and this the corresponding man. (449a) Now for purposes of the present study, we should note that an unexpected consequence of the newfound requirements of the analogy between city and soul was that Plato was compelled to reflect on woman, develop his theory about her, and take a position in the current debate on the subject. Evidence in subsequent chapters will show Plato’s theory on woman as grounded in his metaphysics and fully consistent. Only R. G. Hoerber60 has a reading close to mine in that he fi nds in the requisites of the analogy the motive that explains the community of women and his proposal of the philosopher-king. But he does not recognize that this is the very purpose of Book 5, dealing only with the second and third “waves,” apparently unaware that his explanation also concerns the fi rst “wave,” where the analogy applies to woman’s role, which is left without justification. Once one divorces the three waves from the organicity of Republic as a whole, the interpretations of what they mean and why they are there differ in the wildest manner. For those interested in how many different ways a

59. J. Adam (1902) 274. 60. R. G. Hoerber (1944) 44–45.

The Three Waves in the Analogy between City and Soul 85 text can be interpreted and how well other interpretations stand up to the text of Book 5, the Appendix of this chapter briefly accounts for several of the myriad of views on the subject.

8

CONCLUSION

We examined Plato’s reflection on woman while depicting Socrates’ position in Meno61 and when opposing current trends of gender equality in Symposium.62 But it is not until Republic, and precisely not until the first wave of Book 5, that the arena is entered with a novel, and thoroughly Platonic, theory. The task of the current chapter was limited to finding out why Plato introduced the question of woman at this point. Drawing from its subtext, difficulties with the analogy between the city and the soul were uncovered. As has been said,63 one of the favorite pedagogical instruments of Plato is the extended metaphor; the analogy between city and soul is the best example of this, where the city is introduced so as to read better in large letters the small letters that represent the individual. The explanation I am submitting provides evidence to refute interpretations which judged the appearance of woman to be a capricious or peripheral issue; in my interpretation, she is introduced during the course of Socrates’ argument to prove that the three objections to the analogy between city and soul are invalid, thus rescuing Plato’s whole project from shipwreck. Thus, the supposed “digression” is instead part of Republic’s overall design, and not one involving a difficulty which, as has been alleged, “may be one which we cannot definitely resolve.”64 Those who interpret Republic as a treatise on politics fail to recognize the limited analogical function of the State with regard to the question of whether integrity (justice) is better than its lack and whether it makes those who practice it happier. The analogy is not an excuse to write a political book. As R. Hoerber65 comments, “Plato’s purpose was not to advocate seriously the institution of such a community, but merely to illustrate the characteristics and proper spheres of the rational and appetitive elements of the soul.” Republic is a work of individual and social ethics, and only in that sense is the city part of it. In fact, Socrates tells Glaucon: So our goal was an archetype in this investigation of what integrity (justice) itself is like, and what kind of man (ਙȞįȡĮ) a man of consummate integrity (justice) would be if he existed (472c).

61. 62. 63. 64. 65.

See Chapter 2. See Chapter 3. C. M. Turbayne (1976) 126. F. S. Halliwell (1993) 2. R. G. Hoerber (1944) 113.

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This is not to say that Plato’s political theory is inconsistent; unless it can be sustained, the analogy fails. The point at issue is the purpose of the book. This interpretation contributes, also, to revealing the organicity of Republic. Instead of a collection of vaguely connected issues assumed by some, Republic’s parts fit together into an architectonic work of art. In addition, by recognizing that Book 5’s purpose is to show that the ideal city fulfills the requirements of the soul, I have stressed that the object being examined is the soul, and that the city is a creation required by the investigation. This confi rms the ideal State as ancillary to the ethical theme of Republic. Note, however, that the reading I offer does not imply that because Plato is brought to discuss the issue of woman by difficulties in the analogy between city and soul, the Platonic conception about her is determined solely by the logical necessities of the analogy. His view of woman is part of his philosophy, not simply the result of ad hoc considerations. It is only that, because Plato needs to tailor his reflection to the problem’s needs, his thinking about woman at this point is limited by the needs of the analogy. Still, the logical requirements being considered moved his reflection on woman forward, furnishing its fundamental approach. Also in this connection, although the discussion is centered on women Guardians, Plato crafts a universal demonstration applicable to all women (without explicit application to the artisan class), which goes beyond what is required to satisfy the analogy, since, while the object of the discussion is to fi nd out what activities are proper to women, Plato characteristically pays attention to what she is, aware that activity follows being. This forces him to reflect also on sexual differences, a crucial contribution to his theory of woman. Finally, we should notice that Book 5 witnesses Plato’s distancing himself from the Socratic theory of equality in virtue by limiting its application to men and women, and excluding children, male and female, and older men, free or slave. In brief, then, in examining the subtext as our explanation66 of the reason for Book 5’s place in Republic, we have managed to clarify the following: 1. Why the topic of woman appeared unexpectedly at this precise moment in the development of the argument on integrity (justice). 2. Why Plato was forced to make explicit some aspects of the conception of woman implied in his philosophy. 3. Why he needed to recognize the absence of any pertinent qualitative differences between the two genders with respect to education and city administration. 4. Why he had to defend the unity of the State with a startling description of a fictitious common family in

66. The insight into my interpretation was, characteristically, a spark engendered in philosophical dialogue. I owe it to George A. Blair’s thoughtful participation in it.

The Three Waves in the Analogy between City and Soul 87 the leadership classes. 5. Why he included the wave about the philosopherking, so different from the other two. The detailed analysis of how he argues the fi rst wave still needs to be done, and belongs to the next chapter. The second wave, because it is a dramatic/rhetorical text, was discussed in Chapter 1;67 it contains a dramatic/ rhetorical dreamlike vision to help him make the point about the importance of city unity.68 I must remark that, because treatment of the philosopher-king is omitted in this study as not relevant to its purpose, this is by no means meant to deny that the topic is crucial to Republic’s argument, and rightly takes up much space in the work. In the last paragraph of Book 7 Socrates seems to support my interpretation by implying that Books 5–7 are part of the discussion about the analogy between city and soul: “Well, then,” I said, “has what we said fi nally been enough for us about this city and the man (ਕȞįȡȩȢ) who is similar to it? It should be obvious what kind of person we will say he has to be.” “It is obvious,” he said, “and, to answer your question, I think we have finished.” (541b) This makes it clear that Socrates is talking about the man who is analogous to the just State he described: a man for whom all of the parts of the soul function for the good of the whole, not themselves, and for whom each part of the soul does the task it was made for and nothing else. Thus, the analogy reveals what a man of integrity (a just man) will be like. The next chapter will claim that Plato’s theory holding equal roles for men and women in society develops neither from experience nor rights, but flows organically from the equal application of the basic principles of his philosophy, particularly those of integrity (justice) and nature, which implies his metaphysics of Forms and nongendered souls, and supports the division of labor in accordance with talent and appropriate education. Needless to say, his theory differs essentially from modern social thought. 69 But even here, the very reason why Plato introduces Book 5 at this point is good evidence of his concern for the logical consistency of his arguments, something which argues forcibly against the plausibility of interpretations alleging that he contradicts himself.

67. Pp. 25ff. 68. A. E. Taylor (1908) 112–113, and F. S. Halliwell (1993) 176 n. to 464b, note the connection with the State’s unity, but neither of them seems aware that this is precisely Plato’s real reason for the passage. 69. G. Santas (2003) and (2005).

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APPENDICES: OTHER INTERPRETATIONS OF BOOK 5

A. The Sudden Introduction of Woman Regarding the introduction of woman in Book 5, various explanations have up to now been tried, but none has so far survived criticism. Neither the abolition of property nor the influence of Socrates is sufficient reason for introducing women Guardians, nor is the fact that Plato needed them in the Guardian class for reproductive purposes,70 nor that he did not know what to do with them after eliminating the private family and was forced to turn them into men.71 Still less could Plato have had a “feminist” goal of extending women’s rights or gratifying their ambitions, since the notion of individual rights was yet to be conceived. A. E. Taylor72 infers also a desire to expand women’s duties to serve the State. Even if true, this does not justify her introduction at this point. Regarding the above positions, N. D. Smith73 has shown that female Guardians were not necessary for reproducing the class, and that their introduction is not a necessary effect of Plato’s abolition of property, as M. Piérart,74 E. Barker,75 and S. M. Okin76 hold, because they are not the only alternative when private wives are abolished, and because their only requirement is proper talent. Unable to identify the necessary cause, Smith envisions it as somewhere else. He also refutes A. E. Taylor,77 D. Wender,78 and G. Vlastos,79 who trace the project to Socrates, because equality is restricted to women in Plato, but extends to all human beings in Socrates. Trying a different approach, S. B. Levin80 recognizes Republic 5’s discussion on women as “part of the dialogue’s philosophical core,” but reads it, without explanation, as proving that philosophy is “the technê par excellence,” without recognizing that the theory of woman is grounded in ijȪıȚȢ or nature rather than tȑȤȞȘ.81 As R. G. Hoerber82 demonstrates, the theme of Republic is not defending philosophy but proving that the life of the man

70. A. Bloom (1968) 383. Averroes (1974) 57 (Heb. 52.29) extended this to all classes. 71. J. J. Rousseau (1966) V 472. 72. A. E. Taylor (1908) 116. 73. N. D. Smith (1980) 6–7 and (1983) 471. 74. M. Piérart (1974) 75. 75. E. Barker (1957) 217 and 220 n. 1. 76. S. M. Okin (1977) 346–369 and (1979) 28–50. 77. A. E. Taylor (1956) 278. 78. D. Wender (1973) 84–86. 79. G. Vlastos (1989) 288 and (1983) 471. 80. S. B. Levin (1996) 13 and 20. 81. See Chapter 5, pp. 95ff. 82. R. G. Hoerber (1944) 113.

The Three Waves in the Analogy between City and Soul 89 of integrity (justice) is the best and happiest. Nor is it an investigation into the price to be paid to achieve integrity (justice), as S. Forde83 submits.

B. The Three Waves Trying to explain the function of the waves, R. S. Brumbaugh84 reads Book 5 as showing temperance’s development in the fi rst two “waves,” courage in the uses of war, and wisdom in the third “wave”; J. A. Arieti85 believes that the subject “does not require the discussion of wives and children to occur just here”; R. Demos86 denies any possible “symbolism” between the community of wives and the soul; and F. S. Halliwell87 notes that the fi rst two “waves’” use concepts from biology, psychology and politics not requiring philosophical presuppositions. Certainly, as Halliwell88 says, the third wave also allows Plato to move into metaphysics; but even when treating biological, psychological, or political issues, Plato’s analysis is always philosophical, not empirical, seeking ultimate principles. As I also have shown, Socrates’ analogy compares the State with human beings in general, not with a particular class; but for L. Lange,89 it applies only to Guardians. For Plato, however, the three classes represent three main tendencies, and the part which predominates determines the person’s class, not that he lacks the others; and all individuals should seek harmony of their three parts. In another approach, Smith 90 questions, in his thought-provoking essay, whether soul and State must logically be tripartite for the analogy to work. He shows that the soul’s partitioning process could be unending, and identifies texts showing Plato not committed to a tripartite soul. But he does not address A. W. Price’s91 reasons for excluding the possibility of indefi nite division, and for whom “Plato appears not to take his own tripartition seriously.” For Smith, the analogy’s success depends on States’ and souls’ participating in the Form of Justice whether they have three parts or not. He judges the tripartite division as a well-structured heuristic tool and legitimate, though not logically required. My comments about this are (1) that Plato found three aspects of the soul because he was looking for aspects which would correspond to the three classes of the State; and (2) he may also have adopted an earlier idea of

83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91.

S. Forde (1997) 658. R. S. Brumbaugh (1962) 89. J. A. Arieti (1991) 236. R. Demos (1957) 169. F. S. Halliwell (1993) 4–5. Ibid., 27 and 194. L. Lange (1979) 7. N. D. Smith (1999) 32ff. A. W. Price (1995) 68–71.

90 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman three kinds of life92 which used the triad of pleasure (wealth), ambition (honor), and contemplation (wisdom). Not recognizing that Plato is answering a difficulty with his theory, many also delve into irrelevant practical matters. The universal character of the discussion of women’s roles, for instance, precludes omitting artisan women,93 but the dramatic continuity of the conversation does not leave room for dealing explicitly with members of this class. They are, however, not really important, since in the analogy this low class represents the appetites,94 which in themselves are unruly, and whose only duty is therefore to accept the higher classes’ leadership (i.e., to be held in check by reason and aggressiveness) and not to seek functions above their class.95 This distinction, and not the nature of the jobs as J. Annas96 suggests, is Plato’s criterion; Socrates never describes the proposals as limited to Guardian women as she assumes, and uses examples from all classes.97 Still, the silence of the text obscures Plato’s intentions on this matter, leaving room for many diverging interpretations. Among them, Aristotle,98 arguing lack of information, states that if property and low-class women and children are not shared by all as with the Guardians, the city could become divided into two hostile States; Averroes,99 instead, interprets Plato’s project as applying to all three classes in different degrees. The opposite position, however, predominates: for B. Jowett and L. Campbell,100 the lower classes do not really have a place in Republic; for G. Grote,101 W. Fite,102 B. Bosanquet,103 and F. M. Cornford,104 communism applies only to the Guardians; E. Barker105 agrees, arguing that the economic class represents the appetites; R. H. S. Crossman106 adds that Plato intended liberating only capable women by suppressing for them marriage and family; N. D. Smith,107 who interpreted the silence of the text as

92. 93. 94. 95.

96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107.

H. B. Gottschalk (1980) 30, and Price (1995) 2.7 (69). M. S. Kochin (2002) 48 n. 26. Cf. Rep. 434ab. Plato mentions the other classes several times (Rep. 421e, 456d, 547bc); but in Rep. 450c, 457c, 461e and 464a he apparently limits his project to the Guardians, although in 460a, keeping the same number of citizens determines the number of marriages. J. Annas (1976) 315 and (1981) 183. E.g., Rep. 455e–456a (physicians and musicians). Arist., Pol. 1264a 11–41. Averroes (1974) 69 (Heb. 60.7–13). B. Jowett and L. Campbell (1894) III 224. G. Grote (1888) IV 179. W. Fite (1934) 22ff. B. Bosanquet (1895). F. M. Cornford (1941) 155. E. Barker (1957) 211 and 220. R. H. S. Crossman (1939) 212. N. D. Smith (1980) 9, and (1983) 167 n. 1.

The Three Waves in the Analogy between City and Soul 91 Plato’s intending to keep the status quo for lower-class women, asked why Plato did not exclude all women from equal participation if slaves or lowerclass women can be excluded despite their abilities; but later reconsidered, giving Plato’s prescriptions about woman “full generality.” On this, M. S. Kochin108 cites B. Rosenstock as claiming that Republic 372bc when referring to “intercourse with each other” shows also women artisans in the fi rst city, “Socrates smuggling in an assumption that will become explicit in Republic V.”

C. The Relation of the First Wave to the Second Critics are also divided in their puzzlement on whether Socrates’ answer to the fi rst wave is the cause of the second,109 or if the establishment of the community of wives in the second wave forces Plato to develop the thesis of women Guardians in the fi rst,110 and if the second is a corollary of the abolition of property.111 We have already seen112 that M. Piérart, E. Barker, S. M. Okin, and J. J. Rousseau maintain the emancipation [sic] of women as an effect of the abolition of property and the family. Since Plato could no longer defi ne women by their traditional position, says Okin,113 he “had no alternative but to consider them persons in their own right.” She argues that when in Laws the family is retained, equality is abandoned, though she recognizes the improved woman’s legislation, but as different from men’s. S. B. Pomeroy114 concurs. But Smith objects to her use of “emancipation” as inaccurate and anachronistic, since freedom was not one of Plato’s purposes. Okin’s thesis has been argued against by W. Jacobs,115 N. D. Smith,116 and

108. M. S. Kochin (2002) 48 n. 26. 109. Those who, differing slightly, see the community of women as a consequence of sex-equality are: B. Bosanquet (1895) 184, R. H. S. Crossman (1939) 205– 206, H. D. Lee (1955) 40, A. J. Cappelletti (1980) 90, and M. I. Santa Cruz (1988) 39. 110. Averroes (1974) 57 (Heb. 52.29–53.2), E. Zeller (1876) 481, R. L. Nettleship (1897) 164, and E. Barker (1957) 225. 111. Here we fi nd, on the negative side, Aristotle (Pol. 1262b 36), since for him private property can be discussed separately from women and children; but U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1920) 200, and E. Barker (1957) 220 n. 1, judge on the affi rmative, thinking that the elimination of permanent marriages follows the abolition of property. W. Jaeger (1943) II 242 and 246f concurs, and conceives the community of women as the “logical sequel” of women’s education within the Guardians’ paideia. 112. See pp. 88f. 113. S. M. Okin (1977) 356–368 and (1979) 38 and 42–50. 114. S. B. Pomeroy (1994) 38. 115. W. Jacobs(1978) 29–31. 116. N. D. Smith (1980) 6–7, (1980) 471, and (1983) 467.

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G. Vlastos.117 The following is a summary of Jacobs’ refutation, since it is particularly clarifying: Jacobs objects to Okin’s thesis that her argument (stating that if the family is not abolished, as in Laws and Republic’s artisan class, then women don’t have equal status) suggests the opposite, that women’s equality produces the family’s abolition: “if not II [the second wave] then not I [the fi rst]” logically implies “if I then II.” This does not of itself argue against Okin’s position, because what she argues is that the family’s abolition was a sufficient condition for women’s equality (if II then I) and also a necessary one (if not II then not I)—arriving at the conclusion that II causes I. But she has gone beyond what “implication” means. One can also draw the opposite logical implication, since logical implication is not identical with causation. Jacobs does not mean (or even suggest) that I causes II, any more than the fact that a child implies the parent means that the child causes the parent. He is only saying that (having shown that the fi rst part of Okin’s “proof” [if II then I] is faulty), her second reasoning does not establish causality either (since it could also be due to I’s causing II—or to both’s being effects of another cause). Jacobs’ last criticism does not intend to refute Okin, but only to show that her last argument (if not II then not I) does not establish what she wants to prove, being logically compatible with both I implies II, and II implies I. As I stated in the body of the chapter, the simple explanation is that Plato was dealing with two different difficulties with the analogy, and logically the one involving the family itself would come after the one involving the parts of the family. It is interesting that not one of the above commentaries I have mentioned relate the three waves of difficulty to Republic’s stated purpose (to fi nd out if a man of integrity—a just man—is happier than his opposite), and so do not treat the book as an organic whole. They seem to concern themselves piecemeal with practical implementations, without realizing that Plato’s reflection was consistently operating at the speculative level of a theoretical construct (as he says so often), far from practical questions of feasibility. Objections such as “Who is going to do the washing and cooking?” misrepresent the purely theoretical type of discussion, where prudential considerations of feasibility are beside the point. Plato is not going to plan at that level until later in his life, while legislating for a concrete city in Laws. Because A. E. Taylor118 and R. L. Nettleship119 share this approach, the former fi nds it odd that Plato, possibly misled by the watchdog analogy, did not assign a sphere of public service to women, but introduced her into every sphere as a rival of man; and Nettleship judges women’s public

117. G. Vlastos (1989) 289. 118. A. E. Taylor (1908) 116. 119. R. L. Nettleship (1897) 173.

The Three Waves in the Analogy between City and Soul 93 cooperation as narrow when applying the principle of complementarity to Plato’s time.

D. The Community of Women As to the community of women, A. J. Cappelletti,120 unaware that the description was an answer to a difficulty with the analogy, depicts Plato as a statist concerned only about the security of a coercive State, and his policy about woman determined not by ethical concerns, but by political and utilitarian ones. He holds Plato to be neither a feminist nor a modern egalitarian, and fi nds a change in Timaeus’ sexual differences and in Laws, deeming it “patriarchal.” L. Lange121 also rejects feminist interpretations of Plato, arguing that he does not grant woman full participation in government, nor equality. She approaches this text using categories foreign to Plato, conceiving “public” as superior, rational, political, productive, or paid activity, which she fi nds in men (forgetting the Guardians’ abdicating possessions), and “private” as not rational or political, but reproductive, personal, biological, and labor intensive, which she attributes to women. Thus, she reads the second wave as answering the contradiction between public and private life by conceiving unity as the good of the city, because, in her view, Plato fi nds divisive their opposition, and thus he makes private interests (property, marriage, and family) common and gives the State authority over sexual relations and reproduction. For R. G. Hoerber,122 suppressing the Guardians’ property and private marriage are necessary to the analogy, but this is because they belong to the soul’s appetitive level. For T. J. Andersson,123 marriage is probably affected only in the leadership class because this section was inserted later; but this would limit education to the development of sensibility— inconceivable for Plato. I will not report on different interpretations of the reason for the philosopher-king (or -queen), since that is, as I said, foreign to our study.

120. 121. 122. 123.

A. J. Cappelletti (1980) 90–91 and 93. L. Lange (1979) 5–6, 11 and 10, respectively. R. G. Hoerber (1944) 44–45, 113, and (1961) 38. T. J. Andersson (1971) 121 n. 1 and 123.

5

The Logic of the First Wave

The fi rst wave of Republic 5 (451c–457b) is not only the locus classicus of the doctrine of Plato on woman, but it also can be used as a paradigm of Plato’s writing. From the dramatic introduction to the solidly logical structure of his arguments,1 typically advanced by minute steps; from the customary irony and hesitancy of Socrates in presenting his ideas to his unequivocal positing of ruling principles such as nature and integrity (justice); from the symbiosis of form and content, the use of hypothesis, analogy, imagery and a developing dialectic, to the hints at his long-lasting debate with the eristic of the sophists and the shortcomings of the comedians; from invocations of a goddess to references to the poets, dogs, swarms, dolphins, physicians, shoemakers, carpenters—all this contributes to making this section a Platonic jewel. It is therefore surprising that major Platonists working on Republic have not studied this text in more detail, but have usually skimmed over it on the way to the great topics that follow, probably betraying how puzzling their apparently outrageous agenda has appeared. (Accusations that Plato contradicts himself, seen in my Introduction, were absent in earlier Plato scholars, who recognized his depth and logical coherence; they only arose after the 1970s, which produced merely a proliferation of specialized articles, not a complete study. Even F. S. Halliwell’s2 Plato: Republic 5 mainly highlights its relation to other ancient writings.) One factor that contributes to the perplexity caused by the passage is its being mostly approached as a practical project rather than as intended: a purely theoretical investigation triggered, as we saw, 3 by the question of the validity of the analogy between city and soul. This is not to say that Plato did not intend practice to follow theory; but he was more aware than

1. I use the term “argument” in the precise sense of logical demonstration, not in the sense of “dispute,” or in the loose sense of “plot,” “topics covered,” or “stages in the conversation,” as has been done lately. 2. F. S. Halliwell (1993). 3. Chapter 4, pp. 78ff.

The Logic of the First Wave 95 anyone of the distance between the two, since the world of experience was for him a pale imitation of the reality of Forms. A pragmatic culture may have difficulty understanding Plato’s underlying conviction that only by discovering the undiluted theoretical truth about something have we any chance of being successful in practice. From a utilitarian perspective, Republic’s proposal about woman, free from practical considerations of feasibility, appears airily utopian. One critic,4 for instance, sees it only as an abstract scheme, inspired and provocative, lacking precision. Laws’ prudential application to a concrete State, however, will show how Plato manages to fit his theory into what is viable. As seen in the preceding chapter, the fi rst wave needs to resolve the difficulty that two genders in society creates for the city-soul analogy, since there are no corresponding characteristics in the soul. Chapter 4’s Appendix5 mentions that Republic 5’s discussion on women has been read6 as “part of the dialogue’s philosophical core,” (a statement I would agree with), though there it is said to prove that philosophy is “the technê par excellence.” At this point, we need to stress not only that there is no evidence for this assertion, but also that, as has been shown,7 Plato uses IJȑȤȞȘ (art, skill) only in reference to therapeutic or refutative knowledge, and this at the prephilosophical level of his interlocutors. In any case, there is plenty of evidence, as we will see in what follows, that Plato’s theory of woman is grounded in ijȪıȚȢ or nature rather than tȑȤȞȘ. Solving the fi rst difficulty with the city-soul analogy not only provides Plato the opportunity to formulate his own theory about sexual differences (contributing to the ongoing debate on the subject among intellectuals in Athens), but also restricts his reflection to the parameters of the analogy. This is why we do not find here a complete development of his position on woman, but only of the aspects relevant to the argument. Nevertheless, the discussion advances his view of the subject of woman, because to achieve his goal Socrates must conceive a theoretical basis for proving (1) that it is in principle possible for women to perform the same civic activities as men (i.e., that they have the same nature as men with respect to civic duties), and (2) that performing the same tasks is the best policy (and therefore ought to be done). Section (1) uses one sense of the term “possible” (įȣȞĮIJȩȞ) in its meaning of “not contradictory”; the other meaning, used later, is “feasible” or “practically realizable.”8 This has tripped up some: R. Waterfield,9 for instance, 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

M. Canto (1986) 341f., and (1994) 52. Appendix A to Chapter 4, p. 95. S. B. Levin (1996) 13 and 20. D. L. Roochnik (1986) 185–197. Cf. Rep. 457de, 458ab, 466d, 471c and e, and 472de. R. Waterfield (1993) 450c, 452e, 456c, and 457c.

96 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman translates the fi rst sense as “viable,” saying more than Socrates intends, while F. S. Halliwell10 confuses the two senses, claiming that later Plato means by “possible” “not contradictory” as if reopening the issue, when at that point Socrates is talking about the project’s being realizable, and consequently means “viable.” In any case, once these two steps of Socrates’ plan are successfully taken, the distinction between men’s and women’s roles in society will disappear, the fi rst discrepancy between city and soul will be resolved, and Plato’s conception of woman will have acquired its most characteristic features. Let us review the argument.

SOCRATES’ PROPOSAL AND ITS OBJECTION Socrates invites to a debate over the possibility of his proposal anyone who in jest or in earnest would like to discuss whether female human nature (ijȪıȚȢ ਲ ਕȞșȡȦʌȓȞȘ ਲ șȒȜİȚĮ) is capable of sharing all the tasks of the male sex, or not even sharing one of them, or whether it is some but not others—and where things connected with war fit into all of this. (453a) Socrates’ argument proceeds by raising an objection to his thesis that men and women do not have different social functions, and then giving a refutation, made appealing and partly hidden by the dramatic form (though the form cannot completely conceal the rigor of the logic).11 Several commentaries miss the basic structure of the argument, some distinguishing two and even three arguments defending possibility.12 None of them seems to realize that, as we will see, Socrates’ answer to the objection is a continuous demonstration disproving the two implied premises of the opposition, the fi rst part of which produces a conditional

10. F. S. Halliwell (1993) 183 n. to 466d and 194. 11. Interestingly, U. Wilamowitz-Moellendorf (1920) 198, sensing this, claims the presentation, until 466d or at least 461e, lacks Plato’s accustomed fullness and freshness, while R. H. S. Crossman (1939) 205 praises it “in its style, imagination, or philosophical clarity.” 12. Among them, C. G. Allen (1975) 135 sees two arguments: metaphysical and pragmatic; B. Calvert’s (1975) 231 excellent study also distinguishes two arguments sharing the same conclusion, the first on Platonic justice, the second on men’s superiority; but then he struggles to answer self-created difficulties: whether the arguments contradict each other or the second defends the previous conclusion using masculine superiority, why the second argument is introduced, etc. In addition, C. McKeen (2006) 529 even distinguishes “three distinct (but inconclusive) lines of argument against the sex segregationist view.”

The Logic of the First Wave 97 affi rmation that needs to be established, and the second establishes it from experience. Hence, the passage has a simple basic structure, with Socrates stating his position about the possibility of women Guardians and then formulating the objection on behalf of the opposition and refuting it, and fi nally showing how his proposal is the best option. But instead of a dry logical construction, Plato offers us a delightful dramatic scene revealing a deep understanding of the requirements of human knowledge. A word before entering into the examination. In order not to lose the continuity of the argument by going into the sometimes bewildering detail of the numerous commentaries on each step, I will include in the text only what adds to the understanding of what Plato is doing, and relegate most commentaries, especially those which introduce fallacious objections or unnecessary complexity, to footnotes or this chapter’s appendices,13 so that those who wish to follow Plato’s thought will be able more easily to do so without undue distraction, while those who want to see more of the details will have them available. After the introduction described in the preceding chapter, when the young men are adamant in their demand for an account of the community of wives and children, Socrates complains about their stirring up a swarm of arguments he tried to avoid, afraid to drag his friends away from the truth if he grants Glaucon’s request to discuss the Guardians’ women and the rearing of their children.14 Socrates’ hesitancy underlines the novelty of the theses he must defend. He implores help from Adrasteia,15 ironically thanking his friends for absolving him of any possible damage, and proposes confronting the female drama now, having completed the male one.16 This provides a literary introduction to the logical treatment of the fi rst difficulty. Socrates begins by reintroducing the analogy of watchdogs (451d), which illustrated the Guardians’ character in Book 2 (375a–376b). His strategy is dual: fi rst, to establish continuity between the new development and the previous description of the city, particularly the Guardians’ life. Second, to offer the reader’s imagination a picture to hold on to during the abstract argument that follows. Plato knows that the image does not fit perfectly, but is also aware that abstract thinking needs help from

13. Appendices to Chapter 5, pp. 122ff. 14. J. Adam (1902) 277 notes that the period between birth and education referred by Socrates here is treated in Laws 794c, not in Republic. 15. Nemesis, the goddess who punishes proud words (scholion to a manuscript of Aesch. Prom., 936). 16. Following R. Förster (1875), J. Adam (1902) 279 interprets this to imply that Socrates is justifying the late appearance of women by mentioning poetry, possibly invoking Sophron, whose female mimes followed the male ones.

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the imagination. Few have recognized this intention, and consequently raise several objections, which in turn produce various answers.17 Plato had already approached the issue of using images in Meno (81cff.) and Phaedo (72eff.), where their importance in understanding is explained by the theory of recollection. Once the imagination is comfortably grasping the pictorial message, reason becomes free to work on the complex details inaccessible to it. This insight into the peculiar needs of human knowledge is behind the extraordinary success of the dramatic presentation of Plato’s philosophical doctrines. Socrates reminds Glaucon that female dogs guard and hunt with the males without being incapacitated by bearing and rearing puppies. This has made one reviewer18 opine that Plato’s feminism could have partly resulted from observing them—a remark which highlights Plato’s interest in experience, often obscured by his unquestionable intellectualism. Glaucon agrees that dogs do everything in common, except that females are weaker (this is the fi rst reference to female weakness, found three more times during the discussion), and that animals that are used for the same things require the same rearing and education (451de). Socrates agrees, specifying that if we use women for the same things as men, they must be taught the same things: music (humanities), gymnastic, and the skills of war (451ef). The hypothetical form shows that for Socrates the dog analogy is not sufficient to conclude that women must have the same civic functions as men, but only that, if this can be proved, equality in education necessarily follows. The proof that it is possible and the best takes the rest of the argument.

17. Among those who think its use invalid, Aristotle (Pol. 1264b4–7) holds it absurd to argue, using animals analogously, that men and women should have the same civic activities, because animals do not have household duties. Reacting to this, P. Shorey (1930) n. c to 451c judges Aristotle’s objection literal-minded; but J. Adam (1902) 281, opposing Aristotle, considers the analogy valid because—according to him—Plato regards household management (ȠੁțȠȞȠȝȓĮ) against nature (ʌĮȡ੹ ijȪıȚȞ), and to be abolished. Others objecting to the analogy are R. L. Nettleship (1897) 174, who thinks that since human sex differentiation is the greatest, the analogy with lower animals proves nothing; E. Barker (1957) 120, who argues that animals “may be used to establish anything”; and B. and G. Tovey (1974) 592, who do not recognize the dogs’ limited role either as introductory image or as part of the argument, considering its use a serious flaw, inherent in arguments by analogy. There are also positive views: for Averroes (1974) 58–59 (Heb. 53.28–29 and 54.14–17), animal investigation shows it “fitting that there be women Guardians,” and B. Bosanquet (1895) 176 sees a recognition of man’s animal nature as valid, given the continuous Greek world vision. P. Shorey (1930) n. c to 451c also claims—correctly, in my view—that Socrates “is only pretending to deduce his conclusions from it.” J. Annas (1976) 308 concurs. 18. D. Wender (1973) 76.

The Logic of the First Wave 99 But before considering serious objections, Socrates anticipates the most dangerous one: ridicule (something Plato learned during Socrates’ trial19), and neutralizes it by presenting it himself in an extreme form: the spectacle of old women exercising naked in the palaestra. There is also a spate of reactions to this point among the commentators. 20 Socrates himself even mentions the wits who laughed when the custom was introduced for men, until reason showed that it is foolish to consider ridiculous anything but the bad (452a–d).

THE PRECISE MEANING OF PLATO’S “NATURE” In approaching Socrates’ argument, we must fi rst clear up problems in the interpretation of the word “nature.” It has been correctly pointed out 21 that Plato’s meaning of ijȪıȚȢ, like all his philosophical terminology, must be determined by context; it could mean the immutable nature of things, or blind energy opposed to Mind, or nature considered individually, or as characterized. 22 In his dialogues, Plato does use the term analogously, either in its absolute or universal sense (ʌȐȞIJȦȢ)—as in human beings’ ability to speak, for instance—or in two limited senses: particularly, as when distinguishing men’s and women’s different natures concerning procreation (their ability to conceive or engender), or individually, when referring to the aspect (İੇįȠȢ), which is the person’s skill in performing a determined activity (what we would call innate “endowment,” or “talent”)—as in the “natural” ability to do philosophy or make shoes. It is crucial to be aware that here in Book 5 Plato uses the notion of nature (ijȪıȚȢ) as applied to human beings not in the universal sense, but only individually or particularly. But it must be kept in mind that, in referring to “the nature of X” as he does here, its core meaning is always the same: nature is the principle of activities belonging to the being. In the argument we are addressing, “nature” (ijȪıȚȢ) is mostly limited (as the

19. See Apol. 19a–c. 20. J. Adam (1902) 282 thinks that Socrates exaggerates Spartan usage on women’s exercises; B. Jowett and Campbell (1894) III 225 bring up Aristophanes’ Lysistrata’s jokes about Spartan women’s gymnastics in the context of ridicule; L. Strauss (1964) 116 thinks that overturning custom by demanding sex-equality is presented less as shocking than as laughable; N. W. Senter (1977) 4–5 compares Socrates’ need to address ridicule to contemporary issues, when lack of rational consideration of women’s questions causes dismissal and ridicule of them; and M. F. Burnyeat (1992) 180 agrees with those who interpret that Plato is writing here with Aristophanes’ Ecclesiazousae in mind. They see Spartan customs on women’s physical development influencing Plato as he addresses ridicule, bringing up contemporary issues and Aristophanes’ works. 21. B. Jowett and L. Campbell (1894) II 318–319. 22. For “nature” in Plato see M. Ostwald (1977) 99.

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context makes pellucid) to mean “innate, concrete, individual disposition or capacity” (i.e., talent). 23 Many commentators, however, have not been able to avoid the minefield of the many, often subtle, senses of “nature,” both within Plato and in modern parlance, and have, sometimes inadvertently, been led astray. We need to take a brief look at them, to avoid falling into the same traps. What follows is a sketch of a few of the most characteristic mistakes on the topic (discussed at length, for those interested, in an appendix 24), which will allow the reader to avoid making them.

ERRORS ON THE NOTION OF “NATURE” Some25 err by interpreting Plato’s individual sense of nature either as universal or particular and so encounter unnecessary difficulties. 26 One can, however, see the distinction between individual and particular nature and still miss the point; in one case, 27 it is said that “women as a class have no ‘place,’” forgetting that the “nature” Socrates is talking about is woman’s individual talent, not woman as a particular class. Several other commentaries are foreign in one way or another to Plato’s thought: D. Wender28 interprets “nature” in a modern sense, calling it “typical mammalian behavior”; J. Adam 29 claims that Plato is trying to “get back to nature” in the sense of primitive living; S. M. Okin30 considers “nature” developmentally; and S. F. Halliwell31 as “instinct.” All of these interpretations lead one astray from what Plato is doing, and make the text an enigma, when in fact it is, structurally at least, rather simple. Appendices32 offer more explicit information on these positions. Let us then be clear. The question facing Socrates here is not whether the two sexes have different or common natures. Socrates is only asking whether, at the concrete level of individual aptitudes, a given individual human nature, even if female, is capable of the same tasks as an individual male. That is, do certain women have, as individuals, talents for the same

23. P. Shorey (1930) n. e to 453b, surprisingly, asserts that the emphasis on ijȪıȚȢ in this book “is of little significance” (we will show that he is mistaken). 24. Appendices to Chapter 5, pp. 122ff. 25. S. B. Levin (1996) 13–30, L. Irigaray (1996) Chapters 2 and 3, and R. Demos (1939). 26. C. McKeen (2006) 527–548 has needlessly elaborate attempts at explanation suffering an analogous problem. 27. C. Pierce (1973) 3. 28. D. Wender (1973) 88–89. 29. J. Adam (1902) 280. 30. S. M. Okin (1979) 52–53. 31. F. S. Halliwell (1993) 8. 32. Appendices to Chapter 5, pp. 122ff.

The Logic of the First Wave 101 tasks as certain men? Discovering that they do, he then will be able to say that men and women as such may have diff erent natures concerning reproductive functions, but with regard to other activities the difference is given by the individual nature (innate endowment or talent) of each person, and for these, being male or female is irrelevant.

THE ARGUMENT With this as background, we may resume. Socrates suggests that they start by formulating the opposition’s objection, to avoid leaving it without defenders (453a). Anticipating objections is a rhetorical strategy that usually formulates a “straw man” to facilitate their refutation. But here, Socrates seems to be asserting the strongest logical case against his view. The complaint, as stated by Socrates, defends the traditional view of sexual differences using his own notion of specialization of activities according to nature. This normative principle, according to which each citizen must perform in the city the activity for which he is endowed, was seen to become explicitly ethical in Rep. 433b, where it is defined as the virtue of integrity (justice: įȚțĮȚȠıȪȞȘ). Thus, his formulation of the objection reveals that the whole treatment of the question of woman Guardians will be grounded, in the words of M. I. Santa Cruz,33 in the fundamental theme of Republic, the question about integrity (justice).34 As stated by Socrates, the objection asserts that, since the nature of women differs greatly from that of men, their proper activities must be different, according to the nature of each gender. “You yourselves agreed at the very beginning when you founded your city that every person was to do the one thing that his nature fitted him for.35. . . Isn’t it true then that there is a tremendous difference in

33. M. I. Santa Cruz (1988) 40. Also G. Vlastos (1989) 289 and (1994) 21. Cf. Rep. 433a, 433d, and 434c, with 453b. 34. On this point, because J. Annas (1976) 313–314 fails to recognize the definition of integrity (justice in her translation) at the beginning of the argument (Rep. 434c), she finds it “remarkable in a work which makes proposals about women as radical as Republic, and which has as much to say about justice as Republic has, that inequality of the sexes is not presented as an injustice,” and equal-treatment proposals are not presented as making the State more just. She is using “justice” in the modern sense, not Plato’s sense of “integrity.” In addition, although I concur with N. D. Smith (1980) 5, that “the proposal of women Guardians is not entailed by Plato’s general theory of justice” (integrity)—since I think it results from examining the first difficulty to the analogy between city and soul—to resolve the issue Plato needs to resort to his own theory of integrity (justice). Thus, it cannot be said that Plato’s position “stands on its own” or is independent of his moral views, as Smith, 9, concludes. 35. Cf. Rep. 368b–374d.

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Plato’s Dialectic on Woman nature between men and woman?” “Of course there’s a difference!” “So isn’t it proper to assign a different task to each of them to fit their different natures? . . . Then how is it you’re not making a mistake now and contradicting yourselves when you assert on the contrary that men and women should do the same things, though they have natures that are polar opposites?” (453b–c)

The logical form of the argument of the opposition, as formulated by Socrates, is: Different natures must have different activities. Men and women have different natures. Therefore men and women must have different activities.

Socrates confesses to foreseeing the difficulty when he feared to approach the law (IJȠ૨ ȞȩȝȠȣ) on acquisition (țIJોıȚȞ) of women and rearing of children, and encourages his friends to swim to stay afloat in the discussion just as one who falls either in the immense sea or a small pond must swim. He underlines the risks of the task he is going to undertake by alluding to Herodotus’36 description of the poet Arion, that thrown into the sea by bandits was saved by a dolphin. Plato uses it as hope for salvation, with Socrates metaphorically expecting to be saved by one or to experience some other miraculous rescue.

1. ARGUMENT OF POSSIBILITY (452e–456c) To demonstrate that it is in principle possible (not contradictory) for women to perform the same civic activities as men, Socrates develops a distinct argument before the one showing it to be the best policy. This argument, characterized by M. I. Santa Cruz37 as dialectical, is neither utilitarian, pragmatic, nor feminist, but theoretical, and proceeds in two clearly distinct steps: the fi rst, granting procreative differences to the opposition as self-evident, moves on to distinguish procreation from other activities. This has been rejected38 as requiring additional premises, on grounds that it is supposedly necessary fi rst to show why the difference in women requires rearing. But Socrates’ purpose is not trying to free women from rearing (a modern concern). To refute the opposition, which is his objective, he needs only to show that sexual differences are irrelevant to the tasks of city administration. In doing this, he uses an amazing tour de force of logic: an

36. Herodotus I 23–24. 37. M. I. Santa Cruz (1988) 37. 38. By N. W. Senter (1977) 6–7.

The Logic of the First Wave 103 extremely sophisticated procedure practiced perfectly before logic had even been formulated into a science. What the first step of the argument does, then, is to distinguish two senses in the major premise of the objection; the second step, which is empirical, contradistinguishes (i.e., distinguishes in the opposite direction)39 the minor premise, thus showing that the objectors’ conclusion does not follow in the particular case in question. Schematically, what Socrates will be saying is: Major premise: “Different natures must have different activities” is true, when the natural differences are relevant to the activities in question false, when the natural differences are irrelevant to these activities. Minor premise: “Men and women have different natures” is false, as relevant to civic activities true, as not relevant to civic activities. (Note that the “false” and “true” are opposite to the above; hence the term “contradistinction.”) Therefore, it does not follow that men’s and women’s natures must have different civic activities. Of course, it must be proved that in fact the major premise has the two senses, and it also must be proved not only that the minor premise also has two senses (one true and one false), but that it is the false sense which applies to the true sense of the major premise. Let us now follow the proof step by step.

(a) The Logic of the Major Premise (454a–e). Socrates’ answer begins by distinguishing between the objection’s eristic approach based only on words (ੑȞȩȝĮIJĮ) and dialectical thought that considers what they refer to in reality (İੇįȠȢ). This procedure, where

39. That is, what is true in the major is shown to be false in the minor and vice versa, as below. Contradistinction (See M. W. Shallo, S. J. [1923] 86f.h) is a logical procedure which became popular in the “disputations” of the Middle Ages, used to refute an ambiguous argument, which is only valid in part. First, the major premise is distinguished into two senses, one true and one false. The minor premise is then “contradistinguished” into two contrary senses, showing that the minor does not apply to the opponent’s true sense, and does apply to the false sense, thus proving that the opponent’s argument is invalid. Plato’s procedure is an informal version of this: In it, “different natures must have different tasks” is true only when the difference is relevant to the task; it is false when they are not. In what amounts to the minor premise, Plato shows that the difference in natures is not a relevant difference, and therefore it does not follow that they must have different tasks.

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dialectic (įȚȐȜİțIJȠȢ) appears in relation to the Forms, characterizes Platonic dialectic,40 distinguishing it from its Socratic elenctic method, now left behind. The constructive tone (454a) brings it closer to the method Plato promotes in Rep. 7 (532a–d), develops in its relation to the Forms in Parmenides, and describes as procedure of Division in Phaedrus. 41 But here, the term “dialectic” is introduced to overcome ambiguity by discerning the Forms or aspects (İ੅įȘ įȚĮȚȡȠȪȝİȞȠȚ) (454a) to which the words’ different meanings refer, and so make clear in which respect (ʌȡઁȢ IJȓ) they differ (454b). As Plato says in Sophist (218c), “we must each and every time agree about the fact itself through reasoning rather than by words without reason.” For B. Bosanquet,42 the difference between eristic and dialectic relates to “the immature logical theory of his day,” for which sometimes only tautologies are true. He judges the theory of predication “the great achievement,” making Plato the true founder of logic. It should be noted that the error Socrates fi nds in the objection consists in what Aristotle would later classify as a four-term syllogism, where what applies only to the part is said of the whole.43 Here, “nature” is used by the opposition in two different senses. Socrates acknowledges this by asserting that we must consider the Form (aspect) of the endowment (talent) to which “nature” refers, and the activity toward which it is directed. The text is unambiguous: [When we said] different natures ought to have different tasks, we were boldly following the eristic way of arguing about words (ਥȡȚıIJȚț૵Ȣ țĮIJ੹ IJઁ ੕ȞȠȝĮ), and we never bothered to look at in what aspect (İੇįȠȢ) the natures were the same and different, and in reference to what (ʌȡઁȢ IJȓ) we were trying to defi ne them when we assigned different tasks to different natures and the same tasks to the same ones. (454b) That is, it is not enough to say that two natures are different. It is necessary to determine in relation to what they are different. On this, N. W. Senter, N. D. Smith, C.G. Allen, and A. W. Saxonhouse represent common

40. W. Jaeger (1943) v. II, 3.4 101ff., and III, 9 309–312. 41. Plato describes the dialectic method in Phdr. 265d–266d and Soph. 218bc and 253d. C. H. Kahn (1996) 298 considers it remarkable that the concept of dialectic using the method of Division (not described until Phaedrus) is mentioned as an aside at Rep. 454a, before its central discussion in Book 7. This is not only “the fi rst dialogue in which Plato actually tells us what he means by dialectic,” Kahn remarks, but the term “dialectic” (įȚĮȜȑȖİıșĮȚ) is used to designate a method for the fi rst time. He also notices that Plato uses here both the contrast between dialectic and eristic found in Meno, Euthydemus, and Phaedo, and also dialectic as division according to kinds, not important until Phaedrus. 42. B. Bosanquet (1895) 178–179. 43. A sophism called secundum quid , S. E. 166b38–167a21.

The Logic of the First Wave 105 misinterpretations.44 Most need to realize that Plato considers it against nature to use sex to determine social functions, not because of his view that the soul is sexless, but because sex is not relevant to performing governmental activities. It would be relevant, for instance, in a hypothetical devastating war, if a Greek city were to open immigration to males in order to balance the population. Other commentaries see sexual differences as affecting the whole person.45 Those views are beside the point even if true, because they would only mean that the aptitude for this or that activity (found in individuals of both sexes) expresses itself differently in each sex, not that one or the other would lack a particular aptitude. Accordingly, Socrates must now apply his criterion. He appeals again to the imagination with an example revealing graphically the need to distinguish the major premise: to say that different natures must exercise different activities in an absolute sense would be like saying that bald men and men with hair couldn’t both be cobblers, because they differ in their natures (454c). Socrates knows that the affirmation is ridiculous and the conclusion absurd. Thus, it proves the major premise erroneous. The reason is that it interprets as “different” in an absolute sense (simpliciter) men’s and women’s natures, which are not different in every sense but only in some respect (secundum quid), since what interests us here is only the kind of diversity or difference pertinent to the activities in question.

THE MEANING OF THE EXAMPLE The example of men with and without hair, however, except for few accurate readings,46 has tripped up quite a few commentators. For brevity’s sake, we will deal with the commentaries in this chapter’s appendix.47

44. N. W. Senter (1977) 6 reads it as “equivocation on the meaning of ‘nature.’” Another common fallacy uses the soul, as when N. D. Smith (1983) 472 equates men’s and women’s natures with sexless souls embodied. This sense of nature, even if true, is not the one Socrates uses to develop this argument. In addition, C. G. Allen (1975) 135 concludes that humans can have no differences in nature, and A. W. Saxonhouse (1976) 198–202 and (1994) 70–74 objects that “the female body as a bearer of children cannot be dissociated from her phusis.” 45. A. E. Taylor (1908) 278, for instance, conceives Plato as underestimating the significance of sex; for E. Barker (1957) 225 and (1966) 86, sex in woman’s nature is not isolated but colors her whole being, and sex difference is “a vital difference of nature and almost of kind”; H. D. P. Lee (1955) 42 also interprets physiological differences as entailing profound psychological differences. 46. B. and G. Tovey (1974) 595 n. 34, B. Calvert (1975) 232, J. Annas (1976) 308, and N. W. Senter (1977) 6. 47. See pp. 125ff.

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But because so many interpretations miss what Plato is doing at this point, we need to make a short parenthesis in the analysis of the argument, and examine the function that the example of bald and hairy men has in its development, to be able to go back to the major premise with a clear notion of the example’s function. The comparison does not intend to equate in any sense hairiness and reproduction. Plato is only interested in the pertinence of the differences to the functions in each case, whether they are physical or not, or fundamental (important) or not. Hence, all the analogy is trying to say is two things: (1) We know at least one instance in which natural differences (differences in “nature”) have nothing to do with people’s aptitudes for a given task: bald men have different “natures” from hairy men, but these differences have no effect on either’s skill as a cobbler. (2) Therefore, it might also be the case that sexual differences are also irrelevant to a person’s ability to perform civic duties. In other words, men’s and women’s sexual “natures” with respect to civic activities might be like (i.e., as irrelevant as) the “nature” of hairiness or its lack is to one’s “nature” as a cobbler. Socrates then illustrates in an example how he understands the term “nature” here: a man and a woman with souls gifted for medicine (a possible example because, as S. B. Pomeroy48 has shown, there were not only midwives but also female physicians in Athens) would have the same “nature” in the sense that Socrates postulates, while a (presumably male) physician and a carpenter would have different natures (454d). The manuscripts disagree on whether the two physicians are males, or male and female. Among the many trying to settle the issue, B. Bosanquet’s49 argument shows that male and female physicians accomplish Plato’s goal better. 50 Thus, from Socrates’ example it follows that:

48. S. B. Pomeroy (1978) 499–450 offers evidence of female physicians in IV century Greece. 49. B. Bosanquet (1895) 180–181. 50. He judges it a truism to say that two people fit to be physicians have the same nature when the question is “what sameness in nature fi ts people for the same occupation.” This shows that using male and female physicians accomplishes Plato’s goal better; he is clarifying the precise sense in which he means “nature”: not in all respects, but as the special aptitude for a defi nite task. They may have different natures in other respects, such as the capacity to swim. This seems to be S. B. Pomeroy’s (1978) 497–500 misunderstanding. Among others, B. Jowett and L. Campbell (1894) III 221 prefer two males, acknowledging weak support. J. Adam (1902) 287 joins them. The former claim that it would be clumsy to assume in women, at the beginning, the capacity Plato wants to prove; the latter considers woman’s introduction premature. K. J. Hermann, E. Stephanus, J. Burnet, P. Shorey, F. M. Cornford, A. Bloom, R. Waterfi eld, and G. A. Blair adopt a reading with ੁĮIJȡȚțȒȞ.

The Logic of the First Wave 107 If there is evidence that there is a difference between the male and female human sexes that’s relevant to some skill or other task, we will say that each have to be assigned their proper role;51 but if the only difference there is evidence for is that females conceive children and males impregnate females, we will say that no proof has been given that a man is different from a woman for what we have been talking about, and we still think that the Guardians and their wives should be given the same tasks. (emphasis added) (454d–e) The affirmation is hypothetical, and must be proved. In what follows, he proves the implicit minor premise by showing that since there is no task women perform that men cannot perform equally well, women do not have a proper sphere of activity beyond sexual roles. This allows him to conclude that the objection is invalid, and that only individual capacity (“nature” as natural talent) must determine which activities she could be assigned to perform, although the performance of the average woman will always be inferior to that of the average man. This does not deny that she has the talent, but merely asserts a different degree of it. Let us examine the argument.

(b) Empirical Verification of the Minor Premise (454e–455e). Socrates has solved the theoretical problem posed by the major premise of the objection (i.e., different natures must have different tasks only if the difference is relevant). As to the proof of the minor premise, he explicitly places the burden on the opposition (who originally asserted that women must be given separate tasks): Then is it not the next step to have our opponent tell us precisely in relation to what profession or occupation dealing with the managing of society it is that the nature of a man and a woman are different? (455a) Socrates knows that the opposition is not going to be able to do this, stating that his opponent will claim that “it is not easy to find a satisfactory answer suddenly,” but that he can find one if given enough time (455a). But then Socrates undertakes to show him that in fact it cannot be done, by proving that there is no task peculiar to a woman (੅įȚȠȞ ȖȣȞĮȚțȓ) dealing with managing a society. (455b)

51. I. Bekker (1826) 514 rejects Marsilio Ficino’s reading as a question: “If men and women are not different, should we assign them different functions?” Ficino reads “ȝ੽ . . . ,” where Bekker has “į੽ . . .” (the reading accepted today).

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Some, such as Allen, 52 mistake this as an independent argument predicting a weakening of the State if women, already inferior, are not educated; but Socrates is merely answering an objection here, not trying to prove his own position; he is establishing that the opposition has no case against him. This negative way of stating his purpose is objected to by a few.53 But in order to falsify that “men and women as genders have capacities for different social activities,” Socrates needs only to show that women do not have, as such, proper activities (different from those of men) in the whole social order. 54 Socrates then begins his contradistinction55 of the minor premise by describing the criterion for evaluating endowments (i.e., “natures”), an important responsibility of the Rulers: the capacity of the mind to learn and advance quickly and independently, and the ability also of the body to serve thought satisfactorily (455b–c). This establishes the basic competence for a task.56 Showing that differences in nature are manifested and evaluated during education also answers Annas’57 question about how to determine relevant ones. Note that here, Plato is stressing that assigning activities depends on the kinds of skills people have, not their degree of proficiency for them—once they can be judged “skilled” rather than “inept.” Degrees of skill beyond the “basic competence” mentioned above are irrelevant. This will become significant as the argument progresses. Socrates then draws upon his own experience, considering it obvious that men can perform every human activity better than women, even those the latter are proud of, such as weaving and cooking. Rather than make a tedious list, he uses an a fortiori argument: if men are better at

52. C. G. Allen (1975) 135. 53. C. Pierce (1994) 27, among them, replies to the objection of sexism by recalling Plato’s practice of making his opponent “agree to some outrageous view only to pull the rug out from under him by showing where his views lead.” 54. B. and G. Tovey (1974) 595, overlooking the logic of this step, qualify it as “surprising” and as a “strange procedure” used to withstand the “enormous prejudices” against women threatening men’s exclusive leadership. But all Socrates is doing is refuting the doctrine of the “proper sphere” in the social order. Commenting on this, G. Vlastos (1989) 276, and (1994) 14, remarks that the rejection of the conventional view that “diff erence of sex must determine difference of work allocation” is Plato’s most radical innovation about women, since precedents existed with respect to other issues, such as women’s political and legal rights in Aristophanes, and even for shared women in Herodotus. 55. Cf. p. 103, n. 39. 56. 451b. In addition, J. Annas’ charge that Plato’s theory of human nature was not factual overlooks Socrates’ careful examination of it when provoked by the question about integrity (justice) in Book IV (e.g., 434ab). 57. J. Annas (1981) 182.

The Logic of the First Wave 109 these supposed “women’s specialties,” then they are better in all areas. In the text, Socrates states his conclusion as a question: Do you know of anything mankind does in which the masculine sex is not better than the feminine in all these ways? (455cd) Socrates’ question has been regarded58 as rhetorical, taking a step backwards here to make a concession to the male audience. However, to interpret Plato as a product of his culture has been judged59 an oversimplification. I prefer to read that he was trying to convince Athenian men by working from their prejudices. The text, it must be said, is ambiguous here; it could, taken out of context, mean that women are better only in insignificant activities such as weaving and cooking.60 But the logic Plato is developing intends to show (as Socrates explicitly says, in the quotation just above) that men are better in everything and not only in what is important—and, because men in fact cooked during campaigns and wove in Egypt,61 it would be odd, to say the least, to have him assert that what men do (when weaving and cooking) is inferior to what women do.62 This is confi rmed by the sequence of the verbal moods where Plato says that in this point the feminine gender believes that it is something (IJȚ įȠțİ૙ . . . İੇȞĮȚ), and coming out last is most ridiculous (țĮIJĮȖİȜĮıIJȩIJĮIJȩȞ ਥıIJȚ . . . ਲIJIJȫȝİȞȠȞ). (455d) The translation of “IJȚ įȠțİ૙ . . . İੇȞĮȚ” is literal; the meaning is clearly “something special.” In English colloquial use, “thinks he’s something” has this sense also. The indicative mood signifies a factual state, not something possible. If you interpret the passage to mean instead that women are better than men in weaving and cooking (domestic tasks), this implies that they should have a defi nite social role, though subordinate, which is the position of the objectors, exactly the opposite of what Socrates claims he has proved. Thus, in context, it cannot have the (out of context) meaning above.

58. F. S. Halliwell (1993) 150 n. to 455c4–6. He even alludes to possible tensions in Plato’s views of women (though he does not examine them). 59. N. W. Senter (1977) 4 and 8–10, who equates Socrates’ statement with contemporary mistakes about women’s abilities in nontraditional roles and also fi nds evidence in Greek culture against generalizations of inferiority. 60. A. W. Saxonhouse (1976) 199 and (1994) 71. 61. G. Grote (1888) IV 172 cites as source Hdt. ii 35. To J. Adam (1902) 288, Grote exaggerates Socrates’ comment. 62. The same applies to Averroes’ view (1974) 57–58 (Heb. 53. 10–15) on women excelling men in musical interpretation.

110 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman But Socrates’ question prompts the response from Glaucon, which leaves room for the exceptions required by the argument: Of course, many women are better than many men in many things, but broadly speaking, it is as you say. (455d) What Plato is actually doing here is reminding us that the degree of skill does vary from person to person, even after one has established basic competence. But he is stressing that, “broadly speaking,” men are better than women in all civic skills, which is all he needs to establish (i.e., that though their “nature” may be superior in degree, it is not different in kind, requiring separate tasks). Note that Glaucon’s expression (IJઁ į੻ ੖ȜȠȞ ਩ȤİȚ) cannot be translated as “en casi todo” (in almost all), as A. J. Cappelletti63 does. In context, Plato’s phrase has to mean “in a word,” or “to say it briefly.”64 Glaucon’s qualification implies that in a given case, an extraordinary woman could be best of all, or that some could be good enough to be in the highest class (allowing for the possibility of a few woman Guardians). This was why I said earlier that the discounting of degrees of difference of skills beyond basic competence would become relevant. Women can be skilled enough to be Guardians, even if, on average, they are not as skilled as (most of) the men. If Glaucon’s response makes the argument “moot,” as has been said,65 then Socrates has not offered any reason justifying his position but rather one against it, since that women are better suited for some tasks (to which they should then be assigned) is the argument of the opposition. Socrates’ assertion has been qualified as a Trojan horse66 to gain Glaucon’s acceptance of exceptions; but actually, Socrates is accepting common opinion here. Aristotle67 shares it: “the male is by nature superior, and the female

63. A. J. Cappelletti (1980) 90. The “all” is [ਥȞ] ਚʌĮıȚȞ, meaning “absolutely all.” Cappelletti takes the next phrase, ੪Ȣ ਩ʌȠȢ İੁʌİ૙Ȟ, as meaning “so to speak” (i.e., “more or less”); but in that case, the “all” would have been simply ʌȐıȚȞ. 64. Though J. F. Smith (1994) 37–41 reads Plato anticipating contemporary psychology, fi nding “greater variation among individuals within one sex group than between” male and female, G. Grote’s interpretation of Plato is that generally and collectively women are not better fit than men for any profession, but individual differences make many women superior to many men; but he adds: “no women will equal the best men,” only the second best. This does not follow logically nor is it pertinent, though Plato may agree with it. Socrates affi rms only that average women are inferior in every capacity to average men, which does not exclude logically some woman’s even being better than all men. C. Pierce (1994) 27 also notes this. 65. F. S. Halliwell (1993) 151 n. to 455c6–7. 66. B. and G. Tovey (1974) 596. 67. Aristotle Pol. 1254b12–15.

The Logic of the First Wave 111 inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind.”68 It has, however, been noted69 that Glaucon’s remark does not destroy the argument, but makes it more powerful by showing that affi rmations about the majority cannot allow inferences about any individual person’s capacity. The conclusion is70 that research into sexual differences “ought to have no social consequences of any kind,” and that Plato argues not from equality but from irrelevant class differences. In any case, once Socrates has established that there is no activity where men do not have more ability than women, the argument of the opposition fails. That is, the opposition could not prove that women have (relevantly) different natures from men. This leaves Socrates free to assert that men’s and women’s natures are the same with respect to civic duties.71 On that assumption, he takes the next step: [T]here are no activities among the ones performed by the administrators of the city that belong to a woman because she is a woman or to a man because he is a man. (455d) He can do this precisely because tasks are to be assigned on the basis of individual talents, and what has been established is that there is no reason for saying that a given individual woman cannot have a talent for anything

68. If to refute “separate spheres” we need men’s superiority in all fields, say B. Calvert and J. Annas, equality is in danger, because if no woman has the same nature as the best men, differences are pertinent, disqualifying her. But Plato is not trying to establish “equality” in the modern sense; he is merely saying that some women might have at least basic competence in the social sphere. B. Calvert (1075) 236–237, 239, and 241 resolves Plato’s apparent inconsistency between his principle of justice and the differences from women’s weakness by acknowledging fi rst that woman’s inferiority is affi rmed collectively as a class, not distributively (ȖȑȞȠȢ, never ਪțĮıIJȠȢ). He also attributes the appearance of what he calls a second argument to tactical reasons intending to show that men’s superiority is inconsistent with the “separate spheres” doctrine, and interprets Plato’s affi rmation of women’s inferiority as descriptive (due to culture and education), not natural. But Calvert misses the logical purpose of refuting the objector’s minor premise. This is also J. Annas’ (1976) 310–311 and (1975) 238 objection. She also commits here the sophism of division: fi rst, by interpreting men as better than women distributively and not collectively; second, by not recognizing differences as quantitative, not qualitative (having the same talent in different degrees). 69. H. Lesser (1979) 113 and 114. 70. Contrary to J. Annas (1976) 310. 71. Note that strictly speaking, the failure to prove that they are different does not of itself prove that they are the same, but Socrates is “free to assert” that they are the same, because there is now no reason (no argument) for denying his assertion.

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a man can do. Plato makes government, remarks J. Adam,72 a question of capacity, not sex. But for J. Annas,73 however, neglecting to demonstrate that man has no exclusive activities is a serious gap, given the importance it has for feminists today. We may forgive Plato for not thinking so far ahead, but refuting the opposition does not require this.74 Socrates affi rms that the natures are distributed throughout both sexes (ਕȝijȠ૙Ȟ IJȠ૙Ȟ ȗ૴ȠȚȞ— both animals), and a woman shares in all of the tasks according to her [sc. individual] nature, and so does a man—but for all of them, a woman is weaker than a man. (455d–e) It might be thought75 that the text also seems to extend men’s functions to those traditionally proper to women, as the care of newborns (460b), for instance. But only what is relevant to civic duties is considered here, and so Plato is not “blind to the essential facts of human nature” for regarding woman’s greater weakness the only difference between the sexes. Plato possibly also had in mind Phaedo’s implication from transmigration that gives every person the same fundamental capacities (otherwise, how could they migrate into different bodies?). This, and the empirical evidence which seems obvious to Socrates, enables him to conclude as evident that men and women have the same nature regarding the administration of the city. Note also female weakness asserted for the second time here. In any case, it does not follow that men and women must have different civic activities; the opposition’s argument has failed. C. Pierce,76 describing the empirical verification of the argument devoid of its logical structure, concludes that it may “be construed as an attempt to grant as much as any misogynist could desire, and still show the logical implication to be equal opportunity for both sexes.” She fi nds it an ingenious critique of arguments against equality for women. In the wider context, however, equal opportunity is only an effect of Plato’s reflection on the fi rst difficulty in the analogy between city and soul.

72. J. Adam (1902) 289. 73. J. Annas (1976) 309. 74. On the assumption that women’s talents are not separate from men’s in that they are a subset of men’s talents (a logical possibility here)—meaning that men can do all that women do, but there are also some other tasks that only men can perform—Socrates has still refuted the opposition, because since there is no separate sphere for women, then there is no separate sphere for men as such, but only for (some) individual men. The point is precisely that one must look to the individual, not to maleness or femaleness. 75. B. Bosanquet (1895) 182. 76. C. Pierce (1973) 3, and (1994) Bat-Ami Bar On ed., 27.

The Logic of the First Wave 113 But the argument is not yet over, since a false conclusion logically implies the truth of the contradictory proposition. Therefore, “women’s having to have different activities is false” implies “it is possible for women to share city government with men.” This was the purpose of the argument. There is no reason for surprise77 that Socrates argues for equality of opportunity in occupation without explicit mention that it is natural and just. I think that probably Plato was supposing an audience keenly aware of the relevance of principles developed previously.

WHAT THE PROOF REVEALS We must pause here to take full stock of the importance of the demonstration. Plato hides the dryness of the logic so well that some78 even complain that the argument “is hardly being conducted on a very lofty or rigorous plane,” and that the demonstration is “not of the powers of logical argumentation, but of a skillful rhetoric” used to dislodge entrenched prejudices of male arrogance. Moreover, they evaluate Plato’s argument as “a clear non sequitur” when Socrates, to refute the opposition, uses his experience as obvious. It is not enough, therefore, simply to be surprised at the fact that until now the logical structure of this proof as Plato developed it has escaped commentators, or to admire the architectural character of the passage, built on the base of a rigorously unified logical structure. It is more critical to recognize what we said earlier: the extraordinary command and sophistication of detail revealed in developing a complex logical procedure at a time when logic as a science and its rules had not yet been formalized. It is one thing to be able to reason cleverly and adequately, quite another to have a command of technical and complex procedures to a degree unheard of at the time. This shows clearly the genius of Plato. And in fact, he portrays Socrates himself as fully aware here of the grueling feat accomplished when, in introducing the second wave, he expresses his fatigue and need for a change of pace by asking his friends to let him take a break to relax and have a holiday using his imagination to daydream instead of arguing. But before he does this, agreeing with Glaucon’s qualification that many women are better than many men in many things (455d), Socrates draws the consequences: men cannot be the only ones assigned to social functions, because it is supposed that there are women gifted for medicine, music, athletic life and war, women lovers of wisdom and those endowed with aggressiveness, and others who are not. Since the former are qualities required to become a Guardian, Socrates concludes that there would be, therefore, some women capable of being Guardians and others who are not. He sums up:

77. M. S. Kochin (2002) 62. 78. B. and G. Tovey (1974) 596–597 and 600.

114 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman Women and men have the same nature for watching over the city, except that one is weaker and the other is stronger.79 (456a) This is the third time that female weakness is stated. So it is not true, as has been thought,80 that nature (ijȪıȚȢ) is not found in negative remarks about women; in no less than three places,81 while asserting that men and women share the same pursuits and have the same ijȪıȚȢ, Plato limits each statement, qualifying that women are weaker than men in all (as he does previously [451de] with female dogs). After this, Socrates announces the matter of the second wave by stating that women of this kind must be selected to live with men of this kind, since they are capable and of kindred nature. In this, he differs from both Politicus (309b, 310c–e) and Laws (773a–c), which advise marriages among opposite natures. Adam82 considers this unnecessary in Republic, where the Guardians’ character unites strength and sensibility. Finally, Socrates states that he has proved what he intended: And in fact we weren’t legislating something impossible or visionary, since the law we proposed was consistent with nature (țĮIJ੹ ijȪıȚȞ); it’s what we have now that looks as if it is contrary to nature (ʌĮȡ੹ ijȪıȚȞ). (456c) Now that the possibility of women Guardians has been established in principle, Socrates must prove that it is the best policy for the city, which implies that it ought to be adopted. (Though B. Bosanquet83 believes that Plato has proved desirability also, because what is suitable to the nature is desirable.) What follows below, however, argues against this.

2. WHETHER THIS PROPOSAL IS THE BEST (456C–457B) The argument showing the proposal as the best alternative is simple, starting from the previous conclusion prescribing the same education for men and women Guardians: the best men and citizens in the city will be those who had the Guardians’ education; similarly, the best women in the city will be those educated as Guardians. There does not exist anything better for the city than the best men and women. Therefore the institution proposed is not only possible but also best and necessary for the city.

79. J. Adam (1902) 289 prefers ਕıșİȞİıIJȑȡĮ ਲ਼ ੁıȤȣȡȠIJȑȡĮ to ਕıșİȞİıIJȑȡĮ ੁıȤȣȡȠIJȑȡĮ (with A 2), because it stresses that nature is the same, stronger in men and weaker in women. 80. S. B. Levin (1996) 25. 81. Rep. 455de, 456a, and 457ab. 82. J. Adam (1902) 289. 83. B. Bosanquet (1895) 177.

The Logic of the First Wave 115 In conclusion, Guardian women, covered only by their virtue, will be devoted exclusively to war and to the guardianship of the city, but will perform lighter tasks because of their weakness as a class (457a–b). This is the fourth reference to female weakness. Socrates fi nishes by stating that those who laugh at women exercising naked for the most noble ends are not aware of what they are laughing at, because what is useful is beautiful and what is harmful, ugly.

PLATO’S COMMITMENT TO THE DOCTRINE Plato shows his adherence to this position on woman whenever the topic arises. One Platonist84 notes that the philosopher writes on no other topic with more conviction than on men’s and women’s equality in social functions. For instance, in the second wave the officials taking care of the newborn will be either men or women or both, because presumably these responsibilities will be held jointly by women and men too. (460b) Later Socrates also reconfi rms Glaucon’s acceptance: So you agree with having the women share everything with the men in the way we described, from their education and taking care of children down to defending the other citizens; you think they ought to take on police work with them and be in combat with them and hunt with them in the way female watchdogs do . . . (466c) concluding that to have all in common is best and according to female human nature. Glaucon concurs. Likewise, while discussing war, Socrates denies differences in male and female contributions, rejecting that it is impossible for men to fi ght wars together with women and children (466e–467a). Plato’s reference to military education leaves “no doubt on the scope of the principle.”85 Women warriors have also been found in Critias’ description of prehistoric Athens, even if it is not “the austere philosophical ideal of Republic.”86 Socrates also emphasizes Plato’s commitment when replying to Glaucon’s praise of the Rulers’ life:

84. G. Grote (1888) 171. 85. B. Bosanquet (1895) 176. 86. E. Barker (1957) 269–270.

116

Plato’s Dialectic on Woman And on the women Rulers (IJ੹Ȣ ਕȡȤȠȪıĮȢ) too, Glaucon . . . don’t think that anything I have said applies more to the men than to those of the women whose natures are found to be adequate. (540c)

J. Annas87 misses the importance of IJ੹Ȣ ਕȡȤȠȪıĮȢ here, when she states that in Republic “there is only one reference to women officials” (460b9–10), even then in a traditional “feminine” role; and S. M. Okin88 also overlooks it when she suggests “philosopher monarchs.” But in this connection, it has been remarked, interestingly,89 that the feminine participle ਕȡȤȠȪıĮȢ (used to correct Glaucon’s indeterminate expression ਙȡȤȠȞIJĮȢ, 540c) is the fi rst known argument of linguistic feminism, since Glaucon’s omission obscured woman’s potential. In fact, Book 8’s familiar Platonic recapitulation of the agreement on common education specifies that the tasks [for men and women] are to be common in war and peace. (543a) In addition, Plato’s endorsement of his theory does not end in Republic. Timaeus confi rms it while recapitulating some of the ideal city’s issues from Socrates’ speech “yesterday” (i.e., Republic). Remarkably, the selection includes the thesis of the fi rst wave, but excludes (possibly to avoid resistance) the proposal of the philosopher-king and the education of the Rulers: And in fact we also remarked about the women that their natures would have to be brought into close harmony with the men, and that all the tasks given to them would be common, both in war and in every other aspect of life. (Tim. 18c) Finally, the city of Republic is reaffi rmed in Laws (739bd) as closest to the ideal, best, and happiest. Although only the community of wives but not women’s equality is mentioned there, the unrelenting effort throughout Laws to incorporate them into all activities (insofar as prudently possible in a concrete State) constitutes a notable departure from Greek law. Here, G. Grote90 remarks that Laws shows “[h]ow strongly Plato was attached to his doctrine about the capacity of women [and]

87. J. Annas (1976) 311. 88. S. M. Okin (1977) 358. 89. By M. Nussbaum (1985) 41, who, however, affi rms with no qualification that Plato did not accept women into the Academy because of their poor education (but see Chapter 2, pp. 53ff.) . 90. G. Grote (1888) 195.

The Logic of the First Wave 117 how unchanged his opinion continued,” and M. L. Osborne91 also fi nds remarkable how little Plato’s position on woman changes throughout his works; also C. G. Allen, 92 comparing Timaeus and Republic, recognizes Plato consistency. Plato’s commitment to this doctrine makes it untenable to sustain that his view of woman was quickly forgotten as soon as its purpose overcoming a difficulty in the analogy was achieved. Although the demands of the analogy forced Plato to face the question of woman, the result is authentic Platonic doctrine, consistent throughout and, as we will see, fi rmly rooted in his metaphysics and increasingly refi ned in later works. Among the myriad of (in my view mistaken) interpretations of Plato’s position, two approaches are frequent and need to be mentioned: in the fi rst, several writers have contrasted current feminist tenets with Plato’s view; in the second, Plato is used as a springboard for particular positions. Since my purpose is only to identify the essential features of Plato’s theory of woman and provide a strictly philosophical evaluation of it once this is done, their perspective is outside the range of this work. But for the reader to be aware of these other approaches, I am including in an appendix to this chapter93 one representative example of each.

EXAMINING WOMAN’S WEAKNESS A remarkable feature of the fi rst wave which has provoked commentary is the fact that, during its development, Socrates states four times that the female sex is weaker.94 The problem requires some examination, since it has been taken as Plato’s conceiving women with no real capacity to be Guardians and thus not proposing his theory seriously. One solution has been to interpret ਕıșȑȞİȚĮ 95 as referring exclusively to the body. But although this reading is justified in the analogy of female watchdogs (451e) and could be understood as referring to the physical level in woman’s participation in war and physical tasks of guardianship (457a–b), it is unsuitable as applied to the capacity of woman for all activities (455d–e, 456a), specifying medicine, music, gymnastics, and wisdom—three of which, if not all, are not purely physical. So Plato must mean what he says. It must also be noted that even in Republic’s highest class, not all the members will be equal in talent (though all of them will be more talented 91. 92. 93. 94. 95.

M. L. Osborne (1979) 447–451. C. G. Allen (1975) 131–138. Appendix C to Chapter 5, pp. 126ff. Rep. 451de, 455de, 456a, and 457ab. I. Bekker (1826) 509 quotes Marsilio Ficino’s translation of ੪Ȣ ਕıșİȞİıIJȑȡĮȚȢ as ut imbecillioribus, but of course the Latin meaning is “as weaker.”

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than the auxiliaries). Hence, women’s weakness does not exclude them from belonging to this class, provided that (as is possible for Plato) some are more gifted than (or as gifted as) the least gifted men in the class. This is true even supposing the most gifted woman to be less gifted than the most gifted man (something which itself is not even logically entailed by the argument). Plato’s experience of Athenian women, whose intellectual development had been stunted by their seclusion within the home, the meagerness of their education, and early marriage, 96 could have influenced his belief in the vulnerability of the female sex. But considering exceptional women such as Aspasia probably persuaded him not to make an unrestricted generalization but to leave room for exceptions. Although this fact did not generate Plato’s position, as has been asserted, 97 it certainly could have been a contributing factor in it. Pythagoras’ school could have influenced Plato as well, since it included women members, among them the outstanding Theanus, 98 Pythagoras’ wife, probably head of the school after his death. Although the feminine is among negative categories in their table of opposites, Pythagoreans conceived woman as capable of governing.99 Plato was surely familiar with this view. He seems to have grown more and more convinced that the whole issue was education; his determination to overcome its lack is one of the few remarkable departures from Attic legal practice in Laws. The issue will become clearer when we realize that Plato’s proof dealing with women Guardians in Republic, narrowly tailored to fit the needs of the argument, is just the tip of the iceberg; his metaphysics of the soul is the hidden weight under the surface. What explains the compatibility of the physical and moral weakness of woman with her incorporation into the functions of government is implicit in Republic and not clearly articulated until Plato returns to the topic in Timaeus and Laws, although his conception of the body-soul dualism, which underpins it, was already, as we mentioned, discussed in Phaedo. In Plato, woman’s inferiority is fundamentally moral, and secondarily, and only as a consequence, physical. Instead of determining, her body is only manifesting the current moral state of her soul.

CONSIDERATION PRELIMINARY TO A CONCLUSION The preceding treatment of the text makes it now possible to recognize a fundamental fact: the metaphysical principles of Plato’s philosophical

96. Cf. Chapter 7, 181ff. 97. N. D. Smith (1980) 9. 98. She was the daughter of the Orphic Brontinus, mentioned by Porphyry, VP 18, and by Diogenes Laertius, VIII 42. 99. Stob. 85.19 in E. Cantarella (1987) 56–57.

The Logic of the First Wave 119 anthropology, grounding his conception of woman, are fundamentally dualist. According to this, a person is a soul, and the body is nothing but a place to which the soul happens to be attached. The body is appropriate to the soul that is in it; the soul determines the body, not the body the soul. This is the heart of Plato’s view of what it is to be human. Unfamiliarity with nondualistic views is found in many commentaries. Among them, C. Pierce100 reacts with surprise to a A. E. Taylor’s101 assertion that sex distinction “modifies the whole spiritual life profoundly,” judging this view “implausible,” and a “peculiar idea,” without realizing that Aristotle102 opposed Plato’s dualism (human beings as two complete substances, body and soul, in forced coexistence) by applying his hylemorphic theory describing the human substance as one single being with spiritual and material aspects. This dualism of body and soul has tripped up many commentators, who tacitly hold it themselves and fi nd various dilemmas in their attempt to reconcile Plato with contemporary views of woman, or in critiquing Plato because he does not seem to agree with their conceptions. Since their views are worth examining but too lengthy to place here, I refer the reader to the Appendix E of this chapter103 for a discussion of them. The first wave of Book 5 we have described contains Plato’s contribution to his theory of woman in Republic. The two other waves of difficulty that make up the book undertake problems that are foreign to the theory of woman but refer to the city-soul analogy: the second faces the problem that nuclear families cause to the analogy, and is treated, not in a philosophical, but in a dramatic/rhetorical way and reported in Chapter 1.104 The complete treatment of the third wave, which unfolds what is contained in the idea of the philosopher-king, extends to Books 6 and 7 and contains the most profound pages of Republic. Its consideration, however, is outside the scope of this study.

CONCLUSION The following conclusion acknowledges the results of both the analysis of the text and the critical evaluation of representative commentaries on the matter. It must be noted fi rst that the complex presentation of the theme of woman in Republic contrasts with the simpler Socratic treatment in Meno, in that the topic of woman is no longer purely ethical but expands into political theory, philosophy of education, and even mathematics, as seen in

100. 101. 102. 103. 104.

C. Pierce (1973) 6–7. A. E. Taylor (1927) 278. Aristotle An. II, 412a 28. Appendix E of Chapter 5, pp. 128ff. Chapter 1, pp. 25ff.

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the treatment of the nuptial scheme.105 Also new is the addition of animal analogies106 to the craft107 analogies used in Book 1. The former elenctic Socrates is now a Socrates who, after an initial hesitation, confidently endeavors to demonstrate his position dialectically, even proposing and refuting the thesis that objects to his project on women Guardians. At this point, since Socrates’ view is discussed within the framework offered by the fi rst difficulty in the analogy (that unlike the city, the soul lacks male and female parts), the argument presupposes the tripartite soul and the three classes in the State, a class division which underlines the aristocratic bent of Plato’s political theory, far from Socrates’ populism shown in Meno.108 But, although the discussion is meant universally, it is developed by focusing concretely on the Guardians. At this time, Plato distinguishes civic from procreative functions, using his notions of nature (the talent for a determinate activity) and integrity (justice, doing one’s own work) to raise the possibility of women’s being qualified to perform governmental activities. It must be recognized here that by limiting sexual difference to physical procreation, Plato conceives the soul not only as asexual but also as the base of human equality and of individual destiny, determined by virtue. The Platonic soul as person, seen already in Phaedo,109 is an ethical reality involved in a moral drama, and its excellence varies in degree at different stages of its mythical pilgrimage from body to body, until it frees itself defi nitively from all bodily life. Socrates’ argument here introduces two theses about woman: 1. Woman, as such, has no proper civic sphere; no activities, beyond those involved in procreation, are exclusively hers. 2. Woman is morally and physically weaker than man, making their diversity quantitative, not qualitative. Those are the two pillars of the theory at this stage. But considered in terms of general principles, the argument of women Guardians in Republic is a particular application of Plato’s anthropological dualism which, as seen above, conceives human beings constituted by two coexisting substances, body and soul. This is the reason why for Plato sexuality belongs exclusively to the body and that, since the person is the soul, gender difference is extrinsic to it, the body only reflecting the soul’s moral state; hence, the equality of men and women as persons (souls) follows from Plato’s dualism. This position maintains an admirable consistency throughout, against any charge that he contradicts himself; it is also the basis for the indiscriminate distribution of civic assignments to women capable of them.

105. Rep. 460a. See J. M. Pabón and M. Fernández Galiano (1969) II 131 n. 1. 106. See E. Barker (1957) 119. 107. Or, more precisely, “techne analogy” as preferred by D. L. Roochnik (1986) 295–310 or (1992) 185–197. 108. G. Vlastos (1991) 47–49. 109. E.g., Phaedo, 67c.

The Logic of the First Wave 121 Still, since Plato insists on woman’s inferiority four times in the text, the meaning of this equality requires precision: women are equal to men in kind, but they suffer an existential quantitative inferiority in the circumstantial incarnation to which they are subjected, which is manifested through the body; thus, woman’s equality is qualitative, not quantitative. But since the body simply manifests the moral state of the soul, Plato’s explanation cannot put the total blame for inferiority on the body itself. His dualism does not allow one to say that one’s gender affects one’s spiritual life; it is, if anything, the other way around. Nor is it the result, as some contend, of Plato’s struggle to explain his experience of both women’s lacking education and exceptionally brilliant women, by opening all tasks to individual talent. The fact is that Plato’s conception of woman evolves from his metaphysics and is not subject to the vagaries of the moment. Hence, the essential equality of all human souls explains the equality of man and woman, and the de facto, not essential but current and superable, moral inferiority of the soul of woman is the reason for her quantitative difference, which is thus surmountable and allows for exceptions. Plato holds this position consistently throughout. In sum, the fi rst wave shows once more the noncontradictory quality of Plato’s reflection, and the importance that his philosophical principles have on woman. Given that the moral state of each person is not irrevocable but mobile,110 Plato believes that some women can overcome their weakness as a class and achieve the virtue necessary to govern (455d). Thus, we may conclude that his purpose is not that of manipulating the current distinction between men’s and women’s virtues to move them closer to a single human standard, as some interpret, but rather that the Rulers’ integrity (justice), which determines each person’s activity in the city by judging individual natural gifts, makes individual excellence possible in women as well as in men. It should now be evident how inadequate are the positions that see Plato as concerned with women’s emancipation, rights, or duties, or fi nd in his statements a denial of woman’s psychological or spiritual differences and of her unique contribution, particularly within her role in the family. The roots of Plato’s theory will be uncovered in more and more detail as we examine other texts, like a statue being liberated from its marble block, revealing a secure and consistent position. Plato has yet to give the cosmological framework of this position, which must wait for Timaeus’ theory of transmigration, the mytho-metaphysical formulation of the essential equality of all souls which justifies the equality of woman as a person, and which in Laws is going to justify governmental assignments. Though the basic idea carries through, the particular char-

110. Cf. Tim. 42c–d.

122 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman acteristics of the texts on woman in each dialogue must be understood keeping in mind Plato’s purpose in writing the dialogue. Finally, it must be noted that Plato’s treatment of woman reveals the extraordinary intellectual independence of his reflection. Unlike most philosophers throughout history, who often fi nd the way to justify rationally the status quo when writing about woman, Plato does not hesitate to go contrary to the most ingrained views of the culture to develop a theory totally unheard of, in both its reach and its radical import. Indeed, the intellectual feat that Plato accomplishes in treating the first wave, seen in all that it implies, makes one wonder why it has been not only passed over but been subject to so many mistaken and, it must be said, superficial interpretations throughout the history of Platonic studies, especially by those who blame Plato for contradicting himself.

APPENDICES

A. Errors on the Notion of “Nature” One of the errors in understanding how Plato uses his notion of “nature” is that of mistaking the individual sense for either the universal or particular one: S. B. Levin,111 for instance, confuses two ways in which Plato uses the term, when she wonders “how Plato is able to speak, at the same time, of different types of human nature and of only one type of relation between the soul’s elements as ‘natural.’” She needs to distinguish that in the fi rst case, Plato is talking about individual talent differing from person to person, and only in the second about what is shared by all human souls. The recognition of the precise meaning of “nature” (its analogous use) would also have avoided superfluous intricate efforts at explanation such as C. McKeen’s.112 And when L. Irigaray113 postulates exclusively two real natures, “male nature” and “female nature” (the particular sense of the term), denying the real existence of “human nature,” she equivocates between the real and the logical orders. Examining a nature always requires the conception of universals, which are abstractions from what is real, but referring to what is real. Thus from individual human beings (who are what is real), the intellect may abstract (as Socrates is mainly doing here) either (a) the principle which is the source of some (individual) expertise, or alternatively, (b) “man’s” and “woman’s” (particular) “natures” by focusing on the principles of activities that belong to one or the other

111. S. B. Levin (1996) 23. 112. C. McKeen (2006) 532ff. 113. L. Irigaray (1996) 35–41.

The Logic of the First Wave 123 sex, or (c) (universal) “human nature,” focusing on activities that both can perform.114 R. Demos115 understands diversification in the State as based on nature as talent, not sex, but he also takes nature universally (not individually, as Plato does here) to conclude that, since women are as rational as men, their difference with men is no more important than that between men. This, even if true, has no relevance to what Plato says at this point. Thinking that Plato’s emphasis on individual talent excludes consideration of “nature” in other respects, C. S. Pierce116 perceives, as we said, the importance of the distinction, stressing that “if the language of human nature (one’s nature is one’s ability) is used correctly to apply to individuals rather than classes, the doctrine of woman’s place is undercut.” But when she says: “Women as a class have no ‘place’. . . only individuals have natural places,” she forgets that Plato is talking about civic activities only, which does not deny that woman as such has a nature (e.g., the ability to suckle infants), as N. W. Senter117 also suggests. Another problem is caused by considering “nature” using behavioristic terms: D. Wender118 interprets “nature” in Plato in a modern sense as “typically mammalian behavior” (one way of looking at the universal application). She also interprets Plato’s philosophy not as the search for truth but as a means to “invent” government, god, or women, following his preferences. While Plato is using “nature” as a tool of investigation, Wender charges him with worshiping it. Also, her judgment of Plato’s writing as a way of justifying his emotional preferences not only lacks evidence, but also reveals a deep misunderstanding of the very core of his philosophy. J. Adam119 exemplifies still another error. He sees Plato as affected by the desire in Greek literature to go “back to nature” and, noting the appeal to ijȪıȚȢ, submits that equality of activities is “natural” in two senses: because it is in harmony with men’s and women’s common human nature (universal sense), and as suggested by the analogy with the nature of lower animals (the “back-to-nature” sense). Neither meaning, however, is what Plato

114. L. Irigaray may be referring to the fact that an activity which is human (such as thinking) will be modifi ed by the way it is expressed in each gender, making a woman’s way of thinking different from a man’s. But that does not make the sexual nature any more “real,” because, as one can see, an individual man who is a genius thinks differently from a man who is not. The issue is whether the action in question belongs to the individual as an individual, or as a member of a gender, or as a member of the human race; all three of these are, as we have seen above, abstractions from the (real) concrete individual. 115. R. Demos (1939) 359. 116. C. Pierce (1973) 3. 117. N. W. Senter (1977) 11. 118. D. Wender (1973) 88–89. 119. J. Adam (1902) 280.

124 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman intends here. Plato’s reference to nature points to Book 2 (369b), where the city’s origin was found in individual needs. The solution is specialization, which presupposes different and complementary capacities (“natures” in that sense) in all citizens. Another modern sense is the developmental one. S. M. Okin120 raises the objection that since Plato’s “nature” develops by an education that women lacked, he cannot fi nd out whether women are capable or not by nature. But again there is a misunderstanding. She errs by applying the transient Athenian situation to Socrates’ theoretical elaboration; on this, she agrees with Averroes,121 for whom woman’s competence is unknown since they lacked education, frequently resembling plants. But Plato’s point here is that women’s capacity is rooted in their respective individual natures (which, developed or not, are “there”) (370a–c); this principle, contributing to the continuity between Book 5 and those preceding it, is now going to serve to investigate woman’s capacity and her function in society. In addition, although Okin,122 quoting Phaedrus,123 recognizes “nature” in Plato as the principle of activity, she also takes the term universally as essence when Plato is using it here individually as innate endowment. Moreover, she interprets “nature” as prescriptive and not descriptive of the truth about something, seen—in Thrasymachus’ terms—as what the legislator conventionally and arbitrarily judges to be best and tells the citizens is natural, as if reason created nature instead of discovering it. Thus, she asserts that the rational, not the natural, is Plato’s central standard. This view is utterly foreign to Plato’s philosophy. A further modern sense of the term takes “nature” as “instinct,” as Halliwell124 seems to do. He recognizes that one of Plato’s uses of nature “makes reference to individuals”; but the fact that the Guardians’ sexual desires are thwarted when necessary is understood as a thwarting of nature (i.e., instinct). But this (403a, 458d) is in fact a regulation of emotions by reason (403b), and is consistent with what Plato understands as the relation between instinct and reason in humans (i.e., what is natural for them). Halliwell’s125 interpretation of “nature as manifested through biology” implies that man is an irrational animal with reason an accidental accretion, while for Plato uncontrolled biological impulses, as irrational, are inconsistent with human nature. Plato’s nature is not opposed to ethics; to be ethical is to be true to one’s integrated nature, not to follow the nature of disparate parts. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125.

S. M. Okin (1979) 52–53. Averroes (1974) 59 (Heb. 54.5–14). S. M. Okin (1979) 51, 65 and 68. Phdr. 270d. See also 245c. F. S. Halliwell (1993) 8. Ibid., (1993) 9.

The Logic of the First Wave 125

B. The Bald and the Hairy E. J. Urwick,126 M. S. Kochin,127 S. Forde,128 L. Strauss129 and A. Bloom130 think that Plato conceived the difference between the sexes as comparable to that between men with and without hair. For some, such as R. H. S. Crossman, B. Jowett and L. Campbell, G. Grote, D. Wender, C. Pierce, and A. W. Saxonhouse, the analogy suggests that sexual difference is purely accidental.131 For others, including C. G. Allen, E. V. Spelman, S. M. Okin, S. B. Pomeroy, S. B. Levin, and F. S. Halliwell, the analogy is purely physiological and irrelevant to “nature” understood as soul.132 But note that the analogy is not between the two sets (bald men and men with hair and cobbling are not analogous to men and women and

126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131.

E. J. Urwick (1920) 81. M. S. Kochin (2002) 60. S. Forde (1997) 659f. L. Strauss (1964) 117. For his views see p. 58, n. 65. A. Bloom (1968) 383. R. H. S. Crossman (1939) 204f. thinks that to hold that reason is shared by both genders, Plato must deny sex differentiation as fundamental; B. Jowett (1892) III CLXXIX, that Plato is asking here whether men and women are essentially different or not, fi nding only the accidental difference that men engender and women conceive. B. Jowett and L. Campbell’s (1894) 200–201, subtitle, asks: “Is there an essential or only an accidental difference between men and women?” This is not considered at this point. Plato only affi rms that the capacities to engender and conceive are irrelevant to city administration, not whether they are essential or accidental. Variations of this mistake are also found in G. Grote (1888) IV 171, D. Wender (1973) 76, C. Pierce (1973) 6 and A. W. Saxonhouse (1976) 199 plus (1994) 71. 132. C. G. Allen (1975) 135–136 submits that since the difference between bald men and men with hair belongs to their bodies, it is not in their nature (understood universally as essence and identified with the soul). She concludes analogously that the sexes have the same nature and should be given equal opportunities. This mistake is found also in E. V. Spelman (1988) 19–36; (1944) ed. N. Tuana 90–91, 94, 98, and 100; ed. Bat-Ami Bar On 6–7, 9–10, 14, and 16, who also affi rms that sex is irrelevant to the point at hand because, since it does not differentiate souls, it cannot reveal what kind of soul the person has; this makes it difficult to explain Plato’s cowardly man reincarnating into a woman, revealing “a fittingness of one kind of soul to one kind of body.” Later she states that “a difference in bodily features is not necessarily a sign of a difference in nature, and that what is crucial is whether two people have he same mind or soul.” S. M. Okin (1977) 357 and (1979) 39 also interprets sex as “no more related to the soul than the presence or absence of hair.” For S. B. Pomeroy (1978) 498, Plato demonstrates the irrelevance of external physical characteristics in determining the pursuits appropriate to individual natures and the quality of a person’s soul. S. B. Levin (1996) 27 makes the same mistake. Since F. S Halliwell (1993) 148 n. to 454c2 and 3 considers differences in sex physiological like those in hair, they “need not entail distinctions at the level of social functions,” and “do not differ in their essential capacities.”

126

Plato’s Dialectic on Woman

civic activities); nor does it compare the parts of the two sets (bald men and men with hair are not analogous to men and women nor is cobbling to civic activities). What is analogous (partly the same and partly different) is solely the fact that a particular difference between the agents in each case is irrelevant to the capacity for the task at hand. (Not necessarily for all occupations; baldness and hairiness would be relevant, for instance, if the activity were to model hair fashions; and the sexual difference would be pertinent in applying for a wet-nursing job.) Plato is not asserting by this analogy that sexual differences are in fact irrelevant to the ability to perform civic functions; this remains to be proved later. As usual, Plato advances his arguments by minute steps. In this case he concludes nothing more than that (since the example shows that the major premise is not universally true) it could be the case that sexual differences do not imply different functions. He only furnishes here the logical basis for his next step.

C. Less Likely Interpretations Among the myriad of (in my view mistaken) interpretations of Plato’s position, two approaches are frequent and need to be mentioned: in the first, several writers have contrasted current feminist tenets with Plato’s view; in the second, Plato is used as a springboard for particular positions. Since my purpose is only to identify the essential features of Plato’s theory of woman, and provide a strictly philosophical evaluation of it once this is done, their perspective is outside the range of this work.133 But for the reader to be aware of other approaches, I am including one representative example of each. As to the first approach, J. Annas134 contrasts two diverging mentalities: the liberal feminist’s and Plato’s. This has provoked J. Darling135 to charge that her problem was that Plato “is not a modern western liberal.” It would be difficult to deny that Annas’ characterizations of the two views are striking: feminism as hedonistic individualism, concerned with self-satisfaction of desires, political power, money, and status, and not merely unconcerned about the State, but apparently seeing an anarchist opposition between self-realization and common welfare. Instead, she sees Plato as a collectivist authoritarian, unconcerned about women’s rights, sexual desires, or self-interest, developing a utilitarian argument foreign to modern equality of opportunity, but only centered on the city—its unity, eugenics, and the common good—and forcing a strict regulation of sex life which ignores the satisfaction of sexual desire.

133. Considering the issue, J. F. Smith (1983) 597–598 and (1994) 27 comments that as long as Plato’s contributions on woman are couched in terms such as “feminism,” “fairness,” “equality of opportunity,” “egalitarianism,” etc., the debate will be confused and unending. 134. J. Annas (1976) 309, 311–312 n. 11, 315, 319. 135. J. Darling (1986) 128 n. 5.

The Logic of the First Wave 127 To this, H. Lesser,136 citing Rep. 519e, objects that for Plato, public efficiency and personal fulfillment are not mutually exclusive but complementary. I find Annas’ argument foreign to the meaning of Plato’s text, which is describing the logical requirements of an ideal city in theory in order to understand the soul better, not devising a practical political plan from the perspective of a social activist. But she leaves no doubt that he is not a modern Western liberal feminist, radical or otherwise. As to the second approach, L. Lange’s137 work interprets Plato as freeing women from confi nement by incorporating them into public life. She accepts Plato’s opposition between private and public life; but the ideological intention of the work, stated by the editors’ introduction, vii f. (to reveal the sexism of traditional political theory), is not helpful in investigating Plato’s philosophy, because it subordinates his reflection to political purposes foreign to it, distorting its meaning. For Lange, Plato is not a feminist because he does not require the same number of women as men among the Guardians (no affirmative action and no quotas); women are inferior (hence, fewer will be guardians—no necessity for any to be); and uses property language for them. She judges Plato’s justice (integrity) as “anomalous,” since it is not egalitarian, unaware that she is using our contemporary notion of justice, different from the meaning įȚțĮȚȠıȪȞȘ has in Plato, as honesty or integrity (432b–443b). Lange’s disagreements are metaphysical and from philosophical anthropology, and must be discussed at that level, not in their applications. N. H. Bluestone138 quotes Huntington Cains as denying philosophical value to this approach.

D. Woman’s Weakness in the Commentaries Among those discussing Plato’s fourfold affi rmation of women’s weakness, A. J. Cappelletti,139 for instance, rejects H. Lesser’s140 view that for Plato each should be judged according to his talents, because for Cappelletti, asserting that as classes women are weaker than men introduces a capitis diminutio for any woman, the group projecting its limitations on the individual, and individual differences strengthening the cohesiveness of the State, instead of promoting the rights of the oppressed (as he would expect). Plato’s State appears to him hierarchical and coercive with fi xed classes, men and women Guardians enjoying philosophy, inaccessible for all others; not to mention that women are used as sex objects. He does not recognize that in Plato’s theoretical society each person would occupy the place for

136. 137. 138. 139. 140.

H. Lesser (1979) 115. L. Lange (1979) 3–15. N. H. Bluestone (1987) 7. A. J. Cappelletti (1980) 94. H. Lesser (1979) 113–117.

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which he is gifted (where, consequently, he would be happiest), resulting in social harmony as well as making each happy. Among others, E. Zeller,141 A. E. Taylor,142 E. Barker,143 and H. D. P. Lee144 believe Plato wanted to overcome woman’s confinement as socially detrimental. In fact, as seen above,145 women seem to have attended Plato’s lectures, and at least two women, Axiothea of Phlius146 and Lastheneia of Mantinea, are reported as among Plato’s and Speusippus’ pupils in the Academy.147 Although Plato’s position on women does not derive from his moral philosophy, since the occasion was the difficulty she creates for the city-soul analogy—providing the independent condition that N. D. Smith148 postulates as necessary to explain it—this does not require the theory to be, as Smith suggests, independent of his moral philosophy. Plato is an organic thinker, and woman is part of his reflection. We must distinguish what prompted his reflection from the reflection itself, an integral part of his philosophy. Another commentary comes from E. V. Spelman,149 who conceives woman’s body as the determining factor, although men and women are equal because they are souls (since sexual differences belong to the body), but women are “quintessentially body-directed.” But later,150 she interprets Plato’s souls as gendered (while recognizing that the body expresses the state of the soul), using woman in three ambiguous configurations: “manly soul-female body” (the female philosopher-ruler); “womanly soul-male body” (the cowardly male soldier), and “womanly soul-female body” (the typical Athenian woman). Spelman’s basically sane approach overstresses the role of the body, without adverting to the fact that Plato’s basic approach is ethical, understanding woman’s inferiority as morally determined and producing physical effects. Thus, her body is only revealing the moral state of her soul.

E. Plato’s Dualism and Contemporary Commentaries We need to contrast briefly the fact of Plato’s dualism with some presentday positions extrinsic to it, and to see how far afield and in how many

141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147.

E. Zeller (1876) 456–457. A. E. Taylor (1908) 115. E. Barker (1957) 220. H. D. P. Lee (1955) 41. See Chapter 2, pp. 53ff. Sources do not agree. Themistius gives Arcadia instead of Phlius. C. D. C. Reeve (2001), in a book of imaginary dialogues, has the women discussing Republic’s topics among themselves and with other Academicians. The fi rst dialogue is a revised version of a previously published dialogue (1997), with corrections (such as replacing the anachronistic use of “rights” with “welfare,” etc.). 148. N. D. Smith (1980) 5. 149. E. V. Spelman (1982) 110–119. 150. Ibid. (1988) and (1994) ed. Bat-Ami, 100.

The Logic of the First Wave 129 different directions one can be taken if one misses the foundations of Plato’s view. This will make it easier to recognize its importance in the task of formulating his theory of woman. Among contemporary views, A. Dickason151 judges Plato’s conception of woman’s social functions as inconsistent and depending on different biological theories at different times, without recognizing that biological considerations are foreign to Platonic elaboration, and that his priority of the soul over the body cannot be doubted. M. L. Osborne152 and C. G. Allen153 object to Dickason by stressing that the soul, not the body, counts, since only differences in virtue are Plato’s determining element. Although Osborne does not solve the difficulty of men’s and women’s souls having equal natures while differing in virtue (which requires distinguishing essential and existential aspects in the soul), her view is consistent. Other commentaries presuppose Plato’s dualism without explicitly recognizing it. S. Forde’s154 argument of equality based on the rational view of human nature as essential, for instance, was rightly able to imply that the soul is asexual, since he recognizes that for Plato sexual differences belong exclusively to the body. F. S. Halliwell,155 similarly, reads Plato as advancing a “gender-neutral interpretation of human nature,” where role equality “is a minimisation of gender” [italics his] advocated, not as a radical innovation, but as a logical application of his metaphysics of the soul, where the person is the soul and the soul is asexual, which alters the “conception of woman as a genus.” In fact, the indiscriminate assignment of civic duties to qualifi ed men or women arises precisely as a consequence of Plato’s view of human nature, in which gender does not affect the person’s civic talents. This answers N. D. Smith’s156 question of why “Women doing their own” is unlike “slaves doing their own.” Platonic sex-difference is extrinsic to the soul (person), while slaves, although they would also “do their own,” differ in being outside the Greek community, thereby not being considered as citizens. The reason is political. Several writers157 rightly have held, for different reasons, that sexual equality is qualitative, not quantitative. It must be recognized that Plato’s Athenian experience adds a turn to the theory: although equal in kind, woman has for

151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157.

A. Dickason (1973) 46. M. L. Osborne (1975) 447. C. G. Allen (1975) 135. S. Forde (1997) 661. F. S. Halliwell (1993) 15. N. D. Smith’s (1980) 9. Averroes (1974) 57 Heb. 53.8ff.; J. L. Davies and D. J. Vaughan (1852) XVIII; E. Zeller (1876) 184; T. Gomperz (1905) III 78; E. Barker (1957) 220–221; J. M. Pabón and M. Fernández Galiano (1969) I 18.CIII, and A. J. Cappelletti (1980) 91.

130 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman Plato an existential quantitative inferiority, which is an inferiority in degree in the incarnation to which she is subjected. R. H. S. Crossman,158 missing the meaning of this distinction, believes that “the attempt to demand ‘equality of status’ relegates woman to an inferior position, making her the weaker competitor in a race she must mostly lose.” Likewise, E. Elrod159 does not quite recognize that women are “equal” only qualitatively when stating that for a class defined as inferior in all activities, the choice is to open all tasks to individual talent or to exclude the whole class from all tasks, a dilemma, she said, that may make even a misogynist hesitate. On the soul-body relation, E. V. Spelman,160 recognizing Plato’s dualism, goes as far as to state that any kind of soul can exist in any kind of body, even as she mentions Laws (944de), where a cowardly soldier’s appropriate punishment is to be changed into a woman. She does not consider that a solution must overcome the body/soul opposition, and that Plato has made clear in Timaeus (90e–91a) that the body expresses the moral state of the soul. Several other commentaries manifest the same unawareness, and their reflections reveal that this is a stumbling block for modern readers, inattentive to the relevance that Plato’s dualism has on his consideration about woman; M. S. Kochin,161 for instance, reads that Plato is manipulating the current understanding of the distinction between men’s and women’s virtues to move them closer to a single human standard; E. Barker162 fi nds the proposal “quixotic and impracticable”; for H. D. P. Lee163 it is an exaggeration of a good thing, denying women’s unique contribution and making them inferior men; for L. Lange,164 the idea distinguishes Plato from his contemporaries, in spite of what she sees as the inadequacy of his feminism; Barker165 focuses not on woman’s rights but on duties to the State; and F. S. Halliwell,166 who also sees role equality as serving “State controlled collectivism” divorced from individual liberty, and claims167 that Plato challenges Athenian attitudes “with slightly less than complete conviction,” says that Plato’s submissions are in “radical contradiction” to the customs of classical Athens.168 Others object to his denial of psy-

158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168.

R. H. S. Crossman (1939) 209. E. Elrod (1978) 9. E. V. Spelman (1982) 124 n. 6. M. S. Kochin (2002) 62. E. Barker (1957) 225 and (1966) 88–89. H. D. P. Lee (1955) 41–42. L. Lange (1979) 3. E. Barker (1957) 221. F. S. Halliwell (1993) 9 and 15. Ibid., p. 145, n. to 453b. Ibid., p. 9.

The Logic of the First Wave 131 chological and spiritual gender differences, and to devaluating women’s role in the family. To conclude, we must recognize those who, although generally critical of the community of women in the second wave, are mostly positive on this. Among them, T. Gomperz169 praises Plato on woman’s emancipation [sic] as “the pure and complete truth, almost without admixture of error”; G. M. A. Grube170 calls Plato “an apostle of women’s rights,” and B. Bosanquet171 declares extraordinary Plato’s intuition, judging the current system against nature.

169. T. Gomperz (1905) III 124. 170. G. M. A. Grube (1966) 88. 171. B. Bosanquet (1895) 182.

6

Thematic Transformation The Cosmology of Woman in Timaeus

We enter a new dialectical moment in Plato’s reflection on woman. As with every issue throughout his work, the growth of Plato’s thought on woman follows a pattern where each step has a role in the totality. Its architecture has a quasi-symphonic character, and might be compared to the thematic transformation introduced into musical theory by Franz Liszt, where a basic recurring theme undergoes constant change while serving the structural unity, each new idea containing undercurrents of the fi rst theme, but playing an entirely new part in the composition.1 This is not to say that Plato had a “plan” throughout, but simply that the mind of a genius develops, by and large, consistently with itself. In other words, discoveries build on previous discoveries, and are not detached from them. Analogously, the consideration of woman in Timaeus is a new dialectical step in the development of Plato’s conception about her, but though its approach is quite different from that of previous dialogues, both the cosmological focus and the use of myth shine a new light on the topic, enriching it. The dialectical reflection on woman started by Meno’s Socratic version, distinguished from other views in Symposium, and having its full Platonic elaboration in Republic, can still be recognized here in its mythical and cosmological formulation. But this new step broadens our perspective by forcing us to consider woman in the context of her place in the cosmos, and deepens it by compelling us to examine the language of myth as a Platonic form of expression. Before attempting an interpretation, let us briefly review a few relevant features. First, by way of introduction, a bit of history: medieval studies of Timaeus originally examined only its initial section on the origin of the cosmos. Introduced into Europe by Chalcidius’ fifth-century translation, this segment (up to 53c) contributed to the perception of Timaeus as a

1. My insight on the musical character of Plato’s treatment of woman anticipates the thesis of Jay Kennedy (2010) that symbolic musical structures are embedded into Plato’s dialogues and that he uses codes and mathematical symbols in organizing his works.

Thematic Transformation 133 treatise on physics; thus, few paid attention to the second part, which did not reach Europe until the twelfth century. Then, when—through Bacon’s influence—physics was dissociated from fi nal causes, Timaeus was relegated to the sphere of historical studies. But in the last century, interest was reawakened by Heisenberg, who interpreted with K. Popper the Platonic geometric structure of the world as the basis of modern cosmology, finding the latter more akin to Timaeus than to Democritus.2 Surprising analogies, such as the specific stereometric form of the atoms, their correlation, destructibility, and the principle of indeterminacy, were identified.3 But interest in Plato’s physics was limited to the first part, saying little about the texts dealing with woman, in spite of their importance.

THE TEXT The dialogue begins by recapitulating from Republic Socrates’ discourse delivered “yesterday” (17c–19b). Timaeus, Critias, and Hermocrates are to have a conversation “today” with Socrates about the ideal city’s progress. Timaeus’ description of the origin of the cosmos contains what most assume to be Plato’s own synthesis of the existing sciences, affi rming, against Democritus’ mechanism, a teleological and rational conception of the universe. Critias’ story of Atlantis appears in the second dialogue of the supposed trilogy, the incomplete Critias. Nothing is said about Hermocrates’ discourse. He probably was to describe Greek culture’s reappearance after Critias’ cataclysm, but Laws occupied Plato instead.4 The trilogy would have featured creation, prehistory, and reformation. Timaeus’ initial cosmological discourse describes the Demiurge’s turning the chaos into order following eternal Ideas, dealing with the origin of the world’s soul and body, time, the planetary gods, the doctrine of the elements, and sensible matter. The Demiurge then creates the immortal part of the souls and sows them into earth, moon, and other temporal organs, giving the created gods the task of forming mortal bodies and the rest of the human soul. The construction of the human body out of the four elements requires a new principle: the receptacle of becoming, added to the Idea and its copy; it also requires geometry to explain the cosmos. The description includes physics, chemistry, meteorology, physiology, and medicine. To this section belongs the famous passage using “mother” metaphorically (49a–53a). As seen in Chapter 1, 5 however, this text, in spite of its enormous force, does not have philosophical significance about woman as mother but only, as we

2. 3. 4. 5.

As reported by W. K. C. Guthrie (1989) V 242. P. Friedländer (1969) III 356. According to F. M. Cornford (1957) 7–8. Chapter 1, pp. 19ff.

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showed, a dramatic function.6 It clarifies what is not known, the “receptacle of becoming,” by means of what is known: what the Greek understood by “mother.” Hence, it does not qualify as a philosophical text on woman.7 We fi nd the philosophically relevant texts on woman in Timaeus’ less read second part, which depicts the origin of the human soul and body: its anatomy, physiology, and pathology. These contain the evidence that Timaeus’ myth provides the metaphysical underpinnings of his position on woman, and confi rm the consistency of Plato’s conception throughout his works. Framed by the description of the origin of man and the language of myth, Plato’s reflection on woman is limited to six short passages.8 The state of his theory on the topic must be deduced from them.

INTERPRETATIVE DIFFICULTIES Interpreting Timaeus’ texts on women requires overcoming three preliminary problems: (1) Whether the dialogue contains Plato’s thought or merely documents contemporary scientific theories, especially those of Philistion of Syracuse and the Pythagoreans; if Timaeus only reports current ideas, as some believe, we must abandon it as a source of Platonic thought on woman. (2) What the function of Timaeus is in Plato’s philosophy. This must be answered before establishing the relationship between the texts on woman in Timaeus and the rest of the dialogues. (3) What the role of myth is in Plato’s work, which must be settled, at least to some extent, before being able to discern its application to woman. Since a defi nitive solution of these difficulties is beyond the scope of this study, we will try to adopt the results of the best current investigations. The following is a review of authoritative fi ndings on these three issues.

1) The Paternity of Timaeus’ Cosmology This problem has a long history. According to one report,9 Aristotle understood Timaeus as Plato’s philosophy of science. He10 seems to include

6. In addition to this dramatic usage, Timaeus also contains other mythological feminine figures or invocations of goddesses (21a, e, 22a, 23d, 24 b–d, 26e, 27c, 40bc, 40e, 47d). 7. A. P. Estévez (1986) 185, G. Lloyd (1984) 4–5, and D. F. Krell (1975) 414, however, unaware of the distinction, read the Receptacle as Plato’s view of woman. Krell’s interpretation, for instance, forces him to say that the mother as purely receptive contradicts Republic’s stress on selecting the best women for procreation, since the latter implies that they contribute positively to it. 8. Tim. 18cd; 41–42a; 42b; 42cd; 69e–70a; 76de; 91a. 9. W. K. C. Guthrie (1989) V 241. 10. Arist. De Caelo 279b32–280a1.

Thematic Transformation 135 Xenocrates among those understanding Plato’s generation of the cosmos as a didactic instrument and not literally, but both accept Timaeus as Plato’s reflection. T. Gomperz11 agrees that Timaeus contains Plato’s theories on nature. A. E. Taylor and E. Frank,12 however, argue against this on grounds that Plato’s own ideas on the subject were more advanced. But later criticism13 dismisses Taylor’s interpretation. There is some dispute14 on the matter, but the best evidence seems to indicate that Timaeus is a Platonic synthesis of contemporary scientific thought, especially Philolaus’ and Architas’ Pythagorean mathematics, and also that of Theaetetus himself, plus Philistion of Syracuse’s biology, not as originally formulated, but integrated into a Platonic teleological and rational vision of the universe,15 superseding Democritus’ mechanism. On this question, then, I accept Aristotle, Gomperz, Cornford, Guthrie, C. M. Turbayne, and T. M. Robinson, against Taylor, Frank, and Krell. Although the issue would have had more importance if Timaeus’ texts on woman contradicted those in other dialogues (analysis will show instead that they complement each other), the outcome serves to legitimate Plato’s metaphysical and cosmic contribution to the theory about her.

2) Man and the Cosmos: Timaeus’ Function within Plato’s Philosophy Timaeus reveals Plato’s anthropology as tied to his cosmology. The correspondence of the macrocosmic and microcosmic—the world and the human creature—in Plato has been noted.16 Several Platonists17 underline the link between physics and ethics, the structure of the cosmos and human existence. For A. Rivaud and C. M. Turbayne,18 Plato considered the section on man as the most important, and developed all the rest to prepare for it. In Republic, man was the micropolis; here he is the microcosm; both are treatises on the science of man, not on politics and cosmology.

11. T. Gomperz (1905) 200. 12. A. E. Taylor(1927) 446 n. 1 and 452; also (1962) 19 and 636; and E. Frank (1923) 128–129 et passim. 13. P. Shorey (1928) 345, and (1980) 190; F. M. Cornford (1957) viii–xii and 6 and W. K. C. Guthrie (1989) V 287 n. 1. 14. R. D. Archer-Hind (1888) 12 and n.1; and U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff. 15. On the originality of Plato’s successive cosmologies, see C. Mugler (1960). 16. H. D. P. Lee (1965) 9. 17. F. M. Cornford (1957) 6; T. Gomperz (1905) 216 and 207; P. Friedländer (1969) III 360; A. E. Taylor (1962) 257; W. K. C. Guthrie (1989) V 246; and M. F. Sciacca (1959) 80. 18. A. Rivaud (1925) 7, also 9–11, and C. M. Turbayne (1976) 126.

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E. Voegelin19 adds that in Timaeus the soul is a model of world order, opposing a materialistic conception in Republic, and Democritus’ atomism. 20 It seems, then, most reasonable to conclude that Republic’s analogy between man and the State is broadened in Timaeus into an analogy between man and the universe.

3) The Function of Myth Regarding the presence of myth in Plato, it is significant to note that myth in general seems to deal mostly with subjects that cannot be known fully by reasoned investigation. 21 As suggested by M. R. Lefkowitz, 22 it is used to express views on conduct and an outlook on life; it embodies the ambiguities, tensions and fears of human experience. This is particularly true in the case of woman, who, although prominent in Greek myth, appears there, according to one commentary, 23 colored by antagonism and ambivalence. It has also been remarked 24 that Athenians’ distrust of woman’s moral capacity has its mythical predecessor in Hesiod’s account of Pandora, the cause of evil in man’s life, 25 as well as in Simonides’ poem comparing woman with several animals representing faults (except for the bee, which symbolizes the woman of domestic virtues). Sexual differences, of course, are also brought out in myth, such as the tension between gods and goddesses, and attributing to woman prophetic powers and intuitive or suprarational wisdom. 26 Thus, feminine mythological figures, 27 in addition to the paradigmatic function that mythology has in ancient Greek culture, also become symbols characterizing the feminine. Among these symbolic figures, a myth may also represent what is opposed to reality, to show that a certain outlook is absurd or inconceivable. The Amazons, for instance, were conceived as cruel and savage warrior women whose men were slaves, conceived their children with strangers, killed or

19. E. Voegelin (1966) 183. 20. The relation among these views prompted G. E. L. Owen’s (1953) 79–95 affi rmation that Timaeus and Critias belong to the period immediately after Republic, before the dialogues of the last period. H. Cherniss (1977) 298– 339, however, opposes this position; see history in p. 299 n.3 or (1957) 26. 21. Although psychoanalytic or feminist interpretations ascribe sexual or social significance to it. 22. M. R. Lefkowitz (1985) 208. 23. J. P. Gould (1980) 55. 24. H. Lloyd-Jones (1975) 36–54. 25. Theog. 585–602; Erga 53–82. 26. J. J. Bachofen (1861), based on classic texts, even introduced the thesis that matriarchy preceded the patriarchal structures of classic Greece. 27. I have found 75 different feminine mythical characters in Plato’s work, appearing 412 times.

Thematic Transformation 137 mutilated sons, and cut one breast off daughters to facilitate the use of the bow (from this ǹȝĮȗȫȞ, without breast). The central metope of the Parthenon’s bas-relief of the Amazons’ battle illustrates the fight of culture and reason against the primitive and irrational. If we turn now to Timaeus to discover Plato’s particular use of myth, we can assume, first of all, that his background contained all of the cultural features mentioned. The synthesis of his analytic-rational approach and the mythological representation of his artistic intuition has been judged28 to be a splendid result of his thought. The philosopher himself calls this work “likely myth” (IJઁȞ İੁțȩIJĮ ȝ૨șȠȞ) (29d) or “likely discourse” (țĮIJ੹ ȜȩȖȠȞ IJઁȞ İੁțȩIJĮ) (90e). Its object is the world of becoming, alien to certainty and scientific knowledge. Although inferior to dialectic, it accounts for the physical universe using a procedure tailored to sense knowledge, which makes it appear enigmatic. Discovering, however, the exact role that myth plays in this dialogue has made its interpretation difficult. Gomperz29 reports that this has caused controversy from the Platonic school’s second generation to our day. Some30 recognize that in Timaeus much is purely mythical, such as the formation of mortal beings. Others31 apply this to the whole. Still others32 want the text understood literally except when, as in 34bc, Plato explicitly indicates the contrary, arguing that this clarification would make no sense if Plato were considering the whole work a myth. But the literal approach (even when recognizing the passages’ mythic character) hinders for some the myth’s proper function of evoking in the imagination the message which it contains.33 For many,34 Timaeus must be understood as likely, to distinguish it from both science and myth. J. F. Callahan,35 for instance, sees the dialectical and the

28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

E. Voegelin (1966) 183ff. T. Gomperz (1905) 206. E.g., H. Ritter (1838) II 357. A. Rivaud (1925) 12. T. M. Robinson (1990) 1. E. Voegelin (1966) 187 points out that those focusing on practical issues of concrete possibility make Plato’s thought appear ingenuous or superstitious, or dismiss it as a joke. 34. M. F. Sciacca (1959) 79–80 n. 181 (with F. Überweg, K. Stumpf, A. Fraccaroli, and A. Rivaud) also rejects P. Frutiger’s position that every discourse which is not dialectical should be called a myth and that Timaeus is an important and misunderstood genetic myth, without perceiving that, although in 90e Plato qualifies the discourse as probable logos (țĮIJ੹ ȜȩȖȠȞ IJઁȞ İੁțȩIJĮ), this is the function assigned to cosmological myth in Phaedrus 246a, as an analogy of what it represents (મ į੻ ਪȠȚțİȞ). The term does not signify a likelihood but a counterpart, equivalence or image, and implies a more profound correspondence than the term “similar” (੖ȝȠȚȠȢ). For Rivaud (1925) 11–12, the word “likely” (İੁțȫȢ) qualifying the myth intends to reinforce the authority of the narration; Plato insists less on its evidently fictitious character than on the reasons making it likely: a fable closer than any other to the truth. 35. J. F. Callahan (1977) 70.

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mythical in Timaeus as reinforcing and complementing each other to achieve a perfect fusion of the two. This type of discourse has been distinguished from dialectic and compared to the dianoesis of Republic, where the myth provides sense images evoking the hypothetical knowledge it entails. M. I. Santa Cruz36 proposes that İੁțઅȢ ȜȩȖȠȢ—the method Plato adopts in Timaeus using images (including figures from geometry) starting from hypotheses—is the counterpart in physics of the dianoetic method of mathematics offered in Republic, operating between dialectic and opinion. What emerges fairly clearly from all of this is that Plato understands myth here as an approximation. It is a likely figure, similar to the reality it tries to explain, because only gods can describe it as it is in itself.37 But when we come to what the myth specifically has to say about woman, the commentaries’ bewilderment becomes striking, and the difficulty is to accept a serious intention; two Platonists,38 for instance, even treat the subject as humor or fantasy. A. E. Taylor,39 for instance, claims that absolute literalness seems impossible, because if the souls of virtuous men not reincarnated as women returned to their original stars, the women of the second generation would not have companions, the reproductive system would be useless, and the human race would disappear. Most vacillate between either interpreting the passages on woman literally or denying them any doctrinal content, saying little about their significance, since they are brief and appear of secondary importance.40 Also, too many of those trying to penetrate the meaning of the myth become distracted by problems of practical execution, forgetting that this is foreign to a myth’s purely significative function. To me, it is an error not to take the sense of the myth seriously; the error is in understanding it literally. Another common procedure here is to try to absolve Plato from what he says on woman, insisting on the obvious truth that the myth’s intention is not literal, but leaving us with only partial interpretations. In addition, no one seems to have considered that Plato’s purpose in his Timaeus statements on woman could be consistent with his views in other dialogues. My interpretation intends to start by recognizing the allegorical and figurative elements in the text, and then to attempt an interpretation of their intended rational meaning.

36. M. I. Santa Cruz (1997) 136 et passim. 37. Phdr. 246a. T. Gomperz (1905) 204 observes that in Plato’s enduring didactic purpose the myth becomes indispensable to communicate the soul’s experience. E. Voegelin (1966) 170 concurs. He and P. Hadot (1983) 118–119 conceive it not only as a likely discourse, but also a game, following the great theogonies. 38. P. Shorey (1934) 343, and A. E. Taylor (1908) 93, (1927) 460–461, and (1962) 635 and 653. 39. A. E. Taylor, 635–636. 40. C. M. Turbayne (1976) 125, for instance, does not accept either A. E. Taylor’s or F. M. Cornford’s view that the myth is merely fantastic.

Thematic Transformation 139 THE MEANING OF THE TEXTS ON WOMAN IN TIMAEUS To sum up where we have come so far, the above survey of expert opinion allows us to say that Timaeus (1) represents the thought of Plato, (2) provides the cosmological dimension of his philosophy, and (3) seems to use myth to express a serious but rather obscure doctrinal body of knowledge. Within this framework, we must ascertain now the signifi cance of its texts on woman and their relation to Plato’s conception of woman as a whole.

I. References to Woman in Republic The introduction to Timaeus (17c–19b), as noted by E. Voegelin,41 reports on its connection with other dialogues, particularly Republic. This is what Plato says there specifically about women: We added about women that their natures should be harmonized with those of the men and that common tasks should be assigned them in both war and ordinary life. . . . [and] as to marriages and children all of them should have all of them in common, so that no one would recognize his own offspring . . . (18 c and d) Voegelin also comments42 that already in Republic’s myth of Er the cosmic order completes the study of the right order in soul and city as parts of it, announcing Timaeus’ topic. For R. D. Archer-Hind,43 a mature Plato deliberately grants legitimacy to the political theories of Republic. But because Plato seems to identify Republic’s ideal city in theory with Critias’ discourse, which followed Timaeus’ speech and was expected to discuss the fi rst historical city according to nature (21–26e), women are also included in Critias’ city,44 where ancient war exercises are common to men and women.45 The criterion for selection of themes in Timaeus’ introduction has been explained in various ways. For Cornford46 and Taylor,47 among 41. 42. 43. 44. 45.

E. Voegelin (1966) 181. Ibid., 51. R. D. Archer-Hind (1888) 56 n. 6. Cr. 110b. See Burnet’s edition. T. Gomperz (1905) 202 suggests that an innovation as daring as the emancipation (sic) of women was not necessarily Socratic, since for Plato it originated in the Athens of his ancestors. But of course Plato here was not studying history books, but using his imagination, and re-creating the city that would be closest to nature. 46. F. M. Cornford (1957) 4–6. 47. A. E. Taylor (1927) 438–439. Also P. Shorey (1934) 330, and P. Friedländer (1969) III 357f.

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others, the importance given to the sections on woman’s activities, while excluding the philosopher-king and higher education, is remarkable, although the exclusion of the philosopher-king might be explained by the fact that his role was to overcome the decadence of present-day societies, an evil where what is natural becomes corrupted, alien to Plato’s ideal society. Furthermore, many realize that since Critias was unfi nished, we cannot know how Timaeus’ introduction relates to it. For Gomperz,48 Critias intended to answer objections to Republic as a utopia and to the apparent disloyalty to what is Greek by adopting the Egyptian division of classes; he also points out that Plato excludes elements (such as higher education) which would not be credible in primitive times. In any case, the account of Republic in Timaeus’ introduction is particularly relevant regarding woman. Besides the division into three classes, specialization of functions, character and education of citizens, abolition of both property and private family, it includes the equality of men and women in all activities. We may conclude, therefore, that Timaeus’ reporting about Socrates’ view on woman in Republic achieves two objectives: First, it reaffi rms Plato’s position on woman’s equality as a person, an essential requirement in the ideal city and not a soon-to-be-forgotten detail without importance. This view will reappear, and pervasively, in Laws’ concrete and prudential legal form. Second, by connecting Timaeus with Republic, Plato confi rms the unity of his thought on woman and the importance that these passages have for him.

II. Cosmological Dimensions of the Feminine in Myth It should be clear by now that since Timaeus manifests allegorically Plato’s cosmological conception of the universe including the place of man and the social order, woman’s place in the cosmos becomes part of his approach. Timaeus’ contribution to Plato’s theory of woman is twofold: in its introduction, as we saw,49 it restates in unmistakable terms the doctrine about woman developed in Republic, and in the body of the work, it fulfi lls the critical function of providing a metaphysical foundation for his view, though this is limited to a few short texts and confi ned to three fundamental ideas.50 Turning, then, to the relevant texts, although we already know that they should not be understood literally, we have not yet approached the 48. T. Gomperz (1905) 201 and 203. 49. Above, pp. 139f. 50. Even J. Genova (1994), Bat-Ami Bar On ed., 42, in spite of her poststructuralist notion of truth, recognizes that “political theorists fail to ground their understanding of his [Plato’s] politics in his metaphysics, resulting in the kind of confusion that surrounds Plato’s ideas about woman.”

Thematic Transformation 141 key issue of their significance. If we begin considering the passages referring to the creation of the human species, it is significant that Timaeus seems to be providing the underpinnings on the cosmic level for Republic’s three fundamental assumptions on woman: 1) men’s and women’s souls are equal, 2) women are morally inferior, and 3) their bodies are weaker. Let us examine each of these propositions. 1. The Metaphysical Foundations of the Soul’s Equality First of all, by claiming in the myth that the first birth was one and the same for all, Plato provides evidence for the equality of souls. The account describes the superior part of the human soul as constructed with the same material that the Demiurge used to create the world’s and the gods’ souls, but with a second or third degree of purity, which he divides into the same number of souls as the stars, where he placed them as in a chariot.51 Plato then states that according to the nature of the universe and the laws of destiny, the fi rst generation must be ordained as one and the same for everyone (੖IJȚ ȖȑȞİıȚȢ ʌȡȫIJȘ ȝ੻Ȟ ਩ıȠȚIJȠ IJİIJĮȖȝȑȞȘ ȝȓĮ ʌ઼ıȚȞ), so that none be discriminated against by him. (41e) There are various questions raised about this, generally dealing with whether Plato alludes to the soul itself or to its fi rst embodiment. We will have to enter the controversy, but to avoid having the reader sink into quicksand, I will try to develop here a pathway through it toward what seems the most reasonable answer, leaving more detailed discussion to footnotes and the appendix of this chapter. First, let us consider what ʌȡȫIJȘ ȖȑȖİıȚȢ (fi rst generation) refers to. Since, because of divine distributive justice, it is (as the text above says explicitly) the same for everyone, some have wondered whether Plato is speaking of the soul itself, as I suggested, or its fi rst embodiment. F. M. Cornford, 52 for instance, modifies the translation of ȖȑȞİıȚȢ (generation) into “incarnation.” The word comes, however, from the verb ȖȓȖȞȠȝĮȚ, not ȖİȞȞȐȦ, and means “coming into being,” and not “being born.” He holds53 that men and women have always existed because time has no beginning, and that the fi rst incarnation is that of man as the generic human being (i.e., including women). 54 But this understanding

51. 52. 53. 54.

An image used in Phdr. 246ab et passim, and Laws 899a. F. M. Cornford (1957) 132. Ibid., 145. Interestingly, however, T. M. Robinson’s (1998) 148 acceptance of F. M. Cornford’s translation as “being born” makes him conclude that “the fi rst

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that women exist in the fi rst generation also contradicts the text of the myth, which affi rms that in the fi rst generation no one should be denigrated (ਥȜĮIJIJȠ૙IJȠ, “made less”), and that the superior sex is the one which is going to be called “man” (i.e., “male human being”). 55 What Plato seems to intend here is to attribute to human beings the responsibility for the inferior incarnations which occur throughout time. Cornford’s real problem is that he does not consider the possibility that the fi rst generation refers to the soul. A. E. Taylor, 56 who also ignores that the fi rst generation is that of the soul itself, thinks that the fi rst living creatures in Timaeus were all human, but without sexual differentiation, 57 which appears during the introduction of inferior species later, in a degenerative evolution. For him, this is all that “the fi rst birth [note the term he uses] was one and alike to all” means. Others have asked whether the “degeneration” into lower forms of life involves only beasts, or is also meant to include women. But the fi rst generation, due to divine distributive justice, is the same for everyone, and consequently the myth can only refer either to souls or to man’s incarnation (because women, in Plato’s mind, are inferior to men, and therefore could not exist at fi rst). But if we remember that the embodied soul is impure with various degrees of degeneracy, it seems most logical to conclude from the text here that what is produced in the fi rst generation, which is one and the same for all, must be the soul, the seat of the person, and not the composite with or without sexual differentiation, as F. M. Cornford’s and A. E. Taylor’s interpretations would have it. This is also Proclus’58 opinion, for whom the fi rst generation occurs before the souls are sowed in the stars.59 Further, this interpretation is consistent with Plato’s characteristic dualism, and reveals

55.

56. 57. 58. 59.

generation of human souls was created as exclusively male”; and the fact that in the myth women are fi rst referred to as appearing in time after the life of dishonest men reinforces his view. Tim. 41e. The terms ıʌĮȡİȓıĮȢ, and ij૨ȞĮȚ are used in the metaphor of sowing seed to produce a plant, which distinguishes the seed from the plant. Here, what is “planted” in the temporal organs is going later (਩ʌİȚIJĮ) to produce what will be called a “man.” For More on this, see Appendix A, p. 149. A. E. Taylor (1962) 258. Ibid., 635, attributes to Empedocles the theory that the fi rst creatures were not differentiated sexually. Proclus (1968) V 169, IV 292. R. D. Archer-Hind (1888) 143 n. 2 to 41e2, however, refers ʌȡȫIJȘ ȖȑȖİıȚȢ to the fi rst incarnation in human form and not to the distribution among stars as he says Stallbaum interprets it, because he argues that the second (įİȣIJȑȡĮ ȖȑȞİıȚȢ) is going to be that of woman. But the context seems to support Stallbaum.

Thematic Transformation 143 the essential equality of the souls of man and woman in Plato’s thought— and therefore, their equality as persons. The fi rst fact, then, that we can discern through the mists of the myth seems to be this fi rst creation of the sexless soul, and so it gives us, as I said, the metaphysical foundation of the soul’s equality. 2. Equality and Inferiority of Woman’s Soul Timaeus implies the secondary and derivative character of woman as incarnated soul when he asserts the superiority of man’s soul: And he showed that it was necessary that when each of them was sowed into its proper temporal organ, it would grow as the living creature most fearing God; and since human nature is double, the superior (IJઁ țȡİ૙IJIJȠȞ, the “dominant”)60 would be the sex that afterward (਩ʌİȚIJĮ) would be designated “man”(ਕȞȒȡ). (41e–42a) This notion of woman’s moral inferiority appears three times: a) in the mythical description of the second incarnation of cowardly and evil men, stated twice (42bc and 90e), b) in the analogy between the lower parts of the soul and the apartments for men and women (69e–70a), and c) in the text on the origin of nails (76de). a) Let us begin with a text referring to the fi rst instance of this (we are obviously speaking of embodied souls here): Those who dominate them [the passions] will live with integrity (įȓțૉ, “justly”), but if they allow themselves to be dominated by them, without it. And one who has lived the time assigned him well will return to his stay in his native star, and will enjoy a blessed and appropriate life; but one who fails in this will be changed into the nature of a woman in the second birth (ıijĮȜİ੿Ȣ į੻ IJȠȪIJȦȞ İੁȢ ȖȣȞĮȚțઁȢ ijȪıȚȞ ਥȞ IJૌ įİȣIJȑȡ઺ ȖİȞȑıİȚ 61 ȝİIJĮȕĮȜȠ૙).62 (42b) The myth continues, stating that one who does not correct himself will continue to be changed into the nature of the beast consonant with the characteristics of his evil, and

60. A. E. Taylor (1962) 260 points out that țȡİ૙IJIJȠȞ means not simply “stronger” but “superior.” F. de P. Samaranch (1981) 117 translates, like A. Rivaud (1925) 157, “the most vigorous.” P. Azcárate (1966) 681 uses “the most noble part.” 61. Again, this is a “second beginning,” but in the context of its being a second embodiment, it would be legitimate to consider it a second “birth.” 62. L. Irigaray (1985) 322 seems to be reacting to this when she calls woman Plato’s “female understudy.”

144 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman he will not cease his tribulations until he accepts the movements of the same63 and similar within himself and, dominating with the force of his will the enormous turbulent and irrational multitude which comes from fi re, water, earth, and air, returns once again to assimilate himself to his best original form.64 (42cd) To Gomperz,65 these texts reveal the outstanding predominance of the human and ethical approach in Plato’s biology. For A. E. Taylor,66 they suggest that once the soul of woman has purged its moral faults, it receives a second opportunity to live as man.67 The myth describing woman’s moral inferiority is repeated after the description of the universe—including the production of generic human beings—is completed, except for the rest of living creatures. Thus, as probable reasoning (țĮIJ੹ ȜȩȖȠȞ IJઁȞ İੁțȩIJĮ), he adds: All these creatures generated as men who showed themselves as cowards and passed their lives doing evil (ȉ૵Ȟ ȖİȞȠȝȑȞȦȞ ਕȞįȡ૵Ȟ ੖ıȠȚ įİȚȜȠ੿ țĮ੿ IJઁȞ ȕȓȠȞ ਕįȓțȦȢ įȚોȜșȠȞ), were transformed into women in their second incarnation. And for this reason the gods at that time (țĮIJ’ ਥțİ૙ȞȠȞ į੽ IJઁȞ ȤȡȩȞȠȞ) invented love for sexual relations (ȟȣȞȠȣıȓĮȢ ਩ȡȦIJĮ ਥIJİțIJȒȞĮȞIJȠ) constructing one animate thing in us and another in the women (ȗ૵ȠȞ IJઁ ȝ੻Ȟ ਥȞ ਲȝ૙Ȟ, IJઁ į’ ਥȞ IJĮ૙Ȣ ȖȣȞĮȚȟ੿ ıȣıIJȒıĮȞIJİȢ ਩ȝȥȣȤȠȞ). (90e–91a) D. F. Krell68 relates the text to woman’s position in the Pythagorean table of opposites, where she is identified with evil; and reminds us that “uterus” (੢ıIJİȡĮ) also means “secondary” or “inferior” in Greek, from which “hysteria” is derived, adding that for Timaeus woman is a secondary incarnation inclined toward disorder, representing cowardice, stupidity, and luxury. For Krell, Socrates’ silence here means that Plato disagrees and shows it. My interpretation of his silence—through the whole work—is that it represents Plato’s recognition of Socrates’ attitude toward the natural sciences (Apol. 19cd), which disqualifi es him as spokesman for Plato’s cosmology.

63. W. K. C. Guthrie (1989) V 308 explains “the same” as “the circuits of reason.” 64. The myth also depicts the soul’s necessary union with the body, which brings (as a consequence of influx and efflux) sensation, desire mingled with pleasure and pain, and emotions such as fear and anger. 65. T. Gomperz (1905) 224. 66. A. E. Taylor (1962) 263. 67. Proclus (1968) V 157–158 (IV 281), instead, believes that Timaeus could merely have meant that souls incarnated as beasts could reincarnate themselves as human beings. 68. D. F. Krell (1975) 400–421.

Thematic Transformation 145 For H. Ritter, 69 Plato’s man is the model for mortal living beings, the most perfect form containing the seed of the rest, and guaranteeing a mortal’s creation as perfect as possible by assuring God’s distributive justice making creation the same for everyone. Ritter explains this by Plato’s adopting the Greek opinion that man is superior to woman, but noticing that Plato puts aside any difference which is not of degree. At this point, we must recognize that even though Plato conceives woman as inferior to man, he seems to consider that the inferiority refers to the moral, factual state of each soul, not to its essence; besides, and contrary to some interpretations, nothing in the myth suggests as the source of inferiority a generic difference between men and women.70 R. D. Archer-Hind,71 for instance, expresses surprise that, considering Plato’s more advanced position on woman, the philosopher accepts Athenian prejudice by equating human sex difference to the generic one between different animals, “a piece of questionable metaphysics.” But, the evidence of the text is against him.72 In any case, the myth seems clearly to indicate another fact: that though woman’s soul is, as we saw, essentially equal to man’s (i.e., as a soul), existentially she is inferior to man’s soul, because its current moral state is the result of cowardice in a previous generation. It is important to recognize that this inferiority is not understood essentially, but as the transitory result of a moral fault, and one, therefore, that can be overcome. 3. The Relation of the Woman’s Body to Her Soul’s Moral State As to the woman’s body, we have the following: As mentioned earlier, the texts referring to woman’s inferiority dealt with a) her later generation, b) the description of the upper and lower parts of the body, and c) the formation of nails.

69. H. Ritter (1838) II 358–359. 70. G. Lloyd (1984) 4–5, instead, relates the myth of gender differentiation at 42b and 91a to mind-matter dualism. 71. R. D. Archer-Hind (1888) 144 n. 4. He considers the affi rmation that woman constitutes the second incarnation of cowardly and evil men a questionable metaphysical position, because it is not possible to distinguish the sexes at the same logical level as the genus of different animals, and that in animal life the sexual distinction is ignored. 72. One must remember that for there to be a transmigration of souls at all, the soul must be in some sense identical in the highest and lowest creatures, and therefore, if there is a difference in degree between men and women, this is not incoherent with the difference between humans and lower animals. In this regard, the analogy of the watchdogs is instructive; Plato probably considered it more appropriate than we would.

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Under a) we saw that the best interpretation indicates that woman’s body was constructed at a later stage—given that the fi rst incarnation includes only men (42b, 91a) and says that the superior sex is the one which will be called “man” (42a). The two passages that follow reaffirm woman’s secondary and derivative condition, and imply that her body, like her soul, is an inferior one: b) describes women in an analogy dealing with the physical seat of the moral parts of the soul. Although it uses conventional Greek ideas, the text is consistent with Plato’s thought: And insofar as one part [of the soul] is better [the aggressive] and the other worse [the appetitive] (IJઁ ȝ੻Ȟ ਙȝİȚȞȠȞ Į੝IJોȢ, IJઁ į੻ Ȥİ૙ȡȠȞ) [the created gods] constructed a division in the thoracic cavity—as if between the dwelling-places of men and women,—to place the diaphragm between them like a partition. (69e–70a) Archer-Hind73 objects correctly that this is a simile and does not point to masculine and feminine parts of the soul as in T. H. Martin’s74 interpretation. For Taylor,75 however, referring to virility and courage, the virtue of aggressiveness intentionally suggests that the soul’s lower level corresponds to feminine dwellings. In any case, the division of the body into a superior and inferior part, corresponding to the superior (masculine) and inferior (feminine), implies that the soul is what governs the construction of the body. c) refers to a passage which states: Because those who were making us knew that from man one day woman and the other animals [sic] would follow (ਥȟ ਕȞįȡ૵Ȟ ȖȣȞĮ૙țİȢ țĮ੿ IJਛȜȜĮ șȘȡȓĮ ȖİȞȒıȠȚȞIJȠ), and they understood in addition that many of these creatures would need the aid of nails for many purposes, therefore they imposed on man at his birth the rudimentary structure of nails. (76de) R. D. Archer-Hind76 notes this curious approximation to Darwinism as a brilliant scientific intuition. For Taylor,77 Plato labels nails as women’s natural weapons in jest, reflecting Anaximander’s and Empedocles’ idea of evolution. He also characterizes the soul’s degradation and successive reincarnations into women, birds, quadrupeds, reptiles, and fi sh as “a strange

73. 74. 75. 76. 77.

R. D. Archer-Hind (1888) 257 n. 13. T. H. Martin (1976) 297. A. E. Taylor (1962) 501. R. D. Archer-Hind (1888) 283–284 n. 20. A. E. Taylor (1962) 539.

Thematic Transformation 147 type of evolution à retours.”78 Gomperz79 calls it descending inverted theory, an extraordinary product of Plato’s inventive mind. Shorey80 remarks that the humor of this inverse evolution escapes some when reading that the gods, foreseeing that man’s degeneration will produce women and the other animals, thoughtfully gave them nails and fur. With Galen, Cornford81 believes instead that Plato does not refer to women, neither anticipating Darwin nor following Empedocles, since Plato’s “evolution” is in the opposite direction. But be that as it may, clearly the lesser bodies follow the lessening moral conditions of the souls that inhabit them. Hence, both texts in b) and c) imply not only the physical weakness of the feminine body, but also the physical expression of her moral situation. This inferiority is not stated essentially, but in factual (existential) terms, and is consistent with being the temporary result of a moral fault, which can be overcome. Gomperz82 recognizes that the responsibility for the degradation belongs to man, adding that in the myth of Er (Rep. 617d–620d) souls voluntarily choose worse lives. For L. Robin83 the fi rst incarnation occurs in a man’s body, because every other one, including woman, signifies inferiority and even condemnation, which a good god cannot cause. Besides, the myth of transmigration conveys transitoriness when describing souls changing to superior or inferior bodies in successive lives, according to their moral conduct. Plato’s insistence on women’s education in Republic and especially, as we will see, in Laws manifests his conviction that even though woman is in fact morally inferior, this inferiority is not constitutive (essential) and should be overcome. Plato’s view, different from that of Socrates,84 probably arose from experiencing the contrast between Athenian women in general and the few exceptional women he knew. A fact that emerges here from the myth, then, is that woman’s body reflects the existential weakness of her soul. Hence, Timaeus agrees with Republic (451e, 457a) and Laws (805c) not only in attributing weakness to the feminine body but also in providing, by identifying the cause as a moral fault, its theoretical justification. For those unaware of the above distinctions, Plato’s position becomes illogical and unexplainable. E. Cantarella,85 e.g., misconstrues Plato’s view when she states that “Plato was profoundly convinced of the natural inferiority of woman.”

78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85.

Ibid. (1908), 93, (1927) 461, and (1962) 635. T. Gomperz (1905) 208 and 225. P. Shorey (1934) 343. F. M. Cornford (1957) 301 n. 2. T. Gomperz (1905) 225. L. Robin (1968) 159. See Chapter 2, particularly its conclusion. E. Cantarella (1992) 58.

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The last section of the dialogue describes reproductive anatomy and physiology by identifying the semen with marrow condensed from the head of man as animated, dominant, and difficult to subordinate to reason, causing the desire of generation.86 In woman the womb is also desirous of giving birth, producing all sorts of affl ictions if it remains without fruit, until Appetite (ਲ ਥʌȚșȣȝȓĮ) and Love (੒ ਩ȡȦȢ) unite the two sexes and sow in the womb living, invisible, tiny, and formless beings, give them form and nourish them until they grow and are born, completing the generation of living beings. Timaeus’ concluding line reveals Plato’s concern for the topic of woman when he states, almost as a non sequitur, that in this way women and the whole feminine sex have been generated. Guthrie87 remarks to this that women are “hastily dismissed in a postscript.” The dialogue ends by describing successive reincarnations in the moral decline of souls into birds, quadrupeds, reptiles, and fish,88 passing from one to the other by loss or recovery of reason.89 The work concludes with Timaeus’ praising the universe, a visible living being, as a perceptible god: the image of the intelligible, greatest, best, beautiful and perfect.

CONCLUSION In sum, the evidence offered by Plato in the myth of Timaeus on the question of woman, once one gets through the commentaries and controversies, seems to be intended to reveal that men’s and women’s souls are the same; that women are the result of failings in men of a previous generation; and that their bodies reflect their souls. It has been said that Timaeus as a whole offers us the master key to enter the totality of the thought of Plato. Likewise, its passages on woman provide the focus where his thought on her, contained in previous works, converges, allowing us to understand the relation between the diverse aspects of his reflection on the topic and its underlying unity. The quasi-symphonic transformations that the recurring theme of woman has undergone throughout its appearances fi nd here their harmonic resolution, in that all previous partial formulations are now shown to be serving the same structural purpose. Plato’s synthesizing reflection uses an

86. 87. 88. 89.

F. M. Cornford (1957) 295 traces this theory to the Sicilian school of medicine. W. K. C. Guthrie (1978) V 306. T. M. Robinson (1998) 150–151. To Plato’s descent of souls, T. M. Robinson has offered a new reading: a bifurcated process in which the punishment of men into women for cowardice ends there, while men guilty of three kinds of stupidity (in intelligence, spiritedness, and appetite) have different punishment tracks as birds, land animals and fish, respectively.

Thematic Transformation 149 entirely new perspective which nevertheless contains as undercurrents all the early philosophical appearances of woman in his works, revealing their consistency, depth and organicity. It is possible that in the years after writing Republic, Plato recognized the necessity for the metaphysical justification of his concept of woman. Then as now, if we consider the example of Aristotle,90 the text of the fi rst wave in Republic 5 must have given rise to a number of interpretations questioning his thought. This is why, while developing his cosmological synthesis in Timaeus, he takes advantage of a fitting opportunity for stressing the logical consistency of his theory of woman in both its cosmic dimension and its metaphysical justification. In examining his approach, the fact that Plato uses myth in Timaeus to present his views allegorically excludes discounting the myths on woman as a joke without intellectual content. His dualism of soul and body also clarifi es Plato’s contribution to the discussion provoked by woman’s activities in Republic, where he simultaneously affi rms both the possibility of exceptional women having the natural capacity to exercise all civic functions, while characterizing them in general as physically and morally weak. Within Timaeus’ cosmological framework, the passages of Republic fi nd here their root and internal harmony. Finally, let me point out that Plato’s theory of woman in Timaeus provides the infrastructure for the peculiar form in which he incorporates women into the legal life of Laws’ Cretan city.

APPENDICES

A. On the First Generation R. D. Archer-Hind91 refers ʌȡȫIJȘ ȖȑȖİıȚȢ to the fi rst incarnation in human form and not to the distribution among stars as he says Stallbaum interprets it, because the second (įİȣIJȑȡĮ ȖȑȞİıȚȢ) is going to be that of woman. The context, however, seems to support Stallbaum. Besides, A. E. Taylor92 attributes to Empedocles the theory that the fi rst creatures were not differentiated sexually. And F. M. Cornford93 says that if the meaning in 41d attributing second degree of purity to the material used could refer to the superiority of man’s soul over that of woman (42a), this contradicts 41e, which qualifies the fi rst generation (ȖȑȞİıȚȢ) as one for all. Using a literal

90. 91. 92. 93.

Arist. Pol. II 1264b. R. D. Archer-Hind (1888) 143 n. 2 to 41e2. A. E. Taylor (1962) 635. F. M. Cornford (1957) 143.

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interpretation selectively,94 he states95 that nothing in the text indicates that the fi rst living creatures lacked sexual differences, merely that afterwards a cowardly man would be reborn as a woman and subhuman species would be born later as if in an evolution by degeneration. He asserts that Plato does not mean that men existed before women and inferior animals, only that sexual differences are postponed to 90e. But the view that the seed comes from the head, seat of the immortal elements of the soul, seems to preclude having it come from the sexual organs.96 Proclus97 seems to conceive the fi rst generation as containing souls of living beings superior to man, who was created afterward together with everything mortal. He98 conceives the male sex as having greater affi nity with the Demiurge’s intellect and with immutable souls, other bodies representing increasing imperfection, since although souls were created equal, their incarnations do not necessarily follow an orderly progressive imperfection or increasing perfection (in their later ascent), because otherwise equality of virtue between the sexes and characters such as Diotima would be inexplicable. Asking if the souls are in themselves feminine and masculine,99 he concludes that although this is conceivable, it does not imply any relation between the sex of the soul and that of the body, because the fi rst incarnation always occurs in the body of a man. The text does not seem to justify this.

B. Whether the First Generation Involves Only the Soul For A. E. Taylor100 all souls are fi rst born from the earth (as were Aristophanes’ bisexual creatures in Symposium [196b], or the original natives of Attica referred to in Menexenus [271bc]). Being made of a mixture of a second or third degree of purity implies differences in excellence and capacity, and explains degeneration. Taylor also states, without explanation, that the text is consistent with Socrates’ admitting in Republic both that virtue is the same in women and men, and that the best activity of woman does not reach the best of man in any function. As seen in discussing the passage,101 the latter affi rmation is general, allowing for exceptions (Rep. 455d.), such 94. Ibid., 143–145 and 291–292. 95. Ibid., 145 n. 1. 96. F. M. Cornford (ibid., 294) also accepts the view of A. Rivaud (1925) 93, that the marrow contains seeds of all mortal beings. Rivaud (ibid., 91) sees this as preparing for the myth of man’s degeneration into women and animals (but neglects to name woman), saying that during palingenesis, human souls can be reincarnated into bodies of all classes, even fi sh and molluscs. 97. Proclus (1968) V 157–8; IV,280–2. 98. Ibid.,V 157–158, IV 280–282. 99. Ibid., V 160–161; I-V 283–284. 100. A. E. Taylor (1962) 258. 101. Chapter 5, particularly pp. 110ff.

Thematic Transformation 151 as the philosopher-queen (ibid., 540c). L. Brisson,102 however, brings up the text stating that cowardly men are changed into women in the second generation to ague that it does not imply that there were not men and women in the fi rst one, alleging that the phrase “at that moment” referring to the time of creation of sexual functions (Tim. 91a) is not a consequence of woman’s formation, but of the necessity of retribution and of a mechanism of generation. But he fails to recognize that the myth refers to the souls’ generation before all this.

102. L. Brisson (1974) 456 n. 1.

7

Solving the Puzzle of Woman in Laws “Demain . . . vous serez si près de moi que je ne vous verrai plus.” —Paul Claudel, L’Annonce faite a Marie

Laws, the work that Plato was still engaged in writing when he died, contains what is probably the most valuable evidence of his conception of woman because, as A. E. Taylor1 remarks, it constitutes the final and most mature expression of his views on the subject. It is therefore surprising to fi nd that studies about woman are much less frequent on this work than on Republic, whose thesis on the matter is widely familiar to the educated reader.2 One reason for this is that we do not fi nd here, as in Republic, passages dedicated exclusively to the topic; instead, woman is explicitly integrated throughout. Although, for the most part, the passages on woman do not examine her as such, her presence has “philosophical” meaning, because Plato’s view of woman may be deduced from the position assigned to her in the city. Other reasons for the absence of a detailed treatment of her could be, according to T. Gomperz, 3 the unfi nished character of the work and the curtailment of the dramatic element, since the exposition of the many laws required limiting the dialogue. For J. M. Pabón and M. Fernández-Galiano,4 repetitions, contradictions, irregularities of syntax, and uncertain order of exposition are to be expected in an unrevised rough draft. Philip of Opus, who did the fi nal edition and division, seems not to have dared to make corrections. Thus, it becomes necessary to fi nd the unifying thread of the work’s internal logical coherence, characteristically Platonic, linking each appearance of woman both to Plato’s conception of woman and to the leading ideas of his philosophy.5

1. A. E. Taylor (1927) 463. 2. Exceptions are D. Cohen (1987), T. J. Saunders (1995), S. B. Levin (2000), and also, within a wider scope, S. Frank (1970), S. M. Okin (1977 and 1979), and M. S. Kochin (1002) 1, who noticed that the work “is very little read today.” 3. T. Gomperz (1905) 228. 4. J. M. Pabón and M. Fernández-Galiano (1960) XV. See also W. K. C. Guthrie (1978) V 321f. 5. Among general studies, P. Shorey (1933) 358 offers a concise enumeration of Plato’s leading ideas.

Solving the Puzzle of Woman in Laws

153

Though a number of Platonists have recognized Plato’s interest in women throughout Laws, some, as D. Cohen6 notes, have denied any “change [from current Athenian law] at all, or grudgingly admitted substantial changes, but minimized their import.” To avoid tedium for the reader, I will relegate a discussion of their contributions to an appendix.7 Others sometimes read in more than the text permits: For A. J. Cappelletti,8 for example, girls participate in gymnastic exercises “on occasion,” needing just the theory. Their activity, he asserts, not citing textual evidence, is home care, with the marriage age arbitrarily determined. Infidelity is punished, but husbands’ lightly, a pium votum. But C. G. Allen9 and S. M. Okin had shown that penalties for adultery (784e), sacrilege (851a, 910d), and murder of the marriage partner are equal for both sexes (868e), which Okin10 explains as promoting virtue. For T. J. Saunders,11 Laws’ penology is “the most striking area in which women are placed on an exactly equal footing with men” (except perhaps between ages thirty and forty regarding parental neglect), calling this surprising for those “inferior in virtue,” and failing to see their inferiority as not essential. But when one becomes aware of the texts themselves, and sees Plato’s effort to get across, even redundantly, that he really meant his proposals for women, this notion that nothing dealing with women is new in the Laws is simply astonishing. The peculiar blindness that prompts it might make even an interesting and separate subject of analysis; to many, as the epigraph of this chapter says, woman seems to be simply a given, so close that she cannot be considered an object for investigation—and so it becomes doubly interesting, for instance, when Saunders’12 and S. B. Levin’s13 analyses arrive at opposite conclusions. Objectivity here, then, demands a complete overview of each and every text on woman. But there are several preliminary guides we need in order to fi nd our way through the massive work.

THE BACKGROUND OF PLATO’S THINKING First, it would be wise to mention a number of cultural elements in Plato’s milieu, to aid in recognizing how much his legislation depends on or departs from them.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

D. Cohen (1987) 27. Appendix A to this Chapter, p. 175. A. J. Cappelletti (1980) 92. C. G. Allen (1975) 138 n. 37. S. M. Okin (1977) 364. T. J. Saunders (1995) 601. Ibid. S. B. Levin (2000) 94ff.

154 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman Women’s place at the time was almost exclusively in the home, in which they were kept in separate, locked quarters, their main civic duty being to procreate citizens. Girls were married at fourteen with men of thirty, had little education beyond household duties, and were regarded as minors their whole lives. (See Appendix A for details.) On the other hand, it was known in Athens that Spartan women were well-fed and engaged in exercises, marrying at age 18 or 20 to men of comparable age. They also owned and controlled property legally. (See Appendix B.) Also, it is to be remembered that in Plato’s time, the “woman question” was brought out frequently in literature, not only by followers of Socrates,14 but by such as Aeschylus, Aristophanes, and especially Euripides. (See Appendix C.) Because the topic of woman was intensely present in Plato’s cultural context, comparing Plato’s laws with legislation and writings contemporary to him is essential, as Saunders15 suggests, “to assess the direction in which Plato is moving” (whereas comparing it with legislation or writings contemporary to us, as some have done, has, in my view, no interpretative value).

THE SUBTEXT OF LAWS As the Platonic reader looks at Laws, expecting a steady diet of brilliant dramatic prose, profound intellectual insights, and rigorous logical demonstrations, he is apt to be disconcerted, because it appears quite different from the Plato he is familiar with. Yet, as the reading progresses, he will fi nd the same powerful unifying mind, foundational principles, and driving political concerns. Still, it cannot be denied that something in Plato seems to have changed. This caused some to reject (for a while) the authenticity of the work,16 despite Aristotle’s17 statement that it was Plato’s. Laws was fi nally accepted as genuine, however, mainly because of Aristotle’s testimony. R. F. Stalley18 mentions those who explain the changes in Plato’s writing by the evolution of his thought and his old age, blaming rambling passages on lack of vigor in his thinking.19 But it seems that it is mainly the unfi nished status of the work that justifies its unpolished form, repetitions, problems of syntax, inconsistencies of

14. See Chapter 2. 15. T. J. Saunders (1995) 591. 16. Among them, G. A. F. Ast, F. D. E. Schleiermacher, and E. Zeller (Schleiermacher recanted in 1804, Ast in 1818, and Zeller in 1889). 17. Arist. Pol. 1264b. 18. R. F. Stalley (1983) 3 and 9. 19. J. M. Pabón and M. Fernández Galiano (1960) Intro. 1, 3, and 4 offer a concise report.

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detail, etc.; but some20 fi nd, in addition to this, a pessimism about human nature caused by both a crisis of his metaphysics and his political failures in Syracuse. 21 Still, it cannot be denied that his philosophical genius is there in both the preambles and the body of Laws, and the thesis of Plato’s pessimism about human nature seems to forget that Laws’ rigorous demands for both men and women presuppose people capable of obeying them—not to mention that trying to diagnose the psychological state of a writer is doubtful as a scientific approach. Apparent changes must be explained on more solid grounds. On woman’s issues, the apparent reversal of Republic’s proposal (721a) by reintroducing nuclear marriage and postulating exclusive woman’s functions which seem to threaten sexual equality, as well as Plato’s silence on women’s sharing high government offices, have produced a lively controversy which needs examination. But we should fi rst see, as we did earlier in Rep. 5, 22 if we can fi nd K. Stanislavski’s “super-objective,” the probable purpose for which Laws was written, which will help us to discover the subtext underneath what it says, the Ariadne’s thread to lead us through the maze of the text. Asking what must have prompted Plato at his age to write a work of such breadth as Laws can also help in ascertaining the difference between this work and Republic, particularly with regard to woman. We know that Plato wrote Laws during a peaceful period of full dedication to the Academy, after closing the tragic chapter of attempting to influence politics in Syracuse. Still, he seemed more convinced than ever of the need to produce political experts. History witnesses Academy members’ being consulted on matters of legislation and constitutional issues by contemporary States. Plutarch 23 and Athenaeus24 (though unearthing his evidence requires reading between lines of gossip) name some members of the Academy as advising statesmen, kings, and legislators; and the Sixth Epistle shows Plato recommending two students to the tyrant Hermeias. G. R. Morrow25 identifies seventeen influential members of the Academy, and W. K. C. Guthrie26 names several “invited by existing States to draw up or reform their laws,” including Plato himself, who refused. Although some texts could be spurious, the quantity of sources makes complete spuriousness unlikely and denial that this went on imprudent.

20. For instance, S. B. Levin (2000) 82, 94–95, and G. Klosko (1986) 184. 21. For H. D. Rankin (1964) 132, “Laws represents Plato’s own individual tragedy.” 22. See Chapter 4, p. 76f. 23. Adv. Col. 1126c. 24. Deipnosophitae I 3e, XI 508d–509e, and XV 696a. Cf. Loeb ed., VII 231 n. a. 25. G. R. Morrow (1993) 8–9. 26. W. K. C. Guthrie (1978) V 323.

156 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman Accordingly, Guthrie conceives Plato “in deadly earnest about both the purpose and the content of his Laws,” intended as “a posthumous guide to members of the Academy in their business of legislation, and to any rulers . . . willing to listen” (emphasis mine). 27 R. F. Stalley28 calls it a more single-minded work than Republic. It is also his longest. Putting all this together, then, strongly suggests that Plato intended in Laws to leave a model for constitutions and legal codes. If so, this is its super-objective, which defi nes its subtext (the hidden logic connecting the various parts), and as such, should be a helpful tool in interpreting the passages on woman. On this hypothesis, the content obviously ought to fit Plato’s purpose. This tells us what the subtext should be: The “model” of a viable constitution would have to be (1) broad enough to fit very diverse cases, and (2) fl exible enough to adapt to different circumstances, but (3) doctrinally complete and clear as to what was essential. It must be said that the structure of Laws, with its long explanatory preambles, and its minute detail on less controversial issues (as in women in penal law), seems to fulfi ll these requirements, especially the last one. Laws as a model, paradigmatic document, to be adapted to individual States by Plato’s students, is also probably why the city of “Magnesia”29 is qualified as a second-level one—a “semi-ideal” example of a concrete city, as it were, between the purely theoretical city in Republic and actual existing cities (the third city mentioned [739e] would therefore refer to the concrete cities Laws would be the inspiration for). Saunders, 30 for instance, views Plato’s city of Magnesia as a shifting structure “at one point on a sliding scale of political maturity.”31

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN REPUBLIC AND LAWS This hypothesis will allow us to distinguish Laws’ more concrete level of reflection from the theoretical level of Republic, and may dispel some difficulties affecting this investigation. Stalley,32 for instance, recognizes in Laws “a different purpose and readership” than Republic, and a more practical

27. Ibid., 335. 28. R. F. Stalley (1983) 4. 29. An area called “Magnesia” existed in Thessaly (and another in Lydia), but this city of Magnesia seems obviously to be fictional. 30. T. J. Saunders (1995) 603. See also J. M. Cooper (1997) 1319. 31. M. S. Kochin (2002) 112 does not see this, and judges as obscure Plato’s intention in ranking cities, though for S. Forde (1997) 662, what is “obscure” is “the natural status of the distinctive female traits.” 32. R.F. Stalley (1983) 9.

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orientation. Guthrie,33 however, seems to miss this difference when he states that Laws “simply works out in more detail the ideas of Republic.” It is a common error to read Republic as a practical proposal, and Laws as an attempt to legislate in the same direction, enriched with the experience of a more mature (or more pessimistic, depending on the interpreter) Plato.34 Let us review the differences between the two works: In Republic, the intention is not practical but dialectical. Plato wants to see how far he can go to achieve a model city in the sense of a paradigm using logical reflection without bothering with pragmatic limitations. Laws instead develops legislation for a possible (i.e., a feasible, as opposed to a merely noncontradictory) city, a “model city” in the sense of a practicable blueprint, expressly qualified as a second city (739e) when compared to Republic’s city, which remains the ideal without limitations, which he qualifies as “proper to gods or children of gods” (739bd). In this regard, D. G. Ritchie35 points out that communism is Plato’s ideal, allowing private property and nuclear families only if he could keep parcels equal, limit the acquisition of property, regulate population, and train women like men. In Republic’s ideal society, for instance, where the good of the State is absolute unity, Plato, as we saw, develops a dramatic and playful ideogram of common marriages36 to eliminate nuclear families’ threat to unity. Laws, instead, considers a concrete situation in a hypothetical but realistic contemporary city. In both, women’s assignments agree with this distinction. The reflection in Republic is abstract, belonging to the world of theory; its objects are ideal paradigms or playful ideograms; in Laws the reflection is concrete, with a practical purpose; its object is the sociopolitical world of Plato’s time. While Plato’s task in Republic is unbending and ruled only by logical necessity, Laws constitutes an exercise in prudence, the virtue of applying universal principles to a concrete, contemporary situation. This is what Saunders, 37 in a lucid page and a half, means by asserting that “Plato could perfectly well have written Laws when he wrote Republic and Republic when he wrote Laws, for they are the opposite sides of the same coin.”38

33. W. K. C. Guthrie (1978) V 354. 34. H. D. Rankin (1964) 133ff., for instance, sees Laws as “the work of a disappointed man.” This ignores not only the acknowledged character of the discussion in Republic as a purely mental construct (Rep. 368de–369a.)—an “ideal city” as a mental or theoretical creation, not as an Idea or Form, which are real (indeed, reality itself) for Plato—but also the relation between the two cities as to their perfection, described explicitly in Laws 739a–e. 35. D. G. Ritchie (1902) 176. 36. See Chapter 1, pp. 25ff. 37. T. J. Saunders(1975) 27–28. 38. R. F. Stalley (1983) 14 objects, understanding here more than what Saunders is trying to say.

158 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman UNUSUAL TEXTUAL TRAITS Now then, as we examine Laws’ text, there are a number of peculiar ways Plato refers to women, and these will help us in our interpretation. First of all, woman is found explicitly and redundantly named throughout the whole length of the legislation. The practical character of the work, however, is not enough to explain totally her occurrence at every step. By abandoning custom, Plato is stressing his conviction about the importance of her legal situation and the need to overcome her secondary status. 39 This contrasts sharply with Republic (368c–427d), where the topic of woman is restricted to Book 5 and completely absent (except for dramatic uses) from the rest, even during the genesis of the city. Few recognize this, although the pervasiveness of women is the only element in Laws without historical precedent and is also a radical departure from Attic law. G. R. Morrow,40 for instance, thinks that departures from Attic law on woman’s status are “not motivated by conditions peculiar to Plato’s State.” But as can be seen in Appendix D to this chapter,41 Athenian women lacked citizens’ rights, while Plato here talks about ʌȠȜ૙IJĮȚ țĮ੿ ʌȠȜȓIJȚįİȢ (citizens and citizenesses) (814c), introducing qualifications on betrothal, (925a–c) and divorce,42 for example, that show concern and empathy toward women. On betrothal, some43 note that Plato introduces succession also on the mother’s side, absent in Athenian law. It is also remarked44 that orphan females (ਥʌȓțȜȘȡȠȚ) have greater freedom choosing a husband than in Attic law, though for one critic,45 abolishing dowries leaves a married woman absolutely dependent on her husband and imperfectly integrated into the new family. On divorce, the city of Laws has been regarded as “patriarchal,”46 since Athenian women could ask for divorce with their tutor’s consent, while in Laws officials supervising families decide this. Note, however, that these “officials” are women.47 It is also the case that Athenian women could not attend the Assembly, hold public office (excluding priesthood), serve in the army, bring legal actions, intervene in the courts, own land, or decide, except for

39. Primary resources for current customs are Demosthenes XXVII–LIX. and Isaeus’ speeches. See A. R. W. Harrison (1968) Part I, especially 137 n. 1, while discussing the ਥʌȓțȜİȡȠȢ. 40. G. R. Morrow (1993) 121. 41. See pp. 181ff. 42. 784b and 929e–930b. 43. See G. R. Morrow (1993) 121, and L. Gernet (1951) CLXVI. 44. E. B. England (1921) II 537. 45. M. Piérart (1974) 76–77. 46. A. J. Cappelletti (1980) 93. See also S. M. Okin (1977) 363–364, and G. R. Morrow (1993) 121. 47. See “Supervisors of Marriage” in this Chapter, pp. 163ff.

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widows, whom to marry. Women in Laws fulfi ll all the requirements for attending the Assembly and other governmental bodies, hold offices at age forty, and share military training. The equality in the status of the sexes is also remarkable (e.g., the adultery law, 784e), as is Plato’s lessening women’s dependence on men, giving consideration to particular situations, and providing better conditions for entering political life. Saunders48 says that Plato also simplifies Athenian law by basing penology on psychology, thinking that Plato saw the sexual risk in women’s new activities as worth taking, using moral, social, and religious sanctions for sexual misdemeanors,49 but placing violence within criminal law (874c) with swift punishment for rape (the victim’s family may slay a rapist). T. Gomperz 50 fi nds sexual morality more strict in Laws than in Republic. Secondly, Plato prefers masculine and feminine terms instead of the common masculine that includes both. By applying what he says to each sex he emphasizes his reference to woman, and his interest in including her in civic activities. This curious insistence imposes itself on the reader, though lack of masculine and feminine forms for many nouns in English makes it sometimes difficult to translate his way of expressing himself. Besides “men and women,” “boys and girls,” “mothers and fathers,” “sons and daughters,” “brothers and sisters,” “brides and grooms,” “husbands and wives,” “males and females,” “priests and priestesses,” and “citizens and citizenesses,” the Greek has masculine and feminine forms for adolescents, relatives on the mother’s and the father’s side, gym and dance teachers, governors, orphans, homeowners, slaves, foreigners, and lightly clad boys and girls (ȖȣȝȞȠઃȢ țĮ੿ ȖȣȝȞȐȢ, 772a—the term means “naked,” but Liddell and Scott gives “lightly clad,” as common language, as when Plato adds “as modesty dictates”). The explicit and constant use of both genders, and the extremes to which Plato goes to do this, as in “good males” and “good females,” “foreign males” and “foreign females” (ȟȑȞȠȣȢ IJİ țĮ੿ ȟȑȞĮȢ) and even “dead males” and “dead females”51 (when stating how the Nocturnal Council should treat them), even when the treatment is the same for both sexes, calls attention to itself, and is undoubtedly deliberate. It implies Plato’s criticism of woman’s exclusion from civic and political life by emphasizing her as part of society, anticipating the radical modification of her juridical situation. Thirdly, another rhetorical device used to call attention to woman is to end a section with a redundant paragraph reiterating what he has already

48. 49. 50. 51.

T. J. Saunders (1991) 296 and 246 n. 168. Laws 783b–785a, 841de, cf. 759c. T. Gomperz (1905) 253–254. Ibid., 958d, where he uses “ʌİȡ੿ IJİȜİȣIJȒıĮȞIJĮȢ įȒ, İ੅IJİ IJȚȢ ਙȡ૧ȘȞ İ੅IJİ IJȚȢ șોȜȣȢ.”

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said, stressing that it also applies to women. The text contains eight such recapitulations.52 In one of these cases (805cd), Plato goes so far as to reaffi rm yet again what he has recapitulated before.53. Finally, Plato departs from custom in some enumerations of feminine and masculine terms by using the feminine term first54 —though the shock Plato intended by disturbing the Athenians’ habitual pattern of speech is not always recognized by today’s reader. The effect of all this is to give women an equal juridical status with men. Considering the above rhetorical tools together makes Plato’s intention stand out: Women are to be considered seriously and pervasively in the legal structure of the model city.

THE PLACE OF WOMAN IN LAWS: THE TEXTS But does the legislation itself dealing with woman support this emphasis? Let us look at what the texts say. Their cumulative force, distinctions gained above from analyzing other interpretations, and awareness of the subtext, permit the following depiction of woman’s status in Laws:

1. Educating Female Nature for the Second City Laws’ reintroduction of marriage and family bestows on woman specific functions, requiring her to develop new aspects of her nature. Thus, after primary instruction shared by boys and girls (764c) where women officials supervise education, games, and feeding, 55 children separate from age six, when women directing chorus and physical training prepare girls for their new social functions (794c, 813b), contrary to Levin’s56 implication that women are reduced to teaching children under six. Men, with a tradition of military skills, oversee them in this task, however. Though segregated, Plato insists on identical educational content for both sexes (to which he expects resistance). The text is clear: females must be subject to the same (IJ੹ Į੝IJȐ, 804d) regulations as males in education and in everything else; they must have equal (੖ıĮʌİȡ . . . ੅ıĮ, 804d)

52. Laws, 759d, 784d, 804de, 805cd, 829e, 833d, 834a, and 882c. 53. A curious interpretation by M. Canto (1986) 339–353 and (1994) 49 et passim even fi nds in this section of Laws (805c–806c) a feminist manifesto where Plato abandons Republic, and construes that female body politics is the necessary foundation which, by introducing the sexual difference that the city needs for human reproduction and the satisfaction of desire, makes possible the genesis of the political order. 54. Laws 800ab, 802e, 829e, 928a, 929ac. 55. Ibid., 793e–794a, 795d. 56. S. B. Levin (2000) 90–91.

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training. 57 (M. S. Kochin 58 seems to have missed these passages when he asserts that “female citizens receive a separate and unequal education.”) Rules on military operations and poetic speech (writing encomia honoring outstanding citizens) apply in the same way to men and women (੒ȝȠȓȦȢ, 829e); the whole population conducts all-day military practices monthly (829b); girls and young women enter athletic contests and races before puberty and from puberty until age twenty or marriage (833cd), but running is held within the stadium, a prudent precaution. Horseback riding is voluntary (834d), perhaps because, as the Athenian says, Crete does not need horses very much (534b). Although rules on military training reflect Spartan influence, their purpose is not to produce healthy mothers but to defend the city (814ab), adjusting “to what is possible and fitting in each case” during childbearing (785b). The period for procreation extends ten years (vs. twenty in Republic, 460e); pregnant women should take daily walks (789b), and cultivate a cheerful, bright, and calm demeanor (792e). On this task, for which woman is irreplaceable, Plato is extremely cautious. The role of woman in the city reveals a judicious exercise in prudence.

2. Common Meals By instituting common meals for women, Plato seems to intend to bring them out of their confi nement within the home, and of their alienation from public activities, traditionally limited to nothing but religious functions and festivals. T. J. Saunders59 puts it as “Plato’s desire to ‘flush out’ women from their homes.” Common meals (ıȣııȓIJȚĮ, 806e) for women and children were to be presided over by a woman official, replicating those that men held at the time. The project probably intended to preserve Republic’s community life (weakened by reintroducing the family) by stimulating personal development in its civic aspects and, as R. F. Stalley remarks,60 “promoting a common ethos.” For M. Piérart,61 among others, common meals not only are inconsistent with the family but also imply its dissolution (if you consider meals the particular moment where the family shares life together), and bring the Magnesians closer to the communal ideal of Republic. The detailed description reveals to England62 the importance given to women by

57. For Plato it is irrational not to have the same military training and the same [IJĮ੝IJȐ] objectives and interests men have (805a), such as occurs among Amazons and Sauromatides (804e). 58. M. S. Kochin (2002) 88. 59. T. J. Saunders (1991) 315 n. 93. 60. R. F. Stalley (1983) 104. 61. M. Piérart (1974) 77, 80. 62. E. England (1921) II 280.

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the common meals, freeing them from household duties; to W. K. Lacey63 it proves that the family “was only partially reinstated.” Plato hopes his project will be accepted, but again expects resistance (781d). Recalling men’s opposition in Sparta and Crete, he expresses concern in a passage alluded to earlier: . . . the sex among us human beings which is by nature more secretive and manipulative because of their weakness, the female sex (੒ țĮ੿ ਙȜȜȦȢ ȖȑȞȠȢ ਲȝ૵Ȟ IJ૵Ȟ ਕȞșȡȫʌȦȞ ȜĮșȡĮȚȩIJİȡȠȞ ȝ઼ȜȜȠȞ țĮ੿ ਥʌȚțȜȠʌȫIJİȡȠȞ ਩ijȣ, IJઁ șોȜȣ, įȚ੹ IJઁ ਕıșİȞȑȢ), has improperly been left to disorder due to the pusillanimity of the lawgiver. . . . (781a) Aristotle,64 counting ıȣııȓIJȚĮ for women and children among Plato’s ideas, reads the Athenian as referring to Lycurgus, who, because of women’s resistance, abandoned subjecting them to his laws. Plato continues: For it is not only the half, as one could expect, that is unregulated when women lack norms, but, insofar as the female nature among us is inferior to that of men with respect to virtue (੖ı૳ į੻ ਲ șȒȜİȚĮ ਲȝ૙Ȟ ijȪıȚȢ ਥıIJ੿ ʌȡઁȢ ਕȡİIJ੽Ȟ ȤİȓȡȦȞ IJોȢ IJ૵Ȟ ਕȡȡȑȞȦȞ), to that extent it [i.e., what is unregulated] affects more than the half. It is better for the happiness of the State to revise and reform the regulations, and make the duties of women and men common. (781a–781b) J. M. Pabón and M. Fernández Galiano65 attribute the double harm to women’s inferiority, and Guthrie66 infers that “because of her weakness [the Platonic female] is more given to secrecy and craftiness.” As to the text, J. Annas67 overlooks the last affi rmation (which will also be reaffi rmed later, 829b), and concludes that common meals are all that is left from the common life in Republic; she also fi nds it relevant to compare Plato’s reasons and modern liberalism, while E. Zeller68 observes more emphasis on women’s imperfection here than in Republic. P. Friedländer69 also notices that the Athenian symposium was known as an instrument of political education, but observes that Spartan influence, whose common meals for men had the same purpose, was also present. Zeller70 thinks that the proposal integrates woman into public life, and

63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70.

W. K. Lacey (1968) 314 n. 14. Arist. Pol. II 1270ab. J. M. Pabón and M. Fernández Galiano (1960) I 250. W. K. C. Guthrie (1978) V 354. J. Annas (1976) 313. E. Zeller (1876) 456 n. 64. P. Friedländer (1969) III 401. E. Zeller (1876) 542–543.

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L. Strauss71 opines that Plato may have believed that common meals for women had been used in the remote past. In short, it is the goal of civic education that probably explains Plato’s extending common meals to women, in spite of expected resistance.

3. Women’s Assignments in the City Regarding the activities of woman in Laws, Frank72 has an insightful overview of nonexclusive roles. He approaches them by characterizing woman’s education as association with, imitation of, and assimilation to the social institutions: family, school, temple, army, courts, festivals, etc. This requires cultivating gymnastic, music, literature, theater, choral dances and religion. The majority of women, like men, remain at the level of right opinion, assuming active military duty after gestation, when the mother becomes a matron. At thirty, outstanding women begin superior studies to be leaders, and at forty can assume public offices. G. R. Morrow73 wonders why Plato stresses women’s military training, for which they are less fitted, as their community contribution; but recognizes he does not neglect other areas, nor psychological differences, particularly orderliness and temperance, lacking in Spartan tradition. What follows is the examination of women’s exclusive roles, which is more significant, and the issue of their controverted participation in government bodies. a) The Supervisors of Marriage Though supervising marriage is women’s most significant explicitly stated official ruling position over family policy (784ac) (including appointment of elementary teachers), women have other exclusive offices: only women are also elementary teachers and caretakers of children before age six (795cd), chorus directors (795de, 796b), religious dance teachers (799ab), and gym trainers of older girls, including trainers in military skills.74 (For some reason, however, M. Piérart75 and L. Gernet76 claim that women in Laws live only in and for the family, mothers being procreators deserving their children’s respect. ) The Supervisor of Marriages is the most important exclusively feminine magistracy overseeing compliance with family law, indicting those who disobey, directing and controlling the procreative function of new marriages, 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76.

L. Strauss (1975) 98. S. Frank (1970) 287. G. R. Morrow (1993) 331. Laws, 794c, 804de, 813b. M. Piérart (1974) 77. L. Gernet (1951) CLXIX.

164 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman advising as experts in biosocial matters, assisting in cases of divorce for sterility, and solving family disputes (784ac). They also supervise games in kindergartens, and can petition to implement their directives.77 The office represents authority, protection of the community, mature experience, and counseling on private matters.78 D. Cohen79 mentions skeptical scholars dismissing women officials “as little better than public mothers.” Annas,80 for different reasons, ridicules them as a “women’s moral vigilante group.” Kochin81 refers to them as “some sort of woman offices” whose details are neglected. None of these seem unprejudiced. Some react with indignation to Plato’s planning the intromission of a public official into private life, forgetting this is Ancient Greece, where individual rights had not yet been conceived, much less the right to privacy. Plato was addressing a need in a situation where women married very young, and the general population had but rudimentary education. In fact, the Supervisors of Marriage performed services comparable, mutatis mutandis, to today’s behavioral therapists, psychologists, spiritual directors, counselors, economic and legal advisors, etc. S. Frank82 uses the context of Platonic thought to depict them; for example, the notion of the nuptial number (Rep. 460a) allows him to show Supervisors of Marriage as addressing the mysterious secret of life itself.83 Another of their responsibilities was assessing, using tables of mortality and the number of women old enough to be married, how many children must be born every year. By controlling the population, they would maintain the community’s biological and biosocial continuity (740b–d). Frank also infers from Republic 7 what constituted women’s superior education, including mathematics, astronomy, harmony, and dialectic. Of course, his approach requires accepting the unity of Plato’s thought—something not to be dismissed lightly. In any case, far from being incorporated into man’s activities as a purely numerical addition ranked only by individual talent as in Republic, exceptional women, following the reintroduction of marriage and family, enter public functions having a specific leadership role complementary to that of man. Plato’s departure here from Attic women’s legal status is complete. As Saunders84 has concluded, his innovations are “tremendous.” Yet this does not require modifying Plato’s conception of woman, which continues to be, as

77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83.

Laws, 794b, 930a–d, 932b. S. Frank (1970) 305 and 112. D. Cohen (1987) 36. J. Annas (1976), 317. M. S. Kochin (2002) 96f. S. Frank (1970) 305–307. For Plato’s calculation of the nuptial number, see J. M. Pabón and M. Fernández Galiano (1969) II 131 n. 1. 84. T. J. Saunders (1995) 593.

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in Timaeus, the temporal and temporary incarnation of a person, understood as a human soul (essentially equal to that of man but existentially and in fact deficient in virtue), in an inferior body, while recognizing exceptions. For D. H. Coole,85 however, Plato has ceased to hold, in Laws, the equivalence of men’s and women’s souls. But we already have seen that in Republic Plato fi nds a moral difference between the sexes in the soul. Coole suggests that the notion Plato inherited from Socrates on the sexual equality of souls and virtue contradicts affi rming woman’s difference and natural perversity, and that Plato never overcame the Greek association of woman with the nonrational order. In Chapter 6,86 however, I uncovered necessary distinctions disproving Platonic inconsistency. Plato does appear, on the face of things, not to give women access to the main governing bodies. This is a frequent assumption, but not unquestionable, and so opinions are greatly divided.87 We will see precisely why he is silent below.

CONTROVERTED ASPECTS With this as background, let us examine some of the current controverted issues, to see if our hypothesis of the subtext will resolve them. They include Plato’s reintroduction of nuclear marriage, his views on woman’s nature,

85. D. H. Coole (1988) 38–41. 86. Chapter 6 throughout, particularly the Conclusion, pp. 148ff. 87. For L. Gernet (1951) CXVI–CXVII, political life “remains exclusively masculine,” but woman has some political rights. For G. R. Morrow (1953) 157 and 168, military service qualifies women for Assembly membership and Council magistracies after forty. Against Morrow’s view that women have the right to elect and be elected, M. Piérart (1974) 76–77 limits their magistracy to Supervisors of Marriages by referring relevant passages to male citizens. S. M. Okin (1977) 364–365 sees women as limited to the domestic sphere, assuming that, unlike Republic, Plato states explicitly here when a function is common or belongs only to woman. To R. F. Stalley (1983) 186 and 105–106, women’s participation in the Assembly is not clear, recognizing that Laws 805ac could imply it, adding that mature women seem to exercise all magistracies but are nowhere mentioned in important positions, albeit granting that the grammatical masculine includes the feminine. Stalley judges it impossible to assess the extent of women’s political activities, concluding that Plato modestly advances woman’s legal position. But W. K. C. Guthrie, V 342 n. 2 and 353–354 infers, from women’s age for public positions (Laws 785b), that women participate in the Assembly, concluding that in Laws Plato holds woman on an even level with man in education, physical and military training, military service, participation in public assignments, and common meals. Dissenting, L. Robin (1968) 228 n. 1 denies women citizenship in Laws. Furthermore, and without textual evidence, H. D. Rankin (1964) 84 believes that only full citizen women can be Supervisors of Marriage, and M. S. Kochin (2002) 88 and 96 conceives women as “excluded from the most important offices.”

166 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman her inferiority, and her possible participation in leadership positions. (Difficulties arising from not distinguishing dramatic from philosophical texts have been considered in the Prologue.)

1. Reintroducing Nuclear Marriage Some explain the reintroduction of nuclear marriage in Laws as a result of the abolition of private property.88 Others give different explanations. Most fail, however, in not distinguishing the abstract and concrete levels of reflection in Republic and Laws. Once again, to keep the argument from being sidetracked into a farrago of explanations that contradict each other, I will relegate the discussion of other views to an appendix,89 and concentrate on discussing the question itself. It must be clear that, in Republic, the suppression of property and the handling of the family had as its justification the problems related to the analogy between city and soul, already discussed;90 while Laws, as a working guideline for legal advising, reintroduces nuclear marriage as part of Plato’s practical judgment about what constitutes a possible (in the sense of practically realizable) city. It seems to me that when Plato left the theoretical level of Republic to focus on the practical possibilities of a legislation for a concrete city in Laws, he tacitly admitted that politics is the art of the possible. This meant considering “human nature” in the men and women of his own concrete culture and circumstances, in which he recognized that the inclination to form nuclear marriages was deeply rooted; and therefore he could not plan for them as if they were logical entities (as he did in Republic). This required a new role for woman in the family and society, while still maintaining the principles regarding her education, social activities, and legal reform. It is the same philosophy of woman, but within a different type of reflection.

2. The Misunderstanding of “Nature” The notion of “human nature” as applied to woman is another stumbling block to those who interpret that Plato in Laws is abandoning the ideals of Republic for a more pessimistic view. Some believe that he always means woman as such, missing the concept’s analogous uses, which depend on the scope he intends. Levin,91 for example, explains that in Laws Plato segregates

88. A view held by those who interpret “having” common wives as “owning” them. See p. 73, n. 28. 89. Appendix B to this chapter, pp. 176ff. 90. See Chapter 4 and also Chapter 1, pp. 25ff. 91. S. B. Levin (2000) 87.

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the sexes’ education because women’s natures are different. But this is the universal sense, one Plato is not using here.92 Thus, because recognizing ijȪıȚȢ’ (nature) logical extension (as individual, particular, or universal) in each case is fundamental to interpreting woman’s nature in Laws, we must reexamine its uses briefly. As seen in Chapter 5, 93 the meaning of ijȪıȚȢ in Plato must be determined by context. Although Plato denies neither Republic’s view of a single (universal) human nature including men and women, nor a distinct nature for each sex (particular), nor the notion of nature as individual talent, in Laws he is mostly using the particular sense of the term, referring not to woman as such nor to their individual diff erences, but only to the women contemporary to him. Pace S. B. Levin, 94 these notions are compatible and depend on what he is addressing. Levin’s idea is that Plato has abandoned in Laws the notion of a “single human ijȪıȚȢ rather than male and female ones.” Not to be using it at the moment does not imply rejecting it. Further, although the educated Greek’s background included literature, the concreteness of women’s treatment here betrays Plato’s direct experience, not his literary background, as viewed by Levin. Thus, when Plato says “instead, the female, the sex of us humans most prone (਩ijȣ) to being secretive and intriguing because of its weakness,” the qualifications in ȖȑȞȠȢ ‫ݘ‬ȝࠛȞ IJ૵Ȟ ਕȞșȡȫʌȦȞ (the part [i.e., the sex] of us human beings) at 781a3 doubtless specifies the humans of his time which, coupled with ਲ șȒȜİȚĮ ਲȝ૙Ȟ (our females) at 781b1, quoted below, signifies women in their particular culture, not universally. Additionally, the use of ਩ijȣ instead of ijȪıȚȢ suggests becoming or developing into. T. J. Saunders95 translates “inclined to.” It implies that nature can be stunted, as in Athens, or developed in particular aspects. The context shows that Plato is not rejecting here his ideal woman, but blaming on legislators that women have become understood universally as naturally weak. This awareness of the situation of women in his experience, without affecting his notion of woman as such, prompts him instead to plan legislation to overcome the status quo. Thus, not distinguishing Plato’s three analogous uses of nature increases interpretative mistakes on women’s sociopolitical role, a common problem in current commentaries.

92. S. Forde (1997) 660, though aware of Plato’s use of “nature” in different senses, does not resort to logic to explain it. Finding the notion too complex and ambiguous, he talks instead about Plato’s crosscutting natures, and of essential and inessential parts. 93. See Chapter 5, 122ff., and Appendix A to Chapter 5, pp. 122ff. 94. S. B. Levin (2000) 86. 95. T. J. Saunders (1975) 263.

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3. The Inferiority of Woman What explains the consistency between woman’s inferiority in both works on one hand, and Republic’s equal opportunity plus Laws’ recognition of woman’s virtues and insistence on their education on the other, is that her inferiority, as seen in the preceding chapter, is not essential (as many interpret) but temporary and surmountable. Conceived into inferior bodies as incarnated souls of cowardly men, according to Timaeus’ myth (90e–91a), or lacking education and social development, as reported in Laws (805e), women have, in spite of their diminished status, the task of redeeming their souls fallen while in a man’s incarnation (women as moral savior of men is an old cross-cultural idea). Some would overcome their weakness, even to becoming philosopher-queens. In Laws,96 all have the same possibility as men for virtue. Not that women “achieve less of it,” as Saunders97 puts it, since, as assumed by the philosopher-queen (Rep. 540c), Plato judges talent individually. Because of the profusion of commentary justifying a change from Republic’s to Laws’ view of woman, the reader will fi nd a few references to them during my discussion of the issue here, and a brief report of those positions in an appendix.98 The best arguments against the mistaken thesis reading woman’s inferiority in Plato as essential and unchanging are not only Republic’s philosopher-queen but, more strikingly, his explicit and continuous inclusion of women in various activities in Laws, attesting that promoting virtue, not totalitarian or collectivistic views as some believe, directs his program. Saunders99 adds that otherwise Plato could not say “that if they [women] had the same lifestyle as men, the State could double its achievement” (805ab). Interpreting Plato’s inferiority of woman as essential would make Republic’s project of equal opportunity impossible, and Laws’ insistence on education absurd; moreover, identifying women using “our” argues against the inferiority Plato is talking about as essential, since it limits his statements to the factual state of the women he knew and what the new legislation was to overcome. Moreover, Plato’s insistence on women’s education presupposes his conviction that the state of most contemporary women does not belong to woman as such but has been caused by concrete circumstances and is reversible. Educated women, mentioned as able to prefer tragedy, for example (658d), imply this. Plato’s qualifying as ignorant those who train only the

96. 97. 98. 99.

Ibid., 770c. Cf. Meno 76b. T. J. Saunders (1995) 592. Appendix C to this chapter, pp. 177ff. T. J. Saunders (1995) 593.

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right hand (794d–795c) suggests, according to G. R. Morrow,100 women’s education by analogy: a State that educates only men is like a person training only the right hand. E. B. England101 also relates the two arguments. For L. Strauss,102 training both hands is a preparatory wedge for demanding greater sex equality. But while considering women inferior in virtue, he overlooks the ਲȝ૙Ȟ (our women, 781b) and the difference it makes. Plato follows this by affi rming that all boys and girls (ʌȐȞIJİȢ IJİ țĮ੿ ʌ઼ıĮȚ, 795d) must be supervised in their training by male and female officers.

4. Plato’s Silence on Woman’s Leadership Positions As to women’s administrative assignments, Plato did not state his purpose in Laws. This handicaps investigators trying to explain women’s peculiarly uneven integration into the work, since general legislation states their education, military activity, and participation in the city throughout the legal code in painful or, as Saunders103 says, “dizzy detail,” but says nothing about whether or not they were to hold high government offices. Women’s absence there disconcerts investigators. To name just a few, Guthrie104 fi nds Plato’s position “equivocal”; Okin,105 “a study in ambivalence”; for Saunders,106 Plato speaks “with forked tongue and in double paradox.” As a consequence, many conclude, interpreting Plato’s silence as a positive denial, that the highest leadership jobs will not be held by women. Th. M. Robinson,107 for instance, believes that in Laws any notion of women as rulers is abandoned. Similar views are held by Okin,108 Levin,109 as well as Kochin,110 who states it repeatedly, though unable to cite a text as proof, while affi rming that “it is unclear what they are engaged in instead,”111 since their exclusion “cannot be due to the burdens” of caring for house and children. Difficulties have also risen from mistaking as Plato’s views statements fulfilling a purely dramatic purpose,112 including disparaging remarks113

100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111.

G. R. Morrow (1993) 329. E. England (1921) II 278. L. Strauss (1975) 102. T. J. Saunders (1995) 591. W. K. C. Guthrie (1978) V 354. S. M. Okin, (1977) 360. T. J. Saunders (1995) 591. Th. M. Robinson (1998) 147. S. M. Okin (1977) 364–365. S. B. Levin (2000) 89. M. S. Kochin (2002), 88–90, 96–97, 99, 111, 118, 120, 121. Although he quotes me (1996) 344, stating that “the topic of women is integrated throughout the work.” 112. See Prologue, pp. 14ff. Also B. Calvert (1975) 242 and S. B. Levin (2000) 83. 113. E.g., Laws 949b.

170 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman which Saunders114 judges “in the best (or worst) tradition of Greek male chauvinist piggery” sitting “oddly” with the proposal of highly respected offices headed by women. Nevertheless, it does seem that, beyond her exclusive social functions, Plato intends women to share other assignments with men. Frank’s115 account refers explicitly to some: women are priestesses, an important but not exclusive position, in charge of a temple and supervising rites (741c, 759a–d), presenting to the goddess offerings and prayers (799b), able to excommunicate or expel impure persons (800a), offer hospitality to priestesses or experts in theology from other communities, and judge minor offenses (953ab). Priestesses are also part of a commission regulating women’s festivals, their number, and which are women’s exclusively and which accept men (828bc). But let us see whether in the texts themselves the requirements for candidates in each government office (751a–785b) could include women: Į) The Assembly includes all bearing or having borne arms (women bear arms). ȕ) Council members and Guardians of the laws must be elected by all citizens (women are citizens). Ȗ) Military offi cers and cavalry commanders are nominated by the Guardians and elected by the troops. Generals nominate Company Commanders, elections settling disagreements (women, being citizens and bearing arms, could be Guardians). į) Priests and priestesses inherit their position or are chosen by lot, after screening. İ) Country, city, and market wardens are elected by region (women, being citizens, could be so elected). ȗ) The Minister of Education is a man (no woman here) elected by all the officials except the Council (women could take part in electing him). Ș) Scrutineers are elected from candidates proposed by every citizen (women are citizens and presumably could be elected). ș) Nocturnal Council members are: present and past Ministers of Education (all men), the ten oldest Guardians of the laws, priest recipients of merit awards and those sent abroad to learn from other States. Each of these brings, as member, a qualifi ed young man at least thirty years old. Ț) Justice (private and public) is exercised by the public (which includes women) in the fi rst case, and by either the public or the corresponding board of officials (whose members are citizens and members of the governing bodies), in the second (women could be included here).

114. T. J. Saunders (1995) 591. 115. S. Frank (1970) 299–300.

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This overview shows that, with the sole exception of the Minister of Education and the young members of the Nocturnal Council, requirements do not necessarily exclude women, since being citizens and bearing arms qualifies them to be members of the Assembly and the Council, and to become Guardians of the laws, military offices, cavalry commanders, country, city, and market wardens, electors for the Minister of Education, capable of nominating Scrutineers, and becoming Scrutineers themselves. If they become Guardians of the Laws, or are sent abroad to learn from other States, they can also join the Nocturnal Council. Women possibly can act as part of the public administration of private justice, and also be part of justice boards. Pace Kochin,116 there are at least four explicit instances of women acting as judges, both while priestesses (953b) and as members of family juries.117 Thus, women can be jurors (in courts handling family matters)118 and Assistants to the Minister of Education (813c). Since the rights to vote, be elected, and become members of government bodies are not stated (although these could be implicit), this causes Saunders119 to qualify as “very strange that Plato makes no parade of the innovation,” while preparing the ground in other cases, adding: “Is it likely that he would prescribe such a phenomenal enlargement of women’s rights in such a casual manner?” Because of this, some argue that Plato refers only to recognized women’s offices (priesthood, Supervisors of Marriage, etc.). Moreover, there is no reason to state that “Magnesia will send out only men as ambassadors” as Kochin120 does, since the text consistently uses ਙȞșȡȦʌȠȢ instead of ਕȞȒȡ throughout the passage. I will provide, as I said, the reason for the ambiguity. Thus, besides the Minister of Education and the twenty young men that join the Nocturnal Council, there is no statement barring women from the Nocturnal Council or other high magistracies, as Kochin121 believes (he also cites other views). In addition, a difficulty becomes obvious when Morrow122 dissents from E. Szanto,123 for whom Plato’s “citizeness” (814c) only means a citizen’s daughter, useless as legal concept (he overlooks Laws 770cd); for Morrow this applies only to Greek law, and quoting Laws 804d–805d he defends Plato’s goal of equalizing women’s legal status, even if incompletely. Trying to clarify the issue, Cohen124 has collected Plato’s qualifiers describing voters: “All shall have a voice,” “the city will vote again,” “anyone who

116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124.

M. S. Kochin (2002) 96. Laws 878d, 929bc, and 932b. Ibid., 878d, 929b–c, and 932b. T. J. Saunders (1995) 593. M. S. Kochin (2002) 130. Ibid., 96, 118, 120, 121; also 97 nn. 17 and 19. G. R. Morrow (1993), 113 n. 55. E. Szanto (1892) 60. D. Cohen (1987) 33.

172 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman pleases is to vote” (753bd), the council will be elected by “everyone” (756c), “whoever wishes” may attend the Assembly (764a), etc. He concludes that the text neither excludes women nor necessarily includes them. Hence, the real question here becomes obvious: It is not why women are excluded from high offices, but why is the consideration of their possible inclusion not stated explicitly? It certainly seems that Plato studiously avoids being clear on this point.125 Saunders126 wonders why. Acknowledging that Plato’s proposals flow from his principles, not a feminist agenda, he describes Magnesia127 not as an inflexible blueprint but as a shifting structure embodying aspirations, and imagines that a visitor from the Academy asking Plato’s permission to improve an existing Magnesia would be cheered on. Saunders’ fiction contains a magnificent insight, the fruit of deep immersion in the text. Let us see if Laws’ purpose (the “super-objective” governing Plato’s subtext)128 could enlighten the apparent discrepancies on woman’s position, and that Plato’s original doctrine on woman is consistent with the text of Laws, and does not require attributing to him pessimism or a change of position.

SOLVING THE PUZZLE OF WOMAN IN LAWS My interpretation129 runs in the same direction as Saunders, but I believe it accounts for the text more compellingly. If we simply consider that sharing in government was unheard of for woman at the time, it is extremely probable that Plato expected hard resistance to this most revolutionary and radical departure from Attic law. And since he wrote the Laws intending to leave his followers a model for constitutions and legal codes,130 and foreseeing that references to his projects on woman would cause his disciples difficulties—greater as the offices became higher—as consultants of different governments, he probably judged it prudent to leave undetermined the degree and form of its implementation at the leadership level, deferring to his students’ decision whether or not to introduce women in each case, since they would be familiar both with the conditions of the society they were advising and with his theory about her, a topic they probably discussed often.

125. 126. 127. 128.

For reactions, see M. S. Kochin (2002) 258 n. 2. T. J. Saunders(1995) 591–593, 596–597. Ibid., 602–603. P. M. Schuhl (1946) 59, 46–53; G. R. Morrow (1993) 8–9; P. Friedländer, I 102 and 355 n. 27; E. Zeller 2.1.420 n. 1; and W. K C. Guthrie (1975 and 1978) IV 23 and V 323. 129. See my La Mujer y lo Femenino en Platón, doctoral dissertation, University of Buenos Aires, 1991. 130. See pp. 157ff.

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Plato, in other words, was leaving room for prudent adjustment. This certainly would answer Saunders’131 question about what stands in the way of making explicit a complete partnership in women’s activities. It must also be noted that C. H. Kahn132 explains similarly the late appearance of the Nocturnal Council, since “it may be omitted, at least temporarily, if conditions were unsuitable.” Plato explicitly requires women to receive a full intellectual and military education at the lower levels, which would provoke less resistance, to prepare any particular culture for future changes. The text even reveals caution about possible women’s rebellion and public resistance to all innovations in woman’s traditional status.133 Phrases such as “if they concur” and “as much as possible” (794c, 805cd) show flexibility. For Morrow,134 this addresses parents’ acquiescence and public opinion.135 I submit, then, that this decision of Plato, made for reasons of prudence and based on the character of the document as a blueprint to work from, not a fi nal text, is key to the puzzle of the disconcerting treatment of women in Laws, especially Plato’s silence on the eligibility of woman for higher office (which perplexed G. Santas136 during his insightful examination of gender issues). This interpretation also makes it more likely that Plato tacitly intended to make possible the incorporation of women into State offices by carefully avoiding closing the institutions to them. At the same time, he states clearly that women are included in the priesthood, a telling exception. Priesthood was accepted for woman in the ancient world, and Plato had no concern about his students’ having difficulties in mentioning it. The only instance where priestesses are not named is when priests granted merit awards are made members of the Nocturnal Council, a politically important position (again, however, not excluding priestesses). This reinforces my thesis about the reason for lack of explicitness in other cases. Plato’s was a complex mind, capable not only of theoretical speculation but of practical projects: creating the Academy and advising the government of Syracuse show his interest in practical issues. And writing Laws does not by any means signify a rejection of Republic. Even while advising living by laws (874e–875d) in a possible city, he adds a qualification: the possibility that there could be a man, who at present does not exist, qualified to become a philosopher-king, reconfirming Republic’s view as best option:

131. 132. 133. 134. 135.

T. J. Saunders’ (1995) 592. C. H. Kahn (1961) 422 (also in G. R. Morrow [1993] XXIII). Laws 780b, 781c–d, 790b. G. R. Morrow (1993) 329. Instead, M. S. Kochin (2000) 98 also reads this as women’s military and gymnastic education being “systematically discriminatory.” 136. G. Santas (2003) 239–242.

174

Plato’s Dialectic on Woman One should not look elsewhere for a model constitution, but hold fast to this one, and with all one’s power seek the constitution that is as like to it as possible. (739de)

He nowhere even suggests a change of mind, calling the proposal of Laws “second best” (739e) and this not because Plato is suffering from a pessimistic view of human nature but because he is tailoring his ideal to the concrete.

CONCLUSION This new interpretation of Laws’ apparently contradictory texts makes sense of what Plato says. It shows that there is no real evidence for the view that Plato changed his conception of woman from Republic to Laws. A complete survey of its relevant texts, enlightened by examining the subtext, shows that woman maintains in Laws the same characteristics found in Republic and Timaeus. This conclusion is not simply an inference from the subtext but also from contributing factors, such as the identification of unusual textual traits,137 the implications that follow from the difference between Laws and Republic,138 and the evidence that current investigations are based on mistaken views about underlying issues such as Plato’s reintroduction of nuclear marriage,139 the notion of woman’s nature,140 the inferiority of woman,141 and Plato’s silence on woman’s leadership positions.142 My interpretation, I think, illuminates the way in which the philosopher advanced his legislative strategy, to make it possible to identify key characteristics in its treatment of women and to confi rm Plato’s serious interest about her place in the city of Magnesia. This examination also discloses a stronger formulation of the profi le of woman uncovered previously through the study of the pertinent dialogues: fundamentally capable of excellence (ਕȡİIJȒ), her situation in fact is inferior to men and requires being transcended. In Republic, this is accomplished by means of education and equalization of activities; in Timaeus it is portrayed as the ascent of the soul through successive reincarnations. Plato’s idea in Laws is, as E. Voegelin143 recognizes, that of a soul differentiated by degrees of perfection, not a change from an autocratic Republic to a populist Laws, as some hold.

137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143.

See pp. 158ff. See pp. 156ff. See pp. 166ff. See pp. 162ff. See pp. 168ff. See pp. 169ff. E. Voegelin (1966) 234 n. 2.

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Laws not only includes woman in all levels of education and introduces her to common meals but also integrates her explicitly into such civic functions as the Supervisors of Marriage, while exercising her maternal role and incorporating her forcefully, explicitly, and insistently into the juridical order as a legal person, and implicitly into many other offices, including the highest if given women become capable of them, and cities are enlightened enough to see this. Plato, in his old age, maintained himself loyal to the Socratic idea of the sexes’ capacity for virtue,144 which he tempered and enriched throughout his life. Laws is a magnificent display of his capacity for developing, over a lifetime, a coherent and noncontradictory conception.

APPENDICES

A. Scholars’ Awareness of Plato’s Concern about Woman in Laws Among those who noted Plato’s interest in women: already in 1921, E. B. England145 reported that near the work’s end (953e), he had “an unexpected revelation of the extent to which Plato upheld the ‘equality of opportunity’ between the sexes.” Among our contemporaries, C. H. Kahn146 calls Laws’ insistence on women’s equality in education and politics “unparalleled.” D. Cohen147 judges Plato’s proposals “revolutionary.” T. J. Saunders,148 despite qualifications, draws attention “to the flourish of trumpets, to the clarioncalls for female equality,” characterizing Plato’s approach as “decidedly innovative.” But those are exceptions. G. R. Morrow,149 after acknowledging women’s share in State duties, even military service entailing Assembly membership (785b, 805 a, c), protests afterwards that “there is no hint that Plato has this point in mind.” G. Klosko150 sees only “some attention paid to women’s education.” R. F. Stalley,151 while granting Plato’s desire for a more prominent role for women, finds it “not clear how far he is prepared to go in that direction,” nor “what political rights” he will give them, recognizing only “modest improvements in woman’s status,” inconsistency between women’s inferiority in virtue and their bearing arms and receiving the same education, and (while disregarding that the general masculine could include

144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151.

Meno 73b. See p. 41. E. B. England (1921) II 597. C. H. Kahn XXVII Foreword, G. R. Morrow (1993). D. Cohen (1987) 27. T. J. Saunders (1995) 592 and 597. G. R. Morrow (1993) 157–158. G. Klosko (1986) 202. R. F. Stalley (1983) 104–106.

176 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman women) no mention of them as holding the main offices. M. Schofield,152 commenting about charges of Plato’s ambivalence on woman in Laws, states that “it is hard to avoid the impression of a philosopher struggling to have a serious argument with himself.”

B. The Reintroduction of Nuclear Marriage Among those reading Republic’s abolition of nuclear marriage literally, J. Annas153 speculates, since for her Republic’s project is possible, that Plato abandons sex equality when he ceases to believe in it, education and activities serving only to control women. D. Wender,154 who also considers both works practical projects, thinks that Laws weakens Republic 5’s feminist program while retaining its most radical aspects. For many, such as M. Piérart,155 reintroducing nuclear marriage in Laws (721a) results from restoring private property, requiring privately possessed wives to insure legitimate heirs. S. M. Okin156 agrees, attributing the difference to change in property and family, not to Plato’s idea of woman. But for R. F. Stalley,157 Laws’ emphasis on family and its cautious approach impede Republic’s proposals about sex. Others offer various explanations of the difference between the two works, or question how Plato’s principle of specialization in Republic (370ab) could still govern woman’s new role. Among them, A. Dickason,158 using imprecise contemporary labels, qualifies Laws on women “strict and conservative,” and Republic “egalitarian and liberal,” tracing their difference to Symposium’s and Timaeus’ biological conceptions, which, in this (to me implausible) theory, caused their respective views on woman. M. L. Osborne159 reasonably objects to this that in Plato, woman’s destiny, like man’s, is ruled by her soul, not her body. Failing to distinguish Plato’s abstract and concrete levels of reflection is what is fatal to these interpretations, which then must justify the difference by assuming that Plato had changed. Some, such as C. G. Allen160 and J. Annas,161 misinterpret Plato’s argument for women’s equal education as pragmatic, on the grounds that its lack weakens the State. The change, to them, is a result of calculating woman’s most convenient place in society,

152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161.

M. Schofield (2006) 231. J. Annas (1976) 317. D. Wender (1973) 77. M. Piérart (1974) 75–77. S. M. Okin (1977) 361–368. R. F. Stalley (1983) 104. A. Dickason (1973–1974) 46. M. L. Osborne (1975) 447. C. G. Allen (1975) 135. J. Annas (1981) 182f.

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a view that turns Plato’s position on its head. Still others, charging ambivalence,162 interpret women’s new functions as Plato’s change in his view about woman as such, caused by his discouragement regarding the possibilities of human nature. Among them, B. Calvert163 sees a problem in that women “seem to drop out of the picture as candidates for the highest offices of the State.” He fi nds in Laws “a hesitant affirmation of equality,” and considers as possible both the explanations of Dickinson164 (who sees a residue of male prejudice) and R. C. Lodge165 (who sees contempt for woman); but Calvert thinks that in that case, they would need to agree with Plato’s view of justice. G. Klosko166 and also S. B. Levin167 attribute to Plato a pessimistic view of woman’s nature, rendering inexplicable his insistence on her education and legal equality. Objecting to Levin’s explanation, Osborne168 imputes the difference not to change in Plato but to the purpose of each State; in addition, S. Forde169 reads Laws’ portrayal of gender and nature “closer to that of the Republic than is often recognized.” But E. Zeller170 attributes the difference to Republic’s and Laws’ points of view, not principles, and believes changes do not hurt woman, because education and common meals reduce domestic activity.

C. The Inferiority of Women To justify the apparent change from Republic’s to Laws’ view of woman, some deny her inferiority in Republic, or defi ne it as purely physical or inconsistent, manifesting totalitarian or collectivistic views. S. B. Levin171 distinguishes Republic’s negative from positive comments about woman by attributing the fi rst to Plato’s views of current women, and the second to his ideal reflection about them. Lack of distinction between dramatic and philosophical texts precludes any other explanation. However, describing women theoretically in Republic (455a–e) and Timaeus (42b, 91a), Plato at times writes negatively, while Laws (785b) has positive statements about contemporary women. So this approach does not work. But more importantly, Plato advances woman’s equal participation in Republic (455ab) while denying her any unique feminine contribution outside procreation, stressing differences in degree, and disclaiming any

162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171.

See Introduction, p. 5; and Chapters 6, p. 136, and 7 pp. 169 and 176. B. Calvert (1975) 241. G. L. Dickinson (1931) 71. R. C. Lodge (1947) 239. G. Klosko (1986) 200. S. B. Levin (2000) 87. M. L. Osborne (1975) 449–450. S. Forde (1997) 662. E. Zeller (1876) 542–543. S. B. Levin (1996) 14, 22–26.

178 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman activity where she is not surpassed by men (455d); in this way, women can share all pursuits although, leaving room for exceptions, “woman is weaker than man” (455e). Moreover, Levin’s172 alleged difference where women’s weakness is seen as purely physical in Republic and as moral or intellectual in Laws cannot be sustained, because although some texts in Republic (451e, 457a) do refer to female weakness as bodily, two other texts (455de, 456a) refer to her weakness for all city functions, including medicine, humanities (ȝȠȣıȚțȒ), and wisdom. Laws173 reiterates Republic as not limiting women’s weakness to physical strength. To L. Strauss,174 this explains why Plato subjects woman to law and order. Thus, woman appears as an inferior incarnation from Republic, Timaeus, and Laws. In Laws, however, not in a myth as in Timaeus (42b, 91a), nor as experienced, as in Republic (455cd), but as affecting contemporary woman. The Athenian states that “the nature of our (ਲȝ૙Ȟ) women is inferior to that of men with respect to virtue” (781b) (italics mine), and while counting relations of superiority deserving respect (917a), and proposing as a coward’s appropriate punishment to be changing him into a woman,175 the Athenian asserts men as superior to women. Many other derogatory remarks176 in other works have only a dramatic function. Wender177 regards women’s laws as Laws’ most radical aspect but denies, citing 690ac (while overlooking 917a), that Plato lists the sexes’ relations of dominance. Outside Athens, moral deficiency in the women educating Cyrus (695a) is blamed for the loss of his empire. Plato’s solution to this observed inferiority (which, in his metaphysics, is superable) is to incorporate women into educational programs and legal structures, since lack of control makes her situation doubly dangerous. W. K. C. Guthrie178 suggests that Plato blamed Sparta’s and Athens’ waste of women’s power, squandering half of the State’s strength. Thus, Plato integrates women into the city’s activities not, as some imagine, because their exclusion ignores the equality of human beings and their rights, nor as seeking women’s emancipation, but because of his conviction about her moral (nonessential but transitory) inferiority, in spite of her potential equality. R. F. Stalley179 rejects Plato as a predecessor of women’s liberation, since he did not intend to liberate anybody, male or female; improving security was, rather, his purpose for education and military training. Thus, the reason is

172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179.

S. B. Levin (2000) 84. Laws 781a, 917a, 944de. L. Strauss (1975) 97–98. Laws 944de. See also 872e. For Greek attitudes on women’s inferiority, see K. J. Dover (1974) 95–102, and R. Just (1989) Chap. 8. E.g., Laws 731d. D. Wender (1973) 76. W. K. C. Guthrie (1978) V 354. R. F. Stalley (1983) 106.

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anything but to command them to be inferior and to teach them to acknowledge it, as M. S. Kochin180 inexplicably asserts. (For Kochin,181 woman’s lower status in Laws results from the “licensing of private families”; but later he explains her restricted participation in public life, including philosophical practice, to her being unsuited to it.) T. Gomperz,182 instead, bases women’s emancipation on experience. But Plato’s purpose is precisely for women to overcome their inferior condition, not to “emancipate” them. However, a serious objection of inconsistency is raised when, after assessing women as inferior in virtue, the Athenian defi nes modesty and moderation (IJઁ țȩıȝȚȠȞ țĮ੿ ı૵ijȡȠȞ; 802e) as their distinctive virtues. Two passages, describing qualities required in woman’s new functions, seem to contradict not only her inferiority in virtue but also the qualitative sexual equality postulated in Republic (456b). Stalley183 fi nds the new activities for women “barely consistent,” and Kochin184 sees an irreconcilable difference in a conception of human excellence unable to account for men and women singly. But what Plato is talking about here is not the nature itself, but education: what aspects of one’s nature must be developed to adapt a person to the role he or she will have in the city. One of the passages, in setting artistic standards, states, “The Muses would never make such a mistake as to put lyrics of men into meters and melody suitable to women” (669c). The other passage more forcefully seems to imply a difference between men and women not only of degree (quantitative), as Republic holds, but also in kind (qualitative), by specifying for each sex proper songs for festivals’ religious dancing:185 It is necessary to assign both [harmonies and rhythms] to the songs proper to the difference of each nature, and there must be a clarification of what type belongs to the nature of the female. Now then, what is high minded (ȝİȖĮȜȠʌȡİʌȑȢ) and tends toward what is manly (IJઁ ʌȡઁȢ IJ੽Ȟ ਕȞįȡȓĮȞ ૧ȑʌȠȞ) should be said to be proper to the men, and instead that which leans more toward modesty (IJઁ țȩıȝȚȠȞ) and moderation (ı૵ijȡȠȞ) should be assigned more to women in the law as well as in theory (IJ૶ Ȟȩȝ૳ țĮ੿ ȜȩȖ૳). (802de) The standard distinguishing each sex’s proper songs seems to be their respective natures. Temperance (moderation, self-control), for Plato an important virtue superior to courage, appears proper to woman (a virtue necessary for exercising certain professions incorruptibly, 918e). For R. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185.

M. S. Kochin (2002) 95. Ibid., 102, 111, and 121. T. Gomperz (1905) 242–243 and 253. R. F. Stalley (1983) 105. M. S. Kochin (2002) 128–129. See G. R. Morrow’s (1993) 369, appealing description of a maidens’ dance.

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Demos,186 Plato attributes aggressiveness to the masculine factor and appetite to the feminine. But there is no text defi ning woman by appetite, unless dramatic passages are read as Plato’s doctrine. What we see is that Plato attributes to woman two virtues, modesty and moderation, the latter of the fi rst rank. Thus, woman’s moral inferiority in general for Plato is of degree, and does not defi ne her. J. Annas187 compares this passage with Meno’s (71e, 73a) statement that the virtues of man and woman are different, overlooking that the speaker is Meno, and that Socrates refutes it immediately afterwards. S. B. Levin,188 arguing for Plato’s unfavorable view of woman’s nature, fails to account for the text we saw just above. The Athenian objects to Spartan and Cretan laws emphasizing the lowest virtue, courage, in governing (630c). Law’s189 purpose, for Plato, is to produce self-control. Some interpret both passages’ “natural” sexual differences as essential, one high-minded and manly, the other modest and moderate, forgetting that Plato does not always understand nature by itself (essentially),190 but frequently in relation to the activity being considered (Rep. 454c). Among those sharing this interpretation, W. K. C. Guthrie191 judges Plato’s notion of female character somewhat equivocal but different from male character. Guthrie fi nds it difficult to translate IJઁ țȩıȝȚȠȞ țĮ੿ ı૵ijȡȠȞ, and cites T. J. Saunders’192 “modesty and restraint,” and G. R. Morrow’s193 “modesty and sedateness.” E. England194 quotes Ficinus’ translation: “feminis esse accommodatius, et disputatione asseverandum, et legibus sanciendum”; also G. Schneider’s: “ut femineum magis, cum lege, tum oratione perhibendum est.” Here, he identifies qualities women must develop to succeed in their new functions. Republic (369b, 370c) had already underlined specialization, cultivating each one’s nature for each required function. In Laws, women’s new responsibilities call for developing some characteristics of their natures that were not needed in Republic. On this, S. M. Okin195 disregards Plato’s metaphysics, and describes his notion of “nature” not as a standard that reason must recognize but as a conventional norm made by the governing philosopher prescribing, as we saw previously,196 what to regard as

186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196.

R. Demos (1939) 309. J. Annas (1976) 314 n. 16. S. B. Levin (2000) 87ff. Laws, 633c, 630a, and 688ab. For “nature” see Chapter 5, pp. 99ff., and appendix A to Chapter 5, 122ff. W. K. C. Guthrie (1978) V 354 n. 2. T. J. Saunders (1975) 291. G. R. Morrow (1993) 369. E. England (1921) II 269. S. M. Okin (1979) III 65–69. See Chapter 5, p. 124.

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“natural,” not describing it (italics mine). Thus, for Okin, woman’s nature is what different societies have arbitrarily made of her. This interpretation, closer to Thrasymachus’ views in Republic than to the thinking of Plato, needs no further comment. It is enough to refer to Plato’s preamble on the moral basis of law (726a–732b), a synthetic exposition of his ethics, where he states that a man must honor his soul not in any way he fancies, but only based on what is better; and he adds later that an evil above all others is that every man is by nature a lover of self, and thinks that this is right. The solution to all this seems to be, as I said above, not that men’s and women’s natures are qualitatively different, but that women have to develop different aspects of their (human) nature to be able to perform their new functions adequately. M. S. Kochin197 is convinced, because of Plato’s silence here about woman, that Magnesia “fails to give woman equal treatment in the allocation of public office or an equal military” training and education, a surprising discrimination. The fact is that there is no statement in Laws asserting this. Kochin198 only cites the Athenian Stranger asking for instances of equal treatment, and recognizing both parents’ claims over their children. As to why woman can do more in Republic, he resorts to comparing the principles of justice in both works. But Plato’s intention needs to be found prior to that. He has not given up on educating woman or integrating her into public functions, although the reintroduction of marriage and her new maternal role give them a distinctive character. There is no discrepancy once one understands the passages in context. L. Strauss199 applauds equal sex-separated education (since education in virility is endangered by women educators’ inferior virtue), and calls the proposed equality “a radical innovation” perhaps “not agreeing with nature.” The reason why girls’ education is separate in Laws is not that Plato discovered differences in their nature, as S. B. Levin200 says, but that they need to develop particular aspects of it for their new functions. S. Forde201 considers mysterious that what we call “nature” is “partly at least a product of education, conditioning or habituation.” But of course, what is athletic training, for instance, but a “conditioning” of the athlete’s “nature” by “habituation”? So there is no conflict here.

D. Women in Athens Most researchers agree that woman’s status began to be lowered in Athens when Solonic legislation reduced marriage to merely a means for producing

197. 198. 199. 200. 201.

M. S. Kochin (2002) 100. Ibid., 94. L. Strauss (1975) 110. S. B. Levin (2000) 89 and n. 11. S. Forde (1997) 657.

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citizens. Several scholars202 have recognized that this displaced women, leaving to man the cultivating of relations outside the family. And later, when lack of men became critical after the tragic expedition to Sicily in 413 B.C., Athenian women suffered from laws forcing them to share the same husband with foreign women. Women’s limits and obligations were determined by social class and economic status. Norms differed for citizens, foreigners (metics), courtesans (hetairai), concubines, prostitutes, and slaves. 203 W. K. Lacey204 describes women as merchants and service providers; foreigners or slaves such as flutists, dancers, or courtesans; older women as midwives, messengers, and participants in funerals. Aristocratic women attended marriages, religious festivals, occupying special places in wakes and funerals. But all Athenian women were excluded from civic and political activity, especially the Assembly and city offices. As H. D. F. Kitto205 notes, the State was regarded as the sum of families, not of individuals, which made the legality of marriage of public interest, 206 determining the children’s citizenship and streamlining inheritance. Hence, family perpetuation and stability were Athenian criteria for a man’s choosing a spouse. Legally, a female citizen in Plato’s Athens had the status of a minor, and was always dependent on a man: father, husband, or tutor.207 Even an orphan girl without brothers (the ਥʌȚțȜȒȡȠȢ, heir of her father’s property and responsible for family continuity) depended on the Archon, who gave her in marriage. 208 In spite of this, women were well provided for by law.209 Family men (or the city, if there were none) supplied their dowries, on whose interest (administered but not spent by the husband) they lived. 210 Women could possess property, but could not, like Spartan women, administer it;211 the husband, father, tutor, son, or the Archon was responsible for the welfare of the propertied woman in her old age.212 Although women could not make personal decisions, they were essential to social order and property continuity.213 This sort of

202. Among others, S. B. Pomeroy (1975) 57; H. P. Foley (1975) 32; G. L. Dickinson (1931) 169; and W. K. Lacey (1968) 88 and 156. 203. R. Garland (1985) 28; 31–33; 42 and 104. 204. W. K. Lacey (1968) 148. 205. H. D. F. Kitto (1951) 226. 206. M. I. Finley (1955) 2. 190. 207. J. P. Gould (1980) 43. 208. For H. D. F. Kitto (1951) 235, this only proves how Athenian law considered only family or city interests, not that of individual men or women. 209. W. K. Lacey (1968) 174 and 118. 210. D. M. Schaps (1979) Chap. 6, 74–88. 211. W. K. Lacey (1968) 110. 212. Ibid., p. 117. 213. J. P. Gould (1980) 44–45.

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thing has led some to compare the Athenian norms ruling woman with those for material goods. As to women’s civic function, the principal civic duty of Athenian women was, as it was for Spartans, the procreation of citizens. 214 A Greek belief in woman’s moral deficiency (and consequent concern over the children’s legitimacy) probably explains early marriages and woman’s segregation. 215 Female adultery was a public offense as threatening the family lineage, 216 and misogynistic commentaries reveal that women were not seen as submissive, quiet, and manageable but as independent, undisciplined, and licentious; this caused the men to segregate them. 217 Men and women had separate quarters, women generally on the upper floor, the gynaeceum, remote from reception areas. Physical separation reflects division of functions and the inviolability of the respectable woman. Doors between women’s and men’s quarters were locked to prevent theft and slaves’ clandestine sexual relations.218 Street insecurity, requiring escorts, coexisted with greater liberty in social family relations, 219 and absence from sports and fresh air distinguished Athenian from Spartan women. 220 Masculine figures were painted black and feminine white in vase paintings of the archaic period, manifesting the different exposure to the sun. 221 It has been observed 222 that the evidence contradicts the statement that if women were secluded they were despised.223 Interpreters see marriage as reduced to a physical relationship because disparity in age and education made a personal relationship difficult. 224 Athenian concubines and courtesans, however, transcended these limits, joining men’s symposia; but in public life, except for religious ceremonies, women were absent. Girls were married at fourteen with men of thirty; 225 judging woman as ignorant has been the result of erroneously presupposing today’s educational practices, since girls learned domestic tasks and the rudiments of

214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225.

W. K. Lacey (1968) 113 and 159. K. J. Dover (1978) 67. W. K. Lacey (1968) 113 and 159. D. C. Richter (1971) 7. Xen. Oec. IX 5. See also W. K. Lacey (1968) 137–138 and H. D. F. Kitto (1951) 230. H. D. F. Kitto (1951) 229–230. W. K. Lacey (1968) 153. K. J. Dover (1978) 77. J. P. Gould (1980) 46. See also Plut. Mor. 401. D. C. Richter (1971) 7 thinks that this explains Athenian men’s fear of women’s infidelity and strict legislation against adultery. See also J. P. Gould (1980) 49. W. K. Lacey (1968) 163.

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reading and writing from mother or husband;226 they also took care of children and home, while young men studied rhetoric and military arts until thirty. Married women actually had little free time, since the Greek home was a small factory producing food and clothing; 227 the house’s mistress administered goods and persons, took care of the sick, and organized funerals, including the ritual bath of the dead. 228 Athenian children perpetuated the family of the father and were his property; he could rear or expose a newborn, since the woman was believed to contribute only the receptacle where the man’s seed grew. 229 Athenian law prohibited marriage between siblings having the same mother, but not those with the same father. 230 But in spite of all this, woman as mother was revered. Outside the home, women attended Panathenaean festivals and the Thesmophoria (exclusively feminine). Priestesses formed processions and choruses, sharing in prophecy (even the Pythia, as far away as Delphi, had a public presence in Athens). Several texts in Plato231 and others attest to the presence of women among the spectators at tragedies and comedies. Among them, Aristophanes, 232 who mentions scenes causing “decent women to commit suicide from shame”; and an ancient Life of Aeschylus, which reports that a Eumenides’ chorus of furies caused women to miscarry, which, even if false, implies their attendance.233 Their presence was denied by some who concluded this by using standards of their own time. 234

E. Women in Sparta Unlike Athenians, Spartan women were well-fed. Gymnastics and sporting matches—naked or lightly clothed—were important, excluding only military activity. This prepared them to give birth to warriors, a reason why Athenian aristocrats preferred Spartan wet nurses. Marriage, at eighteen or twenty to men of similar age, was obligatory, becoming permanent with the first child. Custom and opinion approved children produced outside marriage; polygamy was justified when the husband was old or at war. Incongruously, lesbianism was accepted. Also, unlike Athenians,

226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233.

H. D. F. Kitto (1951) 232. Ibid., 234–235. See Xen. Const. Lace. I 3. R. Garland (1985) 24. W. K. Lacey (1968) 165–167. S. B. Pomeroy (1975) 65–66. Gorg. 502bd; Rep. 492b; Laws 658ad and 817c. Aristoph, Ran. 1050. A. Pickard-Cambridge (1968) 262–265 also offers textual confi rmation in some of the Platonic texts. 234. H. D. F. Kitto (1951) 233.

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Spartan women owned and controlled property legally. Aristotle blames inheritances and dowries for governing-class women possessing two-fi fths of the country’s property. In the helot class, both sexes did manual work under military control. That, then, was what Plato observed in the women around him. But since they also appeared in literature, whose intense focus on woman contrasts sharply with their diminished role in the city, we need briefly to report on this also.

F. Women in Literature The “woman question,” if I may so put it, with heroic dimensions in Aeschylus and Sophocles, a human dimension in Euripides, and as matter for comedy in Aristophanes, was strongly present in the literature of the time, revealing the preoccupation on the topic among thinking Athenians. Women have been treated in both epic and tragedy. 235 Many plays have names of women, taking themes from myths and epic poetry, but tragedies add greater force than the epics in depicting women’s psychological and social confl icts. 236 Medea, Clytemnestra, Electra, Antigone, and Lysistrata abandon domestic life and act imperiously, even destructively, in the political sphere, from which they were excluded in real life. Sophocles’ Antigone has been described as rising up against civil power to defend her right to fulfill family duties. 237 Her traditional values contrast with the public character of her presence.238 Besides heroines in the traditional mold, such as Iphigenia, Polyxena, Evadne, Helen, Hermione, and Alcestis, Euripides presents Adromache, Cassandra, Hermione, Phaedra, and Clytemnestra as suffering under forced marriages. Euripides’ Medea and Hecuba defy conventional molds. Medea 239 is depicted as240 addressing the feminine condition as such, attacking the confi nement of woman plus her legal and social restrictions, and having to buy a husband with a dowry. This incorporation of the point of view of woman was unprecedented, even coexisting with misogynistic texts, such as Hippolytus’241 diatribe. Aristophanes in Thesmophoriazusae portrays Athenian women judging Euripides for calumnies (the argument whether he was misogynist or feminist is still going on), although the poet

235. 236. 237. 238.

A.W. Gomme (1925) 4–8. S. B. Pomeroy (1975) 94. H. P. Foley (1975) 31. P. E. Slater (1968) offers an explanation using Freudian theory, where the drama represents childhood memories of a gigantic maternal presence. 239. Eurip. Medea 230–251. 240. E. Cantarella (1987) 68. 241. Ibid., Hippolytus 617–848.

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probably only intended to witness the existing polemic about women by examining it. Tragedy, of course, also contains misogynistic aspects: Phaedra, Creusa, Deianira, and Clytemnestra personify the outcome feared by the conquerors; Antigone portrays the confl ict Athenians perceive between the two sexes. Assertive heroines, such as Clytemnestra, Antigone, and Hecuba, appeared masculine beside traditional characters such as Ismene, Alcestis, Chrysothemis, or Tecmessa. Euripides’ Medea and Hecuba defied conventional patterns.

Part III

Plato’s Philosophy of Woman

8

Prolegomenon to the Results

Before drawing the results from the examination of the texts, three possible difficulties still need clarification. The fi rst is the frequent objection that refers to those who approach issues using Platonic texts different in time and purpose. The pendulum which in J. Burnet, A. E. Taylor, and P. Shorey pointed to the unity of Plato’s thought swung to the other extreme with those interpreting Plato as promoting different philosophies at different times of his life. This created imaginary walls between the dialogues, making it an interpretive crime to relate what Plato says in one dialogue to what he says in another. This has been qualified ironically as Plato’s “philosophical schizophrenia” by T. J. Saunders,1 as he rejected the view that Plato never related Timaeus’ statement that mental illness led to immorality with Laws’ statement that it leads to criminal action. Nowadays the pendulum has swung back again, and we hear respected voices understanding Plato as “a thinker with a unified world view, consistent throughout his life,”2 where unity means not uniformity or rigidity but recognizing a common core in an active and creative mind, a fact that permits the dialogues to enlighten each other. To reassure those who walk on eggs every time the accustomed isolation between dialogues is broken, it should be enough to point out that the philosophical texts on woman reinforce each other, and contradictions have been shown to be only apparent. The debate becomes irrelevant to the validity of my conclusions, because they avoid errors caused by simplistic notions of the texts’ unity. The second difficulty concerns the Platonic use of myths. As seen previously, 3 their meaning is only allegorical, communicating philosophical intuitions when Plato is not able to demonstrate them rationally. Only in this sense must their truth be understood. Plato offers insights into problems by using myth “as if” depicting its solution. He is pointing both to the

1. T. J. Saunders (1991) 172. 2. C. H. Kahn (1996) Preface, XIV. 3. See Chapter 6, pp. 136ff.

190 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman limits of his reason and to the insight he is having, communicating it in the only way he can. This must be recognized in the interpretation. Hence, I have considered the language of myth as the allegoric expression of a philosophical intuition still beyond the reach of reason (at least Plato’s reason), and therefore, as I referred to transmigration, cycle of reincarnations, etc., I tried to clarify their meaning to the degree that it is possible, while respecting the limits of Plato’s knowledge. The third difficulty regards the possible influence of Plato’s sexual orientation on his conception of woman. A general reticence to discuss this issue has limited the commentaries to indirect and general allusions. For a serious investigator, discussing it is apt to seem either irrelevant or indiscreet. In our particular case, however, I intend to show that Plato’s sexual orientation could have contributed to his theoretical view of woman. Thus, we need to examine its possible relevance before trying to identify Plato’s theory. It is not my purpose to discuss Plato’s personality in general, but only whether his sexual orientation could have influenced the development of his view on woman. Commentaries on the topic are few. U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf4 asserts that Plato’s conception of woman’s equality in the State not only shows that Plato was not afraid to accept the consequences of his assertions but also that he was not capable of perceiving the feminine, either with his understanding or his sensibility. K. J. Dover, 5 naming Plato as one of five sources for his study of homosexuality in ancient Greece, notes that in Symposium and Phaedrus the point of departure of metaphysical reflection is homosexual desire and love,6 without recognizing that the initial speeches in both dialogues represent what Socrates is going to distance himself from,7 and that Socrates’ fi rst step toward the Good in Symposium is not homosexual love but the love of a man and a woman satisfying their desire for immortality in children (206c, 208e). However, Plato identifies woman here with physical attraction, without conceiving the possibility of a distinctive relation beyond the physical between the two sexes. In addition, while describing the relation between men as a more advanced stage in the ascent to Beauty, it is understood that the interchange is not physical, and superior for this reason; the beauty of the body reveals the beauty of the mind, which Plato evidently does not see in women in general, although his most profound metaphysical theory is offered by a concrete woman, Diotima (201d–212c). It has been said that Plato belonged to a society which considered homosexual emotion and desire normal, coexisting with a poor opinion of the

4. 5. 6. 7.

U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf (1920) 200 and 722. K. J. Dover (1978) 9. Ibid., p. 12. See Chapter 3, pp. 60f. Also R. G. Bury (1909) n. 4.

Prolegomenon to the Results 191 intellectual capacity of woman. W. K. Lacey8 shows the nuances of this situation. One must keep in mind here that philosophy is not for Plato a solitary activity but a process shared with the young disciples, interchanging questions and answers. For Dover,9 although Plato’s descriptions reflected homosexuality in Athens, we should recognize “the possibility that his own homosexual emotion was abnormally intense, and his heterosexual response abnormally deficient.” If so, its treatment in Symposium’s speeches could possibly not represent Athenian culture fairly. Plato uses homosexual inclination as a paradigm of the pleasures of the body when arguing for the value of self-control, because it was present in the culture and expected to be suppressed without exception, since even in Athens there was praise for the chaste ਥȡȫȝİȞȠȢ, and the disinterested ਥȡĮıIJȒȢ. But the use of ਩ȡȦȢ serves his metaphysical reflection, making it possible to enter the world of Being starting from the sensible perception of beauty.10 Dover11 asserts that characterizing Plato’s orientation is not relevant in studying the history of philosophy; that the coherence of a philosophical argument does not depend on the psychology of the one who proposes it, still less in a culture which accepts that orientation. Nevertheless, I believe that the question has validity when examining his theory of woman, since philosophical reflection does not occur in a vacuum, but in beings of flesh and bones, and is nourished in the concrete by means of images and inclinations arising in a being whose perception is limited by defi nite psychological characteristics. This is particularly true in the relation between a person’s perception of the other sex and the theoretical elaboration of it. G. von le Fort12 talks about “the concept of the spouse as the bride of the masculine spirit . . . as the other part of the human being.” She sees polarity between the sexes as a totality in which man achieves a sense of completeness that grows from fi nding in woman the other half of human existence, as the other half of himself. That sense of polarity seems to be absent in Plato’s perception, giving him a peculiar objectivity which permits him to develop an intellectual elaboration of woman’s role in society divorced from personal, especially nonphysical personal, relations. In contrast to his extraordinary psychological insights in other matters, his women guardians are cardboard figures that seemed conceived with the uncomplicated ingenuity of a child. This limitation apparently allowed him to disregard current views and accept women as students in the Academy,13 and to elaborate a theory that 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

W. K. Lacey (1968) 157–158. K. J. Dover (1978) 12. Ibid., p. 164. Ibid., p. 153. G. von le Fort, (1962) 34. See Chapter 2, pp. 53ff.

192 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman denies any distinction based on sexual differences beyond the procreative ones.14 Even in Laws,15 his insistence on equalizing woman coexists with his recognition of the need for legislation concerning marriage. Yet, he has no problem understanding woman as mother.16 It is only woman as the other half of the masculine self, the half that allows man to be complete, that he seems foreign to. Plato’s works reveal that while scenes describing homosexual emotion are abundant,17 there is not, in the whole Platonic corpus (so rich in dramatic descriptions of human emotion), one single text which describes the passion or love of a man for a woman. Though this could follow ruling conventions because it pertains to the realm of the private, these objections lose force when comparing Plato’s work with his contemporaries. In Aristophanes’ Thesmophoriazusae, Lysistrata, and Ecclesiazusae, for instance, comic situations use conflicts between the sexes; in the tragedies, we see Helen and Paris, Aegisthus and Clytemnestra, Antigone and Haemon, Alcestis and Admetus, etc., portraying the relation between heroes and heroines. Xenophon18 also describes the affection between husband and wife, albeit paternalistically. Plato does not seem to represent fully the attitude of the culture; though of course, as Dover19 comments, the culture neither conceived ਩ȡȦȢ as love for moral and intellectual excellence nor as the starting point toward absolute Good. But we must distinguish the dramatic use which Plato makes of homosexual emotion from his position on the ethical significance of homosexuality. There is no doubt that Plato condemned homosexual practice. D. Wender20 says that the reason is that he condemned every physical pleasure, and opposed homosexual practice not as unnatural but because it is a physical appetite, as is the relation between the two sexes, since he did not admire what is natural (understood as typical conduct). On the contrary, Plato never employs the term “natural” in the sense of “typical conduct” as in present-day nonphilosophical usage; the state of war between Greek cities, the resistance of women against participating in common meals, or the desire to accumulate riches is typical but not “natural” in the view of Plato. As seen above, 21 he means by the term the immutable characteristics of things or their capacity, the blind forces of the physical world, or individual talent. Nor is “nature” established for Plato by means of laws arrived at empirically.

14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

See Chapter 5. See Chapter 7. See Chapter 1, pp. 19f. and 23. Lysis 205d–206a, Charm. 154a–155e, Euthyd. 273a, 274bc, Phdr. 227c et passim, etc. Xen. Ec. 9–10.1. K. J. Dover (1978) 157. D. Wender (1973) 89. See Chapter 5, pp. 99ff., and Appendix A of that chapter, pp. 122ff.

Prolegomenon to the Results 193 This assumption of Wender’s also ignores several texts: in Republic (403b) he condemns homosexual sex as immoderate excess. True, in apparent conflict with this, and contrary to what is reported about Socrates’ vigorous warning against kissing as reported by Xenophon, 22 Plato seems to accept homosexual kissing “while on campaign” (468b). But here we need to consider in context what Plato intends, as discussed above, 23 where the text was shown written playfully in a “let’s pretend” mood, intending to shock. P. Shorey24 remarks negatively on it because he reads the text literally and fi nds that it contradicts Plato’s basic tenets. These tenets appear most clearly in Laws (636c), where Plato attributes the origin of the practice of homosexuality to the institution of gymnasiums in Crete, observing that when the male nature unites with the female for reproduction, the pleasure connected with this is to be considered in accordance with nature, while for a male to unite with a male or a female with a female is against nature; and the audacity (IJȩȜȝȘȝĮ) of the fi rst people to do so was due to their inability to control (ਕțȡȐIJİȚĮȞ) pleasure. (636c)25 M. S. Kochin, 26 making Plato a pragmatist, interprets the passage as due to his interest in the “ethical consequences of pederasty and not by ranking forms of sexuality” that Kochin attributes to medieval and naturallaw lawyers. But in point of fact, the latter follow Plato in identifying the natural purpose of human (and other living beings’) faculties by examining their purpose. Thus, Plato sees sexual attraction as naturally oriented toward procreation; this is why he conceives pederasty as unnatural; 27 and, of course, the ethical consequences follow. When in Phaedrus28 Socrates equates with animals those who engage in the physical pleasure of procreation, saying that intemperance leads us not to be ashamed to pursue pleasure contrary to nature, the text has been interpreted by Dover29 as saying that physical procreation is contrary to nature. What Plato judges contrary

22. 23. 24. 25.

26. 27. 28. 29.

Xen. Mem I.3.8–15. See Chapter 1, pp. 25ff. P. Shorey (1930) 489. This text fully justifies Milton Hindus’ (New York Times Book Review 7/29/79) judging as “misleading” the report by E. Segal (ibid., 4/8/79) on K. J. Dover’s work on Greek Homosexuality. Segal’s reply to him (ibid.) might be taken by Greek knowers as disingenuous, since the context (and the Greek) clearly shows that the pleasure of heterosexual reproductive sex is natural, and that of homosexual sex unnatural; Plato does not say, as Segal claims, that pleasure as such is unnatural. M. S. Kochin (2002) 53 n. 42. Laws 636c and 838e. Phdr. 250e. K. J. Dover (1978) 163.

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to nature is the subordination of reason to the pleasures of the body, not that their being physical makes them contrary to nature. Another passage (Laws 835d–841e) discusses how to educate public opinion in the natural use of the procreative function by equating homosexual practice with incest and contrary to nature (838ac), and strengthening the affection of husbands for their wives (the one time where this affection is acknowledged). A recent controversy refers to the term IJȩȜȝȘȝĮ (“audacity,” “nerve”) in the quotation above, interpreting it as “bravery” in a positive sense, instead of “eff rontery.”30 (It is a little difficult to see how bravery could be due to an inability to control pleasure.) Another proposal is Wender’s, 31 who thinks that the reason for Plato’s opposition to homosexual sex is “not that it was unnatural, but that it was carnal, an objection which holds equally well against heterosexual coitus.” This is not so. The above texts make it clear that, on the contrary, Plato saw this activity as denying the truth of the nature of human sexuality, since it denies that it is essentially reproductive, which is precisely what makes heterosexual sex natural. Of course, those such as S. M. Okin, 32 who do not recognize the philosophical foundation of Plato’s ethics, tend to group it together with uncritical traditions she classifies as “sexual taboos.” But Plato’s quoted texts make it clear that the principles governing his conclusions are nature and reason; reason as the directing principle of the other tendencies (principally appetites, which lack discipline), and nature as revealing which acts are proper, making it the guide of reason. Thus, it is important to distinguish the intellectual position of Plato from his psychological orientation. In this regard, C. H. Kahn33 shows the importance he gave to the moral supremacy of self-control over emotion. A familiarity with Plato’s ethical theory, which is consistent throughout, makes it easier to understand where he stood on the issue. Other texts corroborating this attitude are found in Symposium (217a–219d), Protagoras (309bd), and Republic (403b). Dover34 reports that, according to Xenophon, this was also the position of the historical Socrates. Plato’s apparent orientation and the belief that he never married are also used to allege that Plato despised women as a class, while proposing greater liberation and privilege for them than anyone else in history. Wender35 is among those who allege that he never married as proof that Plato’s

30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

See G. V. Bradley (1994) 12ff. D. Wender (1973) 89. S. M. Okin (1979) 66–67. C. H. Kahn (1996) Chapter 7, particularly 187–188. K. J. Dover (1978) 59–60. D. Wender (1973) 82.

Prolegomenon to the Results 195 attitude was not typical, and cites Shorey,36 who calls him “an Athenian old bachelor”; R. B. Levinson37 also suggests that Plato thought that the Athens that caused the death of Socrates was not a fit place for having children (though he had just recognized that we should attend to what Plato wrote without entering into his private life, about which we know practically nothing). The theory that he never married springs from speculative judgments lacking a contemporary source, inferred from his psychological orientation as drawn from his texts plus the lack of reports on his forming a family. Today, investigators tend to reject the theory, since the philosopher considered forming a family a serious civic duty (773e–774c), while marriage was not the center of personal or romantic inclinations at the time. Moreover, respect for women of the family involved not talking publicly about them (e.g., Plato’s brothers are characters in his dialogues, but his sister Potone never appears in them). Taking all this together, and with the requisite grain of salt, it seems prudent to conclude, regarding his conception of woman, that Plato’s likely psychological orientation probably had some influence on his theory, even if only a subliminal one; but it certainly did not determine his philosophical conclusions. With these points out of the way, then, we can proceed to draw our conclusions in the next chapter.

36. P. Shorey (1933) 632. 37. R. B. Levinson (1953) 125–138.

9

Equal, Therefore Inferior The Logic of Plato on Woman

We have come to the end of the journey examining the texts, and are ready to face the task of trying not only to find out whether it is possible to take the results and draw a profi le of women as Plato conceives her, but also to show that his view throughout is consistent with itself and not contradictory. First, let us recapitulate the work done, as Plato usually did. I started by describing and challenging the opinion, prevailing since the last quarter of the twentieth century, that Plato contradicts himself regarding woman.1 Addressing the issue required, fi rst of all, distinguishing the philosophical texts on woman from those conceived with a dramatic/rhetorical purpose, and identifying, as possible sources of Plato’s views on woman, traits of his culture (never copied but transformed), as well as personal elements, both psychological and intellectual. 2 Cultural, psychological, and intellectual influences were treated where relevant. Dramatic/rhetorical passages were discussed at some length in Chapter 1. The methodological distinction of Plato’s philosophical reflection on woman from references having only a dramatic or rhetorical role governed the study of the texts and solved most of the alleged contradictions found by commentators.3 The main body of the work was devoted to examining Plato’s philosophical texts on woman, starting from the recognition of the Socratic origins of Plato’s view on the subject in Meno, characterized by the affi rmation of the equality of virtue in all human beings indiscriminately (men, women, young, old, etc.).4 This was followed by finding, in the Aristophanic discourse of Symposium, a satirical criticism of extreme views on sex equality probably current among Socrates’ followers.5 Both dialogues contain positions Plato left behind or disagreed with.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

See Introduction, pp. 1ff. See Prologue, pp. 14ff. and Chapter 8, p. 190f. Prologue. Chapter 2. Chapter 3.

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It was not until Republic that Plato’s thinking on woman was revealed as taking its distinctive form. 6 Its treatment was preceded by a chapter uncovering the reason for the introduction of the topic of woman, showing that her appearance in Book 5 was due not to rhetorical demands but to a logical necessity in the central argument of Republic, the question of integrity (justice), based on the analogy between the city and the soul. And this not only led to an explanation consistent with the analogy , but also accounted for why Plato’s refl ection on woman appeared at that point.7 The discussion contains a remarkable tour de force of his logic, the argument on sex equality. 8 Timaeus 9 and Laws 10 then enriched this conception by providing its cosmological foundation and practical application. It is important to notice that Plato’s theory of woman was contemporary with his introduction of the tripartite soul, which enriched Phaedo’s conception of the soul as simple. This provided the foundation, limits, and levels of his view of woman in Republic, Timaeus, and Laws, because Plato not only had already identified in Phaedo the soul with the person (whose intellect [ȞȠ૨Ȣ] is either purified and liberated from bodily influences, or impure and affected by bodily desires needing reincarnation), but beginning from Republic, the embodied soul was seen to experience three kinds of desires (appetitive, aggressive, and rational) in different proportions, and to have integrity (be just) when its desires tended to their proper objects at each level. Bodies represented, in each incarnation, the state of the soul that inhabited them, either because the soul was driven to them (617e) or because it was destined for them (42ac, 91a–92c). Thus, the tripartite division of the soul not only directed Plato’s ethical thinking but also provided the parameters for his conception of woman. Plato’s theory of woman, therefore, is revealed not as an independent position disconnected from his philosophy and containing unrelated and contradictory affi rmations as some mistakenly assume, much less a view stated capriciously and without reflection, but as the logical application to woman of one of the pillars of Plato’s philosophy, his anthropological dualism of body and soul.11

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

Chapter 5. Chapter 4. Chapter 5. Chapter 6. Chapter 7. For other uses of dualism in Plato, see C. Hampton (1994) 53–81, ed. Bat-Ami Bar On. Reprint (1994) 217–242, ed. N. Tuana. A. W. Price (1995) 2. 3 36ff. distinguishes Plato’s dualism from the Cartesian one. I concur, since Plato’s view is much more insightful than the Cartesian “angel in a machine.”

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J. K. Ward12 observes that “Plato’s dualism plays a pivotal, though implicit, role in the proposal for women rulers in Republic 5.” Plato’s dialectical application of his dualism to his theory of woman emerges not only in Republic but in Timaeus and Laws as well, when one considers the texts recognized as philosophical (i.e., independently from those that have a purely dramatic function). Plato’s theory, emerging from this dualism, gives his conception of woman that “extraordinary level of internal coherence” that D. L. Roochnik13 fi nds most impressive in Republic.

THE DEFINING FEATURES OF PLATO’S THEORY Based on the examined texts, we can enumerate nine key features characterizing Plato’s conception of woman, based on his dualism of body and soul: 1. Woman’s soul, considered essentially, is equal to (i.e., the same as) the soul of man. Since the soul is the person for Plato, there is no difference in the being of the two genders as persons.14 2. Woman’s soul, however, in her present situation, is inferior to the soul of man in virtue, because she is still in one of the cycles of reincarnation generated by a previous life’s moral lapses. This moral state, however, is not essential and can and should be overcome.15 3. Woman’s body is quantitatively weaker, not only as a fact but also essentially, because it is a reflection of the moral inferiority of her soul. Plato’s standard of measurement here is man’s body.16 4. Woman as a class (ȖȑȞȠȢ, body and soul) differs qualitatively from man as a class only in her procreative functions, which are exclusively physical; the soul itself, then, is asexual.17 5. It follows from this that there is no evidence that woman as a class, as a composite of body and soul, differs qualitatively from man in other respects.18 6. From 2. and 3. it follows that woman as a class, due to the characteristics of her body and soul, is quantitatively inferior to man in her current existence.19

12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

J. K. Ward (1996) XVI. D. L. Roochnik (2003) 1. Meno 73b, 81a; Rep. 454d; Tim. 41e, among others. Apol. 35b; Rep. 469d and 605de; Tim. 42ab, 69e–70a, and 90e–91a; Laws 780e–781b, plus many implications. Rep. 455de, 456a, and 457a. Ibid., 452e and 456c; Crat. 414a; Tim. 41e. Rep. 454d, 455b and de; Tim. 18c; Crit. 110c. Menex. 249d; Rep. 455cd; Laws 917a.

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7. Each concrete woman possesses defi nite talents distinguishing her individual nature qualitatively from other men’s and women’s, thus equipping her as an individual for a distinctive function in society (including those considered exclusive to men). 20 8. Each concrete woman represents a determinate state in the pilgrimage of her soul towards its liberation from her own inferior body, and later from all bodies. 21 From this it follows that since some women are ready for a higher reincarnation and some men’s moral deficiency predestines them to be reincarnated as women, given men could be inferior to given women in virtue. 9. Athenian women are a concrete example of what happens when beings in themselves weak are excluded from the world of education and culture. 22

RECONSTRUCTING THE PLATONIC WOMAN The above enumeration, however, does not yet give us Plato’s unified insight on what woman is. Nevertheless, to draw an accurate picture of Plato’s woman, any investigation must distinguish when he is referring to woman’s soul essentially (universally) or to its current, concrete, existence; when remarks on her body refer to her body by itself or within the composite of body and soul; when he intends woman as individual, or as a particular class containing either unspecified concrete women, or merely contemporary Athenian women. This careful procedure can avoid some current mistakes. We must, however, not only recognize and distinguish but integrate these aspects into a coherent whole, fi nding the reason justifying them. While taking this into account, the task is to illuminate woman using every glimpse of light shone by Plato as he reflected philosophically about her.

HOW PLATO KNOWS WOMAN The time has come to allow the image of the Platonic woman to rise, like Aphrodite from the foam of the sea, as the crown of the investigation. Since Plato’s relevant texts vary in clarity, progressing from opinion to knowledge and from illusory images to full reality, a careful consideration of his view of the progression of knowledge is required to guide us at this point.

20. Rep. 387e–388a, 398e, 456e, 455d–456a, and 540c; Symp. 201d; Tht. 171e. 21. Meno 81ad; Rep. 614a–621d; Phdr. 248c–249d; Tim. 90e–92c; Laws 903d. 22. Lysis 208d; Gorg. 527a; Rep. 395de, 469d, 549c–e, and 579b; Crat. 418c; Laws 731d, 774c, 781cd, 790a, 794e, and 805e.

200 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman Plato explains knowledge in Republic (509d–511e) using an image of a line divided into two unequal parts, each containing two unequal segments.23 Of the lower two, which represent opinion, conjecture (İੁțĮıȓĮ) at the bottom has images as objects, and belief (ʌȓıIJȚȢ) above it considers particular things. The two higher segments over them represent knowledge: reasoning (įȚȐȞȠȚĮ) has for its objects intelligible representations, 24 and understanding (ȞȩȘıȚȢ) has Forms. This distinction between reasoning and understanding is key in comprehending the problem Plato has in accounting for his knowledge of woman. Because Plato holds the affi nity of souls and Forms, 25 and because, as we saw, woman as a person is a soul, I am going to distinguish, by drawing an analogy with the divided line, the degrees of knowledge about woman in Plato’s text. 1. The lower level of the opinion section of the line, İੁțĮıȓĮ (conjecture), contains visible images of visible things. It is the realm of imagining, illusions, and biased generalizations, the segment farthest away from clarity and truth. It must be clear that this view does not appear in the philosophical discussions, but is found in the prejudiced characterizations of women by men in the dramatic texts. 2. The objects at the higher level of the lower segment, ʌȓıIJȚȢ (belief), are material things. They constitute Plato’s experience at the commonsense level; in this case, his real but still unexamined opinion about contemporary woman. Here, their unsatisfactory situation is recorded without comment, as the point of departure for Plato’s next step, which will involve reflection. This level contains only the facts about contemporary women as Plato knew them. 3. The lower level of the higher segment, įȚȐȞȠȚĮ (thinking), introduces reason. It tries to make rational sense of the facts apprehended at the previous level. It is already knowledge, but subject to procedural limitations. We find here the level of Plato’s theory of woman, elaborated with great care in Republic 5. 26 It has all the characteristics of a scientific construction: a methodical procedure of rational steps, analysis and distinction of parts, and a proposal as a rational project taking into account the elements in the segment below. This project has a mathematical quality, as do the objects proper to this level. In our case, it is a scientific and complex formulation attempting to account logically for the essence of the particular woman as perceived 23. Although J. Sallis (1975) 38 n. 13 remarks that the two middle segments of the line are equal in length. 24. Interpreters do not agree in characterizing the lowest section of the highest segment. For an overview of positions and interpretation, see N. D. Smith (1996). 25. See Phdo. 79de. Also W. K. C. Guthrie III (1969) 469 n. 3, and IV (1975) 360. 26. See Chapter 5.

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in the segment below, while discussing her position in the city. This is all that this level can offer. It is knowledge, but not yet understanding (ȞȩȘıȚȢ), which is left for the segment above. 4. The higher level of the higher segment, ȞȩȘıȚȢ (understanding), is for Plato the realm of Forms, grounded in the fi rst principle, the Good. As Plato explains in Letter VII, 27 at the utmost stretch of human power, understanding blazes here in a flash and the mind is flooded with light. The analogy we are using should permit us to understand, at this level, the intelligible original of what woman really is, purified from the complexity of the dialectical formulation of the fi rst wave argument (which is on the third level, 451c–457b). And in fact the insight on woman on this third level points to the fourth, highest, level. It is as if Socrates’ fi rst wave proposal on woman in Republic 5 was allowing us to see through it to its deeper foundation, because by dismissing physical sexual characteristics as irrelevant to civic activities, he insinuates the highest level where any person, male or female, is a soul. The step from reasoning to understanding occurs, then, seamlessly, and we are suddenly struggling to comprehend the Platonic woman as a paradoxical soul deprived of any feminine characteristics and distinguished from men solely because of her relation to a sexually characterized body that she happens to inhabit at the moment, apprehended only at a lower level of knowledge. Thus, after having followed the knowledge of woman from opinion upward, at the very moment when the reflection is ready to enter the highest level, she suddenly disappears; we are forced to recognize that woman as such is absent at the level of Plato’s understanding. What is left is a soul, neither male nor female, existing not strictly as a unit but (because of its moral status) in a transitory relation with a body that carries sexual differences. When the soul exists without this “longing” for a body, then it, in a sense, transcends humanity itself into the realm of the purely spiritual. As a result, we must conclude that, as U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf has said, 28 and now we have confi rmed by examining Plato’s theory of knowledge, Plato does not understand woman. As L. Irigaray29 puts it, using Platonic terminology, “they have no proper form.” This allows us to conclude that Plato’s theory of woman is limited to the rational, scientific, and methodical approach of the third level of knowledge found in Republic 5, but fails to reach his highest level of knowledge, clear and true understanding.

27. Letter VII 344b. 28. U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf (1920) 200 and 722, commenting on Plato’s conception of woman’s equality in the State. 29. L. Irigaray (1985) 342.

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“EQUAL, THEREFORE INFERIOR.” THE LOGICAL OUTCOME OF PLATO’S DUALISM By bringing to the fore the real difficulty of woman in Plato, the analogy of the divided line begins to account for the widespread reaction of commentaries judging his work on woman as contradictory, inconsistent, or erratic, an awkward way to express the apparently universal insight that there is something deeply unsatisfactory in Plato’s conception.30 Attempts at explanation have remained on the surface of Plato’s thought by using psychological, pragmatic, logical, and even political criticism, without reaching the metaphysical root of the problem. The analysis above shows clearly what handicaps Plato’s conception of woman by revealing her as the temporary situation of a soul on a pilgrimage to a better life where sexual differentiation, identified with the body, is left behind. Thus, Plato’s anthropological dualism of body and soul becomes fundamental in understanding and evaluating his conception of woman, and should be the starting point for any criticism. The principal effect of anthropological dualism is to split woman into a soul, equal to man’s soul and asexual, and a body, dismissed as inferior and merely a sign of her moral inferiority, a view arrived at by using as a standard man’s body and virtues, Plato’s only ideal of the human being. Judging woman by using man as a standard is a serious error, like judging roses by measuring them against orchids. Hence, though Plato considers woman’s disembodied soul to be a person and equal to man, when the actual woman (body and soul) is measured against the actual man, the result is an unavoidable contradiction, since that makes her inferior. I have formulated this as “equal, therefore inferior.” We can see now why Plato’s lack of recognition of woman as distinct and different from man brings him to assert woman’s inferiority. But this dualistic understanding of human beings as composed not of two aspects, or better, principles, but of two things that happen to be together (an undifferentiated soul or mind and a body), not only explains Plato’s apparently contradictory statements about woman; it also, and most importantly, reveals not only that Plato’s reflection is consistent within itself and never contradictory, but also that there is a weak point in his metaphysics, something still influencing some lines of contemporary philosophy. This shows that, as M. Buchan31 has asserted, “the study of woman in philosophy has implications for philosophy as a whole.”32

30. See the Introduction. 31. M. Buchan (1999) 1. 32. A. W. Saxonhouse (2002) 236 laments that Buchan’s gendered view of a “masculine soul” is marred by indifference to methodological issues, such as reading every dialogue as Plato speaking, irrespective of who the character in the dialogue is. This fact highlights the importance of my methodological distinction between philosophical and dramatic/rhetorical texts.

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We may forgive Plato for not solving a problem that philosophy has struggled with for millennia, with greater or lesser success; but awe at his genius and complexity should not blind us to flaws in his anthropological dualism. The solution must be found in woman’s peculiar union of body and soul as two principles in only one being (not two things coexisting); and this generates her unique version of humanity, making her fully human but distinct from men.

10 Beyond Plato Groundwork for a Theory of Woman

Every theory of woman throughout history based on a dualistic understanding of human beings contains the same unsolvable problems affecting Plato’s view; in this way, dualistic positions have historically influenced the philosophical understanding of woman. Conceiving gender differences as purely physical has deprived woman of being recognized as contributing to human endeavors (social, political, artistic, scientific, etc.) in a distinct and original way. Trying to be like men has been for many, particularly in modern times, a sign of liberation. And yet, great women in history were often so because they contributed to human endeavors in ways men could not. A position which conceives the being of woman metaphysically as a unified whole of mind and body (while identifying the peculiarities of that union) should overcome the inadequacy of dualism and open better possibilities for constructing a theory of woman. Plato seems to have already been aware in later life of problems inherent in his metaphysical theory of separated Forms or Ideas,1 and history shows philosophy moving on. The logical next step was fi rst offered by Aristotle, who overcame dualism by bringing in the Forms as constitutive principles of the world’s reality, including human beings.2 He does this, although he persists in conceiving woman as inferior, 3 to explain the person’s unity of body and mind. His hylemorphic theory (the theory of matter and form), when applied to human beings, conceives their essence as constituted by two principles: Form, accounting for what kind of thing the being is, and Matter, for its individuation. They are not two things but rather two aspects or ways of being of one thing. Thus, Matter and Form exist with one existence as a unit; Matter is the thing considered as potentially what it is (i.e., what the being can do, since for Aristotle to be is to do), and Form is that same thing considered as actively itself (i.e., what the matter is doing).4 Thus, “they”

1. The Parmenides offers Plato’s critical examination of the theory. In Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman, the Forms become secondary or criticized, but never abandoned; they are still present in Laws. 2. Aristotle An. II, 412a–414b, 28; Metaph. H, 6, 1045a, 14–30, and b 16–22. 3. Ibid., Pol. I, 4, 1254b, 12–15. 4. See G. A. Blair (1992) 64.

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are not two, really, but one, looked at in two different ways, or with two facets, if you will. Aristotle’s metaphysical contribution, developing parallel to dualism through the history of philosophy, seems a better qualified instrument for investigating the person of woman as a whole. Historical developments of this position continue to provide insights on human reality rich in possibilities for a theory of woman, although contemporary developments have not yet succeeded in accounting metaphysically for the precise source of gender distinction, since many remain entangled in secondary problems such as “the interplay of intellect, emotion and imagination” in the philosophical texts on woman, and thus do not reach the root of the problem, which remains an unfi nished project. G. Lloyd 5 refers to the previous defensive posture of some texts, and to M. Le Dœuff ’s6 consideration of imagery and affection in philosophical writing. Still, an investigation based on woman’s metaphysically relevant aspects seems the most promising approach. I submit that a nondualistic understanding can be a reliable guideline for identifying woman’s defi ning aspects.

THE PRINCIPLES FOR A METAPHYSICS OF WOMAN To provide the essential steps for an investigation using this nondualistic approach, let us begin by applying explicitly to woman the metaphysical principles common to human beings.7 The following procedure is unusual and may, perhaps, be disturbing, disclosing the lack of habitual association between the philosophical use of these notions and woman. Among human characteristics, since woman’s constitutive Form is rational, self-knowledge (consciousness) and control of activity (freedom) follow; they manifest a person whose essential formality is independence, always a subject and never an object,8 although experience reveals that her independence is not absolute because of the temporality of her existent self with its triple perspective of past, present and future. Woman is not her existence, but possesses only her present existence as a contingent attribute where her destiny, the dynamism proper to her nature, is relatively independent. Fulfilling it is the fundamental work of woman as person, the creation of her historic personality by a dynamism of freedom, ruled by the rationality of her human spirit.

5. G. Lloyd (2002) 2. 6. M. Le Dœuff (1989) Preface. 7. See J. Todolí Duque O. P. (1952) for this metaphysics of the human person in general, who guided my reflection on woman. 8. That is, even though another person may have her as an object, she remains in herself a subject, and if, to please that person she “objectifies herself,” she does so by her own choice (and therefore is still a subject). In this latter case, she contradicts her reality.

206 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman This is why feminism, as a particular humanism, should seek the development of woman in the order of her personal perfection; any philosophical anthropology ignoring the essential structure of the person cannot be an authentic humanism. But since woman is a unit of spirit and matter, the perfection and knowledge of both are essential to true feminism. Reason receives its information through the corporeal senses, and influences its elaboration in the imagination. One of the many known functions of the imagination in its relation to reason, that of being present even in the experience of philosophy, has recently attracted some speculation.9 As human principles, self-awareness and freedom to choose manifest woman’s nature as person, which is more than to be an individual part of humanity, since a person is never a part but an independent whole. Individual and person are distinguished in that individuation is due to matter, whereas the root of the person’s individuality is the spirit or mind, which transcends matter. Boethius10 defi nes the human person as an “individual substance of rational nature.” Thus, a reality existing in itself which is self-conscious and free is a person. In logic, its genus is individual substance; its specific difference, the rational nature. The simplicity of the human spirit explains the immutability and permanence of the person; but beyond the entitative aspects of the person of woman, dynamic aspects of tension are essential to the manifestation of her spirit since, as a self, woman is the subject and principle of activity of her changes and the spectator of her experiences while seeking her excellence through time, following knowledge and love of truth. Hence, the being of woman transcends the purely material and somatic, since what constitutes her self, essential to the person, is immaterial; and her properties are easily deduced from this: from being self-conscious and free it follows that she owns her activity and is, therefore, responsible— subject of rights and duties, merit and demerit, and author of her destiny. Thus, her spirit is the fundamental condition of her personality, not by identifying formally with it but because it is the ultimate reason why we call woman a person, owner of her actions and destiny and capable of three disciplines: science and philosophy by reason; morality by the will’s doing; and art and technology by making. Knowledge and love are also woman’s instruments of communication. Her spirit is both the ultimate root of intellectual knowledge and of its immateriality, permitting the intentional presence of a real being in another

9. See G. Lloyd (2002) 4, reporting on a “properly philosophical imaginary” while reading M. Le Dœuff (1989) 8f. and (1991) 166–170, who calls it an “unthought element” in philosophy. 10. Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (475 to 80–524) De Persona et Duabus Naturis, c ii.

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while keeping its independent existence; thus, the union of knower and known is not subjective or material, but objective or formal; it also permits her to be knowing subject and known object by reflection. On the other hand, woman’s loving differs from woman’s wanting. Wants seek interests; love pursues values like knowing, being happy, possessing absolute good, truth, and beauty, etc., manifesting woman’s spirit as a tension toward others and towards the infi nite, spiritual and transcendent. But, and here I am entering into a field rich in possibilities for an investigation into woman, although the root of woman as person is in her spirit (mind), this is not her only constitutive element. The cause of the originality proper to her as person, constituting her difference in being, has been historically attributed to the fact that her spirit is limited physically, which gives each woman her individual body. That is why woman attributes to herself both strictly spiritual and physical or physiological acts (as when saying “I think,” “I run,” etc.). Thus, woman, as human being, constitutes a horizon between spirit and matter. They comprise the substantial unity of her self, the human person she calls “I”; consequently, the value of the physiological aspects in woman’s psychology is based only in being manifestations of her human spirit. Considering body and mind, some philosophers have fallen from distinction into separation, and from separation into reduction to one of them, producing partially true systems where what they fail to account for makes them false. The classics attributed to matter the principle of individuation.11 In this view, the form (mind, soul, spirit) becomes different in each person by virtue of its limitation (the matter), which accounts for and restricts personal activity (also expressing itself quantitatively), without displacing the spirit as its ultimate root. According to this, the mind’s substantial union with the human body causes woman’s personal originality. But this analysis too is inadequate, though on the right track. What has not historically been recognized is that there is a third limitation between that of the form (which limits the species to be this kind of thing, human) and that of the matter (limiting this further to be an individual instance of this kind of thing—a quantitative limitation). This third (intermediate) human limitation, which is subspecific, causes the particular sex of a being of this kind, which is then limited to being the individual by the matter. Thus, men and women are quasi-qualitatively, not just quantitatively, different; thus, there is no question of superiority or inferiority.12 As L. Irigaray13

11. Aquinas, St. Thomas, Opusculum de principio individuationis. See also J. Assenmacher (1926). 12. G. A. Blair (2003) 346ff. He notes that race may also be one of these subspecific limitations. How this fits into his system of philosophy can be found on the Web in fundamentalissues.net, where his treatise Modes of the Finite, Part 3 appears. 13. L. Irigaray (2006) 50.

208

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says, “Sexuate difference takes place at the most basic and most sublime crossroads between body and spirit, nature and culture.” This is a luminous insight, free from her previous tendency toward using Freudian psychoanalysis. Referring to a possible nihilism from the feminist criticism of a monosubjective culture, she has said14 that to try “to suppress sexual difference is to invite a genocide,” and has proposed15 a culture of two subjects, since “difference is a source of fecundity, not only physical but also cultural, spiritual,” as a “specific manner of articulating nature and culture,” while recognizing that “the values of feminine subjectivity in great part are still unknown.” She insists16 that women must realize “the importance of issues that are specific to them,” and construct17 “an objective identity model.”18 The sexual difference then expresses itself as a difference in the style of living the human life, and the particular contribution of each of the genders to manifesting humanity fully, revealing their complementarity. The concept of complementarity has reappeared not only in contemporary feminist works as C. Gilligan’s,19 for whom the discovery of complementarity will produce “an integration of rights and responsibilities,” but also in writers at large, such as C. G. Allen’s20 insightful examination of the theories of sex unity and polarity compared to complementarity, and P. Allen 21 in the field of theological works, 22 as well as J. B. Elshtain, 23 and R. M. H. Lemmons, 24 who consider Mulieris Dignitatem25 a key Catholic document on woman. Amazingly, M. Canto26 fi nds complementarity even in Plato, where “the difference between man and woman lies in the complementarity in procreation,” with effects neutralized politically. Moreover, woman’s body not only does not constitute her as person but is also a kind of limit for her spirit. What is it for woman to be a person and not a thing? It is to have a rational individuality which owns itself; but the body limits woman’s expansion and reduces her field of activities. True humanism respects the being and destiny of woman when she becomes conscious of not realizing and possessing herself unless she expands her spiritual being; this search to liberate herself from the limits of matter by seeking transcendence is revealed fi rst in the desire for the complementarity

14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

Ibid. (1993) 22. Ibid. (2004) VIII–X. Ibid. (1993) 22. Ibid. (1996) 50. For her view postulating two natures, see Appendix A to Chapter 5. C. Gilligan’s (1982) 100. C. G. Allen’s (1983) 311–325. P. Allen (1993) 410ff. Ibid. (1990) 526ff. and (2006) 91ff. J. B. Elshtain (2003) 40f. R. M. H. Lemmons (2002). Apostolic letter of John Paul II, August 15, 1988. M. Canto (1986) 342 and (1994) 53.

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of marriage, family, and other social relations, and then more profoundly in religious manifestations which witness her thirst for unlimited reality. By applying to woman the metaphysical principles common to human beings, and suggesting a metaphysical locus of gender differentiation, I have tried to give a more promising metaphysical basis as a solid starting point in further investigations. This will also help to overcome current problems in the discussion of gender identification, its distinction, and defi nition. Sociological, psychological, or anecdotical observations cannot be generalized in an attempt to defi ne the being of woman at the universal level, because this reflection belongs to the fields of logic and metaphysics, which, starting from observation, enables one to identify what is essential. 27 This is the task to be undertaken in the future.

NOTES FOR A DEFINITION OF WOMAN The last half century’s writings on woman, examined in this work in their relation to Plato, frequently show the futility of subordinating the philosophical question of her being to particular interests, such as political, ideological, or economic agendas, or conceiving it as impossible to articulate. For example, Irigaray’s28 ideology forces her to say that she can either “speak intelligently as sexualized male . . . or as asexualized, otherwise I shall succumb to the illogicality that is proverbially attributed to woman.” In spite of partial attempts, a thorough investigation aiming at defi ning woman as such—free from ulterior motives conspiring against objectivity—is still to be done. F. J. J. Buytendijk, 29 C. G. Allen,30 and P. Allen31 are, among others, commendable efforts in that direction. I envision an investigation which will undertake the task of identifying woman’s defi ning features using two sources: First, her metaphysical principles (which are, as we saw, a complete structure of recognized human characteristics), to insure that no level is missing when investigating gender differences. This will also serve as the guide to organizing and further validating information. Second—and this is an enormous undertaking—a painstakingly thorough and critical examination of how woman’s distinguishing characteristics appear in every documented form of human expression (popular, literary, scientific, philosophical, religious, etc.) through history, including a growing field of contemporary contributions. Since cultural constructions of the idea of what woman is involve 27. See M. Mikkola (2006) 83ff. evaluating Spelman’s (1990) argument against gender realism. 28. L. Irigaray (1985) 148–149. 29. F. J. J. Buytendijk (1968). 30. C. G. Allen (1983). 31. P. Allen (1985).

210 Plato’s Dialectic on Woman insight and human wisdom but also prejudice, a crucial aspect of the work would entail discerning the views respecting reality from those which do not, whether the prejudicial reason is political, psychological, economic, or something else. This requires not only validating each new issue by fi nding its place within the metaphysical structure of woman as human, but also the courage and prudence to discriminate between prejudice and fact. Thus, the work would progress by incorporating tested historical fi ndings of woman’s distinctive characteristics into a conception faithful to her metaphysical human structure. Questions about woman’s distinctive traits, therefore, should proceed following her metaphysical principles: Is woman’s rationality, the consciousness of herself, her approach to freedom, different from man’s? In what way or ways? How, for instance, does she exercise personal independence, grasp her temporality, and ascertain the contingency of her existence? Is the dynamism proper to her nature as destiny specifically distinctive? As a person, is there anything unique in the way she uses her freedom and rationality to create her historic personality? What characterizes the dynamic manifestations of her spirit when, by transcending her material reality, she enters the realm of knowledge in science, philosophy, morality, art, or technology, and the sphere of love as the pursuit of values? How does one characterize the way her spirit and body interact (or the way in which her body both manifests and limits her spirit)? The work is an immense challenge. It requires a mind enriched by a long examination of sources and insightful enough to avoid falling into the sociological or psychological reflection common in existing attempts, by focusing exclusively on her being, and by distinguishing characteristics that belong to woman as such from traits common either to the human race, on the one hand, or to individual women on the other. I foresee particular aspects, such as the interaction of mind and body, especially the way woman handles and expresses her experiences in knowledge, becoming pivotal in the investigation. That human beings are a mixture of spirit (mind) and matter is mysterious but evident; how these aspects are integrated in woman becomes central to this task, since man and woman as persons become distinct as the metaphysical principles of each are unified, and since the form of unity of these principles is unique to each case. Awareness of gender differences appears throughout history since ancient times, from Genesis, where woman represents simultaneously the culmination of the creative work of God (and not simply the source of human downfall), to contemporary experimental biological reflections for which the lack of facial hair locates her farther than man from the animal world. Her unique synthesis of body and spirit is frequently recognized in literature when depicting the peculiar way her insightful knowledge affects human situations, and is also experienced in her particular capacity for lyrical expression in ballet, for example, beyond what men can express.

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Maternity, far from animal reproduction, also involves in all its stages mind and body intimately, since the transmission of cultural identity to the child, essential to human society and a powerful social influence, has been historically attributed to her. We may wonder whether this has been an arbitrary task imposed on her or whether the particular interrelation of her mind and body makes her nature ready for it. Further, her synthesizing gift seems to have an essential role in society, particularly in the life of the family, where women’s insights on people’s states and needs seem to make her capable of assisting, even without words, human relationships. Woman’s scientific, political, philosophical, and religious contributions must also be identified in their uniqueness. This would possibly make obvious the complementarity between the sexes at all levels, providing a path for a richer human contribution. C. G. Allen’s32 article works in this direction, offering, after a logically clear analysis of other theories, insightful ways on how research can identify the differences of being between man and woman, and how they complement each other. An investigation of this kind would reveal how much the world is still lacking in these fields; furthermore, helping woman to develop her original gifts would fi nally show how much has been missing until now. These are a few insights on aspects that a thorough study of what woman is, a daunting task, needs to examine.

32. C. G. Allen (1983) 311–325.

Appendix to the Text Greek Words on Women and the Feminine

(Note: the form of the word will be that found in the text of Plato.)

1. WORDS THAT REFER DIRECTLY TO WOMEN OR FEMININE PERSONS

a. Names of Imaginary or Mythological Figures ૃǹįȡȐıIJİȚĮȞ (Adrasteia) ૃǹșȘȞȐ (Athena) ǹ੅ȖȚȞĮȞ (Aegina) ૃǹȜțȘıIJȚȢ (Alcestis) ૃǹȞįȡȠȝȐȟȘȞ (Andromache) ૃǹȡȝȠȞȓĮȢ (Harmonia) ૓ǹȡIJİȝȚȢ (Artemis) ૃǹIJĮȜȐȞIJȘȢ (Atalanta) ૓ǹIJȘȞ (Ate) ૃǹIJȡȠʌȠȞ (Atropos) īĮȓĮ (Gaea) īોȞ (Ge) ǻȞȝȒIJȘȡ (Demeter) ǻȓțȘ (Dike) ǻȚȫȞȘȢ (Dione) ǼੁȜİȓșȣȚĮ (Eileithuia) ૽ǼțȐȕȘȞ (Hecuba) ૽ǼțĮȝȒįȘȞ (Hecamedes) ૽ǼȜȑȞȘȢ (Helen) ૃǼȡĮIJȠȓ (Erato) ૃǼȡȚijȪȜȘ (Eriphyle) ૽ǼıIJȚĮ (Hestia) ૃǾșȠȞȩȘȞ (Ethonoe) ૠǾȡĮ (Hera) ĬȑȝȚȞ (Themis) ĬİȠȞȩȘȞ (Theonoe)

ĬȑIJȚȢ (Thetis) ૽ǿʌʌȠįĮȝİȓĮȢ (Hippodameia) ૓ǿȡȚȢ (Iris) ૓ǿıȚįȠȢ (Isis) ȀĮȜȜȚȩʌȘ (Calliope) ȀȜİȚIJȫ (Clito) ȀȜȦșȫ (Clotho) ȀȩȡȘȢ (Core) ȁȐȤİıȚȞ (Lachesis) ȁİȣțȓʌʌȘ (Leucippa) ȁȘșȫ (Letho) ȂİȜĮȞȓʌʌȘȞ (Melanippa) ȂȘįİȓĮ (Medea) ȂȞȒȝȘȞ (Mneme) ȂȞȘȝȠıȪȞȘȞ (Mnemosyne) ȂȠ૙ȡĮ (Moira) ȃȑȝİıȚȢ, (Nemesis) ȃȘȓș (Athena [Egyptian]) ȃȚȩȕȘȢ (Niobe) ȅ੝ȡĮȞȓĮȞ (Urania) ȆĮȜȜȐįĮ (Pallas) ȆȐȞįȘȝȠȞ (Pandemon) ȆȘȞİȜȩʌȘȢ (Penelope) ȆİȡıİijȩȞȘ (Persephone) ȆȠȜȣȝȞȓĮȢ (Polyhymnia) ȆȪȡȡĮȢ (Pyrrha)

૽ȇȑĮ (Rhea) ȈİȜĮȞĮȓĮ (Selene) ȈȓȕȣȜȜĮȞ (Sybyl) ȈțȪȜȜĮȞ (Scylla) ȉİȡȥȚȤȩȡĮ (Terpsichore) ȉȘșȪȢ (Thetis) ĭĮȡȝĮțİȓ઺ (Pharmacia) ĭİȡȡȑijĮIJĮ (Pherrhephata) ĭİȡıİijȩȞĮ (Persephone) ȋȚȝĮȓȡĮȢ (Chimera) ૃȍȡİȓșȣȚĮȞ (Orethuia).

214 Appendix to the Text

b. Names of Historical or Pseudohistorical Women ૃǹıʌĮıȓĮ (Aspasia) ǻȚȠIJȓȝĮ (Diotima) ǻȦȡȓįȠȢ (Doris)

ȀȜİȠʌȐIJȡĮȞ (Cleopatra) ȄĮȞșȓʌʌȘ (Xanthippe) ȆȣșȓĮ (Pythia)

ȈĮʌijȠ૨Ȣ (Sappho) ĭĮȚȞĮȡȑIJȘȢ (Phaenarete)

ȂȠȓȡĮ (Moira) ȂȠȓıĮ (Muse [Aeolic]) ȂȠ૨ıĮ (Muse) ȃȘȡૌįĮȢ (Nereids)

ȞȣȝijȘ (nymph) ȈİȚȡોȞĮ (Siren) ȋȐȡȚıȚȞ (Graces).

c. Collective Terms ૃǹȝĮȗȩȞİȢ (Amazons) ȕȐȤĮȚ (Baccants) īȠȡȖȩȞȦȞ (Gorgons) ૃǼȡȚȞȪİȢ (Erinys, Harpies)

d. Personified Forces, Activities, or Things ǹੁįȠ૨Ȣ (shame) ૃǹȞĮȖȤȘȢ (Fate) ૃǹȡȤȒ (Source) īȑȞİıȚȞ (Generation)

ૃǼȜʌȓȢ (Hope) ૽ǾįȠȞȒȞ (Pleasure) ȀĮȜȜȠȞȒ (Beauty) ȆİȞȓĮ (Poverty)

ĭȚȜȠıȠijȓĮȞ (Philosophy) ȋȫȡĮ (Country).

e. National Titles Used as Nouns ȈĮȣȡȠȝȐIJȚįĮȢ (Sarmatia)

ĬȡઽIJIJĮȚȢ (Thrace)

ĬİIJIJĮȜȓįĮȢ (Thessaly).

ਥʌȚțȜȒȡȦȞ (heiress) ਦIJĮȚȡȓıIJȡȚĮȚ (courtesans) ਦIJĮȓȡĮ (courtesan) șİ઼Ȣ (goddess) șİȩȢ (ਲ) (goddess) șİȡĮʌĮȚȞȓȢ (maid) șİȡĮʌȓȢ (nurse) șȣȖȐIJȘȡ (daughter) țȠȝȝȦIJȡȚ૵Ȟ (hairdresser) țȠȡȘ (young girl) ȝĮȓĮȢ (supervisors [f.]) ȝȒIJȘȡ (mother) ȝȘIJȡȣȚȐȞ (step-mother) ȝȠȚȤİȪIJȡȚĮȚ (adulteress) ȞȪȝijȘ (bride, nymph) ȟȑȞȘ (foreign woman) ੑȡȤİıIJȡȓįİȢ (dancers [f.])

ʌĮ૙Ȣ (child [f.]) ʌĮȜȜĮțȒ (concubine) ʌĮȡșȑȞȠȢ (virgin) ʌȠȜȓIJȚįĮȢ (citizenesses) ʌȡİıȕȪIJȚıȚ (old women) ʌȡȠȝȞȒıIJȡȚĮȚ (matchmaker [f.]) ʌȡȠijોIJȚȢ (prophetess) ıȣȞIJȑȤȞȠȣ (fellow worker [f.]) IJȘșȐȢ (grandmothers) IJȚșȒȞȘȞ (wetnurse) IJȓIJșȘ (nurse) IJȡȠijȩȢ (nurse) ijȓȜĮȢ (girlfriends) ijȣȜĮțȓįĮȢ (Guardians [f.]) ȥĮȜIJȡȓĮȢ (lyrists [f.])

f. Common Nouns ਕįİȜijȚį૵Ȟ (nieces) ਕįİȜijȒ (sister) ਕȜȩȤȦȞ (wives [concubines]) Į੝ȜȘIJȡȓȢ (flute-player) ȖİȞȞȒIJİȚȡĮ (mother) ȖȡĮ૙ĮȚ (old women) ȖȡĮȩȢ (old woman [dim.]) ȖȪȞĮȚȠȞ (woman [dim.]) ȖȣȞȒ (woman) įĮȓȝȠȞĮ (divinity [f.]) įȑıʌȠȚȞĮ (lady) įİıʌȩIJȚȢ (queen, lady) įȚįȐıțĮȜȠȢ (teacher [f.]) įȠȪȜȘ (female slave) įȣıĮȡȚıIJȠIJȩțİȚĮ (sad hero’s mother) ਩țȖȠȞȠȢ (daughter)

Appendix to the Text 215

g. Adjectives Used as Nouns ਕȡȓıIJĮȚȢ (best women) ਕIJȩțȠȚȢ (sterile women) șȞȘIJોȢ (mortal women) ȞȑĮȚ (girls)

੒ȝȠȓĮȚȢ (similar women) ੑȡijĮȞȒȞ (orphan [f.]) ʌ઼ıĮȚ (all women) ʌȠȜȜĮȓ (many women)

ʌȡȦIJȠIJȩțȠȚ (first bearers) ıIJİȡȓijĮȚȢ (sterile women) ıȣȖȖİȞો (female parent) ijĮȣȜȠIJȐIJĮȚȢ (worst women).

h. Participles Used as Nouns ਕȡȤȠȪıĮȢ (governing women) ȖİȞȞȘıĮȑȞȘ (women giving birth) ȖİȞȞȘıȐıૉ (women who gave birth) įȠ૨ıȘ (woman who gave) įȣıIJȠțȠȪıĮȢ (women who gave painful birth)

ਥțįȚįȠȝȑȞĮȢ (women given in marriage) țĮIJĮıIJ઼ıĮ (commissioned women) țȣȠ૨ıĮ (pregnant woman) ʌİʌĮȚįİȣȝȑȞĮȚ (educated women)

ıȦijȡȠȞȠ૨ıĮ (prudent women) IJȚțIJȠȪıĮȚȢ (women giving birth) ijİȡȠȪıĮȢ (pregnant women).

i. Noun phrases Įੂ ਕįȪȞĮIJĮȚ IJȚțIJİ૙Ȟ (women who cannot give birth)

j. Adjectives, Adverbs, and Participles with a Feminine Significance ਙȜȠȤȠȢ (childless woman) ȖȣȞĮȚțİ૙ȠȞ (feminine) ȖȣȞĮȚțİȓȦȢ (womanly) įȣıIJȠțȠȪıĮȢ (women giving painful birth) ਥȖțȪȝȦȞ (pregnant)

șȘȜȣȖİȞȑıIJİȡȠȞ (more womanly) șોȜȣȢ (female) țȣȚıțȠȝȑȞȘ (fertile) țȣȠ૨ıĮ (pregnant) ȝĮIJȡ૳ĮȞ (maternal)

੒ȝȠȝȒIJȠȡĮ (born of the same mother) ʌȡȦIJȠIJȩțȠȣ (firstborn) IJİțȠ૨ıĮ (giving birth) ੩įȓȞȠȣıĮȞ (in labor).

2. WORDS INDIRECTLY REFERRING TO WOMAN OR A FEMININE PERSON

a. Festivals ǺİȞįȚįİȓȠȚȢ (Festival of Bendis)

ȆĮȞĮșȒȞĮȚĮ (Panathenian)

b. Places ǹ੅ȖȚȞĮȞ (Aegena [island]) ૃǹȡIJİȝȝȓıȚȠȞ (Artemision) ǺĮıȓȜȘȢ (Queen [shrine])

ૃǿįȘȢ (Ida [mountain]) ȁȒșȘȢ (Lethe [river])

ȝȠȣıİ૙ȠȞ (temple of the muses)

216 Appendix to the Text

c. Common Nouns ȝȘIJȡĮȜȠ૙ĮȚ (matricides) ȝȘIJȡȩʌȠȜȚȞ (mother city) ijȚȜȠȖȪȞĮȚțİȢ (lovers of women) ȝȘIJȡȓįĮ (motherland) ȝȠȣıȘȖȑIJȘȞ (head of the ijȚȜȩȝȠȣıȠȞ (lover of muses) muses [Apollo])

d. Adjectives ਕȝȒIJȦȡ (motherless) ȞȣȝijȩȜȘʌIJȠȢ ਕȞįȡȩȖȣȞȠȞ (hermaphrodite) (nymph-possessed) ȝȘIJȡȠțIJȩȞȠȞ (matricide)

੒ȝȠȝȒIJȡȚȠȢ (with the same mother)

3. WORDS RELATED TO THE TOPIC ਥȖȖȪȘȞ (betrothed) șȘȜȒ (teat) țȣİ૙ (is pregnant) țȣȠȣȝȑȞȠȚıȚ (unborn) ȜȠȤİȓĮȞ (birth) ȝĮȚİȓĮȞ (midwifery)

ȝĮȚİȪİıșĮȚ (assist at birth) ȝĮȓİȣȝĮ (newborn) ȝĮȚİȪıİȦȢ (art of midwifery) ȝĮȚİȣIJȚțȠȞ (pertaining to midwifery)

ȝȒIJȡĮȞ (womb, matrix) ʌĮȚįȠʌȠȚȒıİȦȢ (procreation) ʌĮȡșİȞǿĮȢ (virginity) ʌȡȠ૙țĮ (dowry) ਫ਼ıIJȑȡĮȚ (wombs)

4. WORDS DERIVED FROM FEMININE TERMS ਕįİȜijȒ (sister) ਕȝȠȣıȓĮ (ignorance) ਙȝȠȣıȠȢ (muselessness) ਕȝȠȪıȦȢ (museless, ignorant)

ਕijȡȠįȚıȚȐȗȦȞ (following Aphrodite) ਕijȡȠįȓıȚȠȞ (sexual [pert. to Aphrodite])

ਫ਼ʌȠĮȝȠȣıȩIJİȡȠȞ (more uncultured) ijȓȜȘ (beloved woman) ijȚȜȩȝȠȣıȠȞ (lover of music or muses)

5. WORDS THAT APPEAR ONLY IN SPURIOUS OR DOUBTFUL WORKS ૃǹȝȒıIJȡȚįȚ (Amestris) ǻĮȞĮȓįȦȞ (Danaides) ǻİȚȞȠȝȐȤȘȢ (Deinomache)

ਥȖȤȣIJȡȚıIJȡȓĮȢ (blood-bone collectors) ૽ǼțĮȑȡȖȘ (Hecaerge) Ǽ੝ȡȫʌȘȞ (Europa)

ȀĮȜȜȚțȡȓIJȘȞ (Callicrite) ȀȣȐȞȘȢ (Cyane) ȁĮȝʌȚįȫ (Lampido) ૓ȍʌȚȢ (Opis)

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Index of Ancient and Medieval Names

A Adeimantus 23, 75, 79 Admetus 192 Adrasteia 97 Aegisthus 192 Aeschines 46–47, 50–51 Aeschylus 14, 22, 48, 154, 184–185 Agathon 56, 63 Alcestis 185–186, 192 Alcibiades 29, 33, 35, 60, 67 Amazons 10, 136–137, 161 Anaximander 20, 146 Antigone 185–186, 192 Antisthenes 46, 50–51, 54 Aphrodite 24, 199 Apollo 22, 27, 30, 58 Apollodorus 33 Apuleius 53 Aquinas, St. Thomas 207 Architas 135 Archon 182 Arete of Cyrene 53 Argia 53 Ariadne 9, 155 Arignote 54 Arion 102 Aristippus 53 Aristodemus 33 Aristophanes xi–xii,7, 14, 24, 47–49, 56–68, 70, 99, 108, 150, 154, 184–185, 192 Aristotle 1, 2, 7, 11, 12, 21–22, 24, 43–46, 52, 90–91, 98, 104, 110, 119, 134–135, 149, 154, 162, 185, 204–205 Artemicia 53 Asclepiades 54 Aspasia 27–29, 33, 48, 50–51, 76, 118 Athenaeus 48, 51, 54, 155

Athenian Stranger 181 Averroes 2, 88, 90–91, 98, 109, 124, 129 Axiotheia of Phlious 53

B Bacchante 10, 31 Bendis 28 Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus 206 Brontinus 118

C Cassandra 185 Cebes 33 Chaerephon 27 Chalcidius 132 Chrysothemis 186 Cicero, Marcus Tullius 51 Cleanthes 54 Cleinias 33 Clement of Alexandria 53 Cleopatra 33 Clytemnestra 185–186, 192 Crates the Cynic 54 Cratylus 25 Creusa 186 Critias 23, 115, 133, 136, 139, 140 Crito 23, 27, 35 Ctesippus 29 Cyrus 178

D Damo 54 Deianira 186 Deinomache 33 Demeter 35 Demiurge 20, 133, 141, 150 Democritus 133, 135–136

234

Index of Ancient and Medieval Names

Demosthenes 158 Dicaearchus 53 Diodorus Cronus 53 Diogenes Laertius 53, 118 Diogenes of Sinope 47, 53–54 Dionysius 33, 56 Diotima of Mantinea 25, 27–29, 33, 59, 60, 63, 67, 150, 190 Doris 33

E Eleatic Stranger 11 Electra 185 Empedocles 20, 58–59, 142, 146–147, 149 Epicurus 54 Eros Phanes 59 Eros 50, 56–57, 59. 62 Eryximachus 32, 56–57, 64 Euripides 14, 43, 48, 154, 185–186 Eusebius 60 Euthydemus 104 Evadne 185

F Fate 10, 31 Ficinus 180

G Galen 147 Glaucon 24, 72, 79–81, 85, 97–98, 110–111, 113, 115–116 Gorgias 11 Gyges the Lydian 32, 48

Isaeus 158 Ischomachus 51–52 Ismene 186

L Laches 29 Lactantius 55 Lastheneia of Mantinea 53, 128 Lucian 65 Lycurgus 162 Lysicles 51 Lysis 29, 33, 35, 192, 199 Lysistrata 49, 63, 185, 192

M MȘIJȡoįȓįĮțIJoȢ 54 Medea 35, 48, 185–186 Megillus 29 Meletus 23 Menedemus 54 Menexenus 6, 28–30, 51, 150 Meno x-xi, 7, 15, 27–28, 32, 39–46, 49–52, 66, 85, 98, 104, 119–120, 132, 168, 175, 180, 196, 198–199 Moses 60 Muse 10, 28–29, 31, 62, 64, 179 Musonius Rufus 55 Mya 54

N Nemesis 28, 97 Nicias 29 Nicion 54

H

O

Haemon 192 Hecuba 185–186 Helen 185, 192 Hera 28, 35 Hermaphroditus 59 Hermeias 155 Hermione 185 Hermocrates 133 Herodotus 48, 102, 108 Hesiod 14, 48, 136 Hipparchia 54 Hippolytus 185 Homer 31, 34 Hypatia of Alexandria 46

Olympiodorus 53, 67 Oreithyia 35 Orestes 22

I Ion 25, 31 Iphigenia 185

P Pandora 136 Pantacleia 53 Paris 192 Parmenides 3, 75, 104, 204 Pausanias 56–57, 65 Perdiccas of Macedon 33 Pericles 27, 51, 83 Phaedo 32, 74–76, 83, 98, 104, 112, 118, 120, 197 Phaedra 185–186 Phaedrus 11, 56, 61, 104, 124, 137, 190, 193 Phaenarete 27, 33

Index of Ancient and Medieval Names Pharmacea 35 Philip of Opus 152 Philistion of Syracuse 134–135 Philochorus 58 Philolaus 135 Plutarch 155 Polemarchus 79 Polyxena 185 Porphyry 118 Poseidon 35 Potone 195 Proclus 12, 46, 142, 144, 150 Protagoras 194 Pythagoras 54, 118 Pythia 27, 30, 33, 184

Q Quintilian 51

R Rhodogyne 51

S Sappho 27, 30, 33 Sauromatides 161 Seneca 55 Simonides 14, 136 Siren 10, 24, 29 Socrates xi, xii, 2, 4, 7 11, 13–4, 23–25, 27–30, 32–35, 37, 40–54, 56–57, 59–60, 63, 65–69, 72–76, 78–85, 87,-91, 94–117, 120, 122, 124, 133, 140, 144, 147, 150, 154, 165, 180, 190, 193–196, 201 Sophocles 14, 48, 185

235

Sophron 11, 97 Sophroniscus 33 Sosipara of Pergamum 46 Speusippus 128 Stilpo of Megara 54

T Tecmessa 186 Thargelia 51 Theaetetus 24–25, 34, 135, 204 Theanus 118 Themistius 53, 128 Theognis 53 Theophrastus 59 Thesmophoria 184 Thrasymachus 29, 72, 79, 80, 124, 181 Thucydides 32 Timaeus x-xii, 6, 7, 11, 13, 15, 19–24, 32, 39, 40, 46, 64, 66, 93, 116–118, 121, 130, 132–144, 147–149, 165, 168, 174, 176–178, 189, 197–198

W Witches of Thessaly 31

X Xanthippe 27, 32–33, 51 Xenarchus 11 Xenocrates 135 Xenophon 44, 46–47, 51–52, 192–194

Z Zeno of Citium 54 Zeus 31, 58

Index of Modern and Contemporary Sources

A Al-Rubairy, Abdul A. 4 Allen, Christine Garside 7, 66, 96, 104–105, 108, 117, 125, 129, 153, 176, 208–209, 211 Allen, Prudence 21, 208–209 Andersson, Torsten J. 69, 77, 81, 93 Andic, Martin 42 Annas, Julia 4, 6, 9, 30, 42, 90, 98, 101, 105, 108, 111–112, 116, 126–127, 162, 164, 176, 180 Archer-Hind, Richard D. 21, 135, 139, 142, 145–146, 149 Arieti, James A. 12, 89 Assenmacher, Johannes 207 Ast, G. A. F. 154 Azcárate, Patricio 143

B Bachofen, Johann J. 136 Bacon, Francis 133 Bacon, Helen H. 56 Barber, Cesar L. 62 Barker, Ernest 7, 81, 88, 90–91, 98, 105, 115, 120, 128–130 Bat-Ami Bar On ix, 13, 28, 112, 125, 128, 140, 197 Bäumker, C. 21 Bekker, Immanuel107, 117 Bernal, Martin 47 Bernstein, Leonard 60 Beversluis, John 44 Bianchi, Emanuela 21 Blair, Elena Duvergès 27, 43, 45, 52 Blair, George A. acknowledgments, 21, 70, 79, 86, 106, 204, 207 Bloom, Allan 3–6, 8–9, 51, 70, 88, 106, 125 Bluestone, Natalie H. 1, 8, 77, 127

Bosanquet, Bernard 70, 90–91, 98, 104, 106, 112, 114–115, 131 Bowery, Anne M. 28 Bradley, Gerard V. 194 Brickhouse, Thomas C. 28, 40 Brisson, Luc 151 Brown, Wendy 19 Brumbaugh, Robert S. 89 Buchan, Morag 6, 13, 202 Burnet, J. 106, 139, 189 Burns, Steven 4, 7 Burnyeat, Miles F. 24, 73, 99 Bury, Robert G. 57–60, 190 Butler, Judith 21 Buytendijk, Frederik J. J. 209

C Callahan, John F. 137 Calvert, Brian 4–7, 96, 105, 111, 169, 177 Campbell, Lewis 70–71, 90 99, 106, 125 Cameron, Alister 11 Cantarella, Eva 60, 118, 147, 185 Canto, Monique 64, 95, 160, 208 Cappelletti, Angel J. 4, 6–7, 91, 93, 110, 127, 129, 153, 158 Carroll, Berenice A. 60 Cherniss, Harold 136 Clark, Gillian 65 Cohen, David 32, 152–153, 164, 171, 175 Coole, Diana H. 4, 50, 165 Cooper, John M. 156 Cornford, Francis M. 21–22, 70, 90, 106, 133, 135, 138–139, 141–142, 147–150 Corrigan, Kevin 60 Crossman, Richard H. S. 90–91, 96, 125, 130

238

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D Darling, John 4, 126 Davies, John L. 7, 129 Delebecque, Édouard 52 Demos, Raphael 89, 100, 123, 180 Denyer, Nicholas 33 Derrida, Jacques 21, 23 Dickason, Anne 4, 7–8, 60, 64, 129, 176 Dickinson, Goldsworthy L. 2, 177, 182 Dillon, John 21 Dindorf, Karl W. 53 Dittmar, Heinrich 51 Dover, Kenneth J. 57–59, 65, 178, 183, 190–194 Dudley, Donald R. 53–54

E Edelstein, Ludwig 55 Eggers Lan, Conrado 23 Ehlers, B. 50 Elrod, Eleanor 4, 130 Elshtain, Jean B. 23, 208 England, Edwin B. 158, 161, 169, 175, 180

F Fant, Maureen B. 55 Fernández, Luis G. 61 Fernández Galiano, Manuel 120, 129, 152, 154, 162, 164 Field, Guy C. 48, 50 Finley, Moses I. 182 Fite, Warner 90 Fitzgerald, William 43 Foley, Helene P. 63, 182, 185 Forde, Steven 9, 80, 89, 125, 129, 156, 167, 177, 181 Fortenbaugh, William W. 6 Fort, Gertrude von le 191 Fraccaroli, A. 137 Frank, Erich 135 Frank, Solomon 5, 152, 163–164, 170 Friedländer, Paul 12, 61–62, 71, 135, 139, 162, 172 Frutiger, P. 137

G Garland, Robert 182, 184 Geddes, Anne 21 Genova, Judith 140 Gernet, Louis 158, 163, 165 Ghougassian, Joseph P. 46 Gilligan, Carol 208 Glazov-Corrigan, Elena 60

Goldman, Harvey S. 44 Gomme, Arnold W. 48, 61, 185 Gomperz, Theodor 2, 7, 46, 50, 129, 131, 135, 137–140, 144, 147, 152, 159, 179 Gottschalk, H. B. 90 Gould, John P. 32, 136, 182–183 Griswold, Charles L. 12 Grosz, Elizabeth 21 Grote, George 2, 42, 57, 60, 90, 109, 110, 115–116, 125 Grube, Georges M. A. 131 Guthrie, William K. C. 5, 11–12, 22, 24, 40, 42, 44, 49, 54, 58–61, 63, 65, 133–135, 144, 148, 152, 155, 157, 162, 165, 169, 172, 178, 180, 200

H Hadot, Pierre 138 Hall, Dale Halliwell, F. Stephen 5, 13, 72–73, 75, 77, 83, 85, 87, 89, 94, 96, 100, 109–110, 124–125, 129, 130 Hampton, Cynthia 197 Harriott, Rosemary M. 63 Harrison, Alick R. W. 158 Hawthorne, Susan 28 Heisenberg, Werner 133 Henderson, Jeff rey 63 Hermann, K. J. 106 Hindus, Milton 193 Hoerber, Robert G. 42, 80, 82, 84–85, 88, 93 Howland, Jacob 39 Huntington Cains 127

I Irigaray, Luce 21, 28, 100, 122–123, 143, 201, 207, 209 Ithurriague, Jean 1

J Jacobs, William 91, 92 Jaeger, Werner 12, 42, 56, 71, 91, 99, 104 Jowett, Benjamin 2, 42, 58, 71, 90, 99, 106, 125 Just, Roger 178

K Kahn, Charles H. 44–46, 50–51, 104, 173, 175, 189, 194 Kennedy, Jay B. 132

Index of Modern and Contemporary Sources 239 Kennedy, John 44 Kitto, Humphrey D. F. 182–184 Klein, Jacob 12, 29 Klosko, George 8, 155, 175, 177 Kochin, Michael S. 3, 11, 69–70, 77, 79, 90–91, 113, 125, 130, 152, 156, 161, 164–165, 169, 171–173, 179, 181, 193 Kofman, Sarah 41 Koyre, Alexandre 45 Krell, David Farrell 7, 21, 134–135, 144 Krentz, Arthur A. 12 Kristeva, Julia 21 Krohn, A. 71 Krüger, Gerhard 56

L Lacey, Walter K. 162, 182–184, 191 Lamb, Walter R. M. 58 Lange, Lynda 4, 5, 89, 93, 127, 130 Le Dœuff, Michèle 205–206 Lee, Henry Desmond P. 91, 105, 128, 130, 135 Lefkowitz, Mary R. Acknowledgments, 47, 55, 132, 136 Lesser, Harry 111, 127 Levin, Susan B. 12, 15, 88, 95, 100, 114, 122, 125, 152–153, 155, 160, 166–167, 169, 177–178, 180–181 Levinson, Ronald B. 195 Liddell and Scott 40, 159 Liszt, Franz 132 Lloyd, Genevieve ix, x, 6, 20, 134, 145, 205–206 Lloyd-Jones, Hugh 136 Lodge, Rupert C. 177 Long, Anthony A. 54 Lutoslawski, Wicenty 71

M Mansfeld, Jaap 6 Marchant, Edgard C. 52 Martin, Thomas H. 146 Matthews, Gareth B. 28 McKeen, Catherine 96, 100, 122 McLeish, Kenneth 61 Merlan, Philip 54 Mikkola, Mari 209 Moore, Sonia 76 Morrison, John S. 58 Morrow, Glenn R. 11, 14, 155, 158, 163, 165, 169, 171–173, 175, 179–180 Mugler, Charles 135 Murphy, Neville R. 1, 77, 79

N Nehamas, Alexander 57, 65 Nettleship, Richard L. 2, 70, 91–92, 98 Nicholson, Linda 8 Nussbaum, Martha 116

O Okin, Susan M. 4, 7, 50, 81–82, 88, 91–92, 100, 116, 124–125, 152–153, 158, 165, 169, 176, 180–181, 194 Olivieri, Francisco J. 28, 41 O’Meara, Dominic J. 46 Oost, Stewart I. 52 Osborne, Martha L. 8, 117, 129, 176–177 Ostwald, Martin 99 Owen, Gwilym E. L. 136

P Pabón, José M. 120, 129, 152, 154, 162, 164 Pakaluk, Michael 50 Parker, Douglass 64 Pearson, Alfred Ch. 54 Peramás S. J., José M. 26 Pérez Estévez, Antonio 4, 134 Pickard Cambridge, Arthur 56, 184 Piérart, Marcel 81, 88, 91, 158, 161, 163, 165, 176 Pierce, Christine 4, 23, 28, 100, 108, 110, 112, 119, 123, 125 Polansky, Ronald 27 Pomeroy, Sarah B. 6, 48, 52, 63, 91, 106, 125, 182, 184, 185 Popper, Karl 133 Price, Allan W. 89, 90, 197

R Rankin, H. D. 29, 50, 53–54, 155, 157, 165 Reale, Giovanni 54 Reckford, Kenneth J. 62, 64 Reeve, C. D. C. 128 Richter Donald C. 183 Riginos, Alice S. 53, 67 Ritchie, David G. 43, 51, 157 Ritter, Heinrich 137, 145 Rivaud, Albert 135, 137, 143, 150 Robin, Léon 42, 64, 66, 147, 165 Robinson, Richard 24, 72 Robinson, Thomas M. 13, 135, 137, 141, 148, 169 Rogers, G. M. 47

240

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Roochnik, David L. xii, 70, 95, 120, 198 Rosen, Stanley 58. 62–63 Rosenstock, Bruce 91 Rosenthal, Abigail L. 51 Rosenthal, E. I. J. 2 Ross, William D. 43 Rousseau, Jean J. 81, 88, 91 Ryser, Norma J. 4

S Sallis, John 21–22, 51, 200 Salman, Charles 63 Samaranch, Francisco de P. 143 Santa Cruz, María I Acknowledgments, 6, 91, 101–102, 138 Santas, Gerasimos 87, 173 Saunders, Trevor J. 152–154, 156–157, 159, 161, 164, 167–173, 175, 180, 189 Saxonhouse, Arlene W. 4, 6, 13, 24 51, 70, 104–105, 109, 125, 202 Sayre, Kenneth 22 Schaps, David M. 32, 182 Schleiermacher, Friedrich D. E. 12, 154 Schneider, C. E. Ch. 180 Schofield, Malcolm 176 Schuhl, Pierre-M. 172 Sciacca, Michele F. 135, 137 Scott, Gary A. 40 Sedley, David 25 Segal, Erich 193 Senter, Nell W. 6, 8, 30, 99, 102, 104–105, 109, 123 Sesonske, Alexander 42 Shallo, S. J., Michael W. 103 Shorey, Paul 42, 71, 98, 100, 106, 135, 138–139, 147, 152, 189, 193, 195 Sider, David 24, 56 Slater, Philip E. 185 Smith, Hilda I. 60 Smith, Janet F. 4, 5, 110, 126 Smith, Nicholas D. xii, 4, 8, 28–29, 40, 45, 63, 65, 71, 81, 88–91, 101, 104–105, 118, 128–129, 200 Solomos, Alexis 57, 61, 67 Spelman, Elizabeth V. 8, 13, 125, 128, 130, 209 Stalley, R. F. 154, 156–157, 161, 165, 175–176, 178–179 Stallbaum, Gottfried 142, 149 Stanislavski, Konstantin 76–77, 155 Stenzel, Julius 24, 44 Stephanus, Henricus 106

Strauss, Leo 12, 24, 51, 59, 61, 99, 125, 163, 169, 178, 181 Stumpf, Karl 137 Sutton, Robert F. 48 Szanto, Emil 171

T Tarrant, Dorothy 14, 24, 79 Taylor, Alfred E. 2, 21, 50, 58, 60, 87–88, 92, 105, 119, 128, 135, 138–139, 142–144, 146, 149– 150, 152, 189 Tejera, Victorino 57 Thompson, E. S. 45 Thompson, Norma 48 Tod, Marcus N. 54 Todolí Duque O. P. , José 205 Tovey, Barbara and George 4, 98, 105, 108, 110, 113 Tuana, Nancy ix, 13, 125, 197 Turbayne, Colin M. 21, 85, 135, 138

U Überweg, Friedrich 137 Urwick, Edwards J. 70, 125 Ussher, Robert G. 63, 67

V Vander Waerdt, Paul A. 54 Vaughan, David J. 7, 129 Vlastos, Gregory 5, 7, 42, 44–46, 69, 81, 88, 92, 101, 108, 120 Voegelin, Eric 71, 136–139, 174

W Ward, Julie K. 198 Waterfield, Robin 47, 52, 70, 95, 106 Weiss, Roslyn 28 Wender, Dorothea 4, 5, 30, 47–48, 51, 61, 88, 98, 100, 123, 125, 176, 178, 192–194 Wengert, R. G. 24 Westerink, Leendert G. 39 Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Ulrich von 2, 41, 91, 96, 135, 190, 201 Windelband, G. 71

Y Yunis, Harvey 11

Z Zeitlin, Froma I. 63 Zeller, Eduard 2, 91, 128–129, 154, 162, 172, 177

Index of General Concepts

A academy 34, 53, 92, 95, 116, 128, 155–6, 172–3, 191; women in 34, 53, 116, 128, 191 analogy 2, 22–23, 25–26, 69, 72–75, 77–87, 89–90, 93–95, 97–98, 101, 106, 112, 117, 119–120, 123, 125–126, 128, 136–137, 143, 145–146, 166, 169, 197, 200–202; animal analogies 120; city-soul analogy 25–26, 69–96, 101, 112, 119–120, 128, 166; craft analogy 120; watchdog analogy 2, 73, 92, 97–98, 114–115, 117, 145 Arion saved by a dolphin 102 artisan class 8, 48, 86, 90–92

B body 7, 8, 27, 30, 55, 57, 59, 64, 66, 105, 108, 117–121, 125, 128–130, 133–134, 144–147, 149–150, 160, 165, 176, 190– 191, 194, 197–199, 201–204, 207–208, 210–211; as related to soul 8, 59, 125, 128–129, 134, 144–147, 150, 165, 176, 190; body-soul dualism. See dualism

C cause xii, 37, 43, 74, 88, 91–92, 119, 136, 147, 172, 207 communism 26, 63, 90, 157 consistent, consistency, inconsistent, inconsistency x, xii, 1, 3, 5, 6, 8–10, 20–22, 25–26, 37, 49–50, 60, 66, 68, 71, 76, 78–79, 84, 86–87, 92, 111, 114, 117, 120– 121, 124, 129, 132, 134, 138,

142, 146–147, 149–150, 154, 161, 165, 168, 171–172, 175, 177, 179, 189, 194, 197, 202 contradict, contradiction, contradicting, contradictory, non-contradictory x, 2–10, 13, 15, 20, 24, 32, 46, 49, 51, 64, 82–83, 87, 93–96, 102, 113, 120–122, 130, 134,-135, 142, 149, 152, 157, 165–166, 174–175, 179, 183, 189, 193, 196–197, 202, 205 cosmology, cosmological xi-xii, 6–7, 15, 22–23, 39, 121, 132–135, 137, 139–140, 144, 149, 197

D defi nition 209 dialectic, dialectical xi–xii, 6, 31, 39, 53, 56, 94, 102–104, 120, 132, 137–138, 157, 164, 198, 201 dialogue structure 148, 190, 202 distributive justice 69, 141–142, 145 divided line xii, 200, 202 dramatic/rhetorical xi, 13–17, 19, 25–27, 31–32, 37, 39, 42, 79, 87, 119, 196, 202 dualism, body-soul dualism 20, 66, 118–121, 128–130, 142, 145, 149, 197–198, 202–205

E elenctic elenchus 31, 40, 42, 104, 120 equality. See woman as equal eristic 94, 103–104 essence, essential xii, 5–6, 12, 42, 66, 72, 83, 87, 112, 117, 121, 124–126, 128–129, 140, 143, 145, 147, 153–154, 156, 165,

242

Index of General Concepts

167, 168, 178, 180, 182, 194, 198–200, 204–206, 209, 211 ethics, ethical 7, 14–5, 43, 47–50, 54, 82, 85–86, 93, 101, 119–120, 124, 128, 135, 144, 181, 192–194 197 existential 62, 66, 121, 129–130, 145, 147, 165

F fallacy 105 fate 10, 31 female 8, 10, 13–14, 21–22, 24, 28, 34, 41–42, 45, 48–49, 51–52, 54, 58, 63–65, 80, 82, 86, 88, 96–98, 100–101, 105–107, 110, 112, 114–115, 117–118, 120, 122, 128, 143, 156, 160–162, 167, 175, 178–180, 182–183, 193, 201 feminine x, xii, 2, 4–6, 10, 13–14, 21–22, 25, 28–31, 34–35, 58, 78, 80, 109, 116, 118, 134, 136, 140, 146–148, 150, 159–160, 163, 165, 177, 180, 183–185, 190, 201, 208 feminism, anti-feminism, feminist, proto-feminist, ix, x, 2–6, 9–10, 21, 47, 88, 93, 98, 102, 112, 116–117, 126–127, 130, 136, 160, 172, 176, 185, 206, 208 modern 5 radical 5 festival 56, 61, 161, 163, 170, 179, 182, 184 Forms 73, 87, 95, 104, 200–201, 204 freedom 4, 5, 30, 48, 91, 158, 205– 206, 210

G gender 11, 13, 20, 42, 45–46, 49, 52, 54, 57, 64–66, 68, 77, 80–81, 85–86, 95, 101, 108–109, 120–121, 123, 125, 128–129, 131, 145, 159, 173, 177, 198, 202, 204–205, 208–210 generation 20–1, 49, 53, 135, 137–8, 141–2, 145, 147–51 genius 3, 13, 23, 61, 113, 123, 132, 155, 203 good 41, 47, 52, 59, 63, 73–75, 78, 81, 83–84, 87, 93, 126, 147, 157, 159, 190, 192, 201, 207 Gorgias 11 government, governor xi, xii, 15, 67, 73–74, 78–79, 82–83, 93,

105, 112–113, 118, 120–121, 123, 146, 155, 159, 163, 165, 169–173, 180, 185 gymnastic 24, 73, 98–99, 117, 153, 163, 173, 184

H happy, happiness, unhappiness 59, 61, 72–74, 82, 84–85, 89, 92, 116, 119, 128, 162, 207 home, house, household 2, 23, 30, 32, 40–41, 44, 48, 51, 63, 76, 98, 118, 153–154, 161–162, 169, 184 human, human being ix, 2, 25, 29, 33, 42, 45, 49, 57–58, 64, 69–70, 72, 74, 77–78, 80, 82, 88–89, 96–100, 105, 107–108, 112, 115, 119–124, 129–130, 133–136, 138, 141–145, 149–150, 155, 160, 162, 165–167, 174, 177–179, 181, 185, 191–194, 196, 201–211 hylemorphic 119, 204

I idea xii, 1, 6, 13–15, 20, 22–24, 26, 46, 60–61, 63–64, 75, 89, 94, 119, 121, 130, 132–135, 140, 146, 152, 157, 162, 167–168, 174–176, 204, 209; ideal 2, 15, 26, 46, 54, 61, 72–73, 77, 80, 83, 86, 115–116, 127, 133, 139–140, 156–157, 161, 166–167, 174, 177, 202 image, imagery x, xii, 19, 23–25, 58, 60, 62, 65, 67, 83, 94, 97–98, 137–138, 141, 148, 191, 199–200, 205; in thinking 98, 138, 191, 199, 200 imagination 22, 26, 41, 51, 73, 96–98, 105, 113, 137, 139, 205–206 immortality, immortal 74, 150, 190 indictment 11 individual, individualist 5, 26, 29, 42, 45, 49, 62, 68–69, 72–78, 80, 82–85, 88–89, 99–101, 105, 107, 110–112, 120–127, 130, 155–156, 164, 167–168, 182, 192, 199, 206–207, 210 individuality 206, 208 individuation 206 induction 72

Index of General Concepts integrity (justice) 69, 72–75, 77, 79–81, 83, 85–87, 89, 94, 101, 108, 121, 197 intellectual 8, 27, 30, 39, 44–45, 53, 56, 60, 95, 98, 118, 122, 149, 154, 173, 178, 191–192, 194, 196, 206 interpretation x–xii, 7, 8, 15, 21, 24, 43, 45–47, 50, 56–57, 60, 62, 65–66, 71, 76, 81, 83–88, 90, 93, 99, 100, 105–106, 109–110, 117, 122, 124, 126, 129, 132, 134–138, 142, 144–146, 149–150, 158, 160, 166, 172–174, 176, 180–181, 190, 200 investigation x–xii; acknowledgments, 1, 9, 16, 32, 40, 47, 49, 63, 70–71, 76, 85–86, 89, 94, 98, 123, 134, 136, 153, 156, 174, 199, 205, 207, 209–211 irony 50, 94

J justice. See integrity (justice)

K knowledge xii, 21, 28, 42, 50–51, 73, 95, 97–98, 137–139, 190, 199–201, 205–206, 210

L Laws x, xii, 4, 5, 7, 11, 13, 15, 23–25, 29–35, 37, 39–40, 43, 60, 64–66, 69, 91–93, 95, 97, 114, 116, 118, 121, 130, 133, 140–141, 147, 149, 152–160, 163–169, 171–181, 184, 189, 192–194, 197–199, 204 leader, leadership 4, 7, 15, 26, 73, 81, 87, 90, 93, 108, 163–464, 166, 169, 172, 174 logic, logical xi, xii, 2, 9, 37, 39, 53, 69, 71–72, 74, 76, 80–82, 86–89, 91–92, 94, 96–97, 101–104, 108–109, 111–113, 122, 126–127, 129, 142, 145, 149, 152, 154–157, 166–167, 196–197, 202, 204, 206, 209 logical form 102 love 10, 25, 27–28, 33–34, 59, 62, 113, 144, 148, 181, 190, 192, 206–207, 210 Lysistrata 49, 63, 99, 185, 192

243

M macrocosmic 135 male 2, 13–14, 21–22, 24, 27, 33–34, 41–42, 45, 49, 52, 58, 72, 78, 80, 82, 86, 96–97, 100–101, 106–107, 109–110, 113, 115, 120, 122, 128, 142, 150, 165, 167, 169–170, 177–178, 180, 193, 201, 209 masculine 4, 6, 23, 35, 58–59, 80, 96, 109, 146, 159–160, 165, 175, 180, 183, 186, 191–192, 202 materialistic 136 mature, maturity 24, 40–42, 139, 152, 156–157, 164–165 men’s superiority 6, 7, 14, 96, 110–111, 142–143, 145–146, 149,178, 207. See also woman as inferior Menexenus 6, 28–30, 51, 150 metaphor xi, 14, 19, 21–24, 85, 102, 133, 142 metaphysics, metaphysical xi, 14, 21–23, 25, 37, 39, 43, 84, 87, 89, 96, 117–118, 121, 127, 129, 134–135, 140–141, 143, 145, 149, 155, 178, 180, 190–191, 202, 204–205, 209–210 method, methodological xi, 2, 10, 16, 24–25, 31, 40, 42, 47–48, 56, 71, 76, 104, 138, 196, 200–202; dialectical 56, 104; dianoetic 138; of division 104; of hypothesis 42, 138; Socratic 24–25, 31, 40, 47–48, 104 microcosmic 135 mime, mimetic 11, 29, 39, 97 mind ix, 9, 13, 20, 67, 72–73, 99, 108, 125, 132, 142, 145, 147, 154, 173–174, 189–90, 201–202, 204, 206–207, 210–211 misogynistic, misogyny 4, 9–10, 13, 48, 112, 130, 183, 185–186 modesty 159, 179–180 moral 8, 12–14, 27–29, 32, 34, 42, 44–45, 50, 59, 61–65, 70, 84, 101, 118, 120–121, 128, 130, 136, 141, 143–149, 159, 164–165, 168, 178, 180–181, 183, 189, 192, 194, 198–199, 201–202, 206, 210 music 11, 60, 73, 90, 98, 109, 113, 117, 132, 163 myth xi, xii, 14, 15, 19, 31–32, 35, 37, 48, 59–62, 64–65, 67, 73, 132,

244 Index of General Concepts 134, 136–145, 147–151, 168, 178, 185, 189–190 of metals. See also myth of metals under Republic

N Neoplatonic 46

O object xi, 9, 153, 191, 207–209; object, objective (=aim) 26, 31, 63, 102, 140, 161. See also superobjective; objective, objectivity (vs. subjective) ix–x, 9, 153, 191, 207–209 objection 8, 25–26, 43–44, 50, 74–77, 82–83, 85, 92, 96–99, 101, 103–104, 107–108, 111, 124, 140, 179, 189, 192, 194 old men 41 opinion 7–9, 42, 51, 56, 60, 110, 117, 138–139, 142, 145, 163, 165, 173, 184, 190, 194, 196, 200–201; vs dialectic 138, 200 optimism 6 oratorical 56 organic, organicity x, 77, 84, 86–87, 92, 128, 149 origin xi, 7, 14, 23, 39–41, 43, 48, 50, 57, 64–65, 124, 132–134, 143, 193, 196

P paradigm, paradigmatic 13, 94, 136, 156–157, 191 Parmenides 3, 75, 104, 204 pederasty 57, 193 pejorative 4, 7, 28–30 perception xii, 51, 132, 191 person 5, 6, 8, 11, 13, 26, 42–44, 69, 72, 75, 78, 81, 87, 89, 91, 99, 101, 105–106, 110–112, 119–122, 125, 127, 129, 140, 142–143, 165, 169–170, 175, 179, 184, 191, 197–198, 200–202, 204–208, 210; soul as 8, 119, 120, 125, 129, 142–143, 165, 198, 200–202. See woman as a person pessimism 6, 155, 172 Phaedo 32, 74–76, 83, 98, 104, 112, 118, 120, 197 Phaedrus 11, 56, 61, 104, 124, 137, 190

philosopher ix, 8, 14, 24, 28, 53–54, 57, 69–71, 75, 77–79, 83–84, 87, 93, 115–116, 119, 122, 128, 137, 140, 145, 151, 168, 173–174, 176, 180, 195, 207; philosopher king 70–71, 79, 83–84, 87, 93, 116, 119, 140, 173. See woman as philosopher queen philosophy x, Acknowledgments, 3, 5, 11–12, 15, 21, 23, 25, 28, 39, 46, 50, 53–5, 59, 75, 83, 86–88, 95, 99, 119, 123–124, 127–128, 134–135, 139, 152, 166, 191, 197, 202–207, 210 physicist ix, 20, 133, 135, 138 play (= amusement) 81–82, 157, 193; (= drama) 29–30, 48–49, 56, 61, 64–65, 67, 76, 185 poetry 11, 24, 56, 97, 185 poets ix, 10, 29–30, 33, 57, 60–62, 65–66, 94, 102, 185 political ix, xii, 2, 7–8, 13, 26, 43, 47–49, 51, 61–64, 72, 77, 82–83, 85–86, 89, 93, 108, 119–120, 126–127, 129, 139–140, 154–157, 159–160, 162, 165, 167, 173, 175, 182, 185, 202, 204, 208–211 Politicus 114 possessions 73, 93 possible 3, 5, 10, 25, 41, 43, 45,, 49, 65, 72, 75, 77–78, 81, 89, 97, 106, 109, 145, 149, 160, 172, 176–177, 189–191, 196, 208; (= non-contradictory) 95–96, 98, 102, 113–114, 118, 121; (= feasible) 59, 73, 95, 116, 145, 157, 161, 166, 173–174; confusing “possible” and “feasible” 95–96; vs. impossible 2, 24, 44, 78, 114–115, 138, 165, 168, 209 practical, practicable ix, 1, 26, 45, 53, 75, 78–79, 83, 90, 92, 94–95, 127, 137–138, 156–158, 166, 173, 176, 195, 197; vs. impractical 1 pragmatic 2, 95–96, 102, 157, 176, 202 prime matter 21 principle ix, 2, 4, 6, 21–22, 24, 37, 47, 61, 72, 76, 87, 89, 93–95, 99, 101–102, 111, 113–115, 118, 120–124, 133, 154, 157, 166, 172, 176–177, 181, 194, 201–207, 209–210

Index of General Concepts property (= private) 2, 48, 73, 81–82, 88, 91, 93, 140, 154, 157, 166, 176, 182, 184–185; (= common) 26, 54, 87, 90–91, 93. See also woman as property prudence, prudent, prudential 39, 41, 47, 50, 77, 92, 95, 116, 140, 157, 161, 172–173, 195, 210 public 2, 3, 5, 9, 33, 47, 53, 61, 92–93, 127, 158, 161–165, 170–171, 173, 179, 181–185, 194

Q qualitative 6, 7, 86, 111, 120–121, 129, 179 quantitative 6, 111, 120–121, 129– 130, 179, 207 quantum theory ix

R rational 8, 47–48, 50, 60, 73–74, 85, 93, 99, 122–124, 129, 133, 135, 137–138, 189, 197, 200–201, 205–206, 208, 210 refute xi, 6, 60, 66, 68, 85, 88, 92, 102–103, 111–113, 180 reproduction 78, 93, 106, 160. 193, 211 Republic x-xii, 1–7, 13–15, 20, 23–25, 32–33, 37, 39–40, 42, 44–46, 49–50, 53–54, 64, 66, 69–70, 72–76, 78–81, 83–88, 90–92, 94–95, 97, 101, 114–120, 128, 132–136, 138–141, 147, 149– 150, 152, 155–162, 164–168, 173–174, 176–181, 193–194, 197–198, 200–201

S satire, satirical 39, 47, 51, 60, 63, 65–68, 196 scholarship ix, 9, 37 scientist, scientific ix, 45, 47, 56, 62, 134–135, 137, 146, 155, 200–201, 204, 209, 211 self-awareness 206 self-control 52, 179–180, 191, 194 self-examination 71, 75 sexism 5, 108, 127 sexual, sexuality 2, 4, 6–9, 14, 41, 44, 46, 49, 62–65, 80, 86, 93, 95, 101–102, 105, 107, 111, 120, 123–126, 128, 136, 142, 144–145, 149–151, 155,

245

159–160, 165, 179–180, 183, 190–194, 198, 201–202, 208, 209; heterosexuality 63, 191, 194; homosexuality 59, 63–65, 190–194 Sicily 83, 182 social 1–2, 4–6, 8, 13–15, 33, 43, 48–49, 68–69, 72, 77, 80–81, 85, 87, 96, 105, 108–109, 111, 113, 115, 125, 127–129, 136, 140, 159–160, 163, 166, 168, 170, 182–183, 185, 204, 209, 211 sophist, sophistic 11, 47, 56, 76, 94 Sophist 104, 204 soul 2, 6–8, 11, 15, 24–26, 30, 34, 45, 52, 55, 59–60, 64, 66–67, 69, 72–82, 84–87, 89, 93–96, 101, 105–106, 112, 118–122, 125, 127–130, 133–134, 136, 138–139, 141–151, 165–166, 168, 174, 176, 181, 197–203, 207; See also analogy; person State 1, 8, 11, 24, 26, 30, 40–41, 43, 46, 54, 69, 72–73, 76–77, 79–89, 93, 95, 101, 108, 116, 120, 123, 126–127, 130, 136, 157–158, 162, 168–169, 173, 175–177, 182, 201 substance 71, 119, 206 subtext in general xi, 9, 71, 76; of Republic. See Republic, of Laws; see Laws super-objective 76–77, 155–156, 172 Syracuse 67, 134–135, 155, 173

T talent 2, 40, 72–73, 80, 87–88; nature as 99–101, 104, 107, 111, 117, 120–123, 130, 164, 167–168, 192 techne 88, 95, 120 theory ix, 2, 4–5, 7–8, 13, 21, 33, 41–42, 45, 47, 49, 65, 73, 75, 81, 84–86, 90, 94–95, 98, 101, 104, 108, 120–122, 127–128, 132, 134, 139, 142, 147–149, 153, 157, 176, 176, 179, 185, 190, 194–195, 204–205; of woman x–xii, 1, 9, 30, 39–40, 45, 49, 54, 66–67, 79, 86–88, 95, 116–117, 119–120, 126, 129, 135, 140, 149, 190–191, 197–198, 200–201, 204–205

246 Index of General Concepts Timaeus x–xii, 6–7, 11, 13, 15, 19–24, 32, 39–40, 46, 64, 66, 93, 116–118, 121, 130, 132–144, 147–149, 165, 168, 174, 176–178, 189, 197–198 transmigration 2, 112, 121, 145, 147, 190 tripartite 78, 89, 120, 197 tyrant 19, 32, 79, 155

U understanding, misunderstanding xii, 13, 39, 62, 69, 71, 76, 95, 97–98, 106, 122–124, 128, 130, 135, 138, 140–141, 157, 166, 189–190, 192, 200–202, 204–205 universal 51, 70, 72, 86, 90, 99–100, 120, 122–126, 157, 167, 199, 202, 209 universe 133, 135–137, 140–141, 144, 148 unjust 6, 63–64, 69 unnatural 6, 192–194 utopia, utopian 95, 140

V virtue xii, 7, 8, 28, 40–42, 44–47, 49–51, 54–55, 66, 72–78, 86, 101, 115, 120–121, 129–130, 136, 146, 150, 153, 157, 162, 165, 168–169, 175, 178–181, 196, 198; as knowledge 50, 51; as unisex xii, 7, 40–42, 44–47, 49–51, 54–55, 66, 121, 150, 175, 178–179, 181, 196, 198; woman’s 7, 28, 40, 45–46, 136, 168, 179–180

W war 40, 73, 82, 89, 96, 98, 105, 113, 115–117, 139, 184, 192 wisdom 27, 51, 73, 79, 89–90, 113, 117, 136, 178, 210 Woman: —adolescent 10, 159; adulteress 10, 58–59; amazon 10, 136–137, 161 —bacchant 10, 31; betrothed 10; bride 10, 159, 191 —citizen 10, 114–115, 154, 158–159, 161, 165, 170–171, 182–183; courtesan 10, 29, 34, 182–183; craftswoman 10

—dancing girl 10, 51, 179; daughter 10, 33, 53–54, 118, 137, 159, 171 —equal xi, xii, 1, 3–9, 23, 27, 40–45, 47, 49–50, 52, 54, 56–57, 59, 64–68, 80, 85–86, 88, 91–93, 98–99, 110–113, 115, 120–121, 128–130, 140–141, 143, 145, 150, 153, 159–160, 165, 169, 171, 175, 177–179, 181, 190, 192, 196–198, 201–202 —fate 10, 31; flute-girl 10; foreign 10, 159, 182; friend 10, 24, 26, 73 —handmaid 10; harp-girl 10; harpy 10; heiress 10 —inferior 2, 4, 7, 15, 30, 51, 64–66, 69, 80, 107–111, 118, 121, 127– 128, 130, 141–147, 153, 162, 165–166, 168–169, 174–175, 177–181, 196, 198–199, 202, 204, 207; in Athens 5, 7, 13, 27, 29, 30–31, 33, 47–48, 53, 63, 106, 115, 118, 128, 130, 136, 139, 147, 154, 158, 167, 178. 181–184; in Socrates xi, xii, 2, 4, 7, 11, 13–14, 23–25, 27–30, 32–35, 40–49; in Sparta 13, 30, 48, 52, 99, 154, 161–163, 178, 180, 182–185; in love 10, 34, 59 —magistrate 10; maiden 10, 179; midwife 24–25, 27; mother 4, 10, 19–23, 27, 29–31, 33–35, 54, 73, 133–134, 158–159, 161, 163–164, 184, 192; muse 10, 28–29, 31, 62, 64, 179 —nurse 10, 19–20, 22–23, 29; nursery maid 10; nymph 10, 28 —old 10, 29–30, 49, 99, 164, 182, 196; orphaned 10, 23, 158–159, 182 —person 91, 101, 106, 11, 120, 121, 140, 143, 175, 179, 198, 200–201; philosopher-queen 8, 10, 93, 116, 151, 168; poetess 10, 30; pregnant 10, 161; priestess 10, 27, 30, 33, 50, 159, 170–171, 173, 184; primipara 10; property 6, 127; prophetess 10, 33 —secluded 30, 32, 118, 183; sick 10, 34; siren 10, 24, 29; slave 33, 34, 41–42, 44–45, 49, 86, 91,

Index of General Concepts 129, 136, 159, 182–183; spinning woman 10; stepmother10; sterile 10 —teacher 10, 28, 159, 163 —warrior 2, 10, 115, 136, 184; weak 4, 5, 32, 64, 98, 111–112,

247

114–115, 117–118, 120–121, 127, 130, 141, 147, 149, 162, 167–168, 178, 198–199; wetnurse 10, 20, 194; witch 10, 31 —young 10, 23, 49, 161, 164, 171, 196

Index of Terms and Concepts Relevant to Specific Dialogues

L Laws assembly 63, 158–9, 165, 170–2, 175, 182 difference between Republic and Laws 156–157 inferiority of present-day women 168–169 insistence on education of women 160–163 insistence on explicit inclusion of women throughout laws 158–160 “nature” intended particularly 166–167 preamble 155–156, 181 reintroduction of nuclear marriage 166 silence on women in high offices due to possible resistance if implemented too soon 169–172 subtext of Laws xii, 154–156, 160, 172, 174 Supervisors of Marriage 163–165 Solution: Magnesia a model for applying to existing societies to improve them, especially women’s place 172–174

M Meno Aristotle’s testimony to Meno as authentic Socrates 43–46 evidence in Meno of Socratic origin of gender equality 40–43 historical vs Platonic Socrates 44–50 reminiscence 42 Socratic identity of virtue for everyone 40–41

Socratic school on woman 50–55 Sokratikoi logoi 46

R Republic contradistinguish, contradistinction 103, 108 dikaiosyne as “integrity” rather than “justice” 69 logic of fi rst wave 94–115 myth of metals 73 puzzlement over why the “waves” 70–72 reason for Book 5: difficulties with the analogy between the city and the soul 85–87; fi rst wave: individual is only one sex implies no civic role for women in true city 78; second wave: soul looks to good of whole implies no divisive issues such as property, family 78; State as one family 25–27, 80; third wave: reason rules in individual implies philosophers should rule in society 78 recovery of subtext of Book 5 76–85

S Symposium Aristophanes’ hiccups 57 Aristophanes’ myth as really Plato’s writing 59; as the opposite of Aritophanes’ and Plato’s positions 61–66; as satirizing simplistic views of gender equality 66–68 Diotima 25, 27–29, 33, 59–60, 63, 67, 150, 190

250 Index of Terms and Concepts Relevant to Specific Dialogues T Timaeus Demiurge 20, 133, 141, 150 metaphysical foundation for human reality 141–148 nurse of becoming, 19–20; receptacle 19–23, 133–134; space 13, 19–22 reincarnation 146, 148, 174, 190, 197–199

souls (sexless) created fi rst 141–142; female souls the result of cowardly men in previous generation 143; other animals the result of other vices 143; as souls acquire flaws, receive appropriate bodies 143, 146; nails due to foreseen need for claws 146; degeneration reversible by good life 143