Philosophy of language, Chinese language, Chinese philosophy: constructive engagement 9789004368446, 9789004368439, 9004368442, 9004368434

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Philosophy of Language, Chinese Language, Chinese Philosophy

Philosophy of History and Culture Edited by Michael Krausz (Bryn Mawr College) Advisory Board Annette Baier† (University of Pittsburgh) Purushottama Bilimoria (Deakin University, Australia) Cora Diamond (University of Virginia) William Dray† (University of Ottawa) Nancy Fraser (New School for Social Research) Clifford Geertz† (Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton) Peter Hacker (St. John’s College, Oxford) Rom Harré (Linacre College, Oxford) Bernard Harrison (University of Sussex) Martha Nussbaum (University of Chicago) Leon Pompa (University of Birmingham) Joseph Raz (Balliol College, Oxford) Amélie Rorty (Harvard University)

VOLUME 37

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/phc

Philosophy of Language, Chinese Language, Chinese Philosophy Constructive Engagement

語言哲學，漢語，中國哲學 建設性交鋒-交融

Edited by

Bo Mou

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Mou, Bo, 1956– editor. Title: Philosophy of language, Chinese language, Chinese philosophy : constructive engagement / edited by Bo Mou. Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, 2018. | Series: Philosophy of history and culture, ISSN 0922-6001 ; volume 37 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2018020732 (print) | LCCN 2018024278 (ebook) | ISBN 9789004368446 (E-book) | ISBN 9789004368439 (hardback : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Chinese language—Philosophy. | Philosophy, Chinese. | Language and languages—Philosophy. Classification: LCC PL1035 (ebook) | LCC PL1035.P55 2018 (print) | DDC 495.101—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018020732

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 0922-6001 isbn 978-90-04-36843-9 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-36844-6 (e-book) Copyright 2018 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents Acknowledgments iX List of Contributors xiV Constructive-Engagement Strategy of Doing Philosophy of Language Comparatively in View of Chinese Language and Chinese Philosophy: A Theme Introduction 1 Bo Mou

Part 1 Semantic-Syntactic Structure of Chinese Names and Issue of Reference 1 White Horse Paradox and Semantics of Chinese Nouns 49 Byeong-uk Yi 2 A Double-Reference Account of Names in Early China: Case Analyses of Semantic-Syntactic Structures of Names in the Yi-Jing Text, Gongsun Long’s “White-Horse-Not-Horse” Thesis, and Later Mohist Treatment of Parallel Inference 69 Bo Mou 3 On the Comparative Analysis of Chinese Measure Words: Insights from Evolutionary Theory 170 Marshall D. Willman 4 Intuitions or Reasons: The Empirical Evidence for Theory of Reference 187 Jianhua Mei

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Part 2 Cross-Contextual Meaning and Understanding 5 Communicative Meaning and Meaning as Significance 201 A. P. Martinich 6 Semantics and What Is Said 224 Una Stojnic and Ernie Lepore

PART 3 Principle of Charity and Linguistic Relativism in Relation to Chinese: Engaging Exploration (i) 7 Conceptual Schemes and Linguistic Relativism in Relation to Chinese 247 A. C. Graham 8 A. C. Graham’s Sinologist Criticism and the Myth of “Pre-logical Thinking” 269 Yiu-ming Fung Editor’s Engaging Remarks for Part 3: Davidson’s Opening Message and His Principle of Charity 283 Bo Mou

Part 4 Semantic Truth and Pluralist Approaches in Chinese Context: Engaging Exploration (Ii) 9 Pluralism about Truth in Early Chinese Philosophy: A Reflection on Wang Chong’s Approach 295 Appendix: Replies to Brons and Mou on Wang Chong and Pluralism 322 Alexus McLeod

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10 Wang Chong, Truth, and Quasi-Pluralism 341 Postscript: Reply to McLeod 364 Lajos L. Brons Editor’s Engaging Remarks for Part 4: Rooted and Rootless Pluralist Approaches to Truth: Two Distinct Interpretations of Wang Chong’s Account 371 Postscript: Normative Character of Semantic Truth 394 Bo Mou

PART 5 The “Speakable” and the “Unspeakable” in Chinese Texts: Engaging Exploration (III) 11 From the Ineffable to the Poetic: Heidegger and Confucius on PoetryExpression of Language 403 Xianglong Zhang 12 How Non-Speech Becomes a Form of Speech: A Reinterpretation of the Debate at the Dam over the Hao River 429 Zhaohua Chu Editor’s Engaging Remarks for Part 5: Eternal Dao, Constant Name, and Language Engagement: On the Opening Message of the Dao-De-Jing 446 Postscript: From Lao Zi’s Opening Message to Davidson’s Opening Message 466 Bo Mou

Part 6 Language in Action through Chinese Texts 13 Reading the Analects with Davidson: Mood, Force, and Communicative Practice in Early China 473 Postscript 2017 495 Yang Xiao

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14 Metaphor in Comparative Focus 514 Kyle Takaki

Appendixes Appendix 1: Comparative Chronology of Philosophers 539 Appendix 2: Note on Transcription and Guide to Pronunciation 544 Index of Names and Subjects 546

Acknowledgments I am indebted to the authors of the papers included in this volume for their valuable contributions to the cross-tradition engaging explorations on a range of issues in philosophy of language directly or indirectly. By ‘directly’, I mean the formal contributors [i.e., almost all of the authors of the articles included in the volume, Lajos Brons, CHU Zhaohua (儲昭華), FUNG Yiu-ming (馮耀 明), Ernie Lepore, A. P. Martinich, MEI Jianhua (梅劍華), Bo Mou (牟博), Una Stojnic, Kyle Takaki, Marshall Willman, Yang Xiao (蕭陽), Byeong-uk Yi, ZHANG Xianglong (張祥龍)] with their unpublished articles (or unpublished sections of the published articles) or revised versions of previously published articles, which are worked out expressly and thus directly for this volume. By ‘indirectly’ I mean two authors (the late A. C. Graham and Alexus McLeod) whose articles are re-printed in this book (instead of expressly for this volume, thus indirectly) as engagement-background essays for further engaging discussions on their addressed issues and views respectively in Parts 3 and 4. I also thank the contributors for their constructive support, cooperation and patience throughout the whole process. The following contributions to the volume are substantially-revised or “postscript”-added versions of previously published journal papers or book chapters: Lajos Brons (2015), “Wang Chong, Truth, and Quasi-Pluralism”, Comparative Philosophy 6.1: 129–148 [with added “Postscript”]; CHU Zhaohua (2014), “On the Constitution and the True Aim of ‘The Joy of Heaven’ and ‘NonSpeech’: A Reinterpretation of the Debate at the Dam over the Hao River”, Frontier of Philosophy in China 9.4: 555–569 [the title of its revised version in this volume: “How Non-Speech Become a Form of Speech: A Reinterpretation of the Debate at the Dam over the Hao Rivew”]; Yiu-ming Fung (2006), Section 1 “A.C. Graham’s Sinologist’s Criticism and the Myth of ‘Pre-logical Thinking’” of his contributing essay “Davidson’s Charity in the Context of Chinese Philosophy”, in Bo Mou (ed.), Davidson’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement (Brill), 117–162; Ernie Lepore & Una Stojnic (2013), “What’s What’s Said”, in What Is Said and What Is Not: The Semantics/Pragmatics Interface, edited by Carlo Penco & Filippo Domaneschi (Stanford: CSLI Publications), 17–36; Kyle Takaki (2014), “Light and Affects from a Comparative Point of View”, Comparative Philosophy 5.1: 55–78 [the title of its revised version in this volume: “Metaphor in Comparative Focus”]; Yang Xiao (2004), “Reading the Analects with Davidson: Mood, Force, and Communicative Practice in Early China”, in Bo Mou (ed.), Davidson’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement (Brill) [with its added “Postscript”].

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The following unpublished contributions as a whole consist of unpublished parts and substantially-revised versions of previously published parts. Bo Mou’s contribution, “A Double-Reference Account of Names in Early China”, consists of unpublished section 1, sub-section 3.2, and section A1.2 of “Appendix 1” and the revised versions of (parts of) the following published papers: Bo Mou (1999), “The Structure of Chinese Language and Ontological Insights: A Collective-Noun Hypothesis,” Philosophy East and West 49.1: 45–62; Bo Mou (2007), “A Double-Reference Account of Gongsun Long’s ‘WhiteHorse-Not-Horse’ Argument”, The Journal of Chinese Philosophy 34.4: 493–513; Bo Mou (2014), “On the Double-Reference Character of “Hexagram” Names in the Yijing: Engaging Fregean & Kripkean Approaches to the Issue of How Reference is Possible”, Frontiers of Philosophy in China 9.4: 523–537; Bo Mou (2016), “How the Validity of the Parallel Inference is Possible: From the Ancient Mohist Diagnose to a Modern Logical Treatment of Its Semantic-Syntactic Structure”, History and Philosophy of Logic, 37, 301–324; Bo Mou (2014 / 2018), “How Gongsun Long’s Double-Reference Thought in His ‘White-HorseNot-Horse’ Argumentation can Engage Fregean and Kripkean Approaches to the Issue of Reference”, whose early 2004 version was presented at the workshop “The Gongsunlongzi and Other Neglected Texts: Aligning Philosophical and Philological Perspectives” (University of Zurich, Switzerland, 27th–29th August 2014) and whose revised version is forthcoming in Gōngsūnlóngzǐ and Other Neglected Texts: Aligning Philosophical and Philological Perspectives, edited by Rafael Suter, Lisa Indraccolo and Wolfgang Behr (De Gruyter, 2018). Marshall Willman’s contribution, “On the Comparative Analysis of Chinese Measure Words: Insights from Evolutionary Theory”, includes parts of the following previously published paper: Marshall Willman (2014), “Ontogenesis and Phylogenesis in the Analysis of Chinese Classifiers: Remarks on Philosophical Method”, Frontier of Philosophy in China 9.4: 538–554. Byeong-uk Yi’s contribution, “White Horse Paradox and Semantics of Chinese Nouns”, includes parts of the following previously published paper: Marshall Willman (2014), “Numeral Classifiers and the White Horse Paradox”, Frontier of Philosophy in China 9.4: 498–522. ZHANG Xianglong’s contribution, “From the Ineffable to the Poetic: Heidegger and Confucius on Poetry-Experience of Language”, is his unpublished English version of the revised Chinese paper whose previous version was published in Chinese: ZHANG Xianglong (2006), “Chong-‘Bu-Ke-Shuo’Dao-‘Shi-Yi-Zhi-Shuo’: Hei-De-Ge-Er-Yu-Kong-Zi-Lun-Shi-De-Chun-Si-Xiang-Xing” [“从‘不可说’到‘诗意之说’――海德格尔与孔子论诗的纯思想性”], He-Bei-XuKan [《河北学刊》(Hebei Scholarly Journal)] No. 146 (No. 3 in 2006), 14–22.

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The following journal articles are re-print papers: A. C. Graham (1989), “Conceptual Schemes and Linguistic Relativism in Relation to Chinese”, originally published in Synthesis Philosophica 4.2: 713–732; Alexus McLeod (2011), “Pluralism about Truth in Early Chinese Philosophy: A Reflection on Wang Chong’s Approach”, Comparative Philosophy 2.1: 38–60, and its related paper (2015) “Replies to Brons and Mou on Wang Chong and Pluralism”, Comparative Philosophy 6.1: 169–184. Thanks to the two journals for permission to re-print the materials here. My “Editor’s engaging remarks” sections respectively in Part 4 and Part 5 include the following previously published articles: Bo Mou (2015), “Rooted and Rootless Pluralist Approaches to Truth”, Comparative Philosophy 6.1: 148– 168 [appearing in “Editor’s engaging remarks” section in Part 4 with added “Postscript”]; Bo Mou (2003), “Eternal Dao, Constant Names, and Language Engagement: A Re-Examination of the Opening Message of the Dao-De-Jing”, in Comparative Approaches to Chinese Philosophy, edited by Bo Mou (Ashgate), 245–62, whose partial content (sections 1 and 2) is a revised version of Bo Mou (2000), “Ultimate Concerns and Language Engagement: A Re-Examination of the Opening Message of the Dao-De-Jing”, Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27.4: 429–439 [appearing in “Editor’s engaging remarks” section in Part 5 with added “Postscript”]. With its “constructive-engagement” strategic goal, since its inception in 2002, the International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy (ISCWP) has initiated and organized a number of collective projects and conference events on a range of significant subjects in philosophy that had yet to receive due attention and emphasis in studies of Chinese and comparative philosophy before, including philosophy of language. Several conference/ workshop events focusing on doing philosophy of language comparatively have been initiated by ISCWP (as academic organizer). The first one is the conference on the topic “Philosophy of Language: Constructive Engagement of Distinctive Perspectives” [sponsored by Department of Philosophy & Institute of Foreign Philosophy, Peking University (Host) and co-sponsored by the Committee on International Cooperation of the American Philosophical Association], held at Peking University, Beijing, China, on 20th–21st June 2006. The second one is the symposium on the theme “Philosophical Issues Concerning Chinese Language and Development of Contemporary Philosophy of Language” (both as Wuhan University’s “Advanced Forum in Comparative Philosophy” and as the 2013 term of “Beijing Roundtable on Contemporary Philosophy” workshop series) [sponsored by Philosophy School & Center for Comparative ChineseWestern Philosophy, Wuhan University (Host) and co-sponsored by the

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Center for Comparative Philosophy, San José State University], held at Wuhan University, Wuhan, China, on 8th–9th June 2013. The third one is a follow-up workshop on the same theme as that of the second one entitled “Philosophy of Language, Chinese Language, and Chinese Philosophy: Further Engagement” (the 2015 term of “Beijing Roundtable on Contemporary Philosophy” workshop series) [co-sponsored by Department of Philosophy, Capital Normal University (Host) and the SJSU Center for Comparative Philosophy], held at Capital Normal University, Beijing, China, on 25th July 2015. Although this volume is not the proceedings of the above conferences and thus does not include all quality papers presented at the three conference events due to various reasons (focus, relevance, availability, academic expectations, etc.), the foregoing second and third ones are indeed more directly related to the current anthology project, which have actually provided effective critical-discussions forums on the theme of the book and for the sake of enhancing the quality of the contributions. [The partial result of the aforementioned second conference is a collection of the selected four articles as a special-theme section published in Frontiers of Philosophy in China 9.4 (2014), the contributions of whose authors (Chu, Mou, Willman, and Yi) to this volume either include substantiallyrevised versions of their journal articles as parts of their respective contributing papers (Mou’s, Willman’s, and Yi’s cases) or a substantially-revised version of the article (Chu’s case).] All the critical discussions at these three conference/workshop events are directly or indirectly related to the topics under examination in this volume; they are extraordinarily engaging and helpful. All these critical discussion contributors are thus greatly appreciated. Among others, I am grateful to the following participating colleagues for their stimulating and engaging discussions at one or more than one, of the foregoing three occasions: Gregory Brown, Herman Cappelen, Maria Carnogurska, CHEN Jiangjin (陳江進), CHU Zhaohua, GU Zhiwei (顧知巍), GUO Shiping (郭世平), Chad Hansen, HE Liye (何丽野), Vladimir Krasikov, JIANG Yi (江 怡), Ernie Lepore, LI Puqun (李普群), LI Yong (李勇), LIU Jixin (劉佶鑫), LIU Yi (刘益), A. P. Martinich, MEI Jianhua, Carolyn Richardson, Joyce Scales, Henrique Schneider, Jeremy Seligman, TAN Sor-hoon (陈素芬), TAO Feng ( 陶鋒), Marshall Willman, WU Gengyou (吴根友), WU Guosheng (吳國勝), WU Xinmin (吳新民), XIE Xiaodong (謝曉東), XU Huaming (徐華明), XU Xiangdong (徐向東), YAN Jinfen (焉晋芬), YE Chuang (葉闖), Byeong-uk Yi, YU Guofei (喻郭飞), ZHANG Xianglong, ZHAO Dunhua (趙敦華), ZHENG Yujian (鄭宇健), ZHOU Yuncheng (周允程), and ZHU Qinghua (朱清華). I am also grateful to the following discussants, who (either SJSU philosophy students or Ph.D. students in philosophy from China as Visiting Scholars at SJSU) took my “Philosophy of Language” course given at SJSU in the past

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few years), for their helpful discussion contributions and/or critical feedback comments on some of my relevant writings to this project: Chris Baber, DING Xiaojun (丁曉軍), Joseph Glover, HE Haoping (何浩平), Carmel Weiler, Chris Wills, and ZHOU Hongyin (周宏印). I am grateful to my home institution, San José State University in the U.S.A., and its Department of Philosophy, for a variety of substantial support related to this anthology project (especially, the academic leave in the Fall 2017 semester). I am indebted to Michael Krausz for his cross-tradition-engagement vision and wise judgment on the nature and significance of this anthology project and for his strong recommendation to the publisher that the volume be included in his edited series “Philosophy of History and Culture” at Brill. Last but never least, I am grateful to the house editor at Brill, Meghan Connolly, for her kindly and valuable guidance and effective support and Jennifer Pavelko, Acquisitions Editor at Brill, for her visionary strategic supervision. I am thankful to Kristen Chevalier, Production Team Leader at Brill, for her professional advice and assistance at the production stage of the book. Bo Mou

San José, California May 2, 2018

List of Contributors Lajos L. Brons received a PhD from the University of Groningen (the Netherlands) in 2005 for a thesis in the history and philosophy of social science. Since then, his main research interests have been the philosophy of Donald Davidson, the relations between language, thought and reality, and the realism-relativism debate in metaphysics. Currently he is affiliated with the Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences of Nihon University (Tokyo, Japan) as a researcher, and with Lakeland College Japan Campus (id.) as an adjunct professor of philosophy. Zhaohua Chu (儲昭華) is Professor of Philosophy, Wuhan University, China. He received his B.A. in philosophy from Peking University (1984) and his Ph.D. in philosophy from Wuhan University (1987). He is the authors of several monograph books (in Chinese) on Chinse philosophy including Da-Di-De-Yong-Xian 《 ( 大地的涌 现》, 2003) and Ming-Feng-Zhi-Dao 《 ( 明分之道》, 2005). Yiu-ming Fung (馮耀明) is an Emeritus Professor of the Division of Humanities at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. He received his Ph.D. degree in philosophy from the Chinese University of Hong Kong in 1984. He is an analytic philosopher with special interest in Chinese philosophy (especially New Confucianism, Buddhist philosophy, and the logic of Chinese language) and comparative philosophy. Before joining the HKUST, he was a research fellow at the Institute of East Asian Philosophies, Singapore, from 1985 to 1987, and taught at the Chinese University of Hong Kong from 1987 to 1997. In 1991 and 1993, he visited the National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan, as a research professor. He was a visiting scholar in the Institute of Chinese Studies and the Faculty of Philosophy, the University of Oxford, in 2003 and 2010. Fung has published several books, including Gong-sun Longzi: A Perspective of Analytic Philosophy (Tung Tai Book Company, 2000) and The Myth of ‘Transcendent Immanence’: A Perspective of Analytic Philosophy on Contemporary Neo-Confucianism (Chinese University Press, 2003), and more than 100 research papers both in English and in Chinese. Ernest Lepore is a Board of Governors professor of philosophy at Rutgers University, USA. He is the author of numerous books and papers in the philosophy of ­language, ­philosophical logic, metaphysics and philosophy of mind, including

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Imagination and Convention (with Matthew Stone, OUP, 2015), Meaning, Mind and Matter: Philosophical Essays (with Barry Loewer, OUP, 2011), Liberating Content (with H. Cappelen, OUP, 2016), Language Turned on Itself (with H. Cappelen, OUP, 2007), Insensitive Semantics (with H. Cappelen, Blackwell, 2004), Donald Davidson: Meaning, Truth, Language and Reality (with Kirk Ludwig, OUP, 2005), Donald Davidson’s Truth-theoretic Semantics (with Kirk Ludwig, OUP, 2007), Meaning and Argument (with Sam Cumming, Blackwell, 2009), Holism: A Shopper’s Guide (with Jerry Fodor, Blackwell, 1992), The Compositionality Papers (with Jerry Fodor, OUP, 2002), and What Every Student Should Know (with Sarah-Jane Leslie, Rutgers University Press, 2002). He has edited several books, including Handbook in Philosophy of Language (with B. Smith, OUP, 2006), Truth and Interpretation (Blackwell, 1989), and What is Cognitive Science? (with Zenon Pylyshyn, Blackwell, 1999). He is also general editor of the Blackwell series “Philosophers and Their Critics”. Aloysius P. Martinich is Vaughan Centennial Professor in Philosophy, and Professor of History and Government at the University of Texas at Austin, USA. He received his B.A. (Honours), with first honours, at the University of Windsor, Ontario and his Ph. D. at the University of California at San Diego. He is the author of Communication and Reference (De Gruyter), The Two Gods of Leviathan (Cambridge UP), Hobbes: A Biography (Cambridge UP), Philosophical Writing 4th edition (Wiley-Blackwell), editor, with David Sosa, of The Philosophy of Language 6th edition (Oxford UP), and editor, with Kinch Hoekstra, of The Oxford Handbook of Hobbes (Oxford UP). He has published articles in Asian Philosophy, Dao, The Journal of Chinese Philosophy, and Philosophy, East and West. Jianhua Mei (梅劍華) is Associate Professor of Philosophy, Capital Normal University, Beijing, China. He received his Ph.D. in philosophy at Peking University. His research interests include philosophy of mind and language, experimental philosophy and cognitive science. His selected publications include these: “Experimental Philosophy, Semantic Intuition and Cross Culture Style”, Philosophical Research (2011, in Chinese) and “Hempel’s Dilemma: The Formulation of Physicalism”, Journal of Dialectics of Nature (2014, in Chinese). Bo Mou (牟博) is Professor of Philosophy at San Jose State University, USA. He is Editor of the journal Comparative Philosophy and the founding president (2002–2005) of the International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western

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Philosophy (ISCWP). He published in philosophy of language and logic, metaphysics, Chinese and comparative philosophy, and ethics in such journals as Synthese, Metaphilosophy, History and Philosophy of Logic, Philosophy East & West, Asian Philosophy, Journal of Chinese Philosophy. He is the author of a number of books, including Substantive Perspectivism (“Synthese Library” vol. 344, 2009), Chinese Philosophy A–Z (2010), and Semantic-Truth Approaches in Chinese Philosophy: A Unifying Pluralist Account (2018). He is a contributing editor of several books, including Two Roads to Wisdom? (2001), Davidson’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy (2006), Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy (2008), History of Chinese Philosophy (2009), Constructive Engagement of Analytic and Continental Approaches in Philosophy: From the Vantage Point of Comparative Philosophy (with Richard Tieszen, 2013), and Chinese Philosophy in Routledge’s “Critical Concepts in Philosophy” reference book series (2018). Una Stojnic is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University, USA. She work in philosophy of language, formal semantics and pragmatics, philosophical logic, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. She published articles in these areas in such journals as Nous, Linguistics and Philosophy, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, and Philosophical Perspectives. Kyle Takaki is an independent scholar who obtained his PhD in 2008. He is interested in complexity and its relations to the continuum of tacit knowing, and has published works in various journals exploring this theme. He continues to pursue wisdom and spirituality amidst the fractures of modern philosophy. Marshall D. Willman is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Nanjing Campus of the New York Institute of Technology. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Iowa in 2007, where he studied logic, philosophies of language and mind, and linguistics. He has published extensively in the area of East-West comparative philosophy, and has lectured at several of Asia’s most prestigious universities, having lived in China for over ten years. Notable related publications include “Illocutionary Force and its Relation to Mood: Comparative Methodology Reconsidered”, Dao (2009), “Logical Analysis and Later Mohist Logic: Some Comparative Reflections”, Comparative Philosophy. (2010), “Ontogenesis and Phylogenesis in the Analysis of Chinese Classifiers: Remarks on Philosophical

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Method”, Frontier of Philosophy in China (2014), “Logic and Language in Early Chinese Philosophy”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (2016). Yang Xiao (蕭陽) is Professor of Philosophy at Kenyon College, USA. He received his Ph.D. in philosophy at the New School for Social Research in New York. His main research interests and publications are in ethics, Chinese philosophy, political philosophy, and philosophy of language. He is the co-editor of Moral Relativism and Chinese Philosophy (2014), the editor of Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Mencius (2018), and the author of The Art of Observing Water: The World of Ancient China (forthcoming). Byeong-uk Yi is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto, Canada, and Kyung Hee International Scholar at Kyung Hee University. He studied at Seoul National University, the University of Pittsburgh, and UCLA, where he received a Ph.D. in philosophy, and held academic appointments at University of Alberta, University of Queensland, University of Glasgow, and University of Minnesota. He has published a book, Understanding the Many, and articles in many areas in logic and philosophy, including logic, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, and semantics of classifier languages. Xianglong Zhang (張祥龍) is Chair Professor of Sun Yat-sen (Zhongshan) University (at Zhuhai Campus), China, and Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at Peking University where he was a faculty member of the Philosophy Department. He received his Ph.D. in philosophy from the State University of New York at Buffalo in 1992. His major works include (in Chinese unless indicated otherwise): Heidegger’s Thought and Chinese Dao of Heaven (1996, 2007, 2010), From Phenomenology to Confucius (2001, 2011), Sprache und Wirklichkei (coauthored with R. Puligandla, German trans. Christiane Dick, 2005), Thinking to Take Refuge: The Chinese Ancient Philosophies in the Globalization (2007), Nine Lectures on Confucius from a Phenomenological Perspective (2009), Showing the Heart of Heaven and Earth by Restoration: The Implications and Ways of Confucian Recurrence (2014) and Home and Filial Piety: From the View between the Chinese and the Western (2017).

Constructive-Engagement Strategy of Doing Philosophy of Language Comparatively in View of Chinese Language and Chinese Philosophy: A Theme Introduction Bo Mou In this theme introduction to the volume, I do three things. First, in Section 1, I explain the background and objectives of this anthology project. Second, in Section 2, I explain the fundamental rationale that underlies the foregoing background and objectives, i.e., the “constructive-engagement” strategy of doing philosophy of language comparatively: I start with briefly explaining major points of the general “constructive-engagement” strategy of doing philosophy comparatively and introducing some explanatory resources and lexical distinctions in need; I then explain the “constructive-engagement” strategy of doing philosophy of language comparatively in view of the Chinese language and relevant resources from Chinese philosophy and four distinct fronts of the constructive-engagement exploration of doing philosophy of language comparatively; furthermore, as a further explanation of how doing philosophy of language comparatively is possible, I suggest and explain a set of “adequacy” conditions for the sake of exploring how it is possible to maintain adequate methodological guiding principles in doing philosophy of language comparatively. Third, in Section 3, I explain the organizational strategy of this volume and introduce the major contents of the contributing essays, which are organized into six parts on distinct issues, and of this editor’s engaging remarks in three “engaging exploration” parts among the six parts. 1

The Background and Objectives

It is known that the development of philosophy of language has played its significant role in the development of contemporary philosophy. It has also made substantial contribution to contemporary studies of Chinese and comparative Chinese-Western philosophy, not only in those directly related areas like philosophy of mind and logic, but also in other areas related to the relationship between language, thought and reality (like ethics). Largely owing to historical reasons, reflective elaborations of relevant natural-language phenomena

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004368446_002

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in the field of philosophy of language have typically addressed or relied on the observation of apparent semantic, grammatical and some other relevant phenomena of phonetic languages like English, which are usually supposed to be universally (at least at a deeper level) shared by all natural languages. However, in quite a few connections or cases [such as those dealing with the semanticsyntactic structure of names, the way of predication, classifiers (sometimes called ‘measures’ or, in my way, ‘individualizers’/‘measuring individualizers’), logical-inference structures as presented in natural language, propositionalattitude expressions, sentence structures, and metaphors], the distinctions between apparent linguistic phenomena of a phonetic language like Greek or English and those of an ideographic language like Chinese are reflectively interesting. Elaborating these distinctions might guide and bear on our philosophical reflections on relevant issues in distinct directions or courses, which would be either complementary or enriching or corrective on some status-quo or assumed understandings. Moreover, some relevant resources in classical Chinese philosophy can significantly contribute to our understanding and treatment of a range of issues concerning the relationship between language, thought and reality as addressed in philosophy of language. On the one hand, on the foregoing two fronts, reflective examination and elaboration of those “Chinese elements” (i.e., those philosophically interesting distinct features of the Chinese language and relevant substantial resources in classical Chinese philosophy) can bear on and contribute to the development of philosophy of language and deepen our understanding and treatment of some issues in philosophy of language. On the other hand, relevant resources in contemporary philosophy of language, in turn, can substantially enhance and contribute to our philosophical elaborations of reflectively interesting issues concerning the Chinese language and our understanding and treatment of some classical Chinese thinkers’ philosophically interesting insights on the relationship between language, thought and reality. The objectives of this anthology volume are thus two closely related ones: (1) on the one hand, it is to explore how reflective elaborations of some distinct features of the Chinese language and philosophically interesting resources concerning the relationship between language, thought and reality in Chinese philosophy can contribute to our understanding and treatment of a range of issues in philosophy of language and can bear on and promote the development of philosophy of language; (2) on the other hand, it is also to explore how relevant resources in contemporary philosophy of language can contribute to our philosophical elaborations of reflectively interesting issues concerning the Chinese language and Chinese texts. Although the foregoing two contributing fronts, conceptually speaking, point to two distinct directions of contribution

Theme Introduction

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(i.e., that of the Chinese elements’ contribution to the development of philosophy of language, and that of relevant resources in contemporary philosophy of language to the philosophical elaboration of these Chinese resources), generally speaking, they effectively constitute two complementary sides of this collective project. The fundamental rationale that underlies the foregoing treatments and complementary directions of this volume is what might be labeled the “constructive-engagement” strategy of doing philosophy of language comparatively, to be explained in the next section. The foregoing objectives, the complementary character of the aforementioned two directions of contribution, and the “constructive-engagement” strategy are highlighted in the volume title via its combination of the keywords: Philosophy of Language, Chinese Language, Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement. (With consideration of this volume being specifically related to Chinese language and relevant Chinese texts, let me give the Chinese counterpart of the volume title: “語言哲學，漢語，中國哲學：建設性交鋒交融”.) A bit of history will be helpful to the interested reader for a better understanding of the relevant background of the current research project. The project has been culminated by a range of collective efforts concerning philosophy of language, the Chinese language and Chinese philosophy in the broader background of the constructive-engagement exploration of doing philosophy comparatively in the past decade. Since the establishment of the International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy (ISCWP) in 2002, to implement the “constructive-engagement” strategy, ISCWP has systematically initiated and co-organized a number of collective research projects with their associated conferences or workshops as effective critical-discussion platforms. Two initial projects focus respectively on the constructive engagement between Davidson’s philosophy and Chinese philosophy and between Searle’s philosophy and Chinese philosophy. It is known that Davidson’s and Searle’s thoughts in philosophy of language respectively constitute the foundations of their comprehensive projects in philosophy; the constructive engagement between their thoughts in philosophy of language and relevant resources in Chinese philosophy are central contents of these two collective projects, whose research results appear respectively in Mou (ed.) 2006a and Mou (ed.) 2008. After their associated conferences were held respectively at the Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Science in Beijing (2004) and at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology in Hong Kong (2005), there are three subsequent workshops focusing expressly on doing philosophy of language comparatively in view of relevant Chinese resources, as specified in the “Acknowledgements”: “Philosophy of Language: Constructive

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Engagement of Distinctive Perspectives” (held at Peking University in 2006), “Philosophical Issues Concerning Chinese Language and Development of Contemporary Philosophy of Language” (held at Wuhan University in 2013), “Philosophy of Language, Chinese Language, and Chinese Philosophy: Further Engagement” (held at Capital Normal University in 2015). Although this volume is not the proceedings of the abovementioned three conferences and does not include all quality papers presented at these conference events due to various reasons (focus, relevance, availability, academic expectations, etc.), the foregoing second and third events are more directly related to the current anthology project, and all the three events have more or less provided effective critical-discussion forums on the theme of this volume. Indeed, almost all of the contributors to this volume are participants in one, or more than one, of the aforementioned five conferences or workshops with their own distinct paths in contributing to this “constructive-engagement” research project of doing philosophy of language comparatively.1 In this way, and to this extent, this volume results from, or is closely related to, the foregoing collective efforts. 1  As a coordinator and participant in all these three research projects and their associated five conferences events, I have my own distinct path in this connection that is more or less relevant to their subject identities and the ways they are coordinated. It can be traced back or related to the following four background things. Around thirty years ago, as one way to have a refined understanding of the contemporary development of philosophy of language, I had worked on my earlier translation work on selected essays of Donald Davidson and cotranslation work on the A. P. Martinich—edited anthology book Philosophy of Language (its 1985 first edition) before I came to the US pursuing my Ph.D. degree [these translations were published later in China, as indicated in “References”]. My dissertation work in philosophy of language and metaphysics is partially on Tarski’s semantic conception of truth (Mou 2001a as its partial result) and Quine’s relevant approach, both of which relate part of my subsequent research work to Davidson’s philosophy. With my previous background and interest in classical Chinese philosophy, the foregoing endeavors naturally motivated me to carry out the research on the constructive engagement between analytic and Chinese philosophical traditions; this collective project resulted in Mou (ed.) 2001b, for which Davidson wrote his “Foreword” (Davidson 2001b). The above three closely-related earlier efforts naturally led me to the aforementioned first collective project, “Davidson’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement”. Directly or indirectly related to my efforts on the current project in doing philosophy of language comparatively, besides Davidson and Martinich, I have also learnt substantially from the following well-respected teachers and/or scholars (through reading their relevant writings and/or having communications in various ways, concerning vision, methodology and due resources), though their scholarly focuses are not all on philosophy of language: Richard Feldman (1988), Theodore Sider (2009), Rolf Eberle (1970), Adam Morton (1988), Kwong-loi Shun (1997), Michael Krausz (2011), and Ernie Lepore (2005).

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5

Doing Philosophy of Language Comparatively: ConstructiveEngagement Strategy

As emphasized above, the foregoing objectives and complementary directions of this volume is underlain by the fundamental rationale which might as well be labeled the “constructive-engagement” strategy of doing philosophy of language comparatively. It is a reflective extension and implementation of a general “constructive-engagement” strategy of doing philosophy comparatively. In the following, first, I start with briefly explaining major points of the general “constructive-engagement” strategy of doing philosophy comparatively while introducing some conceptual and explanatory resources and distinctions in need; I then explain the “constructive-engagement” strategy of doing philosophy of language comparatively in view of the Chinese language and relevant resources from Chinese philosophy. Second, I identify and explain four distinct but closely related fronts of doing philosophy of language comparatively. Third, as a further explanation of how doing philosophy of language comparatively is possible, I suggest and explain a set of “adequacy” conditions for the sake of exploring how it is possible to maintain adequate methodological guiding principles in doing philosophy of language comparatively. From the Constructive-Engagement Strategy of Doing Philosophy Comparatively to the Constructive-Engagement Strategy of Doing Philosophy of Language Comparatively Because the constructive-engagement strategy as one general strategic methodology in doing philosophy (or doing philosophy comparatively) has been explained and elaborated before,2 to save space and in view of the current purpose, I briefly highlight its major points and characteristic features below. Generally speaking, the constructive-engagement strategy in doing philosophy comparatively is this: it is to inquire into how, by way of reflective criticism (including self-criticism) and argumentation and with the guidance of adequate methodological guiding principles, distinct approaches from different philosophical traditions (whether distinguished culturally or by styles and orientations) can learn from each other and jointly contribute to the contemporary development of philosophy on a range of philosophical issues or topics, which can be jointly concerned and approached through appropriate philosophical interpretation and from a broader philosophical vantage point. The constructive-engagement strategy has five related methodological emphases (as highlighted in italics): (1) it emphasizes critical engagement 2.1

2  Cf. Mou 2010.

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in view that we can talk about the same object differently (with distinct but complementary perspectives and focuses on distinct aspects of an object of study); (2) it emphasizes constructive contribution of each of the parties in critical engagement through learning from each other and joint contribution to jointly-concerned issues; (3) it emphasizes philosophical interpretation of the addressed thinker’ text in view that an articulate elaboration of some implied point(s) of the text under examination is in need and sensitive to the reflective purpose and focus of one research project; (4) it emphasizes the philosophical-issue-engagement orientation aiming at contribution to the contemporary development of philosophy on a range of philosophical issues that can be jointly concerned and approached through appropriate philosophical interpretation and from a broader philosophical vantage point; (5) it emphasizes that the foregoing engaging exploration needs to be guided by adequate methodological guiding principles. Before I elaborate the points of the constructive-engagement strategy of doing philosophy of language comparatively, for the sake of more clearly and accurately characterizing distinct dimensions of actual methodological approaches in the reflective practice of doing philosophy of language and thus some related methodological points of the constructive-engagement strategy, let me first introduce some preliminary explanatory resources and conceptual distinctions in need in an accessible way. The term ‘method’ or ‘methodological approach’ means a variety of ways that respond to how to approach an object of study. There are three distinct but related ways in which one can approach an object of study, which together constitute three distinct dimensions of a methodological approach as a whole. Let me first briefly specify them and then use a “method house” metaphor for their accessible illustration. (1) A methodological perspective is a way of approaching an object of study,3 about which we can all talk even though we may say different things (concerning distinct aspects of the object), and is intended to point to or focus on a certain aspect of the object and capture or explain that aspect in terms of the characteristics of that aspect, together with the minimal metaphysical commitment that there is that aspect of the object. There are two impor3  The identity of a (genuine) object of study in philosophy is understood broadly: as a naturally produced object in physical reality, a constructed object in social reality, a “linguistic” object (such as a word), an abstract object in philosophical theory, or an “issue” object in philoso­phy (such as the philosophical issue of truth with its distinct but related dimensions), referen­tially accessible and critically communicable among participants in philosophical dialogue.

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tant distinctions concerning methodological perspectives. First, there is the distinction between eligible and ineligible methodological perspectives. An eligible methodological perspective points to and captures a certain aspect that is really possessed by the object (thus capturing the way the object is), while an ineligible one does otherwise.4 Second, there is the distinction between a methodological-perspective simplex and a methodological-perspective complex. A simplex is a single discernible methodological perspective, and a 4  The present tense of the English verb phrase ‘be (really) possessed’ (in its passive voice) here is understood in the broader sense of ‘present tense’ as this grammatical tense legitimately allows it: it is not used to merely locate a situation or event in present time but more inclusive to locae situations or events that occurred in the past (then the use of the presente tense is sometimes called ‘historical present’, as illustrated by the grammatical sentence ‘Gongsun Long argues for his “white-horse-not-horse” thesis’), or occurs in present time or at present (then the tense is used in the narrow sense of ‘present tense’), or will (or is to) occur in future time (then the use of the present tense might as well be called ‘futuristic present’, as illustrasted by the grammatical sentence ‘His train leaves tomorrow morning’). This inclusvie coverage of the present tense does make sense especially when time is treated as a whole and/or when historical happenings are looked at from a certain “transcendental’ vantage point. In the context related to the philosophical issue of truth in view of people’s pre-theoretic “capturing-the-way-things-are” understanding of truth, this inclusvie coverage of the present tense (as used by the term ‘be’ in the above phrase ‘capturing-the-way-thingsare’ characterizing people’s pre-theoretic understanding of truth) especially makes sense. It is noted that, in the philosophical context with the strategic goal of truth pursuit, the furture truths under such truth pursuit are rendered to capture the way things are to be (indicating a certain ‘prescriptive’ point with the phrase ‘are to be’) or capture the way things will be in accordance with the dao in the Daoist terms, instead of whatever will occur in future time; to this extent, in this philosophical context, when the present tense is used to indicate “future truths”, it points to the way things are to be, instead of merely “the way things will be in future time”. It is also noted that, in the Chinese language, the Chinese counter “真正具有” of the English phrase ‘is really possessed’ can cover all these variety of uses of the present tense in English: this Chinese verb phrase itselt is a timeless or tenseless phrase.  This explanation is not merely linguistic but has its substantial philosophical implication: the eligiblibility status of an eligible perspective in the subsequent discussion of this section can have its prescriptive element instead of being merely descriptive concerning what have already occurred in the past and at present; the distinction between eligible and ineligible perspectives thus can be not only compatible but effective in treating the issue of truth in moral and social-political areas along the line with people’s pre-theoretic “capturingthe-way-things-are” understanding of truth. Some relevant resouces concerning the issue of truth in classical Chinese philosophy (such as Gongsun Long’s conception of wei 位 in his acccount of shi 實 and Confucius’ idea of “double-eligibility” in his account of name rectification 正名論) can contribute to our understanding and treatment of the issue of truth in moral and social-political areas, as briefly explained in portion (1) of my “Editor’s engaging remarks” section in Part 4 of this volume; however, due to space and focus, a detailed explanation on this cannot be given here, which the interested reader can see in Mou 2018b.

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complex is either a combination of simplexes (“multiple perspective complex”) or an association of one perspective (simplex) with a certain methodological guiding principle (“guiding-principle-associated perspective complex”).5 By “perspective” below I mean a methodological perspective simplex unless otherwise indicated. (2) A methodological instrument is a way in which to implement, or give tools to realize, a certain methodological perspective. Methodological instruments are largely neutral in the sense that they can serve to implement different methodological perspectives, though there is still the distinction between more and less effective methodological instruments in regard to a given methodological perspective. (3) A methodological guiding principle regulates and guides a certain methodological perspective (or perspectives) in regard to an object of study. Presupposed by the agent, it implicitly guides and regulates how the perspective should be evaluated and used and contributes to the establishment of its desiderata (especially, the purpose and focus that it is to serve). There are adequate and inadequate methodological guiding principles. In the last subsection of this section below, I will explore a range of adequacy conditions for methodological guiding principles; for the sake of illustration, and due to its primary status, one primary adequacy condition is worthy being first identified here as follows: in looking at the relation between the agent’s current perspective in treating an object of study and other eligible perspectives (if any), a methodological guiding principle is considered adequate (in regard to recognizing perspective eligibility) when it allows in other eligible perspectives to complement the application of the current perspective and thus has the agent realize that these eligible perspectives do separately capture distinct aspects of the object and thus can jointly make complementary contributions to capturing the way the object is. It is considered inadequate if otherwise.6 5  For the relevance of perspective complexes, see the discussion of the adequacy condition (8) in the next sub-section. 6  The following “method house” metaphor can be used to illustrate the aforementioned relevant points. Suppose that a person intends to approach her destination, say, a house (the object of study), which has several entrances—say, a front door, side door, and upper story window (various aspects of the object of study)—and several paths, each of which is difficult to discern. If a path really leads to an entrance of the house, the path is called an eligible one. She chooses a path (methodological perspective) to approach the house, believing that the path leads to an entrance (say, the front door). In order to proceed on the difficult to discern path, she wields a certain tool (a methodological instrument) to clear her path—say, a machete if the path is overgrown with brambles or a snow shovel if the path is heavily covered with snow. She also has a certain idea in her mind (methodological guiding principle)

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There are three preliminary morals we can draw about the relations between the foregoing three methodological things. (1) The merit, status, and function of a methodological perspective per se can be evaluated independently of certain methodological guiding principles that the agent might presuppose in her actual application of the perspective. (2) One’s reflective practice per se of taking a certain methodological perspective as a working perspective to focus and point to a certain aspect of the object implies neither that one loses sight of other genuine aspects of the object nor that one ignores or rejects other eligible perspectives in one’s background thinking. (3) On the other hand, it does matter whether one’s taking a certain methodological perspective is regulated by an adequate or inadequate guiding principle, especially for the sake of constructive engagement of seemingly competing approaches, for an inadequate guiding principle will close out certain eligible perspectives. With the preceding brief explanation of the general “constructive-engagement” strategy of doing philosophy comparatively and with the preceding preliminary conceptual resources and distinction in place, the “constructiveengagement” strategy of doing philosophy of language comparatively can be highlighted in this way. It is to inquire into how, by way of reflective criticism (including self-criticism) and argumentation and with the guidance of adequate methodological guiding principles, distinct approaches from different traditions (whether distinguished culturally/linguistically or by styles and orientations) concerning philosophy of language can learn from each other (especially, via their distinct eligible perspectives and/or effective resources in their methodological instruments) and jointly contribute to the contemporary development of philosophy of language on its jointly-concerned issues or topics, whose status of being jointly-concerned can be reached through appropriate philosophical interpretation of relevant texts. Similarly to the general “constructive-engagement” strategy but more specifically, the constructive-engagement strategy of doing philosophy of language comparatively has five related methodological emphases (as highlighted in italics) in a coordinate way: (1) it emphasizes critical engagement in view that we can talk about the same object differently (with distinct and finite but complementary perspectives and focuses on distinct aspects of an object of that explains why she takes that path, instead of another, and guides her to the house. Such a guiding idea can be adequate or inadequate. For example, if the guiding idea allows her to recognize that other eligible paths are compatible with her current path (that is, they all lead to the house), then her guiding idea is adequate; in contrast, if she fails to recognize this and thus understands her current path as exclusively eligible (the only path leading to the house), then her guiding idea is inadequate—even though her current path is, itself, eligible.

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study); (2) it emphasizes constructive contribution of each of the parties in critical engagement through learning from each other and joint contribution to jointly-concerned issues in philosophy of language; (3) it emphasizes philosophical interpretation of the addressed thinker’ text in view that an articulate elaboration of some implied point(s) of the text is in need and sensitive to the reflective purpose and focus of one research project; (4) it emphasizes the philosophical-issue-engagement orientation aiming at contributing to the contemporary development of philosophy of language on its jointly-concerned issues, whose character of being jointly concerned can be reached through appropriate philosophical interpretation of relevant texts; (5) it emphasizes that the foregoing engaging exploration needs to be guided by adequate methodological guiding principles. Four Fronts of the Constructive-Engagement Exploration of Doing Philosophy of Language Comparatively It is arguably the case that, generally and conceptually speaking, there are four significant fronts, or points of engaging tangency, of the constructiveengagement exploration of doing philosophy of language comparatively, which are conceptually distinct (with different focuses) but closely related and practically more or less overlapped in ways to be explained. 2.2

(1) The first front is the constructive engagement of distinct approaches from different philosophical traditions that are distinguished culturally and linguistically (especially those that are linguistically associated with significantly different types of natural languages, such as the Chinese ideographic language and the English phonetic language) on a range of jointly-concerned issues in philosophy of language. The current project works primarily on this front especially with regard to the Chinese language and relevant resources in Chinese philosophy, and relevant resources in contemporary philosophy of language in the Western tradition (as the current scholarship goes, these resources come mainly from relevant “analytic” resources in the perspective dimension and the instrumental dimension of its “analytic” tradition, such as those addressed in most of the contributors’ papers here; but it also includes relevant “Continental” resources in the Western “Continental” tradition).7 What have been discussed concerning the general characterization of the constructive-engagement strategy of doing philosophy of language comparatively in the previous sub-section, so to speak, most explicitly, directly and typically 7  For example, in this volume, Xianglong Zhang’s contributing paper on this front addresses some relevant “Continental” resources in the Western “Continental” tradition.

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address the characteristic features of this front; in this way, I do not say more on this front here. (2) The second front is the constructive engagement between distinct approaches from different traditions that are distinguished by styles and orientations, especially between the two major styles/orientations of doing philosophy, i.e., the analytic tradition and the “Continental” tradition understood in a broad sense,8 on a range of jointly-concerned issues in philosophy of language.9 It is noted that, as the analytic tradition and the “Continental” tradition understood in a broad sense are not limited to those “analytic” and “Continental” resources in the Western philosophical tradition alone but also cover the analytic and/or “Continental” strands and elements (if any) in other non-Western philosophical traditions (such as Lao Zi’s “Continental”style writing, the Dao-De-Jing as a philosophical poem, and Gongsun Long’s “analytic”-style analysis of the “White-Horse-Not-Horse” thesis in Chinese philosophy), this front can more or less overlap with the exploration on the first front.10 In this sense, and to this extent, the foregoing first and second fronts are partially overlapped in this project. (3) The third front is the constructive engagement of distinct approaches or resources within one culturally and linguistically distinguished philosophical tradition (say, the Western “analytic” tradition or classical Chinese philosophy) on a range of issues in philosophy of language with due emphasis on the guidance of an adequate methodological guiding principle in the agent’s background thinking: such a guiding principle would guide the agent to at least take a constructive open-minded attitude towards (making endeavor to understand and recognize) eligible perspectives and effective instrumental resources (say, the “analytic” and other oriented ones) from other culturally and linguistically distinguished traditions in her background thinking. Let me say more about how it is possible via illustrations concerning the case of the analytic resources in the setting of contemporary Western philosophical 8  For the constructive engagement of analytic and “Continental” approaches in philosophy understood in a broad sense on a range of jointly-concerned issues in philosophy from the vantage point of comparative philosophy, see Mou & Tieszen (eds.) 2013. Some of the contributing essays in this volume work explicitly on this second front of doing philosophy of language comparatively, such as Martinich 2013 and Brons 2013. 9  For example, in this volume, Martinich’s contributing essay addresses the relevant resources both from the analytic tradition and the “Continental” tradition. 10  For example, in my “Editor’s engaging remarks” for Part 5 on Lao Zi’s opening message of the Dao-De-Jing, my analysis resorts to some relevant resources in the contemporary philosophy of language in the analytic tradition for the sake of enhancing the understanding of Lao Zi’s relevant philosophical points on language.).

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tradition and the case of some “Continental”-style-oriented resources in the setting of classical Chinese philosophy, as this front is more related to the status quo of what many scholars are currently working on. First consider the former case. It is clear that, if those distinct approaches are from the distinct analytic strands of different culturally-linguistically distinguished philosophical traditions, that would manifest the aforementioned first front. In contrast to this, what typically point to on this front are those distinct approaches from the same Western analytic tradition in the setting of contemporary philosophy. For example, it is known that there have been very active engaging discussions among distinct approaches, say, the Fregean approach and the Kripkean approach to the issue of reference within the analytic tradition in the English-speaking countries. Then the question is this: how can the addressed constructiveengagement strategy make difference here? Or, how is it distinct from, while complementary to, the current already active engagement arena in the Englishspeaking world? The point of the constructive-engagement strategy in this case lies in due emphasis on the reflective guidance of adequate methodological guiding principles concerning how to look at distinct approaches to a range of jointly-concerned issues in philosophy of language, which would minimally involve making efforts to recognize and understand, instead of dogmatically rejecting, other eligible perspectives on these issues if any from other traditions (distinguished culturally and linguistically or by styles and orientations) at least at the agent’s background thinking, even if these other perspectives are not her current working perspective(s) within the analytic tradition. In a similar strategy, let us consider the latter case: for example, one scholar might focus on some “Continental”-style resources in classical Chinese philosophy (say, Zhuang Zi’s Daoist insights on how to understanding the way of language, which were delivered by means of poems, metaphors, stories and fables) without directly addressing, say, some analytic resources in contemporary Western philosophy; similarly, the point of the constructive-engagement strategy in such a case lies in due emphasis on the reflective guidance of adequate methodological guiding principles, which would minimally involve making efforts to recognize and understand, instead of indiscriminately ignoring, other eligible perspectives on these issues (if any) from other traditions (distinguished culturally and linguistically or by styles and orientations) at least in the agent’s background thinking.11 11  For example, in this volume, Zhaohua Chu’s contributing essay on Zhuang Zi’s relevant thought concerning language in classical Chinese philosophy is on this front: although he focuses on Zhuang Zi’s resources per se, he stresses the across-the-board significance of the relationship between the so-called “great speech” and “small speech” and actually also

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(4) The fourth front, the last but never least, is a variety of theoretic explorations of how cross-contextual, cross-textual, cross-linguistic or crosstraditional meaning and understanding is possible, which can profoundly contribute to the “reflective” foundation for the constructive-engagement strategy of doing philosophy of language comparatively,12 whether the authors of such explorations use only sample linguistic items from their own native languages or make cross-references to sample linguistic items from different natural languages, and whether or not their researches are intended to make such contributions to the enterprise of doing philosophy of language comparatively. It is noted that such “foundational” work is important both for the constructive-strategy of doing philosophy of language comparatively and for the general strategy of doing philosophy comparatively, as it is this part of the constructive-engagement strategy of doing philosophy of language comparatively that also contributes to the foundation of the enterprise of doing philosophy comparatively.13 At this point, it is worth emphasizing that, just as the constructiveengagement strategy in doing philosophy comparatively is an across-the-board methodology of doing philosophy, the constructive-engagement strategy in doing philosophy of language comparatively is also an across-the-board methodology of doing philosophy of language, whether or not the agent of doing philosophy of language is currently treating distinct approaches within the same tradition (as addressed and illustrated by the constructive-engagement strategy on the foregoing third front) or from different traditions (as addressed and illustrated by the constructive-engagement strategy on the foregoing first and second fronts). Now we can see that what really or fundamentally unifies all the four fronts of the constructive-engagement exploration of doing philosophy of language comparatively is the reflective guidance of adequate methodological guiding principles concerning how to look at distinct approaches to a range of jointlyconcerned issues in philosophy of language at least in the background thinking gives due weight to the latter instead of dismissing it, which benefits from his adequate understanding of the due role played by the “analytic” perspective on the issue in his background thinking. 12  The term “reflectively” is used here in both general and specific senses of it: generally speaking, such explorations as philosophical theoretic inquiries are “reflective” in nature; furthermore, specifically speaking, such explorations themselves in doing philosophy of language comparatively are reflections on its own foundation. 13  For example, Part 2 of this volume on the issue of cross-contextual meaning and understanding well illustrates this front of doing philosophy of language comparatively.

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of the agent who is to carry out the strategy, no matter which front(s) she is currently working on (being sensitive to her current focus, philosophical interest, training background, and the expectation of her current research project). What is at issue is how it is possible to maintain adequate methodological guiding principles for the sake of carrying out the constructive-engagement exploration of doing philosophy of language comparatively. Indeed, both as one important theoretic connection of the constructiveengagement exploration of doing philosophy of language comparatively and as a way to help the interested reader look at the distinct approaches presented in this volume, a further explanation of how it is possible to maintain adequate methodological guiding principles is due for the sake of effectively carrying out the constructive-engagement exploration of doing philosophy of language comparatively under adequate guidance. Adequacy Conditions for Maintaining Adequate Methodological Guiding Principles in Doing Philosophy of Language Comparatively In this sub-section, I explore how it is possible to maintain adequate methodological guiding principles for the sake of carrying out the constructiveengagement strategy of doing philosophy of language comparatively under adequate guidance in this way: I suggest and exlain a set of adequacy conditions for how to adequately look at the relationship of distinct approaches to jointly-concerned issues. It is thus hoped that, as one vantage reference point, a “constructive-engagement” methodological framework concerning how to look at distinct approaches in doing philosophy of language comparatively can be suggested to the interested reader. Given that the term ‘methodological approach’ means a way responding to how to approach an object of study, the term is a generic term to mean a number of methodological ways. As explained above, in the context of philosophical inquiries including those in philosophy of language, generally speaking, the notion of methodological approach can, and needs to, be refined into three distinct but related notions of methodological ways for the sake of effectively characterizing three distinct but somehow related methodological ways, i.e., those of methodological perspective (or perspective method), methodological instrument (or instrumental method), and methodological guiding principle (or guiding-principle method). As indicated before, for the constructive-engagement purpose, it is especially philosophically interesting, relevant, or even crucial to maintain an adequate methodological guiding principle, which the agent is expected to hold in evaluating the status and nature of eligible methodological perspectives, applying her own working methodological perspective, and looking at the due relationship between her current working perspective 2.3

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and other eligible methodological perspectives. In the following, to explore how it is possible to have adequate methodological guiding principles in carrying out the constructive-engagement exploration in doing philosophy of language comparatively, I suggest a set of ten conditions for maintaining adequate methodological guiding principles (‘adequacy conditions’ for short).14 This set of adequacy conditions are not intended to be exhaustive, exclusive, or dogmatic; they are open to criticism for their validity and explanatory potency. For each of the ten adequacy conditions, I first present a general characterization and then use some selected sample cases for illustration. These sample cases are selected also with consideration of introducing some relevant preliminary conceptual resources in need, such as the distinction between the semantic and the pragmatic and between the so-called “semantic” approach and “pragmatic” approach. In my illustrations of most of the suggested “adequacy conditions”, I use as a main sample object of study the following basic language employment (‘the basic language employment’ for short) of which people have their shared and cross-linguistically pre-theoretic understanding: as widely happened in various natural languages, when referring to an object (such as a physical object in space and time, a number in math, and a fictional figure in a story) via a referring name in linguistic activities (such as communication, doing math via math language, etc.), typically and generally speaking, a speaker intends to say something (and she can say different things or different speakers can say different things) of the (same) object as a referent. It is widely recognized (or it is arguably the case) that the basic language employment has its “pragmatic” dimension and its “semantic” dimension.15 Its “pragmatic” dimension is shown via such terms as ‘speaker intends …’; nevertheless, people can deliver 14  This is a philosophy-of-language-concerned extension and further elaboration of the adequacy conditions in general as explained in Mou 2010. 15  In this writing, the terms ‘semantic’/‘semantics’, ‘syntactic’/‘syntax’, and ‘pragmatic’/ ‘pragmatics’ are used in their quite standard senses (in philosophy of language), though in a bit more refined way regarding ‘semantic’. Let me start with a bit more controversial term ‘pragmatic’/‘pragmatics’ in view of whose sense some sense of ‘semantic’ can be identified. The term ‘pragmatic’ here means situated uses of language which involve particular speech-act-utterance contexts and the language users’ (particular) intentions (or their situated “epistemic” attitudes), or the study of what speakers do with language in its situated uses (speech acts). The term ‘pragmatics’ thus means the study of such situated uses of language. Any linguistic context that is sensitive to a particular speaker’s situated intention is considered to include pragmatic involvement. It is noted that some scholars prefer using the label ‘speech act’ to using the term ‘pragmatic’ (cf., Cappelen & Lepore 2005).

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this basic language employment in a more semantically-oriented way, some thing is said of a referent, which shows its “semantic” dimension. In so saying, people does not mean denying its pragmatic elements but actually treating those pragmatic elements (like “a speaker’s intention”) as presupposed background elements.16 In this way, let me use this sample case to illustrate how the two widely recognized and employed approaches in philosophy of language, the “semantic” approach and the “pragmatic” approach, can be manifested in a refined way by means of some previously introduced conceptual resources and distinctions. For an object of study in linguistics and/or philosophy of language, a “semantic”  The term ‘semantic’ can be used either in its strict or narrow sense or in its broad (loose) sense. In its strict or narrow sense, ‘semantics’ means the study of the non(purely)-linguistic, cross-categorical relations between linguistic expressions and the extra-linguistic objects for which they stand (without being sensitive to how particular speakers would think of the objects); such a non-linguistic relation is usually called a ‘semantic relation’; the notion that captures such a semantic relation is called a ‘semantic notion’. The principal semantic relations are referring and being true; the principal semantic notions are thus the notions of reference and truth. In a broad sense, the term ‘semantic’ points to non-pragmatic and relatively stable meanings that do not change from particular situation to particular situation, such as (vertical) “objective” referents (in the Millian way) and (horizontal) inter-subjective senses (in the Fregean way), which can be captured (designated or expressed) in a relatively stable way by referring names and/or other expressions in our public or inter-subjective language. The above two senses of ‘semantic’ are thus related. [The terms ‘semantics’ is sometimes (mainly in the literature of linguistics) used to mean the study of (a variety of) meanings of words and sentences.] By ‘semantic’ in my contributing writings in this volume, following the usual usage of ‘semantics’ in philosophy of language, I mean either its strict sense of the term or its “non-pragmatic” sense, unless indicated otherwise.  Syntax concerns the deep (instead of merely surface-grammatical) structural relations, which the linguistic expressions have among themselves and which different linguistic expressions in different natural languages can share, and the ways the linguistic expressions can be manipulated in accordance with such deep structural relations; a syntactic relation, thus, is a linguistic relation because it relates the linguistic items in question to each other at the same level.  It is also noted that the preceding distinction between the semantic, the syntactic and the pragmatic does not commit itself to the absolute separation between them but is the conceptual distinction at a certain abstract level and/or with distinct focuses. 16  It is noted that the fact that the basic language employment has both “semantic” and “pragmatic” dimensions does not imply that any object of study in philosophy of language must have both “semantic” and “pragmatic” dimensions. For example, the “semantic” notion of truth per se is conceptually semantic in character, which distinguishes itself from a “pragmatic” conceptual identity.

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methodological approach as a whole can be distinguished and refined into its three distinct but related dimensions: its “perspective” dimension, the “semantic” perspective which is intended to point to and capture the “semantic” aspect of the object of study, although whether it is eligible depends on whether the object really possesses the “semantic” aspect, its “instrument” dimension, which consists of various employed instrumental resources by means of which to effectively implement the “semantic” perspective; and its “guiding-principle” dimension, which is taken to regulate the relationship between the current “semantic” perspective and other perspectives and which might be adequate and might be inadequate, depending on how the agent who takes the “semantic” perspective would treat the relationship between the semantic perspective and other perspectives. We can give a similar refined account of the identity of a “pragmatic” approach.17 Now, as for the sample case of the basic language employment, there are three points that can be made in view of the previously mentioned three general morals we can draw about the relations between the three methodological things. (1) The merit, status, and function of a methodological perspective per se, the “semantic” perspective and the “pragmatic” perspective themselves here, can be evaluated independently of certain methodological guiding principles that the agent might presuppose in her actual application of the perspective; that is, even if the guiding principle of one agent who takes the “semantic” perspective (or the “pragmatic” perspective) as her 17  When the “semantic” perspective and the “pragmatic” perspective (respectively as one dimension of the “semantic” approach and one dimension of the “pragmatic” approach, if any) are used as two sample perspectives here, I neither pretend to have a good general theory of the issue of the relationship between the “semantic” (approach) and the “pragmatic” (approach) nor ignore the complexity of the issue nor overlook the (recent) rich scholarship on it. I use them for the sake of illustration purpose here with consideration that people have their rudimentary understanding of what the expressions ‘semantic’ and ‘pragmatic’ are used to talk about and their distinct but complementary roles in people’s effective communications, whether or not these people are experts with a theoretic understaning of them in philosophy of language or linguistics. It is also noted that one significant relevant vantage point to look at the due relationship of the “semantic” and the “pragmatic” is that, given that human language as means and medium is to deliver (express and/or create) human thought, some parts of the “semantic” aspect, and even the “pragmatic” aspect, of language have their “normative” conceptual bases in human thought that somehow point to (certain parts of) the world, instead of merely “uses” at the purely linguistic level. One example is the “semantic” notion of truth, a topic to be partially addressed in Part 4 of this volume. For this author’s more discussion on the issue, see Mou 2018b.

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current working perspective is inadequate, her perspective can be still eligible. (2) One’s reflective practice per se of taking a certain methodological perspective, either the “semantic” perspective or the “pragmatic” perspective, as one’s current working perspective to focus and point to a certain aspect (the “semantic” aspect or the “pragmatic” aspect) of the basic language employment implies neither that one loses sight of other genuine aspects of the object nor that one ignores or rejects other eligible perspectives in one’s background thinking. (3) On the other hand, it does matter whether one’s taking a certain methodological perspective is regulated by an adequate or inadequate guiding principle, especially for the sake of constructive-engagement exploration of seemingly competing approaches, for an inadequate guiding principle will inadequately close out and dismiss certain eligible perspectives other than one’s current working perspective. With the foregoing preliminary explanation of the aforementioned basic language employment (as a main sample object of study), and treating its related “semantic” perspective and “pragmatic” perspective as main sample perspectives for illustration (also using some other sample cases to be addressed), let me present a general characterization of the ten adequacy conditions for maintaining adequate methodological guiding principles together with their illustrations (more or less detailed, depending on cases).  The same-object-recognizing condition (against the “anything-goes” orientation). A methodological guiding principle is considered adequate (in this connection) if, given an object of study, it enables the agent to recognize that there is a way that the object objectively is such that it is not the case that “anything goes”, and we can all talk about that same object even though we may say different things (concerning distinct aspects of the object) about it.18 18  As indicated before, the identity of a (genuine) object of study in philosophy is understood broadly: an object of study can be a naturally produced object in physical reality, a socially constructed object in social reality, an abstract object out of theoretic construction, a ‘linguistic’ object which is introduced linguistically, a thinker’s text, or an object of philosophical inquiry on an issue, topic or theme. For a sample case concerning various aspects of an object of study in philosophy as a philosophical issue, and an illustration of how such an object of philosophical studies can be treated, see the way in which various aspects of the philosophical issue of truth are treated in Mou 2009. Also note that the account of an object of study as addressed here is not merely compatible with an account of genuine issues in philosophy, but also suggests one way to distinguish genuine issues from pseudo ones in philosophy to the following extent: on the one hand, if an object of study, whether it is an object in a straightforward sense (like a house, a human being, etc.) or an object of philosophical inquiries as an issue or topic (like the issue of truth, etc.) is a genuine one in philosophy, it should be referentially accessible and communicable

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In contrast, it is considered inadequate (in this connection) if otherwise. This adequacy condition may be called a “minimal” truth-pursuing condition in the sense that it is presupposed by the remaining kinds of adequacy conditions for the sake of capturing the way the object is (or is to be) if the truth pursuit is one strategic goal.19 Consider the aforementioned “basic language employment” as the object of study. It has its “pragmatic” aspect and its “semantic” aspect (in other words, the aspect that renders a “semantic” perspective eligible, and the aspect that renders “pragmatic” perspective eligible); we can talk about the same token of the basic language employment, even though we may say different “semantic” or “pragmatic” things about it thus taking a “semantic” perspective or a “pragmatic” perspective (respectively pointing to its distinct “semantic” and “pragmatic” aspects); in so doing, we do not bring about different objects to be talked about.20  The perspective-eligibility-recognizing condition. A methodological guiding principle that is held or presupposed by the agent who uses some eligible methodological perspective concerning an object of study as her current working perspective is considered adequate (in this connection) when this guiding principle renders other eligible methodological perspectives (if any) also eligible and somehow compatible with the application of the and open to reflective criticism; on the other hand, pseudo issues in philosophy do not really possess genuine aspects that are referentially accessible and critically communicable among participants in philosophical dialogue; in this sense, a pseudo issue cannot be really “given” as an object of study or justifiably assumed in philosophical inquiry, whether or not it can be assumed as a legitimate object of study in some other kinds of inquiry (say, in social psychology). 19  As for the significant issue of the truth pursuit as one strategic goal in philosophy (it is intrinsically related to one basic norm in cross-tradition engagement in philosophy, i.e., the “way-things-are-capturing” norm), I cannot examine it here with consideration of the purpose of this writing. For my detailed discussion of this topic, see the relevant parts in Mou 2009 (especially its chapters 4 and 5) and Mou 2018b (especially the ending section of its chapter 5). 20  For this adequacy condition, some other sample cases in other areas of philosophy can also effectively illustrate its point. For example, I use the case of Socrates’ “being-aspectconcerned” perspective (as presented in, say, the earlier Platonic dialogue Euthyphro) and Confucius’ “becoming-aspect-concerned” perspective (as presented in, say, sections 2.5–2.8 of the Analects) can constructively engage with each other when addressing the same object under examination, (filial) piety (Mou 2010). I employ another relatively tougher case concerning how Zhuang Zi’s and Quine’s distinct naturalist approaches in treating some jointly-concerned issues in epistemology, which are usually considered so radically different, can address the same object to constructively engage with each other (Mou 2015).

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current working perspective. In contrast, it is considered inadequate (in this connection) if otherwise. This adequacy condition may be called a ‘minimal’ multiple-perspectives-treating condition in the sense that it is presupposed by the remaining kinds of adequacy conditions concerning how to look at the relationship between distinct perspectives. Consider the two samples of methodological perspectives, namely, the “semantic” perspective and the “pragmatic” perspective regarding the basic language employment as an object of study. Sensitive to one’s purpose, focus and personal research interest, one might take the “semantic” perspective (or the “pragmatic” perspective) to be one’s current working perspective; if one’s guiding principle renders other eligible methodological perspectives (say, a “pragmatic” perspective in this case) also eligible and somehow compatible with the application of the current working perspective, it is adequate in this connection. In this way, a methodological guiding principle that renders both methodological perspectives eligible on the basic language employment would have the perspective-eligibility-recognizing adequacy.21  The agent-purpose-sensitivity condition. A methodological guiding principle is considered adequate (in this connection) if it enables the agent to have her choice of a certain working perspective, among eligible methodological perspectives concerning an object of study, sensitive to the agent’s purpose and thus renders the most applicable or the most appropriate (the best relative to that purpose) the perspective that (best) serves that purpose. In contrast, it is considered inadequate (in this connection) if otherwise. Again consider the two sample methodological perspectives, namely, the “semantic” perspective and the “pragmatic” perspective regarding the basic language employment as an object of study. A methodological guiding principle that sets out to decide which methodological perspective among the two is to be taken by an agent herself as her working perspective, or how to evaluate the validity of some other agent’s working perspective (either one) should be sensitive to the agent’s purpose or her own focus on which aspect of the basic

21  In view of this adequacy condition, in my contributing paper (chapter 2 of this volume), although I take a semantic perspective to look at the “semantic” dimension of the basic language employment, I do recognize the eligibility of a “pragmatic” perspective to look at the “pragmatic” dimension of it; whenever there is the need in a research project of mine (either because I shift my focus in my research, or because the partner of a dialogue needs to address the “pragmatic” aspect, or because a more complete account is expected in some of my future projects,…), a “pragmatic” perspective is expected to be taken as part of its current working perspective(s).

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language employment to be captured in a certain context. The methodological guiding principle then has the agent-purpose-sensitivity adequacy.  The equality-status-granting condition. A methodological guiding principle is considered adequate (in this connection) if it renders all the eligible methodological perspectives (perspective simplexes) concerning an object of study equal in the following two senses: being equally in need for the sake of a complete account of the object and being equally partial from the holistic point of view that transcends any partial and finite methodological perspectives, although one eligible perspective can be rendered more (or even the most) suitable or in need than others only relative to its associated purpose and focus on the aspect of the object to which it points; thus none of them is absolutely superior (or inferior) to the others in the above senses. In contrast, it is considered inadequate (in this connection) if otherwise. Again consider the two sample methodological perspectives, namely, the “semantic” perspective and the “pragmatic” perspective that point respectively to the “semantic” aspect and the “pragmatic” aspect of the basic language employment as an object of study. When one resorts to a certain methodological guiding principle to guide one’s evaluation of the status of the “semantic” perspective (or the “pragmatic” perspective) and thus renders it indiscriminately and absolutely superior to the “pragmatic” perspective (or the “semantic” perspective), the methodological guiding principle thus fails to have the equality-status-granting adequacy concerning the aforementioned two methodological perspectives on the basic language employment. In contrast, if a methodological guiding principle renders one of the two better than another or most suitable only in view of a certain context and in regard to a certain aspect of the basic language employment to which the perspective in question points but without viewing it “absolutely” or “indiscriminately” superior to the other, this methodological guiding principle will thus meet the equality-status-granting condition concerning the aforementioned two methodological perspectives on the basic language employment.  The new-eligible-perspective-possibility-recognizing condition. A methodological guiding principle is considered adequate (in this connection) if it enables the agent to have an open-minded attitude toward the possibility of a new eligible perspective concerning an object of study that is to point to some genuine aspect of the object but has yet to be realized by the agent because of the ‘unknown-identity’ status of that aspect. A methodological guiding principle is considered inadequate (in this connection) if otherwise. Again consider the two sample methodological perspectives, namely, the “semantic” perspective and the “pragmatic” perspective that point respectively to the “semantic” aspect and the “pragmatic” aspect of the basic language

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employment as an object of study (both thus being eligible methodological perspectives on this object of study). If, besides the two methodological perspectives, a methodological guiding principle has its open-minded attitude towards the possibility of new (yet-to-be-recognized) aspects, dimensions or layers of the basic language employment and thus the possibility of new eligible methodological perspectives that are to point to and explain them, the guiding principle thus enjoys the new-eligible-perspective-possibilityrecognizing adequacy. In contrast, any methodological guiding principle that renders exclusive and exhaustive the current working perspective (or the current stock of methodological perspectives that are so far epistemologically available), the guiding principle is thus inadequate in this connection because it fails to meet this adequacy condition.  The dynamic-development-sensitivity condition. A methodological guiding principle is considered adequate (in this connection) if it guides the agent to be sensitive to the dynamic development (if any) of an object of study for the sake of realizing and understanding which aspects are (still or currently) genuinely possessed by the object (thus which methodological perspectives are still eligible) and which ones not (thus which perspectives not eligible anymore). In contrast, it is considered inadequate (in this connection) if otherwise. This adequacy condition calls the agent’s attention and sensitivity to this: during the process of the dynamic development (if any) of an object of study, the object might develop some new aspect(s) while losing some of its previous aspects; consequently, the methodological perspective with regard to the previous aspect of the object might be not absolutely or permanently eligible, and a previously ineligible perspective might become eligible because of its pointing to the new aspect. This adequacy condition highlights the need for the agent’s sensitivity to the dynamic development (if any) of the object of study, one important front which can be easily ignored by an agent who is guided by an inadequate methodological guiding principle in this connection. Now let us consider the Chinese language as a sample object of study in linguistics and philosophy of language (when addressing related philosophical issues). It is known that the Chinese language, as a representative ideographic language, has various distinct features, in contrast to a phonetic language like English, and has undergone its dynamic development, from its ancient form (usually called ‘古漢語’, the ancient or classical Chinese) to its contemporary form (usually called ‘現代漢語’, the contemporary or modern Chinese). There are some reflectively interesting features that occur in the development process of the Chinese language from the ancient Chinese to the modern Chinese; we can expect that there will be some newly developed features of the future

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Chinese language. A methodological guiding principle is considered adequate (in this connection) if it guides the agent to be sensitive to the dynamic development of the Chinese language for the sake of realizing and understanding which aspects are still or currently genuinely possessed by modern Chinese (thus which methodological perspectives are still eligible) and which ones not (thus which perspectives not currently eligible anymore).  The direct-complementarity-seeking condition. Given that multiple, seemingly competing eligible methodological perspectives concerning an object of study, whose identity can result from dynamic development if any, turn out to be directly complementary (in the sense that they point to and capture distinct and directly complementary aspects or layers of the object, which jointly contribute to the identity of the object in a mutually-supportive and supplementary way, and thus are indispensable for a complete understanding of the object), a methodological guiding principle is considered adequate (in this connection) if it captures the complementary character of the involved aspects of the object and thus seeks the complementary connection and harmonious balance between those perspectives for the sake of capturing the way the object is in this connection. In contrast, it is considered inadequate (in this connection) if otherwise. Again consider the two sample methodological perspectives, namely, the “semantic” perspective and the “pragmatic” perspective on the basic language employment as an object of study. Given that the basic language employment as the object of study genuinely possesses both its “semantic” dimension and its “pragmatic” dimension and that both dimensions are not absolutely separated from each other but interdependent, interpenetrating, interactive and complementary with regard to the constitution of the basic language employment. Then the “semantic” perspective and the “pragmatic” perspective on the basic language employment are directly complementary instead of being incompatible or opposed to each other. In this way, any methodological guiding principle that renders the two methodological perspectives complementary and seeks their complementary connection and joint contribution to a complete understanding of the basic language employment thus meets the direct-complementarity-seeking condition. If otherwise, a methodological guiding principle would be inadequate in this connection on the issue. Actually, the direct-complementarity-seeking condition essentially reflects the point of the yin-yang model of interaction and transformation in the Chinese philosophical tradition.  The sublation-seeking condition concerning guiding-principle-associated perspective complexes with complementary perspective simplexes. Given that

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there are two seemingly competing guiding-principle-associated perspective complexes22 concerning an object of study whose perspective parts are eligible (i.e., capturing distinct aspects of the object) but whose respectively associated methodological guiding principles are genuinely competing or incompatible (either because one of them is inadequate or because both are inadequate in other connections), such a methodological guiding principle would be considered adequate (in this connection) if it seeks a due solution through a Hegelian synthetic balance via sublation that keeps what are reasonable or appropriate from both guiding-principle-associated perspective complexes (i.e., their eligible perspectives, maybe plus some adequate guiding principle from one perspective complex if any) while disregarding what are not, i.e., the inadequate guiding principle (or principles) in one (or both) of the perspective complexes. In contrast, it is considered inadequate (in this connection) if otherwise. Again consider the two sample methodological perspectives, namely, the “semantic” perspective and the “pragmatic” perspective on the basic language employment as an object of study. There might be two seemingly competing guiding-principle-associated perspective complexes in this case: the “semantic”-dimension-only perspective complex (i.e., the “semantic” perspective that is associated with a guiding principle which renders the “semantic” perspective exclusively eligible) and the “pragmatic”-dimension-only perspective (i.e., the “pragmatic” perspective that is associated with a guiding principle which renders the “pragmatic” perspective exclusively eligible). It is pre-theoretically recognized (or it is arguably the case) that the basic language employment does have both its “semantic” dimension and its “pragmatic” dimension which jointly contribute to the identity of the basic language employment. In this case, what really makes the two perspective complexes (the two guiding-principle-associated perspective complex) competing or incompatible would be their respectively associated guiding principles that render their respectively guided perspectives exclusively eligible. Then, when a methodological guiding principle seeks a synthetic balance (via sublation) to bring about a new approach that keeps what is reasonable in the two perspective complexes (i.e., the two involved perspective simplexes per se) while 22  See the conceptual characterization of a methodological perspective in Section 2.1: there is the distinction between a methodological-perspective simplex and a methodologicalperspective complex; a simplex is a single discernible methodological perspective, and a complex is either a combination of simplexes (“multiple perspective complex”) or an association of one perspective (simplex) with a certain methodological guiding principle (“guiding-principle-associated perspective complex”).

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disregarding what is not (i.e., the addressed inadequate guiding principles), the methodological guiding principle would be considered to be adequate because it meets the sublation-seeking condition in this case.  The contradiction-recognizing-while-indirect-complementarity-seeking condition (concerning genuinely competing perspectives). Given that two different seemingly competing but eligible methodological perspectives concerning an object of study, whose identity can result from dynamic development if any, turn out to be genuinely “contradictory” (in the sense that they point to and capture distinct aspects or layers of the object, which jointly contribute to the identity of the object but also jointly capture some internal contradiction really possessed by the object, and thus are indispensable for a complete understanding of the object), a methodological guiding principle is considered adequate (in this connection) if it captures the genuine-contradiction state of the involved aspects of the object, recognizes the eligibility of these thus “contradictory” perspectives, and seeks a certain indirect complementarity between those perspectives in a way sensitive to specific situation and with a due understanding of the status of the addressed internal “contradiction”. In contrast, it is considered inadequate (in this connection) if otherwise. In other words, given that some internal contradiction really exists in the object and substantially contributes to the identity of the object, this adequacy condition consists of the three layers: recognizing that some genuine contradiction is possessed by the object and brings about a certain internal tension of the object;23 thus recognizing that each of the involved perspectives that does point to and capture one of the “contradiction” aspects of the object is eligible and contributes to our understanding and treatment of the “contradictory” dimension of the object; seeking a kind of “indirect complementarity” of the involved perspectives in the following sense: eventually, either at a certain deeper level of the way of thinking and from a holistic and broader vantage point or through changing the original “contradictory” aspects to complementary aspects of the newly-developed identity of the object (thus

23  It is noted that this does not go against but actually maintains the basic way-things-arecapturing norm, which regulates any reflective pursuits addressing “how things are”. If there is a genuine contradiction, then recognizing this genuine contradiction (or the “contradictory” dimension of an object) is actually implementing the norm, rather than violating it. The way-things-are-capturing norm does not automatically or necessarily mean that there is one single static entity waiting there for one’s discovery. Rather, the way-things-are-capturing norm includes the normative expectation of capturing the way things are to be, especially for some social issues as objects of study.

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“indirectly”), we can constructively render the originally “contradictory” perspectives “complementary” (mutually supportive and supplementary in some connection and to some extent), rather than just negatively dismissing (the potentiality of) such “indirect complementarity”. The foregoing layer is to be implemented in distinct ways, being sensitive to the nature of different types of objects of study. It is also noted that such an “indirect complementarity” can be minimally and jointly sought and reached, in an indirect way (in the aforementioned connections) by the agents who might disagree to how to “resolve” the “contradiction” and/or how to treat some other relevant issues (i.e., independently of how the agents intend to “resolve” the “contradiction” and treat some other relevant issues). Let me use one sample case concerning language for illustration. Take the human natural language as a whole (or a collection whole of various natural languages); there are genuine “contradictory” aspects of it, its Chinese ideographic language part and its Western phonetic language part with regard to the order of talking about things when giving people’s names and addresses: in English, we first give our given names (thus being called ‘first name’) and last give our family names (thus being called ‘last name’); however, in Chinese, we first give our family names (thus the family name is really the first name in Chinese way) and then the given names (for instance, the real order of my whole name in Chinese is ‘Mou [family name] Bo [given name]’, instead of ‘Bo Mou’). By the same token, in contrast to its way in English, a mailing address (taking my mailing address as an example) should go this way when delivered in Chinese: “USA, California 95192, San Jose, San Jose State University, Department of Philosophy, Mou Bo”, that is, the larger thing goes first while the smaller thing next (and the individual person last); in contrast, the order in English reverses the Chinese way in this connection: “Bo Mou, Department of Philosophy, San Jose State University, San Jose, California 95192, USA” (that is, the smaller thing/individual goes first while the larger thing next. In this way, the “collective-first-oriented” perspective and the “individual-firstoriented” perspective, when pointing to and capturing the foregoing “larger/ collective-thing-being-addressed-first” linguistic aspect and “smaller/individual-thing-being-addressed-first” linguistic aspect of the human natural language as a whole, are both eligible because the above two linguistic aspects to which they respectively point to are really possessed by the human natural language, though they are possessed by its distinct parts, say, the Chinese-ideographiclanguage part and the English-phonetic-language part. Now a range of relevant reflective questions concerning the due relationship between the two distinct perspectives include these. (1) There are seemingly-descriptive questions: To what extent would each of these two distinct linguistic phenomena and their

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associated distinct perspectives bear on the orientation of the way of thinking of its associated linguistic community? In other words, how, or to what extent, would the two distinct perspectives represent respectively the distinct orientations of the folk ways of thinking of, say, the Chinese linguistic community and the Western phonetic linguistic community? [There are distinct layers of the so-called way of thinking; which layer should be focused on—it is more or less a prescriptive issue; to this extent, the preceding “descriptive” questions are also partially prescriptive; that is why I render them “seemingly descriptive”; that is why thinking about such questions is also in need of adequate guidance of an adequate methodological guiding principle.]. (2) There are prescriptive questions: Which perspective would be better? If one world-wide unifying “natural language” (being supposed to be neat, concise and effective) would be constructed (in view that such an actual endeavor was indeed made in the last century), which perspective together with its regulated linguistic stipulations should or is expected to be followed? If the answers to the above seeminglydescriptive questions and the above prescriptive questions are affirmative, then would that mean that the less-fitting-perspective-associated orientation of the way of thinking should be transformed into, or guided by, the betterperspective-associated orientation of the way of thinking? As these questions address various dimensions of the due relationship between the two perspectives concerning the aforementioned aspects of the human natural language, and given that an adequate methodological guiding principle concerning distinct perspectives in treating an object of study is to regulate and guide an adequate understanding and treatment of the due relationship between the perspectives, how to understand and treat these questions needs the guidance by an adequate methodological guiding principle. Then the foregoing adequacy condition in this connection can play its role this way. In this sample case, there seems to be no difficulty with understanding and implementing the aforementioned first two layers of this adequacy condition: recognizing the addressed “contradictory” aspects and recognizing the eligibility of the associated “contradictory” perspectives. However, how to understand and implement the third layer of this adequacy condition (i.e., seeking a holistic indirect complementarity of the involved perspectives) in this case needs to be sensitive to the situation of this specific case: clearly, in such a case, direct complementarity of the involved “contradictory” perspectives is not sought, in contrast to the kind of cases for which the aforementioned adequacy condition (7) (i.e., the direct-complementarity-seeking condition) is sought; rather, a kind of indirect complementarity can be minimally sought in the sense that, eventually at a certain deeper level of the way of thinking and from a holistic and broader vantage point (thus “indirectly”), we can constructively render

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the “contradictory” perspectives “complementary” (mutually supportive and supplementary), even if it is (more or less) controversial how to answer (some of) the aforementioned questions concerning the due relationship of the two perspectives; that is, such a minimal “indirect complementarity” can be sought and reached independently of how to specifically answer these questions or how to take certain specific means to resolve the “contradiction”; this adequacy condition here is not bound with a certain ad hoc point of view on these questions.24  The open-mind-oriented self-criticism condition. This condition is listed last but not least; though the foregoing conditions, especially and implicitly point to this condition, it is reflectively worth specifying and highlighting separately, as this condition would fundamentally distinguish a genuinely philosophical attitude towards distinct critical views from an absolutely faith-oriented attitude that takes its foundation thing for granted and would not allow any criticism and challenge to it. The point of this condition is not that one cannot firmly maintain one’s foundation thing or some axiom-like basic principle—it is clear that one has to stop somewhere in one’s account or theoretic system; rather, the point of this condition is this: one needs to always maintain an open-minded reflective attitude towards all critical challenges to the basic principle(s) on which one’s account or theoretic system is based and is ready to modify, revise, or even give up the basic principle if it turns out to be wrong or mistaken through reasonable justification. In this way, any methodological guiding principle that has such an open-minded self-critical character and thus meets the condition would be adequate in this connection. If otherwise, a methodological guiding principle would be inadequate in this connection. Several notes are due on the foregoing ten “adequacy” conditions for maintaining an adequate methodological guiding principle in philosophical inquiries, generally speaking, and those in philosophy of language, specifically speaking. First, condition , given an object of study, is presupposed by the remaining kind of adequacy conditions as the truth pursuit (capturing the way the object is) is taken as one strategic goal against the radical “anything goes” relativism; condition is presupposed by the subsequent kinds of conditions through . 24  In this way, with consideration of the illustration purpose of citing this case here, I will not go further to explain this author’s view on the issues, although I have an account of how to address this range of specific questions (see my relevant discussion in Section A2.1 of the “Appendix 1” part in my contributing essay to this volume on pages 156–7).

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Second, if the relation between eligible methodological perspectives under consideration is directly complementary, then one needs to resort to condition ; if they appear to be not complementary or not directly complementary, then we really need to have further examination of whether any of these perspectives are perspective simplex or perspective complex (i.e., actually it is a combination of one perspective simplex plus a methodological guiding principle—“guiding-principle-associated perspective complex” as indicted above when I characterize what a methodological perspective is); if it is the latter, one needs to resort to condition ; if it is the former (the addressed eligible perspectives are not directly complementary), one needs to resort to condition seeking a certain indirect complementarity between those perspectives in a way sensitive to specific situation. Third, however, to thoroughly fulfill conditions and , condition needs to be met if the object has its dynamic-development dimension. Fourth, the forgoing adequacy conditions have also contributed to suggesting an “objective” criterion for the identities of those issues that can (and should) be jointly-concerned (through philosophical interpretation) in philosophy of language. As highlighted at the end of the previous section, it is important to note that the identity of jointly-concerned issues of philosophy is not the same as the identity of the existing issue domain of inquiry: for their identities, the constructive-engagement strategy presupposes neither the current agents’ subjective preferences nor the identity of the existing domain of inquiry; rather, as highlighted in the preceding adequacy conditions and , i.e., the “new-eligible-perspective-possibilityrecognizing” condition and the “dynamic-development-sensitivity” condition, the constructive-engagement strategy is explicitly inclusive to cover both newly-identified aspects of an object of study during the process of our further exploration of the object and newly-developed aspects of an object of study during the process of its dynamic development, both of which are open to newly-developed eligible perspectives; in this sense and to this extent, the constructive-engagement strategy has positively suggested some “objective” criterion for the identities of those issues that can be jointly-concerned (through due philosophical interpretation). Fifth, last but not least, in the same philosophical spirit as what is indicated in the foregoing adequacy condition , this “adequacy-condition” list per se is open to criticism, instead of being dogmatically maintained. Indeed, this set of adequacy conditions is suggested here to serve two purposes: for one thing, it is to explain how it is possible to maintain adequate methodological guiding principles in cross-tradition philosophical inquiries; for another thing, it is to

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provide the interested reader with an engaging starting point or an effective stepping stone, which per se is not intended to be dogmatically imposed on the reader but expected to be a target of critical examination in their own engaging exploration on the subject. The constructive-engagement strategy of doing philosophy of language comparatively, as explained above and as practiced especially through a range of aforementioned collective projects in the past decade since the beginning of this century, is presented as one strategic way of doing philosophy of language comparatively, as one organizational strategy for this volume, and as one way of helping the interested reader look at distinct approaches presented in this volume. In so doing, I intend neither to treat the suggested “constructiveengagement” strategy as the exclusive way of doing philosophy of language comparatively nor to suggest it on behalf of the other contributors’ views in this connection if any.25 As emphasized in the “adequacy” condition (10), the constructive-engagement strategy itself is open-minded and open-ending: it is open to criticism; through constructively engaging with itself, it is open to due change and new eligible perspectives without dogmatic limits in doing philosophy of language comparatively. 3

The Organizational Strategy and Contents

This anthology volume is neither given as the proceedings of the aforementioned conferences, as explained before, nor designed for a comprehensive collection of the past representative articles on the theme; it aims at presenting most recent scholarship on a range of issues addressed in doing philosophy of language comparatively in view of the resources of the Chinese language and Chinese philosophy and with the emphasis on the constructiveengagement strategy, as explained in the first section. The whole volume 25  Some of the contributors to this volume are well-respected scholars in philosophy of language who have their own systematic visions and thoughts on how to do philosophy of language and how to look at distinct approaches in this area. For example, Al Matinich and Ernie Lepore not only the authors of some original writings in philosophy of language but also respectively the editors of two widely used source/reference books in philosophy of language in the setting of contemporary philosophy, i.e., Martinich (ed.) 1985/(eds. with Sosa) 2013 and Lepore & Smith (eds.) 2010, which I strongly recommend to the interested reader especially for the sake of capturing the rich scholarship in contemporary philosophy of language in the analytic tradition.

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consists of six parts respectively on distinct topics in doing philosophy of language comparatively in view of relevant Chinese resources, and the included essays are organized into them with consideration of their contents and focuses. The book, in Part 1, starts with one “vertical” fundamental issue of how it is possible for language to hook up to and capture the world through names (i.e., the issue of reference) in view of relevant Chinese resources; due understanding and treatment of the issue (understood broadly, thus intrinsically related to the issue of truth to be addressed below) will provide one important, across-the-board “semantic” foundation (though not the exclusive one) for doing philosophy (generally speaking), do philosophy of language (specifically speaking) and treating the subsequent issues under examination in this volume (more specifically speaking). Then, in Part 2, it moves onto the “horizontal” fundamental issue of cross-contextual meaning and understanding, which also has its general across-the-board significance and whose treatment in philosophy of language is one important connection in which philosophy of language can explicitly contribute to one fundamental issue in doing philosophy comparatively, i.e., how cross-traditional understanding and engagement in philosophy is possible; it thus constitutes one significant general meta-concern in doing philosophy of language comparatively. Parts 3, 4 and 5 focus respectively on a range of contentious issues under current debate in doing philosophy of language comparatively in view of relevant Chinese resources: Part 3 on “Principle of Charity and Linguistic Relativism in Relation to Chinese”, Part 4 on “Semantic Truth and Pluralist Approaches in Chinese Context”, and Part 5 on “The ‘Speakable’ and the ‘Unspeakable’ in Chinese Texts”. With the “constructive-engagement” strategy of this volume, these three parts are organized in a more engaging format (thus with the subtitle “Engaging Exploration”): (1) some engagement background essays (if in need) are included (reprints), which are the cases of Part 3 and Part 4; (2) I as volume editor give my own substantial engaging writing on the issue under examination in a separate section entitle “Editor’s engaging remarks” for each of these three parts, which is either my current engaging commentary writing (in the case of Part 3) or consists of my previously published engaging writing on the issue and my further engaging commentary note in the “postscript” form (in the cases of Parts 4 and 5); (3) the entries in each of these three parts explicitly address the jointly-concerned issue examined in the part with distinct approaches, which either explicitly critically engage the approach presented in the engagement background essay (in the cases of Part 3 and Part 4) or go with their distinct emphases (at least with regard to the “perspective”

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dimensions of these approaches) which can be somehow complementary in a more complete account (in the case of Part 5). The topic of the last part, Part 6, “Language in Action through Chinese Texts” is on how the ways in which Chinese language is used in such representative Chinese classical texts as the Analects and the Dao-De-Jing can contribute to our understanding and treatment of some issues (such as the issue of the relationship between illocutionary force and linguistic convention and the issue of metaphor) in philosophy of language concerning distinct dimensions of the power of language in action. Two explanatory notes are due at this moment. First, as mentioned at the outset of this section, this volume is not designed to be a comprehensive collection of the previous representative publications;26 rather, it is intended to present some selected works of the recent engaging scholarship in the constructive-engagement exploration of doing philosophy of language comparatively; the coverage of the selected topics and the way of classification and organization of the included writings in this volume are neither exhaustive nor exclusive but being sensitive to the objective and strategy of this volume. Second, I would like to alert the interested reader to making a quick or indiscriminate judgment on an author’s approach either without a refined understanding of its distinct dimensions with their own evaluative status (given explicitly or implicitly) or only because of this author’s perspective being different from the current one you prefer (if any). With the conceptual resources and distinctions introduced in the previous section and those suggested “adequacy” conditions, the interested reader might consider first distinguishing distinct dimensions of the author’s approach as a whole: among others, its “perspective” dimension, which sets out to point to and capture a certain genuinely-possessed aspect of the object of study, and its “guiding principle” dimension, which is explicitly given or implicitly assumed to regulate how the author looks at the relationship between her own current working perspective and other (eligible) perspective(s) concerning the object of study. Part 1, “Semantic-Syntactic Structure of Chinese Names and Issue of Reference”, consists of four chapters. The first two chapters directly address the issue of the semantics of Chinese names; both discuss the issue (partially) through examining Gongsun Long’s classical “White-Horse-Not-Horse” (Bai-Ma-Fei-Ma 白馬非馬) thesis; both examine the issue in a larger engaging 26  For a selection of the past representative articles in doing Chinese philosophy of language (comparatively), the interested reader can see Part 1 “Philosophy of Language” in Volume 4, Philosophy of Language, Mind and Logic, in my edited 4-volume-set reference book Chinese Philosophy for Routledge’s “Critical Concepts in Philosophy” reference book series [Mou (ed.) 2018a].

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background: Yi relates it to his general plural logic account, while Mou looks at it in terms of his general “double-reference” account of names in early China. In his contributing essay “White Horse Paradox and Semantics of Chinese Nouns”, Chapter 1, Byeong-uk Yi argues that, in an ancient Chinese treatise, the White Horse Dialogue, Gongsun Long seems to defend a paradoxical thesis: the white horses are not horses. This paper presents an interpretation of the dialogue that shows cogent logic lies under the apparent sophistries in the dialogue. On this interpretation, the individualist interpretation, his main thesis in the dialogue is a true thesis concerning individual horses: (a) the horses (or all the horses taken together), and (b) the white horses (or all the white horses taken together). The thesis holds that the horses are not the same things as the horses. To support this interpretation, the paper discusses features of Chinese and argues that the Chinese sentence Gongsun Long uses to state his thesis (Bai-ma-fei-ma) has a potential ambiguity: it can mean either that the white horses are horses (the usual, indefinite reading) or that the white horses are the horses (the plural definite reading). The paper discusses features of Chinese to show that the plural definite reading, which Gongsun Long is taken to assume, is a potential reading of the sentence, and argues that the dialogue has good arguments for the thesis that the sentence states on this reading. In my contributing essay “A Double-Reference Account of Names in Early China”, Chapter 2, I give a double-reference account of referential meanings of names in early China through three representative case analyses on the semantic-syntactic structures of the hexagram names in the Yi-Jing text, the common names in Gongsun Long’s ‘White-Horse-Not-Horse’ thesis, and names as treated in the Later Mohist diagnosis of the parallel inference. My discussion is an exploration of how the ancient Chinese philosophers under examination reflectively and effectively resort to the “double-reference” character of the basic language employment to talk about the same world or the same objects in distinct focuses via rich Chinese resources. In so doing, I intend to explain how these thinkers’ visions and treatments in looking at the relationship between language, thought and the world can contribute to our understanding and treatment of the issue of reference and thus the contemporary development of philosophy of language. To elaborate relevant points of the Chinese resources in a more precise and effective way, in the appendixes, I suggest and explain an expanded collective-name hypothesis concerning the semantic-syntactic structure of common nouns and an expanded predicate logic account with its enhanced identity sign and collective-generic operator. Marshall Willman aims at analyzing Chinese noun phrases involving measure words from an evolutionary perspective, in his contributing essay, “On the Comparative Analysis of Chinese Measure Words: Insights from Evolutionary Theory”, Chapter 3. Assuming, hypothetico-deductively, that natural selection

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has gradually modified and developed not only the neurobiology of the human brain responsible for language acquisition and competence, but also the very grammars of natural languages themselves, it is argued that Chinese measure word phrases have undergone increasing adaptation to the grammatical and pragmatic contexts in which they occur. Consequently, children growing up today in linguistic environments in which Chinese is spoken are learning Chinese noun phrases more rapidly because Chinese itself has become more efficaciously adapted to the neurobiological mechanisms children have been utilizing to learn it. Given the facility with which this evolutionary perspective provides answers to questions about the meanings of Chinese noun phrases, it is argued that it provides a plausible and important contribution to the comparative analysis of Chinese semantics. Moreover, it provides solutions to questions about logical form that are consistent with the commonly held view that human beings throughout the world share more or less the same basic panoply of neurobiological mechanisms for expressing and interpreting the sentences we use to communicate, in spite of the remarkable diversity that is observed in the grammars of the world’s natural languages. The last essay in Part 1, Chapter 4, is Jianhua Mei’s paper “Intuitions or Reasons: The Empirical Evidence for Theory of Reference”, which looks at the issue of reference related to Chinese names from the vantage point of experimental philosophy, a new movement in recent decades in philosophy which has conducted a range of experiments to test people’s intuitions about philosophical cases. In their 2004 paper “semantics, Cross Culture style”, Edouard Machery et. al intend to undermine Kripke’s argument for his causal-historical theory of reference, through an experiment which chooses Western participants from University of Rutgers and Eastern participants from University of Hong Kong to test their respective intuitions about the Kripkean causalhistorical approach and the Fregean descriptive approach to the issue of reference. Though the experiment is conducted in English, it can be assumed that these University of Hong Kong students know unified written Chinese and can speak a dialect (Mandarin or Cantonese) of Chinese. They design a survey to test participants’ intuition about Kripke’s Gödel case, the results indicate that the Western participants incline to the causal historical intuition while the Eastern participants incline to the descriptive intuition. In this paper, Mei argues that experimental philosophers should design experiments to test people’s reasons for their choices instead of testing their intuitions. Because reasons are more relevant than intuitions to support a theory of reference in several connections. First, intuitions are not the conclusive evidence for theory. Second, its reasons are not always intuitions involved in existing experiments. Third, it seems that we should combine the quantitative method (intuitions

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test) and qualitative method (reasons test) to develop experimental philosophy. Fourth, reasons are rooted deeply in different cultures, and they can be expressed explicitly by participants from different cultural traditions. Part 2 is on a more general topic concerning cross-contextual meaning and understanding. This topic explicitly addresses one of the major fronts of doing philosophy of language comparatively, as indicated before: i.e., exploring how cross-contextual, cross-textual, cross-linguistic or cross-traditional meaning and understanding is possible, which can profoundly contribute to the foundation for the constructive-engagement strategy of doing philosophy of language comparatively; such “foundational” work is important both for the constructive-strategy of doing philosophy of language comparatively and for the general strategy of doing philosophy comparatively. This part starts with A. P. Martinich’s essay “Communicative Meaning and Meaning as Significance”, Chapter 5. It is known that one reason that the nature of meaning is difficult to understand is that the word ‘mean’ is equivocal. The author starts with distinguishing five distinctive senses of the term ‘mean’ and then focuses on two that are particularly important for the theory of interpretation, communicative meaning and meaning as significance. The author intends to show that the elements necessary for interpreting or understanding the meaning of a text (communicative meaning) overlaps or is on a continuum with the elements necessary for interpreting or understanding (meaning as significance) situations and events that are not necessarily linguistic. The author’s argumentation is supported by his detailed analyses of several examples of interpretation. The author examines the relevant resources both from the analytic tradition and the “Continental” tradition in his discussion; as indicated before, this illustrates another front of doing philosophy of language comparatively, i.e., the constructive engagement between distinct approaches from different traditions that are distinguished by styles and orientations, especially between the two major styles/orientations of doing philosophy, i.e., the analytic tradition and the “Continental” tradition understood in a broad sense, on a range of jointly-concerned issues in philosophy of language. In their co-authored article “Semantics and What Is Said”, Chapter 6, Una Stojnic and Ernie Lepore focus more on the semantic dimension of the issue of how cross-contextual meaning and understanding is possible. A once commonplace view is that only a semantic theory that interprets sentences of a language according to what their utterances intuitively say can be correct. The rationale is that only by requiring a tight connection between what a sentence means and what its users intuitively say can we explain why, normally, those linguistically competent with a language upon hearing its sentences uttered can discern what they say. More precisely, this approach ties the semantic

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content of a sentence to intuitions about “says that” reports. Cappelen and Lepore (1997, 2005) forcefully argued against this approach. But given their criticism, what constraints are there on a correct assignment of semantic content to sentences of a language? Two choices are available regard: either give up the strategy of identifying semantic content by looking at indirect speech reports, or, conclude that the intuition about the connection between meaning and intuitions about indirect reports is basically on the right track, but needs to be further constrained. We will explore both strategies and argue that ultimately we should reject the intuitions about indirect reports as tests on semantic theory, and propose a more direct strategy for identifying semantic content. It is noted that, although the two chapters in this part do not directly address some specific features of Chinese language (except in citing some Chinese sample sentences in Chapter 5) and resort to relevant resources in Chinese philosophy, their concerns and treatments are general and are supposed to also hold for the Chinese language; they are especially relevant to cross-contextual and cross-linguistic engagement and to doing philosophy of language comparatively.27 In a broader background, Stojnic’s and Lepore’s article captures and elaborates one of the central points of Donald Davidson’s basic approach in contemporary philosophy of language: the inter-subjectively shared semantic content is a due basis for any cross-contextual meaning and cross-cultural understanding. The point is essentially one central point of Davidson’s version of the principle of charity (‘the Principle of Charity’ for short below). The core idea of Davidson’s Principle of Charity is this: we must interpret others on the assumption that they are rational beings, navigating the same world as we are. 27  Al Martinich and Ernie Lepore are old-friend colleagues of the Chinese philosophial circle (understood broadly, instead of being restricted to those who currently work in the Mainland China), especially to thsoe Chinese colleagues in philosophy of language. Martinich, as mentioned before, is the editor of the widely used source book in philosophy of language, The Philosophy of Language (its 1st edition came out in 1985 and now its sixth edition in 2013); its first edition has been translated into Chinese (I was coordinator and a primary translator of this translation project which was completed in early 1989 right before I came to USA and published in 1998); and the translation was published in 1997. Lepore’s book Insensitive Semantics (co-authored with Cappelen 2005) was translated into Chinese, published in 2002. The first conference on doing philosophy of language comparatively initiated by ISCWP and held in Beijing in 2006, as indicated in the “Acknowledgements”, was co-sponsored by the APA’s Committee on International Co-operation in which Ernie was then its Chair while I served as one of its members; both Al and Ernie were participating speakers at this conference.

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But how to understand the nature, explanatory power, scope and limit of this principle? Although Davidson’s thesis is considered to be (partially) based on a priori argument to some extent, it is open to the test of whether and to what extent it is correct or on the right track when looking at alien linguistic contexts like the Chinese one which is immersed by some distinct ways of thinking. This concern naturally invites us to move on to the topic of Part 3, which is the first of the aforementioned three-part “engaging exploration” series in this volume, “Principle of Charity and Linguistic Relativism in Relation to Chinese: Engaging Exploration (I)”. This part starts with A. C. Graham’s essay “Conceptual Schemes and Linguistic Relativism in Relation to Chinese”, Chapter 7, serving as an engagement-background essay. Graham is a widely-respected sinologist. As summarized by Yiu-ming Fung in his essay “A. C. Graham’s Sinologist Criticism and the Myth of ‘Pre-logical Thinking’”, Chapter 8 (269): [A. C. Graham] may be the first scholar in the context of Chinese philosophy to express opinions counter to Donald Davidson’s Principle of Charity and to his view on the very idea of a conceptual scheme. As a sinologist with a comparative perspective based on a strong British theological background and on a long-term experience through energetic work in Chinese Studies, Graham has made significant contributions to the field of Chinese philosophy, especially in his interpretations of Chinese texts and his explanations of the problems in the field. Graham’s contributions seem inseparable from his special capacity in reading meanings from or into Chinese texts with a comparative perspective from a double eye—a “British eye” together with a “Chinese eye.” It seems to Graham that his and his colleagues’ comparative studies with “bilingual” capabilities (or, to use my metaphor, with a “double eye”) are helpful to do comparison work and that the comparison between Chinese and Western thoughts are understandable or intelligible though they are based on very different conceptual schemes which fundamentally have very little in common. To this extent, and in this connection, Davidson’s challenge to the very idea of a conceptual scheme, also constitutes a challenge to this kind of basic faith of the sinologist. Graham thus criticizes Davidson’s Principle of Charity and presents two alleged problems with it: the first one comes from his doubt about whether the principle can be survived in the context of comparison between Chinese and English language and philosophy; the second one is about the methodological character of the Principle of Charity which many tend to negatively render “transcendental”. In his essay, Fung examines these two alleged problems with Davidson’s Principle of Charity as identified by Graham. The

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author argues that Graham’s criticism regarding the first alleged problem is fundamentally self-defeating; it cannot be understood as a real challenge to Davidson’s Principle of Charity; as for the second alleged problem, the author argues that this is a misunderstanding due to the critics’ failing to take seriously some of the concrete examples provided by Davidson and not realizing a crucial distinction between the two kinds of transcendental argument in the literature. In my “Editor’s engaging remarks” for this part, I give a “double-reference” interpretation of Davidson’s “underlying agreement” point of the Principle of Charity in his opening message (“Foreword”) in an anthology volume28 around seventeen years ago and then make my evaluative remarks on one of Graham’s points in his essay and Fung’s criticism of it. My ending point is this. In view of the two authors’ engaging approaches, a further engaging question in philosophy of language is this: how is it possible for peoples in different linguistic communities and in different cultural traditions to talk about the same objects and reach “underlying agreement” in this connection? The “double-reference” character of the basic language employment makes it possible; a “double-reference” account of referential meanings of names, as suggested in my contributing essay in Part 1 of this volume, is intended to capture and explain this. All the foregoing issues in doing philosophy of language comparatively, so to speak, are intrinsically related to another across-the-board fundamental issue in philosophy, i.e., the philosophical concern with truth as the philosophical reflection and elaboration of people’s pre-theoretic “way-things-are-­capturing” understanding of truth. First, the issue of reference is intrinsically related to the issue of truth because both are closely-related crucial parts of the strategic pursuit in philosophy to capture the way things are, no matter in which direction to understand their relationship (i.e., understanding truth by virtue of reference or understanding reference by virtue of truth). Second, one crucial basis and criterion for reaching cross-contextual and cross-linguistic meaning and understanding is being able to jointly capturing the way things (jointly talked about) are. Indeed, in contemporary philosophical inquiries, it is philosophy of language that is considered to be one primary “hometown” in which the notion of truth and the philosophical concern with truth have been most effectively explored at a deep level; this is not accidental or merely preferable. One primary reason is this: it is the normative “semantic” character of the notion of truth that hits home the point of people’s pre-theoretic “way-things-are-capturing” understanding of truth and that points to the 28  Davidson 2001b.

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fundamental semantic relationship between the truth bearer as the linguistic item and the truth maker as the extra-linguistic way things are. Part 4 focuses on this issue from the vantage point of philosophy of language, which is the second of the aforementioned three-part “engaging exploration” series in this volume; it is thus entitled “Semantic Truth and Pluralist Approaches in Chinese Context: Engaging Exploration (II)”. This part starts with Chapter 9, Alexus McLeod’s essay “Pluralism about Truth in Early Chinese Philosophy: A Reflection on Wang Chong’s Approach” together with the author’s “Replies” article in response to Brons’ and Bo Mou’s critical engaging articles to be mentioned below (both reprinted here), serving as an engagement-background essay. The debate concerning truth in classical Chinese philosophy has for the most part avoided the possibility that pluralist theories of truth were part of the classical philosophical framework. The author argues that the Eastern Han philosopher Wang Chong (c. 25–100 CE) can be profitably read as endorsing a kind of pluralism about truth grounded in the concept of shi 實, or “actuality”. In his exploration of this view, the author explains how it offers a different account of the truth of moral and nonmoral statements, while still retaining the univocality of the concept of truth (that is, that the concept amounts to more than the expression of a disjunction of various truth properties), by connecting shi with normative and descriptive facts about how humans appraise statements. According to the author, “Shi, for Wang, is the property of having properties that we actually do and should seek when we appraise statements” (McLeod 2005, 55). The author also explains why, in addition to providing insight into pluralist views of truth in early China, the unique pluralist view implicit in Wang’s work can help solve problems with contemporary pluralist theories of truth. In his “Replies”, the author gives his further thoughtful defense of his basic position in response to some central points in Brons’ and my engaging essays. The journal Comparative Philosophy includes a “Constructive-Engagement Dialogue” section on McLeod’s essay in its July 2015 issue; the section consists of two portions: two engaging articles on McLeod’s essay, reprinted here as the primary part of the engagement-background essay: Lajos Brons’s article “Wang Chong, Truth, and Quasi-Pluralism” which together with its “Postscript” is included here, and my article “Rooted and Rootless Pluralist Approaches to Truth”, which is included in my “Editor’s Engaging Remarks” for this part; McLeod’s “Replies”, which is reprinted here as the appendix part of the engagement-background essay. In his engaging essay, Chapter 10, Brons criticizes McLeod’s pluralist interpretation of Wang Chong’s theory of truth through raising four difficulties with McLeod’s interpretation of Wang Chong as a pluralist, i.e., symmetry

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problems concerning the shi-xu (實虛, “truth and falsity”) opposition, skepticism about translation of terms as truth terms, doubts about textual evidence for the substantivity of shi (是) and ran (然) as truth-related properties, and seeming inconsistencies in terminology applied to domain in Wang’s essays in the Lun-Heng. In so doing, Brons also positively suggests a kind of “quasi-pluralism”, which builds on both McLeod’s pluralist interpretation and the author’s foregoing criticism of it; author argues that, although Wang did not hold exactly this pluralism , Wang implicitly held something very much like this. In his “Postscript” in response to McLeod’s “Replies”, Brons further stresses his aforementioned second and third objections, whose points he thinks McLeod misses; he also emphasizes that McLeod’s pluralist interpretation of Wang’s notion of shi (having “the properties that we do and should seek when appraising statements”) as truth criterion is neither sufficient nor necessary. My “Editor’s engaging remarks” for this part consists of my critical engaging article on McLeod’s essay and its “Postscript”. In the article, I suggest a distinct “pluralist” interpretation of Wang Chong’s account while engaging McLeod’s “pluralist” interpretation; my interpretation is essentially a substantial extension of my previously suggested general account of truth (Mou 2009) in view of relevant resources in classical Chinese philosophy (including Wang’s approach); I give an engaging analysis of the two interpretations as two distinct pluralist approaches that can be rendered respectively “rooted” and “rootless” and of explanatory forces of the two interpretations in several connections. In its “Postscript”, I emphasize one central point from the vantage point of philosophy of language: a high-order-property-seeking pluralist approach ignores one crucial “normative” character of people’s pre-theoretic “way-things-are-capturing” understanding of truth: people’s pretheoretic understanding of truth “prescriptively” points to the fundamental “semantic” relationship between the truth maker (the way things are) and the truth bearer that captures the way thing are (insofar as the truth bearer is intrinsically language-involved), as captured by the semantic notion of truth. Part 5 addresses the issue of the speakable and the unspeakable (sometime labeled ‘the issue of ineffability, a perennial issue in philosophy of language) in Chinese Texts. This part is the third of the three-part “engaging exploration” series in this volume in which distinct and seemingly disagreeing approaches to the issue are presented: those in the two contributors’ essay and in my own “Editor’s engaging remarks”). It is noted that, when using the phrase ‘seemingly disagreeing approaches’, I mean this: these distinct approaches presented in this part are just “seemingly” disagreeing but actually go with their distinct emphases, and their perspectives can be complementary.

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The first essay in this part is Chapter 11, Xianglong Zhang’s contributing essay, “From the Ineffable to the Poetic: Heidegger and Confucius on PoetryExperience of Language”. Addressing relevant resources in Heidegger’s and Confucius’ philosophies, the author explains that both Heidegger and Confucius are aware of the predicative or descriptive ineffability of the ultimate reality, but neither thinks that the “ineffable” covers all possibilities of language. For them, the arts, especially poetry, have the capacity of speaking primordially, which “opens horizons for truth emerging”, in the Heideggerian terms, and reveals prepredicative senses. In terms of setting forth how analytic philosophers observe Heidegger’s way of expression, the different meanings of the “limit of language” in contemporary Western philosophy are displayed. Heidegger and Confucius respectively move from the recognition of “the ineffability of the ultimate” to that of “poetry as the origin of language and a deeper way of expression”. While doing so, special attention is paid to the role of “nothingness” or “openness” for Heidegger and that of “xing” (興 evoking, uplifting) for Confucius. The author give “a direct comparison between the two thinkers’ views”. In his contributing essay “How Non-Speech Becomes a Form of Speech: A Reinterpretation of the Debate at the Dam over the Hao River”, Chapter 12, Zhaohua Chu starts with explaining how the debate at the dam over the Hao River between Zhuang Zi and Hui Zi arose and characterizes the source of the ideas that led Zhuang Zi to speak on the enjoyment of the fish (yu-zhi-le 鱼 之樂), pointing out that the meaning of the debate rests in bringing about the emergence of the true subject of “enjoyment.” It highlights this meaning by analyzing the essential content and value orientation of Zhuang Zi’s ideas on the joy of heaven (tian-le 天乐樂) and perfect enjoyment (zhi-le 至乐樂). Following up on this thread, the author goes further to analyze the true meaning of Zhuang Zi’s theory concerning the “great speech” of “non-speaking.” The essay indicates that in The Book of Zhuang-Zi, for a “non-speech” to become a form of speech, there should be the presence of the subject and its comprehension. Therefore, “great speech” and “small speech” differ essentially from each other, but are unified together as well. Only through the unity of these two levels can we comprehend the character and meaning of Zhuang Zi’s notion of language and his view of language. The “Editor’s engaging remarks” section for this “engaging exploration” part consists of my article on Lao Zi’s opening message of the Dao-De-Jing and its “Postscript” writing for the foregoing article in the current engaging setting. In the article, I explain how to understand Lao Zi’s two-sided opening message in the Dao-De-Jing concerning language engagement: emphasizing that the Dao is “speakable”, Lao Zi positively affirms the role of the language-engaged finite point of view in capturing the ultimate concern, but he also alerts us to the

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limitation of the language description of finite points of view; I also explain how our understanding and treatment of Lao Zi’s point can be enhanced by resorting to relevant resources in contemporary philosophy of language such as the Kripkean conception of rigid designation and causal-historical communication link. In its “Postscript”, in view of the relevant point concerning Davidson’s opening message in my “Editor’s engaging remarks” in Part 3 [i.e., the previous “Engaging Exploration (I)” part], I explain how the two thinkers’ opening messages are kindred in spirit in one important connection concerning how human beings can hook up to the same world via language. The three distinct approaches presented in this part on the issue of the speakable and the unspeakable are essentially complementary while with their distinct emphases: Zhang’s emphasis is on the capacity of the arts (especially poetry) as language-means/medium to capture what are considered to be predicatively or descriptively ineffable, Chu’s emphasis is on Zhuang Zi’s resources on the “great speech” of “non-speaking”, and my emphasis is on the shared “common” referential meanings (the same objects), which can be designated by names and constitute the foundation for “underlying agreement”. Put together, these approaches can jointly contribute to a more complete account of the issue of ineffability). Part 6, “Language in Action through Chinese Texts”, the last part of the volume, is on how the ways in which Chinese language is used in such representative Chinese classical texts as the Analects and the Dao-De-Jing can contribute to our understanding and treatment of some issues in philosophy of language concerning the philosophical points of distinct dimensions of the power of language in action. In his essay “Reading the Analects with Davidson: Mood, Force, and Communicative Practice in Early China” and his “Postscript” written expressly for this volume, Chapter 13, Yang Xiao engages in an important debate in contemporary philosophy of language between Dummett and Davidson on the relationship between the grammatical moods of a sentence and the pragmatic forces of the utterances of the sentence through drawing out the debate’s implications in the context of early Chinese philosophy and language, primarily through the Chinese classic text Analects. The author argues that, when studying the Analects, we should not limit ourselves to the study of grammatical and conventional features of sentences. Dummett insists that there is a strict correlation between mood and force, and that illocutionary force is always conventional. Davidson rejects the thesis, contending that neither force nor ulterior purpose of an utterance is governed by linguistic convention. Following Davidson, the author suggests that we should make the “pragmatic turn”, focusing on peoples’ communicative practice in concrete occasions. The

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author further clarifies his central point in his “Postscript 2017”, making the distinction between (a) formal and (b) non-formal grammatical approaches and explaining that his argument is only applicable to (a) instead of (b). Kyle Takaki, the author of the last chapter, Chapter 14, “Metaphor in Comparative Focus”, addresses the issue of metaphor in philosophy of language from a comparative vantage point and primarily through the case of the Chinese classic text Dao-De-Jing. The issue of metaphor is a significant one in philosophy of language, as metaphor distinctively show the power of language in action. There are various accounts of what metaphor is, in part due to metaphor’s rich diversity of uses. The levels involved (from metaphor in literature, to investigations of metaphor’s structure as a literary trope, to philosophical accounts of the meaning of metaphor, and so forth) suggest the need for a comparative approach to metaphor, which widens the horizons of these illuminating inquiries. Accounts of metaphor are often tacitly grounded in preconceptions of the phenomena metaphor is taken to cover. But just what is the range of these phenomena, and what is left out of these preconceptions that significantly bear upon what metaphor is taken to be? Takaki aims to disclose that metaphor put into comparative focus significantly expands and shifts the above sorts of projects, casting novel light on language and its relation to understanding the mind, and their embeddedness in worldviews. In sum, in this theme introduction, I have endeavored to fulfill three things. First, in Section 1, I have explained the background and objectives of this anthology project. Second, in Section 2, I have explained the fundamental rationale that underlies the foregoing background and objectives, i.e., the “constructiveengagement” strategy of doing philosophy of language comparatively: after briefly explaining major points of the general “­constructive-engagement” strategy of doing philosophy comparatively and introducing some explanatory resources and distinctions in need, I have explained (1) the “constructiveengagement” strategy of doing philosophy of language comparatively in view of the Chinese language and relevant resources from Chinese philosophy, (2) the four distinct but closely related fronts of doing philosophy of language comparatively, and (3) a set of “adequacy” conditions for the sake of exploring how it is possible to maintain adequate methodological guiding principles in doing philosophy of language comparatively. Third, in Section 3, I have explained the organizational strategy of this volume and introduced the major contents of the contributing essays, which are organized into six parts on distinct issues, and of this editor’s engaging remarks in three “engaging exploration” parts among the six parts.

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References Brons, Lajos L. (2013), “Meaning and Reality: A Cross-Traditional Encounter”, in Mou & Tieszen (eds.) 2013, 199–220. Cappelen, Herman & Ernie Lepore (2005), Insensitive Semantics: A Defense of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism (Blackwell). [For the reference information of its Chinese translation, see “Lepore” entry below.] Davidson, Donald (1993 in Chinese), Zhen-Li-Yi-Yi-Xing-Dong-Yu-Shi-Jian (《真理、意 義、行動與事件》Truth, Meaning, Actions, and Events), compiled and translated by MOU Bo 牟博 [Beijing: Shang-Wu-Yin-Shu-Guan 商務印書館 (the Commercial Press). This Chinese collection is further expanded into my compiled (2008 in Chinese), Zhen-Li-Yi-Yi-Yu-Fang-Fa (《真理、意義與方法：戴維森哲學文選》 Truth, Meaning, and Method: Selections from the Philosophical Writings of Donald Davidson) (as primary translator) [Beijing: Shang-Wu-Yin-Shu-Guan 商務印書館 (the Commercial Press)]. Davidson, Donald (2001a), Inquiries into Truth and Meaning (2nd edition) (Oxford: Clarendon Press). (2007 in Chinese), the Chinese translation of its 2001 second edition, Dui-Zhen-Li-Yu-Jie-Shi-De-Tan-Jiu [《對真理與解釋的探究》] (Inquires into Truth and Meaning), co-translated by MOU Bo 牟博 and JIANG Yi 江怡 [Beijing: Zhong-Guo-Ren-Ming-Da-Xue-Chu-Ban-She 中國人民大學出版社 (the Chinese Ren-Min University Press)]. Davidson, Donald (2001b), “Foreword” [“On Analytic Method and Cross-Tradition Understanding”], in Bo Mou (ed.) 2001b, v–vi. Eberle, Rolf (1970), Nominalistic Systems (Dordrecht: Reidel). Feldman, Richard (1988), “Having Evidence”, in David Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis (Dordrecht: Kluwer), 83–104. Krausz, Michael (2011), Dialogues on Relativism, Absolutism, and Beyond (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield). Lepore, Ernie & Herman Cappelen (2005), Insensitive Semantics: A Defense of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism (Blackwell). (2009), its Chinese translation Zi-Zu-Yu-Yi-Xue (《自足语义学》), trans. ZHOU Yuncheng 周允程 (Beijing: Yi-LinChu-Ban-She 译林出版社). Lepore, Ernie & Barry C. Smith (eds.) (2006). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Martinich, A. P. (ed.) (1985 first edition / 2013 sixth edition co-edited with David Sosa), The Philosophy of Language (Oxford University Press); (1998 in Chinese), the Chinese translation of its 1985 first edition, Yu-Yan-Zhe-Xue [語言哲學] (Philosophy of Language), co-translated by MOU Bo 牟博, YANG Yinlai 杨音莱, and HAN Linhe 韩林合 [Beijing: Shang-Wu-Yin-Shu-Guan 商務印書館 (the Commercial Press)].

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Martinich, A. P. (ed.) (2013), “Meaning as Signicance in Analytic and Continental Philosophy”, in Mou & Tieszen (eds.) 2013, 33–53. Morton, Adam (1988), Lecture note on the issue of truth (delivered at an academic event organized by the Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, August 1988). Mou, Bo 牟博 (2001a), “The Enumerative Character of Tarski’s Definition of Truth and Its General Character in a Tarskian System”, Synthese 124.1–2: 91–122. Mou, Bo (ed.) (2001b), Two Roads to Wisdom?—Chinese and Analytic Philosophical Traditions (Chicago: Open Court). Mou, Bo (ed.) (2006), Davidson’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers). Mou, Bo (ed.) (2008), Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers). Mou, Bo (2009), Substantive Perspectivism: An Essay on Philosophical Concern with Truth (“Synthese Library” monograph series, vol. 344; Dordrecht: Springer). Mou, Bo (2010), “On Constructive-Engagement Strategy of Comparative Philosophy”, Comparative Philosophy, 1.1: 1–32 . Mou, Bo (co-eds. with Richard Tieszen) (2013), Constructive Engagement of Analytic and Continental Approaches in Philosophy: From the Vantage Point of Comparative Philosophy (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill Academic Publishers). Mou, Bo (2015), “Quine’s Naturalized Epistemology and Zhuangzi’s Daoist Naturalism: How Their Constructive Engagement is Possible,” in The Philosophical Challenge from China, edited by B. Bruya (MIT Press), 303–337. Mou, Bo (ed.) (2018a), Philosophy of Language, Mind and Logic Volume 4 of the reference book Chinese Philosophy (in Routledge’s “Critical Concepts in Philosophy” series) (London and New York: Routledge). Mou, Bo (2018b), Semantic-Truth Approaches in Chinese Philosophy: A Unifying Pluralist Account (Lexington Books). Searle, John (2008), “The Globalization of Philosophy”, in Mou (ed.) 2008, 17–29. Shun, Kwong-loi (1997), Section “Some Methodological Issue” of Mencius and Early Chinese Thought (Stanford: Stanford University Press). Sider, Theodore (2009), Chapters 1–3 of Four-dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Part 1 Semantic-Syntactic Structure of Chinese Names and Issue of Reference

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Chapter 1

White Horse Paradox and Semantics of Chinese Nouns Byeong-uk Yi 1 Introduction Most studies of ancient Chinese logic and philosophy of language discuss Gongsun Long’s White Horse Dialogue (Bai-Ma-Lun). In this dialogue, he presents a series of arguments for the thesis he states with a sentence consisting of four Chinese characters: (G)

Bai-ma-fei-ma [white horse not horse] (The) white horses are not horses.

(Call this the white horse sentence.) It is usual to take the dialogue to present a paradox, the white horse paradox, for the thesis seems patently false. The white horse sentence, (G), is usually taken to mean that a white horse is not a horse (or white horses are not horses), as usual translations of (G) into English suggest.1 But the arguments he presents to defend the thesis seem to have considerable sophistication and substantial unity. This suggests that a cogent logic might be behind the apparent sophistries. A key issue in clarifying Gongsun Long’s logic is what is the thesis he means by (G) in the dialogue. Although most Chinese speakers would use (G) to mean a patent falsity, he might use it to state a true or plausible thesis different from the falsity. And most interpretations of the dialogue take him to defend such a thesis. Shih Hu (1922), Yu-Lan Fung (1948; 1952), and Yiu-Ming Fung (2007) take Gongsun Long to use (G) to state a thesis about attributes or universals (e.g., horseness), not a thesis about individuals or particulars (e.g., horses). On *  The work for this paper was supported in part by a SSHRC Insight Grant [Grant No. 435-20140592], which is hereby gratefully acknowledged. I wish to thank Yiu-Ming Fung and Bo Mou for useful discussions. Any remaining errors are mine. 1  See, e.g., Chan (1963, 235–7) and Graham (1990b, 185–193) for translations of the White Horse Dialogue.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004368446_003

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Yu-Lan Fung’s interpretation, for example, he argues for the thesis that “the universal …. ‘horseness’ is distinct from [the universal] ‘white-horseness’” (1948, 88). Janusz Chmielewski (1962) holds that his thesis in the dialogue denies identity between two classes: the class of white horses and that of horses.2 While these interpretations take the thesis to concern abstract entities (e.g., attributes, classes), Chad Hansen (1983; 1992; 1998) holds that it is a thesis about concrete particulars. On his interpretation, which he calls “the Mass-Stuff Interpretation” (1983, 148),3 the thesis concerns mass or stuff: (a) the “horse-stuff” (ibid., 141), the stuff of which all horses are parts; and (b) the white-horse-stuff, the stuff of which all white horses are parts.4 And Bo Mou (1999; 2006; 2007) proposes another interpretation on which the thesis concerns a kind of wholes. He takes the thesis to be about so-called collectionwholes or “wholes each of which itself consists of many countable things”, such as the many horses (1999, 51).5 These interpretations have a common feature. They all take the noun ma ‘horse’ in the predicate of (G) to figure as a referential term, one that refers to a universal, a set, stuff, a collection-whole, etc. More precisely, they take Gongsun Long to assume that the noun figures as such a term in (G). I think it is reasonable to take him to assume this view. But I do not think there is a good reason to take him to use it to refer to an abstract entity (e.g., a universal, a set) or a kind of whole (e.g., stuff, a collection-whole). As the usual English translations of the sentence suggest, the noun ma is normally used to talk about (individual) horses. And I think we can take him to use it to refer to concrete individuals: the many horses (i.e., all the horses taken together). Similarly, 2  See also Cheng (1983), who holds that one can equally take Gongsun Long’s thesis to be about universals or classes. 3  See also Hansen (1976), Graham (1986), and Krifka (1995) for similar interpretations and Graham (1989) and Harbsmeier (1991) for discussions of those interpretations. 4  Hansen (1998, 701) holds that Gongsun Long takes bai ma ‘white horse’ to refer to “the sum of the two stuffs” that he takes its two components (i.e., bai ‘white’ and ma ‘horse’) refer to (i.e., the white-stuff and the horse-stuff). But this interpretation conflicts with passages of the White Horse Dialogue that assumes that the horses, unlike the white horses, include the black (or yellow) horses (see the passage discussed in §3). 5  See, e.g., Rieman (1981) and Thompson (1995) for other interpretations. Thompson holds that Gongsun Long holds a “patently true” thesis about linguistic expressions: “the term ‘white horse’ differs from the term ‘horse’” (1995, 484). But it would be hard to take him to deploy the complicated arguments in the dialogue to propose and defend this obviously true thesis. Rieman (1981, 428) takes him to defend a negated universal biconditional: ‘It is not the case that something is a white horse if and only if it is a horse’ (cf. (2) below). But he does not explain how one can take (G) to state a universal biconditional.

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we can take him to use the compound noun phrase bai-ma ‘white horse’ to refer to the many white horses (i.e., all the white horses taken together). If so, we can formulate the main thesis of the dialogue as follows: (G*) The white horses are not the horses (or the white horses are not the same things as the horses). By dropping the underlined ‘the’ in this thesis, we can get a formulation of the thesis that (G) is usually taken to state: (Gʹ)

The white horses are not horses.6

But there are significant differences between the two theses. In (G*), the italicized ‘horses’ figures in the plural definite description ‘the horses’.7 In (Gʹ), by contrast, it figures predicatively, namely, as a complement of the plural form ‘are’ of the copula use of ‘be’. And this syntactic difference gives rise to substantial logical differences between them. Consider, for example, (1)–(3): (1) The white horses are different from the horses. (2) It is not the case that something is a white horse if and only if it is a horse (and some horses are white).8 (3) Some horses are not white (and some horses are white). All these theses imply (G*),9 and they are true—there are horses that are not white (e.g., black horses) as well as white horses. This means that (G*) is also true. But it does not mean that (Gʹ) is true; none of (1)–(3) implies (Gʹ). Moreover, (Gʹ) is false, for all of the white horses are horses. Despite the clear logical difference between (G*) and (Gʹ), both amount to plausible readings of the Chinese sentence (G). Chinese (like many other languages) does not have the definite article or other devices one can easily use to distinguish them from each other, and the Chinese noun ma can by itself figure

6  For alternative formulations of the same thesis, see (11a)–(11c) in §2. 7  And the ‘are’ in (G*) is used for a kind of identity (viz., plural identity). See the discussions of (8) and (9) in §2. 8  This is the negation of a universal biconditional (in symbols, ‘~Ɐx (Wx ∧ Hx ↔ Hx)’). 9  (3) implies (1) and (2), and these imply (G*). See §2 for more on the logic of (G*) and (Gʹ).

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as a definite noun phrase amounting to the English ‘the horses’ as well as an indefinite noun phrase amounting to the English ‘horses’. So I think Gongsun Long argues for the truth of the white horse sentence, (G), while assuming that it states (G*). And we can see that the dialogue has good arguments for this thesis. But this does not mean that he can correctly conclude that (G) is true. To do so, it is necessary to assume that the sentence is not ambiguous. But this assumption is not correct. (G) has another reading, the usual reading on which it states (Gʹ), and this is not equivalent to (G*). In an earlier article (Yi 2014), I have proposed an interpretation of the White Horse Dialogue based on the idea sketched above. The interpretation, which I call the individualist interpretation, differs from other interpretations in taking the main thesis of the dialogue to concern individual horses (e.g., the many white horses). In this paper, I elaborate on the grounds of the interpretation. 2

Two Readings of the White Horse Sentence

Most studies of the White Horse Dialogue officially translate (G) as follows: (4) A white horse is not a horse.10 But many of them point out that the sentence has other plausible readings. The sentence, which has the negative particle fei ‘not’, is a kind of negation11 of a sentence opposed to (G) in the dialogue: (H)

Bai-ma-nai-ma [white horse be horse].12 (The) white horses are horses.

Although this is usually taken to state that a white horse is a horse (or white horses are horses), the particle nai amounts to the English verb ‘be’, which can be used both for identity and as a copula or predication marker that takes 10  See, e.g., Hu (1922, 123), Fung (1952, 204), Chan (1963), and Graham (1990b). Incidentally, Hansen renders it to ‘White horse is non-horse’ (1976, 199; 1983, 161). 11  The particle fei ‘not’ might be taken to yield either the negation of the entire sentence (H) or the complement of the predicate nai of the sentence. Some discussions in this paper might suggest the second reading. But I think we can ignore the difference between the two readings for the purpose of this paper, for the theses that they yield are equivalent given the assumption that there are white horses (and this is assumed in the dialogue). 12  Here I ignore the sentence final particle ye (cf., (7a)–(7b) below).

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adjective or common noun phrases as complements.13 That is, nai can figure as a predicate for identity as well as a predication marker. So (H) has two potential readings. The same holds for (G). It is a kind of negation of (H), and the particle fei, a negative counterpart of nai, can figure both as a predicate for nonidentity and as a marker for negated predication, as Harbsmeier (1998, 301) notes.14 To clarify the readings of (G) that match the two uses of fei, Harbsmeier translates “along two lines” (ibid., 301): (5) a. A white horse is not (a case of) a horse. b. ‘White horse’ is not (the same as) ‘horse’. (5a), where ‘is’ figures as the singular form of the copula use of ‘be’, is meant to capture the reading on which fei is used to mark negated predication (the predication reading), and (5b) the reading on which it figures as the equivalent of the ‘not be’ where ‘be’ is used for identity (the non-identity reading).15 I agree that (G) has two potential readings and that (5a), like (4), captures the usual reading of the sentence (i.e., the predication reading). But I do not think (5b) helps to clarify the non-identity reading. It is not clear what Harbsmeier means by the sentence. It has two quotation names (one of which has ‘horse’ and the other ‘white horse’), but he gives no indication of what he means by those quotation names. What would then (G) state on a plausible non-identity reading? To articulate such a reading, it is necessary to specify what the two noun phrases flanking the particle fei (i.e., bai-ma and ma) mean on the reading. To do so, it is necessary to note that Chinese (whether classical or contemporary) differs from English in two important respects: [C1] [C2]

Chinese has no (definite or indefinite) articles. Chinese common nouns have no singular or plural forms.

13  Graham says that fei is a “negative copula” that amounts to “is not” (1978, 125), but this ignores its use for non-identity and its uses amounting to the plural ‘are not’. 14  Harbsmeier illustrates the two uses of fei with Chinese sentences amounting to ‘You are not me’ and ‘You are not a fish’ (1998, 301). 15  He also holds that both (4) and its plural cousin (i.e., ‘White horses are not horses’) “are similarly open to two such opposing interpretations” (ibid., 301), but I do not think these English sentences have the non-identity readings.

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For this reason, (G) has a plausible reading on which it states non-identity between the many white horses, on the one hand, and the many horses, on the other. Like many European languages, English has articles: the definite ‘the’ and the indefinite ‘a’ (or ‘an’). And the articles belong to a group of expressions called determiners: ‘the’, ‘a’ (or ‘an’), ‘some’, ‘every’, ‘all’, ‘most’, ‘this’, ‘those’, etc. Bloomfield (1933, 203–5), who introduces the notion of determiner, says “determiners are defined by the fact that certain types of noun expressions (such as house or big house) are always accompanied by a determiner (as, this house, a big house)” (ibid., 203).16 While this might suggest that determiners are mandatory elements in large groups of noun phrases, he adds that not all languages have determiner systems that ban the so-called bare (i.e., determiner-free) noun phrases (or allow them only as exceptions): This habit of using certain noun expressions always with a determiner, is peculiar to some languages, such as the modern Germanic and Romance. Many languages have not this habit; in Latin, for instance, domus ‘house’ requires no attribute and is used indifferently where [sic whether] we say the house or a house. (Ibid., 203) Languages with the so-called habit have determiner systems that deploy articles as key devices, but most languages have no articles, as Lyons (1999, xv) says. Such languages include Latin, Old English, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean.17 And in languages without articles, common nouns, including count nouns (e.g., the Latin domus), can figure as bare noun phrases amounting to definite noun phrases (e.g., ‘the house’, ‘the houses’) as well as those amounting to indefinite noun phrases (e.g., ‘a house’, ‘houses’). So the Latin domus ‘house’, for example, can by itself form a bare noun phrase amounting to ‘the house’, as Bloomfield notes. Similarly, the Chinese ma, for example, can by itself serve as a definite noun phrase, for Chinese (classical or contemporary) has no articles. So one might take both bai ma and ma to figure as definite noun phrases in (G). This yields a reading on which the particle fei is used in the sentence for non-identity.

16  For an account of the English determiner system, see, e.g., Quirk et al. (1985, 253–265). See also Yi (2016) about the logic of determiners. 17  Some issues about such languages are discussed in Yi (2012).

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To make room for such a reading of (G), Mou (2006; 2007) tentatively renders it as follows: (6) [The] white horse [is] not [the] horse. By adding the parenthetical ‘the’ in (6), he indicates that the two Chinese noun phrases in (G) (i.e., bai ma and ma) might be taken to figure as definite noun phrases flanking a predicate for non-identity. But I do not think this suffices to clarify a plausible non-identity reading. On his rendering, the nonidentity reading of (G) would take it to amount to (6*): (6*) The white horse is not the horse. But it is not clear what the two singular definite descriptions in (6*) (i.e., ‘the horse’ and ‘the white horse’) would mean on the reading—neither can be taken to refer to a specific horse as the usual singular definite descriptions do. This problem arises because Mou’s rendering ignores a plausible reading of (G) on which they figure as definite noun phrases. Like the usual translation (4), his rendering presupposes an incorrect assumption: they amount to singular noun phrases of English (e.g., ‘a horse’, ‘the horse’). On this assumption, ma must be translated as ‘a horse’ or ‘the horse’, and bai ma as ‘a white horse’ or ‘the white horse’. But it is wrong to assume this, for the Chinese noun ma can serve the role of not only the singular but also the plural form of the English noun ‘horse’ (which is different from, albeit homonymous with, its singular form). Many European languages (e.g., English) have grammatical number systems that include the singular/plural morphology of predicates and some common nouns (viz., count nouns). But Chinese, like many other languages, has no grammatical number system, and Chinese nouns and predicates do not take singular or plural forms. Consider, for example, classical Chinese counterparts of ‘One horse is a horse’ and ‘Two horses are horses’: (7) a. Yi-ma-ma-ye. [one horse horse ASN 18] One horse is a horse. b. Er-ma-ma-ye. [two horse horse ASN] Two horses are horses.19 18  The sentence final particle ye usually figures as an assertion marker (in short, ASN). 19  Unlike the classical Chinese yi-ma and er-ma, contemporary Chinese counterparts of ‘one horse’ and ‘two horses’ have special expressions (viz., numeral classifiers) in addition to nouns and numerals (see, e.g., (17) in §4).

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In the English translations of (7a) and (7b), the noun ‘horse’ takes the singular and plural forms (i.e., ‘horse’ and ‘horses’), respectively, as the predicate ‘be’ takes the singular and plural forms (i.e., ‘is’ and ‘are’). By contrast, the Chinese noun ma figures without taking a singular or plural form in (7a) and (7b). Chinese, which does not have a grammatical number system, simply uses the nouns themselves where languages with such systems might use the singular or plural forms of their counterparts. That is, the Chinese noun ma, for example, serves the roles of both the singular and plural forms of the English noun ‘horse’, as we can see in (7a)–(7b). So one might take the ma in (G) to amount to the plural form ‘horses’ rather than the singular form ‘horse’. Then the two noun phrases in the sentence might be taken to amount to plural definite descriptions: ‘the white horses’ and ‘the horses’ (for Chinese nouns, as noted above, can by themselves form definite noun phrases). This yields the reading on which (G) amounts to the English plural construction that states (G): (8) The white horses are not the horses. Similarly, one might take both noun phrases in (H) to amount to plural definite descriptions, which yields the reading on which the sentence can be rendered into English as follows: (9) The white horses are the horses. Call these readings of (G) and (H) the plural definite readings. Note that in (9), the plural form ‘are’ of the predicate ‘be’ does not figure as the copula that figures in, e.g., ‘Two horses are horses.’ In this sentence (where it takes the plural form ‘are’), the predicate marks predication while taking an indefinite complement (viz., ‘horses’). But it has no such complement in (9). In (9), it takes two definite noun phrases as it does in, e.g., ‘Cicero is Tully’20 (where it takes the singular form ‘is’), for it figures in (9) as the plural identity predicate, namely, the plural version of the ‘is’ of identity that figures in (10a)–(10b): (10) a. Russell and Whitehead are the authors of Principia Mathematica. b. My two favorite logicians are the authors of Principia Mathematica. 20  And ‘The most famous Roman orator is the author of Academica.’

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And we can take the ‘are not’ in (8) as the complement of the ‘are’ for plural identity in (9). That is, it can be considered a plural non-identity predicate, and (8) can be taken to state the non-identity between the many white horses, on the one hand, and the many horses, on the other. To see what (G) and (H) state on the plural definite readings, it would be useful to note that (8) and (9) are equivalent to (8ʹ) and (9ʹ), respectively: (8ʹ) The white horses are not the same things as the horses. (9ʹ) The white horses are the same things as the horses. For the plural ‘are’ for identity is interchangeable with ‘are the same things as’ just as the singular ‘is’ for identity is interchangeable with ‘is identical with’. By noting that the Chinese ma can serve the role of the plural ‘horses’ and that Chinese bare noun phrases can figure as definite noun phrases, as we have seen, one can reach the plural definite readings of (G) and (H). On these readings, which take them to state a kind of non-identity and a kind of identity, (G) can be rendered as (8), which states (G*), and (H) as (9), which states that the white horses are (the same things as) the horses. Let me now compare the plural definite readings with the usual readings of the sentences. To obtain the plural definite readings, it is crucial to take the second noun phrase, ma, to be definite. By taking it to figure as an indefinite noun phrase complementing fei or nai, we can get the usual readings of (G) and (H). On these readings, they can be rendered into English as follows: (11) a. The white horses are not horses. b. White horses are not horses. c. A white horse is not a horse. (=(4)) (12) a. The white horses are horses. b. White horses are horses. c. A white horse is a horse. We can render (G) to (11a) by taking bai ma to amount to the matching plural definite description (and ma to be indefinite), to (11b) by taking both noun phrases to amount to plural indefinite phrases, and to (11c) by taking both to amount to singular indefinite phrases. Similarly, we can render (H) to (12a)–(12c) by taking the second noun phrase ma as an indefinite phrase complementing nai.

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Although (12a)–(12c) are different English sentences, they might be taken to give essentially the same reading of (H). Similarly, we may take (11a)–(11c) to give essentially the same reading of (G). And they are the readings Chinese speakers usually give to (G) and (H). Let me explain. (12b) and (12c) are logically equivalent. And although they differ in that (12b) involves plural constructions (e.g., ‘horses’, ‘are’) while (12c) involves their singular cousins (e.g., ‘a horse’, ‘is’), this does not directly make one of them a better English rendering of (H).21 This sentence involves neither singular nor plural constructions. Both the predicate nai and the noun phrases in (H) are neutral with respect to the grammatical number, for Chinese does not have a grammatical number system. How about (12a)? There is, I think, a subtle logical difference between (12a) and (12b), but the difference is negligible for the present purpose. Although it is usual to regard both sentences as logical equivalents of (12c) and render them into symbolic languages as elementary language counterparts of (12c) (e.g., ‘Ɐx (Wx ∧ Hx → Hx)’), (12a) differs from (12b) and (12c) in involving a referential term: ‘the white horses’. So one might take the sentence to imply or presuppose the existence of white horses while (12b) and (12c) do not. But it is not clear whether the Chinese (H), as it is usually understood, implies (or presupposes) the existence of white horses. If so, it is not clear whether it is (12a) or (12b) that is better at capturing the usual reading of (H). For the present purpose, however, we may ignore this issue because the White Horse Dialogue, I think, assumes that there are white horses as well as non-white horses. Given this assumption, (12a) is equivalent to both (12b) and (12c). So (12a)–(12c) might be considered close, if not perfect, English approximations of the Chinese sentence as it is usually understood. If so, (11a)– (11c) might be considered alternatives for capturing the usual reading of (G), for this is a kind of negation of (H). Call the readings of (G) and (H) captured by (11a)–(11c) and (12a)–(12c), respectively, the indefinite readings, for they result from taking the second occurrence of ma in the sentences to figure as an indefinite noun phrase complementing fei or ma. The plural definite readings discussed above differ significantly from these usual readings. (G) states (G*) on the plural definite reading but (Gʹ) on the usual reading, and there are substantial logical differences between the two theses as noted above (§1). Similarly, there are significant logical differences between the theses that (H) states on the 21  Semantically, however, I think the Chinese ma is closer to the plural form ‘horses’; it has the same semantic profile as the English noun ‘horse’ (which differs from its singular form), and the plural form of this noun (unlike the singular form) inherits its full semantic profile. See Yi (2014, 517f).

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indefinite and plural definite readings. (9) and (9ʹ), which capture the plural definite reading, logically imply both (13a) and (13b): (13) a. Every one of the horses is one of the white horses. b. Every horse is a white horse. But none of (12a)–(12c), which capture the usual reading, implies them. The key to the logical differences between (8) and (11a) and between (9) and (12a) lies in the logic of identity that pertains to (8) and (9) but not to (11a) and (12a). The principle of substitutivity of identity applies to plural identity sentences as well as singular identity sentences. Thus (10a) (i.e., ‘Russell and Whitehead are the authors of Principia Mathematica’) logically implies ‘If the authors of Principia Mathematica cooperated when they were young, then Russell and Whitehead cooperated when they were young’, just as ‘Cicero is the author of Academica’ logically implies ‘If the author of Academica was an orator, then Cicero was an orator.’ Similarly, (9) logically implies (13a) (by substitutitivity), for (13a) results from replacing the italicized phrase in ‘Every one of the white horses is one of the white horses’ with ‘the horses’.22 3

Arguments for the White Horse Thesis

I think Gongsun Long assumes in the White Horse Dialogue the plural definite readings of (G) and (H). If so, (G*) can be considered the main thesis of the dialogue. So I call it the white horse thesis. This thesis is true, as we have noted, for there are horses that are not white (e.g., black horses). And the dialogue has good arguments for the thesis. Consider a key passage of the dialogue: If one seeks horses, yellow or black horses can be sent. If one seeks white horses, yellow or black horses cannot. Suppose that the white horses are the horses. This means that the same things are sought [in the two cases]. The same things are sought, for the white ones are not different from the horses. If the same things are sought, how can the yellow or black horses be both acceptable and unacceptable? Acceptable and unacceptable are clearly incompatible. So the yellow or black horses are the same, and yet

22  And (13b) is equivalent to (13a), for ‘is a horse’, for example, is equivalent to ‘is one of the horses.’

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they are sufficient for having horses but not for having white horses. It clear then that the white horses are not the horses.23 This passage has two related arguments for (G*). The first of them draws the thesis from (14a)–(14c): (14) a. If the white horses are the horses, then whatever is acceptable to all who seek the horses is acceptable to all who seek the white horses. b. The black horses are acceptable to all who seek the horses. c. The black horses are not acceptable to all who seek the white horses. The second, which is given in the penultimate sentence of the passage, draws it from (15a)–(15c): (15) a. If the white horses are the horses, then whatever is sufficient for having horses is sufficient for having white horses. b. The black horses are sufficient for having horses. c. The black horses are not sufficient for having white horses. I think both arguments are fairly good.24 But complications arise in giving rigorous defenses of their main premisses: (14a) and (15a). One cannot get (15a) by directly applying the substitutivity principle. Its consequent results from replacing ‘white horses’ in a logical truth (viz., ‘Whatever is sufficient for having white horses is sufficient for having white horses’) with ‘horses’, but one cannot appeal to the principle to make the replacement on the basis of its antecedent (i.e., (9)) because both phrases differ from their definite cousins that figure in (9): ‘the white horses’ and ‘the horses’. And some might object that one cannot use the principle to get the consequent of (14a) by replacing ‘the white horses’ in ‘… seek the white horses …’ with ‘the horses’ because ‘seek’ is a special verb that gives rise to a context (i.e., a so-called intensional context) in which the principle is not legitimately applicable. But one can easily avoid these problems of the arguments by extracting a simple argument underlying them. Both arguments presuppose (16a)–(16c): 23  All translations of passages of the White Horse Dialogue are mine (see Yi 2014, 512). The above translation has two occurrences of the italicized ‘the’ that result from giving the plural definite readings to (G) and (H). By removing them, one can get the usual reading of the passage. See the discussions of (14aʹ) and (15aʹ) below. 24  It is straightforward to see that they are valid: (14b)–(14c) imply the negation of the consequent of (14a), and (15b)–(15c) the negation of the consequent of (15a).

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(16) a. If the white horses are the horses, then the white horses include any things that the horses include. b. The horses include the black horses. c. The white horses do not include the black horses. These imply (8), which states (G*). And it is straightforward to see that they are all true. (16a) is a logical truth. Its antecedent, (9), implies its consequent; this results from replacing ‘the white horses’ in a logical truth (viz., ‘The white horses include any things that the white horses include’) with ‘the horses’. Moreover, both (16b) and (16c) are true. They are not logical truths, for both imply the existence of black horses and require the truth of (16d): (16) d. There are black horses (or there is a black horse). But this is true and implies both (16b) and (16c). Assuming (16d), (16b) is equivalent to ‘Every one of the black horses is one of the horses’, which is equivalent to the logical truth ‘Every black horse is a horse.’ And (16c) is the negation of ‘The white horses include the black horses’, and this is incompatible with (16d) because it implies ‘Every black horse is a white horse.’ The White Horse Dialogue, we have seen, has good, if not impeccable, arguments for the thesis, (G*), that the white horse sentence, (G), states on the plural definite reading. Gongsun Long might take this to show that (G) is true by assuming that (G) has no other reading. But it is wrong to assume this. Although the plural definite reading is a plausible reading of (G), the sentence has a different and more plausible reading, the indefinite reading on which it states (Gʹ). The two readings are not equivalent. (Gʹ) is false while (G*) is true. And on the usual reading of the dialogue, on which it defends (Gʹ), the arguments presented in the dialogue involve obvious fallacies. We can get the translation of the passage discussed above on the usual reading by removing the two italicized ‘the’ in the translation given in the beginning of this section. On this reading, the passage argues for (Gʹ) by holding the indefinite cousins of (14a) and (15a): (14) aʹ. If the white horses are horses, then whatever is acceptable to all who seek the horses is acceptable to all who seek the white horses. (15) aʹ. If the white horses are horses, then whatever is sufficient for having horses is sufficient for having white horses.

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These, unlike (14a) and (15a), are false. While their antecedent, (12a), is true, their consequents are false. The same problem arises for the argument for (Gʹ) that rests on the indefinite cousin of (16a): (16) aʹ. If the white horses are horses, then the white horses include any things that the horses include. This is also false, for the negation of its consequent follows from (16b)–(16c). So most readers of the White Horse Dialogue might find the dialogue to involve mere sophistries for an indefensible thesis. Like Gongsun Long, however, such readers fail to notice the potential ambiguity of the white horse sentence. By distinguishing different theses the sentence might be taken to state, as we have seen, we can both appreciate the logic of his arguments and isolate the error that gives rise to the appearance of mere sophistries. 4

The Individualist Interpretation

On the interpretation of the White Horse Dialogue presented above, Gongsun Long in the dialogue assumes that the white horse sentence, (G), has the plural definite reading, and defends the thesis, (G*), that the sentence states on this reading. On this interpretation, the main thesis of the dialogue, (G*), is a thesis about individual horses. So I call it the individualist interpretation. On the plural definite reading, the two noun phrases in (G) figure as definite noun phrases amounting to plural definite descriptions of English: ‘the white horses’ and ‘the horses’. And the individualist interpretation is based on the natural semantic account of English plural constructions. On this account, typical plural definite descriptions refer to many things (taken together): ‘the horses’, for example, refers to the many horses (i.e., all the horses taken together), and ‘the white horses’ to the many white horses (i.e., all the white horses taken together).25 And we can apply this account of English plural definite descriptions to Chinese phrases amounting to them: the bai ma and ma in (G), on the plural definite reading, refer to the many white horses and the many horses, respectively. In this view, both definite noun phrases refer to many individual horses (taken together). Other interpretations of the dialogue deny that its main thesis concerns individual horses. Some hold that the thesis concerns abstract entities and 25  See, e.g., Yi (2005; 2006) for a semantic account of plural constructions on which typical English plural terms refer to many things (taken together).

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some that it concerns stuff or other kinds of wholes. Let me make some remarks about these interpretations to compare them with the individualist interpretation. Hu (1922), Yu-Lan Fung (1948; 1952), Yiu-Ming Fung (2007), Chmielewski (1962), and Cheng (1983) hold that the main thesis of the dialogue concerns abstract entities: universals, classes, etc. On their interpretations (call them abstracta interpretations), Gongsun Long uses bai ma and ma to refer to abstract entities: horseness, the class of horses, etc. The main reason they hold this is that it helps to take the dialogue to give cogent arguments for a true or plausible thesis. But it is not necessary to accept abstracta interpretations to achieve this aim; proponents of the individualist interpretation, we have seen, can also do so. And the dialogue, I think, has an important passage that poses serious difficulties for those interpretations. One of the objections raised by Gongsun Long’s dialectical opponent in the dialogue is that he takes the white horses not to be horses because he assumes or holds the wrong view that any things with colors are not horses (or, equivalently, that the horses have no colors). He responds to this objection by denying the disputed view: The horses certainly have colors, which is why there are white horses. If the horses have no colors … how can there be white horses? This is what one who accepts the individualist interpretation would expect, for the individual horses certainly have colors. But proponents of abstracta interpretations would have to take the passage to be about abstract entities, which they take Gongsun Long to refer to with ma and bai ma in (G). For example, those who take him to use these noun phrases to refer to horseness and whitehorseness would have to take him to use the passage to make statements about them: Horseness certainly has a color, which is why there is white-horseness. If horseness has no color … how can there be white-horseness? On those interpretations, then, the passage takes it for granted that an abstract entity (e.g., horseness, the set of horses) has a color. But it would be highly implausible to attribute this view to Gongsun Long.26 26  On the usual view of universals (or sets), they have no colors and the existence of, e.g., white horseness (or the set of white horses) does not depend on horseness (or the set of horses) having a color.

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Hansen (1983; 1992; 1998) presents the stuff interpretation, on which (G) states a thesis about stuff or mass. He argues for this interpretation by holding that Chinese nouns (e.g., ma) are mass nouns that refer to stuff (e.g., the horse-stuff), and defends this view about Chinese common nouns by noting that contemporary Chinese is a classifier language where common nouns cannot directly combine with numerals. In contemporary Chinese, the noun ma cannot directly combine with numerals but requires mediation of special expressions called numeral classifiers, as in (17): (17) yi-pi-ma [one CL horse] one horse where pi is a numeral classifier matching the noun ma. To explain why Chinese nouns cannot directly combine with numerals, he argues that it is necessary to accept the mass noun thesis: Chinese common nouns are not count nouns, which can directly combine with numerals, but mass nouns. The stuff interpretation has serious problems, as I have argued elsewhere (Yi 2014, §§1–2). For the present purpose, let me note one conspicuous problem: Gongsun Long’s language, classical Chinese, is not a classifier language. Classical Chinese has a large group of nouns that can directly combine with numerals. In particular, ma can directly combine with numerals, as in yi-ma [one horse, ‘one horse’] and er-ma [two horse, ‘two horses’], in the language (see (7a)–(7b)). So it cannot be considered a mass noun in Gongsun Long’s language.27 Mou (2006; 2007) proposes another interpretation on which (G) concerns a kind of wholes. The interpretation is based on his “mereological collectivenoun hypothesis” (1999, 45). On this hypothesis, “Chinese nouns typically function, semantically and syntactically, in the same way that collective nouns function” (ibid., 47), and such a noun refers to a so-called “collection-ofindividuals” (ibid., 47) or “collection-whole” (ibid., 49). A collection-whole, in his view, is different from stuff or a “mass-whole” (ibid., 49) in that it “consists of many countable things” (ibid., 51) and is both a whole with “the part-whole structure” and a class with “the mass-class structure” (ibid., 47).

27  See Yi (2014, 503f) for discussions of Hansen’s reply to this problem. I think both classical and modern Chinese have count nouns. In particular, ma is a count noun in both languages, where it can combine directly with Chinese counterparts of some expressions selecting count nouns, such as wu-shu-de ‘countless’, da-duo-shu-de ‘a majority of’, and shao-shu-de ‘a small number of’. See, e.g., Yi (2009; 2011a; 2011b; 2014, §2).

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By “collective nouns”, he means a kind of “uncountable nouns” that include “‘people’, ‘cattle’, and ‘police’” (ibid., 49). He distinguishes them from count nouns because they, like mass nouns, have no singular or plural forms. For example, ‘people’ is a collective noun while ‘person’ (which has the plural form ‘persons’) is a count noun. And the collective noun hypothesis holds that the Chinese ma has the same syntactic and semantic function as the English ‘cattle’ and ‘people’ (as used in the same sense as ‘persons’). But there is an obvious difference between them. The English ‘people’ cannot combine with ‘one’ (‘one people’ is not well-formed), for it is a plural noun with essentially the same syntactic and semantic function as the plural form ‘persons’ of the count noun ‘person’. By contrast, the Chinese ma can combine with yi ‘one’ as well as er ‘two’ (in classical Chinese), as we have noted, for it amounts to the English count noun ‘horse’ and serves the roles of both its singular and plural forms. The same holds for the Chinese ren ‘people’. Moreover, I think Mou’s account of the semantics of collective nouns is incoherent. He holds that legs of horses, unlike horses themselves, are not parts of the whole that ma refers to. To do so, he holds that the whole is also a class, “a collection-of-individuals as a class” (ibid., 52), and adopts the view Lewis (1991) holds about classes: a class (e.g., the class of horses) is a whole consisting of singletons of its members (e.g., the singletons of horses).28 In this view, parts of classes are not concrete objects but abstract entities, namely, classes of a special kind (viz., singletons). For example, parts of the class of horses are not individual horses but singletons of horses. But Mou holds that “the parts of” a collection-whole (e.g., the referent of ma), unlike those of a mass-whole, “could be separable individuals”, such as individual horses (ibid., 56). To resolve this conflict between Lewis’s view of classes and the view that horses are parts of the so-called collection-whole consisting of horses, Mou might retract the latter view and hold that parts of the referent of ma are not horses but their singletons. This would make his interpretation of the White Horse Dialogue a kind of abstracta interpretation.29 And the above-mentioned passage about colors of horses would pose the same difficulties for his interpretation as for the usual abstracta interpretations.

28  The singleton of something (e.g., Chitu) is the class of which it is the only member (e.g., {Chitu}). 29  It would give rise to further difficulties in defending his claim that “the classical Chinese theories of language takes … nominalist mereological ontology for granted” (ibid., 56; my italics).

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References Bloomfield, L. (1933), Language (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press). Chan. W.-T. (1963), A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Cheng, C.-Y. (1983), “Kung-sun Lung: white horse and other issues”, Philosophy East and West 33: 341–54. Chmielewski, J. (1962), “Notes on early Chinese logic (I)”, Rocznik Orientalistyczny 26: 7–21. Fung, Y.-L. (1948), A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, edited by D. Bodde (New York, NY and London, England: The Free Press). Fung, Y.-L. (1952), A History of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. 1, 2nd ed., translated by D. Bodde (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Fung, Y.-M. (2007), “A logical perspective on ‘Discourse on White-Horse’”, Journal of Chinese Philosophy 34: 515–36. Gongsun, Long, Gong-Sun-Long-Zi, Project Gutenberg E-book (#7216) [available online at www.gutenberg.net]. Graham, A. C. (1978), Later Mohist Logic, Ethics, and Science (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press). Graham, A. C. (1986), “The disputation of Kung-sun Lung as argument about whole and part”, Philosophy East and West 36: 89–106. Graham, A. C. (1989), Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China (La Salle, IL: Open Court). Graham, A. C. (1990a), Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature (Albany, NY: SUNY Press). Graham, A. C. (1990b), “Three studies of Kung-sun Lung”, in Graham (1990a), 125–215. Hansen, C. D. (1976), “Mass nouns and ‘A white horse is not a horse’”, Philosophy East and West 26: 189–209. Hansen, C. D. (1983), Language and Logic in Ancient China (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press). Hansen, C. D. (1992), A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Hansen, C. D. (1998), “Logic in China”, in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 5, edited by P. Edwards (London & New York: Routledge), 693–706. Harbsmeier, C. (1991), “The mass noun hypothesis and the part-whole analysis of the white horse dialogue”, in Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts, edited by H. Rosemont (La Salle, IL: Open Court Press), 49–66; reprinted in Harbsmeier (1998), 311–321. Harbsmeier, C. (1998), Science and Civilization in China, Vol. 7, Part I: Language and Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

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Hu, S. (1922), The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China (Shanghai: Commercial Press). Kim, Y.-W. et al. (eds) (2011), Plurality in Classifier Languages (Seoul: Hankookmunhwasa). Krifka, M. (1995), “Common nouns: A contrastive analysis of Chinese and English”, in The Generic Book, edited by G. Carlson and J. F. Pelletier (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press), 398–411. Lewis, D. (1991), Parts of Classes (Oxford: Basil Blackwell). Lyons, C. (1999), Definiteness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Mou, B. (1999), “The structure of the Chinese language and ontological insights: a collective-noun hypothesis”, Philosophy East and West 49: 45–62. Mou, B. (2006), “Gongsun Long”, in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd ed., edited by D. Borchert (Chicago, IL: Gale). Mou, B. (2007), “A double-reference account: Gongsun Long’s ‘White-horse-not-horse’ thesis”, Journal of Chinese Philosophy 34: 493–513. Quirk. R. et al. (1985), A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language (Essex: Pearson Education Ltd.). Rieman, F. (1981), “Kung-sun, white horses, and logic”, Philosophy East and West 31: 417–447. Thompson, K. O. (1995), “When a ‘white horse’ is not a ‘horse’”, Philosophy East and West 45: 481–499. Yi, B.-U. (2005), “The logic and meaning of plurals. Part I”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 34: 459–506. Yi, B.-U. (2006), “The logic and meaning of plurals. Part II”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 35: 239– 288. Yi, B.-U. (2009), “Chinese classifiers and count nouns”, Journal of Cognitive Science 10: 209–225; reprinted in Kim et al. (2011), 245–264. Yi, B.-U. (2011a), “What is a numeral classifier?”, Philosophical Analysis 23: 195–258; partially reprinted in Kim et al. (2011), 1–51. Yi, B.-U. (2011b), “Afterthoughts on Chinese classifiers and count nouns”, in Kim et al. (2011), 265– 282. Yi, B.-U. (2012), “Numeral classifiers and bare nominals”, in Proceedings of the 13th International Symposium on Chinese Languages and Linguistics, edited by Y.-O. Biq and L. Chen, 138–153 (Taipei: National Taiwan Normal University). Yi, B.-U. (2014), “Numeral classifiers and the white horse paradox”, Frontiers of Philosophy in China 9: 498–522 [doi: 10.3868/s030-003-014-0043-8]. Yi, B.-U. (2016), “Quantifiers, determiners, and plural constructions”, in Unity and Plurality: Logic, Philosophy, and Linguistics, edited by M. Carrara et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 121–170.

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Chinese Glossary

Pinyin Gongsun Long Bai-Ma-Lun Bai-ma-fei-ma bai-ma bai ma fei Bai-ma-nai-ma nai ye Yi-ma-ma-ye Er-ma-ma-ye yi-ma er-ma yi-pi-ma pi wu-shu-de da-duo-shu-de shao-shu-de ren yi er Gong-Sun-Long-Zi

Chinese 公孫龍 《白馬論》 白馬非馬 白馬 白 馬 非 白馬乃馬 乃 也 一馬馬也 二馬馬也 一馬 二馬 一匹馬 匹 無數的 大多數的 少數的 人 一 二 《公孫龍子》

Chapter 2

A Double-Reference Account of Names in Early China: Case Analyses of Semantic-Syntactic Structures of Names in the Yi-Jing Text, Gongsun Long’s “White-Horse-Not-Horse” Thesis, and Later Mohist Treatment of Parallel Inference Bo Mou In this essay, I give a double-reference account of referential meanings of names in ancient China through three representative case analyses for two closely related purposes. First, it is to enhance our understanding of how preHan ancient thinkers in classical Chinese philosophy talked about and hooked up to the world through names in their treatments of the relationship between language, thought and the world. Second, it is to explore how their treatments can contribute to our understanding and treatment of the general issue of how reference is possible and thus to the contemporary development of philosophy of language. My strategy in the subsequent discussion is this. In Section 1, I address and explain two pre-theoretic cross-linguistic understandings that are more or less, directly or indirectly, related to the issue of how language hooks up to the world. My subsequent discussion of the double-reference resources in the pre-Han classical Chinese philosophy will address these two pre-theoretic understandings concerning how language hooks up to the world without relying on further theoretic elaborations of them, although I expound the first pre-theoretic understanding in Section 5, for the sake of engaging some representative approaches to the issue of reference in the contemporary philosophy of language, and the second pre-theoretic understanding in terms of “collective-name hypothesis” concerning common names in natural languages

*  I am grateful to DING Xiaojun, Marshall Willman, and ZHOU Hongyin for their helpful critical comments on an early draft version of this essay. Again I am indebted to many colleagues as listed in the “acknowledgements” parts of those previously published papers whose parts (in their revised versions) are included in this essay for their helpful criticism and engaging discussions in various forms.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004368446_004

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in Appendix 1, for the sake of enhancing our further reflective understanding and treatment of it. In Section 2, I explain and analyze the double-reference character of the “hexagram” names together with their reflective explanation in the classical Yi-Jing text, which constitutes a basic referential foundation for the Yi-Jing text to talk about the world in the yin-yang way. In so doing, I intend to show how some sophisticated treatments of “hexagram” names in the Yi-Jing text can provide us with powerful explanatory resources in talking about the world. In Section 3, I explain and analyze the double-reference character of the common names, ‘ma’ (‘馬’, ‘horse’) and ‘bai-ma’ (‘白馬’, ‘white horse’), used in the context of Gongsun Long’s argumentation for his “White-Horse-Not-Horse” (Bai-Ma-Fei-Ma 白馬非馬) thesis, which I argue is one key for understanding the crucial point and significance of Gongsun Long’s argumentation. Two dimensions of its significance lie in these. First, generally speaking, Gongsun Long thus introduces his notion of relative identity, which in my view is one substantial contribution to the philosophy of language and logic. Second, Gongsun Long raises, and makes his substantial contribution to, a significant issue of semantic sensitivity in sentential contexts in which people talk not merely about an object as a whole but also about some specific aspect of it in perspective focus and thus competent speakers need to maintain due semantic sensitivity to the latter. In Appendix 2, in a formal way, I present an account of the syntax and semantics of an expanded predicate logic account with the sign for the Gongsun-Long-style notion of relative identity, which I intend to show in a more accurate way how the Gongsun-Long-style notion of relative identity can contribute to the substantial resources of the contemporary philosophy of language and logic for the sake of capturing how real-life relative identity in our talking and thinking works. In Section 4, I explain and analyze the semantic sensitivity in the Later Mohist diagnosis of the parallel inference which, essentially along with Gongsun Long’s line, emphasizes the semantic sensitivity to the double-reference character of the referential meaning of names (singular names as well as common names) for the sake of understanding the semantic-syntactic structure of the parallel inference. In Section 5, though in a still schematic way to be further elaborated, I examine how the quasi-theoretic double-reference resources in the relevant accounts of those ancient thinkers in classical Chinese philosophy can contribute to one major debate in the contemporary philosophy of language between two most influential approaches, i.e., the Fregean descriptivist approach and the Millian-Kripkean direct-reference approach.

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1 Preliminaries In this beginning section, I start with addressing and explaining two pretheoretic cross-linguistic understandings more or less, directly or indirectly, related to the issue of how language hooks up to the world. The first one is concerned with a “double-reference” phenomenon concerning one basic language employment, whose pre-theoretic understanding is in fact shared by all human language users (no matter in which natural languages and no matter at which times) whenever they say something about an object, to which a name (whether a common name or a proper name) is used to refer while pointing to some specific aspect of the object. The second one is concerned with how common names in languages, as ready-made dictionary entries before (or conceptually prior to) their various pragmatic uses, denote objects in the world: each of them denotes a collection of things in terms of the collection-generic features addressed by the literal sense of the common name. My subsequent discussion will address, and give a quasi-theoretic analysis of, these two pre-theoretic understandings concerning how language hooks up to the world but without relying on further theoretic elaborations of them, although I do expound the first pre-theoretic understanding in Section 5, for the sake of engaging some representative approaches to the issue of reference in the contemporary philosophy of language, and the second pre-theoretic understanding in terms of “collective-name hypothesis” in Appendix 1, for the sake of enhancing our further reflective understanding and treatment of it. It is noted that the first pre-theoretic understanding concerning the “doublereference” character of the basic language employment is primarily and directly relevant to the theme of this essay, while the second one concerning the collection-of-individuals reference of common names is minor to the extent that the double-reference thesis can be explained and argued for independently of the second one. Now let me first address the aforementioned “double-reference” phenomenon of people’s basic language employment and draw several morals from people’s pre-theoretic understanding of it. Reference as the semantic relation is essentially an “aboutness” relation between language expressions as referring names and objects as referents.1 To argue for the “double-reference” thesis concerning the deep semantic structure of the basic language employment, 1  The term ‘reference’ or ‘referring’, just like ‘talk about’ or ‘talking about’, here and below is used as a less-metaphysically-loaded neutral term expressing the “aboutness” semantic relation between a word, or collection of words, and some object(s), whether it “actually exists”

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in this sub-section, I resort to its pre-theoretic linguistic basis and give a preliminary (or quasi-theoretic) analysis: I start with and explain some relevant linguistic observations and their revealed (quasi) pre-theoretic understandings on which the “double-reference” thesis is based; in so doing, I also give a preliminary or quasi-theoretic “double-reference” account of reference. In our pre-theoretic understanding of the structure of the world around us, we consider many things: a particular human being, a horse, a tree, a chair, a cup of water, and so on, as objects associated with many (current and previous) non-relational or relational attributes or states, whether or not we really know those attributes that are or were actually associated with or possessed by the objects. Such an object is not “thin”, neither like a mere name bearer without any indispensably associated attribute(s) nor like a (group of) mere attribute(s) without its bearer, but quite “thick”: say, it is a real-life person in space and time with her past rich history, with her particular attributes (parts) and her inter-part “organizational” attributes (so her identity cannot be reduced to a mere sum of these parts), with her multiple status and in her manifold states.2 Such real-life objects have generated many situations and events in the world around us. Such individual objects with their rich constituents and attributes might as well be called ‘thick objects’.3 This pre-theoretic understanding of the basic structure of objects in the world around us is reflected or revealed in our ordinary linguistic practice. As addressed at the outset, one basic language employment in our linguistic communication is this: when referring to an object (a physical object in space and time, a number in math, or even a fictional figure in a story) via a referring name in linguistic activities (making linguistic communication, doing math via math language, etc.), typically and generally speaking, a speaker intends to (specifically) say something (and she can say different things or different speakers can say different things) of the (same) object as a referent, or, in a more semantically-oriented way (treating those pragmatic elements like “a speaker’s intention” as the presupposed background elements), some (specific) (instead of being restricted to hold only between a word and some thing that actually exists), and no matter how the ontological status of the object is explained. (cf., Crane 2013, 9–10). 2  In the following, for the sake of convenience and brevity, I use the term ‘attributes’ in a broad sense to cover both attributes and status/states. 3  It seems that it is D. M. Armstrong who is the first using the phrase ‘thick object’ as a quasitheoretic term to label such a particular object with particular properties in his theoretic account (cf., Armstrong 1997, 123–6). It is also noted that C. B. Martin’s notion of particulars with attached tropes (particular properties) can be viewed as a theoretic elaboration of our pre-theoretic understanding of the identity of real-life thick objects (Martin 1980).

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thing is (specifically pointed to and) said of (about) a referent. I call this ‘people’s pre-theoretic (or quasi-pre-theoretic, if minimal reflection involved) “doublereference” understanding of the “double-reference” or “double-aboutness” phenomenon of the basic language employment’. In the following, first, with preliminary “double-reference” semantic paraphrases, I illustrate the doublereference character of the foregoing basic language employment via two typical groups of sentences in our ordinary linguistic practice, each of which says something about what a referring name refers to, respectively concerning two typical kinds of referring names [proper names such as ‘Confucius’ that refers to an individual object, and descriptive referring names such as ‘the white horse’ that refers to either (a typical case) one collection of individual objects that fit the description or one distinctive (or even unique) individual object that fits the description4]. Second, I then highlight a number of reflective characterizations of our ordinary “double-reference” linguistic practice and its pre-theoretic (or quasi-pre-theoretic) understanding.5 Let me start with the first sample group of sentences, giving a preliminary “double-aboutness” analysis in terms of “double-reference” semantic paraphrase to each of them:6 (1.1) Confucius was born in 551 BCE. A preliminary “double-aboutness” analysis in terms of “double-reference” semantic paraphrase: in this sentential context, ‘Confucius’ refers to Confucius as a whole and at the same time points to his specific “birth” part (talking about his “birth” part as well as Confucius as a whole person); the sentential predicate “further comments” on Confucius as a whole in view of this specific-part referent.7 4  In the latter case, a descriptive name is sometimes labeled ‘a definite description’ in its technical sense. 5  Notice that all the following linguistic observations that are given in “pragmatic” terms can be presented in non-pragmatic terms when the focus is on the semantic dimension of the addressed linguistic phenomenon. 6  It is noted that the following preliminary “double-aboutness” analysis in terms of “doublereference” semantic paraphrase is not intended to report and record what actually occurs in the head of a real-life speaker when she or he utters, say, the statement ‘Confucius was born in 551 BCE’; the analysis per se is a quasi-theoretic one to capture the semantic point of people’s pre-theoretic “double-reference” understanding of the “double-reference” phenomenon of the basic language employment. 7  A separate writing by this author presents a double-reference-related “subject-perspective” account of predication which gives a detailed explanation of how the semantic-whole referent in view of the specific-part referent (in “perspective” focus) is “further commented” on

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(1.2) Confucius had a headache (head-ache) when he caught old on a certain day during his life time. A preliminary “double-aboutness” analysis in terms of “double-reference” semantic paraphrase: given that (1.2) is true (given that Confucius was neither God nor a god but a natural human being who caught cold with a headache at least once during his life time), in this sentential context, ‘Confucius’ refers to Confucius as a whole and at the same time points to his specific “head” part (talking about his “head” part as well as Confucius as a whole person); the sentential predicate “further comments” on Confucius as a whole in view of this specific-part referent.8 (1.3) Confucius grew up in the State of Lu (a region located in today’s Shangdong Province, China) before becoming a teacher. A preliminary “double-aboutness” analysis in terms of “double-reference” semantic paraphrase: in this sentential context, ‘Confucius’ refers to Confucius as a whole and at the same time points to his current specific “pre-teacher growing-up” part (talking specifically about his current “preteacher growing-up” part as well as Confucius as a whole person); the sentential predicate “further comments” on Confucius as a whole in view of this specific-part referent. (1.4) Confucius at his 70 years-old was not the same as Confucius at his 60 years old. A preliminary “double-aboutness” analysis in terms of “double-reference” semantic paraphrase: in this sentential context, ‘Confucius’ refers to via the sentential predicate. With consideration of the major purpose here, I will not elaborate the predication part of such preliminary “double-aboutness” analyses in this writing. Nevertheless, a brief pre-theoretic explanation of it will be given in the third pre-theoretic characterization of the “double-aboutness” character below in terms of the “double-reference” analysis of people’s pre-theoretic understanding of the “double-reference” phenomenon concerning the basic language employment below. 8  It is noted that the “double-reference” paraphrase given here is a “semantic” one instead of an “epistemological” or “pragmatic” one; that is, a “double-reference” semantic paraphrase and understanding is related to an already-given sentential context, such as ‘Confucius had a headache (head-ache) when he caught old on a certain day during his life time’ here, in view of its “literal” sense: based on the literal sense of that sentential context, his specific head part is literally and explicitly pointed to and is thus about; in this way, it does not necessarily exclude the possibility that, say, his “health condition” part is also pointed to in a specific “pragmatic” utterance of the sentence; it is possible that the speaker also points to his health condition part); however, this is not literally and thus “semantically” indicated.

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Confucius as a whole and at the same time points to his specific “70–yearsold” part (talking specifically about Confucius’ “70-years-old” part as well as Confucius as a whole person);9 the sentential predicate “further comments” on Confucius as a whole in view of this specific-part referent. In so saying, we are not using the same name to refer to four different persons but the same one person, Confucius. So we can simply say: (1) Confucius was born around 551 BCE, had his headache (on a certain day), grew up in the Lu State in the current Shangdong Province of China, and at his 70-years-old was not the same as Confucius at his 60-years-old. The second sample group of sentences, which go with descriptive referring names (common names) as their subject names are given as follows: (2.1) The white horse (the collection of white horses)10 is (the identical to) the horse (the collection of horses or the horse collection) [regarding some attribute that they share]. 9  Cf., the Analects 2.4: “At fifteen, I set my mind upon learning; at thirty, I took my place in society; at forty, I became free of doubt; at fifty, I understood Heaven’s Mandate; at sixty, my ear was attuned; and at seventy, I could follow my heart’s desire without overstepping the bounds of propriety” (“吾十有五而志于學，三十而立，四十而不惑，五十而 知天命，六十而耳順，七十而從心所欲，不踰矩。”). 10  With consideration that one standard grammatical means in English to express a collection designation is via “the definite article plus the [addressed] common noun” (for instance, grammatically adequate, one can say “the wolf is not really a dangerous animal”, with this usage of the definite article to talk about any individual member of the collection of wolfs), I thus use the English phrase ‘the horse’ and ‘the white horse’ in the sentence ‘the white horse is (not) identical to the horse’ (here and below) to respectively designate the collection of horses and the collection of white horses. In my article (Mou 1999), I suggest and argue for the collective-name hypothesis concerning the semantic-syntactic structure of Chinese common nouns, which explains the reason for my translating such Chinese common nouns as ‘白馬’ (bai-ma) in the sentential context ‘bai-ma-( fei)ma’ into the English phrase ‘the white horse’ that designates the collection of white horses. I now hold an expanded collective-name hypothesis concerning the semantic-syntactic structure of common nouns in natural languages (not limited to Chinese). For more explanation of this, see the second pre-theoretic understanding, to be addressed below in this section, concerning how common names in languages semantically denote objects in the world in terms of the collection-generic features and its further theoretic explanation in the “Appendix 1” part in this essay.

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A preliminary “double-aboutness” analysis in terms of “double-reference” semantic paraphrase: in this sentential context, ‘the white horse’ refers to the collection of white horses as a whole and at the same time points to the specific “horseness” attribute (talking specifically about the common or jointly shared “horseness” attribute as well as the whole collection of white horses); the sentential predicate “further comments” on the collection of white horses as a whole in view of this specific part. (2.2) The white horse (the collection of white horses) is not (the identical to) the horse (the collection of horses or the horse collection) [regarding some distinct attribute which is possessed by any white horse but not by all horses]. A preliminary “double-aboutness” analysis in terms of “double-reference” semantic paraphrase: in this sentential context, ‘the white horse’ refers to the collection of white horses as a whole and at the same time points to the specific part, the distinct attribute of possessing white color, which is possessed by any white horse but not by every member of the horse collection; the sentential predicate “further comments” on the collection of white horses as a whole in view of this specific part. In so saying, we are not using the same name to refer to two different collections of things but the same one collection, that of white horses. So we can simply say: (2) The white horse is identical to the horse regarding some shared attri­bute, and is not identical to the horse regarding some dis­ tinct attribute that is possessed by the white horse but not all horses. Now I address and highlight several reflective, quasi-theoretic characterizations of the “double reference” character of the basic language employment (i.e., saying something about an object) as illustrated by the above two paradigmatic cases.11 11  Although due to space the illustration is given only for these two paradigm cases here, the similar “double-reference” analysis can be carried out for other cases: for example, for a sentence with an abstract-noun subject such as ‘Wisdom is a rare attribute’: the semantic-whole referent is the collection of all thoughts of wisdom or wise thoughts (whatever they metaphysically are—given that there are human wise thoughts in a certain metaphysical sense); the specific-part referent in this sentential context is the shared attribute, being wise, of all wisdom thoughts (given that they have some other attributes—such as some specific attribute (say, being concerned with how to become a

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(1) In people’s linguistic practice, people use the proper name ‘Confucius’ to refer to Confucius as a whole [with his various attributes and in his various relations (to some other objects12)] such that people can talk about him (rather than someone else) while pointing respectively to certain attributes (in perspective focuses) and make various “further comments” on him. In this way, the name ‘Confucius’ designates the same object (in this actual world, the natural Earth, instead of another natural planet or some possible world), Confucius, who himself is an object as a whole that unifies the collection of its various (diachronic and synchronic) specific (attribute) parts. No matter which specific part of Confucius is focused on in a given sentential context (as one specific-part referent), the same object (Confucius with all his rich attributes) as the semantic-whole referent is talked about or thought about. (2) In each of these declarative sentences or statements, when the object as a whole that is said of is referred to or designated (say, Confucius as a whole person), a certain specific part is also at the same time referred or pointed to,13 whose identity is to be sensitive to the focus as shown or revealed in the given sentential context, which is taken to be possessed by Confucius, and which is up to some further comment via linguistic predicate expression in the sentence. In other words, there are two levels of what is about here: first, about Confucius as a whole; second, about some specific part in perspective focus. Given that, in the aforementioned basic language employment fact of something being said of an object, what is referred to is essentially what a sentential context is about, the basic language employment fact has thus its fundamental “double-reference” character. (3) The specific-part referent has its dual status: on the one hand, as explained above, it is part of what is said about in the sentential context and thus it has its “reference” status; on the other hand, in the given sentential context, it points to in focus and thus specifies a certain specific part of the designated referent whole as part of what is said about the semantic-whole referent, jun-zi) possessed by the wise thoughts that are given in the Analects ….; the sentential predicate is a further comment on the semantic -whole referent with regard to that specific-part referent: wisdom “being rare” with regard to the shared specific-part referent “being wise”. 12  Note that it is presupposed, instead of being further explained, that ‘Confucius’ here designates Confucius via various relevant “pragmatic” contributing elements to the communication link between the use of the name and Confucius as the most important figure in the classical Confucianism. 13  Or more than one specific attribute part. For the sake of simplicity of discussion, I focus on the one-part case.

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although, generally speaking, the sentential predicate “further comments”14 on the object as a whole in view of this specific-part referent that is referentially and logically prior to what the sentential predicate literally expresses. In this sense, and to this extent, the predication in the basic language employment right starts at the specific-part reference, although, generally speaking, the latter (or the predicative content of the subject referring name via its specificpart reference) does not exhaust the former in the sense that the predication in the basic language employment (in most cases) does not stops at what the (explicit or implicit) descriptive or predicative content of the subject referring name in the sentential context gives but is further completed and complemented by what the sentential predicate expresses (via its “further comment” on the designated object as a whole in view of the specific-part referent). (4) The speaker can change her focus from one aspect of an object, which the subject expression designates, to another aspect which she already knows (whether or not she then would fully know the object about all its aspects); she can make, say, the statements (1.1)-(1.4) on different occasions for distinct purposes and with distinct perspective focuses. What makes such a focus shift possible lies in this, though it seems trivial: the speaker presupposes and believes that the same object possesses those specific-part aspects, whether or not she purposely focuses on a certain aspect, among others, in her current statement.15 (5) It is also a sound pre-theoretic understanding that a person can successfully designate an object as a whole through a kind of communication link between that object and her current use of the name of the object, with her understanding that it is an object with multiple attributes, even though she does not actually know (or psychologically imagine) exactly what its attributes are).16 14  Perhaps the word ‘comment’ would bring about a “theoretically-loaded” impression; the term used here is intended to be “user-friendly” in capturing what really happen in the addressed basic language employment; surely it can be replaced by another “userfriendly” word which a reader would prefer. 15  This linguistic observation shows that we actually render the object richer (or “thicker” in metaphoric terms) than what the above second linguistic observation (explicitly addressing only one aspect or certain finite aspects in focus) shows us and further strengthens the point of the first linguistic observation. 16  Surely we can resort to relevant theoretic resources in philosophy of language, epistemology and metaphysics to elaborate various aspects of this point. For example, we can use the Kripkean resources to explain the addressed “communication link”, use the Kantian resources to explain various involved epistemic restrictions to one’s knowing process, using (some refined version of) four-dimensionism in contemporary metaphysics to

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Now let me address the aforementioned second pre-theoretic, or quasi pre-theoretic (in the sense of possible minimal reflection involvement) understanding of the “collection” referents of common nouns (in natural languages) as ready-made dictionary entries. It is based on the following observation of one basic linguistic fact concerning what a common noun as an entry in a dictionary in various natural languages denotes: a common noun, as paradigmatically given as a dictionary entry, is to be neither in plural form nor in singular form to directly denote one or multiple singular individual object(s) but in its “prototype” form and can occupy the referring (syntactic) subject position in a (syntactic) sentence;17 it designates (or denotes in a rigid way) a collection of individual particular objects (when it is a grammatically-­classified non-mass count noun), or of variously-located mass stuff of the same constituent (when it is a grammatically-classified mass noun), or of various tokens of an abstract type (such as a number) (when it is a grammatically-classified abstract noun), etc., which is not the same as a mere sum of these individual objects and whose member objects are unified through some collection-generic attributes that are addressed by the literal sense of the common noun. For example, the common noun ‘horse’ as an entry in an English dictionary denotes neither one horse (a singular horse) nor a sum of horses (plural horses) but a collection of individual horses which are unified through the horse-collection-generic attributes as given by the literal sense of the term ‘horse’ (for example, one dictionary definition of ‘horse’ goes this way: “a type of large strong animal with mane, tail and hard feet, which men ride on and use for pulling and carrying heavy things.”), although, in actual uses of ‘horse’ in people’s linguistic practice in various natural languages, the common noun ‘horse’ is used as a grammatically-classified count noun to refer to one individual horse or multiple individual horses when it goes together with numerals, indefinite article, or some pronouns in English or with numerals/individualizers etc. in Chinese. Indeed, upon some reflection on the nature of those attributes that are addressed in dictionary definitions of common nouns, people can see that those attributes are either one or more than one of three types of collection-associated explain how it is possible for an object as a whole to “sweep over” its various diachronic stages with its changes and developments. 17  Both terms ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’ here are understood in the following syntacticstructural sense [or the syntactic-semantic sense]. The subject is a syntactic unit that functions as such a main constituent of a simple declarative sentence: the subject, via its expression, refers to some thing that is what the sentence is about, while the predicate is another syntactic unit that functions as another main constituent which talks about or affirms or asserts some attribute or state of (part of) what the subject refers to.

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attributes, i.e., collection-identity-determining attributes which are possessed by any individual objects of the collection (such as the “馬性” or “horseness attribute” for the collection of horses denoted by the common noun ‘馬’ or ‘horse’, no matter how such an attribute is ontologically elaborated), collection-generic attributes which are not necessarily possessed by each individual member of the collection but generically (typically or normally) possessed by the members of the collections (for example, the attribute of having four legs is not necessarily possessed by each of the individual members of the collection of horses; it may be the case that all the current individual horses in the actual world are three-leg ones for some reason), and collection-created attributes which are possessed not by any individual member of the collection but only by the collection as a whole (for example, the attribute of the collection denoted by the word ‘jury’ that cannot be possessed by any individual member of a “jury” team but by the jury team as a whole). Two notes are due at this point. To some readers, the aforementioned second pre-theoretic, or quasi pre-theoretic (in the sense of possible involvement of minimal reflection) understanding of the “collection” referents of common nouns (in natural languages) as ready-made dictionary entries might be not so obvious and in need of further theoretic explanation; those readers can skip this part and look at the “Appendix 1” where the collective-name hypothesis concerning the semantic-syntactic structure of common nouns is suggested and explained. Second, as indicated before, although the aforementioned first pre-theoretic understanding concerning the “double-reference” character of the basic language employment is primarily and directly relevant to the theme of this essay, the second one concerning the collection-of-individuals reference of common names is minor to the extent that the double-reference thesis can be explained and argued for independently of the second one. 2

On the Double-Reference Character of “Hexagram” Names in the Yi-Jing18

In this section, I give a case analysis of the “double reference” semanticsyntactic structure of the ideographic “hexagram” names in the Yi-Jing text as a generic type of referring names: first, I explain how the “hexagram” names in the Yi-Jing text jointly designate the same actual or natural world as a semantic whole while signify a variety of changing patterns as distinct “specific” referents; second, I draw a number of reflective morals from this examination. 18  This section is a revised version of the relevant parts of Mou 2014.

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In the following discussion, to save space and avoid unnecessary distraction, I assume that the reader already has her general working knowledge of the Yi-Jing text.19 Some preliminary knowledge of the structure of the gua and its terminology is highlighted here. A gua (卦) unit, i.e., a “hexagram” referring name (‘a hexagram name’ or ‘a hexagram’ for short in the following) together with its original “predicative” interpretation, consists of three parts: (1) the “gua-xiang” (卦象) part: an ideographic symbol (as a hexagram name) like ‘ ’, which consists of six divided or/and undivided lines, i.e., yin-yao (陰 爻) or/and yang-yao (陽爻), each of which stands for one of the six stages of the changing pattern signified by the hexagram name; (2) the “gua-ci” (卦辞) part: an explanatory judgment which gives the name of the gua unit (e.g., ‘乾’ of the first gua unit) and the “specific-part” referential meaning of the whole gua-xiang (i.e., the hexagram name as a whole); (3) the “yao-ci” (爻辞) part: an explanatory judgment on the meaning of each yao line (a divided or undivided lines) in the context of the hexagram. In the Yi system, the sixty-four hexagrams respectively and specifically represent sixty-four changing patterns of the universe or our environmental nature, i.e., this actual natural world in the process of change. All the hexagram names talk about the same world as a whole while respectively focusing on its distinct changing patterns. To this extent, they designate the same one nature, as a semantic whole, while also signifying distinct “specific-part” referents, i.e., the distinct sixty-four changing patterns symbolically identified by their distinct yao-line-arrangement structures, which respectively and explicitly provide distinct symbolic or linguistic “contexts”. Indeed, this semantic “double-reference” point is delivered via the hexagraphic structure (so to speak, a kind of quasi-”syntactic” structure) of the six-four distinct hexagram-referring names. Putting aside the issue of whether or to what extent these contextual “specific-part” referents of the hexagram names, whose distinct “predicative” implications are presented via their associated “gua-ci” (卦辞) and “yao-ci” (爻辞), really capture how the universe proceeds with regard to its changing patterns, what is at issue is whether or not, and how, these hexagram names “hook up” to the world. There is a description in the “Xi-Ci-Zhuan” (《繫辭傳》) part of the Yi-Zhuan text 《 ( 易传》the commentary remarks on the original Yi-Jing text) of how Fu Xi, as the legendary creator of the Yi system, gave the various 19  In this section I will not repeat my previous ideas concerning the Yi-Jing philosophy, Chinese language and its involved semantic basis and ontological insight, and some relevant central issues in the philosophy of language in Mou 1998, 1999, 2003 and 2006. My thought in this section can be viewed as a further development of my previous relevant ideas in these writings.

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hexagram names.20 It is noted that, for the current purpose of philosophical interpretation, it is not important whether or not Fu Xi is really the historical figure who formulated the Yi system into what is currently presented as the sixty-four-hexagram system. For convenience, Fu Xi can be taken as a proxy figure who speaks for the historical creator’s way of working out the hexagram names in the gua units. What is reflectively interesting is how the “trigram” (八卦 Ba-Gua) names (such as ‘ ’) and the hexagram names (such as ‘ ’), were given. Looking to relevant explanatory resources in the contemporary philosophy of language, we can see that there was a kind of “naming” ceremony where the name giver (whoever he/she was) assigned the eight “trigram” 20  Its excerpts go this way (my translation):    “古者疱羲氏之王天下也，仰則觀象于天，俯則觀法于地，觀鳥獸之文，與 地之宜，近取諸身，遠取諸物，於是始作八卦，以通神明之德，以類萬物之 情。    Fu Xi, an ancient king reigning in the world, observed upward the heavenly images and looked downward the way of earthly things. He observed the patterns of birds and beasts and how they fit their environments on earth. He learned from nearby things and from distant things. He then began to work out the Eight Trigrams (ba-gua) for the purpose of penetrating the power of the subtle and the bright and for the purpose of sorting out things based on their nature ….” 《 ( 繫辭下傳》the Xi-Ci-Zhuan, Part II, Ch. 2).    是故闔戶謂之坤，闢戶謂之乾，一闔一闢謂之變，往來不窮謂之通；見 乃謂之象，形乃謂之器，紙而用之謂之法，利用出入，民咸用之謂之神。是 故易有太極，是生兩儀，兩儀生四象，四象生八卦，八卦定吉凶，吉凶生大 業。    … Therefore closing the door [to encompass all things] is called ‘kun’ while opening the door [to generate all things] is called ‘qian’. The interaction of closing and opening constitute change and transformation. The alternation of going and coming without exhaustion is called ‘penetrating through’ (通 tong). What is manifested in changing is called an ‘image’ (象 xiang); what comes into physical form in changing is called an ‘implement’ (qi); creating implements and putting them in use is called ‘emulation’ (法 fa); using implements to advantage in all their applications is called ‘subtle’ (神 shen). Therefore, in the Yi system, there is the Great Ultimate (tai-ji) which generates the Two Norms (兩儀 liang-yi) [yin and yang]; the Two Norms generate the Four Images (四象 si-xiang) [major yin, major yang, minor yin, and minor yang]; the Four Images generate the Eight Trigrams (八卦 ba-gua); the Eight Trigrams determines fortune and misfortune; fortune and misfortune produce the great enterprise … 《 ( 繫辭上傳》the Xi-Ci-Zhuan, Part I, Ch. 11).    六爻之動，三極之道。    The alterations of the yin yao [divided line] and the yang yao [undivided line] at the six yao positions [in the sixty-four hexagrams which result from the combinations of two of the eight trigrams] shows the way of the three extremes [the heaven dao, the earth dao and the human dao]. 《 ( 繫辭上傳》the Xi-Ci-Zhuan, Part I, Ch. 2).”

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names to designate eight basic forces or processes, and then assigned the “hexagram” names to designate the same natural world as the actual-whole referent while simultaneously pointing respectively to the sixty-four distinct changing patterns as distinct “specific-part” referents. (Note that, for each of the changing patterns, all eight basic forces jointly play their roles, though the interplay of two certain forces plays a dominant role and thus a certain combination of their “trigram” names results in the hexagram that signifies the changing pattern being addressed.) A double-reference interpretation of the semantic-syntactic structure and referential function of the hexagram names in the gua units can be characterized in terms of the following points. First, a hexagram name is a referring name that says (pointing to and commenting on in a certain perspective focus) some specific thing about the natural universe, which constitutes a distinct “predicative” context on its own (i.e., a hexagram name stands on its own without any extra linguistic attachment); that is, a hexagram name talks about this specific part as well as the actual universe (as a whole). Second, a hexagram name, on the one hand, primarily rigidly designates (“hooks up to”) the actual universe21 whose two fundamental forces, yin and yang, interplay and jointly contribute to the development of the universe in the sense that the actual universe as a whole is metaphysically and logically prior to any specific part of the actual universe which a hexagram name can point to in a perspective focus. Third, a hexagram name, on the other hand, simultaneously points to or signifies (thus is specifically about) one distinct changing pattern possessed by the universe, which is focused on in the specific “hexagram” predicative context; in this sense, its signified “changing pattern” referent is one distinct “specific-part” referent. Fourth, in this way, the sixty-four “hexagram” names rigidly designate (or are jointly about) the same universe as the actual-whole referent but respectively signify (or are specifically about) its sixty-four distinct changing patterns as distinct “specific-part” referents. Fifth, the actual-whole referent of the hexagram names is established, secured and passed on through a communication link that can be traced back to the Yi-hexagram-system creator’s “ceremony”-like “acquaintance” designating occasion which was essentially carried out in a double-reference way: the people who read the Yi-Jing text and make subsequent employment of the Yi system use the hexagram names to designate the same semantic-whole referent as that which the ancient thinker designated (i.e., our surrounding natural world a a whole) while denoting their distinct specific-part referents (those distinct changing patterns). 21  The treatment of associating the notion of rigid designation with the actual world is not new; see Stanley 1998, section 5, and Jackson 1998.

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Sixth, the referring process dimension of the “specific-part” reference of a hexagram name is both linguistic and predicative: it is linguistic because it is presented in a certain form of “ideographic” linguistic expression (i.e., a distinct yao-line-arrangement structure which explicitly provides a distinct symbolic or linguistic “context”); it is predicative because the “hexagram” name assigns a certain attribute to its designated referent through identifying, singling out, and commenting on this attribute of the designated referent. It is reflectively interesting and significant to note that, through the doublereference feature of a hexagram name in a certain gua unit, the gua unit has a double-level of “specific-part-reference” structure. First, as far as the first level of the specific-part reference of the gua unit is concerned, the hexagram name both designates the universe (its actual-whole referent) and signifies a certain changing pattern (its specific-part referent), as explained above. Second, as far as the second level of the specific-part reference of the gua unit is concerned, the gua unit consists of the “predicative” reference presented in the guaci part, which identifies some general characteristic attributes of the signified changing pattern, and the “predicative” reference presented in the yao-ci part, which gives a further illustrative explanation of the signified changing pattern via how a single exemplary subject (such as the dragon in the first gua unit, i.e., the Qian-gua unit) or multiple subjects (such as those in the eleventh gua unit, i.e., the Tai-gua unit) can go through a six-stage process that shows the changing pattern. Third, the foregoing first-level “specific-part” referent is referentially and logically prior to the second-level “specific-part” referent. There are two interesting observations concerning the addressed “doublereference” structure of the hexagram names and their associated gua units, from whose reflective examination some explicit and implicit morals can be drawn. First, a referring name given in a predicative context has its own deep “subject-predicate” structure which fulfills the function of saying something about its designated object. In so doing, it neither intrinsically relies on nor necessarily involves a surface grammatical “sentential” structure; rather, such a deep “subject-predicate” structure is essentially and primarily captured and delivered through the foregoing “double-reference” structure of a referring name when it is set or “used” (not in the “pragmatic” sense of the term ‘use’, but rather in its “semantic” sense) in a certain predicative context of saying something about what it designates, as prominently illustrated in the case of a hexagram name in its gua unit where the hexagram name delivers the deep “subject-predicate” structure via its “double-reference” semantic-syntactic structure in a fundamentally independent way. To this extent, it is quite superficial and misleading to judge the deep “subject-predicate” structure of language expressions merely via a surface grammatical “sentential” structure: we cannot

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judge whether a (semantic) proposition together with its related semantic things (such as truth) is involved merely based on whether the grammatical sentential predicate is explicitly given. In the case of the hexagram name, no grammatical “sentential” predicate, but rather the “predicative” context, is involved: something is addressed and pointed to in focus via the “specific-part” reference about the designated natural world. Second, the aforementioned two levels of “specific-part-reference” structure in the case of the hexagram name has its general significance concerning the issue of how predication is possible and of how to understand the deep structure of predication. The first level of the specific-part referent (as a specific changing pattern) of the gua unit constitutes the subject-expression-related “specific-part” reference, while the second level of the specific-part reference of the gua unit constitutes the predicate-expression-related “specific-part” reference, which, as explained above, consists of the “predicative” reference presented in the gua-ci part (identifying some “general” or overall characteristic attributes of the signified “specific” changing pattern) and the “predicative” reference presented in the yao-ci part (giving a further illustrative explanation of the signified changing pattern). In this way, on the one hand, the “predicative” reference here, which can be presented or paraphrased as a certain sentential predicate, is relative to, and right starts with, the subject-expressionrelated “specific-part” reference; on the other hand, the “predicative” reference, which can be presented or paraphrased as a certain sentential predicate, cons­ titutes “further comments” on the semantic-whole referent with regard to (being relative to) the subject-expression-related “specific-part” referent. 3

A Double-Reference Account of Gongsun Long’s “White-HorseNot-Horse” Thesis

It is philosophically interesting and significant that the thought of Gongsun Long (320–250 BCE) who calls our attention to the distinct identities of referents of referring names through philosophical argumentation; his idea of reference as primarily suggested in his argumentation for the “White-HorseNot-Horse” (白馬非馬 Bai-Ma-Fei-Ma) thesis (‘Gongsun Long’s “WhiteHorse-Not-Horse” argumentation’ for short) in the classical text “Bai-Ma-Lun” (白馬論 “On the White Horse”) is philosophically interesting and engaging: it not only contributes to his contemporary Later Mohists’ understanding of the semantic-syntactic structure of the parallel inference, to be explained in the next section, but also can engage with some representative approaches (in the contemporary philosophy of language) to the issue of reference in some

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philosophically interesting way, to be addressed in Section 5. It is known that modern scholars elaborate their substantial contents and philosophical significance through seemingly competitive interpretations and that there is the debate among the modern scholars concerning how to understand Gongsun Long’s argumentation for his “White-Horse-Not-Horse” (白馬非馬) thesis and its significance; there are distinct dimensions of Gongsun Long’s approach, and thus there are distinct focuses in the modern scholars’ interpretations on it. One focus is on the ontological status of the referents of such names as ‘ma’ (‘horse’) and ‘bai-ma’ (‘white horse’) in the contexts under Gongsun Long’s examination.22 Due to the purpose and scope of this essay and the nature 22  For example, Chung-ying Cheng and Yiu-ming Fung give their distinct elaborations of a representative and influential Platonic-realistic interpretation which was originally suggested by Fung Yu-lan. Fung Yu-lan renders Gongsun Long Platonic-realistic: Gongsun Long’s arguments are intended to argue that ‘white horse’ and ‘horse’ represent two distinct Platonic universals (or universal/abstract qualities) and thus the universal of white-horseness is not (identical to) the universal of horseness (Yu-lan Fung 1952). Chung-ying Cheng makes a defense of a Platonic realistic interpretation in terms of his version of Platonic abstract ontology; he emphasizes the phenomenological source and basis of Gongsun Long’s ontology of forms, which is intended to unify the subjective versus the objective and phenomenology versus the ontology (Cheng 1983). In contrast, Yiu-ming Fung gives a defense of the realistic account in terms of his realistic understanding of universals, which takes it that Gongsun Long’s universals exist in their separate, transcendent and unchanged world but they can emerge, and participate, in the phenomenal world in some interesting way (Fung 1984 and 1985). Chad Hansen proposes a radical shift of interpretation based on mereology (part-whole logic) and his mass-noun hypothesis: ‘white horse’ is a mass noun and refers to a mass-sum whole of horse-mass and white stuff, distinguishing it from a mutually-pervasive compound like hard-white which is a mass-product; the whole of white-part and horse-part is not its horse-part. Hansen’s mereological interpretation is to by-pass class-member relation but resort to whole-part division alone (Hansen 1983). In the metaphysical-interpretation part of my account, I suggest a modest mereological interpretation: the denotational semantics and deep structure of Chinese common nouns are like those of collective nouns (in a semantic-syntatic, instead of grammatical sense), and its implicit ontology is a mereological one of collection-of-individuals with both part-whole structure and member-class structure (see “Appendix 1” below); the denotation of ‘white horse’ is neither a realistic universal nor a mereological sum of white and horse nor an empty set but a collection of white horses with member-class structure (Mou 2007). As far as their metaphysical interpretations concerning the ontotlogical status of referents are concerned, Cheng’s and Fung’s accounts respectively demonstrates two distinct versions of realism concerning universals, Hansen’s account presents a strong or radical version of nominalism, while the ontological dimension of my own interpretation involves a kind of moderate nominalism (conceptualism). Also see Chmielewski 1962 for a set-theoretic account. For a recent

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of the issue under examination, my discussion in this section does not focus on the ontological implications of Gongsun Long’s approach concerning the ontological status of referents; rather, I focus on its referential-relation dimension of Gongsun Long’s approach and its related thoughts. My strategy in this section is this. First, in Section 3.1, I will present an interpretation of the structure and content of Gongsun Long’s argumentation through an interpretative translation of the text of his essay “Bai-Ma-Lun” (“白馬論”) and then give a “double-reference” interpretative analysis. Second, in Section 3.2, I will explain how his “double-reference” idea is intrinsically related to his “relative identity” thought which is especially significant in philosophy of language and logic as well as metaphysics. 3.1

An Examination of Gongsun Long’s Double-Reference Thought via His “White-Horse-Not-Horse” Argumentation23 Gongsun Long’s argumentation for the “White-Horse-Not-Horse” thesis consists of a number of articulate arguments in his essay “Bai-Ma-Lung”. To save space, instead of presenting my interpretative translation of the whole text of the “Bai-Ma-Lung” and giving an analysis of all the major arguments,24 I focus on one crucial passage from the “Bai-Ma-Lun” that gives the fundamental rationale underlying all of his specific arguments for the thesis, and then I explain why, on the issue of reference, Gongsun Long’s point in this passage is philosophically interesting and significant. The crucial passage is this: 曰：有白馬，不可謂無馬也。不可謂無馬者，非馬也？有白馬為有 馬，白之，非馬何也？曰：求馬，黃、黑馬皆可致；求白馬，黃、黑 馬不可致。使白馬乃馬也，是所求一也。所求一者，白馬不異馬也；    所求不異，如黃、黑馬有可有不可，何也？可與不可，其相非明。故

interpretation of Gongsun Long’s thesis that also addresses the semantic structure of the common nouns like ‘horse’ and ‘white horses’, see Byeong-uk Yi (2014).  In my discussion here, I choose not to give my critical examination directly to some other representative competing interpretations for three considerations: first, as indicated above, the focus of mine is diferent from that of some other interpretation; second, for those interpretations which share the same or closely related focus, my own argument itself constitutes a critical response to the other major approaches, as it differs from them in some substantial relevant connections; third, the space here is quite limited. 23  My discussion in Section 3.1 is a revised version of the relevant parts of Mou 2007. 24  For my previous interpretative translation of the whole text of the “Bai-Ma-Lung” and my analysis of all the major arguments in Gongsun Long’s “White-Horse-Not-Horse” argumentation, see section 2 of Mou 2007; for a further analysis, see section 1.1 of Mou 2018.

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A (3): “When there is a white horse, we cannot say that there is no horse. If one cannot say that there is no horse, then isn’t it a horse? There being a white horse means that there is a horse, why is a white horse not a horse?” B (3): “When a horse is sought, either a yellow horse or a black horse may meet what is sought. When a white horse is sought, neither a yellow horse nor a black horse may meet what is sought. What makes the white horse being the horse (shi-bai-ma-nai-ma) is the common [aspect of a white horse and a horse] given that it is what is sought (suo-qiu-yi-ye). If what is sought is the common [aspect], the white horse would not differ from (bu-yi) the horse [regarding the common aspect]. If what is sought in one case [the common aspect of all the horses that is met by the yellow horse and the black horse alike] does not differ from what is sought in the other case [the distinct aspect between the white horse and the horse that is met by neither the yellow horse nor the black horse], then why is it that the yellow or black horse does meet what is sought in one case but not in the other? It is evident that the two cases are distinct. For this reason the yellow horse and the black horse, based on what are the same in them [they are horses but not white horses], respond to what ‘horse’ denotes [fall into the extension of ‘horse’] but not to what ‘white horse’ denotes [not into the extension of ‘white horse’]. Thus [in the way in which the yellow horse and the black horse are not the white horse in regard to their distinct aspect] indeed the white horse is not the horse.” On the one hand, what Gongsun Long emphasizes here is this: when what is sought is the common or shared aspect between the white horse and the horse [in stating how the former is related to the latter], what is expected or needs to be stated is that the whise horse is identical to or is not different from (不 異 “bu-yi”), the horse with regard to the addressed common or shared aspect, because what makes a white horse a horse consists in their same [shared or common] aspect (使白馬乃馬也，是所求一也 “shi-bai-ma-nai-ma-ye, shi-souqiu-yi-ye”). On the other hand, Gongsun Long stresses that what is sought in the above case is different from what is sought when the white horse is claimed to be different from the horse: in the latter case, what is sought or focused on is some distinct aspect (that of being white) between the white horse and the horse, which is thus met by neither the yellow horse nor the black horse. Exactly here does Gongsun Long make a crucial general point that underlies all his specific arguments in the Bai-Ma-Lun: while the subject expression ‘the

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white horse’ designates a (any) white horse (i.e., any member of the collection of white horses) as a whole, what is sought (in focus on some specific aspect of a white horse as a whole) makes a significant difference; it is the distinct aspect or specific attribute part of being white (something that is not shared by all horses) that is focused on when an (any) individual white horse is designated; that is, a double reference, so to speak, is made in such sentential contexts. This gives the fundamental rationale behind all of Gongsun Long’s distinct arguments for the “White-Horse-Not-Horse” thesis, each of which focuses on a certain distinct aspect between the white horse and the horse (or a certain distinct “meaning” aspect between their respective names): for example, the distinctive conceptual contents of their referring names, their distinctive necessary-identity contributors, and the distinctive extensions of their referring names. It is important to note that the foregoing referential structure of the subject expression in a sentential context is neither something odd nor something that is coined for the sake of an intellectual game, because, semantically, every subject-predicate sentence or statement, as a token of the type of one basic language employment to the effect that something is said about something, does have such a double-reference structure and does make such a double reference. Now Gongsun Long actually addresses the deep “double-reference” semantic-syntactic structure of the referential function of the subject expression in a sentential context (in terms of his key terms “what is sought” here) for the sake of calling our attention to distinct aspects of things that are often ignored when they are categorized into their kinds in which they are supposed to belong. In this way, generally speaking, Gongsun Long alerts us to the danger of over-assimilating distinctions, especially when the distinctive aspects need to be emphatically focused on; specifically speaking (concerning the issue of reference), he pays due attention to more carefully distinguishing different but related referential functions of the referring terms and being sensitive to which specific aspect of an object is pointed to in focus while the object as a whole is referred to in reasoning (either deductive reasoning or non-deductive reasoning). Gongsun Long’s points of the foregoing arguments (formulated in quasitheoretic terms) that addresses the double-reference character of a referring name in a sentential context (as a token presentation of the basic language employment to the effect that something is said of an object) deserves a further reflective interpretation: how it is possible for the same referent of a referring name like ‘white horse’ to allow such distinct identity contributors that are sought or focused on in distinct sentential contexts: they might be necessary for one contextual identity of the referent (say, being white is necessary for the

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identity of the white horse when the white horse is claimed to differ from the horse) but unnecessary for another contextual identity (say, being white is not necessary for the identity of the white horse when the white horse is claimed to be the horse). This issue, as presented above, is that of the relation between language and the world, which can thus be presented as the issue of reference in the philosophy of language. Insofar as the issue intrinsically involves the structure and constitution of the referent of the referring name as a thing in the world, it is also metaphysically related. Insofar as the issue involves which identity contributors would be available to the speaker (or, strictly speaking in this context, the inter-subjective nominal speaker) as an epistemic agent25 in a sentential context of using referring names, the issue is also partially an epistemological issue. 3.2 Double Reference and Relative Identity To my knowledge, it is Gongsun Long who first (in the history of philosophy, in view of both Western and non-Western philosophical traditions) explicitly and directly addressed and suggested the idea of relative identity through his “double-reference” ideas as presented in “White-Horse-Not-Horse” thesis/argumentation, although he did not use (the Chinese counterpart of) the very terminology of ‘relative identity’. In the above cited crucial passage of his “Bai-Ma-Lun” essay [i.e., the passage B (3)], as indicated before, Gongsun Long explicitly addressed and emphasized the general rationale underlying all of his specific arguments for the “White-Horse-Not-Horse” thesis. On the one hand, what Gongsun Long emphasizes here is this: when what is sought is the common or shared aspect between the white horse and the horse [in stating how the former is related to the latter], what is expected or needs to be stated is that the white horse is identical to or is not different from, the horse with regard to the addressed common or shared aspect, because what makes a white horse a horse consists in their same [shared or common] aspect. On the other hand, Gongsun Long stresses that what is sought in the above case is different from what is sought when the white horse is claimed to be different from the horse: in the latter case, what is sought or focused on is some distinct aspect (that of being white) between the white horse and the horse, which is thus met by 25  One consideration for which the phrase “the inter-subjective nominal speaker” is used here is to intentionally highlight that the point can be inter-subjectively delivered and thus we can focus on the semantic dimension without discussing the presupposed “pragmatic” contributing elements. By the same token, the occurrences of “the speaker” here can be replaced by those of “the inter-subjective nominal speaker”) to suggest that the semantic dimension of people’s linguistic practice can be focused on given that various relevant “pragmatic” contributing elements are presupposed.

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neither the yellow horse nor the black horse. Exactly here does Gongsun Long make a crucial general point that underlies all his specific arguments in the Bai-Ma-Lun: while the subject expression ‘the white horse’ designates a (any) white horse (i.e., any member of the collection of white horses) as a whole, what is sought (in focus on some specific aspect of a white horse as a whole) makes a significant difference; it is the distinct aspect or specific attribute part of being white (something that is not shared by all horses) that is focused on when an (any) individual white horse is designated; that is, a double reference, so to speak, is made in such sentential contexts. This gives the fundamental rationale behind all of Gongsun Long’s distinct arguments for the “WhiteHorse-Not-Horse” thesis, each of which focuses on a certain distinct aspect between the white horse and the horse (or a certain distinct “meaning” aspect between their respective names): for example, the distinct conceptual contents of their referring names, their distinct necessary-identity contributors, and the distinctive extensions of their referring names. In so doing, Gongsun Long explicitly and directly explored the following “relative-identity” thought: the sameness and difference are both relative; that is, both identity and non-identity are (metaphysically speaking), or should be (in our practice of thinking and employment of language to deliver thought), sensitive to what is sought, which points to some specific part of the object under examination, as illustrated by Gongsun Long’s own sample sentences whose interpretative translations are given as follows: (G1) The white horse is (identical to) the horse [regarding, or relative to, the shared “horse- nature” attribute] (G2) The white horse is not (identical to) the horse [regarding, or relative to, the unshared “white-color” attribute] Such an idea of relative identity can be symbolized as x[γ]= y or x[γ] ≠ y.26

26  The syntax and semantics of an expanded predicate logic account with the added sign ‘x[γ]= y’ for the relative identity with the attribute-in-focus parameter on the basis of the standard predicate logic is given in Appendix 2.

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In the Western tradition, it is Geach who first directly and formally presents a logical notion of relative identity and introduces the phrase ‘relative identity’ in Geach 1967.27 However, Gongsun Long’s idea of relative identity is distinct from Geach’s in several connections in a philosophically interesting and engaging way. First, one thing that distinguishes Gongsun Long’s different approach to the issue of relative identity is his distinct starting point. So to speak, those modern authors (such as Geach) who address relative identity start with the critical look at the traditional “absolute” way of treating identity, challenging the Leibniz law as Indiscernibility of identicals in this way: even without all the attributes of two objects being the same, the two objects still can be identical with regard to some aspect; in contrast, Gongsun Long starts with his reflective look at one “popular” or “dominant” attitude toward classification: he not merely takes it that the two objects are identical with regard to some shared common attribute, and thus they need to be rendered “identical” if that shared common aspect is “what is sought” in focus, he also insightfully further argues that two objects are not identical with regard to, or relative to, some distinct specific aspect of one object which is not possessed by the other object, even though the two objects are usually rendered identical with regard to their shared common aspect. That is, if one object is identical to another object relative to some aspects, the former is still non-identical or different from the latter with regard to some other aspects, even when the former is usually classified into the category of the latter: people tend to classify particular things into various category kinds while ignoring various distinct aspects in which (or relative to which) the former is not identical to the latter. In other words, Gongsun Long moves one further step concerning relative identity: identity is not merely relative; such relative identity means or intrinsically involves relative non-identity or relative difference. For instance, it is not merely that the white horse is identical to the horse with regard (relative) to their shared aspect (their “common” attribute of being horse) but also that the white horse is not identical to the horse with regard (relative) to some distinct aspect that is possessed by any of the collection of white horses but not by every member of the collection of horses. Gongsun Long’s point is this: there is nothing wrong with classifying particular things into their kinds or “general identity” categories; however, when doing such “kind”-belonging classification, don’t forget and ignore these things’ own distinct aspects. In this way, with his general vision in this connection, Gongsun Long alerts us to the danger of over-assimilating distinctions, especially when the distinctive aspects need to be emphatically focused on. 27  For a clear review of Geach’s approach, see Deutsch 2007.

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Second, as far as the “horizontal” dimension of relative identity (i.e., relative identity as presented in the “horizontal” predicative context) is concerned, what Gongsun Long treats is a more general “relative identity” case in the following sense. For Geach, relative identity relationship is ‘equivalent” in the sense that the two objects are reflexive, transitive and symmetric; however, the Gongsun Long-style concept of relative identity does not have such a restriction but is more in accordance with real-life “relative-identity” predications as illustrated by his sample “white-horse-horse” and “white-horse-not-horse” statements: such a “relative-identity” statement is intrinsically related to the real-life predication that is featured with being predicated into the “larger” category to which what the subject referring name designates belongs, and thus the “identity” relationship between what the subject referring name designates and what the “category” collection of the objects to which the referring name in the predicate expression refers is not symmetric: the identity relationship is associated with the category-belonging predication, which does not symmetrically hold of the category term to the subject referring name.28 Third, from the point of view of philosophy of language, which is substantially relevant to logic and philosophy of logic, Gongsun Long suggests an explanation of how relative identity is possible; what makes “relative identity” possible lies in one fundamental feature of the basic language employment “something is said of an object”, which might as well be labeled ‘double reference’: when one object as a whole is talked about (the object-whole aboutness), “what is sought” with regard to some specific aspect of the object in focus is also simultaneously pointed to (the specific-aspect-of-the-object aboutness), which constitutes the semantic (referential) foundation of relative identity. It is noted that the foregoing referential structure of the subject expression in a sentential context is neither something odd nor something that is coined for the sake of an intellectual game, because, semantically, every subject-predicate sentence or statement, as a token of the type of one basic language employment to the effect that something is said about something, does have such a doublereference structure and does make such a double reference. Now Gongsun Long actually addresses the deep “double-reference” semantic-syntactic structure of the referential function of the subject expression in a sentential context (in terms of his key terms “what is sought” here) for the sake of calling our attention to distinct aspects of things that are often ignored when they are 28  Though not directly addressed in Gongsun Long’s argumentation, another type of relative identity is not related to the category-belonging predication (between classes or between individual and class) but directly between individual objects, which is essentially along Gongsun Long’s line here but indeed symmetric. The “symmetry” issue needs more explanation which I explore in another essay.

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categorized into their kinds in which they are supposed to belong. So to speak, specifically speaking (concerning the issue of reference), Gongsun Long calls our attention to more carefully distinguishing different but related referential functions of the referring terms and being sensitive to which specific aspect of an object is pointed to in focus while the object as a whole is referred to in the “horizontal” predicative context. In these connections, Gongsun Long contributes to our understanding and treatment of the structure and content of the law of identity especially in the “horizontal” predicative context, which is intrinsically relevant to the structure and content of the law of identity in the “vertical” inference context, to be explained in the next section. 4

The “Double-Reference” Character of the Later Mohist “Semantic-Sensitivity” Diagnosis on Parallel Inference29

In this section, I examine how the Later Mohist view on reference, which is essentially in line with Gongsun Long’s point on semantic sensitivity to distinct referential identities (what is sought in referring) in the “Bai-Ma-Lun” as explained before, bears on their treatment of the issue of validity of the mou (侔) style parallel inference (arguably a type of deductive reasoning) through their semantic sensitivity to the deep semantic-syntactic structure of such a type of inference. In the following, I present a philosophical interpretation of the ancient Mohist diagnosis of the parallel inference in the Later Mohist text Xiao-Qu (“XQ” for short) concerning its semantic-syntactic structure.30 In the opening passage, the XQ gives a general characterization of disputation in view of its strategic and tactic goals: 夫辯者，將以明是非之分，審治亂之紀，明同異之處，察名實之理，    處利害，決嫌疑。焉摹略萬物之然，論求群言之比。以名舉實，以辭 抒意，以說出故，以類取，以類予。有諸己不非諸人，無諸己不求諸 人。或也者，不盡也。假者，今不然也。

Disputation/argumentation (辯) is to clearly distinguish between what is this/so and what is not-this/so [是非 right and wrong, true and false, or 29  This section is a revised version of the relevant parts of Mou 2016. 30  For a further discussion on how to formally and accurately capture the Later Mohist point in this connection and give a general condition for the validity of the parallel inference via a modern logical treatment, see Mou 2016.

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adequate and inadequate], examine the patterns of order and disorder, differentiate where sameness and difference are located, investigate the principles of names and objects, make judgment of what is beneficial and harmful, and resolve suspicion and doubts. Thereby one can depict and capture (摹略) the ways ten-thousand things are (萬物之然) and explore what distinguish various sayings. Names are used to designate objects; phrases are used to express ideas; explorations are used to bring out reasons. By virtue of kinds selections are made; by virtue of kinds inferences are drawn. If one maintains it in oneself, one should not criticize it in others [not addressing it in this negative way]; if one does not maintain it in oneself, one should not demand it of others [not addressing it in this demanding way]. Some-so is not exhaustive-so; supposed-so is currently not-so. Among others, 焉摹略萬物之然 (i.e., capturing the way things are) both highlights one strategic goal of reflective disputation/argumentation and provides one strategic standard as what is modeled on. The XQ then gives the underlying rationale of a variety of argumentation via modeling: 效者，為之法也，所效者所以為之法也。故中效，則是也；不中效，    則非也。此效也。

Modeling is to have something as a standard; what is modeled on is that by which a standard is set up. Therefore, if a thing matches a model, then it is so [right or true]; if it does not match the model, then it is not so [wrong or false]. This is what modeling is. and four forms of argumentation under examination: 辟也者，舉他物而以明之也。侔也者，比辭而俱行也。援也者，曰  「子然，我奚獨不可以然也？」推也者，以其所不取之同於其所取   者，予之也。是猶謂也者，同也。吾豈謂也[他]者異也。

“Drawing an metaphor-analogy inference” (辟 pi) is making one thing clear by bringing up another similar thing (舉他物); “Drawing a parallel inference” (侔 mou) is comparing/contrasting [both] phrases [via identity or distinction regarding a certain aspect] and having both proceed in a parallel way [regarding the same aspect] (比辭而俱行); “Drawing a pulling-analogy inference” (援 yuan) is [what underlies] such sayings as “As you [the opponent in disputation] are so, why should I alone not be so?”; “Drawing a pushing-analogy inference” (推 tui) is drawing inference

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by recognizing what has not been selected to be the same as what has been selected. This amounts to saying that, if the other is the same, how can I say that the other is different? After the XQ makes some significant remarks on how to adequately employ the foregoing forms of argumentation via specific diagnoses and some general morals, in the subsequent paragraphs, the XQ focuses on the discussion of several representative applications of the parallel inference (i.e., the “侔”-type inference) and makes its diagnosis.31 Now, in the XQ, the Later Mohists explicitly examined three distinct types of situations concerning various applications of the parallel inference, with concrete examples as illustrations: (1) the “shi-er-ran 是而然” situation where a thing is this [in premise] and thus is so [in conclusion]; (2) the “shi-er-bu-ran 是而不然” situation where a thing is this [in premise] but is not so [in conclusion]; (3) the “bu-shi-er-ran 不是而然” situation where a thing is not this [in premise] but is so [in conclusion]. Some applications of the parallel inference seem to be valid, while others not. They can be further classified into two kinds of situations, i.e., the first kind of the applications are considered adequate for the sake of valid parallel-type deductive reasoning, which consists of the explicitly-given Situation (1) of “shi-er-ran 是而然” where a thing is this [in premise] and thus is so [in conclusion] and the implicitly-addressed Situation (1)* of “bu-shi-er-bu-ran 不是而不然” where a thing is not this [in premise] and thus is not so [in conclusion]”. Both are considered to be adequate applications of the parallel inference. The Later Mohists gave examples and illustrations of adequate applications of Situation (1) as follows: 白馬，馬也；乘白馬，乘馬也。驪馬，馬也；乘驪馬，乘馬也。獲，    人也；愛獲，愛人也。臧，人也；愛臧，愛人也。此乃是而然者也。

31  In the literature on the issue of the status and nature of the parallel inference, it is controversial whether the parallel inference is a type of deductive reasoning or a kind of analogical reasoning. Those scholars such as Graham 1967, Liu 2004, and Fung 2012 explicitly render it deductive: though Graham does not explain why he thinks so, while Liu and Fung give essentially the same reason by formally presenting the parallel inference in terms of the standard first-order predicate logic resources. In contrast, some other scholars such as Hansen 1983 and Fraser 2013 render it analogical. On this issue, I agree to the former’s position, while disagreeing to the latter; however, my reason for rendering the parallel inference deductive is substantially different from that as presented in Liu 2004 and Fung 2012. Without elaborating this here, the interested reader can see Mou 2016 for the details in this connection.

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The white horse is the horse; [therefore] riding the white horse is riding the horse. The black horse is the horse; [therefore] riding the black horse is riding the horse. Huo [the name of a female servant] is a person; [therefore] caring for Huo is caring for a person. Zang [the name of a male servant] is a person; [therefore] caring for Zang is caring for a person. There are instances in each of which a thing is this and thus is so (是而然).32 Furthermore, the Later Mohists identified and addressed the other kind of inadequate applications of the parallel inference which do not appear to be valid, that is, Situation (2) of “shi-er-bu-ran 是而不然” where a thing is this [in premise] but is not so [in conclusion] and Situation (3) of the “bu-shi-er-ran 不是而然” situation where a thing is not this [in premise] but is so [in conclusion]. Some examples and illustrations of Situation (2) are given as follows: … 車，木也；乘車，非乘木也。船，木也；入船，非入木也。盜人，    人也，… 殺盜人非殺人也，… 。此與彼同類，世有彼而不自非也，   

墨者有此而非之，無也故焉，所謂內膠外閉與心毋空乎？內膠而不解 也，此乃是而不然者也。

32  One note is due here about the English translation of those phrases like ‘乘馬’ (and ‘乘 車’ below) in such a context of parallel inference. I hold a collective-name hypothesis concerning the semantic-syntactic structure of a common noun (for its earlier version concerning common nouns in Chinese, see Section A1.1 of Appendix 1 of this essay; for its expanded version concerning common nouns in general not limited to Chinese, see Section A1.2 of Appendix 1); with consideration that one standard grammantical means in English to express a collection designation is via “the definite article plus the [addressed] common noun” (for instance, grammantically adequate, one can say “the wolf is not really a dangerous animal”, with this usage of the definite article to talk about any individual member of the collection of wolfs), I thus use the English phrase ‘the horse’ to designate a collection of horses consistently both in a single subject-predicate statement [like ‘the white horse is (identical to) the horse (with regard to the shared common aspect of being horse)] and in a parallel inference here (like the inference from the premise statement ‘the white horse’ is the horse’ to the conclusion statement ‘riding the white horse is riding the horse’). Different from a kind designation or a universal designation, part of the sophisticated semantic point of a collection designation is this: individualization of a collection of individual objects consists totally in (any) individual members of the collection, instead of a collection entity that is separate from its individual members; in this way, ‘riding the horse’ means riding any one individual horse in the collection of horses (instead of some members being ridden while some others not) and more accurately captures the involved collection designation. Although, grammatically and partially semantically, one can use ‘riding a horse’ here, I think that some sophisticated semantic point of what is expressed via ‘riding the horse’ would be lost.

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… The cart is wood; [but] riding the cart is not riding wood. The boat is wood; [but] entering the boat is not entering wood. The robber is the person; … [but] killing the robber is not killing the person [the latter/ the conclusion of this type of applications]. The latter [此 ci/the conclusion] and former [彼 bi/the [inadequate] premise] are of the same kind [but with their distinct focuses on distinct aspects]; the ordinary people hold the former and do not consider themselves mistaken; however, they consider it mistaken for the Mohists to [also] hold the latter. This attitude is not reasonable and amounts to what is called “ossified inside and closed off outside, which results from the closed mind that is ossified inside without being susceptible to change”. These are instances in each of which a thing is this but is not so (是而不然). Some examples and illustrations of Situation (3) are given as follows: 且夫讀書，非 ，好書也。且鬥雞，非雞也；好鬥雞，    好雞也。且入井，非入井也；止且入井，止入井也。… 此與彼同，    世有彼而不自非也，墨者有此而罪非之，無也故焉，所謂內膠外閉與 心毋空乎？內膠而不解也。此乃不是而然者也。

Reading the book is not the book; [but] favoring reading the book is favoring books. Cockfighting is not the cock; [but] favoring cockfighting is favoring the cock. Being about to fall into the well is not falling into the well; [but] stopping being about to fall into the well is stopping falling into the well ….The latter [此 ci/the conclusion of this type of appli­ cations] and former [彼 bi/the [inadequate] premise of this type of applications] are of the same kind [but with their distinct focuses on distinct aspects]; the ordinary people hold the former and do not consider themselves mistaken; however, they consider it mistaken for the Mohists to [also] hold the latter. This attitude is not reasonable and amounts to what is called “ossified inside and closed off outside, which results from the closed mind that is ossified inside without being susceptible to change”. These are instances in each of which a thing is not this but is so (不是而然). Though it is known that those applications of the parallel inference in Situations (1) and (1)* are rendered adequate while those in Situations (2) and (3) problematic, what are at issue are these: Why do (2) and (3) go wrong? Can we say that those application instances of the parallel inference in Situations (2) and (3) constitute genuine counter-examples to the generality of the parallel inference and thus show the failure of the parallel inference per se? What is the point of the Later Mohist diagnosis here?

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Based on the foregoing interpretative examination of the Later Mohist diagnosis, one central point of the diagnosis as presented in the XQ is this: generally speaking, the Later Mohists maintained due semantic sensitivity to the refined semantic relation between language expressions and the way things are in the predicative context of saying something about objects as referents of names; specifically speaking, the Later Mohists implemented this semantic sensitivity in their reflective examination of the parallel inference: such a semantic-sensitivity concern motivated the Later Mohists to call our attention to meeting certain adequate conditions for validly carrying out the parallel inference. What fails in (2) and (3) is not the parallel-inference deductive reasoning per se but its inadequate applications in (2) and (3); this indeed also shows the insufficiency of the available logic resources in the ancient times to capture the deep semantic-syntactic structure of the parallel-inference deductive reasoning. So to speak, the genuine point of the Later Mohist diagnosis of (2) and (3) lies in this: the Later Mohist diagnosis aims at keeping due semantic sensitivity to which aspect of the object (the referent of the addressed subject expression) under examination is focused on when carrying out the parallel inference and thus introducing and maintaining the genuinely relevant premise (with a due perspective focus) in an adequate application of the parallel inference.33 Indeed, the Later Mohists then did not have available due resources to formulate the general inference rule for the validity of the parallel inference in an effective and unified way for the sake of guaranteeing its adequate applications (in the case of “是而然”, explicitly addressed, and of “不是而不然”, implicitly addressed) while against introducing inadequate (i.e., contextually irrelevant) premises (in the cases of “是而不然” and “不是而然”); this has partially brought about, or at least contributed to the subsequent misunderstanding and mistreatment of the status and nature of the parallel inference. Such a historical limitation of the Later Mohists in this connection is neither alone 33  In this fundamental connection, the line of the Later Mohists in diagnosing the parallel inference and Gongsun Long’s rationale in treating the “White-Horse-Not-Horse” thesis as presented before are essentially the same: any identity expression without being sensitive to which aspect is in reference focus would be semantically incomplete. This idea, logically speaking, is also labeled ‘relative identify’, which is often attributed to Geach 1967 in which Geach criticizes the standard notion of absolute identity in the standard first-order predicate logic (also see Deutsch 2007). For the reason explained here, the basic idea of relative identity as a kind of semantic sensitivity is quite pre-theoretic; as explained in section 3.2, its first explicit presentation can be traced back to one fundamental point of Gongsun Long’s “White-Horse-Not-Horse” thesis to the effect that, relative to what is sought, one can say that the white horse is identical to the horse or that the white horse is not identical to the horse. For an earlier logical presentation of the Gongsun-Long-style concept of relative identity (in predicate logic resources), see the relevant discussion in Mou 2016.

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nor accidental. The standard predicate logic with the standard form of identity does not have sufficient logical resources to formally present the foregoing point of the Later Mohist critical examination of various types of application situations of the parallel-inference deductive reasoning. However, this does not mean that there is any intrinsic problem with the parallel-inference deductive reasoning per se but only shows that the standard predicate logic (with identity) has yet to have sufficiently powerful, adequate and sensitive logical resources to formally capture the deductive reasoning in this connection. It is noted that, in view of the principle of charity in philosophical interpretation, and with the due assumption of the consistency of the Later Mohist texts within the Mohist Canons, one can further identify the foregoing point of the Later Mohist semantic sensitivity from some other major texts of the Mohist Canons. Let me consider some crucial passages in the “Jing-Shuo” (經說 “Canons A”) & the “Jing-Shuo-Shang” (經說上 “Explanations A”) [my translations: those paraphrase remarks within bracket parentheses and the point numbers are mine]: A87 [In “Canons A”] 同，重、體、合、類 [In “Explanations A”] 同：二名一實，重同也。不外於兼，體同也。  

俱處於室，合同也。有以同，類同也。 Tong (同 the same) [includes the following seemingly different but

partially overlapping classification of the same things]: being duplicated; being parts; being together/united; being of a kind. Tong (同 the same): What two names designate being one (identical) object is the same of being duplicated [the referential sameness]; [Both] Not being outside the whole is the same of being parts [the sameness of belonging to the one whole]; Both residing in one [single] place is the same of being together [the sameness of being united in one single thing]; Both being the same in some aspect is the same of being a kind [the sameness in regard to some aspect, i.e., the sameness of a kind]. A88 [In “Canons A”] 異，二、不體、不合、不類。 [In “Explanations A”] 異：二必異，二也。不連屬，不體也。不同

所，不合也。不有同，不類也。 Yi (異 different/distinct) [includes the following seemingly different

but not mutually exclusive modes of the same things]: two [instead

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of being duplicated]; not being parts; not being together/united; not being of a kind. Yi (異 different/distinct): Two that certainly have [referential] difference are two; Not being jointed is not being parts [the difference of not belonging to the one whole]; Not residing in one [single] place is not being together [the difference of not being united in one single thing]; Not having the same [in some aspect] is not being of a kind [in regard to some aspect] [the difference in regard to some aspect, i.e., difference of a kind]. Analyzing the XQ text together with examining the point of the relevant passages such as those cited above from the Later Mohist Canons, one can identify several relevant points of the Later Mohist logical discourse to its diagnosis concerning the semantic-syntactic structure of the parallel inference. First, the last mode of the sameness as addressed in A87 is the most general one and can include the other modes as its sub-modes; in other words, the other modes can be viewed as special cases of the sameness of a kind: the referential sameness is the sameness of being of a class with regard to two names’ having the same referent; the sameness of belonging to the one whole is the sameness of being of a class with regard to both having the same part-ship of the one whole , and the same of being unified in one single thing is the sameness of being of a class with regard to both being united by the same single thing (both contributing to the identity of the single thing). Similarly, as shown in A88, the difference of a kind can include the other modes of difference. Second, what determines the identity of a kind? There seem to be two contributing elements: the objective “the way-things-are” foundation: there is some aspect that constitutes a “common” attribute34 among the members of a collection kind; the aspect that is what one (or a group of persons) focuses on and intends to capture for a certain purpose, which results in a certain (eligible) perspective that is intended to point to and capture the aspect. So to speak, the foregoing “the way-things-are” contributing element and “perspective” element would jointly determine the (adequate) identity of a collection kind and thus the identity standard; the former provides the “objective” foundation for the adequacy of the “shi/fei” criterion, while the latter is sensitive to 34  It is important to note that the saying “common attribute” here does not necessarily commit itself to a platonic realism regarding universals but is open to distinct ontological interpretations.

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our diverse purposes, interests and focuses in capturing the way things in the world are. Third, distinct perspectives, as given in distinct sentential contexts, can result in distinct identities of kinds of involved things, but distinct identities of kinds are not necessarily incoherent. For example, when (one of) those common-attribute aspects between the robber and the person are focused on, it is thus stated that the robber is the same as the person [with regard to (one of) those common aspects]; it is thus true to say that they are of the same kind; to this extent (with the focus on the common aspect), it is thus said that killing the robber is the same as killing the person. On the other hand, when some distinct aspect(s) that is(are) not shared by the robber and the person (the person meaning any member of the person as a collection) is(are) focused on, it is thus stated that the robber is not the same as the person [with regard to that distinct aspect]; it is true to say that they are not of the same kind with regard to that distinct aspect; to this extent (with the focus on the distinct aspect), it is thus true to say that killing the robber is not the same as killing the person. It is noted that there is no contradiction here; there is no violation of the principle of non-contradiction both at the ontological level and at the level of linguistic expression: one object can possess all these distinct aspects at the same time; the foregoing distinct perspectives can be consistently maintained; the foregoing distinct cases point to a perspective shift in the agent.35 In sum, essentially along with Gongsun Long’s “double-reference” line in this connection, the Later Mohists were highly sensitive to the refined semantic relation between language expressions and the way things are in the predicative context of saying something of what is designated; the Later Mohists further implemented this “double-reference” semantic sensitivity in their reflective examination of the parallel type of deductive reasoning; such a semantic concern in the Later Mohist logical discourse motivated the Later Mohists to alert us to meet certain adequate conditions for the sake of adequately carrying out 35  There is one substantial implication of such understanding of identity (as labeled ‘relative identity’ in contemporary logic discourse): as one might object, it is thus possible that all different things in the world, in some sense, can be regarded as the same [or similar] from a relevant perspective. I would render such possibilities (or even some related “seemingly-bizarre” but really open-minded ways of classification) very positive and constructive; this would give a thoroughly open-minded approach to look at identities/ similarities among things in the world and at how to classify them: this would be sensitive to distinct eligible perspectives that point to certain aspects which are commonly or jointly possessed by things and thus meet certain reflective needs, though some of these classifications seem trivial or can be against people’s current ready-made or habitual ways of classification.

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the parallel inference, although the Later Mohists then did not have sufficient or adequate logical resources to explicitly formulate the general inference rule for the validity of the parallel inference in an effective and unified way.36 5

A Double-Reference Account of the Semantic Dimension of How Reference Is Possible: Engaging the Lockean-Fregean Approach and the Millian-Kripkean Approach

In this section, I intend to first give a more or less theoretic presentation of the double-reference resources concerning referential meanings of names as suggested in the foregoing three cases in the pre-Han classical Chinese philosophy in a relatively systematic way, though it is a still schematic way to be further elaborated; in so doing, a double-reference account of the semantic dimension of the issue of how reference is possible is presented. I then examine how the double-reference resources in the relevant accounts of those ancient thinkers in the pre-Han classical Chinese philosophy can contribute to the major debate in contemporary philosophy of language between two most influential approaches, i.e., the Fregean descriptivist approach and the Millian-Kripkean direct-reference approach. 5.1 A Double-Reference Account In this sub-section, in view of people’s pre-theoretic understanding of the “double-reference” phenomenon of the basic language employment, as addressed in Section 1, and the reflective double-reference resources in these ancient texts of the pre-Han classical Chinese philosophy under examination, I present the main points of a general double-reference account of how it is possible for a referring name to refer to the same referent in distinct linguistic contexts while having distinct focuses on different aspects, dimensions or layers of the referent.37 36  However, with some enhanced predicate logic resources, the deep semantic-syntactic structure of the parallel inference can be captured and presented in a formal way, although both ancient logical resources during the Later Mohist times and the so-faravailable logical resources (including those currently available expanded predicate logic accounts) have yet to be refined enough to take on, or are unable to formally apprehend, this. For a detailed discussion on this, see Mou 2016. 37  An early version of a brief general double-reference account was presented in Section 2.2 of Mou 2007 (503–509) where “the specific-part referent” is incorrectly labeled ‘the pragmatic referent’. It is incorrect for this reason: the double-reference account of the doublereference character of the basic language employment is a semantic account of the

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First, the term ‘reference’ here means the semantic “aboutness” relation between language expressions as referring names and objects as referents.38 The semantic “aboutness” relationship as a whole consists of that referring process which relates a referring name to what is talked about and (typically or in most cases) its result as the referent of the referring name. With this understanding, an elaboration of the “double reference” character of the basic language employment, to which a preliminary analysis has been given before, and which is essentially related to the “double-aboutness” character of people’s consciousness, can be made at the two levels. At the pragmatic level concerning referring process, the addressing-the-whole reference and the addressing-specific-focus reference of a referring name in a sentential context simultaneously and jointly play their related roles in referring and predicating. At the sematic level concerning referring result, the semantic-whole referent of a referring name and its specific-part referent (really possessed by, or grounded in, the semantic-whole referent) in a sentential context simultaneously and jointly play their related roles in referring and predicating and make their indispensable and distinct contributions to our hooking up to, and our understanding of, things in the world through language. It is important to note semantic dimension of the basic language employment in view of issue of how reference is possible; the distinction between the specific-part reference and the semantic-whole reference is a semantic distinction. The current version of this general double-reference account, as given here, is a modified version of the relevant part in Mou 2018. 38  As already stressed in Section 1, here the term ‘reference’ or ‘referring’, just like ‘talk about’ or ‘talking about’, is used as a less-metaphysically-loaded neutral term expressing the “aboutness” semantic relation between a word, or collection of words, and some object(s), whether it “actually exists” (instead of being restricted to hold only between a word and some thing that actually exists), and no matter how the ontological status of the object is explained. It is noted that some authors do use the term in a narrow sense in which ‘reference’/’referring’ is restricted to the relation between language expressions and objects that actually exist (cf., Crane 2013, 9–10). This is not a mere verbal disagreement but a substantial one. In my view, first, this artificial restriction would substantially conflate the issue of reference as a central semantic issue in philosophy of language and the ontological issue concerning what really exist in metaphysics; second, it unnecessarily and inadequately restricts the wide coverage of the semantic notion of referring or being about in philosophy of language and thus fails to capture the explanatory power of the “double-reference” feature of people’s basic language employment. In sum, the issue of reference in philosophy of language is distinct from an ontological issue in metaphysics; an adequate analysis of the semantic or referential relation between names and referents in philosophy of language is expected to be compatible to various metaphysical accounts regarding what counts as “real” existence concerning the ontological status of what is referred to.

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that the distinction between the semantic-whole referent and the specific-part referent of a referring name in a (declarative) sentential context is a semantic distinction for the sake of a semantic examination of the semantic dimension of the basic language employment in view of issue of how reference is possible, in the sense of ‘semantic’ as explained before. At the level concerning referring process, both addressing-the-whole reference and addressing-specific-focus reference are linguistically associated with their respectively “nominal” or “linguistic” referent as mere objects of thought; each of the two types of reference (the semantic-whole reference and the specific-part reference) as the process of referring minimally involves the referent as a mere object of thought (or its “nominal” or “linguistic” referent) and can reach the alleged substantial referent (or its “substantial” referent) when the alleged referent is really present in the alleged way; the latter referent might as well be called ‘grounded’ referent (grounded in the really-present reality as alleged, whether it is a physical reality, or a social reality, or an abstract reality out of theoretic construction), while the former ‘non-grounded’. It is also noted that the real-presence or “groundedness” of the semantic-whole referent of a referring name at the semantic level does not imply the real-presence of the alleged specific-part referent of the referring name as given in a sentential context. Given that a referring name in its addressing-whole reference (referring process) does designate its semantic-whole referent, when the alleged specificaspect referent of the addressing-specific-focus reference is really possessed by, and thus grounded in, the semantic-whole referent, the foregoing two levels of double reference would be in accordance and parallel and can be viewed as two sides of one coin. This is an ideal case in which truth can achieved. Nevertheless, when the alleged specific-part referent of the addressingspecific-focus reference (referring process) is not really possessed by (and thus not grounded in) the semantic-whole referent, the foregoing two levels of double reference are not in accordance. In the following, in view of the major purpose of this sub-section, I focus primarily on the ideal case in which the two levels of double reference are parallel and thus on the distinction between the semantic-whole referent and the specific-part referent of a referring name in a (declarative) sentential context, although the double reference at the level of referring process is also addressed whenever in need. By ‘double reference’ I mean the semantic-whole reference and the specificpart reference of a referring name in a sentential context that simultaneously and jointly play their related roles in referring and predicating (as shown by the “double reference” character of the basic language employment, as addressed before) and make their indispensable and distinct contributions

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to our hooking up to, and our understanding of, things in the world through language, which is essentially related to the “double-abountness” character of people’s consciousness.39 There is the associated distinction between the semantic-whole referent and the specific-part referent of a referring name in a sentential context, given that both exist in some sense and that the existence of the specific-part referent is grounded in the existence of the semanticwhole referent.40 In the following, unless indicated otherwise, I focus on the by-default case of “referent-associated reference” and thus on the distinction between the semantic-whole referent and the specific-part referent of a referring name in a (declarative) sentential context. As emphasized above, this distinction is a semantic distinction for the sake of a semantic examination of the semantic dimension of the basic language employment in view of issue of how reference is possible, in the sense of ‘semantic’ as explained before. Second, the semantic-whole referent of a referring name is either an individual thick object as a whole (in the case of a proper name and a definite description denoting a unique object41), which unifies a collection of synchronistic-diachronic parts, or a collection of individual “thick” objects (in the case of a common noun in a broad sense). In a “semantic” sentential context, via a singular referring name as the subject, an actual or potential speaker designates its semantic-whole referent through a communicative chain in linguistic practice,42 whether or not she recognizes (or can recognize) all of the 39  Due to the purpose and scope of this essay, I do not further discuss the issue of the “doubleaboutness” character of consciousness concerning how it is possible for consciousness to hook up to an object that is thought about in consciousness, which has been addressed in another writing of this author (Mou 2017, Section 2). 40  Part of such “grounding” content is that the existence of the specific-part referent is grounded in the existence of the semantic-whole referent. In plain words, given that a semantic-whole referent exists in some sense, its specific part is really possessed by, or really symptomizes, the semantic-whole reference, whether the specific part exists in the same sense in which the semantic-whole referent exists or in some other sense than the one in which the latter exists. For example, one person really has some abstract idea (say, the idea of numbers) in this person’s mind; the existence of this idea is thus grounded in the existence of this person, although the person substantially exists while this idea abstractly exists in this person’s mind. 41  Such definite descriptions include both definite descriptions in usual sense like ‘the President of the United States’ and common nouns with demonstrative adjectives in front of them like ‘this horse’ and ‘that human being’. 42  The “pragmatic” notion of communicative chain is just presupposed here, though this does not amount to committing myself to a Kripke-Putnam version of rigid designation: what is designated or identified via a causal-historical link is not what is “essential” (i.e., what remains the same in all relevant possible worlds) but a thick object as a whole which

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characteristics of the semantic-whole referent. Each of the current and past synchronistic (and diachronic) parts of the semantic-whole referent is semanticwholly necessary (‘semantic-whole necessity’ for short) in this sense43: it makes a necessary or indispensable contribution to the semantic-whole-identity of the semantic-whole referent of a referring name and thus is a necessary contributor to the identity of the semantic-whole referent (as a thick object) of the referring name; for each of the parts of the thick object makes its indispensable contribution to the identity of the thick object as a semantic-whole referent due to the nature of the thick object, though it is not the case that each of the parts of the thick object is metaphysically necessary (some of the parts might be only metaphysically accidental instead of essential in the sense that the object might go some other ways or be in an otherwise state in these connections). Third, due to the thick-object metaphysical nature and non-epistemic character of the individual semantic-whole referent of a (singular) referring name, the name when being used as a name of the semantic-whole referent might as well be called a “sentential” name; for it can be viewed as an abbreviation of possesses its various attributes that are or were possessed in this actual world (via the notion of rigid designation concerning this actual world as explained in Jackson 1998); it is arguably the case that this actual natural world was jointly addressed in those classical texts of the pre-Han Chinese philosophy, such as the Yi-Jing text, Gongsun Long’s text, and the Later Mohist text. 43  The notion of semantic-whole necessity as specified here is neither that of metaphysical necessity nor that of de re necessity—the latter two are distinguished in Kit Fine (1994). One might render semantic-whole necessity trivial as it just includes all parts/ attributes that have been possessed by a thick object and thus wonder why such a notion is philosophically interesting and needed. The subsequent account of the semanticwhole necessity possessed by each of parts and attributes of the semantic-whole referent in view of its distinction and connection with the specific-part referent suggests that the notion of semantic-whole necessity is not trivial but philosophically interesting in four connections. First, especially from the holistic vantage point jointly shared by the classical Chinese philosophers, a past happening that has resulted in a certain attribute of a thick object, even if it is “accidental” from the point of view of metaphysical necessity, might bring about some significant consequence to the object. Second, whether or not a certain (accidental) attribute of the object can result in some seemingly-significant contribution to the identity of the object, it is one indispensable contribution to the whole identity of the object; and its understanding is thus indispensable to a holist understanding of the object. Third, each of the parts or attributes of the object is an indispensable truth maker for the predication content of a certain (actual or potential) specific-part referent if that specific-part referent is claimed to be one attribute of the object. Fourth, a seemingly trivial part of an object might be substantial or significant from another perspective.

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a number of relevant sentences each of which reveals one synchronistic part of the semantic-whole referent. For example, when ‘this white horse’ as a singular referring name (or ‘the white horse’ as a non-singular referring name, a collective name) is used to refer to one individual thick object (or a collection of individual thick objects) as its semantic-whole referent, the name linguistically (or, more accurately, semantically) implies or is associated with a number of relevant sentences each of which manifestly reveals one synchronistic part of the thick object, say, this specific horse’s being white, (or a collection of such synchronistic parts of all individual white horses as individual thick objects). The list of the relevant sentences includes, on the one hand, ‘This (the) white horse has its “horse” attribute, its shared “common” aspect with all other horses’, and thus ‘This (the) white horse is identical to (or is not different from) other horses with regard to this common aspect’, and, on the other hand, ‘This (the) white horse is white’, (thus) ‘This (the) white horse differs from other horses of different colors with regard to color’, etc. Fourth, given a referring name (say, ‘this white horse’), a part of its semantic-whole referent (this particular white horse as a whole object) might be epistemologically available or epistemologically unavailable (or in “pragmatic” terms, currently, or even forever, unavailable for a specific speaker or even for any specific speaker); this cannot prevent the speaker (or us) from reaching the semantic-whole referent via a communicative link that objectively exists, independently of her (or our) epistemic recognition of the characteristics of the semantic-whole referent and/or of the whole communication link. An epistemologically available part of the semantic-whole referent of a referring name is either analytically knowable (via the “nominal” identity of the referring name or a sentential context) in the linguistic community (e.g., this white horse’s being white) based on the linguistic sense of the part of the referring name (‘white’ of the referring name ‘this white horse’) or non-analytically knowable via some other epistemic means (say, knowing the specific attribute of this horse’s running faster than some other horses would be based on empirical observation of this white horse’s running faster than some other horses). Fifth, in a (declarative) sentential context, a specific-part referent of a referring name is a part which the speaker (or the inter-subjective nominal speaker) is to take (correctly or incorrectly) to be part of what the referring name rigidly designates (the semantic-whole referent) and which she purposely and emphatically focuses on in a sentential context. In other words, the referring name “outside-in”-rigidly designates the semantic-whole referent while “inside-out”-contextually denoting the specific-part referent whose identity is sensitive to a “perspective” focus as indicated in a sentential context (or

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revealed linguistically through a complete subject-predicate sentence about the semantic-whole referent), which might be true or false. Sixth, the identities of the specific-part referents of a referring name in different sentential contexts can be different among distinct sentential contexts, though the same referring name is presented in distinct sentential contexts (this “semantic” presentation can “pragmatically” point either to the case in which the same speaker utters different statements in different situated contexts with her focus/perspective shifts or to the case in which different speakers utter different statements in the same or different situated contexts with distinct perspective focuses), with distinctive focuses and perspectives. The identity of the specific-part referent of a referring name can change, depending on which distinctive focus and perspective is given in a sentential context (as illustrated by the statements (1.1)–(1.4) in Section 1). Seventh, a part which is viewed as part of the semantic-whole referent in a declarative sentential context when it being focused on in this sentential context might be not really a part of the semantic-whole referent. That is, it might be semantic-whole-relevant and might be semantic-whole irrelevant in the following sense: if a specific-part referent that is identified in a sentential context as a part of the semantic-whole referent and in fact does constitute an indispensable semantic-whole-identity contributor to the identity of the semantic-whole referent, it is semantic-whole-relevant or it is grounded in the semantic-whole referent (in plain words, it is truly attributed); if otherwise (i.e., if a specific-part referent that is identified in a sentential context as a part of the semantic-whole referent but in fact does not constitute an indispensable semantic-whole-identity contributor to the identity of the semantic-whole referent), it is semantic-whole-irrelevant or not grounded in the semantic-whole referent (in plain words, it is falsely attributed). Eighth, the specific-part referent of a referring name is epistemologically available to the speaker who uses the name to refer to the specific-part referent with her “perspective” focus, or, in non-pragmatic semantic terms, it is explicitly given (by the implicit inter-subjective nominal speaker) either via the subject expression and/or via the sentential predicate in a sentential context. However, (1) such an available specific-part referent might fail to be a genuine part of the semantic-whole referent; (2) only those parts of the semanticwhole referent that are epistemologically available can be candidates for the specific-part referents that are semantic-whole-relevant. As explained above, the identity of the specific-part referent of a referring name can be different in different sentential contexts (or, in pragmatic terms, in different situated contexts); the set of sentential contexts is open; consequently, there is thus no

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general list of epistemologically available specific-part referents of a referring name. Ninth, an indispensable (thus “necessary” in this sense) semantic-wholeidentity contributor to the identity of a semantic-whole referent of a referring name is any substantial constituting part of the thick object as the semanticwhole referent of the name. In contrast, a specific-part referent of the referring name is either semantic-whole-relevant or semantic-whole-irrelevant: when it is indeed one constituting part of the thick object as the semantic-whole referent of the name, it is semantic-whole-relevant; otherwise, it is semanticwhole-irrelevant. So to speak, any specific-part referents that have been given in certain sentential contexts constitute indispensable specific-part-identity contributors to the collection of available specific-part referents. However, an indispensable specific-part-identity contributor that is semantic-whole-relevant is (must be) also one indispensable semantic-whole-identity contributor, while any indispensable specific-part-identity contributor that is semanticwhole-irrelevant is not an indispensable semantic-whole-identity contributor. On the other hand, an indispensable semantic-whole-identity contributor is not necessarily an indispensable specific-attribute-identity contributor in a certain sentential context: when an indispensable semantic-whole-identity contributor is irrelevant to any “perspective” focus as given in any currently available sentential context, it is not a member of the collection of available specific-part referents; otherwise it is simultaneously an indispensable specific-part-identity contributor. Tenth, the semantic-whole referent and the specific-part referent of a referring name jointly (generally speaking) and simultaneously (specifically speaking, in any tokens of the basic-language-employment type) play their respective roles in referring and make their indispensable contributions to our connection with, and understanding of, things in the world as double reference through language to hook up to the world. The title of this account, ‘double-reference’, highlights the joint role and intrinsic connection of the two aspects of the referring process as a whole and their respective resulting referents in the semantic connection. Both metaphysically and epistemologically, the semantic-whole referent and the specific-part referent of a referring name are neither two absolutely separate things (in the senses as explained above) nor mutually-exclusive either-or alternatives. Eleventh, last but not least, the specific-part reference per se brings about and constitutes the primary predication in a sentential context; in other words, the predication in the sentential context right starts with its specific-part reference. This last point deserves a separate writing for its due elaboration, which I will not explore here but discuss in another writing with consideration of the major purpose of this essay.

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In the remaining part of this sub-section, I consider and respond to a number of possible doubts or objections that are not necessarily associated with the “double-reference” pre-theoretic understanding but (more) related to its theoretic elaboration. First, one might object this way: if the specific-part referent counts as something that is about, it is a kind of “about about”: it itself is about the semantic-whole referent, and it belongs to what is said about the semantic-whole referent, and it includes “predicative” element and thus it is not something really referential. My response to this objection goes this way. Given that what is referred to is essentially what a sentential context is about, indeed there are two levels of what is about involved in the basic language employment: first, about the designated semantic-whole referent; second about some specific part in focus; the basic language employment has thus its fundamental “double reference” character. To this extent, the specific-part referent is really referential in nature. Moreover, what distinguishes the specific-part referent from what the sentential predicate expresses is this: (1) it is (part of) what is “about” in the foregoing sense; (2) it does not fall into what the sentential predicate expresses but something that “constrains”, is presupposed by, and is logically and referentially prior to what the sentential predicate expresses. To this extent, predication cannot be exhausted (is not totally covered) by what expressed by the sentential predicate, although the specific-part reference cannot exhaust the predication either. Second, one might have another doubt: a standard or traditional allocation of what the subject expression covers and what the predicate covers is good enough; the specific-part reference is redundant: what is covered by the specific-part referent, if it involves predication, is part of what the sentential predicate is to cover since predication is supposed to be covered by what the sentential predicate is to cover. I think that this objection misses something significant. For example, consider the following sample sentence “Her husband is kind to her”, a favored sample sentence in Linsky 1963 and Donnellan 1966. For one thing, what is this sample sentence about? About the person as a whole that is somehow designated by the subject expression ‘her husband’44 and at the same time also about that specific part of the person which is pointed to in focus, i.e., that person’s married-spouse-specific-identity part—that addressed female’s husband. For another thing, it is noted that the specific-part referent is part of what “constrains” the thing that is literally expressed by the sentential predicate, instead of part of what the sentential predicate per se literally 44  More will be said on this in the ending footnote of this sub-section where the same sample sentence is used to illustrate some differences between this distinction between the semantic-whole reference and the specific-part reference and some other “similar” distinctions.

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covers; what the sentential predicate literally covers is simply this: being kind to her, generally speaking; however, the specific-part referent in this sentential context, the specific identity part of the designated person as a whole constrains the refined meaning of the sentential predicate in this sentential context in this way: being husbandly-kind to her.45 Third, one might ask in this way: isn’t the specified specific-part referent just a Fregean-style denotation of a referring name? As far as the specific-part referent is concerned, one major difference is this: it is known (cf., Frege 1892) that the Fregean description theory of referring for names holds that a referring name is an abbreviation of a (set of) definite description(s) whose sense as given by the description determines its referent and which denotes whatever meet the description; in contrast, the double-reference thesis holds that, in a sentential context of the basic language employment, when a referring name designates its semantic-whole referent, it also simultaneously points to in focus and specifies one specific part of the semantic-whole referent that is designated by the referring name. It is noted that, as far as the semanticwhole referent is concerned, the Fregean “denotation” way does play its due role in determining the coverage and identity of the semantic-whole referent of a descriptive referring name such as ‘the white horse’ which (rigidly) designates the collection of white horses; however, then, it seems to the Fregean description theory that a description referring name does not simultaneously point to in focus and specify one specific-part referent. More will be said on the Fregean approach in this connection in the next section.

45  A “double-reference” account seems to have more explanatory potent even for such sentences as ‘This is an apple’ than that of a standard account. Let me first give it a “double-reference” analysis: ‘this’ designates the object as a whole on scene (in front of a certain speaker); the specific-part referent points to or is specifically about that specific attribute of being an apple in the sentential context ‘This is an apple’; in this context, the sentential predicate “further” comments on the semantic-whole referent through giving an explicit linguistic expression of the referentially and logically prior specific-part referent (“further” in view of the predicative element already associated with the referentially and logically prior specific-part referent). Here is why a “double-reference” account has its more explanatory potent even for such sentences as ‘This is an apple’ than that of a standard account: the “double reference” account would do justice to other possible predications; for example, when a person points to this apple saying ‘This is an object in my bag that I (can) use to hit a robber’s head’; in this sentential context, the specific-part referent is the specific attribute of being an object that can be used (as a hitting tool or weapon) to hit a robber’s head (the specific attribute of being an apple or its “apple” identity is not what is specifically about or focused on).

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Last but not least, one who is familiar with the literature of the contemporary philosophy of language might ask: in the contemporary literature of the philosophy of language, there are some seemingly “similar” distinctions: among others, Keith Donnellan’s distinction between the attributive use and the referential use of definite descriptions as presented in Donnellan 1966, and Saul Kripke’s distinction between speaker’s reference and semantic reference of referring names as presented in Kripke 1977, which essentially follows the line of H.P. Grice’s distinction between what the speaker’s words meant on a given occasion and what he/she meant, in saying those words, on that occasion in Grice 1957; then what are substantial differences between the current one under examination and the others? There are three major differences between the “double reference” distinction and the mentioned others. (1) Perhaps the most prominent and substantial difference between the distinction made here and these other “similar” distinctions lies in this: the distinction between semantic-whole and specific-part references is intrinsically related to one central point that is argued for and explained in this writing: though conceptually and functionally distinct, they are simultaneously made in the basic linguistic fact (‘double-reference’ for short, as indicated before). In contrast, in my view, both Donnellan’s distinction and Kripke’s distinction are considered to be an either-or identification, generally speaking. In the case of Donnellan’s distinction, given a definite description, one makes either an attributive use or a referential use of the definite description, instead of both (although, sometimes, one might make a “successful” referential use while an “incorrect” attributive use of a definite description at the same time). In the case of Kripke’s distinction, he distinguishes between the “simple” case (the speaker’s specific intention coincides with his general intention ) and the “complex” case (the speaker’s specific intention is distinct from his general intention); according to Kripke, “Donnellan’s ‘attributive’ use is nothing but the ‘simple’ case, specialized to definite descriptions, and … the ‘referential’ use is, similarly, the ‘complex’ case” (Kripke 1977, 161); however, generally speaking, it is not supposed to be the case that the speaker’s specific intention both coincides and is distinct from his general intention. (2) Putting aside the associated double-reference character of the distinction here, there are substantial differences with regard to some of these involved specific “reference” items in these “similar” distinctions. Consider Kripke’s case (as Kripke considers Donnellan’s distinction to be a special case of his distinction), his notion of “semantic” reference (given or determined by the speaker’s general intention) corresponds to neither that of semantic-whole reference nor that of specific-attribute reference; though the specific-part reference appears to be similar to Kripke’s notion of speaker’s

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reference (given by the speaker’s specific intention), they are actually not the same: a specific-part reference of a referring name could be a “semantic” reference in Kripke’s sense, instead of a speaker’s reference (when the specific focus is what is given by the speaker’s general intention). (3) Last but not least, the “double reference” distinction explained here is primarily “semantic” (in the sense as explained before) while, in my opinion, Donnellan’s (in terms of two uses) and Kripke’s distinction (in terms of the speaker’s general and specific intentions on scene) are primarily “pragmatic”.46 Engaging the Lockean-Fregean Approach and the Millian-Kripkean Approach With the double-reference resources in the pre-Han classical Chinese philosophy, as analyzed in Sections 2, 3 and 4, together with a general theoretic elaboration of the major points of the double-reference account as given in the previous sub-section, in this sub-section, I explore how, or in which connections, some relevant double-reference resources, say, the interpretative elaboration of some relevant ideas and treatments from the Yi-Jing text and Gongsun Long’s text, can engage with two major approaches to the issue of how reference is possible, i.e., the Lockean-Fregean approach and the MillianKripkean approach, and contribute to our understanding and treatment of the issue.47 5.2

5.2.1 Engaging the Lockean-Fregean approach John Locke’s general conception of language is a succinct characterization of one so-far dominant understanding of language in Western philosophy since 46  Let me use one example to illustrate the point of the difference in this connection: consider the sentence “Her husband is kind to her” (a sample sentence which Linsky and Donnellan favor in their seminal papers Linsky 1963 and Donnellan 1966): the designated semantic-whole referent (the picked-out person) as a thick object is presupposed to be “pragmatically” already given, whether it is given via an “attributive” use or a “referential” use (the assumed case in Linsky/Donnalean’s sample context) or, more generally speaking, via a communication link to the object identified in the initial “naming” ceremony; and then the double reference is addressed; the denoted specific part in focus is the specific attribute of being her husband, whether or not the designated semantic-whole referent (the picked-out person) really possesses the specific attribute; the associated predicative attribute is the one of being husbandly kind to her. A non-pragmatic semantic examination can just presuppose such pragmatic process of identifying a certain semantic referent and then focus on the semantic referential relation between the referring name and its thus identified referent. 47  This part of discussion is a revised version of the relevant parts of Mou 2014 and Mou 2018.

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Aristotle, and major parts of it are still accepted now in the Western tradition. Locke’s points as suggested in the foregoing passage can be summarized in the following assumptions.48 (L1) The nature of language is defined by its function. [People find out or create “some external sensible signs” as some kind of artifact to language, whereby to do a certain job with a certain purpose.] (L2) The function of language is to communicate. [By language “those invisible ideas which his thoughts are made up of, might be made known to others” or language is to be created and used for the sake of “communication of thoughts”] (L3) What language is meant to communicate is thought. [See the above] (L4) The components of thought are Ideas. [One’s thoughts “are made up of” “invisible ideas”.] (L5) Words stand for the components, Ideas, of what language is meant to communicate. [“[W]ords stand for [Ideas]”.] (L6) The Ideas for which words stand are thus meanings of the words. [“[I]deas [words] stand for are their proper and immediate significance.] (L7) One person’s Ideas cannot be perceived by another. [One’s Ideas are “invisible and hidden from others”] (L8)The relation between words and what they stand for is arbitrary. [There is no natural connection between “particular articulate sounds and certain ideas”.] (L9) Words are not intrinsically meaningful. [Words only come to be meaningful by being “made use of by men” as “sensible marks of ideas.] Although the assumptions (L1), (2), (8) and (9) have generally been accepted without question in the mainstream tradition, other assumptions have been more or less challenged in the contemporary philosophy of language. Among others, the most relevant assumptions to the current discussion are (L3) and (L4); although now almost nobody really subscribe to (L4) when the key term ‘idea’ is understood in Locke’s original way, that is, something private and unintelligible to others, (L3) is essentially still maintained by many philosophers especially when the term ‘thought’ is understood in a Fregean way: thought is the sense expressed by a sentence and is inter-subjective instead of private. Frege revolutionarily put forward the distinction between reference (Bedeutung) and sense (Sinn). However, as for the relation between them, Frege maintains that the reference of a referring name is determined by its sense. At this point, it is known that Frege suggests the basic line of the (Fregean-Russellian) description theories of referring for (proper) names as follows. (FR 1) The sense of a name ‘a’ is given by a (set of) definite description(s) ‘the F’. (FR 2) Sense is supposed to determine reference. (FR 3) A name is an abbreviation of a (set of) definite description(s) regarding its sense and reference: ‘a’ designates x in virtue of ‘the F’ denoting x (our original problem of explaining reference for 48  Morris, 2007, 6–8. I restate them with some modifications: (L6) is added; (L7), (L8) and (L9) here are thus (L6), (7) and (L8) in Morris’ original account.

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names is reduced to that of explaining reference for definite descriptions). (F4) Thanks to Russell’s Theory of Descriptions, we have an answer to the problem for descriptions: ‘The F ’ denotes x if and only if ‘F ’ applies to x and to nothing else. (The problem of explaining reference for definite descriptions is reduced to that of explaining for general terms that fill the place of ‘F ’; the remaining problem is merely this: In virtue of what does a general term apply to an object?) In sum, the description theory of referring for names, together with Russell’s Theory of Descriptions, reduces three problems of referring to one: the problem of designation for names, denotation for definite descriptions and application for general terms are reduced to the problem of application for general terms. A neo-Lockean-Fregean approach like Jackson’s tries to avoid talking about the half-mysterious “sense” which, according to Frege, is neither objective nor subjective but is claimed to have the status of the “third” world;49 Jackson moves one step further talking on the properties that are associated by us with words (descriptions), instead of the “sense” that is associated with words; for him, the term ‘property’ is simply a short for a way things we take to be (thus a way things might be); he tries to “objectivize” Locke’s Idea and Frege’s Sinn to properties as ways things might be and intends to have Fregean description theory of reference for spoken and written language based on a Lockean picture of language as follows: … Language … is a convention generated set of physical structures that has as a principal function making it easy to articulate, and in consequence easy to record, transmit in communication, debate the correctness of, and so on, how someone—you, me, the enemy, the ideal observer,…—take things to be. I am going to presume this Lockean picture of language. To avoid misunderstanding, though, I should note an unfortunate ambiguity in talk of language having the capacity and principal function of capturing and thereby facilitating the communication of how we take things to be. It might be read as saying, implausibly, that language is principally about states of belief, or it might be read as saying, plausibly, that language is about what states of belief are about, namely, how things are…. we must associate various words with various ways things might be; or, as we will put it, we must associate words with properties. Here the term ‘property’ … is simply a short for a way things might be in the wide sense that includes relational and dispositional way things might be (Jackson 1998, 135–6). 49  Frege, 1918, 369.

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… using the pre-analytic or folk term ‘about’: terms like ‘London’, ‘Pluto’ ‘water’, and ‘inert gas’ are used by speakers to talk about whatever has the properties they associate with the term in question …; or, as philosophers of language might say it, a name T used by S refers to whatever has the properties that S associated with T. (op.cit. 137). However, one crucial thing is missing in the foregoing neo-Lockean-Feregean approach: it actually allows the referential function of referring names to lose its independent root or foundation from what we take things to be; for what a referring name refers to is eventually still “whatever has the properties they [speakers] associate with the term in question” (op.cit.). In this way, given that linguistic referring names do “hook up” to their extra-linguistic referents when being normally or adequately used, the neo-Lockean-Fregean approach cannot really explain how a referring name does “hook up” to the extra-linguistic referent that is independent of how we take the referent to be and of how much we know of the referent; the reason is this: once the alleged properties speakers associate with the referring name turn out to be mistakenly associated, whatever has the properties the speaker associate with the term would mismatch the genuine referent. Let me first consider some relevant resources from the Yi-Jing text. As for how the “hexagram” name establishes, identifies and keeps the track of what it refers to (or doubly refers to via designating and signifying), as cited before, the Yi-Zhuan gives such an account: “Fu Xi … observed upward the heavenly images and looked downward the way of earthly things. He observed the patterns of birds and beasts and how they fit their environments on earth. He learned from nearby things and from distant things” (Xi-Ci, Part II, Ch. 2). The creator of the “hexagram” name then designated the surrounding actual world as what he talked about and signified a certain actual changing pattern of this designated world. Note that this changing pattern is not something that was derived from a certain conceptual content; rather, it resulted from Fu Xi’s direct observation of the actual changing happenings of the actual universe. With this “naming” ceremony, the “hexagram” name “hooked up” to its double reference—via designating the surrounding actual world and signifying a certain changing pattern; the hexagram-gua system has been thus passed on generation by generation on a “communication” link. This significant dimension of the issue of reference has been captured by the Kripkean account to be addressed, though in a half way in the sense to be explained in the next section. Now let me consider some relevant resources from Gongsun Long’s approach. According to Gongsun Long, the referring name ‘the white horse’

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in both ‘The white horse is (identical to) the horse’ and ‘The white horse is not (identical to) the horse’ designates the same collection of white horses as what is talked about (i.e., the same semantic whole) but denote distinct specific parts, or distinct commented aspects, of the same semantic whole. In so arguing, Gongsun Long suggested that the same semantic-whole referent of the same subject expression in the two distinct sentential contexts ‘The white horse is (identical to) the horse’ and ‘The white horse is not (identical to) the horse’ constitute what the distinct specific-part referents are really about. To this extent, so to speak, without the semantic-whole referent as the semantic-metaphysical foundation, the specific-part referent of a referring name is simply baseless; in other words, a certain specific-part referent (distinct specific-part referents if any) of a referring name is (are) semantically or referentially “parasitic on” its (their shared) semantic-whole referent. It is noted that this commented specific-part referent, if it is genuinely semantically relevant, is not something that is derived from a certain conceptual content when we trace back to its “source”; rather, the commented referent that is semantically relevant is genuinely possessed by the semantic-whole referent. A referring name with its double reference is thus “hooked up” to the world—through designating the semantic-whole referent and signifying a certain commented specific-part referent; the double reference of the referring name has been thus passed on generation by generation on a “communication” link: this significant dimension of the issue of reference (i.e., a referring name in distinct sentential contexts can be about or designate the same object while the distinct sentential contexts say differently, in distinct perspective focuses, about the same object) has been captured by the Kripkean account, though in a half way in the sense to be explained in the next section. 5.2.2 Engaging the Millian-Kripkean Approach In contrast to the Lockean-Fregean approach, the Kripkean causal-historical account of referring is intended to do justice to the aforementioned “communication” link by which a referring name reaches its designated referent. According to Kripke, a term is a “rigid” designator which designates the very same item in all possible worlds in which that item exists [in contrast, a (nonrigid) description is a “flaccid” designator because it designates different things in different possible worlds]; the reference of a name, or even a singular term, consists in rigid designation (designation through rigidly designating). Indeed, in contrast to the Millian “direct reference” approach (Mill 1881), for Kripke, definite descriptions can be rigid when they designate the same item in all possible worlds—their rigid designations would be secured by exploiting their

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conceptual content; however, Mill and Kripke do share the essentially same line on the nature of the reference of referring names and their semantics: the reference of a proper name consists in direct (rigid) designation (designation ‘directly’ through rigid designating, rather than ‘indirectly’ through describing), which can be summarized in a well-known way: (MK1) a proper name is only accidentally associated with a certain (non-rigid) definite description; for the same person designated by the proper name might have different attributes in different possible worlds; (MK2) a proper name is thus only accidentally associated with the sense/ properties provided by the (non-rigid) definite description; (MK3) a proper name cannot designate its reference, which is supposed to be necessarily the same one in all possible worlds, ‘indirectly’ through the sense provided by the description; (MK4) a proper name has no sense insofar as such sense is supposed to determine its referent; (MK5) in this way, it is not merely intuitive that a proper name designates its referent ‘directly’ [in (MK1) we appeal to this] but also impossible that a proper name designates its referent ‘indirectly’ through the sense provided by the description; (MK6) therefore, a proper name designates its referent ‘directly’ in the above strong sense. That is, as far as the nature of reference of proper names and their semantics are concerned, the Millian-Kripkean answer is this: a proper name has its rigidly designated referent as its meaning. As far as how, or in virtue of what, a referring name refers to its bearer, Kripke suggests his well-known causal-historical account of referring for proper names and natural-kind terms (cf., respectively Kripke 1980 and Putnam 1973): a referring name rigidly designates its bearer through a causal historical link, or (more accurately speaking) a communication link that traces back to its original “naming ceremony”. What is at issue now is this: given that what has a referring name to hook up to the world is via a “communication link”, as correctly identified by the Kripke-Putnam-style line (‘Kripkean picture’ or ‘Kripkean line’ for short), and given that the process of “rigid designation” via such a communication link is successful and results in what is rigidly designated, what is the identity of this rigidly-designated referent? The Kripkean picture tells us that what a referring name rigidly designates is a kind of “essential” referent (such as the “essential” Aristotle) that would cut across different possible worlds where it exists. Clearly, this picture excludes the contribution by all the alleged “accidental” attributes (other than the “essential”) to the identity of what a referring name rigidly designates. Relating to his criticism of Kripke’s Aristotelian conception of essentialism (on the issue of what counts as the “essential”), Quine makes the following methodological point when commenting on the quantified modal logic of necessity:

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The notion of knowing or believing who or what someone or something is, is utterly dependent on context. Sometimes, when we ask who someone is, we see the face and want the name; sometimes the reverse. Sometimes we want to know his role in the community. Of itself the notion is empty…. The … notions of … vivid designator and rigid designator are similarly dependent on context and empty otherwise. The same is true of the whole quantified modal logic of necessity…. the very notion of necessity makes sense to me only relative to context. Typically it is applied to what is assumed in an inquiry, as against what has yet to transpire. (1977, 121) In view of all these, let me first consider how a reflection on the “doublereference” structure of the hexagram names in the Yi system can contribute. Now look at the case of the “hexagram” names: what is the “essential” world that the sixty-four “hexagram” names jointly designate in the rigid way? What relevant moral can we draw from the foregoing “double-reference” structure of the hexagram names? In the case of the “hexagram” names, the identity of what the “hexagram” names rigidly and jointly designate is this actual world as a whole, which is all inclusive, dynamically developed and fundamentally yinyang interactive. Whether or not one would accept the yin-yang metaphysical account, the point is this: it is arguably right to say that some significant aspect of the referential nature and function of the “hexagram” names (one generic kind of referring names in language) would be ignored or mistreated by the Kripke’s approach. What the Kripkean account has yet to do justice to is not merely the identity of what a referring name designates as an actual-whole referent but also the status and nature of its specific “contextual” reference to the following extent. In the case of the “hexagram” names, those signified changing patterns as their specific “contextual” referents would be taken to be either the “essential” constituents or the “non-essential” constituents of this actual natural world. If this “contextual” referent is the latter, then the Kripkean account would miss out this crucial part of what a “hexagram” name rigidly designates; for a variety of changing patterns (instead of mere chaos) possessed by this actual world, as a matter of fact, constitute one “essential” or indispensable part of this actual world, based not merely on the yin-yang metaphysical vision of the Yi-Jing text but primarily on our pre-theoretic understanding of the identity of our surrounding natural world. (One might object that what is identified by a “hexagram” name as a “contextual” referent can turn out to be mistaken. This would miss the point here: what is really at issue here is neither an epistemological issue concerning to what extent, via her specific “contextual” reference, an epistemic agent can probably capture the way

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things are in this connection, nor a pragmatic issue concerning how a speaker actually uses a referring name to refer to what she intends to signify; rather, it fundamentally involves the semantic status of a “specific-part” referent and the metaphysical status of what a “specific-part” referent is connected with via a “communication” link, a part of the semantic-whole referent.) Now what if the “specific-part” referent is the former (i.e., the “essential” constituents of this actual natural world)? Then the Kripkean account would take what the “hexagram” name rigidly designates to be the “essential” world that necessarily includes the signified “essential” but “actually generalized” changing pattern which this “hexagram” name “contextually” signifies, and this “specific-part” referent of the “hexagram” name consists of (and in) many particular changing processes in this actual world, which constitutes a collection part of this actual world. Then, when Kripke would take this collection part of the actual world and thus the actual world as a whole to be rigidly designated, this would simply go against the original point of his conception of rigid designation. In the foregoing sense, the representative referential case of the “hexagram” names in the Yi-Jing constitutes an effective thought experiment as well as an actual referential case in real-life language to test the explanatory potency of the Kripkean approach and of the double-reference approach. Now I consider how Gongsun Long’s approach can contribute to our understanding and treatment of the issue. Let me start with the previously cited Quine’s methodological point. I think, Quine’s point in this connection is shared by Gongsun Long, though they live in different times, develop their ideas in different philosophical traditions, and employ their distinct conceptual resources: for Gongsun Long, as shown by his “double-reference” approach in treating his “White-Horse-Not-Horse” thesis, distinct sentential contexts provide distinct contexts in which distinct specific parts of the designated object as a whole are specifically pointed to in different perspective focuses, which give the most relevant specific identities of the object on scene respectively relative to the distinct contexts (thus respectively “necessary” to the distinct purposes and focuses). Along with Gongsun Long’s line, there seem something significant missing in the Kripkean picture of referring. Indeed, at the purely semantic level, one can innocently claim that what ‘Aristotle’ rigidly designates is Aristotle; however, what is the identity of Aristotle as a whole? Now let us look at the “white-horse-not-horse” case: what is the identity of the semantic-whole referent (the collection of white horses) of the referring name ‘the white horse’ (a natural-kind term)? In view of Gongsun Long’s “double reference” insight and people’s pre-theoretic understanding of the “double-reference” phenomenon of the basic language employment and of the part-whole relationship, for one thing, the identity of the white horse (the collection of white horses) as

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a semantic-whole referent, which the subject referring name ‘the white horse’ as a collective name50 designates via a communication link, is the collection of white horses with all the associated attributes that are jointly and generically possessed by white horses in this actual world (such as those addressed attributes in the “Bai-Ma-Lun” like white color and a certain shape), instead of the mere “essential” part(s) (whatever it or they are), although some of these associated attributes were then unknown to Gongsun Long during his times (such as the white horse’s DNA structure plus some internal structure that brings about the white horse’s white color, just like the “H2O” structure of what the natural kind term ‘water’ designates in this actual world was then unknown). For another thing, what is most relevant, or semantically indispensable and thus “necessary” on a certain specific scene of referring as given in a sentential context [say, “The white horse is identical to the horse with regard to the shared attribute” or “The white horse is not identical to the horse with regard to some distinct attribute (possessed by each of white horses but not by each of horses)”] consists in the double reference made in the specific sentential context, which points to both the semantic-whole referent and the specific-part referent (if any) that is specifically about in a certain perspective focus; in other words, what makes the sentence true is necessarily associated with the semantic-whole referent which really possesses that specific part, instead of something else (whether or not it is an “essential” part in an Aristotelian/ Kripkean sense). It is noted that, for a fair understanding and evaluation, Kripke does not ignore what the speaker specifically intends to refer to; nevertheless, as briefly explained before, he renders “pragmatic” and “epistemic” his distinction between speaker’s reference and semantic reference as he characterizes them essentially in terms of the speaker’s (general and specific) intentions on particular occasions.51 However, as maintained by the double-reference account, and as suggested and illustrated by Gongsun Long’ “white-horse-not-horse” thesis, the “specific-part” referent is signified in an explicit linguistic sentential context and in terms of inter-subjective “liberal” sense of the “white-horse-not-horse”. 50  As already indicated before, in this essay, I use the English phrase ‘the horse’ and ‘the white horse’ in the sentence ‘the white horse is (not) identical to the horse’ (here and below) to respectively designate a collection of horses and a collection of white horses, in view that one standard grammatical means in English to express a collection designation is via “the definite article plus the [addressed] common noun”. 51  Following Grice’s line, Kripke makes the distinction between what the speaker’s words meant, on a given occasion, and what he/she meant, in saying these words, on that occasion; then he makes the distinction between speaker’s reference and semantic reference—the distinction is taken as a special case of the foregoing distinction (1977, 160–161).

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In this way, the specific-part reference is made right at the “semantic” or nonpragmatic level,52 as the identity of a specific-part referent in the sentential context can be linguistically delivered without involving the knowledge or specific intentions possessed by the speaker on the communication link. In this way, from the point of view of Gongsun Long’s line, the Kripkean picture of referring misses some things significant in the foregoing two connections.53 In my view, these are exactly where Gongsun Long can make his philosophically interesting contributions through his “double-reference” approach in his “White-Horse-Not-Horse” argumentation. First, what is rigidly designated through a communication link is the object as a whole in this actual world, instead of any fixed part rendered “essential”, which provides the referential basis for its distinct specific identities to be focused on in distinct sentential contexts and the “objective” foundation for the cross-contextual understanding of its various distinct specific-part-specified identities, all of which are about the same semantic-whole object, rather than thus resulting in different objects. Second, distinct sentential contexts provide distinct contexts in which distinct specific parts (if any) of the designated object as a whole are specifically pointed to in different perspective focuses, which give the most relevant specific identities of the object on scene respectively relative to the distinct contexts (thus respectively “necessary” to the distinct purposes and focuses). One central moral to be drawn from this discussion is. A double reference is made through a referring name in a sentential context in which something is said about an object designated by the referring name [as a token of (the semantic dimension of] the basic linguistic employment, as highlighted before]: in the senses as explained above, the semantic-whole referent without the specific-part referent is “blind” (descriptively, epistemologically but intersubjectively, or even metaphysically unavailable and unrecognizable), while the specific-part referent without the semantic-whole referent is “empty” (being simply baseless without due semantic-metaphysical foundation). In sum, in this essay, I have given a double-reference account of the referential meaning of names in Ancient China through three representative case 52  Given that the label ‘semantic’ here means either the “semantic” relation between a linguistic item and an extra-linguistic item or something presented in terms of intersubjective liberal senses of the words appearing in the sentence in question and that ‘pragmatic’ here means something that is sensitive to the speaker’s specific intentions at the particular occasion which are not delivered by the literal senses of the involved words and their due implications. 53  Please supply footnote text.

 supply footnote text.

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analyses for two closely related purposes: (1) to enhance our understanding of how pre-Han ancient thinkers in the classical Chinese philosophy talked about and hooked up to the world through names in their treatment of the relation between language, thought and the world; (2) to explore how their treatments can contribute to our understanding and treatment of the general issue of how reference is possible and thus to the contemporary development of philosophy of language. It is hoped that the foregoing discussion has more or less fulfilled these purposes.

Appendix 1 An Expanded Collective-Name Hypothesis Concerning SemanticSyntactic Structure of Common Nouns

In this “appendix” writing, I suggest a collective-name hypothesis concerning semanticsyntactic structure of common nouns, which is intended to theoretically capture the quasi pre-theoretic understanding of the collection-denoting semantic status of common nouns as dictionary entries, as addressed in Section 1 of the main text of this essay, and expand my previously suggested collective-name hypothesis concerning semantic-syntactic structure of Chinese common nouns (Mou 1999) to common nouns in all natural languages (rather than being restricted to Chinese language).54 In this way, this writing constitutes further theoretic explanation in the foregoing two connections. With consideration of the central theme of this essay on the doublereference resources concerning referential meanings of names in ancient China and their contributions to our understanding and treatment of the issue of how reference is possible, the subject of this writing, though not the focus per se of the essay, is still closely relevant to parts of the central argument concerning the semantic status of common nouns; it is thus treated as one “appendix” to the main text of the essay. My strategy is this. In the first section, Section A1.1, I present a modified version of my previously suggested collective-name hypothesis concerning Chinese common nouns as explained in Mou 1999 (for the reader to see the original version of this article, unless typo corrections, the modified parts as added explanatory remarks or clarifications are given either in bracket parentheses in the main text of this “appendix” writing or in the form of added or revised footnotes with the ‘[*]’ indication immediately following their footnote numbers). In the second section, Section A1.2, I suggest and explain an expanded collective-name hypothesis concerning common names in natural languages. 54  The first section, A1.1 of this “Appendix 1” writing in this essay is a modified version of Mou 1999. Its second section, A1.2, is unpublished writing.

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A Collective-Name Hypothesis Concerning Semantic-Syntactic Structure of Chinese Common Nouns

In this section, through a comparative case analysis regarding the Chinese language, I discuss how the structure and functions of a natural language would bear upon the ways in which some philosophical problems are posed and some ontological insights are shaped. In doing this, I suggest and argue for a mereological collective-name hypothesis concerning the semantic-syntactic structure of Chinese common nouns.55

A1.1.1

The Structure of Common Nouns and the Way Some Ontological Question Is Raised in the Chinese Context

My discussion begins with a puzzle: why has the classical Platonic one-many problem in the Western philosophical tradition not been consciously posed in the Chinese philosophical tradition, and why, generally speaking, do classical Chinese philosophers seem less interested in debating the relevant ontological issues? Before I move on, let me give a specification of the Platonic one-many problem. This problem begins with the following observation: objects around us share features with other objects; and many particular individuals—say, horses—bear the same name ‘horse’. The Platonic onemany problem presupposes that there is one single universal entity which is common or strictly identical across all these particular concrete horses and by virtue of which many individual horses bear the same name ‘horse’;56 the single universal entity is labeled ‘horseness’.57 The Platonic one-many problem is how to characterize the status 55  [*] In my 1999 article, I used the phrase ‘collective noun’ in its broad sense: depending on context, it might be used in its “grammatical” sense indicating a grammatical category in a natural language and might be used in its “semantic-syntactic” sense indicating a semanticsyntactic category; here I originally used the expression ‘collective-noun hypothesis about the denotational semantics of Chinese nouns’, which clearly addresses the semantic-syntactic structure of Chinese (common) nouns; to avoid possible or actual misunderstanding, and to more explicitly deliver the semantic point, I change it to the expression ‘collective-name hypothesis about the semantic-syntactic structure of Chinese common nouns’ here and below. The phrase ‘collective name’ and the phrase ‘collective noun’ are thus distinguished: ‘collective name’ is used to indicate a semantic-syntactic category, while ‘collective noun’ is used to indicate a grammatical category whose identity condition in a natural language is sensitive to various relevant grammatical features of the specific natural language. In this way, it might be controversial whether a common noun can count as a collective noun in, say, English; however, if the collective-name hypothesis is correct, this common noun is still a collective name in view of its deep “semantic-syntactic structure”, no matter how it would be grammatically classified into which noun category in English. Also see relevant additional footnotes below. 56  Cf., Plato: Phaedo, 78c–e, 104a; Republic, 596a. 57  Note that the Platonic one-many problem is not the same as a neutral question of how a common name refers to many things. The latter issue is neutral because the question itself

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of universals and the ways by which particulars share universals. Under the aforementioned presupposition, there is the debate among Platonic realism, other versions of realism, and distinct versions of nominalism (conceptualism can be viewed as a modest version of nominalism). For example, Platonic realism claims that single universal entities are universal properties shared or instantiated by, but are separated from, particulars, while the Aristotelian immanent realism takes it that universals, though really existing in the external world, exist in individual particular things. Nominalism, generally speaking, rejects the very presupposition of the Platonic one-many problem: universals do not substantially exist in the external world but only conceptually or nominally subsist in mind or language. Conceptualism concerning universals, as a modest version of nominalism, contends that single universal entities are universal concepts (mental representations) shared by the mind, while the radical version of nominalism insists that universals only nominally or linguistically exist in our language (as abstract nouns like ‘horseness’ and ‘roundness’ or general words like ‘horse’ and ‘dog’). In the Western philosophical tradition, nominalism appears as a challenge to the very presupposition of the Platonic one-many problem: there are no universals except for abstract concepts or words. Historically speaking, the debate between Platonic realism and nominalism is thus meta-philosophical.58 does not presuppose any specific ontological position, whether Platonic realism or conceptualism or [radical] nominalism. This neutral issue can be investigated from different perspectives and in different ways. For example, it could be approached from a mathematical perspective: in group theory, the structure of one-to-many mapping relation, homomorphism, is given a precise formal presentation. However, the Platonic one-many problem is not ontologically neutral but goes with the presupposition in question. 58  [*] When I say ‘historically speaking’, I mean that such a metaphilosophcial boundary has become or can be rendered blurring in contemporary philosophical inquiries. For example, I myself tend to maintain a position that might be labeled ‘minimal conceptualism’: (1) in some collections that are ontologically classified into distinct groups, universals as commonly-shared constituent structures or commonly-possessed constituent elements can be some things that universally exist in all these instances that are ontologically classified into the cases; (2) in some other collections, universals can be just concepts and their linguistic expressions, rather than really existing in the external world outside the human mind and language; (3) in this way, generally speaking, universals ontologically consists minimally of concepts. This position is essentially a situational approach that is sensitive to specific situations of different ontological collections of things that are conceptually classified into distinct groups of things. The term ‘minimal’ in the phrase ‘minimal conceptualism’ is employed here to highlight the point to the effect that the ontological “concept” status of universals is what can be minimally maintained (beyond merely nominal linguistic things) in all cases of universals. One might object: such a situational approach fails to give a single-pattern generalized account. My reply is this: if the ontological status and characteristics of the universals in the world around us (including

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One suspects that the structures and uses of different languages might play their roles in pushing philosophical theorization in different directions; the ways of speaking and writing of the Chinese language might reveal and reflect Chinese folk ideology and then influence the ways in which certain philosophical questions are posed and certain ontological insights are formed. This issue is significant because it is concerned with a fundamental philosophical question about the relation between thought and language. The problem of relating Chinese thought to the structure and functions of the Chinese language has for generations tantalized sinologists and those philosophers who are concerned with the problem. Nevertheless, in the last quarter of the twentieth century, some significant progress has been made in this regard. Chad Hansen advances a novel and provocative theory about the nature of the classical Chinese language (Hansen 1983, 37–42; 1992, chapter 2). The central thesis of Hansen’s theory is his mass-noun hypothesis. Its main ideas are these: (1) the (folk) semantics of Chinese nouns is like that of mass-nouns (i.e., those nouns referring to the so-called interpenetrating stuffs, like ‘water’ and ‘snow’),59 and naming in Chinese is not grounded on the existence of, or roles for, abstract entities (either on the ontic level or on the conceptual level) but rather on finding “boundaries” between things [“to know a word is simply to be able to discriminate” (1983, 39)]; (2) influenced by the mass-noun semantics, the classical Chinese semantic theorists and ontological theorists view words in ways that are natural to view mass nouns rather than count nouns, and Chinese theorists tend to organize the objects in the world in a mereological60 stuff-whole model of reality. In

artifacts and the mental life of the human being) are not so absolutely generalized in the one pattern, and if our ontological theory is supposed to ontologically adequately or truly characterize this world (i.e., to capture the way things are, instead of the way we think things are), then a theoretic demand for an indiscriminate single-pattern generalization is to be inadequate and misplaced. 59  When Hansen hypothesizes that “the semantics of Chinese nouns may be like those of mass nouns” (1992, 48), I believe that by ‘semantics’ he means both the folk semantics of Chinese nouns and the classical Chinese semantic theory with its ontological assumption in Chinese philosophy. Hansen assumes that both are like the semantics of mass nouns, although he does not claim that the grammar of Chinese nouns is a mass-noun grammar (actually he denies this). For, when Hansen claims that “these masslike nouns of classical Chinese are what shape the intuitive picture of the language-world relation in Chinese philosophy” (1983, 33; emphasis is mine), he suggests that the folk semantics of classical Chinese nouns which are like those of mass nouns shape the intuitive theory of language in Chinese philosophy. 60  The term ‘mereologic’ means the (mathematical) theory of the relation of parts to whole. Its two major versions are S. Lesniewski’s formal theory of parts (1916) and H. S. Leonard and N. Goodman’s calculus of individuals (1940).

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this way, according to Hansen, the language theory of classical Chinese philosophers differs fundamentally from the language theory of Western philosophy. To my knowledge, Hansen’s mass-noun hypothesis of the classical Chinese semantics and ontology, since being put forward, has been challenged mainly in two ways. One way is to challenge the mass-stuff model from the perspective of a holographic process ontology (cf., Cheng 1987; Hall & Ames 1987, especially 261–268). The other way is to directly challenge Hansen’s mass noun hypothesis, arguing that there is a clear grammatical distinction in classical Chinese between count nouns and other nouns (generic nouns and mass nouns) (cf., Harbsmeier 1989 and 1991). As far as the first way is concerned, although some scholars also emphasize the implicit ontology of the Chinese language, they focus on the case analysis of the typical philosophical nouns or terms, such as ‘tai-ji’ (太極), ‘wu’ (無), ‘yin-yang’ (陰陽), ‘wu-xing’ (五行), which constitute the basic lexicon (vocabulary) of Chinese metaphysical systems as found in the writings of the early Confucianists, the early Daoist, and Neo-Confucianists. They argue that those nouns stand for interpenetrating wholes and parts in a quite different sense from Hansen’s: the individual things behave in the on-going patterns and in the events or processes of interaction among them, and the universe behaves as an organic whole with parts exemplifying the structure of the whole; they claim that Chinese words in general share this ontological feature of combing universality and particularity, abstractness and concreteness, activity and the result of activity. In this way, some writers consider the relations of ‘parts’ and ‘wholes’ in terms of the model of ‘focus’ and ‘field’ and take Chinese ontological views as holographic rather than mereological (cf., Hall & Ames 1987, 262–264). The holographic hypothesis is indeed a genuine challenge to Hansen’s mereological mass-stuff hypothesis. Now the real question here is whether the former conflicts with or is compatible with (or even an elaboration of) the latter. Nevertheless, I will not directly pursue this issue here. Rather, I will respond to Hansen’s view in the same semantic-referential approach and within the same mereological-analysis track. Disagreeing with Hansen’s mass-noun hypothesis, I will suggest and argue for a collectivename hypothesis. Its main points are these: (1) Chinese common nouns typically function, semantically and syntactically, in the same way that collective names function, and the folk semantics of Chinese nouns are like that of collective names; (2) the implicit ontology of Chinese common nouns is a mereological ontology of collectionof-individuals both with the part-whole structure and with the member-class structure, which does justice to the role of abstraction at the conceptual level; and (3) encouraged and shaped by the folk semantics of Chinese (common) nouns, the classical Chinese theorists of language take this kind of mereological nominalism for granted; as a result, the classical Platonic one-many problem in the Western philosophical tradition has not been consciously posed in the Chinese philosophical tradition, and classical Chinese philosophers seem less interested in debating the relevant ontological issues.

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This mereological collection-of-individuals model of reality, I believe, would provide a more reasonable interpretation of the semantics of classical Chinese nouns and the classical Chinese ontological theory. As far as the second way to challenge Hansen’s mass-noun hypothesis is concerned, although it might miss Hansen’s point, I think that it is still somehow relevant to an evaluation of his hypothesis and more relevant to my collective-name hypothesis. Let me explain why and then say something about my strategy to argue for the collectivename hypothesis. Claiming that there is a clear grammatical distinction in classical Chinese between count nouns and other nouns (generic nouns and mass nouns), Harbsmeier insists that the mass-noun hypothesis is “historically implausible and grammatically quite wrong-headed” (Harbsmeier 1991, 61). However, as Hansen himself emphasizes, his mass-noun hypothesis is not a syntactic [grammatical] claim that classical Chinese nouns have mass-noun grammar but a semantic interpretive hypothesis that the semantics of Chinese nouns may be like those of mass nouns, and classical Chinese theorists view words in ways that are natural to view mass nouns. (Cf., Hansen 1992, 48) So it seems to Hansen that “Harbsmeier systematically confuses syntax [grammatical form] and semantics” and misinterprets his semantic hypothesis (ibid.). Although I agree with Hansen at this point, Harbsmeier’s criticism is not irrelevant in the following sense. If, as some of his writings seem to suggest,61 Harbsmeier insists that his alleged distinction between count nouns and other nouns is not merely grammatical but also semantic (or takes the grammatical difference in question to have semantic implications), then Hansen needs to deal with the linguistic (semantic) evidence against his hypothesis that the semantics of classical Chinese nouns may be like those of mass-nouns. For the mass-noun hypothesis as well as the collective-name hypothesis needs testing against the linguistic evidence regarding the folk semantics of Chinese nouns.62 Moreover, notice that my collective-name hypothesis makes a stronger claim that Chinese nouns do not function as count nouns but typically function, both syntactically and semantically, as collective names. For this dual reason, I will seriously consider Harbsmeier’s criticism rather than dismiss it. More generally speaking, in this essay, I will emphasize the relevant linguistic evidence for the collective-name hypothesis (and against the mass-noun hypothesis), because the aforementioned 61  Cf., e.g., Harbsmeier 1989, 159 where he tries to distinguish count nouns from generic nouns by virtue of the semantics of counting. 62  For, as emphasized before, by ‘semantics’ Hansen means both the folk semantics of Chinese nouns and classical Chinese semantic theory (or ontological assumption) in Chinese philosophy when he hypothesizes that “the semantics of Chinese nouns may be like those of mass nouns” (1992, 48). Thus, the partial content of his mass-noun hypothesis concerning the folk semantics of classical Chinese nouns needs the support from the linguistic evidence in this regard.

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points (1) and (2) of my collective-name hypothesis [concerning Chinese common nouns] need the syntactic and folk-semantic evidence concerning Chinese nouns, and the point (3) of the hypothesis needs the textual evidence in Chinese philosophy. My strategy concerning the textual evidence is as follows. First, the basic textual evidence is that in classical Chinese texts the classical Platonic one-many problem in the Western philosophical tradition has not been consciously posed, and classical Chinese philosophers seem less interested in debating the relevant ontological issues; nevertheless, this basic textual evidence is taken for granted in this work and serves as the starting point of my discussion. Second, the textual fact per se mentioned above does not show that the classical Chinese theorists of language take a mereological nominalist ontology of collection-of-individuals for granted. In order to show this, two approaches could be taken. Either one assumes that the folk semantics of Chinese nouns and their implicit ontology would motivate and shape the classical Chinese semantic or ontological theory in Chinese philosophy and then, on the basis of the assumption, take (1) & (2) together with the aforementioned basic textual evidence to be strong justification for (3). Or one directly resorts to further textual evidence regarding the nature of the background theories of language in classical Chinese philosophy. For the sake of space, I cannot test (3) against the textual evidence by examining the background theories of language in the classical Chinese philosophical writings. Instead, I take the first approach in this essay and will consider the second approach somewhere else. With these considerations, I will build my case primarily on the relevant linguistic evidence for (1) and (2) of the collective-name hypothesis, on its explanatory power in certain respects and on the interpretive consistency of its own conceptual resources, rather than on the textual evidence to be collected from examining various classical Chinese doctrines of language. In the preceding discussion, by evaluating the relevance of two previous ways of challenging Hansen’s view, I have indicated what I am to show and what strategy I will take. Following this strategy, I arrange my argument as follows. In the first part of my argument, I will explain why Chinese nouns do not typically function in the countnoun pattern but in a certain non-count-noun pattern. I will also explain how different noun-function patterns have different implicit ontologies. Among those that differ from Hansen’s similar discussion in this regard, first, I will analyze a possible counterexample to the received view that Chinese nouns lack plural forms; second, for the aforementioned reasons, I will give an analysis of Harbsmeier’s criticism rather than dismiss it. Then, in the second part of my argument, disagreeing with Hansen’s massnoun hypothesis, I will explain why the semantics and implicit ontology revealed and reflected by the semantics and syntax of Chinese nouns is a mereological nominalist ontology of collection-of-individuals, rather than a mass-stuff model of reality, which classical Chinese philosophers take for granted.

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The Structure of Chinese Nouns and Ontological Models

In contrast to those typical common nouns (i.e., the so-called count nouns like ‘person’ and ‘horse’) in Indo-European languages such as Greek and English,63 the syntax of Chinese nouns appears strikingly similar to the syntax of those uncountable nouns, usually labeled either ‘collective nouns’ (such as ‘people’, ‘cattle’ and ‘police’)64 or ‘mass nouns’ (such as ‘water’ and ‘snow’). The reason that count nouns are so called is a semantic reason: their referents are considered to be countable separate individuals: one person, nine horses, five mountains. The grammatical representation of this semantic point is this: count nouns have their plural forms, or, they can be pluralized.65 In this way, when count nouns are used in Indo-European languages, they refer either to one single individual or to many separate individuals. By contrast, collective nouns and mass nouns do not take pluralization. For when it stands alone, a collective noun or 63  The following language groups are classified as Indo-European: Indic (Old Indic = Sanskrit), Slavic, Italic (including Latin), Germanic, and Greek. English, with its Germanic ancestry and admixture of Latinate elements via French, is an Indo-European tongue. As far as the syntactic features of nouns are concerned, Greek and English are very similar. For the sake of convenience, I focus on the examples in English. By ‘convenience’ I mean this: on the one hand, the grammatical features of Greek and English are very similar; on the other hand, English is our working language in this case, and English would provide good and easily understood examples for various grammatical categories that are needed. In this way, focusing on English examples, there would be nothing to lose but gain. 64  [*] Focusing on “grammatical” features of some addressed English nouns, Fraser indicates that “none of which [these English nouns, ‘people’, ‘cattle’ and ‘police’, as cited here] are in fact collective nouns. These nouns typically function as plurals, taking plural verbs, and when counted (‘two people’, ‘several police’) divide their reference into individuals not collections” (Fraser 2007, 436–7). Putting aside what grammatical identity condition for a collective noun in English would be, and to avoid a mere verbal disagreement, I intend to call readers’ attention to this: as explicitly indicated and emphasized in the main text of my 1999 article, what is to argue for in the article is that “Chinese [common] nouns typically function, semantically and syntactically, in the same way that collective nouns function, and the folk semantics of Chinese nouns are like that of collective nouns” (Mou 1999, 47); as reiterated in the beginning footnote of this “Appendix” writing above, “… in this way, it might be controversial whether a common noun can count as a collective noun in, say, English; however, if the collective-name hypothesis is correct, this common noun is still a collective name in view of its deep “semantic-syntactic structure”, no matter how it would be grammatically classified into which noun category in English.” 65  As far as the number inflection (number declension) of nouns is concerned, Greek is more prominent or more sophisticated than English: Attic Greek nouns have three numbers: not only singular and plural but also dual (the dual is used to refer to a pair of persons or things). Because there are five cases and three numbers in Greek, each noun theoretically can be inflected into 15 forms.

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a mass noun is not supposed to stand for a countable individual but for a whole, either a collection-whole or a mass-whole. It seems that Chinese nouns do not typically function in a count-noun pattern but in some non-count-noun pattern. For, grammatically, classical Chinese nouns have no plural forms, and even the nouns in modern Chinese have no plural form, at least in the sense of ‘plural forms’ in Indo-European languages.66 This linguistic fact seems to reveal and reflect the following semantic point: a Chinese (common) noun, when standing alone, typically denotes a whole of many things or a whole of much stuff rather than one individual. In various ways, one might challenge the claims that Chinese nouns have no plural forms and that Chinese nouns do not typically function as count-nouns. One would give counter-examples like this: the noun-like counterpart term (actually, pronoun) in Chinese of ‘I’ in English, ‘wo’ (我) can be pluralized into the counterpart term in Chinese of ‘we’, ‘wo-men’ (我們), and similarly with the term ‘ni’ (你) (the counterpart of ‘you’) can be pluralized into ‘ni-men’ (你們) (the counterpart of ‘you-plural’). Although one might respond that ‘I’ and ‘we’ are pronouns rather than nouns and the grammar of Chinese nouns is different from the grammar of Chinese pronouns, the Chinese suffix ‘-men’ (們) can also be used with some Chinese nouns. (Cf., Lü 1985, chapter 2; Mei 1986, 407.) Nevertheless, if ‘-men’ is considered as a Chinese plural suffix, it seems that its grammatical identity conditions are quite doubtful. The standard identity conditions of the plural forms of the nouns require these: (1) the plural form is not only sufficient but also necessary for nouns to be grammatically eligible to stand for multiple individuals (for example, the plural form of ‘horse’ in English is ‘horses’; the suffix ‘-s’ here is necessary for the noun ‘horse’ to be grammatically eligible to denote more than one horse—we cannot say ‘many horse’); (2) the plural form can be used 66  In English, count nouns have another grammatical feature: they cannot stand alone as a noun phrase unless they are in plural form or preceded by articles, demonstratives, numerals, and so forth. For example, ‘Horse is white’ is not grammatical in English. In contrast, collective nouns and mass nouns can stand alone as noun phrases in sentences. For example, ‘People like it’ and ‘Snow is white’ are perfectly grammatical English sentences. Like collective nouns and mass nouns in English, Chinese nouns by themselves are complete noun phrases. Nevertheless, in Greek, a count noun can stand alone as a noun phrase, by default denoting one individual. So, I take the grammatical feature of a noun per se being a complete noun-phrase in the above sense to be necessary, rather than sufficient, for functioning as a non-count-noun.  Moreover, one also notes that, in English, count nouns go with ‘many’, while mass nouns go with ‘much’; however, Chinese nouns lack a many/much distinction. Nevertheless, a lack of many/much distinction does not mean the assimilation of many/much into much. So, this linguistic fact is not necessarily in favor of the mass-noun hypothesis, although it might suggest that, in Chinese, there seems to be a more uniform way to deal with measure-expressions.

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with cardinal numerals (e.g., ‘three horses’). However, in the case of modern Chinese, although, for example, ‘ren-men’ (人們) is sufficient for being grammatically eligible to stand for more than one person, it is not necessary: ‘ren’ alone can do that job [we can say either ‘hen-duo (many) ren-men’ (很多人們) or simply ‘hen-duo ren’ (很多人)]. Moreover, once ‘-men’ is suffixed after a Chinese noun, say, ‘ren’, the phrase ‘ren-men’ cannot be used with the cardinal numerals: it is ungrammatical to say ‘san [three] ren-men’. In this way, the Chinese suffix ‘-men’ in modern Chinese appears to behave quite like such indefinite quantifiers as ‘many’ except that ‘-men’ is only used with the nouns standing for persons and animals or with pronouns: for example, the Chinese counterpart noun ‘zhuo’ (桌) of the English noun ‘table’ cannot be pluralized into the term ‘zhuo-men’ for ‘tables’. Another important linguistic fact is that there was no plural suffix ‘-men’ before the Tang Dynasty, and it arose only after the tenth century and came partially from Altaic language (cf., Mei 1986). In this way, it seems that classical Chinese nouns do not have ‘men-like’ plural forms and that the modern Chinese nouns do not have plural forms in the sense of ‘plural forms’ in Indo-European languages. Now let us consider Harbsmeier’s linguistic observation that there is a grammatical distinction in classical Chinese between count nouns and other nouns. Harbsmeier takes the grammatical mark of count nouns in classical Chinese to be this: they can be used with quantifiers like ‘shu’ (數 ‘a number of’), ‘ge’ (各 ‘each’), ‘mei’ [每 ‘every’], and so forth. Consider the case of ‘shu’. We have ‘shu-ren’ (數人 ‘a number of persons’), ‘shuri’ (數日 ‘a number of days’), or ‘shu-zhuo’ [數桌 ‘a number of tables’]. If Harbsmeier accepts the aforementioned grammatical feature of count nouns, that is, as having plural forms, and if he takes measure phrases like ‘shu-ren’, ‘shu-ri’ and ‘shu-zhuo’ to be the respective plural forms of ‘ren’, ‘ri’ and ‘zhuo’, then surely there would be something wrong here: ‘shu’, ‘ge’, ‘mei’, and so forth are indefinite quantifiers rather than the plural forms of count nouns. The reason for this is that a plural count noun or the plural form of a count noun, as already indicated before, should be able to be used with cardinal numerals; but ‘shu-ren’, ‘shu-ri’, ‘shu-zhuo’, etc. cannot be used with cardinal numerals: it is ungrammatical to say ‘san (three) shu-ren’, ‘wu (five) shu-ri’, ‘qi (seven) shu-zhuo’, and so forth in classical Chinese. If Harbsmeier does not accept the aforementioned grammatical feature of count nouns and simply takes the measure structure ‘quantifier + noun’ as the grammatical mark of count nouns, then there would also be something problematic: the grammatical structure ‘quantifier + noun’ can be also applied to collective nouns; that is, those quantifiers like ‘shu’ and ‘ge’ can be used with collective nouns as well as with count nouns. However, Harbsmeier somehow surprisingly ignores the case of collective nouns and seems to conflate collective nouns with count nouns [given that he thinks that there are Chinese counterparts of count nouns and non-count nouns]. For example, Harbsmeier takes ‘a number of people’ and ‘no more than a few people’ to be his respective English translations of the measure phrases ‘shuren’ and ‘bu-guo-shu-ren’ (不過數人), which he views as count nouns (Harbsmeier 1991,

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52). As a matter of fact, in support of his position, Harbsmeier should translate them respectively into ‘a number of persons’ and ‘no more than a few persons’, as he does on other occasions67. This confusion via English hits the point home in its negative way: we can say ‘three persons’ or ‘a number of persons’ (cardinal numeral or quantifier + count noun); we can also say ‘three people’ or ‘a number of people’ (cardinal numeral or quantifier + collective noun). By the same token, the nouns involved in the structure ‘quantifier + noun’ in classical Chinese might well be collective nouns: ‘shu-ren’ is to count individuals in a collection denoted by ‘ren’. In sum, my points are these. (1) The grammatical structure like ‘quantifier + noun’ in classical Chinese is not sufficient or conclusive for claiming that the nouns involved are count nouns in classical Chinese; they might be collective nouns. (2) Because so far there is no linguistic evidence for the claim that these nouns in classical Chinese have their plural forms, given that the characteristic grammatical feature of count nouns lies in having plural forms, I hypothesize that these nouns in classical Chinese, syntactically speaking, are not count nouns. It is important to notice that the key syntactic features, having plural forms or not having plural forms, are not purely grammatical features but the syntactic features that have significant semantic implications or indicate certain semantic relations. The different noun-syntactic patterns resulting from the syntactic features would somehow reveal and reflect different folk semantics and different implicit ontological ways of thinking. One tendency regarding the relation between linguistic expressions and their referents seems to be common both in the Chinese semantic tradition and in the Western semantic tradition (at least during their respective classical periods): almost all words were treated as names, and naming was regarded as the main semantic relation. Naturally, naming is taken as a one-to-one relation. That is, one name refers to some one single thing, whatever it is and whether or not it actually consists in many things or in much stuff. However, the one-to-one naming paradigm, when connected with different name-syntactic patterns, would reveal and reflect different semantic orientations and different ontological tendencies. When the one-to-one naming paradigm goes with the count-noun syntactic pattern, names typically behave like count nouns; that is, it seems that they are typically supposed to pick up countable, separate, and self-sufficient things rather than to refer to wholes each of which itself consists of many countable things or of much stuff. However, when the one-to-one naming paradigm goes with the non-count-noun syntactic pattern (either with the collective-noun pattern or with the mass-noun pattern), names do not behave like count nouns; each of them is typically supposed to denote a whole of many things or a whole of much 67  Harbsmeier regards ‘ren’ as a typical count noun in classical Chinese and translates it into English count noun ‘man’, ‘person’ or ‘individual’. Cf., op. cit., 53 and 55.

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stuff. The folk semantics connected with a non-count-noun syntactic pattern tends to organize the objects basically under the part-whole relation and hence imparts to its implicit ontology a mereological character. Now, if the nouns in the Indo-European language in which Western philosophy expresses itself typically function as count nouns while the Chinese nouns typically function as non-count nouns (either mass nouns or collective nouns), and if the folk semantics and implicit ontology of nouns in a language would contribute to shaping the intuitive understanding of the language-world relation in a philosophical tradition which uses the language to express itself, then the different ways of noun-functioning would encourage and motivate different ontological models of reality. With the countnoun-functioning pattern and one-to-one naming paradigm in mind, one might be encouraged and motivated to think that the world consists of countable self-sufficient things both at the particular level and at the universal level when one looks at the structure of the world. Under the count-noun functioning pattern in the Indo-European language, the Platonic one-many problem with the following presupposition seems to be quite natural: there is one single, self-sufficient universal entity that is common or strictly identical across all the particular individuals which share the same name. Those philosophers with this presupposition in mind have searched for such a single entity and tended to identify it either with one ontic universal instantiated by particulars (Platonic realism or some other versions of realism regarding universals) or with one conceptual entity shared by minds (conceptualism) [see footnote 79 [*] below]. However, if the folk semantics of Chinese nouns, whether it goes with the collective-name-functioning pattern or with the mass-noun-functioning pattern, tends to organize the objects basically under the part-whole relation and hence makes their implicit ontology have a mereological character, classical Chinese philosophers who use Chinese nouns to express themselves would be encouraged to look at the world in terms of mereological ontology, and they would be discouraged from posing the Platonic one-many problem with the aforementioned presupposition. For classical Chinese philosophers, common nouns raise no Platonic one-many problem at all. That, I believe, is why the classical Platonic one-many problem has not been consciously posed in the Chinese philosophical tradition and, generally speaking, the classical Chinese philosophers seem less interested in debating the relevant ontological issues.68 68  In two ways, one might cite the “White-Horse-Not-Horse” (白馬非馬 bai-ma-fei-ma) case from Gongsun Long, a philosopher in the School of Names, to argue that classical Chinese philosophy also concerns the Platonic one-many problem. One way is to argue directly that Gongsun Long is a Platonic realist. Fung Yu-lan treats Gongsun Long’s “White-Horse-Not-Horse” case as a discussion of such universals as “white” (whiteness) and “horse” (horseness) (Fung YL 1952). Fung Yiu-ming also argues that Gongsun Long is a Platonic realist (Fung YM 1984 and 1985). However, for one thing, it is controversial

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The Collection-of-Individuals as a Mereological Whole

My argument in this part will be given in the following steps: first, I will further examine some relevant linguistic (syntactic and semantic) evidence for the collective-noun hypothesis and against the mass-noun hypothesis; second, I will spell out why the collective-noun hypothesis has a stronger explanatory power than the mass-noun hypothesis does in several respects; and third, I will explain how it is possible for a mereological whole to be collection-of-individuals as a class in terms of certain contemporary conceptual resources. Now what is at issue is this: Does the function of Chinese nouns go with the collective-name-functioning pattern or with the mass-noun-functioning pattern? Although the function of Chinese nouns examined so far appears to be compatible with both patterns, and although Chinese nouns in both patterns denote mereological wholes, the semantics and implicit ontologies in the two cases are significantly different. A collection-whole and a mass-fusion whole have different ontological structures: whether Gongsun Long is a nominalist or Platonic realist. For another thing, even if we suppose that Gongsun Long is a Platonic realist, it is still the case that, generally speaking, classical Chinese philosophers feel less interested in the Platonic one-many problem, that this problem is not a typical philosophical concern in classical Chinese philosophy, and that, typically, classical Chinese philosophers seem to take some nominalist outlook for granted.  The other way is to argue that Gongsun Long makes his contribution toward solving the Platonic one-many problem by providing his nominalist answer. Note that for one to hold a nominalist view does not necessarily commit oneself to finding that common names raise the Platonic one-many problem and that the problem is interesting. When the philosophers in a philosophical tradition somehow widely take nominalism for granted rather than try to argue for nominalism against the presupposition of the Platonic onemany problem, they would not attempt to solve the Platonic one-many problem because they do not think that common names raise any problem in this regard at all. I believe this is the case with classical Chinese philosophers. Nevertheless, this does not amount to saying that classical Chinese philosophers feel less interested in the neutral question, as mentioned before, of how a common name refers to many things. A nominalist orientation of Classical Chinese philosophers, as I see it, might well be regarded as a conscious answer to this neutral question rather than to the Platonic one-many problem. Moreover, it would be hardly true that Gongsun Long’s genuine purpose in his “White-Horse-NotHorse” argument is to argue for a sort of nominalism or is to make his own contribution in this regard. For one thing, it is arguably the case that Gongsun Long merely takes a nominalist outlook for granted and makes use of it to serve his other purpose, that is, to argue for certain points concerning philosophy of language and logic. For another thing, a (modest type of) nominalist orientation without the Platonic presupposition is essentially a common-sense insight or a folk truism which is encouraged by, or embedded in, the folk semantics of Chinese nouns and widely shared by classical Chinese philosophers including Gongsun Long.

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the former consists of (many) separate individuals, while the latter consists of (much) inseparable and interpenetrating stuff; and they have different part-whole structures to be discussed. Furthermore, the mass-noun hypothesis and the collective-noun hypothesis have different epistemological implications. If the mass-noun hypothesis is right, one appears not to be obliged to commit oneself to any kind of abstraction: not only the abstract object at the ontic level regarding what exists but also the abstraction at the conceptual level regarding people’s cognitive process. For, according to Hansen, once one wants to refer to a particular part of this stuff-whole, one just uses one’s mind “not as repositories of weird [abstract] objects called ideas, but as the faculty encompassing the abilities and inclinations to discriminate stuffs from each other” (Hansen 1983, 35). (Nevertheless, I will explain why such discrimination could not be free of abstraction.) However, if the collective-noun hypothesis is right, one has to do justice to the role of abstraction as the ability of generalization at the conceptual level, although one is not necessarily committed to any abstract entities at the ontic level. For, in this case, there is still a question of why and how certain particular individuals as members are classified into, or are viewed as, one collection-whole as a class. In such a cognitive process, some abstraction at the conceptual level is unavoidable. For example, many horses are recognized as the same class or the same kind of things by virtue of the characteristic shapes of the kind. However, to draw out the characteristic shapes of the kind from the characteristic shapes of many individual horses is a process of generalization of similarities among specific shapes; such generalization is a kind of abstraction. If one wants to give a mass-noun interpretation of the folk semantics of Chinese nouns, there should be convincing linguistic evidence regarding the semantics of Chinese nouns. Hansen provides further linguistic evidence to support his mass-noun model. In English, a count noun can be directly preceded by (cardinal) numerals or indefinite articles ‘a’ or ‘an’, whereas a mass noun cannot be directly preceded by numerals or indefinite articles. Thus, the phrase ‘two horses’ is well-formed while the phrase ‘two water’ is ill-formed. Instead, one has to associate mass nouns with certain other expressions (usually called ‘measures’ or ‘measure words’, sometimes called ‘sortals’ or ‘classifiers’69) so as to turn what they denote into countable units. For example, 69  [*] I feel puzzled about why (and in what sense and for what good) to use the highly misleading word ‘classifiers’ or ‘sortals’ for measure words: literally (actually, one primary by-default definition in dictionaries), ‘classifier’ would mean a person or thing that classifies something [into a class]; however, this literal sense is clearly not what is meant by using it in this context. Or, in linguistics, according to some dictionary definitions, it means “an affix or word that indicates the semantic class to which a noun belongs, typically used in numerals or other expressions of counting”; however, this “linguistic” usage seems quite unclear and likewise misleading: in this sense, it is a “second-order” word not

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in English, people say ‘two cups of water’. On the other hand, roughly after the Han Dynasty, Chinese nouns, like mass nouns in English, cannot be directly preceded by numerals or indefinite articles or demonstratives; each noun is associated with appropriate measures. Thus, in Chinese, instead of saying ‘san-mao’ (three cats), ‘wu-ren’ (five persons), and ‘yi-gou’ (one dog), one says ‘san-ZHI- mao’ (三只貓), ‘wu- KOU-ren’ (五口人), and ‘yi-TIAO-gou’ (一條狗). Note that Hansen’s point of resorting to this syntactic feature of modern Chinese nouns is not purely grammatical but semantic: the words like ‘zhi’, ‘kou’ and ‘tiao’ stand for some quantity-measures like a cup, and ‘mao’, ‘ren’ or ‘gou’ refers to some massstuff; the folk semantics of Chinese nouns are like those of mass-nouns. Hansen indeed notices that classical Chinese nouns are directly preceded by numerals or demonstratives, and measures were not grammatically necessary for classical Chinese nouns. For example, one simply says ‘san-ren’ 三人 (three persons), ‘wu-ma’ 五馬 (five horses), and ‘ci-ren’ 此人 (this person). But Hansen takes this linguistic fact in his favor, suggesting that the semantics of mass nouns in the pre-Han classical Chinese “may have affected Chinese language development”: “[g]radually nouns came to have a more uniform mass-noun syntax” and “[t]he number-sortal[measure] forms became standardized during the Han dynasty” (Hansen 1992, 49). This linguistic analysis, I believe, is problematic or at least controversial. First, consider those nouns in modern Chinese corresponding to count nouns in Indo-European languages.70 These words which go between numerals and the nouns are not really indicating it classifying (first-order) objects in the world but indicating a semantic class to which a noun belongs; however, in this sense, any word that indicates the semantic class to which a noun belongs can be said to be a “classifier”: for example, all the current noun labels in their grammatical senses such as ‘mass noun’, ‘collective noun’, ‘count noun’ and ‘abstract noun’ are entitled to be called ‘classifiers’. The word ‘sortal’ has its similar difficulties when being used in this context. In this way, in this modified version of my 1999 article, I delete the mentioned ‘sortals’ but use ‘measure’ or ‘measure words’ at this moment. However, the term ‘measure’ or ‘measure words’ is also not accurate enough; I will use ‘individualizers’ (in the case of non-mass nouns) or ‘measuring individualizers’ (in the case of mass nouns which really involve certain measuring means by which to do such individualization) (see my relevant discussion and footnotes below). 70  One might argue that I should focus only on classical Chinese before the Han Dynasty in which classical Chinese philosophers express themselves. The points of my turning to the case of modern Chinese are these. First, considering that Hansen stresses the linguistic evidence from the syntax of modern Chinese nouns, I want to explain why the ‘mass-like’ structure of modern Chinese Noun does not function exactly in the way Hansen specifies. As far as my argument for the collective-name hypothesis is concerned, I needn’t resort to the case of modern Chinese; classical Chinese makes a stronger case. Second, more importantly, although the syntax of modern Chinese nouns (a widespread use of the measures or quantity-indicators with nouns) appears to be favorable to Hansen’s model, and

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measures or the quantity-indicators [although these words are usually called ‘measure words’ in English and ‘量詞’ (liang-ci) in Chinese, and although (partial) function of those that go between numerals and mass nouns is measuring];71 rather, they are what I call ‘individualization indicators’ or ‘individualizer’. These individualizers, unlike such genuine measure-expressions as ‘cup’, indicate certain features of individuals rather than certain quantity-measures.72 The genuine function of those individualizers is to individualize the collections denoted by, say, ‘mao’, ‘ren’, and ‘gou’ so as to

although one who disagrees with Hansen tends to dismiss his observation for the excuse that only classical Chinese is relevant, I don’t think the linguistic evidence from modern Chinese is irrelevant and so should be ruled out of the court. Indeed, the grammar of classical Chinese is much different from that of modern Chinese; but only saying that there is much difference between classical Chinese and modern Chinese is not enough for the justification of the irrelevancy of modern Chinese in this case. For the semantic status of a typical Chinese noun like ‘ma’ (horse) does not undergo a radical change; that is, it is not the case that a Chinese noun, say ‘ma’, as a count noun in classical Chinese, referred to a single and individual horse but afterwards dramatically changes to a mass term in modern Chinese and turns out to denote the horse-stuff as a whole. Throughout the last two thousand and five hundred years, the Chinese people have been using the essentially same Chinese character or pictograph in the essentially same semantic way. Note that the point or the methodology involved in this issue is this: by examining the grammatical features of Chinese nouns, both in classical Chinese and in modern Chinese, we try to diagnose the semantic status and implicit ontological commitment of a typical Chinese noun. Now, if one admits, or cannot falsify, that the semantic status of a typical Chinese noun like ‘ma [horse]’ does not undergo a radical change, one should meet Hansen’s challenge from the perspective of modern Chinese. 71  [*] It is noted that, although the mentioned Chinese counterpart, ‘量詞’ (liang-ci), of the English term ‘measure words’ is a usual or conventional ready-made phrase in linguistics and folk contexts in Chinese, ‘量詞’ (liang-ci) is also used to translate the English term ‘quantifier’ in logic among professional logicians [so ‘universal quantifier’ is translated into ‘全稱量詞’ (quan-cheng-liang-ci)]. In my view, the former use of ‘量詞’ puts more emphasis on the ‘measure’ dimension of the literal sense of the Chinese word ‘量’ (liang), while the latter use puts more emphasis on the ‘quantity’ dimension of the literal sense of the word ‘量’; both make sense in their distinct contexts to the extent that each goes with some dimension of the word ‘量’. For a suggested better label for what are usually called ‘measure words’/ ‘量詞’, see the relevant footnote below. 72  [*] A further etymological analysis would reveal this. For example, ‘kou’ (口) in ‘wukou-ren’ (五口人) means “mouth” (each person has one mouth), while ‘bei’ (杯) in ‘san-bei-shui’ (三杯水 three cups of water) means “cup” which serves as a measuring means by which to “individualize” a certain amount of water into three separate units of water and which then (after such individualization) indicates a certain feature of “postindividualized” water, rather than that of “pre-individualized” water.

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count the individual(s) in the respective collections.73 This point will be highlighted by their following characteristic linguistic usage in Chinese [when such individualization can be carried out without resorting to a certain measuring means]: if one cannot find a suitable individualizer that could best match the noun in question, one could just use the Chinese word ‘ge’ (個, meaning individual) instead. For example, instead of saying ‘san-ZHI-mao’, ‘wu-KOU-ren’, and ‘yi-TIAO- gou’, one can simply say ‘san-GE-mao’, ‘wu-GE-ren’, and ‘yi-GE-gou’. The word ‘ge’ here performs the same function that the substituted individualizers are supposed to perform: to individualize the collections denoted by, say, ‘mao’, ‘ren’, and ‘gou’ so as to count the individual(s) in the respective collections. The meaning of ‘ge’ here highlights the function of such individualization.74 73  [*] It is a controversial issue of how to understand the semantic role and nature of those terms that are called ‘individualizers’ (or ‘individualization indicators’) here and traditionally labeled either ‘classifiers’ or ‘measures’ (or ‘measure words’) or ‘sortals’. Besides aforementioned Hansen’s interpretation, there are some other interpretations including recent ones by Marshall Willman (2014) and Byeong-uk Yi (2014). These distinct interpretations are not necessarily incompatible; some of them might focus on distinct aspects and dimensions of the issue and thus might be more or less compatible and complementary; this topic is engaging and interesting but is unable to be explored in this writing due to space and the major purpose here. 74  [*] The point here is this: when the member objects of a collection (such as a collection of horses and a collection of persons) are ready-made separate individual objects, such individualization can be carried out without resorting to a certain measuring means; what is expected in the (modern) Chinese context is to give a linguistic indicator for individualization of the collection; then one can always just use ‘ge’ (as a common individualizer) instead. However, it is noted that, when an object as a collection (denoted by a collective name) to be individualized needs to be individualized by means of a certain measuring instrument (a cup, a kettle, etc.) (for example, when the object is mass stuff such as water, mud, soil, etc.), ‘ge’ cannot function as a common individualizer; rather, people need to use a word that indicates the means by which to individualize the collection object; in such a case, that word serves a dual aim or performs a dual function: individualizing while measuring, or individualizing by means of measuring. The word might as well be called ‘measuring individualizer’. But, even then, individualization is logically and conceptually prior to measuring: a measuring means or instrument serves the aim of individualization; “how many” (quantity to be counted) depends on how (by means of which measuring tool) to individualize the collection object. For example, the same amount of water can be individualized respectively into, say, one jar of water (一缸水 yi-gang-shui), ten kettles of water (十壺水 shi-hui-shui), and fifty cups of water (五十杯水 wu-shi-bei-shui) (given that the capacity of a jar amounts to that of ten kettles and that the capacity of one kettle amounts to that of five cups), depending on which measuring means (缸 jar, 壺 kettle or 杯 cup) is to be used for individualization. The point is the same: all of them primarily serve the function of individualization. In this sense, and to this extent, a better or more accurate label that I would like to suggest for such linguistic function (descriptively

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Second, if one agrees that the grammar of classical Chinese nouns is not a mass-noun grammar but at the same time insists that the semantics of classical Chinese nouns is like those of mass-nouns, and if one entertains that those grammatical features of Chinese nouns to which one resorts reveal certain semantic points, then, under the mass-noun hypothesis, we are owed an explanation of why there were the tensions between the non-mass-noun grammar of classical Chinese nouns and their mass-noun semantics and between the non-mass-noun grammar of classical Chinese nouns and the alleged mass-noun grammar of modern Chinese nouns. On the other hand, it seems that the tensions do not go with the collective-name hypothesis. For one thing, as discussed in the last sub-section, collective nouns in classical Chinese can be directly preceded by numerals or indefinite quantifiers. For another thing, as explained above, the grammar of those nouns in modern Chinese corresponding to count nouns in Indo-European languages should not be regarded as a mass-noun grammar. Third, if a Chinese noun corresponding to a count noun in English is a pictograph to indicate something concrete, the pictograph, etymologically speaking, typically depicts the common characteristic shape or feature of those separate individuals in a collection rather than of an inseparable stuff-whole; the countable units are taken as separate individuals rather than bits of inseparable and interpenetrating stuff.

individualizing a collection) is ‘individualization words’/’individualizer’ or ‘measuring individualizer’ (‘個體化詞’ or ‘度量性個體化詞’ in Chinese; in this way, we can also clearly distinguish such measuring individualization from ‘量詞’ as a usual translation for ‘quantifier’ in logic in Chinese). In the above senses, we can see why the traditional label ‘measure’ or ‘measure word’ is not accurate enough and why I would prefer the labels ‘individualizer’ (in the cases of non-mass nouns) and ‘measuring individualizer’ (in the case of mass nouns).  It is important to note that, although an individualizer as one grammatical means for such individualization in the (modern) Chinese context, that does not imply that, in any natural languages, there must be a certain grammatical counterpart of such an individualizer as ‘ge’ (個), which is “grammatically-developed” in the modern Chinese context. In other words, even if without such “grammatically-developed” individualizer in a natural language, the collective-name hypothesis concerning the deep semantic-syntactic structure of common nouns can still arguably hold, as I will further explain in the next section, Section A1.2, on the expanded collective-name hypothesis: it does not exclusively rely on this historically-developed grammatical feature in (modern) Chinese; rather, it resorts to people’s pre-theoretic understanding concerning the referential status of a common noun’s “prototype” form as a dictionary entry, which is semantically and syntactically prior to its various “pragmatic” uses with distinct habitual “grammatical” features in various different natural languages.

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The available linguistic evidence suggests that, first, given that the function pattern of Chinese nouns is a non-count-noun pattern, a collective-name hypothesis seems to be a more reasonable interpretation of the folk semantics of Chinese nouns than a mass-noun hypothesis; second, what the folk semantics of Chinese nouns encourages and shapes seems to be a collection-of-individuals paradigm of reality rather than a mass-stuff paradigm of reality.75 Furthermore, theoretically speaking, it seems implausible to say that a Chinese noun, say, ‘horse’ refers to a mereological horse-stuff whole in the way in which a genuine mass term like ‘water’ refers to water-stuff. There are two reasons or two difficulties with the mass-stuff model. First, the horse-whole and the water-whole, for instance, have different ontological structures: the horse-whole, in fact, is a collection of many separate individual horses, while the water-whole is a collection of much inseparable and interpenetrating stuff. Why this difference is significant is to be seen below. Second, assuming that a whole is divisible into parts above the molecule level, one can find that the transitivity of the parthood would highlight the different partwhole structures of the horse-whole and of the water-whole. If a horse is a part of the horse-whole, then, since a horse-leg is a part of a horse, a horse-leg is also a part of the horse-whole because the parthood is transitive; however, it is obvious that the noun ‘horse’ is supposed to refer to the horse rather than to the horse-leg. Nevertheless, on the other hand, the genuine mass noun, say ‘water’, would not be confronted with the same problem when what it refers to is taken as a mereological object, so long as water is divisible above the molecule level.76 There is the third difficulty which is not necessarily connected with the mass-stuff model but with Hansen’s interpretation of it: in my opinion, it is implausible to say that people discriminate one type of stuff from another or one particular part of horse-stuff from other parts without any abstraction in mind. For, according to our own cognitive experience, any cognitive process which involves distinguishing one stuff from another 75  Although what are sometimes labeled ‘generic’ nouns, when being preceded with numerals [such as ‘bai-shou’ (百獸 ‘the hundred kinds of animal’) and ‘wu-gu’ (五谷 ‘the five classes of cereals’)], would count kinds rather than individuals and hence cannot directly fall under the individual-collection paradigm, their naming paradigm can be eventually reduced to the individual-collection paradigm. For, given such a generic noun actually refers to a second-order collection, the kinds which are counted are collections of individuals. 76  Indeed what the standard mereological analysis requires is a sum principle (If X is horse and Y is horse, then X + Y is horse) rather than a subtraction principle (If X and Y are parts of horse, then X is horse and Y is horse). The points here are these: first, the horse-whole has a significantly different part-whole structure from that of the water-whole; second, perhaps a version of mereology which could do justice to the member-class relation (or to a subtraction principle) is expected in some cases.

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stuff cannot be free of abstraction. Hansen says: “… horse can be held to be the name of a mereological object—a thing-kind, and we can explain our ability to distinguish horse-stuff from ox-stuff as our ability to distinguish characteristic shape” (Hansen 1983, 54). As said before, many horses are recognized as the same kind of things by virtue of the characteristic shapes of the kind. However, to draw out the characteristic shapes of the kind from the characteristic shapes of many individual horses is a process of generalization of the similarities among specific shapes, and such generalization is a kind of abstraction; only on the basis of having already recognized the two kinds of stuff (horse-stuff and ox-stuff), respectively, can one distinguish one kind of stuff from other kinds of stuff. The collection-of-individuals model can effectively solve the first problem. For the model directly regards a noun as denoting a collection-whole of individual things and takes the case of the mass noun to be a special case: it denotes a collection of one single inseparable and interpenetrating stuff. Moreover, the collection-of-individuals model can directly solve the third problem. For it takes a collection as a class; a class is understood as the extension of a concept which consists in some abstraction. However, one might immediately object: if the collection is viewed as a mereological whole, the collection-of-individuals model would be in the same boat as the massstuff model is when being confronted with the problem about the aforementioned horse-leg. For, although one can say that a horse-leg is not an individual specified by the concept of horse and hence is not a member of the horse-collection as a class, it is still a part of an individual horse; if a horse is taken as a part of the horse-collection whole, then, since parthood is transitive, it follows that a horse-leg is a part of the horse-collection whole. Let me call this objection ‘the horse-leg objection’. One might further object: if a collection is taken as a class, it is simply not a mereological whole. Let me call this objection ‘the no-mereological-class objection’. I believe that the no-mereological-class objection is really a dogma. David Lewis’s work on mereological classes shows that a class could be a mereological whole in a certain consistent way (Lewis 1991). Below, by resorting to some conceptual resources in Lewis’ formal account of mereological classes, I explain the characteristic features of the collection-whole model and how the model can deal with the horse-leg objection. The crucial differences that distinguish the mereological interpretation of the collection-of-individuals model from the mereological interpretation of the mass-stuff model are as follows. (1) It can be said that a is a member of A if and only if A is a class and the singleton {a} of a is part of A (ibid., 16): that is, a collection A to which a noun refers is taken both as a mereological whole and as a class; what is taken as a part of the whole A is not individual a but its subclass—singleton {a}; the part-whole relation here is the relation between class and subclass.

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(2) In this model of reality, reality is divided exhaustively into individuals and classes as mereological fusions,77 i.e., collection wholes, rather than into mass-stuff wholes. Note that there is a fundamental difference between a collection-whole and a mass-stuff-whole: as far as the ontological status is concerned, the parts of the former could be separable individuals while the parts of the latter could not. (3) An individual a and its singleton {a} have exactly the same ontological status but differ only in our different ways of understanding the classification of a at the conceptual level.78 (4) What really distinguishes a horse as a part from a horse-leg as a part is a certain concept which characterizes the membership of the class and is eventually based upon certain ontic features of a horse; since the horse-leg of a horse is not a subclass of the horse’s singleton though it is indeed part of the horse, the horse-leg is not a part of the horse-whole.79 77  Cf., ibid., 1, 7, and 73. By definition, a fusion is a sum of some things if and only if it has all of them as parts and has no part that is distinct from each of them. 78  When saying that a is one member of the class A, we have such a background-assumption before we assign the membership of the class A to a: the membership of the class A is talked about here; when claiming that {a} is part of the mereological whole A, we do not have the background-assumption aforementioned but assign the membership of the class A to a by means of the notation {a} and in mereological terms. In this way, to say that a is one member of the class A is (ontologically) equivalent to saying that {a} is part of the mereological whole A. 79  [*] Byeong Yi renders my treatment in this connection (treating Gongsun Long’s language in terms of the collective-name hypothesis) “incoherent” (Yi 2018, 65): on the one hand, I employ the abstraction-involved conceptual resource, singleton, and emphasize the indispensable role played by conceptual abstraction; my interpretation is thus assimilated to what he calls ‘abstracta interpretations’, which “hold that the main thesis of the dialogue concerns abstract entities” (my emphasis in italics); on the other hand, I also maintain a kind of nominalist interpretation of the classical Chinese theories of language, as indicated in the cited statement of mine “…the classical Chinese theories of language takes … nominalist mereological ontology for granted” (Mou 1999, 56, i.e., 146 here). My responses are these. First, generally and theoretically speaking, it is not the case that any versions or kinds of nominalism (regarding universals) must indiscriminately reject abstraction; a modest version of nominalism, conceptualism or a conceptualist nominalism, on the one hand, rejects universals being “indiscriminately” treated as “abstract” entities that really exist in the external world outside the human mind (as indicated in the previous footnote 58[*], I do think that, in some collections that are ontologically classified into distinct groups, universals as commonly-shared constituent structures or commonly-possessed constituent elements can be some things that universally exist in all these instances that are ontologically classified into the cases; but then these universals are not “abstract” entities but “concrete” ones); however, on the other hand, such conceptual nominalism emphasizes the indispensable role played by abstract concepts that would bring about

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The fact that we can give a consistent interpretation of the classical ontological insight in terms of a modern account of mereological classes does not mean that classical Chinese philosophers have any technical conception regarding mereological classes. Nevertheless, this does suggest: on the one hand, the collection-of-individuals model revealed and reflected by the semantics of Chinese nouns could be a consistent ontological insight and be precisely defined in terms of some contemporary conceptual resources; on the other hand, a certain natural way of speaking or the folk semantics of a natural language might motivate and push philosophical theorization in a convincing and promising direction. In sum, in this section, I have argued for a collective-name hypothesis concerning the semantic-syntactic structure of Chinese common nouns which consists of the following points: (1) the denotational semantics and relevant syntactic features of classifications and thus classes; such abstract concepts are “universal” in character and in function; thus they and their linguistic expressions can be viewed as “universals” (if any). It is noted that, if abstract concepts as universals are understood in this way, and if they are called or treated as “abstract entities”, they are either “abstract entities” only in a “nominal” sense of ‘entities’ (that is, their nominal existence in the human mind, in contrast to “substantial” existence in the external world, which can be “nominally” or linguistically expressed by abstract nouns), or, without the term ‘entities’ in ‘abstract entities’ being used in its substantial sense, they are just abstract concepts with its classification function (thus its association of “nominal” existence of classes as a variety of conceptual membership in classification) in less theoretically-loaded terms; there is thus no “incoherent” treatment in such modest conceptualist nominalism. Second, what I hold is such a modest kind of conceptualist nominalism that is associated with my collective-name hypothesis and my interpretation of Gongsun Long’s “White-Horse-Not-Horse” thesis, as explicitly indicated and explained in my 2007 article, which is cited in the reference list in Yi 2018; therefore, there is no “incoherent” treatment in my account. Third, when the foregoing conceptualism and the Platonic-realist interpretations (such as Fung YL’s, Fung YM’s and Cheng’s) are assimilated to one group “abstracta interpretation” without due clarification and distinction (e.g., the distinction between the abstract “entities” in the “nominal” and “substantial” senses: for “nominal” entities, the “entity” talk is a mere verbal choice and can be easily replaced by some other expressions if more effective or better serving a certain explanatory purpose), there is some substantial conflation and ignorance that would have such a verbal division less effective and lose explanatory potency: it conflates, and thus ignores the substantial distinction between a modest conceptualist version of nominalist interpretation and a Platonic-realist interpretation; this assimilation would be less effective and lack of explanatory potency to the extent that it fails to see that some difficulties that are associated with the Platonic-realist “abstracta interpretations” do not go with a modest version of nominalism, such as conceptualist nominalism as addressed in my interpretation of Gongsun Long’s thesis (Mou 2007) and as briefly further explained in footnote 56[*] before.

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Chinese common nouns are like those of collective names; (2) their implicit ontology is a mereological ontology of collection-of-individuals with part-whole structure and member-class structure, which does justice to the role of abstraction at the conceptual level and which can be given a consistent meta-interpretation in terms of contemporary conceptual resources; and (3) encouraged and shaped by the functions and folk semantics of Chinese nouns, the classical Chinese theorists of language take this kind of nominalist mereological for granted; as a result, the classical Platonic onemany problem in the Western philosophical tradition has not been consciously posed in the Chinese philosophical tradition, and, generally speaking, classical Chinese philosophers seem less interested in debating the relevant ontological issues. The mereological collective-name hypothesis concerning the semantic-syntactic structure of Chinese common nouns, I believe, would provide a more reasonable interpretation of the semantics of classical Chinese nouns than Hansen’s mass-noun hypothesis; one would understand the classical Chinese ontological theory better on the collectivename hypothesis, although there are other more elaborate interpretations that would be compatible with this hypothesis.

A1.2

An Expanded Collective-Name Hypothesis Concerning the SemanticSyntactic Structure of Common Nouns in Natural Languages

In this section, I present an expanded collective-name hypothesis concerning the semantic-syntactic structure of common nouns in natural language, not restricted to the case of Chinese common nouns, with further while distinct linguistic evidence and in a distinct argumentation line. The purpose of this section is to further examine the issue of how the reference of common nouns is possible with the focus on how, generally speaking, common nouns hook up to this actual world semantically and thus syntactically.

A1.2.1 Background

Around twenty years ago (during the 1996–1999 period), when discussing the relationship between the structure and functions of Chinese language and some ontological insights in classical Chinese philosophy, and engaging Hansen’s mass-noun hypothesis in this connection (Hansen 1983), I suggested and argued for a collective-name hypothesis concerning the semantic-syntactic structure of Chinese common nouns (Mou 1999, whose modified version is presented in the previous section, Section A1.1, in this “appendix” writing). Since then, in view of the critical discussion on the issue and for the sake of further engagement, I have not merely maintained the basic line of my original collective-noun hypothesis concerning the semantic-syntactic structure of Chinese common nouns but extended the hypothesis to cover the semanticsyntactic structure of common nouns in general, not merely in Chinese but also in other natural languages [though, more strictly speaking, the hypothesis is now labeled

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the ‘collective-name’ hypothesis, instead of the ‘collective-noun’ hypothesis, in view of actually talking about the semantic-syntactic, rather than apparent grammatical, structure of common nouns (as a grammatical category) understood in a broad sense]. Let me first specify the scope of this section: what I will do in the subsequent content and what I will not, and what I will emphasize among those that I will do. First, I will focus on the deep semantic-syntactic structure of those non-singular referring nouns or common nouns in a broad sense [grammatically in English, they include the common nouns in a narrow or typical sense,80 definite descriptions that refer to unique sets of objects like ‘the white horse’, and those definite-article-prefixed referring adjectives like ‘the red’], instead of that of singular referring names, such as proper names, definite descriptions that refer to unique objects like ‘the current US president’, singular personal pronouns like ‘you’ and ‘she’, demonstrative pronouns like ‘this’ and ‘that’, demonstrative-associated common nouns like ‘this table’ and ‘that house’.81 Second, I will focus on how common nouns hook up to this actual world semantically and thus syntactically via a collective-name hypothesis concerning their semantic-syntactic structure, instead of how, as treated in modal logic, they semantically hook up to possible worlds, for some substantial philosophical considerations.82 Third, as this work is a further expansion of my previous work on the collective-name hypothesis concerning the semantic-syntactic structure of Chinese common nouns in Mou 1999, the relevant parts that have been already examined in it will not be repeated in this section but only briefly mentioned (with the due reference information) when in need. Fourth, as highlighted in the title of this writing and the sub-title of this section, I will focus on the semantic dimension of non-singular referring terms concerning how they hook up to 80  The common nouns as a grammatical category in English in a broad sense include count nouns, collective nouns, mass nouns (what they stand for can be either concrete in the actual outside world, such as natural particular things in the world, or abstract in our mind, such as fictional figures). 81  These non-singular referring nouns are sometimes labeled ‘general terms’, which is not accurate and misleading at least to the extent that such a general term as ‘man’ can generically refer to a sortal collection of individual objects and thus “lose” its “general term” status. 82  In this connection, this work has a different focus from, but can be somehow compatible with, some other writings on common nouns, such as Gupta 1980 whose title (“The Logic of Common Nouns: An Investigation in Quantified Modal Logic”) reveals its distinct focus, though this distinct focus should not prevent my writing from talking about the notion of (rigid) designation which is typically associated with Kripke’s theory of reference in terms of the possible-world resources (see Kripke 1980) but which can be also addressed in view of this actual world (see Jackson 1998). In this way, this writing will not involve the discussion of the notion of “intension” as a logical notion involved in the treatment of situations of possible worlds.

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the (actual) world, instead of its “pragmatic” or “speech-act” dimension, though some of relevant pragmatic contributing elements are presupposed. Fifth, in the foregoing connections, this work on common nouns is incomplete but also gives due room for its possible complementary connection with some other works on common nouns.

A1.2.2

The Identity of the Collective-Name Hypothesis and Its Major Argumentation The Identity of the Collective-Name Hypothesis

Why do I address the hypothesis again since I suggested its version concerning Chinese common nouns? Primarily, I make some substantial and philosophically engaging expansion to cover the semantic-syntactic structure of common nouns in all natural languages instead of being merely about those in Chinese. Besides this, I think that there are some (more or less) misunderstandings83 of the points of the original version of the “collective-noun” hypothesis and it is worth making due explanation. 83  Cf., Fraser 2007, 436–437, and Han 2014, 29. As indicated in a previous footnote, in view of “grammatical” features of some addressed English nouns, Fraser contends that “none of which [these English nouns, ‘people’, ‘cattle’ and ‘police’, cited in my 1999 article] are in fact collective nouns. These nouns typically function as plurals, taking plural verbs, and when counted (‘two people’, ‘several police’) divide their reference into individuals not collections” (Fraser 2007, 436–7); I then emphasize that what is focused on in my 1999 article is the semantic-syntactic structure of Chinese common nouns, instead of some “grammatical” features of collective nouns in a certain natural language (say, English). Now with the current expanded collective-name hypothesis, my enhanced position in response is this: not merely these nouns ‘team’, ‘jury’, ‘committee’ in English and their counterparts in other natural languages, even not merely these ‘people’, ‘cattle’, ‘police’ in English cited in my 1999 article, but also other common nouns in English and their counterparts in other natural languages, are all collective names with regard to their shared semantic-syntactic structure, whether or not they would “grammatically” count as collective nouns in a specific natural language (if there is such a ready-made grammatical category in that natural language).  My brief response to Han’s evaluative remark “[Mou’s] main view has the same line with Hansen’s” (“其主要观点却可以引陈汉生为同调”, Han 2014, 29) is this: it fails to see the legitimacy and need of the semantic-dimension-concerned approach, indiscriminately treating the major distinct points of any semantic-dimension-concerned approaches as the same line, and thus misses the point of my “internal” criticism of Hansen’s approach, which might be more forceful and relevant to Hansen’s approach at least in some connections than a variety of “external” criticism that Hansen can easily render missing the point of his “semantic” approach. For example, Hansen evaluates Harbsmeier’s criticism this way: he “systematically confuses syntax [the grammatical in this case] and semantics” and misinterprets his semantic hypothesis (Hansen 1992, 48f), though I think that Harbsmeier’s criticism is still relevant (in the sense as explained in Mou 1999, 47–48).

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By a collective name I mean a semantic84-syntactic category of a non-singular referring name, which is typically or paradigmatically listed as a common noun (in a standard grammatical way) in a dictionary, to (primarily) designate (or denote in a rigid way) a kind (or sortal) collection of individual objects (as its semantic-whole referent); this primary or basic semantic feature has the two “derivative” features. (1) Syntactically, the collective name thus can occupy the referring subject position in a sentential context that expresses one basic language employment (as addressed in Section 1 of the main text of the essay) to the effect that something is said of an object (as the referent of a singular referring name) or a collection of objects (as the referent of a non-singular referring name, i.e., a collective name) to which a referring name as the subject refers. (2) The “collective-generic” nature of a collective name is determined jointly by the following three types (subsets) of sortal-collection-associated attributes possessed by the generic-kind collection of the individual objects: the type of sortal-collection-nominal-identity-contributing attribute(s) which gives (give) the nominal identity of the sortal collection and which is (are) linguistically labeled by the descriptive/adjective element(s) in the linguistic expression of the collective name; the type of sortal-collection-generic attribute(s) which is (are) generically possessed by typical individual objects of the collection (in this sense, generically possessed by the collection), rather than necessarily by each object of the collection; the type of collection-created attribute(s) which are generically possessed by the collection as a whole only, rather than by any individual member of the collection. Those non-sortal-collection-nominal-identity-contributing attributes consist of and . I contend that any collective name more or less possesses the three types of sortal-collection-associated attributes.85 It is important to note that the aforementioned “metaphysical” attributes become relevant or “semantically relevant” in this 84  As indicated before, by ‘semantic’ in this context, I mean the following strict or narrow sense of the term. It is known that the term ‘semantic’ is used in its strict or narrow (strict) sense and in its broad (loose) sense. In its strict or narrow sense, ‘semantics’ means the study of the non-(purely)-linguistic, cross-categorical relations between linguistic expressions and the extra-linguistic objects for which they stand. Such a non-linguistic relation is usually called a ‘semantic relation’; the notion that captures such a semantic relation is called a ‘semantic notion’. The principal semantic relations are referring and being true; the principal semantic notions are thus the notions of reference and truth. 85  The interested reader might also look at Mill 1981, where he distinguishes a variety of “names” including the distinctions between general and singular names, between general and collective names, between concrete and abstract names, between connotative and non-connotative names, etc. Though he seems to use the term ‘name’ largely in terms of its grammatical status, I have some substantial disagreements with Mill’s identification, which I will not examine here to avoid unnecessary distraction but will discuss somewhere else.

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case because they are directly related to the collective-generic (referring) nature of collective names. Clearly, the identity of a collective name that is semantically and syntactically characterized in the foregoing way is not necessarily the same as the identity of a collective noun as grammatically characterized in a natural language (say, in English).86 As mentioned above, the hypothesis is now more explicitly (to avoid misunderstanding) labeled the ‘collective-name’ hypothesis, instead of the ‘collective-noun’ hypothesis, as what it essentially talks about is the semantic-syntactic (rather than grammatical) structure of common nouns (the “common noun” as a grammatical category). In Mou 1999, I already emphatically indicate that the “collective-noun” hypothesis is on the semantic-syntactic structure of Chinese common nouns: “Chinese [common] nouns typically function, semantically and syntactically, in the same way that collective nouns function, and the folk semantics of Chinese nouns is like that of collective nouns function” (Mou 1999, 47; my emphasis here). In so saying, I use the phrase ‘collective-noun’ to mean the (deep) semantic-syntactic structure of Chinese common nouns concerning its naming/referring function in hooking up to the world, not taking the grammatical features of a collective noun in any specific natural language to be the identity criteria but merely using collective nouns in a natural language (say, English, as it is the natural language in which the paper was written) for the sake of illustration. Although in my 1999 I explicitly explain to what extent I used the phrase ‘collective nouns’ as a label of a grammatical category whose “grammatical features” are always sensitive to the actual uses in a certain natural language (say, in English), using this phrase in the title of the hypothesis under examination can bring about a certain misunderstanding if one does not pay due attention to my relevant explanation in the main text of the article in this connection. For this consideration, when labeling the expanded hypothesis, I do not use the phrase ‘collective-noun’ but explicitly use ‘collection-name’ to label a semantic-syntactic category whose ‘name’ part literally implies referent-naming nature.

86  Indeed, what is focused on in Mou 1999 is the semantic-syntactic structure of Chinese common nouns, instead of some “grammatical” feature of collective nouns in a certain natural language (say, English); My position is that, not merely these nouns ‘team’, ‘jury’, ‘committee’ in English and their counterparts in other natural languages, but also ‘people’, ‘cattle’ and ‘police’ in English and their counterparts in other natural languages, are all collective names with regard to their shared semantic-syntactic structure, whether or not they would “grammatically” count as collective nouns in a natural language (if there is such a ready-made grammatical category in that natural language).

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Let me first explain my strategy of arguing for this expanded hypothesis. For the sake of philosophical argumentation and of generating philosophically interesting and engaging discussion, this substantial extension being made is not based on the following seemingly-easy or “cheap” inference: given that (the first premise) the collective-name hypothesis concerning the semantic-syntactic structure of common nouns in Chinese holds, and given that (the second premise) all natural languages share essentially the same deep semantic-syntactic structure of common nouns (at least in major semantic-syntactic connections, if not in all connections), the collective-name hypothesis concerning the semantic-syntactic structure of common nouns in Chinese also holds for common nouns in the other natural languages. For one thing, although many would agree to the second premise in the above inference (i.e., all natural languages share the same deep semantic-syntactic structure), the collective-name hypothesis concerning the semantic-syntactic structure of common nouns in Chinese was made based on some relevant grammatical features of Chinese common names and thus on examining some deep structure in the context of Chinese; to this extent, when the collective-name hypothesis concerning the semantic-syntactic structure of common nouns in Chinese was made, it is then neither claimed nor automatically implied that this hypothesis is about the semantic-syntactic structure of common nouns in general. In other words, there might be some gap between the “deep” semantic-syntactic structure of Chinese common nouns and the “genuinely deep” semantic-syntactic structure of common nouns in general, and thus it would need further explanation of why there would be no such a gap if the aforementioned seemingly-easy argumentation line holds. For another thing, surely, although it is widely believed and assumed (such as in Chomsky’s case) that all the natural languages share the same deep semantic-syntactic structure, it is neither the case that it is not controversial nor that all the involved key concepts are clearly characterized. Actually, more importantly, even if the foregoing line of argumentation can go smoothly, we still need an argument that is directly and primarily based on the relevant basic linguistic or semantic evidence which (at least arguably) generally holds for all the human natural languages and can be independently argued for (‘independently’ here meaning that it does not rely exclusively on the Chinese case). For any shared deep semantic-syntactic structure of natural languages should directly have its own semantic evidence for it. Moreover, given the “gap” difficulty with the former line of argument, the latter line of argumentation is expected to be not only in need but also primary for the purpose of this article. With the foregoing considerations, the basic line of argumentation and explanation for the collective-name hypothesis concerning the semantic-syntactic structure of common nouns in (all natural) languages here is based primarily and directly on what is labeled below ‘the basic linguistic fact concerning the semantic status of common

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nouns paradigmatically as non-singular-referring-name dictionary entries’ and on the analysis of how common nouns semantically and syntactically behave in general. This means that, though relevant linguistic evidence is cited from English and/or Chinese (as this article is written in English and as my working knowledge of natural languages are limited to English and Chinese), it is analyzed in the context of examining its general significance and application in two senses: first, it is (is considered to be) a common linguistic phenomenon; second, it is to point to the shared deep structure and functions. If the expanded collective-name hypothesis holds, its direct substantial implications would include these two among others. First, it would be a further support to my previous collective-name hypothesis concerning the semantic-syntactic structure of common names in Chinese. Second, it would be a further support to the assumption that all natural languages share the same deep semantic-syntactic structure (at least concerning common nouns in this regard). My major argumentation is based on the following linguistic observation of several closely-related crucial features of a common noun that are paradigmatically or typically shown by an common noun simplex entry87 in a dictionary in various natural languages, which, as indicated above, can be labeled ‘the basic linguistic fact concerning the semantic status of common nouns paradigmatically as non-singularreferring-name dictionary entries’, as follows. (1) A common noun, as paradigmatically given as a dictionary entry, is to be neither in plural form (if any) nor in singular form but in its “prototype” form and can occupy the referring (syntactic) subject position in a (syntactic) sentence88 that expresses one basic linguistic fact to the effect that something is said of an object as the referent of that name occupying the subject position. What is highlighted here is exactly the semantic-syntactic structure of such a prototype form of common nouns. Given the established “prototype” form of a common noun (simplex) via its “entry” status in a dictionary, a “subsequent” or “derivative” variety of actual-use-generated grammatical features in a certain specific natural language are eventually based on, and need to be explained in terms of, the deep semantic-syntactic structure of the common noun in a natural language (or the shared semantic-syntactic structure of common nouns in natural languages) in this connection; to this extent, such actual-use-generated gram87  Such as the noun ‘horse’, instead of the noun ‘white horse’ which can be treated either as a common noun complex or a definite description that refers to a unique set of objects. 88  Both terms ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’ here are understood in the following syntacticstructural sense [or the syntactic-semantic sense]. The subject is a syntactic unit that functions as such a main constituent of a simple declarative sentence: the subject, via its expression, refers to some thing that is what the sentence is about, while the predicate is another syntactic unit that functions as another main constituent talks about or affirms or asserts some attribute or state of (part of) what the subject refers to.

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matical features (plural form, singular form, etc.) are pragmatic in nature, instead of the primitive syntactic features. Generally speaking, in the foregoing sense, those postprototype forms and classifications do not necessarily or directly reflect and reveal the genuine semantic-syntactic structure of common nouns. (2) It designates (or denotes in a rigid way) a collection of individual particular objects [as special cases, it might designate a collection of variously-located mass stuff of the same constituent when it is a mass noun; it might designate a collection of various tokens of an abstract type (such as a number) when it is an abstract noun;…], which is not the same as a sum of these individual objects but has its own collectionassociated (attribute) parts. (3) Some of these collection-associated (attribute) parts give(s) the (metaphysical and linguistic) identity of the collection via their expressively linguistic appearances in common nouns (thus nomimal) – they are accordingly called “collection-nominalidentity-contributing” attributes, such as the case of the common noun (simplex) ‘horse’ in which the attribute of having the horse nature that is shared by all the individual horses in the “horse” collection and thus makes an indispensable contribution to the identity of the “horse” collection, and the case of the common noun (complex) ‘white horse’, in which, the attribute of having white color that is shared by all the individual white horses in the “white horse” collection and thus also makes an indispensable contribution to the identity of the “white horse” collection. (4) Some of these collection-associated (attribute) parts are not necessarily possessed by each individual member of the collection but generically possessed by the collection of individual members (in the sense of being typically or normally possessed by most of the collection members) – thus they are called “collection-generic” attributes (such as the attribute of having four legs is not necessarily possessed by each of the individual members of the “horse” collection but generically (typically or normally) possessed by the (most) members of the “horse” collection (i.e., generically possessed by the collection in the foregoing sense).89 (5) Some of these collection-associated (attribute) parts are possessed not by any individual member of the collection but by the collection as a whole only—thus they are called ‘collection-created attributes’. For example, the attribute of winning a team game or some “organizational” attribute among the individual members (or, generally speaking, a certain collection-created attribute) cannot be possessed by any individual member of a team of the team members but by the team as a whole. To this extent, generally speaking, a collection is not the same as a sum of these individual objects but has its own collection-associated (attribute) parts.

89  For a comprehensive examination of “generic” linguistic phenomena, see Carlson and Pelletier 1995, especially its “introduction” essay by Krifka, M. et al. (1–124).

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In view of the foregoing five features of a common noun paradigmatically as given in a dictionary, one can give a pre-theoretic or quasi-theoretic90 folk presentation of the semantic-syntactic structure of a common noun, which an ordinary normal speaker can reflectively understand. The features (2)-(5) are expressively semantic features, while the feature (1) is one semantically-related syntactic feature, which reflects the semantic features and which is thus not the same as, but logically and “semantically” prior to, any actual-use-generated grammatical features. The feature (2) per se does not commit itself to a platonic understanding of what a common noun designates: an ontological status of a collection consists in and of its constitute individual objects together with their own “parasitic” parts and their collection-associated (attribute) parts. The semantic features (3), (4) and (5) address those collection-associated (attribute) parts and jointly give the raison d’être of the collection. The semantic feature (3) gives the raison d’être of why all those individual members of the collection are classified into the same collection. The semantic features (4) and (5) determine that the collection can be reduced neither to the individual objects (thus syntactically the prototype of a common noun, as paradigmatically given as a dictionary entry, cannot be taken to be in a singular form), nor to a sum of the individual objects (thus syntactically the prototype of a common noun, as paradigmatically given as a dictionary entry, cannot be simply given in a plural form). It is also noted that the semantic feature (5) explains why a collection is neither the same as nor can be reduced to a generic kind but can include the generic feature as one of its characteristic aspect. As indicated before, it is important to note that the aforementioned “metaphysical” attributes as addressed in (3), (4) and (5) become relevant or “semantically relevant” in this case because they are directly related to the collective-generic (referring) nature of collective names. One might object this way: when one uses the term ‘book’ in language practice, one actually refers to some books on the book shelve, or some fictional books or some book plan in mind,..; that is, the name ‘book’ is used to refer to distinct kinds of books, instead of just designating one collection of individual particular objects as the aforementioned basic referential meaning. My major response to this possible objection is this. Such an objection results from the conflation between the semantic and the pragmatic; when one uses the term ‘book’ in language practice (including working on various philosophical or metaphysical accounts, in fictional works, etc.) to actually refer to some books on the book shelve or some fictional books or some book plan in mind, … all these are how people further pragmatically use the noun ‘book’ based on its basic referential meaning [say, “(a collection of) any number of written or printed pages fastened along one side …”] as given in, say, its dictionary entry whose “prototype” form gives its basic “semantic-syntactic” structure. The point 90  If the talk of the semantic and the syntactic counts as minimal theoretic, we can treat the following account as a quasi-theoretic one.

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here is essentially in accordance with another point as explained above that various grammatical distinctions such as singular vs. plural forms are essentially actual-usegenerated grammatical features in certain specific natural languages.



Some Further Thoughts

In the following, let me say something about the relation between the argument in Mou 1999 concerning the semantic-syntactic structure of common nouns in Chinese and the argument presented in this article concerning semantic-syntactic structure of common nouns in general. Generally speaking, it is reflectively interesting and illuminating to examine some “surface” structure of a certain natural language so as to achieve a kind of guidance and “breach” point to further explore the shared deep semantic-syntactic structure of natural languages in general in some relevant connections to significant issues concerning the relation between language, thought and objects.91 It can lead us to penetrate the otherwise-misguided linguistic phenomena and then capture the shared genuine structure of natural languages in these connections. In this way, as I argue in my 1999, in contrast to those natural phonetic languages like English, the “surface” or grammatical feature of Chinese common nouns prominently suggests the “collectivename” semantic-syntactic structure, which, as argued for in this article, actually constitutes the deep semantic-syntactic structure that is fundamentally shared by all natural languages. To this extent, indeed, the surface “collective-name” grammatical feature of Chinese common nouns relatively better, or more directly, represents the shared semantic-syntactic structure of common names in general in the human natural languages that more or less reflects people’s folk way of thinking in understanding the semantic relationship between language and the world in this connection (that is, how common nouns as names hook up to the world); this guides us to further realize that people’s folk ways of thinking in distinct linguistic communities are essentially the same in this connection; that is, the semantic-syntactic structure of a collective name reflects a holistic character embedded in the human natural languages and our ways of thinking. 91  In this writing, I do not intent to explore the more general issue of how the way of a certain natural language would bear on the way of thinking of a linguistic community. It is noted that, when using the word ‘bear on’ above instead of ‘influence’ alone in the preceding statement, I mean that the relation between the former and the latter is bi-directional instead of one-directional. The actual situation might be this: when the way of a certain natural language (say, Chinese language) was originally formed up, it was (at least partially) influenced by the way of thinking of the folk people around that time; on the other hand, when such a linguistic way has become relatively stable and been followed and passed on generation by generation, it has conversely influenced the way of thinking of the future language speakers to some extent.

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However, it is important to note that saying that the surface “collective-name” grammatical feature of Chinese common nouns relatively directly captures the deep semantic-syntactic structure of common nouns in general neither just means nor implies that the Chinese ideographic language better reflects the deep structure (the semantic-syntactic, logical, etc.) of natural languages in all connections. There is a need to carefully look at relevant situations: in certain connections there might be no shared semantic-syntactic structures at least to the extent that there might be no shared deep syntactic structures in these connections; however, even though there is no shared deep syntactic structure in these connections, that does not mean that there is no shared deep semantic orientations to some extent in these connections. To illustrate this point, let me start with some relevant surface linguistic facts about certain characteristic features of Chinese ideographic language and Western phonetic language (say, English) in comparison and in contrast.92 We know how we as English speakers give our names and addresses: we first give our given names (thus being called ‘first name’) and last give our family names (thus being called ‘last name’). However, in Chinese, the family name goes first (thus the family name is really the first name in Chinese way) and then the given name (e.g., the real order of a whole name in Chinese is, say, ‘Wang [family name] Dong [given name]’, instead of ‘Dong Wang’). For, in philosophical terms, the family (name) is both metaphysically and logically prior to the individual (name), and the former provides a necessary holistic background for understanding the latter. By the same token, in contrast to its way in English, a mailing address (taking an assumed one as an example) should go this way when delivered in Chinese: “USA, California, San Francisco, X University, Y Department, Wang Dong”, that is, the larger thing goes first while the smaller thing next, instead of the reversed English way in this connection: “Dong Wang, Y Department, X University, San Francisco, California, USA”. It seems arguably right that the structure of Chinese language in this respect to some extent bears on the orientation of the way of thinking of the Chinese people as a whole. In this case, one can say that there seems to be neither shared grammatical nor shared (inter-sentential) syntactic structure in the connection of the order of talking about things (grammatically and syntactically, which one would go first and which one would go later); however, saying this neither means nor shows that there is no shared similar semantic orientation in this connection. That is, the foregoing linguistic phenomenon implies neither that, say, English speakers really mean dramatically otherwise in talking that way, nor that only the people speaking in the similar grammatical way to Chinese with regard to the aforementioned inter-sentential order tend to put the family/the collective interest first. Some other relevant elements might also 92  I make further modification of the analysis of this linguistic fact as addressed in Mou 2006.

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contribute to what really happens in this connection. Even if such a distinctive order (concerning which one is mentioned first while another next or last) indeed influences which one would first go in mind at some level of thinking, surely one can say that, though saying things in a certain order, one might actually think about all the involved things in some linguistic contexts once for all simultaneously or even actually the larger background things first. It might be the case that, at a certain deep level, ordinary people in the West and ordinary Chinese people behave much like generically; the folk way of thinking collectively/generically held by ordinary people in the West has seen (concrete) things also (more or less) in roughly the same way: both of them think about the involved things simultaneously without substantially ignoring either but put more or less emphasis on the larger background things, though their distinct linguistic habits seem to go otherwise to some extent in this connection. Indeed, I can personally tell based on my own first-hand experience in the English language community (for almost thrity years in the USA) that generally speaking nobody in the English language community really ignores or pays less attention to the aforementioned whole picture (on such “folk” issues as those of people’s names or mailing addresses). On the other hand, the distinct surface structures (thus distinct “grammatical” features) of different natural languages might (mis)lead some of their generalization-favoring speakers to generalize distinctive orientations or tendencies in theorizing (say, the “Chinese” “holistic” or “collective” orientation while the “Western” “individual” orientation). Indeed, even just considering “theorizing” people in the West, we can see that the difference between the two different traditions lies in “quantity” instead of “quality”: the difference lies basically in degree in “quantity”, instead of dramatically difference in “quality”.93 With the preceding discussion, as for the relation between the argument in the previous section (i.e., in Mou 1999) concerning the semantic-syntactic structure of common nouns in Chinese and the argument presented in this section concerning semantic-syntactic structure of common nouns in general, the points are these. First, on the one hand, it is reflectively interesting and illuminating to examine some “surface” structure of a certain natural language so as to achieve a kind of guidance and “breach” point to further explore the shared deep semantic-syntactic structure of natural languages in general in some relevant connections to significant issues concerning the relation between language, thought and objects; it can lead us to 93  For example, when Searle emphasizes the Background and Network in his theoretic work (cf., Searle 1983, 63–71, 143.), this does show that in the Western tradition this issue has been historically and contemporarily addressed instead of being totally ignored; for another thing, Searle does highlight what has been more or less ignored (at least from his standpoint in view of his own tradition, largely the mainstream analytic tradition in the contemporary Western philosophy).

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penetrate the otherwise-misguided linguistic phenomena and then capture the shared deep structure of natural languages in these connections. Second, even though the “collective-name” hypothesis concerning semantic-syntactic structure of common nouns in general would not hold (to the extent that there would be no shared deep syntactic structure in common nouns of all natural languages), the “collective-name” hypothesis concerning the semantic-syntactic structure of Chinese common nouns, if it holds on its own, still can provide some illuminating guidance concerning some shared semantic orientation of the people’s folk way of thinking in various linguistic communities concerning the relation between language, thought and objects. Third, on the other hand, in my view, the suggested argument for the “collective-name” hypothesis concerning semantic-syntactic structure of common nouns in general, if it holds, can provide a further significant support to the “collective-name” hypothesis for concerning the semantic-syntactic structure of Chinese common nouns.



Appendix 2 An Expanded Predicate Logic Account with Enhanced Identity Sign and Collective-Generic Operator

For the sake of formally and more accurately presenting Gongsun Long’s conception of relative identity and of incorporating the collective-name hypothesis into the semantic-syntactic structure of our predicate logic resources, I propose the syntax and semantics of an expanded and strengthened account of “relative-identity-sensitive” and “collection-sensitive” predicate logic (‘RI-C PC’ for short) with an enhanced identity sign (called “identity with attribute-in-focus parameter”), many-sorted variable, and “collection-generic operator” symbol.94 In this expanded predicate logic account, there are the following additions on the basis of the standard predicate logic account, some of which are new or partially new while the others not: (1) adding the “collective-generic operator” symbol, which is partially new;95 (2) adding the sign ‘[ ]＝’ for “aspect-in-focus parameter” identities, which is new;96 (3) adding the sign ι* for complex noun phrases (definite descriptions), 94  This account is a further expansion and revision of the enhanced predicate logic account as formally given in Mou 2016. 95  This “collective-generic” operator can be viewed as a further development from Krifka, M. et al. 1995 in which a “generic” operator is suggested. Also see footnote 100 below. 96  When saying that it is new, I mean that the logical notation to be given below, i.e., “the identity symbol with ‘perspective-attribute-in-focus’ parameter [ ]=“, is new in view of a standard predicate logic account, instead of the basic idea of relative identity or its other logical expressions being new. The basic idea of relative identity is not odd but

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which is a further expansion on the standard ι operator—semantically defined in a modified way; (4) adding the sign λ for complex predicates, which is not new; (5) turning one-sorted logic into many-sorted logic in the way to be defined, which is not new either; (6) this expanded logical system includes both predicate variables and predicate constants (added in our primitive vocabulary) that symbolize attributes; their semantics is partially standard one while being enhanced with modified domain and interpretation, which is partially new.97

(1)

Syntax of RI-C PC

(1.1)

Primitive Vocabulary

individual variables x, y … with or without numerical or letter subscripts individual constants (names) a, b…, with or without numerical or letter subscripts sortal variables s, p…, with or without numerical or letter subscripts for each n > 0, n-place function symbols f, g…, with or without numerical or letter subscripts “definite description” symbol ι*98 for each n > 0, n-place predicate variables X, Y…, with or without numerical or letter subscripts for each n > 0, n-place predicates (predicate constants) A, B…, with or without numerical or letter subscripts

quite pre-theoretically intuitive in view of its close relation to our pre-theoretic understanding of the “double-reference” phenomenon of the basic language employment, which is addressed and explained in Section 1, and can be traced back to Gongsun Long, as explained in Section 3.2, although he did not use the Chinese counterpart of the very phrase ‘relative identity’, and although in the logic literature it is often attributed to Geach 1967 in which Geach criticizes the standard notion of absolute identity in the standard first-order predicate logic and suggests his “modern” version of relative identity. It is noted that, in my article 2016, the relative identity sign is given in the form of ‘=[ ]’, in contrast to ‘[ ]=’ given here for some substantial consideration. 97  The presentations of those added materials that are labeled ‘not new’ are quite standard; their basic presentation lines and fashions can be found in many textbooks or more advanced source books for classical and non-classical predicate logic, such as Gamut 1991, Priest 2008, and Sider 2010, though newly introduced resources into the system unavoidably bear on some aspects of the presentations of those previous materials. 98  See its semantic interpretation (2.2) below, which distinguishes itself from the standard semantic interpretation of the “definite-description” symbol ‘ι’.

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(1.2) Definition of Terms Any individual variable, sortal variable or individual constant is a term If f is an n-place function symbol and α1… αn are terms, then f (α1… αn) is a term If φ is a formula and α is an (individual or sortal) variable, then ι*αφ is a term Only strings that can be shown to be terms by the preceding clauses are terms (1.3)

Definition of Formulas

If Π is an n-place predicate and α1 … αn are terms, then Π α1 … αn is an (atomic) formula If π is an n-place predicate variable and α1 … αn are terms, then π α1 … αn is a formula 99  See its semantic interpretation (2.3) below, which distinguishes itself from those of the “identity” symbol ‘＝’ and of the Geach-style “relative identity” symbol (it places the “relative-identity” parameter beneath equation symbol in the middle, indicating its symmetric character, cf., Wiggins 2001, 24–28). It is noted that Geach (1967) presents another logical notation to express relative identity (basically: x and y are the same F but x and y are different Gs, where F and G are predicates). Generally speaking, I contend that this logical notation in treating relative identity is less natural and expressive (for example, it would be hard to present Gongsun Long’s “white-horse-not-horse” case); the suggested identity notation with the parameter as a primitive, together with its semantic interpretation (2.3) below, treats the traditional identity sign expressing absolute identity as one special case, and it treats as being not symmetric the type of relative identity that is intrinsically related to the category-belonging predication. See my relevant discussion in Section 3.2 of the main text. 100  In Krifka, M. et al. 1995, a generic operator is suggested concerning only the feature (4) of common nouns mentioned in A1.2.2 above or the case below, having yet to take care of the feature (5) of common nouns mentioned above or the case below.

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If α, β and γ are terms, then α [γ]＝β is a formula If φ is a formula, α is a variable and β is a term, then λαφ(β) is a formula If φ is a formula, α is a term, then CGφ(α) is a formula If φ and ψ are wffs, and α is any variable, then ⁓ φ, (φ → ψ), and ∀αφ are formulas Only strings that can be shown to be formulas using , , , , and are formulas

(1.4)

Definition of Derivative Logical Symbols

Definition of ∧: “φ∧ψ” is short for “⁓(φ → ⁓ψ)” Definition of ∨: “φ∨ψ” is short for “⁓φ →ψ” Definition of ↔: “φ↔ψ” is short for “(φ→ψ)” ∧”(ψ → φ)” Definition of ∃: “∃αφ” is short for “⁓∀α⁓φ” Definition of ≠: “α [γ] ≠ β” is short for “⁓(α [γ]＝β)”

(1.5) Definition of Free and Bound Variables An occurrence of a variable x in a formula φ is bound in φ if and only if that occurrence is in the context of the form ∃αφ or ∀αφ within φ. If it is not bound, it is free. A formula with no free variables is a closed formula or sentence; otherwise it is an open formula. (2)

Semantics of RI-C PC

Definition of value-assigning interpretation, model, for PS-PC: A PS-PC-model is an ordered pair ⟨D, v⟩ such that:

(2.1)

D Is a Non-Empty Set (“The Domain of Quantification”); D Is Divided into Two Types of Primary Subsets as Sorts

individual-object subsets O of individual objects, d1, d2, …, which are divided into various secondary subsets (sorts or sortal collections), O1, O2, … whose “nominal” identities (or whose memberships) are given by the distinct term ι*αφ (where φ is a formula and α is a sortal variable) subset A of all specific grounded parts (specific aspects, particular attributes,…) that are grounded in, and depend on, individual objects (though the defining identities of some of them, such as relational attributes, are grounded in more than one individual objects), which can be further divided into three kinds of subsets whose members can be overlapped:

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universal-attribute subsets, A1, A2, …, which are various subsets of particular attributes whose memberships constitute (or are given respectively by) various universal attributes individual-object-association subsets, Ad1, Ad2, …, which are different subsets of specific grounded parts (specific aspects: such as collection-nominalidentity-determining attributes, collectively-holding attributes, genericallyholding attributes, …) whose memberships are given by their respective associations with different individual objects, d1, d2, …; each of individual objects d1, d2, …, as a whole can be thus labeled d1-Ad1, d2-Ad2, …101 sortal-collection-associated subsets of attributes concerning sortal collections which might be further divided into three types (for a sortal collection of individual object Oi, it includes one, or more than one, of the following three types of sortal-collection-associated subsets of attributes):102 the subset Oi-collection-identity-attributes of collection-identity-determining attributes, which can be abstractly presented by the related universal attributes (such as the “horseness” attribute), and which are possessed by any individual objects of Oi (for example, the “horseness” attribute or the “white-color” attribute is possessed by any individual object in the white horse as a sortal collection of individual white horses); the subset Oi-collection-generic-attributes of collection-generic attributes, which are not necessarily possessed by each individual member of Oi, (for example, the attribute of having four legs is not necessarily possessed by each of the individual members of the collection of horses but generically (typically or normally) possessed by the members of the collections); the subset Oi-collection-created-attributes of collection-created attributes, which are possessed not by any individual member of Oi, but only by Oi, as a whole (for example, the attribute of winning a team game cannot be possessed by any individual member of a team of the team members but by the team as a whole).103 101  Such identities of individual objects with its associated attributes as a whole capture our pre-theoretic understanding of individual objects as “thick” objects, which constitute the semantic-whole referents of the names of such thick objects if they do have names. 102  Two notes are due. First, it is not necessary for any sortal collection to include all these types of sortal-collection-associated subsets. Second, these three subsets are not exhaustive (because some “accidental” attributes possessed by some of these objects in Oi do not fall into any of these three subsets), though they are exclusive. 103  Indeed, a purely-mathematically-oriented logician would render this characterization of the domain of quantification too much metaphysically-loaded. It is noted that the primary purpose of presenting this enhanced and expanded predicate logic account is to capture the Gongsun-Long-style relative identity and the collective-name hypothesis

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v Is an (Interpretation) Function such that

v for Terms if α is a (non-predicate) constant, then v (α) ∈D: if α is an individual object-identifying constant: v (α) is an individual object in D [which is designated by α] if α is a particular-attribute-identifying constant: v (α) is a particular attribute aij, which is a member of a “grounded” subset (sort) Ai in A (notes: the subset or the membership of the subset is identified by a “nominal” universal attribute Ai that is symbolized by a predicate Pi, the member of the subset is possessed by an individual object in D, which is a member of a subset (sort) of D, whose membership is specified and named by a “nominalized” predicate Pi, i.e., the term ι*xPi) if α is a universal-attribute-identifying constant: v (a) is a universal attribute which (as the membership) gives the identity of a universal-attribute subset Ai in A if α is an individual or sortal variable: if α is an individual variable: v (α) is an individual object in D if α is a sortal variable: v (α) is either an individual object in a subset of O, whose membership is specified and named by a “nominal” universal attribute, i.e., the term ι*αφ,104 or an (universal) attribute among various universal-attribute subsets, A1, A2, …, of A (A as a sort in D), or a particular attribute among various members of a universal-attribute subset, Ai, of A (Ai as a sort in A), or a particular attribute among various members of an individual-object-association subset, Adi, of A (Adi as a sort in A) if α is an ι* term: if φ is a formula and α is an individual variable, then v(ι*αφ) is a unique object in D if φ is a formula and α is a sortal variable, then v(ι*αφ) is a (unique) subset (sort) of D, which is named, and whose membership is specified, by ι*αφ105 regarding the semantic-syntactic structure of common nouns in natural languages in a more accurate and effective way, instead of merely formal consideration. 104  See footnote 105 below. 105  Notice that the semantics for the symbol ‘ι* ’ is different from the standard one for ‘ι’ (signifying the uniqueness of the single one object as the referent of a “definite” description) but an enhanced expansion of the latter so as to have it (in the predicate logic) more adequately capture how “definite” descriptions (descriptive noun phrases with unique referents) are used in our linguistic practice (in natural languages): a definite description as a noun phrase denotes either an unique object or a unique set of objects that meet(s) the description of the noun phrase; formally speaking, as indicated in the clause (2.2), the semantics for ‘ι*’ is presented as follows: if α is an ι* term: the case

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