Philosophies of Appropriated Religions: Perspectives from Southeast Asia 9819951909, 9789819951901

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Soraj Hongladarom Jeremiah Joven Joaquin Frank J. Hoffman   Editors

Philosophies of Appropriated Religions Perspectives from Southeast Asia

Philosophies of Appropriated Religions

Soraj Hongladarom · Jeremiah Joven Joaquin · Frank J. Hoffman Editors

Philosophies of Appropriated Religions Perspectives from Southeast Asia

Editors Soraj Hongladarom Center for Science Technology & Society Faculty of Arts Chulalongkorn University Bangkok, Thailand

Jeremiah Joven Joaquin Department of Philosophy De La Salle University Manila, Philippines

Frank J. Hoffman International Buddhist Studies College Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University Ayutthaya, Thailand

ISBN 978-981-99-5190-1 ISBN 978-981-99-5191-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5191-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore Paper in this product is recyclable.

Foreword

The global philosophy of religion is an emerging field that advocates for a more productive and constructive approach to the philosophy of religion by broadening its focus to incorporate a wide range of religious perspectives. Traditionally, Western philosophy of religion has concentrated almost exclusively on issues arising from the Judeo-Christian tradition. However, considering that religious phenomena can be found worldwide and that all traditions raise profound philosophical questions, it is surprising that the discipline has focused on a specific tradition for so long. Consequently, there is a need to diversify the philosophy of religion by incorporating and intellectually engaging with other traditions. The global philosophy of religion does not merely advocate for interreligious or interfaith dialogues. It calls for locating theoretical resources in the field beyond those found in the West to gain progress on traditional problems, such as the nature of the divine, the immortality of the soul, and the problem of pain and suffering. These issues naturally arise in the context of debates among philosophers and theologians within the Judeo-Christian intellectual tradition, yet have also been explored and debated in other religious traditions, including Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, and numerous indigenous beliefs. Therefore, philosophical explorations of these problems would benefit from looking across cultural boundaries to examine how others have grappled with similar issues. After all, problems such as the nature of the divine and the soul’s immortality are rooted in the pursuit of truth, which is not confined to a specific culture or belief system. The Global Philosophy of Religion Project was launched in 2019, generously supported by the John Templeton Foundation. One of the project’s activities involves funding worldwide research projects that aim to engage in the global dimension of the philosophy of religion. I am delighted that one such project, Philosophies of Appropriated Religions in Southeast Asia, led by Professor Jeremiah Joven Joaquin at De La Salle University in the Philippines and Professor Soraj Hongladarom at Chulalongkorn University in Thailand, received funding and has produced a truly groundbreaking collection of papers, which you now hold in your hands. Southeast Asia presents a fascinating landscape for global philosophers of religion, as this highly diverse region encompasses practitioners of all the world’s v

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major religions. Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia are predominantly Theravada Buddhists, while Vietnam has a strong tradition of Mahayana Buddhism. In Malaysia, most Malays practice Islam, and the Chinese population primarily adheres to Mahayana Buddhism. The Philippines is predominantly Roman Catholic, with a significant Muslim minority in the South. Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim country, and Singapore is a small nation with a mixture of all these religions. Beyond the geographical proximity of these major religions, the religious practices in this region are characterized by “appropriation.” Apart from indigenous beliefs, these religions did not originate in the region; instead, they were imported and subsequently adapted by locals to suit their cultural backgrounds and needs. Southeast Asia offers numerous dimensions for philosophers of religion to explore. One layer is the proximity of various religions, which prompts discussions on religious pluralism—a topic widely debated in the philosophy of religion. Another aspect concerns how these appropriated religions contribute to local distinctiveness and beliefs, leading to even greater diversity when considering the primary issues in the philosophy of religion. The chapters in this book effectively showcase this diversity. I would like to extend my congratulations to the editors of this collection. Professors Joaquin and Hongladarom, the project leaders, and Professor Frank J. Hoffman contributed significantly to editing this book’s chapters. I sincerely hope this book will establish a firm foundation for the philosophy of religion in the global age. Birmingham, UK

Yujin Nagasawa

Yujin Nagasawa is H. G. Wood Professor of the Philosophy of Religion and Co-Director of the Birmingham Centre for the Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham. He specializes in the philosophy of religion, the philosophy of mind, and applied philosophy. He is the author of Maximal God: A New Defence of Perfect Being Theism (Oxford University Press, 2017), Miracles: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2017), The Existence of God: A Philosophical Introduction (Routledge, 2011) and God and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Novel Approach to Knowledge Arguments (Cambridge University Press, 2008). He is Editor of Religious Studies and former president of the British Society for the Philosophy of Religion. He currently leads the Global Philosophy of Religion Project, a £2.15 million research initiative funded by the John Templeton Foundation and the Dynamic Investment Fund (DIF) at the University of Birmingham.

Preface

This collection is another product of the partnership between the Philosophical Association of the Philippines (PAP) and the Philosophy and Religion Society of Thailand (PARST). Our partnership began at the 2018 World Congress of Philosophy in Beijing. It led to our first Joint Meeting in 2019, which, in turn, resulted in our first book collection, Love and Friendship Across Cultures: Perspectives from East and West (published by Springer in 2021). After publishing our first joint work, we started working on a new project, “The Philosophies of Appropriated Religions in Southeast Asia.” Our primary motivation was to further promote the works of philosophers in the region to the wider global philosophical community. While doing this new project, we came across a call for proposals for a Global Philosophy of Religion Grant, which aims to advance the philosophy of religion by engaging the best scholars from all geographical regions and religious traditions. As our project coincides with the aims of the Global Philosophy of Religion Project, we submitted a proposal, and luckily, it was accepted. So here we are now, presenting the product of our latest collaboration. The essays in this collection have undergone several workshops and writeshops since July 2021. These workshops were held in Bangkok, Manila, and Birmingham (UK). They were grueling but fulfilling sessions. We thank our authors for their patience and professionalism. We also thank our team, Hazel T. Biana, Fernando A. Santiago, Jr., and Anne Claire Simpao, for their dedication and support. They have been instrumental in the whole process, from the project’s conceptualization to its eventual completion. We also thank the Springer team, especially Alexandra Campbell and Hani Wang. Without their help, this collection will not be possible. We thank the administrators of our respective home universities for their usual assistance and support. We thank De La Salle University, especially its President, Brother Bernard Oca, FSC, the Provost, Robert C. Roleda, the Dean of the College of Liberal Arts, Rhoderick Nuncio, the Department of Philosophy, and the Southeast Asia Research Center and Hub. We also thank Chulalongkorn University, especially its President, Bandhit Euaarport, the Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Suradech Chotiudomphant, and the Chairperson of the Department of Philosophy, Sarinya Arunkhajornsak. vii

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Finally, we would like to show our extreme gratitude to Yujin Nagasawa, the Global Philosophy of Religion Project leader and Co-director of the University of Birmingham Centre for Philosophy of Religion, his team, particularly Rabab Anjum and Abbas Ahsan, and the John Templeton Foundation, for believing in our project. We deeply appreciate all that you have done for us. We dedicate this collection to all Southeast Asian philosophers. We hope that it inspires you to showcase your works on the global stage. Bangkok, Thailand Manila, Philippines Ayutthaya, Thailand

Soraj Hongladarom Jeremiah Joven Joaquin Frank J. Hoffman

Contents

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Global Philosophy of Religion and the Perspectives from Southeast Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Soraj Hongladarom, Jeremiah Joven Joaquin, and Frank J. Hoffman

Part I

Traditional Problems of the Philosophy of Religion

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Spinoza and Buddhism on Death and Immortality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Soraj Hongladarom

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See You in 100+ Years or So: Immortality and the Afterlife in K-Dramas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hazel T. Biana

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The Theist’s Legal Paradox: The Problem of Evil, Classical Natural Law Jurisprudence, and the Legal Validity of Immoral Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Enrique Benjamin R. Fernando III

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Morteza Motahhari on the Problem of Evil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Miqdad Wongsena-aree

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Dialetheism and the Problem of Evil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ben Blumson

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Bahala Na: Fatalism or an Open Future? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jeremiah Joven Joaquin

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Taking a Point of View on a Debatable Question Concerning Karma and Rebirth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Frank J. Hoffman

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Part II 9

Religious Identity

Epistemic Violence and the Religious Beliefs of Sixteenth-Century Tagalogs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 Fernando A. Santiago

10 A Linguistic Approach to the Tagalog Bathala and the Javanese Gusti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 Ramon Eguia Nadres 11 The Phenomenology of Inayan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Charlie M. Dagwasi and Virgilio A. Bas-ilan II 12 Catholicism in the Philippines Between Sákop and Kagandáhang-loób: A Critical Phenomenology of Religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 Anton Heinrich Rennesland 13 Nakem and Echoes of the Sacred: An Onto-Religious Musing . . . . . . 167 Danilo S. Alterado 14 On the Multispecies Spectrum of Spiritual Ethos in Pre-colonial and Colonial Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181 Virgilio A. Rivas 15 Hesus Kanakangbungat Nipakapara: Aetas’ Soteriological Experience from Pinatubo Eruption to Present . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 Miguel F. Baluyut Part III Religious Beliefs and Practices 16 A Gadamerian Exploration of Play and Festive in Pasko . . . . . . . . . . 213 Fleurdeliz A. Albela 17 Revisiting Indigenous Islamic Practices for Community Healing and Peacebuilding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227 Sheryl R. Morales and Roque S. Morales 18 Buddhism, Chinese Funeral Rites, and the Therav¯ada Tradition in Malaysia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247 Lim Mun Chin 19 An Appropriated Understanding of Therav¯ada Buddhist Notions of Moral Shame and Moral Dread in Thai Society . . . . . . . . 259 Theptawee Chokvasin 20 Conflicts Between General Causation and the Therav¯ada Concept of Kamma in Moral Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273 Klairung Iso

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21 Negotiating the Body in the Slums and the Devotion to the Black Nazarene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293 Mark Joseph Calano 22 Virtual Catholicism in the Philippines: An Analysis of Technology, Religion, and Kalooban in Time of Isolation . . . . . . . . 303 Mark Inigo M. Tallara Part IV Religious Diversity 23 Religious Belief and Device Paradigm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325 Jerd Bandasak 24 A Critical Look at Religious Diversity and Responding to Its Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337 Jove Jim S. Aguas 25 Epistemic Tolerance and Religious Diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353 Natika Krongyoot 26 A Feminist Reimagining of Mary’s Role in Philippine Colonial Catholicism’s Economy of Salvation Through the Works of Jose Rizal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365 Rosallia Domingo 27 Listening to a Different Voice: Gendering Dharma Through Sita of the Ramayana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377 Joseph Martin M. Jose Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391

Editors and Contributors

About the Editors Soraj Hongladarom is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy and Founding Director of the Center for Science, Technology, and Society, Faculty of Arts, Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, Thailand. He is the President of the Philosophy and Religion Society of Thailand. He has wide-ranging interests in the philosophy of technology and applied ethics, among others. Jeremiah Joven Joaquin is Professor of Philosophy at the College of Liberal Arts and Research Fellow of the Southeast Asia Research Center and Hub (SEARCH), De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines. He is also Associate Member of the University of Birmingham Centre for Philosophy of Religion. He is the present President of the Philosophical Association of the Philippines. He specializes in the philosophy of religion, moral philosophy, philosophical logic, and metaphysics. Frank J. Hoffman specializes in philosophy of religion and Asian Philosophy. He is Professor of Philosophy at the International Buddhist Studies College, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya, Bangkok, Thailand, and Affiliated Faculty of the South Asia Center at the University of Pennsylvania. He was former Professor at West Chester University near Philadelphia and Chair of the Greater Philadelphia Philosophy Consortium. His four books are Rationality and Mind in Early Buddhism, Introduction to Early Buddhism, Breaking Barriers (with Godabarisha Mishra), and Pali Buddhism (with Mahinda Deegalle). Professor Hoffman is currently Associate Editor of Asian Philosophy.

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Contributors Jove Jim S. Aguas University of Santo Tomas, Manila, Philippines Fleurdeliz A. Albela University of Santo Tomas, Manila, Philippines Danilo S. Alterado School of Advanced Studies (SAS), Saint Louis University (SLU), Baguio City, Philippines Miguel F. Baluyut St. Rose Catholic School, Inc., Tarlac, Philippines Jerd Bandasak Center for Science, Technology, and Society, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand Virgilio A. Bas-ilan II University of Baguio, Baguio City, Philippines Hazel T. Biana De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines Ben Blumson Department of Philosophy, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore Mark Joseph Calano Panpacific University, Urdaneta City, Philippines Lim Mun Chin Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Ayutthaya, Thailand Theptawee Chokvasin Kasetsart University, Bangkok, Thailand Charlie M. Dagwasi Benguet State University, Benguet, Philippines Rosallia Domingo De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines Enrique Benjamin R. Fernando III Department of Philosophy, University of the Philippines (Diliman), Quezon City, Philippines Frank J. Hoffman International Buddhist Studies College, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Ayutthaya, Thailand Soraj Hongladarom Center for Science, Technology, and Society, Faculty of Arts, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand Klairung Iso Department of Philosophy, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand Jeremiah Joven Joaquin Southeast Asia Research Center and Hub (SEARCH), De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines Joseph Martin M. Jose De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines Natika Krongyoot Mahidol University, Bangkok, Thailand Roque S. Morales Institute for Comparative and Advanced Studies in the Philippines, Manila, Philippines Sheryl R. Morales Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Manila, Philippines

Editors and Contributors

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Ramon Eguia Nadres Widya Mandala Catholic University, Surabaya, Indonesia Anton Heinrich Rennesland University of Santo Tomas, Manila, Philippines Virgilio A. Rivas Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Manila, Philippines Fernando A. Santiago De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines Mark Inigo M. Tallara De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines Miqdad Wongsena-aree Bangkok, Thailand

Chapter 1

Global Philosophy of Religion and the Perspectives from Southeast Asia Soraj Hongladarom , Jeremiah Joven Joaquin , and Frank J. Hoffman

Abstract Global Philosophy of Religion is a constructive approach to the philosophy of religion. It aims to incorporate various religious perspectives to diversify the field’s theoretical and practical resources. Proponents of this approach hope that these diverse resources may aid in the progress of the traditional problems of the field. In this introductory chapter, we discuss how the perspectives from Southeast Asia, particularly those from what we call “appropriated religions,” may help in this endeavor. Keywords Appropriated religions · Global philosophy of religion · Philosophical progress · Southeast Asia

1 Introduction Native English-speaking Christian philosophers have dominated discussions in the (analytic) philosophy of religion. Though the traditional topics under discussion have been varied, e.g., the nature of the divine, the problem of evil, and the immortality of the soul, they are mainly addressed from the vantage point of Christian theism. Moreover, while some scholars have discussed the philosophy of Buddhism,

S. Hongladarom (B) Center for Science, Technology, and Society, Faculty of Arts, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand e-mail: [email protected] J. J. Joaquin Southeast Asia Research Center and Hub (SEARCH), De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] F. J. Hoffman International Buddhist Studies College, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Ayutthaya, Thailand e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Hongladarom et al. (eds.), Philosophies of Appropriated Religions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5191-8_1

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Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, and Shintoism, they have little or no interaction with mainstream discussions in the field. With this narrow scope and limited interaction among scholars from other religious traditions, the field has suffered from parochialism. However, if philosophers of religion want to progress in the traditional problems of the field, they must take religion seriously. They must expand the field’s scope and incorporate philosophical views from many religious perspectives. This is the challenge of the Global Philosophy of Religion (Nagasawa, 2017, pp. 33–34). In this introductory chapter, we discuss what this challenge implies and how the perspectives from Southeast Asia, particularly those from what we call “appropriated religions,” may help in this endeavor.

2 The Challenge of Global Philosophy of Religion Global Philosophy of Religion is the normative view that a more productive and constructive approach to the philosophy of religion is to expand its focus and incorporate a wide range of perspectives. To “globalize the philosophy of religion” is to diversify its theoretical and practical resources to gain progress with some of its traditional problems—problems like the nature of the divine, the immortality of the soul and life after death, and the problem of evil and suffering (Nagasawa, 2017, p. 45). For instance, Confucian philosophers may formulate the problem of evil differently from Christian philosophers (Harrison, 2020, p. 28). Their difference may aid in appreciating the nuances of the problem. Moreover, though Islamic and Buddhist philosophers have different starting points, one a theist, the other a nontheist, they have similar ideas about negative “theology.” Their similarity may aid in understanding the nature of the divine. Thus, expanding the resources of the field may lead to philosophical progress. The global approach to the philosophy of religion is more than a call for interreligious dialogue or comparative philosophy of religion. Interreligious dialogue promotes mutual understanding of religious beliefs and practices across religious traditions, and comparative philosophy of religion is an evaluative approach to the field. These two aims are good, but Global Philosophy of Religion goes beyond them. While the globalized approach promotes understanding and evaluating religious beliefs from different traditions, it does so to answer particular philosophical questions in the field.

3 The Appropriated Religions in Southeast Asia This collection is the response of Southeast Asian philosophers of religion to the challenge of Global Philosophy of Religion. Southeast Asia is home to most of the world religions. Thailand, Vietnam, Myanmar, Singapore, Laos, and Cambodia

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are predominantly Buddhist. Islam is prevalent in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei are Islam, while Christianity is the Philippines and Timor-Leste’s primary religion. However, these world religions are “appropriated.” They are imported cultural products reimagined and assimilated by the culture that embraced them. Our aim in this collection is to investigate the philosophical impact of Southeast Asia’s appropriated religions. Our overarching question is whether there is a uniquely Southeast Asian way of framing and addressing traditional problems in the philosophy of religion. The essays of this collection suggest that there is. When a particular world religion is appropriated by the cultural milieu that receives it, these traditional philosophical problems are framed and answered nuancedly because of the indigenous sources of the appropriated religion. For example, Thai Buddhism offers a more mundane understanding of dhamma (dharma), which, in turn, implies a unique Thai view of life after death. Moreover, the Filipino concept of Bathala provides unique ways of understanding the nature of divine attributes. Finally, the Indonesian appropriation of Islamic philosophy, Kebatinan borrows elements from folk animism and HinduBuddhism, which implies mystical pantheism. As evident in this collection, reflecting on the Southeast Asian appropriated religions implies different perspectives in addressing the traditional problems in the philosophy of religion. Moreover, it also implies philosophical insights about the nature of religious identity, beliefs, practices, and diversity.

4 Overview of the Chapters We divide the collection into four parts. Part I consists of attempts by Southeast Asian philosophers to address the traditional problems of the philosophy of religion in a uniquely Southeast Asian way. In Chap. 2, Soraj Hongladarom compares and contrasts Spinoza’s thoughts on death and immortality with that of Buddhist philosophy. According to Spinoza, the death of a human being is a process whereby the body, as a mode of Substance, is modified according to natural law. However, something of it remains, which is eternal. Hongladarom concludes that the part that survives, both in Spinoza and Buddhist philosophy, is not personal but is Mind in general, in the same way as bodies are essentially Extension in general. In Chap. 3, the Philippine-based cultural critic Hazel T. Biana looks at popular Kdramas (i.e., TV dramas from South Korea) focusing on immortality. These K-dramas are also popular in Southeast Asia. She analyzes this theme through the lens of religious traditions that prevail in South Korea, namely Christianity, Buddhism, and folk religions. Biana argues that this approach sheds light on the religious underpinnings of the ultra-modern character of these K-dramas. In Chap. 4, Enrique Benjamin Fernando, III discusses what is known as the “Theist’s Legal Paradox,” the problem of reconciling God’s natural law with human law. Evidenced by the Filipino Catholic experience, he argues that the traditional

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solutions to the paradox all fail, and we must embrace some form of legal positivism to address the problem. In Chap. 5, the Thai scholar Miqdad Wongsena-aree investigates the view of Iranian philosopher Morteza Motahhari on the traditional problem of evil. He argues that for Motahhari, evil is a lack of goodness, and its value is always relative. Thus, its role in the world must be looked at holistically. Wongsena-aree discusses the surprising role of evil in developing the human soul. The Singapore-based philosopher Ben Blumson looks into the dialetheic approach to the problem of evil in Chap. 6. According to this approach, since God may create a world with a higher infinite amount of goodness, God can and cannot make the best of all possible worlds; thus, evil does and does not exist. However, Blumson argues that this approach may address the usual paradoxes of infinity but is worse off when it comes to the problem of evil. In Chap. 7, Jeremiah Joven Joaquin explores the traditional problem of the compatibility of divine omniscience and human free will through the lens of the Filipino concept bahala na. He argues that this concept implies two ways of framing and answering the problem. On the one hand, the fatalistic conception implies a passive, deferential attitude to God’s omniscience. On the other hand, the open-minded conception implies an active, playful attitude of human agency. He shows that each of these conceptions entails interesting ways of addressing the problem of divine omniscience. Part I closes with the contribution of Frank J. Hoffman, the Thailand-based Buddhist expert. In Chap. 8, Hoffman argues that there is a way to mediate between two competing views about karma and rebirth. The traditionalist view is that supernatural agencies are required in the Buddhist system of concepts and that secularism and the naturalized karma view will not supply concepts necessary for traditional Buddhism. The modernist view holds otherwise. The mediating view advocates a doctrinal interpretation of Buddhist teachings, a socially engaged practice inspired by mett¯a, and the theory and practice of satipat..th¯ana (mindfulness of breathing). Part II includes chapters about religious identity, particularly the identity of indigenous religions of native Filipinos and Indonesians. In Chap. 9, Fernando Santiago, Jr. looks at the religious dimension of Tagalog life before colonization. The Tagalogs are native Filipinos who live in the greater Manila area. He highlights the violence done by the colonizers on Tagalog epistemic system, resulting in the only evidence available to reconstruct Tagalog life before colonization coming from the colonizers themselves. In Chap. 10, Ramon Eguia Nandres explores the distinction between transcendent religions, grounded on revelation claimed to be received directly from God, and immanent religions, grounded on universal intellectual intuition of the existence of the One True God or an all-encompassing Divinity. Using a linguistic approach, he argues that the Tagalog Bathala and the Javanese Gusti faiths are examples of immanent religions, and the existence of the intuition of the One God in indigenous religions can be attributed to what we may call the Unfinished Story Model of the epistemological status of science, philosophy, and religion. In Chap. 11, Charlie M. Dagwasi and Virgilio A. Bas-ilan II discuss the

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phenomenology of the Kankanaeyan concept of Inayan. The Kankanaey (also known as the Ipugaw) is an indigenous people in the Cordillera region in the northern part of the Philippines. Dagwasi and Bas-ilan argue that Inayan implies cosmology, metaphysics, ethics, and moral philosophy, essential aspects of the Kankanaeyan lived world. In Chap. 12, Anton Heinrich Rennesland presents a critical phenomenological approach to Filipino Christianity (particularly Roman Catholicism) using the Filipino experiences of sákop (reduction) and kagándahang-loób (hospitability). He argues that these two experiences imply a paradox about Filipino Christian identity and that there are quasi-transcendental structures of the Filipino Christian experience located between the extremes of sákop and kagandáhang-loób. Danilo S. Alterado explores the philosophy of religion of the Ilokano people in Chap. 13. Ilokanos are indigenous people in the northernmost part of the Philippines. Alterado shows the centrality of the indigenous term Nakem as a hermeneutical key to the Ilokano worldview. Although the focus is on the Christian religion, Alterado is mindful of the other indigenous expressions of believing in a transcendent God. The main point is that the binding force that keeps the phrase “thy will be done” (matungpal koma ti nakemmo) is a fitting description of faith in Ilokano contemporary life. In Chap. 14, Virgilio Rivas touches on the pre-colonial and colonial Philippines, focusing on a multispecies narrative. He argues that the multispecies spectrum that informs historical and geographical transformations of the Philippines archipelago offers a way toward decolonization from the globalization logic of the West. Part II closes with Miguel F. Baluyut, Jr.’s discussion of Aeta’s soteriology. The Aetas are indigenous people in Central Luzon, the Philippines. In Chap. 15, Baluyut’s phenomenological study aims to capture the experiences of Aetas since the cataclysmic eruption of Mt. Pinatubo. Six tribal elders were interviewed and described their experience of suffering and relief. They felt the goodness of God manifested, uplifting their dignity, seeing the hand of God in all, and that no one is forsaken. They also saw the salvation of God through Jesus and had an experience of Christian resurrection. Part III includes essays that focus on the philosophical nuances of religious beliefs and practices in Southeast Asia. In Chap. 16, Fleur A. Albela utilizes Hans-Georg Gadamer’s concepts of Play and Festive to analyze Filipino Christmas (Pasko) celebrations. Using these Gadamerian concepts, she examines select rituals and traditions in widely diverse regional and ethnic groups in the Philippines. For example, Play and Festive practices are sorted according to performativity, the musical re-enactments of the journey of Joseph and Mary to the stable (panunuluyan, panarit, Pastores, Villancicos), gift-giving (Monito-Monita, pamamasko), novena masses (Simbang Gabi or Misa de Gallo) and the Christmas Midnight Dinner (Noche Buena). With such intense “playing,” one finds an overlap of Filipino life’s religious, aesthetic, economic, and social layers, thereby stirring a dialogue that prompts historical reflection on deeper values as a community. In Chap. 17, Sheryl R. Morales & Roque S. Morales focus on Islamic practices in the Philippines. External ideas, values, and indigenous religious practices influence

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Islamic practices in the Philippines. One poignant practice is respecting community elders and leaders. They argue that de facto community leaders with institutional knowledge, wisdom, and understanding of Islam are critical for community building. In this way, these leaders have a crucial role in peacebuilding, conflict resolution, and community healing. Lim Mun Chin explores Chinese Malaysian Buddhist funeral rites in Chap. 18. In the Chinese Malaysian Buddhist community, when a person dies, funeral rites are performed to ensure the well-being of the deceased, and some of these funeral rites are not common to Buddhist practices in part due to the intermingling of philosophies of Daoism (Dàojiào), Confucianism (Rúji¯a), and Chinese traditional beliefs (zh¯onghuájiào). The principles that underlie míxìn (superstition) rituals are not based upon the four noble truths and the eightfold path of textual Buddhism. In the end, a proper Buddhist funeral is about respect and gratitude for the deceased. In Chap. 19, Theptawee Chokvasin asks how the appropriated, modern understanding of moral shame and dread compares with the original Buddhist understanding. He argues that they differ in their philosophical assumptions. Therav¯ada philosophy espouses causalism; the appropriated understanding implies possibilism. Both face the problem of explaining scrupulosity or the irrational fear that shame and dread imply. Chokvasin offers a new conception of meditative intentionality’s power to solve. In Chap. 20, Klairung Iso analyzes the concept of general causation and the concept of kamma, and argues that the concept of kamma does not fit with moral education for three reasons. First, general causation explains causal relations using substances and the idea of temporal connections as a basis. Second, although reward and punishment in moral learning also work with the concept of general causation, a temporal gap between kamma and vip¯aka (action and result) makes the relations unknowable. Third, Therav¯ada Buddhist metaphysics of pat.iccasamupp¯ada (dependent co-arising) holds that all existents flow in co-arising condition. Since reality is not seen as persons and substances, it makes the fruit of kamma seems arbitrary and unknowable. In Chap. 21, Mark Joseph Calano explores an often neglected aspect, especially in the context of the global philosophy of religion, namely the congested communities in Manila and their devotion to the Black Nazarene. He argues that there is a complex relationship between the body and the locality of the communities, as well as how religious devotion helps locals negotiate the grey areas between law and lawlessness. Part III closes with another essay on the Black Nazarene. In Chap. 22, Mark Iñigo A. Tallara explores “virtual Catholicism” in the Philippines, where the Covid19 pandemic resulted in many Roman Catholic Churches being forced to conduct some of their services online. He focuses on the devotion to the Black Nazarene and investigates how space, knowledge, power, and the self are intertwined in the complex relations between technology and this religious practice. The essays in Part IV explore philosophical issues in religious diversity. In Chap. 23, Jerd Bandasak argues that diversity of religious life is viable amidst technological advancements. He employs the resources of the philosophy of technology to analyze the situation of religious life and technology, especially the notion of the

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“device paradigm” proposed by Albert Borgmann. The idea is to show that religion and technology do not need to be incompatible. In Chap. 24, Jove Jim Aguas discusses the diversity of religions in Asia. He evaluates three views that may explain such diversity: Alvin Plantinga’s exclusivism, Karl Rahner’s inclusivism, and John Hick’s pluralism. He finds that these views have some problems and offers ways to respond to the challenge of religious diversity. In Chap. 25, Natika Krongyoot discusses the problem of religious tolerance. Using the resources of social epistemology, she argues that conciliationism or tentativism, which she developed from Alvin Goldman and Richard Feldman, can be used as a foundation for a kind of epistemic and religious tolerance that makes genuine religious diversity possible. The collection closes with two essays on the role of gender and “feminisms” in religious discourses. In Chap. 26, Rosallia Domingo explores the writings of the Philippine National Hero Jose Rizal as a source of insight into the predominant role of Mary as the Mother of God in Christian devotion and salvation during the Spanish Colonial period in the Philippines. She shows that the construction of Filipina identity in Philippine Colonial Catholicism leads to a view of Mary as a feminine authority and a symbol of religious oppression. She suggests reimagining Mary’s spiritual authority that empowers Filipino women. Finally, in Chap. 27, Joseph Martin Jose negotiates the multifaced meanings of dharma by looking at one of the great Indian epics, the Ramayana. He suggests reading the character of Sita as having a different moral voice and a unique way of approaching her morality. This reading implies a gendered view of dharma.

5 Concluding Remarks The impact of the appropriated religions in Southeast Asia on the philosophy of religion is evident in this collection. We hope the essays contained herein will raise the interest of the global philosophy community in the underrepresented area of Southeast Asian Philosophy of Religion.

References Harrison, V. (2020). Global philosophy of religion(s). Religious Studies, 56(1), 20–31. Nagasawa, Y. (2017). Global philosophy of religion and its challenges. In P. Draper & J. L. Schellenberg (Eds.), Renewing philosophy of religion: Beyond the faith-based model (pp. 33–47). Oxford University Press.

Soraj Hongladarom is a Professor Emeritus of Philosophy and Founding Director of the Center for Science, Technology, and Society, Faculty of Arts, Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok,

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Thailand. He is the president of the Philosophy and Religion Society of Thailand. He has wideranging interests in the philosophy of technology and applied ethics, among others. Jeremiah Joven Joaquin is a Professor of Philosophy at the College of Liberal Arts and a Research Fellow of the Southeast Asia Research Center and Hub (SEARCH), De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines. He is also an Associate Member of the University of Birmingham Centre for Philosophy of Religion. He is the present President of the Philosophical Association of the Philippines. He specializes in the philosophy of religion, moral philosophy, philosophical logic, and metaphysics. Frank J. Hoffman specializes in philosophy of religion and Asian Philosophy. He is a Professor of Philosophy at the International Buddhist Studies College, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya, Bangkok, Thailand, and an Affiliated Faculty of the South Asia Center at the University of Pennsylvania. He was a former Professor at West Chester University near Philadelphia and Chair of the Greater Philadelphia Philosophy Consortium. His four books are Rationality and Mind in Early Buddhism, Introduction to Early Buddhism, Breaking Barriers (with Godabarisha Mishra), and Pali Buddhism (with Mahinda Deegalle). Professor Hoffman is currently an Associate Editor of Asian Philosophy.

Part I

Traditional Problems of the Philosophy of Religion

Chapter 2

Spinoza and Buddhism on Death and Immortality Soraj Hongladarom

Abstract There is no evidence that Spinoza knew anything about Buddhism, but his philosophy bears certain similarities with Buddhist philosophy, or at least as shall be argued later. This paper compares and contrasts Spinoza’s thoughts on death and immortality with Buddhist philosophy. According to Spinoza, the death of a human being is a process whereby the body, as a mode of Substance, is modified according to natural law. However, Spinoza’s view on the mind or the soul is interesting. In Book V of the Ethics, he says, “The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something of it remains which is eternal” (VP23). This proposition has generated a considerable number of commentaries. This paper notes some similarities and differences between Spinoza’s thoughts and the corresponding view in Buddhist philosophy. Spinoza’s idea bears an interesting similarity with Buddhist philosophy. The mind that survives, both in Spinoza and in Buddhist philosophy, is not personal but is mind in general, in the same way as bodies are essentially extension in general. Keywords Buddhism · Spinoza · Death · Immortality

1 Introduction Philosophy of religion as a subdiscipline within philosophy is usually concerned with problems arising from the theistic tradition in the West. Among the issues investigated by philosophers of religion are the existence of God, the problem of evil, the problem of suffering, death, and immortality, among others. Recently there have been attempts to broaden the scope of the philosophy of religion by including perspectives from other religious traditions beyond Europe. This is a welcoming addition since it provides the discussion within the philosophy of religion with fresh perspectives. This could help philosophers find new answers and angles to look at these problems. S. Hongladarom (B) Center for Science, Technology, and Society, Faculty of Arts, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Hongladarom et al. (eds.), Philosophies of Appropriated Religions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5191-8_2

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Among the most perennial problems in the field are death and immortality. Philosophers in all traditions have long been engaged with this problem. What, strictly speaking, is death? What is immortality? How should one account for these phenomena? Does immortality exist? Do we survive in some form after we die? These are the problems that human beings have been interested in for as long as there has been humanity. This paper investigates the views of death and immortality in two wildly divergent philosophical views, namely that of Spinoza and Buddhist philosophy. Even though the two traditions are distinct of each other both in time— Spinoza lived in the seventeenth century CE and the Buddha probably in the sixth century BCE and in space—Spinoza lived in the Netherlands and the Buddha in India—we will find that there are many striking similarities in the two. The critical point in the agreement between the two traditions is that both view death as not a complete end but a continuation. Both view immortality as a continuation not of the person but of something larger. However, there are also significant differences. This paper shall lay out these similarities and differences. What is interesting about both views is that they have views that contrast with the materialist view that is commonly accepted. Instead of viewing death as the end of consciousness, both regard consciousness as enduring in some form after the individual person’s death. Nonetheless, this does not mean that both Buddhism and Spinoza share the belief, common in many religions, in personal continuity after death. So, the continuity is not personal, and the interest lies in accounts in both views as to what this impersonal continuity consists of.

2 Spinoza on Death and Immortality The concept of the person in Spinoza is constituted by his views on the human body and mind. Both are modes of Attributes, where the human body is the mode of extension, and the human mind is the mode of Thought. Both are parts of God, which in Spinoza is the only Substance that exists through itself. In other words, Substance is the only thing that exists in itself, in that its existence is only conceived through itself. All other things are in God or Substance because they are conceived only through another. There is absolutely speaking only one thing: God or Substance. God has an infinite number of Attributes that express its properties in an infinite variety of ways. Thus, God, or Substance, is the only thing there is, and it contains everything imaginable, both existing and non-existing. Spinoza says in Book I, Proposition 14 as follows: “Except God, no substance can be or be conceived (IP14).”1 This means that God is the only substance there is. Spinoza’s reason for supporting this Proposition, his demonstration, is that since God is an absolutely infinite being with all infinite Attributes, if there were to be another substance, that substance would have to be conceived through some Attributes of God, which would mean that there were 1

All references to the text of the Ethics come from the Curley edition (Curley, 1985).

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two substances of the same Attribute, which Spinoza earlier claims to be impossible. In other words, God is one and the same as the only substance there is because God is absolutely infinite. One of the Attributes of God is Extension. Thus, if there were more than one substance, this Attribute would also belong to that other substance. This implies that none of the two substances is infinite, or, in other words, in itself because the two substances would then limit each other and that each one would have to be conceived through the other, which is contrary to the definition of Substance that Spinoza has given in Definition 3, which says, “By substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, i.e., that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed” (ID4). Since, by Definition 5, an attribute is what the intellect perceives to constitute its essence (ID5), and as it pertains to the essence of Substance that it is infinite, that there are two substances of the same Attribute would indeed be impossible. Furthermore, in the next Proposition, he says: “Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God” (IP15). This means that God, or Substance, is the total of everything, to the extent that there is nothing beyond God. God is only conceived through itself; all other things must be conceived through God. In the Aristotelian tradition, the nature of a thing is understood through conceiving it as lying under something more general. Then a property narrows it down to the thing itself. For example, a human being is understood as a rational animal. The human being is put under a more general category, that of an animal. Then since only humans are rational, the property of being rational is applied to the class of animals so that we get to rational animals. However, God cannot be conceived this way because God is “in itself” while all other things are “in another.” Since God is “in itself,” the only way to comprehend God is through comprehending it in its entirety, and since God contains everything, it contains both Thought and Extension or Mind and Matter. In modern scientific language, this would mean that God is the sum total of all the material things there are in the universe, and if it is the case that there is more than one universe, God would contain all the universes also. As God can only be conceived through itself, this expansion of all the universes can go on to infinity. The idea is that there is absolutely nothing outside of God since if that were the case, it would contradict the proposition that God is conceivable only through itself and is in itself. This means that there is only one God. This is one way of thinking of God through the conception of Extension, or Matter. The other way of conceptualizing God is through the other Attribute, that of the Mind. In this case, God is a thinking thing; we can imagine all the thinking there is and can be an infinite expanse of thinking. This infinite expanse of thinking is absolutely speaking one and the same as the infinite expanse of material extension since there is only one God. In the end, thinking and taking up space are one and the same thing. Thus, one can regard Spinoza’s view here as either absolutely materialistic or absolutely idealistic, though none of these characterizations alone would accurately describe Spinoza’s position. The point is that God can be understood only in these two ways since this is what we limited human beings can do.

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We can see, then, that Spinoza’s God is vastly different from the God of the monotheistic religions. The God of the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic religions is personal. He has emotions, and He has designs, and His emotions and designs are strictly His own as an individual and belong to none other. On the contrary, Spinoza’s God is strictly identified with Substance, which means that God is identified with the basic reality that constitutes the material and mental world. Scholars such as Steven Nadler regard this conception of God as pantheistic: God is everything, and everything is God. Nonetheless, Claire Carlisle has challenged this view as being panentheistic rather than pantheistic. The difference is that in panentheism, God is more than everything, though everything is God (Carlisle, 2021). God is more than everything because everything must be conceived through God, but not the other way around. God has a spiritual dimension that is not available in any individual things, even though the sum total of the latter constitutes God. However, this paper will not focus on the relationship between God and everything. Spinoza’s understanding of individual objects can be seen in how he defines a mode. For Spinoza, according to Definition 5 in Book I, “[b]y mode I understand the affections of a substance or that which is another through which it is conceived” (ID5). “Affections of a substance” here means alterations or changes or modifications of substance in such a way that to understand them, one needs to do it through a conception of another. For example, a human body is a mode because it is an alteration of Substance in such a way that it appears as a body with one head, two arms, and two legs. Moreover, to conceive of a human body, one needs to put it inside another, more general, concept. The human body, after all, is a body, which means that the human body is a species, a kind of body in general. All modes must be understood in this way. The human mind can also be conceptualized in the same way. The individual human mind is also a mode because it is an affection, a modification, of Substance, in this case, insofar as it is conceived under the Attribute of Thought. Since another of the same kind limits an individual human mind—we can readily distinguish someone’s mind or mental episodes from that of another—it can only be conceived through another. Similarly, we can conceptualize the human mind as belonging to the genus of “mind” in general. For example, it is a human mind, not an angelic or robotic one. This conception of the human body and mind points to Spinoza’s view on the nature of the person. Even though Spinoza does not discuss the concept of the person per se, we can piece his view through his discussion of the human mind and the body. In Book II of the Ethics, Spinoza defines the body as follows: “By body I understand a mode that in a certain and determinate way expresses God’s essence insofar as he is considered as an extended thing” (IID1). Moreover, instead of talking about the mind or the human mind, Spinoza talks instead of ideas. The general understanding of ideas among philosophers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was that ideas are individual mental objects that directly relate to the subject. Thus, when I perceive the computer monitor in front of me, I have an idea of the monitor in my mind, and when I bring up the mental image of the monitor when I am not in front

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of it, the image that I conjure up is also an idea. Spinoza’s notion of the idea follows this same general trend. In Definition 3 of Book II, he says, “By idea I understand a concept of the Mind that the Mind forms because it is a thinking thing” (IID3). Thus, an idea is a concept that the mind forms. In this case, it does not matter whether the idea represents some really existing object or not. Reading its description in fairy tales gives me an idea of a unicorn. The idea of the unicorn is no less an idea of the computer monitor I see in front of me. An idea is a concept formed by the mind. A concept is some determinate mental object that results from a cognition or an understanding, such as “This is a computer monitor in front of me.” Here Spinoza does not define the mind directly, but we can understand that he means that the mind is a characteristic of a human being insofar as the human being is a thinking thing. Furthermore, ideas can be either “adequate” or “inadequate.” Ideas are adequate only insofar as they have all the properties of true ideas when considered in themselves or insofar as they have what Spinoza calls “intrinsic denominations” of a true idea (IID3). That is, an adequate idea is completely true, and its being true does not depend on other ideas. It has “intrinsic denominations” insofar as they do not need the relation with an object or other ideas for their truth. This is somewhat mysterious as it stands, but the notion of adequate ideas will be made more evident in the course of the paper. In Book II, Spinoza has several axioms on the nature of human beings. The first one says that the essence of a human being “does not involve necessary existence; (IIA1)” in other words, an individual human being is not a necessary being such that she must exist. This also pertains to the human being as a species. As a species, the existence of human beings is a contingent matter. Axiom 2 states simply that “Man thinks” (IIA2). Thus, thinking is part of the essence of the human being. Thus, for Spinoza, the human being is a mode of Extension and a mode of Thought, combined in one entity, namely a human person. Here we can extrapolate Spinoza’s conception of the person, which will be important in our later understanding of death and immortality. The person is constituted by body and mind, insofar as both are modes of the Attributes of Extension and Thought. Being thus constituted is not enough in constituting an individual person since everybody is equally made up of Extension and Thought. To constitute a unique individual person, one requires the notion of affect. Spinoza’s view here is that the affections of the body always affect the mind. When the human body is affected in any way by an external body, the human mind is similarly affected. According to Spinoza, “The idea of any mode in which the human Body is affected by external bodies must involve the nature of the human Body and at the same time the nature of the external body” (IIP16). What Spinoza seems to have in mind here is that when the mind perceives an affection of the body by an external body, it forms an idea that involves the nature of the body and the external body. In other words, the mind is affected by the body. This follows from Spinoza’s claim that both Thought and Extension are Attributes of God (IIP1: “Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing” and IIP2: “Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing.”). Affections of the body always affect the mind, and vice versa. This

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is confirmed in Proposition 19: “The human Mind does not know the human Body itself, nor does it know that it exists, except through ideas of affections by which the Body is affected” (IIP19). The only way for the Mind to know the Body is through the affections of the Body, which produce ideas in the Mind of the same. Thus far, we can summarize Spinoza’s view of the body and the mind. The universe is composed of many things, and these are the modes of the Attribute of Extension that express the essence of God. Likewise, the universe is composed of many ideas, and these are the modes of the Attributes of Thought that also express the essence of God. As previously mentioned, Spinoza’s universe is both materialistic and idealistic at the same time; and a startling point is that Spinoza’s universe is also neither because to say that it is materialistic or idealistic alone would deprive God, or Substance, of the infinite variety or infinite Attributes that follow from its nature. The absolute nature of God cannot be fully comprehended by a human being, who can only conceive of God as Thought or Extension. In contrast, the absolute nature of God necessarily contains an infinite number of Attributes. Thus, things in the world, such as tables and chairs, are modes of extension and modes of thought—they are both material objects and ideas at the same time. As ideas, they are ideas in God as modes of God’s Thought Attribute. Thus, affections in one can be found in the other. As for the idea of the person, we can see an individual person derives her individuality from her position in a particular time and place, which renders her a unique position of being affected by external bodies differently from other persons. For example, I have the character of the person that I am by my being born in Bangkok sixty years ago to such and such parents, having been taught in such and such schools, having such and such groups of friends, and so on. These are all affections to the mind and body complex that make up my individuality. As a mode in the infinite expanse of God, my position is a very small one, but then the pattern of affections that influences me is not necessarily the same as that affecting others. Others are affected by other external bodies and external circumstances, but their being so affected happens in their own way, which is not the same as the pattern affecting me. My individuality and character as an individual result from this series of causes and effects that together make up who I am. This conception of the person then plays a significant role in Spinoza’s view on death and immortality. A key passage is Axiom 1 of Book II, which is mentioned earlier: “The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, i.e., from the order of nature it can happen equally that this or that man does exist, or that he does not exist” (IIA1). This is hugely important because it is one of the few places where Spinoza discusses an individual, namely that the existence of an individual is contingent. My existence as a sixty-year-old teacher is contingent: It could have happened that I do not exist. If my mother were to marry another man and not my father, then it would be doubtful at best whether I would exist. In any case, the contingent existence of the human being means that everyone experiences death. The birth of a human being is a contingent matter—the world does not have to contain me. Moreover, the existence of the human being is also contingent in that nobody lives forever. Here Spinoza discusses that all humans are mortal without mentioning the term “death.”

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However, as modes of the Attributes of Thought and Extension, a way can be found toward a kind of immortality in Spinoza. As my body, as a mode of the human body, is part of the sum total of extended things that is God’s essence, my body, in a real sense, is eternal because, as part of the sum total of extended things, my body is also a part of God, since God is an extended thing. We can imagine my body merging with other modes of Extension or being affected further by other bodies in various ways. Someone would surely object to this, saying that this is not the immortality of the body since the body that constitutes the individual person is no longer there. However, it is still there, only that it is no longer constituted in such a way that the individual person in question exists. However, to expect someone to live forever is untenable and contrary to nature because, as we have seen, our existence is always contingent. Thus, as the bodily mode that constitutes an individual person is part of God, it is not destroyed and continues to exist. In the same vein, the existence of the human mind and the individual mind that makes up an individual person is also contingent. Nonetheless, as part of the infinite expanse of God as a thinking thing, the mind still endures since it is also eternal. Spinoza has the following to say in one of the most perplexing and controversial Propositions in the whole of Ethics: “The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something of it remains which is eternal” (VP23). This Proposition, which appears in Book V of the Ethics, has earned a large number of criticisms from commentators who think that Spinoza is flirting with mysticism and obscurantism, but the idea behind it is not very difficult to understand. Since Mind is part of the Attribute of Thought, which in turn expresses the essence of God, Mind in general is eternal in the sense that it does not pertain to time (ID8: “By eternity I understand existence itself, insofar as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the definition alone of the eternal thing.”). Thus, Mind as the Attribute of Thought itself is God’s existence itself, and it is Mind in this sense that remains after the dissolution of the individual body. As we have seen, the Body is not destroyed through the dissolution of the complex of the individual body and mind that constitute a human person either, and the Mind is the same. Here, then, is Spinoza’s account of immortality. It is a different kind of immortality from what is familiar in the theistic religions. When someone dies, his personality, his individuality are all dissolved, but something of the person remains, which is eternal. In fact, we can even say that everything of the person remains since a human person is made up of body and mind, both of which are modes of God, as we have seen. As God is eternal, his modes, being affects of God, are also eternal. In 1973, Alan Donagan had the following to say about the matter: When a living body is destroyed, the corresponding mind, as nonderivative idea of that body actually existing, perishes with it; for they are the same finite mode in two distinct attributes. However, that mind, as actual essence, had as a part of the idea of the formal essence of that body. And the idea of that formal essence belongs to God sub specie aeternitatis: it is part of the infinite idea of God, which is an eternal mode of God in the attribute of thought. Therefore the part of a man’s mind which consists in the idea of the formal essence of his body must be eternal: it must have pre-existed his body, and cannot be destroyed with it. (Donagan, 1973, p. 255)

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S. Hongladarom Furthermore, Steven Nadler has much of the same idea. Commenting on this crucial Proposition and explaining how the mind could survive the body, Nadler says: The mind thus includes, as an essential component of its nature, an idea-correlate in Thought of the essence of the body in Extension. This idea-correlate is eternal because it, like the essence of the body that corresponds to it, is situated non-durationally within one of God’s/Nature’s eternal attributes. The mind as the idea of (the eternal essence of) the body is itself eternal. (Nadler, 2006, p. 265) In the same vein but focusing more on the religious aspects of Spinoza’s thought, Claire Carlisle, writing much later, has the following to say about the same topic: Spinoza’s account of the human mind shows how our identity as persons is grounded in our imagination, our memory, and our emotions. It is impossible for any of this to continue after we die: “The mind can imagine nothing, nor can it remember past things, except during the existence of the body,” (E5p21), and “a passion is an act of imagination insofar as it indicates the present constitution of the body; and thus the mind is liable to ‘passions’ only during the existence of the body” (E5p34d). (Carlisle, 2021, p. 153)

She continues: And this, I think, is how Spinoza’s account of the eternity of the mind should be understood: certainly not as the continuance of personal duration in an afterlife, nor as a mere technicality lacking in practical significance–but rather as a transformation, at once ethical and ontological, that softens the distinction, perhaps even to a vanishing point, between a human being’s finite life and the eternal life of God. (Carlisle, 2021, p. 162)

What we have seen is an account of immortality in Spinoza, which is impersonal. Indeed something survives after our demise, but that is not to be identified with the individual person. When the individual person dies, nothing belonging to her as this very particular individual survives. Perhaps what survives are those memorials that her relatives have made for her, such as her tomb, memoirs about her, and so on. Those memorials keep the memory of this particular person alive, but in the eyes of God (or in Spinoza’s language, “under the view of eternity”—sub specie aeternitatis), we always remain because we are complexes of body and mind, both of which are Attributes of God, which are part of the eternal existence of God. In this sense, then, death is only a form of transformation. Nothing really perishes when we die. We are only transformed. This view of death and immortality in Spinoza bears a striking resemblance to the view in Buddhism. In the next section, I will offer an account of death and immortality in Buddhism and then show the similarities and differences between the two traditions.

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3 Buddhism on Death and Immortality Unlike Spinoza, Buddhism is a long-standing tradition of religious practices, schools of thought, and teaching lineages that span more than two millennia. In comparison with Spinoza’s philosophy, our aim is not to focus on any particular school of thought in Buddhism, of which there are many. Instead, we will focus on the standard view that all schools within Buddhism accept. Such a standard view originated from the teaching of Siddhartha Gotama, the founder of Buddhism, around the sixth century BCE. We might call the standard view here the view of early Buddhism, but the emphasis here is on the fact that it is the view that all schools of Buddhist thought accept since it is basic and forms a starting point in any form of learning of Buddhist philosophy. Buddhist thought generally accepts the view prevalent in Indian religions such as Hinduism and Jainism concerning reincarnation. According to this common belief, when a person dies, his soul wanders out of the deceased body and finds a new place to live, engendering a new life. In common Hindu parlance, this is compared to a person shedding old pieces of clothes and wearing new ones. The new life that a person assumes does not have to be in this world. He or she can get a new life as a god or goddess in heaven, or he or she might end up in a hell realm. However, the time in heaven or hell (in Buddhism and other Indian religions, there are many) is limited. After some time, the being dies from the old realm and finds a new life again. This cycle of births and rebirths is known as sam . s¯ara. The goal of Indian religions such as Hinduism, Jainism, and Buddhism is to end this wandering around, which all agree to be deeply unsatisfying. Each religion teaches a way to achieve the end to the cycle. As for Buddhism, the end of wandering around in samsara is achieved when a person attains Enlightenment, known as nibb¯ana. Details in this matter are vast, but the point is that when one arrives at nibb¯ana, one stops wandering in samsara, endlessly taking up new life forms, only to die and take yet new ones again. One achieves Enlightenment when one fully realizes that one’s self is only an illusion, and in reality, there is no such thing as an enduring self. This is known as the Doctrine of No-Self. Again details about this topic are also vast but suffice it to say that the Doctrine does not argue that there is absolutely speaking no self. The fact that I am sitting in front of my computer typing this out attests to the fact that I do exist as a person. However, what all schools of Buddhism teach is that this self that I can feel as someone who is now reflecting on what I am doing (namely thinking of how to write this paper and being aware of sitting at my desk, and so on) when analyzed further, is found to be in fact composed of many smaller elements. None of these elements can be attested to be my own self. Thus, according to one of the early teachings of Buddha, my self can be analyzed into five components, namely body (r¯upa), feelings (vedan¯a), perceptions (saññ¯a), thought formations (sa˙nkh¯ara), and consciousness (viññ¯an.a). The first component is the material part of my body and the other four are various aspects of my mental life. In short, the Buddha teaches that the person, such as the person sitting and typing this out at this moment, is

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composed of these five elements. Since none of these elements can be said to be my own self, my self cannot be found to exist objectively in reality. None of the five elements (known as khandha) is identical to my own self because my own self can be broken down through observation and analysis into these five elements. These five elements, when taken together in a certain way, constitute my own person. Thus, my own person, my own sense of self, is a result of this coming together in a certain way of these elements, which means that objectively speaking, it does not exist on its own. An analogy usually offered is that of a car composed of various elements. When these elements come together, a car comes into being. Its components, such as the wheel, the engine, the roof, and the door, taken on their own, comprise a car. Thus, both the car and I myself do exist, but the existence here depends on various causes and conditions and does not subsist on its own. The point of the Doctrine of No-Self for the understanding of death is that, since one’s own self, objective speaking, does not exist, there is no death because death always happens to something that exists objectively. The person of an individual is made up of various smaller components and episodes, to such an extent that there is a sense in which I am not the same person as who I was one month ago or even one day ago. Hence, one can also say that death occurs continuously as the bodymind complex that makes up my identity always changes. The only reason we do not usually feel that we are dying every minute is that we are attached to the existence of our own self as it is commonly understood, believing that there is an enduring subject while, in fact, through analysis, it is not found. This understanding of life as a continuous process also applies to the kind of death understood by ordinary people. The continuous process continues, and if one has yet to attain Enlightenment, one wanders around in samsara, assuming a new form. Still, the process of constantly changing forms remains essentially the same. Since causes and conditions constitute everything, death is merely a form of transformation engendered by causes and conditions. This does not mean, however, that there is something that endures through the cycle of death and rebirth. This is where Buddhism differs significantly from Hinduism and Jainism. According to Buddhism, nothing related to the person objectively remains through death. In other words, when someone dies, the components that make up her person are scattered and changed to other forms. The body returns to dust. The mental components become causes for the new being to form. Buddhism does not believe in an enduring soul that leaves the old body and enters a new one, as do Hinduism and Jainism. On the contrary, Buddhism believes that the old person’s mental components influence the new person’s components in the samsaric cycle. So, I am not the same person as my previous reincarnation. However, my previous reincarnation causes or influences who I am in this life. In one of the clearest passages in the Buddhist Scripture where the Buddha addresses the problem of death, the Buddha is teaching someone named Moghar¯aja, who had asked him before two times as to what one had to do to avoid being seen by the Lord of Death (or in other words what one must do to conquer death). The Buddha answered as follows:

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The Buddha, who can cure all illnesses in the world, said to me thus: "O Moghar¯aja! You shall always be mindful, consider the world to be empty, withdraw the views that there is a self. A person shall gain victory over the Lord of Death through these means. You should consider the world to be like this, and the Lord of Death shall not see you. (Moghar¯aja-Panh¯a, 2022)2

The Buddha told Moghar¯aja that one could conquer death if one adhered to the Doctrine of Emptiness and embraced the Doctrine of No-Self. The Doctrine of Emptiness—to regard all things empty of inherent characteristics—is a counterpart of the Doctrine of No-Self. The latter teaches that the self, as commonly understood, does not exist objectively, and the former teaches that everything does not exist objectively, either. One can conquer death in this way because when one realizes that all phenomena are empty of their inherent characteristics, one sees that death is only a kind of transformation where nothing is really destroyed. Since the self of the person is empty or is objectively non-existent in the first place, death is a non-issue because no one dies and nothing is to be destroyed.3 The passage points to a conception of immortality that, like Spinoza’s, is impersonal. When one realizes that there is ultimately no such thing as a self and that everything lacks inherent characteristics, one “conquers” death because one is unaffected by it. The Buddha’s teaching here sounds somewhat similar to Epicurus: “Death, Epicurus insists, is nothing to us, since while we exist, our death is not, and when our death occurs, we do not exist” (Letter to Menoeceus 124–125, quoted in Konstan, 2022). According to the Buddha, death can also be regarded as nothing to us because we experience death at every moment, and when we die, nothing carries over to the next life. One might object to the Buddha’s view on death by pointing to the existence of sam . s¯ara, which Buddhism also accepts. There are many stories in the Scripture about someone who has done such and such acts and received such and such results in their next lives. However, the key difference is that those born in the next lives are not the same person as the ones who died, but their status as gods is only influenced or caused by the karmic action of the person who died. Unlike the view of personal immortality in the theistic religions, they are not the same persons. Furthermore, 2

The text of the Moghar¯aja-Panh¯a here is translated from Thai by myself. The English translation can be found at https://accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/snp/snp.5.15.than.html. 3 During the workshop, a question was raised about whether Buddhists actually believe in this teaching. People in Buddhist countries typically believe that they do survive their death, and they either go to heaven or hell depending on their karmas, which is contrary to the Buddha’s teaching here. Furthermore, Buddhists perform funeral rites, which consist of making merits and dedicate the merits to the deceased. These rites would make no sense if Buddhists followed the Buddha’s advice to Moghar¯aja. It is indeed true that Buddhist lay persons do believe in some form of existence after death, and that they do dedicate merits to the deceased during funeral rites. However, the Buddha’s teaching in this context is intended for those who aim at achieving Realization fast, as it is the only way to defeat Death as Moghar¯aja has asked. Those who are still wandering in samsara and do not aim at achieving Realization in this lifetime still retain their causes and conditions that propel them forward as individual beings in sam . s¯ara. In this latter sense, then, believing in the existence in some form of personal duration after death (as conditioned by the relevant causes and conditions) does make sense.

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beings only wander in samsara because they have not fully realized the Truth. Once they do, they are said to have attained Enlightenment and are free from being a part of this causal chain of events. This does not mean they exist as objective entities and are detached from the law of cause and effect governing nature. However, it means that being subject to the law is not an issue for them because they have realized that no enduring person suffers from their past negative actions or enjoys the fruits of their past position actions from the beginning.

4 Conclusion: Comparisons and Contrasts There are several striking similarities in the account of death and immortality in Buddhism and Spinoza. First, both view death not as an absolute end of life but as a transformation and a continuation. For Spinoza, death is inevitable because the person is a contingent entity. Moreover, death is a transformation because the body and mind complex that constitutes the person still remains part of God’s essence. For Buddhism, death is also a continuation and a transformation. When someone dies, the material elements that make up her body are scattered. As for the mental episodes, they do not survive either though they influence other mental episodes resulting in the birth of a new life in the samsaric cycle. Secondly, for Spinoza, immortality consists of the mind surviving the body’s dissolution. This survival is not personal but an identification of the individual mind with the Attribute of Thought itself. In Buddhism, personal immortality is also impossible because that would counter the tenet of the impermanence of all things. Nonetheless, this does not mean that everything is totally destroyed when the person dies. If the person has not attained Enlightenment, which is the case for most of us, then she assumes a new life form in the samsaric cycle, essentially becoming a new being. If the person has realized Enlightenment, she becomes identified with the whole of nature in a manner not too dissimilar from the Spinozan account of immortality. There are also several differences between the two philosophies, however. The main difference is that while Buddhism teaches the Doctrine of Emptiness, no such account is available in Spinoza. The Doctrine of Emptiness says that all things lack inherent characteristics that provide the basis for their identity. Spinoza does not directly say that all things lack inherent characteristics. However, we can also see that his view of modes being those things that can only be conceived through another and as part of the one Substance is at least sympathetic to the Doctrine of Emptiness. A reason is that if a mode contained an enduring characteristic, the mode would become an enduring substance on its own, contradicting Spinoza’s view that there can be only one Substance. The second difference is that Buddhism does not have the same conception of God as Spinoza. Buddhism does not believe in God’s Creator’s existence, whereas Spinoza says explicitly, albeit in his way, that God is the immanent cause of all things (IP18).

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Thirdly, Buddhism does talk about the whole of existence, using the word dhamma to refer to it. In a way, dhamma, the sum total of all existence, can be compared to Spinoza’s God or Nature. Perhaps the difference between the two here is that dhamma lacks any inherent characteristic; thus, dhamma lacks any substantial attributes. For Spinoza, on the contrary, God has an infinite essence and an infinite number of attributes. So, the difference is between zero, on the one hand, and infinity, on the other.

References Carlisle, C. (2021). Spinoza’s religion. Princeton University Press. Donagan, A. (1973). Spinoza’s proof of immortality. In M. Grene (Ed.), Spinoza: A collection of critical essays (pp. 241–258). Anchor Books. Konstan, D. (2022). Epicurus. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Fall 2022 ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/epicurus/ Moghar¯aja-Panh¯a. (2022). https://84000.org/tipitaka/attha/v.php?B=25&A=11387&Z=11404 Nadler, S. (2006). Spinoza’s ethics: An introduction. Cambridge University Press. Spinoza, B. (1985). The collected works of Spinoza (E. Curley, Ed. and Trans.). Princeton University Press.

Soraj Hongladarom is a Professor Emeritus of Philosophy and Founding Director of the Center for Science, Technology, and Society, Faculty of Arts, Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, Thailand. He is the President of the Philosophy and Religion Society of Thailand. He has wideranging interests in the philosophy of technology and applied ethics, among others.

Chapter 3

See You in 100+ Years or So: Immortality and the Afterlife in K-Dramas Hazel T. Biana

For Surrey, in this year and the next 100+ years or so Life without love is no life at all. —Leonardo Da Vinci

Abstract South Korean dramas or K-dramas have been top-rated worldwide. The dubbed or subtitled shows’ success is due to their sometimes outrageous yet wholesome storylines. They tackle family, love, relationship, and career themes. However, religious themes wherein immortal and reincarnated characters recur are noticeable in some of these K-dramas. The main characters have lived for 100+ years or so, and they have been waiting for their lovers to be reborn in their many lifetimes. These character and storyline themes reflect South Korean religious believers’ and practitioners’ understanding of reincarnation and immortality. South Korea, after all, is the dwelling place of various world religions such as Christianity, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Shamanism (and atheism and irreligion). This chapter aims to shed light on the philosophical-religious motivations of these shows by investigating select K-dramas storylines and characters, their cultural nuances, and the underpinnings of these themes. Although K-dramas are fictional, their themes reflect how traditional religious questions may be understood as they expound on the existence and nature of the divine, the cycle of reincarnation, and the nature of the afterlife. Keywords South Korea · K-drama · Religion · Immortality · Reincarnation · Afterlife

H. T. Biana (B) De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Hongladarom et al. (eds.), Philosophies of Appropriated Religions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5191-8_3

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1 Introduction South Korean dramas or K-dramas have penetrated homes worldwide through free television and streaming sites. In Southeast Asia alone, K-dramas were the “largest consumed online video content category” in 2021, even more than Western content! These K-dramas have also been dubbed “new live sports” with millions of devoted viewers. The success of these shows has been attributed to their sometimes outrageous but wholesome storylines and family, love, relationship, and career themes. Such fanaticism over these shows can also be traced to well-defined characters and relatability (Ramadurai, 2020). These shows have profoundly influenced various countries’ pop culture and socio-cultural norms. Over the years, a noticeable element in some of these K-dramas is the recurrence of immortal and reincarnated characters. Such tropes of the existence of mythical and immortal characters have been a favorite of K-drama fans (Tabanera, 2020). The main protagonists have lived for 100+ years or so and have been waiting for their lovers to be reborn. For example, in My Love from a Star (Choi, 2013–2014), the lead character is an alien living on Earth for 400 years. The alien then falls in love with the reincarnation of a woman he met in the Joseon dynasty. In another drama, Guardian: The Lonely and Great God (Kim & Yoon, 2016–2017), a 936-year-old immortal goblin falls in love with a 19-year-old woman and waits for her to be reincarnated after her death. Other K-dramas such as Hotel del Luna (Kim, 2019), Mystic Pop-up Bar (Oh, 2020), and Tale of the Nine-Tailed (Kim, 2020b) have immortality and reincarnation themes as well, which have been top-grossing. A more recent drama, Ghost Doctor (Lee, 2022a), features the everyday encounters of career-driven grim reapers with souls of dead people (and animals) traveling to the afterlife. Referred to as the paranormal urban fantasy genre or the subgenre paranormal urban fantasy romance (Slušná, 2014), South Korean storylines and characters have departed from traditional (Hollywood) rom-com formulas. The supposed existence of uniquely local fantastical narratives and characters (such as more-than-a-hundredyear-old characters and other-worldly beings) has led to the considerable viewership and popularity of K-dramas (An, 2021). Their integration of Confucian values has also contributed to their popularity in Asia (Kim, 2007). This chapter aims to shed light on the philosophical-religious motivations of these shows’ themes on immortality and the afterlife by investigating select K-drama storylines and characters, their cultural nuances, and underpinnings. Although Kdramas are fictional, their themes reflect how traditional religious questions may be understood as they expound on the existence and nature of the divine and the nature of life after death. Examining the relationship between religion and pop culture reveals K-drama tropes and South Korean religious concepts on immortality and the afterlife.

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2 Religion and Pop Culture One can see a direct link between representations and how people live in popular culture (hooks, 1997). As a part of pop culture, TV shows and series present significant and operational elements of culture. Aside from entertainment, they also reflect the sharing of collective experiences of groups of people (Slušná, 2014, p. 99). When it comes to religion in pop culture, however, Bruce Forbes and Jeffrey Mahan (2017) prompt readers to analyze the portrayal of religion in popular culture through images, figures, institutions, and practices. Accordingly, pop culture may be a source of innovation for religiosity and beliefs, inspiration for creating patterns and norms, and symbolic languages through which people communicate with others and perform their identities. Craig Detweiler and Barry Taylor (2003, p. 9) assert that pop culture is one of the most “profound, provocative, exciting expressions of legitimate spiritual yearning in at least 100 years […] (it is) a vibrant and vital arena of spiritual expression.” The expressions of spiritual yearning are evident in the pop culture genre known as the paranormal urban fantasy. Accordingly, Zuzana Slušná (2014) claims that this genre may provide a framework for understanding religious (and not-so-religious) questions about religion. On the other hand, a subgenre of paranormal urban fantasy is the paranormal urban fantasy romance, which may likewise frame religious understanding as a “true cultural hybrid” featuring romance against the backdrop of religious, mythological, folk characters, and symbols (Slušná, 2014, p. 100). In South Korea, immortal characters who time travel, have superhuman abilities, or “live” extremely long lives populate this pop culture genre. Storylines also revolve around immortality and reincarnation, wherein the main characters seek to end their immortal lives or wait for their reincarnated lovers.1

3 K-Dramas on Immortality and the Afterlife Paranormal urban fantasy shows are also known as supernatural/mystical fantasy shows in K-dramas. These shows center around immortal beings and supernatural or bizarre creatures like aliens, fairies, mermaids, and spirits. They are often heartwarming and dramatic while playing around with local histories and folklore and tying South Korea’s rich past with contemporary times. Guardian: The Lonely and Great God (Kim & Yoon, 2016–2017) is one of the most famous shows within the said genre. Guardian (Kim & Yoon, 2016–2017) features a deity, the immortal Goblin with superhuman abilities, who lived for almost a thousand years. He can conjure magic spells and travel through place and time. The Goblin’s immortality was a curse for murdering people as a soldier during the war, and the only way to 1

However, these storylines are not evident in pure supernatural/mystical fantasy shows like The Uncanny Counter (Kim, 2020, 2020–2021 or Hellbound (Byung, 2021). These tropes tend to be centered on the paranormal urban fantasy romance genre.

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end his life was for the Goblin’s bride, Eun Tak, to pull a sword out of him. A grim reaper, Wang Yeo, becomes friends with the Goblin Kim Shin as he seeks to “claim” Eun Tak’s soul. Wang Yeo’s job is to collect souls and bring them to judgment (they either go to heaven or hell or go through reincarnation). Being denied passage to the afterlife due to grave sin, Wang Yeo was assigned to be a grim reaper as punishment for committing suicide. Both the Goblin and the Grim Reaper are immortal beings, who endure the passing of countless lifetimes, all for a chance to reunite with their beloved. Like the Goblin’s punishment, Jang Man Wol, the main protagonist of Hotel del Luna (Kim, 2019), was cursed with immortality after killing many people. She has to spend eternity running a hotel where souls and ghosts stay while coming to terms with unfinished businesses in their former lives (before they pass on to the afterlife and cycle of reincarnation through a bridge over the Samdocheon or the river to the afterlife). Throughout the years, 1300-year-old Man Wol hires a mortal manager Gu Chan-Sung, and eventually falls in love with him. Ultimately, she had to decide between staying on as owner to live out her life with him or finally passing on to the afterlife. She moves on to the afterlife, hoping to be reunited with her lover through reincarnation in a forthcoming lifetime. (There has been a discourse among aficionados regarding whether Man Wol had been reborn.) Just like the Goblin and Wang Yeo, Man Wol does not age. Mystic Pop-up Bar (Oh, 2020) also tackles the topic of the afterlife and saving souls. The show illustrates how souls are judged after death and beyond, emphasizing karmic effects and how past actions reflect on the future and the next lifetimes (Wheeler, 2022). Like Man Wol, the female lead, Wol Ju, is sentenced to live centuries for her sin of hanging herself on the Sacred Tree. The difference is that rather than serving ghosts like Man Wol, Wol Ju has to serve the living by appeasing 100,000 of their grudges. (Wol Ju hates the idea and prefers to be sent to the Hell of Extinction but eventually agrees.) Wol Ju chooses to forego reincarnation to save a human being named Kang Tang Bae, who aided her in completing her final task. Another character who assists her is Gwi-banjang. Gwi-banjang used to be a chief underworld detective who caught evil spirits. Later on, the show reveals that Wol Ju and Gwi had a romantic relationship in their past lives, and Gwi bargained to be with Wol Ju while she sought redemption for taking her own life. Another character with a career in the afterlife is Lee Yeon, who happens to be a 1000-year-old gumiho or a nine-tailed fox in Tale of the Nine-Tailed (Kim, 2020a, 2020b). Lee Yeon is a guardian mountain spirit (in previous times) who is now a city dweller in the present time. He is an agent in the Afterlife Immigration Office and a protector of the Samdo River. While fulfilling his duties in the office, he searches for the reincarnated soul of his first love and eventually finds her in the present time. Other mythical beings surrounding Lee Yeon include the underworld’s supreme ruler, the Samdo River’s gatekeeper, and other gumihos. Other K-dramas featuring immortals are Bulgasal: Immortal Souls (Joo & Kang, 2021–2022), My Girlfriend is a Gumiho (Choi, 2010), and Black (Kim & Song, 2017). Bulgasal tackles reincarnation, remembering past lives, and the curse of immortality through the Bulgasal (which means impossible to kill), a deadly creature in Korean

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mythology. Likewise, My Girlfriend is a Gumiho (Choi, 2010) features a gumiho who dreams of becoming human. Black (Kim & Song, 2017) is another grim reaper story where the grim reaper falls in love with a mortal woman. Other K-dramas that deal with past lives and reincarnation include Chicago Typewriter (Kim & Park, 2017), Black Night: The Man Who Guards Me (Jung & Kang., 2017), Legend of the Blue Sea (Kim et al., 2016–2017), Abyss (Lee & Bae, 2019), 49 Days (Choi, 2011), and Born Again (Kim, 2020b). Patricia Hului (2020) explains that these dramas feature characters who vow to reunite with their loved ones in the afterlife as they discover their past lives. A recent K-drama, which explains the transitions between life, the in-between, and the afterlife, is Tomorrow (Lee, 2022a). Tomorrow (Lee, 2022a) features the intricate careers of grim reapers in various departments, focusing on the “crisis management” team. The said team saves suicidal humans by proving the importance of life. (The department came about due to the overpopulation of souls in hell. Since suicide cases always go straight to hell.) Instead of being reincarnated, the main characters fulfill the duty of grim reapers to escort departed souls into the afterlife. Some of the main characters have lived for 100+ years or so and have witnessed their loved ones’ numerous deaths and rebirths. The story reveals that the two lead grim reapers are lovers in their previous lives, separated by suicide and tragedy, and are presently navigating the intricacies of the career of grim reaping in the in-between of life and death. Tomorrow (Lee, 2022a) is similar to 49 Days (Choi, 2011) in that it also explains what happens to people’s souls when their human bodies go into a coma. My Love from a Star (Choi, 2013–2014) broke viewership records worldwide with a different supernatural storyline. The K-drama was so popular that it garnered over 14.5 billion streams on a Chinese streaming platform service (Shao, 2020). The main protagonist, Do Min-joon, is an alien living on Earth for 400 years who falls in love with the reincarnation of a woman he met in the Joseon dynasty.2 Do Min-joon has super strength and hearing and performs teleportation and telekinesis. While he is not an immortal in the strict sense (a god or a mythological deity), Do Min-joon has witnessed reincarnation cycles because of his 100+ years lifespan as an alien from his home planet. Immortal characters like the gumihos (nine-tailed fox), goblins (spiritual deities), and grim reapers (except for the alien in My Love from a Star (Choi, 2013–2014)) are on the same plane as werewolves, vampires, and other supernatural entities (Bellingham, 2022). However, their immortality tends to be only temporary, as these supposed immortals eventually die or choose to die. Immortality, rather than unchanging, is a phase or a state which can be overcome. Despite living for almost 1000+ years or so and having superhuman powers, immortality on the earthly plane is usually a curse for those who are not natural deities like the gumihos or the higher 2

There have been criticisms about the show, specifically about Do Min-joon’s superhuman powers as he protects the female human lead Cheong Son Yi who is weak and helpless in their romantic relationship (Shao, 2020). The same criticisms on the portrayals of “excessive glorification of powerful men” have also been made on Guardian (Kim & Yoon, 2016–2017), wherein the Goblin protects Eun Tak from perilous circumstances every time she blows out a flame (Hassim et al., 2019, p. 78).

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gods and goddesses that punish mortals into immortality. For the Goblin, Wol Ju, and Man Wol, their long almost-immortal lives were curses for murdering many people or a form of atonement from which they ought to break free. For Goo Ryeon of Tomorrow (Lee, 2022a), serving hundreds of years as a grim reaper in the inbetween of souls (about to be reincarnated) was the alternative to eternal hell. The irony here is that the price of taking one’s or other people’s lives is having to live for 100+ years or so. The penalty is doing community service for the living or the departed or seeing all loved ones die as lifetimes pass. In the case of Goo Ryeon, her ties and connection to her lover were severed as additional punishment. The genre shows the commonality of the fusion of the linear progression of life and the cycle of life, death, and rebirth. In the K-drama universes mentioned above, hell or heaven co-exists with reincarnation, transmigration, mythical monsters, creatures, and demons. It may be confusing, though, as hell, heaven, and reincarnation can be traced to two different religious frameworks, i.e., Christianity and Hinduism, and mythical creatures and afterlife careers can be traced to local legends and myths. While heaven and hell can be the final destinations of mortal souls, they can also undergo reincarnation without the memory of their previous lives. Unless a special potion was avoided, then memories were always erased. Figure 1 illustrates the fusion of the linear progression of life, which either ends in heaven or hell, and the cycle of reincarnation. Sometimes, hell is also referred to as the underworld, where the judges of the afterlife send evil souls. Who these judges are is always unclear. Sometimes, the judges are a combination of the caregiver and magician archetypes who sometimes appear as older women and are responsible for the curse of immortality. The supposed limbo or the in-between of life and death is a plane where souls stay as they are being ushered into afterlife possibilities. To cross from death to the afterlife, souls pass through bridges over the Samdo River or a “to heaven” tunnel. In the Tale of the

Fig. 1 Fusion of linear and cyclic progressions of life in K-dramas

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Fig. 2 Love in the progression of life in K-dramas

Nine-Tailed (Kim, 2020a), the instrumental theme song was “Parting at the River of Three Crossings,” or the mythical Sanzu river (said to be similar to the river Styx or the boundary between the earth and the underworld). Grim reapers can move from the plane of earthly life to the in-between to the afterlife as they accompany souls moving from death to the next phase. The grim reapers’ job description implies the presence of a soul and a physical body (sometimes, supernatural characters bear both souls and physical bodies). In the case of Tomorrow (Lee, 2022a) and 49 Days (Choi, 2011), those in a coma are stuck in the in-between and are neither dead nor alive. Although not mentioned earlier, Ghost Doctor (Lee, 2022b) also explains how those in a coma may stay on as spirits or souls to address unfinished businesses. What makes the selection of shows under the genre of fantasy romance is that characters seem to fall in love with characters on a different plane, cycle, or progression. Given the mandatory romance component of the genre, some characters are lucky enough to reunite with their beloved in 100+ years or so. While fantastical and can be a form of escape, K-dramas still affirm death’s existence. Although death is a tragedy, however, it is not the end. Figure 2 illustrates how death is necessary for rebirth and the eventual reunification of lovers in the next lifetimes. The happy endings could have come in a single lifetime, but the genre illustrates how love is bittersweet. The narratives entail conflict and illustrate how love is patient; it takes lifetimes to resolve issues and grudges and find one’s beloved. In a hierarchy, death transcends love, but rebirth and reincarnation can be love’s salvation. Most characters have a quiet acceptance of death with the hope of being (re)born again at a perfect time and place. The spiritual yearning evident in these characters and storylines is atonement. There is hope that the universe or the divine will allow second chances despite the law of karma and the cause and effect of past actions. While some heroes end in the tragedy of not being reunited with their lovers in their present lives, reincarnation is a possible afterlife line.

4 Religious Concepts of Immortality and the Afterlife The paranormal urban fantasy romance genre can be a framework for understanding immortality and the afterlife. These shows may prove how South Korean religious believers and practitioners understand certain religious concepts. Although K-dramas are fictional, their themes reflect how traditional cultural and religious questions are

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understood in South Korean culture. They bring components that everyday experience defines as empirically unverifiable. Tracing these K-drama religious themes, however, can be done by identifying the appropriated religions in South Korea. After all, the Korean peninsula is the dwelling place of major religions such as Christianity, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Islam, which coexist peacefully with shamanism. Regarding the South Korean religious population, 20% identify as Protestants, 15% as Korean Buddhists, and 8% as Catholics (Kjølstad, 2020). Others also identify with Won Buddhism, Confucianism, Islam, Shamanism, and other native religions (Kjølstad, 2020). According to another survey, 46% of the population claim to be irreligious or have no religious affiliation; 29% are Christians (Catholics, Protestants, and other Christians), and 23% are Buddhists (Connor, 2014). Looking at how the South Korean population identifies with various religions and irreligion, this section examines specific religious beliefs on immortality and the afterlife that have been appropriated and portrayed in K-dramas. Beginning with Christianity, Western religious influence came to Korea during the Joseon dynasty. Christian belief purports that there is only one supreme and perfect eternal and immortal God. The human soul, however, is promised eternal life— wherein there is a “survival of the person in one way or another after death” (Bovon, 2010, p. 401). This immortality of the soul, however, is not part of an “immanent process” but rather a “fruit of redemption” (Bovon, 2010, p. 405). Where the soul goes after death is differentiated by their righteousness or wickedness in their earthly lives (Finney, 2016, p. 3). At the end of their days, persons will be bodily resurrected, and depending on God’s judgment, some will enjoy the blessings of heaven, and others will experience the torments of hell (Finney, 2016; Joaquin & Biana, 2020). Hell is illustrated as a place or state wherein the “unsaved will suffer the consequences of sin” in “eternal fire” with “the devil and his angels” (Mb˜ugua, 2011, p. 95). In Islam, hell is described as “endless punishment” (Mb˜ugua, 2011, p. 95). Heaven, however, is where God dwells, and souls may rest in eternity. Some imagine it like a temple or court, where the faithful can enter through closed doors or gates guarded by St. Peter, an apostle of Jesus Christ (Dijkstra, 2018, p. 187). Christianity in Antiquity imagined the barrier between earth and heaven as a river (Dijkstra, 2018, p. 188). In between heaven and hell, though, there is a place known as purgatory in Christian doctrine (Protestantism denies the existence of purgatory). Purgatory is a “place of purification” of sin, an “intermediate state between death and heaven” wherein its inhabitants are “preparing for eternal, loving intimacy with God” (Griffiths, 2007, p. 427). Rather than a religion, Korean Buddhism is a philosophical way of thinking. While China brought Buddhism to the Korean peninsula in the fourth century, Korean Buddhism evolved due to a larger East Asian Buddhist tradition (Buswell, 2002). In general, Buddhist belief treats death and life as an illusion. Secular Buddhists, on the other hand, believe in the afterlife (Kwon, 2013). The afterlife (or after death) is supposed to be reincarnation, in which immortal souls journey into inhabiting new bodies (J. R. (Theresa) Kim et al., 2004). Depending on one’s deeds, a soul can move into a higher or lower state of being. Tibetan Buddhists believe that the soul waits for forty-nine days upon death before reincarnation. Other Buddhists believe that

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reincarnation is immediate. During the Joseon period in Korea, the cult of the Ten Kings and Jijang bodhisattva was prevalent. The Ten Kings are said to be the afterlife judges who decide on the punishment for dead souls (Yongtae, 2020). The Jijang bodhisattva, on the other hand, assists souls as they migrate through six destinies of rebirth (gods, demi-gods, humans, animals, hungry ghosts, and beings in hell) or help repentant souls in hell to pass through the other stages (Yongtae, 2020, p. 272). There is no written record of Confucianism’s arrival on the Korean peninsula (Mitu, 2015). Many scholars, however, speculate that it came before the Three Kingdoms period (57 BCE–668 CE) (Mitu, 2015). The core Confucian moral teachings revolve around humaneness and that human nature is good upon birth. Particular South Korean Confucian practices include filial piety, emphasizing respect for teachers, elders, and departed loved ones. Modern Korean funeral rites are said to be influenced by both Confucianism and Christianity (Levi, 2013). However, the Confucian idea of immortality is not tied to human beings living for centuries. Xiaowei Fu and Yi Wang (2018, n.p.) claim that Confucian immortality is embodied in glorifying parents “by making one’s name famous in future ages.” A good name ensures that one’s family is alive for centuries. Death is transformed into immortal life through remembrance and representation of descendants (Lew et al., 2011, p. 176). Confucianism is less hardcore in religious terms, in that death should be dealt with appropriately, and individual life as it is need not extend into the afterlife. “There is no divine plan for the afterlife” (Lew et al., 2011, p. 174). Due to the intersections of the Confucian worldview and Korean Buddhism, Confucian moral virtues have been incorporated into the Korean Buddhist view of the afterlife. They are considered preconditions for Buddhist salvation (Yongtae, 2020). Shamanism is a folk religion in Korea that is embodied by characteristics such as polytheistic worship, giving importance to good fortune in the physical world, and mixed religious rituals based on various doctrines (Seo, 2013). Korean Buddhism has parallel notions with Shamanism, given the belief in the existence of the Mountain Spirit and the prevalence of bodhisattva cults (Kim, 2018). Such beliefs may be a manifestation of how Korean Buddhism adopts the Shamanic religious ethos (Kim, 2018). Shamanism believes that there is “this world” and “that world” (Kwon, 2013). “That world” is where the soul travels after death. Some Koreans, therefore, visit shamans after their relatives pass away. The practice is a way to connect to the gods who oversee reincarnations and the afterlife. Looking at the substantial irreligious population of South Korea, however, it is essential not to confuse irreligion with atheism. Irreligious South Koreans do not affiliate with formal religion but believe in ancestral worship and deities. Although they do not readily identify with one framework of institutional religious thinking, the significant influences of Buddhism, Confucianism, Christianity, and even Shamanism are evident in their spiritual yearnings and practices. Although irreligious, South Koreans may still believe in the soul’s immortality and reincarnation.

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5 Discussion If there is one key concept that K-dramas emphasize, it is that the immortal soul exists. This concept reflects most of the religious and philosophical ways of thinking appropriated in the Korean peninsula, including Christianity, Buddhism, and Shamanism (or even irreligion, for that matter). For instance, the conflicting existence of aliens alongside reincarnated souls is not an issue in My Love from a Star (Choi, 2013–2014). (This would imply that aliens also have souls and transmigrate on top of their superhuman abilities.) The destination of souls after death, though, is an interesting point of discussion. In Fig. 1, concepts of heaven, hell, and reincarnation seem to be a joint idea of life’s linear progression and the rebirth cycle. Figure 1 illustrates a fusion of Buddhist and Christian thought. In cases like Tomorrow (Lee, 2022a), Hotel del Luna (Kim, 2019), Tale of the Nine-Tailed (Kim, 2020a), and Mystic Pop-up Bar (Oh, 2020), there seem to be two kinds of hell, however. One hell is eternal torment and torture alongside other demons (the Christian hell); the other is of six destinies from which one can still be reincarnated (the Buddhist hell). The fusion of the linear and cyclic ideas, thus, depends on the type of hell. (In the case of the tragic heroes doomed to immortality, such as the Goblin and Man Wol, their hells are their stay on earth for thousands of years. When they die, however, they move on to Buddhist hell.) Heaven, however, needs to be clarified in K-dramas. There is a mention of a “to heaven” tunnel, but this heaven leads to reincarnation. There are, however, “heavenly” or godly characters who supposedly judge mortals after they pass away. These characters could represent the court or even St. Peter in Christian imaginaries. They may also be a portrayal of the Ten Kings in Buddhist narratives. However, the consistent existence of the grim reaper as an “assistant” to these judges in K-dramas is pertinent. There are similarities between K-drama characters and the Korean Buddhist’s belief in the bodhisattva. The grim reaper can be said to be a bodhisattva archetype in that they exist as guides in assisting distressed souls as they move on to the next life. In the case of Tomorrow (Lee, 2022a), the grim reapers in the crisis management team sought to help suicidal humans understand the value of their lives—in this case, providing a path toward a form of awakening. In Catechism, guardian angels guide or watch over human beings from birth to death. The grim reapers, then, are those that guide after death. Returning to the bodhisattva, some scholars claim it is not a unique Buddhist concept (Brinkman et al., 2014). Hee-Sung Keel (1996, p. 172) argues that if Jesus Christ had been born in Asia, “he would have likely taken the form of the bodhisattva.” After all, the bodhisattva path is the path of compassion, leading to a meaningful personal and spiritual life. Following ethical and spiritual lessons and imbibing insights into what is essential, K-Drama characters may live their best lives (with others). Buddhist and shamanistic ideas fuse with the grim reaper character in the presentday concept of shamans as consultants for the afterlife. In asking help from the shamans in praying to the gods to assist their departed relatives, K-dramas pose as a yearning or hope that the journey to “that world” is friendlier than harsher.

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Such longing may also be something to which the irreligious population adheres. Shamanistic folklore and Korean indigenous beliefs and practices influence the Kdrama storylines with goblins, gumihos, and bulgasals. In Korean mythology, there are various guardian spirits alongside the goblins or evil spirits and helpers of the gods (Seo, 2013). The existence of the mountain spirit in Tale of the Nine-Tailed (Kim, 2020a) is part of the supposed “pantheon of gods and spirits, ranging from the “god generals” who rule different “quarters of heaven” in the universe of Korean shamanism. These gods may also “inhabit trees, sacred caves, and piles of stones” as nature spirits, as in the Mystic Pop-up Bar (Oh, 2020; Korean Shamanism—New World Encyclopedia, n.d.). Victoria Ten (2021, p. 134) refers to the revival of these olden narratives as “yearning for the past,” where “the past is idealized and imagined anew.” These mountain immortals are part of “childhood tales about fairy mountain dwellers” and Korean mountain culture (Ten, 2021, p. 136). K-dramas use shamanistic narratives as “source(s) of inspiration in constructing and re-inventing tradition” (Ten, 2021, p. 134). With evil spirits and ghosts, the in-between concept in K-dramas is tied to Korean Shamanism. However, some departed souls’ “purification” process resembles the Christian idea of purgatory. The community service of some grim reapers and ghosts, the goblin, and other characters may be considered a form of purgatory or limbo, where they supposedly “repent” for their grave sins. They are then “rewarded” with the chance for rebirth. The influence of Confucianism arises in the type of good deeds performed in one’s earthly life, perceived as a means to achieve a higher degree of being in the next life. The success of K-dramas in the Asian market has also been attributed to the Confucian values portrayed in specific shows (Kim, 2007). Patriarchal family relations and respect and veneration for ancestors reflect some of these Confucian value systems in most of the mystical fantasy genres of K-dramas (Ryu, 2020). Some K-Dramas seem to criticize Confucianism’s ideals, though, particularly the belief in the obsession with restoring honor to the self, family, or community (in some cases, by taking one’s own life). After all, immortality in Confucianism is tied to the reputation of the family name, among others. In Tomorrow (Lee, 2022a), for instance, the Jumadeung organization, which guides the departed into the afterlife, established a department that aids suicide prevention in South Korea (Bellingham, 2022). “Shame,” aside from hopelessness, seems to be the primary motivation for these suicides. In unstructured interviews with South Koreans on K-dramas, immortality and reincarnation themes are very recent developments in the last five to ten years. Jiyoon An (2021) confirms that the trend of these fantasy tropes began in 2013 with My Love from a Star (Choi, 2013–2014). The Legend of the Blue Sea (Kim et al., 2016–2017) and Guardian (Kim & Yoon, 2016–2017) followed suit with immortal characters and fantastical rom-com storylines. These tropes feature reincarnation and are detective-like thrillers seeking to uncover the mystery of past histories. More than just the influence of one or a combination of religious beliefs, K-dramas also reflect

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South Koreans’ socioeconomic, mental, and psychological struggles. The themes reflect spiritual yearning and show helplessness in the present life. Since 2013, South Korea has had the highest suicide rate (among countries within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)) (Jang et al., 2022). Higher suicide rates were associated with lower socioeconomic status and religious activities (Jang et al., 2022). Reincarnation in fantastical tropes is a yearning for a “life reset” amidst socioeconomic hardships. Knowledge of the past gives the characters a sense of power or control over their present lives and possible forthcoming lifetimes. While conflicts and struggles are inevitable, would life not be easier if one were immortal with second or 100th chances in life and love?

6 Conclusion K-Drama supernatural, mystical fantasy themes point to the belief and wishful thinking in the soul’s immortality and reincarnation. Although Buddhist and shamanistic influences are dominant, K-drama narratives show a combination and plurality of beliefs that arise in South Korean appropriated religions. Like the Budae Jjigae (army stew), an American-influenced South Korean fusion stew, K-dramas are a melting pot of Eastern and Western religious appropriations and portrayals. Regardless of religion or irreligion, these themes allow for the diversity of K-drama viewers. Other cultures with majority religions or diverse socioeconomic backgrounds may show varying themes. In predominantly Catholic countries like the Philippines, reincarnation is not a common theme in the paranormal urban fantasy romance genre. Aside from the fact that K-dramas are very entertaining, various scholars have found relevance in studying them in the fields of Korean studies, Asian studies, media and fandom studies, behavioral sciences, communication studies, and others. Furthermore, their religious and cultural representations have implications for contemporary ethics, the philosophy of religion, and even the philosophy of pop culture. South Korean hybrid conceptions of immortality and the afterlife may bring about replies to some traditional philosophical puzzles. K-dramas also provide sources of innovation for understanding the nature of the divine and the nature of life after death. They also help provide perspectives on current lives and how religion and spirituality may mitigate suffering and hardship. When understanding the nature of love in a religious backdrop, however, it would take more than just this chapter, conquering death, a few lifetimes, and 100+ years or so. Acknowledgements My thanks go to Anamarie Avecilla, Glovedi Bigornia, Mandel Cabrera, Helen De Cruz, Natalja Deng, Rosallia Domingo, Scott Gordon, Frank Hoffman, Soraj Hongladarom, JJB Joaquin, Jun Young Kim, Eric Lee, Kapyong Lee, Michael Mariano, Ariane Moore, Sheryl Morales, Sylvia Nagasawa, Yujin Nagasawa, Ramon Nandres, Martin Pickup, Fernando Santiago, Jr., Shivanand Sharma, Anne Claire Simpao, Khai Wager, and Daniel Waxkirsh for their comments, support, questions, and constructive feedback. Various versions of this chapter were presented in the Annual Meeting of the Philosophy and Religion Society of Thailand [20–22 December 2021], the Philosophy of Religion Workshop at the University of Birmingham, United

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Kingdom [22 July 2022], the Global Philosophy of Religion Project: Philosophies of Appropriated Religions in Southeast Asia Culminating Conference in Bangkok, Thailand [5–7 September 2022], and the Philosophy of Religion in Asia Workshop at Underwood International College, Yonsei University, Seoul, South Korea [31 March–1 April 2023].

References An, J. (2021). Aliens, mermaids, and cartoons: Neoliberal gender politics in twenty-first century South Korean dramas. In M. Harrod, S. Leonard, & D. Negra (Eds.), Imagining “We” in the age of “I” (pp. 110–126). Routledge. Bellingham, H. (2022, April 11). Netflix’s new Korean show tomorrow is the perfect stepping stone from Hellbound. Gamesradar. https://www.gamesradar.com/netflix-tomorrow-series-hel lbound-south-korean/ Bovon, F. (2010). The soul’s comeback: Immortality and resurrection in early Christianity. Harvard Theological Review, 103(4), 387–406. Brinkman, M. E., Jansen, H., & Jansen, L. (2014). The non-Western Jesus: Jesus as bodhisattva, avatara, guru, prophet, ancestor or healer? Routledge. Buswell, R. E. (2002). Buddhism in Korea. In J. Kitagawa (Ed.), The religious traditions of Asia (2nd ed., pp. 347–354). Routledge. Byung, S. (Executive Producer). (2021). Hellbound [TV series]. Climax Studio. Choi, M. (Executive Producer). (2010). My girlfriend is a Gumiho [TV series]. Studio Dragon; Show Runners. Choi, M. (Executive Producer). (2011). 49 days [TV series]. HB Entertainment. Choi, M. (Executive Producer). (2013–2014). My love from a star [TV series]. HB Entertainment. Connor, P. (2014, August 12). 6 Facts about South Korea’s growing Christian population. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/08/12/6-facts-about-christ ianity-in-south-korea/ Detweiler, C., & Taylor, B. (2003). A matrix of meanings: Finding god in pop culture. Baker Academic. Dijkstra, R. (2018). Imagining the entrance to the afterlife: Peter as the gatekeeper of heaven in early Christianity. In E. M. van Opstall (Ed.), Sacred thresholds: The door to the sanctuary in late antiquity (pp. 187–218). Brill. Finney, M. (2016). Resurrection, hell, and the afterlife: Body and soul in antiquity, Judaism and early Christianity. Routledge. Forbes, B. D., & Mahan, J. H. (2017). Religion and popular culture in America (3rd ed.). The University of California Press. Fu, X., & Wang, Y. (2018). The idea of immortal life after death in biblical Judaism and Confucianism. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy, 18, 7–16. Griffiths, P. J. (2007). Purgatory. In J. L. Walls (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of eschatology (pp. 427– 455). Oxford University Press. Hassim, N., Jayasainan, S. Y., & Khalid, N. L. (2019). Exploring viewer experiences with sageuk Kdramas from a parasocial relations perspective. SEARCH Journal of Media and Communication Research, 11(1), 77–94. hooks, bell. (1997). bell hooks—Cultural criticism & transformation [Interview]. https://www.med iaed.org/transcripts/Bell-Hooks-Transcript.pdf Hului, P. (2020, September 21). KajoPicks: 10 South Korean dramas about reincarnation to watch. KajoMag. https://kajomag.com/kajopicks-10-south-korean-dramas-about-reincarna tion-to-watch/

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Jang, H., Lee, W., Kim, Y., & Kim, H. (2022). Suicide rate and social environment characteristics in South Korea: The roles of socioeconomic, demographic, urbanicity, general health behaviors, and other environmental factors on suicide rate. BMC Public Health, 22(1), 1–10. Joaquin, J. J. B., & Biana, H. T. (2020). The good place and Ted Sider’s puzzle. Think, 19(54), 25–29. Joo, J., & Kang, H. (Executive Producers). (2021–2022). Bulgasal: Immortal souls [TV series]. Studio Dragon; Show Runners. Jung, C., & Kang, B. (Executive Producers). (2017). Black Knight: The man who guards me [TV series]. NCH Entertainment. Keel, H.-S. (1996). Jesus the Bodhisattva: Christology from a Buddhist perspective. BuddhistChristian Studies, 16, 169–185. Kim, B., & Yoon, H. (Executive Producers). (2016–2017) Guardian: The lonely and great god [TV series]. Hwa & Dam Pictures. Kim, J. (2007). Why does Hallyu matter?: The significance of the Korean wave in South Korea. Critical Studies in Television, 2(2), 47–59. Kim, J. & Song, J. (Executive Producers). (2017). Black [TV series]. iWill Media. Kim, J., & Park, J. (Executive Producers). (2017). Chicago typewriter [TV series]. The Unicorn; Studio Dragon. Kim, J. R. (Theresa), Elliott, D., & Hyde, C. (2004). The influence of sociocultural factors on organ donation and transplantation in Korea: Findings from key informant interviews. Journal of Transcultural Nursing, 15(2), 147–154. Kim, K. (Executive Producer). (2019) Hotel del Luna [TV series]. Hwa & Dam Pictures; GTist. Kim, S., Choi, J. J., & Lee, J. (Executive Producers). (2016–2017). The legend of the blue sea [TV series]. Culture Depot; Studio Dragon. Kim, S.-E.T. (2018). Korean Buddhist adoption of shamanic religious ethos. International Journal of Buddhist Thought and Culture, 28(1), 59–85. Kim, S. H. (Executive Producer). (2020a). Born again [TV series]. UFO Production; Monster Union. Kim, Y. (Executive Producer). (2020b). Tale of the nine-tailed [TV series]. Studio Dragon; How Pictures. Kim, S. T. (Executive Producer). (2020–2021). The uncanny counter [TV series]. Neo Entertainment; BETTY & Creators. Kjølstad, K. N. (2020, September 16). Religion in the Republic of Korea 상세보기|. Citizen Journalists. https://overseas.mofa.go.kr/no-en/brd/m_21237/view.do?seq=88 Korean Shamanism—New World Encyclopedia. (n.d.). Retrieved September 2, 2022. https://www. newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/korean_shamanism Kwon, I. (2013). Koreans’ traditional view on death. The Korean Journal of Hospice and Palliative Care, 16(3), 155–165. Lee, H., & Bae, L. (Executive Producers). (2019). Abyss [TV series]. Neo Entertainment. Lee, H. (Executive Producer). (2022a). Ghost doctor [TV series]. Studio Dragon; Bon Factory Worldwide. Lee, T. (Executive Producer). (2022b). Tomorrow [TV series]. Studio N; Super Moon Pictures. Levi, N. (2013). The impact of Confucianism in South Korea and Japan. Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia, 26, 7–15. Lew, S.-C., Choi, W.-Y., & Wang, H. S. (2011). Confucian ethics and the spirit of capitalism in Korea: The significance of filial piety. Journal of East Asian Studies, 11(2), 171–196. Mb˜ugua, K. (2011). The problem of hell revisited: Towards a gentler theology of hell. Thought and Practice, 3(2), 93–103. Mitu, B. (2015). Confucianism and the contemporary Korean society. Romanian Journal of Sociological Studies, 1, 31–38. Oh, H. (Executive Producer). (2020). Mystic pop-up bar [TV series]. Drama House; Samha Networks. Ramadurai, C. (2020, December 2). K-drama reaches across Asian cultures. Nikkei Asia. https:// asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/Tea-Leaves/K-drama-reaches-across-Asian-cultures

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Hazel T. Biana is a Professor of Philosophy and a Research Fellow at the Southeast Asia Research Center and Hub (SEARCH) and the Social Development Research Center (SDRC), De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines. Her research interests are diverse and interdisciplinary, with topics on feminist philosophy, gender studies, artificial intelligence, and cultural criticism. She also works on philosophy and pop culture, the most recent of which is her venture into the world of Korean dramas.

Chapter 4

The Theist’s Legal Paradox: The Problem of Evil, Classical Natural Law Jurisprudence, and the Legal Validity of Immoral Law Enrique Benjamin R. Fernando III

Abstract The metaphysical problem of evil concerns how to reconcile God’s existence with the existence of evil. This paper explores a similar question: the so-called jurisprudential problem of evil or what might be called “Theist’s Legal Paradox.” The paradox implies the problem of reconciling the (legal) theist doctrine that God’s natural law is the ultimate basis of a law’s validity with the apparent existence of evil laws throughout history (e.g., the anti-Jewish laws of Nazi Germany). The paradox is a cause of concern in a Roman Catholic country like the Philippines, where Church doctrine has profoundly influenced natural law jurisprudence for decades. This chapter examines two theistic solutions to the paradox: (i) the Augustine-Radbruch-Alexy formula and (ii) the Aquinas-Finnis central case solution. The former claims that laws that breach an intolerable degree of injustice lose their status as law; the latter that unjust law is a perverted, corrupted, and peripheral law. As argued later, these solutions fail to resolve the paradox; hence a theist must reject the classical view in favor of some other perspective, e.g., contemporary natural law theory or legal positivism. Keywords The problem of evil · Theist’s legal paradox · Classical natural law jurisprudence · Theistic philosophy of law

1 Introduction The metaphysical problem of evil concerns how to reconcile God’s existence with the existence of evil (Yandell, 2016, p. 100). More precisely, it is how to reconcile the following propositions: (1) God exists. E. B. R. Fernando III (B) Department of Philosophy, University of the Philippines (Diliman), Quezon City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Hongladarom et al. (eds.), Philosophies of Appropriated Religions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5191-8_4

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(1A) God is omnipotent. (1B) God is omnibenevolent. (1C) God has both the power and desire to prevent the existence of evil. (2) Evil exists. (1A) and (1B) are analytic truths insofar as they express divine attributes. Any entity appropriately named “God” must be omnipotent and omnibenevolent. Otherwise, it would not be God. In general, a being is omnipotent if it has the power to do anything, including the capacity to eliminate evil. In contrast, a being is omnibenevolent if it has the goodwill, desire, or motivation to eliminate evil. (1C) is logically entailed by (1A) and (1B). Because (1C) seemingly cannot be reconciled with (2), which is true, the theist who believes that God exists—is forced to either reject (1) or (2) or explain how (1) and (2) can simultaneously be true. Many are reluctant to deny (1) and try instead to disprove (2). However, this approach is implausible since there are natural evils such as earthquakes, floods, and volcanic eruptions, as well as human evils that have been freely committed, such as acts of rape, slavery, torture, and genocide. Most solutions to the problem thus purport to show that (1) and (2) are somehow not contradictory. This paper, however, is not concerned with this metaphysical problem of evil per se. Instead, it reformulates the problem in the context of the philosophy of law. This latter problem is particularly relevant to legal professionals like judges who are confronted with such philosophical questions when adjudicating cases. As we shall see later, there are instances wherein judges are caught between their religious beliefs as theists and their legal obligations as court officers. In such situations, their beliefs may entail that evil laws are not “really” laws and thereby cause them to strike them down, whereas the latter may direct them to count such laws as valid and enforceable. This paper is also concerned with applying the problem to the religious context of the Philippines, where Roman Catholic Church doctrine has greatly influenced jurisprudential views, cases, and judicial decisions on several occasions. We might refer to this problem as the Jurisprudential Problem of Evil, or more simply, the Theist’s Legal Paradox. Whereas the metaphysical problem of evil turns on the question of God’s existence, the jurisprudential Problem of evil revolves around the validity of evil laws. Specifically, it concerns the question of whether the existence of the Natural Law— whose moral standards allegedly constitute the ultimate ground of the validity of positive law—can be reconciled with the existence of evil laws that have been enforced as binding throughout history, such as the Anti-Jewish laws of Nazi Germany. The Theist’s Legal Paradox can be restated as the problem of reconciling the following sentences: (1) God exists. (1D) Natural Law exists.

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(3) The Classical Natural Law Thesis: The immorality of a norm is sufficient to make it legally invalid for failing to conform to the Natural Law (hereinafter referred to as “CNLT”).1 (3A) Legal norms, such as statutes that perpetrate genocide or institutionalize racial segregation, are not legally valid. (4) The Immoral Laws Exist Thesis: Immoral laws exist (hereinafter referred to as “ILET”). (1) shall be accepted by fiat and treated as uncontroversial. (1D) follows from (1) on philosophical and theological grounds. This, too, is relatively uncontroversial, though this entailment relationship shall be discussed in greater detail later. (3)—i.e., CNLT—shall be the main subject of this paper. However, it should be clarified that not every natural lawyer subscribes to this thesis.2 (3A) merely provides hypothetical examples of immoral laws that render CNLT invalid. Finally, (4), i.e., ILET, expresses an incontrovertible historical fact that challenges the CNLT. For example, even if Nazi laws perpetrated human rights violations on a grand scale, they were adequately enacted following the legislative procedures of the Weimar Constitution. This, in turn, had been adequately amended by the Enabling Act of 1933, effectively authorizing Hitler’s government to promulgate laws without going through the Reichstag (Fergusson, 1964, p. 247). Similarly, the South African courts at the time of apartheid upheld the validity of racially oppressive laws passed by Parliament (Pitts, 2020, pp. 63–65), including an act that denied people of color the right to vote. Should judges within these jurisdictions have stricken these laws for violating natural justice, even without legal basis? How should they have reconciled their religious and legal duties when they came into conflict? In this sense, CNLT and ILET constitute the paradox’s two horns. Four solutions may be considered to resolve the paradox, each of which targets a specific proposition thereof but accepts the validity of the others: Solution 1 (The Atheist Solution) Deny the thesis that (1) God exists. Solution 2 (The No Natural Law Solution) Maintain that (1) God exists but deny that (1D) the Natural Law exists. Solution 3 (The Classical Natural Law Solution) Accept the CNLT but deny the ILET by explaining that immoral laws such as those of Nazi Germany are not law. 1

CNLT is derived from the more general Natural Law doctrine known as The Overlap Thesis: that there is a conceptual connection between law and morality. It is traditionally contrasted with the legal positivist’s Separation Thesis that no conceptual connection exists between law and morality. For further discussions, see (Duke & George, 2017). 2 As its name suggests, CNLT primarily expresses the view of classical natural lawyers, so contemporary natural lawyers do not need to endorse it. Indeed, some of the most celebrated contemporary natural lawyers, such as Lon Fuller, Ronald Dworkin, Michael Moore, and to an extent, John Finnis, do not accept CNLT. Despite its decline in popularity, however, it continues to shape religious doctrine in Catholic countries, such as the Philippines, thus making it worthwhile to examine its merits.

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E. B. R. Fernando III Solution 4 (The Separation Solution) Accept the ILET but deny the CNLT by explaining that although the Natural Law exists, it has no bearing on the legal validity of positive law.

The remainder of this paper shall be devoted to examining each of these solutions. However, note that Solution 1 is a non-option for theists. As we shall see later, Solution 2 is also not a plausible alternative because (1D) is philosophically and theologically entailed by (1). We shall examine two versions of Solution 3: Gustav Radbruch’s Formula, recently developed in greater detail by Robert Alexy, and John Finnis’s Central Case Solution, which Neo-Thomist lawyers have endorsed. However, it shall be argued later that both versions fail to defend CNLT adequately. Finally, after showing that Solutions 1, 2, and 3 are not viable, it will be concluded that the theist has to accept Solution 4. This implies that law and morality are conceptually distinct and that the Natural Law has no direct or logical bearing on legal validity. It shall be explained that the theist may opt to subscribe to a version of Contemporary Natural Law Jurisprudence or Legal Positivism instead, allowing him to maintain that God and Natural Law exist while accounting for the validity of immoral laws.3

2 Classical Natural Law Jurisprudence This section explains why Solution 2 is not a reasonable response to the theist’s legal paradox. This is accomplished by explaining why (1D) philosophically and theologically follows from the thesis (1). To this end, conducting a brief survey of the origins of Classical Natural Law Theory will be helpful. Classical natural lawyers believed in the existence of an objective moral order. For them, this order contained moral standards of conduct that can be distinguished from positive law in two ways. First, the objective moral order implies universal and immutable natural laws, binding regardless of time or place. Second, these natural laws supersede any law promulgated by human authorities and comprise a higher body of law that is also the universal standard for all human action (Harris, 1980, p. 7; Schofield, 2021, p. 115). This view received one of its most explicit formulations from Cicero in On The Commonwealth: True law is right reason, consonant with nature, spread through all people. It is constant and eternal; it summons to duty by its orders; it deters from crime by its prohibitions [...] It is 3

Alexy describes Solution 3 as “inclusive non-positivism,” the view that the moral defects of law sometimes nullify its legal validity. He classifies Finnis and himself as inclusive non-positivists. He describes Solution 4 as “super-inclusive non-positivism,” which claims that the moral defects of a law never affect its legal validity, a view that he associates with legal positivism. Finally, he describes “exclusive non-positivism” as the view that the moral defects of law always void legal validity (Alexy, 2013, p. 104). No serious natural lawyer holds this latter view, so it shall not be considered here. In response to Alexy, Finnis claims that his body of work defends all three nonpositivist positions, “each in its proper place as a truth about unjust law.” This paper, however, shall only focus on Finnis’s more dominant view, which seems to be that of the inclusive non-positivist (Finnis, 2014, p. 85).

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wrong to pass laws obviating this law; it is not permitted to abrogate any of it; it cannot be totally repealed. We cannot be released from this law by the senate or the people, and it needs no exegete or interpreter [...] all nations at all times will be bound by this one eternal and unchangeable law, and the god will be the one common master and general (so to speak) of all people. (Cicero, 1999, p. 71)

In On The Laws, Cicero explains that natural law derives from the “reason and mind of a wise being” that has always ruled “the whole universe through the wisdom of commanding and prohibiting” (Cicero, 2014, p. 156). It is perfect compared to the “resolution[s] of peoples,” which may be faulty, defective, and lacking in legitimacy to command our absolute obedience. Cicero thus derives the authority of natural law from its universality—a divine order as ancient as the gods, normative before human choices, and more real and objectively true than any legal order. This provides general standards known as Natural Law, which, in turn, provides the basis for specific legal rules. These rules express the demands of Natural Law; they tell us what we ought or ought not to do, and so to live following them is, as the Stoics would say, to live in agreement with nature (Brüllman, 2019, p. 16). Natural Law Theory was united with Christian Doctrine by the early fathers of the Catholic Church. Equipped with the additional resources of faith and the gift of divine revelation, they argued that God must have created the laws of nature. For example, St. Augustine claimed not only that God’s Eternal Law existed “out there” but that some notion of it was “stamped upon our minds” (Augustine, 1993, p.11) and “written […] in the hearts of men” (Augustine, 1951, p. 141). Thus, Natural Law refers to some inherent aspect of human nature built into us as a likeness of the original passed on through creation (Gronewoller, 2019, p. 272). Augustine theorized that humans share God’s divine attributes and strive toward justice like his Creator. However, he also recognized that positive law could sometimes be unjust and asserted that unjust law is no law at all (Augustine, 1993, p. 8). He also claimed that without justice, the state is nothing but organized brigandage (Augustine, 2014, p. 55). On this view, positive law that fails to conform to divine justice is not genuine. Similarly, St. Thomas Aquinas claimed that by failing to conform to natural reason, a tyrannical law is not “really” a law. Such a law represents merely a perversion of law, its only law-like quality being that it was enacted by a political superior (Aquinas, 1988, p. 31). However, the procedure of its enactment was not as relevant to its validity as its rationality. Aquinas systematized Classical Natural Law Jurisprudence further by clarifying the relationship between the Natural Law and other kinds of laws, of which there are four in total: the Eternal Law, which is known only to God and which governs the entire universe; the Divine Law that is discovered in scripture with the aid of divine revelation; the Natural Law which is derived from the Eternal Law through human reason; and positive laws that are derived from the Natural Law to promote human ends (Aquinas, 1988, pp. 17–22). Thus, like Augustine, Aquinas differentiated between Eternal and Natural Laws. However, unlike Augustine, he thought that discovering the Natural Law is not a simple matter of introspecting human inclinations; more than this, it is a process of rational discernment. The Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) echoes this idea of Natural Law:

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E. B. R. Fernando III 824. Christian moral tradition has developed another type of law called “Natural Law” because it expresses the wisdom of God in His creation and because it belongs to the very nature of human persons [...] In Catholic morality, natural law means the sum of the rights and duties which follow directly from the nature of the human person, endowed with reason and freedom, not to be confused with social norms and conventions, nor with public opinion, nor with civil law. 825. Three basic convictions of the natural law approach are central to Catholic morality. First, the basis for the “natural law” is the truth that God has created everything and is the root of all things [...] Secondly, natural law morality is knowable by all persons, independent of their religious faith...Thirdly, there are objective moral values and teachings that can be universalized. (CBCP, 1997, p. 232)

The impact of Natural Law Jurisprudence extends far beyond the confines of theological discourse in the Philippines. For instance, Natural Law has underpinned the Church’s views on reproductive health, artificial birth control, abortion, and even population growth since the 1960s (Gorospe, 1969a, 1969b).4 More recently, it has been cited as the foundation of human rights (Gaspar, 2016, pp. 21–22) and used to argue against reinstating capital punishment against those convicted of heinous crimes (Cariño, 2018, p. 246). It has made a lasting impact on actual legal practice as well. The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains a Bill of Rights that is deeply influenced by that of the United States, which, in turn, extensively borrows principles from Classical Natural Rights Jurisprudence,5 such as the inviolability of the pursuit of life, liberty, and property (Fernando, 2011, p. 110). These constitutional provisions are often cited in legislative statutes and judicial decisions. Indeed, several controversial cases heard before the Philippine Supreme Court have turned on arguments that invoked Natural Law principles. It would not be an exaggeration to say that Natural Rights Jurisprudence, and by extension, Natural Law Jurisprudence, is the country’s dominant legal theory. That religious arguments often blend into legal ones should be no surprise, given the deep Christian roots of the country. Against this background, there are two reasons why it is incoherent to accept (1) but deny (1D). First, the theist’s thesis that the Natural Law exists is a logical truth within more foundational religious propositions. For example, because the concept of God implies that He is omniscient, it follows that He has a rational plan for all things. However, this plan is nothing more than what Aquinas called the Eternal Law that governs the universe. If the Natural Law is defined as the aspect of the Eternal Law that is accessible to human reason, then it must necessarily exist as well. Natural Law thus refers to the portion of the Eternal Law that the theist already accepts. In short, the belief in God entails a belief in the existence of a plan, which, by definition, is equivalent to a belief in the Natural Law. Hence, it is logically impossible to accept that God exists but deny that the Natural Law exists. 4 In particular, the post-Vatican II encyclical, Humanae Vitae, depends on classical views of Natural Law remains one of the most significant sources of Catechism in the Philippines. Its contents continue to be cited and taught at school. 5 Classical Natural Rights Jurisprudence is sometimes referred to as Modern Natural Law. Some of its proponents include John Locke, Francisco Suárez, Samuel von Pufendorf, and Hugo Grotius (Darwall, 2009).

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Second, from a theist’s perspective, an argument can be made that Natural Law is observable throughout creation. This point, however, needs to be qualified. It does not mean that Natural Law is physically perceivable through some kind of natural property, such as color, sound, or touch. Rather, the Natural Law can be considered spiritually intuitable from creation. For example, the CBCP teaches that the Natural Law is “the wisdom of God (expressed) in His creation.” This means that one can abstract from what is physically observable in nature and discern the deeper, intelligible structure a divine architect has put in place. This structure, in turn, reveals the architect’s greater plan for the universe. This doctrine reflects Aquinas’s teleological view of reality—the belief that all beings have a purpose, meaning, beauty, and ultimate good toward which they strive. In this light, Natural Law is nothing more than the good that creation simultaneously expresses and hopes to attain. This teleological view also applies to humans. Humans achieve what is good by acting under Natural Law. They do what is evil by acting against their nature. Hence, Natural Law represents humans’ final good per se and provides the standards that help them attain it. For Cicero, these standards took the form of eternal laws woven into the fabric of reality. For Augustine and Aquinas, these were justice norms incorporated into human reason. Finally, for the CBCP, they are rights and duties that flow from intelligent reflection. In this sense, the Natural Law may be conceived of as the precondition or foundation for exercising human reason (Long, 2018, p. 3); without it, it would be impossible for humans to act according to their design. However, humans often succeed in living up to their ideals, so it can be inferred that the Natural Law exists in some form to guide them. Thus, it is incoherent for the theist to acknowledge the wonder of creation (including humans) while denying that the Natural Law exists. The No Natural Law Solution is, therefore, unavailable to the theist.

3 Contemporary Interpretations of Classical Natural Law Jurisprudence In this section, I argue that two contemporary interpretations of Solution 3 fail to resolve the theist’s legal paradox. It will be illustrated denying the thesis ILET. Immoral laws are not “really” laws and are not a persuasive strategy. The first solution is Radbruch’s Formula, which takes St. Augustine’s thesis that an unjust law is no law at all, making the strong claim that a law that breaches an extreme threshold of injustice loses the very nature of law. The second is Finnis’ Central Case Solution which adopts St. Thomas Aquinas’ more moderate claim that an evil law is still prima facie law but falls outside of its “central case” and is thus a defective kind of law.

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3.1 The Radbruch Formula Gustav Radbruch was a German legal scholar from the early to mid-twentieth century. He accused leading positivist jurists, such as Hans Kelsen,6 of enabling crimes against humanity with their amoral credo “a law is a law.” In his view, the German courts should have invalidated several Nazi statutes during Hitler’s reign in the name of natural justice, such as those which authorized the persecution of millions of Jews (Radbruch, 2006a, p. 15): If laws deliberately betray the will to justice—by, for example, arbitrarily granting and withholding human rights—then these laws lack validity, the people owe them no obedience, and jurists, too, must find the courage to deny them legal character.

Radbruch clarified his views further in what is famously known as Radbruch’s Formula: The conflict between justice and legal certainty may well be resolved in this way: The positive law, secured by legislation and power, takes precedence even when its content is unjust and fails to benefit the people, unless the conflict between stature and justice reaches such an intolerable degree that the statute, as “flawed law,” must yield to justice...Where there is not even an attempt at justice, where equality, the core of justice, is deliberately betrayed in the issuance of positive law, then the statute is not merely “flawed law” it lacks completely the very nature of law. (Radbruch, 2006b, p. 7)

The implications of Radbruch’s Formula are clear. A hypothetical but determinate line marks the point at which law should no longer enable an “intolerable degree” of injustice. Below this threshold, positive law takes precedence and should still be treated as valid, even if it permits a certain degree of injustice. Above it, however, positive law loses authority and must yield to supra-statutory Natural Law and should be stricken down to uphold eternal moral principles.7 Thus, Radbruch’s Formula is a legal doctrine that permits judges to decide cases following their conscience when the law itself is gravely immoral. In Radbruch’s view, applying this doctrine would have empowered German courts to resist Hitler’s commands by invalidating Nazi statutes, making several of his actions illegal and unenforceable. It is an extension of Augustine’s view that an unjust law is no law. That morality, over and above any social convention, provides the ultimate grounds for legal validity in any legal system. A contemporary German legal philosopher, Robert Alexy, revitalized the interest in Radbruch’s Formula through his Argument from Injustice. Let it be assumed, he says, that there are legal reasons for a judge not to apply a particular ordinance, e.g., a legal norm or statute instructing him to refuse to apply gravely unjust ordinances. The existence of such laws is not uncommon. For instance, the Eighth Amendment 6

Kelsen’s theory found in Pure Theory of Law (1967 [1960]) is “pure” because it eliminates all elements alien to law, such as those of morality or the social sciences. 7 Not everyone agrees with this reading of Radbruch’s Formula. Brian Bix (2013, p. 73) prefers the narrower reading of Radbruch, offering a prescription for judicial decision-making without making conceptual claims.

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of the United States Constitution prohibits the administration of “cruel and unusual punishments” against any citizen. At the same time, Section 19 of the Bill of Rights in the Philippines expressly forbids “cruel, degrading, or inhuman” punishments. Both jurisdictions have cited these clauses as legal reasons to strike down laws that reinstate the death penalty. A judge’s decision in such cases will count as a law because it will be legally binding and based on legal reasons. However, Alexy argues that if he were to accept a gravely unjust statute as “law” as well, or at least implicitly validate it by not striking it down, then two contradictory legal norms would be law, which is unacceptable. This contradiction can only be resolved if the statute is denied legal character altogether (Alexy, 2002, p. 42). Thus, the Argument from Injustice is not only a moral argument like Radbruch’s but a formal one in that it stipulates that laws must not be substantively inconsistent. How sound is this solution? While Alexy’s version is more sophisticated than Radbruch’s, both arguments rest on the shared assumption that grossly unjust laws are so morally deficient that they cancel legal considerations and should ultimately not be recognized by the court. It assumes, moreover, that some natural metastandards determine how judges ought to decide cases when the standards of law and morality conflict. The problem with this assumption, as Joseph Raz argues, is that the immorality of a law does not automatically entail that courts possess the inherent legal power to invalidate it. While one may have a moral duty not to recognize it (especially if the judge is a theist with religious reasons to invalidate it), it is unclear whether the same can be said of his legal duty (Raz, 2007, p. 32). The same can be said of ordinary citizens. While he may have a moral duty to disobey the law, he may have a countervailing legal duty to do so. In other words, this solution fails to acknowledge that the duties of an individual may be compartmentalized. Even though a theist may have a moral duty to not-θ, he may also have a competing legal duty to θ. For Radbruch and Alexy, the question becomes whether moral duty can outweigh the legal one, which they answer in the affirmative. However, this question is misguided. The more nuanced question is, from whose perspective is it asked whether a law is valid? The answer is that a legal question is asked of an official or citizen within a legal system. This means that they have outstanding legal duties to observe and that the law may already possess the resources to resolve such matters. In short, there may be no necessity for one kind of duty to supersede the other, only for the theist to factor in the relevant legal considerations. Radbruch and Alexy thus need an additional premise explaining why law cannot be unjust in certain respects, especially since they concede that unjust law can be law, provided it falls below Radbruch’s hypothetical threshold. Why would its degree of injustice make any conceptual difference? As we have seen, the worries of the theist may be assuaged without going as far as accepting the Radbruch Formula. In many legal systems, there are purely legal reasons for judges to refrain from applying unjust laws (Bix, 2006, p. 145). Besides constitutional provisions such as those mentioned earlier, Congress may pass statutes stipulating that grossly unjust laws are invalid. At the same time, courts may recognize judicial decisions containing legal principles to the same effect. Alternatively, judges

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may apply accepted techniques of statutory construction, such as the Golden Rule in British Law, which directs judges to refrain from giving a statute a literal reading if it leads to some grave injustice or manifests absurdity. The point of this objection is that the Radbruch Formula, which is essentially metaphysical, is redundant and non-sequitur. There are already norms within a legal system that safeguard the populace against gravely unjust laws. Unlike the Radbruch Formula, these norms do not permit judges to speculate on supra-statutory laws that exist “out there” and grant them wide discretion to act on their conscience instead of law. Rather, they provide judges with objective, determinate, and public standards to decide hard cases. Is this not more respectful of democratic considerations and less prone to subjective, erroneous human moral judgment? Thus, even if grossly unjust laws fail to be law, it does not entail that it is because the Natural Law makes it so. It also does not entail that a grossly unjust law—even if judges refused to apply it—was never valid in that legal system. It might have just conflicted with other laws or legal principles that carried greater weight. Alexy attempts to vindicate his argument by invoking what he calls the Correctness Thesis that law necessarily claims to be correct. This refers not only to the legal correctness of its application but to the moral correctness of its content (Alexy, 2007, p. 52). By implication, this can only mean that a law that does not succeed at being correct would necessarily fail to be law. Unfortunately, this rejoinder is too strong. Viewed narrowly, it does not logically follow from the fact that an entity claims to be morally correct that its failure to achieve moral correctness disqualifies it from being an entity of that kind. The fallacy in this argument can be made more explicit with an analogy. It is a general feature of mothers that they claim to impart good values to their children. Surely a mother who fails to do so does not cease to be a mother, even if she teaches the wrong values to her child. Similarly, a law that fails to be morally correct is no less of a law than those which are morally correct. The point of this objection is that even a law that fails to live up to its claims does not cease to be law. A more palatable interpretation of the Correctness Thesis is that law claims to be correct only insofar as it purports to be authoritative. As Raz explains, laws merely represent standards considered binding within a community (Raz, 2009, p. 102). This does not mean that law always claims to be morally correct or conceptually dependent on whether it is morally correct. It only means it claims the final word, not the best, even if it may err. A morally mistaken law is still a law.

3.2 Finnis’ Central Case Solution John Finnis applies a more moderate solution to the paradox that deploys what is known as The Central Case method of analysis in jurisprudence. The method takes various phenomena considered legal practices as its starting point. It then considers the point or purpose of such practices, specifically, what human goods are served by their existence. An account that best captures this point, how it is served, and

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how these goods are realized is then developed, one which constitutes the “focal meaning” of the general concept underlying these practices. The focal meaning may be considered the standard application of this concept, which implies that there may be borderline cases that share family resemblances but also differ from the standard application in important respects. In turn, the general concept being explicated is that which captures those instances that constitute their central cases, as opposed to borderline or peripheral cases in which some of the features of the central cases are less well-instantiated (Lamond, 2020, pp. 27–28). In making this demarcation, it then becomes clear which features of the phenomenon under investigation make it fall under the concept; that is to say, it becomes easier to identify the essential features that an object must possess to fall under the central case of the concept’s application. Once the focal meaning has been clarified, analyzing practices concerning these central features becomes possible. Finnis co-founded the Neo-Thomist Natural Law Tradition.8 He adopts the Central Case method, where the central case of law arises from a community’s need for a system to solve coordination problems. This system is necessary to protect the “common good”—the practices and conditions that enable its members to achieve human flourishing (Finnis, 2011, p. 155). Finnis uses the Central Case method to address the existence of immoral laws but accepts Aquinas’s more moderate view that immoral laws are still legally valid but are “watered-down,” “borderline,” or “peripheral” instances thereof. However, he makes an important qualification: What, then, are we to say in reply to the question whether an unjust law creates a moral obligation in the way that just law of itself does? The right response begins by recalling that the stipulations of those in authority have presumptive obligatory force only because of what is needed if the common good is to be secured and realized...Therefore, if he uses his authority to make stipulations against the common good, or against any of the basic principles of practical reasonableness, those stipulations altogether lack the authority they would otherwise have by virtue of being his...[F]or the purpose of assessing one’s legal obligations in the moral sense, one is entitled to discount laws that are ‘unjust’ in the ways mentioned. Such laws lack the moral authority that in other cases simply come from their origin, ‘pedigree’, or formal source. (Finnis, 2011, pp. 360–361)

For Finnis, the central case of law is not determined exclusively by its moral merit but by its rationality. In this view, immoral laws fall outside the central case because they are unjust and violate basic principles of practical reasonableness that promote the common good. Accordingly, even if immoral laws are prima facie valid, they may still fail to claim moral authority and impose obligations upon us. Because no central case of law can fail to be binding, immoral laws must be peripheral cases and not “genuine” laws. Other Neo-Thomists adopt a similar view. Natural Law is not a set of suprastatutory laws “out there” but action-guiding principles of practical reason derived from human nature (George, 1999, p. 102). As such, Natural Law does not invalidate immoral laws in some mysterious way but simply gives us reasons to discount them because they are corrupted and fail to live up to rational ideals. Natural Law, in this 8

The other co-founder is widely acknowledged to be Germain Grisez (1965), whose influential article made a profound impact on Finnis’ jurisprudence.

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sense, is not framed in terms of morality but by reference to rationality. Moral and immoral laws may be legally defective by failing to provide adequate reasons for action (Crowe, 2019, p. 147). The CBCP (1997, p. 232) advocates the same critical attitude: 827. [...] natural law must be viewed in terms of certain fundamental aspects. First, as real: morality is based on reality, not just on commands as the legal positivists hold. Moral life means doing the good, not just blindly following the law.

However, Finnis’ application of the Central Case Solution commits a methodological error. Finnis confuses two senses of what a case of law means to be central. In its first sense, a law is central if it possesses the essential elements of law (e.g., being enacted following legislative procedure, enforced by the executive branch of government, and upheld by the judiciary). In its second sense, a law is central because it is an ideal, excellent, and exemplary instance of law (Shapiro, 2011, p. 391). Finnis thinks immoral law fails to be central in the second sense and uses it as a justification to argue that it fails in the first. An argument based on such a crucial equivocation of the word “central” is questionable. An analogy might clarify this rebuttal. Broken clocks are real clocks. They are not “watered-down,” “borderline,” or “peripheral” cases of clocks. They were created and once functioned as authentic clocks that told the time correctly. They are unlike decorative clocks that were never designed to tell the time. It is just that they are defective and cannot do what clocks are supposed to. It would therefore be a mistake to classify them in the same category as a decorative clock. Similarly, although Finnis correctly points out that immoral laws fail to accomplish what law is supposed to—which is to promote the common good—he illicitly slides from the second sense in which law is a central case to the first. From the fact that law is contrary to reason or the fact that it fails to help realize the common good, he concludes that it is a corrupted case of law and, therefore, cannot be binding. However, his does not follow. There is a difference between a law that is central insofar as it lives up to moral ideals and a law that fails to be valid for technical or procedural reasons. Alternatively, in a different but somewhat related line of objection against Finnis, one might say that a deviant object of a certain kind is not the same as a defective one (Murphy, 2012, p. 50). The former might lack characteristics that the central case of its kind ordinarily has, but it does not follow that it ceases to be an object of its kind. There is no basis for saying that non-rational law, even if deviant in morality, fails to meet legal standards. To illustrate this point further, consider the following case: In September 1997, the Philippine Congress passed Republic Act No. 8353, also known as the Anti-Rape Law (1997). Feminists viewed its passage as a tremendous victory for their movement because it approached the crime of rape from a woman’s perspective. The most important development introduced by the act was the reclassification of rape from a crime against chastity to a crime against persons, the rationale of which was to advance three liberal feminist theses within the legal system, which, due to its patriarchal perspective, did not appreciate that rape is: a crime against a woman’s very being and personhood and not just her virtue, a violent act rooted

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in male dominance and macho culture, and a public crime that can be prosecuted directly by the state rather than a private crime which must be filed directly by the offended party (Fernando, 2013, p. 11). However, specific clauses within that bill have generated much controversy, such as the following, which potentially decriminalizes marital rape: Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. The subsequent valid marriage between the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed. In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab initio.

Another oft-criticized clause sets the age of consent at twelve years old—the lowest in Southeast Asia—which assumes that a child of this age is sufficiently rational, mature, and of sound mind to determine whether she can engage in sexual relations with an adult: Article 266-A.1d. Rape: When and How Committed: When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above is present.

It is easy to see how such clauses are contrary to reason. The first clause inadvertently legitimizes marital rape and, just as regretfully, counts subsequent acts of forgiveness (e.g., consenting to sexual relations) as grounds to extinguish criminal liability for past actions. This is absurd; it has been well-documented that rape occurs even within marriages, especially by men who feel they reign supreme within the home and that their wives are their personal property. It is also absurd that engaging in sexual relations with consent after a prior act of rape has been committed somehow absolves the offending party of the prior crime. Yet, the law considers such an action as an act of forgiveness. In many cases, it will only have the effect of trapping women in violent and abusive marriages under the shroud of legitimacy. Finally, it is absurd that a twelve-year-old should be deemed mature and rational enough to consent to sexual relations, even if the other party may be a much older man with some power over her. After all, it is not uncommon for authority figures such as teachers or even parents to coerce young children into sexual relations, and this clause potentially encourages that. The point is that some provisions within this law make it irrational, yet it is still a law. It is a misguided, immoral, and dangerous law that undermines the goals of the feminist movement. It falls far short of being a central case of law in the ideal sense, but unfortunately, it is still a central case in the procedural, legislative sense that Philippine courts recognize. To pretend that it is not binding because it is corrupted would be to fail to recognize the tangible and alarming implications it carries for rape victims in the household and in court. Thus, even if Finnis were correct and the principles of practical reason derived from Natural Law do not give us reasons for action to obey immoral laws, it does not follow that immoral laws are not law in the central or proper sense of the term. Perhaps they are not central cases of law in the second moral sense, but they can still be central cases in the first legal sense. The theist may be morally justified in

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disobeying an immoral law, but he may still be charged, convicted, and sanctioned. It would thus be unhelpful to assess the validity of law exclusively from the external moral perspective of the theist, for his paradox is primarily a legal one that requires taking the internal legal perspective of someone who is also a subject of a legal system. This is because the standards of law are fundamentally different from each standpoint. The theist’s perspective is that of someone interested in acting following whatever his religious beliefs require. In contrast, the perspective of a legal system subject— an official or ordinary citizen—is that of someone concerned with what political obligation to the state requires. In short, either variation of Solution 3 approaches the problem from a confused perspective. Because neither of them supports the soundness of CNLT adequately, ILET stands. Someone who accepts Solution 3 must explain how both standpoints can be reconciled and, more importantly, how general standards of morality can override a legal system’s standards of validity.

4 Conclusion In Sect. 2, it was argued that Solution 2 (The No Natural Law Solution) is not viable because the theist cannot logically deny that the Natural Law exists. In Sect. 3, it was argued that Solution 3 (The Classical Natural Law Solution) is not viable because neither the Augustine-Radbruch-Alexy nor the Aquinas-Finnis versions succeed in showing that immoral law is not “really” law. This leaves Solution 4 (The Separation Solution), which allows the theist to maintain that God and the Natural Law exist, but forces the concession that these do not bear upon the validity of positive law. This is not the place to discuss the Separation Solution at length, but an overview may be warranted. Moral facts cannot alter the validity of positive law, so what is known as the “metaphysical foundation” of Classical Natural Law Jurisprudence (Crowe, 2017, p. 114) must be abandoned. Indeed, while maintaining a conceptual connection between law and morality, contemporary natural lawyers have attempted to ground moral criteria of legal validity in social facts. In their view, the criteria for the validity of positive law depends on moral concepts as embodied by certain social or institutional practices, not merely in their pure form. These criteria may derive from the procedural fairness of lawmaking (Fuller, 1969, pp. 33–39), their coherence with the morally principled voice of the community (Dworkin, 1986, p. 175), or the social function of law to uphold the common good (Moore, 1992, p. 216). While each theory might suffer its defects, none of them are susceptible to the objections that have been raised here. Alternatively, he may accept Legal Positivism,9 which denies that there is a conceptual connection between law and morality. In no 9

Legal Positivism accepts four central theses: (1) the Social Thesis that law is a matter of social fact, (2) the Separation Thesis that there is no conceptual connection between law and morality, (3) the Social Efficacy Thesis that the validity of law presupposes that it is socially efficacious, and (4)

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way does this entail that there is no necessary connection between law and morality, i.e., no positivist denies that law necessarily has a moral purpose, only that the validity of a law depends exclusively on social facts. In any case, the theist has many options, none asking him to betray his faith. So the theist has a plausible way out of his dilemma. Among the dominant positivists in the last fifty years include the likes of H.L.A. Hart, Joseph Raz, Jules Coleman, Leslie Green, Andrei Marmor, and Scott Shapiro. John Hick once said that the fact of evil constitutes the most serious objection against the metaphysical Christian belief in a God of love (Hick, Hick, 1968, p. ix). It might be said, analogously, that the fact of evil law constitutes the most serious objection against Classical Natural Law Jurisprudence, which places the theist in the untenable position of reconciling the historical fact that immoral laws have been enforced as valid (ILET) with the metaphysical speculation that they are not law (CNLT). We have also shown that the latter’s strong and weak versions are incoherent, so he must reject them to escape his legal paradox. Acknowledgements An earlier version of this essay was awarded as a runner-up in the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) Episcopal Commission on Seminaries Philosophy of Religion Essay Prize competition in July 2021, judged by a panel of professional philosophers from the Philosophical Association of the Philippines (PAP) and the Union of Societies and Associations of Philosophy in the Philippines (USAPP). The competition was hosted at an international conference on “Emerging Religions in Southeast Asia.” I would like to thank the participants of the Philosophies of Appropriated Religions Conference and Writeshop hosted in Manila on May 27, 2022, as well as those of the Global Philosophy of Religion Project: Culminating Conference hosted in Bangkok from September 4–6, 2022 for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper. Both of these conferences were organized by Prof. Soraj Hongladarom, PhD of Chulalongkorn University, Prof. Jeremiah Joven Joaquin, PhD, Prof. Hazel Biana, PhD, Prof. Fernando Santiago, Jr., PhD, and their colleagues at De La Salle University. Finally, I dedicate this article to my late uncle, Prof. Emmanuel “Toto” Q. Fernando, DPhil (Oxon). Some of Tito Toto’s published works are cited in this paper as they have deeply inspired my views on the subject matter and, more importantly, my views of philosophy in general.

References Alexy, R. (2002). The argument from injustice: A reply to legal positivism. Oxford University Press. Alexy, R. (2007). An answer to Joseph Raz. In G. Pavlakos (Ed.), Law, rights, and discourse: Themes from the legal philosophy of Robert Alexy (pp. 37–55). Hart Publishing. Alexy, R. (2013). Some reflections on the ideal dimension of law and on the legal philosophy of John Finnis. The American Journal of Jurisprudence, 58(2), 97–110. Aquinas, T. (1988). On law, morality, and politics. In W. Baumgarth & R. J. Regan (Eds.). Hackett Publishing Company. Augustine. (1951). Commentary on the Lord’s sermon on the mount with seventeen related sermons (D. J. Kavanagh, OSA, Trans.). The Catholic University of America Press.

the Semantic Thesis that normative legal terms such as “right,” “duty,” or “authority” have different meanings from their moral counterparts (Spaak & Mindus, 2021, p. 7).

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Augustine. (1993). On the free choice of the will (T. Williams, Trans.). Hackett Publishing Company Inc. Augustine. (2014). The city of god (G. Walsh, SJ, Trans., V. Bourke, Ed.). Image Books. Bix, B. (2006). Robert Alexy, Radbruch’s formula, and the nature of legal theory. Rechtstheorie, 37, 139–149. Bix, B. (2013). Radbruch’s formula, conceptual analysis, and the rule of law. In I. Flores & K. Einar (Eds.), Law, liberty, and the rule of law (pp. 65–75). Springer. Brüllman, P. (2019). The stoics. In T. Angier (Ed.), The Cambridge companion to natural law ethics (pp. 11–30). Cambridge University Press. Cariño, J. (2018). The Ethico-political theory of Thomas Aquinas and the revival of capital punishment in the Philippines. Kritike, 12(1) (June), 233–249. Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines. (1997). Catechism for Filipino Catholics (New). Word & Life Publications. Cicero, M. (1999). On the commonwealth and on the laws (J. Zetzel, Ed.). Cambridge University Press. Cicero, M. (2014). On the republic and on the laws (D. Fott, Trans.). Cornell University Press. Crowe, J. (2017). Metaphysical foundations of natural law theories. In G. Duke & R. George (Eds.), The Cambridge companion to natural law jurisprudence (pp. 103–129). Cambridge University Press. Crowe, J. (2019). Natural law and the nature of law. Cambridge University Press. Darwall, S. (2009). Autonomy in modern natural law. In N. Brender & L. Krasnoff (Eds.), New essays on the history of autonomy (pp. 110–130). Cambridge University Press. Duke, G., & George, R. (2017). Introduction. In G. Duke & R. George (Eds.), The Cambridge companion to natural law jurisprudence (pp. 1–13). Cambridge University Press. Dworkin, R. (1986). Law’s empire. Fontana Press. Fergusson, G. (1964). A blueprint for dictatorship: Hitler’s enabling law of March 1933. International Affairs, 40(2) (April), 245–261. Fernando, E. Q. (2011). A course in legal theory Vol. 1: Natural law theories. Rex Printing Company, Inc. Fernando, E. Q. (2013). The misclassification of the crime of rape. IBP Journal, 38(3–4) (July– December), 11–43. Finnis, J. (2011). Natural law and natural rights (2nd ed.). Clarendon Press. Finnis, J. (2014). Law as fact and as reason for action: A response to Robert Alexy on law’s “ideal dimension.” The American Journal of Jurisprudence, 59(1), 85–109. Fuller, L. (1969). The morality of law (Revised). Yale University Press. Gaspar, K. (2016). The interface of social ethics and human rights in the Philippines today. Social Ethics Society Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2(1) (October), 1–31. George, R. (1999). In defense of natural law. Oxford University Press. Gorospe, V. (1969a). The Church and the regulation of birth: After Humanae Vitae. Philippine Studies, 17(3) (July), 556–585. Gorospe, V. (1969b). Humanae Vitae and the natural law. Philippine Studies, 17(4) (October), 683–719. Grisez, G. (1965). First principle of practical reason: A commentary on the Summa Theologiae, 1–2, Question 94, Article 2. Natural Law Forum, 168–201. Gronewoller, B. (2019). Augustine of Hippo. In P. L. Reynolds (Ed.), Great Christian jurists and legal collections in the first Millenium (pp. 266–282). Cambridge University Press. Harris, J. W. (1980). Legal philosophies. Butterworth & Co Ltd. Hick, J. (1968). Evil and the god of love. Fontana. Kelsen, H. (1967) Pure theory of law (2nd ed., M. Knight, Trans.). The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. Lamond, G. (2020). Methodology. In J. Tasioulas (Ed.), The Cambridge companion to the philosophy of law (pp. 17–37). Cambridge University Press. Long, S. A. (2018). God, teleology, and natural law. In C. Wolfe & S. Brust (Eds.), Natural law today: The present state of the perennial philosophy (pp. 3–18). Lexington Books.

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Moore, M. (1992). Law as a functional kind. In R. George (Ed.), Natural law theory: Contemporary essays (pp. 188–242). Clarendon Press. Murphy, M. (2012). Defect and deviance in natural law jurisprudence. In M. Klatt (Ed.), Institutionalized reason: The jurisprudence of Robert Alexy (pp. 45–60). Oxford University Press. Philippine Congress. (1997). Republic Act 8353: The Anti-Rape Law of 1997. Pitts, J. (2020). Judges in an unjust society: The case of South Africa. Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, 15(1), 49–94. Radbruch, G. (2006a). Five minutes of legal philosophy (B. L. Paulson & S. L. Paulson, Trans.). Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 26(1) (Spring), 13–15. Radbruch, G. (2006b). Statutory lawlessness and supra-statutory law (B. L. Paulson & S. L. Paulson, Trans.). Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 26(1) (Spring), 1–11. Raz, J. (2007). The argument from justice, or how not to reply to legal positivism. In G. Pavlakos (Ed.), Law, rights, and discourse: Themes from the legal philosophy of Robert Alexy (pp. 17–35). Hart Publishing. Raz, J. (2009). Between authority and interpretation. Oxford University Press. Schofield, M. (2021). Cicero. Oxford University Press. Shapiro, S. (2011). Legality. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Spaak, T., & Mindus, P. (2021). Introduction. In T. Spaak & P. Mindus (Eds.), The Cambridge companion to legal positivism (pp. 1–36). Cambridge University Press. Yandell, K. (2016). Philosophy of religion: A contemporary introduction (2nd ed.). Routledge.

Enrique Benjamin R. Fernando III is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy, the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines. He completed his Master of Arts in Philosophy at the same university in 2020. He graduated with a double major in BS Management Engineering and AB Philosophy and a double minor in History and Strategic Human Resource Management from Ateneo De Manila University in 2015. His research interests include topics in the philosophy of law, political philosophy, ethical theory, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and the history of analytic philosophy.

Chapter 5

Morteza Motahhari on the Problem of Evil Miqdad Wongsena-aree

Abstract Morteza Motahhari was a celebrated Iranian philosopher who proposed a solution to the problem of evil derived from the Holy Quran and the medieval Muslim philosophers Avicenna and Mulla Sadra. He argues that evil is nonexistent or the lack of goodness. He assumes that some types of evil are relative and emphasizes the importance of viewing the world holistically. He claims that the necessity of evil reveals the role of suffering in the development of the human soul. This paper examines Motahhari’s view and the sources that influenced him. Keywords Morteza Motahhari · The problem of evil · Metaphysics · Islam

1 Introduction It is undeniable that there are a variety of evils in our world, such as creature imperfection, natural disasters, and crimes, collectively called metaphysical, natural, and moral evil, respectively. An important question that has preoccupied philosophers for centuries (especially those who believe in God) is how these evils can exist if an omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent God created the world. Among those philosophers are Muslim philosophers, who have dealt with this subject since the Middle Ages. Since the beginning of their philosophical thought, Muslim philosophers have discussed this issue in two main areas: Unity of God (tawh.¯ıd) and Divine Providence (al- .inayat al-il¯ahiyat). They wondered how evil could come into being when God, the sole Creator, is the absolute good and omnipotent. Likewise, they wondered how evil could exist when divine providence states that the world should be perfect without defects. Among the philosophers who explained this problem was the contemporary Iranian philosopher Morteza Motahhari (1919–1979), who wrote a famous book about this problem entitled .Adl e il¯ah¯ı (Divine Justice). M. Wongsena-aree (B) Bangkok, Thailand e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Hongladarom et al. (eds.), Philosophies of Appropriated Religions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5191-8_5

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Motahhari was a well-known Iranian philosopher, theologian, and writer. He studied under the eminent Iranian philosopher Allamah Tabataba’i (d. 1981) and the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatullah Khomeini (d. 1989). Motahhari is regarded as a leading critic of Marxist thought and doctrine in Iran, and he has had a significant influence on the ideologies of the Islamic Republic. One of his most notable characteristics was his ability to explain Islamic thought to the rising generation in simple and understandable terms. Motahhari has written many books on social issues, but his most significant works are in philosophy and theology, many of which have been translated into several languages. As a result of his numerous contributions to academic society in Iran, the Iranian government declared the day of his death, 12 Ordibehesth (2nd May) of each year, as Teacher’s Day in Iran. In Divine Justice, Motahhari proposed a logical solution to the problem of evil by combining medieval Muslim philosophers’ theories with the Holy Quran and Islamic mysticism ( .irf¯an). This paper examines his view and the sources that influenced him.

2 The Problem of Evil in Islamic Philosophy The problem of evil has become a matter of concern for scholars of Islamic philosophy since its formative period. Muslim philosophers of different periods wrote extensively about it in their works. Among them were Avicenna (d. 1037) and Mulla Sadra (d. 1635), whose perspectives Motahhari learned to articulate his ideas in his Divine Justice. As a result, by grasping these thinkers’ views on the issue of evil, we will better comprehend Motahhari’s point of view. In the Islamic philosophy of the Middle Ages, the problem of evil was considered primarily in the unity of God and the nature of Divine Providence. For instance, in the Metaphysics of Healing (il¯ahiy¯at al-Shif¯a), Avicenna writes, It must, hence, be known that providence consists in the First’s knowing in Himself [the mode] of existence of the order of the good in His being, in Himself, a cause of goodness and perfection in terms of what is possible, and His being satisfied [with the order of the good] in the manner that has been mentioned. He would thus intellectually apprehend the order of the good in the highest possible manner, whereby what He intellectually apprehends in the highest possible way an order and a good would overflow from Him in the manner, within the realm of possibility, that is most complete in being conductive in order. This, then, is the meaning of providence. (Avicenna, 2005, p. 339)

Here, Avicenna characterizes God’s providence (due to His absolute goodness) as His overflowing ( fayd.) goodness to the creature in the best possible way. The question that arises here is, “Why does evil exist?” To analyze this problem, Avicenna classifies evil into two categories: essential evil (shar bi al-dh¯at) and accidental evil (shar bi al- .ard.). He describes essential evil as privation ( .adam) and accidental evil as the nonexistent (ma .d¯um), or that which keeps perfection from what it deserves. He continues,

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Know that evil is spoken of in various respects. Thus, “evil said of what is akin to deficiency [such as] ignorance, weakness, and of deformity in physiognomy. “Evil” is [also] said of such [things] as pain and distress that consist in an apprehending of something that has a cause, not merely in the loss of a cause. For the cause that negates the good, impedes the good, and necessitates its nonexistence may be some separate thing not apprehended by that which suffers the harm […] Thus, evil in essence is privation, though not any [type] of privation but only privation of that to which the nature of the thing necessarily leads in terms of the perfections that belong permanently to its species and nature. Accidental evil [on the other hand] is the nonexistent, or that which keeps perfection away from that which deserves it. (Avicenna, 2005, pp. 339–340)

Mulla Sadra takes a different approach and treats the problem of evil with his theory of the “primacy of existence” (as.a¯ lat al-wuj¯ud). For him, absolute existence, a necessary being (w¯ajib al-wuj¯ud), is the only reality. Since absolute existence— absolute good—has no opposite, evil is only relative, partial, and negative. Evil only arises from the partial existence relative to the entities (Rahman, 1975, p. 38). He writes, Thus, the absolute good for which all things crave and are perfected by them or by that from which their selves and perfections overflow from is the Eternal – Necessary in Essence (al-qayy¯um al-w¯ajib bi al-dh¯at), for He is the Absolute Existence (wuj¯ud mut.laq) in which there is no lack, pure light, pure and perfect, and above perfection. Everything else is not without blemish and poverty. None of that which resulted was pure and excellent in every respect; rather, it had a taint of evil proportional to its diminishing degree from that of the Absolute Good, whose goodness knows no bounds and for whom there is no higher goal than Him. (Mulla Sadra, 1981, p. 58)

For Mulla Sadra, evil is a feature of the contingent being that is inseparable from its contingency. At the same time, goodness and perfection are only restricted to Necessary Being, the Absolute Good. Avicenna and Mulla Sadra agree that evil is the absence of goodness (privatio boni). In light of this perspective, Motahhari developed his explanation of evil.

3 Motahhari’s Approach to the Problem of Evil As we can see from the preceding discussion, medieval Muslim philosophers have dealt with the problem of evil in the context of Divine Providence, which is a subject discussed in divine philosophy (al-il¯ahiy¯at bi al-ma .na al-akhas.). However, unlike his predecessors, Motahhari addressed the problem from the standpoint of divine justice. He first questioned the definition of justice ( .adl) and distinguished between human and divine justice. According to Motahhari, human justice is not a violation of the rights of other human beings. If so, can the above definition of justice be applied in the case of God? Motahhari’s answer is no because everything belongs to God. He derived this view from Quranic verses that state, “His is the kingdom, and His is the praise” (Quran, 64:1) and “Everything shall be returned to Him” (Quran, 11:123). He explained these two verses as follows:

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M. Wongsena-aree Accordingly, God’s disposal of all things and affairs is in actuality a free right of disposal of things that are His to begin with. In comparison to God, no one has any right of ownership or precedence with respect to anything whatsoever. Hence injustice is negated from and does not apply to God; not because it is evil and God does not carry out evil actions, nor because good and evil have no meaning in the case of God and do not apply to Him-for even if the evil of injustice was innate and essential to injustice and essential good and evil were to govern Divine acts in the same way that they govern over the acts of man-but because a concrete and actual referent for injustice cannot possibly exist in the case of God. (Motahhari, 2004, pp. 36–37)

According to Quran (3:18), God is the One who stands firm on justice (q¯aiman bi al-qist.), and justice is one of His attributes. Based on the meaning of this attribute, Motahhari initiated his discussion on the problem of evil and posed the question of the meaning of justice for God as follows: “What does the justice of God mean?” In order to give a clear answer to this question, Mutahari said that God’s justice means “the unconditional emanation of universal grace on all existences with the possibility of existence or other existential perfections.” He writes, God, who is all-Perfect, all-Good, and the absolute bestower of grace, gives to each thing its possible existence and perfections. Hence justice is ontologically defined according to this perspective as: every existent acquiring the degree of existence and perfection that it merits and is possible for it. Injustice then lies in preventing an existent from receiving such grace as it merits and is its due. (Motahhari, 2004, p. 50)

As previously stated, God’s justice is His granting of existence to all things based on their capacity and bestowing upon each thing based on their potentiality without excluding anything from existence and perfection. Furthermore, to provide a complete description of God’s justice, Motahhari mentioned another significant attribute of God related to this issue, i.e., His wisdom. God is wise (al-H . ak¯ım), and according to this attribute, He creates and designs this world to the best of its possibility. Because everything exists for a reason, everything in this world, if not good in itself, must lead to goodness (Motahhari, 2004, p. 57).

4 Motahhari’s Solution to the Problem of Evil For Motahhari, the existence of evil does not seem to be a problem for God’s existence, as it is for Western philosophers. However, it is a challenge to God’s justice. On this basis, Motahhari tried to find a solution to the problem of evil as an explanation of how evil and a just God can coexist. To find a solution, he elaborated on three main points: the nature of evil, the relationship between evil and good, and the purpose of evil. On the first point, Motahhari asked whether evil actually exists or whether it is, in its essence, nonexistent. On the second point, he asked whether good and evil are separable or inseparable; if they are inseparable, the whole world is good or evil. In other words, does good dominate evil? Do the world’s evils triumph over its goodness? Do they not have a distinct advantage over the other? On the third point, he asked whether all evil is absolutely evil. Does it have something good (like

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a good purpose (Motahhari, 2004, p. 117)? These are the three major points on which Motahhari grounded his solution to the problem of evil.

4.1 Evil Is Nonexistent On the first point, Motahhari argues that whereas existence is good, “evil is nonexistent matter” (al-sharru amrun .dam¯ı). Blindness is one of the examples used to illustrate this point. Blindness is evil because it is the privation of seeing: the “nonexistence of seeing.” In contrast, seeing is the existence of sight; hence, it is good. In the same way, death is evil because it is the nonexistence of life, while life is good because it is the existence of being alive. As Motahhari writes, Good and evil, too, are like being and non-being; in fact, fundamentally good is the same as being and evil is the same as non-being. Wherever we speak of evil, there is definitely a non-being and lack [of something] involved. “Evil” is either itself of the form of non-being, or it is a being that necessitates a form of non-being; that is, it is a being that, inasmuch as it is itself, is good, and it is evil inasmuch as it necessitates a non-being; and it is only evil because it necessitates a nonbeing, not for any other reason. We consider ignorance, poverty, and death to be evil. These by their essence are non-being. We consider poisonous and dangerous animals, bacteria, and afflictions to be evil. These are not non-being by their essence, but they are beings that necessitate non-being. (Motahhari, 2004, p. 121)

Similar to Avicenna, Motahhari classified evil into two types: nonexistent (amr al- .adam¯ı) and existential (amr al-wuj¯ud¯ı). Nonexistent evil is that which, in its essence, is a privation, e.g., ignorance, incapacity, and poverty. On the other hand, existential evil exists in its essence but results in the loss of existence of others, e.g., floods, poisonous animals, and disease. (Let us consider first nonexistent evil, then turn to existential evil in the following subsection.) According to Mulla Sadra’s transcendent theosophy (al-hikmat al-muta’liyah), which significantly influences Motahhari’s thought, existence and nonexistence do not form two distinct groups. Nonexistence is nothingness and emptiness; thus cannot coexist with existence in any way. However, in the material world, which is the realm of potentiality and reality, movement and evolution, conflict and contradiction, wherever there are forms of existence, there are also forms of nonexistence. For example, when we imagine blindness, we should not think of it as a particular entity and concrete reality that exists only in the eyes of a blind person. Instead, blindness is nothing more than a lack of vision that has no substance in and of itself (Motahhari, 2004, p. 121). This is the meaning of the remark of Muslim philosophers that “evil is not created by essence but by accident” (al-shar laysat maj .u¯ latan bi al-dh¯at bal maj .u¯ latun bi al- .ard.) (Mulla Sadra, 1981, p. 71), because in its essence there is nothing created as an effected. Consequently, it does not require a creator or an efficient cause to bring it into existence. The blindness of a blind person is not an independent reality, so it cannot be said that the blind person was created by one cause, and another caused his blindness (Motahhari, 2004, p. 128). The same is true of evil. Evil is speculative and privation.

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4.2 Evil Is Relative On the second point, Motahhari argues that “evil is relative matter” (al-shar amr nisb¯ı) by dividing properties into two types: real properties (al-s.ifat al-h.aq¯ıqiyat) and relative properties (al-s.ifat al-nisbiyat). A real property is true of a particular thing under all conditions and independent of everything else. On the other hand, a relative property is one in which “the assumption [of the existence] of a thing and a property is not sufficient for that thing to be described by that property unless a third thing is assumed that can serve as the basis for the comparison and relationship” (Motahhari, 2004, pp. 123–124). Motahhari uses the concepts of dimension and relation to illustrate the difference between the two. Dimension is a category of quantity. Objects have specific dimensions (i.e., shape and size) without relying on anything else. In contrast, an object’s smallness or bigness must be measured relative to something else. Such properties are in the category of relation.1 The question now is whether evil is a real or a relative property. To answer this, let us return to Motahhari’s two types of evil: nonexistent and existential. Recall that nonexistent evil is that which is evil in itself and does not actually exist, such as blindness and ignorance. The evil of this type is real property. On the other hand, existential evil is something that exists but causes something else to lose its existence, such as natural disasters and diseases, which may be good in itself but evil in relation to something else. This type of evil is a relative property. To further illustrate this distinction, let us consider some examples given by Motahhari (Motahhari, 2004, p. 126). Snake poison is good for snakes but bad for humans and other creatures. A wolf is bad for sheep but not for itself. A sheep is bad for a plant (since it eats and destroys it), but with respect to itself, human beings, or a wolf, it is not bad. Here Motahhari cited Rumi’s poem: Snake poison is life for the snake, (But) in relation to man, it is death. Hence there is no absolute evil in the world; Evil is relative, know this (truth) also. Motahhari analyzed this idea further by dividing existence into real existence (alwuj¯ud al-h.aq¯ıq¯ı) and suppositional existence (al-wuj¯ud al-i .tib¯ar¯ı). He defined real existence as that which is created, originated, and has actual existence—which exists for itself. On the other hand, suppositional existence is not created and originated for itself but for something else. According to Motahhari, creation is associated with 1

Note that Motahhari’s meaning of relativism is not relative versus absolute (al-shar fi muq¯abil al-mut.laq), but relative versus actuality (al-shar fi muq¯abil al-h.aq¯ıqat), that is, relativism in respect to something else. In the first sense, relativism refers to a set of conditions of which the absolute is independent. According to this interpretation, all contingent and material objects are relative since they depend on a set of conditions, and the only thing you can validate as absolute (al-mut.laq) is the abstract existent (al-mawj¯udat al-mujarradat).

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the first type of existence. In addition, every existent thing is good for itself, and evil appears only when it relates to others.

4.3 The World Through the Holistic View As for Motahhari’s third point, if evil is relative, we must analyze the world holistically to arrive at a logical judgment. That is, if the world is a unified whole that refuses to be divided, […] in terms of goodness and evilness if things are looked at alone, separate, and independently of other things they have one ruling; and if they are looked at as part of a system and as an organ of a body they have another ruling, which occasionally may be opposite to the first one. It is obvious that if things that are in reality separate are looked at as a system, their actual being will be separate and their organic and body-like being will be suppositional; and in the same way if things that are actually and ontologically parts and organs of a system are looked at separately, their actual being will be organic and body-like, and their separate being will be suppositional. (Motahhari, 2004, p. 134)

According to Motahhari, the world functions in a system of interdependent causalities and factors. Consequently, the world must be viewed holistically and inseparably. When we look at the world this way, balance is revealed in all the organs of existence. It is like seeing a piece of art with different colors that, when mixed and conveyed holistically, result in nothing but beauty. Regarding the preceding discussion, it is clear that the understanding of the issue of evil cannot be acquired through a fragmented view of the world. Such an approach cannot lead to a comprehensive and holistic view. The world may be bad when viewed in isolation. However, it can be useful and complete as a comprehensive vision. Anything is good in and of itself sometimes. However, it is bad with respect to something else. As mentioned above, snake venom harms humans since it can result in death. However, it is good for the snakes themselves.

4.4 The Benefits of Evil The two points discussed earlier are ontological solutions that consider evil as a nonexistent and relative property of a thing. In his concluding discussion, Motahhari justifies the existence of evil in the world in terms of its utility: (1) it reveals what is good, and (2) it develops the human soul. Concerning the former, imagine that everything in the world exists on the same plane. How can we identify something as white or black, beautiful or ugly, cold or hot, and suffering or happy when everything is the same in our imagination? If we have not recognized the opposite qualities of things, there is no measure of the differences between everything. The same is true for good and evil. If everything existed on the same level of goodness, there would be neither good nor evil. Therefore, Motahhari considered

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evil necessary to balance the world and create criteria for classifying and measuring entities as good or evil. He writes: Ugliness is necessary not only because it is a part of the whole system of the universe and the whole order depends on it, but its existence is also necessary to manifest beautiful things and bring them to light. If beauty and ugliness were not compared, neither the beautiful would be beautiful nor the ugly; that is, if ugliness did not exist in the world, there would be no beauty. If all people were beautiful, no one would be beautiful, and if all were ugly, no one would be ugly. (Motahhari, 2004, p. 135)

Here the question arises, why are there differences in the world? Why did God create someone beautiful and someone ugly? Why was someone created smart and someone created stupid? Why did God not create everything with the same perfection? Concerning these questions, we must assume that the differences between creatures are innate, essential, and necessary for the system of causes and effects (Motahhari, 2004, p. 98). However, God is good and wise. Because of His goodness and wisdom, God should emanate His goodness and perfection to the creatures in the best way. However, accepting goodness and perfection also depends on the capacity and possibilities of the creatures. Therefore, deficiency comes from the nature of the creatures (contingent beings), not from the divine emanation (Motahhari, 2004, p. 137). Motahhari derived this idea from the Quranic verse that states, “Our Lord is the One who created everything and then guided it” (Quran 20:50). The phrase “created everything” refers to the fact that He created creatures according to their capacity and possibilities. Concerning why evil is necessary for the development of the soul. Mottahari argues that evil, whether metaphysical, natural, or moral, causes suffering in human life. It is crucial to find a reasonable explanation for the existence of evil, especially if we assume, as mentioned by theologians, that God is the only Influencer (al-muathir al-wah¯ıd) in the universe and that He is merciful to His servants (rah.¯ımun bi .ib¯adih¯ı). From¯the perspective of Motahhari’s perspective, this implies the following. Based on Islamic teachings, one of the sources of Motahhari’s thought, suffering is necessary for the growth of the human soul. Motahhari believes that humans must endure challenges and difficulties to reach the appropriate level of being. Conflicts and upheavals are the “whip” of development. This whip guides living organisms to perfection (Motahhari, 2004, pp. 145–146). Motahhari quoted Imam .Ali bin Ab¯ı T.a¯ lib’s sermon in Nahj-al-Balaghah as follows: But you must remember that hardy trees which grow on the border of deserts have very strong timber; and trees which are found in marshy lands have thin bark and soft wood, similarly when the former are lit up they burn longer and with a very strong glow and give out more heat than the latter. (Al-Sharif al-Radhi, 1983, p. 665)

Motahhari considered difficulties and sufferings as learning opportunities for human beings. “The more difficulties touch a person’s soul, the more determined, active and sharp he becomes because the specialty of life is to fight the difficulties and to prepare to meet them knowingly or unknowingly” (Motahhari, 2004, p. 149).

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5 Conclusion The problem of evil implies that if God is omnipotent and omnibenevolent, can He not create a world free of deficiency and evil? In his Divine Justice, Motahhari answers that (i) defects and evils are necessary since they are effects; as such, they must be less perfect than the cause, and (ii) evil has other benefits and makes the good in the world perceivable. If all existing things in the world were on the same level of good and evil or beauty and ugliness, there would never be anything perceived as good and evil, beauty and ugliness. The consequence is that goodness and beauty will also disappear from the world. Furthermore, the suffering accompanying evil is considered an essential factor in developing the human soul, which makes the human spirit strong and ready to face adversity and challenges. Thus, Motahhari has shown that God’s existence is compatible with evil. What Motahhari has done in his Divine Justice is unique as he turned the subject of evils from a complex metaphysical discussion to a simple explanation that the general public can explore. His greatest challenge is explaining complicated philosophical ideas, usually formulated in technical terms, in a simple language and style, while maintaining the depth and precision of discussion.

References Al-Sharif al-Radhi. (1983). Nahj-al-Balaghah (Peak of Eloquence) (A. Jafri, Trans.). Imam Al Khoei Islamic Center. Avicenna. (2005). The metaphysics of healing (Al-ilahiyat min al Shifa) (M. E. Marmura, Trans.). Brigham Young University Press. Motahhari, M. (2004). Divine justice (S. H. Abidi, M. Alidina, & Sh. Ali Mirza, Trans.). International Institute for Islamic Studies. Mulla Sadra. (1981). Al-H . ikmat al-Muta .aliyat f¯ı al-Asf¯ar al-Arba .at. Beirut: D¯ar ih.ya al-Tur¯ath al- .arab¯ı. Vol. 7. Rahman, F. (1975). The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra. State University of New York Press.

Miqdad Wongsena-aree is an independent scholar living in Bangkok, Thailand. He received his M.A. in Comparative Religion from Mahidol University in 2016. His work mainly focuses on comparative religion and Islamic philosophy. In addition, he is also interested in philosophy of religion and Buddhist philosophy.

Chapter 6

Dialetheism and the Problem of Evil Ben Blumson

Abstract According to dialetheism, some contradictions are true. In a recent paper, Aaron Cotnoir has suggested that theists who are also dialetheists can resolve the paradox of the stone by accepting a contradiction and arguing that God both can and cannot make the stone. However, Zach Weber has replied that dialetheism is of no help in avoiding one of the most serious problems for theism, namely the problem of evil. This paper argues that the situation is even worse than this for dialetheist theists since one motivation for dialetheism closes off what otherwise might be a loophole in a classical version of the problem of evil. Keywords Dialetheism · Theodicy · Infinity · Evil · God

1 Introduction According to dialetheism, some contradictions are true. For example, consider the sentence “this sentence is false.” Suppose it is false. Then since this is what it says, it is true. Suppose, on the other hand, that it is true. Then what it says is true, and so it is false. So if it is true, it is false, and if it is false, it is true. So paradoxically, it must be both true and false or, in other words, true and not true. This is the well-known liar paradox. One of the central motivations for the doctrine of dialetheism is that it allows us to take the reasoning in paradoxes like the liar at face value by accepting their contradictory consequences (Priest, 2006, p. 9). Now consider the paradox of the stone—can God make a stone so heavy that even God cannot lift it? If God cannot make such a stone, this brings into question God’s omnipotence, since there is something that God cannot do. However, if God can make a stone that God cannot lift, there is something else that God cannot do— namely, make that stone and then lift it. In a recent paper, Aaron Cotnoir (2018) has suggested that theists who are also dialetheists can resolve this problem by B. Blumson (B) Department of Philosophy, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Hongladarom et al. (eds.), Philosophies of Appropriated Religions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5191-8_6

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accepting the contradiction and arguing that God both can and cannot make the stone.1 However, Zach Weber (2019) has replied that dialetheism is no help in avoiding one of the most serious problems for theism, namely the problem of evil. He writes: […] if you think that the problem of evil defeats theism, then you will almost certainly think it defeats dialetheic theism, too […] If there is no God, then there is still no God even if the Russell set is both self-membered and not. If traditional theism is already absurd, then traditional theism may be no worse off than any other theism, but it is no better off either, because it is still theism (Weber, 2019, p. 405).

This paper argues that the situation is even worse than this for dialetheist theists since one motivation for dialetheism closes off what might otherwise be a loophole in classical versions of the problem of evil. In particular, consider the following version of the argument from evil, adapted from Brown and Nagasawa (2005, p. 309): 1. The actual world is not the best possible world. 2. If the actual world is created by God, it is the best possible. 3. Therefore, the actual world is not created by God. Famously, Leibniz rejected the first premise of this argument, arguing that the actual world is the best possible.2 However, it is also possible to reject the argument’s second premise by arguing that there is no best possible world. Robert Adams, for example, writes: I do not in fact see any good reason to believe that there is a best among possible worlds. Why can’t it be that for every possible world there is another that is better? And if there is no maximum degree of perfection among possible worlds, it would be unreasonable to blame God, or think less highly of His goodness, because He created a world less excellent than He could have created (Adams, 1972, p. 317).

If there is no best possible world, then arguably an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God may still create a world that is not the best.3 Section 2 argues that the most plausible reason for denying that there is a best possible world is that there is no maximum infinity. So even if God had created an infinitely good world, it would still not have been the best possible since God may still have created another world with a higher infinite amount of goodness. However, as Sect. 3 explains, one crucial motivation for dialetheism is to resolve Cantor’s paradox by allowing that there is (but also is not) a greatest infinite number. In that case, an omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient God could (and so should) have created a world of 1

See also Beall (2019a, 2019b, 2019c, 2019d, 2019e, 2019f, 2021), Pawl (2019), McCall (2019), Cotnoir (2019), Uckelman (2019), for discussion of dialetheism in Christianity. Chowdhury (2021) discusses dialetheism in Islam. Dialetheism is also relevant to the study of non-theistic religions. For the case of Buddhism, see for example, Garfield and Priest (2003), Deguchi et al. (2008), Ziporyn (2013), Cotnoir (2015), and Kreutz (2019). 2 Brown and Nagasawa (2005, p. 309) call this the “problem of inferiority” rather than the “problem of evil”, but I prefer the more familiar name. 3 Adams (1972, p. 317) raises this problem just to set it aside, but Brown and Nagasawa (2005) argue the case in detail. See also Plantinga (1973, p. 539) and Forrest (1981, p. 52).

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infinite goodness. Section 4 considers whether a dialetheist theist can resolve this problem by conceding that there is a best possible world but simultaneously arguing that there is not a best possible world, and argues that their best chance of doing so is to maintain that the actual world both is and is not the best, but that even this defense fails. Section 5 considers ways a dialetheist might simply deny (without also accepting) that there is a best possible world and argues against these too. While the issues discussed in Sects. 4 and 5 are admittedly subtle, Sect. 6 concludes that the problem of evil is worse for dialetheist theists than for their classical cousins.

2 The No Best World Defense How could there be no best possible world? One way is that there might be a tie—two possible worlds that are both as good as each other and such that no other possible world is strictly better than either of them (Brown & Nagasawa, 2005, pp. 311– 314). Exactly similar considerations apply if the value of some pair of worlds is incomparable, and there are two worlds, neither of which is better than the other, and such that no other worlds are strictly better than either of them. In this case, if God creates either of these two possible worlds, he does not create the best possible, but merely a best possible world. However, in either case, it does not seem reasonable to fault God for creating one world rather than the other, so the second premise of the argument above is false (Brown & Nagasawa, 2005, p. 314). However, the argument can easily be restated to avoid this objection (Brown & Nagasawa, 2005, pp. 314–315). To wit, 1. The actual world is not a best possible world. 2. If the actual world is created by God, it is a best possible world. 3. Therefore, the actual world is not created by God. The new first premise is stronger than before, and Leibniz would deny it for the same reason as he denies the original. Nevertheless, the stronger first premise is plausible for the same reasons as the weaker one, which is that we can easily imagine a world that is strictly better than this one. However, the new second premise, although weaker than before, is still open to further objections. Another way in which there could be no best world is if there are cycles with respect to the goodness of worlds (Brown & Nagasawa, 2005, p. 315). For example, suppose that there are three worlds—rock, scissors, and paper—such that rock is better than scissors, scissors is better than paper, but paper is better than rock. Then none of these worlds is best since, for each of them, there is another which is better. In this case, God could hardly be faulted for not creating a world that is best, and so the new version of the second premise is false too. For the sake of argument, we follow Brown and Nagasawa (2005, p. 315) in assuming that betterness is transitive and antisymmetric, thus ruling out cycles of betterness. That leaves the final way in which there may be no best possible world, which is that the number of worlds may be infinite—in which case, just as for every

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number, there is a number greater than it, it may be that for every possible world, there is a world strictly better than it (without any cycles of betterness). In this case too, God could hardly be faulted for not creating a best world, so the new version of the second premise is false (Brown & Nagasawa, 2005, pp. 315–317). Moreover, this possibility is close to the situation an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent creator would face. As Brown and Nagasawa explain: Such a scenario does not seem implausible. For one thing, there appears to be no logical limit on the size of the universe, and, in particular, no limit on the number of sentient beings it contains; so, for any world filled with happy creatures, we can imagine a better world simply by adding a few more happy creatures. Moreover, there may be no limit on sentient beings’ capacity for pleasure; so we could improve on any world by making the happy creatures even happier. (Brown & Nagasawa, 2005, p. 317)

One natural response to this point would be to argue that the best possible world would be infinitely good, in which case one might argue it could not be improved further by adding more happy creatures or increasing their already infinite happiness. However, as we shall see in the next section, this response works only if we reject classical logic and mathematics.

3 Dialetheism and Paradoxes In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the semantic paradoxes were joined by the paradoxes of set theory, such as Russell’s paradox. Consider the set of all and only sets that are not members of themselves. Is it a member of itself? Suppose it is a member of itself. Then since it includes only sets that are not members of themselves, it is not. On the other hand, suppose it is not a member of itself. Then since it includes all sets that are not members of themselves, it is. So if it is, it is not; but if it is not, it is. So paradoxically, it must be and not be a member of itself. One standard solution to Russell’s paradox is to deny the existence of the set of all and only sets that are not members of themselves. To do so, one must also deny the axiom schema of naive comprehension, according to which for every predicate, there is a set of all and only things that satisfy that predicate.4 In particular, since “is a set which is not a member of itself” is a predicate, the axiom schema of naive comprehension entails that there is a set of all and only sets that are not members of themselves. But instead of following this route, dialetheists may embrace naive comprehension and argue that the set of all and only sets that are not members of themselves is and is not a member of itself (Priest, 2006, pp. 28–29). For our purposes, two paradoxes of set theory are especially important: Cantor’s paradox and the Burali–Forti paradox. Cantor’s paradox arises from the following theorem, the proof of which is very similar to the reasoning which gives rise to Russell’s paradox: 4

Formally, (∃x)(∀y)(x ∈ y ↔ φ(x)), where x does not occur in φ (Suppes, 1972, p. 6).

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Theorem 1 (Cantor’s Theorem). Every set has more subsets than elements. Proof. Suppose for reductio that a set had as many elements as it has subsets. Then each subset could be labeled with one of the elements. Then consider the subset that includes all and only elements that are not in the subset they label. Does this subset contain its label or not? Suppose it does. Then since it includes only elements that are not in the subset they label, it does not. Suppose, on the other hand, it does not. Then since it includes all elements that do not label themselves, it does. But this is a contradiction, completing the reductio. □ Cantor’s paradox results when we apply this theorem to the set of everything: the set of everything includes its subsets as elements, so it has at least as many elements as subsets. But since every set has more subsets than elements, this is a contradiction. One standard solution to Cantor’s paradox is to deny the existence of the set of everything.5 To do so, one must again deny the axiom schema of naive comprehension. In particular, since “is a thing” is a predicate, the axiom schema of naive comprehension entails that there is a set of all and only things or, in other words, a set of everything. However, instead of following this route, dialetheists may embrace the axiom schema of naive comprehension and accept that there is a set of everything but argue that it has at least as many elements as subsets, while still maintaining that it has strictly more subsets than elements. For our purposes, the critical point about the standard solution to Cantor’s paradox is that it implies there is no maximum cardinal number, finite or infinite. For every set A with cardinality |A|, there is the power set P(A) with strictly greater cardinality 2|A| , so there is no greatest cardinal number. On the other hand, if dialetheism is true and Cantor’s paradox is resolved by accepting that there is a set of everything, which both has and does not have at least as many elements as it has subsets, then there is a greatest cardinality, viz.: the cardinality of the set of everything (although it is also true that this is not the greatest cardinality, an issue to which we shall return later). As Cantor’s paradox is to the cardinal numbers, the Burali–Forti paradox is to the ordinal numbers. We can think of an ordinal number as the set of all the ordinal numbers preceding it, beginning with 0 = {}, followed by 1 = {{}}, 2 = {0, 1} = {{}, {{}}}, …, and so on through all the ordinal numbers of finite cardinality, and then continuing through the infinite ordinal numbers beginning with ω = {1, 2, 3, …} and its successor ω + 1 = {1, 2, 3, …, ω}, and so on, until we reach 2.ω, 2.ω + 1,…, and so on, through all the ordinal numbers of countable cardinality. Then the set of all ordinal numbers of finite or countable cardinality is ω1 , the first uncountable ordinal number, and so on, through ω1 , ω2 , …, and all uncountably infinite ordinal numbers. In each case, every ordinal number has a successor that is strictly greater than it, consisting of the set of it and all its predecessors, so we can always make a greater 5

In classical Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory, the axiom schema of naive comprehension is replaced by the axiom of the schema of separation, according to which (∀z)(∃x)(∀y)(y ∈ x ↔ (y ∈ z ∧ φ(z))), where x does not occur in φ (Suppes, 1972, pp. 6–7). If there were a set of everything, each instance of the axiom schema of separation would imply the corresponding instance of the axiom schema of naive comprehension, thus reintroducing Russell’s paradox, and further motivating denying the existence of a set of everything.

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ordinal number by adding one. But now consider the ordinal number consisting of the set of all ordinal numbers. Since it is the set of its predecessors, it is greater than all ordinal numbers. But since every ordinal number has a successor which is greater, it is not greater than all ordinal numbers. This is a contradiction. As before, the standard solution is to deny the existence of the set of all ordinal numbers. But if dialetheism is true, we may accept its existence by accepting that it is and is not the largest ordinal number.

4 Both Best and Not Best? As we saw in the previous section, a dialetheist may resolve the Cantor and Burali– Forti paradoxes by accepting that there is (but also is not) a greatest cardinal and ordinal number. So, a dialetheist theist cannot deny that there is a best possible world simply because there is no highest infinite cardinal or ordinal number (or at least, not because a highest infinite cardinal or ordinal number would be inconsistent). But as always in philosophy, there are numerous moves a dialetheist theist could make to defend their position. First, a dialetheist could concede that there is a best possible world but point out that there is also not a best possible world (just as there both is and is not the highest number). Does this help to resolve the argument? It does not help to avoid either version of the second premise since if there is a best possible world, then God should have created it (even if it is also true that he should not have created it). Nevertheless, it is worth dwelling on this point for a moment since some of the material in Sect. 2 now appears in a different light. Consider the highest ordinal number. Recall that adding one to that number produces an ordinal number that is strictly higher than it and which both is and is not the same number we had before. If the goodness of worlds were analogous to the ordinal numbers, then we would have a best possible world and a better possible world, which both is and is not the same world as we had before. In this case, we have (and also do not have) a cycle of worlds, from the best possible world to its successor (itself), each of which is better than the previous one. However, recall from Sect. 2 the point that if there is a cycle of worlds, each of which is better than the last, then God cannot be faulted for not creating the best among these worlds. Should we not concede the same here? No, we should not, because whereas in the previous case, God had no good way to choose between the three worlds in the cycle, in this case, there is only one best world for God to choose, and so he should choose that world (even if it is also true that there is a better one, and so he should choose it instead).6

6

We also put this example aside before on the grounds of transitivity. However here the issue is trickier because even though the example is inconsistent with the transitivity of betterness, a dialetheist may still retain transitivity in the face of the example by accepting the inconsistency.

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Likewise, because adding one to any ordinal number produces a strictly higher ordinal number (and also does not), we still have (and also do not have) an infinite chain of numbers, each of which is higher than the last. Thus, if the goodness of worlds is analogous to ordinal numbers, we may still have (and also not have) an infinite number of worlds such that for every world, there is another better than it (almost without any cycle of betterness, modulo the issue discussed in the previous two paragraphs). In Sect. 2, we conceded that God could not be faulted for not creating the best in a similar situation. Should we not do the same here? Again no, because in this case, there is still a unique best possible world that God ought to create (even though it is also true that for each such world, there is a better world that he ought to create). So while this issue is admittedly subtle, a dialetheist who concedes that there is a best possible world (even while arguing that there is not) should accept both versions of the argument’s second premise. Similarly subtle issues arise for the first premise. Suppose a dialetheist concedes that there is but is not a best possible world. In that case, they may follow Leibniz in arguing that the first premise is false and that the actual world is, in fact, a best possible world (while also conceding that it is true and that the actual world is not a best world). This might seem to be a slight improvement on Leibniz’s position since a dialetheist theist taking this line could accept that there is unnecessary evil in the world, even while arguing that there is not (whereas Leibniz has to argue that all evil is necessary, perhaps for some hidden purpose or reason known only to God). However, even if it improves on Leibniz, this line of defense is ultimately unsuccessful. As Weber (2019, p. 402) stresses, dialetheism claims that some contradictions are true, but not all. The thesis that we are living in the, or even merely a, best possible world is simply false, not both true and false. If this were the best possible world but also not the best, then although there would be evil, there would also not be evil. Unfortunately, it is just true that there is evil, and it is not also false that there is evil. Hence, a dialetheist who concedes that there is (but also is not) a best possible world should ultimately accept both premises of the argument. Nevertheless, there are at least two further options. First, they may accept the conclusion of the argument— that the actual world is not created by God—while accepting that it is contradictory that the actual world is created by God. This is preferable to maintaining that the actual world is and is not the best possible, which does not cohere with what we observe around us (in my view). However, it is still better not to accept this additional contradiction since the more natural position is simply that it is just true that God created the world and not also false that he created it. The final option is to deny the argument’s validity, which in this case involves denying the validity of modus tollens. Typically, dialetheists accept the validity of modus tollens. However, Blumson and Helke (2021), for example, suggest that modus tollens is undermined by some intuitive cases in which the antecedent of the major premise is simply true, but the consequent is both true and false. However, even if the validity of modus tollens were rejected for this reason, this only returns us to the

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option of arguing that it is both true and not true that we are in the best of all possible worlds. As was already argued, it is more likely that this is simply true and not that it is also not true.

5 Dialetheism and No Best World Of course, a dialetheist theist need not concede that there is a best possible world for several reasons. First, while it is open to dialetheists to resolve the Cantor and Burali–Forti paradoxes by accepting that there is and is not a greatest number, they need not do so but may instead motivate their dialetheism on other grounds. However, while opinions vary on this matter, the plausibility of a unified solution to the logical and set-theoretic paradoxes is in my view the most persuasive consideration in favor of dialetheism, and the distinctively religious reasons canvassed above for accepting dialetheism are insufficient in their absence. A more attractive possibility for a dialetheist theist is to accept that there are and are not the highest ordinal and cardinal numbers but not to accept that there is and is not a best possible world whose degree of goodness is measured by one of those numbers. One way would be to argue, for example, that worlds only have finite degrees of goodness and then to argue that there is no best possible world simply because there is no highest finite number. The same move could be made by choosing some other threshold. For example, perhaps worlds only have ordinal degrees of goodness below ω2 or some other limit ordinal (an ordinal with no immediate predecessor). However, insofar as goodness is numerically measurable at all, and there is an omnipotent God, it would seem to be within God’s power to create a world of any degree of goodness, finite or infinite. Just as God can improve a finitely good world by adding finitely many more goods, he could create an infinitely good world by adding infinitely many more goods. This was the intuition that led us to deny that there is a best possible world in the first place. But then so long as there is a greatest infinite cardinal or ordinal number, God could and should continue improving the world until it reaches that infinite degree of goodness. This raises the question of whether goodness is numerically measurable at all. Recall from Sect. 2 the concession that betterness is transitive and asymmetric. In this case, we can construct an ordinal scale for the goodness of worlds using the real numbers, so long as they have a countably order-dense subset, meaning that there is a countable subset of the possible worlds such that between every pair of nonequally good worlds, there is a world from the subset which is between them in respect of goodness (Krantz et al., 1971, p. 40). In this context, because there are plausibly infinitely many worlds with more than a continuum of many degrees of goodness, this condition cannot be met. There are simply too many worlds, with too many differences in goodness, for a realvalued ordinal scale (Lewis, 1973, p. 51). Thus, to construct even an ordinal scale for the goodness of worlds, we will have to look beyond the real numbers to transfinite numbers and even hyperreal or surreal numbers to accommodate infinite and

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infinitesimal degrees of goodness. This is a project beyond the scope of this paper, especially given the non-classical background logic in play. While the details of this task may seem daunting, there is some reason for optimism in this context since only an ordinal scale is needed. To know which world to create, God only has to know which world is best or which world has the highest numerical degree of goodness. If he faced a decision under risk, he would also have to know how much better some worlds are than others so that he could weigh the extra goodness of a world against the chance he fails to create it. But as God knows he will create whichever world he wills, there is no risk in question. God only needs to know which world is best.

6 Conclusion To conclude, let us compare how the no best world defense against the problem of evil fares in both the classical and dialetheist contexts. As Brown and Nagasawa summarize the dialectic: We see two strategies open to the proponent of that argument. Firstly, she might try to show that there must be a best possible world, where this would involve denying that any of the cases we have put forward can accurately describe the range of possibilities faced by an omni-being. This seems to us a hard row to hoe, but we do not deny that an argument to that effect could be made (Brown & Nagasawa, 2005, p. 317).

As we have seen, in the context of dialetheism, it is easier to argue that there is a best possible world because it is easier to accept that there is a highest infinity. Thus, in the context of dialetheism, this is an easier row to hoe, and the problem of evil is worse for theism in this respect. However, Brown and Nagasawa also suggest a different way to strengthen the argument by arguing that even if there is no best possible world, the actual world is still not good enough because it [...] does not cross some threshold of minimal goodness. It is tricky to pinpoint the location of such a threshold, and doubtless if there is one, it lacks sharp boundaries; but this may be the most plausible thing there is to say about such examples. Perhaps, then, the proponent [...] might argue that even if the goodness of possible worlds increases infinitely, it is clear that the actual world is not good enough (Brown & Nagasawa, 2005, p. 317).

This may well be the best version of the argument available in the classical context. However, it leaves considerable wiggle room for the theist, who may argue for lowering the threshold and raising our assessment of the actual world until it comes out as good enough relative to the threshold. For my part, I am unsatisfied with this response—I do not see why the bar should need to be lowered to make it easier for an omnipotent being to hop over it. If God really exists, he ought not only to make a good world but the best one possible. By accepting dialetheism, we can set the bar sufficiently high because we can say that God should create a good world to the highest infinite degree. This reflects

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dialetheism’s advantage in providing a natural response to the set-theoretic paradoxes, especially Cantor’s and the Burali–Forti paradox. However, it also means that the problem of evil is worse for dialetheist theists because dialetheists can better prosecute the case against God. Acknowledgements I thank Nick Trakakis for introducing me to the classical version of this problem. I am also grateful for the comments from the audience at the Philosophy of Religion in Southeast Asia conference, especially Jeremiah Joven Joaquin and Yujin Nagasawa, and for comments from the students in my graduate seminar, Md. Shahidul Islam, Lan Tianxiang, Lee Yong Teck, and Freddie Mingquan Wu. This paper is part of our Metaphysics of Humanity project, supported by a grant from the Ministry of Education, Singapore (grant number, A-0003057-00-00).

References Adams, R. M. (1972). Must God create the best? The Philosophical Review, 81(3), 317–332. Beall, J. (2019a). Christ—A contradiction: A defense of contradictory christology. Journal of Analytic Theology, 7, 400–433. Beall, J. (2019b). On contradictory Christology: A reply to Cotnoir’s “On the Role of Logic.” Journal of Analytic Theology, 7, 529–543. Beall, J. (2019c). On contradictory Christology: A reply to McCall’s “Doctrinal Orthodoxy and Philosophical Heresy.” Journal of Analytic Theology, 7, 488–507. Beall, J. (2019d). On contradictory Christology: A reply to Pawl’s “Explosive Theology.” Journal of Analytic Theology, 7, 452–472. Beall, J. (2019e). On contradictory Christology: A reply to Uckelman’s “Contradictions, Impossibility, and Triviality.” Journal of Analytic Theology, 7, 560–577. Beall, J. (2019f). On contradictory Christology: Preliminary remarks, notation and terminology. Journal of Analytic Theology, 7, 434–439. Beall, J. (2021). The contradictory Christ. Oxford Studies in Analytic Theology. Oxford University Press. Blumson, B., & Helke, T. (2021). Dialetheism and Modus Tollens. The Reasoner, 15(4), 30. Brown, C., & Nagasawa, Y. (2005). The best of all possible worlds. Synthese, 143(3), 309–320. Chowdhury, S. Z. (2021). God, gluts, and gaps: Examining an Islamic traditionalist case for a contradictory theology. History and Philosophy of Logic, 42(1), 17–43. Cotnoir, A. J. (2015). Nagarjuna’s logic. In K. Tanaka, Y. Deguchi, J. Garfield, and G. Priest (Eds.), The moon points back. Oxford University Press. Cotnoir, A. J. (2018). Theism and dialetheism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 96(3), 592–609. Cotnoir, A. J. (2019). On the role of logic in analytic theology: Exploring the wider context of Beall’s philosophy of logic. Journal of Analytic Theology, 7, 508–528. Deguchi, Y., Garfield, J. L., & Priest, G. (2008). The way of the dialetheist: Contradictions in buddhism. Philosophy East and West, 58(3), 395–402. Forrest, P. (1981). The problem of evil: Two neglected defences”. Sophia, 20(1), 49–54. Garfield, J. L., & Priest, G. (2003). Nagarjuna and the limits of thought. Philosophy East and West, 53(1), 1–21. Krantz, D., et al. (1971). Foundations of measurement, Vol. I: Additive and polynomial representations. Academic Press. Kreutz, A. (2019). Recapture, transparency, negation, and a logic for the catuskoti. Comparative Philosophy, 10(1), 67–92. Lewis, D. (1973). Counterfactuals. Blackwell.

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McCall, T. (2019). Doctrinal orthodoxy and philosophical heresy: A theologian’s reflections on Beall’s proposal. Journal of Analytic Theology, 7, 473–487. Pawl, T. (2019). Explosive theology: A reply to Jc Beall’s “Christ—A contradiction.” Journal of Analytic Theology, 7, 440–451. Plantinga, A. (1973). Which worlds could god have created? The Journal of Philosophy, 70(17), 539–552. Priest, G. (2006). In contradiction: A study of the transconsistent (Expanded). Oxford University Press. Suppes, P. (1972). Axiomatic set theory. Dover. Uckelman, S. L. (2019). Contradictions, impossibility, and triviality: A response to Jc Beall. Journal of Analytic Theology, 7, 544–559. Weber, Z. (2019). Atheism and dialetheism; or, “Why I Am Not a (Paraconsistent) Christian.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 97(2), 401–407. Ziporyn, B. (2013). A comment on “The way of the dialetheist: Contradictions in Buddhism,” by Yasuo Deguchi, Jay L. Garfield, and Graham Priest. Philosophy East and West, 63(3), 344–352.

Ben Blumson is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the National University of Singapore. His book Resemblance and Representation: An Essay in the Philosophy of Pictures draws a strong analogy between pictures and language to defend the resemblance theory of pictoral representation. He writes on topics at the intersections of metaphysics, aesthetics, logic, and the philosophy of mind and language.

Chapter 7

Bahala Na: Fatalism or an Open Future? Jeremiah Joven Joaquin

Abstract This paper discusses two conceptions of the Filipino expression bahala na. The first implies a fatalistic attitude, while the second implies an open-minded attitude toward an uncertain future. We explore how these two conceptions may be used to frame and address the familiar philosophical puzzle about the compatibility of divine omniscience and human free will. Keywords Bahala na · Theological fatalism · Omniscience · Free will · Filipino philosophy

1 Two Conceptions of Bahala Na The use of the Filipino expression bahala na is prevalent in Philippine society. So much so that despite speaking different languages, Filipinos from various parts of the country share a common understanding of its pragmatics and semantics in varying linguistic contexts. This is especially true in decision-making contexts. For example, a native Visaya understands what a Tagalog speaker means when she utters “bahala na” after deliberating what action to take. Likewise, an Ilokano understands what a Bicolano means with bahala na if he knows that the latter is contemplating a decision to act or not.1 Because of its prevalence, some scholars argue that bahala na reflects a uniquely Filipino cultural trait or attitude toward decision-making (Casiño, 2013; Hong, 2020). When one utters “bahala na” in a decision-making context, it signifies that the speaker is reluctant to make a decision or is not confident in her decision. Let us call this the deliberative use of bahala na. Let us contrast it from what we may call its agential use. Uttered in a particular context, the Tagalog sentence “Ako na bahala 1 The terms Visaya, Tagalog, Ilokano, and Bicolano refer to ethnolinguistic groups in the Visayas, Tagalog, Ilocos, and Bicol regions, respectively.

J. J. Joaquin (B) De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Hongladarom et al. (eds.), Philosophies of Appropriated Religions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5191-8_7

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diyan” means that its speaker takes responsibility for a particular action, which the English sentence, “I will take care of that,” may capture. On the other hand, the sentence “Bahala ka na diyan” or “Bahala na sila diyan” could mean the passing on of responsibility: “It is on you (them)” or “It is not my responsibility.” Alternatively, they could express indifference: “It is all up to you (them)” or “I do not care anymore” (Gripaldo, 2005). The agential use of bahala na implies that some agent is taking or passing on responsibility for a particular action. In some sense, the action of which responsibility is taken or passed on has a definite outcome, and the agent only chooses to take responsibility for it. In contrast, the deliberative use of bahala na does not imply a definite outcome. In expressing bahala na, the speaker waves her hands in surrender and lets things happen as they happen. This is not to say that she is no longer taking responsibility for her decision because, in some sense, she does. What she is not taking responsibility for, however, are the outcomes of her decision, which she leaves up to fate. This sense of bahala na is understandable, given its etymology. Bahala na comes from the Tagalog phrase, “si Bathala na,” which means “leave it up to Bathala.” The Tagalog word “Bathala,” refers to a supreme being who created and governed the universe, is worthy of worship and prayer, and has the traditional omni-properties associated with the Christian God (Bulatao, 1965; De Mesa, 1979; Jocano, 1981). However, historians have debated whether the Christianization of a pre-Hispanic indigenous religion brought about this conception of bahala na or whether some Islamic and Hindu concepts influenced it (Casiño, 2013; Matienzo, 2015). We set this historical issue aside in this paper. The use of bahala na has some religious undertones, particularly theistic ones. This may be attributed to the fact that various theistic religions are practiced in the Philippines. Almost 90% of the country’s population practice some form of Christianity, be it Adventist, Roman Catholic, Protestant, Baptist, Evangelical, Episcopalian, or even the local Christian sects, such as Iglesia ni Cristo (Church of Christ) and the Aglipayan Philippine Independent Church. 8% practice other theistic religions like Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism, while only a small percentage practice non-theistic religions like Buddhism, or identify as nonreligious or atheists. We could distinguish between two general conceptions of bahala na in decisionmaking contexts. The first implies a fatalistic attitude of surrender or submission to the will of an all-powerful and all-knowing God. This fatalistic conception is often associated with the Latin expression, “fiat voluntas tua,” which can be translated in English as “Thy will be done” or “let God’s will be done.” The phrase “Thy will be done” is familiar to many Christians as it is a passage in the Lord’s Prayer (aka the Our Father). The older generation of Filipino Christians may know it in Latin as Pater Noster or in Spanish as Padre Nuestro. The basic idea here is that when someone utters, “bahala na,” she is forgoing her agency and letting God take control of the outcomes of her decisions. The fatalistic attitude implied by bahala na is supported by sociological studies. Some theorists observe that this attitude is brought about by an individual’s religious commitments and the political and socioeconomic circumstances of the country (Bostrom, 1968; Bulatao, 1965; de Mesa, 1979). For example, people living in poor

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rural areas in the Philippines are mostly (Christian) theists. Many lack access to proper education, economic resources, social and physical infrastructures, and political and government subsidies. Being unable to access the necessities of life, these people feel powerless, and they resort to embracing a fatalistic attitude in going about their daily lives (Casiño, 2013; Hong, 2020). In effect, they leave their lives up to Divine Providence. As such, evidence suggests a strong correlation between the fatalistic bahala na attitude and the immediate social experience of an individual. On the other hand, the second conception of bahala na implies an open-minded attitude toward an uncertain future outcome. Psychological studies suggest that rather than being fatalistic, someone who utters, “bahala na,” has an open or improvisational attitude toward the future (Lagmay, 1978). In this sense, the person who embraces this kind of bahala na attitude has a positive functional response to uncertainty. She strongly tolerates the ambiguous outcomes of her decision. While she accepts things as they are—i.e., she accepts that her current situation is beyond her control—she adapts to the situation and welcomes spontaneity in succeeding actions. Moreover, an individual who embraces this open-minded conception of bahala na has a sense of responsibility (i.e., causality) for her life choices. To her mind, far from being products of God’s providential plan, her decision and its outcomes are hers and hers alone. How she lives her life is not up to God but to her. Under this conception, bahala na is something akin to the freewheeling, “anything goes” attitude implied by the expression “Geronimo.” Indeed, people who exclaim “Geronimo” while jumping off planes have complete knowledge and control of what they are doing, and their action is not left to fate. Their exclamation indicates a sense of adventure on their part. Some scholars claim that the two conceptions of bahala na imply different outlooks on life. The fatalistic conception implies a generally negative outlook that one has no control over her life, while the open-minded conception implies a positive outlook that her life is an open road (Casiño, 2013; Gripaldo, 2005; Hong, 2020). However, this way of assigning values to each conception’s implied view of life is not apt. After all, if the fatalistic conception is a sign of a person’s piety and faith in God, then a positive value might be assigned to it. On the other hand, if the open-minded conception indicates an individual’s attitudinal instability, then it might be judged as having a negative value. Perhaps a better contrast between these two conceptions could be put in terms of having an active or a passive attitude toward the outcomes of one’s decisions. In these terms, the fatalistic conception implies a passive, deferential attitude precisely because it indicates a person’s non-agency over her life, that her decisions and actions are not hers but God’s. On the other hand, the open-minded conception implies an active, playful attitude since it signifies that while the outcome of her life choices might be beyond her control, she still has some command over her life, and her actions are hers and hers alone. Whether an individual has agency over her life choices or God has control over them invites the familiar philosophical problem about the compatibility of human free will with divine omniscience. As we shall see in Sect. 3, the two conceptions of

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bahala na might be used to frame and address this problem. Before elaborating on this any further, however, let us first discuss this philosophical problem in the next section.

2 A Puzzle About Omniscience and Human Free Will The compatibility of human free will with divine omniscience is one of the problems concerning the concept of free will. It is a relatively old philosophical problem that stemmed from St. Augustine’s reflections in the fourth century CE (Rice, 2018). Unlike the other problems concerning free will that rely on a posteriori assumptions (e.g., the problem of the compatibility of free will with causal determinism, which is grounded on the empirical thesis that every event has a cause) Augustine’s compatibility problem rests on the a priori thesis that an omniscient God exists (Garrett, 2017, p. 95; Rice, 2018). We could formulate the problem using the following argument: 1. If God is omniscient, then God knows all truths. 2. If it is true that I will perform some action A, then God knows that I will perform A. 3. If I am free to perform A, then I could have performed not-A. 4. If I could have performed not-A, then God does not know I will perform A. 5. Either God knows that I will perform A, or God does not know that I will perform A. 6. Therefore, either God is not omniscient, or I am not free in performing A. Premise 1 defines divine omniscience. “God knows all things” means “God has conclusive knowledge of all truths,” where the scope of all truths is true propositions. This means that for any true proposition p, God knows that p. There is no possible scenario where God knows that p but p is false. This is right since to say otherwise implies a contradiction. That is, if God can know that p but p is false, then He does not have conclusive knowledge of all truths. Premise 2 logically follows from Premise 1. Given premise 1, all true propositions are within the scope of God’s divine knowledge. Thus, if “I will perform A” is true, it is within omniscience’s scope. It follows then that if it is true that I will perform A, God knows that I will perform A. Premise 3 provides a libertarian characterization of human free will. To say that I am free to perform A means that I could have done otherwise. I am free to perform A if there is a scenario where I did not perform A (Garrett, 2017). For example, since I could have opted not to raise my arm at a particular time t, it follows that if I did raise my arm at t, I was free to do so. More generally, I am free to perform an action A at t just in case I could have opted not to perform A at t. This general definition follows what philosophers have called the principle of alternative possibilities (Frankfurt, 1969; Robb, 2020). God’s actual knowledge implies premise 4. The scope of God’s omniscience is the set of all true propositions in the actual world. If God is omniscient, then He

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knows all truths in this world. Thus, if it is true that I will actually perform A, then He knows it. However, if I could have opted not to perform A, then it seems that He does not know it since what I will actually do is A. Premise 5 is an instance of the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM). LEM is one of the logical truths in classical (bivalent) logic. LEM implies that for every proposition p, either p is true or not-p is true. That is, it is always true that either some proposition is true or its negation is true. Being an instance of LEM, Premise 5—i.e., “Either God knows that I will perform A or God does not know that I will perform A”—is a logical truth (at least in classical logic). Finally, the conclusion of the argument just follows via logic since the argument itself is an instance of a valid (destructive) dilemma argument: • • • •

If A, then C If B, then D Either not-C or not-D So: either not-A or not-B

If the argument’s premises are true, its conclusion must also be true. However, the argument results in the puzzling conclusion that human free will is incompatible with God’s divine knowledge. If God is omniscient, I am not free to perform any action. Contrapositively, if I am free to perform a given action, then God is not omniscient. Given the argument, there is no possible scenario where human free will and an omniscient God exist. That is, the existence of human free will and the existence of an omniscient God are mutually exclusive.2 There have been standard responses to this argument. We will consider five of these here. The first is how Augustine himself responded to it. While God foreknows all things He causes, He is not the cause of all He foreknows (Cahn, 2009, p. 265). Accordingly, what is wrong with the argument is that it confuses the natural direction of dependence between God’s knowledge and the fact that I will perform A. Contra the argument, it is not because God knows that I will perform A that I performed A. Instead it is because I will, in fact, perform A that God knows that I will perform A (Garrett, 2017, p. 99). An objection to this response is also familiar. Omniscience may not cause me to perform A, but it may prove its necessity (Cahn, op cit). This is so because, as the argument is set up, God’s omniscience entails that if it is true that I will perform A, then God knows it. God is not omniscient if this entailment (i.e., if this necessary logical consequence) does not hold. The second response to the argument shows that the issue of the compatibility of human free will with divine omniscience is not that different from traditional fatalistic arguments. Thus, a response to the latter is also a response to the former. Traditional fatalistic arguments have the following structure:

2

Pike (1965) and Cahn (2009, p. 265) each offer a slightly different formulation of the argument. A discussion of Pike’s formulation is found in (Rice, 2018); for Cahn’s, see Garrett (2017, p. 99).

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J. J. Joaquin If it was true yesterday that I will tomorrow perform A then I will perform A. But if I could refrain from performing A, I could change the past. But this is impossible. But my action is not free if I cannot refrain from performing A.

A standard reply to this argument is to show that the second premise is false. That is, it is not true that if I could refrain from performing A, I could change the past. Consider two possible scenarios, S1 and S2. In S1, I do action A. In S2, I do something other than A, say B. The fact that I did B in S2 does not change the fact that I did A in S1. Thus, it is true that I could refrain from action A, but it is false that I could change the past. A similar strategy may be used to respond to the argument about God’s omniscience. This time the task is to show that Premise 4 is false. That is, it is not true that if I could have performed not-A, then God does not know that I will perform A. Consider two possible scenarios, S1 and S2, again. As before, I performed A in S1, while I did something else in S2. But the fact that I performed something else in S2 does not confute God’s knowledge that I performed A in S1. Thus, while it is true that I could have performed not-A, it is false that God does not know that I will perform A (Garrett, 2017, p. 99). The third standard response to the argument challenges the libertarian definition of free will in Premise 3. This has been done by compatibilists (aka soft determinists). According to compatibilists, the principle of alternative possibilities, i.e., the principle used to define free will in terms of the ability to do something other than what one actually has done, does not guarantee human free will (Frankfurt, 1969). Consider the case of Andres, who was brainwashed by a mad scientist such that whenever he hears a whistle, he cannot help but raise his hand. Suppose that, for some reason or other, Andres intends to raise his hand for a particular moment. And he did. But as he was raising his hand, he heard the sound of a whistle. Given the libertarian definition of free will, Andres’s action was not done out of free will since there is no possible scenario where he could have opted not to raise his hand. Intuition tells us, however, that this is the wrong verdict. Andres’s action seems to have been done out of his free will. Compatibilists claim that this intuition is right and that this kind of (Frankfurt-style) case suggests a more apt definition of human free will, to wit: I am free to do A just in case my beliefs and desires cause the performance of A. What this implies in the argument about God’s divine knowledge is simple. Since the principle of alternative possibilities is false, it follows that it is possible that I performed A out of my own free will, yet I could still not have done not-A. This is right if my beliefs and desires cause my actions. This shows then the argument’s Premise 3 is false; hence, the whole argument is unsound. The fourth response to the argument argues that Premise 1 is false. That is, while God is omniscient, it does not imply that God knows all and only true propositions. One motivation for this is the Divine Liar paradox proposed by Grimm (1983). Consider the sentence: (*) God believes that (*) is false.

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Suppose that (*) is true. Then what it says holds. Since it says that God believes that (*) is false, it follows that God believes a false proposition. However, if God is omniscient, He cannot have false beliefs. Hence, if (*) is true, God is not omniscient. Moreover, if (*) is true, then there is at least one true proposition that God does not know, viz., (*) itself, since if (*) is true, then God believes that (*) is false. It follows from this that God holds a contradictory belief. On the other hand, if (*) is false, then what it says does not hold. This means that it is not the case that God believes that (*) is false. However, ex hypothesi, this implies that (*) is true since there is some sense that this is what (*), in fact, says. But if this is the case, God does not believe it; hence He does not know. Two kinds of responses may be given to the Divine Liar paradox. One is a response that hinges on the tenets of classical logic, the other on the tenets of some nonclassical logic. The classical response might imply the acceptance of the paradox’s consequence that God is not omniscient either because God holds a contradictory belief or because there is at least one true proposition that He does not believe (Grimm, 1983, p. 267). However, a non-classical response to it might imply the denial of this consequence but the acceptance that God could hold contradictory beliefs (Cotnoir, 2018). This non-classical response implies that if there are such things as dialetheias (i.e., true contradictions), then if (*) is a dialetheia, there is nothing wrong if an omniscient God knows that (*). This is so on the assumption that (*) is both true and false. If (*) is both true and false, then it has a true part that God knows. This means that God is omniscient, and He knows all true propositions and also some propositions that are both true and false. Finally, the fifth and final solution that we will consider is the failure of LEM. Premise 5 hinges on the truth of LEM. If LEM holds, then it is logically true that God knows that I will perform A, or God does not know that I will perform A. However, there are cases where LEM fails. Consider the case of denotation failure. Santa Claus is jolly is neither true nor false since there is no such thing as Santa Claus. Thus, it is neither true nor false that Santa Claus is jolly or Santa Claus is not jolly. If “God knows that I will perform A” is neither true nor false in this way, then Premise 5 is also neither true nor false. It is neither true nor false that God knows I will perform A.

3 Bahala Na and the Puzzle of Omniscience In the previous section, we discussed the philosophical puzzle about the compatibility of free will with divine omniscience and the five solutions to it. Now let us look into how the two conceptions of bahala na (discussed in Sect. 1) could be used to frame and address this puzzle.3 3 The first (published) inquiry into the implications of bahala na to the philosophical problem of fatalism was undertaken by Gripaldo (2005) (Matienzo, 2015). Gripaldo’s work is notable as it outlined the various philosophical positions implied by this Filipino expression and evaluates the

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Recall that the fatalistic conception of bahala na implies the passive attitude that the outcomes of one’s decisions are not up to oneself but are up to God. Those who hold this attitude submit the outcomes of her decisions to the will of an omni-God. One may immediately think that the fatalistic conception implies the puzzle. The thought is that since the passive attitude implied by bahala na is fatalistic and the puzzle is a fatalistic argument, the fatalistic conception implies the puzzle. This way of interpreting the fatalistic conception then holds that given the argument (presented in Sect. 2), the puzzling conclusion that God is not omniscient or we do not have free will is true since it is true that we do not have free will. Given this fatalistic conception, the puzzle affirms God’s omniscience but a denial of human free will. God indeed knows all truths, and if it is true that I will perform A, then God knows that I will perform A. This means Premises 1 and 2 of the argument are true. Moreover, it is also true that I am not free to perform A. That is, it is false that I could have performed not-A. This means Premise 3 and Premise 4 are trivially true (since they have a false antecedent). Consequently, the argument leading to the puzzling conclusion is valid. However, there is another way of interpreting the fatalistic conception of bahala na that does not imply the outright denial of human free will. In this interpretation, one’s submission to God’s will is an act of human free will. That is, surrendering everything to God is done out of one’s free will. Thus, while a person may be passive about the outcomes of her decision, she is nonetheless making an active commitment to submit herself to the will of God. This means that at least one action is done out of one’s free will. Viewing bahala na as an active submission to God’s will can be likened to the Arabic expression, “In sha’Allah,” a famous expression in the Noble Quran based on James 4:15 of the Christian Bible. “In sha’Allah” means “God willing” or “if God wills.” Thus, in uttering, “In sha’Allah,” one is letting the outcome of future events up to God. However, this does not imply that the speaker no longer has free will. On the contrary, in uttering the expression, the speaker hopes that her decision’s outcomes follow the will of God. Interpreted this way, the fatalistic conception of bahala na implies the denial of the argument’s Premise 4. In this interpretation, it is false that if I could have performed not-A, God does not know that I will perform A. Given this, it is true that God is omniscient and He knows that I will perform A if it is true that I will perform A. This makes Premise 1 and Premise 2 of the argument true. However, if A is the very act of submitting to God’s will and the very act itself is done out of free will, then I could have opted not to submit to the will of God. This makes Premise 3 true. However, this possibility does not imply that God does not know that I will surrender to God’s will since (using the second response to the puzzle outlined in the previous section) my surrendering is an actual fact God knows. At the same time, my act of non-surrender is a possible fact that God also knows. Thus, if bahala na “positive” and “negative” features of bahala na. This present work is different from Gripaldo’s since its main focus is to elucidate the implications of the passive and active attitudes implied by bahala na to the concept of divine omniscience.

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is interpreted as an active surrender to God’s will, the compatibility of human free will with God’s omniscience is preserved. Let us now turn to the open-minded conception of bahala na. As was discussed above (in Sect. 1), this conception implies an active, improvisational attitude toward an uncertain future. This means that while one accepts that her present actions are a product of her agency (her free will), their future outcomes are open and are left up to God’s providence. A straightforward interpretation of the open-minded conception implies that the future is open. That is, it implies a kind of indefiniteness. One way to make sense of this is to utilize a three-valued logic that accepts truth-value gaps, especially in sentences about the future. That the future has an indefiniteness quality implies that sentences about it do not have a definite truth value. They are neither true nor false or are in the gap between truths and falsities. This means that not all temporal sentences (i.e., tensed sentences) have a definite true or false value. In some sense, sentences about the past and present do have a definite truth value. The past tense sentence, “I raised my arm five minutes ago,” is true if I did raise my arm five minutes ago (false, otherwise). On the other hand, the sentence, “I am now raising my hand,” is true if it is the case that I am now raising my hand (false, otherwise). While the truth (or falsity) of the sentences about the past and present have some definiteness, sentences about the future do not have such a quality. Consider the future tense sentence, “I will go to the office tomorrow.” It is still open whether I will indeed go to the office tomorrow. Thus, whether the sentence about it is true or false is also open. If I did go to the office at that time, it would be true then; otherwise, it would be false (Cahn, 2009, p. 266; Rice, 2018). Unlike true past and present tense sentences with some solid quality, the truth of future tense sentences is malleable since it depends on how things will turn out. In a sense, while the past and present are real in the robust sense that they both exist, the future is unreal since it is still yet to exist.4 The open future view implies something about the omniscience puzzle. If future tense sentences do not have a definite truth value, then the whole motivation for the puzzle collapses. The puzzle is motivated by the issue of whether or not God knows that an individual will perform some future action A. As the argument goes, if God knows that she will perform A, her action is not done out of her free will. God is not omniscient if God does not know that she will perform A. In either case, the mutual exclusivity of divine omniscience and human free will follows. However, if the open future view is right, then the truth of future tense sentences is neither true nor false since future events have an indefinite quality. The future tense sentence, “I will perform A,” is neither true nor false. If I did perform A (at some future time), the sentence is true; otherwise, it is false. The indeterminacy of my future performance of A does not affect God’s knowledge of my future performance of A, nor does it mean that I am not free in performing A. 4

There is a whole literature about the metaphysics of time implied by the indefinite nature of future tense sentences. However, this is already beyond the scope of this present paper. For a discussion of this literature, see (Garrett, 2017, ch. 7).

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Like the second response to the puzzle (considered in Sect. 2), my possible nonperformance of A implies that my performance of A was done out of my free will. On the other hand, the same possible fact does not affect God’s knowledge of my performance of A since God still knows that I will perform A, and He also knows that I could have done not-A. The open future view implied by the open-minded conception of bahala na is reminiscent of Aristotle’s solution to the sea battle argument. The sea battle argument runs as follows: Either there will be a sea battle tomorrow, or there will not be a sea battle tomorrow. If there will be a sea battle tomorrow, then it is inevitable that there will be. If there will not be a sea battle tomorrow, then it is inevitable that there will not be. Hence it is inevitable that there will be a sea battle tomorrow, or it is inevitable that there will not be a sea battle tomorrow. (Garrett, 2017, p. 96)

The ultimate conclusion of the argument is that the future is inevitable. Aristotle responds that the sentence, “There will be a sea battle tomorrow,” has no definite truth value. Hence, its first premise is not true. Moreover, since future events have no definite truth value, their inevitability also has no definite truth value (Cahn, 2009, p. 262; Rice, 2018).

4 Conclusion We have seen how the two conceptions of bahala na could be used to frame and address the puzzle about the compatibility of human free will with divine omniscience. On the one hand, the fatalistic conception implies two ways of framing the puzzle. The first is a rather straightforward acceptance of the puzzling conclusion about the mutual exclusivity of God’s omniscience and human free will. If God is omniscient, then we do not have free will. Thus, if bahala na is interpreted as a passive submission to God’s will, then our actions are not our own but God’s. The second implies that surrendering to God’s will is not passive but an active attitude. This means it is false that if I could not have submitted to God’s will, then God does not know that I will submit to His will. On the other hand, the open-minded conception of bahala na implies that while I have some control over my present actions, their future outcomes are still uncertain. More generally, future events do not have a definite quality that (past and) present events have. In this interpretation, they are not inevitable since future events have an indefinite quality. This makes room for free will. However, this does not mean that God is not omniscient. God knows I will perform some future action even if I could have opted not to. This is so since God’s knowledge’s scope includes actual and possible facts.

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References Bostrom, L. C. (1968). Filipino Bahala Na and American Fatalism. Silliman Journal, 15(3), 399– 413. Bulatao, J. (1965). Split-level Christianity. Philippines Sociological Review, 13(2), 119–121. Cahn, S. M. (2009). Fatalism. In J. Kim, E. Sosa, & G. Rosenkrantz (Eds.), A companion to metaphysics (2nd ed., pp. 264–266). Basil Blackwell. Casiño, T. C. (2013). Mission in the context of Filipino Folk Spirituality: Bahala Na as a Case in Point. In W. Ma & K. R. Ross (Eds.), Mission spirituality and authentic discipleship (pp. 157– 171). Regnum Books International. Cotnoir, A. J. (2018). Theism and dialetheism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 96(3), 592–609. de Mesa, J. M. (1979). And God said, “Bahala na!”: The theme of providence in the Lowland Filipino context. Publishers’ Printing Press. Frankfurt, H. (1969). Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. The Journal of Philosophy, 66(23), 829–839. Garrett, B. (2017). What is this thing called Metaphysics? (3rd ed.). Routledge. Grimm, P. (1983). Some neglected problems of omniscience. American Philosophical Quarterly, 20(3), 265–276. Gripaldo, R. M. (2005). Bahala Na [Come what may]: A Philosophical Analysis. In R. M. Gripaldo (Ed.), Filipino cultural traits: Claro R. Ceniza Lectures (pp. 203–220). Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Hong, Y. (2020). Powerlessness and a social imaginary in the Philippines: A case study on Bahala Na. The Ashbury Journal, 75(1), 127–150. Jocano, F. L. (1981). Folk Christianity: A preliminary study of conversion and patterning of Christian experience in the Philippines. Trinity Research Institute. Lagmay, A. V. (1978). Bahala Na! Philippine Journal of Psychology, 26(1), 31–36. Matienzo, R. A. (2015). Revisiting the philosophy of Bahala Na Folk Spirituality. Filocracia, 2(2), 86–105. Pike, N. (1965). Divine omniscience and voluntary action. Philosophical Review, 74, 27–46. Rice, H. (2018). Fatalism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition) (E. N. Zalta, Ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/fatalism/ Robb, D. (2020). Moral responsibility and the principle of alternative possibilities. The Stanford encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition) (E. N. Zalta, Ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/arc hives/fall2020/entries/alternative-possibilities/

Jeremiah Joven Joaquin is Professor of Philosophy at the College of Liberal Arts and Research Fellow of the Southeast Asia Research Center and Hub (SEARCH), De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines. He is also Associate Member of the University of Birmingham Centre for Philosophy of Religion. He is the present President of the Philosophical Association of the Philippines. He specializes in the philosophy of religion, moral philosophy, philosophical logic, and metaphysics.

Chapter 8

Taking a Point of View on a Debatable Question Concerning Karma and Rebirth Frank J. Hoffman

Abstract My thesis is that there is a way to mediate between two competing views about karma and rebirth by arguing for a third position. The first, or traditionalist view, is that supernatural agencies are required in the Buddhist system of concepts and that secularism and naturalized karma view will not supply concepts necessary for traditional Buddhism. The second, or modernist view, holds the opposite view. Supernatural agencies are not required in the Buddhist system of concepts, and even without traditional concepts of karma, rebirth, and enlightenment after death, there is still a coherent karma and rebirth theory as applied to experience in this very lifetime. A third position, or mediating view of coexistence, advocates a doctrinal interpretation of Buddhist teachings, a socially engaged practice inspired by mett¯a, and the theory and practice of satipat.t.h¯ana (mindfulness of breathing). I will inquire into each of the above views on karma and rebirth by asking: what it means (the linguistic concern), how does one know (the epistemological concern), and how does it work (the pragmatic concern)? These are three fundamental philosophical questions for meaning, knowledge, and application. Although I will exemplify aspects of each position concerning some Buddhist philosophers, I am mainly interested in the three kinds of positions and the benefits of each one. So, I am not interested in identifying the Buddhist scholar with what many call “the best view” or “the most popular view.” I am interested in identifying the position most likely to bring unity to humankind and benefit the global ecosystem of animals, earth, and people going forward. In sum, to raise the linguistic, epistemological, and pragmatic concerns about the interpretation

A Substantially Different Version of This First Part Was Read at the Association for Core Texts and Courses, Special Meeting, Irvine, California As “Which Asian Texts Should American College Students Read?” at Concordia University and the Atrium Hotel, July 13–15, 2018. An Updated Version Was Previously Written for Publication in the Journal of Philosophy and Religion of Thailand, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2564), Feb. 15, 2022. This Version Is Substantially the Same As That in the Journal Article, and It Was Presented As a Lecture for the Second Time at a Hybrid Conference on 24 March 2023 in the College of Religious Studies, Mahidol University. F. J. Hoffman (B) International Buddhist Studies College, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Ayutthaya, Thailand e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Hongladarom et al. (eds.), Philosophies of Appropriated Religions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5191-8_8

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of karma and rebirth is to raise some of the most significant and consequential questions we can ask about Buddhism in modernity. Keywords Karma · Rebirth · Modernist view · Traditionalist view · Modified view

1 Stipulative Definitions For use in this paper, I understand these terms as follows. Naturalized karma and rebirth view: Naturalized theory of karma and rebirth holds that traditional concepts of karma, rebirth, and enlightenment are unnecessary for Buddhism. Instead, karma and rebirth are to be applied only to experience in this very lifetime; and talk about nibb¯ana is only about nibb¯ana saup¯adisesa (nibb¯ana with the five aggregates intact) and not talk about nibb¯ana anup¯adisesa (nibb¯ana after death without the five aggregates for a Tath¯agata). The naturalized karma and rebirth view is essential to the Buddhist Modernist view and is antithetical to the Buddhist traditionalist view. Secularism: holds a viewpoint relating not to religion but to pragmatic and naturalistic concerns, relating not to spiritual matters but to ethical and everyday concerns. Buddhist traditionalist view: This holds that the theory of karma and rebirth without traditional concepts of karma, rebirth, and enlightenment is unintelligible. On this view, the theory of karma and rebirth must include talk of enlightenment after death, that is, of nibb¯ana anup¯adisesa (nibb¯ana without the five aggregates intact), and Buddhist Modernism does not. Traditionalists assert that the naturalized karma view is conceptually unconnected with related concepts that would ground key terms in traditional Buddhism. Buddhist modernist view: This view asserts that the naturalized karma view can be connected with other Buddhist concepts to form a coherent view of karma and rebirth. The Buddhist modernist view is the logical negation of the Buddhist Traditionalist view.1 1

An overview comment about Professor Richard Gombrich’s interview with the Secular Buddhism organization, relates the idea of Buddhism in the modern world thusly: The term living tradition may seem as much an oxymoron as, well, Secular Buddhism. And yet this organic vitality is a hallmark of Buddhism, even and perhaps especially today. There have been growing pains as Buddhism rubs up against, and eventually becomes part of each different cultural context it encountered, but eventually Buddhism settled in. It’s been an evolutionary tale, as new forms arise from the selective pressures of the environment, while older varieties may still flourish… or at least soldier on. Today is perhaps the greatest assault, as new ideas and cultures are pushing and pulling the tradition with unprecedented rapidity and variety. (Messner, 2017)

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2 Introduction In the paper, I will outline versions of the Traditionalist and Modernist positions and propose a Middle Position.2 This position may activate cohesive community Buddhist values for both laity and monastic Sangha.3 On this view, one may experience continuity of experience from ordinary mental peace to Nibbana in this very life, whether monastic or laity.4 A path of social engagement that is agnostic about the supernatural but focused on meditation in daily life and benefiting local and global communities can coexist with traditional Sangha in the twenty-first century and beyond.5 In this process, I will make my argument toward proving a particular thesis about the interpretation of karma and rebirth against the background of traditionalist and modernist positions.6 Before this, let us first rehearse the arguments for these two latter positions.

2

The Appendix of this paper provides detailed text data for a well-rounded understanding of karma and rebirth. It uses a recent publication from Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya Press, Common Buddhist Text: Guidance and Insight from the Buddha, which includes Theravada, Mahayana, and Vajrayana texts and is now available free online. CBT, for short, is a singular development in the study of religion in Thailand today. It is a volume compiled by a team of Buddhist Studies text specialists that authoritatively presents Theravada, Mahayana, and Vajrayana translations of Buddhist texts. The CBT in the Appendix of this paper shows in practice how topics in Buddhism may be presented well in only one volume of a little more than 400 pages. 3 Socially Engaged Buddhism refers to a process of applying meditation practice and dhamma teachings to situations of social, political, environmental, and economic suffering and injustice. It was mentioned by Walpola Rahaula in 1946 in connection with Buddha’s instruction to monks to travel and spread the teachings widely, and that Buddha’s teachings included social and economic matters. In the 1950s, Ven. Thich Nhat Hanh and Plum Village made the idea influential through his collection of articles, “A Fresh Look at Buddhism”, and in his response to war by community service in 1963 in Vietnam. The humanistic Buddhism movement in China of Taixu and Yinshun was an inspiration (and later Cheng Yen and Hsing Yun in Taiwan). In 1998, the Dalai Lama emphasized on a retreat in Bodh Gaya that, in contrast to Christians, Buddhists have not acted vigorously to address social and political issues. Roshi Pat Enkyo O’Hara has continued the Engaged Buddhist movement for Village Zendo in New York. 4 Divisions between monastics and laity are perpetuated by traditional beliefs that only ordained persons can attain enlightenment, but Buddhadasa has challenged this way of thinking. For example, Peter Jackson (1988, p. 319) observes that “many monks follow a kammatic form of Buddhism rather than a nibbanic rather than a kammatic form of Buddhism and some lay people follow the nibbanic form of the religion.” 5 “Beyond” here refers to the emergence of a united Sangha consisting of male and female monastics and laity united on the basis of equality as human beings. These sons and daughters of the Buddha may work together toward common goals of bhavana or body-mind cultivation, facilitating human flourishing on the psychological and artistic levels, world peace, ecological harmony, and mitigating dukkha or suffering of all beings who can feel pain. 6 The traditionalist and modernist debate started with the exchange between Stephen Batchelor (1997) and Bhikkhu Bodhi (1998).

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3 Three Philosophical Views: Traditionalist, Modernist, and Mediating View The traditionalist argument may be formulated as follows.

3.1 Argument A—Traditionalist Argument (1) There are two popular filters with which Buddhism is viewed, secularism and naturalized karma theory, and viewing Buddhism with either or both of these two filters, one departs from traditional Buddhism. (2) Naturalized karma theory holds a view rejected by most Theravada practitioners, namely that without traditional concepts of karma, rebirth, and enlightenment karma theory may still be called karma theory if applied only to experience in this very lifetime. (3) Secularism holds views rejected by most Theravada practitioners, namely that focusing on pragmatic and naturalistic concerns and not on spiritual matters is a good path. (4) As a corollary, viewing Buddhism from secularism and naturalized karma filters one departs from traditional Buddhism. (5) In traditional Buddhism, concepts of karma, rebirth, and enlightenment form a conceptual web, and no one of these concepts is intelligible without the others. (6) The first part of K¯al¯ama Sutta about self-reliance forms a conceptual web with the second part recommending consulting the viññ¯u or wise ones, and also with the third part on the four assurances in “the safe bet argument.” (7) There is no karma without rebirth, and there is no self-reliance without the context of dialogue with the viññ¯u or wise ones and the safe bet argument of the four assurances.7 Therefore, secularism and naturalized karma filters are views rejected by most traditional Theravada Buddhist practitioners and are regarded as conceptually unconnected with related concepts such as karma, rebirth, and enlightenment that would ensure the meaning of the terms in traditional Buddhism. We apply the semantic, epistemological, and pragmatic criteria to evaluate this argument. We ask, What does the traditional view mean? How does one know it? How does the traditional view work? The view has meaning because language games and forms of life, such as meditation, pilgrimage, and donation, conceptually fit together. The traditional view has an epistemological basis because those who practice the abhiññ¯a and sam¯adhi and experience the ninth stage of meditation will know and see for themselves. Depending on the particular experience of individuals, there are many benefits possible from meditation, such as developing the four brahmavih¯aras—mett¯a (loving kindness), karun.a¯ 7

Compare this schema with Batchelor (1997) and Bodhi (1998, pp. 14–21).

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(compassion), mudit¯a (sympathy), upekkh¯a (equanimity)—and reducing kodhana (hatred and irritability). The view has pragmatic outcomes that work in terms of wellness and satisfactions that generations of meditators report having as benefits from studying with famous masters who know the psychic powers or abhiññ¯a. However, it does not have the benefit of changing with the times, as the historically slow (and sometimes entirely lacking) support for women in Buddhism shows. The main point about the traditionalist view is as follows. Supernatural agencies are required in Buddhism, and both the filter of secularism and the filter of naturalized karma theory have departed from the traditionalist view of Buddhism in not believing in supernatural agencies. We can formulate the modernist argument as follows.

3.2 Argument B—Modernist Argument (1) (2) (3) (4)

Buddhism was never static but continually developed. There is no static or original form of Buddhism that remains totally unchanged. Whether there is any undisputable core of Buddhist doctrine is unclear. There is no absolute standpoint to say a concept is or is not unconnected with Buddhism but only a range of possibilities in a contested space.8

Therefore, in this Buddhist modernist view, doctrines of secularism and naturalized karma are logically connected to Buddhism. As we did in evaluating the traditionalist argument, we apply the semantic, epistemological, and pragmatic criteria. We ask, What does it mean? How does one know? How does it work? The modernist view has a meaning because there are language games and forms of life such as going to Sangha meditation meetings together, studying and discussing Buddhist writings in the group, helping newcomers find the way, and chanting together. The view has an epistemology because those who practice meditation will know and see the results for themselves. The view has pragmatic outcomes in terms of wellness and the cultivation of mindfulness. However, it does not have the advantage of retaining the traditional beliefs that many people find comforting and believable. The main point of the Modernist View is that supernatural agencies are not required in modern Buddhism. The conclusion of Buddhist modernists in Argument B contradicts the conclusion of Buddhist traditionalists in Argument A. So, we have a disputable question that the mediating position in Argument C will attempt to resolve. This argument is as follows. 8

Compare with Batchelor (1997). See also Batchelor’s interview at Barre Center for Buddhist Studies on his recent book, After Buddhism, which is available at buddhistinquiry.org (accessed October 24, 2021), and Divan Thomas Jones’s review of Batchelor’s books, After Buddhism and Secular Buddhism for the Western Buddhist Review, which is available at thebuddhistcentre.com (accessed October 24, 2021).

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3.3 Argument C—Mediating the Traditionalist and the Modernist Views (1) Kesaputta Sutta, commonly called the K¯al¯ama Sutta (or “Discourse to the K¯al¯amas”) applies to modernist-type criticism of karma and rebirth and presents a wager (or safe bet) argument in defense of believing in karma and rebirth. (2) The safe bet argument can support the idea of karma and rebirth when expressed in narratives told but not asserted as facts; that is, when they become guiding or regulative beliefs without metaphysics.9 (3) As a corollary, Buddhist views like the “safe bet” argument of the K¯al¯ama Sutta cover belief in karma and rebirth without metaphysics pragmatically against traditionalist claims that karma and rebirth must be understood as involving spiritual agencies. [By (2)] (4) The eightfold noble path consists of the right view, right intention, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration. (5) Morality, concentration, and wisdom constitute a summary of the eightfold noble path according to traditionalists. (6) Every day throughout the day people experience rising and falling, and karma and rebirth, because persons are not substances but processes constantly made and remade within the causal nexus of change.10 (7) As a corollary, Buddhism does not have to give up its traditional ethics of morality, concentration, and wisdom in replying to modernist criticism of karma and rebirth. Therefore, the safe bet argument in “Discourse to the K¯al¯amas” defends traditionalist belief in the theory of karma and rebirth from some modernist criticisms and allows one to retain traditional ethics when reinterpreted as regulative beliefs without metaphysics. The main point about the Mediating View is that although supernatural agencies are not required in modern Buddhism, they may be used by practitioners who find them comforting and believable. Now let us evaluate this mediating position and ask, What does it mean? How does one know? How does it work? First, it has a clear meaning as used in language games and forms of life of going to meditation meetings, studying Buddhist writings, helping newcomers find the way, and chanting together. Second, the view has an epistemology because those practicing meditation will know and see the results for themselves and may be assisted with their questions by monks, nuns, and laypersons in the practitioners’ community. Thirdly, this mediating view combines the benefits of both monastic life and householder life.

9

My expression of this premise owes much to the ideas of Richard Braithwaite (1955/1970) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1972), especially the latter’s idea of “regulative beliefs.” 10 I owe this point to Bhikkhu Buddhadasa, but the phraseology is mine, so I cannot attribute it exactly to him. Compare this point with some process philosophers.

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There are many benefits possible from meditation in terms of developing the four brahmavih¯aras, i.e., mett¯a, karun¯a, mudit¯a, upekkh¯a, reducing anger and irritability (kodhana). The view has pragmatic outcomes in terms of wellness and satisfactions that generations of meditators report—not by developing abhiññ¯a (six items of higher knowledge, psychic powers)—but by developing satipat..th¯ana (or cit-wang as Buddhadasa sometimes said). This could be developing the kaya, vedan¯a, citta, ¯ ap¯anassati system and dharma as four initial keys to everything in Buddhadasa’s An¯ of mindfulness with breathing (Buddhadasa, 1990/2006, pp. 16, 40, 114–122, 127, 152, 160). It has the advantages of retaining focus on traditional doctrines for those who need them and the advantage of adapting to changing times and is, therefore, the most beneficial of the three views. It has the advantage over the Buddhist Modernist View of retaining some traditional beliefs that many people find comforting and believable. It has the advantage of being open to how Buddhism may develop in a future that can only flourish without dogmatism and in the spirit of discovery indicated in the K¯al¯ama Sutta. Let me be precise about this Mediating View’s semantics, epistemology, and pragmatics. The view has meaning because there are language games and forms of life called modern Buddhism in which meditation practices and social engagement coexist, helping local and global communities. The view has an epistemological basis because those practicing traditional Buddhist meditation and socially engaged Buddhism will know and see the dual benefits intertwining themselves. These practitioners see that combining traditional and modernist Buddhist practices has pragmatic outcomes far above developing in isolation. These practitioners are not cut off from traditional learning and growing from famous old masters in robes and popular contemporary Buddhist speakers. It is a process philosopher’s way of being Buddhist comparable to re-enchantment without supernaturalism.11 Using meditation, engagement with societal issues related to the psychological issues of individual people, social issues related to Sangha and laity interaction, and all learn more from Buddhist social life while retaining the dhamma such as four noble truths and the eightfold noble path.12 The main point about the Middle Position is that belief in supernatural agencies is not required in Buddhism but may be present in Buddhism for those who find these beliefs comforting and believable.

11

For related developments in other religions, see inter alia John B. Cobb and David Griffin (1976), C. Robert Mesle (2008), and David Ray Griffin (2020). 12 A contemporary example is the monastery and eco-village of Ven. Prof. Dr. Hansa Dhammahaso at Sisaket. The eco-village is described in Kanchana Horsaengchai’s dissertation in progress at IBSC MCU.

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4 Summary and Conclusion In summary, Traditionalists assert that secularism and naturalized karma view are conceptually unconnected with related concepts that would ground key terms in traditional Buddhism. Modernists deny what traditionalists assert and instead assert that secularism and naturalized karma view can be connected with other ethical concepts in Buddhism to form a coherent whole without metaphysics. The Middle Way position mediates by saying that traditional meditation practices with sila (ethics) of the eightfold path can combine with old and new forms of meditation, so the three traditions of Theravada, Mahayana, and Vajrayana can coexist and be practiced in a socially engaged way. In this way, nibb¯ana in this very life is the focus of the meditative practices, and socially engaged Buddhism is one form that mental cultivation (bh¯avan¯a) takes. Anything to do with nibb¯ana after death and sam¯adhi states would still be a viable practice for those thus dedicated to the old tradition (boran kammatth¯ana) of esoteric Theravada (Crosby, 2020). However, in modernity, many practitioners in a unified Sangha consider the problem is to achieve greater unity. As I interpret Buddhaghosa, a¯ n¯ap¯anasati (mindfulness of breathing) and satipat..th¯ana (four foundations of mindfulness) are both very important. Just as doing philosophy and practicing Buddhism can be done at different moments in human life, so too different Buddhist traditions can coexist. From my perspective, it is evident that, as stated above, the Middle Position is more beneficial than either of the other one-sided views and, thus is the most acceptable view. Open-mindedness and not dogmatism have characterized the Buddha’s perspective from the beginning and, accordingly, whatever view one takes, it is important to keep an open mind.

5 Epilogue The mid to late twentieth-century philosophy, including the philosophy of religion, pivoted toward Wittgenstein, and this development is not dead yet (Putnam, 1995). Now the worlds of science and humanities are taking a process turn. Before philosophy had its epistemological turn with early modern philosophy, it had a pragmatic turn with William James and a linguistic turn in the twentieth century. Perhaps now we can say there is a process turn. Alfred North Whitehead (1929), John B. Cobb and David Ray Griffin (1976), and C. Robert Mesle (2008) have shown the way to process philosophy and theology. It is distinct from the substance and dualistic thinking of the past. Some process thinkers, especially John Cobb, have shown a special affinity with Buddhist thinking, taking William James’ engagement with Buddhism further than ever before. One in this process group, David Ray Griffin, has written Reenchantment without Supernaturalism (2020), exploring how in his view Christianity is possible in modernity without mind–body dualism and without clinging to ghostly supernatural views of the afterlife. Recently, Don Cupitt paved the way in A Sea of

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Faith and numerous other books with his idea of a perspective with Buddhist form and Christian content (Cupitt, 1984). Speaking personally for a moment, I hope that the next generation of Buddhist philosophers will develop an inter-religious philosophy of religion in a process way toward the global coexistence of faiths. This development may link with contemporary movements of ecological awareness and breaking down unilateral binary thinking that pervades modern society in many ways.

Appendix Let us see what the MCU expert translation team of international scholars says about karma and rebirth. Using the recently published Common Buddhist Text: Guidance and Insight from the Buddha (Ayutthaya: Mahaculalongkornrajavidyalaya University Press, 2017 and 2018), it is easily possible to choose a topic, for example, karma and rebirth, and sketch the outlines of the Buddha’s with exact textual references from the Pali, and I now summarize.13 In Theravada Buddhism, there is samsara, a cycle of rebirths, but it is without a known beginning. It follows that there is, on this view, no evidence of a first beginning initiated by a monotheistic substance called “God” (Tinakattha Sutta of Samyutta Nikaya II.178). The reality of rebirth and karma is understood in Theravada Buddhism as independent of sacrifices and gifts, unlike in ancient Hindu rituals. It is an error to deny a future life, how one is reborn depends on one’s conduct, and awakened ones directly know and see this (Apannaka Sutta of Majjhima Nikaya I.402). Buddhists think that believing in rebirth and karma is a safe bet, as stated in the third part of the K¯al¯ama Sutta. This last one is a very important and well-known sutta, but it is not one that people typically study deeply and completely: part one is about being self-reliant, part two is about paying attention to the words of the wise ones, viz., the intellectuals (viññ¯u), and the third part is the probabilistic argument to the effect that believing in rebirth and karma is a safe bet (Kesaputta or K¯al¯ama Sutta of Anguttara Nikaya I.192).14 Another sutta says that there are five main rebirth realms: purgatory, animal, hungry ghosts, human, or the gods or devas (Nibbedhika Sutta of Anguttara Nikaya III.415). As Buddhism developed, there came to be a sixth realm, the Titans. Perhaps the devas are of two types, one benevolent and shining, and another wrathful type who is malevolent and likes to fight. The titans or asuras were divided 13

Most Venerable Phra Brahmapundit et.al, Common Buddhist Text, p. 258. The four consolations of the Kessamutt Sutta (K¯al¯ama Sutta) are: if there is a heaven and I’m free from enmity and ill will, I will experience it; if there is not a heavenly realm, I will still have been free from enmity and ill will; if bad things happen to people who do bad things since I have no bad intentions then I will be unharmed; if bad things don’t happen to people who do bad things, I will be pure anyway (Bhikkhu Sujato, Kesamuttisutta, p. 65). The text is available at the K¯al¯amas of Kesamutta suttacentral.net. 14

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over time from the benevolent deities to be an independent realm making a sixth rebirth realm. Anyway, rebirth as a human is a precious and rare opportunity, as Nakhasika Sutta explains. If one is fortunate enough to have a human rebirth, then it is prudent to use the opportunity to attain enlightenment (Nakhasika Sutta of Samyutta Nikaya II.263.). Being born a human who can hear the dhamma is rare (Dhammapada 182). So, since life is short, it is good to practice while you can (Dhammapada 47). Our world in the context of the universe is among clusters of worlds throughout the universe (Abhibhu Sutta of the Anguttara Nikaya I.227–228). Buddha’s view has cycles of cosmic eons (Pabbata Sutta of the Samyutta Nikaya II.181–182). Next, to consider karma, karma (Pali: kamma) is volition (Nibbedhika Sutta of Anguttara Nikaya III.415), and one’s unskillful actions have a karmic impact sooner or later (Dhammapada 69–71). One’s actions and thoughts condition one’s rebirth, not the rituals of others (Asibandhakaputta Sutta of the Samyutta Nikaya IV.312–314). Karma shows how past actions lead to differences among people (Culakammavibhanga Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya III.203–206). However, experiences, and skillful and unskillful actions, cannot all be blamed on past karma or a God, but neither are they causeless (Titthayayatana Sutta of the Anguttara Nikaya I.173–176). Feelings and illnesses are not all due to past karma (Sivaka Sutta of the Samyutta Nikaya IV.230–231). A good character can dilute the karmic results of a bad action (Lonakapallaka Sutta of the Anguttara Nikaya, I. 242–250). Self-determination of one’s rebirth occurs through virtue, wisdom, and resolve (Sankharuppati Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya III.99–104). Karma can mature slowly, and one’s view and attitude at the end of one’s life are important (Mahakammavibhanga Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya III.214–215). There are implications of karma and rebirth for attitudes to others. For example, we have experienced in the past both the good times and bad times of others, so sympathy for others and non-attachment to good experiences are wise (Duggatam and Sukhitam Suttas of the Samyutta Nikaya II.186–187). This life and all rebirths result in aging, sickness, and death; nothing that is conditioned is permanent (Mahaparinibbana Sutta of the Digha Nikaya II.157; Alagaddupamasutta of the Majjhima Nikaya II.157). There are frailties of human life (Ratthapala Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya II.70–73), and one must accept the inevitability of death (Salla Sutta of the Sutta Nipata 574–573). The search for sensual pleasures leads to suffering (Culadukkhakkhandha Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya I.91–92).

References Batchelor, S. (1997). Buddhism without belief: A contemporary guide to awakening. Riverhead. Bodhi, B. (1998). Review of Buddhism without beliefs: A contemporary guide to awakening, by Stephen Batchelor. Journal of Buddhist Ethics, 5, 14–21. Braithwaite, R. B. (1955/1970). An empiricist’s view of the nature of religious belief . The Ninth Arthur Stanley Eddington Memorial Lecture. Cambridge University Press.

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Buddhadasa, B. (1990/2006). Mindfulness with breathing: Unveiling the secrets of life. Dhammadana Foundation. Cobb, J. B., & Griffin, D. R. (1976). Process theology: An introductory exposition. Westminster John Knox Press. Crosby, K. (2020). Esoteric Theravada: The story of the forgotten meditation tradition. Shambala Publications. Cupitt, D. (1984). The sea of faith: Christianity in change. BBC. Griffin, D. R. (2018/2020). Reenchantment without supernaturalism. Cornell University Press. Jackson, P. (1988). Buddhadasa: A Buddhist thinker for the modern world. The Siam Society Under Royal Patronage. Mesle, C. R. (2008). Process-relational philosophy: An introduction to Alfred North Whitehead. Templeton Foundation Press. Messner, T. (2017, January 15). Episode 268: Professor Richard Gombrich: Buddhism in the modern world. Secular Buddhist Association. https://secularbuddhism.org/episode-268-profes sor-richard-gombrich-buddhism-in-the-modern-world/ Putnam, H. (1995). Renewing philosophy. Harvard University Press. Whitehead, A. N. (1929). Process and reality: An essay in cosmology. Free Press. Wittgenstein, L. (1972). Lectures and conversations on aesthetics, psychology, and religious belief (C. Barrett, Ed.). The University of California Press.

Frank J. Hoffman specializes in philosophy of religion and Asian Philosophy. He is a Professor of Philosophy at the International Buddhist Studies College, Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya, Bangkok, Thailand, and an Affiliated Faculty of the South Asia Center at the University of Pennsylvania. He was a former Professor at West Chester University near Philadelphia and Chair of the Greater Philadelphia Philosophy Consortium. His four books are Rationality and Mind in Early Buddhism, Introduction to Early Buddhism, Breaking Barriers (with Godabarisha Mishra), and Pali Buddhism (with Mahinda Deegalle). Professor Hoffman is currently an Associate Editor of Asian Philosophy.

Part II

Religious Identity

Chapter 9

Epistemic Violence and the Religious Beliefs of Sixteenth-Century Tagalogs Fernando A. Santiago

Abstract This paper adopts a critical approach to the use of historical sources to describe religious aspects of Tagalog life during the sixteenth-century. It highlights a dilemma in relying on Philippine colonial records about religion and spirituality. It shows that among the consequences of colonialism was epistemic violence, which refers to the destruction of the Tagalogs’ knowledge of their pre-colonial religious beliefs and practices through the intentional and unintentional silencing of the indigenous voice in the colonial records. Consequently, historical records represent the colonizer’s, not the native understanding of the pre-colonial religion. For such a reason, the historical records are not entirely reliable. Since the Tagalogs did not have written records about their religious beliefs, no alternative historical sources explain their perspective during the sixteenth-century. Thus, the true characteristics of the pre-colonial Tagalog religion have been lost in time. Keywords Tagalog · Filipino religion · Epistemic violence · Spanish colonialism · Internal otherness · Sixteenth-century Philippines · Bathala · Anito

1 Introduction “Tagalog” is a word with several meanings. It refers to the language from which Filipino, the national language of the Philippines, is based. It signifies a region with parts of Luzon, Marinduque, Mindoro, Romblon, Palawan, and some smaller islands, with Manila as the heartland. Lastly, it refers to the ethnolinguistic group that speaks the language and inhabits the region. Thus, “Tagalog” is a language, place, culture, and people, a defining marker of social identity. The Tagalog people have a shared history. They experienced Spanish colonialism in the sixteenth-century and underwent the process of Hispanization and Christianization over the next three hundred years (Phelan, 1967). By the late nineteenthcentury, Spanish culture and Roman Catholicism had so deeply permeated their way F. A. Santiago (B) De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Hongladarom et al. (eds.), Philosophies of Appropriated Religions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5191-8_9

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of life that Tagalog intellectuals, such as Jose Rizal, the National Hero of the Philippines, developed an identity crisis that stemmed from a sense of isolation from the past. They realized that their ancestors had become strangers, the uncivilized Other, whose ways had been long gone and forgotten (Santiago, 2021, p. 91). The sense of alienation was further heightened by forty-eight years of American colonialism. Americanization involved adopting American culture, English, and a new Western mindset. Modern ways further transformed their culture and beliefs to the extent that today, like other colonized ethnolinguistic groups in the Philippines, an internal Otherness or “being a stranger to one’s self” exists (Todorov, 1984, p. x), particularly concerning their society’s pre-colonial life, and of which the religious dimension is a matter of interest. This paper adopts a critical approach to the use of historical sources to describe religious aspects of Tagalog life during the sixteenth-century. It highlights a dilemma in relying on Philippine colonial records about religion and spirituality. It shows that among the consequences of colonialism was epistemic violence, which refers to the destruction of the Tagalogs’ knowledge of their pre-colonial religious beliefs and practices through the intentional and unintentional silencing of the indigenous voice in the colonial records. Consequently, historical records represent the colonizer’s, not the native understanding of the pre-colonial religion. For such a reason, the historical records are not entirely reliable. Since there are no alternative written historical sources, it also means that the true characteristics of the pre-colonial Tagalog religion have been lost in time.

2 Sixteenth-Century Tagalog Religious Beliefs and Historical Reconstruction The conversion to Roman Catholicism began the Tagalogs’ distancing from their ancestor’s indigenous religious beliefs. While vestiges of the old ways remain in “religious syncretism characteristic of ‘folk Catholicism,’” (Rafael, 1988, p. 5) the pre-colonial religion is no longer generally understood nor appreciated. The historical method has been used to reconstruct the spiritual aspect of sixteenth-century Tagalog life, but they have been based on the early observations of the colonizers. Historical reconstruction of the pre-colonial religious dimension requires more than descriptions. It entails the appreciation of indigenous cosmological beliefs, signs, and symbols and demands understanding more profound meanings of the spiritual aspect of pre-colonial life. Such is a problem in the Philippines, where sixteenthcentury historical records were generated by colonizers unfamiliar with the realm of symbols of the colonized. The historical accounts are also in the colonizer’s language, Spanish, instead of the vernacular, which adds a layer of detachment. Pre-colonial Tagalogs did not leave written records to explain the meanings of their signs, symbols, and beliefs. While they had an indigenous script called baybayin, they had “neither books nor histories.” They did not “write at length except missives and

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notes to each other” (Anonymous, Boxer Codex: A Modern Spanish Transcription and English Translation of Sixteenth-Century Exploration Accounts of East and Southeast Asia and the Pacific, 2022, p. 73). Symbolisms and beliefs were shared and transmitted across generations through oral tradition by the knowledge bearers. On the other hand, historical sources were penned by sixteenth-century colonizers, all male Iberian Roman Catholics. What is known about the pre-colonial Tagalog religion is therefore based on observations made by people of a different culture, language, religion, and ancestry. Foreigners who were not immersed in the culture they observed chronicled what they saw according to their style of thought and worldview. Sixteenth-century historical accounts of the Philippines thus reflect the colonizers’ worldview more than the Tagalogs’ thought system. As a result, they describe Tagalog practices and beliefs based on foreign standards. For this reason, it is common to find descriptions of such practices and beliefs as obscure, barbaric, or the work of the devil. An example is the account of the Jesuit, Pedro Chirino (1604), who wrote: Although upon entering into the dark abyss of such blind idolatry, I find a disorderly confusion of the vilest and most abominable things worthy of its inventor, although in examining the walls within this infernal cave, I discover an infinitude of loathsome creatures, foul, obscene, truly damnable, it is my task, aided by the light of truth, to reduce them to order—so that we who upon opening our eyes find ourselves within the light of truth may offer praise to Almighty God, and have compassion for those who, blinded by their ignorance, love and prize these things of darkness, and cannot open their eyes to any light beyond. I shall speak first concerning the false belief that they hold concerning the divinity of their idols; second, of their priests and priestesses; third, and last, of their sacrifices and superstitions. Their art of writing was of no service to them in any one of these three things, or in matters of government and civilization (of which I shall perhaps later tell the little that I know); for they never used their writing except to exchange letters, as we have said. All their government and religion is founded on tradition, and on custom introduced by the Devil himself, who spoke to them through their idols and the ministers of these. (Chirino, 1904, pp. 262–263)

Historical accounts represent the colonizer’s gaze. The Tagalogs’ different styles of thought were either excluded, dismissed, or rendered inferior and, consequently, silenced. This is how Gayatri Spivak describes epistemic violence (Spivak, 1988, p. 76). Because of the absence of their ancestors’ voices in the records, presentday Tagalogs understand the past through the lens of sixteenth-century foreigners. Because their past is filtered through a Western lens, their point of view is distorted. They become strangers to themselves and thus consequently, they perceive their ancestors as the exotic Other. Aside from the accounts being written in Spanish, putting the pre-colonial Tagalogs’ religious beliefs into writing involves the process where language takes the place of ritual and divination (Todorov, 1984, p. xii). Translating signs, symbols, and beliefs into Spanish also involves converting them into colonial representations rooted in the Western worldview (Sales, 2020, p. 105). The historical records are, therefore, the products of multiple forms of translation that, again, reflect the vision of the colonizers rather than the Tagalogs’ construction of their concepts.

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3 Cracks in the Parchment Curtain Filipino historians have long recognized the limitations of historical records. Finding the Filipino perspective in colonial accounts has been one of the fundamental objectives of nationalist historiography. Nonetheless, Filipino historians have found recourse in William Henry Scott’s “cracks in the parchment curtain,” which Susan Evangelista describes as “like the Iron Curtain and the Bamboo Curtain, a metaphor for the type of government control of information which makes it impossible for outsiders to learn much about the ‘true condition’ of those inside the curtain” (Evangelista, 1984, p. 112). While Teodoro Agoncillo asserts that “it will never be possible to write a real history of the Filipino people under Spain because the colonial government enjoyed a monopoly of the production of source materials,” Scott contends that the Filipino perspective can be established by looking at the cracks in the curtain “through which fleeting glimpses of Filipinos and their reactions to Spanish dominion may be seen.” Furthermore, “these are more often than not unintentional and merely incidental to the purpose of the documents containing them.” Colonial records can thus be helpful for they “contain direct or implied references to Filipino behavior and conditions” (Scott, 1982, p. 1). While Scott’s dictum gives hope to Filipino historians, relying on “cracks in the curtain” cannot explain ancient religious beliefs sufficiently. Direct references to religions in colonial records are superficial, and implied references do not have the depth to reveal religious meanings. Both also do not reflect the Tagalogs’ point of view. Because the records are in Spanish, language becomes an “impediment to accessing knowledge” (Sales, 2020, p. 107). There are also the earlier mentioned barriers to the meanings of the Tagalog religious beliefs described in the colonial texts, such as the authors’ positionality and “translations” of words and meaning that decontextualize religion in pre-colonial life. They add credence to Agoncillo’s position that it will never be possible to write an accurate history of the Filipino people under Spain, especially on matters concerning religion. At most, colonial documents can only provide a cursory view of the Tagalog religion from the colonizer’s perspective.

4 Overview of the Pre-Colonial Tagalog Religion 4.1 Islam in the Tagalog Region During the initial encounters in the sixteenth-century, inhabitants of the Tagalog region were thought to be Muslims by the Spaniards (Anonymous, Relation of the Voyage to Luzon, June 1570, 1903).1 They were called “Moros,” the term used to 1

Onofre D. Corpuz (1989) includes Manila, Tondo, Batangas, and their environs on the island of Luzon, as well as the islands of Mindoro and Palawan as part of the region occupied by the Moros. These places are in the Tagalog region today.

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refer to adherents of Islam and distinguished from the pagans by their appearance and ways. The author of the Boxer Codex (1603) describes them as clothed in cotton, cut their hair “as in Spain,” wore mustaches, do not pierce their ears, and “do not paint (tattoo) any part of their body.” Furthermore, they practiced Islamic ways such as circumcision, not eating pork, and other minor Muslim laws (Anonymous, Boxer Codex: A Modern Spanish Transcription and English Translation of SixteenthCentury Exploration Accounts of East and Southeast Asia and the Pacific, 2022, pp. 63, 71). The absence of tattoos and pierced ears are also mentioned by Miguel de Loarca (1582) as features that distinguished Moros from the Pintados (or the Visayans) (de Loarca, 1903, p. 83). The “greatest chiefs” of Manila and Tondo, namely Raja Matanda, Raja Soliman, and Lacandola observed the practice of Islam and imitated Muslim names and customs (de Medina, O.S.A., 1905, p. 198). It was also known that the Tagalogs were “instructed in that faith” by those from Brunei (de Loarca, 1903, p. 83). These details are corroborated by the author of the Boxer Codex who describes trade between the Tagalogs and Borneans, and how the latter taught the natives “the law of Muhammad” (Anonymous, Boxer Codex: A Modern Spanish Transcription and English Translation of Sixteenth-Century Exploration Accounts of East and Southeast Asia and the Pacific, 2022, p. 63). However, the initial impression was wrong. Not long after the conquest of Luzon, a Spanish document from 1572 states that: It is quite certain that the natives of this island of Luzon, whom we Spaniards commonly call Moros, are not so; for the truth is that they do not know or understand the law of Mahoma (Muhammad) – only in some villages on the seacoast they do not eat pork, and this for the reason that they have had dealings with the Moros of Burney, who have preached to them a little of the teaching of Mahoma. (Anonymous, Relation of the Conquest of the Island of Luzon, Manila, April 20, 1572, 1903, pp. 141–142)

The same document states further: In the villages nearest the sea some do not eat pork, the reason for their not eating it, which I have already given, being that, in trading with the Moors of Burney, the latter have preached to them some part of the nefarious doctrine of Mahoma, charging them not to eat pork. In this they act most childishly, and when, by chance any of them are asked why they do not eat it, they say that they do not know why; and if one asks them who Mahoma was and what his law commands, they say that they do not know the commandment or anything about Mahoma, not even his name; nor do they know what his law is, nor hence where it came. It is true that some of them who have been to Burney understand some of it, and are able to read a few words of the Alcoran (Quran); but these are very few, and believe that he who has not been to Burney may eat pork, as I have heard many of them say. (Anonymous, Relation of the Conquest of the Island of Luzon, Manila, April 20, 1572, 1903, p. 165)

The author of the Boxer Codex also discusses the Spaniards’ mistake and explains that the presence of Islamic practices made them assume that the natives were Moros, but “in reality, they are pagans and have almost the same customs and modes of living as the Bisayans” (Anonymous, Boxer Codex: A Modern Spanish Transcription and English Translation of Sixteenth-Century Exploration Accounts of East and Southeast Asia and the Pacific, 2022, p. 63). Antonio de Morga (1609) also recognizes

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the presence of Islam but explains that the Tagalogs were still transitioning toward conversion during the late sixteenth-century. In his account: A few natives of the island of Borneo began to come with their trade to the island of Luzon a few years before the Spaniards subjected it, especially to the towns of Manila and Tondo; and the people of the two islands intermarried. These people of Borneo are Mussulmans (Muslims) and they were introducing their sect amongst these natives, giving them short prayers and ceremonies and forms to be observed, by means of some gazizes, whom they brought with them: and already many, and the greatest chiefs, were beginning (although by piecemeal) to become Muslims, circumcising themselves, and taking Muslim names, so that if the entrance of the Spaniards had been longer delayed, this sect would have extended over all the island, and even throughout the others; and it would have been difficult to have uprooted it from them. The mercy of God remedied it in time; so that, as it was but in the very beginning, it was banished from these islands, and they were free from it throughout all that the Spaniards have subdued, and placed under the government of the Philippines, while it has been much propagated and spread in the other islands which are outside of this government; for already the natives of nearly all of them are Mahomedan Moors, directed and instructed by their gazizes and morabits, who come to preach and teach them continually, from the straits of Mekkah and the Red Sea, from whence they navigate to these islands. (de Morga, 2006, pp. 307–308)

The historian Cesar Adib Majul explains that the Spaniards saw “a group of people exemplifying practices which they vaguely recognized as Islamic” in Manila and other parts of the Tagalog region and that they eventually came to distinguish between the non-Muslims and the Muslims. He attributes the difficulty in recognizing the difference between the groups to the “simple fact that some inhabitants were passing through that transitory stage between the older religion and Islam.” Furthermore, he says, “Islamic consciousness might have formed as the result of a gradual process ending with the reduction of old religious practices to a minimum with a corresponding increase in the practice of Islamic rituals and adherence to dietary laws” (Majul, 1999, pp. 78, 82–83). Another historian, Onofre D. Corpuz, describes Manila then as an “incipient sultanate” with its development arrested by the Spaniards’ arrival (Corpuz, 1989, p. 43). The Spanish crusading spirit thus halted the spread of Islam, which assured Christianity’s supremacy as the Tagalog region’s religion. The spread and influence of Islam in the region in the sixteenth-century is largely forgotten and surprises contemporary Tagalogs. Even the presence of Islam in the region during the early days of Spanish colonialism is generally unknown except by those who have studied their history. In the Tagalog social memory, Islam has been expunged, and the possibility that some of their ancestors converted to Islam is even little considered. The presence of Islam and its teachings among Tagalogs have thus been erased from the consciousness of their descendants. The pre-colonial Tagalogs’ knowledge and understanding of Islam have been eliminated. Their descendants can only rely on inferences and how it was described by their colonizers. This demonstrates the outcome of epistemic violence in the Philippines.

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4.2 Anito The prevailing religion among the sixteenth-century Tagalogs involved spirits known as Anito. Described as a form of animism, this indigenous religion involved many gods, with Bathala as the chief among them. The author of the Spanish document from 1572 says that “they call God, Batala […] and even consider him God of all creation” (Anonymous, Relation of the Conquest of the Island of Luzon, Manila, April 20, 1572, 1903, pp. 204–205). Juan de Plascencia (1589) describes “Badhala” as the one especially worshiped (de Plascencia, 1903, p. 186). Chirino mentions the name of the chief god of the Tagalogs as Bathala Mei capal, which means “God the creator” (Chirino, 1904, pp. 263–264). Another iteration is Bathala na may kapangyarihan sa lahat or “God, the Almighty.” There is also mention of a reddish blue and black bird that natives called Bathala but, the author of the Boxer Codex states that the natives say that it is improper to call it such for “they do not believe it to be God but an acolyte who with its song makes men understand the will of the same bathala, who is God” (Anonymous, Boxer Codex: A Modern Spanish Transcription and English Translation of Sixteenth-Century Exploration Accounts of East and Southeast Asia and the Pacific, 2022, pp. 63, 89). Several scholars have surmised that Bathala is derived from Sanskrit. Scott, for instance, explains that “two important Sanskrit terms for royalty or deity, bhatarra and devata, are well known for their distribution throughout the central and Southern Philippines in the forms of Bathala and diwata variously applied to gods, spirits, omen-birds, and idols, and early assumed by Spanish missionaries to be the local equivalent of the Judeo-Christian supreme being” (Scott, 1984, p. 40). G. A. Wilken’s study on animism among the people of the “Indian Archipelago” shows the possibility that Bathala was derived from Sanskrit Batara-Guru, which originally meant Siva, or bhattara (Lord). He says that Batara Guru or Batara alone is the name of a superior divinity among many Malayan peoples (Blumentritt, 2011, p. 64). On the other hand, John Crawfurd believes that the word Batara is “a corruption of avatara, both in sense and orthography” and was used as an “appellative expressing any deity (Crawfurd, 2013, pp. 219–220). Jose Rizal was puzzled by the word Bathala for it was not commonly used during the late nineteenth-century. Instead, the Spanish word Dios was being used by the Tagalogs of his time to refer to God. He believed the name was an error reproduced by historians several times over the years. He explains: Despite the derivation of Deva, avatara, etc. it seems to me incredible that the Tagalogs had at all times in their mouth the name of their foremost God when they hardly pronounced the name of their parents - a custom that has been preserved throughout a period of three centuries, despite the efforts of the missionaries to make such reverence disappear, as Chirino observed. I believe that the Tagalogs never pronounced the name of their God, especially before strangers whom they considered their greatest enemies. They only called him Maykapal, a designation still used and understood by any Tagalog. Why is there no trace at all of the name Bathala among the Tagalogs in the towns? And nevertheless, the Tagalogs in the towns use such words as Tikbalang, Asuang, Anito, Nuno, Tiyanak, etc., and they retain many pagan usages, many traditions, legends, stories of pagan origin. I believe that the phrase Bathala MayKapal that was adopted by the other historians after Chirino is nothing more

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than the phrase Bahala ang MayKapal, wrongly written, that is equivalent to Alla or Alah of the Muslims or to the Malayan Tuan Alla punia Kraja; because Bahala ang MayKapal means "God will take care", a meaning given also in a dictionary to the phrase Bathala May Kapal. However, the fact that the phrase Bathala May Kapal is often encountered, makes me presume that it may be only a copy. There cannot be found another source where the word Bathala is used but without the denomination May Kapal. The bird which, according to Morga, has been called Bathala is not the omnipotent one; it may be the symbol of another divinity. (Rizal, 2011, pp. 350–351)

Rizal based his argument on his direct knowledge of Tagalog language and culture. His insights were an insider’s perspective that ran against the historical records. He relied on indigenous knowledge to challenge the prevailing views. His act of confronting the colonial accounts was “an attempt to conquer knowledge in order to ‘resist power’” (Todorov, 1984, p. xii). Nonetheless, Sales explains that the missionaries deemed the names of pre-Christian deities as “incompatible to the Christian Dios, while the practice of worshipping creatures such as the raven and the crocodile was modulated as a form of worship similar to that accorded to the Roman Gods. The local belief system was framed as an aberration, an abhorrent defect that kept the indigenous people from attaining grace. Local deities – Bathala, Laon, Nono, and whoever else—were made equivalent to Pan or Ceres, whose significance and signification were bound within the contextual contours of the Filipinos’ pre-conquest religion but were incapable of crossing over the cultural interstices” (Sales, 2020, pp. 115–116). The sixteenth-century Tagalog religion was a form of animism described by Jean Paul-Potet as “the religion of those who believed that above all the spirits (anitos) with whom they were in contact, there existed a supreme and unique one called Bathala.” Furthermore, based on the accounts, he also describes it as a “monotheistic religion with polytheistic traits comparable to those found in Buddhism (avatars) and Christianity (saints)” (Potet, 2017, p. 23). Such can be observed in de Loarca’s account, which states: […] they worshiped a deity called among them Batala, which properly means “God.” They said that they adored this Batala because he was the Lord of all, and had created human beings and villages. They said that this Batala had many agents under him, whom he sent to this world to produce, in behalf of men, what is yielded here. These beings were called anitos, and each anito had a special office. Some of them were for the fields, and some for those who journey by sea; some for those who went to war, and some for diseases. Each anito was therefore named for his office; there was, for instance, the anito of the fields, and the anito of the rain. To these anitos the people offered sacrifices, when they desired anything – to each one according to his office. The mode of sacrifice was like that of the Pintados. They summoned a Catalonon, which is the same as the vaylan among the Pintados, that is, a priest. He offered the sacrifice, requesting from the anito whatever the people desired him to ask, and heaping up great quantities of rice, meat, and fish. His invocations lasted until the demon entered his body, when the catalonan fell into a swoon, foaming at the mouth. The Indian sang, drank, and feasted until the catalonon came to himself, and told them the answer that the anito had given to him. If the sacrifice was in behalf of a sick person, they offered many golden chains and ornaments, saying that they were paying ransom for the sick person’s health. This invocation of the anito continued as long as the sickness lasted. When the natives were asked why the sacrifices were offered to the anito, and not to the Batala, they answered that the Batala was a great lord, and no one could speak to him. He

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lived in the sky; but the anito, who was of such a nature that he came down here to talk with men, was to the Batala as a minister, and interceded for them. In some places and especially in the mountain districts, when the father, mother, or other relative dies, the people unite in making a small wooden idol, and preserve it. Accordingly there is a house which contains one hundred or two hundred of these idols. These images also are called anitos; for they say that when people die, they go to serve the Batala. Therefore they make sacrifices to these anitos, offering them food, wine, and gold ornaments; and request them to be intercessors for them before the Batala, whom they regard as God. (de Loarca, 1903, pp. 171–175)

De Loarca’s summary suggests parallelisms between the pre-colonial Tagalog religion and Roman Catholic practices and beliefs. Among them are a supreme being, spiritual intercessors, priests, objects of worship representing God and the intercessors, and offerings. Scott found the religion’s similarity to folk Catholicism remarkable for “it presents a creator God who can only be approached through intercessors like deceased relatives or the patron deities of farmers, seafarers, or warriors, all of whom are worshiped in the form of idols which receive sacrifices and adornment.” Nonetheless, he explains that “the discrepancy might be that Spanish Christians like de Loarca were predisposed to find concepts in other religions which were normative in their own” (Scott, 1994, p. 233). Thus, de Loarca’s summary reflects how he constructed the pre-colonial religion based on his worldview rather than how the Tagalogs understood it. It is worth noting Potet’s observation that “Christian saints were quickly perceived as the Spanish equivalent of anitos, perhaps even as the foreign avatars in some cases” (Potet, 2017, p. 24). This means that while the Spaniards were framing the anitos according to their worldview, the Tagalogs were also shaping the saints into the image of their anitos, as evidenced in Folk Christianity. Although indirect, how saints are perceived in folk Christianity may serve in unpacking the concept of the anito among the Tagalogs in olden times. Anito is a complicated concept, and while generally known to refer to spirits, it has a wider meaning rooted in the signs and symbols of the ancient Tagalogs. According to Jocano, “Anito is difficult to translate. It has been used to refer to an ancient spirit, a deity or groups of deities, sculptured objects, a body of shared ideas and symbols, and to events associated with religious phenomena” and shows the “existence of a body of beliefs and practices associated with supernatural beings” (Jocano, 1975, p. 217). Potet describes the development of the Tagalogs’ religion “from a purely animistic world view that involved myriads of spirits, to the idea that there existed a hierarchy among them with a single one at the summit of the pyramid” (Potet, 2017, p. 23). The Tagalogs believed in a cosmological order where subordinate spirits assisted the creator, Bathala in preserving regularity and order in the universe. Among Bathala’s subordinates described by Plascencia are Dian Masalanta— patron of lovers and generation, Lacapati and Indianale—patrons of cultivated land and husbandry, and the buaya or crocodile, which they revered. He also identified the following “priests of the devil”—catalonan, mangangauay, mangisalat, mancocolam, hocloban, silangan, magtatangal, osuang, mangangayoma, sonat, pangatahojan, and bayoguin (de Plascencia, 1903, pp. 189–195). Space constraints do not permit a description of each so-called “priests of the devil.” Still, even presentday Tagalogs can identify misplaced concepts such as magtatangal (manananggal)

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and osuang (aswang), which are monstrous creatures of Philippine mythology. Such errors put into question the accuracy of Plascencia’s account. However, as already mentioned, there are no alternative historical documents explaining the Tagalogs’ perspective. Jocano classifies the Tagalog gods into the divinities of the sky and the divinities of the lower world. Among the divinities of the sky were Indianale, deity of labor and good deeds; Dimangan, deity of good harvest; Amanikabli, deity of the sea; Mayaari, the caretaker of the moon; Hana, deity of the morning; Tala, deity of the stars; Ikapati, deity of land and agriculture; Mapulon, deity of the seasons; Apolaki, patron of fighters and keeper of the sun; and Dian Masalanta, the deity of lovers. On the other hand, the lower world’s divinities inflicted illness and bad luck, broke families, brought bad weather, death, and other undesirable situations. Among them were Sitan, Mangangaway, Manisilat, Mankukulam, and Hukluban (Jocano, 1975, p. 219). Aside from these gods, anitos also included the spirits of the ancestors whom the Tagalogs revered and spirits in the form of animals, plants, rock formations, and others (Chirino, 1904, pp. 264–267).

4.3 Finalist Strategy of Interpretation A factor to consider is what Todorov refers to as “a finalist strategy of interpretation… ‘where the ultimate meaning is given from the start.’” Such is committed by an enquirer who commits violence and destruction in the desire to know the Other. Farish Noor explains that “the up-shot of this enterprise is the epistemology that kills; an epistemology that does come to know the world, but from a singular perspective that does not admit the validity of other epistemologies” (Noor, 2019, p. 22). This was exemplified by the Spaniards, who were resolved to find in their colonies, Godless barbarians, regardless of their faith and level of culture. They had a mission to convert the natives to Christianity. From this perspective, the historical accounts shared above, regardless of how descriptive and detailed, were never meant to explain the pre-colonial religions. The colonizers were not trying to understand the precolonial religion when they described it. Their mission was to replace whatever they encountered with Catholicism. Thus, it was inevitable for the pre-colonial Tagalogs’ religion to be described as the work of the devil that, in the Spaniards’ view, had to be destroyed.

5 Conclusion A tragedy of colonialism in the Philippines is epistemic violence—the destruction and extermination of indigenous knowledge and its bearers. Pre-colonial religious beliefs were among the casualties of such violence because of Spain’s zeal to convert

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its colonies to Catholicism. How Tagalogs understood such beliefs in the sixteenthcentury has been forgotten and replaced by Christian doctrine. While colonial records provide information about the pre-colonial religions, what remains are descriptions that reflect the colonizer’s perspective and worldview. Since the Tagalogs did not produce records that explain their beliefs, the available historical accounts signify the colonizer’s perceptions instead of their own. Such is a dilemma for historical research because the available accounts do not provide explanations of the religious beliefs and practices from the Tagalogs’ point of view. Beyond the historical accounts, the pre-colonial beliefs and practices “persist to this day albeit in a new form, as seen in folk Christianity” (Zialcita, 2008, p. 53). The mutuality of conversion is also evident. Because Filipinos converted to Catholicism, they also redefined the religion according to their terms and preferences (Rafael, 1988, p. xi). Although some vestiges of the past remain, their historicity with the pre-colonial era cannot be established. Therefore, one of the lasting outcomes of colonialism in the Philippines is that the meaning of the Tagalogs’ pre-colonial religious beliefs will forever be forgotten.

References Anonymous. (1903). Relation of the conquest of the island of Luzon, Manila, April 20, 1572. In E. H. Blair, & J. A. Robertson (Eds.), The Philippine islands, 1493–1803 (Vol. III). The Arthur H. Clark Company. Anonymous. (1903). Relation of the voyage to Luzon, June 1570. In E. H. Blair, & J. A. Robertson (Eds.), The Philippine islands, 1493–1803 (Vol. III). The Arthur H. Clark Company. Anonymous. (2022). Boxer codex: A modern Spanish transcription and English translation of sixteenth-century exploration accounts of East and Southeast Asia and the Pacific. I. Danoso (ed.) (M. Garcia, C. Quirino, & M. Garcia, Trans.). Vibal Foundation, Inc. Blumentritt, F. (2011). Blumentritt, Leitmeritz, 27 March 1887. In Jose Rizal correspondence with Blumentritt (E. Alzona, Trans.). National Historical Commission of the Philippines. Chirino, P. S. (1904). Relacion de las Islas Filipinas (1604). In E. H. Blair, & J. A. Robertson (Eds.), The Philippine islands, 1493–1803 (Vol. XII). The Arthur H. Clark Company. Corpuz, O. (1989). The roots of the Filipino nation Philippine centennial (1898–1998) edition (Vol. I). AKLAHI Foundation Inc. Crawfurd, J. (2013). History of the Indian archipelago: Containing an account of the manners, art, languages, religions, institutions, and commerce of its inhabitants. Cambridge University Press. de Loarca, M. (1903). Relacion de las Yslas Filipinas (1582). In E. H. Blair, & J. A. Robertson (Eds.), The Philippine islands, 1493–1898 (Vol. V). The Arthur H. Clark Company. de Medina, O.S.A., F. (1905). History of the augustinian order in the Filipinas islands by Fray Juan de Medina, O.S.A. (1630). In E. H. Blair, & J. A. Robertson (Eds.), The Philippine islands, 1493–1898 (Vol. XXIII). The Arthur H. Clark Company. de Morga, A. (2006). History of the Philippine islands (1609) (Vol. I & II). Bibliobazaar. de Plascencia, J. (1903). Customs of the Tagalos (1589). In E. H. Blair, & J. A. Roberston (Eds.), The Philippine islands, 1493–1898 (Vol. VII). The Arthur H. Clark Company. Evangelista, S. (1984). Review: Cracks in the parchment curtain by William Henry Scott. Philippine Studies, 32(1), 112–115. Jocano, F. L. (1975). Philippine prehistory: An anthropological overview of the beginnings of Filipino society and culture. Philippine Center for Advanced Studies.

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Majul, C. A. (1999). Muslims in the Philippines (3rd ed.). The University of the Philippines Press. Noor, F. (2019). Locating Asia, arresting Asia: Grappling with “The epistemology that kills”. In A. Acri, K. Gani, M. K. Jha, & S. Mukherjee (Eds.), Imagining Asia(s): Networks, actors, sites. ISEAS Yusoff Ishak Institute. Phelan, J. L. (1967). Hispanization of the Philippines: Spanish aims and Filipino responses, 1565– 1700. The University of Wisconsin Press. Potet, J. P. (2017). Ancient beliefs and customs of the Tagalogs. Lulu Press Inc. Rafael, V. (1988). Contracting colonialism: Translation and Christian conversation in Tagalog society under early Spanish rule. Ateneo de Manila University Press. Rizal, J. (2011). Rizal, Brussels, 17 April 1890. In Jose Rizal correspondence with Blumentritt (Vol. II). National Historical Commission of the Philippines. Sales, M. J. (2020). Translating “Asia” in Philippine missionary-colonial texts. In J. Mojarro (Ed.), More hispanic than we admit 3 (Quincentennial, pp. 1521–1820). Vibal Foundation Inc. Santiago, F. A. (2021). Historicising malayness: Spanish colonialism and the emergence of the “hispanised malay.” In O. Bakar, A. M. Merican, & W. W. Mamat (Eds.), Colonialism in the malay archipelago: Civilizational encounters (pp. 89–112). ISTAC-IIUM Publications. Scott, W. H. (1982). Cracks in the parchment curtain and other essays in Philippine history. New Day Publishers. Scott, W. H. (1984). Prehispanic source materials for the study of Philippine history. New Day Publishers. Scott, W. H. (1994). Barangay: Sixteenth century Philippine culture and society. Ateneo de Manila University Press. Spivak, G. C. (1988). Can the subaltern speak? In C. Nelson, & L. Grossberg (Eds.), Marxism and the interpretation of culture. University of Illinois Press. Todorov, T. (1984). The conquest of America. Harper & Row. Zialcita, F. N. (2008). Devout yet extravagant: The filipinization of christianity. In I. Donoso (Ed.), More hispanic than we admit: Insights into Philippine cultural history. Vibal Publishing House.

Fernando A. Santiago, Jr. is an Associate Professor of History at De La Salle University, Manila, where he also serves as Director of the Southeast Asia Research Center and Hub (SEARCH). He is a former Vice-President and Board Member of the Philippine Historical Association (PHA) and a member of the Philippine Social Science Council Social Science Ethics Review Board (PSSC-SSERB). His research interests include rural history, Maritime Southeast Asian history, local history, oral history, and biographies.

Chapter 10

A Linguistic Approach to the Tagalog Bathala and the Javanese Gusti Ramon Eguia Nadres

Abstract In classes on the Philosophy of Religion in Indonesia, students are often tasked to classify the country’s major religions under two different types: immanent and transcendent. Transcendent religions are grounded on revelation claimed to be received directly from God. On the other hand, immanent religions are grounded on universal intellectual intuition of the existence of the One True God or an allencompassing Divinity. The Tagalog Bathala and the Javanese Gusti faiths are examples of immanent religions. The existence of the intuition of the One God in indigenous religions can be attributed to what we may call the Unfinished Story Model of the epistemological status of science, philosophy, and religion. There are questions that science eventually cannot answer but can be answered by philosophy. On the other hand, even philosophy is at a loss for words on some questions only religion can answer. This paper aims to provide a linguistic study of the terms Bathala and Gusti and show that they are indigenous intuitions of a God that will eventually lead these people to the acceptance of the concept of the One God found in the great monotheistic religions of the world, especially in Christianity and Islam. Keywords God · Bathala · Kejawen · Gusti

1 Introduction The ubiquity of the interest in religion—whether in favor of it or not—is undeniable. The inquiries about it are many. However, some of the most interesting questions are: (1) whether religion is based on some type of reality external to the human mind; and (2) if our present religion’s hold on us is strong, what are the factors that allow for the acceptance of a new religion? Regarding this second question, there is a particular interest in those cases of indigenous societies where a new religion takes over a former religion. The new religions are considered to be appropriated religions. The appropriation process is of great interest because this process reveals something R. E. Nadres (B) Widya Mandala Catholic University, Surabaya, Indonesia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Hongladarom et al. (eds.), Philosophies of Appropriated Religions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5191-8_10

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about the manner of thinking and attitudes of indigenous societies. It opens a way for comparing the indigenous way of thinking and its attitudes with the way of thinking and attitudes of the culture bringing in the new religion. In this paper, we shall explain the Unfinished Story Model of understanding the epistemological status of scientific knowledge, philosophical knowledge, and religious knowledge, especially noting that philosophical and religious knowledge can only be really accepted as part of reality if the weltanschauung of the thinker agrees with the existence of metaphysical realities outside the mind. After explaining that, we then consider the classification of religions as immanent religions and transcendent religions depending on whether the origin of the religion is internal or external. Note that the concept of transcendent religions can only be accepted if the source of information about that religion, which in most religions is God, is a reality external to the human mind and who could communicate and interact with human beings. Many researchers consider religion only as an internal event or reality. But in this paper, we are considering the possibility of religion based on a God that exists outside of ourselves and our minds. With the concepts of immanent and transcendent religions in mind, we move forward to linguistically studying the Tagalog (Philippine) term Bathala and Javanese (Indonesian) Gusti. Both terms are known to refer to the one God. While Bathala has been replaced by the Spanish language-based word Diyos in the predominant Catholic and Protestant rites in the Philippines, Gusti is still used in Java when the religious rites are celebrated in Javanese. In any case, it is undeniable that both Bathala and Gusti have indigenous roots and are good channels for peeking into the concepts in the indigenous mind before the new religions brought in by foreigners. We claim that both terms are open to the reception of the Christian concept of God and the Islamic concept of Allah.

2 What is Religion? Before further studying the terms Bathala and Gusti, we should clarify the definition of religion in this paper. The various books on the Philosophy of Religion define religion in different ways, and we cannot immediately uphold one definition and unilaterally condemn another (Bayne, 2018; Schilbrack, 2022; Thistleton, 2018). Why is this so? Because religion is a personally chosen variable element of one’s weltanschauung or worldview. One’s consideration of it could differ according to how it can fit—or how one has chosen to fit it into—all the other truths previously selected, established, ordered, and justified in that worldview. According to the online version of the Merriam-Webster Dictionary weltanschauung (MerriamWebster, 2022) means “a comprehensive conception or apprehension of the world, especially from a specific standpoint.” In the traditional way of establishing a personal worldview, which is how Greek philosophers like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle did it, one’s worldview is compared with what is considered objective external reality. For Socrates and Plato, that objective external reality was the collection of Eternal

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Ideas—which will be transformed into the substantial forms and abstract universals in the Aristotelian philosophical system—found in the heavenly place. For Aristotle, the objective external reality constituted all those things he defined as substances that populated the universe. For a long time, one of the essential pieces that made up the personal and collective weltanschauungs in the world was religion. For the Greeks, philosophy was the way to arrive at unquestionably true statements, but religion remained mysterious, hard to prove, and attractive. Religion resonated with some of humanity’s deepest longings. On many points, it did not contradict philosophy, which attracted philosophers like Socrates and Plato. On the other hand, the French Revolution in 1789 was the catalyst that would undo that acceptance. Religion was considered to work in connivance with an unjust civil rule to place onerous burdens on the shoulders of the citizens and, because of this, had to be done away with. God, together with religion and royal rule, was taken out of the picture, and in His place, the goddess of Reason was made to reign (Bristow, 2017; Britannica, 2002). From then on, the superiority of science over religion and philosophy was continually taught throughout the centuries. The damage was such that, although we have to admit that it benefited the growth of science, it disfavored philosophy and religion. The world entered the twentieth century with science as the sole arbiter of truth and brandished as a weapon for exposing all that was untrue: only the scientifically verifiable was considered true. However, it was eventually also in the twentieth century that the Philosophy of Science was born. It was born when people discovered that scientific statements were primarily not pronouncements of absolute truths but rather claims based on the probability of something occurring in the wake of a previous event. Its premises were also seen taken from assumptions from a still unproven theory. Then, at least a portion of humanity realized that science did not have all the answers, especially to those pervasive existential questions that have haunted humanity since the beginning of human history: Where did we come from? Why are we here? Where are we going? What will happen to us after we die? The discipline that claims to answer these perennial existential questions is philosophy. It has always claimed this and has attempted to find the answers to these questions even before science’s popularity rose to its present heights. When one’s weltanschauung includes the existence of metaphysical reality, that is, realities that do not manifest themselves empirically, then philosophy can bring humanity to considerations of a realm beyond this empirical world. Otherwise, people will have to confine themselves to the empirical meaning such that philosophy and religion must be explained empirically. In such a case, philosophy and religion would remain psychological exercises that give human beings pleasure, calm them, and offer them a sense of well-being. In such a scenario, nothing else would be needed to explain religion besides the physical world.

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3 An Unfinished Story Model of the Epistemological Nature of Philosophy and Religion No matter how much science may insist that the spiritual experience of human beings, i.e., those we find in philosophy and religion, is the mere fruit of humankind’s physiological and neurological activity, human beings continue to take interest in them and tend to hold them as true. Many people remain unsatisfied with a materialist answer of all this being mere physiological or neurological creations. If we are to believe Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and all who have followed this line of metaphysicalrealist philosophy, like Avicenna, Averroes, and Thomas Aquinas that this is the case, then these questions might have metaphysical answers. Within a metaphysicalrealist framework or weltanschauung, things like soul, God, goodness, evil, beauty, and justice make more sense and can become real objects that can be subjected to philosophical study. Indeed, historically speaking, philosophy has given satisfactory answers to several questions unanswered by science. As objects of philosophical study, they are not physical but metaphysical. In a metaphysical-realist weltanschauung, metaphysical objects are part of reality. Morality, for example, is not directly dictated by the physicality of the moral event but by the fact that those events make human beings good or bad. Two poles in the metaethics spectrum are used as the foundation for ethical evaluation. On the one hand, some recognize a universal standard that applies to all human beings. On the other hand, some recognize absolute relativism, where morality is based on personal choices. Of course, other views lie between these two poles, which are not equal to absolute relativism, like descriptive moral relativism and meta-ethical moral relativism (Gowans, 2021). The fact that we have a right to judge, reward, or punish other human beings is a sign that a particular part of morality is not based on a personal, subjective choice or the physicality of the event. The ethical considerations generally associated with certain experimental research—like abortion, human cloning, and genetic engineering—show that the discipline called Ethics, which plays an important role in human life, is not based on science, even though the followers of Scientism say otherwise (Lennox, 2009). As mentioned above, philosophy is used to answer the deep existential questions of human beings that do not have empirical answers, like: Who am I? Why am I here? What is my purpose in life? While philosophy does answer many existential questions, it eventually meets some further questions that philosophy itself cannot answer. In Plato’s dialogue Phaedo, Socrates successfully proves the soul’s immortality within a metaphysicalrealist weltanschauung. However, once he demonstrates that the soul remains existent after humans die, he is asked what happens to their immortal soul after the person dies (Phaedo, 107e–114d). Surprisingly, Socrates does not use philosophy to answer that question. He says that he has heard of a story that answers that question. The story comes from Greek religion (with a touch of Ancient Greek geology). After all the intellectual journeys undertaken by science and philosophy to answer questions about the world and humanity, there is a point when the intellect and the senses—both

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of which are heavily used in science and philosophy—go quiet, as if feeling lost and looking for another guide, a believable one, to venture into the task of answering some still unanswered questions, like what the soul does after a human being dies. At this point, humans discover that science or philosophy cannot answer such questions. It is religion that gives some light. The intellect gets left behind but somehow approves the direction towards which a human being ought to take a leap of faith. Philosophy answers questions that go beyond the empirical limits of science. However, religion seems to provide answers to questions that exceed the capabilities of the philosophical mind because they are answers to issues that transcend the empirical and intellectual experiences from which human knowledge begins (Armstrong, 2009; Nadres, 2018; Yepes Stork, 1996). While most people speak of “dichotomies” between science, philosophy, and religion, we prefer to consider it a continuity. It is like a relay race. When the first runner has finished and cannot go further, the next one takes the baton and continues the race. This happens because there are transitions from one aspect of reality to the next. The previous discipline cannot advance because it does not have the next discipline’s conceptions. However, we can also look at it going the other way. As we transition from religion to philosophy to science, we understand that some beliefs and convictions we hold in the previous discipline may not be taken as immediately valid in the other fields we enter into. One who believes in religion and holds a specific system of philosophy does not necessarily forget what she treasures in these as she goes into science. However, she will be able to discover how these beliefs and convictions are still held true vis-à-vis what is discovered in science. We shall call this the Unfinished Story Model of the Epistemological Nature of Science, Philosophy, and Religion. With such a model, we can see that the three disciplines belong to three realms of reality. They flow into one another because when one realm reaches a boundary, it will have to depend on another to answer some questions that no longer belong in its realm. Thus, for example, Ethics from philosophy is required to answer the ethical problems that science meets. Religion will need science and philosophy to acquire some connection and basis in reality with the material world, which is much more evident for humankind.

4 Immanent and Transcendent Religions In the previous section, we have said that religion is a body of knowledge that answers existential questions beyond the sublime heights that philosophy reaches. The next question is: How does it do that? In classes on the Philosophy of Religion, we ask our students to try to understand and employ two ways in which religion can come about. We try to classify major religions into immanent or transcendent religions, depending on whether they seem to flow out from the human being’s internal desire to commune with God or they are built upon a source of knowledge—revelation—that has reached its first followers from the outside, presumably from God.

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Beginning with the observation that there seems to be an innate tendency in humans to be religious, we note that it seems to spring forth from a drive within us that spurs us on to get into a relationship with the object of our religiosity. The object of natural religiosity is God or the Divine (Yepes Stork, 1996). Religion is the external expression of this attempt to communicate with God or the Divine. It results from humanity’s innate desire, and their creativity to satisfy that desire is what we call immanent religion. It is immanent because it germinates from within and is not induced into existence by an external factor. On the other hand, a transcendent religion enjoys an external precipitating factor: revelation. A transcendent religion has a serious claim that God has spoken to its founder and has given him instructions on how to relate with the Most High. Almost all the major religions have religious literature. However, some have literature narrating events in a mystical time and place. They do not seem to correspond to anything that happened with the actual events on Earth but seem more like allegories of the religious content one holds in one’s mind and heart. For example, R. B. Braithwaite (1970) spoke of stories narrated but not asserted as fact. Nevertheless, they play a guiding role in ethical action. On the other hand, a truly transcendent religion holds claim to a specific period in the history of humankind when God from His “place” in Eternity entered into human time and space and spoke to humankind. This is the tricky part of the determination of a transcendent religion. The one investigating would have to ask: Do the proponents of the revelation claim to have had a factual meeting between divinity and humanity? Is there supporting evidence to corroborate that fact? This does not mean to say that the data gives empirical proof of the facticity of the revelation received by this religion. It just means we discern credible features that seem to point in that direction. In the end, a leap of faith will still have to be made to assent because no empirical data and logical reasoning can cover all the needed steps of valid proof of the authenticity of the information. This is very much like Socrates in the Phaedo, who just said that he accepts the story because it fits in very well with all the other things that he knows, i.e., it fits in very well with the weltanschauung that he has built up. So, concerning our quest of discerning whether the terms Bathala and Gusti may be caused by an intellectual intuition of the existence of God, we are not aiming to prove the Tagalog and Javanese native beliefs to be factually referring to the same One God of the monotheistic religions like Christianity and Islam. We wish to establish if these two terms are the product of the internal religious drives reacting to an intuitive discovery of the existence of God. In other words, the original indigenous concepts of Bathala and Gusti, while not possessing all the characteristics of the “Western” God, can nevertheless be considered an awakened awareness of that One God—an awareness that has made it possible for the indigenous people to assimilate the new religions.

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5 Some Possible Criteria of Signs of the Intuition of the One God With all the above in mind, what should we look for to prove our point? We think that the following criteria would give us sufficient support to accept that the concepts of Bathala and Gusti represent the expressions of an immanent religion that is open to the acceptance of the One God: 1. They are monotheistic conceptions, i.e., these beliefs do not break out into beliefs of different deities that explain natural forces. This is equivalent to a compromise or confusion between science, philosophy, and religion: religion in a polytheistic form seems to be attempting to answer scientific questions, and the gods are used to explain natural phenomena). 2. They lord it over any other deity that may be traditionally included in their pantheon of gods, i.e., they are not considered of the same make and character as the other deities but transcend not only material creation but the deities that have power over parts of creation as well. Note that Zeus or Jupiter, though considered superior to the other gods and goddesses, are actually of the same make and nature as those lesser gods and goddesses. 3. They refer to a personal Divine Being with intellect and will. This makes them capable of communicating with human beings using language, not just an inner sentiment or mystical non-conceptual communication. As such, they would also be free Beings who know what they are doing and freely choose to do what they are doing. What is the importance of discovering a monotheistic God like those described above? The monotheistic God described above seems to belong to transcendent religions, like Judaism, Catholicism, Islam, and Protestantism. A monotheistic God like that would be a good candidate for giving out revelation, a characteristic of a transcendent religion. This may well explain why the early Filipinos and Javanese eventually ended up with strong convictions about the transcendent religions they now almost universally hold, i.e., Catholicism and Islam. The indigenous religion was already open to the reception of the latter transcendent religions, although some degree of inculturation was expected to occur. In The Invention of God in Indigenous Societies, James L. Cox provides several cases in which another religion brought in by missionaries supplanted an original indigenous religion that was present in a certain society. In all those cases, the propagators of the new religion claim to find a pre-existent knowledge of the One God in the indigenous religion that was previously being followed. This was claimed to be Io in the Maori culture, Mwari in the Shona of Zimbabwe, the Rainbow Serpent among the Australian Aborigines, and Ellam Yua among the natives of Alaska (Cox, 2014). This view has been challenged by other authors who think that those who claim that the concept of the One God is already present in indigenous cultures are heavily influenced by the teachings of their religion, especially the Christian ones in whose Bible can be found the claim that indigenous people have the “gospel written

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in their hearts” and that God can be known “through the work of His hands” (Cf. Romans 1:20 and Romans 2:15). Cox goes deep into the analysis of these cases and acknowledges that some researchers can be heavily influenced by their Christian background when investigating the nature of the Divinity in the native religions. At the same time, though, he does not close the door permanently to the possibility that these indigenous, allpowerful gods who are the source of all creation indeed possess some reflection of the Western concept of the One God. Many parallelisms can be seen between the efforts of Cox and the little study we are attempting here. Admittedly, the research done by Cox is more wide-ranging and deeper. On our part, we do not intend to compete with that depth of study. However, it must be recognized that the concepts of Bathala and Gusti open the door to further study of God in cultures that still do not appear in Cox’s book. Fortunately, as we said, the thorough investigation of Cox does not put the indigenous concepts of Divinity at loggerheads with the Western Monotheistic God: there is an openness. We would like to point out this about the Tagalog Bathala and the Javanese Gusti concepts. As mentioned, our approach will be through the linguistic study of those terms.

6 The Tagalog Bathala as a Monotheistic God The first historical report about the worship of God in the Philippines was made by Antonio Pigafetta in his records of the First Voyage Around the World, written about 1521 or around the time of the Magellan expedition. He said that the Cebuanos “have no other worship than raising their clasped hands and their face to the sky; and […] they called their god ‘Abba” (Pigafetta, 2010). This, of course, was not the deity worshipped by the Tagalogs—the deity Bathala —but the one worshipped by the Cebuanos. The Spaniards only learned about the Bathala (Tan, 2008) of the Tagalogs in the subsequent voyages. Ferdinand Magellan’s expedition landed in Cebu in 1521, but this expedition did not go to the Tagalog region. Miguel Lopez de Legazpi ordered a new voyage to the Philippines in 1565, a mission that could go all the way to Manila (Francia, 2014, ch. 2). The interest in the Tagalog concept of Bathala probably began when the Spaniards decided to establish their central seat of power in Manila. Blumentritt (1853–1913), in his Diccionario Mitológico de Filipinas, published in Madrid in 1895, says this about Bathala: This name, of Sanskrit origin, is given or given to several gods of the Philippine Malayans. The early Tagalogs called their primary God Badhala or Bathala mey-kapal, and gave the same name to the bird Tig-mamanukin. The Pampangos called a bird Batala, upon whom, according to Dr. Pardo de Tavera, they had their superstitions. The Tagalogs sometimes gave the same name Badhala or Bathala to comets or other celestial bodies that, according to them, predicted some occurrence. Bathala was also a good anito of the ancient Bicolanos, a kind of guardian angel. […] In the religion of the Mandayas (island of Mindanao) there is a god Badla, the only son of Mansilatan, who preserves and defends people against the power and trickery of the demons Pudaugnon and Malimbung. - The early Visayans named the images

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of their gods or diwatas, Bathala or Bahala. (Blumentritt, 1895; see also Verstraelen, 1973, 167–174)

The Sanskrit origin makes one feel that Bathala was a god borrowed from Hinduism, as Blumentritt claims in the note following this entry in the Diccionario: Note. — Batala comes from Batara-guru, a name given to Çiva, one of the three gods (Brahma, Çiva and Wishnu [Brahma, Shiva, and Vishnu]) that form the trimurti or trinity of the Hindus. Bhattara means in Sanskrit: señor [lord]. The Dayaks of Borneo called their Batala: Mahatara, contraction of Mahabatara, which means "the Great Lord." The Dayaks of the coast O. of Borneo call this god Betara or Petara. The Bataks have a god, Bata-raguru (guru means teacher who teaches). Between the Macasares and Bugis of the island of Celebes a god bears the same name of Bata-ra-guru. If the Relation published by Thévenot, which in Tagalog meant Bathala Meikapal: “le Dieu createur,” is correct, we can cite an analogy, since the indigenous people of Sumba have a god whose name means the same, although it is not identical to Tagalog Ombu-vialu-mendoku, which literally means translated “the Lord who did everything.” (Blumentritt, 1895)

Because the term Bathala has Sanskrit origins, McCoy also thinks that Bathala was a Hindu god directly borrowed by the Filipinos from the Indians. He says: Like its counterparts elsewhere in the region, Philippine animism was strongly influenced by Indian religion. In a study of Indian influences in his nation’s language and literature a Filipino academic, Dr. Juan Francisco, recorded some 336 words of probable Sanskrit origin currently in use among the archipelago’s numerous linguistic groups. Although the number of Sanskrit words is not terribly impressive, most describe key religious and political concepts – naga and garuda, sawa or python, diwata meaning spirits from the Sanskrit devata, and bathala meaning supreme deity from the Sanskrit bhattara or noble lord. In his analysis of the myths of both majority and minority culture groups Dr. Francisco identified common motifs which he felt to be of Indian origin. Francisco concluded that: “Hindu systems of thought have considerably influenced the operations of the Filipino mind and conscience. The predominance of Indian loanwords in religion suggests that Filipino languages were lacking in key religious concepts and, in other cases, the words in Filipino languages were supplanted by Sanskrit.” (McCoy, 1982)

However, finding a resource that says Bhattara was a Hindu god coming directly from the Indus Valley culture is difficult. At best, the available sources say that the term Bathala, which seems to come from the Indonesian Hindu term Bhattara or Batara (Bonnefor, 1993), is related to the Indian term avatara (Crawfurd, 2013). Avatar refers to a god who has come to Earth in human form. However, the Filipino concept of Bathala does not fit in with the idea of an avatar. For the Filipinos, Bathala was God himself, who was transcendent. He did not appear to the Filipinos as an avatar but used intermediaries, who were the anitos (MacDonald, 2004). Bathala was also Creator (Jocano, 1968; Ortega Pérez, 2018; Demetrio, 1968). In the Hindu pantheon, the Creator god is Brahma (Knott, 2000), who is only one of the Trimurti. If we look for a Bathala in the Hindu pantheon, the first “suspect” would be Brahman (Wainwright, 2017). Brahman is considered the origin of all things (Armstrong, 2009; Blair & Robertson, 1941), but the concept of being the origin of all things and a creator are two different things in Hinduism (Knott, 2000; Sen, 1989). We can conclude that Bathala is neither Brahman because Brahman is not a Creator, nor Brahma because Bathala is supposed to be above every other god

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and simultaneously Creator of all things (Jocano, 1968; see also: Hislop, 1971 and Del Castillo, 2015). So, even if etymologically speaking, Bathala may have come from the Sanskrit word Avatara, it was used differently. A search for the word’s origin brings us back to Bhattara, which seems to be the “transition word” from Avatara to Bathala (Santarita, 2018). Indeed, Bhattara looks more like Bathala than Avatara. At the same time, Bhattara can be traced back to the Indonesian Hindu term Batara, which is phonetically similar. For example, Ahmad Hidayatullah says that “Lord Teacher,” the Indonesian translation of Batara Guru, is the name of a Wayang character that originally had been Shiva. According to him, the change was done by the Walisongo to remove any grave contradiction with Islam (Ahmad Hidayatullah, 2017). Thus, Bhattara seems to be the Sanskrit word to which both Avatara and Batara are related. however, by shifting to the Indonesian Batara, we finally land a word more consistent with the Tagalog Bathala: “Lord.”

7 The Indonesian/Hindu Term Batara is Lord Indonesian Hinduism uses the word Batara, but it does not use the word all by itself but always with another term, usually a noun. Thus employed, Batara becomes an adjective, which precisely means “Lord” (Capeller, 1891). It is a title that is used for a god who is essentially a teacher (Batara Guru) or the lord of death (Batara Kala) (Skeat, 1900). It is also used for the heroes of the smirti writings and the gods of the Hindu pantheon that we are all already familiar with: Bhatara Kresna, Bhatara Rama, Bhatara Ganesha, Bhatara Brahma, Bhatara Wisnu, Bhatara Siwa. Interestingly, the Tagalog Bathala refers to a deity in itself, not as a concrete deity title. As a title, it aims to describe the glorious character of the god. Standing by itself, though, it seems to refer to a God above all gods, who is the origin and Creator of everything (Potet, 2017). Unlike Brahman, Bathala is a personal God who possesses Intellect and Will and therefore knows, acts with complete freedom, and is not tied down by a law external to His law: He commands and loves. With such characteristics, too, He can communicate with humans through some language, and humans can communicate with Him, but there is no record of Bathala speaking directly to humanity (Potet, 2017). Not so with Brahman, the awareness and knowledge of whom will have to be achieved by entering into some altered state, which is different from the intellectual communication with which human beings are familiar. Because there is no strong record of his having spoken with human beings, there are myths about Bathala, but there is no revelation. As mentioned above, one of the best criteria for determining if a religion is transcendent is if it has revelation—a revelation which does not occur in out-of-this-world mystical time and place but a historical revelation, wherein God communicates His existence and His will to humanity within human time and space. A transcendent religion is built on the premise of this revelation and not on the creative and fertile meditation, which is the fruit of a human mind and heart searching for God. So, we could think of the

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cult of Bathala as an expression of the Tagalog people’s internal desire to communicate with God. There was no claim that God communicated with them, so there are legends but no revelation per se.

8 The Javanese Gusti Compared with the Tagalog Bathala When studying the Javanese concept of God, one must remember that it is difficult to pinpoint any specific term for the original Javanese God. This is so because the original “religion,” Kejawen, focused more on what has to be achieved rather than defining the elements that come into play when trying to achieve this. The aim of Kejawen—whose translation into English would be tricky, but it might sound something like “Javanism,” precisely like a way of life—is to harmonize one’s inner self with nature, the universe and God (Beatty, 2003; Mulder, 1970; Zoetmulder, 1990). Since it is a collection of wise precepts for a specific way of life more than it is a system of belief or an organized body of doctrines about the metaphysical world (except perhaps in its belief in transforming spirit guides) (Beatty, 2003), it can fuse very easily into a syncretic symbiosis with the great traditional religions of the world, specifically with Hinduism and Islam, but also with Christianity. Alternatively, if we follow Cox’s lead, we have to say that it readily hybridizes culturally with the major religions coming from outside (Cox, 2014). Given the absence of a standard Kejawen canon of teachings, one can surmise those great traditional religions are useful in completing what is lacking in the body of doctrines about the metaphysical world that Kejawen may still not have. At this point, it would probably be a challenging task to determine the original, “unadulterated” version of Kejawen. Suppose we are to base ourselves on what remains. In that case, it seems fairly certain that it was an animist religion, like the original religion of the Philippines. We suspect that in the original animist Kejawen, there was no personal, overarching, supreme Deity because of the ease with which it blended with the great, traditional, organized religions that eventually came to Java, especially Hinduism and Islam. The sequence of arrival seems relevant: Hinduism first, then Islam (Ricklefs, 2006). Hinduism has a pantheon of gods, but when one goes more deeply into the theology of the Vedas, some discover Brahman, who is not a personal God but the principle of the entire universe (Chadha, 2022; Chauduri, 1954). This type of Supreme Deity suits Kejawen well because it advocates harmony with Nature and the Universe. One harmonizes with Nature and the Universe because this harmony puts human beings in contact with and harmonizes them with the Divine (Beatty, 2003). From a Hindu-Kejawen point of view, that would be enlightened discovery and experience. Then Islam comes into the picture. While it may not be easy to convince the Javanese to leave behind the Kejawen way of life, the Kejawen way of life does not seem completely incompatible with the existence of the monotheistic God (Hari Pamungkas & I Made Suparta, 2018). If the Javanese leave Brahman and transfer

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to Allah, one can imagine a smooth transition from an originally Kejawen point of view. There are two points of an unsmooth struggle, however. From the point of view of an Islamic culture that has come from outside of Indonesia, retaining some aspects of Kejawen while professing Islam is unacceptable (Beatty, 2003; Geertz, 2017; Woodward, 1988). At the same time, Islam was forced on the population in some areas, although this did not remove the fact that Kejawen could blend Islam into its worldview (Beatty, 2003). We now turn our attention to the title Gusti. Gusti, like Bathala, means “Lord.” As such, we can find it being used similarly to Batara. For example, we find it being used in the phrase Gusti Pangeran which means “Lord Prince/Leader” or Gusti Allah meaning “Lord God.” Gusti Pangeran is a title that may be used for the leader of a kingdom, as is done in Yogyakarta. However, Gusti can also be used as a standalone term to refer to God, even when not combined with the name Allah. Several basic Kejawen principles are expressed using this term. For example, Manunggaling kawulo Gusti, advises human beings to align their life with the Will of God (Beatty, 2003; Zoetmulder, 1990) and Jumbuhing kawula Gusti explains the unity between the servant and his Lord (Khalim, 2014). When cited in a monotheistic context such as that, Gusti refers to the One God. When we go back to the original Kejawen sense before the influence of the externallyintroduced religions or even just when it was used in a Hindu context, it could refer to the presence of the Divine in Nature and human nature. So, in a Hindu sense, the task of humanity would be to harmonize human life with Nature and the Divine (Beatty, 2003; Hari Pamungkas & I Made Suparta, 2018). Although the original concept of God in Kejawen is not monotheistic, it is precisely the lack of clarity of this concept that makes possible the syncretical introduction of Kejawen into Islam, and even into Catholicism for some inculturated practices, like the Mass on Jumat Legi (a specific Friday of the Javanese lunar calendar) celebrated at Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes at Pohsarang, Kediri, East Java. As we can see, while the term Gusti means “Lord” like Bathala, there was a time when it did not exactly mean the One God. We can admit that it has a monotheistic meaning in many contexts, which opens it to the interpretation that could lead to the One God.

9 Conclusion: Immanent Religions Reinforced As discussed above, the Tagalog Bathala and the Javanese Gusti provide us with a concept of a God that could easily be monotheistic. Monotheism was probably clearer in the concept of Bathala than in Gusti. Because of this, Christianity had fewer problems taking root in the Philippines than in other places in Asia (Thanissaro, 2009). A common concept of a God like Bathala and Gusti was probably prevalent in the native, often animistic, religions found in Southeast Asia before the advent of the major organized religions such as Hinduism, Christianity, and Islam. We had referred to the usefulness of categorizing religions into immanent and transcendent religions to establish a theory or hypothesis on the origin of a particular belief system.

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If correct, this analysis can give students of the Philosophy of Religion a glimpse into what one is making a leap of faith when choosing a religion for oneself. The two notions fulfill the criteria we have set for identifying the presence of the intuition of the personal God: monotheistic, Lord of all, and personal. Bathala is seen as Lord and Creator, above all the other gods. The original concept of God in Java, which will eventually be called Gusti, initially looking more like the Hindu Brahman in His being in all things and bringing all things, will eventually hybridize with Islam to become the One God. As the one sustaining the being of all and being sustained by all beings, he can be considered the Lord of all. His very name Gusti says He is Lord. Bathala, on the other hand, whose name seems to have originated from the term Bhatara, which also means “Lord.” Regarding being a personal God, the fact that Bathala and Gusti are creators implies they have a Mind that can plan and design things. As such, they can potentially communicate with human beings through language. However, neither of them proves doing so, and neither the indigenous Tagalog religion nor the indigenous Javanese religion can boast of a revelation received directly from God. The absence of revelation is of no problem to our quest. In our description of the difference between immanent and transcendent religions, we have said that the transcendent religion possesses revelation, not the immanent one. Our initial hypothesis was that the concepts of Bathala and Gusti are concepts of God that belong to immanent religions. So, the absence of revelation in the case of the cults of Bathala and Gusti proves our hypothesis. That said, studying the background of the terms Bathala and Gusti and finding out that they have a strong relationship with the concept of the One God elicits an impression that the native inhabitants of Southeast Asia had a gut feeling about the existence of the One God. This explains why there was an openness to the monotheistic religions once they came and took over the hearts of the people of the land.

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Ramon Eguia Nadres is a Catholic priest who lectures at the Faculty of Philosophy at Widya Mandala Catholic University in Surabaya, Indonesia. He earned his Bachelor of Science in Zoology in 1981 from the University of the Philippines. He finished his seminary formation at the Major Seminary of Colleggio Romano della Sancta Croce in Rome with sponsorship from Opus Dei. He completed his Master’s and Ph.D. in Philosophy at the University of Navarra in Pamplona, Spain, with the dissertation La Memoria en Santo Tomás de Aquino: Fuentes y Originalidad.

Chapter 11

The Phenomenology of Inayan Charlie M. Dagwasi and Virgilio A. Bas-ilan II

Abstract This phenomenological study attempts to describe and understand the many roles of Inayan in the lived experiences and indigenous beliefs and practices of the Kankanaeys. The mode of the study is field research through personal interviews with some elders of the Kankanaey community. The interviews reveal a wealth of indigenous epistemologies, rhetoric, aesthetic criteria, and sensibilities. The overarching aim of this paper is to reclaim the authentic episteme of Inayan as understood in the Cordilleran tradition. Keywords Inayan · Adikaila · Kankanaey · Indigenous knowledge · Ipugaw

1 Introduction When the Belgian Scheut Fathers came to the Philippines in 1907, they aimed to convert the so-called “pagans” to Christianity. Initially, the mission was medical, educational, and catechetical. They build dispensaries for the sick, erect schools for young children, and go to barrios to preach. However, they had to understand the belief systems of these pagans (including their faith in Adikaila—the Great Unseen). The Belgian missionaries started learning the people’s languages, such as Ibaloy, Kankanaey, Ifugao, Kalinga, Ikalahan, and other native tongues. They lived with the natives, understanding their culture. Slowly, they earned the respect of the elders, and baptism started to be done. To convert the elders was then to convert the Igorot communities for whatever the elders say, the community adheres to and respects (Gevers, 1954; Jenks, 1905). Notably, the Spaniards from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries had difficulty penetrating the mountain ranges of the northern Philippines. A few attempts were C. M. Dagwasi (B) Benguet State University, Benguet, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] V. A. Bas-ilan II University of Baguio, Baguio City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Hongladarom et al. (eds.), Philosophies of Appropriated Religions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5191-8_11

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made via Ilocos Sur but to no avail. The natives drove away the Spanish missionaries by rolling stones in the upland routes or by loud, angry voices from the native hunters. Direct passages and entry points had a problematic opening since most tribes were fierce and unwelcoming. A lot of unwritten stories had never been done at this time. It was in the early twentieth century that the history of the Igorots was written. The Belgian missionaries made this possible (Jenks, 1905). Converting the Igorots to Christianity happened because of the patience and perseverance of the Belgian missionaries. The “headhunting practices” of the so-called “barbaric tribes”—characterized by Spanish friars in the seventeenth century—did not deter the Belgian missionaries. Instead, these missionaries started immersing themselves with the natives. After some time, they gained the confidence of the natives to the extent that both camps asked for guidance from each other. One of the lay missionaries who had lived among the natives of the Mountain Provinces was Dr. William Henry Scott (1921–1993). Scott stayed in Sagada in the 1950s, which helped him realize that the Sagada pagan community are spiritual people. The religious practices of the Igorots penetrate every aspect of their life. Prayers, rituals and religious songs accompany their everyday activities. Even economic areas of social life were directly influenced by public worship. Folklores, superstitious beliefs, and pagan rites underscore the religious nature of the Igorots’ social morals. Popular beliefs and well-known myths taught that the deserving or the unworthy would be appropriately rewarded or punished respectively in this world by the supernatural. Since their prayers, rituals, songs, poetry, tales, and folklore are expressed through their language, examining some terms and concepts in their vocabularies is necessary. During his stay in Sagada, Scott encountered the indigenous term Inayan, which he defined as (1) to hold somebody back, prevent from doing, dissuade; (2) a mild expression like “shucks!” (Scott, 1957, p. 30). However, for the native Kankanaeys, Inayan does not merely echo sheer expressions. It goes deeper into their core belief. Some factors contributed to the ambiguity of Inayan. First, the Kankanaey is an ethnolinguistic tribe in the Cordillera region. The Kankanaeys dominated Benguet’s northwest area, particularly the Municipalities of Bakun, Buguias, Mankayan, and Kibungan. Kankanaey was also spoken in the western parts of the Mountain Province in Bauko, Besao, Sagada, and Tadian. The Kankanaeys of Mountain Province were called Applais. People living on the borderline of the Kankanaeys tend to have a mixture of beliefs, practices, and language. They are called the Bago or Bag-bag-o from the peripheral areas of the west and south of Benguet, stretching from the east of Ilocos Sur to the North of Pangasinan and the Katagwan of Kapangan (Sacla, 1987). Although the Kankanaeys are considered a minority in the Philippines, their language must not be disregarded or deemed obsolete because “language as a text illuminates tradition” (Gadamer, 1975/2004, p. 479). Inayan is an oral tradition. Its transference depends on the ability of the parents and elders to transmit the richness of the concept.

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The second factor is due to acculturation. The Belgian missionaries learned the language and culture of the Cordillerans, paving the way for more accessible communication and evangelization. However, an intercultural exchange may lead to challenges and changes. Pope John Paul II acknowledged that the church had “violated the rights of ethnic groups and had shown contempt for their cultures and religious traditions” (Stanley, 2000). The Pope deplored divisions between Catholicism and other branches of Christianity and discrimination against women. To avoid fragmentations, Heidegger implored that “we should enter into the lived experience of the surrounding world” (Von Hermann, p. 30) for understanding through interpretation to take place. Although Inayan suffered less in efficacy due to acculturation, it is partially recovered. The Inayan culture was instilled into the Cordilleran lifeworld, but its full meaning still needs to be clarified among the younger generations. Delima (2006) explored the polysemy or multiple meanings of Inayan from the Kankanaeys of Western Mountain Province and Northern Benguet. She says, “Inayan embodies the virtues of humility, truthfulness, fidelity, honesty, and commitment.” Further, Inayan “stresses faith in, and respect for, the unseen gods or spirits” (Delima, 2006, p. 4). Therefore, Inayan has complex pragmatic meanings and appears as a culturespecific ethic, but its meaning still appears fuzzy (Delima, 2006, p. 9). It is then the desire of this paper to explore a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of Inayan by describing the lived experiences of the Kankanaeys and Inayan’s role in their lifeworld. Thus, Inayan must be placed into its correct viewpoint to understand better its essential meaning and appreciation from a Kankanaey perspective and a non-Kankanaey worldview.

1.1 Hermeneutical Phenomenology This paper employs hermeneutical phenomenology as its method. It “combines the age-old tradition of hermeneutics with phenomenology” (Malpas & Gander, 2015, p. 575). Using this method, we aim to provide phenomenological interpretations of ethnographic descriptions of Kankanaey culture, particularly how their beliefs, ways of life, and codes of conduct relate to Inayan through personal interviews with some elders of the Kankanaey community. As shall later be seen, these interviews reveal a wealth of indigenous epistemologies, rhetoric, aesthetic criteria, and sensibilities. We hope that these results may impact the philosophy of culture and the philosophy of religion. Hermeneutical phenomenology implies the hermeneutic circle, characterized as “letting what is alienated by the character of the written word or by the character of being distantiated by cultural or historical research speak again” (Flynn, 2006, p. 118). The hermeneutic circle “is a method for discerning the meaning of an unfamiliar text, whether its strangeness be historical, like an inscription, or simply foreign to us, like the statements of someone from one’s culture or even from another profession” (Flynn, 2006, p. 118). Thus, hermeneutics is an art of interpretation.

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Fig. 1 Hermeneutic Spiral (Hirashima, 2016)

The value of individual experiences to collective understanding is illustrated in Fig. 1. An interpretation has a circular character because the things we seek to understand have unity like a circle. Neither whole nor part can be understood without reference to each other. As with a circle, there is no unique place to begin circling or, as we prefer, spiral toward understanding. One only fully knows the whole unless one grasps its parts, and one can only understand the parts if one has grasped the whole.

2 Inayan and the Kankanaey Worldview The following three sections explore the Kankanaey worldview and Inayan’s role in it. Note that the etymology of the word ipugaw is from the words “i” and “pugaw”. The prefix “i” is used by Kankanaeys to refer to past, present, or future human actions or states. For example, “i-Baguio” means a person from Baguio. On the other hand, “i-ali” or “i-paila” means a person’s action is needed. The word “pug-aw” or “peg-aw” comes from “pug-a,” which means pulled out. Other Kankanaey words related to it are “pug-as” or “peg-as,” which is to spray out or sprinkle water, and “bu-gaw” or “be-gaw,” which is to shout or call out. Common to these words is the state of being pulled, called out, scattered, or thrown out. Given this context, i-pugaw means a person being thrown out in the world or pulled out into the world. In this context, i-pug-aw anticipates Inayan as enduring and avoiding pain after birth. When an ipugaw comes into being, she exists with other beings. An integral part of the Kankanaey culture is the idea of the spirits. In the Kankanaey lifeworld, ipugaw is interconnected with nature and spirits. Various identifications can be made when the Inayan is connected to spirits. First, some identify spirit in the local language as the adikaila or unseen. No san adi kaila et san espiritu (the adikaila or unseen

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is what we call as espiritu or spirit) (P. Macario, personal communication, July 10, 2022). Thus, what is spirit is the adikaila of the Kankanaeys. Second, some identify the spirits as overseers. An overseer is someone that watches and directs. It is Inayan if we do evil acts because there is an adikaila that is watching. (Inayan no man-amag ta si lawa tan wada di adi kaila ay umil-ila) (S. Guinid, personal communication, July 13, 2022). The native priests or shamans classify the spirits according to hierarchy and acts (Sacla, 1987, p. 10). By hierarchy: (a) there is a spirit that made the universe known as Adikaila or Nanpalangka, (b) there are lesser spirits or kabunyan, (c) there are the spirits of ancestors or ap-apo/kaapuan or people who just died or kakkading/ kedaring, and (d) there are spirits inhabiting the Earth collectively or anito. By acts, spirits are benevolent or maeya/mapteng, or malevolent or makedse/makedsel. Under the first classification, one must understand that although the Maker of the universe is called the “Adikaila” or “Nanpalangka,” the term “adikaila” is also applied to all spirits since adikaila is a term that means unseen spirits. For the sake of hierarchy, the Adikaila in the big letter “A” refers to the maker of the universe and the small letter “a” for all the lesser spirits. The Kankanaeys “believe in many spirits and among them is the highest who made the sun, moon, stars, and the earth with all the elements and creatures” (Sacla, 1987, p. 10). Just as the Christian term God is the Anslemian description of “that which nothing greater can be conceived,” the Kankanaey description of the highest and greatest spirit is Nanpalangka. “The supreme Being, Adikaila, made all things good and perfect” (Sacla, 1987, p. 26). Since Adikaila created all things good and perfect, the treatment of all the Supreme Being’s creations is fair and just. Mutual respect is present in all creation; this can be seen in the acts, rituals, and attitudes of the Kankanaeys toward all creation. The highest spirit, or the Adikaila, does not need the material things because he made them all, and only the underworld spirits crave material things to appease or please them (Sacla, 1987, p. 6). The next in the hierarchy is the kabunyan, a collective term for the spirits overseeing the creation of the Adikaila. The kabunyan are spirits that belong to the sky world. They have supernatural powers but no power to create (Sacla, 1987, p. 16). In the case of the kabunyan, the Nanpalangka creates them; thus, they are not considered gods and goddesses but keepers or those who manage what is created. Each of the kabunyan has specific functions in overseeing all of creation. For example, Bal-litoc is the keeper of gold while Bangan is the keeper of pigs (Sacla, 1987, pp. 16–17). The Kankanaeys honour the kabunyan through chants called bayyog. “In the lower grade of feasts, only a few kabunyan are mentioned in the songs” (Sacla, 1987, p. 7). The third in the hierarchy are the “ap-apo” and the “kakkading.” The ap-apo are the spirits of ancestors. They live with the kabunyan and can travel to and from the sky world to the Earth. However, there are also underworld ancestral spirits that cannot do this. The kakkading are the spirits of those who just died or are on a journey toward the sky world. They are still lingering in this world. Of all the creatures on this earth, only humans have a spirit (abiik) that can go to the sky world when one

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dies (Sacla, 1987, p. 10). Abiik seems to imply a kind of dualism where a spirit is embodied. The last in the hierarchy are the “anito,” or the spirits inhabiting the earth. “The anito are the spirits in the underworld, and each group has a collective name and are identified by group according to their dwelling place” (Sacla, 1987, pp. 18–19). They are grouped as follows: ANITO

Dwelling location

1

Tomongao, pinten, pinad-ing, lebek, tonoton/debek, ampasit, tayab-ban, botatew, mandoweng, nante-es bilig, liblibayan, amlag, and pamakan

Big rocks, cliffs, ravines, caves, abandoned tunnels, abandoned buildings, bushy trees, bushes, waterfalls, creeks, springs, lakes, rivers, ocean and in the ground

2

Pinten, kakkading, and pinad-ing

Anywhere around liquor stores, trading places, around people drinking wine and during feasts

The anitos are the spirits that are usually in contact with humans; hence they are the ones whom the Kankanaeys usually fear. Since they live in the same place as humans, utmost care and every action must be done, especially in their dwelling place. Under the second classification, according to acts, the adikaila is categorized into two. The first category is the benevolent or maeya. The maeya oversee all animals, plants, and even minerals. For example, the tomongao are always in contact with human beings and keepers of all human resources. The other category is the makedse or the malevolent ones. The makedse are selfish, easily offended, and quick to pass retribution and vengeance on human beings. If this happens, native priests are summoned. Native priests are of three kinds: the manbunong, mansip-ok, and the mankotom. Through rituals, they are believed to have been given the power of deliverance from affliction and malady by the adikaila (Sacla, 1987, p. 26). The manbunong acts as the administrator of prescribed ritual cure or healing ritual. The mansip-ok is the determiner of the cause of sickness, misfortune, or death and prescribes the healing ritual. Finally, the mankotom functions as the interpreter of dreams and omen. Interestingly, the introduction of Christianity did not diminish the influence of the native priests. The second essential understanding is that for the Kankanaeys, spiritual beings have different functions and roles. Each plays a part in the Kankanaey world, thus making them interdependent. Therefore, dependency and co-existence between spirits are an interpretation of interconnectivity. For Kankanaeys, this interconnectivity applies to both embodied and pure spiritual beings. The third essential understanding is that humans are accountable to all beings (embodied or purely spiritual). All actions have repercussions for all creation; thus, one must be highly cautious and respect all beings. This respect leads to the fourth essential understanding that human beings must always give gratitude for all blessings received and penance for all atrocities committed. With the help of intermediaries through rituals, human beings must give due respect and honor to all beings. Thus,

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for Kankanaeys, one shows gratefulness by performing rituals. When faced with other spiritual beings, one must acknowledge their presence since they are real and not just a product of someone’s thoughts.

3 Egyat, Paniyew, and Inayan The lived experiences of the Kankanaeys of Inayan are composed of “egyat” (Fear) and “paniyew” (Forbidden). The egyat appeals to one’s emotions and is usually the first phenomenon experienced by people. For instance, Pablo Macario, 71 years old, a mang-ilut, mangparut, or mangdateng (a native doctor and counsellor) from Buguias, Benguet, talks about Inayan in the following way: “waday epekto nanto ay kabutbuteng sinan maudi isunga kanan da en Inayan Paniyew” (there is an effect that is to be feared in its consequences, hence, it is called Inayan or paniyew) (P. Macario, personal communication, June 2, 2022). Mario Layugan, 66 years old, a manbunong (native Priest) from Bakun, Benguet, also supports this: “waday epekto nanto ay kabutbuteng sinan maudi” (there is an effect then that is fearful in the end) (personal communication, June 4, 2022). From these two statements, one may say that Inayan has an effect of fear due to its consequences. It is a “dangerous precaution or a warning to something bad that may happen that is disastrous or destructive” (G. Dulag, personal communication, June 12, 2022). Since the feeling of fear affects the way a person thinks and acts, Inayan can be said to “siya nan mangagalot endatako tapno adi tako makaaramid si kinadakes” (limit us so that we will not do evil) (D. Pusot, personal communication, June 21, 2022). Paniyew or Inayan means unethical, a taboo against established tradition (Sacla, 1987, p. 152). In other words, it is a code of ethics or set of laws or regulations of behavior based on what is morally good and evil. For Kankanaeys, what is evil must be feared because of Inayan. The fear of the unknown or “adi ammo di nemnemen” (not knowing what to think) (H. Sacyat, personal communication, June 25, 2022) is a common experience of every human being. Not knowing is fearsome since, without certainty, one is blinded. Being blinded induces susceptibility to go out of the way, thus incurring malignant consequences. Aside from the unknown, there are known things that are feared. This is the second theme of paniyew or the forbidden. It is forbidden since committing such actions would bring disastrous retribution. “Wada di egyat sin nemnem mo no adi pati-en ya ma-isagmak si kompurmi ay basol unno sik-ay mabiktima” (There is fear in your mind; if you don’t believe, you will be led to sin or you will become the victim) (P. Awisan, personal communication, June 26, 2022). Violating Inayan results in committing a sin or becoming the victim. If sin is defined as an offense committed against religious or moral laws, and moral laws are what is right or wrong according to a norm, then sin is an offense against the norm or laws of the community. On the other hand, becoming the victim is a realization of the golden rule, which is doing to others what one wants them to do in return. Other retributions even go beyond life, thus making it possible that “mateyak uno maaksidinti ak no adi ak

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patien din kali ay Inayan” (I will die or suffer an accident if I will not believe in the Inayan) (D. Bag-ayan, personal communication, June 28, 2022). These samples of malignant retributions indicate the presence of someone who gives such retribution. This someone can be visible and “invisible who sees whatever I am doing, listen to what I say, reads what is in my mind and heart” (A. Cayatoc, personal communication, July 8, 2022). Thus, the presence of visible and invisible beings plays a significant part in the Inayan belief system. “The indigenous ontology where Inayan is practiced recognizes an unknown force operating beyond individual action powerful enough to incur adverse consequences against socially unacceptable behavior” (Orticio, 2016, p. 86). From personal interviews of 39 resource persons, 49% identify fear as an element of Inayan, while 51% refer to it as a forbidden act or paniyew. Paniyew is commonly used for ritual ethics. “Ritual ethics are the do’s and don’ts which were carried from generations through the performance of the ritual” (Sacla, 1987, p. 151). It is a Kankanaey ritual in the sense that all aspects of one’s life are full of meaning defined by prayers and actions. Rituals are performed from conception to death and even up to the afterlife. A ritual performance follows specific procedures, and deviating from them will anger the spirits to cause misfortune. Thus, rituals are made to appease the spirits. Although paniyew is used for ritual ethics, it does not solely comprise what is to be called Inayan for it is applied to all aspects of an Ipugaw’s life. Reflecting on the individual accounts and the common understanding of Inayan, there are deducible concepts or truths about it. First, Inayan induces fear of the known and the unknown. Inayan is a Kankanaey word that draws the emotion of fear when communicated. The fear of the uncertain and certain is natural because it is grounded in the Ipugaw existence. In the philosophy of Heidegger, “Fear is a mode of attunement” (Heidegger, 1953, 1996, p. 133). By attunement, he meant being in a mood or being in a “what” is most familiar and an everyday thing that brings being to its there-being or as being-in-the-world (Heidegger, 1953/1996). “Human moods, such as guilt, fear, anxiety, joy or dread, are no longer considered as mere physiological sensations or psychological emotions but are now recognised as the ontological ways in which we feel and find our being-in-the-world, our being-there as Befindlichkeit” (Levinas, 1995, p. 181).

4 Inayan in the Natural Environment Inayan speaks of what is forbidden. Those forbidden involve things and acts that the Kankanaeys believe threaten their conditions. Heidegger defines nature as “which surrounds us” (Heidegger, 1953/1996, p. 195). Since nature surrounds us and that which surrounds us affects one’s development and growth, nature is the foundation of a being. Inayan in nature can be categorized into three. The first category is about natural calamities. “Wada di Inayan sin ig-igid tako, masapul ay man-linis sin alubayan ta adi umali di eweg ya dalusan di canal ta adi magday and etc.” (O. Mateo, personal

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communication, July 21, 2022). It means that there is an Inayan in the surrounding. One has to clean his backyard so that snakes will not come; one must clean the canal so no landslide will happen. In other words, “batog mo, dalusam!” (clean your surroundings) since human beings are vulnerable to nature. The second classification is about the adikaila, especially the anito or the spirits who dwell in the living spaces of human beings. There are many things to be feared in nature. “Amin ay amagen masapul mankedaw si permiso tan waday manbanbantay ay adi kaila” (there is a need to ask permission because there is a guardian, the adikaila)” (A. Bestre, personal communication, August 1, 2022). Since the kabunyans are the guardians, keepers, and overseers of creation, human beings who benefit from it must ask permission to use it. “Mo sin lalakay yan wada di imadmad da asi da manputo si kaiw” (S. Guinid, personal communication, August 3, 2022). It means that for one to cut a tree, the Kankanaey elders have to make a ritualistic prayer. This prayer asks permission from the adikaila, anito, or the particular guardian of the trees. In cleaning one’s home, one has to be wary of where to throw the dirt since spirits are around. “Baken basta kaiwasi-sit si lugit tan waday manbonget” (A. Beligan, personal communication, July 29, 2022). One must be cautious of the anito, particularly the “tomongao that might cause inexplicable things if they are displeased” (R. Sanagen, personal communication, August 2, 2022). For example “No maagdang kay a waday mapulag si bato, ibagam: sanay bato! Mo man-isbu kayu abe, adi kau is-isbuan mo waday puon di bato tan beey di temengaw et matemengaw ka” (If you step and a stone falls, you say: A stone is falling! And if you urinate, do not do it in a location where there are large stones, the house of the tomongao, because you will be matomongao or be at the mercy of the tomongao.) (M. Layugan, personal communication, August 2, 2022). Aside from stones, rivers can also be an Inayan. When you are in grief for a dead person, they say that it is Inayan or paniyew to stroll afar because the spirit of the dead, who is with you and goes anywhere with you, might be the source of disaster since you would be walking for a while and unlike today that there are cars to ride on. If you will cross a river, it is crossing the line. You can go for fun experiences if you do not cross a river because it is Inayan. Because there are accounts of people that, upon seeing the dead person, they fall and drown in the river (P. Macario, personal communication, August 2, 2022). This story reveals that even the kakkading or the spirits of those who recently died can cause misfortune or disaster. It also indicates that the spirits of the dead can make themselves visible to people if they choose to. Of the 39 respondents, 15% identified calamities as Inayan; 23% identified it as evil human acts; 59% identified it as the spirit’s presence; and 3% refused to answer the question. The themes identified by the respondents are all connected to the idea that calamities happen due to the evil acts of human beings toward nature, the dwelling place of the spirits. From the three identified themes, the most common idea of Inayan is the presence of spirits when one fails to recognize or ask permission from these spirits dwelling in human living spaces. Generally, all spirits are regarded as good. However, the degree of goodness of the spirits depends on their perception of human actions, where their

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punishment is curable only by appeasing the spirits (Sacla, 1987, p. 4). The spirits who are not being offended and trespassed remain to be benevolent as protectors and providers of man. Both the favors and wrath of the spirits to the perception of man can be availed of and appeased. This is traced as the basis of ritual practices (Sacla, 1987, p. 4). The ritual practices of appeasing and asking a favor from the spirits originate from the premise that the spirits can grant favors and impose the opposite. When a family member is sick and found to have been caused by underworld spirits, the ancestor is asked to intercede by telling the underworld spirits to stop inflicting the sickness (Sacla, 1987, p. 18). Undeniably, the Kankanaeys believe in intermediation between the living, the dead, and the spirits. For the intermediation, “animal sacrifices and material offerings from man must be exacted, not as elements of worship but a condition of appeasement to the spirits’ whims and caprices” (Sacla, 1987, p. 26). The belief in the appeasement of the spirits has now become engraved in the “thought, ways and lifeways” of the Kankanaeys (Sacla, 1987, p. 37). The thought and ways of the Kankanaeys refer to their mentality in making decisions and their “lifeways” to their way of doing things or putting into action what is in their mind, e.g., in cases of the spirit communicating with human beings through dreams and bad omens. Dreams and omens are naturally the media of communication since the spirits are invisible. Some of the omens farmers believe are “the prevalence of rodents, insects and other diseases are attributed to the disturbed spirits during the working period” (Sacla, 1987, p. 167). Another omen is when wild birds and animals who live in the mountains enter homes even in the presence of the occupants. Strayed animals and insects can be vessels of a spirit or the messenger of the spirits that either give fortune or misfortune. Suppose the interpretation of the omen is about misfortune. In that case, the pukkay, which means to deflect, is administered by sacrificing a chicken or a dog to the spirits involved. For the omens of good fortune, the sangbo is celebrated. Aside from animals and insects, celestial bodies are a witness to adikaila who can defend and reciprocate the innocent but render curses to the guilty by merely looking at the sun, moon and stars in whom s/he swears will always have a disturbed conscience, “nas-engan”, until it worsens to a curse (Sacla, 1987, p. 162). What is important to note here is that everything happens for a reason. In nature, visible and invisible beings exist. For the native respondents, unseen beings are real and evident from their experiences. Moreover, nature or the natural environment is life-giving and life-sustaining to visible and invisible beings. As the famous Cordilleran warrior who fought in the construction of the Chico Dam, Macliing Dulag argued, You ask if we own the land and mock as saying, ‘Where is your title?, When we ask the meaning of your words, you answer with taunting arrogance, ‘Where are the documents to prove that you own the land? Titles? Documents? Proof of ownership. Such arrogance to speak of owning the land when we instead are owned by it. How can you own that which will outlive you? Only the race owns the land because the race lives forever.

The kina-ipugaw is to take care of all the things in nature since human beings be-long and be-comes. We exist (“be”) as “longing” for nature, and through nature,

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we reach our possibility (“becoming”). Thus, nature is the foundation of being. The “be” is the whatness of the life of the kina-ipugaw toward a glimpse of a totality of Being. The “longing” and the “coming” are the desire to grasp that totality of life. Therefore, there is always a connection between the “be” with the “longing” and the “coming,” which is the close relation of the Kankanaeys with their environment.

5 Inayan in Basic Needs In the world of the Kankanaeys, the Inayan in food, clothing, and shelter speaks of what is to be avoided. The Inayan in food, the first of the basic needs, is about “being careful in what one is eating” (A. Cayatoc, personal communication, August 8, 2022). Being careful means being aware of the value of the food. The value of the food is important for the Kankanaeys that they even go to the extent of regarding them as living entities. For instance, “No isnan makan aditako basta iwaswasit tay man-uga da kano” (D. Pusot, personal communication, August 9, 2022). “Inayan nan iwas-wasit nan makan tay insangit da” (J. Ferrer, personal communication, July 21, 2022). “Mo mangan di esa ay ipugaw adi maiwasit di makan tan Inayan mo mamaga et madegaangan tako” (A. Bestre, personal communication, August 11, 2022). These statements refer to food as a living entity that, if wasted, will cry and will withdraw itself. Thus, food will not be abundant in the future. One should not just throw hot water anywhere because there might be spirits that will be hurt (J. Ferrer, personal communication, August 12, 2022). Aside from wasting food, there is also the Inayan of food poisoning. “Wada abe di Inayan sin makan din mapoisonan” (O. Mateo, personal communication, August 13, 2022). What is poisonous or deadly are the foods the human body cannot consume and thus can cause death or illness. Poison can be natural or human-made. The natural refers to the plants, animals, and insects which are to be found in nature. Some of the top poisonous entities are the Nerium oleander, the putter fish, and the anopheles mosquito. Human-made poisons are manufactured chemicals. The Kankanaey respondents have identified anything that destroys life as the Inayan in food. Too much fat, sugar, or salt is Inayan because it is unsuitable for the body. They will have high blood, get sick, become weak, and die. Too much liquor and smoking affect the heart, lungs, and the entire body and soul (M. Dagasen, personal communication, July 3, 2022). What is being pointed out here is that the Inayan in food is humans’ immoderation toward their meals. The Kankanaey elders believe in moderation of action as the way to live without Inayan. Inayan in clothing concerns how it is acquired and from whom it is acquired. “Din bado abe mo way adika ammo ay ginatang ket paibado da en sik-a Inayan abe di” (The piece of clothing that you wear but did not buy is Inayan.) (O. Mateo, personal communication, August 2, 2022). Anything gotten from evil will result in evil. Stealing is Inayan. Do not get the property of others. When you are already as old and cannot get food, there is in your mind that maybe this is due to your wickedness (M. Layugan, personal communication, August 2, 2022). There is a consequence to

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one’s action, whether immediately or in the future. No one is exempted from this fate. There is Inayan in how one uses an item of clothing. If the clothing is used properly, it is good. However, wearing a dead person’s clothing in Benguet is Inayan because an anito may cause misfortune. If it must be used, then a sida or canao ritual must be performed (P. Macario, personal communication, August 2, 2022). (Note that this practice is not present in other regions of the Cordillera.) Anitos have an appetite for material things. That is why there are various restrictions (Inayan) in how Kankanaeyas revere the dead. They must respect the dead and their clothes because the anito may use them. Aside from the clothing of the dead, one is not to wear a pair of black unless one is a widow or “inaafig” (J. Tagaban, personal communication, August 12, 2022). Inayan in shelter refers to the proper place of one’s shelter or house. A home should be built on your lot; otherwise, other people may threaten to sue you (A. Cayatoc, personal communication, July 18, 2022). If a shelter is already built, “adi kan pante-an no adi nadasadasan” (you cannot live on it unless it is blessed) (T. Calines, personal communication, July 18, 2022). The blessing or “madmad” asks permission from the spirits dwelling in that space. The purpose is “ta mayat di bumeey” (that good will come to the dwellers) (A. Bestre, personal communication, August 12, 2022). The asking of permission implies “mo nan amag ta si beey yan sat wada di maimadmad tapno maipakada sin beme-ey ay wadas di” (if you make a house, then there must be a blessing so that permission will be given to the people to live in it) (S. Guinid, personal communication, August 13, 2022). After the madmad or blessing, evil acts, like engaging in adultery, are not allowed in the home. “Aditako is-isgep nan adi gawis ay aramid kaspangarigan panagkabit” (D. Pusot, personal communication, July 21, 2022). The interviews with the Kankanaeya elders imply two themes regarding the Inayan in basic needs. Inayan is an offense against self and others as the primary concern or an offense against the spirits. Of these two themes, the first is more feared than the second since spirits can only be angered if one has done a paniyew or Inayan toward them and their dwelling. However, in the case of an offense against other people, the action is unpredictable and sometimes unreasonable and irrational. However, the reality is that the younger generation of Kankanaeys is being alienated from their roots due to the fast changes and exodus of foreign cultures. The way to solve this problem of alienation is to build a solid foundation. Thus, it is urgent to find reasons behind practices to appreciate one’s culture. The Kankanaey practices always involve basic needs. “The longing for material wealth and good health by man makes them very ritual conscious” because it is believed that “these spirits can intercede for man for a bountiful harvest, prolific animals and good health” (Sacla, 1987, pp. 5–6). The healthier and more prosperous one is, the more one is bound to observe rituals. All achievements in life are attributed to the favors granted by the spirits. To return the favor is to perform rituals such as thanksgiving feasts. “One with bountiful harvests, herds of animals and has money gives higher ritual stage” (Sacla, 1987, p. 6). Even though there are statuses in the Kankanaey world, there are responsibilities

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and functions that they cannot do. Everyone has a place or role in society, regardless of status. The baknang (rich) and the biteg (poor) have each their perks, but they are still held accountable for their actions by the native priests. If any of them has transgressed the spirits, they are to be judged all the same, but their penance corresponds to their status in life. A thanksgiving celebration called “pedit” is usually celebrated by the baknang or kadangyan. In pedit, the number of pigs butchered is always in odd numbers. Odd numbers are lucky numbers since they represent the family structure (father, mother, child). Furthermore, when grouped in pairs, odd numbers always have an extra thing. This extra thing signifies that those celebrating pedit will always live in abundance and be capable of sharing their material possessions (Sacla, 1987, pp. 59–60). It is evident that there is always a meaning in every ritual being conducted by the Kankanaeys. In the Kankanaeyan culture, odd numbers are good or lucky since they represent something extra that can be shared with other people. From the number of pigs to be butchered for rituals, the number of figures in the designs of the bedbed (headgear), wanes (G-string), tapis (skirt), and galey (blanket), to the days of waking of the dead, odd numbers are being observed. Other forms of thanksgiving feasts happen during wedding celebrations. A ritual called teteg follows after two or more days after a wedding ritual. A pig is offered to the Kabunyan and ancestors as a symbol and a necessary start to a prosperous married life. The purpose is to open the door for their ancestors to bring in good luck for the couple (Sacla, 1987, p. 37). Thanksgiving celebrations are for both human beings and the adikaila. They signify a communion between embodied spirits (human beings) and purely spiritual beings. Catholic Christians have their communion with their God, hosts of heaven, saints, the dead, and the living during the Holy Eucharist. In sida or kanyaw or thanksgiving celebrations, Kankanaeys have their communion with their Maker (Nanpalangka), the spirits living in the sky world (kabunian), the spirits of the ancestors (kaapuan), those who just died (kakkading), the spirits of the underworld (anito), and the embodied human spirits (abiik).

6 Conclusion For Kankanaeys, Inayan commands one to avoid bad things and pursue good things. In its interconnected cosmology, Inayan is a set of norms of how all spiritual beings must encounter one another. It has the elements of fear (egyat), as an attunement, and forbidden (paniyew), as a threat. In the Kankanaeyan context, it is the calling of the being to its true being. Violating Inayan implies going against one’s being. For a Kankanaey, human beings are spiritual beings (abiik) born (na-i-pug-aw) into this world (kalutaan) embodied (na-i-awak). Other spirits (kabunyan, kakkading, anito) are dwelling and on a journey to the sky world (kadayaan) where the Creator (Nanpalangka) and their ancestors (kaapuan) dwell. For a human being’s journey to

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be good (mayat/siged), s/he must live with other beings by caring and loving (eset and layad) them. To show love and care for other people, one must share one’s resources like food (makan), clothing (bado), and shelter (baey); one must educate (itduan) children and be guided by the elders (nankakay) and be with them (maki-kadwa). To show love and care for purely spiritual beings (adikaila), one must acknowledge, include, and appease (atang, peltik and day-eng) them using rituals (pedit, dilus, sobsobot, denet, es-eset, sabosab, bosal-lan, liyaw, pocpocley, dasadas, tomo, dawes, tanong, dangtey, begnas, an-anito), offer thanksgiving (sida/kanyaw) to show a sign of communion or interconnectivity (man-es-esa). Finally, to show love and care for nature, one must take care (esten) of their dwelling place (pan-te-an) since nature is the foundation of all beings. Thus, it is by Inayan that Kankanaeys are reminded to act on one’s being. It is a call to be true to oneself. However, this call is not confined to one’s being but to all beings that are part of the cosmos. It is by way of caring and loving that Kankanaeys exhibit their being.

References Delima, P. G. (2006). The polysemy of “inayan” across tribal groups in Mountain Province: Exploring evidence of culture-specific ethical concepts in language. Paper presented to the 9th Philippine Linguistics Congress (25–27 January 2006), organized by the Department of Linguistics, University of the Philippines. Flynn, T. R. (2006). Existentialism: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press Inc. Gadamer, H. G. (1975/2004). Truth and method. (J. Weinsheimer & D. G. Marshal, Trans.). Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. Gevers, F. (1954). Historical sketch of the igorot people. The Little Apostle of the Mountain Province, 25(2), 2–5. Hirashima, T. (2016). Hermeneutic spiral [Photograph]. https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Her meneutic-Spiral_fig2_303891111 Heidegger, M. (1996). Being and time. (J. Stambaugh, Trans.). State University of New York Press. (Original work published 1953). Jenks, A. E. (1905). Bontoc igorots. Bureau of Public Printing & Saint Louis College Baguio City. Levinas, E. (1995). Ethics of the infinite. Interviewer: In R. Kearney (Ed.), States of mind: Dialogues with contemporary thinkers (pp. 177–199). New York University Press. Malpas, J., & Gander, H. H. (2015). The Routledge companion to hermeneutics. Routledge. Orticio, G. (2016). The indigenous digital collective: The translation of mobile phones among the iTadian. In L. E. Dyson, S. Grant, & M. Hendrix (Eds.), Indigenous people and mobile technologies (pp. 71–91). Routledge. Sacla, W. D. (1987). Treasury of beliefs and home rituals of Benguet. BCF Printing Press. Scott, W. H. (1957). A vocabulary of the Sagada Igorot dialect (Transcript No. 6). University of Chicago. Stanley, A. (2000, March 13). Pope asks forgiveness for errors of the church over 2000 years. The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/13/world/pope-asks-forgiveness-for-errorsof-the-church-over-2000-years.html?pagewanted=all Von Hermann, F. W. (2000/2013). Hermeneutics and reflection: Heidegger and Husserl on the concept of phenomenology. The University of Toronto Press.

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Charlie M. Dagwasi is an Associate Professor and the designated Dean of the College of Social Sciences, Benguet State University, La Trinidad, Benguet, Philippines. He finished his MA in Philosophy at Saint Louis University, Baguio City, and his Ph.D. in Educational Management at Benguet State University. Virgilio A. Bas-Ilan II is a Senior Instructor at the School of Teacher Education and Liberal Arts of the University of Baguio. He finished his MA in Philosophy at Saint Louis University, Baguio City.

Chapter 12

Catholicism in the Philippines Between Sákop and Kagandáhang-loób: A Critical Phenomenology of Religion Anton Heinrich Rennesland

Abstract This paper presents an approach to Filipino Christianity (particularly Roman Catholicism) using the concepts of sákop (reduction) and kagándahangloób (hospitability). It attempts a critical phenomenology of the Filipino experiences of reduction and hospitality. These two experiences imply a paradox. Since being baptized by the Spanish colonial conquest in 1521, its identity has been in flux. Historically, the Filipino Christian experience was brought about by the reducción system. However, this experience is condensed by claiming kagandánhang-loób as a virtue. Yet, kagandánhang-loób is not enough to articulate the Filipino Faith, evidenced by the experience of Filipino migrants or in questioning the faith’s presence in Philippine politics. This critical phenomenology of religion seeks to interrogate these quasi-transcendental structures of the Filipino Christian experience and locate such structures between the extremes of sákop and kagandáhang-loób. Keywords Kagandáhang-loób · Sákop · Catholicism · Filipino · Reducción

1 Introduction Critical phenomenology inherits the phenomenological tradition’s reflection of “the quasi-transcendental social structures that make our experience of the world possible and meaningful” (Guenther, 2013, 2020, p. 15). In reflecting upon it, critical phenomenology goes beyond the traditional view by providing new social imaginaries (or restructuring) for a more meaningful experience. Its critical import distinguishes it from the traditional view; critique offers a dynamicity that emphasizes a continuous rumination on the quasi-transcendental structures of reality, which make lived experience possible, yet also continuously tests the elasticity of one’s experiences to posit a different state of things.

A. H. Rennesland (B) University of Santo Tomas, Manila, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Hongladarom et al. (eds.), Philosophies of Appropriated Religions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5191-8_12

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In this paper, my attempt at a critical phenomenology of religion aims to describe the quasi-transcendental structures that make the lived experience of Filipino Christians (mainly Roman Catholics) in the Philippines possible. This requires a shift from a first-order to a second-order observation, similar to Nietzsche’s distinction between good/bad and good/evil or Heidegger’s inquiry into the essences of being, truth, and metaphysics (Fuchs, 2017). This shift allows me to situate the Filipino Christian experience in the crossing between the extremes of sákop and kagándahang-loób, a tug between the experiences of reduction and hospitality. These two extremes reflect Christianity’s historical and social reality in the country. The first signifies its arrival; the second embodies the daily experience of some alleged Christian virtue. I divide the discussion as follows. First, I describe the Filipino words, Sákop and kagándahang-loób. These two words may be translated differently. However, I maintain two translations to refer to two sets of experiences. I first describe sákop, the first extreme, which can be translated as jurisdiction or one’s power over something. I use the operative condition of reduction through the imposed reducción system and the Cross as a saturated image of Christian phenomenological reduction. Then, through the second use of reduction, I proceed to the other extreme, kagándahangloób, which is usually translated as hospitality, but I argue is better taken as magnanimity. I then end with some musings on the crossing between these extremes. To tackle the Filipino image of Christianity, I posit how the Cross is a saturated image. Through critical phenomenology, this image is distilled through three intuitions: the first two are the two definitions of sákop, while the third is the second definition of kagándahang-loób.

2 Sákop The Philippine experience of Christianity begins with sákop. The Christian faith arrived upon the shores of islands in the Western Pacific in March 1521. Sákop, in this first sense, may be translated as colonizing. Colonization emerged by distinguishing between the colonizer (Spaniards) and the colonized (the native indios). The Latin colonia refers to settled land outside, from the verb colere, to cultivate or to tend. A colonia is a piece of land outside one’s territory that is cultivated. The distinction of cultivation bears a mimetic practice: what was outside, what was foreign, was made to imitate what was inside, what was familiar. Colonization upholds this tension between the foreign and the familiar. The various spheres of social life in the colonized territory—religion, socio-political constitution, and even social imaginaries—became a testament to this mimetic practice. The mimesis between the Occident and the Orient, the Spaniards and the people that would later become the Filipinos, was a tension that had to “support and to an extent reflect each other” (Said, 1978, p. 5).1 The mimetic relation arises from 1

What must be noted with this division is that the Occident is such only in respect to the Orient. Their division is arbitrary (in being dependent upon the other), and though they represent geographical

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the imposition of colonial rule of one over the other, borne through time. Because of the tension that emerges between the two, each side of the tension bears the imprint of the other. This points to how the tension between the Occident and the Orient, the colonizer and the colonized, unveils their respective worlding (Heidegger, 1969). One cannot be entirely independent of the other. Although the colonial tension may appear as a subject-object relationship (treating the colonized as inferior), a critical phenomenological insight unveils this as a subject-subject relationship. The subject, in this case, bears dual significance: the observer and the one subjected to that observing, the one colonized and the one continuously colonizing itself. This critical phenomenology of religion ultimately attempts to pave the way for a self-critique of this type of worlding. The paradoxical case of eventual self-colonizing began with the imposition of the colonizer of the same grammar of experience upon the colonized. This imposition lies at the heart of the mimetic practice. Its beginning came through the Spanish colonial conquest, marked by the Christian faith’s arrival in 1521. Baptizing the islands into the Christian faith, although it was part of the Christian missionary zeal, “was meant to bind them as loyal subjects of the Emperor by means of a formula that became an obsession” (Gaspar, 2021, p. 109). With this, Filipino identity was baptized into the Hispanidad grammar of experience. The imposition of the grammar of experience came through the paradoxical mimetic relationship in Hispanidad between Madre España and Nueva España. The latter was planned to mirror the former while preserving certain aspects of its culture (Forster, 1956; Mumford, 2012). The newness of Nueva España was due to its mimicry of the Spanish setup, notwithstanding how ethnologically, politically, or environmentally different. This distinction posited value in their relationship, opportuning the control, as what Edward Said (1978) situates, of the Occident on the Orient’s political, sociological, ideological, scientifical, and even imaginative structures. The goal of the Hispanidad imposition was the imagined communities of codwelling away from the natural rhythm of pre-Spanish everyday life. The Oriental Subject outnumbered the Occident Subject, yet the latter was easily subjected to an imposition. The Oriental out-group became the in-group. As Fr. Leonardo Mercado (1974) characterized, sákop as a reference group fulfills the Filipino’s social, communal character. However, Mercado’s association seems to take the historical context of what this word means for granted. A historical reorientation allows us to understand that sákop was possible due to the general resettlement plan—the reducción policy—that aimed to domesticate and pacify the indios while at the same time upholding an ethnographic tradition to incorporate into the newly established pueblos (Mumford, 2012). regions, the distinction is not in any way entirely definite. Although I use Edward Said’s distinction between East and West to begin my argument, the colonial approach to the Philippines was not entirely viewed from this perspective. The discovery of the islands, or part thereof that will eventually become the Philippines was part of Fernando de Magallanes’ voyage to discover an alternative route to the spice islands (Gaspar, 2021).

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What this meant for the Filipinos was not slavery, unlike the fate of other colonized nations due to movements concerning its abolition within Hispanidad but the indios’ auto-domestication (Agoncillo, 1990; Castro, 2007; Gaspar, 2021). Here, we observe the first extreme of Christianity: sákop, territorializing the indios in a new settlement planned to induce the European way of life. This emerges as the first intuition of the Cross, a display of Christianity’s strength through the constant display of both the cross and the sword. The Spaniards found it challenging to locate the center of power in the varying barangays and to travel from one area to another. Congregating different people into one pueblo with a clear center is more fruitful than constantly preaching at different topologies, figuratively and literally (Hernandez, 2010). The original barangays were forced into pueblos. The latter built on the former’s existing social structure with the difference of the distinct centering of the communal life within the defined community under the tolling of the church bells. The structure of the pueblos is literally and metaphorically centered on the church bells. These audible signs signaled to the community how life should follow: when to pray and celebrate mourning or festivities (Ocampo, 2016). These resettlements centered life under the control of the Church, comprising the familiar city centers with the Church and the plaza in the middle, a life structured bajo de la campana (Gaspar, 2021; Gutay, n.d.). Under the reducción system, life was centered on the occupying power’s display of strength, visually (the built environment of the pueblos) and auditorily (through the bells). This, of course, did not come for free. The Philippines was unlike other Spanish colonies that were rich in precious metals. The colonizers did not find the need to scramble to get their hands on the precious stones, leaving the sustenance of the resettlements to the tributes of the settlers themselves (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005; Reyes, 2015). This also added to the colony’s lasting heritage because, although not entirely profitable and easy to manage, the colony was a stepping stone for further evangelization in Asia. The Encomienda system allowed a reduction of power into the hands of the encomendero and, at times, his descendants (Forster, 1956; Gaspar, 2021). Though the people were not exported to be enslaved in another land, they were coaxed into this new life-world internally and externally that restructured their lives with Christianity in the middle (Agoncillo, 1990). My use of reduction to translate sákop comes from the twofold operative definition of the Spanish reducción: (1) the fastest and easiest way to indoctrinate Christianity through a town of the indios that have accepted or have returned to the true faith and (2) to return to its original state, to reduce, to perfect, to transfer, to control, and to divide (Hernandez, 2010). The second definition, used in medieval Spanish texts, did not directly mean colonial rule but a desire to return to an original setup and, as Hernandez claim, a homecoming. However, the Philippine word sákop bears testament to the obverse, a form of territorialization that became defined by the controlling power. Territorialization (pagkasakop) is dependent upon the occupying power’s (mananakop) ability to maintain control (kakayahang manakop) or the degree of the occupied’s willingness or subservience (magpasakop). In this case, sákop unfolds as a tension between

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territorialization and deterritorialization, coercion and willingness, that beget autodomestication. I hold that the Philippine experience of Christianity at this extreme of sákop made possible an eventual auto-domestication of those subjected to it. It is crucial to note how domestication comes from the Latin domus or home. Sákop, on the other hand, points to a covering, and metaphorically we may say, an imposition of a covering upon this home. It is fitting to understand sákop in the context of colonization because what has been domesticated is a cultivation of a people’s exteriority through built design and their internal character. This homogenization made any baptism to Medieval European grammar possible. In imposing this new home and a new grammar of expression, sákop has run its course.

2.1 From Reducción to Reduction From sákop as reducción, we proceed to my second reference of sákop as a phenomenological reduction. This follows the original definition of reducción. I discuss this through Jean-Luc Marion’s (1998, 2002) investigation of the phenomenological project: as much reduction and as much givenness. This is part of the attempt to critique Kantian formalization, i.e., the primacy of a priori categories of understanding, and to focus on the phenomenon’s presence as givenness, a donation. Marion exposes how Husserl and Heidegger undertake a phenomenological reduction in their writings and points out the loopholes of the previous two, conceiving phenomena as constituted objects (for Husserl) or in terms of Being (for Heidegger) (MacKinlay, 2010). For Marion (2002), the primacy of philosophy is seen in this turn from metaphysics to phenomenology. His contribution to understanding phenomenological reduction is through the shift in focus toward the givenness of a phenomenon. The importance of phenomenological reduction is a counterbalance to the earlier discussion of reducción. Reducción originally signified a movement toward the original state and likewise must be said with Christianity’s intentionality. For Marion, since reduction paradoxically increases the level of givenness, the level of the phenomenon giving itself, the effect of this is the emergence of saturated phenomena. The saturated image of the Cross is tied with the reducción system. Saturated images have various intuitions that do not exhaust the saturatedness. As discussed in the previous section, the Cross’ first intuition in the islands was the display of might. From the erection of the Cross after the first Mass to the baptisms of the friendly natives on the islands, what was central is the claim that these islands and their people are within the territorial claim of the Spanish Crown and the heavenly Kingdom. The efforts of the Spanish missionaries and the close collaboration with the Spanish Crown became the image of colonial rule. Without them knowing, the natives’ baptism into the Hispanidad experience and such control required a bureaucratic approach to maintain the hierarchy. While most Spaniards were found within Intramuros, the only ones who really resided outside the walled city (and consequentially wielded power in the pueblos) were the friars (Wise, 2019).

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The friars conveyed the salvation of one’s soul and territorial homeland through the pulpit preaching. From this display of power, the Cross’ second intuition expresses its Christian message of salvation. Following Teodoro Agoncillo’s (1996) earlier analysis of the importance of the masses in the Philippine revolution, Reynaldo Ileto (1979) tries to read history from below through his historical analysis of popular movements in the Philippines. His argument hinges on the impact of the Pasyon, the Casaysayan nang Pasiong Mahal ni Jesucristong Panginoon Natin, used during the pabasa on Holy Week. What he offers is a reading of how the pasyon resounds this experience of the majority of Filipinos: The most provocative aspect of the pasyon text is the way it speaks about the appearance of a “subversive” figure, Jesus Christ, who attracts mainly the lowly, common people (taong bayan), draws them away from their families and their relations of subservience to the maginoó, and forms a brotherhood (catipunan) that will proclaim a new era of mankind. (Ileto, 1979, p. 16)

The salvation that Christ offers his disciples follows the paradigm of offering no resistance. Loving enemies, doing good to those who hate you, blessing those cursing you, and praying for those who mistreat you (New American Bible Revised Edition, 2010, Lk. 6:27–28). This admonition even provides a tangible aspect. Turn the other cheek to one’s offender, give one’s entire cloak instead of just the tunic, go for another extra two miles, shell out to one who wishes to borrow, and do not demand back what was borrowed (New American Bible Revised Edition, 2010, Mt. 5:38–42; Lk. 6:29–30). The Christian Bible is replete with images of docility that are often taken as the manifestation of Christ’s new commandment, “Love one another as I have loved you” (New American Bible Revised Edition, 2010, Jn. 13:34). This image of Christ as a meek victim though does not go without reproach. One must be mindful of the paradox of what the Cross represents, an image of docility and obedience on the one hand, of radicality, on the other hand. Christ lashed his fury in words, “I have come to set the earth on fire, and how I wish it were already blazing!” (New American Bible Revised Edition, 2010, Lk. 49:12) and even in deeds, whipping those people selling in the temple area (New American Bible Revised Edition, 2010, Jn. 2:15–16). This tension between two images of Christ climaxes at the summit of the Paschal mystery as sung during the Easter Vigil: This is the night // that with a pillar of fire // banished the darkness of sin. This is the night // that even now, throughout the world, // sets Christian believers apart from worldly vices // and from the gloom of sin, // leading them to grace // and joining them to his holy ones. This is the night, // when Christ broke the prison-bars of death // and rose victorious from the underworld. (Roman Missal, 2010, pp. 354–355)

Notice that the passage from darkness to light (or death to life) implies a reading of the eschatological promise that requires arduous purifications. At the same time, this desire for a universal brotherhood is transcendental in their noble desires. This

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resounds the euphoric image of all being siblings in the presence of Joy, the daughter of Elysium (Schiller, 1785). Despite the conflict in the two images, the climax of the Paschal mystery presents this ultimate vision of a return to life from death, a return to paradise from suffering, and a return to the Kingdom of God from this valley of tears. A similar longingness may be observed in the theme of the recitation of the pabasa during Holy Week. The Pasyóng Pilapil begins with the Genesis account of creation. This beginning is noteworthy as it sets the stage for the ultimate homecoming of Christ as the new Adam (New American Bible Revised Edition, 2010, Rom. 5:12–24; Benedict XVI, 2008). The book begins with the old Adam through whom we have been banned from paradise and ends with the new Adam who brings us back to our heavenly terrain. From the creation narrative to a glimpse of John’s apocalypse of the final judgment of Christ, what follows each segment is a section devoted to teachings for the populace. This is summarized by the four letters of ARAL (Anunciación, Resurrección, Adoración, Lamentación). The acronym forms the Filipino word that means lesson or reminder. These four words signify what the Pasyón teaches: people are imperfect and that through suffering, one gains eternal life through faith in Christ lest one is condemned to eternal punishment. The ARAL stanzas are practical teachings from the just-concluded section of the Pasyón directed at those who have forgotten the goodness (nakalimot ng kagandáhang-ásal at kabutíhang-loób) associated with Christian life (Bautista, 2017). These ARAL sections are rebukes against the wicked and praise for those who exemplify Christ’s disposition. From humanity’s fall after creation to its restoration in Christ’s paschal mystery, one may notice in the Pasyón this homecoming theme: the desire of Christ’s loyal followers to be with him at his second coming. Interestingly, Hernandez (2010) points out the theme of coming home as a common interest in the various epics and poems throughout the country, identical to the original intention of the word reducción. Here arises again a sense of deterritorialization for reducción signifies a territorialization within the pueblo, yet its original intention is precisely its obverse to return home. Our attention is brought again to the Cross to see how this paradox is contained therein. The second intuition, i.e., salvation, is mirrored in the spiritual (the recitation of the Pasyón as a devotion or panata) and the political senses (evidenced by the eventual outbreak of revolutions). I argue that Christianity’s phenomenological reduction is reflected by the Filipino’s reduction of one’s identity to simply what is inside (loób) the pueblo. The Pasyón, as Ileto discusses, mimics the indigenous practice of chanting epics. However, it differs in terms of its catechetical effort and the political force of pacifying indios under the sákop since there is no better image than Christ who conquered (nanákop) the powers of sin.2 Notice here the movement of sákop that can be projected upon society. Inside the pueblo is society’s logical structure of power, whereas outside it are found oppositional powers. Inside was where the rule of power 2

I took Christ’s conquering (pagsákop ni Krísto) from a stanza in the Pasyón (1949, p. 128; emphasis is mine): “Pumasok kapagkaraka // itong Sumakop sa sala // inaliw niyang lahat na, // ang doroong kaluluwa // Patriarkas at Propeta.”

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reigned, whereas outside was where lawlessness was found. What remains similar between the two areas is the saturatedness of the Cross for the Passover from death to life in the Paschal Triduum was the apex of recharging and putting the anting-anting to the test (Ileto, 1979). Tying this to the political thrust, the Filipino Christian experience stands out as not a form of the religion’s domestication but rather the creation of a folk Christianity. Concomitant to the friars’ catechism was the continuation of pre-Christian practices and the widespread use of anting-anting, the Katipuneros’ reverence of these for warfare, and contemporary usage for prosperity (Ocampo, 2011, 2015). Here arises a dialectical relationship between what is outside and inside. The use of the anting-anting went against Christian practice, against the sákop, but its continuation was made possible because of it. Whereas the religious blessing was considered vital to the life within (loób) the reducción, the anting-anting was instrumental to any hope of victory for life outside it, and later on by those the Filipinos who held power through the revolutions until the Spaniards retreated in 1898. Reading history from below, one can understand how protest movements emerged outside the reducción and paved their way inward. From a movement to pacify the indios came another wave by the indios to aggravate themselves against the colonial masters. Ironically, what is outside re-territorialized the inside (muling nanákop sa loób ang labas). This ends this first section on sákop with the two senses in which reduction has been employed, aligning with the two intuitions of the saturated image of the Cross. The first intuition is power manifested through the reducción system. The second is salvation regarding spiritual redemption and political struggle sourced from the tension between inside and outside the sákop. I sought to portray a dialectical tension that took the form of a continual conquering (patuloy na pagsakop) of the inside from the outside that emphasizes a sense of restrained development either in the direction of Hispanidad or indigenousness—Pasyón and revolution beckon the same image of the Cross.

3 Kagándahang-Loób A passage forms between both extremes of the Christian experience in contextualizing loób within the ambit of phenomenological reduction in the previous section. The earlier take on loób is a view of its holistic account, the reference of the “I” to an interior life of a community (Mercado, 1974). In this section, I proceed to the second dimension of loób, which refers to an individual’s interiority qua the moral and ethical dimension (Alejo, 1990; Mercado, 1974). My treatment of kagándahangloób is two-tiered. I tackle first its domestic-economic link (translating kagándahangloób as hospitality) and then proceed to the third intuition of the Cross (translating kagándahang-loób as magnanimity). A more common approach to loób, especially its actualization in goodness (kagándahang-loób), is through an outward impetus. In the context of a community, this is associated with bayanihan, commonly illustrated through Amorsolo’s

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painting of individuals helping the owner of a bahay-kúbo transport it to another location. Bayaníhan, as an ancient Filipino practice, is rooted in the bayan and is a collective action for each to be a hero (bayani) to the other, an anthropology of cooperation in a non-cash economy (Ang, 1979). I critique this first view since this sociological insight bears testament to the etymology of economics—oikonomia or managing domestic affairs. Suppose kagándahang-loób is best portrayed through this. Then one is left with a weak representation of going outside of oneself. Although there is this outward movement in helping the other, the bigger picture shows that the loób is concerned simply with domestic affairs. At this juncture, one may see the outward impetus of a person’s goodness (kabutíhan) through hospitality as a primal Filipino trait (Agoncillo, 1990). This provides an intersection in today’s economic grammar for the Filipino worker being part of the ideal labor force. In particular, the overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) are seen as modern-day heroes (bagong bayani) who provide their respective families with a better life, but at the same time, who provide headway for the country’s economic stabilization (Guevarra, 2010; Suarez, 2017). However, Cariño (2018b) is critical of this distinction and points out how this begs the question. Is the desire to work abroad really the answer to socioeconomic woes, or is it masking even worse continuously ignored pathologies? One may view this question against the backdrop of the high rate of unemployment in the 70s onwards under the Marcos dictatorship and the mask of pomp associated with what Former President Gloria Arroyo calls “the new aristocracy” (Guevarra, 2010). What can be sourced between president-turned-dictator Marcos Sr.’s promotion of a “new society” (PDI, 2016) to Arroyo’s “new aristocracy” is the sense of hopelessness that becomes the springboard for a renewed form of domestication. When push comes to shove, a desire for a clean slate, a fresh start, something new—a new society, a new hero, a new virtue—ultimately drives us to renew our experience of sákop even in today’s more extensive ambit of globalization. To be an OFW is considered a modern-day hero to the extent that it allegedly mirrors the patriotism of the national hero. This is evident in Former President Rodrigo Duterte’s move to formally create an executive department tasked with the welfare of Filipino migrant workers on the death anniversary of the country’s national hero, citing that these new heroes mirror Rizal’s valor.3 What this reality fails to bring to the fore is how the degree of today’s heroic disposition is reduced to mere economic figures, especially considering how nearly 9% of the 2021 GDP comes from OFW remittances (Caraballo, 2022), which is foreign to Rizal’s wish for his country. What is peculiar with this valorization of migration is how it embodies an 3

Former President Rodrigo Duterte on December 30, 2021, formally signed the creation of the Department of Migrant Workers. This department succeeds and expands the scope of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration from the Department of Labor and Employment. Its creation was marked as urgent to address the growing concerns of Filipino migrant workers, and the signing of its creation is uncanny. The President is reported to have said: “The establishment of the Department of Migrant Workers happens on the celebration of Rizal Day, when we honor not only the exceptional love for the country of Dr Jose Rizal but also the patriotism, excellence, courage of our modern-day heroes, including our overseas [Filipinos]” (Galang & Cator, 2021).

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intersection between economic and domestic affairs as a doubling of the domestic: the home (the remittances sent to the family) and the country (gross domestic product). This leads one to question an individual’s capacity to be at home, fully be oneself, and dwell within this condition from a physical perspective. Today’s modern-day heroes continue their heroic virtue in remaining far from their homes. From such a point of view, one may notice a tug between two images of what a home is. The struggle of a family coping with separation contrasted with a reproduction of a foreign way of life. Transnational families (separated by migration) become accustomed to an absence to gain a better economic advantage or maintain their luxurious lifestyle. Alongside this sacrifice is a pernicious global image of what a home is. Globalization gets displayed not by the doubling of a European or American city in the Philippines but by the emptiness contained by the abodes of transnational families (Suarez, 2017). This does not reduce globalization to the issue of migration; it rather strengthens the argument of noticing the trend of migration as part of Philippine culture and the apparent emptiness that comes alongside it. Forced migration made the reducción system possible, and that constant tension between inside and outside the pueblo continued to strengthen this notion. Today’s post-colonial Filipino experience of migration is a continuation of the identity of a Filipino as a migrant that Cariño (2018b) initially provides. From yesteryears’ pueblo to today’s city, a movement outward, abroad. Today’s struggle of a transnational family is a mimesis of yesteryears’ experience of learning to live with a different barangay in one cabecera. The eccentric abodes of today’s migrant families mimic the reducción system, an imposition of a foreign covering on one’s home. In presenting these points, I indirectly discuss how the inside (loób) is figured. The complex image of the migrant’s home in the previous paragraphs conjures the dialectic of territorialization. Following Peter Sloterdijk’s (2013) diagnosis of today’s experience with globalization, one sees the self without a place and a place without a self . The former refers to the experience of nomadism. He uses the exiled Jews as a case in point. The latter signifies the desert areas, uninhabitable places in nature (ocean, jungle, actual deserts, ice caps) but at the same time within habitable places (transitory areas such as airports, train stations, toll booths, shopping areas, work areas, and even vacation spots). Sloterdijk’s illustration of the former misses the recognition of indigenous people within special places in nature, such as those dwelling in the desert (the Arab Bedouins), the jungle (tribes in the Amazon rainforest), and even in bodies of water (the Badjao tribe in the Philippines). However, to better understand his illustration, he perhaps wishes to bring forward how these demarcated regions are becoming inhabitable to these people due to the strong march of globalism to reclaim deserts, clear forests, and pollute bodies of water. At the other extreme, at the heart of the urban environment, are these transitory zones filled with people regularly yet inhabited by no one. These form territories of exclusion that any particular individual cannot identify. What Sloterdijk provides are the two extremes of the experience of globalism—nomadism and desertification—and this is the reality with which the individual’s loób has to contend.

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An individual today is pushed to be a digital nomad in an urban desert environment, to be a migrant in the continuous desertification of the neoliberal landscape. Although the country reaps enormous benefits from good-willed migrants, the institutional push toward a more robust migrant community hastens the realization of this globalized extreme. Transnational, nomadic Filipino families born in the country yet identify themselves with the Middle East, the US, or Europe, among other places. The migrant identity becomes a transitory, being neither entirely Filipino nor foreign.

3.1 From Hospitality to Magnanimity In the preceding, I critique the thrust toward capitalizing on Filipino hospitality alongside the grim face of globalization, notwithstanding its benefits and impact on the migrant’s conception of a home or oneself. Against the backdrop of globalization and forced migration, the interiority of the home and the self (loób) contains the same image of emptiness, an inhabitable topos. An apparent emptiness allows a further distillation of the recurring figure of the Cross, leading to the third intuition for this piece that provides the springboard for my shift in the translation of kagandánhangloób from hospitality to magnanimity. From the treatment of kagandánhang-loób within the ambit of the capitalist enterprise, I tackle kagandánhang-loób as a virtue. Jeremiah Reyes (2015) goes at length to discuss Filipino virtues, and he elevates kagandánhang-/kabutíhang-loób as a root paradigm of Filipino culture. Such a treatment of one’s interiority, i.e., volition, uncovers the beauty of one’s will that is actualized in a relationship with another. This relation is highly emotive, involving passions. The third intuition takes shape. Magnanimity is in the transcendentals of unity, truth, goodness, and beauty. To be magnanimous is to be a great-souled individual, and my take on this comes from St. Thomas Aquinas’s consideration that this virtue allows the passions to be brought back to the rhythm of everyday life. For Aristotle (2004), magnanimity is the virtue between the vices of pusillanimity and presumptuousness. The magnanimous person is worthy of great things, seeks after honor—those fitting for such a stature— and looks down on others while thinking of oneself highly. Aristotle’s magnanimous person recognizes his superiority as something that comes from his greatness. Aquinas (2017), however, changes this perspective. For him, magnanimity conveys a sense of perfection that mirrors God’s (New American Bible Revised Edition, 2010, Mt. 5:48). The perfection of the passions provides a sense of honor, not one’s own doing but precisely sourced from the quotidian. This virtue brings us to recognize our incapacity for total independence. As a paradigm, the saturated image of the Cross represents humanity’s dependence on the Perfect Other, God (Aquinas, 2017). The Bible is replete with personae that exemplify this disposition. Abraham left the place of God and sold his wife (New American Bible Revised Edition, 2010, Gen. 12:10–20). Joseph, the dreamer, was sold to the Egyptians (New American Bible Revised Edition, 2010, Gen. 37:18–6). Job lost everything yet maintained his faith (New American Bible Revised Edition, 2010,

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Job. 1: 20–22). Paul persecuted Christians (New American Bible Revised Edition, 2010, Acts 9:1–9). Peter turned his back on his Master (New American Bible Revised Edition, 2010, Jn. 18: 15–27). Mary was found a virgin yet pregnant at a tender age (New American Bible Revised Edition, 2010, Mt. 1:18–19). Though imperfect, they have kept their eyes on the Lord, who perfects their shortcomings (New American Bible Revised Edition, 2010, Heb. 10:11–18). However, the recognition of this vertical measure of greatness—not comparing oneself to one’s neighbor but rather realizing one’s worth as a child of God—coming from prayer is not solely of our doing as one must be willing to “receive God’s gracious assistance, to receive it as a gift, and to trust that what is needful will be given.” “Magnanimity depends on God’s power and trusts his goodness, it protects us from smug presumption on the one hand and pusillanimous despair on the other” (Konyndyk DeYoung, 2004). In receiving this from God, the attention to the quotidian takes the form of recognizing one’s difference. In this, one is brought to recognize one’s imperfections and capacity and to what extent one may be willing to go out of one’s way to help that other. A linguistic play provides its intersection with the loób. “The loób initiates a gift (kaloób) and kapwa is the one who reciprocates. However, since the kapwa is also a loób, then the kapwa can also initiate a new gift (kaloób) to the previous initiator” (Reyes, 2015, p. 99). Magnanimity arises from the loób as it is something gifted that is actualized through one’s relationship with the other. The beauty of an individual is recognized through that individual’s willingness for something good, not entirely for oneself but for another, dependent upon a recognition of the widening of the loób through an outward movement that incorporates the kapwa into an understanding of one’s fulfillment (Reyes, 2015). The loób is dependent on the other for which it can actualize itself. It is drawn to recognize one’s dependence on one’s kapwa (horizontal measure) as one recognizes one’s imperfections to God (vertical measure). What one may notice in this crossing is the difficult passage of being a true neighbor to another. So, the question of the scholar of the law is a persistent one that presses upon us, who is my neighbor? (New American Bible Revised Edition, 2010, Lk. 10:29) Sino ba ang aking kapwa? Although the tension between the loób and the kapwa already existed in preHispanidad consciousness, it was the Christian mission that was able to expand its definition from within the tribe to even those outside of it (Enriquez, 1992, p. 64; Reyes, 2015; Scott, 1994, p. 237–238). This widened our jargon of authenticity to the non-identical character of the individual from within oneself: one’s tribe to those beyond the sákop of my tribal domain. Widening one’s grammar of experience can vitalize one’s sense of hopelessness, vulnerability, and woundedness to make one recognize this shared experience. Thus, the pressing concern in this second extreme is the identity, nay the recognition of being this co-dweller in this earthly abode, a co-maker of the Kingdom of Heaven.

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4 At the Crossing: The Filipino Christian Experience on the Streets What remains as a question is the intersection of the Philippine experience of the faith and the street (kalye). Mark Calano (2020) posits the importance of the kalye in the manifestation of the panatà during the Traslación. He shows the link between the two. Panatà arises from the “loób as a response to a petition, a form of sacrifice and penance, or an act of thanksgiving.” This “simply be reduced to a transactional act” since the object of the panatà is the Perfect Other and such an act springs from the beauty of one’s interiority (kagándahang-loób) “which embodies the very depths of Godhood.” In tying a panatà to the loób, Calano exposes the intersection between the loób and the kalye, maintaining the tension between what is inside and outside. However, we are left to inquire if this panatà may be found beyond the Traslación or, as I discussed earlier, the Pasyon. The difficulty in suggesting this is because the kalye is likewise the site of extrajudicial killings, prostitution, and trash. On a wider scale, one may even note faith’s apparent absence in Philippine politics considering the slate of government officials or the government’s priorities. At this third intuition of the Cross, one is introduced to a tension of what loób is in everyday life. This is left as an open question since what is more readily recognizable is the admixture of various elements. Whatever the loób had to struggle with is external representation: a citizen of one’s own country and a migrant in a foreign place; a person of Asian interior but a Western abode; a believer of values such as justice and truth and a government history with plunderers and dictators. This constant oscillation among elements reinforces the difficulty of the movement of identity that abounds in the first intuition vis-à-vis the Filipino. Understanding what a Filipino is, requires not just decolonization but deterritorialization (Cariño, 2018a). Being a Filipino is less of a static concept and more of becoming, an event, a deterritorialization of any sákop that became a covering for this identity. Philosophizing this condition highlights how philosophy is less of agreement and more of discourse, not identity but difference (Cariño, 2018a, 2018b; Pada, 2014). Difference marks this Filipino identity, and the Spaniards encountered no singular identity upon their arrival. They witnessed a plurality of differences, evidenced by the diversity of languages on which the friars wrote dictionaries. The goal of understanding the diversity of the people was not to celebrate the difference but to maintain the identity of the Spanish Catholic sovereign (Salazar, 2015). Contrary to the centrality of power in a reducción or a renewed sakóp in today’s spiral nomadism and desertification, the outward impetus of magnanimity impels in us this need to break asunder. It deterritorializes any conception of pure beauty as the primal consideration for its actualization is vulnerability, the experience of hardship, injustice, and vicissitudes. It takes the form of an encounter with someone who goes through the same thing, someone who is as vulnerable as oneself, as dependent as oneself—all a daily occurrence.

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One may easily claim to have toppled dictatorship through the power of prayer and have implored the aid of the Almighty God in the preamble of our Constitution. However, a critical phenomenology of religion presses one to reevaluate the social structures that make possible a seeming misalignment between one’s creed and everyday actions. How can the Filipino Christian experience be found in the public sphere? This attempt at a critical phenomenology of the Filipino Christian experience leaves us with this question into a foundation that impels us to action. Once more the question arises: sino nga ba ang aking kapwa? The kalye takes center stage through the mark of the church that ought to shatter the complacency of everyday life, a voice crying out for the slain victims of the extrajudicial court (Villegas, 2016a, 2016b, 2017), a bastion of conscience against forgetting (David, 2022a; Villegas, 2016a, 2016b), and a guide toward the right, not necessarily easy, path (David, 2022b). However, on an individual level, one is left to ponder the exact images of greatness: against the movement of complacency, a desire to help one’s family, neighbor, or country. One may brood over the image of an OFW’s selflessness in desiring to help one’s family or even the image of a young person in the prime of his or her life who sacrifices enjoyment to care for an aged relative. Finally, one may consider the image of a dedicated public servant who rejects illicit offers that come her way. This observation asks us to recognize that sanctification is the crossing between sákop and kagandáhang-loób, reduction, and magnanimity, which is part of everyday life. As a manifestation of the Christian identity, one must look into those moments when we feel that deep urge to give food or drink or clothing to those who need them the most, especially after devastating typhoons and other calamities; moments when we console our friends who are doubting or give proper instruction those who do not know; or even moments when we pay respects when a relative of a friend has died. These are moments when hardships come one’s way, yet one’s faith increases.

References Abinales, P. N., & Amoroso, D. J. (2005). State and society in the Philippines. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Agoncillo, T. A. (1990). History of the Filipino people (8th ed.). R.P. Garcia Publishing Co. Agoncillo, T. A. (1996). The revolt of the masses: The story of Bonifacio and the Katipunan. University of the Philippines Press. Alejo, A. (1990). Tao po! Tuloy kayo!: Isang Landas ng Pag-Unawa sa Loob ng Tao. Ateneo de Manila University Press. Ang, G. R. (1979). The Bayanihan spirit: Dead or alive? Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society, 7(1/2), 91–93. Aristotle. (2004). Nicomachean ethics (R. Crisp, ed. & Trans.). Cambridge University Press. Bautista, C. (2017, March 27). Ang Pasyon at ang Pagbasa. Balita. Available at https://www.pressr eader.com/philippines/balita/20170327/281706909512453 Benedict XVI. (2008, December 3). Saint Paul 15: The Apostle’s teaching on the relation between Adam and Christ. General Audience. Available at https://www.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/ en/audiences/2008/documents/hf_ben-xvi_aud_20081203.html

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Calano, M. (2020). Interiority, traslación, and the devotion to the Black Nazarene. Kritka Kultura, 35, 6–20. Caraballo, M. (2022, February 15). OFW remittances hit record-breaking $34B in 2021– BSP. The Manila Times. Available at https://www.manilatimes.net/2022/02/15/news/ofw-remittances-hitrecord-breaking-34b-in-2021-bsp/1833127 Cariño, J. V. (2018a). Re-thinking Filipino philosophy with Gilles Deleuze. Muni. UST. Cariño, J. V. (2018b). Ang Larawan ng Migrante Bilang Filipino: Isang Panukalang Hermenyutika ng Pagka-Filipino. Muni. UST. Castro, D. (2007). Another face of empire: Bartolomé de Las Casas, indigenous rights, and ecclesiastical imperialism. Duke University Press. David, P. (2022a, February 25). The truth will set you free (John 8:32) a pastoral letter on the EDSA commemoration. Available at https://cbcpnews.net/cbcpnews/the-truth-will-set-you-free-john832/ David, P. (2022b, March 27). Be Concerned about the welfare of others (cf. Philippians 2:4) pastoral letter on the 2022 Election. Available at https://cbcpnews.net/cbcpnews/wp-content/uploads/ 2022/03/BE-CONCERNED-ABOUT-THE-WELFARE-OF-OTHERS-CBCP-Pastoral-Letteron-the-2022-Election.pdf Enriquez, V. (1992). From colonial to liberation psychology: The Philippine experience. University of the Philippines Press. Forster, J. (1956). The encomienda system in the Philippine islands: 1571–1597 [MA Thesis, Loyola University Chicago]. Fuchs, S. (2017). Observing facts and values: A brief theory and history. Canadian Review of Sociology, 54(4), 456–467. Galang, B., & Cator, C. (2021, December 30). Duterte signs law creating Department of Migrant Workers. CNN Philippines. Available at https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2021/12/30/Dut erte-OFW-department-law.html Gaspar, K. (2021). Handumanan: Digging for the indigenous wellspring. Claretian Communications Foundation. Guenther, L. (2013). Solitary confinement: Social death and its afterlives. University of Minnesota Press. Guenther, L. (2020). Critical phenomenology. In G. Weiss, G. Salamon, & A. Murphy (Eds.), 50 concepts for a critical phenomenology. Northwestern University Press. Guevarra, A. (2010). Marketing dreams, manufacturing heroes: The transnational labor brokering of Filipino workers. Rutgers University Press. Gutay, F., OFM. (n.d.). Bajo de la Campana: The “reduccion” policy. OFM Province of San Pedro Bautista. Available at https://www.ofmphil.com/bajo-de-la-campana Heidegger, M. (1969). The essence of reasons. (T. Malick, Trans.). Northwestern University Press. Hernandez, J. R. (2010). Reducción: Ang Pag-uwi sa Diskurso ng Pananakop at Pakikipagtunggali. Malay, 23(1), 67–80. Ileto, R. (1979). Pasyon and revolution: Popular movements in the Philippines, 1840–1910. Ateneo de Manila University Press. Kasaysayan ng Pasyong Mahal ni Hesukristong Panginoon Natin. (1949). Luna et al. Konyndyk DeYoung, R. (2004). Aquinas’s virtues of acknowledged dependence: A new measure of greatness. Faith and Philosophy, 21(2), 241–227. MacKinlay, S. (2010). Interpreting excess: Jean-Luc Marion, saturated phenomena, and hermeneutics. Fordham University Press. Marcos: Rise and fall of a dictator. (2016, November 19). Philippine Daily Inquirer. Available at https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/845784/marcos-rise-and-fall-of-a-dictator Marion, J.-L. (1998). Reduction and givenness: Investigations of husserl, heidegger, and phenomenology (T. A. Carlson, Trans.). Northwestern University Press. Marion, J.-L. (2002). In excess: Studies of saturated phenomena (R. Horner & V. Berraud, Trans.). Fordham University Press. Mercado, L. (1974). Elements of Filipino philosophy. Divine Word Publications.

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Mumford, J. (2012). Vertical empire: The general resettlement of Indians in the Colonial Andes. Duke University Press. Ocampo, A. R. (2011, September 13). Anting-anting. Philippine Daily Inquirer. Available at https:// opinion.inquirer.net/11967/anting-anting Ocampo, A. R. (2015, November 20). Marcos’ (anting-anting).” Philippine Daily Inquirer. Available at https://opinion.inquirer.net/90489/marcos-anting-anting Ocampo, A. R. (2016, May 27). When people lived “bajo la campana.” Philippine Daily Inquirer. Available at https://opinion.inquirer.net/94927/when-people-lived-bajo-la-campana Pada, R. (2014). The methodological problems of Filipino philosophy. Kritike, 8(1), 24–44. Reyes, J. (2015). Loób and Kapwa: Thomas Aquinas and a Filipino Virtue Ethics [Ph.D. Dissertation, KU Leuven]. Said, E. W. (1978). Orientalism. Vintage Books. Salazar, M. S. (2015). The role of language in the Philippines in a colonial and postcolonial context. In P. L. Reyes (Ed.), Towards a Filipino history: A Festschrift for Zeus Salazar. Bahay-Saliksikan ng Kasaysayan/Bagong Kasaysayan, Inc. (BAKAS). Schiller, F. (1785). An die Freude. Available at https://www.friedrich-schiller-archiv.de/inhaltsan gaben/an-die-freude-schiller-interpretation-inhaltsangabe/ Scott, W. (1994). Barangay: Sixteenth-century Philippine culture and society. Ateneo University Press. Sloterdijk, P. (2013). In the world interior of capital: For a philosophical theory of globalization (W. Hoban, Trans.). Polity Press. Suarez, H. J. (2017). The work of mothering: Globalization and the Filipino diaspora. University of Illinois Press. The Roman Missal. (2010). International Commission on English in the Liturgy Corporation. Thomas Aquinas. (2017). Summa theologiae. The Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Trans.). Available at https://www.newadvent.org/summa/ Villegas, S. (2016a). I will turn their mourning into joy (Jeremiah 31:13). CBCP Online. Available at http://cbcponline.net/i-will-turn-their-mourning-into-joy-jeremiah-3113/ Villegas, S. (2016b). Statement on the Supreme court decision to allow the burial of former president Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani. CBCP Online. Available at http://cbcponline.net/statement-on-the-supreme-court-decision-to-allow-the-burial-offormer-president-marcos-at-the-libingan-ng-mga-bayani/ Villegas, S. (2017). For I find no pleasure in the death of anyone who dies—oracle of the Lord God (Ezekiel 18:32). CBCP Online. Available at http://cbcponline.net/for-i-find-no-pleasure-in-thedeath-of-anyone-who-dies-oracle-of-the-lord-god-ezekiel-1832/ Wise, E. (2019). Manila, City of islands: A social and historical inquiry into the built forms and urban experience of an archipelagic megacity. Ateneo de Manila University Press.

Anton Heinrich L. Rennesland is an Instructor at the Department of Philosophy and a Research Affiliate of the Research Center for Culture, Arts, and the Humanities, University of Santo Tomas, Manila, Philippines. He is a Managing Editor of Kritike: An Online Journal of Philosophy . His fields of interest are Friedrich Nietzsche, Peter Sloterdijk, Urbanism, and Comparative and Multicultural Philosophy.

Chapter 13

Nakem and Echoes of the Sacred: An Onto-Religious Musing Danilo S. Alterado

Abstract This paper aims to show the centrality of the Ilokano indigenous term Nakem (will) as a hermeneutical key to ontological and ethnoreligious musing. It probes the echoes of the sacred in indigenous belief systems and practices as appropriating Christian religiosity. It attempts to rediscover the inherent echoes of the transcendent Nakem (Divine Will) in day-to-day Ilokano life as its epiphany. This paper focuses on the Christian religion but is mindful of the other indigenous expressions of believing in a transcendent God. It interprets the binding force that keeps the phrase “thy will be done” (matungpal koma ti nakemmo) as a fitting description of faith in Ilokano contemporary life. Keywords Ilokano · Nakem · Onto-religious · Sacred · Naimbag a Nakem · Divine Will

1 Introduction The Philippine Catholic Church celebrated the 500th anniversary of the arrival of Christianity in the country from April 2021 to April 2022. Despite the widespread assimilation and integration of Christian symbols and meanings into native religious beliefs and practices, the native has never died, and the local spirituality was never wholly abandoned. The indigenous belief system and spirituality have endured. Priests may have replaced the local shamans and scapulars in place of amulets, and churches displaced ancient places of worship. However, the indigenous character of religious beliefs and practices inscribed their mark in contemporary Christian belief and worship (David, 2017, p. 179). The dialogue between the Christian message and the local culture where the Christian faith embodies a particular view of religious life is called inculturation (Javier,

D. S. Alterado (B) School of Advanced Studies (SAS), Saint Louis University (SLU), Baguio City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Hongladarom et al. (eds.), Philosophies of Appropriated Religions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5191-8_13

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2011).1 Inculturation is the active process of an encounter between the Christian message and indigenous culture. In inculturation, it does not simply mean the insertion of the Christian message into non-Christian cultures or cultures because the Christian message cannot exist except in a cultural form. It is an inescapable truth that faith always operates culturally. To the Christian church, this is the skillful work of evangelization. It emphasizes the interplay of the local culture with the Christian message, where such interaction enriches both. The Christian message takes the contextual, cultural shape, form, and meaning while preserving the indigenous culture. In the process of inculturation, however, the abasement of certain indigenous practices, beliefs, and traditions also happens. One of the most cited examples is the vilification of the pre-colonial shamans called babaylan or the baglan for the Ilokanos.2 The inculturation of the Christian religion in the Philippines has also led to the marginalization of non-Christian narratives of the indigenous peoples. Nonetheless, the overlay of many Christian rituals and festivities manifests the uniqueness and peculiarities of the rich indigeneity of the Philippine multicultural communities, which attests that culture pervades religious discourse, and every religious discourse is also a cultural discourse. The interaction of culture and religion appropriates new symbol systems that embody meaning and shared experience (Medina, 2022, p. 65). Commentators astutely observed that Christianity had become the world’s most multicultural and multilingual religion (McGreevy, 2022, p. 1). This appropriated religious discourse is also true of the Ilokano and Amianan peoples of the northern Philippines. Christianity is every Ilokano’s “appropriated” religion with an indigenous temper. The pre-Christian Ilokano already believe in the transcendent Apo (reverend), spirits, soul, and afterlife, and religion plays a vital role in shaping the Ilokano character from birth to death. The ethnoreligious belief system of the Ilokanos spells out an essential aspect of the pursuit of the naimbag ti nakem (goodness of character). Piecing together from what is left and practiced by ordinary Ilokanos in the countryside hints at a holistic view of how pammati (faith or belief) holds a significant influence in the development of naimbag ti nakem—virtue and good character—the quintessence of Christian religious ideals toward attaining pannakapnek (fulfillment in life). The Ilokanos are the third largest ethnolinguistic group in the Philippines and are referred to as the descendants of Austronesian-speaking people from southern China via Taiwan whose native domain is the narrow northwestern coast of Luzon directly faces the West Philippine Sea (also referred to as the South China Sea). They were initially called Iloko, a word derived from the prefix I means “people of” while lokong refers to the low-lying terrain. The Iloko, therefore, are “people who dwell 1

Inculturation is sometimes mistaken as the same as enculturation. Enculturation is an anthropological-sociological concept that refers to the gradual process of acquisition of the characteristics and norms of a culture by a person or group or simply, the process in which one learns the tradition, practices and values of one culture. Another related term to inculturation is interculturation. In theological parlance, interculturation emphasizes the dynamic process of rapprochement of cultures in the Christian doing of mission. 2 I used Ilokano spelled with ‘k’ than the Hispanized version “Ilocano” spelled with a “c” to refer to both the people and the language of the Ilocos region.

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in the lowland,” as opposed to the Igolot or Igorot, who are people of the gulot or mountains, specifically the Cordillera mountain range. Other sources state that the term Ilokano originates from I (from) and looc (cove or bay), thus “people of the bay.” As a people, the Ilokanos have a rich pre-colonial and Castilianised heritage, shared historical memory and value, a distinct language and culture, and a territory or homeland institutionalized in public and private spheres. Amianan is an Ilokano term with a denotative meaning of the north or northern Philippines.3 The term is a configuration instructive of the confluences of enduring ethnocultures since pre-colonial times. Ethnoculturally, the northern cultures exhibit significant confluences based on language, terrain, belief system, migratory patterns, marriages and affinity, and historical experience, which may have led to the construction of the regional stereotype of people from the north.

1.1 Religiosity and the Contemporary Ilokanos Research by contemporary Ilokanos alludes to vibrant religiosity laced with indigenous temper. For example, the first translation of Isabelo De Los Reyes’ El Folk-lore Filipino in the Ilokano language highlights the first and second chapters of Folk-lore Ilocano, which contains accounts of the indigenous Ilokano belief system on religion, mythology, and psychology (De Los Reyes, 2021, pp. 1–16).4 The introduction to this translation evidences the distinct Ilokano pammati (religious belief system), which is unique from other ethnolinguistic groups in the Philippines (e.g., Tagalog, Visaya, etc.). On the other hand, Dalila Gamet Agtani and Guillermo William Labtis’s Pagsasao: Ilokano Life According to our Ancestors (2020) is a compendium of Ilokano indigenous aphorisms of life’s precepts. Noteworthy here is the concept of worlding, which is the belief that words become a world. For Ilokanos, it is the thought that ni Apo Dios Saan a Matmaturog (God does not sleep), which means that trust in God is all that matters in life’s journey (Agtani & Labtis, 2020, p. 113). In Palpaliiw (or observation in English), Amador Foz gives meaningful imagery of the Ilokano’s faith in Jesus Christ in their day-to-day struggles through a collection of beautifully crafted Ilokano adages. Religious faith in God makes life light and liveable amidst difficulties and trials is its centerpiece message (Foz, 2021). Finally, the autobiography of Don Sabas Manzano Gaerlan, The Almighty Moves Mountains (2021) is based on handwritten notes that narrate the life story of an Ilokano in the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century. It is imbued with a Etymologically, Amianan (amian + an) comes from the root word amian, which refers to the northeasterly cold breeze that blows throughout the archipelago, which starts in the last quarter of the year and ends in the first quarter of the following year. Interestingly, the Tagalog/Filipino amihan is derived from the Ilokano amian. 4 This new translation in Ilokano is the work of Ariel Sotelo Tabag with an insightful introduction by Junley Lorenzana Lazaga which establishes the distinctive features of the Ilokano indigenous belief system. 3

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deep sense of religious faith in God’s sustaining providence and gives a glimpse of an Ilokano soul about his life as a son, brother to his siblings, husband to his wife, father to his children, a government official, and as a believer of deep religious faith.5 The narrative’s core is an abiding faith in life’s ultimate end as he petitioned his Almighty all the time as he celebrates triumphs and braves through big and small failures—life’s giftedness in finitude is an apt oblation to the creator.6

1.2 The Aims of This Work This work aims to contribute to the contemporary Ilokano appropriated religious discourse by presenting three substantive and interrelated concerns. The first is the centrality of the Ilokano indigenous term Nakem (will) as a hermeneutical key to ontological and ethnoreligious musing. The second is to show the Ilokano Naimbag a Nakem as a positive appropriation of the Christian Gospel message of salvation (pannakapnek). Finally, the third is that pammati in Ilokano ethnoreligious practices is integral to the quest of naimbag a nakem (goodness of character). In this paper, we probe into the echoes of the sacred in indigenous belief systems and practices as appropriating Christian religiosity. We attempt to rediscover the echoes of the transcendent Nakem (Divine Will) in the day-to-day Ilokano life as its epiphany. We focus on the Christian religion but are mindful of the other indigenous expressions of believing in a transcendent God. We interpret the binding force that keeps the phrase “thy will be done” (Mt. 6:10) (matungpal koma ti nakemmo) as a fitting description of faith in Ilokano contemporary life. Finally, we show that the binding force that keeps the verse from the Christian Lord’s Prayer, “thy will be done” (matungpal koma ti nakemmo) is a fitting description of religious faith in the Ilokano contemporary life.

1.3 The Approach This paper employs hermeneutical, critical-normative, and lexicographic approaches. Critical normative theorization draws insights from indigenous Ilokano religious practices and traditions of what ought to be in pursuing the good for oneself and the community. Critical narrative analysis is an essential tool in normative theorizing to unpack the esoteric gems of the indigenous lifeworld (Emerson & Frost, 2010, p. 6). Equally important in this exploration is the lexicographic approach to the Ilokano language. In this lexicographic work, we use Agcaoilon PAR (punget-a-ramut a 5

This is the description of Aurelio S Agcaoili as the editor and translator of the Ilokano manuscript as he comes to terms with the text. 6 This part of the book’s prologue was written by Alvin Gaerlan, the great-grandson of Don Gaerlan and the appointed caretaker of his manuscript—casaritaan ti biagko (The story of my life).

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balikas) (literally: stump-root word) in reading the key terms or phrases used by the Ilokanos in everyday life. We account for the discursive meaning of the terms in the context of the broader life practices of the people. The performative dynamics of locating these terms in their broader context or contexts and their derivatives will hopefully unpack the development and reconstruction of meaning within the discursive social contexts in which these are employed and deployed. Like elsewhere in Christianized indigenous cultural communities and other ethnoreligious groups, the Ilokanos can attest that religion continues to survive and thrive in the Philippines and other Asian nations. This contradicts the Western secularists’ view that religion would eventually dissipate as the Western epistemic culture progresses in global cosmopolitan societies (Pangilinan, 2009, p. 5).

2 Nakem as Cultural Philosophy Meaningful philosophizing is never isolated from day-to-day life concerns and the vicissitudes of cultural expression. These esoteric philosophical narratives are usually labeled “grassroots” or “indigenous” in academic circles. This indigenous philosophy is alive at the margins because its philosophical underpinnings are embedded in the cultural life (kannawidan) and the rich resource of the language of the Ilokanos. The Ilokanos exemplify the contemporary community that navigates the labyrinths of its spirituality. They (Ilokanos) demonstrate a persistent commitment to conveying their “philosophy from the margins” to the center, which is not afraid to go novel and contemporary in these changing times. Their “decentered way of doing of philosophy” is a quest for cultural self-understanding, a challenge of articulating distinct self-knowledge, and a recognition of their various efforts fitted to bring together in a creative whole the communicative, relational, and receptive dimensions of their worldview (Alterado, 2015, p. 116). This clarifies the way of doing philosophy in Ilokano, reflecting on their reality, humanity, and society. Doing philosophy in Ilokano always deals with one consistent approach, that is, by reflexive observation. The gift of the rich Ilokano kannawidan and the resource of the Iloko language provide an a priori condition in everyday Ilokano life. By and through this condition, the Ilokanos speak of the normative content of an emerging philosophy that spells out some universal aspects inherent in the universe of Ilokano experience as embodied by the indigenous term nakem as an originating force. Nakem philosophy arises from kannawidan and language (Alterado, 2021).7 Kannawidan is understood from a new perspective. It includes folk traditions or traditional cultural activities and the entire spectrum of organized human activities in social life. The dynamic Ilokano culture includes the question of the performative, which means it encompasses the acting out, dramatization, narrativity, story-making, story-telling, truth-telling, history-making, and recalling, which are mediated by our 7

I called emerging indigenous Ilokano philosophy “Nakem philosophy” to refer to Ilokano philosophers form of theorizing.

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Iloko language. With this premise, the Ilokano sees himself as a unique whole with a distinct identity. What makes the Ilokano distinctly unique rests in the mediation of its rich Iloko language. Language, the lifeblood of culture, cannot be divorced from the one who speaks it. This is why the Ilokano language has lived on through time. In a philosophical sense, we do not own language. Instead, language claims us and owns us. It is through the Iloko language that the Ilokanos are collectively known. Thus, by and through the internal evidence of the linguistic resource—Iloko language and culture, we anchor our Ilokano Nakem philosophy.

3 The Ilokano Nakem as a Hermeneutical Key In a pioneering work that presents the rudiments of an Ilokano philosophy, Agcaoili (2016) identifies nakem as the vital basis of understanding the Ilokano and its universe. It is the most comprehensive term to spell out the Ilokano personhood. Ilokanos brought up in the Ilokano milieu, in domestic and communal domains, can resonate with the meaning and derivative usage in varying contexts. As a single word, nakem could mean will, freewill, discretion, intellect, sense, sound perception, sound reasoning, correct judgment, good mental capacity, power of free decision, conscience, intention, and reasoning, depending on the context of its usage (Gelade, 1993, p. 415). Arguably, Nakem refers to Ilokano wisdom and culture, which needs to be unearthed and articulated philosophically to bespeak the ontological, epistemic, ethical, and religious self-knowledge of the Ilokanos. There are seven categories or important domains of its meaning and usage. These are (1) critical consciousness, (2) basis of good morals, (3) wisdom and quality of knowledge, (4) capacity of rational judgment, (5) will, free will, and determination, (6) concept or way of thinking, and (7) honorable and responsible decision making and virtue. The different domains intersect and interplay in nakem’s actual usage, making it dynamic and a rich resource of meaning. In its provenance, nakem is a single word. This means that it does not come from any root word. It is in itself a root word. On the other hand, it may come from the root word akem, meaning role or entrusted responsibility, with the prefix na (na + akem). Thus, the complete word is naakem. But supplying the principles of the economy of expression and process of pronunciation, nakem is the syncopated version of naakem (Agcaoili, 2016, p. 61). We must note here that nakem as an idea and concept is critical consciousness, but it goes further than this. It also hints at morals, the will, the intellect, the sense of the good and the right, the just and proper, and the formation of moral character and value (Alterado, 2021, p. iii).

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4 Nakem as an Ontology of the Self (Kinatao) Nakem is the most comprehensive indigenous term that renders the Ilokano interiority, the core, and the worth of one’s personhood. Nakem, for the Ilokano, is not just one of his common faculties. Nakem is not exclusively about the mind or thinking. Nakem is the Ilokano’s totality (kinatao). It is the foundation of the Ilokano ontology and epistemology. The intellectual, volitional, psychological, emotional, ethical, spiritual, religious, and social aspects are interconnected and operate in nakem. There is no contradiction of faculties in the nakem prototype. It epitomizes the “harmonic assimilation of opposites” (De Guia, 2005, p. 233). Nakem is the seat of a person’s dignity and the essence of being human. In other words, nakem captures the Ilokano sense of being. It is the center of maturity expected of every person created in the likeness of God. It reflects God’s will and providential presence, which enables one to desire and attain all that is good and noble, not only for oneself but for others and the environment. The inner compulsion directs one to do what is good: to express what ought to be human, where one finds true peace, happiness, and contentment. By inference, nakem bespeaks the Ilokano ontology or philosophy of being. So any attempt to understand the Ilokano ontology of the self cannot escape ruminating on nakem (Alterado & Jaramilla, 2019, p. 101). Hence, the Ilokano has an ontology of self-engendered from their culture because nakem is one cultural resource that makes sense of the Ilokano life and world.

5 Ilokano Ontology and the Ethics of Naimbag a Nakem For Ilokanos, nakem is naimbag (good or good character). Naimbag a Nakem is the quintessence of the Ilokano being and personhood. The phrase is derived from the root word imbag, which means good, or the positive view of being, connoting the embodiment of goodness, distinguishing between right and wrong. Nakem here means the Ilokano interiority, the core and the worth of one’s personhood. The Ilokano prefix na in naimbag means “full being.” Thus, naimbag implies the fullness of good. Naimbag a nakem signifies goodness synonymous with integrity, dignity, honesty, honor, respect, and decency. It is a positive value in which actions and intents manifest the good deeds and acts of the person. Moreover, naimbag a nakem is normative. It provides the standard concerning moral and spiritual statements on specific good deeds and actions. It contains an ethical value in a person’s “internal and external loci of attitude” (Bueno, 2010). The internal locus of attitude means the deeds and actions of an individual provide the moral and spiritual ground of the goodness and righteousness in the heart. The external locus of attitude implies that the individual is morally upright; he relates to other people according to the community’s moral imperatives. By this, it perpetuates the good with genuine heart and soul. For Ilokanos, there is a sustained need to develop the goodness of one’s heart/character.

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Naimbag a nakem is inherently other-oriented and outwardly radiating. It seeks growth in others and shares with their aspirations and vision for good. It is an act of self-giving and self-surrendering which makes a fundamental option for God (makaDios), for fellow persons (kapada a tao), for the community (makapagili), and for the environment (maka-aglawlaw). Every Ilokano strives to embody the elusive naimbag a nakem, the kinaimbag a katatao (good personhood). This very consciousness of the Ilokano, the core of its being and becoming a reality, is the impetus for everyday living and the future. In this sense, nakem for Ilokanos gives grace and promise of goodness to be multiplied and acted out by everyone who aspires to attain it: to be in a state of being of nanakem, and the state of becoming of agnakem. It provides and sustains the energy and the eros—the gagar, rugso, and the derrep to strive, to persistently seek the good and meaning of life. Nakem, in this view, is both the ground and the goal. In the religious sense, nakem bespeaks the transcendent Nakem or Divine will for every person and all humanity.

6 Naimbag a Nakem as an Appropriation of the Christian Message of Salvation The value of naimbag a nakem is a cultural appropriation of God’s Divine Will. The display of naimbag a nakem in the day-to-day Ilokano life gives glimpses of God’s goodness (naimbag a nakem) to his people. It appropriates God’s continuous offer of life and love to his people. This is Valdez’s (2001) main claim in her theological reflection as an inculturation with the Ilokanos. A further reflection into the meaning and analysis (PAR) of terms and phrases relative to naimbag a nakem will unpack a unique cultural self-understanding of Ilokanos religious life. It spells out God’s pathos with the Ilokanos and the message of salvation—pannakapnek.8 This manifests echoes of the sacred presence in people’s lives. There is an important relationship between the meaning of the terms naimbag a nakem and pannakapnek in the Ilokano religious experience. For Ilokanos, naimbag a nakem is the condition sine qua non to pannakapnek—fullness of life/well-being and pannakapnek is the telos of the naimbag a nakem (Valdez, 2001, pp. 62–64). The concept of pannakapnek (fulfillment in life/well-being) is the dynamic equivalent of the Christian understanding of salvation upon an in-depth analysis of the meaning and value of naimbag a nakem. Traditionally, pannakaisalakan is used to deliver the message of salvation to the Ilokanos. However, such a term emphasizes the idea of redemption or being delivered from eminent or impending danger. Valdez (2001) contends the Ilokano concept of pannakapnek emphasizes the meaning of well-being and the quest for the fullness of life in the here and now. It is a more appropriate term to mean the message of salvation. Pannakaisalakan (deliverance) is the fitting and meaningful translation of 8

PAR—“pennek” meaning to the full of one’s heart content.

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the Judaeo-Christian message of salvation than pannakapnek (well-being/fulfilment) (Valdez, 2001, p. 64). Pannakapnek translates as satisfaction or completeness. It implies a state of fulfillment that is nearly total and absolute. It is the experience of completeness and wholeness in body and spirit. It could further mean liberation from bodily needs and the experience of wholeness of mind, heart, and spirit. It echoes the message of oneness with the sacred as expressed by the Psalmist, “The Lord is my shepherd, there is nothing I shall want” (Psalm 22:1). Pannakapnek also speaks of the promise of the Beatitudes (Matt. 5:3–11): “Blessed are the poor in spirit, they that mourn, and the needy.” The Gospel message of the New Testament equates true happiness (pannakapnek) with the riches and values of the Kingdom of God, not earthly wealth. Furthermore, the concept of pannakapnek includes other related values and ideals like wayawaya (freedom), bang-ar (relief), nam-ay (prosperity), and kappia (peace). This means that a truly blessed and meaningful existence is made possible only by a community animated with a good heart and mind actualized in both words and deeds (naimbag a nakem). Conversely, the absence of naimbag a nakem is the absence of pannakapnek. Human selfishness and being unconcern about the welfare of people can lead to estrangement and hatred in the community. The negative character, kinaawan ti nakem (absence of good character), can destroy the community. In other words, pannakapnek is preconditioned by the practice of naimbag a nakem in each person and the community (Valdez, 2001, p. 65).

7 Some Ilokano Proverbs About Good Character and Well-Being The following Ilokano proverbs embody the interconnectedness of ideals of naimbag a nakem and pannakapnek. These proverbs bear indigenous wisdom on the value of good name, good character, and moral integrity as requisites for well-being. Ilokanos profess: Ti tao a nanakman, daeganna tay nabaknang (a person of good character excels over the rich one); and so, Bay-am tay kukua ta masapulan, ngem ti naimbag a panagnaknakem narigat a matuntunan (Never mind wealth for it can be found/ procured but good character is hard find/discover). One should not forget, Uray nakurapay ti kasasaadmo, nabaknangka iti imatang ti tao no nasayaat aramidmo (you may be poor but you are rich before the eyes of the people if you possess good character) (Timbreza, 2011, p. 63). The abovementioned proverbs manifest that for Ilokanos, naimbag a nakem spells out self-worth and dignity are more important than material wealth. Real wealth includes personal honor, integrity, honesty, and a good reputation. Good character is lasting and priceless. As such, it leads to true fulfillment in life (pannakapnek).

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8 Naimbag a Nakem and the Judaeo-Christian Concept of Salvation The Ilokano pannakapnek is equivalent to the Judaeo-Christian message of salvation. It is the appropriate concept that is culturally intelligible to Ilokanos. While pannakapnek is the telos every Ilokano desires to possess, they are realistic in their life assessment. The adage, No adda pannakapnek, adda met pannakasapulan, pannakalikagum (If there is fulfillment, there is also need.) aptly reminds us there is a time for everything, which is similar to the message of the Book of Ecclesiastes 3:1–8. Life is an interplay of both good and bad. Another Ilokano proverb captures this appraisal of life: Awan ragsak ditoy rabaw ti daga nga saan a nasibugan iti lua (There is no joy on earth that has not been watered with tears). In other words, for Ilokanos, life on earth is not about attaining pure pannakapnek (pure fulfilment/full gratification), but is also interlaced with needs, worries, and problems. Ilokanos are resigned to the reality that total pannakapnek (total well-being) cannot be attained since humans are finite and fleeting and only rest in God’s naimbag a Nakem (Valdez, 2001, p. 66). Interestingly, Ilokanos are willing to invest time, effort, and all possible human resources to acquire pannakapnek in life. Anus (patience), gaget (industry), and kired (courage) are traits that keep the fire of hope burning for a better life. In this regard, naimbag a nakem appropriates God’s love for us. In the Judaeo-Christian tradition, God’s naimbag a nakem is an eternal offering of life and love to His people. God’s naimbag a nakem is eternal love, without limit, freely given, pure and perfect. It is inclusive and without discrimination. It is shared and offered to all. It radiates through all cultures and all human domains. It is always life-enhancing and promotes growth and maturity. Hence, God’s naimbag a nakem ensures the promise of the fullness of life since it offers His sustaining presence through His people. God’s naimbag a nakem is the vehicle of His love and grace. The gift of His abiding grace is offered to people through the people of God. God’s out-pouring love is culturally mediated through historical people and cultural events. Similarly, the Ilokano naimbag a nakem is the particular people’s response to God’s invitation to life and love. People can only concretely manifest their love for God through their love, concern for their fellow persons, and commitment to transforming the world to be a better place for everyone. This means that the imperfection of the cultural mediation—naimbag a nakem—does not prevent the value of being the vehicle and instrumentation of God’s good news of pannakapnek—salvation. In every culture, one finds the liberating message of God. It is through a culture that the Christian message can be articulated in understandable terms to a particular people. Through cultural and linguistic mediation, the universal—Transcendent Nakem/Will—becomes concrete in the particular—naimbag a nakem. Religious leaders and practitioners employ life-enhancing tools and resources found in culture to communicate God’s message of salvation to a people (Valdez, 2001, pp. 68–69).

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9 Ilokano Ethno-Religious Practices as Integral to the Pursuit of Well-Being The ethnoreligious belief system of the Ilokanos spells out an essential aspect of the pursuit of well-being. Piecing together what is left and practiced by ordinary Ilokanos in the countryside hints at a holistic view of how pammati (faith or belief) significantly influences the development of naimbag ti nakem (virtue, good life, and well-being). The practice of these indigenous beliefs and religious rituals is interspersed with the Christian belief and ritual system. Historically, Christianity is every Ilokano’s re-appropriated religion with an indigenous temper. The pre-Christian Ilokano already believes in anitos, spirits, soul, afterlife, and a transcendent Apo (Alterado, 2012, p. 317). The Ilokano expressions Dios ti kumuyog (may God be with you) and Dios ti agaluad (may God be your protector) capture one’s prayer for the transcendent Apo’s blessings to oneself and everyone (Alterado, 2012, p. 318). The word apo (Lord) shows reverence to the Divine, e.g., Apo Dios (Lord God), saints, and heavenly hosts. But Ilokanos also show their reverence for both people and elements of nature. They append the word apo to honor leaders and esteemed community members like village elders, e.g., Apo Lakay and Apo Mayor (Agcaoili, 2018, p. 18). Ilokanos consider themselves part of the greater lubong (universe) of human and non-human beings. Some old concepts that date back to the pre-Christian Philippines manifest the reverence of Ilokanos to nature as a source of life. This refers to the usual appellation of the word Apo to elements of nature like Apo Daga (Lord Earth), Apo Init (Lord Sun), Apo Baybay (Lord Sea), Apo Bulan (Lord Moon), and Apo Langit (Lord Heaven). The Ilokano Cosmic Nakem recognizes nature not just as an object or resource for its needs and wants, but as an Other to be respected and to relate to for the greater good. Interestingly, for Ilokanos, Earth is Apo Daga, meaning it is breathing and has life; therefore, it deserves respect (Agcaoili, 2018, p. 17). This indigenous practice manifests a cosmic epistemology and consciousness that reveres Earth as a resource at one’s disposal and as a living participant in ecological balance and prosperity. This practice manifests the constant interconnection of the people to the Earth and all elements of nature. It is instructive of that reverence and gratefulness of the grace from langit (heavens) and the gift of the task of stewardship (Agcaoili, 2018, pp. 14–15). Finally, some linguistic expressions of rural Ilokanos manifest recognition and respect for spirits that dwell in forests, mountains, etc. For instance, the expression Bari Bari, dikat agunget pari. Ta pumukan kami. Iti pabakirda kadakami (Bari-bari, do not get angry, my friend. We want to cut some trees) (De los Reyes, 2014, p. 87), asks spirits to go away or leave before one does something. Asking permission before doing anything in forests, mountains, or places believed to be where spirits live, exhibits respect for the unseen inhabitants of these places (Agcaoili, 2018, p. 18). The presence of an Ilokano pantheon of gods shows a distinct character of the Ilokanos’ life as connected with the supernatural realm beyond human control and

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comprehension. Buni (boni) is considered the supreme being. Though often, it is addressed only as an unnamed supreme being giving the task of creation to primordial giants. There are no descriptions of it. It is construed as mysterious and beyond the perceptual capacities of ordinary human beings. Since Buni is the supreme being, Parsua, the creator deity, becomes the intermediary to Buni. Parsua is seconded by the two giants, Angalo and Aran, who were believed tasked to initiate creations in the sky and things below. This proves that Buni is not the creator but only the giver of command to Parsua and the two giants. It is not even a question of whether Buni gave the order straight to the giants or passed it through Parsua (De los Reyes, 2002, p. 11). This is part of the Ilokano folklore that bespeaks the indigenous wisdom in Ilokano cosmology. Besides the abovementioned deities, anitos or spirits abound. For example, in the Ilokano cosmology, there are the kaibaan (anitos of the undergrowth of the forests), mangmangkik (anitos of the trees), ansisit (dwarves), batibat (creatures responsible for nightmares), di katataoan (demons, evil spirits), and pugot (darkskinned, headless human) to name a few are mythical creatures or beings believed by Ilokanos. The Ilokano belief in the deities does not negate the presence of these other mythical beings or creatures. They exist separately from the deities, and their belief is also directed to more specific acts or practices. Such belief in mythical creatures or spirits makes the Ilokano extra cautious about what they do with their environment so as not to harm any anitos that may be affected. This may be construed as the Ilokano guide to environmental ethics. The belief in the anitos and mythical beings may deter doing any harm to the environment. A good relationship with the environment is an important element for one to achieve happiness and well-being. These practices are essential to maintain a good relationship with unseen entities. It is also believed that sometimes good or bad fortune happens because of the intervention of the deities and spirits or anitos. Notably, these practices are supposed to please the deities and anitos to ensure good luck. Other Ilokano words that portray belief and respect for the spirits are karkama, a-alia, araria, anioa-as, ama, anghel, kararua, atang, etc. These are depicted in some Iloko texts.9 In everyday provincial Ilokano life, the sense of the good life (naimbag a biag) alludes to the Ilokano pantheon. A good life is expressed by having lung-aw (God of progress) at one’s side (Keesing, 1962). It speaks of the person’s socioeconomic condition, where one can go through life despite difficulties. The other references to naimbag a biag in the day-to-day would be to the pia which means health or wellbeing, to the karadkad (strength, also hinting health), and to the salun-at (health, sanity) of oneself and also to the other. This trio of pia, karadkad, and salun-at led to the lung-aw, that sense of progress in the economic and social sense. The fundamental criterion in the sense of the naimbag a biag is the ability to breathe properly and most freely, with the anges 9

Karkama, a-alia, araria, and anioa-as refer to soul, spirit, or ghost, but they mean different things in different situations. Agcaoili sometimes refers to them as the four souls for the Ilokanos. Ama means father but is usually used to address the elements of nature, like ama daga. Kararua refers to the human soul or the spirit of a dead person. Atang refers to offerings of food or in kind to appease the spirits, and anghel refers to heavenly hosts, see Agcaoili et al. (2001).

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(breath) invoked as a reference to life continuing and life being lived. “Kastoy, apo, umang-anges pay laeng datao” (I am alright, apo, I am still breathing/alive). The reference to breathing leads us back to the concept of lung-aw. The invocation of apo lung-aw in everyday life demonstrates the affinity of Ilokanos to a higher power. It manifests a belief in a God or gods/spirits as a guide for a good life. Pammati of the Ilokano still significantly influences how they develop their character and life priorities. These ethnoreligious belief systems remain in place despite the Christianization of the Ilokanos. They consider them an essential part of development in the material sense but, more importantly, in their conduct with their surroundings and their relationship with people. They believe that past, present, and future things happen through the intervention of the deities and anitos affected by man’s deeds. It is significant to note that human actions are supposed to please the deities and anitos to ensure a better future existence.

10 Concluding Reflections The Christian prayer, the Lord’s Prayer verse, “Thy Will be done” (Mt. 6:10)— Matungpal koma ti Nakem mo—captures the Ilokano’s echoes of the sacred since it is interwoven with the Ilokano daily life. The Ilokano’s quest for the pannakapnek (fulfillment in life) is intrinsically interlinked with the formation of naimbag a nakem (moral virtue—good character). Becoming a person of good character (virtue) is the key to life’s fulfillment and happiness. In a religious sense, the Ilokano’s daily struggles and striving for a better life coincide with their daily imploring God’s providence and submitting to God’s Will—Matungpal koma iti nakem mo! Understanding Ilokano religiosity requires an in-depth understanding of the Ilokano kannawidan (culture) and language. A core concept of Nakem captures the rich resource of the meaning of the Ilokano religious beingness. Nakem is the most comprehensive word that embodies understanding the Ilokano universe. It is the key to the rich and dynamic resource of the Ilokano lifeworld that intimates the Ilokano ontology of the self, epistemology, ethics, and religiosity. An in-depth understanding of Nakem entails echoes of the sacred.

References Agcaoili, A. S. (2016). Balabala ti filosopia nga Ilokano. Undertow Books. Agcaoili, A. S. (2018). Climate justice, environmental ethics in Ilokano life. Budhi: A Journal of Ideas and Culture, 26(3), 1–26. Agcaoili, A. S. et al. (Eds). (2001). Salaysay: Pananaliksik sa wika at panitikan. Kaguro sa Filipino at Departamento ng Filipino, Miriam College. Agtani, D. G., & G. W. Labtis. (2020). Pagsasao: Ilokano life according to our ancestors (Agcaoili A. S. ed.) Hoaeae Publication.

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Alterado, D. S. (2012). Aquinas and discoursing on the Ilocano cosmic nakem. In A. P. Co & P. A. Bolanos (Eds.), ACTA: Thomism and Asian cultures, Proceedings of the quadricentennial international philosophy congress (pp. 311–318). UST Publishing House. Alterado, D. S. (2015). Nakem ken ulimek: A hermeneutics of silence in the Ilokano cosmic self. In Agcaoili A. S. & Calinawagan E. A. (Eds). In aro ken sirmata: Language, culture, education, and the pursuit of diversity (pp. 104–122). Nakem Conferences Philippines and Undertow Book. Alterado, D. S. (2021). Wisdom and silence: Essays on Philippine nakem philosophy. Academy Press of Amsterdam. Alterado D. S., & Jaramilla A. S. (2019). Maiyannatup a panagripirip: Towards an Ilokano indigenous doing of philosophy. Philosophia: International Journal of Philosophy, 20(1), 97–110. Bueno, C. F. (2010). The basic phenomenological experiences on the values of cultural reciprocity along the notion of naimbag-a-nakem. In 5th Nakem International Conference: Adal ken Sirib: Education to Cultural Diversity and Linguistic Democracy. University of Northern Philippines. David, R. S. (2017). Understanding Philippine society, culture and politics. Anvil Publishing. De Guia, K. (2005). Kapwa: The self in the other, worldviews and lifestyles of Filipino culturebearers. Anvil Publishing. De Los Reyes, I. F. (2002). The religion of the katipunan (J. M. Yap, Trans.). The University of the Philippines Press. De Los Reyes, I. F. (2014). History of Ilocos (Vols. 1 and 2, M. E. Peralta-Imson, Trans.). The University of the Philippines Press. De Los Reyes, I. F. (2021). Sirib ti puli ni Ilokano (A. S. Tabag, Trans.). J. L. Lazaga (intro.). Saniata Publications. Emerson, P., & Frost, S. (2010). Critical narrative analysis in psychology: A guide in practice. Palgrave Macmillan. Foz, A. (2021). Palpaliiw. Vigan Printing Press. Gelade, G. P. (1993). Ilokano-English dictionary. CICM Missionaries. Javier E. G. (2011). The missionary amidst different cultures and religious traditions: Re-imaging the missionary identity in contemporary times. Religious Life Asia, 13(3). Keesing, F. M. (1962). Ethnohistory of Northern Luzon. Standford University Press. McGreevy, J. T. (2022). Catholicism: A global history from the French revolution to Pope Francis. W. W. Norton & Company. Medina, C. R. (2022). Religions and other stories. Tellwell. Pangilinan, R. D. (2009). Barth and Habermas on the changing role of religion in a postnational constellation. Hapag, 6(1–2), 5–31. Timbreza, F. T. (2011). Filipino values today. National Book Store. Valdez, V. R. (2001). Naimbag a nakem: Inculturation with Ilocanos. Saint Louis University Research Journal, 32(1), 57–69.

Danilo S. Alterado is a Professor of Philosophy at Saint Louis University (SLU), School of Advanced Studies (SAS) Baguio City, Philippines. He is the author of Wisdom and Silence, Essays on Philippine Nakem Philosophy, a book published in 2021. His research interests include critical social theory vis-à-vis heritage, cultural discourses, and indigenous philosophies. He is currently the Chair of the Philosophical Association of Northern Luzon (PANL) and a board member of the Philosophical Association of the Philippines (PAP), Nakem Conferences International, and the Philippine National Philosophical Research Society (PNPRS). He obtained his Ph.D. from the Ateneo de Manila University (ADMU), Quezon City, Philippines.

Chapter 14

On the Multispecies Spectrum of Spiritual Ethos in Pre-colonial and Colonial Philippines Virgilio A. Rivas

Abstract This paper provides a multispecies narrative of the Philippine experience as a Christianized archipelago. Multispecies studies are still absent in local scholarship regarding the textual, ethnological, and even anthropological understanding of our pre-colonial and colonial experience. I conclude that the multispecies spectrum (partly drawing from feminist studies) of understanding the historical and geographical transformations of the archipelago as a post-colonized nation offers a path of decolonizing the distributive logic of the globalization of the guilt of the West. All this amid the new planetary predicament ushered in by the Anthropocene. Keywords Folk Christianity · Hybridism · Indigenous · Multispecies · Postcolonialism

1 Preamble: Willing the Islands When Philip II was advised by his military council to abandon the islands “on economic grounds,” compounded by environmental challenges traversing the open seas “through belts of stormy and unpredictable winds” (Fernandez-Armesto, 1995, pp. 660–661), the King replied that he would rather that “all the gold in his treasury [sacrificed for] one oratory where the name of Christ was praised” (FernandezArmesto, 1995, p. 306). True to form, the Spanish conquest of the archipelago was to be modeled after the “totalitarian economy of divine mercy” (Rafael, 1988, p. 109). However, also, from this perspective, against the background of the liquidity and fluidity of space represented by the oceanic, colonialism asserted the illusion that as a modern purveyor of universal truth, it was “free from the ultimate restriction that might limit [its] expansion” (Latour, 1993, p. 38). At the outset, this expansion was aimed at the gendered spatialization of the alien other, the island:

V. A. Rivas (B) Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Manila, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Hongladarom et al. (eds.), Philosophies of Appropriated Religions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5191-8_14

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Widely held to be ‘tiny spaces’ absent significance or moment, islands are commonly represented as feminine—vacant, passive, acted upon, stirred only by outside manly manipulations. That gendered definition of self or continents as large, unbroken landmasses has its other, islands, as distant, small bodies of land surrounded by water. (Okihiro, 2010, p. 746)

Thus, the full brunt of colonial transgression was borne by gender, which used to be a fluid contact zone where multispecies intersect. Viewed as feminine where species lines overlap, pass across, take root, and flourish, the island represents the hybridity of actants constituting its symbolic consciousness in a semio-physical landscape. This spatial determination of “island-consciousness” reveals an intersectional confluence of psychosocial and nonhuman actants gravitating around the porous subjectivity of the feminine, such as conveyed in ritual practices of shamanism (Tedlock, 2005) where gender roles interchanged, blurring the boundaries between the sexes. The gendered spatialization of colonial spaces “as it intersects with other social forces” was, therefore, designed to undermine the vitality that, as one scholar notes, “contours” the multispecies spectrum of native life, habitats, and ecologies anchored on a sustainable practice of gender fluidity (Karides, 2017, p. 30). The onset of European colonizers altered this situation, undermining the peoples’ ethos of co-habitation with natural actants, a form of co-existence enabling zones of interactions under a common spiritual arc encompassing indigenous cultures (Haraway, 2008; Mosha, 1999). Godfrey Baldacchino captures the essence of this indigenous conception of vitality as follows: “Creation is an archipelago” (Baldacchino, 2012, p. 24). The island is the pivot around which multispecies life flourished, which no less presupposed a spatiotemporal realism. In this light, Bruno Latour, for instance, describes how the socio-centric mindset of colonial powers supplants these indigenous semio-physical realisms: “Century after century, colonial empire after colonial empire, the poor premodern collectives were accused of making a horrible mishmash of things and humans, of objects and signs, while their accusers finally separated them totally—to remix them at once on a scale unknown until now” (Latour, 1993, p. 39). As Descola (2013) echoes, from the standpoint of the premodern, “sociological realities” are “subordinate” to the ontological conditions of existence that “endow” things with “specific properties’ according to which they can be perceived to be enabling or destroying linkages (p. 124). At the core of the colonial strategy is the schema of islanding the colonized peoples through a “geographic-economic deterministic view” (Nadarajah & Grydehøj, 2016, p. 442) in place of multispecies history that thrives in the spirit of co-knowing, trust, alliances, and “persuasive kinship” (Maizza, 2017). Colonialism modified this history into an economic-teleological paradigm to flatten the diversity of “modes of construal” unique to pre-colonial societies to a single representation or identity (Descola, 2013, p. 414, fn. 26). Thus, an overarching colonial determinism gave the archipelago the mandate of a singular identity telos, mainly targeting the gender fluidity in the islands. Spain’s colonial conquest of the Philippine archipelago was then characterized by widespread demonizing of the female (babaylans) and transvestite (asogs) practitioners of shamanistic rituals, who were also spiritual healers (Aparece, 2006) and key

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advisers to the village council both in war and peacetime (Salazar, 2010). Some likely underwent torture at the hands of the Guardia Civil as the colonial regime carried out systematic Christian indoctrination. At first, it was an economic teleology heavily invested in the theological treasure of the Crown. As Rafael (1988) puts it, natives “were constrained to negotiate with and around the totalitarian economy of divine mercy” (p. 109). In the following centuries, this economic teleology slowly led to shifts in colonial strategies vis-à-vis the emerging geopolitics, compounded by local rebellions and the large-scale War of Independence of 1896.

2 Colonialism and Multispecies Ecologies In the Philippines, island assemblages formed the unitary background of the teleological economic transformation of native spiritual systems by subsuming these vital ecologies under a single Identity, that of a subservient character to the King. However, the many examples of local and regional rebellions culminating in the 1896 revolution showed that anti-colonial struggles were more than human contradictions. They were borne out of the multispecies scale of island indigeneity via an overarching spiritual ethos (that distinguished their lifeworld from the moderns) destroyed by colonial powers. Donna Haraway and Anna Tsing (2019) describe this period as the beginning of the slavery of non-privileged and non-Western others, original peoples, women, and Blacks, but also the slavery of nonhumans, animals, plants, and multispecies (p. 8). Bolstered by the initial creation of plantation economies to support the colonial regimes, colonialism pursued an aggressive global dispersal and transfer of “exotic plants” and “peoples from other places,” altering the multispecies demographics across the archipelago. Due to plantation economies, peoples and ecologies were dispossessed of their habitats and multispecies relations, and worst, the vitality of the island’s spirit as the spirit and substance of a people’s consciousness. In the Philippines, it was the Galleon trade that: [...] saw the introduction of a wide array of plants native to the New World... New World plants were slowly introduced by individuals to be planted in the estates of religious orders that were the main drivers of administrative, social and economic change in the Archipelago prior to the 18th century CE. (Amando et al., 2020, p. 319)

However, the Galleon trade had little impact on agriculture. The Bourbon reforms in mainland Spain opened the Philippine economy to international commerce. This changed the agricultural system from subsistence farming to plantation economies to produce goods for exports. At this point, plantation economies defined the human and vegetal flows of geographical relationalities, paving the way to different collateral “modes of microbiopolitcs” (van Doreen et al., 2016). These changes yielded various forms of resistance, for example, in separate plantations in Calamba and Negros (Aguilar, 2017), two geographies with different

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vegetal and human tensions, reflecting the multispecies arc of spatial determinations across demographic scales. Notwithstanding the difference in contexts of place, multispecies actants, predominantly plants (owing to their biomass that populate the planet), express these tensions rather poetically. Pre-colonial societies and indigenous cultures knew much about this vital practice of multispecies kinship mediated by the plant world (Maizza, 2017). These expressive tensions reflect a semio-physical or vital poetry (most evident in the practice of shamanism) that begins with “bearing seeds, irrupting in flowers, sprouting rhizomes, uncoiling leaves, attracting pollinators, garnering human attention, and mobilizing transnational network” (Vieira et al., 2016, p. xix). Consequently, these networked mobilizations connect plantation activities to global economies and the geopolitical landscape. However, this vegetal poetry is not uniform in all places. In Calamba, rice and sugar plantations were governed by a religious corporation. In contrast, Negros’ plantations were influenced mainly by international markets and a multi-ethic immigrant economic class. Calamba is a stark contrast, an enclave economy where plantations were concentrated in the hands of the friars (Fradera, 2004, pp. 307–320), enabling a centralized colonial administration. This is different from Negros characterized by a “distinctive plural society” (Aguilar, 2017, p. 240), with the colonial state acting in the shadow most of the time. Local landowning classes could avoid confrontation with the colonial regime. It was only when the demand for sugar declined due to economic and political changes overseas that Negros became active in the anti-colonial fight against Spain. All this resulted from significant vegetal tensions at the time—the Crimean War and the Haitian revolution that “curtailed the importation of sugar,” causing sugar prices to plummet worldwide. Spain imposed brutal economic policies on Philippine haciendas, reproducing poverty down the economic scale. This reveals an overarching vegetal flow from the colonial transfer of plants and peoples (in the Philippines, forced settlements called reducción were implemented) to the creation of “political identities” that varied across the archipelago. Scholars of plant studies call this the consequence of plant or “vegetal cosmopolitanism” (Head et al., 2014). Thus, in this context, the multispecies backbone of original people’s lives and ecologies produce geographical relationalities as a consequence of “vegetal patterns” manifesting “deep time evolutionary pathways and the ‘muddy and indecipherable blur’ of human influence” (Head & Atchison, 2009, p. 236). For instance, Rangan and Kull (2009) underscored the same “drama of plant transfers by European colonial powers” that “transformed natures and societies in every part of the world” (p. 29). The “forceful introduction of flora and fauna” behind the “success of European conquest and domination,” created a colonial spectrum of intersectionality via race, class, gender, and “moral conflicts, discharging in intimate relations and social interactions” (Kirbis, 2020, p. 839), besides enabling large-scale “transnational circuits of power and identity” (Ahuja, 2009, p. 556). At the core of these transfers is the instrumentalization of indigenous spiritual life out of “forced subjugation of ecological concepts of nature” (Shiva, 1992, p. 210).

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3 Animistic Resistance in a Multinatured Environment Animism was one of the main drivers of resistance to occupying foreign powers under the banner of anthropocentric colonialism. The success of colonial conquest saw the imposition of the “anthropological matrix” (Latour, 1993, p. 47), supplanting a multispecies history by destroying the vital cornerstone of premodern life. Anticolonial revolutions were thus tactical responses to “colonial enterprises” that were “[producing] extinction” (Kirksey & Chao, 2022, p. 3). As Reynar argues, [...] detaching indigenous knowledge from its sustentative human/nature context is tantamount to foretelling its death; its roots have been lanced. Indigenous knowledge is no longer indigenous when extracted from its human/nature context; it stands ashamedly naked. What remains is knowledge—knowledge that is no longer an integral constituent of a broader living ecological and communal understanding. (Reynar, 1999, p. 290)

Through political imaginings beyond species lines against “racialized, gendered, and speciesist” legitimations of power (Kirbis, 2020, p. 831), original peoples resisted the imperial threat of extinction imposed as an economic teleology by force of dogma and warfare. Its target is the ethnicity that binds peoples’ consciousness and nonhuman actants in ecologies of bodily natures. Schoenbrun and Johnson (2018) summarize this indigenous conception of vital assemblage as “materially real, partially knowable, multicultured and multinatured, magical and emergent through the contingent relations of multiple beings and agencies” (p. 313). The Western paradigm of separation of culture and nature destroyed this material-semiotic landscape sustained by “thick contact zones” defining the “specificity of lived naturalcultural entanglements” (van Dooren et al., 2016, p. 13) through which ethnicities participated in multispecies flourishing. This concept of difference, which operates through the “massive conversion of ontological into epistemological questions,” as Viveiros de Castro (2015) argued, went on to pacify not only human actors but nonhuman actants as well, “objects and things, retreating to an exterior, silent, uniform world of nature” (p. 293). This meant forced assimilation into a foreign ethos, system, and lifeworld. For instance, using enforced Christian liturgical practices, religious control shattered people’s conception of the “modularity of consciousness and diversification of self” (Winkelman, 2002, p. 73) intrinsic to premodern life. The conquest of their belief systems contradicted not only the shamanistic worldview of self and sociality but also the very condition of their integration, the practice of “altered states of consciousness” that unify “modular-based domains” of (1) natural history, (2) consciousness, and (3) social intelligence (Winkelman, 2002, p. 74). This already presupposed an integrated system of life, hence, the threat of extinction imposed by the muskets and canons of Christianity. This explains the emergence of the famous Tamblot of Bohol, a former principales, who led one of the famous shamanistic resistances in the Southern Philippines. Tamblot rallied his people to abandon Spanish-administered settlements (reducción) to flee to the mountains and forests (back to “modular-based domains” of multispecies ecologies), escaping “tax extraction, tribute or labor” imposed by the colonial regime

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(Cushner, 1972, p. 108). A similar example happened in Leyte through Bancao, a local chieftain who was one of the early converts of Christianity when Miguel Lopez de Legaspi launched the initial indoctrination of the islands. These two revolts were historically unified by a common adherence to “Diwata,” a female divine figure (the outcome of partial absorption of Christian beliefs into the local spiritual ethos), reflecting shamanism’s overarching belief in the feminine nature of spiritual life. “Diwata” was a direct challenge to the image of the Virgin Mary promoted by the Catholic colonizers. The babaylans of the Philippine archipelago (female and later male shamans) who practiced shamanism epitomized this resistance to colonialism’s systematic genderization of the islands’ spiritual ethos, relegating ethnicities to obscure bundles of primordialism and ahistorical narratives of descent traceable to the feminine. From the standpoint of colonial patriarchy, these genealogies required objective (external) epistemic representation. The systematic erasure of the babaylans from social memory (replaced by the image of Maria Clara, the obedient Christian female figure) attests to the pivotal role of gender in the “flexibilities and rigidities of this metaphor of descent” (Schoenbrun & Johnson, 2018, p. 311). However, this also led to the syncretic appropriation of Christianity through the “invention” of folk mythologies and faith systems mixed with shamanistic practices, which used to be supervised by women. Despite genderization, female shamans quickly adapted to these changes. Their healing practice and potent political presence in the communities were already part of the repertoire of the male takeover of shamanism. The takeover would later produce confraternities assigned by the colonial clergy (Rafael, 1988, p. 187) to guard Christianity against contamination of pagan beliefs, mainly from the babaylans’ lingering influence. Males were forced to “consolidate” their gender position “to participate in the hierarchy of divine commerce” (Rafael, 1988, p. 83) administered by a punitive clergy. However, this patriarchal diffusion of colonial power was prone to speculative intervention, especially in translating Christian ideals and doctrines on the part of the colonized “decontextualizing the means by which colonial authority represents itself” (Rafael, 1988, p. 3). In the process, it engendered a spatiotemporal zone of externality, “an ‘outside’ that lent itself to being located, appropriated, and valorized in different ways by the rulers and the ruled” (Rafael, 1988, p. 6), resulting in syncretic Christianity and folk Catholicism. Latour, for instance, would portray the early moderns in the same light, White colonizers who “could not understand themselves any better than they could understand those whom they claimed they were freeing from their superstitions” (Latour, 2013, p. 204). On the part of the colonized, this liminal point of translation was more in keeping with the indigenous spiritual system that reflects a multi-perspectival world, manifested in healing rituals that intersect with social hierarchy, cultural differences, and even spatial boundaries (between and among tribes). Despite these boundaries, tribes were unified by a liminal but spiritually functional concept of multispecies kinship, trust, and knowledge (Haraway, 2016, p. 22; Miller, 2019).

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This extant indigenous ethos and spiritual history significantly contributed to the tenacity of folk Christianity. This tenacity, however, as Latour argues, is borne by “the subtle elaborations invented [by collectives] to explore the crossings between [beings or actants]” (Latour, 2013, p. 204), broadly reflecting the multispecies spectrum of the changing temporal landscapes. Subsequent adaptations of Christianity proved precisely this point. In Haraway’s lingo, a form of hybridism emerged whose trajectory “is not [to mix] Indigenous and Western knowledge practices and stirring, but rather exploring the fraught possibility of generative contact zones without denying long histories of violence” (Haraway, 2016, p. 202). Before the historic 1896 revolt, colonial resistances against Spain were characterized by multifrontal assaults that reflected the resistance against the “[pathologization] and [exoticization] of multispecies spaces” (Walther, 2021, p. 13). The Tagalog revolts of 1745 were another case, ignited by conflicts in the “adjustment of boundaries of religious estates” (Palanco, 2010) where “farm animals could pasture,” and the usual repertoire of colonial violence: “confiscation of lands, rising land rents, compulsory sale of farm produce” imposed by the religious orders. These early revolts were atavistic, approximating the multispecies ground of counterhegemonic resistances. By atavism, we mean the multispecies imprint of unconscious and mechanical behavior derived from the past that has conflicted with the psychosocial demands and circumstances of the present. Its extant politics was perceived as unfavorable, ahistorical, and counter-imaginative vis-à-vis the viability of utopian fantasy (that would later define the 1896 revolution). It is atavistic only insofar as it struggles to become relevant in an alien condition where it finds itself enmeshed and has yet to take on a modern substance. Overall, colonialism produced an environment of fixed settlement out of forcible transfer of multispecies actants and massive relocation process (Nadeau, 2002, p. 81), creating an uncanny cultural surplus of spatial-temporalities that the colonized, especially those experiencing untold poverty, were ill-equipped to deal. At the same time, this gave opportunities for the local ruling class and its intersectional scope of influence to become “lower level authority figures” entrusted by the colonial regime via a “new division between natives who paid tribute and natives who collected it” (Nadeau, 2002, p. 80; Rafael, 1988, p. 17). A new social complexity across intersectional lines arose, instrumental in the emergence of folk Christianity—an offshoot of “staying with the trouble” that is, nonetheless, replete with monsters (Haraway, 1992, p. 333). Interestingly, as is known in anthropological studies, original peoples responded to colonial aggression by “reflexively dislocating” (Viveiros de Castro, 2009, p. 78) their brand of anthropomorphism from the standpoint of official anthropology (the White colonizer’s). Whereas the former refers to the point of view of premodern humans in their organic consistency flourishing in multinatured ecologies, the latter designates the anthropocentrism of the colonial mindset. Oddly enough, anthropocentrism operates on the premise that the “human” is nongiven, itself “the very being of the nongiven” (Viveiros de Castro, 2009, p. 63). Without a multinatured context within which the human is supposed to be nongiven, the situation permits artificial construction, a self-nomination of being in the vanguardist fashion of self-transcendence

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that the Western psyche historically displayed by occupying territories, islands, and frontiers. The anthropomorphism of the indigenous is different. Human “experiences the primordial as bare transcendence” (Viveiros de Castro, 2009, pp. 62–63), which is “human” only insofar as these experiences subsist in species-entanglements that require a minimum constant of identity that remains fluid. de Castro described this identity as an “identity-by-subtraction’ from a multi-perspectival world” (p. 59).

4 The Biopolitical Erasure of Multispecies History Defining the 1896 revolt was deemed “modern” both in its essence as anti-clerical and anti-colonial (Palanco, 2010, p. 70), implying that the 1745 revolts and those much earlier, a century after the Europeans discovered the archipelago, were ahistorical, unable to craft a retentional force of historical memory. The parameters of historical memory fit this description of the atavistic resistance of the natives, albeit disjunctive. This framing does not apply to original people’s predicaments and worldviews. Instead, it belonged to the Western colonial and imperial mindset. This framing ignores the correlative of pre-colonial life and culture, essentially multispecies; thus, refractive to the universalist identity cohort, such as the idea of a “nation” and “national identity” in the ensuing post-colonial period. The Spanish colonizers advanced a spiritual conquest (aided by a decrepit colonial military), the first successful stage to destroy the multispecies spectrum of pre-colonial history. From the perspective of historical colonialism, this was a necessary conjuncture for the gradual transition to the new global order. If Spain’s colonialism administered the early phase of destroying the multispecies continuum of geographical relationality with multinatured stirrings of premodern life, the American imperial blueprint sealed the beginnings of the complete transition of history by converting the natives to citizens (Anderson, 2006). That is, from multinatured to a singular conception of nature shaped by the combined forces of utilitarian science and the global administration of homo economicus. From multispecies kinship-based history to the modern conception of the global utilitarian village, the new colonial dispensation was characterized by the racialist framework of scientific reason (which defined the early phase of the twentieth century) and the commercial prospect of expansion. The new terms of global commerce shattered the boundaries of the old world (the preceding centuries were marked by proselytizing campaigns alongside the administration of “divine commerce”) to carve up an open space for capital mobility and systematic labor exploitation. However, the new colonial blueprint only revealed the extent to which the empire represented itself in ambiguous terms, at times bordering on fantasy (Rice, 2014), a kind of figural disjunction described by Fredrick Jameson (1997) in terms of the decadent aspect of imperial modernity. This decadent impulse involves two rather interconnected “reflexive monsters” (extending Haraway’s description [1992])—that

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of the subjugated natives and the colonizing gaze. On the one hand, as Jameson describes, the premodern, who, by being subjugated, were forced to “look at their own surroundings with [modern] eyes, seeing nothing but what is morbidly exotic, but complicitous and finally infected by that, so that the roles slowly reverse, and it is [the] moderns who become ‘decadent’ against the backdrop of the more natural realities of the precapitalist landscape” (Jameson, 1997, p. 381). On the other hand, seeing into the inherent crisis of modernity’s self-representation, Latour offered a description of the colonizing gaze: By a reversal that should not surprise us by now, the Whites presented themselves to the others as people who were ‘finally’ in possession (this is the word for it!) of a rational psychology, a native subjectivity, an authentic, nonfabricated self, which was going to be able to extend the benefits of subjectivity to the whole planet. (Latour, 2013, p. 204)

More so, the turn from indigeneity to citizenship, islanders to civilized converts revealed a biopolitical design via the comprehensive implementation of what American colonial administrators called “hygienic modernity,” which involved massive vaccination campaigns against tropical and venereal diseases, as well as transforming the Philippine barrios into “well-ordered American military camp” (Anderson, 2006, p. 2). Anderson adds: Bodily and behavioral reforms came to be promoted less as techniques of pacification than as part of a civilizing project [...] American medical officers linked the attainment of Filipino self-government to corporeal and cultural transformation, to the establishment of hygienic identities in the colonial laboratory. (Anderson, 2006, pp. 2–3)

The concept of “hygienic identities” characteristically departs from the notion of “bodily natures” in that the body becomes the site of “false choices,” as Val Plumwood (1993) asserts, “turning around sameness and difference” (p. 215), echoing Jameson’s and Latour’s disputations above. In this context, the imperial fantasy of civilizing the natives and the rest of the old world is premised on pathological hauntology that propelled the European imagination of being “haunted by the exotic” (Jameson, 1997, p. 411), the idyllic concept of the tropic, the “wilderness or ‘nature proper’ as ‘completely apart’” (p. 215). The latter’s characterization of nature goaded the American empire’s early preoccupation with global exhibitionism displaying exotic peoples it had conquered, organizing “human zoos” (Pilapil, 1992) to exhibit the imperial success over premodern societies.

5 Colonial Binarism As was for its European counterpart, the American empire was not safe from the dangers and consequences of the same fixation and pathology that undermined European colonialism. Here, we can refer to the problem intrinsic to radical exclusion based on colonizer and colonized “colonial binarism.” As Plumwood (1993) argues,

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this binary logic is consequent on an invasive binarism of human and nature, a division that legitimates agential and collective positionalities (colonizer or colonized) as “part of the natures of beings construed not merely as different but as belonging to radically different orders or kinds, and hence as not open to change” (p. 48). In this light, we can contextualize this binarism concerning the multispecies background of the Philippine colonial experience, which, as I claimed, targeted the vital expressiveness of island indigeneity. Thus far, this experience sustains a functional role in the Christianization of the archipelago and the succeeding post-colonial imaginaries characterized by ambiguous attempts to reconstruct the colonial binarism, albeit in the physical absence of the oppressor, a kind of passive synthesis in the name of a more efficient neocolonial setup. Unlike the Spanish colonizers’ emphasis on liturgical hygiene, the American concept of “hygienic identities” skillfully over-coded (1) a backward colonizer mindset responsible for its pathetic version of the “mishmash of humans and things” (given the “liturgical hygiene” I mentioned that undermined the integrity of the clergy to convince the people of their superiority), technically, a defective treatment of the binarism of human/nature from the standpoint of the new imperial order and (2) the indigenous worldview of multispecies connections through the treatment of bodily natures as specimens for instrumental and technical research based on the separability of human and nature. Here the body is vaccinated, dressed, and rehearsed (Heise, 2008, p. 93) as the corporeal basis for entering civilization and displayed to a new colonizing gaze in the name of biopolitics. Bodily natures become collectively reduced as “object” or “clockwork,” emptied of “mind and purpose,” intelligence and meaning (Plumwood, 2002, p. 48). From the perspective of the new global order, the idea of purposiveness in the old colonial regime is, unfortunately, “located […] in a wrong place, above and beyond the fallen earth” (p. 220). This reveals the recessive logic of Spain’s theological pretensions that would require an actual god coming to its aid if not a “metadispatcher,” to accomplish them. But as Latour argues, there is no [...] metadispatcher, the one who ‘has in hand’ the destinies of all those who consider themselves with delight to be slaves of the immense forces to whose service they devote themselves wholly. The atrocious irony of this particular religion is that it is constantly reinforced by the very actors who wanted our eyes to stop turning Heavenward. (Latour, 2013, p. 471)

This predicament echoes the protests and cries of shamans who revolted against Spain in Bohol and Leyte, e.g., desecrating rosaries and bibles, setting fire to churches, before they fled to the mountains to worship their Diwata and preparing for their last defense against the Spanish war machine. From the perspective of Alvin Plantinga (2000), for instance, animists and shamans draw their beliefs in spirits that dwell in things, natural and human-made, nonhuman and human, from what he calls sensus divinitatis. Except at this point, we are not utilizing this description to mean a cognitively impaired notion of the divine. Contrary to Plantinga, who required the necessary intervention of the Holy Spirit to repair this cognition (which animists do not share), this sense of the divine could be “independently” reached and agreed upon by members of the society. Not imposed

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from some external sources of authority or arrived at by “mere agreement,” but instead thought out in isolation to offer probabilistic support to what people believe to be the spirits in things. As Tiddy Smith (2019) argues in his defense of the independence of indigenous epistemology, animism is the outcome of a “common consent agreement” characterized by separate mental concurrence, which explains the reason for its “retention over extraordinarily long period of time” (p. 10) across evolutionary and historical changes. Contemporary feminists like Plumwood assert that this kind of resilience, against the overpowering logic of negation by identity (applied historically), could be explained by arguing paraconsistently against the rationalist (and White male colonizer) framework of classical logic: In classical logic, negation (~p) is interpreted as the universe without p ... [W]hat is important for the issue we are considering here is that ~p can then not be independently or positively identified, but is entirely dependent on p for its specification. Not-p has no independent role, but is introduced as merely alien to the primary notion p. (Plumwood, 1993, p. 56)

This feminist standpoint also resonates with contemporary analytic philosopher Graham Priest’s argument that although some terms “may fail to denote,” for instance, in judging the semantic consistency of animistic beliefs, which rules out “non-existent objects having existence-entailing properties” (Priest, 2005, pp. 60–61), the shaman’s inconsistency does not necessarily mean their terms of use are trivial. Priest would even defend a Platonist in terms of the characterization principle (CP) or the principle of existence-entailing properties, despite the notorious idealism of its standard interpretation of reality: “The paraconsistent plenitudinous platonist must hold that many of the objects characterized by the CP have their characterizing properties at other worlds. They exist, however, at all worlds” (Priest, 2005, p. 154). Quentin Meillassoux (2008) offered a similar philosophical proposal, using paraconsistent logic, in his “extensive argument against the Christian dogmatist and the agnostic,” leading to the conclusion “that there are no necessary entities, only necessary contingency” (Olkowski, 2016, p. 306). Coming off from this brief digression, it is in this context that we can return to the beginnings of the biopolitical dispensation that defined the destiny of the archipelago under the American rule. The same principle, broadly construed, can encourage the discipline of humanities to look deeper into power relations that constitute the socalled consistencies of the logical enforcement of semio-physical realities as they decontour the multispecies plenitude of the cultural process of the indigenous lifeworld. In the Philippines, the beginnings of this biopolitical dispensation proved to be a substantial colonial success. A new bourgeois class was created to participate in the global economy, which contained networks of rational agencies, contracts, and transactions that completely over-coded the multispecies spectrum of the past. As Plumwood (2002) observes, this familiar flight into the new rationalist model transformed power and identity relations through “instrumentalism, individualism, and human centeredness,” [and replaced] earlier rationalist models in which human reason meets its match in an actively disclosing, rational celestial world which evokes awe, wonder and a sense of human limitation

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from the knower. The new model in contrast evokes from the knower a sense of human superiority to nature and of freedom from its limits. (Plumwood, 2002, p. 48)

At the core of this new model is the ecological erasure of worlds that have become irreparable and a spiritual lifeworld subjected to a metaphysical principle whose expression is formidably economic and whose political direction is suffused with teleological justifications for interventionism. This metaphysics is founded on the Western “dualistic construal of difference,” known for its geopolitical provenance in the colonial mindset of boundary-making, thus, originated by a geopolitical privilege to initiate the condition against which difference could be posited. This privilege operates from a position of power that claims the integrity of “human reason, contemplation, and higher pursuits” (Plumwood, 1993, p. 50). However, it is also based on a pathological “denial of overlap” (between two terms of difference), privileging the reflexive position of identity that metes out a comparative judgment, producing difference itself in a self-sustaining telos. As discussed in a previous section, this is not the same as the “identity-by-subtraction” of the premodern (Viveiros de Castro, 2009), which is more ecologically probabilistic than intentionally instrumental. Thus, the American occupation infused a new global rationality that superseded the old colonial condition by erasing the material-semiotic landscape of multispecies history through the “permanent construction of extinction.” Edward Said (1990) sums up this neocolonial condition as follows: For the native, the history of his or her colonial servitude is inaugurated by the loss to an outsider of the local place, whose concrete geographical identity must thereafter be searched for and somehow restored. From what? Not just from foreigners, but also from a whole other agenda whose purpose and processes are controlled elsewhere. (Said, 1990, p. 77)

In the above sense, the construction of extinction produces an “absent ontology” in the guise of invisible circuits of power relations. Still, this form of “absence” is compelling enough to hook the colonial imagination to the loss of geographical relationality that can no longer be recovered except in fantasy. The continuing history of folk Christianity generally attests to this geographical imaginary. Filipinos have learned to embrace Christianity by appropriating an external belief system and incorporating it into their modular-based spectrum of understanding nature and social intelligence. However, for the most part, this incorporation proceeds without an actual multispecies structure already destroyed by an economic teleology based on the metaphysics of the permanent production of extinction. As Said adds, “[t]his cultural process has to be seen if not as the origin and cause, then at least as the vital, informing, and invigorating counterpoint to the economic and political machinery that we all concur stands at the center of imperialism” (Said, 1990, p. 72).

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6 Conclusion Today, this business of producing extinction has acquired a new name via its designation within the humanities and social sciences discipline—the Anthropocene. As a continuing justification of the Western erasure of the multispecies history of the planet, the Anthropocene requires the “totalization of the entirety of human actions into a single ‘human activity’ generating a ‘single human footprint’ on the Earth” (Bonneuil & Fressoz, 2016, p. 65). The motive for such totalization is apparent. The Western “sense of entitlement and domination of natural systems” (Cole, 2022, p. 6) has transformed into a planetary guilt, a distributive logic of planned economy of exoneration (via carbon reduction across national borders and geographical scale). The proximity to the economic jargon of planned obsolescence is not far-fetched. To the extent that the planet is starting to create the conditions for the nongivenness of the human (recall our brief discussions on Viveiros de Castro), in its most perfect sense, its nongivenness becomes an object of fantasy. The “human” must no longer exist without the multispecies context of existence, now assured of its positive end. Extinction has to be total, or else the nongivenness of the human will deprive itself of its self-imposed teleology. As a counterpoint to the Anthropocene, in recent years, the call for multispecies justice (Celermajer et al., 2020) aims to challenge this singularization of humanity. The Catholic church hierarchy is among the most vocal institutions promoting this view in light of Pope Francis’ Laudato Si’ (which, unfortunately, is still oriented to classical negation logic). Laudato Si’ carefully crafts this multispecies perspective but fails at the tail end of expressing a “broader vision of reality,” which, if Latour would have it, requires that this vision modeled on God has to be “emptied of its substance” (Latour, 2013, p. 314): Just as the different aspects of the planet—physical, chemical and biological—are interrelated, so too living species are part of a network which we will never fully explore and understand. A good part of our genetic code is shared by many living beings. It follows that the fragmentation of knowledge and the isolation of bits of information can actually become a form of ignorance, unless they are integrated into a broader vision of reality. (Francis, 2015, pp. 103–104)

In the Latourian sense, the singularity of the church’s vision of reality, insofar as it is “sensitive to speech,” can be understood in terms of the “continuity of the message [that is] retained without any content but the reprise itself” (Latour, 2013, p. 315). As Latour adds, one “sees nothing.” If we may annotate in return, one sees an empty statement devoid of a multispecies context—the actual substance of the speech, which lies underneath all “renewals of interpretation.” Regarding its resonance with spiritual ethos, the real substance points to the situated materiality of the spirit as enacted by bodies but formalized by institutional religion, which is the error of religion in the Western sense in that it is only a constituent of its “whole world.” As a constituent, it is intersubstitutable with the master story of the West, denying the “non-tradeable position and irreplaceability of the other” (Plumwood, 1993, p. 194). In Plumwood, this is equivalent to the final stage of the dualizing process of Western reason (p. 192),

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a rational economy assisted by institutional faith. Modern religions help secure the non-proximity of power relations to post-colonized peoples’ conscious awareness of the reality with which they deal. However, already as the “other,” the latter “offers no resistance and does not answer back because it no longer has a voice and language of its own” (p. 193). This “other” represents not only those humans marginalized by the rational economy but also actants in a multispecies world swept aside by Western anthropocentrism. Nonetheless, far from being reduced to silence, the other essentially decolonizes self-consciously and, thus, “deconstructive of [today’s] liberal hegemony” (Celermajer et al., 2020, p. 11). Here, I take the position of Haraway concerning the concept of inappropriate/d alterity, which, though not entirely immune from reduction, has the power to negotiate for less unitary or totalizing forms of subjectivity (Haraway, 1992, p. 299). The negotiations produce monsters, which Haraway idiosyncratically characterizes as “hybrid [creatures that] show the arbitrariness and constructed nature of what is considered the norm(al)” (Prins, 1995, p. 360). Today’s normal is the singularization of multispecies life into the human climate footprint. This is not to say multispecies footprints should replace anthropogenic guilt; rather, these actants are decolonizing the necessity to create this historical guilt. They are decolonizing the planetary mindset via nature’s speechless articulation of “undecidable modes and sites where connections can be made” (Haraway, 1992, p. 324) against the background of the totalizing condition of the Anthropocene designed for humans only to address, resolve and negotiate. In this sense, monsters decolonize; they signify asignifying codes that render humanity uncertain of its destiny—the humanity that pursues more abstraction from multispecies history. McKenzie Wark wrote in an old essay that “it is only by becoming more abstract, more estranged from nature that I can make the cultural leap into thinking its fragile totality” (Wark, 1994, p. 127). Multispecies history diffracts humanity’s nongivenness—as emphasized, this acquired the meaning of the Western guilt—by demonstrating the uselessness of the metaphor of “fragile totality.” The Anthropocene is this totality, the singularization of humanity under the economic teleology of planned obsolescence through which the multispecies past becomes the most potent object of the fantasy of extinction. The difference matters less whether one arrives at this fantasy via Laudato Si’ or the techno-inspired discourse of climate science. Both standpoints echo the decadent necessity for the permanent production of extinction.

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Virgilio A. Rivas is a Professor of Philosophy at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines. He obtained his Ph.D. in Philosophy at the University of Santo Tomas, with a dissertation on F.W.J. Schelling and the broader relation of German Idealism to the current Anthropocene debate and

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extinction and collapse theory. His research interests intersect with Deleuzean studies, posthumanist theory, cultural, island, multispecies, and gender studies. He is a New Centre for Research and Practice (USA) member.

Chapter 15

Hesus Kanakangbungat Nipakapara: Aetas’ Soteriological Experience from Pinatubo Eruption to Present Miguel F. Baluyut

Abstract This phenomenological study aims to capture the experiences of Aetas since the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo. Six (6) tribal elders who have experienced the cataclysmic event were interviewed to describe their kasakitan/hirap (sufferings) and nipakapara/ginhawa (relief) experiences. Results reveal that despite the suffering they experienced, they still feel the kagandahang loob ni Apu Namalyari (the goodness of God) manifested and continually uplifted their plight and dignity. Amidst their suffering, they saw Apu Namalyari’s hand working for them. They feel blessed in surviving and thriving because “alang mengapaburen” (no one is forsaken) with “lugud ning Ginu” (God’s love). Moreover, they saw the salvific act of God through Jesus as the source of nipakapara, who brought them an experience of pagbabangong-dangal (resurrection). This brings a new Christological title close to the hearts of the Aetas: “Hesus kanakangbungat nipakapara.” Keywords Aetas · Mt. Pinatubo · Ginhawa · Hirap · Pagbabanong-dangal

1 Introduction After 400 years of dormancy, Mt. Pinatubo erupted on June 12–15, 1991, and it caused widespread devastation in Central Luzon. Aside from people living in Pampanga, Tarlac, Bataan, and Zambales, one of the most distressed people was the Aetas, who lived near the slopes of Mt. Pinatubo. Due to the calamity, they were forced to leave their ancestral lands, displaced in the resettlement sites in the lowlands, and introduced to unfamiliar cultures. Some of them went begging to survive, but they are met with discrimination by the lowlanders they call unat, and the lowlanders call them baluga (Seitz, 2004).

M. F. Baluyut (B) St. Rose Catholic School, Inc., Tarlac, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Hongladarom et al. (eds.), Philosophies of Appropriated Religions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5191-8_15

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Decades have passed, and the Aetas are still facing different difficulties and struggles, which include: (1) the aftermath of the Mt. Pinatubo Eruption, (2) the discrimination or stereotyping of the society, (3) the lost of their Ancestral Lands, (4) the deprivation of their rights; and (5) their everyday struggles (Seitz, 1998; Balilla et al., 2013; Gobrin & Andin, 2002; Banal, 2016). Despite the limited literature on the topic, this paper describes the soteriological experience of the Aetas since the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo. This experience results in a new Christological title.

2 The Indigenous Aetas and Their Experiences Indigenous people are considered the first inhabitants of the country. One of the most famous indigenous people in Central Luzon is the Negritos, commonly known as Aetas. Negritos or Aetas are one of the Philippines’ aborigines estimated during the last glacial era about 25,000 years ago (Balilla et al., 2012; Cultural Center of the Philippines, 1994; Seitz, 2004). They are considered one of the major groups of indigenous people in the Philippines. Residing from Zambales, Bataan, Pampanga, and Tarlac, they are dark in complexion, short in stature, and with kinky hair (Gaillard, 2006; McHenry et al., 2013; Molintas, 2004). Different tribes of Aetas are known in Luzon, namely: Abenlen, Magbeken, Mag-Antsi, Mag-Indi, and Ambala. They are classified according to their languages (Reid, 2013). Before the Pinatubo eruption, most Aetas were foragers, hunters, and fishers and relied on agriculture for a living, transferring from one place to another. In the past, they utilized their environment to great advantage. Their approach to food subsistence was to get food through various methods and techniques. They would go hunting, fishing, gathering, or foraging to get their food, which was abundantly attainable in their region. For instance, when fishing, they may employ the angtoko (water goggle) and biste (short iron spear) techniques or the mamalah method, in which the Aetas constructed dams by laying large stones in streams, forcing the streams to diverge and making fishing easier (Shimizu, 1992). They utilized different types of arrows for various birds when hunting for bird games (Brosius, 1990). As their primary sources of sustenance, they would also go for wild yams, bananas, insects, wild pigs, and even bats. According to Aetas, food was always easy to get in the highlands (Headland et al., 1989; Shimizu, 2001). However, even if they travel from one place to another, they roam around the peripheries of Mt. Pinatubo because of their strong bond with the mountain (Acba, 2008; Balilla et al., 2012; Gaillard, 2006; Minter, 2009; Headland et al., 1989; Seitz, 1998, 2004; Ting Jr. et al., 2008; Shimizu, 1992b). The social component of Aetas is egalitarian. A chieftain or tribal leaders, or elders lead them. Aetas have close family ties. Related, two or three families come together and live in a settlement (Regpal et al., 2010; Woodburn, 1980). As an ethniccultural minority group, the Aetas are considered socially, politically, and economically disadvantaged compared to the lowlanders. This is caused by racial differences and isolation in their upland habitat (Seitz, 2004).

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2.1 The Experience of Suffering (Kasakitan/ Hirap) When Mt. Pinatubo erupted, Aetas were evacuated to places (like San Fernando and Magalang in Pampanga and Pulilan in Bulacan). The crowded tents of the evacuation sites resulted in trauma among the Aetas. An example is the inappropriate distribution of foods like canned goods, which are unfamiliar to them (Seitz, 1998). Also, in the same place, 90% of Aetas children caught measles, which caused death to them (Magpantay et al., 1992). Also, some social workers are biased against Aetas for medical attention (Balilla et al., 2013; Fondevilla, 1991). Aetas resettlements never got an adequate supply of water. Schools were established, but no teacher would want to live on resettlement sites or take the long journey there. Health centers were placed but primarily unoccupied (Seitz, 1998). However, earning for living remains their main problem (Shimizu, 1992b; Shimizu, 1992c). For those living on offsite resettlement, agricultural sufficiency is their dream, but there is a lack of agricultural land. They started to switch activities like agriculture, husbandry, and handicrafts. They also sell fruits like taro, cassava, sweet potatoes, banana, squash, and watermelon in the market. They focus on a money-based economy to buy rice (Acba, 2008; McHenry et al., 2014; Seitz, 1998). However, transporting their products to market remains impossible due to lahar flows during rainy seasons (Espiritu, 2018). Also, stereotyping of the Aetas as “primitive and needy” lingers among the lowlanders (Balilla et al., 2013). Decades later, Aetas are still struggling. They remain malnourished, sick, homeless, discriminated against, poor, and uneducated (Agustin, 2012). Aetas are still stereotyped and called “Pinatubo Aetas” (Balilla et al., 2013). Since they did not know how to count, scheming traders cheated them into unfairly selling their products (Gobrin & Andin, 2002). Even foreigners asked them to sign a memorandum of agreement to use their land in exchange for jobs (McHenry et al., 2013). Also, Aetas asks tourists to stop taking pictures since their pictures are sold at exhibits without their knowledge. Even the government exploited them by asking them to perform sacred rituals, dance, and chant and even ask them to wear their traditional pinang and were forced to speak Tagalog to attract tourists. Thus, according to them, they became slaves. For them, they are unprotected in their rights and lands. Lastly, they feel that they are the least priority of the government in terms of jobs and opportunities (Banal, 2016). Aetas hope to be helped and recognized. Hitherto, they become milelele or outcasts in the Kapampangan term (Zabala & Peñol, 2018).

2.2 The Experience of Ginhawa Ginhawa is a Filipino word used by lowlanders as a sense of well-being. This term is used by Filipino who are in great distress (hirap) and find relief (ginhawa) after the experience. This word is not just relief from pain and difficulty; it is the approach proposed by Dr. Jose M. de Mesa “to understand the reality of total well-being of

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man and men to God.” The word ginhawa is the dynamic equivalent of the word salvation. It is not only well-being from spiritual but also physical, emotional, and material—the total holistic well-being of man (de Mesa, 1987, 1990, 2004, 2016). Although Aetas are not considered lowlanders, the study used the term ginhawa to describe their experience of salvation or well-being and hirap for their difficulties or struggles during and after the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo. According to Aetas Magindi, they use the word kasakitan to express their challenges and struggles in life. The word kasakitan has the root word sakit. The word has the same meaning and connotation in Filipino and Kapampangan, meaning difficulty, struggle, and problems. Meanwhile, nipasnaw or nipaldan signifies relief. However, according to Aeta Mag-indi, nipakapara signifies total well-being or salvation in their term (Storck et al., 2005).

2.3 The Experience of Nipakapara During the pre-eruption in the early 1980s, most of the Aetas were Christianized, yet traditional beliefs were maintained (Dizon et al., 2021). They believe in a Supreme Being lording over minor spirits or anitos. They also believe in Kamana, spirits in trees, springs, hills, rivers, rocks, or a specific territory. They believe these spirits should not be disturbed because they will cause sickness or death if so (Grey, 2016; Zabala & Peñol, 2018). Only a managanito can help make contact with these anitos and appease them. Aetas are religious by nature (Shimizu, 1983). Their ancestors worship Apu Namalyari, the Supreme Being and Creator, who dwells on Mt. Pinatubo. Mt. Pinatubo plays a vital role in the Aetas’ religious life and belief of the Aetas, for aside from that, it is the dwelling place of Apu Namalyari and the resting place of the dead (Fondevilla, 1991). There is much debate if Aetas are monotheistic or polytheistic. However, depending on their tribe, they believe in one creator: Apu Namalyari, Gutugutumakkan, or Magbabaya (Mendoza, 2022). Then, this creator is manifested by four spirits residing on a Balete tree: Tigbalog is the source of life and action. Lueve takes care of the production and growth of goods. Amas moves people to pity, love, unity, and peace of heart. Finally, Binangewan is responsible for change, sickness, and death (Arbues, 1960; Zabala & Peñol, 2018). Moreover, Aetas believe that these spirits or manifestations of the creator directly affect them, like Amas, who controls the people’s emotion. Amas is thought to unite people through love, compassion, and peace of heart. Although some tribes of Aetas still hold these beliefs today, there is limited literature or oral tradition to characterize the etymology and description of the Supreme Creator’s manifestation in the life of the Aetas. However, Aetas believe that the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo is a supernatural phenomenon. The manganito consults the anitos during the first sign of imminent eruption about the reason for the mountain’s grumbling. According to the manganitos, Apu Namalyari was angered by the drilling for geothermal power in the mountain (Shernoff, 1991) and the greed of the people exploiting the mountain (Acba, 2008;

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Shernoff, 1991; Zabala & Peñol, 2018). Since they mingled with the lowlanders and missionaries, they adapted and were accustomed to the lowlanders’ faith and culture even before the mountain eruption. Most of them embraced Christianity—even before the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo. However, during the destructive eruption of the revered mountain, some lowlanders and Church organizations helped and assisted them during these difficult times. At the resettlement site, they were provided with the basic needs of men. Also, even years after the eruption, many Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) are still helping the Aetas to make them self-resilient (Acba, 2008; Seitz, 1998). NGOs, like the Lubos na Alyansa ng mga Katutubong Ayta sa Sambales (LAKAS) and Aetas Development Association (ADA), have been working on long-term development for the Aetas that fit their sociocultural setting. They were provided living space, farming lands, livestock, and jobs. They were also separated from lowlanders that might exploit them (Koshida, 1992). Local and international help came to provide food, shelter, clothing, and education among the Aetas in the present. Even though some Aetas lost their faith in the government, they still accept help from organizations with a heart for the indigenous people (Rey, 2017). This brought ease to the daily struggles of the Aetas. These people, according to Aetas, manifest Jesus as the source of salvation or ginhawa during these difficult times. The people who cared for them have shown the face of compassion, agape, and unity to them in their times of distress from the past up to the present. Thus, bringing the Aetas an experience they call nipakapara.

2.4 Jesus as the Source of Nipakapara The lowlanders consider the Aetas as an outcast in society. It manifests in the discrimination Aetas has experienced in the past and present (Balila et al., 2016). The experiences of the Aetas can be likened to the attitude of the Jews toward the gentiles, lepers, prostitutes, widows, and publicans. The lack of openness and sensitivity among some lowlanders, who see themselves as first-class citizens and the indigenous Aetas as second-class citizens, continues to manifest in society. This ideology then brings discrimination and injustices among the Aetas. Just like the lowlanders (Christian and non-Christian alike), who were moved by the situation of the Aetas, they acted from exclusivity to inclusivity and were moved with love and compassion. The struggles of the Aetas brought a positive connotation to the lowlanders and the Church that they are also “partakers and have the right to the food that falls on the master’s table.” Church organizations and NGOs help alleviate the Aetas’ plight, thus providing their basic needs and becoming self-sufficient through education, employment, and civil rights assistance. Hence, these people manifest Jesus to them, the source of nipakapara or kaginhawaan. Hence, this experience of salvation or ginhawa brought by the people gives a concrete face or manifestation to Jesus, the source of nipakapara and the Kagandahang Loob ng Diyos (de Mesa, 2016).

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3 Conceptual Framework and Method of Analysis In describing the Aetas’ soteriological experience, this paper followed the framework used by de Mesa and Wostyn (1990), which has two interacting theological poles, viz., “projection and givenness.” Culture encapsulates the experience, beliefs, feelings, traditions, actions, and people’s way of living (de Mesa, 2004). In this context, the culture and experiences (negative-contrast experience) of the Mag-indi Aetas were the projection side. Through the projection of experience, they saw God’s salvific act gave significance to their experiences and day-to-day living (de Mesa & Wostyn, 1990), thus, seeing their relief from their struggles in the context of a soteriological experience. The paper brings out the indigenous Aetas’ unique experience, giving us a glimpse of their faith response to their struggles unknown to most Filipinos. There needs to be more resources and knowledge about the faith and struggles of the Aetas. This paper hopes to raise awareness regarding their experiences and cultural shifts during and after the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo and the different struggles they face every day. The questions asked in this paper are as follows: 1. What are the struggles (kasakitan/ hirap) the Aetas have overcome from past to present? 2. How did the respondents cope up with their struggles? 3. How did participants see the salvific act of God (nipakapara/ginhawa) in their struggles as indigenous people? 4. How did these experiences manifest Jesus as the giver of Nipakapara?

3.1 Methodology In capturing the experiences and struggles of the Aetas, the paper employed a phenomenological form of research. Six (6) Indigenous Aetas who are tribal elders from Katutubo Village Brgy. Planas, Porac Pampanga, who belong to the Mag-indi tribe were interviewed to extract the experience needed for the study. Only those who have experienced the onslaught of Mt. Pinatubo were the participants of this research. A one-on-one interview was conducted to describe the experiences and struggles of the Aetas during and after the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo. Using an open-ended interview guide questionnaire. The participants were asked about their experiences and struggles during and after the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo. Using open-ended questions will allow them to give free-form answers to describe their experiences. A thematic analysis was used to analyze the interview data. The analysis pattern in qualitative research proposed by Braun and Clarke (2006) uses the following techniques: (1) familiarization of the data; (2) assigning codes in describing the contents; (3) sorting of terms, themes, and patterns; (4) categorizing of the themes; and, lastly, (5) interpreting the given data (Mortensen, 2020). The experiences collected

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were themed or categorized as Hirap and Ginhawa to describe the soteriological experience of the participants.

4 Results and Discussion 4.1 Aetas’ Experiences of Hirap The experience of Mt. Pinatubo brought the Aetas to their knees. They thought it was the end of the world. Leaving their ancestral land during the eruption was the greatest of their struggle. According to the respondents, they never thought the deadly eruption would occur. There were 400 years of dormancy on the revered mountain, and none of them, even the elders, knew it was a volcano. They were forced to leave their lands and pet when the imminent eruption occurred. Their livelihood was a washout from the ash fall and pyroclastic flow. They experience transferring from one evacuation site to another by foot or on a crowded truck from Porac Pampanga to Pulilan Bulacan. After being transferred from different resettlement sites, they separated from their loved ones or family. At the evacuation site, they were met with problems of limited food and water supply; sardines and noodles were foreign to them (Seitz., 1998). Aetas children suffered diseases like measles and dehydration that caused the deaths of 90% of children and adults (Abellanosa et al., 1992; Magpantay et al., 1992). They were also discriminated against at the evacuation sites by lowlanders. In turn, some went begging. Two to three years have passed, and the tribal leaders of each community pleaded to the government to allow them to return to their ancestral lands. They started to till their lands and grew crops for everyday consumption. Nevertheless, their daily struggle continues, not because of Mt. Pinatubo but their fellow human beings. They were taught to sell their crops in the lowland. Since some are still uneducated, they are being cheated by people who would buy their products at a low price but sell them in the market at a higher price (Espiritu, 2018). According to one respondent, ding aliwa paburen da namu kasi atin lang utang karela (some Aetas just tolerate it because they have debts or can loan money from them). Since some of them can go to schools and colleges already, they are met with discrimination by their lowland classmates. Even if they finish high school or college, they are not prioritized for a job opportunity. According to the respondents, their greatest struggle now is the discrimination they receive. They were being looked down upon and belittled, thinking they were beggars. However, a remarkable story was given by one respondent. According to one respondent, detang aliwang mamalimus susupan da no ding gobyernu at NGOs. Mamalimus la at mumunta aggiang nokarin tapos deng apamalimus da pagawa de ing bale da (some of the Aetas who went begging are being helped and supported by the government and NGOs already. They go to other places to beg. After collecting enough money, they will go home to repair or reconstruct their house).

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4.2 Aetas’ Experiences of Ginahawa Meanwhile, amidst those experiences, there is still the experience of ginhawa or nipakapara. They could cope with the help and support from the national and local government through the Department of Social Welfare and Development, the Red Cross, and Non-Government Organizations. They were provided food, shelter, clothing, and medical needs at evacuation centers and relocation sites (Espiritu, 2018). When they were allowed to return, they were assisted by the Religious of the Virgin Mary (RVM) toward self-empowerment. They were given lands to build their houses by the government and the RVM sisters. They were given training and livelihood programs, such as soap and detergent making, rug and candle making, and flower vase making. Yet one respondent shared a thought, tiru daka kami pin gagawang sabun, basan, flower vase, sabun panos pinggan at pamipi, ampong makananung gagawang kandila pero ala nakami mang puhunan para magumpisang business (they have taught us how to make soap, rugs, flower vase, laundry detergent and dishwashing liquid but we don’t have the capital to start the business). Other NGOs also bring food, goods, and toiletries to the community. They teach children proper hygiene. Most importantly, they consider their children’s education the most significant ginhawa (Rogayan, 2019). According to them, this education gave them recognition, like Norman King, the first Aetas who graduated from the University of the Philippines. However, for them, one of the most remarkable experiences of ginhawa will be, and they still see it as far-fetched, the equality among the lowlanders.

4.3 Aetas’ Soteriological Experience The Aetas saw Apu Namalyari’s hands working amidst their difficulties. They still call and recognize God as Apu Namalyari to them. Apu Namalyari is gagawa yang paralan (God is making ways for them). Ating tula (there is joy); Kikilus ya ing Ginu libutad ning kasakita (God is working amidst sufferings); Ating obra aggiang ali kami megaral (There is livelihood amidst illiteracy and Apu Namalyari gave them lots of opportunity). According to them, Iingatan na kaming Apu Namalyari (God is taking care of us). Also, they are surviving and thriving because of lugud ning Ginu (God’s love), alang mengapaburen (no one was left behind). The Kagandahang loob ni Apu Namalyari is manifested through the people who continually help and support them. One Aeta shared that Ing papamakbung ning Pinatubu midinan lang pansin reng Aetas. Bakit? Kasi bala na ning gobyernu tamu ditak lamu ding Aetas. Kanitang memakbung ya, ikit na ning gobyernu na dakal kami pala (The eruption of Mt. Pinatubo gave chance to the Aetas to be recognized by the government. Why? Because they thought before that the population of the Aetas was only small. However, during the eruption, they realize how big our population is). Now, they were given attention and care.

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The Aetas have learned through the different experiences of discrimination to uunawaan mi nalamu, kasi keng pegaralan da isipan da mas matas la kekami. Kaya ikami namu ing mumunawa at mimintindi karela kasi ita ing utus ning Diyos. Kasi king mata na ning Diyos pante-pante tamu (We just understand them. They thought that because they were educated they were superior to us. That is why we are just the ones who understand them because that is the commandment of God. Because in the eyes of God, we all are equal). Hence, with the different struggles of the Aetas (from past to present), with the community’s help, they have experienced a resurrection experience from a “negative-contrast experience.” They have experienced the pagbabangon dangal ni Apu Namalyari (Salvation through God). Lastly, Jesus is the source of nipakapara for the Aetas. According to them, there is ginhawa in Jesus when one calls onto him. Niligtas na kami king kasakitan (Jesus saved us from our difficulties and struggles). For the Aetas, nipakapara is land, livelihood, and education. Jesus continually provides for them, manifested through the help and assistance of the government, non-government organizations, and the people who help them in their plight. Potang nilapit ka kaya ali naka paburen at ating kapaldanan (When you call on Him, He will not forsake you and there is wellbeing). Committing and trusting ourselves to Jesus that kaginhawahan/kapaldanan/ nipakapara is possible. God manifests kagandahang-loob to those who experience burden and struggle in life through Jesus Christ. Hence, Jesus Christ is the source of ginhawa or, in the experience of the Aetas: Hesus kanakangbungat nipakapara.

5 Conclusion Jesus Christ is the source of nipakapara. There is ginhawa when one follows Him. He manifests the kagandahang loob ni Apu Namalyari (the goodness of God) who brings nipakapara amidst kasakitan. This kagandahang-loob is manifested through other people who helped them alleviate their struggle. The struggle of the Aetas from past to present is seen in the salvific action of Apu Namalyari, who has never forsaken them. Apu Namalyari gave pagbabangon dangal for their struggles and suffering. However, the greatest dream of nipakapara for the indigenous Aetas is equality and respect from the lowlanders. Acknowledgements I want to express my sincerest gratitude to the community of Aeta Mag-Indi at Brgy. Planas, Porac Pampanga, and to the Religious of the Virgin Mary (RVM). Declarations This research received clearance and approval from the chieftain and elders of the Aeta community at Brgy. Planas Porac Pampanga in compliance with the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples.

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Miguel F. Baluyut is a De La Salle University-Manila graduate student pursuing an MA in Applied Theology. He also studied for an MA in Pastoral Theology at Maryhill School of Theology. He is an Instructor at Concepcion Holy Cross College and St. Rose Catholic School, Inc. His research interests are Inculturated Theology, Feminism, and the Philosophy of Religion.

Part III

Religious Beliefs and Practices

Chapter 16

A Gadamerian Exploration of Play and Festive in Pasko Fleurdeliz A. Albela

Abstract This paper discusses Filipino Christmas (Pasko) celebrations through select rituals and traditions representing the widely diverse regional and ethnic groups in the Philippines. Considering Hans-Georg Gadamer’s concepts of Play and Festive, such practices are sorted according to performativity: the musical re-enactments of the journey of Joseph and Mary to the stable (panunuluyan, panarit, Pastores, Villancicos), gift-giving (Monito-Monita, pamamasko), novena masses (Simbang Gabi or Misa de Gallo) and the Christmas Midnight Dinner (Noche Buena). In highlighting nonpurposive rationality and performativity in the concept of Play and the suspension of time and diversion of subjectivities leading to common practices in Festive, such Gadamerian interpretation explains how Filipinos are taken out by the “Christmas phenomenon.” With such intense “playing,” one finds an overlap of Filipino life’s religious, aesthetic, economic, and social layers, thereby stirring a dialogue that prompts historical reflection on deeper values as a community. Keywords Gadamer · Play · Festival · Pasko

1 Introduction The composite geopolitical condition of the Philippines conveniently justifies many festivals in the country. With more than 7,000 islands, each composed of at least a province with underlying cities, towns, and barangays (tr.: villages), adding religious communities as in the case of dioceses and parishes; community celebrations could but go numerous (Tourism Promotions Board of the Philippines, 2022). Filipinos are happy and joie de vivre (Philippine Celebrations) who take every opportunity to celebrate life and be grateful even for the smallest graces amid major adversities. For these reasons, the Philippines is also dubbed the Fiesta Islands. The Spanish gift of Christianity also sparked a light-hearted attitude toward the Catholic saints, creating more formal expressions of native spirituality. As the F. A. Albela (B) University of Santo Tomas, Manila, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Hongladarom et al. (eds.), Philosophies of Appropriated Religions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5191-8_16

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missionaries preached the lives of the saints, the early natives were catechized to be inspired by and to seek the intercession of these holy men and women in their daily affairs and tribulations. Local political and religious units, respectively, subscribe to a portrayal of Jesus, Mary, and the saints. For example, we cite San Isidro de Labrador as the patron of farmers, San Clemente as the patron of the fishermen, San Juan Bautista for the tailors, printers, and builders, San Joseng Manggagawa for the workers, Santa Clara as the refuge of the childless, Santo Blas as a refuge for throat problems, San Antonio de Padua when in search of lost items and so on. Fiestas are celebrated in honor of these holy men and women in vibrant and energetic ways and are passed on to generations. Among these many merriments is Christmas, regarded as the country’s most extensive and prolonged event (i.e., season) as it begins as early as September and ends on Epiphany Sunday. Filipinos call Christmas Pasko from the Hispanic-Catholic tradition, from the Spanish word Pascua. However, unlike the Spanish signification of Pascua as Easter, which the Catholic Church universally regards as the culmination of the Paschal Mystery, the Philippine Pasko is much more attributed to the Pascua de Navidad (or vernacularly, Pasko ng Pagsilang). By historical presumption, we attribute Filipino’s high regard for the birth of Jesus Christ to its earlier orientation toward the image of Jesus as a Child. The Santo Niño de Jesus was the first image given by the Spanish missionaries to the native leaders, specifically to Hara Amihan, who is the wife of Raha Humabon. In Pigafetta’s narration, Amihan (the natives’ queen) has developed a fondness toward the image of the Child Jesus that she was advised to put the Niño in place of her idols (Pigafetta, 2007). This event is commemorated in the islands of Cebu (and eventually throughout the country) in the Sinulog Festival every third Sunday of January. Furthermore, Filipino historians generally inferred that the eventual devotion to the Child led to a more profound spiritual attachment to the Mother, the Blessed Virgin Mary, whom the Filipino Catholics have consecrated the islands. Pasko is a general and grand festival celebrated throughout the country in the public (secular) and religious spheres. Through time and with the diverse ways of life among the regional groups, the Filipinos could develop specific practices to celebrate the birth of Jesus Christ. For the intent to open a discursive path toward a more philosophical regard of Pasko as a distinct Filipino religious and cultural phenomenon, I intend to look at Christmas traditions that are widely practiced in the Philippines, namely: the musical re-enactments of the first Christmas night, the nuances of Filipino gift-giving, the novena masses held at dawn and the Christmas Midnight Dinner. The mechanics of its prominent versions shall be described and interpreted with the help of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s concepts of Play and Festive toward a phenomenological context that can illumine such practices’ status as art forms beyond consciousness and how “playing” may reveal to the players their underlying collective (Filipino) values.

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2 Telling the First Christmas Night: Panunuluyan, Panarit, and Pastores Filipino practices that commemorate the first Christmas Night are commonly extensive in plot and dramatically vivid in storytelling, all involving music and some sort of theatrics. Much so that each regional version highlights a specific scene or point of view of a specific character to show the variety of subjectivities involved in the story of this Holy Night. The most well-known of these re-enactments is the Panunuluyan which portrays the point of view of the holy couple, Joseph and Mary, who were dramatized to be in a difficult search for an inn until they are led to a stable where the Infant Jesus is finally born. The practice may have been derived from the Mexican nine-day posadas ritual that goes with the Christmas novenario. This practice is also said to go with other names such as “pananawagan” (to call or to appeal) or “pananapatan” (to refuse with regret). However, unlike the Mexican posadas held for nine days, panunuluyan only occurs on Christmas Eve, commencing after dark and ending just before the Midnight Mass. In institutions such as universities, government offices, and companies, it is scheduled on the last day of work or during the Paskuhan (community Christmas celebration) commencing the celebration of the Holy Mass and the Christmas feast. Actors portraying Joseph and Mary go to pre-designated houses to rouse the owners to accept them for the night. However, as scripted, the household will have to reject the holy husband and wife, sometimes also in song, but would voluntarily hand in a monetary gift. This procession to the different houses ends with Joseph and Mary making their way to the already crowded parish church, but it is in darkness, only lit by a parol (star lantern) hanging on a rope or wire that crosses through the church’s ceiling. After that, the parol shall creep through the wire toward the stable. The panunuluyan then serves as the opening act to the Misa de Gallo, beginning in the dark until the parol reaches the stable. After which, lights are turned on, thereby revealing Joseph and Mary in the stable with the Infant Jesus (either as a doll or a newborn baby), which is just time for the community to sing Papuri sa Dios (Gloria in Excelsis Deo!). The basic form of the panunuluyan is sometimes modified according to the locale. Some towns dress the actors in costumes and bring images in andas or karos (carriage), others make Mary ride a horse, and others only declaim the script. Accompaniment also varies from a guitar to a band or orchestra. The most spectacular version is the Maytinis practiced in Kawit, Cavite, where aside from Mary and Joseph, other actors portray more Biblical and national characters, each riding a float. The last personality in the procession would be Inang Pilipinas (Mother Philippines), which Tiongson notes is a reminder of the town’s historical pre-eminence during the Philippine Revolution (Tiongson, 2008). Pastores, literally shepherds, portray how the shepherds adored the Infant Jesus in Bethlehem. Tiongson traces its source from the Pastorela Chica of Mexico, which in

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turn was introduced by the Spanish colonizers to illustrate the Catholic doctrines. In the Philippines, pastores are widely practiced in Southern Luzon (Bicol and Cavite) and the Visayas islands. In the Bicol provinces of Camarines Sur and Albay, the pastores are composed of twelve children or youngsters, with the girls wearing the traditional round-neck blouse with puffed sleeves and full skirts coupled with wide-brimmed hats adorned by ribbons and flowers and the boys wearing sport long-sleeved white shirts, breast and waistbands, and decorated hats. Costumes are traditionally coordinated into red, blue, and green. Before the midnight mass, they dance in front of the Child Jesus placed by the altar. The day after Christmas, up to the Feast of the Three Kings, these pastores go around the town dancing and singing carols accompanied by a guitar or violin in front of different houses. These carols are called villancicos (chanted religious poetry) and are sung in Spanish and the vernacular Bicolano. This spectacle of sounds, colors, and movements is furthered with the props used during the performances, such as rattan arches adorned with colorful paper and little bells, parol (star lanterns), handkerchiefs, and flowers. For their performances, the pastores are gifted with money or foodstuff by the homeowners they visit (Tiongson, 2008). The Visayan version, mainly found in Cebu, Bohol, and Leyte, renders a more detailed and creative storyline. To cite one is the version in Tolosa, Leyte that has four principal scenes: Scene One depicts pastores happy when the herd is well-fed and sad with the loss of an animal or if one dies in the mountain or the wilderness. Then in spoken dialogue, shepherdess Lia, Silpa, Raquel, and Sara talk about the news that the Verbo (Divine Word) has been born, ending the first scene with the opening song. Scene Two proceeds with Menguillo, the leader of the shepherds, witnessing the apparition of the angel who announced the birth of the Savior whom they should see and adore. The scene ends with the pastores singing a Spanish villancico. This is followed by Scene Three, which features Satanas (Satan, the devil) portrayed with bat-like wings, driven away by Lia. This ends with another song where they enumerate the gifts they will bring: chestnuts and oranges, fattened animals, milk, candies, and one violin. Scene Four finally shows the pastores kneeling before the Sagrada Familia and offering their gifts (Tiongson, 2008). Panarit, practiced in Eastern Visayas, has the simplest form, with carolers going around the neighborhood to chant the Christmas story in the Gospels. The practice is said to begin on December 16 and end on Christmas Eve. Unlike the panunuluyan and pastores, panarit does not require wearing costumes or musical accompaniment. It only requires a caroler, an individual or a group, to sing Bible verses in the traditional chant or modern mellow pop tunes (Tubeza, 2011). Its spontaneous discursiveness is peculiar since the house owners are expected to participate in the song’s refrain. Carolers are said to be given small gifts and money but would sometimes just be requested to return on the 23rd or Christmas Eve. Traditionally, the carolers would come carrying candles or torches, giving a pleasant sight in the dark evening.

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3 Practicing Creative Generosity: Filipino Gift-Giving The idea that Christmas is the season for gift-giving is universally verifiable. This worldwide practice reflects the Christian belief that God gave His only Son, Jesus, out of love for the salvation of humanity. In that context, it would be straightforward to infer how Christmas should be celebrated by giving. The occasion of the birth (i.e., God-giving) of the Son is remembered by also sharing one’s blessings. It should be noted, though, that the pre-historic communities in the islands already have gift-giving practices. An example is an approximately 3,000-year-old practice of the residents of Besao from the Mountain Province. Yearly, in the early morning of September 30, households would gather in Dap-ay Awaw to wait for the sunrise that rises atop Ambaon Bato, a rock placed in Langsayan Mountain that divides Sagada and northern Besao. They do this to celebrate the start of a new agricultural cycle. They mark a stone calendar annually and share linapet, a sticky rice delicacy with ground peanuts, salt, and sugar (Degay, 2022). Moreover, by the Christian doctrine of love and giving, Filipinos carry out this practice of generosity during Christmas in a very far-reaching way. The fundamental practice is to give aguinaldo (presents) to family and friends on Christmas day. Such is distinct from the Hispanic and Latin-American practice of giving Christmas gifts on Epiphany Sunday (to remember how the kings adored and gave gifts to the Infant Jesus). On Christmas day, good tidings are shared throughout the community, with families preparing small candy pouches called posadas or small notes in red Chinese envelopes called an pao. In recent years, more generous families even go around the community right after attending the Midnight Mass to give Christmas dinner packages to homeless families. It is customary likewise for children to visit their godparents in their homes on Christmas day. This is purposed to renew their spiritual connection. However, at the end of the visit, they would receive “blessings” in spirit and a wrapped box or cash envelope. It is also traditional among Filipinos to exchange presents between families and friends. This is practiced in group Christmas parties and according to specific rules the host or organizer sets. Usually, guests are advised to bring a gift that costs according to a specified price range. On the day of the party, each gift will be given a number to be raffled off during the program. The most extensive and elaborate custom for exchanging gifts would be what Filipinos call Monito-Monita, a modified version of Secret Santa, Kris Kringle, or Pere Nöel. The Filipino way varies according to the mechanics set by the participants. However, the common practice includes the sinister concealment of the giver’s identity. Gifts according to a set theme (say, something long and sweet) shall be given once a week for the entire month of December until the day of revelation (usually the Christmas party).

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4 Communal Spiritual Preparation: From the Eucharistic Novenario to the Midnight Mass Religious preparations for Christmas are furthered at the beginning of December. Catholic Filipinos liturgically prepare for the birth of Jesus through Advent, specifically by attending the Holy Mass and receiving the Sacrament of Penance. Participation in the celebration of the Holy Eucharist increased in the last two weeks due to the novenario in preparation for Christmas. This is known as the Simbang Gabi or Misa de Gallo, which begins as early as four in the morning. The name Misa de Gallo is derived from the usual time of the rooster’s crow, which wakes the farmers in the morning. As per traditional stories, the novena Masses are held at dawn so farmers can do their Christmas novena before they work in the fields. Unlike in the usual Eucharistic celebrations held every Sunday, the mood is interestingly festive during the novena masses. As it is held only once daily, Simbang Gabi is always fully attended, filling the church outside the doors. Some parishes would celebrate the Mass outside the church to accommodate the crowd (Eballo & Fortunado, 2020). For contemporary Filipinos, the early schedule of the Mass still brings special anticipation because it gathers the community in joy and prayer. Outside the Church, stalls of steamed rice cakes (puto bumbong, bibingka, suman), congee (lugaw), and hot drinks await for street breakfast. “The experience of eating together among the crowds in the plaza after Mass, before heading to work, adds a sense of festiveness and camaraderie” (Eballo & Fortunado, 2020). Many Filipinos believe that completing the Masses for nine straight mornings is an excellent way to offer sacrifice and spiritually prepare for Christmas. In cities where jobs are no longer agricultural, “the experience of rising in the morning and traveling to church in the dark adds an element of sacrifice and specialness” (Eballo & Fortunado, 2020). The more superstitious ones also believe that petitions brought to the baby Jesus at each of the nine Simbang Gabi Masses are especially likely to be answered. For some, being able to complete the nine Masses is a form of panata, which is a commitment to offering sacrifice in gratitude for an answered prayer. “Panata petitions ranged from very spiritual to very material, from wishes for peace and reconciliation to protection from accidents, typhoons, and earthquakes, to good health or healing, finishing studies or passing board exams, getting a good job or even acquiring a house” (Eballo & Fortunado, 2020). With the belief that such votive Mass is an offering on the occasion of the Birth of Jesus (Villaroel, 1999) and God shall give blessings to those who fervently pray by diligently attending the novena Masses, this practice is also called Misa de Aguinaldo. The Eucharistic preparation for Christmas culminates with the Midnight Mass, celebrated on Christmas Eve. On this occasion, Catholic families go to church to attend a Holy Mass before the clock strikes midnight. This religious celebration is most notable because it highlights the end of panunuluyan at the singing of Gloria, families receiving the Christmas blessing, and the kissing of the image of the Infant Jesus. At the end of the Midnight Mass, people finally head home to partake in the Midnight Dinner or Noche Buena.

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5 Families Bonding Through Blessings on the Table: Noche Buena Translated as “a good night,” Noche Buena specifically pertains to the particular dinner families partake in a midnight feast. Dishes served are always in full flavor and color. Christmas menu traditionally includes jamon (glazed ham), queso de bola (round Edam cheese), pansit (stir-fried noodles) or any noodle substitute, roasted chicken, morcon (rolled braised pork), and local deserts such as leche flan (custard), buco pandan, maja blanca (starch panna cotta with corn), just to name a very few. On this occasion, Filipinos serve the family specialties on the table, but most importantly, expect the family to be complete. The Noche Buena is a meal ideally spent with the nuclear family members but is also a kick-off for more significant gatherings with extended families. Some Filipino families immediately head to the patriarchal home right after the midnight feast for a bigger clan party in the morning. Christmas is a hectic day for Filipinos, with people making sure that the day is well spent with family (both nuclear and extended) and friends. This is when most of the gifts are given. Children look forward to filling their loot bags with small toys, candies, and coins.

6 Gadamer, Play, and Festive Gadamer’s phenomenological hermeneutics, particularly his concept of Play, may provide a more meaningful understanding of the Christmas phenomenon (or play) in the Philippines. Hans-Georg Gadamer was a leading philosopher in the Continental tradition who contributed to the development of hermeneutic philosophy. He universalized the scope of hermeneutics by extending it to all forms of human understanding. Heidegger’s question of Being influenced Gadamer’s approach. However, while Heidgger’s metaphysical inquiry focuses on the “ground” and background that precedes conditions and allows particular forms of human knowledge, Gadamer paid attention to the problem of historicity in an affective manner. Gadamer notes that “our capacity to understand history is always also an expression of our self-understanding” (Gadamer, 1992). His thought goes with the Heideggerian idea of fore-conceptions: Vorsicht (fore-sight), Vorgriff (fore-grasp), and Vorhabe (fore-having) (Gadamer, 2004, pp. 268–273). Like Heidegger, he notes that the utmost task of interpretation enterprise consists in self-critique—that is, to work out one’s self-projections so that the subject matter to be understood (the text) can affirm its validity regarding them. Since erroneous yet inevitable fore-conceptions can mislead understanding, the interpreter must develop apt initiatives from their situations. By prejudice, no understanding of the thing in itself is possible—and in reading, one should always be aware of one’s bias so that the text can unfold itself in its otherness and uniqueness and assert its truth against the reader’s fore-meanings

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(Gadamer, 2004). He notes, “It is only temporal distance that can solve the question of critique in hermeneutics, namely how to distinguish the true prejudices, by which we understand, from the false ones which we misunderstand” (Grondin, 1994, p. 113). Gadamer developed Heidegger’s description of the fundamental nature of Being through phenomenological hermeneutics. Gadamer’s hermeneutics has three features: 1. It emphasizes historical and linguistic situatedness and affirms the necessity and productivity of tradition and language. 2. Compared to positivists, it develops a more humanistic view that truth is not reducible to a set of criteria. (For Gadamer, truth is derived from a method that requires a deeper and more extensive notion of Truth). 3. It puts significance to dialogue as a route for understanding. (For Gadamer, dialogue is based on and is committed to further a common bond between men to the extent that it affirms the finite of knowledge.)1 Gadamer’s aesthetics is highlighted by the notion of Play, which he links to the Aristotelian idea of self-movement. For Aristotle, self-movement is essential among living beings, especially humans. Gadamer enriched this idea by stating that play as self-movement represents organic life yet exceeds the measure of ends. Play “does not pursue any particular end or purpose so much as movement as movement, exhibiting so to speak a phenomenon of excess, of living self-representation” (Gadamer, 1987, p. 23). Fundamentally, play is a nonpurposive movement representing life (e.g., the animal life—of how animals move, as how puppies playfully run and birds freely soar up the sky). For Gadamer, the human capacity for play distinctively involves reason, “which allows us to set ourselves aims and pursue them consciously, and to outplay this capacity for purposive rationality” (Gadamer, 1987, p. 23). No human play can exist without creating goals and following rules to put human movement in order. For example, it is natural for a child to set and beat a record in shooting basketball and to feel happy when achieving such a goal. With the mutual presence of movement and thinking at play, we now infer that play is better grasped as a form of self-representation of human performance. The seeming conflict between the spontaneity of vital self-movement and the necessary use of thinking is reconciled by Gadamer by his notion of nonpurposive rationality, where the end pursued is nonpurposive, yet the activity is itself intended. One plays the game well not simply for winning (nonpurposive) but for the love of it (i.e., conscious appreciation, rational of the game). For Gadamer, “[…] the function of the representation of play is ultimately to establish not just any movement whatsoever, but rather the movement of play determined in a specific way. In the 1

In Truth and Method (Wahrheit und Methode), Gadamer traces the history of hermeneutics from Schleiermacher and deemed that this long history brought forth the so-called “fusion of horizons”— something that is formed through an art of agreement (Ormiston & Schrift, 1990). This particular thrust of Gadamer opens hermeneutics as a meaningful communication of perspectives and a deeply inspiring motivation towards solidarity.

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end, play is thus the self-representation of its own movement. However, this play exceeds self-representation and self-expression as it involves a ‘playing along with’” (Gadamer, 1987, p. 23). This justifies the other side of play as performative. This probably explains why a child is happier and more spontaneous in playing in the presence of avid viewers like his/her parent. The playful activity will always have to involve an audience who is not a distanced spectator but an active participant who takes part in the playful activity. The play of art is more complex than the usual idea of play as games. Gadamer sets the stage for connecting them by highlighting their common feature: play being “intended as something, even if it is not something conceptual, useful or purposive, but only the pure autonomous regulation of movement” (Gadamer, 1987, p. 24). The identity of art as play also acknowledges its performativity. The being of a work of art is inseparable from its presentations. They allow the work’s identity to emerge, meaning it is part of the work’s being dependent on self-presentation (Gadamer, 2004). Art resists transposition to another medium but is also a statement from the play of art (Grondin, 1994). Regardless of any distortion in form and content, Gadamer upholds that any form of presentation will always refer back to the work represented. Such an idea of repetition affirms the novelty of new renditions and, more importantly, the flexibility and freedom that do not negate the work’s unity but an intrinsic feature of the work’s ontology. Repetition indicates a free movement, making the work of art a phenomenon of play, as through its nonpurposive and rational activity, the work comes to light. For Gadamer, this is possible through presentations, performances, or interpretations. There is a sacred seriousness in play (Gadamer, 1987). In play, one is fully engrossed and taken out in playing along. Play indicates an aesthetic experience of being drawn into where the event overcomes one’s whole being. Such a portrayal is perhaps intended to stress that one’s serious play experience should not end with an objectified look at the rudiments of the game but rather allow the player or the performer to welcome what one does not “know here” in this very playing. This is humanizing because it indicates the reflexive experience of a much more sovereign subjectivity. The optimum experience of playing along beyond one’s subjective choice is realized at the festival. More exhilarating than a usual game or performance, the festival is an experience that is more exciting and enticing because of the way it “moves time,” for the intensity of the aesthetic experience, festive dramatically reverses how time brings back a festival. For Gadamer, the festival fulfills its grandeur through representation or performativity in a specific place and time. When it is time for a festival, the usual way of life stops, and we should have fun because it will also have to stop. As a festival exists only to be celebrated, it allows the fusion of the past and the present and would instead bring back time through this present feasting. In such optimum performativity in the feast, we play along, but through participation already on a higher scale. The festival is a commonality and represents communality itself in its consummated form (Grondin, 1994). Participation is the essence of the Festival, and it is communicative. “Whoever participates in a festival wants to communicate.

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Communicating means, however, not necessarily an exchange of words but rather more a being with one another and involvement in others. Being and coming together is more important than agreeing about this or that” (Grondin, 1994, p. 47). In the context of the Sacred, play and festive take the form of a ritual, which for Gadamer is the fullness of one’s acting, thinking, and speaking, carried out with the way we live in the world—“through mutual agreements, morals, and customs” (Grondin, 1994, p. 48). Rituals manifest that our acts are supported by an ethos, which is subtly effective and more practiced than known consciously.

7 The Filipino Christmas Phenomenon as Play: Fusions (and Tensions) Understanding how Horizontverschmelzung, or the fusion of horizons, applies to the Filipino Christmas play can reveal several perspectives that could have allowed traditional practices to thrive and evolve through time. However, it is vital to first talk about horizons. Gadamer in Truth and Method (2004) describes “horizon” as “the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point” (p. 301). As a descriptor of how a person sees far enough, the horizon is then hermeneutically constituted by the interpreter’s prejudices or biases (predispositions) that may influence reading a text. These prejudices are shaped by previous knowledge and, most likely, by personal inferences from experiences, representing the interpreter’s objectives and stances. However, one’s capacity to think within the scope indicates the interpreter’s capacity to look beyond it. Gadamer also thinks that with horizons, the interpreter realizes there is more to the text: “To have a horizon means not being limited to what is nearby but being able to see beyond it” (Gadamer, 2004, p. 301). Horizons are prejudices that mirror one’s historical situatedness while trying to engage with other prejudices, acquiring a more meaningful understanding of the text. It is “how one can attempt to dialogically engage with prejudices other than those possessed by oneself, and thereby learn to evolve from one’s initial horizon” (Laraurri Pertierra, 2020, p. 49). The idea of horizons can prove that Filipinos take the Christmas Play too seriously. The performance of traditional Christmas practices is always taken on a higher notch to display not just the intended commemoration of the nativity but also to mirror the joy brought by its celebration. This consequently results in the flamboyant showcase of sounds, sights, and flavors (as depicted in the first part of this work). However, more importantly, the convergence (i.e., the fusion) of the fundamental aspects, which I call layers of Filipino culture, yields an interesting play of Filipino life’s aesthetic, religious, economic, and social layers. First, the religious layer sustained in the re-enactments of the Nativity and the Christmas Eucharistic celebrations crosses the aesthetic. Among the re-enactments of the birth of Jesus, panunuluyan appears to have faithful consistency with the biblical

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narrative. Meanwhile, Pastores and panarit have variations already reflective of the local versos, gender shifts (favorable to the feminine—as shepherds are identified as female in pastores), and characters from other religious literature (like the demon). Eucharistic celebrations like Simbang Gabi and Misa de Gallo always follow the liturgical rudiments, with improved aesthetic implements, such as the chorale performance. The church’s exterior will always be a visual delight with bright lights and colorful lanterns. While the colors of Advent—the wreath’s evergreen and the violet and pink candles manifest the spiritual preparation of Catholics through liturgy, churches are commonly adorned with bright lights, parols, and accents of red and gold (Juntado, 2019). From a devout mimicry of the Christmas story, Filipinos cross the religious line to become an aesthetic feast. Second, there is an ambiguous mingling of the aesthetic and economic layers in the secular practices of gift-giving. The Christmas phenomenon in the Philippines exceeds the rudiments of traditional practices. While there are serious religious rites that follow the Catholic liturgical calendar, gift-giving traditions are characteristically secular and done beyond the influence of religion. Aguinaldos are gifts given to godchildren (and so would somehow belong to the religious layer) but are also given to special family members and friends. Monito-monita, or exchanging gifts, is practiced in smaller groups (e.g., offices, residential compounds, and a circle of friends). In exchanging gifts, there are no rules to exclude non-Christians; only basic rules on fairness are followed. There is no influence of any religious rule or superstition in decision-making; only the minimum cost for gifts, the schedule for the drawing of names, and gift-giving are the things mainly considered and upheld. Gifts, bought or made, are given to family and friends, employees and superiors, neighbors, and the most regular community helpers. Thus, this season of massive generosity takes time to prepare and some aesthetic stirring to commence. The secular Christmas play begins, noticeably, under the influence of aesthetics. Visual installments and music encourage people to begin tedious preparations for the season as soon as the “-ber” months strike. Christmas comes as early as September, with public areas, especially commercial malls, and metro stations, setting up holidaythemed décor paired with Christmas music. Mass media heighten this excitement for Christmas as even daily news programs end with Christmas countdowns. Radio stations play their first Christmas song for the year as early as September, playing these songs more frequently until December. A couple of weeks later, households would adorn their homes with Christmas decorations, build artificial Christmas trees, and slowly install bright lights (Juntado, 2019). However, ambiguous aesthetic fusions may arise from late October to November. One may find commercial areas adorned with Halloween and Christmas decorations simultaneously. One can find a witch, a skeleton, and Santa Claus in a common corner, proving that no religious canon was consulted in such decorative installations. In the Philippines, preparations for the holiday season heighten more and more until Christmas day comes. This momentum is seen in how bazaars are slowly set up to last until the first weeks of January. Thrifty locals know that the most economical way to shop for the season would be to visit Divisoria. As soon as the Christmas season rolls around, Filipinos build their Christmas list with names of people they wish to

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gift. As early as October, the holiday rush begins, especially with the widespread promotion of Christmas sales. For the thrifty Filipino, shopping early means sparing oneself from the extra effort to be with much more shoppers during November and December. Filipinos go through this holiday (commercial) rush to ensure their loved ones will have (wrapped) presents on Christmas. Third, Christmas homecoming’s religious, economic, and social layers overlap with Christmas meals, gift-giving, and family reunions. Filipinos love to celebrate Christmas because it is, first and foremost, a festival. Following Gadamer, it is difficult to attribute sheer aestheticism to this intense performativity since Christmas celebrations in the Philippines “move time” by distinguishing such a season from the other days of the year. The Christmas play transcends the banality of a typical day in the year. This is evident in practices that unite families, like the Christmas masses, gift-giving, Noche Buena (the midnight dinner), and family reunions. For a hardworking Filipino, especially those overseas, Christmas is an opportunity to come home and reunite with the family to enjoy the season. With an earlier note about indigenous gift-giving practices (i.e., the Linnapet festival from the North), Filipinos have always been willing to share their blessings. Though not surprising, it is still interesting to note that Filipino families find the celebration of Christmas important because of their deep-seated religious beliefs. Tomacruz (2017) notes that the positive outlook toward Christmas is partly framed by how the Church celebrates it. More than being joyful, remembering the Savior Jesus Christ’s birth reflects deeply-seated values that give Filipinos a sense of ownership of Christmas. The Christmas Play, by the intense performativity of rituals and traditions, affirms the Filipino’s deep love for the family. Christmas is a time for the family, most especially the children. With the current economic conditions demanding Filipinos to be thrifty, families still strive to come up with something to share during Christmas. Children should be given gifts which should not be expensive. Conversely, children are taught to receive blessings with gratitude, regardless if they like it or not. The love for the family also manifests in the en-masse homecoming of overseas Filipino (migrant) workers during the season. Those who live and work abroad for most of the year fill their cargo boxes as early as September to give presents to their family as they spend the holidays in the Philippines. Giving time, presence, and presents to loved ones manifests Filipino generosity, which most likely justifies the value of hospitality to guests, whether it is the holidays or not. This is amplified by the economic phenomenon of stronger spending powers during Christmas. As per Noble (2021), each Filipino family spends PhP37,106.00 to celebrate Christmas, with 45% allotted for food, 48% for gifts, and 3% for decorations, against the average annual family income of PhP307,190.00 (House of Representatives, 2022). Such overspending is motivated and supported by holiday and year-end bonuses. In a way, there is a glimpse of generosity in the economy since people, organizations, and the government are most willing to provide and spend for the Christmas celebration.

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8 Sustaining the Play and Festive by Fusion and Dialogue When reading cultural texts, interpretation could not be a static phenomenon since understanding is based on horizonal interaction, as though a conversation that is vital and moving that “the text speaks to us through its horizonal reality” (Laurrari Pertierra, 2020, p. 50). In turn, the reader approaches the text through one’s horizon as though also speaking to the text. In this regard, human practices are texts that convey meanings while being read according to one’s predispositions. This leads to revising and transforming prejudices that entail a horizonal evolution. This indicates how our horizons are historically affected, as one’s understanding improved by dialogue orients us to how cultural symbols or other semantic representations are influenced by time. Moreover, it is in such a stance that “we share with the past an imperfect horizonal continuity, implying that interpretative engagement with the past in dialogue partakes in the phenomena of sameness and difference” (Laurrari Pertierra, 2020, p. 51). These fusions are most reflected in Filipino Christmas traditions because these practices reflect the convergence of the sacred and the secular, the social, cultural, economic, aesthetic, and political. Arising from religious commemorations of the birth of Jesus Christ, Filipino Christmas practices have crossed the liturgical line by engaging the public to partake in economic and social activities. Traditional practices are being modified to become opportunities for sharing through the giving of gifts and even just by fostering a livelier economic activity. Everybody willingly spends the season giving gifts, a very Filipino way to reaffirm ties and renew their sense of obligation to one another. While being beyond a religious occasion, we see the tension between retaining the canonical and sacramental and giving leeway to liturgical modifications. This allows Filipinos to live Christmas more aesthetically, showing the valuable link between religion and culture. This is why the modifications cannot distort the practice, even if such changes entirely override its religious rationale. It is as though there was just a second act instead of a performance of a second play. Hermeneutically, the performativity of play is the dialogue between the traditional (religious) and contemporary (aesthetic) expressions that usher the fusion of horizons. Regarding Christmas as a play stirs a dialogue, where Filipinos are both the hermeneutic subjects and readers, historically moving forward while realizing their deeper values as a community. Filipino culture celebrates camaraderie and cheerfulness, which the Christmas play highlights through a quarter-long fanfare of lights, sounds, food, presents, and homecoming. This Christmas play naturally conveys what is most important for Filipinos: family, community, and God. With these fusions, one can see that the Filipino Christmas play brings out an overlooked yearning for peace and a wish for good tidings and love at Christmas and throughout the coming burdensome year.

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References Degay, I. (2022, October 4). Linapet and Linapet day. Herald Express: News in Cordillera and Northern Luzon. https://baguioheraldexpressonline.com/linapet-and-linapet-day/ Eballo, M., & Fortunado, A. V. (2020). Simbang Gabi, pre-dawn Masses, prepare for Christmas in the Philippines. Catholics and Cultures Website. https://www.catholicsandcultures.org/philip pines/christmas-epiphany/simbang-gabi Gadamer, H. G. (1987). The relevance of the beautiful and other essays. Cambridge University Press. Gadamer, H. G. (1992). On education, poetry and history. State University of New York Press. Gadamer, H. G. (2004). Truth and method. Continuum. Grondin, J. (1994). Introduction to philosophical hermeneutics. Yale University Press. House of Representatives of the Philippines. (2022, December). Consumption patterns among Filipino households. https://cpbrd.congress.gov.ph/2012-06-30-13-06-51/2012-06-30-13-3650/1562-ff2022-71-consumption-patterns-among-filipino-households-2021#:~:text=Accord ing%20to%20the%20latest%20report,the%20results%20from%20FIES%202018 Juntado, D. A. (2019). Ligligan Parul: Pampanga’s Giant lanterns as political and cultural thought. TALA: An Online Journal of History, 2(2), 165–197. Larrauri Pertierra, I. X. (2020). On Gadamerian hermeneutics: Fusions of horizons, dialogue, and evolution(s) within culture as dynamic system of meaning. Eidos: A Journal for Philosophy of Culture, 4(4), 45–62. Noble, L. T. (2021, December 1). Christmas spending expected to top P37,000 per household. Business World Online. https://www.bworldonline.com/economy/2021/12/01/414632/christmas-spe nding-expected-to-top-p37000-per-household/ Ormiston, G. L., & Schrift, A. D. (Eds.). (1990). The hermeneutics tradition from ast to ricoeur. State University of New York Press. Pigafetta, A. (2007). First voyage of the around the world 1519–1522 an account of Magellan’s expedition. University of Toronto Press. Tiongson, N. (2008). Mexican Philippine relations in traditional folk theater. In P. Patajo-Legasto (Ed.), Philippine studies: Have we gone beyond St. Louis? (pp. 57–67). University of the Philippines Press. Tomacruz, S. (2017). Why do Filipinos love to celebrate Christmas? Rappler Online. https://www. rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/192164-why-filipinos-love-christmas-yearend-2017 Tourism Promotions Board of the Philippines. (2022). Calendar of Philippine festivals and monthly observances/theme. Tourism Promotions Board Philippines. https://www.tpb.gov.ph/tpb-cal endar-of-promotions-and-marketing-activities/calendar-of-philippine-festivals-and-monthlyobservances-theme Tubeza, P. C. (2011). CBCP: Let’s revive the ‘panunuluyan’ songs. Inquirer.net. http://newsinfo. inquirer.net/115813/cbcp-let%E2%80%99s-revive-%E2%80%98panunuluyan%E2%80%99songs Villaroel, F. (1999). The Aguinaldo masses: Origins, Setbacks and Survival. Philippiniana Sacra, 34(102), 487–509.

Fleurdeliz A. Albela is a Professor of Philosophy and a Researcher for Arts, Culture, and Humanities at the University of Santo Tomas, Manila. She is also an Associate Editor of Kritike: an Online Journal of Philosophy (https://kritike.org) and Managing Editor of Philosophia (Philippines): an International Journal of Philosophy (https://www.pnprs-philosophia.com/). She specializes in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, phenomenology, and ethics. Her latest research focuses on phenomenological approaches in studying the family and the hermeneutics of Filipino cultural practices.

Chapter 17

Revisiting Indigenous Islamic Practices for Community Healing and Peacebuilding Sheryl R. Morales and Roque S. Morales

Abstract Islamic practices in the Philippines are a complex dynamic belief system. Both external ideas and values and indigenous religious practices influence them. This paper claims that recognizing kamaasan as de facto community elders with institutional knowledge, wisdom, and understanding of Islam is critical for building community consensus (ijma). As such, based on the findings, indigenous Islamic practices can be a powerful tool for peacebuilding, conflict resolution, and community healing. Keywords Peacebuilding · Community healing and reconciliation · Customary law

1 Introduction Faith traditions have the unique characteristic of having diverse manifestations as they traverse nations and tribes. As a faith tradition enters a culture or civilization, it can either obliterate a culture, such as what happened to the Native Central and South Americans when Christianity was introduced together with Western colonialism, or else produce integration or syncretization, as what happened to Islam in Southeast Asia where it immersed itself in the civilization of Nusantara (literally, “Islands yonder” in Bahasa). The Philippines is part of the bigger civilizational crucible of Southeast Asia, where Islamization has permeated the region from the ninth–tenth century CE to the present, transforming many cultural communities by integrating pre-Islamic and Islamic culture; in other instances, allowing non-Islamic groups to develop and coexist alongside with Islamic groups peacefully. Islamization has permeated parts of S. R. Morales (B) Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Manila, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] R. S. Morales Institute for Comparative and Advanced Studies in the Philippines, Manila, Philippines © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Hongladarom et al. (eds.), Philosophies of Appropriated Religions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5191-8_17

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peninsular Southeast Asia (viz., Thailand, Cambodia, Burma, and Vietnam) and has settled in archipelagic Southeast Asia or Nusantara (viz. Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia), giving rise to a local distinct character of Islam known as Indigenous Islam. The paper highlights the nature of Indigenous Islam in the Philippines, in particular, and Southeast Asia, in general. The initial phase of Islamization in Southeast Asia was gradual and connected to trade and commerce, where Muslim traders interacted with local leaders (Aljunied, 2019). This allowed the local leaders to reap the benefits of the ongoing commerce of the Silk Road and the sea routes connected to their archipelagic routes. The gradual acceptance of the Islamic faith allowed some leeway. Local customs and beliefs were integrated and assumed some essence of Islamization and indigenization. Before the arrival of Islam, countries in Southeast Asia were Hindu and Buddhist, and the interaction between these cultures produced deeper impacts on the indigenization of Islam in Southeast Asia (Acri & Meyer, 2019). Since the earlier strands of Islam that arrived were Sufi, assimilation, and integration were easier, such as in the case of Javanese and Malay cultures. The process of assimilation of Islam in Southeast Asia, particularly in the Javanese states, brought a tacit recognition of the uniqueness of the area’s culture. This led to the welcoming of differences between newly converted Muslim locales and their non-Muslim neighbors. This cultural-cumsociopolitical osmosis allowed both to freely interact, engage, do business, address common issues and threats, or settle disputes in a very tolerant manner (Johns, 1998). Indigenous Islam in Indonesia has been closely related or synonymous with Sufism since the first missionaries and converts to Islam in Indonesia (and Malaysia) were followers of Sufism and sought a middle ground in bringing people toward Islam. Sufi practitioners facilitated the evolution of Islam in Southeast Asia. Still, it took a more visual, distinct, and obvious form by the fourteenth century CE, when many significant indigenous communities accepted Islam (Bruinessen, 2018). In the Philippines, the arrival of Muslim missionaries in the tenth century CE had remarkable differences in their manhaj (methodology). In addition to bringing their local Islamic customs and beliefs, each brought a part of their home culture. The significant ones who have impacted the historical development of Islam in the region include Sheikh Karim ul-Makhdum, who introduced Islam in 1380 when he set foot on Simunul Island, currently known as Bohe Indangan, Simunul Island, Tawi-Tawi province. In a conversation with George Lee (March 2022), most historians acknowledge Sheikh ul-Makhdum as one of the primary foundational steps toward the Islamization of Mindanao. Shariff Baguinda (of the Sulu Sultanate) and Shariff Kabunsuwan (Maguindanao Sultanate) were noted travelers and nobles who settled among the local leadership and intermarried among the elite. They eventually oversaw the formation of the political (sultanate) rule while providing religious guidance to the locals. Their erudite learning earned them the respect and admiration of the people, influencing them to practice Islam (Kimpa). Shaykh Barzubair Karama Al-Hadhrami was the first Muslim Arab missionary to arrive in Basilan from Hadhramaut, Yemen. In the 1800s, Islam eventually spread among the Yakan and Sama populations through his propagation. In another conversation, Jaafar Kimpa (January 2022), among the recent missionaries who intermarried

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and planted roots in the Philippines were Ustaz Ilyas Ismail (from Indonesia), who died in the late 1980s in Maharlika Village, Taguig, and Sheikh Abusuud bin Ahmed Mustafa (from Yemen), who died in the late 1970s in Campo Islam, Zamboanga. When the Philippines opened its doors to foreigners in the late 1950s, the country received an influx of foreign students and businesspeople, which led to the Jamaah Tabligh in the early 1970s (Jaljalis). Jaafar Kimpa (January 2022) narrated that in the same period, the Middle East opened its doors to overseas contract workers, after which Filipino contract workers arrived in the region. Meanwhile, other religious groups, such as the Shia, arrived during the height of the Islamic revolution in Iran, courtesy of Iranian students and the Ahmadiyah (through the Pakistani and Indian Ahmadis). A strong cultural milieu also highlights the unique evolution of how Filipino Muslims perceived and interpreted Islam in the twentieth century. The Islamic practices in the Philippines have been influenced by both external ideas and values and indigenous religious practices, thus creating a complex dynamic belief system.

2 Indigenous Religious Practice: An Overview Spirituality is always related to the search for the sacred through relationships above the self (Hill et al., 2000). In this regard, Filipinos are known to be religious and spiritual people with a culture rich in religious traditions, rituals, devotions, and beliefs (Biana et al., 2016). Indigenous faiths intertwined with other, more contemporary religions to establish the people’s core ideas and shared behaviors. For example, many Africans practice Islam or Christianity, depending on their cultural background. They may, however, continue to maintain their beliefs and engage in rites associated with indigenous religions. They combine the teachings of the two religions into a belief system that makes intuitive sense to them. The following characteristics characterize all indigenous religions: (a) oral transmission, (b) embedding in the specific areas where adherents dwell, (c) a strong sense of the interrelationship of living things, and (d) a strong sense of the interrelationship of living things (Unitarian Universalist Association, 2017). When local indigenous and new spiritual traditions are brought together, certain rituals become indigenized, also called indigenous religious practices (IRPs). In a conversation with Fatmawati Salapuddin (April 2021), a former commissioner of the National Commission on Muslim Filipinos, some examples of indigenous religious practices among Muslim Filipinos include their form of Aqiqah (ritual shaving of infants’ hair eight days after birth), pagliguh patay (ritual washing of the dead), wherein the dead is ritually cleansed with indigenous and Islamic rituals and materials, and pagtammat (ceremonial completion of recitation and mastery of the Quran), wherein certain local rituals are performed to commemorate a young Quran learner (student). Note that the term “indigenous spirituality” refers to the spiritual beliefs and practices that indigenous people identify as being “traditional”

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or “customary.” This may sometimes be practiced with other faith traditions such as Christianity or Islam (Ontario Human Rights Commission; Maarif, 2019). Because of Islam’s historical association with ethnicity in the Philippines, information about Islam and Muslims can be found in various sources that either concentrate on individual tribes or conduct studies conducted on tribes throughout the country, depending on the source (Afable, 1960; Angeles, 2013). Before colonization, local communities were constantly exposed to both old and new influences, giving rise to the syncretization of beliefs and practices (Balogun, 2011) that were unique to each community. In the indigenous cultural communities, their customs and interpretations of the sacred were either merged, transformed, or adapted to the new circumstances. As for indigenous Islam, when Islam arrived in the southern Philippines, instead of condemning or penalizing local customs and practices, the missionaries attempted to create a version of Islamization that did not destroy local customs, cultures, and social structures (Kimpa). Over time, conflicts in the Philippines occurred due to historical, sociopolitical, socio-cultural, economic, and cultural factors (Peleo, 2013). Meanwhile, there was clan-related violence or rido (Ragandang III, 2018); the Moro National Liberation Front (an Islamist separatist organization); the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (the largest militant organization); and violent extremist groups such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (Al-Qaeda separatist group) in Basilan Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, the BIFF Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters in Central Mindanao and Socsargen, the Daula Islamiyah Ranao, Maute Group (Franco, 2020) in Northern Mindanao (which pursued an independent Islamic state for the Filipino Muslim minority); and other Daesh-affiliated jihadist groups (Mapping Militant Organizations). These conflicts predominantly occurred in indigenous communities in Mindanao. The conflict is rooted in Muslims and indigenous non-Muslim peoples’ struggles for greater socioeconomic development, equal recognition and support for their cultural and religious identities, and social justice (Russell et al., 2004). Indigenous cultural communities generally include internal processes for resolving conflicts and difficulties. These “alternative dispute resolution” (ADR) tools are deeply ingrained into their cultural worldview and spiritual beliefs. However, addressing these conflicts (brought about by adapting different ideologies) requires professional competence in conflict resolution and institutional memory that truly understands the socio-cultural, political, and economic issues (Social Assessment of Conflict-affected Areas in Mindanao). It also requires people who practice indigenous Islam and are familiar with its customary laws to respond appropriately. Indigenous peoples continue to place high importance on their traditional institutions for the governance of community concerns and a strong desire to have customary laws to govern their communities (Plant, 2022). Although customary law is traditionally seen to be at the bottom of the legal pyramid, it carries much weight in practice. In areas where national authority is weak, customary law is still the main source of law for many indigenous peoples and local communities regarding a wide range of civil and criminal law issues (Tobin, 2008). For example, when indigenous people have conflicts and disputes, customary law practices can be the best way to deal with them because they keep the community and everyone safe (Roy, 2005).

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Like Indonesia and Thailand, the Philippines presents unconventional peacebuilding issues (Mulakala, 2019). Peacebuilding and conflict resolution have been the most critical subjects of focus, where novel approaches and ideas have been tested and implemented to address the barriers to peace and security in many local communities. In this regard, indigenous Islamic practices can be a powerful tool for peacebuilding, conflict resolution, and community healing.

3 Nature of Indigenous Islam Due to the dynastic political development and the development of indigenous institutions in the early part of the Islamization of the Philippines, relations with adjacent Muslim kingdoms constitute international relationships. The spread of Islam in the country results from complex interactions between political, economic, psychological, and social factors and ideological antecedents and consequences (Majul, 1966). Overall, indigenous Islam is defined by the following characteristics.

3.1 A Strong Eco-Theology Eco-theology is characterized by a strong affinity for connecting to the environment and the sacred so that the environment manifests the greatness of the Divine. This can be best described by the twin concept of Amanah (divine trust) and Khilafatul Ard (vice-regent/custodian of the world). From the perspective of Islamic eco-theology, one’s faith is defined not just by the number of ritual levels or prayers offered in places of worship but also by one’s devotion to preserving and managing the environment (Masyhuda et al., 2021). As custodian of the earth, Mankind is instructed: “And make not mischief upon the earth after its reformation. And invoke Him in fear and aspiration. Indeed, the mercy of Allah is near to the doers of good” (Quran, 7:56). The same order can be found in another Ayah of the Quran: “And when they are told, ‘Do not spread corruption on earth,’ they answer, ‘We are but improving things!’” (Translated by Muhammad Asad Al-Baqarah 2:11). This shows that humanity is expected to take care and preserve the environment and not corrupt/defile the earth. As for being Khilafatul Ard, humanity is instructed: “Remember when He made ¯ are mentioned in the you successors after’Âd (literally meaning the People of ’Ad) 24 times in the holy Quran as the people to whom Allah sent the prophet Hud to guide them back to the righteous path of faith) and established you in the land – and you built palaces on its plains and carved homes into mountains. So, remember Allah’s favors, and do not go about spreading corruption in the land” (Surah al-Araf: 74). These injunctions evidence Mankind’s role in caring for the environment, manifested in indigenous Islam (Robinson, 2005) and classical Islam (Hillenbrand, 2022).

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Understanding eco-theology means bringing the universe’s sense of completeness and divinity as the Divine presence in an interconnected natural world (Ouis, 1998). All of the principles and doctrines that are commonly referenced in Shari’ah (Islamic law) regarding God’s design for the natural world (ilm al-khalaq) and Mankind’s responsibility for its consumption, care, and protection are the philosophical bases of Islamic eco-theology (Nasir, 2017). Thus, indigenous Islam fundamentally evolved as knowledge about God, best exemplified by the love for God. Finally, eco-theology is a process by which community elders focus more on God’s connection to them and how to be truthful to God (Kimpa). In this regard, indigenous Islam is a culturally assimilated form of Sufism brought by Islam’s early missionaries. It also carries the profound spirituality our great elders taught our communities and the indigenous people’s customs and traditions. For example, there is the belief in wahdatul wujud, which fundamentally unifies all existence in God’s devotion (Hashim). People in the early days also ensured that their actions, thoughts, and words went hand in hand with tawhid, akhlaq, family relations, and community relations, according to Prophets’ traditions.

3.2 A Culture that Adheres to Indigenous Customs and Traditions (‘Urf) In indigenous Islam, the adherence to customary laws and traditions is known as ‘Urf . In the belief of Imam Malik, ‘Urf must be maintained in the development of Islamic law and justice as it is following the needs of society and the common good (Gaafar et al., 2015; Yamamah, 2016). This means that certain customs and traditions must be maintained to ensure law and order in society, as long as it does not contravene Islamic law or enhances it. This also implies a certain accommodation within the context of a community and the ones that uphold Islamic rule. Since ‘urf is a proposition, it does not stand alone as a source of law, but its presence will explain the application of existing nash (textual evidence) (Yamamah, 2016). ‘Urf , as an unwritten law, also develops according to a community’s traditional development. Moreover, it aims to ensure that a society is peaceful and prosperous, with minimal conflicts, and that such a society results from a mutual agreement based on common interests. In other words, ‘urf is the consensus of acceptable/ unacceptable behavior in a community and the perceived penalties for digression of such established unwritten customs. Indigenous customs and traditions among Muslim minorities focus on learning the Quran under the guiding hand of a guru. This includes pagguru (search for knowledge), life skills, pamansak, chanting luguh for weddings, burials, aqiqah (sacrifice of an animal on a child’s birth), and other special occasions (Quiling Arquiza, 2006). Damao (March 2021) mentioned that Filipino Muslims, who are also members of indigenous cultural communities, should preserve cultural practices. This can also be considered as the people’s heritage and the process by which (like the Tausugs)

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kamaasan is preserved to understand Islam and be closer to Allah. This act of making the process a more spiritual ritual and belief system may or may not be practiced in other Muslim countries, even though it is said to have been passed down from the mahkdumin’ ancestors to their descendants and followers (Musa). In sum, indigenous Islam emphasizes the importance of peace and harmony in the community and adherence to the people’s and community’s interests (Salapuddin).

3.3 The Establishment of Indigenous Cultural and Political Structures that Strengthen Islam While there are divergent opinions on how indigenous Islam evolved into what it is today, it should be noted that Islam’s introduction and development in the Philippines largely occurred peacefully and not through conquest (Majul, 1966). This peaceful integration allowed the local tribes’ traditions/customs to accept Islam and eventually envelop the community, reshaping it through Islamization and endowing it with a new character (MacKay, 2012). This can be best illustrated in three models: (1) the Sulu Sultanate, (2) the Banguinguih Community in Taluksangay, and (3) the traditional badjao community. Before Islamization, the Sulu Sultanate exhibited non-Islamic governance mechanisms, such as the Rajah, Maharadja, and Datu, which upon Islamization, became parts of a new governance system that did not destroy the old leadership structure, but simply built on them. The Sultan, as absolute ruler by Divine right, oversaw the council of Datus, which was originally non-Muslim but became subjects of the Sultan upon Islamization. On the other hand, the Taluksangay community (although not ruled by a Sultan) was ruled by a Datu from the lineage of Datu Taupan, who ensured that local customs, traditions, and Islam, were practiced by the community (Kimpa). As for the badjao communities, they practiced a syncretism of Islam and local practices while respecting Muslim religious leaders and Islamic customs when conflicts arose (Hefner, 2009). The position of the elderly in the Muslim community is unique. The Muslim cultural framework holds the elderly in high regard and respect (Adhikari, 2019). Likewise, indigenous Muslim communities prioritize listening to and respecting community elders, who serve as de facto community leaders with institutional knowledge, wisdom, and understanding of Islam necessary for effective governance. In a conversation with Akbar (March 2022), the elders’ role as community leaders portrays a peaceful and harmonious life for Muslims rather than simply practicing jihad and fleeing when the time comes. However, as community leaders, they do not hesitate to protect themselves if necessary. Furthermore, they encourage people to seek paradise through good deeds rather than conflict or violence.

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4 Indigenous Islam: Knowledge, Transmission, Learning, and Preservation In general, love and compassion are essential in Islam, but knowledge is required to make them fruitful. Hence, every Muslim is required to seek knowledge. Historically, ulama (scholars endowed with ilm or knowledge) are responsible for passing on the gift of knowledge. It was also an important responsibility to transmit this gift in its purest form, as well as the ability to interpret the Quran and Muhammad’s life for the benefit of the community (Robinson & Robinson, 1996). The transmission and learning of indigenous Islam and other indigenous knowledge skills and processes are carried out in cultural and religious learning institutions (CRLIs). These CRLIs ensure the preservation of cultural and religious traditions and instill institutional memories that may last for generations (Morales & Morales, 2020). Regarding indigenous Islam, it is transmitted by teaching the fundamentals of Islamic beliefs and practices in the community, which include: the basic undangundang (or Arabic alphabet), grammar, huruf iban hijjah (or Quran reading and articulation), simple duwa’a (prayers), and Muslim values. In local villages, pangadji ha lihal (home-based Quran and values education) uses bilingual instruction, incorporating the local language and fundamental Arabic (Quiling Arquiza, 2006). Learning indigenous Islam is also a lifelong learning process. As such, learning starts at a young age, in which love and compassion are nurtured and guided by the eldest person in the house. Because knowledge transmission must be in its purest form, those who follow ilmuh kamaasan (the ancient knowledge guarded in tradition) must practice purification of the heart to avoid being blemished by impurities and burdened (Quiling & Tahil, 2019). The act of worship and practice will be made easier in this manner. Additionally, since it is founded on love and compassion, it is critical to remember that God, not us or others, is the giver and controller of everything (Hashim). Thus, as mentioned by Guru Musa (March 2021), we should always treat others accordingly. The elders teach people through sincerity and goodness rather than coercion, which is the way of indigenous Islam. Since all creation was formed out of love and compassion, increasing compassion, love, and understanding is the antidote to anger, violence, and other negative emotions (Kimpa). In a conversation with Binatal-Arah (March 2021), it is also believed that if one must focus on goodness and justice, then s/he cannot take anything without permission from the Divine owner, as we are all part of this Divine world. This is also exhibited in love for Allah and His creations, which teaches us not to harm Allah’s creations as they manifest His beauty in the world. Every Muslim must have compassion for others and a thirst for knowledge and understanding of God. Once you have such understanding and knowledge, you will become his Khalifa (vice-gerent) and assist humanity, regardless of whether they are Muslims or non-Muslims (Binatal-Arah). As for non-Muslims, they are not viewed as brothers in Islam but as brothers in humanity, manifesting Allah’s attributes in all their glory among Muslim brethren

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and non-Muslim friends. In addition, Allah has honored all of us, including nonMuslims, with laqad karramna bani adam (honor). If you love Allah, you will love his creation and aim to reach paradise. This indicates that one should respect people, whether Muslim or non-Muslim (Julkarnain), and their beliefs (Damao), culture, or religion. In other words, one should avoid discrimination and treat everyone equally (Ismail). The Prophet of Islam (Peace be upon him) stated that one could not claim to believe in God if s/he does not treat his/her neighbors with respect and courtesy. S/he should also perform hurmat (service) with respect and perform good deeds for his/her neighbors, as this is the guidance of the Prophet of Islam (Nuruddin). Understanding and knowing others’ beliefs and religion is also a way of building friendships, even with Christians (Kimpa). As the elders preserved this tradition of learning, the depth of foresight and knowledge encouraged the community to respect them, especially the panglima (community chieftain) and imam. They place a premium on respecting elders’ decisions that promote settlement and pagkasilasa (love) among the various parties, a conversation with Ismail (April 2021). Our ancestors valued and accepted diversity, as evidenced by our communities’ peaceful and meaningful relationships with Muslims and nonMuslims before the arrival of trans-national Islam (Hasan, 2010). This included elements of how to interact with others positively and Tausug’s outgoing nature, which reinforced the Islamic spirituality that eventually emerged (Tindick).

5 Traditions of Tolerance and Openness Various traditions existed long ago when our Filipino Muslim ancestors were taught about aqueedah (belief), fiqh (jurisprudence), and tasawuff (mysticism) as components of how to interact with others positively. The positive, outgoing nature of the Tausug is an example of this, as it reinforced the Islamic spirituality that came with Islam (Tindick). This is also reflected in the fact that kaadilan and kasabunnalan (justice and truth) were the foundations of the kamaasan’s justice system. Although it does not presently possess the police power to enforce, it primarily serves as on moral persuasion to do good or be cursed following iban in Katluan jud sin Quran, the 30 chapters of the Quran, (Salapuddin). Respect and tolerance for different religious beliefs are core values. Kandulis or celebrations were once a place of unity and love (Bacaron, 2010). In a conversation with Damao (March 2021), he said, “since these gatherings strengthened the relationships of Muslims, disunity prevailed because others would no longer attend family gatherings (e.g., Mawlid celebration).” In sum, religious leaders have always emphasized respect and a sense of community among believers, which translates to the bond between two parties. If this is between relatives, then they will emphasize love for family. However, if this is between friends and acquaintances, they will emphasize love for friends, as their emphasis on love and compassion is aimed at healing the parties’ pain and anger toward one another (Musa).

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6 The Principle of Ijma or the Consensus of the Community Indigenous Islam primarily builds on community consensus, or what is known as ijma. Prophet Muhammad’s hadith, which states, “My community will never agree on an error,” is frequently cited in support of the ijma principle (Tanabe, 2018). Thus, in the early centuries of Islam, ijma was identified as the community itself (Hasan, 1975). The kamaasan (elders) would bring parties before the imams (religious leaders) whenever there were conflicts or disputes. The parties would then listen to what the elders had to say (who also acted as mediators) and resolved disagreements or misunderstandings through community consensus (Kimpa). This demonstrates that the knowledge of the elders (ilmuh kamaasan) can be used as a tool for conflict resolution (Morales & Morales, 2022). In such situations, the kamaasan’s approach to problem-solving was manifested through duwaas (supplication), sincerity, and genuine concern for other people. This resonated with respect and tolerance for others, particularly community elders. This also indicates that if one party is harmed, they will always find a way to resolve the situation, as the Prophet of Islam advised (Peace be upon him). Common conflicts include disagreements between two parties because two people are romantically involved when their clans oppose one another, making marriage almost impossible. However, the kamaasans would settle this conflict by encouraging the marriage and ensuring that the settlement is arranged and the dowry is mutual. In the case of physical injury or murder, blood money (diyat) must be raised and paid by the guilty party’s family to the aggrieved party. In this case, the kamaasans would ensure that the parties being amicably settled meet halfway, within their means, and to the mutual satisfaction of both parties. Since these conflicts are thought to significantly impact the community/families, making it easier for the aggrieved parties to settle is critical. Meanwhile, the kamaasans perform this act with love and compassion, strengthening the families and the community (Akbar). This ability of the kamaasans to resolve and mediate conflicts is due to their moral and religious ascendancy, as they will always find a way to reach a consensus in resolving disputes and conflicts (Nuruddin). The kamaasans consider their knowledge and practices coming from the Holy Prophet of Islam. They can resolve problems because they are patient and have good ethical behavior. They also encourage people to forgive those who have sinned against them, and they focus on making people and communities united, just as they did during the Prophet’s time in Hijaz (Binatal-Arah). While Islamic law generally accepts qisas (retribution) as a penalty for certain offenses, such as murder and adultery, community elders also accept it as part of their beliefs (Mumisa et al., 2015). Still, they would prefer a more restorative and conciliatory approach to such offenses and other sources of conflicts. This is because they do not view crimes and conflicts as between two individuals but between two parties, groups, or communities. While qisas may be binding and accepted as part of Islamic law, they may not altogether solve the hurt and disharmony caused by the

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crime. Hence, the elders do not simply use penalty as the main solution but more of a conciliation to ensure that all parties feel confident with the results (Kimpa).

7 Promotion of Community Healing and Reconciliation Community healing is a broad term encompassing the concepts of community and healing and the views on peace and conflict (Zambara, 2015). Selecting credible local counterparts (e.g., community elders) is critical to peacebuilding efforts. The ilmuh kamaasan who embraces indigenous Islam’s traditions can help promote community healing by being conciliatory and using moral persuasion to compel the people to be truthful to themselves, their neighbors, and the rest of the community (Tindick). Moreover, if a leader is strongly rooted in indigenous Islam, then s/he will become the basis for the people to emulate. In this regard, a good leader can influence the community toward peace and tranquility (Akbar) by facilitating and mediating conflicts and unifying families and communities (Hashim). In their role as community builders, community leaders engage in the reconciliation process by listening to the stories of both parties and expressing empathy and understanding (Holt, n.d.). Reconciliation between groups after a violent incident can contribute to the healing and growth of individuals’ lives, and it is essential in lowering the probability of similar violent incidents occurring (Kirven & Jacinto, 2017). In a long conversation with Jaafar Kimpa (April 2021), he said that generally, resolving conflicts consists of the following phases: Channeling. Both parties seek out identified community elders (kamaasan) who have strong social capital and are recognized as the primary or secondary elders who can mediate between different groups and personalities in the community. Backgrounding. Identified community elders (kamaasan) would discreetly conduct their investigation by going around the community to obtain their information and have an independent assessment of what transpired, including events that eventually led to the actual conflict in the area. This may take from a day to several days, depending on the depth or intensity of the conflict created. Confrontation. Convening parties affected to present each of their allegations to the mediators may also take some time, depending on the depth, intensity, and number of parties involved in the conflict. While the kamaasan already has their appreciation and understanding of the facts of the case, they would not pre-empt any decision but instead listen intently and sincerely to all parties involved as it may deepen his understanding of the situation and assist his discernment in coming out with an amicable solution. Conciliation. Upon hearing each of the interested parties’ side and perhaps their own proposals to an amicable settlement, the mediator/community elder (kamaasan) would then, from a consensus point, translate all the inputs into a working proposal that would appear acceptable and amenable to all parties involved (piyagsulutan sin katan). While the consensus may be 100% favorable to each party, this is normally the middle ground achieved by consensus (piyagta’ayunan) and thus properly processed.

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Sealing and Finalization. After acceptance of the proposed measures, it is then formalized and sealed wither through a ritual which is normally pagduwa’a salamat (prayer of thanks) which involves a recitation of certain prayers as well as ritual slaughtering of a goat or cow that would be cooked and distributed among those who were involved in the process. Others would include signing a document as a record or basis that actual conciliation has occurred. Such documents may be with a person of authority such as the Barangay Captain, police, or military. During a conversation with Fatmawati Salapuddin (April 2021), she mentioned that from a conceptual standpoint, the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedure that adherents of ilmuh kamaasan employ contain the following elements: • Presence of respected elders who would mediate the conflict; • Presence of religious leaders (Imam/Ustad) who will conduct a ritual (pagduwa’a salamat) to sanctify or formalize the conciliation; • Presence of persons of authority (Sara’h) that would serve as witnesses in addition to witnesses to ensure that should parties break the peace/covenant, they would be meted sanctions by either the community or the authorities in the area to prevent any escalation of further conflict. • Pag-ampun (forgiveness): Because all conflicts must begin with forgiveness, it must also start with pagmaap (inclination to apologize) to make all parties feel comfortable moving forward. • Pagtayma (acceptance): The openness to proposals and settlement to accept although not all their demands would have been met and that everyone would come home with a happy heart (makuug in atay) because a heavy load has been lifted from their shoulders; and • Pagsulut (reconciliation): The result of a long process will only be met with reconciliation, which is an assurance that all parties will be comfortable and not feel fear or concern for their safety and families and be open to reaching out to the other parties without fear or reservation because the conflict was settled to the acceptance of all parties. The prevailing wisdom behind this is “nagsapa kamu yan ha alupan sin Tuhan iba Sara’h” (you have made a promise before God and the law). It is assumed that you understand that breaking such an oath has divine and legal implications because the duwa’a salamat and the signed documents witnessed by persons of authority was conducted to solemnize and formalize the settlement (Kimpa). In a nutshell, Indigenous Islam can be best illustrated by the following framework and their lines of relationships (Fig. 1): 1. Horizontal or worship (ibadah): Involves deepening one’s relationship with God by ensuring all actions align with divine favors and pleasure. These actions are in the context of purifying oneself into the divine embrace (Fana). 2. Lateral or transactional (muamalah): Involves ensuring one’s actions do not violate the rights of others, as even the Quran has commanded the Holy Prophet, “Say [O Muhammad], ‘My Lord has commanded justice […]’” (Quran 8:29). To

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Fig. 1 Relationships in Indigenous Islam

3. 4.

5.

6.

human, non-human sentient and non-sentient individuals, this is defined by how the following relationships are defined (Fig. 2): Relationship with oneself: Showing that one must always be true to oneself and be introspective, as mentioned by Kimpa and Nurrudin (March & April 2021). Relationship with God: This is maintained in a state of worship. Indigenous Islam maintains that the primal purpose of Man’s existence is worship and Service of God (Kimpa), the Holy Quran also strongly emphasizes this verse that God created Mankind and Jinns (the unseen) but to worship Him (Quran, 51:56). Relationship with fellow human beings acting with justice (adalah) and compassion (rahmah): In a conversation with Nurrudin, he mentioned that this is manifested in the Quran’s instruction that “maintain justice—even regarding a close relative. And fulfill your covenant with Allah. He has commanded you this, so perhaps you will be mindful (Quran, 6:152). Relationship with other living things: Being God’s custodian (khilafah), we are expected to care for all living things to ensure they continue to exist and propagate. As the Quran reminds humanity that they have been created as “a viceroy (Khalifah) in the land; so they must always judge humanity with justice and not follow desire, lest it should lead them astray from the path of Allah; (as

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Fig. 2 Mankind as God’s Custodian on Earth

for) those who go astray from the path of Allah, they shall surely have a severe punishment because they forgot the day of reckoning” (Quran, 38:26). 7. Relationship with non-sentient (non-living) things: Being God’s custodian, mankind is expected to make sure that these things continue to be of use to humanity. All creations (Quran, 38:26). As indigenous Islam is strongly linked to the environment, its valuing of everything around them, living and unliving is crucial to their belief system as each element in their environment serves an important purpose in the universal scheme of things. 8. Relationship with the environment: Abu Sa’id al-Khudri reported, “The Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, said, ‘The entire earth has been made a place of prayer, except for graveyards and washrooms” (Sunan al-Tirmidh¯i 317). As such, one is expected to take care of the earth and ensure it remains pure and clean for others to use as well (Quran, 38:26). Being God’s custodian and caretaker (khalifa), we have been imbued with a divine task to oversee the earth should not be destroyed by corruption and that he may ensure its perpetuity for generations to come (Salapuddin). The conceptual framework explains how the operational mindset of practitioners of Indigenous Islam goes about their daily lives. When they engage with other people and society in general, they are guided by the notions of justice and compassion (Rahmah) as there is a strong emphasis on the Muslims to be compassionate to one another, which is a manifestation of mercy and justice so that other people will not succumb to oppression. This state of mind ensures that they do not stray toward oppressing others, being mindful of their actions and completely immersed in seeking divine acceptance of their thoughts, words, and actions. This, in turn, increases their awareness of God’s and his earth’s natural creations, including non-sentient beings, the environment, animals, and Jinn. As explained by Hoque (2021), Jinn are creatures made by Allah

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that the human eye cannot see. Believing in wahdatul wujood (unity of existence) and wahdatul shuhood (unity of witnessing), all of his deeds are a testament to the grandeur of his Creator, and his very existence is a testament to his faith in God.

8 Common Regional Indigenous Practices and Perspectives in Southeast Asia Today’s Southeast Asia is geographically and religiously split between a largely Buddhist mainland region and a largely Muslim maritime region (Kosuta, 2017). Owing to the cultural osmosis of Islam in the early stages of the history of Southeast Asia and the then Hindu and Buddhist Kingdoms therein, some practices and perspectives can be noted among practitioners of Indigenous Islam in Southeast Asia. First, there is the presence of indigenous healers (padang, pakil, tungguh lumah) who serve communities through their knowledge of indigenous medicine and Islamic healing intertwined (Peltzer & Pengpid, 2018). Second, women have key roles in the community, such as communal leaders, healers, and key social influencers (Johns, 1995). Third, there are several special celebrations of Islamic festivities such as Mauludin Nabi, Ashoora, Al-Isra wal Miraj, Lailatul Qadr, and others. Fourth, the perspective of seeing the presence of Allah in all things (Wahdatul wujood) (Johns, 1995; Bedil Dehlavi, 2008). Before Islam arrived in the region, Buddhism and Hinduism were the prevalent faith traditions that manifested similar beliefs (Afrianty, 2016). Fifth, as mentioned by Salapuddin (April 2022) there is a strong emphasis on conciliation instead of violence as a method of resolving conflict. Regional alliances were built among Muslim and non-Muslim states during the pre-colonial and colonial periods using conciliation rather than military conquest. Being situated in an archipelagic realm, these kingdoms would prefer alliances to strengthen their political and economic interests and ensure that their respective religions and cultures be protected (Baldoza, 2022).

9 Conclusion Indigenous Islam is not simply a system that has developed overnight, it is a system that has developed from centuries of experience and practice in which elders have crystalized the lessons learned in many areas such as ADR, communal law, environmental protection, and other aspects of human behavior. Like other traditional systems, it is built on our interactions with God, ourselves, other people, other living things, and the environment. As a result, Indigenous Islam is a dynamic system that continuously grows through time rather than simply static. Indigenous Islam is best described as having community-centered values because it places high value on the community’s interests. As a result, when resolving issues

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and problems in the community, it considers a consensus-building process known as ijma. This is because indigenous Islam’s goal in resolving conflicts is restorative justice. At the community level, it ensures that conflicts and issues are resolved to everyone’s satisfaction. To preserve and sustain the modalities of knowledge and learning, it is critical to preserve, empower, and support the institutions that propagate them, not only at the community but also at the local and national levels. To understand the impact of tolerance and openness on current conflict resolution efforts, it is essential to understand and promote indigenous Islam’s multiple processes, as it is a contextualized and localized model capable of addressing existing local problems and issues. Its research and documentation must also be continued to generate knowledge and a thorough understanding of indigenous Islam’s other facets. Many scholars have written on Indigenous Islam, but there is still a need to develop or conduct more studies in this field to document the rapidly disappearing records, practices, and even models they are adopting and to ensure that they are preserved and not lost to time. Because IKSP (indigenous knowledge, skills, and processes) is necessary to undertake further in-depth studies in different parts of Muslim Mindanao to understand how this is practiced. In addition, comparative studies of indigenous Islam with IKSP of non-Islamized indigenous cultural communities in the Philippines and identifying state policies and legislation that permit its practice and implementation would also be encouraged to ensure its preservation. Ijma has always been an integral part of the Islamic culture and in indigenous communities as a consensus-building process. However, in Islamic and indigenous communities, this is manifested as a common good and public interest (maslaha), which can be best institutionalized by active practice and government recognition. Thus, to promote their teaching, documentation of existing knowledge and propagation leading to their translation into manuals and systems should be implemented to make them more relevant in such communities. Finally, community elders and other stakeholders, such as local government officials, teachers, civil society, and religious leaders, should be included in promoting conflict resolution that results in community healing. Their participation can ensure a more inclusive conflict resolution process and provide additional insight into indigenous Islam’s preservation. Although it is critical to ensure that it is practiced on the grassroots level, it must also be codified as policy. To do so, agencies interested in cultural preservation, including higher-level government officials, should be involved. In addition to local government, educational institutions, academics, and national government agencies are also represented. There are already laws to safeguard IKSP, such as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA). However, new modifications and legislation should be drafted to ensure the survival of Indigenous Islam for years to come. At the same time, changes should not prohibit us from keeping and documenting for posterity what the traditions have done to preserve the people, the community, and the civilization they represent.

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Sheryl R. Morales is an Associate Professor and Director of Parañaque City Campus of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines. Since 2005, she has expanded her work with Indigenous Peoples. Her travels inspired her to help indigenous populations, notably in the Zamboanga peninsula, where her husband lives. In 2008, she began training in countering violent extremism (local and abroad). Her extension and community initiatives in the National Capital Region focus on youth advocacy. She led the 2013 National Youth Congress in promoting youth, peace, and

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nation-building. The Philippine Armed Forces awarded her the “Bayanihan Award” in 2014 and the “CMO Soldier” in 2013. Roque S. Morales is a Former Commissioner of the NCFM (National Commission on Muslim Filipinos). He is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Comparative and Advanced Studies in the Philippines (ICAS-Phils) and the Consortium of Peacebuilders. He serves on the Board of Advisors of the Ateneo De Davao University’s Al-Qalam Institute for Muslim Identities in Southeast Asia. He is a regular contributor to the Mindanews. He is a PCVE expert (preventing and countering violent extremism). He helped draft the National Action Plan to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism. He also led PCVE training and seminars for the Philippine Armed Forces, Philippine National Police, Philippine Coast Guard, and other peace and security stakeholders.

Chapter 18

Buddhism, Chinese Funeral Rites, and the Therav¯ada Tradition in Malaysia Lim Mun Chin

Abstract In the Chinese Malaysian Buddhist community, when a person dies, funeral rites are performed to ensure the well-being of the deceased. On reflection, some of these funeral rites are not common to Buddhist practices in part due to the intermingling of philosophies of Daoism (Dàojiào), Confucianism (Rúji¯a), and Chinese traditional beliefs (zh¯onghuájiào). It is a deeply rooted cultural and religious belief that only through such rituals can help the deceased achieve liberation from the misery of death. The observance of rites and rituals for the deceased through ignorance and fear is not founded on moral or ethical values, but míxìn (superstition) has no relation to the philosophical doctrine preached by the Buddha. The principles that underlie míxìn (superstition) rituals are not based upon the four noble truths and the eightfold path of textual Buddhism. Although a few may have heard of such concepts, these have no bearing on their daily religious life. The rooted beliefs that only such rituals can help the deceased achieve liberation from death’s misery are incompatible with the central Therav¯ada Buddhist doctrines of kamma. The objective of this chapter is to take due cognizance of some prevalent funeral rites incompatible with Buddhist teachings of the nature of death and kamma. This chapter scrutinizes some relevant texts in the P¯ali Canon on the significance of Buddhism’s concept of merit and its direct consequence on the well-being of the deceased. The findings are expected to generate a basic reappraisal of rites and rituals and to bring about a sense of security in knowledge to Chinese Buddhists who wish to perform a Theravadin Buddhist funeral. In the end, a proper Buddhist funeral is about respect and gratitude for the deceased. Keywords Malaysia · Chinese traditional beliefs · Funeral rites · Kamma · Meritorious deeds

L. M. Chin (B) Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Ayutthaya, Thailand e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Hongladarom et al. (eds.), Philosophies of Appropriated Religions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5191-8_18

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1 Introduction In the Chinese Malaysian Buddhist community, when a person dies, a funeral rite is performed to ensure the well-being of the deceased.1 Some funeral rites and rituals have changed over time, and others have not, even though the premises they were based on no longer apply. Goh Sang Seong (2015) notes that some unique customs and taboos must be scrupulously observed: If death occurred at home, the idols at home must be covered with red paper and must not come into contact with the deceased or the coffin. Apart from that, all mirrors or reflective surfaces (such as television screen) at home must be covered as it is believed anyone who see the coffin’s shadow in the mirror will bring death to his or her family. A white cloth will be hung on the front door to indicate the house is in mourning. As for deaths which occurred outside the house, the deceased will not be brought back home but taken to the funeral parlour prior to burial. (Goh, 2015, p. 135)

This chapter argues that the observance of rites for the deceased through ignorance and fear, not founded on moral or ethical values but instead on míxìn (superstition), has no relation to the philosophical doctrine preached by the Buddha. The belief that rituals not founded on moral or ethical values but instead on superstition can help the deceased achieve liberation from death’s misery is incompatible with the central Therav¯ada Buddhist doctrine of kamma. An attempt is made to shed some light on the subject so that Buddhists may discard blind and slavish adherence to superstitions and taboos incompatible with the Buddha’s teachings. As in most things, knowledge and understanding is the key to dropping unsuitable rites and rituals and adopting skillful and meaningful practices in their stead. Chinese Malaysian Buddhists are followers of three major Buddhist sects: Mah¯ay¯ana, Vajrayana, and Therav¯ada. However, many practice the religion without a clear understanding of Buddhism. Chinese Malaysian Buddhists follow the beliefs about death and dying from intermingled philosophies of Daoism, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Chinese traditional beliefs (Tan, 1983). According to Chinese culture in relation to Daoism belief, a deceased will be ushered by the black and white ghosts called h¯eibái wúcháng to the Ten Courts of Hell, which are guarded by Ox-Head and Horse Face (Poo, 2022). It is said the deceased will be presented in front of Judge King Qin of the First Court. In this stage, the deceased’s sins would be read out. If the deceased good deeds exceed the sins, he or she will be sent to the Golden Bridge to reach paradise and await rebirth. A deceased with too many past sins will be severely punished and persecuted. In Chinese traditional belief, funeral rites are about helping the deceased repent their sins and for judges to have mercy and pardon. 1 This paper uses P¯ ali in Roman script transliteration from the P¯ali Text Society. A few words are left untranslated because they are common, for example, kamma and sutta. The P¯ali texts and their corresponding English translation are on the same page. The standard pinyin system is used in romanizing all Mandarin text except for personal names with a well-known romanization. For example, Daoism (Dàojiào) is used instead of Taoism (Tao-chiao). Other terms used: Confucianism—Rúji¯a, Chinese traditional beliefs—zh¯onghuájiào, Superstition—Míxìn, Black and white ghost—H¯eibái wúcháng, and Confucious—Kˇongzˇı.

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Chinese culture emphasizes the importance of maintaining the body intact for the death ritual. Cremation is traditionally uncommon. The wish is to be buried intact. Dying with an incomplete body would be a curse and interferes with the death ritual. It prevents one from resting in peace. Conversely, improper funeral arrangements directly affect the well-being of the deceased’s afterlife and can wreak ill fortune and disaster upon the deceased’s family. This chapter is critical of the idea that observance of funeral rites and rituals can help the deceased achieve liberation from the misery of death since it conflicts with the Buddhist scriptures. The Buddhist attitude toward rituals can be seen from its reference to silabbata-paramasa (“clinging to rules and rites”), an expression used to signify an attitude of over-dependence on rituals based on mere superstition through confusion, ignorance, and fear. Out of ignorance and fear, rituals are explicitly designed to benefit the deceased’s “soul.” The idea of soul appears to be ephemeral in rituals to help the deceased achieve liberation from the misery of death. In fact, this orientation does not reinforce the defining premise of Buddhism and is one of the main things that differentiates it from other religions. The basic Buddhist view is described as anatman—no soul is the substitute for the immortal soul of other religions. According to Buddhism, the mind is nothing but a complex compound of fleeting mental states. One unit of consciousness consists of three phases—arising or genesis (uppada) static or development (thiti), and cessation or dissolution (bhanga). Immediately after the cessation stage of a thought moment there occurs the genesis stage of the subsequent thought-moment. Each momentary consciousness of this everchanging life process, on passing away, transmits its whole energy, all the indelibly recorded impressions to its successor. Every fresh consciousness consists of the potentialities of its predecessors together with something more. There is, therefore, a continuous flow of consciousness like a stream without any interruption. The subsequent thought moment is neither absolutely the same as its predecessor—since that which goes to make it up is not identical—nor entirely another—being the same continuity of kamma energy. Here there is no identical being but there is an identity in process. Every moment there is birth, every moment there is death. The arising of one thought-moment means the passing away of another thought-moment and vice versa. In the course of one life-time, there is momentary rebirth without a soul. Therefore, Therav¯ada texts do not speak of funeral rites but merit accrued during the lifetime has a direct consequence on the well-being of the deceased (Narada Thera, 2020, pp. 64–65). This chapter investigates some relevant sections of the texts in the P¯ali Canon on the significance of Buddhism’s concept of merit and its direct consequence on the well-being of the deceased. The findings are expected to generate a basic reappraisal of rites and rituals and bring about a sense of security in knowledge for Buddhists who intend to perform a proper Buddhist funeral. In addition, more recent studies have shown that some traditional and cultural ideas, e.g., burying the body intact and filial piety, have become less influential, suggesting generational differences. Furthermore, this also shows that younger individuals are potentially more informed about Buddhism. Given that Chinese Malaysian cultures possess strong family values, it is

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suggested that an extensive educational effort that focuses on improving awareness among younger individuals and encouraging them to initiate this discussion within the family may positively impact a proper Buddhist funeral rite.

2 Traditional Chinese Funeral Beliefs, Rites, and Practices The way of honoring the deceased, as most Chinese Malaysian Buddhists practice, is a mixture of Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism. Most Chinese Malaysians and those who call themselves Buddhists perceive honoring the deceased as a proper funeral that must be carried out thoroughly. Even if the funeral causes the families of the deceased to go into some form of debt, the funeral must be carried out entirely because people commonly believe that only through rituals and chanting performed by the medium can the deceased be guided to the right path into paradise. Through such a ritual, the soul is assured not left to wander around (Taoist Funeral Malaysia, 2021). In conjunction with this belief is that the spirits of the deceased continue to remain on earth, and improper handling of the deceased will bring bad luck to the immediate family and the entire family clan (Yick & Gupta, 2002). A deceased is believed to play a role in a family’s wealth, health, and success. Retribution relates to the current family or previous generation’s negative experiences and is commonly blamed on the family having been cursed by failing to perform correct rituals for the deceased (Yeo et al., 2005). The fear of losing what they possess, or the thought of fear that they will be harmed or will face “bad luck,” have naturally brought families into contact with Daoist priests to perform funeral rituals to seek its cause to avoid and remedy misfortunes or at the least to maintaining family’s current wealth (Kleeman, 2003). No verifiable evidence linking to these beliefs had been found, however. Arguably, the observance of rites for the deceased is due to ignorance and fear. It is not founded on moral or ethical values but míxìn (superstition) that have no relation to the philosophical doctrine preached by the Buddha. Some Chinese Malaysian Buddhist families continue to observe funeral rites without questioning them. They had inherited these traditional beliefs from their ancestors. These ancestors were migrants from Fujian and Guangdong provinces, attracted by the prospect of work in the tin mines, rubber plantations, and the possibility of opening up new farmlands at the beginning of the nineteenth century until the 1930s in British Malaya (Lim & Gosling, 1983). When Chinese migrants first immigrated to Malaya, their worship was to generate good fortune because of the miserable working conditions in their new land. Migrants adhered to rites and rituals that could offer immediate assistance and psychological appeasement. At the time, Chinese Buddhist monks and nuns helped “mainly with chanting and performing ritual” rather than with other transcendental concerns. This practice has continued until today (Ooi, 2020, p. 27). Venerable Suvanno (1996), a senior Theravadin Buddhist monk and teacher, cites as an example

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prevailing Chinese funeral rites where the followers place a bowl of rice with chopsticks in front of the casket, place a basin of water and towel under the casket, burn paper houses and cars, as well as “hell” money and other paper paraphernalia, distribute red threads to those who attend the funeral, to wash one’s face with “chanted” water at the end of the funeral to ward of bad luck, and so on. According to Venerable Suvanno, a Chinese Buddhist who wishes to hold a purely Theravadin Buddhist funeral should discard many of these rites and superstitious practices. However, the manner of interpreting and holding such funeral rites may include fear of not meeting parents’ filial expectations. Filial piety is based on the teaching of Confucius (Kˇongzˇı 551–479 BCE), a preeminent Chinese philosopher, social thinker, political theorist, and educator (Csikszentmihalyi, 2005). Confucian ethics does not regard filial piety as a choice but rather as an unconditional obligation of the child. However, “rebellion or outright defiance” is never approved in Confucian ethics (Yau-Fai Ho, 1994). In the Confucian Book of Rites, respect is envisioned in the detailed manners by which children respect their parents, speak to them (words and tone used), and care for parents making sure parents are comfortable in every single way: this involves food, accommodation, clothes, hygiene, and basically to have them live without worry (Keawsuwan, 2021). However, the essential expressions of, and exercises in, filial piety were the burial and mourning rituals to be held in honor of one’s parents, to display sorrow for their sickness and death; and to bury them and carry out sacrifices after their death. They understand filial piety consists of physical care, love, service, respect, and absolute obedience. In Chinese parent–child relations, fear contributed to meeting parents’ filial expectations (Yau-Fai Ho, 1994). Children may not internalize their parents’ expectations but rather perform roles as good children in a detached way through affect–role dissociation. In the Confucian Book of Rites, the most important expressions of, and exercises in, filial piety were the burial and mourning rituals in honor of one’s parents. These rituals display sorrow for their sickness and death and to bury them carries out sacrifices after their death. The notion of filial piety has a far-reaching effect on Chinese Malaysian families.

3 Buddhist Modernism, Therav¯ada Temple, and the Buddhist School The burial of the deceased is a matter taken very seriously by a great majority of Chinese Malaysian families. The older generations cling strongly to their superstitions and beliefs in funeral rites resulting from a lack of information and proper understanding of Buddhism. The early Mah¯ay¯ana Buddhism was the prevalent form practiced during colonial times. This form of Buddhism was inseparable from Chinese religions and was treated as a Chinese religion without a clear notion of Buddhism as a distinct religion.

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There was an awareness of more organized religion through exchanges of new ideas of Buddhism from historically and contemporarily connected regional ties by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Ooi, 2020, p. 44). The transnational and local religious leaders orchestrate the reorientation of Buddhism, emphasizing the rational learning of dhamma in life. There are at least two crucial trajectories of Buddhist modernism in Malaya and later Malaysia. They are the Therav¯ada traditions from Thailand and Sri Lanka and the Mah¯ay¯ana tradition from China. In Buddhist countries under colonialism, such as Burma and Sri Lanka, Buddhism had “been forced to undergo a major transformation.” In Thailand, the Tripitaka’s recompilation and the Sangha’s subsequent reorganization by King Mongkut (Rama IV) have impacted the modernization of Buddhism. The abbots from Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar to newly established temples in Peninsular Malaya had been trained under the modernization project in their respective countries. As a result, they brought along the idea of Buddhist modernism to Malaya. In the early nineteenth century, the Chinese built many temples throughout Malaya. Many were Daoist rather than Buddhist temples, but they were all regarded as Chinese temples. However, no Therav¯ada Buddhist temples and monks were present (Silva, 1998, p. 23). The landscape was gradually transformed by the mid-eighteenth century. On the Theravada side, the first Burmese Buddhist temple in Malaya, the Dhammikarama, was built in 1803 in Penang (Ooi, 2020, pp. 32–34). The Thais built their first Buddhist temple, the Wat Chaiyamangalaram, in 1845 on a piece of land in Penang donated by the British Government in the interest of commerce (Don Premaseri, 2013). The Sri Lankans built their first temple, the Taiping BodiLangkaram, in 1885 in Perak. The Brickfields Buddhist Temple (now known as the Buddhist Maha Vihara Brickfields) in 1894, the Sri Lanka Buddhist Temple Sentul in 1917, and the Mahindarama Buddhist Temple Penang in 1918 followed suit. Some monks who could speak Chinese would spread Therav¯ada Buddhism to Chinese religious followers who went to Thai or Sri Lankan temples to seek religious services. The influence might not be far-reaching due to linguistic constraints and limited resources. The turning point came when the young and educated were attracted to the beauty of the Buddha Dhamma, which the Venerable K Sri Dhammananda had so expertly propounded by means that would not conflict with the old-age customs and the ways of life current to the Chinese community.2 As stated earlier, many Chinese Buddhists do not simply practice Buddhism. They also maintain traditional Chinese beliefs and ancestor worship. The coming of Buddhist leaders, especially K. Sri Dhammananda from Sri Lanka, had successfully promoted Buddhist education, developed Buddhist societies, and had close linkages with students in major public universities, colleges, and secondary schools. Buddhist education in Malaysia changed significantly by introducing informal Buddhist education in a dhamma class and establishing the Buddhist Institute Sunday Dhamma School (BISDS).

2

That turning point came on 2 January 1952 with the arrival of Ven. Dhammananda to the Maha Vihara temple.

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The first BISDS was established as a Religious School in 1929 under the tutelage of Ven. M. Dhammadassi Thera, the incumbent bhikkhu of the Brickfields Buddhist Temple (Lochan, 2019, p. 504). The emphasis was put on the simultaneous need to preserve traditional, canonical, and text-based Buddhist learning and exposure to modern curriculum subjects like the History of Buddhism and English. Many Buddhists appreciated the Buddhist Sunday Schools, which considerably helped improve public understanding of Buddhist values and practices. Buddhism, previously rarely pursued by Chinese families, became popular among the young and college-educated. Modern Buddhism has contributed to a new worldview “very different” from the past based on “traditional rituals and traditional religious education.” This new religious worldview shifted “from practice centered on communal rituals” to self-cultivation. The benefit from Buddhist education has made the new generation competent enough to be critical of certain traditional beliefs and practices as these are not Buddhist practices and arguably have no efficacy. What is being criticized is the observance of meaningless and wasteful rites and rituals, which are founded not on moral or ethical values but on utter superstition. Modern Buddhists oppose the traditional belief that upholding funeral rites directly affects the wellbeing of the deceased. Such a deeply rooted belief that only such rituals can help the deceased achieve liberation from the misery of death contradicts the Buddhist teaching. Traditional Buddhists believe that the more elaborate and complex the rituals, the higher the honor for the deceased. Also, a smooth passage for rebirth is assured. However, from the Therav¯ada Buddhist perspective, such rites contradict its scriptures. In the following two sections, we investigate this issue further. Section 4 investigates scriptural and prevalent perceptions of honoring the deceased. Section 5 suggests procedures to honor the deceased based on the conclusions reached in Sect. 4.

4 The Direct Consequence of Meritorious Deeds The Therav¯ada understanding that merits accrued in a lifetime directly affects the well-being of the deceased is based on the Buddhist doctrine of the fourfold kamma. This doctrine is explicitly stated in AbhidhammatthaSa˙ngaha (MN 136. PTS: M iii 207). One such example is “The Greater Exposition of Kamma” (Mah¯akammavibha˙nga Sutta, MN 136), where the Buddha explained the workings of kamma. Four scenarios were given by the Buddha in MN 136, hinting at the complexities of possibilities and probabilities surrounding the ripening of kamma. A person performs a good act and subsequently has a good rebirth; another also performs a good act but has a bad rebirth. The same two outcomes can follow a bad act, but why and how does that happen?

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The sutta explains that before or after a particular act, something else is done that has the opposite effect. It is this other act that results in the subsequent rebirth. A certain task is undertaken and completed at the time of death, which determines the well-being of the dead, resulting in a good rebirth. The teaching of kamma asserts that we are the masters of our destiny. Our destiny is not dependent on expiation or appeasement to external forces. Gods, deities, and supernatural beings cannot save us from bad luck or misfortune. Suppose one has performed many kusala (wholesome) actions and abstained from akusala (unwholesome) actions that lead to hell (niraya) after death. In that case, one can be confident that one’s good kamma will bring positive results for one’s well-being after death. A Buddhist does not need elaborate rites and rituals after death to go to heaven. In the Therav¯ada texts, one cannot find any claim that funeral rites and rituals result in the well-being of the deceased. On the contrary, the texts state that what happens to the mind just before death influences the well-being of the deceased. The concept of kamma is extended even on the deathbed. The Theravada texts state that kamma and the accrued kusala or akusala can be changed in three ways: bodily, verbally, and mentally. The commentaries explain that dying in an angry frame of mind might result in being reborn in peta or other low or unpleasant forms of existence. This is true even for very virtuous people. One example of this case was King Asoka, born as a snake due to anger (k¯entiya) arising at death. However, after only seven days, he was reborn in a heavenly realm (devalokaya) due to his generally good kamma—i.e., the merits accrued in his lifetime. The rationale of the concept of merits accrued in one’s lifetime resulting in the well-being of the deceased has effectively shifted the perception of many people and helped remove their attachment to funeral rites and superstitions. Although the Abhidhammattha Sa˙ngaha, the compendium of higher Dhamma, was attributed to Venerable Anuruddha in the tenth century, this four-fold classification of kamma is by no means a baseless invention, but a neat and structured summary of the Buddha’s teaching concerning how bad and good kamma are created practically through our mind that responds to the six sense objects. Any intentional response constitutes kamma, which is directly responsible for generating rebirth. Since we are intentionally responding to the senses at practically every wakeful moment, good and bad kammas are continuously being created. So, when we are on the threshold of death, we must ensure a good consequence by responding in a wholesome way to whatever appears in our awareness. Therefore, by creating good wholesome kammas (kusala kamma), we can be assured of our well-being after death. To appreciate the Therav¯ada perspective of kamma and rebirth, we must first understand the quartet of kamma: (1) By way of function, (2) By way of ripening, (3) By time of ripening, and (4) By place of ripening. As the kamma we have created in life is hugely varied, which type of kamma takes priority over others in determining rebirth? According to the second quartet, this kammic influence is not random but follows a particular order. In the ripening order of kamma, when someone dies, the weighty kamma gets the foremost priority in producing rebirth, followed by near-death

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kamma, habitual kamma, and reserve kamma. Putting aside the weighty kamma, the predominance of any of the other three types of kamma at the time of death depends very much on chance. We can increase the chances of a good type of kamma prevailing just before death, but there can be no certainty that our efforts will bring the desired result. Our deeply rooted belief that rituals are “kammic booster” to help the deceased achieve liberation from the misery of death does not appear to be in line with the Therav¯ada doctrine. If we sincerely appreciate and internalize the understanding that our conduct at any time can produce effects, we can take the proper steps more often. Practically, this simply means trying to live a morally upright and spiritually fulfilling life as much as possible while pursuing material gain and intellectual advancement. Actions in Buddhism are not good or evil because they lead to good or evil consequences, as the utilitarians claim. Rather, they generate good or evil consequences because they are intrinsically good or evil in the first place (Velez de Cea, 2004, p. 123). However, niggling ethical and philosophical issues about kamma and rebirth have continually placed the next of kin of the deceased in a quandary. Filial children fear the kammic retribution for not fulfilling a deceased’s wishes. They understand that, according to the traditional texts, filial piety consists of physical care, love, service, respect, and obedience. As children, they should attempt not to bring disgrace upon their parents. Frank J. Hoffman has raised similar questions concerning philosophical issues. He writes, If it is not the same soul substance across lives at T1 , and T2 , then in what way is one justified in regarding the consciousness at T2 , as that of the same person? And if it is not the same person, then what sense does it make to ascribe moral responsibility for actions performed by another? (Hoffman, 1987, pp. 60–64)

Hoffman claims that “there is an ambiguity in the expression ‘rebirth doctrine’” (Hoffman, 1987, pp. 93, 117–118). If taken as a view, in the sense of a picture, in full recognition of there being no propositional sense here, then, of course, Buddhists have a “doctrine.” However, if taken as a theory to be defended with argument, given the condemnation of ditthi as a speculative view, then there is no early Buddhist doctrine in that sense. It is well known that in Buddhist theories, the relation between soul and body is set aside, as well as the speculation on the state of the Tath¯agata. This shows the unwillingness of the Buddhist teaching to become entangled in a specific philosophical theory of rebirth. There is no soul substance in Buddhism but only a stream of consciousness. The Buddhist standpoint in helping the dying who is a skeptic or has little faith in Buddhism should be sensitive to this point and not appear “pushy.” Otherwise, the mind of the dying could be affected by negative thoughts, as this may give rise to confusion in the dying person’s mind. Justifying the kamma and rebirth doctrines should be avoided when death is imminent. In such circumstances, a true Buddhist should be mindful that speculating on things unrelated to the elimination of craving (tanha) and the destruction of passion

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(raga), hatred (dosa), and confusion (moha) is counterproductive. The right attitude is crucial in maintaining harmony and avoiding disputes among disagreeing parties in families concerning funeral rites.

5 A Proper Funeral in the Therav¯ada Tradition A strict Buddhist understanding of the non-self and kamma doctrines implies that upon death, what is left is only matter, and how the physical remains are treated is usually of no direct consequence to the well-being of the deceased. However, this does not mean that at a Buddhist funeral, one can disrespect the bodily remains of those who had showered their love on us. Buddhists should perform meaningful rites, like carrying out meritorious deeds in their memory, as an act of gratitude and respect. The Buddha did not lay down rules on proper rites of passage for the laity, nor did he specifically prohibit his lay disciples from outwardly expressing their respect and gratitude, especially in times of death and separation. To express bereavement and filial piety, a Buddhist funeral should be simple, solemn, and dignified. While it can be assumed the idea of a lavish funeral neither contradicted nor reinforced the Buddhist attitude to the concept of filial piety, it can also be observed lavish spending on some rituals is deemed unnecessary. The previous paragraphs explained that rites and rituals that contradict Buddhist teachings should be abandoned. Instead, the money allocated for such purposes could be wisely donated to worthy causes, such as a charity in the deceased’s name. An altar can be set up before the casket, and the deceased portrait placed before it. Be practical when choosing the casket. It need not be expensive and beyond one’s means. Offerings such as flowers, fruits, candles, and incense can be placed on the altar. Bouquets, wreaths, and banners given by friends and relatives can also be displayed modestly in the funeral hall. The hall where the body lies for the wake should appear serene and peaceful. A wake or vigil accompanied by drinking and gambling is considered disrespectful because these activities violate Buddhist precepts. Contemporary Sri Lankan practice informs us that it is customary for the family to invite a monk to visit, console, and remind the dying person of the meritorious deeds she performed in her lifetime (Langer, 2007, p. 10). However, in retrospect, calling a monk to the deathbed might be counterproductive because it would make the dying person realize that her death is near and may cause agitation rather than calm. In that case, family members may reassure the dying person that she needs not worry about them, that she should keep her mind calm and peaceful, and that it is all right to go when her time has come. The custom of placing a Buddha image or a tray of flowers near the dying person is a visual aid to remember meritorious deeds in the hour of death. If the dying person had been practicing meditation, remind her of the importance of mindfulness. Encourage her to note the rising and falling of events constantly. Dhamma friends

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who are meditation practitioners can be invited to radiate metta (loving-kindness) to ease the sick person’s suffering. In their absence, family members can do the ritual instead. To radiate metta, one must recite the following verses: “May you be well and happy, may you be free from suffering, may you be in good health, may you be at peace. Feel the peaceful compassion from the mind envelop and penetrate the dying. Feel the vibrations that come with compassion, enveloping the dying person’s body.”

6 Conclusion The Buddhist attitude toward ritual can be seen from its reference to s¯ılabbatapar¯am¯asa “clinging to rules and rites,” an expression used to signify an attitude of over-dependence on ritual, which, from the Buddhist perspective, was considered a hindrance to the genuine spiritual upliftment of the individual. Since Buddhism is a way of life, its concern is more with moral conduct and the quest for enlightenment. The only mention of regulated rites and rituals is in the Vinaya, which is solely for the discipline of its monks. The Theravada texts imply that rites and rituals are not integral tenets of Buddhism. What is accountable for well-being in this present life and after death is kamma. It is the term for “action” or “intentional action.” It is wholesome (kusala kamma) in that it is conducive to enlightenment, or it is unwholesome (akusala kamma), leading to further (unpleasant) rebirths. Kamma is the principle that underpins the thought that merits accrued in a lifetime directly affect the well-being of the dead. However, this does not mean we can disrespect the bodily remains of the deceased. Though the Buddha did not lay down rules on the proper rites of passage for the laity, he specifically prohibited his lay disciples, who are still very much attached to worldly possessions, from outwardly expressing their respect and gratitude, especially in times of death and separation. The Therav¯ada texts do not mention any special near-death rituals or customs in Buddhist funerals, except some descriptive burial procedures for the Buddha in the M¯ahaparinibb¯ana sutta. A proper Buddhist funeral provides physical comfort to help someone dying to have a positive, peaceful mind. That means avoiding disturbing emotions like fear, anger, attachment, and depression. The dying person should be helped to accept death as a natural and inevitable phenomenon that we all come to according to our kamma. She should constantly be helped to reflect on the good deeds that she has done and be reassured that her wholesome deeds lead to a good rebirth. Family members may reassure the dying person that she need not worry about them, that she should keep her mind calm and peaceful, and that it is all right to go when her time has come. Cuti-viññ¯an.a, or consciousness at the moment of death, is considered especially important for the type of rebirth realm that occurs. Therefore, it is clear that a proper Buddhist funeral rite is an outward expression of respect and gratitude for the dead and is of no direct consequence to the well-being of the deceased.

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References Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2005). Confucianism: An overview. In L. Jones (Ed.), Encyclopedia of religion (2nd ed., Vol. 3, pp. 1890–1905). Macmillan Reference. de Silva, H. M. A. (1998). 100 years of the Buddhist Maha Vihara (1895–1995). Sasana Abhiwurdhi Wardhana Society. Goh, S. S. (2015). Penang Chinese customs and traditions. Kajian Malaysia, 33(2), 135–152. Hoffman, F. J. (1987, 1992, 2002). Rationality and the mind in early Buddhism. Motilal Banarsidass. Keawsuwan, C. (2021). The study of the concept of filial piety in Confucianism through the four books. Manutsayasat Wichakarn, 28(1), 255–286. Kleeman, T. F. (2003). Taoism. In R. Kastenbaum (Ed.), Macmillan encyclopedia of death and dying (Vol. 2, pp. 873–875). Macmillan Reference. Langer, R. (2007). Buddhist rituals of death and rebirth: Contemporary Sri Lankan practice and its origins. Routledge. Lim, L. Y., & L. P. Gosling (Eds.). (1983). The Chinese in Southeast Asia, volume 1: Ethnicity and economic activity. Maruzen Asia. Lochan, A. (2019). Buddhist education in Southeast Asia: Crisis and remedies. In T. D Thien & T. N. Tu (Eds.), Buddhist approach to global education in ethics. Vietnam Buddhist University Publications. Mah¯akammavibha˙nga Sutta. (1993). Ñanamoli Thera (trans.). PTS: M iii 207. Narada Thera. (2020). Buddhism in the Nutshell. Singapore Buddhist Meditation Centre. Ooi, T. L. (2020). Buddhist revitalization and Chinese religions in Malaysia. Amsterdam University Press. Poo, M. C. (2022). Ghosts and religious life in early China. Cambridge University Press. Premaseri, P. D. (2013). Buddhism in Malaysia. Therav¯ada Buddhist Council of Malaysia. Suvanno. (1996). How a Theravadin Buddhist Chinese Funeral may be conducted. Malaysia: Sukhihotu Sdn Bhd. Tan, C. B. (1983). Chinese religion in Malaysia: A general view. Asian Folklore Studies, 1, 217–252. Taoist Funeral Malaysia. (2021). http://funeralsmalaysia.com/en/services/taoist-funeral Velez de Cea, A. (2004). The criteria of goodness in the Pali Nikayas and the nature of Buddhist ethics. Journal of Buddhist Ethics, 11, 123–142. Yau-Fai Ho, D. (1994). Filial piety, authoritarian moralism, and cognitive conservatism in Chinese societies. Genetic Social and General Psychology Monographs, 120(3), 347–365. Yeo, S. S., Meiser, B., Barlow-Stewart, K., Goldstein, D., Tucker, K., & Eisenbruch, M. (2005). Understanding community beliefs of Chinese-Australians about cancer: Initial insights using an ethnographic approach. Psycho-Oncology: Journal of the Psychological, Social and Behavioral Dimensions of Cancer, 14(3), 174–186. Yick, A. G., & Gupta, R. (2002). Chinese cultural dimensions of death, dying, and bereavement: Focus group findings. Journal of Cultural Diversity, 9(2), 32–42.

Lim Mun Chin is pursuing a Ph.D. in Buddhist Studies at Mahachulalongkorn University, Thailand, focusing on material and immaterial devotionals of Chinese Malaysian Buddhism. Her passion for the subject stems from her heritage as a Chinese Malaysian Buddhist She has traveled extensively around Southeast Asia, learning about the history of Buddhism in the region. Her work has led her to Kuala Lumpur, Kedah, Bangkok, and Dublin.

Chapter 19

An Appropriated Understanding of Therav¯ada Buddhist Notions of Moral Shame and Moral Dread in Thai Society Theptawee Chokvasin

Abstract This chapter asks how moral shame and dread in Therav¯ada Buddhist philosophy compare with their appropriated use in contemporary Thai society. There has been a received view or an appropriated understanding of these concepts, warning against doing bad deeds. Moral shame and dread imply an irrational fear of doing something morally horrible in this contemporary usage. For example, one has an excessive fear of punishments in purgatory and believes it should be the sole morally appropriate reason for not killing. However, how does this appropriated understanding differ from the original Buddhist understanding? This chapter argues that they differ in their philosophical assumptions: causalism and possibilism. Therav¯ada philosophy espouses causalism, the view that one should avoid bad deeds because of the doctrine of karma. On the other hand, the appropriated understanding implies possibilism, with a scrupulosity-based assumption that avoiding evil behaviors is motivated by the grip of unreasonable fear that doing them could result in irredeemable errors. I offer a new conception of meditative intentionality’s power to solve this implied irrational fear problem. Keywords Moral shame · Moral dread · Metaphysical power · Scrupulosity · Therav¯ada Buddhist Philosophy

1 Introduction Many Thai Buddhists believe in the law of karma or the law of intentional actions and their fruits. The saying, “Good deeds produce good results, bad deeds produce bad results,” can be heard occasionally, especially from parents to their children. Buddhist families were raised believing that the law of karma implies some form of reward in heaven and punishment in purgatory (niraya). The consequent punishment in purgatory is for doing bad deeds. It is usually emphasized that it can be avoided T. Chokvasin (B) Kasetsart University, Bangkok, Thailand e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Hongladarom et al. (eds.), Philosophies of Appropriated Religions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5191-8_19

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by not committing those sinful actions in the first place. For one not to be induced to do those bad deeds, one must remember carefully that the purgatorial punishments are so dreadful, and doing bad deeds is foolish and shameful. Buddhists in Thailand are, therefore, often taught to be cautious in actions that may arise out of ignorance and that result in sin. It is believed that this interpretation stemmed directly from the teaching in the Tipit.aka without any distortion. One of Buddha’s teachings, Itivuttaka, said that for the world to be guarded against the unwholesomeness of evil things, there must be moral shame and dread. They are considered hiri and ottappa (Pali) or hr¯ı and apatr¯apya (Sanskrit) (Mahendra, 2018). When hiri and ottappa are first introduced to non-Buddhists, they might associate them with moral apprehensiveness. Nevertheless, these concepts are explicated in detail only in light of their utility. The utility is of the necessity that one knows that it will be shameful to do evil things and that the pain of punishment for doing evil things is so much dreadful. Therefore, one should avoid doing evil things, and then having moral shame and moral dread can be considered helpful for living in the aspect of attaining a peaceful mind. However, some things still need to be added to this explication. Could the teaching of Buddhism make a strong requirement for Buddhist practitioners to be scrupulous over every move of moral actions? Suppose that the above understanding of the Buddhist teaching, appropriated by most Buddhist practitioners in Thailand, could be considered a received view. In that case, there will be a question about the difference between the received view here and the original one, which the Buddha says, and about what philosophical theory would be suitable to explain the cause. Suppose the received view will make things worse for Buddhist practitioners to develop mindfulness and meditation practices. In that case, another question could be asked developed for them. This chapter is interested in how we should have an “appropriated” definition of moral shame and dread. Should there be a well-defined line differentiating between being reasonably shameful and dreadful and being too shameful and dreadful of moral defilements? Jesse S. Summers and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2019) argued that being driven by a morally conscientious mind to get oneself into doing good things should be differentiated from being driven by scrupulosity or excessive anxiety about moral or religious issues. In its extreme manner, the scrupulosity could stem from an obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD). We should then explicate why the Therav¯ada conception of shamefulness and dreadfulness is somewhat different from the unreasonably anxious feelings that doing some moral actions could have brought about. This chapter aims at a comparative study between (a) the Therav¯ada conceptions and underlying assumptions of moral shame (hiri) and moral dread (otappa) and (b) the conceptions and underlying assumptions in the moral psychology of scrupulosity explained as an unreasonable anxiety about morality or religiosity. Thus, our objectives are (1) to explain the ethical assumption of moral shame and moral dread in Therav¯ada Buddhist philosophy, (2) to defend the thesis of Therav¯ada Buddhist moral psychology, i.e., to point out that moral shame and dread are not based on

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an excessive aspect of scrupulosity, and (3) to analyze why the appropriated understanding of these two concepts can be dangerously close to scrupulosity, and it can be solved with a proper conception of “the power of meditative intentionality.”

2 What Are Moral Shame and Moral Dread? Let us first discuss the teachings about moral shame and dread from the Pali canon, or the Tipit.aka, and also from previous research works and academic explanations in Therav¯ada Buddhist studies.

2.1 Direct Quotes from the Tipit.aka The Buddha says in Itivuttakap¯a.li that the two dhammas are the guardians of the world’s peace. Those two dhammas are hiri (moral shame) and otappa (moral dread): This was said by the Blessed one, said by the Arahant thus I heard—“Bhikkhus, these two bright dhamm¯a guard the world. Which two? Shame and fear of wrongdoing. Bhikkhus, if these two bright dhamm¯a did not guard the world, here would not be discerned mother, or mother’s sister, or mother’s brother’s wife, or teacher’s wife, or guru’s wife. They would contaminate the world like goats-sheep, roosters-pigs, dogs-jackals. Indeed bhikkhus, because these two bright dhamm¯a guard the world, therefore here is discerned mother, or mother’s sister, or mother’s brother’s wife, or teacher’s wife, or guru’s wife.” For this meaning Blessed One spoke. There this is what was said—“Those who don’t have shame-fear of wrongdoing, all the time; Deviated from the root of brightness they are, leading to birth-death. “Those who have shame-fear of wrongdoing, always established rightly; Growing in the holy-life they are peaceful, with further becoming ended.” This too is the meaning of what was said by the Blessed one, thus I heard. (Translated by An¯ag¯arika Mahendra, 2018, 2.2.5)

From moral shame and dread come the knowledge of discernibility and then recognizability. The discernibility of one’s mother and wife in one’s mind comes from one’s ability to recognize one’s appropriate manner of action toward one’s mother and another toward one’s wife. The possibility of engagement between moral shame, dread, and moral knowledge will be analyzed here. How can it be possible for those two realms to indicate cause and effect? The Buddha talks about hiri and otappa in A˙nguttara Nik¯aya (The Numerical Discourses of the Buddha), Pañcaka Nip¯ata (The Book of the Fives), as two out of five trainee’s powers: “Bhikkhus, there are these five trainee’s powers.” “What five?” “The power of faith, the power of moral shame, the power of moral dread, the power of energy, and the power of wisdom.” (2) “And what is the power of moral shame?”

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“Here, a noble disciple has a sense of moral shame; he is ashamed of bodily, verbal, and mental misconduct; he is ashamed of acquiring evil, unwholesome qualities. This is called the power of moral shame.” (3) “And what is the power of moral dread?” “Here, a noble disciple dreads wrongdoing; he dreads bodily, verbal, and mental misconduct; he dreads acquiring evil, unwholesome qualities. This is called the power of moral dread […]” (Translated by Bhikkhu Bodhi, n.d.; Bhikkhu Bodhi, 2012, p. 31)

Buddhist practitioners can use these direct quotes from the Pali canon to contemplate moral shame and dread on two relevant aspects. In Itivuttakap¯a.li, they are considered the world’s custodians, helping hands to guard people against living in filth with some moral misunderstandings, such as having sex with those with whom one is not supposed to have sex. However, in the Pañcaka Nip¯ata, they are two compositions out of five, which are the signs of the powers of Buddhist practitioners who are skillful in refraining from moral misconduct. In the latter interpretation, it can be seen that moral shame and dread are some kinds of skills.

2.2 Interpretations from Therav¯ada Scholars Many scholars of Therav¯ada Buddhism have explained moral shame and dread in terms of knowledge of Therav¯ada moral psychology. As explained by Bhikkhu Bodhi (2010), those who have moral shame and dread will become “The Guardians of the World” who can make use of the sense of understanding: The Buddha asserts that whatever evil arises springs from a lack of shame and fear of wrong, while all virtuous deeds spring from the sense of shame and fear of wrong. By cultivating within ourselves the qualities of moral shame and fear of wrongdoing we not only accelerate our own progress along the path to deliverance, but also contribute our share toward the protection of the world. Given the intricate interconnections that hold between all living forms, to make the sense of shame and fear of wrong the guardians of our own minds is to make ourselves guardians of the world. (Bodhi, 2010)

Again, some Buddhist scholars would emphasize the important aspects of moral shame and moral dread in their context of skillful knowledge that improves one’s living. Some scholars call this sort of knowledge a kind of wisdom. According to Bhikkhu P. A. Payutto: As part of a practical analysis of good and evil, the Buddha first encouraged people to reflect on the wholesome and the unwholesome as the essential factor for evaluation. He developed the teaching to include an awareness of good and evil as it manifests in the mind (i.e., to apply one’s conscience), and a consideration of the opinions by wise individuals as a frame of reference. These two factors act as the basis for moral shame (hiri) and fear of wrongdoing (ottappa). Moreover, he encouraged people to consider the fruits of their actions as they affect themselves and others, that is, on an individual and a social level. Because some people lack a necessary depth of wisdom and may not recognize for themselves what is wholesome and unwholesome, the Buddha encouraged them to consider the opinions of the wise. If they still have doubts, then they should examine the effects of

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their own actions, even as they relate to social conventions. (Payutto, 2019, pp. 343–344; his italics)

Some scholars analyze the advantages of being ashamed and in fear of sin. Those two notions are defined by Phra Thammakittiwong (Thongdee Suratecho) as follows: “Hiri means shame, being ashamed of sin. Hiri refers to one’s own shame for committing an evil deed, shame for all corrupt practices, and being ashamed of oneself to refrain from doing the good things that should have been done. For example, parents are ashamed of not caring for their children. This is called hiri. Hiri arises from thinking of one’s education, status, rank, and family. It arises from thinking about the damage that will occur combined with the courage of the mind not to do such evil things. Hiri is the Dhamma serving as power of world protection. It is for world peace which is to make people live together in peace. This is because a person who has the power hates evil, and is ashamed to do evil both in front and behind his back. So, it does not cause trouble to the world and all living beings.” (Phra Thammakittiwong, 2008, p. 1172; his italics, translated by the author) “Ottappa means fear, which means shuddering fear of the consequences of evil, fear of the consequences of corruption committed. Ottappa is a symptom of the mind that is shaken when doing evil things, fearful of the wrongdoing that will result later. It arises because of the thought of suffering that will occur from doing evil or from their corrupt behavior. For example, one is dreadful of having to suffer damage of losing wealth, freedom, or being criticized by others, being shunned by society, etc. Ottappa is, together with hiri, the Dharma that protects the world. This is because people with ottappa are afraid of making mistakes, and then they refrain from those corrupt behaviors. This will bring peace and happiness to the world.” (Phra Thammakittiwong, 2008, p. 1426; his italics, translated by the author)

It is noticeable that moral shame and dread are relevant to the analysis of knowledge. It hints at their usefulness as conditions that can incur knowledge and its consequence in world protection. Phra Maha Theerasak Theerananto (Piamphet) (2010) argues that moral shame and dread imply moral enhancement for good behavior to develop human living. Together, they guarantee good decisions of doing good deeds and avoiding bad deeds. Moreover, Sudjai Pookonglee (2017) explains that hiri and ottappa, along with the Buddhist line of explanation, are “Lokapala Dhamma” or things with their function of protecting the entire world, and “Sukka Dhamma” or things with their function of cleansing human beings of all sins bodily, mentally, and spiritually. Human behaviors stem from the personal inner mind. So, when this inner source of judgment is good, it will bring about the outer development of good behavior. Phra Maha Banchong Phoonaphiphat et al. (2019) explain that knowledge, or Paññ¯a in the Buddhist understanding, is essential to the four noble truths. With Paññ¯a, we avoid foolishness resulting from not knowing how to extinguish the cause

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of suffering and not knowing how to differentiate between right and wrong. Without moral shame and dread, we are at a disadvantage. He writes: For this, the Buddha recommends us that there are three behaviours of a foolish person, the first behaviour of a fool is one thinking wrong thoughts, that means a foolish person is always thinking about ways of duccarita or akusala. Many akusala ideas are in his or her mind every time, because he or she lives in the world without Hiri and Ottappa. In this statement, Hiri means shame at doing evil, and Ottappa means fear of the results of doing evil. He or she is coveting others’ possessions (Lobha), he or she is thinking of harming others (by¯ap¯ada), and he or she has wrong understanding which is not in line with Dhamma. So, three kinds of wrong thoughts are called “Manoduccarita.” (Phoonaphiphat et al., 2019, p. 108)

When one is not sufficiently skillful in restraining oneself from doing evil actions, one risks being distracted from the right path and being harmful to one’s and others’ lives. However, the Therav¯ada scholars’ works do not have a more profound philosophical diagnosis of the moral psychology of shame and dread. They accept that being ashamed or fearful of sinning is without disadvantages. Moreover, they offer no comparative studies of excessive scrupulosity. In other words, they are not asking questions about the excessive aspect of moral shame and dread.

3 Excessive Scrupulosity and Its Philosophical Considerations Let us now turn to the excessive aspects of moral shame and dread. Let us first ask what excessive scrupulosity is in the first place.

3.1 What is Excessive Scrupulosity? According to Brian Weatherson, “If I fire a cannon down Fifth Avenue at peak hour, I do something morally horrible even if miraculously I don’t hit anyone. My action is wrong because it is reckless” (Weatherson, 2019, p. viii). This means that, to some extent, an agent must thoroughly consider all the moral aspects of one’s action. Agential action should involve the relevant responsibility. So, heedful consideration should be considered reasonable and be a sign of excellent moral agency. However, is this always true? Summers and Sinnott-Armstrong (2019) have pointed out something different. Even though moral character or moral virtue needs careful consideration that can be applied to other moral issues, excessive and unreasonable consideration should not be considered moral. This is the topic of scrupulosity, which is about the excessive consideration of moral or religious issues in the agent who is too worried about possible bad consequences from careless decision-making. Summers and SinnottArmstrong explain that this kind of scrupulosity implies an obsessive–compulsive

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disorder (OCD). So, scrupulosity is a mental illness, not a moral capacity. Scrupulosity is an exceptionally high moral requirement. Sometimes, one is scrupulous because one needs to soothe one’s anxiety or irrational fear. Therefore, scrupulosity should not be moral (Summers & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2019, pp. 117–122). In Summers & Sinnott-Armstrong’s view, excessive scrupulosity involves obsessive behavior induced by too much fear of possible defects after doing something. A person with this sort of obsessive behavior might have feelings of insecurity. For example, if one thinks that a wedding ceremony is religiously inappropriate because of the bride’s menstruation, then one is just being scrupulous (Summers & SinnottArmstrong, 2019, pp. 6–7). Likewise, one is scrupulous if one feels unsure whether one has served contaminated food to customers (Summers & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2019, pp. 8–9). Those obsessed with extreme scrupulosity were so insecure that they dared not decide. The preoccupation with these things created a sense of extreme fear of the bad consequences and made them feel that they would be humiliated if such things happened. Should the appropriated Thai Buddhist understanding of being ashamed and dreadful of sin be related to some sort of excessive scrupulosity? That is, should unreasonable fear of purgatorial punishments be considered as scrupulous as viewed by Summers & Sinnott-Armstrong? This might be so. However, it is not because purgatorial punishments are unreasonable but because they simply do not exist. Purgatorial punishments are indeed mentioned in the Pali canon. However, these “purgatories” are mentioned to promote the doing of good actions to Buddhist practitioners, not to cultivate irrational fear of these purgatories. To fear something that could occur in the future is not a depiction of a strong mentality or skillful knowledge about something that must happen due to something else. However, an analysis of many Buddhists’ beliefs of moral shame and dread by Pataraporn Sirikanchana pointed out this issue. Some Buddhists believe in the Law of Kamma (karma) as the reason they should avoid evil for fear that it will return to them (Sirikanchana, 1985, p. 169). However, as argued in the next section, moral shame and dread in Therav¯ada Buddhism can avoid the charge of being scrupulous using the resources developed by some recent metaphysicians of causation.

3.2 Models of Philosophical Consideration: Causalism vs. Possibilism There are differences between the original view of Therav¯ada concepts of moral shame and dread and the received appropriated view in Thai society. The main difference lies in the different fundamental beliefs about causation. Causalism is a philosophical view of causation that an effect must be brought about from some pre-existent cause. To some extent, the Buddhist notion of Dependent Origination (paticcasamuppada) engages with the belief that there can be no effect without a cause. So, the Buddhist explanation of events and actions could be

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explained in terms of causalism. However, Buddhist causalism requires some extraunderstanding of the nature of causation. In its overall picture, Buddhist philosophy can be understood as a causality-based explanation of truths and realities (Kalupahana, 1975). We could interpret the notion of Buddhist causalism in light of a causality-based explanation. For some events or actions to occur, they need their relevant causes. Therefore, those causes exist for us to be assured of their power to bring about their effects. On the other hand, possibilism is a philosophical view of the existence of possible worlds. This sort of explanation is different from the notion of assurance mentioned earlier. As David Lewis’s modal realism explains, possible worlds are real because there must be some logical space for one to judge that something exists in this or that possible world (Menzel, 2022, sec. 2). On the other hand, Thomas Wetzel explains that “‘Possibilism’ is the view that among the things that there are, or which have being, are included individual objects which do not exist, although they conceivably could have existed, and would have existed if certain possible-but-unrealized states of affairs had obtained” (Wetzel, 1980, p. 2). Possibilism is not concerned with proving the existence of these alien realities because it confirms the existence of those worlds without needing our capabilities to prove their existence empirically. For things to exist in some possible world, the essential requirement is that they could exist and that they are without any logical contradiction. Based on Wetzel’s view of “possible states of affairs” (Wetzel, 1980), possibilism could be interpreted as “possible occurrences,” which describes the possible effects that could be obtained after doing something morally or religiously. What does it mean to say that one is sufficiently skillful to feel ashamed of doing bad deeds and to feel dreadful in receiving their bad fruits? That is, what does it mean to accept that the sufficient skill that one has will be the essential criterion for judging that one knows full well about the right and wrong of moral actions? From the Buddhist’s causalist interpretation, the skill of knowing about the workability of the law of karma needs no modal notion of necessity or possibility of the consequences of bad deeds. A Buddhist need not fully explain the necessity or possibility of what bad fruit of a bad deed will be or when it will come around. Compare this with the sufficient skill of a turbine baler mechanic who knows how to construct a turbine baler into a river. The mechanic knows what way the turbine baler will function when the river flows. However, the mechanic need not know full well about the weather conditions in rainy seasons or the amount of water there will possibly be. When we interpret what will happen in the future, there are two possibilities: whether it will happen or not. However, what grounds this interpretation? Of course, the foundation of such thinking is that we know ourselves that we do not know what will happen in the future, and some portion of our mind is filled with fear of what will happen. It may or may not be entirely opposite to what was expected to happen, so we can comfort ourselves by thinking about when things will happen; they are still within the scope of those two paths. If this assumption is right, then the instinctive curiosity of predicting what will happen in the future expresses a boastful attitude that one knows the future: things will or will not happen. The usual reason for this is that no matter what happens, it stays within the two possibilities set before. However,

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is this probabilistic basis of thinking the same as being proficient in knowing the outcome of karma as stated by Buddhism? The answer, of course, is no. If we look at the two possible propositions, eventually, there must be one true statement, so we expect that there will be a person who knows more than we do. When we implore that person, he or she can give us a signal that tells us the correct answer. Since that person is the one who knows more than we do, we can rely on that person by asking him or her to bless us by making the statement that we are expecting and asking for them to come true. Does this line of interpretation show that we are self-sufficient in knowing the answer to the consequences of karma? Again, Buddhism will say no. Given the argument above, the original Buddhist moral psychology requires acquiring moral knowledge and awareness to understand why wrongdoings are shameful and dreadful. The causality-based theory implies that bad actions bring bad fruits, and the causal chains, or the law of karma, are real. In contrast, the possibilist theory will talk about the possibilities of occurrences. Therefore, the possibilist will feel unsure of what is going to happen. Therefore, the possibilist stance is connected with excessive scrupulosity that cannot be moral. However, the causalist explanation involves the Buddhists’ realist notion of natural law, which implies something about the powers of knowledge on moral consciousness. We now turn to this in the next section.

4 The Metaphysical Power of Meditative Intentionality 4.1 Mental and Cognitive Therapy with Mindfulness G. T. Maurits Kwee (2015) talks about mindfulness as therapy and reports the significant success of meditative practices in treating psychological patients. His proposed model of mindfulness meditation is called “pristine mindfulness” or “heartfulness,” which is argued to be more successful than the traditional Buddhist way of attaining mindfulness because “heartfulness is a general factor sustaining meditation, including concentration and contemplation toward wholesome intentional action (karma) […]” (Maurits Kwee, 2015, p. 345). However, Maurtis Kwee’s notion of “intentionality” is not karmic intentionality but is “mindfulness’ deliberate and effortless practice” (Maurits Kwee, 2015, p. 355). What does this imply about cases of psychological patients with excessive anxiety? Such patients need curing methods that are simple and manageable. To cure excessive anxiety, a patient needs to focus on the presence of the mind with attention. However, some other aspect is required. A patient should also be isolated to fully concentrate on effortlessly achieving presence of mind. This mindfulness model is called “meditative intentionality” which is to be done effortlessly and in isolation. What this thing adds to traditional Thai Buddhist meditation practice is that the effortless, or, to some extent, contentless concentration can lead one not to be obsessive about the contingent

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possibilities of what is going to happen. This newer model of meditative intentionality adds the notion of karmic intentionality back into consideration. In Buddhist doctrine, karmic intentionality is considered in Kusalacitt¯a (good mentality). It is driven by a real metaphysical power directed at avoiding being hampered by the persuasive power of Kilesa (defilements). Buddhist scholars are paying more attention to introducing Buddhist principles into consideration of psychotherapy. In monastic education, the techniques of mindfulness-based psychotherapy are taught because Buddhist monks now have “a greater role in serving and healing people” (Marma, 2012, p. 3). Some aspects of insight meditation involve the observation of purification of morality with the fifth precept of Buddhism (refraining from intoxication through alcohol or drugs) will result in keeping one’s presence of mind and having moral shame and dread (Rathnasiri, 2012, p. 69). Buddhist ethical teaching can be healing by prohibiting one from messing with bad karmas, even when one is being tortured by physical or mental pain incurred by the pathological consequence of wrong actions, such as the feelings of guilt, shame, or remorse (Sumanacara, 2012, p. 131). Buddhist approach to psychotherapy is now of interest among Buddhist scholars seeking to solve people’s mental problems in the modern world. To be freed from excessive scrupulosity, which is close to mental illness, one needs to fill up the power of mindfulness for oneself. The power can be found in some sort of mental action. When it is completed, one will find out the answer for oneself: why the knowledge of moral shame and dread must be cultivated before one can be skillful in this kind of knowledge later. However, there is still one last question: How can this type of knowledge result in understanding the true nature of moral shame and dread so that one is not in the grip of unreasonable anxiety or excessive scrupulosity? George Molnar’s view about dispositions might answer this question.

4.2 George Molnar’s Realism About Disposition and Its Buddhist Application Philosophical discussions of causation are finding answers to the relation between cause and effect. The explanation in recent metaphysics of causation talks about power and disposition that are real on their own. For example, inflammability in a sheet of paper is real even when not burnt. So, dispositions, or dispositional properties, are real, even without manifestations. This is the central tenet of the theory of causation espoused by George Molnar (2003). For Molnar, powers, or dispositional properties, can be explained in the realm of causation. Those properties manifest themselves to bring about relevant changes. As Molnar explained, the concept of powers is close to intentionality. So, the dispositional properties in physical things can be considered as “Physical Intentionality” (Molnar, 2003, p. 186). Moreover, “[…] the laws of nature may be explained in terms

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of the dispositional properties characteristic of natural kinds.” As such, dispositions are real and ineliminable properties, which can be distinguished, for instance, as being the causal powers of objects (Molnar, 2003, p. 2). We could frame Buddhist causalism in terms of Molnar’s theory. Buddhist causalism is not required to be relevant to any supernatural power or divine power for inducing results of knowledge in one’s mind. As mentioned, knowledge is said to be closely related to the Therav¯ada Buddhist explanation of moral psychology. A person’s knowledge of the punishment of an offense means that that person has the mental state of being ashamed and fearful of the consequences of wrongdoings. However, something must explain the connection between such knowledge and mental state. Finding such an explanation sheds light on how knowledge relates to the mental state of the person having that knowledge. What can create such a strong connection must be something acting as a kind of power that ties knowledge to the state of mind known as shame and fear, while the consequences of avoiding wrongdoing are merely a byproduct that will come later. How can such a “power” be philosophically explained? There are some notable characteristics of the power mentioned here. Such a force exists in the explanation process. In Therav¯ada moral psychology, such forces are thought to have a causal and consequential explanation. The cause here is moral knowledge resulting in a mental state of shame and fear. To feel assured that the knowledge is conducted on the right path, one needs to focus on one’s presence of mind in isolation. This is what we call “isolated endurability in moral reasoning.” Isolation here means that when the agent is free from distractions, he or she may stimulate his or her anxiety. If this is possible, then moral reasoning can endure through the flexible changes of moral judgments. However, what would be a good explanation of the characteristics of endurability? When one is prepared to make correct moral judgments, and one can empirically demonstrate this capacity without any hesitation in any situation, one’s capacity for moral reasoning yields a status of isolated endurability. This model of moral reasoning is compatible with the skillful knowledge of moral shame and dread, which can refrain from excessive scrupulosity.

5 Conclusion The original Buddhist notions of moral shame (hiri) and moral dread (ottappa) are about skillful knowledge of moral actions and their consequences in terms of causality-based explanation. Sufficiently skilled Buddhists will consider shame and fear of sin as natural protectors according to the law of karma. On the other hand, the appropriated (received) view implies having moral shame and dread scrupulously. However, we have seen that this latter view is directed toward something other than the original understanding of those two concepts since the original and the received views operate on different philosophies of causation. The original teaching is based on causalism, while the appropriated view is based on possibilism. The latter is unsuitable for Buddhist moral psychology that refrains from mental anxiety in meditative

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practices. Finally, the concept of the metaphysical power of meditative intentionality is offered to solve this problem. Such a concept implies isolated endurability in moral reasoning close to the original view of skillful knowledge of moral shame and dread. Acknowledgements This chapter developed from a research project, “Moral Shame and Moral Dread in Therav¯ada Buddhist Philosophy,” supported by the Department of Philosophy and Religion, Faculty of Humanities, Kasetsart University, Thailand. It was presented at the 2nd Summit of the Union of Societies and Associations of Philosophy in the Philippines: Emerging Philosophies of Religion in Southeast Asia, 21–24 July 2021, and the Philosophies of Appropriated Religions in Southeast Asia Culminating Conference, Bangkok, Thailand, 5–7 September 2022.

References Bodhi, B. (2010). The guardians of the world. Access to Insight (BCBS Edition). http://www.acc esstoinsight.org/lib/authors/bodhi/bps-essay_23.html. Accessed 1 May 2021. Bodhi, B. (Trans.). (2012). The numerical discourses of the Buddha: A translation of the A˙nguttara Nikaya (The Teachings of the Buddha). Wisdom Publications. Bodhi, B. (Trans.). (n.d.). A˙nguttara Nik¯aya. https://obo.genaud.net/dhamma-vinaya/wp/an/05_ fives/an05.002.bodh.wp.htm. Accessed 1 May 2021. Kalupahana, D. J. (1975). Causality: The central philosophy of Buddhism. The University Press of Hawaii. Mahendra, A. (Trans.). (2018). Itivuttakap¯a.li—Book of this was said. Dhamma Publishers. Marma, A. (2012). Counseling and its importance: A Buddhist perspective. In Buddhist psychotherapy: Academic papers presented at the 2nd international association of Buddhist Universities conference (pp. 3–18). Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Main Campus Wang Noi. Maurits Kwee, G. T. (2015). Pristine mindfulness: Heartfulness and beyond. In E. Shonin, W. Van Gordon, & N. N. Singh (Eds.), Buddhist foundations of mindfulness: Mindfulness in behavioral health (pp. 339–362). Springer. Menzel, C. (2022). The possibilism-actualism debate. An Entry in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/possibilism-actualism/. Accessed 1 Dec 2022. Molnar, G. (2003). Powers: A study in metaphysics. Oxford University Press. Payutto, B. P. A. (Somdet Phra Buddhaghosacariya). (2019). Buddhadhamma: The laws of nature and their benefits to life (R. P. Moore, Trans.; 4th ed.). Buddhadhamma Foundation. Phoonaphiphat, P. M. B., Kittisarasuthee, P., & Kotsombat, S. (2019). The concept of Paññ¯a in Buddhist philosophy. The Journal of Humanities, 11(2), 107–114. Phra Maha Theerasak Theerananto (Piamphet). (2010). An analytical study of moral shame and moral dread in Therav¯ada Buddhist philosophy. A Thesis for Master’s Degree in Buddhism and Philosophy at Mahamakut Buddhist University. Phra Thammakittiwong (Thongdee Suratecho). (2008). Dictionary for Buddhism education: The words of monastery (Third Printing). Dhammasabh¯a and Banluedhamma Institute. (In Thai) Pookonglee, S. (2017). Hiri Ottappa and social problems solving. The Journal of Sirindhornparithat, 18(1), 124–133. (In Thai). Rathnasiri, R. M. (2012). Cognitive, behavioral and psychotherapeutic aspects as reflected in insight meditation and methods of insight. In Buddhist psychotherapy: Academic papers presented at the 2nd international association of Buddhist Universities conference (pp. 62–72). Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Main Campus Wang Noi.

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Sirikanchana, P. (1985). The concept of ‘Dhamma’ in Thai Buddhism: A study in the thought of Vajiranana and Buddhadasa (Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 954). https://repository. upenn.edu/edissertations/954. Accessed 1 July 2022. Sumanacara, A. (2012). A psychological analysis of physical and mental pain in Buddhism. In Buddhist psychotherapy: Academic papers presented at the 2nd international association of Buddhist Universities conference (pp. 124–136). Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Main Campus Wang Noi. Summers, J. S., & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2019). Clean hands: Philosophical lessons from scrupulosity. Oxford University Press. Weatherson, B. (2019). Normative externalism. Oxford University Press. Wetzel, T. (1980). Possible states of affairs and possible objects. Philosophy Research Archives, 6, 1–24. https://doi.org/10.5840/pra198061. Accessed 1 July 2022.

Theptawee Chokvasin is an Associate Professor at the Department of Philosophy and Religion, Faculty of Humanities, Kasetsart University, Thailand. He is interested in philosophical and religious studies. His primary research interests include autonomy in ethics, metaphysics, the philosophy of education, and the philosophy of technology.

Chapter 20

Conflicts Between General Causation and the Therav¯ada Concept of Kamma in Moral Education Klairung Iso

Abstract This paper analyzes the concept of general causation and the concept of kamma. It argues that the concept of kamma does not fit with the concept of moral education for three reasons. First, general causation explains causal relations using substances and the idea of temporal connections as a basis. Second, reward and punishment in moral learning also work with the concept of general causation. However, the skillful and unskillful actions (kusala/akusala kamma) parallel reward and punishment in the natural flow of kammic events. Here, a temporal gap between kamma and vip¯aka (action and result) makes the relations unknowable, notably when correlated with punabbhava (rebecoming or rebirth). Third, Therav¯ada Buddhist metaphysics of pat.iccasamupp¯ada (dependent co-arising) holds that all existents flow in co-arising condition. Since reality is not seen as persons and substances, it makes the fruit of kamma seems arbitrary and unknowable. Keywords Therav¯ada Buddhism · Causation · Dependent co-arising (pat.iccasamupp¯ada) · Kamma · Moral education

K. Iso (B) Department of Philosophy, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Hongladarom et al. (eds.), Philosophies of Appropriated Religions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5191-8_20

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1 Introduction This paper is based on the assumption that moral education is concerned with practical knowledge.1 Morality, the principles that explain which actions are moral or evil, is the knowledge of practical everyday life. Therefore, according to a naturalistic perspective, it should be justifiable by ordinary sensory experience and helpful for everyday living. Lay Buddhists observe the Five Precepts (pañca-s¯ıla) and believe in the Law of Kamma.2 Both function as the fundamental moral principle: any wrongful acts (akusala kamma) against the five precepts lead to unpleasant fruits of kamma. In contrast, any kusala kamma (skillful actions conducive to nibbana) are endorsed since they result in benefits. Moreover, teaching the five precepts and the principle of kamma are also correlative with rebirth. The idea of kamma (action) and punabbhava (rebirth, “again becoming”) is illustrated in various sutta-s, such as Pañcavera Sutta (Five Threats), which describes that any female3 who breaks the five precepts will lead a miserable rebirth: Anuruddha, when females have five qualities, when their body breaks up, after death, they are reborn in a place of loss, a bad place, the underworld, hell. What five? They kill living creatures, steal, commit sexual misconduct, lie, and consume alcoholic drinks that cause negligence. When females have these five qualities, when their body breaks up, after death, they are reborn in a place of loss, a bad place, the underworld, hell. (SN 37.14)4

On the contrary, the Pañcas¯ıla Sutta (Five Precepts) describes that any female who follows the five precepts will attain a good rebirth: Anuruddha, when females have five qualities, when their body breaks up, after death, they are reborn in a good place, a heavenly realm. What five? They don’t kill living creatures, steal, commit sexual misconduct, lie, or consume alcoholic drinks that cause negligence. When females have these five qualities, when their body breaks up, after death, they are reborn in a good place, a heavenly realm. (SN 37.24)5

In Thailand, the principle of kamma is directly taught to laypeople by religious and educational institutions with various incidents from P¯ali sutta-s. Also, popular 1 In general, the aim of believing is to believe what is true. Truths of the pragmatism theory or the practical knowledge rely on what is useful for living a life. In general, the problem of “what truths are?” can broadly be answered by three theories; the correspondence theory, the coherence theory, and the pragmatism theory of truth (Glanzberg, 2021). This study sees that, in moral education, the knowledge exchange between a moral agent and society or teachers should engage a sense of living in the world and universal moral principles. The universal moral principles here point to values that could hold for everyone, e.g., the feelings of pleasure and pain bodily and psychologically. 2 P¯ al.i: kamma; Sanskrit: karma. 3 Pañcavera sutta (Five Threats) and pañcas¯ıla sutta (Five Precepts) are the discourses related to the inquiries about females raised by the interlocutors pertained to the Buddha. It does not reflect any gender issue. A similar context about the five precepts and rebirth disregarding the female gender is also found, for example, in A˙nguttara Nik¯aya, Upasampad¯avaggo, Bhikkhu Sutta (AN 5.286) (see Bhikkhusutta—Bhikkhu Sujato, 2018). 4 Samyutta ˙ Nik¯aya, Sal.a¯ yatanavaggo, Pañcavera Sutta (Bhikkhu Sujato, 2018). 5 Samyutta ˙ Nik¯aya, Sal.a¯ yatanavaggo, Pañcas¯ıla Sutta (Bhikkhu Sujato, 2018).

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Buddhism indirectly ingrains in Buddhist people the idea of kamma through everyday shared knowledge among the members. However, the complexity of the occurrences of kammic results distorts proper knowledge. After skillful or unskillful volitions cease, the results of kamma (vip¯aka) could arise whenever appropriate conditions coarise. Therefore, the time gap could depict the arising effects (from the old kamma), which do not resemble their causes (in the current life). In other words, the time gap could portray moral persons receiving harsh conditions while immoral persons gain good fortune. This complexity makes the case appeal to blaming the victim6 and leads to a deterministic view of kamma.7 With a backdrop of Therav¯ada Buddhism, this paper analyzes the concept of general causation in Western philosophy and the law of kamma in Therav¯ada Buddhism concerning moral education. General causation8 involves the Western ontology of causation. It points to the notion of causation derived from ordinary sensory experiences, or the cognitive application, without the purpose of judging a realistic or an idealistic view. On the Buddhist side, the causation involves the concepts found in Sutta Pit.aka,9 Abhidhamma Pit.aka,10 and Abhidhammattha Sangaha (the commentary expounding on Abhidhamma).11 This paper argues that the law of kamma might not fit moral education and provides three reasons. First, the ordinary sensory experience of the world relies on a notion of space–time, and a general notion of causation is also limited to this spatiotemporal everyday experience. Therefore, this ordinary way of knowing corresponds with experience of the world: truths are justified by the sensory experience of the world. This forms the basis for comprehending casual relations and leads to the second reason. Second, the fundamental concept of moral learning by reward and punishment also works on space–time and causation. Regarding this, kammic results cannot be used as the motive for moral education since there is an untraceable time lag between a kammic result and its cause. Note that this part of the study attaches importance to 6

Blaming the victim describes that any painful conditions held by the victims are accountable for their previous unskillful deeds. Therefore, the blamers may think any assistance for the victims is unnecessary. 7 The determisistic view of kamma explains that the occurrences of the fruits of kamma are determined by the previous causes, which cannot avoid or change; therefore, moral agents could become passively surrendered to their results of kamma. 8 The Western general causation is the idea that there are general principles or laws of causation that apply to all events in the world. This view suggests that there are certain rules, patterns, or principles that govern how events are related to each other, and by understanding them, we can make predictions about future events. 9 Sutta Pitaka provides the discourses of the Buddha teaching to monks and laypeople. . 10 Abhidhamma Pitaka provides the ontology of dhamma or the theory of reality as dhamma. . 11 The primary P¯ ali sources of Therav¯ada Buddhism in Thailand, which are the recommended sources for the Thai Buddhist monk to study, include Vinaya Pit.aka, Sutta Pit.aka, Abhidhamma Pit.aka, Milinda Pañha, Visuddhimagga, Abhidhammattha Sangaha (the commentary expounding on Abhidhamma), Vinayat..thakath¯a (the commentary expounding on Vinaya), and Bhikkhup¯atimokkhap¯ali (Payutto, 2002).

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Sutta Pit.aka, since the teachings in sutta-s are the primary references to use in moral education and are more readily understandable than Abhidhamma Pit.aka. Third, for the metaphysic of dependent co-arising (pat.iccasamupp¯ada)12 described in Sutta Pit.aka and Abhidhamma Pit.aka, which incorporates kamma, the causal relation is not explained by the notion of substances but by the process philosophy of dependent co-arising. As a result, an event arising at this moment can be any random residues from previous moments, depending on the overall balance between skillful and unskillful actions (kusala and akusala kamma) stretching back into numerous previous rebirth realms. The following sections provide details of the three reasons and a summary at the end.

2 Western and Buddhist Metaphysics of Causation The metaphysical problem of causation originates from the curiosity of why two things, two events, or two relata connect.13 The answer to such a question relies on sensory experiences of the world. The explanation of why any phenomenon (Y) exists rather than others leads an observer to find the causal relation of Y to other relata (X). The contemporary debate on causation in Western philosophy is categorized into causal idealism and casual realism (Ehring, 1987). To illustrate, consider the case where one throws a brick through a glass window and the glass breaks. Let the Xevent be the throwing brick and the Y-event the breaking of the glass window. Causal realists will explain that some physical elements connect X and Y, such as forces and lawful waves, without being mind-dependent or any inference to create a causal relation concept in the human mind. In contrast, causal idealists will explain that the human mind creates a concept that X causes Y.

12 Paticcasamupp¯ ada, or dependent origination or dependent co-arising, shows a recurrence of . causality of twelve constituent factors incorporated phenomena of the association of the five aggregates. It has another definition as the creation of suffering. It is the first concept that the Buddha was expounding during the seventh days of the uninterrupted sitting meditation under the Bodhi tree (see Therav¯ada Vinaya Pit.aka, First Khandhaka, Mah¯avagga, Vin.I.1), and it can be found in several places in Sutta and also in Abhidhamma Pit.aka. The cycle begins with ignorance (avijj¯a), then volitional activities (sa˙nkh¯ara), consciousness (viññ¯an.a), mentality and corporeality (n¯amar¯upa), six senses bases (sal.a¯ yatana), contact (phassa), feeling (vedan¯a), craving (tan.h¯a), clinging (up¯ad¯ana), becoming (bhava), birth ( j¯ati), aging, and death ( jar¯amaran.a) here includes the origin of suffering (dukkha-samudaya), which are sorrow (soka), lamentation (parideva), pain (dukkha), grief (domanassa), and despair (up¯ay¯asa). 13 Considering causation inquiry from the origin, the Greek word “aitia” or cause, can be grossly classified into two views. Firstly, it is the meaning of cause in a metaphysic and epistemic view as explanation or reason. “Aitia” also has a juridical sense of responsibility for the existence of some events, actions, or states of affairs. Another is the meaning in an empiricist or a scientific view as necessary connexion or real causes such as fundamental forces of nature (Broadie, 2012, pp. 22–23).

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Moreover, causal idealists, led by David Hume, explain that human imagination works under the power of reason to form a kind of union in the imagination (Hume, 1793/2001). The constant conjunction between X and Y suggests a necessity is involved when it is only a probability. Humans see similar successive events of X then Y, say a thrown object breaks a piece of glass. Time after time, those impressions trigger a union in the imagination to form a belief that X determines Y. Hence, both causal realism and causal idealism use a source of knowledge from sense-perception to acquire data from a particular experience in the world. A notion of causation is limited to everyday experiences combining a notion of space–time: the notion of causal relations between two events beyond senseperception becomes an imaginative inference and logical construct. The point is that sensory experiences and causal impressions cannot happen involving unusual concepts of experiences such as the arising results of kamma (the arising of vip¯aka) and rebirth. In physics, Bharucha (1992) comments that causation, similar to our conventional notions of space and time, is a concept that is constrained by a particular experience of the world and must be abandoned when this experience is extended through the inclusion of more advanced action solutions, such as the Buddhist principle of dependent origination. (Bharucha, 1992, p. 167). Moreover, with difficulty explaining the “nature” of causation, Bharucha notes that a view of nature as a system is not a mechanistic aggregate of parts in isolable causal relations: the system should be considered as integrated” wholes of their components, and each system receives and provides new inputs for others (Bharucha, 1992, pp. 167–168).14 This idea coheres with the Buddhist concept of interdependent causal relations. However, the occurrence of the fruit of kamma goes beyond the sensory experience of knowing. The Buddhist concept of causation is interwoven with empirical knowledge for a practical proposal, since the teachings aim to guide monks, nuns, and lay practitioners toward eradicating suffering (dukkha). Therefore, the terrain of Buddhist knowledge of causation comprises a combination of metaphysical concepts, empirical knowledge, and ethical guidelines. Moreover, the empirical knowledge of Buddhism coexists with non-substantial phenomena: in Buddhism, the existence of concrete entities or substances of natural science is understood as conditioned phenomena. In terms of the metaphysical stance Early Buddhism and Therav¯ada assert that all existences exist out of conditionality (idappaccayat¯a), and as a result, all existences have a characteristic of nonself (anatt¯a). Note that the characteristic of nonself for 14

Bharucha’s work of causation is dedicated to Physics and explores the relevance of the Buddhist causation in the context of modern Physics. The sense-world is translated by physics to a formal physical world image that appears to be causally connected, then deriving a necessary conclusion from logical deductions. However, this process leads to inaccuracy, and making the prediction is subject to inaccuracy due to a homo-logic approach (Bharucha, 1992, pp. 30–31). Instead of a homologic approach (a formal proof in an axiomatic system), he proposes a heterological approach. He notes that various schools of Buddhism have practical guidelines to go beyond the ordinary experience of space-time existence and cites Sawami Vivekananda Jnana Yoga, “Time, space and causation are the glass through which the Absolute is seen […] In the absolute, there is neither time, space nor causation” (Bharucha, 1992, pp. 167–168).

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the Buddha points to all existences being void of an authentic enduring self (P¯ali: a¯ tta, Sanskrit: a¯ tman) that can control phenomena. In other words, all existences are derived from the void and resolved into the void (Shastri, 2020, p. 126). All existences arise from a bundle of properties, and no entity or substance whose properties belong to them since the properties are constantly changing or impermanence (anicca) because of their absolute characteristic of change (dukkha). This voidness of existence (P¯ali: suññat¯a, Sanskrit: s´u¯ nyat¯a) has been a center of argumentation in the M¯adhyamika school. For the empirical source of knowledge, the difference between Western and Buddhist epistemology is that Buddhism sees it as a source of the two levels of reality, conventional and ultimate.15 The ability to be conscious at the ultimate level depends on conditioning or the state of consciousness. It is to say either the consciousness is accompanied by delusion or ignorant (moha) which generates conventional reality (sam . muti), or accompanied by wisdom (panna) which generates ultimate reality (paramattha).16 Conventional reality, conventional truth, or rhetorical truth (sammati-sacca), refers to consensual truth that shares common designations. Conventional truth is required as a communication tool in everyday life. The teaching of Buddha aims to guide disciples and ordinary people toward eradicating suffering (dukkha); therefore, the language the Buddha used corresponds to the sense-perception of ordinary people. In Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta, human suffering originates from the five clinging-aggregates, resulting in unskillful actions and generating the results of kamma. The explanation of the five aggregates and how they coexist with external objects must be able to follow and practiced by ordinary people. Therefore, the Buddha must refrain from using conventional language to teach due to the convenience of communication. However, the Buddha encourages laypeople to recognize language as a means to see all existence’s insights (Payutto, 2017, pp. 70–71). Hence, observing sensory experiences in Buddhism can lead to

15

In Western epistemology, there are no multiple levels of truths, instead, the interest gears to the ontology of truth or the problem of “What truths are?,” as explained in footnote no. 1. Moreover, there is another main question of “What does it take to know something?.” Buddhism may respond to the last question by its concept of phenomena of contacts (phassa) according to the dependent co-arising (pat.iccasamupp¯ada), and the thought-process according to Abhidhamma (see the thought-process at Anuruddha, 1999, pp. 27–29). 16 Two levels of reality are introduced in Abhidhamma: conventional or consensual reality (sammuti) and ultimate reality (paramattha) (Payutto, 2017, p. 70). P¯ali sutta-s do not explicitly present the two systems of reality since the Buddha refrains from explaining reality on a metaphysical basis. However, the two concepts of reality are found in P¯ali sutta-s’ commentary text to provide extra explanation of the reality regarding the Buddha’s teachings in two ways. First, it is to explain when the Buddha mentions a person (puggala). Since there is nonself, so the person meant by the Buddha is subsumed under consensual reality (for example, see details in the P¯ali commentary of A˙nguttara Nik¯aya, XIII. Ekapuggalavagga, pp. 170–178, “A Certain person”). Second, it is to explain the use of conventional language of the Buddha while teaching so that to justify consistency of the concept of nonself in general (for example, see details in the P¯ali commentary of Khuddaka Nik¯aya, Itivuttaka, 24, “A Heap of Bones”).

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insight with the help of conventional language as a learning and communication tool.17 Although conventional language can pave the way to the ultimate, it adheres to knowable sensory experiences. Therefore, the unknowable kammic results are a hindrance. The following section discusses the conflict between kamma and the concept of reward and punishment in moral learning.

3 Reward, Punishment, and Kamma In Therav¯ada Buddhism, reward and punishment appear in the principle of kamma, which is widely used for moral teaching, as “what you sow is what you reap.” The explanation of kamma by the Buddha in Sutta Pit.aka presents on two occasions: (i) answering interlocutors about specific phenomena of moral agents regarding their unskillful deeds and kammic results; (ii) explaining the general principle of kamma, suggesting its lawlike causes and results. In Indian philosophy, kamma indicates deeds or actions, generally divided into mental, verbal, and bodily acts. However, in Buddhism, kamma points to intention (cetan¯a). Intention in Abhidhamma Pit.aka is one of the fifty-two mental factors (or mental states), derived from the same root of the P¯ali word citta (mind or consciousness), which means to think (N¯aradaThera, 2013, p. 72). Cetan¯a coordinates other mental factors on the object of consciousness (arammana-paccaya) to fulfill its function and regulate the function of other mental factors associated with itself. The coordination of cetan¯a and other mental factors represents a state of consciousness. According to Abhidamma, ordinarily, there is no moment when we do not experience a particular kind of consciousness, hanging on to some object—whether physical or mental. The time-limit of such a consciousness is termed one thought-moment […] within the brief duration of a flash of lightning, or in the twinkling of an eye billions of thought-moments may arise and perish. (N¯aradaThera, 2013, p. 170)

Therefore, kamma explains the phenomena of human actions from intention. This intention and other mental factors bring up occurrences of skillful and unskillful deeds. In Sutta Pit.aka, “intention” is used more familiarly as making a choice, as displayed in Nibbedhika Sutta18 (Penetrative): “Deeds should be known. And their source, diversity, result, cessation, and the practice that leads to their cessation should be known.” That’s what I said, but why did I say it? It is intention that I call deeds. For after making a choice one acts by way of body, speech, and mind. (AN 6.63)

17

As Anuruddha states, “The ultimate realities are characterized not only from the ontological angle as the ultimate existents, but also from the epistemological angle as the ultimate objects of right knowledge [...] Thus by examining the conventional realities with wisdom, we eventually arrive at the objective actualities that lie behind our conceptual constructs” (Anuruddha, 1999, p. 26). 18 A˙ nguttara Nik¯aya, Pañcaka-chakkanip¯at¯a, Nibbedika Sutta (AN 6.63) (Bhikkhu Sujato, 2018).

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Once moral agents make any choices, the fruits of kamma are ripe in the future. However, whether the principle of kamma differs from the general idea of reward and punishment is debatable. This general idea functions as a motive in moral learning. Moral agents should know the causes and results of their moral and immoral conduct. In other words, moral agents should know what actions get rewarded or punished so they can learn and correct their previous deeds in the future. Hence, it is not practical to use kamma for moral education. The drawbacks of using kamma in moral education can be explained in two points.

3.1 Kamma and Arbitrariness Kamma grants for unknowably delayed fruits that are too long for the human lifespan to justify fairness, and the lawlike delay requires a meta-ethical explanation. Various illustrations in P¯ali sutta-s explain that the consequential distribution of results of kamma could range from the very next moment to the next life, as an example found in the continuing part in Nibbedhika Sutta; And what is the source of deeds? Contact is their source. And what is the diversity of deeds? There are deeds that lead to rebirth in hell, the animal realm, the ghost realm, the human world, and the world of the gods. This is called the diversity of deeds. And what is the result of deeds? The result of deeds is threefold, I say, in this very life, on rebirth in the next life, or at some later time. This is called the result of deeds. AN 6.6319

The time lag between causes and results from the principle of kamma often confuses moral agents and third persons who observe the events. Firstly, this time lag exists side-by-side with a memory loss condition. This memory loss points to the memory of the old skillful and unskillful deeds that terminate once moral agents are reborn. Moral agents may lose some of their memories even during this life. Moreover, when kamma coexists with the concept of rebirth (punabbhava), no corresponding fact can justify moral agents’ past life events. Paul Reasoner mentions another concern. When kamma is accompanied by rebirth, its justifying explanation holds an objective sense of justice. Kammic causality involves the universal casual flows promoting justice for every moral agent (Reasoner, 2010, p. 643). P.A. Payutto states that kamma can reflect in the human system code of conduct like Vinaya Pit.aka, and the code of conduct should incorporate into the system of nature (dhamma) which is the large system of truth. One who obtains wisdom will see the interrelationship of all various conditions in nature (Payutto, 2017, p. 403). Nevertheless, the relationship between universal causal flows and kammic causality is still unclear: how one moral agent’s kamma causes external physical phenomena toward the agent. 19

Ibid.

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Similarly, Bruce R. Reichenbach notes that the temporal gap between the deeds of moral agents now and their kamma consequences in the future, especially when the fruits of kamma involve external conditions, requires explanations (Reichenbach, 1988). Reichenbach raises an issue of randomness in consequential moral distribution functioned by the law of kamma, “one’s experiences often seem to have no necessary connection with one’s present moral qualities or character” (Reichenbach, 1990, p. 63). This notification is inconsistent with universal justice in which chance is disqualified. Moreover, he points to questioning works of such a kamma scale that claim to justly distribute pleasure or pain to the agents (Reichenbach, 1990, p. 94). Finally, Reichenbach notes that the kamma residues in the agent of Buddhism extend beyond empirical verification (Reichenbach, 1990, pp. 80–86).20 On the contrary, Bhikkhu P.A. Payutto sees that only the mind itself can verify rebirth since rebirth is a phenomenon directly occurring in the mind (Payutto, 2017, pp. 368–369).21 However, his observation is based on the ethical objective of Buddhism, disregarding the metaphysical view of the relationship between the fruits of kamma, rebirth (punabbhava), and external causation. This arbitrary pattern of the reward and punishment of kamma leads to questions like, “Why one who conducts evil receives good results while who conducts morally receives painful results?” Whitley Kaufman notes that the law of kamma seems unsuitable for moral teaching (Kaufman, 2005, pp. 19–21). He argues for a fundamental principle of justice “one should in general be apprised of what one is being punished for and why” (Kaufman, 2007, p. 556). Monima Chadha and Nick Trakakis (2007) respond to Kaufman by arguing that the theory of kamma does not require us to remember our past mistakes in detail by giving two supporting ideas. First, moral agents must not commit crimes before learning that murder is wrong. Second, moral agents often do wrong without a proper stage of consciousness. However, wrongdoers still have to get punished, like a drunk driver who killed a pedestrian and later on knows what happened and has to be responsible for what he did in a court of law. Moreover, they explain that the law of kamma does not promise that the punishment or the reward will be yielded instantaneously. Kaufman sees those arguments 20

In “Karma, Causation, and Divine Intervention,” Reichenbach mentions that the law of karma requires explaining its precise moral calculations and its causal operations; therefore, it leads to the appeal to a theistic administrator. However, a supernaturalistic view of divine grace and forgiveness violates the status of the law of karma. In sum, both naturalistic and supernaturalistic views face some difficulties in explaining how the law of karma operates (Reichenbach, 1989, p. 148). 21 Bhikkhu P.A. Payutto provides how agents should move to the following three methods; i.e., the three sequences to prove the truth of rebirth. First is verification through mental concentration if the mind creates deceptive images (nimitta) while practicing meditation. Second is verification by sacrificing one’s life; however, no one wishes to do so. Third is verification through case histories and logical arguments: for example, collecting data of agents who can recollect past life memories and looking for other scientific ways of validation like wavelengths of light. However, it is still not a piece of direct knowledge. Lastly, he concludes that no matter what beliefs, denials, and evidence of agents’ rebirths are, it is a present life with which the agents should engage. Therefore, the present life requires care and attention. Only a few descriptions of past and future lives, heaven and hell, are referred to in the sutta-s, compared to the teaching pertaining to the present life (Payutto, 2017, pp. 368–369).

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as simply the dogmatic insistence of faith in the law of kamma, and emphasizes a concern of blaming the victim elevating by the law of kamma (Kaufman, 2007, p. 559).

3.2 Kamma and Unknowable Events The deterministic characteristic of old kamma creates epistemically unknowable events. The response of Chadha and Trakakis (2007) is a valuable source to explain the theory of kamma. However, it is question-begging. Consider two restaurants A and B, located next to each other, offering the same menu and sharing the same kitchen, with the same friendly services. It happened that restaurant A made more fortune than restaurant B. To analyze a sufficient condition of A’s fortune, for example, suggested by Mill’s methods,22 the observer would search for other knowable conditions to see what B lacked. If there was not any, an unknowable condition like the concept of kamma might shed light on the event. Since all knowable conditions for running the restaurant were already matched, B started to comply with the law of kamma. No matter how many of B’s good deeds are in this life, unfortunately, the old painful results of B’s kamma could continue to occur. In this case, only being a strong believer in kamma would motivate B to persist in conducting good deeds. Kamma conditions these results. However, the complexity of the co-conditions of these results can puzzle observers, as in the above example. Another more straightforward example is the chance of winning a lucky draw. Luck is often used to describe events that seem to happen randomly or without explanation. It’s a label that we give to things we do not fully understand or cannot explain through other means. The characteristic of luck points to numerous possibilities of an outcome with multiple causes. All of which makes the outcome hard to predict. The arising fruits of kamma are similar to luck since countless residues have to be conditioned with other multiple external causes to arise. Moreover, there are unfavorable factors (vipatti) and favorable factors (sampatti) that affect the fruition of kamma (Payutto, 2017, pp. 358–359). The perplexing kammic results appear in various sutta-s, such as Mah¯akammavibha˙nga Sutta23 (The Great Exposition of Kamma). There are four kinds of moral agents existing in the world: (i) “Here some person kills living beings, takes what is not given, misconducts himself in sexual desires, speaks falsehood, speaks maliciously, speaks harshly, gossips, is covetous, is ill-willed, and has wrong view. On the dissolution of the body, after death, he reappears in the states of deprivation, in an unhappy destination, in perdition, in hell.” (ii) “But here some person kills living beings […] and has wrong view. On the dissolution of the body, after death, he reappears in a happy destination, in the heavenly world.” 22

John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) proposes five methods for identifying causal connections between events, see (Hurley & Watson, 2018, pp. 560–577). 23 Majjhima Nik¯ aya, Mah¯akammavibha˙nga Sutta (MN 136) (Bhikkhu Thanissaro, 2010).

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(iii) “Here some person abstains from killing living beings, from taking what is not given, from misconduct in sexual desires, from false speech, from malicious speech, from harsh speech, from gossip, he is not covetous, is not ill-willed, and has right view. On the dissolution of the body, after death, he reappears in a happy destination, in the heavenly world.” (iv) “But here some person abstains from killing living beings […] and has right view. On the dissolution of the body, after death, he reappears in the states of deprivation, in an unhappy destination, in perdition, in hell.” (MN 136)

Buddha continues explaining that events (ii) and (iv) that oppose the kammic principle are misapprehended because the observer sees only some fractions of the whole life’s event of the observed agent. Monks or true brahmins cultivate chal.abhiññ¯a (the six higher powers). They may obtain the ability to have the divine eye (dibba cakkhu), which is direct knowledge of the kammic causality of other sentient beings.24 However, the partial experience of the divine eyes possibly fails to see the whole threads of good and bad deeds of those sentient beings and causes misapprehension. Mah¯akammavibha˙nga Sutta can be an example of the misapprehension of kamma. These misapprehensions can lead to determinism or chaotic order. Without the supposition of the divine eye, the concept of kamma accompanied by rebirth is epistemically unknowable. Mah¯akammavibha˙nga Sutta displays a situation where all parties in the discourse have the divine eye, though some have it partially. In many cases, the discourses in Sutta-s display the teachings of kamma and rebirth to ordinary people. C¯u.lakammavibha˙nga Sutta (The Shorter Analysis of Deeds) is one example.25 In this discourse, the Buddha explains kamma makes human beings exist with a variety of characteristics and possessions: “What is the cause, Master Gotama, what is the reason why even among those who are human beings some are seen to be inferior and superior? For people are seen who are short-lived and long-lived, sickly and healthy, ugly and beautiful, insignificant and illustrious, poor and rich, from low and eminent families, witless and wise. What is the reason why even among those who are human beings some are seen to be inferior and superior?” “Student, sentient beings are the owners of their deeds and heir to their deeds. Deeds are their womb, their relative, and their refuge. It is deeds that divide beings into inferior and superior.” “I don’t understand the meaning of what Master Gotama has said in brief, without explaining the details. Master Gotama, please teach me this matter in detail so I can understand the meaning.” “Well then, student, listen and pay close attention, I will speak.” “Yes, sir,” replied Subha. The Buddha said this: “Take some woman or man who kills living creatures. They’re violent, bloody-handed, a hardened killer, merciless to living beings. Because of undertaking such deeds, when their body breaks up, after death, they’re reborn in a place of loss, a bad place, the underworld, hell. If they’re not reborn in a place of loss, but return to the human realm, then wherever they’re reborn they’re short-lived. For killing living creatures is the path leading to a short lifespan [...] 24 25

D¯ıgha Nik¯aya, P¯a.tika, Dasuttara Sutta, see Groups of Six (DN 34) (Bhikkhu Sujato, 2018). Majjhima Nik¯aya, C¯u.lakammavibha˙nga Sutta, (MN 135) (Bhikkhu Sujato, 2018).

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So it is the way people live that makes them how they are, whether short-lived or long-lived, sickly or healthy, ugly or lovely, insignificant or illustrious, poor or rich, in a low class or eminent family, or witless or wise.” (MN 135)

Ordinary people lack the divine eye. Therefore, the unknowable concept of kamma and rebirth becomes an appeal to believing in authority. Since the law of kamma is complex, it might be difficult to comprehend without guidance from an authority like the Buddha. Again, the point is that no matter whether the law of kamma and rebirth are true or false, it is unknowable by sensory experience. However, believing in authority plays a role in forming what William James calls a pragmatic truth that extends to religious beliefs.26 When the Buddha explains the general mechanism of the law of kamma, some texts reflect a sense of deterministic characteristic. For instance, in Kammavagga Vitth¯ara Sutta27 (Deeds in Detail), the Buddha explains the four types of deeds— dark, bright, both, and neither—and the destiny of moral agents according to each type of deeds: And what are dark deeds with dark results? It’s when someone makes hurtful choices by way of body, speech, and mind. Having made these choices, they’re reborn in a hurtful world, where hurtful contacts strike them. Touched by hurtful contacts, they experience hurtful feelings that are exclusively painful—like the beings in hell. These are called dark deeds with dark results. And what are bright deeds with bright results? It’s when someone makes pleasing choices by way of body, speech, and mind. Having made these choices, they’re reborn in a pleasing world, where pleasing contacts strike them. Touched by pleasing contacts, they experience pleasing feelings that are exclusively happy—like the gods replete with glory. These are called bright deeds with bright results. And what are dark and bright deeds with dark and bright results? It’s when someone makes both hurtful and pleasing choices by way of body, speech, and mind. Having made these choices, they are reborn in a world that is both hurtful and pleasing, where hurtful and pleasing contacts strike them. Touched by both hurtful and pleasing contacts, they experience both hurtful and pleasing feelings that are a mixture of pleasure and pain—like humans, some gods, and some beings in the underworld. These are called dark and bright deeds with dark and bright results. And what are neither dark nor bright deeds with neither dark nor bright results, which lead to the ending of deeds? It’s the intention to give up dark deeds with dark results, bright deeds with bright results, and both dark and bright deeds with both dark and bright results. These are called neither dark nor bright deeds with neither dark nor bright results, which lead to the ending of deeds.

26

The pragmatic theory of truth of William James (1842–1910) tells that in order to describe which statement is true depends on its utility. The true statement is the statement that is useful to believe by helping us do what it needs to get done, “Ideas […] become true just in so far as they help us get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience, to summarize them and get about among them by conceptual short-cuts instead of following the interminable succession of particular phenomena. (James, 1907 [1975], 34)” (Capps, 2019). 27 AN 4.233 (Bhikkhu Sujato, 2018).

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These are the four kinds of deeds that I declare, having realized them with my own insight. (AN 4.233)

This sutta suggests actions of human beings belong to the third type, conducting both dark and bright deeds and receiving a mix of hurtful and pleasing results throughout their lives. The Buddha, then, illustrates the phenomena of results through dependent co-arising (pat.iccasamupp¯ada). Deeds create fruits of kamma (vip¯akapaccaya), and the fruits become the conditions for rebirth and occurrences of contact (phassa), and then contact conditions feeling (vedan¯a). Feeling, the physical and mental pain or pleasure, is one source of the four foundations of practicing insightful knowledge called vedan¯anupassan¯a satipat..th¯ana (the contemplation of feeling).28 The insight observes feeling with an equanimous mind (upekkh¯a), so there is no new kamma to respond, no new kammic result in the future. Hence, without intention, there is no kamma: therefore, the fourth type of deed is excellent. Regarding feeling, S¯ıvaka Sutta29 (With S¯ıvaka) states that kamma is not the only condition of feeling. The other seven factors also cause feeling: bile, phlegm, and wind, and the conjunction of bile phlegm wind, the weather, not taking care of oneself, and overexertion. Bhikkhu Thanissaro (2013) and Bhikkhu P.A. Payutto (2017, p. 378) tell us that the objective of the Buddha to stress these seven factors is to prevent people from falling into a deterministic view of kamma. Determinism leads to wrong actions, such as ascetics who try to cease all actions to prevent creating all kammic results. However, this prevention of the deterministic view requires a strong belief in the justice of kamma. Moral education would be more effective with a knowable epistemic context. Practically, the ability to know the results of kamma is limited to the arising of contact and feeling and other knowable sources without knowing of any kammic relations. Therefore, the valuable part of the principle of kamma to learn could be practicing skillful responsiveness rather than emphasizing the reward and punishment pattern. To support the practical knowledge of morality, the following section provides more important details of the differences between the concept of dependent co-arising and general causation in metaphysics, logic, and epistemology.

4 Dependent Co-Arising and Kamma Dependent co-arising (pat.iccasamupp¯ada), which incorporates kamma, differs from general causation in the ontological and logical aspects. Ontologically, the causal relation in pat.iccasamupp¯ada is explained differently by the condition of arisen phenomena. In sutta-s, the ultimate reality of human beings is the co-arising of the five aggregates (pañcakkhandha). In contrast, in Abhidhamma, the ultimates are grouped into four categories: consciousness (citta), mental factors (cetasika), matter 28

Digha Nikaya, Mah¯asatipat..th¯ana Sutta (DN 22) (The Longer Discourse on Mindfulness Meditation). 29 Samyutta Nikaya, S¯ıvaka Sutta (SN 36.21) (Bhikkhu Sujato, 2018).

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(r¯upa), and enlightenment (nibb¯ana) (Anuruddha, 1999, p. 26). The five aggregates fit with consciousness, mental factors, and matter. No substance exists in co-arising the ultimates since all existences arise from a bundle of properties (Karunadasa, 2019, pp. 40–42). Noa Ronkin sees the Buddhist metaphysical system of dependent co-arising, impermanence, and nonself as process metaphysics, supposing that encountered phenomena are best described as processes and events rather than things. Therefore, through the Buddhist epistemic lens, reality is not a container of persons and substances (Ronkin, 2009, p. 14). Given that all existences exist in co-arising conditions, an event arising at this moment can be conditioned by any random residues of previous moments since it also depends on other external conditions. On the other hand, reward and punishment, under the ontology of general causation, are based on knowable events with the notion of substances and temporal connections. The notion of substances means seeing moral agents as substantial persons whose actions have external effects and responsibility. In addition, the logical approach of general causation differs from the logic of pat.iccasamupp¯ada. The logic of general causation implies that “X causes Y” is a one-directional condition. If X, then Y (if A-agent does X-harmful, then A-agent receives Y-punishment). Dependent co-arising, however, is a biconditional.30 X if and only if Y. Feeling arises if and only if contact arises. Abhidhamma Pit.aka states the twofold causation. One, shared with Sutta Pit.aka, is dependent co-arising (pat.iccasamupp¯ada), and the other is the law of causal relations (pat..th¯ana). Below is the explanation of the characteristics of pat.iccasamupp¯ada and pat..th¯ana: Abstractly stated, the principle of dependent arising is expressed by the oft-occurring dictum: “When this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises” [...] As applied to the twelve terms of the Sutta formula, this principle means that when any of the conditions, such as ignorance, etc., exist, then in dependence on those conditions the conditionally arisen states, such as kammic formations, etc., come to be […] In contrast to the method of dependent arising, which deals only with the conditioning states and conditioned states and the structure of their arising, the method of the Pat..th¯ana also deals with the conditioning forces (paccayasatti). A force (satti) is that which has the power to bring about or accomplish an effect. Just as the hotness of chili is inherent in the chillis and cannot exist without them, so too the conditioning forces are inherent in the conditioning states and cannot exist without them. All conditioning states have their particular force, and this force enables them to cause the arising of the conditioned states. (Anuruddha, 1999, pp. 293–294)

The biconditional logic coheres with the teaching in the discourse, “conditioned by ignorance are the habitual tendencies” and “from the utter fading away and stopping of this very ignorance (comes) the stopping of habitual tendencies” (KD, 1).31 In Abhidhamma, dhamma is presented as the four categories mentioned earlier. The twenty-four casual relations presented in Pat..th¯ana explain the various 30

Somparn Promta discusses this notion of biconditionals in Promta (BE2560 [2017]). This biconditional logic makes the ultimate reality of the Buddha true when its two components have the same truth value (True vs True, and False vs False). 31 Vinaya Pitaka, Mah¯ avagga, Mah¯akhandhaka (KD 1) (Horner, 2014). .

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ways of inter-relation of those material and mental phenomena (Anuruddha, 1999, p. 303). Dhamma is the ultimate reality behind all manifest phenomena and beyond justification in the ordinary sense. On the other hand, Dhamma in Sutta Pit.aka focuses on ordinary things, which means all things that ordinary sense organs can observe. It includes all twelve elements in pat.iccasamupp¯ada in an observable version. For instance, to explain how physical or mental contact raises a feeling (phassa paccay¯a vedan¯a); Abhidhamma focuses on explaining a process of the arising of consciousness (citta), mental factors (cetasika), and matter (r¯upa), while in Sutta Pit.aka the Buddha points to the observation of pleasant or unpleasant feeling that comes to be. The extra-sensory experience, such as the divine eye, is mentioned by the Buddha in Sutta Pit.aka. However, either to the groups of people who cultivate chal.abhiññ¯a and have experienced it before or to ordinary people when it is required for cultivating the right view. The metaphysical system of non-substance in pat.iccasamupp¯ada makes existence unknown. However, in Sutta-s there are observable existences. The Buddha explains the concept of kamma to monks and laypeople using conventional language and aims to make it observable. Knowability is necessary for observing the conventional human system (vinaya). As mentioned earlier, P.A. Payutto recommends that vinaya be based on nature or dhamma. Here, the meanings of dhamma and kamma described are interchangeable.32 However, he continues that vinaya does not need to wait for the fruit of dhamma to complete its course (Payutto, 2017, p. 402). Hence, the unknowable fruit of kamma should be disregarded. Buddhist scholars observe the difference between Early Buddhism and Abhidhamma. In epistemology, Early Buddhism shifts from an empiricist to a rationalist approach of Abhidhamma (Karunadasa, 2019, pp. 17–18). In metaphysics, Early Buddhism shifts from phenomenology and process metaphysics toward event-based metaphysics, seeing in a theory of momentariness-based rationalism and abstraction of Abhidhamma (Barborich, 2017, p. 1). Noa Ronkin notes that the Abhidhamma metaphysics works on mental individuation rather than an ontological view of causation, where the Indian concept of causation (including Buddhists) is identified to account for mental bondage liberation (Ronkin, 2005, pp. 193–194). Hence, though dhamma theory is not empirical, it revolves around making sense of the mediation experience. For example, meditators can observe their unwholesome and wholesome consciousness—such as greed, hatred, sloth, fear of wrong, shame, and tranquility—with the equanimous mind.

32

Dhamma means absolute reality, which means all things exist according to conditionality. Ordinary people call dhamma nature. Nature operates by the law of nature (niy¯ama) or the rule of certainty, and kamma-niy¯ama, or the principle of kamma is considered one type of natural law with a distinct attribute (Payutto, 2017, pp. 311–312).

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5 Conclusion The idea of kamma unified with the law of nature presupposes that there is an objective sense of the distribution of justice in the lived world. However, the memory loss issue from the time lag and rebirth in the ordinary case without abhiññ¯a still makes the kamma explanation a mystery. Moreover, the truth of nature is still obscure to human beings. Suppose an objective sense of the distribution of justice in the lived world is positive. In that case, it means all events about moral agents as fruits of kamma are just but entirely arbitrary. Thus, what moral agents could do is respond to the events skillfully to lessen the chance of creating new kamma. Disregarding the unknowable rebirth theory and arbitrary characteristic of fruits of kamma, the teachings of kamma in sutta-s include the parts that open for justification by sensory experiences. Pat.hamaduccarita Sutta33 (the First Bad Conduct) illustrates punishment and reward for good and bad conduct: Mendicants, there are these five drawbacks of bad conduct. What five? You blame yourself. After examination, sensible people criticize you. You get a bad reputation. You feel lost when you die. And when your body breaks up, after death, you’re reborn in a place of loss, a bad place, the underworld, hell. These are the five drawbacks of bad conduct. There are these five benefits of good conduct. What five? You don’t blame yourself. After examination, sensible people praise you. You get a good reputation. You don’t feel lost when you die. When your body breaks up, after death, you’re reborn in a good place, a heavenly realm. These are the five benefits of good conduct. (AN 5.241)

In an epistemic view, the five drawbacks of bad conduct can be divided into the knowledge acquired from sensory experience and the knowledge of extra-sensory experience. Sensory experience enables a moral agent to blame oneself, sense when people criticize, and know when a bad reputation arises. The remaining two events about life after death are unknowable to ordinary laypeople without the divine eye. The five benefits of good conduct can be explained in similar thinking. Despite the unknowable part, kamma is beneficial in building morale toward some unexplainable occurrences or phenomena. As a result, kamma has been widely accepted and represents norms in Indian society.34 To encourage moral agents’ direct knowledge or the objective truth is also illustrated in Kesamutti Sutta (or aka K¯al¯am¯a Sutta)35 : Thus, K¯al¯amas, when we said: Come, K¯al¯amas, do not go by oral tradition […] But when you know for yourselves: These things are wholesome; these things are blameless; these 33

A˙nguttara Nik¯aya, pañcaka-chakkanip¯at¯a, Pat.hamaduccarita Sutta (Bhikkhu Sujato, 2018). In Indian philosophy, the metaphysic presupposition regarding kamma differs from school to school in both the orthodox (Hinduism: Sankhya, Yoga, Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Mimamsa, and Vedanta) and the heterodox (Jainism, Buddhism, and Carv¯aka). In such metaphysical presupposition, Buddhism differs from the others in that there is no substance, all things are impermanent, and all things exist in a momentary phenomenon. This idea leads to a debate that the non-substance, momentary, and impermanent self cannot experience the results of its previous action since the moral agent disappears before arising of the results (Chakraborty, 1998, p. 41). 35 A˙ nguttara Nik¯aya, Kesamutti Sutta (AN 3.63) (Bhikkhu Bodhi, 2012). 34

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things are praised by the wise; these things, if accepted and undertaken, lead to welfare and happiness, then you should live in accordance with them, it is because of this that this was said. (AN 3.63)

Pat.iccasamupp¯ada describes the entire process of performing volitional deeds. The teachings in the Sutta-s provide the knowledge that can be justified by ordinary sense-perception, the sense-perception enabled by co-arising the five aggregates and external objects’ contacts. Once a moral agent contacts any external object, the co-arising of body (r¯upa), consciousness (viññ¯an.a), and contact (phassa) are a set of necessary conditions sufficient for an arisen feeling (vedan¯a) to co-exist with comprehension/memorization (saññ¯a). Feeling (vedan¯a) and comprehension (saññ¯a) are a set of necessary conditions sufficient for arising volitional activities (sa˙nkh¯ara). By distributing a sufficient condition for a deserved feeling, which is the feeling that shows qualities worthy of reward or punishment, we see the results of kamma in moral agents. Therefore, if the fruit of kamma seems arbitrary and unknowable, a good moral judgment strategy should be on the self-protective side, not creating unskillful volitional deeds. In other words, the law of kamma might be used as moral education on skillful responsiveness; otherwise, it is not recommended.

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Klairung Iso is a Lecturer at the Department of Philosophy, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand. She has a diverse educational background with a bachelor’s degree in Political Science and two master’s degrees in Business Administration and Marketing, then a Ph.D. in Philosophy with a thesis on the Ethics of Consumerism. Before turning to academia, she had 16 years of experience in marketing management and was interested in debates on moral issues, which brought her to explore Western ethics. In addition, her Therav¯ada Buddhism background has expanded her interest in Buddhist metaphysics and ethics in the sense of comparative studies and applied ethics.

Chapter 21

Negotiating the Body in the Slums and the Devotion to the Black Nazarene Mark Joseph Calano

Abstract The symbiotic relationship between formal structures and informal dwellers constitutes a bond that defines Metro Manila. Where we find slums, we also find one of the most attended religious festivities—the feast of the Black Nazarene. This paper argues that the locality shapes the body; similarly, the body defines the performance of the devotion within the continuities and discontinuities of the city. This paper is divided into three parts. The first part considers the body vis-à-vis the everyday struggle for survival by looking at embodied and disembodied spaces identified as “squatters.” The connaturality between bodies and spaces is juxtaposed with the performances of the devotion to the Black Nazarene. The second part considers the bond between the slums and the devotion. The third considers the play in the body of the informal settlers as a convergence of law and lawlessness as well as sin and atonement. Keywords Slums · The body · Devotion to the Black Nazarene · Locality · Criminality

1 Introduction In “How Kristo Democratized Langit: The Discourse of Liberation in Christianized Katagalugan,” Agustin Martin Rodriguez (2021) emphasizes the need for persons to concretize themselves in a system of valuation. Such is necessary to articulate their unique and peculiar being-in-the-world. On the other hand, amidst criticism of syncretism and inauthenticity, Jayeel Cornelio (2014) recognizes the growing interest in everyday religiosity as a concrete and authentic expression of faith. It is in this context that the urban contrasts with the rural. In this dichotomy, the rural is associated with religiosity, while the urban is associated with secularism. Despite this, the growing religious aspiration in Metro Manila remains undeniable (Cornelio, 2015). The devotion to the Black Nazarene is at the heart of the metropolis, one of the M. J. Calano (B) Panpacific University, Urdaneta City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Hongladarom et al. (eds.), Philosophies of Appropriated Religions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5191-8_21

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most attended and male-dominated religious performances in the Roman Catholic Philippines. Predominantly urban poor devotees participate in the devotion to the Black Nazarene. Thus, one can understand such devotion as the informal class expressing its right to be in the city (Berner, 1997) and its desire to overcome its weakness and vulnerability (Tremlett, 2006, p. 15). Given Aristotle’s hexis (or “way of being”) and Pierre Bourdieu’s “feel for the game,” one can argue for the interrelationship of the locality and the body and the body and the performance of religiosity. The paper is divided into three parts. The first part presents the relationship between informal spaces and bodies. The second part discusses how the lifestyles and valuations of the informal infiltrate religious performances. Finally, the third part shows how the porousness of the sacred and the ordinary characterizes everyday life in the metropolis.

2 Informal Locality/Bodies Spaces are never neutral nor empty (Heidegger, 1973). They are always embodied (Malpas, 2006, p. 263; Vallega, 2003, p. 58). Spaces are inhibited by spatially oriented moving and speaking bodies (Low, 2003, p. 10). Like binary relations, informal spaces are identified only in contrast with formal communities. This is true of gated subdivisions as well as government properties; squatter (the body) inhabits a particular place (the slum) and operates informal economies versus formal ones (Hogan & Hogan, 2012). When one looks at spaces, it is easy to reduce them to an objective place; but it is never merely a place as it is a dwelling. When one dwells in a space, the fundamental relations produce the locality, which Appadurai (1996) understands as “both a general property of social life and as a particular valuation of that property.” While spaces and places are never understood as empty, it is interesting how the slums are often understood as such. From a developmental perspective, slums are often considered public, open, and empty spaces that must be cleared and demolished. Less of a dwelling, the slums are understood in a legal-formal environment as illegal and informal structures where their inhabitants are easily profiled, reduced, and quantified (Cruz, 2010, pp. 1–6). By referring to them as “squatters,” they are disembodied, understood as homeless citizens, bodies without a space, and aliens in their inhabitants on an urban topography. In Metro Manila, the relationship between space and body is recognizable in the term “squatter,” which is understood interchangeably as a person or a place. Squatter seems to point to what Casey (2001, p. 697) refers to as the “human subject actively committed to a habitation that can accommodate nomadic and settled dwelling.” This active commitment to this site of poverty and deprivation is baffling; the slums were always something a city must eliminate. This negative connotation of the slums is worth considering; there is a need to understand the slums without pre-determined concepts. Concepts are co-created by looking at places, bodies, and their bonds.

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Casey explains this conceptualization as essentially local, “To live is to live locally and to know first of all to know the place one is in” (Casey, 2001, p. 685). To explain this connaturality between body and place, Casey (1996) identifies four areas for consideration. The first refers to the place and movement. The second is the place as a gathering of many elements (like thoughts, memory, and history), both living and non-living. The third considers the place’s capacity to contain shapes, landscapes, contours, and the like. Finally, the fourth points to its residents as living beings. Bodies and narratives constitute the place. Bodies make perceiving, accessing, and experiencing the world possible. Place provides the body with material for acting, thinking, feeling, and expressing. The body reflects different traces of the many places it inhabited. In this context, the place also represents the many bodies that inhabited it. This is the “habitudinal bond” between place and bodies. It allows the place to assimilate bodies as they are assimilated in spaces (Casey, 2001, p. 685). In this context, one can understand why a squatter refuses to be reduced to the informal and defies this subsumption. The squatter refuses to be seen only as one who inhabits a portion of public, open, and spare land. Becoming a home that can collect and gather organic and non-organic matter, the place and the person become an event (ereignis) rather than a thing to be assimilated. As an eventual experience, the person/ place becomes a unique feature of the space; it turns idiolocal and demands to be understood on its terms. In this narrative, one’s failure to recognize the squatter as a way of life also misses the way of life that is the squatter (Jocano, 2002). There is no definite and objective space. There are only idiolocalities. Language is constitutive of the space where the person dwells as much as it is constitutive of the thinking, perceiving, and living subject (Searle, 1970). The body of the squatter (person) serves as the very place’s localizing agent in the squatter (place). Locality is an output of the lived experiences of persons made possible by their body types cohabiting in a particular place. This lived experience can only be local. In this way, no place nor body can be categorically and objectively named; if anything, we can only speak of a particular type of place and body. Quiapo is such a locality. It is an actual district in the City of Manila. Through the years, Quiapo has been known for being crowded and cramped, making it an ideal location for informality and petty crimes. Andrade (2006) points to this problem as a consequence of rootlessness: On the one hand, many Quiapenses who have moved to the suburbs no longer care what happens in the district, even if they retain homes and real estate in the area. On the other hand, newcomers seem not to care about the district either because they consider Quiapo not a home but a temporary domicile. (Andrade, 2006, p. 68)

Whether or not Andrade’s observation is accurate, it does not deny that informality shares the Quiapo district. Part of this experience of informality is the disorder characterized by the abundance of petty crimes in the area. With informality comes petty crimes. Those who perform petty crimes typically steal from passersby. These thieves are called in Filipino, tirador; the root of the word being tira (which refers to something residual or a left-over). Interestingly, tira can also refer to one’s residence as in the word naka-tira. In the slums, the tirador

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lives in a very narrow piece of land, often adjacent to a creek (or estero). It is often interspersed with many side alleys (or callejons) branching in all different directions. As the land is limited, it determines the size and position of the houses. The houses define the position of the bodies living in them and their possible movement. The land is public land; it is vacant as it is often residual. Occupied arbitrarily by resilient squatters, the land defines the archeological principles of building. Like Lego bricks, the materials are placed one on another, creating a very tall structure. Because the land is narrow, houses can only be built vertically to accommodate families and extended families living in one household. The material is also worth noticing. The slums are made of light and semi-concrete materials (concrete in the lower portion and wood or tarp in the upper portion) or the makeshift barong-barong. The structure reflects the speed in occupying the land, the construction of the houses, and its future dismantling. Possessing lands in the slums is a matter of moving in a very fast way. As such, there is a sense of urgency and vulnerability. They build their houses by dismantling and re-using the materials again. Interestingly, these houses look humble, decrepit, and dilapidated; they are no match for external calamities such as fire, wind, and storm (Jocano, 2002). Because the slums are always vertical, their residents are also almost always in an upright position. This explains why residents are generally always moving or on the streets. The limited land allows for callejons in and around the area. Because of the space, people are constantly moving fast, making the place hectic and bustling. In the slums, one needs to move fast; this, too, is idiolocal. It is not an accident that tirador is fast. Snatching goods requires a quick movement on a startled victim. This goes without emphasizing that the snatched goods are also often small items that facilitate quick movement. This makes the kalye an important place for social encounters (Calano, 2015). On the streets, they catch news, gossip, and make friends and enemies (Jocano, 2002, pp. 41–46). In the street, they earn their livelihood and spend time (tambay) with friends while waiting for any opportunity. The kalye is wider than the looban. It is a place to slow down and wind up, especially since their makeshift houses do not have spacious living rooms.

3 Discordant Orders Shirtless men in the looban are like their vertical houses, made of concrete foundations topped with lightweight materials. The similarity is undeniable. Aside from lightweight materials, the top parts are also made of enormous windows for ventilation and social interaction. These windows allow gossiping between and among neighbors. It keeps them abreast of what is happening in their community and the looban. Similarly, the same observation can be made about shirtless men. Like their vertical houses, these men need ventilation and social interaction. Just as lightweight materials can easily be dismantled, so can shirtless men simply put on or remove

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their shirts. Men, in the looban, can also easily blend with others and move swiftly when necessary. Being a tirador is an enterprise predominantly for men. Similarly, the mamamasan of the Black Nazarene was first reserved for men. While the tiradors usually are without shirts in the looban and when they engage their family or barkada, they are often seen in maroon and yellow shirts in church or during the traslacion. While they wear shoes or slippers in the looban (necessary for swift movement), they come barefoot during the procession (where there is no rush). This explains why tiradors move swiftly along callejons, while, during the traslacion, the mamamasan are afforded any mobility and speed aside from the procession’s rhythm (indayog). Despite the similarities and differences, the body of the tirador and the mamamasan constitutes that of an anonymous day laborer. They are bodies just one among the many often monitored and managed by the local police. A regular police operation in the slums (as it is presented in movies and the news, and often portrayed as a legal search), homes are illegally inspected, and suspected criminals are gathered. This is uncommon in formal communities but not in informal ones. Often, those gathered are men suspected of being involved in a continuing crime. Once out of their homes, they are gathered in a clearing and asked to remove their shirts. They are asked to sit or squat and to show their tattoos. Police check their faces; in this scenario, the presence of police officers is a mode of control—a way of management (Gestell). Similarly, during the annual procession, the presence of police officers is also a mode of control, which also seems to indicate crime or its possibility, even though many have even reported a zero crime rate during the annual traslacion (Zurbano, 2019). The body of the mamamasan is the body of the tirador. It is the body of one who is not oblivious to work. It is the body of a daily wage earner. It is a body familiar with doing tasks that some people would rather pay for than do. This is what others would call tira. This body is familiar with manual tasks, demanding jobs, and low wages. In contrast to formal jobs, many mamamasans and tiradors end with informal ones—house help, gardener, family driver, and the like. These informal tasks often necessitate certain body types depending on the job title. Some battle scars form on areas often used. Callouses define their hands and feet. Similarly, some religious performances define the body as constant kneeling or bowing. Manual labor is constitutive of the devotion to the Black Nazarene. When one looks at the performances done in the devotion (pulling, pushing, climbing, wiping, touching) to the Black Nazarene, one recognizes the actions proper of a laborer who works for a master. It is not an accident that the devotees of Black Nazarene are also called mamamasan. Etymologically, the root word is pasan, a reference to something being carried. One can even say that those who have devotion to the Black Nazarene carry something—a problem, a request, a petition. Struggling with life, the devotees make swift moves in otso or kabig sa kanan o sa kaliwa during the devotion if it entails survivability. The body of the mamamasan is also embodied in the body of the tirador. I explained this in another paper, and it is worth quoting here as a whole:

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In circumstances of poverty, devotees, in all their embodiment and physicality (as buhay), understand their devotion as earning a living (hanap-buhay) through manual labor. As such, the embodiment of this devotion cannot be separated from the perspective of the manggagawa (manual laborer). The manggagawa (worker) is most acquainted with the dynamics of hirap (difficulties) and ginhawa (relief). Within this logic, the hirap of work necessarily leads to ginhawa as the hirap (and effort) of work is rewarded with wages. For the mahihirap (or those in poverty), earning a living (or hanap-buhay) is always a transactional experience; and operating with scarce resources entails its efficient utilization. The body mediates the manggagawa’s mode of negotiating with others, whether economically and/or spiritually. Therefore, it is not an accident that the manggagawa present themselves as mamamasan (devotees) who pasan or carry something. Devotion is understood as (and is not separated from) work. It can be understood as an attempt to “labor” for and with a God who obviously is laboring for us. As labor (hanap-buhay) necessitates reward (which is supposedly lifegiving), so does every performance of the devotion to the Black Nazarene also rewarding. The reward is understood as ginhawa; but within the transactional logic defined above, the devotion can be understood in terms of two acts of negotiation understood as pagtawad (bid) and patawad (forgiveness). (Calano, 2018, pp. 66–67)

If anything, devotees are not objects that are unaffected by their environment. They bring to devotion their life’s struggles, petitions, and worldviews. It is easy to articulate faith when it is a matter of memorizing concepts and ideals. However, unless it is embedded in the everyday experiences of the devotees, it remains what it is—an ideal. So, every day, the mamamasan is challenged to live out his faith in the Black Nazarene in the face of many other (and often more urgent) challenges. Such is a life of constant negotiation with the body and others, including politics. Crime and some illicit activities are normalized in the looban. It is tolerated by those who are devoted to the Black Nazarene. This is part of their everyday experiences of negotiation, of integration. This economy of crime creates a dependency between the tirador and their victims, as well as the police and the tirador. In the place of devotion, the tirador can steal from other devotees. It does not matter if they are fellow devotees; what matters the most is the grace being given. Similarly, narratives of police confiscating goods from the tirador also abound. Access to these goods (stolen or not) completes the economy. For the tirador, there is no contradiction here. Survivability is a higher virtue than honesty. Even elected officials (tanods) know who the tirador is in their barangays (localities) like priests know the sin of the faithful. Similarly, the sacrament of reconciliation is offered to all devotees who want to receive it 24/7 in the Basilica. That, too, is an economy and a dependence made possible by grace. The dependence on politics with the poor cannot be emphasized enough. Political leaders pursue the majority and popular vote. During elections, these politicians target the poor and present themselves as one of them. The tirador and the slums are not foreign to vote-buying and promising politicians. Though illegal, vote-buying is a constant with every election season; their new gadgets or clothes can induce this in the days following an election. Gossip is the primary mode of information and ensures group cohesion. Truths are better told in gossip than read or reported. There is truth in this informality—a truth more dependable than mass media. In short, people in the looban are not trying to present themselves as saints. They know their brokenness and lapses and live with them.

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The devotion to the Black Nazarene is undeniably a cult revolving around suffering. The poor approach Christ. It is easy to juxtapose this with elections when politicians associate themselves with the urban poor. What Wataru Kusaka (2017) observes as moral politics between the civic and masses also exists in the devotion to the Black Nazarene. The Black Nazarene is an image of a “Jesus,” who was accused by Pontius Pilate—a representative of the body politic. His body is reduced to the body of a criminal. The tirador is understood as a criminal, like society’s bottom feeders. During elections, they, too, become the object of vote-buying. They are the leftovers. In the Gospel of Matthew, the Canaanite Woman (Mt 15: 21–28) speaks of crumbs falling from their master’s table. While identifying herself with dogs, she can demonstrate the grace that comes with such humility. Similarly, the tirador does not fake religiosity, nor do they act self-righteous. There is no disconnect between the two. They are precise with their ordo amoris. The Black Nazarene provides for their everyday needs, even if that means stealing from fellow devotees. One can argue how these disparate elements may merge, but that is only true of a “Puritan sensibility” with strict observance of “moral” codes. The tirador and the mamamasan are used to hearing promises for a better world. They believe and pray for it but also work for it. They are people who hope (taga-asa) for ginhawa. They know they cannot wait for hope to materialize—that is fatal. The devotion to the Black Nazarene as panatà is also understood as a way of asking for forgiveness (patawad), of promising to be a better person in exchange for a petition or need. Interestingly, many prayers are about mundane and essential commodities such as food, health, and shelter and more mundane realities such as winning the cockfight (sabong) or lottery. The urban poor might not have much and spend little gambling. This is a matter of chance (fate) but is also a matter of faith [pananam (to taste) + palataya (what it means to gamble)] for the tirador. Interestingly, there is some gambling, like the lottery, and the state officially sanctions that. According to Philippine laws, the profit made from the lottery is to aid the poor. In short, the poor are made the very beneficiaries of a crime. This is ironic because the lottery was instituted to prevent illegal gambling; it is decriminalized to criminalize it.

4 Negotiating Faith/s In the looban, people are always in the run. When they run, they do not always invalidate the law. Running is not always constitutive of a crime, even if it indicates a crime. The traslacion and the looban—although appearing like pandemonium to an external observer—are not governed by lawlessness. The looban shows the normalization of criminality as a mode of resiliency between and among generations. They are absorbed by children from their significant others and close encounters. The looban, just like the devotion to the Black Nazarene, is a form of resiliency. Like faith, these petty crimes are caught and not taught because it is a lived reality.

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Similarly, devotion to the Black Nazarene is caught, not taught. They are transferred unconsciously, absorbed by a generation who grew up within communities with devotion (balangays). Thus, we speak of an inherited faith. Crime and faith have resemblances along these lines. In terms of crime, the tirador is at the mercy of what is stolen. Due to their agility and speed, what is stolen is mostly lightweight, disposable, and inexpensive. As such, it is not simply worth the effort of police searches. The things, when stolen, take a symbolic value. For the tirador’s discerning eye, there is value in what is stolen. The value does not always imply monetary reward. That is the reason why these crimes are considered petty and why they move within an underground economy. The tiradors are guilty of petty crimes. Due to its pettiness, it usually skips through the fringes of the law and is reduced to amicable settlements or constant negotiations. Just as they can be reintegrated into society, so can they be absorbed in the mercy of God. With the tirador and the mamamasan is the place and space for the merging of lawlessness and the law, of transgressions and conventions, and of sin and mercy. They habituate these many worlds and are the best of them because they know them all. As such, they can camouflage themselves easily into an anonymous crowd just as the clothes they wear during the traslacion camouflages them with the many. In the performance of the devotion to the Black Nazarene, we recognize the at-one-ment (atonement) between the blessed and the sinner, the innocent and the corrupt, the legal and the criminal in a juxtaposition and mixture of sorts that are interchangeable, and renewable in the very experience of life in the slums and the witness of their faith. In a way, this recognition of oneself-as-another (Ricoeur, 1992) is the very principle that decriminalizes and absolves everyone.

5 Conclusion The looban and the squatter are related in a habitudinal bond. This bond does not exclude one’s constitution of faith and its expression. The body of the mamamasan is the body of the laborer working for their Lord for their survival. This explains the extravagance of this religious performance and its rootedness in the idiolocality that is Quiapo. In this bigger picture, petty crimes are negotiated in the face of God’s “negotiable” love.

References Andrade, P., Jr. (2006). Quiapo in the history of the nation. In F. Zialcita (Ed.), Quiapo: Heart of Manila (pp. 40–69). The Cultural Heritage Studies Program of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology of Ateneo de Manila University and Metropolitan Museum of Manila. Appadurai, A. (1996). Modernity at large: Cultural dimension of globalization 1. University of Minnesota Press.

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Berner, E. (1997). Defending a place in the city: Localities and the struggle for urban land in metro Manila. Ateneo de Manila University Press. Calano, M. J. (2015). The Black Nazarene, Quiapo, and the weak Philippine state. Kritika Kultura, 25, 166–187. Calano, M. J. (2018). Ginhawa as ethic of Panatà: Body politics and the devotion to the Black Nazarene. Budhi: A Journal of Ideas and Culture, XXII(2), 43–74. Casey, E. S. (1996). How to get from space to place in a fairly short stretch of time: Phenomenological prolegomena. In S. Feld & K. H. Basso (Eds.), Senses of place (pp. 14–51). School of American Research Press. Casey, E. S. (2001). Between geography and philosophy: What does it mean to be in the place-world? Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 91(4), 683–693. Cornelio, J. S. (2015). Global and religious: Urban aspirations and the governance of religions in metro Manila. In P. van der Veer (Ed.), Handbook of religion and the Asian city: Aspiration and urbanization in the twenty-first century (pp. 69–88). University of California Press. Cornelio, J. S. (2014). Popular religion and the turn to everyday authenticity: Reflections on the contemporary study of Philippine Catholicism. Philippine Studies Historical & Ethnographic Viewpoints, 62(3–4), 471–500. Cruz, J. E. (2010). Estimating informal settlers in the Philippines. Paper presented at the 11th National Convention on Statistics (NCS), Mandaluyong, Metro Manila (October 4–5). Available at http://www.adb.org/projects/pep/papers/report-smokeymountain.pdf. Heidegger, M. (1973). Art and space (Charles H. Seibert, Trans.). Man and World, 6(1), 3–8. Hogan, T., & Hogan, C. J. (2012). Gates and borders, malls and moats: A photo essay of Manila, 2011. Thesis Eleven, 112(1), 35–50. Jocano, F. L. (2002). Slum as a way of life: A study of coping behavior in an urban environment. Punllad Research House. Kusaka, W. (2017). Moral politics in the Philippines: Inequality, democracy, and the urban poor. Ateneo de Manila University Press. Low, S. M. (2003). Embodied space (s) anthropological theories of body, space, and culture. Space and Culture, 6(1), 9–18. Malpas, J. (2006). Heidegger’s topology: Being, place, world. MIT Press. Ricoeur, P. (1992). Oneself as another (K. Blarney, Trans.). The University of Chicago Press. Rodriguez, A. M. (2021). How Kristo democratized Langit: The discourse of liberation in Christianized Katagalugan. Kritike, 15(1), 1–20. Searle, J. R. (1970). Speech acts: An essay in the philosophy of language. Cambridge University Press. Tremlett, P.-F. (2006). Power, invulnerability, beauty: Producing and transforming male bodies in the Lowland Chritianised Philippines. School of Oriental and African Studies’ Centre for Gender and Religion Research. Vallega, A. A. (2003). Heidegger and the issue of space: Thinking on exilic grounds. Penn State Press. Zurbano, J. (2019, January 9). Traslacion effect: Tons of garbage, zero crime rate. Manila Standard. Available at https://manilastandard.net/news/top-stories/285047/traslacion-effect-tons-ofgarbage-zero-crime-rate.html

Mark Joseph Calano is the Vice President for Research and Innovation of the Panpacific University. He has graduate degrees in philosophy, theology, and linguistics. His research interests revolve around the philosophy of Religion, popular religiosity, and the ideas of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Charles Taylor, and Jacques Derrida. He was the Former President of the Philosophical Association of the Philippines from 2012 to 2017.

Chapter 22

Virtual Catholicism in the Philippines: An Analysis of Technology, Religion, and Kalooban in Time of Isolation Mark Inigo M. Tallara

Abstract In Southeast Asia, the COVID-19 pandemic became a significant period for many churches, temples, mosques, and religious groups to experiment with virtual and limited religious gatherings. The transition of the Catholic churches in the Philippines to conduct fully online religious activities was immediately implemented when the lockdown was announced on 5 March 2020. However, churches were allowed to hold limited activities when the government implemented a modified lockdown. What will happen after the pandemic? What should the churches do in response to the members who are against and those who have already developed a preference for online religious activities? In this paper, the discussion considers the works of (Certeau, The practice of everyday life, University of California Press, 1984), Lefebvre (1991), and (Tallara, M. (2022). Symbolism and expression of performing Panata in the Philippines: An ethnohistorical analysis of Nuestro Padre Jesus Nazareno of Quiapo. Religions, 13(4)) on how space, knowledge, power, and the self can produce a series of steps to analyze the role of technology in religion. This paper utilizes anthropological and philosophical approaches, particularly the social shaping technology (SST) method, to analyze the religious experiences of devotees performing sacred vows (PSV) to Nuestro Padre Jesus Nazareno of Quiapo. This is consistent with the theoretical and conceptual thinking that placing self or pamumuwesto and substituting a sacred site or commutatio in religious practices are crucial to the devotee’s innermost selfhood or kalooban. Keywords Catholicism · Quiapo · Black Nazarene · Kalooban · Panata

M. I. M. Tallara (B) De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Hongladarom et al. (eds.), Philosophies of Appropriated Religions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5191-8_22

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1 Introduction The challenges of performing online religious practices due to COVID-19 have become a significant concern for many religious institutions, communities, and organizations worldwide. In the Philippines, the government has imposed strict measures to prevent physical contact, urging people to follow social distancing to help stop the spread of the virus. The COVID-19 pandemic has presented challenges and opportunities, particularly in Quiapo, a known center for the Catholic faith in Manila. The implementation of the social distancing measures prohibited or encouraged devotees to limit their visits to the church. In 2021 and 2022, Catholics in Manila marked Quiapo Fiesta, or the feast of Nuestro Padre Jesus Nazareno (NPJN), with Eucharistic pods or prayer pods, similar to a self-contained group of people who limit their interaction with one another. The purpose of the prayer pods is to follow the government rules on the limited capacity for religious gatherings. The limited religious gatherings have suspended the standard patterns of spiritual life, mainly performing personal and collective ritual practices. COVID-19 became a critical test for the Catholic Church in the Philippines on how to conduct their religious activities remotely. However, the response of Catholics to the pandemic was exemplary as most of the devotees in Quiapo Church followed the actions of the church leadership and obeyed the rules of the lockdown. Quiapo Church is one of the biggest churches in the Philippines and a popular site for Friday devotion and the annual procession in honor of NPJN. Nevertheless, how do the regular NPJN devotees conduct their devotion during the lockdown? How do the devotees perform their panata or sacred vow to NPJN? The use of digital technology during the lockdown has brought about a significant impact on the Catholic churches in Manila. The use of mobile technology, in particular, has affected how the devotees practiced religious activities in Quiapo. During the Enhanced Community Quarantine (ECQ) in Manila, Catholic masses, officially known as the Eucharistic celebration, were held remotely, live-streaming on different social media platforms. Through the help of digital technology, Catholics could perform their religious or sacred vow just by staying in their homes. Live broadcasting or streaming of masses allowed many devotees in Quiapo to participate in the mass and other religious activities, initially reserved for those who could not leave their houses because of illness, age, or lack of churches in their area. However, can recording or live-streaming affect religious practices in Quiapo? Despite the restrictions that keep people physically apart, parishes in Manila are finding new ways to bring people together and continue their religious practices. Before the COVID-19 lockdown, only a few parishes had masses online or livebroadcasting it on television. During the lockdown, many parishes in the Philippines started to live-stream their masses through Facebook. Quiapo Church’s online presence has created a space for religious information and other content to be more accessible to people. In Quiapo, almost 95% of the respondents joined online religious gatherings regularly, especially during the first year of the lockdown. About 91% said that they sustained their devotion through the virtual format, with some

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developing more individualized religious practices even after more than two years of lockdown. In the digital space, viewing religious activities, particularly a mass, brings the viewers closer to the actual ritual performance. The viewers are re-imagining a community in an actual live-streamed mass. Digital technology and religion were once contrasting and even contradicting fields. Pope Francis noted that Internet technology could benefit Catholics (O’Kane, 2019). He urges responsible use of the Internet and social media, which should be used to liberate, not entrap, people. Although televised masses were already popular in the Philippines in the late 1990s, it took several years before Catholic churches and religious orders accepted the benefits of recording, live-streaming, and using social media for religious activities and practices. The once impossible and even controversial became a reality when the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) released a Pastoral Letter on 13 March 2020 and 22 March 2021, announcing the suspension of masses due to ECQ, live-streaming them instead. The devotees’ online experiences are essential in depicting reverence and what happened in Quiapo Church during the lockdown. For many devotees, performing their sacred vow (PSV) or devotion matters to them. PSV can be personal or inherited, online or physical, and vital for young and older devotees. Whether their petitions, prayers, or wishes are granted, many consider PSV as a duty. Another aspect of PSV in Quiapo is the presence of sacred objects like pictures or replicas of NPJN. These sacred images are crucial to the understanding of the religious devotion and motivation of the devotees. It motivates the desire to PSV, to share the stories of their religious experiences, and to be with physical objects like the images of Christ or any items blessed by holy water. Buying and selling religious objects in Quiapo Church has resulted in commercializing the reproduction of the images of NPJN. However, for many devotees, the image or replica of NPJN is an integral part of their PSV. The power eminent from the religious object is believed to bring protection, happiness, and joy. Despite having religious activities online, many devotees still desire to return to the actual place of worship. As this study argues, the use of technology, like print media and digital technology, is crucial to the growth and development of the Catholic Church. Catholicism reached the Philippines through the Iberian new communication pathways and maritime trade across the Pacific Ocean. Print and digital technologies became an apparatus for space production and contributed to Catholicism’s transplantation in the Philippines. Moreover, the influences can be seen in the religious practices in Quiapo, which is unique in showing the devotee’s innermost selfhood or kalooban. This paper considers the works of scholars on the discussion of place and knowledge and their function in analyzing technology’s role in studying religion. Furthermore, it examines the role of the actors, events, and objects involved in the historical production and shaping of religious practices and space. This is consistent with the conceptual framing of the study on how the placing of self or pamumuwesto. Substituting a sacred site or commutatio in religious practices is crucial to the devotee’s kalooban. The location of the self in religious practices is pamumuwesto.

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Pamumuwesto can happen in an officially recognized sacred place or beyond the official sacred space. Pamumuwesto is connected to commutatio. Devotees who could not attend church because of lockdowns could make a commutatio (visiting a substitute sacred site). The process also involves “substituting a sacred site” or “creating a temporary site or space” for religious practices. This study utilizes ethnographical and philosophical methods and social shaping technology (SST) framing to analyze how pamumuwesto and commutatio have increased the alternative ways of performing sacred vows or panata. A hybrid approach that combines face-to-face and online research methods helped analyze how panata have changed in Quiapo. The netnographical technique was used in the data gathering. Netnography is a specialized form of ethnography popularized by Robert Kozinets (2010, pp.1–3). Netnography or digital ethnography was used to discuss the religious activities of the devotees on the Internet and through other technologically mediated communications. The netnographic and philosophical methods used in the analysis enhance this study’s Performing Sacred Vow-Social Shaping Technology (PSVSST) framework. Participant observation, on the other hand, involves both face-to-face and watching the live broadcast or recorded religious activities. Analyzing text and images through the media provided a platform to observe the participants or respondents and their online behavior (Garcia, Standlee, & Cui, 2009, pp. 52–84). The first phase of the research was conducted face-to-face in Manila between 2014 to early 2020. The second phase of the research was conducted online due to the COVID-19 lockdown in the Philippines. The interviews were done through Zoom, Facebook Messenger, and email correspondence between October 2020 to January 2021 and December 2021 to January 2022. Personal interaction with the devotees before the lockdown and the insights of the people involved in online communities or platforms of Quiapo Church and the Facebook group page of selected Hijos del Nazareno (HDN) were used in the discussion. The series of conversations with the people involved in the content creation and those managing the groups’ social media have also contributed to the analysis. All respondents were selected based on the following criteria: (1) devotees in Quiapo Church; (2) all aged 18 years and above; and (3) willing to participate in the conduct of the study. Both synchronous and asynchronous interview methods were conducted. The respondents were twenty-five active members of HDN.

2 Understanding Space and Technology in the Study of Catholicism In Quiapo, the process of creating religious space involves the production of objects and events. Religious space plays an indispensable role as a gathering mechanism. The study of space in religion is still evolving. Some of the earliest scholarships on the subject focus on sacred space and pilgrimage; see, for example, (van der Leeuw,

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1933), (Eliade, 1959), (Smith, 1978, 1987), and (Turner & Turner, 1978). The study of place and space can also be found in the works of Michel de Certeau (1984) and Henri Lefebvre (1991), which recognize the power of individuals, the authority of institutions, and the discourses on the historical production and shaping of space. In Quiapo, for example, the presence of the devotees and sacred objects are essential components in producing religious space. As mentioned, space plays a critical role as a medium to unite people; however, it is also an arena of struggle (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 417; Foucault, 1991). During the lockdown, devotees are against performing religious activities online but have also developed a preference for online religious practices. Virtual religious activities are now more acceptable, but for some devotees performing religious practices, face-to-face is still an essential aspect of their social lives. While the pandemic lockdown defines the flexibility of religious space, without the actors and objects to produce and shape the space, ideas, and beliefs will remain ephemeral, ungrounded, and unorganized (Lefebvre, 1991, pp. 417–418). Quiapo is a space for many things, echoing Lefebvre’s idea of space. For the local government, Quiapo is one of the sixteen districts of Manila. It is a lived or living space for permanent or temporary residents. As a perceived space, Quiapo can be a business district or an area for political and social activities. It is also a conceived space where devotees of NPJN can visit Quiapo Church for their religious practices. Before the popularity of the Internet in religious practices, the Catholic Church already had a history with the adoption and utilization of technology. To understand the relationship of the Catholic Church to technology, let us explore some of the works of scholars that studied the intersection between technology and religion. The aim is to contribute to the historical understanding of how the Catholic Church was able to adopt and utilize the Internet during the COVID-19 pandemic. This is consistent with the conceptual consideration of how pamumuwesto and commutatio to perform online and face-to-face religious practices are crucial to Quiapo devotee’s kalooban or innermost selfhood. The advent of the press media or print technology paved the way for widespread communication but also presented new challenges for the powerful institutions of that time (Eisenstein, 1979, pp. 1–18). The printing press democratized access to the previously handwritten word or text reserved only for a few people. The Catholic Church is one of the most prominent patrons of the printing press. Print technology made the spread of religious knowledge and ideas not only in Europe but also in other parts of the world. While religious groups capitalized on using the printing press, this technology also shifted knowledge production to print. For Marshall McLuhan (1965), radio and television not only changed the way people communicated with each other. Radio and television have altered societies that adopted the technology. For Brenda Basher (2001), the Internet offers online users access to different religious information twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Furthermore, Basher noted that removing oneself from the religious physical place has radically altered the sense of simulation in performing religious practices and has transformed how people think about religion (Basher, 2001). For Christopher Helland (2000), the convergence of religion and the Internet has provided a new space and ways for members to exercise a specific form of religiosity (Helland, 2000,

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pp. 205–224). While the Catholic Church has been struggling with the question of virtual spaces since the early 2000s (Foley, 2017). Todd Frobish noted that the Catholic Church was the first major religious institution to create an official webpage (Frobish, 2006, pp. 38–69). The Internet is now a part of people’s daily lives, and religious institutions, groups, and organizations must consider the impact of this technology on their members. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, almost all major religious groups in the Philippines now have a digital presence. There are numerous Catholic Facebook pages, downloadable Catholic mobile applications (apps), and an increasing number of Catholic websites, either personal or institutional web pages. Their functions range from giving the members the ability to access various information to engaging with the other church members conveniently. Although the Internet and social media platforms are a blessing to religious institutions in many ways, they can also be a religious group’s worst nightmare. The increasing number of fake news and disinformation openly challenge many religious institutions and poses a threat to misinformed devotees. Despite this, the Catholic Church in the Philippines, particularly Quiapo Church, is keen to increase its digital presence and use technology to reach out to its members in Manila and worldwide.

3 Framing Virtual Catholicism in the Philippines Before the Internet, print media was once considered a threat to the Catholic Church. Many church leaders have been suspicious of print technology since its development in the fifteenth century. This cautious action, to some extent, has protected the Catholic Church’s authority while utilizing technology, especially in printing religious books and articles. Despite the threat, print technology afforded the Catholic Church new opportunities especially transporting and transplanting Catholicism across the Pacific Ocean in the Philippines. The earliest printed book in the Philippines is Doctrina Christiana. It was published in 1593 with the primary goal of spreading Catholic teachings among the Tagalogs. The publication of Doctrina Christiana and other religious books in the Philippines is a period connected to the expanding print culture of that century (De la Cruz, 2015, p. 27). The Catholic Church has continued using the printing press but has imposed strict guidelines for its use within Catholic doctrines, teachings, and practices. Digital technology, particularly the Internet and mobile technology, further intensifies the changes already present in the Catholic Church. Catholics do online almost the same as they do offline. The difference is that their religious activities are now more mediated virtually rather than physically. While the COVID-19 lockdown became a critical test of how to enhance the religious life of the devotees, it also created a connection between the visible on screen, like the altar, religious images, priests, preachers, readers, and the rituals, and the invisible, like an imagined community who are viewing the activities remotely in real-time.

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The works of Heidi Campbell (2010) on how religious communities use technology provide a suitable theoretical approach and a methodological technique to analyze how the Catholic Church uses digital technology. Her analysis uses a modified version of the religious-social shaping of technology or RSST on how Catholics perform their religious practices in a technologically mediated space. RSST employs the critical components of the existing SST model, which was born from the intersection of science, technology, and the sociology of technology (Campbell, 2010). SST frames technological change and user innovation as a mutual process where both technology and society influence each other (Edge & Williams, 1996, p. 856). Campbell expanded SST by positing that religious and technological progress did not happen entirely separately (Campbell, 2010). According to her, religious identity is a social construct. Therefore, the social growth of religion and the evolution of technology are inextricably linked, one having influence over the progress of the other (Campbell, 2010). Campbell’s model allows for a more critical analysis of the adoption of digital technology of Quiapo Church and the devotees of NPJN. With this framework, the discussion further argues that adopting the live-streaming method and the strong digital presence of Quiapo Church enhances the religious life of the devotees. This argument is supported by a modified framework, Performing Sacred Vow-Social Shaping Technology (PSVSST), see Diagram 1. This model shows how the church and devotees have adopted digital technology to experience less disruption and fully participate in different religious activities and practices. PSVSST considers the virtual experience and perspective of the individual experiencing the religious activities. Moreover, it examines how devotees accepted the new forms of technology by taking their face-to-face and virtual religious experiences into consideration. PSVSST uses three layers of analysis: (1) the historical development of the devotion to NPJN and the use of technology of the Catholic Church; (2) the devotee’s engagement, beliefs, and interpretations of virtual religious practices; and (3) the effectiveness or bisa of the devotee’s religious practices and rituals. These three layers of PSVSST helped in describing and interpreting how the situated body makes sense of the conscious experience and the existential meaning revealed by pamumuwesto and commutatio (Tallara, 2022). In this study, the ritual practice to honor NPJN, either face-to-face or virtual, is called pamumuwesto. As PSV, pamumuwesto is how devotees place themselves and the sacred image or NPJN while viewing religious activities online. PSV is also similar to commutatio since devotees who could not go to the church because of the lockdown or for whatever reason could make their devotion or religious practices virtually and receive the same blessings or bisa of the face-to-face PSV in Quiapo. As previously mentioned, the discussion on pamumuwesto and commutatio was based on the description from the online interviews and the interpretation of the respondent’s experience in the physical and virtual space.

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Diagram 1: Performing sacred vow-social shaping technology or PSVSST (PSVSST to Nuestro Padre Jesus Nazareno of Quiapo)

4 PSV in Space and Out of Place During PSV, either physical or virtual, devotees of Quiapo are fulfilling their religious obligation while discovering different ways to honor NPJN. For selected HDN members,1 the COVID-19 pandemic, though it has restricted at times or limited the usual performance of their panata, has not hindered their feeling to NPJN but strengthened and maintained it through its virtual presence on Facebook and other social media platforms. PSV in space and out of place has two distinct yet interconnected actions of the devotees: (1) Pamumuwesto is the devotee’s position to the actual religious site or imagined sacred space. Through pamumuwesto the memories associated with a particular religious tradition or connected to a family or community tradition are re-enacted, and (2) Commutatio is how devotees are symbolically moving from one space to another to perform their panata. This also involves the substituting or exchanging a sacred site for the actual site. Here the symbolic movement and exchange happening in the religious space connects the interiority or the kalooban of the devotee to the sacred. NPJN devotees are a prayerful community, according to a group of young HDN members.2 “We respond through social media, and our PSV is integral, especially during this pandemic. Moreover, we are sharing 1

Eight active HDN members. Interview and personal communication. Manila, 10-12 January 2021. Seven young HDN members. Interview and personal communication. Manila, 12-15 January 2022.

2

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pictures of NPJN and old photos of the processions with our family and fellow devotees to make the presence of NPJN.” And through these actions, NPJN is known, experienced, and made present in the physical or virtual space. For many of the devotees of NPJN, the power of the sacred differs from technological or political power. The devotee’s kalooban recognizes this sacred power. If the kalooban has magandang-loob, devotees would have the abilities to experience the power of NPJN and be able to help other devotees. Even if their PSV is physical or virtual, they believe that NPJN will grant their petitions or prayers. This act of hope requires malakas ang loob or strong inner self because hope for many devotees in Quiapo means having a buong loob that recognizes the true power of NPJN. The succeeding discussion highlights the events and objects on the popular devotion to NPJN. What are the motivations of the devotees? How has PSV changed overtime in Quiapo? The analysis takes a broader consideration of Quiapo in the history of Catholicism in the Philippines. This step is consistent with the main argument of this study that PSV, particularly NPJN, is important to the historical development of Catholicism and how it has changed in the Philippines.

5 Nuestro Padre Jesus Nazareno of Quiapo in the History of Catholicism in the Philippines The annual procession known as Traslacion of NPJN was canceled in 2021 and 2022 due to COVID-19 social distancing measures. The cancelation was confirmed by Quiapo Church and the Manila City government. In 2021, instead of a procession,3 Quiapo Church held online and face-to-face masses at 10% capacity (Tiangco, 2020). The traditional pahalik 4 or kissing of the image was suspended; instead, the church held a pagtanaw or viewing of the image at the balcony of the church fronting Plaza Miranda (Aquino, 2020). The pre-COVID-19 Traslacion or the 2020 procession of NPJN ends before 9:00 p.m. The procession lasted around 16 h, the earliest in the last 12 years when the “re-enactment of the transfer of the image” was reintroduced in 2007 (see Table 1). Although many devotees complained that they were barred from the procession, some find it “joyful and fulfilling” despite the barricades and strict security along the procession route. The history of the January 9 procession of Quiapo can be traced back to the official transfer of the image from the Augustinian Recollects’ Church and Convent of San Juan de Bautista in Bagumbayan, an area near the present-day Luneta Park. The Augustinian Recollects, also known as Recoletos, decided to transfer the image to their Church and Convent of San Nicolas de Tolentino in Intramuros and then to its 3

Details of the 2021 Traslacion cancelation in Tiangco, Minka Klaudia, “No Traslacion 2021 procession amid COVID-19 pandemic,” Manila Bullentin, October 23, 2020. 4 See details of 2021 Pahalik cancelation Aquino, Leslie, “‘Pahalik’ for Feast of Black Nazarene in January cancelled,” Manila Bulletin, October 25, 2020.

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Table 1 Traslacion in numbers5 Year 2022** 2021**

Injuries

Casualties

Duration

Crowd Estimate

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

2020

523

0

16 h

3.1 million

2019

754

0

21 h

2.4 million

2018

1,132

1

22 h

2.5 million

2017

565

0

21 h

2.2 million

2016

1,017

2

20 h 6 min

1.5 million

2015

709

2

21 h

5 million

2014

1,403

0

19 h

12 million

2013

1,899

0

19 h

1.2 million

2012

1,766

0

22 h

3 million

2011

708

0

17 h

1.6 million

2010

520

1

15 h

3.5 million

2009

227

0

13 h

3 million

2008*

–

–

–

–

2007

2

0

8h

3 million

**

Traslacion 2021 and 2022 were canceled due to COVID-19 pandemic social distancing measures. In 2008, the church management decided that the procession should only be within the Quiapo district. However, from 2009 to 2020, the starting point of the procession was held at Luneta Park

*

current location in Quiapo Church. The image’s origin was attributed to a MexicanNahuatl wood carver whom the Recoletos commissioned to create a life-size image of Christ. In 1606, the image arrived in the Philippines via the Manila Galleon from the port of Acapulco, Mexico. Together with the image is a group of Recoletos, the original owner and caretaker of NPJN. According to tradition, the life-size statue was fair-skinned initially, just like the images of Christ commonly found in Europe. Quiapo is one of sixteen districts of Manila with a total land area of 85 hectares. Much of the Quiapo area remains residential, with families occupying the second floor of post-WWII houses while the ground floors are rented for commercial use. For many devotees, Quiapo Church’s countless stories of rising from ruins. It experienced fires in 1603, 1791, and 1929; the Sangleys or Chinese uprising of 1606; earthquakes in 1645 and 1868; and pandemics in 1820, 1882, 1902, 1918, and 2020. It was demolished and rebuilt in 1863 and again damaged during the World War II bombings of 1945. The church survived these ruins, and many devotees attribute this to the miraculous NPJN. NPJN is a life-size image of Christ wearing a maroon robe embroidered in gold and silver with a crown of thorns and a diadem that forms three silver rays on the 5

From various sources: Quiapo Church; LGU of Manila; Philippine National Police; Manila Bulletin; Philippine Daily Inquirer; GMA News; ABS-CBN News; Rappler; Philippine National Red Cross; NDRRMC; DOH-HEMS; MDRRC; MMDA; MPD.

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Fig. 1 Image of the Black Christ Nazarene of Quiapo (Nuestro Padre Jesus Nazareno or NPJN [Photograph by the author])

head (see Fig. 1). The image’s right shoulder rests on a wooden cross, re-enacting a biblical scene of Christ’s struggle standing up after a fall with a face manifesting pain and suffering. The complexion is black with real human hair. Before 2007, the traditional January 9 procession was called pasan, a Tagalog word for “carrying.” The image was placed in a carriage designed to be carried on the shoulders. Before a wheeled carriage was used, the image was carried in a procession in the streets of Quiapo. In 2009, the Tagalog term salya became popular. The word is from pag-salya, which means “to pull” because the current carriage or andas are now wheeled and pulled by a pair of 50 m ropes. The rope was a symbolic extension of NPJN’s cross for many devotees. Although historically correct, the term Traslacion, which means transferring the image from Bagumbayan to Quiapo, became popular in 2007. That year was the 400th anniversary of the arrival of the image from Mexico to the Philippines. Jose Clemente Ignacio popularized the term Traslacion. He was the parish priest and rector of Quiapo Church during the 400th-anniversary celebration. When monsignor Hernando Coronel was appointed rector of Quiapo Church in 2015, he started the live-streaming of masses on Facebook (see Fig. 2) for Filipinos working and living abroad. This initiative of Coronel eventually became more popular during the COVID-19 lockdown. As of 2022, the virtual presence of Quiapo Church has 3.6 million followers on Facebook and more than 250 thousand subscribers on YouTube. In a study conducted by BluePrint.PH, through their end-to-end communication service, the announcement of the Friday mass resumption in Quiapo has the most “like” or “thumbs up” on Facebook from 17 March 2020 to 31 January 2021. Quiapo Church is the only religious institution on the list where Filipinos get information on COVID-19. According to the study, news and prayers are essential in dealing with the pandemic due to COVID-19 in the Philippines. In another survey conducted in

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Fig. 2 Screenshot of Quiapo Church’s facebook live-streaming of mass (Facebook live-streaming of mass in Quiapo. [Photograph by the author])

June 2021 by the same research and communication firm, Quiapo Church was first place, scoring the highest engagement among the religious pages on the topics or genres of faith on Facebook. The data were based on the double entries under the names “Quiapo Church” and “Minor Basilica of the Black Nazarene.” Through the social media of Quiapo Church, the Internet is an integral part of the engagement with the devotees.

6 Performing Sacred Vow in Quiapo Let us now turn to the two meanings of PSV in Quiapo. First, it connects the physical and virtual experiences of the devotees in performing their panata. PSV highlights how the interplay of “events” and “objects” could offer a new understanding and analysis of the development of Catholicism in the Philippines. Second, PSV is used by the devotees as a metaphor for “gratitude” and “reciprocity,” or the reciprocal process happening to return the favor or debt of gratitude to NPJN. The presence of a sacred object is critical to understanding the devotees’ religious reality, particularly their Friday devotion. The presence of sacred images presupposes that the image of NPJN is the center of their PSV. While devotees are re-enacting their PSV, they are using a picture or replica of NPJN that has been blessed by holy water. For many devotees, this picture or replica is not an ordinary object, not ephemeral, but a sacred object they can keep and place in their family or home altar. The blessing received by the object can be shared or transferred to the whole family or community. According to Julius Bautista (2010), sacred objects, whether

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Table 2 Quiapo’s Hijos Del Nazareno (HDN) Group Name

Facebook Page

Year founded

Leadership

HDN Central (GABAY)

https://www.facebook.com/HDNCentral

1939

Cesario Samia

HDN Basilica

https://www.facebook.com/HDNBasilica

1982

Orlando Giray

HDN MBBN

https://www.facebook.com/hdnmbbnbalangays

1982

Jonjon Dionisio

HDN NPJN

https://www.facebook.com/hdnnpjn

2009

Zaldy Bernabe

HDN ANPON

https://www.facebook.com/HijosANPON

2009

Albert Canete

HDN BUKLURAN

https://www.facebook.com/Hijos-Del-NazarenoBukluran-104819157761211

2015

Alex Jacinto

used as souvenirs or for veneration, portray a kind of transportability of spiritual energy inherent in religious material culture (Bautista, 2010, p. 38). According to Deirdre de la Cruz, they are proofs of the most material sort, witnessed, and possessed by not just one but by many (De la Cruz, 2015, p. 151). The presence of sodalities, confraternities, and other forms of Catholic lay associations is another important feature of PSV. They are crucial in the transmission and continuation of devotional practices. Sodalities or confraternities, also known as brotherhoods, were medieval phenomena that originated from European Catholic communities. Confraternities and brotherhoods became widespread in Spain’s Latin American colonies, including the Philippines. Many of the confraternities in the Philippines had undergone modifications over time. We focus on the Quiapo-based brotherhood of Hijos del Nazareno or HDN (see Table 2). The discussion on Catholic lay association addresses the importance of lay actors to the growth of the devotion to Christ in the Philippines. As of 2022, there are six HDN groups officially recognized in Quiapo. HDN is organized in different balangays or chapters, which renew their membership every feast day of Christ the King.

6.1 Pamumuwesto as PSV in Quiapo Although Quiapo Church could transition to virtual masses easily and conduct other activities remotely, most churches in Manila were caught off guard to continue their activities online. During the lockdown, Quiapo Church used social media to reach out to their parishioners. The church reinforced the live-streaming of all masses on Facebook Live and YouTube. They also regularly upload devotional information and other religious materials on Instagram.

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Most devotees noted that they avoided going to Quiapo during the lockdown because they feared contracting the virus. Although their usual ritual practices were suspended, PSV at home or in a specific space (puwesto) was also proven effective. While one may not touch the sacred image physically, one can glimpse NPJN virtually. However, while online masses and virtual devotion at home are not at the same level as going to a church physically, online masses and other religious activities provide the continuity of PSV. The home altar near the television or gadgets for online religious practices became a typical home setup. Moreover, the innovations done by selected churches in Manila, such as the motorcade procession, offer happiness, joy, and satisfaction to devotees who see the sacred image, albeit just for a moment. In Quiapo, PSV generates meaning through the interaction of the virtual space and sense of place. This interaction is connected to the idea of pamumuwesto, which narrates the devotee’s religious experience. The experiences and stories were told and shared in different ways and are based on (1) how they are performing their religious devotions face-to-face and online; (2) how they interact with other devotees and introduce their devotions to non-Catholics; and (3) how the different historical accounts are incorporated into the formation of the devotee’s sense of space. In the Philippines, the Tagalog word pamumuwesto or puwesto is similar to the Spanish word puesto, which means place or position. For many Tagalog communities, puwesto is also synonymous with sacred places in nature, like mountains, rivers, caves, trees, or even waterfalls. While pamumuwesto is performed depending on puwesto to puwesto (place to place), placing the self in the physical and virtual space is a ritual act. The practice of pamumuwesto has three important components: (1) God (or the sacred image of NPJN) as the source of power and blessings; (2) the devotee or receiver of power or blessings; and (3) the space or puwesto. During the pre-COVID-19 procession of NPJN, looking for a puwesto or safe space is a struggle. Without proper balance, one will be carried by the force of the uncontrollable movements of devotees. To avoid the hard push of the devotees, one should not stay or pumupuwesto too close to the center or near the andas (see Fig. 3). The center is where the intense pushing and the struggle for space happen. Many devotees would want to get an opportunity to see NPJN up close and with some scrambling up to the andas eagerly wanting to touch the image. It seems that the uncontrollable movements around the andas were normal. It is also where devotees threw their towels toward the andas. PSV as pamumuwesto is how devotees make temporary space for themselves, others, and NPJN. Many devotees view their homes as temporary spaces within a larger community. They see themselves as religious beings dwelling in place and crossing into space. Their final destination is to return to the sacred. Through their practice of pamumuwesto, devotees are overcoming the boundaries of the physical space. They also join the other devotees virtually from the same communities or other places. In PSV, they likewise share the place and space with the people who govern them, for example, the elders in their family, community, or group, who guide them in properly expressing their devotion or religious practices.

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Fig. 3 Traslacion of NPJN at Luneta Park to Quiapo Church (Traslacion 2014 at Luneta Park, Manila [Photograph by the author])

6.2 Commutatio as PSV in Quiapo Virtual activities through live-streaming masses and novena devotions on Facebook and YouTube are now common features in Quiapo Church. The church also has prerecorded religious activities and infographics posted on Instagram. When the faceto-face masses resumed, only 10% capacity of the church was allowed to participate in or attend religious activities. After a while, the archdiocese increased the number of people per mass based on the government’s COVID-19 health protocol. Although most respondents described that online mass is better than nothing at all, the social distancing measures helped control the spread of the virus. A good number of them noted that nothing beats the experience of receiving the Eucharist in person. However, if physical communion is impossible, then spiritual communion will do. All respondents agreed that the good point about online masses is that everyone can attend masses from all over the world; hence, they are a kind of borderless masses. PSV in Quiapo Church is distinctive in showing the devotee’s innermost selfhood or kalooban. The symbolism and expression of devotee’s kalooban are rooted in the Filipinos’ traditional religious understanding. PSV, either personal or inherited, occupies a singular importance among the devotees. Many devotees’ experiences are kaloob ng Poong Itim na Nazareno (favors given or granted to them by NPJN). Most of them view PSV as a “sacred promise” from a “debt of gratitude” (utang na loob) that must be fulfilled to return the favor. A key feature of fulfilling their PSV is the commutatio of the actual site, like for a pilgrimage shrine or church. Whether their petitions or wishes are granted, they must fulfill their PSV as a lifetime commitment. This commitment is often passed down to the next generation, the extended family, or the community. The practice of commutatio is rooted in the practice where pilgrims or devotees who could not go

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to Jerusalem for whatever reason could make the pilgrimage to Rome and receive all of the same blessings (Miedema, 1998, p. 81). Alternatively, a local church could be a substitute if pilgrims or devotees could not make it to Jerusalem or Rome. (Commutatio is Latin for exchange or substitution.) In Quiapo, commutatio is part of the “new normal” of religious activities due to the COVID-19 lockdown. Some of the characteristics of PSV as commutatio can be described as: 1. Collective and personal: While performing virtual religious practices has a collective aspect through a ritual practice in an imagined community, it is also a personal journey, a way for devotees to construct their paths of PSV. 2. Symbolic and performative: During PSV, bodily gestures, text, words, and objects are believed to convey the messages of the essential truths of the devotee’s actions. While it raises issues regarding the relationship between the physical and virtual PSV, both PSVs are effective ritual practices for many devotees. 3. Intensifying joy and religious satisfaction: PSV increases the joyful feeling of the devotees wanting to see or touch the sacred image inside the church. Religious and other devotional objects, especially those connected to Christ, are placed on a devotee’s family altar after being blessed. In Quiapo, PSV is not simply substituting the physical sacred sites but also about the virtual space the devotee is occupying. It is not just about viewing and looking at the screen but encountering others virtually. It is performative imagining and transporting the mind of the devotees to the sacred. It is “imagining NPJN” and re-enacting their PSV in the sacred site, Quiapo Church. Most respondents believe online religious activities and virtual PSV will remain even after the lockdown. However, the desire to return to the church suggests that many devotees, especially the young in Quiapo, will not permanently disconnect themselves from the physical site for religious activities.

6.3 Bisa of Pamumuwesto and Commutatio As integral parts of PSV, pamumuwesto and commutatio connect the devotees’ virtual and physical religious practices and experiences. These are not entirely separate spaces but integrated through the devotee’s kalooban. The bisa or the effectiveness of PSV is how the devotees of NPJN understand and act on their religious practices and rituals. Moreover, bisa is how devotees reimagined the ritual space expressed in touching, kissing, and placing a replica of NPJN during their PSV. For many devotees, bisa is both concrete and sacred. It manifests the same power to the actual holy site and the original image of NPJN enshrined in Quiapo Church. For bisa to be more effective, they use objects and direct their actions to the powerful symbol of the image, the source of power. This interaction of bisa and action is crucial to the pamumuwesto and commutatio. Many devotees claim that the towels or replica images, when rubbed on any part of the NPJN, acquire an extraordinary

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curative power, locally known as virtud or the power to heal. However, the bisa in PSV is not only about wiping and touching the image, walking on bended knees, and other expressions of devotion but also about how devotees are forging relationships with other devotees. The face-to-face and virtual or reimagined communities highlight the importance of pakikipagkapwa in PSV. Both kinds of communities are now prevalent and are bringing new ways of religious practices. The concept of bisa in PSV is felt in devotees’ relationship with God (NPJN) and others. NPJN (God) is an important figure in acquiring the bisa. Though sometimes invisible, pakikipagkapwa is also one of the defining features of PSV to NPJN. The social aspect of PSV and gathering space are critical to collective religious practices. Most respondents claim that they missed the kamustahan and sharing of meals during the activities and events in the church. The staying power of many of the devotees in Quiapo prevails even when asked about their prayers not being granted. Many devotees consider it a “trial” or pagsubok that one should wait and bear with it or magtiis (from the Tagalog word tiis which means to suffer, endure, or wait). For many devotees, magtiis means (1) it is always the will of NPJN to grant the petitions or not, NPJN knows what is best for the devotee, and (2) the timing is not right; that it is not for the good of the devotee.

7 Conclusion When Catholics think of sacred spaces, they think of sites of religious and historical importance. Cities like Jerusalem and Rome are called “holy cities.” Both cities are essential to the growth and development of Catholicism worldwide. For devotees of NPJN, Quiapo Church is a sacred site or, to be exact, a substitute sacred space, a commutatio that reimagines the places and recalls the episodes connected to the life of Jesus Christ. During the COVID-19 pandemic, home altars became more significant in performing religious practices due to the temporary closure of churches. This process of pamumuwesto was also extended to a particular space to either view or listen to a live or recorded mass or any religious activities by staying at home. Most respondents mentioned attending online masses is almost like face-to-face, especially during the lockdown. The difference is that the activity is mediated virtually rather than physically. The use of digital technology for religious content creation and activities enhances the spiritual life of the devotees in Quiapo. Moreover, it creates a connection between the visible and the invisible. Although integrating physical and virtual space is a challenge for the authorities of Quiapo Church, they recognize the benefits of digital technology. With official dispensation, watching mass on televisions, laptops, smartphones, or even listening to it on the radio will remain even after the COVID-19 pandemic. Digital technology is reshaping the religious way of life. Even if the digital experience may not be as sacred as physically attending inside the church, it is still an acceptable act and the only option, especially during a pandemic.

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Is commutatio and pamumuwesto valid? The bisa or effectiveness of PSV in Quiapo is connected to how the devotee acts following church teachings and tradition. The Internet reshapes and reconfigures how devotees participate or perform their panata or PSV, and using such technology is now more acceptable. A crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic offers new possibilities. The use of television and digital technology indeed increased the alternative forms of religious activities. Quiapo Church is using Facebook and Youtube to live-stream their religious activities. Through these social media platforms, some NPJN devotees are willing to continue this alternative form for their PSV. But what will happen after the COVID-19 pandemic? What should the Catholic Church in the Philippines do in response to those who have already developed a preference for virtual religious practices? When the pandemic ends, will religious gatherings and rituals in Quiapo change forever? The Catholic Church should rethink and improve the guidelines and conduct on the proper use of digital technology. The Internet and other social media platforms can open opportunities to enhance authentic Catholic religious practices. Acknowledgements My thanks to De La Salle University for permission to reprint portions of my conference paper on “Quiapo and Antipolo as Shared Spaces for Performing Panata: An Ethnohistorical Analysis of Nuestro Padre Jesus Nazareno and Nuestra Señora de la Paz y Buen Viaje,” which was published in Pamana at Sining: Valuing the Arts. (Proceedings of the 13th DLSU Arts Congress). Declarations Interviews of selected devotees, HDN members, and priests in Quiapo: January & May 2014; January, April, May 2015; January–February 2018; October 2020, January, December 2021 to January 2022. Parts of this study were conducted following and approved by the Institutional Review Board of the National University of Singapore, 2014–19. Consent was obtained from all subjects involved in the study.

References Basher, B. (2001). Give me that online religion. Rutgers University Press. Bautista, J. (2010). Figuring Catholicism: An ethnohistory of the Santo Niño de Cebu. Ateneo de Manila University Press. Campbell, H. (2010). When religion meets new media. Routledge. De Certeau, M. (1984). The practice of everyday life. University of California Press. De la Cruz, D. (2015). Mother figured: Marian apparitions & the making of a Filipino Universal. University of Chicago Press. Edge, D., & Williams, R. (1996). The social shaping of technology. Research Policy, 25(6), 865–899. Eliade, M. (1959). The sacred and the profane: The nature of religion. Harcourt Brace Jovanovitch. Foucault, M. (1991). Space, knowledge, and power. In P. Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault reader: An introduction to Foucault’s thought. Penguin. Frobish, T. (2006). The virtual Vatican: A case study regarding online ethos. Journal of Communication and Religion, 29, 38–69. Garcia, A., Standlee, A., Bechkoff, J., & Cui, Y. (2009). Ethnographic approaches to the internet and computer-mediated communication. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 38, 52–84. Eisenstein, E. (1979). The printing press as an agent of change: Communications and cultural transformations in early modern Europe (2 vols). Cambridge University Press.

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Foley, J. (2017). The church and the internet. Vatican Website. http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/ pontifical_councils/pccs/documents/rc_pc Helland, C. (2000). Religion online/online religion and virtual communities. In J. K. Hadden & D. E. Cowan (eds.), Religion on the internet: Research prospects and promises. JAI Press. Kozinets, R. (2010). Netnography: Doing ethnographic research online. Sage Publications. Lefebvre, H. (1991). The production of space. Blackwell. McLuhan, M. (1965). The future of man in the electric age. British Broadcasting Corporation. Miedema, N. (1998). Following in the footsteps of Christ: Pilgrimage and passion devotion. In A. A MacDonald, H. N. B. Ridderbos, & R. M. Schlusemann (eds.), The broken body: Passion devotion in late-medieval culture. Egbert Forster Groningen. O’ Kane, L. (2019). Pope highlights pros and cons of internet and social media use. Vatican News Online. https://www.vaticannews.va/en/pope/news/2019-01/pope-highlights-pros-and-cons-ofinternet-and-social-media-use.html Smith, J. (1978). Map is not territory: Studies in the history of religions. Chicago University Press. Smith, J. (1987). To take place: Toward a theory of ritual. University of Chicago Press. Tallara, M. (2020). Quiapo and Antipolo as shared spaces for performing panata: An ethnohistorical analysis of Nuestro Padre Jesus Nazareno and Nuestra Señora de la Paz y Buen Viaje. Pamana at Sining: Valuing the arts, rediscovering heritage and reaffirming identities. Proceedings of the 13th DLSU Arts Congress. Manila: De La Salle University. Tallara, M. (2022). Symbolism and expression of performing Panata in the Philippines: An ethnohistorical analysis of Nuestro Padre Jesus Nazareno of Quiapo. Religions, 13(4). Turner, V., & Turner, E. (1978). Image of pilgrimage in Christian culture. Columbia University Press. Van Der Leeuw, G. (1933). Religion in essence and manifestation. Princeton University Press.

Interview Materials Interviews and personal communication: Five HDN members, October 2020 to December 2021; Twenty HDN members, December 2021 to January 2022.

Mark Inigo M. Tallara is an International Studies Department Assistant Professor and Founding Co-coordinator of the Southeast Asian Studies Program of De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines. He completed his Ph.D. major in Southeast Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore (NUS). He worked at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore from 2008 to 2013 and as an editorial and media assistant at the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines from 2003 to 2006. A graduate of the University of Santo Tomas (UST), he completed his MA (magna cum laude) major in Philosophy in 2007. He was a Visiting Graduate Student at the Center for Ibero-Latin American Studies at UC San Diego in 2015 and an IASACT Scholar at the Institute of Advanced Study in Asian Cultures and Theologies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong in 2018 and 2020–21. His research interests include Southeast Asian Studies, History, Philosophy, Culture, and Religion.

Part IV

Religious Diversity

Chapter 23

Religious Belief and Device Paradigm Jerd Bandasak

Abstract This paper discusses the place of religious belief in the digital era. It shows that religious belief is still relevant as an ultimate question of our life regardless of the advancement of technology. However, this means that technology compatible with religious thoughts. This paper is divided as follows. The first part discusses the digital revolution as a philosophical challenge. Luciano Floridi calls the digital revolution or the Fourth Industrial Revolution a challenge since technological changes transform our understanding of the world and ourselves. This revolution gives rise to many philosophical topics. The second part discusses information and communications technologies (ICTs) and the device paradigm. Here we focus on Albert Borgmann’s view on ICTs as a device paradigm, how technology separates society, and how they constitute a different relation to reality. The third part discusses technology and vulnerability through the lens of Mark Coeckelbergh, who proposes that technology is a way to deal with existential risks and vulnerability. Technology is somewhat related to the existential aspect of human life. The fourth part discusses the status of religious beliefs in a technological society. Here we discuss how religions remain relevant to life in the digital era. The idea is that religion answers the question of the meaning of life without any appeal to a supernatural reality. We argue that technological changes do not need to undermine religious thought and that dependence on technology can lead to a misconception of religious belief. The final part concludes by considering possible objections and issues like cyber-worship and irreligious movements on social media. Keywords Religious transcendence · The meaning of life · Digital technology · The human condition

J. Bandasak (B) Center for Science, Technology, and Society, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Hongladarom et al. (eds.), Philosophies of Appropriated Religions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5191-8_23

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1 Introduction This paper aims to answer two questions: (1) Is religious belief still relevant to our life in the age of technological advancement? (2) What is the relation between living in a technological society and living in the religious one? Both questions come from the predicament of modern society characterized by the separation between secular and religious thoughts. Carl Mitcham argues that technology and religion are both interdependent throughout history. He argued that religion is not directly opposed to technology, even if technology is seen as a material and an artificial means to solve problems (Mitcham, 2012). This paper focuses on the relationship between technology and religious belief. Mitcham’s argument is a mere conceptual analysis of technology and religion, not from the subject’s view or how one sees herself living with technology and how to keep her religious beliefs. In a technological society, our religious lives seem alienated from socioeconomic activities prevalent in secular society. Advanced knowledge in science and technology has made religious belief appear less real, and spiritual pursuits and religious beliefs have become personal superstitions. Thus, we discuss how religious thoughts are still relevant. We show the connection between living religiously and living in a technological society as inseparable parts of how we manage to live and deal with our human condition. We take religious belief to mean the belief predicated on supernatural explanations of human life. According to Thaddeus Metz (2013, 2022), the meaning of life can be understood under two categories: natural and supernatural. According to the natural view, the meaning of life can be understood as a part of the natural world. On the other hand, the supernatural view concerns how life’s meaning is related to a reality beyond the natural world. According to this view, human life is only meaningful when related to a greater reality, which could be either theistic or atheistic. We find Metz’s view on religion as a basis for understanding the meaning of life interesting because here, theism and atheism have no conflict as answers to the meaning of life. Moreover, it makes religion more familiar to ordinary experiences without having to resort to worshiping mystic reality. Religion is a worldview we try to understand how and why we can live meaningfully. Another view that we find interesting is Tim Crane’s view on religious impulse (Crane, 2017). For Crane, having a religious belief is a tolerable point of view because the religious impulse is related to the understanding of transcendence, which is beyond the natural world. A religious belief also gives the believer a sense of identification with one’s group or culture. The idea is that religion is a projection of transcendence; we try our best to answer the ultimate question of the meaning of human life. On the contrary, science and technology seem more tangible than religion. This is the more familiar way of thinking about religion because our lives in the modern world depend on science and technology to survive. Science and technology can explain many things, and our society would cease to exist without them. The pandemic era is an excellent example of why we need science and technology to survive. Furthermore, religious belief is susceptible to doubt and how it should be anything other than mere

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personal belief. Religion is only optional. We can live meaningfully without believing in any religion, and the movement for abandoning religions is growing. This even makes secular life more distanced from the religious one. On the one hand, religion is closely related to culture and the traditional conduct of life. The separation between religious and secular living can be understood as a distinction between the material and the spiritual. In our everyday life, we rarely depend on religious rituals to survive. However, we are trapped in the material lifestyle if we depend too much on secular life. The religious purpose of life does not need technology because the ultimate goal of life cannot be attained in this natural world. Technology is unnecessary. The distinction is extreme. Either one of them is a mere illusion. We have the only option of seeing religion as a part of a culture, and we do not have any evidence to prove that its content is true or that the material world and technology have nothing to do with the true essence of life. In the following sections, we discuss how religious beliefs are justifiable without accepting them as personal preference, which is prone to an arbitrary choice. Doing that would be either begging the question.

2 The Digital Revolution as a Philosophical Challenge In this section, we discuss the inevitability of technology. Technological advances are not merely tools to make our lives easier. Technology does come with a worldview and how we understand ourselves in the world. According to Martin Heidegger, technology shapes our understanding of nature and the world (Heidegger, 1982). Our lives and societies rely on technology, and any historical transformation always involves technology. The industrial revolution is a good example showing that technological change affects our lives and societies. The steam engine changed the way manufacturing of products was done, and many people became factory workers. Then, electricity became ubiquitous and an infrastructure and living standard. Our society cannot function without electricity. Blackouts are unusual for us today. With electric power, we became alienated from the natural world. Then the digital age arrived. Manufacturing has become computerized, and information and communication technologies are inseparable from our lives. According to Luciano Floridi, the changes brought about by information and communication technologies (ICTs) as part of the Fourth Industrial Revolution are accompanied by changes in understanding (Floridi, 2014). The first revolution was the Copernican revolution, which changed the worldview from being based on the geocentric system to one based on the heliocentric. This means humans are not the center of the universe any longer. The second revolution is the Darwinian revolution, which implies that humans are not the center or the apex of living creatures. Then, in the third revolution, the Freudian distinction between consciousness and subconsciousness means that our mind is not as transparent as we seem to think. Finally, the fourth revolution is a digital technology which has changed our knowledge.

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Information and knowledge are closely related. When we claim to know something, it implies we have enough information to claim such knowledge. Digital technology has a profound impact on how we receive information, which significantly impacts our knowledge. Floridi argues that the digital age is “hyper-history” because data is produced, processed, and transmitted exponentially (Floridi, 2011). Additionally, as technology advances, what we have seen as the distinction between online and offline becomes blurred since information can be in both forms. There is no difference in whether a piece of information is received from a newspaper or a news feed on social media. That information could enable us to claim knowledge as long as it is true. Floridi calls the ecosystem of information the infosphere, the information space wherein everything is connected because the more information we have, the more knowledge we can acquire (Floridi, 2004). The pandemic is an excellent example of how important information is. Every expert needs data to know the situation thoroughly and thus develop solutions to cure this new disease. Information technology does not only increase knowledge but also changes our surroundings. Every technology changes our environment as it adjusts our ways of living. We live in a society surrounded by buildings, roads, electricity, and water supply. Nonetheless, information technology is changing even the perception of our surroundings. As we navigate the screens of mobile phones, we look for a restaurant from our phones rather than walking around to find one. We consume information daily, and the internet has become a regular part of life, like electricity. Floridi has a new term, “onlife,” which means living in both offline and online worlds, and ICTs merge with our very activities of life (Floridi, 2015). Thus, humans, technologies, and the environment are more intertwined. Onlife is a good representation of how life is dependent on technology. Technological advances are not only tools that we just use, but they also shape our society. Information technology is involved with everything we know. Everything that is computerized is part of information technology. For Floridi, information is also the way we understand reality. Information creates the structure of reality through a conceptual interface known as Levels of Abstraction (Floridi, 2007). Data is the information we understand through our Levels of Abstraction (Floridi, 2008). For example, the temperature is measured in various ways, such as in Kelvin, Celsius, or Fahrenheit. The same phenomenon, “temperature,” can have different information depending on levels of abstraction. Computers are also products of information technology which can process any type of information as we can program it. This could be calculating electricity usage or measuring medical data; everything can be computerized. Artificial Intelligence, as a technology, is about how machines are smart enough to do human tasks. Onlife is not only about how we use the internet daily. It is about how we live among technological surroundings. Everything becomes connected and computerized; even our natural world can be quantified as information. For instance, one global research effort is to predict how plastic waste travels in the oceans. The research uses a large quantity of data in many forms (Yurasits, 2021). AI can also contribute to biology by solving protein folding problems since it can perform more powerful calculations

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than any human could. This means that we rely on information technology for our knowledge and discovery. We discussed above how information technology is different from other types of technology. Every type of technology can be computerized, from medical technology to architecture, engineering, and even art. This means that we live within an envelope of technology. This makes life more liveable. In this time of the pandemic, we are isolated because of social distancing. However, technology can still bring us together; we can communicate, work remotely, and continue our lives without needing religious activities. Our life and death depend on modern medicine rather than religious rituals. Psychological well-being and therapies can be alternatives to religious advice to deal with hardship and the uneasiness of life. Therefore, the first question remains unanswered: Is religious belief still relevant to our life in the age of technological advancement?

3 ICTs and Device Paradigm The previous section showed that living in a technological society is unavoidable. That, however, does not mean that technology is always the solution to all problems. Some critics of technology talk about how humans use technology may not be related to reality. Albert Borgmann warns us that modern technology makes people become isolated from one another. He thinks that technology shapes our understanding of reality. He divides aspects of technology into the focal and the device paradigm. The focal is what brings humans together and holds the community together. An example is the fireplace, which brings everyone in the house together. An activity like preparing dinner in the family is a focal practice because it brings everyone in the house together, and such activity will constitute interaction between members. On the other hand, a device paradigm is a technology that becomes more individualized and separates people. For example, food services made dinner preparations unnecessary. Thus, family time also decreases. Technology is progressing toward devices; our household has more devices to assist our activities. Running can be done on a treadmill rather than as an outdoor exercise. Borgmann also pictures technology as a function of society; technology should cultivate good life by bringing focal practices to humans. Focal practices describe how technology should be in the interest of ordinary people and directed toward bringing about good living (Borgmann, 2010). Borgmann also thinks information technology impacts our relation to reality (Borgmann, 1999). He proposes that digital technology has more distance to reality than other kinds of Information Technology. For Borgmann, information is a sign that gives us meaning and understanding of reality, but the information is understood differently depending on the information technology. There are three kinds of information related to reality. First, natural information is the sign that itself is reality, like an animal’s footprint and a tree’s year ring. It informs us that an animal is around

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and the tree’s age. Borgmann calls it information about reality because the natural sign is about reality in nature. Second, cultural information is information whose meaning is understood through the products of human cultures, such as language and musical notation. For example, history books inform us about past events, but we need reading skills to read the book. Cultural information needs the human mind to acquire the information. Cultural information does not need machines to process or represent it. This is what he calls information for reality; that is, humans need specific skills to understand the reality that such information entails. The last type of information is digital information. This type of information is mediated by digital technology, which increases the distance between humans and reality. We can see sea turtles at the beach if we want to see them. We can also read about them. The activity of searching for information about sea turtles, the information gathering that brings us to sea turtles, concerns only pages of books. However, knowing about sea turtles using digital technology takes less effort. It lies just some fingertips away. One can type into the search engine and let the computer do the rest. This is how technology transforms our acquiring of information; it is a part of reality. Borgmann accepts digital technology, but he warns us that our life depends on what appears on the screen and that we see reality through that screen. The lives of sea turtles are recorded and transmitted via digital communication. It is what machines do to bring us information. It is not itself reality. Borgmann has a point when he says that digital technology impacts how we see reality, but he puts it differently from Floridi. For Borgmann, digital technology does not seamlessly become a reality; it comes in between us and reality. Moreover, it distracts us from reality. We communicate via social networks, which are more private than meeting someone in person. However, it is just how we refrain from interacting with our fellow humans. Technology can assist the activity but cannot replace the activity of meeting a person. Smart devices only make people more isolated from one another. Our smartphone is personalized by algorithms that bring us information according to individual preferences. We do not need to watch the same television channels or read the same news. Everyone can join any online group according to their interest. Many things warn us of the dystopian effects of digital technology. However, we cannot deny that it has become a part of our life. As for religious belief, even digital technology and social media can become a means of communicating religious thoughts to people. Many Facebook pages or online channels purport to teach religion. Nonetheless, taking technology as a means is tantamount to accepting that reality is saturated with technology. However, much religious life is like living in the past. For example, the living conditions of Buddhist monks in Thailand are very different from lay people surrounded by technology. Although technological advancements have changed our lives, the religious goal remains the same. The belief is that we should live properly and receive greater rewards in the afterlife. (I know the religious goal is more than reward and punishment in the afterlife. We will elaborate on this later in the last section.) If the essence of human life remains unchanged, why should we develop

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technology to enhance our lives? Why should we not invest more in the spiritual aspect of life? Thus, another question remains: What is the relationship between religious life and living in a technological society?

4 Technology and Vulnerability In the previous section, we analyzed our society’s and life’s technological phenomenon. We have shown that technological progress not only makes our activities more accessible but also creates jobs and assists our myriad activities. Technology changes our understanding of society and even reality. This is why religious belief is alienated from our lives. This section discusses the view that technology has a deeper purpose for human beings. The view implies that technology represents how we manage our risk of living in the world. Technology ties the very existential aspect of being a human being. This will answer why humans need technology to survive. Mark Coeckelbergh argues that risk is a human condition. He calls this “human being-at-risk.” Vulnerability is fundamental to human existence (Coeckelbergh, 2013). Humans live vulnerably on Earth. We try to survive, and how we survive needs technology to decrease vulnerability. Coeckelbergh explains the risk of being a human in terms of existential angst. We are aware that we do not live forever. We build shelters to survive the weather. Technology makes life less miserable. The survival rate of infants indicates the level of development of a society. However, the problem with technology is that it also creates new risks. For example, using antibiotics has created the problem of superbugs that threaten to resist all available antibiotics. Food container helps facilitate food distribution and preservation but also creates the problem of excessive garbage. Risk is central to our existential condition because it lies within our relationship with the world. We cannot control nature or our objective conditions. Nor can we control our temporality of being-toward-death, which is a personal risk. However, these objective and subjective aspects are not separate because we are beings-in-theworld. Awareness of risks is awareness of our vulnerability. Technology is how we manage to decrease vulnerability. Coeckelbergh does not directly discuss religious beliefs. He proposes an ethical view on technology and how to design it to serve humanity. However, his point that technology is related to the fundamental essence of a human being is fascinating. Technological innovation is not only the accidental progress of human beings. Innovation helps us survive. This view that technology is how we manage risks has some points that can be further analyzed as the relationship between religion and technology, which we will discuss in the next section.

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5 Religious Belief in Technological Society In the last section, we discussed technology’s necessity and how it relates to our human condition. This section shows that technology and religion have something in common: they are our existential projections to manage our lives. This will answer the two questions proposed at the beginning of the paper. Religion and technology are very different. Religions see life as vulnerable, and every human life has a specific goal, and only humans can achieve such a goal. Humans in any millennia should achieve this goal, which for religion becomes soteriological. However, technology constantly changes and improves. Even if it brings us new problems, they result from the attempt to solve some previous ones. Artificial Intelligence, for example, could cause many people to be unemployed. However, there is a demand for more computing power, and AI can help us solve some tasks or decrease human error. Autonomous vehicles can decrease accidents because it follows traffic rules much better than the average human driver. The goals of religion and technology are consistent. Undoubtedly, we must live with technology. Our lives depend on it. Without a technological society, we would have to live primitive life as hunter-gatherers as we were thousands of years ago. Technology can develop in unimagined ways. In the last decade, no one would have thought we would now be as dependent on mobile phones as we are today. We used to get worried about social network addiction, but it has become customary to connect and receive news on social networks. Religion, on the contrary, has yet to see such a level of progress. Scholars have presented new interpretations of the teaching, but religion is still the same, espousing the same ultimate truth about the ultimate life goal. How religious communities are organized may change. The main goal of religion always remains the same, or it will become a new religion. Why do we still need religion? We may think of religion as answering our ultimate concerns. However, what concerns or beliefs are religious? We answer that religion is a belief in transcendence. Transcendence is not only something supernatural. If we worship a mysterious rock and believe it will bring good luck, it is not religion; it is only the belief in supernatural power. That is why religion is sometimes seen as a superstitious, irrational belief. However, religious transcendence is believing in something supernatural, but not as something with a mysterious power that can provide anything. Religious transcendence is supernatural in that there is something greater than the phenomena or living in the world as we know it. Transcendence can be understood from human incompleteness. John Cottingham said that human is essentially incomplete, with four dimensions of incompleteness (Cottingham, 2022). These dimensions are (1) existential: we are thrown into our existence, we already exist; (2) cosmological: the universe already exists, and there seems to be no reason at all why we exist in this universe; (3) finitude: we are aware of our limitation, the feeling that we are only a speck of existence compared to vast existence of time and space; and (4) moral adequacy: we are limited in our moral judgments some time our will is weak to act morally.

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Given these dimensions of incompleteness, Cottingham concludes that we are mired in immanence, yet we yearn for transcendence (Cottingham, 2022, p. 209). For Cottingham, transcendence contributes to the meaning of life. In a sense, it is an urge to fill the anxiety of incompleteness. Religion offers such transcendence to human incompleteness. Religious truth is hard to prove because humans are limited. This is why we call it an existential projection. Religious belief occurs when we try to project our lives as a part of a greater reality, which is not only the reality of this natural world. Every religion has a cosmological projection and tries to explain how humans are part of a greater reality. Every religion tries to explain why we are here in this world, and there is a goal which is the destination for human life, and this goal is not of this world. No major religion says that we can achieve the ultimate goal in this life. Finding life’s meaning is finding the ultimate answer (Metz, 2022). Every religion says that the ultimate goal of life can be achieved only in the afterlife. However, religion differs from cults or superstitious beliefs because it offers the ultimate answer to our life; not only believing in something magical will change our fortune. Religions are systematic worldviews that put human life in the relation of transcendence. Religion also provides a cosmological explanation that gives a picture of human life and how it relates to a greater reality. This explanation can come in theistic or non-theistic forms. This is why religion never changes. We have been the same creature for centuries, trying to live in this world. Our technology might become more advanced, but we are still mortal beings. Is religion true? It is challenging to prove this because there are many religions. So which one is true? We cannot prove whether religion is true or not. Religious practices and rituals can change over time and vary from culture to culture. However, the cosmology and relationship of human life toward the ultimate goal of religion always remain the same. Either there is God, or there is not. Is life full of suffering and tangled in samsara or not? Religion is how we project our lives in reality. It cannot be proven true or false because human beings have limitations; our human condition binds us. Religious belief is an existential projection we create to see beyond our limitations. That is why we cannot know what the greater reality is. If we cannot know, is it necessary to believe in religion? Thomas E. Long gives a provocative answer. Religious belief is a transcendental aspect of experience (Long, 1998). The transcendental dimension of experience happens when we realize ourselves as beings-in-the-world, as temporal beings. The reality of living in this world is that we live toward our non-being, our death. We agree with Long that belief in religion is about how we interpret the transcendental dimension of our experience. Different religions comprise different communities of faith, depending on how we interpret the cosmology in which we want to live. So, the necessity of having a religion depends on how much one realizes the reality of one’s being. According to Metz, our lives have meaning whether we are religious or not (Metz, 2002). It depends on how one sees oneself only in this natural world or on how one relates to something greater than this natural world. Metz and Crane see religious beliefs as merely optional, a personal preference.

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What we proposed earlier about existential projection, however, is somewhat different. Projecting one’s life requires more than mere preferences of the reality in which one wants to live. The projection requires seeing oneself in a context, either in a religious community or reality. One lives toward the projection of the religious goal. Otherwise, being religious is merely a cultural performance not related to the religious goal that directs human life. Thus, our answer to the question of the necessity of religion is that religions give us a sense of salvation, a spiritual survival amidst the greater reality. Technology is only how we manage our survival situation in this natural world. However, we can call ourselves religious if we project our lives toward a religious goal beyond the natural world. On the other hand, our answer to the two questions at the paper’s beginning is that religion and technology are always relevant to our lives. Technology is a means to survive in this world. Technology is made to decrease the vulnerability that is our human condition. We need it to survive. Every ethical issue surrounding technology concerns how technology will degrade humans or bring societal injustice. Thus, our ethical values can expand outside the realm of human beings to include animals or the environment. However, this is only at the level of the natural world; we can see ourselves as a part of a greater reality where survival may not be enough. Living with technology is not in conflict with believing in religion because we are still humans, and the mortal question cannot be answered by technology. Even if there is a kind of technology that could make us immortal, the mortal question still needs an answer. Why should we live forever? Every religion says that this mortal life is only a part of reality. This world is not the ultimate destination of life. Religion is another level of a greater reality, the reality that we do not live to survive only. This answer, then, implies the answer to the second question. The relation between religious belief and technological advancement are our projections due to our attempt to understand and live our lives according to our human condition as beings-in-the-world. Technology is humans’ means of survival, and we have become very successful; in the end, humans are still mortal. So, the quest to understand our lives remains the same.

6 Conclusion In the previous sections, we have shown that religion is still relevant to our contemporary life and that the goal of religion remains unchanged because it tries to answer to the purpose of human life, which is more than just surviving in this world. In this concluding section, we answer a vital objection against our proposal. Some may say each religion is not a mere cosmological projection as it involves a long history, practices, doctrines, and scriptures. Each religion has different levels and different parts. One may understand religion at a cultural level or theoretical level. However, this explanation needs to be more complex to capture these things. Our project in this paper presents the conceptual possibility of understanding religions given the human condition. Of course, religions contain many details, but

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religion at the cultural or ritual levels does not change its cosmology or ontology. Do worshiping deities or traveling to sacred places in cyberspace have the same value as visiting physical places? It does not change the ontology of religion (Karapanagiotis, 2013). We may further discuss adopting technology in religious practice. For example, can we replace some practices with technology, using a device to play chants or mantras instead of chanting them ourselves? Alternatively, in Thailand, some monks love to play video games. We respond that these are practical issues within the religious community itself. Negotiation and discussion can be done among the community members, just like discussing the place of new technology in the secular society with religious context included. Our argument is focused on how we should understand religion as related to our lives. The idea of religion as an existential projection may not convince anyone to have faith in a religion. Religious belief is personal. In this paper, we wanted to show how religion is relevant to contemporary digital lives. Believing or having faith is another issue. If someone does not believe in religion, it is her cosmological point of view. Existential projection depends on how one sees oneself in the world. One could project oneself in a theistic or nihilistic cosmology; that projection is for oneself, as Long said, “[…] in one way or another, or which understand reality to be neutral, threatening, or absurd” (Long, 1998, p. 16). Anyone can project themselves at any level of reality, be it in this natural world or the greater theistic reality.

References Borgmann, A. (1999). Holding on to reality: The nature of information at the turn of the Millennium. University of Chicago Press. Borgmann, A. (2010). Focal things and practices. In C. Hanks (Ed.), Technology and values: Essential readings. Wiley-Blackwell. Coeckelbergh, Mark (2013). Human being @ risk: Enhancement, technology, and the evaluation of vulnerability transformations. Springer. Cottingham, J. (2022). The meaning of life and transcendence. In I. Landau (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of meaning in life. Oxford University Press. Crane, T. (2017). The meaning of belief: Religion from an Atheist’s point of view. Harvard University Press. Floridi, L. (2004). Information. In L. Floridi (Ed.), The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of computing and information (pp. 40–61). Blackwell Publishing. Floridi, L. (2007). A defence of informational structural realism. Synthese, 161(2), 219–253. Floridi, L. (2008). The method of levels of abstraction. Minds and Machines, 18(3), 303–329. Floridi, L. (2011). The philosophy of information. Oxford University Press. Floridi, L. (2014). The fourth revolution. Oxford University Press. Floridi, L. (2015). The onlife manifesto. In L. Floridi (Ed.), The onlife manifesto: Being human in a hyperconnected era (pp. 7–13). Springer International Publishing. Heidegger, M. (1982). The question concerning technology, and other essays. HarperCollins. Karapanagiotis, N. (2013). Cyber forms, worshipable forms: Hindu Devotional viewpoints on the ontology of cyber-gods and -goddesses. International Journal of Hindu Studies, 17(1), 57–82. Long, E. T. (1998). Quest for transcendence. Review of Metaphysics, 52(1), 3–19. Metz, T. (2002). Recent work on the meaning of life. Ethics, 112(4), 781–814. Metz, T. (2013). Meaning in life: An analytic study: Oxford University Press.

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Metz, T. (2022). The concept of life’s meaning. In I. Landau (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of meaning in life. Oxford University Press. Mitcham, C. (2012). Religion and technology. In J. K. B. O. Friis, S. A. Pedersen, & V. F. Hendricks (Eds.), A companion to the philosophy of technology. Wiley-Blackwell. Yurasits, B. (2021, February 26). Where does plastic pollution go when it enters the ocean? The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/where-does-plastic-pollution-go-whenit-enters-the-ocean-155182

Jerd Bandasak is an Assistance Professor of Philosophy and a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Center for Science, Technology, and Society, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand. He specializes in the Philosophy of Technology, Ethics and Technology, Philosophy of Information, Epistemology, and the Philosophy of the Meaning of Life.

Chapter 24

A Critical Look at Religious Diversity and Responding to Its Challenges Jove Jim S. Aguas

Abstract Religious diversity has been a subject of many discussions and debates. Many scholars have concluded that although many religions exist, we can maintain a more accommodating and pluralistic attitude to this diversity. However, we may find contradictions when we reduce religious beliefs to their most fundamental tenets. Preferring one over the other may ultimately result in rejecting the contrary beliefs as false or unacceptable. Since religious beliefs have truth claims, they have epistemological importance. However, the challenge of religious diversity is not only on the epistemic level but more so in the social and political domains. This paper discusses the diversity of religions in Asia. It evaluates three views that may explain such diversity: Alvin Plantinga’s exclusivism, Karl Rahner’s inclusivism, and John Hick’s pluralism. Finally, it offers ways to respond to the challenge of religious diversity. Keywords Religious diversity · Exclusivism · Inclusivism · Pluralism

1 Introduction The Philippines is the most predominantly Catholic country in Asia. Together with other Christian denominations, it makes the Philippines overwhelmingly Christian. There is also a vibrant Muslim community and other indigenous religions in the southern Philippines, each with its own religious identity. Before the Spanish colonizers arrived in the country, many natives practiced some form of religion. They practiced animism. They believed in anitos or diwatas (indigenous deities) found in nature. Other belief systems, such as Hindu and Buddhist influences, also came around the ninth to tenth century CE, brought spontaneously and non-systematically by traders and migrants from China, India, and nearby countries (Macaranas, 2021). The Filipinos are known for their deep spirituality and religiosity. This religious zeal brings with it a diversity of religious beliefs. We find a more diverse set of J. J. S. Aguas (B) University of Santo Tomas, Manila, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Hongladarom et al. (eds.), Philosophies of Appropriated Religions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5191-8_24

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religious beliefs and practices when we add folk religiosity. That is, “folk religiosity is embedded in the Filipino culture and permeates the Filipino Catholic way of expressing their faith” (Macaranas, 2021). The predominantly Catholic Philippines is unique in the Southeast Asian region, where most countries are Muslim, Hindu, or Buddhist. This predominantly Catholic nation shows the diversity of religions in Asia, particularly Southeast Asia. We see a plurality of religions in the wider Asian region. It is the birthplace of all many world religions. Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism came from South Asia (Brodd et al., 2013; Ridgeon, 2003). Hinduism, the oldest religion originating from this region, is a polytheistic and ritualistic system comprising numerous cults and sects. It remains the unifying force of Indian culture and the social-caste system. Jainism emerged in reaction to prevailing Hindu practices in the sixth century BCE. Although Jainism never spread significantly beyond two present-day states of northwestern India, Maharashtra, and Rajasthan, its principles of non-violence and asceticism have deeply influenced Indian thought. Buddhism emerged in reaction to prevailing Hindu practices in the fifth century BCE. It arose in northeastern India as a universal alternative to hierarchical religion, offering nirvana or eternal bliss to individuals regardless of culture or social status. The centuries following its foundation led to two leading yet divergent schools—Theravada, the most ancient tradition, and Mahayana, which held the fullest account of Buddha’s message. The monastically oriented Theravada predominates today in Sri Lanka and mainland Southeast Asia. At the same time, the more liberal Mahayana, with its proliferation of philosophical schools and sects, had an immeasurable impact in China, Japan, and Korea. Tantrism, an esoteric form of Buddhism, predominates in Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, and Mongolia. Another religion, Sikhism, a monotheistic Indian religion, was founded in Punjab in the late fifteenth century CE (Brodd et al., 2013). Middle Eastern Asia is the cradle of three great monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Brodd et al., 2013; Ridgeon, 2003). Judaism, the religion of the Jews, was founded in the eastern Mediterranean region some 4,000 years ago and experienced a covenant relationship between God and humankind. Most Asian Jews are now in Israel, although other small Jewish communities exist in other areas of the continent and other parts of the world. Christianity, which traced its roots from Judaism and was founded in Israel, started as a movement within Judaism founded by Jesus Christ. It emphasized the salvation of the soul through the observance of the law and the teachings of Christ. In 2,000 years, it has become the most widespread of the world’s religions, predominating in Europe and European-derived cultures. Sizable minorities practice it in many Asian countries and by a Roman Catholic majority in the Philippines. However, Islam is the fastest-growing religion in the world. It is the religion of the Arab world, some Asian nations, and Black Muslims in the USA. Islam dominates as the state religion of most Southwest Asian countries. It has by far the largest number of adherents in Asia. From the Arabian Peninsula, where it was founded in the seventh century CE, Islam spread through the Middle East, into Central Asia, and across the southern part of the continent to Indonesia. Most Asian Muslims belong to the orthodox Sunnite branch, except in Iran and Iraq, where most are the more esoteric Shi’ite branches. Muslims constitute minority populations

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in India and China. These three monotheistic religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, comprise more than half of the world’s population. In East Asia, ancient Chinese religious and philosophical traditions survived through two schools: Taoism and Confucianism (Brodd et al., 2013). Taoism, which originated in the fifth century BCE, attributed to the philosopher Lao Tzu, stresses mystical experience and the individual’s harmony with nature. The universe expresses harmony, purpose, order, and calm power. On the other hand, Confucianism, which originated in the sixth century BCE, based on the teachings of Confucius, emphasizes the individual’s duty in society and government. The school of the literati (Ju school) taught people how to govern. Both have profoundly influenced Chinese and Chinese-derived cultures. Another religion is Shintoism, which encompasses the Japanese people’s indigenous religious beliefs and practices (Brodd et al., 2013). Its principles that link sacred power, ritual observance, and imperial nationhood remain unique to Japanese culture, although some of its practices have absorbed the influences of Taoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism. Among the other religions that developed in Southwest Asia is Zoroastrianism, an ancient religion founded in Persia and survived in Iran and India.

2 Religious Diversity Religious diversity is a common phenomenon evidenced by different religious beliefs and practices. Generally, there are theistic or monotheistic religions and non-theistic or non-monotheistic religions. The diversity of religions has been the object of many discussions and debates. Many scholars have concluded that although many religions exist, we can maintain a more accommodating and pluralistic attitude to this diversity. However, when we reduce religious beliefs to their most fundamental tenets, we recognize that they cannot all be true. There are contrary, if not contradictory, beliefs. Preferring one over the other will result in considering false or unacceptable beliefs. Since religious beliefs have truth claims, they have epistemological importance. At the core of the doctrines of major religions is a belief about a transcendent or ultimate reality that underlies the natural, physical world. Their diverse interpretations of this reality have been the basis of their diverse religious beliefs and doctrines. The Eastern and Western religions have differing views about this reality. In Western religions, particularly Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, the Ultimate Reality is conceived as a personal, supreme, and perfect being—a God. God is not only personal; He is the creator of all and sustains the existence of every creature; He is perfect in every respect and commands obedience from his creatures. Many other properties are attributed to God, including omniscience, omnipotence, and immutability. In Eastern or Asian religions, notably Buddhism, Taoism, and the Advaita Ved¯anta school of Hinduism, the Ultimate Reality is understood as a state of being, not a personal being. It is not a personal creator. It cannot be described by attributes like perfection, omniscience, or omnipotence because it is an undifferentiated Absolute

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Reality. In Taoism, the absolute or ultimate reality is tao or dao. In Hinduism, the absolute or ultimate reality is referred to as Brahman. In Buddhism, it is generally referred to as sunyata. While the Ultimate Reality is not a personal being, it is the basis for all beings and is beyond all human categories and understanding. Hindus refer to “being,” “consciousness,” and “bliss” as attributes that at least point toward the experience of the Infinite Spirit (Robinson, 2004, p. 45). The notion of “ultimate reality” is expounded in the most common form of Hinduism—Advaita Ved¯anta. According to this school of Hinduism, the Ultimate Reality is Brahman: Brahman is all reality. It is eternal and beyond any description. It cannot be perceived or described by words. It is beyond senses and intellect and, therefore, undefinable. The Asian non-monotheistic religions have a different view of the ultimate end of life. According to classical Hinduism, the ultimate soteriological goal is moksha, the release from the cycle of death and rebirth (samsara), and absorption into Brahman in nirvana—a state of bliss. However, we must note that while classical Hinduism’s ultimate goal is moksha and absorption into nirvana in the afterlife, in Theravada Buddhism, the notion of nirvana (Nibbana in Pali) as the ultimate goal is different. While Buddhism regards anupadisesa nirvana (without a substrate of five aggregates and experienced after the death of the Arahat) as the soteriological goal, it believes that saupadisesa nirvana (with the substrate of five aggregates and experienced when the Arahat is alive) is attainable here in this life. Enlightenment brings liberation from the wheel of samsara and the extinction of all desires, cravings, and suffering. This enlightenment can be attained by understanding the four noble truths and practicing the last one—the eightfold path. The four noble truths are: (1) there is suffering (dukkha), (2) there is a cause of suffering—craving (trishna), (3) there is a cessation of suffering (nirvana), and (4) there is a way to end suffering and achieve nirvana— the eightfold path—right views, right resolution or aspiration, right speech, right behavior, right livelihood, right effort, right thoughts, and right concentration (Bodhi, 2000, p. 1844). Different claims and beliefs are regarded as true by the respective religions. In the philosophy of religion, there are three fundamental epistemological positions regarding religious diversity: exclusivism, as proposed by Alvin Plantinga; inclusivism, as proposed by Karl Rahner; and pluralism, as proposed by John Hick.1

1

Exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism belong to second-order reflections on religious diversity. Each seeks to categorize first-order reflections (those that consider matters that directly arise from the phenomenon of religious diversity—the epistemology of religious beliefs, concepts of the Ultimate, and the possibility of salvation/liberation across religious traditions). Each seeks to find the most appropriate strategy for approaching the phenomenon of religious diversity (Dastmalchian, 1993, pp. 298–308).

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3 Exclusivism and Inclusivism According to exclusivism, there is only one way to God and salvation. Although there are truths in other religions, basic claims about the nature of God (and salvation or liberation) differ in different religions. However, they cannot all be true. Only one set of claims and one religion is exclusively true. It alone describes the way to salvation or liberation. Suppose we are going to compare, for example. In that case, in Christianity and other religions, we can see a marked contrast between the basic doctrines of Christianity and other religions, especially on different concepts of God or ultimate reality, the nature of humanity, the function and role of Christ, and the way to salvation. Given these differences, a particular religion is the only way to get into a proper relationship with God—the only way to salvation. Alvin Plantinga (1994) defends religious exclusivism on epistemic grounds. He argues that the religious exclusivist is not committing any epistemological fault or moral error. If a religious person truly adheres to or believes in his creed or conviction, then some exclusivist tendencies or positions in one’s beliefs are inevitable. For instance, if pre-colonial Filipinos practiced animism and believed in anitos and diwata, we should expect them to treat their religious beliefs as fundamentally true and the other beliefs are not. They would be inclined to treat their religious beliefs as the only way to communicate with the divine realm or spiritual beings. However, Plantinga agrees that the knowledge of other religions is something we need to seek, but this may lessen one’s assurance in his own belief. According to Plantinga, an exclusivist is fully aware of other faiths. She has paid attention to their existence and their claims, and she has to some degree, reflected on the problem of pluralism and has asked herself whether God has revealed Himself and His teachings to Christians but has revealed Himself to those of other faiths (Plantinga, 1994, p. 531). Moreover, an exclusivist does not only believe that the world was created by God, an almighty, all-knowing, and perfectly good personal being and that human beings require salvation, and God has provided a unique way of salvation, and that any proposition incompatible with it is false. She also meets a further condition. The exclusivist is also fully aware of genuine piety and devoutness in other religions but accepts no arguments that would necessarily convince them to change their belief (Plantinga, 1994, p. 532). So, an exclusivist is aware of and has studied the different world religions; she admits there is real piety and spirituality in those religions, but she does not want to give up her religious belief. Even among those who professed theistic beliefs, there is diversity regarding their fundamental beliefs. In recent times we have become aware of the world’s religious diversity. There are several positions or reactions to this awareness of religious diversity. All these diverse religious beliefs and practices may be equally true and acceptable. Alternatively, one may continue to believe what he has believed all along; after learning about this diversity, he decides to continue to believe his religious beliefs. A Hindu or Buddhist may continue to hold on to these religious beliefs and consequently take any beliefs, religious or otherwise, that are incompatible with his views as false. According to Plantinga, we have learned more about people of

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other religious persuasions. Given the advancement of technology, we have seen how they have displayed their piety, devoutness, and spirituality. Plantinga observes "a more widespread sympathy for other religions, a tendency to see them as more valuable, as containing more by way of truth, and a new feeling of solidarity with their practitioners"(Plantinga, 1994, p. 531). On the other hand, the inclusivist agrees with the exclusivist that the absolute provision for salvation is revealed in one religion. However, God has acted in a particular way, making salvation available to all. God might reveal himself or act graciously at various places and times. Hence, people can encounter God and receive God’s grace in diverse religions; adherents of other religions can be saved because of persons or events specified by the true religion without knowing anything about the religion that embodies the objective provision for salvation. One of the proponents of inclusivism is the theologian Karl Rahner (1969). Rahner maintains that Christianity is the true religion. Christianity portrays God’s grace as coming in his self-revelation in Christ. Before Christianity historically introduced the obligation to believe in Christ, other lawful religions admittedly embodied an imperfect knowledge of God yet contained some supernatural elements of grace. According to Rahner, every human being has a “supernatural existential” that makes it possible and necessary for even a non-Christian to receive God’s grace unless he or she says in his/her heart, “there is no God” (Rahner, 1969, pp. 393, 395). This grace became instrumental in the salvation of many righteous but non-Christian persons who practiced those religions. In present times other religions are similar to those that preceded the coming of Christ, and their adherents likewise have no meaningful historical encounter with Christianity. However, these religions are lawful because their teachings are consistent in the eyes of God. Because God desires everyone to be saved, He gave salvation to the people through these religions. These adherents are regarded as anonymous Christians, “a person lives in the grace of God and attains salvation outside of explicitly constituted Christianity” (Rahner, 1986, p. 135). However, some scholars opposed religious exclusivism and inclusivism. One prominent objection is sometimes dubbed the “myth of neutrality.” The basic idea is that no neutral or objective criterion exists for whether one religion or worldview is true and others false or whether one has more truth or falsity than another. Hence, to claim that one religion is true or offers the only way of salvation is inappropriate and perhaps even morally offensive (Meister, 2009, p. 8). However, some exclusivists and inclusivists argue that it is no longer important if there are no criteria for neutrality because religious beliefs are not matters that should be subjected to rational assessment. To do such is to undermine one faith, and that would reflect a lack of faith. Other exclusivists and inclusivists maintain that they are justified in affirming their beliefs are exclusively (or inclusively) true because they are warranted by evidence from natural theology or by properly basic beliefs (Meister, 2009, p. 8). Another criticism against the exclusivists is that their position is unjust and arbitrary. Billions of people are unaware of religions outside or beyond their religion. To claim that someone’s religion is the only “true” religion is arbitrary and unjust to those people outside of such a religion. Suppose there is only one true religion, as the exclusivists claim. In that case, people not part of that religion must be held

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morally and epistemically responsible for affirming religious truths different from the “true” religion. This objection is often raised against monotheistic religions that believe in a final judgment in the afterlife. Could the good, merciful, and just God of Christianity deny salvation to countless people who have never heard about the Christian faith? It seems contradictory that such a God unjustly condemns people to eternal perdition simply due to their lack of knowledge of Christian teachings. There are good, sincere, devoted people in the other major world religions who have not heard about the Christian teachings.

4 Religious Pluralism Pluralism holds that all religions, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism, are different paths to the same God or Ultimate Reality. The different religions are equally good ways to relate to God. According to the pluralists, the holy is beyond our finite capacity to understand. Individual religions are the earthly appearances of God’s presence or interpretations of God. Pluralists contend that we must abandon the claim to exclusivity and accept the thesis that many paths lead to God and salvation. Hence, there is no one true religion. Some pluralists argue that religion does not make truth claims, so there is no problem with diverse claims. Other pluralists hold that religious concepts express not the divine reality itself but man’s attempt to understand this divine reality. They are not literal descriptions of this reality. They simply express how this reality appears to us. One of the most vocal proponents of pluralism is John Hick (1993), whose view may differ from the other pluralists. According to Hick, God historically revealed himself through various individuals in various situations, where geographic isolation prevented a common revelation to all humanity. In historical context, world religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism) are not essentially rivals. They began at different times and places, expanding outwards into the surrounding world. Religion has been a virtually universal dimension of human life, universal in human societies. Major religions recognize that the ultimate divine reality is infinite and, as such, transcends the grasp of the human mind, but so do some folk religions. These folk religions also recognize the transcends of divine or spiritual reality. For example, the pre-colonial Filipinos already recognized and worshiped the anitos and diwatas. This shows that belief in the spiritual realm is inherent in their culture. Thus, the practice of folk religiosity is a testament to the pluralist position. Whether people call the divine being or reality a God or the gods or deities does not matter. All that matters is that these religions show our attempt to understand and interpret ultimate reality. According to Hick, all religions are interpretations of the same Ultimate Reality born out of the different historical and cultural factors that define or modify the contacts or experiences of the divine or ultimate reality. Hick understands that religion has many definitions and varies because they come from different perspectives.

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Religion, however, is not just any other phenomenon, for together with the acknowledgment of a supreme, divine, or ultimate being or reality, it also proposes a certain way of living or a way of life based on the relationship with the divine or ultimate being or reality. Hicks does not say that different religions do not make conflicting truth claims; he is saying that these religions are different expressions of the same reality humanity encountered at different points in human history. As a basic premise to his position, Hick offers his understanding of religion as an “understanding of the universe, together with an appropriate way of living within it, which involves reference beyond the natural world to God or gods or the Absolute or a transcendent order or process” (Hick, 1993, p. 133). Hick then provides a historical analysis of the religious tendency of man starting from the primitive time when man was just beginning to be aware of the divine or transcendent reality. He stresses that in the life of primitive man, this religious tendency is expressed in a belief in sacred objects endowed with mana- the power of elemental forces of nature embodied in an object. Primitive humans believe in various nature and ancestral spirits that must be carefully appeased to attain some favors. The divine reality is loosely apprehended as a plurality of quasi-animal forces that could be influenced, to some extent, by certain rituals and other magical procedures or practices. Hick claims that this represents the simplest beginning of awareness of the transcendent in the infancy of the human race (Hick, 1993, p. 134). Hick cites the two earliest civilizations in Asia where the development of religions as we know them emerged: Mesopotamia in the Near East and the Indus valley of northern India. The early inhabitants of Mesopotamia lived as nomadic shepherd tribes, and each tribe worshiped its god. Later, these tribes gradually integrated into one nation or social group. Each nation is now dominated by great deities like Marduk of Babylon, Ishtar of the Sumerians, Amon of Thebes, Yahweh of Israel, and Zeus of the Greeks. We find a similar variety of gods and goddesses in the Indus valley in India. However, they are not tribal like those in the West; instead, they represent the basic forces of nature, particularly fertility. The many Near East and Indian deities expressed our awareness of the divine at the dawn of documentary history. Some tribal gods were often described as cruel and sometimes required human sacrifices (Hick, 1993, p. 134). Hick’s account explains how the natural religions of primitive people emerged. Religion is based on some divine illumination or revelation that is preceded by the growth of natural religion. This primitive spirit worship expresses man’s fears of unknown forces, and his reverence for nature deities expresses his sense of dependence upon realities greater than him. It is not far-fetched to observe the different causal connections between the way the early religions were formed and the material circumstances of the primitive man’s life, indicating the significant part played by the human element within the history of religion. The natural condition of primitive humans played a crucial role in his religious tendency; the natural condition of man becomes a foundation of his religious life; here, we can see religion emerging from the natural condition without divine revelation or illumination. However, Hick notes that sometime around 800 BCE, there began what has been called the golden age of religious creativity. What we can observe during this period is a remarkable “series of revelatory experiences”

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which happened during the next five hundred years or more in different parts of the world, “experiences which deepened and purified men’s conceptions of the ultimate and which religious faith can only attribute to the pressure of the divine Spirit upon the human spirit” (Hick, 1993, p. 135). Karl Jaspers refers to this as the Axial Age when many great philosophers and religious leaders—Confucius, Buddha, Lao Tzu, Zarathustra, Isaiah, Elijah, Jeremiah, Homer, Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Plato flourished independently and almost simultaneously. However, people were unaware that similar or complementary ideas were being developed simultaneously (Jaspers, 1961, p. 135). Hick said these revelatory experiences were all "moments of divine revelation" (Hick, 1993, p. 136). God or the divine being revealed himself in different parts of the world and historical milieus. By revealing himself at different times and places, he produced different, and presumably partial, revelations at different times and places. Hick explains this point by highlighting the place of world religions in the divine purpose. Relying on the facts of history and geography, he points out that during that period, between two and three thousand years ago, God could not reveal himself through any human mediation to all humanity. A worldwide revelation might be possible today through mass media—press, radio, television, and communication satellites. However, this was simply impossible in the ancient world’s technology. However, we can observe a slow diffusion and interaction of cultures over centuries and millennia. Hence, Hick concludes, “if there was to be a revelation of the divine reality to mankind, it had to be a pluriform revelation, a series of revealing experiences occurring independently within the different streams of human history.” He further adds that “because religion and culture were one, the great creative moments of revelation and illumination have influenced the development of the various cultures, giving them the coherence and impetus to expand into larger units, thus creating the vast, many-sided historical entities which we call the world religions” (Hick, 1993, p. 137). Throughout history, each of these “religio-cultural complexes” has expanded from within their territory until it connected with the boundaries of another. Then the resultant integrated complex spread out from another center. Consequently, each significant occasion of divine revelation has slowly transformed primitive and national religions within its influence. Later, each developed into what we now know as the world religions. However, the expansions and developments from different revelation centers have not been straightforward and uncontested. Many of them proved less durable and have perished or been absorbed. Some have been aggressive in their expansion and, along the way, absorbed the other centers. Different religions or faith, seen from a historical perspective and context, are not rivals. Hick stresses that they began at different times and places. Each expanded outwards into the surrounding world of primitive natural religion until most of the world was drawn up into one or other of the great revealed faiths. However, Hick also notes that the process of establishment and assimilation consequently involved conflicts, like in the case of Islam’s entry into India and the virtual expulsion of Buddhism from India in the medieval period, and in the case of Islam’s

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advance into Europe and then its retreat at the end of the medieval period and Christianity’s claim of the Holy Land which was under the control of Islam. However, now that the frontiers of the different world faiths have become more or less fixed, there has been little penetration of one faith into societies molded by another (Hick, 1993, p. 138). This claim of Hick, however, is undermined by the continuing religious violence. One example is the case of the Rohingya genocide of August 2017 in Myanmar which bears the imprint of religious extremism manifested in anti-Muslim racism. The Rohingya crisis is a by-product of religious extremism encompassing systemic racism and anti-Muslim violence. Hick explained that the development of world religions could not just be viewed from a historical perspective. From the standpoint of religious faith, “the only reasonable hypothesis is that this historical picture represents a movement of divine self-revelation to mankind.” The question about the relation between the different world religions and the different truths which they embody cannot be answered by the idea that there is only the same divine or ultimate being or reality who expressed or revealed himself to people at different times and places and the different truths embodied by different religions are man’s different responses to these revelatory events. Hick suggests that the same divine reality has always been self-revealingly active toward humanity and that the differences in human response are related to different circumstances. These circumstances—ethnic, geographical, climatic, economic, sociological, and historical—have produced differences in human culture. Within each main cultural region, the response to the divine has taken its characteristic forms (Hick, 1993, p. 138). In this context, we can consider Islam as an embodiment of the main response of the Arab people to the divine reality. Hinduism is the response of the people of India. Buddhism is the main response of the people of Southeast Asia and parts of Northern Asia. Christianity is the main response of the European peoples and their emigrations to the Americas and Australasia. Hick, therefore, argues that in this context, it is historically intelligible to see why the revelation of the divine or ultimate reality or being to man and the disclosure of the divine will for human life must occur separately within the different streams of human life. While from an epistemic perspective, this can be questioned, as exclusivists question it, it is not illogical from a theoretical perspective to view that these revelations took different forms related to the different mentalities and conditions of the people to whom they were expressed or revealed and “developed within these different cultures into the vast and many-sided historical phenomena of the world religions” (Hick, 1993, p. 139). If the ultimate or divine reality or being is indeed infinite, then it transcends the grasp of the human mind. Moreover, human thought cannot define or encompass since we recognize that it is not an object or a part of the universe existing alongside other things, nor a being falling under a certain category. Hence, it is not within the power of humankind to draw boundaries or limitations to the divine nature and say that it is this and no more. Since our understanding of the Ultimate Reality is limited, our responses to its revelations are also limited and partial. Therefore, one person cannot fully and exclusively express the truths about the divine reality or being. It is, therefore, tenable to take the different encounters with the divine or ultimate being

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or reality within the different religious traditions as encounters of the same infinite or divine reality or being, though with partially different and overlapping aspects of that reality. This claim is stressed in the Bhagavad Gita, where Lord Krishna, the personal God of love, says, “Howsoever men approach me, even so, do I accept them; for, on all sides, whatever path they may choose is mine.” The Buddhist parable of the blind men and the elephant tells of an elephant brought to a group of blind men who had never encountered such an animal before. One felt a leg and reported that an elephant is a great pillar. Another felt the trunk and reported that an elephant is a great snake. Another felt a tusk and reported that an elephant is like a sharp plowshare. And so on. And then they all quarreled together, each claiming that his account was the truth and, therefore, all the others false. According to the Buddha, they were all true, but each referred only to one aspect of the same reality and all expressed in imperfect analogies. The teaching in the Bhagavad Gita and the parable told by the Buddha underscore that there are many different accounts of the divine, and they may all be true. However, they are all expressed in imperfect human analogies. Hence no one can claim the exclusive right to the whole truth. So, Hick emphasizes that the different concepts of God, such as Yahweh, Allah, Krishna, Param Atma, and the Holy Trinity, and likewise the different concepts of the hidden structure of reality, as the eternal emanation of Brahman or as an immense cosmic process culminating in Nirvana, are all images of the Divine. They each express some aspects or range of aspects, but none by itself fully and exhaustively corresponds to the infinite nature of the ultimate or divine reality. “Central to pluralism is the view of religious traditions as connected, overlapping attempts on the part of human beings to understand and orient themselves towards the sacred” (Byrne, 1995, p. 13). It is a realistic attitude that realizes “the irreducibility of the many to unity, tries to embrace the whole without reducing it to the quantifiable sum total of its parts or to a formal unity of whatever type” (Sharma & Dugan, 1999, pp. 31–32). According to Hick, every conception or claim of truth about the divine which has resulted from a great revelatory religious experience and has been tested through a long tradition of worship has sustained human faith over centuries and touched millions of lives, is likely to represent a genuine encounter with the divine reality (Hick, 1993, p. 140). However, because they are encounters from different historical and cultural standpoints with the same infinite divine reality, they lead to a different awareness of that reality. They can focus on one or several aspects of that reality. This is manifested in the different prayers and hymns of different religions. These prayers and hymns express diverse encounters with the same divine reality. These encounters took place “within different human cultures by people of different ways of thought and feeling, with different histories and different frameworks of philosophical thought, and have developed into different systems of theology embodied in different religious structures and organizations” (Hick, 1993, p. 143). There may be questions about whether one religious claim represents a genuine encounter with divine reality. However, it cannot be denied that for religious people, whether that is a case of folk religions like in the case of pre-colonial religiosity of the Filipinos or an organized or systematized religion, the religious experience has sustained their

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faith. Their religiosity is their way of expressing their belief in the divine; for them, it is as valid as other expressions of faith or belief. The religious pluralist calls on us to give up our claims to exclusivity and accept the thesis that many paths lead to God and salvation or liberation (Pojman & Rea, 2008, p. 508).

5 Responding to the Challenges of Religious Diversity Religious diversity is not only manifested in Asia or Southeast Asia; it is a global phenomenon. We cannot ignore this diversity, especially now, because the world is rapidly becoming heterogeneous. People of different religions and cultures come together and live in a common society. The challenge of religious diversity is not just on the epistemic level but more critically in the social and political domains. Conflicts arise between nations and peoples because of different religious beliefs, practices, and values, often resulting in violence. The challenge is not only to understand this diversity and to have a proper attitude toward this religious diversity. The challenge is promoting harmonious relations among diverse religions and avoiding religious violence. This ideal of a harmonious relationship among different religions can be attained through these core elements: religious pluralism, religious freedom, and inter-religious dialogue. It is easy to realize the highly intricate interconnectedness of human life in the world or the oneness of humanity. The awareness of this human interconnectedness also changes how we construct our identities and live our lives. Today, with the mechanisms of globalization, people and social institutions can hardly avoid contact or knowledge of some cultures and religions (Aguas, 2006a, 2006b, pp. 124–127). Indeed, people can accept or reject or modify their beliefs or values as they get into contact with and encounter other societies, cultures, and religions. Although there may still be some religions that may still close themselves to the influence of other religions, they cannot remain to be either indifferent or exclusive. Given the diversity of religious beliefs or faiths, religious pluralism is appropriate. Religious pluralism does not dissolve this diversity nor grants a privileged position to any religion. Although there are certain irreconcilable religious doctrines, these are viewed from the perspective that they all pertain to the same ultimate divine reality (Aguas, 2006a, 2006b, p. 78). Religious pluralism is an attitude of respecting this diversity of religious beliefs. Indeed, the social experiences of a particular society and its diverse religious groups greatly contribute to the openness or isolation of different religions. Among Muslims, for example, while in many Muslim countries, openness cuts across the distinction between the Shiites and Sunni divide (it has become common for members of the two sects to intermarry and pray at the same mosques as they share faith in the Quran and the Prophet Mohammed’s sayings and perform similar prayers, although they differ in rituals and interpretation of Islamic law) the Sunnis are generally more open compared to their Shiite Muslim brothers (Aguas, 2006a, 2006b, p. 78). Since the Sunnis are the majority, we find them in more countries and are open to contact and interaction with other religious groups.

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Religious freedom is respecting the right of every individual to follow his conscience, religious beliefs, and convictions. It also implies the right to express these beliefs. Religious freedom is manifested in the freedom of conscience and worship (Aguas, 2006a, 2006b, p. 78). This is further extended to the freedom of a Church, freedom of religious association, and freedom of religious expression. It is “freedom on the one hand for individuals to profess a personal religious faith in conformity with their conviction of conscience and freedom on the other hand for their religious communities to put this conviction into practice and make use of the means which are indispensable for that purpose” (Janssens, 1966, p. 119). Religious freedom results from recognizing the personal freedom of the human individual. According to the Second Vatican Council, the right to religious freedom is grounded on “the very dignity of the human person as this dignity is known through the revealed word of God and by reason itself” (Paul VI, 1965). However, the exercise of religious freedom must be done responsibly. Every freedom has its corresponding responsibility. In exercising it, men and women must respect the rights of others. Religion cannot be used to cause harm or injury to other human individuals or groups of individuals. Religious freedom, the freedom of the individual to express his religious beliefs and freedom of religion, that is, religious institutions or organizations to practice their beliefs and rituals, can be best promoted with religious pluralism. It encourages respect for the free expression of one’s religious beliefs and respect for the right of any person to associate with others and to organize with them for religious purposes. The pluralistic framework is appropriate for religious dialogue because it accommodates different religious positions. Under this attitude, inter-religious dialogue can be promoted to discover more common bonds and realize that other religious people participate in ultimate reality as validly as others do in their respective religions. A genuine pluralistic attitude should be inclusive, accommodating even those who profess exclusivist or inclusivist epistemological positions regarding religious diversity. Inter-religious dialogue is an open relationship and interaction among religions or religious people based on respect, understanding, and hospitality. Inter-religious dialogue is a mechanism that can counter violence due to religious conflicts. It can serve as a mechanism for promoting harmony and peace. It fosters mutual knowledge and enrichment, lessens tensions and misunderstanding, and promotes common goals and collaborations among followers of different religions (Aguas, 2007, p. 97). Pope St. John Paul II stressed that those engaged in inter-religious dialogue “must be consistent with their religious traditions and convictions, and be open to understanding those of the other party without pretense or close-mindedness, but with truth, humility, and frankness, knowing that dialogue can enrich each side” (John Paul II, 1990). For inter-religious dialogue to be successful, it should be based on recognizing the dignity and centrality of the human person—the person who recognizes the existence of the divine reality. While we hold on to our respective religious beliefs, we must give up our claims to exclusivity and accept the thesis that many paths lead to God and salvation or liberation and that there are many ways of expressing our faith or religious beliefs. We must take a gentler and more accommodating stance

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regarding the differences in our religious convictions and regard other religions with understanding, openness, and respect.

References Aguas, J. (2006a). Religious pluralism and freedom of religion. Journal of Dharma: International, Quarterly of World Religions and Philosophies, 31(1), 67–80. Aguas, J. (2006b). Preserving Asian cultural identities in the face of globalization. Prajna Vihara Journal of Philosophy and Religion, 7(1), 123–150. Aguas, J. (2007). Respect for human dignity and inter-religious dialogue: Keys to world peace. In I. Yusuf (Ed.), The role of religious and philosophical traditions in promoting world peace: An Asian perspective (pp. 91–104). Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Bodhi, B. (Trans.) (2000). The connected discourses of the Buddha: A translation of the Samyutta Nikaya. Wisdom Publications. Brodd, J. et al. (2013). Invitation to world religions. Oxford University Press. Byrne, P. (1995). Prolegomena to religious pluralism: Reference and realism in religion. Macmillan. Council on Foreign Relations. The Sunni-Shia divide. https://www.cfr.org/sunni-shia-divide/#!/ Dastmalchian, A. (1993). The epistemology of religious diversity in contemporary philosophy of religion. Philosophy Compass, 8(3), 298–308. Hick, J. (1993). God and the universe of faiths. Oneworld Publication. Janssens, L. (1966). Freedom of conscience and religious freedom. Alba House. Jaspers, K. (1961). The future of mankind. University of Chicago Press. John Paul II. (1990). Redemptoris Missio. Available online: https://www.vatican.va/content/johnpaul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_07121990_redemptoris-missio.html Macaranas, J. (2021). Understanding folk religiosity in the Philippines. Religions, 12, 800. https:// doi.org/10.3390/rel12100800 Meister, C. (2009). Introducing philosophy of religion. Routledge. Plantinga, A. (1994). A defense of religious exclusivism. In L. P. Pojman (Ed.), Philosophy of religion an anthology, 2nd ed. Wadsworth Publishing Company. Pojman, L., & Rea, M. (2008). Philosophy of religion: An anthology (5th ed.). Thomson Wadsworth. Rahner, K. (1969). Anonymous Christians. In Theological investigations, Vol. 6. Darton, Longman & Todd. Rahner, K. (1986). Karl Rahner in dialogue: Conversations and interviews, 1965–1982. Crossroad. Ridgeon, L. (Ed.). (2003). Major world religions: From their origin to the present. Routledge. Robinson, J. (2004). Religions of the world: Hinduism. Chelsea House Publishing. Sharma, A., & Dugan, K. (Eds.). (1999). A dome of many colors: Studies in religious pluralism, identity and unity. Trinity Press International. Vatican Council II. Declaration on religious freedom. Dignitatis Humanae. Promulgated by Pope Paul VI, December 7, 1965.

Jove Jim S. Aguas is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Santo Tomas, Manila, Philippines, where he is also a Research Faculty at the Center for Theology, Religious Studies, and Ethics. He is the Executive Governor of the Philippine National Philosophical Research Society and the Editor-in-Chief of Philosophia: International Journal of Philosophy. He was a Former President of the Philosophical Association of the Philippines (1999–2012). His publications include Person, Action, and Love: The Philosophical Thoughts of John Paul II/Karol Wojtyla (2014), Towards an Understanding and Appreciation of the Human Person (2017), The Good and Happy Life: An Introduction to Ethical Systems (2019). He has published articles in local and international journals. He received the Dangal ng UST, Hall of Fame Award in 2016 and the

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Lifetime Service Award by the Philippine Dominican Center for Institutional Studies in 2018. His research interests include existentialism, intercultural/interreligious dialogue, philosophy of religion, and ethics.

Chapter 25

Epistemic Tolerance and Religious Diversity Natika Krongyoot

Abstract This paper discusses some epistemological issues concerning religious diversity or religious disagreement. We explore the questions: Is it justified for a person to hold her own religious beliefs and entertain beliefs in another religion? How can we deal with religious diversity reasonably and with tolerance? To answer these questions, we propose the idea of epistemic tolerance that is based on conciliationism. First, we introduce the concepts of intolerance and religious exclusivism, which are undesirable for religious diversity. Next, we endorse the idea of conciliationism or tentativism, a form of epistemic tolerance supported by Alvin Goldman’s view of reasonability and Richard Feldman’s view of evidential equality. We argue that such an idea can help us handle religious diversity with reason and tolerance. Keywords Religious tolerance · Religious diversity · Epistemic conduct

1 Introduction Religious diversity refers to different perspectives of religions that are incompatible. One religion can have different views within the same religion. For example, there are various Christian perspectives about the nature of God. Another term for religious diversity is religious disagreement. For instance, theism and atheism are the main conflicting views illustrating religious disagreement. This paper uses these terms interchangeably to refer to situations where individuals consider different and incompatible religious beliefs. The main philosophical question regarding religious diversity or disagreement is epistemic. How can religious diversity be justified when there are conflicting religious claims? One religious diversity debate concerns the particular epistemic question concerning the justification of a religious belief for an individual in a religious disagreement. That is, whether a person is justified to hold her religious beliefs while simultaneously acknowledging opposing ones. In short, how should we deal N. Krongyoot (B) Mahidol University, Bangkok, Thailand e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Hongladarom et al. (eds.), Philosophies of Appropriated Religions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5191-8_25

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with religious diversity reasonably and tolerantly? (Basinger, 2020; Feldman 2011). We focus on and answer these questions in this paper. We argue that religious tolerance is desirable and required to handle religious diversity or disagreement and offer epistemic tolerance as an answer to these questions. We start with the discussion of intolerance and religious exclusivism. Then, we propose a view of epistemic tolerance, which we call conciliationism or tentativism supported by Alvin Goldman’s view of reasonability and Richard Feldman’s view of evidential equality. We demonstrate how this kind of epistemic tolerance provides a satisfactory answer to whether a person is justified to hold her religious beliefs while entertaining opposing ones and how we should deal with religious diversity reasonably and tolerantly.

2 Intolerance and Religious Exclusivism In this section, we introduce the concept of religious exclusivism. Religious exclusivism is the view that only one’s religious beliefs are true. It rejects religious beliefs that contradict one’s own. Thus, religious exclusivists believe their beliefs are superior to others. According to Feldman (2011), religious exclusivism is characterized by intolerance and mindless relativism.

2.1 Intolerance Intolerance, generally, means the position or attitude of denying different ideas or views. People who do not accept beliefs except their own have such an attitude. Intolerant people see other people with other beliefs as their opponents. In epistemic matters, they regard their beliefs as true and beliefs that contradict theirs as false. The intolerant attitude in the religious domain is adopted by religious persons who believe that only their religion is true and that other religions are not true. Intolerant believers express a sense of superiority. They feel that their religious beliefs are closer to the real truth than the competing beliefs and, thus, are superior to these other beliefs. Such a sense of religious superiority implies religious exclusivism, which means believers not listening to other people from different religions and judging other religions as untrue. Therefore, religious exclusivists are intolerant and fail to engage in proper epistemic conduct. They do not engage in religious inquiry that is open to an exchange of different religious ideas and argumentative assessments for truth (Feldman, 2011, p. 138). Religious exclusivists do not recognize religious diversity and will not consider other religions because they are absolutists about religious matters. They always think their religion is true and dismiss other religions as false. However, if religious exclusivists are absolutists, could relativism explain religious disagreement? We argue that it does not. While relativism is admittedly

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a complicated concept in philosophy and epistemology, we introduce “mindless relativism” as a kind of relativism that does not accept religious diversity.

2.2 Mindless Relativism On the surface, relativism is a compromise for all sides of a disagreement. Its general idea is that neither side possesses the absolute truth. Relativists claim that there is more than one true set of beliefs. A belief might be true for some people but false for others. Thus, the truth value of a proposition (the content of a belief) may differ from one community to another. Each community may have doxastic norms, determining whether a belief is true or false. In this picture, disagreements about certain beliefs may be accepted since incompatible beliefs can survive together. As for religious diversity, religious relativists can accept other religions and recognize religious diversity (Basinger, 2020). Consequently, the exclusivist attitude could not accommodate this kind of relativism. Relativists can be open-minded and willing to consider other views that are against their views, and they can be tolerant and respectful of religious diversity. However, the idea of mindless relativism proposed by Feldman (2011) seems to imply an exclusivist attitude: [Relativists] often say that while one proposition is true for one person or one group of people, different and incompatible propositions are true for others […] I think of this view as “mindless relativism.” But in many cases, they really do disagree [… ] To say that the different propositions are true for people on the different sides of the issue is just another way to say that they believe different things […] it is notable that they also fail to engage with the arguments of others. Since, their own view is true for them, relativists do not see their own positions as challenged by the views of others. Therefore, they need not examine with care the arguments for these dissenting views. (Feldman, 2011, pp. 140–141)

Mindless relativists believe conflicting views can be true, according to some groups. For instance, according to mindless relativists, when one believes that God exists and another that God does not exist, these two beliefs can be true. This means that one can believe one’s view is true while accepting that the opposite view is also true. According to Feldman (2011), this relativistic attitude implies that we have different beliefs, so one must respect other people’s beliefs, and other people must not attack one’s beliefs. This implies that all beliefs are epistemically at par. No belief is superior to other beliefs. However, while mindless relativists could admit incompatible religious beliefs, they do not consider other religious views seriously. As such, they dismiss critical inquiry or exchange of arguments to understand differing views better. Also, they do not acknowledge why other views are different from theirs. So, while mindless relativists may seem to respect and tolerate other religious beliefs, they remain dismissive. Their tolerance is just their way of avoiding quarrels and dissents. Thus, the difference between intolerance and mindless relativism is that the former fails to recognize religious diversity, and the latter seems to welcome it. Intolerance

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presupposes absolute truth and superiority. Intolerant believers treat other views as false. Subsequently, intolerant believers do not recognize religious diversity or religious disagreement. On the other hand, Mindless relativists are more tolerant and respectful toward religious dissent. They refuse to believe that there is just one truth; thus, they can accept contrary views. So, they seem to acknowledge religious diversity or religious disagreements. Intolerance and mindless relativism share a dismissive attitude toward genuine inquiry concerning religious matters. On the one hand, intolerant people reject a critical assessment of religious beliefs. On the other hand, mindless relativists ignore argumentative inquiries of religious truths. Thus, both imply an exclusivist attitude toward religious diversity; hence, they are both unjustifiable and unreasonable. We should avoid these exclusivist approaches to deal with religious diversity with a justified and tolerant approach.

3 Epistemic Tolerance and Religious Tolerance This section introduces the notions of religious and epistemic tolerance that may address the problems of religious exclusivism. We begin with the former notion first.

3.1 Religious Tolerance Tolerance is the attitude or approach of accepting different beliefs or practices with which one sometimes disagrees. Religious tolerance is recognizing different religious beliefs, allowing people to hold beliefs other than what one holds. Characterized this way, tolerant believers reasonably welcome religious dissent and seriously consider other religious beliefs with care and respect. These are desirable characteristics of tolerance for religious diversity (Basinger, 2020). As discussed in the preceding section, intolerance and mindless relativism do not fit the given characteristics of religious tolerance. Intolerant believers and mindless relativists do not disturb other people’s different religious beliefs. They just allow other people to have such beliefs. However, merely allowing people to hold such beliefs is not respecting them because it implies that one simply does not care. Hence, it does not promote genuine religious diversity. However, since we require genuine care and respect as part of religious tolerance promoting religious diversity, how must we proceed to have such an appropriate tolerance? We need a reasonable epistemic tolerance expressing genuine care and respect to answer this question.

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3.2 Epistemic Tolerance Epistemic tolerance for religious diversity is a reasoning practice that promotes a critical inquiry toward truth and knowledge. This type of epistemic practice means that people engage with one another in reasoning and argumentative inquiry to assess religious dissents or incompatible religious beliefs and that they understand their and other people’s beliefs. This epistemic conduct is a performance of considering other views to understand different views and why those views differ from one’s own. To properly practice this kind of epistemic conduct, people must listen to others to learn the evidence for their views. One engages in such conduct to better understand other people, and not to put down their views. Of course, the aim here is to reach the truth of religious beliefs and rationally resolve epistemic conflicts. If this goal is not met, one must continue the epistemic inquiry to reach the truth. In conducting epistemic inquiry, we should suspend our sense of superiority concerning our religion. As inquirers, we must listen to one another to understand each other better. A caring attitude is needed for this type of epistemic inquiry because when we care about each other, we listen to them more carefully. If one listens to others carefully, one gets more evidence and understands them better. A caring attitude and open-mindedness are required. Such care and respect refer to an appropriate religious tolerance that we need. This kind of epistemic tolerance leads us to conciliationism or tentativism.

4 Conciliationism or Tentavism Conciliationism or tentativism implies genuine epistemic tolerance. Suppose both parties cannot share evidence that they can equally accept with non-question-begging and objective justification. In that case, one is not justified in maintaining a superior view of one’s religious beliefs (Christensen, 2007, 2016; Feldman, 2011). If two parties of opposite views cannot fully share their evidence and have not reached a shared judgment of religious truth, they need not give up their respective religious beliefs. The two parties should take the stance of epistemic equality, where each of their beliefs is assumed true since we do not know the truth of all religions. This stance of epistemic equality brings about tentativism, where the exclusivist attitude is reduced. The two parties should tentatively hold their religious beliefs and not consider theirs superior. This means that believers should adopt the fallibility attitude. Each party should be open to the possibility that the opposite view might be correct and one’s view might be wrong. Tentativism leads to genuine epistemic tolerance that allows one to engage in a (collaborative) rational inquiry with whom someone disagrees. It regards rational inquiry as a way to resolve religious diversity and provides an agent with justifiedness since a person who adopts this approach acknowledges religious dissent (Gutting, 1982, p. 108; McKim, 2001, pp. 154–155; p. 178).

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Tenativism also implies a critical outlook toward religious disputes. As one critically listens to other perspectives, one’s epistemic horizon widens, leading to suspension of judgment and genuine tolerance. At the same time, this epistemic practice can cause us to acknowledge religious diversity further. Through this epistemic practice, genuine, truth-seeking discourse may happen. As people critically reflect on religious dissent, they gain more understanding of religious alternatives. As Quinn (2001) said, serious reflection on religious diversity leads to religious tolerance. Reflection will necessarily weaken people’s justification of their religious superiority. They will not think that their religious perspective is superior to perspectives different from theirs. This weakened justification can lead to greater religious tolerance toward other people with different perspectives. Thus, people will experience genuine religious tolerance. However, this epistemic approach only explains how to deal with religious diversity. It does not provide guidelines on how believers could deal with their faith. This approach does pursue epistemic equality, but it could also weaken people’s confidence in the truth of their religion since they embrace the view that no one could know all the truth about all religions. This weakened confidence could result in less confidence to perform moral duties or practices for their religious communities since less confidence in religious superiority might mean believers are not justified in keeping their faith. Furthermore, it may not motivate believers to engage in religious disagreement. Thus, they may resort again to an exclusivist attitude toward religious diversity (Plantinga, 2000). This concern is an obstacle to epistemic tolerance because religious believers may be afraid that engaging in religious disagreement would weaken their faith in their religion, so they will not want to take the epistemic tolerance stance while engaging in religious disagreement. Adopting this kind of epistemic tolerance appears to have a problem with one’s faith. If one accepts such a position and still has faith and continues with religious practices, one would be led to religious exclusivism. So, one might give up his or her religious faith and discontinue his or her religious (and moral) practices.

5 Reasonability and Evidential Equality We respond to this problem by supporting our proposed idea of epistemic tolerance with the views of Goldman (2010) and Feldman (2011), particularly the former’s view about reasonability and the latter’s view of evidential equality and the uniqueness thesis. We show that a strengthened conciliationist view provides epistemic norms where an agent holding a particular set of religious beliefs could reasonably tolerate others.

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5.1 Reasonability Goldman distinguishes a belief’s truth value from its reasonability. He writes, A false proposition can be reasonably believed. What determines a belief’s reasonability is the agent’s evidence (or belief-forming methods), not the belief’s truth-value. The actual rightness of an E-system doesn’t determine the reasonability of agent’s conforming to it. What is critical is the agent’s evidence about its rightness. (Goldman, 2010 p. 198)

As Goldman (2010) notes, reasonable deliberation of the belief-forming process, not the contents’ truth value, determines the reasonability of beliefs. When an agent receives evidence relevant to a proposition p, she applies her epistemic system (Esystem) consisting of norms or principles for forming beliefs, functioning as its evidence. Accordingly, she generates a confident attitude toward p and concludes that p is correct. Note that an E-system differs from one community to another. Consequently, two agents from different communities can have different E-systems. When they get the same evidence concerning p, they can entertain different beliefs toward the same subject matter. One may believe that p is true, and another believes that not-p is true (Goldman, 2010, pp. 197–198). Goldman elaborates that applying an E-system in the belief-forming process might not lead to a different truth than the exact truth of a proposition. However, when an agent performs the application, she performs the reasonability of beliefs and imposes justifiedness to the formed belief. It follows that she is justified in believing that she is justified in believing p with attitude D. From this application, two agents can be justified in believing that p and not-p, one believing that p, and the other that non-p. Thus, two people can be reasonable in holding conflicting views. So, there can be a reasonable disagreement because the truth value of p is irrelevant to its reasonability. Let us look at an example. Suppose Amanda is justified in believing that she is justified in believing that p with attitude D. In contrast, Jerome is justified in believing that he is justified in believing p with attitude D*. At the first-order level of justification (she is justified in believing p with attitude D, and he is justified in believing P with attitude D*), the different beliefs imply that one agent is reasonable and another is not. However, when the second-order level of justification is performed, it can result in the two being reasonable for holding conflicting views. The second-order level of justification, which reflects their justification, shows the different epistemic systems of the two agents. This reflection explains an agent’s reasonable belief. In other words, two agents can reasonably hold different beliefs, even though they hold the same evidence, only if they reflect on their justification. That is, they perform a second-order level of justification. Thus, a higher-order level of justification provides reasonability for an agent (Goldman, 2010, pp. 197–198). We may apply Goldman’s view to epistemic tolerance. When an agent faces a religious dissent situation or new evidence of the opposite religious view, she must perform epistemic conduct with the E-system of her religion to deal with the new evidence to generate a new belief. Generating a new belief means the agent tries to understand the opposing view. When the agent performs epistemic conduct to deal with religious dissent, she will justifiably have a new belief concerning religious

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dissent. Her new belief can become reasonable if she often re-examines or reflects on the evidence by performing epistemic conduct or applying the E-system. Her new belief formed by the epistemic conduct with the E-system of her religion might agree with the same standpoint of her religion. This new belief might fit the same standpoint because of the E-system of her religion. Consequently, if an agent performs her epistemic conduct (taking the stance of epistemic tolerance) and gets a new belief fitting the same standpoint of her religion, she is justified or reasonable for her religious belief. This process shows that an agent keeps her religious standpoint and does not revise the original religious beliefs. Nevertheless, the E-system of her religion could be changed or given up if she revises her original beliefs following the new evidence (religious dissent). This view agrees with Quine (1978) and Dormandy (2019), who suggest that a belief system is a web of beliefs. The web of religious beliefs comprises propositions, each supporting the other. The core center of the web contains norms or principles or religious standpoints that are the E-system of the given religion. This core of the religious belief web is hard to change or revise, especially if the core of the web is a domain of religious transcendence beyond empirical evidence. The edge of the web consists of empirical propositions often revised according to new facts or evidence but are often adjusted to fit the core center of the web. However, it would be possible for an agent to give up the E-system of her religion if she has changed or revised a lot of religious propositions from the edge to the core. These revised propositions could change the core propositions of the web, so the given religion’s E-system could eventually be given up. Applying Goldman’s view of reasonability to epistemic tolerance suggests that, in the face of religious conflicts, if a believer did not know the truth of her religious beliefs that are formed by her epistemic conduct, she could still justifiably believe both her religious beliefs and her newly formed belief about the religious dissent that fits the same standpoint of her religion, even though her beliefs disagree with others. According to an agent’s performance of epistemic conduct, she is justified in her religious beliefs when she takes epistemic tolerance for religious disagreement. This means she reasonably and tolerantly deals with religious diversity and retains her religious beliefs.

5.2 Evidential Equality and the Uniqueness Thesis Let us now turn to Feldman’s view of evidential equality. Evidential equality is the concept of fully shared evidence for explaining epistemic peers. Feldman offers the concept of epistemic peers as follows: Let’s say that people are epistemic peers when they are roughly equal with respect to intelligence, reasoning powers, background information, etc. When people have had a full discussion of a topic and have not withheld relevant information, we will say that they have shared their evidence about that topic (Feldman, 2011, p. 144)

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Feldman suggests that the opposing views of two agents cannot constitute a reasonable disagreement if these agents are not epistemic peers. Thus, if either party does not fully and equally share their evidence, they cannot claim to possess full knowledge, and thus their views are liable to be false. As such, the two parties should take fallibility for their views. In this case, the two parties should pursue evidential equality, which could lead to a situation where the same evidence can support only one view, leaving the other false. This is known as the Uniqueness Thesis. However, as Goldman (2010) notes, it is difficult for the hearer to receive the same evidence as the speaker holds by just hearing or communicating. For instance, a hearer could not get the same memory or visual experience as a speaker did, and thus the two parties should take fallibility for their views. Therefore, it is reasonable for two parties to have different beliefs and disagree during epistemic conduct, even if they are not in a state of evidential equality. We may agree with Feldman (2011) about evidential equality and uniqueness. Two parties should pursue evidential equality while carrying out the epistemic conduct, and then, if necessary, this conduct or this inquiry could reach the uniqueness thesis. Fallibility could occur in the epistemic conduct or Goldman’s application of the Esystem for belief formation. As Goldman (2010) notes, an agent might make a mistake during a certain stage of belief formation, e.g., when an agent faces new evidence from opposite views. The mistake could result from partially shared evidence of the two parties. However, if an agent has performed epistemic conduct, she is justified in believing her belief. Fallibility and evidential equality caution believers to suspend their exclusivist position and take the tentativist approach to continue the epistemic conduct for religious disagreement to reach the truth. William Alston (1988) raised an objection to tentativism by arguing that it is not clear that there is such a non-circular ground for supposing one of the contestants to be superior to the others, so it is not irrational for one to remain an exclusivist. In response, the stance of epistemic tolerance suggests that when it is not clear whether there is a non-circular ground or objective justification, we have to suppose fallibility. This means that the two parties should be open to the possibility that the other view might be true and that the view that one holds might be incorrect. Fallibility cannot accept exclusivism. The exclusivist attitude is unlikely to involve critical inquiry for engaging in religious disagreement or seeking truth since such an attitude could weaken tolerance and strengthen religious superiority. The epistemic conduct or the epistemic tolerance that contains Goldman’s reasonability thesis can provide the religious believer with justifiedness for keeping her religious beliefs. In religious diversity, as soon as evidential equality cannot occur between two parties, a believer may form her beliefs that agree with the same standpoint of her religion. Her beliefs generated by epistemic conduct without evidential equality still fit her religious beliefs, so she is justified in believing in her religion and tolerating religious diversity. So, epistemic conduct indicates that a believer is justified in holding her religious beliefs and acknowledging opposite ones. Although she holds the same belief while taking the stance of epistemic tolerance (engaging in epistemic conduct), she may take conciliationism or tentativism because this position can make her carry out epistemic tolerance and give up the exclusivist position.

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Taking this epistemic tolerance or conciliationism makes it necessary for an agent to suspend her religious superiority; an agent does not think that her religious belief is true and others are not. Moreover, given Goldman’s distinction between reasonability and truth, when one performs epistemic conduct, one reasonably holds his or her original religious beliefs while suspending his or her religious truth and giving up the exclusivist position. This is because, following Goldman’s view of reasonability and epistemic tolerance, holding one’s original religious beliefs presupposes the fallibility of one’s beliefs; so it is a tentative holding of such beliefs. It follows that while one reasonably and tentatively holds one’s original religious beliefs, he or she must suspend his or her religious truth and pursue evidential equality with other religious believers. This suspension and fallibility presumption might shake one’s religious faith and not allow to continue one’s religious practices or moral duties. Taking the stance of epistemic tolerance allows people to have religious faith and continue their religious practices since it distinguishes the reasonability of religious beliefs from their truth. Religious faith is trusting is the relation between an agent and his or her religion. When one has faith in a religion, one trusts this religion as a guide to life. Religious faith is beyond reason and truth and has nothing to do with the reasonability of holding different beliefs and the religious truth. It involves the morality and worth of life. We have faith because we trust that our faith will guide our practical and moral decisions. Epistemic tolerance does not have a problem with religious faith and can deal with religious diversity with reasonability and real respect for opposite religious views avoiding the attitude of exclusivism. Thus, one may still hold one’s religious beliefs and practices with the religious faith. Nevertheless, by taking the stance of epistemic tolerance, it is possible for one to give up one’s religious faith and beliefs if the web of beliefs is revised due to performing critical inquiry or epistemic conduct. When we face religious diversity, we should respect opposite views by suspending our religious truth and reducing our sense of religious superiority since it is unreasonable to hold our religious beliefs exclusively. We should maintain our religious practices for living in our life. Therefore, the stance of epistemic tolerance is the respectful and reasonable way of dealing with religious diversity while we should still hold our religious beliefs and continue our religious practices with the faith for living, not because we think that our religion is closer to the truth than other religions.

6 Conclusion Epistemic tolerance consisting of proper epistemic conduct toward religious faith can handle religious diversity with tolerance and reasonableness. In cases of religious diversity or religious disagreement, people should take the stance of epistemic tolerance when met with opposing religious beliefs. They must perform epistemic conduct that endorses ideas of Goldman’s reasonability and Feldman’s evidential equality to deal with the opposite views. This performance provides people with

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justifiedness or reasonability for holding their religious beliefs tentatively while acknowledging religious diversity. Besides, epistemic tolerance can avoid religious exclusivism including intolerance and mindless relativism that are undesirable and unreasonable for the religious conflict. Therefore, epistemic tolerance can be the appropriate attitude for the religious diversity that suggests that it is reasonable for a person to hold her own religious beliefs tentatively and acknowledge and entertain the opposite religious beliefs.

References Alston, W. P. (1988). Religious diversity and perceptual knowledge of god. Faith and Philosophy, 5, 433–448. Basinger, D. (2020). Religious diversity (pluralism). In Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), The stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/religious-plu ralism/ Christensen, D. (2007). Epistemology of disagreement: The good news. The Philosophical Review., 116(2), 187–217. Christensen, D. (2016). Conciliation, uniqueness, and rational toxicity. Noûs, 50, 584–603. Dormandy, K. (2019). The epistemic benefits of religious disagreement. Religious Studies, 56(3), 309–408. Feldman, R. (2011). Reasonable religious disagreement. In A. I. Goldman & D. Whitcomb (Eds.), Social epistemology: Essential readings (pp. 137–157) Oxford University: Oxford University Press. Gutting, G. (1982). Religious belief and religious skepticism. University of Notre Dame Press. Goldman, Alvin I. (2010). Epistemic relativism and reasonable disagreement. In R. Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (Eds.), Disagreement. (pp. 187–215). Oxford University Press. McKim, R. (2001). Religious ambiguity and religious diversity. Oxford University Press. Plantinga, A. (2000). Pluralism: A defense of religious exclusivism. In K. Meeker & P. Quinn (Eds.), The Philosophical challenge of religious diversity (pp. 172–192). Oxford University Press. Quinn, P. L. (2001). “Religious diversity and religious toleration”. International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, 50, 57–80. Quine, W. V. (1978). The web of belief . McGraw-Hill Education.

Natika Krongyoot is a Lecturer at the Department of Humanities, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Mahidol University, Thailand. She leads the sub-committee on the philosophy for children and youth of the Philosophy and Religion Society of Thailand. She specializes in philosophy of language, epistemology, social epistemology, philosophy for children, and ethics.

Chapter 26

A Feminist Reimagining of Mary’s Role in Philippine Colonial Catholicism’s Economy of Salvation Through the Works of Jose Rizal Rosallia Domingo

Abstract This paper explores the writings of Jose Rizal as a source of insight into the predominant role of Mary, as the Mother of God, in Christian devotion and salvation during the Spanish Colonial period in the Philippines. It demonstrates the implication of the contradiction of the feminine spiritual authority of Mary—as the mediatrix of salvation, on the one hand, and the symbol of religious oppression, on the other hand—to the construction of the Filipina identity in Philippine Colonial Catholicism. It proposes a feminist reimagining of the feminine spiritual authority of Mary that is empowering for Filipino women. Keywords Catholicism · Mary · The doctrine of salvation · Jose Rizal · Feminism

1 Introduction: The Philippines and Colonial Catholicism During the Time of Rizal The Philippines is one of the only two predominantly Christian countries in the Southeast Asian region, with Catholicism as the most embedded denomination of Christianity in Filipino culture. Today, 83% of the Philippine population identifies as Catholic (Brown & Chambon, 2022). The Philippines’ Catholic majority originates in its long period as a Spanish colony lasting nearly three hundred years. Colonial Catholicism brought to the Philippines an ideology of salvation that Filipinos assimilated into their understanding of death and the afterlife (Stošı´c et al., 2016, p. 195). Under Spanish rule, Filipinos started to believe in Christ and the salvation he offers in the afterlife for those who believe in the doctrine of the Faith (Rafael, 2013, p. 100). Integrating Christian ideas into Filipinos’ socio-cultural and ethical life has placed Catholicism as the cornerstone of Filipino identity and allowed the Catholic Church R. Domingo (B) De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Hongladarom et al. (eds.), Philosophies of Appropriated Religions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5191-8_26

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to dominate and rule the region (Baring, 2022; Shirley, 2004). The Catholic Church exercised, along with its religious functions, to propagate and preserve the Christian religion, political and judicial functions (Zaide, 1957, pp. 177–178). It had been so closely intertwined with the state that it produced tensions that would lead the Filipino people to revolt against Spain (Willis, 1905). In his writings, Jose Rizal illustrated the colonial abuses of the Catholic religion that colonization has enabled and encouraged. In them, Rizal portrays and then sharply criticizes the Catholic clergy’s corruption and abuses that would help inspire the Philippine Revolution from 1896 to 1898, the first anti-colonial movement in Southeast Asia (Alfante, 2018; Escalante, 2019). The development of Filipino nationalism and the beginning of a series of nationalistic movements mark the Philippines of Rizal’s time. At the root of this movement were the Filipino elites who absorbed the democratic and nationalistic ideas of the French revolution due to their education in Spain and other countries of Europe. This era stands out as the initial period of ideological preparation for reformist propaganda and education led by Rizal. As a supporter of peaceful reform, Rizal began writing his first novel, Noli Me Tangere, in late 1884 during his medical studies in Madrid, Spain, and published it in 1887 in Berlin. Through his novel, Rizal aimed to awaken Filipino patriotism and sought reforms in the colonial administration. The novel reflected Rizal’s and his contemporaries’ experiences of colonial administration and Catholic Church abuses during the Propaganda Movement. Originally written in Spanish, the Spanish authorities banned Noli Me Tangere and its sequel El Filibusterismo (1891), in some parts of the Philippines for their subversive content. Both novels became a primary source for developing the intellectual framework of Philippine nationalism and revolutionary movements of 1896 through 1901 against the Spanish and American regimes. To this day, Rizal and his works’ legacy lives on with the passing of the Rizal law or Republic Act. No. 1425 or “An Act to Include in the Curricula of All Public and Private Schools; Colleges and Universities Courses on the Life, Works, and Writings of Jose Rizal, Particularly His Novels Noli Me Tangere and El Filibusterismo, Authorizing the Printing and Distribution Thereof and for Other Purposes” on June 12, 1956, which the Catholic Church then staunchly opposed (Francia, 2021). It would prove beneficial, therefore, to examine the influence of Mary’s role in Philippine Colonial Catholicism’s doctrine of salvation and how it shaped Filipino women’s identity in Philippine society. It is also beneficial to explore Rizal’s literary works, given their relevance and contribution to expressing the social and historical events of the nineteenth-century colonial Philippines. The aim of this paper is twofold. It aims to revisit the role of Mary in Philippine Colonial Catholicism’s economy of salvation in reimagining a feminine spiritual authority that empowers Filipino women; secondly, to contribute to the distinctively feminist project in philosophy of religion, which feminist philosophers characterize as an inclusivist philosophy of religion.

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2 The Works of Rizal as a Source of Insight into the Predominant Role of Mary in Christian Devotion and Salvation During the Spanish Colonial Period in the Philippines Most of Rizal’s written works contain religious ideas that offer considerable insight into the influence of the Catholic religion in the nineteenth-century colonial Philippines. His religious thought developed in the context of the Catholicism in which he was born and taught. Rizal grew up in a devout Catholic family and was educated in prestigious Catholic schools in the Philippines. His mother, Doña Teodora Alonzo, is a devout follower of Our Lady of Peace and Good Voyage in Antipolo. She was said to have had a difficult pregnancy and almost died giving birth to Rizal, made a vow to the Virgin of Antipolo to make a pilgrimage to her shrine for safe delivery. Notwithstanding his religious upbringing, his immersion in Enlightenment thought and disagreement with the prevailing Catholic propagation of the Faith led Rizal to develop a religious philosophy not totally in accord with the Catholic religion (Rizal in Focus, 2018). A central characteristic of the Catholic tradition during Rizal’s time is the veneration of Mary, the Blessed Mother. Mary’s role in divine intercession to receive God’s blessing characterizes the Catholic Faith of the Filipino people. The phrase “pueblo amante de Maria,” which means people in love with Mary, describes the Church of the Philippines (Redemptorists International, 2016). The devotion to Mother Mary is deeply embedded in Filipino culture. Daily rosary recitations, novenas, and pilgrimages reflect the widespread integration of Mary into the social and spiritual practices of Filipino Catholics (Cardinal Rosales, 1975). Several of Rizal’s written works evince this exceptional Marian piety of the Filipino people. In particular, the sonnet he composed during his stay at the Ateneo Municipal de Manila in 1876, entitled To the Virgin Mary (A La Virgen Maria), the 1887 novel Noli Me Tangere, and the letter he penned To the Young Women of Malolos when he was in London in 1889, illustrates not only the transformation of his religious thought but also the predominant role of Mary, as the Mother of God, in Christian devotion and salvation during the Spanish Colonial period in the Philippines. These writings illuminate the contradiction in Colonial Catholicism’s representation of the nature of the feminine spiritual authority of Mary—as the mediatrix of salvation, on the one hand, and the symbol of religious oppression, on the other hand—and its impact on the construction of the Filipina identity. Despite his later views in life that run contrary to the Catholic dogmas in which he was brought up, Rizal was a devout Marian in his youth. His Jesuit education required him to attend daily Mass, recite daily prayers, and encouraged him to join sodalities such as the Fraternity of Mary. In Ateneo, he excelled in academics and vocational classes and extracurricular activities such as poetry and rhetoric competitions (DeStephano, 2011, p. 114). During his third academic year in Ateneo de Municipal, he wrote the poem To the Virgin Mary in praise of Mary, the Mother of Jesus. The poem reflected Rizal’s veneration of Mary, who intercedes on our behalf

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to Jesus and hears our prayers. Rizal’s high regard for Mary’s mediation in heaven and her place between her Son and all humanity in the reality of their needs and sufferings is evident in these verses: To the Virgin Mary Mary, sweet peace and dearest consolation of suffering mortal: you are the fount whence springs the current of solicitude that brings unto our soil unceasing fecundation. From your abode, enthroned on heaven’s height, in mercy deign to hear my cry of woe and to the radiance of your mantle draw my voice that rises with so swift a flight. You are my mother, Mary, and shall be my life, my stronghold, my defense most thorough; and you shall be my guide on this wild sea. If vice pursues me madly on the morrow, if death harasses me with agony: come to my aid and dissipate my sorrow! (Rizal, 1876)

Rizal’s strong interest in Philippine national culture and history occurred during his stay in Germany, where he published the first Propaganda movement novel in February 1887 (Ikehata, 1968, p. 180). Rizal’s first novel Noli Me Tangere depicted different aspects of Filipino society as he observed and witnessed. It describes his views on the oppressive conditions of Spanish colonial rule and religious corruption among Spanish friars in the Philippines. The novel follows the main protagonist, Crisostomo Ibarra, who returns to his homeland, the Philippines, after studying for seven years in Europe following his father’s death in prison due to an altercation with a Franciscan friar and former town curate named Padre Damaso. The novel narrates Crisostomo Ibarra’s idealism to improve his country and his ill-fated love relationship with Maria Clara, his childhood sweetheart whom he left behind when he left for Europe. In chapter 36 of the novel entitled The First Cloud, Ibarra is excommunicated as punishment for nearly killing Padre Damaso for humiliating his father’s memory. Having been forbidden to speak to Ibarra until the ex-communication was rescinded, Maria Clara was left weeping inconsolably and praying to God for help: She wanted to pray, but who in despair can pray? Prayers are for the hours of hope, and when in the absence of this we turn to God it is only with complaints. “My God,” cried her heart, “why dost Thou thus cut a man off, why dost Thou deny him the love of others? Thou dost not deny him thy sunlight and thy air nor hide from him the sight of thy heaven! Why then deny him love, for without a sight of the sky, without air or sunlight, one can live, but without love—never!”. (Rizal, 1990)

In this chapter, Maria Clara found solitude in her room, seeking succor from the image of Mary. Mary’s intercessory role as the Spiritual Mother in the life of Maria Clara and all Christians is made clear in these lines:

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Would these cries unheard by men reach the throne of God or be heard by the Mother of the distressed? The poor maiden who had never known a mother dared to confide these sorrows of an earthly love to that pure heart that knew only the love of daughter and of mother. In her despair she turned to that deified image of womanhood, the most beautiful idealization of the most ideal of all creatures, to that poetical creation of Christianity who unites in herself the two most beautiful phases of womanhood without its sorrows: those of virgin and mother—to her whom we call Mary! “Mother, mother!” she moaned. (Rizal, 1990)

The aspect of the feminine spiritual authority of Mary in the Catholic tradition during Rizal’s time raises crucial questions about the relations between religion and gender, such as the implication of the veneration of Mary as the ideal of womanhood in the construction of the Filipina identity. In the novel, Maria Clara, who was often compared to the Virgin Mary, embodied the colonial Spanish period’s ideal image of a Filipina that has (to a certain degree) permeated the Filipino psyche until today: beautiful, reserved, self-effacing, submissive and devoutly religious. Rizal may have intended to use the stereotypical female characters to demystify the Filipina femininity created by the Spaniards. Violeta Lopez-Gonzaga (1996, p. 144) claims that the character of Maria Clara offers a subtle critique of the then-dominant gender stereotype. As expressed in his Letter to the Young Women of Malolos, commending the women’s perseverance in fighting for their rights to receive a formal education, Rizal strongly hoped to empower all Filipino women (Domingo, 2010, p. 123). In this portion of Rizal’s letter, he pointed out how the self-sacrificing and virginal qualities of the Holy Virgin Mary, held up as the ideal woman by the colonizers and persisted as the ideal image of Filipina femininity, need to be contested: In a book published by D. Sinibaldo de Mas and in other friar sketches sins are related of which women accused themselves in the confessional and of which the friars made no secret in talking to their Spanish visitors seasoning them, at the best, with idiotic and shameless tales not worthy of credence. I cannot repeat here the shameless stories that a friar told Mas and to which Mas attributed no value whatever. Every time we hear or read anything of this kind, we ask each other: Are the Spanish women all cut after the pattern of the Holy Virgin Mary and the Filipinas all reprobates? I believe that if we are to balance accounts in this delicate question, perhaps […] But I must drop the subject because I am neither a confessor nor a Spanish traveler and have no business to take away anybody’s good name. I shall let this go and speak of the duties of women instead. (Rizal, 1932)

3 The Feminine Spiritual Authority of Mary and the Filipina Identity in Rizal’s Time While the Bible teaches that there is only one mediator—Jesus—between God and humans, as emphasized by Paul in 1 Timothy 2:5, there are teachings that affirm Mary’s intercessory role as the mother of God-incarnate in salvation history. As the Mother of God, Mediatrix, and Blessed Virgin, Mary occupies the central role in salvation history and is one of the Catholic Church’s essential doctrines. Without

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her, its sacred history would not be possible. According to June-Ann Greeley (2017), Mary may be a central figure of the Christian narrative. Still, the various ways Christians have characterized Mary throughout history show the lack of a single definite perception or image of Mary among the devout. The Catholic Church invokes Mary under various titles and invocations, including the “Mother of God” (Theotokos), the “Mediatrix,” and the “Blessed Virgin.” Mary undoubtedly merits consideration as she sheds light on a distinctive component of Catholic spirituality and continues to occupy the central position in Catholic soteriology with her Son, as Greeley argues. In the Philippines, Immaculate Conception and Our Lady of the Rosary are particularly prominent among the many titles under which Mary is venerated (Cardinal Rosales, 1975). The veneration of Mary, under the title of the Immaculate Conception, could be traced back to the decree of the Manila Cathedral under the invocation of the Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary that Pope Gregory issued on February 6, 1578. On the other hand, the title of Our Lady of Rosary goes back to 1587, when her statue was brought to the Philippines (Cardinal Rosales, 1975). Marian devotion in the Philippines includes local variations of titles that correspond to Church teaching and dogmas concerning her. The title of “Our Mother of Perpetual Help,” also known in the Philippines as the Holy Virgin of Baclaran, is one of the most popular under which Mary is venerated. Many Filipino devotees have embraced Mary, Our Mother of Perpetual Help, as their mother, referring to her as “Mama Mary” (Mother Mary). Filipino devotees come each Wednesday to the National Shrine of Our Mother of Perpetual Help, also known colloquially as Baclaran Church, to attend mass and pray the novena. Mary occupies a place of considerable importance in Filipino religious beliefs and spirituality from the Spanish colonial time to the present. Despite very few Biblical passages describing Mary’s perpetual virginity and Assumption into Heaven, the importance of the Blessed Virgin Mary as a source of spiritual empowerment characterizes the Filipino Catholic faith (Co, 2021). In the Philippines, the devotion she commanded among the Filipino people played an essential role in the colonial project and the survival of Catholicism in the country. The appropriation of Mary in the service of patriarchal colonialism complicates matters further. Mary has been used to legitimize not only Spanish colonialism but also a tool of patriarchy that set an impossible standard for women to model. Spanish missionaries’ strategy of naming the churches in honor of Mary and using Marian images not only replaced the natives’ worship of local divinities but also introduced new feminine values by glorifying Mary’s submissive, passive virginal yet maternal, supportive, and always suffering model of purity. More precisely, according to Jean-Noël Sánchez Pons (2016), the success of the subjugation of Filipino women under men’s social authority during the Spanish rule could be attributed to Colonial Catholicism’s model of gender hierarchy that epitomizes the Virgin Mary as the new model of womanhood. Similarly, in How the cult of the Virgin Mary turned a symbol of female authority into a tool of patriarchy, Dorothy Ann Lee (2019) claims that the belief in the eternal virginity of Mary has distorted the character of Mary from a symbol of female authority and autonomy into a passive recipient of male agency that particularly harmed women. Jeane Peracullo

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(2017, p. 145) states, “Filipino women’s internalized expectations of a good woman or mother are colonial vestiges that are deeply burrowed in the cultural psyche of the people.” Peracullo (2017, p. 143) claims the image of the Virgin Mary represents the imagery of a “good Filipina,” one who is weak and passive–is deeply entrenched in both the cultural and religious landscape of Filipinos. The conflation of images of the Virgin Mary with Maria Clara, whose feminine virtues were romanticized as the ideal Filipina, did not help but harm Filipino women (Peracullo, 2017, p. 143). Undoubtedly, Mary is a female figure in Christianity that can be used and interpreted as an image of liberation for some and oppression for others. More precisely, the feminine spiritual authority of Mary in Filipino Catholicism positions her as a tool of political and sexual oppression on the one hand, and as a source of spiritual and political empowerment, on the other hand. But the uniqueness of Filipino Marian devotion lies not only in Mary’s power of mediation as the mother of God but also in her representational capacity as the beloved figure of Inang Bayan (Mother Land), according to Deirdre de la Cruz (2015, p. 20) in Mother Figured: Marian Apparitions and the Making of a Filipino Universal. Dela Cruz (2015, p. 20) claims that “such reimaginings of the relationship between mother and child” in the colonial Philippines “paved the way for a double translation that rendered “Filipino” (in the new national-cultural sense of the term) both the figure of the Virgin Mary and the global circulating concept of motherland.” The national archetype Inang Bayan came into use in the literature of revolution in the Spanish colonial era. However, as Maria Carmen Sarmiento (2014) argues, these are, at best, empty platitudes demonstrating the ambivalent and conflicted Filipino perspective and relationship to what is considered female.

4 Mary Viewed Through the Lenses of Feminisms and the Feminist Philosophy of Religion How the feminine spiritual authority of Mary holds significant implications for the gender ideology that created and perpetuated the oppressive views about what it meant to be a Filipina in the nineteenth century merits a feminist evaluation. Feminism has never been a monolithic theoretical or political project. Although some ideas do attain a kind of dominance over time, feminism has, in fact, a wide array of ideological, scholarly, and political viewpoints. Thus, feminists would instead use the plural form “feminisms,” rather than “feminism” to acknowledge the multiplicity of approaches and assumptions inside the discipline. Feminists, however, have some common understanding that women have historically been disadvantaged and that these disadvantages must be eliminated. In the same way, feminists engaged in religious studies recognize the revolutionary nature of woman’s question as it relates to patriarchal religions.

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In Feminism and Religion: Intersections between Western Activism, Theology and Theory, Laurel Zwissler (2012, p. 355) writes that the relationship between feminism and religion is multifaceted. It involves feminist political activism and feminist theory, which approaches gender issues as imperative to any rigorous analytic perspective. While feminists share the common goal of challenging systemic inequalities at the societal level with the end goal of ending them, their goals in understanding religious traditions and their contribution to the oppression or empowerment of women within society vary (Zwissler, 2012, p. 358). At best, feminist scholarship of religion is characterized by the recognition that religion, as they are an essential part of most people’s lives worldwide, is a possible resource for the liberation of women from oppression (Zwissler, 2012, p. 363). In Epilogue: Prolegomenon to Future Feminist Philosophies of Religions, Marilyn Thie (1994, p. 235) asserts that feminists are forging new directions in discussing religious beliefs as they critically evaluate how religious beliefs, practices, and traditions shape people’s values in understanding gender and sexuality. In the philosophy of religion, feminists are transforming conventional topics as they tap into ongoing, humanly important concerns, which include uncovering gender implications, especially one that shed light on religious attitudes and theological positions that underpin discrimination, repression, and injustice (Thie, 1994, pp. 233–236). At the same time, feminists are refashioning philosophies of religion from the perspective of women’s religious experiences through various approaches with the goal that philosophies of religions be more inclusive (Thie, 1994, pp. 235–236). In Is There a Distinctively Feminist Philosophy of Religion? Elizabeth Burns (2012, p. 423) writes that in the feminist philosophy of religion, methodological issues and topics discussed within the discipline often intertwine—feminist philosophers of religion engage in critical analysis of relevant texts in religion and philosophical writings in which religious beliefs are evaluated and proposed. Burns (2012, p. 432) further suggests that a distinctively feminist project in the philosophy of religion would be characterized as inclusive, emphasizing the inclusion of women by being more open to concepts of the divine that are not masculine and raising awareness of how abstract concepts and arguments about the divine could be relevant to the practical aspects of human life. Within Catholicism, feminist philosophers of religion are apt to note that within popular piety in devout Catholic countries, Mary attains the status of divinity so that many women direct their prayers to her, believing that she understands their plight as a woman. Thus, she will address their concerns or intercede with God (Thie, 1994, p. 235). Catholics have made clear, though, that their worship of Mary (and other saints) does not in any way violate the scripture that says worship and adoration are due to God alone. The Church’s ongoing and most authoritative teaching is that Mary is not God but a mediator who intercedes on our behalf with her Son while recognizing her as Co-Redemptrix, who shares in the redemptive mission of her son. According to Fr. Saunders (1994), we could therefore look at Mary’s vital role as the Mediatrix in three senses: as the Mother of the Redeemer, as an aid in reconciling sinners to her Son, and because of her assumption and role as mother for all of us, as our intercessor before the Lord. Mary is a highly relevant figure in any feminist

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analysis of Catholicism as she plays an integral part in the theological and secular critique of this tradition, and an essential part of that critique has focused on Mary’s ambiguity as an example and ideal for women (Vuola, 2019, p. 11).

5 A Feminist Reimagining of the Feminine Spiritual Authority of Mary The Filipinos’ unique devotion to Mary, as the blessed Mother, could be traced back to the Spanish colonization. Rizal’s works also demonstrate the contradiction of her feminine spiritual authority that has embodied and informed the Filipina identity. While Mary’s power of maternal intercession as the mediatrix of salvation becomes a source of spiritual empowerment for Filipino devotees under challenging times, it positions her in a subordinate role in the economy of salvation. At the same time, her unique and influential presence in the Filipino Catholic faith as a symbol of spiritual and political empowerment turned into a tool of political and sexual oppression. A critical and imaginative reading of the context in which Philippine Colonial Catholicism shaped the Filipina identity during Rizal’s time also reflects this contradiction. Social structure and doctrine were still fluid despite being thoroughly patriarchal, and persistent women were able to assert themselves. Given the feminine spiritual authority of Mary in the Philippines, Colonial Catholicism has shaped the Filipino feminine ideal and played a key (if subtle) role in maintaining oppressive gender hierarchies in the Philippines for a long time. Reimagining Mary’s role in the economy of salvation in a distinctively feminist way would thus offer a constructive turn for a doctrine of salvation empowering Filipino women. Such a project would include demystifying Philippines Colonial Catholicism’s narratives of ideal womanhood that were often compared to the Virgin Mary, the paradigm of true womanhood who is beautiful, reserved, self-effacing, submissive, and devoutly religious, to which Rizal’s works also identify as the prevailing qualities idealized during his time. Mary Grey explores a possible contemporary theology of Mary in Theological trends. Her Reclaiming Mary: a task for feminist theology (1989) offers a feminist reimagining of Mary’s feminine spiritual authority. The feminist reconstructions of the marginal position of Mary in the Christian tradition Grey sketched within the context of liberation theology and Process Philosophy provide a critical vantage point for this goal. Reclaiming Mary, as Grey (1989, p. 336) suggests, should move beyond reclaiming relational language about Mary that has kept woman as the passive inferior other and instead reclaim relational language itself—one that is seen from the perspective of a right relation of justice that respects two poles: the integrity and self-affirmation of the person and that of interdependence and intersubjectivity. From the lens of a feminist critical liberationist hermeneutic, we learn that “Mary is a woman of strength, independence, of integrity, of autonomous action,” which is liberating for Mary (Grey, 1989, p. 336).

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Grey proposes through a reclaimed relational language to view the whole action of redemption as relational and creative, creation and redemption as one action to see the motherhood of Mary as free, active cooperation in redemption (Grey, 1989, p. 338). Such relational interpretation of motherhood reminds us of the mutuality of redemption—Jesus and Mary together accomplish the redemption and mutually messianic redeemers of each other (Grey, 1989, p. 338). With the mutuality of redemption, Mary’s title as the co-mediatrix is thus seen in a new light without positioning Mary’s role as central and distorting Jesus’s role in the incarnation and the redemption of humankind. Grey argues that we must look at the redemptive process as a unified process of Creation/Incarnation/ Redemption/New Jerusalem to see Mary as a symbol of redeemed creation as well as summoning women to contribute both to our own and the world’s redemption (Grey, 1989, p. 340).

6 Conclusion: Finding Empowerment in Mary’s Reimagined Feminine Spiritual Authority Understanding the redemptive process that liberates Mary as a symbol for the subordination of women could provide a lens through which Mary’s reimagined feminine spiritual authority could contribute to the empowerment of Filipino women and the distinctively feminist project in the philosophy of religion. The extent to which Mary’s role has a significant influence on the Filipino perception of the role of women in society points to the need for greater attention to a reimagined feminine spiritual authority of Mary, one that could debunk the religious norms and traditions that have contributed to the formation of gender inequalities and subordinate roles of women in Filipino society. The feminist reconstruction of the marginal position of Mary in the Christian tradition could better the lives of Filipino women who were traditionally deemed to embody Mary’s inferior position and at the same time, contribute to the evolving conceptual scheme of transforming our ways of thinking about religion that effect change in the lives of women.

References Alfante, A. (2018). The body disordered: Diagnosing the Philippine nation in José Rizal’s “Noli me tángere” (1887). Decimonónica Journal of Nineteenth Century Hispanic Cultural Production, 15(2), 187–202. Baring, R. (2022). Experiencing religion: Post-colonial views for religious education. Religions 13(14), 1–8. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13010014 Brown, B., & Chambon, M. (2022, February 4). Catholicism’s overlooked importance in Asia. The Diplomat. Retrieved July 25, 2022, from https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/catholicisms-overlo oked-importance-in-asia/ Burns, E. (2012). Is there a distinctively feminist philosophy of religion? Philosophy Compass, 7(6), 422–435.

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Cardinal Rosales, J. (1975). Ang Mahal na birhen mary in Philippine life today (part 1). CBCP Online. Retrieved July 30, 2022, from https://cbcponline.net/ang-mahal-na-birhen-mary-in-phi lippine-life-today-part-1/ Co, R. (2021, September 9). Tatler Deep Dive: A glimpse into marian devotion in the Philippines. Tatler Asia. Retrieved July 30, 2022, from https://www.tatlerasia.com/power-purpose/ideas-edu cation/marian-devotion-in-the-philippines De La Cruz, D. (2015). Mother figured: Marian apparitions and the making of a Filipino universal. University of Chicago Press. DeStephano, M. (2011). José Rizal, the quest for Filipino independence, and the search for ultimate reality and meaning. Ultimate Reality and Meaning, 34(1–2), 113–129. https://doi.org/10.3138/ uram.34.1-2.113 Domingo, R. (2010). Rizal’s letter to the Malolos young women: A vindication of Filipino women’s rights during his time. Philosophia: International Journal of Philosophy, 39(2), 115–123. Escalante, R. (2019). Did Jose Rizal die a catholic? Revisiting Rizal’s last 24 hours using spy reports. Southeast Asian Studies, 8(3), 369–386. https://doi.org/10.20495/seas.8.3_369 Filipinos, they are “pueblo amante de Maria,” people in love with Mary. Redemptorist International. (2016, July 8). Retrieved July 30, 2022, from https://www.cssr.news/2016/07/filipinos-they-arepueblo-amante-de-maria-people-in-love-with-mary/ Francia, L. H. (2021, March 29). Christianity : A cross a nation has had to bear, Part 2. Retrieved July 25, 2022, from https://usa.inquirer.net/66752/christianity-a-cross-a-nation-hashad-to-bear-part-2 Greeley, J. (2017). Water in Native American spirituality: Liquid life—blood of the earth and life of the community. Green Humanities: A Journal of Ecological Thought in Literature, Philosophy & the Arts, 2, 157–179. Grey, M. (1989). Theological trends. Reclaiming Mary: A task for feminist theology. In The way: Contempory Christian spirituality, 334–341. Retrieved July 25, 2022, from https://www.theway. org.uk/back/29Grey.pdf Ikehata, S. (1968). José Rizal: The development of the national view of history and national consciousness in the Philippines. The Developing Economies, 6(2), 176–192. https://doi.org/ 10.1111/j.1746-1049.1968.tb01123.x Lee, D. A. (2019, August 5). How the cult of virgin mary turned a symbol of female authority into a tool of patriarchy. The Conversation. Retrieved July 25, 2022, from https://theconversation.com/how-the-cult-of-virgin-mary-turned-a-symbol-of-female-aut hority-into-a-tool-of-patriarchy-127806 Lopez-Gonzaga, V. (1996). Images of women and their role in society in Jose Rizal’s writings. In M. Rajaretnam (Ed.), Jose Rizal and the Asian renaissance (pp. 171–189). Solidaridad. Peracullo, J. (2017). Maria Clara in the twenty-first century: The uneasy discourse between the cult of the Virgin Mary and Filipino women’s lived realities. Religious Studies and Theology, 36(2), 139–154. Pons, J. (2016, May 2). Construction and deconstruction of Maria Clara: History of an imagined care-oriented model of gender in the Philippines. Academia.edu. Retrieved July 25, 2022, from https://www.academia.edu/24937445/Construction_and_deconstruction_of_ Maria_Clara_History_of_an_imagined_care_oriented_model_of_gender_in_the_Philippines Rafael, V. L. (2013). The afterlife of empire: Sovereignty and revolution in the Philippines. CIEHL, 19, 99–109. Rizal, J. (n.d.). Rizal in focus. Retrieved July 25, 2022, from http://bayaningrizal.pairserver.com/ jru/philosophies.html Rizal, J. (1876). To the Virgin Mary. Jose Rizal. Retrieved May 12, 2022, from https://www.joseri zal.com/to-the-virgin-mary/ ———. (1932). A letter to the young women of Malolos Manila. Bureau of Printing. ———. (1990). Noli me Tangere. Pambansang Suriang Pangkasaysayan. Sarmiento, M. C. (2014). The whore as a Filipino metaphor. Asia Literary Review, 26, 102–116.

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Saunders, W. (1994, December 8). Mary as mediatrix. The Arlington Catholic Herald. Retrieved May 12, 2022, from https://www.ewtn.com/catholicism/library/mary-as-mediatrix-1081 Shirley, S. (2004). Guided by god: The legacy of the Catholic church in Philippine politics. Marshall Cavendish Academic. Stoši´c, S., Markovi´c, L., & Smith, A. J. M. (2016). Early Spanish reign over the Philippines: Social and spiritual remodeling. The Journal of International Civilization Studies, 1(2), 187–202. Thie, M. (1994). Epilogue: Prolegomenon to future feminist philosophies of religions. Hypatia, 9(4), 229–239. Vuola, E. (2019). The Virgin Mary across cultures: Devotion among Costa Rican Catholic and Finnish orthodox women. Routledge. Willis, H. P. (1905). Our Philippine problem: A study of American colonial policy. H. Holt and company. Zaide, G. (1957). Political and cultural history of the Philippines. Philippine Education Company. Zwissler, L. (2012). Feminism and religion: Intersections between western activism, theology, and theory. Religion Compass, 6(7), 354–368.

Rosallia Domingo is a Lecturer of Philosophy at De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines. She holds a Master of Arts in Philosophy degree from the same university and a Master of Arts in Gender Studies from the Central European University, Budapest, Hungary. Her research interests include feminist philosophy, gender studies, and gender and development.

Chapter 27

Listening to a Different Voice: Gendering Dharma Through Sita of the Ramayana Joseph Martin M. Jose

Abstract Dharma is one of the foundational concepts of Hindu philosophy and religion. Some recent scholars argued that a more nuanced understanding of it could be based on the Itihasas: the Mahabharata and Ramayana. Such an understanding moves away from dharma’s traditional cosmic and formalistic analysis. However, a closer examination of these recent efforts shows that this kind of analysis is more philological rather than philosophical. It returns to a formalistic understanding of the concept, defeating the analysis’s original purpose. In light of this, this paper aims to mend the nuanced understanding of dharma by focusing on the character of Sita in the Ramayana. Through Carol Gilligan’s ethics of care, Sita will be shown to have a different moral voice and a unique way of approaching her moral/dharma dilemmas, contrasting with how Rama approaches his own. This difference can pave the way for understanding dharma as a gendered concept, thus contributing to a more nuanced understanding of dharma. Keywords Dharma · Ramayana · Ethics of care · Carol Gilligan

1 Introduction Scholars have debated how we should understand the Hindu concept of dharma. A facet that leads to the difficulty of understanding dharma is that the concept itself is extensive, broad, and open, making it susceptible to misinterpretations or inadequate understanding (Brockington, 2004). The contemporary discourse on the subject pulls in two different directions. Some scholars argue that dharma should be understood as a strictly cosmological, abstract, and formalistic concept. Other scholars argue that the concept should be understood as a nuanced, open, and context-sensitive one. One argument for the latter suggests re-examining dharma in light of the Itihasas: the Mahabharata and Ramayana. Recent literature shows that, in so far as the Itihasas are concerned, dharma must be understood as nuanced and contextual. J. M. M. Jose (B) De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Hongladarom et al. (eds.), Philosophies of Appropriated Religions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5191-8_27

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However, a closer examination of these recent efforts shows that the analysis is more philological than philosophical. As such, it returns to an understanding of dharma as a cosmic and formalistic concept, which these efforts are critical of in the first place. In light of this, this paper aims to mend the nuanced understanding of dharma through the Itihasas by focusing on the character of Sita in the Ramayana. Through Carol Gilligan’s ethics of care, Sita would be shown to have a different moral voice and a unique way of approaching her moral/dharma dilemmas, contrasting with how Rama approaches his own. As argued, this difference paves the way for a gendered understanding of dharma, contributing to a nuanced understanding of the concept. The discussion proceeds as follows. We begin by introducing the contemporary discourse on dharma. We focus on two contending positions: (1) those who argue that dharma ought to be understood as a metaphysical-cosmological abstract concept and (2) those who argue that dharma ought to be understood as a nuanced, open, and context-sensitive concept. Then, we show how a genderized notion of dharma can enrich the latter position. By elaborating on Gilligan’s salient and significant insights about care ethics, we show that Sita is an ethicist of care. Finally, we discuss scenes or events in the Ramayana that contrast Sita’s moral reasoning with those of Rama and Hanuman.

2 Two Directions of Dharma 2.1 Dharma as Metaphysical-Cosmological, Abstract, Formalistic Dharma is traditionally understood as a metaphysical concept. Dharma means “duty” (Radhakrishnan & Moore, 1967). Its root word, dharana, means “support” (Danielou, 1994). Given the Nirukta or symbolic etymologies, dharma means “that which supports the world” (Danielou, 1994). We can see the truth of such meaning when considering how dharma is part and parcel of Hindu life. Dharma is one of the Purusharthas or the aims of life of the Hindu. The Purusharthas are artha (wealth), kama (pleasure), dharma (virtue/morality), and moksha (liberation) (Danielou, 1994). These four aims are not without apparent and pragmatic support. Human life “necessitates three kinds of activity: (1) to assure its survival, its means of existence, and its nourishment; (2) to realize its reproduction according to forms of activity generally connected with sexuality; and, lastly, (3) to establish rules of behavior that allow different individuals to perform their roles within the framework of the species” (Danielou, 1994, pp. 1–2). The Purusharthas instantiate these essential activities for human life. Survival and nourishment are provided by artha (wealth). Reproduction or propagation of the human species is achieved through kama (pleasure). The persistence of human society is guaranteed by dharma (rules of behavior, customs and traditions,

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and morality). These are pursued to achieve moksha, or liberation from the cycle of rebirth (samsara). One must be careful not to view these Purusharthas in a strictly linear and dualistic manner. By a linear view, we mean viewing the Purusharthas in stages, starting from the “lower” aims, if one wishes to call them that, which are artha and kama, then concluding with the “higher” aims, which are dharma and moksha. Each of the four aims can be pursued successively and interdependently without anxiously pursuing them in a step-by-step manner. On the other hand, by a dualistic view, we mean viewing the Purusharthas as mutually exclusive. This exclusivity can be seen in labeling artha and kama as earthly, material, and physical aims while labeling dharma and moksha as spiritualmoral aims. The danger with this kind of dualism is that one may misunderstand and downgrade artha and kama in relation to dharma and moksha, and merely focus on dharma and moksha at the expense of artha and kama.1 As the Kama Sutra says, “During the one hundred years of his life, a man must pursue the three aims (dharma, artha, kama) […] without one being prejudiced to another” (Danielou, 1994, p. 25). There are four stages of Hindu life (Ashramas). Each stage has a corresponding dharma that must be fulfilled. The Kama Sutra provides them as follows: Childhood must be dedicated to acquiring knowledge. Eroticism predominates in adulthood. Old age must be dedicated to the practice of virtue and spiritual pursuit (moksha). Since life’s duration is uncertain, all opportunities must be taken advantage of. Celibacy is recommended during the period of study. (Danielou, 1994, p. 26)

First, a Hindu undergoes the Brahmacharya stage. At a young age, a Hindu submits himself or herself to the care of a guru who will teach him or her the sacred Vedas and other texts. This stage is a student stage where one aims to acquire knowledge. The dharma one must fulfill at this stage is to be a good and diligent student. Second, after acquiring sufficient knowledge, a young adult Hindu enters married life, the grhastha stage. He or she acquires wealth and property (artha) essential for sustaining his or her family. He or she contributes to the propagation of the human species by expanding his family through kama. The dharma that one must fulfill at this stage is to be a good parent to one’s child and a good spouse to one’s spouse. The Kama Sutra is an essential guide at this point in one’s life since it speaks of being both a good family person and a good spouse. When one’s children have a family of their own, a Hindu then enters the third stage, the vanaphrasta stage. One becomes a forest-dweller contemplating the teachings of the Vedas and attempting to contribute to its understanding and propagation. At 1

There is an on-going discussion among scholars regarding the inter-relationship of each Purushartha. The issue is whether only artha, kama, and dharma are Purusharthas; thus called trivarga, or all four remain as the Purusharthas or caturvarga. The motivation for the former is that scholars think that moksha can be achieved even by pursuing either artha, dharma, or kama alone. Thus, we can say that the issue revolves around the reducibility of Purusharthas to one another (Prasad, 1981).

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this stage, a Hindu must fulfill the dharma of achieving earthly liberation (kaivalya) through austerities. Finally, propagating the Vedantic teachings is the aim of the last stage, the sannyasa stage. After fully realizing the Vedas’ teachings, a Hindu could either stay in the forest to relish the bliss of experiencing the Ultimate (Brahman) or return to society and be a guru to the younger generations. One must fulfill the dharma of being an excellent teacher to the young. Unfortunately, only some in Hindu society have the privilege of undergoing all these stages. There are two reasons. One is gender; the other is class. Often, only men and the members of the upper class (brahmins and ksatriyas) can go through all these stages. However, the members of the lower class (vaisyas and sudras) are not exempted from fulfilling their respective dharmas. Each Varna or caste system member has specific dharmas allotted to them (Fitzgerald, 2004). The relationship between dharma, the Varna system, and action becomes evident considering the dynamics between dharma, karma, and samsara. Ideally, Hindus should fulfill the dharma demanded by their varna, ashrama, and activities. Each time one fulfills one’s dharma, a corresponding karma accompanies it either in this earthly life or the next life after being reborn. Fulfilling dharma brings positive or good karma, which may be visible or invisible. That is, Acts are enjoined with a view to their fruits. Between an act and its result there is a necessary connection. An act performed today may achieve its result at some later date, and in the meantime, the result is in the form of an unseen force or apurva, which may be regarded either as the imperceptible antecedent of the fruit or the after-state of the act itself. (Radhakrishnan & Moore, 1967, p. 486)

However, due to human frailty and ignorance (avidya), there are times when one may fail to fulfill one’s dharma. Such failure is called adharma. Each time one fails to fulfill one’s dharma, one yields visible or invisible bad karma in this life or the next.2 Thus, all actions involving dharma have a consequence. There is samsara or rebirth because one has to reap the fruits or results of one’s actions. One has to reap the rewards and merits of good acts and fulfillments of dharmas. One has to reap some sort of punishment and demerits from bad acts and nonfulfillments of dharmas. One achieves moksha from samsara when one has nothing to reap, be it merit or demerit, which liberates one from the cycle. Dharma plays a crucial role in this metaphysics, and “there has been a tendency to impose a universal cosmological interpretation on the term” (Brockington, 2004, p. 65). As such, the term dharma is understood in the context of universal cosmic laws (Halbfass, 1988). For instance, when considering the Itihasas, particularly the Ramayana, one concludes that dharma must be understood in purely formalistic terms (Brockington, 2004). However, some scholars think otherwise. This leads us to those who claim that dharma must be understood as a nuanced, open, and context-sensitive concept. 2 Of course, karma is not without critics. Critics often claim that karma is said to be (1) “fatalistic,” (2) “immoral,” (3) “unduly egoistic,” (4) “unrealistic,” and (5) “objectionably naturalistic” (Potter, 2001).

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2.2 Dharma as Nuanced, Open, and Context-Sensitive In its ancient and traditional use, dharma involves nothing about an idea of an objective natural order effective in the world, such as some sort of natural law. For example, Halbfass (1988) argues that dharma is an aggregative term and does not refer to any cosmic entity. Brockington, on the other hand, contends that: […] understanding of dharma is not just something abstract and impersonal, but the inner struggle is always at least hinted at. The Ramayana is far more than merely a morality tale, in which Rama eptomises kingly virtues and Sita those of womanhood; it can be read on many different levels. (Brockington, 2004, p. 669)

Brockington shows that dharma has various senses in the Ramayana. It implies (1) “propriety” or “morality,” (2) sacrificial or religious activity, (3) caste, family, or personal duty, (4) norms, necessity, and legality, and (5) the three aims of life. Regarding the Mahabharata, Fitzgerald argues that “we are left to observe the word dharma used in the rough and tumble of practical discourse and we must try to discern the scope and operation of the word in this usage.” He agrees with Halbfass that “dharma is not a descendant of the Vedic rta and does not refer to some kind of free-standing, overarching cosmic natural law” (Fitzgerald, 2004, pp. 672–673). Like Brockington, Fitzgerald also analyzed dharma. He arrived at three senses of dharma in the Mahabharata. Dharma implies (1) a normative action that is beneficial to its agent after death, and good action appropriate to specific kinds of people; (2) an abstract quality of correctness, rightness, goodness, or justice; (3) universally good character attributes, habits, and dispositions. Concerning the first sense, translations of dharma in the Mahabharata are law and merit. Concerning the second sense, dharma is translated as right and just. Finally, concerning the third sense, dharma is translated as virtue and piety. The foregoing shows that part of the efforts to argue for the second direction of the discourse is a re-examination of dharma in light of how it is elucidated in the epics, namely, the Mahabharata and Ramayana. These efforts show that in so far as the epics are concerned dharma must be understood as nuanced and contextual. However, as one can notice, the works of Brockington and Fitzgerald lean toward a philological analysis of dharma in the Ramayana, rather than a philosophical one. Brockington and Fitzgerald point out the different instances where dharma appears in the text, grouping such appearances into clusters and then elucidating how dharma is shown and defined based on those clusters. While recognizing the initial efforts of Brockington and Fitzgerald, there is a need to go back to philosophizing about dharma in the Ramayana. Otherwise, we might get sidetracked into a philological rather than philosophical understanding of the epic. In addition, one can notice that in one way or another, the senses of dharma exposed by Brockington and Fitzgerald lead to the cosmological-metaphysical-formalistic notion of dharma. One must look at how these authors defined dharma as a necessity, legality, and abstract quality of justice. Hence, we must be careful that a philological approach to the epic does not lead to a philosophical conclusion about the status and nature of dharma.

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Despite the gaps in Brockington and Fitzgerald, one could see some scholarly support for a nuanced notion of dharma in the Ramayana. One only needs to enrich these initial scholarly efforts. We shall attempt to do this in the following section. We shall enrich the nuances of dharma by showing how dharma can be gendered through the character of Sita. We accomplish this by employing Carol Gilligan’s ethics of care as a starting framework.3

3 Gendering Dharma Through Sita in Valmiki’s Ramayana 3.1 Carol Gilligan’s Ethics of Care Carol Gilligan (1993) argues that women and girls have a “different voice” when it comes to matters of morality, such as addressing moral dilemmas. She says that “To have a voice is to be human. To have something to say is to be a person,” and by “voice,” she means “something like what people mean when they speak of the core of the self” (Gilligan, 1993, p. xvi). Thus, “voice” does not mean the literal voice of women but something that women speak from the core of their being. Moreover, the difference in women’s voices from that of men does not mean a difference in sound and intonation but in modes of speaking about moral problems and the relationship between the self and others (Gilligan, 1993). Gilligan argues that there must be a “constant eye to maintaining relational order and connection” in a world “preoccupied with separation and obsessed with creating and maintaining boundaries between people” (Gilligan, 1993, p. xiv). Examples of this obsession are the likes of Lawrence Kohlberg and Erik Erikson, who celebrate autonomy, separation, and independence as models and measures of growth (Gilligan,

3

Carol Gilligan’s ethics of care has received praise and criticisms from feminists, moral philosophers, and moral psychologists, especially during the intellectual debates in the 1980s and 1990s. Those who praise Gilligan argue that Gilligan is a forerunner of a new moral theory and that her work is a final blow to the masculinist tradition in moral philosophy (Hekman, 1995). On the other hand, critics argue that her work is methodologically confused, and theoretically unsound. Some further claim that it is anti-feminist because it emphasizes women’s traditional difference from men; hence perpetuates women’s inferiority (Hekman, 1995). Despite these criticisms, Gilligan’s framework is still useful since it guards against siding with any feminist or anti-feminist philosophy camp, especially concerning the Ramayana. Note that Gilligan did not frame her project as feminist since a feminist philosophy is critical of a bigger philosophical, intellectual tradition. The claim that her work is a feminist one is only a label attached to her work by readers and critics and is never hers. Moreover, her framework has not always been used to analyze literary texts such the Ramayana. As such, her work has insights that can shed light to understanding the idiosyncrasies of women characters, especially their moral dilemmas and personal journeys, which other frameworks might misinterpret or distort in their insistence of some feminist “ideals” or “propagandas.”

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1993). For these scholars, individuation from relationships is the goal and not integration.4 Tying these aspects of relationships, women’s voices, and the male-centric psychology of her time, Gilligan writes, Relationship requires connection. It depends not only on the capacity for empathy or the ability to listen to others and learn their language or take their point of view but also on having a voice and having a language. The differences between women and men which I describe center on a tendency for women and men to make different relational errors—for men to think if they know themselves, following Socrates’ dictum, they will also know women, and for women to think that if only they know others, they will come to know themselves. Thus men and women tacitly collude in not voicing women’s experiences and build relationships around a silence that is maintained by men not knowing their disconnection from women and women not knowing their dissociation from themselves. Much talk about relationships and about love carefully conceals these truths. (Gilligan, 1993, pp. xix–xx)

Considering all these, Gilligan attempts “to turn the tide of moral discussion from questions of how to achieve objectivity and detachment to how to engage responsively and with care” (Gilligan, 1993, p. xix). Thus, she endeavors to pave the way for an ethics of care that considers problems in human relations as moral problems. After conducting interviews with women and girls, the particularities we will not elaborate on anymore, Gilligan (1993) notices something common. In expressing their take on morality, these women and girls wish not to hurt others, hoping “that in morality lies a way of solving conflicts so that no one will be hurt” (Gilligan, 1993, p. 65). As far as these women and girls are concerned, a moral person is a person who helps others, is of service to others, and meets one’s obligations and responsibilities without sacrificing oneself if possible (Gilligan, 1993). A moral dilemma is “one where helping others is seen to be at the price of hurting the self,” and helping oneself is at the price of hurting others (Gilligan, 1993, p. 71). The conflict between the self and the other, the conflict between compassion and autonomy, and the conflict between virtue and power constitute the central moral problem for women (Gilligan, 1993). Such conflict is a dilemma that requires reconciliation, a reconciliation where no one is hurt at the end of the day (Gilligan, 1993). This brings us to the heart of her ethics of care. According to Gilligan (1993), since women’s construction of the moral problem is that of a problem of care and responsibility rather than a problem of rights and rules, the development of women’s moral thinking is a development in changes in their understanding of responsibility and relationships (Gilligan, 1993). We must understand the ethics of care through the psychological logic of relationships. In the same way, we must understand the conception of morality as justice by men through the logic of equality and reciprocity, which is a formal logic of fairness (Gilligan, 1993). Since the ethics of care is an ethics of relationships, the stages of such ethics of care can also be construed as tension and reconciliation of the self and others. Gilligan 4

In philosophy, the existentialist philosopher Gabriel Marcel (1950) laments that the brokenness of this world is brought about by separation and detachment of people from each other, which in turn is brought about by a mechanical existence. Healing can only happen when relationships become mended.

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fleshes out the stages as follows: (1) caring for the self, (2) caring for others, and (3) interdependence of self and other. The development begins with caring for the self to ensure survival. “The concern is pragmatic, and the issue is survival […] In this mode of understanding, the self, which is the sole object of concern, is constrained by a lack of power that stems from feeling disconnected and thus, in effect, all alone […] As a result, women in some instances deliberately choose isolation to protect themselves against hurt” (Gilligan, 1993, p. 75). The transition from this stage to the next happens when one is criticized and when one realizes that such caring is selfish and egotistic. Such a realization will signal a new understanding that sees a connection between oneself and the other—a connection of responsibility (Gilligan, 1993). This ushers one into the second stage: caring for the other. In the second stage, what is good is not so much that which ensures one’s survival but that which ensures the survival of the other (Gilligan, 1993). However, inequality arises because care becomes other-focused and forgets the one providing the care. This exclusion of the self gives rise to problems in the relationship (Gilligan, 1993). From here, another transition commences—a transition that re-considers the relationship. This brings us to the third stage: the interdependence of the self and the other. The third stage is neither self-centered nor other-centered. This stage attempts to mend the confusion inherent in caring between the self and the other. It seeks to arrive at a new understanding of the interconnection of self and the other that dissolves the tensions between selfishness and responsibility (Gilligan, 1993). “In separating the voice of the self from the voice of others, the woman asks if it is possible to be responsible to herself and others and thus to reconcile the disparity between hurt and care” (Gilligan, 1993, p. 82). In such inquiry, she reconstructs dilemmas in their contextual particularities. This allows a better understanding of causes and consequences and engages compassion and tolerance (Gilligan, 1993). “The proclivity of women to reconstruct hypothetical dilemmas in terms of the real, to request or to supply missing information about the nature of the people and the places where they live, shifts their judgement away from the hierarchical ordering of principles and the formal procedures of decision making” (Gilligan, 1993, pp. 100– 101). There is a willingness to always make exemptions so as not to hurt anyone and to urge everyone to care (Gilligan, 1993). “The reluctance to judge remains a reluctance to hurt, but one that stems not from a sense of personal vulnerability but rather from a recognition of the limitation of judgement itself” (Gilligan, 1993, pp. 102–103).

3.2 Sita as an Ethicist of Care Given Gilligan’s framework, let us see Sita’s moral voice in the Ramayana. Let us identify significant passages from the Aranyakanda, Sundarakanda, and Yuddhakanda that instantiate this. First, let us note that the tension and transition

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present in Gilligan’s first and second stages, characterized by a criticism of the selfishness and egotism of the first stage, can be seen in both the Aranyakanda and Yuddhakanda. The Ramayana says that Sita, “In her agony she began to curse herself for having desired to possess the golden dear in the forest, for having asked Rama to go in search of that magic beast and, above all, for having so thoughtlessly, so foolishly and in such unpardonable language, bidden Lakshmana go away leaving her alone” (Srimad Ramayana, 2001, p. 225). We can see how Sita realizes the insufficiency and immorality of only thinking of herself during her forest exploration. Rama and Lakshmana had been warning her of the dangers of the forest, but Sita did not listen, thinking there was nothing wrong with taking possession of a suspicious creature. Thinking that it was Lakshmana’s duty to save his brother more than staying with her as Rama ordered, Sita brought her to her present agonizing state. Here we can see that Sita experiences the dreading realization of her failure to go beyond her individualistic concerns. She experiences the criticism that Gilligan’s women experience, only that the criticism comes from within, from Sita herself. Sita criticizes herself for not thinking of the welfare of others and being shut up with her desire for self-sufficiency. Moreover, Sita seems to claim responsibility for her selfishness. All the trouble she has caused can be seen when she again experiences anguish upon hearing Ravana’s fictitious account of killing Rama by showing Sita a fake head of Rama produced by the rakshasa magician Vidyujjihva. Sita says, Why am I alive, O gods, even after this? O my beloved lord, how short-lived you were! What has become of all the prophecies of those astrologers who said you would live very long and I should never lose you. It is my own sins that have brought about your death. O my lord, why have you left me here and gone to heaven? You promised at the time of our joining hands that you would take me always with you. Why have you broken the promise now? I have been hoping all these days that you would come here and rescue me. It is with that hope that I sustained my life in this hell. You have come and gone without taking me. (Srimad Ramayana, 2001, pp. 289–290)

Sita’s dreading transition from the first to the second stage of Gilligan’s care ethics can be seen in her admission that her selfishness and sins brought Rama’s “death.” These passages point to the transition from being self-centered to being other-centered, focusing on the other at the expense of oneself, wishing not to have hurt the other and the self to be hurt. On the other hand, the reconciliation between the tensions of the self and the other can be seen in the Sundarakanda. The reasons provided by Sita to Hanuman stating why Hanuman should not carry her back to Rama to make things easier shows the progression of Sita’s ethic of care. Sita says of Hanuman’s proposal, But I am afraid your proposal is open to many objections. First of all, you may fly fearlessly, but what about me? Can I hold on to my seat as you fly across the ocean? I am not sure. I may get nervous and drop down and be drowned. Again, when the Rakshasas see you flying away, they may attack you with deadly weapons in the air. And you will have to fight them with a burden on your back. That would be extremely hazardous for both of us. But my greatest objection is this. If you carry me away successfully from Lanka, it will no doubt redound to your glory, but it will, I fear, detract from the glory of my lord and husband. The

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better course would be for the Prince to come here with an army and defeat the Rakshasas in open battle and take me back in triumph. I don’t want to be as stealthily carried away from here as I was brought here. Ravana is a thief, but I want my husband to be a hero. (Srimad Ramayana, 2001, pp. 233–234)

Sita’s first objection to Hanuman is an explicit instantiation of the first stage of the ethics of care. Sita is caring and thinking of herself in saying that she might be unable to hold on to Hanuman’s back as Hanuman flies. Thus, Sita is worried about falling and eventually drowning in the ocean. On the other hand, her second objection is an improvement or a progression from the first. It is an instantiation of the second stage of the ethics of care, which is care for others. In saying that Hanuman might be attacked easily by weapons while carrying Sita and that Hanuman will have to fight with a burden on his back, is a clear manifestation of being concerned with the other. The third stage of Gilligan’s ethics of care, the interdependence of the self and the other, can be seen in Sita saying that what Hanuman wants to do is exceptionally hazardous for both of them. This time Sita considers herself and Hanuman, and when she discovers that either of them might get hurt, she readily declines Hanuman’s offer. It is because, just as in the ethics of care, Sita wants to resolve the problem or conflict without hurting anyone at the end of the day. Things could have been easier for Sita and everybody if Hanuman had immediately brought her back, but Sita declined out of care and concern for both of them. Sita cares for their well-being. Meanwhile, Sita’s last objection is premised on the glory of Rama. This objection sounds more duty-bound and dharmic because she thinks of her duty to make Rama the hero of the events, not Hanuman. She is thinking of her duty as a wife. However, despite that, her use of dharma is only at the service of her care for Rama. Dharma is not her primary concern. Nevertheless, one can still say that this last objection by Sita is less of an ethic of care than her preceding objections because this last objection makes Sita define her self-worth by helping and protecting Rama’s reputation, thus making her only other-centered which is of the lower stage of the ethics of care. The epitome of Sita as an ethicist of care is when after Rama wins over Ravana, Hanuman asks Sita for permission to punish the rakshasi guards who have long terrorized Sita in the Asoka grove. Hanuman thought that by punishing the rakshasis, he would be able to give back the compliments of Sita to him. However, Sita replies, “Not so, O Vanara,” replied the princess without hesitation. “They were only the servants of Ravana and had to do his bidding. Now that he is dead, they can do me no harm. No, no, they are not to blame. I have suffered for my own sins. One cannot escape the results of one’s past actions. And even if these women have their own accord done me wrong, it is our duty to forgive them and not retaliate. Noble it is, O Vanara, always to do good for evil. For there is none in the world who does not err some time or other.” (Srimad Ramayana, 2001, p. 359)

To better understand Sita’s argument, let us build up the case for her. Sita’s insistence that the rakshasi women should not be punished is not without support. If we return to the Aranyakanda, Ravana provides orders and instructions to these rakshasi women. Ravana orders them to take charge of Sita and provide her with food, silk, jewels, and precious stones. Ravana even tells them not to say harsh words and give

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hostile glances. He even warned them not to use her in any form. In another instance, Ravana says, “it must also be your duty to induce her to accept my love” (Srimad Ramayana, 2001, p. 124). These instances show that these servant women were not just working on a formal ready-made dharma of being a servant. They were operating on the very words and orders of Ravana. Thus, Sita’s claim that they were only doing their duty is supported by the concept of dharma per se and the same orders of Ravana. However, these two supports are insufficient to build up Sita’s argument. It is because it can be argued that there is a higher dharma that these servant women should have followed, which is the dharma of truth. The truth is that Ravana has been doing wrong for so long, and one such wrongdoing is stealing Sita from Rama. If these women servants were aware of the dharma of truth, they would have left Ravana. (John Brockington has shown earlier that the dharma of truth is the highest dharma in the Ramayana). Thus, despite being directly ordered by Ravana, these servant women should have fulfilled the higher or highest dharma. What other instances can support Sita’s argument if that is the case? The relationship that Sita established and maintained while she was with them is a factor in Sita’s decision not to punish them. Returning to the Aranyakanda, one reads this description after Ravana says something violent to Sita: “These terrible words of Ravana frightened the ladies who were surrounding him. Tears stood in their eyes and they made secret gestures to the princess showing their sympathy. But the princess was not cowed down. Brave in the spotless purity of her heart she hurled once more her defiance at the aggressor” (Srimad Ramayana, 2001, p. 213). Here we can see a relationship of sympathy and empathy going on when Sita is with them. One can see that even the servant women were listening to Sita and, in one sense, also wish that Sita would not be hurt. This made Sita adamant that they should not be punished in the end. Sita is operating on the ethics of care, especially the moral imperative of maintaining relational order and connection. Sita seeks to resolve the conflict between the rakshasis and herself, where no one will be hurt at the end of the day. Lastly, which is most evident in an ethic of care, Sita is willing to make exemptions. Hanuman does not because, for him, those who are punishable must be punished, but Sita looked into the context and particularity of the situation and saw that an exemption has to be made. If Sita had been working on the justice framework instead of the care framework, she would have been like Hanuman and Rama, who were unwilling to make exemptions. This unwillingness to make exemptions makes Rama suspect and doubt Sita’s purity in the Yuddhakanda. Rama thinks that there might be an instance where Sita had sexual contact with Ravana, thereby making Sita impure and not worthy anymore of being Rama’s wife. In reply, Sita says, Why do you, O valiant hero, speak these harsh and unbecoming words to me, as a common man does to a vulgar woman? Upon my honour, I declare I am not what you seem to think I am. Do not judge the whole of our sex by the conduct of a few. You know me and you should not have entertained any suspicion in your mind. It is true that the Rakshasa cast his eyes lustfully on me, seized me by the hand and kept me a prisoner in his palace. But how could I help it? It was not my fault that the monster carried me off by force. He could only touch

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my body. He could not touch my mind. He could only imprison this frame of flesh, he could not imprison my soul. All the time, my mind, my heart and my soul were fixed on you and you alone, my husband. If after living so long together you do not know my heart, I am truly undone. When you sent Hanuman over the sea to Lanka, if only you had made known to me your mind, I would have given up my life then and there and spared you all this trouble of building a bridge and this risk of waging a terrible war. In suspecting on my honor you have not considered, O wise Prince, my immaculate birth and my stainless history. (Srimad Ramayana, 2001, pp. 364–365)

Here we can see one disadvantage of the justice framework of traditional ethics. It is unwilling to make any exemptions, even those one knows are incapable of doing the wrong. It blatantly imposes the pangs of justice on the accused without looking into the situation’s context, specificity, and particularity. In contrast, in the ethics of care, one willingly and empathically listens to the other before judging or withholding judgments, which, unfortunately, Rama fails to do. That is why Sita disappointingly tells Rama not to judge the whole female sex by the conduct of a few unfaithful and impure females. In a sense, Rama is committing the relational error that Gilligan emphasized earlier. Men think that if they know themselves, they know others. Truly, Rama is operating on his own experiences of seeing some unfaithful women, and now he is generalizing this personal experience and applying it to all women, including his wife. Indeed, Rama is not willing to make exemptions, even his wife does not escape from his wrath, a wrath justified by championing his dharma. Contrast this with Sita, who still operates on care and does not even boast to Rama in her parting words: “If only you had made known to me your mind, I would have given up my life then and there and spared you all this trouble of building a bridge and this risk of waging a terrible war” (Srimad Ramayana, 2001, p. 365).

4 Conclusion: A Gendered Dharma? If Sita is an ethicist of care, in what way then does her being one genderize dharma? The current scholarly discourse have yet to arrive at a final definition of dharma. The only thing that is certain about dharma is that it is the fundamental Hindu concept that deals with matters of morality. Whether we define dharma in its traditional cosmological-metaphysical-formalistic undertones or its contextual-nuanced-open undertones, dharma will always be about what is right and what is wrong, what is good and what is bad, what is proper and what is improper. Hence, dharma is not simply an entity existing out there that is static and reified. As shown earlier, dharma involves the person’s actions, thinking, feeling, and decisions. Reasoning and thinking about morality are part and parcel of dharma. Thus, Sita’s unique voice about good and bad gendered dharma. This gendered dharma goes beyond the stridharma, the pre-packaged dharma imposed upon Hindu women. This latter dharma has the danger of subjugating women through essentialism. Our gendering of dharma enriches the fundamental concept of dharma per

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se and empowers women. Women are made to realize that the prevalence of care in their moral reasoning is not a disadvantage but what makes them unique from men. Indeed, if Sita is an ethicist of care, Hindu women can find so much inspiration from how Sita argued for her case in the moral dilemmas she faced. Moreover, our gendering of dharma shows that a feminist understanding of the Ramayana need not be critical of the intricacies of Hindu culture and philosophy. Rather, this kind of understanding listens to the nuances and contexts of fundamental Hindu concepts such as dharma, and also listens to the voice of women in Hindu culture and literature, such as Sita. We can hear their unique life stories when we listen to these voices.

References Brockington, J. (2004). The concept of Dharma in the Ramayana. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 32, 655–670. Danielou, A. (1994). The complete Kama Sutra. Park Street Press. Fitzgerald, J. (2004). Dharma and its translation in the Mahabharata. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 32, 671–685. Gilligan, C. (1993). In a different voice: Psychological theory and women’s development. Harvard University Press. Halbfass, W. (1988). India and Europe: An essay in understanding. State University of New York Press. Hekman, S. (1995). Moral voices, moral selves: Carol Gilligan and feminist moral theory. Polity Press. Marcel, G. (1950). The mystery of being: Reflection and mystery. Henry Regnery Company. Potter, K. (2001). How many Karma theories are there? Journal of Indian Philosophy, 29, 231–239. Prasad, R. (1981). The theory of Purusarthas: Revaluation and reconstruction. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 9, 49–76. Radhakrishnan, S., & Moore, C. (1967). A source book in Indian philosophy. Princeton University Press. Sarma, D. S. (2001). Srimad Ramayana. Sri Ramakrishna Math.

Joseph Martin M. Jose is an Assistant Professorial Lecturer at the Department of Philosophy, De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines. He obtained his Ph.D. in Philosophy in December 2022, and his dissertation was recognized as an Outstanding Dissertation. He worked as a Research Apprentice at the Office of the Assistant Dean for Research and Advanced Studies of the College of Liberal Arts, De La Salle University. He is a member of the Philosophical Association of the Philippines and the Philippine National Philosophical Research Society. His research interests include the philosophy of friendship, virtue ethics, Hindu philosophy, and internet studies.

Index

A Adikaila, 135, 138–140, 143, 144, 147, 148 Aetas, 5, 199–207 Afterlife, 18, 26–36, 100, 142, 168, 177, 249, 330, 333, 340, 343, 365 Agoncillo, Teodoro, 110, 154, 156, 159 Allah, 120, 130, 231, 233–235, 239–241, 347 Anito, 113–116, 126, 127, 139, 140, 143, 146–148, 177–179, 202, 337, 341, 343 Anthropomorphism, 187, 188 Anting-anting, 158 Appropriated religions, 2, 3, 7, 32, 36, 119 Aquinas, Thomas, 45, 47, 122, 161 Aristotle, 90, 120–122, 161, 220, 294 Atheism, 33, 326, 353 Augustine, 45, 47, 48, 54, 84, 85 Avicenna, 60, 61, 63, 122

B Babaylan, 168, 182, 186 Badjao, 160, 233 Bahala na, 4, 81–84, 87–90 Batara, 113, 127, 128, 130 Batchelor, Stephen, 95–97 Bathala, 3, 4, 82, 113–115, 120, 124–128 Bible, 88, 125, 156, 161, 190, 216, 369 Binarism, 189, 190 Birth, 16, 19, 22, 33, 34, 46, 138, 168, 214, 216–218, 222, 224, 225, 229, 232, 249, 261, 276, 367, 388

Black Nazarene, 6, 293, 294, 297–300, 311, 314 Bodhi, Bhikkhu, 95, 96, 262, 276, 288, 340 Bodhisattva, 33, 34 Borgmann, Albert, 7, 329, 330 Bourdieu, Pierre, 294 Buddhadasa, Bhikkhu, 95, 98, 99 Buddhism, 1, 3, 4, 6, 12, 18–23, 32–34, 70, 82, 94–101, 114, 241, 248–253, 255, 257, 260, 267, 268, 275, 277–279, 281, 287, 288, 338–340, 343, 345, 346 Buddhist middle way view, 100 Buddhist modernist view, 4, 94, 97, 99 Buddhist traditionalist view, 94

C Cantor, Georg, 70, 72–74, 76, 78 Catechism, 34, 46, 158 Catholic Church in the Philippines, 304, 308, 320 Catholicism, 5, 7, 107, 108, 115–117, 125, 130, 137, 186, 305, 308, 311, 314, 319, 365–367, 370–373 Causalism, 6, 265, 266, 269 Causation, 6, 265, 266, 268, 269, 275–277, 281, 285–287 Chinese Malaysian Buddhist, 6, 248, 250 Chinese traditional beliefs, 6, 248 Christianity, 3, 5, 30, 32–34, 82 Cobb, John B., 99, 100 Colonization, 4, 152, 230, 366, 373

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 S. Hongladarom et al. (eds.), Philosophies of Appropriated Religions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-5191-8

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392 Common Buddhist Text, 95, 101 Community cohesive values, 95 Community healing, 6, 231, 237, 242 Commutatio, 305–307, 309, 310, 317–320 Confucianism, 6, 32, 33, 35, 248, 250, 339 Covid-19, 6, 304, 306–308, 310–313, 317, 319, 320 Cremation, 249 Criminality, 299 Critical phenomenology, 151–153, 164 Cult of Ten Kings, 33 Customary law, 230, 232

D Daoism, 6, 248, 250 Death, 3, 12, 15, 16, 18, 20–22, 26, 29–34, 36, 60, 63, 65, 94, 100, 102, 128, 142, 145, 156, 158, 159, 185, 202, 248, 249, 251, 253–257, 274, 282, 283, 288, 329, 333, 340, 368, 385 De Legazpi, Miguel Lopez, 126 Dependent co-arising (pat.iccasamupp¯ada), 6, 276, 285 Dharma, Dhamma, 3, 7, 99, 377–382, 386–389 Dialetheism, 69, 70, 73, 75–77 Digital technology, 304, 305, 309, 319, 320, 327, 328, 330 Divine justice, 45, 60, 61, 67 Divine Providence, 59–61, 83 Divine will, 31, 170, 174, 346 Diwata, 113, 127, 186 Doctrina Christiana, 308

E East Asia, 339 Ecologies, 182–185, 187 Epistemic equality, 357, 358 Epistemic violence, 108, 109, 112, 116, 294 Ethics of care, 378, 382, 383, 386–388

F Facebook, 304, 306, 308, 310, 313–315, 317, 320, 330 Fatalism, 87 Feldman, Richard, 7, 354, 355, 357, 358, 360–362 Feminisms, 7, 371

Index Festival, 213, 214, 221, 224 Filipino Christmas, 5, 222, 225 Folk Christianity, 115, 158, 187, 192 Freed Mind (Cit-wang), 268 Free will, 4, 83–86, 88–90, 172 French Revolution, 121, 366 Funeral rites, 6, 33, 248–251, 253, 254, 256

G Gadamer, Hans Georg, 5, 136, 214, 219–222, 224 Ghosts, 28, 33, 35, 248 Gilligan, Carol, 378, 382–386, 388 Ginhawa, 201–207, 298, 299 Global Philosophy of Religion, 2, 6 Goblin, 26–28, 30, 35 God, 3–5, 11–14, 16–18, 21–23, 29, 32–34, 41–47, 54, 55, 59–62, 66, 67, 69–72, 74–77, 82–90, 101, 102, 109, 112–115, 120–131, 139, 147, 157, 161, 162, 164, 169, 170, 173–179, 193, 202, 204, 206, 207, 217, 218, 225, 232, 234, 235, 238–241, 298, 300, 316, 319, 333, 338, 339, 341–345, 347–349, 355, 367–369, 372 Goldman, Alvin, 7, 354, 355, 358–362 Greek religion, 122 Grimm, Patrick, 86, 87 Grim Reaper, 26, 28–31, 34, 35 Gripaldo, Rolando M., 82, 83, 87, 88 Gumiho, 28, 29, 35 Gusti, 4, 120, 124–126, 130, 131

H Haraway, Donna, 183 Heaven, 19, 30, 32, 34, 254, 368, 370, 385 Heidegger, Martin, 137, 142, 152, 153, 155, 219, 220, 294, 327 Hell, 19, 21, 28–30, 32–34, 251, 254, 274, 280–284, 288, 385 Hick, John, 7, 55, 340, 343–347 Hinduism, 2, 19, 20, 30, 82, 127–130, 241, 338, 340, 343, 346 Hirap, 201, 202, 204, 205, 298 Husserl, Edmund, 155 Hybridism, 187

Index I Ijma, 236, 242 Ilokano, 5, 81, 168–179 Immortality, immortal, 1–3, 11, 12, 15–18, 21, 22, 26–36, 122 Inayan, 5, 136–139, 141–143, 145–148 Indigenous knowledge, 114, 116, 185, 234, 242 Indonesia, 3, 130, 228, 229, 231, 338 Infinity, 4, 13, 23, 70, 77 Internal otherness, 108 Interreligious (interfaith) dialogue, 2 Ipugaw, 5, 138, 142, 144 Iran, 60, 229, 338, 339 Irreligion, 32–34, 36 Islam, 2, 3, 6, 32, 70, 82, 111, 112, 124, 125, 128–131, 227–242, 338, 339, 343, 345, 346 J Javanese, 4, 120, 124–126, 129–131, 228 Jesus Christ, 32, 34, 156, 169, 207, 214, 224, 225, 319, 338 Jihad, 233 K Kagándahang-loób, 5, 152, 158, 159, 163 K¯al¯ama Sutta, 96, 98, 99, 101 Kalooban, 305, 307, 310, 311, 317, 318 Kankanaey, 5, 135–148 Karma, Kamma, 4, 6, 31, 94–96, 98, 100–102, 248, 253–255, 257, 259, 265, 266, 274–276, 278–285, 287–289 K-drama, 3, 26, 27, 29–32, 34–36 Kejawen, 129, 130 L Latour, Bruno, 181, 182, 185–187, 189, 190, 193 Laudato Si’, 193, 194 Levinas, Emmanuel, 142 Locality, 6, 294, 295 Love, 26, 28, 29, 31, 36, 55, 109, 148, 159, 174, 176, 202, 203, 206, 217, 220, 224, 225, 232, 234–236, 251, 255, 256, 300, 335, 347, 367–369, 383, 387 M Magellan, Ferdinand, 126

393 Mah¯ay¯ana Buddhism, 251 Malaysia, 3, 228, 252 Manila, 4, 6, 107, 110–113, 126, 293–295, 304, 306–308, 310–312, 315–317, 367, 370 Maori, 125 Mary, the Mother of God, 7, 367, 369–371 Mercado, Leonardo, 153, 158 Meritorious deeds, 256 Metta, 257 Molnar, George, 268, 269 Moral dread, 260–262, 269 Moral education, 6, 274, 275, 280, 285, 289 Moral shame, 6, 260–265, 268–270 Motahhari, Morteza, 4, 59–67 Mt. Pinatubo, 5, 199–206 Mulla Sadra, 60, 61, 63 Multispecies, 5, 182–185, 187, 188, 190–194 Myanmar, 2, 252, 346

N Nagasawa, Yujin, 2, 70–72, 77 Naimbag a Nakem, 170, 173–176, 179 Nakem, 5, 170–174, 179 National Commission on Muslim Filipinos, 229 Naturalized karma and rebirth view, 94 Natural Law Jurisprudence, 44–46, 54, 55 Negros, 183, 184 Nibbana, Nirvana, 95, 274, 340 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 152 Nusantara, 227, 228

O Omniscience, 4, 83–85, 87, 89, 90, 339 Onto-Religious, 167

P P¯ali Canon, 249 Pamumuwesto, 305–307, 309, 310, 316, 318–320 Panata, 157, 218, 304, 306, 310, 314, 320 Paradox, 4, 5, 43, 44, 47, 50, 54, 55, 69, 70, 72, 73, 78, 86, 87, 156, 157 Pasko, 5, 214 Pasyon, 156, 163 Peacebuilding, 6, 231, 237 Peter (the apostle), 32, 34 Philippines, 3, 5–7, 36, 42, 43, 45, 46, 49, 82, 83, 107–109, 112, 113, 116, 117,

394 120, 126, 129, 130, 135, 136, 152–154, 156, 160, 168, 169, 171, 177, 183–185, 191, 200, 206, 213–216, 219, 223, 224, 227–231, 233, 242, 294, 304–306, 308, 311–316, 337, 338, 365–368, 370, 371, 373 Philosophical progress, 2 Pigafetta, Antonio, 126, 214 Plantinga, Alvin, 7, 190, 340–342, 358 Plato, 120–122, 345 Plumwood, Val, 189–193 Pop culture, 26, 27, 36 Post-colonialism, 160, 188, 190 Priest, Graham, 69, 70, 72, 141, 191 Problem of evil, 1, 2, 4, 11, 41, 42, 60–63, 67, 70, 71, 77, 78 Process philosophy, 100, 276, 373 Prophet of Islam, 235, 236 Protestantism, 32, 125 Purgatory, 32, 35, 101, 259 Q Quarantine, 304 Quiapo, Manila, 295, 304–320 Quran, 61, 62, 88, 111, 229, 231, 232, 234, 235, 238–240, 348 R Rahner, Karl, 7, 340, 342 Ramayana, 7, 378, 380–382, 384, 387, 389 Rebirth, 4, 19, 20, 29–31, 34, 94, 96, 98, 101, 102, 248, 253–255, 257, 274, 277, 280, 281, 283, 284, 288, 379, 380 Reincarnation, 19, 20, 26–36 Religious diversity, 6, 7, 340, 341, 348, 349, 353–358, 360–363 Religious exclusivism, 7, 340–342, 354, 356, 358, 363 Religious inclusivism, 340, 342 Religious pluralism, 348, 349 Religious tolerance, 7, 354, 356–358 Religious transcendence, 332, 360 Rizal, Jose, 7, 108, 113, 114, 159, 366–369, 373 Roman Catholic, 6, 42, 82, 109, 115, 152, 294, 338 Roman Gods, 114

Index S Said, Edward, 153, 192 Sákop, 5, 152–155, 157–159, 163, 164 Samsara, 19, 22, 101, 333, 340, 379, 380 Scrupulosity, 6, 260, 261, 264, 265, 267–269 Sea battle argument, 90 Secularism, 4, 94, 96, 97, 100, 293 Shamanism, 32, 35, 182, 184, 186 Silk Road, 228 Slums, 294–298, 300 Socially engaged Buddhism, 99, 100 Socrates, 120–122, 124, 383 Soteriology, 5, 370 Soul, 1, 2, 4, 19, 20, 28, 31–34, 36, 65–67, 122, 123, 145, 156, 168, 170, 173, 177, 178, 249, 250, 255, 338, 388 Southeast Asia, 2, 3, 5, 7, 26, 53, 109, 111, 113, 130, 131, 227, 228, 241, 338, 346, 348, 366 South Korea, 3, 27, 32, 33, 35, 36 Spanish, 7, 82, 107–113, 115, 120, 136, 153–155, 163, 181, 188, 190, 213, 214, 216, 316, 337, 365–371, 373 Spinoza, 3, 12–19, 21–23 Sri Lanka, 252, 338 Sufism, Sufi, 228, 232 Suicide, 28, 29, 35, 36 Superstition, 6, 109, 126, 223, 248–251, 253, 254, 326 T Tabataba’i, Allamah, 60 Tagalog, 4, 81, 82, 107–110, 112–116, 120, 124, 126–131, 169, 187, 201, 313, 316, 319 Tawi-Tawi, 228, 230 Thailand, 2, 4, 95, 228, 231, 252, 260, 274, 275, 330, 335 The body, 3, 6, 14–18, 20, 22, 129, 145, 189, 190, 249, 256, 282, 283, 294, 295, 297–300 The Doctrine of Salvation, 366, 373 Theistic philosophy of law, 11 The meaning of life, 326, 333 Therav¯ada Buddhism, 252, 262, 265, 275, 279 Tibetan Buddhism, 32 Transmigration, 30 Traslacion, 297, 299, 300, 311–313, 317

Index U

395 V Vajrayana, 100, 248

Unity of God, 59, 60 ‘Urf , 232

W Weltanschauung, 120–122, 124